Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947 [1 ed.] 0199458324, 9780199458325

Table of contents :
acprof-9780199458325-miscMatter-1
Title Pages
Sumit Ganguly
Title Pages
(p.i) Engaging the World (p.ii) (p.iii) Engaging the World
Title Pages
acprof-9780199458325-miscMatter-4
Dedication
Sumit Ganguly
Dedication
acprof-9780199458325-miscMatter-6
(p.xi) Tables and Figure
Sumit Ganguly
(p.xi) Tables and Figure
Tables
Figure
acprof-9780199458325-miscMatter-7
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
Sumit Ganguly
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
(p.xiii) Abbreviations
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-1
Introduction
Sumit Ganguly
Introduction
Sumit Ganguly
Nicolas Blarel
Abstract and Keywords
Introduction
The Contributions of this Book
Introduction
Introduction
India’s Foreign Policy from 1947 to 2015
The First Phase (1947–64)
Introduction
The Second Phase (1964–91)
Introduction
The Third Phase (1991–2015)
Introduction
Introduction
Incomplete Transformation
Organization of the Volume
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Notes:
Introduction
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-2
India–Pakistan Relations
Sumit Ganguly
India–Pakistan Relations
Between War and Peace
Rajesh Basrur
Abstract and Keywords
India–Pakistan Relations
Structure and Process at the System Level
Strong State versus Weak State
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
Systemic Change and Its Effects
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
Economic Factors
India–Pakistan Relations
The Role of Power
India–Pakistan Relations
Identity and Politics at the State Level
India–Pakistan Relations
Kashmir and Identity
India–Pakistan Relations
Domestic Politics
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
Toward a Democratic Peace?
India–Pakistan Relations
Individuals and Leadership
Early Leaderships
India–Pakistan Relations
New Millennium Leaderships
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
Notes:
India–Pakistan Relations
India–Pakistan Relations
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-3
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Sumit Ganguly
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, or Something More Complex?
Eswaran Sridharan
Abstract and Keywords
Historical Background
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
The Deterioration of Relations from the Early 1980s
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Understanding the Nature and Motivations of the Intervention
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations 1991–2009: Post-IPKF, Post-assassination, Post-Cold War
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations after the LTTE: 2009 to 2015
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
(p.68) Interpreting the Motivations behind India’s Sri Lanka Policy
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Notes:
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-4
India–Bangladesh Relations
Sumit Ganguly
India–Bangladesh Relations
An Overview
Shibashis Chatterjee
Abstract and Keywords
India–Bangladesh Relations
Early Years
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
Contemporary Issues
Water
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
Boundary and Border Conflict
India–Bangladesh Relations
Migration and Islamist Militancy
India–Bangladesh Relations
(p.85) Trade and Transit
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
Three Levels of Analysis
Personalities
India–Bangladesh Relations
The Regional/International
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
The Domestic Level
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
Notes:
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
India–Bangladesh Relations
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-5
India–Afghanistan Relations
Sumit Ganguly
India–Afghanistan Relations
Rani D. Mullen
Abstract and Keywords
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
Historical Background
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
Structural Factors
No Common Border after Independence
Close Relations during Most of the Cold War
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
The End of the Cold War
India–Afghanistan Relations
Re-alignment after 9/11 and India’s Rising Power
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
Domestic Factors
Widespread Political Support
India–Afghanistan Relations
Domestic Security Concerns Crystallize with the 1999 Hijacking of an Indian Plane
India–Afghanistan Relations
Access to Natural Resources
India–Afghanistan Relations
Access to Potential Markets
India–Afghanistan Relations
Individual Factors
(p.122) Mahatma Gandhi and ‘Frontier Gandhi’
India–Afghanistan Relations
Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi: Little Leadership during the Cold War Years
India–Afghanistan Relations
Manmohan Singh and Hamid Karzai
India–Afghanistan Relations
Narendra Modi and Ashraf Ghani (as well as Abdullah Abdullah)
Future Prospects for India’s Relationship with Afghanistan
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
India–Afghanistan Relations
Notes:
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-6
The Indo-US Entente
Sumit Ganguly
The Indo-US Entente
Committed Relationship or ‘Friends with Benefits’?
Devin T. Hagerty
Abstract and Keywords
The Indo-US Entente
The Third Image: The International System
The Indo-US Entente
(p.136) Historical Background
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Second Image: Indo-US Relations since 2009
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente: Analysis and Forecast
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
Notes:
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
The Indo-US Entente
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-7
India’s China Policy
Sumit Ganguly
India’s China Policy
Manjeet S. Pardesi
Abstract and Keywords
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
Tibet and the China/Tibet–India Border (1947–59)
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
The Run-Up to the War (1959–62)
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India–China Relations and Balance of Power Politics (1962–88)
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India–China Relations since 1988
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
Notes:
India’s China Policy
India’s China Policy
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-8
India and Russia
Sumit Ganguly
India and Russia
A Special Relationship?
Vidya Nadkarni
Abstract and Keywords
India and Russia
History: Constants, Variables, and Context
India and Russia
The Historical Context
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
Policy Convergences and Divergences
The Defence Relationship
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
Trade and Investment Links
India and Russia
India and Russia
(p.210) Political-Strategic Issues
Kashmir
India and Russia
The Nuclear Issue
India and Russia
Terrorism
India and Russia
UNSC Membership
The Pakistan Factor
India and Russia
The Play of Individual, State, and System Levels
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
India and Russia
Notes:
India and Russia
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-9
India and the United Kingdom
Sumit Ganguly
India and the United Kingdom
Finding a New Equilibrium
Andrew Wyatt
Abstract and Keywords
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
Historical Context
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
The Loosening of Ties between India and Britain, 1965–91
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
Convergence of Interests at the National Level since 1991
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
India and the United Kingdom
Notes:
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-10
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
A Strategic Partnership First
Jean-Luc Racine
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
The Systemic Framework of the Indo-French Relationship
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
The National Level Factors: History and Contents of the Bilateral Relationship
The Background: 1947–98
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
The Turning Point in 1998
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
The Contents of the Relationship: Diplomacy and Defence, But Not Only These
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Defence Contracts and Cooperation: A Long Tradition Intensified
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Nuclear Energy and Space: The Technology Parameter
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Investment and Trade: The Need for Expansion
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Soft Power and Bilateral Diplomacy
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Leaders and Decision Making: Individuals and Beyond
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
Notes:
India’s Foreign Policy toward France
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-11
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
An Entrepreneurial Partnership
Hannes Ebert
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Germany Policy in Retrospect
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India and the ‘German Question’, 1947–72
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Pragmatic Indian Leadership: Withstanding Adenauer’s Mistrust
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Economic Self-Interest and Hedging on German Angst
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Stretching the Limits of Non-Alignment
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Recognition and Benign Neglect, 1972–89
Chancellors Kiesinger and Brandt: Friends of India
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Domestic Pressure Groups and Economic Stagnation
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Two Wars and a Tilt toward the Eastern Bloc
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Strategic Partnership among Trade Powers, 1988–2015
Pragmatic Indian Leadership Free from Historical Baggage
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Economic Liberalization and the Fall of the Berlin Wall
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Reforming the International Order
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
(p.290) Prospects of India’s Germany Policy
Individual Continuity and Leadership beyond Pragmatism
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
A Pragmatic Joint Venture: Making India’s Germany Policy Resilient to Economic Crises
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Shaping Globalization in a Contested World Order
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
Notes:
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
India’s Germany Policy since 1947
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-12
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Manjeet S. Pardesi
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Historical Links
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Nehru and India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India and Korea (1947–54)
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India and Japan (1951–66)
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Estrangement with Japan and South Korea
Indo-Japanese Relations until the End of the Cold War
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with South Korea until the End of the Cold War
The End of the Cold War and the Beginning of India’s Engagement with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Economic Relations
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Strategic Relations
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
Notes:
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-13
India and Southeast Asia
Sumit Ganguly
India and Southeast Asia
Whither India’s Strategic Engagement with ASEAN?
Isabelle de Saint-Mézard
Abstract and Keywords
India and Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
Reconnecting with Southeast Asia in the 1990s
Shaping the LEP: The Importance of the Individual Level of Analysis
The Foundational Vision of Narasimha Rao
India and Southeast Asia
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s Support
India and Southeast Asia
The State Level of Analysis: The Domestic Underpinnings of India’s LEP
India’s Economic Liberalization
India and Southeast Asia
Security and Development Challenges in the Northeast
A Nascent Military Diplomacy
India and Southeast Asia
At the Systemic Level: A Favourable Regional Context for the LEP
The Fear of a Power Vacuum in Southeast Asia
(p.334) New Institutional Links between India and ASEAN
India and Southeast Asia
India’s Rising Profile in Southeast Asia since the Late 1990s
At the Leadership Level: A Consensual Policy, but with Nuances in Interpretation
India and Southeast Asia
At the National Level: Growing Confidence and Ambition
An Emerging Economic Powerhouse in Asia
India and Southeast Asia
India’s Strategic Ambitions in Asia
India and Southeast Asia
At the Regional Level: A Quest for a Security Architecture in East Asia
India as Part of Southeast Asia’s Hedging Strategies against China
India and Southeast Asia
India’s Contribution to Regional Security Structures
India and Southeast Asia
(p.341) Mounting Challenges in India’s Engagement with Southeast Asia
At the Personal Level: A Lack of Focus under UPA II
India and Southeast Asia
At the National Level: Enduring Domestic Constraints
Entrenched Domestic Interests
A Lack of ‘Physical Connectivity’ with Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
At the Systemic Level: A Climate of Heightened Tensions in Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
Growing Security Uncertainties in Southeast Asia
India’s Hesitations on the South China Sea Disputes
India and Southeast Asia
India’s China Problems
India and Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
India and Southeast Asia
Notes:
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-14
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
Sumit Ganguly
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Evolution of India–Israel Relations (1947–2012)
Nicolas Blarel
Abstract and Keywords
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
(p.354) Historical Background
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
(p.358) International Factors
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
National Factors
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
Individual-Level Factors
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
Notes:
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name?
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-15
India and Latin America
Sumit Ganguly
India and Latin America
Distant Acquaintance, Rhetorical Solidarity, Strategic Engagement
Varun Sahni
Abstract and Keywords
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
(p.377) Distant Acquaintance: Nehru’s Worldview and the Missing Continent
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
Case Study 1: Kashmir Issue and Latin American Voting in the UN Security Council
India and Latin America
Rhetorical Solidarity: Socialist India and Nonaligned Revisionism
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
Case Study 2: The Curious Episode of ‘Khalistan’ in Ecuador
India and Latin America
Strategic Engagement: Systemic Dynamics and the Emergence of India and Brazil
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
Case Study 3: The Displacement of IBSA by BRICS
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
Notes:
India and Latin America
India and Latin America
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-16
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Rani D. Mullen
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
History up to Independence in 1947
The Systemic Factor of Colonialism
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Domestic Factors
(p.403) Individual-Level Factors
Mohandas K. Gandhi
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Jawarharlal Nehru
(p.404) India’s Policy towards Africa: 1947 to the Early 1990s
Systemic Factors: Decolonization of Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement
Supporting the Decolonization of Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
The Non-Aligned Movement
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
(p.408) Domestic Factors Influencing Indian Foreign Policy towards Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
(p.409) Individual-Level Factors
Continued Influence of Nehru until 1964
Indira Gandhi and the Declining Influence of Individuals in Determining Indian Foreign Policy towards Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India and Africa Since the Early 1990s
Systemic Factors Influencing the Indo-African Relationship
The Geopolitical Realignment
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic Motivations
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Domestic Factors Driving Indian Interest in Africa
Enhancing Energy Security
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic Diplomacy: Finding New Markets for Indian Goods and Services
Security Concerns Lead to Closer Collaboration with Eastern Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Declining Individual Factors in the Indo-African Relationship since the 1990s
Prospects for the Future of India’s Relationship with Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Notes:
India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-17
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Sumit Ganguly
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Dinshaw Mistry
Abstract and Keywords
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Multiple Sources of Energy and Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Oil
Phases One and Two: Western Oil Firms, the Soviet Union, and Middle Eastern States
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
The Third Phase: Changing Suppliers and Oil Asset Acquisitions
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
(p.435) Gas
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Liquefied Natural Gas
Gas Pipelines via Iran–Pakistan, Myanmar–Bangladesh, and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Shale Gas
Nuclear Energy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
The First Phase: Civilian Nuclear Reactor Imports
The Second Phase: The Cessation of Imports with Minor Exceptions
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
The Third Phase: The Revival of Nuclear Energy Imports
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Notes:
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-18
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Vipin Narang
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Phase I: Creep (1948–89)
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Phase II: Confusion (1989–2003)
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Phase III: Consolidation (2003–15)
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
Notes:
India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
acprof-9780199458325-chapter-19
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Sumit Ganguly
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Rahul Mukherji
Abstract and Keywords
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
The Causes and Phases of India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Limited Globalization, 1947–66
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
The Anti-globalization Phase, 1967–75
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Halting Globalization, 1975–90
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Globalization as Embedded Liberalism, 1991 and Beyond
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Aid Diplomacy
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
Notes:
India’s Foreign Economic Policies
acprof-9780199458325-indexList-1
(p.496) Index
Sumit Ganguly
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
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(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
(p.496) Index
acprof-9780199458325-miscMatter-8
(p.521) Editor and Contributors
Sumit Ganguly
(p.521) Editor and Contributors
(p.521) Editor and Contributors

Citation preview

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Abbreviations Btu British thermal unit CCP Chinese Communist Party CECA Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean States CEO chief executive officer CFA Ceasefire Agreement CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts CIA Central Intelligence Agency CII Confederation of Indian Industry CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam DoD Department of Defense DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus (p.xiv) EAS East Asia Summit ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EPR evolutionary power reactor EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front EU European Union FDI foreign direct investment FGR Federal Republic of Germany Page 2 of 6

Abbreviations FTA free trade agreement GDP gross domestic product GDR German Democratic Republic GNP gross national product GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company HUJI Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami IBSA India–Brazil–South Africa IMDT Illegal Migration Detection by Tribunal IMF International Monetary Fund INC Indian National Congress IOR Indian Ocean Region IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISLA India–Sri Lanka Accord ISRO Indian Space and Research Organization IT information technology ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (Programme) ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor JWG Joint Working Group LEP ‘Look East’ policy LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LNG liquefied natural gas Page 3 of 6

Abbreviations LoC Line of Control LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MDMK Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam MFN Most Favoured Nation MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle MoU Memorandum of Understanding MP Member of Parliament MTA multi-role transport aircraft (p.xv) MTOE million tons of oil equivalent NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDA National Democratic Alliance NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NPC Northern Provincial Council NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NSSP Next Steps in Strategic Partnership ODA official development assistance OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference ONGC Oil and Natural Gas Corporation OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Page 4 of 6

Abbreviations OVL ONGC Videsh Ltd PLA People’s Liberation Army PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PNE peaceful nuclear explosion POW prisoner of war PPP Pakistan People’s Party PRC People’s Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SARAL Satellite for Argos-3 and Altika SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal SFC Strategic Forces Command SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile SSBN ship submersible ballistic nuclear SSTL Sistema Shyam TeleServices TAPI Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India TEAM-9 Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations Human Rights Council Page 5 of 6

Abbreviations (p.xvi) UNP United National Party UNSC United Nations Security Council UNTCOK United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea UPA United Progressive Alliance UPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance US United States

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Introduction accepted as a legitimate member of the international nuclear club (Pant 2011; Rachman 2008). Finally, in a 2010 trip to India, President Barack Obama of the United States acknowledged in a speech to the Indian Parliament that India was ‘not simply emerging; India had emerged’ as a world power, and offered qualified support for its bid for a United Nations Security Council seat (Stolberg and Yardley 2010). However, in spite of these changes in India’s material capabilities, the study of India’s external relations has attracted much less attention than the rise of China. To bridge this gap, this book aims to explain the evolution of India’s foreign relations from 1947 to the present day as international, domestic, and individual circumstances have evolved. This introduction is divided in three sections. First, there is a discussion of the empirical and theoretical contributions of this book to the extant literature on India’s foreign policy. Second, there is an analysis of the evolution of India’s foreign policy from 1947 to 2015 through (p.2) changes in systemic, national, and individual factors. Third, there is a presentation of the structure of the book which, in turn, is divided into five parts.

The Contributions of this Book This volume seeks to provide a comprehensive account of India’s foreign relations since its independence in 1947. Over the last decade, both foreign and Indian scholars have attempted to provide a historical and wide-ranging overview of India’s international relations (Bajpai and Pant 2013; Bajpai et al. 2014; Cohen 2001; Ganguly 2003; Jain 2008; A. Kapur 2006; H. Kapur 2009; Malone 2011; Malone et al. 2015; Nayar and Paul 2003; Pant 2008; Raja Mohan 2003; Rothermund 2009; Scott 2011; Sikri 2009; Sinha and Mohta 2007). However, many of these existing surveys are uneven in their historical and regional breadth. In addition, some of these works are collections that combine historical and contemporary essays which are not always connected by a general and consistent research question and/or theoretical logic. Although there are chapters, essays, and articles of great quality and relevance within these existing books, there is an absence of a common framework undergirding them. The absence of a shared theoretical framework makes it difficult to effectively compare the evolution of India’s different bilateral relationships. Existing volumes are therefore less comparative studies than collections of essays on Indian foreign policy. The key objective of this book is to provide the most well-informed, complete, and critical analysis of India’s external relations. It draws on a variety of experts from India, the US, Singapore, and Europe who are recognized authorities on the particular relationships and policies discussed in this work. This overview includes chapters on India’s relations with its neighbours (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) as well as with the great powers (US, China, and Russia). It also includes chapters on India’s Africa and Latin America policy, and on India’s relations with France, the UK, and Germany, which have traditionally been Page 2 of 16

Introduction neglected in the extant literature. Despite every effort to cover all of the country’s principal bilateral ties, there are some lacunae. Nevertheless, this volume attempts to address more regions of the world and a great array of India’s key relationships. It also contains updated chapters on (p.3) the origins, evolution, and direction of the country’s foreign economic policy, its energy policy, and its nuclear weapons policy. One other novel contribution of the book is theoretical. A successful survey of India’s foreign policy requires an organizing framework that helps to make sense of its foreign relations. The use of a common theoretical framework helps compare the driving forces that structure India’s bilateral relationships and policies. In this book, we propose to use the ‘level of analysis’ framework to explain the evolution of bilateral relations with a host of countries. The first use of this approach came from Kenneth Waltz (1959), who identified three ‘images’ or sources of causation associated with the individual, the nation-state, and the international system. Singer (1961) then redefined the ‘images’ as the ‘levels’ of analysis. The individual or decision-making level of analysis concentrates on the pivotal role played by particular political leaders of a state in shaping foreign policy decisions. The individual level takes into account individual-level factors such as belief systems, personalities, psychological processes, political socialization, learning from history, and management styles. For instance, many have argued that India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the primary architect of India’s foreign policy from 1947 to 1964 (Bandyopadhyaya 1970; Cohen 2001; Kennedy 2012; Mittchell 2007; Schottli 2012). The domestic level of analysis includes both state and societal factors. By state factors, we refer to institutional variables like the structure of the political system and the features of the policy-making process. Societal factors can be the structure of the economic system, the lobbying influence of economic and of other non-economic interest groups, the role of public opinion, and/or the influence of political culture and ideology. For instance, what can the characteristics of India’s democratic institutions tell us about its foreign policy? Can India’s political culture help us understand how it deals with certain nations? Do certain socio-economic or ethnic groups support India’s engagement of the US or other partners? Each of these factors can be interpreted as domestic-level variables. International or systemic-level variables, which are traditionally linked with the realist tradition in international relations theory, include the structure of the international system, the number of major powers in the system, the distribution of military and economic power among (p.4) them, and the pattern of alliances. For instance, most authors in this book have shown how the Cold War and the bipolar world order constrained India’s external behaviour until the early 1990s. Page 3 of 16

Introduction By contrast, some have also argued that the systemic changes in the early 1990s created favourable structural conditions for India to engage with international actors and regions it had previously neglected, such as the US, Israel, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. Building on these concepts and units of analysis, we argue that the level of analysis framework is useful to identify and measure the influence of various causal factors shaping India’s foreign policies and actions.3 Accordingly, all the chapters adhere to the three-level framework. However, it is also evident that in some cases, in the judgement of the author, a particular level provides greater explanatory purchase. This is hardly surprising because, on occasion, despite systemic constraints, a state may act more in accord with the imperatives of its domestic politics, or according to the perceptions and/or preferences of a particular leader. As a result, the book offers the first systematic attempt to study the full extent of India’s external relations through a logical and consistent theoretical framework. It is also an empirical contribution to the larger theoretical debates about the relevance of the level of analysis approach to studying foreign policy behaviour.

India’s Foreign Policy from 1947 to 2015 Though particular authors may differ on matters of nuance and emphasis, this collection is based on the assumption that post-independence India’s foreign policy can be divided into three broad periods. The first began with independence and lasted until about 1962. A second phase started in 1964 and lasted until about 1991. The latest phase began in 1991 and, despite some shifts, mostly holds to the present day. Each of these phases and their characteristics at systemic, national, and individual/decision-making levels needs discussion. The First Phase (1947–64)

In the first phase, under the towering influence of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the country sought to disregard systemic constraints and pursue an ideational foreign policy. Nehru was passionately (p.5) committed to keeping defence expenditures constrained and wanted to focus the country’s resources and efforts toward economic development. In the absence of colleagues with much knowledge of foreign affairs, he was able to make critical decisions in India’s foreign policy, largely unhampered by other domestic constraints. He also sought to steer a course away from the titanic ideological superpower struggle and pursue a policy of nonalignment. In practice, this policy sought to hobble the use of force in international affairs, promote universal nuclear disarmament, end colonial rule elsewhere, and reduce global economic inequities. Nehru was perhaps most successful in his efforts to delegitimize the colonial enterprise and achieved modest success in the other areas, most notably in that of disarmament. It is little known, for example, that

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Introduction his early campaign for nuclear disarmament helped contribute to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (Tannenwald 2008). This initial phase came to a close with the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962. In the aftermath of the war, the prime minister was a broken man, there was a dramatic national backlash against the policies that he and his minister of defence, Krishna Menon, had pursued toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and nonalignment came under considerable duress. Owing to Cold War concerns about Communist expansion, the United States provided limited military assistance to India to bolster its capabilities. However, the bipolar systemic structure, in which Pakistan constituted an important US ally, placed significant constraints on the American willingness to provide substantial assistance to India (Haqqani 2013). The Second Phase (1964–91)

Nehru died in 1964, and Lal Bahadur Shastri, an unassuming member of the then dominant Congress Party, succeeded him in office. Though there were no major systemic shifts during this time, at the national and decision-making levels, the changes in India’s security policy proved to be quite sweeping. Shastri’s knowledge of international affairs was limited, he lacked Nehru’s cosmopolitan outlook, and certainly did not possess his erudition. Nevertheless, during his brief span at the helm of India’s national affairs, he proved to be an able and thoughtful leader. He not only demonstrated his mettle during the 1965 IndoPakistani conflict, (p.6) but also handled the aftermath of the 1964 Chinese nuclear test with dexterity. Shortly before his demise, Shastri initiated the Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project. This effort culminated in the first Indian nuclear test of 1974 (Ganguly 1983). Shastri died after negotiating the Tashkent Agreement of 1966, in the wake of the second India–Pakistan conflict. This accord not only restored the status quo ante but also committed the two states to abjure from the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute. Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, became the prime minister following Shastri’s death. It is well known that Congress stalwarts had seen her mostly as a placeholder, and did not expect her to demonstrate any independence of mind. These expectations, however, were soon proven to be quite erroneous. Indira Gandhi proved to be a decisive leader in the realms of both domestic and foreign policy (Mansingh 1984). While she proved capable of making tough decisions on a host of issues, her tenure in office also witnessed the steady erosion of a range of political institutions at the national level (Brass 1994). Policy making became increasingly personalized, with few meaningful institutional checks on the exercise of her power. Though she flirted with socialist ideas at home, her foreign policy lacked a clear-cut ideological cast. The country continued to publicly espouse many of Nehru’s ideas in the realm of Page 5 of 16

Introduction foreign policy, but for all practical purposes it abandoned his ideational commitments. Owing to the exigencies of global politics, India moved closer to the USSR, especially after the signing of a treaty in 1971 during the East Pakistan crisis (Horn 1982). Again, systemic pressures, especially the renewal of a US military relationship with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led the country to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union for military assistance (Singh 1984). Indeed, this period until the end of the Cold War can well be considered to be one of strategic dependence despite the continued professions of India’s adherence to the principles of nonalignment. Until the Cold War’s end, India’s foreign policy remained an odd amalgam of ideational rhetoric and increasing pursuit of the country’s material interests. As a minor thaw took place in the Cold War with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the country’s policy underwent limited readjustments under Indira Gandhi’s son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi. At the end of his term in office, when a (p.7) series of coalition governments ruled the country, these incremental adjustments continued. However, it was not until the end of the Cold War that some fundamental changes took place in the country’s foreign policy orientation. The Third Phase (1991–2015)

Few, if any, of India’s decision-makers had anticipated the end of the Cold War. Consequently, they were forced to make a set of significant changes as they reexamined and reassessed a set of key assumptions on which the nation’s foreign policy had been based. One of these, of course, was the formal commitment to nonalignment. Despite efforts to infuse it with new meaning, for all practical purposes, the concept was moribund (Ganguly 1992). This endeavour aside, India’s decision-makers, confronted with the Soviet demise and a fundamental systemic shift of power, did move with both alacrity and dexterity to change the country’s foreign policy (Ganguly 2003–4). Despite their limitations, India’s national institutions proved responsive to the directives of India’s policy-makers, albeit at differing paces of adaptation. Apart from the Soviet collapse, an unprecedented fiscal crisis at home, which virtually coincided with the Cold War’s end, hastened changes in the country’s foreign policy. The immediate precipitant of change was a combination of parlous domestic fiscal circumstances which were exacerbated as a consequence of a dramatic exogenous shock stemming from the First Gulf War of 1991 (Ganguly 1991). Confronted with a dire economic crisis, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in conjunction with his Minister of Finance, Manmohan Singh, chose to fundamentally abandon the economic paradigm that had undergirded the country’s foreign and domestic policies. It involved moving from a mostly closed and state-driven model of economic development to one based upon greater external openness and a limited embrace of the market at home. This shift, of course, necessitated concomitant changes in India’s foreign policy, and Page 6 of 16

Introduction especially its ties to the United States, which had emerged as the dominant systemic power. Despite an Indian willingness to open a new chapter in its relations with the US, two issues continued to dog the bilateral relationship. The two countries found themselves at odds on matters related to nonproliferation and human rights. The first obviously involved India’s refusal (p.8) to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (and later the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]). The second stemmed from India’s problematic human rights record in prosecuting the insurgency in Kashmir. In considerable part, these irritants surfaced in the bilateral relationship owing to the paucity of ties, whether at decision-making, national, or systemic levels, with the United States. Ironically, it was India’s steadfast refusal to sign the CTBT (even after initially co-sponsoring it with the US) and its subsequent decision to test nuclear weapons in May 1998 that contributed to a steady transformation of the Indo-US relationship. Though India made no concessions to the US, the two sides developed a degree of understanding for each other’s concerns.4 In the 1990s, especially under the National Democratic Alliance government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, the country pursued a mostly pragmatic foreign policy and even sought to improve relations with its long-standing adversary, Pakistan. The efforts, however, were thwarted to a great extent owing to Pakistan’s continued support for terror in Indian-controlled Kashmir and elsewhere. Matters deteriorated further after a Pakistani incursion into the Kargil region of Indian-administered Kashmir precipitated the fourth IndoPakistani conflict in 1999. Despite being caught unaware, a swift and decisive Indian reaction brought this conflict to a close and a Pakistani military withdrawal from all occupied sites. Even after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and Pakistan’s formal renunciation of its ties with the Taliban, Pakistan’s terrorist activities against India continued apace. An attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 in fact precipitated a major crisis and resulted in an Indian attempt at coercive diplomacy to induce Pakistan to eschew its support for terror. The results of this endeavour were inconclusive at best, largely because of Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons (Ganguly and Kraig 2005). Subsequently, India did initiate a ‘composite dialogue’ with Pakistan, and it made some progress toward the resolution of a series of outstanding issues (Cohen et al. 2007). However, domestic factors combined with a leadership change in Pakistan, specifically the ouster of General Pervez Musharraf in 2007, brought it mostly to a close. The coup de grâce to the process, for all practical purposes, came in the aftermath of the attack by elements of the Lashkar-e-Taiba on a

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Introduction number of sites in Mumbai, including the iconic Taj Hotel (Scott-Clark and Levy 2013). (p.9) In the second decade of the twenty-first century, as India’s economic growth continued to flourish, its ties with the United States, Western Europe, and many of the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia expanded. The Sino-Indian relationship, however, despite a range of discussions, remained fraught as little or no progress was made toward the resolution of the border dispute. Furthermore, the PRC looked askance toward the expansion of Indo-US ties, especially in the military realm. Incomplete Transformation

Despite the shift toward a more pragmatic foreign policy, changes in Indian domestic politics, combined with leadership changes at the national level, elements of the past’s emphasis on an ideational approach to foreign policy remained. This was evident from the publication of a document in 2012 (Khilnani et al. 2012). The document, though not a formal statement of foreign policy goals and objectives, nevertheless had a quasi-official ring to it. The curious feature of the document, however, was that it represented an amalgam of differing views. Some sections displayed a remarkable pragmatism on various foreign policy matters while others were clearly a throwback to an earlier era (Ganguly 2012). Its contents and India’s continuing inability to place its relations with the US on a firm footing, an awareness of how best to handle the power of a resurgent PRC, and its stances on critical global regimes such as climate change, global trade, and questions of humanitarian intervention, all suggest that there is still an ongoing national debate about forging a consensus on these critical issues. How the emergent leadership within the country fashions responses to these issues will, in considerable measure, shape the future of the country’s foreign policy.5

Organization of the Volume The chapters in this volume use the level of analysis framework sketched out in this brief introduction to assess the evolution of India’s foreign policy from 1947 to the present day. The volume is divided into five distinct sections. The first section deals with India’s relations with the bulk of its immediate neighbours; the second with several key states in the international order; the third section with three major Western European countries; the fourth section with countries and regions that (p.10) lie athwart India; and finally the fifth section addresses the country’s nuclear, economic, and energy policies. In Chapter 1, which begins the first part, Rajesh Basrur traces the origins of India–Pakistan discord. He then proceeds to provide a discussion of how the relationship has evolved over the past sixty years and identifies key turning points. He concludes his analysis with a discussion of possible external and domestic factors which may help to ameliorate the relationship in the future. In Page 8 of 16

Introduction Chapter 2, Eswaran Sridharan analyses the evolution of India’s Sri Lanka policy and its drivers in terms of the systemic, domestic, and personal levels of analysis. While all three factors have played a role, he argues that domestic politics, and more specifically the role of state governments and ethnic minorities in the Indian polity, have been the most significant factor in shaping India’s foreign policy. In Chapter 3, Shibashis Chatterjee discusses the fraught Indo-Bangladeshi relationship. Similar to Sridharan in the previous chapter, Chatterjee advances the argument that domestic politics are the key driver of India–Bangladesh relations. His chapter surveys the major issues that have divided the two nations in contemporary times, including water, boundaries, migration, religious extremism, terrorism, transit, and economic disputes. In Chapter 4, Rani D. Mullen discusses the evolution of India’s engagement in Afghanistan. Mullen provides a detailed and nuanced interpretation of India’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan which takes into account the historical basis of the Indian–Afghan bilateral relationship and the geopolitical, regional, economic, and domestic political factors driving India’s policy over time. She concludes that India’s relationship with Afghanistan will be one of India’s key bilateral relationships in the twenty-first century because it will define how India manages to navigate its growing regional as well as global power, while addressing its growing domestic needs. In the second part, Devin T. Hagerty examines in Chapter 5 what is perhaps India’s most significant bilateral relationship, namely, that with the US. Hagerty’s main argument is that India wants to be treated like an ally of the US without becoming formally allied with Washington. He arrives at this conclusion from an in-depth analysis of the nature of India’s domestic political institutions and the world view of Indian strategic elites, which are respectively domestic and individual-level explanations. In Chapter 6, Manjeet S. Pardesi explains the factors which have influenced India’s foreign and security policy towards China (p.11) since independence in 1947. Pardesi distinguishes four historical phases where individual, domestic, and international-level factors have played varying roles in shaping India’s policy towards its northern neighbour. As China and India rise through the international order, he concludes that structural factors are likely to remain the primary determinants of India’s policy towards China. In Chapter 7, Vidya Nadkarni discusses India’s evolving relationship with Russia, the principal successor state to the former Soviet Union. Nadkarni argues that India’s quest for strategic autonomy and its heavy dependence on Russian arms have been the primary drivers of India’s policy towards Moscow. As a result, unless international conditions evolve radically (for instance, an increasingly revisionist China could push India into an American embrace), she contends that the Indo-Russian relationship is unlikely to weaken in the short to medium term. In Chapter 8, which begins the third part of the book, Andrew Wyatt looks at India’s relationship with the United Kingdom, which remains unique because of the historical legacy of the British Empire. Wyatt argues that bilateral relations Page 9 of 16

Introduction between India and the UK have frequently been constructive. The chapter also shows that individual actors have at times contributed to effective cooperation between the states. However, Wyatt also concedes that there have been moments of sharp tension between India and the UK, and that there remain a number of unresolved issues. In Chapter 9, Jean-Luc Racine investigates the dynamics underlying India’s relationship with France, which he considers to be very different from the country’s partnerships with Germany and the UK. Racine explains that global politics, defence ties, and nuclear and space cooperation have historically shaped the bilateral relationship. Racine also argues that France is an interesting partner for Indian elites because it is strong enough to be able to offer tangible benefits (as in the defence and nuclear sectors), but not powerful enough to impose diplomatic pressure on India’s strategic preferences. In Chapter 10, Hannes Ebert analyses India’s relations with Germany. Ebert argues that Germany has traditionally played an ambiguous role in India’s foreign policy and has been perceived primarily as an economic gateway to Europe. However, Ebert argues that international factors have gradually encouraged India to take steps to transform this narrow and equivocal engagement into a more strategic partnership. (p.12) In Chapter 11, which begins the fourth part, Manjeet S. Pardesi studies the evolution of India’s relations with two important East Asian powers, Japan and South Korea. Pardesi argues that the structural exigencies of the Cold War and the closed nature of the Indian economy initially led to India’s estrangement from the Pacific economic powerhouses of Japan and South Korea, both of which in turn pursued a policy of benign neglect of India. He then shows how the combination of structural changes in the early 1990s, like the rise of China and India’s domestic economic reforms, reshaped India’s policies towards these states. In Chapter 12, Isabelle de Saint-Mézard analyses the evolution of India’s relations with Southeast Asia, and more specifically with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which was created in 1967. Saint-Mézard argues that the Cold War and India’s military defeat against China in 1962 limited India’s extra-regional ambitions and connections with Southeast Asia. She then argues that systemic changes in the early 1990s—the end of the Cold War, structural economic reforms at home, and the demise of the USSR—led India to launch its ‘Look-East Policy’, a multifaceted and well-publicized initiative aimed at reconnecting it with the region. In Chapter 13, Nicolas Blarel explains why the Indo-Israeli relationship was so slow to come to fruition during the first forty-odd years of their existence as independent states. He then proceeds to explain the rapprochement between the two countries that ensued after the end of the Cold War and then the Kargil War of 1999. This chapter then asserts that decisionmaking factors were decisive in explaining the emergence of a solid policy consensus to engage Israel as a military and technology supplier. In Chapter 14, Varun Sahni looks at one of the long-missing continents in India’s world view, Latin America. Sahni argues that India’s policy towards Latin America had first Page 10 of 16

Introduction been of distant acquaintance during the Nehru years, and then of rhetorical solidarity driven mostly by domestic considerations. He then observes a shift to strategic engagement in the last two decades which coincided with India’s emergence as a player with system-shaping potential. In Chapter 15, Rani D. Mullen deals with another region that Indian decisions-makers and scholars had long neglected, Sub-Saharan Africa. Mullen explains how the first links between India and the African continent were established during the anti-colonial struggle and then continued with India’s support for independence movements during the Cold War. She then argues that the opening of India’s economy in the (p.13) early 1990s, the need to secure natural resources as well as to access new markets for its goods and services, and the rivalry with China have now been guiding India’s dealings with African countries. In Chapter 16, which begins the fifth and final part of this volume, Dinshaw Mistry discusses India’s international energy policies. Mistry shows how India, an acutely energy-short state, has fashioned various diplomatic strategies to guarantee its energy security over time in the context of shifting international and regional conditions. He also underscores India’s increased attempts to secure hydrocarbon supplies and civilian nuclear imports in an era of rapid economic growth. In Chapter 17, Vipin Narang discusses the evolution of India’s nuclear policies. Narang argues that structural constraints certainly provided the broad parameters within which India’s nuclear weapons policy operated and pushed towards nuclearization, but it is primarily domestic organizations and individuals that have driven the timing of the turning points in India’s evolution as a nuclear weapons power. Since the early 2000s, Narang believes, India has entered the consolidation phase of its nuclear weapons programme, establishing the capabilities, organizations, and procedures to manage its nuclear forces and operationalize it toward what it terms ‘credible minimum deterrence’. Finally, in Chapter 18, Rahul Mukherji provides an account of the evolution of India’s foreign economic policies from the era of import-substituting industrialization to the present circumstances of economic liberalization. In tracing this evolution, Mukherji argues that the domestic and the international levels of analysis were the principal drivers of India’s economic policies, and he identifies key turning points and significant epochs in India’s foreign economic policy-making process. It is important to state forthrightly that the book has some lacunae. It does not have individual chapters on India’s relations with two other emerging powers, Brazil and South Africa. Since the last decade of the twentieth century, India has forged important relationships with these two key states in both regions. These relationships have contributed to an informal group referred to as India–Brazil– South Africa (IBSA).6 However, at this juncture, it is difficult to comment at substantial length on the workings of this emergent entity. Prior to the formation of this organization, India’s ties to either region were limited and ad hoc.

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Introduction Furthermore, unlike the first edition, this book now includes chapters on India’s relations with the two continents, Latin America and Africa. (p.14) However, there is no chapter on India’s relations with global multilateral institutions. The decision not to include such a chapter was also quite deliberate, albeit for different reasons. The theoretical framework utilized in this volume simply does not lend itself to an analysis of India’s policies toward multilateral institutions. References Bibliography references: Bajpai, K.P. and H.V. Pant, eds. 2013. India’s Foreign Policy: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Bajpai, K., S. Basit, and V. Krishnappa, eds. 2014. India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases (New Delhi: Routledge). (p.15) Bandyopadhyaya, J. 1970. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities (New Delhi: Allied Publishers). Brass, P.R. 1994. The Politics of India since Independence (2nd edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cohen, S. 2001. India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings University Press). Cohen, S.P., P.I. Cheema, and P.R. Chari. 2007. Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution). Ganguly, S. 1983. ‘Why India Joined the Nuclear Club’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 39, no. 4. ———. 1991. ‘Between Iraq and Hard Place: The Developing World and the New Oil Crisis’, International Executive, vol. 32, no. 4. ———. 1992. ‘South Asia after the Cold War’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4. ———. 1998. ‘India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of India’s Nuclear Weapons Program’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 4. ———. ed. 2003. India as an Emerging Power (London: Frank Cass).

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Introduction ———. 2003–2004. ‘India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up’, World Policy Journal, vol. 20, no. 4. ———. 2012. ‘India Urged Again to Pursue Nonalignment’, YaleGlobal Online, 26 March. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-urged-again-pursuenon-alignment (accessed 2 February 2015). Ganguly, S. and M. Kraig. 2005. ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy in South Asia’, Security Studies, vol. 14, no. 2. Gleditsch, N.P. and H. Hegre. 1997. ‘Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 2. Haqqani, H. 2013. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs). Horn, R. 1982. The Soviet–Indian Relationship: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger). Jain, B.M. 2008. Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2006 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books). Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Kapur, A. 2006. India: From Regional to World Power (New York: Routledge). Kapur, H. 2009. Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers (New Delhi: Lancer). Kennedy, A.B. 2012. The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru (New York: Cambridge University Press). Khilnani, S., R. Kumar, P.B. Mehta, P. Menon, N. Nilekani, S. Raghavan, S. Saran, and S. Varadarajan. 2012. Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic (p.16) Policy for India for the Twenty-First Century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research). Levy, J. and W. Thompson. 2010. Causes of War (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell). Malone, D. 2011. Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Malone, D., C. Raja Mohan, and S. Raghavan, eds. 2015. Oxford Handbook on Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Mansingh, S. 1984. India’s Quest for Power: Indira’s Gandhi’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage).

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Introduction Mittchell, D. 2007. ‘Determining Indian Foreign Policy: An Examination of Prime Ministerial Leadership Styles’, India Review, vol. 6, no. 4. Narlikar, A. 2006. ‘Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India’, International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1. Nayar, B.R. and T.V. Paul. 2003. India in the World Order: Searching for MajorPower Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Pant, H.V. 2008. Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). ———. 2011. The US–India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rachman, G. 2008. ‘Welcome to the Nuclear Club, India’, Financial Times, 22 September. Raja Mohan, C. 2003. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Viking). Rose, G, 1998. ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, vol. 51, no. 1. Rosenau, J.N. 1966. ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in R. B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), pp. 27–92. Rothermund, D. 2009. India: The Rise of an Asian Giant (New Haven: Yale University Press). Schottli, J. 2012. Vision and Strategy in Indian Politics: Jawaharlal Nehru’s Policy Choices and the Designing of Political Institutions (New York: Routledge). Scott, D., ed. 2011. Handbook of India’s International Relations (London: Routledge). Scott-Clark, C., and A. Levy. 2013. The Siege: 68 Hours inside the Taj Hotel (New York: Penguin Books). Sikri, R. 2009. Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage). Singer, J.D. 1961. ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations’, World Politics, vol. 14, no. 1.

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Introduction Singh, S.N. 1984. ‘Why India Goes to Moscow for Arms’, Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 7. (p.17) Sinha, A. and M. Mohta, eds. 2007. Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: Academic Foundation). Stolberg, S.G. and J. Yardley. 2010. ‘Countering China, Obama backs India for UN Council’, New York Times, 8 November. Talbott, S. 2004. Engaging India: Democracy, Diplomacy and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution). Tannenwald, N. 2008. The Nuclear Taboo: The US and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Waltz, K. 1959. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press). (p.18) Notes:

(1.) ‘India displaces Japan to become third-largest world economy in terms of PPP: World Bank’, Economic Times, 30 April. (2.) ‘Global defence budgets overall to rise for first time in five years’, IHS Jane’s Annual Defence Budgets Review, 4 February. Available at: http://press.ihs.com/ press-release/aerospace-defense-terrorism/global-defence-budgets-overall-risefirst-time-five-years#sthash.bNClxPWT.dpuf (accessed 2 February 2015). (3.) The ‘levels of analysis’ framework is not without its theoretical limits and detractors in the study of international relations. For instance, Rosenau (1966) disaggregated state and societal causal variables into two separate levels. Jervis (1976) introduced another level of decision making: the bureaucratic level of analysis. More recently, some have simplified the framework by opposing only two levels of causation, one internal to the state (innenpolitik) and one external (systemic factors). Finally, some have recently argued that the dyadic or interactional level of analysis might give more explanatory leverage to understand certain political phenomena. It is fair to assume that there is no single adequate level of analysis, but that for the purposes of our book, the three levels of analysis framework is a useful analytical template. See also Gleditsch and Hegre (1997); Levy and Thompson (2010); Rose (1998). (4.) On the transformation of the Indo-US relationship, see Talbott (2004); for a discussion of India’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons, see Ganguly (1998). (5.) On the matter of India’s negotiating strategy toward various global regimes, see Narlikar (2006).

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Introduction (6.) See, for example, the special issue on the foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world in Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 6.

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India–Pakistan Relations trajectory of the relationship. Though a positive outcome is hardly assured as yet, the trend is sufficiently encouraging to evoke expectations of better times. But the process is likely to remain a relatively uneven one.

Structure and Process at the System Level The term ‘international system’ is applied here to mean both the ‘structure’ of the system of interacting states (that is, the distribution of power in a system without a higher authority above states) and ‘process’ (day-to-day interactions among states). Both of these are analysed here at the (p.22) global as well as the regional levels.2 India and Pakistan are both relatively weak states in the global system (Paul 2010). In contrast, at the regional level, India is a major power, while Pakistan, though no mean contender, has always been much smaller in terms of size, population, economic strength, and military capabilities. As Mandelbaum (1988) shows, the strategies adopted by states are shaped by their relative positions in a system. First, strong states try and draw closer to their weaker counterparts by enhancing political and economic relationships with them in order to exploit opportunities to use their power advantage. In contrast, through a strategy of distancing or ‘moat building’, weak states seek to distance themselves politically and economically from strong states in order to reduce their vulnerability. Second, strong states show a marked preference for bilateral engagement, which places them in an advantageous position, especially in bargaining over disputes. In contrast, weak states favour a multilateral framework as this enables them to draw on the support of others in the bargaining process. Third, strong states periodically try to exert their power over weak states to bend them to their will. The latter try to garner as much military capability as they can through their own efforts, or what is called ‘internal balancing’, and by attempting to bolster their defences with the help of other strong states, that is, by ‘external balancing’. It follows that if the weak are successful in obtaining significant support, the balance between the two hostile states may be altered, in which case the stronger state may try to augment its position by means of its own balancing efforts. Strong State versus Weak State

During the period 1947–71, the pattern of behaviour in the South Asian system was mixed. On the one hand, India was clearly a much larger state with all the attributes of a dominant regional power. On the other, its actual capacities were limited by its relative economic weakness. In addition, the Pakistani military had an exaggerated perception of its relative strength vis-à-vis India (Cohen 2005: 103). This gave Pakistan the ‘false optimism’ that caused it to initiate war twice in the expectation of extracting Kashmir by force (Ganguly 2002: 7–8). The first war, fought in 1947–8, at least partly justified Pakistani optimism, for it left Pakistan in control of about a third of Kashmir. Pakistan’s confidence was boosted by its membership of the Cold War alliance system of (p.23) the United States. It became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization in 1955, which enabled it to obtain Page 2 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations American tanks and fighter aircraft. Its success in external balancing appeared to have given it a fleeting advantage. In the wake of India’s poor performance in its 1962 war against China, Pakistan was emboldened to attempt another military venture in 1965, but this time to no avail. The post-war Tashkent Agreement (January 1966) confirmed the 1948 division of Kashmir. In the early 1970s, as Washington sought to build bridges with Beijing via Islamabad, India’s structural position became uneasy, but it countered by signing a ‘friendship treaty’ with the Soviet Union in August 1971. Its confidence buoyed, India took advantage of a violent civil war between East and West Pakistan by intervening militarily and assisting in the creation of an independent Bangladesh in December 1971. Thereafter, till the mid-1980s, the India–Pakistan relationship conformed to the strong state/weak state pattern. In the structure of the regional system, India was the strong state, the ‘local superpower’, as one unbiased if exaggerated view put it; Pakistan the weak one (de Riencourt 1982–3: 433). By the mid-1980s, India’s military capabilities far exceeded those of Pakistan. Its total military expenditure in 1985 was US$8,921 million as against Pakistan’s US$2,957 million (International Institute of Strategic Studies 1999). In relative terms, the cost for Pakistan was much higher. In the same year, India’s defence expenditure as a percentage of its gross national product (GNP) was 3.0 per cent, while Pakistan spent 6.9 per cent of its GNP on defence (International Institute of Strategic Studies 1999). To offset its weakness, Pakistan turned to a determined quest for nuclear weapons—the ‘great equalizer’—which it eventually obtained by the mid-1980s (Khan 2012). Using a strong-state strategy, India consistently sought to build closer economic and cultural relations with Pakistan. Accordingly, it pressed for higher levels of trade, granted Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan in 1995, and welcomed Pakistani cultural figures into India. Pakistan, on the other hand, resisted close relations. Trade with India declined precipitously from 32 per cent of its imports and 56 per cent of its exports in 1948–49 to a ‘mere trickle’ by the early 1950s (Gidadhubli 2005: 135).3 Official trade, though supplemented by indirect trade and smuggling, was kept to a very low level. By the late 1990s, Pakistan’s exports to India were just 0.42 per cent of its total exports, and its (p. 24) imports from India only 1.22 per cent of its total imports (IMF 1998). In consequence, India’s capacity to influence Pakistan was minimized. Cultural links were shunned. Hindi films and music, popular in Pakistan, were not given access to the Pakistani market. As Pakistani writer Irfan Hussain comments, the political leadership ‘sought to justify the existence of Pakistan by presenting an image of a country severed from the heritage of culture and history and sealed from the map of South Asia’ (Hussain 1997: 12, cited in Tikekar 2005: 196).

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India–Pakistan Relations Indian bilateralism on Kashmir contrasted with Pakistan’s preference for a multilateral approach. India sought to restrict the scope of a possible resolution of the Kashmir question to bilateral negotiations, laying much stress on the Simla Agreement of 1972, which it viewed as a mutual commitment to bilateralism. Pakistan, on the other hand, consistently attempted to drum up support from the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and individual states, notably the United States and China. These contrasting approaches produced continual tension and exacerbated the animosity over Kashmir. Systemic Change and Its Effects

From around the mid-1980s, two new systemic processes affected the strategic balance in South Asia. The advent of nuclear weapons dramatically altered the India–Pakistan relationship, generating a surge of hostility between them. In the opposite direction, and more slowly, the accelerating pace of global economic change created new incentives for cooperation. With regard to nuclear weapons, the pattern that all nuclear rivalries display is similar (Basrur 2008: see especially Chapter 2). The level of tension initially shoots up, producing a tendency toward crisis, which in turn brings caution owing to the fear of nuclear war, and negotiations follow. Thereafter, the rivals may repeat the cycle, though not necessarily. India and Pakistan, like the United States and the Soviet Union, went through a series of alternations between crisis and negotiation before settling down to negotiate seriously (Chari et al. 2007; Ganguly and Hagerty 2005). The tension wrought by rising mutual suspicions and fears was exacerbated by Pakistan’s strategy of pushing a low-cost option. With a new confidence gained from the knowledge that India no longer had recourse to war, Pakistan focused on an ‘asymmetric strategy’ and stepped up its support for terrorist (p.25) groups active in India, especially in Kashmir (Chalk 2001; Kapur 2007; Swami 2004).4 The first crisis of the period of transition from a conventional to a nuclear weapons dynamic occurred in 1986. The so-called ‘Brasstacks Crisis’ occurred when a major Indian military exercise designed for a nuclear weapons environment was conducted near the Pakistan border and led to a war scare. In 1990, as tensions grew over Kashmir, a second crisis broke out when the two nations were still covert nuclear powers. Both sides mobilized forces, but they did so in defensive configurations and assiduously avoided war. A third crisis took place in 1999, barely a year after both had conducted nuclear tests in the summer of 1998. Pakistan pushed the envelope further by sending troops in the guise of mujahideen to occupy positions along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, which had been vacated by Indian troops for the winter (Kapur and Narang 2001; Riedel 2002: 2).5 This time, fighting occurred over several weeks from May to July, but both exercised restraint at considerable cost. India refrained from crossing the LoC, though this hamstrung its use of air power and slowed down its counterattack. Pakistan, still claiming that the intruders were Page 4 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations ‘freedom fighters’, did not back up its troops when they were forced to retreat. Both sides took care not to escalate. In December 2001, a fourth and prolonged crisis broke out when terrorists attacked India’s Parliament and an angry India threatened limited war (Basrur 2005; Ganguly and Wagner 2004). Both sides mobilized fully along the entire border and resorted to oblique nuclear threats by carrying out missile tests. The crisis eventually petered out, but left behind a sense of exhaustion. Yet another crisis occurred in late 2008, when a small group of Pakistan-based terrorists ran amuck in Mumbai city, killing some 170 people with small arms (Rabasa et al. 2009). Just as relations seemed to be improving—Pakistan announced in 2012 that it would give India MFN status by year end—tensions revived following the beheading of an Indian soldier in January 2013 and the killing of five more in August 2013. The up-and-down character of the relationship persisted, leaving analysts and policy makers uncertain about its future. Both sides made some gains from the recurring confrontations. India drew the world’s attention to Pakistan’s risk-taking and its support for terrorism, while Pakistan compelled India to think beyond its status-quo approach on Kashmir and come to the negotiating table. Both also saw the limits of their strategies: cross-border terrorism and (p.26) limited war threats were high-risk gambits that could trigger nuclear war. From this perspective, compromise appeared an acceptable option. In January 2004, India and Pakistan agreed to begin a ‘composite dialogue’ on a range of issues, including terrorism, nuclear risk reduction, and Kashmir. Most remarkably, they began to think out of the box on Kashmir, abandoning mutually exclusive claims and focusing on the softening of the LoC, expanding communication links between the divided portions of Kashmir, and enhancing trade (Koithara 2007). Yet the underlying problem remained. Cross-border terrorism continued and Indian interest in a military solution remained. The Indian Army began developing the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, which was designed to quickly occupy slices of Pakistani territory for bargaining purposes. Pakistan responded by developing tactical nuclear and cruise missiles (Ladwig 2007–2008; SIPRI 2013: 317–20). A significant systemic factor influencing the course of the India–Pakistan relationship is the role of external powers. While India initially sought to stand apart from the Cold War and keep the superpowers at arm’s length, Pakistan from the beginning has tried (as weak powers often do) to bolster its position by building strategic relationships with more powerful states.6 This helped it in important ways. In the early years, as a US ally, it was able to obtain military equipment, such as combat aircraft, tanks, and nuclear weapons materials and technology. From China, it was able to obtain nuclear materials and technology.7 In the 1980s, its role as a ‘frontline’ state against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan brought it the benefit of Washington’s blind eye with respect to its development of nuclear weapons. In the post–Cold War era, Pakistan continues to depend heavily on China for military transfers. A major change has been the growing Page 5 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, which has been viewed with anxiety in Islamabad as upsetting the ‘balance’ in the subcontinent.8 The strategic gap between India and Pakistan has clearly grown since the 1990s. While Pakistan is secure from an Indian military threat because of its nuclear capability, its ability to use alliances to put diplomatic pressure on India has diminished following the emergence of the latter as a major regional power.9 Economic Factors

Economic developments in the system as a whole had a significant effect on India and Pakistan. The key feature of the system was (and is) (p.27) what is loosely referred to as ‘globalization’, a process that was prominent by the mid-1980s. The movement of goods, services, and money grew phenomenally as a result of what Bell (1989) called the ‘third technological revolution’, an amalgam of developments in electronics, miniaturization, digitalization, and software development. The prominent features of the globalizing economy included transnational production and greatly expanded flows of trade and money. The value of world trade jumped from $244.1 billion in 1960 to $3,846.2 billion in 1980 (IMF 1990). For developing countries, the old Third World-ism characterized by autarkic policies was no longer viable: to get ahead, states had to shift to more open and competitive economies (Harris 1986). India, as Rahul Mukherji has shown in this volume, entered the brave new world of liberalization reluctantly. A balance of payments crisis forced it to seek a bail-out from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which inevitably compelled it to abandon autarky. Thereafter, its economy shifted gear and quickly achieved a higher rate of growth. In the changed environment, with its new focus on obtaining foreign direct investment, the economic cost of instability generated by India–Pakistan hostility began to be viewed as unaffordable. During the 2001– 2 crisis, there was public criticism to this effect (Dikshit 2002; Mukherjee 2002). It was brought home to political leaders that the fast-moving world of information technology was unwilling to tolerate the uncertainty arising from regional tensions and the threat of war (Friedman 2002). Political frictions, as we have seen, had long confined India–Pakistan trade to a low level because Pakistan sought to protect itself by keeping India at arm’s length. It was only after the 2001–2 crisis was behind them that trade between the two countries began to increase significantly. Along with the growing awareness that nuclear weapons had made confrontation a negative-sum game came the recognition that there was much to be gained through enhanced trade. The opening of trade between the separated portions of Kashmir in 2008 brought both economic benefit and a lessening of tension. Negotiations on a proposed Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline took place intermittently, but India dropped out in the face of potential sanctions from the US. With talks under way, India–Pakistan trade spurted from $521 million in 2004–5 to about $2.35 billion in 2012–13.10 One recent study estimates that the potential for growth is some tenfold (Mehdudia 2013). But till the time of writing (mid-2014), Pakistan had Page 6 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations yet to give India (p.28) MFN status, a decision it had announced in late 2011. This reflected the central problem that has dogged the relationship: governments’ hesitation to cross key bridges in anticipation of domestic political opposition. On the cultural front, there was a gradual opening up of relations between the two countries. Pakistan permitted the entry of Indian films and cultural troupes after more than four decades. In July 2008, the Pakistani film Ramchand Pakistani made history when it was released simultaneously in both countries (Z. Ahmed 2008). Though this has been a worry for those concerned about ‘cultural penetration’, Indian films and television programmes have flooded the Pakistani market (Ezdi 2012). Clearly, building bridges at the level of popular culture is less of a problem than ever before. The Role of Power

Although nuclear weapons and economic interdependence impose constraints on the exercise of power in the traditional sense, power does play a significant role in other ways. First, economic power enables a nation to exercise influence over others, whether by means of carrots or sticks. India’s emergence as a major economic player occurred precisely at the time when Pakistan’s economy struggled, largely as a result of domestic political turmoil, to stay afloat. Nowhere is this more evident than in the relationship between the two states and major international institutions. India’s stature has risen sufficiently for it to count as an agenda shaper on critical issues. For instance, the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of talks collapsed in July 2008 when India (in tandem with China) refused to bow to US and European pressure to jettison tariff safeguards for its farmers (Miller 2008: A1). Similarly, the following month, India (again, along with China) successfully resisted efforts by developed nations at Accra in Ghana to impose greenhouse gas emission cuts on developing nations despite their low per capita contribution to global warming (Sethi 2008). Clearly, India had demonstrated unprecedented institutional and economic power. In contrast, Pakistan by late 2008 was in dire straits, seeking a massive infusion of cash from lenders as its economy struggled to stem capital flight to the tune of US$15 billion annually (Butt 2008; Sehgal 2008). By the autumn of 2013, the Indian economy was slowing down, with the rupee falling (p.29) rapidly in international markets, but Pakistan’s troubles were worse, leading it to seek a rescue from the IMF and other agencies (Haider 2013). Second, political power still counts, for it determines the success or failure of states in negotiating their way through the institutional framework of international politics. On this front, India made a major breakthrough as a global player when, in the autumn of 2008, the US and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to change their restrictive rules and engage in civilian nuclear commerce with it (Varadarajan 2008). Washington’s insistence that this was a single exception and that Pakistan would not get a similar deal underscored its Page 7 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations new policy of ‘de-hyphenating’ the neighbours and providing only India with special treatment (Tellis 2008). In effect, the new dispensation recognized India’s status as a nuclear weapons power since it involved the acknowledgement of a plan separating the Indian civilian and military programmes. The underlying calculus was evident: the interests of India, the US, and many members of the NSG converged over the need to hedge against the new superpower-in-waiting, China (Blank 2007). Economics counted too: the Indian nuclear energy market was estimated at about US$100 billion over a decade.11 Though Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons enabled it to neutralize the conventional advantage enjoyed by India, the latter’s combination of rising economic and political power has widened the gap between them significantly. This gap further encourages (but does not necessitate) long-term cooperation between the two countries. India’s strategic horizons have spread well beyond the subcontinent and it needs a modicum of stability in its immediate environs to enable it to play a bigger role in Asia. Pakistan, weakened as never before by internal difficulties, has been placed in a position where the economic cost of challenging India is rising rapidly, while the military and economic incentives to cooperate are growing simultaneously. Yet the element of rivalry remained durable. First, as will be shown, the problem of Kashmir was a serious obstacle to cooperation between the two relatively weak states. And second, the implosion of Afghanistan gave both an incentive to become competitively involved in its politics—a dynamic that intensified with the United States’ decision to withdraw its forces and, inevitably, raise the prospect of a political vacuum that both India and Pakistan (and others) would want to fill (Pant 2010). (p.30) Thus, at the systemic level, the structurally driven behaviour of yesteryear was altered as a consequence of fundamental changes occurring in the process of the relationship. The synchronized impact of nuclear weapons and economic transnationalization created the conditions for the shift by: (a) providing security from attack to Pakistan and thereby reducing its sense of vulnerability; (b) producing sufficient risk to encourage leaders on both sides to rethink their relationship; and (c) creating stronger incentives to cooperate, both because nuclear weapons brought a mutual interest in stability and because global economic pressures raised the prospect of higher returns from cooperation.12 But the change was not predetermined. Rather, it was made through specific decisions in both countries—decisions that need not have been made. We will return to this later.

Identity and Politics at the State Level Contrasting conceptions of national identity were deeply embedded in the hostility between India and Pakistan. Torn apart at the moment of independence, the two countries sought to build very different kinds of nation-states (Harshe 2005). India under Jawaharlal Nehru sought an inclusive identity which would Page 8 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations give its extraordinarily diverse social segments—both horizontal (ethnic) and vertical (caste/tribe/class)—expression in the making of a collective future. Pakistan, created by Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s assertion of Muslim separateness, was less sure of itself and tended to swing between modernist and secular versions of an Islamic identity. The violence of Partition, ‘a nightmare from which the subcontinent has not yet fully recovered’, persists in the mutual perceptions of the two countries (Bose and Jalal 2004: 164). Its political potency is reflected in the sharply opposing views of ordinary Indians and Pakistanis on Kashmir, the bone of contention between them (Kull et al. 2008). Kashmir and Identity

Kashmir remains the symbol of an incomplete parting and a mutually exclusive conception of identity, with each country claiming the land in its own image. The impact of the dispute is multiplied by the centrifugal forces that have threatened to tear the two countries apart from (p.31) time to time. Both, conscious of their internal diversity, fear that the loss of Kashmir will set in motion a process of political disintegration. While India is relatively status-quoist, Pakistan has tried hard to alter the status quo. India has been content to retain its portion of Kashmir without making an effort to change the situation on the ground because its control of the Kashmir Valley, a Muslim-majority area, allows it to retain its claim to being a state which can accommodate Muslims. In contrast, Pakistan, always vulnerable and rendered even more so by the breaking away of Bangladesh in 1971, finds the physical alienation of Kashmir deeply hurtful and has repeatedly tried to extract the territory from India by force and by diplomacy. Nowhere has the intensity of the symbolic tug-of-war been more graphically illustrated than in the prolonged military contest for the icy wasteland of northern Kashmir’s Siachen glacier, where a hostile geography has exacted a far larger toll than has sporadic fighting since the early 1980s. Identity is not as straightforward as it is often made out to be. Anthropologists know that ethnic groups are not simply ‘etic’ or empirically defined aggregations of people with common physical or cultural characteristics, but are more properly ‘emic’ or self-defining (Eriksen 2002: 11–13).13 An individual’s sense of affinity with a group is defined externally by the group’s separateness from other groups and internally by a sense of belonging arising from participation in the life of the group. Given that a large group is almost always diverse, participation in its collective life (doing) is essential to identification with it (feeling) (Verkuyten 2005: 50–4). At the level of the nation/state, this means that a voice in, and therefore a positive contribution to, social and political life is the essential prerequisite of a strong sense of national identity. If the external component of identity is not adequately balanced by the internal, there is an inbuilt tendency to reinforce identity in opposition to a collective external other. In the India–Pakistan case, this has been all too evident.

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India–Pakistan Relations The Kashmir issue was from the beginning aggravated by domestic struggles over power sharing that kept the internal component of identity weak and made hostility toward the neighbour an important element of national sentiment. Over time, India’s experience was relatively positive. Under Prime Minister Nehru, power was exercised democratically but was nevertheless centralized because of the dominance of the Indian National Congress, which had led the movement (p.32) for independence under Mohandas Gandhi. Subsequently, Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi (no relation of her namesake Mohandas Gandhi) tried to forestall the weakening of the Congress by centralizing power. But, barring the aberration of a period of emergency rule (1975–7), an inexorable process of decentralization set in, making coalition governments the rule by the late twentieth century despite the continuing elevation to premiership of members of the Nehru–Indira Gandhi ‘dynasty’.14 Domestic Politics

Though stained by recurrent religious, linguistic, and caste conflicts, the Indian polity gradually evolved into a relatively stable democracy in which political power was decentralized and the periodic transfer of power after elections was smooth. The state responded to regular outbursts of secessionist violence with force, but also with a willingness to negotiate. The democratic structure developed a fairly stable process of articulating and negotiating differences (Mehta 2006). The fragmented character of Indian society ensured that no serious hegemony was possible. The Hindu right under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which held power from 1998 to 2004, sought with little success to establish Hindutva (or Hindu-ness) as an alternative unifying ethos (Pardesi and Oetken 2008). The movement, which targeted minorities as ‘responsible’ for many of the nation’s ills, made for a useful slogan to mobilize support from an electorate deeply disturbed by the instabilities of social and economic life in India. But it had no distinctive practical meaning or agenda, and by 2012–13 appeared to be losing ground to a fresh alternative. The spectacular success of the BJP in the general election of 2014 was accompanied by a shift from religion to pragmatism in its party platform.15 Power in India’s democratic framework can be attained by even the most powerful groups only through coalitions among diverse social and political groups, which has invariably meant compromising political platforms. Notwithstanding its multitude of deficiencies, the Indian political system has been built on the participation of an expanding set of players, gradually reaching down toward the most disadvantaged strata. This has engendered the sense of belonging that comprises the domestic element of identity. All the same, the flaws in the system have (p.33) been evident from its numerous maladies— persistent poverty and hunger, pervasive corruption, a violent Maoist movement in its heartland, and the endless turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir, the last a failure which has deepened the tension with Pakistan.16 Thus, the internal face of Indian identity is still scarred by a degree of uncertainty and tension, which Page 10 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations makes Indian policy makers conscious of threats to their country’s territorial integrity. Though India has been broadly status-quoist on Kashmir—it has made little effort to regain those portions that Pakistan controls—the territory remains critical to the Indian conception of the nation, and no government in New Delhi can afford to make substantial concessions on Kashmir. For Indian policy makers, Kashmir has been a difficult area at the interstices of domestic Indian politics and India–Pakistan relations (Behera 2006). Indian political (mis)management of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has a long history. The consequence has been a deep vulnerability that Pakistan has been able to exploit. Islamabad first supported India-based Kashmiri secessionists during the early 1990s, but—on finding them more inclined to independence than to joining Pakistan—shifted its backing to fundamentalist jihadis operating from within Pakistan-controlled territory. After the series of crises from 1990 to 2008 mentioned earlier, cross-border jihadi activity was somewhat reduced, but at the time of writing (mid-2014), the cauldron continued to bubble as Jammu and Kashmir remained turbulent and terrorist groups based in Pakistan continued to attack targets in India. For Pakistan, the identity problem was always more difficult because it began with severe handicaps. Grafting a ‘fundamentally non-territorial vision of nationality’ on to a physically bounded space without the benefit of a history was difficult enough (Gilmartin 1998: 1081). To attempt it in a society that was ethnically fragmented demanded an effort of Herculean proportions, and neither the leadership (after the early demise of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan) nor the institutional framework for this was available. East Pakistan broke away to form Bangladesh in 1971 and other territories became restless, while the army and the mainstream political parties failed to bring enduring stability, their tensions instead providing political space for Islamic extremism and a ‘culture of jihad’ (Stern 2000). Thanks to its fractured polity, Pakistan has been unable to develop the inner confidence that would have permitted a more sanguine approach towards India, especially towards Kashmir. (p.34) The Pakistani state has tottered between civilian and military control (Haleem 2003). The army under Ayub Khan overthrew a fractious and unstable government in 1958, but, unable to hold the country together, gave power back to the civilians following the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) performed no better, resulting in General Zia ul Haq’s takeover in 1977. Zia tried and executed Bhutto and reoriented the Pakistani state toward a more severe form of Islam, which unleashed powerful fundamentalist forces. Civilian rule returned upon Zia’s death in 1988 to perform indifferently under the alternating governments of Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. But Sharif’s attempt to enervate the army brought a coup in 1999 by General Pervez Musharraf, who ran the

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India–Pakistan Relations country first as chief executive and later as president, till yet another popular upsurge led to the revival of civilian authority in 2008. Is the dominance of the military in Pakistan an abiding source of tension between the two countries? On the one hand, it can be argued that the Pakistan Army has an interest in sustained tensions since they enable it to retain a high profile and to brush off criticisms against its political dominance. On the other hand, it was a military leader, Pervez Musharraf, who facilitated a series of unprecedented cooperative efforts on loosening borders, opening up trade, and enhancing cross-border travel in the mid-2000s. By the beginning of 2014, the prospects for a more democratic Pakistan looked brighter. A positive development was the survival of the PPP government under President Asif Ali Zardari, who took control of the party following the assassination of his wife, Benazir. This was the first elected government in Pakistan’s history to live out its full term, a remarkable achievement amidst a civil war between the state and the Pakistani Taliban, which had established a large base along the border with Afghanistan. With the election of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 2013, the power of the army appeared to have receded, though it was too early to predict that it would henceforth remain in the barracks. Demilitarization of the state is not an easy process as has been evident from the experience of many countries. In Pakistan’s case, the army is well entrenched in politics and society, with important positions in the state apparatus and considerable economic investments to its name (Siddiqa 2012). Pakistan’s internal problems have produced two significant effects that have contributed to the lessening of tensions with India. First, the (p.35) opening up of a new ‘front’ along the Afghan border has shifted the nation’s security gaze somewhat away from India. For the Pakistan Army, the Taliban now constitutes the most immediate if not primary threat to the country’s sovereignty. According to an official government statement before the Supreme Court, the Pakistan Army has incurred over 15,000 fatalities at the hands of the Taliban since 2008 (Raja 2013). Second, public opinion has shifted away from India. A 2013 poll showed that as many as 44 per cent of Pakistanis thought the US to be the main threat to world peace, with India well behind (15 per cent), just ahead of Israel (13 per cent) (T. Ahmed 2013). Toward a Democratic Peace?

Driven by systemic incentives, both India and Pakistan have moved away from their zero-sum approaches to the Kashmir problem and sought to draw closer by loosening controls on the cross-border/LoC movement of people and goods. But factors operating at the state level have ensured that the movement toward peace has been a slow crawl. India has been status-quo oriented rather than revisionist, but it has also lacked the capacity to move quickly and substantially toward entente with Pakistan. In an era of coalition governments, the task of hammering out a consensus on virtually any issue requiring a significant shift Page 12 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations from established policy has been extraordinarily arduous, since governments between 1984 and 2014 have been preoccupied with domestic issues bearing on their political survival. The prospects for a ‘democratic peace’ between India and Pakistan remain limited for the near future.17 The truism that democracies do not fight one another applies only to developed capitalist societies, and neither is anywhere close to being that. Besides, there is evidence that democratizing states are warprone (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). India is still vulnerable to powerful forces disposed to manipulate identity issues for electoral purposes. Pakistan remains a hybrid democracy, an uneasy mix of populism and military power in which democratic parties are prone to ‘outbid’ each other in appeasing conservative elements opposed to an India–Pakistan rapprochement, and the army has a stake in limiting the prospects for peace when its domestic position is threatened.18 While India has over the years emerged as a relatively ‘self-confident state’, Pakistan has not (Jaffrelot 2002). Yet India’s self-confidence (p.36) should not be exaggerated. The fall in its growth rate, the mushrooming of corruption scandals, and the apparent policy paralysis of the Manmohan Singh–led government had by late 2013 brought an air of disillusionment in the country (Jha 2013; Sridharan 2013). The politics of outbidding persisted. Opposition parties remained alert to the aggrandizing possibilities inherent in conflict with the external other by mobilizing protest against compromise, while the government was under pressure to be tough with Pakistan. The BJP’s 2014 electoral victory opened the possibility of a less vulnerable government in New Delhi, but the apparently decisive win—the BJP was the first party to obtain a clear majority on its own since 1984—obscured the fact that the party had secured only 31 per cent of the total votes cast.19 Ultimately, with neither country’s government particularly strong, the prospects of a risk-taking breakthrough based on a compromise over Kashmir remain limited for the foreseeable future.

Individuals and Leadership The role of the individual in the making of foreign policy is often overspecified or underspecified, as analysts tend either to focus largely on personalities or to treat states as the primary actors in international relations. Gauging the effect that individuals have on large events is difficult. Yet we cannot deny that on occasion they do have a powerful influence in shaping the relations between states. A name that quickly comes to mind is that of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is widely credited with having the political courage and the skill to initiate the end of the Cold War (Lévesque 1997; Zubok 2002). Early Leaderships

How have individual leaders affected the course of the India–Pakistan relationship? In the early years, India had powerful leaders who were able to direct the course of foreign policy with a degree of confidence. Nehru, in Page 13 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations particular, was a dominant figure in the making of foreign policy, and the direction that Indian policy took was in large part determined by his personality, preferences, and decisions. His policies were characterized by considerable contradiction between its idealist and realist elements (Bandyopadhyaya 1979: 291–8; Rajan 1976: xvi). Thus, (p.37) his penchant for playing a global role on behalf of India was not backed by a realistic accumulation of the hard power capabilities to back it up. This became evident from the Indian Army’s lacklustre performance against Pakistan in 1947–8 and China in 1962. It took the more realist personalities of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi to use the military effectively against Pakistan, the former expelling Pakistani forces from India in 1965, the latter decisively defeating and breaking up Pakistan in 1971 (Mansingh 1984: 302–8). Subsequently, till the end of the century, as political power shifted from Congress dominance to a patchwork of coalitions, Indian leaders were too weak to take major initiatives. On the other side, Pakistan lost its major leaders, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, shortly after independence and the intense competition for power did not permit individual leaders to give decisive direction to foreign policy. The populist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did not match in practice the expectations he generated, and was central to both the loss of East Pakistan as well as to the return of the army soon after. One long-term impact he did have was via his determination to acquire nuclear weapons, which—as we have seen—have both exacerbated and constrained India–Pakistan conflict. It was the military as a whole rather than individual commanders that shaped the orientation toward India. General Zia was something of an exception. He directed much of his political energy toward recasting Pakistan in an Islamic mould, developing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, and keeping India at arm’s length. The last quarter of the twentieth century produced no leader of exceptional capability who might have been able to surmount the constraints imposed by systemic and state-level factors to alter the trajectory of India– Pakistan relations. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif aroused high expectations, but failed to meet them as the Pakistani state became bogged down in a morass of inefficiency and corruption, the army entrenched itself, and the populace became increasingly disaffected, all of which fed into a growing turbulence. New Millennium Leaderships

With the turn of the millennium, the opportunity for individual initiative was provided by the crises that beset their relationship after India (p.38) and Pakistan officially went nuclear. Having peered into the abyss, leaders on both sides sought to step back and try to break new ground. To his credit, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had made the effort almost immediately after the 1998 nuclear tests, and travelled to Lahore in early 1999 to attempt a rapprochement. But the response had been shallow, producing the Kargil crisis a Page 14 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations few weeks later. A mutual effort to come to terms led Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf to confer at Agra in 2001, but nothing came of it. After the 2001–2 crisis had subsided, the two leaders responded symmetrically and a comprehensive dialogue on major issues of dispute began in 2004. Though he was much vilified in India as the brain behind Pakistan’s Kargil adventure, Musharraf revealed a remarkable willingness to discard old shibboleths. Vajpayee’s successor, Manmohan Singh, showed similar flexibility. By mid-2007, both had indicated obliquely a new readiness to consider dividing Kashmir permanently (Gilani 2007; Hasan 2007). Apparently, a ‘breakthrough’ was close, but Musharraf’s standing declined as a democratic upsurge swept through Pakistan and quickly eroded prospects for a deal. Singh and Musharraf’s successor Zardari maintained continuity, but the peace process was slowed down by Pakistan’s internal troubles as well as by the revival of India–Pakistan tensions over the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and periodic tension-producing incidents, particularly a spate of exchanges of fire that persisted well into 2013. Nawaz Sharif, returning to power that year, indicated a renewed interest in fostering peace and spoke of going ‘the extra mile’ with India.20 Interestingly, both the Indian government and the opposition BJP responded positively.21 However, the approaching elections in India made it difficult for any substantive movement forward. As observed earlier, leadership initiative was curbed by state-level constraints. The BJP’s Advani, when in opposition, attempted to bridge the divide in the summer of 2005, but was compelled to backtrack quickly when his own followers became critical of his going ‘soft’ on Pakistan. Similarly, Zardari’s criticism of ‘terrorists’ in Kashmir in the autumn of 2008 aroused a storm of protest in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the composite dialogue was sustained by leaders on both sides and made significant progress toward improved relations. As a result of leadership persistence, a set of informal principles crystallized to mark the new character of the India–Pakistan relationship. It was understood that: (a) the LoC would not be altered but in a sense transcended by expanded (p.39) communication; (b) there would be a new focus on self-governance on both sides; (c) military forces would eventually be reduced substantially; and (d) India and Pakistan would work together to build a mechanism for implementing the process (Koithara 2007). Most importantly, both countries shed their old inflexibility and agreed not only to negotiate on all major outstanding disputes, but to discard their non-negotiable and mutually exclusive positions on Kashmir. New thinking was not lacking on either side. However, it takes leaders of exceptional commitment and skill to override the pressures emanating from factors operating at the system and state levels. The likes of Gorbachev (or, on the negative side, Hitler) are uncommon. In the South Asian context, Vajpayee was unusual in that he had a history of attempting goodneighbourly relations going as far back as the mid-1970s when he had been minister for external affairs. His persistence in the 1990s and thereafter, and Page 15 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations certainly the positive response from Musharraf after 2003, were more the product of learning from hard experience that the advent of nuclear weapons had drastically narrowed their options. Singh and, on the other side, Zardari and Sharif were keen on compromise, but Indian and Pakistani leaders simply lacked the capacity to override the dictates of state-level pressures. In particular, domestic politics—relatively weak government control and strong opposition to major concessions—did not permit dramatic departures from prevailing policy. The election of Narendra Modi as prime minister in May 2014 raised the possibility of a future lessening of tensions, but the picture at the time of writing shortly thereafter remains unclear. The India–Pakistan relationship was characterized by unremitting hostility from 1947 till the turn of the millennium. For this entire period, systemic, state-level, and individual-level dynamics pushed in the same direction. Till 1971, there was no clear strong state/weak state pattern in the relationship. Though India had the attributes of a strong state, it was relatively cautious. Pakistan was the weaker state, yet the more aggressive in initiating war twice. In late 1971, largely owing to the initiative taken by Indira Gandhi, India defeated and broke up Pakistan, thereby producing a well-defined strong state/weak state pattern. This (p.40) lasted till the late 1980s as Pakistan sought (successfully) to remedy the situation by pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. By the late 1980s, systemic constraints on conflict and incentives to cooperate gradually began to appear with the covert advent of nuclear weapons and the onset of economic liberalization in the region. Initially, tensions were heightened considerably, as is the case with all nuclear rivalries. But after a period of recurring crises, individual leaders, learning from the experience, sought to attune themselves to the systemic changes in progress and major initiatives to break the ice were taken by Vajpayee and Musharraf, with their successors sustaining the new orientation. The setback over the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008 significantly slowed but did not derail the peace process. However, statelevel politics was not always congruent with systemic and leadership shifts. Efforts to build bridges were hampered by the relative weakness of governments, persistent identity politics, and the readiness of powerful groups, such as the religious right in both countries and the army in Pakistan, to block a rapprochement. Where is the India–Pakistan relationship headed? The systemic pressures for cooperation are powerful and almost certainly cannot be turned back. Individual leaders who have to confront these pressures directly in the process of policy making are likely to appreciate the need for change and continue to seek resolution. But they are just as likely to be slowed down by state-level politics. Both countries have had relatively weak governments, with India hampered by coalition pressures (till 2014) and Pakistan hamstrung by economic problems and the continuing conflict with the Taliban. Their task is made all the more Page 16 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations difficult because systemic factors are not undiluted in offering incentives to cooperate. Old suspicions die hard and both long-standing and new sources of tension sustain friction. Nuclear weapons may invite moderation, but they also produce arms racing, and a slow but perceptible competition between the subcontinental rivals is evident as they pursue new acquisitions to their respective arsenals. These include ballistic missiles of varying range, cruise missiles, sea-based capabilities, increasing numbers of warheads, and more sophisticated targeting capabilities (SIPRI 2013: 311–16 [for India] and 317–20 [for Pakistan]). Competition is also present in other ways, notably with regard to filling the expected political vacuum in Afghanistan in the wake of American withdrawal. (p.41) Work on how rivalries end shows that a positive outcome depends on a combination of factors: shocks that override foreign policy inertia; changes in threat perceptions; positive responses to cooperative initiatives; and sustained effort to mitigate post-conflict tensions (Rasler et al. 2013). The picture drawn in these pages is a mixed one. Policy inertia or ‘business as usual’ has been jolted by recurring crises under the nuclear shadow, yet remnants of the old ways of doing things persist. Threat perceptions are less acute, but are hardly melting away. And efforts have been made by both sides to build bridges, but these have not been sustained. Under the circumstances, it would take a pair of exceptionally determined and skilful leaders to carry the relationship toward either a high degree of cooperation or the renewal of unremitting hostility. Since it is not on the cards that systemic trends will be reversed, the complementarity between systemic and state-level factors can only be positive, almost certainly never negative. But for a positive transformation to occur, we will have to await changes at the state level that produce confidence in self-identity and democratization on both sides. In particular, while the Pakistan Army appears to be reducing its profile in national politics, it is not clear that its backing of terrorist groups active in India is entirely in the past. The two processes, as we have seen, are closely intertwined. Given the political realities of the subcontinent, they are also likely to be slow-moving. Accordingly, we may expect at worst a persistent but restrained hostility between the two countries, and at best incremental and cumulative improvement rather than a dramatic breakthrough in the relationship for some time to come. References Bibliography references: Ahmed, T. 2013. ‘Global end of year survey: After US, Pakistan considered biggest threat to world peace’, Express Tribune, 3 December. Available at: http://

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India–Pakistan Relations tribune.com.pk/story/652982/global-end-of-year-survey-after-us-pakistanconsidered-biggest-threat-to-world-peace/ (accessed 4 February 2015). Ahmed, Z. 2008. ‘Pakistan film makes India record’, BBC News, 14 July. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7506364.stm (accessed 4 February 2015). Bandyopadhyaya, J. 1979. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities (revised edition) (New Delhi: Allied Publishers). Basrur, R.M. 2005. ‘Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment: The December 13 Crisis’, in R. Dossani and H. Rowen, eds, Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 301–25. ———. 2008. South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective (Abingdon and New York: Routledge). ———, ed. 2009. Challenges to Democracy in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Behera, N.C. 2006. Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Bell, D. 1989. ‘The Third Technological Revolution and Its Possible Consequences’, Dissent, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 164–76. Blank, S. 2007. ‘The Geostrategic Implications of the Indo-American Strategic Partnership’, India Review, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–24. Bose, S. and A. Jalal. 2004. Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (2nd edition) (London and New York: Routledge). (p.44) Butt, T. 2008. ‘National debts up by Rs 900 billion as rupee plunges’, News International, 20 October. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/ TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=17906&Cat=13&dt=10/24/2008 (accessed 4 February 2015). Chalk, P. 2001. ‘Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September. Available at: http://www.rand.org/blog/2001/09/pakistansrole-in-the-kashmir-insurgency.html (accessed 3 February 2015). Chari, P.R., P.I. Cheema, and S.P. Cohen. 2007. Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Chengappa, B.M. 1999. ‘India–Pakistan Trade Relations’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 443–57. Page 18 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations Cohen, S.P. 2005. The Idea of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). ———. 2013. Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India–Pakistan Conundrum (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). de Riencourt, A. 1982–1983. ‘India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 416–37. Dikshit, S. 2002. ‘Paying the piper’, Hindu, 9 June. Available at: http:// www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/06/09/stories/2002060900191600.htm (accessed 4 February 2015). Eriksen, T.H. 2002. Ethnicity and Nationalism (2nd edition) (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press). Ezdi, A. 2012. ‘A silent invasion’, News International, 3 September. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-129727-A-silent-invasion (accessed 4 February 2015). Friedman, T.L. 2002. ‘India, Pakistan and G.E.’, New York Times, 11 August. Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? res=940CEED9153AF932A2575BC0A9649C8B63 (accessed 4 February 2015). Ganguly, S. 1997. ‘War and Conflict between India and Pakistan: Revisiting the Pacifying Power of Democracy’, in Mirium Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press), pp. 267–301. ———. 2002. Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Ganguly, S. and D.T. Hagerty. 2005. Fearful Symmetry: India–Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Ganguly, S. and R.H. Wagner. 2004. ‘India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 479– 507. Gidadhubli, R.G. 2005. ‘India–Pakistan Trade: Problems and Prospects’, in P. M. Kamath, ed., India–Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of (p. 45) War (New Delhi: Promilla and Co., in association with Bibliophile Asia), pp. 135–43. Gilani, I. 2007. ‘Manmohan hints at trisecting Kashmir’, Daily Times, 25 April. Available at: http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/25-Apr-2007/manmohanhints-at-trisecting-ihk (accessed 4 February 2015). Gilmartin, D. 1998. ‘Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative’, Journal of South Asian History, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 1068–95. Page 19 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations Haider, M. 2013. ‘Dar says Pakistan to borrow $12 bn from IMF, WB, others’, News International, 27 August. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysNews-13-25029-Dar-says-Pakistan-to-borrow-$12-bn-from-IMF-WB-others (accessed 4 February 2015). Haleem, I. 2003. ‘Ethnic and Sectarian Violence and the Propensity toward Praetorianism in Pakistan’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 463–77. Harris, N. 1986. The End of the Third World: Newly Industrialising Countries and the Decline of an Ideology (London: Penguin). Harshe, R. 2005. ‘India–Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir: Peace through Development Cooperation’, South Asian Survey, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 47–60. Hasan, K. 2007. ‘There is a need to identify what is Kashmir: Musharraf’, Daily Times, 5 June. Available at: http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/05Jun-2007/there-is-a-need-to-identify-what-is-kashmir-musharraf (accessed 4 February 2015). Hussain, I. 1997. Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press). International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1990. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990 (Washington, D.C.: IMF). ———. 1998. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: IMF). International Institute of Strategic Studies. 1999. The Military Balance, 1999– 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Jaffrelot, C. 2002. ‘India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political Trajectories’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 251–67. Jha, P.S. 2013. ‘Overcome by a sense of betrayal’, Hindu, 15 January. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/overcome-by-a-sense-of-betrayal/ article4307678.ece (accessed 4 February 2015). Kapur, S.P. 2007. Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Kapur, V. and V. Narang. 2001. ‘The Fate of Kashmir: International Law or Lawlessness?’ Stanford Law Journal, vol. 31, no. 1. Available at: http:// www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/3.1.06_kapur-narang.html (accessed 3 February 2015). Khan, F.H. 2012. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Page 20 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations (p.46) Koithara, V. 2007. ‘The Advancing Peace Process’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 41, no. 52, pp. 10–13. Kull, S., C. Ramsay, S. Weber, and E. Lewis. 2008. ‘Pakistani and Indian Public Opinion on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani Relations’, World Public Opinion.org, Washington, D.C., 16 July. Available at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ pdf/jul08/Kashmir_Jul08_rpt.pdf (accessed 4 February 2015). Ladwig III, W.C. 2007–2008. ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 158–90. Lévesque, J. 1997. The Enigma of 1989: The Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Mandelbaum, M. 1988. The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mansfield, E. and J. Snyder. 2005. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Mansingh, S. 1984. India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982 (New Delhi: Sage). Mehdudia, S. 2013. ‘Study Pitches for Treaty to Promote Investment in India and Pakistan’, Hindu, 31 January 2013. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/ business/Economy/india-pakistan-trade-potential-is-198-bn-icrierarticle4365501.ece (accessed 28 April 2015). Mehta, P.B. 2006. ‘Identity Politics in an Era of Globalization’, in A. Kelly, R.S. Rajan, and G.H.L. Goh, eds, Managing Globalization: Lessons from India and China (Singapore: World Scientific), pp.387–411. Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS). n.d. ‘China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan’. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/archive/ country_india/china/npakpos.htm (accessed 3 February 2015). Miller, J. 2008. ‘Global trade talks fail as new giants flex muscle’, Wall Street Journal, 30 July. Mukherjee, A. 2002. ‘War at What Cost?’, Hindu, 6 January. Available at: http:// www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/01/06/stories/2002010600681500.htm (accessed 4 February 2015). Nisley, T.J. 2008. ‘The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars’, International Politics, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 168–81.

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India–Pakistan Relations Pant, H.V. 2010. ‘Solving Afghanistan: Elephant in the Room is Indo-Pakistan Rivalry’, YaleGlobal Online, 1 February. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/solving-afghanistan-elephant-room-indo-pakistan-rivalry (accessed 4 February 2015). Pardesi, M.S. and J.L. Oetken. 2008. ‘Secularism, Democracy, and Hindu Nationalism in India’, Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 23–40. Paul, T.V., ed. 2005. The India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (p.47) ———, ed. 2010. South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Rabasa, A., R.D. Blackwill, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, C.C. Fair, B.A. Jackson, B.M. Jenkins, S.G. Jones, N. Shestak, and A.J. Tellis. 2009. The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND). Raghavan, V.R. 2000. ‘Limited War and Strategic Liability’, Hindu, 2 February. Available at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/02/02/stories/ 05022523.htm (accessed 3 February 2015). Raja, M. 2013. ‘Pakistani victims: War on Terror Toll put at 49,000’, Express Tribune, 27 March. Available at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/527016/pakistanivictims-war-on-terror-toll-put-at-49000/ (accessed 4 February 2015). Rajan, M.S. 1976. ‘Introduction: India’s Foreign Policy under Nehru’, in M. S. Rajan, ed., India’s Foreign Relations during the Nehru Era: Some Studies (Mumbai: Asia Publishing House), pp. i–xxiv. Rasler, K., W.R. Thompson, and S. Ganguly. 2013. How Rivalries End (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). Riedel, B. 2002. American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Center for the Advanced Study of India). Sehgal, I. 2008. ‘The “hawala” drain’, News International, 21 October. Available at: http://archive.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx? ID=142168&Cat=9&dt=11/6/2008 (accessed 4 February 2015). Sethi, N. 2008. ‘India, China Join Hands against Rich Countries’, Times of India, 28 August. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ Climate_talks_India_China_join_hands/articleshow/3413939.cms (accessed 4 February 2015).

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India–Pakistan Relations Siddiqa, A. 2012. ‘Pakistan’s Civil–Military Balance: The Fourth Round’, in R. Basrur and K. Bommakanti, eds, Demilitarizing the State: The South and Southeast Asian Experience, RSIS Monograph No. 25 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies). Available at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2014/07/Monograph2513.pdf (accessed 28 January 2015). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2013. SIPRI Yearbook 2013 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Sridharan, E. 2005. ‘Improving Indo-Pakistan Relations: International Relations Theory, Nuclear Deterrence and Possibilities for Economic Cooperation’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 321–39. ———. 2013. ‘Drift and Confusion Reign in Indian Politics’, Current History, vol. 112, no. 753, pp. 123–9. Stern, J. 2000. ‘Pakistan’s Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6 (November–December), pp. 115–26. (p.48) Swami, P. 2004. ‘Failed Threats and Flawed Fences: India’s Military Responses to Pakistan’s Proxy War’, India Review, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 147–70. Tellis, A.J. 2008. ‘The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 21–42. Tikekar, M. 2005. ‘Cultural Idiom in the Indo-Pak Conflict’, in P.M. Kamath, ed., India–Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War (New Delhi: Promilla and Co., in association with Bibliophile Asia), pp. 187–238. Tremblay, R.C. and J. Schofield. 2005. ‘Institutional Causes of the India–Pakistan Rivalry,’ in T.V. Paul, ed., India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 227–37. Varadarajan, S. 2008. ‘NSG lifts sanctions on India’, Hindu, 7 September. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/2008/09/07/stories/ 2008090757400100.htm (accessed 4 February 2015). Verkuyten, M. 2005. The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Hove and New York: Psychology Press). Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics (Lexington, MA: AddisonWesley). Zubok, V.M. 2002. ‘Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality’, Cold War History, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 61–100. Notes:

(1.) For detailed analyses, see Cohen (2013), Ganguly (2002), and Paul (2005). Page 23 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations (2.) For a sharp distinction between system structure and process, see Waltz (1979). (3.) On problems relating to trade, see Chengappa (1999). (4.) This support was initiated early by way of backing extended to Sikh separatists fighting for an independent ‘Khalistan’, but was intensified when a popular upsurge occurred in Kashmir. (5.) Though the events of 1999 are frequently treated as a ‘war’, I concur with V.R. Raghavan, a former director-general of military operations with the Indian Army, that Kargil was not so much a war as ‘a series of local military actions … to clear Indian territory of intruders’ (Raghavan 2000). (6.) New Delhi did seek help from major powers—with the US after the 1962 war with China, and with the Soviet Union from the 1960s—but both efforts were directed against China. (7.) On China’s nuclear assistance to Pakistan, see MIIS (n.d.). (8.) The emerging India–US strategic partnership is, once again, not specifically directed at Pakistan, though India stands to gain from US efforts to restrain Pakistan, especially after the Kargil crisis. (9.) For India’s emergence as a significant player at the global level, see Blank (2007). (10.) The figures for the two dates are taken from separate sources: ‘India, Pak agree on easing norms for cement, tea trade,’ Times of India, 2 August 2007. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/ India_Pak_agree_on_easing_norms_for_cement_tea_trade_/articleshow/ 2249954.cms (accessed 4 February 2015); and ‘Trade Flows between India and Pakistan despite Tensions,’ Daily News and Analysis, 18 August 2013. Available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-trade-flows-between-india-andpakistan-despite-tensions-1876178 (accessed 28 April 2015). (11.) ‘India’s nuclear energy trade to touch USD 100 bn in 10 years: US’, Times of India, 9 September 2008. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ India/Indias_N-energy_trade_to_touch_USD_100_bn_in_10_yrs_US/articleshow/ 3464364.cms (accessed 4 February 2015). (12.) For a similar argument, see Sridharan (2005). (13.) The terms ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ are derived from phonemics and phonetics. (14.) Indira’s son, Rajiv Gandhi, was Prime Minister from 1984 to 1989. His widow, Sonia Gandhi, led the Congress to victory in the elections of 2004, but Page 24 of 25

India–Pakistan Relations preferred to install Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister while retaining final authority through her control of the party. Her son, Rahul Gandhi, became a senior functionary of the Congress Party and is widely viewed as the heir apparent to its leadership and a potential prime minister. (15.) The BJP’s 2014 election manifesto only briefly mentioned on its penultimate page the religious issues it had formerly emphasized. See http:// www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf (accessed 4 February 2015). (16.) On the many challenges remaining before Indian democracy, see Basrur (2009). (17.) The idea of the democratic peace has a rich intellectual history. For a recent review, see Nisley (2008). On its limited applicability in the South Asian context, see Ganguly (1997). (18.) On Pakistan as a ‘hybrid democracy’, see Tremblay and Schofield (2005). (19.) See the website of the Election Commission of India at http:// eciresults.nic.in/# (accessed 19 May 2014). (20.) “PM Nawaz Sharif Says Pakistan Ready to Go ‘Extra Mile’ with India”, News International, 22 October 2013. Available at: http://www.thenews.com.pk/ article-123422-PM-Nawaz-Sharif-says-Pakistan-ready-to-go-extra-mile-with-India (accessed 28 April 2015). (21.) ‘Dialogue with Pakistan the only option: India’, Daily Times, 26 December 2013. Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/region/26-Dec-2013/dialoguewith-pakistan-the-only-option-india (accessed 4 February 2015); ‘Rajnath Singh welcomes Nawaz Sharif’s India outreach’, Times of India, 15 May 2013. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Rajnath-Singh-welcomesNawaz-Sharifs-India-outreach/articleshow/20057591.cms (accessed 4 February 2015).

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Indo-Sri Lanka Relations rule, the relationship inherited from the colonial period, geopolitical alignments, economic relations, and personal relationships between the leaders. In this chapter, an interpretative essay, I will analyse the evolution of India’s Sri Lanka policy and its drivers in terms of three levels of analysis—the systemic, domestic, and personal. While all three factors have played a role, my argument will be that domestic politics has been the most significant factor in shaping Indian policy, but in a way that is different from most other analyses which share this conclusion. Colonial Ceylon was directly ruled from Britain and was not part of the British Indian Empire.1 During the colonial period, beginning from the 1830s, Indian indentured labour from Tamil Nadu was taken to the (p.50) Central Highlands of Sri Lanka to constitute the labour force of the plantation sector. This population came to be called the Indian-origin Tamils or (tea, rubber) estate/ plantation Tamils (numbering 842,000, or 4.2 per cent of the population in 2012). They are a community distinct from the native Sri Lankan Tamils (11.2 per cent of the population in 2011), who were a majority of the population in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island at independence, and are still the vast majority in the north and 40 per cent in the east (2011 Sri Lanka census). The deteriorating relationship between the majority Sinhalese, who are about three-quarters of the population, and the minority Tamils since independence, and especially since the early 1980s, has been a major factor in Indo-Sri Lanka relations, as has been Sri Lanka’s shifting geopolitical alignment since the late 1970s and again in the 2000s. Starting from shortly after independence, Sri Lanka (Ceylon till 1972) established itself under the 1948 Soulbury constitution as a unitary state under the effective control of the majority Sinhalese, who constituted three-quarters of the population, and who were overwhelmingly Buddhist. The official language policy of 1956 made Sinhalese the sole official language, threatening the prospects of the Tamils in public employment, a sphere in which they were then relatively overrepresented due to the early emergence of an English-educated professional class, in turn due to the impact of missionary education in the Tamil heartland, Jaffna, in the north. Sinhalese majoritarianism went from strength to strength from the 1950s onwards. Two important pacts between prime ministers and the leaders of the main Tamil party, the (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike–(S.J.V.) Chelvanayakam pact of 1957 and the Dudley Senanayake–Chelvanayakam pact of 1965, which made concessions to Tamil-speakers on matters of language, education, public employment, and limited regional autonomy in the Tamilmajority Northern and Eastern Provinces, were not honoured.2 Tamil-speakers were progressively marginalized in public employment, and from the early 1970s in university admissions, under a ‘standardization’ policy that favoured the backward provinces, in effect the Sinhalese. State-sponsored colonization schemes settled Sinhalese in considerable numbers in the Tamil-majority Eastern Province, significantly altering its demography such that by 2011, TamilPage 2 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations speakers were down to about three-quarters of the population overall and less than that in the Trincomalee district that connects the Northern and Eastern Provinces. (p.51) The 1972 republican constitution officially established Buddhism as having a special status and removed the 1948 Soulbury constitution’s protection of minority rights, completing the establishment of a Sinhalese-Buddhist majoritarian unitary state. The 1978 constitution concentrated power in the hands of an executive president, inevitably a Sinhala Buddhist, against a weak parliament. Major anti-Tamil riots, in which state forces and politicians were involved, took place in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983. From the late 1940s to the 1970s, Indo-Sri Lankan relations remained normal if not cordial, both being nonaligned, Third Worldist, and state-regulated economies. Sri Lanka’s nonaligned geopolitical posture was not seen as a threat by India. The major tension in the first three decades was over the citizenship status and repatriation of the Indian-origin Tamils. In 1948 itself, immediately after independence, Ceylon refused citizenship to the Indian-origin Tamils, who at that time had actually come to outnumber the native Tamils, reducing them to statelessness and therefore vulnerability in terms of lacking citizens’ rights. It also wanted their repatriation to India, which Nehru resisted because he did not want to set a precedent for other overseas Indian populations (Sahadevan 1995). This was a point of tension in the relationship. However, India agreed to consider repatriating some of them, and long-drawn-out negotiations took place resulting in two major agreements spaced ten years apart, the 1964 Sirimavo– Shastri accord, and the 1974 Sirimavo–Indira accord, that fixed the exact numbers to be repatriated, the rest being granted citizenship. These accords were of a piece with the broad Nehruvian policy on overseas Indians, which was to encourage the Indian communities to be good citizens of the countries they found themselves in, and to encourage the host countries to accord them full citizenship with commensurate rights, thus avoiding conflict with a range of countries that India sought to build relations with as part of the nonaligned and broad Third World grouping in world politics and at the United Nations. This strategy worked so long as the host country followed an accommodative policy. In the case of Ceylon this was not so. India helped, short of military force, with the quelling of the uprising by the radical, then-Maoist as well as paradoxically Sinhalese-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 1971. Despite Sri Lanka allowing Pakistani aircraft to refuel at its airports during the December 1971 war, (p.52) India concluded the 1974 and 1976 agreements that completed the process of repatriation of Indianorigin Tamils in agreed numbers, and also recognized Sri Lankan sovereignty over the barren Kachchativu islet, against objections by the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government in Tamil Nadu, without adequate safeguards for traditional fishing rights of Tamil Nadu fishermen.3 However, Chief Minister Karunanidhi chose not to exercise the option of moving the Supreme Court, Page 3 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations unlike West Bengal Chief Minister B.C. Roy over the Beru Bari enclave that was agreed to be ceded to the then East Pakistan in the 1960s. These developments were partly because of the personal relationship between Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a move to keep Sri Lanka well disposed to India, but also a complete lack of foresight that relations with Sri Lanka could deteriorate due to the latter’s domestic policies of discrimination against the Tamil minority and its fallout in India, and, likewise, that in the future the depletion of fish stocks could lead to trans-maritime boundary poaching and its political fallout. However, it certainly cannot be interpreted as being due to any conscious bias against Tamil Nadu, as evidenced by the decision by the Congress government during the first DMK government, 1967–71, to locate one of the most vital strategic nuclear facilities at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu, the first fully indigenous, unsafeguarded plutonium producing reactor and reprocessing plant (and later, the crucial fast breeder reactor project at the same location). This was an act of inclusion and participation of Tamil Nadu in the most secret and sensitive core of national security, indicating trust and confidence in the leadership and people of the state whose ruling DMK party had abandoned separatism less than a decade earlier (in November 1963).

The Deterioration of Relations from the Early 1980s Indo-Sri Lankan relations worsened from the early 1980s under the combined impact of three developments, and sharply after the July 1983 riots against the Tamil minority, widely considered a pogrom, which resulted in about 200,000– 250,000 refugees crossing over to India in a short period of time (Dixit 1998: 13). The three developments were the following. First, the election of J.R. Jayawardene of the United National Party (UNP) in 1977, and his election as executive president under the new 1978 constitution, led to a distinct shift to the right in economic (p.53) policy as well as a pro-American tilt in foreign policy. In the next few years, despite Indian misgivings expressed at the diplomatic level, Sri Lanka was negotiating with the US over naval facilities in Trincomalee and a Voice of America broadcast relay station on the west coast, which India suspected could be used for electronic intelligence gathering and monitoring of communications. At that time, following the strain in Indo-US relations after the US tilt towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of 1971, the Indian nuclear test of 1974, and the pro-Soviet tilt in Indian policy in the early 1980s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India was very sensitive to a possible US presence in Sri Lanka.4 Second, Sri Lanka’s discriminatory and majoritarian treatment of its Tamil minority had led to the beginnings of Lankan Tamil separatism from the late 1970s with the passage of the separatists’ Vaddukoddai declaration in 1976 by the Tamil United Liberation Front. The 1977 anti-Tamil riots elicited expressions of concern by India at the diplomatic level (Bhasin 2001, 3: 1077–8). The 1981 riots and the burning down of the Jaffna Public Library and its priceless Page 4 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations collection of manuscripts in June 1981 by the Lankan security forces, and finally the massive anti-Tamil riots of late July 1983, with the participation of government ministers, led to an eruption of sympathy in Tamil Nadu and in India generally, which the government could not ignore.5 Covert assistance, including arms and training, to Lankan Tamil rebel groups, which had been in existence from the early 1980s, was stepped up, the support being spread across a number of groups (Dixit 1998: 23; Swamy 1994: 93–114). The Sri Lankan government in its counterinsurgency policy also drew upon the support of Israeli advisers at a time when India did not have diplomatic relations with Israel, saw the latter as a surrogate for a US with whom relations were cool, and had sensitivities about neighbouring countries inviting a security presence from third countries without consulting India. Third, President Jayawardene’s relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, reelected in January 1980, were cool. During the Janata government, he had made gratuitous remarks about her role in the Emergency, and in general was seen as disregarding Indian sensitivities.6 Following the July 1983 riots, clandestine Indian support to Tamil insurgent groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was stepped up so as to put pressure on the Sri Lankan (p.54) government to accommodate the Tamils, to mollify public outrage in Tamil Nadu, and respect Indian security sensitivities (Swamy 1994: 93–114). India also offered its good offices to arrange an accommodation between the government and the rebel forces. Indira Gandhi designated a special envoy, G. Parthasarathi, to talk to both the government and the Tamil parties and groups and try to arrive at a solution to devolve and share power. Parthasarathi made three visits to Sri Lanka in late 1983 and early 1984. Despite a draft agreement in late 1984 (called Annexure C) modelled on Indian federalism, which arguably went beyond the later 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA), which was to be but eventually was not accepted by a (Sri Lankan) All Party Conference due to Jayawardene’s machinations, this mediation did not bear fruit.7 India then arranged, under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, two rounds of talks between the Tamil parties and militant groups and the government in July–August 1985 in Thimphu, Bhutan. But that too did not bear fruit as the government rejected Tamil demands, which centred on their recognition as a nation, recognition of a Tamil homeland, and self-determination for Tamils. In the meantime, the government hardened its stand and, during 1986 and 1987, made a push for a military solution by sending the army to crush the rebel groups. By May 1987, it appeared as if the main rebel group, the LTTE, then supported by India, would be defeated by the army in the Jaffna peninsula. Rajiv Gandhi, under pressure of circumstances, made a decision to intervene. On 4 June 1987, the Indian air force dropped food packets in the Jaffna peninsula, violating Lankan airspace and sovereignty, ostensibly to offer relief to the civilian population in response to the government’s blanket cut-off of civil Page 5 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations supplies to the peninsula. Over June and July 1987, India pressured Sri Lanka to permit a mediatory military intervention under the ISLA of 29 July 1987, although in a separate exchange of letters, whereby India would send contingents of its army called the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to disarm the Tamil rebel groups in return for Sri Lanka amending its constitution to provide for a meaningful devolution of power to the Tamil-majority north and east, merged into a combined North-Eastern Province, and make Tamil an additional national language. Rajiv Gandhi went to Colombo to sign the agreement only after asking and getting the concurrence of the entire opposition including the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), then ruling Tamil Nadu, as well as its main rival (p.55) DMK, although he did not, constitutionally, have to seek any such concurrence (Bhasin 2001, 3: 1943; Dixit 1998: 150).8 Specifically, ISLA had the following components.9 While supporting the territorial integrity and unity of Sri Lanka, it recognized Sri Lanka as a multireligious, multi-lingual society in which each group’s identity had to be carefully nurtured. It recognized the Northern and Eastern Provinces as the historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples. It provided for the devolution of power, including the subjects of land, police, and finances, to the provinces, and the recognition of Tamil as an official language. In exchange for this, India undertook to deploy a peace-keeping force to disarm the rebel groups, while the Sri Lankan army was to be confined to the barracks in the merged NorthEastern Province. In addition, there was a supplement to the agreement consisting of an exchange of letters that addressed Indian security interests, in that Sri Lanka undertook not to allow its territory, including Trincomalee port, to be used by third powers to the detriment of India’s security, and India undertook to not allow its territory to be used for separatist militancy in Sri Lanka. The Tamil rebel groups were not a party to the agreement, although it was very grudgingly accepted with explicit reservations by Prabhakaran on 4 August 1987 in Jaffna, and with equally great reluctance by the Sinhalese. The IPKF was deployed immediately starting from 30 July 1987, and initially a token surrender of arms by the Tamil groups including the LTTE was arranged in early August. However, Prabhakaran soon went back on his initial acceptance of the accord, and afterwards began to provoke the IPKF by organizing demonstrations and a fast unto death (in September by Dileepan) against it. The situation deteriorated after the 3–5 October incident in which the Sri Lankan navy arrested over a dozen LTTE guerrillas smuggling arms and transported them to Colombo against the appeal of Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit. They committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules. High Commissioner Dixit had tried to stop the movement of the captured LTTE cadres to Colombo, but the IPKF commander in Jaffna, Major-General Harkirat Singh, refused to take orders from him, saying Dixit was not in his chain of command. On the Sri Lankan side, Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, an opponent of the accord, acted pre-emptively before President Page 6 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Jayawardene’s instructions not to take the prisoners to Colombo (in response to Dixit’s plea) could reach him. (p.56) The LTTE blamed the IPKF for this, unfairly from India’s perspective, announced a pullback from the accord, and began firing on the IPKF on 6 October, including from crowded civilian locations, killing half a dozen Indian soldiers. This led India to order an operation (Operation Pawan) against the LTTE on 6 October, commencing from 10 October. In turn, this led to a long-drawn-out guerrilla war by the LTTE against the IPKF (Dixit 1998: 209–14). The inconclusive guerrilla war lasted until the IPKF’s withdrawal by 24 March 1990. The losses suffered by the IPKF were over 1,100 men dead and a few thousand wounded. In the meantime, in November 1987, the Sri Lankan parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the (1978) constitution, setting up a devolutionary arrangement in which nine provincial councils with limited devolved powers were to be set up, including a merged North-Eastern (Tamil-speaking majority) Province. The permanence of the merger was to be decided by a referendum in the Eastern Province.10 This was meant to give effect to the ISLA (although India has always maintained that the 13th Amendment only partially and in a diluted form reflected the agreement, and has pressed for ‘full implementation’ of the agreement, though taking the 13th Amendment as a useful starting point).11 Elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council were held in November 1988, despite a boycott and armed obstruction by the LTTE. A North-Eastern Provincial Government headed by a chief minister (A. Varadaraja Perumal) was set up and began to function, however ineffectively given the LTTE’s guerrilla war, under the protection of the IPKF, although without the still-to-be-devolved land, police, and fiscal powers.

Understanding the Nature and Motivations of the Intervention A crucial question is why India, after taking the risk of violating Sri Lankan sovereignty, and over the previous few years clandestinely arming and training the Tamil militants, opted for a relatively weak devolutionary solution in the ISLA that fell far short of even India’s then relatively centralized federalism or even Annexure C of 1984. This is part of the reason why the agreement was rejected by the LTTE as falling far short of its aspirations. There was also a trust deficit in the Sri Lankan government that made the LTTE loath to surrender arms in (p.57) exchange for vague promises and mere devolution within a stillunitary state. It appears that Jayawardene was not willing to go any further for fear of his own overthrow and opposition from his cabinet, party, parliament, and public opinion. Hence, India had to either settle for the terms of devolution as they emerged in the accord, or not have an agreement, which would result in a resumption of military action against the Tamils (Dixit 1998: 149). What is crucial to understand about the 1987–90 military intervention and the subsequent trajectory of developments is the circumstances of the withdrawal (‘de-induction’) of the IPKF (Mehrotra 2011).12 President Ranasinghe Page 7 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Premadasa, elected in December 1988 and an opponent of the ISLA and the IPKF’s deployment, announced on 1 June 1989 that he wanted the IPKF withdrawn by the second anniversary of the ISLA, that is, by 29 July 1989. This resulted in a long-drawn-out battle over the withdrawal of the IPKF over the final six months of Rajiv Gandhi’s term as prime minister. Gandhi, while agreeing in principle to eventually withdraw the IPKF, refused to commit to a date and kept linking withdrawal to the implementation of devolution to the North-Eastern Provincial Council as part of the agreement. The Premadasa government began covertly arming the LTTE, which also wanted an immediate withdrawal of the IPKF, calculating that it could then overthrow the seen-to-beinadequate North-Eastern Provincial Council run by the pro-India Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) led by Perumal, as well as defeating the Sri Lankan army and gaining an independent Tamil Eelam. The demand for the IPKF’s withdrawal also began to be supported by the DMK government in Tamil Nadu, elected in January 1989, and by the Janata Dal–led opposition to the Congress in the November 1989 national election, of which electoral alliance the DMK was a partner (Swamy 1994: 310–16). This position was motivated by the perverse and unexpected outcome of the Indian intervention, intended to secure Tamil rights, that of the IPKF ending up fighting the main Tamil rebel group. After the victory of the Janata Dal-led National Front government, supported by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Left Front, Prime Minister V.P. Singh and Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral initially stuck to the stand that IPKF withdrawal was tied to the implementation of the agreement, that is, devolution (the NorthEastern Provincial Council constantly complained that Colombo had not devolved even the limited (p.58) land, police, and financial powers that were in the 13th Amendment). But on 6 January 1990, the V.P. Singh government agreed to unconditionally withdraw the IPKF by the end of March 1990 (it was actually withdrawn by 24 March 1990), thereby delinking withdrawal from devolution (Mehrotra 2011). Karunanidhi, who was asked to help bring the various Tamil groups including the LTTE under one umbrella to stabilize the North-Eastern Council, tried to do so but failed. The result was that the EPRLF leadership fled to India with the IPKF, the North-Eastern Provincial Council collapsed, and very soon war resumed between the LTTE and Colombo’s army and continued in three different phases (1990–5, 1995–2001, 2006–9) until the defeat and liquidation of the LTTE in May 2009. What were India’s motivations for the intervention of 1987–90? Was it strategic, driven by concern about the international and security alignment of the Sri Lankan government in the 1980s? Or was it driven by domestic politics, that is, by pressure from Tamil Nadu public opinion and the regional parties of Tamil Nadu (AIADMK, DMK) in their concern for the Sri Lankan Tamils? The best answer seems to be that it was a combination of overlapping and mutually reinforcing motivations in a situation where security concerns and domestic Page 8 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations politics coincided and led to an intervention of the type that was undertaken, subject to international structural constraints. To elaborate, the belief that Sri Lanka might permit a US naval facility in Trincomalee, and an electronic intelligence facility on its west coast, caused great concern and was one of the motivations for destabilizing the government by supporting the Tamil rebels even before the watershed July 1983 riots (de Silva 2012: 63; Krishna 1999: 223–4). Second, the enormous concern and pressure to do something that arose in Tamil Nadu, including from Congress Party MPs from the state, was also a factor in the post-riots period (Krishna 1999: 223–4). This has to be placed in context. While neither the Indira nor Rajiv government’s majority depended on either the MPs of its regional ally the AIADMK, nor even on the Congress MPs from Tamil Nadu, the state’s importance derived also from concerns about the possible long-term alienation of public opinion in Tamil Nadu if the Indian government ignored atrocities against Tamils in Sri Lanka. The DMK had until 1963 been a party with a separatist platform. And although this had been decisively repudiated by the party in November 1963, and was never revived after it (p.59) came to power in 1967, making Tamil Nadu a successful case of India’s unofficial nationbuilding strategy of unity through accommodation, there remained an underlying concern about the revival of separatism due to a feeling that the centre and the Congress Party were not sensitive to Tamil Nadu’s concerns about the Lankan Tamils. Hence, it was not possible to ignore the anti-Tamil policies of Sri Lanka. Additionally, at the time of the July 1987 agreement, Rajiv Gandhi had decided to try to revive the fortunes of the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu by capitalizing on a pro-Tamil intervention in Sri Lanka. Thus, from late 1987, in the context of the political vacuum after the death of two-term chief minister and AIADMK leader M.G. Ramachandran in December 1987, Gandhi visited Tamil Nadu every month in 1988 to rebuild his party.13 The Congress contested the January 1989 state assembly elections on its own without an electoral alliance for the first time since 1967, and did creditably in terms of vote share (20 per cent) given this background, even though it picked up relatively few seats. Thus, security concerns, domestic concerns at the centre about alienation in Tamil Nadu (something distinct from policy being driven by Tamil Nadu or regional party pressures, demands, or threats), and Congress revival plans in Tamil Nadu, all coincided and reinforced each other.

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations 1991–2009: Post-IPKF, Post-assassination, PostCold War The assassination of then former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur near Chennai on 21 May 1991 by the LTTE, while he was on an election campaign in Tamil Nadu, and the subsequent banning of the LTTE in India in 1992 after the act was traced to it, marked the beginning of the next phase in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. To set the latter in its larger context, Indian foreign policy underwent a gradual shift in the post-1991 period. Starting from the Page 9 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations election of the Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao in June 1991 just after the assassination, India launched a long-term economic liberalization programme that would gradually globalize the economy, with the merchandise trade–GDP ratio rising from 15 per cent in 1990 to about 43 per cent (57 per cent including trade in services) by 2012, and foreign investment bulking much larger in the economy. Parallel to this would be a pro-US shift in foreign policy for both economic and strategic reasons. In (p.60) economic terms, India’s growth strategy needed Western capital and technology, overwhelmingly from private sources. Strategically, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the implicit guarantee against China that the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 represented. And since the Kashmir insurgency supported by Pakistan erupted from December 1989, an Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir was always a possibility. In this larger context, Indian policy followed a dual track on South Asia, particularly from the time of the United Front government of I.K. Gujral, 1997–8, that had emphasized South Asian regional cooperation, particularly trade promotion, both for growth and to conduce to peace, as well as regional cooperation-building, both bilateral and via the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), for improved relations and security. In this larger context, again, and in the context of domestic policy and political shifts in Sri Lanka, India’s policy moved towards greater cooperation with Sri Lanka, particularly from the late 1990s (Basrur 2011). This shift over the 1990s and 2000s was helped by shifts in public opinion in Tamil Nadu. Shocked by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, public opinion in Tamil Nadu underwent a distinct shift, in that there was a cooling off towards the LTTE from 1991 to 2008–9. In the 1991 Lok Sabha and state assembly elections, the Congress–AIADMK alliance swept to power, AIADMK’s Jayalalitha forming the government in the state and cracking down hard on the LTTE. The LTTE was banned by the centre in 1992 after it was determined that the organization had been behind the assassination. Jayalalitha remained uncompromisingly tough on the LTTE and carried the public with her, winning the 2001 assembly election, and arresting pro-LTTE apologists like Vaiko (V. Gopalaswamy) of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), a minor party in Tamil Nadu that was a coalition partner of the 1998–9 BJP-led government. Incidentally, the pro-LTTE MDMK remained a minor party in Tamil Nadu, and other pro-LTTE fringe groups also remained marginal in Tamil Nadu politics, with the Sri Lankan Tamils issue remaining at best a second-order issue. However, the LTTE continued to operate a low-profile arms smuggling network using the Tamil Nadu coast and a local support network of sleeper cells, with apparent toleration of this by Indian intelligence, provided the LTTE did not create any internal problems for India.14 This was not a policy, but apparently a low-level informal understanding, and was (p.61) apparently violated by the LTTE by the training of (separatist) United Liberation Front of Assam cadres, support to separatist fringe elements in Tamil Nadu, and links with the bandit Page 10 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Veerappan. In retrospect, the LTTE made its biggest blunder ever in plotting the assassination, in that it seemed to have taken Tamil Nadu public support for granted on the assumption of blind ethnic solidarity, and also seemed to have made the bizarre assumption that subsequent governments at the centre could and would continue to deal with it as if the assassination of a former prime minister amounted to nothing. Sri Lankan policy on its Tamil minority also underwent a shift under President Chandrika Kumaratunga from 1994, which helped the process of improvement of relations with India. Kumaratunga put forward proposals for resolution of the conflict, which went halfway towards a federal solution, in 1995, 1997, and 2000, the last of which can be read as an improvement on the 13th Amendment (Ghosh 2003: Appendix 6, pp. 450–8). These proposals were rejected by the LTTE, which was then bent on a sovereign Tamil Eelam and would not consider anything short of that. The Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement of 1998 signed by the BJP-led government of 1998–9, operational from 2000, was part of a larger shift in both foreign economic policy, South Asia policy, and Sri Lanka policy, as well as running parallel to the process of trade liberalization in SAARC (in the form of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement and the South Asian Free Trade Area) initiated in the mid-1990s. On the trade, investment, and tourism fronts, Indo-Lanka relations grew rapidly during the 2000s, particularly during the boom years for the Indian economy of 2003–8. Sri Lanka emerged as India’s largest trading partner and largest investment destination in South Asia by 2012. The gradual liberalization of trade was reinforced by the policies of President Kumaratunga and, in the early 2000s, Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, which were felt to be serious in exploring accommodative solutions to the Tamil minority’s demands. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government broadly followed the approach of the ISLA in encouraging a negotiated solution based on devolution of power and discouraging a military solution. It refused to intervene despite the appeal for help by Kumaratunga in the April–May 2000 crisis, when the LTTE captured Elephant Pass, the access point to the Jaffna (p. 62) Peninsula, and cut off some 40,000 troops. Defence cooperation, except for training slots in Indian military academies for Sri Lankan officers and the leasing of an offshore patrol vessel to the Sri Lankan Navy in 2000, was kept in abeyance.15 This was partly because of opposition from its alliance partner, the DMK. This was the high point of the LTTE’s military power. The NDA government, in a sophisticated behind-the-scenes operation, encouraged the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of February 2002 and the subsequent negotiations, in which Norway played the role of mediator between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The process was co-chaired by the USA, the European Union, and Japan (Swamy 2010). India did not participate directly as it Page 11 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations could not talk to the LTTE, a banned organization. However, it was kept fully informed and played a behind-the-scenes role in trying to arrange a federal solution. This was, however, rejected by the LTTE, which walked out of the dialogue process after six rounds, in April 2003, leaving India and the Western world with the impression that it, not the government, was the intransigent party in the process. Three important developments changed the context of Indo-Sri Lankan relations in 2004. First, in March 2004, the LTTE split, with the bulk of its fighters in the Eastern Province defecting to the breakaway group led by Vinayakamoorthy Muralidharan, nicknamed Karuna, namely, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal, which revolted against Prabhakaran’s leadership and cooperated with the regime. Second, the UNP lost the parliamentary election, and the co-habitation arrangement between the UNP prime minister Ranil Wickramasinghe and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) president Kumaratunga came to an end. The relatively hawkish Sinhala nationalist Mahinda Rajapaksa became the prime minister, signalling a shift to a more hardline strategy vis-à-vis the LTTE. Third, the NDA government lost the May 2004 election and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government of Manmohan Singh came to power. In Sri Lanka, although the CFA was still officially in force, negotiations were in effect frozen since the LTTE’s walkout in 2003. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president in November 2005, crucially helped in his victory over the dovish Ranil Wickramasinghe by the LTTE-enforced boycott of the election by Tamil voters in the Northern Province. The already hawkish Rajapaksa was provoked by LTTE actions such the Mavil Aru incident in the (p.63) Eastern Province in July 2006, and the assassination attempts on the army chief Sarath Fonseka and the president’s brother and defence secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in 2006. The ensuing final phase of the conflict, called Eelam War IV, 2006–9, led to the rollback and defeat of the LTTE by an army that had used the period of the CFA to modernize itself, particularly since 2005, beginning with the recapture of the Eastern Province with the help of the LTTE rebel group led by Karuna in July 2006, and ending with the decimation of the LTTE in May 2009. The UPA minority government, in which the DMK was a key partner enjoying its highest-ever representation in the cabinet and council of ministers, followed a hands-off policy on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict while promoting trade and investment. On forming a minority government in Tamil Nadu with Congress support in May 2006, it also declared that the centre’s policy on Sri Lanka would be the state’s policy. In 2008–2009, while threatening to quit the UPA coalition unless the centre stopped the war in Sri Lanka, which the LTTE was losing, but not carrying out the threat, the DMK cooperated with the centre in that the state’s intelligence branch actively cooperated with the Intelligence Bureau to break up the LTTE’s smuggling network during the final phase of the war Page 12 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (Swamy 2010).16 A key part of the reason for the DMK’s cooperation in 2008–9 was that, firstly, it had a huge stake in the UPA government since it controlled key economic ministries. Secondly, bargaining power favoured the Congress, since a DMK withdrawal would not unseat the Congress as it could draw on the external support of the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party as it did after the Left withdrew support over the Indo-US nuclear deal in July 2008, and since the DMK minority government in Tamil Nadu depended on Congress support. In the 2009–11 period, key DMK ministers and Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi, a member of parliament, were under investigation for corruption in the 2G (telecom) scam. The UPA I government also kept defence cooperation in abeyance except for officer training, and continued to advocate a negotiated political solution right through to the defeat of the LTTE in 2009.17 However, sometime during its tenure, possibly as early as 2004 when J.N. Dixit was the national security adviser, but certainly after President Rajapaksa came to power in late 2005, it seems to have made a strategic decision that the LTTE was the intransigent party in the conflict, as well as a threat to Indian security due to its support to separatist fringe elements (p.64) in Tamil Nadu, and hence that India would not intervene in the event of a war breaking out on the island.18 In the event, India supplied non-lethal defensive equipment such as radars, and personnel to man the same, in response to the LTTE’s use of micro-light aircraft, five Mi-17 transport helicopters (though these were used to transport troops, and hence in combat, although they were not used as gunships), and naval intelligence, along with US intelligence, to help the Sri Lankan navy sink the LTTE’s arms smuggling fleet of ten ships in the final phase of the war, 2006–9, although without participation in the action (Gokhale 2009: 121).

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations after the LTTE: 2009 to 2015 The defeat of the LTTE and the decimation or surrender and capture of its entire leadership in a massive bloodbath took place in May 2009, just a couple of days after the Indian election results, in which the UPA, which included its partner DMK, was re-elected both nationally and in the seats from Tamil Nadu. This happened despite increasing public concern in Tamil Nadu from late 2008, as the Sri Lankan army used massive aerial and artillery bombardment to roll back the LTTE, about large-scale civilian casualties among the Tamil population and the possible denial of Tamil rights and autonomy by the government in the event of an LTTE defeat. However, public opinion in Tamil Nadu, while concerned about civilian casualties and Tamil rights, cannot be interpreted as having become pro-LTTE. Nor can the stand of either the DMK, then a Congress ally, or the AIADMK, whose leader Jayalalitha urged Indian military intervention to stop the war in its closing months as the election campaign in India was in full steam, be interpreted as being pro-LTTE. In fact, neither party took a pro-LTTE or proPrabhakaran stand even while expressing acute concern about civilian casualties and apprehensions about Tamil rights in the event of the Sri Lankan government Page 13 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations forcing a military solution to the ethnic conflict. In fact, the DMK–Congress alliance won the majority of Lok Sabha seats from the state (18 DMK including 1 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, 8 Congress); the AIADMK, which had called for Indian military intervention, lost; and Vaiko’s party, the pro-LTTE MDMK, lost all the seats it contested, with Vaiko losing his own election. Hence, at that point in time, public (p.65) opinion in Tamil Nadu could be interpreted as being concerned about the Sri Lankan Tamils’ rights, equality, and autonomy, including a separate Tamil Eelam in case these demands were denied, but not for antiIndia or pro-LTTE/Prabhakaran positions, or for any separatist sentiments as regards the separation of Tamil Nadu from India. Indeed, in the period since then, as at all times since 1963, no significant party or politician in Tamil Nadu, even those expressing the strongest sympathies for the Sri Lankan Tamils or the strongest criticism of India’s Sri Lanka policy, has claimed that Tamilians in India are discriminated against or expressed separatist sentiments. The major developments after May 2009 are the following. In geopolitical terms, China and, to a much lesser extent, Pakistan established a diplomatic presence in Sri Lanka. Pakistan supplied pilots and arms during the final phase of the Eelam War (2006–9), and China supplied arms on a larger scale, while India exercised restraint due to its earlier bad experience of fighting the LTTE, its uncertainty about the Sri Lankan government’s ultimate goals and intentions regarding the Tamils, and public sentiment in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka has since then played the ‘China card’ against India to ward off pressures to accommodate the Tamils in a political solution based on the full implementation of the 13th Amendment involving the devolution of land, police, and fiscal powers to the north and east. China has also emerged as the largest aid donor to Sri Lanka even while India has emerged as the largest trade partner, source of tourists, and one of the major direct investors. China is also building the Hambantota port, a pet project of President Rajapaksa, which India initially turned down for financial reasons, and which India is keeping under observation in case it is used to service the growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, Sri Lanka has repeatedly assured India that they will respect Indian security interests and concerns. Second, economic integration between India and Sri Lanka has proceeded apace and constrained political options. India has become Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, with trade reaching $5 billion in 2011–12 (0.6 per cent of India’s trade), with India enjoying a huge trade surplus. India has also become the largest direct investor in recent years ($800 million cumulative, $160 million in 2012), and the largest single source of tourists (176,000 or one-sixth of the influx).19 This both gives leverage with Sri Lanka and at the same time constrains options to put (p.66) pressure on Sri Lanka due to the fact that Indian economic interests have a stake in smooth trade relations with Sri Lanka.

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Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Third, domestic politics in India has evolved since May 2009 in response to the Rajapaksa regime’s policies towards the Tamil minority. While Tamil Nadu was initially quiescent, and the ruling DMK in the state, allied to the Congress Party and dependent on it for its majority in the assembly, did not make an issue of the Sri Lankan Tamils, tacitly accepting the assurances of the Rajapaksa regime that it would implement the 13th Amendment and more, that is, 13++, left undefined, public opinion in the state gradually became more concerned about the regime’s non-implementation, indeed, its movement backward on its promises. India’s decision to vote against Sri Lanka in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) twice in succession, in March 2012 and March 2013, despite such a vote potentially having an impact on India itself due to the fact that the Kashmir issue could similarly become internationalized, was due to mutually reinforcing factors, namely, pressures from Tamil Nadu parties and from the Congress own Tamil Nadu unit, and the increasingly blatant reneging on commitments made to India at the highest level by the Rajapaksa regime.20 Since the AIADMK’s victory in the state assembly election of May 2011, Chief Minister Jayalalitha has chosen to raise the issue of the Sri Lankan Tamils forcefully, and a process of ratcheting up of demands on the centre on this issue by both the AIADMK and the DMK due to political competition has unfolded. Resolutions have been passed in the Tamil Nadu assembly demanding a UN referendum on self-determination by the Tamils in Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces; there have been demands for an economic boycott, for cancellation of defence training and joint naval exercises (which were commenced after the defeat of the LTTE), and for condemnation of Sri Lanka in the UNHCR. The issue of fishing rights and the ceding of Kachchativu in the 1970s has been revived due to frequent Sri Lankan shooting and arrests of Indian fishermen over the past decade and particularly after the war, and efforts are on to reduce tensions. All this reflects a combination of political competition and frustration with the non-implementation of the Rajapaksa regime’s promises on sharing of power with the Tamils, and its ill-concealed intent to move backward rather than forward on the Tamil issue, including perhaps even gradual state-sponsored colonization of the Tamil-majority provinces. (p.67) Paradoxically, or perhaps not—see my argument later in this chapter— India took a tougher stand on the Tamil issue with Sri Lanka after the DMK left the UPA II coalition in March 2013, at the time of India’s UNHCR vote against Sri Lanka, on the grounds that the US-sponsored resolution was not strong enough, and that the centre had tried to dilute it. (The truth was that the US was against a stronger resolution that might not pass, as a number of non-Western states would have reservations in backing a stronger and more intrusive human rights resolution.) As a reaction to moves by the Rajapaksa regime, signalled by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa in May–July 2013, to either do away with the 13th Amendment and the provincial council system altogether, or dilute its devolutionary provisions, India intervened in the form of a telephone call on 17 Page 15 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations May 2013 from Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to his Sri Lankan counterpart G.L. Peiris, warning against any dilution of the 13th Amendment’s provisions or cancelling the first-ever elections to the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) that were scheduled for September 2013 (Sunday Times 2013). National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon reinforced this message in early July on his visit, pressing for full implementation of the 13th Amendment and for holding of the NPC elections.21 The implicit threat was that of a boycott of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) that was scheduled to be held in Colombo in November 2013, and/or further action at the UNHCR. This led to the NPC elections being held on schedule on 21 September 2013, which resulted in a sweeping victory for the main Tamil political coalition, the Tamil National Alliance, which had been in regular dialogue with the Indian government, and a resounding defeat for Rajapaksa’s ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition. The NPC is now the only one of the nine provincial councils not controlled by the ruling UPFA. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did not attend the Colombo CHOGM summit, sending another signal.22 The defeat of Rajapaksa and the coming to power of the new president, Maithripala Sirisena, in the January 2015 presidential election has improved relations. The Sirisena government has been attempting to correct the diplomatic tilt towards China to a greater orientation towards the West and India, and in this context the new president visited India in February 2015 and hosted a return visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in March 2015. Sri Lankan domestic politics and foreign policy are in flux and it remains to be seen how the relationship evolves.

(p.68) Interpreting the Motivations behind India’s Sri Lanka Policy Taking a historical overview of India’s Sri Lanka policy, what have been the key motivations and drivers? Has it been driven by systemic considerations? Has it been motivated by strategic concerns about the possible acquisition of facilities by the US (in the early 1980s), or by China under the Rajapaksa regime? Undoubtedly, India is extremely sensitive to any third-power presence in Sri Lanka, and Indira Gandhi’s decision to exploit Tamil grievances to destabilize the Jayawardene government in the early 1980s had this motivation among others. Likewise, concern about the Rajapaksa regime’s proximity to China during Eelam War IV (2006–9) and since, at a time of a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, has undoubtedly led Indian policy towards the competitive wooing of Rajapaksa with aid, defence training, and other inducements. However, strategic concerns alone do not explain policy. If this was so, then India could well have abandoned the Tamil minority to woo successive Sri Lankan regimes to induce bandwagoning towards itself. This has not been the case either in the 1980s or since, whether at the height of the LTTE’s power at the time of the CFA in the early 2000s, or even after the LTTE’s defeat. Hence,

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Indo-Sri Lanka Relations it is necessary to factor in domestic politics for a fuller and more holistic explanation. But what precisely does domestic politics mean, as a determinant in the context of Sri Lanka policy? Does it mean pressure to support the Lankan Tamil minority from the Tamil Nadu regional parties as a part of coalition politics? This might partly explain some developments, like the vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHCR in 2012 and 2013, or the decision to hold full defence cooperation in abeyance under both the NDA and UPA, but it is again only a partial explanation. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the strongest pro-Tamil intervention took place in the 1980s when coalition politics was not on the horizon, and when both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi enjoyed ample majorities on the Congress’s own strength in the Lok Sabha, even if one subtracted the Congress MPs from Tamil Nadu. Likewise, the strongest intervention in the post-LTTE phase came in May– July 2013 after the DMK left the UPA II government, and the latter survived without depending on either Tamil Nadu regional party and also not being dependent on the (p.69) Congress MPs from Tamil Nadu. It was in May–July 2013 that the UPA II government pressured the Rajapaksa regime, against its will, to keep the 13th Amendment intact and hold elections to the NPC. The most recent development in Indo-Sri Lanka relations, the bilateral meeting between newly sworn-in prime minister Narendra Modi and President Rajapaksa, reinforces this argument. Modi called for ‘full implementation of the 13th amendment and beyond’ even when his party, the BJP, enjoys a majority on its own, and neither the ruling AIADMK in Tamil Nadu nor the DMK are its alliance partners and it has only one member of parliament from the state (Bastians 2014). On his visit to Sri Lanka in March 2015 at the invitation of the new government of President Maithripala Sirisena, he not only repeated this advice but also advocated ‘co-operative federalism’ in a speech to the Sri Lankan parliament and visited Jaffna and met NPC Chief Minister C.V. Wigneswaran to show India’s support for Tamil aspirations. Hence, while coalition politics in the form of pressure from Tamil Nadu’s regional parties is a factor, this is an incomplete explanation. Rather, one needs to interpret domestic politics more broadly and holistically in terms of the basic nature of the Indian state and its implicit nation-building strategy to be able to explain the Indian state’s preference for accommodation of the Lankan Tamil minority. Basically, we need an explanation of why Indian governments across parties, coalitions, and personalities since 1983 have preferred an accommodative solution in Sri Lanka even when they were not dependent on Tamil Nadu’s regional parties, and even when purely strategic and economic interests would dictate turning a blind eye to Sri Lankan treatment of the Tamils. In the case of Bangladesh, for example, India has turned a blind eye to the gradual colonization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the Bengali Muslim majority and the reduction of the Buddhist Chakmas to a minority in that tract Page 17 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (their homeland) or to refugee status in India. And in the case of Myanmar, India has turned a blind eye to the problem of stateless Indians while cultivating the military regime for essentially (counter-Chinese) strategic and (Nagaland) counterinsurgency reasons over the past decade and more. Besides, the role of the states in foreign policy has often been misinterpreted as being a case of states proactively demanding a role. Actually, it was the centre that initially drew in the states, particularly the border states, so as to implement foreign policy more effectively.23 (p.70) Foreign policy towards Sri Lanka and the issue of the Sri Lankan Tamils cannot be understood without taking into account the nature of the Indian state and its unstated nation-building project, as manifested in its constitution and political practices over the past six decades. The Indian state inherited vast heterogeneity at independence, being multi-religious, multi-caste, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural, de facto federal, and, after the linguistic reorganization of states from 1956, linguo-federal, in effect, ethno-federal. It adopted a secular, federal, multi-lingual constitutional dispensation with explicit minority rights and protection against caste discrimination, in addition to equal rights and nondiscrimination in general. Political practice has flowed from this constitutional dispensation and from the inclusive, umbrella character of the Congress Party that ruled India for over four decades since independence, in that the unity of the nation and the inculcation of a sense of identification with the nation and the state have been based on policies of accommodation and inclusion. Hence, the resolution of the language conflict of the 1950s and 1960s, centred on whether Hindi should be the sole official language at the centre, was resolved in an accommodative manner with the reorganization of states on linguistic lines, establishing self-ruled homelands for all major linguistic groups, and by the retention of English as an official language by the central government and by the judiciary all over India, and from the 1960s by the creation of new states for ethnic groups in the north-east, starting with a separatist Nagaland in 1963. This accommodative strategy has been by and large successful in integrating India as a nation, most notably in the Tamil Nadu case where the DMK dropped the separatist part of its platform in 1963 and has never raised it again since, nor have even minor parties in Tamil Nadu. The foreign policy counterpart of such a national integration strategy (and national unity is the foundation of internal security and hence national security) would inevitably be a policy of sensitivity to the feelings of any section of the people of India, if agitated or mobilized, as far as discrimination or maltreatment of ethnic kinfolk is concerned.24 I would argue, from the track record analysed in this chapter, that it is this—the centre’s own sensitivity to the perceived requirements of national unity as the foundation of national security, and not only pressure from Tamil Nadu parties— that explains the broadly Tamil-sympathetic policy stance of India’s Sri Lanka policy since the July (p.71) 1983 riots. Underlying this sensitivity is the shadow Page 18 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations of the possibility of alienation leading to the revival of separatism in Tamil Nadu, a crucial state from a strategic and economic standpoint, the danger being that alienation from the Indian state and the perception of the latter as an anti-Tamil, discriminatory state could arise, at first among fringe groups, if India went along with Sri Lanka’s anti-Tamil policies. While this has not happened, and while Tamil Nadu political parties and public opinion have not turned anti-India or separatist or pro-LTTE, there is genuine concern about the fate of the Sri Lankan Tamils and a lack of trust in Sri Lankan parties and governments. The complication for Indian policy has been that the LTTE, the group nurtured by India in the mid-1980s, turned anti-India because it felt that the ISLA was far too weak, and it wanted nothing less than an independent Eelam. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi made it impossible for India to deal with the LTTE. Indian policy has therefore proceeded by making a distinction between sympathy for the situation of the Lankan Tamils and antipathy to the LTTE as a group, which roughly mirrored post-assassination public opinion in Tamil Nadu. In broader theoretical terms, the dissonance between India and Sri Lanka since 1983 has been founded on their contrasting nation-building and state-building strategies, which have been almost polar opposites. Sri Lanka has followed, almost from the outset, a Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarian state-building process, which contrasts sharply with India’s inclusive and accommodative approach. As Mohammed Ayoob argues, the state-building process in its early stages impinges on relations with neighbouring states, and hence domestic politics cannot be separated from foreign policy (Ayoob 1995). Hence, it is necessary to move theoretically beyond not only realism to understand Indian policy on Sri Lanka, but also beyond extensions of it, like neoclassical realism, which merely incorporates domestic inputs. For while realism is clearly inadequate for the reasons just explained, even neoclassical realism can at best accommodate domestic inputs such as pressures from Tamil Nadu, but cannot explain why Indian policy has been sympathetic to Lankan Tamils even when the centre is not beholden to Tamil Nadu. The best fit would be a theory of the Ayoobian type that roots foreign policy behaviour in the state-building exercise and its external fallouts, in this case in the contrast between inclusive and majoritarian strategies for state building and nation building. This would explain Indian policy by (p.72) the Indian state’s sensitivity to Tamil Nadu’s concerns about Sri Lankan Tamils because of the implications for alienation, and hence for the nation’s psychological unity, and hence for long-term national security. To conclude, in a larger perspective, India’s relations with Sri Lanka raise three general issues for Indian foreign policy that need to be thought through to evolve a broad set of principles/guidelines. First, what position should India take on normative issues concerning democracy, human rights, and the treatment of minorities? Second, what should be the role of the states in foreign policy? Third, what should be the role of ethnic links, if any, in foreign policy? Guidelines for the last two need to be evolved in a way that do not undermine national unity Page 19 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and domestic harmony; that is, in the event that states and ethnic links are given a place in foreign policy, no state or group within India should feel that this is done on a discriminatory basis. Thus, India’s relations with Sri Lanka, although seemingly an isolated relationship, have much broader implications in a world of discriminatory states and ethnic links instantaneously magnified by modern communications, increasing federalization of Indian politics, and the growing strength of democratic and human rights norms. References Bibliography references: Ayoob, M. 1995. The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Basrur, R. 2011. ‘Foreign Policy Reversal: The Politics of Sri Lanka’s Economic Relations with India’, in E. Sridharan, ed., International Relations Theory and South Asia, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 242–59. Bastians, D. 2014. ‘Modi–Mahinda Talks: Indian PM Renews 13 Plus call’, Daily FT, 28 May, available at: http://www.ft.lk/2014/05/28/modi-mahinda-talks-indianpm-renews-13-plus-call/ (accessed 22 February 2015). Bhasin, A.S., ed. 2001. India–Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict, 1947–2000, 5 vols (New Delhi: India Research Press). de Silva, K.M. 2012. Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE (New Delhi: Penguin). DeVotta, N. 2004. Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Dixit, J.N. 1998. Assignment Colombo (New Delhi: Konark). (p.75) Fernando, Shamindra. ‘India’s Warships to remain with Sri Lanka’, The Island Online, available at: http://www.island.lk/2009/11/16/news7.html (accessed 1 May 2015). Ganguly, R. 1999. Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflict (New Delhi: Sage). Ghosh, P.S. 2003. Ethnicity versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Sage). Gokhale, N.A. 2009. Sri Lanka from War to Peace (New Delhi: Har Anand). Krishna, S. 1999. Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and the Question of Nationhood (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Mehrotra, L. 2011. My Days in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Har Anand). Page 20 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Sahadevan, P. 1995. India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Kalinga). Sunday Times. 2013. ‘Govt. Going Ahead with NPC Polls; 13th A intact’, 26 May, available at: http://www.sundaytimes.lk/130526/columns/govt-going-ahead-withnpc-polls-13th-a-intact-46167.html (accessed 21 February 2015). Suryanarayan, V. 2005. Conflict over Fisheries in the Palk Bay Region (New Delhi: Lancer). Swamy, M.R.N. 1994. Tigers of Lanka (New Delhi: Konark). ———. 2003. Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran (New Delhi: Konark). ———. 2010. The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s Story (New Delhi: Sage). Notes:

(1.) For a very select list of works on India–Sri Lanka relations from varied perspectives, see Bhasin (2001), de Silva (2012), DeVotta (2004), Dixit (1998), Ganguly (1999: chapter 6), Ghosh (2003), Gokhale (2009), Krishna (1999), Mehrotra (2011), Swamy (1994, 2003, 2010), and the annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, over the years. (2.) See Ghosh (2003: Appendix III and IV, pp. 440–4), for the two pacts. (3.) See Suryanarayan (2005) for an account of the Kachchativu and maritime boundary issue. (4.) Interview with former High Commissioner S.J.S. Chhatwal, 10 September 2013. (5.) See Bhasin (2001, 3: 1466–536) for official statements and parliamentary debates. (6.) An internal Emergency was declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 26 June 1975, which lasted until the March 1977 elections which she lost, on dubious grounds of threats to internal security. (7.) See Dixit (1998: 22–3 and Annexure V, pp. 368–70 for the text of Annexure C proposals). (8.) The DMK did not initially criticize the accord, but after Prabhakaran’s speech of 4 August 1984 criticizing the accord while only grudgingly accepting it, N.V.N. Somu of the DMK echoed this criticism in the Lok Sabha on 18 August 1987, while not disowning the accord (Bhasin 2001, 4: 2019–21). The criticism that the accord should not have been signed by India but by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, and that Prabhakaran was kept in the dark till the last moment, has been contested by Indian diplomat Hardeep S. Puri, who Page 21 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations discussed the terms with Prabhakaran in Jaffna in July prior to the accord. He maintains that Prabhakaran agreed to the main points, but also that he wanted India to sign it with Sri Lanka and did not want to sign an agreement himself. Interview with Ambassador Hardeep S. Puri, 9 May 2014. (9.) See Dixit (1998: Annexures II and III, pp. 355–61) for the texts of ISLA and the letters exchanged. (10.) The text of the 13th Amendment is available at: http://www.satp.org/ satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/actsandordinance/13th_Amendment.pdf (accessed 19 February 2015). (11.) Interview with former High Commissioner L.L. Mehrotra, 11 September 2013. (12.) Interview with former High Commissioner L.L. Mehrotra, 11 September 2013. (13.) Interview with Mani Shankar Aiyar, a key aide to Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s, 30 April 2012. (14.) Interview with former High Commissioner N.N. Jha, 2 October 2013. (15.) Anonymous interviews with Indian diplomat and journalists in 2014; also see Fernando. This leasing of a patrol vessel, which was renewed later by the UPA government in 2007 along with that of another such vessel, has to be seen in the context of a perception by both the NDA and UPA governments that—in the context of the 1995, 1997, and 2000 proposals for power-sharing by the Sri Lankan governments and the LTTE walkout from the Cease Fire Agreement in 2003—that the LTTE was the intransigent party to the conflict. (16.) Interview with M.R. Narayan Swamy, 30 May 2014. (17.) The annual reports of the Ministry of External Affairs record a consistent official position throughout on urging Sri Lanka to go for a negotiated solution based on accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all communities. On defence cooperation, the UPA renewed the lease of an offshore patrol vessel transferred earlier by the NDA as well as another vessel in 2007; see note 28 for the context of such decisions. (18.) Interview with M.R. Narayan Swamy, 30 May 2014. Also see Swamy (2010) for an account of this phase. The post-2005 phase of Indian policy is the least transparent to researchers so far. (19.) See http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IndiaSriLankaRelations.pdf and http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ Sri_Lanka_January_2014.pdf (both accessed 15 February 2015). Page 22 of 23

Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (20.) However, the lame-duck UPA II government abstained on the US-moved UNHCR resolution on Sri Lanka in March 2014 because the resolution called for an international inquiry, something that would have set an uncomfortable precedent for India in that it could have been cited by Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir. (21.) Interview with Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Joint Secretary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives), 30 September 2013. (22.) A critical view of India’s Sri Lanka policy is that of former Foreign Secretary (2009–11) Nirupama Rao who was also High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (2004–6) who holds that Sri Lanka is a major foreign policy failure for India in that the policy was passive and reactive and no attempt to combat the LTTE narrative and champion the Tamil cause from an alternative perspective during both NDA and UPA, and in the case of the UPA there was no Plan B in case the Rajapaksa regime reneged on its promises to share power with the Tamils in exchange for diplomatic support against the LTTE despite there being grounds for suspecting his bona fides due to his repeated double speak on the issue of power-sharing. Interview with Ambassador Nirupama Rao, 9 January 2015. (23.) Interview with former High Commissioner S.J.S. Chhatwal, 10 September 2013. (24.) For the concept of kin state, see Ganguly (1999: chapter 1).

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India–Bangladesh Relations post-colonial nationalism.2 Given the overwhelming size of India, it comes as little surprise that India is most significant for Bangladesh’s bilateral relations.3 This chapter advances the argument that domestic politics, the second of the three levels of analyses formulated by Waltz (1959), is the key driver of India– Bangladesh relations.4 While the role of the international system and key personalities cannot altogether be dismissed, their impact is considerably less compared to that of domestic politics in deciding the nature of India–Bangladesh relations. Set in this framework, this chapter unfolds through several sections. The first looks into the early days of the relationship and chronicles the evolution of bilateral ties between these two states, identifying areas of convergences and (p.77) divergences and explaining why relations gradually hardened over time. The second section will deal with contemporary issues bedevilling India–Bangladesh relations in the new millennium. The third section will return to the three levels of analysis just referred to and validate the case for the primacy of the level of domestic politics over the other two as a possible explanation of shifts in this relationship. This chapter chronicles the Indian view of the relationship, exposing in its wake the underlying assumptions, problems, and consequences.

Early Years The colonial history of the subcontinent set the broad parameters of India– Bangladesh relations.5 The communalization of politics in the 1940s that led to the Partition of India saw a massive inflow of refugees to West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, the bulk of whom were caste Hindus. Religion was the basis for the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947. While a part of Bangladesh’s national identity was based upon language, culture, and heritage, the other base was formed of religious separatism and a latent fear of an all-encompassing Indian hegemony (Chakrabarty 2004; J. Chatterjee 1994, 2007; Sengupta 2012). East Pakistan resisted the unfair dominance of its western counterpart, particularly the imposition of Urdu. When Pakistan prevented the leader of the largest political party, the Awami League (AL), from forming the federal government in 1970, fearing the loss of Punjabi political domination, violence erupted in many parts of East Pakistan. Pakistan unleashed unprecedented terror in the East, and an exodus of refugees began to flow into India, creating problems of rehabilitation and law and order.6 Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister of India, decided to intervene militarily in the crisis. In spite of an antiIndia alliance consisting of Pakistan, China, and the US, and bolstered by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, India plunged into the war and decisively defeated Pakistan, and helped the Mukti Bahini fighters to liberate Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971.7 Relations between India and Bangladesh were healthy and robust during the initial years. The Friendship Treaty (1972) was signed during the Indian prime Page 2 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations minister’s first visit to Bangladesh that institutionalized close cooperation. However, issues like the maritime boundary, the sharing of arms and ammunition captured in the liberation war, the (p.78) sharing of Ganges waters, and disputes over the Muhurir Char8 and Purbasha island in the Bay of Bengal9 created major irritants in relations. Though India and Bangladesh began their relations on a positive note, they were unable to find mutually acceptable solutions to these problems. Both leaders met with strong opposition at home and began to show authoritarian tendencies in response. Bangladesh was formed on the dual identities of faith and language, and there was always a tension between these identities. As Bangladesh moved away from its politics of linguistic nationalism, Islam once again emerged as a potent political rallying point. Even Mujib, in an effort to outbid his opponents during his final days in power, began to compromise on Islam and started to move away from secularism, which had been one of the four pillars of state policy as enunciated by him (Pant 2007: 232–3). With Mujib’s assassination and the retreat of democracy in Bangladesh, Islam re-emerged as one of the anchors of Bangladesh’s national identity. Bangladesh also gradually became wary of India’s overbearing presence. As Jacques’s (2000) study reveals, India–Bangladesh relations gradually became fraught, with India being accused of insensitivity, intolerance, and high-handedness, and Bangladesh erring on the side of ultra-sensitivity, unfounded suspicion, and mistrust. During 1975–96, relations plummeted. India criticized the military takeover in Bangladesh and the assassination of Sheikh Mujib. Mujib’s tragic assassination saw Ziaur Rahman becoming the next president of Bangladesh.10 Zia wanted to distance himself consciously from India, and returned to the Islamic roots of Bangladesh’s identity, cultivating ties with Pakistan, China, and the West. India gave anti-Zia elements political shelter. The insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and its militarization, due to which Chakmas migrated to India, and the Shanti Bahini operating from Indian soil, compounded the problems. Migration, and Bangladesh’s reluctance to address issues like cross-border illegal trade, further alienated ties. Bangladesh became vocal and started internationalizing the contentious water sharing issue. Relations improved marginally during the Janata regime in India (1977–80),11 with a short-term agreement on the water issue (Thakar 2010: 65–6). General Hossain Mohammad Ershad came to power in a bloodless coup on 24 March 1982 as the chief martial law administrator. He suspended the constitution and political parties and took over as president on 11 December 1983 (General Books LLC 2010). He broadly continued (p.79) the direction of President Zia’s foreign policy, and was keen to legitimize his own image and unpopular military rule. He attached importance to bilateral relations with India within this framework, and undertook three visits to India. On the first visit (6–7 Page 3 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations October 1982), two memoranda of understanding on the sharing of Ganges waters at Farakka and a joint economic commission were signed. These, however, failed to revive ties. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984–9) made several diplomatic moves to improve relations with neighbours. But relations with Bangladesh remained stagnant, as disputes over the maritime boundary, the claim over South Talpatti Island (New Moore), water sharing, illegal migration, Bangladesh’s support of insurgent groups in India’s north-eastern states, and insurgency in CHT could not be addressed with trust and commitment (S. Datta 2008, 2010; Pant 2007; Pattanaik 2010, 2011). After Ershad was removed from power on 4 December 1990, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed’s neutral transitional government declared a state of emergency, restored civil liberties, and the first democratic elections were held on 27 February 1991. The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) formed the government, and Khaleda Zia was sworn in as prime minister. The BNP’s preelection campaign included standing up to India’s hegemony and following an autonomous foreign policy. As Pattanaik (2011: 392) puts it, ‘The BNP’s recurrent theme has been that the election of the Awami League would lead to erosion of sovereignty and emergence of Bangladesh as a client state of India due to the League’s “subservient foreign policy”.’ However, the BNP made limited attempts to forge close economic relations with India. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia came to India and signed an agreement on the Tin Bigha corridor in 1992. India formally granted perpetual lease to Bangladesh over the 1.5 hectare Tin Bigha corridor that had long separated an enclave of Bangladeshi nationals from their homeland. But given the BNP’s fundamental mistrust of India, the overall relations remained frozen. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s open encouragement of insurgents in the north-east further aggravated ties (Bhaumik 2006).

Contemporary Issues Water

In 1947, while India and Pakistan emerged as two separate political entities, the river regimes of the subcontinent remained the same (p.80) (Upreti 1994: 141). The sharing of river waters became contentious for the first time during Mujib’s rule. India decided in 1951 to construct a barrage at Farakka.12 Pakistan objected to this undertaking as it would have affected the flow of the Ganges waters into East Pakistan (Upreti 1994: 140). The barrage and the feeder canal were finally commissioned in 1975 following an interim agreement signed between India and Bangladesh on 18 April 1975. A joint declaration following Mujib’s visit to New Delhi in May 1974 had recognized that ‘during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges, there might not be enough water to meet the needs of the Calcutta port and full requirements of Bangladesh, [and] the fair

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India–Bangladesh Relations weather flow of the Ganges in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the requirements of the two countries’ (Government of Bangladesh 1974). But differences arose over the augmentation of the fair weather flow of the Ganges. An agreement on 5 November 1977 for a five-year period13 provided for the withdrawing of 20,500 cusecs and 34,500 cusecs of water from the Ganges by India and Bangladesh, respectively, during the leanest period (21–30 April). But this agreement did not receive a favourable response in many quarters in India. After the coming to power of the first non-Congress Janata government in 1977, Morarji Desai began talks with Zia that paved the way for a five-year agreement on river usage. The return of Indira Gandhi in 1980 and the assassination of General Zia, leading to the military takeover of Bangladesh under General Ershad, prevented any finalization of the treaty. Bangladesh urged dam construction up front in Nepal, which India saw as a ploy to regionalize the issue. The stalemate ultimately gave way to the two-year agreement between Rajiv Gandhi and General Ershad in 1985, but Ershad was forced to resign in 1990. Under the BNP, despite a number of protracted and acrimonious meetings, no agreement on water sharing could be inked. As one commentator puts it, ‘Dhaka stuck to its previous opinion that reservoirs needed to be built in Nepal. That was not acceptable to India, which saw another attempt to regionalize the Farakka issue’ (Hossain 1998: 139; Rahaman 2009; Sood and Mathukumalli 2011). On 12 December 1996, Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina and H.D. Deve Gowda of the Janata Dal United signed a treaty on the sharing of Ganges water. Hasina was personally committed to finding a just and acceptable solution to the Farakka issue (Hossain 1998: 140). She (p.81) negotiated on the basis of bilateralism and had the sagacity to involve the veteran chief minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu. This was a master stroke in two ways. First, it ensured that the treaty would not be victimized by the imperatives of domestic politics, and second, as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was a supporter of the United Front government in New Delhi, Basu’s consent was critical before the deal could go through (Hossain 1998: 131–50). River Teesta in the northern parts of both West Bengal and Bangladesh is a major source of irrigation and water. The sharing of its water becomes problematic due to the construction of barrages by both states that compromise its flow in the dry season. Both upper riparian and lower riparian interests are involved, and the two states have broadly agreed on a framework to reconcile these diverse commitments. Since the era of coalition politics beginning in 1991, the claims of bordering provinces or states have assumed much greater significance for India. The government has difficulty articulating bold policies vis-à-vis its neighbours. Indian foreign policy is yet to develop the means to Page 5 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations incorporate federal concerns in its dealings with neighbouring states. Hence, New Delhi’s inability to involve the chief minister of West Bengal in the tardy negotiations over the Teesta water sharing arrangement led to the latter’s lastminute veto. The second image is much more nuanced now in the South Asian context. Simple Delhi–Dhaka negotiations do not always work; unless federal grievances are accommodated, there is little scope for a genuine breakthrough on the issue. Needless to say, such setbacks strengthen anti-India sentiments and weaken the legitimacy of secular political forces in Bangladesh (Mukharji 2011: 371–2). The decision to construct the controversial Tipaimukh hydroelectric power project in November 2011 in the state of Manipur has fuelled anti-Indian sentiments considerably.14 Bangladesh had strong reservations, fearing the flooding of Sylhet district in particular. India’s insistence that Dhaka’s concerns would be accommodated was interpreted as an assurance that work would not commence unless Bangladesh gave its approval.15 The signing of the agreement was looked upon as a breach of that tacit undertaking; and evidently, little has been done to meet Bangladesh’s concerns. Climate and human security issues remain critical but grossly neglected areas in India’s relations with Bangladesh.16 Alarmingly, local climate changes in India are expected to have higher adverse consequences in Bangladesh, and this would trigger (p.82) environmental refugees into India. However, no institutional and legal agreement at the bilateral level or adequate policies exist to reduce the vulnerability of people, posing significant risks for stakeholders in the process (Panda 2010). Boundary and Border Conflict

India shares its largest land boundary with Bangladesh—4,096 kilometres, somewhat tortuously (and insensitively) defined by Sir Cyril Radcliffe on the paper map sketching the Partition lines across India in 1947.17 Along with this line that cut through the heart of the communities, the border drawn by Radcliffe left behind landholdings called enclaves (territory notionally belonging to one side, but totally surrounded by the territory of the other), with India having 111 such enclaves in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh having fifty five in India. There also remains the problem of Adversely Possessed Lands (APL)—land that had been habitually used for cultivation or other agrarian activities by a community, which the Radcliffe ‘award’ took away from them through artificial fencing.18 By 2009, the problem of the enclaves had become more complicated as the population increased, turning over 50,000 people on both sides virtually ‘stateless’. Despite attempts to resolve the issue, the border dispute and tension worsened in 2001. In a major clash between the armed forces of the two countries in mid-April 2001, the lives of nineteen soldiers were lost. Sheikh Hasina expressed ‘regret’ over the deaths of the Indian soldiers to Prime Minister Vajpayee, but at the same time used the incident at home to strengthen her position against the BNP, claiming that the military’s actions demonstrated Page 6 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations her willingness to stand up to India.19 While tensions soon abated, problems nevertheless remained. During the rule of the BNP–Jamaat coalition (2001–6), frequent violations of the international border were reported. With the return of Sheikh Hasina in 2008, a number of landmark agreements were signed during the visits undertaken by the respective prime ministers to each other’s capital cities. In the much improved climate of mutual understanding and trust, both sides signed the Protocol to the Land Boundary Act of 1974 on 6 September 2011 in Dhaka, by which the de facto situation was turned de jure, and the Radcliffe Line was accepted with minor modifications in the APLs.20 (p.83) While Bangladesh gained constitutional ratification, the issue remains in abeyance in the Indian Parliament, owing to stiff opposition from the present chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, who made it clear that she would not allow it. Maintaining that people living in the areas to be exchanged must be asked first, she wrote, ‘It must be noted that our state of West Bengal will get only about 7,000 acres of land but will have to cede nearly 17,000 acres of land to Bangladesh… . This cannot be accepted without taking into confidence and consent of the local people who live in the transferable areas’ (Statesman 2013). Migration and Islamist Militancy

The demographic impact of large-scale migration from Bangladesh has serious implications for India’s national security and development.21 It has changed the demography of Tripura, leading to militant and violent tribal unrest, and has also threatened serious social turmoil in a number of states in India’s north-east. The ethnic turmoil in Assam claimed thousands of lives and strained inter-community ties. As expressed most graphically in the Sinha (1998) report, ‘This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of the geostrategically vital districts of Lower Assam. The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim-majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made.’22 The reluctance of Bangladeshi migrants to give up their religious and ethnic identities often contributed to the internationalization of regional separatism.23 With the rapid rise of Islamist ideology across South Asia in the wake of the Talibanization of Afghanistan, Bangladesh also underwent considerable religious extremism. According to Behera (2011: 14), Bangladeshi migration has been securitized by the ‘developing nexus between Muslim immigrants and thriving, separatist insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist groups like HuJI [Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami] and others.’24

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India–Bangladesh Relations Bangladesh saw a significant rise in Islamic militancy during the BNP’s rule (2001–6) as the Jamaat and Islamic Oikya were a part of the ruling coalition. The BNP’s reliance on overtly religious organizations (p.84) encouraged fundamentalism and militancy to take deep root within the state. This pervasive trend within the state spilled into India. Bangladesh became a transit, a haven, and a launching point for Pakistan-based terrorist groups which targeted India. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and HuJI established their bases and had a significant presence within Bangladesh, and used its territory to launch terrorist attacks against India.25 The arrest of three LeT militants revealed the presence of Pakistan-backed terrorist groups. The Bangladesh unit of HuJI has, for long, been backing operations by the LeT in Bangladesh, with the LeT reportedly funding the operations of local militant groups. Allegedly, they received political patronage from the BNP–Jamaat-e-Islami government headed by Begum Khaleda Zia (SATP 2010). In 2005, the Government of India prepared a list of 172 Indian insurgent group camps located along the border areas of the CHT, the Sylhet division, and Chittagong. In addition, a list of 307 criminals/ insurgents was handed over to Border Security Force and Bangladesh Rifles. These insurgents are believed to be supported by Bangladeshi extremist outfits sponsored by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and with money coming from the Gulf. India has received periodic reports about the ISI fomenting anti-Indian sentiments and assisting Islamist groups with arms, training, and resources to indulge in terrorist and criminal activities against India.26 Moreover, there are intelligence reports alleging the use of northeastern territory by Islamist groups as a transit to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir courtesy the cooperation of the Bangladeshi state. In the words of Mehrotra (2008), ‘ULFA is also said to be a constituent of the Bangladesh Islamic Manch, a united council under HuJI’s leadership. Inter-regional linkages of these groups further worsen the internal security situation in India.’ After the AL’s return to power, Bangladesh has put in place a powerful and effective programme of counter-insurgency. Several insurgent camps operating in Bangladesh territory and feeding into India were dismantled and a number of prominent militant leaders of India’s north-east who had taken refuge in Bangladesh were captured and handed over to India. More significantly, the two states moved closer to institutionalize the process of handing over terrorists and dreaded criminals. Towards this goal, India and Bangladesh signed a landmark agreement on the extradition of criminals (along with an agreement on a friendlier visa regime) in January 2013.27 (p.85) Trade and Transit

The structural asymmetry between India and Bangladesh is also reflected in their economic relations. From 1995 until 2005–6, India was Bangladesh’s chief exporter. In 2011–12, India’s total exports to Bangladesh reached $5.84 billion. But this hides the substantial volume of illegal exports, which are as high as legal exports, and the sizable but unaccounted amount of trade in services. Page 8 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations However, Indian exports have dominated trade, while Indian imports from Bangladesh remain paltry. According to India’s former foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey (2013), the trade deficit was $476 million in 1980, increased to $140 million in 1990, and then to nearly a billion dollars in 2000. It increased from $1.5 billion in 2003–4 to $3 billion in 2007–8. The latest available figures for 2011–12 show a trade balance in favour of India of $3.2 billion. Though this is a major bone of contention with Bangladesh, most commentators recognize the structural inevitability of this imbalance. Bangladesh has a huge deficit in its trade with China as well. While India has consistently offered concessions in removing items from the negative list, Bangladesh did not find these concessions significant, as they did not include items of export interest in areas where it has competitive advantage like jute and jute goods, footwear, readymade garments, knitwear, and ceramic products.28 The Government of India was frustrated with Dhaka’s lack of appreciation of these concessions. At the 14th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit held in New Delhi in 2007, India announced duty-free access to all imports from Bangladesh that were not on India’s negative list under the South Asian Free Trade Area Agreement. More concessions followed, the last two including forty-seven items at the time of Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India in 2010, and forty-six textile items during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in 2011. With this, practically all the items in which Bangladesh has an export interest in the Indian market have been removed from the negative list (Dubey 2013). India initially provided credits and loans on exceptionally soft terms and conditions, in the form of grants for urgent relief and rehabilitation. Subsequently, the financial assistance assumed the form of export credits, which suffered from bureaucratic inertia at both ends and were tied to India’s needs. When Sheikh Hasina visited India in January 2010, (p.86) India announced an extension of a credit of $1 billion to Bangladesh, the highest bilateral assistance provided to any state by New Delhi. The bulk of this credit, amounting to $200 million, is in the form of grants, and is tied to transport infrastructure projects. If connectivity infrastructure materializes in the near future, as promised by Sheikh Hasina in 2010, then India would have a huge stake in the railway, roadway, and riverine infrastructure of Bangladesh that would benefit Bangladesh immensely. Since relations are guided by politics and not purely economic considerations, unless major political differences are sorted out, the proposals might not get off the ground at all. The politics of mistrust that prevails in Bangladesh explains the tragedy of India’s private investment plans in Bangladesh so far. The proposed gas pipeline project is a case in point. The India–Bangladesh–Myanmar gas project was mooted during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) I regime, but despite positive signals at the beginning from Bangladesh, the project did not Page 9 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations materialize. Bangladesh put forward conditions before India.29 The BNP had originally shown interest in the project, but political and electoral compulsions stemming from reliance on Islamic parties stymied the decision in the end. The BNP linked the gas pipeline to bilateral issues of trade with Nepal and Bhutan. In 2005, the Tatas put forward a proposal for the investment of nearly 3 billion dollars in Bangladesh for a steel plant, fertilizer factories, and power plants based on the local supply of gas. But the prospect of an Indian company using Bangladesh’s resources, particularly natural gas, was not politically feasible in Bangladesh. As former foreign secretary and erstwhile ambassador to Bangladesh Muchkund Dubey (2013) succinctly puts it, ‘the big-neighbour–smallneighbour syndrome, which impels Bangladesh to look with suspicion at every major initiative for linking its economy with that of India, has also been in operation in the process of decision-making on this issue.’ Similarly, despite obvious economic benefits accruing to Bangladesh, it has steadfastly refused to grant transit benefits to India as the issue of transit remains embedded within this larger political framework.30 Transit benefits are incremental; they are linked to wider linkages and steady investment in the physical, financial, and information infrastructure of that entire area as part of the land-based ‘Look East’ initiative of Indian foreign policy.31 The benefits of such a policy, needless to say, would be considerable for Bangladesh. But the strategic advantage that (p.87) Bangladesh sees in locking up India’s north-east trumps the promising economic benefits of connectivity, strong regionalism, and the opening up of borders.

Three Levels of Analysis Personalities

Personalities have not been decisively influential in determining the trajectory of India–Bangladesh relations. Sheikh Mujib and Indira Gandhi enjoyed a cordial relationship, and were instrumental in laying the foundations for the AL’s ties with the Congress Party. Both had huge domestic support bases and were largely plebiscitary politicians, who were keen to dominate their respective states. Their camaraderie was based on Indira Gandhi’s vigorous and proactive role in assisting the liberation movement of Bangladesh. Mujib remained grateful for this forever. His strong linguistic nationalism and commitment to ideas of socialism and secularism brought him closer to Indira Gandhi, who shared similar political values. Mujib’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina, carries the legacy of her father. She has consistently taken a pro-Indian stand and enjoyed warm relations with Indian leaders across the board. But her ties have been particularly close to the Congress leader Sonia Gandhi, and with India’s Prime Minister under the UPA I and II regimes, Manmohan Singh. Her personal efforts played a critical role in drastically improving India–Bangladesh ties after the disastrous period of 2001–6, when relations touched their nadir during the BNP– Jamaat rule.

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India–Bangladesh Relations General Zia and Ershad had no attraction for Indian leaders, whom they disliked and did not trust. On the Indian side, Morarji Desai was keen to improve India’s relations with Bangladesh as part of a new neighbourhood policy based on cooperation. But he did not rule long enough to develop any bonding with Zia. It is instructive that the one-time meeting of the two leaders in London produced a temporary agreement on the sharing of Ganges river water. With Indira Gandhi’s return to power in 1980, relations nosedived as she held Zia responsible for Mujib’s assassination. Ershad continued Zia’s line and could not befriend Indian leaders, thereby not risking any radical alteration in Bangladesh’s official approach towards India. Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral (April 1997 to March 1998) was genuinely interested in (p.88) improving relations with all neighbouring states, including Bangladesh. His ‘Gujral Doctrine’ guided India’s new approach of making asymmetric and non-reciprocal concessions to its smaller neighbours for building trust. India’s initiatives to improve relations with its neighbours began with a dialogue with Bangladesh (Upreti 2009: 214). Begum Khaleda Zia (1991–6, 2001–6) held India responsible for her husband’s assassination, and this hostility found manifestation in her relations with India. No Indian leader felt comfortable with her, as she deliberately used anti-India sentiment as the trump card of her political strategy. She remained close to the Islamists and, during her second term in office, ruled Bangladesh in coalition with them. She warmed up to both Pakistan and China with the intention of forging an anti-India strategic nexus in South Asia. She gave safe sanctuary and political support to the insurgents in India’s troubled north-eastern states in their armed conflicts against the Indian state. She allowed the ISI of Pakistan to use Bangladesh as a transit to inflict regular terrorist strikes against India. While very recently she had indicated a willingness to reassess relations with India, given the trajectory of strategic developments in the subcontinent, this seems more a ploy aimed at her domestic audience rather than a move to resolve outstanding issues across the border. The Regional/International

Regional and global trends likewise have been rather marginal in affecting this relationship. A part of this is explained by the military and economic weakness of Bangladesh that makes it an unattractive strategic asset. But over the years, the role of international dynamics has gained in prominence. This is particularly true in Bangladesh’s fledgling relations with China and guarded normalization of ties with Pakistan during Khaleda Zia’s rule. A Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed between Bangladesh and China during the visit of Begum Khaleda Zia to Beijing. This was Bangladesh’s security guarantee against a probable hard-line Indian approach in case Bangladesh’s growing irredentism invited a reprisal from New Delhi. China not only checkmates India on the north-eastern frontier, but allows strategic intrusiveness in South Asia to be reinforced further. According to Pant (2007: 235), ‘This strategy is not typical of Bangladesh’s

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India–Bangladesh Relations foreign policy, but other states in (p.89) the region—including both Pakistan and Nepal—have frequently used China to try to counterbalance India.’ Bangladesh’s decision to allow China to use the Chittagong port may pose a major threat for India. In the event of anti-Indian political forces coming to power in Bangladesh, the forging of a strategic nexus consisting of Pakistan, China, and Bangladesh cannot be ruled out. The fact that Bangladesh has opted for a defence pact with China rather than the United States means a conscious desire on Dhaka’s part to invest in anti-Indian coalitions in South Asia, since America’s relationship with India has metamorphosed fundamentally in the new millennium.32 While a perceptible unease marked relations with India during BNP–Jamaat rule, Bangladesh and Pakistan ties improved dramatically, causing concern in New Delhi. Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf visited Dhaka and expressed ‘regret’ for the ‘excesses’ committed in the 1971 war. He followed up his conciliatory gestures by signing a series of agreements with Bangladesh that included a decision to extend an existing defence cooperation treaty (Ramachandran 2002). The AL’s return to power and Pakistan’s deepening domestic crisis reversed this normalization after 2008. But given the polarized nature of Bangladesh’s politics, there is every chance that a BNP government would revive normalization, with adverse security implications for India. India and Bangladesh share a broadly similar position regarding South Asian cooperation, but cannot arrive at a consensus on concrete issues due to obvious structural differences. While Bangladesh underlines the need for open trade, excluding the building of fences along the Indo-Bangladesh border, India upholds the fencing project for security and control of illegal infiltration. But Dhaka complains of the high-handedness of the Indian Border Security Force in dealing with poor Bangladeshis wanting to cross the border to trade local products. While contentious bilateral issues have been kept outside the SAARC framework, India lacks interest in investing in SAARC. Differences over trade and transit issues, river sharing, and common resource management have prevented both countries from offering a strong, united front for South Asian regionalism. Close economic linkages between Bangladesh and north-eastern India would usher in economic prosperity, neutralizing insurgency and political unrest in the region. India and Bangladesh have different expectations from SAARC, which stem primarily from (p.90) dissimilar models of South Asian regional cooperation. While India has always visualized the subcontinent as a region whose architecture is drafted by New Delhi, Bangladesh, like other smaller states of the region, sees SAARC as a bulwark against Indian political, strategic, and economic domination of the region.33

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India–Bangladesh Relations The Domestic Level

The principal driver of India–Bangladesh relations remains the second image, that is, domestic politics. Commentators are broadly united on the enormous salience of political identity. For example, the idea that the BNP’s electoral campaign against the AL on the latter’s pro-India connections was a key factor in the BNP’s electoral victory in 1991 is widely accepted among media persons and scholars. Khaleda Zia, as the leader of the seven-party alliance, had led the Farakka march against the Ershad government on several occasions to mobilize public support for her cause. Later, both AL and BNP had repeatedly staged such mobilizations against each other. These efforts illustrate that antiIndianness is a potent factor in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, and to the extent that the problem gets perpetuated by mutual inflexibility and lack of understanding, it seems to contribute to the weakening of the salience of secular political formations within Bangladesh (Iftekharuzumman 1989: 232). Thus, Indo-Bangladesh relations remain hostage to the ebb and flow of the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Hence, Bangladesh’s foreign policy vis-à-vis India is largely driven by its domestic agenda, which prevents it from enjoying handsome dividends by way of expanded access to Indian markets (S. Chatterjee 2011). The trends in Bangladesh, however, seem to indicate complexities in IndoBangladesh relations in spite of globalization, liberalization, the ‘Look East’ tilt in India’s foreign policies, and an increasingly complex energy security scenario in the subcontinent. The post-9/11 American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a considerable radicalization of political Islam in Bangladesh, with the Jamaat emerging as a key factor in sustaining the BNP-led coalition of 2001– 6. With the growing Islamization of Bangladeshi society and culture, the rift between secular and religious forces took an alarmingly violent character. The Indian concern about Bangladesh’s support and shelter to insurgents active in the north-eastern states of India and illegal migration to India (p.91) has decisively hardened the cleavage over foreign policy in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. The split in Bangladesh’s national identity along the lines of language and faith is closely linked to its ties with India, as New Delhi has steadfastly supported secular political forces in Bangladesh. Thus, India continues to loom large in Bangladesh’s domestic political divisions, no matter which party comes to power there. It is this deep political chasm that explains much of the inconsistency and vacillation in India–Bangladesh relations. However, in its own domestic politics, as India has moved away from a oneparty-dominant multi-party system to a coalition polity based on two major national parties flanked by a number of powerful regional entities, the role of regional forces in the foreign policy of the state is rising alarmingly. At one level, local issues and concerns are now driving national choices, rather than the top– down approach that had characterized the days when the Congress dominated Indian politics.34 The revival of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics (Jaffrelot Page 13 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations 2000) has been an important factor affecting bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh. The frenzied response of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to migration from Bangladesh in recent decades is significant in this context (Shamshad 2008). Hindu migrants were characterized as ‘refugees’, Muslim migrants were described as ‘infiltrators’. Illegal migration became a crucial political agenda of the BJP and the Sangh Parivar in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dalwai and Engineer 1995). In April 1992, the BJP National Executive passed a resolution claiming that over fifteen million Bangladeshis had illegally entered India, and stating that ‘the influx constitutes a serious strain on the national economy, a severe stress on the national society and withal a serious threat to the stability and security of the country. And yet the Congress takes no action to stem this flood or push back illegal immigrants, because it views them as its vote bank’ (Gillan 2002). Ever since the Protocol on the Land Boundary was signed in September 2011 between the prime ministers of India and Bangladesh, the BJP made known its opposition to the agreement and declared that it would not help in the constitutional process that the implementation of the agreement would require because of loss of territory in the exchange of enclaves. On 2 March 2013, the BJP president Rajnath Singh in his address at the Party’s National Council in New Delhi said: ‘Under the work of exchanging “Enclaves” which the government of India is (p.92) undertaking under Teesta water sharing , India will have to forgo 13,000 acres of land while Bangladesh will have to forgo 3,000 acres only. The government is not answering as to how it will compensate for this loss of 10,000 acres of land’ (Bhasin 2013). Much of the party’s intransigence vis-à-vis Bangladesh stems from its uncompromising position on illegal migration, which assumes further significance as the migrants, or infiltrators as they are called, happen to be mostly Muslims. The consistently anti-Indian stance of the BNP–Jamaat coalition in Bangladesh, which coincided with the National Democratic Alliance regime in India, seems to have further stiffened the BJP’s position vis-à-vis Dhaka. It remains to be seen how the BJP government that has come to power in India in 2014 responds to the ongoing political crisis in Bangladesh that has turned the AL-BNP divide into a point of no return. Compulsions of coalition politics are undermining India’s capacity to fulfil its promises and build credibility among neighbours. Mamata Banerjee’s torpedoing on vital issues is a case in point. While West Bengal’s water interests are vital, so are India’s commitments and responsibility towards a lower riparian. The astounding majority with which the AL returned to power in Bangladesh, Hasina’s assuaging of India’s long-standing grievances, and the path-breaking agreements signed between her and Manmohan Singh were excellent opportunities to turn India–Bangladesh relations into a model of partnership and good-neighbourliness in South Asia. The UPA II government’s political failure to explain to West Bengal this wider perspective and its direct involvement of the Page 14 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations West Bengal chief minister as a stakeholder nipped this newfound promise in the bud and will cost India dearly in the days ahead. This study has sought to chronicle India’s troubled relationship with Bangladesh. It has traced the dynamics of their ties in a complex history of dual partition that provided a dual basis for Bangladesh’s national identity in religion (Islam) and language (Bengali), respectively. The fundamental material or structural asymmetry between the two states makes Bangladesh nervous of, and obsessed with India. This breeds insecurity and a search for external security guarantees. But the threat that India poses is largely constructed by the domestic political formations (p.93) that polarize Bangladesh’s politics along the dual bases of its identity. The AL does not fear any threat to Bangladesh’s identity vis-à-vis India; its complaints are all related to differentials of power. The BNP and the Islamist parties are hostile to India, fearing not only military security but also questions of identity. The relations between the two states have moved within this structural bind. The chapter has surveyed the major issues that divide the two nations in contemporary times, including water, boundaries, migration, religious extremism, terrorism, transit, and economic issues. Domestic politics has prevented agreement upon and resolution of these issues on both sides, particularly in Bangladesh. However, sustained and responsible diplomacy can produce results, like the agreements signed during the visits of Sheikh Hasina and Manmohan Singh in 2010 and 2011. However, these agreements have fallen prey to domestic politics on the Indian side. Unless India finds a way out of this impasse, the window of opportunity will close swiftly, inflicting huge costs on both states. I have argued that the chief explanatory image of this relationship is domestic politics. As S. Datta (2010: 343) puts it, ‘Arguably, India and Bangladesh relations have suffered cyclic phases of highs and lows, largely reflecting the changing governments both in Dhaka and New Delhi… . The bilateral ties have suffered setbacks whenever the Awami League has been in the wilderness.’ Personalities have built on domestic politics. The international system has so far been largely inconsequential in shaping India–Bangladesh relations. Conventional realism seems to be working at this level. Bangladesh cultivates China as a counter to India’s hegemony. China reciprocates to keep India tied up in regional disputes. Pakistan has recently warmed up to Bangladesh, taking advantage of anti-Indian forces during the BNP–Jamaat rule, only to again disappear into the wilderness with the AL’s return to power. The US, as the world’s leading military power, has little interest in being drawn into this game. Bangladesh’s preference for China over the US as its chief strategic partner is indicative of a larger strategic game plan against a much stronger neighbour. It is a fairly uncomplicated response to America’s post-9/11 strong relations with India and China’s readiness to deter New Delhi in South Asia. How Bangladesh Page 15 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations reacts to these possibilities depends ultimately on who rules at Dhaka. Like in the past, it is domestic politics that determines the nature of India–Bangladesh relations. References Bibliography references: Bass, G.J. 2013. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). BBC News. 2001. ‘Fresh Bangladesh border clash’, 19 April. Available at: http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1284789.stm (accessed 25 February 2015). Behera, Subhakanta. 2011. ‘Trans-border Identities. (A Study on the impact of Bangladeshi and Nepali migration to India)’, ICRIER Policy Series, No.1, May, http://icrier.org/pdf/policy_series_1.pdf (accessed 13 March 2015). Bhasin, A.S. 2013. ‘BJP must not oppose India–Bangladesh land boundary agreement’, Uday India, 20 April. Available at: http://www.udayindia.in/english/ content_20april2013/viewpoint1.html (accessed 26 February 2015). Bhaumik, S. 2006. ‘Politics of Sanctuary: Indian Rebel Bases in Bangladesh’, in J. Saikia, ed., Bangladesh Treading the Taliban Trail (New Delhi: Vision Books), pp. 186–206. Chakrabarty, B. 2004. The Partition of Bengal and Assam, 1932–1947: Contour of Freedom, Routledge Curzon Studies in South Asia (London and New Delhi: Routledge). (p.101) Chatterjee, J. 1994. Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932–1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ———. 2007. The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India 1947–1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Chatterjee, S. 2011. ‘Structural Realism and South Asian Security’, in E. Sridharan, ed., International Relations Theory and South Asia, vol. 2: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities and Images (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 61–7. Chatterjee, S.S. 2012. ‘India–Bangladesh international border disputes—Muhuri river’, News Blaze, 18 April. Available at: http://newsblaze.com/story/ 20120418194723shan.nb/topstory.html (accessed 23 February 2015). Dalwai, S. and I. Engineer. 1995. ‘Immigrants in Bombay: A Fact Finding Report’. Available at: http://www.oocities.org/indianfascism/fascism/ deportating_bangali_muslims.htm (accessed 13 March 2015). Page 16 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations Datta, N. 2012. Questions of Identity of Assam: Location, Migration, Hybridity (New Delhi: Sage). Datta, S. 2008. ‘Bangladesh’s Relations with China and India: A Comparative Study’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 755–72. ———. 2010. ‘India and Bangladesh: The Road towards Common Peace and Prosperity’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 343–9. Devi, N.T. and A.S. Raju, eds. 2009. Envisioning a New South Asia (New Delhi: Shipra). Dubey, M. 2013. ‘Indo-Bangladesh economic relations’, Mainstream Weekly, vol. 51, no. 14, 23 March. Available at: http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/ article4074.html (accessed 25 February 2015). General Books, LLC. 2010. Jatiya Party: Hussain Muhammad Ershad (Dhaka: General Books, LLC). Gillan, M. 2002. ‘Refugees or Infiltrators? The Bharatiya Janata Party and Illegal Migration from Bangladesh’, Asian Studies Review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 73–95. Government of India (GoI). 2011. ‘Fencing along India-Bangladesh Border’, IJ/ PT/India-Bangladesh Border, Release ID 77968, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 20 November. Available at: http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/ erelease.aspx?relid=77968 (accessed 25 February 2015). Goswami, N. 2010. ‘Bangladeshi Illegal Migration into Assam: Issues and Concerns from the Field’, IDSA Issue Brief, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Available at: http://www.idsa.in/system/files/ IB_BangladeshiIllegalMigrationintoAssam.pdf (accessed 26 February 2015). Government of Bangladesh. 1974. Joint Declaration of Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, 19 March. Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh. Habib, H. 2013. ‘India, Bangladesh sign extradition treaty, new visa regime’, Hindu, 29 January. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiabangladesh-sign-extradition-treaty-new-visa-regime/article4353846.ece (p.102) (accessed 26 February 2015). Hossain, I. 1998. ‘Bangladesh–India Relations: The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty and Beyond’, Asian Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 131–50. Iftekharuzumman. 1989. ‘The India Doctrine: Relevance for Bangladesh’, in M.J. Kabir and S. Hassan (eds), Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society of International Studies), pp. 19–43.

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India–Bangladesh Relations Rahaman, M.M. 2009. ‘Principles of Transboundary Water Resources Management and Ganges Treaties: An Analysis’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 159–73. Rajan, Chella S. 2008. ‘Climate migrants in South Asia: Estimates and solutions’, Blue Alert Report of the Indian Institute of Technology, Chennai, on demand of Greenpeace India, 2008. Ramachandran, S. 2002. ‘Bangladesh, Pakistan and the country in between’, Asia Times Online, 21 August. Available at: http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ DH21Df02.html (accessed 26 February 2015). ———. 2004. ‘Part 2: Behind the Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami’, Asia Times Online, 10 December. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ FL10Df06.html (accessed 26 February 2015). Rashid, H. 2013. ‘Tipaimukh Dam: What is the Current Position?’ Dhaka Courier, 14 March. Available at: http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/tipaimukh-dam-what-isthe-current-position/#sthash.K6KExhD3.dpuf (accessed 13 March 2015). South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). 2010. ‘Bangladesh Assessment 2010’. Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/ assesment2010.htm (accessed 26 February 2015). Sengupta, N. 2012. Bengal Divided: The Unmaking of a Nation (1905–1971) (New Delhi: Penguin). Shamshad, R. 2008. ‘Politics and Origin of the India–Bangladesh Border Fence’, Paper presented at the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Melbourne, 1–3 July. Available at: http:// artsonline.monash.edu.au/mai/files/2012/07/rizwanashamshad.pdf (accessed 25 February 2015). Singh, P.K. 2010. ‘China–Bangladesh Relations: Acquiring a Life of Their Own’, China Report, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 267–83. Sinha, S.K. 1998. Report on Illegal Migration into Assam. Submitted to the President of India by the Governor of Assam, Guwahati, 8 November. Sisson, R. and L.E. Rose. 1991. War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press). Sood, A. and B.K.P. Mathukumalli. 2011. ‘Managing International River Basins: Reviewing India–Bangladesh Transboundary Water Issues’, International Journal of River Basin Management, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 43–52.

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India–Bangladesh Relations Statesman. 2013. ‘Indo-Bangla ties not at Bengal’s cost: CM’, 26 August. Available at: http://www.thestatesman.com/news/11955-indo-bangla-ties-not-atbengal-s-cost-cm.html (accessed 26 February 2015). (p.104) Tanaka, K. 2011. ‘India–Bangladesh Maritime Border Dispute: Conflicts over a Disappeared Island’, ICE Case Studies Number 270, December. Available at: http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/taplatti.html (accessed 23 February 2015). Thakar, M. 2010. ‘Indo-Bangladesh Relations: The Puzzle of Weak Ties’, in S. Ganguly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 62–82. Times of India. 2005. ‘Sharp fall in migration from Bangladesh’, 24 September. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1241203.cms (accessed 26 February 2015). Upreti, B.C. 1994. ‘Indo-Bangladesh Water Dispute’, in S.R. Chakravarty, ed., Foreign Policy of Bangladesh, New Delhi: Har-Anand. ———. 2009. ‘India’s Policy towards Its South Asian Neighbours: Constraints, Impediments and Perspectives’, in R. Harshe and K.M. Seethi, eds, Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan), pp. 136–54. Waltz, K.N. 1959. Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press). Zee News. 2009. ‘Indo-Bangla border fencing to be completed by March 2010’, 9 October. Available at: http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/indo-bangla-borderfencing-to-be-completed-by-march-2010_569528.html (accessed 25 February 2015). Notes:

(1.) The author is deeply indebted to his colleagues Professor Partha Pratim Basu and Dr A.J. Majumdar at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, for their very helpful comments. Considerable editorial help and support also came from Ms Sreya Maitra Raichaudhuri, Senior Research Fellow, Jadavpur University. Standard disclaimers apply. (2.) As Deb Mukharji (2011: 371), the former Indian ambassador to Bangladesh, succinctly puts it: Structuring relations with neighbours is always a difficult exercise: disparity in size complicates the process, because the smaller partner has obvious anxieties and concerns. Between Bangladesh and India there is the additional and inescapable burden of the past. The two countries had been, in a sense, one people for long; while this has obvious advantages in Page 20 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations cultural connectivities, it also ensures a constant desire to assert sovereignty. Many of the “issues” between the two countries are more a matter of perception and politics than problems of import. However, in all relationships, perceptions are no less potent than the reality. (3.) Some of the following statistics reveal this disparity: India’s total land area is 2,973,190.0 sq. km compared to Bangladesh’s 130,170.0 sq. km, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2 (accessed 13 March 2015); according to available figures, India’s population in 2015 is estimated to be over 1,278,337,096 against Bangladesh’s 159,833,718. Available at: http:// www.geohive.com/ (accessed 13 March 2015). (4.) Waltz drew the models from Western political philosophy’s engagement with war and peace. Spinoza found the cause of war (military combat) in the original nature of man; Kant in the internal organization or structure of states; Rousseau in the system of relationships of states to one another. War therefore results from defects inherent in human nature (the first image); domestic properties of states (the second image); and the interactions of structures and units (the third image). (5.) In the undivided Bengal Presidency under British rule, while Hindus and Muslims shared language and cultural roots, the new English-educated elite selfconsciously maintained a social distance from the Muslim peasants, preventing a politics of assimilation within the community. When Lord Curzon, the British viceroy, introduced the idea of Bengal’s partition in 1905, these social differences came to the fore for the first time. While the plan was politically resisted, its social impact could not be entirely reversed. The Muslim League, formed in Dhaka in 1906, gained considerable support among the disenfranchised Muslim aristocrats, but became a dominant political force only after 1942. Large sections of Bengali Muslims, though, had been alienated from the Indian National Congress since the mid-1930s. (6.) For an excellent account, see Jahan (1972). (7.) On the culpability of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, see Bass (2013). The story has also been vividly narrated in Raghavan (2013). For slightly older but standard accounts, see Sisson and Rose (1991) and Khasru (2010). (8.) The Muhuri River is one of the trans-border rivers of India and Bangladesh. The Muhuri River rises from the Lushai Hills and enters into Parshuram Upozila in the Feni district of Bangladesh. In a few places, the river demarcates the international border between India and Bangladesh, but it first merges with the Feni river, just near the inter-district border between Feni and Chittagong. Then it passes through Chittagong district, before it falls into the Indian sea, the Bay of Bengal. Specialists on the India–Bangladesh international boundary assert that the entire dispute arose just after the Revision Settlement Survey, 1937, Page 21 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations when strips of land, the Char, or river islands, came out from the river bed in the years 1956, 1960, 1961, and 1966 due to heavy silting and erosion of the river’s lower course (Chatterjee 2012). (9.) During the aftermath of the Bhola Cyclone in 1971, a small island unexpectedly emerged approximately 3.5 km from the mouth of the Hariabhanga River, which serves as the river border between Bangladesh and India. Its geological location prompted both nations to claim the island under their jurisdiction. The border dispute was reignited which is presently referred to as the Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary dispute. The disputed island was named ‘New Moore’ by India, and ‘South Talpatti’ by Bangladesh (Tanaka 2011). (10.) During Bangladesh’s Independence War, Zia had been sector commander of much of the Chittagong division, and commander of Bangladesh army’s ‘Z’ brigade. Mujib’s government had brought him to Dhaka in June 1972 and appointed him deputy chief of staff under Major-General Shafiullahhe. Visibly upset, Zia waited for his opportunity, which came when Sheikh Mujib was overthrown and killed in 1975 by a handful of junior officers, who immediately chose Zia as the new chief of staff. This was followed by two quick coups, one by right-wing military officers headed by Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, and the other by privates who had received support from the Jatio Samaj Tantrik Dal—a leftist political party (which Zia later suppressed). Uninvolved in both coups, Zia emerged as the most commanding military leader who gave hope to a young nation mired in deep crisis immediately after its independence. (11.) The Janata regime was the first non-Congress government to rule India. It was a volatile patchwork of different groups whose only common agenda was to remove the Congress from power. The formation was a result of the massive allIndia protest movements against Indira Gandhi’s decision to impose Emergency and suspend the normal democratic functioning of the state for a twenty-onemonth period in 1975–7. The movement was led by the veteran Gandhian leader Jayaprakash Narayan. The fractious coalition was headed by Prime Minister Morarji Desai between 24 March 1977 and 28 July 1979, when he lost a noconfidence motion in the national Parliament and was replaced by Charan Singh as the new prime minister, who held office from 28 July 1979 till 14 January 1980. (12.) Farakka is a village in Murshidabad near the Bengal–Bihar border, about eleven miles from Bangladesh’s border. (13.) Foreign Affairs Record, November 1977, vol. 23, no. 11, pp. 215–16, cited in Upreti (1994: 143). (14.) Tipaimukh is located on the river Barak in the state of Manipur in India. The proposed Tipaimukh embankment dam will be 390 metres (1,280 feet) long

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India–Bangladesh Relations and 162.5 metres (534 feet) high. The proposed construction of the dam on the common Barak River has enraged the people of Bangladesh (see Rashid 2013). (15.) During the visit of the Bangladesh prime minister to India in January 2010, the prime minister of India reiterated the assurance that India would not take steps on the Tipaimukh project that would adversely impact Bangladesh (paragraph 31 of the Joint Communique between India and Bangladesh). While the Indian official position emphasized that the Tipaimukh dam would be a ‘hydro-electric project with provision to control floods’, it explicitly stated that the project would not involve ‘diversion of water on account of irrigation’ (Rashid 2013). (16.) It seems inevitable that climate change will trigger large-scale environmental migration from Bangladesh to India (Rajan 2008). A study by Myers (2002) projects that twenty-six million refugees are expected to pour in from Bangladesh in the coming decades. Climate change is expected to aggravate vulnerabilities in the regions of Bangladesh dependent on water resources from India. (17.) Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a distinguished barrister, was appointed to draw the boundaries between the two nations. It was only on 30 June 1947 that the governor general of India constituted the two boundary commissions for the partition of Punjab and Bengal—each consisting of two Hindu members and two Muslim members. Sir Radcliffe’s task was an unenviable one, given that he had never ever been to the subcontinent in his life earlier; he did not know its people, and had no first-hand knowledge of its culture and economics, and knew little of the local history of the provinces that he was given to divide. His work was compounded by shoddy statistics, as he was compelled to work with outdated and obsolete census statistics based on the census of 1931. The British government, critically, did not grant him the time to do a proper job of the assignment, even if he had wanted to. He arrived in India on 8 July 1947 for the first time, and the award was announced on 16 August. Within these five weeks, he was given the momentous task of deciding on a boundary that, as one chronicle noted, would ultimately carve out three nations over a period of twenty-four years between 1947 and 1971. Many of the existing problems on the eastern frontier are attributed to this imperial callousness. On the Radcliffe Line, see J. Chatterjee (1994). (18.) India decided to set up barbed fences along certain stretches of the international border with Bangladesh to prevent trade in contraband items, illegal migration, and illicit cattle trade. Till 2009, 2,649.74 kilometres of fencing had been completed out of a total length of 3,436.56 kilometres (Zee News 2009). According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, ‘Assam has 263 km of international border with Bangladesh out of which 143.9 km is

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India–Bangladesh Relations land border and 119.1 km of riverine border. Govt. has sanctioned 230.03 km border fence in Assam out of which 221.56 km has been completed’ (GoI 2011). (19.) While the immediate cause was an outstanding dispute over territory, the incidents fuelled nationalist sentiments in both countries—particularly in Bangladesh. The fighting during 16–19 April was the worst since the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. It took place around the village of Padua (known as Pyrdiwah in India), which adjoins the Indian state of Meghalaya and the Timbil area of the Bangladesh border in the Sylhet district, where about 6.5 kilometres of the international border remained in dispute. The trigger for the clash appears to have been an attempt by Indian forces to construct a footpath from an army outpost in Padua across a disputed territory some 300 metres wide to Indian Meghalaya. In three days of fighting, both sides used rockets, mortars, and heavy machine guns, resulting in the deaths of sixteen Indian soldiers and three Bangladeshis. As a result of the clash, an estimated 10,000 Bangladeshis and 1,000 Indians were forced to flee the area (BBC News 2001). (20.) Another related but leftover problem from earlier times was the Tin Bigha corridor issue, which involved allowing unfettered access for Bangladeshis in the Dahagram–Angarpota territories of Bangladesh to the Bangladesh mainland throughout the day, as against the earlier very restrictive arrangement. Normal traffic rules were put into practice on both sides and twenty-four-hour access for citizens of both sides to their respective territories became available since it was initiated in 2011. (21.) According to India’s census report of 2001, released in 2005, the number of Bangladeshi migrants during the decade 1991–2001 was about 280,000, which actually represented a decrease of 53 per cent from almost 600,000 migrants between 1981 and 1991. In the case of Bangladesh as the last place of residence, the total number of migrants who had migrated from zero to nine years previously was 279,878 in 2001 and 591,572 in 1991 (Times of India 2005). However, the actual numbers are much higher. The real figure is difficult to get at due to political and operational difficulties. Illegal migrants are considered as assets in an open, competitive, and first-past-the-post democracy like India, where these people are provided fake identification documents by a chain of middlemen and local politicians who are instrumental in giving them both security and legitimacy. (22.) In 1997, General Srinivas Kumar Sinha was appointed governor of Assam when the state was ravaged by insurgency and inter-community feuds. He was instrumental in designing a three-pronged strategy of unified command, economic development, and psychological initiatives. He submitted a forty-twopage printed report to the president of India on illegal migration from Bangladesh that looked into the root cause of insurgency in the state. This highprofile report was published in full in all the newspapers of Assam. Sinha’s Page 24 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations radical recommendation was the scrapping of the Illegal Migration Detection by Tribunal (IMDT) Act, which facilitated illegal migration and applied exclusively to Assam. The report became the basis for a major political controversy in Assam. Although disapproved by some sections in Assam and elsewhere in the country, the Supreme Court in a landmark verdict struck down the IMDT Act, quoting extensively from the Sinha report. For an excellent account, see N. Datta (2012). (23.) According to Namrata Goswami (2010: 2), an Indian security analyst, Though there is no documented data on the number of illegal migration, it is assumed that out of the 26 million people residing in Assam, around six million are illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Influential Assamese intellectuals like Dhiren Bezboruah, who is also the editor of The Sentinel warns that Assam could become a part of “Greater Bangladesh” with districts like Dhubri and Goalpara witnessing a change in their demographic profile by becoming migrant-dominated while other districts like Barpeta, Nalbari, Nagaon and Darrang are also heading in that direction. (24.) According to one study (Kumar 2009: 16), some Islamic fundamentalist outfits like HuJI, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Islamic Liberation Army of Assam, Islamic Sevak Sangha, Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam, Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, United Reformation Protest of Assam, People’s United Liberation Front, and the Muslim Volunteer Force, have tried to establish their foothold in Assam. This has been possible due to the presence of a large number of Bangladeshi immigrants. (25.) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (the Islamic Struggle Movement) is an Islamic fundamentalist organization most active in the South Asian countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India since the early 1990s. The origins of the Bangladesh unit of HuJI can be traced to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan that HuJI—a Sunni extremist group of the Deoband tradition—was first set up in 1980. In 1992, a Bangladesh unit of HUJI was set up, reportedly with direct assistance from Osama bin Laden. The organization has strong links with al-Qaeda and is a member of Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front. By 2004, HuJI had about 15,000 members, including 2,000 hard-core fighters. Its members were recruited mainly from Bangladesh’s 60,000 madrasas and exported to other countries. These recruits were trained in the hilly areas of Chittagong and the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. Apart from being the prime suspect in a scheme to assassinate Sheikh Hasina and liberal Bangladeshi politicians, HuJI was responsible for a number of bombings in 2005. In October 2005, it was officially banned by the Government of Bangladesh. It was most active between 2001 and 2006 in Bangladesh, during which years its operations were widely aided and supported by LeT, a prime anti-

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India–Bangladesh Relations India terrorist organization based in Pakistan. For details, see Ramachandran (2004). (26.) Some of the top Indian militant organizations that have found sanctuary in Bangladesh include the United Liberation Front of Asom, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the All Tripura Tiger Force, the United National Liberation Front, the Peoples’ Liberation Army, and the Kanlei Yawol Kanna Lup. (27.) However, exceptional clauses were introduced to clinch the deal. If the extradition of someone poses a threat to national security, a country may refuse the deportation request. It was agreed that no political detainee would be brought under the purview of the treaty. Controversies arising out of the process of extradition would be settled as per the laws of the country concerned (see Habib 2013). (28.) Items on the negative list are denied concessions by the state that maintains it. These lists are maintained by all states of South Asia in their mutual trade, despite their commitment to creating a South Asian Free Trade Area. (29.) First, Bangladesh wanted India to keep the checkpost on the India– Bangladesh and India–Nepal borders open twenty-four hours for getting goods in transit from Bangladesh to Nepal without inordinate delay. Secondly, it insisted on purchasing power directly from Myanmar instead of Myanmar first selling it to India and then India reselling it to Bangladesh. The third condition was that India should improve the balance of trade, which was heavily tilted against Bangladesh. Despite India’s efforts to convince Bangladesh to allow New Delhi to construct the gas pipelines through its territory, India’s inability to deliver on the Teesta project and the enclave agreement has apparently sealed the fate of the project for the time being. (30.) For Bangladesh, the Indian case for transit offers little material gain for Dhaka. According to Murshid (2011: 44), ‘India’s goal is not just to connect a remote, neglected, poor and discontented but resource rich part to the rest of the country. It is in fact eyeing direct connectivity with southeast Asia and China using the north-eastern states (NES), via Bangladesh… . However, from a purely business point of view, transit trade with these states may not be particularly attractive to Bangladesh given their small size and low incomes.’ (31.) India’s Southeast Asia policy was a hostage of Cold War politics. As the Cold War moulds were broken, India’s foreign policy displayed a major concern to carve out a strategic place for itself in an increasingly globalized and dynamic Asia. It was in this context that India’s ‘Look East’ policy (conceived by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992) was designed to repair relations with its eastern neighbours and provide the much-required opportunities for furthering Page 26 of 27

India–Bangladesh Relations its national interest. Eventually, it has given an opportunity to India to create land-based linkages through Bangladesh and Myanmar, and develop extensive bonds of cooperation and friendship with a number of Southeast Asian states. For an excellent analysis, see the chapter by Isabelle Saint-Mézard in this volume. (32.) On China–Bangladesh strategic ties, see Singh (2010). (33.) On SAARC, see the various essays in Devi and Raju (2009). (34.) However, the 2014 national elections in India resulted in a BJP majority government led by Narendra Modi. While Modi’s electoral campaign in the northeastern states, particularly in Assam, harped on the illegal immigration issue, the fact that he is not constrained by errant coalition partners makes him much more capable to drive goal-oriented policies with determination. The concern, however, is that the rise of the BJP in the state politics of West Bengal may cause further tensions in India–Bangladesh relations. The imperatives of state politics are therefore expected to survive the return of one-party majority rule in India.

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India–Afghanistan Relations geopolitics during the Cold War. Such a viewpoint does not take into account the other structural and domestic factors undergirding the bilateral relationship. It also denies the agency and interest of the Afghans in seeking a closer relationship with India. With the precarious security situation in Afghanistan as underscored by the Taliban capture of the northern Afghan city of Kunduz for two weeks in September 2015 and US President Obama’s decision to extend the presence of 9,800 US troops in Afghanistan through 2016, (p.106) neighbouring states will be essential to determining the future stability and economic viability of the Afghan state. One of the neighbouring states with which Afghanistan is most keen to maintain its good relationship is India. Both India and Afghanistan see their bilateral relationship as crucial to securing a democratic and economically stable Afghanistan, which is in both the countries’ interests. The growing closeness between India and Afghanistan was evident with the 2011 signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the first such agreement for India and the first with a country in the region for Afghanistan, underscoring the crucial role India will play in shaping Afghanistan’s future. At the time of signing the agreement, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated, ‘India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014’ (BBC News 2011; Hindu 2011). The partnership agreement covers soft power areas such as capacity building, education, and cultural, civil society, and people-to-people relations, as well as the hard power areas of security cooperation. It also covers trade and economic cooperation. The wide range of areas covered by the agreement highlights India’s interest in binding the two nations together not only on the economic front, but also in the areas where India already enjoys significant prestige in Afghanistan: as the preferred destination for education and health care services, as a symbol of a developing country in the region with a consolidated democracy, and a country with great soft power sway, particularly in the form of Bollywood. The signing of the Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement has already reverberated in the region. It has continued to create anxiety in Pakistan, the country sandwiched between India and Afghanistan that has regarded Afghanistan as its sphere of influence. It has spurred other neighbours like Iran to also seek out deeper engagement in Afghanistan. And it has prompted the other major regional power, China, to engage with India on their common interest in preventing a return to the 1990s civil war chaos in Afghanistan. Yet for India, the Strategic Partnership Agreement signalled a strengthening of its already sizable commitments to Afghanistan. The agreement was followed up by further efforts to solidify this partnership, such as through the international Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in 2012 and several bilateral visits between the two heads of government. Even when new governments (p.107) Page 2 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations came to power in both countries in 2014 and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s political overtures to Pakistan worried some Indian policy makers and analysts, the Afghan government, cognizant of the continued popularity of India in Afghanistan, and India as the largest regional source of foreign aid and one of the largest regional investment sources to Afghanistan, continued to assure India that it remained an important strategic partner of Afghanistan. This chapter is divided into five main sections. First, it presents a historical overview of the relationship between the two countries we today know as India and Afghanistan. Second, it disaggregates the global, structural factors that have influenced Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Third, it locates domestic factors influencing India’s relationship with Afghanistan, highlighting that these factors play a growing role in India’s foreign policy. And fourth, this chapter highlights the role of individual leaders. Fifth, the chapter concludes by underscoring that it is all three of these factors and their interlinkages that determine Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan. India’s relationship with Afghanistan will be one of India’s key bilateral relationships in the twenty-first century, defining how India manages to navigate its growing regional as well as global power while addressing its growing domestic needs.

Historical Background The relationship between India and Afghanistan long predates Indian independence in 1947, or even the creation of an area called Afghanistan around 1747. Due to its geography, which separates the Indian peninsula to the northeast by the Himalayan range, successive conquerors of the Indian subcontinent, from the early Aryans to Alexander the Great and the Mughal rulers, have used the land route through the area that is now Afghanistan. Moreover, at various times in history the areas of these two countries have been under the same rule. From the Indian Mauryan Empire which united the areas from Afghanistan to Bengal in the third century BC, to the Afghan rulers of the vast South Asian Kushan kingdom during the first century AD, to the Pashtun fifteenth-century Lodi rulers whose graceful monuments still punctuate the central Delhi landscape, there are centuries-strong historical, religious, and cultural links between these two countries. (p.108) The more recent basis for the relationship between these two countries is the founding of Afghanistan in 1747 under Ahmad Shah’s Durrani Empire, at a time when the Mughal Empire in India was in decline and the British were gaining power in the subcontinent. By the early part of the nineteenth century, the British were firmly established as the colonial rulers over much of India. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was fractured, as a Sikh ruler annexed Afghanistan’s last Indian province of Peshawar, and the Persians campaigned to retake Afghanistan’s western city of Herat with the help of the Russians. British designs on preventing any expansion of Russian influence beyond the northwestern border of Afghanistan started the ‘Great Game’ of the nineteenth Page 3 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations century and spawned three Anglo-Afghan wars. It also established the idea of Afghanistan as a buffer state between British India and Russian Central Asia, leading to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between British India and the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan on the ‘Durand Line’ as delineating their respective spheres of influence. This infamous memorandum on the Durand Line, which cut right through the heartland of Pashtuns, Balochs, and other ethnic groups who lived on both sides of the border, was at independence inherited by Pakistan and forms the disputed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan today. It was not only the acts of British India towards Afghanistan during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century that closely bound together the histories of these two regions, but also the budding nationalist movement in India and on the Indo-Afghan frontier. While the British achieved some tactical victory in the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, after being resolutely defeated in the first two, the concomitant end of World War I and its aftermath led the British to recognize Afghan sovereignty. In British India, the end of World War I and the return of Mahatma Gandhi reignited the independence movement under the leadership of the Indian National Congress, and its affiliated movement in the North West Frontier border areas of Afghanistan. The nationalist movement on the Afghan border, which later became known as the Frontier National Congress, was born under the leadership of the two Khan brothers, including Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as ‘Frontier Gandhi’. During the 1937 provincial elections, the Indian National Congress emerged as the largest single party in India, and the Frontier National Congress as the largest party in the (p.109) North West Frontier Province. When India gained independence in 1947 and was partitioned to create Pakistan on its western and eastern fronts, the Durand border remained a sore point with Afghanistan, and Afghanistan objected to the recognition of Pakistan (with its implied permanent recognition of the Durand Line) at the United Nations in 1947, while retaining close ties with India. These historical connections between India and Afghanistan, particularly the links between the two nationalist, secular movements, are critical to understanding the deeper Indo-Afghan relationship. India’s links with and support for the Frontier National Congress predated Indian independence. The Pakistani rivalry with India, which formed the basis of their subsequent relationship, started after independence. In the ensuing Cold War decades, particularly until 1979, Indian and Afghan foreign policy interests had much in common, though India shied away from close engagement with Afghanistan. Both countries were among the original members of the Non-Aligned Movement, despite being inwardly focused on the task of developing their countries during the 1950s and 1960s. However, with the 1979 occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, India’s non-aligned stance, despite initial protestations to the Soviets, gave way to a grudging recognition of Soviet-backed rule in Afghanistan —a low point in the relationship between the two countries. When the Soviets Page 4 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations troops pulled out in 1988–1989 and civil war ensued in Afghanistan, India was emerging from an economic crisis and preoccupied with domestic affairs. Nevertheless, India, along with Iran and Russia, started supporting the ‘Northern Alliance’ against the Pakistan-backed radical Islamist group, the Taliban. When the Taliban was defeated by American troops in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, India was one of the first countries to reopen its embassy in Kabul. India soon started engaging in the provision of development assistance, becoming the fifth largest global provider of development assistance to Afghanistan, and the largest regional provider. India continued to remain engaged in Afghanistan through political, economic, cultural, and investment means through 2015, increasing its ties to and influence in Afghanistan through multilayered engagement. Yet the election of new governments in India and Afghanistan in 2014, the seemingly intractable nature of the Indo-Pakistani relationship, and an Afghan reengagement with Pakistan in (p.110) 2015 in order to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban and increase border security has led both India and Afghanistan to focus on their foreign relations with other countries. Nevertheless, the security threat that a destabilized Afghanistan could pose for India, as well as the access to resources and trade in Afghanistan through Iran that a strong bilateral relationship presents, will continue to drive an engaged Indian foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Structural Factors No Common Border after Independence

In addition to the historical links between India and Afghanistan, several structural factors have impacted the Indo-Afghan relationship since Indian independence. The immediate impact of the August 1947 partition of British India into independent India and Pakistan was the creation of a Pakistan whose western portion was henceforth sandwiched between Afghanistan and India. This geographical reality had several implications for the bilateral relationship. Foremost was the fact that independent India and Afghanistan no longer shared a border. Trade between the two countries, which for centuries had taken place via the land route, now had to negotiate transiting through Pakistan. Not only did transiting goods through Pakistan bring additional costs, but Pakistan to this day only allows select goods to be exported from India to Afghanistan and vice versa through its territory, greatly inhibiting commerce in what was once a flourishing trade route. The alternate sea trade route through Iran was significantly more expensive, further constraining trade between India and Afghanistan. Close Relations during Most of the Cold War

The second major structural factor impacting India’s foreign policy relations with Afghanistan was the Cold War. India gained its independence at a time when the Cold War was ensuing between the two superpowers, the United Page 5 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations States and the Soviet Union. With fresh memories of colonial subjugation by Britain, a former superpower, and loath to subordinate its foreign policy interests to those of either of the two superpowers, India chose to pursue a policy of non-alignment (p.111) (Ganguly and Mukherji 2011: 18–19). India was joined in this pursuit of a policy to navigate a path separate from the superpowers by countries from different continents. Notably, Afghanistan joined the non-aligned bloc of countries, while Pakistan did not. The close ties between the governments of India and Afghanistan were apparent in the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, which stated: The Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan recognising the ancient ties which have existed between the two countries for centuries and their mutual need for co-operation in strengthening and developing these ties and urged by their mutual desire to establish peace between the two countries with a view to the common benefit of their people and the development of their respective countries, wish to enter into a Treaty of Friendship with each other.2 This wording was repeated during the 2011 signing of the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan. Notably, no such agreement has been signed by either India or Afghanistan with Pakistan. By 1954, when Pakistan entered into a mutual defence treaty with the United States, while India and Afghanistan ostensibly pursued the path of nonalignment, the Cold War camps were being more clearly drawn in the southwestern Asia region, as Afghanistan and India started importing military hardware from the Soviet Union. Indian commitment to non-alignment faded particularly after Indian prime minister Nehru’s death in 1964, and took an unmistakable step towards the Soviet camp with the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This treaty, which articulated mutual strategic cooperation, was signed during the prelude to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. In the context of closer Sino-American-Pakistani ties and provision of military assistance by the United States to Pakistan despite an official embargo,3 India drew closer to the Soviet Union and became a significant recipient of Soviet military assistance (Horn 1982). Yet India’s difficulty in navigating its tightrope foreign policy, with an ostensible commitment to non-alignment while at the same time committing to the Soviets through the Friendship Treaty, was highlighted during the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. India had maintained strong ties with Afghanistan during the 1970s, with the newly declared Republic of Afghanistan after the 1973 coup, as well as with the pro-Soviet governments leading up to the 1979 invasion. (p.112) However, the Soviet invasion was a crucial turning point, testing Indo-Afghan friendship. Given India’s significant dependence on Page 6 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations Soviet military assistance, India was cornered, unable to condemn the invasion without significant cost to its military and political power (Ganguly and Mukherji 2011: 22). Choosing the path of least resistance, India abstained from condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet occupation of the country in any forum, and maintained tepid relations with the ostensibly ‘Afghan’ government until the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the end of the Cold War in 1989. The 1980s marked the low point in independent India’s relationship with Afghanistan. The End of the Cold War

The third structural factor impacting Indo-Afghan relations was the end of the Cold War and the change it brought about in the international system and in inter-state relations. With the 1988–9 pull-out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the major impediment to closer Indo-Afghan relations disappeared. Yet the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a major impact in general on India’s foreign policy. India needed to wrestle with questions like how to deal with no longer being able to rely on the Soviet Union veto in the United Nations Security Council when questions on Kashmir were raised, and from whom to secure military assistance. These issues, together with a domestic economic crisis lead India to be inward-focused in the early 1990s. Focused on domestic issues, India failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan for a rapprochement in Indo-Afghan relations. In Afghanistan, the end of the Cold War led both superpowers to withdraw from backing opposing sides within its borders, ushering the descent into the chaos of the civil war years in the early 1990s, which in turn led to the rise of the Taliban. India did not focus on its relationship with Afghanistan until the Saudi Arabia and Pakistan-funded Taliban started gaining territory in 1995. Subsequent Indian engagement with the antiTaliban ‘Northern Alliance’ was a delayed strategic move in order to counter the spread of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan as well as in India. When the Taliban took over Kabul in the fall of 1996 and killed the Indian-supported former Afghan president Najibullah, India offered asylum to Najibullah’s family and withdrew its ambassador (p.113) from Afghanistan. Worried about the strategic implications of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for India’s regional ambitions as well as its domestic security, India continued to support the antiTaliban Northern Alliance until the defeat of the Taliban at the end of 2001, letting the Northern Alliance maintain its only diplomatic mission in Delhi until 2001. The significance of the end of the Cold War for Indo-Afghan relations was apparent in the shift of support by India to Afghanistan, from an approach guided by the ideological constraints of the Cold War to one that was more regionally focused, driven largely by the worry of the spread of extremism and its impact on domestic security. The fact that India’s nemesis Pakistan, which Page 7 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations lent support to the Kashmir insurgency and is widely regarded in India as the source of terrorism aimed at India, was one of the few backers of the Taliban, also contributed towards the shift in Indo-Afghan relations. Re-alignment after 9/11 and India’s Rising Power

The fourth main factor influencing India’s relationship with Afghanistan was the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The subsequent defeat of the Taliban led to a new realignment of Indo-Afghan policy. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the newly emerging government in Afghanistan, its main initial international backer the United States, and India all found themselves on the same side, with the Pakistan-supported Taliban on the other. Pakistan, under pressure from the United States, which needed land access to Afghanistan, formally withdrew its support to the Taliban and supported the nascent Afghan democracy. Yet the sanctuary that the Taliban and other extremist groups continued to find in Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan once again put Pakistan at odds with a deepening Indo-Afghan relationship, while the mistrust dating back to Pakistani independence characterized the Afghan–Pakistani relationship. This has made for a triangular relationship between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, a relationship that has often been misunderstood and mischaracterized as Indian interests in Afghanistan being driven by the fighting of a proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan. While Indian policy in Afghanistan since 2001 is undoubtedly driven by its worries of security threats emanating from the Afghanistan–Pakistan border areas as described later, it (p. 114) is also driven by its status as a rising regional power, both in political and economic terms. Yet India’s overtures to Afghanistan have also found fertile soil, as Afghanistan has repeatedly reached out to India. Afghanistan’s overtures to India are based on their common history and interest in seeing a democratic and stable Afghanistan succeed. They are also driven by the realist assessment that continued engagement with India will help counter Pakistan’s interest in seeking a politically pliant government in Afghanistan, as well as thwart the interests of extremist groups such as the Haqqani network, the Taliban, and even Al Qaeda, who find refuge and financing in Pakistan (Gall 2014; Rubin 2007) and whose aims include toppling the elected government in Afghanistan. This underlying strategic imperative has not changed despite overtures by the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in 2015 towards Pakistan in order to achieve greater security within Afghanistan and along the Afghan-Pakistan border in particular. Afghanistan’s relationship with India will remain crucial to balancing its relationship with Pakistan, while Afghanistan is too important to India’s security and future economic prosperity to disengage from. Not only have India’s policy interests with regard to Pakistan been aligned with those of Afghanistan since 2001, Indian foreign policy has also demonstrated a realist view that a stable, democratic Afghanistan whose economy is integrated with its neighbours is in India’s larger regional and geostrategic interests. Indian policy towards Afghanistan also conveys the message that India will stand Page 8 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations by Afghanistan for the longer haul—well after Western governments decrease their aid to Afghanistan and their military troops on the ground. This is most evident in India’s development cooperation with Afghanistan. While Western governments’ aid transfers to Afghanistan were decreasing by 2015, India’s commitments were increasing. By 2015 India’s stated commitments of development assistance to Afghanistan were at about US$2 billion, with nearly half this amount disbursed by the end of 2015.4 This easily made India the largest regional donor. Indian assistance to Afghanistan encompassed not only humanitarian areas such as the daily feeding of vitamin-fortified school biscuits to nearly two million school children and the provision of free medicines and medical services monthly to over 30,000 Afghans in the country (GoI 2012). India, as a symbol of its commitment to supporting democracy in Afghanistan, also funded the building of Afghanistan’s new parliament (p.115) building. Between 2007 and 2011 over 50 per cent of India’s development assistance to Afghanistan funded infrastructure projects such as roads and hydroelectricity generation.5 Worried about antagonizing Pakistan through overt military assistance to Afghanistan, and pushed by international donors to proceed cautiously with any military assistance to Afghanistan, India has, despite repeated requests from Afghanistan, limited its overt military assistance to the training of Afghan officers in India. India’s policy towards Afghanistan has instead focused on seeking greater engagement through the building of political and economic relations. Examples include the securing of alternative access to and from Afghanistan, as well as facilitating integration of Afghanistan’s economy within the region. India has pursued investments in Iran’s Chabahar deep-sea port and rail and road linkages into Afghanistan. New Delhi has also increased investments in Tajikistan’s Farkhor air base, India’s only air base abroad. Nowhere perhaps is India’s commitment to seeking influence in Afghanistan in the longer term more evident than in the over 2,000 annual training and study scholarships India had offered by 2014–15 to Afghan students and civil servants. By training Afghanistan’s current and future civil servants and political and economic leaders, India is investing in a soft power approach to building up the large influence it already enjoys among Afghanistan’s political elite. Political leaders with personal experience in India include Afghanistan’s president (until 2014) Hamid Karzai, who studied in India and is at home in India’s language and culture. They also include Karzai’s wife and son who resided in Delhi for several years, the family of Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, and the families of several other Afghan politicians and civil servants. These investments in India’s relationship with Afghanistan already appear to be bearing fruit, with India enjoying great goodwill in Afghanistan (Pant 2010). Though political influence is notoriously difficult to measure and public opinion is only one aspect of such influence, polls by international organizations in 2009

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India–Afghanistan Relations and 2010 showed that India was the country most favourably regarded by Afghans, while Pakistan was the least favourite out of the countries polled.6 The longer-term geostrategic interests undergirding India’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan have become more evident since 2001, and further enhanced with the drawdown of international troops in (p.116) 2014–15. Indian foreign policy seeks to continue building its influence in Afghanistan in order to enhance its bilateral, regional, and global standing. And while the government of Ashraf Ghani has made greater overtures to Pakistan in order to secure a peace deal with the Taliban, even canceling military assistance which Afghanistan had sought from India but that troubled Pakistan, Ghani also continued to seek Indian engagement in Afghanistan. Signifying the longer-term commitment by both countries to each other was the 2011 Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. This agreement formalized cooperation between the two countries in a variety of areas, including political, security, economic, trade, and capacity development (Pant 2010). Significantly, this was the first strategic partnership that post-Taliban Afghanistan entered into with any other country. It was also an agreement that previous Afghan President Hamid Karzai was eager to sign, unlike the Afghan–US negotiations during 2013–14 to sign a bilateral security agreement. For India, the signing of the agreement marked its longerterm commitment to Afghanistan beyond a donor relationship, as well as its first foray into security cooperation. Along with the visit by Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh to Kabul in May of 2011, these events sent the message that India was not looking for an ‘exit strategy’ from Afghanistan, and would follow a more activist foreign policy in Afghanistan to cement its role as a rising regional and a responsible global power. It is this structural underpinning of the IndoAfghan relationship will continue to shape the bilateral engagement, despite an Afghan reengagement with Pakistan.

Domestic Factors Widespread Political Support

A foreign policy aimed at a close relationship with Afghanistan has enjoyed widespread public support in India across the spectrum of political parties since Indian independence. Yet domestic politics prevented India from deepening its engagement in Afghanistan when the opportunity opened in the early 1990s. The Congress Party, which dominated Indian politics until the end of 1989, had generally fostered close relations with Afghanistan. However, the virtual oneparty Congress rule at the national level gave way to coalition politics in India around (p.117) the same time as the end of the Cold War at the international level. It was also followed a couple of years later by an economic crisis in India and growing insurgency in Kashmir. All these factors led India to be inwardly focused on domestic politics, just when the 1988–89 pull-out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan presented India with a rapprochement opportunity.

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India–Afghanistan Relations However, by the mid-1990s, when India’s economy was starting to recover and once it became apparent that the Taliban was gaining strength in the civil war, Indian foreign policy started to engage further with the opposing Northern Alliance faction. Under the Congress government and subsequently the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Janata Dal/United Front governments and various coalition governments after them, all Indian political parties in power and in their election campaigns pursued a policy of supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Moreover, since the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001, both national parties, the BJP and the Congress, have supported closer relations with the elected government of Afghanistan. Domestic Security Concerns Crystallize with the 1999 Hijacking of an Indian Plane

The main driving force behind broad-based political support in India for closer relations with Afghanistan has been the widely held perception that good IndoAfghan relations are important for India’s domestic security interests. Key to understanding India’s security concerns was the December 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight en route from Kathmandu to Delhi with 179 passengers. The flight eventually landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the ruling Taliban ostensibly took on the role of mediators with the hijackers, though their stationing of militias around the aircraft raised questions about their mediating role. While the hijacking ended after eight days when India released three terrorists in exchange for the passengers, the incident was a turning point for Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan. It galvanized greater attention to the threat to Indian citizens emanating from non-state actors, particularly extremist Islamic groups with refuge in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also highlighted the imperative of a longer-term engagement with Afghanistan in order to counter the spread of these radical groups and improve the security of its citizens. (p.118) While the hijacking is singularly the most important event for understanding the domestic security concerns underlying a deeper Indo-Afghan relationship, several other factors have contributed towards heightened security concerns in India. Prime among these factors is that India has had an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Though the insurgency was set off in the aftermath of alleged election rigging in 1987, the height of the insurgency in Kashmir occurred during the 1990s, the same time as the Taliban rule in Afghanistan—not so coincidentally, according to some Indian analysts (see Swami 2007). Indian policy analysts worry that a re-emergence of a Taliban government in Afghanistan could again have the domestic repercussions of reigniting an insurgency in Kashmir if funds and fighters again get support in Afghanistan and Pakistan.7 India, like Afghanistan, has also been subject to a large number of terrorist attacks on its soil, with at least one every year between 2002 and 2015, except for 2004. Many of these terrorist acts were perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups, some with links to Pakistan and the border areas between Afghanistan Page 11 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations and Pakistan. Significantly, India experienced another major terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008, which resulted in over 250 deaths. That terrorist attack was widely believed to be planned in Pakistan and carried out by the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has a professed ideology of seeking to restore Islamic rule over parts of India (Bajoria 2010). The 2008 Mumbai attack cemented Indian worries about the extremist threat emanating from India’s western neighbour and its border regions with Afghanistan (Curtis 2008). Like India, Afghanistan also has had terrorist attacks on its soil from a variety of Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist groups like the Haqqani network and the Taliban. Both India and Afghanistan have seen common cause in the terrorist threat to their nations emanating from extremist Islamic groups based in and perhaps even funded by some sectors of the Pakistani government.8 India and Afghanistan are thus both pitted against the terrorism they see radiating from Pakistan into their countries, though the government of Afghanistan in 2015 also saw an enhanced relationship with Pakistan as crucial to its internal security. Moreover, Indian citizens in Afghanistan have also been the target of attacks by terrorist groups, with an attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 killing fifty-eight people, a second attack on the embassy the following year killing (p. 119) seventeen, six Indian construction workers being killed in Afghanistan in 2010, and several Indian security guards in 2014. There is a widely held belief in Indian policy circles that if the Taliban succeeds again in coming to power in Afghanistan,9 this would have dire consequences for Indian security, thus lending additional impetus to greater Indian foreign policy engagement in Afghanistan. Access to Natural Resources

While domestic security concerns have dominated the bilateral relationship, the potential of accessing natural resources both within and through Afghanistan also gives added incentive to India to remain engaged in Afghanistan. India’s economy since the turn of the century has been one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing. In order to sustain growth and meet the rising demand for energy, India, a country where a third of the population still does not have access to electricity and the rest still experiences periodic blackouts, has been seeking access to new energy sources (Mullen 2009). Geological research in Afghanistan has found that it has abundant non-fuel mineral resources, including rare earth elements, with a potential value of over $1 trillion (Peters et al. 2011). The main example of India pursuing its interests in accessing natural resources in Afghanistan is the 2011 bid won by an Indian public-sector-led consortium to develop the Hajigak iron-ore mines and build a steel plant. The Indian government, through its development assistance projects to Afghanistan and Iran, had plans to link its investments in the Iranian Chabahar port through railways and roads into Afghanistan, and up to the Page 12 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations mines. However, by 2014 growing security concerns in Afghanistan led the consortium to decrease their initial investments in the mining project— illustrating that without security, it will be difficult for India to pursue economic opportunities. Greater Indian engagement in Afghanistan also provides potential opportunities for accessing the oil and gas of Central Asia through Afghanistan. A prime example of such possibilities is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline, which aims to bring natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkmenistan down to India. While this project has been under discussion since the early 1990s, the political barriers to building a gas line that ran through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India were formidable. Despite financing by the Asian Development (p.120) Bank, and a democratically elected government in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban, the project made little headway for a decade. However, by mid-2012, the four countries involved signed an agreement with construction to commence in 2015 and plans to have the TAPI gas pipeline operational by 2018. Such a pipeline would provide India with a much-needed, steady source of energy, while providing Afghanistan as well as Pakistan with much-needed revenue from the transit fees. Yet as with the iron-ore mining by Indian companies within Afghanistan, the security situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan could still potentially derail these efforts by India to seek access to Central Asian gas through Afghanistan. Access to Potential Markets

Afghanistan is not only a potential source of natural resources for India. The reconstruction efforts within Afghanistan since 2002, the rising income levels, albeit from among the lowest in the world, and Afghan interest in accessing services in India, all make Afghanistan a potential market for Indian goods and services. With large development assistance inflows to Afghanistan since 2001, Indian subcontractors to rebuild roads and hotels or even provide medical services were generally cheaper and more familiar with the culture and language than Western subcontractors. Some Indian goods, such as Bollywood movies, have for decades been popular in Afghanistan, including during the Taliban period when they were banned. As an example of this Indian soft power in Afghanistan, Nye (2004: 10) relates the story of the Indian foreign minister flying to Kabul after the fall of the Taliban, not with a plane-load of food or arms, but of Bollywood movies which were rapidly distributed across the city. Such anecdotes about the popularity of Bollywood and Indian music abound. Other Indian products such as medicines are also sought after in Afghanistan, especially since medicines are some of the few goods that Pakistan allows Afghanistan to import from India across its territory. Yet despite these constraints, Indian trade with Afghanistan grew nearly twelve-fold between 2001 and 2012.10

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India–Afghanistan Relations With rising incomes in Afghanistan, India has also become the most popular regional destination for health and education services. Those Afghans who can afford it go to Europe or the United States for these services, but for those looking for more affordable health care or (p.121) education, India is the main destination. Regional proximity, cultural familiarity, lower costs, friendly relations between the two countries, and the 675 annual university scholarships given by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations encourage Afghan students to study in India. Afghan officials estimated that 5,500 Afghan students were studying in India in 2013 (Das 2013). Similarly, Afghans have been flocking to India for medical services since a free and easy-to-obtain medical visa was introduced in 2005. Indian medical services are seen as cheaper, easier to access, and going to India does not pose significant cultural and linguistic barriers for most Afghans. Between 2010 and the end of 2013 the Indian embassy in Kabul stated that over 100,000 such medical visas had been issued to Afghans, about half the number of travel visas issued during that time period (Bearak 2013). Overall, domestic factors have been playing an increasingly important role in India’s relationship with Afghanistan since the defeat of the Taliban. As international forces and funding start drawing down in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond, regional actors will become increasingly important in determining Afghanistan’s future. India is one of the most important regional actors for Afghanistan. And for India, domestic considerations are increasingly salient in prioritizing its relationship with Afghanistan. Indian policy analysts see economic investment opportunities in Afghanistan as mutually beneficial to both countries as well as a means of building a bulwark against the challenge faced by extremist groups in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border areas.

Individual Factors Indo-Afghanistan relations are often viewed through a post-9/11 prism, where regional rivalries between Indian and Pakistan, security issues, and the role played by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004–14) and Afghan President Hamid Karzai (2002–14) are seen as determining the Indo-Afghan relationship. Yet a more complete understanding of India’s foreign policy has to take account of two leaders who unmistakably shaped the idea of both nations in the earlier part of the twentieth century, Mahatma Gandhi and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as ‘Frontier Gandhi’ or Fakhr-e Afghan (Pride of the Afghans), as well as the leaders elected in both countries in 2014. (p.122) Mahatma Gandhi and ‘Frontier Gandhi’

Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of non-violent resistance to British colonial rule shaped those of Ghaffar Khan, who by the late 1930s had become a part of Gandhi’s inner circle of compatriots. Khan’s movement in the Pashtun border areas of Afghanistan and British India opposed British rule, and was closely allied with the Indian National Congress, India’s independence movement. Strongly Page 14 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations opposed to the partition of British India, and feeling that he had been betrayed by the 1947 partition, Khan’s movement and the Indian National Congress Party boycotted the referendum on accession to Pakistan, leading to a majority vote for accession in 1947. Khan died decades later in Pakistan, but was buried in Afghanistan with over 200,000 mourners from both countries turning out for his funeral, in an enduring legacy of his commitment to secular nationalism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Eswaran 1999). While Ghaffar Khan is popularly identified with the idea of Pashtunistan, the border areas straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan, his close relationship with the Indian National Congress and commitment to a secular national idea, despite being a staunch Muslim, formed historical and political bonds between independent India, these border areas, and independent Afghanistan. This historical legacy formed the basis of the Indo-Afghan relationship in the decades after independence. It provided the bilateral relationship with a common link that was in opposition to the very idea of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims of South Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi: Little Leadership during the Cold War Years

From the late 1940s through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the leaders of both India and Afghanistan maintained amicable, though not prioritized relations. The main issue that tied both countries together, yet also presented one of the greatest foreign policy challenges to them, was Pakistan, the country sandwiched between them. When Afghan king Zahir Shah refused to recognize the Durand Line border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1947, Nehru publicly opposed Afghanistan’s position (Chaudhuri 2013). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Indian and Afghan leaders walked a tightrope in their foreign policy, as India often found itself on the same (p.123) side of international political issues as Afghanistan, but did not want to provoke military conflict with Pakistan. Nehru signed an Indo-Afghan Friendship Treaty in 1950 in order to promote trade. The treaty also promised limited military training. Yet India sought not to antagonize Pakistan by stating that despite the treaty, future foreign policy decisions towards Afghanistan would be determined as they came up (Chaudhuri 2013). Both Nehru as well as the Afghan leaders King Zahir Shah and his cousin, Prime Minister Daoud Shah, tried to navigate a path between the two superpowers. Yet the Cold War alliances pushed India and Afghanistan together, particularly by the mid-1950s. The 1954 US–Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, despite some muted assurances from the US government to Nehru, was perceived by the leaders of both countries as strengthening Pakistan’s military capacity against those of India and Afghanistan (Gopal 1979: 186, 275). Nehru paid an official state visit to Afghanistan in 1959, underlining the common cause between the two countries, but not making any further commitments.

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India–Afghanistan Relations Despite common interests, Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan remained tepid under Nehru’s successors. It was not until the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets that India, which had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the 1971 war with Pakistan and had started relying heavily on Soviet military assistance by the 1970s, was forced to clarify its stance on Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi, who had been elected prime minister with a landslide majority but had technically not assumed office at the time of the Soviet invasion, never openly criticized the aggression. Even when a resolution condemning the invasion came up for vote in the United Nations Security Council, where India was at that time a member, India abstained, essentially accepting the violation of sovereignty. Manmohan Singh and Hamid Karzai

It was not until the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s that Indian foreign policy started to take greater cognizance of Afghanistan and started channelling funds to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Yet this policy was one born out of security fears, particularly after the 1999 hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane, rather than out of leadership or a coherent strategy towards Afghanistan. Only when the Taliban were (p.124) defeated at the end of 2001 did Indian foreign policy start to re-engage with Afghanistan. India’s relationship with Afghanistan became closer under Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, both of whom were leaders of their countries until the spring of 2014. Since the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement by both leaders in 2011, both Prime Minister Singh and President Karzai spoke out more firmly in support of the bilateral relationship. As a sign of the deepening bilateral relationship, Prime Minister Singh was given the rare honour of addressing a joint session of the Afghan parliament in 2011. Singh’s speech, which came just a week after the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, did not directly refer to Pakistan, but stated that both India and Afghanistan shared a common concern over extremism and terrorism, and that neither country could allow extremism to re-emerge (GoI 2011). Singh also committed another US$500 million in development assistance to Afghanistan, bringing India’s total stated commitment to Afghanistan up to around US$2.2 billion. Singh’s engagement on Afghanistan, particularly towards the last years of his tenure, was in reaction both to India’s growing strategic and domestic interests in Afghanistan, as well as to the significant outreach by President Karzai towards India. By the end of 2013 President Karzai had paid thirteen visits to India in as many years, with five visits during 2011–13 alone. At the end of the tenures of both Singh and Karzai, during the spring of 2014, the same year that the numbers of international troops were being drawn down, both leaders tried to strengthen the bilateral relationship as a means of countering the feared rise in extremisms within Afghanistan. By 2014, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Page 16 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations had committed Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan more closely than any other Indian leader before him. In doing so at a crucial time of transition in Afghanistan, he also ensured that his successors, regardless of political affiliation, were going to keep Indian foreign policy engaged with Afghanistan. Narendra Modi and Ashraf Ghani (as well as Abdullah Abdullah)

In the aftermath of the 2014 election of Prime Minister Modi in India and President Ghani in Afghanistan, the bilateral the relationship between (p.125) the two countries appeared to cool as Afghanistan cancelled military orders from India while seeking a closer relationship with Pakistan. Yet it would be wrong to surmise a fundamental restructuring of the bilateral relationship in 2015. President Ghani does not have the same personal connection with India that his predecessor President Karzai had enjoyed. Yet Abdullah Abdullah, who is Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Officer in a power-sharing government with President Ghani, maintains a close personal relationship with India and has repeatedly emphasized the close bilateral relations between both countries. Moreover, individual factors were less important in determining Afghanistan’s relationship with India in 2015 than the necessity to engage with Pakistan, which is believed to be crucial to negotiations with the Taliban at a time of international troop withdrawal and heightened insecurity in Afghanistan. From India’s perspective, the insecurity in Afghanistan increases the need to remain engaged with Afghanistan, as seen in the repeated outreach by Prime Minister Modi and his government to Afghanistan.

Future Prospects for India’s Relationship with Afghanistan Indo-Afghan ties in the twenty-first century are the closest they have been since Indian independence in 1947, with a mutual realization of the strategic importance of this bilateral relationship. The relationship is one that is built on a history stretching back centuries. In addition, by 2015, strategic, geostrategic, and domestic factors converged to make a symbiotic bilateral relationship in the interests of both countries. Despite the appearance of a cooling in the bilateral relationship after the 2014 elections in both countries, a fundamental interest in securing a democratic and stable Afghanistan continued to underpin the bilateral relationship. This fundamental focus of India’s foreign policy engagement with Afghanistan is only likely to intensify with drawdown of international troops from Afghanistan. India’s growing regional as well as global power ambitions will propel a continued activist foreign policy towards Afghanistan, a country where India has multiple interests at stake. India and Afghanistan have systemic concerns that the decreased presence of international troops in Afghanistan after 2014 will leave a political and security vacuum comparable to the early 1990s, which had led to the rise of the Taliban. India is concerned that a similar situation (p.126) could arise, enabling extremist Islamic groups who have found refuge in Pakistan to once again gain power and spread throughout Afghanistan, spilling over into India. The taking

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India–Afghanistan Relations over of the Afghan city of Kunduz by the Taliban for two weeks in September 2015 only cemented such Indian fears. In addition to India’s geostrategic, regional, and security interests in Afghanistan, the search for access to new sources of energy and minerals both within Afghanistan and through Afghanistan from Central Asia, as well as potential new markets for Indian goods and services in a stabile and secure Afghanistan, have added impetus to India’s foreign policy in Afghanistan. India has a pragmatic belief that a foreign policy which supports Afghanistan’s nascent democracy and economy through development assistance, trade, regional integration and even some military assistance will make for a more stable Afghanistan, in turn improving India’s domestic security. Such a foreign policy is also seen as one that could help the Afghan and Indian economies in a mutually beneficial partnership, while buttressing India’s role as a rising regional and global power. While the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan by the end of 2015 has the power to further unravel the stability of the country, leaving India powerless to provide hard power support or the ability to protect its investments in Afghanistan, the orientation of the India– Afghanistan relationship is unlikely to change. The systemic as well as domestic drivers pushing for a strengthening of Indian foreign policy towards Afghanistan are only likely to grow beyond 2015. As a result, Indian engagement with Afghanistan will seek to broaden and deepen the relationship. References Bibliography references: Bajoria, J. 2010. ‘Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)’, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 14 January. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-armypure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar-taiba/p17882 (accessed 27 February 2015). Bass, G. 2013. Blood Telegram (New York: Knopf). BBC News. 2011. ‘Afghanistan and India sign “strategic partnership”’, 4 October. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15161776 (accessed 27 February 2015). Bearak, M. 2013. ‘India a Hub for Patients from Afghanistan’, New York Times, 1 November. Available at: http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/india-a-hubfor-patients-from-afghanistan/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (accessed 27 February 2015).

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India–Afghanistan Relations Chaudhuri, R. 2013. ‘Negotiating Its Way In: India in Afghanistan’, in Aglaya Snetkov and Stephen Aris, eds, The Regional Dimensions of Security: The Other Sides of Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 83–99. Curtis, L. 2008. ‘After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen U.S.–India Counterterrorism Cooperation’, Backgrounder, no. 2217, 9 December. Available at: http:// 164.100.154.239/newsarticles/newsreport/backgrounder.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). (p.128) Dalrymple, W. 2013. ‘A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India’. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/deadlytriangle-afghanistan-pakistan-india-c (accessed 27 February 2015). Das, B. 2013. ‘Afghan Students Flock to Indian Universities’, Al Jazeera, 3 June. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/ 2013/04/201342211228401708.html (accessed 27 February 2015). Eswaran, E. 1999. Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan—A Man to Match His Mountains (New York: Nilgiri Press). Gall, C. 2014. The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–14 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt). Ganguly, S. and R. Mukherji. 2011. India since 1980 (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Government of India (GoI). 2011. ‘Address by Prime Minister to the Joint Session of the Parliament of Afghanistan’, Prime Minister’s Office, 13 May. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=72118 (accessed 27 February 2015). ———. 2012. ‘India–Afghanistan Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, August. Available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/afghanistanaug-2012.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). Gopal, S. 1979. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol. 2: 1947–1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Hamdam, M.S. 2015. ‘The Real Victims of India and Pakistan Proxy War’, Huffington Post, 7 August. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ mohammad-shafiq-hamdam/the-real-victims-of-india_b_7939160.html. Haqqani, H. 2013. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs). Hindu. 2011. ‘Statement made by Prime Minister at the End of Signing of Firstever Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan’, 5 October. Available at: Page 19 of 21

India–Afghanistan Relations http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/statement-made-by-prime-minister-atthe-end-of-signing-of-firstever-strategic-partnership-agreement-with-afghanistan/ article2513967.ece (accessed 27 February 2015). Horn, R. 1982. Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger). Kaplan, E. 2007. ‘The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations’, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 19 October. Available at: http:// www.spearheadresearch.org/Pages/Documents/ The%20ISI%20and%20Terrorism.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). Mahr, K. 2013. ‘India–Pakistan Tensions Find Deadly Echo in Afghanistan’, Time, 6 August. Available at: http://world.time.com/2013/08/06/afghanistan-becomingnew-theater-of-india-pakistan-conflict/ (accessed 27 February 2015). (p.129) Mullen, R.D. 2009. ‘Afghanistan’s Neighbors: Understanding Iranian, Chinese, Pakistani and Indian Interests in Afghanistan’, in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, ed., Peterberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region, Liechtenstein Colloquium Report vol. 9 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University), pp. 143–51. Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/lisd/publications/ afgh2009_lcm4.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). Nye, J.S., Jr. 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs). Pant, H.V. 2010. ‘India in Afghanistan: A test case for a rising power?’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 133–53. Peters, S.G., T.V.V. King, T.J. Mack, and M.P. Chornack, eds, and the U.S. Geological Survey Afghanistan Mineral Assessment Team. 2011. Summaries of Important Areas for Mineral Investment and Production Opportunities of Nonfuel Minerals in Afghanistan, Open-File Report 2011–1204, USGS Afghanistan Project Product No. 199. Available at: http://afghanistan.cr.usgs.gov/ nonfuel-report (accessed 27 February 2015). Raghavan, S. 2013. 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Rubin, B.R. 2007. ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1, pp. 57–74, 76–8. Swami, P. 2007. India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947– 2004 (London: Routledge).

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India–Afghanistan Relations Tisdall, S. 2010. ‘India and Pakistan’s Proxy War Puts Afghanistan Exit at Risk’, Guardian, 7 May. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/ may/06/india-pakistan-afghanistan-exit (accessed 27 February 2015). (p.130) Notes:

(1.) William Dalrymple, the historian known for his works on British India, has argued this view vociferously in several outlets, including in an essay published by the Brookings Institution in 2013 (Dalrymple 2013). This view has also been echoed by Mahr (2013) in Time, Tisdall (2010) in the Guardian, and Hamdam (2015) in the Huffington Post. (2.) ‘Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan’, New Delhi, 4 January 1950. Available at: http:// www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1950/3.html (accessed 27 February 2015). (3.) See Bass (2013) and Raghavan (2013) for an account of the changing alliances during the 1971 war. (4.) Calculations made by Indian Development Cooperation Research at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, January 2014. (5.) Calculations made by Indian Development Cooperation Research at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, January 2014. (6.) ABC News/BBC/ARD Poll, ‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand’, Questions #39 and #40. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/ 11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf (accessed 27 February 2015). (7.) Based on personal communications with Indian foreign service officers, policy analysts, and journalists in New Delhi, November–December 2013. (8.) For an insider’s view of the support provided by the Pakistani government to the Taliban during the 1990s, and the failure of Pakistan to make a clean break with the Taliban after 11 September 2001, see Haqqani (2013: 312). Also see Kaplan (2007). (9.) Based on personal communications with Indian foreign service officers, policy analysts, and journalists in New Delhi, November–December 2013. (10.) Calculations by Indian Development Cooperation Research, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, based on Trade Statistics, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.

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The Indo-US Entente Indian strategic elites do not state this, of course, but my conclusion flows logically from a close analysis of recent developments in US–India relations.2 The chapter unfolds in the following way. In the next section, I set the stage by outlining the global context within which New Delhi and Washington operate today. The second section provides the historical background necessary to situate the relationship in its contemporary context. Section three examines Indo-US relations since 2009, roughly coinciding with the re-election of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the inauguration of US President Barack Obama. I focus on several core issues of mutual strategic interest: Washington’s evolving grand strategy of ‘rebalancing’ to the Asia-Pacific region; US arms and (p.134) technology transfers to India; civilian nuclear energy collaboration; and the consequences for India of the ongoing withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan.3 The fourth and final section concludes the chapter by analysing the vitality of the Indo-US entente and briefly forecasting what the near-term future holds for India’s relations with the United States. Throughout the chapter, I use Kenneth Waltz’s three-tiered framework to discuss the individual, domestic, and systemic contexts within which Indian policymakers are charting their country’s foreign policy course. Waltz’s three ‘images’ help to identify, distinguish between, and assign relative weight to causal factors originating in human beings and human nature, domestic governance and politics, and the international system itself. The latter, Waltz’s ‘third image’, provides a ‘theory of the conditioning effects of the state system itself’, but we ‘still have to look to motivation and circumstance in order to explain individual acts’ (Waltz 1959: 231). The third image ‘describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results’ (Waltz 1959: 238). From Waltz’s perspective, two systemic characteristics structure international relations. The first is anarchy, or the absence of a world government above states. The second is the distribution of capabilities, or balance of power, between the states at any given time (Waltz 1979: 79–101). The main secondand first-image variables that I marshal in this chapter to help explain Indian foreign policy toward the US include the nature of India’s domestic political institutions and the weltanschauung—or world-view—of Indian strategic elites.

The Third Image: The International System World politics is in transition from bipolarity to a new, as yet indeterminate international order.4 More than twenty years into this transition—often described by international relations scholars as America’s ‘unipolar moment’— the outlines of the new order are taking shape.5 Most prominently, China is rising steadily toward the top tier of global politics (see the Appendix to this chapter). Bipolarity’s eventual (p.135) successor might turn out to be a new Page 2 of 32

The Indo-US Entente form of bipolarity, with the United States and China competing for influence atop the great-power hierarchy. China’s rapid economic growth, its conventional military buildup, and the post-Cold War drawdown of US strategic nuclear forces have gradually narrowed the gap between Chinese and American national power, although the overall US power profile still exceeds China’s by a considerable margin. Alternatively, we might see the re-emergence of multipolarity, historically the modern international system’s most common configuration. Some analysts identify the so-called ‘BRICS’ countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—as potential great powers in a future multipolar system that might also include Germany, Japan, and/or Turkey.6 Another open question concerns the nature of the emerging powers’ ascent. Conceptually speaking, every state in the international system has an external orientation that can be plotted on a continuum from ‘status quo’ to ‘revisionist’. Some great powers rise as challengers to the existing global order, 1930s Nazi Germany being an obvious example. In contrast, others rise in relative harmony with the extant rules, norms, and institutions; the United States from the 1890s to the First World War is a good example. One of the liveliest debates in international affairs today concerns China’s place on this continuum. The term ‘peaceful rise’ nicely captures China’s rhetorical aspiration to become a world power without threatening the institutional foundations of the US-led global order, as well as the international community’s own cautious optimism regarding China’s emergence as a responsible ‘stakeholder’ in the system. More pessimistically, Gilpin’s (1981) theory of international political change suggests that as new states climb the great-power hierarchy, they will eventually chafe against the existing rules and norms—which were, after all, created by other, now declining, great powers for their own purposes. These aspiring great powers will try to reshape the normative landscape to better suit their own interests, which can spark instability. Kissinger (1957: 1) arrives at the same point in the reverse direction: international stability ‘has commonly resulted … from a generally accepted legitimacy … an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers.’

(p.136) Historical Background India causes less trepidation than China.7 For most of the Cold War, India was a discontented middle power whose grand strategy of ‘nonalignment’ synthesized a litany of grievances, including anti-colonialism; resentment at the injustice of Partition, which hacked from independent India territory roughly the size of Texas and Oregon combined; indignation at the loss of one-third of Kashmir, for Indians an integral part of India, but now a source of chronic tension with Pakistan; and bitterness at the intrusion of the US–Soviet competition into the Indian subcontinent, which New Delhi viewed as challenging its pre-eminence as

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The Indo-US Entente the ‘natural’ successor to the British Raj and its rightful role as post-colonial South Asia’s security manager. During the Cold War’s waning years, a number of developments combined to gradually reorient Indian foreign policy away from its Nehruvian roots toward a posture that was more compatible with the ‘Western’ world order. Most important in this context were the US–Soviet rapprochement; the decline and eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s primary security benefactor; social, cultural, and political upheavals within India itself (Frankel et al. 2000), which led to the formation of a coalitional two-party political system; and the beginnings of Indian economic reforms, which interacted with a severe balance of payments crisis in the early 1990s to produce a full-blown economic restructuring.8 New Delhi’s external orientation shifted in tandem with improvements in IndoUS relations. Although enhanced ties between India and the US are often depicted as having begun only recently, the upward trajectory actually started thirty years ago. Rajiv Gandhi began to explore new cooperation with the US soon after succeeding his mother, Indira Gandhi, as prime minister in late 1984. With the global revolution in information technology, Indian planners worried that the utility of their dense economic ties with a stagnant Soviet Union was quickly diminishing. They wanted to develop India’s own information technology sectors, including electronics, computer software, and telecommunications, all areas where America was vastly outperforming the Soviet Union. Washington had its own incentives for seeking warmer ties with India: the staunchly antiCommunist Reagan administration was eager to drive wedges between Moscow and its allies. A 1985 ‘Memorandum (p.137) of Understanding’ paved the way for increased collaboration in science and technology. India’s 1991 balance of payments crisis convinced New Delhi that the economy required drastic restructuring. Since then, successive governments headed by both major parties, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have liberalized foreign investment and foreign exchange rules, lowered tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, overhauled India’s fiscal and monetary policies, and begun to reform the country’s financial sector. These policies dovetailed with the Clinton administration’s economics-driven grand strategy of ‘engagement and enlargement’, as well as with the increasing political clout of a growing and prosperous Indo-American community in the US. Tentative Indo-US military collaboration began when the two sides signed a 1995 ‘Agreed Minute on Defence Relations’, which established an institutional framework for Indo-US defence cooperation. From 1995 to 1998, the US and India embarked on joint naval exercises, an air force pilot exchange programme, and cooperative military training, as US International Military Education and Training funding for India doubled (Fair 2004: 67–76). However, the overall Page 4 of 32

The Indo-US Entente political relationship continued to be soured by what Indian leaders viewed as the Clinton administration’s excessive preoccupation with the India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and India’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes. When India tested five nuclear explosive devices in 1998, US nonproliferation laws mandated an array of sanctions against New Delhi, including the termination of all aid other than humanitarian and food assistance. Although most military-to-military contacts were suspended, India’s nuclear tests also generated a sustained, high-level engagement between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh.9 Over time, the Clinton administration adapted itself to the reality that India’s great-power aspirations included becoming an overt nuclear weapon state. In hindsight, India’s 1998 nuclear tests destroyed the illusion that New Delhi could somehow be coaxed out of pursuing the ultimate currency of great-power status; once the illusion evaporated, the US and India could begin to relate to one another on a more realistic footing. The Indo-US convergence in the 1990s was also powered by a ‘de-hyphenation’ process that evolved as a consequence of comparative Indian and Pakistani behaviour.10 Washington’s improving relationship (p.138) with New Delhi paralleled Pakistan’s continuing fall from grace in US eyes, a downward trajectory that had begun in 1990 (Hagerty 2004).11 In 1999, Islamabad launched its Kargil initiative, a reckless incursion into Indian-administered Kashmir that sparked a decisive military response by New Delhi, a forceful diplomatic intervention by President Clinton, and utter humiliation for Islamabad. Later that year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was toppled by army chief Pervez Musharraf, ending Pakistan’s latest attempt at democracy. Other drivers of ‘de-hyphenation’ were Islamabad’s continuing support for the antiIndian insurgency in Kashmir, its patronage of the severely repressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and emerging evidence that Pakistan was leaking nuclear weapons related materials to North Korea. In the early 2000s, the Indo-US partnership extended more deeply into national security affairs. After 9/11, New Delhi offered its backing for US military and counterterrorist operations in South Asia—including access to air bases, aircraft refuelling and maintenance support, overflight rights, intelligence cooperation, and port facilities for US warships. Although Washington demurred, given its need for Pakistan as a staging area for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (and Pakistani sensitivities), India’s initiative showed that Cold War habits of mind were fading. In late 2001, the two sides agreed to expand their collaboration in trade, counterterrorism, regional security, science and space, and civilian nuclear safety. Since then, Indo-US security relations have blossomed in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War.

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The Indo-US Entente For a decade now, the Indian and US armed services have conducted joint exercises in areas such as maritime interdiction and search-and-rescue, naval aviation, anti-submarine warfare, air combat, airlift support, airborne assault, mountain warfare, close quarters combat, jungle warfare, and special forces and peacekeeping operations. These exercises are intended to build trust between the two countries’ services and enhance the readiness of their forces to collaborate in humanitarian and stabilization operations. In 2004, New Delhi and Washington committed themselves to a process called ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ (NSSP), a phased effort to ease restrictions on India’s access to US technology in four critical areas: dual-use items, civilian nuclear applications, civilian space cooperation, and ballistic missile defence. In the NSSP’s first phase, the US removed the Indian Space and Research Organization (p.139) (ISRO) headquarters from the US Department of Commerce Entity List, abolished licensing requirements for ‘low-level dual-use items’ exported to ISRO subsidiaries, and granted a ‘presumption of approval’ for exports of ‘all dual-use items not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for use in the “balance of plant” activities at nuclear facilities subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards’ (Kronstadt 2009).12 In March 2005, Washington’s ambassador to New Delhi, David Mulford, announced: ‘It is now official. It is the policy of the United States to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century’ (Mulford 2005). Also in 2005, New Delhi and Washington signed a ten-year security agreement, which outlined ‘planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defence trade, increasing opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, [and] expanded collaboration related to missile defense’. The next several years saw India’s largest-ever defence purchases from the United States. In January 2007, the amphibious transport dock USS Trenton was sold to India (and converted to the INS Jalashwa), along with six Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters and six landing craft. India also took delivery of six C-130J Hercules transport aircraft in January 2008. In January 2009, New Delhi bought eight P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance/anti-submarine warfare aircraft from Boeing for $2.1 billion (Kronstadt 2009). The crowning achievement of the early 2000s strategic convergence was the conclusion of a deal that enables New Delhi to buy American nuclear fuel and technologies while still maintaining its nuclear weapons programme. In July 2005, India and the US signed a ‘roadmap to lift global nuclear trade restrictions on India’ (Hibbs 2010). After three years of arduous negotiations, authorization for Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation was signed into law in October 2008, making it legal for American companies to provide India with nuclear-related technology, fuel, reactors, and other equipment.13

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The Indo-US Entente By 2009, the relationship between India and the US had blossomed into an entente. This characterization is more useful than the often-used ‘strategic partnership’. Contemporary world politics is so littered with ‘strategic partnerships’ that the phrase has lost its utility as a meaningful description of any two countries’ ties. Indeed, ‘strategic partnership’ has become the generic post-Cold War shorthand for just about any relationship between two countries that are closer to amity (p.140) than to enmity. The word ‘entente’ better captures the essence of the Indo-US bond, while at the same time distinguishing it from an ‘alliance’, which is not only inaccurate but also disagreeable to both sides. The concept of an ‘entente’ denotes a type of close alignment between states that falls short of a full-blown alliance. Alliances constitute the deepest possible commitment states can make to one another. They are formal, often treaty-based expressions of security cooperation, involving the promise and expectation of mutual military assistance in case of aggression by a proactively identified common enemy. When allying with each other, countries essentially aggregate their military power for the purposes of deterrence in peacetime and defence during war. Compared to alliances, ententes are relatively informal. They are often not expressed in treaties or other formal agreements. Entente partners thus retain greater flexibility than alliance partners when it comes to supporting one another in specific cases of threat or aggression.14

The Second Image: Indo-US Relations since 2009 Soon after the election of Barack Obama in 2008, a perception grew among Indian (and Indian-American) elites that he might be less committed than President Bush to the entente with India. The Indian perception was that, historically, Democratic presidents had been more inclined to pressure New Delhi on issues like Kashmir and nuclear proliferation, while Republican presidents tended to adopt more pragmatic, less intrusive postures. When the new president left Manmohan Singh off the short list of world leaders he telephoned in the days immediately after the election, Indians fretted that Obama had downgraded India relative to its status during the Bush presidency. These concerns intensified when it emerged that President Obama’s foreign policy team was considering the appointment of a special representative for South Asian affairs, which the Indian intelligentsia took to include India and India–Pakistan relations. Would the new president be an activist on Kashmir, threatening India’s preferred approach to conflict resolution—namely, that India and Pakistan should resolve the dispute bilaterally, without interference from outsiders? Indian angst eased when, partly in response to lobbying by New Delhi and Indian-Americans, the president appointed Richard Holbrooke as his Special Representative for (p.141) Afghanistan and Pakistan, leaving India and IndoPakistani relations—and thus Kashmir—out of Holbrooke’s portfolio.15 India’s three most important bilateral relationships are with Pakistan, China, and the US. With their history of Partition, three major wars, nuclear weapons competition, numerous crises and terrorist attacks, and chronic tension over the Page 7 of 32

The Indo-US Entente disputed territory of Kashmir, Pakistan represents India’s chief day-to-day security threat.16 Pakistan complicates India’s great-power aspirations; when Indian strategic elites talk about ‘rising above the region’, what they envision is a globally ascendant India that is not repeatedly dragged down, sullied, and distracted by conflict with Pakistan (Merchant 2010). In their view, Pakistan’s aggressiveness forces India to waste scarce security resources—money, manpower, military materiel—dealing with challenges it would rather not have to face. Unfortunately for New Delhi, though, total ‘de-hyphenation’ is a chimera. India and Pakistan are too linked by history, culture, geography, and demography, not to mention the everyday minutiae of international politics, to be completely disconnected.17 New Delhi and Beijing are immersed in a new great game over influence and prestige in Asia (Scott 2008).18 India and China have been geopolitical competitors since they re-emerged as sovereign states in the aftermath of the Second World War. During the early Cold War, they pursued starkly different development paths, which in turn provided competing models for scores of newly independent Third World governments. Despite initial expressions of neighbourly solidarity, Sino-Indian relations soured in the late 1950s, and in 1962 China trounced India in a border war whose underlying territorial disputes remain unresolved today. The roots of India’s nuclear weapons programme lie in the 1962 defeat and in China’s first nuclear explosive test in 1964. A fundamental purpose of India’s nuclear weapons is to deter another attack by China, which, while considered unlikely, can never be entirely ruled out.19 While much has changed since the end of the Cold War, India’s second-image orientation persists; at its core is the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’. Although New Delhi has appreciated since 1962 the necessity of having powerful friends to bolster its strategic confidence vis-à-vis China, its colonial history continues to leave it wary that forming alliances will compromise its hard-won sovereignty.20 Moreover, Indian leaders have yet to reach a consensus about what grand strategy should (p.142) replace their Cold War grand strategy of nonalignment. Because of this strategic inertia, New Delhi is by default practising what might be termed ‘neo-nonalignment’.21 Like its Cold War predecessor, this is a grand strategy of exclusion. India has since 1947 viewed itself as the ‘natural’ regional hegemon, having inherited that role from the British. Cold War nonalignment was partly motivated by a desire to keep the superpowers out of South Asia; only if the bipolar competition were allowed to intrude into regional affairs could India’s natural dominance be eroded. Today, it is Chinese penetration that threatens India’s regional dominance. New Delhi and Beijing dispute ownership of 48,000 square miles of territory, roughly the size of Mississippi or Tajikistan. The two rising powers are developing ‘bluewater navies’ that can project national power and protect vital sea lanes of control.22 Their growing, energy-thirsty economies have generated a competitive Page 8 of 32

The Indo-US Entente search for new energy resources. Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars in developing ports at Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Burma, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. A Chinese-built road network crisscrosses Nepal, while Chinese-engineered oil and gas pipelines snake their way across Burma. Beijing provides aid to Afghanistan as insurance against a surge in Islamist radicalism in China’s far west. Most worrisome for New Delhi, China and Pakistan are entente partners, with Beijing building nuclear power plants for Islamabad and acting as its largest supplier of conventional weapons and other military equipment. Meanwhile, India and China continue to competitively build up their military capabilities astride the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh (Economist 2010). Much to the chagrin of Indian strategic elites, President Obama’s Asia policy initially gave highest priority to US relations with China. With regard to South Asia, much of the new president’s attention went to Pakistan, largely because of the ongoing war in Afghanistan and his campaign commitment to refocus US military attention away from Iraq and toward the ‘good war’ in Afghanistan. As a consequence, the impression grew in New Delhi, and among India analysts in the United States, that Obama was neglecting India (Raja Mohan 2012; see also Joshi et al. 2013: 2–4).23 These concerns eased somewhat in November 2009, when Prime Minister Singh was welcomed to Washington in the Obama administration’s first hosted state visit. The president ‘made (p.143) amends by talking of India’s role in Asia and its global significance’ (Raja Mohan 2012: 35). Still, there remained a lingering sense that the momentum of the Indo-US strategic convergence had slowed, and that without a renewed sense of strategic vision and tangible steps to undergird it, relations could stagnate.24 In 2010, having concluded a lengthy review of US policy in Afghanistan and decided on a surge of 30,000 troops, to be followed by a hand-off of the war against the Taliban to the Afghan security forces by 2014, the Obama administration redirected its attention toward India and ‘reaffirmed the core premises of the Bush policy—that the US would assist India’s rise to great-power status and that Washington sees India as an indispensable power in the future management of Asia’ (Raja Mohan 2012: 35–6). The US President returned Singh’s visit in November 2010 and, in a warmly received speech to the Indian parliament, announced that it was now official US policy to support India’s aspirations for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Obama also announced a further loosening of controls on exports of sensitive technology to India, as well as US support for Indian membership in several nonproliferation institutions, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had special symbolic importance, having been created as a direct response to India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ of 1974 (Karl 2012: 314).

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The Indo-US Entente In 2011, the Obama administration announced that it would ‘rebalance’ the US diplomatic and military posture toward the Asia-Pacific region. Although US officials downplayed the role of China as a cause of the rebalance, it is clearly a hedging strategy driven by China’s rapidly growing power and willingness to throw its weight around. The Obama White House had been growing less and less enamoured of Beijing, owing to China’s rhetorical arrogance during the US financial crisis and its increasingly aggressive assertion of its claims to disputed island territories in the South China Sea, which had led to pronounced tension between China and Vietnam, as well as China and the Philippines. In a major statement of policy in July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had told an audience in Hanoi that ‘the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea’ (Kronstadt and Pinto 2013: 5). A year later in New Delhi, Secretary Clinton foreshadowed what Washington would envisage as India’s role (p.144) in the rebalance by exhorting her hosts ‘not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well’ (Karl 2012: 314). President Obama officially unveiled the rebalance initiative during a visit to the Asia-Pacific region in November 2011 (Manyin et al. 2012; see also Clinton 2011). Partly because of a messy roll-out, the rebalance engendered considerable confusion in Asian capitals, including New Delhi. The rebalance to Asia is not a foreign policy or military doctrine. It is a grand-strategic concept, intended to identify broad US strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to guide diplomatic, economic, and defence policy, priorities, and spending over the next ten years. Furthermore, the rebalancing concept is most accurately viewed not as a fundamentally new initiative, but rather as a restoration of the high US priority accorded to the Asia-Pacific since 1941. The US maintained a strategy of forward engagement in the Asia-Pacific during the Second World War and then throughout the Cold War. The Clinton administration perpetuated the strategy in the 1990s, as symbolized by the ‘Nye Doctrine’ of maintaining 100,000 uniformed US military personnel in the region. Prior to 9/11, the Bush administration initially focused on managing the rise of China, identified for the first time as ‘strategic competitor’, rather than ‘strategic partner’. After the 9/11 attacks, the global war on terrorism, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom redirected an enormous portion of US military resources away from Asia and toward the Middle East. Since late 2011, the United States has been reverting (haltingly, because of ongoing volatility in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) to a grand strategy of forward engagement in the AsiaPacific in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Iraq, and with the thinning out of US military forces in Afghanistan. In the words of former Bush administration official Ashley Tellis: ‘The Obama Administration has simply picked up where the Bush Administration’s original impulses lay’ (Chaffin 2012).

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The Indo-US Entente The main difference between 2001 and 2011 was, of course, that the evolution of the international system—the third image—had brought about new geopolitical circumstances, namely, the waning of unipolarity and rise of new great-power aspirants like China and India. Since 2011, Washington has been reverting to its ‘normal’, long-standing commitment to Asia-Pacific security, but now in the context of an increasingly powerful and assertive China, and a rising India that values both its strategic autonomy and its entente with the US.25 The (p.145) US Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) January 2012 ‘strategic guidance’ (DoD 2012a), which outlines the rebalancing concept, identified two underlying foundations for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific: a ‘balance of military capability and presence’ and a ‘rules-based international order’. Essential to maintaining these foundations, the document said, are strengthened relationships with US friends in the region: ‘Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region.’ In particular, Washington would invest in a ‘long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region’. The DoD guidance specifically included coastal South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as part of the geographical scope of Asia-Pacific, mainly because of the volume and strategic importance of the energy resources and other high-value goods that pass through the IOR and the Strait of Malacca. (According to the Congressional Research Service, ‘an estimated 50% of world container traffic and 70% of shipborne oil and petroleum transit the Indian Ocean’ [Manyin et al. 2012: 5].) Specifically regarding India, Washington’s grand-strategic goal is a progressively closer entente: ‘US leaders … expect India’s importance to US interests to grow steadily, and they foresee India taking on new security roles commensurate with its status as a major power and stakeholder in the international system’ (Kronstadt and Pinto 2012: 1). In a June 2012 speech in New Delhi, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said bluntly: ‘We need to deepen our defense and security cooperation.’ He continued: ‘Over the long term, I am certain that we will transition our defense trade beyond the buyer–seller relationship to substantial co-production and eventually high-technology joint research and development.’ Defence cooperation with India, said Panetta, is a ‘linchpin’ in the rebalancing strategy (DoD 2012b). As the DoD strategic concept says unequivocally: ‘The United States is committed to providing India with topof-the-line technology’ (DoD 2012a). When it comes to defence trade and technology transfer, recent years have witnessed both positive and negative developments. In July 2009, New Delhi and Washington reached a critical breakthrough on the issue of end-use monitoring, and further paved the way for US companies to compete for contracts as New Delhi modernizes its armed forces and diversifies its portfolio of suppliers. In 2011, most (p.146) Indian defence organizations were removed from the Department of Commerce ‘Entity List’, which essentially eliminated broad Page 11 of 32

The Indo-US Entente licensing restrictions on technology sharing (Kronstadt and Pinto 2012: 27). In June 2012, the two sides launched the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, which, one senior US official maintained, would ‘streamline our bureaucratic processes and make our defense trade more simple, responsive and effective’, moving from a ‘vendor/buyer relationship to one of partnership in co-developing and co-producing defense systems’ (DoD 2013). Indian defence purchases from the US have soared, with American companies signing ‘nearly $10 billion in defense contracts with India over the past few years’.26 Despite this forward movement, the defence trade and technology partnership stumbled in 2011. As India had begun the process of choosing a new combat aircraft to replace its aging fleet of Soviet-era MiG-21s, the Bush White House gave its approval for American firms to provide India with advanced combat aircraft for the first time (P. Baker 2005). In 2008, Boeing and Lockheed-Martin submitted bids for, respectively, the F/A-18 and F-16IN, and the two American firms competed against four European bidders for the 126-plane, $12 billion contract. New Delhi planned to buy eighteen of the jets off the shelf and coproduce the rest in India, an arrangement that would have been new for US companies in India. As always, the Indian assessment and decision process was exceedingly slow and plagued by delays. India rejected the Boeing and Lockheed-Martin bids in April 2011, and decided on the French Dassault Rafale in January 2012 (Kronstadt and Pinto 2013: 19).27 The disappointment was palpable on the US side. As he departed his post in New Delhi in May 2011, US ambassador Timothy J. Roemer complained about the lack of a ‘two-way street’ in the Indo-US relationship. ‘India needs to be asking itself,’ he said, ‘is it delivering on the global partnership?’ (Karl 2012: 318). Frustration has also mounted over the slow implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal. In 2009, one big step remained before American companies could begin building nuclear plants in India: parliament had to approve legislation limiting the firms’ liability in the event of a nuclear accident. Indian memories of the 1984 Union Carbide toxic gas leak in Bhopal (history’s worst industrial disaster) make the liability matter particularly pressing for Indian lawmakers. Parliament passed a nuclear liability bill in 2010, but it was incompatible with global (p.147) standards that direct liability for accidents to nuclear plant operators, not to plant suppliers. India’s new liability law went ‘far beyond international norms … , all but blocking the involvement of US companies in India’s expanding nuclear energy sector’ (Karl 2012: 317). Arduous negotiations have taken place over the last several years, and on the eve of Prime Minister Singh’s September 2013 visit to Washington, his cabinet approved the outlines of a commercial contract to start work on reactors (Hindustan Times 2013). During the visit, Singh and Obama ‘welcomed the announcement that NPCIL [the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd] and US nuclear company Westinghouse have concluded a Preliminary Contract to develop a nuclear power plant in Gujarat’ (White House 2013). When Obama visited India in Page 12 of 32

The Indo-US Entente January 2015, he and Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the two sides had resolved all of the remaining issues, and that implementation of the nuclear deal could now move forward (BBC News 2015). The regional security issue that has most preoccupied Indian strategic elites in recent years has been the ongoing withdrawal of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces from Afghanistan, slated to be completed by the end of 2016, and the potential follow-on effects in the north-western subcontinent (Landler 2014). Indian leaders remember that when the Soviet Union withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan in 1989, thousands of jihadis redirected their aggression to Indian-administered Kashmir, where an insurgency was just beginning against Indian control. New Delhi worries that history may be about to repeat itself. After periodically intense fighting that left some 50,000 Kashmiris dead between 1989 and 2003, Kashmir has been relatively calm for most of the last decade. India and Pakistan reached a ceasefire agreement in 2003, and it was essentially observed until early 2013. During that time, many of the jihadis who had fought in Kashmir moved back to Afghanistan (or to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas) to battle the Americans and their NATO allies. Political conflict occasionally erupted in the Kashmir valley, especially in 2008–10, but the violence was much less devastating than prior to 2003. India’s ‘nightmare scenario’ is that jihadist energies will once again be directed back to Kashmir after the Americans have left (Latif 2012: 27). Already there are worrying signs that the conflict in Kashmir might be reigniting (see Staniland 2013). In January 2013, four Indian and Pakistani soldiers were killed in a firefight, and New Delhi claimed that (p.148) one of the Indian jawans was beheaded. Then in August, five Indian soldiers were ambushed and killed while patrolling along the Line of Control (LoC) dividing the disputed territory. Near-daily mortar and machine-gun fire continued into September (Gowen 2013). The Indian Ministry of Defence reported in August 2013 that Pakistani ceasefire violations were up 80 per cent over the previous year, and that the number of ‘hardcore Pakistan-trained terrorists’ who had tried to breach the LoC had doubled (BBC News 2013). Feeding directly into Indian fears, Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba have said that they will indeed refocus on fomenting violence in Kashmir as the US military presence in the region diminishes (Gowen 2013). More broadly, the Indo-Pakistani competition over Afghanistan is likely to intensify as US and NATO forces leave the region. Uncertainties abound, and how they are resolved will have enormous ramifications for Indian security. Who will succeed President Karzai, and how broad will the new president’s support base be? Can the Afghan security forces maintain some semblance of stability beyond Kabul? Indian strategic elites anticipate resumed conflict between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns; neither of the two likeliest outcomes they envision— Page 13 of 32

The Indo-US Entente the return of the Taliban to power or widespread conflict and chaos—is consonant with Indian national security interests. Either way, Afghanistan might once again become a ‘haven for anti-India terrorist groups’ (Dasgupta 2013: 11). New Delhi has made a huge investment in Afghan social and economic development over the last thirteen years, and the collective Indian forecast is that the gains made by that investment are at serious risk. Washington has attempted to reassure New Delhi that the US will not ‘abandon’ Afghanistan.28 Secretary of State John Kerry told his Indian hosts in June 2013 that, after the withdrawal of US combat forces, ‘the United States will continue … to support the Afghan government, to support the Afghan military, to continue to equip and train it well beyond 2014, and to continue to have a level of force on the ground that will continue to conduct … counterterrorism activity’ (DeYoung and Londono 2013). However, most American analysts share the predominant Indian view that ‘the Afghan forces aren’t strong enough to win or even guarantee continued containment of the Taliban on their own’ (O’Hanlon 2013), and their pessimism is compounded by the failure (at the time of writing) of US and Afghan leaders to finalize an agreement on the status of US forces beyond 2014 (Sanborn 2014). (p.149) Like Washington, New Delhi hopes for the emergence of a reasonably powerful, broad-based government in post-Karzai Kabul, but Indian strategic elites tend to be sceptical about the prospects for sustainable political reconciliation with the Taliban. If, as most knowledgeable analysts expect, the level of violence in Afghanistan ratchets up again, Pakistani jihadis will likely be deeply involved (Washington Post 2013). That prospect does not bode well for Indo-Pakistani peace efforts.29

The Indo-US Entente: Analysis and Forecast A number of factors have indeed caused a certain malaise in the Indo-US entente since 2008, among them the 2009 change of US presidential administrations; President Obama’s early Asia focus on China and ‘Af-Pak’; India’s instinctive aversion to compromising its cherished ‘strategic autonomy’; the political and policy exhaustion of Manmohan Singh’s government; the prolonged, contentious grind of pushing the nuclear deal from agreement to execution; bureaucratic sluggishness in moving arms sales forward; New Delhi’s decision not to meet its combat aircraft needs by selecting one of the American bidders; and, most recently, the unfortunate Khobragade affair.30 Here again, Obama’s January 2015 India trip has raised expectations of improved relations, but it is too early to tell if they will be matched by tangible results (Parsons et al., 2015). Secretary Clinton may have been correct when she said at the June 2012 US– India Strategic Dialogue: ‘today there is less need for dramatic breakthroughs that marked earlier phases of our relationship, but more need for steady, focused cooperation aimed at working through our differences and advancing the interests and values we share. This kind of daily, weekly, monthly collaboration Page 14 of 32

The Indo-US Entente may not always be glamorous, but it is strategically significant’ (Limaye 2013: 147–8). Even so, there is agreement on all sides that the entente has not yet reached the potential that was imagined for it in the heady days of the early 2000s. Furthermore, the Khobragade episode sharply demonstrated how close to the surface lie the remnants of decades of mutual insensitivity and incomprehension between India and the US, which are perhaps more similar than their leaders appreciate. Both countries evince a strong strain of exceptionalism that can rub interlocutors the wrong way. Both are freewheeling democracies with noisy opposition parties, intense (p.150) competition between news media fighting to scoop each other, and 24/7 social media saturation. As easy as it is for all parties to ignore or forget Secretary Clinton’s sound advice in the heat, fog, and noise of a diplomatic kerfuffle gone viral, the two sides would do well to bear it in mind. Washington has been more eager than New Delhi to push the entente forward into new areas, such as the proactive development of a common strategic vision and the interoperability of military forces needed to carry it out. New Delhi derives status recognition and broad strategic reassurance from its entente with Washington, but Indian strategic elites also cherish their sovereignty, insist on charting their own course in world affairs, and deplore any impression of dependency in their external affairs (see, for example, Chellaney 2014). Moreover, while the US wants India to act as a ‘stakeholder’ in various multilateral contexts, India would prefer to pick and choose its battles on a caseby-case basis—or avoid them entirely. It is unwilling to ‘be dictated to’, which in India smacks of neo-colonialism. New Delhi also has a hard time accepting linkages across issue areas, as demonstrated by Indian officials’ rejection of any suggestion that they should have favoured American manufacturers when considering bids for their combat aircraft upgrade, in recompense for the US ‘acceptance’ of India as a nuclear power. India’s strategic ambivalence is especially pronounced when it comes to China. Many Indian strategic elites will privately acknowledge that the US entente is partly intended to balance against China, or at least to give New Delhi a sense of strategic reassurance vis-à-vis Beijing. But the degree of reassurance India actually derives is accentuated by the extent to which the US is still the unipolar superpower, which goes against the grain of New Delhi’s oft-expressed desire for a more multipolar global economic order. The irony here is that if the international system were to become truly multipolar in both its economic and security dimensions, Indian leaders would probably be faced with much starker and more urgent choices about how to secure India against China, which in turn might imply drawing even closer to the US. In some sense, then, to be both truly autonomous and secure, New Delhi needs: (a) a deepening entente with Washington; and (b) the US to be measurably stronger than China, at least in security terms.

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The Indo-US Entente (p.151) Although it is common for American and Indian analysts alike to implore Washington to devise a strategic vision for the US entente with India, India’s insistence on strategic autonomy makes that an all-but-impossible task. Strategy aligns means and ends. If the logical end is containing China, and the means is Indo-US collaboration, it is India’s desire not to be strategically entangled, as much as a US lack of strategic imagination, that inhibits the formulation of a mutual strategic vision. India wants friendly relations with the United States, partly to hedge against China’s continuing rise to great power, but at the same time it does not want to be dragged into Sino-US conflicts or otherwise spark Beijing’s ire. As a result, Indian strategic elites often speak in platitudes: ‘India principally wants the [United States] to partner it in shaping the strategic space in the region, which could otherwise be usurped by other regional powers.’31 Such vagaries are the unfortunate flip side of the flexibility embodied in ententes as opposed to alliances, and they provide little direction for doctrine and planning. While it is all too easy to bemoan the absence of a mutual ‘strategic vision’, the simple fact is that enemies make alliances. Neither the US nor India is willing to label China an enemy, and for good reasons. Neither wishes to bring about the self-fulfilling prophecy of Chinese antagonism, and neither is willing to jeopardize its massive, growing, and lucrative trade with China. Until that changes, a dramatic deepening of the entente is unlikely. As the Economist (2013b) put it recently, ‘Those on both sides hankering after a “next level” in relations would probably abhor what such a level might look like: an anti-China strategic alliance.’ Also evident in the relationship is a residual, mutual tone-deafness extending back to Cold War days. As was amply demonstrated during the Khobragade affair, Washington and New Delhi have not yet mastered the language of partners who have the expectation of occasional conflicts within a permanently stable relationship. Throughout the ordeal, US officials underestimated the ferocity of the Indian response to the consular officer’s arrest, despite the fact that India was in the midst of a national election campaign, as well as the fact that there has emerged in India an unprecedented level of political agitation against the abuse of women since the horrendous gang rape of a young physiotherapy intern on a Delhi bus in December 2012. While law enforcement officials in New York maintained that they followed standard procedures (p. 152) after arresting Khobragade, the State Department might have been more proactively sensitive to how such ‘procedures’ would play in an India where women’s rights activists have successfully mobilized mass public opinion against the mistreatment of women. Writes one analyst: ‘Even expelling Ms. Khobragade would have been less inflammatory than arresting her. And if an arrest was unavoidable, it’s still hard to justify treating a diplomat in a wage dispute like a Colombian drug lord’ (Dhume 2013). Underneath it all, at the very foundations, lie India’s continuing post-colonial sensitivities. As one report summed it up at the tail end of the episode: ‘In the month that has passed since Ms. Page 16 of 32

The Indo-US Entente Khobragade’s arrest, she has been transformed into a symbol of India’s sovereignty, pushed around and humiliated by an arrogant superpower’ (Barry and Weisner 2014). More generally, Indian strategic elites remain sceptical of US bona fides. Although they appreciate US support for India’s great-power aspirations and its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, they cannot completely erase the more deeply embedded perception of Washington as a historically fickle friend. Indians remember that not long after the US extended a military supply line to India in the wake of the 1962 Chinese invasion, it embargoed arms transfers to India (and Pakistan) upon the outbreak of the 1965 India–Pakistan war.32 In 1978, Washington cancelled fuel supply contracts for India’s Tarapur nuclear power plant, setting off a bitter dispute that scuttled a promising friendship between the Carter administration and New Delhi. Ten years later, President Clinton was obliged by US law to cancel military supply licences in response to India’s nuclear tests (Schaffer 2009: 80). These experiences have left doubts in the minds of Indian leaders about the reliability of the US as a supplier of critical technology and materials. The ranks of the dubious also include elite Indian scientists and technocrats, many of whom rose through the professional hierarchy during the days when the US was actively denying India access to cutting-edge technologies. Some of them warn against New Delhi becoming dependent on Washington for sophisticated weaponry and nuclear fuel, which might be cut off were India to run afoul of future US governments. From this standpoint, although French and Russian defence and nuclear technology may be inferior to America’s, French and Russian weapon systems are (p.153) effective enough, and Paris and Moscow are proven, dependable suppliers with fewer scruples and demands. These attitudes will perhaps fade as more and more Indian scientists and engineers do their graduate work in American universities, but generational turnover takes time. More worrisome for proponents of a closer entente are severe limitations on the capacity of the Indian state to develop a more robust grand-strategic consciousness that would allow the Indo-US relationship to deepen. One convincing recent analysis concludes that India is simply not well equipped for grand-strategic thinking: ‘India rarely engages in long-term thinking about its foreign policy goals, which prevents it from spelling out the role it aims to play in global affairs.’ New Delhi ‘produces no internal documents or white papers on grand strategy’. The Indian foreign service is tiny by major power standards, and ‘overburdened foreign service officers have little time or inclination for strategic thinking’ (Miller 2013b). Although New Delhi has been the world’s largest importer of arms since 2008 (Holtom et al. 2013), the strategic underpinnings of India’s defence acquisitions are weak. Meaningful defence reviews are rarely undertaken by the Indian national security community. Senior officers in the various services scorn the Ministry of Defence for being ignorant on strategy, logistics, and procurement. Any semblance of ‘jointness’ in planning, doctrine, Page 17 of 32

The Indo-US Entente and operations is absent. There is no apex authority in New Delhi—like, say, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff—to provide a single funnel for military advice (Economist 2013a). India is, as two American scholars put it, ‘arming without aiming’ (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010). These are significant structural impediments to deeper security cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, as are the interrelated facts that Indian state governments are the ‘primary domestic security actors’, and that there is no ‘effective national-level body with which the US government can engage and coordinate’ (Kronstadt and Pinto 2012: 19; see also R. Sharma 2013). On the plus side, outright hostility to the US entente is increasingly rare in India, and its potency tends to be undermined by the fact that the Indo-US strategic convergence has now spanned both Congress- and BJP-led governments. As an opposition party, the BJP opposed aspects of the relationship between Washington and New Delhi, but its motives (p.154) were for the most part transparently political rather than substantive. It is unlikely that the newly elected Narendra Modi government would attempt to reverse the forward progress that was made by the Congress, especially as the BJP was instrumental in the creation of the entente in the first place. For their part, the various parties of the left can be expected to raise the clarion call for strategic autonomy at opportune moments, but the impact of their protests will be limited by the BJP’s solid majority in the Lok Sabha (Gowen 2014). The biggest challenge to the continued evolution of the Indo-US entente is India’s stalling economy. India’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for 2013 was estimated at 5 per cent (World Bank 2015), down from its 8 per cent average from 2002–11. The rupee’s value declined sharply in 2013. Foreign investment is turning away from India, whose reform momentum has stalled in the face of continuing problems with corruption, massive rural subsidies, poor infrastructure, an over-regulated labour market, inflation, and lingering protectionist instincts that are deeply embedded in the Indian national psyche. The BJP’s resounding election victory has been widely interpreted as a call to reinvigorate the flagging economy and restore India’s reputation as a promising place to do business (Economist 2014b). India’s economic slowdown not only threatens to derail the country’s rising standard of living, but it could also undermine India’s military buildup, its nuclear expansion plans, and ultimately its very rise to great-power status. As an American analyst notes, ‘Indian decision-makers and policy elites recognize that economic dynamism is not just a prerequisite for bringing prosperity to India’s poor, but also a strategic asset—or liability. And around the world, India’s economic performance is seen as a prime indicator of its capacity to shape regional and global events’ (Schaffer 2013). Getting the Indian economy back on its fast growth trajectory is the sine qua non of continued strategic convergence with the United States.

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The Indo-US Entente (Unless otherwise noted, all figures in the tables are from the CIA World Factbook, May 2014. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/ [accessed 23 March 2015]). (p.155) Table 5.A.1 Size of Territory Country

Area (sq km)

World Rank

Russia

17,098,242

1

United States

9,826,675

3

China

9,596,961

4

Brazil

8,514,877

5

India

3,287,263

7

South Africa

1,219,090

25

Turkey

783,562

37

France

643,801

43

Japan

377,915

62

Germany

357,022

63

United Kingdom

243,610

80

Table 5.A.2 Population Country

Population

World Rank

China

1,355,692,576

1

India

1,236,344,631

2

United States

318,892,103

3

Brazil

202,656,788

5

Russia

142,470,272

9

Japan

127,103,388

10

Turkey

81,619,392

16

Germany

80,996,685

17

France

66,259,012

21

United Kingdom

63,742,977

22

(p.156)

Table 5.A.3 Resource Endowment (Proved Oil Reserves)

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The Indo-US Entente

Country

Oil Reserves (bbl)

World Rank

Russia

80,000,000,000

8

United States

20,680,000,000

13

China

17,300,000,000

14

Brazil

13,150,000,000

15

India

5,476,000,000

22

United Kingdom

3,122,000,000

29

Turkey

270,400,000

53

Germany

254,200,000

54

France

85,180,000

70

Japan

44,120,000

78

South Africa

15,000,000

85

Table 5.A.4 Resource Endowment (Proved Natural Gas Reserves) Country

Natural Gas Reserves (cum)

World Rank

Russia

47,800,000,000,000

1

United States

9,459,000,000,000

5

China

3,100,000,000,000

12

India

1,241,000,000,000

22

Brazil

395,500,000,000

33

United Kingdom

244,000,000,000

43

Germany

125,000,000,000

51

Japan

20,900,000,000

76

South Africa

16,000,000,000

77

France

10,700,000,000

81

Turkey

6,173,000,000

88

(p.157)

Table 5.A.5 Gross Domestic Product Country

GDP (ppp in US$)

World Rank

United States

16,720,000,000,000

1

China

13,390,000,000,000

2

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The Indo-US Entente

Country

GDP (ppp in US$)

World Rank

India

4,962,000,000,000

3

Japan

4,729,000,000,000

4

Germany

3,227,000,000,000

5

Russia

2,553,000,000,000

6

Brazil

2,422,000,000,000

7

United Kingdom

2,387,000,000,000

8

France

2,276,000,000,000

9

Turkey

1,167,000,000,000

16

South Africa

595,700,000,000

25

Table 5.A.6 Per Capita Gross Domestic Product Country

PC/GDP (ppp in US$)

World Rank

United States

52,800

14

Germany

39,500

29

United Kingdom

37,300

34

Japan

37,100

36

France

35,700

39

Russia

18,100

76

Turkey

15,300

89

Brazil

12,100

104

South Africa

11,500

107

China

9,800

120

India

4,000

167

(p.158)

Table 5.A.7 Human Development Index Country

Level

World Rank

United States

Very High

3

Germany

Very High

5

Japan

Very High

10

France

Very High

20

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The Indo-US Entente

Country

Level

World Rank

United Kingdom

Very High

26

Russia

High

55

Brazil

High

85

Turkey

High

90

China

Medium

101

South Africa

Medium

121

India

Medium

136

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2013. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/ statistics/ (accessed 23 March 2015). Table 5.A.8 Military Expenditures and Nuclear Weapons Status Country

Military Spending (US$, 2013)

World Rank

Nuclear Weapons State?

United States 640,000,000,000

1

Yes

China

188,000,000,000

2

Yes

Russia

87,800,000,000

3

Yes

France

61,200,000,000

5

Yes

United Kingdom

57,900,000,000

6

Yes

Germany

48,800,000,000

7

No

Japan

48,600,000,000

8

No

India

47,400,000,000

9

Yes

Brazil

31,500,000,000

12

No

Turkey

19,100,000,000

14

No

South Africa

4,607,000,000

40

No

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures (accessed 23 March 2015). Brazil data is from 2012. References Bibliography references:

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The Indo-US Entente Baker, P. 2005. ‘Bush: US to sell F-16s to Pakistan’, Washington Post, 25 March. Baker, P.H. 2014. ‘Unraveling Afghanistan’, American Interest, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 39–50. Barry, E. and B. Weisner. 2014. ‘As Indian Diplomat Exits after Arrest, a Culture Clash Lingers’, New York Times, 10 January. BBC News. 2013. ‘Kashmir: Five Indian Soldiers Killed in Shooting’, 6 August. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23584350 (accessed 23 March 2015). (p.162) ———. 2014. ‘India Diplomat Row: Delhi says “no stand-off” with US’, 11 January. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-25695696 (accessed 23 March 2015). ———. 2015. ‘India and US Seal Nuclear Deal as Modi Hosts Obama’, 25 January. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30930581 (accessed April 12, 2015). Blumenthal, D. 2010. ‘India Prepares for a Two-front War’, Wall Street Journal Online, 1 March. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052748704240004575085023077072074 (accessed 28 February 2015). Chaffin, G. 2012. ‘China’s Military Challenge: An Interview with Ashley J. Tellis’, 6 November. Available at: http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx? id=291#.UkBrrF2rYXw (accessed 28 February 2015). Chellaney, B. 2014. ‘Arming India into Dependency’, Hindu, 14 January. Clinton, H. 2011. ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October. Cohen, S.P. 2013. Shooting for a Century: The India–Pakistan Conundrum (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Cohen, S.P., and S. Dasgupta. 2010. Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Dasgupta, S. 2013. ‘Regional Politics and the Prospects for Stability in Afghanistan’, Peaceworks (US Institute of Peace), no. 86, May. DefenseWorld.net. 2014. ‘Will Rafale F3R Upgrade Impact Indian MMRCA procurement?’, 13 January. Available at: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/ 9809/ Will_Rafale_F3R_Upgrade_Impact_Indian_MMRCA_Procurement_#.Utbbjl2rYXw (accessed 28 February 2015).

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The Indo-US Entente DeYoung, K., and E. Londono. 2013. ‘Kerry assures India and its neighbours that US will not abandon Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 24 June. Dhume, S. 2013. ‘The end of the US–India Honeymoon’, Wall Street Journal, 30 December. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052702304137304579289771348242380 (accessed 23 March 2015). Department of Defense (DoD). 2012a. ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, Washington, D.C., 5 January. ———. 2012b. ‘Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India’, 6 June. Available at: http:// www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5054 (accessed 28 February 2015) ———. 2013. ‘Media Roundtable with Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter in Delhi, India’, 18 September. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5306 (accessed 28 February 2015). Economist. 2010. ‘A Himalayan rivalry’, 21 August. ———. 2013a. ‘Know Your Own Strength: India as a Great Power’, 30 March. ———. 2013b. ‘So near, and yet …’, 29 June. (p.163) ———. 2014a. ‘India shows who’s boss’, 10 January. ———. 2014b. ‘Modi’s mission’, 24 May. Fair, C.C. 2004. The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). Frankel, F.R., Z. Hasan, R. Bhargava, and B. Arora, eds. 2000. Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Gilboy, G., and E. Heginbotham. 2012. Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm (New York: Cambridge University Press). Gilpin, R. 1981. War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Gowen, A. 2013. ‘Pakistan, India spar in Kashmir in Worst Border Violence in years’, Washington Post, 12 September. ———. 2014. ‘After a long freeze-out, US Reaches Out to India’s new prime minister’, Washington Post, 27 May. Page 24 of 32

The Indo-US Entente Hagerty, D.T. 2004. ‘The United States–Pakistan Entente: Third Time’s a Charm?’, in C. Baxter, ed., Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society (Lanham, MD: Lexington), pp. 1–19. ———. 2012. ‘The Nuclear Holdouts: India, Israel, and Pakistan’, in T. OgilvieWhite and D. Santoro, eds, Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (Athens: University of Georgia Press), pp. 219–48. Hagerty, D.T. and H.G. Hagerty. 2005. ‘India’s Foreign Relations’, in D.T. Hagerty (ed.), South Asia in World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 11–48. Hibbs, M. 2010. ‘Moving Forward on the US–India Nuclear Deal’, Q&A, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 5 April. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/05/moving-forward-on-u.s.-india-nucleardeal (accessed 28 February 2015). Hindustan Times. 2013. ‘Nuclear liability clause gets cabinet nod before PM leaves for US’, 25 September. Holmes, J.R., and T. Yoshihara. 2013. ‘Redlines for Sino-Indian Naval Rivalry’, in J. Garofano and A.J. Dew, eds, Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press), pp. 185–209. Holtom, P., Mark B., Pieter D.W., and Siemon T.W. 2013. ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March. Available at: http://books.sipri.org/product_info? c_product_id=455# (accessed 23 March 2015). Joshi, S., C. Raja Mohan, V. Sood, R.P. Rajagopalan, J.J. Carafano, W. Lohman, L. Curtis, and D. Scissors. 2013. ‘Beyond the Plateau in US–India Relations’, Special Report no. 132, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., and (p. 164) the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 26 April. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations (accessed 26 March 2015). Kann, R.A. 1976. ‘Alliances versus Ententes’, World Politics, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 611–16. Karl, D.J. 2012. ‘US–India Relations: The Way Forward’, Orbis, Spring, pp. 308– 27. Khilnani, S., R. Kumar, P.B. Mehta, P. Menon, N. Nilekani, S. Raghavan, S. Saran, and S. Varadarajan. 2012. Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research).

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The Indo-US Entente Kissinger, H. 1957. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). Kronstadt, K.A. 2009. ‘India–US Relations’, CRS Report for Congress no. RL33529, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 30 January, pp. 34– 54. Kronstadt, K.A., and S. Pinto. 2012. ‘India–US Security Relations: Current Engagement’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, no. R42823, Washington, D.C., 13 November. ———. 2013. ‘India–US Security Relations: Strategic Issues’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, no. R42948, Washington, D.C., 24 January. Landler, M. 2014. ‘US Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of ’16’, New York Times, 28 May. Latif, S.A. 2012. ‘US–India Military Engagement: Steady as They Go’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December. Limaye, S. 2013. ‘India–East Asia/US Relations: A Year of Notable Visits and Anniversaries’, Comparative Connections, vol. 14, no. 2. Malik, M. 2011. China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder: Lynne Rienner). Malone, D.M. 2011. Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press). Manyin, M.E., S. Daggett, B. Dolven, S.V. Lawrence, M.F. Martin, R. O’Rourke, B. Vaughn. 2012. ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward Asia’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, no. R42448, Washington, D.C., 28 March. Merchant, M. 2010. ‘Rising above the Region’, Times of India, 7 April. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/Rising-Above-The-Region/ articleshow/5767725.cms (accessed 28 February 2015). Miller, M.C. 2013a. Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Stanford: Stanford University Press). ———. 2013b. ‘India’s Feeble Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 14–19. (p.165) Mulford, D.C. 2005. ‘US–India Relationship to Reach New Heights’, Times of India, 31 March.

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The Indo-US Entente Nau, H.R., and D.M. Ollapally, eds. 2012. Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (New York: Oxford University Press). National Intelligence Council (NIC). 2012. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December. Available at: http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ GlobalTrends_2030.pdf (accessed 28 February 2015). O’Hanlon, M. 2013. ‘US Troops Should Not Abandon Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 11 July. Panetta, Leon E. 2012. ‘Shangri-La Security Dialogue’, speech delivered in Singapore, 2 June, 2012. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ speech.aspx?speechid=1681 (accessed 14 April 2015). Parsons, C., Shashank, B., and Kathleen, H. 2015. ‘White House Has High Hopes for US-India “Bromance”’, Los Angeles Times, 26 January, 2015. Available at: http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-obama-modi-20150127story.html#page=1 (accessed 13 April 2015). Parthasarathy, G. 2010. ‘Does Mr. Obama Care about India?’, Wall Street Journal Online, 12 April. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052702303828304575179201403587166 (accessed 28 February 2015). Raja Mohan, C. 2012. ‘Managing Multipolarity: India’s Security Strategy in a Changing World’, NBR Special Report no. 39, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, May. Riedel, B. 2013. Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Sanborn, J.K. 2014. ‘Final Rotation of Marines Deploys to Afghanistan’, Military Times, 13 January. Available at: http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140113/ NEWS/301130010/Final-rotation-Marines-deploys-Afghanistan (accessed 23 March 2015). Sasikumar, K. and G. Verniers. 2013. ‘The India–US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’, Asian Survey, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 679–702. Schaffer, T.C. 2009. India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press). ———. 2013. ‘India’s Sagging Economy—Strategic Consequences’, South Asia Hand, 20 September.

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The Indo-US Entente Scott, D. 2008. ‘The Great Power “Great Game” between India and China: “The Logic of Geography”’, Geopolitics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–26. Sharma, R. 2013. ‘The Rise of the Rest of India: How States Have Become the Engines of Growth’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 92, no. 5, pp. 75–85. Sharma, S.D. 2009. China and India in the Age of Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press). (p.166) Staniland, P. 2013. ‘Kashmir since 2003: Counterinsurgency and the Paradox of “Normalcy”’, Asian Survey, vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 931–57. Talbott, S. 2004. Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings). Tellis, A.J. 2012. Nonalignment Redux: The Perils of Old Wine in New Skins (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Tellis, A.J., T. Tanner, and J. Keough, eds. 2011. Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and India (Strategic Asia 2011–12) (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research). Tharoor, S. 2012. Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century (New Delhi: Penguin). Varadarajan, T. 2010. ‘An Ally Worth the Trouble’, Hoover Digest, no. 2, Spring, pp. 104–6. Waltz, K.N. 1959. Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press). ———. 1979. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill). ———. 1993. ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2. Washington Post. 2013. ‘In Pakistan’s Punjab Area, Militants Plan for Next Afghanistan War after Foreign Troops Leave’, 7 September. ———. 2015. ‘Foreign Fighters Are Spilling into Afghanistan, Helping the Taliban,’ Washington Post, 14 April 14. Available at: http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/foreign-fighters-are-spilling-intoafghanistan-helping-the-taliban/2015/04/14/91ee9378-748f-404e-996acb651d0307b4_story.html (accessed 14 April 2015). White House. 2011. ‘Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, 17 November. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

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The Indo-US Entente 2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament (accessed 28 February 2015). ———. 2013. ‘US–India Joint Statement’, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 September. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-statement (accessed 28 February 2015). Wolfers, A. 1968. ‘Alliances’, in D.L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan). World Bank. 2014. Global Economic Prospects: South Asia. Available at: http:// www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/regional-outlooks/ sar (accessed 23 March 2015). ———. 2015. ‘South Asia’, in Global Economic Prospects, p. 7. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Notes:

(1.) For their helpful comments, I would like to thank the participants in the October 2013 Indian Foreign Policy Conference, sponsored by the Center on American and Global Security, Indiana University. Special thanks go to John Ciorciari, Sumit Ganguly, and Varun Sahni for their especially useful insights. I also appreciate Vivian Hagerty’s editorial assistance. (2.) The term ‘strategic elites’ refers to that small group of Indians who shape New Delhi’s foreign policy. Their numbers include politicians, their advisers, senior and retired civil servants, scientists, and military officers, as well as influential journalists, academics, and think-tank analysts. My central argument is not intended as a criticism of Indian leaders; their collective position on the US entente is eminently rational. (3.) Needless to say, this is not a comprehensive treatment of every important issue area in the relationship. Significant challenges occupy US and Indian decisionmakers in areas as diverse as trade, investment, immigration, intellectual property, and pharmaceuticals, but doing justice to all of these issues within the space constraints of this chapter is impossible. For broader coverage, see Joshi et al. (2013). (4.) For a thoughtful discussion of various possible ‘futures’, see NIC (2012). (5.) In 1993, Waltz forecasted that: ‘In the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years, three political units may rise to great-power rank: Germany or a West European state, Japan, and China.’ The ‘emerging world will’, he predicted, ‘be one of four or five great powers, whether the European one is called Germany or the United States of Europe’ (Waltz 1993: 50, 70). For analysis of US unipolarity

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The Indo-US Entente and its implications, see the collection of articles in World Politics, vol. 61, no. 1 (January 2009). (6.) See the Appendix for these countries’ world rankings in selected categories of national power. Because its integration as an ‘actor’ in international political and security affairs lags far behind its economic integration, I discount the European Union as a potential new ‘pole’ of global power, at least for the time being. For an excellent analysis of India’s strategic position and options in a multipolar world, see Raja Mohan (2012). (7.) Recent book-length treatments include Malone (2011), Nau and Ollapally (2012), and Tharoor (2012). (8.) For a more detailed discussion of these developments, see Hagerty and Hagerty (2005). (9.) The details are recounted in Talbott (2004). Talbott recalls on pp. 3–4 that ‘we met fourteen times at ten locations in seven countries on three continents’. (10.) ‘De-hyphenation’ is typically understood to be a policy of the Bush administration during the early 2000s. Here, I am arguing that the policy was preceded by a process rooted in the comparative choices made by the Indian and Pakistani governments in the 1990s. (11.) As required by US non-proliferation law, President George H.W. Bush cut off military and economic assistance to Pakistan in October 1990, when it became impossible to issue the required certification ‘that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device’. This language is from the text of the so-called Pressler Amendment, signed into law in 1985. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Larry_Pressler#cite_note-10 (retrieved April 12, 2015). (12.) Owing to NSSP-related changes, ‘the percentage of US exports to India requiring export licenses fell from 25 percent in 1999 to 0.2 percent in 2008’ (Schaffer 2009: 95). (13.) For additional details, see Sasikumar and Verniers (2013). (14.) For further elaboration, see Kann (1976) and Wolfers (1968). (15.) For an account of Indian strategic elites’ early doubts about President Obama, see Karl (2012). (16.) For background, see Cohen (2013) and Riedel (2013). (17.) For a longer discussion, see Rajesh Basrur’s chapter in this volume. Page 30 of 32

The Indo-US Entente (18.) For additional background, also see Gilboy and Heginbotham (2012), Malik (2011), S. Sharma (2009), and Tellis et al. (2011). (19.) For a discussion of Indian nuclear capabilities, motivations, and doctrine, see Hagerty (2012). (20.) For an examination of how India’s—and China’s—‘post-imperial ideology’ is a significant driver of foreign policy choices, see Miller (2013a). (21.) See Khilnani et al. (2012), as well as a critique of this report by Tellis (2012). (22.) On the India–China naval rivalry, see Holmes and Yoshihara (2013). (23.) Joshi et al. (2013), pp. 2–4. (24.) On the Indian side, see, for example, Parthasarathy (2010). For a similar US perspective, which notes President Obama’s ‘apparent lack of interest in cementing the partnership with Delhi’, see Blumenthal (2010). A diasporan perspective appears in Varadarajan (2010). (25.) Another contextual factor is today’s dismal US fiscal outlook and the nearterm certainty of deep reductions in overall US defence spending. Notwithstanding such cuts, US military forces in Asia-Pacific will, according to President Obama, be strengthened and made ‘more broadly distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable’. As he told the Australian parliament: ‘Reductions in US defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the Asia Pacific’ (White House 2011). Defense Secretary Leon Panetta later added that, ‘by 2020, the Navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those two oceans’, Panetta (2012). (26.) Joshi et al. (2013), p. 13. Major deals have included $1.2 billion for 22 Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, $4.1 billion for 10 Boeing C-17A Globemaster-3 transport aircraft, $2.1 billion for 12 C-130J-30 Hercules transport aircraft, and $2.1 billion for 8 Boeing P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft (Kronstadt and Pinto 2012: 29–30). (27.) The French aircraft deal has yet to be finalized (DefenseWorld.net 2014). (28.) For a grim prognosis regarding post-2014 Afghanistan, see P. H. Baker (2014). (29.) This bleak forecast has been affirmed by events on the ground since the time of writing (Washington Post 2015).

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The Indo-US Entente (30.) A diplomatic furore erupted in December 2013 after Devyani Khobragade, India’s deputy consul general in New York, was arrested on charges of visa fraud and underpaying her housekeeper. New Delhi pronounced itself ‘shocked and appalled’ that Khobragade was handcuffed and strip-searched following the arrest. Spurred on by an emotional media outcry, India ordered a series of reprisals against the US mission in New Delhi, including the removal of security barriers outside the embassy. After four weeks of tension, the spat finally drew to a close in January 2014, when Khobragade was indicted by a US federal grand jury, but was also granted diplomatic immunity, paving the way for her return to India. As Khobragade arrived in New Delhi, it was announced that a US diplomat had been expelled from India as a quid pro quo (Barry and Weisner 2014; BBC News 2014; Dhume 2013; Economist 2014a). (31.) A retired Indian brigadier, quoted in Schaffer (2009: 70). (32.) Even though the embargo affected a militarily dependent Pakistan more than India, it was viewed in New Delhi as unfair punishment for a war inflicted upon India by Pakistan.

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India’s China Policy exile based in India); China’s relations with Pakistan; and the nature of their military modernization efforts including their nuclear weapons programmes. At the heart of the China–India rivalry is the issue of position or status in their overlapping ‘spheres of influence’ in South and Southeast Asia, the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayan states, parts of Central Asia, and increasingly the Indian Ocean Region, which have given rise to a number of national security issues between these two states. But what have been the sources of India’s foreign and security policy towards China? This chapter divides the China–India relationship into four stages. In first phase, which began with India’s independence in 1947 and lasted until the Dalai Lama’s dramatic escape into exile in India in 1959, factors at the individual level of analysis decisively shaped India’s approach towards China, as India’s foreign and security policymaking (p.168) was single-handedly dominated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In the second phase, which lasted from 1959 until the 1962 Sino-Indian War, domestic politics also influenced India’s China policy as the Indian parliament pressured Nehru to take a more assertive approach towards China. Nevertheless, Nehru remained firmly in charge during this period as well. Unlike in the first two phases, India’s policy towards China in the third phase was dominated by systemic factors. In the third phase, which lasted from India’s defeat in 1962 until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s trip to China in 1988, balance of power considerations influenced India’s approach towards China. During this period, India aligned first with the United States and then with the former Soviet Union to balance Chinese power. On the other hand, China aligned with Pakistan during this period and also received tacit backing from the United States after 1971 in its security competition with India (and the Soviet Union). In the fourth phase, which began in 1988 and continues until the present, it is a combination of systemic and domestic-level factors that have influenced India’s approach towards China. While the threat of China’s rising power and the China–Pakistan alignment have been constant during this phase, India’s rapid economic growth has created a domestic constituency supporting economic engagement with China. At the same time, rapid economic expansion is also providing India with the resources to internally balance China’s growing economic and military power. As such, India is pursuing a strategy of hedging against the uncertainty associated with the rise of China. In recent years, India has tilted towards the United States as it seeks a closer economic and military relationship with America to build up its own power, even as India is unlikely to join the United States in any alliance relationship aimed at China’s rising power (assuming that the United States seeks such a relationship). The remainder of this chapter is structured chronologically in terms of these four phases. While factors at all levels of analysis were important throughout the period under

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India’s China Policy consideration, it will be shown that the key determinants of India’s policy towards China in each phase have been as just described.

Tibet and the China/Tibet–India Border (1947–59) Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister and the ‘founding architect’ (Dixit 2004: 77) of its foreign policy, also served as the minister of external (p.169) affairs until his death in 1964. Being the only senior leader of the Indian National Congress— the political organization that led the Indian nationalist movement—with an extensive knowledge of foreign affairs around the time India gained freedom, Nehru dominated the conceptualization and implementation of India’s foreign policy. Therefore, during the Nehru years, foreign policy decisionmaking remained concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office, and the institutional framework of foreign policymaking remained underdeveloped in the country (Bandyopadhyaya 2003: 83). Nehru’s adoption of non-alignment as the principle behind independent India’s approach to world affairs also meant that structural factors were not driving India’s external affairs under his leadership (Thomas 1979). Nehru’s role in foreign policymaking was further enhanced because two of India’s most important leaders—Mahatma Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel (Nehru’s deputy minister and home minister)—died soon after independence.1 While single-handedly dominating India’s foreign affairs, Nehru did seek inputs from several top officials. In the case of India’s policy towards China, these officials included K.P.S. Menon (India’s first ambassador to Nationalist China, 1946–8), K.M. Panikkar (India’s second ambassador to Nationalist China and first ambassador to Communist China), and B.N. Mullik (the director of the Indian Intelligence Bureau). According to Menon, Nehru’s policy at the time of Indian independence was to ‘support the independence of Tibet, subject to the suzerainty of China’ (Menon 1985: 270). Menon also noted that Nehru’s India had inherited this policy from British India. However, Britain had never supported Tibetan independence. According to the British, Tibet was under the suzerainty of China. ‘Suzerainty implied a low level of Chinese administrative and military presence and a high level of both Tibetan autonomy and British Indian influence in Tibet’ (Garver 2001: 35; emphasis in original). Moreover, Menon had explained to the Chinese that India had no intentions of subverting China, whether in Tibet or elsewhere, especially since China was facing great difficulties as a consequence of its civil war (Yang 1987: 414). Therefore, even as Menon used the term ‘independence’ for Tibet in his autobiography as just noted, it is likely that he actually meant Tibetan autonomy as well as Indian influence in that region. In 1948, on the eve of the Communist victory on the mainland in the Chinese Civil War, Panikkar, who was then India’s ambassador to (p.170) Nationalist China, advised India to recognize Tibetan independence to keep ‘the new Page 3 of 27

India’s China Policy Chinese Communist State away from the Indian border’ (quoted in Shakya 1999: 24). However, Nehru refused to follow up on Panikkar’s suggestion because Indian intervention in Tibet would have led to permanent hostility between China and India, thereby destroying Nehru’s conception of the postwar, postcolonial order in Asia. A week before India’s independence, Nehru articulated a ‘Monroe Doctrine for Asia’, that is, the complete disappearance of all ‘foreign armies operating in Asian countries’.2 Given the nature of SinoIndian interactions after the Japanese invasion of China,3 Nehru became convinced that India and China would work together in postwar and postcolonial Asia. In Nehru’s view, the United States and Russia along with China and India were the ‘four great powers’ of the then emerging world order (Nehru 1947, 1:311). Nehru believed that only Sino-Indian amity could ‘maintain peace in Asia … [and] start a new phase in world affairs’, which was essential for Asia that was only now coming out of centuries of colonial humiliation and subjugation (Gopal 1979: 139). Consequently, even though Nehru was highly suspicious of communism, he chose to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) soon after its proclamation in October 1949, for it reflected the reality on the ground in that country.4 However, when the newly formed PRC invaded and annexed Tibet in 1950–1, Nehru’s perception of China fundamentally transformed. In the aftermath of the Chinese invastion of Tibet, Nehru told Mullik in 1952 that India should not be ‘deluded by Chinese assertions of friendship’, because Indian and Chinese cultures had been in a ‘continuous tussle’ and ‘war … for over 2,000 years in Central Asia, Tibet, Burma, and the whole of South-East Asia’ (Mullik 1971: 177–82). While India was the only country to diplomatically protest against China’s armed expansion after the proclamation of the PRC,5 China’s expansion into Tibet also meant that China and India became geographically contiguous states. Nehru became worried that ‘a new period’ of Chinese ‘expansionism’ was now imminent (Gopal 1979: 190). The China–India border is essentially the Tibet–India border.6 The eastern sector of the border between India and Tibet (east of Bhutan) was defined by the 1913– 14 Simla Agreement between British India and Tibet—the so-called McMahon Line. All Chinese governments since 1913–14 (whether Republican, Nationalist, or Communist) have (p.171) rejected this agreement by claiming that Tibet, being a part of China, did not have the authority to independently enter into an agreement with a foreign power.7 On the other hand, there was no accepted frontier in the western sector (in Kashmir) between India and Tibet/China when the British departed from the subcontinent in 1947. India’s claim in this region includes Aksai Chin, an uninhabited region which is an extension of the Tibetan plateau. However, India had no administrative or military presence in this region at the time of its independence, while Aksai Chin was used by China following the 1950–1 Chinese invasion of Tibet.8 Page 4 of 27

India’s China Policy Although concerned with potential Chinese territorial expansionism, Nehru felt that Tibet’s forbidding terrain might yet provide India with the opportunity to safeguard its Himalayan frontiers while preventing any further deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, which was important in his vision for the emerging order in Asia. Given that the Tibetan plateau is at an average height of 15,000 feet above the sea level and is surrounded by mountains on all sides, Nehru believed that its geography and Communist China’s economic difficulties (as a consequence of the long war with Japan and the Chinese Civil War) would mean that India would not have to fear a massive Chinese military presence along its northern frontiers.9 Furthermore, the Seventeen-Point Agreement that the PRC had signed with the ‘local’ government of Tibet in 1951 gave Tibet considerable autonomy, as it was allowed to keep its own army, currency, and to collect its own taxes (Goldstein 2007: 541). Consequently, it was the small Tibetan army (as opposed to the People’s Liberation Army [PLA]) that was in charge of China’s frontiers with India until 1959 (Fravel 2008: 78). Furthermore, given Tibet’s close historical links with India, the Indian rupee was an important unofficial legal tender in that region until 1959 (TPPRC 2006: 42–3). As a result, India did not immediately perceive a military threat from China along its northern frontiers. So when Deputy Prime Minister Patel urged Nehru to rethink India’s China policy after China invaded Tibet, Nehru replied by arguing that only Pakistan was India’s ‘major possible enemy’ and that India could not afford to have ‘two possible enemies’ along its immediate borders.10 However, Nehru was not naïve about the security of India’s frontiers. The Indian government ‘annexed the town and monastery of Tawang in February 1951, possibly in response to China’s actions [in Tibet] in 1950’ (Hoffman 2006: 174). To be sure, (p.172) Tawang, which lay to the south of the McMahon Line, was already a part of British India according to the Simla Agreement. However, independent India had not consolidated its position there until early 1951. Unlike the McMahon Line, there was no accepted frontier between British India and Tibet in the western sector in Kashmir when India became independent. Interestingly, the Indian government made the decision about the location of the India–Tibet/China border in this region only in 1953 (Hoffman 1990: 13–28, 35– 6). The Indian leadership decided that the entire Aksai Chin region was to be included in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it was believed to have been a part of the pre-colonial Dogra kingdom of Kashmir. Notably, India’s claim in the eastern and western sectors was not merely historical or legal but also had political and strategic significance. From India’s perspective, the possession (and retention) of Tawang was deemed crucial for the defence of north-eastern India, as the southern Himalayan slopes provided tactical military advantages to China.11 Similarly, India was aware of China’s road-building activities in Aksai Chin as early 1952 (or even sooner) (Mullik 1971: 157),12 and it is possible that Nehru might have been of the opinion that India’s diplomatic (and cartographic)

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India’s China Policy claims to this region that was crucial to China’s control of Tibet would prevent large-scale Chinese military presence in Tibet.13 After deciding India’s frontiers with China, Nehru signed the 1954 Panchshila Agreement with China through which India recognized that Tibet was a part of China.14 While this agreement was about trade between India and China’s Tibet, Nehru believed that India’s frontier had been ‘finalized not only by implication in this Agreement but the specific passes mentioned there are direct recognitions of our [India’s] frontier there’ (Nehru 1984, 26: 482). Therefore, after signing this agreement in mid-1954, Nehru also sent a note to India’s Ministry of External Affairs in which he noted that ‘new maps should be printed showing our Northern [in Aksai Chin] and North Eastern [along the McMahon Line] frontier without reference to any “line”. These new maps should also state that there is no undemarcated territory’ (Nehru 1984, 26: 481–4; see p. 482). Importantly, China did not protest when India made these cartographic changes. Nehru equated China’s silence with acquiescence of the Sino-Indian borders thus defined. In the following years, China and India dutifully exchanged a number of protest notes citing border violations. Nehru was of the opinion (p.173) that at stake were concerns related to the actual position on the ground at specific points, as opposed to disputes over large chunks of territory. However, developments in Tibet led to a gradual deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. As the PRC began to implement social and economic ‘reforms’ in the ethnically Tibetan regions of China, the Tibetans viewed it as an attack on their values and on Buddhism itself, as communist land reforms targeted Buddhist monasteries which were the largest land owners in Tibet. This was followed by massive unrest in Tibet that was brutally suppressed by the PLA, which resorted to aerial bombings of prominent monasteries where large numbers of Tibetans had taken refuge (Shakya 1999: 140–3). These events culminated in a large-scale revolt against Chinese rule in Lhasa by 10 March 1959—the biggest revolt against the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the creation of the PRC. The Chinese leadership was convinced that Indian power was lurking behind this audacious assault against the CCP’s authority. The Chinese premier Zhou Enlai believed that India was behind the Lhasa revolt, and that it was precisely for this reason that the ‘commanding center of the rebellion’ had been ‘established in Kalimpong on Indian territory’ (Jian 2006: 85). While there is no evidence of Indian complicity in this revolt, Chinese suspicions were strengthened because the Indian consul-general in Lhasa had met with Tibetan demonstrators ‘at the start of the uprising’ (Kramer 2006: 12). Furthermore, soon after the uprising began, the demonstrators presented the Indian consulate in Lhasa with a ‘proclamation of independence’ and even asked them to inform the United Nations of it (Liu 2010: 216). Although the Indian consulate in Lhasa was under

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India’s China Policy strict instructions not to support any Tibetan demand for independence, the situation in that region continued to worsen. Consequently, China responded with a massive military crackdown in Tibet that ended any autonomy granted to Tibet under the Seventeen-Point Agreement of 1951. This led to the Dalai Lama’s dramatic escape into exile into India on 30 March 1959. The decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama was made by Nehru and was not discussed in the Indian parliament. It is reasonable to infer that Nehru granted refuge to the Dalai Lama in order to ensconce himself as an interlocutor between Tibet and China so as to secure India’s defence interests in any future agreement between them (Pardesi 2011: 102–4). In fact, India had decided to play the role of ‘benevolent neutrality’ to settle the issues (p.174) between Tibet and China at the time of its independence even as India had no intentions of making a public declaration of it (Goldstein 1989: 565n17). These developments not only questioned the status of Tibet, they also brought the Sino-Indian border dispute into the open.

The Run-Up to the War (1959–62) The coming of the Dalai Lama to India was followed by the influx of thousands of Tibetan refugees as well. China was not only worried about the outflow of the Tibetans into India, but also of their influx back into Tibet (and with it the possibility of carrying out anti-Chinese activities in this volatile region). Consequently, the PLA replaced the token Tibetan army guarding the Tibet/ China–India frontier along the McMahon Line in April 1959 (Liu 2010: 165). Given the heightened military activities and the disputed nature of the actual border, there was a serious military clash between the PLA soldiers and men from India’s Assam Rifles, a paramilitary organization, at Longju in the eastern sector in August 1959. Following this incident, India transferred the responsibility of border management in this sector from the Assam Rifles to the Indian Army (Hoffmann 1990: 67). At the same time, China also began to advance its military position on the ground in the western sector by moving PLA outposts ‘to provide defense in depth for the Aksai Chin road’ (Whiting 1975: 11; emphasis added). China had officially announced the opening of the Aksai Chin road in 1957. Of the three motor roads between China and Tibet at this time, the Aksai Chin road was the only all-season route connecting Tibet with China (Garver 2001: 80–8). The gradual Chinese encroachment in this region led to another bloody incident between the PLA and the Indo-Tibetan Border Force, also a paramilitary organization, near the Kongka Pass in the western sector in October 1959. Consequently, the Indian Army was given the responsibility for the management of the entire Sino-Indian border (Hoffmann 1990: 78). With this, the militarization of the Sino-Indian frontier was complete on both sides by the end of 1959.15

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India’s China Policy The presence of the Dalai Lama in India, the border clash in Longju, and the announcement of the Aksai Chin road meant that Nehru could no longer keep the Indian parliament in the dark about the developments along the Sino-Indian border. Heretofore, Nehru had not kept (p.175) the Indian parliament informed about the military activities along the Sino-Indian border that had begun as early as July 1954. Since Nehru was of the opinion that the border between India and China was settled and accepted by both sides as such, barring some minor issues regarding different perceptions of its exact location along a few points, he did not inform parliament in an attempt to prevent the issue from blowing out of proportion. However, in a September 1959 letter to Nehru, Zhou openly claimed for the first time that the entire Sino-Indian border was unmarked and also laid claim to 40,000 square miles of territory under Indian control.16 Nehru consistently began to inform the Indian parliament about the state of Sino-Indian relations after this letter from Zhou (Jetly 1979). The parliament (and the media) began to put pressure on Nehru to take a more assertive stand on the border dispute with China. On the other hand, the border issue was intertwined with the status of Tibet for China. Nehru had earlier sent an important note to China in March 1959 protesting against the presence of a Chinese-built road—the Aksai Chin road— through Indian territory. Since the note had reached China after the start of the Lhasa revolt, the Chinese leadership believed that Nehru had ‘hastily’ written to China at a time when China was facing internal difficulties by ‘making territorial claims on China based on the map arbitrarily altered by the Indian Government’.17 In other words, the Chinese leadership began to link the territorial dispute with India to the status of Tibet itself, as Chinese control of the Aksai Chin road was crucial for Chinese presence in Tibet. Therefore, when India responded to China’s military assertiveness along the frontier with its socalled ‘forward policy’, China began to worry about India’s intentions with respect to Tibet. Between July 1961 and September 1962, India sent a number of troops to the disputed area around Ladakh and then along the McMahon Line.18 According to Ganguly, ‘the forward policy amounted to a strategy of compellence —namely, an effort to force an adversary to undo the consequences of a hostile act’ (Ganguly 2004: 114; see also Whiting 1975). However, the Indian military was ill prepared to actually implement such a strategy, for the Indian troops were lightly armed with insufficient firepower and poor supply and logistics lines. Furthermore, Nehru and the Indian leadership were working under the illfounded assumption that China would not retaliate. Nehru believed that large countries like China and India could not fight ‘local (p.176) wars’ and that it was impossible for either country to defeat the other in a ‘great war’.19 While the Indian leadership expected patrol skirmishes between the two sides, it was convinced that there would be no war (Hoffmann 1990: 125). On the other hand, after linking the Aksai Chin issue with China’s control over Tibet, the Chinese leadership erroneously believed that India wanted to restore Tibet to its Page 8 of 27

India’s China Policy pre-1950–1951 status as a ‘buffer state’ between China and Tibet (Garver 2006). Consequently, China attacked India on 20 October 1962 when PLA forces simultaneously attacked Indian positions in both the eastern and the western sectors.

India–China Relations and Balance of Power Politics (1962–88) India’s ill-prepared and under-equipped forces fell quickly in the face of the massive Chinese onslaught. The PLA reached the Chinese claim line in both the eastern and western sectors and China unilaterally announced a ceasefire on 21 November 1962. While the McMahon Line was re-established as the ‘line of actual control’ in the eastern sector, China consolidated its position in Aksai Chin. Following its defeat against China, India undertook a massive programme of military and defence-industrial expansion (Kavic 1965). An important feature of India’s military expansion was the creation of the Special Frontier Force during the Sino-Indian War itself. This was a special commando force of ethnic Tibetans trained in guerrilla tactics and high-altitude operations that soon expanded to a troop strength of almost 10,500 with the probable aim of being air-dropped behind PLA lines in a future China–India war (Avedon 1994: 121, 129–30). At the same time, the ‘issue of military reverses at the hands of China went beyond military preparedness to India’s conceptual approach to international affairs’ (Nayar and Paul 2004: 150). The war with China proved that India needed military help from external powers to meet the Chinese challenge. Most notably, India sought and received military assistance from the United States (McMahon 2004: 272–304). At the same time, the Indian Intelligence Bureau joined forces with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in arming, training, and funding the activities of various Tibetan resistance groups (including the Special Frontier Force) to undermine China’s authority in Tibet (p.177) (Conboy and Morrison 2002; Knaus 1999; McGranahan 2010). India’s threat perception vis-à-vis China further increased after China conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964. In December 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri (who was now India’s prime minister following Nehru’s death), authorized a subterranean nuclear explosion project that eventually culminated in India’s first nuclear test in 1974 (Ganguly 1983). At the same time, India and the United States also began clandestine cooperation in the high Himalayas in the mid-1960s to collect information on China’s nuclear capability (Kohli and Conboy 2002). India had also asked the United States for a nuclear umbrella after the first Chinese nuclear test, although India’s efforts were unsuccessful in this regard (Noorani 1967). In any case, Indo-US cooperation proved to be of a limited nature and was short-lived. Pakistan, a staunch Cold War ally of the United States by this time, was uneasy about the US–India military relationship. Given its policy of non-alignment, India itself was uncertain about it. India’s unease Page 9 of 27

India’s China Policy further increased when the United States demanded that India must commit to opposing communism globally prior to the establishment of substantive military cooperation between the two countries (Barnds 1972: 195). Finally, the outbreak of India’s second war with Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965 led to an arms embargo against the subcontinent that ended the nascent US–India military cooperation. Despite this embargo, ‘secret’ cooperation between the Intelligence Bureau and the CIA in support of Tibetan resistance groups continued.20 In the meanwhile, China had dramatically improved its relations with India’s subcontinental rival, Pakistan, which was fast emerging as one of China’s most important informal allies (Vertzberger 1980). In May 1962, even before the SinoIndian War, China and Pakistan agreed to demarcate their boundaries. Later, when the war was actually under way, China and Pakistan were negotiating the exact location of their boundaries. The Sino-Pakistani entente developed so rapidly that China threatened to open a second front during the 1965 India– Pakistan War. So serious was the Chinese threat to India—all along the Himalayas and the Chumbi Valley in particular—that the American ambassador in Warsaw warned his Chinese counterpart that ‘even the making of such threats [to India], which if pursued could create a most dangerous situation, which it would be difficult to confine to the areas or parties initially affected’ (Department of State 1998: 203). (p.178) While a larger conflagration was avoided, the imposition of the American arms embargo led India to turn towards the Soviet Union, as New Delhi began to look towards Moscow as a source of advanced military technology and to balance China’s power in the region. India had also approached the Soviet Union for a nuclear umbrella, but Moscow refused. Instead, India was offered a bilateral security pact which culminated in the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between the two (Mastny 2010). The treaty specifically forbade either side ‘from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other side’, and called for ‘mutual consultations’ to ‘eliminate’ the threat when either side was attacked or threatened with an attack.21 Signed on the eve of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1971 treaty with the Soviet Union was India’s answer to the emerging alignment between the United States, China, and Pakistan. Taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split and the 1969 Sino-Soviet military clashes, Henry Kissinger, the then US national security advisor, had made a secret trip to China in 1971 to tacitly ally with Beijing in an attempt to shift the balance of power in Asia. The US–China–India triangle had transformed so dramatically since 1965 that the United States gave China its implicit consent to attack India if it escalated the war in West Pakistan (Garver 2001: 207–15). The United States further dispatched a US Navy battle group, the USS Enterprise (believed to be nuclear-armed by strategists in New Delhi) to the Bay of Bengal to warn India against escalating the war in the west. At the same time, it was Page 10 of 27

India’s China Policy also meant as a signal to the Soviet Union to desist from taking any military action against China in the event of a Chinese military attack on India (Garver 2001: 322). In turn, the Soviet Union not only warned China against attacking India, but also positioned its air and ground forces facing the border with China in Xinjiang, and even considered wiping out China’s nuclear and missile facilities at Lop Nur (in Xinjiang) (Anderson and Clifford 1973: 260–2). India did not escalate the conflict in West Pakistan, thereby avoiding a larger war. However, India’s vivisection of Pakistan followed by India’s 1974 nuclear test led China to provide nuclear weapons and missile assistance to Pakistan to keep India focused on its South Asian neighbourhood (Garver 2001: 324–31). SinoIndian relations further deteriorated after India absorbed the small Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim into the Indian union in 1974–5 (Datta-Ray 2013). In an attempt to lessen political (p.179) tensions with Beijing after the absorption of Sikkim, full diplomatic relations with China were restored in 1976 (after being severed in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian War) under Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s initiative (Ranganathan 1988). In the meanwhile, China and Pakistan announced the opening of the Karakoram Highway—linking Pakistan’s Gilgit–Baltistan region (claimed by India as a part of Kashmir) with China’s Xinjiang—in 1978 (Ispahani 1989: 182). During the opening of the highway, China’s Deputy Prime Minister Li Xiannian noted that this highway allowed China ‘to give military aid to Pakistan’ (Topping 1979). In responding to this dramatic development, Indian soldiers seized key positions in Siachen—a disputed region between India and Pakistan in northern Kashmir—in 1984 and neutralized China’s military advantage. The Karakoram Highway had given China the ability to monitor any Indian attempt to cut Chinese communications lines through the Aksai Chin road. However, the new Indian position in Siachen not only neutralized this Chinese advantage, but also provided India with the capability ‘of isolating Pakistan from mainland China … with little or no warning’ (Bok 1991: 151). Two years later, in December 1986, India granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh—the disputed region in the eastern sector—in the context of the Sumdorong Chu crisis which sparked fears of a second China–India war. After a lull of almost two decades since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the two sides had agreed to start border talks in 1981. While China agreed to a sector-by-sector demarcation of the border that India desired, Beijing also raised the stakes in the eastern sector to gain leverage in its negotiations with India (Garver 2001: 106). Heretofore, the western sector (or Aksai Chin) had been the most important region for China. Since Aksai Chin was already under Chinese control (and because modern Chinese infrastructure including railways and airports now connected Tibet with Han China, thus reducing the importance of the Aksai Chin road), Beijing now claimed that the eastern sector was the ‘biggest dispute’ in Sino-Indian relations (Indian Express 1986). By granting full statehood to Page 11 of 27

India’s China Policy Arunachal Pradesh, the Indian government was signalling its intent to vigorously defend that region. This resulted in the Sumdorong Chu crisis (named after a point along the McMahon Line) as China and India mobilized anywhere between 50,000 and 400,000 troops. However, deterrence prevailed and (p.180) war was avoided because India now matched China’s military strength along their common border. This was dramatically displayed during Operation Checker Board—a series of combined air–land military exercises along the McMahon Line launched by India. India became so confident because of these exercises that the Indian government became convinced of its ability ‘to successfully decide any regional confrontation’ with China (Bodansky 1988). However, it was during this crisis that India realized that Soviet help was not forthcoming as Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, was keen on improving ties with China. The announcement of the Sino-Soviet border accord in August 1987 came as a shock to India, because New Delhi had not expected this issue to be resolved so soon (Statesman 1987). Therefore, India had to seek a new approach towards China.

India–China Relations since 1988 The opportunity for improved relations with China came during the wave of protests and riots that began in Tibet in 1987—the most serious protests in Tibet against Chinese authority since 1959 (Barnett 2008). Given the militarization of Tibet after 1959 (and especially since 1962), India’s threat environment remained unchanged as a consequence of the ongoing developments in Tibet. In an attempt to improve ties with China, the Indian government not only restrained the activities of Tibetan exiles in India, but also took precautions along the border to prevent the arrival of new refugees (Ali 1987). The Indian leadership also distanced itself from the main trigger that caused this cycle of upheaval in Tibet—the Dalai Lama’s ‘zone of peace’ proposals that were articulated in the United States and Europe in 1987 and 1988 (Shakya 1999: 414–15). Through these proposals the Dalai Lama gave up the cause of Tibetan independence in return for genuine political autonomy and a restricted number of Chinese military installations in Tibet.22 In an attempt to demonstrate that India was serious about improving its relations with China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a landmark trip to China in December 1988 when the wave of protests in Tibet was still ongoing.23 From New Delhi’s perspective, India was responding from a position of military strength. India perceived itself to be militarily strong enough to deter China along the McMahon Line as a result of Operation Checker Board.24 Gandhi’s trip, the first prime ministerial (p.181) visit between the two countries since 1954, broke the impasse between the Asian giants as they pledged to put the more contentious bilateral issues on the back-burner while starting economic

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India’s China Policy engagement. This visit also led to the creation of the Joint Working Group (JWG) that met fourteen times between 1989 and 2002 to resolve their border dispute. Later, the Indian government did not participate in the western-led international isolation of China following the 1989 Tiananmen Square bloodshed (Raja Mohan 2009). While India was certainly concerned about China’s rising economic power and China’s nuclear and missile links with Pakistan, the end of the Cold War (and the consequent implosion of India’s Soviet partner) meant that New Delhi had to seek a new modus vivendi with Beijing. The JWG meetings provided the framework for the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity and the 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures. As a result of these agreements, the two sides agreed to avoid large-scale military exercises involving more than one division (15,000 troops) along their borders, while providing prior notification for exercises involving more than one brigade (5,000 troops) (Sidhu and Yuan 2003: 113–40). While these were important agreements that reduced any immediate military tensions between the two countries, they did not result in any political understanding between them about their disputed border. Nor was any progress made on any other important issues that divided them. In fact, bilateral Sino-Indian relations reached a new nadir when the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes declared China as India’s ‘potential threat number one’ a few days before India’s May 1998 nuclear tests (Indian Express 1998), while the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee indirectly referred to China and the China–Pakistan nexus as the main reasons behind India’s nuclear tests (New York Times 1998). China firmly rejected India’s ‘China threat’ theory and even issued a joint statement with the United States condemning India’s nuclear tests. It was the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to China in June 1999 that eased bilateral tensions and led the two sides to agree to build constructive relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. They also agreed to refrain from treating one another as threats.25 In the meanwhile, commercial relations between the two countries were gradually improving as a consequence of China’s and India’s market-oriented reforms after 1978 and 1991, respectively. From being (p.182) virtually nonexistent about two decades ago, China is currently India’s third largest trading partner while India is China’s thirteenth largest.26 Furthermore, bilateral trade is expected to touch almost US$100 billion by 2015 (Press Information Bureau 2011). However, this trading relationship is asymmetric, as India’s trade deficit with China is around US$40 billion (Davies 2013). This is because while India is for the most part engaged in the export of raw materials like iron ore and cement to China, it has become home to a range of manufactured goods from China. Consequently, even though trade has become one of the most important drivers of the Sino-Indian relationship, the structure of their commercial Page 13 of 27

India’s China Policy relationship stimulates ‘Indian concerns over India’s achievement of a status position equal to China in the hierarchy of states and [also for the] security of India’, because the economic (and therefore military) advantage lies with China (Garver 2012: 64). Furthermore, given the presence of their ongoing territorial dispute and geopolitical contest in their overlapping spheres of influence, it is not clear if growing commercial ties will result in peaceful relations between Asia’s rising powers (Ganguly and Pardesi 2012). Indeed, China has raised the ante along the Sino-Indian border since 2005 and has begun referring to Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Zangnan’ or South Tibet (Garver and Wang 2010: 250). This is particularly troubling for New Delhi because India had interpreted the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India– China Boundary Question to mean that no exchange of areas with settled populations would take place in any future territorial give-and-take between China and India. In fact, China has apparently conveyed to India that the border issue cannot be resolved unless, ‘at a minimum’, Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) is ‘transferred to the Chinese side’ (Saran 2012). Given the strategic value of Tawang for the defence of north-eastern India, New Delhi is unlikely to compromise with China on this issue.27 In fact, the Sino-Indian border dispute has become more complicated in recent years with China’s massive investments in infrastructure building in Tibet (Chansoria 2011). The development of road and railway networks in Tibet along with high-altitude airfields in that region are a major cause of concern for New Delhi as they allow for the rapid deployment of China’s military forces there. According to the Indian Army, China now has the capability to deploy and sustain more than 500,000 troops for over a month along the Sino-Indian border (Gupta 2001). (p.183) China has also reportedly built oxygen-enriched barracks in Tibet to help acclimatize its troops to Tibet’s high-altitude terrain (Xinhua 2010), and has been regularly conducting military exercises in the region to prepare for high-altitude warfare.28 In turn, New Delhi is also upgrading the country’s road and railway infrastructure along the border with China, albeit at a much slower pace than Beijing (Pioneer 2013; Singh 2013). India is also upgrading its army and air force defence bases along the border with China (Sawhney and Wahab 2013; Siddiqui 2013). At the same time, India is raising new troops to be deployed along the China border, including a mountain strike force of over 80,000 soldiers with the capability ‘to launch a counter-offensive’ into Tibet in the event of a Chinese attack (Pandit 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Sino-Indian frontier has become rife with border intrusions and transgressions (by both sides) in recent years (Deccan Herald 2013). In April 2013, the Sino-Indian frontier witnessed the most serious border violation since the Sumdorong Chu crisis, when a small contingent of PLA troops transgressed nineteen kilometres Page 14 of 27

India’s China Policy into Indian territory at Depsang in the western sector and remained there for three weeks (Joshi 2013). The Sino-Indian rivalry is not limited to conventional forces only. The two sides are also upgrading their nuclear forces (especially delivery vehicles) in order to strengthen regional deterrence. China is replacing its liquid-fuelled nuclearcapable CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with the more advanced solid-fuelled CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles to ‘strengthen its deterrent posture relative to India’ (Department of Defense 2011: 38), while India recently tested its Agni-V missile that is capable of reaching Beijing and Shanghai to enhance its own deterrent against China (BBC News 2012). Although China has never openly threatened India with nuclear weapons in a crisis, India remains concerned about the nuclear nexus between Beijing and Islamabad that is largely driven by balance of power considerations (Paul 2003). The Pakistan factor also affects the Sino-Indian border issue as Pakistan’s Gilgit– Baltistan region—claimed by New Delhi to be a part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir—shares a border with China.29 The presence of several thousand troops of China’s PLA in the Gilgit–Baltistan region of Pakistani Kashmir, where they are engaged in infrastructure building activities, has led one prominent analyst to (p.184) question if Pakistan was handing over the ‘de facto control’ of this region to China. While these troops may belong to the PLA’s engineering corps (instead of armoured or infantry corps meant for warfighting), their presence has also been confirmed by the Indian security agencies (Economic Times 2011). In the midst of all these diplomatic and military developments over the status of Kashmir, the Indian foreign minister S. M. Krishna informed the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao that Kashmir was a ‘core’ issue for India just like Tibet was for China. In fact, India has also officially asked China to stop its activities in Pakistani Kashmir (Bagchi 2011; Times of India 2010). Given this relationship, the Indian military is working on a new military doctrine that will prepare it for a ‘two-front war’ against China and Pakistan simultaneously as it is believed that a conflict scenario involving either Pakistan or China may also end up involving the other (Pandit 2009; Unnithan 2010). In recent years, both China and India have raised the ante vis-à-vis one another in an attempt to influence the overall relationship. In 2009, China raised the issue of Arunachal Pradesh at the Asian Development Bank, when it tried to block a $2.9 billion loan for India after claiming that a part of the loan had been marked for this disputed region (Samanta 2009). This was the first time that China tried to influence the Sino-Indian border dispute at a multilateral setting. China’s strategy seems to be working, as the Indian government recently removed Arunachal Pradesh (as well as Sikkim30) from a World Bank loan proposal to avoid running into any Chinese objections (Rao and Bhaskar 2013). China’s growing financial clout is giving Beijing the power to influence bilateral issues through multilateral and international institutions. India too seems to be Page 15 of 27

India’s China Policy responding in kind by raising the stakes in Tibet. While India officially claims that Tibetan refugees living in India are not allowed to indulge in political activities,31 India allowed the Tibetans living in the country to participate in elections to choose a prime-minister-in-exile after the Dalai Lama relinquished his political role in 2011 (Yardley 2011). The Indian government has not yet explained why India allowed the Tibetan refugees to engage in political activities on Indian soil. At the same time, China has also become wary of India’s ‘Look East’ policy, which was launched by New Delhi after the end of the Cold War to enhance India’s economic and security links with its neighbours and partners in Northeast and Southeast Asia. China is especially (p.185) concerned about the Indo-Japanese relationship that has the potential to influence the balance of power in Asia. China perceives India’s growing ties with Japan as an alignment targeted against it (Zongyi 2013). Given Myanmar’s opening up to the wider world, its strategic location connecting South and Southeast Asia with southern China, and its considerable energy potential, Myanmar is fast emerging as a new arena for Sino-Indian rivalry (Myint-U 2011). Beyond Myanmar, India is engaged in offshore activities in Vietnam’s territorial waters even as China emphatically claimed that the India–Vietnam oil exploration agreement must be stopped because the South China Sea—a region over which China claims sovereign control—constituted China’s core interests (Hindu 2011; People’s Daily 2011). India’s strategy in East Asia seems to be driven by India’s desire to emerge as a major Asian power as opposed to a regional power in South Asia only. However, Chinese analysts worry about the strategic implications of India’s ‘Look East’ policy, and have also warned India that ‘China might nip its ambitions in the bud’ (Hongmei 2010). At the same time, the Sino-Indian rivalry is also spilling over into the Indian Ocean Region (Kaplan 2009). Given China’s reliance on the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean Region for energy resources from the Middle East and for trade with this region, Africa, and Europe, the Sino-Indian rivalry may soon have a strong naval dimension, given that India is the most important naval power in this region. China is in the process of building or upgrading seaports all along India’s periphery, from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Bangladesh and Myanmar (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008). While all of these ports are currently commercial in nature, Indian strategists worry that the Chinese navy may soon make its presence felt in this region. In particular, India is worried about the use of Pakistan’s Gwadar seaport by China (especially since it was largely financed by China) (Bagchi 2013). Chinese strategists on the other hand worry about India’s rapid naval/military expansion on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as it has the potential to threaten China’s seaborne commerce through the Strait of Malacca (Lanteigne 2008; Saalman 2011a, 2011b).

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India’s China Policy However, China’s biggest concern about India revolves around India’s growing strategic links with the United States. China noted it warily when the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton encouraged India to ‘not just look east, but to engage East and act East as well’ (quoted in (p.186) Kaufman 2011). In fact, China was already upset that the United States had changed its domestic law and had also taken the lead in changing international law in 2008 to make an exception for India’s participation in international civil nuclear commerce, even though India is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Given the budding US–India partnership, a former Chinese ambassador to India has warned that in light of China’s friendly relations with Pakistan, ‘there might be changes in the situation that will be unfavorable to India’ should an ‘alliance’ aimed at China emerge between India and the United States (Ruisheng 2008). While India is unlikely to enter into a full-fledged alliance with the United States, there seems to be an emerging understanding in New Delhi that close relations with Washington are essential for India’s own rise to great-power status. China and India are engaged in a complex rivalry that involves a contest both over territory and over status and position in Asia. While Indian policymaking towards China was guided by Nehru’s vision of India in Asian and world affairs in the early years after independence, India’s contemporary approach towards China is largely driven by structural factors and to a lesser degree by economic considerations. Although there is a general consensus in India that New Delhi should not become a part of any American-led effort to contain or balance China’s rising power, India has also begun to slowly respond to China’s provocations, as the burgeoning Indo-Japanese and Indo-Vietnamese relations demonstrate. However, India would prefer to deal with China as a great power and as an independent pole in its own right by rapidly building up its own economic and military power. As China and India rise through the international order, structural factors seem likely to remain the primary sources of India’s policy towards China. References Bibliography references: Ali, S. 1987. ‘India Plays It Cool’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 October. Anderson, J. and G. Clifford. 1973. The Anderson Papers (New York: Random House). Avedon, J.F. 1994. In Exile from the Land of Snows (New York: Harper Perennial). Bagchi, I. 2011. ‘Keep off PoK, India warns China’, Times of India, 16 September. ———. 2013. ‘India Irked as China gets Pakistan’s Strategic Gwadar Port’, Times of India, 2 February. Page 17 of 27

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India’s China Policy Kaplan, R.D. 2009. ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 16–29, 31–2. Kaufman, S. 2011. ‘Clinton Says India’s Leadership Is Important for Asia’, 20 July. Available at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/ 2011/07/20110720141544nehpets0.5934107.html#axzz1m7GU2AG1 (accessed 27 March 2015). Kavic, L.J. 1965. India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press). Knaus, K.K. 1999. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York: PublicAffairs). Kohli, M.S. and K.J. Conboy. 2002. Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). Kramer, M. 2006. ‘Great-Power Rivalries, Tibetan Guerrilla Resistance, and the Cold War in South Asia’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 5–14. Kumar, V. 2012. ‘India Evaluating China’s Military Exercises in Tibet’, Hindu, 26 August. Lanteigne, M. 2008. ‘China’s Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma”’, Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 143–61. Liu, X. 2010. Recast All Under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century (New York: Continuum). Malik, M. 2011. China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder, CO: FirstForumPress). Mastny, V. 2010. ‘The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 50–90. (p.192) McGranahan, C. 2010. Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War (Durham: Duke University Press). McMahon, R.J. 2004. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press). Menon, K.P.S. 1985. Many Worlds: An Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press). Ministry of External Affairs. n.d. Prime Minister on Sino–Indian Relations, vol. 1: In Parliament, part 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs).

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India’s China Policy Mullik, B.N. 1971. My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal (New Delhi: Allied). Myint-U, T. 2011. Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Sioux). Nayar, B.R. and T.V. Paul. 2004. India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1947. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, ed. S. Gopal (2nd series) (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund). New York Times. 1998. ‘Nuclear Anxiety; Indian’s Letter to Clinton on Nuclear Testing’, 13 May. Noorani, A.G. 1967. ‘India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee’, Asian Survey, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 490–502. Pandit, R. 2009. ‘Army Reworks War Doctrine for Pakistan, China’, Times of India, 30 December. ———. 2013. ‘Army gets final nod to deploy 80,000 troops along China border’, Times of India, 19 November. Pardesi, M.S. 2011. ‘Instability in Tibet and the Sino-Indian Rivalry: Do Domestic Politics Matter?’, in S. Ganguly and W.R. Thompson, eds, Asian Rivalries, Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 79–117. Patel, V. 1974. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50, ed. Durga Das, vol. 10 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House). Paul, T.V. 2003. ‘Chinese–Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power’, Nonproliferation Review (Summer), pp. 1–9. People’s Daily. 2011. ‘India–Vietnam Oil Exploration Deal Must be Stopped’, 14 October. Pioneer. 2013. ‘India plans 14 railway lines near LAC’, 28 October. Press Information Bureau. 2011. ‘India China to Achieve Trade of US$100 Billion by 2015’, Government of India, 3 November. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/ newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=76986 (accessed 27 March 2015). Raja Mohan, C. 2009. ‘Places 20 Years Apart’, Indian Express, 4 June. Ranganathan, C.V. 1998. ‘India–China Relations: Problems and Prospects’, World Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2. Page 22 of 27

India’s China Policy (p.193) Rao, K.V. and U. Bhaskar. 2013. ‘Govt drops Arunachal, Sikkim from proposed World Bank loan’, Mint, 5 August. Ruisheng, C. 2008. ‘Trend of India’s Diplomatic Strategy’, China International Studies, no. 1. Ruwitch, J. 2009. ‘Singh to Wen: Dalai Lama an honored guest’, Reuters, 25 October. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/25/us-india-chinadalailama-idUSTRE59O0HW20091025 (accessed 27 March 2015). Saalman, L. 2011a. ‘Between “China Threat Theory” and Chindia: Chinese Responses to India’s Military Modernization’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 87–114. ———. 2011b. ‘Divergence, Similarity, and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 169–94. Saksena, S. 1992. India, China, and the Revolution (New Delhi: Anmol). Samanta, P.D. 2009. ‘India–China face-off worsens over ADB loan for Arunachal’, Indian Express, 15 May. Saran, S. 2012. ‘China in the Twenty-First Century: What India Needs to Know about China’s World View’, Second Annual K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture, India International Centre, New Delhi, 29 August. Available at: http:// www.globalindiafoundation.org/Second%20Annual%20K.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015). Sautman, B. 2010. ‘Tibet’s Putative Status and International Law’, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 127–42. Sawhney, P. and G. Wahab. 2013. ‘Air Power’, Force (India), October. Shakya, T. 1999. The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: Penguin). Siddiqui, H. 2013. ‘New Delhi Ramps up Defence Bases along Chinese Border’, Indian Express, 7 October. Sidhu, W.P.S. and J.D. Yuan. 2003. China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (New Delhi: India Research Press). Singh, V. 2013. ‘MHA Plans to Build 48 Roads along China Border’, Indian Express, 8 June. Sinha, P.B. and A.A. Athale. 1992. History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India).

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India’s China Policy Smith, J. 2014. ‘Meet the Tiny Himalayan Town at the Center of Global Politics’, Foreign Policy, 8 January. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2014/01/08/ meet_the_tiny_himalayan_town_at_the_center_of_global_politics#sthash.arTX7uDy.dpbs (accessed 27 March 2015). Statesman. 1987. ‘Speculation over accord with China’, 24 August. Thomas, R.G.C. 1979. ‘Nonalignment and Indian Security: Nehru’s Rationale and Legacy’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 153–71. (p.194) Times of India. 2010. ‘Kashmir to Us is what Tibet is to China: Krishna’, 16 December. ———. 2013. ‘Chinese Air Force Holds Night Flying exercises in Tibet’, 23 July. Topping, S. 1979. ‘Opening the high road to China’, New York Times, 2 December. Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre (TPPRC). 2006. Indian Parliament on the Issue of Tibet: Rajya Sabha Debates, 1952–2005 (New Delhi: TPPRC). Unnithan, S. 2010. ‘The ChiPak threat’, India Today, 23 October. Vertzberger, Y. 1980. The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations (New York: Praeger). Whiting, A.S. 1975. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Xinhua. 2010. ‘First Batch of Ecological Oxygen-enriched Barracks Built in Tibet’, 25 June. Available at: http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/chinamilitary-news/2010-06/25/content_4246482.htm (accessed 27 March 2015). Yang, Y. 1987. ‘Controversies over Tibet: China versus India, 1947–49’, China Quarterly, no. 111 (September), pp. 407–20. Yardley, J. 2011. ‘Tibetan Exiles Elect Scholar as New Prime Minister’, New York Times, 27 April. Yuan, J.D. 2001. ‘India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments’, Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 978–1001. Zongyi, L. 2013. ‘India gets close to Japan at its own peril’, Global Times, 30 May. Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 785656.shtml#.Uivm7MbI3hc (accessed 27 March 2015).

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India’s China Policy Notes:

(1.) Gandhi died in 1948, while Patel died in 1950. (2.) ‘A Monroe Doctrine for Asia,’ 9 August 1947, in Nehru (1947, 3:133–5). (3.) See Chapter 11, this volume, on India’s policy towards Japan and South Korea. (4.) Nehru also felt that Chinese communism was a manifestation of nationalism (see Saksena 1992). (5.) For the full text of the three notes sent by the Government of India to the PRC in response to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, see Goldstein (1989: 719–29). (6.) China’s Xinjiang does have a border with the state of Jammu and Kashmir (which itself is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan). However, the PRC had militarily annexed Xinjiang just before the creation of the new Chinese state in October 1949. (7.) The details of the historical and legal status of Tibet vis-à-vis China are beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that Tibet had become independent of the control of the Qing Dynasty for all practical purposes after the White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1804), and that Tibet even declared its own independence in 1913 after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911–12 (see Sautman 2010). (8.) See Document 36, ‘Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou’, 10 July 1971, p. 5, The Beijing–Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, National Security Archive. Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-36.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015). (9.) On the impact of Tibetan geography on Nehru’s thinking, see Garver (2001: 50). (10.) Patel’s note to Nehru dated 7 November 1950 can be found in Patel (1974: 335–41). For Nehru’s reply, see ‘Prime Minister Nehru’s Note on China and Tibet forwarded to Vallabhbhai Patel’, in Jain (1981: 41–7; see p. 44). (11.) Chinese troops can easily threaten Assam (and Bhutan) even if they are present only in moderate numbers in Tawang (Goldstein 1989: 305). (12.) Also see Sinha and Athale (1992: 28). This restricted report of the Government of India was leaked and is now available online at http:// www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/ 1962Main.pdf (accessed 27 March 2015). (13.) This point is also made in Garver (2001: 89–90). Page 25 of 27

India’s China Policy (14.) In addition to India, Nepal was the only other country with which China signed such an agreement over the status of Tibet. (15.) Even the small central sector, which was heretofore managed by the state police, was handed over to the Indian military. (16.) For Zhou’s letter, see Document 121, ‘Chou En-lai’s reply to Nehru’s letter of 22 March 1959, 8 September 1959’, in Jain (1981: 138–40). And for Nehru’s reply to this letter, see Document 128, ‘Nehru’s reply to Chou En-lai’s letter of 8 September 1959, 26 September 1959’, in Jain (1981: 147–51). (17.) ‘More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question’, in The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, enlarged edition (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), p. 100. (18.) For details of the decision that led to the formulation of the forward policy, see Hoffman (1990: 92–111). (19.) In fact, Nehru felt that a China–India war had the potential to become a world war. See Ministry of External Affairs (n.d.: 279–80). (20.) This cooperation lasted until the 1970s and was only terminated after America began the process of normalization of its relations with China (Conboy and Morrison 2002: 210). (21.) For the full text of the treaty, see ‘Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of India’, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 23, no. 32, p. 5. (22.) Beijing perceived this as the Dalai Lama’s attempt to seek independence by stealth. From China’s perspective, any limitation on China’s military presence in Tibet could only help one country—India. (23.) In fact, three months after Gandhi’s trip, China brought the situation in Tibet under control after declaring martial law in that region. (24.) Gandhi had also ordered the weaponization of India’s nuclear programme around this time (Baruah 2008). (25.) On China’s reaction to India’s nuclear tests, see Yuan (2001). (26.) On India’s trade statistics, see European Commission (2013a). On China’s trade statistics, see European Commission (2013b). (27.) India may be unable to do so for nationalistic reasons as well. On the Chinese and Indian views on Tawang, see Smith (2014).

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India’s China Policy (28.) Some of these exercises have also involved the Chinese air force (see Kumar 2012; Times of India 2013). (29.) India also regards the Shaksgam Valley that was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963 as a part of Jammu and Kashmir. (30.) While China may have implicitly recognized Sikkim as a part of India in 2003, Beijing has never formally accepted this position. (31.) This is the official policy of India and has been repeated many times (see Ruwitch 2009).

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India and Russia friendship, and upon the resolution of thorny bilateral issues such as the disposition of Soviet-era debt. This process culminated in the signing of the IndoRussian strategic partnership in 2000. More than a decade after this formalization of ties, and despite the continuing merits of the partnership, the bilateral relationship, at least from India’s perspective, no longer retains the strategic imperative that had characterized the Indo-Soviet nexus. Both sides have attempted to airbrush frictions and to focus on ways of sustaining a longstanding friendship that the two sides, in a joint statement issued during President Dmitri Medvedev’s 2010 visit to New Delhi, termed a ‘special and privileged’ partnership (MEA 2010). At critical historical junctures, the salience of systemic, state-level, or individuallevel variables has influenced the nature both of the (p.196) Indo-Soviet and of the evolving Indo-Russian relationships. The precedence of one set of variables over another has largely been a function of developments in the international and domestic arenas. Defence ties have been the primary component of the bilateral relationship, and, while these remain central, Moscow is gradually losing its monopoly in the arms trade with India. Trade links are weak, and the primary question with regard to the Indo-Russian connection is whether, in the long run, an arms trade that continues to be brisk provides sufficient impetus to sustain a strong bilateral relationship in the absence of dynamic economic ties. This chapter details the Indo-Russian relationship in three sections. The first part contextualizes the relationship by providing a historical overview; the second section examines the policy elements that underpin mutual ties; and the conclusion assesses the opportunities and challenges that beset the future.

History: Constants, Variables, and Context One of the constants in Indian foreign policy has been the quest by New Delhi’s dominant political elite for strategic autonomy, with the policy of non-alignment born of the Cold War being its exemplary manifestation. The elite consensus on this idea, certainly until the end of the Cold War and to some extent even after, has been strong enough to weather shifts in the international distribution of power. Non-alignment, as articulated in the early 1950s, signified neither neutrality nor isolation but an effort to shield the country from the unwarranted influence of external actors, and a belief that this stance would allow India to avail of economic and technological help both from the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a posture, however, neglected to take into account the impact of systemic factors, such as regional and international configurations of power and influence. This neglect of power considerations often did not serve New Delhi’s objectives of domestic economic development and social uplift. During the Cold War, the Indian leadership’s policy choices distanced the country from the United States and, after the 1949 revolution, from Mao’s China. These choices also moulded the development of the Indo-Soviet relationship. With the end of the Cold War, the continued emphasis on strategic Page 2 of 26

India and Russia autonomy has led to the adoption of a foreign policy of equipoise toward all major centres of power. India has signed (p.197) strategic partnerships with Russia, the United States, major European countries, Japan, Russia, and even China. India’s ties with the United States, in particular, have improved markedly since the end of the Cold War (Nadkarni 2010). In the context of intensifying frictions between India and Russia generated by disputes relating to trade and investment and New Delhi’s emphasis on diversifying its sources of arms supply, the budding US–Indian friendship has raised concerns in Moscow over the loss of earlier Soviet influence in India.1 Similarly, New Delhi has reacted warily to a warming Sino-Russian partnership, which has replaced Cold War–era Sino-Soviet hostility that had ensured Moscow’s strategic embrace of India. As in India, leadership factors played an important role in the Soviet view of its ties with New Delhi. Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi underwent a sea change with Nikita Khrushchev’s doctrinal modifications in Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin in March 1953, which resulted in strengthened IndoSoviet ties. Thereafter, the relationship deepened as the imprint of the Cold War on the Indian subcontinent imposed an external strategic logic upon the IndoSoviet nexus. Mikhail Gorbachev’s abandonment of doctrinaire MarxismLeninism and his foreign policy reforms had the effect of undercutting temporarily the basis of the Soviet Union’s special relationship with India. The bilateral relationship languished until the signing in 2000 of the strategic partnership under President Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In both India and the Soviet Union/Russia, elite influence has generally shaped the alignment of domestic interests and of public opinion on foreign policy, rather than the other way around. Some observers in India have remarked upon the rise in the twentyfirst century of domestic economic interests and of the media in shaping the contours of official and public debate over the substance of foreign policy, but decision-making largely continues to be the preserve of a small and insular elite (Baru 2009; Kapur 2009).2 Thus, changes in foreign policy have principally been pragmatic responses to fluid developments both at home and abroad with a worldview favouring strategic autonomy. The Historical Context

India and Russia have never shared borders. This circumstance more than any other perhaps accounts for the signal lack of a history of overt (p.198) hostility between the two countries. In 2012, India and Russia celebrated the sixty-fifth anniversary of uninterrupted diplomatic relations—a testament, despite intermittent disagreements, to a largely cordial relationship. In joint statements and communiqués issued at annual summits held alternately in New Delhi and Moscow since the signing of the strategic partnership agreement in 2000, the two countries routinely tout their long-standing and friendly ties. While elite predilections largely explain the Indo-Soviet and Indo-Russian relationships, systemic factors and the interests of powerful European countries had a

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India and Russia significant impact on the nature of interactions, or lack thereof, between India and Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Until India’s independence in August 1947, the relationship between British India and Imperial Russia was shaped primarily by two British preoccupations— first, with securing its overseas Indian colony from the threat of southward Russian imperial expansion; and later, with the rise of Germany in Europe, which triggered a British entente with France and Russia. The imperatives of British and Russian colonialism resulted in an end to the economic and cultural interchange, albeit limited, that had existed earlier between the peoples of the Indian subcontinent and of Central Asia. In the early nineteenth century, the Tsarist empire had begun to expand southward into Central Asia, moving ever closer to India. Concerned over the possibility of Russian encroachment, the British government actively worked to insulate India from the perils of Russian expansionism. After failed British wars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Afghanistan, Britain and Russia signed the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, in which they agreed to delineate Afghanistan’s northern border in such a way as to create a physical buffer between their respective empires. Additionally, in return for Russian acknowledgment of British paramountcy in Afghanistan, the British acquiesced to Russian influence in northern Persia (Iran). Systemic variables help explain why age-old historical links between South and Central Asia were sundered. In the early part of the twentieth century, Britain worked toward a diplomatic settlement with Russia in Asia in order to enlist Tsarist Russia’s help in Europe against the rise of Germany. Developments in the European theatre, therefore, had a consequential impact on policies that Britain and Russia pursued in Asia. Thereafter, the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 further (p.199) distanced British India from the fledgling Soviet communist state by superimposing ideological antipathies upon erstwhile competitive geopolitical considerations. Early Soviet leaders dismissed the Indian independence movement against British colonialism as a bourgeois-led effort that lacked revolutionary potential. The young Soviet state, preoccupied with internal disarray and with neutralizing the active opposition of Western powers to Bolshevik rule, paid scant attention to India. When India became independent in 1947, its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s disdain for realpolitik coloured India’s foreign policy until the early 1960s. Nehru’s idealist faith in a new Asian path that replaced competitive and destructive European-style power politics among states with peaceful coexistence led him to seek the moral high ground in global politics. Adopting non-alignment as a key tenet of Indian foreign policy, Nehru attempted to steer clear of the ideological and military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. His decision to cast India’s lot with neither of the two powerful Page 4 of 26

India and Russia protagonists of the Cold War had major consequences for India, leading the country down a path-dependent series of choices created by regional and global exigencies that culminated in the signing of a defensive treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971. During the period of tight bipolarity from the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, when the US–Soviet conflict was intense, New Delhi’s strategy of non-alignment resulted in India’s isolation from the high tables of global political decisionmaking. Neither Stalin in the Soviet Union nor Truman in the United States was willing to accept a posture of non-alignment in what each considered an epic battle between capitalism and communism. The pursuit of autonomy in foreign policy meant that India did not have powerful international sponsors to protect its interests on the world stage. Until the 1990s, the dominant Nehruvian worldview of India’s elite shaped the country’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and much of the rest of the world (see Chaulia 2002). Nehru envisioned a global leadership role for India even when the system-level configuration of power during the Cold War did not support such a grand objective. Non-alignment afforded New Delhi no substantive policy gains and even the rhetorical advantages, such as leadership of the movement it spawned, were ephemeral. China’s 1950–1 invasion and subsequent political absorption of Tibet shattered Nehru’s vision of a peaceful Asia that would provide an alternative to destructive European-style power (p. 200) politics. However, only after the humiliating Indian defeat in the1962 SinoIndian War did New Delhi under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi move decisively away from Nehruvian idealism toward a realist view that focused on developing military strength to secure the country’s national interests.3 But non-alignment remained the country’s lodestar until the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of bipolarity brought into question its continued salience. Non-alignment’s domestic counterpart was the adoption of a mixed economy model in which centralized planning and government regulation coexisted with limited private enterprise. In pushing for an autonomous domestic strategy of growth leavened with social justice, Nehru closed the doors to robust Western engagement in India’s economic development. An early example came when India sought international assistance for constructing a public sector funded steel plant in Bhilai. Unable to secure Western support for a government-run project, India signed an aid agreement with Khrushchev’s Soviet Union in March 1955 paved the way for Soviet assistance to major infrastructure and heavy industry projects in India (Stanislaus 1975). Unlike Stalin, who had viewed India’s leaders as capitalist lackeys, his successor Khrushchev saw the value of enlisting India as an anti-imperialist ally in the East–West Cold War conflict. This Soviet recalibration of doctrine and policy toward the Third World opened the door to Soviet economic and military assistance to India (Goldman 1965). Thus, Page 5 of 26

India and Russia while Indian elite preference for non-alignment would have predicted divergence between New Delhi and Moscow, a key domestic variable—India’s mixed economy, which was closer to the Soviet economic model—facilitated improved ties. The India–Soviet Union/Russia nexus is, in effect, a legacy of Nehru’s early policy choices. In the Cold War environment, Moscow was willing to offer diplomatic backing on matters of core interest to India. In his 1955 visit to India, Khrushchev offered unqualified support for New Delhi’s position on Kashmir. In 1959, as Sino-Indian differences over the contested border with Chinese-controlled Tibet mounted, Khrushchev angered Beijing by leaning toward India on the boundary issue. However, during India’s disastrous 1962 war with China, Moscow, to India’s dismay, reversed its earlier support, parroted the Chinese view that India’s position on the border was a legacy of British imperialism, and counselled a negotiated ceasefire on Chinese terms (Mastny 2010: 57–63).4 (p.201) A belated Soviet offer of military assistance to a beleaguered India came only after the war was over, but it spelled the beginning of an arms relationship that saw the Soviet Union supplant Britain as India’s primary weapons supplier. Soviet arms transfers helped India repel Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir by force during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.5 Meanwhile, the SinoSoviet conflict, which had been brewing since the late 1950s, resulted in a final break between the two countries in 1963. Thereafter, the China factor, as had the US–Pakistan Cold War relationship earlier, became another external element defining and propelling the Indo-Soviet relationship. The estrangement of China and the Soviet Union eventually paved the way for a Sino-American rapprochement inaugurated by Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971. Given the key role of Pakistan, India’s subcontinental adversary, both as a US ally in the Cold War and as the indispensable intermediary in the US–China rapprochement, New Delhi feared the development of a hostile Washington–Beijing–Islamabad axis. The ongoing civil war between East and West Pakistan was another matter of grave concern in New Delhi. Moscow, for its part, saw the emerging US–China reconciliation as a palpable threat to Soviet interests. These systemic developments led to the signing in August 1971 of the twenty-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, cementing a pronounced tilt toward the Soviet Union.6 Generous shipments of Soviet military aid that followed the signing of the treaty allowed India to defeat Pakistan in a war unwisely provoked by the latter in December, which resulted in the dismemberment of the Pakistani state through the creation of Bangladesh and established India as the pre-eminent power in South Asia.7 The 1971 treaty represented the high mark in Indo-Soviet ties. Though publicly uncritical, New Delhi was shaken by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was viewed as an unwarranted Soviet incursion in India’s South Asian Page 6 of 26

India and Russia sphere of influence. Aside from this minor wrinkle, however, the India–Russia relationship continued to flourish in a Cold War environment where both New Delhi and Moscow saw strategic merit in strong bilateral ties (Ghosh and Pandey 1983). By the 1980s, Soviet arms constituted 85 per cent of India’s imports. In the mid-1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated tentative steps toward economic liberalization, even as the Soviet Union led by Mikhail Gorbachev undertook major domestic reforms under the banner of (p.202) perestroika. While both leaders were committed to a strong Indo-Soviet relationship, the cumulative impact of domestic economic reforms in both countries set in motion a cycle of developments that resulted in attenuated ties by the end of the decade. Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy in 1987 resulted in a Soviet reappraisal of its unqualified support of India. As Gorbachev pursued a policy of even-handedness in relations with India and Pakistan, chided New Delhi on Kashmir, and voted for a Pakistani-sponsored resolution in the United Nations calling for a nuclear-free zone, Indo-Soviet ties weakened, and in 1991, the twentieth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet treaty went unmentioned in New Delhi and Moscow. This downward slide continued after the Soviet collapse as President Yeltsin, under his staunchly ‘Atlanticist’ foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, focused on nurturing Russia’s ties with the West to the neglect of its age-old relationship with India. However, by early 1993 Russia, disenchanted with the United States and Europe, began to rekindle ties with India. This turn eastward received additional impetus as the American decision to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and engage in ‘out-of-area’ NATO operations in the Balkans decisively ended Moscow’s ‘romance with the West’. During President Yeltsin’s January 1993 visit to New Delhi, the two sides signed a twenty-year Treaty of Indo-Russian Friendship and Cooperation. Another development of concern for India emerged as an outgrowth of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet entry into South Asia elicited an American proxy war in Afghanistan through the funnelling of arms to neighbouring Pakistan in support of anti-Soviet Islamic rebels—the mujahedin. When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, Islamic militants with covert support from Pakistan redirected their efforts to an armed insurgency to ‘liberate’ Kashmir. Preoccupied with the runaway consequences of domestic reform, the Soviet leadership was largely focused on issues of internal order and paid scant attention to Afghanistan. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 1996, however, set off alarm bells in Moscow and New Delhi, and India and Russia began to support the opposition Northern Alliance, which became the mainstay of USbacked resistance forces in the American-led war.

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India and Russia A convergence of interests on Afghanistan, a shared preference for a polycentric world, and a common disinclination toward violating state sovereignty through humanitarian military interventions led to warming (p.203) Indo-Russian ties by the late 1990s. As President Putin steered Russian foreign policy in a pragmatic direction, India and Russia initialled the strategic partnership agreement of October 2000. Despite intermittent hiccoughs in the relationship, Moscow has generally proved to be a reliable Indian ally through consistent backing of India’s primary interests and aspirations, ranging from support of India’s position on Kashmir and India’s bid for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to a refusal to join the chorus of international criticism and sanctions when India joined the club of nuclear weapons countries in 1998.8 Mindful of Indian sensibilities, Russia has refrained from selling arms to Pakistan and excoriated the latter’s covert support for terrorist attacks in India by Islamic militants. Russia’s willingness to sell India its most advanced weapons systems, to transfer arms technology, and jointly to develop and produce missiles and aircraft have added to the value of the Russian partnership to India. The next section will consider whether the partnership can weather warming US–Indian and Sino-Russian ties and India’s decision to diversify its sources of arms supply.

Policy Convergences and Divergences How is the ‘special and privileged partnership’ between India and Russia reflected in evolving dyadic interactions on issues of consequence to New Delhi? In addition to examining the trajectory of the arms connection, which is a primary component of the Indo-Russian relationship, and the commercial links between the two countries, one way to accomplish this task is to assess the depth and constancy of Russia’s support for India’s stances on Kashmir, nuclearization, terrorism, and UNSC membership. Moreover, how Russia deals with India’s traditional rivals—Pakistan and China—also has a significant bearing on Indo-Russian ties. The Defence Relationship

By 1962, the Soviet Union had displaced Britain as the largest arms exporter to India. British concerns over the intense India–Pakistan rivalry played a role in their reticence to sell weapons, as did India’s decision to adopt non-alignment in foreign policy. The latter choice also (p.204) meant that the United States was wary of arming India. Between 1947 when India became independent and 1949, Indian arms imports were nil to negligible. But between 1950 and 1961, Britain was India’s largest arms supplier, with a value of total exports amounting to $4.9 billion. During the same eleven-year period, the value of total US arms exports totalled $421 million, and Soviet exports were valued at $326 million. The shift in 1962 was stark, with annual arms sales figures at $286 million for the Soviet Union; $77 million for Britain; and $1 million for the United States.9 Thereafter, Soviet exports dwarfed those from any other country. Recent Russian concerns

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India and Russia over India’s attempts at diversification in suppliers mask the overwhelming advantage that Moscow continues to enjoy in arms exports (see Table 7.1). Thus, while the relative share of Russian weapons sales to India has fluctuated from year to year, unseating the Russian niche in the Indian arms market will be a long-drawn-out process (see Table 7.2). Russia is unique among countries in having an institutionalized format for defence cooperation and arms sales. Established in 2000, the Russian–Indian Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation hosts annual meetings at the defence minister level, and has primary responsibility for supervising the implementation of ten-year intergovernmental agreements spanning the 2001–10 and 2011–20 decades (Weitz 2012: 79). More than half of the Indian Navy’s surface fleet and submarines are sourced from Russia, and even indigenously built ships use Russian-made ship-to-ship and surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, guns, and anti-submarine weapons. Some major recent Indian purchases of Russian arms comprise Su-30 MKI fighter jets designed for the Indian Air Force; Mi-17 multi-role tactical transport helicopters; T-90 tanks for the army; and the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) (Weitz 2012: 80–2). India has also signed a contract for the tenyear lease of a nuclear attack submarine, christened INS Chakra. Another unique feature of Russian–Indian defence cooperation is joint design and production of weapons systems, of which there is, so far, one prominent example. The BrahMos venture, which was initiated in 1998, has developed and produced tactical cruise missiles in India using Russian technology. In 2007, the Indian Army began deploying BrahMos-1 missiles on trucks, and tests of a naval variant (BrahMos-2) have begun. Air- and submarine-launched versions of this missile are (p.205)

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India and Russia

Table 7.1 Volume of Arms Exports to India (Trend Indicator Values) in millions of dollars Suppli er

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Russia

685

1,125

1,756

2,316

1,444

651

921

1,783

1,612

2,060

2,298

2,449

3,966

23,064 77

Israel

25

58

71

78

151

176

174

104

37

92

101

117

254

1,436

5

104

117

164

224

112

120

140

290

1,289

4

74

87

5

2

51

190

139

562

2 1

UK US

18 1

% of Total

8

2

France 41

22

11

15

148

100

5

9

13

15

17

22

23

440

All

1,384

1,946

2,891

2,142

1,088

1,428

2,288

1,908

2,542

2,883

3,511

4,764

29,784 100

1,008

Source: Compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database (accessed 14 September 2013).

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India and Russia

Table 7.2 Russian Arms Sales to India as Percentage of Total 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

68

81

90

80

67

60

64

78

84

81

80

70

83

Source: Compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database (accessed 14 September 2013).

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India and Russia (p.206) in development. The two sides have also launched a joint venture—Multi-role Transport Aircraft Ltd—for the research and development of multi-role transport aircraft for the Indian and Russian air forces (Weitz 2012: 82).

However, the defence relationship is not without mutual misgivings. On the Indian side, problems besetting the Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) aircraft carrier deal are symptomatic of overall concerns. Under the terms of a contract signed in 2004, the Indian Navy agreed to buy the aircraft carrier (with warplanes) for $1.5 billion, with expected delivery in August 2008. Infrastructure problems and underfunding of the Russian ship-building industry led to delays and cost overruns, requiring a renegotiated contract in March 2010 that reset the cost at $2.34 billion (Weitz 2012: 84). After sea trials, Vikramaditya was finally inducted into the Indian Navy in November 2013 (Anandan 2013). India has voiced concerns over quality and delays in delivery and/or upgrade of other weapons purchases as well (Weitz 2012: 83–9). Between 2008 and 2012, India was the world’s largest arms importer absorbing fully 12 per cent of the global share, thereby displacing China, which is developing more of its weapons systems indigenously. As the world’s second largest buyer, China imported half as much as did India (6 per cent) during the same period (SIPRI 2013: 10). India is courted by the world’s leading arms suppliers and, as a country with a fairly large arms budget, has become a more discriminating buyer (Economist 2013). Thus, Russia was nonplussed when it lost the bid for what was called ‘the deal of the century’—the $10.4 billion contract for the purchase of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft. The Russian tender was eliminated in the first round in early 2011. Spurning both the Russian (MiG-35) and American (Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Falcon and Boeing’s F-18 Hornet) tenders, India awarded the contract in January 2012 to France (Dassault Rafale). Moscow’s last-minute cancellation of the INDRA-2011 joint naval exercises in April, followed in June by the Russian cancellation of a joint army exercise, may have been done in a fit of pique. The failure of the MiG-35 bid elicited much comment and handwringing in the Russian media and in Moscow, where government and defence industry officials began to worry about the danger of losing Russia’s prime niche in the Indian arms market. Russian observers remarked that India’s diversification efforts worked against the Russian bid because of the near-monopoly of the Su-30 MKI heavy (p.207) long-range fighters in the Indian Air Force (Reutov et al. 2011: 13). As the data in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate, however, Russia cannot easily be dislodged from its position in the defence relationship. In 2012, Russia signed over $3.5 billion worth of new arms export agreements that included the purchase of 71 Mi-17B-5 helicopters and the delivery of assembly kits for 42 Su-30 MKI fighters. In February 2013, Viktor Komardin, the deputy general director of Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport, was sanguine about Russia’s place in the Indian arms market: ‘The country [India] is one of the main importers of defense products on the global scale, and Russia continues to be one of its key suppliers’ (The Hindu Business Line 2013). Inertia, domestic interests in both Page 12 of 26

India and Russia countries tied to the defence and foreign policy establishments, weapons contracts sealed through the next decade, and the need for personnel training as well as spare parts to service weapons systems already in place are factors that will keep the arms relationship robust in the medium term. But Russia can no longer take automatic Indian favour for granted. Indo-Soviet arms trade had occurred on soft (rupee–rouble) credit terms that were tied to trade, and this arrangement had fuelled large Indian commodity exports to the Soviet Union. After the Soviet collapse, the Indo-Russian arms/trade relationship went through a difficult process of readjustment. Part of the Soviet-era debt was auctioned off, and part was converted into opportunities for Russian investment in India. Russian arms, which now require hard currency payments, therefore have to be competitive in price, performance, and delivery. A warming Indo-US relationship has resulted in tighter bilateral military-to-military ties. Europe and the United States can offer India more advanced military technology than can Russia. India conducts more joint air and naval exercises with the United States than with Russia, and such frequent contacts spur the development of a network that could facilitate arms and technology transfers. The United States, however, would have to match Russian willingness to offer India the privilege of joint production and development of weapons systems and generous terms of technology transfer. The United States is reported to have proposed the joint development of the next-generation Javelin anti-tank missile, but no contracts have yet been signed (Shukla 2013). Senior Indian diplomat Shyam Saran has said that the United States ‘still appears unable to decide whether to treat India as a partner … as far as technology (p.208) matters are concerned’ (North 2011). Until such an eventuality occurs, the privileged Russia–India arms relationship will continue. Trade and Investment Links

When the artificial rupee–rouble foundation underpinning $5.5 billion in annual bilateral Indo-Soviet trade was dismantled, trade levels plummeted to $2.5 billion in 1992.10 Since then, trade has been moving steadily upward: $7.5 billion in 2009, $8.5 billion in 2010, $8.9 billion in 2011, and $11.04 billion in 2012. The two-way investment is a meagre $7.8 billion (MEA 2013a). Almost all Indian investment in Russia is in the energy sector. In India, rupee debt repayment fuels much of the Russian investment. The main institutional mechanism for monitoring economic cooperation is the India–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, and Cultural Cooperation, chaired respectively by the minister of external affairs and the deputy prime minister. Additionally, the India–Russia Forum on Trade and Investment, co-chaired by the Indian minister of commerce and industry and the Russian minister for economic development and the India–Russia CEOs’ Council, promotes bilateral business-to-business contacts (MEA 2013a). The two sides

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India and Russia have set an ambitious goal for bilateral trade turnover at $20 billion by 2015 (MEA 2013a). The fairly low volume of Indo-Russian trade is in stark contrast with Sino-Indian trade volumes, which in 2011 registered $66 billion. China and India have set a goal of $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2015—five times higher than the target for Russia (MEA 2013b). The difference is particularly noteworthy because India and China are traditional rivals, whereas India and Russia have had historically friendly ties. The most significant reason for weak economic links is that the partnership has for many decades been driven by the arms relationship.11 IndoRussian trade is also hampered by logistical challenges. Direct overland trade routes are complicated by the India–Pakistan rivalry. Other complications that impede trade and investment are: the narrow range of traded commodities of which raw materials constitute the largest percentage; inadequate access to commercial information; and a time-consuming Russian visa process for business travel (Financial Express 2007). At the April 2013 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Commission dealing with economic and trade issues, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry (p.209) Rogozin argued that the Indo-Russian military cooperation model of joint development and production should be imported to the civilian economic sector, noting: ‘We must strive to attain a much more substantial level of trade considering the traditionally friendly, very close relations between Russia and India. This can be achieved by not only joint industrial cooperation, but also joint industrial initiatives’ (quoted in Voice of Russia 2013). In order to ease the flow of trade, India is investigating the possibility of negotiating a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Community, of which Russia is a member (Voice of Russia 2013). These efforts are unlikely to show immediate results. Trade is clearly the weakest leg of the political/strategic–military–economic triad on which IndoRussian ties are built. Investment has presented another problem that has infected the cordiality of Indo-Russian ties. Using rupee debt repayment funds, Russia’s AFK Sistema teamed with Indian Shyam TeleServices (SSTL) to invest in the telecommunications market, winning twenty-two zonal 2G licences in 2008 from the Indian government. In early 2012, the Indian Supreme Court voided all 122 telecom licences awarded in 2008 (including all but one of SSTL’s), declaring the governmental allotment process ‘unconstitutional and arbitrary’, and noting that the licences were ‘virtually gifted away’ at great loss to the public exchequer (Times of India 2012a, 2012b). This turn of events greatly upset Russian officials, who demanded that the Indian government reverse the high court’s decision. According to Russian ambassador to India Alexander Kadakin, the Sistema matter was ‘political’ rather than ‘judicial’ and could therefore be settled if the government chose to do so. As one Indian commentator noted, Kadakin’s comments revealed a fundamental misreading of the Indian political system Page 14 of 26

India and Russia because, ‘unlike New Delhi, Moscow has a system of the executive advising the judiciary’ (Bansal 2012). In March 2013, SSTL won back in an auction eight of its twenty-one forfeited licences for $570 million, and chose to exit from the remaining zones (Reuters 2013). However, the political fallout from this episode may affect the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, which acquired the Siberian oil fields of Imperial Energy. According to R.S. Sharma, former head of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, ‘the way the Indian side has treated Sistema by cancelling its 2G licences will have a long-term impact on the way the Russians will treat Indian interests in the Imperial asset’ (Srivastava 2013). (p.210) Political-Strategic Issues

There is a convergence of worldviews between India and Russia on the desired contours of a post-bipolar world. India and Russia have similar regional interests, particularly in Afghanistan. The vexing issues are likely to be Indian wariness over cooperative Sino-Russian ties and Russian concerns over the warming Indo-US relationship. The Soviet Union/Russia has generally offered India strong diplomatic support on matters of key national interest, as illustrated in what follows. Kashmir

The unresolved Kashmir dispute is central to India’s rivalry with Pakistan and has been the catalyst of all but one of the India–Pakistan wars—that of December 1971 that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. This issue continues to roil relations between India and Pakistan, and the border dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir is the scene of frequent military clashes. As far as New Delhi is concerned, there is one major non-starter with regard to Kashmir— there will be no third-party mediation on the issue. India has consistently held that the Kashmir problem can only be solved bilaterally. India’s privileged place in the Soviet Union’s Asia policy began in the mid-1950s with Khrushchev’s unequivocal endorsement of New Delhi’s position on Kashmir in venues such as the United Nations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union cast vetoes on Kashmir-related resolutions in the UNSC; and in 1971, a Soviet veto kept a UNSC resolution calling for a ceasefire in the India– Pakistan war off the table until India felt ready to declare a unilateral ceasefire (Economic Weekly 1957; see also Donaldson 1979: 13). The 1965 war ended with the Soviet-brokered Tashkent Peace Agreement that committed both sides to a peaceful resolution of outstanding disagreements. After the 1971 India–Pakistan War, during which Soviet diplomatic and military support played a crucial role, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement committing both sides to a bilateral resolution of the Kashmir dispute, effectively ending the UN mediation role. The Soviet Union/Russia has, with few exceptions, demonstrated unstinting support for India on Kashmir. The exceptions occurred in the mid-1960s when Brezhnev sought to increase Soviet Page 15 of 26

India and Russia influence in South Asia by (p.211) proposing an Asian collective security system, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Gorbachev and later Yeltsin sought to pursue a balanced approach toward India and Pakistan. Neither effort received Indian support and both attempts were short-lived. Whether Russia’s support will continue depends on Moscow’s pragmatic assessment of India’s importance, particularly as regards its privileged arms relationship. But there is no doubt that the constancy of Russia’s support on the vital issue of Kashmir is regarded favourably in India, particularly in light of the perceived hostility of the UK and the US vis-à-vis the Indian position. The Nuclear Issue

Archival records demonstrate that the Soviet Union tried to discourage India from testing its ‘peaceful nuclear device’ in 1974 (Pokhran I), but refrained from public criticism of Indian action (Mastny 2010). Similarly, in 1998, when a chorus of international criticism greeted India’s nuclear weapons tests (Pokhran II), Russia’s Yeltsin merely expressed disappointment and refused to join with countries that subsequently imposed sanctions on India. But during 1992–3, Yeltsin’s government had displayed uncharacteristic indifference toward India when a strong pro-Western foreign policy orientation had resulted in the adoption of policy stances inimical to Indian interests. The first example was the curtailment of space cooperation with India because of American fears that it would contribute to India’s ballistic missile development programme. This led to the cancellation of the supply of cryogenic rocket engines and related technologies to assist in India’s outer space programme, though Moscow did fulfil existing contracts by supplying seven cryogenic engines. The second example was the application of the full range of safeguards to future nuclear supply agreements (Weitz 2012: 76–7). By the latter half of the 1990s, the relationship with India received renewed positive attention in Moscow. India and the Soviet Union had been signatories to the Integrated Long-Term Programme of Cooperation in Space and Technology established in 1987, which was renegotiated in 1992 and infused with new momentum in 2000 through a tenyear extension. Russian support for India in the area of nuclear energy has been strong. Shortly after Pokhran II, Russia signed an agreement to construct (p.212) two lightwater nuclear reactors in Kudankulam in south India. The first reactor (Unit 1) at Kudankulam came online in October 2013; the second reactor is close to completion, but the project was plagued by delays. Russian concerns over civil nuclear liability have hampered work on the construction of Units 3 and 4. The civil liability story is complex.12 In view of the international sanctions imposed on India after Pokhran II, the 1998 Russian decision to supply India with two nuclear reactors in the face of opposition from the Nuclear Suppliers Group represented a significant political victory for New Delhi. Russia demanded an exemption from any nuclear liability before proceeding with the Page 16 of 26

India and Russia project, and India gave such assurances in the absence of any domestic civil nuclear liability laws in the country.13 The signing and ratification of the US–India civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2007 ended the post–Pokhran II sanctions and opened the path for countries to negotiate civil nuclear deals with India. Moscow’s long-standing presence in India and its history of engagement in India’s nuclear energy programme since Soviet times allowed Russia to be the early beneficiary of the 2007 civil nuclear agreement. In January 2007, the two sides signed a memorandum of intent for the construction of additional nuclear power plant units at Kudankulam (Nadkarni 2010: 94). In the absence of liability legislation in India in 2007, Moscow asked for and received exemption from civil liability. The situation changed in August 2010 when the Indian Parliament passed civil nuclear liability legislation.14 As the contracts for Units 3 and 4 had not been inked, a group of Indian activists filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the exemptions. The Indian government claimed that in light of the new legal circumstances, the contracts for Units 3 and 4 would be subject to the liability law. Officials in New Delhi have indicated that the ‘three-year-long tussle over the modalities of the remaining two nuclear reactors’ at Kudankulam will soon be resolved with India paying more for the project in return for Russian compliance with the liability law (Jacob 2013). The Kudankulam project represents the first time when legislative acts and private citizen activism in India have complicated the Indo-Russian relationship. Terrorism

According to Indian officials, the armed insurgency in Kashmir that began in the late 1980s is aided and abetted by militant Islamic terrorist (p.213) organizations operating across the border in Pakistan, and supported by elements in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. Moscow, especially in light of Russia’s wars in Chechnya against Islamic insurgents, has been sympathetic to India’s plight. As early as 1994, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Moscow, and India and Russia signed the Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States calling attention to the problem of international terrorism. In 1997, after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan increased concerns in New Delhi and Moscow, Prime Minister Deve Gowda received personal assurance from President Yeltsin that Russia would not supply weapons to Pakistan. When he visited New Delhi in October 2000, President Putin assured Indian leaders of Russia’s support for India on issues of terrorism and both sides agreed to cooperate in supporting the opposition Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States spurred India and Russia to sign the 2001 Moscow Declaration on International Terrorism, which excoriated ‘violent actions being perpetrated under the slogan of self-determination’ that ‘in Page 17 of 26

India and Russia reality represent[ed] acts of terrorism’ (Nadkarni 2010: 85–95). In a 2002 speech in New Delhi, Putin expressed concern that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists, and he expressed regret that Pakistan had failed to reciprocate India’s gesture in according it ‘most favoured nation’ trade status (Jain 2003: 390). During his visit to New Delhi in 2009, President Medvedev repeated Moscow’s fear regarding nuclear weapons security in Pakistan. Troubled by Pakistan’s role in harbouring Islamic militants who were seen as largely responsible for the instability in Afghanistan, he noted that India and Russia had an interest in a ‘stable, prosperous, and moderate Afghanistan’. Prime Minister Singh added that both countries had agreed to work together to address the ‘grave challenges of terrorism and religious extremism’ in the region (Hindu 2009a). In 2003, India and Russia initiated joint military exercises code-named Indra to enhance cooperation and interoperability between their respective forces. Counterterrorism operations represented one facet of the Indra-2012 exercises held in Buryatia, which involved joint battle reconnaissance and simulated destruction of an illegal armed force. The joint Indra-2013 military exercises in India’s north-western state of Rajasthan were designed to emphasize counterterrorism and peacekeeping (Mahapatra 2013). Russia and India have shared concerns over terrorism, and both are concerned over the operation of militant (p.214) Islamic groups in Pakistan that could destabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan with grave consequences for South-Central Asian stability. UNSC Membership

Russia was one of the earliest countries to offer unequivocal support for India’s bid for permanent membership in the UNSC. In a New Delhi speech in 2004, President Putin declared: ‘India is our candidate number one in terms of enlarging the geographical representation of the Security Council’ (BBC News 2004). In 2009, President Medvedev reiterated Russia’s support for permanent Indian membership in an expanded UNSC, calling India ‘a deserving candidate’ (Hindu 2009b). While Indian officials have welcomed Russia’s support, Moscow has been unable to influence China’s leaders, without whose support India’s UNSC aspirations are unlikely to be met. The Pakistan Factor

Since 1979, developments in Afghanistan have influenced Soviet and later Russian policy toward Pakistan. The nature of Russia’s interaction with Pakistan in turn has affected the India–Russia nexus. New Delhi views warming Russia– Pakistan ties with wariness, and Russia is cautious about expanding ties with Pakistan for fear of losing its influence in India. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan was treated by the United States as a frontline state against the onslaught of Soviet communism. As a result, US arms

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India and Russia were funnelled through Pakistan to fund anti-Soviet mujahedin fighters, and Moscow’s relationship with Islamabad deteriorated. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 coincided with Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy and inaugurated a short period of warming ties with Pakistan. This cordial relationship continued in the early years of the newly founded Russian republic. Thereafter, when the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban took control of the Afghan government with Pakistan’s sponsorship and began destabilizing the former Soviet state of Tajikistan, Russia began supporting the opposition Northern Alliance, and ties with Pakistan again took a downward spiral. Russian officials have repeatedly called on Pakistan’s President Zardari to curb the clandestine backing of Central Asian jihadist groups (p.215) operating in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. United Nations diplomats have noted that these Central Asian groups are being aided and abetted by the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (BBC News 2012). The latter has been implicated in a series of terrorist attacks in India. The withdrawal of most US combat troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 has prompted Moscow to seek a better relationship with Islamabad based on the pragmatic recognition that the path to influence in Afghanistan runs through Islamabad. Russia has therefore made efforts to establish a more cooperative relationship with Pakistan. Such a move, however, has to consider Indian sensibilities, and runs the risk of undercutting Russia’s advantages attached to its decades-long friendship with India.

The Play of Individual, State, and System Levels As the foregoing analysis has shown, the Indo-Soviet relationship bore the strong imprint of decision-making choices in New Delhi. However, through its mediating influence, the bipolar international structure imposed its own logic on these choices with results that India’s early leaders perhaps did not anticipate. The Nehruvian trinity of socialism, secularism, and non-alignment coloured by idealism moved India gradually into the Soviet orbit, even though Nehru had hoped to maintain equidistance from the two superpowers while interacting amicably with both. Structural elements such as the US–Soviet Cold War rivalry and the emergence of China as a common enemy gave India’s non-alignment a distinctly Soviet colouring and provided the impetus for classic international balancing. Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a strong measure of realism entered Indian foreign policy thinking. Indira Gandhi believed that friendship with India was indispensable to the Soviet Union.15 She was able to obtain diplomatic and tangible economic and military assistance, particularly from the late 1970s until her death in October 1984, which occurred on the eve of important leadership changes in the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India and Soviet

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India and Russia leader Mikhail Gorbachev vainly tried to sustain the failing logic of the IndoSoviet relationship in the late 1980s. While decision-making and system-level variables continue to be salient, domestic-level factors have played and will likely continue to play a (p.216) larger role in the shaping of Indo-Russian ties. The influence of domestic-level variables has served both to buttress and weaken the relationship. As IndoSoviet interaction increased under the weight of external exigencies, strong proSoviet/Russian domestic constituencies emerged—particularly in the defence and foreign policy communities and later also in the business community, as exporters who benefited from the rupee–rouble arrangement developed a vested interest in ties with the Soviet Union. These entrenched domestic constituencies have created an all-party consensus in India on the value of ties with Russia that has persisted in the face of problems that have buffeted the India–Russia relationship. The SSTL and the civil nuclear liability episodes noted earlier demonstrate the budding salience of civic groups and judicial institutions in India in the bilateral relationship. New trends, such as the decision of the Ministry of Defence to open a small window for private industry to bid for indigenous weapons-building programmes, are likely to create interest groups that do not have ties to the Russian defence industry. Domestic constituencies—government and private— have begun to emerge that favour diversification in arms suppliers. Additionally, warming Indo-US ties and the expansion of trade and military links may, in time, generate new constituencies calling for strategic reorientations more suited to a rising power. These groups are so far inchoate and weak. But they presage a period when domestic (state-level) factors may play a greater role in defining the future trajectory of the India–Russia relationship than was the case earlier. However, given the current configuration of elite proclivities, domestic constituencies that favour Russia, and the strong defence partnership, the India–Russia relationship is unlikely to be derailed at least for the next decade or two. The Indo-Russian relationship that had initially come unmoored in the absence of the sure compass of the bipolar world was gradually reconstituted on a new footing. Antipathy toward the emerging unipolar world and American unilateralism triggered the initial Russian turn toward erstwhile partners in the east. India’s preference for a multipolar order made a convergence of interests at the macro level possible and rekindled the stagnating India–Russia relationship. At a policy level, (p.217) India’s growing appetite for weapons and Russia’s interest in rescuing its cash-strapped defence industry provided a synergy that both sides were eager to exploit.

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India and Russia The relationship, however, is founded on a pragmatic basis and lacks the deep strategic logic that had underpinned the Indo-Soviet nexus. Whereas the Soviet Union was willing for strategic reasons to offer arms and trade on attractive terms, the Indo-Russian arms and commercial trade is market-driven. Defence and trade and investment links are marred by disputes and recriminations on both sides. Despite efforts by both governments, Indo-Russian trade is struggling to reach the $20 billion benchmark that the two sides had established for 2015. Deepening Indo-American and Sino-Russian ties have the potential to weaken the Indo-Russian partnership in the long run. However, as long as India continues to be a major importer of Russian arms and remains important to Moscow as a hedge against a revisionist China, Russia is unlikely to jettison its long-standing friendship with India. On the Indian side, the deep-seated preference of the elite for autonomy, the heavy dependence on Russian arms, and the willingness of Moscow to enter into joint weapons production and development programmes provide New Delhi with a huge impetus toward sustaining Russian friendship. At the regional level, India and Russia are joined by a common interest in stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, unless the strategic environment changes radically (think an overtly revisionist China that will drive India into an American embrace; a tighter Russia–Pakistan nexus in the context of Moscow’s desire to influence Afghan developments; or a seamless Sino-Russian anti-American condominium), the Indo-Russian relationship is unlikely to wither on the vine. References Bibliography references: Anandan, S. 2013. ‘INS Vikramaditya sets sail for India’, Hindu, 27 November. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ins-vikramaditya-sets-sailfor-india/article5394676.ece (accessed 4 April 2015). (p.219) Bansal, R. 2012. ‘Putin visit: Krishna to Kudankulam on Indian agenda’, Indo-Asian News Service, 23 December. Available at: http://in.news.yahoo.com/ putin-visit-krishna-kudankulam-indian-agenda-131621942.html (accessed 4 April 2015). Baru, S. 2009. ‘The Influence of Business and Media on Indian Foreign Policy’, India Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 266–85. BBC News. 2004. ‘Putin Backs India’s UN Seat Bid’, 4 December. Available at: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/4069453.stm (accessed 4 April 2015).

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India and Russia ———. 2012. ‘Russia and China eye role in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 6 June. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18342888 (accessed 4 April 2015). Chaulia, S.S. 2002. ‘BJP, India’s Foreign Policy, and the “Realist Alternative” to the Nehruvian Tradition’, International Politics, vol. 39, pp. 215–34. Cohen, S. 2001. India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press). Donaldson, R.H. 1979. The Soviet–Indian Alignment: Quest for Influence, Monograph Series in World Affairs vol. 16, Books 3 and 4 (Denver: University of Denver). Economic Weekly. 1957. ‘Soviet Veto on Kashmir’, 30 November. Available at: http://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1957_9/48/soviet_veto_on_kashmir.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). Economist. 2013. ‘India as a Great Power: Know Your Own Strength’, 30 March. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poisedbecome-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end (accessed 4 April 2015). Financial Express. 2007. ‘India Likely to Push Economic Agenda in Russia’, 11 November. Ghosh, P. and R. Pandey. 1983. ‘Domestic Support for Mrs. Gandhi’s Afghan Policy: The Soviet Factor in Indian Politics’, Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 261– 79. Goldman, M. 1965. ‘A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 349–60. Hindu. 2009a. ‘Russia Joins India in Asking Pak to Punish 26/11 Perpetrators’, 7 December. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/russia-joinsindia-in-asking-pak-to-punish-2611-perpetrators/article61584.ece? ref=relatedNews (accessed 4 April 2015). ———. 2009b. ‘Russia Supports India’s Claim for Permanent UNSC Seat’, Hindu, 7 December. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/russiasupports-indias-claim-for-permanent-unsc-seat/article61516.ece? ref=relatedNews (accessed 4 April 2015). Jacob, J. 2013. ‘India, Russia Close to Deal on Remaining N-reactors’, Hindustan Times, 8 April. Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/ NewDelhi/India-Russia-close-to-deal-on-remaining-N-reactors/ Article1-1039004.aspx (p.220) (accessed 4 April 2015).

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India and Russia Jain, B.M. 2003. ‘India and Russia: Reassessing Time-Tested Ties’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 375–97. Kapur, D. 2009. ‘Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy’, India Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 286–305. Mahapatra, D.A. 2013. ‘Indra-2013 to Aid India–Russia Anti-terror Cooperation’, Russia & India Report, 8 September. Available at: http://indrus.in/economics/ 2013/09/08/indra-2013_to_aid_india-russia_anti-terror_cooperation_29187.html (accessed 4 April 2015). Mastny, V. 2010. ‘The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 50–90. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 2010. ‘Joint Statement: Celebrating a Decade of the India–Russian Federation Strategic Partnership and Looking Ahead’, Government of India, 21 December. Available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/5118/

Joint+Statement+Celebrating+a+Decade+of+the+India+Russian+Federation+Strategic+Partn (accessed 3 April 2015). ———. 2013a. ‘India–Russia Relations’, Country Brief, Government of India, July. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Russia_Relations.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). ———. 2013b. ‘India–China Relations’, Country Brief, Government of India, August. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IndiaChina_Relations.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). Miller, M.C. 2013. ‘India’s Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 14–19. Nadkarni, V. 2010. Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (London: Routledge). North, A. 2011. ‘India and China, the New Great Game’, BBC News, 12 December. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16149397 (accessed 4 April 2015). Patil, K. and G. Balachandran. 2012. ‘Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and Civil Nuclear Liability’, Issue Brief, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, 9 November. Available at: http://idsa.in/issuebrief/ KudankulamNuclearPowerPlantandCivilNuclearLiability_BalachandranPatil_091112 (accessed 4 April 2015).

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India and Russia Reuters. 2013. ‘Sistema India Phone unit Q2 Loss Narrows’, 26 August. Available at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/sistema-india-resultsidINDEE97P05920130826 (accessed 4 April 2015). Reutov, A., Sergei Strokan, Ivan Safronov, Jr., and Yelena Kiselyova. 2011. ‘MiG’s Moment of Misfortune’, Kommersant, 29 April, in Current Digest of the Russian Press, vol. 63, no. 17. (p.221) The Hindu Business Line. 2013. ‘Russia Remains Key Arms Supplier to India, says Official’, 5 February. Available at: http:// www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/russia-remains-key-arms-supplier-to-indiasays-official/article4382418.ece (accessed 10 May 2015). Shukla, A. 2013. ‘US Offers to Co-develop New Javelin Missile with India’, Business Standard, 17 September. Available at: http://www.businessstandard.com/article/current-affairs/us-offers-to-co-develop-new-javelin-missilewith-india-113091600624_1.html (accessed 4 April 2015). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2013. SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Summary. Available at: http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/ SIPRIYB13Summary.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). Srivastava, S. 2013. ‘ONGC Videsh’s Operations in Russia May Have to Pay for Sistema’s Woes’, Economic Times, 1 August. Available at: http:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-01/news/40963304_1_imperialenergy-sistema-shyam-teleservices-bashneft (accessed 4 April 2015). Stanislaus, M.S. 1975. Soviet Economic Aid to India: An Analysis and Evaluation (New Delhi: N.V. Publications). Times of India. 2012a. ‘2G Scam: SC Scraps 122 Licences Granted under Raja’s Tenure’, 2 February. Available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2012-02-02/india/31016262_1_spectrum-licences-2g-spectrum-allotment-case (accessed 4 April 2015). ———. 2012b. ‘2G Verdict: A. Raja “virtually gifted away important national asset”, says Supreme Court’, 2 February. Available at: http:// articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-02/india/31016547_1_2g-raja-swantelecom (accessed 4 April 2015). Voice of Russia. 2013. ‘India and Russia on the Path to Free Trade Zone’, 30 April. Available at: http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_04_30/India-and-Russia-on-thepath-to-free-trade-zone/ (accessed 4 April 2015). Weitz, R. 2012. ‘The Maturing of Russia–India Defence Relations’, Journal of Defence Studies, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 83–9. Available at: http://idsa.in/system/files/ jds_6_3_RichardWeitz.pdf (accessed 4 April 2015). (p.222) Page 24 of 26

India and Russia Notes:

(1.) For details on India’s relationship with the United States, see Devin Hagerty’s chapter in this volume. (2.) On the argument that India’s foreign policy decision-making is individualistic, see Miller (2013). (3.) In his account of India’s foreign policy, South Asia scholar Stephen Cohen (2001: 41) refers to this phase as that of ‘militant Nehruvianism’. (4.) For further details on the India–China relationship, see Manjeet Pardesi’s chapter in this volume. (5.) For details on this war, see US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘The India–Pakistan War of 1965’. Available at: http://history.state.gov/ milestones/1961-1968/IndiaPakistanWar (accessed 4 April 2015). (6.) A key security clause in this treaty required each party to come to the defence of the other in case of an armed attack by a third party. (7.) For further details on the India–Pakistan relationship, see Rajesh Basrur’s chapter in this volume. (8.) Russia’s support of India’s aspirations to become a major world power in the twenty-first century is indicated by Moscow’s willingness to stand by India on key matters of interest to New Delhi. While US support of India’s great power aspirations is often accompanied by pressure on New Delhi to support Western positions, for instance on Iran and Syria, Moscow has generally refrained from seeking to influence India on issues affecting New Delhi’s relations with third countries. India’s staunch diplomatic support of Russia during the 2013–14 crisis in Ukraine reflects the continued overall strength and salience of the bilateral relationship. (9.) Data compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfers Database. (10.) See trade data in Nadkarni (2010: 101). (11.) When Putin became president in 2000, Russian media wags said that PUTIN was an acronym for Planes, Uranium, Tanks, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power. See Weitz (2012: 78). Putin’s strong push for a strategic partnership agreement with India was motivated in part by the desire to maintain and enhance Indo-Russian defence ties. (12.) This account draws on the detailed history and documentation provided in Patil and Balachandran (2012).

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India and Russia (13.) Russian support in 1998 was also urgent in another matter—the ensured supply of enriched uranium for the already operating nuclear reactors in Tarapur in view of the fact that all other suppliers had boycotted India in light of the international sanctions imposed after Pokhran II. (14.) According to experts, the Indian civil liability law far exceeds the specified liabilities in any other country, and has prevented the signing of contracts with any international supplier. See the discussion in Patil and Balachandran (2012). (15.) For the argument that the Soviet–Indian influence relationship was lopsided in India’s favour, see Donaldson (1979).

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India and the United Kingdom between India and the UK. Yet, this chapter argues that bilateral relations between India and the UK have frequently worked well. The UK is receptive to India’s soft power, and vice versa, given long-standing cultural connections between the countries.1 Interests at the national level in the two countries are often complementary. The chapter also shows that individual actors have at times contributed to effective cooperation between the states. That said, there have been moments of sharp tension between India and the UK, yet relations between the two states are constructive if not exactly intimate. The evolution of relations between India and the UK can be divided into three periods: 1947–65, 1965–91, and the period after 1991. The (p.226) transition between each period was not marked by a sharp critical juncture (in contrast to other cases in this volume, such as Germany). However, there was a qualitative difference in relations between each period. The period immediately after 1947 was marked by uncertainty about the nature of relations between India and Britain. While the transfer of power was not hastened by a war of national liberation, the British had repressed Indian nationalists quite severely during the protracted struggle for independence. As it turned out, relations between India and Britain proved to be cordial, with India’s nationalist elite adopting a conciliatory attitude from 1947 onwards. This was epitomized in India’s commitment to join the Commonwealth of current and former colonies in 1949. The onset of the Cold War did introduce some complications into the relationship, but close inspection of the record reveals that close relations between the UK and the United States (US) did not prevent India from working constructively with the UK. The ties between India and the UK began to loosen in the mid-1960s. In 1965, the position taken by the UK during the Indo-Pakistan war was resented by India. This did not lead to a sharp deterioration in relations, but it was around this time that India began to turn towards the Soviet Union for material support, and Britain ceased to be a leading supplier of arms. The trade relationship between India and Britain continued to weaken. India’s lean towards the Soviet Union in the 1970s revealed a divergence in wider strategic ambitions, though this did not alienate Britain. Relations between some leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi, were warm and occasional large arms contracts added commercial interest to strong cultural links between the two states. India’s economic opening in 1991 created an incentive for both states to look for closer ties with each other. The UK proved to be a valuable source of investment funds, and both parties recognized that trade relations could only be improved. Once again, this was not a sharp disjuncture, as relations between the two states were not held hostage by the Cold War, but it was recognized that more could be done to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. The first part of the chapter will set out the historical context of the relationship between 1947 and 1965, a period in which India made it clear that close relations with the UK would continue. Among other things, the impact of Page 2 of 18

India and the United Kingdom individual actors is assessed. The second section of the chapter covers the phase between 1965 and 1991. It is in this period (p.227) that the impact of longerterm systemic changes became more obvious. The third section of the chapter reviews developments after the end of the Cold War. This important systemic change facilitated cooperation between India and the UK. The position of the UK as a middle power firmly allied to other western states did not present an obstacle in the way of India’s trajectory as a rising power. While changes at the national level also created imperatives for closer cooperation, some national considerations have complicated the relationship between India and the UK. Throughout the chapter, I argue that the UK and India have maintained effective relations in spite of systemic pressures. I conclude by arguing that India and the UK are now placed quite differently in systemic terms. This has helped the two states achieve a new balance in their bilateral relationship.

Historical Context India’s position towards the UK in 1947 was an ambiguous one. India experienced only limited economic growth under colonial rule, and the charge of neglect was a central part of Indian nationalist propaganda against the British Raj (Nehru 1981: 49). Many Indian politicians had been exposed personally to the repressive side of the colonial regime. The continuance of British imperial rule in other regions of the world was reflexively opposed by senior Indian nationalist politicians. Jawaharlal Nehru was of the view that India should form an independent foreign and defence policy.2 This ruled India out of schemes for imperial defence that some British officials had in mind. Yet the transfer of power was conceded by negotiation after the end of the Second World War. Personal factors also helped the rapprochement between India and the UK. Some British politicians had supported the nationalist movement and established good relations with Congress leaders before 1947. Nehru thought constructive relations with Britain could still be established. Some senior bureaucrats and military officers, who began their careers with the Raj, felt India should remain close to Britain.3 A number of elite figures completed parts of their education in Britain, and developed important personal connections.4 Harold Laski at the London School of Economics did much to build links between Indian nationalists and the Labour Party in the 1930s and 1940s (Moscovitch 2012). One of his notable students, V.K. Krishna Menon, the first high (p.228) commissioner in London and later minister of defence, continued to be favourably inclined to Britain as his political career developed. He advocated close links and cooperation with Britain on international issues as far as possible (Brecher 1974: 65, 81). Shortly after independence was achieved in 1947, Prime Minister Nehru advocated joining the Commonwealth. The suggestion was a controversial one. Opposition parties, including the Congress Socialists and the Communists, argued that the British Commonwealth embodied western interests and was still associated with colonial rule. Therefore, membership would be contrary to Page 3 of 18

India and the United Kingdom India’s plan for a non-aligned foreign policy (Brecher 1974: 64–5). Senior Congress leaders took the view that India would lose more if it remained outside. At an uncertain moment in international politics, India risked isolation and relations with Britain would be damaged by avoidance of the Commonwealth. More positively, it was judged that Commonwealth membership would provide useful support for India in a rapidly changing world. Furthermore, Pakistan was eager to join the Commonwealth and would in all likelihood use the forum to present its complaints against India (Brecher 1974: 63, 70, 71). Nehru and other policymakers felt India could join the Commonwealth and preserve their policymaking autonomy. The appearance of joining an ‘imperial club’ was diminished by India’s insistence that, unlike other members, it would not accept the British monarch as head of state, and instead it would join the Commonwealth as a republic. India persuaded British officials and diplomats from other Commonwealth states to change the rules of association. India ratified this agreement in 1949, and joined the Commonwealth as a republic when the new constitution came into force on 26 January 1950 (Brecher 1974: 78–9). The economies of Britain and India had important financial, commercial, and trade links in the 1940s. Colonial prerogatives did shape India’s economy, but India was not dependent on the UK economy in 1947. Nevertheless, India’s new elite were keen to achieve new national economic objectives which entailed changes in international economic links. National control of foreign currency transactions required looser ties with London, and the repatriation of Indian government assets held in the UK. During the Second World War, the UK government agreed to reimburse some of the costs of fighting the war that were incurred by the Government of India. These funds were not immediately (p. 229) transferred to India and remained as a substantial ‘sterling balance’ of £1,300 million held in London in 1947. To avoid undermining Britain’s precarious balance of payments in 1947, an agreement was negotiated whereby the balances were returned in instalments over the course of nearly ten years (Tomlinson 1993: 182). British businesses in India had to adapt to a new environment after 1947. The companies run by British expatriates were already contracting before 1947, as they faced strong competition from Indian-owned businesses in sectors such as jute. These firms faded out from the late 1940s onwards, with many being taken over by their Indian competitors (Tomlinson 1989). The subsidiaries of British multinational corporations had more viable businesses, and some have kept a continuous presence in India’s corporate sector. Other British subsidiaries were less successful but still remained part of the Indian economy for several decades after 1947. Even in 1975, the largest of the British companies accounted for twenty-one out of the thirty-six foreign-owned companies with assets over Rs 10 crore (Rs 100 million). The Government of India was anxious to avoid the dominance of foreign capital, and from the 1960s onwards kept quite tight Page 4 of 18

India and the United Kingdom control on the activities of overseas companies. British subsidiaries faced keen competition from Indian-owned concerns, which responded to the limits of planned development by diversifying into new areas of activity. British companies were generally less innovative, and by the end of the 1970s other overseas entrants were better able to find new markets (Tomlinson 1989: 101– 5). The British government provided overseas development assistance to India over a long period. Some resources were channelled through the Colombo Plan, and Britain also contributed to the costs of the early Five Year Plans, assistance which was later formalized in the Aid to India Consortium (Brecher 1974: 82). India often received the largest proportion of the UK aid budget, though in absolute terms the amounts were always relatively small. Other donors, including the US, the USSR, and Western Germany could afford to contribute more generously (Ward 1961: 449–50). Doubts were expressed about the efficacy of British aid, as the poverty impact was not always rigorously assessed (Lipton 1996: 482–3). The linking of aid to purchases from UK firms was another issue of concern to those advocating more careful aid expenditure.5 While relations between India and the UK were generally positive in the immediate period after 1947, the issue of Kashmir was a source (p.230) of difficulty. The UK wanted to have close relations with both Pakistan and India, and it was thought that this would become easier if the Kashmir dispute could be brought to a permanent resolution (Colman 2009: 477). When the issue was discussed in the United Nations Security Council, the UK did not automatically support India’s position. The US and Britain worked together on various resolutions which proposed mediation and demilitarization (Brecher 1953: 196, 203). In 1957, the UK voted for three Security Council resolutions, mandating further UN involvement in the Kashmir dispute. India did not welcome these interventions and Nehru made his objections very clear to Prime Minister Harold MacMillan (Gopal 1984: 48). In the early 1960s, Britain offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, an offer which again was not welcomed by New Delhi (Hewitt and Wickham-Jones 2000: 203–4). In spite of the differences over Kashmir, India and the UK continued to work together, cooperating closely on various international initiatives until the mid-1950s (Brecher 1974: 82). The UK also encouraged and helped India to develop its relationship with the US in this period (Gopal 1984: 40). The decision by the British to use force to resolve their disagreement with Egypt over the status of the Suez Canal disrupted the early trust between India and the UK. After the Suez Canal was nationalized by Egypt, Nehru tried to mediate and produce a diplomatic solution. India strongly condemned the intervention by the armed forces of the UK, France, and Israel in October and November 1956. Many in India thought the actions of the UK were those of a reactionary imperial power, and some thought India should withdraw from the Commonwealth. The Page 5 of 18

India and the United Kingdom UK government resented India’s strident criticism, even though the military action was not universally supported in Britain (Brown 2003: 262–3). However, relations between India and the UK did not break down. Nehru was very clear that India should remain in the Commonwealth, in spite of further provocations in 1957 from UK activity on the Kashmir issue in the UN (Gopal 1984: 48–52). The UK government continued to supply arms to India, as indeed it had done since 1947. The Indian armed forces had made wide use of British equipment in the 1940s, and on grounds of efficiency it made sense to continue buying British weapons, though India looked to other suppliers as well (Chari 1979: 231). In 1962, the UK supported India during the confrontation with China over its northern borders. The UK provided (p.231) moral support and airlifted military supplies once hostilities had broken out (Maxwell 1972: 419–20). The 1962 war with China resulted in policy changes in India, and modernization of the armed forces became an Indian priority. The US and the UK made some effort to draw India closer to the west at this point, offering military assistance and access to advanced technology (Gopal 1984: 252). However, some the items on offer were expensive, and both the US and the UK linked arms transfers to the reopening of talks on Kashmir with Pakistan (Maxwell 1972: 420). For its part, the Government of India was keen to manufacture material under licence and diversify its range of suppliers. The Soviet Union offered India better terms and was more flexible when it came to selling India advanced technology (Chari 1979: 231–4). Thus, in the mid-1960s British firms lost markets for jet aircraft and naval vessels.

The Loosening of Ties between India and Britain, 1965–91 The UK was severely tested by the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Initially the UK government managed to satisfy both sides as it mediated the dispute over the Rann of Kutch that preceded the full scale war. On 6 September, India retaliated against the earlier infiltration of Kashmir by Pakistan, launching an attack across the border in the Punjab region. Harold Wilson, the UK prime minister, condemned this Indian ‘aggression’ and immediately alienated India, which considered itself the wronged party. The events of September 1965 further demonstrated how the UK was torn between India and Pakistan. In May 1967, Indira Gandhi complained that Britain was using Pakistan to keep India in check. As Colman (2009: 477) concludes, this may have been an overstatement, but it did reveal that the Wilson government was not ready to tilt towards India on the Kashmir issue. A systemic shift in relations between states during the Cold War had consequences for relations between India and the UK. Most importantly, the systemic changes resulted in a decline in the UK’s standing as a world power. As we shall see later, this offered some advantages for advocates of close ties, as the UK was much less likely to come into direct competition with India. The rise of the US to global prominence became very obvious with the onset of the Cold Page 6 of 18

India and the United Kingdom War. The UK was (p.232) generally comfortable with the international leadership offered by the US. Foreign policy makers in London felt very close relations with the US were in the national interest and tended to be very responsive to American requests, and this had an impact on India’s view of the UK during the Cold War. In general, it meant that the UK was firmly identified as being in the western bloc. In a number of specific ways, this created tension with India. As noted earlier, the issue of Kashmir was seen as an impediment to the UK’s ambition for good relations with India and Pakistan. Stability in South Asia was seen in the UK as helping the western cause in the Cold War. The UK slotted into alliances led by the US, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. These larger geopolitical considerations pulled the UK closer to Pakistan than India wished. The UK decided in 1968 to run down its military presence in the Indian Ocean (Vivekanandan 1975: 61). The subsequent withdrawal of British forces from the region removed a potential source of rivalry with India. Yet the British continued to control of the Chagos Archipelago, a cluster of small islands several hundred miles due south of the Maldives. In 1966, the atoll was assigned to the US for eventual use as a military base, and the residents of the main island of Diego Garcia were removed from the island by the UK government. The UK felt it was in its interests to encourage a greater US naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The Government of India took a contrary view, and expressed its strong opposition to the development of the Diego Garcia military facilities in the early 1970s (Vivekanandan 1975: 65–9). The UK government did not always follow the lead of the US when it came to India. So, for example, when the US put pressure on India in the mid-1960s to adopt economic reform, a key policy favoured by the US was devaluation of the rupee. The World Bank outlined a detailed set of policies and encouraged the Government of India to undertake reform. British officials dissented from the devaluation advocated by the World Bank, seeing considerable risks in the proposal. The Bank of England gave India policy advice between 1963 and 1966, and the UK government declined to support the International Monetary Fund policy on Indian devaluation in 1966 (Revi 2008: 202–6). The relationship between Britain and India has partly been mediated by the World Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The BBC World Service has long broadcast radio programmes to India, (p.233) and its Delhi bureau coordinates coverage of India for other services of the BBC. In the late 1960s, there was a growing feeling among some Indian policymakers and legislators that the BBC had been overly critical of India. These critics took particular exception to a documentary film on Calcutta screened by the BBC in June 1970. The Government of India subsequently decided to expel the BBC for a period. The political logic was clear; namely, that a government leaning towards the Soviet Union resented the interference of a foreign broadcaster, and standing up to a representative of the former colonial power was thought to be a Page 7 of 18

India and the United Kingdom popular action. Yet the decision was cogently criticized by some opposition politicians and sections of the print media who felt it was an inappropriate action for a democratic government to take (Pinkerton 2008: 545–7). India’s lean towards the Soviet Union, made clear in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, altered the systemic context in which relations with the UK were maintained. It became clear how much India and the UK had diverged on geopolitical issues. Areas of disagreement included such wider political questions as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. This Cold War context prompted one commentator to suggest that cooperation was more likely in ‘sectors of ‘low politics’ such as trade, aid and cultural relations’, rather than in the high politics of security (Barber 1986). In spite of different ways of viewing world politics, India and the UK continued to interact fairly closely on practical issues. The UK regarded India as a friendly power in the Indian Ocean region and continued to supply overseas aid. The 1975 Emergency did not prove to be a major obstacle in relations. One senior member of the Labour government argued for an ‘imaginative understanding’ of the Emergency (Frank 2001: 384). India still considered the UK to be a useful supplier of some military hardware, and so the trade in arms between the two states continued, though the UK was not a leading supplier of arms to the Indian military. India mattered more to the UK than vice versa, being the largest purchaser of British arms exports in the developing world between 1964 and 1997 (Phythian 2000: 28). Notable deals during that period included the sale of jet aircraft (Sea Harriers and the AngloFrench Jaguar) and the aircraft carrier INS Viraat. After the efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to assist India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, the UK adjusted its policy and took the view that the issue should be resolved in bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. (p.234) Mrs Thatcher was careful not to raise the issue while she was prime minister between 1979 and 1990. When asked in 1983 about a possible plebiscite in Kashmir, Thatcher brusquely told the House of Commons, ‘I did not talk with Mrs. Gandhi about a plebiscite in Kashmir,’ moving on to other questions about the just-concluded Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi.6 In some respects, relations improved between India and the UK during the 1980s, with various visits exchanged between heads of government. The Punjab crisis did create some difficulty as British Sikhs gave vocal support to the Khalistan cause, and the Government of India demanded stern action (which the UK was unable to take in the absence of evidence indicating material support for terrorist activity) (Barber 1986: 133–4). Margaret Thatcher’s premiership gave a particular twist to relations with India, and illustrates how personal factors have had some influence on relations between India and the UK. Her introduction to India occurred when she was still leader of the opposition. Thatcher struck up a good relationship with Indira Gandhi on a visit to India in September 1976, taking an indulgent view of the Page 8 of 18

India and the United Kingdom Emergency measures then in place (Frank 2001: 384). When in government, Thatcher was an enthusiastic advocate of British arms exports, and it was observed at the time that increases in British overseas aid correlated strongly with anticipated arms purchases (Phythian 2000: 178). India continued to buy British arms and received an increase in UK aid. Thatcher also took a singular approach to Commonwealth affairs, and was not willing to yield on the question of sanctions against South Africa. Rajiv Gandhi also held clear personal views on the same issue. He represented the view of the majority of Commonwealth leaders and expressed very strong disagreement with the UK over South Africa on several occasions in the late 1980s (Nugent 1990: 87).

Convergence of Interests at the National Level since 1991 The economic reforms set out by Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in 1991 created more space for interaction between India and the UK. John Major’s Conservative government was anxious to develop economic links with India, and a flurry of ministerial visits took place in 1992. This was followed by a prime ministerial visit to New Delhi in January (p.235) 1993 with a strong emphasis on building business links and encouraging trade (Dutt 1999: 333–5). At the systemic level, relations between India and the UK began to work in a changed context. The dissolution of the Soviet Union encouraged Indian diplomats to reassess their world view and take a more pragmatic approach towards the US and its Cold War allies (Kapur and Ganguly 2007: 647–8). In these new circumstances, closer economic links with the UK seemed both logical and desirable. In practice it has not been that easy to develop the economic facet of relations between India and the UK. Trade between the two countries is modest, and it has increased since the renewed round of economic diplomacy in the early 1990s. Even so, the latest data for 2013 showed that the UK received 3.1 per cent of India’s exports, at the same time as the UK accounted for just 1.5 per cent of India’s imports.7 While the trend has shifted gently upwards since the early 1990s, the long term trend since 1947 is sharply down. In 1948, India received 6.1 per cent of UK exports and provided 4.8 per cent of UK imports. In 2011, India provided just 1.3 per cent of UK imports and received 1.7 per cent of UK exports (House of Commons 2012: 7). Britain has struggled to maintain its position as an exporter to India; it ranked behind other European states (namely, Switzerland, Belgium, and Germany) in 2013 data provided by India’s Department of Commerce. The investment relationship between India and the UK is in many ways more significant. Reforms since 1991 have made it easier for UK companies to access India’s ‘emerging market’, and numerous joint ventures have been launched. Subsidiaries of UK companies with a long-standing presence in India have been able to expand their operations. Indian companies with sufficient capital have found it easier to extend their overseas operations, and the permissive financial regime in the UK has made it an attractive location for some Indian businesses Page 9 of 18

India and the United Kingdom to use as a base. Lakshmi Mittal manages his steel conglomerate in London, while Vedanta Resources has its headquarters in London and is listed on the London Stock Exchange. The UK has been a leading investor in India in recent years, with major companies like Unilever and GlaxoSmithKline investing in Indian subsidiaries. Other companies such as Vodafone have spent large sums acquiring Indian companies or buying out joint ventures. Between 2009 and 2013, the UK and Singapore were jointly positioned as the largest investors in India, each with an 11 per cent (p.236) share.8 Indian companies have made significant investments in the UK as well. The combined purchases of the steel maker Corus and Jaguar-Landrover have made Tata the largest private sector employer in the UK. While the UK has generally taken a passive position on Kashmir in recent decades, it has still become a point of tension from time to time. Responding to pressure from within his party, Robin Cook, the new foreign secretary of the incoming Labour government in 1997, reviewed the UK government policy on Kashmir. In October 1997, Cook offered to mediate between Pakistan and India. A few days earlier a junior minister in the Foreign Office, Derek Fatchett, had suggested that a referendum might be used to decide the future of Kashmir (Hewitt and Wickham-Jones 2000: 201, 213–15). Neither of these suggestions was palatable to New Delhi, and official displeasure was registered so strongly that Prime Minister Tony Blair quickly reversed UK policy to one of favouring a bilateral solution. In January 2009, another Labour foreign secretary, David Miliband, caused a minor stir by suggesting that the resolution of the Kashmir dispute would eliminate a cause of extremist violence in South Asia. The comments, which were made not long after the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai, were regarding as insensitive and an intrusion into India’s internal affairs (Merrick 2009). These stray incidents have encouraged some Indian commentators to express low opinions of the contemporary Labour Party, arguing that it has failed to appreciate India’s concerns (Dutt 1999: 336). The actual record reveals a relationship that moved forward in a business-like way between 1997 and 2010 while Labour governed. In September 2004, Manmohan Singh and Tony Blair signed an agreement establishing a strategic partnership between India and the UK. Both parties agreed to act together to counter terrorism. The agreement set out an agenda for future cooperation in civilian nuclear, space technology, and high technology trade. The agreement also specified regular meetings between senior officials of both countries (Khare 2004). Education and research cooperation has stepped up significantly since 2004. Tony Blair made clear UK’s support for a permanent seat for India on the UN Security Council in 2004. Prime Minister Gordon Brown reiterated this view when he visited New Delhi in January 2008. Labour also gave strong support to UK overseas aid to India. The programme was refocused on poverty alleviation and concentrated on a small number of states in (p.237) India. India regularly received the largest amount Page 10 of 18

India and the United Kingdom spent by the UK on a single country in the 2000s. India re-evaluated its policy, announcing in 2003 that it would reduce significantly the number of states it would receive assistance from, and increasing its own expenditure on overseas aid (Price 2004). Britain continued as a favoured partner even though it became increasingly clear that some senior Indian officials were not enthusiastic about the UK aid programme. In November 2012, it was announced that the UK aid programme would cease by 2015, with some limited technical assistance to continue after that date (Suroor 2012). The UK and India have defence agreements, though they have a low profile. Joint naval exercises have been under way since 2004, and small army units have taken turns to visit Indian and British training facilities since 2008. The Government of India would like to carry out joint development of defence technology with UK suppliers. This would move India beyond the licensed manufacture of imported weapons system. At present the cooperation is modest, such as joint research into unmanned aerial vehicles (Ministry of Defence 2011). Larger projects, such as joint development of nuclear submarines, remain an aspiration (Menon 2012: 79–80). The historical links between India and the UK have encouraged migration between the two countries. The 2012 Labour Force Survey estimated 700,000 UK residents were born in India (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2013: 6). The size of the Indian diaspora is considerably larger when family members born in the UK are taken into consideration. One estimate suggests the overall figure lies between 1.5 and 2 million (Ministry of External Affairs 2012: 4). The number of British citizens living in India was estimated to be 32,000 in 2006, with the numbers probably on an upward trend as global business links intensify, and some return migration has been undertaken by members of the diaspora (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006). In addition to permanent residents in the UK, Indian professionals are granted temporary work permits. These workers pay social security contributions, but cannot access the full benefits available to permanent residents, an anomaly the Government of India would like the UK to resolve (Singh 2012: 13). The Indian diaspora in the UK have not had cause to lobby on India’s behalf in the same way as US citizens of Indian origin intervened in support of the India–US nuclear deal. Yet the Indian diaspora have been politically active and quietly encouraging UK policymakers to look (p.238) towards India. British citizens of Indian origin have tended to support the Labour Party, though the Conservative Party has pitched strongly for those votes as well (appealing to the aspirations of upwardly mobile migrants). The Labour Party has had the support of a number of very wealthy donors and numerous activists with connections to India. Cultural ties between India and the UK have developed in new and interesting ways in the last two decades. Writers from India and Britain have a following in each country. A number of writers divide their time between the two countries. Page 11 of 18

India and the United Kingdom The Jaipur Literary Festival has become an important meeting place for writers, readers, and publishers (Dalrymple 2012). The BBC World Service continues to broadcast to India. Since the 1990s, satellite broadcasting has made some BBC television output accessible to Indian audiences. The BBC World Service is a curious institution, in that it was funded for a very long time by the British Foreign Office but has always made strong claims for its editorial independence. The BBC is also a powerful example of soft power at work as it strikes up a close relationship with its listeners and subtly promotes British values (Hanks 2007). The relationship between India and the BBC can be said to be a microcosm of the larger relationship between the two states. The BBC has a loyal audience for its output in India. The former BBC correspondent Mark Tully, who began working in India in 1965, has been recognized as a firm friend of India, being awarded the Padma Bhushan in 2005. The BBC also has its opponents in India. Critics see it as a remnant of an old imperial relationship (Pinkerton and Dodds 2009: 23). Editorial lapses and journalistic errors by the BBC have not gone unnoticed by the Indian print media. Satellite has also enabled Indian broadcasters to access markets for their products in the UK. Zee TV is easily accessible in the UK, and several other channels provide Indian film and music offerings to customers in the UK. The depth of cultural ties between the two countries is unusual, and this adds an important non-state element to relations. National considerations within the UK have had an impact on very recent relations with India, and have disrupted the impact of personal factors on UK policy. The current prime minister David Cameron has taken close interest in UK policy towards India. His first overseas visit as leader of the opposition was to India in 2006. When the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition was formed after the 2010 general elections, David Cameron declared that he wanted a new ‘special relationship’ (p.239) with India. Some of his supporters claimed that India had been overlooked by the UK and ‘a certain lassitude had crept into the relationship’ (Johnson and Kumar 2012: 17–18). To indicate the seriousness of his intentions, Cameron has made three official visits to India as prime minister. The first visit came very soon after Cameron became prime minister, and the importance of the visit was underlined by the large delegation that accompanied him, including six cabinet ministers and nearly 60 senior business leaders. Cameron took the bold step of tilting UK policy towards India by denouncing Pakistan’s ‘export’ of terrorism in the most outspoken terms while speaking in Bengaluru on 28 July 2010. David Cameron visited India twice in 2013, on both occasions keeping economic issues to the fore. On the last visit in November 2013, Cameron announced the appointment of one of his backbench members of Parliament (MPs) to the new post of UK Indian Diaspora Champion. On 16 May 2014, Cameron was very quick to congratulate Narendra Modi on the Bharatiya Janata Party’s impending victory, and invite him to visit the UK. Despite all of this effort, Cameron has struggled to overcome domestic obstacles to deepening relations. The hostility of many in the Conservative Party to a liberal policy on Page 12 of 18

India and the United Kingdom migration has caused difficulties. An embarrassing proposal to require visitors to the UK from various countries, including India, to post bonds was dropped after the Liberal Democrats, the junior partners in Cameron’s coalition, objected. Travelling to the UK is not as easy as it might be. In spite of official denials, students from India are finding it more difficult to study in the UK as visa rules have been tightened. The Conservative Party promised to increase the UK aid overseas budget in its 2010 election manifesto. The pledge was a curious one, given the recession in the economy and the large budget deficit being run by the UK government. The new coalition government of Conservatives and centrist Liberal Democrats promoted austerity and inflicted heavy cuts on most public services. Yet the Conservative-dominated coalition has stuck to its promise to increase the aid budget, a policy that has been targeted by disgruntled MPs on the right of the Conservative Party and by their supporters in the tabloid media. A number of unedifying press reports picked out India, a rising power with high rates of growth, as an undeserving recipient. In an apparent bid to placate the malcontents among backbench MPs, one minister suggested that aid to India would help the UK win arms contracts. When India indicated a preference (p. 240) for the Dassault Rafale in January 2012, rather than the British-backed Eurofighter, the criticism of UK aid policy resumed (Daily Mail 2012; Shipman and Reid 2012). In November 2012 it was announced, rather abruptly, that the UK aid programme to India would be wound down. While the decision to end UK aid did not irritate New Delhi, it demonstrated how domestic considerations limited the ability of national leaders in the UK to project their preferred foreign policy options. The BBC relationship with India has also been shaped by these national developments in the UK. Determined to make the BBC share the pain of austerity, the Conservative coalition froze the broadcasters’ budget and transferred the cost of the BBC World Service from the budget of the Foreign Office to the BBC. The BBC scaled back its World Service output, and attempted to do this in part by cutting its Hindi output. It proposed ending its shortwave transmissions in 2011, but this cut was postponed in the face of protests, including interventions from senior figures like Mark Tully. The impact of the BBC World Service in India has been affected by other factors as well. Growth and innovation by Indian media outlets has had an impact on audience share. So, for example, the BBC Tamil service felt it had less to offer in India, and concentrated more effort on broadcasting in Sri Lanka (Thiranagama 2011: 160). The audience for the BBC Hindi service has declined steeply, from an estimated 17.1 million listeners in 2007 to 11 million in 2010 (Moudgil 2013). These changes have encouraged the BBC to experiment with its style of broadcasting in India and seek out new audiences.

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India and the United Kingdom As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, India and the UK have a paradoxical relationship. Personal ties and shared culture bring the two countries together and contribute to close understanding. However, the relationship between two states began in a highly unequal way, with India suffering British colonial dominance. Even in 1947, the UK was a world power with significant military resources, while India had urgent domestic priorities to meet. India’s foreign policy was intended to foster national autonomy and to avoid future colonial or neo-colonial dominance. This encouraged India to be sceptical of aspects of UK policies that projected imperial ambitions. The Suez crisis was a case in point. Nevertheless, India and the UK fashioned a mutually beneficial relationship. (p.241) Over time, bilateral relations have changed so that the original imbalance has been erased. This is reflected in systemic developments. India’s status has risen in international politics, whereas that of the UK has declined. While UK policymakers talk of Britain ‘punching above its weight’ in international politics, the UK is overshadowed by the US. The UK is often described as a middle power, a status compatible with its limited conventional military capabilities and its modest economic growth rates since 1945. While the UK does have nuclear weapons, its strategic autonomy is limited by close ties to the US. The middling status of the UK in world politics has the advantage that it reduces possible rivalry with India. India’s enhanced global profile does not impinge of the UK’s modest strategic ambitions. Yet, the reduced circumstances in which the UK finds itself add some complications to the bilateral relationship. Policymakers in the UK work within national constraints. Hawkish commentators argue that India has a reduced imperative to deepen links with the UK because it is not a front-rank power (FNSR Group of Experts 2011: 10). For example, it has been observed that the UK has less to offer in terms of arms sales. To this one might add that the decision by recent UK governments to run down its civilian nuclear industry means that India will esteem other collaborators more highly (Kumar 2013). Since 1947, the balance of relations between India and Britain has changed markedly. The UK has now accepted its position as a middle power, whereas India is gaining influence as a world power. Indian businesses are getting well established in Britain; and India’s economic dynamism since the 1980s contrasts with prolonged periods of recession in the UK. The UK will cease giving grants in aid to India in 2015, just as India is getting established as a significant aid donor in its own right. Relations between India and Britain have been rebalanced. References Bibliography references:

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India and the United Kingdom Barber, J. 1986. ‘Britain and India: A Continuing Relationship’, World Today, vol. 42, nos 8–9. Blarel, N. 2012. ‘India’s Soft Power: From Potential to Reality?’, in N. Kitchen, ed., India: The Next Superpower? (London: IDEAS, London School of Economics), pp. 28–33. Brecher, M. 1953. ‘Kashmir: A Case Study in United Nations Mediation’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3. ———. 1974. ‘India’s Decision to Remain in the Commonwealth’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 12, no. 1. Brown, J. 2003. Nehru: A Political Life (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Chari, P.R. 1979. ‘Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review’, Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. 3. Colman, J. 2009. ‘Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, 1965’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 37, no. 3. Daily Mail. 2012. ‘If India Doesn’t Want Our Aid, Stop it Now’, 6 February. Dalrymple, W. 2012. ‘Literary Ties’, in J. Johnson and R. Kumar, eds, Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership (New Delhi: Academic Foundation), pp. 145–52. Dutt, V.P. 1999. India’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New Delhi: Vikas). (p.243) FNSR Group of Experts. 2011. India’s Strategic Partners: A Comparative Assessment (New Delhi: Foundation for National Security Research). Frank, K. 2001. Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (London: HarperCollins). Gopal, S. 1984. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, vol. 3: 1956–1964 (London: Jonathan Cape). Hanks, R. 2007. ‘Why the World Service still matters’, Independent, 9 July. Hewitt, V. and M. Wickham-Jones. 2000. ‘New Labour and the Politics of Kashmir’, in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones, eds, New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 201–17. House of Commons. 2012. ‘UK–India Trade Statistics’, Standard Note SNEP 6191, UK Parliament, 23 October. Jagannathan, K.T. and A. Srivas. 2013. ‘The Ghost of the Helicopter Past’, Hindu, 24 February. Page 15 of 18

India and the United Kingdom Johnson, J. and R. Kumar, eds. 2012. Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership (New Delhi: Academic Foundation). Kapur, S.P. and S. Ganguly. 2007. ‘The Transformation of U.S.–India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future’, Asian Survey, vol. 47, no. 4. Khare, H. 2004. ‘India, Britain to combat terrorism in “all its forms”’, Hindu, 21 September. Kumar, S. 2013. ‘France and India Deepen Ties’, Diplomat, 18 February. Lipton, M. 1996. ‘Growing Mountain, Shrinking Mouse? Indian Poverty and British Bilateral Aid’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 30, no. 3. Maxwell, N. 1972. India’s China War (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Menon, K.R. 2012. ‘The Military Phoenix: Reviving Indo-British Defence Cooperation’, in J. Johnson and R. Kumar, eds, Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership (New Delhi: Academic Foundation), pp. 75– 81. Merrick, J. 2009. ‘Miliband’s Trip to India “A Disaster”, after Kashmir Gaffe’, Independent, 18 January. Ministry of Defence. 2011. ‘India and UK Sign Defence Research Agreement’, Government of UK, 22 September. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ news/india-and-uk-sign-defence-research-agreement (accessed 8 April 2015). Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 2012. India–UK Relations (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). Moscovitch, B. 2012. ‘Harold Laski’s Indian Students and the Power of Education, 1920–1950’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 20, no. 1. Moudgil, M. 2013. ‘BBC Hindi Changes Stations’, The Hoot, 8 May. Available at: http://thehoot.org/web/BBC-Hindi-changes-stations/6775-1-1-14-true.html (accessed 8 April 2015). (p.244) Nehru, J. 1981. The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Nugent, N. 1990. Rajiv Gandhi: Son of a Dynasty (London: BBC Books). Phythian, M. 2000. The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

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India and the United Kingdom Pinkerton, A. 2008. ‘A New Kind of Imperialism? The BBC, Cold War Broadcasting and the Contested Geopolitics of South Asia’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, vol. 28, no. 4. Pinkerton, A. and K. Dodds. 2009. ‘Radio Geopolitics: Broadcasting, Listening and the Struggle for Acoustic Spaces’, Progress in Human Geography, vol. 33, no. 1. Price, G. 2004. ‘India’s Aid Dynamics: From Recipient to Donor?’, Asia Programme Working Paper, Chatham House, London. Revi, V. 2008. ‘Reassessing the 1966 Devaluation of the Indian Rupee’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick. Rienzo, C. and C. Vargas-Silva. 2013. Migrants in the UK: An Overview (Oxford: The Migration Observatory). Shipman, T. and S. Reid. 2012. ‘Well that’s gratitude!’, Daily Mail, 5 February. Singh, M. 2012. ‘Foreword’, in J. Johnson and R. Kumar, eds, Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership (New Delhi: Academic Foundation), pp. 11–15. Sriskandarajah, D. and C. Drew. 2006. Brits Abroad: Mapping the Scale and Nature of British Emigration (London: Institute for Public Policy Research). Suroor, H. 2012. ‘Britain to stop aid to India from 2015’, Hindu, 9 November. Tharoor, S. 2012. ‘The Soft Power of India’, in J. Johnson and R. Kumar, eds, Reconnecting Britain and India: Ideas for an Enhanced Partnership (New Delhi: Academic Foundation), pp. 131–44. Thiranagama, S. 2011. ‘Ethnic Entanglements: The BBC Tamil and Sinhala Services amidst the Civil War in Sri Lanka’, Journalism, vol. 12, no. 2. Tomlinson, B.R. 1989. ‘British Business in India, 1860–1970’, in R.P.T. DavenportHines and G. Jones, eds, British Business in Asia since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 109–11. ———. 1993. The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Vivekanandan, B. 1975. ‘Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: A Problem in IndoBritish Relations’, Round Table, vol. 65, no. 257. Walton, C. 2014. Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire (London: HarperCollins).

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India and the United Kingdom Ward, B. 1961. ‘India and the West’, International Affairs, vol. 37, no. 4. Zachariah, R. 2013. ‘British MNCs Renew Tryst with India, Boost FDI Flow with Deals Worth over $6 bn in 2013’, Economic Times, 4 November. Notes:

(1.) For an upbeat assessment of India’s soft power, see Tharoor (2012). A critical response is offered by Blarel (2012). (2.) See Introduction by Sumit Ganguly and Nicolas Blarel, this volume. (3.) The importance of this personal and professional interest in maintaining links with the UK was illustrated in the collaboration between Indian and British intelligence agencies after 1947, often without the full knowledge of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The links continued until at least 1967 (Walton 2014: 133–8). (4.) Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv, and Rahul Gandhi all studied at the University of Cambridge. Indira Gandhi was a pupil at Badminton School in Bristol before studying at the University of Oxford. (5.) The heavily subsidized purchase of Westland helicopters in 1985 was a notable case of the inefficiency of the Aid Trade Provision. The UK aid budget contributed £65 million towards the cost of twenty-one helicopters, which were withdrawn from service only six years later (Jagannathan and Srivas 2013). (6.) Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons Statement, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (New Delhi), 1 December 1983. (7.) Government of India, Department of Commerce, ‘Foreign Trade Performance’, http://commerce.nic.in/ftpa/ (accessed 10 March 2014). (8.) Mauritius was technically the largest investor in India during this period, with a 36 per cent share, but this reflects tax rules that encourage investors to pass funds to India via an offshore location. So some British investment also came via Mauritius (Zachariah 2013).

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France When compared with other key European countries, the relationship of India with France appears quite specific. Like Great Britain, France had a colonial past in India, but a limited one. Like Great Britain, it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), but with a transatlantic policy usually much less aligned with Washington. Also, unlike the Indo-German relationship, the core of the matter between India and France is not just focused on economics. When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed French President François Hollande on his first state visit to India in early 2013 saying: ‘India regards France as one of its most valued strategic partners’ (GoI 2013b), it was not a mere diplomatic nicety. In fact, global politics, defence, nuclear cooperation, and space do carry a special weight in the bilateral relationship, although both sides believe that much more should be done in the field of trade and investment. (p.246) Trying to unravel the Indo-French relationship, I shall first locate it in its global context, before paying attention to its history since 1947, and assessing its content, particularly after the significant turning point that occurred in 1998. In a third step, I shall evaluate the role of the leadership, including, beyond key political leaders, those who cultivate within the administration a genuine knowledge of the diplomatic legacy. Finally, I shall conclude with a discussion on what New Delhi’s relationship with France reveals about the principles defining the conduct of Indian foreign policy.

The Systemic Framework of the Indo-French Relationship Since India’s independence, France global geopolitical interests have been focused—beyond its European and American allies—on the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa much more than on South Asia. It is also true that China has attracted much more French investments than India since the reforms that Deng Xiaoping undertook. However, important areas of convergence do exist. Paris supported India’s call for reforming the UNSC long before Barack Obama changed the US stance in 2010, and Paris reiterated in 2013 its willingness to see the UNSC reform implemented ‘at the earliest’. On the sensitive subject of civil nuclear energy, France has been willing early to grant India a special status, and was the first to sign an agreement with New Delhi weeks after this status was granted. Ending the technology denial imposed upon India since the 1970s was not simply guided by economic interests: it implied a diplomatic engagement in international arenas when the civilian nuclear agreement was negotiated. Today, Paris supports India joining the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and other export control bodies. India has cooperated with France on counter-terrorism, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001. A Joint Working Group on Terrorism defines the policy in this regard. In 2013, the first round of the India–France cyber dialogue, another security-related initiative, was initiated. Seen from India, the question of terrorism is of course largely focused on its immediate neighbourhood. The joint Page 2 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France statement released in early 2013 during President Hollande’s visit to India underlines how New Delhi and Paris are in accord. Not only does it refer to ‘cross-border terrorism’—a catchword of Indian diplomacy on Kashmir—it (p. 247) underlines as well that ‘both sides agreed that Pakistan must abide by its commitment to expeditiously bring all the perpetrators of Mumbai terror attacks to justice’. Turning to the future of Afghanistan, it states that the two sides recognized that terrorism poses the main threat to Afghanistan’s security and stability, as well as the need for joint concerted efforts and cooperation by countries of the region to effectively counter it, including dismantling terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens, beyond Afghanistan’s border, disrupting financial and tactical support being provided to terrorist groups. (GoI 2013c) Another field of common interest is the Indian Ocean, where France still has a territorial presence, and where its fleet operates. The two navies conduct joint exercises, and both have participated in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and beyond, a part of India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’. In 2001, two years after Japan, one year after China, but eleven years before the US, France has become a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, established in 1997. India is a prominent founder member of this regional grouping. There are, however, areas of difference which have developed recently. One of the stumbling blocks involved the failure of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round, and the question of European and American subsidies to agriculture: an issue that invites Indian criticism. France, being the first beneficiary of these subsidies in the European Union (EU), is not in agreement. This did not prevent India from pushing its agenda at the ninth World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference held in Bali in December 2013, and overcoming opposition to its new subsidized food security policy. However, this bears on the current negotiations between India and the EU on a free trade agreement. On the one hand, Paris has made the agriculture subsidies a sine qua non for supporting the free trade agreement. On the other hand, surprisingly or significantly, New Delhi has asked France for its support to complete negotiations opened with the EU in 2007 (GoI 2013b; Mishra 2013). Another bone of contention, more geopolitical, is the strong difference on the issue of national sovereignty and the ‘responsibility to protect’. France has been very active in recent years in Libya as well as in Mali, and took a hard line on Syria. The Indian government’s position on Libya was that France and Great Britain went beyond the UN mandate. (p.248) On Syria, New Delhi supported a dialogue between Syrians, and India, along with Brazil and South Africa (the India–Brazil–South Africa group), sent emissaries to Damascus in August 2011, vainly hoping to convince the government to change its line. Four months Page 3 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France earlier, India had forcefully distanced itself from an Anglo-French resolution at the UNSC (India Ministry of External Affairs 2011) on Libya, by abstaining on the vote seeking to impose a no fly zone against Gaddafi’s forces. On the other hand, India voted in February 2012 for the resolution on Syria asking Bashar al Assad to step down. This has been described by some Indian analysts as ‘a landmark change’ (Sinha and Iyer-Mitra 2012), but has not significantly altered the principles guiding India’s diplomacy: no regime change by force; no intervention without UN backing. The resolution did not pass, as Russia and China vetoed it. In fact, after the gas attack on 21 August 2013 in a suburb of Damascus and the willingness of Paris to ‘punish’ the regime, New Delhi reiterated its support for negotiations and preferred ‘to await the full results of the U.N. inspection’, before supporting the Russian initiative asking Syria to put its chemical weapons under international control before destroying them. These differences with Paris do not affect the core of the bilateral relationship for a number of reasons. First, on the issue of foreign military interventions, India has supported the French operation in Mali (New Delhi was informed before the French troops were actually deployed), as the demand for help came from the Malian president (even if interim). More, New Delhi has pledged $100 million for the reconstruction of Mali, in addition to $1 million for the Malian Army itself. India has some mining interests in Mali (which have been protected by the French troops on the ground), but India’s posture is also related to the al Qaeda threat in the region. While serving at the UNSC in December 2012, Delhi co-sponsored with Paris UN Resolution 2085 calling for an African Union– ECOWAS military force in Mali.1 A noted commentator wrote then: ‘India gathered with European and African nations in Brussels to commit itself to stabilizing Mali which is reeling under al-Qaida attacks. It’s the first time India will be involving itself in the political process as well as reconstruction of a country so far removed from its immediate sphere of influence’ (Bagchi 2013). Second, the core of the relationship remains unaffected by differences of views on geopolitical issues for symmetrical reasons. For (p.249) India’s quest of strategic autonomy, French defence contracts are useful in order not to put all of India’s eggs in the same basket, and the same is true for civil nuclear reactors. For France, New Delhi’s interest in French military or civilian technology is a structural axis of the partnership, and an important market. We need to go back to the history of the relationship between the two countries in order to understand why it is so.

The National Level Factors: History and Contents of the Bilateral Relationship The Background: 1947–98

The end of French colonial rule in India offered a sound base for bilateral relations with independent India. Colonial rule ended peacefully (Neogi 1997), de facto in 1954—the year the French withdrew from Indochina—under the Page 4 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France government of the much-respected Pierre Mendes-France, and then de jure in 1962, the very year when Charles de Gaulle, back in power in 1958, paved the way for the independence of Algeria through the Evian Agreement signed with the Algerian National Liberation Front. In between, though, the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 brought India and France into opposite camps, as Nehru had strongly condemned the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. However, de Gaulle’s foreign policy was bound to resonate well with the Nehruvian paradigm of non-alignment. Certainly, France was not a non-aligned country stricto sensu, but de Gaulle had not forgotten that Churchill and Roosevelt had not invited him to the Yalta Conference—and for the general, national independence was the key principle. Pleading for a dialogue with USSR; recognizing in 1964 the People’s Republic of China; withdrawing France from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966 (the NATO headquarters were then located in Paris); and reaffirming six months later, in a celebrated speech delivered in Phnom Penh while the US was engaged in Vietnam, that no military solution would prevail for ‘there was no chance that peoples from Asia would submit themselves to the law of foreigners coming from the other side of the Pacific’ (de Gaulle 1966): all these positions asserted a deliberate independent line, including with allies. The crux of the matter in this regard was de Gaulle’s (p.250) decision to go beyond transatlantic ‘integration’ in matters of defence, and to have control of the strike capacity of nuclear weapons in order for France to be able ‘to solely engage in and in whichever manner she chose’ (Mayoura 2000). Beyond ideological compatibilities on the concept of sovereignty, there was also, from the 1950s onward, a field of Indo-French cooperation deserving attention: nuclear research. After the setting up of the Atomic Energy Commission by Nehru in 1948, its Director General Homi Bhabha started looking for foreign partners. France was soon one of them (along with the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada later on), as early as 1951—‘the first such agreement between a developed and a developing country’, the developed one still a colonial power, at that time fighting the Indochina war (Sarkar 2013: i). Despite the setback following the first Indian nuclear test conducted in 1974—due to multilateral constraints, France had to stop its nuclear cooperation with India—the links established in the 1950s would bear fruit later on. From a geopolitical perspective and as a commercial venture, the nuclear component is today one of the key elements of a relationship which has become a ‘strategic partnership’. Nehru went to Paris as prime minister in 1951, to explain India’s position regarding the Korean war, and again in 1962, when de Gaulle condemned the Chinese military move against India across the McMahon line. Indira Gandhi visited Paris in 1971, a step in her international tour undertaken to explain India’s support to the insurgents fighting for the secession of East Pakistan (Indira dissuaded André Malraux from joining the Mukti Bahini insurgency, but Page 5 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France bestowed the Nehru Prize on him in 1972). Occasional visits of prime ministers from both countries did not build up a strong relationship, however. A new era opened with the first French presidential visit by Valery Giscard d’Estaing in 1980. Giscard’s Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, an economist, was conscious that India’s potential would deserve more attention. When Indira Gandhi went again to Paris in 1981, François Mitterrand, Giscard’s successor, received her well, before going himself to India in 1982, and again in 1989. Since the beginning of his first mandate, Mitterrand had placed India in the priority list of what was not yet defined as emerging countries. However, the stakes were not then what they are today. Some French companies had established themselves in India (a few of them since the nineteenth century), and a number of large (p.251) corporate houses had started to open at least a representative office in India to prepare for the future. The failure of some industrial initiatives (the energy major Electricité de France, the car maker Peugeot) confirmed what was often said: it was difficult to conduct business in India, a leitmotiv to be heard for long. In order to facilitate a better mutual understanding, cultural activities were put forward, with Festivals of France in India and Festivals of India in France being organized in quick succession. This, however, was not enough to make India a significant concern of French businesses, who had other markets in mind. Yet, the basis for cooperation had been established. Defence cooperation was still flourishing, based upon a long tradition of trust and familiarity: India had bought the first Dassault Ouragan fighter-bomber (Toofan in India) in 1954. The first helicopter built by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd was the French Alouette series (named Cheeta and Chetak in India), which was ordered in the 1960s and has been built in India for decades. In 1982, India decided to upgrade its air force with the multirole fighter Mirage 2000. The mid-1970s and 1980s were difficult years for India with insurgencies in Punjab and the north-east, the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi, her assassination in 1984, and the assassination of her son and successor Rajiv in 1991. Everyone noticed, however, that some industrialized countries had seized the new opportunities offered by India, as testified by Japan’s car companies opening joint ventures with Indian partners. The pro-import reforms that Rajiv Gandhi pursued, and the pro-business and pro-technology teams surrounding him when he was in power (1984–9), were also noted in Paris. India’s image changed considerably in the 1990s, with two important shifts: the economic reforms launched for good by the Congress in 1991, and the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by the freshly elected Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government.

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France The Turning Point in 1998

In January 1998, Inder Kumar Gujral was India’s interim prime minister, having lost the majority two months before, but Jacques Chirac, unlike other heads of state or heads of government, decided to keep to his agenda and went to New Delhi, sending the message that he was coming there for India, and not for a specific government. His decision was appreciated in New Delhi. Then came the BJP and, in May, the (p.252) nuclear tests. Paris, a member of the Permanent Five of the UNSC and the Group of Eight, had of course to condemn the tests along with France’s partners, but it did so on a low key, and, unlike the US and Japan, decided not to impose sanctions upon India. Here again, Chirac’s choice was welcomed in New Delhi. In the Foreign Affairs ministry in Paris, a few voices believed that India had made a mistake in crossing the nuclear threshold at the risk of finding itself isolated (d’Andurain 1999). Others had a different view, which proved right ten years later. If reforming the Non-proliferation Treaty by including India (and Pakistan) in the circle of recognized nuclear power states was not an option— because that could open the door to other countries seeking to test—another option had to be explored. Now that India was a de facto, if not de jure, nuclear weapon state, it could be practical to consider it as one and, given India’s record on non-proliferation, to see if some sort of agreement could be negotiated for starting afresh the cooperation on civil nuclear energy and research, ending the dual technology denial imposed upon the country after the first ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ conducted by Indira Gandhi in 1974. This approach would obviously imply conditionalities and international support. Seven years later, when President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their decision to negotiate such an agreement, Paris promptly stepped forward. In February 2006, when Chirac came again to India, a specific declaration was made public, besides the regular joint statement concluding such high level visits. This joint declaration was entirely dedicated to the prospect of nuclear energy cooperation, listing the French and Indian organizations to be involved in the process (PMO 2006). In the meanwhile, the ‘Joint Action Plan’ signed between India and the EU in September 2005 for establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ made no such commitment, confining itself to embarrassed generalities on this sensitive nuclear topic. Seen from New Delhi, there is therefore a clear distinction between EU and its key member states. On economic issues, the EU, as such, defines the rules of trade for its member states, and remains the first trade partner of India, and the first global economic power with a gross domestic product (GDP) slightly higher than the US’s. However, on strategic or geopolitical issues, EU members states enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre, as the EU is much more self-limited in this field, where consensus hardly prevails. (p.253) Be it the UNSC’s proposed enlargement or past negotiations of nuclear deals, Paris, like London, has clearly supported India’s expectations, Page 7 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France while the EU has remained at best ambiguous. This dichotomy between the EU’s active economic policies and its limited geopolitical engagement defines in large part the differentiated geometry of India’s foreign relations with European countries on the one hand, and the EU as such on the other hand. This has given Paris enough autonomy for defining an active relationship with India. It was after Chirac’s visit of 1998 that a full-fledged ‘strategic partnership’ was established between France and India. The visit to Paris by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee in fall 1998 underlined that New Delhi was taking seriously the emerging relationship. Regular sectoral meetings started soon after, the most significant being the ‘strategic dialogue’ conducted between India’s national security adviser (Brajesh Mishra launched this dialogue) and the diplomatic adviser to the French president. In 2003, Chirac was the first Western leader to invite India and other emerging countries to the G8 summit at Evian. The return to power of the Congress in 2004, and the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president three years later, did not alter what had become a regular relationship. Since the launch of the strategic dialogue in 1999, India and France have had twenty-five rounds of talks at the national security adviser level, in addition to the annual Foreign Office consultations between foreign secretaries and various topical committees, amongst them the High Level Committee for Defence Cooperation. French presidents have visited India in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2013. Indian prime ministers have visited France in 1998, 2008, 2009, and 2015. Some asymmetry is noticeable at the highest level of visits, but key ministers travelled regularly between New Delhi and Paris in all those years, and French presidents and Indian prime ministers have met regularly on the sidelines of the international diplomatic circuit, from the UN General Assembly to the G8 and the G20. During his mandate (2007–12), Sarkozy made two visits to India, the first as the chief guest of India on Republic Day 2008. His direct appeal to Indian CEOs (despite his undiplomatic remarks about Lakshmi Mittal, who had taken over French steel company Arcelor in 2006) helped to eclipse the irritant of the Sikhs in France protesting against the ban on religious headgears in French government schools, imposed in 2004. The size of the business delegation accompanying the president’s visits (p.254) was growing. Big contracts were the order of the day. Paris reciprocated quickly the Republic Day invitation: Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the chief guest for Bastille Day 2009 and, for the first time parading abroad, Indian troops opened the military march down the Champs Élysées. The Contents of the Relationship: Diplomacy and Defence, But Not Only These

Wide is the field of bilateral relations between India and France, but unequal are their components: diplomacy and defence clearly lead over economics and trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs states in its country note on France that: Page 8 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France France was the first country with which India entered into an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation following the waiver given by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, enabling India to resume full civil nuclear cooperation with the international community. There is also a growing and wideranging cooperation in other areas such as trade and investment, culture, science & technology and education. France has consistently supported India’s increasing role in international fora, including India’s permanent membership of the UNSC… . A clear indication of the importance that France assigns to the strategic partnership with India was the fact that India was the first country in Asia that the President chose for a bilateral visit. (GoI 2013d) Effectively, François Hollande’s win over Sarkozy in the French presidential election of 2012 only confirmed that the Indo-French relationship remains on track, whoever is in power in New Delhi and in Paris. Nine months after taking over, Hollande undertook his first official travel to Asia: a state visit specific to India. The usual large business delegation went along with him, as well as key ministers. Defence Contracts and Cooperation: A Long Tradition Intensified

In New Delhi in July 2013, six months after President Hollande’s maiden visit to India, French defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian made his point clearly: ‘India is a major priority of our diplomacy… . Apart from our Allies and European partners, there are few countries across the world with which we are prepared to go as far as we do with India.’ He referred (p.255) as well to the shared deep attachment ‘to our national sovereignty and our strategic autonomy’ (Le Drian 2013). The selection of Dassault’s Rafale fighter, which sent waves across the US after Lockheed Martin’s F-16 and Boeing’s F/A-18 had been rejected, is high on the agenda. The negotiations on this major deal (between US$ 12 and 20 billions according to estimates) have been harder than expected on the price tag and the guarantee issue, as Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd and a number of smaller Indian companies were supposed to build under licence 108 of the 126 planes to be delivered to the Indian Air Force from 2018 onward. As India needs urgently to refurbish its Air Force capacity, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while visiting Paris in April 2015, decided to change India’s line, and opted for buying as soon as possible 36 Rafale made in France, the larger deal been probably revisited. A few weeks later, the Defense minister confirmed that the larger deal was scrapped, and that India will stick to 36 planes, with perhaps an additional squadron of 18 Rafale at a later stage (The Hindu 2015). Besides the Rafale contract, India is also upgrading its Mirage 2000 fleet, and will add to these upgraded aircrafts 500 MICA missiles, the total cost of which is more than $3 billion. More spectacular is the Scorpene deal: six diesel attack submarines are under construction at Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai. Another agreement has been reached to develop short-range surface to air newPage 9 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France generation missile systems to be co-developed by the Paris-based European firm Matra BAE Dynamics Alenia, and the Indian public agency, the Defence Research and Development Organisation. Later, light helicopters, artillery, and Airbus tanker aircraft may be developed. Beyond weapons procurement, a High Level Committee for Defence Cooperation conducts regular exchanges. Going beyond anti-piracy operations, joint exercises are now conducted on a regular basis under the names Garuda for the air force, Varuna for the navy, and Shakti for the army. A recent official report notes that in the defence field, ‘the Indo-French cooperation plan is one of the most intense of all those France is engaged in’, with some sixty events each year (Giacobbi and Woerth 2012: 59). Pakistan may have been an irritant at one time, for Islamabad also has a long tradition of procurement of French weapons. But New Delhi knows that France has dehyphenated India from its neighbour: the speech of President Sarkozy in Mumbai in 2010 was clear in that (p.256) regard, and so was the joint statement marking Hollande’s visit in 2013. Furthermore, the six Scorpene submarines under construction in India are more sophisticated than the three Agosta submarines based in Karachi. French arms contracts with India are now much larger than those with Pakistan: €2,187 million for India, and €591 million for Pakistan over 2005–9 (Giacobbi and Woerth 2012: 65). India’s defence contracts with France illustrate three key principles guiding New Delhi’s foreign and defence policy, which aims at maximizing its strategic autonomy. First, there is a willingness to diversify its procurement sources. Russia remains India’s principal supplier, and Israel has greatly expanded its defence deals with New Delhi, but France, after six decades of cooperation, remains a major partner. Second, political reliability and trust are decisive criteria. Beyond the Rafale deal are not merely the operational qualities of the French plane. In case of war, France will not stop the supply of spare parts and weapons, while uncertainty prevails on this point with regard to the US planes, as well as to the Eurofighter, due to German constraints (de Briganti 2012). Third, India wants ‘to transform defence ties beyond buyer–seller relationship and to pursue opportunities for technological cooperation for co-development and co-production of defence equipment’: a point reiterated in Washington in June 2013 (US DOS 2013). The French have accepted this policy, even after tough negotiations. The Indo-French defence contracts also illustrate perfectly a crucial matter: the challenge of indigenization. In August 2013, India was able to launch its first home-built aircraft carrier, and to have its first nuclear submarine go critical. These are great steps on ‘the holy grail of indigenisation’ (ASSOCHAM 2013), after noted delays on other projects in the past (the Arjun battle tank, the Tejas light fighter). A problem remains, however: are Indian companies capable of Page 10 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France handling transfers of advanced defence technology? The construction of the Scorpene submarines, for instance, is now beyond schedule partly because Mazagon Dock Ltd, the Indian public company partner of French DCNS, has not built submarines for fifteen years, and partly because the procedures for importing parts are complex (Anandan 2013). The decision by India to buy 36 Rafale made in France illustrates as well the difficult question of the transfer of high technology, which has plagued the negotiations on the larger deal as Dassault, the French manufacturer, was reluctant to guarantee the hundred-plus planes that Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd was supposed to (p.257) build in India. It illustrates also the limitations of the ‘Make in India’ slogan raised by Narendra Modi’s government for developing Indian industries through foreign direct investments, as the fighter jets bought from France will be cheaper than those which were supposed to be built in India through technology transfer. On the other hand, it appears that the future of defence technology transfers will open more space for Indian private industrialists, often more trusted by foreign big industrial houses. Nuclear Energy and Space: The Technology Parameter

In 2008, a few weeks after the completion of the civilian nuclear deal negotiated by India with the US, and later on with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, Manmohan Singh, after the G20 summit at Cannes, went to Paris and signed the first bilateral agreement permitted by India’s new status. The agreement was to ‘form the basis of wide ranging bilateral cooperation from basic and applied research to full civil nuclear cooperation including reactors, nuclear fuel supply, nuclear safety, radiation and environment protection, and nuclear fuel cycle management’.2 As part of the 2008 agreement, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd signed a memorandum of understanding with the French nuclear major Areva for building six EPR nuclear reactors3 at Jaitapur in Maharashtra for 10,000 MW (in 2012, the existing six Indian nuclear power plants generated less than 5,000 MW), as well as providing fuel for twenty-five years. Leaving aside the protests against nuclear energy in general, and nuclear plant sites in particular, and the questions raised about the delays afflicting EPR projects in France and Finland (but not in China), an unexpected development came in 2010 when the Indian Parliament passed the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. This act, against international practices, calls for compensation to the victims of a disaster not just from the operator but also from the supplier. The act has been criticized in India for being too generous, and abroad as too demanding. The French have been much more discreet than the US on this point, and announced that they would work, of course, under the framework of the new law, but the complex negotiations have not yet been finalized.

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France The policy of diversification of suppliers does not prevent multilateral cooperation for preparing the future: this is why India joined the (p.258) International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, based in France. Elaborated in the 1980s with the participation of the USSR, the US, Japan, and the Europeans, the ITER project was joined by China and South Korea in 2003, and by India in 2005. The final agreement was signed in 2006 at the Élysée Palace, and entered into force in 2007. As an ITER member, India is now part of the first international experiment to produce nuclear energy from fusion, presented as a much cleaner process than fission. On the ITER site near Aix en Provence, India asserts itself as a recognized scientific power. Space is the third component of Indian policy related to sensitive activities. In this field as well, a long-standing cooperation with France, established in the 1960s, is gaining momentum, and the Indian Space Research Organisation has a permanent representative in Paris. India has used repeatedly, since 1981, the Ariane rockets facilities in French Guiana, but now the cooperation is more intricate. For instance, the twenty-third mission of the Indian rocket PSLV-C/20 in February 2013 delivered seven satellites into orbit. Amongst them, the satellite for Argos-3 and Altika (SARAL), with payloads from the French National Center for Space Studies (CNES), is dedicated to the study of climate and oceanography. Two years earlier, another joint project, the satellite MeghaTropiques, was launched, also by an Indian PLSV, as part of a major component of Indo-French space cooperation for understanding the monsoon process, and more generally tropical climates. An Indian expert observed after the successful SARAL launch: ‘space is emerging as a flagship for enhancing Indo-French relations’ (Lele 2013). The positioning of India on the global space launch market allows for other global space partners, the French amongst them. Beyond the prestige and sophistication of space activities, this is a rationale implemented as well by Indian industrialists, or by foreign companies using India as a base for exporting to other markets. Investment and Trade: The Need for Expansion

The strategic partnership is not just about global diplomacy, defence, and high technology. India needs foreign direct investment (FDI). With the economic reforms launched in 1991, business meetings have multiplied between Indian and French organizations, and CEO forums have been established, but with unequal success. (p.259) France is the fifth world economy by GDP, but only the ninth largest foreign investor in India with a cumulative investment of $3 billion in the years 2000–12, according to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. This amounted to only 2 per cent of the total FDI inflows into India for the period (Indian Embassy 2013: 1). Compared with other major European economies, France’s record, Page 12 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France however, is not all that bad, as the largest Eurozone investor in India, Germany, invested $5.1 billion in FDI in 2000–12, according to the same source. The French Embassy in India, however, argues that these figures are deceptive: Such statistics, based upon the sole territorial origin of the [capital] flux give a very inadequate image of the reality of the French presence in India. The survey conducted by the New Delhi Regional Economic Service [the branch of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance at the French Embassy in Delhi] shows that the 750 French companies located in India have invested, by the end of 2012, a stock of $17 billion. So France appears to be one of the major investors in India, besides the U.S. and Japan. (Trésor 2013) The discrepancy is due to the investments related either to the French companies located outside France, or to investments transiting through third countries (in Indian statistics, Mauritius and Singapore are by far the largest purveyors of FDI in India). The 750 French companies (Indian branches or subbranches of French companies) employ 240,000 persons, with very few expatriates. French majors are present in a large spectrum of activities, from industries (Schneider, Alstom, Saint-Gobain, Airbus, Renault, Michelin), to banking, services, infrastructures (Vinci, Lafarge), pharmaceuticals (Sanofi Aventis), food (Danone), energy (Total), and luxury brands. In the meantime, Indian investments in France have started as well. Around $1 billion has been invested since 1996 by forty-three Indian groups, from Tata Steel to Ranbaxy (pharmaceuticals) and information technology majors (TCS, Infosys), aerospace, auto parts, plastics, and so on (Indian Embassy 2013: 2). Whatever the exact data may be, both sides expect more. Successive Indian governments’ communication policies projecting the image of ‘Shining India’ in 2004, and the motto ‘India Everywhere’ at the Davos summit in 2006, are not enough. If investing is first and foremost a decision taken by business leaders, the government’s regulatory milieu shapes the overall investment climate and the way India is perceived. (p.260) New Delhi’s economic diplomacy is today a major component of India’s foreign policy. After two decades of reform, more is clearly expected by foreign investors, including the French. The steps taken in September 2012 by the Government of India regarding opening up to retail majors have not been fully convincing yet, as neither Walmart, an American chain, nor Carrefour, the French global company in the field, have yet decided to jump in. However, all investors will closely watch what new reforms the Indian government will announce for expanding the FDI limit in a number of sectors, and what changes Raghuram Rajan, former International Monetary Fund chief economist, and as of September 2013 governor of the Reserve Bank of India, will bring about. Beyond the rhetoric, French investors will look closely as well to

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France the economic policy defined by the new government of Narendra Modi, and to facilities provided to foreign companies for expanding their activities in India. In the meanwhile, New Delhi and Paris have taken initiatives beyond the IndoFrench Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation that has run since 1976 at the ministerial level. In 2009, the India–France CEO’s Forum was started afresh, led on the Indian side by Narayana Murthy, the iconic Infosys mentor, and then by Dhruv Sawhney, who has been in discussions with his French counterparts for twenty years or so, through Confederation of Indian Industries/Mouvement des Entreprises de France joint seminars. In addition, François Hollande nominated a Special Representative for Indo-French Economic Relations: Paul Hermelin, CEO of French information technology company Cap Gemini, which has greatly expanded in India in the last couple of decades, now employing more than 50,000 persons across India. In his speech to the business community in Mumbai, Hollande also called for more Indian investments in France, saying: ‘You don’t have a window of opportunity in France. You have a door wide open’ (Padgaonkar 2013). A few months earlier, the Indian Embassy in Paris had released a report on the same topic, facilitating Indian investments in France (Indian Embassy 2012). The French Embassy in Delhi itself has an office promoting France as a destination for foreign investment, the ‘Invest in France Agency’. On the trade front, India enjoys a positive balance of trade with France. With $3.8 billion exported to India in 2011–12, France ranks fifth within the EU, behind Germany ($15.7 billion), Belgium, UK, and (p.261) Italy. With $4.5 billion exports by India, France also ranks fifth within EU, behind UK ($8.5 billion), Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium (Economic Survey 2012–13: Tables 7.4A and 7.4B). The level of exchanges should be better: the target of $12 billion in bilateral trade in 2012, jointly agreed upon in 2008, has not been reached, as both economies had slowing growth rates. India has identified priorities for expanding investments in fields where France has a recognized expertise: sustainable urban development (infrastructure, water, waste management, urban planning) and railways first of all, but also agroinfrastructure and renewable energy. The French Development Agency is also involved in the better management of public goods since it was established in India in 2009: energy efficiency, renewable energy, urban public transport, biodiversity, and health projects are financed in relation to priorities defined by the Indian government (AFD 2012). Soft Power and Bilateral Diplomacy

The last component of the Indo-French relationship, to define it broadly, is related to the field of soft power. India cannot rely upon a strong diaspora in France. A significant part of the 100,000 members accounted for by the Indian Embassy come in fact from the former French settlements in India, and most of them are French nationals: People of Indian Origin rather than Non Resident Page 14 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France Indians. On the business side, the Indian Professional Association, set up in Paris in 1995, cannot compete with its US counterparts, and similarly, the political influence of Indo-French Chambers of Commerce and Indo-French business groups is way behind the clout enjoyed by the US-India Business Council at Capitol Hill. However, they clearly expand their activities and the dissemination of information, and so do advisory services firms. The private sector, here, complements the Government backed institutions. Interestingly, both countries try to attract investments from the other side, and Indian investment in France will logically provide more visibility to the Indian diaspora. Culture is also a fine tool for better mutual understanding. Both governments, as noted earlier, have for years organized months-long festivals. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations does its job (although Paris is still waiting for the opening of the Indian Cultural Centre), and the Festival de Cannes celebrated a hundred years of Indian cinema in 2013. More significantly perhaps, private initiatives are legion: Indian (p.262) literature is now on the catalogue of major French publishers, and concerts and recitals run to packed houses. Higher education and research are also receiving increased attention. There are less than 3,000 Indian students in French universities, but joint research and scholars’ mobility have been encouraged for long in the social sciences (a cooperation pioneered by the Maison des sciences de l’homme in Paris since the 1970s), as well as through the Indo-French Centre for the Promotion of Advanced Research, established in New Delhi in 1987 (an Indira Gandhi–Giscard d’Estaing initiative). Life and health sciences, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and earth and planetary sciences, amongst other fields, are covered by joint projects across India. Two French research institutes, in New Delhi and Pondicherry, are dedicated to Indian studies and Indian affairs. Significantly, India attracts today a growing number of French institutions of higher learning —not just business schools—willing to have partnerships with their Indian counterparts: some 300 memorandums of understanding have been signed. Doctoral students exchanges will increase under the Raman-Charpak Fellowship Programme launched in 2013.4 A joint project for setting up an Indian Institute of Technology in Jodhpur is now on the cards. On the whole, fifteen years after Chirac’s significant visit to India in 1998 and the beginning of the strategic partnership, the Indo-French relationship is now well anchored, and is clearly gaining momentum. To what extent have leaders added their mark on this process?

Leaders and Decision Making: Individuals and Beyond Exceptional cases apart, linked mostly to war or war-like situations, the role of leadership in international relations is usually not easy to evaluate—the more so in the framework of bilateral relations. As noted earlier, de Gaulle’s vision of France’s independence and his criticism of some US policies resonated well with Page 15 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France Nehru’s non-alignment principle. However, the French and the Indian policies were not identical, and the two leaders did not cultivate strong personal relations. De Gaulle never visited India after coming back to power in 1958. Symmetrically, Indira Gandhi speaking in French added less to the bilateral relationship than Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s willingness to put India more clearly on the French diplomatic horizon. More important was what could be defined (p.263) as the ‘climate’ of bilateral relations, a legacy defined by France’s Gaullian quest for autonomy even within alliances and by a tradition of cooperation in sensitive fields such as weapons and nuclear research. In such a context, were leaders’ profiles decisive for explaining the step forward in 1998 under Jacques Chirac’s presidency? Behind his congenial electoral campaigns deep in the French countryside, Chirac was a discreet but genuine admirer of Asian arts and cultures, with a considerable interest in Japan in particular. Asia, therefore, was clearly on Chirac’s mental map. Dominique de Villepin, before becoming foreign minister (2002–4) and the last prime minister nominated by Chirac (2005–7), in 1998 had served as secretary general of the presidency, coming in daily contact with the president. Villepin had earlier been a young diplomat posted in New Delhi. Similarly, the Hindi-speaking Maurice Gourdon-Montagne served as chief of staff of Chirac’s prime minister Alain Juppé (1995–7), and diplomatic adviser of President Chirac in 2002–7. There was clearly, in the top circles of power in those days, a president who was knowledgeable about Asia, with two key aides who had served in India. Furthermore, when the right wing lost the elections in 1997, Hubert Védrine became foreign affairs minister in the socialist government of Lionel Jospin. With Védrine at the Quai d’Orsay, President Chirac not only had a foreign minister with long experience of matters of state (Védrine had served at Élysée Palace for fourteen years as the diplomatic adviser of President Mitterrand, and then as secretary general), but also a theoretician of international relations, fully aware of the implications of the rise of emerging countries. Under the circumstances, the French leadership—a rightist president and a leftist government—adjusted well to the new BJP government in New Delhi. Significantly, A.B. Vajpayee reciprocated by sending the right signal when stopping in Paris on his way back from his first UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Under Sarkozy, foreign policy was much more defined by the president’s staff than by the successive foreign ministers, particularly during the decisive years of negotiation of the civilian nuclear deal between the US and India. Top diplomat Jean-Daniel Levitte, who had served at the Élysée under President Giscard d’Estaing, was Chirac’s diplomatic adviser between 1995 and 2000 before becoming French ambassador to the UN, then to the US. Sarkozy called him back as diplomatic adviser. At one time the head of the Asia Directorate at the Quai d’Orsay, and trained in Chinese and (p.264) Indonesian, Levitte too was a top presidential adviser who was well versed in Asian affairs. He was part of the team that implemented in 1998–9 the new French policy Page 16 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France toward India. Hollande himself in 2012 chose the head of the Asia Directorate Paul-Jean Ortiz as his diplomatic adviser. On the whole, it appears that most often the top diplomats belonging to the president’s staff have been in a position to convey to their respective leaders a seasoned view of what is at stake in the Indo-French relationship. Is this true as well in India? While reciprocity was unnecessary, at least three former Indian ambassadors to France later became foreign secretaries (Maharaj Krishna Rasgotra in 1982–5, Kanwal Sibal under a BJP minister in 2002–3, and Ranjan Mathai under a Congress minister, 2011–13). There have been similarities between ambassadors as well. The French ambassador to India since 2012, François Richier, had headed the Strategic Directorate at the Quai d’Orsay before being posted in New Delhi. Significantly, the Indian ambassador to Paris at that time, Rakesh Sood, was himself an expert on security and nuclear affairs, having set up and headed from 1992 to 2000 the Disarmament and Security Affairs Division at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, before becoming Indian ambassador in charge of disarmament at Geneva. Sood was appointed the prime minister’s special envoy for disarmament and proliferation in 2013. If Vajpayee and Chirac can be credited with having boosted the bilateral relationship in 1998, it is clear that shared interests, coupled with top-level bureaucracies that cultivate the memory of Indo-French partnership and experienced enough to have a clear vision of Asian and global stakes, have played a role in contributing to sustaining and enlarging the relationship, whatever the colour of the governments in the two countries. India’s foreign policy toward France, seen in a comparative perspective, offers much material for analysis. Of course, the role of leaders is important, but it should not be overemphasized. The turnaround of 1998 was largely due to Jacques Chirac and his team, but what is striking is how a bipartisan consensus governed the relationship after that: the Congress and the BJP in India, the right and the left in France, have carried on the legacy, and have built on it. In the 1990s the French side did recognize (p.265) emerging India’s potential. The Indian side confirmed its willingness to turn a traditional relationship into a deeper strategic partnership. In other words, if individuals can play a significant role at whatever level they stand,5 the bilateral relationship is now systemic, and its strength is anchored in the dialectics between compatible national interests and global convergence, as I have noted earlier (Racine 2003). In any case, the two cannot be strictly demarcated in an interdependent world. The civil nuclear cooperation offers a perfect example of the interplay of complex parameters. Without the negotiations between India and the US administration, nothing would have happened, but the bilateral negotiations needed global approval to be concluded and their results accepted. Once this was done, the expertise of France, where nuclear power accounts for 78 per cent of the electricity supply, was of course of Page 17 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France special interest to India, in addition to what resulted from the Indo-Russian cooperation. The fact that France had an old connection with the Indian nuclear programme was certainly less important than the expertise and the trust—the political trust, one may say—built by France’s understanding of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, and by the reliability exemplified by the defence procurement relationship. In a competitive world where multidirectional diplomacy is a guiding principle of India’s policy, the multiplicity of partners is an asset. In an interview given in 2006, the then French ambassador to India Dominique Girard noted that France ‘will never be number one in India’, but that ‘we can certainly be very close’, if not a close neighbour (Roger 2007: 23). From strategic dialogue to strategic partnership, this remains true today. The degree of friendship diplomatically celebrated by Salman Khurshid in Paris in 2013, and investigated earlier by Roger (2007)—‘friends in need or friends indeed?’—is probably less decisive for New Delhi than the degree of understanding between the two countries. India does not need to agree with France on all issues, as we have seen, but convergences prevail over differences: it made sense for the French defence minister, when visiting New Delhi in July 2013, to put emphasis on the ‘choice of strategic autonomy’ made by the two countries. The specifics of the Indo-French relationship deserve attention in a comparative perspective, facilitated by this volume.6 Its core content is quite different from what the Indo-German relationship has focused upon (even though, on a number of diplomatic and security issues, (p.266) New Delhi and Berlin views may converge, particularly on a cautious or reluctant approach to the responsibility to protect). On the other hand, the Indo-French relationship illustrates why the strong rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington has not developed in a full-fledged Indo-American alliance. Many US experts on India had warned the Bush administration that the right expectation should aim not a a full-fledged alliance but rather at a partnership, which might eventually compare with the Gaullist way of defining the Franco-American relationship. India wishes to diversify its defence procurement, as Russia, which has been for long the major defence supplier, knows too well to day. New Delhi wishes more broadly to conduct a multi-directional diplomacy. This Indian quest for strategic autonomy applies as well for the French case—and for all partners of India. Lord Palmerston said long ago that nations have no permanent friends, no permanent enemies; they have only permanent interests. What is important for India is probably less friendship per se than what Pranab Mukherjee theorized, when he was external affairs minister, as ‘a well crafted system to promote a balance of interests among the major powers’, instead of the old Westphalian balance of power (Mukherjee 2007). For New Delhi, the bilateral relations with France are part of this system. So are the relations with China. The difference, of course, lies in the bilateral context in which the balance of interests is in Page 18 of 23

India’s Foreign Policy toward France motion. In the French case, cooperation prevails upon competition and no threat perception exists. In a way, France offers to India an interesting profile: strong enough to have something to offer; not strong enough to put too much pressure in search of grand strategy games. For France as well, India is important, but not the most important partner. A sufficient level of trust coupled with a degree of freedom gives each state enough room to manoeuvre. This balance gives the partnership, despite occasional irritants, the strength of win–win expectations. References Bibliography references: Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 2012. AFD and India, New Delhi, March. Available at: www.afd.fr/webdav/shared/PORTAILS/PUBLICATIONS/ PLAQUETTES/AFD_en_Inde_GB.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Anandan, S. 2013. ‘DCNS insists Scorpene project is on track’, Hindu, 27 April. Available at: www.thehindu.com/news/national/dcns-insists-scorpene-project-ison-track/article4658401.ece (accessed 8 April 2015). ASSOCHAM. 2013. ‘The Holy Grail of Indigenisation: Achieving Self-Reliance in Defence Equipment’, PwC report, New Delhi, June. Available at: https:// www.pwc.in/en_IN/in/assets/pdfs/publications/2013/the-holy-grail-ofindigenisation.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Bagchi, I. 2013. ‘India pledges $100m for Mali reconstruction’, Times of India, 5 February. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indiapledges-100m-for-Mali-reconstruction/articleshow/18353701.cms (accessed 8 April 2015). d’Andurain, A. 1999. ‘La politique étrangère entre isolement et puissance’, Special Issue on India, Pouvoirs, no. 90, pp. 124–38. Available at: www.revuepouvoirs.fr/La-politique-etrangere-Entre.html (accessed 8 April 2015). de Briganti, G. 2012. ‘The real reasons for Rafale’s Indian victory’, defenseaerospace.com, 1 February. Available at: www.defense-aerospace.com/articleview/feature/132379/why-rafale-won-in-india.html (accessed 8 April 2015). de Gaulle, C. 1966. ‘Discours de Phnom Penh’, 1 September. Available at: www.ina.fr/video/CAF94060215/index-video.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Economic Survey. 2012–13. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, Government of India. (p.268) Ernst & Young. 2009. Capitalizing on the India Opportunity: Helping French Companies Achieve Business Success in India. Available at: www.ey.com/

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France Publication/vwLUAssets/Capitalizing_on_the_India_opportunity_11Feb10/$FILE/ Capitalizing_on_the_India_opportunity_11Feb10.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Giacobbi, P. and E. Woerth. 2012. ‘La place de la France en Inde’, Rapport d’information 4187, Commission des affaires étrangères, Assemblée nationale, Paris, January. (English abstract: ‘India—France’s Indispensable Partner’.) Available at: www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/dossiers/india.pdf (accessed 9 September 2013). Government of India (GoI). 2013a. ‘Transcript of External Affairs Minister’s interview to Le Figaro’, Ministry of External Affairs Media Centre, New Delhi, 11 January. Available at: www.mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/21048/ (accessed 8 April 2015). ———. 2013b. ‘Prime Minister’s Statement to the Media during the State Visit of President of France’, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi, 14 February. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=92229 (accessed 8 April 2015). ———. 2013c. ‘Joint Statement Issued during the State Visit of President of France to India’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 14 February. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21172/ Joint+Statement+issued+during+the+State+Visit+of+President+of+France+to+India (accessed 8 April 2015). ———. 2013d. ‘India–France Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, August. Available at: www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IndiaFrance_Relations.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). India Ministry of External Affairs. 2011. ‘UNSC resolution on Libya—India’s Explanation of Vote’, 18 March, 2011. Available at: http://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/639/UNSC_resolution_on_Libya__Indias_Explanation_of_Vote (accessed 6 June 2015). Indian Embassy. 2012. Investing in France: Opportunities and Insights for Indian Companies (Paris: PricewaterhouseCoopers). Available at: www.pwc.fr/investingin-france.html (accessed 8 April 2015). ———. 2013. ‘Indo-French Economic and Commercial Relations’, Paris, 3 May. Available at: http://ambinde.fr/images/PDF/Indo-French_Commercial_Relations/ The-Indo-French-Economic-and-Commercial-Relations.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Le Drian, J.Y. 2013. ‘Indo-French Defence Partnership: The Choice of Strategic Autonomy’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 26 July.

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France Available at: www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/IndoFrenchDefencePartnership_Jean-Yves (accessed 8 April 2015). Lele, A. 2013. ‘India’s French Connection in Space’, Space Review, 18 March. Available at: www.thespacereview.com/article/2261/1 (accessed 8 April 2015). (p.269) Mayoura, S. 2000. ‘France and Franco-Indian Relations since 1958’. Available at: http://www.upf.pf/IMG/doc/0Mayoura.doc (accessed 8 April 2015). Mishra, A.R. 2013. ‘India Tells France No Further Scope to Meet Free Trade Deal Demands’, LiveMint, 9 July. Available at: www.livemint.com/Politics/ JPSEQSwzxL9K1xwfvKuuDO/India-tells-France-no-further-scope-to-meet-freetrade-deal.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Mukherjee, P. 2007. ‘India and the Global Balance of Power’, Address on the occasion of the national launch of the Global India Foundation, Kolkata, 16 January. Available at: www.globalindiafoundation.org/pranab.html (accessed_6 June 2015). Neogi, A.K. 1997. Decolonization of French India: Liberation Movement and Indo-French Relations, 1947–1954 (Pondicherry: French Institute). Padgaonkar, D. 2013. ‘French President François Hollande’s Visit to India was Low on Style but High in Substance’, Times of India, 18 February. Available at: http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/talking-terms/entry/french-presidentfrancois-hollande-s-visit-to-india-was-low-on-style-but-high-on-substance (accessed 8 April 2015). Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). 2006. ‘Declaration by India and France on the Development of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes’, PMO press release, New Delhi, 2 February. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx? relid=15655 (accessed 8 April 2015). Press Trust of India. 2008. ‘Text of Indo-French nuclear deal’, Times of India, 30 September. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Text-of-IndoFrance-nuclear-deal/articleshow/3545557.cms (accessed 8 April 2015). Racine, J.L. 2003. ‘The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue: Bilateralism and World Perceptions’, in S. Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power (London: Frank Cass), pp. 157–91. Roger, C. 2007. ‘Indo-French Defence Cooperation: Friends in Need or Friends Indeed?’, Research Paper 7, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. Available at: www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/2081635937IPCS-ResearchPaper7Constance.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015).

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France Sarkar, J. 2013. ‘From the Peaceful Atom to the Peaceful Explosion: Indo-French Nuclear Relations during the Cold War, 1950–1974’, NHPIHP Working Paper #3, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. Available at: www.wilsoncenter.org/ publication/the-peaceful-atom-to-the-peaceful-explosion (accessed 8 April 2015). Sinha, A. and A. Iyer-Mitra. 2012. ‘Decoding India’s Syria vote’, DNA, 9 February. Available at: www.dnaindia.com/analysis/1647629/comment-decodingindias-syria-vote (accessed 8 April 2015). The Hindu. 2015. ‘Wiil buy only 36 Rafales, no need for 126: Parrikar’, 31 May. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/parrikar-to-buy-only-36rafales-no-need-for-126/article7268264.ece (accessed June 6, 2015) (p.270) Trésor. 2013. ‘L’investissement étranger en Inde en 2011’, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Paris, 10 June. Available at: https:// www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/7509_linvestissement-direct-etranger-en-indeen-2011 (accessed 8 April 2015). US DOS (Department of State). 2013. Joint Statement, Fourth U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue, Washington, D.C., 24 June. Available at: http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211084.htm (accessed 8 April 2015). Vaidyanathan Iyer, P. 2012. ‘Murthy quits French CEO Forum’, Indian Express, 12 February. Available at: www.indianexpress.com/news/narayana-murthy-quitsceo-forum/911355/ (accessed 8 April 2015). Notes:

(1.) ECOWAS is the acronym for the Economic Community of West African States. (2.) From the press release wrongly titled: ‘Text of the Indo-France nuclear deal’ (Press Trust of India 2008). The full Co-operation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the French Republic on the Development of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Paris, 30th September 2008, has been published by the French Government after the approval of Parliament, in February 2011. (3.) Originally, EPR stood for European Pressurized Reactor. The acronym now stands for Evolutionary Power Reactor. (4.) C.V. Raman and Georges Charpak were both recipients of the Nobel Prize in Physics, the former in 1930, and the latter in 1992. (5.) Narayana Murthy resigned from his vice-chairmanship of the Indo-French CEO Forum because he disagreed with the list of Indian members the Ministry of Commerce had selected (Vaidyanathan Iyer 2012).

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India’s Foreign Policy toward France (6.) See particularly the chapter on the Indo-US entente by Devin T. Hagerty; the chapter on India’s Germany policy by Hannes Ebert; and the chapter on India– Russia relations by Vidya Nadkarni.

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 government conducts such a high-level dialogue. Many observers praise the consultations as the latest testament to an evolving strategic cooperation among ‘natural partners’ that began to take shape in May 2000, when the two countries signed the Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership for the 21st Century. However, this chapter will demonstrate that Germany, throughout the six decades of bilateral relations, has played an ambiguous political role in India’s foreign policy, and has been perceived primarily as an economic gateway to Europe. Only more recently did India take (p.272) steps to transform this narrow and equivocal engagement into a more strategic relationship. India’s Germany policy since independence can be divided into three historical periods: 1947–72, 1972–88, and 1988–2015.1 In each period, New Delhi pursued a distinct set of goals with regard to Germany which were driven by a mix of individual, domestic, and systemic factors. During the first period from 1947 to 1972, the Indian government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru quickly entered into diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) while keeping the German Democratic Republic (GDR) at arm’s length. India’s preferential treatment of West Germany and the Indian governments’ decision not to recognize the ‘second’ German state, was mostly driven by economic incentives coupled with New Delhi’s sympathy to a liberal democratic state that carried the burden, like recently independent India at the time, of (re)building the political identity of a ‘divided nation’ (Das Gupta 2012). India withstood mounting diplomatic initiatives by East Berlin and the Soviet Union and even significant mistrust and irritations between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did not lead to a substantial change of course. The second period from 1972 to 1988 commenced when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi officially recognized the GDR on 8 October 1972. Formal recognition was enabled by Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ‘Neue Ostpolitik’, and driven by India’s desire to re-establish equidistance from both German states and their associated blocs in order to maintain its credible role as a leading member of the NonAligned Movement (NAM). Brandt’s abandonment of Germany’s Hallstein doctrine to deter third countries’ recognition of the GDR—resented by India in the past—led to a phase of indifference instead of a further deepening of India’s Germany policy. The standstill was a response to a significant reduction of aid flows from Bonn and a shift from West German solicitude to indifference toward India, which by recognizing the GDR had lost its central political value. This period of ‘benign neglect’ was additionally driven by economic stagnation in India and mutual political alienation. Indian indifference prevailed until Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Bonn in 1988—the first official head of state visit to West Germany in twenty-eight years. The ensuing third and current phase of India’s Germany policy has witnessed a significant broadening of India’s ties to the reunified Germany, including initiatives to jointly reform the international insti (p.273) tutional architecture Page 2 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 and cautious attempts to strengthen defence and security relations. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union forced India to seek new partners abroad and rethink its policy toward the reunited Germany. New Delhi re-launched an active Germany policy, initiating a number of important policies in the fields of trade, science and technology, and culture. However, as in the past, a shift in economic interests underpinned these changes, and India’s Germany policy broadened only slowly and in substance remained confined to the economic sphere. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the prospects for India’s Germany policy. Whether New Delhi chooses to genuinely broaden its policy toward Berlin in the future seems to mostly depend on the economic development in India as well as on its leaders’ vision of India’s broader role in the international system. Germany’s growing international influence and its recent systematic upgrade of its relations to emerging economies, however, might lead New Delhi to recalibrate its foreign policy and highlight wider common interests to make the strategic partnership less vulnerable to economic fluctuations.

India and the ‘German Question’, 1947–72 New Delhi’s Germany policy in the period after India’s independence in 1947 revolved around the question of recognition or non-recognition.2 Responding to this ‘German question’ was a particularly challenging task for the Indian government. New Delhi was aware that it could pursue formal relations with only one Germany, since the FRG had declared that it was the only legitimate representative of the entire German population. The Indian government thus first took steps to approach West Germany. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, the Indian government became the first in the world to end the state of war with West Germany on 1 January 1950, and among the first to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn on 7 March 1951 (Rothermund 2002). Recognition of East Germany, in contrast, was put on hold for an indefinite period of time. This exclusive recognition of the FRG was a fateful decision that would set the parameters of India’s active but ambiguous Germany policy until 1972. With the emergence of India as a leader of the group of non-aligned states in the 1950s, an informal network that New Delhi used to garner (p.274) support for its foreign policy priority of contesting colonialism and racism in world politics, the preferential treatment to Bonn grew into a dilemma for New Delhi’s foreign policy.3 Pressures to keep equidistance from both blocs—and hence from the two ‘Germanies’—increased, and forced India to gradually balance its approach. New Delhi began to recalibrate its Germany policy, increasingly engaging in trilateral hedging strategies: it shifted from cautious support for reunification, to a long period of de facto GDR recognition and informal contacts to the GDR since the mid-fifties, to finally granting the latter de jure recognition in 1972. This Page 3 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 vacillating policy resulted in recurrent irritations and mutual mistrust with the FRG, and frequently led India close to foreign policy reorientation. Surprisingly, however, its policy of non-recognition survived even the most difficult phases of Indian–West German relations, and New Delhi learned to exploit its pivotal role as the leader of the NAM in both its West and East German foreign policy. Garnering Delhi’s support promised both Bonn and East Berlin more support by the NAM, which was seen as crucial in the German–German Cold War competition. India’s decision to quickly align with West Germany and to maintain the preferential treatment even under internal and external pressure for change is a telling example of Delhi’s efforts to balance principles and political realities. A combination of individual, domestic, and systemic factors explain India’s early and exclusive recognition of West Germany and active yet ambiguous and shifting Germany policy. Pragmatic Indian Leadership: Withstanding Adenauer’s Mistrust

Individual leadership aspects help explain India’s Germany policy during 1947– 72, as the beliefs and concerns of key political figures remained ambiguous and burdened with suspicion. On the one hand, particular convictions were conducive to the decisions to end the state of war with and maintain the onesided recognition of West Germany.4 The first central figure who dominated India’s foreign policy was Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.5 His earlier visits to Nazi Germany in 1936 and civil war torn Spain in 1938 had shaped his belief that international peace was threatened foremost by fascism and imperialism. This belief informed his sympathy to the newly liberated democratic West German state. His affinity was nurtured by what he considered a common struggle for (p.275) liberation, a shared experience of partition, and the mutual challenge of building a new democratic state (Schütz 1964: 44–5). He was also deeply impressed by the ‘capacity for hard work and the inventiveness of the [West German] people’ that led to quick post-war economic recovery.6 Meanwhile, Nehru was not inherently opposed to the communist political economy of East Berlin, but viewed its ‘puppet regime’ unfavourably and as inconsistent with his central post-independence foreign policy doctrine of selfdetermination (Rothermund 2010: 3). Even prior to independence, he had expressed his conviction that India could not be indifferent to the German question. In his belief, which was deeply conditioned by India’s own struggle for independence and subsequent split from what would become the state of Pakistan, partition was an ‘unnatural state’, and reunification (as well as reconstruction) a historical necessity for world peace (Das Gupta 2012: 304; Yadav and Bärthlein 2010). In a Joint Communiqué of July 1956 following his first official visit to Bonn, Nehru expressed his ‘understanding of, and sympathy with, the desire of the German people for the peaceful achievement of their national unity, which would be facilitated by a lessening of tensions and would itself contribute materially to an improvement in the European and the general international situation’.7 Page 4 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 Nehru’s moral principles therefore led him to consider relations with West Germany as a pivotal element of his foreign policy and to name Subimal Dutt, one of his closest aides and one of India’s top diplomats at the time, the first ambassador to Bonn in 1952.8 His successor, A.C.N. Nambiar, who had spent the World War II period in Germany as a journalist and close advisor to Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, was an equally decisive individual factor in India’s active Germany policy. He represented a small group of members of the ruling Congress Party who were well informed about German politics, further encouraging Nehru to attach increasing importance to the ‘German question’ (Der Spiegel 1957).9 On the other hand, several developments throughout the 1950s and 1960s led India to never fully embrace the West German claim of being the sole legitimate representative of the German people, or to categorically rule out the possibility of recognizing the GDR. In 1955, the FRG and the GDR joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, respectively, which to India underscored the de facto existence of two opposing independent states. In a speech (p.276) at the University of Hamburg, Nehru stated his concern, not shared by Adenauer, that military alignment would prevent unification and significantly undermine its prospects (St. Petersburg Times 1956). Second, Nehru acknowledged that the security concerns of Germany’s neighbouring countries, which feared the re-emergence of a powerful united Germany, were potent drivers against unification that needed to be taken seriously. As a result, to the anger of the West German government, he stated at a press conference in 1959 that nobody—including the Western allies and the two German governments—really wished for unification, and that partition was a fundamental fact.10 The ‘professional peacemaker’, as the magazine Der Spiegel dubbed Nehru in 1961, had grown tired of constantly hedging toward the two states and refused to serve as a mediator in the German–German struggle as he had done in other European conflicts (Der Spiegel 1961).11 Throughout the 1950s, Nehru grew increasingly sceptical of the prospect of reunification. Nehru’s relationship with the first German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was also laden with tension. Both heads of state attached considerable importance to their countries’ foreign policies, and hence named themselves at the same time as the first minister of external affairs and foreign minister, respectively. Adenauer appreciated India’s early support, but remained a vocal critic of the positioning of the NAM and was deeply suspicious of Nehru’s worldview (Voigt 2001: 75). The German chancellor in his memoirs accused Nehru of being an ‘idealist not a realist’, and naïve regarding possible Soviet aggression toward West Germany. Nehru in turn criticized his counterpart for having a ‘crusader mentality’.12 The two leaders would never fully managed to build a relationship of confidence and trust. However, the strained relationship between the two leaders was not the only driver of India’s vacillating foreign policy toward Germany, as the next section will demonstrate. India also deliberately aimed to Page 5 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 exploit ‘German angst’ to maintain Bonn’s economic and technological support (Voigt 2008: 679), or, as others argue, gave into Bonn’s blackmail attached to its development aid (Das Gupta 2004). Economic Self-Interest and Hedging on German Angst

Overall, the Indian government’s foreign policy practice never truly called into question its support for West Germany and its policy (p.277) of non-recognition of East Berlin (Voigt 2008: 679). Two powerful domestic factors constrained Nehru’s decision-making on Germany. First and foremost, Bonn’s economic boom combined with its weak political influence internationally promised to serve New Delhi’s interest in building economic self-reliance and political autonomy after independence. India’s post-independence economic system was under substantial stress. The government pursued an ambitious industrialization strategy within the framework of the First Five-Year Plan and was in dire need of external funding.13 West Germany, meanwhile, witnessed an unprecedented economic revival under the auspices of the Western bloc, largely underwritten by the Marshall Plan. This reality brought the two nations into an economic partnership, especially because Bonn’s constrained political role enabled India to benefit from these ties without compromising its post-colonial commitment to staying politically independent. West Germany quickly became one of India’s most important economic partners, and India sought German expertise and financing to help meet its growing infrastructure needs. German companies played a crucial role in the construction of trucks and roads, helping build the first all-seasonal road connections to Jammu and Kashmir, as well as contributing a wealth of technical knowledge and financial investment (Das Gupta 2004: 81–4). Most importantly, a German consortium contributed to one of the Second Five-Year Plan’s most critical and expensive projects, the construction of the Rourkela steel plant. The mill, whose construction was completed in 1955, constituted the world’s most modern, technically advanced, and complex infrastructure project to date (Voigt 2008: 679). In 1959, Bonn supplied financial and technical assistance for the establishment of the Indian Institute of Technology in Madras (now Chennai), the third of its kind in India, and West Germany’s largest international academic project at the time (Voigt 2008: 252). Overall, the FRG became the second most important country after the United States for India’s post-independence economic build-up. The volume of its financial and development assistance equalled that of the entire East bloc (Voigt 2001b: 76). These measures of economic support, however, did not come without political strings attached. While Bonn never formally linked its aid to India with nonrecognition of the GDR, a position which India would have never accepted, New Delhi was well aware that the continuation (p.278) of development aid and, to a lesser extent, preferential trade agreements hinged on its restraint from recognizing East Berlin (Das Gupta 2012). The Hallstein doctrine, which was Page 6 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 introduced in 1955 by Chancellor Adenauer, stipulated recognition of GDR by third states as an ‘unfriendly act’ that would result in a range of sanctioning mechanisms including the severance of diplomatic relations. Until Germany’s own reversal of this policy in the mid-1960s, India, albeit grudgingly, accepted this doctrine, especially as it faced a serious balance-of-payments crisis in 1957 in connection with its ambitious Second Five-Year Plan, which significantly increased its dependence on Bonn’s financial support (Rothermund 2010: 4).14 The relatively high dependence on West German economic support also helps explain the divergent approach to other ‘divided nations’ in the Cold War toward whom India stayed neutral, such as Korea (divided in 1953) and Vietnam (divided from 1954 until 1976). India’s economic stakes in these countries were less pivotal to its economic survival. India’s approach to divided Germany hence ‘did not follow principles but political realities’ (Das Gupta 2012: 301). While the initial embrace of a pro–West Germany policy had been driven predominantly by individual factors, economic incentives ensured its persistence. India’s affinity toward West Germany’s democratic political system and the shared experience of partition constituted a second though less significant domestic driver behind India’s non-recognition. India’s traumatic experience with what it perceived as ‘partition’ after 1947 shaped its early interpretation of the German question in favour of unification (Das Gupta 2012: 300). In addition, India’s emphasis on self-determination as a main pillar of its post-independence foreign policy caused it to publicly distance itself from the GDR, which it perceived as a ‘puppet regime’ of the Soviet Union. India’s affinity toward West Germany’s democratic political system and the shared experience of partition constituted a second though less significant domestic driver behind India’s nonrecognition. Stretching the Limits of Non-Alignment

Systemic factors also underlined India’s policy of non-recognition of the GDR. India as a young state lacked the experience and capacity to withstand the propaganda efforts of the great powers in the Cold War. India’s positioning toward the ‘German question’ was highly relevant (p.279) to both the United States and the Soviet Union due to its emerging leadership in the non-aligned grouping. Bonn and its Western allies feared a potential domino effect emanating from Indian recognition of the GDR, and exerted great efforts to pull India into their camp. The Hallstein doctrine of 1955 mentioned earlier was one instrument of pressure specifically targeted at non-aligned states like India to side with the Western bloc in the ‘German question’. The doctrine had a considerable effect. Delhi’s efforts to balance its Germany policy in accordance with its broader non-alignment policy was confined to symbolic gestures, including the opening of a trade representation in East Berlin in 1954, a cautious public acknowledgement of a de-facto (but not de jure) recognition of

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 the GDR in 1959, and a reluctance to publicly condemn the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As a response to these symbolic gestures, the West increased its political pressure on India by largely rejecting Indian requests for support when the Indian military became entangled in a border war with the People’s Republic of China in 1962 (Das Gupta 2009: 3). Meanwhile, Moscow’s support for East Berlin’s efforts to garner Indian recognition was much more limited compared to the commitment granted by the US and the UK to West Germany. Moscow’s hesitance stemmed from its fear that it could lose control over East Germany as a result of the latter establishing closer ties with non-aligned states (Das Gupta 2014: 6). In spite of growing rhetoric to the contrary, India thus defended nonrecognition in the first conferences of the NAM in Belgrade and Cairo in 1961 and 1964, respectively, and remained loyal to Bonn (Das Gupta 2012: 318).

Recognition and Benign Neglect, 1972–89 After a long period of ambiguity, India eventually moved to formally recognize the GDR in October 1972. The government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had waited until the very last moment, on the one hand afraid to upset stability in Europe, while on the other careful not to miss the opportunity to shape the emerging realities of the de jure partition. New Delhi again tactically manoeuvred its steps toward recognition. While it demonstrated sensitivity toward West Germany’s angst about the domino effect by letting other important non-aligned states such as Egypt and Yugoslavia take the lead in recognition, it (p.280) nonetheless stopped short of waiting until the two ‘Germanies’ signed the Basic Treaty of mutual recognition in December 1972, to demonstrate its independence in foreign policy decision-making and to avoid exacerbating East Berlin’s impatience (Das Gupta 2009: 11, 16). The ‘mantra of such a policy was a slow upgrading of the status of the GDR without annoying Bonn or triggering off a wave of recognition in the non-aligned world’ (Das Gupta 2009: 19). Paradoxically, the full recognition of both ‘Germanies’ would eventually lead to a long period of what West German ambassador to India Dirk Oncken aptly described as ‘benign neglect’ (Das Gupta 2012: 322–3; Rothermund 2010: 5–6). While there were no outright bilateral conflicts, the period from 1972 to 1988 witnessed a diplomatic hiatus and an abrupt decline of economic collaboration. For many years, no Indian prime minister visited West Germany, and levels of official development assistance (ODA) decreased significantly. Again, changes at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels explain both recognition and the subsequent standstill of India’s Germany policy. Chancellors Kiesinger and Brandt: Friends of India

While economic interests largely dominated India’s Germany policy until the mid-1960s, changes in individual leadership in 1966 heavily influenced India’s decision to recognize East Germany in 1972. The year 1966 witnessed a change Page 8 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 in both West Germany’s and India’s governments. In India, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi replaced Lal Bahadur Shashtri as prime minister in January, while in West Germany a Christian Democratic–Social Democratic ‘Grand Coalition’ government under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt came to power in December. The incoming German government introduced a new diplomatic style toward New Delhi. Kiesinger would become the first ever German chancellor to visit India in November 1967, and his approach of seeking consensus and building confidence, which stood in stark contrast to Adenauer’s focus on exerting pressure, was highly welcomed by India (Das Gupta 2012: 319). Indo–West German relations improved significantly and laid the ground for India’s recognition of the GDR when Willy Brandt became chancellor of a Social Democratic–Liberal government three (p.281) years later in September 1969. His charisma, his past as an anti-Nazi resistance fighter, and his Social Democratic political attitudes coincided with India’s post-colonial idealist principles, and dissolved fears of an assertive and distrustful West Germany, which had prevailed under Adenauer (Das Gupta 2009: 4, 18). Nehru and his daughter had already been impressed by Willy Brandt’s keen understanding of the political realities when he visited India in 1959 as mayor of West Berlin. Indira Gandhi explicitly stated her support for the first ever post-war German Social Democratic government (Das Gupta 2009: 11). In addition, the Indian government welcomed Brandt’s decision to gradually soften the resented Hallstein doctrine, replacing the former threat of sanctions with a plea to defer recognition until German-German agreement on the matter, as well as his ‘Ostpolitik’, a doctrine that assertively sought détente toward the East bloc and the GDR and for which Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971. These developments laid the ground for a non-confrontational path to recognition, which was in line with India’s worldview and traditional foreign policy approach of peaceful coexistence.15 In addition, Khub Chand, who had returned to Germany to serve as ambassador from 1967 to 1970, was finally able to realize his policy of accommodation with the GDR under these conducive circumstances that had been absent under his stint as the representative of the military mission in the late 1940s. While these individual factors paved the way for a mutually respected recognition of the GDR, the personal qualities of Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt substantially contributed to the subsequent period of ‘benign neglect’. West Germany’s affinity for India subsided when Schmidt replaced Willy Brandt as chancellor in 1974. Schmidt entertained much closer ties with India’s rival China and focused heavily on transatlantic relations, demonstrating a near indifference toward New Delhi (Rothermund 2010: 5). In addition, in comparison to her father, Indira Gandhi was not very popular abroad, and turned the government’s attention away from foreign policy concerns to domestic policy, essentially mirroring Schmidt’s negligence. In particular, Indira Gandhi’s Page 9 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 decision to declare a state of emergency between 1975 and 1977 was publicly condemned as undermining democracy by the FRG (Voigt 2008: 80). The Indian prime minister portrayed such criticism as illegitimate interference in internal affairs and further scaled down (p.282) India’s engagement with Bonn—a development that deepened the Indo-German political alienation. Domestic Pressure Groups and Economic Stagnation

Until the late 1960s, a GDR ‘friendship movement’ had emerged in India with considerable support from the GDR and the Soviet Union, consisting of civil society organizations such as the Indo-German Democratic Republic Society, and leftist parliamentarians. These groups actively pressured the Indian government to recognize the GDR. In the Indian parliament, a ‘Friends of the GDR’ lobby group was established, which also rallied the Indian public for support to its cause, handing over 3,000 signatures in support of GDR recognition to Indira Gandhi’s government in February 1970 (Voigt 2001a: 84). Economically, India also took steps, albeit cautious ones, to establish some trade links with the GDR. In 1967, New Delhi gave in to pressures by the GDR to open a Bureau of State Trade Corporation, which would be upgraded one year later to a General Consulate. Apart from intensifying Indo–East German economic ties, New Delhi’s growing receptiveness to East Berlin’s aid offers also contributed to its 1972 decision—a late success, given that the East German government had reportedly invested more financial means into public support for recognition in India than in any other country (Das Gupta 2009: 10; Voigt 2001a: 81, 2008: 1, 577). All these initiatives were facilitated by the popular presence of cultural and academic Indo–East German ties, including a long and popular tradition of East German Indology and studies of Sanskrit at Humboldt University. However, the ensuing period of indifference can be primarily attributed to economic stagnation in India. A major drought in India in 1965–6, and the OPEC oil crisis of 1973 triggered by the Arab–Israeli conflict, led to a deep economic crisis. This was compounded by Indira Gandhi’s populist pursuit of nationalization and protectionist policies, which largely led West German companies and investors to pull out of the country. Closer ties to the GDR could not balance this disengagement, as the GDR was plagued with its own economic problems and heavily focused on domestic issues; its international political engagement at the time was mostly confined to sending the infamous ‘congratulatory’ telegrams, which simply recognized any reshuffling of posts (Das Gupta 2012: 322). The strong economic ties and cooperation (p.283) between India and West Germany of the 1950s and early 1960s therefore witnessed a significant interruption. German ODA to India sank by nearly 50 per cent from USD 848 million in 1971 to USD 446 million in 1972. Until 1971, West Germany had been India’s second most important donor after the United States, with ODA to India accounting for 35 per cent of total West German ODA and equalling the ODA of the entire Eastern bloc, according to official estimations (Voigt 2001a: 81). While German overall international ODA increased almost Page 10 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 sixfold during the period of ‘benign neglect’, from USD 808 million in 1972 to USD 4.73 billion in 1988, ODA to India by contrast continued to hover around USD 600 million on average.16 India’s nuclear test in 1974, amidst a period of economic stress, was further met with German public disdain and discouraged Germany from channelling additional financing to India (Yadav and Bärthlein 2010). Meanwhile, the absence of outright conflict and the intensification of IndoGerman academic and cultural ties ensured the ‘benign’ character of this otherwise indifferent relationship. India welcomed the opening of several foundations attached to German political parties and cultural institutes (such as the Max Müller Bhavan)—highly popular among the Indian population— throughout the 1970s (Rothermund 2010: 6). Two Wars and a Tilt toward the Eastern Bloc

While Brandt’s ‘Ostpolitik’ led to a more accommodative handling of the ‘German question’ by India, there were several systemic factors that also underpinned India’s inclination to recognize the GDR. In the early 1960s, West Germany had started to pursue a South Asia policy that often ran counter to Indian interests. Most importantly, Bonn, under pressure from its alignment obligations to the United States and still disappointed by India’s reaction to the 1958 Second Berlin Crisis and the invasion of Goa in 1961, intensified support to Pakistan in its conflicts with India. For instance, West Germany supplied President Ayub Khan’s government with aid and military equipment for the Kashmir war in 1965—a point of Indian contention that was augmented by GDR propaganda to that effect (Das Gupta 2012: 318–19; Rothermund 2010: 5; Voigt 2001a: 82). Bonn also backed Pakistan in the war of 1971 that led to the partition of Pakistan, criticizing India openly for abandoning its principles of non-intervention by supporting East Pakistan (p.284) (Yadav and Bärthlein 2010).17 The denial of support to India by the West more broadly, and US President Richard Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan, led New Delhi to seek support from the Eastern bloc, culminating in the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971 (Raghavan 2012).18 While Soviet support to India was relatively modest in comparison to US support to Pakistan until the mid-1960s, Moscow stepped up its efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, also using its influence over East Germany.19 The East Berlin government stood by New Delhi in the 1971 conflict and seized the opportunity for closer cooperation to pursue its own agenda. As the first European government to recognize Bangladesh’s independence, the GDR government under the newly designated general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, Erich Honecker, increased the pressure on India to reciprocate the gesture and recognize the GDR (Schanberg 1972).20 However, underlining the importance of individual factors in managing these tensions, Chancellor Brandt tactically intervened to prevent this move by requesting the Pakistani authorities to Page 11 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 release Mujibur Rahman, leader of the East Pakistan opposition movement and later first president of Bangladesh (Das Gupta 2012: 320–1). India’s structural tilt toward the Soviet Union not only led New Delhi to recognize the GDR, but also laid the ground for the subsequent period of ‘benign neglect’. With the ‘German question’ out of the limelight, India could no longer exploit its power to tip the scale in the East–West confrontation in its favour, or try to position itself as a mediator in Europe. At the same time, pressure from both East and West Germany to seek New Delhi’s sympathies also ceased. As a result, until the late 1980s, Germany ranked very low on India’s priority list in its foreign policy.

Strategic Partnership among Trade Powers, 1988–2015 Following a long period of ‘benign neglect’, India re-launched an active Germany policy in 1988 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Bonn in June. During the historic events of 1989–90, India enthusiastically embraced German reunification. Subsequently, exchanges among senior government officials grew exponentially, culminating in the now annually held Intergovernmental Consultations.21 The closer interaction (p.285) at the diplomatic level was also mirrored by a boost in economic cooperation. First signs of a broader and more strategic partnership also emerged, which was institutionalized in May 2000 in the Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership in the 21st Century that declared economic exchange, science and technology, and culture as primary areas of cooperation.22 With the signing of the Defence Cooperation Agreement of April 2006, the partnership also integrated defence into its portfolio. As in the 1950s, Germany again became a pivotal European ally and India’s most important European trade partner (Altenburg 2006). These initiatives arguably mark the Indian government’s political will to broaden its Germany policy. Many of the agreements, however, still need to be implemented and therefore carry mostly a symbolic weight, rather than constituting a full-fledged strategic partnership. The persistent divergence of interests with Germany in areas such as climate change, international criminal law, non-proliferation, and internet governance have constrained Indian policymakers’ willingness to intensify relations further. Again, individual, domestic, and systemic factors help explain the return to closer engagement with Germany. Pragmatic Indian Leadership Free from Historical Baggage

Individual leadership kick-started the process of re-launching India’s active and accommodative Germany policy in 1988, but has only played a marginal role in later years. Rajiv Gandhi, who reciprocated Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 1986 visit to India two years later, belonged to a new generation of Indian leaders. He was free from historical baggage and the suspicion that had characterized the Cold War atmosphere. This, combined with his charisma and confidence in the Page 12 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 international arena, facilitated a more active and equal political dialogue with West Germany (Das Gupta 2012: 322–3). In addition, while his mother Indira Gandhi’s domestic economic reforms had alienated Germany, Rajiv embraced a modern vision of economic and political liberalization, which was welcomed in Bonn and nurtured cordial relations between Kohl and Gandhi (Rothermund 2012). This provided the necessary context for the Indian prime minister to designate the FRG as India’s most important European partner and a gateway to the continent’s market on his visit to Bonn in 1988 (Das Gupta 2012: 322). After his assassination in 1991, however, domestic preoccupations constrained his successors (p.286) Vishwanath Pratap Singh (1989–90) and Chandra Shekhar (1990–1) in further advancing Gandhi’s European agenda, and their welcoming remarks on German reunification did not resonate far. It was only when Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao became prime minister in 1991 that foreign policy was drastically reappraised, and the prominent role of Germany in it was resumed. Contrary to protocol, which would have dictated a reciprocal visit by Germany first, Rao visited reunified Germany in 1991 to attend the Festival of India. It was his first official visit abroad (Rothermund 2010: 7). Rao’s successors have continued on the path of stronger engagement with Germany. Under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s auspices, India signed the May 2000 Agenda for Indo-German Partnership. Manmohan Singh carried over a strong economic focus from his tenure as finance minister under Prime Minster Rao into his foreign policy toward Germany as India’s prime minister from 2004.23 India’s Economic Liberalization and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Economic reforms, broader shared interests, and increasingly vocal domestic groups have been the key drivers of the reorientation of India’s Germany policy since the late 1980s. Among these, economic factors again predominantly shaped India’s Germany policy. Facing an unprecedented economic and financial crisis in 1990–1, India pursued drastic structural reforms. These most importantly included economic liberalization starting in 1991 under Finance Minster Singh, and the decision to become a founding member of the World Trade Organization in 1995. Germany became India’s preferred trade partner, and India’s economic rise brought German business and industry back to the country. Bilateral trade grew steadily and substantially. Exports to Germany increased from USD 1.2 billion in 1989 to USD 2.6 billion in 1996, while imports increased from USD 1.6 billion to USD 3.1 billion.24 By 2009, imports from Germany had risen to USD 11.2 billion and exports to USD 7.1 billion, making Germany India’s sixth most important importer and seventh most important export destination.25 Germany also ranked among the top foreign direct investors in India.26 This intensification of trade relations transformed the IndoGerman Chamber of Commerce, originally established in Mumbai in 1956 (p.

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 287) during the post-war boost in economic relations with West Germany, into the largest institution of its kind worldwide (Rothermund 2010: 7). Development assistance also still played a major role in India’s Germany policy. While in summer 2003, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government under Prime Minister Vajpayee suspended most of the aid inflow to underscore the BJP’s goal of reshaping India’s image into that of an autonomous great power (ODA during his tenure went down from USD 106 million in 1998 to none in 2004), Germany was reintroduced as one of India’s few selected donors under the Singh government. In 2011, ODA rose to an unprecedented level of USD 497 million, making India Germany’s second largest aid recipient after Afghanistan.27 India’s new international status and its role as an emerging donor, however, crucially transformed the nature of Indo-German development cooperation, shifting from a previous traditional focus on health and social services to knowledge and technology transfer, especially in energy, environment, and sustainable growth (Wagner 2011: 11). India’s increased economic engagement with Germany facilitated closer cooperation in other areas such as technology and science, culture and society, and defence. Technology and science cooperation has become a major pillar of the two countries’ bilateral strategic partnership. India’s skills shortage and its attempt to capitalize on its ‘demographic dividend’ led India to look to Germany for cues on how to develop an effective higher dual education system, which offers vocational training combined with university study. In 2003, India declared in its ‘Vision for 2020’ that knowledge should become India’s primary competitive resource (Kalam 2003). Continuing a long tradition of academic exchange, New Delhi signed two agreements with Germany in 2004 and 2007 on science and technology cooperation focused on bio and information technology, space research, and natural disaster protection, to name a few.28 In October 2012, the German House for Research and Innovation was opened in New Delhi to further advance academic ties. India’s closer cultural and societal collaboration with Germany has focused on cultural festivities with remarkable visibility, such as the Indian Festival in Germany in 1991, and the German Festival in India in 2001, as well as the Germany Year in India (2011–12) and the India Year in Germany (2012–13) to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic (p.288) relations between India and (West) Germany. In addition, in 2006 India served as the partner country of the Hanover Fair, the world’s largest technology fair, and the Frankfurt Book Fair, again the world’s largest of its kind (Rediff 2006). Finally, the spectrum of societal groups with an influence on India’s Germany policy has grown remarkably, and now includes the Indo-German Consultative Group, which was established in 1992 and annually brings together prominent industrialists and scholars from both countries to produce a set of recommendations on future

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 engagement to the respective heads of state, an active Indo-German Parliamentary Group, and a Federation of Indo-German Friendship Associations. In the defence arena, India, in an effort to broaden relations beyond trade, initiated a strategic dialogue on defence and military cooperation. The Defence Agreement signed in April 2006 created a High Defence Committee which brings together defence ministers of both countries on an annual basis and seeks to expand the previous narrow concentration on the armament sector to include training and exchange of military personnel, increased defence technology transfer, and joint defence production.29 Joint naval exercises started for the first time in April 2008 (The Hindu 2008). In addition, after the Mumbai attacks in December 2008, the German elite police counter-terrorism and special operations force (GSG-9) provided training for the National Security Guards (Indian Express 2008). The first cautious steps to engage in a traditional strategic dialogue also became visible in Indo-German nuclear relations: while Germany heavily criticized India’s overt nuclearization in 1998, and subsequently refused to join the US-led initiative to gradually co-opt New Delhi into the club of nuclear states, Berlin showed a more accommodative stance when it backed India’s aspiration for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group in December 2010 (DNA India 2010).30 Reforming the International Order

The dramatic systemic shifts resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union in the years between 1989 and 1991 and the reunification of Germany forced India to refocus its foreign policy orientation and led it to reposition itself in the new world order. With non-alignment losing its relevance as a primary point of reference, India systematically sought (p.289) new partners (Rana 2002: 31). In an effort to recalibrate and diversify its alignments, India chose Germany as a preferred partner. In 1994, it joined forces with Germany along with Brazil and Japan to form the ‘Group of Four’ (G4) to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The decision was driven by both common interests and value-based considerations. First, common interests with regard to global governance issues such as the strengthening of conflict prevention measures and UN peacekeeping operations, the fight against international terrorism, as well as humanitarian intervention sidelined their different views on questions of climate change, international criminal law, non-proliferation, and internet governance. India is among the largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, while Germany is among the top financiers of both the UN’s regular budget and UN peacekeeping missions, and Germany and India have stepped up efforts to jointly combat terrorism via an Indo-German Working Group on Counterterrorism (Husar et al. 2008: 21). Moreover, India’s economic reforms also propelled a new acceptance of the existing international economic and finance regime as reflected in New Delhi’s membership in the World Trade Organization and the Group of 20 (G20) Page 15 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 (Wagner 2005: 11). This joint belief in multilateralism and the primacy of economics for pursuing national interests has led the Indo-German ‘strategic’ partnership to sideline military aspects. Second and most prominent in India’s official reasoning for aligning with Germany is that both countries are perceived to broadly share the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In its own reorientation process after reunification, Germany had opted to position itself as a ‘civilian power’, commonly understood as a new type of international power that, ‘unlike a great power, uses multilateral institutions and economic cooperation to achieve its foreign-policy goals, avoids the use of military force except in limited circumstances and in a multilateral context, and thus helps to “civilize” international relations by strengthening international norms’ (Kundnani 2011: 3). This understanding corresponded well with India’s strategy of reforming the international order based on pragmatic and economic considerations. Again, as in the post-war period, the combination of economic prowess and political restraint constitute promising conditions for more effective and more equal cooperation.

(p.290) Prospects of India’s Germany Policy During the periods of non-recognition and subsequent ‘benign neglect’, and in recent attempts at establishing a more far-reaching strategic partnership in the multipolar system, individual, domestic, and systemic factors have all played their part in shaping India’s Germany policy. Yet economic interests have largely dominated India’s engagement with Germany, and India has not aimed at formulating a coherent and comprehensive foreign policy toward Germany. However, India has been a beneficiary of the recent geopolitical power transition, accelerated by the 2008–9 economic and financial crisis, and its new international standing has established a blueprint for a more proactive and coherent policy toward Germany in the future. Individual, domestic, and systemic conditions, however, will need to be conducive for New Delhi to fully realize a sustainable strategic partnership. Individual Continuity and Leadership beyond Pragmatism

The outcome of parliamentary elections in India in 2014 will unlikely change the focus of India’s Germany policy. If anything, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first year in office indicated the new government’s intent to re-energize cooperation, in particular in the field of science and technology. During his visit to Berlin and Hannover in April 2015 on the occasion of co-hosting the Hannover Fair, he sought to promote his country as an innovative, reliable, global brand with a predictable business environment. ‘I am here to assure German companies that India is now a changed country—transparent, responsive and stable’, Modi noted in front of a group of German and Indian business leaders.31 The following India visit by German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen in Page 16 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 May equally underlined the mutual will to enhance technology transfer, but also implied cautious steps to deepen the strategic collaboration in the areas of cyberspace and maritime security (Peri 2015). Since 1988, the different governments under Congress or BJP leadership have shown a remarkable continuity toward Bonn and later Berlin. Similarly, the victory of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany’s September 2013 parliamentary elections also points to continuity of past policies. Managing some of the afore-mentioned divergent interests would require the heads (p.291) of state to demonstrate leadership qualities beyond mere pragmatism. Some developments point to initiatives taken beyond this realm. For instance, recent debates in Berlin about strengthening a value-oriented foundation of Germany’s foreign policy, and the German government’s systematic upgrade of its partnerships with rising powers, point to first attempts at finding common ground and might offer entry points for New Delhi. The ‘Heiligendamm Process’ initiated during Chancellor Merkel’s leadership of the G8 in 2007, which aims to intensify cooperation between the G8 and emerging economies, eventually resulted in the creation of the G20. Subsequently, Merkel approved a governmental strategy entitled ‘Shaping Globalization—Sharing Responsibility’ in February 2012 that called for a much more prominent and open-ended engagement with rising India (German Federal Foreign Office 2011). German President Joachim Gauck’s speech on 3 October 2013 to commemorate German unification called on the German government to do just that, arguing that it was crucial for Germany to maintain credibility in the new global dynamics and its G4 alliance to gain a seat in the Security Council (Business Standard 2013). A Pragmatic Joint Venture: Making India’s Germany Policy Resilient to Economic Crises

At the domestic level, the prospects of India’s economic development will arguably have the most significant impact on India’s Germany policy. The high inflation rates and a gradual decline of growth in gross domestic product in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis reveal a lack of sufficient and sustainable structural reforms in India’s political economy and may threaten the stamina of Indo-German economic ties. However, India’s nascent efforts to diversify its Germany policy may pay off in this regard, and further underline the benefits of a coherent strategy. Germany has thus far supported India in negotiations around a free trade agreement with the EU, which started in 2007. Its realization would be an important pillar in stabilizing economic ties (Indian Express 2008). In addition, large-scale high-technology projects such as the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project, which would be worth USD 70 billion once completed and to which German technological know-how would be key, and the Eurofighter bid likewise have the potential to (p.292) offset fluctuating economic ties (Sharma 2013).32 The High Technology Partnership Group that

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 met for the first time in September 2013 reflects efforts to institutionalize this scheme of cooperation. Shaping Globalization in a Contested World Order

The prospects for intensified political cooperation furthermore depend largely on how India and Germany define their global roles in the future. India’s more prominent role became visible when European countries approached New Delhi and its allies in the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) grouping for financial assistance in the Eurozone crisis. In December 2012, the Singh government offered USD 10 billion to the International Monetary Fund to combat the fallout of the Eurozone crisis (Times of India 2012). Demonstrating solidarity and sharing responsibility on issues of global financial stability further strengthens India’s role as an equal partner for Germany, bringing it closer to the level of Chinese–German cooperation, which has far outweighed ties with India thus far. Weakening export opportunities within the Eurozone and increasing calls for a more active leadership role in turn may induce Germany to seek even stronger ties with emerging economies such as India. Economic incentives might also contribute to generating consensus on contested questions in the areas of trade, the maritime order, non-proliferation, and human rights (Fontaine and Kliman 2013). Undoubtedly, there is ample potential for India to further broaden the focus on economic cooperation with Germany and build a more strategic partnership from the groundwork laid thus far. If the domestic and international environment allows Delhi to tap this potential, India’s political engagement with Germany might well transform from an entrepreneurial partnership liable to economic dynamics to a more robust political venture. (p.297) References Bibliography references: Alessi, C. 2015. ‘Narendra Modi: India has Changed’, Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2015. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/angela-merkelwelcomesindian-prime-minister-to-messe-trade-fair-1428917529. Altenburg, T. 2006. ‘Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Gesamtkontext der Deutsch-Indischen Kooperation: Eine Portfolioanalyse’, Discussion Paper, German Development Institute, Bonn. Available at: http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/ volltexte/2011/3072/pdf/13_2006.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Bass, G.J. 2013. The Blood Telegram (New York: Knopf). Business Standard. 2013. ‘Germany must Play Bigger Global Role: Gauck’, 4 October. Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 germany-must-play-bigger-global-role-gauck-113100400376_1.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Das Gupta, A. 2004. Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin: Die bundesdeutsche Suüdasienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949 bis 1966 (Husum: Matthiesen). ———. 2009. ‘India and Ostpolitik’, in C. Fink and B. Schaefer, eds, Ostpolitik, 1969–1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 163–81. ———. 2012. ‘Divided Nations: India and Germany’, in A. Hilger and C.R. Unger, eds, India in the World since 1947: National and Transnational Perspectives (Frankfurt: Peter Lang), pp. 300–25. ———. 2014. ‘The Non-Aligned and the German Question’, in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds), The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War. Delhi–Bandung–Belgrade (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 143–61. Datta-Ray, D. 2012. The Making of Modern Indian Diplomacy: A Critique of Eurocentrism (New York: Columbia University Press). Der Spiegel. 1957. ‘Nehru Nickte’, 2 January. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/ spiegel/print/d-41120205.html (accessed 10 April 2015). ———. 1961. ‘Der Friedensmacher’, 20 September. Available at: http:// www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43366448.html (accessed 10 April 2015). DNA India. 2010. ‘Germany Backs India for Nuclear Suppliers Group Membership’, 6 December. Available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1477526/ report-germany-backs-india-for-nuclear-suppliers-group-membership (accessed 10 April 2015). Dutt, S. 1977. With Nehru in the Foreign Office (Calcutta: Minerva). Fontaine, R. and D.M. Kliman. 2013. ‘International Order and Global Swing States’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 93–109. Fraser, T.G. 1977. ‘Germany and Indian Revolution, 1914–18’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 255–72. German Federal Foreign Office. 2011. Gestaltungsmächtekonzept (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/ contentblob/616558/publicationFile/190244/ Gestaltungsmaechtekonzept%20engl.pdf (p.298) (accessed 10 April 2015). Grevi, G. 2010. Making EU Strategic Partnerships Effective (Brussels: FRIDE).

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 Hazarika, S. 1988. ‘West Germany Builds Trade Ties with India’, New York Times, 26 September. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/26/business/ international-report-west-germany-builds-trade-ties-with-india.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Husar, J., P. Fuhrhop, G. Maihold, and S. Mair (eds). 2008. ‘Neue Führungsmächte als Partner Deutscher Außenpolitik: Ein Bericht aus der Forschung’, SWP-Studien (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/ 2008_S36_hsr_ilm_mrs_ndm_ks.pdf (accessed 10 April 2015). Indian Express. 2008. ‘Elite German Police Wing to Train NSG’, 20 December. Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/elite-german-police-wing-totrain-nsg/400650/ (accessed 10 April 2015). ———. 2013. ‘Germany Voices Support for FTA between India and EU’, 11 April. Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/germany-voices-support-for-ftabetween-india-and-eu/1100889/ (accessed 10 April 2015). Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul. 2003. ‘Vision for 2020’, India Today, 17 March. Available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/president-abdul-kalam-envisions-an-indiawhere-knowledge-is-the-primary-production-resource/1/206902.html (accessed 10 April 2015). Kapur, D. 2002. ‘The Causes and Consequences of India’s IT Boom’, India Review, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 91–110. Kuhlmann, J. 2003. Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der Achsenmächte (Berlin: Schiler). Kundnani, H. 2011. ‘Germany as a Geo-Economic Power’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 31–45. Leifer, W. 1971. India and the Germans: 500 Years of Indo-German Contacts (Mumbai: Shakuntala Publishing House). ———. 1973. Indo-German Partnership. (Mumbai: Shakuntala Publication Series). Nehru, J. 1964. ‘The Problem of Germany. From Reply to Debate in the Rajya Sabha, 23 August 1961’, in Government of India, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, September 1957–April 1963, vol. 4 (Delhi: Government of India), pp. 357–8. Pardesi, M.S. 2012. ‘Southeast Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Positioning India as a Major Power in Asia’, in S. Ganguly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Page 20 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 Peri, D. 2015. ‘Germany Still Hopeful of Selling Euro fighters to India’, The Hindu, 28 May 2015. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ germany-still-hopeful-of-selling-eurofigthers-to-india/article7252765.ece. (p.299) Raghavan, S. 2012. ‘Between Regional and Global Interests: The IndoSoviety Treaty of 1971’, in A. Hilger and C.R. Unger, eds, India in the World since 1947: National and Transnational Perspectives (Frankfurt: Peter Lang), pp. 326–45. Rana, K.S. 2002. ‘Indien und Deutschland im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine Strategische Perspektive’, Auslandsinformationen (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung). Available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_1223-544-1-30.pdf?040415174916 (accessed 10 April 2015). Rediff. 2006. ‘Germany and India are Natural Partners’, 19 April. Available at: http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/apr/19inter2.htm (accessed 10 April 2015). Rothermund, D. 1986. The German Intellectual Quest for India (New Delhi: Manohar). ———. 2002. ‘Introvertierte Nationen: Indien und Deutschland 1947–2001’, in Werner Draguhn, ed., Indien 2002: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft (Hamburg: GIGA Instiute of Asian Studies). ———. 2010. ‘Indo-German Relations: From Cautious Beginning to Robust Partnership’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 1. ———. 2012. ‘Sixty Years of Indo-German Diplomatic Relations’, Lecture delivered at the Federation of Indo-German Societies in India, New Delhi, 29 March. Available at: http://www.figs-india.org/Lectures/Other%20Lecture/2%20%20otherlec.pdf (accessed 2 April 2015). Schanberg, S.H. 1972. ‘East Germany recognizes Bangladesh’, New York Times, 12 January. Schneider, B. 1978. Die Außenpolitik der DDR Gegenüber Südasien, Berichte des Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien (Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien). Schütz, W.W. 1964. Unteilbare Freiheit: Nehrus Politik der Selbstbestimmung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). Sharma, R. 2013. ‘Why PM’s Visit to Germany is Important for India’, Firstpost, 10 April. Available at: http://www.firstpost.com/world/why-pms-visit-to-germanyis-important-for-india-691315.html (accessed 8 April 2015).

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 St. Petersburg Times. 1956. ‘Nehru Calls on Big Powers to End Domination over Other Countries’, 17 July. Available at: http://news.google.com/newspapers? nid=888&dat=19560717&id=tdINAAAAIBAJ&sjid=J3YDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7454,344273 (accessed 8 April 2015). Times of India. 2012. ‘India Offers $10 billion to Combat Fallout of the Eurozone Crisis’, 21 June. Available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2012-06-21/edit-page/32336921_1_imf-india-eurozone-crisis-imf-membercountries (accessed 8 April 2015). The Hindu. 2008. ‘Indo-German naval exercises to begin today’, 8 April. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/indogermannavalexercise-begins-today/article1235329.ece (accessed 8 April 2015). (p.300) ———. 2013. ‘Sujatha Singh to be India’s Next Foreign Secretary’, 2 July. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sujatha-singh-to-beindiasnext-foreign-secretary/article4872628.ece (accessed 10 April 2015). Voigt, J.H. 2001a. ‘India’s Road to Berlin and Bonn: From War to Relations’, in G. Berkemer, J. Lutt, H. Kulke, and T. Frasch, eds, Explorations in the History of South Asia: Essays in Honour of Dietmar Rothermund (New Delhi: Manohar), pp. 27–37. ———. 2001b. ‘Anerkennung oder Nicht-Anerkennung—Das war die Frage: Indien im Deutsch–Deutschen Kalten Krieg 1952–1972’, University of Stuttgart, ed., Wechselwirkungen: Jahrbuch aus Lehre und Forschung der Universität Stuttgart, Stuttgart, pp. 70–86. ———. 2008. Die Indienpolitik der DDR: von den Anfängen bis zur Anerkennung (1952–1972) (Köln: Böhlau Verlag). Wagner, C. 2005. Indien in der Deutschen Außenpolitik. Stand und Ausblick (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). ———. 2011. Die Deutsch-Indischen Beziehungen, Note Du Cerfa (Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2011) Wulf, H. 2013. India’s Aspirations in Global Politics: Competing Ideas and Amorphous Practices, INEF Report, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg/Essen. Yadav, R. and T. Bärthlein. 2010. ‘The Ups and Downs of Indo-German Relations’, Deutsche Welle, 26 November. Available at: http://www.dw.de/the-ups-anddowns-of-indo-german-relations/a-5214092 (accessed 8 April 2015).

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 Notes:

(*) The author is extremely grateful for comments by Prof. Michael Brzoska, Jan Ebert, Prof. Sumit Ganguly, Dr Amit Das Gupta, Prof. Dietmar Rothermund, Caroline van Kampen, Dr Christian Wagner, and Boris Wilke. All errors that remain are the author’s sole responsibility. (1.) For a detailed overview of India’s Germany policy prior to 1947, see Leifer (1971). Indian–German relations during the First World War are covered by Fraser (1977). The significant impact of German political thinkers and Indologists on Indian society is discussed in Rothermund (1986). Such sources help us to understand that the relations between the new states in the late 1940s did not begin from a ‘zero hour’, but reveal significant continuities driven by networks of politicians, diplomats, and journalists with links to pre-Nazi Germany and already established business ties (see Das Gupta 2012: 301). (2.) This chapter focuses only on the key aspects of India’s Germany policy in this period. Written sources on India’s Germany policy until 1972 are extremely scarce and predominantly compiled by German historians. For a broad overview, see Voigt (2001a). The historian Amit Das Gupta has produced the most significant archival work from both the German and Indian Foreign Ministry archives. See, for example, his seminal work on West Germany’s South Asia policy between 1949 and 1966 (Das Gupta 2004); on India’s stance toward German ‘Ostpolitik’ in the period from 1951 to 1972, see Das Gupta (2009); and on India’s balancing between non-alignment and preferential treatment of West Germany, see Das Gupta (2014). For a discussion of Subhas Chandra Bose’s links to Nazi Germany in pre-1947 Indo-German relations, see Kuhlmann (2003). Finally, Voigt’s (2008) extensive work on GDR’s India policy from 1952 to 1972 offers useful insights; see also Voigt (2001a). For a short overview of how the pro-India atmosphere in the Weimar Republic influenced the Indo-German partnership until the late 1960s, see Leifer (1973). (3.) Rani Mullen’s chapter in this volume on India’s Africa policy discusses at greater length India’s leading role in the emergence and evolution of the NAM. Mullen shows that while New Delhi’s anti-imperialist agenda drove its initial desire to keep an ideological equidistance to both Cold War superpowers, the movement lost its institutional appeal after failing to provide sufficient support during the 1962 war with China, and became factionalized and later radicalized during the 1970s and 1980s. (4.) For an excellent overview of the impact of Indian diplomats’ political attitudes on New Delhi’s foreign policy, see Datta-Ray (2012). (5.) For a more detailed description of Nehru’s ties to Germany during the late German Empire and the Weimar Republic, see Schütz (1964: 48–49, 58–60).

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 (6.) ‘The Text of the Joint Communiqué by the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Issued in Bonn on July 16, 1956’, Unpublished manuscript, p. 238. (7.) ‘The Text of the Joint Communiqué by the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany Issued in Bonn on July 16, 1956’, p. 239. See also Nehru (1964: 357–8). (8.) Ambassador Dutt became the longest-serving foreign secretary briefly after his position in Bonn. For the perspective of this leading bureaucrat and diplomat’s on India’s foreign policy during the years under Prime Minister Nehru, see Dutt (1977). Ambassador Khub Chand became the first head of India’s Allied High Commission in Berlin (1946–1949/50), which was replaced by a legation in Bonn headed by the Indian general Prem Krishen until 1952. (9.) The article outlines a tilt toward West Germany in Nehru’s thinking on the German question. While until his stopover in Düsseldorf in1957, he had remained indifferent to the West German demand of withdrawing foreign troops from East and West Germany (and Central and Eastern Europe), largely embracing the Soviet assumption that a troop withdrawal would first require global disarmament, Nehru now for the first time rallied with Bonn, stating that the ‘presence of foreign troops on the territory of foreign countries is neither normal nor desirable’ (Der Spiegel 1957, author’s translation). (10.) Even when the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was debated intensively in the Indian parliament, and Indian fears arose about a possible nuclear escalation and a possible decline of existential economic support, the Indian prime minister fell short of condemning the humanitarian consequences of Walter Ulbricht’s project. Two years later, at the first conference of NAM in Belgrade, Nehru declared ‘the present division as a political reality’ (see Leifer 1973: 42). (11.) Earlier, he had been introduced to the German public as ‘the World Neutralist’. See Der Spiegel (1957). (12.) The quotes can be found in Rothermund (2010: 4) and Das Gupta (2009: 1), respectively. On Nehru’s third visit to Germany in 1957, Chancellor Adenauer stated that he ‘has become convinced that he [Nehru] is not a communist in disguise, but a reasonable man’ (Der Spiegel 1957, author’s translation). (13.) Rahul Mukherji’s chapter in this volume on India’s economic policies from 1947 to the present explores in greater detail how different economic ideas shaped India’s foreign policy in interaction with international and domestic constraints. His distinction between four discrete phases of economic policies–– 1947–66 (‘limited globalization’/‘autarkic industrialization’), 1967–74 (‘antiglobalization’), 1975–90 (‘halting globalization’), and 1991–present Page 24 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 (‘globalization’/‘deregulation’)—suggests that shifts between these broader economic ideas contributed significantly to variations of New Delhi’s Germany policy. (14.) For more information on the Second Five-Year Plan, see Rahul Mukherji’s chapter in this volume. (15.) For a discussion on India’s ‘idealist’ foreign policy, see Wulf (2013: 16). (16.) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ (accessed 4 October 2013). (17.) Germany blamed India for having ‘betrayed its own philosophy of nonviolence and interfering in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country’ (Yadav and Bärthlein 2010) by intervening in the war—an accusation that met with a harsh response by Prime Minister Gandhi, who blamed the international community’s inaction for the outbreak of the conflict and polemically compared the situation in East Pakistan with Germany under Hitler. (18.) Vidya Nadkarni’s chapter in this volume on the special relationship between India and Russia elucidates how the treaty substantiated New Delhi’s pronounced tilt to Moscow, and was another sign of the gradual de facto abandonment of non-alignment principles. (19.) For an insightful account of Nixon’s involvement in the India–Pakistan war of 1971, see Bass (2013). (20.) The New York Times poignantly shows how India’s East Germany policy was part of its larger Cold War positioning: ‘The East German move could have a side-effect—Indian establishment of full diplomatic relations with East Germany. Such a step by India, under consideration for some time, has been strenuously opposed by the United States, just as Washington opposed India’s establishment of full diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, a step New Delhi took last Friday. India’s latest diplomatic moves serve in part to rebuff the United States for its support of Pakistan during the Indian–Pakistan war last month, while rewarding the Soviet Union for its firm backing of New Delhi’ (Schanberg 1972). See also Schneider (1978: 18–20). (21.) India’s technological transition had already attracted West German interest in the late 1980s (see Hazarika 1988). (22.) The agenda is widely understood as a ‘strategic partnership’ agreement, and India and Germany since as ‘strategic partners’. Similarly, India and the European Union entered a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2004, leading to a 2005 joint action plan whose revised version of 2008 is still referred to as the key document for the European Union–India relationship. Yet, the concept of Page 25 of 27

India’s Germany Policy since 1947 ‘strategic partnership’ has been inflated both in international politics and in academic studies without providing an authoritative definition. The aforementioned official ‘strategic partnership’ agreements emphasize the commonality of interests and values among equal partners—yet both the ‘strategic’ and the ‘partnership’ qualities need qualification. For the purpose of assessing India’s Germany policy, this chapter refers to ‘strategic partnership’ in the narrow sense as a relationship between at least two parties which they regard ‘as essential to achieve their basic goals. This is because the cooperation of strategic partners can lead to win-win games and, conversely, because such partners are those who could inflict most harm to one another were relations to turn sour’, and who ‘should contribute to bridging over various levels of cooperation’ (Grevi 2010: 3, 5). Regular cooperation across multiple levels hence turns a bilateral relationship into a ‘partnership’. While the identification of ‘basic goals’ depends on the specific context and is subject to change, a partnership that lacks a significant dimension of security cooperation does not qualify as ‘strategic’. (23.) Former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Sujatha Singh`s promotion to the post of Foreign Secretary in August 2013—a post she held until her removal in January 2015—arguably underlined the diplomatic weight of Germany in India’s foreign policy (see The Hindu 2013). However, among diplomatic postings, Berlin is still considered far less prestigious for Indian foreign policy than key embassies in the South Asian region, Washington, D.C., Beijing, and Moscow. For other signs of how India started thinking strategically about its foreign economic relations in the early 1990s, for example, by strengthening the economic competence in its Ministry of External Affairs, see Pardesi (2012: 122). (24.) ‘OECD Statistical Extracts: STAN Bilateral Trade 2010’, http:// stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=32957# (accessed 6 October 2013). (25.) For the data, see ‘OECD Statistical Extracts: STAN Bilateral Trade 2010’. On the ranking, see Christian Wagner, Die Deutsch-Indischen Beziehungen, Note Du Cerfa (Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 2011), 5. (26.) India, in its turn, constitutes a relatively subordinate economic partner for Germany whose overwhelming focus in Asia remains on China, with German exports to China increasing from USD 2.4 billion in 1989 to USD 50.9 billion in 2009. See ‘OECD Statistical Extracts: STAN Bilateral Trade 2010’. (27.) ‘OECD Statistical Extracts: STAN Bilateral Trade 2010’. (28.) For further information on India’s academic policy in Germany, see Rothermund (2010: 8–10). For an excellent overview on the causes and consequences of the explosive growth of India’s information technology sector, see Kapur (2002).

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India’s Germany Policy since 1947 (29.) German Embassy in India, ‘Bilateral Defence Cooperation’. Available at: http://www.india.diplo.de/Vertretung/indien/en/01_Embassy/Departments/ Defence_cooperation.html (accessed 14 April 2014); for a brief analysis of the agreement, see Wagner (2005: 19–20). (30.) Various factors explain why the international nuclear technology embargo was lifted in the late 2000s, among them a major US foreign policy initiative as well as commercial interests and environmental considerations by other states, in particular France and Russia. For a more elaborate analysis, see Dinshaw Mistry’s chapter on India’s energy policy in this volume. (31.) Cited in Alessi (2015). (32.) Germany’s constraints in supplying spare parts and weapons connected to the Eurofighter to India in case of an Indian war involvement also demonstrate the different strategic attitude compared to France’s India policy, with Paris being willing to assist even in a casus belli. See Jean-Luc Racine’s chapter in this volume.

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea the end of the Korean War as well as in bringing Japan back into the comity of nations in the postwar world. However, by the late 1950s, structural exigencies created by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the closed nature of the Indian economy, led to India’s estrangement from the Pacific economic powerhouses of Japan and South Korea, both of which pursued a policy of benign neglect of India. New Delhi’s ingratiation with Tokyo and Seoul began only with the end of the Cold War and with the simultaneous but gradual embrace of the market by India in the 1990s. It is this combination of structural factors, accentuated by the rise of China and India’s own domestic economic reforms, that is currently guiding India’s policies towards Japan and South Korea. (p.304) This chapter begins with a brief overview of India’s relations with Japan and Korea during the nationalist period, which set the stage for New Delhi’s approach towards these Pacific powers in the aftermath of the Second World War and independence. This is followed by a discussion of India’s policies towards Japan and South Korea under Nehru. In the early years after independence, it was factors at the individual level of decisionmaking, a consequence of Nehru’s near-total dominance of external affairs, that guided India’s policies towards Japan and South Korea. Next, it will be shown that it was a combination of factors at the systemic and domestic levels that led to India’s neglect of Japan and South Korea for the rest of the Cold War. As the Cold War architecture began to harden in Asia by the mid-1950s, non-aligned India found it difficult to play any meaningful role in the Pacific. The closed nature of the Indian economy and the adoption of socialist policies on a large scale by the 1960s also meant that there was no meaningful economic intercourse between India and Japan or India and South Korea, as both of these Pacific powers adopted capitalist and export-oriented economic growth models. It was the end of the Cold War that created a major structural opportunity for India to re-engage with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, India began to implement major domestic economic reforms. In its gradual embrace of the market, New Delhi found important partners in both Tokyo and Seoul. While economic factors remain important, it is structural factors—the rise of China, the protection of the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean Region, and the nuclear issue—that are driving India’s relationships with both of these Pacific powers. This chapter will conclude by arguing that unless there is a decisive and sustained interest by the Indian leadership (as in the Nehru years) to develop close ties with Japan and South Korea, India’s relations with these countries will not be able to reach their full potential, despite the presence of structural and domestic (economic) factors promoting congruent strategic interests.

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Historical Links India’s cultural links with Japan and Korea are around two millennia old as a consequence of the transmission of Buddhism to these regions from the Indian subcontinent.2 Given the influence of Indian ideas on (p.305) Japanese culture, including arts and language, it has even been argued that ‘without Indian influence, Japanese culture would not be what it is today’ (Nakamura 1961: 1). In the case of Korea, an Indian princess from Ayodhya is believed to have travelled to Korea to marry King Suro of Gaya in the first century CE. Both North Korea and South Korea have capitalized on this in recent years, with the North Koreans inaugurating a memorial in Ayodhya to the Indian princess in 2001 (BBC News 2001), and with the former First Lady of South Korea, Kim Yoon-ok, claiming to be a descendant of the Indian princess in 2010 (T.H. Lee 2010). These long historical and cultural connections between India and the Pacific notwithstanding, India’s political links with Japan and Korea are of a more recent vintage. Japan entered the political consciousness of the leaders of the Indian nationalist movement after its victory over Russia in the 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War, the first war in modern history in which an Asian power defeated a western power (Dua 1966). ‘Japan became a symbol of Asian resurgence and a source of inspiration for the Indian nationalists in their struggle for freedom’ (Prasad 1979: 41). Ironically, while celebrating the victory of an Asian power over a European power, India’s nationalist leaders seem to have overlooked the fact that the war was in fact fought over the control of Korea, which became a fullfledged Japanese colony in 1910. India’s fascination with Japan began to end only with the beginning of Japanese aggression against China in the 1930s (Nehru 1994: 18, 449). After the full-scale Japanese invasion of China in 1937, Japan lost favour in the eyes of India’s nationalist leaders. In fact, Nehru organized ‘China days’ in India to raise funds for China’s war efforts and even led the boycott against Japanese goods domestically (Samarani 2005: 9). This was significant not only for moral reasons but also because British India was Japan’s third largest trading partner behind England and the United States (T. Sato 2012: 458). During the Second World War, the leadership of the Indian National Congress was also upset about the association between Subhas Chandra Bose (a former leader of the Congress) and the Japanese. Bose was planning to lead the armed liberation of India from British colonialism with Japanese help (Fay 1993). India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands fell to the Japanese during the war, and were then promptly transferred by them to Bose. The Japanese were finally defeated in Imphal and Kohima in north-east (p.306) India and in Burma (now Myanmar). India provided the bulk of the manpower of the British Indian Army that helped defeat the Japanese in Southeast Asia (Bayly and Harper 2005).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Given the strained relations between India and Japan in the decade or so before independence, it is not a surprise that India’s leaders sympathized with China as a fellow victim of colonialism and sought to build the postwar and postcolonial order in Asia with China as opposed to Japan.3 However, the Indian leadership did not completely abandon Japan. India’s nationalist leaders believed that peace and stability in Asia was not possible without Japan’s active participation, and therefore harsh punishment for Japan or its postwar isolation had to be avoided. At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, Judge Radhabinod Pal, the only Indian justice out of a total of eleven, declared all twenty-five Japanese top leaders charged with Class A war crimes as not guilty. According to Pal, who was also an Indian nationalist and therefore sympathetic to India’s anticolonial struggle, Japan had simply followed in the footsteps of western colonial powers in its quest to colonize large parts of Asia (Kei 2007). Interestingly, a monument to Judge Pal was erected at Japan’s controversial Yasukuni Shrine in 2005 (Onishi 2007). Furthermore, Nobusuke Kishi, a Class A war criminal suspect who was never charged, eventually went on to become Japan’s prime minister (1957), and his grandson Shinzo Abe is Japan’s current prime minister (since December 2012). Abe, a leader with nationalist credentials who has been influenced by the legacy of his grandfather, informed the Indian Parliament during his earlier stint as prime minister in 2007 that Pal was respected ‘even today by many Japanese for the noble spirit of courage he exhibited during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East’ (Abe 2007). This tribunal from over six decades ago clearly has resonance for Japan’s contemporary leaders. Unlike Japan, which elicited strong emotions from India even before independence, India’s nationalist leaders seem to have ignored Korea. Even Rabindranath Tagore, India’s leading intellectual, poet, and literary personality during this period, never visited Korea despite his numerous trips to Japan. Nevertheless, during his 1929 visit to Japan, Tagore wrote a four-line poem titled ‘Light of Asia’ in an attempt to ‘encourage the nationalist aspirations of the Korean people’.4 While Tagore’s poem received widespread publicity in Korea and generated (p.307) positive and negative reactions alike, meaningful political interaction between India and Korea had to wait until the end of the Second World War and India’s independence.

Nehru and India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea India and Korea (1947–54)

Soon after independence, India became involved with the affairs on the Korean peninsula. With a de facto division of the peninsula after the Second World War, the United Nations General Assembly established the nine-member United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) with India’s K.P.S. Menon as its chairman (Pak 2000: 5). The aim of UNTCOK was to ensure Soviet and American troop withdrawal from Korea and the neutral observation of general Page 4 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea elections. Menon, who later served as the first foreign secretary of India emphasized that UNTCOK desired the ‘unity’ of the Korean peninsula (Oliver 1999: 78), which was also in line with the Indian position on the issue. In spite of this, India’s relations with South Korea began with a rocky start. Syngman Rhee, the staunchly anti-communist South Korean leader, who emerged as the country’s first president in 1948 (and ruled the South as an authoritarian leader until 1960), was worried that UNTCOK and India wanted to impose a coalition government on a unified Korean peninsula. However, UNTCOK was not given access to North Korea, and elections were held in the South only (in which Rhee emerged as the winner). While India was against the holding of the elections in the South only, New Delhi nevertheless went along with the American proposal at the UN to do so. However, New Delhi did not extend diplomatic recognition to South Korea. In spite of this, India voted in favour of the American proposal at the UN to extend recognition to South Korea. These changes in New Delhi’s position on Korea were possibly related to India’s ongoing war over Kashmir with Pakistan for which Nehru had sought UN mediation (Kim 2010: 25). Later, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, India was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. India voted along with the United States on two UN resolutions, the first of which named North Korea the aggressor, while the second called for collective (p.308) action against the aggressor (Mansingh and Heimsath 1971: 66). Nehru not only believed that this was the right course of action, but he also felt that ‘well planned aggression had taken place and to surrender to it was wrong and would have meant the collapse of the UN structure as well as leading to other dangerous consequences’ (Gopal 1979: 100). However, India’s support of these US-sponsored resolutions annoyed the Soviets and Chinese, who began to suspect India’s non-aligned credentials. This was unfortunate, because India did not support the US-led UN resolution to provide military assistance to South Korea. Instead, India responded with a medical unit comprising seventeen officers and 329 listed personnel that served troops from the British Commonwealth and South Korea from November 1950 until February 1954.5 Consequently, the United States also began to view India suspiciously as a communist sympathizer. By this time, India had not only recognized the communist regime on mainland China, but was also calling for the People’s Republic of China to be on the United Nations. The Korean War was the first test of Nehru’s policy of non-alignment or strategic independence, and he fully acknowledged the inherent ‘limitations’ in trying to remain independent because all policies depended on ‘other acts done before and other things happening in the world’ (Gopal 1979: 101).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea As the Korean War continued, India played the role of a diplomatic interlocutor between China and the United States, as these two powers did not have direct diplomatic links. Nie Rongzhen, the chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff, and the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai had both informed K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador in Beijing, that China would intervene in Korea if the United States crossed the 38th parallel. While India had promptly conveyed these messages to the United States, the American president Harry S. Truman dismissed Panikkar’s warnings because he was perceived as a communist sympathizer in Washington (Truman 1956: 362). At the same time, Nehru was also resented by Rhee who perceived India to be doing the bidding of Communist China in Korean affairs. Later, when actual hostilities ceased, India also played a leading role in the postwar Korean settlement. The settlement was stuck on the question of prisoners of war (POWs), as the western position of only voluntary repatriation of communist soldiers was not acceptable to China, the Soviet Union, or North Korea (especially since many North (p.309) Korean soldiers wished to stay back in the South). After initially meeting strong resistance from both the Soviet and the American camps, India eventually succeeded in implementing ‘a formula for “non-forcible” repatriation to be carried out by an impartial body of “neutral” states’ (Mansingh and Heimsath 1971: 71). As per the agreement, Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya of India was appointed as the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and Major General S.P.P. Thorat led some 6,000 Indian troops and administrative personnel in the Custodian Force which landed in South Korea and actually implemented the exchange of some 23,000 POWs (Kim 2010: 31). However, it was during this period that the acrimony between Rhee and Nehru came out in the open. While South Korea accused India of forcing POWs to change their minds and go back to the communist countries, ‘India reciprocated with public and private criticism of the Rhee regime, including Rhee’s negative attitude toward the armistice, his reluctance to abandon the policy of reunification through force, and the “undemocratic aspects” of the Government of the Republic of Korea [ROK or South Korea]’ (Gills 1996: 89). At the same time, India’s role as a liaison for Communist China ‘infuriated the ROK’, and Rhee ‘nurtured a vendetta against Nehru and India as a result of India’s role in the Korean POW repatriation issue’ (Gills 1996: 88–9). It is not surprising that India and South Korea became estranged in the ensuing years. India and Japan (1951–66)

Unlike relations with South Korea, India’s relations with Japan began on a more positive note. Ever since independence, India was officially in a state of war with Japan which was under American occupation. When invited to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951, Nehru declined and argued that this was ‘one of the wisest things’ that India had done so far (Nehru 1996: 629). To Page 6 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea begin with, India did not wish to be a part of a multilateral framework for security in Asia that excluded China and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, India felt that ‘the Treaty did not grant Japan full sovereignty’ (Levi 1952: 120). More specifically, India had three major objections to the treaty. First, India complained about Japan being coerced to grant military bases to the United States as well as about the stationing of American troops in Japan. Second, India wanted the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands and the Bonin (Ogasawara) (p.310) Islands to be returned to Japan instead of becoming American trust territories. Finally, India wanted Taiwan (a Japanese colony since 1895) to be returned to China. As a consequence, India decided to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan in June 1952, which was modelled after the San Francisco Peace Treaty but differed significantly from it (H. Sato 2005). First, India waived all wartime reparations owed by Japan as the damage done by the Japanese on Indian territory was relatively small. Second, the treaty with Japan was negotiated between ‘equals’, as both India and Japan granted one another the ‘most favoured nation’ status. This was in sharp contrast to the San Francisco Peace Treaty through which Japan was made to unilaterally grant this status to all the Allied powers. This was largely due to the fact that while the United States and especially its Asia-Pacific allies feared an economically resurgent Japan, India did not. In fact, it is reasonable to infer that India would have preferred a stronger Japan to China’s east that would keep Beijing preoccupied in East Asia, now that India’s suspicions regarding China were out in the open as a consequence of the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950–1.6 Notably, the peace treaty with India was Japan’s first treaty with an Asian state since the end of American occupation, and therefore represented Japan’s return in postwar Asia.7 The treaty with India was also useful because India enjoyed the respect of many Southeast Asian states under Nehru’s leadership, and this helped Japan during its negotiations with Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines which were then under way. India did not want Japan isolated from the larger Asian arena, and had earlier invited it to participate in the first Asian Games held in New Delhi in March 1951 (Japan had not been invited to the 1948 London Olympics). Nehruvian India had organized these games in its bid to portray Delhi as the ‘capital of Asia’ (Majumdar and Mehta 2009: 112). Similarly, under Nehru’s leadership, Japan was invited to the 1955 Bandung Conference and welcomed back into the comity of Asian nations, even though Japan was not yet a member of the UN (Ampiah 1995).8 Not surprisingly, Japan was appreciative of Indian efforts. During these early years, ‘the economic relationship between the two countries mirrored the prewar years’ (T. Sato 2012: 459). Indian cotton had played an important role in Japan’s industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Japan was India’s second largest trading (p.311) partner on the eve of the Second World War, while India was Japan’s third largest trading partner Page 7 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea (Mansingh and Heimsath 1971: 490). This relationship was somewhat restored in the 1950s when India began exporting raw cotton to Japan. In the following decade, when Japan’s postwar economic recovery took off, India became the leading supplier of iron ore to Japan (T. Sato 2012: 461). As early as 1950, India was the first recipient of Japan’s overseas technological transfer project when Japan began to manufacture electric wires in India. By the end of that decade, Japan was also supplying yen loans to India (Takenori 1993: 36). However, changes in the Indian economy and Cold War politics were already beginning to put an end to this nascent period of Indo-Japanese bonhomie.

India’s Estrangement with Japan and South Korea Indo-Japanese Relations until the End of the Cold War

In spite of a relatively good start, the Indo-Japanese relationship began to lose steam in the early 1960s. To begin with, India and Japan had different visions for the Asian security order. While Nehru’s India had adopted a policy of nonalignment and had even articulated a ‘Monroe Doctrine for Asia, or the complete disappearance of all ‘foreign armies operating in Asian countries’,9 Japan, under the so-called Yoshida Doctrine (named after Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida), had adopted economic development as Japan’s grand strategy after leaving the country’s defence in a subordinate alliance with the United States (which was formally signed after the San Francisco Peace Treaty) (Pyle 2007: 241–77). Consequently, India began to view Japan as America’s ‘surrogate in Asia’ (Limaye 2006: 226). During the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Japan chose to remain neutral although it did extend sympathy to India (Murthy 1968: 54). While their Cold War differences were important, Japan’s decision had more to do with the advent of SinoJapanese commercial relations. While ‘friendly trade’ between Japan and China had begun in 1960, it was formalized in the 1963 Liao–Takasaki Agreement even before the normalization of relations between the United States and China (Itoh 2012). After Nehru’s death in 1964, India also embraced socialism more decisively after having begun under a mixed economy in the wake of (p.312) independence (Panagariya 2008: 47–77). This dramatically reduced India’s attractiveness for Japan. In fact, after 1966, Japan began to shift its economic attention, including the Japanese official developmental assistance (ODA), towards Southeast Asia. ‘Until that time’, Japan ‘had regarded India as part of Southeast Asia’ (Takenori 1993: 37). However, India now disappeared from Japan’s mental map of Asia that ended in Burma/Myanmar. Later, following the American lead, Japan did not take sides in the 1965 India– Pakistan War either. Furthermore, not only did India’s 1971 ‘friendship treaty’ with the Soviet Union put India and Japan in rival Cold War camps, but it also meant that India was now aligned with Japan’s principal Cold War adversary. No peace treaty had been signed between Japan and the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War as a result of differences over the Southern Kurils/ Page 8 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Northern Territories.10 India’s position on these islands—that these island territories should belong to the Soviet Union as a result of the Yalta Agreement (Levi 1952: 121)—meant that India could not expect any support from Japan over its territorial dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan (or over the border issue with China). In fact, Japan closed down its consulate in Dhaka during the 1971 Bangladesh War to avoid becoming embroiled in subcontinental affairs (Khan 1975–6: 550). Tokyo was also upset with New Delhi for conducting a nuclear test in 1974 (Langdon 1975). While there was a modest improvement in economic relations between India and Japan in the 1980s—noticed most visibly in the automobile sector in the form of the Maruti car in India (a joint collaboration with Japan’s Suzuki and the Indian government) (Venkataramani 1990)—IndoJapanese relations remained strained until the end of the Cold War. India’s Relations with South Korea until the End of the Cold War

As with India’s relations with Japan during this period, India also had troubled relations with South Korea. To begin with, India was critical of the 1953 mutual defence treaty signed between the United States and South Korea after the end of the Korean War, for it made provisions for the continued presence of western troops in Asia.11 Furthermore, since President Rhee remained in office in South Korea until 1960, there were no official relations between New Delhi and Seoul. Consular relations (p.313) between India and South Korea were established only in 1962, while full diplomatic links at the ambassadorial level had to wait until 1973 (Kanan 2008: 307). However, given India’s policy of non-alignment, consular- and ambassadorial-level relations were established between India and North Korea at the same time as New Delhi was following a policy of ‘equality’ towards the two Koreas. India was also highly critical of South Korea’s contribution of troops in support of America’s war efforts in Vietnam in the 1960s (Brewster 2010a: 405). However, India did not rethink its Korea policy even after it was discovered that Pakistan had purchased military hardware, including ammunition and spare parts, from North Korea during the 1971 Bangladesh War (Brewster 2010a: 407). In fact, New Delhi and Pyongyang appeared to be in the same camp when seen from Seoul after the announcement of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty. At the same time, South Korea was also rapidly emerging as one of Asia’s ‘tiger economies’ by following an export-led model of economic growth while India turned towards socialism (Harvie and Lee 2003). Consequently, as in the case with Japan, India had neither an economic nor a strategic rationale to engage with South Korea during the rest of the Cold War.

The End of the Cold War and the Beginning of India’s Engagement with Japan and South Korea

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Economic Relations

The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union removed one of the most significant barriers affecting India’s relations with these Pacific powers. At the same time, India also experienced a serious balance of payments crisis. India managed to avoid default only after shipping its gold reserves to the Bank of England as collateral, thereby receiving financial help from the Bank of England ($210 million) and the Bank of Japan ($195 million) (T. Sato 2012: 462). Japan’s powerful position at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank also provided India with structural adjustment loans, following which India embarked upon fundamental reforms and began to embrace the market. Simultaneously, India also launched the so-called ‘Look East’ policy as it began to engage its neighbours in East Asia, a region that was (p.314) emerging as the most dynamic centre of the global economy. While it is generally believed that India’s initial thrust under the ‘Look East’ policy was directed towards Southeast Asia, this view is incorrect. The Northeast Asian states of Japan and South Korea were very much within the ambit of India’s ‘Look East’ policy from the very beginning.12 On the eve of India’s economic reforms, Manmohan Singh, a senior Indian government official (who was the finance minister at the time of India’s economic reforms, and served as prime minister from 2004 to 2014), observed that the economic rise of Japan, which had emerged as the world’s second largest economy by the end of the Cold War, ‘presages the emergence of China and India in the twenty-first century’ (Singh 1988: 47). At the same time, India also drew inspiration from the East Asian tiger economies, including South Korea (Singh 2006). Therefore, it is no surprise that the Indian leadership visited both Japan and South Korea immediately after launching its ‘Look East’ policy in order to showcase its economic reforms and potential, and to engage with the fastest growing economies in the world. The Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao visited Japan and South Korea in 1992 and 1993, respectively (Saint-Mézard 2006: 43). Singh (who had also visited Japan along with Rao) has been of the opinion that, as a major leader in technology and innovation, economic relations with Japan have the potential to ‘transform’ India (Bagchi 2013). Similarly, in Seoul, Rao, who was the first Indian prime minister to ever visit South Korea, made it clear that India would no longer follow parallel policies with North and South Korea, as New Delhi was now being guided by its commercial interests in its external relations (Saint-Mézard 2006: 43). Notably, both Japan and South Korea reciprocated India’s economic overtures. Japan soon identified India (along with China and Vietnam) as ‘Asia’s new [economic] frontier’, while South Korea, which had only recently established diplomatic ties with China (in 1992), looked towards India, as Seoul did not wish to put all of its eggs in the China basket (Saint-Mézard 2006: 47, 49).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea India’s economic relations with Japan and South Korea have come a long way over the past two decades. South Korea and Japan are India’s fourteenth- and sixteenth-largest trading partners.13 Similarly, Japanese and South Korean foreign direct investment has been steadily growing in India.14 India has also been the single largest recipient of Japanese ODA since 2003.15 Japanese ODA is important for political reasons as it (p.315) highlights the priorities of the Japanese government. At the same time, it also offers a cue to private Japanese companies to invest in specific markets. India also signed free trade agreements with South Korea and Japan in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Furthermore, Japan is involved in several high-profile commercial projects in India, like the Delhi– Mumbai and the Chennai–Bangalore industrial corridors (Siddiqui 2013). China’s decision in 2010 to cut the export of its rare earth metals to Japan, metals that are vital for the latter’s hi-tech industries, also led Japan to reach an agreement with India as Tokyo began to look for alternative suppliers (Asahi Shimbun 2012; King and Armstrong 2013). Despite these successes, India’s commercial ties with Japan and South Korea pale in comparison with China’s commercial relations with these states.16 However, both Japan and South Korea are looking towards India with the aim of reducing their growing economic dependency on China. At the same time, the slow pace of India’s reforms, inadequate infrastructure, and the legal aspects of industrial land acquisition in India are major concerns for these Pacific states.17 However, there is one crucial difference between Japanese and South Korean investments in India. While South Korea hopes to use India as a manufacturing base for potential export to other markets, Japan is largely investing in India for consumption in the Indian market itself (Brewster 2010a: 411; Green 2011: 150; C.M. Lee 2011: 188–9). The medium- to long-term consequences of these different investment strategies are not yet clear. While much needs to be accomplished on the economic front, there has been a remarkable alignment in their strategic interests in recent years. Strategic Relations

To begin with, there has been a dramatic transformation in Indo-US relations since the end of the Cold War. Their alliance with the United States has been the central pillar of Japan’s and South Korea’s foreign policy for almost six decades now. India’s budding partnership with the United States has not only provided an impetus to the Japan–India alignment, but it also provides Japan with ‘an alliance hedge against overdependence on the United States for security’ (Green 2011: 132). The same is true for South Korea as well (Brewster 2010a: 419). At the same time, all of these powers are also concerned about the rise of China. Some analysts have even described the China factor as the (p.316) ‘primary driver bringing Tokyo and New Delhi together’ (Mathur 2012: 2; emphasis in original). While this may be an exaggeration, the rise of China has certainly brought Asia’s two biggest democracies closer to one another. Japan and India have recently rediscovered one another in the context of their own Page 11 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea (re-)emergence as great powers in Asia. On the other hand, South Korea, concerned though it is about the rise of China, is approaching India not from the perspective of balance of power politics, but as a consequence of its desire to expand its strategic footprint in Asia and beyond (C.M. Lee 2011: 166, 191). At the same time, issues related to nuclear proliferation have brought these states together. While Japan and South Korea worry about North Korea’s nuclear weapons, India is concerned about Pakistan’s.18 Furthermore, the Pakistan– North Korea nuclear proliferation axis (which arguably runs through China) and has been apparent for at least two decades is slowly bringing Asia’s democratic powers together. Pakistan is believed to have supplied nuclear weapons technology to North Korea while receiving missile technology in return (see Squassoni 2006). As early as 2000, the South Korean foreign minister Lee JoungBinn had expressed his concerns about the Pakistan–North Korea nuclear and missile nexus during his visit to India (Raja Mohan 2000). Similarly, Japan and India have also been discussing this issue that has directly connected the Indian subcontinent with the Korean peninsula since 2003 (if not earlier) (MOFA 2003). However, progress on this issue has been limited to date because of India’s ‘desire to avoid taking a role in security issues on the Korean peninsula’ (Brewster 2010b: 100). Japan had also led a major political campaign against India in the aftermath of New Delhi’s May 1998 nuclear tests (Limaye 2000). In fact, Japan had even temporarily recalled its ambassador to India (Jaishankar 2000). Furthermore, Japan’s economic sanctions on India were much harsher than those imposed on China after Beijing’s five nuclear tests in 1996 (Limaye 2000: 324). However, after the United States removed all sanctions imposed on India in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Tokyo also followed Washington’s lead. Japan also grudgingly supported the 2008 US–India civil nuclear deal. However, India has not yet been able to sign a similar pact with Japan, and this has become particularly problematic in the aftermath of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster (The Hindu 2013). However, several Japanese firms, especially those with ties with American nuclear firms (such as Toshiba (p.317) and Hitachi), are keen to enter into a commercial/civilian deal with India (Green 2011: 137). On the other hand, given its ambitions of entering the Indian nuclear energy sector, South Korea signed a nuclear deal with India in 2011 (BBC News 2011). Finally, the reliance of these two Pacific powers on the Indian Ocean, especially for their energy needs, has led them to establish close maritime links with India. India’s maritime power first became apparent to Japan when its vessel, M/V Alondra Rainbow, which was hijacked by pirates in the Strait of Malacca in 1999, was recovered by the Indian navy (Richardson 1999). Later, in April 2002, Indian naval ships escorted high-value American ships passing through the Strait of Malacca during Operation Enduring Freedom (Baruah 2002). Since both South Korea and Japan are acutely dependent upon the Middle East for Page 12 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea energy resources to power their economies, and because the bulk of their energy resources pass through the Strait of Malacca, the maritime dimension of their relationship is poised to grow in the years ahead.19 India and Japan are already conducting joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and in the waters around Japan (and have also participated in trilateral naval exercises with the United States). In fact, Japan has requested the Indian government to convert the annual US–India naval exercises into trilateral exercises involving Japan as well (Times of India 2014). Japan has also called for India and Japan, Asia’s ‘two largest maritime democracies . . . to become net providers of regional security’ (Bhamik 2013). Similarly, the South Korea–India partnership also ‘has all the hallmarks of becoming a mini-Blue Ocean relationship’ (C.M. Lee 2011: 162). In recent years, India’s ‘Look East’ policy and its desire to play the role of a major power in Asia have helped it foster closer relations with Japan and South Korea, which have been facilitated by both structural and domestic (economic) factors as described earlier in this chapter. India and Japan have recently established the so-called ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective foreign and defence secretaries to discuss all of the previously mentioned issues, given that Asia’s strategic architecture is currently in a flux.20 While the 2+2 dialogue is Japan’s third such relationship after the United States and Australia, it is India’s first such engagement with an external power. Similarly, India, Japan, and (p. 318) the United States have also been holding regular trilateral dialogues since 2011 (Hindustan Times 2013). At Japan’s insistence, India has also become a member of the most important regional security institutions such as the East Asia Summit (despite Chinese objections). Similarly, India and South Korea established a strategic partnership in 2010 and have since been holding regular foreign policy and security dialogues (Times of India 2013). As a consequence, both South Korea and Japan have emerged as new potential suppliers of advanced defence hardware for India. In fact, India can learn much from South Korea in the defence-industrial sector, as Seoul has been domestically manufacturing almost 70 per cent of its total defence equipment since 1990 (Gallagher 2010: 48). South Korea leads in shipbuilding and drone technologies, which are useful areas for potential collaboration with India.21 India is not only purchasing eight advanced minesweeping and hunting warships from South Korea (Pandit 2012), but is also in the process of purchasing the US-2 amphibian aircraft from Japan (Economic Times 2013). Although this dual-use aircraft will most likely be sold to India as a commercial plane, it is representative of Japan’s entry into the global arms export market. While strategic and economic issues are bringing Japan and South Korea closer to India, New Delhi’s relationship with these Pacific powers will need intensive high-level engagement for several years before it can generate a self-sustaining momentum. Given their relatively weak economic relations (especially when Page 13 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea viewed from the perspective of the Pacific economies), their mutual rediscovery of the strategic importance of one another after a long hiatus, and the absence of strong domestic groups in any of these countries lobbying for closer politicomilitary ties, regular high-level political and military engagement is needed before these relationships can be taken forward. During his second term in office (2009–14), India’s Prime Minister Singh made a concerted effort to build strategic relationships with Japan and South Korea, and to ensure that India is seen as a part of ‘Asia’ in the mental maps of these Pacific states. In particular, Japan has ‘de-hyphenated’ India from Pakistan and has begun to look towards India as a major strategic player in Asia as it ‘equalizes’ its alliance with the United States while simultaneously looking for new partners. Not only did Singh personally visit both Seoul and Tokyo in his second term, but his foreign and defence ministers also paid visits to (p.319) these Northeast Asian states. Similarly, the Japanese defence and foreign ministers visited New Delhi during these years, and the Japanese prime minister Abe (of the Liberal Democratic Party) visited India as the chief guest for the country’s Republic Day celebrations in 2014. In fact, there is clearly bipartisan support in Tokyo for closer relations with India, as Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (of the Democratic Party of Japan) had also visited New Delhi in 2009. However, there is some uneasiness among certain quarters of the Congress Party itself about forging closer relations with Tokyo, especially in terms of the signal that this will send to Beijing. The Indian president Pranab Mukherjee (an old Congress Party stalwart) visited a World War II cemetery in Kohima in north-eastern India (where British and Indian soldiers had fought the Japanese) on the day the Japanese emperor Akhito and Empress Michiko arrived in India on a rare overseas visit in late 2013 (Bhaumik 2013). Likewise, the former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited India as the chief guest for the country’s Republic Day celebrations in 2010, while the current president Park Guen-hye was in New Delhi in mid-January 2014. The South Korean foreign and defence ministers also visited India during Singh’s second term in office. There is clearly a push by the top leadership in New Delhi, Tokyo, and Seoul to promote closer Indo-Japanese and Indo–South Korean relations. However, it needs to be noted that while the Indo-Japanese relationship has the potential to contribute to the balance of power in Asia, the Indo–South Korean relationship is not in the same league. After all, South Korea is only a medium power (its dynamic economy and technological sophistication notwithstanding). On the other hand, India and Japan are Asia’s (re-)emergent great powers. Nevertheless, the Indo–South Korean relationship is important simply because it has the potential to transform the Indian economy and build up its technological capabilities, thereby enhancing its status in Asia. Although the budding Indo-Japanese relationship also holds this promise, this partnership

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea (p.323) Kanan, N. 2008. ‘Indians in Korea’, in K. Kesavapany, A. Mani, and P. Ramasamy, eds, Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 301–15. Kei, U. 2007. ‘Pal’s “Dissenting Judgment” Reconsidered: Some Notes on Postwar Japan’s Responses to the Opinion’, Japan Review, vol. 19, pp. 215–24. Khan, Z.R. 1975–1976. ‘Japanese Relations with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 541–57. Kim, C.W. 2010. ‘The Role of India in the Korean War’, International Area Review, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 21–37. King, A. and S. Armstrong. 2013. ‘Did China Really Ban Rare Earth Metals Exports to Japan?’, East Asia Forum, 18 August. Available at: http:// www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/18/did-china-really-ban-rare-earth-metalsexports-to-japan/ (accessed 12 April 2015). Langdon, F.C. 1975. ‘Japanese Reactions to India’s Nuclear Explosion’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 173–80. Lee, C.M. 2011. ‘Coping with Giants: South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise’, in A.J. Tellis, T. Tanner, and J. Keough, eds, Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers, China and India (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research), pp. 161–92. Lee, T.H. 2010. ‘India is First Lady Kim’s ancestral home’, Korea Times, 25 January. Available at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/ 2013/08/116_59663.html (accessed 12 April 2015). Levi, W. 1952. Free India in Asia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Limaye, S. 2000. ‘Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 322–39. ———. 2006. ‘Japan and India after the Cold War’, in Y. Sato and S. Limaye, eds, Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges (Lanham: Lexington), pp. 225–47. LiveMint. 2013. ‘Posco Investors Sour over $12 billion Orissa Plant’, 25 July. Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Companies/73dFZrTG0fm3FIij1k7oFL/ Posco-investors-sour-over-12-billion-Orissa-plant.html (accessed 13 April 2015). Majumdar, B. and N. Mehta. 2009. India and the Olympics (New York: Routledge). Mansingh, S. and C. Heimsath. 1971. A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied Publishers). Page 17 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Mathur, A. 2012. ‘India–Japan Relations: Drivers, Trends and Prospects’, RSIS Monograph No. 23, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2003. ‘Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi’s Visit to Sri Lanka and India (Summary and Evaluation)’, (p.324) January. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/fmv0301/ summary.html (accessed 13 April 2015). ———. 2005. ‘Outline of Japan’s ODA to India’. Available at: http:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0504/oda_i.pdf (accessed 12 April 2015). Murthy, P.A.N. 1968. ‘India and Japan’, in J.D.B. Miller, ed., India, Japan, Australia: Partners in Asia? (Canberra: Australian National University Press), pp. 39–58. Nakamura, H. 1961. Japan and Indian Asia: Their Cultural Relations in the Past and Present (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay). Nehru, J. 1985. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, second series, vol. 3 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund). ———. 1994 [1946]. The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). ———. 1996. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, second series, vol. 19 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund). Oliver, R.T. 1999. ‘Transition and Continuity in Korean–American Relations in the Postwar Period’, in Y.B. Lee and W. Patterson, eds, Korean–American Relations: 1866–1997 (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 67–82. Onishi, N. 2007. ‘Decades after War Trials, Japan still Honors a Dissenting Judge’, New York Times, 31 August. Pak, C.Y. 2000. Korea and the United Nations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International). Panagariya, A. 2008. India: The Emerging Giant (New York: Oxford University Press). Pandit, R. 2012. ‘India to Buy 8 Warships from South Korea for Rs 6,000 Crore’, Times of India, 10 June. Prasad, B. 1979. Indian Nationalism and Asia (1900–1947) (New Delhi: B.R. Publishing). Pyle, K.B. 2007. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs). Page 18 of 22

India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Raja Mohan, C. 2000. ‘India, South Korea to strengthen partnership’, The Hindu, 1 August. Reserve Bank of India. 2013. ‘Foreign Direct Investment Flows to India: Country-wise and Industry-wise’, 22 August. Available at: http://www.rbi.org.in/ scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1110 (accessed 12 April 2015). Richardson, M. 1999. ‘Challenging marauders’ Spread, Navy Recovers a Hijacked Ship: India and China Set Sights on Piracy’, New York Times, 23 November. Saint-Mézard, I. 2006. Eastward Bound: India’s New Positioning in Asia (New Delhi: Manohar). Samarani, G. 2005. ‘Shaping the Future of Asia: Chiang Kai-shek, Nehru, and China–India Relations during the Second World War Period’, Working (p.325) Paper No. 11, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden. Available at: http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download? func=downloadFile&recordOId=951381&fileOId=3128707 (accessed 12 September 2013). Sato, H. 2005. ‘India Japan Peace Treaty in Japan’s Post-War Asian Diplomacy’, Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, vol. 17, pp. 1–20. Sato, T. 2012. ‘Economic Relations between India and Japan’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 457–78. Shanker, A. 2014. ‘India Removes Hurdle for POSCO Project before Park Visit’, Bloomberg, 10 January. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 2014-01-09/india-clears-hurdle-for-8-billion-posco-plant-before-park-visit.html (accessed 13 April 2015). Siddiqui, H. 2013. ‘Delhi–Mumbai Corridor tops PM’s Japan Agenda’, Indian Express, 27 May. Singh, M. 1988. ‘India and Japan on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century’, in U.S. Bajpai, ed., India and Japan: A New Relationship (New Delhi: Lancer), pp. 46–53. ———. 2006. ‘India has Come to Terms with Globalisation: PM’, Rediff.com, 18 March. Available at: http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/mar/18asoc.htm (accessed 12 April 2015). Squassoni, S.A. 2006. ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan’, CRS Report for the Congress, 28 November. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf (accessed 13 April 2015).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea Takenori, H. 1993. ‘Synchronizing Japan–India Relations’, Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 34–40 (36). The Hindu. 2013. ‘Several issues hold up civil nuclear deal: Japan’, 13 September. Times of India. 2013. ‘India, South Korea hold foreign policy, security dialogue’, 3 September. ———. 2014. ‘Japan Wants to Join India–US Naval War Games’, 12 January. Truman, H.S. 1956. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, vol. 2 (New York: Doubleday & Company). Venkataramani, R. 1990. Japan Enters Indian Industry: The Maruti-Suzuki Joint Venture (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers). Notes:

(1.) This chapter focuses on only two Pacific states, Japan and South Korea. On India’s relations with China (and how they fit with Nehru’s vision of India’s role in the Pacific) and with the United States (which is also a Pacific power), please see the chapters on Sino-Indian and US–India relations in this volume. (2.) Buddhism reached Korea via China, while it reached Japan via both China and Korea. (3.) This aspect of India’s policy toward China is discussed in the chapter on Sino-Indian relations in this volume. (4.) On Tagore’s reception in Korea, see Hyun (2009). (5.) ‘Under One Banner: The United Nations Command in Korea’. Available at: http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/PDFFiles/Under_One_Banner.pdf (accessed 12 September 2013). (6.) See the chapter on Sino-Indian relations in this volume. (7.) Japan did sign the 1952 Treaty of Taipei with the Nationalists in Taiwan before signing the treaty with India as neither China nor Taiwan were present at San Francisco. This treaty officially brought the war between Japan and (Nationalist) China to an end. However, it was clear by this time that Taiwan did not represent all of China. (8.) Japan became a member of the UN in 1956. (9.) ‘A Monroe Doctrine for Asia’, 9 August 1947, in Nehru (1985: 133–5).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea (10.) This issue has remained unresolved, and this was the case even at the time of this writing (June 2015). See BBC News (2013). (11.) See Takenori (1993). (12.) However, it is true that India’s relations with Southeast Asia developed more rapidly than India’s links with Japan and South Korea, although New Delhi has now begun to address this issue. (13.) In 2013–14, India’s total trade with South Korea and Japan was US$16.7 billion and US$16.3 billion respectively. See ‘Total Trade: Top 25 Countries’, Export Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India. Available at: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp (accessed 04 June 2015). (14.) Japanese foreign direct investment into India increased from $266 million in 2008–9 to $1,340 million (provisional) in 2012–13, while South Korean foreign direct investment increased from $95 million to $224 million (provisional) during the same period. See Reserve Bank of India (2013). (15.) For the data on Japan’s ODA to India from 2009 to 2013, see “India”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (no date). Available online at http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/data/pdfs/india.pdf (accessed 4 June 2015). (16.) China’s total trade with Japan and South Korea is higher by an order of magnitude than India’s total trade with these Pacific economic powerhouses. See note 13 above, and European Commission (2013). (17.) For example, the South Korean firm POSCO’s investment in the Indian state of Odisha—India’s as well as South Korea’s largest foreign investment deal —was on hold for a long time, and has only recently been cleared by the Indian government (LiveMint 2013). See also Shanker (2014). (18.) Japan and India also worry about China’s nuclear weapons. (19.) Japan depends upon the Middle East for 83 per cent of its crude oil imports, while South Korea depends upon this region for 85 per cent of its oil supply. Most of these energy imports reach these Pacific powers via the Malacca Strait. See US Energy Information Administration, ‘Japan’ and ‘South Korea’. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/ (accessed 13 January 2014). (20.) India and Japan held their first such dialogue in 2010 (Economic Times 2010). (21.) In fact, India and South Korea are already engaged in the joint development of self-propelled artillery and mine-countermeasure vessels (Brewster 2010a: 417).

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India’s Relations with Japan and South Korea

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India and Southeast Asia Asia’ (ASEAN 2012: 46). In other words, the strategic partnership was not just about the expansion of Indo-ASEAN ties, it was also expected to contribute to the shaping of a new regional order in Asia. As shown by the ambitions of the India–ASEAN strategic partnership, New Delhi has come a long way in reconnecting with Southeast Asia. In point of fact, India used to be very close to this region in the 1940s and 1950s (Pardesi 2010). In those days, Indian nationalist leaders felt that India and the nations of Southeast Asia belonged to the same geopolitical entity and, as such, their future trajectories were to be intrinsically interdependent. This vision, however, did not survive the advent of the Cold War. In the early 1960s, India got caught in a bitter spat with China over the border, which ended in a military debacle (p. 327) against Chinese forces in 1962. India’s stupor was such that it gave up its regional ambitions and focused only on its closest neighbours in South Asia. Cold War politics further drew India and Southeast Asia poles apart: the latter fell in the US alliance system, at the bilateral level as well as the multilateral level, with the creation of ASEAN in 1967, while the former increasingly tilted toward the Soviet Union. The disconnect became so serious that in 1980, India rejected a proposal to become an ASEAN dialogue partner (Pannikar 1943). It took a systemic change, with the demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, for India to reconsider its relations with Southeast Asia. By the early 1990s, India was deprived of its closest partner, the USSR, while its inward-looking economy was dangerously running out of steam. More generally speaking, India confronted a clear danger of marginalization from a diplomatic, strategic, and economic point of view. As New Delhi undertook a programme of structural reforms of its economy, it also proceeded to find new friends and partners. In this context, Southeast Asia was one of the very first regions New Delhi decided to approach. In the process, New Delhi launched the so-called ‘Look East’ policy (LEP), a multifaceted and well-publicized initiative aimed at reconnecting with India’s eastern neighbourhood. The LEP has generated a fair amount of literature. It has generally been regarded as a rather successful initiative, perhaps one of the most successful in India’s foreign policy reorientations since the 1990s. Some insightful studies have differentiated two phases in the development of this policy, with a first phase unfolding in the 1990s and aimed at reconnecting with Southeast Asia/ ASEAN, and a second phase starting at the turn of the twenty-first century and reflecting a strengthening and a broadening of India’s interactions with the region. Interestingly, a few analysts argue that India’s LEP has entered a new phase. For instance, S. D. Muni observed in 2012: ‘Now after almost a decade of the second phase, a third phase of the LEP seems to be unfolding under which India’s economic and strategic engagement with the region will be expanded

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India and Southeast Asia and deepened, and India will be more willing and active to play a larger strategic role’ (Muni 2011). For analytical purposes, this chapter divides India’s LEP into two time sequences, distinguishing between its initiation phase in the 1990s, and its acceleration phase as a result of India’s rise to power since the late 1990s. As Muni (2011) does, it argues that a third phase is about to (p.328) emerge, but it takes a more sceptical view of the unfolding scenario and questions the extent of India’s potential role in Southeast Asia in the near future. It suggests that enduring constraints and underlying contradictions, rather than the promise of India playing ‘a larger strategic role’, may mark the third phase of the LEP. The methodology of this chapter is based on the three-level analysis approach, which consists in factoring three different parameters in the study of a given country’s foreign policy, that is, the personal vision of the state’s leadership, the national trajectory and domestic constellation of forces in this country, and, finally, the systemic or regional environment in which this country evolves. Using this methodology, this chapter shows that there has been congruence across all three levels of analysis in terms of greater engagement with Southeast Asia in India, despite the uncertainties affecting the latest phase of the LEP. In its organization, this chapter follows the main phases of India’s LEP. In the first part, it analyses the launching of the policy in the 1990s and shows that it was marked by economic and institutional re-engagements with ASEAN. Then it argues that India’s LEP entered a second phase during the first decade of the twenty-first century, and assumed a more prominent strategic edge. In a final part, the chapter discusses the view that India will have to assume greater strategic responsibilities in Southeast Asia in the context of the third phase of the LEP.

Reconnecting with Southeast Asia in the 1990s The first phase of the LEP consisted in reconnecting with Southeast Asia after a hiatus of three decades. A combination of personal, national, and systemic factors quickly led to greater engagement with Southeast Asia. Shaping the LEP: The Importance of the Individual Level of Analysis The Foundational Vision of Narasimha Rao

The leaders from the Congress Party who came to power in 1991 were well aware of the so-called ‘East Asian miracle’ (World Bank 1993). Narasimha Rao had been External Affairs Minister under Indira Gandhi (1980–4) and under Rajiv Gandhi (1988–9). His Finance Minister, (p.329) Manmohan Singh, was formerly Secretary General of the South Commission in Geneva. Messrs Rao and Singh clearly understood that India was lagging behind Southeast Asia in terms of economic and social development. In their view, India had to catch up with its successful neighbours and in so doing, India had to take Southeast Asian development models as a source of inspiration. Moreover, with the advent of the Page 3 of 22

India and Southeast Asia European Common Market and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993, Prime Minister Rao and his team felt that India should link up to Southeast Asia in order to avoid being marginalized from major trading blocs in the world economy. Following the defeat of the Congress Party in the 1996 general elections, India experienced governmental instability until 1998. As far as foreign relations were concerned, Inder Kumar Gujral proved the most influential figure during this period of time, both as External Affairs Minister (1996–8) and Prime Minister (1997–8). His focus on restoring peace and stability in South Asia—with the socalled ‘Gujral doctrine’—brought an essential clarification on the finality of the LEP, as he made it clear that India could not pursue the LEP as a strategy to get away from its problematic neighbourhood (Sen Gupta 1997). On the contrary, if India were to further link up with Southeast Asia, it would have to improve relations with its direct neighbours. This emphasis on stability in South Asia as a condition for enhanced relations with Southeast Asia proved clear-sighted, as the ASEAN member states dreaded being exposed to India’s disputes with its neighbours. During this first phase of the LEP, the Indian leadership understood the importance of interpersonal networks in Southeast Asian diplomatic practices and paid regular visits to the region. Narasimha Rao visited most Southeast Asian countries between 1992 and 1995. In a span of two months, in July–August 1996, Inder Kumar Gujral visited Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. In so doing, Indian leaders, and Indian diplomacy more generally, adjusted their style to the new circumstances. They avoided the mistakes of the 1940s and 1950s, when India behaved like an elder sister vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Indeed, with their frequent references to the influence of India’s ancient civilization on the rest of Asia, Indian leaders often conveyed a sense of cultural superiority that was strongly resented by their Southeast Asian counterparts. In the 1990s, Indian leaders took great care not to hurt Southeast Asian sensitivities and approached the region in a discreet fashion (Keenleyside 1982). (p.330) Ironically, the low-key style of Prime Minister Rao, which was sometimes derided in India, was appreciated in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s Support

In Southeast Asia, Singapore proved supportive from the very beginning of the LEP. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong personally promoted India’s economic reforms in his own country, stating in his 1993 National Day speech that he intended to inject a ‘mild Indian fever’ in Singapore’s business community. He also paid several high-profile visits to India and forged personal contacts with his counterparts. Significantly, he was the guest of honour at India’s Republic Day celebrations in 1994. He also hosted Narasimha Rao’s Singapore lecture in 1994. This high-profile event greatly helped in publicizing the message of India’s LEP in Southeast Asia. Some high-ranking officials of Indian origin also proved Page 4 of 22

India and Southeast Asia very influential: such was the case of Singapore Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Shunmugam Jayakumar, who also worked as coordinator of IndoASEAN institutional relations. However, not all Southeast Asian leaders proved as forthcoming. Another influential political figure, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, more often than not expressed his scepticism about India’s LEP. Mahathir was not opposed to enhancing relations with India as such. His misgivings were of an ideational nature and concerned the essence of India’s regional identity. Mahathir was indeed keen to shape a new regional identity around the notion of East Asia, with the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) project as its main vehicle.1 In his view, India had no credentials to be part of this exclusive club of supposedly Confucian-inspired countries, with high rates of economic growth. The prevalence of Mahathir’s view explains why, in the following years, ASEAN engaged India, but mostly as a peripheral power that was kept on the fringes of its regional vision. The State Level of Analysis: The Domestic Underpinnings of India’s LEP India’s Economic Liberalization

At the national level, the LEP was primarily driven by India’s economic liberalization and opening onto the world economy. The economic (p.331) reforms initiated from 1991 meant that India had to attract foreign investments and technology transfers, as well as boost its exports in order to support its economic growth. This implied that India had to reconnect with major growth areas in the world, that is, Western Europe, North America, and East Asia. Logically, the diplomatic apparatus was made to contribute to this important reorientation in India’s external relations. In other words, India’s economic interests were to be of prime importance in the conduct of its foreign policy. Thus, a process of economic diplomacy was slowly put in place in the early 1990s. The LEP was the expression of this nascent economic diplomacy. Its objective was to attract foreign investment from Southeast Asia as well as boost India’s trade links with the prosperous markets of this region. Logically, the LEP developed in close connection with business circles, especially with major chambers of commerce and industry, such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In point of fact, CII played a pivotal role in promoting close relations between India and Singapore. It opened a representative office in Singapore in the early 1990s to network with the leadership of the city-state. Its networking strategy proved rather successful, as reflected by the fact that Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong attended CII’s centenary celebration as the guest of honour in January 1995.

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India and Southeast Asia Security and Development Challenges in the Northeast

The question of the Northeast had a special impact on the shaping of the LEP. This landlocked and underdeveloped region had for long posed governance problems. Its security was affected by various insurgency groups, many of which enjoyed sanctuaries in Myanmar. India also feared that China’s forays into Myanmar would portend further security challenges for its Northeast. By the early 1990s, New Delhi grew convinced that the stabilization of the Northeast called for better cooperation with Myanmar. Until then, it had supported the prodemocracy movement and was at odds with the military regime in Rangoon. However, India changed track and started to engage Myanmar’s secluded junta. It had Rangoon sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas in 1994, which was seen as an encouraging development in the fight against insurgency and criminality in the Northeast. (p.332) India’s rapprochement with Myanmar converged with the ASEAN decision to integrate this country as full member in 1997. It came as a relief for New Delhi to see that this crucial neighbour was brought into the orbit of ASEAN, rather than being left under China’s influence. Moreover, Myanmar’s integration with ASEAN meant that India shared more than 1,600 kilometres of land border with this organization. New Delhi formed grand plans for developing land corridors between its Northeast and Southeast Asia through Myanmar and Thailand. Its hope was that the Northeast would become a gateway to the dynamic markets of Southeast Asia and that it would benefit from a development boost. In other words, the Northeast was to become a nodal point in the expansion of India’s LEP. As we shall see later, this vision proved over-optimistic. A Nascent Military Diplomacy

In the late 1980s, India’s naval modernization had been a cause of concern in Southeast Asia. To dispel suspicions, Indian leaders clearly stated that they had no hegemonic ambition whatsoever in the region. They also took note of the symbolic and concrete importance of naval diplomacy. In late 1991, in a major about-turn, the Indian government agreed to revive high-level interactions with foreign navies. This decision, which had been long awaited by the Indian Navy, put an end to twenty-five years of isolation and helped restore a climate of confidence with Southeast Asia (Roy Chaudhury 1995: 201). From then on, the Indian Navy had regular interactions with its Southeast Asian counterparts. In 1994, for instance, it initiated basic anti-submarine warfare exercises with Singapore’s navy, which grew in complexity over the years. At the multilateral level, it hosted a gathering of regional navies in the Andaman Islands in 1995. This confidence-building measure, codenamed MILAN, was conducted on a biennial basis and proved successful in creating a platform of cooperation with the navies from Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.2

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India and Southeast Asia While naval cooperation was the most active part of its emerging defence diplomacy, India explored other areas of military cooperation. For instance, an MoU on defence cooperation with Malaysia was concluded in 1993. Based on this agreement, the Indian Air Force provided logistical and maintenance support to Malaysia’s fleet of MiG 29, in (p.333) addition to offering training programmes for its pilots. In 1994, India also signed a protocol of military cooperation with Vietnam—its oldest friend in the region—for maintenance support and military training. In other words, by the early to mid-1990s, the Indian armed forces, the navy especially, broke out of their inward-looking tradition and contributed to improving India’s image in Southeast Asia. In this respect, New Delhi came to realize that its large defence forces could be used as an influential instrument to support its new diplomatic orientations. At the Systemic Level: A Favourable Regional Context for the LEP The Fear of a Power Vacuum in Southeast Asia

With the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia confronted new uncertainties. Many Southeast Asian states felt insecure at the prospect of a US disengagement from the region. As the US closed major military bases, such as Subic Bay in the Philippines, ASEAN member states worried about the possibility that they would be left with a power vacuum in Southeast Asia. In their view, such a situation would portend further instability and regional rivalries. To add to their concerns, there were apprehensions about the strategic ambitions of China, and Japan to a lesser extent. In face of this uncertain situation, ASEAN undertook to engage all major regional powers with a view to building a climate of confidence. In 1994, it set up the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as its main discussion platform on regional security issues. In so doing, its energies were mostly directed toward China. More precisely, its objective was to socialize Chinese leaders into multilateral discussions and to develop a climate of trust with them. In this context, India was also brought into the ASEAN fold. India’s efforts to dispel the mistrust caused by its naval build-up in the 1980s were convincing enough. The key point of its message to the region clearly hit the mark: in contrast to China, India had no territorial disputes with Southeast Asia (its maritime boundaries with Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar were clearly demarcated), and, as opposed to Japan, India had no past of brutal military imperialism. From then on, India was seen as a non-threatening, benevolent power that could contribute positively to regional stability. (p.334) New Institutional Links between India and ASEAN

Indeed, ASEAN proved rather quick to respond to India’s overtures. An ASEAN– India sectoral partnership was established in 1992, which was transformed into a full dialogue partnership in 1995. Significantly, ASEAN created partnership relations with India and China nearly at the same time, in 1995–6, as if to bring ballast to its institutional rapprochements with these two major neighbours. Page 7 of 22

India and Southeast Asia With respect to India, the interests of ASEAN were two-fold. They were primarily of an economic nature, as the ASEAN member countries hoped that India’s reforms would offer new business opportunities. In a more strategic perspective, ASEAN felt that India could contribute to its effort to redefine regional security on a multilateral basis. However, ASEAN opted for a prudent engagement: ‘step by step’ was its motto, as it wanted to test India’s resolve to develop the partnership and to pursue economic reforms at home. On the whole, India proved comfortable with ASEAN’s diplomatic practices. As a multilateral organization, ASEAN abided by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which meant that it would not impinge on India’s sacrosanct sovereignty. On its part, ASEAN appreciated the fact that New Delhi kept a low profile and repeatedly acknowledged its centrality in the management of regional affairs. As a result, in 1996, India was integrated into ARF, the main discussion platform on matters of regional security. Some efforts were made to dispel the notion that India was brought in as a counterweight to China. At that point in time, neither ASEAN nor India wanted to entertain that idea. The general objective was to initiate a collective effort to promote regional understanding and build stability in an era of uncertainties. The fact that relations between India and China had improved since the late 1980s actually reassured ASEAN and made it possible to bring India into its fold, without running the risk of upsetting Beijing.

India’s Rising Profile in Southeast Asia since the Late 1990s By the turn of the twenty-first century, India’s LEP had gathered momentum and involved a comprehensive range of issues, including strategic and security issues. Again, a combination of personal, (p.335) national, and systemic factors accounted for India’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. At the Leadership Level: A Consensual Policy, but with Nuances in Interpretation

The business-driven vision that was framed by Narasimha Rao stood as the mainstay of the LEP during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh stuck to the view that Southeast Asia was a prosperous region with which India should be closely connected. Interestingly, this vision was not affected by the changed circumstances of the late 1990s, as Southeast Asia experienced a serious financial crisis in 1997–1998, while India had started to enjoy its own growth story. However, with the coming to power of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)–led coalition in 1998, the LEP was given a more ambitious strategic edge. Prime Minister Vajpayee and his two External Affairs Ministers—Jaswant Singh (1998– 2002) and Yashwant Sinha (2002–4)—regarded the LEP as an expression of India’s quest for power in Asia. In the aftermath of the Pokhran nuclear tests of 1998, Jaswant Singh justified India’s decision in the name of an Asian balance of Page 8 of 22

India and Southeast Asia power; he even suggested that India wanted to correct a strategic imbalance in Southeast Asia that was too much in China’s favour (Singh 1998). Then, in 2003, Yashwant Sinha declared that the agenda of the LEP was to be broadened: ASEAN remained a prime focus of interest, but Northeast Asia was also to be engaged, including Japan and China. In the same fashion, economic integration with Southeast Asia was to be pursued, but this should not prevent India from considering wider security issues in the region (Sinha 2003). During his first tenure (2004–9), Prime Minister Singh strongly controlled economic and foreign policy matters (while Congress president Sonia Gandhi kept the upper hand on domestic politics). Having experienced the launching of the LEP in his capacity as Finance Minister under the Rao governments, Singh’s background was extensive, and he remained convinced of the significance of this policy orientation. While he adopted the broadened agenda set by the BJP-led government and pursued the strategic dimensions of the LEP, his foremost concern was to further integrate India to East Asian economic regionalism. In (p.336) this perspective, he pushed several free trade agreements (FTA) with Southeast Asia at the bilateral and multilateral levels, and personally intervened to have some free trade negotiations finalized (Tharoor 2012: 186). At the National Level: Growing Confidence and Ambition An Emerging Economic Powerhouse in Asia

India’s economic reforms led to a higher growth path, with an average growth rate of 7 to 8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) per year between 2002 and 2012.3 Thanks to this economic dynamism, the volume of Indo-ASEAN trade grew ten-fold in a decade, from USD 8 billion in 2001–2 to nearly 80 billion in 2011–12.4 In 2012, ASEAN economies accounted for 10 per cent of India’s global trade, with Singapore as India’s first trade partner in Southeast Asia. The citystate was a major export destination, accounting for 5 per cent of India’s global exports in 2011–12. But India’s booming trade relations with Southeast Asia were also driven by its growing needs of raw material and energy resources. As a result, Indonesia also emerged as a major trading partner, mostly as a supplier of coal and palm oil, as well as gas and timber. India’s booming economy also attracted a growing amount of foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia. According to Indian official sources, Singapore was the second largest foreign investor in the country in the period 2000–13 (SIA Newsletter 2013). The city-state would have committed to invest USD 19 billion, thus accounting for 10 per cent of total foreign direct investment in India.5 Conversely, after the Indian government simplified the procedures for outbound investments, Singapore became the first destination of Indian investment outflows in the world (Khan 2012). A large number of Indian companies used Singapore as an offshore financial centre to raise funds and further expand overseas, including in Southeast Asia. In the process, the Indian

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India and Southeast Asia business community became one of the largest foreign business communities residing in the city-state.6 Clearly, Singapore acted as a conduit for India’s expanding economic relations with Southeast Asia. The city-state partly owed this special position to the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (p.337) (CECA) with India in 2005. With its special provisions securing avoidance of double taxation, as well as free trade in goods, services, and investments, the CECA boosted trade and financial flows between the two signatories. In fact, India felt confident enough to embark on a growing number of free trade negotiations in Southeast Asia. Predating the signing of CECA with Singapore, India had concluded a framework agreement for free trade in goods with Thailand in 2003. India also signed an FTA with Malaysia in 2011 and initiated negotiations with Indonesia in the same year. At the multilateral level, New Delhi decided in 2003 to launch negotiations for the establishment of an ASEAN–India free trade area in goods, services, and investments to be completed in the next ten years. This was the first time India embarked on an FTA with a trade bloc. India’s Strategic Ambitions in Asia

The decision to go openly nuclear in 1998 boosted national pride and gave a greater sense of self-confidence. From then on, India clearly expressed its geopolitical ambitions over its so-called ‘extended neighbourhood’, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Strait. On its eastern flank, it asserted its military presence in the Bay of Bengal and off the Strait of Malacca with the commissioning of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, its first unified command. Boosted by growing budget allocations, the Indian Navy increased its presence in the Strait of Malacca and in the South China Sea from the late 1990s onward. Moreover, in the aftermath of the tsunami that hit the Bay of Bengal in December 2004, the Indian Navy demonstrated its capacity to deliver quick assistance by providing post-disaster relief to Sri Lanka and Indonesia on its own, before joining the navies of the US, Japan, and Australia. Incidentally, this ad hoc coordination group proved an inspiring experience, as reflected by the fact that the Indian Navy occasionally embarked on multilateral manoeuvres with the US and Japan as well as Singapore and Australia in the following years. In keeping with its deployments, the Indian Navy formalized its geopolitical vision in the Maritime Military Strategy released in 2007 (Ministry of Defence 2007: 59–60). Not surprisingly, the Bay of Bengal and ‘the choke points leading to and from the Indian Ocean—primarily the Strait of Malacca’ were designated as ‘primary areas’ of interest. (p.338) Further east, the Indian Navy described the South China Sea and the East Pacific Region as ‘secondary areas’ of interest. Two years later, in 2009, the Indian Navy released another doctrinal report, which outlined a more ambitious vision. In addition to the Malacca Strait, the Sunda and the Lombok Straits fell in its ‘areas of primary maritime interest’. As for ‘the secondary areas of maritime interests’, they included not only the South Page 10 of 22

India and Southeast Asia China Sea, but also ‘other areas of west Pacific Ocean and friendly littoral countries located therein’ (Ministry of Defence 2009). India also strengthened bilateral cooperation with a growing number of Southeast Asian states. Singapore remained its partner of choice: in 2003, the two states concluded a defence cooperation agreement that planned for expanding military cooperation, joint military training, and joint contribution to maritime security, thus making Singapore one of India’s closest defence partners. Suffice it here to say that it was the only foreign country that could use some Indian military bases for training. While maintaining defence exchanges with Malaysia and Thailand, India built stronger ties with other partners and signed defence cooperation agreements with Vietnam (2000), Indonesia (2001), and the Philippines (2006). Finally, India enhanced its engagement with Myanmar, providing military hardware as well as training to the Burmese military. There were also significant exchanges at the senior military level, as reflected by the visit of Myanmar’s strongman, Senior General Than Shwe in 2004, followed by Vice-Senior General Maung Aye in 2008. At the Regional Level: A Quest for a Security Architecture in East Asia India as Part of Southeast Asia’s Hedging Strategies against China

In the 1990s, China proved to be a rather peaceful stakeholder in the regional institutions run by ASEAN. But following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–8, Southeast Asia confronted a new regional context that was marked by China’s growing influence. In contrast to most Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese economy was left unscathed by the crisis and Beijing was more than happy to extend support to its weakened neighbours and to take the lead in regional economic integration. While ASEAN kept engaging China, it felt increasingly (p. 339) overwhelmed by its growing clout. As a consequence, some ASEAN member states hedged their bets against China. They pushed further economic integration with China, but they also sought a potential fall-back plan, should their relations with this country deteriorate. In this context, they further engaged India so as to tone down China’s overwhelming influence. A boosting factor was India’s strategic rapprochement with the US. Under the two George Walker Bush administrations, that is, between 2000 and 2008, bilateral cooperation between New Delhi and Washington developed at a spectacular pace. As part of the rapprochement, the US supported a more active role for India in Southeast Asia. Washington also encouraged Southeast Asian states to incorporate India in their nascent security architecture. Concomitantly, India made significant headway in its strategic dialogue with Japan, a major US ally in Asia. Tokyo and New Delhi developed converging views on the necessity of promoting an open and inclusive security order in Asia, as well as on ensuring the safety of the sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean.

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India and Southeast Asia As an acknowledgment of India’s relevance, ASEAN elevated the level of its interactions with India and established an ASEAN–India Summit in 2002. This new mechanism provided for annual consultations at the highest level, that of heads of government (instead of ministers, as was previously the case). This decision meant that India was granted the same status as Japan, China, and South Korea, which were part of ASEAN+3, the new mechanism of coordination that had emerged in the wake of the Asian financial crisis to become the centrepiece of regional integration. Initially, New Delhi would have rather been part of ASEAN+3, but at this point in time ASEAN chose to engage India on a separate track, that of a special summit-level meeting, not as part of the core of East Asian regionalism. But with China’s growing clout in the following years, most Southeast Asian countries felt that India should be a full-fledged member in their regional structures. The creation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 was a case in point. In the heated debates that led to the establishment of EAS, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan lobbied intensely for having India as a founding member. Their rationale was to open up the new forum as much as possible so as to prevent China’s domination over its proceedings. China and Malaysia were opposed to India’s admission, (p.340) but they were eventually won over by the ‘pro-India’ camp. India’s admission to EAS was a clear signal that ASEAN expected New Delhi to take on a more active role in the region.7 India’s Contribution to Regional Security Structures

As proof of its support, India contributed to the security mechanisms promoted by ASEAN. In October 2003, it acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a legal and binding document conceived as a pillar of ASEAN’s attempts at promoting multilateral security cooperation. This came as a token of India’s resolve to abide by the ASEAN norms of inter-state behaviour to promote peace and stability in the region. India also joined cooperative initiatives in the fight against transnational threats. It concluded a counterterrorism agreement with ASEAN in 2003 and contributed to antipiracy efforts in the Malacca Strait from 2004 onward. That the countries of the region—Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand—allowed India to join them in patrolling the Malacca Strait reflects a high level of appreciation of the Indian Navy. India also joined the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, a multilateral antipiracy initiative launched in 2006, with its headquarters in Singapore. Finally, India was invited to the biennial ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) established in 2010. This new mechanism was launched as part of ASEAN’s general effort to shape the regional security architecture. Reflecting the ASEAN vision of regional security, the meeting was inclusive and brought together the ASEAN Defence Ministers with their counterparts from the EAS (the US, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, India, Australia, and New Zealand). Page 12 of 22

India and Southeast Asia All in all, India deliberately enmeshed itself in a web of cooperative mechanisms with ASEAN. This implied that the Indian state apparatus had institutionalized interactions with ASEAN power structures at many different levels, at the chiefs of government level (for the ASEAN–India Summit and EAS), at ministerial levels (for ARF and ADDM-Plus), as well as at senior officials’ and experts’ levels (through various specialized committees). In the process, India has been increasingly engaged in the shaping of a regional architecture in Southeast Asia.

(p.341) Mounting Challenges in India’s Engagement with Southeast Asia While India and ASEAN have built a successful relationship, the limits of their partnership have become more obvious in recent years and have caused a sense of frustration in Southeast Asia. At the Personal Level: A Lack of Focus under UPA II

Following the 2009 general election, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition remained in power, with the added benefit of a reinforced majority in Parliament. The second mandate of the UPA government (often designated as UPA II), with Manmohan Singh at the helm of affairs, raised high expectations in India and beyond. However, UPA II proved unable to be up to the mark. To make things worse, the government was weakened by a succession of large-scale corruption scandals. A pervasive sense of drift came to characterize the second mandate of Prime Minister Singh. With a government politically vulnerable, the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers retracted to a defensive and inwardlooking approach, as their top priority was to remain in power. This obviously had an impact on foreign policy matters. India’s lack of commitment in Southeast Asia became marked as the government faced growing difficulties at home. Indian ministers did not attend key regional meetings hosted by ASEAN, and, more generally speaking, the Indian establishment failed to keep up with the periodicity of the ASEAN meetings. In 2013, for instance, Defence Minister Anthony skipped two major discussion platforms on Asian security, the Shangri-La dialogue of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and ADMM-Plus. This lack of steadfastness proved to be a cause of disappointment in ASEAN circles (Raja Mohan 2013a: 11–12). More importantly, a growing disconnect emerged between Prime Minister Singh’s vision of the LEP and the expectations of ASEAN’s leadership. Singh’s focus on FTAs and economic integration became a source of frustrations, as many in Southeast Asia wished India had more of a political and strategic vision for the region. Finally, despite its efforts, India was increasingly left behind by China’s diplomatic activism (du Rocher 2013). The difference between (p.342) the Chinese and Indian approaches could be seen in their respective partnerships and plans of action with ASEAN (the China–ASEAN strategic partnership was signed in 2003, and the India–ASEAN partnership in 2004). As pointedly noted Page 13 of 22

India and Southeast Asia by Carl Thayer, the India–ASEAN ‘current five-year plan of action (2011–15), which contains 80 points for cooperation, appears rudimentary when compared to the latest China-ASEAN plan of action (2011–15) with over 200 detailed points of cooperation for the same time period’ (Thayer 2011: 328). At the National Level: Enduring Domestic Constraints Entrenched Domestic Interests

The political fragility and fatigue that characterized the second mandate of the UPA government led to a slowdown in the reform process. The policy environment became unstable and the growth rate of the GDP weakened after 2011–12. Also, the liberalization of the Indian economy remained constrained by various internal factors, including the opposition of powerful interest groups. That some sectors of the Indian economy were hostile to further liberalization was clearly revealed in the context of the India–ASEAN FTA negotiations. Indeed, these negotiations ran into difficulties because of the domestic opposition from Indian farmers, especially those from the plantation sector. The producers of tea, coffee, palm oil, and rubber felt especially threatened by the competition from Southeast Asia, and intensely lobbied the government for the protection of their sectors. As a result, it took nearly six years of protracted negotiations with ASEAN to finalize the trade in goods agreement in 2009, instead of 2005 as originally anticipated. By way of comparison, China signed its agreement on trade in goods with ASEAN in 2005, after three years of speedy negotiations. Furthermore, India’s trade relations with Southeast Asia brought to light the lack of competitiveness of various sectors of the Indian economy. India faced a growing trade deficit in its exchanges with Southeast Asia, at the bilateral as well as the multilateral level. After 2006–7, its trade deficit vis-à-vis ASEAN hovered between USD 5 to 7 billion.8 It reached a new low in 2012–13, with a deficit of USD 12 billion. In this context, the issue of FTAs with Southeast Asia provoked a serious disconnect between the political leadership and some sections of the (p.343) business community. Indeed, the government had often presented its FTA initiatives as a promise of increasing exports, but more often than not these agreements led to an increase in imports. Many in the Indian business community felt betrayed by the government FTA policy, and suspected the Prime Minister’s Office of having forced the conclusion of the India–ASEAN agreement on goods in 2009 for diplomatic rather than economic reasons (Sidhartha 2013; Times of India 2012). A Lack of ‘Physical Connectivity’ with Southeast Asia

A major objective of the LEP was to link up India’s Northeast with Myanmar, with a view to developing a transport corridor between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia. In the process, the remote region of the Northeast was to benefit from a development boost. Nearly two decades after the launching of the LEP, this vision is yet to be translated on the ground. India’s main achievement Page 14 of 22

India and Southeast Asia has been the construction of a road connecting Manipur’s border town of Moreh with Mandalay, Myanmar’s second largest city. Other than that, India’s megaprojects in transport infrastructure have lagged behind, and its land connections to Myanmar have remained underdeveloped. As for the Northeast, it has remained a backward, unstable, and isolated region. The predominance of security concerns over socioeconomic development with respect to the Northeast accounts for this poor state of affairs. Despite its professed vision of using the Northeast as a land bridge to Southeast Asia, India primarily views this region through a security lens, and is reluctant to open it up to its neighbours, especially China. For instance, India has been hesitant about China’s proposal to promote trade and transport corridors with its Yunnan province through Myanmar and Bangladesh (under the Bangladesh–China– India–Myanmar project). As a result, India’s Northeast has been disconnected from the sub-regional cooperation that has developed between Yunnan, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion programmes. Other promising sub-regional cooperation projects such as BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, as well as Nepal and Bhutan) and Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam) have not made much headway (Sikri 2009: 72–3, 119–20). In this respect, India has failed to develop the potential of its Northeast in the context of the LEP. (p.344) Moreover, India’s relations with Myanmar have not been robust enough to give a development thrust to the Northeast. As aptly put by Chatterjee (2014), ‘Myanmar’s role is pivotal if India’s Northeast is to benefit from the LEP.’ But, despite two decades of engagement, India has never been much at ease with the Burmese junta, and it has never been in a position to match China’s overwhelming influence on this neighbour. Whether India can take advantage of the democratic transition in Myanmar to regain some ground and forge a closer partnership with this crucial neighbour remains to be seen (Bhattacharjya and Daniel 2012; Bhaumik 2013). One the one hand, the new political dispensation in Myanmar, as well as the Burmese will to mitigate China’s influence, may allow India to raise its profile in this country; on the other hand, however, Myanmar’s slow opening to the world may as well confront India with renewed competition, especially as the US and European countries are getting increasingly interested in this country. In any case, given India’s difficulties with putting its act together in the Northeast, as well as the complex geopolitics of the Indo-Burmese border areas, the Northeast may not emerge as a vibrant land connection with Southeast Asia for a long time. At the Systemic Level: A Climate of Heightened Tensions in Southeast Asia

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India and Southeast Asia Growing Security Uncertainties in Southeast Asia

China’s assertiveness on a number of maritime disputes has put considerable strain on Southeast Asia since 2010. While Vietnam and the Philippines have been the most exposed to China’s renewed territorial claims, some tensions have also come into the Sino-US relationship. The brunt of this security deterioration has been borne by ASEAN: its institutions have proved too underdeveloped to manage the regional tensions, and it has experienced internal frictions as reflected by the failure of its 2012 Phnom Penh Summit to issue a joint communiqué. Indeed, Cambodia refused to endorse the position of Vietnam and the Philippines with respect to China’s assertiveness. In other words, ASEAN has feared that its ability to remain in the driver’s seat of regional developments would be weakened and that its efforts at building a multilateral and cooperative security architecture would be challenged by a growing polarization between China and the US. (p.345) With the region in such a state of flux, ASEAN would like India to be more supportive, if not more proactive. Indeed, India’s best interest is in maintaining ASEAN in the driver’s seat of regional development (Raja Mohan 2013a). In the same fashion as ASEAN, it wants to avoid a situation where the region would be dominated by one power such as China, or by the conflicts between the US and China. In this connection, India has repeatedly declared that it supports the ASEAN vision of an open and inclusive architecture of regional cooperation in Asia, which enhances trust and confidence. India has also for long had the ambition of being a benevolent power that would contribute to a stable strategic order in Asia. But beyond these articles of faith, India has proved indecisive and found it difficult to define its own contribution to regional security, as reflected by its lacklustre participation in EAS and ADDMPlus. India’s Hesitations on the South China Sea Disputes

The fact is that India is not clear about the kind of power it wants to be in Southeast Asia. Nowhere does India seem as self-contradictory as on the South China Sea issue. Indeed, the Indian Navy has been increasingly visible in the South China Sea in recent years. It has sent flotillas on an annual basis to train with Singapore and/or make port calls in Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. India has also engaged in energy cooperation with Vietnam, signing an agreement with Hanoi to expand oil exploration in the South China Sea in October 2011. One of its public companies, ONGC Videsh, has invested USD 600 million in oil and gas exploration in three offshore deep-water blocks on the southern Vietnamese coast, in an area that is disputed by China. Despite China’s challenge to the legality of its presence and intimidation tactics both at the rhetorical and naval levels, India has carried on its activities.

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India and Southeast Asia Because of its strategic partnership with Vietnam and its oil and gas exploration activities off the Vietnam coast, India has developed some concrete interests in the South China Sea. In this respect, the Indian Navy has made it known that it was prepared to deploy forces to protect Indian interests in this area. This position was clearly stated by Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi in December 2012: Not that we expect to be in those [South China Sea] waters very, very frequently, but when the requirement is there, for example in situations where our country’s interests are involved, for example ONGC Videsh (p. 346) etc., we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that. Are we preparing for it? Are we holding exercises of that nature? The short answer is yes. (Pubby 2012) Interestingly, the Indian government has refrained from such proactive postures. It has kept a low profile and has been demure when requested by Vietnam to extend stronger political support in its conflict with China. It has even tried to assuage China by describing its activities in the area as purely commercial in nature. At the same time, it has echoed the US position on the importance of the freedom of navigation in the region as well as right of passage in accordance with principles of international law (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). In other words, India has not yet articulated its strategy for the South China Sea. This issue has nevertheless raised a domestic debate, with diverging views, and consequently diverging signals toward the region (Raja Mohan 2013b: 30). These discrepancies have made it all the more difficult for the countries of Southeast Asia to understand the Indian approach. India’s China Problems

India’s misgivings result from its difficulty in finding the right balance in its relations with China. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges for India’s diplomacy is to manage its complex relationship to China, primarily in South Asia, but also in Southeast Asia. In South Asia, China has put India under pressure on many fronts. The massive expansion of its infrastructure in Tibet, along the border areas, has alarmed Indian security circles. The border areas have become a theatre of tensions again, with recurring transgressions of the Line of Actual Control since 2006. These provocation tactics culminated in April– May 2013, when a few Chinese troops settled a small camp in Eastern Ladakh for three weeks (Bagchi and Pandit 2013). Beyond the border dispute, China has maintained close relations with Pakistan and has extended its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh, as well as in other South Asian countries. In Southeast and East Asia, China has kept a watchful eye on the LEP. It has regarded the Indo-Japanese defence exchanges with suspicion, if not open irritation. It has also signalled that India’s naval presence in the South China Sea is out of place: on two occasions, Indian Navy ships sailing off Vietnam were Page 17 of 22

India and Southeast Asia warned by Chinese warships that they were in Chinese waters (Ministry of External Affairs 2011). Logically, (p.347) in such a context, India’s strategic priority should focus on the shifting security equation on its Himalayan borders and in its South Asian neighbourhood, not in the South China Sea. While a few experts may argue that India should play in China’s Southeast Asian backyard as a tit-for-tat strategy, a majority of them regard this approach as risky (Prakash 2011). In any case, India does not yet have the capabilities to maintain a naval presence in this distant area. All in all, it seems safer for India to avoid provoking China in the South China Sea, in view of its enduring vulnerability in the Himalayas and in South Asia. This does not mean that India should downsize its strategic engagement in Southeast Asia. What it means is that India may find it difficult to substantially enhance its strategic profile in Southeast Asia, despite the expectations of some countries in this region. To add to New Delhi’s dilemmas, the US has also encouraged India to be more proactive in Southeast Asia (Clinton 2011). But these US suggestions have elicited a cautious response on India’s part. First, some sections in the Indian foreign policy establishment have felt that India’s growing partnership with the US has alienated China. They recommend that India should not be seen as ‘ganging up’ with the US against China and that New Delhi should put some distance in its dealings with Washington. Second, India has proved to be uncomfortable with the US rebalancing strategy in Asia (Carter 2012; Hathaway 2012). As seen from New Delhi, such a strategy could portend a risk of Sino-US polarization in Asia, something that is seen as hostile to its own interests. All in all, it seems that India will have to tread a fine line between the US strategic shift to Asia and China’s growing assertiveness in the region. Its priority will be to avoid getting dragged into a potential Sino-US rivalry in Asia, while maintaining a nuanced strategic engagement with its Southeast and East Asian partners. This will be no minor challenge. As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, the LEP has been a successful foreign policy initiative. Various factors have come into play. At the personal level, there has been a consensus in the Indian leadership on the need and merits of the LEP since the early 1990s. Whatever the ideological inclinations and party affiliations of the leaders in place at South Block, Southeast Asia has been regarded as a growth area that (p.348) could have a dynamo effect on India’s economy. In Southeast Asia, the vision and influence of Singapore’s leadership has proved critical in shaping and advancing the India–ASEAN partnership. At the national level, India’s increasing resources have contributed to raising its profile in Southeast Asia, especially since the late 1990s. In this respect, the LEP has been truly multifaceted, comprising economic, diplomatic, and defence as well as social and cultural interactions.

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India and Southeast Asia However, after two decades of engagement, India’s LEP may face growing difficulties. As of mid-2014, a number of domestic constraints in India and challenges in the regional context of Southeast Asia seem to have accumulated. At the national level, many constraints reflect the capacity limitations of the Indian state. For instance, India has failed to bring infrastructure development to its most deprived territories, as shown by the example of the Northeast and the border areas with Myanmar. This has clearly inhibited the continental dimension of the LEP. In a different field, the Indian ability to bring the various components of the state apparatus to a converging and consistent position on foreign affairs—especially on sensitive strategic issues—can prove faulty. This has been reflected in India’s conflicting signals on the South China Sea disputes since 2010. Another, more fundamental difficulty may relate to the fact that India has not yet articulated the nature of its role and strategy in Asia. There is no denying the fact that India has raised its profile in the region and has become powerful enough to exert an influence in Southeast Asia. However, New Delhi has been found indecisive when encouraged to act. Its priority has been to avoid being dragged into Southeast Asia’s conflicts with China. In return, there has been a sense of disappointment in Southeast Asia in the face of what is perceived as India’s non-committal and overtly business-oriented approach. It can be seen as an ironic twist of history that ASEAN complains about India’s lack of involvement while, in the 1990s, many in Southeast Asia were sceptical of India’s relevance to the region. Anyhow, the point remains that, despite Southeast Asian expectations, India may hesitate to substantially raise the level of its strategic engagement in this region because of its enduring security vulnerability in the border areas with China, as well as its many domestic constraints. In other words, India might find it difficult to be a security provider in the Southeast Asian region in the short to medium term. References Bibliography references: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2012. ASEAN-India Eminent Persons’ Report to the Leaders (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat), October. Bagchi, I., and R. Pandit. 2013. ‘Ladakh stand-off ends as China agrees to pull out troops’, Times of India, 6 May. Bhattacharjya, S. and F.J. Daniel. 2012. ‘India’s Wild East Unprepared for New Myanmar’, Reuters, 26 February. Bhaumik, S. 2013. ‘India Marginalized in Myanmar’, Irrawaddy, 20 July.

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India and Southeast Asia Carter, A.B. 2012. ‘The US Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective’, Speech Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, New (p. 350) York City, 1 August. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ speech.aspx?speechid=1715 (accessed 15 April 2015). Chatterjee, S. 2014. ‘The Look East Policy and India’s Northeastern States’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Report, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, March. Clinton, H.R. 2011. ‘Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century’, Speech delivered at Anna Centenary Library, Chennai, 20 July. du Rocher, S.B. 2013. ‘ASEAN–India Political Cooperation: How to Reinforce a Much-Needed Pillar?’, Asie.Visions, no. 63, March. Hathaway, R.M. 2012. ‘India and the US Pivot to Asia’, YaleGlobal Online, 24 February. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-and-us-pivot-asia (accessed 15 April 2014). Keenleyside, T.A. 1982. ‘Nationalist Indian Attitude towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy’, Pacific Affairs, no. 2. Khan, H.R. 2012. ‘Outward Indian FDI: Recent Trends and Emerging Issues’, RBI Monthly Bulletin, April. Available at: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/ BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=674 (accessed 13 April 2015). Ministry of Defence. 2007. Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence [Navy]). ———. 2009. India’s Maritime Doctrine 2009 (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence [Navy]), August. Ministry of External Affairs. 2011. ‘Incident Involving INS Airavat in South China Sea’, Press briefing, 1 September. Muni, S.D. 2011. ‘India’s “Look East” Policy: The Strategic Dimension’, ISAS Working Paper No. 121, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, February. Pannikar, K.M. 1943. The Future of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan). Pardesi, M.S. 2010. ‘Southeast Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Positioning India as a Major Power in Asia’, in S. Ganguly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Planning Commission of India. 2008. Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–12). (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).

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India and Southeast Asia ———. 2013. Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–17) (New Delhi: Sage). Prakash, A. 2011. ‘Where are our ships bound?’, Indian Express, 1 October. Prime Minister’s Office. 2011. ‘Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s Statement at the 6th East Asia Summit Plenary Session’, Government of India, 9 November. Pubby, M. 2012. ‘Ready to Protect Indian Interests in South China Sea: Navy Chief’, Indian Express, 4 December. (p.351) Raja Mohan, C. 2013a. ‘India and ASEAN: Toward Maritime Security Cooperation’, in T. Osius, ed., Enhancing India–ASEAN Connectivity (Washington, D.C.: CSIS). ———. 2013b. ‘An Uncertain Trumpet? India’s Role in Southeast Asian Security’, in A.K. Das, ed., India–ASEAN Defence Relations (Singapore: Rajaratnam School for International Studies). Roy Chaudhury, R. 1995. Seapower and Indian Security (London: Brassey). Sen Gupta, B. 1997. ‘India in the Twenty First Century’, International Affairs, no. 2, pp. 297–314. SIA Newsletter. 2013. ‘Statement on Country-wise FDI Inflows from January 2000 to January 2013’, vol. 21, no. 10, February. Available at: http://dipp.nic.in/ English/Publications/SIA_Newsletter/2013/feb2013/index.htm (accessed 12 April 2015). Sidhartha. 2013. ‘Foreign trading partners getting more out of free trade agreements’, TNN, 15 April. Sikri, R. 2009. Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Sage). Singh, J. 1998. ‘Against a Nuclear Apartheid’, Foreign Affairs, no. 5. Sinha, Y. 2003. ‘Resurgent India in Asia’, Speech delivered at Harvard University, 29 September. Available at: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx? 221594 (accessed 13 April 2015). Tharoor, S. 2012. Pax Indica (New Delhi: Penguin). Thayer, C.C. 2011. ‘The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia Autonomy?’, in A. Tellis, T. Tanner, and J. Keough, eds, Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research).

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India and Southeast Asia Times of India. 2012. ‘Have Free Trade Agreements Helped Exports? Exporters Say No’, 15 December. World Bank. 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policies (Washington, D.C.: World Bank). Notes:

(1.) The EAEC was supposed to include the ASEAN member states, as well as Japan, South Korea, and China. (2.) See the official website of the Indian Navy: ‘History of Milan, Friendship across the Sea’. Available at: http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/milan/MILAN-14Friendship-across-the-Seas.html (accessed 14 September 2013). (3.) As per India’s Planning Commission, India’s GDP growth rate averaged 6.5 per cent per year during its Eighth Plan (1992–6), 5.5 per cent during its Ninth Plan (1997–2001), 7.7 per cent during its Tenth Plan (2002–6), and 8 per cent during its Eleventh Plan (2007–12) (Planning Commission of India 2008: 25–6, 2013: 37, 42). (4.) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Export-Import Data Bank, available at: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp (accessed 14 September 2013). (5.) This percentage should be nuanced, as a substantial portion of the investment flows registered as Singaporean actually originate from other countries. According to Indian sources, Singapore comes second after Mauritius, which also serves as a major entry point for Indian-bound investment flows. (6.) In 2011, it was reported as the largest foreign business community residing in Singapore. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, ‘India: Bilateral Relations’. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/ countries_and_region/south_asia/india.html (accessed 12 April 2015). (7.) The EAS was originally meant to include only the ASEAN+3 member states. After India, Australia and New Zealand were also integrated in EAS in 2005. Then, the US and Russia were allowed to join in 2011. (8.) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, Export-Import Data Bank, available at: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp (accessed 10 September 2013).

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? India’s neutral and sometimes unfavourable posture towards Israel until the early 1990s. For the last two decades, however, trade and economic relations have taken an upward swing. The signing of various trade agreements paved the way for an enormous increase of the volume of bilateral trade from $200 million in 1992 to $6 billion in 2014.1 Although both governments are still reluctant to talk openly about cooperation in this sensitive area, arms sales are another major component of this flourishing partnership. India has become Israel’s largest arms export market in the world since the mid 2000s (replacing China); and Israel is today India’s second largest arms supplier (behind the traditional Russian partner) (Inbar and Ningthoujam 2012). This fast burgeoning relationship revealed (p.353) an unexploited potential for fruitful and complementary cooperation between the two nations. Given the visible strategic benefits of Indo-Israeli cooperation, how can we explain India’s deliberate policy of not establishing official diplomatic relations with Israel for more than forty years? Why have Indo-Israeli relations moved from almost naught to a rapid and substantial development in certain sensitive sectors like defence cooperation and, in particular, high-tech weaponry in only a few years? Despite a growing literature on the subject, these questions have mostly been left unanswered.2 Existing studies of Indo-Israel relations have mostly concentrated on the major international and domestic changes of 1990–2, such as the end of the Cold War, the domestic economic reforms, and the Israeli-Palestinian talks following the Madrid Conference, as leading to the reappraisal of India’s Israel policy (Aaron 2003; Inbar 2004; Kumaraswamy 2010; Naaz 2005; Nair 2004; H.V. Pant 2004). India’s decision to establish full diplomatic relations and to build a strong defence partnership with Israel was subsequently interpreted by some as a pragmatic redirection of India’s policy (see, for example, Kumaraswamy 2004; Raja Mohan 2005: 47, 224–7). The 1992 decision was, for example, read as a reaction to the lack of reciprocity in India’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries in the region. But what led to this new thinking in India’s West Asia policy?3 What was the specific causal path linking these important events and a renewed debate on the merits of engaging Tel Aviv? By analysing changes at the international, national, and individual levels, this chapter aims to explain the reorientation of India’s policy towards Israel since 1992.4 This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, it is necessary to present a brief background on the nature of Indo-Israeli contacts from the time of Indian and Israeli independence to the end of the Cold War. The chapter then describes the evolution at the structural level that facilitated a reappraisal of India’s policy towards Israel. The third section explores the transformations in the domestic context in the 1990s which enabled the introduction of new perspectives on how to engage Israel. The fourth section will examine the role of certain new actors in advocating for a strong and durable partnership with Israel since 1999. Page 2 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Finally, the chapter explains how the combination of forces at these different levels can accurately explain the timing, the nature, and the new intensity of Indo-Israeli relations.

(p.354) Historical Background Relations between the Indian and Israeli communities existed well before they became independent from the British Empire after the Second World War.5 The roots of India’s Israel policy can even be dated back to the early 1920s, when the leaders of the Indian nationalist movement started supporting the Palestinian nationalist movement against the British rule (Gordon 1975). In fact, the Indian National Congress (INC), which would eventually form the first independent Indian government in 1947, made its first statement on the Palestine question as early as 1922 (Zaidi and Zaidi 1980: 542). It was through a shared opposition to British imperialism that the first political links were established between Indian and Arab leaders. Jawaharlal Nehru, who would become India’s first prime minister, held discussions with Arab nationalists in various anti-imperialist meetings such as the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels in 1927 (Heptulla 1992: 38). As a consequence, India’s attitude towards Israeli national aspirations has long been opposed to that of the Western countries. Nehru found similar features between the partitions in Palestine and in the Indian subcontinent. He believed both were the results of British policies of divide and rule (Nehru 1989: 885–91). As a result, the Jewish problem was perceived to be a minority problem, and Nehru envisaged a single Palestinian state based on federal principles, with religious rights for the Jewish minority, a solution which was consistent with his own domestic position in regard to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan (quoted in Ministry of External Affairs 1968: 69–70). Although India was one of the few countries where there was no record of any persecution of the Jewish communities, Indian nationalists did not support the Zionist movement for five reasons.6 First, Nehru and the INC promoted a secular type of nationalism after 1922 and did not adhere to the religious rationale of the Zionist movement (Nehru 1989: 886). When opposing the Muslim League’s argument that South Asia Muslims were a distinct nation at home, Congress was also indirectly arguing against the Zionist project. Second, the INC strongly condemned the Zionist movement’s reliance on British imperial support. Nehru regretted that the Jewish national movement had preferred to ‘take sides with the foreign ruling power’ (Nehru 1989: 888). Third, the influx of European-based Jews into Palestine strengthened the image of (p.355) the Jew as an alien on Asian soil in the Indian nationalist mind.7 Fourth, INC leaders like Mohandas Gandhi and Nehru had reservations about the violent methods used by some of the Jewish nationalists (Gandhi 1983: 417).8 Finally, the Zionist movement did not actively try to establish links with the INC during the interwar period. It made a tactical choice to concentrate its diplomatic attention on British and American material and political support.9

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? When the question of the partition of Palestine became an issue at the United Nations (UN), New Delhi rejected the ‘two nation’ theory and instead supported an alternative plan envisaging a federal Palestine with an autonomous status for the Jewish population. Regardless of this initiative, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved by a large majority the plan creating the State of Israel on 29 November 1947. Indian recognition was not immediate, as Nehru admitted he did not want to ‘offend the sentiments of our friends in the Arab countries’ (Nehru 1986: 217). Nevertheless, on 17 September 1950, India did finally recognize the State of Israel after two years of existence, including UN membership (Kumaraswamy 1995). As the existence of Israel had become a fait accompli recognized by a large number of states, of which some had an important Muslim population like Iran and Turkey, New Delhi conceded that the de jure recognition of the State of Israel could not be indefinitely deferred.10 However, contrary to common diplomatic practice, the recognition of Israel did not lead to the immediate establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. Although some efforts to establish links were partly successful with the creation of an Israeli Consulate in Bombay in 1953 and the Indian support for Israel’s participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Rubinoff 1995), the recognition was not followed by the establishment of full diplomatic relations. This policy was characterized by a deliberate refusal from New Delhi to reciprocate Israeli requests to set up diplomatic relations (Brecher 1963: 129). The sources of this policy could be traced to domestic and international considerations. From the very beginning, Prime Minister Nehru and his successors did not want to antagonize the large Muslim minority at home and the Arab states in the region. For instance, Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly openly opposed the recognition of the State of Israel during the debates (Misra 1966: 35). In the early 1950s, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was considered to be an expert in (p.356) ‘Arab affairs’ and a ‘respected leader of India’s 40 million Muslims’ in Nehru’s mind.11 He argued that full-fledged diplomatic contact with Israel would have an unsettling effect on Indian Muslims (Brecher 1963: 129). The refusal to normalize relations with Israel was also seen as a way to maintain good relations with Arab and Muslim states. Support from Arab states in West Asia against Pakistan was also interpreted as decisive on the Kashmir issue. From the onset of the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan tried to internationalize the issue, especially by trying to obtain religious solidarity from the Muslim world. New Delhi supported the Palestine cause and the Arab demands, hoping in exchange to gain their backing or at the least their neutrality on the Kashmir dispute (Brecher 1963: 130). A strong personal relationship between Nehru and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser also shaped India’s relations with Israel. India wholeheartedly supported Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956 against Page 4 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Great Britain, France, and Israel. Nehru was very critical about this venture and condemned the Sinai campaign as a ‘clear naked aggression’ (quoted in Rajan 1964: 151). The fact that Israel collaborated with ex-colonial powers such as France and Great Britain revived anti-imperialist sentiments and further dissipated what little sympathy the Indian leadership had for the Jewish state. Krishna Menon—who was defence minister at the time—later conceded that the Suez crisis had ended any possibility of opening relations with Israel. Sending an ambassador to Tel Aviv would have been perceived by the Arabs as a hostile action (Brecher 1968: 79). The official excuse, invoking financial and personnel difficulties, for delaying the institution of diplomatic relations was no longer relevant. Successive Indian prime ministers pursued this policy in support of the Arab states. However, it quickly became apparent that Indo-Arab relations were lopsided, as the unambiguous Indian support against Israel in 1956 and in the West Asian crises of 1967 and 1973 was not reciprocated by the Arab states, which failed to back India in its regional conflicts against China in 1962 and against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 (Blarel 2015: chapter 4). Moreover, with the third largest Muslim population at that time, and with its repeated and unambiguous support to the Palestinian cause during the Arab-Israeli wars, India hoped it had a legitimate right to participate at the meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Rabat in September 1969. India felt that its important domestic (p. 357) Muslim population was as concerned with the Palestinian situation as any other Muslim country (Noorani 1969; G. Singh 2006). Although India was officially invited to the conference, opposition from Pakistan kept the Indian delegation from participating. This was a serious blow to the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who sought in the future, albeit with little success, to demand more reciprocity in its relations with the Arab and Muslim states. In spite of the lack of success of India’s pro-Arab policy, Indo-Israeli relations still deteriorated in the 1970s and 1980s as other domestic and regional factors affected India’s position. Aside from the need to elicit Arab support on the Kashmir dispute, India’s proArab policy was also shaped in the 1970s by its growing energy needs. Since it lacks substantial hydrocarbon reserves in its territory, India is perennially dependent on energy imports. Furthermore, the oil shocks of 1973 had put New Delhi in a more vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Arab states. The fourfold increase of oil prices in 1973 by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries severely affected India, by provoking shortages that adversely affected agricultural and industrial production. To meet these challenges, Indira Gandhi decided to further strengthen political links with Gulf states, supporting their diplomatic positions against Israel but also by offering engineering services and manpower (Dietl 2000). This policy did bring some relief to India’s energy dilemma thanks to help from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, as well as from non-Arab, but Muslim, Iran. The remittances sent from the growing Indian Page 5 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? expatriate community in West Asia also became an important factor in the formulation of India’s West Asia policy. These migrant workers, ranging from labourers to skilled technicians, employed in the Arab states have increased tremendously since the 1970s, going from 123,000 in 1975 to approximately 4.5 million in 2008 (Abhyankar 2009: 199; G. Pant 2001). In discussions with Arab states, India equally took into account the presence and well-being of this population. This historical background can explain why Israel did not have any place in India’s West Asia policy from 1948 to 1991. Indian foreign policy makers considered it too risky to establish relations with Israel because such a decision could jeopardize India’s traditional links with Arab and Muslim partners. This chapter now analyses how the combination of structural, domestic, and individual leadership factors shaped the abrupt change in 1992.

(p.358) International Factors The emergence of India and Israel as sovereign states on 15 August 1947 and 14 May 1948, respectively, coincided with the start of a struggle for power between two big global players, the United States and the USSR. Some analysts have argued that Cold War divisions explained the prolonged estrangement between Delhi and Tel Aviv until 1992 (Kumaraswamy 2004; H.V. Pant 2004). The two countries were considered to be more or less integrated in the two rival Cold War blocs. This argument seems to fit nicely the pre- and post-1992 story, as the abrupt end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the USSR encouraged India to diversify its relationships and to change its Israel policy. However, this argument is unsatisfactory. The Cold War did not directly impact South Asia and West Asia in the immediate post-independence phase. The influence of Cold War politics on India’s foreign policy only became significant in 1971 when India started engaging the USSR while Israel became more and more dependent on US aid in the late 1960s.12 The end of the Cold War left Indian decision-makers facing a completely uncertain strategic situation where the parameters of a new emerging global order were still undefined. Radical changes like the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower presented India with new opportunities and challenges. The USSR had been India’s largest arms supplier since the early 1960s and, in 1991, 70 per cent of India’s military equipment was of Soviet origin, including 400 Mig-29 in the Indian Air Force (A. Gupta 1995). Almost overnight, India had to deal with a military industry that was dispersed in fifteen countries that emerged from the USSR collapse, and with less favourable financial conditions offered by the Russian Federation. This new unipolar world that surfaced in 1991 presented new challenges but also new opportunities for India. The end of the bipolar confrontation offered India more strategic leeway than in the Cold War era. As a consequence, India sought assistance from all

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? countries that could help to improve its precarious regional and international security situation. Regional developments in the early 1990s also permitted India to transform its relations with Israel. The Kuwait crisis of 1990–1 and its consequences modified Israel’s status vis-à-vis Arab states. Internal opposition within the Arab world and widespread criticism regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) support of Iraq during (p.359) the war limited the negative implications of opening up to Israel. The Iraqi intrusion into Kuwait diverted attention from Israel, as the Saddam Hussein regime became the new source of concern in the region. India no longer needed to systematically condemn Israel to obtain Arab sympathies. Following the Gulf War, where Israel showed military restraint in spite of Iraqi attacks, many countries from the region even sought new ties with the Jewish state. A series of West Asian peace initiatives such as the Madrid Conference of October 1991 created a new era in the region where coexistence and negotiations with Israel became possible. The peace process created a window of opportunity for India to revise its traditional pro-Arab policy and subsequently to develop a strategic partnership with Israel. Another international factor which made a reassessment of India’s Israel policy necessary was the growing US pressure to normalize. Since independence, India had regarded Israel as a state that had been set up with the support of imperialist powers in general, and the US in particular. Prime Minister Nehru had famously pointed out that the US government had handled the Palestine question ineptly in 1947 (Nehru 1986: 126). In the 1980s, there were strong pressures from the US government and the pro-Israel groups in Washington on India to change its policy vis-à-vis Tel Aviv. The US influence on India’s West Asia policy further increased during the Gulf War. India’s shift to support the US-led intervention against Iraq in the Gulf war and its consent for letting US military planes refuel in Indian airports, proved that Indian decision-makers had come to terms with increased American presence in West Asia.13 The domestic economic crisis in India in 1991 and the disappearance of its Soviet economic partner also made New Delhi more vulnerable to US economic demands. In June 1991, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao inherited an important economic crisis from his predecessor, which was an opportunity for a traditionally selfreliant India to liberalize and to open its economy to the world. With his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, Rao fundamentally changed the economic policies of its predecessors.14 Rao notably sought investments and loans from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as from Western countries like the US (New York Times 1991). The objective for Rao and Singh was to neutralize all obstacles in Washington to the urgent loans India needed. Improving relations with Israel was (p.360) progressively perceived as a necessary condition to obtain financial US assistance for India’s economic recovery. As a result, India decided first to support the US move to Page 7 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? revoke UNGA Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism in December 1991, and then to normalize ties with Israel, which was finally announced just as Indian prime minister Narasimha Rao was visiting the US in January 1992 (Gargan 1992). These structural changes in the early 1990s were therefore important permissive conditions to explain a reassessment of India’s Israel policy, but this is only part of the causal story. What led to this new thinking in India’s West Asia policy? Why did India develop a defence relationship with Israel and not with the US or other West European partners? Why did defence purchases increase only in the late 1990s?

National Factors Alongside the regional and international factors, there were also propitious conditions at home for a policy change. What changed in 1991 was the fragile and divided situation of the ruling Congress party, which pushed an uncharismatic Rao to the prime minister position. After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, Rao’s nomination was mostly a compromise between two warring camps within the Congress party. Dismissed as a low-profile political leader without any electoral base, it was widely believed that his appointment would not last long (Bajpai 1992). Because he was heading an apparently weak government of transition, Rao did not feel constrained by the Congress’s longestablished ideological positions and by traditional domestic voting constituencies such as the Muslim vote. As a consequence of this greater flexibility, his government gradually pushed for a reformist agenda, especially in the foreign policy field. At the domestic level, the deterioration of the situation in Kashmir in the late 1980s with the rise of militancy and of a pro-independence insurrection complicated India’s relations with its West Asian partners, and especially with the OIC. The Kashmir issue had rarely been raised by Pakistan in the early years of the OIC’s existence. However, from 1987 onwards, Islamabad exploited the ongoing unrest and the reports of human rights violations in the Kashmir valley to mobilize Arab-Muslim support for Pakistan’s position (Baba 2008). The OIC consistently took Islamabad’s side and never condemned cross-border insurgency coming (p.361) from Pakistan. It became evident that an unconditional pro-Arab policy did not provide India with any strategic support in its efforts to cope with threats to its unity and territorial integrity. The OIC resolutions lead to a strong diplomatic response from the Rao government, which asserted that Kashmir was an integral part of India (Baba 2008). The negative response of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran to backing India’s counter-insurgency struggle in Kashmir in 1990 put an end to India’s expectations of reciprocal support on Kashmir in exchange for its proPalestine stance.

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? In November 1991, an important debate took place on the issue of normalization in the upper house of Parliament (Rajya Sabha). On this occasion, various opposition members from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Janata Party, and the Samajwadi Janata Party criticized the official Indian foreign policy towards Israel, and called for the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relations between the two countries (Blarel 2015: chapter 5). There seemed to be a consensus emerging between some members of the Congress and the opposition on the need for a revision of India’s policy. The gradual change in position, with the revocation of UNGA Resolution 3379, was not consensual and was criticized by some members of Congress and parties from the left as a betrayal of India’s traditional policy towards the Arabs. To prepare the ground for normalization, Rao invited Yasser Arafat for an official visit in New Delhi on 20 January 1992. Arafat’s visit was an opportunity for the Indian leadership to gauge his reaction and to build a political and domestic consensus behind the decision to normalize relations (Dixit 1996: 311). Arafat told Rao there was a likelihood of official relations being established between the PLO and Israel in a period of six to eight months. Arafat implicitly endorsed the pending Indian decision when he publicly said in Delhi that the ‘exchange of ambassadors and recognition are acts of sovereignty on which I cannot interfere’.15 In his memoirs, the former foreign secretary at the time, J.N. Dixit, identified three important developments which pushed the Indian government’s decision to reassess its Israel policy: the Gulf War of 1991, the general attitude of the Arab states towards the problem of Kashmir (notably at the OIC), and the conclusion of a peace agreement between the PLO and Israel (Dixit 1996: 309–12). The decision to establish diplomatic relations on 29 January 1992 was not just the result of a series of international and domestic (p.362) changes. The shocks created a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to promote new ideas. Until 1992, the decision-making process vis-à-vis Israel had been dominated by a limited number of actors who defined and limited the scope of the policy. A combination of Indian politicians (mostly from the ruling Congress) and bureaucrats of the Ministry of External Affairs had unfailingly treated the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a zero–sum game and therefore vetoed any cooperation with Israel which could be interpreted as a betrayal of India’s longstanding policy.

Individual-Level Factors International and domestic-level changes were important enabling factors for a policy change, but are insufficient to explain the timing and direction of India’s new Israel policy. What followed the 1992 decision was a second stage of policy flux exposed to new ideas, preferences, and actors. Two main groups, which had historically envisaged the long-term benefits of engaging Israel, supported a redefinition of India’s Israel policy. The Indian military had sporadically collaborated with the Israelis and encouraged further cooperation. Similarly, Page 9 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? certain economic actors, private but also state government, had both directly and indirectly suffered from the economic boycott against Israel, and saw in the establishment of diplomatic relations a new opportunity. For example, the operational relevance of Israel’s military industry for India’s strategic needs was not a new realization for India’s security establishment. The Indian military admired the experience and expertise of the Israeli Army in its different successful military campaigns, and had lobbied for more cooperation. The study of the Israeli military operations of 1967 had, for instance, been made compulsory reading for officers of the Indian army.16 There were also instances of Israeli military assistance during the conflicts of 1962, 1965, and 1971. In times of strategic need and of international arms embargo, the Israeli provision of mortars and ammunition proved decisive (Kumaraswamy 2010: 199, 202, 215; Maxwell 1970: 385; Rubinoff 1995; S. Singh 1979). However, the Indian military has traditionally had little say in the making of India’s foreign policy, with probably the exception of technical issues like the procurement of military equipment necessary to deal with India’s security problems. Even before normalization, there was (p.363) an urgent need to diversify India’s military procurement given India’s dependence on Soviet equipment, the increasing obsolescence of Soviet acquisitions, and the failure of the indigenous military industry to deliver (Hoyt 2006: 61–6; Pardesi and Matthews 2007). As a consequence, in its rationale behind the decision to establish full and normal diplomatic relations with Israel, the Narasimha Rao government openly acknowledged that defence procurement had been a major consideration (Dixit 1996: 310). This was the first opportunity for military actors to play a greater role in India’s Israel policy. Despite these initial statements, India still hesitated to buy weapons from Israel until the late 1990s, as opposition still remained. S. Krishna Kumar, minister of state for defence, explained in 1992 that ‘there was no proposal, no initiative, no offer for any kind of defence ties [with Israel]’, and that ‘that subject had not even been formally discussed in the Defence Ministry’.17 Due to internal reluctance, it also took five years of lobbying from the Indian military establishment to convince the Ministry of External Affairs and the political class of the need to have a defence attaché permanently based in Tel Aviv. The statecontrolled Defence Research and Development Organization, which was in charge of most of India’s national defence projects, also had organizational interests in limiting acquisitions from and cooperation with the Israeli industry. In addition, there were international arms control treaties which limited technology transfer between the two countries. Some of the Israeli technology was also co-produced with the US, and Tel Aviv needed prior approval from Washington to enter into negotiations with third parties on technological collaboration.18

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Military exchanges only became substantial in the early 2000s because of five developments. There was first the rise to power of the BJP which had traditionally promoted better relations with Israel, even before the establishment of diplomatic relations. During their tenure, BJP leaders openly talked about strategic cooperation, and particularly counter-terrorism cooperation. Some observers have emphasized the ideological rapprochement between the Hindu right and Israel as an explanation for the emergence of a strong strategic axis (Jaffrelot 2003; Tillin 2003). The BJP government, through its National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, even suggested a military and ideological alliance to fight terrorism.19 However, BJP leaders frequently clarified that India’s foreign policy had not shifted regarding Israel and Palestine, and (p.364) regularly reiterated India’s support for a Palestinian state (Baruah 2003; Hindu 2003). Second, unlike most Western countries, Israel did not condemn the Indian nuclear tests of 1998 and was one of the limited options for New Delhi’s arms procurement. This symbolic gesture increased Israel’s credibility as a reliable arms supplier. Third, the main window of opportunity for those advocating an engagement of Israel was created by the Kargil conflict.20 In spite of the final diplomatic and military victory, the Kargil crisis led to an important debate over India’s defence and intelligence failures (Kargil Review Committee 2000). It was in this enabling context of reforms that India’s security establishment chose to expand its cooperation with Israel. Finally, by 2000, Israel could no longer export weapons to China because of Washington’s veto and had to find an alternative market (Blarel 2006). By the early 2000s, the Indian military establishment emphasized the technical benefits of collaboration with Israel. In certain high-technology niche fields such as surveillance equipment (unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic sensor equipment, night-vision equipment, airborne early warning system, Green Pine radars) and ballistic missile defence, where India had failed to build robust indigenous capabilities, Israel could offer important equipment and expertise, like the Barak-I AMD systems India bought in 2001 (S. Gupta 2001; Pandit 2012). Israel also proved to be an interesting indirect way to access US defence technology, such as sub-elements of the Arrow system like the Green Pine radar (Koshy 2003). Israel has also provided qualitative upgrades to some of India’s ageing Soviet equipment (Rajiv 2010). A new qualitative edge was attained with the $1.1 billion purchase of the Phalcon AEW systems which were finally delivered in 2009 (Hindu 2009).21 Israel was gradually presented by the security establishment as a potential facilitator to reach self-sustaining indigenous defence capabilities. The Israeli military industry had demonstrated its willingness to transfer technology, and to engage with the Indian defence industry in joint ventures, production, and in research and development in high-technology military equipment. Joint ventures Page 11 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? and transfer of technology from Israel were presented as a way to develop India’s own indigenous defence production. Owing to the technical nature of this collaboration, most politicians have deferred to the defence bureaucrats for the negotiations. Defence (p.365) collaboration with Israel was progressively perceived positively by politicians across the political spectrum as a way to preserve India’s strategic autonomy. The difficulties in reversing the new Israel policy have been directly observable since the return of the Congress party to power in 2004. While expressing strong anti-Israeli rhetoric during the electoral campaign (Hindu 2004), Congress has been more rhetorically prudent since it came back to power. Congress even declared that it would not review its diplomatic relations with Israel, which had now been framed as a ‘strategic imperative’ (Indian Express 2004).22 After three initial years of discreet military exchanges, Minister of Defence A.K. Antony finally announced in May 2007 the scope of the defence procurements from Israel which had attained ‘US$5 billion’.23 In July 2007, Antony further argued to Parliament that ‘successive governments since 1992 have had defence ties with Israel. This is not new. And the relation is not ideological, but purely based on our security requirements’ (Financial Express 2007). As a result, there is now a bipartisan political consensus behind the strategic relationship with Israel. Similar to the dynamics observed in the security sphere, certain economic actors have also exploited the shocks and openings of the 1990s to influence the direction of India’s Israel policy. There had been early frustrations for some economic sectors with India’s pre-1992 foreign policy. For instance, Prime Minister Nehru had always indicated that India could learn much from Israel’s achievements in agriculture and especially drip irrigation systems.24 On Nehru’s initiative, limited technical assistance had occurred in the development of water resources in the Rajasthan desert (Rafael 1981: 90). However, agricultural assistance remained limited as other demands for advice on irrigation projects (often at state-level initiative) were not approved by the central government. Other sectors were disadvantaged by the existing policy, such as the diamond trade business. Prior to normalization, most of the limited $200 million trade between the two countries was concentrated in the diamond industry, with most exchanges with Israeli companies having to circumvent the Indian government’s boycott and taking place through third countries (Gerberg 1996: 36). Many Indian companies were also negatively affected by the Arab boycott blacklist. As a consequence, the early 1990s marked a structural opportunity for these actors to engage Israeli partners and to diversify the Indo-Israeli bilateral trade beyond the traditional diamond trade. (p.366) The first set of actors to exploit the opening of the policy-making process were local governments from Indian states facing drought and water shortage issues, and which were looking for Israeli assistance in the production Page 12 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? of high-yield crops and irrigation systems. Indian state governments, free from the political and institutional constraints inhibiting the central government, dealt directly with the Israeli government and with Israeli firms. Several joint ventures, agricultural projects, and memorandums of understanding were signed between the state governments and Israel, notably during the visits of Indian chief ministers to agricultural exhibitions in Israel, and following the visits of Israeli President Ezer Weizman and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, respectively, in 1996 and 2003.25 In addition, active participation in trade fairs and agricultural exhibitions enhanced the awareness regarding business opportunities and promoted contact between Indian and Israeli firms. When the Minister of Agriculture Sharad Pawar made his visits to Israel in 2005 and 2006, he discussed various agricultural agreements and was accompanied by various delegates from state governments.26 In addition, some leading Indian corporate groups also visited Israel to build direct ties with Israeli companies in the fields of agriculture, horticulture, irrigation, and dairying.27 The decentralized economic relationship occurring directly between Israel, subnational governments, and private companies further insulated the direction of India’s Israel policy from political decision-makers in New Delhi. Economic relations have continued and accelerated following the return of Congress to power in 2004. As India’s economic profile has risen since the early 2000s, Indian private actors have explored certain complementary niche fields where collaboration with Israel could bring benefits, such as in the pharmaceutical, information technology software, telecommunications, clean energy technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and space technology sectors.28 There has been an important increase in mutual investments, joint ventures, and collaboration in research and development in these fields. Political action has been mostly that of following and encouraging these private Indian initiatives, notably by negotiating various specialized agreements facilitating investments, and memorandums of understanding to promote further research and development cooperation. Approximately 150 bilateral agreements were reportedly signed during (p.367) the first fifteen years of bilateral diplomatic relations (Kumaraswamy 2010: 255). In 2004, the Israeli Minister of industry, trade, and employment, Ehud Olmert, agreed with the Indian commerce and industry minister Kamal Nath to set up a Joint Study Group to make recommendations on mechanisms and targets for expanding trade and economic cooperation. In 2006, Israel’s minister of industry Eli Yishai visit India and concluded with Nath a Preferential Trade Agreement based on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group.29 In spite of the diversification of bilateral trade, diamonds still constituted about 56.4 per cent of the total bilateral trade in 2011.30 Furthermore, while trade has increased by five times between 2002 and 2012 and India stood at sixth place Page 13 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? among Israel’s trade partner countries (third largest trade partner in Asia) in 2010, Israel only represented 0.79 per cent of india’s total trade in 2014.31 This relationship could evolve further, with negotiations under way for a free trade agreement which has the potential to change the composition of trade and give opportunities for more sectors, such as information technology and biotechnology, to invest in India. India and Israeal have been negotiating a FTA since 2013 (Airy 2012). Until now, this economic relationship has been limited to specific collaborations in niche fields, with various sub-national actors (private economic actors and state governments) taking their own initiative. This chapter has argued that a confluence of structural, domestic, and individual-level factors has been responsible for a radical shift in Indo-Israeli strategic relations. At the structural level, the end of the Cold War fundamentally altered India’s strategic calculus and made possible a reassessment of India’s Israel policy. There were also some propitious conditions at the domestic level with the decrease in salience of the Muslim factor in influencing Indian decisions towards West Asia. At the individual level, new actors and interests have taken advantage of these permissive conditions to redefine the nature of India’s Israel policy. The recasting of India’s policy from a highly politicized issue (and therefore dependent on regional events and domestic electoral cycles) to a more narrow, selective, and technical partnership has two important (p.368) implications for the future of Indo-Israeli relations. First, since the new Israel policy is insulated from the fluctuations of political events, it is likely that the current state of relations will not be reversed in the short term. The current policy has already been tested by different regional-diplomatic shocks such as the 2006 Lebanon conflict, the 2008 and 2014 Gaza crisis, and the Palestinian bids for observer status at the UN in 2011 and 2012. Until now, bilateral defence and economic relations have been relatively unaffected by these diplomatic developments. Indian politicians have publicly condemned Israeli actions but have not attempted to reverse the current policy.32 There is a solid policy consensus to engage Israel as a military and technological supplier. The current positive feedback from Israel’s military assistance could, however, evolve. For example, scandals linked to some important defence purchases could become more publicized and politicized (Kundu 2012; Melman 2009; Samanta 2011). The bribery scandals affecting important Israeli companies like Israel Military Industries or even Israel Aircraft Industries in the Barak missile deal could seriously delay or limit future defence deals. Incriminated companies could either be blacklisted, or future tenders could prove to be longer processes (Pandit 2012). The Indian military could also revise its privileged military partnership if there is evidence of substantive sales of Israeli weapons to China and/or Pakistan (Times of India 2013).

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? There are other historical and regional factors that could endanger this relationship. For instance, India has maintained good relations with one of Israel’s declared enemies, Iran. For some time now, Israel has expressed its concerns regarding the increasing military ties between India and Iran. In October 2003, these qualms were made public by Ariel Sharon, who threatened to put an end to military technology transfer to India on the ground that it could be redirected towards Tehran. India’s aspiration to engage very diverse allies like Iran or Israel is a vital trait of its new pragmatic policy with regard to West Asia (Abhyankar 2012). The Indian government has tried to maintain good relations with Iran to respond to internal and external critics of its ideological rapprochement with Israel. It is difficult to clearly envisage the impact of the Iran factor on the future of Indo-Israeli relations, but it seems improbable that it can put an end to the growing strategic cooperation between the two nations. References Bibliography references: Aaron, S.J. 2003. Straddling Faultlines: India’s Foreign Policy toward the Greater Middle East, CSH Occasional Paper 7 (New Delhi: French Research Institute). Abhyankar, R., ed. 2009. West Asia and the Region: Defining India’s Role (New Delhi: Academic Foundation). ———. 2012. ‘Israel, Iran, and India’, Haaretz, 22 June. Airy, A. 2012. ‘India, Israel to triple trade’, Hindustan Times, 27 November. Baba, N.A. 2008. ‘OIC and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: The Indian Dimension’, in R.N. Abhyankar, ed., West Asia and the Region: Defining India’s Role (New Delhi: Academic Foundation), pp. 669–73. Bagchi, I. 2012. ‘India–Israel Relations Come Out of Arab World Shadow’, Times of India, 13 January. Bajpai, K.S. 1992. ‘India in 1991: New Beginnings’, Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 207–16. Baruah, A. 2003. ‘We Fully Support Palestinian Cause, says Vajpayee’, Hindu, 16 November. Beck, N. 2013. ‘India and Israel’s Strategic ties’, Jerusalem Post, 21 August. Blarel, N. 2006. Inde et Israel: Le Rapprochement Stratégique (Paris: L’Harmattan). ———. 2015. The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy: Continuity, Change and Compromise since 1922 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Page 15 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Brecher, M. 1963. The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (London: Oxford University Press). ———. 1968. India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London: Oxford University Press). Clary, C. and M.E. Karlin. 2009. ‘A fine balance: India’s Middle East policy’, Indian Express, 9 May. Dietl, G. 2000. ‘The Security of Supply Issue: The Growing Dependence on the Middle East’, in P. Audinet, P.R. Shukla, and F. Grare, eds, India’s Energy: Essays on Sustainable Development (New Delhi: Manohar), pp. 209–24. Dixit, J.N. 1996. My South Block Years: Memoirs of a Foreign Secretary (New Delhi: UBS Publishers). Financial Express. 2007. ‘Relation with Israel based on our security requirements, says Antony’, 23 July. (p.372) Gandhi, M.K. 1983. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 87: February 21–May 24, 1947 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India). Gargan, E. 1992. ‘India Announces Full Israeli Ties’, New York Times, 30 January. Gerberg, I. 1996. ‘India Developing Trade’, Israel-Asia Trade, no. 8 (Tel Aviv: Israel Asia Chamber of Commerce). ———. 2008. The Changing Nature of Israeli-Indian Relations: 1948–2005 (Pretoria: University of South Africa). Gopal, K., and S. Sharma. 2007. India and Israel: Towards Strategic Partnership (New Delhi: Authorspress). Gordon, L. 1975. ‘Indian Nationalist Ideas about Palestine and Israel’, Jewish Social Studies, vol. 37, nos 3–4, pp. 221–34. Gupta, A. 1995. ‘Determining India’s Force Structure and Military Doctrine’, Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 441–58. Gupta, S. 2001. ‘India to Buy Missile Defense Systems from Israel’, Hindustan Times, 11 February. Heptulla, N. 1992. Indo-West Asian Relations: The Nehru Era (New Delhi: South Asia Books).

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Hindu. 2003. ‘Unequivocal support for Palestinian cause, says PM’, 25 September. ———. 2004. ‘India Should Initiate Action Against Israel: Antony’, Hindu, 27 April. ———. 2009. ‘Israeli Phalcon to Land in India Today’, 25 May. Hoyt, T.D. 2006. Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel (London: Routledge). Inbar, E. 2004. ‘The Indian-Israeli Entente’, Orbis, vol. 48, no. 1. Inbar, E. and A.S. Ningthoujam. 2012. ‘Indo-Israeli Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century’, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 93, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, January. Indian Express. 2004. ‘Israel ties won’t affect Palestine ties: Natwar’, 12 July. Jaffrelot, C. 2003. ‘Inde-Israël, le Nouvel Elément-Clé de l’Axe du Bien?’, Critique internationale, vol. 21, pp. 24–32. Kargil Review Committee. 2000. From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage). Koshy, N. 2003. ‘US Plays Matchmaker to India, Israel’, Asia Times, 10 June. Kumaraswamy, P.R. 1995. ‘India’s Recognition of Israel, September 1950’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 124–38. ———. 2004. ‘Israel-India Relations: Seeking Balance and Realism’, in E. Karsh, ed., Israel, the First Hundred Years: Israel in the International Arena (London: Frank Cass), pp. 254–73. ———. 2010. India’s Israel Policy (New York: Columbia University Press). ———. 2012. ‘Warming up to Israel’, New Indian Express, 8 January. (p.373) Kundu, R. 2012. ‘Banning Foreign Defence Contractors is a Loss for Both Country and Firms: Experts’, Times of India, 9 August. Maxwell, N. 1970. India’s China War (New York: Random House). Melman, Y. 2009. ‘Media Allege Corruption in Massive Israel-India Arms Deal’, Haaretz, 29 March. Ministry of External Affairs. 1968. India and Palestine: The Evolution of a Policy (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). Page 17 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? Misra, K.P. 1966. India’s Policy of Recognition of States and Government (New Delhi: Allied Publishers). Naaz, F. 2005. West Asia and India: Changing Perspectives (New Delhi: Shipra Publications). Nair, S. 2004. Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed: India and Israel (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications). Nehru, J. 1986. Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers 1947–1964, vol. 2: 1950–1952, ed. G. Parthasarathi (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). ———. 1989. Glimpses of World History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). New York Times. 1991. ‘Economic Crisis Forcing Once Self-reliant India to Seek Aid’, 29 June. Noorani, A.G. 1969. ‘Rabat: Religion and Diplomacy’, Indian Express, 4 December. Pandit, R. 2011. ‘IAF will Add Two More Israeli AWACS to its Fleet’, Times of India, 8 November. ———. 2012. ‘Navy’s Critical Requirement for Israeli Barak Missiles Stalled due to CBI Case’, Times of India, 27 August. Pant, G. 2001. ‘Gulf NRIs: From Expatriates to Entrepreneurs’, World Focus, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 9–11. Pant, H.V. 2004. ‘India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 8, no. 4. Pardesi, M.S. and R. Matthews. 2007. ‘India’s Tortuous Road to DefenceIndustrial Self-Reliance’, Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 23, no. 4. Rafael, G. 1981. Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy—A Personal Memoir (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson). Raja Mohan, C. 2005. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s Foreign Policy (London: Penguin). Rajan, M.S. 1964. India in World Affairs, 1954–1956 (London: Asia Publishing House). Rajiv, S.S.C. 2010. ‘India, Israel and the Defence Taboo’, IDSA Comment, 30 September. Rubinoff, A.G. 1995. ‘Normalization of India–Israel Relations: Stillborn for Forty Years’, Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 487–505. Page 18 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? (p.374) Samanta, P.D. 2011. ‘Blacklist Effect: Tank Ammo at Critical Low Levels, MoD Waives Policy to Buy’, Indian Express, 4 October. Shichor, Y. 1998. ‘Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan’, Survival, vol. 40, no. 1. Shimoni, G. 1977. Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews: A Formative Factor in India’s Policy towards Israel (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Singh, G. 2006. ‘Oral History: India at the Rabat Islamic Summit (1969)’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 1, no. 2. Singh, S. 1979. ‘Indo-Israel Relations: A Study of Some Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy’, Journal of Indian History, vol. 57, nos 2–3. Slapak, O., ed. 1995. The Jews of India: A Story of Three Communities (Jerusalem: The Israel Museum). Suroor, H. 2011. ‘West Asia Policy Hostage to “Muslim” vote’, Hindu, 15 March. Tillin, L. 2003. ‘US-Israel-India: Strategic axis?’ BBC News, 9 September. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3092726.stm (accessed 15 April 2015). Times of India. 2012. ‘Timing of Krishna’s Maiden Trip to Israel Holds the Key’, 8 January. ———. 2013. ‘Israel Not to Supply Weapon Systems to Pakistan’, 15 September. Ved, M. 1998. ‘Slow and Steady: Growing Security Ties with Israel’, Times of India, 30 March. Zaidi, A.M. and S.G. Zaidi, eds. 1980. Encyclopedia of the Indian National Congress, 1921–1924: India at the Crossroads, vol. 8 (New Delhi: S. Chand). Notes:

(1.) These figures do not include defence ties (see Beck 2013). (2.) There have been a few books that have concentrated on this relationship. See Blarel (2015); Gerberg (2008); Gopal and Sharma (2007); and Kumaraswamy (2010). (3.) Rejecting the Eurocentric terms ‘Near East’ or ‘Middle-East’, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had a more Asia-centric worldview and therefore referred to this region as ‘West Asia’. This chapter will henceforth be using the expression ‘West Asia’ when discussing India’s position vis-à-vis the Middle East.

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? (4.) For more details on the three levels of analysis approach, see the Introduction to this volume. (5.) For a detailed treatment of the pre-independence determinants of India’s Israel policy, see chapter 2 in Blarel (2015). (6.) The three Jewish communities in India are the Baghdadi, Bene Israeli, and Cochini, which are mainly settled in Maharashtra and Kerala. For more, see Slapak (1995). There are also the Bene Menashe present in the Indian states of Mizoram and Manipur. (7.) Nehru (1989: 886) even referred to their recent immigration to Palestine as a ‘colonizing movement’. (8.) Nehru (1989: 890) equally discussed Jewish terrorism, but interpreted it as an escalation and reaction to Arab terrorism. (9.) There were some sporadic attempts from the Jewish community in the late 1930s to get support from Gandhi and Nehru for the Zionist cause (see Shimoni 1977). (10.) Communiqué published by the Hindu, 18 September 1950. (11.) Although Azad never held an official position linked to foreign affairs (he was minister of education), various observers have defined him as an influent personality on Nehru on West Asian affairs (see Brecher 1963: 130; Kumaraswamy 2010: 18, 145–50). Azad’s grand-niece, Najma Heptulla, said that Azad had been a ‘guide’ to Nehru on ‘matters concerning West Asia’ (see Heptulla 1992: xi, 3). (12.) See, for example, Vidya Nadkarni’s chapter in this volume. (13.) To ensure the wellbeing and repatriation of Indian expatriates in Kuwait and the provision of crude oil imports, the Indian government initially supported a negotiated settlement of the conflict and opposed the use of force to solve the Gulf crisis. (14.) See Rahul Mukherji’s chapter in this volume. (15.) Indian Express, 20 January 1992. (16.) See General V.P. Malik’s statement on his visit to Israel in 1998 in Ved (1998). (17.) Statesman, 28 February 1992.

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The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? (18.) The US had previously criticized and even blocked the Israeli transfer of the Lavi, patriot missile, and Phalcon technologies to China. These precedents served as cautionary tales for further joint ventures between India and Israel (see Shichor 1998). (19.) See National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra’s speech at the AJC dinner, AJC Global Forum 2013, 5 May 2003. Available at: http://www.ajc.org/site/apps/ nlnet/content3.aspx?c=ijITI2PHKoG&b=851361&ct=1118743 (accessed 15 April 2015). (20.) The Kargil War between India and Pakistan took place between May and July 1999, and was initiated by the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers on the Indian side of the Line of Control. For more details on the conflict, see Rajesh Basrur’s chapter in this volume. (21.) In spite of delivery delays and some operational difficulties, the Congress government had been planning on buying two more Phalcon AWACS (Pandit 2011). (22.) See also National Herald, 10 March, 2004. (23.) Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question 4481, 16 May 2007. (24.) Similarly, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri also spoke highly about Israel’s achievements and did not rule out the possibility of Israeli technical cooperation with India in agricultural development. See Jerusalem Post, 14 January 1966. (25.) The chief ministers of Maharashtra (twice), Gujarat (twice), Rajasthan (twice), Karnataka, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh (twice), Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, and Haryana have all visited Israel since 1992. (26.) Pawar had already visited Israel in May 1993 as chief minister of Maharashtra to discuss agricultural cooperation. (27.) Information retrieved from the website of the Indian Embassy in Israel, http://www.indembassy.co.il/pages.php?id=14#.VVBpu5P44yM (accessed 10 May 2015). (28.) Information on India–Israel relations retrieved from the Ministry of External Affairs website, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ Israel_July_2014.pdf (accessed 10 May 2015). (29.) Hindu, 6 December 2006. (30.) Indian Embassy figures available at http://www.indembassy.co.il/pages.php? id=14#.VVBpu5P44yM (accessed 10 May 2015). Page 21 of 22

The Partnership that Dare not Speak its Name? (31.) Information retrieved from the Department of Commerce, Government of India, http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (accessed 10 May 2015). (32.) In fact, India and Israel seem to have reached some informal understanding on the separation between India’s international and multilateral positioning on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and its bilateral interactions with Israel (see Clary and Karlin 2009; Suroor 2011).

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India and Latin America the rivalries between Kolkata’s traditional soccer clubs. Understanding the carnival of Argentinean and Brazilian colours in India’s eastern megalopolis gives us an insight into how India views Latin America. Kolkata’s soccer fanatics support Argentina and Brazil not only because both teams often play fantastic, aesthetically appealing, football, nor because they regularly win—an aspect that matters in a country singularly lacking in sporting success stories—but because they are able to defeat European teams. Kolkata soccer fans support the South American giants because they identify with them: they view Argentine and Brazilian triumphs on the soccer pitch as victories of the ‘wretched of the earth’ over erstwhile oppressors and extant exploiters, and imagine similar outcomes (p.376) for their own country and for themselves in an unfair world in which they have drawn the short straw. If the above rendering is fanciful, which it surely is, it is so only in the sense that all symbolism is fanciful. In most of India’s foreign policy history, Latin America has featured only sporadically and symbolically. India’s policy toward Latin America has gone through three distinct phases: distant acquaintance (late 1940s to early 1960s, or the Nehruvian years), rhetorical solidarity (the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, or the years of nonaligned revisionism), and strategic engagement (mid-1990s onward, coinciding with India’s emergence as a player with system-shaping potential). The chapter will deliberately eschew a historical narrative of India’s relations with Latin America, which would amount to a mind-numbing chronology of insignificant state visits coupled with a puerile analysis of dismal data on non-existent trade.1 Instead, the chapter takes as its point of departure Kenneth Waltz’s (1954) articulation of the ‘three images’ through which an observer can seek to understand international phenomena: through the eyes of the statesperson or policymaker (the first image); through the lens of state and/or national interest and domestic policy impulses (the second image); or through the envisioning of systemic dynamics (the third image). The chapter examines which of the three images best describes and explains each of the phases of Indian foreign policy toward Latin America. In so doing, it suggests that in order to understand the years of distant acquaintance, we must delve into Jawaharlal Nehru’s worldview (first image analysis) and Latin America’s place in it. In contrast, the years of rhetorical solidarity with Latin America are best understood by focusing on the nature of the Indian state (second image analysis) and comprehending its foreign policy orientation. Finally, the shift to strategic engagement can be best understood in terms of power transition and systemic transformation issues (third image analysis) and India’s attempts to cope with the consequences of being an emerging power. The organization of the chapter flows out of this analytical scheme. In the three sections that follow, the three phases in India’s Latin America policy are analysed sequentially. Each of these sections also contains a brief case study

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India and Latin America pertaining to the period that highlights specific problems and deficiencies in India’s Latin American policy. A final section concludes the chapter.

(p.377) Distant Acquaintance: Nehru’s Worldview and the Missing Continent India became sovereign at a moment in world history when power was polarized between two large, continent-sized states that presented radically different alternatives of how to best organize society and politics. As a British colony, India had contributed an army of 2.5 million men—the largest all-volunteer military force in human history—to the Allied cause in World War II. Although this had given India a seat at the high tables that were shaping the post-war order, as a colony India did not really have a voice at any of these tables. In systemic terms, India in 1947 was large but weak, post-colonial yet not revolutionary, more status-quo-oriented than revisionist: from being the ‘brightest jewel in the British crown’, and thereby a core area of interest to Britain’s systemic hegemony, it became a peripheral actor in a marginal region. Born through a painful territorial vivisection, inheritor of a patchwork quilt of colonial provinces and presidencies and semi-autonomous feudal princedoms, and responsible for the fate of a continent-sized population characterized by immense socio-cultural diversity and widespread socio-economic deprivation, the domestic tasks of the Indian state clearly were pacification, consolidation, and development. Externally, India faced war due to unsettled borders and contested territories: indeed, the first phase of Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America is bookended by two border wars, against Pakistan (1947–8) and China (1962). Latin America was not germane to any of India’s external or internal concerns during the first two decades of independence. Nevertheless, while Latin America was neglected in Indian foreign policy, Asian concord and African decolonization were significant areas of foreign policy focus. The British Commonwealth was a central pillar of foreign policy concern, as were the two superpowers. India had historical links with the region lying between Egypt and Iran, as it did with most of eastern and southern Africa. However, south of the US and Canada, the only part of the Western Hemisphere with which India had historically had any contacts were the islands and territories of the Anglophone and Dutch Caribbean. So although Indian foreign policy during the first two decades ranged far and beyond the immediate regional neighbourhood and presumed to reshape the world, Latin America, or more specifically Ibero-America, simply did not have a place in it. (p.378) Understanding Indian foreign policy during the Nehruvian years requires a prior understanding of the role, vision, and inclinations of Jawaharlal Nehru, which were in every sense primary and foundational. Nehru was, first of all, the prime minister in a cabinet imbued with the inherited Westminster notion of primus inter pares. Nehru had been, for decades, the authoritative voice within the Indian National Congress on the world beyond India’s shores. Page 3 of 23

India and Latin America Although several other leaders in India’s national movement—Rabindranath Tagore, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Abul Kalam Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Bhimrao Ambedkar—had their own distinct worldviews, Nehru outlived and outlasted all of them. As a colony, British India did not have a foreign policy establishment, so the crucial aspect of statecraft and public policy pertaining to the external world had to be designed and built from scratch after independence. Public sentiment did not play much of a role, either; foreign policy in mid-twentieth century India was still very much an elite activity. By the early 1950s, within the Congress party, the bureaucracy, and public opinion more broadly, the overwhelming sentiment on foreign policy matters was that ‘Panditji knows best’.2 However, Nehru’s broad cosmopolitan outlook is often exaggerated. A creature of his times, Nehru’s worldview was essentially an amalgam of three perspectives—elite Indian nationalist, Harrow-Cambridge Anglophile, and Fabian socialist—all of which are, in themselves, quite narrow. Understandably, Latin America was almost entirely absent in each of these perspectives. No better evidence for this can be found than Glimpses of World History, a compilation of 196 letters on world history written by Nehru to his daughter Indira Priyadarshini from various British Indian prisons in the early 1930s. Glimpses of World History is often cited as an exemplar of Nehru’s globalist vision, yet it is, from a Latin American perspective, a curiously incomplete and unbalanced book. It covers all of Latin America in the following words: ‘The Monroe Doctrine, about which I told you in my last letter, preserved the republics of South America from the greed of Europe. These republics are called Latin republics, as they were founded by people from Spain and Portugal. These two countries, as well as Italy and France, are called Latin nations’ (Nehru 1934 –5: 398). It is not just that Latin America is summed up in two sentences in a 992-page book; Latin America is acted upon: it is ‘founded’ by two countries, ‘preserved’ by a third. The first (p.379) sentence, in particular, articulates the standard US perspective on the Monroe Doctrine; Latin American sentiments about being forcibly dragged into the US sphere of influence, already well known to people of learning in the 1920s, are altogether missing. There is evidence in brick and mortar that Latin America was absent from Nehru’s Weltanschauung. Chanakyapuri, New Delhi’s magnificent diplomatic enclave, consists of beautifully designed and carefully maintained buildings that house the diplomatic missions of countries big and small. When the diplomatic enclave was planned in the 1950s, the countries that India considered cardinal to its foreign relations were given neighbouring sites on which they subsequently constructed their embassies and high commissions. If one were to read meaning into the layout of Chanakyapuri, it could give us deep insight into India’s worldview during the Nehruvian period.3 Even a cursory examination would show that all the major geographical regions, cultural areas, and ideological groupings that existed in the world in 1950 find representation in Page 4 of 23

India and Latin America Chanakyapuri, with one singular exception. A huge chunk of the world’s landmass, from Río Bravo to Tierra del Fuego, an entire continent, a developing region, a vibrant and cohesive cultural area, finds no place in India’s diplomatic heartland. Although most Latin American countries had been independent for nearly a century and a half when India gained its independence, they are all missing in the parade of nations on Shantipath. India established diplomatic relations with major Latin American countries in the early years of independence. Mexico was the first Latin American country to recognize India after independence, but the two countries did not establish diplomatic relations till 1950. By then, India had already opened its embassy in Rio de Janeiro in 1948 (later shifting it to Brasilia in 1971); the Brazilian embassy started functioning in New Delhi in 1949. However, India’s links with Argentina pre-date independence. India opened a trade commission in Buenos Aires in 1943 and later converted it into an embassy in 1949. Argentina had established a consulate in Calcutta in the 1920s, which was transferred to Delhi as an embassy in 1950. Thus, by 1950, the three largest countries in Latin America had embassies in New Delhi. Thus, during the years of distant acquaintance, it is indisputable that Latin America was on the periphery of India’s foreign policy concerns. There were admittedly some systemic reasons for this. Even after the (p.380) Cuban Revolution of 1959 and well into the 1960s, Latin America was firmly in the Western sphere of influence due to both external (the historical US dominance over Latin America) and internal (the pro-Western and anti-Communist sentiments of Latin American elites) reasons. The core issues driving the new nations of Asia and Africa—decolonization, nonalignment, and racial equality— had little traction within Latin America. Thus, the benign neglect went both ways: India did not feature in the foreign policies of Latin American countries either.4 The only exception to this trend occurred after the liberation of Goa in 1961; the use of military force by India to bring about the end of Portugal’s Estado da Índia was severely criticized by Brazil, which had taken a proPortuguese position on the matter of decolonization, and which represented Portuguese interests in India after the rupture in their diplomatic relations. It was only in November 1961, fourteen years after he became prime minister, that Nehru, India’s peripatetic world statesman, made a state visit to Mexico, the only Latin American country that he ever visited. In this respect, Nehru can be contrasted with Tagore, who had travelled to Peru and Argentina as far back as 1924. Case Study 1: Kashmir Issue and Latin American Voting in the UN Security Council

New Delhi’s blinkered worldview during the Nehruvian years led to the marginalization of a continent, but was that really an issue of consequence? Did developments in Latin America really matter to India in the 1950s and 1960s? Page 5 of 23

India and Latin America Unfortunately for India, there is evidence that it has paid a price for ignoring Latin America. Of all the issues that India has to confront in international forums, none is more essential than Kashmir. Garnering support from all quarters for India’s position on the Kashmir dispute has always been a major aim of Indian foreign policy. An analysis of Latin American voting on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a powerful argument in favour of maintaining robust ties with the countries of that region.5 Latin American countries sitting on the UNSC exercised considerable influence on voting patterns on the Kashmir issue (Kumar 1973). To give only one example of Latin American voting, ‘at certain moments, Argentina assumed clearly a partisan position against India’. In fact, (p.381) Argentina went to the extent of recommending that Pakistani armed forces remain in Kashmir ‘at a time when the Council was engaged in demilitarizing the area’ (Kumar 1973: 80). Why did Argentina vote the way it did? Was it won over by Pakistani diplomatic dexterity? Or was Argentina, itself a claimant of territory under the effective control of another state, merely reading its own national interest concerns into the India– Pakistan dispute? What is particularly significant here is not that Argentina voted the way it did, but that there is no evidence of Indian efforts to win Argentine support. During the Nehruvian years, the Indian foreign policy community did not seek to understand what made its counterparts in Latin America tick. India paid a concrete political price for its neglect of a continent.

Rhetorical Solidarity: Socialist India and Nonaligned Revisionism The year 1964 is important in India’s relations with the countries of Latin America, although not for any bilateral reasons. Instead, 1964 is the year in which countries of the developing world began to challenge the contours of the international system itself. Two significant systemic developments in 1964 were the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as a permanent intergovernmental body under the UN General Assembly to deal with trade, investment, and development issues, and the setting up of the Group of 77 (G77) as a caucus organization of developing states to pursue common goals and develop leverage in UN deliberations. The year 1964 marks the beginning of a process of fundamental systemic reorientation, in which the centrality of the East–West political, ideological, and military cleavages of the Cold War were gradually replaced by a North–South dichotomy drawn principally on economic and developmental lines. Since many Latin American countries were enthusiastic participants in both UNCTAD and G77, India discovered for the first time an identity of interests with them.6 While the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was the first big sign within Latin America that things were changing, its impact was largely symbolic: the significant changes that started taking place in the mid-1960s were unconnected with the Cuban Revolution itself. Latin American countries enthusiastically participated in and played a key role in the (p.382) Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place between 1973 and 1982. In commodity groups in cocoa, Page 6 of 23

India and Latin America copper, sugar, and coffee, the countries of Latin America could make common cause with Afro-Asian countries. Venezuela and Ecuador played an important role in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the most powerful commodity cartel in the 1970s. Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela played leading roles in the formulation and promotion of the New International Economic Order in 1974, a diplomatic initiative in which India was also heavily involved. But perhaps the biggest sign that things had changed was the expansion of Latin American involvement in the Nonaligned Movement, from the presence of just Cuba and three former Commonwealth Caribbean observers at Belgrade in 1961, to the participation of fifteen Latin American and Caribbean states at New Delhi in 1983 along with eight observer states from the region. Latin American theories of dependency also had a significant intellectual impact in India and indeed across much of the Third World; Raúl Prebisch, the iconic dependency theorist, became the first secretary-general of UNCTAD (1963–9). The rise of tercermundismo (Third Worldism) in Latin America can be attributed to three factors: the increasing preoccupation of the Nonaligned Movement after 1970 with economic issues and its de facto merger with the G77; the success of OPEC and the belief that a unified Third World coalition could force significant concessions from the industrialized countries; and a broader trend in Latin America toward increased international assertiveness and the diversification of international relations. While these system-level developments are important, the second phase of India’s Latin American policy is best understood through an analysis of the ways in which the Indian state itself changed from the mid-1960s onward. By the end of the Nehruvian period, and despite India’s humiliating defeat at the hands of China in the border war of 1962, a political consensus still existed in the country. This broad-based consensus in India’s public life could be attributed to several factors: cohesion flowing out of the freedom struggle, the experience of Partition at the moment of independence and the determination that the country would not be divided ever again, the generation of ‘tall leaders’ spawned in the national liberation movement, the ‘banyan tree’ character of the Congress party,7 as also deliberate decisions to seek the ‘middle ground’ in domestic and foreign policy. Consensus was manifest (p.383) in the policies of nonalignment and anti-colonialism in international relations, democracy and secularism in domestic politics, centralized planning and self-reliance in economic development, and egalitarian reform and affirmative action in the social sphere. Nonalignment in its initial years is best understood as the foreign policy analogue of the mixed economy at the domestic level: sticking to the middle ground made choosing between the two superpowers unnecessary, and thereby prevented a rupture in India’s public life. Although aspects of the national consensus were contested by the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra Party, and the Communist parties, and in general terms received a body blow during the Emergency (1975–7), it nevertheless managed to survive till the early 1990s. Page 7 of 23

India and Latin America What this consensus masked was the fact that the Indian state turned steadily leftward from the mid-1960s, and despite sporadic moves to the centre, could be characterized as socialist for much of this period. The leftward movement of the Indian state began with the garibi hatao (abolish poverty) campaign by Indira Gandhi in the 1971 elections. Faced with an assault by the old guard within the Congress party, Indira Gandhi sought to change the discourse permanently in her own favour. In this endeavour, she largely succeeded. However, this phase of Indian domestic politics was not only about an individual leader; it was also about the creation of a new support base that could give the Congress party a permanent majority. The ‘garibi hatao’ slogan, and the anti-poverty programmes with which it was accompanied, were designed to create a new coalition of rural and urban poor, with specific emphasis on the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the religious minorities. Over time, the more liberal features of the Indian Constitution, especially some of the Fundamental Rights, were eroded while the socialist tendencies in the Directive Principles of State Policy were progressively strengthened. This phase in India’s domestic politics culminated with the word ‘Socialist’ being added to the Preamble of the Constitution by the Forty-second Amendment, enacted in 1976 during the Emergency. The movement leftward domestically had its external cognate. In 1971, faced with the certainty of war against Pakistan, the possibility of an Islamabad– Beijing axis, and a pronounced US tilt toward Pakistan, India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. The full implications of the Indo-Soviet treaty became evident a few years later, when New Delhi found that it was unable to (p.384) condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in October 1979, a development that impacted on India’s region in a series of increasingly negative ways. This period of Indian foreign policy was marked by diplomatic moves aimed at strengthening Third World solidarity and pushing a revisionist agenda in various multilateral forums. The foreign policy thrust of the 1970s and 1980s was the direct outcome of the domestic changes in India since the mid-1960s. India’s Latin America policy during the years of rhetorical solidarity therefore had domestic roots. While many countries in Latin America, in different ways and at different paces, were also eager to build ties with countries like India, even at the height of tercermundismo in the mid-1970s, the degree of nonalignment in Latin America varied greatly from country to country and from regime to regime. Although it joined hands with Africa and Asia as a part of the South, Latin America’s identification with the rest of the Third World remained qualified. Unlike the other two peripheral continents, Latin America was also in the West, culturally and often (in the era of military regimes and leftist guerrilla insurrection) ideologically. Tercermundismo was usually a means of improving a Latin American country’s position within the West, and only rarely reflected a Page 8 of 23

India and Latin America fundamental challenge to Western values and interests. In particular, tercermundismo was a pragmatic and useful additional source of leverage in relations with the US, which remained for most Latin American countries their major area of foreign policy concern. Latin American interest and support for Third World initiatives continued to be based on economic issues, with the region’s relatively high income levels and resource abundance often complicating the formation of a unified negotiating position with poorer countries in Asia and Africa. Latin American countries remained especially wary of all proposals that singled out the least developed countries for special treatment. Many of the economic pressures that pushed Latin America toward the Third World in the 1970s weakened as economic divergences between the region and the rest of the Third World became more apparent. For instance, the inability of Third World markets to absorb Brazilian exports and the turnaround in Brazil’s energy position reduced the economic importance of the Third World for Brazil. Furthermore, the Third World coalition lost some of its coherence and momentum in the 1980s: OPEC’s power declined, the attitudes of industrialized countries hardened, and the Third World movement proved useless in (p.385) dealing with the single most pressing international problem facing Latin America in the 1980s: the external debt crisis. Thus, while on the face of it there was an exponential growth in India’s relations with Latin America during the years of rhetorical solidarity, the overall quality of these relationships remained superficial and wafer-thin. As the following case study suggests, during this period India remained vulnerable in terms of its key national interests to developments within Latin America. Case Study 2: The Curious Episode of ‘Khalistan’ in Ecuador

In July 1985, at the height of the terrorist challenge in Punjab by some extremist Sikh organizations, India suddenly realized that a so-called ‘Khalistan’—a secessionist state that was being sought by the militant groups—was on the verge of being formally recognized by Ecuador (Malik 1985). This would have been a grave attack on India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by a country with which India did not ostensibly have any quarrel. It subsequently transpired that a high-level delegation from Quito had indeed held intensive discussions in London with various self-proclaimed leaders of the ‘Khalistani’ groups. The Ecuadorian delegation was led by a former president of that country who was also the chairman of the ruling party, which made the entire episode all the more ominous from an Indian perspective. However, a few days later, the administration of Leon Febres Cordero formally announced that the team that had met the ‘Khalistani’ leaders was a private delegation (Times of India 1985). With that announcement this curious but menacing episode slowly disappeared from the newspaper headlines.

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India and Latin America An analysis of the ‘Khalistan in Ecuador’ episode reveals several important issues. It is clear that the Ecuadorean delegation was on the verge of recognizing a ‘Khalistan government-in-exile’ and offering free agricultural land for agriculture and settlement to ‘Khalistani refugees’. Furthermore, in return for their public support, it is certain that substantial financial inducements were offered by the ‘Khalistan’ groups to Ecuadorean politicians. Thus, the behaviour of the Ecuadorean political establishment during this entire episode was illconceived and offensive. Nevertheless, Indian policy was also found wanting. Citing financial reasons, India had closed its embassy in Quito just a year before the ‘Khalistan’ episode, and had refused to reconsider its decision even after (p. 386) a request by the Ecuadorean government. India thus gratuitously transgressed against the self-esteem of the Ecuadorean elite. More importantly, the closing down of the Indian embassy in Quito left India with no leverage in Ecuador.

Strategic Engagement: Systemic Dynamics and the Emergence of India and Brazil The latest phase in India’s Latin American policy, the years of strategic engagement, was initiated in the mid-1990s. From 1971 to 1991, India had enjoyed a quasi-alliance relationship with the Soviet Union that provided it with a sense of security backup. Since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, India has been essentially ‘friendless’ in the international system: it has friendly relations with many countries but friendship—in the sense of mutual support in security matters—with none. India’s budding friendship with the US is constrained by many factors, the most important being not so much the US– Pakistan relationship as the ineluctable fact that India is not regarded by the Western democracies as a member of the ‘democratic core’ of states. Since India is not a part of the security community led by the US, it cannot rely on the latter for security backup as it had successfully depended for two decades upon the Soviet Union. Also, India is just too big to be accommodated in any security community as a junior partner. The conjunction of unexpected circumstances in the 1990s made it India’s most dangerous decade by far.8 India discovered that it was friendless at the precise moment when its external environment was increasingly fraught, even as it was beset with every type of domestic problem imaginable. In the early 1990s, the Indian economy was facing an acute foreign exchange crisis (which forced the government to physically transfer some of the country’s gold holdings as collateral), divisive identity politics had created violent religious, caste, and regional fissures in Indian society, Pakistan was openly fomenting rebellion through terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir, and Beijing had blatantly transferred not just missile components but entire M-11 missiles to Islamabad. India not only successfully navigated the perilous 1990s; it was during these years that its long-incubating technological revolution finally emerged. Most important of all,

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India and Latin America as India entered the decade of the 2000s, it found that it was increasingly being regarded by other states as an emerging power. (p.387) What is an emerging power? The meaning of the emerging power concept is best arrived at via a triangulation from the great power and middle power concepts. What great powers are has never been in doubt: they are the states with system-shaping capabilities and intentions.9 In contrast, the middle power concept is nebulous, protean, and lacking in clarity (Holbraad 1984). We define middle powers as the special category of states that lack the systemshaping capabilities of the great powers, but whose size, resources, and role preclude them from being ignored by the great powers. Triangulating from these two definitions, we can define emerging powers as middle powers on the ascendant: states that have the capability and intention to manoeuvre their way into great power status. In the early 2000s, India found that it shared the status of emerging power with a few other countries, the most significant of which was Brazil. This implied for India a new and unexpected visibility in Latin America: in the 2000s, across Latin America, India began to be compared with China. A World Bank report in 2008 explicitly compared the challenge that China and India posed to Latin America (Lederman et al. 2009). An Inter-American Development Bank report in 2010 asked whether India was Latin America’s ‘next big thing’ (Moreira 2010). A report from the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 suggested that ‘India and Latin America and the Caribbean, together with China, are the world’s new growth poles’ (ECLAC 2011: 7). It does not, at first glance, make much sense to compare India’s presence in Latin America with that of China: India’s merchandise trade with Latin America in 2010, at US$23 billion, was barely one-sixth of China’s trade with the region. Furthermore, although China is an emerging economy, it is a rising power, not an emerging power like India or Brazil.10 A recent paper suggests that India’s relationship with Latin America could not only emerge as a counterbalance to that of China, but also that it would—unlike China’s ‘Colonialism 2.0’—be much more beneficial for the countries of the region (Avery 2012). Latin America’s trade with India grew by a factor of eight in the 2000s, and ‘shows similar growth trends today to those that Sino-Latin American trade showed a decade ago’. Furthermore, India’s trade with Latin America is driven by India’s private sector, which makes the India–Latin America commercial relationship different from the Sino-Latin American trade (p.388) relationship in three important respects. Firstly, India’s trade and investment relationship with Latin America is much broader than China’s, and India’s foreign direct investment in Latin America, while far smaller than China’s, is also far more diverse. Secondly, unlike China, raw materials and intermediate products, not finished goods, comprise over half of Indian exports to the region, thereby helping Latin American firms become part of a globally competitive Page 11 of 23

India and Latin America supply chain and create employment in the region through value-added manufacturing. Thirdly, India’s trade relationship with Latin America is helping to build the capabilities of local firms in ways that China’s is not. Thus, ‘India’s private sector can offer Latin American firms new capabilities to produce goods and services for the global economy, not just raw materials. In the long term these capabilities will be far more valuable to Latin America than China’s cash’ (Avery 2012: 4). In terms of its trade relationships with the countries of the region, it is Venezuela and not Brazil that is the most important country for India these days. This is clear from data on India’s top ten trading partners in Latin America presented in Table 14.1. Venezuela’s US$13.8 billion trade surplus with India in 2012–13 is based entirely on its petroleum exports, which have become an important element in India’s energy

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India and Latin America

Table 14.1 India’s Top Ten Trade Partners in Latin America, 2012–13 (Values in US$ Million) Rank

Country

Export

Import

Total Trade

Trade Balance

21

Venezuela

234.14

14,117.67

14,351.81

–13,883.54

24

Brazil

6,048.53

4,825.76

10,874.29

1,222.77

36

Mexico

1,628.24

4,037.62

5,665.86

–2,409.37

43

Chile

690.00

2,992.31

3,682.31

–2,302.31

45

Colombia

912.12

2,352.79

3,264.91

–1,440.67

56

Argentina

539.95

1,198.71

1,738.66

–658.75

66

Peru

637.93

561.32

1,199.25

76.61

68

Ecuador

263.55

872.54

1,136.10

–608.99

101

Panama

226.49

109.55

336.04

116.95

103

Costa Rica

74.28

219.72

294.00

–145.44

Source: Government of India, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank, ‘Total Trade: Top 250 Countries’. Available at: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopn.asp (accessed 10 October 2013).

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India and Latin America (p.389) security. Nevertheless, what is especially notable in the latest phase of India’s Latin America policy is the extent to which the emphasis is on the relationship with Brazil, a clear indication that systemic concerns are now the principal driver of India’s Latin America policy.

At the level of their respective regional sub-systems, Brazil and India have different experiences of power (as opposed to notions of power), arising out of their differently constituted regional settings.11 Brazil’s regional sub-system has a long geopolitical history and is now evolving in interesting directions. The following five interlocking components can be discerned: (a) Brazil, by far the largest country in its continent, has historically not dominated its regional space due to its relatively low socio-economic levels, its inability to integrate and leverage its continental dimensions, and its cultural distinctiveness as the only Portuguese-speaking country in a Spanish-speaking region; (b) since the 1960s, Brazil has advanced technologically and economically while its traditional regional rival, Argentina, has not only stagnated but declined; (c) Brazil has been largely successful in integrating its regional space into a zone of peace, with multiple projects for regional cooperation, including important bilateral projects; (d) the Brazilian Amazon, long a formidable barrier between Brazil and its Pacific and Caribbean neighbours (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana), is rapidly being occupied and integrated into its national territory; and (e) Brazil is now engaged in a high-stakes game of challenging US hemispheric hegemony by ensuring that there are two integrationist projects in the Western hemisphere instead of a single one. If the central problem in Brazil’s regional security complex is the problem of regional integration, India’s regional security problématique could not be more distinct. It is made up of three interlocking components: (a) while India dominates its region, its dominance is severely contested, particularly by Pakistan; (b) as a consequence, India’s region is neither internally peaceful nor externally cohesive; and (c) China, although an extra-regional player, now rivals India for influence in India’s neighbourhood, and may well end up exercising significant regional leadership in South Asia.12 The biggest challenge that China poses to India has nothing to do with the border dispute, its military modernization, or even its military assistance to India’s neighbours. Over the last three decades, China has built strong political and economic links with (p. 390) nearly all of India’s neighbours in South Asia. While India has failed to present a feasible regional vision and invest heavily in it, China has worked in a systematic and piecemeal manner to create an alternate incentive structure for India’s neighbouring countries. The net result, by Chinese design and Indian default, has been to tie India within a regional framework that is inimical to India’s interests and ambitions. As the following case study suggests, China is outmanoeuvring India not only in South Asia but also in a larger systemic sense as well.

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India and Latin America Case Study 3: The Displacement of IBSA by BRICS

The India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) was formally inaugurated by the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003.13 Earlier that year, conversations between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India, President Luis Inacio de Silva of Brazil, and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa led to the Brasilia meeting between the foreign ministers of the three countries. The explicit aim of the Brasilia meeting was to examine ‘themes on the international agenda and those of mutual interest’. As is to be expected, the bulk of the Brasilia Declaration focuses on issues of trade, global financial flows, and development. Reform of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, is an important yet predictable element in the document. However, the foreign ministers also highlighted ‘new threats to security’ and emphasized the establishment of ‘concrete cooperation projects’ in the areas of science and technology, defence, transportation, and civil aviation. In a quick follow-up to the Brasilia meeting, the first Meeting of the Trilateral Commission of the IBSA Dialogue Forum was held in New Delhi on 4–5 March 2004; the three foreign ministers, Yashwant Sinha (India), Celso Amorim (Brazil), and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (South Africa) were the principal participants.14 Significantly, the IBSA Dialogue Forum also involved working-level discussions for enhancing trilateral cooperation in the spheres of science and technology, information technology, health, civil aviation and shipping, tourism, trade and investment, defence, energy, and education. The early years of IBSA set up a new pattern of trilateral cooperation, consisting of regular meetings of fourteen joint working groups (agriculture, culture, defence, education, energy, environment, health, human settlements, public administration, revenue administration, science and technology, social development, transport, trade and (p.391) investment) and six people-to-people’s forums (academic, business, editors, local governance, parliamentary, and women). The work done within IBSA is fairly low-key but intense, and has in less than a decade created authentic networks of specialists in key areas of development activity. China had early on indicated its interest in joining IBSA, but the fact that the three countries were democracies became a subtle factor in keeping China out of the trilateral grouping. China has been able to outmanoeuvre India diplomatically through the parallel initiative of the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) grouping. As a rising power, China has an enormous incentive in challenging the status quo, and BRIC has provided China with an excellent opportunity to do so at very low cost to itself. By inviting South Africa to join BRIC during the Sanya Summit in 2011, China in effect made IBSA redundant (Taylor 2012): in the future, it is extremely likely that IBSA summits will take place on the sidelines of BRICS summits before IBSA itself fades into oblivion. China’s invitation to South Africa to join the BRICS summit at Sanya in 2011 was an initiative that was welcomed by the other three countries; indeed, it could be said that they had virtually no choice in the matter. That says something about Page 15 of 23

India and Latin America South Africa’s moral heft in international politics today. Being singled out from among all the African countries to be a part of BRICS bolsters South Africa’s self-perception as an active global citizen and a leader in Africa, and strengthens its claim to a permanent role in global governance. South Africa’s presence in BRICS will also have a positive impact on the development cooperation dimension of the grouping. While there was not much that Indian diplomacy could do to prevent the expansion of BRIC, there is a sense in which the Brazilian perspective was not understood by India. The Brazilian perception of the role of BRICS seems to be anchored in its prior understanding of IBSA and MERCOSUR15, in the sense that its diplomacy seems involved in dealing with the so-called ‘variable geometry’ of multiple international coalitions. Amâncio de Oliveira and Janina Onuki (2012) have devised an interesting matrix to disentangle the variable geometry of Brazilian diplomacy: BRICS is viewed as the best asset for Brazil at the global level, since MERCOSUR is no longer seen to be providing global leverage to Brazil, while IBSA has largely symbolic or normative value as a notable instance of South–South cooperation. (p.392) India is in BRICS because it cannot afford to be out of the grouping. Nevertheless, of the BRICS countries, India is easily the most positively inclined toward the US. Since India’s domestic politics remains resolutely divided on the issue of India–US relations, being a part of BRICS moderates and levels out any supposed proximity to Washington. Being in BRICS also rekindles old ties with Russia and builds a much-needed bridge to China. Finally, although India has a marked preference for IBSA, BRICS has become an alternate forum for both routine and high-level interaction with Brasília and Pretoria. The five BRICS countries are contra-hegemonic and revisionist to different degrees. In the case of India, the difference may well be of kind and not merely of degree. The faster the pace at which the relative power of the US declines, the better it would be from the respective perspectives of China, Russia, and Brazil. The same cannot be said with confidence about India, which would be unwilling to swap US global hegemony for Chinese continental hegemony. What will be the overall impact of the current crop of emerging powers on world politics? Will they lead to a power transition, that is, will it simply be one more case in history of power moving from one set of states to another? Or will the emergence of a new set of great powers, this time around, transform the nature of the international system itself? It will surely not be a case of either power transition or systemic transformation, but rather both. However, both power transition and systemic transformation will most probably be imperfect processes.

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India and Latin America This chapter has focused on India’s relations with Latin America, that is, Hispanic America and Brazil. It has deliberately excluded the non-Hispanic islands and territories of the Caribbean Basin, some of which are host to significant Indian diaspora and many of which, as members of the Commonwealth, have a long history of diplomatic engagement with India. Although there is enormous diversity among the twenty countries of Hispanic America and Brazil, it is nevertheless possible—due to the paucity and thinness of interaction—to generalize about India’s relations with them. At least during the first two phases of its relations with Latin America (1947–64, 1964–98), India’s policies toward individual countries in the region did not significantly (p. 393) differ from one another. The one exception was Brazil, which even in the years of distant acquaintance played an important role, both before (negative) and after (positive) the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule. In the most recent phase in India’s relations with Latin America, Brazil has clearly stood out as India’s principal partner in the region: as emerging powers, both countries have collaborated in a variety of different forums including the Group of Four (G4), Group of 77 (G77), IBSA, and BRICS. Through three brief case studies, the chapter has also sought to demonstrate that in each phase of India–Latin America relations, the actions of specific Latin American countries had an inimical impact on India’s interests. At a critical moment, Argentine voting in the UNSC favoured the Pakistan position on Kashmir; Ecuador nearly recognized a ‘state’ that sought to secede from India; Brazil could have been more mindful about India’s concerns regarding the impact that the expansion of BRICS would have on IBSA. In each case, Indian diplomacy was also found wanting to a certain extent. India has also been quick to establish links with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the latest integration initiative in the region; the first meeting of the India–CELAC Troika Foreign Ministers was held in New Delhi on 7 August 2012. India is also making a special effort vis-à-vis the Latin American countries on the Pacific Rim. While the scope for increasing Indo–Latin American trade, investment, and joint ventures is vast, small gestures, often of a symbolic nature, are also important in winning friends: although there are scores of roads and parks across Latin America named after Mahatma Gandhi, Simón Bolivar and Benito Juarez are the only two historic Latin American personalities similarly honoured by India. The distance of Latin America from India is usually cited as a reason for their low level of interaction, although in reality their relative lack of contact has had very little to do with lack of geographical proximity and everything to do with the absence of a common history or shared culture. Even in an age of global interaction, images of India in Latin America, and vice versa, have till recently been stereotypical, superficial, and fanciful. Nevertheless, there also exists a latent fund of goodwill for India in the region that could be harnessed for mutual Page 17 of 23

India and Latin America benefit. As India grows in power and prominence, the incentive to build strong links with it will increase, in Latin America and elsewhere. However, (p.394) the onus for greater interaction lies equally with India: a country which aspires to great power status simply cannot be missing from any part of today’s interconnected and increasingly integrated world. Finally, the chapter suggests that Waltz’s three levels of analysis do contribute a couple of important insights to our understanding of India’s relations with the countries of Latin America. The first is about the three phases of India–Latin America relations, a point already made in the introductory section to which we briefly return. We have seen that the distant acquaintance phase, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, can be explained by the complete absence of Latin America in Jawaharlal Nehru’s worldview; all his overseas travels as India’s acknowledged leader took Nehru to Latin America only once. The rhetorical solidarity phase, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, was driven by an energetic nonaligned revisionism, which was the foreign policy cognate of the leftward turn of the Indian state during this period. The strategic engagement phase, initiated in the mid-1990s, pertains to power transition and systemic transformation issues that flow out of India’s emergence as a player with system-shaping potential. The sequential fit between the three phases of India’s relations with Latin America and the three levels of analysis is so neat that it would inevitably invite a measure of suspicion and incredulity. However, the second insight from Waltz’s levels of analysis qualifies the foregoing analysis in an important manner. Our study suggests that India’s relations with Latin America, and especially Brazil, have acquired heft only when propelled by systemic circumstances. Seen in this light, Waltz’s emphasis on systemic structure as an explanation of state behaviour (see Waltz 1979) also applies powerfully to India’s relations with the countries of Latin America. Thus, an alternative and perhaps more satisfactory explanation of the absence of Latin America in Indian foreign policy in the first phase can be traced not to the Nehruvian worldview, but rather to the structural impediments faced by India and its potential partners in Latin America, just as the second phase probably owes as much to structural imperatives as it does to the leftward turn in India’s domestic politics. References Bibliography references: Amâncio de Oliveira, J. and Janina Onuki. 2012. ‘Os poderes emergentes frente aos novos dilemmas da governança global: os casos da Índia e Brasil’, Round Table at the 8º Encontro da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política (‘Ampliando fronteiras da Ciência Política: Desafios contemporâneos à democracia e ao desenvolvimento’), Gramado, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 4 August. Page 18 of 23

India and Latin America Avery, W.H. 2012. ‘Beyond Commodities: The India–Latin America Trade Partnership’, Perspectives on the Americas, Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami, 18 September. Available at: https://umshare.miami.edu/ web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/AveryPerspectives.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2011. India and Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities and Challenges in Trade and Investment Relations (Santiago de Chile: ECLAC). Harrison, S.S. 1960. India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Holbraad, C. 1984. Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan). Jadeja, D.P. 1983. India Draws Closer to Latin America (New Delhi: Indian Society for Latin America). Kumar, V.S. 1973. ‘A Study of Latin American Attitudes to Kashmir (in the Security Council) 1948–1965’, MPhil thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. (p.397) Lederman, D., M. Olarreaga, and G.E. Perry, eds. 2009. China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat? (Washington, D.C.: World Bank). Levy, J.S. 1983. War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky). Malik, K.N. 1985. ‘Protest lodged with Ecuador embassy’, Times of India, 30 July, p. 9. Moreira, M.M., ed. 2010. India: Latin America’s Next Big Thing? (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank). Narayanan, R. 1978a. ‘India Drifts towards Latin America: An Indifferent Involvement’, Seminar on Continuity and Change in Indian Foreign Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 13–15 May. ———. 1978b. ‘India and Latin America’, International Studies, vol. 17, nos 3–4, pp. 655–75. ———. 1981. ‘India and South America: Towards Mature Partnership’, Indian and Foreign Review, vol. 18, no. 7, pp. 15–31. ———. 1983. ‘Latin American Studies in India’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 179–84.

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India and Latin America Narayanan, R. and A. Nafey. 1995. ‘Scope and Strategy for India’s Economic Relations with Latin America’, Indian Journal of Americas, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–24. Narayanan, R. and Vishnu Priya. 1986. ‘India’s Expanding Relations with Latin America’, in Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook of India’s Foreign Policy 1983–84 (New Delhi: Sage), pp. 143–55. Nehru, J. 1934–5. Glimpses of World History: Being Further Letters to His Daughter, Written in Prison, and Containing a Rambling Account of History for Young People (Allahabad: Kitabistan). Paz, O. 1969. Ladera este (1962–1968) (Mexico City: J. Mortiz). ———. 1974. El mono gramático (Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral) (trans. The Monkey Grammarian [New York: Grove Press, 1981]). ———. 1995. Vislumbres de la India (Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral) (trans. In Light of India [New York: Harcourt Brace]). Peña, K. 2012. ‘Brazil, the Bomb and the Poet: Cecília Meireles and the Gandhian Seminar (1953)’, InterDISCIPLINARY Journal of Portuguese Diaspora Studies, vol. 1, pp. 143–67. Available at: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/ 70507/1/70507.pdf (accessed 8 April 2015). Roy, A.N. 2010. ‘Latin America in India’s Foreign Policy’, International Studies, vol. 47, nos 2–4, pp. 387–402. Sahni, V. 1991. ‘Latin America and Other Regions’, in M. Deas, ed., Latin America in Perspective (Boston: Houghton Miflin), pp. 293–7. ———. 1998. ‘India and Latin America’, in Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute), pp. 76–90. (p.398) ———. 2011. ‘Regional Dynamics of Emerging Powers: Power/Control or Leadership/Consent?’, in E. Sridharan, ed., International Relations Theory and South Asia: Security, Political Economy, Domestic Politics, Identities, and Images (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 56–107. Taylor, I. 2012. ‘Has the BRICS Killed IBSA?’ South African Foreign Policy Initiative, 15 August. Available at: http://www.safpi.org/worldview/ian-taylor-hasbrics-killed-ibsa (accessed 8 April 2015). Thakur, V. 2013. ‘Foreign Policy Discourses in India (1946–1956) and South Africa (1994–2004): A Postcolonial Reading’, PhD thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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India and Latin America Thanvi, O. 2007. ‘The Roving Revolutionary’, Himal, December. Available at: http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/1349-the-rovingrevolutionary.html (accessed 8 April 2015). Times of India. 1985. ‘No recognition to extremists: Ecuador’, 5 August, p. 1. Vishnu Priya. 1988. ‘Relations since 1947’, in D.P. Jadeja, ed., India and Latin America: Partners in Progress (New Delhi: Trans Asia Publications), pp. 32–72. Waltz, K.N. 1954. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press). ———. 1979. Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill). Notes:

(1.) In order to track the evolution of Indo–Latin American relations over the years, see Jadeja (1983), Narayanan (1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1983), Narayanan and Nafey (1995), Narayanan and Vishnu Priya (1986), Roy (2010), and Vishnu Priya (1988). (2.) However, Thakur (2013: 111n1) has argued that there is ‘an overemphasis on the agency of Nehru and under appreciation of the significant role some of India’s diplomats played at international forums in the early years’. (3.) This paragraph, and one further down, is taken from Sahni (1998). (4.) Admittedly, some Latin Americans of note did visit India during the Nehru years. The renowned Brazilian poet Cecília Meireles visited New Delhi in 1953 to participate in a seminar organized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ‘to discuss Gandhi’s “outlooks and techniques” as a creative means to resolve Cold War nuclear tensions’ (see Peña 2012). Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, the Argentine doctor and Cuban revolutionary, visited India in June–July 1959, six months after the Cuban Revolution, in the course of his semi-official tour of Europe, Asia, and Africa (see Thanvi 2007). Perhaps the most substantial of these individual encounters was that of Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet and Nobel laureate, who served as Mexico’s ambassador to India from 1962 to 1968. While in India, Paz wrote his celebrated works El mono gramático (The Monkey Grammarian) (1974) and Ladera este (1962–8) (1969); much later, he wrote Vislumbres de la India (In Light of India) (1995). I thank Constantino Xavier for suggesting this discursive note. Nevertheless, the basic point of the section remains: the interactions (and lack thereof) between India and Latin America during this phase were all at the individual level. (5.) Since only a few Latin American countries have been non-permanent members of the UNSC, it could be argued that an analysis of voting patterns in the UN General Assembly would be far more representative of Latin American Page 21 of 23

India and Latin America attitudes. However, the purpose of this case study is not to analyse voting affinity between India and the countries of Latin America, but rather to argue that the neglect of Latin America has had negative political consequences for India. (6.) A few paragraphs in this section draw upon Sahni (1991). (7.) Well into the mid-1960s, the Congress party included within its ranks politicians who spanned a wide ideological spectrum, who shared little else beyond a broad Indian nationalist sensibility. (8.) In 1960, Selig Harrison had suggested that India was living through its most dangerous decades (see Harrison 1960). In many aspects, the 1990s were for India even more dangerous than the 1960s. (9.) Most definitions of great powers focus upon their security profiles and roles, a focus that this definition seeks to avoid. The classic definition of great powers can be found in Levy (1983: 8–18). (10.) The distinction is an important one: unlike emerging powers, which could have a systemic impact in the future, a rising power already has a systemic impact today. China’s impact on multiple aspects of the international system and the world economy is no longer in doubt. (11.) This paragraph and the two that follow draw on Sahni (2011). (12.) An additional, and complicating, component is the presence of US forces in Afghanistan as the bulk of the International Security Assistance Force, at least till 2014. (13.) The text of the Brasilia Declaration, 2003, is available at http://ibsa.nic.in/ brasil_declaration.htm# (accessed 30 October 2005). (14.) The texts of the Agenda for Cooperation and Plan of Action of the India– Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum Trilateral Commission Meeting, New Delhi, 2004, is available at http://ibsa.nic.in/new_delhi_agenda.htm (accessed 30 October 2005). (15.) MERCOSUR or MERCOSUL (Sp.: Mercado Común del Sur; Port.: Mercado Comum do Sul; Eng.: Common Market of the South) is a regional organization in the Southern Cone of South America and consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. For the milestone treaties, protocols and declarations in the short history of MERCOSUR, see http://www.mercosur.com/in/info/ tratados_acuerdos.jsp (accessed 17 April 2004).

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Recent controversies over the Indian government’s economic investments in sub-Saharan African countries like Ethiopia, where land acquisition by the Indian government has been said to be associated with forced resettlements with no compensation, raise the question of whether Gandhi’s analysis of India’s relationship with Africa holds true today. These controversies notwithstanding, the Indo-African relationship has experienced a resurgence, particularly since the turn of the twenty-first century. The economic as well as strategic importance of the African continent to India has risen, and Indian leaders often highlight this relationship. At the March 2013 Africa Dialogue Forum, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced, ‘India’s relations with Africa are rooted in the history of our solidarity against colonialism and apartheid’ (Singh 2013). Highlighting the fact that the relationship had come a long way since the days of Mahatma Gandhi, Prime Minister Singh pledged India’s commitment to assisting development in Africa. (p.400) Adopting a ‘level of analysis’ approach, this chapter focuses on understanding the impact of systemic factors, domestic factors, and the role of individual leaders in shaping India’s foreign policy towards Africa, as well as the interlinkages between these factors. The role of these factors in driving India’s foreign policy towards Africa can be divided into three major phases. The first phase came to the fore during the anti-colonial struggles in India and the African continent, lasting until Indian independence in 1947. The second phase commenced with independent India’s support for independence movements in Africa and lasted through the end of the Cold War and the opening of the Indian economy in the early 1990s. The latest phase since the early 1990s stems from the end of the Cold War. With the ideological triumph of the West, the India-supported Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) decreased in relevance, including in Africa. However, India, as the world’s largest democracy as well as a market-based economy, provided an attractive alternative model to China’s forays in Africa. From the Indian perspective, the Indo-African relationship was also grounded in the rapid growth of the Indian economy and the concomitant need to secure natural resources as well as develop new markets for its goods and services. Of course, these phases of India’s relationship with Africa have also been characterized by continuity. Today, as during the pre-independence era of a hundred years ago, Indo-African relations are still embedded in their common history of the struggle against colonial subjugation and couched in the language of South–South solidarity and strivings. This chapter will argue that India’s relationship with Africa during the twentieth century was driven largely by the idealism of anti-colonial struggle, while by the twenty-first century domestic factors have played a more dominant role. The Page 2 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa latter half of the twentieth century was a transition phase, where domestic factors gained momentum in the relationship, especially after India’s disillusionment with African countries when they did not support India during the Sino-Indian war of 1962–1963. After this critical event, and as an increasing number of African countries gained independence during the 1960s and 1970s, Indian policy towards Africa was focused on using its ‘soft power’. The aim was to build support and legitimacy for India as it tried to build its global stature in international fora such as NAM, and more broadly in the institutions of the United Nations. (p.401) By the twenty-first century, India’s relationship with Africa increasingly shifted to one driven by national needs and interests. It is driven today by the growing priority of securing energy sources and building markets for Indian goods and services, as well as the continued urge to build support for India’s global ambitions. In India’s dealings with African countries, the language of South–South cooperation increasingly cloaks a more realist concern for engaging in foreign partnerships that are ‘mutually beneficial’. While in the twentieth century, individuals were crucial to formulating the bonds between India and Africa on the basis of common ideas about the colonial experience and the quest for sovereignty in a world dominated by Western powers, by the twenty-first century domestic drivers rose to the fore.

History up to Independence in 1947 The Systemic Factor of Colonialism

India’s relationship with Africa is based on a foundation of pre-colonial trade dating back at least to the fourteenth century (Bhacker 1992; Tarling 1992: 186– 7), and the forced and indentured labour sent to Africa from India during the nineteenth century colonial period. The most important systemic factor influencing the relationship, however, was the shared experience of colonial subjugation by the Portuguese, French, and particularly the British during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The British East Africa Protectorate, the area that is today Kenya and Uganda, was even ruled for a while from British Bombay (Bhattacharya 2010: 64). Yet for much of the colonial period there was little understanding in India and Africa of each other’s experience. India’s antiimperialist struggles in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century were focused exclusively on British rule in India. India’s experience of the First World War, where over a million Indians served on the British side2 against the Austro-Hungarian empire, but were not rewarded with independence themselves, galvanized its independence movement. American president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in 1918, which made the argument that the war was being fought on moral grounds and highlighted democracy and self-determination as the aim in fighting the war, further highlighted the dichotomy between British fighting in World War I and their continued (p.402) colonial policies in India. In the aftermath of the war, Page 3 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa India’s nationalist leaders started championing not only their own independence movement but also the rights of others living under imperial rule throughout the world. Jawaharlal Nehru helped organize and participated as the Indian National Congress’ only delegate to the conference of the League against Imperialism held in Brussels in 1927 (Gopal 1984, 1:100–1). At the conference, he was appointed to the conference presidium and in his first press statements emphasized the commonality of the struggle against imperialism in different parts of the world. The following year, upon Nehru’s return to India, the Indian National Congress declared that ‘the struggle of the Indian people for freedom is a part of the general world struggle against imperialism’ (quoted in Bandyopadhyaya 1970: 70). Many Congress documents and resolutions of the 1930s condemned imperialism, including in Africa. For example, after Mussolini’s 1936 invasion, the Congress Party president called the invasion the ‘rape of Abyssinia’ (Nehru 1937), and the party held an ‘Ethiopia Day’ in protest of the Italians’ imperialistic aggression. As Europe prepared for war in 1938, Congress declared that ‘World Co-operation would be impossible of achievement so long as the roots of international conflict remained and one nation dominated another and imperialism held sway’ (quoted in Yadav and Baghel 2009: 4). By World War II, India’s relationship with African countries was firmly predicated upon its own struggle for independence. Domestic Factors

Until independence in 1947, India’s relations with Africa were largely shaped by the common experience of colonialism. After the abolition of slavery in British territories in 1870, Indian workers were sent by the thousands to British Africa on indentured servant contracts, often differing little from slavery (Govinden 2008). It was not until after the First World War and the return to India of Mohandas K. Gandhi from South Africa in 1915 that the presence of Indians in Africa gained national attention and started to influence India’s relations with the African continent. Moreover, Indian trade with Africa was minimal and perhaps even less important than in the pre-colonial period, as both British India and colonies in Africa focused on exchange with the metropolitan colonizer. (p.403) Individual-Level Factors Mohandas K. Gandhi

One of the two pivotal figures who helped link India more closely with the African continent during the pre-independence period was Mohandas K. Gandhi. Gandhi went to South Africa as a young lawyer in 1893 and remained there over two decades, returning to India in 1915. While Gandhi primarily represented the interests of the Indian community in South Africa, his sympathy for the plight of subjugated Africa later made him a hero to many on the African continent, and he was one of the earliest links between nationalist leaders in Africa and India (Park 1965: 351–2). As Gandhi ascended to leadership in the Indian freedom movement, his personal involvement and success in the anti-colonial struggles in South Africa made him a source of inspiration for many African leaders of the Page 4 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa twentieth century, notably Nelson Mandela. Gandhi’s experience in South Africa also spurred a broadening of the world-view of the Indian freedom movement, tying the anti-colonial struggle in India to the broader global fight against imperialism. Jawarharlal Nehru

The other individual who greatly shaped the relationship between India and Africa was Jawaharlal Nehru, who would later become independent India’s first prime minister. While Gandhi framed India’s and Africa’s colonial experience on the level of individual rights, Nehru’s perception was of a common fight against international imperialism. For example, Nehru, referring to Ethiopian struggles against colonialism in his 1929 Indian National Congress presidential address, stated that: ‘We have watched also with admiration the brave fight of the Ethiopians for their freedom against heavy odds. . . . Their struggle is something more than a local struggle. It is one of the first effective checks by an African people on an advancing imperialism (and already it has had far-reaching consequences)’ (Nehru 2010). More broadly, Nehru spoke of the impossibility of international peace in the presence of colonial subjugation: ‘So long as there is domination of one country over the other, there will always be attempts to subvert the existing order, and no stable equilibrium can endure. Out of imperialism and capitalism, peace can never come’ (Nehru 2010).

(p.404) India’s Policy towards Africa: 1947 to the Early 1990s Systemic Factors: Decolonization of Africa and the Non-Aligned Movement

When India attained independence in 1947, most of Africa was still under colonial rule. The process of decolonization was one of the most important systemic factors influencing Indian foreign policy towards Africa after 1947 and through the 1980s. The other important systemic factor was the emergence of NAM in response to the formation of the two blocs of the Cold War. Supporting the Decolonization of Africa

Decolonization of Africa extended into the 1980s and beyond. Given that the Indian National Congress had, in the wake of the First World War, tied its freedom movement to the international fight against imperialism, independent India’s relations with Africa continued to be based on supporting decolonization. Moreover, the Congress movement and its leaders had been vocally critical of the British Empire’s use of Indian troops, at great cost in terms of money and lives, during the First and Second World Wars and in support of the British Empire’s endeavours in Africa and elsewhere. American president Roosevelt’s belief in anti-colonialism and self-determination in Europe as well as Asia (Dulles and Ridinger 1955: 1) buoyed Congress’s argument for independence. The British Indian army fighting for democracy against the Italians in Ethiopia and against the Italians and Germans in North Africa during the Second World War further cemented post-independence India’s ideological support for decolonization in Africa. India’s support for decolonization in Africa was also Page 5 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa based on more practical concerns that its conduct of foreign affairs could be autonomous only if it interacted with fully independent states (Ayoob 1990: 7). Ethiopia was not colonized except for the period of the Italian–Abyssinian War (1936–1941), and the South African Union achieved self-rule by 1909 (although rule only by the white minority). The entirety of the rest of the sub-Saharan African continent, however, still remained colonized at the time of Indian independence. Indian support for independence movements in Africa focused on British colonies, (p.405) particularly in East Africa with its large Indian-origin population. India established formal relations with the independence movements of many African countries and set up diplomatic representation in some countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya, even before their attainment of independence. Independence of the Belgian Congo in 1960 was followed by civil war and continued interference by Belgium and other outside powers, leading to United Nations intervention (Dayal 1976) and India sending non-combatant troops and a special representative to Congo (Gopal 1984, 3:146–54). The crisis in Congo further solidified Indian commitment to the decolonization of Africa, as well as its ardent support of multilateral institutions like the United Nations where newly independent countries had a voice. Due in part to India’s experience in supporting the independence of Congo, Indian leaders started emphasizing the notion that all possible aid should be given to newly independent countries, especially in Africa (Gopal 1984, 3:160). As sub-Saharan African countries attained independence during the 1950s and 1960s, Indian foreign relations continued to be framed in the language of cooperation between independent developing countries or South–South cooperation. In 1955, Indian belief in Indo-African cooperation in order to create a more peaceful international order, drove Indian leadership to play a significant role in the Asian-African Conference in Indonesia, known as the Bandung Conference. This was the first conference of Asian and African states, highlighting the common ideological grounds between India and many African states, as well as providing the basis for NAM (Dikshit 1989: 37). Yet the importance of decolonization and independence in the rhetoric of Indian foreign policy towards Africa was undermined a few years later when, among African countries, only Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Libya came out in support of India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 (Ghosh 2009: 422–4), while some prominent African leaders, particularly in Kenya, openly supported China in the war (McCann 2011: 116). India’s insistence that African independence movements adopt peaceful methods for attaining independence in contrast to China’s open support for armed liberation movements also decreased the appeal of Indian support for some emerging African countries (Beri 2003).

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa After the death of Nehru in 1964, and conclusively after the 7 December 1971 United Nations General Assembly vote of 104 to 11 asking India to agree to a cease-fire and withdrawal from what was to (p.406) become Bangladesh (Bass 2013: 284–5), Indian foreign policy towards Africa, while continuing its support for decolonization and South–South cooperation, took on a more selective and pragmatic approach. In 1964, the government launched the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme, its main instrument of bilateral foreign assistance, based on the idea that ‘it was necessary to establish relations of mutual concern and inter-dependence based not only on commonly held ideals and aspirations, but also on solid economic foundations’.3 Although India continued to support movements such as the campaign against apartheid in South Africa, by the late 1980s almost all African countries had attained independence, and India’s post-independence idealism gave way to a more pragmatic approach to building foreign relations through economic cooperation. The ITEC Programme continued to be the privileged instrument for development cooperation between India and Africa, with African countries accounting for the bulk of ITEC training and educational development programmes through the 1990s, thereby building up generations of civil servants and policy makers from African countries who studied or were trained in India. The Non-Aligned Movement

The other major systemic issue influencing Indian foreign policy towards Africa in the post-independence period was NAM. With the onset of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1947, India searched for a foreign policy that was not dependent nor too closely aligned with either of the two major blocs. This search for an autonomous foreign policy stemmed from India’s experience as a former colony where Indian troops were used by Britain to fight in the Second World War, in a reaction against pressure to ally with one of the two Cold War blocs (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 225). Following the 1955 Bandung Conference, a meeting of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries including Egypt and Ghana, was held in 1961 in Yugoslavia. This conference gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement, a movement which was largely the idea of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. The conference brought to the fore the common ideological ground between India and Africa, evident in the anti-colonial and anti-racism agenda of NAM as well as (p.407) in India’s ardent support of anti-racist movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa (Bhattacharya 2010: 65). India’s non-alignment policy was initially successful, meeting fertile ideological grounds in many newly independent Africa countries who were trying to ward off external political interference and navigate the two Cold War blocs. For example, NAM led to some Indo-African cooperation in international fora, even decades after its institutional mechanisms had outlived their usefulness to Indian foreign policy. In 1986, NAM helped set up the Action for Resisting Page 7 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Invasion, Colonialism, and Apartheid (AFRICA) Fund to support freedom movements in countries that continued to be ruled by white minority regimes (Bhattacharya 2010: 66). India was a large contributor to this fund while IndoAfrican cooperation in this general area led to many United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning racism and apartheid (Bhattacharya 2010: 66). Another indirect outcome of NAM, as well as of India’s general commitment to supporting full decolonization in Africa, was India’s granting of diplomatic status to the African National Congress in 1967 and the South-West African People’s Organization in 1985 (Indian National Congress 1976: 92–6). India also indirectly funded African independence movements by contributing to multilateral organizations such as the Organization of African Unity and various United Nations funds directed towards Africa. Yet the reality was that most newly independent African countries did not maintain a non-aligned policy and ended up in one or another of the superpowers’ camps, securing development and military financing for their new states. From India’s perspective, NAM, particularly after the lack of support for India among African countries during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, lost some of its appeal as an institutional mechanism for garnering support for its foreign policy. Moreover, as a movement, NAM became increasingly factionalized and even radicalized during the 1970s and 1980s, while India in the post-Nehru era increasingly focused on domestic issues. Nevertheless, within India, nonalignment came to mean a foreign policy independent of the two main Cold War powers and as such continued to hold sway as a guiding principle through the end of the Cold War up to the present day (Pardesi 2010: 110). (p.408) Domestic Factors Influencing Indian Foreign Policy towards Africa

In post-independence India, domestic factors played no significant role in influencing India’s foreign policy towards Africa, at least until the 1990s. Though economic and trade data for pre-independence India are scarce, we do know that post-independence India’s overall trade with Africa through the turn of the twenty-first century was small—accounting for less than 11 per cent of exports and imports in the decades between the 1950s and 2010 (see Figure 15.1). Since 2010, Indian exports to Africa have increased more than imports from Africa, though overall trade remained below 11 per cent in 2014–15. Given the closed nature of India’s economy up to the 1990s, domestic economic factors were not important in determining Indian foreign policy towards Africa. Furthermore, the Nehruvian foreign policy towards Africa steadfastly included a principled stand on the South Asian diaspora in Africa, instructing non-resident Indians in Africa that their loyalties should reside with their African homelands (McCann 2011: 114), and that they should not seek any privileges for themselves at the cost of opportunities for Africans (Dubey 1990: 25).

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa the Sino-Indian war. But unlike her father Nehru, she increasingly focused on economic engagement with African countries, but above all on domestic issues. By the time her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi came to power in 1984, India’s foreign policy towards Africa was no longer associated with an individual. This reflects Rajiv Gandhi’s lack of interest in a coherent foreign policy towards Africa and general focus on domestic politics during the slow demise of the Congress Party as the single dominant party. However, the inward focus of Indian politics and decreasing role of individuals did not mean that Indo-African relations had broken down. Indian foreign policy successes such as the 1971 war against Pakistan and the 1974 nuclear test, as well as the domestic achievements of the Green Revolution during the 1970s, actually led to a rise in India’s prestige in Africa (Beri 2003: 218). At the same time, during the 1970s and 1980s there was a rising sense that India and Africa faced similar development challenges, leading to a renewed articulation of solidarity and South–South cooperation (Baghel 2009: 290; Bhattacharya 2010: 66).

India and Africa Since the Early 1990s Systemic Factors Influencing the Indo-African Relationship

The end of the Cold War in late 1989–90 was the most important systemic factor that affected India’s foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the superpower rivalry in Africa, India’s drive to differentiate its policies in Africa from those of the two major Cold War powers lost its impetus. India’s rising stature and its concomitant interest in gaining influence in multilateral institutions led it once again to engage more deeply with individual African countries who each counted for one vote in the United Nations General Assembly. In order to attain the backing of African countries in international fora, India sought to move beyond its traditional history of engagement with Anglophone African countries and started also to engage Francophone and Lusophone countries. In addition, India sought closer politico-military engagements with African countries in order to counter rising regional threats, including China. At the same (p.411) time, a domestic economic crisis in 1991 in India led to the increased importance of economic factors in motivating India’s Africa policy. The Geopolitical Realignment

With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty also became void, while Soviet funding of African countries like Libya, Ethiopia, and Algeria dried up (Grey 1984: 512). In this changing global political environment where the United States was left as the dominant global power, India had to reposition itself in Africa. Since the early 1990s and particularly since the turn of the century, India has looked to reinvent its relationships. It has sought to change relationships with traditional partners in Africa such as Ethiopia, which no longer had the financial and military backing Page 10 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa of the Soviet Union. It has also sought out new friends in Africa in order to extend and deepen its relationships on the continent. At the same time, a geopolitically and economically rising India shifted from trying to differentiate itself as a ‘Southern’ partner in an era of Cold War rivalry, to differentiating its policies in Africa from the other emerging economic power active in Africa— China. In the twenty-first century, India has been opening up new embassies in Africa and has further increased diplomatic focus by creating three high-level officials (joint secretaries) within the Ministry of External Affairs to cover the African continent (Naidu 2010: 40). In order to deepen Indian engagement in Africa, there have been two India–Africa Forum summits, with the most recent one having been held in New Delhi in October 2015. These summits have led to a host of joint declarations aimed at increasing cooperation in the political and economic arenas. Seventeen African countries joined India at the previous summit in Addis Ababa, where India promised five billion dollars in credit to African countries over the following three years. Two documents, the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Africa India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, were also signed at that summit, signalling growing cooperation on bilateral, regional, and international issues, from common positions on the need for reform within the United Nations to the need for capacity building in engagements between the two regions. Another systemic factor influencing geopolitical alignment and driving India’s enhanced engagement with Africa is India’s rising global (p.412) stature, its wish to be seen as such, and its desire to be more adequately represented in the voting and management mechanisms of multinational institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. India has pursued this by courting the votes of individual African countries in the United Nations General Assembly, through economic diplomacy and development cooperation. It has won the backing of the African Union in its bid for a seat on the Security Council. India has also historically been one of the most important contributors to the United Nations’ international peacekeeping operations, most of which since the end of the Cold War have been deployed in Africa (van Rooyen 2010). India’s continued commitment to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in the twenty-first century should also be viewed as buttressing India’s strategic repositioning as a global international power. India has sought to highlight its growing global stature by joining an increased number of international fora where both India and African countries have sought to build on their common interests as developing countries. The NAM forum of the Cold War era is being replaced with regional organizations aimed at addressing particular issues. In addition to regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the New Partnership Page 11 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and Techno-Economic Approach for Africa– India Movement (TEAM-9), India, Brazil, and South Africa formed a group known as the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 to discuss cooperation on developmental as well as common foreign policy interests. The commonality of foreign policy interests among the IBSA members is evident in their voting record at the United Nations, where they have voted in convergence 96 per cent of the time during 2003–10 (White 2010). India and many eastern African countries are also increasingly active in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). More recently India and South Africa joined Brazil, Russia and China to form the New Development Bank, in a direct challenge to the US–dominated World Bank. Though there have been criticisms also within India that these regional organizations have been slow to show any results, these organizations have provided platforms for highlighting India’s closer engagement in Africa, offered an opportunity for forming partnerships on regional issues of common interest, and delivered opportunities for increased South–South cooperation also in forming regional alliances (p.413) and presenting the view of developing countries at international fora such as the World Trade Organization. Economic Motivations

The 1991 economic crisis in India, which led to a turn towards neoliberal economics, also influenced the changing Indo–Sub-Saharan African relationship. The liberalizing of the Indian economy in the wake of the crisis led India to seek new resources and markets for its growing economy in Africa. Though Indian trade with sub-Saharan Africa still only accounted for a small fraction of its overall international trade by 2013, it continued a steady rise from a low during the end of the Cold War. Also, African countries and India saw the potential for expanding their markets through investment and trade, with economic growth rates rising in both regions. A more rapidly growing and more global economy increasingly influenced Indian foreign policy towards Africa in particular over the past decade, when growth rates in both sub-Saharan Africa and India have averaged over 5 per cent. Indian foreign policy since the turn of the century has become more focused on furthering India’s economic as well as global ambitions. This has translated into a focus on promoting trade and economic diplomacy in sub-Saharan Africa. India has courted African countries through specific measures aimed at closer economic relations. In 2002, India launched a ‘Focus Africa Programme’, which provided financial assistance to trade associations, export promotion councils, and trade promotion organizations. Under this aegis, lines of credit were extended to regional blocs such as ECOWAS, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the ECOWAS bank. In addition, the Indian government extended a credit line to NEPAD in order to support African economic integration, and a credit line to TEAM-9, a grouping of eight Francophone countries in Africa. It also committed over US$1 billion in a joint venture with the African Union to build a pan-African e-network to provide tele-education and Page 12 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa tele-medicine to African countries from India. Another initiative, the Conclave on India Africa Project Partnership, was started in 2005 with the aim of building a strong business-to-business platform for the two regions. This conclave was initiated by the Confederation of Indian Industry and Exim Bank with the support of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and aimed at bringing together Indian and (p.414) African government officials, civil services, and industry. By 2013, nine Indo-African conclaves and thirteen regional conclaves had taken place. This plethora of Indian economic diplomacy in Africa since the turn of the century is indicative of a desire for deeper economic and political relations with the continent. Another noticeable scaling up of Indian engagement in Africa has been in the field of development cooperation, which in turn has a focus on economic cooperation. Indian development assistance to Africa for much of the twentieth century had been in the form of technical assistance and training slots through ITEC and its corollary, the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme, as well as grants largely to Anglophone countries. In the twentyfirst century, development cooperation between the two regions is increasingly focused on provision of lines of credit through the Export Import Bank of India; such cooperation covers the continent, and has greatly increased in volume. By mid-2013, over half of the approximately US$10 billion in open lines of credit provided by India went to African countries,5 while less than 5 per cent of Indian grants went to Africa by 2013.6 Indian development cooperation in Africa is heavily focused on the provision of these credit lines, which are tied credits which stipulate that 75 per cent of goods and services required for projects be sourced from India—an indication of the increased economic and commercial engagement in Africa. Indian economic diplomacy in Africa has deepened and widened, and now covers all sub-Saharan African countries. China has similarly engaged in economic diplomacy with almost all African countries since the turn of the century. The enhanced economic engagement by both China and India in Africa is indicative of the rivalry between the two rising Asian powers for primacy in the foreign relations of these African countries. Since India cannot match the deep pockets of the Chinese state, Indian policy towards Africa has sought to highlight its long-standing relationship with Africa, through the common yoke of colonialism and decolonization, non-alignment, the quest for economic development, and the links formed through the Indian diaspora in African countries. At Indo-African summits and fora, India has repeatedly emphasized its respect for African sovereignty and a relationship of equal partners engaged in deepening the relationship for mutual benefit. India has also sought to use its multi-party democracy, engage (p.415) with its diaspora, and build on its ITEC alumni networks in African countries in order to differentiate its engagement from China’s. In deepening its policy towards Africa in the twenty-first century and in trying to differentiate itself from Chinese engagement, India is trying to present Page 13 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa itself as the alternative, older and democratic partner for economic development in Africa. Domestic Factors Driving Indian Interest in Africa

The major change in Indian foreign policy towards Africa since the early 1990s has been the growing importance of domestic factors. Three domestic factors in particular have increased demand for a deepened Indian engagement in Africa: energy security, the search for new markets for Indian goods and services, and security concerns emanating from the Indian Ocean region that India shares with Africa. Enhancing Energy Security

India is an energy-dependent country and currently imports about three-fourths of its energy requirements. For a country that was already ranked by the International Monetary Fund as the world’s ninth largest economy by gross domestic product in 2014 (IMF 2015), securing energy sources to enable continued economic growth is of strategic and economic importance. Africa has the world’s third largest region of oil production and supply, in addition to other valuable energy resources and minerals. In addition, the political volatility of the Middle East, from where India imports the majority of its oil, has increased India’s need to diversify its sources of energy imports—thereby further enhancing India’s need to engage with African countries that are of domestic strategic import to India’s growing economy. The need for secure access to natural resources has been a significant factor in catalysing a deepening of Indian relations with African countries, particularly in the decade up to 2015. While at the turn of the century India was not importing any oil from sub-Saharan Africa, by 2013 more than 20 per cent of Indian oil and gas imports came from Africa, mainly from Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco (Sharma 2013). These natural resources comprised nearly two-thirds of India’s imports from Africa (WTO and CII 2013). (p.416) In order to secure access to African petroleum resources and to diversify India’s sources of oil, the Indian government has encouraged public and private investments in natural resource extraction in Africa. As a result, several Indian state-owned oil companies have started investing and seeking joint ventures in Africa. The Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), and its subsidiary ONGC Videsh Limited which is primarily tasked with the exploration for and management of foreign assets, have managed to secure exploration contracts in Libya, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, and South Sudan. After acquiring a 10 per cent stake in an offshore gas field in Mozambique, ONGC, Oil India and Bharat Petroleum invested $6 billion by 2015 and planned on investing $6 billion more to develop the gas field.7 The rising

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa demand of a growing Indian economy has buttressed the domestic need for a deepened Indian engagement with Africa. Economic Diplomacy: Finding New Markets for Indian Goods and Services

The search for new export markets for Indian goods and services in the rapidly growing economies of Africa has also motivated the deepening of Indian relations with the African continent. Since the economic reforms of the early 1990s Indian trade with African countries continued to rise through 2014/15, growing at 32.4 percent between 2008–11, outpacing bilateral trade growth with China.8 India primarily imports commodities from Africa and exports electronic goods to Africa. It has also increased private and public investments in Africa in electronics, automobiles, pharmaceuticals and machinery. Some of the increased private and public investments in Africa have been facilitated by government-to-government meetings and summits. Indian development cooperation is also playing a key role in fostering Indian investments in Africa and creating new markets for Indian products. For example, under the pan-African e-network for tele-education and tele-medicine, Indian institutes of higher education and hospitals are paid for their time in providing distance learning and medical advice through a $125 million initial grant from the Indian government. The $5 billion in open credit lines from the Indian Exim Bank to African countries is similarly providing opportunities for Indian companies to (p.417) deliver goods and services to African countries and thereby expand opportunities for growth of the Indian economy. Security Concerns Lead to Closer Collaboration with Eastern Africa

A third domestic factor motivating enhanced Indian engagement with eastern Africa has been India’s security worries, piracy and terrorist attacks in particular. The vast majority of Indian trade is through shipping, and, given India’s increased dependence on importing energy resources from Africa and the rising piracy incidences off the eastern African seaboard, securing these global shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean region is of great domestic importance. Also, as the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, where terrorists entered Mumbai from the sea, highlighted to India, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Rim area is a large priority for the Indian peninsula. India has pursued addressing its security concerns by entering into conventional defence partnerships with several African Indian Ocean Rim countries, including Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania, and has started to hold joint naval exercises with some of these East African countries. It has also deepened some of these defence partnerships, for example by establishing an electronic listening post and receiving limited berthing rights in Madagascar for the Indian Navy (Brewster 2011: 9). The Indian Army has also sent training teams to some African countries, has supplied small conventional arms for African patrol boats from Mauritius and Guinea Bissau, and imports Page 15 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa some arms from South Africa (Bhattacharya 2010: 72). The twin concerns of possible domestic security challenges emanating from the Indian Ocean Rim area and the need to safeguard global shipping lanes for trade with Africa and the Middle East will continue to influence India’s policy of increased engagement with the African continent. Declining Individual Factors in the Indo-African Relationship since the 1990s

Whereas the importance of domestic factors in determining India’s foreign policy towards Africa has risen since the early 1990s, the impact of individual leaders was on the decline at least until India’s 2014 elections. As the postindependence era of one-party rule led by one of India’s (p.418) independence leaders gave way to multi-party coalition governments, none of which has lasted more than two elections, the importance of any one leader in determining Indian politics and foreign policy towards Africa appeared to decline. However, the 2014 election of Prime Minister Modi and the majority he won in the lower house presented new opportunities for individual factors to reinvigorate the Indo-African relationship. Yet while Modi’s invitation to all African countries to participate in the October 2015 India-Africa Summit in New Delhi was instrumental to the large turnout at the summit, the main motivation for seeking deeper relationships with Africa was domestic: India needs African partnerships to foster trade as well as ensure its supply of energy sources. As many as seven governments came to power at the centre between 1990 and 2004, which prevented any individual leader from playing a prominent role in shaping Indo-African relations. Indo-African policy from 2004–14, under the United Progressive Alliance coalition government also was not associated with one individual, and despite the majority government of Prime Minister Modi, he personally did not concentrate on India’s relationship with Africa, preferring instead to focus on the region. Domestic pressures thus offer the larger explanatory factor for India’s renewed engagement with the Africa region. It was domestic pressures that drove the United Progressive Alliance government to rejuvenate India’s foreign policy towards Africa in 2004 and led to a large increase in development cooperation, as well as public and private sector investments, engaging in more regional Indo-African organizations, and having more frequent summits with African leaders to foster closer ties. Yet at IndoAfrican summits, India’s leaders of the twenty-first century, from Prime Ministers Singh to Modi, use the language of soft power, seeking to leverage the Indian diaspora and the common fight against colonialism, harking back to decades past to legitimize India’s re-engagement in Africa.

Prospects for the Future of India’s Relationship with Africa There has been a convergence of systemic as well as domestic factors that are likely to continue driving enhanced Indo-African ties in the (p.419) twenty-first century. This deepening engagement is based on realist assessments of domestic needs that increased cooperation with Africa can help attain. Systemic concerns Page 16 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa that international multilateral organizations are not reflective of the power changes since the end of the Cold War, and India’s larger geopolitical interest in fostering a multipolar world in which India plays a larger role and can counter China’s growing influence, will accentuate India’s engagement in Africa. India will pursue Africa’s fifty-five UN-recognized countries for their votes in multilateral and regional institutes and for the legitimacy that these votes represent to the idea of South–South cooperation. India and Africa are rediscovering each other in the twenty-first century. The relationship is marked by remarkable consensus and builds on different previous phases of India’s engagement with Africa, with a focus on Indian diaspora. At the same time, the election of a government with a political majority under Prime Minister Modi presented opportunities to further enhance Indo-African relations, though these opportunities were not seized upon through 2015. Indo-African relations have changed from the post–World War I common focus on throwing off the yoke of subjugation; to the post–1947 commitment to decolonization as well as ideological delineation between the two Cold War superpowers through NAM; to an increasingly pragmatic approach in India’s policy towards Africa which stems from domestic factors playing a larger role. This pragmatic approach is based on a belief that a deepened engagement in Africa will help India to deal with systemic concerns with the international system. It is also based on a belief that such an engagement will address India’s growing security concerns emanating from the Indian Ocean region, address its resource security challenges, and help its growing economy find new markets in Africa. Over the last few years, the Indian government has sought to address these state and domestic pressures for increased engagement with African countries by greatly increasing development cooperation with old and new partner countries in Africa. Since the domestic drivers of Indian foreign policy towards Africa are only likely to grow, Indian policy, regardless of the ideology of the government coalition in power at present and in the foreseeable future, will seek wider and deeper engagements with African countries through development and policy cooperation. References Bibliography references: Ayoob, M. 1990. India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies (London: Routledge). Baghel, I. 2009. India’s Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Obstacles in the Post Cold War Era (New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House). Bandyopadhyaya, J. 1970. The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes, and Personalities (Calcutta: Allied Publishers). Page 17 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Bass, G.J. 2013. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Alfred Knopf). Beri, R. 2003. ‘India’s Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: An Assessment’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 27, no. 2. Bhacker, M.R. 1992. Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar: Roots of British Domination (London: Routledge). (p.421) Bhattacharya, S.B. 2010. ‘Engaging Africa: India’s Interests in the African Continent, Past and Present’, in F. Cheru and C. Obi, eds, The Rise of China and India in Africa (New York: Zed Books). Brewster, D. 2011. ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?’, Security Challenges, vol. 6, no. 3. Available at: http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ ArticlePDFs/vol6no3Brewster.pdf (accessed 24 April 2015). Dayal, R. 1976. Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Dikshit, S. 1989. Nehru and Africa, Jawaharlal Nehru centenary volume (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Dubey, A.K. 1990. Indo-African Relations in the Post-Nehru Era, 1965–1985 (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications). Dulles, F.R. and G.E. Ridinger. 1955. ‘The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 1. Ghosh, A. 2009. India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Pearson). Gopal, S. 1984. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, 3 vols (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Govinden, D. 2008. ‘The Indentured Experience: Indian Women in Colonial Natal’, in J.C. Hawley, ed., India in Africa, Africa in India (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 57–61. Grey, R.D. 1984. ‘The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 22, no. 3. Guest, P. 2012. ‘India in Africa: The Elephant and the Dragon’, Global: The International Briefing, October. Available at: http://www.global-briefing.org/ 2012/10/the-elephant-and-the-dragon/ (accessed 18 April 2015). Heimsath, C.H. and S. Mansingh. 1971. A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Calcutta: Allied Publishers).

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Indian National Congress. 1976. India and the African Liberation Struggle (New Delhi: Indian National Congress). International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015. ‘Report for Selected Countries and Subjects’, World Economic Outlook Database, April. Available at: http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 18 April 2015). Maxwell, N. 1974. ‘Reconsiderations: Jawaharlal Nehru—Of Pride and Principle’, Foreign Affairs, 1 April. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 24514/neville-maxwell/reconsiderations-jawaharlal-nehru-of-pride-and-principle (accessed 18 April 2015). McCann, G. 2011. ‘Diaspora, Political Economy and India’s Relations with Kenya’, in E. Mawdsley and G. McCann, eds, India in Africa (Oxford: Pambazuka Press). (p.422) Naidu, S. 2010. ‘India’s African Relations: In the Shadow of China?’, in F. Cheru and C. Obi, eds, The Rise of China and India in Africa (New York: Zed Books). Nehru, J. 1937. ‘Presidential Address to the Indian National Congress at Faizpur’, Labour Monthly, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 98–107. ———. 1980. ‘Presidential Address to the Indian National Congress, Lahore, 29 December 1929’, in A.M. Zaidi, ed., The Encyclopaedia of Indian National Congress, vol. 11 (New Delhi: S. Chand), pp. 601–18. Available at: http:// archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/9977/2/ AppendixDocuments600dpi.pdf (accessed 18 April 2015). ———. 2010. ‘Presidential Address at the Congress Session, Lahore, 1929’, in Words of Freedom, Ideas of Nation: Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Penguin), pp. 6–11. Pardesi, M.S. 2010. ‘Southeast Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Positioning India as a Major Power in Asia’, in S. Ganguly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Park, R.L. 1965. ‘Indian–African Relations’, Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 7. Sharma, P. 2013. ‘India–Africa ties energized with oil and other products’, DNA, 3 September. Available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/1883659/columnindia-africa-ties-energised-with-oil-and-other-products (accessed 24 April 2015). Singh, M. 2013. ‘PM’s Statement at the BRICS Leaders—Africa Dialogue Forum’, Durban, 27 March 2013. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx? relid=94318 (accessed 17 April 2015). Page 19 of 21

India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Tarling, N. 1992. The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From Early Times to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). van Rooyen, F. 2010. ‘Blue Helmets for Africa: India’s Peacekeeping in Africa’, Occasional Paper No. 60, South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg, May. White, L. 2010. ‘IBSA: Reflect, Realign & Redefine’, IBSA Academic Forum, IPC Brasilia, April. Available at: http://www.ipc-undp.org/pressroom/files/ipc150.pdf (accessed 18 April 2015). World Trade Organization (WTO) and Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). 2013. India–Africa: South–South Trade and Investment for Development. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/ global_review13prog_e/india_africa_report.pdf (accessed 24 April 2015). Yadav, S.N. and I. Baghel. 2009. India’s Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Obstacles (New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House). Notes:

(1.) Quoted in Bhattacharya (2010: 63). (2.) ‘Participants from the Indian subcontinent in the First World War’, Memorial Gates Trust, available at: http://www.mgtrust.org/ind1.htm (accessed 18 April 2015). (3.) Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, ‘About ITEC’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Available at: http:// www.itec.mea.gov.in/?1320?000 (accessed 18 April 2015). (4.) Interview reported in the New York Times, 1 September 1946, cited in Gopal (1984, 2:43). (5.) Based on Exim Bank annual reports and conversations with Exim Bank officials in 2013. (6.) Calculations made by Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) based on ‘Grants and Loans to Foreign Governments, India Budget 2000/01– 2013/14’, and ‘Operative Lines of Credit’, from Export Import Bank website. Available at: http://cprindia.org/ Spring_2014_IDCR_Report_the_State_of_Indian_Development_Cooperation.pdf (accessed 18 April 2015). (7.) ONGC, Oil India and Bharat Petroluem to invest $6 billion in Mozambique. April 13, 2015. Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 2015-04-13/news/61103185_1_golfinho-oil-india-ltd-rovuma-area-1

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India’s Resurgent Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (8.) India–Africa: South–South Trade and Investment for Development (2013). Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/ global_review13prog_e/india_africa_report.pdf (accessed 30 October2015).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy Further, after it initiated economic reforms in 1991, India’s economic growth rates increased (annual economic growth averaged 6 per cent from 1992 to 2002, 8.5 per cent from 2003 to 2010, and 5.5 per cent in the period 2011–13), and its consumption of energy also increased. Domestic producers were unable to meet this growing demand, especially for oil, where domestic production did not significantly increase while consumption more than doubled in the 1990s and 2000s; foreign suppliers then contributed a greater share of India’s energy needs (see Table 16.1). In 1991, imports accounted for about 18 per cent of India’s commercial energy requirements; by 2001, their share had risen to 25 (p.426) Table 16.1 India’s Oil and Total Energy Production and Consumption 1991

2001

2011

Consumption

8.4

13.9

23.6

Production

7.2

10.3

16.0

Imports

1.2

3.6

7.6

Consumption

58.9

107.0

163

Production

33.1

36.0

42

Imports

25.8

70.9

121

Total Primary Energy

Oil

Source: US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Energy Profiles: India; and British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, various years. Note: Total primary energy is measured in quadrillion British thermal units (Btu); oil is measured in million tons. per cent; and by 2011, their share was over 30 per cent. Accordingly, energy issues became more important in India’s foreign policy, and India’s political leaders and foreign affairs bureaucracy sought to pursue ‘robust and multifaceted engagements across the world to promote India’s energy security interests’ (Ahmad 2005: 1095). Thus, beyond the traditional energy ministries, one additional set of bureaucratic actors—India’s foreign policy establishment and its political leadership—sought to more actively influence India’s energy policy in the 2000s. At the same time, these efforts were only partially successful because international political factors hindered India’s quest to obtain energy from abroad.

This chapter discusses these issues in Indian energy policy. The chapter first clarifies India’s main sources of energy and energy policy. It then reviews India’s policies on oil, gas, and nuclear energy. On oil policy, it shows how India’s choice Page 2 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy of oil suppliers was influenced by the colonial legacy and then by socialist economic policies and India’s relations with the Soviet Union. It also discusses how India’s relations with Russia and states in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa influenced India’s attempts to acquire oil assets in these regions in the 2000s. On gas policy, the chapter discusses how US policies, regional security considerations, and India’s relations with Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar, and (p.427) Bangladesh prevented the development of gas pipelines to India from or through these states. Finally, on nuclear energy, the chapter analyses how international economic, security, and environmental regimes influenced India’s civilian nuclear imports.

Multiple Sources of Energy and Energy Policy India’s main sources of energy are coal (which accounts for about 50 per cent of primary commercial energy consumption, and generates about two-thirds of India’s electricity), oil (which accounts for approximately 30 per cent of commercial energy consumption), and gas (which accounts for approximately 8 per cent of commercial energy consumption).1 India’s two other important energy sources are hydroelectricity (which accounts for 5 per cent of commercial energy consumption and generates about one-fourth of India’s electricity) and nuclear energy (which accounts for 1 per cent of commercial energy consumption and generates about 3 per cent of India’s electricity). Foreign suppliers are crucial to India’s energy mix, mainly in the areas of oil and gas, and, since the early 2000s, also for coal. Overall, in the mid-2000s, India imported over 70 per cent of its oil, 17 to 19 per cent of its gas, and 12 to 17 per cent of its coal, as shown in Table 16.2.2 Indian government policy for each energy source is developed by a ministry such as the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, the Department of Atomic Energy, and the Ministry of Power. India’s foreign ministry also plays a role in its energy policy.3 While energy issues were always important in Indian foreign policy—for example, New Delhi sought to maintain strong ties with Middle Eastern oil suppliers—energy has become more prominent in Indian foreign policy since the late 1990s. In 1996, India’s government began recognizing the significance of acquiring energy assets abroad. It established a new firm, ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), a subsidiary of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), to acquire oil assets overseas. In subsequent years, India’s government recognized the need for an overarching energy policy. It sought institutional coordination among the several government ministries and departments responsible for different energy sectors (Planning Commission 2002: section 7.3.4).4 The Prime Minister’s Office set up an interministerial group to focus on (p.428)

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy

Table 16.2 India’s Domestic Production and Imports of Energy Coal

Crude Oil

Gas

2010

2005

2010

2005

2010

2005

Domest 186 ic Product ion

244

37

43

24

42

4.5

Imports 26

49

101

167

5

Percent 12 age of Imports

17

73

79

17

2005

Nuclear

Hydroelectric

Biofuels

Total

2010

2005

2010

2005

2010

2005

2010

6.8

8.6

9.8

158

170

419

518

10

144

244

19

25

32

Source: International Energy Agency, IEA Statistics, Energy Balances for India, various years. Note that British Petroleum (the source for oil data in Table 16.1) reports India’s oil imports as 85 MTOE (2005) and 114 MTOE (2010). Note: All figures are in million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE). Other energy sources are solar and geothermal (0.5 MTOE [2005] and 2.0 MTOE [2010], all from domestic production) and petroleum products (11 MTOE [2005] and 16.7 MTOE [2010], all from imports). India’s sources of installed electric capacity in 2010 were coal (54%), natural gas (10%), hydroelectric (22%), nuclear (2.7%), wind (7.6%), and biomass (1.6%); the actual electricity produced in 2009–10 was from coal (68%), natural gas (11.6%), hydroelectric (13.6%), nuclear (2.3%), wind (2.3%), and biomass (1%).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy (p.429) energy policy, which produced a report in early 2000 titled Hydrocarbon Vision 2025. Further, India’s policymakers began viewing energy as a security issue, and the concept of energy security increasingly entered government discourse on foreign policy and security policy.

Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 and reports by India’s Planning Commission (such as India’s Five-Year Plans, and its Integrated Energy Policy which was drafted in 2005–6 and approved by the cabinet in 2008) noted that one route to energy security was through the diversification of foreign suppliers. These reports noted that another means to energy security was for Indian firms to invest in oil and gas ventures overseas. In short, by the 2000s, New Delhi sought to substantially diversify its foreign sources of energy, particularly in the areas of oil and gas, and also in the area of nuclear energy. Still, these efforts had limited results—by the early 2010s, Indian-owned overseas oil assets produced about 6 to 8 million tons of oil annually, which was small compared to India’s annual oil imports of over 100 million tons, while the construction of international gas pipelines and imported nuclear reactors had not even begun.

Oil India’s foreign energy policy in the area of oil can be analysed in three phases— a first phase from India’s independence to the 1960s, a second phase from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, and a third phase thereafter. International political factors (the colonial legacy in the 1950s, and India’s stronger ties with the Soviet Union since the 1960s), as well as domestic factors (in particular, a socialist economic policy in the 1960s and 1970s), influenced India’s choice of suppliers in the first two phases. In the third phase, India sought to diversify its sources of oil by acquiring oil assets overseas. A key bureaucratic factor— involvement by India’s foreign policy bureaucracy and high-level diplomacy by Indian government officials—furthered these efforts, but other bureaucratic factors, technical constraints, and international political factors set them back. Phases One and Two: Western Oil Firms, the Soviet Union, and Middle Eastern States

India’s oil policy for some two decades after its independence was shaped by a historical international political factor—the colonial legacy. Its oil (p.430) industry was largely controlled by the British-owned Burmah (that had a joint venture with Shell to form Burmah-Shell) and American companies StandardVacuum and Caltex. These firms imported oil from their fields in the Middle East; thus, from the 1940s to the 1960s, most of India’s imported oil came from Iran and Saudi Arabia, with smaller amounts coming from Kuwait and Indonesia (Dasgupta 1971: 202). The Western oil companies also owned most of the refineries in India. Until the early 1960s, all four refineries in India were foreignowned, and in the late 1960s, foreign ownership was still considerable. For example, in 1967, five of the nine refineries in India drew supplies from abroad, and only 5.7 million tons of India’s 14.4 million tons in crude oil consumption came from public sector refineries (Dasgupta 1971: 184–7).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy During the second phase of India’s oil policy, from the 1960s onward, a domestic economic factor (India’s socialist economic policy that was most strongly implemented from 1965 to 1981) (Panagariya 2008), and an international factor (New Delhi’s stronger ties with Moscow during the Cold War), resulted in changes in India’s oil suppliers. At the time, India’s government had major disputes with Western oil firms over the price of oil and the refining of imported oil. Specifically, in 1960, New Delhi signed an agreement with Moscow to import Soviet oil at prices below those prevailing in world markets. The Western oil firms refused to refine this oil, causing India’s government to hold back on the Soviet contract. India’s government then built public sector refineries with Soviet and Romanian support beginning in 1962, and it also banned Western oil companies from expanding their refineries in India (Ghadar 1982: 137–8). Eventually, the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation was given a monopoly on oil imports, and, in 1976, the Burmah-Shell and Caltex refineries were nationalized. As a result, India was no longer reliant on Western oil firms. In 1977, New Delhi requested and Moscow agreed to supply crude oil to India purchased in rupees. The Soviet Union accounted for 5 to 15 per cent of India’s crude oil imports from 1977 to 1982, and its share had increased to 23 per cent by 1984, after New Delhi requested an increase in Soviet supplies during the Iran–Iraq war (Mehrotra 1990: 178–80). The remainder of India’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East, as shown in Table 16.3 (the table also shows how India’s oil purchases from Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq decreased during times of war and international sanctions involving these countries, and increased when wars (p.431)

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy

Table 16.3 Percentage Share of India’s Foreign Suppliers of Oil 1984–1985

1985–1986

1989–1990

1992–1993

2005–2006

2012

USSR/Russia

23

17

17

Iran

13

23

9

11

10

6

Iraq

19

14

10

?

9

13

Kuwait

3

2

11

17

12

10

15

16

16

Nigeria Saudi Arabia

33

16

25

30

25

19

UAE

4

14

26

23

?

9

Oman

4

10

Source: Monthly Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India, various years; US Energy Information Administration, various years.

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy ended and sanctions were lifted). In addition, three of the ten public sector refineries in India in 1984 were built with Soviet assistance (and accounted for 16 million tons of India’s total refining capacity of 34 million tons), and two were built with Romanian assistance (Mehrotra 1990: 116–17). The Third Phase: Changing Suppliers and Oil Asset Acquisitions

During the third phase of India’s oil policy, since the 1990s, international political factors significantly affected its choice of oil suppliers. Thus, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of rupee– ruble trading arrangements, Russia’s oil supplies to India ended. India then purchased most of its oil on the world market, from Nigeria and the Middle East, as noted in Table 16.3. Illustrating this, in 2005, India’s main oil suppliers were Saudi Arabia (which supplied 25 per cent of India’s oil), Nigeria (16 per cent), Kuwait (12 per cent), Iran (10 per cent), and Iraq (9 per cent) (Madan 2006: 54). Later, in the early 2010s, international politics again influenced India’s oil suppliers—to receive a waiver from US sanctions against Iranian oil importers, New Delhi reduced its imports of Iranian oil from 21.8 million tons in 2008–9 to 13 million tons by 2012–13, and Iran then provided just 6 per cent of India’s oil imports. (p.432) To augment commercial purchases on the world market, India’s government and oil firms sought to secure oilfields abroad in the 2000s and early 2010s. New Delhi assumed that overseas production by Indian companies would enhance its energy security.5 Eventually, these assets annually produced 3 to 6 million tons of oil in the 2000s and some 6 to 8 million tons in the early 2010s, which was still less than 5 per cent of India’s total annual oil imports. In the 2000s, OVL’s two main foreign investments, of the order of $2 billion each, were the acquisition of assets in Sudan (beginning in 2002) and in Russia’s Sakhalin oilfields (2001).6 In the Russian case, India’s senior-most political leaders were involved in furthering OVL’s bid. In January 2001, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha discussed the Sakhalin-1 agreement during a visit to Moscow, and Russian president Vladimir Putin also spoke to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee seeking better terms for Russia. The Sakhalin agreement was signed on 10 February 2001 (Subramanium 2005). In subsequent years, India’s political leaders had to lobby more actively for investments in Russia. Thus, during an October 2006 visit to Moscow, India’s petroleum minister offered Russian companies participation in India’s downstream energy sector, including a stake in a $4 billion refinery and petrochemical project in Orissa, in return for Indian investments in the Sakhalin-3 oil project. India’s petroleum minister further discussed the Sakhalin-3 project with President Putin during his January 2007 visit to India (Times of India 2007). Active Indian diplomacy, along with bureaucratic politics and the absence of international competitors, also influenced India’s acquisition of oil assets in Sudan. In 2002, during Sudan’s civil war, Canada’s Talisman Energy was the Page 8 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy target of a divestment campaign by Western human rights groups. It then sold its stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) to OVL (the other partners in GNPOC were the China National Petroleum Corporation and Malaysia’s Petronas). Sections of India’s government were reluctant to invest in Sudan because of the political instability in that country. However, India’s oil ministry favoured the Sudanese investment. Further, Sudan’s ambassador to India called attention to long-standing bilateral ties, noting that Indian investments in Sudan would be ‘within the old framework of bilateral relationship and south-south partnership’ and that such investments would ‘enthuse the entire African continent’ (p.433) (Cherian 2002). Eventually, India’s government went ahead with the Sudanese investment, and Indian diplomats met with and persuaded Sudan’s leader to accept the contract with OVL despite objections from Petronas, which had been exercising its right of refusal in GNPOC to obstruct the OVL venture. Beyond its investments in Russia and Sudan, OVL and other Indian firms signed agreements for the exploration and development of oil and gas blocks in Libya, East Timor, Iraq, and Iran (these had not produced significant returns by the early 2010s), as well as in Nigeria, Vietnam, Syria, and Brazil. In the early 2010s, OVL’s ventures in Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and Syria accounted for one-third of its overseas oil production, while its projects in Russia and Vietnam accounted for much of its gas production.7 ONGC Videsh Ltd also failed to secure several investments for a variety of technical, bureaucratic, and international political reasons. On technical grounds, OVL sometimes lacked internationally competitive capabilities (Carl et al. 2008: 20).8 On bureaucratic grounds, hindrance or inaction from Indian government agencies prevented OVL from making competitive bids (Mehta 2013). And these factors overlapped with a key international political factor— competition from China—that also prevented OVL from acquiring assets abroad. Illustrating this, in 2004, OVL lost out to Chinese firms in acquiring assets in Ecuador when India’s government did not raise its bid of $1.4 billion. In 2005, India’s government blocked OVL from acquiring assets in Nigeria on security grounds, and these were then procured by Chinese firms (Madan 2006: 42–3). In 2005, Chinese firms outbid OVL to acquire PetroKazakhstan for $4.2 billion— China’s political ties with and geographic proximity to Kazakhstan probably influenced Kazakhstan’s decisions on this issue (Asia Times 2005; Bradsher and Pala 2005). Chinese firms also outbid OVL for a $2.5 billion acquisition in Uganda in 2010, a $2 billion acquisition in Angola in 2011, and a $5 billion transaction in Kazakhstan in 2013—in this last case, ONGC had asked the Indian government to intervene with its Kazakh counterparts at the highest level, but ‘nothing was done’ by New Delhi (Times of India 2013).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy In the 2000s, India’s government recognized that more active diplomacy, financing, and economic assistance would be needed to secure overseas oil agreements. Thus, in 2006, New Delhi signed an energy cooperation agreement with Beijing whereby both countries would (p.434) cooperate, rather than compete against each other, in acquiring and developing oil assets overseas. (This did not prevent Beijing from outbidding OVL in the several instances noted earlier.) In addition, Indian government ministers and officials increased their visits to oil-rich countries and also invited their leaders to India. This oil diplomacy, whereby foreign ministry diplomats and petroleum ministry officials worked together, helped secure a few agreements. For example, in 2005, Indian firms won small contracts for oil and gas exploration or refineries in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Venezuela (Madan 2006: 46). India’s government also lobbied for its oil firms in Iraq. In 2000–1, Saddam Hussein’s government had awarded oil exploration contracts for the Block 8 oilfield to OVL, and was negotiating with OVL and Reliance Industries for another oil block at Tuba. These contracts were suspended by the new Iraqi government in 2003. India’s diplomats persuaded this government to revive the Block 8 contract but were unsuccessful in advancing the Tuba contract (Business Line 2007). India’s government and public and private firms sometimes deployed additional tools toward oil diplomacy. They offered military cooperation, economic financing, and infrastructure assistance to advance some oil and gas agreements (Madan 2006: 48). For example, in 2005, ONGC and the private firm Mittal signed an agreement with Nigeria’s Ministry of Energy to explore two oil blocks, in return for investing $6 billion in a refinery, a 2000 megawatt power plant, and a railway line in Nigeria (Business Line 2005a). Individual government ministers also influenced these policies. Thus, in 2004–5, a minister with a foreign policy background—Mani Shankar Aiyar—actively sought to explore oil and gas opportunities in the Middle East and Central Asia, while his successors were somewhat less active in such foreign energy policy ventures. To summarize, in the 2000s and early 2010s, most of India’s oil was still obtained through commercial purchases on the international market, and international politics significantly affected India’s choice of oil suppliers. A small fraction of India’s oil came from its overseas oil investments; high-level diplomacy, public–private partnerships, and military and economic cooperation initiatives helped secure these investments, but bureaucratic and technical factors, along with international political factors such as competition from China, reduced the extent of such investments.

(p.435) Gas India was not a major consumer of gas until the mid-1980s, when the Bombay High gas field went into production. By the mid-2000s, gas comprised 8 per cent Page 10 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy of India’s commercial energy consumption, and gas consumption was growing. Domestic supplies were insufficient to meet this demand, and India began importing gas in 2004. It then sought to import gas in three ways—through liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipped from the Middle East, via pipelines from regional states, and via shale gas imports. By the early 2010s, however, only the first of these sources had come through, and only on a limited scale—logistical challenges and international political factors considerably disrupted India’s quest to secure gas from abroad. Liquefied Natural Gas

India began importing LNG from Qatar in 2004, and Qatar remained India’s major LNG supplier for the next decade.9 New Delhi also sought to import LNG from Iran, but this project faltered. On technical grounds, Iran relied upon foreign firms to set up LNG facilities, but Indian and foreign firms would not build such facilities because of a key international political factor—they would have incurred US sanctions under the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act. Moreover, India–Iran relations somewhat cooled in 2005–6, and, in 2006, the LNG project was held up after Iran sought higher prices (Tribune India 2006). Although the pricing issue was eventually resolved, New Delhi and Tehran were unable to advance this project over the next decade. Gas Pipelines via Iran–Pakistan, Myanmar–Bangladesh, and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan

To augment LNG projects, India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas considered three transnational gas pipelines—an Iran–Pakistan–India project, a pipeline involving Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, and a Burma–Bangladesh– India project.10 Indian government officials at the senior-most levels sought to advance these projects, but logistical challenges and international political factors thwarted them. (p.436) The Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline was first discussed in the mid-1990s. It was proposed in July 1993 during the Iranian oil minister’s visit to India, and, in 1997, all three countries agreed in principle to the pipeline. In 1999–2000, Indian and Iranian government officials held several meetings which resulted in the formation of committees to further discuss the pipeline. Three international political factors then affected the project. First, India–Pakistan military crises and political tensions caused pipeline talks to stall in 2001–2003. India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)–led government then linked the pipeline to Pakistan’s granting India ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) status. In 2004–5, in conjunction with a thaw in India–Pakistan relations, the two countries revived pipeline discussions. In mid-2004, India’s new government led by the Congress party did not link the pipeline with the MFN issue, and this resulted in a positive response from Pakistan (Khosla 2005: 74–85). India’s petroleum minister led a delegation to Pakistan in early June 2005, and an Indian delegation also visited Iran in mid-June 2005.11 In March 2006, Pakistan, Page 11 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy India, and Iran held their first tripartite governmental talks in Tehran. Still, other political factors delayed the project. Second, a strain in Iran–India relations after India’s September 2005 vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency somewhat affected the pipeline project (previously, India–Iran relations were advancing after President Khatami visited India in 2003). Tehran then seemed to hold back on the pipeline project, also relating this delay to cost considerations. In July 2006, it sought a price of $7.20 per million Btu of gas against New Delhi’s offer of $4.20. In early 2007, all three countries agreed to a price of $4.93 (Hindustan Times 2006). Pipeline talks then continued in 2007 and 2008 (Dawn 2008; Khosla 2005: 87). Ultimately, Pakistan and Iran signed an agreement to advance the project in 2009 but India did not join them. Third, US opposition, especially from 2005 to 2008 when New Delhi and Washington were negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement, affected New Delhi’s position on the pipeline. Washington had long-standing concerns about any foreign investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector, and members of Congress also warned that they could hold back civilian nuclear cooperation with India if it went ahead with the Iran pipeline. New Delhi still participated in pipeline talks with Tehran and Islamabad, though it tactically paused on the issue while Congress (p.437) was discussing the nuclear agreement in mid-2006 and then again in late 2008.12 Washington tacitly endorsed the Turkmenistan– Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline as an alternative to the Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline (Cohen et al. 2008; Kronstadt and Katzman 2006). India’s second proposed gas pipeline was a Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan– India project. This pipeline had originally been proposed by the US firm Unocal; in 1995, the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding for a pipeline through Afghanistan; and, in 2002, Afghanistan’s new government and Turkmenistan and Pakistan signed a similar agreement. New Delhi joined the pipeline project thereafter. Initially, India’s BJP-led government, which had concerns about the situation in Afghanistan, was reluctant to participate in the project, but a new Indian government led by the Congress party accepted the project, especially because, by then, the project had greater international support. In 2005, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) submitted a feasibility report on the pipeline to the oil ministers of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Turkmenistan.ru 2006). In May 2007, New Delhi joined a four-country agreement with the ADB on this proposed pipeline. In April 2008, at a meeting facilitated by the ADB, the four participating countries signed a framework agreement on the project. Yet logistical challenges and the war in Afghanistan prevented the project from being realized in subsequent years (Blank 2008: 34; Foster 2008).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy India’s third gas pipeline project was the Myanmar–Bangladesh–India pipeline, which would bring gas from Myanmar to east India via Bangladesh. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh discussed this project during his visit to Myanmar in 2001 (Hindustan Times 2001). The project had not just an energy component but also a political aspect—under a BJP-led government in the early 2000s, New Delhi sought to build ties with Myanmar to counter Chinese influence in that country (Lall 2006). In January 2005, ministers from India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh discussed the pipeline. Still, international political factors related to Bangladesh’s attempts to seek concessions from India—which India’s foreign ministry had warned about—delayed the pipeline project (Aiyar 2005: 37).13 Specifically, Bangladesh linked the gas pipeline to economic concessions from India. It sought the removal of Indian nontariff barriers; a trade and transport corridor linking Nepal and Bangladesh through (p.438) Indian territory; and access to hydroelectric power generated in Bhutan.14 Given this opposition from Bangladesh, New Delhi then considered a bilateral gas agreement with Myanmar, even though a pipeline through India’s north-eastern states bypassing Bangladesh would be more expensive than a pipeline routed through Bangladesh (Business Line 2005b). Thus, in the period 2005–8, the India–Bangladesh– Myanmar pipeline did not advance due to opposition from Bangladesh.15 Subsequently, while a more pro-India government took office in Bangladesh, another international political factor—competition from China—affected the project. By mid-2010, Myanmar and China had commenced construction of a gas pipeline to China from Myanmar’s Shwe gas fields. Since these fields could not also support a large supply of gas to India, any gas pipeline to India became logistically and commercially more challenging. To summarize, international political factors stalled this gas pipeline project, though New Delhi still sought to advance it—during an early 2013 visit to Myanmar, India’s minister for commerce and industry sought to revive the project. Shale Gas

In the 2000s and early 2010s, India was not an importer of shale gas, but, in the future, shale gas from the United States could contribute a small portion of India’s gas imports. Indian firms such as Reliance Industries, Gail India Ltd, and ONGC were undertaking joint gas exploration ventures with US firms, and Washington also altered its regulatory policies to allow shale gas exports to India.16

Nuclear Energy India’s nuclear energy policies can be differentiated into three phases. In the first phase, from the 1950s until its 1974 nuclear test, imported nuclear reactors were the main component of India’s nuclear energy sector. In a second phase, from 1974 to the mid-2000s, civilian nuclear imports to India essentially ended. In this phase, India built up its domestic nuclear industry to offset the loss of Page 13 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy nuclear imports. In a third phase that began in the mid-2000s, the slow development of its indigenous nuclear sector, the growth of its economy, and a major US foreign policy initiative all contributed to India’s revival of interest in (p.439) nuclear energy imports. In addition, prevailing international regimes in the areas of economics, security, and the environment influenced India’s nuclear energy policies during these three phases. The First Phase: Civilian Nuclear Reactor Imports

India’s first nuclear energy reactors were provided by foreign suppliers—two US-built 160 megawatt reactors at Tarapur commenced operation in 1969, and a Canadian-built 100 megawatt CANDU reactor commenced operation in 1973. Thereafter, with the exception of a second Canadian-built CANDU that commenced operation in 1981, India faced an international embargo on nuclear reactor imports. Domestic and international factors influenced India’s nuclear energy policies at this time. At the domestic and decisionmaking level, Prime Minister Nehru and India’s political leaders, as well as nuclear scientist Homi Bhabha who headed India’s Atomic Energy Commission, sought to use science and technology to advance India’s economic development. They recognized the limitations of India’s domestic industry and therefore sought nuclear imports to develop India’s energy sector.17 Internationally, an economic regime based on the same notion of science and technology cooperation to promote development influenced the United States and Canada to supply reactors to India. Thus, guided by its ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative of civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and also for political reasons (to strengthen ties with India), the United States provided the Tarapur reactors to India. And, partially financed by the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, Canada provided the 40 megawatt CIRUS reactor to India, after which it supplied two CANDU reactors, partly financed by the Canadian Export Credit Insurance Corporation. The Second Phase: The Cessation of Imports with Minor Exceptions

After its 1974 nuclear test, India faced an international embargo on nuclear technology imports. Washington and its Western allies reversed the ‘Atoms for Peace’ approach and constructed a security regime that restricted nuclear technology transfers. These initiatives, centred (p.440) around the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), were a direct response to India’s nuclear test. This international embargo affected and impeded the growth of India’s nuclear energy sector.18 Thus, after the Canadian-supplied CANDU in 1973, no further nuclear reactors entered India’s energy grid in the 1970s, and only three reactors were completed in the 1980s (one of which was a Canadian-supplied CANDU). Although eight more reactors were completed in the 1990s, these Indian-built reactors, based on the CANDU design, had small 220 megawatt capacities and provided less than 3 per cent of India’s electricity. During these

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy decades, nuclear imports dropped off India’s energy policy agenda, with two exceptions. First, India still required enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur reactors. Accordingly, as a result of US–India negotiations, Washington agreed to supply this fuel until 1982, and then accepted that the fuel could be supplied by France, after which it was supplied by China (in 1995) and Russia (in 2001). Second, in 1988, New Delhi and Moscow signed an agreement for two 1,000 megawatt light water reactors. One main international factor—New Delhi’s political ties with Moscow and their mutual interest in high-technology cooperation—led to the signing of this agreement. However, other international factors—US opposition, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union which resulted in financing problems—held up the agreement for over a decade (Moody 1997). It was only in 1998 that the agreement was revived. By then, New Delhi and Moscow had resolved financing issues after Russia extended a $2.6 billion credit at a low 4 per cent interest rate, to be paid back in hard currency after the first reactor was commissioned. Also, Washington dropped its opposition by accepting Russia’s position that the original reactor agreement was signed in 1988, well before NSG guidelines of 1992 prohibited reactor sales to countries such as India that did not have full-scope safeguards. Russian technicians began constructing the reactors in 2002, and completed the first in 2012. By then, NSG restrictions on India had been lifted. The Third Phase: The Revival of Nuclear Energy Imports

In the mid-2000s, domestic factors—the slow development of its indigenous nuclear sector—and international factors—a US foreign policy (p.441) initiative to lift NSG restrictions on India, that was supported by other states partly out of environmental considerations—contributed to India’s revived interest in nuclear energy imports. In terms of domestic factors, although India’s indigenous nuclear industry had matured, and had built higher-capacity 540 megawatt reactors (compared to its earlier low-capacity 220 megawatt reactors), it was still some two decades away from realizing its ambitious three-phase programme of generating nuclear power from indigenous thorium reserves on a large scale. Also, India’s nuclear sector could not attain its short-term and medium-term targets. For the short term, it was not supplying enough uranium to fuel its existing reactors, which were therefore operating at only 50 per cent of their capacity. And in the middle term, it was unlikely to attain its goals of generating 20,000 megawatts of nuclear energy by 2020. (In the early 2010s, India’s indigenous reactors had a capacity of about 4,400 megawatts, and two Russian reactors would add 2,000 megawatts. Even if India built eight new 700 megawatt reactors in the late 2010s as planned, it would be well short of its 20,000 megawatt target.) Thus,

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy India could only make up its nuclear energy deficit by importing uranium fuel and reactors, but it faced a long-standing embargo on such imports. International factors, in the form of a major US foreign policy initiative in 2005, began the process of lifting this embargo. That year, as part of the effort to build a strategic partnership with India, the Bush administration agreed to change US laws and international regime guidelines to permit nuclear cooperation with India.19 Indeed, it was only after Washington’s July 2005 announcement of this initiative that the domestic factor just mentioned became more prominent—it was only thereafter that Indian analysts and policymakers more closely examined and recognized the shortcomings in India’s indigenous nuclear sector, and this made international civilian nuclear cooperation more appealing to them. US policy was the main, but not the only, international factor enabling the lifting of nuclear technology embargoes on India. Washington still required the approval of the NSG. The NSG members lifted trade restrictions against India in 2008 for a few key reasons. Some, particularly France and Russia, had commercial interests in supplying reactors and fuel to India. Just as important, NSG members recognized that India, the world’s fifth largest carbon emitter in 2005 and expected to (p.442) become the third largest by 2015,20 could help the effort against global warming by increasing its reliance on nuclear power.21 In short, international factors such as a major US foreign policy initiative, furthered by a global recognition of the potential positive environmental impact of nuclear cooperation with India, helped in lifting the international nuclear technology embargo on India. This allowed India to import uranium fuel for its reactors in the early 2010s.22 Thus, in 2012, seven Indian reactors generating 1,400 megawatts of electricity were using imported fuel and working near their full capacity, while nine reactors generating 2,630 megawatts used domestically supplied uranium.23 Still, in the early 2010s, US, Russian, and French firms had not begun building reactors in India because, in 2010, India’s parliament adopted laws that made these suppliers responsible for liability in the event of any nuclear accident. US and Indian officials subsequently sought to resolve this issue during President Obama’s January 2015 visit to India. Thus, while international factors allowed India to resume nuclear imports in the early 2010s, domestic political factors, which resulted in an investor-unfriendly liability bill, prevented the actual supply of reactors to India. This chapter has discussed various bureaucratic, domestic, and international factors influencing India’s energy policy since independence. Similar factors are likely to influence India’s future energy policy. Bureaucratically, by the late 2000s, India’s foreign ministry had established institutional links with other government agencies responsible for securing energy supplies from abroad. In 2007, it formed an Energy Security Unit within the foreign ministry for this purpose. Thus, India’s foreign ministry could considerably influence India’s Page 16 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy future foreign energy policy. It would generally favour securing energy supplies from countries having good political ties with India. It would be cautious about energy investments in certain countries if these investments strain India’s ties with other states. Domestically, high economic growth rates would considerably increase India’s demand for energy, and its quest for energy from abroad. India may then more aggressively seek a larger number of energy investments with a wider range of countries. Conversely, (p.443) reduced economic growth would lessen the magnitude and intensity of India’s quest for energy imports. These domestic factors may combine with bureaucratic factors—a less internationally oriented oil minister may, especially during an economic slowdown, shift his ministry’s focus homeward and rely more on state-run refineries and oil companies rather than on foreign suppliers to meet India’s energy requirements. Internationally, the prevailing economic, security, and environmental regimes will significantly influence India’s energy policy. In particular, global environmental considerations will cause India to seek clean sources of energy. India may then opt for greater foreign technological collaboration in its energy sector, for example, seeking a range of clean-coal, nuclear, wind, solar, and nonfossil-fuel technologies from international suppliers. To summarize, some key domestic and international factors are likely to influence India’s energy policy in the twenty-first century. Domestically, if India’s economy maintains moderate growth rates, India could intensify its quest for energy from abroad, and its energy policy would then be significantly affected by international political factors. Internationally, India is likely to keep all its energy options open—it is likely to continue to maintain a diverse portfolio of foreign suppliers and sources for its energy requirements. (p.446) References Bibliography references: Ahmad, T. 2005. ‘Oil Diplomacy for India’s Energy Security’, in A. Sinha and M. Mohta, eds, Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute). Aiyar, M.S. 2005. ‘Energy Cooperation: India and Its Neighbors’, in I.P. Khosla, ed., Energy and Diplomacy (New Delhi: Konark). Asia Times. 2005. ‘Kazakh Oil Coup for China, India Cries Foul’, 24 August. Betz, J. and M. Hanif. 2010. The Formation of Preferences in Two-Level Games: An Analysis of India’s Domestic and Foreign Energy Policy (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies).

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy Blank, S. 2008. India’s Energy Options in Central Asia (London: South Asian Strategic Stability Unit). Bose, S. 2007. ‘Energy Politics: India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations’, IPCS Special Report no. 45, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, July. Bradsher, K. and C. Pala. 2005. ‘China beat India for Kazakh oil field’, International Herald Tribune, 23 August. Business Line. 2005a. ‘ONGC Mittal Energy Signs MoU with Nigeria’, 11 November. ———. 2005b. ‘India, Myanmar may bypass Bangladesh for gas pipeline—other options to be explored’, 7 July. ———. 2007. ‘Indian Oil Cos will Have to Bid Anew for Iraqi Blocks’, 26 May. Carl, J., V. Rai, and D. Victor. 2008. ‘Energy and India’s Foreign Policy’, Working Paper no. 75, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford, May. Cherian, J. 2002. ‘A Promising Deal’, Frontline, vol. 19, no. 15, 20 July. Cohen, A., L. Curtis, and O. Graham. 2008. The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation), 30 May. Dasgupta, B. 1971. The Oil Industry in India (London: Frank Cass). Dawn. 2008. ‘Energy Crisis Forces India to join Iran Gas Pipeline’, 26 April. Ebinger, C. 2011. Energy and Security in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). Financial Express. 2008. ‘Govt to build N-buffer stocks, overseas assets’, 3 October. Foster, J. 2008. ‘A Pipeline through a Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada, and the New Great Energy Game’, Center for Policy Alternatives, Foreign Policy Series, vol. 3, no. 1, 19 June. Ghadar, F. 1982. The Petroleum Industry in Oil Importing Developing Countries (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books). (p.447) Hindustan Times. 2001. ‘Delegation to Visit Myanmar for Oil Deal’, 18 February. ———. 2006. ‘Iran Rejects Indian Price for Tripartite Gas Pipeline’, 16 July.

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy International Energy Agency (IEA). 2007. World Energy Outlook 2007 (Paris: International Energy Agency). Khosla, I.P., ed. 2005. Energy and Diplomacy (New Delhi: India International Centre). Kronstadt, K.A. and K. Katzman. 2006. India-Iran Relations and US Interests (Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 2 August). Lall, M. 2006. ‘Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 424–46. Madan, T. 2006. The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: India (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution). Mehrotra, S. 1990. India and the Soviet Union: Trade and Technology Transfer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mehta, V. 2013. ‘Step on the Gas’, Indian Express, 6 October. Mistry, D. 2014. The US–India Nuclear Agreement (Delhi: Cambridge University Press). Moody, R.A. 1997. ‘The Indian–Russian Light Water Reactor Deal’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 112–22. Panagariya, A. 2008. India: The Emerging Giant (New York: Oxford University Press). Planning Commission. 2002. Tenth Five-Year Plan, 2002–2007 (New Delhi: Government of India). Subramanium, T. 2005. ‘The Sakhalin Venture’, Frontline, vol. 22, no. 22, 22 October. Times of India. 2007. ‘India will Demand Stake in Sakhalin’, 25 January. ———. 2013. ‘Kazakhstan Govt blocks OVL’s $5 Billion Deal’, 4 July. Tribune India. 2006. ‘India, Iran agree to renegotiate LNG price’, 17 November. Turkmenistan.ru. 2006. ‘Gas Pipeline Project Turkmenistan-AfghanistanPakistan-India Approved’, 20 November. Varadarajan, S. 2005. ‘Inside Myanmar: India, China vie for Energy, Influence’, Hindu, 17 January.

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy Notes:

(1.) British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, various years. These figures exclude biofuels that are shown in Table 16.2. (2.) India’s coal imports are not significantly affected by international politics and are therefore not discussed in this chapter. India imports thermal coal for power plants from Indonesia and South Africa, and coking coal for steel production from Australia. (3.) In turn, each ministry has several sections. For example, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas includes the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons that undertakes planning for petroleum exploration, state-owned oil enterprises, and gas fields, and the Oil Coordination Committee that is responsible for the downstream sector. The ministry also oversees the Gas Authority of India Limited, which is responsible for transporting and marketing natural gas; the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and Oil India Limited that manage exploration and production activities; and the Indian Oil Corporation that secures oil from abroad. (4.) The Prime Minister’s Office set up a formal inter-ministerial body, the Energy Coordination Committee, which held its first meeting in July 2005. For more on India’s energy policy, see Betz and Hanif (2010). (5.) This notion is sometimes flawed for a fungible commodity such as oil. Equity oil assets abroad can enhance energy security only if this oil can be transported to the home country at lower costs and with greater reliability than from openmarket sources (Carl et al. 2008: 15, 20). (6.) In Sudan, OVL initially paid $750 million to secure the oil contract and then invested another $1 billion to develop the oilfields. (7.) The overseas assets of OVL produced both oil (the biggest sources were the Sakhalin-1 and Sudan oilfields) and gas (mostly from Vietnam). The production at these sites (in MTOE) was 3.3 (oil) and 0.5 (gas) in 2004; 3.7 (oil) and 1.3 (gas) in 2005; 4.6 (oil) and 1.8 (gas) in 2006; and 5.8 (oil) and 2.1 (gas) in 2007. From 2008–9 to 2010–11, OVL’s overseas sites produced 6.5 to 6.7 million tons of oil each year—the Sudan and Sakhalin fields contributed approximately 2.2 million tons each, with additional production from Venezuela (0.7), Colombia (0.5), Brazil (0.5 in 2010–11), and Syria (0.6). During these years, OVL fields also produced gas in Russia (0.4 billion cubic metres [bcm]) and Vietnam (2.24 bcm). It should also be noted that production from these assets was sold in overseas markets and to countries near the assets and only a fraction was transported to India.

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Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy (8.) The assets owned by OVL also underperformed—thus, while OVL acquired Imperial Energy’s stake in Siberian oilfields for $2.1 billion in 2009, production at these fields was less than half of what had been projected. (9.) Illustrating this, in 2009–2010, India’s LNG imports totalled 12.3 bcm: most of this came from Qatar (8.0), followed by Australia (1.1), Trinidad and Tobago (0.7), and the Sakhalin fields in Russia (0.7). (10.) India’s government also considered a fourth project, an undersea pipeline from Oman to India; several feasibility studies were conducted on this from the mid-1990s but the project was never formalized (Ebinger 2011). (11.) Ministry of Petroleum Factsheet, ‘Import of Natural Gas to India through Transnational Gas Pipelines’, Government of India. (12.) In April 2008, Indian and Iranian officials discussed the pipeline during President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Delhi, and New Delhi outlined a number of issues to which Tehran responded in July. New Delhi then delayed the pipeline dialogue while the US Congress was voting on the nuclear agreement with India in September. It resumed pipeline discussions in November 2008, when India’s foreign minister visited Tehran for the fifteenth meeting of the India–Iran joint commission. (13.) See also the chapter by Shibashis Chatterjee in this volume. (14.) ‘Energy Politics: India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations,’ IPCS Special Report, July 2007. (15.) India also lost out on another venture in Myanmar in 2006–7, when the military regime awarded China, rather than India, a project to pipe gas from offshore fields (Varadarajan 2005). (16.) US law does not permit oil and gas exports to countries with which Washington does not have a free trade agreement, and these countries have to receive case-by-case exemptions. (17.) Accordingly, in its nuclear energy plans of 1954 and 1961, India aimed to have 600 megawatts of nuclear power by 1970 (by that year, the two reactors at Tarapur provided a capacity of 320 megawatts), and 8,000 megawatts by 1980; a revised plan in 1970 called for 2,700 megawatts by 1980, which would be just sufficient to fuel one breeder reactor. (18.) Domestic factors also hindered India’s nuclear industry. In 1987, because of inadequate government financing, a new company, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, was set up to raise capital from bonds and loans. Thereafter, India installed eight reactors in the 1990s (in the early and mid-1990s, India’s government still did not provide sufficient financing to India’s Page 21 of 22

Domestic and International Influences on India’s Energy Policy nuclear sector). A much earlier domestic policy, the 1962 Atomic Energy Act, which barred private sector investment in the nuclear sector, also impeded the development of this sector. (19.) Washington and New Delhi took three more years, until late 2008, to actually complete the technical and legislative requirements for nuclear cooperation. For this issue, see Mistry (2014). (20.) World Energy Outlook expected India’s carbon dioxide emissions (in Gigatons) to be 1.1 Gt (in 2005), 1.8 Gt (2015), and 3.3 Gt (2030), compared to the United States’ 5.8 Gt (2005), 6.4 Gt (2015), and 6.9 Gt (2030), and China’s 5.1 Gt (2005), 8.6 Gt (2015), and 11.4 Gt (2030) (see IEA 2007: 200). (21.) One study noted that, of India’s projected greenhouse gas emission savings by 2030, most would come from efficiency in the end-use of electricity (18 per cent), use of renewables and biofuels (24 per cent), and switching from coal to gas (24 per cent), with only 5 per cent coming from the increased use of nuclear plants (IEA 2007: 538). (22.) India also sought to acquire uranium assets abroad—in 2008, it modified its Integrated Energy Policy to include seeking uranium assets abroad for India’s nuclear energy sector (Financial Express 2008). (23.) By 2012, India had signed uranium supply agreements with Russia, France, and Kazakhstan for 800 tons of uranium from these sources, and also had agreements with Namibia and Mongolia.

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy weapons power. Initially, for almost three decades, India had a creeping approach to nuclear weapons represented by ambivalence and hedging toward the role nuclear power might play toward military ends. By the mid-1990s, India’s nuclear policy became one of confusion: should it become an overt nuclear weapons power by openly testing its nuclear capabilities? The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) irrevocably settled that debate in May 1998 when it chose to test India’s nuclear weapons capabilities in a series of simultaneous tests. However, the confusion about what India would now do with its newfound open nuclear weapons capability persisted for several years, and it was unclear how India’s leaders viewed nuclear weapons and toward what end. Since the early 2000s, however, India has entered the consolidation phase of its nuclear weapons programme, establishing the capabilities, organizations, and procedures to manage its nuclear forces and operationalize it toward what it terms ‘credible minimum deterrence’ or an assured retaliation strategy against its primary adversaries, China and Pakistan. (p.449) In each of these phases, I argue that structural constraints certainly provided the broad parameters within which India’s nuclear weapons policy operated and pushed the fact of India’s nuclearization, but it is primarily domestic organizations and individuals that have driven the timing of the punctuations in India’s evolution as a nuclear weapons power. In particular, during the creeping phase, substantial progress on India’s nuclear weapons programme was only triggered when prime ministers such as Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi ordered them in a top–down manner, and only sometimes conditioned by domestic political incentives or shifts in India’s security environment. Although India’s scientists were quietly working to put India in a position to weaponize its nuclear capabilities, it was only once authorization was given by India’s prime ministers for a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) or to explicitly weaponize capabilities that India moved forward in its creep toward nuclear weapons. To be sure, the creeping phase ended when India was forced to respond to intelligence that Pakistan was on the verge of having an operational nuclear capability in the late 1980s. It is largely a historical myth that Pakistan’s military nuclear weapons programme was begat by India’s. In fact, the exact opposite is true. Pakistan’s nuclearization was essentially a foregone conclusion after the 1971 war, and was largely driven by India’s conventional, not nuclear, advantage (though India’s ambiguous nuclear programme and the 1974 PNE certainly provided additional motivation). So while Pakistan undertook a focused drive toward nuclear weapons, India crept along through the 1980s. Rajiv Gandhi was ultimately shaken out of nuclear complacency following a series of crises in the late 1980s and reports that Pakistan was on the verge of obtaining an operational nuclear capability. It was only then that he ordered the weaponization of India’s nuclear programme, since ceding a nuclear monopoly to Pakistan in the region would have been strategic suicide. In point of fact, Page 2 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy India’s nuclear weapons programme trailed Pakistan’s in this period. But once the decision to weaponize was made by Rajiv Gandhi around 1989, India’s creeping approach to nuclear weapons gave way to confusion. In the confusion phase, there was significant muddling along as India’s new and sometimes unstable coalitional domestic political configurations often neutered the power and interest of India’s prime ministers in India’s nuclear weapons programme. The air force struggled (p.450) through the mid-1990s to establish a capability to even deliver rudimentary nuclear weapons, while India’s scientists pushed to test under the looming spectre of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But their efforts were met with indifference or resistance by Indian leaders (including an aborted test in 1995 under Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao) until the BJP took power in 1996 and then again in 1998. When Prime Minister Vajpayee tested in May 1998, there were few immediate security pressures to do so. As a result, India was saddled with an overt nuclear weapons capability but no nuclear strategy: India tested first and asked questions later. Only several years later—well after the Kargil War and the 2001–2 crisis with Pakistan known as Operation Parakram—did India begin the process of consolidating its nuclear weapons capability into a robust and credible assured retaliation strategy. In this phase, India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been the primary domestic actor in developing an array of capabilities—some that may exceed its brief—to operationalize India’s nuclear forces. Again, there have been very few immediate security pressures pushing India to consolidate its nuclear weapons policy, but rather domestic organizations and individuals driving the process. The fact that India’s evolution as a nuclear weapons power has been primarily driven by domestic and individual-level factors has resulted in a policy that may sometimes seem schizophrenic to outside observers. During the creeping phase, it was unclear what objective India was trying to achieve with nuclear ambiguity or ambivalence. During the confusion phase, India was in the unique position of being ‘kind of’ pregnant with nuclear weapons: every state knew India had rudimentary operational nuclear weapons, but India refused to admit it and no one really knew how capable India was, including perhaps India itself. In the ongoing consolidation phase, India’s scientists are dreaming of building an arsenal and array of capabilities—including ballistic missile defences (BMD) and multiple warhead ballistic missiles—that could push India well beyond its targeted ‘assured retaliation’ nuclear strategy. India has the security luxury of being able to behave in a relatively incoherent fashion with respect to its nuclear weapons policy because, with robust conventional capabilities and buffered terrain to the east, it does not face an existential threat from either China or Pakistan. But the lack (p.451) of tight security constraints has meant that India’s prime ministers have paid variable attention to India’s nuclear weapons Page 3 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy programme, while its scientists continue to push for building more, and more diverse, capabilities. The end result of these domestic and individual factors in India’s nuclear weapons policy is less of a coherent strategy and more of a schizophrenic condition whose best medication can only be strong civilian oversight and coordination.

Phase I: Creep (1948–89) It is a myth that India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, outright opposed the application of nuclear power to military purposes. As Perkovich (1999: chapter 1) and others document, Nehru’s actual practice reveals some ambiguity about the intentions he had in laying the groundwork for India’s civilian nuclear programme in the late 1950s—simultaneously calling for global universal nuclear disarmament whilst laying the groundwork for India’s own potential to develop nuclear weapons by pursuing the development of a nuclear fuel cycle. Although he was certainly interested in civilian nuclear power to catalyse India’s economic development, Nehru was deeply pragmatic and ambiguous about the application of nuclear power to military capability. His anointed scientific advisor, Homi Bhabha, was a major proponent of developing nuclear weapons for India’s security and prestige. India’s significant security pressures, particularly the Chinese threat, were crystallized in the 1962 war and China’s 1964 test of a nuclear weapon. However, after Nehru’s death, Prime Minister Shastri cared little about foreign policy or nuclear weapons, and India’s ambiguity about nuclear weapons—even after the Chinese test—recessed into the background. Indeed, after the Chinese test, Shastri forcefully argued that India simply could not afford a nuclear weapons programme when it was facing so many more pressing domestic challenges, including a significant food shortage (Shastri’s remarks in Lok Sabha debates, cited in Perkovich 1999: 80–1). Although Bhabha continued to publicly lobby for an Indian nuclear weapons programme, India did not in fact have any reprocessed plutonium from its domestic reactors until 1965. Nevertheless, to satisfy his critics, Shastri argued that Bhabha and India’s atomic scientists should continue to lay the groundwork for nuclear explosives so India ‘can reap its peaceful (p.452) benefits’, approving the subterranean nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes project (cited in Perkovich 1999: 82). India’s external relations would end up critically shaping India’s nuclear policy in this period as well toward maintaining a potential military ‘option’ (see especially Ganguly 1999: 153–6). As Kennedy (2011) documents, India at one point searched for an external nuclear security guarantee from both the United States and the Soviet Union, but came up empty; the US relationship with Pakistan precluded an extended nuclear umbrella, while the Soviet Union remained ambivalent about extending any such guarantees and professed neutrality in any potential China–India conflict. Furthermore, the diverging interests of the superpowers and India on the NPT—of which India was initially a vocal proponent owing to its purported provisions on disarmament—would ultimately find India as a non-signatory due to the perceived inequities of a Page 4 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy treaty that amounted to what Jaswant Singh (1998) would later term ‘nuclear apartheid’. This forced India into a position of nuclear self-reliance. Facing threats from China and persistent conflict with Pakistan, Indira Gandhi continued to hedge about the application of India’s nuclear power toward military purposes, continuing to allow the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), now led by Vikram Sarabhai, to lay the groundwork for nuclear explosions— whose uses, peaceful or military, would remain ambiguous and were mostly semantic anyway. While theoretical work on equations of state and high explosives continued, Indira Gandhi was beset by domestic challenges as the Congress party split. As a result, the nuclear programme literally crept along without much high-level oversight for several years, with the primary battle being an internal AEC fight about how far to proceed on laying the foundation for nuclear explosives. Sarabhai’s death in 1971 removed a significant opponent of this work. The new AEC head, Homi Sethna, would be a significant figure that would lobby Indira for years to approve a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’. India’s security environment improved following its decisive win in the 1971 war with Pakistan, so there were no immediate security pressures to exercise even a ‘peaceful’ nuclear option as a deterrent to either Pakistan or China in this particular time frame. Indeed, it was in September 1972 that Indira Gandhi laid the groundwork for the test by authorizing India’s scientists to develop a test version of a PNE. But it would be only eighteen months later, on 18 May 1974, that Indira (p.453) would approve the actual test of the PNE, with a claimed yield of 12 kT.2 Though the actual yield may have been considerably smaller, perhaps 2–4 kT (Tellis 2001: 196–8), India had demonstrated competency in the scientific and technical skills necessary to produce nuclear fission for explosive purposes. This device itself was not suitable as a nuclear weapon as it was too big and unstable to be used as a deliverable nuclear weapon.3 Indeed, the decision to test the PNE involved only a handful of people, none of whom were in the military or the defence ministry (though they were aware of the prototype’s existence). This suggests that there were no immediate plans to fully weaponize India’s nuclear capability. But India’s capability to detonate a fission device was now transparent to the world, though everything else about India’s nuclear programme remained ambiguous. Nevertheless, the test provided India with critical design-level data that could allow it to assemble rudimentary nuclear weapons if necessary; and a US National Security Council memo dated 30 May 1974 judged at the time that India could ‘use its 38 light Canberra bombers as delivery vehicles. . . . the IAF has been experimenting recently with heavy payloads akin to those of a crude nuclear bomb’ and could reach critical targets in all of Pakistan and parts of China.4 The test thus made India a latent nuclear weapons power that could constitute a nuclear weapons programme in a reasonable time frame from a decision to do so. Perkovich (1999: 189) writes that after the PNE, India ‘possessed the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons if security Page 5 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy interests required it, but it would refrain from exercising this military option’ unless absolutely necessary. But in demonstrating the capability to assemble a nuclear fission device that could be used as a weapon and delivered by modified aircraft in its inventory, India demonstrated the ability to retaliate against China (and Pakistan) in the event of a nuclear attack, albeit with a severe time-delay. India would play fast and loose over whether it technically possessed a nuclear weapon—since it did not keep any fully assembled or any stockpile—but it had the capability to assemble and deliver one within weeks or months of a decision to do so (Perkovich 1999: 267–8) after the PNE. Despite a persistent structural threat from China, there was no immediate security trigger for Indira’s decision to approve the PNE, a decade after China’s own nuclear test. India had had the capability to test a PNE for several years. The timing in this case for the test was largely dictated by Indira Gandhi’s desire to (p.454) have a rally-around-her effect before upcoming elections, though it is unclear whether voters ultimately cared. Remarkably, after the PNE, India’s nuclear weapons programme went almost entirely dormant for nearly a decade, and stirred only slightly even after that. Beset by domestic concerns—such as the Emergency, a brief Janata Dal interregnum led by the anti-nuclear Morarji Desai, Sikh separatism, Indira’s assassination, and Rajiv taking over—little attention was paid to India’s nuclear weapons programme and to moving from the PNE to a truly operational or stockpiled nuclear weapons capability. Until the mid-1980s, India enjoyed relative calm on its security front with China and Pakistan. There was some work in the early 1980s on developing capabilities for India’s ballistic missiles. But the nuclear weapons programme advanced very little in parallel, despite a reportedly aborted consideration by Indira Gandhi to test a weapon in 1982–3. However, a series of crises in the late 1980s would change Rajiv Gandhi’s calculation on India’s nuclear weapons programme. After the Brasstacks crisis in 1986–7 with Pakistan in which a series of large-scale Indian Army exercises triggered a crisis on the subcontinent, an increasing number of reports and boasts—including from A.Q. Khan and General Zia themselves in Pakistan— suggested that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was very far advanced. It was in response to these reports that Rajiv Gandhi would bring India’s nuclear weapons programme out of dormancy and fully creep toward a nuclear weapons capability. Thus, a perceived change in India’s immediate security environment— evidence of Pakistani nuclearization—was seized decisively by Rajiv to push India toward the final steps of weaponizing India’s nuclear capabilities. India could not allow Pakistan to have a monopoly on nuclear weapons in South Asia. The fact of India’s nuclearization was thus structurally driven: the combination of a nuclear and conventionally superior China, and a Pakistan that pursued nuclear weapons primarily due to India’s conventional superiority, left India with little choice but to develop nuclear weapons. The proximate cause of weaponization, however, was Pakistan: India could not cede a nuclear monopoly Page 6 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy to Pakistan in the late 1980s and was therefore forced to react. But the timing of India’s advances was not as straightforward or linear. Thus, Rajiv Gandhi continued India’s march toward an overt nuclear capability in 1988–9 when he discreetly ordered the AEC and DRDO (p.455) to ‘weaponize’ India’s nuclear capability so that India would have components necessary to assemble nuclear weapons more readily available (Perkovich 1999: 267–8). Hymans (2006: 190) reports that this order was given directly to AEC and DRDO chairmen P.K. Iyengar and V.S. Arunachalam, to begin ‘design, testing and production of advanced detonators, ruggedized high volt trigger systems, interface engineering, systems engineering and systems integration to military specifications’.5 As noted already, with respect to delivery vehicles, in 1983 Indira Gandhi revived and then Rajiv Gandhi accelerated India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, which designed India’s indigenous ballistic missile families Prithvi and Agni that began flight-testing in 1988 (see Narang 2009). India’s nuclear-capable aircraft by this point included the Jaguar as well as French Mirages. Studies of nuclear proliferation often date Indian weaponization to 1988 (Montgomery and Sagan 2009: 307–10), which represents the year in which India had readily assembleable nuclear weapons but still kept them in a de-mated and dispersed state out of the hands of the military, thereby compressing India’s time to retaliate against a nuclear strike to hours or days rather than weeks. The targeted time to retaliation from an order to do so was reported to be seventy-two hours—that is, the targeted time to assemble, move, mate, and use nuclear weapons in a retaliatory mission was three days, suggesting just how recessed India’s posture was at this time. This was institutionalized around 1991 after a crisis over Kashmir with Pakistan. However, Rajiv abstained from authorizing an explicit test of these new military designs. India’s erratic creep toward nuclear weapons in this phase is only loosely explained by structural constraints. It is certainly true that the latent pressures of a nuclear and conventionally superior China, persistent conflict with Pakistan and its nuclear advances (with Chinese assistance), and a lack of external security guarantees shaped India’s general condition of creating a possible ‘nuclear option’. However, the timing of critical events—save Rajiv’s decision to authorize the final steps of weaponization short of a nuclear test in light of Pakistani nuclear advances—were almost entirely dictated by domestic or individual-level factors. Very little else can explain why India waited ten years after China’s nuclear test to conduct a PNE, when it could have done so earlier, and then why the programme lay virtually dormant for another fifteen years. Different leaders and different organizations could have (p.456) accelerated (or decelerated) the pace of India’s creep advanced toward nuclearization. It was the contingencies of domestic politics, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, and India’s scientific organizations that determined India’s movement in these three decades toward nuclear weapons. Because of the reliance on individuals such as Page 7 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Indira and Rajiv Gandhi to get India’s nuclear weapons even to this point, the rise of coalition politics and the increasing variance of India’s leaders meant that punctuated creep would give rise to rampant confusion for over a decade as inexperienced leaders were charged with trying to determine how to proceed with India’s nuclear weapons programme.

Phase II: Confusion (1989–2003) After Rajiv Gandhi’s explicit order to work on weaponizing India’s nuclear weapons capability, more than a decade of confusion in India’s nuclear weapons programme would follow. I term this the ‘little bit pregnant with nuclear weapons’ syndrome. What did India want to do with its nuclear weapons, how many would it need, how would it deliver them, against whom, and under what conditions? These were the main questions that went unanswered for many years after Rajiv essentially took India to the threshold of being a nuclear weapons power. As coalitional politics beset India after Rajiv’s tenure, it was almost a toss of the coin as to whether India’s prime minister would care about nuclear weapons or foreign affairs. The larger global pressures loomed large: the permanent extension of the NPT and perceived momentum toward the CTBT. Indeed, with the debate on the CTBT heating up in the 1990s, India’s scientists pressed its prime ministers to authorize nuclear tests to confirm the fruits of their work on weaponization before the window closed on their ability to do so. The military had very little input into this debate. Thus began several years of ‘will she or won’t she test?’ India’s leaders, including Congress’s Narasimha Rao, did not seem to be able to answer the question of whether India should become an explicit nuclear weapons power, or whether nuclear ambiguity would suffice to deter nuclear use against the country. Domestic political pressure from the right-wing BJP continued to mount on Congress, with one of the key pressure-points being ‘exercising India’s nuclear option’, that is, overtly testing nuclear weapons. In 1995, Congress Prime Minister Rao came (p.457) within a hair’s breadth of testing before American pressure forced him to walk away from the precipice (Hymans 2006: 193).6 When the BJP ephemerally formed a thirteen-day government in 1996, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also ordered tests but had to pull back when his government collapsed. In March 1998, the BJP established a relatively stable coalition government and, in May, Vajpayee took India across the explicit nuclear weapons threshold, citing as his motivations everything from China to Pakistan to a hypocritical international community that itself possessed nuclear weapons but which was pushing regimes such as the permanent extension of the NPT and CTBT to prevent India from acquiring them (Vajpayee 1998). All of these domestic political machinations made for high international drama, with the American intelligence community lambasted for ‘missing’ India’s impending nuclear tests. However, in terms of capabilities, the tests arose from a nuclear weapons programme that was already relatively advanced. Indeed, India’s scientists had little doubt that the four fission devices would successfully Page 8 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy detonate, which they did, but they were still unable to successfully detonate the device that would have dramatically improved India’s retaliatory power: a boosted fission device,7 let alone a true thermonuclear weapon. Rather than marking a discontinuity, though, India’s May 1998 tests represented continuity in India’s nuclear capabilities. However, India tested first and asked questions later. Although the tests represented the culmination of almost three decades of work by its scientists, many in which India’s nuclear weapons program laid dormant, it was a significant discontinuity in international politics. India was the first new state to openly test nuclear weapons in thirty-four years. What would it do with its nuclear weapons now that it was a self-declared nuclear power? This was a question that, remarkably, the BJP was unprepared initially to answer. In an embarrassing bureaucratic exercise, a year after the tests and several months after the Kargil War with then-nuclear Pakistan, India released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine which was simultaneously inconsistent and ambitious, calling for a credible minimum deterrent without defining what that meant, while at the same time pursuing a full nuclear triad without explaining how that might serve India’s national interests or deterrence goals (see Sagan 2009). This public release was often disavowed as just a ‘draft’ by Indian national security elites, suggesting significant confusion about what (p.458) India’s nuclear policy and doctrine actually were, with little clarification until 2003. After the 1999 Kargil War and the ten-month Operation Parakram in 2001–2, in which India’s mainstay conventional retaliatory options were effectively neutralized by Pakistan’s nuclear capability, and finding its own nuclear capabilities ineffective at deterring Pakistani provocations, Indian security managers were forced to try to resolve their confusion about the direction and purpose of India’s nuclear weapons programme (Narang 2009–10). Finally on 4 January 2003, almost half a decade after the nuclear tests, the Cabinet Committee on Security released an eight-point ‘memo’ that summarized the salient points about India’s now-official nuclear doctrine (Prime Minister’s Office 2003). There was significant evolution between the 1999 and 2003 versions, but no less incoherence. While calling for a credible minimum deterrent, the 2003 summary also called for ‘massive’ retaliation, which raises real questions about the numerical and capability requirements Indian security managers believe are sufficient to achieve India’s nuclear deterrent objectives against Pakistan and China. The summary also dilutes India’s original ‘No First Use’ pledge by threatening retaliation against chemical or biological weapons attacks—which would in fact cause India to be responsible for the first use of nuclear weapons. For several years after India tested nuclear weapons, Indian security elites in the BJP, and later Congress, lacked a clear vision about how openly possessing nuclear weapons would fit into India’s national security strategy. This is a condition that persists today. While some in the Indian military might have foreseen the strategic consequences of testing—that Pakistan would Page 9 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy follow suit and that India’s conventional advantage over Pakistan might be neutralized—it does not appear that much forethought was given to the strategic consequences of becoming an overt nuclear weapons power. The confusion in the doctrine is just one piece of evidence to support this general condition. Furthermore, though the BJP took India over the nuclear weapons line in 1998, there was a marked lack of delivery capabilities for India’s nuclear weapons. Although the tests declared India as a nuclear weapons power to the world, there were some very real limitations on how operational that capability was. As Kampani (2013) masterfully shows, the Indian Air Force struggled for years to figure out how to reliably deliver India’s nuclear bombs. It was not a simple matter, and the difficulties (p.459) of interfacing India’s AEC, DRDO, and military were rampant. In addition, India’s ballistic missile capabilities were very thin in 1998 when it tested nuclear weapons. While the Prithvi and early variants of the Agni were in development, they were liquid-fuelled, which meant that they were difficult to maintain and move, and it was unclear whether India’s nuclear weapons designs included a missile-mateable warhead. As further evidence of confusion, it appears that India tested nuclear weapons loudly to the world but was unsure how it would deliver them against strategic targets in Pakistan or China. India would have to spend the better part of the next decade getting its organizational and hardware house in order so that it could consolidate its nuclear weapons policy into something coherent. It is an understatement to say that that process is still ongoing.

Phase III: Consolidation (2003–15) The official release of the 2003 doctrine is an appropriate marker of India’s transition from nuclear confusion to nuclear consolidation. Concurrently, the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) was raised and represented the recognition that the military—which had heretofore been almost entirely excluded from anything nuclear—was the ultimate end-user and would have to be brought into the process of operationalizing India’s nuclear weapons capability. Since 2003, India’s domestic organizations have taken significant steps to consolidate India’s nuclear weapons policies toward a somewhat identifiable and coherent strategy of assured retaliation against its primary adversaries, China and Pakistan. The present concern is that strong civilian oversight and coordination is required in the Prime Minister’s Office, particularly from the National Security Advisor, to ensure that India’s domestic political organizations adhere to this national goal and do not exceed their briefs. Specifically, India’s DRDO routinely publicly discusses the development of a variety of capabilities that may not conform to India’s stated strategy of assured retaliation, such as multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and BMDs in addition to a variety of lowerorder, shorter-range nuclear use options. In combination, these capabilities—to an adversary—can look much different than assured retaliation and more like a

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy ‘splendid first strike’ capability, especially against Pakistan whose nuclear assets are limited—for now—in number and geography. (p.460) As the BJP’s National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra was the point person for the ultimate coordination and consolidation of India’s nuclear policies through 2004. After the experiences of Kargil and Parakram, external security events that highlighted the confusion of India’s nuclear policy, Mishra had the unenviable task of accelerating the maturation of India’s nuclear strategy. Setting up a dedicated National Command Authority and the SFC, with a parallel command and control structure to the conventional military that would answer directly to him and the Prime Minister’s Office, Mishra began the process of organizing and coordinating the disparate bureaucracies that would be required to interface in order to launch India’s nuclear weapons. In the decades prior, India’s nuclear arsenal was dispersed across various civilian agencies, with the AEC (now the Department of Atomic Energy) stewarding the fissile cores and the DRDO stewarding the high explosives package. Only once an order to constitute a weapon was given by the prime minister would a weapon be assembled. And only when an order to fire that weapon was given would the military take custody of it. As Kampani (2013) argues, it is unclear that the military would have known what to do with it once it received it. Indeed, V.S. Arunachalam said in 1996: ‘If New Delhi goes up in a mushroom cloud, a certain theater commander will go to a safe, open his book, and begin reading on page one, paragraph one, and will act step by step on the basis of what he reads’ (quoted in Rosen 1996: 252). As a declared nuclear weapons power, India had to mature so that the various component organizations responsible for developing and releasing its nuclear weapons could act seamlessly in a variety of contingencies. The principle of civilian stewardship has largely persisted, but the role of the military has become much more prominent with the raising of the dedicated SFC, which is led by a rotating three-star from each of the three services. Vice Admiral (Retd) Vijay Shankar, who commanded the SFC in the late 2000s, notes that there is still a clear demarcation between custodian and controller, and that Department of Atomic Energy and DRDO representatives are still required to release India’s nuclear weapons. He explicitly writes that there is ‘multiple redundancy and dual-rule release authorization at every level’, which involves both ‘procedural and technical’ negative controls that require express authority from the National Command Authority (Shankar 2014: 5). This highly assertive structure maximizes centralized civilian (p.461) control over India’s nuclear assets.8 But it seems to no longer be the case that components are dispersed and stewarded separately by significant distances. This is consistent with DRDO’s recent claims. Dr Avinash Chander, as head of the DRDO, publicly stated that it is India’s ultimate aim to deploy its entire strategic nuclear missile force in an ‘anytimeanywhere’ state: ‘We are working on cannisterised systems that can launch from anywhere at anytime. . . . We are making much more agile, fast-reacting, stable Page 11 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy missiles so response can be within minutes’ (quoted in Aroor 2013). These hardware and software changes allow India to credibly respond quicker and in a more seamless fashion if required. The consolidation of India’s hardware has also proceeded apace since 2003.9 To be sure, India is still far from achieving a credible deterrent against Beijing. Systems developed by DRDO to impart India strategic reach against China are only now coming online. The intermediate-range Agni III (3,500 km) has been successfully tested only a handful of times, while the longer-range Agni V (5,000 km) was first tested in April 2012, with an Agni VI reportedly in development. These missiles will extend India’s strategic reach against China and are solidfuel rail and road mobile capabilities. In addition, India’s ship submersible ballistic nuclear submarine (SSBN) project to enhance survivability, christened Arihant, is still undergoing testing, and its SLBM, the K-15 Sagarika with a range of roughly 750 km (and a longer range K-4 missile), was first launched from an underwater pontoon in January 2013.10 It is unclear when India will be able to deploy an SSBN on deterrent patrol and, even when it does, whether it will be capable of supporting a continuous deterrent patrol, or whether SSBNs will be stationed primarily in port and only sent out on patrol as a crisis approaches or unfolds. Despite these growing capabilities, the Chinese would have good reason to be sceptical of the overall systems reliability of India’s Agni and SLBM forces. The Agnis were only tested several times before ‘induction’ into the armed forces, and whether India could reliably deliver and detonate a nuclear warhead atop any of these capabilities is something China’s security managers could reasonably question. This ought to concern India in its development and testing cycle. The capabilities just described would largely be suitable only for a China contingency. Leaving those aside, however, India’s expansion of its lower-order use options have caused India’s nuclear posture to drift well beyond any reasonable definition of ‘minimum retaliation’ toward Pakistan. Although India’s posture is still oriented for nuclear retaliation (p.462) against Pakistan primarily through aircraft and the Agni I missile, it is developing a range of accurate shorter-range capabilities for potential use in retaliation against hard or soft counterforce targets such as military bases or concentrated armoured formations. These include the 150 km Prahaar tactical ballistic missile, aimed, according to the DRDO’s head Dr V.K. Saraswat, at ‘bridg[ing] the gap between the multi-barrel rocket system, Pinaka and the Prithvi missiles’ (quoted in Subramanian and Mallikarjun 2011a), and which can carry ‘different types of warheads’ (DRDO 2011). This language, and the fact that Prahaar can be tipped with a 200 kg warhead, means that India could easily assign Prahaar—though it is not clear whether it has yet—a nuclear role, particularly since there are reports that the Prahaar missiles are intended to replace all the 150 km Prithvis, which were officially dual-use themselves (Mohanty 2011). Similarly, the 750-km Shourya hypersonic missile, which is the land-based version of the Sagarika Page 12 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy SLBM, could eventually find itself assigned a nuclear role given its payload capabilities. Dr W. Selvamurthy of the DRDO said that the Shourya’s biggest advantage was its mobility and concealability: ‘it cannot be detected by satellite imaging. It will surprise our adversaries and strengthen our strategic defence’ (quoted in Subramanian and Mallikarjun 2011b). These capabilities augment India’s development of cruise missiles such as BrahMos and Nirbhay. The former is a joint venture with Russia and has publicly been labelled as a nuclear-capable system. After a joint test, the Russian defence noted that: ‘fired from land, air and sea platforms, it can hit targets at ranges of 300 to 500 kilometres and is also capable of carrying a nuclear warhead,’ though SFC has not yet officially assigned it a nuclear role (Radyuhin 2012). According to DRDO, the cruise missiles and the Shourya are evidently some of the world’s fastest and most accurate capabilities. In sum, though SFC has a firm commitment to not adopt a nuclear warfighting posture, the development of these capabilities in toto expands India’s arsenal in numbers and in character. It is positioning Delhi for potentially greater flexibility in future nuclear use options beyond what is suggested by minimum strategic retaliation. But wait, there’s more, and herein lies the challenge India’s civilian security managers face: reining in DRDO’s ambitions to build an arsenal that drifts well beyond the capabilities required for assured retaliation. The DRDO is developing a BMD capability, a layered system (p.463) that includes the Prithvi Air Defence terminal defence system and the Ashwin-based Air Defence theatre defence system. Though there has again been no political decision about deploying the system, Saraswat claims that India is ready to put ‘Phase I’—the protection of two cities—into place and that the layered system has a hit-to-kill probability of 99.8 per cent (!!), a claim that strains mathematical credulity (quoted in Hindustan Times 2009). Furthermore, DRDO claims it is also developing MIRVs for some of the Agni missiles. Dr Saraswat stated in May 2012 that although there has been no government decision to adopt MIRVs, DRDO is developing the capability for several Agni variants: ‘Where I was using four missiles, I may use only one missile. So it becomes a force multiplier given the damage potential’ (quoted in Economic Times 2012). The combination of a layered BMD system, lower-order use options, and MIRVs starts looking a lot less minimal and potentially like something much more aggressive, such as a ‘splendid first strike’ ambition or an escalation dominance posture.11 In particular, the coupling of MIRVs and BMDs could allow a state to start thinking about first-strike strategies that use multiple warheads to target an adversary’s nuclear arsenal and then rely on BMDs to intercept any residual assets that survive the disarming strike attempt. Due to the threat this combination might pose to the survivability of Pakistan’s nuclear forces, Pakistan may be forced to further increase the size of its nuclear arsenal and take dangerous steps to continuously move its nuclear assets around the country Page 13 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy during a crisis, or even during peacetime, so that they cannot be located by India. Now, it could be that India’s security managers are worried about the survivability of their land-based missiles and know that warheads are cheaper than missiles, so there is a potential logic for MIRVs that fits with an assured retaliation strategy—but it has yet to be articulated by anyone even quasi-official in the Indian system. Indeed, it should be noted that there has been no official political or SFC decision to assign these platforms nuclear roles, or whether India will indeed MIRV any of its missiles or deploy a layered BMD. But the loose talk by the DRDO’s senior leadership in potentially assigning nuclear roles to platforms, and the damage potential of MIRVs, is sure to be discomforting to a Pakistan Strategic Plans Division (see Narang 2011). For Pakistan, DRDO’s claims and capability development vitiate whatever meek denials emanate from other organs in the Indian system. Pakistani (p.464) force planners, already acutely worried about the growth of India’s conventional and nuclear capabilities, must look at long development timelines and assess likely Indian capabilities, irrespective of present Indian intentions. The reality is that the lower-order delivery vehicles will be able to serve as nuclear platforms if India develops warheads of suitable size and weight for any of them. The DRDO is thus attempting to put India in a position to adopt a very different posture if political clearance for BMD and MIRVs is ever given. Thus, the conventional wisdom that India’s strategic retaliatory capabilities start and end with aircraft and Agni missiles is untrue. India is developing a range of potential capabilities that could allow it to one day adopt a counterforce or escalation dominance strategy over Pakistan, enabling India to retaliate with lower-order use options in a variety of contingencies against a variety of targets—including nuclear systems if they can be located, as well as population centres. The challenge is that India’s nuclear policy is actually in the worst possible position at the moment: it is neither credible toward China, nor minimal toward Pakistan. As it continues to strive for the former (in addition to developing Pakistan-specific lower-order use option), it is undermining the latter, in ways that could have significant consequences for a regional arms race. These organizational pressures require a strong civilian coordinator to ensure that India maintains a consistent and coherent nuclear weapons policy. India’s security pressures are predictable and set the range of India’s nuclear policy: with robust conventional capabilities, India does not require nuclear weapons to deter conventional conflict from Pakistan or China. India’s primary aim is to deter nuclear use against itself, and has therefore rationally veered toward an assured retaliation posture. However, bureaucratic interests, particularly within the DRDO which wants to develop bigger and broader capabilities, could spark a cycle of arms racing as China and Pakistan respond. Thus, the strength of the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Security Advisor in particular in

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy ensuring that India’s domestic arms conform to a consistent strategy is the key driver going forward in the consolidation phase. India’s nuclear weapons policy can be broken up into three distinct phases: creep, confusion, and consolidation. However, the explanation (p.465) for India’s behaviour in these periods is remarkably consistent: real security pressures—a conventionally superior and nuclear China, and a Pakistan whose nuclearization was a foregone outcome to deter India’s conventional superiority —clearly drove the fact of India’s nuclearization. It would ultimately have no choice. But these structural pressures, and the global nonproliferation regime (NPT, CTBT, etc.) provide little insight into how and when India’s nuclear options unfolded. Instead, it was largely domestic organizations and individuals that have driven the timing and character of its nuclear weapons policy. This unfortunately means that India’s nuclear weapons policy—because changes in its posture and policy are not driven by predictable security pressures—will sometimes not appear to conform to a coherent strategic logic. For example, while the civilian leadership may continue to cling rhetorically to ‘credible minimum deterrence’ and an assured retaliation doctrine, its scientists are putting India in a position to far exceed the requirements for such a doctrine, with very real and dangerous implications for an Asian arms race and Asian security. It also means that coherence and restraint in India’s nuclear weapons policy demand strong individuals at the centre that can coordinate and manage the various disparate organizations within India that have a tendency to run their own agenda. When that strength at the centre exists, India’s nuclear weapons policy is likely to be predictable and well thought out. When it is lacking, India’s domestic organs may pursue interests that run counter to India’s broader national interest at their own peril. References Bibliography references: Aroor, S. 2013. ‘New Chief of India’s Military Research Complex Reveals Brave New Mandate’, India Today, 3 July. Bhaumik, S.N. 2008. ‘Blast from a Far Past’, Outlook India, 19 May. Chengappa, R. 2000. Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins). Cohen, S. 1998. ‘Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in South Asia’, Paper presented at the Harvard/MIT Transnational Security Project Seminar, 23 November. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/11/23india-cohen (accessed 26 April 2015). (p.467) Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). 2011. ‘“Prahaar”—New Surface to Surface Tactical Missile Successfully Launched’, Page 15 of 19

India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy DRDO press release, 21 July. Available at: http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/dpi/ press_release/PressReleasePraharnew.pdf (accessed 25 April 2015). Economic Times. 2012. ‘Agni-V may be Equipped with Multiple Warheads: DRDO chief’, 10 May. Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 2012-05-10/news/31655855_1_agni-v-range-missile-medium-range (accessed 25 April 2015). Ganguly, S. 1999. ‘The Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 148–77. Hindustan Times. 2009. ‘World’s Best Interceptor Missile by 2011: DRDO’, 10 March. Hymans, J. 2002. ‘Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons?’, in D.R. SarDesai and R. Thomas, eds, Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave), pp. 139–60. ———. 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kampani, G. 2013. ‘The Process of State Agency Formation and India’s Pre-1998 Operational Nuclear Posture’, Unpublished manuscript. Karnad, B. 2008. India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International). Kennedy, A.B. 2011. ‘India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb’, International Security, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 120– 53. Mohanty, D. 2011. ‘India Successfully Test Fires Surface-to-surface Prahaar Missile’, Indian Express, 21 July. Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/india-successfully-test-fires-surfacetosurface-prahar-missile/820344 (accessed 25 April 2015). Montgomery, A.H. and S.D. Sagan. 2009. ‘The Perils of Predicting Proliferation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 53, no. 2. Narang, V. 2009. ‘Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia’, in S.D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press). ———. 2009–10. ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International Security, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 38–78.

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy ———. 2011. ‘Indian Nuclear Posture: Confusing Signals from DRDO’, IDSA Comment, 26 September. Available at: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ IndianNuclearPostureConfusingSignalsfromDRDO_vnarang_260911 (accessed 25 April 2015). ———. 2013. ‘Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 143–57. (p.468) Narang, V. and C. Clary. 2012. ‘Capability without strategy’, Indian Express, 22 May. Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/capabilitywithout-strategy/952086/0 (accessed 25 April 2015). Paul, T.V. 2002. ‘India, the International System and Nuclear Weapons’, in D.R. SarDesai and R. Thomas, eds, Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave), pp. 85–104. Perkovich, G. 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press). Prime Minister’s Office. 2003. ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, press release, 4 January. Available at: http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/ r040120033.html (accessed 25 April 2015). Radyuhin, V. 2012. ‘BrahMos gains sub-strategic super weapon capability’, Indian Express, 13 October. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/brahmos-gains-substrategic-super-weapon-capability/ article3994856.ece (accessed 25 April 2015). Rajagopalan, R. 2008. ‘India: The Logic of Assured Retaliation’, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 188–214. Rosen, S.P. 1996. Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Sagan, S.D. 2009. ‘The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, in S.D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 219–64. Shankar, Vice Admiral Vijay (retd), ‘A Covenant Sans Sword’, Unpublished working paper, p. 5. Draft available at: http://thestrategicdialogues.com/ 2014/08/07/a-covenant-sans-sword/ Singh, Jasjit, ed. 1998. Nuclear India (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses).

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy Singh, Jaswant. 1998. ‘Against Nuclear Apartheid’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 5, pp. 41–52. Subrahmanyam, K. 2000. ‘From Indira to Gowda it was bomb all the way’, Times of India, 17 April. ———. 2002. ‘India and the International Nuclear Order’, in D.R. SarDesai and R. Thomas, eds, Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave), pp. 63–84. ———. 2004. ‘Narasimha Rao and the Bomb’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 28, no. 4. Subramanian, T.S. and Y. Mallikarjun. 2011a. ‘“Prahaar” missile successfully test-fired’, Hindu, 21 July. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ prahaar-missile-successfully-testfired/article2279166.ece (accessed 25 April 2015). (p.469) ———. 2011b. ‘India Successfully Test Fires Shourya Missile’, Hindu, 24 September. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/ article2482010.ece (accessed 25 April 2015). Tellis, A. 2001. India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation). Times Now. 2008. ‘India aborted N-test last minute in 1994’, 1 April. Available at: http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=6911. Vajpayee, A.B. 1998. ‘Indian’s letter to Clinton on the nuclear testing’, New York Times, 13 May, p. A14. Notes:

(1.) For treatments of India’s nuclear weapons history, see Chengappa (2000), Cohen (1998), Ganguly (1999), Hymans (2002, 2006: chapter 7), Paul (2002), Perkovich (1999), Rajagopalan (2008), Jasjit Singh (1998), Jaswant Singh (1998), Subrahmanyam (2002), and Tellis (2001). (2.) The PNE used twelve lenses to compress roughly 6 kg of plutonium in a device that was 1.25 m in diameter and weighed in at 1,400 kg. See Chengappa (2000: 182). (3.) For example, India’s scientists apparently had trouble stabilizing the polonium-beryllium neutron initiator. (4.) Sidney Sober, Acting Chairman, NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia, ‘Indian Nuclear Development’, Declassified National Security Study Memorandum 156, 30 May 1974, p. 18.

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India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy (5.) ‘Joint Statement by Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation’, New Delhi, 17 May 1998. Available at: http:// www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980500-drdo.htm (accessed 25 April 2015). See also Chengappa (2000: 334–5). This point was confirmed by the author’s discussion with a member of Rajiv Gandhi’s Prime Minister’s Office staff who claimed that the decision to move toward weaponization was a gradual one through the 1980s, but required the authorization of very specific steps by the prime minister in order to proceed, which only occurred in 1988/1989. (6.) ‘India Aborted Nuclear Bomb Plans in 1994: Nuclear Scientist’, DNA, 2 April 2008. Available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-aborted-nuclearbomb-plans-in-1994-nuclear-scientist-1158324 (7.) Data gathered from the test may nevertheless have been sufficient to allow India to develop and field boosted fission devices. (8.) Karnad (2008) in India’s Nuclear Policy suggests a more devolved command and control structure, but provides few citations; in my discussions with Indian Army and political officials, I have been unable to corroborate the details Karnad suggests. (9.) This section is largely derived from Narang (2013). (10.) Note that the Sagarika’s short range does not allow India to target China’s strategic centres from, for example, the Bay of Bengal, and would require any SSBN to venture east to the East or South China sea prior to a retaliatory strike. (11.) It is certainly true that if a country is worried about the survivability of its land-based forces, MIRVs increase its retaliatory throw weight in the event a substantial portion of its forces are pre-emptively destroyed. It may be the case that this is India’s and DRDO’s thinking, but it has not been clarified by the political leadership. The worry is that these capabilities also support a posture that aims for a ‘splendid first strike’ or at least escalation dominance. See Narang and Clary (2012).

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies The next section will delineate factors that produced different types of involvement with the global economy for India. I have divided India’s economic history into four phases, whereas the introduction divides India’s foreign policy into three distinct phases.3 In both narratives, the Cold War plays an important role at the international political level. The first phase from 1947 till 1967 was one of limited globalization, when the Indian state engaged the Cold War to earn the support of both the US and the USSR to finance an inward oriented import substitution model of industrialization. India was interested in building domestic industrial capacity and economic self-sufficiency rather than promoting (p.471) exports at this time. The second phase from 1967 to 1974 was the period of anti-globalization. This was a time when India and the USSR became economic and strategic partners. The third phase lasted from 1975 till 1990. This was an era of halting globalization when the dominant ideas within the state became critical of import substitution, but domestic and international political constraints stood in the way. The final phase from 1991 is one of substantial globalization and deregulation, especially in comparison with the past. Later on in this section, I explain why this mode of globalization resembles what Ruggie (1982) aptly describes as ‘embedded liberalism’. Any explanation that gives primacy to the state must deal with economic ideas that dominate the state and its technocrats. State centred explanations suggest that the state has a mind of its own that cannot be derived from the interests of a particular class or other vested interests in society. This implies that the state’s interest must be derived from a certain body of ideas that shape what is considered to be in the long term interests of the state and society (Skocpol 1985; see also Krasner 1978). For example, when the Indian state was convinced that a closed economy was best for development in a post-colonial country, institutions and policies embodying India’s import substitution reflected the primacy of these ideas. On the other hand, when the Indian state was disillusioned with import substitution based on the country’s developmental experience from 1947 till 1975, it began questioning old ideas, and embarked on a model of globalization and export-led growth from 1991. In these cases, while the Indian state placed great premium on economic growth, whether or not the desired path involved trade and foreign investment varied during different epochs. That path depended on economic ideas that captured the state. How the state thinks is therefore very important. Does that imply that the state in India can impose whatever it likes on an unwilling society? We find that while there are foundational moments for powerful economic ideas, over time, these ideas develop favourable constituencies. The Indian state was especially autonomous of powerful social actors during these foundational moments. We find that the state under India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was fairly autonomous of the industrial class when he laid the foundations of import substitution in India in the mid-1950s. And the Indian state under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in 1991 was (p.472) Page 2 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies similarly insulated from the dominant interests of the business class when it embarked on a strategy of globalization. Do powerful social actors such as industrialists, farmers, and professionals not matter at all? Interest groups such as industrialists, farmers, and professionals constrained the Indian state’s quest to deregulate and globalize the economy in the 1980s (Bardhan 1984). But the Indian state, especially in a moment of crisis, was able to articulate and pursue its interests relatively free from these constituencies in 1991. To give just two examples: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was constrained by powerful social actors who accepted only half-hearted, domestically oriented industrial deregulation but not economic globalization. It was the balance of payments crisis of 1991 that enabled the state to unleash a substantial paradigmatic shift in the policy frame. If powerful social actors obstruct institutional change, what produces change in India? State autonomy with coherent ideas about development can produce policy and institutional change at a time of crisis. The year 1991 witnessed tectonic shifts in policy and institutional change not only because ideas within government had come to favour economic globalization and deregulation, but also because there was a balance of payments crisis and consequent dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at that time. Devoid of the crisis, ideational change during the 1980s had produced rather insignificant economic globalization during that decade. The ratio of India’s trade to gross domestic product (GDP), which was about 17 per cent between 1980 and 1991, had shot to 54.5 per cent by 2011. India’s trade to GDP ratio was higher than the US’s at 31.7 per cent in 2011.4 If the state and the ideas it holds dear matter, how do developmental ideas change within the state? I have argued elsewhere that ideational change within the state is largely an endogenous process driven by an understanding of how previous policies failed. How technocrats within the state evaluate past policies given the international demonstration effect of growth oriented policies elsewhere in the world matters. Interaction between technocrats and the political executive driven by the need to change the course of policy shifted the weight of economic ideas from favouring import substitution towards economic globalization and deregulation (Mukherji 2013). Policy and institutional changes favouring economic globalization and deregulation in India resembled a tipping point model. A tipping (p.473) point model suggests an earthquake model of economic change. Like in the case of an earthquake, endogenous processes gradually move the system in the direction of change. Change that looks abrupt does not occur primarily for exogenous reasons, but because the ideas that undergird change have been internalized quite substantially within the state. In this mode of argumentation, a bridge collapses not because of the last bicycle that went over it. The collapse occurs Page 3 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies owing to structural characteristics that undermined the bridge consistently over a period of time. Similarly, import substitution was overtaken by economic deregulation and globalization because old policies, it seemed to policy makers, had proved incapable of generating either growth or equity, and had rendered the system highly vulnerable to external shocks (Mukherji 2013, 2014b; see also Cappoccia and Kelemen 2007). In the tipping point model discussed earlier, what moves policies in India are the dominant ideas which capture technocrats and the political executive within the state. India could not be easily coerced under foreign pressure. When the Indian government believed in import substitution, it could not be coerced to accept trade-led growth under foreign pressure during the balance of payments crisis in 1966. On the other hand, when the state desired a change of course owing to the weight of economic ideas within the state having shifted to favouring economic deregulation and globalization in 1991, it exploited IMF pressure to deal with domestic opposition to policy change. The nature of India’s global economic engagement can be characterized as ‘embedded liberalism’. Ruggie (1982) challenged the literature that rationally sought to derive state interests from hegemonic dominance. Hegemons, it had been argued, would produce free trade (Krasner 1984). Ruggie, on the other hand, opined that hegemony produces different kinds of social and economic orders depending on the state–society relations prevailing at the time. So pre– World War I globalization was driven by the idea of laissez faire, and post–World War II globalization was characterized as embedded liberalism. Laissez faire was driven to a much greater extent by the market than embedded liberalism. Embedded liberalism emerged from discussions between the US negotiator Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes in the aftermath of the Second World War. It respected both a liberal order and domestic autonomy—so that global economic coordination would not impinge on the sovereignty of states. Embedded (p.474) liberalism stressed international economic coordination with domestic autonomy. The Indian state is supportive of a similar embedded liberal order in international economic regimes such as negotiations around the G-20 and on climate change. It supports a liberal order which is quite different from the conflict-ridden international economic relations that characterized its behaviour till the 1980s. In the past, India was averse to engaging the global economy, except as a way of acquiring resources for pursuing import substitution.5 That has changed. India now fights hard to secure its domestic interests within an overall framework of preserving a global economic order that promotes both domestic economic autonomy and the market.

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies The next section is an analytic narrative of India’s economic history that begins by isolating and describing the factors discussed so far. It will demonstrate how economic ideas within the state interacted with international and domestic constraints to produce different types of globalization in India.

The Causes and Phases of India’s Foreign Economic Policies The previous section suggested the following propositions. First, comprehending dominant ideas within the Indian state is important if we are to understand what drives its interests. The Indian state would define its interests very differently if it were a votary of autarkic import-substituting industrialization than if it favoured economic globalization. In the former case, it would exploit globalization to garner resources for import substitution and resist marketdriven international economic regimes. If it believed in globalization, on the other hand, the state would try to promote a trade and investment agenda that would be sympathetic to its domestic concerns. Second, the international context also matters. India’s approach to globalization is likely to be more benign if India had excellent security and economic ties with countries engaged in global commerce than if its trusted friends were communists who opposed economic globalization. Finally, the state had to negotiate both international and domestic politics. Therefore, if globalization is met with stiff domestic resistance from domestic industrialists, workers, and (p.475) Table 18.1 Factors Affecting India’s Economic Globalization Strategic Setting

Non-trader (communist) friends

Dominant Idea within State Autarky

Critiquing Autarky

Globalization

1. 1967–75: Antiglobalization

2. 1975–90 Halting Globalization

3. No episode

5. No episode

6. 1991– Globalization: Embedded

Traders (capitalist) 4. 1947–66: and non-traders Limited (communist) as Globalization friends

Liberalism

Source: Mukherji (2014a: chapter 2). farmers, then it would be difficult for a state that has to face elections to turn the tide in favour of globalization.

We divide India’s economic history into four discrete phases. In the first phase from 1947 till 1966, the Indian state was a votary of autarkic industrialization. During this phase, India maintained fairly cordial relations with both the US and the USSR, even though there were at times serious differences with the US. Limited globalization during this phase was to garner resources for import substitution from both the superpowers. From 1967 till 1974 was the antiPage 5 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies globalization phase, when India drew very close to the Soviet Union and signed a treaty of peace and cooperation in 1971. Autarkic ideas and anti-Americanism estranged India’s relations with countries that engaged in global commerce and became part of the American-led co-prosperity sphere. The period from 1975 till 1990 was one where ideas favouring globalization were consolidated within the Indian state. But the USSR remained the mainstay of Indian foreign policy, and relations with the US and its trading friends and allies did not improve substantially. Domestic and international constraints paved the way for halting globalization during this period. Finally, the post-1991 phase is the globalization and deregulation phase. Autarkic industrialization as an idea had passed its prime. The balance of payments crisis of 1991 enabled the Indian state to deal (p.476) with domestic political opposition to globalization and deregulation. Ideational evolution within the state of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War helped to chart a new course. If there was no Soviet Union, it would be easier for the US and its friends, especially those in Asia, to trust India. The next few sections will describe the various phases of India’s globalization. The discussion will lay greater stress on the post-globalization phase, which is characterized by embedded liberalism.

Limited Globalization, 1947–66 The Indian state pursued import substitution and non-alignment during this period.6 Import substitution and non-alignment produced limited globalization when India’s foreign economic engagement was in order to largely finance the country’s import-substituting industrialization with the help of the US and the Soviet Union. The idea of import substitution was firmly embedded within the Indian state. Debates about the extent of state control over the economy engaged pro–private sector advocates like India’s powerful deputy prime minister and home minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who believed in private initiative, and socialists like Jayaprakash Narayan and Ram Manohar Lohia who desired extensive public sector intervention. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 was a compromise between the two groups (Kudaisya 2003). India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru was more inclined towards state intervention and the closed economy than Patel. Nehru’s powerful political moment came after the death of Patel in 1950. The state as an economic actor became significant with the Industrial Development and Regulation Act of 1956, and the formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956–61). The act signalled the birth of industrial licensing in India. Sectors such as steel and coal were barred for private companies. And, industrialists would need the permission of government before they could make production decisions. This plan set the tone for India’s import substitution that would enjoy a lasting legacy till the mid-1970s. It articulated a closed economy model of heavy industrialization Page 6 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies where the state would play an important role. Such was the power of this model within the state that when the World Bank tried to push India in the direction of private sector friendliness during a balance of payments crisis in 1966, India retreated to temporary liberalization (p.477) and devaluation of the rupee, only to pursue the most stringent version of import substitution after 1967 (Frankel 2005; Mukherji 2000). Second, capital intensive industrialization needed finances. India ran into a balance of payments crisis in 1957, a year after launching the Second Five-Year Plan. The state was actively involved in garnering resources for India’s industrialization rather than promoting trade (Joshi and Little 1994). Third, India was firmly committed to non-alignment at this time. This meant that India would work with both superpowers, despite differences, without becoming any one’s camp follower. And, Nehru was committed to keeping Asia out of the Cold War. This was the primary reason Nehru organized the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 and supported another pan-Asian conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955 (Gupta 1964; Mukherji 2008). So how did India’s tryst with capitalist and communist countries pan out? The US was uneasy with India’s independent approach to foreign policy, but provided around $500 million in aid between 1950 and 1955 (Cohen 1955). The country, after all, had opted for democracy and kept communism at bay. Thereafter, it was the USSR’s interest in supporting India after Stalin’s death (around 1955) that led to a surge in American interest as well. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in 1955 and congratulated India on its Second Five-Year Plan. The Soviet Union supported a steel plant in Bhilai when the US was unwilling. Even though aid from the Eastern bloc was only 8 per cent of total aid, Khrushchev asserted that Soviet aid was a form of Western aid because it made Americans compete with the Soviets to please India. The US was not willing to lose India to the Soviet camp (Datar 1972; Donaldson 1974). US aid to India surged after 1957. The National Security Council opined that a vulnerable India would increase the anti-communist appeal worldwide. Economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology like Walt Rostow, P.N. Rosenstein Rodan, and Max Millikan provided the intellectual basis for rapid, heavy, import-substituting industrialization and praised Indian planning. The aid figure to India surged from $400 million in 1957 to $800 million in 1960. Moreover, cheap wheat exports under the Public Law (PL) 480 programme were critical for India to fill the shortfall in food-grain production, which became a chronic problem. India’s import substitution (p.478) emphasized industrial development over agriculture (Cullather 2007; Kux 1992; Patel 2003).

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies The US subsequently became disenchanted with India’s import substitution after 1962. India was coerced to devalue the rupee, promote the private sector, and spend more on agriculture during a balance of payments crisis in 1966. India had a drought in 1965 and in 1966 in the aftermath of wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965). Foreign exchange scarcity arising from wars and droughts made it impossible for the country to buy wheat at market prices and finance its Third Five-Year Plan. The US exploited the aid lever to persuade India to devalue the rupee and promote the private sector and trade. But the promised $900 million aid package in return for policy change did not materialize (Denoon 1986; Muirhead 2005; Mukherji 2000). This episode in India’s economic history turned India in the direction of the Soviet Union. First, the Indian state was not convinced about the benefits of trade and export promotion. Second, it interpreted US and World Bank pressure as an imperial dictation from above when it was not convinced about that policy change. Where the Indian state agreed with the US on agricultural policy, it took US advice, invested in agriculture, and sowed the seeds of green revolution and self-sufficiency in agriculture. Finally, India did not take kindly to the fact that the US was unwilling to stomach Indian criticism on the US invasion in Vietnam. American behaviour at the international political level may have contributed to driving the Indian state further in the direction of autarky.

The Anti-globalization Phase, 1967–75 The hallmark of the anti-globalization phase was abandonment of equal distance from the superpowers and moving substantially closer to the USSR. When the USSR signed a peace treaty with the Indians in 1971, India’s security was virtually guaranteed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, the countries had organized barter trade, for example, weaponry for wheat, which saved India precious foreign exchange. The US acted swiftly and unequivocally. Its assistance to India dipped from 51 per cent of India’s total assistance between 1951 and 1966 to 1 per cent in 1975. The World Bank, however, continued to engage India (Rudolph and Rudolph 2008; N.S. Singh 1986). (p.479) Ideationally, the Indian state had moved to a much further extent in the direction of autarky and state control. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 reduced the maximum permissible level of foreign equity from 51 per cent to 40 per cent. This lower level of equity meant that foreign companies now had much less say in management issues. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 stringently regulated all companies worth Rs 200 million or more (Ganguly and Mukherji 2011; Panagariya 2008). Sectors such as banks, insurance, and wheat production were all nationalized. A state that was ideologically driven by autarky and state control met with an international setting of the Cold War, where it found strategic bonds with the USSR rather than the US. India’s trade as a proportion of its GDP was 10 per Page 8 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies cent in 1961, and dipped further to 8 per cent in 1971.7 Foreign companies and large companies found it much harder to do business in India during this period than in the past.

Halting Globalization, 1975–90 Halting globalization followed the anti-globalization phase between 1975 and 1990. The Indian state during this period became critical of import substitution, but domestic and international constraints lay in the path of India’s engagement with the global economy. It would be difficult to befriend the allies of the US in Asia and promote trade as long as India remained a reliable partner of the Soviet Union. India’s trade as a proportion of its GDP rose gradually from 14 per cent in 1980 to 18 per cent in 1990.8 But India continued to remain one of the most protected economies in the world in 1990. There is no denying the fact that the Indian state gradually but steadily shifted towards an understanding that import substitution had outlived its utility. It consciously began to critique autarky. Various reports of the Government of India since 1979 began criticizing past policy. They argued that exports were essential for raising resources for development; that foreign investment was required for accessing technology; that the Indian public sector was too politicized for commercially viability; and industries needed to be freed from the clutches of government control (Dagli 1979; see also Hussain 1984; Narasimhan 1985; Sengupta 1984). A few sectors such as pharmaceuticals, information technology (IT), and auto parts were freed from licensing requirements. The Monopolies and (p.480) Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 was diluted to the extent that it now regulated companies worth Rs 1 billion (US$80 million) and above. It had earlier been operational for all companies worth Rs 200 million (US$16 million) or greater.9 There was also some relaxation in import controls for export promotion in sectors like IT. Taken together, these measures were hardly revolutionary by the standards of the tectonic policy shifts of 1991 and beyond. This period is therefore coded as a period of halting globalization (Ganguly and Mukherji 2011; Panagariya 2008). Domestic political economy was not supportive of government de-control and globalization. Industrialists were accustomed to receiving licences and protection, and wanted to compete neither with foreign goods nor with multinational companies who could export from India. The bureaucrat and politician wielded substantial power within a regime of controls. Further, trade union laws protected a labour aristocracy, which was less than 10 per cent of the work force, which was in the import-substituting sector. In addition, while changes were taking place within the technocracy in government, the political class, especially within the Congress Party, was still largely in the Nehruvian mould (Bardhan 1984; Kohli 1989; Rubin 1985).

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies The international environment did not favour India’s globalization at a time when India could not renounce its close ties to the Soviet Union. The US had hoped that India would engage with it after the Congress Party lost the general elections in 1977. This was the first non-Congress government in power. President Carter of the US visited India in 1977 in the immediate aftermath of the election. However, the Janata Party soon realized the critical importance of the Indo-Soviet relationship when the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko offered India Rs 2.25 billion credit on rather soft terms (Kux 1992; Mehrotra and Lawson 1979; Nayar 1977). The Cold War situation continued to impede India’s economic globalization when the country supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite substantial internal reservations. This act reinforced the Cold War; Pakistan became the frontline state, and the US could not trust India (Weiner 1979). Relations with the US did not pick up substantially in the 1980s. The US did not sell sensitive technology to India for fear of it finding its way to the Soviet Union. It was difficult to obtain nuclear fuel for the plant in (p.481) Tarapur; when India requested the Cray XMP 24 supercomputer, it got a substantially inferior machine—the XMP 14. India was also threatened with sanctions under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Kux 1992). Rapidly growing Asia, especially Southeast Asia, shrugged off economic relations with India. The US’s friends in Southeast Asia had worried about India ever since it supported the Soviet-backed People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea in 1979. This meant that visits by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi did not yield the desired economic cooperation between India and Southeast Asia. India was not recognized as a dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the Cold War (Mukherji 2008; Sridharan 1996). International and domestic constraints produced halting globalization, despite ideas favouring globalization and deregulation within the Indian technocracy. At the domestic level, India’s political economy resisted change, and at the international level, India’s strategic relations with the Soviet Union did not augur well for its tryst with global commerce.

Globalization as Embedded Liberalism, 1991 and Beyond This section will describe India’s globalization. Why did it occur? What was its nature? And how does Indian behaviour at the bilateral and multilateral levels suggest that India’s is an embedded liberalism model of economic globalization. I will first explain the historical reasons for change and then proceed to describe the character of India’s foreign economic policies beyond the Cold War.

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies I have argued elsewhere that 1991 was a tipping point for India’s globalization. The previous section briefly laid out how the Indian government changed its mind—something that is clearly evident from government reports that began criticizing past policies, and from gradual policy changes that provided greater freedoms to the private corporate sector in India. However, there was a dominant coalition of industrialists, farmers, and professionals with a stake in import substitution who successfully slowed down the initiatives of the state. India was at a tipping point in 1991, building on years of cogitation and policy (p.482) experiments with globalization and deregulation. The balance of payments crisis of 1991 allowed room for manoeuvre to a state which had begun to think differently from the past. The state exploited the crisis and its consequent dependence on the IMF to chart out a fairly home-grown programme of economic stabilization and structural adjustment in a manner that would have long term ramifications for India’s foreign economic policies (Mukherji 2013, 2014b). Globalization and deregulation occurred at the very moment when the Soviet Union had collapsed and India was forced to look for new economic partners who would facilitate the new path charted out by trade and investment. The collapse of the Soviet Union made available economic possibilities with the US and friends in Asia that were not available before. We noted in the previous section that it was difficult for India to win the trust of the US as long as the Cold War was on, given India’s strategic proximity to the USSR. This section will highlight two aspects of India’s foreign economic engagement. First, while India’s relationship with the US and its former allies in Asia is an intimate one, India has resisted becoming a part of the US strategy of containing China. Second, when it comes to India’s engagement in multilateral fora like the G-20 or climate change negotiations, India’s strategy has shifted from conflict with the market-driven economic order to one that participates in the economic order without giving up domestic autonomy. This characteristic of embedded liberalism also finds expression in the bilateral agreements that India signs with various countries. Let us begin with bilateral relations. India’s relationship with the US is the most significant economic partnership. The decline of the USSR rendered economic engagement with the US a policy priority. Moreover, India’s globalization charted out in 1991 was based on trade with important trading countries. India’s total trade with the US was worth $61.3 billion in 2012–13, but the corresponding figure for Russia was $6.5 billion.10 Apart from merchandise trade, the US is the largest consumer of India’s famed IT exports. In 2011–12, total trade including service trade was $86 billion, which has risen to about $100 billion for 2014–15.11 Further, India’s IT and services exports surged from $22 billion in 2008 to $40 billion in 2012. The exports of the IT and business process outsourcing sector that year was $69 billion.12 India and the US were discussing Page 11 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies a free trade agreement on the eve of the (p.483) Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with US President Barack Obama. Economic and security relations are intertwined. The Indo-US security relationship has moved from a situation where the US was unwilling to part with its latest computers in the 1980s, to one where India has been recognized as a nuclear weapons state which can procure uranium and construct reactors for peaceful purposes that strengthen the country’s energy security (Hagerty 2006; Sahni 2006). Once geopolitics favoured trade, the Indian diaspora, through organizations such as the Indian American Forum for Political Action led by Swadesh Chatterjee, played a significant role in drawing the Indian and American business communities to lobby for India within the Congress and Senate (Kapur 2010; Pant 2011; Vickery 2011). India’s democratic checks and balances ensured that neither was it easy for the Indian government to sign the nuclear deal, nor has it been easy for the government to get foreign, especially US, investment in nuclear reactors for generating power. General Electric and Westinghouse have both lobbied against the Nuclear Liability Act which makes foreign companies liable in case of a nuclear accident. The Indian prime minister received an opinion from Attorney General Goolam Essaji Vahanvati in October 2014 suggesting that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) operating any plant using imported reactors will decide whether it will exploit the ‘right to recourse’ in section 17 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act. According to this view, whether the liability for catastrophe will apply or not will be decided by NPCIL. In 2008, India promised US companies 10,000 megawatts of power generation. The government is attempting to respect that promise by letting NPCIL and Westinghouse enter into an agreement to set up a plant in Mithi Virdi in Gujarat. Negotiations over how to deal with the nuclear liability law seems not have made substantial progress beyond President Obama’s visit in January 2015 (Dikshit 2013; Venkatesan 2013). The end of the Cold War had a positive impact on India’s second most important relationship—that with the People’s Republic of China. China’s trade with India grew despite differences on the border. Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit is considered historic because it came after a long time, and created the urge among the two countries to find a mechanism to maintain tranquillity along the border. Over a period of time, (p.484) and especially after the Cold War, the profile of the visits has become more substantial and mechanisms to ensure peace on the border have improved (Ganguly 2004; Mansingh 2013; Nayar and Paul 2003). Merchandise trade with China at $65.7 billion is greater than India’s merchandise trade with the US (2012–13).13 Moreover, India tolerates a deficit and largely exports raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods. Chinese companies manufacture 30 to 35 per cent of the Indian power equipment and have garnered 35 per cent of the wireless infrastructure market. Indian Page 12 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies companies like Mahindra service 9 per cent of the Chinese tractor market, second only to John Deere; and the National Institute of Information Technology had 205 centres in China in 2012. The Tatas are a big player, with Land Rover and Jaguar having entered into a joint venture with the Chinese company Chery (Jaishankar 2012). It seems that interdependence is helping keep the peace despite differences over the border. There was a stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in April–May 2013 when fifty Chinese troops camped in a place called Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh. It was only after the Indian side placed a similar camp a short distance away that Indian and Chinese troops both decided to withdraw from a disputed part of the Indo-Chinese border. Indian and Chinese troops returned on the eve of the Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid’s visit, which would have been cancelled had the troops not withdrawn (Bhardwaj 2013). Subsequently India airlifted the C-130 J Super Hercules transport aircraft with soldiers and ammunition to a rudimentary air strip in the same region (Pandit 2013). While India would like to relate to China on its own terms, its economic growth and resources are substantially less than China’s. Any Chinese behaviour that is deemed threatening will drive India to keep its deterrent options open with the US and Japan. Even though India has strategic relations with China and the US, the strategic relationship with the US and Japan is more comprehensive. Japan is actively lobbying for India to become a member of nuclear regulatory groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. As both countries worry about the prospect of Chinese hegemony in the region, their economic relations have warmed up considerably (Chand 2013a). Japan’s trade with India at $18.5 billion (2012–13) is substantially below potential.14 Most significantly, India was the largest recipient of (p.485) Japanese overseas development assistance during the last decade. Japan has invested $4.5 billion in the Golden Quadrilateral—a road network that will connect Delhi to Mumbai. This is a $75 billion project in infrastructure development that could transform India’s transport infrastructure (Chand 2013a). In another gesture to help secure India’s economic security, in August– September 2013, when the US dollar seemed to be dangerously appreciating with respect to the Indian rupee, Japan pledged a $50 billion access to hard currency to stave off a balance of payments crisis. Ongoing negotiations between Indian and Japanese commerce ministers aim at working out a regulatory infrastructure that will facilitate Japanese foreign investment in India (Venu 2013). India’s relations with Southeast Asia, especially that with Singapore, are important. Trade with Singapore in 2012–13 was $21 billion—a figure that exceeds India’s commerce with all South Asian countries. Relations with Page 13 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies Singapore and Southeast Asia as a whole reveal how important is the relationship between economic and security cooperation. Trade with ASEAN is around $75 billion. India tried but failed to engage economically with Southeast Asia during the Cold War because ASEAN was an anti-communist group, and India had close ties with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. No sooner had the Cold War ended, than India was accorded the status of an ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner (in 1992), then a dialogue partner (1995), and subsequently invited as a full-fledged member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (1996). The ASEAN bloc was one of the few regions in the world that accepted India’s nuclear tests without hesitation. India has a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with Singapore (concluded in 2000) and with ASEAN (2010). Singapore played a critical role in getting India invited to the East Asia Summit in 2005 (Mukherji 2008; Yogaananthan 2013). India’s economic relations with South Korea are significant as well. What is more important than the $20 billion trade is the ability of Korean investors to penetrate the Indian market. Brands like Hyundai, Samsung, and LG are better known than the country itself. And the $12 billion investment in the Pohang Steel Plant in Odisha is an ambitious investment proposal where democratic politics poses all manner of hurdles for investors. The end of the Cold War was absolutely essential for this relationship to take off, and Pakistan’s special relationship with South Korea’s arch enemy, North Korea, would have also helped. (p.486) India’s commerce within the South Asian region continues to be dismal. Economic relations within South Asia have improved, but have not made a significant difference to the direction of trade. Trade within the region is less than 5 per cent of its total trade. The end of the Cold War has not reduced the antagonism over Kashmir, but there is an understanding within the Pakistan elite that trade with India is the only rational way for the country to deal with its economic problems. It is more expensive to smuggle Indian products or buy them from Dubai than through direct trade. Moreover, most goods procured from other countries are more expensive—given the relationship between geography and trade. The $2.6 billion figure, though an improvement from the past, is hardly consequential for India.15 The end of the Cold War, Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, India’s embrace of globalization—all these improved the possibility of Indo–Sri Lanka economic ties. Moreover, India’s globalization was faced with the Asian financial crisis and trade sanctions over nuclear tests during the latter half of the 1990s. All these factors pushed India to negotiate a reasonable free trade agreement with Sri Lanka that boosted Sri Lanka’s exports, even though the balance of trade remained favourable for India (Mukherji 2011). More recently, commercial and security relations with Sri Lanka have deteriorated at a time when India worries

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies about the treatment of the Tamil minority community in that country in the aftermath of the decimation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. India’s trade with Sri Lanka at $4.6 billion has been overtaken by its trade with Bangladesh ($5.7 billion). Economic engagement has more now to do with development assistance for the 300,000 displaced Tamils. This is India’s largest financial assistance programme at a time when relations between the Indian and the Sri Lankan governments are not at their warmest. India has pledged $270 million for the construction of 50,000 houses in the Northern, Eastern, and Central Provinces. In addition, the Indian government has supplied fishing boats, agricultural equipment, and finance for small-scale business development, vocational training, and railroads construction (Chand 2013b). Sri Lanka is increasingly beginning to engage with China in the area of economic cooperation. India’s trade and investment relations with Bangladesh have improved, especially because Sheikh Hasina Wajed has made excellent gestures on the political and security fronts. Shibashis Chatterjee (p.487) in this volume points out that the relationship has been held hostage to domestic politics in India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh has a secular constitution, and the government has clamped down on terror groups that have used Bangladesh as a base to operate in India. Bangladesh’s globally competitive readymade garments industry has led to a surge in Indian investment in the country. Indian companies like Craft, TCNS, Pearl, and Gokuldas Images have a presence in Bangladesh (Dhume 2010; Lewis 2011). But West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s intransigence over delivering a fair share of river water in the higher riparian, despite Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s promise to the Bangladesh prime minister, has hurt relations on both sides. India needs Bangladesh both to control terror and for its ‘Look East’ policy. Transit through Bangladesh to northeast India and Southeast Asia would augur well for India. Similarly, freer IndoBangla trade and investment would also be welcomed in Bangladesh. But if India fails to deliver on water sharing, this may have a negative political impact on a friendly political regime and set India’s globalization clock backwards. The Bangladesh prime minister is unable to visit India to promote ties in the absence of an agreement on water sharing (Davar 2013).

Aid Diplomacy India’s aid diplomacy has become quite significant in recent years as the country seeks to play an important role in the global governance of funding. India’s aid is characterized by embedded liberalism because it respects domestic concerns to a much greater extent than aid provided by developed countries. India’s aid to Africa witnessed a compounded average growth rate of 22 per cent for a decade beyond 1998–9. Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and West Africa are substantial Indian aid recipients and are welcoming it. Rani Mullen’s chapter in this volume underlines the ideational roots of India’s aid relations with Africa. In Page 15 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies 2004, India lent $400 million to Brazil, Burundi, and Indonesia under IMF transactions. The country is involved with the Development Cooperation Fund under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Chanana 2009). The Pan African E-network, for example, brings together initiatives such as elearning and e-healthcare from India to Africa through a virtual medium. The India-Africa Virtual University, which is part of (p.488) this network, will bring learning to Africa with the help of the Indira Gandhi National Open University. India will spend $3.5 million to educate 10,000 students in Africa. The E-network also brings together Indian super-speciality private hospitals and their doctors in the service of African patients (Duclos 2012). India’s respect for embedded liberalism is quite pronounced in its positions at the G-20. Participation in the Group of 20 countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 has offered India the opportunity to project its identity and views in the governance of the global economy. This is consistent with India’s own behaviour with respect to powerful multilateral organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, and more powerful countries like the US and China. India is famous for asserting its autonomy wherever possible, without undermining the liberal economic order. Let me explain this peculiar characteristic of Indian diplomacy with examples (Mukherji 2014c). India is averse to severe austerity and respects home-grown adjustment driven by domestic concerns as the developed world deals with the global financial crisis. It provided $10 billion for global recovery, and has argued that structural adjustment should not be front-loaded. It supports the Macroeconomic Policy Mechanism of the IMF as a way to provide technical assistance to the affected countries, rather than being a prescriptive organization that imposes strict conditions. India understands that economic adjustments need to be made, but these should be sensitive to issues in domestic political economy. This is precisely what India fought for during the balance of payments crisis in 1991. It continues to fund its welfare expenditure and the current account deficit with foreign inflows of investment, while it realizes that it is important to drastically reduce this deficit. India is also a front-runner among countries that seek to adjust IMF quotas with the weight of developing countries in the world economy (Ahluwalia 2011; M. Singh 2012). We find a similar dynamic at work in climate change negotiations. India opposes unilateral expensive technology adjustments for averting climate change. Energy consumption is highly correlated with economic growth. Moreover, India is a poor country where electricity consumption is 22 per cent of the global average. The country’s per capita emission of carbon dioxide is 1.1 tons, while the corresponding figures are 20 and 10 tons, respectively, for the US and EU. India and China therefore argue for containing per capita emissions rather than (p. 489) total emissions. India has also agreed to reduce the energy intensity of a Page 16 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies unit of GDP growth by 2020, compared to the same figure in 2005. India and China both want technology-rich countries to provide technology. While India is not averse to adjusting to climate change, the pace of adjustment should be determined by the imperatives of development. Independent of foreign pressure, India has eight national missions in areas such as energy efficiency and solar energy that address the issue of climate change. India subsidizes wind power, and the Indian company Suzlon is the world’s fifth largest turbine manufacturer with operations that generate 21,500 megawatts of power outside India (Bodansky and Rajamani 2013; Ganguly and Panda 2009). This brief snapshot of India’s economic history reveals that a combination of ideas within the state and the geopolitical context at the international political level of analysis have both mattered for India’s tryst with globalization. When the state believed in import substitution (autarky), foreign pressure in 1966 could not bend the state towards export promotion. India pursued import substitution till 1975 of its own volition. However, the geopolitical context mattered as well. India pursued a policy of limited globalization till 1966, when it used its relations with both the Cold Warriors to garner resources for import substitution. When relations with the US dipped after 1966, left with only nontraders like the USSR as strategic partners, India opted for the most autarkic regime in its economic history from 1967 to 1974. Ideas within the state mattered when India opted for halting globalization after 1975. Ideational change had begun to favour export promotion, but both domestic and international politics were hostile to it. India’s relations with the US could not take off as long as it had close security and economic ties with the USSR. The year 1991 was the tipping point when the state in India, led by a team comprising the prime minister, finance minister, and technocrats, shook the foundations of India’s economic policies, building on ideational changes in the 1980s. They exploited a balance of payments crisis to deal with internal political opposition to deregulation and globalization after the end of the Cold War. This time, the US, the IMF, and the World Bank were all supportive of India’s project of globalization and deregulation. (p.490) Exogenous shocks seem to be facilitators rather than drivers in the story. India suffered a balance of payments crisis in 1966 and in 1991. When the state was in favour of import substitution, foreign pressure could not bend India to adopt a growth strategy led by trade and the private sector. On the other hand, when the state was convinced about globalization and deregulation, it exploited the crisis to deal with domestic opposition to reforms. India’s globalization can best be described as ‘embedded liberalism’, following the concept received from John Ruggie. ‘Embedded liberalism’ connotes a liberal economic order that respects the domestic imperatives of sovereign states. India does not oppose the market in bilateral or multilateral relations, but asserts its Page 17 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies independence. It has a close strategic relationship with the US without becoming a camp follower. It also enjoys a significant economic relationship with China and the rest of Asia. Its economic relations within South Asia have improved but are not commercially significant. The strategic relationship between India, US, and Japan is likely to flower, especially if China is hostile to India’s understanding of what constitutes the Sino-Indian border. This is a security relationship imbued with substantial commercial potential. In all manner of negotiations from the G-20 to those dealing with climate change, India seeks a liberal order that respects its domestic economic and political imperatives. Also, India’s aid diplomacy is less intrusive than development funding from the developed world. References Bibliography references: Ahluwalia, M.S. 2011. ‘The G20: A New Experiment in Global Governance’, Planning Commission, New Delhi. Available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/ aboutus/speech/spemsa/dch_1606fascrift.pdf (accessed 28 April 2015). Bardhan, P. 1984. The Political Economy of Development in India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). Bhardwaj, A. 2013. ‘The India–China Relationship: A Possible New Paradigm’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 12–15. Bodansky, D. and L. Rajamani. 2013. ‘The Evolution of the Governance Architecture of the Climate Change Regime’, in D. Sprinz and U. Luterbacher, eds, International Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press). Cappoccia, G. and R.D. Kelemen. 2007. ‘The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’, World Politics, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 314–69. (p.492) Chanana, D. 2009. ‘India as an Emerging Donor’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 12, pp. 11–14. Chand, M. 2013a. ‘Sculptors of a Rising Asia’, India Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 32–7. ———. 2013b. ‘A New Narrative of Hope’, India Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 38–40. Cohen, J.B. 1955. ‘India’s Foreign Economic Policies’, World Politics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 546–71.

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies Muirhead, B. 2005. ‘Differing Perspectives: The World Bank and the 1963 Aid India Consortium’, India Review, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 1–22. Mukherji, R. 2000. ‘India’s Aborted Liberalisation 1966’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 375–92. ———. 2008. ‘Appraising the Legacy of Bandung: A View from India’, in S. S. Tan and A. Acharya, eds, Bandung Revisited (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press), pp. 160–79. (p.494) ———. 2011. ‘The Political Economy of Preferential Trade in South Asia: The Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement’, in E. Sreedharan, ed., International Relations Theory and South Asia, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 301–28. ———. 2013. ‘Ideas, Interests and the Tipping Point: Economic Change in India’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 363–89. ———. 2014a. Political Economy of Reforms in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). ———. 2014b. Globalisation and Deregulation: Ideas, Interests, and Institutional Change in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). ———. 2014c. ‘India and Economic Globalisation’, in B. Chakma, ed., South Asia in Transition: Democracy, Political Economy and Security (Abingdon: Palgrave Macmillan). Narasimhan, M. 1985. Committee to Examine the Principles of a Possible Shift from Financial to Physical Controls: Final Report (New Delhi: Ministry of Finance, Government of India). Nayar, B.R. 1977. ‘India and the Super Powers’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 12, no. 30, pp. 1185–9. Nayar, B.R. and T.V. Paul. 2003. India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (New York: Cambridge University Press). Office of the USTR (United States Trade Representative). 2014. ‘U.S.–India Bilateral Trade and Investment’. Available at: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/ south-central-asia/india (accessed 28 April 2015). Panagariya, A. 2008. India: The Emerging Giant (New York and New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Pandit, R. 2013. ‘India Flexes its Muscles, Sends Super Hercules Aircraft to Ladakh’, Times of India, 20 August. Available at: http://

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India’s Foreign Economic Policies Venu, M.K. 2013. ‘India Happy over G20 Move to Stem Currency Volatility’, Hindu, 7 September. Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/indiahappy-over-g20-move-to-stem-currency-volatility/article5102572.ece (accessed 28 April 2015). Vickery, R.E. 2011. Strategic Aspects of US–India Economic Engagement (New Delhi: Oxford University Press). Waltz, K.N. 1959. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press). Weiner, M. 1979. ‘Assessing the Impact of Foreign Assistance’, in J.W. Mellor and P. Talbot, eds, India: A Rising Middle Power (Colorado: Westview Press), pp. 49– 68. Wolfers, A. 1962. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). Yogaananthan. 2013. ‘Deconstructing the Trajectory of India-Singapore Bilateral Relations (1965–2012): The Role of Geopolitics, Ideas and Political Will’, Honours thesis, National University of Singapore. Notes:

(1.) The author thanks Rajiv Bhatia, Shyam Saran, and Jawed Ashraf for discussions and Priscilla Vincent, Yogaananthan, and Sojin Shin for excellent research assistance. The chapter was supported by a Staff Research Support System grant of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. The shortcomings rest with the author. (2.) For the importance of the state and international politics for foreign policy, see Waltz (1959); also see Wolfers (1962: 3–24). For the state at the intersection of domestic and international politics, see Evans (1993). (3.) I employ a similar characterization in Mukherji (2014a: see especially chapter 2). (4.) This data was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. (5.) This strategy resembles what Krasner (1985) called ‘structural conflict’. (6.) The editor of this volume code the period 1947–62 as the period of nonalignment. For me, the cut-off date for limited globalization is 1966 because it was Lyndon Johnson’s dealings on the food crisis in 1966 that marked the end of Indo-US economic cooperation. (7.) See World Bank, World Development Indicators database. Page 23 of 24

India’s Foreign Economic Policies (8.) Data retrieved from World Bank, World Development Indicators database. (9.) It is reasonable to assume an exchange rate of Rs 12.50 to US$1. Retrieved from http://www.forecast-chart.com/usd-indian-rupee.html (accessed 28 April 2015). (10.) See World Bank, World Development Indicators database. (11.) This data was obtained from the Office of the USTR (2014). (12.) This data was obtained from the website of the National Association of Software Companies (NASSCOM). Available at: http://www.nasscom.in/indianitbpo-industry (accessed 28 April 2015); see also ‘IT Services’, http:// www.nasscom.in/it-services (accessed 28 April 2015). (13.) This data was obtained from the website of the Department of Commerce, Government of India. (14.) The figures cited in the text are from the website of the Department of Commerce, Government of India, unless stated otherwise. (15.) These views have arisen from various discussions with Shahid Javed Burki in 2013. He is a former finance minister of Pakistan and vice-president of the World Bank.

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Index Manmohan Singh and Hamid Karzai 123–4 Narendra Modi and Ashraf Ghani as well as Abdullah Abdullah 124–5 Obama’s decision on troop presence through 2016 105 Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011 106, 116, 124 structural factors no common border after Independence 110 re-alignment after 9/11 attack 113–16 relations during and end of Cold War 110–13 Taliban fall in 2001 105 (p.497) Afghanistan–Pakistan border 113 Africa decolonization of 404–6 domestic factors driving Indian interest in closer collaboration with eastern Africa 417 economic diplomacy 416–17 enhancing energy security 415–16 future of India’s relationship with 418–19 Indian foreign policy towards 408–10 Africa Dialogue Forum 399 Africa India Framework 411 African National Congress 407 Agni I missile 462 Agni III missile 461 Agni V missile 183, 461 Agni VI missile 461 Agosta submarines 256 aid diplomacy 487–9 (see also foreign economic policies of India) Airbus 259 Aiyar, Mani Shankar 434 Aksai Chin region 171–2, 174, 176, 179 al Assad, Bashar 248 Algerian National Liberation Front 249 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) 54, 58–60, 64, 66, 69 All Tripura Tiger Force 99n26 Al Qaeda 114 Alstom 259 Ambedkar, Bhimrao 378 ‘A Monroe Doctrine for Asia’ 320 Amorim, Celso 390 analysis framework level 4 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 185 Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, Third 108 anglophone countries 414 anticolonial struggle 306 anti-Tamil riots (1977) 53 Arab–Israeli conflict 282 Arab terrorism 369n8 Arafat, Yasser 361 Arcelor steel company 253 Page 2 of 30

Index Arjun battle tank 256 Arunachalam, V.S. 455 Arunachal Pradesh 142 China raised issue at Asian Development Bank 184 full statehood by India in 1986 to 179 as ‘Zangnan’ or South Tibet 182 ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) 340 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 333, 485 Asia, India’s strategic ambitions in 337–8 Asian-African Conference 405 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 119–20, 184, 313, 437 Asian Relations Conference 477 Asia-Pacific allies 310 Asia-Pacific region 133, 144, 160n25 US diplomatic and military posture toward 143 US rebalancing concept for 145 Assam Rifles 174 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 326, 481 and India, institutional links between 334 Athulathmudali, Lalith 55 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 250, 257, 452 ‘atoms for peace’ 439 (p.498) Austro-Hungarian empire 401 autarkic industrialization 475 Awami League (AL) 77, 84, 87, 89–90, 93 Ayoob, Mohammed 71 Azad, Abul Kalam 378 Baghdadi Jewish community 369n6 Bahujan Samaj Party 63 balance of payments crisis, India in 1957 278 in 1991 27, 137 ballistic missile defences (BMD) 450 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo 52 Bandung Conference 310, 355, 405 Banerjee, Mamata 83, 487 Bangladesh 33, 185 creation and war in 1971 23, 31, 76, 178 national identity 77–8, 91–2 Bangladeshi migration 83 Bangladesh-India relationship 76 contemporary issues boundary and border conflict 82–3 economic relations 84–7 migration and Islamist militancy 83–4 on water 79–82 early years of assassination of Sheikh Mujib 78 BNP’s pre-election campaign 79 Page 3 of 30

Index Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) insurgency 78–9 communalization of politics 77 East Pakistan dominance of western counterpart 77 Friendship Treaty (1972) 77 Mohammad Ershad bloodless coup in 1982 78–9 Muhurir Char dispute 78 Purbasha island dispute 78 Tin Bigha corridor agreement in 1992 79 three levels of analysis domestic level 90–2 personalities influence on relations 87–8 regional and international level 88–90 Bangladesh Islamic Manch 84 Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 79–80, 93 electoral victory in 1991 90 –Jamaat coalition and rule 82, 89, 92 reliance on religious organizations 83–4 Bangladesh Rifles 84 Bangladesh War (1971) 312 Barak missile deal 368 Barre, Raymond 250 basic treaty, of mutual recognition 280 Belgian Congo, independence of 405 Bene Israeli Jewish community 369n6 ‘benign neglect’ 272, 281 Berlin Crisis (1958) 283 Berlin Wall fall 273, 286–8, 294n10 Bhabha, Homi 250, 439, 451 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 8, 57, 61, 100n34, 117, 137, 154, 239, 251, 264, 287 2014 election manifesto 42n15 frenzied response of migration from Bangladesh 91 Hindu right under 32 victory in 2014 general elections 32, 36 (p.499) Bhola Cyclone (1971) 95n9 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 34, 37 BIMSTEC project 343 bin Laden, Osama 98–9n25 bipolar world order 4 Blair, Tony 236 blue-water navies 142 Bolshevik Revolution (1917) 198–9 Bombay High gas field 435 Bonin Islands 309–10 Border Security Force 84, 89 Bose, Subhas Chandra 275 BrahMos/BrahMos-1/BrahMos-2 missiles 204, 462 Brandt, Willy 272, 280 Brasilia Declaration (2003) 390, 396n13 Brasstacks crisis 25, 454 Page 4 of 30

Index Brazil and India, emergence of 386–90 Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) 391 Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) 135, 292 IBSA displacement by 390–2 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service 232–3, 238, 240 British colonialism/colonial rule 49, 199 British Commonwealth 308, 377 British East Africa Protectorate 401 British imperalism 200 British Indian Army 306 British Indian Empire/rule 49, 172 British Petroleum 443n1 British Raj 136, 227 Brown, Gordon 236 Buddhism 304, 320n2 Bureau of State Trade Corporation 282 Burki, Shahid Javed 491n15 Burma–Bangladesh–India project 435 Burmah-Shell refinery 430 Bush, George H.W. 140, 144, 146, 160n11, 339, 252 C-130 J Super Hercules transport aircraft 484 Cabinet Committee on Security 458 Caltex refinery 430 Cameron, David 238–9 Canadian export credit insurance corporation 439 CANDU reactor 439 capitalism 199, 403 caste conflicts 32 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), America 176–7 Central Treaty Organization 23 Chabahar deep-sea port and rail (Iran), India investments in 115, 119 Chancellors Kiesinger and Brandt 280–2 (see also Germany-India policy) Chander, Avinash 461 Charpak, Georges 267n4 Chatterjee, Shibashis 486 Chatterjee, Swadesh 483 ‘Che’ Guevara, Ernesto 395n4 Chery 484 ‘China days’ 305 China-India policy/relationship balance of power politics 176–80 Nehru’s approach towards China 168 since 1988 180–6 strategic rivalry since 1940s 167 Tibet and China/Tibet–India border (1947–59) 168–74 war between 1959–62 174–6 (p.500) China threat theory 181 Chinese Civil War 169–70 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 173 Page 5 of 30

Index Chirac, Jacques 251, 263–4 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 78–9, 84 Ciorciari, John 159n1 CIRUS reactor 439 civilian nuclear reactor imports 439 (see also nuclear energy) Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 257 civil nuclear liability legislation, passed by Indian parliament in 2010 212 civil war, of Spain (1938) 274 Clinton 137–8, 144, 152 Clinton, Hillary 143, 185 coalitional two-party political system 136 coalition governments 7, 32, 35, 117, 239, 280, 307, 418, 457 coalition politics 68–9, 81, 92, 116, 456 Cochin Jewish community 369n6 Cohen, Stephen 217n3 ‘Cold Start’ doctrine 26 Cold War 4–7, 12, 26, 36, 100n31, 105, 109, 117, 177, 181, 184, 196, 226–7, 232–3 architecture 304 end of 313–17, 410 India as discontented middle power 136 India’s second-image orientation, persistence of 1141 nonalignment 142 Pakistan confidence of membership in alliance system 22–3 relationship between India and Afghanistan during and end of 110–13 Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development 229, 439 colonialism, systemic factor of 401–2 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, The 413 Commonwealth 228, 230, 234 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 67 communism 170, 177, 199, 477 Communist bloc 225 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 393 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) 336–7, 485 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 8, 450 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 331, 413 ‘congratulatory’ telegrams 282 Congress Party 5, 32, 42n14, 64, 70, 117, 137, 251, 395n7 –AIADMK alliance 60 close relations with Afghanistan 116 –DMK alliance 64, 66 Conservative Party, UK 239 Cook, Robin 236 corruption 33, 36–7, 63, 154, 341 counter-terrorism 236, 246, 288, 363 Cray XMP 24 supercomputer 481 cross-border jihadi activity 33 cross-border terrorism 25–6, 246–7 ‘crusader mentality’ 276 Cuban Revolution (1959) 380–1 Page 6 of 30

Index cultural penetration 28 custodian force 309 Dalrymple, William 126n1 Danone 259 (p.501) Daulat Beg Oldi 484 Davos summit (2006), motto of 259 decision-making level of analysis 3 Deere, John 484 Defence Agreement (2006), The 288 defence budget(s) global 14n2 of India 1 Defence Cooperation Agreement (2006) 285 Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) 450, 454–5, 459–64, 466n11 de Gaulle, Charles 249–50, 262 dehyphenation process 137–8, 141, 159–60n10 Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project 291 demilitarization of state 34 democratic peace 35–6, 42n17 de Oliveira, Amâncio 391 Department of Atomic Energy 427 Desai, Morarji 80, 87, 96n11, 454 de Silva, Luis Inacio 390 d’Estaing, Valery Giscard 250, 262 Development Cooperation Fund 487 de Villepin, Dominique 263 ‘2+2 dialogue’ 317 ‘divided nation’ 272 Dixit, J.N. 55, 63 Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana 390 domestic and international influences, on India’s energy policy 425–7 energy and energy policy, multiple sources of 427–9 gas 435–8 nuclear energy 438–42 oil 429–34 domestic level of analysis 3 domestic politics 4, 9–10, 21, 32–5, 76 domestic pressure groups and economic stagnation 282–3 (see also Germany-India policy) domino effect 279 Draft Nuclear Doctrine 457 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 52, 55, 57–8, 62–3, 68, 70, 73n8 Dubey, Muchkund 85 Durand Line / border 108–9, 122 Dutt, Subimal 275 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) 330, 349n1 ‘East Asian miracle’ 328 East Asia, security architecture in 338–40 East Asia Summit (EAS) 339–40, 349n7, 485 Page 7 of 30

Index East German foreign policy 274 East Pakistan 33–4, 52, 76–7, 250 crisis in 1971 6 East–West Cold War conflict 200 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 266n1, 412 economic crisis in India (1991) 411 economic liberalization programme, India 59, 201–2, 286–8, 330–1 economic motivations 413–15 (see also Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign policy of India in) economic transnationalization 30 ECOWAS bank 413 Ecuador, ‘Khalistan’ in 385–6 Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 57–8 Eelam War IV (2006–9) 63, 68 Egypt 144, 230, 249, 279, 356, 377, 406, 409, 415 ‘embedded liberalism’ 471, 473 (p.502) emerging powers 13, 135, 376, 386–7, 392–3 energy policy of India, domestic and international influences on 425–7 energy and energy policy, multiple sources of 427–9 gas 435–8 nuclear energy 438–42 oil 429–34 Enlai, Zhou 173, 175, 308 Ershad, Hossain Mohammad (General) 78, 80, 87 estrangement, India’s with Japanese relations until Cold War end 311–12 with South Korea until Cold War end 312–13 ‘Ethiopia Day’ 402 ethnic groups 3, 31, 70, 108 Eurasian Economic Community 209 European Common Market 329 European Union (EU) 247, 252 Eurozone crisis 292 Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) 267n3 Exim Bank 413 export import bank of India 414 ‘extended neighbourhood’ 337 external balancing 23 Fabian socialist 378 Farakka barrage 80 fascism 274 Fatchett, Derek 236 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 272 Feni river 95n8 Fernandes, George 181 FIFA World Cup tournament 375 films (Indian) in Pakistan market 28 financial crisis (1997–8) 335 First World War 135, 292n1 ‘Focus Africa Programme’ 413 Page 8 of 30

Index Fonseka, Sarath 63 foreign direct investment (FDI) 258–9 by Japan into India 320n14 foreign economic policies of India 470–4 aid diplomacy 487–9 anti-globalization phase (1967–75) 478–9 causes and phases of 474–6 globalization as embedded liberalism 481–7 halting globalization (1975–90) 479–81 limited globalization (1947–66) 476–8 foreign exchange crisis 386 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973) 479 foreign exchange rules 137 foreign investment 59, 137, 154, 185, 260, 320n17, 331, 432, 436, 471, 479 foreign policy India first phase (1947–64) 4–5 second phase (1964–91) 5–7 third phase (1991-present) 7–9 role of individual in making of 36 foreign suppliers of oil, India’s 431 Forty-second Amendment 383 forward policy of China 175 fourteen points speech 401 France and India relationship 245 individual leaders and decision making 262–5 national level factors defence contracts and cooperation 254–7 investment and trade 258–61 (p.503) nuclear energy and space 257–8 relations between 1947–98 249–51 soft power and bilateral diplomacy 261–2 turning point in relationship from 1998 251–4 systemic framework of 246–9 Francophone 410 Frankfurt Book Fair 288 freedom fighters 25 free trade agreements (FTA) 336 ‘friendly trade’ 311 ‘friendship movement’ 282 ‘Friends of the GDR’ 282 Frontier National Congress 108–9 Gandhi, Indira 6, 32, 37, 39, 52–3, 87, 122–3, 136, 179, 215, 242n4, 250, 262, 272, 328 assassination in 1984 251 decision to exploit Tamil grievances 68 in determining Indian foreign policy towards Africa 409–10 internal Emergency in 1975 declared by 72n6, 251 peaceful nuclear explosion conducted in 1974 by 252 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) 32, 108, 121–2, 169, 355, 378 Page 9 of 30

Index helped India and African continent link 403 Gandhi, Rahul 42n14, 242n4 Gandhi, Rajiv 6–8, 42n14, 54, 57–8, 79–80, 215, 234, 242n4, 251, 272, 328 assassination in 21 May 1991 by LTTE 59–60, 71 exploration of new cooperation with US 136 steps for economic liberalization 201–2 trip to China in 1988 180–1 Gandhi, Sonia 87 Ganguly, Sumit 159n1, 175 ‘garibi hatao’ slogan 383 Garuda joint exercise for air force between India and France 255 gas 435–8 gas pipelines 435–8 liquefied natural gas 435 shale gas 438 geopolitical alignments 49 geopolitical realignment 411–13 (see also Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign policy of India in) German angst, hedging on 276–8 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 272 German–German Cold War competition 274 Germany-India policy 271–3 from 1947–72 272 from 1988–2015 272 prospects of individual continuity and leadership beyond pragmatism 290–1 pragmatic joint venture 291–2 shaping globalization in a contested world order 292 recognition and benign neglect (1972–89) 279–80 Chancellors Kiesinger and Brandt 280–2 domestic pressure groups and economic stagnation 282–3 two wars and a tilt toward the eastern bloc 283–4 (p.504) strategic partnership among trade powers (1988–2015) 284–5 India’s economic liberalization 286–8 pragmatic Indian leadership free from historical baggage 285–6 reforming the international order 288–9 Ghani, Ashraf 107, 114, 116, 124–5 Girard, Dominique 265 globalization 21, 27, 90, 471 globalization and embedded liberalism 481–7 (see also foreign economic policies of India) Goa, invasion of (1961) 283 Golden Quadrilateral 485 Gopalaswamy, V. (Vaiko) 60 Gorbachev, Mikhail 36, 39, 197, 201–2, 211, 215 Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) aircraft carrier 206 Goswami, Namrata 98n22 Gowda, H.D. Deve 80 Page 10 of 30

Index ‘Grand Coalition’ 280 Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) 432 ‘Great Game’ of Afghanistan 108 Green Revolution 410, 478 Gromyko, Andrei 480 gross domestic product (GDP) 336, 472 Group of 20 (G20) 253, 257, 289 Group of 77 (G77) 381 Group of Eight (G8) 252–3 ‘Group of Four’ (G4) 289 GSG-9 288 Guen-hye, Park 319 guerrilla war 56 Gujral Doctrine 88, 329 Gujral, Inder Kumar 57, 60, 87–8, 251, 329 Gulf War (1991) 361 Hajigak iron-ore mines, Afghanistan 119 Hallstein doctrine 272, 278–9 halting globalization 479–81 (see also foreign economic policies of India) Hanover Fair 288 Haqqani network 114, 118 Haq, Zia ul (General) 34, 37 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) 83–4, 98–9n25 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 98n24 Harrison, Selig 395n8 Harrow-Cambridge Anglophile 378 Hasina, Sheikh 80, 82, 85–6, 93 Hatoyama, Yukio 319 ‘Heiligendamm Process’ 291 Hindu migrants 91 Hindu nationalism, revival in Indian politics 91 Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd 251, 255–7 Hindutva (or Hindu-ness) 32 historical baggage, Indian leadership free from 285–6 Hitler 39 Holbrooke, Richard 140–1 Hollande, François 245–6, 254, 260 Honecker, Erich 284 hunger 33 Hussain, Irfan 24 Hussein, Saddam 359, 434 hybrid democracy, Pakistan as Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 429 IBSA Dialogue Forum 412 Illegal Migration Detection by Tribunal (IMDT) Act 98n22 (p.505) images as levels of analysis 3 imperialism 274, 402–4, 409 India and ASEAN, institutional links between 334 Page 11 of 30

Index and Brazil, emergence of 386–90 China problems 346–7 domestic production and imports of energy 428 economic crisis in 411 economic globalization, factors affecting 475 oil and total energy production and consumption 426 India–Africa Forum summits 411 India Africa Project Partnership 413 India-Africa Virtual University 487 India and Latin America 375–6 distant acquaintance 377–80 Kashmir issue and Latin American voting 380–1 rhetorical solidarity 381–5 ‘Khalistan’ in Ecuador 385–6 strategic engagement 386–90 IBSA by BRICS, displacement of 390–2 India and Southeast Asia 326–8 in 1990s shaping the LEP 328–30 the state level of analysis 330–3 at the systemic level 333–4 challenges in climate of heightened tensions 344–7 enduring domestic constraints 342–4 lack of focus under UPA II 341–2 late 1990s 334–5 a consensual policy 335–6 growing confidence and ambition 336–8 security architecture in east Asia 338–40 India and the ‘German Question’(1947–72) 273–4 economic self-interest and hedging on German Angst 276–8 pragmatic Indian leadership 274–6 stretching the limits of non-alignment 278–9 India-Bangladesh-Myanmar gas pipeline project 86, 438 India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) 13, 390–2, 396n14 India–Israel relationship 352–3 historical background of 354–7 individual-level factors 362–7 international factors 358–60 national factors 360–2 Indian Air Force 255, 458 Indian Airlines flight hijack (December 1999) 117–19 Indian American Forum for Political Action 483 Indian Army 26, 37 Indian Council for Cultural Relations 121, 261 Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) 420n6 Indian Institute of Technology Chennai 277 Jodhpur 262 Page 12 of 30

Index Indian leadership, pragmatic 274–6 (see also India and the ‘German Question’(1947– 72)) Indian National Congress (INC) 94n5, 108, 122, 31–2, 169, 305, 354 Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 145, 304 (p.506) Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 412 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 54–8 Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) 138–9 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) Programme 406, 414–15, 420n3 India–Pakistan military crises 436 India-Pakistan relations (see Pakistan-India relationship) India–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, and Cultural Cooperation 208 India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 435 Indira Gandhi National Open University 488 individual level of analysis 3 individual states 24 Indo-Afghan Friendship Treaty (1950) 123 Indo-African relationship, factors influencing 410–11 Indo-French Centre for the Promotion of Advanced Research 262 Indo-French Chambers of Commerce 261 Indo-German Consultative Group 288 Indo-German Democratic Republic Society 282 Indo-German Friendship Associations 288 Indo-German Intergovernmental Consultations 271 Indo-German Parliamentary Group 288 Indo-German Partnership 271 Indo-German Working Group on Counterterrorism 289 Indo-Pakistani conflict / war of 1965 5–6, 177, 201, 312 of 1971 210 of 1999 in Kargil 8, 12, 38, 370n20 Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971) 284 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 77 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) 1987 54–7, 61, 71 Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement of 1998 61 Indo-Sri Lanka relations (see Indo-Sri Lankan relationship) Indo-Tibetan Border Force 174 Indo-US nuclear deal (2008) 63 Indo-US security relationship 483 INDRA-2011 joint naval exercises between India and Russia 206 Industrial Development and Regulation Act (1956) 476 Industrial Policy Resolution (1948) 476 Information technology (IT) 479 Infosys 259 INS Jalashwa 139 INS Viraat 233 Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme 455 Inter-American Development Bank 387 internal problems within Pakistan 34–5 Page 13 of 30

Index International atomic energy agency 436 international imperialism 403 International Military Tribunal 306 (p.507) International Monetary Fund (IMF) 27, 29, 260, 313, 359, 412, 415, 472 international order, reforming the 288–9 (see also Germany-India policy) international or systemic-level variables 3 international political change theory 135 international stability 135 international system, meaning of 21 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, France 258 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan 84, 88 Iran–Iraq war 430 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act 435 Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project 27, 435–6 Iraq 90, 142, 144, 357–9, 430–1, 433–4 Islam 34, 78, 90, 92 Islamabad 23, 26, 33 Islamic fundamentalist 83, 98n24 Islamic identity 30 Islamic militancy rise in Bangladesh 83 Israel Aircraft Industries 368 Israeli Consulate, in Bombay 355 Italian–Abyssinian War 404 Iyengar, P.K. 455 Jaffna Public Library 53 Jaguar 233 Jaipur Literary Festival 238 Jammu and Kashmir 22–3, 25, 29, 36, 117, 183 and identity 30–2 Indian bilateralism on 24 Islamabad launched Kargil initiative in 1999 138 opening of trade in 2008 27 political mismanagement by India 33 status-quo approach 25 Janata Dal 57, 117, 454 Janata Dal United 80 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, Sinhalese-nationalist 51 Jan Sangh 383 Japan and India relationship economic relations 313–15 historical links 304–7 strategic relations 315–17 Japan and South Korea, India’s engagement with economic relations 313–15 strategic relations 315–17 Jayakumar, Shunmugam 330 Jayalalitha 60, 64, 66 Jayawardene, J.R. 52–5, 57, 68 Jewish community / state 354–6, 359, 369n6 Page 14 of 30

Index Jewish terrorism 369n8 Jiabao, Wen 184 jihadis 147, 149 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 30, 33, 37 joint naval exercises 288 Joshi, Devendra Kumar 345 Juppé, Alain 263 K-15 Sagarika 461 Kabul 120 (see also Afghanistan-India relationship) India as first reopen embassy in 109 Manmohan Singh visit of 2011 116 Kadakin, Alexander 209 Kanimozhi 63 Kanlei Yawol Kanna Lup 99n26 Karakoram Highway 179 (p.508) Kargil War (1999) 364, 458 Karunanidhi 52, 58, 63 Karzai, Hamid 115–16, 121, 123–4, 148 Kashmir war (1965) 283 Kerry, John 148 Keynes, John Maynard 473 Khalistan 234 ‘Khalistan’ in Ecuador 385–6 Khan, Amir Abdur Rahman 108 Khan, Ayub Q. 34, 283, 454 Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar (‘Frontier Gandhi’ or Fakhr-e Afghan) 108, 121–2 Khan, Liaqat Ali 33, 37 Khobragade, Devyani 149, 151–2, 161n30 Khrumah, Kwame 409 Khrushchev, Nikita 197, 200, 210 Khurshid, Salman 67, 245, 265, 484 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 280 Kissinger, Henry 95n7, 178, 201 Kohl, Helmut 285 Kongka Pass 174 Korean War 250, 308 Kozyrev, Andrei 202 Krishna, S.M. 184, 352 Kudankulam nuclear reactors 212 Kumaratanga, Chandrika 61 Kumar, S. Krishna 363 Kuwait crisis (1990–1) 358 Labour Party, UK 227, 236, 238 Lafarge 259 Lama, Dalai 173–4 zone of peace 180 Land Boundary Act of 1974 82 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 8, 84, 118, 148 Laski, Harold 227 Page 15 of 30

Index Latin America policy 389 top ten trade partners of India in 388 Latin America and India 375–6 distant acquaintance 377–80 Kashmir issue and Latin American voting 380–1 rhetorical solidarity 381–5 ‘Khalistan’ in Ecuador 385–6 strategic engagement 386–90 IBSA by BRICS, displacement of 390–2 Latin nations 378 Latin republics 378 Le Drian, Jean-Yves 254 Left Front 57 levels of analysis framework 14n3 Levitte, Jean-Daniel 263 Liao–Takasaki Agreement (1963) 311 Liberal Democrats, UK 239 liberalization 27, 90, 137 liberation of Goa (1961) 380 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 53–4, 56–9, 68, 71, 73n8, 74n22, 486 (see also Gandhi, Rajiv) banned in 1992 60 captured Elephant Pass 61–2 defeat of 64–7 Mavil Aru incident 62–3 use of micro-light aircraft 64 Libya 248 ‘Light of Asia’ 306 limited globalization 476–8 (see also foreign economic policies of India) Line of Actual Control 142, 346 Line of Control (LoC), Kashmir 25–6, 35, 38–9, 148 linguistic conflicts 32 linguistic nationalism 78 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 435 Lohia, Ram Manohar 476 (p.509) Lok Sabha 154 London School of Economics 227 London Stock Exchange 235 ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) 86, 184–5, 313–14, 327, 487 domestic underpinnings of India’s 330–3 regional context for 333–4 shaping the 328–30 the foundational vision of Narasimha Rao 328–30 lusophone 410 M-11 missiles 386 MacMillan, Harold 230 ‘Make in India’ slogan of Modi government 257 Madrid Conference 353, 359 Page 16 of 30

Index Major, John 234 Maldives 232 Maoist movement 33 Maritime Military Strategy 337 Marshall Plan 277 Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) 60, 64 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 477 ‘massive’ retaliation 458 Mathai, Ranjan 264 Mauritius 242n8 Mazagon Dock Ltd 256 Mbeki, Thabo 390 McMahon Line 170, 172, 179–80 Medvedev, Dmitri 195, 213 MeghaTropiques satellite 258 Meireles, Cecília 395n4 Mekong–Ganga Cooperation 343 Menon, K.P.S. 169, 307 Menon, Krishna 5, 356 Menon, Shiv Shankar 67 Menon, V.K. Krishna 227–8 MERCOSUL 396n15 MERCOSUR 391, 396n15 Michelin 259 Middle East 46, 144, 185, 321n19, 369n3 middle power 136 MiG-29 358 Miliband, David 236 militant Nehruvianism 217n3 military capabilities of India and Pakistan 23 military transfers, Pakistan dependence on China for 26 Millikan, Max 477 Ministry of Coal, India 427 Ministry of Defence, India 148 Ministry of External Affairs, India 254, 259, 264 Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources, India 427 Ministry of Power, India 427 Mirage 2000 255 Mishra, Brajesh 253, 370n19, 460 Missile Technology Control Regime 484 Mittal, Lakshmi 235, 253 Mitterrand, François 250 moat building 22 Modi, Narendra 67, 69, 100n34, 124–5, 147, 154, 239, 255, 257, 290 Mohammad, Mahathir 330 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969), The 479 Monroe Doctrine for Asia 70, 311, 320n9, 378 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 23, 25, 28, 436 Muhuri River 95n8 Page 17 of 30

Index mujahideen 25 Mujib, Sheikh 78, 80, 87 Mukharji, Deb 94n2 (p.510) Mukherjee, Pranab 266, 319 Mukherji, Rahul 27 Mulford, David 139 Mullen, Rani 487 Mullik, B.N. 169–70 Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) 459, 463–4, 466n11 multiple warhead ballistic missiles 450 Mumbai terrorist attacks (2008) 35, 42n18, 118, 247, 288 Muni, S.D. 327 Muralidharan, Vinayakamoorthy (Karuna) 62–3 Murthy, Narayana 260, 267n5 Musharraf, Pervez (General) 8, 34, 38–40, 89 Muslim aristocrats 94n5 Muslim League 94n5 Muslim migrants 91 Muslim separateness 30 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 98n24 Muslim Volunteer Force 98n24 M/V Alondra Rainbow 317 Myanmar 69, 99n29, 185, 306, 312, 331–3, 338, 343–4, 348, 426 Myanmar–Bangladesh–India gas pipeline project 437 Myung-bak, Lee 319 Narayan, Jayaprakash 95n11, 476 nascent military diplomacy 332–3 (see also ‘Look East’ policy (LEP)) Nasser, Gamal Abdel 356, 409 Nath, Kamal 367 National Association of Software Companies (NASSCOM) 491n12 National Center for Space Studies (CNES), France 258 National Command Authority 460 National Day speech 330 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 73n15, 74n22 behind-the-scenes operation 62 follow approach of ISLA 61 foreign policy during tenure 8 lost 2004 election 62 National Democratic Front of Bodoland 99n26 National Front government 57 (see also Janata Dal) national identity 21, 30–1 National Institute of Information Technology 484 National Liberation Front of Tripura 99n26 National Security Advisor 363, 459 National Security Council 477 National Security Guards 288 nation-states 3, 30–1, 76 Nazi Germany 135, 293n2 ‘Near East’ 369n3 Page 18 of 30

Index Nehru–Indira Gandhi dynasty 32 Nehru, Jawaharlal 3–6, 12, 30–1, 51, 111, 122–3, 168, 186, 199–200, 227, 242n3, 250, 272, 293n8, 294n9, 319–20n1 adopted Monroe Doctrine for Asia 170 adoption of non-alignment 169 advocated to join Commonwealth 228 architect of foreign policy 168–9 helped India and African continent link 403 and India’s relations with Japan (1951–66) 309–11 with Korea (1947–54) 307–9 influence until 1964 409 informed about military activities on Sino-Indian border 175 (p.511) policies as contradiction between its idealist and realist elements 36 policy at independence time 169 signed Panchshila Agreement in 1954 172 Nehruvian period 379 NEPAD 413 ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ 272 Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 309 New International Economic Order (1974) 382 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 412 New York Times 295n20 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) process 138–9, 160n12 Nirbhay missile 462 Nixon, Richard 95n7 Nobusuke Kishi 306 ‘no first use’ pledge 458 non-aligned bloc 111 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 109, 272, 382, 400, 406–7 non-alignment policy 110–11, 196, 200 Non-Proliferation Treaty 8, 252 North American Free Trade Agreement (1993) 329 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 147–8, 202, 232, 249, 275 North-Eastern Provincial Council 56–8 Northern Alliance 109, 112–13, 117, 123 Northern Provincial Council (NPC) 67 North West Frontier border 108 North West Frontier Province 109 ‘nuclear apartheid’ 452 nuclear cooperation agreement 436 Nuclear Damage Act 483 nuclear energy 438–42 cessation of imports with minor exceptions 439–40 civilian nuclear reactor imports 439 revival of 440–2 nuclear energy by India 42n11 Nuclear Liability Act 483 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 450 Page 19 of 30

Index Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) 147, 257, 483 nuclear powers 25, 105, 142, 147, 150, 152, 212, 252, 265, 425, 441–2, 448, 451–2, 457, 483 nuclear rivalries 24, 40 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 29, 139, 143, 212, 254, 257, 440, 484 nuclear test by India of 1974 6, 53, 250 of 1998 38 nuclear weapons 8, 30 hostility between India and Pakistan over 24 of India, fundamental purpose 141 Pakistan acquisition for 29 determination for 23 nuclear weapons policy of India 448–51 phase I (1948–89) 451–6 phase II (1989–2003) 456–9 phase III (2003–15) 459–64 Nye Doctrine 144 Obama, Barack 1, 105, 133, 140, 142–4, 147, 149, 160n24, 246, 483 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 280, 283, 312 (p.512) oil 429–34 changing suppliers and oil asset acquisitions 431–4 western oil firms, the Soviet Union, and middle eastern states 429–31 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) 209, 416, 427 old Third World-ism 27 Olmert, Ehud 367 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) 481 ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) 416, 427, 433 Onuki, Janina 391 OPEC oil crisis (1973) 282 Operation Checker Board 180 Operation enduring freedom 317 Operation Parakram 450, 458 Operation Pawan 56 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 294n16 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 24, 356 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 357, 382 ‘Ostpolitik’ 281, 293n2 P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance/antisubmarine warfare aircraft 139 Pakistan Army, fatalities in Taliban since 2008 35 Pakistan-India relationship 141 economic factors 26–8 identity and politics at state level domestic politics 32–5 Kashmir and identity 30–2 individuals and leadership early leaderships 36–7 new millennium leaderships 37–9 Page 20 of 30

Index role of nuclear power and weapons 28–30 strong vs weak state 22–4 structure and process at system level 21–2 systemic change and its effects 24–6 Pakistan Muslim League 34 Pakistan–North Korea nuclear proliferation axis 316 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 34 Pakistan Strategic Plans Division 463 Palestine 354–6, 359, 363, 369n7 Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) 358 Pal, Radhabinod 306 Pan African E-network 487 pan-Asian conference 477 Panetta, Leon 145 Panikkar, K.M. 169–70, 308 Paris UN Resolution 2085 248 Parliament (India) attack on 13 December 2001 8, 25 Parthasarathi, G. 54 Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 5 Partition 136 of India in 1947 76–7 violence of 30 Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, conflict between 148 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 169, 171, 378, 476 Pawar, Sharad 366 payments crisis (1991) 472 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ 452 peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) 449, 452–5, 465n2 Peiris, G.L. 67 (p.513) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 99n26, 171, 174, 176, 183–4 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1, 5, 9, 24, 141, 144, 279, 308, 483 competing for great-power hierarchy 135 implementation of social and economic reforms in Tibet 173 investment in ports development 142 nuclear test in 1964 6 threatens regional dominance of India 142 People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea 481 People’s United Liberation Front 98n24 Perumal, A. Varadaraja 56–7 Phnom Penh Summit 344 Pinaka missile 462 Planning Commission 429 Planning Commission, India 349n3 Pohang Steel Plant 485 Pokhran I and II nuclear weapon tests 211–12, 218n13, 335 political frictions 27 POSCO, South Korea firm 320n17 poverty 33, 229, 236, 383 Prabhakaran 65, 73n8 Page 21 of 30

Index Prahaar missile 462 Preferential Trade Agreement 367 Premadasa, Ranasinghe 57 prisoners of war (POW) 308 Prithvi Air Defence 463 Prithvi missile 462 Priyadarshini, Indira 378 ‘professional peacemaker’ 276 Public Law (PL) 477 ‘puppet regime’ 278 purchasing-power parity 1 Puri, Hardeep S. 73n8 Putin, Vladimir 197, 218n11, 432 Qatar, LNG import from 435 Qing Dynasty 187n7 Radcliffe, Cyril (Sir) 82, 96n17 Radcliffe Line 82 Rafale fighter 255–6 Raghavan, V.R. 41–2n5 Rahman, Ziaur 78 Rajan, Raghuram 260 Rajapaksa, Gotabaya 63, 67 Rajapaksa, Mahinda 62, 65–9 Ramachandran, M.G. 59 Raman-Charpak Fellowship Programme 262 Raman, C.V. 267n4 Ramchand Pakistani (Pakistani film) 28 Ranbaxy 259 Rao, Messrs 329 Rao, Nirupama 74n22 Rao, Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha 59, 213, 286, 314, 456 foundational vision of 328–30 ‘rape of Abyssinia’ 402 rebalancing concept 145 Regional Cooperation Agreement 340 religious conflicts 32 religious extremism 10, 83, 93, 213 Renault 259 Republic of Korea 309 Reserve Bank of India 260 Rhee regime 309 Rhee, Syngman 307 Rodan, P.N. Rosenstein 477 Roemer, Timothy J. 146 Rogozin, Dmitry 208–9 Rongzhen, Nie 308 Rostow, Walt 477 (p.514) Rourkela steel plant, construction of 277 Roy, B.C. 52 Page 22 of 30

Index Ruggie, J.G. 473, 490 Russia and India relationship 217 domestic-level variables impact on 216 history of Anglo-Russian Convention (1907) 198 bilateral relationship under Putin 197 Bolshevik Revolution (1917) 198–9 British India and Imperial Russia, relationship during 1947 198 Gorbachev’s doctrinaire Marxism- Leninism abandonment 197 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1971) 201 military assistance by Russia to India 201 non-alignment strategy of New Delhi 199 political choices of Indian leadership during Cold War 196 President Yeltsin focused on ties with West 202 Rajiv Gandhi steps for economic liberalization 201–2 Tsarist empire expansion expanded into Central Asia 198 uninterrupted diplomatic relations celebration in 2012 198 policy convergences and divergences defence relationship 203–8 political-strategic issues 210–15 trade and investment links 208–9 Soviet Union collapse in 1991 195 Russian–Indian Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation 204 Russo-Japanese War 305 Ryukyu Islands 309 Sagarika SLBM 462 Sahni, Varun 159n1 Saint-Gobain 259 Sakhalin-1 agreement 432 Samajwadi Janata Party 361 Samajwadi Party 63 San Francisco Peace Treaty 309 Sangh Parivar 91 Sanofi Aventis 259 Sanya Summit 391 Sarabhai, Vikram 452 Saraswat, V.K. 462 Sarkozy, Nicolas 253–6, 263 satellite for Argos-3 and Altika (SARAL) 258 Saudi Arabia 112 Schneider 259 Scorpene submarine 255–6 Sea Harriers jet aircraft 233 Second World War 141, 144, 227–8 self-confident state, India 35 Selvamurthy, W. 462 Sethna, Homi 452 Shah, Daoud 123 Shah, Zahir (King) 122 Page 23 of 30

Index Shakti joint exercise for army between India and France 255 Shale gas 438 Shankar, Vijay 460 (p.515) ‘Shaping Globalization—Sharing Responsibility’ 291 Sharif, Nawaz 34, 37–8, 43n20, 138 Sharma, R.S. 209 Sharon, Ariel 366 Shastri, Lal Bahadur 5–6, 37, 177, 280, 370n24 Shekhar, Chandra 286 ‘Shining India’ 2004 259 Shourya hypersonic missile 462 Shyam TeleServices (SSTL) 209, 216 Sibal, Kanwal 264 Sikkim 178, 184 Simla Agreement of 1972 24, 172 Singh, Harkirat 55 Singh, Jaswant 137, 181, 335, 437 Singh, Manmohan 36, 38–9, 42n14, 62, 87, 92–3, 106, 116, 121, 123–4, 133, 140, 142, 147, 149, 213, 234, 236, 245, 252, 271, 314, 399 Singh, Rajnath 43n11, 91 Singh, Sujatha 296n23 Singh, Vishwanath Pratap 57–8, 286 Sinha report (1998) 83 Sinha, Srinivas Kumar 98n22 Sinha, Yashwant 335, 390 Sino-Indian border war of 1962 5, 168, 179, 200, 231, 311, 400, 405 Sino-Japanese commercial relations 311 Sino-Latin American trade 387 Sirimavo–India accord (1974) 51 Sirimavo–Shastri accord (1964) 51 Sirisena, Maithripala 67, 69 Sober, Sidney 465n4 Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt 281 societal factors 3 Sood, Rakesh 264 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 60–1, 85, 89 South Asia policy 283 South China sea disputes, India’s hesitations on the 345–6 Southeast Asia fear of a power vacuum in 333 growing security uncertainties in 344–5 lack of ‘physical connectivity’ with 343–4 Southeast Asia and India 326–8 in 1990s shaping the LEP 328–30 the state level of analysis 330–3 at the systemic level 333–4 challenges in climate of heightened tensions 344–7 Page 24 of 30

Index enduring domestic constraints 342–4 lack of focus under UPA II 341–2 late 1990s 334–5 a consensual policy 335–6 growing confidence and ambition 336–8 security architecture in east Asia 338–40 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 23, 232 South Korea and India relationship economic relations 313–15 historical links 304–7 strategic relations 315–17 South-West African People’s Organization (1985) 407 Soviet camp 477 Soviet Union 7, 24, 110, 136, 178, 226 (see also USSR) collapse in December 1991 60, 195 impact on India’s foreign policy 112 (p.516) withdrew Red Army from Afghanistan (1989) 147 Soviet Union, collapse of 273 special commonwealth African assistance programme 414 Special Frontier Force 176 Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 62 Indo-Sri Lankan relationship between 1991 and 2009 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002 62, 73n15 defence cooperation 62–3 developments in 2004 62 economic liberalisation programme by India 59 Jayalalitha toughness on LTTE 60 Rajiv Gandhi assassination in 1991 59–60 Sri Lankan policy on its Tamil minority 61 after LTTE defeat and present scenario 64–7 deterioration of relations from early 1980s 52–6 historical background 49–52 motivations behind policy 68–72 nature and motivations of intervention 56–9 Sri Lankan Tamils 50–1 standard-vacuum 430 state-building process 71 state factors 3 strategic elites, Indian 133–4, 141–2, 147–52, 159n2 Strategic Forces Command (SFC) 459 strategic partnership 139–40 strong states 22–4 (see also Weak states) Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign policy of India in 399–401 history up to independence 401–3 policy, 1947 to early 1990s 404–10 prospects for future relationship 418–19 since early 1990s 410–18 declining individual factors 417–18 Page 25 of 30

Index domestic factors 415–17 systemic factors 410–15 Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project 6 Suez Canal crisis 230, 240, 249, 356 Sumdorong Chu crisis 179 ‘surrogate in Asia’ 311 Suzlon 489 Swatantra Party 383 (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike–(S.J.V.) Chelvanayakam pact of 1957 50 Syria 144, 248 Tagore, Rabindranath 306, 320n4, 378 Tajikistan 115, 142, 214–15 Talbott, Strobe 137 Taliban 34–5, 40, 112, 117, 120, 125 defeated by American troops in 2001 109, 123–4 Pakistan withdrawal it support from 113 return to power 148 takeover in Afghanistan in 1996 202, 213 Talisman energy 432 Tamil United Liberation Front 53 Tarapur nuclear power plant 152 Tashkent Agreement of 1966 6, 23 Tashkent Peace Agreement 210 Tata Steel 259 TCS 259 (p.517) Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement (TEAM-9) 412 Teesta water sharing project 81, 92, 99n29 Tejas light fighter 256 television programmes in Pakistan market 28 Tercermundismo 384 terrorism 10, 25–6, 93, 113, 118, 124, 144, 203, 212–14, 239, 246–7, 289, 363, 386 Thatcher, Margaret 234, 242n6 Thimayya, K.S. 309 third image system 134–5 Third World 141, 200 Thorat, S.P.P. 309 three-tiered framework 134 Tiananmen Square (1989) bloodshed 181 Tibet 183 China’s policy towards 168–74 impact on Nehru’s vision on political absorption 199–200 military installations by China in 180 ‘tiger economies’ 313 Tong, Goh Chok 330 trade deficit between India and China 182 trade relations between India and Pakistan 23–4 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 340 Treaty of Friendship 1950 between India and Afghanistan 111 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation (1971) between India and China 178 Page 26 of 30

Index Treaty of Taipei (1952) 320n7 Trilateral Commission 390 Truman, Harry S. 308 Tully, Mark 238 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project 119–20, 437 ‘two nation’ theory 355 UH-3H Sea King helicopters 139 ‘Under One Banner: The United Nations Command in Korea’ 320 ‘unfriendly act’ 278 UNGA Resolution 3379 361 UN General Assembly (UNGA) 253, 355, 381, 395n5 Union Carbide toxic gas leak (1984), Bhopal 146 United Front government, India 60, 81, 117 United Kingdom and India relationship 241 Conservative Party promise to increase overseas budget 239 cultural ties 238 defence agreements 237 dissolution of Soviet Union 235 historical context 227–31 historical links between 237–8 Indian economic reforms impact 234 India rejected notion of empire 225 investment relationship 235–6 loosening of ties between 1965–91 231–4 national considerations impact on India 238–9 support for India’s permanent seat in UN 236 trade between 235 UK passive position on Kashmir 236 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 61, 83–4, 99n26 (p.518) United National Liberation Front 99n26 United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka 52, 62 United Nations (UN) 24, 51, 109, 202, 355 Economic Commission 387 mediation 307 resolutions 307 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 381 United Nations Economic and Social Council 487 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 395n4 United Nations General Assembly 307, 405, 407, 410, 412 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) India’s vote against Sri Lanka in 66–8 US-moved resolution in 2014 74n20 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 112, 123, 203, 245, 252, 289, 307, 380, 395n5, 412 Anglo-French resolution on Libya 248 Kashmir issue and Latin American voting 380–1 see also India and Latin America) President Obama’s support for India’s seat in 1 proposed enlargement or past negotiations of nuclear deals 253 Russia support for India’s permanent seat in 214 Page 27 of 30

Index UK voted for UN involvement in Kashmir 230 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) 307 United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 67 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) I and II government, Congress-led 62–3, 67, 73n15, 74n22, 86–7, 92, 341–2, 418 United Reformation Protest of Assam 98n24 United States (US) 5, 9, 24, 26, 110 China upset towards 186 terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 8, 109, 113 US–China–India triangle 178 US Department of Defense (DoD) 145 US-India Business Council 261 US-India entente/relationship 133–4 analysis and forecast 149–54 historical background dehyphenation process in 1990s 137–8 Indo-US military collaboration in 1995 137 joint exercise by armed services 138 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) process 138–9 partnership after 9/11 terrorist attacks 138 Rajiv Gandhi explored new cooperation with US 136 signed roadmap for global nuclear trade restrictions in 2005 139 strategic partnership 139–40 ten-year security agreement in 2005 139 (p.519) US International Military Education and Training for India 137 India asked for nuclear umbrella 177 relations since 2009 Barack Obama election in 2008 140 defence cooperation 145 Defense Trade and Technology Initiative in 2012 146 grand-strategic goal of Washington 145 Indian perception on Democratic presidents 140 international system evolution 144 nuclear liability bill (2010) passed by Indian parliament 146–7 Obama’s Asia policy 142–3 Pakistan complicates great-power aspirations of India 141 rebalance initiative 144 regional security issue 147 removal of Indian defence organization from US ‘Entity List’ 146 support for permanent seat in Security Council for India 143 US government support to Afghan government 148 US–India Strategic Dialogue (2012) 149 US National Security Council 453 US–Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954) 123 US–Soviet rapprochement 136 USSR 6, 12, 229, 249, 258, 327, 358, 431, 470–1, 475, 477–9, 482, 489 Uzbekistan 215 Vahanvati, Goolam Essaji 483 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 38–40, 82, 253, 263–4, 286, 432 Page 28 of 30

Index ‘variable geometry’ 391 Varuna joint exercise for navy between India and France 255 Vedanta Resources 235 Védrine, Hubert 263 Veerappan 61 Vietnam 185–6 Vinci 259 virtually stateless 82 ‘Vision for 2020’ 287 Vodafone 235 Wajed, Sheikh Hasina 486 Walter Ulbricht project 294n10 Waltz, Kenneth 3, 134 Warsaw Pact 275 war threats, limited 26 weak states 22–4 (see also Strong states) Weizman, Ezer 366 West Asia 356–60, 367–8, 369n3 West Asian crises 356 Western human rights groups 432 western oil firms 429–31 Western world order 136 West German foreign policy 274 White, Harry Dexter 473 White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1804) 187n7 Wickramasinghe, Ranil 61–2 Wigneswaran, C.V. 69 Wilson, Harold 231 Wilson, Woodrow 401 World Bank 184, 232, 412 (p.520) ‘the World Neutralist,’ German public as 294n11 world politics 51, 134, 139, 233, 241, 274, 392 world rankings gross domestic product 157 human development index 158 military expenditures and nuclear weapons status 158 per capita gross domestic product 157 population 155 resource endowment in proved oil and natural gas resources 156 territory size 155 World Trade Organization (WTO) collapse of Doha Round of talks (2008) 28 Doha Round 247 Ministerial Conference, Bali 247 world trade, value of 27 Xiannian, Li 179 XMP 14 supercomputer 481 Yalta Agreement 312 Yalta Conference 249 Page 29 of 30

Index Yasukuni Shrine 306 Yoon-ok, Kim 305 Yoshida Doctrine 311 Zardari, Asif Ali 34, 214 criticism of terrorists in Kashmir 38 Zee TV 238 zero hour 293n1 zero-sum approaches 35 Zia, Khaleda (Begum) 79, 84, 88 Zionist movement 354

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Editor and Contributors Senior Fellow and Head of Research at the Institute of South Asian Studies in NUS. (p.522) Rani D. Mullen is Associate Professor in the Government Department of the College of William & Mary in Virginia, where she teaches South Asian Politics and Politics of Developing Countries. Vidya Nadkarni is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of San Diego. Vipin Narang is Mitsui Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and member of its Security Studies Program. Manjeet S. Pardesi is Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Jean-Luc Racine is Emeritus Senior CNRS Fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and Vice-President of the Paris-based think tank Asia Centre. Isabelle de Saint-Mézard is Lecturer in Asian geopolitics at the French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris 8 Vincennes - St-Denis. She is a Research Fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris, and the Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities (CSSH), New Delhi. Varun Sahni is Professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Eswaran Sridharan is Academic Director of the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India, in New Delhi, and Editor of India Review. Andrew Wyatt is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Bristol.

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