Emotions : a social science reader 9781134719341, 1134719345, 9781134719419, 1134719418, 9781134719488, 1134719485, 9781315881393, 131588139X, 0415425646

Table of contents :
Content: Universals and particulars of affect --
Embodying affect --
Political economies of affect --
Affect, power and justice.

Citation preview

Emotions A social science reader

Edited by M onica G reco a n d Paul Stenner

R Routledge Student Readers

Emotions

A re emotions becoming more conspicuous in contem porary life? A re the social sciences undergoing an 'affective turn'? This reader gathers influential and contem porary work in the study of emotion and affective life from across the range of the social sciences. Drawing on both theoretical and em pirical research, the collection offers a sense of the diversity of perspectives that have emerged over the last thirty years from a variety of intellectual traditions. Its wide span and trans-disciplinary character is designed to capture the increasing significance of the study of affect and emotion for the social sciences, and to give a sense of how this is played out in the context of specific areas of interest. The volume is divided into four main parts: Universals and p a rticu la rs of affect Embodying affect P olitica l economies of affect •

Affect, power and justice

Each main part comprises three sections dedicated to substantive themes, including emotions, history and civilization; emotions and culture; emotions, selfhood and identity; emotions, space and place; emotions and health; emo­ tions in work and organizations; emotions and the media; emotions and politics; emotions and law, with a final section dedicated to themes of compassion, hate and terror. Each of the twelve sections begins with an editorial introduction that contextualizes the readings and highlights points of com parison across the vol­ ume. Cross-national in content, the collection provides an introduction to the key debates, concepts and modes of approach that have been developed by social scientists for the study of emotion and affective life. M onica Greco is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Gold­ smiths, University of London. She is the author of Illness as a W ork o f Thought: A Foucauldianperspective onpsychosom atics (.Routiedge 1998) and co-editor of The Body: A reader (with M. Fraser, Routledge 2005). Paul Stenner is Professor of Psychosocial Studies at the University of Brighton. He has lectured in Psychology at East London, Bath and University College, London. Following his Doctoral thesis on jealousy entitled Feeling deconstructed? (Reading 1992) he has published widely on the emotions and psychosocial theory.

Rou t l edge S t u d e n t Readers Series Editor: Chris Jenks, Professor o f Sociology, Goldsmiths College, University o f London.

Already in this Series: T heor ie s of Race and Rac ism: A Reader Edited by Les Back and John Solomos Gender: A S o cio lo g ic a l Reader Edited by Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott The S o c io lo g y of Health and Illness: A Reader Edited by Mike Bury and Jonathan Gabe So cial Research M eth od s: A Reader Edited by Clive Seale T h e I nform a ti o n So cie ty Reader Edited by Frank W ebster The Body: A Reader Edited by Mariam Fraser and Monica Greco Fashion T he or y: A Reader Edited by Malcolm Barnard So cial M ovem en ts : A Reader Edited by Vincenzo Ruggiero and Nicola Montagna E m o tio n s : A So cial Sc ie n ce Reader Edited by Monica Greco and Paul Stenner

Emotions A social science reader

Edited by M onica G reco and Paul Stenner

| j Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, O xon 0 X 1 4 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routlcdge is an imprint of the Taylor

Francis Group, an informa business

© 2008 Greco and Stcnner for selection and editorial matter; individual chapters, the contributors Typeset in Perpetua and Bell Gothic by RefineCatch Ltd, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain bv The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wiltshire All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Greco, Monica, 1966Emotions : a social science reader / Monica Greco, Paul Henry Stenner. p. cm. (Routlcdgc student readers) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978—0 -4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 4 - 3 (pbk.) - ISBN 9 7 8 - 0 ^ 1 5 -4 2 5 6 3 -6 (hardback) 1. Emotions. I. Stenner, Paul Henry, 1966 . II. Title. BF531.G 73 2008 152.4-d c22 2008016530 ISBN 10: 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 - 8 (hbk) ISBN 1 0 :0 415 42564 6 (pbk) ISBN 13: 9 7 8 - 0 - 4 1 5 - 4 2 5 6 3 -6 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978 0 415 4 2 564 3 (pbk)

There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact. Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. A. I\l. Whitehead, Process and Reality

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

Contents

Notes on co n trib u to rs P refa ce Acknow ledgm ents

xiii x x iii xxv

Monica Greco and Paul Stenner INTRODUCTION: EMOTION A N D SO CI AL S C I E N C E

1

PART ONE Uni versal s and part i cul ars of a f f e c t

23

Emotions, history and civilization

25

1

Thomas Dixon FR OM P A SS IO NS TO EMOT IONS

2

Norbert Elias ON C H A N G E S IN A G G R E S S I V E N E S S

3

43

Peter N. Stearns and Deborah C. Stearns H IS TO RI CAL I S S U E S IN EMO TI ONS R E S E A R C H

Emotions and culture 5

34

Abram De Swaan T H E P OL ITI CS OF A G O R A P H O B I A

4

29

51

59

Catherine Lutz E N G E N D E R E D EMOTION

63

Viii

6

CONTENTS

William M. Reddy AGAINST CONSTRUCTIONISM

7

Michael E. Harkin FE E LIN G AND THINKING IN M EM O R Y AND FORGETTING

8

Emotions and society

121

127

Randall Collins TH E ROLE OF EMOTION IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

15

116

Theodore D. Kemper POWER, STATUS, AND EMOTIONS

14

112

Arlie Russell Hochschild EMOTION WORK, FE E LIN G RULES, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

13

106

Susan Shott EMOTION AND SOCIAL L IF E

12

101

Erving Goffman EMBARRASSMENT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

11

93

Jack Barbalet EMOTION IN SOCIAL L IF E AND SOCIAL THEORY

10

84

Johan Lindquist NEGOTIATING S H A M E IN THE INDONESIAN BORDERLANDS

9

72

132

Niklas Luhmann IN D IVID U ALITY

OF PSYCH IC S YS T EM S

137

PART TWO Embodying affect

141

Emotions, selfhood and identity

143

16

Silvan S. Tomkins REVISIONS IN SCRIPT THEORY

17

Dick Pountain and David Robins COOL R U LES

18

15 2

Charles Morgan and James R. Averill TRUE FEELINGS, THE SELF, AND AUTHENTICITY

19

147

158

Agneta H. Fischer and Jeroen Jansz RECONCILING EMOTIONS WITH W ESTERN PERSONHOOD

166

CONTENTS

20

W. Ray Crozier S E LF -C O N S C IO U S N E S S IN S H A M E

Emotions, space and place 21

Emotions and health

209

217

226

Elizabeth A. Wilson T H E W ORK OF A N T ID E P R E S S A N T S

29

205

James M. Wilce Jr and Laurie J. Price M E T A P H O R S OUR BO D YM IN D S L IV E B Y

28

201

Alan Radley P O R T R A Y A LS OF S U F F E R IN G

27

193

Peter E. S. Freund T H E E X P R E S S IV E BODY

26

188

Ben Anderson DOM ESTIC G E O G R A P H IE S OF A F F E C T

25

184

Mimi Sheller AU TO M O TIVE EMOTIONS

24

181

Rani Kawale IN E Q U A L IT IE S OF T H E H EAR T

23

175

Nigel Thrift IN T E N S IT IE S OF F E E L IN G

22

iX

240

Nikolas Rose D ISORD ERS W ITH O U T BO RD ERS?

246

PART T H R E E Political economies of affect

259

Em otions in w ork and organizations

261

30

Kiran Mirchandani C H A L L E N G IN G R A C IA L S IL E N C E S IN S T U D IES OF EMOTION W ORK

31

264

Stephen Fineman G ET TIN G T H E M E A S U R E OF EMOTION - A N D T H E C A U T IO N A R Y T A L E OF EM O TIO NAL IN T E L L IG E N C E

32

276

Charlie L. Reeve, Steven G. Rogelberg, Christiane Spitzmuller and Natalie DiGiacomo T H E C A R IN G -K IL L IN G PARADO X

283

X

33

CONTENTS

Allen C. Smith, III and Sherryl Kleinman M A N A G IN G EM O TIO N S IN M E D I C A L SCH O O L

Emotions, economics and consumer culture 34

Emotions and the media

324

331

Minna Aslama and Mervi Pantti T A LK IN G A LO N E

41

321

Imogen Tyler "C H A V M U M C H A V S C U M "

40

315

Birgitta Hoijer T H E A U D I E N C E A N D M E D I A R E P O R T IN G OF H U M A N S U F F E R IN G

39

311

Jon Elster EM O TIO N S A N D EC O N O M IC T H E O R Y

38

307

Daniel Lefkowitz IN V E S T IN G IN EM O TIO N

37

301

Danny M ille r A T H E O R Y OF S H O P P IN G

36

299

Colin Campbell T H E R O M A N T IC E T H IC A N D T H E S P IR IT OF M O D E R N C O N S U M E R IS M

35

290

339

Greg M. Smith T H E MOOD C U E A P P R O A C H

347

PART FOUR A f f e c t , power and justice

355

Emotions and politics

357

42

Barry Richards T H E E M O T IO N A L D E F IC IT IN P O L IT IC A L C O M M U N IC A T IO N

43

Anne-M arie Fortier P R ID E P O L IT IC S A N D M U L T IC U L T U R A L I S T C I T I Z E N S H I P

44

368

Clifford Shearing and Michael Kempa A M U S E U M OF H O P E : A STORY O F R O B B E N IS L A N D

45

361

374

Deborah Gould RO CK T H E BOAT, D O N 'T R O CK T H E BOAT, B A B Y : A M B I V A L E N C E A N D T H E E M E R G E N C E OF M IL IT A N T A ID S A C T IV IS M

383

CONTENTS

Emotions and law 46

Compassion, hate, and te rror

434

439

Elaine Hatfield and Richard L. Rapson EM O TIO N AL CONTAGION

55

429

Judith Butler V IO LE N C E , M O URN IN G , P O LIT ICS

54

425

Lauren Berlant CO M PASSIO N (AND W IT H H O LD IN G )

53

418

Marguerite Feitlowitz A LEXIC O N OF TERRO R

52

411

Susanne Karstedt EM OTIONS A N D C R IM IN A L JU S T IC E

51

405

Yael Navaro-Yashin M A K E -B E L IE V E P A P E R S , L E G A L FO R M S A N D T H E C O U N T E R FE IT

50

401

Arie Freiberg A F F E C T I V E V E R S U S E F F E C T IV E JU S T IC E

49

396

Bettina Lange T H E EM O TIO N AL D IM EN SIO N IN L E G A L R EG U LA T IO N

48

393

Kathy Laster and Pat O'Malley S E N S IT IV E N EW -A G E LAW S

47

Xi

443

Nathan Sznaider TH E C O M PA S S IO N A TE T E M P E R A M E N T

Guide to further reading Index

449 455 469

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

Notes on Contributors

Ben A N D E R S O N is a L e c tu re r in H um an G e o g rap h y at the U n iv ersity o f D u rh am . H e is the au th or o f several artic le s on affect and e m o tio n , m ate riality and te c h ­ n o lo g y , and n o n -re p re se n tatio n a l th e o ry . H e is cu rren tly p re p arin g a m o n o g ra p h on th e o rie s o f affect and e m o tio n , p rovisio n ally en titled Spaces of Affect and Emotion. M inna A SL A M A is the P ro g ram

O ffice r for the N e c e ssa ry K n o w le d g e fo r a

D e m o c ra tic Sph ere P rogram at the S S R C . She h old s a Ph .D . from the U n iv e rsity o f H elsin ki and is the au th or o f several artic le s fo r Finnish and in tern ation al p u b lic a­ tion s on to p ic s ran gin g from E u rop ean m ed ia p o litic s to n ation al id en tity and reality telev isio n . Ja m e s R . A V E R IL L is P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch ology at the U n iv ersity o f M assach u se tts, A m h e rst. H e w o rk s in the fields o f p e rso n a lity th e o ry , stre ss and e m o tio n , c re ativ ity , a e sth e tics, h istory and sy ste m s o f p sy ch o lo g y . H e w as am o n g st the p io n e e rs o f a so cial c o n stru c tio n ist ap p ro ach to the e m o tio n s and his b o o k s in clude Anger and Aggression: An Essay On Emotion (S p rin ge r-V e rla g, 1 9 8 2 ), Rules o j Hope (S p rin ge r-V crlag, 1 9 9 0 ), Voyages o f the H eart: Living an Emotionally Creative Life (T he F ree P re ss, 1 9 9 2 ). Jack B A R B A L E T is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f L e ic e ste r and D ire c to r o f the C e n tre fo r C lassical and C ritical S o c io lo g y . H e is the au th or o f Emotions, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach (C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ) and e d ito r o f Emotions and Sociology (B lack w e ll, 2 0 0 2 ). L auren B E R L A N T is G e o r g e M . P ullm an P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f E nglish at the U n iversity o f C h icago. H e r w ork c o n c e n tra te s on the legal and n orm ative p ro d u ctio n o f p e rso n h o o d in the LI.S. n in eteen th , tw en tieth and tw en ty-first c e n tu rie s. She has recen tly finished a trilo gy o f b o o k s on U S se n tim e n tality : The

XiV

NOTES

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C O N T R I B U T O R S

Anatomy of N ational Fantasy (C h ica g o , 1 9 9 1 ), The Qitcen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (D u k e , 1 9 9 7 ), and The Female Complaint: the Unfinished Business o f Sentimentality in American Culture (fo rth co m in g 2 0 0 8 ). Ju d ith B U T L E R is M axin e E llio t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n ts o f R h eto ric and C o m p ara tiv e L ite ra tu re at the U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia , B erk eley . She is a p o s t ­ stru c tu ra list p h ilo so p h e r w ith a b ac k g ro u n d in H e g e l, and she has m ad e significant c o n trib u tio n s to fem in ist and q u e e r th eory and to political and cthical p h ilosoph y. H er b o o k s in clu dc Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o j Identity (R o u tlc d g e , 1 9 9 0 ), Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limitations o j ‘Sex’ (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 ), Excitable Speech: A Politics o j the Performative (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 7 ) and The Psychic Lije o f Power: Theories o j Subjection (Stan fo rd U n iv e rsity P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ). C olin C A M P B E L L is p r o fe sso r o f so c io lo g y at the U n iversity o f York. H e has w ritte n on the so c io lo g y o f re lig io n , the so c io lo g y o f c o n su m p tio n and so c io lo g ic al th e o ry , l l i s b o o k s in clu d c Toward A Sociology' o f Irreligion (M acm illan , 1 9 7 1 ), The Myth o f Social Action (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ) and The Shopping Experience (S age , 1 9 9 7 ). R an dall C O L L IN S is the D o ro th y Sw ain e T h o m a s P ro fe sso r in S o c io lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f Pennsylvania. In 2 0 0 4 he w as aw arded an A m eric an So cio lo g ica l A ssociation L ifetim e C o n trib u tio n s A w ard for his w ork on the e m o tio n s. H is b o o k s in clu de Four Sociological Traditions (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ), The Sociology o f Philosophies: A Global Theory o f Intellectual Change (H arv ard U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ) and Interaction Ritual Chains (P rin c eto n U n iversity P re ss, 2 0 0 5 ). W. Ray C R O Z IE R is a P r o fe sso r in the Sch o o l o f Social W ork and P sy ch osocial Scien ces at the U n iv ersity o f E ast A n glia. H e is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on shyn ess, and c o - e d ito r (w ith L. E. A ld en ) of The Essential Handbook o f Social Anxiety for Clinicians (W 'iley, 2 0 0 5 ). A bram D E SW A A N is E m e ritu s P ro fe sso r o f Social Scie n ce at the U n iv ersity o f A m ste rd a m , w h ere he held the chair o f so c io lo g y b e tw e en 1973 and 2 0 0 1 . Since 2 0 0 4 he has been the d ire c to r o f the E u rop ean A cadem y o f Yustc (S p ain ). H is b o o k s in clu dc In Care o f the Slate; Health Care, Education and Welfare in F.urope and the USA in the Modern Era (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 8 8 ); The Management o f Normality; Critical F.ssays in Health and Welfare (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 0 ); Human Societies (P olity , 2 0 0 ! ) and Words o f the World: The Global Language System (P olity , 2 0 0 3 ). N atalie D IG 1 A C O M O is V ice P re sid en t, D e v e lo p m e n t/O u tr e a c h P ro g ra m s o f T h e H u m an e S o cicty o f the U n ited S tate s, W ashington, D C . T h o m a s D IX O N is a L e c tu re r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f H isto ry at Q u ee n M a ry ’s, U n iv e rsity o f L o n d o n . H e is the au th o r o f From Passions to Emotions: The Creation o f a Secular Psychological Category (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ). N o r b e r t E LIA S (1 8 9 7 —1 9 9 0 ) w as a G e rm an -Je w ish so c io lo g ist. H e coin ed the e x p re ssio n s

‘ p ro c e ss

so c io lo g y ’

and

‘ figuration al

so c io lo g y ’

to

d e sc rib e

his

a p p ro ac h , w hich now influen ces w ork by m any o th e r sch o lars. H is m ain w o rk , The Civilizing Process, w as first pub lish ed in G e rm an in 1939 (late st E nglish edition 1 9 9 4 ) but rem ain ed largely unknow n and unread am o n g the G e rm an and E nglish speak in g

NOTES

ON

C O N T R I B U T O R S

XV

p u b lics fo r nearly th irty y e a rs, d u e to E lia s’ p re c a rio u s ac a d e m ic e x iste n c e as a re fu g e e from N azi G e rm an y . H is o th e r w o rk s in clu d e: The Established and the Outsiders (1 9 6 5 ), What is Sociology? ( 1 9 7 8 ), The Court Society ( 1 9 8 3 ), The Loneliness o j the Dying (1 9 8 5 ), Involvement and Detachment (1 9 8 7 ), The Symbol Theory (1 9 9 1 ), The Society o f Individuals (1 9 9 1 ) and Time: An Essay (1 9 9 2 ). Jo n E L S T E R is the R o b e rt K . M e rto n P ro fe sso r o f Social S cien ces w ith a p p o in t­ m en ts in Political Scien ce and Ph ilosoph y at C o lu m b ia U n iv ersity and professeur attache at the C o lle g e d c F ran ce. H e w as aw arded the Jean N ico d P rize in 1 9 9 7 . His b o o k s in clu dc Nuts and Bolls for the Social Sciences (C a m b r id g e , U K , 1 9 8 9 ); Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior T h e Jean N ico d L e ctu re s. (M IT p r e ss, 1 9 9 7 ); Alchemies o j the .Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (C a m b r id g e , 1 9 9 9 ); Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment. and Constraints (C a m b r id g e , 2 0 0 2 ); Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (C a m b r id g e , 2 0 0 4 ) and Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts f o r the Social Sciences (C a m b r id g e , 2 0 0 7 ). M a rg u e rite F E IT L O W IT Z is P ro fe sso r o f L ite ra tu re at B en nin gton C o lle g e . She has published th ree v o lu m es o f literary tran slation s from French and Spanish and she is an au th or o f fiction , p o e try , essays and a r t c ritic ism . H e r w o rk has been published w id ely in the A m e ric as, E u ro p e , and Israel. Stephen F IN E M A N is P ro fe sso r in O rgan isatio n al B eh aviour at the Sch ool o f M an ag em en t o f the U n iv ersity o f Bath. H is w ork e x p lo re s the im p licatio n s o f v iew in g organ izatio n s as e m o tio n a l aren as. R e c e n t b o o k s in clu de The Emotional Organization: Passions and Power (B lack w e ll, 2 0 0 7 ), Organizing and Organizations (S a g e , 2 0 0 5 ), and Understanding Emotion at Work (S a g e , 2 0 0 3 ). A gn eta H . F IS C H E R is a P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f Social P sy ch ology at the U n iv ersity o f A m ste rd a m . She is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on g e n d e r d if­ fe re n c es in e m o tio n ality and oth er asp e c ts o f the relation b e tw e en e m o tio n and cu ltu re . She is the e d ito r o f Emotion and Gender: Social Psychological Perspectives (C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ) and c o -e d ito r (w ith A. M an stead and N . F rijd a) o f Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium (C a m b r id g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 4 ). A n n e-M arie F O R T IE R is a S e n io r L e c tu re r in the D e p a rtm e n t o f S o c io lo g y at L an caste r U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f Migrant Belongings: Memory, Space, Identity (B e rg , 2 0 0 0 ). P eter E. S. F R E U N D is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at M o n tclair State U n iv ersity in N ew Je r se y . H e is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s a rtic le s lin kin g the so c io lo g y o f the b o d y to that o f the e m o tio n s and o f health and illn ess. H is b o o k s in clu de The Civilized Body: Social Domination, Control and Health (1 9 8 2 ) and Health, Illness and the Social Body: A Critical Sociology (2 0 0 2 ). A ric F R E IB E R G is Fou nd ation C h air o f C rim in o lo g y at the U n iversity o f M e l­ b o u rn e . H e has h eld p o sitio n s w ith the A u stralian Institu te o f C rim in o lo g y and the C o m m o n w e alth D ire c to r o f Public P ro se c u tio n s and w as P re sid en t o f the A u stralian and N ew Z ealan d Society o f C rim in o lo g y Inc b etw een 1996 and 19 9 8 .

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H e is an e x p e r t on crim in al sen ten cin g and con fiscation o f the p ro c e e d s o f crim e . H e has au th o red m a jo r w ork s in both o f th ese fields and has pub lish ed o v e r seven ty m o n o g ra p h s and artic le s. E rv in g G O F F M A N (1 9 2 2 —1 9 8 2 ) w as an A m erican so c io lo g ist, best know n fo r his c o n trib u tio n s to the stud y o f sy m b o lic in teraction through a d ram a tu rg ical p e r sp e c ­ tive. H e held p o sts at the U n iv ersity o f C h ica go , the U n iversity o f C alifo rn ia (B e rk e le y ) and the U n iversity o f Pennsylvania. H e w as also 7 3 rd P re sid en t of the A m erican S o cio lo g ic a l A sso ciatio n . H is b o o k s in clu dc The Presentation o f S e lf in Everyday Life (U n iv ersity o f E dinb urgh Social Scien ce R e sea rc h C e n tre , 1 9 5 9 ); Asylums (D o u b le d ay ,

1 9 6 1 ); Stigm a: Notes on the Management o f Spoilt Identity

(P rcn tic e -H all, 1 9 6 3 ); Relations in Public: Microstudies o f the Public Order (B asic B o o k s, 1 9 7 1 ) and Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization o f Experience (H a rp e r & Row , 1 9 7 4 ). D eb o rah G O U L D is A ssistan t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f S o c io lo g y , Llniversity o f P ittsb u rg h . She is in te re sted in e m o tio n s in relation to social m o v e m e n ts, q u e e r stu d ie s, and social and political th eory and has w ritte n several p a p e rs on HIV related activism . M ichael F.. H A R K IN is P ro fe sso r o f A n th ro p o lo gy at the U n iversity o f W yom ing. H e is the au th or o f The Fleiltsuks: Dialogues o f Culture and ITistory on the Northwest Coast (U n iv ersity o f N e b rask a P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ). E laine H A T F IE L D is P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch o lo gy at the U n iv ersity of H aw aii. She has m ad e sign ifican t and influential c o n trib u tio n s to the social p sy ch o lo gy o f e m o tio n , in clu d in g her b o o k Psychology o f Emotion (H a rc o u r t, B racc, Jo van ovich , 1 9 9 2 ) and she is c o -au th o r (w ith R ichard R ap so n ) o f I.ove, Sex, and Intimacy: Their Psychology, Biology,

and

Flistory

(H a rp e r C o llin s,

1993)

Emotional

contagion

(C a m b rid g e

U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ) and Love and Sex: Cross-cultural Perspectives (A llyn & B acon , 1 9 9 6 /2 0 0 5 ). A rlie

R u sse ll H O C H S C H IL D

is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f

C alifo rn ia (B e rk e le y ). In 2001 she w as aw ard ed an A m erican S o c io lo g ic a l A sso c i­ ation L ife tim e C o n trib u tio n s A w ard fo r h er w o rk on the e m o tio n s. She is the au th or o f The Managed H eart: The Commercialization o f Human Feeling (U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss, 1 9 8 3 ) and n u m e ro u s artic le s on the so cio lo g y o f e m o tio n . H er m o re re ce n t b o o k s in clu de The Time Bind: When Home Becomes Work and Work Bccomes Home (M e tro p o lita n /I Iolt 1 9 9 7 ); Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex-Workers in the New Economy (co -e d ite d w ith B. E h ren reich , M e tro p o litan B o o k s, 2 0 0 2 ); The Com­ mercial Spirit o f Intimate Life and Other Essays (U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ). B irgitta II O I JE R is P ro fe sso r o f M edia and C o m m u n ic a tio n at the U n iversity o f O r e b r o in Sw ed en . She is the au th or o f several artic le s on the the m ed ia and m ean in g creation in the au dien ce. Je ro e n JA N S Z is a Sen io r A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a rtm e n t o f C o m m u n icatio n Scien ce at the U n iv ersity o f A m ste rd a m and re se a rc h e r in the A m ste rd a m Sch o o l o f C o m m u n ic a tio n s R e sea rch (A S C o R ). H e has w ritte n exten sively on video g a m e s and th eir e m o tio n a l ap peal and on the h istory and th eory o f p sy ch o lo gy .

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Susann e K A R S T E D T is P ro fe sso r o f C rim in o lo g y in the Sch ool o f C rim in o lo g y , E d u catio n , S o c io lo g y and Social W ork at K e e le U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f several article s and has c o -e d ite d (w ith K . B u ssm an ) Social Dynamics of Crime and Control: New Theories for a World in Transition (H a rt, 2 0 0 0 ) and (w ith G. D. L aF re e ) Democracy, Crime and Justice (the ANNALS o f the American Academy of Political and Social Science Series) (S a g e , 2 0 0 6 ). Rani K A W A LE is an in d e p e n d e n t re se arc h e r w o rk in g on q u e stio n s o f sexu ality and space. M ich ael K E M P A is a so cio -leg al th e o rist and a L c c tu re r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f C rim in o lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f M e lb o u rn e. H e is the au th or o f several artic le s on p o licin g and o th e r g o v e rn an ce p ro c e sse s. T h e o d o re D. K E M P E R is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y at St. Jo h n ’ s U n iv e rsity , N ew York. In 2 0 0 3 he w as aw ard ed an A m erican So cio lo g ica l A sso ciatio n L ifetim e C o n trib u tio n s A w ard for his w ork on the e m o tio n s. H is b o o k s in clude /I Social Interactional Theory of Emotions (W ile y , 1 9 7 8 ), Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotion (State U n iversity of N ew York P re ss, 1 9 9 0 ) and Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-bio-social Chain (R u tg e rs U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 0 ). Sh erry l K L E IN M A N is P ro fe sso r o f S o c io lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f N o rth C arolin a at C h ap el H ill. She w ork s on the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n s and m e m o irs and is in te r­ este d in c lass, race and g e n d e r and in m e th o d o lo g y . H er b o o k s in clu d c Feminist Fieldwork Analysis (S a g e , 2 0 0 7 ), Opposing Ambitions: Gender and Identity in an Alternative Organization, (U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ) and Emotions and Fieldwork (S a g e , 1 9 9 3 ). Bettina L A N G E is U n iv ersity L e c tu re r in Law and R egu latio n and a Fellow o f W olfson C o lle g e at O x fo rd U n iv ersity . She is the au th or o f Implementing E ll Pollution Control: Law and Integration (C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 8 ). Kathy L A S T E R is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the Sch o o l o f Law at La T ro b c U n iv e rsity , M e lb o u rn e . She sp ecializes on legal cu ltu re and m u lticu ltu ralism , legal ed u cation and gen d er. H e r b o o k s in clu de The Drama o f the Courtroom: A Filmography (F ed eratio n P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ), Domestic Violence: Global Responses (A B A c a d e m ic , 2 0 0 0 ) and Law as Culture (F e d e ratio n P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ). D an iel L E F K O W IT Z is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f A n th ro p o lo gy at the U n iv ersity o f V irgin ia and C h air o f M E SA (M id d le E ast Stu d ies A sso c iatio n ). He is the au th or o f Words and Stones: Language and the Israeli/ Palestinian Conflict (O x fo r d U n iversity P re ss, 2 0 0 4 ). Johan L IN D Q U IS T is A ssistan t P r o fe sso r of Social A n th ro p o lo gy at the U n iversity o f S to c k h o lm . H e is the au th o r o f The Anxieties o f Mobility: Emotional Economies at the Edge o f the Global City (U n iv ersity of H aw aii P re ss, 2 0 0 8 ) and c o -e d ito r (w ith T. B o e llsto rff) of a sp ecial issu e o f Ethnos en titled Bodies o f Emotion: Rethinking Culture and Emotion Through Southeast Asia (2 0 0 4 ). N ik las L L IH M A N N (1 9 2 7 —1 9 9 8 ) w as a G e rm an so c io lo g ist, ad m in istratio n e x p e r t and sy ste m s th e o rist. H e held p o sts at the u n iv ersities o f M u n ste r and Fran k fu rt

XVi i i

NOTES

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CONTRIBUTORS

before becom in g a P ro fesso r o f Sociology at the U niversity o f Bielefeld in 1969, w here he rem ained until his retirem en t in 1993. H is magnum opus. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (T he Society of Society) appeared in 1997. English translations of his book s includc Social Systems (Stan ford U niversity P ress, 1996) and Love as Passion: The Codification of Intimacy (Stanford U niversity P ress, 1998). C ath erin e L U T Z is a W atson Institute P ro fesso r (research ) and holds a joint ap poin tm en t w ith the D ep artm e n t of A nth ropology at Brow n U niversity. She is the author o f Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and their Challenge to Western Theory (C h icago, 1988) and n um ero us articles on the an th ro­ pology o f em otio n . H er m o st recen t b ook s includc Local Democracy under Siege: Activism, Public Interests, and Private Politics (N ew York U niversity P ress, 2 0 0 7 ) and Homcfront: A Military City and the American 20th Century (Beacon P ress, 2 0 0 1 , w inner o f the L eed s Prize and the V ictor T u rn er Prize). D anny M ILLE R is P rofessor o f M aterial C ulture in the D ep artm e n t o f A n th ro­ pology at U n iversity C o lle g e , London . He has w ritten extensively on m aterial cu ltu re, m ass con su m ption , value and new m edia and relationships. His recen t book s include The Cell Phone: /In Anthropology o j Communication (B e rg, 2 0 0 6 ), The Dialectics o f Shopping (U n iversity o f C hicago P ress, 2 0 0 1 ), Car Cultures (B e rg, 2 0 0 1 ), The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach (B e rg, 2 0 0 0 ). Kiran M IR C H A N D A N I is an A ssociate P ro fesso r in the D ep artm e n t o f Adult Education and C oun selling Psych ology, U niversity o f Toronto. H er research and teaching focuses on h om e-based w ork , telew ork , con tin gen t w ork, e n tre p re n e u r­ ship, transnational service w ork and self-em ploy m en t and she is coord in ato r o f the D em ocratizin g W orkplace L earnin g W orking G rou p at the CSEW . C harles M O R G A N collab orated w ith Ja m e s Averill in the w ritin g o f the article included in this volum e, w hich w as based on his M a ste r’ s D issertation . Pat O ’ M A L LE Y is a P rofessor in the D ep artm e n ts o f Sociology and A n th ropology and o f Law at C arleton U niversity, O ttaw a. He has published w idely in the field o f risk and secu rity , and has been a m em b er o f various go vern m en t b odies w orking in related areas o f crim inal ju stice, d ru g policy and crim e prevention . His book s includc Risk, Uncertainty and Government (Cavendish P ress, 2 0 0 4 ), Crime and the Risk Society (D artm o u th , 1 9 8 8 ), Crime Prevention in Australia (Federation P ress, 1997) and Law Capitalism and Democracy: A Sociology o f Australian Legal Order (G e o rg e Allen and U n w in , 1983). Yael NAVARO-YAS1 UN L cctu rcs in the D ep artm e n t o f Social A n th ropology at the U niversity o f C am b rid ge. H er w ork ex p lo re s affect, sub jectivity, and psy ch ical/ psych ological m echan ism s in the dom ains o f politics, the public sph ere, b u reau ­ cracy, and law. She is author o f Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (P rin ceton U niversity P ress, 2 0 0 2 ), and has recently co -edited (w ith Jane C ow an) a special issue o f Anthropological Theory entitled ‘ Phantasm atic R ealities, Passionate States: Special Issue in M em ory o f Begona A r c tx a g a ,’ 7 (1 ), 2 0 0 7 . M crvi PA N T T I is a research fellow in the A m sterdam Sch ool o f C om m u nication s R esearch (A S C o R ), U niversity o f A m sterdam and in the D ep artm en t o f C o m ­

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XiX

m u n ication , U n iversity o f H elsin ki. She has published b o o k s and article s on the n ation al cin em a , p o p u lar television and e m o tio n s in n ew s jo u rn a lism . D ick F O U N T A IN is a tech n ical au th or and a d ire c to r o f D en n is Publishing. H e is the au th or (w ith D avid R o b in s) o f Cool Rules: Anatomy o f an Attitude (R e ak tio n B o o k s,

2000 ). L au rie J. P R IC E is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio cu ltu ra l and A p p lied A n th ro p o lo gy at the C alifo rn ia State U n iversity (H a y w a rd ). She has co n d u cted research on E cu ad o r d ealin g w ith illn ess m a n a g e m e n t, cu ltu ral iden tity , g e o g ra p h ie s o f p o w e r and p a rtic ip a to ry planning. Alan R A D LF.Y is P ro fe sso r o f Social P sy ch ology in the D e p a r tm e n t o f Social S cien ces at L o u gh b o ro u gh U n iv e rsity . H is is the au th or o f n u m e ro u s artic le s on the social p sy c h o lo g ic al asp ects o f health and illn ess, and on the aesth etics o f illn ess re p re se n tatio n . H e is the au th or o f Prospects o f Heart Surgery (Sp rin ge r, 1 9 8 8 ); The Body and Social Psychology (S p rin g e r, 1 9 9 1 ); Making Sense o f Illness (S a g e , 1 9 9 4 ), and has e d ite d the volu m e IVorlds o f Illness (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 ). R ich ard L. R A P S O N is P r o fe sso r of H isto ry at the U n iv ersity of H aw aii and w as F ou n d er and D ir e c to r o f N ew

C o lle g e . H e has w ritte n n u m e ro u s b o o k s on

A m erican h isto ry and cu ltu re and is co -au th o r (w ith E laine H atfield ) o f Love, Sex, and Intimacy: Their Psychology, Biology, and History (H a rp e r C o llin s, 1 9 9 3 ) Emotional contagion (C a m b r id g e

U n iv ersity P re ss,

1 9 9 4 ) and Love and Sex: Cross-cultural

Perspectives (A llyn & B acon , 1 9 9 6 / 2 0 0 5 ) . W illiam M . R E D D Y is the W illiam T. L ap rad c P ro fe sso r o f H isto ry and P ro fe sso r o f C u ltu ral A b n th ro p o lo g y at D u k e U n iv e rsity . He is the au th or o f The Navigation o f Peeling: A Frameworkf o r the History o f Emotions (C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 1 ); The Invisible Code: Honor and Sentiment in Post-revolutionary France, 1 8 1 S —1 8 4 8 (U n iv ersity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss, 1 9 9 7 ), and o f several artic le s on the h isto rio g rap h y and eth n ograp h y o f e m o tio n . H e is cu rren tly w ritin g a h istory o f ro m an tic love. C h arlie L . R E E V E is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch o lo gy at the U n iv ersity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h arlo tte . H e has pub lish ed n u m e ro u s scien tific a rtic le s, p articu larly on p sy c h o m etric s. B arry R IC H A R D S is P ro fe sso r o f Pu blic C o m m u n ic a tio n and H ead o f R e sea rc h at the M ed ia Sch o o l at the U n iversity o f B o u rn e m o u th . H e is au th or o f Disciplines o f Delight: The Psychoanalysis o f Popular Culture (F re e A sso ciatio n B o o k s, 1 9 9 4 ), Im ages

of

Freud

(P algravc

M acm illan ,

1 9 9 0 ),

The

Dynamics

o f Advertising

(H a rw o o d A cad e m ic P re ss, 2 0 0 0 ) and Emotional Governance: Politics, Media and Terror (P algrave M acm illan , 2 0 0 7 ). D avid R O B IN S (1 945

2 0 0 7 ) w as an u n d e rg ro u n d jo u rn a list, so c io lo g ist and charity

w o rk er and auth or, am o n g st o th e r b o o k s, o f Tarnished Visions: Crime and Conflict in the Inner City (O x fo r d U n iv ersity P re ss, 1 9 9 2 ). Steven G. R O G E L B E R G is P ro fe sso r o f O rgan izatio n al Scien ce and P ro fe sso r o f P sy ch ology at the U n iversity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h arlo tte. H e is also D ire c to r o f

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O rgan izatio n al S c ic n ce , D ir e c to r o f In du strial and O rgan izatio n al P sy ch o lo gy , and is the f o u n d e r /d ir e c to r o f the O rgan izatio n al Scicn cc C o n su ltin g and R e search U n it. H is re se arch in te re sts in clu d c team e ffe ctiv e n e ss, health and e m p lo y e e w e ll­ b ein g , m e e tin g s at w o rk , organ ization al research m e th o d s, and organ ization al d e v e lo p m e n t. H e se rv e d as E d ito r-in -C h ie f o f the tw o -v o lu m e Encyclopedia o f Indus­ trial and Organizational Psychology (S a g e , 2 0 0 6 ) and the Handbook o f Research Methods in Industrial and Organizational Psychology (B la c k w e ll, 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 ). N ik olas R O S E is the Ja m e s M a rlin W h ite P ro fe sso r o f S o c io lo g y , and the D ire c to r o f the B IO S C e n tre for the Study o f B io scien ce, B io m e d icin e , B io tech n o lo g y and Society at the L on d on Sch o o l o f E co n o m ics and Political Scien ce. H is b o o k s include The Psychological Complex: Psychology, Politics and Society in England, 1 8 6 9 —1 9 3 9 (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 8 4 ); Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (R o u tle d g e , 1 9 8 9 ); Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (C a m b r id g e U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 6 ); Powers o f Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (C a m b r id g e U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ), and The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (P rin c eto n U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 6 ). C lifford S H E A R IN G is P ro fe sso r o f C rim in o lo g y and D ir e c to r o f the In stitu te o f C rim in o lo g y at the U n iv ersity o f C ap e Tow n. H is b o o k s in clu de Imagining Security (w ith Je n n ifer W o o d ; W illan , 2 0 0 7 ) and Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice (w ith L cs Jo h n sto n ; R o u tlc d g e , 2 0 0 3 ). M im i S H E L L E R is a V isitin g A sso ciate P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f S o cio lo g y and A n th ro p o lo gy at S w arth m o re and a V isitin g Sen io r R e search Fellow in the Faculty o f A rts and Scien ces at the U n iv e rsity o f L an caster. H e r b o o k s in clude Consuming the Caribbean: From Awawaks to Zombies (R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 3 ), Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in H aiti and Jam aica (M acm illan , 2 0 0 0 ), Tourism Mobilities, Places to Play (R o u tlc d g c , 2 0 0 4 ) and Mobile Technologies o j the City (R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 6 ). Susan S H O T T w as b ased at the U n iv e rsity o f C h icago. H e r 1979 artic le ‘E m o tio n and social life: a sy m b o lic in tc ra ctio n ist an aly sis’ is w id ely re c o g n ise d as an early and influential co n trib u tio n in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n s. A llen C . S M IT H , III c o -au th o re d ‘ M an agin g e m o tio n s in m e d ical s c h o o l’ w h ilst at the U n iversity o f N o rth C aro lin a at C h apel H ill. G re g M . SM IT H

is A sso ciate P ro fe sso r o f C o m m u n icatio n at G e o rg ia State

U n iv e rsity , A tlan ta. H e has w ritten exten sively on m e d iate d com m u n icatio n and e m o tio n s and is au th o r o f Beautiful TV: The Art and Argument o f Ally McBeal (U n i­ versity o f T exas P re ss, 2 0 0 7 ), Film Structure and the Emotion System (C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ), On a Silver Platter: CD-ROMs and the Promises o f a New Technology (N e w York U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ) and Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion (Joh n s H o p k in s U n iversity P re ss, 1 9 9 9 ). C h ristian e S P IT Z M U L L E R is A ssistan t P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch ology at the U n iv ersity o f H o u sto n . She has pub lish ed scientific artic le s in the fields o f o ccu p ation al p sy ch o lo gy and organ ization al behaviour. D eb o rah C . S T E A R N S is A d ju n ct P ro fe sso r in the D e p a r tm e n t o f P sy ch ology at

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G e o rg e to w n U n iv e rsity . She e arn ed h er Ph .D . fro m the U n iversity o f Pennsylvania and h er re se arch in te re sts in clu de p e rso n p e rc e p tio n and in tim ate relation sh ip s w ith a p a rtic u la r fo cu s on pow er, gen d er, se x u ality and se x u al o rie n tatio n . P eter N . S T E A R N S is P ro fe sso r o f H isto ry at G e o rg e M ason U n iv e rsity . H is b o o k s in clu d c Emotions and Social Change: Towards a New Psychohistory (w ith C . Z . S te arn s; H o lm e s and M eier, 1 9 8 9 ); American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-century Emotional Style (N Y U P re ss, 19 9 4 ); An Emotional History o f the United Stales (c o -c d itc d w ith Jan L e w is, N Y U P re ss, 1 9 9 8 ); Anxious Parents: A History o f Modern Childrearing in America (N Y U

P re ss, 2 0 0 3 ); American Fear: The Causes and Consequences o f High Anxiety

(R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 6 ) and Anger: The Struggle f o r Emotional Control in America’s History (w ith C . Z . S te a rn s; U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss, 1 9 8 6 ). N athan S Z N A ID E R is P ro fe sso r o f S o cio lo g y in the Sch ool o f B eh avioural Scien ces at the A c a d e m ic C o lle g e o f Tel-Aviv-Yaffo. He is cu rren tly w o rk in g on a m o n o g ra p h on m e m o ry and hum an rig h ts, and his b o o k s in clu dc The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (T em p le U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 5 ), The Compassionate Temperament: Care and Cruelty in Modern Society (R o w m an & L ittle fie ld , B old er, C o. 2 0 0 0 ), and Uber das Mitleid im Kapitalismus (E d itio n M iin ch en , 2 0 0 0 ). N ig e l T H R IF T is the V icc -C h an ce llo r and a P ro fe sso r at the U n iv ersity o f W arw ick. H e is also a V isitin g P ro fe sso r o f G e o g rap h y at O x fo r d U n iv ersity , and an E m e ritu s P ro fe sso r o f G e o g rap h y at B ristol U n iv ersity . H e is a Fellow o f the British A cadem y and an A cad em ician o f the A cadem y o f Social Scien ces. H is b o o k s include Spatial Formations (S a g e , 1 9 9 6 ); Money/ Space: Geographies oj Monetary Transformations (w ith A. L eysh on ; R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 7 ); Cities: Reimagining the Urban (w ith A . A m in ; Polity, 2 0 0 2 ); Automobilities (w ith M . F ea th c rsto n e and J. LIrry; Sage, 2 0 0 5 ) and NonRepresentational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (R o u tlc d g c , 2 0 0 7 ). Silvan S. T O M K IN S (1 9 1 1 —1 9 9 1 ) w as on e o f the m o st influential th e o rists on e m o tio n and e m o tio n al e x p re ssio n o f the tw en tieth ccn tu ry . A fte r co m p le tin g a d o c to ra te in ph ilosoph y and w o rk in g on p e rso n a lity asse ssm e n t at the H arvard P sy ch o lo gical C lin ic u n d e r the tu te lag e o f H en ry M u rray and R o b e rt W h ite, he to o k up a p o st at the P sy ch ology D e p a r tm e n t at P rin ceton U n iversity in 1 9 4 7 . His Magnum Opus w as the fou r v o lu m e w ork Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. T h e first tw o v o lu m es w ere pub lish ed in 1962 and 1963 and the last tw o w ere se n t to the p u b lish ers d u rin g the final y ear o f his life. In 1965 Tom kin s h elp ed to establish the C e n te r for C o g n itio n and A ffect at the G rad u ate C e n te r o f the C ity U n iversity o f N ew York and from 1968 until his re tire m e n t he w ork ed at L ivin gston C o lle g e , R u tg e rs U n iversity . Im ogen T Y L E R is a L e c tu re r in the S o cio lo g y D e p a rtm e n t at L an caste r U n iv ersity . H e r re se arch fo cu se s on the in te rse c tio n s o f gen d er, race and class re se arch in the fo rm a tio n o f social and cu ltu ral id e n titie s and has a p a rtic u la r in te re st in social m argin ality and ‘b o rd e r id e n titie s’ . She is cu rren tly w o rk in g on a m o n o g ra p h on social ab jectio n . Ja m e s M . W IL C E is P ro fe sso r o f A n th ro p o lo gy at N o rth e rn A rizon a U n iv ersity . He is the au th o r ol Eloquence in Trouble: The Poetics and Politics of Complaint in Rural Bangladesh (O x fo r d

U n iversity P re ss,

1 9 9 8 ) and o f Crying Shame: Metaculture,

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C O N T R I B U T O R S

Modernity, and the Exaggerated Death of Lament (B la c k w e ll, in p r e ss). H e has e d ited Social and Cultural Lives o f Immune Systems (R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 3 ). E lizabeth A . W IL S O N is an A u stralian R e sea rc h Fellow in the Sch o o l of E nglish , M edia and P e rfo rm in g A rts at the U n iv ersity o f N e w South W ales, Sydn ey. She has a Ph .D . (U S y d ) in P sy ch o lo gy and is au th or o f a b o o k on n e u ro sc ie n c e en titled Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body (D u k e U n iv ersity P re ss, 2 0 0 4 ).

Preface

The p ro cess o f p roducin g a R ead er o f this kind is challenging, inherently frustrating in som e w ays, and yet also trem endously in stru ctive. We have learn ed m uch along the w ay, and accum u lated many deb ts that we w ant to ackn ow ledge here. We are gratefu l, first and fo re m o st, to the auth ors w ho have given their p erm ission s fo r us to rep rin t extracts from their previously published articles or book s. The com m en ts o f the anonym ous review ers at the early stages o f the p ro cess w ere extrem ely helpful, and w e arc grateful for them . We w ish to thank the several frien ds and colleagues w ho respo n d ed with advice and suggestion s: although we did not always use them , they go t us thinking. In particular, our thanks go to A ndrew Barry, G eorgin a B orn , Steve B row n, R os G ill, K atherine Joh n son , Sonia Livin gstone, Peter I.unt, K ate N ash, and Andy Pratt. At R o u tlcd gc, wc wish to thank G erhard Boom garden w ho so w arm ly w elcom ed the idea o f this p ro jec t, and Ann C a rte r who un d ertook the arduou s task o f sourcin g perm ission s. O u r m o st im p o rtan t thanks go to our tw o children, Ezra and Anna. They are too young to realize w hat exactly has been com petin g w ith them for o u r tim e and attention — yet they have shown a rem arkable deal o f un derstandin g and patience (m o st o f the tim e ), while never ceasing to rew ard us with their laugh ter and love. This book is for them and for their gen eration . Monica Grcco — Goldsmiths, University o f London Paul Stenner —University o f Brighton 2008

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Acknowledgements

T h e p u b lish ers w ould like to thank the fo llo w in g fo r th eir p e rm issio n to re p rin t th eir m aterial: A m erican E co n o m ic A sso ciatio n fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t Jo n E lster, Emotions and Economic Theory, in Jo u rn al o f Economic Literature ( 1 9 9 8 ), volu m e 36 (1 ), pp. 6 3 —6 8 . A m erican S o c io lo g ic a l A sso ciatio n lo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t A llen C . Sm ith and Sh crry l K lcin m an , M anaging Emotions in Medical School, in Social Psychology Quarterly (1 9 8 9 ), v o lu m e 52 (1 ), pp. 5—6 9 . Blackw ell P u blish ing for p e rm issio n

to re p rin t N o r b c r t E lias, On Changes in

Agressiveness, pp. 157—166, 4 7 5 —4 7 8 ; W. Rav C ro zie r, Self-Consciousness in Shame, in Journal f o r the Theory o f Social Behaviour, v o lu m e 28 (3 ), pp. 0 2 1 ; A gn eta H . Fisch cr and Jc r o c n Ja n sz, Reconciling Emotions with Western Personhood, in Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour, volu m e 25 (1 ), pp. 0 2 1 ; N igel T h rift, Intensities o f Feeling, v o lu m e 8 6 B (1 ), pp. 6 4 6 8 ; P eter F.. S. F re u n d , The Expressive Body (1 9 9 0 ), v o lu m e 12 (4 ), pp. 4 5 2 - 4 7 7 ; C h arlie L. R e e v e , Steven G. R o g e lb e rg , C h ristian e

S p itzm iiller and

N atalie

D iG ia c o m o ,

The Caring-Killing Paradox,

in Journal o f Applied Social Psychology, volu m e 35 (1 ), pp. 1 1 9 —135; D an iel Lcfkovvitz, Investing in Emotion, in Jo u rn al o f Linguistic Anthropology, volu m e 13 (1 ), pp. 7 1 —9 7 ; Bettin a L an ge , The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation, in Jo u rn al o f Law and Society (2 0 0 2 ), volu m e 29 (1 ), pp. 197—2 2 5 . C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t T h o m a s D ix o n , From Passions to Emotions ( 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 1—3, 4 , 2 1 —2 4 ; C ath erin e L u tz, Engendered Emotion: Gender, power and the rhetoric o f emotional control in American discourse, in L u tz and A b u -L u g h o d , Language and the Politics o f Emotion (1 9 9 0 ); Ja c k B arb alet, Emotion in Social Life and Social Theory, in Social Theory and Social Structure ( 1 9 9 8 ), pp. 8—9,

xxvi

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11—13; Silvan S. T o m kin s, Revisions in Script Theory, in Tom kin s and D e m o s, Exploring Affect ( 1 9 9 5 ); E lizabeth A . W ilso n , The Work of Antidepressants, in BioSocieties ( 2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 1 (1 ), pp. 125—1 3 1 ; N ik olas R o se , Disorders Without Borders, in BioSocieties (2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 1 (4 ), pp. 4 6 5 —4 8 4 ; e x tra c ts fro m G re g M . Sm ith , Film Structure and the Emotion System (2 0 0 3 ), p p .4 1 —5 1 ; E laine H atfield and R ic h ­ ard L. R ap so n , Emotional Contagion, in T ic d e n s and L e ac h , The Social Life o f Emotions (2 0 0 4 ), pp. 129—143. C olin C am p b ell fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from

C olin C a m p b e ll, The

Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o f Modern Consumerism (1 9 8 7 ) pp. I 2; 202 D uke U n iv ersity

P ress for p e rm issio n

206.

to re p rin t M ich ael E. H ark in , Feeling

and Thinking in Memory and Forgetting, in Ethnohistory (2 0 0 3 ), volu m e 50 (2 ), p p .261 -28 4 . E lsevier Ltd fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t Kathy l.a ste r and Pat O ’ M alley, Sensitive New-Age Laws, in International Jo urn al o f the Sociology o f Law ( 1 9 9 6 ), v o lu m e 24 (1 ). O x fo r d

U n iv ersity P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from

M a rg u e rite

F eitlo w itz, A Lexicon o f Terror ( 1 9 9 9 ), pp. 4 8 —4 9 , 5 0 —6 0 . Polity P ress L td for p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from D an iel M iller, A Theory o f Shopping (1 9 9 8 ) pp. 15—21. R eak tion B o o k s L td fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from D ic k P ountain and D avid R o b in s, Cool Rules ( 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 19—32. R ow m an & L ittlefield fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from N athan Sznaider, The Compassionate Temperament (2 0 0 1 ). Sage P u blication s L td fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t M im i Sh ellcr, Automotive Emotions, in Theory, Culture and Society (2 0 0 4 ), volu m e 21 ( 4 / 5 ) , pp. 2 2 1 —2 4 2 ; Alan R ad ley , Portrayals of Suffering in Body and Society ( 2 0 0 2 ), volu m e 8 (3 ), pp. 1 - 2 3 ; K iran M irch an d an i, Challenging R acial Silences in Studies of Emotion Work in Organizational Studies (2 0 0 3 ), v o lu m e 24 (5 ), pp. 7 2 1 —7 4 2 ; Steph en Fin em an , Getting the Measure of Emotion — and the Cautionary Tale of Emotional Intelligence, in Human Relations ( 2 0 0 4 ), v o lu m e 57 (6 ), pp. 7 1 9 —7 4 0 ; B irgitta H o ijer, The Audience and Media Reporting o f Human Suffering, in Media, Culture and Society ( 2 0 0 4 ), v o lu m e 26 (4 ), pp. 5 1 3 —5 3 1 ; M inna A slam a and M e rv i P antti, Talking Alone, in European Journal o f Cultural Studies ( 2 0 0 6 ), v o lu m e 9 (2 ), pp. 167—184; Susann e K a r stc d t, Emotions and Criminal Justice, in Theoretical Criminology ( 2 0 0 2 ), v o lu m e 6 (3 ), pp. 2 9 9 3 1 7 ; A ric F re ib e rg , Affective Versus Effective Justice, in Punishment and Society (2 0 0 1 ), v o lu m e 3 (2 ), pp. 2 6 5 - 2 7 8 ; Yacl N avaro-Y ashin , Make-Believe Papers, Legal Forms and the Counterfeit, in Anthropological Theory ( 2 0 0 7 ), volu m e 7 (1 ), pp. 7 9 - 9 8 . Stan ford U n iversity P ress for p e rm issio n to re p rin t N ik las L uh m an n , tran slated by Jo h n B ed n arz, Jr, Individuality o f Psychic Systems, in Social Systems, © 1996 by the B o ard o f T ru ste e s o f the L clan d Stan ford Jr. U n iversity for the tran slatio n ; 1 9 8 4 by Suh rk am p V crlag for the o rig in al G e rm an edition . Taylor & Fran cis Jo u rn a ls for p e rm issio n to re p rin t Johan L in d q u ist, Negotiating Shame in the Indonesian Borderlands, in Ethnos ( 2 0 0 4 ), volu m e 69 (4 ), pp. 4 8 7 —5 0 8 ; R ani K aw ale, Inequalities o f the H eart, in Social and Cultural Geography (2 0 0 4 ), volu m e 5 (4 ), pp. 5 6 5 —5 7 7 ; Ben A n d e rso n , Domestic Geographies o f Affect, in Social and Cultural Geography ( 2 0 0 5 ), volu m e 6 (5 ), pp. 6 4 5 —6 5 9 ; A n n e-M arie F ortier, Pride Politics and Multiculturalist Citizenship, in Ethnic and R acial Studies (2 0 0 5 ),

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

X X V i i

volu m e 28 (3 ), pp. 5 59—5 7 8 ; Im ogen Tyler, Chav Mum, Chav Scum, in Feminist Media Studies (2 0 0 8 ), volu m e 8 (1 ); B arry R ich a rd s, The Emotional Deficit in

Political

Communication,

in

Political

Communication

( 2 0 0 4 ),

v o lu m e

21,

pp. 3 3 9 - 3 5 2 . Th e U n iv ersity of C h icago P ress fo r p e rm issio n to re p rin t W illiam M . R c d d v , Against Constructionism, in Current Anthropology (1 9 9 7 ); A rlie R u sse ll H o ch sch ild , Emotion Work, Feeling Rules and Social Structure, in American Journal o f Sociology (1 9 7 9 ); E rv in g G o ffm an , Embarrassment and Social Organization, in American Journal i f Sociology (1 9 5 6 ); Susan S h o tt, Emotion and Social life , in American Journal o f Sociology (1 9 7 9 ); D eb o rah G o u ld , Rock the Boat, D on’t Rock the Boat, Baby, in G o o d w in , Ja sp e r and P o llctta, Passionate Politics (2 0 0 1 ). V erso for p e rm issio n to re p rin t e x tra c ts from Ju d ith B utler, P re c ario u s L ife (2 0 0 6 ), pp. 1 9 , 2 0 - 2 3 , 2 3 - 2 5 . T h e p u b lish ers have m ad e every e ffo rt to co n ta c t au th o rs and co p y rig h t h o ld e rs o f w ork s re p rin te d in Emotions. T h is has n o t b een m ad e p o ssib le in every case how ever, and w e w ou ld w elc o m e c o rre sp o n d e n c e from in dividuals o r co m p a n ies w e have b een un able to trace.

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I n t r o d u c t i o n : e m o t i o n and social science

L

ONG

A

KEY

interest amongst psychologists and biologists, the study of

emotions has become increasingly im portant to the work of social scientists in

the course of the last three decades. The sociology and anthropology of emotions, for instance, are now well established sub-disciplines with their own textbooks, courses and research networks. Beyond sociology and anthropology however, concern with emotion, passion, feeling, mood and sentiment - let us for convenience call it 'affective life' - has come to provide a shared focal point for an emerging community of scholars and students based in a wide range of disciplines including history, geography, cultural studies, politics, economics, legal studies and criminology, media studies, gender studies, management studies; the list could go on. The Em otions: A S o cia l Science Reader has been designed to give students, scholars and the general reader a birds-eye view of some of this research activity. The task of addressing such a vast and complex area of work may appear overambitious, and the result of our efforts is certainly destined to remain provisional. Nevertheless, we considered it im portant to offer a collection framed in terms of 'social science' broadly defined rather than, as is more often the case, in terms of an individual discipline or research tradition. It is im portant for the simple reason that most of us researchers, scholars and students are so preoccupied with the overwhelming number of developments in our own discipline or sub-discipline, that it has become alm ost unthinkable to 'see the wood for the trees' and to strive for a more general perspective. The recent proliferation of publications on emotions across the field, though in itself a positive development, has compounded this problem. In many cases, there is a noticeable tendency to celebrate the conceptual novelty (still) associated with the study of affect and emotion, at the expense of rigorous reflection on continuities and differences with previous research. The inclusive notion of social science adopted in this volume is informed by the idea that academic disciplines are historical creatures in a constant

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process of change; some changes - in the type of questions asked, or in the manner of asking them - are discipline-specific, while others transcend disciplinary boundaries. Our aim has been to capture the more general significance of the study of affect and emotion for the social sciences, as well as to give a sense of how this is played out in the context of specific sub-fields. We have thus deliberately tried to give a sense of the diversity of perspectives that have emerged over the years from a variety of intellectual traditions. As a whole, the collection is intended to provide an intro­ duction to the key debates, concepts and modes of approach that have been developed by social scientists for the study of emotion and affective life. It is in the nature of a Reader to present but a selection of a ll the authors or texts that might have been included, and this volume is no exception. Having stressed that variety and inclusiveness have been key crite ria for us in putting together this collection, it is equally im portant to stress that our selections cannot claim to be representative of all that has been accomplished in social science research on the emotions. We have gathered together texts that, in our view, could productively be made to speak to each other in the interest of facilitating their understanding and discussion; we have alm ost exclusively drawn from traditions of qualitative, rather than quantitative research. We expect that readers w ill appreciate our editorial choices differently, at least to some degree, depending on th eir own disciplinary and intellectual location. Nevertheless, we hope they w ill find that the collection as a whole reflects much of the diversity constituting the field, and that it works in stim u­ lating learning and debate. As editors, we have considered it im portant to ease access to the m aterial by providing a substantive introduction at the beginning of this volume, as well as shorter introductions to each of the sections within it. The general intro­ ductory overview is designed to give a sense of the background, both intellectual and social, against which the study of emotion and affect in social science has emerged and evolved in recent years. By contextualizing the m aterial in this way, our intent has been to make some of the fundamental continuities and differences inherent in the field more clearly intelligible to readers. The final section of the introduction outlines the structure of the Reader and a number of other features of the volume.

T H E A F F E C T I V E SOCIETY If interest in emotions and affect has burgeoned in social science, this is not due simply to intellectual reasons, internal to the disciplines in question. A concern with 'the em otional' is indeed apparent in all aspects of social life and, at one level, the turn to affect and emotions in social science reflects and responds to this broader societal development. For a number of years now, social scientists have observed that emotions have become conspicuous and increasingly im portant in the form s of inter­ action and com munication that are typical of late - or post-modern societies (see, Lasch 1978; Wouters 1986; W illia m s 2001). We now live, it is claimed, in an 'affe ct­ ive society' (Watson 1999, Squire 2001). This diagnosis has been made not only in relation to society as a whole, but also in relation to the specific institutions, sectors or sub-systems that make it up. Let us unpack this last point first. According to classical historical sociology, a key characteristic of modern societies is the fact of

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being structured into functionally distinct sectors or sub-systems (as opposed to being predominantly structured into clan-based segments or into a fixed hierarchy of types of people, as in feudal Europe). The law, economics, medicine, education, politics, science, a rt and so on are examples of such functionally specialized spheres of social activity. In relation to each of these, it is now rem arkably easy to find specialists commenting on an 'affective turn' within their area of interest. In the crim inal justice system, to give a first example, emotions have become conspicuous in connection with what Bottoms has called 'populist punitiveness' (1995; see also P ratt 2000, Garland 2001) and, in a more positive vein, with emerging practices of 'restorative justice' that bring victim s of crime fact-to-face with perpetrators (Van Stokkom 2002; M asters and Sm ith 1998; Braithw aite, 1993). For some this is an unwelcome shift from the 'jurisdiction of law' to the 'jurisdiction of em otion' (Garapon, 1996), w hilst it is embraced by others as a positive corrective to an overly dry and rational system (Freiberg 2001, Solomon 1995). Others still prefer to take the position of neutral observers (Lange 2002). On the one hand, em otionalization is sometimes critic a lly associated with the role of the mass media and with spectacular events such as the OJ Simpson tria l. On the other hand, it may also be championed in the interest of taking emotions and 'sensibilities' (e.g. 'em otional harm ') seriously in the making, applying and enforcing of laws. Theorists of the media, to give a second example, have sim ilarly noted the rise of a new culture of intim acy associated pa rticu la rly with the emergence of 'factual television' and its sub-genres - ta lk shows (both traditional and 'tabloid') docu-soaps and docu-drama, and reality T V (Dovey 2000; Bignell 20 00 a and 2000b; Coles 2000; Holmes and Jermyn 2004; H ill 2005). F irst person media and factual tele­ vision are characterized by subjective, autobiographical and confessional modes of expression, with narratives involving the intimate revelation of real life experiences of deviance, crime, illness or accident. Some see this squarely as a form of exploitation of sometimes tragic circumstances, turning audiences into voyeuristic consumers of second-hand, or 'vicariou s' emotions (M estrovic 1997). Others have argued that these shows offer the opportunity of representation to m arginalized groups, in what has been described as a 'counter public sphere' (Shattuc 1997; see also Gamson 1998). Others yet have stressed how tabloid shows such as Je rry S pringer constitute an 'em otional public sphere'. Rather than simply undermining the possibility for rational debate, this emotional public sphere offers a forum for the airing of moral dilemmas in the absence of traditional community fram ew orks (Lu nt and Stenner 2005). A shift towards em otionally saturated modes of expression is also evident in the context of news reporting (Altheide 2002), and has been associated to a 'hybridization' of television genres whereby the traditional distinction between information and entertainment has been eroded (Brants 1998; Dovey 2000; Coles 2000). This hybridization, in turn, is sometimes held responsible for a general climate of 'com passion fatigue' (M oeller 1999; Tester 2001). The fields of business and management offer a third example. These have seen a great proliferation of academic publications and manuals on the importance of addressing emotions in the workplace. Topics range from how to recognize and handle 'to x ic' emotions (e.g. Frost 2004, 2007; Jordan et al. 2006) to the relevance of emotional intelligence in decision making and leadership (Jordan et al. 2007; Kerr

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et al. 2006; Humphrey 2002; Cherniss and Goleman 2001; Goleman, Boyatzis and M cKee 2002; Goleman 1998). A clear symptom of the new conspicuousness of emotions in the workplace is the inauguration, in 2005, of the International Jo u rn a l o f Work, O rganization and Em otion, alongside a steady stream of journal special issues in the field. A sim ilar conspicuousness of emotion is evident in the economy more generally, where the emphasis on consumption is closely related to the fore­ grounding of aesthetic and hedonistic concerns. The study of the role of emotion in marketing has been expanding over the last 25 years (Erevelles and Granfield 1998), while the com m ercialization of emotions has become a topic in journals of general sociology (M a rtin et al. 2003). Companies now explicitly adopt strategies of 'em otional branding' (Gobe 2001). The political sphere, to mention a fourth example, has allegedly abandoned its former seriousness and severity and become the kind of setting where people expect to see, and experience, emotional engagement. Prom inent politicians now routinely sport caring and smiling facia l expressions, where once it was com pulsory to look stern and disciplined. 'Feel good7 policies are 'spun' along with images crafted for their emotional appeal (such as senior ministers wearing baseball caps or carrying low strung electric guitars) and it is commonplace for serious world events to be mediated via accounts of personal joys and sorrows. Policies, we are told, are increasingly tailored around predictions of mass 'fea rs' and mass 'hopes' (Shearing and Kempa 2004; Furedi 2005; Braithw aite 2004). Liberal politics is said to depend upon 'em otional intelligence' (Shalin 2004) and the new international security paradigm upon 'em otionology' rather than 'ideology' (Pupavac 2004, 2006). M any more accounts of the em otionalization of different sectors of social life could be provided. Observers of the education system, for example, write of 'the emotional turn in education' (Tamboukou 2003: 209). Education has allegedly become more 'child centred', stressing dialogue and emotional engagement over didactic and rational instruction; there is increasing discussion of the 'pleasures' and other affective dimensions of pedagogy (B oler 1999; M cW illia m 1999; Schutz and Lanehart 2002; Bendelow and M ayall 2002; Price 2002). Observers of the health system claim that it has become 'patient centred', stressing choice, wellbeing, quality of life and 'happiness' over 'doctor knows best' paternalism (Layard 2005; W illiam s 1998). Theorists of social policy and welfare have stressed the increased relevance of 'love and hate' (Froggett 20 0 2) and of 'feeling and fear of feeling' (Cooper and Lousada 2005) to the policy process. Even natural science appears to have made moves to shed its 'D r Strangelove' image of cold m artial rationality in favour of a science in the loving image of a feeling Venus (Serres 2 0 0 0 :1 0 7 -1 0 9 ; M alin 2001; Eastman and Keeton 2004; Stenner 2004). To these observations of specialized spheres we must add the various diagnoses of society in general. For some (e.g. Richards 2004), this general 'affective turn' is associated with a more 'hum an' and 'civ ilize d ' form of social order. For this reason it is embraced and valued positively. For others, the same trends are associated with negative values such as a culture of selfish hedonism (e.g. Furedi 2004). M estrovic (1997) goes as far as to argue that emotions have become fetishized as consumable items in the context of a media-led 'authenticity industry'. As such, they have been subjected to processes of M cD onaldization and Disneyfication that have ultimately

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corrupted th eir power to move us. He thus writes of a 'postem otional' society in which emotions are ubiquitous yet so shallow as to be effectively meaningless. The suggestion of an 'em otionalized' contem porary society and a corresponding turn amongst its social sciences stands in rather stark contrast to a more fam ilia r picture that is painted of 'Enlightenm ent m odernity' and of modern scientific knowledge. When classical sociologists began offering th eir descriptions of modern society they tended, if anything, to describe modernity as a move away from the alleged em otionality of so called traditional societies. Weber, for instance, wrote of the spread of bureaucratic and calculative forms of rationality associated with the rise of capitalism . A little later, Elias wrote of the gradual encroachment of a 'civilizing

process' entailing

ever increasing forms of affective

restraint and

disciplined self-control. Parsons, to briefly mention a third, wrote of a trend towards 'affective neutrality' as society differentiates itself into functional sub-systems. He argued for example that money, as a sym bolically generalized medium of com m uni­ cation, can remove the need for the more complex and em otionally fraught circum ­ stances of barter: one merely pays the agreed price. On the few occasions when emotion was directly addressed by early social scientists, it was typica lly associated with the primitive, the embodied, the female. Le Bon (1895) and Sighele (1898), for example, were concerned with the irration ality and infective em otionality of crowd (mob) behavior (see Stainton Rogers et al. 1995). In addition to the content of these classical accounts, it can also be noted that the m anner in which these social scientists wrote and conducted th eir research was framed in the ch aracteristically detached form of objective and rational science. If the transition to modernity was grasped as a move from nature to society and from emotion to reason (as expressed in the famous Gem einschaft/Gesellschaft distinction, for example), it was also grasped in this way via form s of thinking and research which themselves valorized detached reason over the affective.

MOVING DI S C IP L IN E S We have suggested that the turn towards affect and emotion in social science may be regarded, on one level, as the expression of a broader societal turn in the same direction. To the extent that we may speak of an affective turn now taking place in social science, however, this does not simply mean that social science disciplines have come to take the emotions on board as an object of study, each in its own distinctive way. W hile this is certainly the case, what is at stake in this 'turn' is not only the incorporation of a novel subject matter into an existing disciplinary framework. Rather, the phrase indicates that an engagement with affective life has the potential to transform the ways in which social science disciplines conceive th eir own way of knowing and their objects of research. Where this has happened, we might say that the social sciences themselves are being moved or affected. When we speak of social science disciplines, it is im portant to remember that these are fa r from constituting homogenous and coherent wholes. Some social scientists embrace a new paradigm, for instance, while others dismiss it as a shallow fad and still others reach for a compromise position (even the use of the term

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'paradigm ' is problem atic here, precisely due to the absence of a general consensus). Several distinct ways of construing and enacting a discipline can - and mostly do exist during any one time period, and it is im portant not to lose sight of this variability. In addressing the affective turn, we are dealing with a transdisciplinary shift com par­ able to the textual turn that transformed a great portion of social scientific practice during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Although the two shifts occurred at different times and involve some im portant theoretical differences, strong elements of continuity between them become apparent when they are considered in a broader historical context. When cultural anthropology, critica l social psychology and interpretive sociology went through their respective textual turns, they did not sim ply take on a new subject matter (narrative, for instance). Rather, those who were part of this intellectual movement began to seethe full gamut of their inherited subject m atter as a complex weave of socially constructed cultural 'texts' im plicated in relations of power. W hat had previously been treated as objectively measurable variables or factually observable processes (such as, 'attitudes', 'personality traits', 'class', 'gender' and even Balinese cock fights) came to be newly construed as 'discursive form ations', 'interpretive repertoires', 'lo cal and contingent scripts' and other 'modes of textuality'. Again, it is im portant to recognize that the textual turn was by no means total or uncontested (particularly in those disciplines closer to the natural sciences, such as psychology). Nevertheless, this new way of seeing was, for those who embraced it, part of a wholesale rethinking of the very nature and mission of the social sciences. It was a shift in self-definition away from a so-called 'positivism ' associated with the natural sciences, and towards different ways of constructing knowledge as accountable and valid. Intellectually, the sources of this transform ation included philosophical movements such as existential hermeneutics and phenomenology, ordinary language philosophy and semiotics, pragmatism and post-structuralism , as well as the work of sym bolic interactionist and dram aturgical sociologists, and feminists offering critiques of m asculinist forms of power (C urt 1994; Gorton 2007). These forms of thought and practice challenged, among other things, the scientific superiority of 'detached reason' and 'objective observation' over the 'em otional' and the 'subjective'. H istorically, the resurgence of em pirical and theoretical interest in the emotions among social scientists is thus closely associated with the textual turn. It was first in that context that affective life became the site of an intellectual battleground of sorts. Em otions became the object of a tug-of-war in which social scientists influenced by the textual turn struggled to drag them across the line separating the psychobiological from the socio-cultural. P rio r to this struggle, affective life had fallen squarely within a territory claimed by the natural sciences. For the most part, social scientists who wished to tackle the emotions had been obliged to deal with more peripheral issues, such as the social shaping of the expression of emotions. The im plicit understanding was that emotions, at root, were psychobiological, 'n a tu ra l' objects. It is worth dwelling on this last point in just a little more detail, for it helps us to appreciate the magnitude of the challenge social scientists faced (and posed) when they proposed emotions as viable objects of research for their own disciplines.

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F r o m a positive sc i ence of e mo t i o n to soci al c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m Em otions have long been a core topic of scientific psychology. When W illia m James articulated his definition in the famous a rticle 'W h a t is em otion?' (1884), he was drawing upon more than half a century of physiological and medical research on the topic. James proposed that emotions are but the awareness of the bodily changes that accompany the perception of an exciting fact (for example, the raised heartbeat that accompanies the encounter with a threatening anim al). Around the same time, the Danish physician and psychologist Carl Lange proposed that vaso-motor changes themselves are the emotion. In the standard histories of psychology, the Jam es-Lange theory of emotion (thus named despite the fact that James and Lange had developed th eir accounts independently) is superseded in the 1920s by W alter Cannon's theory, in which emotions are identified with thalam ic processes (later elaborated as the 'lim b ic system'). W hile the two theories are significantly different, the move from the Jam es-Lange theory to Cannon's is a move from a physiological account grounded in the functioning of the autonom ic nervous system - or the 'viscera' to use the terminology of Jam es' day - to another physiological account, grounded in subco rtica l brain processes. Naturally, the science of emotion did not end with the work of W alter Cannon (see Cornelius 1996, for an overview). However, with a few exceptions, it did continue in the same direction, deepening the conception of emotions as psychobiological phenomena. This trend has been boosted in recent years by the development of tech­ nologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging ( F M R I) that can provide 'real-tim e' representations of brain processes in action and that have facilitated the development of new fields such as affective neuroscience. Panksepp (1998), for instance, argues on the basis of neuroanatomical evidence for the existence of a number of distinct emotional systems - including systems for seeking (interest, cu ri­ osity, excitement), rage, fear, and panic (distress) - that are effectively homologous in a ll mammals. These are associated with very localized neural circuits that mature shortly after birth and whose stim ulation in experimental anim als yields coherent affective displays. In the same vein, Hyman (1998) asserts that emotions 're ally are circuits in our brain that allow us to survive'. Perhaps the standard approach amongst contem porary experimental psycholo­ gists is to define emotions as response systems or response syndromes (Parkinson 1995). The idea here is that what we call emotions involve m ultiple components or factors, coordinated or organized into a tem porarily unified and coherent response. There appears to be reasonably good agreement about what these m ultiple factors or components might be, and they are either biological or psychological. Cornelius (1996), for instance, mentions four factors: expressive reactions (such as facial expressions); physiological reactions (such as increased heart-rate); behavior (such as withdrawal from danger) and cognition (such as persistent trains of thought). W hat we call distress or joy would thus be a tem porary coordination of these factors into a generally recognizable form. Scherer (1984, 2005), to give a second example, defines emotion as a sequence of state changes in five organism ic sub-systems. Four of these correspond to the components offered by Cornelius: the motor system (which deals with expressive reactions); the autonom ic system (arousal); the motivational

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system (action tendencies); and the cognitive system (appraisal). To these, Scherer adds a fifth: the m onitor system, which he argues supplies the conscious feeling of emotion. Scherer argues that usually these sub-systems function relatively independently. But in response to im portant events that trigger emotions, they con­ verge into interdependence, giving rise to fam ilia r emotions like fear, anger and shame. Em otions have thus been territorialized by the psychobiological sciences which take them to be 'natural kinds' amenable to analysis in terms of measurable factors and variables, and hence to objective scientific observation and intervention: emotions can, in principle, be described, predicted and controlled. It is this conception that came to be challenged by social scientists in the context of the textual turn. In the 1970s and 80s, influential figures such as James Averill, Theodore Sarbin, A rlie Russell Hochschild and Rom Harre published landm ark texts articulating broadly 'con stru ctivist' or 'social constructionist' accounts of emotion (Averill 1974, 1980; Harre 1986; Hochschild 1979; Sarbin 1986). A key issue here, as we have suggested, was to lay claim to the emotions as a properly social and cultural subject matter as opposed to a subject matter belonging firm ly within the biopsychological sciences. Rather than viewing emotions as organic systems hard-wired through evolution, these authors began to stress some of the very different ways in which emotions are played out interactionally amongst people from different cultural backgrounds, and the variety of ways in which they have been made sense of in different historical periods. A key feature of the social constructionist accounts of emotion is their 'nonrepresentational' epistemology which holds that discourse does not merely describe reality but is a constitutive part of that reality. W ith respect to affective life, this means that emotion ta lk is considered to be constitutive of emotional experience rather than sim ply reflective of it (H arre 1986; Harre and Parrott 1996). For this reason, the em pirical study of emotion ta lk became a focal point for social constructionist approaches to emotion, demonstrating that great variation exists concerning how people ta lk and think about the location, the genesis and the management of emotional episodes (see Heelas 1986, for a review). It should be noted that the door to social constructionist accounts had been p a rtia lly opened by the famous experimental work of Schachter and Singer (1962) and by the broadly cognitive accounts of emotion articulated by figures such as Arnold (1960). These stressed that emotions are essentially permeated and indeed constituted by cognition, including high level thought processes. The Schachter and Singer studies, for example, provided some mixed support for the idea that subjects injected with adrenalin can interpret the resulting feelings of arousal as a range of different emotional experiences, depending upon the causal attributions they make (e.g. as anger in one experimentally engineered set of circum stances and euphoria in another). The resulting 'two fa c to r' theory - the two factors being arousal and cognition - directly challenged the hegemony of previous biological accounts and chimed with some of the insights emerging from the work of figures such as Goffman. In this theory, organic factors were relegated to the minor role of supplying undif­ ferentiated arousal w hilst the cognitive system had the more subtle job of lending specific emotional meaning to this arousal. It was a short step from here to argue - as did Averill and his social constructionist colleagues - that the content of the meaning

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at play is largely 'second-hand' and social. In other words, cognitive processes such as thinking could be framed within the broader communicative and interactional practices of a given culture. Ergo, if emotions were irreducibly cognitive, then they were also irreducibly social. In the context of the textual turn emotions came to be considered as discursive, dia lo g ica l phenomena, structured and influenced by the historical and cultural con­ tingencies of com m unicational interactions. Positivist accounts were criticized for being scientistic and reductionist and for stripping emotions away from the social context in which they acquire their force and meaning. There was a call for qualitative and phenomenological methodologies capable of reflexiveiy grasping the subjective dimension of emotion through its modes of narration, and these were often contrasted with the quantitative methods associated with positivism (Denzin 1984; Stenner 1993; Stenner and Stainton Rogers 1998). Given these origins within an intellectual tug-of-war between the two extremes of (social) constructionism and positivism, it is not surprising that arguments raged about the degree to which this thesis concerning the fundam entally social nature of emotions could be sensibly maintained. Some sociologists, such as Kemper (1978), sided with the positivists and advanced theories of emotion aiming at general predictions. Anthropologists and historians joined the fray, some providing am munition in support of cultural and historical relativism , and some arguing for universals.

F r o m the textual t o the a f f e c t i v e t ur n in soci al sci ence W hile the textual turn gained ascendancy in the 1970s and has been around ever since, references to the affective turn are a lot more recent and very much presented as the cutting-edge way forw ard (e.g. Massumi 2002; Sedgwick 2003; Clough 2007; see Hemmings 2005; and Agnew 2007 for critiques relative to the fields of fem inist cultural studies and historiography respectively). W hat is the relationship between the textual and the affective turn? Genealogically speaking, the textual turn may be described as one of the conditions of possibility for the more recent affective turn. The affective turn follow s on from the textual turn, in the context of a theoreticopolitical landscape dominated by different concerns - some of which stem from the intellectual legacy of the textual turn itself. A key concern, for example, is that of avoiding the theoretical

impasse of relativism that is associated with the

m ethodological bracketing out of all pre- or extra-discursive reality. A t one level, the affective turn is thus a turn against the privileging of text and discourse as the key theoretical touchstones, drawing attention instead to the 'p itfa lls of w riting the body out of theory', and to the 'residue or excess that is not socially produced, and that constitutes the very fabric of our being' (Hemmings 2005: 550, 549). This agenda also (cor-)responds to a renewed dominance and cultural presence of biology, including the ascendancy of neuroscientific, biochemical, genetic and evolutionary accounts of affect and emotions within both psychology and psychiatry (Le Doux 1998; Panksepp 1998; Greenfield 2000; Damasio 2003). Despite a reconnection with issues of m ateriality and embodiment, what is involved in the affective turn is by no means a return to the naive representationalism

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associated with positivism. On the contrary, invoking affect is closely related, in many accounts, to the call for a post-deconstructive rethinking of ontology (T h rift 2008). The move from 'text' to 'a ffe ct' thus parallels a shift in emphasis from epistemolo g ica l questions as to the nature, sources and lim its of knowledge, to ontological questions as to the nature of (pre-discursive) realities. In foregrounding these ontological questions, the relationship between the natural and the social sciences is no longer construed sim ply in terms of opposition and critique. Social scientists - in the wake of the ascendancy of sub-disciplines that take natural science and the work of scientists as their object - have come to recognize the need to be more discerning of the variety and m u ltiplicity that characterizes the natural sciences themselves, not a ll aspects of which can by any means be lumped together under the label of 'positivism '. On this basis, social scientific theories of affect may well draw on post­ positivist forms of biology and psychology, as well as on forms of process philosophy that take their constructivism well beyond the lim itations of so c ia l constructionism . These influences include cybernetic and second-order systems theories, form s of psychoanalytic theory, and Silvan Tom kin's work on the psychology of affect. On the side of philosophy, they include the work of Henri Bergson, A lfred North Whitehead and G illes Deleuze. Having outlined some of the clear differences between the textual and the affective turn in social theory, we hope this outline also shows that there is a strong element of continuity between them. The critique of the social and discursive lim its of the textual turn represents a deepening of constructivism and not its abandonment (Stenner 2008). The constructivist notions of power, perform ativity and activity which gave value to the concept of discourse in the textual turn have been extended beyond the socio-cultural domain to include pre-conscious and pre-discursive forms of existence, and the concept of 'a ffe ct' has become a marker of this extension. If the textual turn involved a tug-of-war between positivists and social constructionists, then the affective turn turns against w hat is perceived as a linguistic im perialism that threatens to throw the babies of 'the body' and its 'affe cts' out with the bathwater of naively scientistic 'representational theory'.

A f f e c t and e mo t i o n In this volume so fa r we have been using the terms 'a ffe ct' and 'em otion' as if they were interchangeable. It is worth mentioning that this would be considered deeply problem atic by many proponents of the affective turn. A brief anecdote might serve to illustrate this point. A t a conference on Psychosocial Studies recently held at a College of the University of London (B irkb eck 2 0 07), Barry Richards stressed what he saw as the fundamental importance of distinguishing affect from emotion, suggesting that emotion is a more superficial and conscious affair, w hilst affect refers to the deep and often unconscious organism ic processes discussed by psychoanalysts. Consistent with the shift we outlined above, Richards was at pains to distinguish his own 'psychosocial' approach from social constructionist accounts that treat 'em otions' as social categories amenable to explicit com m unication and to conscious reflection (see also Hollw ay and Jefferson 2000; Rustin 2002; Froggett and

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Richards 2002). A re-engagement with psychoanalytical theory - within which the concept of affect has a long pedigree - is thus one clear pathway into the affective turn (Redding 1999; M atthis 2000; Green 1977). But it is not the only pathway. Interestingly enough, comparable moves were made by a number of delegates at a conference held at another London College (Goldsm iths 2007) just two days earlier. This time the traditions invoked in connection with a turn to affect were philosophical rather than psychoanalytical, stemming from

Deleuzian post-structuralism and

W hiteheadian metaphysics. The concept of affect as opposed to emotion was at play in both conferences, but the theoretical resources informing it were quite distinct. It was notable, however, that in both settings the term 'a ffe ct' was being associated with a ll things sophisticated and good and the term 'em otion' with all things superficial and bad. A sim ilar tendency can be detected more generally. T h rift (2004), for instance, works hard to separate his preferred concept of affect from the 'nice', 'cuddly' and even 'touchy feely' issues he appears to associate with the words 'em otion' and 'feeling' (cf. Thien, 2005 for a critique). Likewise, M cCorm ack contrasts the lim ita­ tions of 'em otion' with the 'creative potential of affect'. Emotion is associated with the individual person and with a certain fixity within regimes of discursive meaning, w hilst affect is associated with an 'unqualified intensity' that is 'never reducible to the personal quality of em otion' (2003: 500). Both T hrift and M cCorm ack draw on Brian M assum i's elaboration of Deleuzian philosophy (see Massumi 1996; also W issinger 2007 and Clough 2007). We believe that insisting on this term inological distinction is not inherently help­ ful, and may actually obscure more than it clarifies at a conceptual level. If Sedgwick (2003) and her follow ers prefer 'affect', for instance, then this is probably because it was the term employed by Silvan Tomkins in his magnum opus Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. But Tomkins himself used 'a ffe ct' to ta lk about experiences and expressions such as shame, anger, fear, excitement, joy and distress that are quite com patible with the word 'em otion'. Tomkins was not terribly concerned to draw a radical distinction between 'a ffe ct' and 'em otion', and often used the terms inter­ changeably, although he did consider the conscious experience of affects to be decisive to their b io lo g ica l function as drive am plifiers. Likewise, if Deleuze and his follow ers prefer to use 'affe ct', then this is probably because of Spinoza's use of the Latin word affectus in his Ethics. Spinoza himself used the term as a generic for such specifics as joy, fear, jealousy, shame. Spinoza did not outline - pace M assumi - a 'difference in nature between affect and em otion' (M assum i 1996: 222). It seems to us that drawing an overly sharp (and value laden) distinction between affect and emotion serves, paradoxically, to perpetuate the illusion that such words refer unproblem atically to states of the world, thus bypassing the need to think care­ fully about the conceptual issues at stake. The issue at stake in Deleuzian philosophy, for example, is a shift towards modes of thought and practice that concern the potential and the virtual as much as the actual and the real. A ffe ct is thus a decisive concept for grasping transform ations, potentialities, 'unpredictable connections between bodies and forces' (Tamboukou, 2003: 217), and 'shifts in the energetic capabilities of a body' (Conradson, 2007: 104). This shift - which concerns how we address reality more generally - can be masked by a preoccupation with words.

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If indeed the concern of the affective turn is to argue for a move beyond a narrowly 'discursive' conceptualization of emotion, then it might be more sensible to argue, along with people such as K atz (1999), that there is more to emotion than ta lk about em otion and more to emotion than can be captured in its conscious experience (see also Stenner 2005b). This strategy serves to highlight that w hat is at stake is the contestation of a concept and not the mere application of a linguistic label. In short, our approach to these term inological questions is to stress that ter­ minology serves first of all as a marker of difference for groups of intellectuals, keen to distinguish th eir own approach from that of specific others. As we have stressed, however, shared terminology need not imply a shared theoretical position. One only has to move from Goldsmiths to Birkbeck College to find the term 'a ffe ct' being used in very different ways, albeit to accom plish a comparable criticism and deepening of the textual turn. It is instructive in this context to reflect on the fact that the term 'em otion' is actually a rather recent addition to the English lexicon. As Dixon dis­ cusses (see extract in section one of this volume), the term 'em otion' came into common currency amongst speakers of English as late as the nineteenth century. Before that, people were more likely to talk of affections, passions, sentiments and the like. Passions and affections, especially since Augustine and Aquinas, were terms that were very much part of a theological semantic web. They resonated with other terms such as the soul (whether animal, vegetative or intellective) and the w ill, and they operated within a normative moral fram ework at whose pinnacle stood a transcendent deity. The term 'em otion' entered into circulation as part of a medicoscientific discourse associated with the early development of scientific psychology. In calling affective life 'em otion', these novel scientific discourses also transformed the ways in which people thought about their affective life. Specifically, the emotions came to be thought of as quasi-mechanical b io lo g ica l processes. The association of 'em otion' with physiology has been boosted in recent years by Dam asio's (1999; 20 03 ) distinction between 'em otions' and 'feelings', where the former are construed as objectively observable organic processes w hilst 'feelings' are the subjective experience of emotions. It is thus somewhat ironic that Massumi, M cCorm ack, T hrift and others associate the word 'a ffe ct' with issues of m ateriality and corporeality, and 'em otion' with subjective experience, since the very term 'em otion' marks a historical rupture whereby the affections of the soul lost their place to the emotions of the viscera.

DISCIPLINING A F F E C T S Despite the rich diversity that characterizes approaches to affect and emotion in the social sciences, there is a clear common denominator in this research. In a nutshell, this lies in the foregrounding of the link between affective life and relations of power. Specifically in the context of the textual and affective turns, this foregrounding becomes reflexive in character. The textual turn and the affective turn, as we have seen, share a non-representational epistemology - the notion that discourse and knowledge are not simply about reality, but constitute an active part of it. Theories of

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emotion do not simply hover above th eir subject matter. Rather they intervene in the affective life they scrutinize, a little like a geologist's map of a coal seam might enable the extraction of the coal and hence the transform ation of the landscape. A t a m ethodological level, non-representational epistemology translates into a com m it­ ment to reflexivity vis-^-vis the normative im plications of knowledge about emotion. How does knowledge about emotion enter into the power configurations of our time? How does it contribute to the ways in which individuals and collectivities can both affect and be affectecR In linking emotions to the political dimension of power and governance, the social sciences may be said to re-establish a profound continuity with debates that predate the historical attempt to define and explain emotion scientifically. P rio r to the inauguration of 'em otion' as a scientific category, passions, sentiments and affects had been at the centre of p ractically all the great moral, ethical and religious dis­ courses on what constitutes a good life. Consider for example the connection between ethics and passions in Aristotle, or the doctrine of the seven cardinal sins in Christian morality. The effort to define the proper nature and place of the affects became bound up with struggles of a specifically political character in seventeenth-century Europe. This was part of a broader philosophical reflection on the role and function of nascent secular governments, as distinct from systems of ethical and moral governance (Koselleck 1988). For Spinoza and Hobbes, both witnesses of the p olitical earth­ quakes engendered by the w ars of religion, a reframing of affective life in terms of natural philosophy was part of the search for new, secular answers to political ques­ tions. This is especially clear in Hobbes' Leviathan, where the discussion of passions, appetites and desires in P art I grounds his proposals for the Commonwealth made in P art II. But this sequence - whereby the discussion of emotions comes 'before' the discussion of political, legal or economic questions - constitutes a more general pattern, common to many of the classics from the late 17lh through to the mid 18th century. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1 6 89 ) appears the year before his Two Treatises o f Government. Volume 2 of Hume's Treatise o f Human Nature, entitled On the Passions (1739), is sw iftly followed by the essays on political economy, m orals and ethics. Sm ith's Theory o f the M o ra l Sentiments (1759) pro­ vided the ground for the W ealth o f N ations (1776). W ith Rousseau, the analysis of affective life takes place in his novels. J u lie (1 76 1 ) precedes the S o c ia l Contract by one year, and Em ile is published in the same year (Stenner 2004; see also Barbalet, extract in section 3, for a discussion of Sm ith and Ferguson in this light). The normative dimension of knowledge of affective life is thus made perfectly apparent in the work of these Enlightenment thinkers: different p olitical prescriptions literally follow from different ways of thinking about passions or sentiments and their place in human nature. It was only with the functional specialization that marks the establishment of scientific disciplines in the 19th century, and with the appropriation of the domain of affect (as 'em otion') into the territories of biology and psychology, that the link between concepts of emotion and the dimensions of politics, m orals and ethics disappeared from view. Although these disciplines - psychology in p a rticu la r were no less embroiled in the normative business of governance and social engineer­ ing, they intervened in the name of a supposedly value-neutral distinction between the 'n o rm al' and the 'p ath o logical' (H acking 1991).

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As relative late-comers to the study of emotion, the social sciences have con­ structed their agendas not in a vacuum, but in relation to a social situation already marked by the success of the natural and clinical sciences of emotion. For this reason, one agenda for social scientists has been to c ritica lly document the ways in which the psy-disciplines (and, more recently, neuroscience) have actively contributed to the shaping of affective experience in modern and late-modern times. E arlier in this introduction, for example, we addressed what has been called an 'em otionalization' of all spheres of social life in late modernity. This phenomenon has been attributed, at least in part, to a process of 'proto-professionalization', whereby psychotherapeutic concepts and terminology gradually found th eir way into the everyday vocabulary of social actors (De Swaan 1990). As Doyle M cC arthy has put it, it is only in the specific context of a 'psychological age' - one distinguished by the dissemination of psychological knowledge and therapeutic discourse - that 'emotions acquire a social meaning previously a bsent:. . . emotions are "w orked a t" and "w orked on", one has an "em otional life " ' (1989: 66). But the im pact of the sciences of emotion has not been limited to facilitating a greater scope for the awareness, expression, and management of emotional experience. In so doing, these sciences have also facilitated profound transform ations in the ways social relations are conducted, at an inter­ personal level and beyond. Social scientists have examined the dissemination of psy-concepts and the social conspicuousness of emotion talk within the context of rationalities of government that increasingly rely on reflexive forms of self­ management and self-regulation on the part of individuals (Rose 1996a, 1996b, 1999). A t a more general level, this development has been addressed in terms of processes of in divid u alization (Beck, 1992) and reflexive m odernization (Giddens 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; see also CastelIs 2004; and Dean 2007 for a critique). To employ a dram aturgical metaphor, we may say that the occasions and settings wherein we are called to act in the name of our 'selves', beyond the prerogatives and limits of form al roles, have consistently m ultiplied in the course of the 20th century. These occasions and settings are now ubiquitous in Western liberal democracies, reaching well beyond the context of intimate or private relationships. As a dram a­ turgical role, the self is characterized by its informal, personal and confessional style: we act as selves by follow ing a (supposedly) unique and authentic m otivational script to which we and we alone have access through introspection. The acknowledgment and/or expression of emotion acts a prime signifier and guarantor of the self as a social actor. Emotions, writes Doyle M cCarthy, are 'necessary "p ro p s" with which the drama of self establishes its realism ' (1989: 66). Social scientists have been at pains to demonstrate, in various ways, how these new touchy-feely forms of interaction management do not imply a greater fairness or equality of social arrangements, contrary to the impression th eir rhetoric conveys. Social scientists can thus provide a form of critica l reflection on how psycho­ logical knowledge of emotions contributes to social processes, how it increasingly mediates relations of power and governance, and with it also the sensibilities and likely affective experiences of participants. But what of the social sciences them­ selves? How does their knowledge of emotion enter into these relations, shaping their development in pa rticu la r directions? Any critica l reflexive assessment of their

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contribution, pa rticu la rly given the rapidity with which the field is expanding, is necessarily provisional. Generally speaking, however, we may say that the social sciences offer a measure of distance with regard to commonsense accounts. They allow us to consider any proposition regarding affective experience in the context of broader fram eworks and dynamics. For example, if it is the case that the expression of authentic feelings increasingly features as a normative feature of interaction management, social scientists may point to the paradoxical character of the situ­ ations this generates. Commenting on the phenomenon of 'p o litica l correctness', for example, Schw artz writes: '[t]o have to try and act in a p olitically correct manner is to be p olitically incorrect. As George Orwell put it in 1984, " A party member is required to have not only the right opinions, but the right in s tin c ts " .. . . Love of the Oppressed, not the display of love but love itself, is a criterion for one's moral accept­ a b ility' (1993: 210, emphasis added). This comment highlights how the opportunities for the expression of 'au th entic' emotion can be logically subverted by their institutionalization, codification, and inevitable standardization, once emotional expression becomes a feature of routine interaction management. W hat can it mean to act 'true to oneself', in the name of deep personal feelings or beliefs as opposed to mere conventions, when doing so also represents the adequate response to social requirements and expectations? Acknowledging this paradox does not involve an epistem ological commitment to the notion of an authentic self as the source of authentic emotions, or indeed an opposite com m itm ent against it - the paradox can be taken either way. On the one hand, it may support a form of ironic detachment from the notion of authenticity as a theoretical possibility, and a view of identity as something to be reflexively 'invented'. On the other hand, the paradox may be taken to suggest that the dynamics of con­ tem porary governance contribute to forms of affective 'false consciousness' that are problem atic, for example on grounds of physical and mental health. The point here is that, in each case, the sociological diagnosis has im plications of a normative, and thereby also affective character (cf. Greco 2001). Engagement with the topic of affect and emotion on the part of social scientists may be said to produce a measure of disenchantment with the em ancipatory promise of psychological knowledge. A t the same time, this engagement carries an em ancipa­ tory potential of its own, to the extent that it has produced awareness of the con­ straints im p licit in supposedly relaxed and 'lib e ra to ry' form s of interaction. But we must, of course, be careful not to suppose that the work of social scientists is exempt from contributing to the creation of new constraints, as much as it may free us from old ones. We are not, indeed, to think in terms of a dichotomy opposing power and freedom. We may think instead in terms of a need to address the performative value im plicit in the interventions we make at any one time, in any p a rticu la r context. Producing ironic detachment from the theoretical possibility of authenticity, for example, may well be em ancipatory in one context, though not necessarily in another. For the community of social scientists, this reflection on performative value is an im portant aspect of the significance of the turn to affect. To redescribe the social world as saturated with affect and emotion is to redescribe it as saturated with value, or with the possibilities of affecting and being affected in positive or negative ways.

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INTRODUCTION:

EMOTION

AND

SOCIAL

SCIENCE

U si ng the Rea der We have organized the Reader into four Parts, each com prising three Sections. P art I is entitled Universals and p a rticu la rs o f affect. As this title suggests, one of the key features of social-scientific research on emotions is an acknowledged tension between those who emphasize the universally 'hum an' aspects of emotions and those, conversely, that stress the contingency of emotional experience and expression on variables such as historical time, culture, or social situation. This P art aims to intro­ duce how the disciplines of historiography, anthropology and sociology have each differently contributed to the fram ing of this debate, and how central the debate itself is to the definition of a broadly social-scientific approach to the emotions. P art II, Em bodying affect, includes texts that address emotion in relation to the embodied individual self, and in relation to subjective space. Spatial metaphors feature prominently in how the relationship between the self and emotions has been con­ ceptualized in different cultures and historical periods. The experience of space through the body, on the other hand, plays a crucial role in rendering space affectively significant. Last but not least, emotions have been described as the embodiment of culture, and thereby as the 'missing link' between the social and the physical determinants of health and illness. The aim of this P art of the book is to introduce the reader to the literatures that have addressed emotions and selfhood, emotions and space/place, and emotions and health as topics in their own right, w hilst pointing to the mutual resonances between these subjects. In P art III, P o litic a l economies o f affect, we have included extracts that address emotions from the angle of political economy, broadly defined. A ffect is central to contem porary economic processes, whether in the form of 'em otional labor' in the service industry, of 'em otional intelli­ gence' in the context of organizational management, or of the increasing attention paid to feeling in developing marketing strategies for p a rticu la r products. The centrality of emotions is equally evident in the media. Here, the increasing prominence of ta lk shows, docu-soaps and other rea lity genres, and the merging of information and entertainment as infotainment, reflects an erosion of the boundaries between the public and the private spheres, and between work and leisure. This P art includes texts relative to emotion in the contexts of work and organizations, economics and consumer culture, and the media industry. In the last P art of the book, entitled Affect, pow er and justice, we have gathered extracts that address the relationship between emotions and issues of social justice on a global and local level. These texts address themes such as the role of emotions in p olitical m obilization and social movements; the influence of mass-mediated emotional com m unications upon crim inal justice and the legal system; the importance of a discourse of compassion to contemporary hum anitarian and human rights movements; the role of emotions like 'te rro r' and 'hate' in contem porary political rhetoric and debate. In addition to this general introduction, where we have presented the general background and our rationale for the volume as a whole, we have produced a brief introduction for each of the twelve Sections of the book. These shorter introductions are designed to provide a guide to the specific themes covered by the extracts, and to highlight points of mutual relevance and comparison. There then follow s an annotated Guide to Further Reading. In this Guide we have listed a number of im portant texts

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th a t a re n ot o th e rw ise in clu d e d , fo llo w in g the s tru c tu re o f th e R ea d e r itse lf. A lth o u g h the G u id e is by no m eans co m p re h e n siv e o r co m p lete , we hope it w ill su p p o rt re a d e rs in fo llo w in g up th em e s o r qu e stio n s o f p a r t ic u la r in terest.

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Routledge. Shearing, C. and Kempa, M . (2 0 0 4 ) 'A museum of hope: a story of Robben Island', A n n a ls o f the A m e rica n A ca d e m y o f P o lit ic a l and S o c ia l Science, 5 9 2: 6 2 -7 8 . Sighele, S. (1 8 9 8 ) Le Fo u le C rim in e lle. Paris: A lca n . Solom on, R. C. (1 9 9 5 ) A P assio n fo r Ju stice : em otions a n d the o rig in s o f the s o c ia l contract. Lanham , M ary la n d : Rowm an & L ittle fie ld . Squire, C. (2 0 0 1 ) 'The public life of em otions', In te rn a tio n a l J o u rn a l o f C r it ic a l Psychology, 1 : 1 6 - 2 7 . Stainton Rogers, R. Stenner, P. Gleeson, K. and S tainton Rogers, W. (1 9 9 5 ) S o c ia l Psychology: a c r it ic a l agenda. Cam bridge: P o lity Press. Stenner, P. (1 9 9 3 ) 'D isco u rsin g jealousy', in Burm an, E. and Parker, I. (eds) D iscourse A n a ly tic Research: re p erto ire s and readings o f texts in action. London: Routledge. Stenner, P. (2 0 0 4 )

'Is a utopoie tic systems theory alexithym ic?

Luhm ann and the

sociopsychology of em otions', S o z ia ie Systeme, 10 (1): 1 5 9 -8 5 . Stenner, P. (2 0 0 5 b ) 'A n outline of an a utopoie tic approach to em otion', C ybernetics and Hum an Know ing, 12 (4): 8 -2 2 . Stenner, P. (2 0 0 8 ) 'A . N. W hitehead and su bjectivity', S ubjectivity, 22: 9 0 -1 0 9 . Stenner, P. and S tainton Rogers, R. (1 9 9 8 ) 'Je a lo u sy as a m anifold of divergent under­ standings: a Q m eth odological investigation', The Eu ropean J o u rn a l o f S o c ia l Psychology, 28, 7 1 -9 4 . Tam boukou, M . (2 0 0 3 )

'Inte rro ga tin g

the

"e m o tio n a l

tu rn ":

m aking

connections

w ith Fo u cau lt and Deleuze', Eu rop ean J o u rn a l o f Psychotherapy, Co un selling and Health, 6 (3): 2 0 9 -2 3 . Tester, K. (2 0 0 1 ) Com passion, M o r a lit y and the M edia. Buckingham : Open U niversity Press. T h rift, N. (2 0 0 8 )

N o n -rep re se n ta tio n al Theory: space / p o litic s / affect. London:

Routledge. Tom kins, S. (1 9 6 3 ) A ffe ctiv e , Im agery, Consciousness.

Vol. 1 The p o sitiv e affects.

London: Tavistock. Van S tokkom , B. (2 0 0 2 ) 'M o r a l em otions in restorative justice conferences: managing shame, designing em pathy', T h e o re tica l C rim ino logy, 6(3): 3 3 9 -6 0 . W atson, S. (1 9 9 9 ) 'P o lic in g the a ffective society: beyond governm entality in the theory of socia l c o n tro l', S o c ia l a n d L e g a l Studies, 8: 2 2 7 -5 1 . W illia m s, S. (2 0 0 1 ) E m o tio n s a n d S o c ia l Theory. London: Sage. W illia m s, S .J. ( 1 9 9 8 ) ' " C a p ita lis in g " on em otions? R ethinking the inequalities in health debate', S ociolo gy, 32 (1): 1 3 2 -3 3 . W issinger, E. (2 0 0 7 ) 'M o d e llin g a way of life: im m aterial and affective labour in the fashion m odelling industry', E p h e m e ra ,1 (1): 2 5 0 -6 9 . W outers, C. (1 9 8 6 ) 'F o rm a liz a tio n and In fo rm a liza tion : Changing Tension B alances in C iv ilizin g Processes', Theory, C u ltu re & Society, 3 (2): 1 -1 8 .

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PART ONE

Universals and particulars of affect

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1. Emotions, history and civilization

T

H I S IS T H E F I R S T O F three sections where we have gathered texts that share a concern with questions of universality and difference in the study of

emotions. The concern is common across the disciplines of history, anthropology and sociology, as are some of the concepts through which it is articulated (e.g. 'con­ structionism '). Debates in each discipline, however, are coloured by different emphases and priorities. The texts included in this section address the dimension of tem poral continuity and difference through the work of historians and historical sociologists. H istorical research on the emotions can be broadly distinguished in terms of the focus on two very different kinds of object. One strand of research addresses theories or ideas about emotion as these have been developed by philosophers, theologians, psychologists and psychiatrists. This strand is exemplified here in our first extract, from Thomas D ixon's Fro m Passion to Em otions: the creation o f a secular psycho­ lo g ica l category (2003). Ideas and theories of 'em otion' as such are relatively recent, as the term was not widely in use before the early nineteenth century. W hile much historical writing underplays the significance of this term inological point, sometimes to the point of ignoring it altogether, it is central to Dixon's analysis. Dixon proposes that the shift from 'passions' to 'em otions' cannot be understood simply as the employment of a new word to describe the same thing. Passions and affections, especially since Augustine and Aquinas, were terms embedded in a theological semantic web. They resonated with other terms such as the soul and the w ill, and they operated within a normative moral fram ework at whose pinnacle stood a trans­ cendental deity. 'E m otion ', by contrast, has its provenance in the secularized idiom of the increasingly specialized and autonomous practices of science and medicine. As a concept, it is born of a quasi-em pirical distinction between external and internal affections of the mind. As internal affections of the mind, emotions are in turn

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distinguished from thought or intellect. In this manner, emotions are dissociated from the dimensions of m orality and ethics, and construed as non-rational feeling states with evident ties to the body. The text by Dixon included here points to the historical specificity of the concept of emotion, and to the methodological dangers im plicit in the historiographical task of mediating between this modern concept and its equivalents in the past. D ixon's argument in this work parallels anthropological deconstructions of Western concepts of emotion, such as the studies by Lutz (1986; see also extract in this volume), which seek to highlight the epistem ological and normative assumptions these concepts imply, and the methodological p itfa lls of ignoring them. Another strand of historical research on the emotions addresses changes not in theories or concepts of emotion, but in the social norm s regarding their experience and expression - changes in attitudes, standards, or what sociologist A rlie Hochschild named 'feeling rules' (see section 3 below) and what historians Stearns and Stearns called 'em otionology' (1985). Here the focus can be on the historical trajectory of individual emotions such as anger, jealousy or fear, or it can be on general styles of affect management typical of entire epochs. The work of Norbert E lias is the clearest example of this latter approach and, for better or for worse (see the critique by Rosenwein, 2002), it has been credited with providing something like a paradigm for subsequent historical and historico-sociological research on the emotions. The text included here comprises two short extracts from E lia s' magnum opus, The C iv iliz in g Process, originally published in 1939. The theory of the civilizing process offers an account of the long-term correlation between changes in personality structure and socio-political changes since the late M iddle Ages in Europe. In a nutshell, the theory describes how the increasing complexity of networks of human interdependence, as particu larly evident in the emergence of the modern state with its increasing functional differentiation, goes hand in hand with the development of increasing capacities for foresight and calculation on the part of individuals. These capacities for foresight and calculation rely in turn on increasing measures of impulse restraint, of detachment and observation of self from the vantage point of others. Over time, both the quality of affective experience and the form s of its expression are profoundly transformed through this process. In relation to emotions, and contrary to some readings of E lia s' theory, it is im portant to realize that the theory of the civilizing process does not suggest changes in the direction of a wholesale repression of a ffec­ tive life. One keyw ord to describe the direction of the overall process is 'psychologiza­ tion'; this involves an expansion of the occasions for the experience of emotions like shame and repugnance, for example, as much as it involves restraint over the physical expressions of, say, anger and joy. The theory of the civilizing process constitutes much more than a historio­ graphical endeavour. It also offers a diagnosis of typ ically modern form s of self­ perception, which in turn provides the basis for a h istorically reflexive sociology of knowledge. For Elias, an historical movement in the direction of increasing capacity for detachment and affective neutrality was crucial for the development of modern science. This capacity occurred earlier in relation to the observation of natural phenomena, and only later in relation to the reflexive observation of human behaviour and relationships. The theory of the civilizing process should be read, on one level, as

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an expression of the very dynamics it describes: it is designed to bring a further measure of affective detachment (and thus w hat Elias called 're a lity congruence') to the study of human beings. This is evident, for example, in the relationship between E lia s' theory and psychoanalysis. E lias borrowed and adapted many Freudian con­ cepts, such as that of 'repression'; but he was also critica l of Freud for assuming that the structure of the mental apparatus as he had described it was universal and relatively ahistorical. Elias considered that Freud, like most of his contemporaries, was trapped (or still too 'involved') in the human self-image typical of modernity, one that regarded the opposition between 'in dividual' psyches and 's o cia l' constraints as a static epistem ological given. The constructionism im plicit in E lia s' theory thus assumes a fundamental plasticity of emotional experience, while positing the a vail­ ability of universal psychological mechanisms for the moulding of that experience. The selections from The C iv iliz in g Process that we have included in this volume touch on these m ultiple aspects and valences of the theory. The first part addresses changes in aggressiveness, underscoring the im portance that E lias ascribed to violence and to the relative degree of pacification in a society for the purposes of explaining changes in emotional experience and expression. The second part of the text focuses on the concept of 'psychologization', illustrating the pivotal importance of the European courts as sites for the exponential development of capacities for emotional detachment, observation and self-observation. Abram De Swaan is one of a group of Dutch sociologists who have applied and developed E lia s' insights to the study of more contem porary social phenomena. This extract from an essay entitled 'The politics of agoraphobia' (1990) presents an analytical fram ew ork for understanding how social developments 'm ay have altered the intimate relations between people, so that the difficulties they experience with themselves and with one another may have become translatable into the vocabulary of psychotherapy and suitable for treatm ent as psychic problems'. The argument developed in the text speaks to a number of interrelated theoretical concerns. The broadest of these is the question of whether the relaxation of codes of behaviour and the 'in fo rm a lization ' of many social relations, especially evident since the 1960s, signifies a reversal in the direction of the 'civilizing process' - a movement towards decreasing self-restraint. The answer is a resounding 'no': inform alization involves new and subtler form s of affective self-restraint and self-discipline, and these are associated to the proliferation of a range of psychic problems. De Swaan thus takes issue with the constructionist notion that the emergence of psychic problems in their contem porary form is a consequence of the rise of the profession of psychotherapy. According to the constructionist argument, professional and bureaucratic institutions have provided a vocabulary of troubles through which the lay public construct their definition and experience of everyday difficulties, and thereby also the presentation of th eir com plaints. W hile this may be true on one level, argues De Swaan, the explanation is reductive and sim plistic, for it fails to take into account the context of wider changes in the patterns of mutual interdependence between individuals. De Swaan focuses on a transform ation in the management of power relations that is im plicit in processes of 'in fo rm alization ', which he describes as a transition from 'management by com m and' to 'management by negotiation7. Against this background, a range of psychic problems can be interpreted as ways of 'opting out'

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of form s of social interaction that are not as liberating as their rhetoric often suggests. The fourth and final extract in this section is from a chapter by Peter and Deborah Stearns, where the authors discuss issues of causation and timing in the historical study of emotions. In the chapter as a whole, Stearns and Stearns present a number of m ethodological choices in relation to the problem of causation in historical research. One choice is between taking changes in specific emotions the explanatory focus, or adopting a larger, m eta-historical focus of analysis by looking at changes in general frameworks, or 'em otional styles'. A focus on larger fram eworks assumes 'th a t changes in individual emotion follow simply from the larger innovations'. These issues of scale in causation have rarely been considered by historians, they claim , but are in fa ct m ethodologically crucial. A second choice involved in the analysis of historical change concerns the balance between 'fu n ctio n a list' and 'cu ltu ra list' explanations. Functionalist explanations of emotional change interpret such change as an adaptation to novel social conditions (such as industrialization and urbaniza­ tion, in the modern period). Cu ltu ralist explanations, on the other hand, examine change in connection with factors such as the nature of dominant discourses (e.g. religious vs scientific, and variations within these), and changes in the media employed by advice-givers and educators. W hile outlining these methodological and analytical alternatives, the authors stress that they are not m utually exclusive and that causation, in most instances, is 'm ultifaceted'. Our selection from this chapter focuses on the discussion of causation in relation to changes in specific emotions.

References Rosenwein, B. H. (2 0 0 2 ) 'W orrying about emotions in history', A m erica n H isto ric a l Review, 107 (3): 8 2 1 -8 4 5 . Stearns, P. N. and Stearns, C. Z. (1 9 8 5 ) 'Em otionology: clarifying the history of emotions and em otional standards', The A m erica n H is to ric a l Review, 90 (4): 8 1 3 -8 3 6 .

Chapter

1

Thomas Dixon FROM

I

N THIS

P A S S I O N S TO E M O T I O N S

BOOK

I INVESTIGATE

the crcation o f ‘the e m o tio n s’ as a

psychological category. By seein g how this category w as con ceiv ed , and by looking at the different psychological catego ries it replaced durin g the eighteenth and nineteenth cen tu ries, 1 aim to provide read ers w ith reso u rces that w ill help them to step back from the con tem p orary obviousn ess o f the existen ce and im p o r­ tance of ‘the e m o tio n s’ and to ask fundam ental question s ab out this c ate g o ry ’ s m eaning and value. In other w ords, I hope my h istorical accoun t w ill stim ulate philosophical and psy ch o lo gical reflection . O f particular im portan ce to this story is the d isplacem en t, in the h istory of system atic psy ch o lo gical theorisin g, of m ore differentiated ty p ologies (w hich included ap petites, p assion s, affections and se n ti­ m en ts) by a single over arching category o f em otio n s d u rin g the nineteenth century. Perhaps these past ty p o lo gie s w ill give re a d e rs pause for thought, and encourage them to ask w hether the em otio n s, as w e think o f them today in psychology and philosophy, really form a coh eren t c a te g o ry .1 I will su gg est that a m ore differentiated typology w ould be a useful to o l, and w ould help us to avoid m aking sw eeping claim s about all 'e m o tio n s’ being go o d o r bad things, rational or irrational, virtu ou s or vicious. . . . My argu m en t about the h istorical provenance o f m o d e rn th eories o f the em otio n s is revision ist, especially w ith re sp e ct to R o b e rt So lo m o n ’ s thesis in his influential b ook

The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning o f Life (1 9 7 6 , 19 9 3 ) . 2

S o lo m o n ’ s thesis is, in sh o rt, that W estern thinkers have been pron e, right up to the late tw entieth cen tury, to take a negative view o f the em otio n s and to think o f them as inherently bodily, involuntary and irrational. Solom on blam es this negative view o f em otio n s on the influence o f rationalist view s (in w hich reason and the em otions arc an tagon ists) that have been dom inant am on g W estern ph ilosoph ers in gen eral and certain C hristian theologians in particular.

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S o lo m o n ’ s w as the first in a sp ate o f b o o k s in rc c e n t d e c ad e s that all se e k , in on e w ay o r anoth er, to reh ab ilitate the e m o tio n s. . . . M any of th ese w rite r s also ech o S o lo m o n ’ s th esis that from an tiquity up until the late tw en tieth cen tu rv p h ilo so p h e rs and p sy ch o lo g ists have g e n e rally , and m isg u id e d lv , th ough t of reason and the e m o tio n s as an tag o n ists. . . . O n e o f m yJ aim s in this b o o k is to show how O th ese view s on the h isto ry o f ideas ab o u t p assio n s and e m o tio n s arc th e m se lv e s, in certain re sp e c ts, m ythical and e rro n e o u s. T h e h istorical sto ry I tell h ere tu rn s S o lo m o n ’ s view on its head. I argu e that it w as in fact the rc c c n t d e p a rtu re from trad ition al view s ab o u t the p assio n s (n o t the influence o f th ose v ie w s) that led to the creation o f a cate g o ry o f ‘ e m o tio n s’ that w as co n ceiv ed in o p p o sitio n to re a so n , in te lle ct and w ill. T h e cate g o ry o f e m o tio n s, con ceiv ed as a se t o f m orally d ise n g ag e d , b o d ily , n on -cogn itive and in volun tary fe elin gs, is a rc c c n t in ven tion . P rio r to the creation o f the e m o tio n s as an o ver-arch in g c a te g o ry , m o re su b tle ty had b een p o ssib le on th ese q u e stio n s. T h e ‘ a ffe ctio n s’ , and the ‘ m o ral se n tim e n ts’ , fo r e x a m p le , cou ld be u n d e rsto o d as both ration al and v olu n tary m o v e m e n ts o f the so u l, w hile still b e in g su b jectiv ely w arm and lively p sy c h o lo g ic al states. It is n ot the case that p r io r to the 1 9 7 0 s n o one had realised that thinkin g, w illin g and feelin g w ere (and should b e ) in te rw in e d in one way o r anoth er. A lm o st every b od y had re a lise d this. Too m any c o n te m p o ra ry w rite r s still ap p e al, n o n e th e le ss, to the idea . . . that eith er a p a rtic u la r in dividu al, o r sch oo l o f th ou gh t, o r p e r io d , o r even the en tire h istory o f ph ilosoph y has been ch a ra c te rise d by the view that the e m o tio n s . . . are en tirely in sidiou s and are to be su b je c ted at all tim e s to alm ighty re aso n . A nythin g m o re than the b rie fe st o f glan ces at the h istory o f th ough t establish es that this is a th orough ly un ten able id e a, even w hen ap p lied to Sto ic o r C h ristian p h ilo so p h e rs (th o se m o st o lten accu sed o f passion - o r c m o tio n -h a trc d ) . 1 [. . .] It is an im m en sely strik in g fact of the h isto ry o f E n glish -lan gu age p sy ch o lo g ical th ough t that d u rin g the p e r io d b e tw e en c. 1800 and c. 1850 a w h olesale ch an ge in establish ed vo cab u lary o c c u rre d such that th o se en gaged in th e o retical d iscu ssio n s ab o u t p h en o m en a in clu ding h o p e , fear, love, h ate, jo y , so rro w , an g e r and the like no lo n g e r prim arily d iscu ssed the p assio n s o r affection s of the so u l, n or the se n tim e n ts, b u t a lm o st invariablv re fe rre d to ‘ the e m o tio n s’ . T h is tran sition is as strik in g as if establish ed c o n ccp tu al te rm s such as ‘r e a so n ’ o r ‘ m e m o r y ’ o r ‘ im ag in a tio n ’ or ‘ w ill’ had been quite sudden ly re p la c e d by a w holly new cate g o ry . T h e pu zzlin g h istorical q u e stio n , th en , at the h ea rt o f this b o o k (a q u e stio n that, equally puzzlin gly, has rarely b een p o se d b e fo re , let alone an sw ered ) is: w hen and why did E n glish -lan gu age p sy ch o lo gical w rite r s sto p usin g ‘p a ssio n s’ , ‘ affe c tio n s’ and ‘se n tim e n ts’ as th eir p rim ary c a te g o rie s and sta rt re fe rrin g in stead to the ‘ e m o tio n s’ ? . . . O n e im p o rta n t e le m e n t o f m y an sw er to this cen tral h istorical q u e stio n is that it w as the sec u larisa tio n o f p sy ch o lo gy that gave rise to the creation and ad o p tio n o f the new c ate g o ry o f ‘ e m o tio n s’ and influen ced the w ay it w as o rigin ally and has su b seq u en tly b een con cciv ed . [. . .] T h e initial b ack d ro p I p rovid e to this sto ry o f g rad u al, c o m p le x and in co m p le te se cu larisa tio n , takes the fo rm o f an analysis o f p atristic and sch o la stic C h ristian th e o lo g ie s o f the sou l. C lassical C h ristian th e o lo g ia n s, especially St A u gustin e o f H ip p o and St T h o m a s A q u in as, . . . p ro d u c e d m o d e ls o f the h um an so u l in w hich

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3 1

the passions and ap p etites, w hich w ere m ovem en ts o f the low er anim al sou l, w ere distinguish ed from the affections, w hich w ere acts o f the higher rational soul. The ap petites w ere hunger, thirst and sexual desire. The disob edien ce of the low er soul to the higher, and o f the body to the sou l, e x p erien ced in sexual appetite and in the passions w as a sign of, and punishm ent for, the original sin o f Adam and Eve. O ften , passions w ere unruly and disturb ed the body; they included love, hate, h ope, fear and anger. T h e higher affections o f love, sym pathy and joy w ere signs o f rclatcdn ess to G od and held out the possibility o f reunion with G od . T h e affections w ere also signs o f the o rd e r o r direction o f the w ill. A carnal w ill w as affected by w orldly ob jects and, ultim ately, by love o f self; a holy w ill’s affections w ere for go o d n ess, truth an d, ultim ately, G o d . It is im p o rtan t to have an understan ding o f the im p o rtan ce o f the w ill to Christian m orality and Christian psychology in o rd e r to appreciate the significance o f its gradu al disappearance in eighteenth- and nineteenth -century w orks. The destiny o f each person w as determ in ed by freely taken voluntary decision s — decision s o f the individual w ill. The w ill w as divided by Aquinas into tw o ‘ap p e ­ t ite s’ : the higher in tellectual appetite (the w ill p ro p e r), w hose m ovem en ts w ere the affections; and the low er, non-rational sense ap petite, w hose m ovem en ts w ere the ap p etites and passions. It is particularly im p o rtan t, then, to realise that — contrary to pop u lar opinion — classical Christian view s about reason and the passions w ere equivalen t n either to the view that reason and the ‘e m o tio n s’ arc inevitably at war, n or to the idea that ‘e m o tio n s’ overpow er us against o u r will. A p petites, passion s and affections, on the classical C hristian view, w ere all m o v e­ m en ts o f different parts o f the w ill, and the aftections, at least, w ere potentially in lorm cd by reason. C h apter 3 exam in es so m e o f the m ovem en ts away from classical Christian p sych ology tow ards m ore secular and m echanistic view s of passions and affections in the eighteenth cen tury, as w ell as w ays that the traditional C hristian pictu re w as m aintained and d eveloped. Christian thinkers such as Josep h Butler, Jonathan E dw ards and T h om as R eid adapted the tradition al m od els in various ways. The tenden cies to see passions and affections as ‘m ech an ism s’ designed by G o d , and as ‘p e rce p tio n s’ , w ere both sy m pto m atic o f psy ch o lo gies in w hich the will had b eco m e less im p o rtan t. Passions and affections w ere conceived increasingly as m ini-agents in their own right, o r as a faculty o f their ow n, rath er than as acts or m ovem en ts o f the individual w ill. This had significant m oral and theological im plication s. The d iscou rse o f ‘m oral se n tim e n ts’ specifically and the culture o f ‘ se n tim e n t’ and ‘sen tim en talism ’ m ore gen erally, w hich w ere fascinating features o f this sam e p e rio d , arc also referred to in chapter 3. T h ese serv e as further exam p les o f the variety o f catego ries and con ceptu alisation s used durin g this p e rio d , w hich w as an age o f passions and sen tim en ts as m uch as it w as an ‘ Age o f R e aso n ’ . The initial baptism o f the term ‘e m o tio n s’ . . . in its m od ern sense occu rred in the school o f Scottish em p iricist ph ilosoph ers and m ental scien tists from David H u m e ’ s Treatise o f Human Nature (1 7 3 9 —4 0 ) on w ards. The m ost im portan t tex t w as Thomas B row n ’s Lectures on the Philosophy o f the Human Mind (1 8 2 0 ) in which ‘ e m o tio n s’ w as the term ad opted for all those feelings that w ere n either sensations n or in tellectual stales. Brow n developed a new term in ology and classification o f

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m en tal sta te s, m otiv ate d by a d e sire to b reak away fro m trad ition al faculty p sy c h ­ o lo g y , and to cre ate a d c -C h ristian ise d and scien tific altern ative.

‘ E m o tio n s’

in clu ded a w id e variety o f state s that had previou sly b een d iffe ren tiated , and m any o f w hich had b een c o n sid e re d active p o w e rs o f the so u l. T h e te rm ‘ e m o tio n s’ w as b ap tised in a w ay that su g g e ste d these m en tal state s wrere passive and n on -cogn itive. T h e c ate g o ry w as o ver-in clu sive and w as e m b e d d e d in a trad ition c o m m itte d to the ap plication o f scien tific m e th o d o lo g y to the stu d y o f the m in d . H ow ever, the a p p li­ cation o f scientific m e th o d and c o m m itm e n t to C h ristian ity w ere by n o m ean s m utually e x clu siv e : the evan gelical th eologian T h o m a s C h alm e rs ad o p ted and even stren gth en ed the n on -co gn itiv e, in volun tary and m ech an ical te n o r o f B ro w n ’ s ‘ fe e l­ in g ’ th e o ry o f e m o tio n s. . . . Physical scien ce re p la c e d m en tal scien ce as the d o m in an t m e th o d o lo g y in w ork s on e m o tio n s by H e r b e r t Spen cer, A le x a n d e r Bain and C h arles D arw in in the 1 8 5 0 s to 1 8 7 0 s. T h e a ssu m p tio n , still m ad e by C h ristian p h ilo so p h e rs and p sy c h o lo g ists at this tim e , that p assio n s and affection s w ere in stan ces o f the soul actin g upon o r usin g the b o d y , w as re p la ce d w ith the assu m p tio n that e m o tio n s w ere in stan ces o f the brain and n e rv e s acting u p o n o th e r p a rts o f the b o d y . T h e m in d o r so u l p e r se w as n ot given an active ro le. P h y sio logical and e volu tion ary th in kers w ere q u ic k er to a p p ro p ria te the cate g o ry ‘ e m o tio n s’ than th in kers w ithin the C h ristian trad itio n , so m e o f w h om w ere still speak in g the lan gu age o f ‘ w ill’ , 'p a ssio n s’ and ‘ affe c tio n s’ in the 1 8 7 0 s. So use o f the te rm w as gen erally indicative o f fam iliarity and sym path y w ith B ro w n ’ s se c u larise d m en tal scien ce. T h e re la tio n ­ ship b e tw e en th ese ph ysicalist th in kers and the m o ral p h ilo so p h e rs and n atural th eo lo g ian s w hose w o rk they w ere d e v e lo p in g u p o n , w as not alw ays straig h t­ fo rw ard , how ever. D a rw in ’s relation sh ip w ith Scottish m o ral ph ilosoph y and Sir C h arles B e ll’ s design th eology se rv e s as an illu stratio n o f th ese c o m p le x re la tio n ­ ships. T h e th e o rie s of e m o tio n and e x p re ssio n p ro d u c e d by this ge n e ra tio n o f scien tific p sy c h o lo g ists wrere shaped both po sitiv ely and n egatively by th eo lo g ical and re lig io u s id eas. S o m e C h ristian and th eistic p sy c h o lo g ists (fo r e x a m p le , W illiam Lyall o r Ja m e s M cC o sh ) ad o p ted the n ew cate g o ry o f e m o tio n s but o p p o se d the ph y sicalist ap p ro ach o f the new e m o tio n s th e o rists and p ro p o se d m c n talistic and cogn itiv e alte rn ativ e s. . . . M o re p r c sc n tist and n arro w e r h isto rie s o f p sy ch o lo gy m igh t b egin their a cc o u n t o f the h isto ry o f p sy ch o lo gical th e o rie s o f e m o tio n s w ith W illiam Ja m e s. In this h isto ry , in c o n trast, Ja m e s ’ in fam ou s th eory is d e p ic te d as the cu lm in atio n o f c o m p le x p ro c e sse s o f se cu larisatio n and innovation in p sy c h o lo g ical d isc o u rse . Ja m e s ’ ico n ic 1884 artic le ‘W h at is an e m o tio n ? ’ m ad e e x p lic it in a n ew way the tacit c p ip h c n o m c n alism o f the ph y sio lo g ical-ev o lu tio n ary th e o ry o f e m o tio n s. H is th e o ry o f e m o tio n s — that they w ere felt aw are n e sse s o f visceral activity — w as a flagship th eory o f the new scien tific p h y ch ological p ro fessio n . Ja m e s in verted the trad itio n al assu m p tio n that the o u tw a rd b odily m an ife statio n s o f e m o tio n s w ere cau se d by eith er the activity o f the soul o r even — as in the case o f the ph y siologicale volu tion ary sch o o l — by the activity o f the b rain ; the v iscera w ere m ad e p rim ary and the brain and its m in d se co n d ary by Ja m e s. |. . .]

F RO M P A S S 10 N S T O

E M OTI O N S

3 3

Notes 1

2 3

For a very helpful article sum m arising recent debates about the natural kind status o f ‘em otion ’ ,and arguing that ‘em otion’ is indeed a natural kind term , see Charland (2002). Solom on (1993). O n Stoic and early Christian attitudes to passions, will and reason, see Sorabji ( 2 0 0 0 ).

References Charland, L. (2002) ‘The natural kind status o f em otion ’ , British Journal fo r the Philosophy of Science. 53(4): 1—27. Solom on, R. (2003) The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning o f Life. Indianapolis: Hackett. Sorabji, R. (2000) Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. O xford: O xford University Press.

Chapter

2

Norbert Elias ON C H A N G E S I N A G G R E S S I V E N E S S

[• • •]

T

HE ST A N D A R D

OF A G G R E S S I V E N E S S ,

I T S tone and intensity,

is not at presen t cxactly uniform am on g the dilTerent nations o f the W est. But

these differen ces, which from close up often ap p ear quite con siderable, d isap pear if the aggressiven ess o f the “civilized” nations is com pared to that o f societies at a d if­ ferent stage o f affect con trol. C o m p ared to the battle fury o f Abyssinian w arrio rs— adm ittedly pow erless against the technical apparatus of the civilized arm y— o r to the frenzy o f the different tribes at the tim e o f the G reat M igration s, the aggressiven ess o f even the m ost w arlike nations of the civilized w orld ap pears su b dued. Like all other instincts, it is boun d, even in directlv w arlike actions, bv the advanced state o f the division o f function s, and by the resultin g gre ater depen den ce of individuals on cach other and on the technical apparatus. It is confined and tam ed bv innum erable ru les and proh ibitions that have b eco m e self-con strain ts. It is as m uch tran sfo rm e d ,

“refin ed ,” “civilized ,” as all the other fo rm s o f p leasu re, and its im m ediate and un controlled violence ap pears only in d ream s or in isolated o u tb u rsts that we account for as path ological. In this area o f the affects, the theater o f the h ostile collisions betw een m en , the sam e h istorical tran sform ation has taken place as in all others. N o m atter at w hat point the M iddle A ges stand in this tran sform ation , it will again suffice here to take the standard o f their secular rulin g class, the w arrio rs, as a startin g poin t, to illustrate the overall pattern o f this d evelopm en t. T h e release o f the affects in battle in the M iddle A ges w as no longer, p erh aps, quite so uninhibited as in the early p erio d o f the G reat M igration s. But it w as open and uninhabited enough com pared to the standard o f m o d ern tim es. In the latter, cruelty and joy in the destru ction and to rm e n t o f o th ers, like the p ro o f o f physical su p e rio rity , are placed under an increasingly stron g social con trol an ch ored in the state organization. All these fo rm s o f pleasure, lim ited by threats o f d ispleasure, gradually com e to e xp re ss them selves

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only in d irectly , in a “ refin ed” fo rm . And only al tim e s o f social upheaval o r w here social c o n tro l is lo o se r (e .g ., in colon ial re g io n s) do they b reak o u t m o re directly , unin hibitedly, less im p e d e d by sh am e and rep u gn an ce. L ife in m ed iev al so c iety ten d e d in the o p p o site d ire c tio n . R ap in e, b attle , h u n t­ ing o f m en and an im als— all th ese w ere vital n e c essitie s w h ich , in ac co rd an c e w ith the stru c tu re o f so c ie ty , w ere visible to all. A nd th u s, for the m igh ty and stro n g , they fo rm e d p a rt o l the p le a su re s o f life. “ I tell v o u ,” says a w ar hvm n attrib u te d to the m in strel B crtran de B o r n ,1 “that n eith er eatin g, d rin k in g, n o r sle ep has as m uch savor fo r m e as to h ear the cry ‘ F o r w a rd s!’ from both sid e s, and h o rse s w ith ou t rid e r s shying and w hin n y­ in g, and the cry ‘ H elp ! H e lp !’ , and to see the sm all and the g r e a t fall to the g rass at the d itch es and the dead p ie rc e d by the w o o d o f the lances d eck ed w ith b a n n e rs.” Even the lite ra ry fo rm u la tio n giv es an im p ressio n o f the orig in al savagery o f feelin g. In an oth er p lace B e rtran de B o rn sin gs: “T h e p le asan t se aso n is draw in g nigh w hen o u r ships shall lan d , w hen K in g R ich ard shall c o m e , m e rry and p ro u d as he n ever w as b e fo re . N o w w e shall see go ld and silver sp e n t; the n ew ly b u ilt sto n e ­ w o rk w ill c rack to the h e a r t’ s d e sire , w alls c ru m b le , to w e rs to p p le and c o llap se , o u r e n e m ie s taste p riso n and chain s. I love the m e le e o f blue and verm ilio n sh ield s, the m a n y -co lo red en sig n s and the b an n e rs, the ten ts and rich pavilions sp read out on the plain , the b reak in g lan ces, the p ie rc e d sh ield s, the g le a m in g h elm ets that are sp lit, the b low s given and re c e iv e d .” W ar, on e o f the chansons de geste d e c la re s, is to d e sce n d as the stro n g e r on the e n em y, to hack dow n his vin es, u p ro o t his tre e s, lay w aste his lan d, lak e his castles by sto r m , fill in his w ells, and kill his p e o p le . . . . A p a rtic u la r p leasu re is taken in m u tilatin g p riso n e rs: “ By my tr o th ,” says the king in the sam e chanson, “ I laugh at w hat you say, I care n ot a fig lo r y o u r th reats, I shall sh am e every knight I have taken , cut o ff his n o se o r his cars. If he is a se rg ea n t o r a m erch an t he w ill lose a fo o t o r an a r m .” Such things arc n o t only said in song. T h e se e p ics are an in tegral p a rt of social life. A nd they e x p r e ss the feelin gs o f the liste n e rs fo r w h om they arc in ten ded far m o re d irectly than m o st o f o u r literatu re. T h ey m ay e x a g g e ra te in d etail. Even in the age o f chivalry m on ey already h ad, on o cc asio n s, so m e p o w e r to su b d u e and tran sfo rm the affects. U su ally only the p o o r and low ly, fo r w h om no co n sid erab le ran som cou ld b e e x p e c te d , w ere m u tila te d , and the kn ights w ho co m m a n d e d ra n so m s w ere sp a re d . T h e ch ro n icles w hich d irectly d o c u m e n t social life b e ar am p le w itn e ss to these attitu d es. T h ey w ere m o stly w ritte n by c le rics. T h e value ju d g m e n ts they con tain are th erefo re often th ose o f the w eak er g ro u p th reaten ed by the w a r rio r class. N e v e r ­ th e le ss, the p ictu re they tran sm it to us is qu ite gen u in e. “ H e sp en d s his life ,” we read o f a kn igh t, “in p lu n d e rin g , d e stro y in g ch u rc h es, fallin g upon p ilg r im s, o p p re ssin g w id o w s and orph an s. He takes p a rtic u la r p le asu re in m u tilatin g the in n ocen t. In a single m o n a ste ry , that o f the b lack m o n k s o f Sarlat, th ere are 150 m en and w o m en w h ose h ands he has cut o ff o r w h o se ey es he has p u t o u t. And his w ife is ju st as cru e l. She h elp s him w ith his e x e c u tio n s. It even giv es h er p le asu re to to rtu re the p o o r w o m en . She had th eir b re asts h acked o ff o r their nails to rn o ff so that they w ere in capable o f w o rk .”’

3 6

N O R B E R T

ELIAS

Such affective o u tb u rsts may still o c c u r as e x c e p tio n a l p h e n o m e n a, as a “ p a th o ­ lo g ic a l” d e g e n e ra tio n , in later ph ases o f social d e v e lo p m en t. But h ere no punitive social p o w e r e x iste d . T h e only th reat, the only d an g er that co u ld instill fe ar w as that o f b e in g o v e rp o w e re d in b attle by a stro n g e r o p p o n e n t. L eavin g aside a sm all elite, rap in e, pillag e, and m u rd e r w ere stan d ard p rac tic e in the w a r rio r so ciety o f this tim e , as is n o ted by L u ch aire , the h istorian o f th irte e n th -ce n tu ry French so ciety . T h ere is little ev id en ce that things wrcre differen t in o th e r c o u n trie s o r in the c e n tu rie s that follow ed . O u tb u rsts o f c ru e lty did n o t e x c lu d e on e from social life. T h ey w ere n ot o u tlaw ed . T h e p le asu re in killin g and to rtu rin g o th e rs w as g re at, and it w as a socially p e rm itte d p le asu re . To a certain e x te n t, the social stru c tu re even push ed its m e m b e rs in this d ire c tio n , m akin g it seem n e c essa ry and practically ad v an tageo u s to behave in this w ay. W h at, for e x a m p le , ou gh t to b e don e wnth p riso n e rs? T h e re w as little m on ey in this so ciety . W ith re g ard to p r iso n e rs w ho co u ld pay and w h o, m o re o v e r, w ere m e m b e rs o f o n e ’s ow n c lass, on e e x e rc ise d so m e d e g re e o f re strain t. B ut the o th e rs? To keep them m e an t to fe ed th em . To re tu rn them m e an t to enhance the w ealth and fighting p o w e r o f the en em y. For su b je c ts ( i.e ., w o rk in g , se rv in g , and fighting h an ds) w ere a p a rt o f the w ealth o f the ru lin g class o f that tim e . So p r iso n e rs w ere killed o r sen t b ack so m u tila te d that they w ere un fitted fo r w ar se rv ic e and w o rk . T h e sam e ap p lied to d e stro y in g field s, filling in wre lls, and cu ttin g dow n tre e s. In a p re d o m in an tly ag rarian so c iety , in w hich im m o b ile p o sse ssio n s re p re se n te d the m a jo r p a rt o f p r o p e rty , this to o se rv e d to w eaken the en em y. T h e stro n g e r affectivity o f beh avior w as to a c e rtain d e g re e socially n e cessary . P eople behaved in a socially u sefu l way and to o k p le asu re in d o in g so. And it is en tirely in k eep in g w ith the le sse r d e g re e o f social c o n tro l and co n strain t o f in stin ctual life that this joy in d e stru c tio n cou ld so m e tim e s give w ay, th rough a su d d en iden tification w ith the v ictim , and d o u b tle ss also as an e x p re ssio n o f the fear and g u ilt p ro d u ce d by the p e rm an e n t p re ca rio u sn e ss of this life; to e x tre m e s o f pity. T h e v ic to r o f today w as d e fe ate d to m o rro w bv so m e accid e n t, c a p tu re d , and im p e rile d . In the m id st o f this p e rp e tu a l risin g and falling, this alte rn atio n o f the hum an hunts o f w artim e w ith the an im al h un ts o r to u rn a m e n ts that w ere the d iv e rsio n s o f “p e a c e ­ tim e ,” little cou ld b e p re d ic te d . T h e fu tu re wras relatively u n certain even fo r those w ho had fled the “w o rld ” ; only G o d and the loyalty o f a few p e o p le w h o held to g e th e r had any p e rm an e n c e . Fear reign ed e v e ry w h e re; on e had to be on o n e ’ s gu ard all the tim e . And ju st as p e o p le ’ s fate could chan ge a b ru p tly , so th eir joy cou ld turn in to fear and this fear, in its tu rn , cou ld give w ay, equally ab ru p tly , to su b m issio n to so m e new p leasu re. T h e m a jo rity o f the se cu lar ru lin g class o f the M idd le A g e s led the life o f le ad e rs o f arm e d b an ds. T h is fo rm e d the taste and h abits o f in dividuals. R e p o r ts left to u s by that so ciety yield by and larg e , a p ictu re sim ila r to th ose o f feudal so c ietie s in o u r ow n tim e s; and they show a c o m p a ra b le stan d ard o f behavior. O n ly a sm all e lite , o f w hich m o re w ill b e said later, sto o d ou t to so m e ex ten t from this n o rm . T h e w a rrio r o f the M idd le A ges n o t only loved b attle , he lived in it. H e spent his youth p re p arin g for b attle. W hen he cam e o f age he w as k n ig h ted , and w aged w ar as lo n g as his stren gth p e r m itte d , into old age. H is life had no o th e r fun ction . H is d w ellin g p lace w as a w atch tow er, a fo rtre ss, at on ce a w eapon o f attack and d efen se. If by ac c id e n t, by e x c e p tio n , he lived in p eace, he n e e d e d at least the

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illu sio n o f w ar. H e fou gh t in to u rn a m e n ts, and th ese to u rn a m e n ts o fte n d iffered little fro m real b a ttle s.4 “ For the so c iety o f that tim e w ar w as the n o rm al s ta te ,” says L uch aire of the th irteen th ce n tu ry . And H uizin ga says of the fo u rte e n th and fifteenth ce n tu rie s: “T h e ch ron ic fo rm w hich w ar w as w on t to take, the c o n tin u o u s d isru p tio n o f tow n and co u n try bv every kind o f d a n g e ro u s rab b le, the p e rm an e n t threat o f harsh and un reliab le law e n fo rc e m e n t . . . n ou rish ed a feelin g o f universal u n c e rta in ty .”’ J In the fifteenth c e n tu ry , as in the ninth o r th irte e n th , the kn ight still gives e x p re ssio n

to his joy in w ar, even if it is no lo n g e r so open and in tact as

earlier. “W ar is a jo y o u s th in g.” It is Jean de B ueil w ho says this. H e has fallen into d isfavor w ith the king. A nd now he d ic ta te s to his se rv a n t his life sto ry . T h is is in the y ear 1 4 6 5 . It is no lo n g e r the co m p le te ly fre e , in d e p e n d e n t knight w ho sp e ak s, the little king in his d om ain . It is so m e o n e w ho is h im se lf in se rv ic e : “ W ar is a jo y o u s thing. W e love each o th e r so m uch in w ar. If w e see that o u r cause is ju st and o u r kin sm en fight b o ld ly , te a rs c o m e to o u r ey es. A sw eet joy rise s in o u r h e a rts, in the feelin g o f o u r h on est loyalty to each o th e r; and se e in g o u r frien d so bravely e x p o sin g his body to d a n g e r in o r d e r to k eep and fulfill the c o m m a n d m e n t o f o u r C re a to r, w e re so lv e to g o fo rw ard and die o r live w ith him and n ever leave him on accou n t o f love. This b rin gs such deligh t that anyon e w ho has n ot felt it can n ot say how w on d erfu l it is. D o y ou think that so m e o n e w ho feels this is afraid o f death ? N o t in the least! H e is so stre n g th e n e d , so d e lig h te d , that he d o e s n ot know w here he is. T ruly he fe ars n oth in g in the w o rld !” T h is is the joy of b attle , c e rtain ly , but it is no lo n g e r the d ire c t p le asu re in the h um an h un t, in the flashing o f sw o rd s, in the n eigh in g of ste e d s, in the fear and death o f the en em y — how fine it is to h ear them cry “ H e lp , h e lp !” o r see them lying w ith their b o d ie s to rn o p en ! N o w the p le asu re lies in the clo se n e ss to o n e ’ s frie n d s, the enth usiasm fo r a ju st cau se , and m o re than e arlie r w e find the joy o f b attle se rv in g as an in to x ican t to o v e rco m e fear. Very sim p le and p o w e rfu l feelin gs speak h ere. O n e kills, giv es o n e se lf up w holly to the fight, se e s o n e ’ s friend fight. O n e fights at his side. O n e fo rg e ts w here on e is. O n e fo rg e ts death itself. It is sp le n d id . W h at m o re ? [. . .] It is the stru c tu re o f so ciety that d e m a n d s and g e n e ra te s a specific stan d ard o f e m o tio n a l co n tro l. “ W e,” says L u ch aire, “w ith o u r p eacefu l m a n n e rs and h abits, w ith the care and p ro te c tio n that the m o d e rn state lavishes on the p r o p e rty and p e rso n o f each in d iv id u al,” can scarcely fo rm an idea o f this o th e r so ciety . A t that tim e the cou n try had d isin te g rated in to p ro v in c es, and the in habitants o f each provin ce fo rm e d a kind o f little nation that ab h o rred all the o th e rs. T h e p ro v in ces w ere in tu rn d ivided in to a m u ltitu d e o f feu d al e sta te s w h ose o w n e rs fou gh t each o th e r in cessan tly . N o t only the gre at lo r d s, the b a ro n s, b u t also the sm alle r lo rd s o f the m an o r lived

in d e so late

isolatio n

and

w ere

u n in te rru p te d ly

o c c u p ie d

in

w agin g w ar again st th eir “so v e re ig n s,” th eir e q u a ls, o r th eir su b je cts. In ad d itio n , there w as co n stan t rivalry b etw een tow n and to w n , village and v illage, valley and valley , and co n stan t w ars b etw een n e igh b o rs

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that seem ed to arise from the verv m ultiplicity o f these territo rial un its.6 T his d escription helps to see m ore precisely som eth in g w hich so far has been stated m ainly in general te rm s, n am ely, the con nection betw een social structure and person ality stru ctu re. In this society there is no central pow er strong enough to com pel peop le to restrain t. But if in this o r that region the pow er o f a central authority g ro w s, if over a larger or sm aller area the peop le arc forced to live in peace with each other, the m oldin g o f affects and the stan dards o f the econ om y o f instincts are very gradually changed as w ell. As will be discussed in m o re detail later, the reserv e and “ m utual con sideration ” o f peop le increase, first in norm al everyday social life. And the discharge o f affects in physical attack is lim ited to certain tem p oral and spatial enclaves. O n ce the m on opoly o f physical pow er has passed to ccntral au th orities, n ot every stron g m an can afford the pleasure o f physical attack. This is now re se rv ed to those few legitim ized by the ccntral authority (e .g ., the police against the crim in al), and to larger n u m b ers only in exception al tim es o f w ar o r revolution, in the socially legitim ized stru gg le against intern al or extern al enem ies. But even these tem p oral or spatial enclaves within civilized society in which b elligerence is allow ed freer play— above all, w ars betw een nations— have becom e m ore im person al, and lead less and less to an affective discharge having the im m e d i­ acy and intensity o f the m edieval phase. The necessary restraint and tran sform ation o f aggression cultivated in the everyday life o f civilized society cannot be sim ply reversed , even in these enclaves. All the sam e, this could happen m ore quicklv than we might su p p o se, had not the direct physical com b at betw een a man and his hated adversary given way to a m echanized stru gg le dem anding a strict con trol o f the affects. Even in w ar in the civilized w orld, the individual can no lon ger give free rein to his pleasure, sp u rred on by the sight o f the en em y, but m u st fight, no m atter how he may feel, accordin g to the com m an ds o f invisible o r only indirectly visible lead ers, against a frequently invisible or only indirectly visible enem y. And im m ense social upheaval and urgen cy, heightened by carefully con certed propagan d a, arc n eeded to reaw aken and legitim ize in large m asses o f peop le the socially outlaw ed instincts, the joy in killing and destru ction that have been rep ressed from everyday civilized life. A d m itted ly, these affects do have, in a “refin ed ,” rationalized fo rm , their legitim ate and exactly defined place in the everyday life o f civilized society. And this is very characteristic o f the kind o f tran sform ation through w hich the civilization o f the affects takes place. For exam p le, belligeren ce and aggression find socially perm itted exp ression in sp o rtin g con tests. And they are e xp re sse d especially in “spectatin g” (e .g ., at boxin g m atch es), in the im aginary identification w ith a sm all n um b er o f com batan ts to w hom m o d erate and precisely regulated scop e is granted for the release o f such affects. And this living-out o f affects in spectatin g o r even in m erely listening (e .g ., to a radio com m en tary ) is a particularly ch aracteristic feature o f civilized society. It partly d eterm in es the developm en t o f book s and the theater, and decisively inlluences the role o f the cinem a in o u r w orld. This tran sform ation o f what m anifested itse lf originally as an active, often aggressive exp ression o f pleasure, into the passive, m ore o rd ered pleasure o f spectating ( i e . , a m ere pleasure

0 N CH A N G E S

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3 9

o f the eye) is already initiated in education , in condition in g p recep ts for young p eop le. | . . .]

The muting o f drives: psychologization and rationalization “ Life at c o u rt” , La B ruyere w rite s,7 “is a se rio u s, m elancholy gam e, w hich requires o f us that we arran ge ou r pieces and o u r b atteries, have a plan, follow it, foil that o f o u r ad versary, so m e tim e s take risks and play on im pulse. And after all our m easures and m editations we are in check , som etim es ch eck m ate.” At the c o u rt, above all at the great ab solutist c o u rt, there w as form ed for the first tim e a kind o f society and hum an relationships having stru ctu ral characteristics w hich from now on, over a long stretch of W estern history and through many variation s, again and again play a decisive part. In the m idst o f a large populated area w hich by and large is free of physical violen ce, a “go o d society” is fo rm e d . But even il the use o f physical violen ce now reced es from hum an in terco u rse, if even duelling is now forb idden , peop le now e x e rt pressu re and force on each oth er in a w ide variety of different w ays. Life in this circle is in no way peaceful. Very many people are continuously d epen den t on each other. C o m p etitio n for prestige and royal favour is intense. “ A ffaires” , disputes over rank and favour, do n ot cease. If the sw ord no lon ger plays so great a role as the m ean s o f d ecision , it is replaced by in trigue, conflicts in which careers and social success arc con tested with w ords. T hey dem and and p rodu ce other qualities than did the arm ed stru gg le s that had to be fought out w ith w eapon s in o n e ’ s hand. C ontin uous reflection, foresigh t, and calculation, self-con trol, precise and articulate regulation o f o n e ’s own effects, know ledge o f the w hole terrain , hum an and non-hum an, in w hich one acts, b eco m e m ore and m ore indispensable precond ition s o f social success. Every individual b elon gs to a “clique” , a social circle w hich su p p o rts him when n ecessary; but the grou p in gs change, lie en ters alliances, if possib le w ith people ranking high at co u rt. But rank at co u rt can change very quickly; he has rivals; he has open and con cealed en em ies. And the tactics o f his stru g g le s, as o f his alliances, dem and careful con sideration . The degree o f aloofn ess o r fam iliarity with everyone m ust be carefully m easu red ; each greetin g, each conversation has a significance over and above what is actually said o r done. They indicate the standing o f a p e rso n ; and they con tribu te to the form ation o f co u rt opinion on his standing: “ Let a favourite pay close heed to h im self: for if he d oes not keep m e w ailing as long as usual in his antecham ber; il his lace is m ore op en , if he frow ns less, il he listens to m e m ore w illingly and accom panies m e a little further when show ing me ou t, I shall think that he is beginning to fall, and I shall be rig h t.”1' The co u rt is a kind of sto ck exch an ge; as in every “g o o d society ” , an estim ate o f the “value” o f each individual is continuously bein g fo rm e d . But here his value has its real foundation not in the w ealth or even the ach ievem ents o r ability of the individual, but in the favour he enjoys with the king, the influence he has with other m ighty o n es, his im portan ce in the play o f courtly cliques. All this, favour, influence, im p o rtan ce, this w hole co m p lex and dan gerous gam e in which physical force and d irect affective o u tb u rsts arc proh ibited and a threat to existen ce, dem ands o f each participan t a con stan t foresigh t and an e x ac t know ledge o f every

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other, o f his position and value in the n etw ork o f courtly opin ion ; it exacts precise attu nem ent o f his ow n behaviour to this value. Every m istake, every careless step d ep resses the value o f its p e rp e trato r in courtly opin ion ; it mav threaten his w hole position at co u rt. “ A man w ho know s the co u rt is m aster o f his ge stu re s, o f his eyes and his e x p ressio n ; he is d eep , im pen etrab le. He dissim ulates the bad turn s he d o e s, sm iles at his en em ies, su pp resses his ill-tem per, disguises his passion s, disavow s his h eart, acts against his feelin gs.”‘l The tran sform ation o f the nobilitv in the direction o f “civilized” behaviour is unm istakable. H ere, it is not yet in ail re sp ects so profound and all-em bracing as later in b o u rg e o is so ciety ; for it is only tow ards their p e e rs that the c o u rtie r and the c o u rt lady need to su b ject them selves to such con strain t, and far less so tow ards their social in ferio rs. Q u ite ap art from the fact that the pattern o f drive- and affect-con trol is different in courtly from that in b o u rg eo is society , the aw areness that this con trol is exercised for social reasons is m o re alive. O p p osin g inclinations do not yet w holly vanish from w aking con scio u sness; self-con straint has not yet b eco m e so com pletely an apparatus o f habits operatin g alm o st autom atically and including all hum an relationships. But it is already quite clear how' human beings are beco m ing m ore co m p le x , and internally split in a quite specific way. Each m an , as it w ere, con fron ts him self. H e “con ceals his passions” , “disavow s his h eart” , “acts against his feelin gs” . The pleasure o r inclination o f the m om en t is restrain ed in anticipation o f the disagreeab le con sequ en ces o f its in dulgen ce; and it is, indeed, the sam e m echanism as that by which ad ults— w hether parents o r other p erso n s— increasingly instil a stable “su p e reg o ” in children. The m om en tary drive and affect im pu lses are, as it w ere, held back and m astered by the fore know ledge o f the later d ispleasure, by the fear o f a future pain, until this fear finally o p p o se s the iorb idden behaviour and inclinations by force o f habit, even if no oth er p erso n is directly presen t, and the energy o f such inclinations is channelled into a h arm less direction not threatened by any displeasure. In keeping with the tran sform ation o f society , o f in terp erson al relationships, the affective m ake-up o f the individual is also re co n stru cted : as the series o f actions and the n um b er o f pe o p le on w hom the individual and his actions constantly' depend arc in creased, the habit o f foresight over lon ger chains g ro w s stronger. And as the behaviour and personality stru ctu re o f the individual change, so d ocs his m anner o f con siderin g others. H is im age o f them b e co m e s rich er in n uances, freer o f spon tan eous em otio n s: it is “psy ch o lo gized". W here the stru ctu re o f social functions allow s the individual gre ater scope for actions un der the influence o f m om en tary im pulses than is the case at c o u rt, it is neither necessary n or possible to con sider very deeply the nature o f an oth er p e r ­ so n ’ s con sciousness and affects, o r w hat hidden m otives may underlie his behaviour. If at cou rt calculation m eshes w ith calculation, in sim pler societies affect directly en gages affect. T his strength o f the im m ediate affects, however, binds the individual to a sm aller num b er o f behavioural option s: som eon e is friend o r foe, go o d or evil; and depen din g on how one p erceives another in term s o f these black and w hite affective p atte rn s, so one behaves. Everything seem s directly related to feeling. That the sun shines, o r lightning flashes, that som eon e laughs or knits his brow, all this appeals m ore directly to the affects o f the perceiver. And as it excites him here and

0 N CH A N G E S

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4 1

now in a friendly o r unfriendly w ay, he takes it as if it w ere m eant this way especially for him . It d o es not en ter his head that all this, a flash o f lightning that alm ost strikes him , a face that offends him , are to be explained bv rem o te c o n ­ nections that have nothing directly to do with h im self. People only develop a m ore long-sigh ted view o f nature and other p eop le to the e xten t that the advancing division o f functions and their daily in volvem ent in long human chains accustom them to such a view and a g re ater restrain t o f the affects. O nly then is the veil which the passions draw before the eyes slow ly lifted, and a new w orld co m e s into view — a w orld w hose co u rse is friendly or hostile to the individual person w ithout being intended to be so, a chain o f events that need to be con tem p lated dispassionately over lon g stretch es if their con nections arc to be d isc lo se d .10 I.ike con duct gen erally, the p ercep tion o f things and peop le also b eco m es affectively m ore neutral in the cou rse o f the civilizing pro cess. The “ w orld p ictu re” gradually b e co m e s less directly d eterm in ed by hum an w ishes and fears, and m ore strongly orien ted to w hat we call “ e x p e rie n c e ” o r “the em pirical” , to sequen ces with their own im m an ent regularities. Ju st as today, in a further sp u rt in this direction , the cou rse o f h istory and society is gradually em erg in g from the m ists o f personal affects and involvem ent, from the haze o f collective longin gs and fears, and begin n in g to appear as a relatively au ton om o u s n exu s o f events, so to o w ith nature and— w ithin sm aller confines— w ith hum an beings. It is particularly in the circles o f cou rt life that w hat we w ould today call a “p sy ch o lo gical” view o f m an d evelops, a m ore precise ob servation o f oth ers and o n e se lf in term s o f lon ger series o f m otives and causal con n ection s, because it is here that vigilant self-con trol and p erpetu al ob servation o f others are am on g the elem entary p rerequ isites for the preservation o f o n e ’s social position. But this is only one exam ple o f how w hat we call the “ orien tation to e x p e rie n ce ” , the observation o f events w ithin a lengthening and broaden ing n exus o f inter d epen den ce, slow ly begins to develop at exactly the point w here the stru ctu re ol society itself com pels the individual to restrain his m om en tary affects and tran sform his libidinal en ergies to a higher d egree. Saint-Sim on in one place o b serv es som eon e with w hom he is on an uncertain footing. H e describ es his ow n behaviour in this situation as follow s: “1 soon noticed O that he w as grow in g co ld e r; I closely follow ed his con duct tow ards m e to avoid any confusion betw een w hat m igh t be accidental in a man b urdened with prickly affairs, and w hat I su sp ected . My suspicion s w ere con firm ed , causing m e to w ithdraw from him entirely w ithout in the slightest ap pearin g to do s o .” " This courtly a rt o f human ob serv atio n — unlike w hat we usually call “ psych ­ ology ” today— is never con cern ed with the individual in isolation, as if the essential features o f his behaviour w ere indepen dent o f his relations to o th e rs, and as if he related to o th e rs, so to speak, only retrosp ectively . The approach here is far closer to reality, in that the individual is always seen in his social co n te x t, as a human being in his relations to others, as an individual in a social situation. It w as poin ted out ab ove13 that the p recep ts on behaviour o f the sixteenth century differ from those o f the p recedin g cen tu ries less in term s o f their content than in their ton e, their changed affective atm osph ere; psych ological insights, p e r ­ sonal ob servation s, begin to play a larger part. A com p arison betw een the p recep ts o f E rasm us o r D ella C asa and the co rresp o n d in g m edieval ru les show s this clearly. Investigation o f the social changes o f this tim e, the tran sform ation o f human

4 2

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ELIAS

relation sh ip s that lo o k p lace, p ro v id e s an e x p la n atio n . T h is “p sy ch o lo g iza tio n ” o f ru le s o f c o n d u c t, or, m o re p re cise ly , th eir g r e a te r p e rm e atio n by o b se rv a tio n and e x p e rie n c e , is an e x p re ssio n o f the acc e le ra te d co u rtiza tio n o f the u p p e r class and o f the c lo se r in te gratio n o f all p a rts o f so ciety in this p e r io d . Sign s o f a chan ge in this d ire ctio n arc certain ly n ot to b e foun d only in w ritin gs re c o rd in g the stan d ard o f “g o o d b eh av io u r” of the tim e ; w e find them equally in w o rk s d e v o te d to the e n te rtain m e n t o f this class. T h e o b se rv a tio n o f p e o p le that life in the c o u rtlv circle d e m an d s finds its lite rary e x p re ssio n in an a rt o f hum an p o rtra itu re . [. . .]

Notes 1

A. I.uchaire, La societeJranfaise au temps de Philippe-Auguste (P aris, 19 0 9 ), p. 273.

2 3

Ib id ., p. 275. Ib id ., p. 272.

4 5

Ib id ., p. 278. I. H uzinga, Herbst des Mittelalters, Studien iiber Lebens und Geistesform des 14 und 15

6

Jahrhunderts in Trankreich und in den Niederlanden (M unich, 1924), p. 94. Luchaire, La societeJranfaise, pp. 278f.

7

La Bruyere, Caracteres, ‘ D e la c o w ’ (P aris, H achette, 1922), Oeuvres, vol. 2, p. 2 37, N o. 64 . . .

8 9

La Bruyere, op. cit., p. 2 4 7 , N o. 94. Ib id ., p. 211, N o. 2; cf. Also p. 211, N o. 10: “The co u rt is like an edifice o f m arble; I m ean it is com p o sed o f m en w ho are very hard, but very polish ed .” C f. also n. 1 34.

10

See in this con text N o rb e rt Elias, “ Problem s o f Involvem ent and D etach m en t” , British Journal o f Sociology’, 7 (1 9 5 6 ), pp. 226 52. [Author’s note to the translation]

11

Saint-Sim on, Memoires (nouv. ed. Par A. de B oislisle) (P aris, 1910), vol. 22 (1 7 1 1 ), p. 63.

12

The History o f Manners, pp. 56ff, p a rtic .6 2 —3.

Chapter

3

Abram De Swaan T H E P O L I T I C S OF A G O R A P H O B I A

E

a r n i n g s

o f

t h e i r

o w n

a n d

a new occupation al prestige,

acquired independently o f husbands and lathers, m ade w orking w om en less

depen den t upon their husbands and thus the balance of d ep en den cies betw een spou ses began to shift som ew hat in favour o f w om en . A round 1890, the lim itations on public appearan ce by w om en w ere quickly disap pearin g (for exam p le, in the N eth erlan d s). . . . And yet, at a tim e when restriction s on the m ovem en t o f w om en in w est E uropean cities w ere decreasin g, psychiatric publications began to include case d escription s o f Plalzschwindel: agoraph obia. A ctions that had been socially prohibited b efore, rem ained unfeasible to som e even after they had b eco m e p e r ­ m issible, out o f an unreasoned anxiety a vague fear that had lost its su p p o rt in con tem p orary public discussion and could now only be exp ressed in psychiatric term s as a problem to be m anaged and treated by psychiatrists.

T h ese ob servation s do not im ply that con tem p orary agoraph ob ics directly inherited these anxieties from their great-g ran d m oth ers w ho w ere prohibited from goin g w here they now fear to tread. But they do convey that nin eteenth-century society prod u ced circum stan ces in w hich b ou rgeois fam ilies, out o f con cern for their safety and status, im posed restriction s on the m ovem en t o f their w om en folk ; these p reoccu pation s soon acquired ad ded m eanings o f respectab ility, chastity, and d epen den cy , w ere tran sform ed into collective fantasies about public order, se x u al­ ity, and violence in the street and about the family as the ‘ haven in a h eartless w o rld ’ . Such fantasies disap peared from public d iscou rse but survived in the intim ate fam ily circle as available them es to be elab orated into a particular

4 4

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agoraph ob ic relationship. ‘Thus the uncon scious of m odern w om en contains many rem nants of the con scious m isp ercep tion s of her g ran d m o th e r.’ O r, rather, all so rts of ideas that w ere taken very seriously in one gen eration arc gradually abandoned as sub jects o f adult discussion in another, but these notions con tin ue to be passed on as jokes, n ursery talcs, inn uend oes, and threats and arc added to the cultural heritage o fla t e r gen eration s. Ju st as som e p o e ts use the th em es o f h alf-forgotten legen ds and folk talcs to co m p o se w orks o f art, oth er pe o p le select them es from this shadow v childhood folklore to co n stru ct private fantasies that will guide them the m ore com pulsively the m ore com pletely they have rep ressed them . In other w ords, there is no collective u n con scio us, there are the abandoned opin ion s and idees revues o f fo rm e r gen eration s surviving as in consequential and unverifiable prattle, elaborated upon in infantile fantasy, rep ressed in a later stage. That may explain the striking sim ilarity and constancy o f so many very private fantasies. A lthough the nineteenthcentury restriction s upon the m ovem en t o f b o u rg e o is w om en have re lax e d , and her dependen cy on h er husband has b eco m e less on e-sid ed , the agoraph obic relationship rep ro d u ces such restriction s w hile denying any other m otive ex ce p t an in explicable anxiety. It is now tim e to return to the gen eral question in this chapter: how global developm en ts o f society may have altered the intim ate relation s betw een p eo p le, so that the difficulties they e xp erien ce w ith them selves and one anoth er may have b eco m e translatable into the vocabulary o f psychotherapy and suitable for treatm ent as psychic prob lem s. R ather than dealing with the problem directly in its full and form idable p ro p o rtio n s, it w as alluded to in an e xam p le: the restriction and re la x ­ ation of ru les tor the m ovem ent of w om en in public during the nineteenth century and the sub seq uen t em ergen ce of agoraphobia. The early developm en t ol capitalism resulted in a stron g lim itation on the presen ce in public of urban b o u rg eo is w om en , w hereas b o u rg eo is m en could co n ­ tinue to m ove w herever they w ished and, possibly, could allow them selves greater liberty than before tow ards w om en in public and w ith public w om en , since their own daugh ters and w ives had disappeared from the streets. In the past hundred y ears, however, w om en have begun to m ove m ore freely in public and, possibly, b o u rg eo is m en have lost so m e o f their p riv ileges in approach in g w om en in public. On balance, b o u rg eo is urban m en and w om en have b eco m e m ore equal, at least in this resp ect. This partial equalization o f intim ate relations in the co u rse o f the past hundred y ears, however, is not lim ited to this one aspect in the balance o f depen den cies betw een m en and w om en , but covers alm o st all relation s betw een the sexes. A d egree o f equalization has also occu rred in the relation s betw een parents and children, or betw een young and old in gen eral. A sim ilar d ecrease in social distance is developin g betw een adjacent ranks in organ ization s, betw een those who used to be called ‘su p e r io r s’ and ‘in fe rio rs’ , and now often p re fe r to be view ed as m em b ers o f a ‘te a m ’ . But even as social distan ces betw een adjacen t ranks within organizations d e cre ase d , with the grow th o f these organizations the n u m b er o f such ranks in creased, and with it the overall distance betw een the low est echelons o f production w ork ers, co n su m ers, clien ts, and the lo p echelon o f com pany p re si­ den ts, ch airm en , and so on. This double m ovem en t may explain the conflicting re p o rts on ‘in fo rm alization ’ and ‘alien ation ’ , the fo rm e r go in g on am ong adjacent ranks, the latter betw een the low er and the u p p e rm o st strata. Finally, the distance

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4 5

betw een go vern m en ts and their sub jects has been decreasin g, form erly in the lo n g ­ term process o f constitution al dem ocratization and m ore recently in the dealin gs of particip atory citizen s’ action g ro u p s w ith local and national au th orities. . . . A secon d line o f lon g-term developm en t in E uropean cou n tries con cern s the increasing con trol o f infantile and bodily im pulses. M arx and his follow ers have describ ed extensively how a relatively in depen den t agrarian population w as re g i­ m ented and disciplined into the strict rhythm s and routin es o f the industrial w o rk ­ force. W eber has dem on strated the intim ate connection betw een a puritan abstin ­ ence and the en trepreneurial style o f life in early capitalism . Freud has argued that the disconten ts o f civilization con stituted its very essen ce, because w ell-ordered society exacts the renunciation o f drive satisfaction. T h e gradu al p rocess o f state form ation and the increasing con trol o f d om estic violence im plied a m ore equable, m ore flexible and lon g-term m an agem en t o f em o tio n s, as N o rb e rt Elias has suggested in The Civilizing Process. U n dou b tedly ,

the

relations

betw een

peop le

have

b eco m e

less

volatile,

im pulsive, sp o n tan eo u s, and violen t since the M iddle A ges, and peop le have found them selves com p elled to ste e r their im pulses m ore strictly, through extern al c o m ­ pulsion first, gradually through a social com pu lsion to self-com p u lsion , and finally mainly through self-com p ulsion . By the end o f the nineteenth cen tury, this had resulted in rath er strict and lim iting pattern s o f in tercou rse am on g the b ourgeoisie and in severe and restrictive su p ereg o form ation s in m iddle-class citizens — very m uch the type o f fam ilies and the type o f patients Freud w as fam iliar with. U nm istakably, these p attern s have changed in the co u rse o f the tw entieth cen tury. This p resen ts a theoretical problem to h istorical so cio lo gists con cern ed with prob lem s o f societal change, fam ily life, and ch aracter form ation : how is this recent shift in m anners to be in terp reted and how can it be explain ed in term s o f societal tran sform ation s? . . . A first survey o f co n tem p o rary m o re s su ggests that the m argins and the variety o f acceptable behaviour have increased m arkedly since the First W orld W ar and even m ore quickly since the Second W'orld War. E xam p les o f the relaxation o f restriction s on the m ovem en t o f w om en in public arc onlv one case in point. Many oth ers may be ad d ed , especially in the realm o f intim ate relation s: the practice o f con traception , ab o rtio n , con cubinage, p rom iscu ity , divorce, h o m o ­ sexuality, p orn ograp h y , m asturbation . . . a w ide gam ut o f sexual relations with o n e se lf and with oth ers has b eco m e m en tion able, acceptable in m any circles, think­ able for m o st peop le. But this observation often leads to the conclusion that the relaxation o f restriction s also applies to oth er sph eres o f life. A lthough m o st peop le b elieve that violent behaviour is on the increase everyw here in the w orld, as a gen eral statem en t this is unlikely to be tru e. [. . .] The social acceptability o f violent behaviour has probably n ot in creased. In m o st coun tries fratern ity initiation rites and bar braw ls are quickly disappearin g as m ale rituals. O n the other hand, gangs o f so ccer su p p o rte rs have b eco m e alm ost as violent as they used to be a b efore sp ectator sp o rts becam e organ ized and broadcast. P aradoxically, an increased aversion am on g the public against violent behaviour may result in an increased visibility o f such violence both in n ew spaper rep o rtin g o f shocking incidents and in official statistics: indignant citizens are m ore prone to re p o rt, police to investigate, and cou rts to convict in cases that before

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w ent unrem arked as routin e rough n ess. Increasing sexual toleran ce d oes not exten d at all to violent fo rm s o f sexual con du ct such as rape o r flagellation; rather, the con trary is tru e: m oun tin g indignation should not be in terp reted as increasing incidence. People, including youn g, stron g, and volatile p eo p le, arc still being pressured to su rren d er the advantages and p leasures o f physical strength and not to lay hands on oth ers. Even as violence and to rtu re arc continually depicted in novels and on the screen , these scen es arc w ithout exception accom pan ied by m essages o f disapproval and by the pun ish m ent o f w hoever has abandoned h im self to such lustful violence. This sim ultan eous excitation and its denial, this h ypocrisy, used to be a ch aracteristic o f sexual porn ograp h y until recently; it conveys the severity o f the prohibition and at the sam e tim e the effo rt it takes for p eop le to give up these p leasures un der the m oral con dem nation by oth ers and their own c o n ­ science. T his in tertw in in g o f d isgrace and lust finally co m e s to characterize the pleasure itself. . . . People, then, arc n ot only su pp osed to contain their violen t im p u lses, but there are other em otio n s they also m ust inhibit: all those m ann ers o f feeling and conduct w ith w hich one puts o n e se lf above oth ers are increasingly b eco m in g un acceptable. Scorn for the defects o f oth ers, fo r their uglin ess, disability, or indigence only serv es to discredit the scoffer in the eyes o f m o st co n tem p o raries. The self-satisfied aw areness and osten tatio us display o f o n e ’s su p e rio r social positio n, be it through w ealth, descen t, rank, or education , do not necessarily add to the deferen ce one w ill receive, but may be held against one. Even the aw areness that such rankings play a role at all in o n e ’ s ow n and other p e o p le ’ s thoughts is m ore and m o re denied. People preten d to be ‘colou r-b lin d ’ , not to n otice class diflerences in speech , d ress, and dem ean ou r, not to p rescrib e behaviour but to arrive at a definition o f the problem togeth er with the clien t, to discuss alternatives w ith co-w ork ers rath er than o rd e r their assistants aroun d. D ifferen ces in social position are denied in every possib le w ay, vet are betrayed in this very denial at the sam e tim e that the denial also co n tribu tes to dim inishing the social distan ce. Equally, p eop le arc expected not to apply th em selves in an effort to ou tdo o th ers, through am bition and c o m ­ petition , b ccausc o f a desire for fam e, glo ry , honour, pow er, o r the dom ination over others. This is not to say that peop le in fact no lon ger attem p t to rise above oth ers, but that they try to con trol the expression o f these strivings in th em selves, and especially in oth ers, and that they attem p t to convey the im pression that they never sought aggran dizem en t

it ju st befell them . N o r is there m uch reason to suppose

that peop le have relaxed their m utual pressure and self-discipline con cernin g habits o f pun ctuality, reliability, d iscretion , clean liness, hygiene, dietary re strictio n s, p r e ­ cision, and accuracy , w hereas their m cticu lou sn ess in operatin g and m aintaining all so rts o f m achinery and in participatin g in au tom obile traffic has n ecessarily increased (the sociologically in teresting developm en t is not the incidence o f road acciden ts, but their relative rarity and the im position o f a deadly discipline in traffic). A sm all m in ority o f Bohem ians and academ ics m ay have abandoned som e o f these ‘anal v irtu e s’ to a d e gre e , and in so doin g they have b eco m e highly visible to university p ro fesso rs com m en tin g on the spirit o f the epoch . But al the sam e tim e, and alm ost un noticed, many m illions have each year join ed the rigidly tim ed and regim en ted life in sch oo ls, facto ries, large organ izations, the w orld o f traffic, and o f taxes.

T H E

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4 7

U n d en iab ly , the m an age m e n t o f affect is ch an gin g, but the w idely held a ssu m p ­ tion that, all things c o n sid e re d , re stric tio n s are lo o se n in g d o e s n ot h old ; n o t w hen it c o m e s to the co n tro l o f v io le n ce, n or w ith re g ard

to the co n tro l o f self-

a g gran d ize m e n t o r o f lax ity . It d o e s n o t even apply to the m an age m e n t o f se x u ality . A s w ill b e c o m e ap p are n t from a se co n d look at the d e v e lo p m en t o f se x u al re la tio n s, these have b e c o m e su b je c t to d ifferen t b u t certain ly no less re strictiv e co n tro ls. R etu rn in g to the list o f se x u al m a n n e rs that o p e n e d this se c tio n on ch an gin g m o ra ls, it ap p e ars to contain only th ose se x u al activ ities in volvin g n o d am ag e o r d e grad atio n to o th e rs. (In the ab o rtio n d e b ate , the issu e is p re cise ly w h eth er an oth er ‘p e r s o n ’ is in v o lv e d .) W h ere a relaxatio n o f re stric tio n s o c c u rs, it p e rta in s to sexu al relatio n s b etw een p a rtie s co n sid e re d to b e equal and re sp o n sib le fo r their action s. T h e d e sire s o f the p a rtie s involved m u st receive equal c o n sid e ratio n . A ccep tan ce c o n c e rn s in te rc o u rse b etw een co n se n tin g ad u lts. L e ss than b e fo re these relatio n s are defin ed by can on s o f b eh aviou r; w h e rev er the n e go tiatio n s b etw een th ese relatively au to n o m o u s p a rtie s m ay lead th em has b e c o m e in creasin gly irr e le ­ vant, b u t th ese relatio n s m u st be n e g o tiated in m u tu al co n sid e ratio n and shaped by m utual co n se n t, and they m ay n ot be im p o se d by u n ilateral c o m p u lsio n o r openly se rv e the se lf-a g g ran d ize m e n t o f on e o f the p a rtie s. R ap e, ro u g h n e ss, sc o rn , and d e g rad a tio n , so c o m m o n and ac ce p tab le fo r e m p lo y e rs to inflict u po n se rv a n ts and facto ry g ir ls, o r c u sto m e rs upo n p ro stitu te s only a few ge n e ra tio n s ag o , have b e c o m e m o re d ista ste fu l to the c o n te m p o ra ry pub lic. S e lf-a g g ra n d iz e m e n t and violen ce have b e co m e less acce p tab le and are in creasin gly su b je c t to social c o m p u l­ sio n , social co m p u lsio n to se lf-c o m p u lsio n , and se lf-c o n tro l, in that o rder. In se x u al m a tte rs so m e can on s o f b eh aviou r have relaxed o r d isap p e are d , but p e o p le now c o m p e l o th e rs and th em selv es to take in to co n sid e ratio n m o re asp e c ts o f m ore p e o p le at m o re m o m e n ts, to arran ge th eir relatio n s accord in gly and to su b o rd in ate th eir e m o tio n a l m an age m e n t to th ese co n sid e ratio n s. In this p r o c e ss, m any in tim ate re la tio n s have b e c o m e less p re d ictab le fo r they no lo n g e r d e p e n d as m uch as b efo re on the c o m m a n d s o f social can on s and p e rso n a l co n scie n c e , but are shaped in a p r o c e ss of n ego tiatio n b e tw e en relatively equal and a u to n o m o u s p a rtie s. T h is re q u ire s new and differen t fo rm s o f se lf-c o n tro l. It re q u ire s a d e g re e o f in sisten ce and sin ce rity in voicin g o n e ’ s d e m an d s (now called ‘ a sse rtiv e n e ss’ ), the su rre n d e r o f m ean s o f physical o r e co n o m ic c o m p u lsio n , and it re q u ire s a re a d in ess to c o n ­ sid e r the d e sire s o f o th e rs and iden tify w ith th e m , alo n g w ith a d e g re e o f patien ce and in ven tiven ess to c o p e w ith th em . A t the very least, it re q u ire s the display o f th ose q u a litie s, for, in the h istory o f m o ra ls, ap p e aran c e s are h alf the w ork . R elatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le are in creasin gly m an aged th rough n ego tiatio n rath er than th rough co m m a n d . T h is ap p lie s to relatio n s b e tw e en the se x e s, b e tw e en p a r ­ e n ts and ch ild ren , often to relatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le in ad jacen t ran ks w ithin o rgan ization al h ie rarch ie s, and so m e tim e s to relation s b e tw e en local au th o ritie s and citizen g r o u p s. T h is m ak es fo r a la rg e r variety o f p o ssib le o u tc o m e s, b u t the p ro c e ss o f arran gin g th ese re la tio n s im p o se s o n e ro u s re stric tio n s u po n the p e o p le involved. In a sen se, this tran sitio n from m a n a g e m e n t through co m m a n d to m an agem en t through n ego tiatio n re p re se n ts an in crease in fre e d o m : fre e d o m b e in g taken to m ean the p ossib ility to do w hat on e w ish es in so far as it d o c s not in terfere w ith that p ossib ility in o th e rs. But that is n ot very far: such a definition o f fre e d o m m ay fit the ro o m fo r m o v em en t in allo tm e n t g a rd e n s, but il d o e s n ot apply to m o st h um an

4 8

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relation s. D e sire s and righ ts are alm o st alw ays d e m an d s and claim s upon o th e r p e o p le and th ere e x ists n o sp ace w hich is n ot o c c u p ie d also by the d e sire s and righ ts o f o th e rs. T h at is why this m an age m e n t th rough n e g o tiatio n , even if it w ere to be th ough t o f as fre e d o m , is so rarely e x p e rie n c e d as liberating. T h e shift from m an age m e n t through co m m an d to m an age m e n t through n e go tiatio n has tied p e o p le to on e an o th er even m o re in tricate ly , in m o re and m o re su b tle w ay s, in all ph ases of life, at all m o m e n ts o f the day, w ith reg ard to m any m o re activities and d e sire s. It c o m p e ls each p e r so n , in tu rn , to scru tin ize his ow n lo n g in g s and to speak up for them an d, at the sam e tim e , to b e read y to abandon them if they clash w ith the claim s o f o th e rs. N o w a co u p le m ay n e go tiate a p ro m iscu o u s relatio n sh ip , but they m u st co n tro l je a lo u sy and the fear o f d e se rtio n , deny an g e r and rivalry w ith the p a r tn e r ’ s p artn er, and fo rce th em selv es to play the g a m e a c co rd in g to the ru le s im p o se d upon them by th eir ow n m utual c o n se n t. C le arly , in the c o u rse o f this p ro c e ss so m e p e o p le have gain ed a la rg e r m argin o f m o v e m e n t, and o th e rs have lo st. M u nicipal au th o ritie s have often lo st a co n sid e rab le am o u n t o f d iscretio n to carry on b u sin ess alo n g lines o f ad m in istrative efficien cy ; b u t n eigh b o u rh o o d g ro u p s have gain ed o p p o rtu n itie s. P aren ts have lost the m ean s to ch id e, c h astisc, and c o m m an d ch ild ren , but y o u n g p e o p le can afford g r e a te r fre e d o m o f m o v e m e n t, e x p re ssio n , and c o n su m p tio n . O rgan izatio n al s u p e r io r s find th e m se lv e s fo rc e d to listen to th eir im m e d iate su b altern s, in stead o f ru n n in g the d e p a rtm e n t as they see fit, and the low er e ch e lo n s can so m e tim e s e x a c t th eir d e m an d s. M en can afford less lib e rtie s to w ard s w om en than they u sed to and w om en have gain ed in o p p o rtu n itie s fo r physical and social m o v e m e n t. N o w o n d er that m any w h ite, m id d le -ag e d m ales in high aca d e m ic p o sitio n s w ho p ro d u ce the social criticism o f the era show a keen eye fo r the in creasin g o p p re ssio n in so ciety and w o rry ab o u t the decay and d e cad e n ce that o th e rs w ou ld call fre e d o m . T h e tran sition fro m m an age m e n t th rough co m m an d to m an age m e n t through n ego tiatio n is the re su lt o f v ariou s so c ie tal d e v e lo p m en ts. T h e in creasin g and ge n e ralizin g d e p e n d e n c e o f p e o p le upo n on e an o th er and the re su ltin g in crease in equality b e tw e en them is on e such d e v e lo p m e n t. A n o th er p r o c e ss c o n sists in the c o n se cu tiv e tid e s o f em an cip a to ry m o v e m e n ts: cam p aign s for un iversal su ffrage, o rgan ized w o rk e rs’ stru g g le , m o v e m e n ts fo r w o m e n ’ s lib e ratio n , and the m any eth n ic, racial, and re g io n al liberatio n m o v e m e n ts. Each m o v e m e n t le arn ed from a p re ce d in g on e and each tim e in eq u alities that w ere c o n sid e re d n atural until then w ere ab o lish e d , this in stilled d o u b t ab o u t the inevitability o f o th e r ty p es o f d is­ crim in atio n . B ut a th ird , qu ite a u to n o m o u s p r o c e ss m ay b e d e tecte d in the e m e rg e n c e and d e v e lo p m e n t o f large organ izatio n s. A s such organ izatio n s b ecam e ever m o re c o m p le x and sh ifted from sim p le c le rical and p ro d u c tiv e task s to the m a n a g e m e n t o f in creasin gly su b tle p e rso n a l re la tio n s, clear, re ctilin e ar lines o f c o m m an d p ro v ed in ad eq u ate. T h e officials in such o rgan izatio n s n o lo n g e r p e r ­ fo rm e d w ell-defin ed ro u tin e s b u t en gaged in co m p licate d in teractio n s w ith c o l­ le ag u e s, c lien ts, o r c u sto m e rs, usin g th eir p e rso n a litie s and ju d g e m e n tal cap acities as o ccu p atio n al in stru m e n ts. Th ey co u ld n ot be m an aged w ith out a m o d icu m o f co n sen t and they w ould n ot co n sen t w ith ou t th eir in te re sts and d e sire s b e in g taken into c o n sid e ratio n . T h e se organ izatio n s have had a tw o fo ld effect on c o n te m p o ra ry fam ily life. Hirst, m an age m e n t through n ego tiatio n w as c arrie d over by these organ ization al m id d le -class w o rk e rs, often w o m e n , from the sph ere o f w ork to the

T H E PO L I T IC S 0 F AG 0 R A P H 0 B I A

4 9

sphere o f the fam ily. And it is this organizational, ‘ p rofession al-m an agerial’ m iddle class that has em erged and expan ded in the co u rse o f this century and b eco m e the arbiter o f con tem p orary life-styles and opinions. Secon d, a quickly increasin g p r o ­ portion of the population of m odern capitalist (and state capitalist) cou n tries has b eco m e the clients of such organ izations, as pupils and stud ents in sch oo ls, as patients in the health-care sy ste m , as claim ants and clients o f the social services. The m o d e s of em otio nal and relational m an agem en t o f the organizational m iddle class have been tran sferred ( ‘im p o se d ,’ savs Lasch) to these new clien tele. P ara­ m oun t in the innovation o f m o d es o f relational and em otional m anagem en t is the profession o f p sychoth erapy: the helping profession o f the helping p rofession s. To a con siderable d e gre e , the transition o f m anagem en t through com m and to m an age­ m en t through n egotiation w as eased by the extern al effects o f the psychotherapy profession upon w iden ing circles, first o f related helping profession s, then o f clients, and then o f the gen eral public o f poten tial clients: the process o f p r o to ­ profession alization . The argum en t has com e full circle. People in this age define difficulties with one anoth er in te rm s o f psychic p rob lem s that refer to profession al p sy ch o­ therapeutic treatm en t. But these difficulties have changed as the relations betw een peop le have changed w ithin a society un dergoin g global tran sform ation s. Increasing and gen eralized depen den cy co rre sp o n d e d to som e increase in equality betw een p eop le. E m ancipatory m ovem en ts helped to abolish many unequal relations. The developm en t o f co m p le x arran gem en ts o f organizational care resulted within the organization in m ore egalitarian relation s that spread from there to family relations. The psychotherapy p rofession , especially, provided con cepts and stances for this transition from m anagem en t through com m an d to m anagem en t through n e g o ti­ ation. All things con sid ered , this developm en t has not resulted in broaden ing m argin s of m ovem en t and exp ression lo r everyon e, but it has m ade relations less predictable, because the outcom e is n ot being stru ctu re d by com m an d s, but the pro c e ss of relational and em otio n al m anagem en t is bein g shaped by the re q u ire ­ m en ts of m utual con sideration and con sent, and o f the absten tion from violen ce and self-aggran dizem ent. The poin t has been rcachcd w here the lim its o f the argu m en t m ust be indicated and the con clusion s draw n from it. The relaxation o f m anners in the tw entieth century affects only a lim ited range o f activities. The restrain t on violent behaviour has not lessen ed, the inhibition upon self-aggran dizem en t has probably in creased, and the discipline in the handling o f tim e, m oney, go o d s, and the body has grow n. W hat has broaden ed are the m argin s o f toleran ce in sexual m atters and in the expression o f em otio n s and d esires, especially in intim ate circles. But even this relaxation is conditional upon the con sideration o f the w ishes o f others and upon their n egotiated con sent. . . . The burden s o f pov erty and tyranny may have lessen ed, but in other rcsp ects w estern society has lost little o f its oppressive character, and in many resp ects discipline has in creased. Yet, som e lim itations are not im p o se d , but rather incurred in relations m anaged through negotiation . Th ere is no gu aran tee w hatsoever that such n egotiations lead to dignified o r fair arran gem en ts: ‘A uthenticity rep laced m orality and sincerity replaced ju d g e m e n t.’ W orse, n egotiators may even relinquish authenticity o r sincerity, and m islead or m anipulate one another. M ore im p o rtan t, m anagem ent through n egotiation

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paralyses rebellion : the dissid en ts agree them selves to deal, o f their ow n free w ill, after am ple consultation . T h us, the con tract theory o f citizenship and o f econ om ic man is exten d ed to lovers, paren ts, and colleagu es: one may take them o r leave them . And this points to the basic flaw in any view o f hum an relations as the o u tco m e of negotiated con sen t: such n egotiations alw ays occu r w ithin a w ider social co n te xt in w hich on e party generally holds b etter alternative option s than another. W ithin their m arriage a man and w om en may be equal to each other, but outside it job op p o rtu n ities or chances for rem arriage arc very different. M oreover, the scope o f n egotiation s, o f w hat is n egotiab le, arc narrow ly p re scrib e d , not by the p a rtn ers, but in the social c o n text in w hich they find them selves. T h us, collab o rato rs in an agcncy may bargain with one an oth er distribution o f caseloads

for exam p le, over the

until all o f them togeth er are tran sferred by the board

o f tru ste e s: then they may negotiate over wrho is to go first. The shift tow ards m anagem en t through negotiation rep resen ts a change in the m anner in w hich peop le con trol them selves and one another, especially in face-to-face relations. Seen w ithin a larger social co n te x t such negotiations ap pear lim ited in sco p e , their ou tcom e biased by the option s that each party has in society at large, w hereas the very occu rren ce o f such n egotiation s legitim izes the social o rd e r in w hich such m utual consent is being achieved. Ju d ged within its im m ediate c o n te x t, m an age­ m ent through n egotiation seem s to allow a g re ater variety o f arran gem en ts, b etter suited to the strivin gs o f the p artn ers that brin g about the arran gem en t. But even in this co n text such a form o f relational and em otional m anagem ent forces peop le to take one an o th er’s dem ands into con sideration and to relinquish som e o f their ow n. Som e people forgo these option s and ste e r clear o f such threatening involvem ents, or avoid the negotiation s and the ensuing en gagem en ts. They do not rebel but they reject, not with so many w ords, but tacitly, im plicitly, with a strategy that denies itself, until it is ex p re sse d in a vocabulary o f psychic prob lem s, as depersonalization , as a p leasu re-less prom iscu ity ( ‘tertiary im p o te n ce ’ ), o r as phobia. [. . .] The transition to m anagem en t through negotiation is on ero u s and hazardous. W h ere no com m an d can be heard from within o r w ith out, peop le may ad opt fears and com pu lsion s to help them refrain from w hat they arc now allow ed to do bv others but w hat they find to o difficult, too d an gerou s, and too lonely.

Chapter

4

Peter N. Stearns and Deborah C. Stearns H I S T O R I C A L I S S U E S IN E M O T I O N S RESEARCH C a u s a tio n and tim in g

U

n q u e s t i o n a b l y

,

e x p l a i n i n g

c h a n g e s

in

specific

em otio n s o r em otional con stellation s to rm s the essen tial startin g point in

assessin g causation, lo r both analytical issues and evidence are m ost clear-cut at this level. C hanges in particular em otional form u lations alm o st always follow from som e causes peculiar to the em otion in questio n — a poin t to w hich we m ust retu rn in dealing with the inescapability o f larger fram ew orks as w ell. In addition, the facto rs involved in many specific em otio n s changes can be directly traced through explicit referen ces in p rescrip tive literatu re or a close ch ro n o ­ logical ju x tap o sitio n — this latter connection slightly less definitive, but plausible nevertheless. R cccn t changes in em otional stan dards o r relation ships, though so m e tim e s difficult to determ in e sim ply because o f their recen cy and the dan gers o f e x ag g e rat­ ing con trasts w ith the p ast, provide unusually abundant evidence on causation, because the em otional participan ts can be directly o b serv ed . Arlie H o ch sch ild’s research on clashes over gratitu d e, in fam ilies w here m en and w om en both w ork, leaves little dou b t as to why new con fusions have arisen (H och schild and M achung 1 9 8 9 ). The b asic correlatio n involves the alteration in w o m e n ’ s w ork pattern s and resultan t tension s over family ob ligations, w hich began to take shape in the 1950s but still reverberate. C o rrelatio n can be tested by the e xplicit observation o f family dynam ics, w hen m en m ake clear their b e lie f that they are exceed in g , in their family con tribu tion s, what their fathers did and deserve high praise, w hile w om en stress the gap betw een m e n ’ s and w o m en ’s family involvem ent even as w ork roles have considerably equalized. It w ould be hard to pretend that causation in this instance involves many m ysteries. Many changes in em otio n al stan dards in the m o re distant past may be explain ed

5 2

P ET ER

N. S T E A R N S

AND

DEBORAH

C.

ST E A RN S

w ith alm ost the sam e d egree of certain ty , because o f the con nection s available in the p rescrip tive evidence. It is true that im portan t shifts in em otional culture arc not accom panied by lull aw areness o f the novelty in volved, w hich m eans that the so u rces o f altered stan dards rarely rellect on causation ; but they may leave abundant clucs n evertheless. In the first edition ol his im m ensely p op u lar baby book issued in 1945, Dr. Benjam in Spock rep eated standard advice about anger, o f the so rt that had been characteristic o f childrearin g literatu re for alm o st a century. A nger required parental m on ito rin g, for children m ust learn that so m e form s o f anger arc in app ro­ priate and that som e targets, particularly in the fam ily, should be out o f boun ds. But anger itse lf w as a vital m otivation fo r future com petitive b usin essm en o r farm e rs, and parents should also be con cern ed not to discipline it ou t o f existen ce. A bit m ore than a decade later S p o ck ’ s advice had changed. By the 1960s ch ild ren ’ s anger should be firm ly con trolled in all circu m stan ces, for the em otio n w as both d an ger­ ous and valueless. Rather than teaching children how to channel their aggressive en ergies tow ard useful g o als, paren ts now should help children m inim ize anger, talking it out h arm lessly and so redu cing its place in their em otio n al m akeup. Revealingly, w hen Spo ck w rote in his su b seq u en t revisions about the w ork goals tow ard which this new anger strategy should be directed , he now referred to m an agers and salesm en , w here sm ooth p erso n alities and em otional self-control held pride o f place (Stearn s and Stearn s 1986). Spock did not carefully analyze his change o f view s con cern in g anger, and so we are speculatin g slightly in su ggestin g that a key reason involved recognition that the em otio n al req uirem en ts o f w ork w ere un dergoin g alteration and that childrearing standards m ust follow suit. The m argin ol e rro r in this speculation is redu ced when a variety o f additional evidence poin ts in the sam e direction: from as carlv as 1928 D ale C arn egie and a host o f w ork-advice pop u larizers had been urgin g anger con trol on adults in the grow in g service se c to r of the econ om y. By the 1950s studies o f actual A m erican paren ts dem on strated that the fam ilies m o st keen to pick up on the new er kinds o f childrearin g advice, bent on m inim izing in terp erson al friction s, cam e d ispro portion ately from the m anagerial m iddle class. H ere, then, is an accum ulation o f evidence, including direct p rescrip tive referen ces, d e m o n ­ stratin g that a m ajor cause o f evolving anger stan dards follow ed from changes in the stru ctu re o f the lab or force, as earlier en trepren eurial and production em phasis gave way to c o rp o rate bureaucracies and service se c to r jobs. In the d ecades around 1800, m iddle-class p eop le in France (and elsew h ere in the W estern w orld) began to m anifest new levels o f d isgust at bodily o d o rs and other sm ells. T h e change is fascinating, in that this changc involves both em otional reaction s and a real shift in the evaluation o f the physical senses. Sm ells o f sw eat, urine, and d efecation , previously tolerated o r even (in the case o f urin e) so m e ­ tim es w elcom e, now b ecam e nauseating. U rin e, used fo r tooth brush ing in seventeenth -century H olland and as a m ark o f courtsh ip in seventeenth-century W ales, now provided sickening sm ells in the c o rrid o rs o f urban slum s o r the clothing o f ill-disciplined young children. N ew sanitary p ro ce d u re s, including in door plum bin g and m ore rigorou s toilet training, follow ed from these new em otional and visceral reaction s, ab etted o f co u rse by tech n ological innovations (C orbin 1986).

HISTORICAL

ISSUES

IN E M O T I O N S

RESEARCH

5 3

N on e o f the c o n te m p o rarie s w ho m anifested the new levels of disgu st explicitly stated why they w ere b eco m in g, by traditional standards, so fastidious. Evidence is m ore indirect than in the case of Spo ck and the anger training of children. But tw o related causes sprin g out both from the com m on targets of the new d isgust, and from correlatio n s with w id er social change. In the first place, grow in g urban iza­ tion and industrialization created heightened an xieties ab out physical health. C ities w ere traditionally less healthy than the cou n trvside, and the return o f fearsom e plagues, like the cholcra epidem ic o f the 1830s, drove the dangers hom e quite graphically. In advance o f the germ th eory, reaction to urban o d o rs both expressed health fears and helped propel behaviors, including flight from the w o rst, sm elliest m iasm as, that seem ed directly useful in redu cin g disease risk. R elated ly, incipient industrialization heightened social class divisions. M iddle-class peop le feared the w rath and the stran geness o f the urban poor, and at the sam e tim e needed ju stifi­ cations for their acceptancc o f new, visible fo rm s o f inequality. The notion that the p o o r w ere anim al-like, alm o st a different sp ecies, legitim ized avoidancc and neglect. Fastidiousn ess w as an em otional and sen sory b ack drop to this social dif­ ferentiation. (Interestingly, young children, fully as logical a disgu st targ et, w ere increasingly idealized, though also bathed and p erfu m ed — suggestin g again the selectivity o f disgust causation and its derivation, not from sm ells in gen eral, but from the sm ells associated with new social divid es.) T h e p o o r sm elled bad, as part o f their feck less, uncivilized habits m ore generally. They could be called to o rd e r by classes who m aintained the p ro p e r standards o f em otion and hygiene, o r dam ned if they refused to com e aroun d. E m otion al change w as, in sum , socially useful, in respond in g to the novel and rath er Irightening social co n te xt o f in dustrialization, becom ing m arkers of class standing. C orresp on d in gly , peop le w ho p ropou n d ed and utilized the new stan dards of disgust explicitly targeted p rob lem s o f d isease and the ill-governance o f the p o o r in e x p ressin g and illustrating the stan dards. T h e causal link is clear. O th er instances o f causation applied to p articu lar em otio n s depen d m ore purely on chronological correlatio n s, as explicit referen ces arc largely absen t; and, it m ust be ad m itted , correlation may be m isleadin g in that tw o ph enom ena may be sim ultan eous w ithout being integrally con n ected. But the correlation betw een reduction o f birth rate and new em otional attachm en t to individual children is w idely accepted am ong historians, w ho find its traces around 1800 in the m iddle class o f cou n tries like the U nited States, a bit later fo r the w orking class, and recently again in areas undergoing dem ograph ic transition such as urban China. The link is clear: large fam ilies in a tradition al d em ograph ic regim e p erm itted real affection for children, but the intensity w as con strained by the sheer n u m b ers o f children involved, the ten den cy o f children to bond as m uch with o ld e r siblings as with paren ts, and the frequency o f infant m ortality w hich introduced som e caution in attachm en ts ven tured in early childh ood. W hen the birth rate d ro p s, from six to eight children p e r couple to four or five or less (as began to occur in a w ell-studied case am on g Philadelphia Q u ak ers around 1800 ) (W ells 1 9 7 1 ), many o f these co n ­ straints dim inish. Parents have m ore tim e and em otional energy fo r the individual children they do have. Sibling bonding dim inishes in favor o f ties directly with parents. And efforts to provide b etter care for youn g children cut into traditional resignation about young ch ildren ’ s deaths, prom otin g gre ater em otional

5 4

P ET ER

N. S T E A R N S

AND

DEBORAH

C.

ST E A RN S

com m itm en t to infants (and ultim ately, a reduction in the infant death rate). The only analytical p ro b lem , aside from the need (or careful statem en t of the change in em otio n s itself lest the traditional parent-child tics be oversim plified, involves p rio rity . It is very difficult to determ in e w hether so m e grou p s first cut their birth rates for n on-em otion al reason s— econ om ics, for e x am p le — and then discovered their co m m itm en t to their sm aller b ro o d s affected; o r w hether in so m e cases at least an em otional redefinition occu rred first, pro m o tin g a new in terest in reducing birth rates in o rd e r to be able to lavish m ore atten tion, care, and m oney on the children (T rum bach 1978). Yet the d em ograph ic correlation stands w ith the only co m p le x ity , not insignificant to be su re, w hether it m u st be supp lem en ted by other facto rs, such as cultural redefinition o f children and their degree o f in n ocen ce, to explain why em otio n al change m ight preced e new dem ograph ic behavior, serving as cause then enhanced by effect (Sch cpcr-H u gh es 1985). And a final correlatio n ease: around 1900, attitudes tow ard ch ild ren ’s e m o ­ tional resp o n se to death began to change (Fiore 199 2 ). D urin g m o st o f the nine­ teenth cen tury, advice to parents (and many actual cerem on ies and com m en ts associated with death) had stressed the im p ortan ce o f preventing ch ildren ’ s fear o f death by associatin g children with death closely w hile enveloping death itse lf in a positive and sen tim en tal aura. Beginning about 1880, and with grow in g intensity early in the tw entieth cen tury, this tone began to change. A nxiety about preventing fear escalated. Children w ere now seen as potentially m anifesting very co m p lex reaction s to death that could not be diverted sim ply by religious and familial assurance. Parents m ust now carefully m anage the presen tation o f death to children w ith aw areness o f trau m atic response u p p e rm o st in their m inds. N ineteenthcentury stap les, such as the association betw een death and sw eet sleep , w ere now attacked because ol their fear-inducing poten tial. G r id w as ack n ow ledged as a problem am ong children, to be handled with outrigh t m anipulation including con ccalm en t o f p arental feelings. P sych ological studies ol the em otio nal com p lexities o f childhood played a role in this new effo rt to distance children, em otio n ally, from death. Popularized research findings m ade it increasingly difficult for m iddle-class A m erican s o r W est European s to believe in childish innocence and em otional ease. But the m ost strikin g correlation with the new approach to ch ildren ’ s fear and g r ie f involved the huge changes occu rrin g in ch ild ren ’ s m ortality itself, and in the institutional practices

su rroun din g death.

Im proved

n utrition , b etter

sanitation

including

im plem en tation o f m easu res derived from P asteu r’ s ge rm th eory, and fuller use o f trained m edical perso n n el in cases o f difficult b irth s, all com bined to drive infant m ortality dow n from over 20 p ercen t o f all b irth s in 1800, to under 5 p crccn t by 1920. This m assive transition had tw o im pacts on adult treatm en t o f ch ild ren ’ s em otio n s surroun din g death, the one ob vious, the other probably m ore im portan t. It b ecam e increasingly likely that a child w ould n ot have to exp erien ce death in the n uclear family (Stearn s and H aggerty 199 1 ). This change how ever explain s why a new em otional cultu re w as possib le, but not why it took the anxious shape it did. At this poin t, a secon d correlative facet m ust be introduced. The revolution in child m orality w as accom pan ied by grow in g parental anxiety about ch ild ren ’ s health. W atchfulness— against g e rm s, for ex am p le — b ecam e essential, but also fruitful in that il could produ ce a death-free childh ood. As paren ts acquired new con cern s

HISTORICAL

ISSUES

IN

EMOTIONS

RESEARCH

55

ab ou t c h ild re n ’ s d ise ase s and a new aw aren ess o f th eir re sp o n sib ility in p rovid in g m ed ical care, their ow n attitu d e to ch ild re n ’ s death p o te n tial b e ca m e m o re v u l­ n erable. W h en thcv assim ilated new ad vice ab o u t the n eed to sh e lte r ch ild ren , e m o tio n a lly , from death , they w ere essen tially tran sp o sin g th eir ow n g ro w in g fears. T h is is an ob v io u s c o rre latio n in on e sen se: a d e v e lo p m en t in child m o rta lity so u n p re ce d e n te d as the tran sition b e tw e en 1880 and 1920 w'ould alm o st certain ly re v e rb e rate in e m o tio n al c u ltu re . Yet it is n o t a c o rre latio n that can be directly tra c e d , b c ca u sc none o f the so u rcc s o f new ad vice ab o u t c h ild re n ’ s fe ars and g r ie f d rew the ob v io u s con n ectio n s. D e sp ite its tcn tativ cn css it su g g e sts again the ex citin g p o ssib ilitie s, w hen a specific shift in e m o tio n al stan d ard s can b e iso late d , o f e x p lo rin g ap plicab le cau sation directly . P articu lar ch an ges in e m o tio n m ay, o f c o u rse , u n cover n o t a p rim ary b asic cause b u t a con caten atio n o f fac to rs. A final e x a m p le w ill in dicate the p o ssib ilitie s h ere. A rou n d 1 9 2 0 , A m erican p are n ts b egan to be tre ate d to a b arrag e o f co n ce rn ab o u t je alo u sy b e tw e en sib lin gs, p articu larly involving the re actio n s o f a to d d le r to the arrival o f a new' baby (S te arn s 1 9 8 9 ). N in ete e n th -c e n tu ry fam ily cu ltu re had alm o st c o m p le te ly ign o re d siblin g ten sio n s, and th ere w as no p re ce d e n t fo r the co n ce rn ab o u t c h ild re n ’ s je alo u sy that b egan to sw ell from the 19 2 0 s o n w ard , as paren ts b egan to w orry both ab o u t je a lo u sy — in d u ced v iolen ce and ab ou t lon gerterm p e rso n a lity d am ag e fo r the je alo u s child h im self. W hy did this new featu re o f fam ilial e m o tio n a l cu ltu re su rface w hen it did? T h re e p rim ary c au ses in te rtw in e d , the first directly d e m o n strab le , the o th e r tw o in volving the m o re sp ecu lative kind o f c o rre latio n s already sketch ed in o th e r c o n ­ n ection s. F acto r 1: a new b re e d o f p o p u la riz e rs began to use p sy ch o lo gical research on siblin gs to g e n e ra te a m uch less favorab le p ictu re o l c h ild re n ’ s n atural e m o tio n s than had p revailed in the n in eteen th -cen tu ry m id d le class (W ish y 1 9 6 8 ; K ell and A ld o u s 1 9 6 0 ; D un n

1 9 8 5 ). E x p e rts foun d a novel b asis for establish in g th eir

au th ority w ith p are n ts by callin g atten tio n to a p re v io u sly -u n d e te cte d but se rio u s p ro b le m , and p ro v id in g so lu tio n s. Facto r 2 (h elp in g to explain why p aren ts listen ed to the e x p e r ts ): several ch an ges in fam ily life m ad e siblin g rivalry m o re likely than had been the case previou sly. By the early tw en tieth cen tu ry the m id d le class had an average o f tw o ch ildren . S m a ller fam ily size m ean t less b o n d in g am o n g sib lin gs, m o re con ten tio n fo r d ire c t em o tio n al acc e ss to p are n ts (D un n 1 9 8 5 ). A t the sam e tim e , the p re se n ce o f o th e r ad u lts in the h o u s e h o ld — live-in se rv a n ts and g ra n d p a re n ts— d e clin e d , in the first case after 1 8 9 0 , in the se co n d after 1 9 2 0 . Finally, in creasin g e ffo rts to p ro m o te c h ild re n ’ s in dividu ality, by e arm ark in g se p arate toys and in sistin g on se p arate b e d ro o m s, in directly c n c o u ra g c d new levels o f e m o tio n a l ten sion am id a siblin g c o h o rt, even as the new siblin g ad vice p ro m o te d fu rth e r in d ivid u ation . T h e stro n g likelih ood then is that new c o n ce rn ab ou t c h ild re n ’ s je alo u sy follow ed from new levels o f this sam e e m o tio n , deep ly tro u b lin g to p are n ts w ho now h an dled children w ith less o u tsid e assistan ce. F a cto r 3: ro u n d in g o u t e ssen tial cau sation w as the fact that by the 1 9 2 0 s ad u lts w ere b e co m in g m o re c o n ce rn e d ab ou t th eir ow n je alo u s re actio n s (Lynd and Lynd 1 9 2 9 ). R em oval o f re stric tio n s on so cializin g b e tw e en m en and w o m e n , the rise o f datin g as an ad o le sc e n t behavior, and g r e a te r em p h asis on sexu ality all p ro d u c e d a g ro w in g n u m b e r o f situ atio n s in w hich jealo u sy w as both likely and

5 6

P E T E R

N.

S T E A R N S

c o u n te rp ro d u c tiv e

(B ailey

AND

1988;

D E B O R A H

M o d e ll

C.

S T E A R N S

1 9 8 9 ).

A ttack s

on

ad ult

jealou sy

a b o u n d ed , but the fo cu s on ch ild re n ’ s jealou sy se rv e d as an o u tle t as w ell. L o gically , by red u cin g ch ild re n ’ s jealo u sy ad u lts m igh t be lo r m e d w h o co u ld handle h e te ro se x u a l socializin g m o re readily (C lan to n 1 9 8 9 ). L e ss co n scio u sly , an xiety a b o u t c h ild re n ’ s je a lo u sy h elp ed ad u lts e x p r e ss u n ce rtain tie s a b o u t th eir ow n re sp o n se s that they w ere e m b a rra sse d to state o pen ly . T h is ad u lt d isp lac e m e n t fac to r re se m b le s, o f c o u r se , the c o rre latio n involved in e x p lain in g new co n c e rn s a b o u t c h ild re n ’ s re actio n s to death ju st a sh o rt tim e b e fo re and like this fac to r can n o t at le ast as y et be directly pro v ed . G ro w in g k n o w led g e ab o u t ch an ges in sp ecific e m o tio n s has clcarly g e n e ra te d a n u m b e r o f relatively p re cise p o in ts o f tran sition that can b e fruitfully analyzed in te r m s o f cau satio n , d e sp ite variatio n s in precisio n o f p r o o f. T h e re su lts frequen tly u n cover d ire ct relatio n sh ip s b etw een o th e r d e v e lo p m en ts and the inn ovation s in e m o tio n al stan d ard s. Even seem in g ly as ch an ges in the lab o r fo rc e as they reach ed in to fo rm u la tio n s a b o u t d ealin g w ith ch ild re n ’s an ger, can be d e m o n strate d w ith high p ro b ab ility . O th e r relatio n sh ip s involve c o rre latio n s w h ose ch ro n o lo g ical c o in c id en cc c o m b in es w ith p lau sib ility in exp lain in g n o t only n ew e m o tio n al stan d ard s but the inten sity o f th eir im p a ct, in clu d in g u n ack n o w le d g e d ad u lt te n ­ sion s that spill over in to ch ildrearin g. W h ile so m e shifts in e m o tio n a l stan d ard s d e p e n d p a rticu larly on on e p rim ary cau se o th e rs re su lt from a con fluen ce o f several fa c to rs, w hich en rich es but also c o m p lic ate s an alysis. A m id the several sce n a rio s involved the an alytical e x p lo ra tio n o f cau sation e x p a n d s u n d e rstan d in g o f the chan ge itself, w ell b eyon d w hat sim p le d e sc rip tio n o f shifting stan d ard s can provide.

R cfcrcnccs Bailev, B. 1988. From Front Porch to Back Seat: Courtship in Twentieth-Century America. Baltim ore, M D : The Johns H opkins U niversity Press. C lanton, G. (1 9 8 9 ). “Jealousy in A m erican C ulture, 1945—1985: R eflections from Popular C u ltu re .” In The Sociology o f Emotions, edited by David Franks and E. D. M cC arthy. G reenw ich , C T : JA I Press. C orbin , A. 1986. The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination. C am bridge, M A : H arvard U niversity Press. D unn, J. 1985. Sisters and Brothers. C am bridge, M A : H arvard U niversity Press. Fiore, D. 1992. Grandma's Through: Children and the Death Experience from the 18th Century to the Present. U npublished paper, C arn egie M ellon U niversity. H ochschild, A. R. and A. M achung. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Flome. N ew York: Viking. K ell, L. and J. A ldous. 1960. “Trends in Child C are over T h ree G en eration s.” Marriage and Family Living 22: 176—177. Lynd, R. S. and FI. M . Lynd. 1929. .Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture. N ew York: H arcou rt Bracc and Co. M odell, J. 1989. Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the United States, 1920—1975. Berkeley, C A : U niversity o f C alifornia Press. Stearn s, P. N . (1 9 8 9 ) Jealousy: The Evolution o f an Emotion in American Flistory. Newr York and London: N ew York U niversity Press.

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Stearn s, C .Z . and Stearns, P.N. (1 9 8 6 ) Anger: The Struggle fo r Emotional Control in America's History. C h icago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. T rum bach , R. (1 9 7 8 ) The Rise o f the Egalitarian Family: Aristocratic Kinship and Domestic Relations in Eighteenth-Century England. N ew York: A cadem ic Press. W ells, R . V. (1 9 7 1 ) ‘Family Size and Fertility C on trol in E ighteenth-C entury A m erica: A Studv o f Q u aker Fam ilies’ . Population Studies, 25 (1 ): 7 3 —82. W ishy, B. W. (1 9 6 8 ) The Child and the Republic: The Dawn o f Modern American Child Nurture. Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press.

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2. Emotions and culture

T

HE

QUESTION

OF W H E T H E R

OR in w hat ways emotions can be

said to be universal has been articulated, perhaps most exactingly, in the domain

of anthropology. The field of relevant contributions spans several decades, and is enormously rich and varied. As early as 1986, anthropologists Lutz and W hite pub­ lished a comprehensive analytical review of cross-cultural research on emotions, which we highly recommend as background reading to this complex problem-area. The review cites just under 200

references and surveys the contribution of

ethologists, linguists, cross-cultural psychologists and psychiatrists, besides that of physical, psychoanalytic and cultural anthropologists. For the purposes of this brief introduction, it w ill suffice to say that Lutz and W hite identify four different approaches positing cross-cultural universals in emotion, namely: e th o lo g ic a l a n d e v o lu tio n a ry approaches, p sy ch o d yn a m ic a n d p s y c h ia tric perspectives, approaches

informed by what they call com m onsense n a tu ra lis m and, last but not least, approaches that posit lan guag e u n iv e rsa ls (linguistic or cultural codes found across cultures) as evidence of universal aspects of emotional experience. Lutz and W hite then go on to present varieties of research on emotions as culturally and socially constructed. In contrast to the form er set of approaches, these posit that different cultural meaning systems have a p r im a r y role to play in the shaping (or, sometimes, constituting) of emotional experience itself. The emphasis in this equally vast body of work is therefore on cultural variation, mediated by cognitive categories of ethnop s y c h o lo g ic a l un d erstan d in g (such as that of the cu ltu rally constituted 'self'), by the s o c ia l s tr u c tu r a l c o rre la te s of such understandings, and/or by ve rb a l c o m m u n ica tio n .

Generally speaking, this research tends to define emotion 'm ore as a socially validated judgment than an internal state', and thus focuses largely on 'the translation of emotion concepts and the social processes surrounding their use' (1986: 40 8). Lutz and W hite im portantly stress that the relativism embraced by authors in these fields

6 0

U N I V E R S A L S

AND

P A R T I C U L A R S

OF

A F F E C T

involves different degrees of constructionism , as many of them do posit universals in some aspects of emotions - for example, in the types of situations or social positions associated with them. An influential collection by the title

The S o c ia l Construction o f Em otion

appeared in the same year as Lutz and W hite published their review (1986). This collection, edited by Rom Harre, argued for a m ethodological agenda giving priority to linguistic studies of emotion, with a view to illustrating cultural variation among emotion systems. Such studies would pay p a rticu la r attention to how specific lin­ guistic repertoires mediate local moral orders, and to the social functions that p a r­ tic u la r emotion displays and emotion ta lk 'perform in the dram aturgically shaped episodes of this or that culture' (H arre 1986: 13). Constructionist programs of research gained ascendancy in the wake of these seminal publications, in the context of what we have referred to as the textual turn in social science. M ore recently, however, an increasing number of authors have articulated the lim itations of cultural constructionism , and the need to develop theoretical and methodological tools capable of eschewing the conceptual dichotomies of affect/cognition, individual/ society, body/mind, matter/discourse. If, in 1986, Lutz and W hite were able to write that research positing cross-cultural universals was 'usually positivist in epistemological orientation' (408), a feature of the more recent critiques of constructionist relativism is their re-framing of the question of universals in terms that do not rely on positivist assumptions. On the one hand, it is argued that the way forw ard in the study of 'emotions and culture' lies in adm itting the relevance of non-reductive form of psychology, in order to address 'the enormous diversity in the way individuals appropriate symbolic form s related to emotions and emotional experience' (Good 2004: 532; see also Good and Good 2005). On the other hand, it is argued that the 'ideational bias' in cultural accounts of emotions must be corrected through a focus on embodiment and non-mechanistic biology (Lyon 1995; see also Csordas 1994; W ilce 20 03 ). The backdrop to these developments in the study of emotion are new and complex ways of thinking about 'culture', in response to processes of g lo baliza­ tion and emergent, de- and reterritorialized cultural forms (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). The first extract included in this section is by Cathrine Lutz, one of the bestknown exponents of the constructionist approach to the study of emotion. In this text, Lutz examines the gendered dimensions of the construct of emotion in some sectors of Am erican culture, through the analysis of interview conversations with both men and women. This piece builds on an earlier a rticle (Lu tz 1986) where Lutz proposed that Euroam erican conceptions of emotion, both lay and expert, should themselves be subject to a deconstructive reading, for the purpose of translating between cultural systems. If the cultural specificity of Euroam erican concepts of emotion is not immediately apparent, she argued, this is in good part because of the (Western) positivist assumption that it is possible to identify an 'essence' of emotion, and that such an essence is universal. The meaning system that constitutes the Western category of emotion associates this concept with a number of others (nature, irrationality, subjectivity, femininity, chaos) that share a position of inferiority with respect to their dichotomous counterparts (culture, reason, universality, masculinity, order and control). In this extract, drawn from a chapter published in 1990, Lutz

E M O T 10 N S A N D C U L T U R E

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focuses on the function of a 'rhetoric of control' in women's ta lk about emotion. She argues that this rhetoric can be read as 'a narrative about the double-sided nature both weak and dangerous - of dominated groups' (1990: 70). The second extract in this section is from an a rticle by W illia m Reddy, where the author takes issue with the 'strong' constructionism he associates with the work of Lutz, among others. W h ilst appreciating the reasons, both theoretical and political, for refusing essentialist conceptions of subjectivity and emotions, Reddy draws attention to some of the paralyzing features of the constructionist focus on 'cu ltu re' (or language) at the expense of the individual (or feeling). Reddy proposes the term 'em otives' to characterize emotion statements, stressing that such statements are themselves 'instrum ents for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying [the inner experience of] e m otion s'.'Em otives' are not representational, because there is always a disjuncture between them and the feelings to which they are 'anchored'. But neither do they simply perform emotion in the sense of constructing it from linguistic and cultural conventions. Rather, 'em otives' perform feeling in the sense of shaping it (or m oving it) in p a rticu la r directions. Understanding emotion statements in terms of 'em otives' allows theoretically for the existence of a 'residuum that is not satis­ factorily shaped', and this residuum 'provides an initial reservoir or possibilities for change' - the source of the possibility for deviance, resistance, or the generation of alternative idioms. Reddy's approach draws on post-structuralist insights about language and on reform ulations of classic psychodynamic concepts, to offer a post­ positivist and non-essentialist account of feeling as what is 'universally human'. One critique of Reddy's position is that it is pitched against an extreme version of constructionism that is very rarely, in fact, espoused by researchers of emotion and culture. In its original published form, Reddy's a rticle is followed by responses from Brenneis, Garro, Howell, Hunt, Longman, and Lutz, as well as a reply from the author, to which we refer readers who may want to deepen their understanding of this debate. The author of our third extract is another ethnohistorian of emotions, M ichael Harkin, who also draws on psychodynamic approaches in explicit contrast with dis­ cursive ones. Harkin poses the methodological question of 'w hat role the emotions can possibly play in our interpretations of cultures that were destroyed or radically altered in the aftermath of contact with Euroam ericans'. One of the most interesting features of this question is that it addresses simultaneously emotions as an aspect of the culture(s) under study, and emotions as an aspect of the research process. Harkin proposes that ethnopsychological approaches that rely on linguistic documentation bracketing out any assumptions concerning the nature of the human psyche - are not helpful for the purposes of investigating emotional schemata in cultures and languages that are now extinct. Psychodynamic approaches, on the other hand, assume a degree of sim ilarity in the basic mechanisms through which humans manage traum atic events and emotions. On this basis, an explication of the emotional dimensions of specific ethnohistorical events can be offered, and this is illustrated in this extract through examples from the Am erican Northwest Coast. Harkin argues moreover that, in the classical tradition of anthropology, a professional reluctance to think historically can be read as a psychologically defensive response to the 'searing histories of genocide, culture loss, land appropriations, and immense cruelty per­ petrated on indigenous peoples'. Among contem porary ethnohistorians, who no

6 2

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longer think in terms of an 'ethnographic present', the unwillingness to consider the emotional dimensions of the past persists, and can sim ilarly be regarded as an unwillingness to face emotions of extreme distress - not only those of the peoples studied, but also those that the practice of studying them may provoke in the researcher. The last extract in this section, by Johan Lindquist, is a recent contribution to the vast body of anthropological research on emotions in Southeast Asia. This piece follow s in the steps of seminal authors like Geertz and Rosaldo in looking at emotions as a basis for theorizing social action; it departs from their classic studies, however, in focusing on social change and cultural transition. The a rticle examines m alu approximately translated as shame or embarrassment - as a key emotional trope for contem porary Indonesian migrants, by looking at the practices of two very different groups of migrant women (factory workers and prostitutes). Unlike other possible translations of 'shame-embarrassment', which remain tied to p a rticu la r ethnic groups and languages, m alu has become especially salient as a concept that exists in several Indonesian languages and, in the context of migration, as part of the Indone­ sian lingua franca. As such, m alu functions as an experiential trope that links the spaces of migration and expresses the (gendered) anxieties that emerge from the tensions between them. A t the same time, m alu describes a relationship between individuals and the cultural fram ew ork of the 'nation', beyond any one local community.

References Csordas, T. J . (ed.) (199 4) Em bodim ent and Experience: The E x iste n tia l Grounds o f Culture and Self. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Good, B. J. (200 4) 'Rethinking "e m o tio n s" in Southeast A sia ', Ethnos, 69 (4): 5 2 9 -5 3 3 . Good, B. J. and Good, M .-J. DelVecchio (200 5) 'On the "su b je c t" of culture: subjectivity and cultural phenomenology in the w ork of C liffo rd Geertz', in R. Schweder and B. Good (eds) C liffo rd Geertz by his Colleagues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (eds) (1 9 9 7 ) A n th ro p o lo g ic a l Locations: Boundaries and Grounds o f a F ie ld Science. Berkeley: University of C a liforn ia Press. Harre, R. (ed.) (198 9) The S o c ia l C onstruction o f Em otion. Oxford: B lackw ell. Lutz, C. and W hite, G. M. (1 9 8 6 ) 'The anthropology of em otions', A n n u a l Review o f Anthropology, 15: 4 0 5 -4 3 6 . Lutz, C. (198 6) 'E m otio n , thought, and estrangement: emotion as a cultu ral category', C u ltu ra l Anthropology, 1 (3): 2 8 7 -3 0 9 . Lyon, M. L. (199 5) 'M issin g emotions: the lim itations of cultu ral constructionism in the study of em otion', C u ltu ra l Anthropology, 10 (2): 2 4 4 -2 6 3 . W ilce, J. M . (ed) (200 3) S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. London: Routledge.

Chapter

5

Catherine A. Lutz ENGENDERED

EMOTION

Gender, power, a n d th e rh e to ric o f e m o tio n a l c o n tr o l in A m e r ic a n d is c o u rs e

W

ESTERN

DISCOURSE

ON

EMOTIONS

CONSTITUTES

them as p arad o xical en titie s that are both a sign o f w eakn ess and a pow erful

fo rc e . O n the on e h and, e m o tio n w eaken s the p e rso n w ho e x p e rie n c e s it. It d o e s this both by se rv in g as a sign o f a so rt o f c h a ra c te r d e fe ct (e .g ., “ She c o u ld n ’ t rise above her e m o tio n s”) and by b ein g a sign o f at least te m p o ra ry in trap sy ch ic d is ­ o rgan ization (e .g ., “She w as in a fragile sta te ” o r “ She fell a p a r t”). T h e p e rso n w ho has “ fallen a p a r t,” n e e d le ss to say, is unable to fun ction effectively o r fo rc e fu lly . O n the o th e r h and, e m o tio n s are literally ph ysical fo rc e s that push us in to v ig o ro u s action . “She w as ch arg ed u p ,” w e say; “ W aves o f e m o tio n sh o ok his b o d y .” W om en arc c o n stru cte d in a sim ilar c o n trad ic to ry fashion as both stro n g and w eak (e .g ., Jo rd a n o v a I 9 8 0 ), and I w ill p re se n t eviden ce [. . .] that w hen A m erican w om en and m en talk ab o u t e m o tio n , they draw on that sim ilarity to c o m m e n t on the n ature o f g e n d e r and pow er. T h is featu re o f the em o tio n al and o f the fem ale p ro d u c e s fre q u e n t d iscussion in the in te rv ie w s o f the p ro b lem o f co n tro llin g o n e ’ s feelin gs. Such discu ssio n is fou n d in b oth m e n ’ s and w o m e n ’ s d isc o u rse , b u t m uch m o re frequ en tly in the latter. I w ill show that this talk ab o u t c o n tro l o f e m o tio n s is eviden ce o f a w id ely shared cu ltu ral view o f the d an g e r o f b oth w o m en and their e m o tio n a lity . It is also talk that m ay m ean d ifferen t things to b oth the sp e ak e r and the au d ien ce w hen it is u tte re d bvJ w om en and bvJ m e n , and this facto r w ill b e u sed to h elp acco u n t for d iffe ren ce s in the rate o f use o f this rh e to ric o f c o n tro l. A lth ough both w o m en and m en draw on a cultu rally available m o d e l o f e m o tio n as so m eth in g in n eed o f co n tro l, they can be seen as often m akin g so m e d ifferen t kinds o f sen se and claim s from it. T h e m ate rial I tu rn to first w as c o llc c tc d in fo u r e x te n d e d in te rv ie w s on e m o tio n w ith fifteen A m erican w ork in g- and m id d le -class w om en and m en . All

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w h ite , th ey ra n g e d in a g e fr o m th e e a rly t w e n tie s to th e m id - s e v e n t ie s an d in c lu d e d a b a n k te lle r, fa c to r y w o r k e r , c o lle g e te a c h e r , r e t ir e e , h o u s in g c o d e in sp e c to r , an d s to c k b r o k e r . M o s t w e r e p a r e n ts . T h e in te r v ie w s w e r e u su a lly c o n d u c t e d in p e o p l e ’ s h o m e s , an d th e in te r v ie w e r s in c lu d e d m y s e lf an d a n u m b e r o f g r a d u a t e s tu d e n t s , m o s t o f th e m w o m e n . E ac h p e r s o n w a s in te r v ie w e d b y th e s a m e in d iv id u a l fo r all fo u r s e s s io n s , an d a lth o u g h a sm a ll n u m b e r o f q u e s t io n s o r g a n iz e d e a c h s e s s io n , e v e r y a t t e m p t w a s m a d e to h ave th e in te r v ie w s a p p r o x im a t e “ n a tu ra l c o n v e r s a t io n .” N o n e t h e le s s , it is d e a r l y im p o r t a n t to k e e p in m in d th e c o n t c x t o f th e d is c o u r s e to b e a n a ly z e d , a s it w a s p r o d u c e d b y a g r o u p o f p e o p le w h o a g r e e d o n le t t e r and p h o n e so lic ita tio n “ to talk a b o u t e m o t io n ” fo r an a u d ie n c e o f re la tiv e s t r a n g e r s w h o w e r e a lso a c a d e m ic s an d m o s tly fe m a le s . M a n y p e o p le m e n tio n e d a t o n e o r se v e ra l p o in t s in th e in te r v ie w s th a t th ey b e lie v e w o m e n t o b e m o r e e m o t io n a l th a n m e n . O n e e x a m p le o f th e v a rie ty o f w ay s th is w a s p h r a s e d is th e a c c o u n t o n e w o m a n g a v e t o e x p la in h e r o b s e r v a tio n th a t s o m e p e o p le s e e m in h e r e n tly to b e “ n e r v o u s t y p e s .” Sh e r e m e m b e r e d a b o u t h e r c h ild h o o d th at th e fe m a le te a c h e r s h ad a te n d e n c y to re a lly h o lle r a t th e k id s a lo t , an d w h e n I w a s in c la ss w ith th e m a le te a c h e r , it s e e m e d lik e h e ju s t le t th in g s p a s s by an d it d i d n ’ t s e e m to g e t h is g o a t as fa s t, an d h e d i d n ’ t sh o u t at th e s a m e tim e th e fe m a le m ay h ave in th e s a m e in sta n c e . . . . I th in k e m o t io n a l p e o p le g e t u p s e t fa ste r. I d o . A n d like w ith m e n an d w o m e n , th in g s th a t a r e s o r t o f im p o r t a n t o r b o th e r in g m e d o n ’ t b o th e r m y h u sb a n d . . . . 1 th in k t h a t ’ s a d iffe r e n c e o f m a le an d fe m a le . O n e th e m e th at fr e q u e n tly a r is e s in th e in te r v ie w s is w h a t can b e c a lle d th e “r h e t o r ic o f c o n t r o l” ( R o s a ld o 1 9 7 7 ) . W h e n p e o p le a r c a s k e d to ta lk a b o u t e m o t io n s , o n e o l th e m o s t c o m m o n s e t o f m e t a p h o r s u s e d is th a t in w h ic h s o m e o n e o r s o m e th in g c o n t r o ls , h a n d le s , c o p e s , d e a ls , d is c ip lin e s , o r m a n a g e s e ith e r o r b o th th e ir e m o t io n s o r th e s itu a tio n s e e n a s c r e a tin g th e e m o t io n . F o r e x a m p le : I b e lie v e an in d iv id u a l can e x o r c is e a g r e a t d e a l o f control o v e r th e ir e m o t io n s b y m a in ta in in g a m o r e p o s it iv e o u t lo o k , b y n o t d w e llin g on th e n e g a tiv e , b y tr y in g to p u sh a sid e an u n p le a sa n t fe e lin g . I ’m g e t tin g a n g r y an d lik e I s a id , h e ’ s o v e r b e in g a n g r y , m o r e o r le ss d r o p p e d it an d h e e x p e c t s m e t o a lso . W e ll w e d o n ’t have th e s a m e t e m p e r , I ju s t c a n ’ t handle it th a t w ay . A n d in a m o r e p o e t ic t u r n , o n e p e r s o n m u s e d : s a d n e s s . . . d ip p in g , d ip p in g in to th at . . . ju s t th e out-of-con tro/new o f th in g s. P e o p le ty p ic a lly ta lk a b o u t controlling e m o t io n s , h an dlin g e m o t io n a l s itu a tio n s as w e ll a s e m o t io n a l fe e lin g s , an d dealin g w ith p e o p le , s itu a tio n s , an d e m o t io n s . The n o tio n o f c o n tr o l o p e r a t e s v e ry sim ila rly h e re to th e w ay it d o e s in W e s te r n d is c o u r s e s o n s e x u a lit y (F o u c a u lt 1 9 8 0 ) . B o th e m o t io n a lity an d s e x u a lity

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arc dom ain s w hose understan ding is dom inated by a b iom edical m od el; both are seen as un iversal, natural im p u lses; both arc talked about as existin g in “healthy” and “ unhealthy” fo rm s; and both have com e under the con trol of a m edical o r q u asi­ m edical profession (principally psychiatry and p sy ch o lo gy ). Foucault has argued that p op u lar view s o f sexuality — as a drive that w as rep ressed during the V ictorian era and gradually liberated during the tw entieth century

arc m isleading because

they p osit a single essen ce that is m anipulated by social convention. Rather, Foucault p o stu lated , m ultiple sexu alities arc constantly prod u ced and changcd. A pop u lar discou rse on the con trol o f em otion ru ns functionally parallel to a d is­ cou rse on the con trol o f sexuality; a rh eto ric o f con trol requires a psychophysical essen ce that is m anipulated or w restled w ith and directs attention away from the socially con stru cted nature o f the idea o f em otion (see A bu-Lughod and Lutz, this volum e). In addition , the m etaph or o f con trol im plies som eth in g that w ould otherw ise be out o f co n tro l, som eth in g w ild and un ruly, a threat to order. To speak about con trollin g em otio n s is to replicate the view o f em otio n s as natural, dan gerou s, irrational, and physical. W hat is striking is that w om en talked about the con trol o f em otion m ore than tw ice as often as did m en as a p ro p o rtio n o f the total speech each prod u ced in the in terview s. To help account for this difference, we can ask what the rh eto ric o f con trol m ight accom plish fo r the speak er and w hat it might say to several audiences. . . . At least three things can be seen to be don e via the rh eto ric o f em otional con trol: It (1 ) rep rod u ces an im portan t part o f the cultural view o f em otion (and then im plicitly o f w om en as the m ore em otio nal gen d er) as irration al, w eak, and dan gerou s; (2 ) m inim ally elevates the social status o f the p erso n w ho claim s the need or abilitv to self-con trol em o tio n s; and (3 ) o p p o se s the view o f the fem inine se lf as dan gerous when it is reversed , that is, w hen the speak er denies the need lor or possibility of con trol o f em otio n . Each o f these suggestion s can only briefly be exam in ed. First, this rh eto ric can be seen as a rep ro d u ctio n , prim arily on the part of w om en , o f the view o f them selves as m o re em otio n al, o f em otion as dan gerou s, and hence o f them selves as in need o f con trol. It d ocs this first by setting up a boundary that edge over w hich em otion that is uncontrolled can spill. A n um b er o f people have noted that threats to a dom inant social o rd er arc som etim es articulated in a concern with diverse kinds o f boun daries (w hether physical or social) and their in tegrity (e .g ., M artin 1987; Sch eper-H ughes and L ock 1987). O n e o f the m o st critical b oun daries that is con stituted in W estern psychological d iscou rse is that b etw een the inside and the outside o f p e rso n s; individualism as ideology is funda­ m entally based on the m agnification o f that p articu lar boundary. W hen em otion is defined, as it also is in the W est, as som eth ing inside the individual, it provides an im p ortan t sym bolic vehicle by which the problem o f the m aintenance o f social o rd er can be voiced. A d iscou rse that is con cern ed w ith the e x p re ssio n , con trol, or rep ression o f em otio ns can be seen as a d iscou rse on the crossing back and forth o f that boundary betw een inside and ou tsid e, a discou rse we can ex p e ct to sec in m ore elaborate form in p e rio d s and places w here social relation s ap pear to be im m inently o vertu rn ed . This rh etoric o f em otional con trol g o es further than defining and then d e fe n d ­ ing b o u n daries, however, il also su gg ests a set o f ro les — one stron g and defensive

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and the o th e r w eak but invasive — that are h ierarch ized and lin ked w ith g e n d e r ro les. R o sald o (1 9 8 4 ) n o te s o f h ierarch ical so c ie tie s that thev se e m to evince g r e a te r c o n ce rn than do m o re egalitarian o n es w ith how so ciety co n tro ls the in n er e m o tio n a l se ll an d, w e can ad d , w ith how on e p a rt o f a b ifu rc ated and h ierarch ically lavered sell co n tro ls anoth er. T h e b ody p o litic , in o th e r w o rd s, is so m e tim e s re p lica te d in the social relation s o f the v ario u s h om un culi that p o p u late the hum an m in d , a kind o f “m en tal p o litic .” W hen cogn itio n o u tre a so n s and su ccessfu lly m a n ­ ages e m o tio n , m a le -fe m ale ro le s arc rc p lic a tc d . W hen w om en sp eak o f c o n tro l, they play the ro le s o f both su p er- and su b o rd in a te , o f c o n tro lle r and co n tro lle e . T h ey iden tify th eir e m o tio n s and th em selv es as u n discip lin ed and d iscip lin e both through a d isc o u rse on co n tro l o f feeling. T h e c o n stru ctio n o f a fem in in e self, this m a te ria l m igh t su g g e st, in clu d es a p r o c e ss by w hich w o m en c o m e to c o n tro l th e m ­ selv es and so ob viate the n ecessity fo r m o re co c rciv c o u tsid e co n tro l. T h e re is the e x am p le o f on e w om an in h er late th irties; she talked ab o u t the hate she felt for h er e x -h u sb an d , w ho b egan an affair w hile she w as p re gn an t and left h er w ith the in fan t, an o ld e r ch ild , and no paid e m p lo y m e n t: So I think y ou try h ard n o t to b rin g it [the feelin g] o u t ’ cause y ou d o n ’ t w ant that type o f thing at h om e w ith the k id s, you know. T h a t’ s very b ad , very unhealthy, th at’ s n o way to gro w up. So 1 think now , m aybe I’ ve ju st le arn ed to c o n tro l il and lim e has ch an ged the feelin g o f the hate. T h e w om an h ere d efin es h erse ll as so m e o n e w ith a feelin g o f hate and p o rtray s it as d a n g e ro u s, p rim arily in te r m s o f the th reat it p o se s to h er ow n ch ild ren , a threat she p h rases in b io m e d ica l te r m s ( i.e ., “ unh ealth y”). She re p lic a te s a view that Sh ields (1 9 8 7 ) foun d p revalen t in a su rv ey of tw en tieth -cen tu ry E n glish -lan guage ch ild -rearin g m an u als; this is the d a n g e r that m o th e r s ’ (and n ot fa th e rs’ ) e m o tio n s arc th ough t to p re se n t to ch ild ren . In ad d itio n , this w o m a n ’ s d e scrip tio n o f her feelin gs e sscn tializcs th em as sta te s; as su ch , they rem ain passive (se e C an cian 1987 on the fem in ization o f love) rath er than active m o tiv a to rs, a p o in t to w hich w e w ill re tu rn . In o th e r c ase s, p e o p le do n ot talk ab o u t th e m se lv e s, b u t rath er rem in d o th e rs (u su ally w o m e n ) o f the n eed to co n tro l th e m se lv e s. T h e se in stan ces also se rv e to rep licate the view o f w o m en as d an g ero u sly e m o tio n a l. A n o th er w om an spok e a b o u t a fe m ale frien d w h o still g rie v e d fo r a son wrho had died tw o y ears p rev io u sly : “Y ou’ ve g o t to p ick up and g o on . Y ou ’ ve g o t to try and g e t th ose feelin gs u n d er c o n tr o l.” T h e “y o u ” in this sta te m e n t is a c o m p le x and m u ltiv o cal sign (K irk p a tric k 1 9 8 7 ), and d ire c ts the ad m on ition to co n tro l sim u ltan eo u sly to the g riev in g w o m an , the fem ale in terv iew er, the sp e ak e r h erse lf, no on e in p articu lar, and e very on e in a p o te n tial au dien ce. A seco n d p rag m atic e ffect o f the rh e to ric o f e m o tio n a l co n tro l is a claim to have the ability to “rise ab ov e” o n e ’ s e m o tio n s o r to ap p ro ve o f th ose w ho do. W o m en, m o re than m e n , may sp e ak o f co n tro l b e cau sc they are co n c c rn c d ab out co u n teractin g the cu ltu ral d e n igratio n o f th em selv es through an asso ciatio n w ith e m o tio n . “ I think it’ s im p o rta n t to co n tro l e m o tio n s ,” they say, and im plicitly rem in d a critical au d ien ce that they have the c o o le r stu ff it takes to be c o n sid e re d

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m ature and rational. It is im p ortan t to note that, as academ ics, 1 and the gradu ate students w ho con ducted the interview s may have been perceived as an audience in special need o f such rem in ders. The speak ers w ould have been doing this, however, by dissociatin g them selves from em otio n rath er than by questionin g the dom inant view both o f them selves and o f em otion . Although w om en may have less access to a view o f them selves as m asterful individuals, a com m on asp ect o f the cultural sch cm e that is available paints them as m asterfully effcctivc with oth ers on join t tasks, particularly in terp erson al or em otional tasks (social scicn cc version s o f this includc C h odorow 1978, Parsons and Bales

1955). This subtly alters the m eaning o f the rh eto ric o f con trol;

know ledge o f w hat the feelings are that “n eed ” con trol and o f w hat con trol should be like is perceived and d escrib ed as a social rather than an individual process. For exam p le, one w om an says: “ If y o u ’re tied in with a fam ily, . . . you have to use it for guidan ce how you con trol your e m o tio n s.” This is the sam e w om an w hose ccntral life problem during the in terview p erio d w as copin g w ith her h usban d’s ex-w ife and fam ily, w ho lived across the stre et from her. T h e regular, friendly contact betw een husband and ex-w ife has left her very unhappy but also unsure ab out w hat to do. T h e am biguity over w ho ought to con trol o r regulate w hat is evident in her description o f an argum ent she had w ith her husband over the issue. I w as m ad. 1 w as m ad. And I said, “ I d o n ’ t care w hether you think I should [inaudible w ord] o r slay in this at all, it’s too, and cause I’ m go in g to say it.” And I said, “H ow dare you tell m e how I’m su pp osed to fe e l,” you know. Bob [her husband] w ould say, you know, “You go t to live with it” o r “ You go t to do this” o r “ How dare you tell m e this, I d o n ’ t have to put up with anything” o r “ I d o n ’t have to feel this way because you tell m e I have to feel this w ay.” You know, it w as, in that case Robin is his ex-w ife, “and you have to just kind o f deal with it,” you know, “all the p rob lem s that she p resen ts in your ow n w ay .” And it w as alm ost so rt o f like saying “Y ou’re goin g to have to like it.” Well I d o n ’t. I d o n ’t, you know. And for a year and a h alf he kept saying, you know, “ You’re goin g to have to like it, this is the way it’s go in g to be, y o u ’re go in g to have to do this, y o u ’ re goin g to have to have, lie, act, this certain w ay,” you know, act everything hun ky-dory, and it w asn ’ t, you know, and I w as beginning to resen t a w hole lot o f things. I, I, I resen ted him for telling m e I had to feel that way w hen I, I w asn ’t real fond o f the situation. I d id n ’t like it. W hen I w ould tell him that I d id n ’t like it, it w as “ It’s your p ro b lem , you deal w ith it.” I d id n ’t like that, that m ade m e really angry because I w as saying, “ H elp m e o u t here, I d o n ’t know how to deal w ith th is.” This w om an is fru strated w ith her husband for failing to join h er in a co llab o ra­ tive p ro ject o f “dealing w ith” her feelings o f resen tm en t. H ere con trol is given away to o r shared w ith others. This strategy o f control is m ore co m p le x and sub tle than the sim ple self-im position describ ed in other parts o f the tran scripts so far; it aim s to con trol both the em otio n s o f the se lf and the attention and assistance o f the other. N o te also that she speaks o f “resen tin g” o r “not liking” (relatively m ild term s o f

6 8

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displeasure) the overall situation but is m ost incensed (“ m ad, m ad, m ad”) about her h usban d’ s assum p tion that she ought not to feel a certain way. She asse rts the right to “feel” unhappy about her predicam en t but is clearly defining that feeling in the standard con tem p orary sen se of a strictlv internal and passive event. N ow here in the in terview d o es she explicitly state or ap p ear to im ply that she w an ts, inten ds, or ought to act in co n ce rt with those feelings. W hat is bein g con trolled o r dealt w ith, th erefore, has already been defined as a relatively inn ocuous feelin g rath er than an action ten dency. Finally, the rh eto ric o f em otional con trol can also be em ployed in both idiosyncratic and “rev ersed ” ways that may intend o r have the effect o f at least m inim ally resistin g the dom in ant view o f em otionality , and thus o f w om en. A few p eo p le, for exam p le, spontaneously spoke about the problem o f em otional con trol, thereby evoking the w hole schem a we have ju st been looking at. They w ent on, however, to define “con trol” in a way that entailed relatively m inim al constraints on em otional com m unication . O n e w om an, a tw enty-eigh t-year-old bank teller, said: “ Let m e explain con trol. It’s not that you sit there and you take it [som e kind o f abuse] and, you know, I think con trollin g them |em otion s] is letting them out in the p ro p e r tim e, in the p ro p e r p la c e.” Perhaps m ore radically, so m e w om en (as well as one o f the gay m en w ith w hom 1 spok e) denied that they had the ability to con trol som e o r many o f their em otio n s. O n e m an in his tw enties critically d escrib ed a previous tendency he had to over-intellectualize p rob lem s and explain ed that he w orked against that tendency because Il w asn ’t that I w anted to cut o lf my em otio n s, I just d id n ’ t, they w ould get out o f co n tro l, and I found that the m ore I tried to su pp ress them , the m ore pow erful they w ould b ecom e. It w as like this big dam that d id n ’t let a little out at a tim e, it w ould just e x p lo d e all of a sudden , and I’d be totally out o f con trol. The question rem ains, however, of the validity o f seein g these latter seem ingly resistan t uses of the rh eto ric o f em otional con trol as “op p o sitio n al” fo rm s (W illiam s 1977) within that system . This is certain ly a dangerous rh etorical strategy , caught as they (w e) arc w ithin a h cgcm on ic disco u rse not o f o ur own m aking. T h e opposition to sclf-control w ill m o st likely be absorbed into the logic o f the existin g system and so com e to equal not resistance but sim ple deficiency or lack (o f con trol). A possibly oppositional intent may have collaborative o u tcom es to the exten t that the denial o f self-con trol is taken by m o st audiences as a deficit and a confirm ation o f ideas ab out w o m e n ’s irrationality. The culturally con stru cted em otionality o f w om en is rife with con tradiction. The em otio n al fem ale, like the natural w orld that is the cultural source o f both affect and w om en , is con stru cted as both pliant (because w eak and a resou rce for use by civilized m an) and ultim ately trem en dously pow erful and un con trollable (Strath ern 1 9 8 0 ). Em otion ality is the source o f w o m e n ’s value, their e x p e rtise in lieu o f rationality, and yet it is the origin o f their unsuitability for b ro ad er social tasks and even a poten tial threat to their children. T h ere arc vivid parallels betw een this and the cultural m eanings surroun din g colonialism that Taussig (1 9 8 4 ) and Stoler (1 9 8 5 ) have d escrib ed . Look in g at early-

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tw entieth-century co lo n ists’ view s o f the local C olum bian lab or force, Taussig d escrib es their alternation betw een fear and awe o f Indians w ho w ere perceived as dangerous and pow erful figures, on the one hand, and disgust and den igration o f their perceived w eakness and lack o f civilization, on the other. Taussig d escrib es the p ro c e ss as one in w hich a “ colonial m irro r” “reflects back on to the colon ists the barbarity of their ow n social relations” (1 9 8 4 :4 9 5 ). In a (certainly less system atic or universally brutal) w ay, a “patriarchal m irro r” can be con ceptu alized as helping to prod u ce the view o f w om en as em otional — as dangerously “ eru p tive” and as in the p ro cess o f w eakly “breaking d o w n .” A “paradox o f w ill” seem s consistently to attend dom in atin g relation ships

w hether those o f gender, race, o r class

as the

subordin ate other is ideologically painted as w eak (so as to need protection or discipline) and yet periodically as threatening to break the ideological boun dary in rio t o r hysteria. E m otion talk, as evident in these tran scrip ts, show s the sam e contradictions o f co n tro l, w eakn ess, and stren gth . Given its definition as nature, at least in the W est, em otion d iscou rses may be one o f the m o st likely and pow erful devices by w hich dom ination p roceed s. [. . .] In all so cieties, body d iso rd ers — w hich em otion is con sidered to be in this society — b eco m e crucial in dicators o f p rob lem s w ith social con trol and, as such, arc m ore likely to occur o r em erge in a discou rse con ccrn in g social subordin ates. Foucault has m ade the claim that pow er creates sexuality and its disciplining; sim ilarly, it can be said to create em otionality.

The cultural con stru ction o f

w o m en ’ s em otio n can thus be view ed not as the rep ression o r supp ression o f em otion in m en (as many lay-people, th erapists, and oth er com m en tato rs argue) but as the creation of em otion in w om en. B ecause em otio n is con stru cted as relatively ch aotic, irrational, and antisocial, its existen ce vindicates authority and legitim ates the need for co n tro l. By association with the fem ale, it vin di­ cates the distinction betw een and hierarchv of m en and w om en. And the cultural lo g ic conn ectin g w om en and em otion c o rre sp o n d s to and sh o res up the w alls betw een the sph eres o f private, intim ate (and em otio n al) relation s in the (id e o lo g ic ­ ally) fem ale dom ain o f the family and public, form al (and rational) relation s in the prim arily m ale dom ain o f the m arketplace. Rubin has rem arked o f sexuality that “T h ere arc h istorical perio d s in w hich (it) is m o re sharply con tested and m ore overtly politicized” (1 9 8 4 :2 6 7 ). E m otion ality has the sam e h istorical dyn am ism , w ith shifting gen d er relations often ap pearin g to be at the ro o t o f both academ ic and lay stru gg le s over how em otion is to be defined and evaluated. In other w ords, the con tem p orary dom inant discou rse on em otio n s - and particularly the view that they arc irrational and to be con trolled — helps co n stru ct but d ocs not wholly d eterm in e w o m en ’s d isco u rse ; there is an attem p t to recast the association o f w om en w ith em otion in an alternative fem inist voice. Fem inist treatm en ts o f the question o f em otion (e .g ., H ochschild 1983; Jagger 1987) have tended to portray em otio n s not as chaos but as a d iscou rse on prob lem s. Som e have con tested both the irrationality and the passivity o f feelings by arguing that em otio n s may involve the identification o f prob lem s in w o m e n ’s lives and

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are th e re fo re p olitical. Talk ab o u t an ger, for e x a m p le , can be in te rp re te d as an atte m p t to identify the e x iste n ce o f in ap p ro p riate re strain t o r in ju stice. Sad n ess is a d isc o u rse on the p ro b lem o f lo ss, fe ar on that o f danger. By e x te n sio n , talk ab ou t the co n tro l o f em o tio n s w ou ld b e, in this fe m in ist d isc o u rse , talk ab ou t the s u p p re s­ sion of pub lic ac k n o w le d g m e n t of p ro b le m s. T h e e m o tio n a l fem ale m igh t then be seen n ot sim ply as a m yth ic co n stru c tio n on the ax is of so m e arb itrary cultu ral dualism b u t as an o u tc o m e of the fact that w o m en o ccu py an ob jectively m o re p ro b lem atic p o sitio n than d o c s the w h ite, u p p e r-c la ss, N o rth e rn E u ro p e a n , o ld e r m an w ho is the cu ltu ral e x e m p la r par e x c e lle n c e o f c o o l, e m o tio n le ss ration ality . A cc o rd in g to a fe m in ist analysis, w h eth er o r n o t w om en e x p r e ss th eir p ro b lem s (i.e ., arc em o tio n a l) m o re than m e n , th ose w o m e n ’ s au d ien ces m ay h ear a m e ssag e that is an am algam o f the o rth o d o x view and its fem in ist co n te statio n : “ W e (th o se) w om en are d an g ero u sly c lo se to e ru p tin g in to e m o tio n a lity /p o in tin g to a p r o b le m / m ovin g to w ard a social c ritiq u e .”

References C hodorow , N ancy. 1978. C alifornia Press.

The Reproduction o f Mothering. Berkeley: U niversity o f

Foucault, M ichel. 1980. The History o f Sexuality, Vol. 1. N ew York: Vintage. H ochschild, A rlie. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling. Berkeley: U niversity of C aliforn ia Press. Jagger, Alison. 1987. Love and K n ow ledge: E m otion as an E pistem ic R esou rce for Fem inists. M s. in possession of author. D ep artm en t of Philosophy, U niversity o f Cincinnati. Jordan ova, L. J. 1980. N atural Facts: A H istorical Perspective on Science and Sexuality. In Carol M acC orm ack and M arilyn Strathern, e d s., Nature, Culture, and Gender. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 4 2 —69. K irkpatrick, John. 1987. R epresen ting the Sell as ‘You’ in A m erican D iscou rse. Paper presen ted at the annual m eetin gs of the A m erican A nthropological A ssociation, Chicago. M artin, Em ily. 1987. T h e Ideology o f R epro duction : The R eproduction o f Ideology. Paper presen ted to the U pstate N ew York Fem inist Sch olars’ N etw ork, Septem ber. Parsons, Talcott, and R o b e rt Bales. 1955. Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process. G len coe, IL: Free Press. R osaldo, M ichelle Z . 1984. Toward an A n th ropology o f Se lf and Feeling. In R . Shw eder and R. LeV ine, e d s., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 1 37—57. R osaldo, Renato. 1977. T h e R h etoric o f C on trol: Ilongots V iew ed as N atural Bandits and W ild Indians. In B. B abcock, e d ., The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society. Ithaca, NY: C orn ell U niversity P ress, pp. 2 4 0 —57. Rubin,’ Gavle. 1984. ThinkingO Sex: N o tes for a Radical Th eory J of the Politics o f J Sexuality. In C arol S. Vance, e d ., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality. B oston: R outledge & Kegan Paul. Sch eper-H ughes, N ancy, and M argaret L ock. 1987. T h e M indful Body: A P ro­ legom enon to Future W ork in M edical A nthropology. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1:6—41.

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Shields, Stephanie A. 1987. W om en, iMen and the D ilem m a o f E m otion . In P. Shaver and C. H en drick, e d s., Sex and Gender. N ew bury Park, C A : Sage Publications, pp. 2 2 9 - 5 0 . Stoler, Anne. 1985. Perceptions o f Protest: D efining the D an gerous in Colonial Sum atra. American Ethnologist 1 2 :6 4 2 —58. Strath ern, M arilyn. 1980. N o N ature, N o C ulture: The Hagen C ase. In C arol MacC o rm ac k and M arilyn Strath ern, e d s., Nature, Culture, and Gender. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity P ress, pp. 174—222. Taussig, M ichael. 1984. C u ltu re o f T error — Space o f D eath. R o g er C ase m e n t’ s Putum ayo R e p o rt and the Explanation o f Torture. Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 6 :4 6 7 —97. W illiam s, R aym ond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press.

Chapter 6

William M. Reddy AGAINST CONSTRUCTIONISM The h is to r ic a l e th n o g ra p h y o f e m o tio n s

The persistent dilemmas o f relativism

T

HE

ABSOLUTE

im plication

PLASTICITY

OE

THE

individual is a n ecessary

o f stron g con stru ction ist stances on questions

o f sexuality,

ethnicity, and identity. M ichel Foucault . . . argued for a view o f pow er so allpervasive and so insidious in its operation that there w as no relu gc w here the individual could say, “This is m e, this is w here the tru e se lf lives.” E very space w as

su b jected to disciplinary determ in ation , so m uch so that the very e xp erien ce o f being a su b ject w as, in F ou cau lt’s view, an o u tco m e o f p o w e r’s discursive w orkings. . . . Foucault w as not a relativist— he d eplored this tyranny o f d isco u rse — b u t, as he occasionally ack n ow ledged, his position w as in consisten t, for there w as nothing in the nam e o f w hich he could justify his disapproval. In his last w orks he had begun to distance h im self from this ex tre m e position (Foucault 1985). But it is im p ortan t to recognize that his earlier notion o f pow er d oes n ot involve the sw ay, the p e r ­ suasive capacity, the au th ority, o r the coercion exercised by one p erso n over other perso n s. It is not, in this sen se, a notion o f pow er that has any W estern p e d ig re e ; it has nothing to do with w hat we norm ally call “p o litic s.” N o r d oes the type o f resistan ce Foucault occasionally allud es to as a possibility rep resen t anything re se m ­ bling political action. Foucault is, in this sense, a relativist in all but nam e. . . . A nother influential m od el w idely used to replace old er notions o f culture is Pierre B o u rd ieu ’s (1 9 7 7 ) theory o f practice, built around the con cept o f habitus. . . . T h e con cept helped B ourdieu to un derstand the gap betw een w hat in form an ts say to eth n ograp h ers and the actual shape o f the actions they take. E xplicit principle is never sim ply “ap plied” to social life, B ou rdicu argu es; in stead, the co m p le x qualifications and reform ulatio n s that interven e arc them selves eth n ograp h y’ s (and

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73

h isto ry ’s) p ro p e r ob ject o f study. They are fo rm e d by an in articulate sense of rightness

and

strategy

(habitus)

w hich

cannot

be

com m un icated

verbally.

B o u rd ieu ’s individual is not p lastic, b ecause he en dow s individuals w ith a desire to pu rsu e advantage and a strategic sen se that drives them constantly to so rt out and refo rm u late situations and action plans. H ow ever, this pu rsu it o f advantage m u st be regarded eith er as em pty, the con ten t bein g com pletely determ in ed by cultural co n te x t, o r else as predefined and therefore universal. In the fo rm e r case, practice theory rem ains relativist and apolitical; in the latter, it may fall into the e c o n o m ist’ s fallacy that advantage and in terest arc easily defined (in W estern te rm s). This fallacy is presen t, although “c o rre c te d ” in various w ays, in B o u rd ie u ’ s (1 9 7 9 ) notion o f “cultural c ap ital.” [. ■ ■] In the debate over essen tialism , fem in ist th eorists have been stru gglin g w ith a version o f the sam e problem that has con fron ted an th ropo lo gists and cultural h is­ torian s, and ex tre m e relativism still arises as a con ceptu al n ecessity at ccrtain jun ctures o f this deb ate. “E sscn tialists” m aintain that w om en arc endow ed with universal ch aracteristics that distinguish them from m en , ch aracteristics in virtue o f w hich they m ust, in ju stice, dem and fo r them selves a very different place in society from that accord ed them in the con tem p orary W est. A n tiessen tialists insist that claim ing special ch aracteristics for w om en is perp etu atin g the sam e e rro r that ap ologists for m ale dom in ation have always m ade (for review s o f this d ilem m a, see A lcoff 1 9 8 8 , Riley 1 9 8 8 , M iller 1 9 9 1 , Haraway 1 9 9 1 , M ohanty, R u sso , and Torres 1 99 1 ). W om an's difference has justified her disqualifications, an tiessentialists note, and any argum en t based on difference can be turn ed against w om en . M oreover, w om en need to be freed Irom any and all expectation s as to their “n atu re.” . . . The argum en t that it is con straining to characterize w om en as nurturing o r as emotional easily b e co m e s an argum en t against characterizing w om en and m en in any way. The political go al of liberating m en and w om en from con strain ing exp ectatio n s or assum p tion s can easily ge t lost in this refusal to characterize th em , since, if in di­ viduals arc entirely em pty and w holly plastic, then there is nothing in virtu e of w’hich liberation is g o o d .

Emotional constructionism as a form o f relativism Th ese d ilem m as have com e into focus recen tly , and in a very com pellin g and im p o rtan t w ay, in a n um ber o f eth n ographies o f em otion (A bu-Lughod 1986, Lutz 1988, G rim a 1 9 9 2 , see also pap ers collcctcd in Lutz and A bu-Lughod 1990 and the im p o rtan t earlier w ork by R osald o 1980, 1 9 8 4 ). T h ese stud ies have draw n inspiration from F ou cau lt’s notion o f d isco u rse, B o u rd icu ’s con cept o f practice, and fem inist critiq ues o f essen tialism . In each case the ethnographer, a w om an, carried out fieldw ork in an unusual w ay; each w as in tegrated into a local household as a w om an and shared in the con strain ts on m ovem en t and interaction locally im posed on w om en. Because o f this in tegration , A bu-Lughod and G rim a, w orking in M uslim societies, had access to “priv ate” fem ale exp ression and practice that previous m ale eth n ograp h ers had been barred from o r con sidered un im portan t. Lutz, w orking on a Pacific atoll, found no public-private divide in exp ressin g em o tio n , contrary to both W estern and M uslim n otions o f privacy and prop riety . [. . .]

7 4

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M.

REDDY

T h e se o u tsta n d in g c o n trib u tio n s to the g ro w in g field o f the an th ro p o lo gy o f e m o tio n arc n otab le lo r th eir ad am an t refu sal to allow fo r any p h y sio lo g ical, p sy c h o lo g ic al, o r o th e r un iversal d e te rm in a n t o r influence in e m o tio n a l life. M any o th e r c o n trib u tio n s to this field rem ain n eu tral o r ag n o stic ab o u t the relation b etw een c o n stru c te d and d iscu rsiv e e m o tio n al e x p re ssio n and actual em o tio n al e x p e rie n c e . Fred M v ers p r o p o se s to “ leave o p e n ” ( 1 9 8 6 :1 0 5 ) the relation b etw een cultu rally c o n stru c te d e m o tio n s and in dividual p sy ch o lo gical d y n am ics. S im u l­ tan eo u sly , he w ish es to avoid e x am in in g the qu estio n w h eth er an a c to r “really ” feels e m o tio n s that arc cultu rally ap p ro p ria te in given c ircu m stan c e s ( 1 9 8 6 :1 0 6 7 ). . . . W h eth er such e p iste m o lo g ic al caution is m o re a p p ro p ria te than the stron g stan d o f G rim a , L u tz, and A b u -L u gh od is n o t the real p o in t, how ever. T h e stron g c o n stru c tio n ist stan d is one that view s the in dividual as fully p la stic , and it is one th at, as a re su lt, can n o t p ro v id e g ro u n d s fo r a p o litical c ritiq u e o f any given c o n ­ stru ctio n . G rim a (1 9 9 2 :1 6 3 —6 4 ) co n d e m n s the “o p p re ssio n ” o f w om en in Paxtun so c ie ty , w hich is firm ly in the g rip o f a m a lc -c c n tc rcd “g e ro n to c ra c y ” ; she exp lain s the firm n ess o f this g r ip by n otin g that fem ale id en tity and survival are entirely w ra p p e d up in relation sh ip s to m ales. H ow ever, if, as she a sse rts, “ e m o tio n is c u ltu re ,” then w e m u st a cc e p t that th ose w o m en w ho perform no e m o tio n a l n eed to free th e m se lv e s fro m this o p p re ssio n have no n eed to do so. O n e can n ot have it both w ays. U n le ss one sp ecifics the g ro u n d s— by saying w hat in fact un iversally ch a ra c­ terize s the individual (w hich both the stro n g c o n stru c tio n ists and the ag n o stics w ish to avoid d o in g )— on e can n ot have a p o litics o f e m o tio n o r a m ean in gful h istory o f e m o tio n . T h e re is, m o re o v e r, tro u b lin g eviden ce again st the stro n g c o n stru c tio n ist poin t o f view from o th e r eth n o grap h ies o f e m o tio n — ev id e n ce su g g e stin g that individual e m o tio n al life has a dyn am ic c h aracte r and that specific c o m m u n itie s strive to sh ape, con tain , and channel (n o t c o n stru c t) e m o tio n a l e x p re ssio n . B re n n e is’ s (1 9 9 0 ) w o rk on Fijians o f Indian d e sc e n t and W h ite ’ s (1 9 9 0 a , h) stud y of A ‘ ara s p e a k e rs’ “disen tan g lin g” p rac tic e s b oth fo cu s on m e th o d s e m p lo y e d to e n co u rage e x p re ssio n o f hidden o r p e n t-u p n egative feelin gs that th reaten c o m m u n ity so li­ d arity and p e a ce . . . . B c sn icr (1 9 9 5 ) em p h asize s the strik in g c o n trast b etw een the effusive e m o tio n a l stvlc o f le tte rs w ritte n by N u k u lae lac Islan d ers and their re se rv e d style in p e rso n . . . . Both c o n trasts p o in t to an e ffo rt to organ ize or o rch e strate rath er than c o n stru c t e m o tio n . . . . C og n itive a n th ro p o lo g ists have foun d that in dividuals re sp o n d to e m o tio n -c h arg e d cu ltu ral “sc h e m a s,” such as ro m an tic love o r class c o n sc io u sn e ss, in highly d iv erg en t w ays, d e p e n d in g upon c o n te x t and p e rso n a lity ; this div ersity p o in ts to un d erly in g e m o tio n a l p ro cliv itie s that such sch e m as m ay o r m ay n o t en gage (H o llan d 1 9 9 2 , S trau ss 1 9 9 2 ). . . . M any p sy ch o lo g ists a sse rt that th ere are only a few basic varieties o f e m o tio n s; they certain ly have g o o d eviden ce that a u to n o m ic n e rv o u s sy stem re actio n s and facial e x p re ssio n s c o m e in a few b asic varieties ac ro ss the g lo b e , w ith an ap p aren t ge n e tic b asis (E k m an 1 9 8 2 , E km an and D avidson 1 9 9 4 ; but see the im p o rta n t caveats o f B arrett 1993 and the argu m en t o f O rto n v and T u rn e r 1 9 9 0 ). [. . .]

AG A I N S T

C 0 N ST R U CTI 0 N I S M

75

B r i d g i n g the s p a c e b e tw e e n la n g u a g e ( p r a c t ic e ) a n d fee lin g H e r e I w is h to p r o p o s e a s o lu t io n to th is p o litic a l d ile m m a , w h ic h is a t th e s a m e t im e a d ile m m a a b o u t c o n c e p tu a liz in g h is to r y an d c u ltu r a l d iffe r e n c e . I p r o p o s e to fin d w ith in th e v e ry p la stic ity o f th e in d iv id u a l g r o u n d s f o r m a k in g u n iv e rsa l a s s e r t io n s th a t can m o tiv a te e th n o g r a p h ic an d h is to r ic a l an a ly sis th a t is p o litic a lly m e a n in g fu l. G r o u n d in g u n iv e rsa l c la im s in e m o t io n a l life r a th e r th an in id e n tity , g e n d e r , c u ltu r e , o r d is c o u r s e s id e s t e p s th e th o rn y q u e s t io n s th at h ave re c e n tly f o r m e d in s u r m o u n t a b le s tu m b lin g b lo c k s to an y u n iv e r s a lis m o r h u m a n is m . To say s o m e th in g a b o u t th e in h e r e n t c h a r a c te r o f e m o t io n s o f f e r s a w ay o u t , a b a sis f o r p o litic a l ju d g m e n t th a t is n o t a petitio prin cipii. T h e d ile m m a o f e m o t io n a l c o n s tr u c tio n is m f o llo w in g m a n n e r : T h e

W e s te r n

e th n ic v ie w

m ig h t b e r e f o r m u la t e d in the

(in c lu d in g th a t o f e x p e r t so c ia l

s c ie n c e ) o f s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s is th at th e y a re d e s c r ip t iv e in c h a r a c te r or, in J. L . A u s t in ’ s t e r m s , “ c o n s t a t iv e .” T h e s tr o n g c o n s t r u c t io n is t v ie w o f G r im a , L u tz , an d A b u - L u g h o d m ig h t b e se e n as an in sis te n c e th a t s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s are “ p e r fo r m a t iv e ” in A u s t in ’ s s e n s e . J u s t as say in g “ I d o ” a t a w e d d in g is t o w e d , so to say “ I am a n g r y ” is , in th e c o n s tr u c tio n is t v ie w , t o he a n g r y . T o p e r fo r m a n g e r, s a d n e s s , fe ar, sh a m e , is to b e a n g r y , s a d , fe a r fu l, a s h a m e d . G r im a ( 1 9 9 2 : 7 ) , fo r e x a m p le , d e fin e s e m o tio n a s a c o m b in a tio n o f b e h a v io r an d e x p e c t a t io n s , d e n y in g th a t th e re is an y “ in n e r ” r e s id u u m on w h ic h th e y a re b a s e d . A b u - L u g h o d say s th a t it is b e t t e r “t o e x a m in e d is c o u r s e s r a th e r th an th e ir p u ta tiv e r e f e r e n t s ” ( 1 9 9 0 : 2 8 ) . I w o u ld a r g u e th a t b o th v ie w s a r e m is ta k e n an d th a t s ta te m e n t s a b o u t e m o t io n s are n e ith e r d e s c r ip t iv e (c o n s ta tiv c ) n o r p e r fo r m a t iv e — th e y n e ith e r a d e q u a te ly r e p r e ­ se n t n o r c o n s t r u c t ( p e r f o r m ) e m o t io n s . A n e m o t io n s ta te m e n t is n o t , as A u stin s u g g e s t e d , a “ m e r e r e p o r t ” ( 1 9 7 5 : 7 8 - 7 9 ) . It is an e f fo r t by th e s p e a k e r to o ffe r an in te r p r e t a tio n o f s o m e th in g th a t is o b s e r v a b le t o n o o t h e r a c to r . S u c h an e ffo r t is e s s e n tia l to s o c ia l life , an in e sc a p a b le fa c e t o f o n e ’ s id e n tity , o n e ’ s r e la tio n s h ip s , o n e ’ s p r o s p e c t s . A s s u c h , it h as a d ir e c t im p a c t o n th e fe e lin g s in q u e s t io n . If a sk e d th e q u e s t io n “ D o y o u fe e l a n g r y ? ” a p e r s o n m ay g e n u in e ly fe e l more a n g ry in a n s w e r in g y e s, less a n g r y in a n s w e r in g n o . A c o m m o n s tr a t e g y in p s y c h o lo g ic a l s tu d ie s o f e m o t io n an d m o o d is to in d u c e e m o t io n s in s u b je c t s by h av in g th e m re a d s ta te m e n t s su c h as “ I am jo y fu l” o r “ I am s a d .” S u c h r e a d in g e x e r c is e s d e p e n d a b ly p r o d u c e e ffe c ts in th e s u b je c t s c o n s o n a n t w ith th e m o o d o r e m o t io n in v o k e d , a s d o e x e r c is e s in w h ic h s u b je c t s a re in s t r u c t e d to a d o p t c e r t a in la c ia l e x p r e s s io n s (s e e , e .g ., R h o lc s , R is k in d , an d L a n e 1 9 8 7 a n d , l o r a g e n e r a l re v ie w o f su c h r e s e a r c h , L a ird 1 9 8 7 ; o n in d u c in g a ffe c t w ith la c ia l m o v e m e n t s , s e e E k m a n , L e v e n so n , an d F r ie s e n 1 9 8 3 ). M a n y o t h e r e ffe c ts a r c p o s s ib le , in c lu d in g th e o p p o s it e : e x p r e s s in g a fe e lin g can e a sily r e s u lt in its r a p id d is s ip a t io n . S ta b le p a tt e r n s o f su c h s t a t e m e n t s , r e p e a te d o v e r y e a r s , h av e v e r y p r o f o u n d , sh a p in g e ffe c ts on o n e ’ s w h o le e m o tio n a l m akeup. I p r o p o s e t o c all e m o t io n s ta te m e n t s su c h as th e s e , in w h ic h th e s t a t e m e n t ’ s r e f e r e n t c h a n g e s b y v ir tu e o f th e s ta te m e n t , “ e m o t iv e s .” P e r fo r m a tiv e u t te r a n c e s , by th e w ay in w h ic h th e y r e f e r to t h e m s e lv e s , a c tu a lly d o th in g s t o th e w o r ld . In th e s ta te m e n t “ I a c c e p t y o u r n o m in a t io n ,” th e v e rb “ a c c e p t ,” u se d in th is w a y , r e f e r s to o r n a m e s th e s ta te m e n t in w h ic h it a p p e a r s , m a k in g th e s ta te m e n t an a c c e p t ­ a n c e . T h e a c c e p t a n c e , a s an a c t o f th e s p e a k e r, c h a n g e s th e wro r ld in a w ay th a t a

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d e s c rip tiv e sta te m e n t c a n n o t, b e c a u se it m a k e s the sp e a k e r in to a n o m in e e . An e m o tiv e u tte ra n c e , u n like a p e r fo r m a tiv e , is n o t s e lf- r e fe re n tia l. W h en so m e o n e say s, “ 1 am a n g r y ,” th e a n g e r is n o t the u tte ra n c e — n o t in th e w ay th a t, in “ I a c c e p t ,” “ a c c e p t” is the a c c e p ta n c e . An e m o tiv e sta te m e n t se e m s at first g la n c e to have a real e x te r n a l r e fe r e n t, to b e d e s c rip tiv e o r c o n sta tiv c . O n c lo s e r in sp e c tio n , h ow ever, o n e re c o g n iz e s th at th e “ e x te r n a l r e fe r e n t” th at an e m o tiv e a p p e a r s to p o in t at is n o t p a ssiv e in th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e e m o tiv e , and it e m e r g e s fro m the a c t o f u tte r in g in a ch a n ge d sta te . E m o tiv e s arc in flu e n ce d d irc c tly by an d a lte r w h at th ey “ r e fe r ” to. T h u s , c m o tiv c s arc sim ila r to p e r fo r m a tiv e s (and d iffe r fro m c o n sta tiv c s) in that e m o tiv e s d o th in gs to th e w o rld . E m o tiv e s are th e m se lv e s in stru m e n ts fo r d ire ctlv c h a n g in g , b u ild in g , h id in g, in te n sify in g e m o tio n s . T h e re is an “ in n e r” d im e n sio n to e m o tio n , b u t it is n e v e r m e re ly “ r e p r e s e n te d ” by s ta te m e n ts o r ac tio n s. It is the n e c e ssa ry (re la tiv e ) failu re o f all e ffo r ts to r e p r e s e n t fe e lin g th at m a k e s fo r (a n d se ts lim its o n ) o u r p la stic ity . M any w ay s o f e x p r e ss in g fe e lin g w o rk e q u a lly w ell (p o o r ly ); all fail to so m e d e g r e e . It is h e r e , ra th e r than in so m e p u tativ e s e t o f g e n e tic a lly p r o g r a m m e d “b a sic ” e m o tio n s , that a u n iv e rsa l c o n c e p tio n o f th e p e r ­ s o n , o n e w ith p o litic a l re le v a n c e , can b e fo u n d e d .

Emotivcs a n d p o ststru c tu ra lism T h is c o n c e p t o f e m o tiv e s b u ild s on p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis t in sig h ts a b o u t lan g u ag e but g o e s b e y o n d th em . In the first p la c e , th e e x is te n c e o f e m o tio n s is n o t d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e a c c u ra c y o f o n e o r m o r e W e ste rn n o tio n s o f in te n tio n a lity o r o f the p e r s o n , w h ich p o s t ­ str u c tu r a lis ts have w id ely an d v e ry su c c e ssfu lly a tta c k e d . T h e e x is te n c e o f e m o tio n s is n o t d e p e n d e n t on the a c c u r a c y , e ith er, o f W e stern c o n c e p tio n s of w h at e m o tio n s are . E th n o g ra p h ic re se a r c h has re p e a te d ly d e m o n stra te d the n a r ro w n e ss an d p a r ­ tiality of this fam ily o f W e stern c o n c e p tio n s , a n a r ro w n e ss and p a rtia lity c lo se ly a sso c ia te d w ith th e n o tio n s o f in te n tio n th at p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis m re je c ts . B u t it has a lso re p e a te d ly c o n firm e d the e x is te n c e o f le x ic o n s and p r a c tic e s sign ifican tly sim ila r to th o se W e ste r n e rs a sso c ia te w ith e m o tio n s (s e e , e .g ., M a n so n , S h o re , and B lo o m

1 9 8 5 , H e id e r 1 9 9 1 ). O n the b a sis o f this re s e a r c h , e m o tio n s c an n o t be

r e g a r d e d — as th ey have b een in the W est— as a re sid u a l, s o m a tic , an tiratio n al d o m a in o f c o n sc io u s life w h o se tu rb u le n c e is a c o n sta n t th re a t to th e fo rm u la tio n o f c le a r in te n tio n s. In ste ad , I a r g u e , th ey m u st b e r e g a r d e d as the v e ry lo c atio n o f the c a p a c ity to e m b r a c e , re v ise , o r r c je c t c u ltu ra l o r d isc u rsiv e s tr u c tu r e s o f w h a te v e r k in d .1 E m o tio n s arc the re a l w o rld - a n c h o r o f sig n s. To re sta te this in p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis t t e r m s , th e re is a fe e lin g th at g o e s w ith e v e ry sig n ; e m o tio n g e n e r a te s parole ag ain st the b a c k d ro p o f lartgue. P h ilo so p h e rs an d r e s e a r c h e r s have n o t b e e n ab le to find la n g u a g e ’ s an c h o r in th e w o rld w h en r e g a r d in g sign s o r lan g u ag e as r e fe r r in g o r p o in tin g to a w o rld an d have w ro n g ly c o n c lu d e d that sig n s an d lan g u ag e m u st th e re fo r e float fre e o f any p o ssib le w o rld . B ut th e w o rld they b e lo n g to is the w o rld in w h ich fe e lin g s o c c u r, in w h ich u tte ra n c e s and te x ts g ro w d ire c tly o u t o f fe elin g s. O n e d o e s n o t n e e d a q u e stio n a b le W e ste rn -sty le su b je c t to p r o v id e the link b e tw e e n th e m .

AG A I N S T

C0 NSTRUCTI 0 NISM

7 7

An em otive utteran ce is not self-referen tial like a perform ative but claim s by definition to refer to som eth in g close to its o rigin , to its ow n w orld-anchor. Why d oes this kind o f referen ce not fail, just as all other kinds o f referen ce to a “w orld ” that is not alreadyJ signs fail? T h e answ er is that it d oes lail. The em otive effect O derives from the failure. If the em otiv e did not fail, it w ould be a “ m ere r e p o r t,” an accurate rep resentation . A statem en t about how one feels is always a failure to one degree o r anoth er; like a p erform ative it is n either true n or false. E m otives c o n sti­ tute a kind o f pledge that alters, a kind o f getting-through o f som eth in g nonverbal into the verbal dom ain that could never be called an equivalence or a re p re se n ta­ tion. The very failure o f representation is recogn ized and b rin gs an em otional respo nse itself; this respo n se is p art o f the em otive effect. This is true w hether o n e ’s “ in ten tion ” is to speak the “tru th ” ab out o n e ’s feelings o r n ot. This p ro b ­ lem atic link betw een em otive and em otio n , this dilem m a, is o u r activity as a perso n . O n e m ight say that, ju st as a p erform ative can be happy o r unhappy, an em otive brin gs em otional effects ap pro priate to its con ten t or effects that differ m arkedly from its conten t. If it d o c s brin g ap p ro p riate cffccts, then the em otiv e, in a W estern c o n te x t, m ight be said to be “sin ccrc” ; if it d o c s n ot, the em otive may be claim ed, after the fact, to be h ypocrisy, an evasion, a m istake, a p rojection , o r a denial. But all o f these ch aracterization s— including the notion o f sincerity— are p rob lem atic, them selves fo rm s o f failed referen ce. [. . .]

Emotivcs, repression, and cultural styles The con cept o f em otives can draw su p p o rt from recen t reform u latio n s o f the notion o f rep ression . T h e question w hether rep ression really occu rs has inspired debate am on g p sy ch o lo gists lo r decades. T h ere has been a recen t convergence am ong contending view s, however, that offers su p p o rt for a reform u lated view of rep ression con sisten t with the con cept of em otiv cs being elab orated h ere. . . . In a rcccn t review , D avid S. H o lm es (1 9 9 0 ) argu es that there is no laboratory evidence to su p p o rt the cxistcn cc of rep ressio n , despite sustained efforts over the past 60 years to find em pirical p r o o f of its operation . H o lm es n otes that p sy ch o ­ therapists view ing v id eotap es o f therapy sessions often disagree as to w hen re p re s­ sion is occu rrin g or how its operation is effectu ated. H o lm es con cedes w illingly that laboratory research has yielded abundant evidence o f “selectivity in percep tion and recall” (p. 9 7) and readily accepts the existen ce o f “d e n ial,” a related p ro cess which he defines as a con scious decision to ign ore and fo rg et (p. 8 6 ). T h ese con cessions are substantial. It is only because rep ression is deem ed to be an unconscious m echanism that laboratory studies have failed to turn up conclusive evidence o f it. M atthew Erdelvi (1 9 9 0 ), however, argues that there is no bar in psychoanalytic theory to view ing rep ression as resultin g from a conscious decision to forget. M em ory research — H o lm es and Erdelyi ag re e — has identified an array o f m ech an ­ ism s available for use in con scious su pp ression o f unpleasant thoughts o r feelings or m e m o rie s. Such con scious su p p ression — any act o f con scious “d en ial,” in H o lm e s’ s sense— may th erefore, in E rdely i’s view, be con sidered an instance o f “re p re ssio n .” (N o r is there, he rem ark s, any reason that a p erso n cannot, in a second stage, consciously decide to forget having consciously decided to forget som eth in g.) “ If

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r e p r e s s i o n ( d e f e n s iv e o r o t h e r w i s e ) can b e c o n s c i o u s , th e n s u d d e n l y it b e c o m e s an o b v io u s and ub iq u itou s d e v ic e ” (E rd ely i 1 9 9 0 :1 4 ) . . . . B v s o m e m o d e l s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s u c h as D e n n e t t ’ s ( 1 9 9 1 ) “ m u l t ip l e d r a f t s ” m o d e l , th e d is t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s is n e v e r a s h a r p o n e in any c a s e . A n y r e p o r t a p e r s o n m ig h t m a k e a b o u t an in n e r s ta te is, b y s u c h a m o d e l , o n ly o n e o f a n u m b e r o f i n c o m p l e t e “ d r a f t s ” that c o n t e n d f o r fo c u s . T h e a r g u m e n t h e r e is th at e x p l i c i t e m o t i v e s t a t e m e n t s s u c h as “ I a m n o t a n g r y ” a re i n s t a n c e s o f s u c h d r a f t s . F e e lin g s in v o lv e , a t o n c e , a c ti o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d th e u n f o r m u l a t c d “ t h i c k ” th in k in g th a t b o n d s c o n t e n d i n g d r a f t s t o g e t h e r . T h e y a r c s u m m a t i o n s t a t e s , a b a c k g r o u n d a g a in s t w h ic h fo ca l d is c u r s i v e s t r u c t u r e s e m e r g e . T o c h a r a c t e r i z e s u c h s u m m a t i o n s t a te s is e x t r e m e l y d iffic u lt; in g e n e r a l a c t o r s a r e c o m p e l l e d to fall b a c k o n c o n v e n t io n a l e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t a p p r o p r i a t e e m o ­ t io n s . In a d d i t i o n , th e r e is s o m u c h at s ta k e in vital r e la t io n s h ip s th at e m o t i v e s o fte n have the s ta tu s o f c o n t r a c t u a l c o m m i t m e n t s . (“ I fe e l like g o i n g to a m o v i e . ” “ H e f r ig h t e n s m e . ” ) T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s d o n o t in v o lv e m e r e “ d is p la y r u l e s , ” as E k m a n ( 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 2 ) a n d o t h e r s c o n t e n d , b u t n e i t h e r d o th e y “ c r e a t e ” e m o t i o n s o u t o f w h o l e c lo t h as th e s t r o n g c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s w o u l d h ave it. . . . T h e in a d e q u a c y o f c o n v e n t io n a l e m o t i v e s t o c h a r a c t e r i z e th e c o m p l e x s u m m a ­ ti o n s t a t e s th e y “ d e s c r i b e ” c a n b e c o v e r e d ov er, to s o m e e x t e n t , b y th e e ffe c ts o f h a b itu a l r e p e t i t i o n . Isen a n d D i a m o n d ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 4 4 ) , in a r e v ie w o f r e s e a r c h in t o a ffe c t as an a u t o m a t i c p r o c e s s , a r r i v e a t a te llin g c o n c l u s i o n that is w o r t h q u o t i n g a t le n g th : T o th e e x t e n t that a ffe c t can have an in flu e n c e a u t o m a t i c a l l y — w it h o u t a t t e n t i o n o r i n t e n t io n a n d s e e m i n g l y ir r e s i s t ib ly — it ca n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a d e e p l y in g r a i n e d , o v e r l e a r n e d h a b it , o r a s a p r o c e s s o f c h u n k in g a n d o r g a n iz in g the s itu a t io n . . . . W e a r c r e m i n d e d o f th e w a y in w h ic h little b o y s have o f t e n b e e n tau gh t to keep fro m cryin g by su b stitu tin g a n g e r fo r sad n ess: “ W h en so m eth in g bad h appen s d o n ’t g e t sad , g e t m a d .” T h u s, p e o p le m ay be a b le to r e g u l a t e th e ir f e e l in g s , t h r o u g h th e ir f o c u s a n d t h r o u g h c h a n g i n g w h a t th e y l e a r n in g iv e n s itu a t io n s . . . . In th is w a y , p r o b l e m e m o t i o n s , e v e n th o u g h th e y fe el a u t o m a t i c an d u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , m a y b e a lt e r a b l e . T h i s d o c s n o t m e a n th at u n w a n t e d a ffe c tiv e r e a c t i o n s w ill b e e a s y to c h a n g e (o ld h a b it s d ie h a r d ) , b u t it d o c s s u g g e s t th at c h a n g e m a y b e p o s s i b l e an d th a t th e v e r y s e n s e o f in e v ita b ilit y m a y b e m is le a d in g . T h u s , t h e r e is g o o d

r e a s o n to a t t r i b u t e e x t e n s i v e p o w e r to th e c o n v e n t io n a l

e m o t i v e s a u t h o r i z e d in a g iv e n c o m m u n i t y t o s h a p e m e m b e r s ’ s e n s e o f id e n tity a n d s e l f - a w a r e n e s s , m e m b e r s ’ m a n n e r o f c o n f r o n t i n g c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d r o u t in e . B u t p o w e r to s h a p e is a v e r y d if fe r e n t m a t t e r f r o m th e c a p a c it y t o c r e a t e fr o m n oth in g. T h e n a t u r e o f th e r e s i d u u m th at is n o t s a t is fa c t o r ily s h a p e d is an a l l - i m p o r t a n t q u e stio n

for un d erstan d in g

w h a t is u n iv e r s a lly h u m a n

and fo r u n d erstan d in g

th e p o l it ic s o f th at s h a p in g p o w e r . In any g iv e n field c o n t e x t , o n e w o u l d e x p e c t to find a w i d e r a n g e o f d e v ia t i o n s , r e s i s t a n c e s , a n d a lt e r n a t iv e i d i o m s th a t p o i n t to p o s s ib i li t ie s f o r c h a n g e t h r o u g h c r is is , d i s s o l u t i o n , o r a d a p t a t io n a n d th a t o f fe r g r o u n d s f o r d r a w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t w h o h as p o w e r a n d w h o d o e s n o t .

AG A I N S T

C 0 N S T R U C T I 0 N I S M

7 9

W h e r e e m o t iv e s h ave th e ir g r e a t e s t e ffe c ts an d a re s u b je c t to th e ir g r e a t e s t fa ilu re s is in s itu a tio n s o f w h a t I w ill c a ll in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e . C u lt u r a l o r c o n ­ v e n tio n a l a c tio n p a tt e r n s o fte n c o m e in to play b o th in p r o d u c in g su c h s itu a tio n s an d in h e lp in g a c t o r s n a v ig a te th e m . It is e s p e c ia lly b e c a u s e c o m m u n ity c o n v e n tio n s r e c o m m e n d th e u s e o l e m o t iv e s to m a n a g e in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e th a t c o m m u n it ie s m a yJ b e said to h ave e m o t io n a l s tv le s o r to n e s . J To illu s tr a te , I w ill d r a w s o m e e x a m p le s fr o m G r im a ’ s ( 1 9 9 2 ) v iv id e th n o ­ g r a p h ic re v ie w

o f P a x tu n

e m o t io n a l c o n v e n tio n s .

P a x tu n

c o n v e n tio n

d ic ta te s

a r r a n g e d m a r r ia g e s in w h ic h b r id e - p r ic e s can b e q u ite sig n ific a n t. A r e c e n tly w e d w o m a n is c o n fin e d to th e h o m e , fo r c e d to c a r r y m o r e than h e r sh a re o f th e h o u s e w o r k , an d r e q u ir e d to s u b m it to th e a u th o r ity an d u n d e r g o th e m is tr e a tm e n t o f h e r h u s b a n d ’ s m o t h e r an d s is t e r s as w ell as an y s e n io r w iv e s p r e s e n t . M a r r ia g e is t h e r e fo r e c o n v e n tio n a lly th e fir s t g r e a t s a d n e s s , o r gh am , in a w o m a n ’ s life . T h e in te n sity o f a w o m a n ’s s u ffe r in g , th r o u g h th is an d o t h e r gh am e x p e r ie n c e s , as she u n flin c h in g ly s u b m its t o th e r e q u ir e m e n t s o f h e r fam ily is h e r p r in c ip a l s o u r c e o f h o n o r. A s a r e s u lt , th e b r id e , d r e s s e d in h e r b e s t an d d e c k e d o u t in je w e lr y an d o th e r a d o r n m e n t s , is s u p p o s e d to a d o p t a d o w n c a s t e x p r e s s io n , t e a r f u l, q u ie t ; she ta k e s n o p a r t in th e c e le b r a t io n s o f th e m a r r ia g e

cerem o n y .

H e r c re s tfa lle n

d e m e a n o r is said to b e “ b e a u t if u l.” B u t d o e s c u ltu r e c r e a te th e gham o f th e b r id e ? S t r u c t u r a lly , th e tr a n s itio n s e e m s lik e ly t o b e e x p e r ie n c e d as b o th a s e v e r e lo s s ( o f fa m ilia r p e r s o n s an d p la c e s , th e o n ly o n e s k n o w n sin c e b ir th ) an d a d r o p in s ta tu s (fr o m

d a u g h te r t o in - m a r r y in g b r id e , lo w e st in th e n e w

h o u s e h o ld ’ s p e c k in g

o r d e r ) . W h a t th e e m o t io n a l c o n v e n tio n s o f th e w e d d in g c e r e m o n y d o is g iv e sh a p e to th e lik ely e m o t io n s o f th e b r id e , ra th e r th an c r e a te th e m . T h e y d o so in a m a n n e r th at a llo w s f o r a h ig h ly r e s t r a in e d d isp la y o f o p p o s itio n . B o th the r e s t r a in t an d the d isp la y a c c r u e to th e b r i d e ’ s c r e d it , b e c a u s e th ey s u g g e s t th at sh e is m a s t e r in g in te n s e n e g a tiv e fe e lin g s in o r d e r to re m a in o b e d ie n t to h e r m a le e ld e r s an d a c q u ie s c e in th e m a r r ia g e . T h is is a c o n v e n tio n fo r m a n a g in g in te n s e a m b iv a le n c e (th e d e s ir e to o b e y v e r s u s the d e s ir e n o t to m a r r y ) , a im in g at th e r e p r e s s iv e tr a n s fo r m a tio n o f r e b e llio u s n e s s in to gh am . C h a r a c te r is t ic o f P a x tu n w o m e n ’ s c o n v e n tio n a l e m o t io n a l sty le is th a t th ey c a n n o t e x p r e s s an in te n s e e m o t io n o r in c lin a tio n p u b lic ly , e x c e p t in th e fo r m of gh am . To d isp la y in fa tu a tio n w ith a sin g le y o u n g m a n is f o r b id d e n , b u t lo s s o f th at m a n r e s u lt in g fro m a r r a n g e d m a r r ia g e t o a n o th e r t r a n s f o r m s th e in fa tu a tio n in to a s o u r c e o f su ffe rin g . T h e s u ffe r in g n o t o n ly m ay b e e x p r e s s e d b u t , if e x p r e s s e d in a r e s t r a in e d m a n n e r a s sile n t s o r r o w , is re w a r d e d w ith a d m ir a tio n an d r e s p e c t . To d isp la y in te n se p r id e in a s o n ’ s e n e r g ie s , sk ills , an d a c c o m p lis h m e n ts r u n s th e risk o f in su ltin g lis te n e r s . B u t i f th a t so n is h u r t in an a c c id e n t, fa lls ill, o r d ie s , th e e x p r e s s io n o f gh am m a y b e in d u lg e d in — in d e e d it is r e q u ir e d th a t a m o t h e r e x p r e s s e x t r e m e ly in te n se g r i e f , w ith o u t r e s t r a in t , in su c h situ a tio n s . T h e in te n sity o f g r i e f is o fte n d isp la y e d by m o m e n t a r y la p se s in m o d e s t y : ru sh in g o u t o f th e h o u se w ith o u t a v e il, s e e k in g h e lp fro m s tr a n g e m e n to g e t t o a h o s p ita l, b u r s t in g in to t e a r s w h e n sp e a k in g . [. . .] W h e n v ie w e d a s e m o t iv c s , e x p r e s s io n s o f s u ffe r in g by P a x tu n w o m e n f r e ­ q u e n tly d o le a d to e x t r e m e intensification (b u t, I w o u ld a r g u e , n o t c r e a tio n ) o f g r i e f an d so r r o w . T h e w h o le p a tte r n o f r e s t r ic tio n s o f fe m a le b e h a v io r — in v o lv in g low e s tim a tio n o f fe m a le c a p a c ity , fe a r o f th e ir m is b e h a v io r , s u b m iss io n o f w o m e n to

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m a l e a u t h o r i t y — r e p r e s e n t s an i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e o f s o r r o w . T h e d e a th o f a s o n is r e a s o n e n o u g h t o g r i e v e in m a n y s o c i e t i e s . B u t w h e n th at s o n w a s b o r n in a m a r r i a g e n o t d e s i r e d ( w h i c h is th e normative c a s e in th is s o c i e t y ) a n d r a is e d th r o u g h s e l f- d is c i p lin e , s e l f - a b n e g a t i o n , a n d s u b m i s s i o n t o fa m ily a u t h o r it y a n d th e n e e d s o f m a l e h o n o r ( t h e s e a r c th e local w a y s o f ta lk in g a b o u t w o m e n ’ s d u t y ) , th e w o m a n ’ s e x t r e m e a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t h e r life o f p e r s o n a l lo s s e s m a y o f f e r d e e p e r r e a s o n s to g r i e v e o v e r th e l o s s o f a s o n . . . . H e n c e th e w h o l e p a t t e r n o f e m o t i v e s d i s c u s s e d by G r i m a s p e a k s o f e m o t i o n s managed n o t c r e a t e d . G r i m a h e r s e l f s p e a k s f r e q u e n t ly o f e m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l r a t h e r than c o n s t r u c t i o n ( e . g . , p p . 8 9 , 1 4 1 , 1 6 3 ) . J u s t a s c o n ­ v e n tio n lays d o w n a h o s t o f r e s t r i c t i o n s on f e m a l e b e h a v i o r a n d c h o i c e (w h ich a rc u n d e r s t o o d lo ca lly as h a r s h ) , s o c o n v e n t io n lays d o w n a s ty le f o r r e p r e s s i n g s o m e f e e lin g s an d in t e n s ify in g an d p u b lic ly e x p r e s s i n g o t h e r s . . . . T h e im p l ic a t i o n h e r e is n o t th a t c e r t a in f e e lin g s s u c h as g r i e f at d e ath a re “ n a t u r a l ” o r u n i v e r s a l. S it u a t io n s o f in t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e a re likely in m o s t so c ia l o r d e r s b e c a u s e th e y a r r a n g e f o r a n d e n c o u r a g e e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t s o r h o p e s th a t in e v ita b ly c o m e in to c o n flic t. A y o u n g P a x t u n w o m a n is e n c o u r a g e d by in s titu t io n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s th a t o f f e r b o t h r e w a r d s a n d p e n a l t i e s to d e v e l o p a d e e p a t t a c h m e n t to h e r m o t h e r . A t th e s a m e t i m e , m a r r i a g e is an e s s e n t ia l e l e m e n t o f th e n o r m a t i v e life c y c le . T h u s a w e d d i n g is h igh ly lik e ly to g e n e r a t e in t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e in a b r i d e . I n t e n s e a m b i v a l e n c e ca n b e a n o d a l p o i n t o f in sta b ility in a n o r m a t i v e e m o t i o n a l s ty le . By a ll o w in g w o m e n full e x p r e s s i o n o f sorrow * ( b u t n o t o t h e r f e e l i n g s ) a n d b y t r e a t in g s o r r o w as a s o u r c e o f h o n o r f o r w o m e n , P a x t u n c o n v e n t io n t r i e s to tip th e b a la n c e o f a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d g r i e f . T h i s is n o t c u lt u r e c r e a t in g g r i e f b u t c o n v e n t io n p r o m o t i n g c e r t a in e m o t i v e s o v e r o t h e r s b e c a u s e , o v e r t i m e , t h e s e e m o ­ tiv e s s t r o n g ly in flu e n c e in d iv id u a l e m o t i o n in a m a n n e r th at a ll o w s f o r a c e r t a in s ta b ility a n d i d e o l o g i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y in a c o m m u n i t y ’ s life. T h e v a r ia tio n o f in d iv id u a l r e s p o n s e s ( s o m e fittin g e x p e c t a t i o n s w e l l , s o m e g o i n g all th e w ay to c o m p l e t e d e v i a n c e ) p r o v i d e s an initial r e s e r v o i r o f p o s s ib i li t ie s f o r c h a n g e , s o m e t h i n g th at c a n b e d r a w n u p o n w h e n i d e o l o g i c a l , e c o n o m i c , o r p o lit ic a l f a c t o r s p u t p r e s s u r e o n th e s y s t e m (a s is, i n d e e d , h a p p e n i n g in th e l a r g e r t o w n s o f the r e g i o n G r i m a s t u d i e d ) . T h o s e w h o fe e l m o r e f r u s t r a t e d o r e x c l u d e d can m o r e re a d ily a d o p t n e w n o r m s th a t a r c c o n t e n d i n g f o r d o m i n a t i o n . A n i m p o r ­ ta n t q u e s t i o n f o r c o m p a r a t i v e a n aly sis w o u l d b e w h e t h e r c e r t a in e m o t i v e s t y l e s f o r c e g r e a t e r n u m b e r s in to e m o t i o n a l d e v ia n c e than o t h e r s . If w e c o n c e i v e o f c o m m u n i t y c o n v e n t i o n s a s s tip u la t i n g s ty le s o f e m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l th a t e x p l o i t th e c a p a c it y o f e m o t i v e s to s h a p e e m o t i o n s , th e n p o w e r , p o l i t i c s , a n d l ib e r a t io n r e g a in th e ir m e a n in g . E m o t i o n a l c o n t r o l is th e re a l site o f th e e x e r c i s e o f p o w e r : p o l it ic s is j u s t a p r o c e s s o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h o m u s t r e p r e s s as il l e g i t i m a t e , w h o m u s t f o r e g r o u n d a s v a lu a b le , th e f e e l in g s a n d d e s i r e s th a t c o m e u p f o r t h e m in g iv e n c o n t e x t s a n d r e la tio n s h ip s . [. . .]

N o te 1

T h is a ss e r t io n d e p e n d s on a b r o a d d efin ition o f e m o t i o n that c a n n o t b e fully e x p l o r e d h ere b u t that d r a w s on the v ie w s o f p s y c h o lo g is ts su ch as L a ird ( 1 9 8 7 ) , O a tle y ( 1 9 9 2 ) , an d A verill ( 1 9 9 4 ) , w'ho r e g a r d e m o t i o n s as a f o r m o f, o r a sp e cts

AG A I N S T

C 0 N ST R U CTI 0 N I S M

8 1

o f, th o u g h t o r c o g n itio n , and o f p h ilo so p h e rs su ch as S o lo m o n (1 9 8 4 , 1 9 9 2 ), D c S o u sa ( 1 9 8 7 ) , and G re e n sp a n ( 1 9 8 8 ) , w h o a r g u e that e m o tio n re p re s e n ts a fo rm o f ju d g m e n t th at can n o t b e re ad ily d istin g u ish e d fro m th o u g h t o r ra tio n a lity .

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in fe m in ist th e o ry . Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 1 3 :4 0 5 —36. A u s t i n , j. L . 1 9 7 5 . 2d e d itio n . How to do things with words. C a m b r id g e : H a rv a rd U n i­

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1 9 7 7 . Outline o f a theory o f practice. T ran slate d by R ic h a rd N ic e .

C a m b r id g e : C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss. — . 1 9 7 9 . La distinction: Critique sociale du jugement. P aris: E d itio n s d e M in u it. b r e n n e i s , d o n a l d . 1 9 9 0 . “ S h ared and so lita ry se n tim e n ts: T h e d is c o u r s e o f frie n d sh ip ,

play , an d a n g e r in B h a tg a o n ,” in Language and the politics o f emotion. E d ite d by C a th e rin e A . L u tz an d L ila A b u -L u g h o d , pp . 1 1 3 —2 5 . C a m b r id g e : C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P r e s s / P a r is : E d itio n s d e la M a iso n d e s S c ie n c e s d e I'H o m m e . d e n n f . t t , D. c . 1 9 9 1 . Consciousness explained. B o sto n : L ittle , B ro w n . d e s o u s a , R o n a l d . 1 9 8 7 . The rationality o f emotion. C a m b r id g e : M IT P re ss. e k m a n , P a u l.

1 9 8 0 . The face o f man: Expressions of universal emotions in a New Guinea

village. N e w Y ork: G a rlan d S T P M P re ss. — . E d ito r. 1 9 8 2 . 2 d e d itio n . Emotion in the human face. C a m b r id g e : C a m b r id g e U n iv e rsity P re ss. E K M A N , P A U L, A N D R IC H A R D J. D AVIDSON. E d ito r s. 1 9 9 4 . The nature o f emotion: Funda­

mental questions. O x fo r d : O x fo r d U n iv e rsity P re ss. E K M A N , P A U L , R O B E R T W.

LEV F.N SO N , A N D W ALLACE V. F R IE S E N .

1 9 8 3 . A u to n o m ic

n e rv o u s sy ste m activ ity d istin g u ish e s a m o n g e m o tio n s. Science 2 2 1 :1 2 0 8 —10. F.RDF.LYi, m a t t h f . w

h.

1 9 9 0 . “ R e p re ssio n , re c o n s tr u c tio n , and d e fe n se : H isto ry and

in te g ra tio n o f the p sy c h o an aly tic and e x p e r im e n ta l fra m e w o r k s,” in Repression and dissociation: Implications for personality theory, psychopathology, and health. E d ite d by Je r o m e L . Sin ger, p p . 1—31. C h ic a g o : U n iv e rsity o f C h ic a g o P re ss. F O U C A U L T , m i c h e l . 1 9 8 5 . The history o f sexuality. V ol. 2. The use o f pleasure. T ran slate d

by R o b e r t H u rle y . N e w Y ork: P an th eon .

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M . REDDY

G R E E N S P A N , PATRICIA s. 1 9 8 8 . Emotions and reasons: An inquiry into emotional justification.

N e w Y ork: R o u t le d gc>e . g rim a,

b e n e d ic te .

1992.

The performance o f emotion among Paxtun women. A ustin:

U n iv e rs ity o f T e x a s Press. h araw ay, d o n n a

j. 1 9 9 1 . Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention o f nature. N e w

York: R o u t le d gw e . h e i d e r , k a r l G. 1 9 9 1 . Landscapes o f emotion: Mapping three cultures o f emotion in Indonesia.

C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n iv e r s ity P ress. H o llan d ,

d o ro th y

c . 1 9 9 2 . “ H o w cu ltu ral s y st e m s b e c o m e d e sir e : A case study

o f A m e r ic a n r o m a n c e , ” in Human motives and cultural models. E d ite d by R o y D ’ A n d r a d e and C la u d ia S tr a u s s, pp. 6 1 —8 9 . C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n iv e r sity Press. h o l m e s , d a v i d s. 1 9 9 0 . “T h e e v id e n ce fo r r e p r e s sio n : An e x a m in a tio n o f six ty y e a rs o f

r e s e a r c h ,” in Repression and dissociation: Implications for personality theory, psycho­

pathology, and health. E d ite d by J e r o m e L . Singer, pp. 8 5 —102. C h ic a g o : U n iv ersity o f C h ic a g o P ress. i s e n , A l i c e m . , a n d G R E G O R Y a n d r a d e d i a m o n d . 1 9 8 9 . “ A ffect and a u t o m a t ic i t y ,” in

Unintended thought: Limits o f awareness, intention, and control. E d ite d by J. S. U lc m a n and Jo h n A. B a rg h , pp. 124—5 2 . N e w York: G u ilfo r d Press. l a i r d , j a m e s d . 1 9 8 7 . M o o d affects m e m o r y b e c a u s e fe elin g s a rc c o g n itio n s. Journal

o f Social Behavior and Personality 4 : 3 3 —38. l u t z , C a t h e r i n e A. 1 9 8 8 . Unnatural emotion: Everyday sentiments on a Alicronesian atoll

and their challenge to Western theory. C h ic a g o : U n iv e r s ity o f C h ic a g o P ress. l l i t z , C A T H ER IN E A . , a n d l i l a a b l i - l u g h o d . E d it o rs . 1 9 9 0 . Language and the politics

o f emotion. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n iv e r s it y P r e s s / P a r i s : E d itio n s d e la M aiso n d e s S c ie n c e s d e 1’ H o m m e . M A N SO N , s p e r o m . , j a m e s h . s h o r e , a n d J o s e p h d . b l o o m .

1 9 8 5 . “T h e d e p re ssiv e

e x p e r ie n c e in A m e r ic a n Indian c o m m u n itie s : A ch a llen g e fo r p sy c h ia tr ic th e o ry and d ia g n o s is ,” in Culture and depression: Studies in the anthropology and cross-cultural

psychiatry o f affect and disorder. E d ite d by A . K le in m a n and B. G o o d , pp . 3 3 1 —6 8 . B e rk e le yJ : U n iv e r sityJ o f C a lifo r n ia P ress. m i l l e r , NANCY K . 1 9 9 1 . Getting personal: Feminist occasions and other autobiographical acts.

N e w Y ork: R o u t le d gc>e . MOHANTY, CHAND RA TALPADE, A N N R U SSO , A ND L O U R D E S T O R R E S .

E d it o r s . 1 9 9 1 .

Third World women and the politics o f feminism. B l o o m in g t o n : Indiana U n iv ersity Press. MYERS, F R E D R .

1 9 8 6 . Pintupi country, Pintupi self: Sentiment, place, and politics among

Western Desert Aborigines. B e rk e le y : U n iv e r sity o f C a lifo r n ia Press. o atley ,

k e ith .

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Best-laid schemes: The psychologyr o f emotions.

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a .,

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T E R E N C E j. t u r n e r .

1 9 9 0 . W h a t ’s ba sic a b o u t ba sic e m o tio n s ?

Psychological Review 9 7 : 3 1 5 —31. r h o l e s , w. s ., j. h . r i s k i n d , a n d

j. w. l a n e . 1 9 8 7 . E m o tio n a l s ta te and m e m o r y

b ia se s: Effects o f co g n itiv e p r im in g and m o o d . Journal o f Personality and Social

Psychology' 5 2 : 9 1 - 9 9 . " RILEY, D EN ISE. 1 9 8 8 . “Am I that name?” Feminism and the category o f “women” in history.

M in n e a p o lis: U n iv e rs ity o f M in n e so ta Press. r o s a l d o , M IC H E L L E z . 1 9 8 0 . Knowledge and passion: Ilongot notions o f self and social life.

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— . 1984. “Toward an anthropology o f se lf and feelin g,” in Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion. Edited by R. Shw eder and R . LeV ine, pp. 137—57. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. s o l o m o n , r o b k r t c. 1984. “G etting angry: T h e Jam esian theory o f em otion in an thro­

p o lo g y ,” in Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion. Edited by R . Shw cdcr and R. LeV ine, pp. 2 3 8 —54. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. — . 1992. E xisten tialism , em otio ns, and the cultural lim its o f rationality. Philosophy East and West 4 2 :5 9 7 —6 2 1 . s t r a u s s , c l a u d i a . 1992. “W hat m akes Tonv run? Schem as as m otives re co n sid e re d ,”

in Human motives and cultural models. Edited bv Roy D ’A ndrade and Claudia Strauss, pp. 191—2 2 4 . C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. m . 1990a. “M oral discou rse and the rh eto ric o f em o tio n s,” in Language and the politics o f emotion. Edited by C atherine A. Lutz and Lila

w h ite , G e o ffre y

A bu-Lughod, pp. 4 6 —6 8 . C am b rid ge: C am bridge U niversity P re ss/P a ris: Editions dc la M aison des Sciences dc l ’ H om m e. — . 1990h. “ Em otion talk and social infcrcncc: D isentangling in Santa Isabel, Solom on Islands,” in Disentangling: Conflict discourse in Pacific societies. Edited by Karen Ann W atson -G egeo and G eoffrey M . W hite, pp. 53—121. Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press.

Chapter

7

Michael E. Harkin F E E L I N G A N D T H I N K I N G IN M E M O R Y AND FORGETTING T o w a rd an e th n o h is to ry o f th e e m o tio n s

[■ ■ ■]

E

THNOHISTORIANS

SUCH

AS R A Y M O N D

FOGELSON

have

lon g b een sen sitiv e to the p ro b lem ol e m o tio n . F o r F o g e lso n , eth n oh istory has

b e en , at least in p a rt, a tvpe o l em p ath y , in w hich w e can h ope to u n d e rstan d o u r su b je c t only it w e e x e rc ise o u r lull hum an facu lties and n ot sim ply o u r analytic on es. H is p resid en tial ad d re ss on the cth n o h isto ry o f “ n o n -ev en ts” m ad e the origin al o b se rv a tio n that so m e even ts d isap p e ar from c o n sc io u sn e ss b e ca u se they arc to o trau m atic to b e re m e m b e re d (F o gc lso n 1 9 8 9 : 1 4 3 ). . . . W e m igh t also take n ote o f R o b e rt L e v y ’ s n otio n o f “h y p o c o g n itio n ,” in w hich cc rtain e m o tio n a l c x p c r ic n c c s m ay n o t find e x p re ssio n sincc they lack an ap p ro p ria te cogn itiv e stru c tu ratio n in the e u ltu re that w ould allow th em to b e co m e the su b jc ct o f d isc o u rse . In such e ases, “th eir u n articu la tc d , un -n am ab lc, and ch ao tic q u a litie s” m ake them d istu rb in g and d a n g e ro u s an d, I w ould arg u e , p o ten tially creative fo rc e s, in revitalization m o v e ­ m e n ts, for e x am p le (L evy 1 9 8 4 : 2 2 8 ). T h ese in sights re p re se n t an im p o rta n t c o n ­ trib u tio n to o u r m e th o d o lo g y . T h e aptly n am ed “trail o f te a r s ” o f the C h e ro k ee , w hich p ro v id e s F o g c lso n ’ s key e x a m p le o f a re p re sse d even t, g iv e s us a clue as to the im p o rta n ce o f e m o tio n in the re p re se n tatio n o f h isto ry . If w e naively assu m e that oral h istory can give us p riv ile g ed ac c css to the en tire ran ge o f a c u ltu re ’ s p a st, w e risk p ro d u cin g in co m p le te e th n o h isto rie s, n ot m erely b e ca u se w e m ay om it c e rtain even ts but also b e ca u se w e fail to take into ac co u n t the c o m p le x relation that p e rta in s b e tw e en a c o n te m p o ra ry co m m u n ity and its p ast. T h at this re la tio n ­ ship is an e m o tio n a l on e is c c rta in ; how to g o ab ou t takin g th ese e m o tio n s into acco u n t is still largely an open q u e stio n . . . . Thom as Buckley (1 9 9 6 ) has n o ted how A lfred L. K ro c b c r avoided the study o f C alifo rn ia e th n oh istory b e cau se il w as m erely the “ little h istory o f pitiful e v e n ts.” M o re g e n e rally , an th ro p o lo gy has ten d e d to c o n stru c t the relatio n betw een

FE E L I NG

AND

THINKI NG

IN

M E M O R Y

AND

FORGETTING

8 5

culture and personality heavily in favor o f the form er, thus distinguishing itse lf from psych ology, w hich it (rightly) criticized fo r excessive m eth od o logical individualism . And yet the so rt o f culture and personality studies produced by Ruth B en edict, M argaret M ead, G eoffrey G orer, and oth ers in m idcen tury virtually ignored the individual along with the question o f em otio n s in favor o f the broad b rush strokes o f configurationism and culture at a distance. Edw ard S a p ir’ s attem p t to introduce a m ore ro bu st con cept o f the individual psyche failed to survive his death (D arn ell 1986). [. . . ]

Emotions and culture dissolution From a m eth odo logical p ersp ectiv e, we m u st ask ourselv es w hat ro le the em otions can possibly play in our in terp retation s o f cultu res that w ere destroyed or radically altered in the afterm ath o f con tact w ith E uroam erican s. Lacking detailed eth ­ n ographies and linguistic d ocum en tation , we have no possible way o f know ing what schem ata o f em otio n s may have existed in extin ct cultu res and languages o r what the co n sequ en ces for h istorical events may have been . As Richard and N ora D auenhauer (1 9 9 5 ) have rem ark ed , the loss o f a language is a cultural death, and m em b ers o f the ethnic gro u p go through predictable K iibler-R ossian stages o f reaction. W hile the universality o f the phases o f death as outlined by Elisabeth K u b ler-R oss is debatable, and their applicability to stages o f cthnocide un certain , we m ust turn to som e psychodynam ic m odel to un derstan d this process. N ow it is perhaps tim e to listen to the psychoanalytical an th ropo lo gists while retaining skepticism about the overarching Freudian p ro ject. A great advantage o f a psychoanalytic persp ective is that it assum es that the basic m echanism s hum ans em ploy to deal with trau m a are sim ilar cross-cultu rally. T h us their m ean ings, while ro oted in culturally specific idiom s, transcend that co n te xt and are available to all w ho w ould read them carefully. E th n opsy ch ologists, on the oth er hand, often seem to assum e that the hum an psyche is a tabula rasa and capable o f alm ost infinite variation, despite the fact that their ow n resu lts su gg est a fairly m o d e st variation ol em otion catego ries across cultu res. That the H ciltsuk schem a o f h il’ala is quite sim ilar to the Ifaluk song o r the Flathead anger con ccp t is not su rp risin g, n or is the fact that all three arc im m ediately rccogn izab lc to A m erican s, w ho p ossess a som ew hat different m od el o f anger (L utz 1 9 8 8 ; O ’ N eil 1996). It seem s that in ex tre m e circum stan ces the actions o f p erso n s to e x p re ss g rief, w hile fam ously irrational, are the m o st tran sparen t to outside in terp retation . The Sioux G h ost D ance o f 1892 is a case wrhere g r ie f and distress at the destru ction o f the buffalo and the loss o f land, p e o p le, and freedom to live as they had in the past p ro m p ted the Sioux to ad dress these trau m as ritually (D cM allic 1984: 2 5 6 —82 ; M ooney 1965 [1 8 9 6 ]). Anthony W allace (1 9 7 0 ), the g re atest theoretician o f religiou s respo nses to cultural disru p tion , ad dressed a sim ilar chain o f events am ong the nineteenth century Seneca from a psychoanalytic p ersp ective. Ilis p a r ­ ticular con tribution wras linking stress — seen on the levels o f individual, g ro u p , and ecosystem — and ritual (W allace 1956). R esp o n ses to cultural dissolution arc h olistic, totalizing ph enom ena. The H an dsom e Lake m ovem en t am on g the Seneca involved all asp ects o f Seneca culture

8 6

M I C H A E L

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and its relation to the physical and social en v iro n m en t and w as fo cu sed equally on the in dividual and on cu ltu ral p ractic e s. In d eed , such m o v e m e n ts establish a m ic ro -m a c ro c o sm relation m o re exp licitly than m o st relig io n s and atte m p t to affect the con d ition o f the u n iv erse by localized actio n s. In these p o in ts, W allace e x te n d s and sh arp en s the eth n o -h isto rian ’ s u n d e rstan d in g o f cu ltu ral re actio n s to e x tre m e stre ss. T h e p ro b lem w ith W allace’ s m o d e l is eviden t in the n am e usually attach ed to such p h e n o m e n a: “revitalization m o v e m e n ts.” T h is p la c c s, a p r io ri, en tirely to o o p tim istic a re ad in g on ev e n ts, su g g e stin g a n e ccssa ry tra je c to r y , even a te le o lo g y , in w hich the cu ltu re w ill e m e rg e “re v ita liz e d .” O f c o u r se , w e all kn ow o f cases w h ere th ese have n o t b een su c c e ssfu l, and W allace did to o , fo r he w ro te an in tro ­ ductio n to a m o d e rn edition o f Ja m e s M o o n e y ’ s Ghost Dance (W allacc 1 9 6 5 ). H o w ­ ever, on this view , w e can only se e such even ts as tragically b lo c k e d revitalization s. T h is ign o re s the m o re likely in te rp re tatio n that such m o v e m e n ts w'ere n ot p ro p e rly ab o u t “rev italiza tio n ,” that they wrere ce n te re d n ot on the life driv e b u t the death d riv e, n o t eros b u t, rath er, thanatos, in F reu dian te r m s. In the G h o st D an ces g e n e rally , d e sp ite the w'idc variation in v e rsio n s, the e m p h asis on death and the d e ad , and the se lf-d e stru c tiv e e le m e n ts o f ritu al p rac tic c , give us stro n g c lu cs that it wras n o t so m eth in g p ro p e rly te r m e d a “revitalization m o v e m e n t.” N o r w-ere they cu ltu ral “p a llia tio n ,” to borrow ' the D au e n h a u e rs’ su gg estiv e te r m . In stead , they w ere , fo r the m o st p a rt, ritu al e n ac tm e n ts o f c u ltu ral d isso lu tio n and death . In so m e case s,’ such as the on e I e x am in e below ,1 thev to o k on alm o st the ch aracter J o f ab rcactive u tte ran ces. I w ill look at the G h ost D an ce as it ap p e are d in so u th w e ste rn O re g o n in the 1 8 7 0 s, w h ere it w as know n as the “ W arm H o u se ” cult (D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ). It w as o rigin ally e x p o r te d from C alifo rn ia by Indians fro m the Sa cram e n to R iv er area. By the 1 8 7 0 s, the situ ation in n o rth ern C alifo rn ia and so u th ern O re g o n w as even W'orse, from the Indian p e rsp e ctiv e , than that on the Plains. In C a lilo rn ia , Indians w ere b e in g hun ted dow n w ith the co m p lic ity and su p p o rt o f the state g o v e rn m e n t. In the b o rd e rla n d s, in a sh o rt span o l v c a rs, the M o d o c had b een placcd on a m u ltieth n ic re se rv a tio n , d e fe ate d in an all-o u t w ar, and e x ile d to Indian T e rrito ry (N ash 1955 [1 9 3 7 ]). In O r e g o n , after the fe d e ral tre atie s of 1853 and 1 8 5 5 , w hich c o n clu d cd the R o g u e R iv er W ars, a d isp arate a sso r tm e n t o f g ro u p s from the P lateau w-crc g ro u p e d w ith several coastal g r o u p s, in clu din g the C o o s , A lsca, Silctz, Siuslaw', T illa m o o k , L o w er U m p q u a , and T u tun i, at the G ran d R o n d c and Silctz R e serv atio n s on the co a st (B eck h am 1 9 9 0 : 182 3; Ja c o b s n .d .) . T h e co n d itio n s in these tw o re se rv atio n s w ere h arsh ; d u rin g 1857 8, 205 p e rso n s died o f d isease and starv atio n at Siletz alo n e (B eck h am 1 9 9 0 : 1 8 3 ). T h is o c c u rre d am o n g a p op u lation n u m b e rin g 5 5 4 p rio r to this (ib id .: 184). M o rtality w'as thus c lo se to 4 0 p e rce n t in this tw o -y e ar p e r io d . B ecau se o f age and g e n d e r sk ew in g in the 1857 p o p u latio n fig u re s, w e can su rm ise that p o p u latio n had d eclin ed significantly p r io r to that p o in t (ib id .). An in crease in in tereth n ic ten sion and organ ic and p sy c h o lo g ic al illn ess e n su e d . T h e se fu rth e r in creased as m o re p e o p le and trib e s w ere c ro w d e d o n to re se rv atio n s and as allo tm e n t and o th e r lan d g rab s fu rth e r re d u ce d Indian-held lan d. M elville Ja c o b s (n .d .) n o te s in triguingly th at, afte r 1 8 5 7 , w hen the C o o s w ere first e xiled from th eir lan d, p e o p le in g e n e ra l, and not only sh am an s, b ecam e in te re sted in d rea m s and their in te rp re tatio n s. We do not know p recisely w hat these d ream s

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e n taile d , but it is qu ite likely that they w ere sim ila r to th ose that later b e ca m e the fou n d ation o f the G h o st D an ce : d rea m s o f the dead in an idyllic se ttin g , w hich p e rfe ctly e x p re sse d the trau m a o f cu ltu ral d isin te g ratio n , w ith th eir co m b in atio n o f w ish fu lfillm en t and trau m atic re e n actm e n t. In 1 8 7 3 , a Shasta p ro p h e t n am ed B o g u s Tom b ro u g h t a version of the G h ost D an ce to the m u ltieth n ic Siletz and G ran d R o n d e re se rv atio n s o f w este rn O re g o n (B eck h am et al. 19 8 4 : 9 6 ; D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ; T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). It b e ca m e q u ite p o p u lar and sp read rapidly a m o n g the native p o p u latio n s b oth on and off re se rv atio n s. T h is d an ce, called the E arth L o d g e by the Sh asta and o th e r in te rio r O re g o n g ro u p s w ho ad o p ted it, b e ca m e kn ow n as the W arm H o u se dance in w este rn O re g o n (N ash 1955 [1 9 3 7 ]). It involved several novel featu res b ro u g h t from C alifo rn ia , such as se m isu b te rra n e an h o u se s w ith a cen tral p o le and the w earin g o f feath er cap es and w 'oodpeck er quill h ead b an d s (D u B o is 1 9 3 9 : 25 2 7 ; B eckh am et al. 1 9 8 4 : 9 6 ). It wras orig in ally b ase d on a variation o f the R o u n d D an ce , in w hich m en and w om en d an ced in a circle arou n d a cen tral fire. Like p re v io u s v e rsio n s o f the G h o st D an ce , this ritu al p ro m ise d the re tu rn o f dead relativ es and the re sto ra tio n o f the prec o n tact social and m o ral ord er. T h e m o ral and sp iritu al state o f the p a rticip a n ts w as c ru cial to its su cce ss. P articip an ts trie d to d ream and see vision s o f the d e a d ; failure re su lte d n o t only in the dead n ot re tu rn in g , b u t also in the d an ce r p o ssib ly b ein g tra n sfo rm e d in to an an im al in the b argain (D u B o is 19 3 9 : 2 7 ). S ep aration fro m the E u ro a m e ric an w o rld w as a cen tral value o f all v ersio n s o f the G h ost D an ce in O re g o n and C alifo rn ia . It w as th ough t that living in the w hite m a n ’ s way d e p riv e d Indians o f sp iritu al pow er. C o m m u n a lism w as an oth er n o rm ativ e value. This w as said to be in k eep in g w ith the values o f trad ition al c u ltu re , in w hich p e o p le “ w ere n ever stin gy ” (T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). D an c e rs p o o led th eir re so u rc e s so that th ose w ith ou t m on ey o r fo o d co u ld con tin u e to d ance, so m e tim e s lo r as lo n g as ten days at a tim e. B o g u s Tom con tin u ed su m m e r visits to O re g o n and W ashington fo r lo u r o r five y e a rs, until the religion b egan to b e su p p re sse d by the au th o ritie s. In ab ou t 1878 the W arm H o u se d ance w’as taken up bv tw o Silctz R e serv atio n In dians, C o q u ille T h o m p so n and C h e tc o C h arlie, w ho sp read the w ord am o n g the coastal g ro u p s. Both m en w ere A th ab ask an , b u t T h o m p so n had a C o o s m oth er. T h e y b ro u g h t the d ance to the n o n re se rv atio n co m m u n ity o f C o o s , Siuslaw', and L o w er U m p q u a w’ho lived at the m outh o f the Siuslaw R iver, n ear F lo re n ce , O re g o n (B eck h am et al. 1 9 8 4 : 9 9 ; D u B o is 1 9 3 9 ; M ille r and S e ab u rg 1 9 9 0 ; T h o m p so n 1 9 3 5 ). T h o m p so n ’ s C o o s con n ection an d, re p o rte d ly , the m e n ’ s o rato ric al and sin g in g skills m ad e th eir m e ssa g e p o p u la r am o n g this c o m m u n ity . Both m en m a rrie d local w om en and b egan to p ro se ly tize th ro u gh o u t so u th w e ste rn O re g o n . T h e W arm H o u se d an ce to o k on specifically O re g o n ian cu ltu ral fe atu re s, such as the id ea that the dead co u ld n o t re tu rn to earth b e ca u se the way w as b lo c k c d by a g re a t rain b ow lik c stru c tu re (B eck h am et al. 1 9 8 4 : 1 0 0 ). T h is recalls the C o o s vision o f the afterlife , alth ough n o rm ally the dead w ere striv in g to reach a secon d level o f heaven rath e r than re tu rn to e arth (F rach te n b e rg 1 9 1 3 ; Ja c o b s 1 9 3 9 ). N atu rally , the dance w as co n d e m n e d by au th o ritie s, but for a tim e it flo u rish ed . So g re a t w as its ap p aren t su c c e ss that it p ro d u ce d varian ts as it sp read to differen t c o m m u n itie s. P erson s w ho built w arm h ou ses b e ca m e the “b o sse s” and used their au th o rity to in tro d u ce new p ractice s.

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O ne such practice w as the building up o f the fire and the blockin g of the sm ok e h ole, creatin g a m iasm a o f sm oke in the h ouse, w hich m ade breathing difficult (T h om p son 1935). M en w ere rolled in blankets and then placed upon a fire that had been built up w ith fir boughs. Both of these practices wrerc design ed to facilitate visions on the p art o f the m ale dancers (for it w as only m en w ho could have them ) but failed (ib id .). The lack o f visions wras frustratin g and caused the con gregan ts to ge t “c razy ,” as T h om p son m uch later told M elville Jaco b s (ib id .). The real “craziness” involved n ot only the building up o f the fire and the sm okin ess o f the lodge but com m unal sex am on g men and w om en in the dark sm oky co rn e rs o f the house. W hile n ot central to the ritu al, and, indeed, apparently uncon n ected writh the attem p t to achieve visions, com m unal sex b ecam e an increasingly large p a rt o f the W arm H ouse dance in its w aning days. Belowr is T h o m p so n ’s d escription o f the d en ou em en t o f the W'arm H ouse religion as reco rd ed by Elizabeth Jaco b s: A t that tim e m en and w om en w'erc gettin g crazy. They wrere copulating w ith one anoth er (there in the dark sm oky w arm h ou se). L ots o f m en copulated w ith the w om en , even m arried peop le copulated w ith others because nothing could be seen; it had go tten to be dark (in there). T h a t’ s the w'ay it h app en ed; when they danced it changed to a different way. In the daytim e the w om en w ere around there naked. T h a t’s the way they did. (H o xic [Steph ens, a G alice inform ant] says only 3 or 4 fam ilies, and som e bach elor fellow s, w ere in on this at the end. E very­ body else kept aw ay.) T h a t’s why they finally set the W arm H ouse on fire and it all burned up. (They baptized the peop le after this.) (T h om p son 1935; parenthetical com m en ts by Jacob s?) O b cv esck cre (1 9 9 0 : 2 6 —2 9 ), in his psychodynam ic w ork on Sri Lankan religiou s e x p re ssio n , divides rituals into tw o types, dromena and cathartic rites. A dromenon (G reek for “ thing p e rfo rm e d ”) is a solem n and stately cerem on y , in which cultu ral, religio u s, and philosophical values arc rep resen ted in a fairly straigh t­ forw ard m anner. Individual psychological p rob lem s arc not absen t, and indeed provide a b asic m otivation for the ritual en actm ent, but they arc tran sform ed into idealized cultural them es and “b rough t in line with higher cultural values” (ib id .: 27). That is, the relation to real em otio ns and dilem m as is rather atten uated. D rom en a are “p ro gressiv e” in that they attem p t to resolve psych ological prob lem s by p rojectin g them forw ard into the future and the level o f the n um inous. C athartic rite s, by con trast, rep resen t these things m ore directly, although in doin g so they tran sform the cultural th em es, often parodically. T h u s, the H indu go d s and go d d e sse s portray ed in these rites p o sse ss, inter alia, large sexual ap petites and organs. T h ese rep resen tation s are the pro d u ct o f sym bolic tran sform ation s that O b ey esek ere (ib id .: 55) calls “the w ork o f c u ltu re .” It is like dream w ork in that it tran sform s the original fo rm s into d isto rtio n s, the difference being that dream w ork disguises uncon scious thoughts, while the w ork o f culture reveals them (ib id .: 5 6 ). C ath artic rites arc thus regressive in that they dw ell upon psychological conflicts w ithout attem p tin g to tran sform o r resolve them . We are now in a b e tter position to address the “ crazin ess” that T h om p son ob served in the latter days o f the W arm H ouse m ovem en t. The m ovem en t was

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tran sform ed from a d ro m en o n , w hich attem p ted to resolve the conflicts that the w estern O rego n Indians w ere exp erien cin g in the p ost-con tact p erio d by tran s­ ferrin g them onto another plane, into a cathartic rite, in w hich these them es w ere radically and parodicallv d isto rte d . Reunification with dead paren ts b eco m es tran sfo rm ed into physical union with co n tem p o raries. [. . .]

Cathartic rites as a response to colonialism T h ere can be little dou b t that religious m ovem en ts such as the W arm H ouse dance should be seen as eth n oh istorical ph enom ena, that is, view ed within the m atrix o f E uroam erican invasion and forced culture change (W alker 196 9 ). Further, it is clear that they arc m echan ism s for dealing with collective stress and pow erful negative em otio n s, and n ot always therapeutically. Rather, they offer em otional release from the dreary reality o f death, d isease, starvation , and acculturation. W hat is m ore, they rep lace the specific qualities o f each p e r so n ’ s sufferin g w ith a collective m ean ­ ing con stru cted in ritual. In this sense they allow for a certain forgettin g o f the specific past o f m assacres and epid em ics, w hich is rep laced w ith the idealized account (Fogelson 1 9 8 9 ). At first, such m ovem ents are optim istic and future orien ted . They arc drom cn a in O b e y c se k c re ’s term in ology . H ow ever, over tim e, as their participan ts arc repeatedly d iscom fited, the focus turn s away from futureorien ted optim ism and m oves increasingly in the direction o f pure catharsis. At such a point the gro tesq u e qualities o f the rite are elab orated and com e to prevail. [. . .]

Conclusion: for em otional ethnohistories As Bucklev has n oted , K ro eb e r avoided ethnohistorical research because he could not b ear all those tears. T h e invention o f the “ eth n ographic p re se n t” by K ro eb er and other an th ropo lo gists o f the p ro fessio n ’ s “classic” (i.e ., late colonial) phase wras perhaps above all a psych ological resp o n se to the scarin g h istories o f gen ocid e, culture loss, land ap p ro p riation s, and im m en se cruelty p erp etrated on indigenous p eo p les. K ro eb cr and others con stru cted an cpistem olo gical space in w hich such questions have no p lace; they rem ain outside the paradigm . [. . .] Ethnographic presen ts, reified and m echanistic cu ltu res, a detached view poin t: all are con ditioned by o u r p rofession al avoidance o f unpleasant realities. O f cou rse, m uch has changed in the past gen eration , but m uch has not. In particular, the unw illingness o f ethnohistorians to con sider the em otional dim en sions o f the past has changed little. This resistan ce, w hether from fear o f co lle ag u e s’ censure for bein g to o subjective or from an unw illingness to face all those tears, contin ues to deform ethnohistorical research and w-riting. In addition to these im pedim en ts o f ancient p ed ig ree, the rise o f p o st­ m od ern ism has instilled a stance o f ironic detachm en t am on g its second gen eration o f scholars (see Bracken 199 7 ). C olonial h istories arc seen as absurdist docum en ts. W hile the po stm o d e rn ist positions h im self o r h e rse lf as rhetorically on the side o f the su b altern , or at least as o p p osed to the colonial au th ority, such a stance has little significance fo r the actual pro ject, w hich, after all, is seen as m erely anoth er textual

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accretio n in an already te x t-satu ra te d field. T h e tex tu al ap p ro ach is n ot w ith out m e rit, especially if on e c o n sid e rs that such te x ts w ere , in d e e d , w hat m ad e colon ial ad m in istratio n p o ssib le. H ow ever, such a w h eels-w ith in -w h eels analysis is unlikely to b rin g to light the “h id den h isto rie s” o f c o lo n ize d and e n cap su lated co m m u n itie s (se e S ch n eid e r and R ap p 1 9 9 5 ). I have argu ed that the p ro fessio n al aversion to such h isto rie s w as and rem ain s in sep arab le from an u n w illin gn ess to lace e m o tio n s: o u r ow n in clu d e d . (A m o n g th ese e m o tio n s arc u n d o u b ted ly a ccrtain p ro fessio n al gu ilt at o u r c o m p licity w ith colon ial re g im e s .) T h e K urtzian h o rr o r o f E u rop ean colon ialism in A frica or A m erican c o n q u e st o f C alifo rn ia , w ritte n ab o u t by n ovelists and jo u rn a lists, has n ot gen erally been c o n sid e re d a fit su b je c t fo r a n th ro p o lo g ists o r h istorian s (but se e T aussig 1 9 8 7 ; Fabian 2 0 0 0 ). In stead , w e have ten d ed to seek the c o m fo rtab le g e n e ralitie s o f social organ ization o r m y th ology w hile avoidin g the h istorical sp ecificity . . . . I w ou ld argu e that this view has thin gs e xactly re v e rse d : the u n iv e r­ sals are to be fou n d in the colo n izin g so c iety b e cau se it is p a rtic ip a tin g in a glo b al p ro c e ss c arrie d o u t in m uch the sam e m an n er ev ery w h ere. It is the in d igen ou s re sp o n se s to colon ial e n co u n te r that rem ain to b e e x p lo re d in all th eir e m o tio n al and h istorical specificity . It is to that specificity that e th n oh istory m u st now tu rn .

R eferences Beckham , Stephen D ow 1990 H istory o f W estern O regon since 1846. In H andbook of N orth A m erican Indians. Vol. 7, T h e N orth w est C oast. Wayne Suttles, ed. Pp. 180—8. W ashington, DC: Sm ithsonian Institution Press. Beckham , Stephen Dow, Kathryn Anne Popel, and R ick M inor 1984 Native A m erican R eligious Practices and U ses in W estern O regon . U n i­ versity o f O regon A nthropological Papers, N o. 31. Eugene: U niversity o f O regon Press. B racken, C h ristopher 1997 T h e Potlatch Papers: A C olonial C ase H istory. Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. Bucklev, Th om as 1996

“T h e Little H istory o f Pitiful Events” : The E pistem ological and M oral C o n tex ts of K ro e b e r’s California Ethnology. In V olksgeist As M ethod and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the G erm an A nthropological Tradition. G eorge Stockin g, ed. H istory of A nthropology 8. Pp. 2 5 7 —97.

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Personality and C ulture: The Fate o f the Sapirian Alternative. In M alinow ski, R ivers, B enedict, and O th ers: Essays on C ulture and P erson al­ ity. G e o rge Stockin g, ed. H istory o f A nthropology 4. Pp. 156—83. M adison:

U niversity o f W isconsin Press. D auenhaucr, R ichard, and N ora M arks D auenhauer 1995 O ral L iterature E m bodied and D isem b odied. In A spects of O ral C om m u n i­ cation. U ta Q uasth off, ed. Pp. 9 1 - 1 1 1 . Berlin: W alter de G ruyter.

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Fabian, Johannes 2000 O u t o f O u r M inds: R eason and M adness in the E xploration o f Ccntral A frica. Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press. Fogelson, Raym ond 1989 The Ethnohistory 133—4 7 .

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and U niversity A rchives, U niversity o f W ashington, Seattle. C o o s N arrative and Ethnologic Texts. U niversity o f W ashington Publications in A nthropology 7 (1 ): 1—27.

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C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. L utz, Catherine 1988 U nnatural E m otions: Everyday Sentim ents on a M icronesian Atoll and T h eir Challenge to W estern T h eory. C hicago: University' o f C hicago Press. M iller, Jay, and W illiam Seaburg 1990 Athapaskans of Southw estern O rego n . In H andbook o f N orth A m erican Indians. Vol. 7 , T h e N orth w est C oast. Wayne Suttles, ed. Pp. 580—8. W ashington, DC: Sm ithsonian Institution Press. M ooney, Jam es 1965 [1896]

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cultural C om m unity on Klam ath R eservation. In Social A nthropology o f N orth A m erican T ribes. Fred Eggan, ed. Pp. 377—4 4 4 . C h icago: U niversity o f Chicago Press. O b ey esek ere, Gananath 1990 The W ork ol C ulture: Sym bolic T ransform ation in Psychoanalysis and A nthropology. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. O ’N eil, T h eresa 1996 D isciplined H earts: H istory, Identity, and D epression in an A m erican Indian C om m u nity. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press. Schneider, Jane, and Ravna Rapp 1995

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Taussio M ichael O ’ 1987 Sham anism , C olon ialism , and the W ild M an: A Study in T error and Healing. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. T h om p so n , C oquillc 1935

Ethnologic Text on R eligion : The G host D ance C u lt, Brought U p from the

Sacram ento Valiev. M alville. Jacob s C ollection , M anuscripts and U niversity A rchives, U niversity o f W ashington, Seattle. Walker, D ew ard 1969

N ew Light on the Prophet D ance C on troversy. Ethnohistory 16: 2 4 5 —55.

W allace, Anthony F. C. 1956 Revitalization M ovem ents: Som e Th eoretical C on sideration s for Their 1965

C om parative Study. A m erican A nth ropologist 58: 264—81. Jam es M ooney (1 8 6 1 —1921) and the Studv of the G h ost-D ance R eligion . In The G h ost-D ance R eligion and the Sioux O u tbreak o f 1980. Pp. v—x . C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press.

Chapter

8

Johan Lindquist N E G O T I A T I N G S H A M E IN T H E INDONESIAN BORDERLANDS

A

S

UNEXPECTED

IT

AS

MIGHT

se e m , m igran t w om en so m e ­

tim es w ear M uslim veils o r take ecstasy (the pop ular term for m d m a or 3,4-

m cthylenedioxy-m etham ph etam in e) in the sam e places and for the sam e reason s; reasons that are both com prehen sible and explicitly m oral. O n the Indonesian island

o f Batam — a place ch aracterized by rapid so cio-eco n o m ic change and dram atic d em ograph ic shifts — fem ale m igran ts use these techniques in o rd e r to deal with malu, m eaning ap proxim ately sham e, em b arrassm en t, shyness, or restrain t and p r o ­ priety (G o d d ard

1 9 9 6 :4 3 2 ; Peletz 1 9 9 6 :2 2 8 ). W hile veiling rein forces m oral

b ou n daries associated with malu, ecstasy use facilitates the tran sgression of those sam e b o u n daries. W earing the veil, or jilbab, offers an identity that p ro te cts against the dangers o f social interaction in the co n te xt o f m igratio n , w hile ecstasy use allow s fem ale p ro stitu tes to en gage m ore easily in m orally am bigu ous fo rm s of transactions. Both activities, however, can be tran sform ed into legitim ate m odels o f personal developm en t (kemajuan), w hich may displace malu upon retu rn h om e; one as a sign o f religiou s insight, the other as a m eans for creating econ om ic value. Veiling and ecstasy use are therefore both directly connected w ith the dem ands o f hom e and the expectation s o f m igratio n . In this co n te x t, it is the e x p erien ce o f malu, or o f bein g identified as som eon e w ho should be malu, w hich b eco m es an organizing prin ciple for social action and the m anagem en t o f appearan ces. In other w ords, malu b e co m e s the em otional link betw een the kampung, the village or h om e, and the rantau, the space o f m igratio n , as the dem ands o f w hat it m eans to be a m oral person haunt the m igran t. This link su gg ests various fo rm s o f exch ange that bind the individual to b ro ad er historically specific m oral and social o rd e rs, m ost notably the Indonesian nation. [. . .] . . . On

B atam ,

...

it

is

not

other

possible

translations

of

‘sham e-

e m b a rra ssm c n t,’ such as the Balinese con cept o f lek — fam ously tran slated by G e e rtz as ‘ stagefrigh t’ — or isin that have b eco m e key em otional tro p e s, but rather

9 4

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malu, a Malay w ord that exists in other Indonesian lan guages, but m ore im portan tly in this co n te x t, a p art o f the Indonesian lingua franca. This also highlights an im p ortan t difference betw een B atam , a place w here prim arily Indonesian is spok en, and the kampung, w here it is not. As Siegel (1 9 9 7 :1 5 ) has argu ed , the form ation o f the Indonesian national language ‘offers one the op p ortu n ity for a ccrtain excursion if n ot into a new iden tity, at least away from an old o n e .’ R e fe rrin g to the sam e qu o te, Spyer (2 0 0 0 :3 0 ) argues m ore strongly that it even ‘c o m p e ls’ this shift. In this article, I argue that in the co n te x t o f the m ore literal excursion that m igration entails, malu should be u n d erstood in relation to em ergen t identities con nected to the nation. This d oes not m ean , how ever, that malu is played ou t in the sam e w ays am ong the tw o g ro u p s that I am discussing. O n e o f the m ain differences betw een fem ale p ro stitu tes and factory w ork ers is education. W hile the latter arc required to have a high school d egree, the fo rm e r usually have far m ore lim ited education . F u rth e r­ m ore, w hile religious en gagem en t may be a legitim ate m odel o f kemajuan for som e w om en , for others wrho m ust su p p o rt fam ilies, only econ om ic su ccess counts. In other w o rd s, socioecon om ic differences stru ctu re life traje cto ries and lead malu to b eco m e relevant in various w ays in the lives o f m igrants. ( . . . ) Batam has com m on ly been rep resen ted by the Indonesian go vern m en t as a c o m p e tito r to Singapore — the new ‘ H o u sto n ’ or ‘ R o tte rd a m ’ o f South east Asia, the ‘ lo c o m o tiv e ’ o f Indonesian national d evelopm en t. The island has a distinct frontier-tow n atm osph ere: it is a place that has changed lo o quickly. G o lf c o u rse s, m arin as, and gated com m un ities co -exist w ith facto ries, squ atter com m un ities, karaoke b ars, and b roth els, w hile jungle still covers large p arts o f the island. A long w ith the industrial estates that offer facilities lo r m ultinational corp o ratio n s, prostitution has expan ded rapidly, serv in g the large n um b er of mainly Singaporean m en w ho take the 40-m in u tc ferry ride across the Straits o f M alacca in search o f inexpensive sex and dru gs. The econ om y of the day — based in the facto ries — and the econ om y of the night — based on p rostitution and d ru g use — have developed togeth er, both depen din g prim arily on fem ale lab or and foreign capital. In this c o n te x t, national-cultural distinctions betw een m en as bread w in n ers and w om en as tied to the d o m estic sphere arc easily disturbed (cf. Blackw ood 1 9 9 5 :1 2 6 ).

The day It is ju st after 4 p.m . at the Batam indo Industrial E state, the flagship o f econ om ic developm en t on Batam . [. . .] The sidew alks and the gen eral sense o f o rd e r in the estate serve to strengthen the feeling that Batam indo, w'hich is m anaged by a Singaporean c o rp o ratio n , is organized accordin g to different prin ciples than those o f the W'orld that exists outside its w alls. [. . .] Batam indo h ouses ab out 100 m ulti-national corp oration s and over 6 5 ,0 0 0 w ork ers, and is generally con sidered to be the m ost successful developm en t project on Batam . Eighty percen t o f the w ork ers are w om en betw een the ages o f 1 8 and 24, with a high-school d egree being a prerequisite for em ploy m en t. F u rth erm o re, m ost o f the w om en m ust sign a con tract prom isin g not to m arry or b eco m e pregnant

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w hile w o rk in g th ere. A p p ro x im ate ly 50 p e rce n t o f the w o m en in the e state w ear the jilb ab , an e x trao rd in arily high n u m b e r by In don esian sta n d ard s, even after the re c e n t w ave o f Islam ization th ro u gh o u t the co u n try . R e lig io u s activ ities arc stro n gly su p p o rte d by the m a n a g e m e n t and the local g o v e rn m e n t on the islan d , and each facto ry has its ow n o rgan izatio n s for C h ristian s and M u slim s. T h e con v erg en ce o f state and c o rp o ra te in te re sts can be se e n , for in stan ce, in atte m p ts by the D e p a r tm e n t o f R e lig io u s A ffairs to p rovid e p re -m arital co u n selin g fo r w o rk e rs. A t on e p o in t, the head o f the local office ex p lain e d the reaso n in g : By c o u n se lin g them [the w o rk e rs], w e h ope to p rev en t the possib ility o f negative b eh aviors [in p a rtic u la r p re -m arital se x and pregn an cy ou t o f w ed lock ] b ein g m a n ife ste d . If th ese p ro b le m s occur, w o r k e r s ’ p ro d u ctiv ity co u ld be re d u ce d . (The Ja k a rta Post, D e c e m b e r 19, 1 9 9 2 ). In c o n trast, y ou n g m ale m ig ran ts view B atam ind o as a p lace w h ere it is easy to find a g ir lfr ie n d , and on Saturday n igh ts the d o r m ito r ie s are p ack ed w ith v isito rs lon g in to the early h o u rs o f the m o rn in g , d e sp ite official ru le s statin g that g u e sts m ust leave by m idn igh t. In in te rv ie w s w ith officials at B atam in d o , as w ell as w ith n u rse s in the clin ic, issu es o f se xu ality aro se con stan tly . [. . .] R e lig io n a p p e ars as n ot only the solu tio n to preven tin g im m o ral behavior, but also to im p ro v in g w o rk e r p ro d u c tiv ity . T h e co n v e rg e n ce o f e c o n o m ic , n ation alist, and re lig io u s d isc o u rse s co n ce rn in g y ou n g w o m en is recog n izab le from o th e r c o n ­ te x ts in the re g io n (e.g. O n g 1 9 8 7 , C h ap te r 8 ). . . . T h e co m p lic ate d relation sh ip b etw een

m a n a g e m e n t and se lf-m an age m e n t

b e c o m e s p a rticu larly in te re stin g in relation to veiling. In c o n v e rsatio n s writh w o rk ­ e rs w h o w o re the veil it w as clear that m o st o f them b egan to do so only after they had arriv e d on B atam . T h e typical re sp o n se to m y en qu iry ab o u t this w as that they had onlv ju st ‘b e c o m e aw 'are’ (baru sadar). For in stan ce, W idy a, from the city o f Y ogyakarta in C c n tral Java, claim cd that she had alw ays w an ted to w ear a jilbab b e fo re she cam e to B atam , b u t that it w as rare th ere. W h ile in Java it w as easy to be b ran d ed fan atik (cf. B ren n er 1 9 9 8 :2 3 2 ), on Batam on e gain ed su p p o rt n ot only from ro o m m a te s b u t also from the ag e n cie s and co m p a n ies that re c ru ite d th em . . . . T h e in te re sts o f the w o rk e rs, the co m p a n ie s, and the local g o v e rn m e n t ap p e ar to co n v e rg e , as the m o v e m e n t o f w 'orkers is re stric te d to the m o sq u e (o r the c h u rc h ), the d o r m ito r ie s , and the fac to ry . T h e d e v e lo p m en t o f the in d u strial estate is m atch ed by the sp iritu al d e v e lo p m en t o f the w orker. W h ile this m ay easily be in te rp re te d as an ad d ed in stru m e n t in the discip lin in g o f w o rk e rs, in reality it is m o re co m p lic ate d . A lth ough ‘ b e co m in g aw a re ’ w as certain ly a key m o tif am o n g w o m en wrho w ear the jilbab at B atam in d o , m any — away fro m h om e fo r the first tim e — readily ad m itted that an o th er m a jo r reason fo r veiling w as to avoid m ale atten tio n and malu in the stre ets. W earing a jilb ab p r o te c ts w om en from b e in g ap p ro ac h cd by m e n , or o f b ein g iden tified as a lontong, a p ro stitu te . [. . .] So m e re se a rc h e rs have argu ed that w earin g the veil can be u n d e rsto o d as a kind o f ‘ sy m b o lic s h e lte r’ that allow s w om en to e n te r public sp a ce s (e.g. M a cleo d 1 9 9 2 ).

9 6

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LINDQUIST

Brenner (1 9 9 6 :6 7 4 ) claim s that this is not the case in Java, w here there is no clear delineation betw een ‘ m a le ’ and ‘fe m ale ’ sph eres. O n B atam , however, this distin c­ tion is far m ore prob lem atic, since the island has a reputation through -out Indonesia as a place ol p rostitution and lim ited social co n tro l, m aking m ovem en t through public space particularly sensitive for w om en . . . . V isiting go vern m en t officials arouc that fem ale w ork ers have too m uch free tim e and m av easilv be lured bv the to J J J potentially high earnings that prostitution offers. T his is a boun dary , however, that w om en them selves arc often con ccrn cd with policing. For instance, fem ale factory w ork ers who frequen t discos in the main tow n o f N agoya m ake clear attem p ts to distinguish them selves from p ro stitu te s, both spatially and in term s o f dress. M o st rem ain on one side o f the disco and are easily distinguished by their un iform o f loose T -sh irts and jeans. Sim ilarly, many w om en living in the d o rm ito ries avoid squatter housing around the estate, which often arc associated w ith prem arital cohabitation and a lack o f social con trol. Veils serve a sim ilar p u rp o se in creating social boun daries and form alizing iden tities. (. . .] O n Batam the jilbab as a sign o f religiou s devotion and chastity w^as, however, often doub ted by other p eo p le. R u m o rs o f w om en w ho w ore a jilbab during the day but frequen ted discos by night w ere com m on . My n eigh b o r’s girlfrien d , w^ho w orked at Batam indo and w ore a jilb ab , w ould frequently spen d the night in his ro o m , trying to sneak in late at night while my h ousem ates chuckled from our balcony across the street. O ne o f my neigh bors told m e that he ‘d id n ’t tru st jilbabs an y m o re ’ because he thought m ost w om en w ore them to hide their unattractive b od ies, anoth er m an claim ed that they w ere ‘m erely a fo rm a lity ’ (formalitas saja), w hile a n urse at the Batam indo clinic revealed that ‘il a w om an co m e s into the clinic and has a problem with som eth in g like sex and they arc w earin g a jilbab, I tell them to take it off, that they should be m alu.' The potential ironies arc evident. W hile veiling p ro te cts w om en from the threats of pre-m arital sex or o f bein g h arassed by m en — thereby displacing potential so u rccs of malu — and is con sidered a legitim ate m od el for perso n al d evelopm en t, the veil is not alw avs read as a sign o f piety and dem ands a b ro ad er tran sform ation o f subjectivity. [. . .]

The night [. . .] W ith the em ergen ce o f the G row th Triangle in the early 1990s, prostitution rapidly expan ded on Batam and n eigh boring islan ds, as prim arily Sin gaporean m en began to take the sh o rt ferry trip across the border. This p ro c e ss reached its peak in 1998 at the height o f the Asian econ om ic crisis, as the Indonesian rupiah drop p ed to as little as one sixth o f its previous value in relation to the Sin gapore dollar. W hile Indonesian m en are m ainly found in the h alf dozen quasi-legal lokalisasi — lowcharge brothel villages — m ost prostitu tion on Batam is based in karaoke bars and d iscos around the m ain tow n o f N agoya, which cater prim arily to foreign m en. O n a busy night, O zon is nearly filled to its capacity o f 2 ,0 0 0 people by 1 1 p.m . A l the back o f the disco, the

dj

plays techno versions o f Indonesian and w estern pop

son gs, but only a few peop le are on the sm all dance floor in the m iddle o f the club. In co n trast, the high tables and b arsto o ls that surroun d the dance floor are packed

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with peop le w ho can afford to buy drinks. M o st o f them arc con spicuously m oving their heads back and forth to the beat o f the m usic — in m ost cases, such peop le arc ‘trip p in g ’ on ecstasy, the d ru g o f choice in Indonesian night-clubs during the late 1990s. Behind the

d j,

and at the entrance to the to ile ts, there arc young m en selling

d ru g s, offering their g o o d s to anyone w ho looks their way. Lidya, w ho is in her m id tw enties and com es from M edan in N orth Sum atra, w orks as a frcclan cc prostitu te and is search in g for a lam u, a clicnt - preferably a Sin gaporean . The ccstasy that she has taken has n ot quite kicked in, and she is indccisivc about w hom to approach . Lidya claim s that she feels malu about approach ing clients, and she uses ecstasy to cross the barrier. I like taking ecstasy because I am n ot as scared to approach a client. If I d o n ’t take ccstasy , I feel in ferio r; I feel malu tow'ards the clicnts. Ecstasy m akes m e feel brave. M ost o f the freelance p ro stitu tes wrho w'ork in O zon use the d ru g on a regular basis, m any o f them nearly every night. U nlike brothel areas, w hich are ‘closed in stitution s' (C oh en 1 9 9 3 ), or p rostitu tes w ho have pim ps to n egotiate transactions with clicn ts, Lidya and other frcclancc w om en m ust to a g re ate r degree perform in o rd e r to attract clients. A ni, w ho co m e s from C cn tral Java, claim s that taking ccstasy ‘ m akes everything easier. If I am at the disco and I d o n ’ t take it, I feel con fused and I can ’t stand the m usic. I just keep asking m yself why I am here. Il is also easier to act and dance in a seksi w ay .’ . . . In O zon and other discos on Batam , ecstasy is crucial in the form ation of a spacc w here appearan ces may be altered and sub jectivities may — at least te m ­ porarily — be tran sfo rm e d . . . . In the con text of the d isco, ecstasy allow s w om en to tran sgress culturally pow erful m od es of bodily control and perform as p ro sti­ tutes. It allow s them to forget their malu, by ‘distancing e m o tio n ’ (Sch cff 1977) and to b eco m c the kind of w om an w hom a client w ill d esire, thereby facilitating econ om ic transactions. In this co n te x t, there is a w'holc re p erto ire o f actions that is learned through practical m im esis and which is facilitated by ccstasy : learning to dance in a m anner that is seksi, o r be flirtatious w ithout ap pearin g overly ag gressive, or change attitudes depen ding on the clicnt. T h e m o st successful frcclan cc p ro sti­ tutes are not necessarily the ones w ho are con sidered m ost beautiful, but rather, those w ho have m astered this re p erto ire . To m erely u n derstan d ecstasy in relation to this specific use w ithin the con text o f p rostitu tion , however, w ould be to underestim ate its poten tial m ean in gs and uses. In the disco ccstasy gen erates distin ctions betw een clicnts and prostitu tes alike by b eco m in g a sign that one is gengsi (hip). N o t being on, th erefore, can also b eco m e a source o f malu in relation to other p ro stitu te s, since it can be seen as a sign that one cannot access the d ru g, im plying that one cannot ge t a client o r afford to buy it. [. . .] Bloch and Parry (1 9 8 9 ) argue that all fo rm s o f econ om ic system s m ust allow for an ideological spacc in which sh o rt-term econ om ic acquisition — which often is m orally am bigu ous — is accepted in o rd e r to rep roduce a lon g-term m oral order. In relation to this, con sider the follow ing quote from R osa:

9 8

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o f c o u r se I feel m alu w h en I thin k a b o u t w h at I am d o in g — th o u g h it has b e c o m e e a sie r — b u t it is n o th in g c o m p a r e d to the malu I w o u ld fe el if I re tu r n e d h o m e w ith n oth in g. N ow , I can fe el p r o u d (ban gga) w h en 1 re tu rn h o m e . 1 am su re so m e p e o p le s u s p e c t that I w o rk as a p r o s titu te , b u t n o o n e e v e r ask s. T h is m alu, sh e te lls m e , is m o r e p o w e rfu l than the malu that she e x p e r ie n c e s in b e in g a p r o s titu te . In this c o n tc x t , th e c o m p le x ity o f th e m e a n in g s o f malu — ra n g in g fro m p r o p r ie ty to sh a m e

b e c o m c s e v id e n t in the d o u b le -b in d o f m o d e r n ­

ity (B a te so n 1 9 7 3 ). B e c o m in g a p e r so n is n o t on ly a b o u t a c tin g in a p a rtic u la r m a n n e r and re c o g n iz in g o n e ’ s p o sitio n w ith in s o c ic tv ; o th e r d e m a n d s have b c c o m c eq u a lly im p o r ta n t, n am e ly sig n s o f su c c e ss fro m

th e rantau. H o w ev er, R o s a ’ s

m o v e m e n t fro m the sp a c e o f h o m e , the kampung, to the sp a c e o f m ig r a tio n , the rantau, an d b a c k ag ain , fac ilitate s th is p r o c e ss . M alu, it a p p e a r s , can b e e ra se d and fo rg o tte n . T h e g r e a t e s t fe a r o f m any p r o s titu te s is — as the q u o te ab o v e s u g g e sts — that n e w s o f th e ir w o rk w ill sp r e a d b a c k to th e kampung. T h e u se

o f W e stern

p se u d o n y m s is o n e e x a m p le o f how’ id e n titie s are m a sk e d , w h ile n ew o n e s are fo rg e d in re la tio n to a b r o a d e r w o rld . R e tu r n in g h o m e alw ay s m e a n s tra n sfo rm in g o n e s e lf b a c k in to an id e a l, m o r a l p e r so n , p rim a rily th ro u g h m o r e c o n se rv a tiv e fo r m s o f d r e s s . B e in g id e n tifie d as re fin ed ( halus) ra th e r than c ru d e ( kasar) is a n o th e r sign that o n e k n o w s m alu. A s R o sa p u ts it: W h e n e v e r I re tu rn to Java an d visit m y so n and m y m o th e r, I have to sto p sm o k in g and s ta r t w e a rin g a sa ro n g ag ain . I have to re stra in m y se lf w h en I sp e ak and n o t b e as kasar as I am on B a ta m . F o r th o se w h o have p a r t n e r s o r ch ild re n liv in g on B a ta m , h ow ever, this ten sio n b e c o m e s m o r e c o m p lic a te d . F o r in sta n c e , o n e day w h e n I w e n t o v e r to visit the hall that I d e s c r ib e d in the b e g in n in g o f this se c tio n , D ia n a had a b lack ey e. H e r b o y frie n d U m a r had hit h e r w hen she c a m e h o m e fro m O z o n on and w ith o u t any m o n e y . A t the tim e D ia n a c o m p la in c d to m e th at U m a r : alw ay s g e t s m a d if I c o m c b a c k w ith o u t any m o n e y cvrcn th o u g h it s o m e tim e s is d iffic u lt to g e t a c lic n t. If he had any se n se o f re sp o n sib ility (bertangungjaw ab), I w o u ld n ’ t have to w o rk like th is, b u t he alw ay s says th a t it is d ifficu lt fo r m e n to find w o rk on B a ta m . W h at I really w an t is to b e a h o u se w ife an d have c h ild re n , b u t if he k e e p s h ittin g m e I w ill leave him sin ce I am the on ly o n e m a k in g any m o n e y . U m ar, o f c o u r se , had a d iffe re n t sto ry . H e c la im e d th at th e first tim e he had h it h er w as w h en she actu ally b ro u g h t a c lie n t b ac k to th e ir floor. E v e ry o n e w as sh o ck e d by th is, and it m a d e U m a r fu rio u s. I t ’ s b ad e n o u g h th at she has to w o rk as a p r o s titu te fo r us to su rv iv e , b u t she d o e s n ’ t have to m a k e m e even m o r e malu by b rin g in g this gu y b a c k . N o w sh e a lso s e e m s m o r e in te re ste d in tak in g d r u g s than she is in

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m akin g m on ey . All I do is sit here and w ait fo r h er all nigh t, and w hen she re tu rn s she is tripping and has no m on ey ! 1 w ish that 1 had n ever c o m e to B atam . I had a g o o d jo b b e fo re in M edan [N o rth S u m atra], but I ju st w an ted to o m uch and now I am stu c k here. I w ould rath er die than re tu rn h om e malu w ith ou t any m o n ey . In this p a rtic u la r situ atio n , the d istin ction b etw een the sh o rt-te rm and the lo n g ­ term sph ere d o c s n o t n ecessarily re p re se n t the distan ce b e tw e en the kampung and the rantau. O n the c o n tra ry , the d istin ction is d e p e n d e n t on w hat each p e rso n iden tifies as ‘h o m e ’ an d, th u s, the th resh old for w h ere the lo n g -te rm m o ral o rd e r b e gin s. T h is is p e rh ap s a distin ction that m akes life b e ara b le: the c o m m o d ificatio n o f the b o d y , and the sp a ce s w h ere this is allo w e d , are distin gu ish ed from p e rso n al relation sh ip s and the sp a cc o f ‘h o m e .’ In the e con om y o f the night the d istin ction b e tw e en ‘ p le a su r e ’ and ‘ la b o r ’ is n ever clear and co n stan tly a so u rc c o f con flict and an xiety . T h e d istan cin g o f e m o tio n th rough the use o f ccstasy facilitates e co n o m ic e x c h an ge , b u t also cre a te s p e rso n a l ten sio n s and m o ral d ile m m as. [. . .]

The m alu o f m odern ity [. ..[I n relation to the sp read o f merantau as a cu ltu ral fo r m ,

it is n ot su rp risin g that

malu has e m e rg e d as a key e m o tio n a l tro p e fo r m ig ran ts on B atam . W h ile isin, lek, and o th e r related e m o tio n al tro p e s rem ain b ou n d to a p a rtic u la r eth nic g ro u p and lan gu age, malu travels and b e c o m e s the link b etw een the rantau and the kampung, b e tw e en the citizen and the nation. A s I have n o ted th ro u gh o u t, p a rtic u la r m o d e r n ­ ist fo rm s asso ciate d w ith the nation and kemaiuan; m o st n otably e co n o m ic su cc e ss, re lig io u s d e v e lo p m e n t, and the n u cle ar fam ily, arc at the h ea rt o f th ese an xieties. O n e is malu to re tu rn ‘h o m e ’ w ith ou t having anything to show for the tim e one has sp en t in the rantau. F or m ig ra n ts, th e re fo re , the links b etw een malu and merantau effectively d e sc rib e the c o n trad ictio n s o f life on Batam and in the G row th T rian gle. In this c o n te x t malu ap p e a rs as an em o tio n that d e sc rib e s the failures to live up to the ideals o f the n ation . It o ffers m ig ran ts an e x p e rie n tia l tro p e as Indonesians in the sh adow s o f the p ro m ise s o f Indonesian e c o n o m ic d e v e lo p m en t (cf. Siegel 1 9 9 7 ; B o e llsto rff 2 0 0 2 ). [. . .] T h ou gh the p e rfo rm a n c e o f p ro stitu tio n m ay ap p e ar as an in version o f the p e rfo rm a n c e o f p ie ty , in fact they arc both cry stallizatio n s o f p a rtic u la r g e n d e re d sty les. A lth ough th ere are certain ly varying d e g re e s o f reflexivity involved in these acts, in all situ atio n s the p rim ary p ro b lem is n o t se lf-id e n tity , but rath er avoidin g b e in g iden tified as so m e o n e w ho d o e s n ot b e lo n g (cf. R eddy 1 9 9 7 ). It is im p o rta n t, how ever, to highlight the reflexive n ature o f this p r o c e ss; Batam is a p lace that not only p ro d u c e s new kin ds o f p o w e r re la tio n s, b u t also o ffers new fo rm s o f freed o m and agen cy fo r m ig ra n ts, m any o f w hom arc away from the kampung fo r the first tim e. In the c o n te x t o f merantau, malu is an e m o tio n that leads w o m en to en gage w ith , rath er than w ithdraw fro m , a new kind o f w orld and its c o n trad ic tio n s; a p ro c e ss that d o e s n o t, how ever, n ecessarily gu aran te e su cc e ss. [. . .]

1 0 0

JOHAN

LINDQUIST

References Bateson, Gregory. 1973. Steps to an Ecology' o f Mind. London: Paladin. Blackwood, Evelyn. 1995. Senior Women, Model M others, and Dutiful Wives: Managing Gender Contradictions in a Minangkabau Village. In Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia, edited by Aihwa Ong & Michael G. Pclctz. Berkeley: University o f California Press. Bloch, Maurice & Jonathan Parry. 1989. Money and the Morality of Exchange. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Bocllstorff, Tom. 2002. Ethnolocality. Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 3(1): 24-—48. Brenner, Suzanne. 1996. Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and the Veil. American Ethnologist, 23(4):673—697. — 1998. The Domestication o f Desire: Women, Wealth, and Modernity in Java. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press. Cohen, Erik. 1993. Open-ended Prostitution as a Skilful Game of Luck: Opportunity, Risk and Security among Tourist-oriented Prostitutes in a Bangkok Soi. In Tourism in Southeast Asia, edited by Michacl Hitchcock, Victor T. King & Michael J.G . Parnwell. New York: Routlcdge. Goddard, Cliff. 1996. The ‘ Social Em otions’ of Malay (Bahasa Melayu). Ethos, 24(3): 4 2 6 -4 6 4 . M aclcod, Arlene Eknvc. 1992. Hcgcmonic Relations and Gender Resistance: The New Veiling as Accommodating Protest in Cairo. Signs, 17 (3 ):5 33—557. Ong, Aihwa. 1987. Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Pclctz, Michacl G. 1996. Reason and Passion: Representations of Gender in a Malay Society. Berkeley: University o f California Press. Reddy, William M. 1997. Reply. Current Anthropology, 38(3):346—348. Schcff, Thomas J. 1977. The Distancing o f Emotion in Ritual. Current Anthropology', 18(3):48 3-505. Siegel, James T. 1997. Fetish, Recognition, Revolution. Princeton, N J: Princcton University Press. Spyer, Patricia. 2000. The ,Memory i f Trade: Modernity’s Entanglements on an Eastern Indonesian Island. Durham: Duke University Press.

3. Emotions and society

W

ITH

ANTHROPOLOGY,

THE

DISCIPLINE

OF

sociology has

one of the longest records of research and debate on the extent to which,

and the processes whereby, emotions are shaped by socio-cultural factors. W hile Am erican sociologists pioneered the field, today the Am erican, British and European Sociological Associations all have them atic sections or study groups dedicated to the emotions. The field of relevant publications spans more than three decades; some of the concepts and analytical fram eworks developed during the 1970s and 1980s still orient research today, as can be seen throughout this volume. Once regarded as an area of specialist interest, the study of emotions is increasingly considered central to the discipline and to the ways in which the discipline conceives of itself. As Barbalet (2 0 0 2 :3 ) puts it, 'once the importance of emotions to social processes becomes clear, the intellectual constitution of sociology, and therefore the history of sociology and those who have contributed to it, have to be rethought/ Just as there is no singular theoretical or methodological fram ework that can characterize sociology as a whole, so there is not a singular sociology of emotions but rather many variants, each with its pa rticu la r inclinations and ways of proceeding. Jonathan Turner and Jan Stets have recently published a book-length review of the field (2005), to which we refer readers who are interested in a detailed discussion of key theoretical and methodological differences. Turner and Stets identify seven theoretical variants in the sociology of emotions: dram aturg ical and cultural', ritu a l; sym bolic interactionist; sym bolic interactionist with psychoanalytical elements; exchange theorizing; structural; and evolutionary. In this section we have tried to provide a balanced selection from these variants, while including also a contribution from a systems-theoretical perspective. Our first reading is from the first chapter of Jack Barbalet's book Em otion, S o c ia l Theory and S o c ia l Structure (2001) which presents a m acro-sociological

1 0 2

U N I V E R S A L S

AND

P A R T I C U L A R S

OF

A F F E C T

approach to the emotions. The book has two aims. To examine aspects social struc­ ture by applying emotions categories (e.g. what role does resentment play in relations of social class?), and to re-work sociological theory in the light of a focus upon emotions. The extract we have chosen focuses on the latter, since this provides a useful and concise introduction to questions such as: W hat is sociology's 'business' with the emotions? How has it tackled them? How did emotions feature in the early origins of sociology? To what extent are subsequent sociological approaches to emotion themselves the expression of changes in broader social structural factors? This latter question is of pa rticu la r interest with respect to B arbalet's picture of the changing fortunes of emotions in sociology. W h ilst the founders of modern sociology - including figures such as Adam Sm ith, Adam Ferguson, A lexis de Tocqueville, Gustave Le Bon, Em ile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Ferdinand Tonnies and Georg Simmel - regarded emotions as im portant sociological variables, Barbalet suggests that they effectively dropped out of the picture from about 1930 to 1970 as a cognitive emphasis came to dominate sociological theory. In the U K context, Barbalet relates this shift to changes in mass society such as the effective contain­ ment and pacification of the working classes in the post-war period of reconstruction and the relative rise in numbers of white-col lar workers in administrative, clerical and sales positions which factors together 'enhanced the sense of a less passionate and increasingly rational social order' (2001: 15). Barbalet goes on to associate the rise of the social constructionist approach to the increased prominence, from the 1970s onwards, of new social movements such as the Women's the Environmental and the B lack Movements which served to politicize emotions through the foregrounding of a politics of identity and a critique of 'n a tu ra listic' accounts of 'knowing one's place'. The second extract is from Goffm an's classic a rticle 'Em barrassm ent and Social Organization'. This a rticle was published in 1956 at a time when most of sociology was committed to rather rational and calculative models of social organization. Where emotion was considered, it tended to feature as a component of more prim itive forms of social organization or in relation to its 'p ath o logical' expression (e.g. in times of social crisis). The polarity affectivity / neutrality, for example, was one of Talcott Parsons' 'pattern variables', and he associated affectivity with pre-modern society and with the fam ily dynamics of modern social systems (cf. Fish 2004). Goffman, by contrast, is unembarrassed in his dealings with the emotion of embarrassment. This is perhaps because his 'd ram atu rgical' approach was more in tune with ideas coming from the arts and humanities and with the power struggles of psychiatric wards. Goffm an thus recognized that emotion is, in part at least, a genuinely s o c ia l category by showing how embarrassment is part and parcel of socially prescribed behaviour and not some prim itive and irrational biopsychological force 'breaking through' the crust of orderly conduct. From Goffm an's dram aturgical perspective, social action is sustained less by reasoned rule follow ing or hedonistic self-interest than by a delicate dance of affective encounters whose emotional qualities are, for the most part, carefully concealed. The next four extracts are drawn from sociologists who made significant con­ tributions from the second half of the 1970s, when explicit sociological interest in the emotions was re-kindled. Thus Susan Shott begins her a rticle 'Em otion and Social Life: a symbolic interactionist analysis' by pointing to the neglect of emotion amongst

E M OTI O N S A N D SOC I ET Y

1 0 3

contem porary sociologists with the exception of figures such as Goffman. Shott provides a clear example of a constructionist account of emotion as a socialized phenomenon mediated by sym bolically organized 'definitions of the situation' and interactional factors such as 'role taking'. The indebtedness to Schachter and Singer's (1 96 2 ) social psychological tw o-factor theory is explicit, as is the influence of cultural anthropology, which also challenged prior thoroughly biological accounts of emotion. Shott's concern is with the agency of social action, and it is argued that social systems and th eir structures do not determine conduct but rather influence the settings for conduct and the ways these are cognitively interpreted. It is also notable that a decisive role is given to the concept of s o c ia l norm s as the key elements in a social fram ew ork that shape and modify the acto rs' emotional experiences and expressions by way of th eir influence on modes of interpretation or reality construc­ tion. These norms are approached in two related ways: either through an emphasis on how normative social reality constructs the actor through socialization, or on how the actor constructs reality by way of their normative subjective definitions. The extract from A rlie Russell Hochschild's a rticle 'E m otion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure' shares this focus on social norms and on the importance of an order of interaction which mediates between the personality structures of individuals and the social structures of a social system. Elsewhere in the article, Hochschild distinguishes an organismic account of em otion-as-biological with the interactive account associated with Schachter, Goffman and others. Hochschild favours the latter because it offers a more deeply social account according to which social norms and knowledge enter into the definition of emotion via interpretive processes of labeling and attribution. Hochschild's specific contribution is to take Goffm an's work further by arguing that actors do not simply manage the outward 'im pressions' they give off to others but also th eir inner feelings. Her 'emotions management' approach is thus based upon the idea of deep acting through which people struggle to actually alter their emotions to better fit social norms and expec­ tations. Her concepts of 'emotion w ork' and 'feeling rules' thus extend the focus on social norms. This move allow s Hochschild to connect emotions to broader questions of power and social structure, since feeling rules can be thought of as the 'underside' of ideology - the side that deals with emotions. A key difference between working class and middle class socialization practices, for example, m ight well be the extent to which they prepare children to control and manage their emotions. It is no surprise that we now ta lk of 'em otional intelligence' as a quality necessary for work in econ­ omies dominated by service and consumption rather than industrial production. For Hoschschild, such economies require high levels of emotion work (interesting com par­ isons with E lias's theory of the civilizing process could be made here, cf. Wouters 1989). In contrast to Shott and Hochschild, Theodore Kemper offers a self-consciously 'p o sitivistic' interactional theory of emotions. The perspective presented in the extract is part of a broader theory (cf. Kemper 1978) in which it is argued that 'a very large class of emotions results from real, imagined or anticipated outcomes in social relationships' (1978: 43). As this quotation indicates, Kemper is mostly interested in the social causes of emotions, which are themselves considered to be psychophysiological phenomena. He argues that two universal structural dimensions

1 0 4

U N I V E R S A L S

AND

P A R T I C U L A R S

OF

A F F E C T

of social interaction that he calls 'power' and 'status' can parsimoniously predict the generation of many emotions. Happiness, for example, is caused by a gain in power w hilst fear and anxiety result from its loss. Pride, to give another example, is caused by a gain in status w hilst shame results from its loss. W h ilst social norms and cultural knowledge may well mediate the relationships between structural relations and emotions, Kemper's work suggests that it is possible both to overstate the causal role of such factors and to overstate the 'cognitive' nature of emotions as fundamentally related to local interpretations. He is interested in providing a more complete model of the social environment (which naturally includes the macro aspects of social systems) so that variations in that environment can be correlated with varying emotional experiences. The extract by Randall Collins illustrates his more general theory of interaction ritual (Collins 1975). Under the influence of Durkheim, Goffm an and Darwinian animal ethology, Collins deals as much with the social effects of emotions as with the social causes. Em otions are tacitly mediated by interaction rituals and are viewed as a form of 'social energy' which upholds social structures and gels groups into coalitions with 'fe lt' hierarchies of dominance and solidarity. Collins is thus less con­ cerned with specific namable emotional occasions (e.g. this moment of anger) than with a constantly reproduced underlying emotional dynamic that is sometimes only vaguely sensed. This emotional dynamic influences whether or not people feel they 'belong' in a p a rticu la r situation, group, institution or social relationship, how 'con­ fident' they feel, and so on. From this perspective, property, for instance, is based upon a sense of entitlem ent to occupy a p a rticu la r place or to access a p a rticu la r thing and something like 'au th ority' is communicated via subtle cues that are affect­ ively apprehended. L ittle things like 'ta lkin g shop' or 'name dropping' or remarks about tasteless internal decoration serve to reproduce such emotional dynamics and Collins is thus less interested in the content of such ritu a listic conversations than in th eir unstated em otional effects, both individual and collective (e.g. how they increase and decrease the confidence of the actors and how they reproduce or challenge existing group boundaries). The final extract is from the German systems theoretician, N ikla s Luhmann. Luhmann offers an h istorically informed post-positivistic sociology grounded in complexity theory (c.f. Stenner 2004, 2006). He draws upon the biological theory of 'autopoiesis' which examines how living organisms must constantly reproduce them­ selves from out of th eir own elements. For autopoiesis to occur, a system must be fully self-referential or operationally d o se d upon itself. In contrast to our other authors, Luhmann thus makes a rather clear distinction between social systems (which are systems of com m unication) and psychic systems (which are systems of consciousness grounded in unconscious biological systems). Both systems face the task of repro­ ducing themselves on an ongoing and self-referential basis either by continuing to generate com m unication (in the case of social systems) or consciousness (in the case of psychic systems). For Luhmann, the emotions prim arily concern psychic systems and they arise whenever the autopoiesis (continuous self-referential repro­ duction) of consciousness is in danger. Nevertheless, there is a close relationship of 'structural coupling' between psychic and social systems. The stream of conscious­ ness, for instance, is endangered by interruptions and these can be caused by

E M O T I O N S

AND

S O C I E T Y

1 0 5

u n p red icta ble so cia l events. M o re sp ecifically, Luh m ann holds th a t em otion is the process of a d ap ta tio n to m et or unm et cla im s. A cla im is m ore than a mere e xp e ct­ ation, since a disappoin ted expectation can sim p ly be revised o r given up. W ith a cla im , by co n trast, we have a sense of rig h t and so its disa p p oin tm en t o r fu lfillm e n t is m ore of a shock to the psychic system and so generates e m otion a l responses. T his s tru c tu ra l co upling a llo w s Luh m ann to co nn ect em otions to c u ltu ra l se m a n tics (e.g. s o c ia lly prevalent ideas and rules about w ho can lay c la im to w h a t) and to relate se m a n tics to sh ifts in so cia l stru ctu re (e.g. the s h ift from a feudal society to one th a t is fu n c tio n a lly d iffe re n tia te d ). In a w o rld where our c la im s are ostensibly 'in d iv id u a l ch o ice s' u nlim ited by so cia l d icta te s concerning ou r predefined 'p ro p e r p la ce', they are less likely to be rou tinely m et and hence m ore likely to engender em otion.

References Barbalet, J. (ed) (2 002) Em otions and Sociology. Oxford: Blackw ell Publishing. Collins, R. (1 975) C o nflict Sociology: Toward an E x p lo ra to ry Science. New York: Academ ic Press. Fish, J. S. (2004) 'The neglected element of human emotion in Talcott Parsons's The Structure of Social A ction ', Jo u rn a l o f C la ssica l Sociology, 4 (1): 115—134. Kemper, T. D. (1 9 78 ) A S o c ia l Internation al Theory o f Em otions. New York: John Wiley. Schachter, S. and Singer, J. E. (19 6 2) 'Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of em otional state', P sych o log ica l Review, 69: 3 7 9 -9 9 . Stenner, P. (20 0 6) 'A n outline of an autopoietic systems approach to em otion', Cyber­ netics and Human Knowing, 12 (4): 8 -2 2 . Stenner, P. (20 0 4) 'Is autopoietic systems theory alexithym ic? Luhmann and the socio­ psychology of emotions', S ozia le Systeme, 10 (1): 1 5 9 -8 5 . Turner, J. H. and Stets, J. E. (eds) (2 00 5 ) The S ociology o f Em otions. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Wouters, C. (19 8 9) 'The sociology of emotions and flight attendants: Hochschild's "M a n a g e d H e a rt" ', Theory, Culture & Society. 6: 9 5 -1 2 3 .

C hapter 9

Ja ck Barbalet

E M O T I O N IN S O C I A L L I F E A N D SOCIAL THEORY

E m o ti o n a n d s o c i o l o g y : th e o d d c o u p l e

W

HAT

IS

S O C I O L O G Y ’S

BUSINESS

WITH

em o tion ?

One

a n s w e r is th at s o c i o l o g y a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a in s o c ia l p h e n o m e n a , a n d e m o t i o n

is a s o c ia l p h e n o m e n o n . T h a t e m o t i o n h as a so c ia l n a t u r e is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s , h o w e v e r . A n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s e x p e r i e n c e o f e m o t i o n m o r e r e a d ily r e v e a ls th e p e r s o n a l a n d in t im a t e s id e o f e m o t i o n than its c o l l e c t i v e o r s o c ia l d i m e n s i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it has b e e n s h o w n b y a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , h is t o r i a n s , a n d s o c i o l o g i s t s , that th e p a t t e r n s o f e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s a r c d if f e r e n t in d if f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . In this s e n s e e m o t i o n can b e r e g a r d e d as an o u t c o m e o r e ffe c t o f so c ia l p r o c e s s e s . A s a so c ia l p r o d u c t , e m o t i o n is in p r i n c i p l e a m e n a b l e t o s o c i o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n an d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e r e is in fa c t a la r g e a n d g r o w i n g lit e r a t u r e w h ic h s h o w s , fr o m a n u m b e r o f d if f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s , th a t e m o t i o n is a s o cial th in g ( K e m p e r 1 9 9 1 ; M cC arth y 1989). T h e r e is a n o t h e r a n s w e r to th e q u e s t i o n , “ W h a t is s o c i o l o g y ’ s b u s i n e s s w it h e m o t i o n ? ” S o c i o l o g y m i g h t b e c o n c e r n e d w it h e m o t i o n b e c a u s e e m o t i o n is s o m e ­ h o w n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a in th e v e r y f u n d a m e n t a l s o f s o c ia l b e h a v io r . T h i s id e a , th at e m o t i o n is a s o c ia l c a u s e , is m o r e likely t o b e r e s i s t e d b y s o c i o l o g i s t s th an th e id e a th a t it is a s o c ia l e ffe c t. A s th is is th e m o r e d iffic u lt t o a c c e p t o f th e t w o a n s w e r s c o n c e r n i n g s o c i o l o g y ’ s b u s i n e s s w ith e m o t i o n , it is th e o n e th a t w e shall f o c u s on h e r e . T h e o n ly g o o d r e a s o n t o o f f e r a s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f e m o t i o n is if e m o t i o n is i t s e l f sig n ific a n t in th e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f s o c i a l r e la t io n s h ip s , in s t i t u t io n s , a n d p r o c e s s e s . [. . .]

EMOTI ON

IN

SOCIAL

LIFE

AND

SOCIAL

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Em otion in the o rigin s o f sociolo gy T h e eigh teen th -cen tu ry Scottish o rig in s o f so c io lo g y have b een frequ en tly n o ted (B ie rste d t 1 9 7 9 ; Sw in g e w o o d 1 9 9 1 ). A dam Sm ith , for in stan ce, in The Wealth o f Nations ([1 7 7 6 ] 1 9 7 9 ), is c re d ited w ith an ticip atin g co m p arativ e h istorical so c io lo gy and a m a c ro so c io lo g y o f in stitu tion s. A dam F e rg u so n , in An Essay on the History o f Civil Society ([1 7 6 7 ] 1 9 6 6 ), is even m o re se cu re as a p r e c u rso r o f m o d e rn so c io lo gy in his e x p lic it u n d e rstan d in g o f the social as d istin ct fro m the e co n o m ic c o n ­ se q u e n c e s o f the division o f lab o r and fo r his accou n t o f h isto ric d e v e lo p m en t. W hat is se ld o m n o ted , how ever, but w hich is essen tial fo r an u n d erstan d in g o f each o f th ese th in k ers, and fo r an ap p re ciatio n o f the in tellectu al fo rm a tio n o f the S cottish E nligh ten m en t o f w hich they are a p a rt, is the im p o rta n ce they attach to e m o tio n in m akin g sen se o f social relation sh ip s and as a fou n dation fo r th eir large r social th e o rie s. T h e re is a view that in The Wealth of Nations Sm ith d e v e lo p e d a line antith etical to that o f his e arlie r b o o k , The Theory o f Moral Sentiments ([1 7 5 9 ] 1 9 8 2 ). It is held that w h e reas on e p u rsu e s the th read o f eco n o m ic se lf-in te re st, the o th e r e x p a n d s on sym path y as a b asis o f m o ral behavior. T h is read in g o f the relation sh ip b e tw e en S m ith ’ s b o o k s m isin te rp re ts each o f them (M acfic and R aphael 1 9 7 6 , pp. 20 5). W h at m u st b e em p h asized h ere is that the m uch n arro w e r focu s o f The Wealth o f Nations, a d etailed w o rk in g o u t o f the c o n se q u e n c e s fo r e co n o m ic actio n s and in stitu tion s o f “se lf-lo v e ,” d e riv e s from S m ith ’ s e arlie r th e o ry . Moral Sentiments accou n ts for m o ral ju d g m e n t and social in teraction in te r m s o f p a rtic u la r e m o tio n s, and a rg u e s that the cap acity fo r a sy m p ath etic echo o f th ese e m o tio n s in oth er ac to rs is a fu rth e r d e te rm in an t o f social co n d u ct. T h e u n d erp in n in g e m o tio n s fra m e w o rk o f F e rg u so n ’ s Essay on the History o f Civil Society ([1 7 6 7 ) 1966) is unavoidable to its re a d e rs. T h e b o o k co n sists o f six p a rts. T h e first and by far the lo n ge st is “ O f the G e n e ral C h arac te ristics o f H um an N a tu re .” T h is fo rm s the m e th o d o lo g ic al and th e o retical b asis o f w hat follow 's, and is largely c o n c e rn e d w ith the e m o tio n a l d isp o sitio n s asso ciate d w ith social and p olitical relatio n s and organ ization . T h e e x p la n ato ry value o f e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s can also be lo c ate d in the m a jo r s o c io lo g ists o f the n in eteen th and early tw en tieth ce n tu rie s. A le x is de T o cq u ev ille, G u stave Le B on , E m ile D u rk h e im , V ilfred o P areto , Ferdin and T o n n ie s, and G e o r g S im m el are so m e o f the m o re n otab le. E u ro p ean so c io lo g ists w h o, in a n u m b e r o f d ifferen t w ays, re g ard e d e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s as im p o rta n t e x p la n ato ry variab les. D u rin g this sam e p e rio d A m erican so c io lo g y , in the w ork s o l such figu res as A lbion S m all, W illiam G rah am Su m m n cr, and L e ste r Frank W ard, as w ell as E dw ard R o ss and C h arles H o rto n C o o le y , fou n d e x p la n ato ry ro le s fo r e m o tio n s c a te g o rie s. A ll ol this is m e n tio n e d h ere sim ply to indicate that d u rin g an e arlie r tim e it w:ou ld n ot have b een n e c e ssa ry , as it is now , to show that a so cio lo g ic ally ro b u st u n d e rstan d in g o f e m o tio n m akes g o o d sen se. T h e ab sen ce o f M ax W eb er from the lists o f the p re ce d in g paragrap h is not accid en tal. A n u m b e r o f c o m m e n ta to rs w ith p ro je c ts sim ila r to m y ow n have re c ru ite d W eb er to th eir p u r p o se , argu in g that W eb er w as one so c io lo g ist wrho re c o g n iz e d the e x p la n ato ry im p o rta n ce o f e m o tio n . W eb er did have an ideal type c o n c e p tio n o f “affectual a c tio n ,” c e rtain ly ; b u t as T alcott P arso n s ([1 9 3 7 ] 1 9 6 8 ,

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pp. 6 4 7 —9 ), fo r in stan ce, has n o te d , this cate g o ry is prim arily re sid u a l, and w as not positively u sed in W e b e r’s e m p irica l w o rk . P arso n s may e x a g g e ra te the ab sen ce o f e m o tio n in W e b e r’ s e x p la n atio n s: it is n otio nally cen tral to (alth ough w holly u n d evelop ed in) his ac co u n t o f ch arism atic au th o rity . T h e re are, in fact, m any re fe re n ce s to e m o tio n in W e b e r’ s w o rk . H e in sists on the n ecessity o f passio n in the callin g o f scien ce. T h e d iscu ssio n o f the ro le and p ractice o f the p rie sth o o d in Ancient Judaism (W eb er [1 9 1 7 ] 1 9 6 7 ) in clu d es m uch on the gen eration o f e m o tio n and its m an ip u latio n . E m o tio n is also im p o rta n t in W e b e r’ s discu ssio n o f the P ro testan t eth ic and the sp irit o f c a p ita lism . A co n sid eratio n o f this latte r d iscu ssion w ill be d e v e lo p e d in the fo llo w in g ch apter. It w ill be show n that W e b e r’ s acc o u n t o f em o tio n is n ot only in itse lf se rio u sly flaw ed, but is associated w ith the exp u lsion o f e m o tio n from so c io lo g y . It is this th em e w hich w ill be taken up h ere.

The exp u lsio n o f em otion from sociolo gy [. . .] C hanging fo rtu n e s o f m ass society It is an e n d u rin g featu re o f political life that th ose wrho e x e rc ise p o w e r c x p c rie n c c th eir en th u siasm s as re aso n ab le , b u t the en th u siasm s o f th ose w ho ch allen ge them as u n reaso n ab le and e m o tio n a l. E ty m o lo g ic a lly , “en th u siasm ” is a state o f su p e rn atu ral p o sse ssio n o r in sp iratio n , and in that sen se, as a state o f bein g m o v e d by an e x te rn al c o n c e rn , it is inherently n on -ration al. T h e n in eteen th -cen tu rv th e o rists o f m ass so c ie ty , fo r in stan ce, w ere at le ast p artly stim u late d in th eir acc o u n ts o f c o n te m ­ p o rary so ciety by a c o n ce rn for, if n o t a fear o f, the en th usiasm o f the p o p u lar m a sse s fo r an arch ist, so cialist, and sy n d icalist id eas and en ga ge m e n ts. Social an alysts do n ot n e cessarily e x p r e ss th em selv es th rough a political v ocab u lary . B ut the salien ce o f an e m o tio n s te rm in o lo g y in the so c io lo g y o f the n in eteen th and early tw en tieth c e n tu rie s re so n a te s w ell w ith the e m o tio n s w'hich the re se a rc h e rs th e m ­ selves e x p e rie n c e d d u rin g an h isto ric p e rio d o f un ruly c ro w d s, urban m a sse s, and e c o n o m ic , p o litic a l, and social tran sfo rm a tio n s. By the end o f the F irst W orld War, how ever, and certain ly by the 1 9 2 0 s, in w estern E u ro p e and A m e ric a , the g e n e ra l im age o f a w holly th reaten in g seeth in g social lan d scap e ap p e are d less ten able. T h e w ar itse lf had p e rm itte d p o litical states to reg u late e c o n o m ie s and p o p u latio n s in a way w hich re in fo rc e d the c o n stitu tio n a l­ ism that had b een d e v e lo p in g th ro u gh o u t E u ro p e d u rin g the n in eteenth c en tu ry . At the sam e tim e , the in d u strial h eart-Iand co u ld by now b e re g ard e d as largely p aciticd. In the p o st-w a r p e rio d o f re c o n stru c tio n , m ilitan t w o rk e rs and m a rg in al­ ized radical e le m e n ts o l lab o r m o v e m e n ts w ere c alm e d by full e m p lo y m e n t (G allic 19 8 3 ; M id d le m as 1 9 7 9 ). W ith the c o n so lid atio n o f in dustrial o r d e r the w ork in g classe s ceased to be re g ard e d as a th reat to “civilizatio n ” in the w ay that they had p rev io u sly b een . In ad d itio n , e c o n o m ic organ izatio n s w ere by this tim e in creasin gly large and im p e rso n a l (B cn d ix 1 9 7 4 , pp. 21 1 2 6 ). An asso ciated d e v e lo p m e n t w as n o t only a rise in the n u m b e r o f b lu e -c o lla r w 'orkers b u t at the sam e tim e th eir relative declin e

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as a p ro p o rtio n o f the w o rk fo rc e as a w h ole. T h is w as through a rise in the n u m b e rs o f w h ite-co llar cle ric al, ad m in istrativ e, and sale s w o rk e rs w hich ac co m p an ie d g ro w th in the size and im p o rta n ce o f o rgan izatio n s. T h e se fa c to rs to g e th e r e n hanced the sen se o f a loss passion ate and an in creasin gly ration al social o rder. O u t of th ese and asso c iate d d e v e lo p m e n ts, a new m o d e l o f social action gained c u rre n cy , w hich se e m ed m o re c o m m e n su ra te w ith the e m e rg© e n t social and civic J ’ e x p e rie n c e , and w hich gain ed p ro m in e n ce in so c io lo g ic a l thinking. It is from ab o u t this tim e that e m o tio n c e ase s to find rcad v accc p tan cc as an e x p la n ato ry variable in so c io lo g y . In fact, the te rm and co n ce p t cease to h old any real in te re st for s o c io lo g ists at all. T h e se ch an ges w hich w e have acco u n ted

for in political

e c o n o m ie s w ere su p p o rte d by in tellectu al d e v e lo p m en ts in allied discip lin es. (. . .)

The new rise o f em otion . . . T h e o rth o d o x refu sal to a c c c p t the sign ifican ce o f e m o tio n in social p ro c e sse s did find o p p o sitio n from the late 1 9 7 0 s, w hen a n u m b e r o f so c io lo g ic al w ork s e x p re ssly d ealin g w ith e m o tio n in social p r o c e sse s b egan to appear. T h e creative b u rst, from the late 1 9 7 0 s to the m id - 1 9 8 0 s, o f p a p e rs and b o o k s on e m o tio n in social p ro c e sse s w as o f a sufficien t critical m a ss to ge n e ra te se rio u s discu ssio n and d eb ate and to en co u ra g e o th e rs to join in. [. . .] A s in all in tellectu al sea-ch a n g e s, e m e rg e n t tre n d s arc n ever con fin ed to a single discip lin e. So it w as w ith the ren ew ed in terest in e m o tio n . H isto rical sta rtin g -d ate s can only be in dicative, even sp e cu lativ e , o p e n in g s fo r d isc u ssio n , n ever definitive d e m a rc atio n s. T h e re fo cu s o f p sy ch o lo gy on to e m o tio n m igh t be d ated as early as 1 9 6 4 , if Silvan T o m k in s’ s ag g re ssiv e “ In tro d u ctio n to A ffect S y m p o siu m , APA 1 9 6 4 ” (T om kin s and Izard 1 9 6 6 , p. vii) can be taken as a gu id e. C e rtain ly , from the 1 9 70s th ere w as e n o rm o u s g ro w th in p sy c h o lo g ic al research on e m o tio n (L even th al and T om arken 1 9 8 6 ). In an th ro p o lo gy also, the early 19 7 0 s sawr the b egin n in g o f new in te re st in e m o tio n (B rig g s 1 9 7 0 ; L evy 1 9 7 3 ), w hich c on tin u ed to gain m o m e n tu m (L u tz and W h ite 1 9 8 6 ). Ph ilosoph y w as an oth er d iscip lin e in w hich the ren ew ed in te re st in e m o tio n can be d ated from the 19 7 0 s (N c u 1 9 7 7 ; S o lo m o n 1 9 7 6 ), although the p ro c e ss w as se t in m o tio n rath er earlier (B e d fo rd 1 9 5 7 ; K enny 1 9 6 4 ; R y le 1 9 4 9 ). [. . .] T h e notion that social agen ts arc sp o n tan e o u sly m oved by and su b je c t to e m o ­ tion is cen tral to the po sitio n that e m o tio n s are u n iv e rsal, ob jectively asce rtain ab le , and b io lo gically ro o te d . T h e idea that social ag en ts m ay c o n tro l o r m an age their e m o tio n s is co re to the view that e m o tio n s are cu ltu ral artificats relative to p a r ­ ticu lar so c ie tie s, sign ifican tly su b je ctiv e, and p h e n o m e n o lo g ically g ro u n d e d . In so cio lo g y th ese differen t asp ec ts o f e m o tio n arc differen tially em p h asized by d if­ feren t ap p ro ac h es. T h e idea that e m o tio n is re sp o n sib le fo r social o u tc o m e s has b een em ph asized by w 'riters such as T h o m a s S ch eff and T h e o d o re K em p er. T h e o th er p o ssib ility , w hich se e m s to d om in ate ce rtain so c io lo g ic al acco u n ts o f em o tio n at the p re se n t tim e , is that e m o tio n is prin cip ally a c o n se q u e n c e o f cu ltu ral and cogn itiv e, as o p p o se d to so c ial-stru c tu ral and re la tio n al, p ro c e sse s. T h is is the ap p ro ach w hich c o n c cn tra tcs on the “social c o n stru c tio n ” o f e m o tio n .

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Constructionism and culturc N ew Social M ovem en ts, from the 1970s, challenged prevailing political arran ge­ m en ts and un derm in ed received conventions o f social status. T h ese M ovem ents, w hich include the W o m en ’ s, the Environm ental, and the Black M ovem ents, also con tribu ted to the new aw areness o f the significance o f em otio n in social and cultural pro cesses. A m ajo r concern o f the N ew Social M ovem ents has been that o f identity. The politics o f iden tity, in gettin g away from the idea that the political standing o f perso n s is bequeathed to them by facto rs they are subordin ate to and cannot influence, em phasized instead the conventional and custo m ary as opp osed to the natural elem en ts o f being. That is, they em phasized the cultural and social con stru ction o f the “p e rso n ” and their “ id en tity .” E m otion , too, can be seen in this light. But if this is its only illum ination the im age is d isto rte d , and the value of the co n cep t for sociological research and analysis is lost: in the con stru ction ist view em otion rem ains a con sequen ce o f other forces and its capacity for influencing social p ro ce sse s is neglected if not im plicitly denied. [. . .]

References Bedford, Errol. 1957. “E m otions.” Proceedings o j the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 5 7 :2 8 1 - 3 0 7 . Bendix, Reinhard. 1964. Nation-Building and Citizenship. N ew York: W ilev. 1974. Work and Authority in Industry. Second edn. Berkeley: University o f California Press. Bierstedt, R obert. 1979. “Sociological Thought in the Eighteenth C entury.” Pp 3 38 in A History o f Sociological Analysis, ed. Tom Bottom ore and R obert N isbet. London: Heinemann. Briggs, Jean I.. 1970. Never in Anger: Portrait o j an Eskimo Family. C am bridge, Mass.: Harvard U niversity Press. Ferguson, Adam. [1767] 1966. An Essay on the History o j Civil Society. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Gallie, Duncan, 1983. Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain. C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press. Kem per, Theodore D. 1991. “ An Introduction to the Sociology o f E m otions.” Pp. 3 0 1 -4 9 in International Review o f Studies on F.motion, vol. 1, ed. K. T. Stongman. Newr York John W ilev. Kenny, Anthony. 1964. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. I.eventhal, Howard and Andrew'. J. Tomarken. 1986. “Em otion: Today’s Problem s.” Annual Review o f Psycholog)', 37: 565 610. Levy, R obert I. 1973. Tahitians: Mind and Experience in the Society Island. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Lutz, Catherine and Geoffrey M. W hite. 1986. “The Anthropology' o f E m otions.” Annual Review o j Anthropology-, I 5: 405 36. Macfie, A. L. and D. D. Raphael. 1976. “Introduction.” Pp. 1-5 2 in Adam Smith: the Theory o f Moral Sentiments. O xford: O xford University Press. M cCarthy, E. Doyle. 1989. “ Em otions are Social Things: an Essay in the Sociology of Em otions.” Pp. 51 72 in The Sociology’ o f Emotions: Original Essays and Research

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Papers, eel. David Franks and E. D oyle M cC arthy. G reenw ich , C o n n .: JAI Press. M iddlem as, Keith. 1979. Politics in an Industrial Society: the Experience o f the British System Since 1911. Lon don : A ndre D eutsch. N eu , Jero m e. 1977. Emotion, Thought and Therapy: Hume and Spinoza, Theories o f Emotion and Therapy. London: R outledge & Kegan Paul. Parsons, Talcott. [1937] 1968. The Structure o f Social Action. N ew York: Free Press. R yle, G ilb ert. 1949. The Concept o f Mind. London: H utchinson. Sm ith, A dam . [1759] 1982. The Theory o f Moral Sentiments. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press. [1776] 1979. An Inquiry in the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press. Solom on , R o b e rt C .

1976.

The Passions. G arden C ity, N .Y .: A nchor Press and

D oubleday. Sw ingew ood, Alan. 1991. A Short History o f Sociological Thought. 2nd edn. London: M acm illan. Tom kins, Silvan S. and C arroll E. Izard. 1966. Affect, Cognition, and Personality: Empirical Studies. London: Tavistock. Weber, M ax. [1904] 1949. “ ‘O b jectivity ’ in Social Scien ce.” Pp. 50—112 in The Methodology o f the Social Sciences, ed. Edw ard A. Shils and H enry A. Finch. Newr York: Free Press. [1917] 1967. Ancient fudaism. Newr York: Free Press.

Chapter

10

Erving Goffman E M B A R R A S S M E N T AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Causes o f em barrassm ent

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h a s

t o

d o

w i t h

unfulfilled expectation s

but not o f a statistical kind. Given their social iden tities and the setting, the

participan ts will sense w hat so rt of conduct ought to be m aintained as the ap p ro ­ priate thing, how ever m uch they may d espair o f its actually occurrin g. An individual may firm ly ex p e ct that ccrtain others w ill m ake him ill at ease, and yet this kn ow ledge may increase his discom fiture instead o f lessening it. An entirely u n expected flash o f social en gin eerin g may save a situation, all the m ore effectively for being unanticipated. The exp ectation s relevant to em b arrassm en t arc m oral, then, but e m b arrass­ m en t d oes not arise from the breach o f any m oral exp ectation , for som e infractions give rise to resolu te m oral indignation and no un easiness at all. Rather we should look to those m oral obligations w hich su rrou n d the individual in only one o f his cap acities, that o f som eon e w ho c arrie s on social en cou n ters. The individual, o f c o u rse , is obliged to rem ain c o m p o se d , b ut this tells us that things arc goin g w ell, not w hy. And things go well or badly b ecause o f w hat is perceived about the social identities o f those presen t. D urin g interaction the individual is ex p e cted to p o ssess certain attribu tes, cap acities, and in form ation wrhich, taken togeth er, fit togeth er into a s e lf that is at once coherently unified and ap p ro p riate for the occasion. Through the expressive im plications o f his stream o f con duct, through m ere participation itself, the in di­ vidual effectively projects this acceptable se lf into the interaction , although he may not be aw are o f it, and the others may not be aw are o f having so in terp reted his conduct. At the sam e tim e he m ust accept and hon or the selves p rojected by the

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other participan ts. The elem en ts o f a social encounter, then, consist o f effectively projected claim s to an acceptable sell and the confirm ation o f like claim s on the part o f the oth ers. The con tribu tion s o f all are o rien ted to these and built up on the basis o f them . W hen an event throw s doub t upon or d iscredits these claim s, then the en coun ter finds itse lf lodged in assum p tion s w hich no lon ger hold. The respo nses the parties have m ade rcadv arc now out o f place and m u st be choked b ack , and the in teraction m u st be re co n stru cted . [. . .] Th ere arc many classic circum stan ces un der w hich the se lf p rojected by an individual may be discred ited , causing him sham e and em b arrassm en t over w hat he has or ap pears to have done to h im self and to the interaction . To exp erien ce a sudden change in status, as by m arriage o r p ro m o tio n , is to acquire a se lf that other individuals w ill not fully ad m it because o f their lingering attachm en t to the old self. To ask for a job , as loan o f m oney, or a hand in m arriage is to p ro jec t an im age o f se lf as w orth y , under con ditions w here the one w ho can discredit the assum ption may have go od reason to do so. To affect the style o f o n e ’s occupational or social b e tters is to m ake claim s that may w ell be discredited by o n e ’ s lack o f fam iliarity w ith the role. The physical stru ctu re o f an en coun ter itse lf is usually accorded certain sym bolic im plication s, so m e tim e s leading a participan t against his w ill to project claim s about h im self that are false and em barrassin g. Physical closen ess easily im plies social closen ess, as anyone know s w ho has h appened upon an intim ate gath erin g not m eant for him o r who has found il necessary to carry on fraternal “ sm all talk” w ith som eon e lo o high o r low or stran ge to ever be a brother. Sim ilarly, if there is to be talk, som eon e m ust initiate it, feed it, and term in ate it; and these acts may aw kw ardly su gg est rankings and pow er w hich are out o f line w ith the facts. Various kinds ol recu rren t en cou n ters in a given society may share the assu m p ­ tion that participan ts have attained certain m oral, m en tal, and ph ysiognom ic stan dards. The p e rso n w ho falls sh o rt may everyw here find h im self inadvertently trap ped into m aking im plicit identity claim s w hich he cannot fulfil. C o m p ro m ised in every en coun ter w hich he e n te rs, he trulv w ears the le p e r’ s bell. The individual w ho m o st isolates h im self from social con tacts may then be the least insulated from the dem and s o f society . A nd, if he only im agines that he p o sse sses a disqualifying attribu te, his ju d gm en t o f h im self may be in error, but in the light o f it his w ith ­ drawal from contact is reason able. In any case, in decidin g w'hether an in dividual’ s gro u n d s for shyness are real or im aginary, one should seek not for “justifiable” disqualifications but for the m uch larger range o f ch aracteristics w'hich actually em b arrass encoun ters. In all these settin gs the sam e fundam ental thing o ccu rs: the expressive facts at hand threaten o r discredit the assum p tion s a participan t finds he has projected about his id en tity .7 T h ereafter those presen t find they can neither do w ith out the assum p tion s n or base their ow n resp o n ses upon them . The inhabitable reality shrinks until everyone feels “sm all” or out o f place. [. . .]

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ERV1NG

GO F FM A N

Domain o f em barrassm ent Having started w ith psychological con sideration s, we have com e by stages to a stru ctu ral sociological point o f view. P reced en t co m cs from social an th ropo lo gists and their analyses o f joking and avoidance. O n e assum es that em b arrassm en t is a n orm al p art o f n orm al social life, the individual b eco m in g uneasy not because he is personally m aladjusted but rath er b ecause he is n ot; presum ably anyone with his com bin ation o f statuses w ould do likew ise. In an em pirical study o f a particular social sy stem , the first ob ject w ould be to learn what categories o f p erso n s becom e em b arrassed in what recu rren t situations. And the second o b ject w ould be to discover what w ould happen to the social system and the fram ew ork o f obligations if em b arrassm en t had not com e to be system atically built into it. An illustration may be taken from the social life o f large social establish ­ m en ts— office buildings, sch o o ls, h ospitals, etc. H ere, in elevators, halls, and cafe ­ terias, at new'sstands, vending m ach ines, snack co u n ters, and en tran ces, all m em b ers arc often form ally on an equal il distant footing. . . . C uttin g across these relationships o f equality and distance is another set o f relation ships, arising in w ork team s w hose m e m b e rs arc ranked by such things as prestige and authority and yet drawn togeth er by join t en terp rise and personal know ledge o f one another. In many large establish m en ts, staggered w ork h ou rs, segregated cafeterias, and the like help to insure that those w ho arc ranked and close in one set o f relations will not have to find them selves in physically intim ate situations w here they arc ex p e cted to m aintain equality and distance. The d em ocratic orien tation o f som e o f our new er establish m en ts, however, tends to throw differently placed m em b ers o f the sam e w ork team togeth er at places such as the cafeteria, causing them uneasiness. T h ere is no w'ay for them to act that d ocs not disturb one o f the two basic sets o f relation s in w hich they stand to each other. T h ese difficulties arc especially likely to occu r in elevators, for there individuals w ho arc not quite on chatting term s m ust rem ain for a tim e to o close togeth er to ign ore the opp ortu n ity for in form al talk— a problem solved, o f co u rse , fo r som e, by special executive elevators. E m b arrassm en t, then, is built into the establish m ent ecologically. B ccausc o f p ossessin g m ultiple selves the individual may find he is required both to be presen t and to not be presen t on certain occasions. E m barrassm en t en sues: the individual finds h im self being torn ap art, how ever gently. C o r re ­ sponding to the oscillation o f his con duct is the oscillation o f his self.

Social function o f em barrassm ent W hen an in dividual’s p ro jecte d self is threatened durin g interaction, he may with poise su pp ress all signs o f sham e and em b arrassm en t. N o flu sterin gs, or efforts to conceal having seen th em , ob tru d e upon the sm ooth flow o f the en cou n ter; p a rtic i­ pants can proceed as if no incident has o ccu rred . W hen situations arc saved, however, som eth in g im p ortan t may be lost. By show ing em b arrassm en t when he can be n either o f tw o p e o p le, the individual leaves open the possibility that in the future he may effectively be cither. H is role in the cu rren t interaction may be sacrificed, and even the en coun ter itself, but he

E M B A R R A S S M E N T

AND

SOCIAL

ORG ANIZAT ION

1 1 5

dem on strates that, w hile he cannot presen t a substainable and coh eren t se lf on this occasion , he is at least d istu rb ed by the fact and may prove w orthy at another tim e. To this e xten t, em b arrassm en t is not an irrational im pulse breakin g through socially p re scrib e d behavior but p a rt o f this orderly behavior itself. Flusterin gs arc an ex tre m e exam p le o f that im p o rtan t class o f acts w hich arc usually quite spon tan eous and yet no less required and obligatory than on es self-con sciously p e rfo rm e d . Behind a conflict in identity lies a m o re fundam ental conflict, one o f organiza­ tional prin ciple, since the self, for m any p u rp o se s, con sists m erely o f the application o f legitim ate organizational prin ciples to o n e ’s self. O n e builds o n e ’s identity out o f claim s w hich, if den ied, give one the right to feel righteously indignant. Behind the ap p re n tice ’ s claim s for a full share in the use o f certain plant facilities there is the organizational p rin ciple: all m e m b e rs o f the establish m en t arc equal in ccrtain ways qua m em b ers. Behind the sp e cialist’s dem and for suitable financial recogn ition there is the prin ciple that the type o f w ork, n ot m ere w ork, determ in es status. The fum blings o f the appren tice and the specialist w hen they reach the C oca-C o la m achine at the sam e tim e e xp re ss an incom patibility o f organizational prin ciples. The principles o f organization o f any social system are likely to com e in conflict at ccrtain points. Instead o f p erm ittin g the conflict to be e x p re sse d in an encounter, the individual places h im se lf betw een the opp osin g prin ciples. H e sacrifices his identity for a m om en t, and so m e tim e s the encounter, but the prin ciples are p re ­ served . He may be groun d betw een opp osin g assum p tion s, thereby preventing direct friction betw een them , or he may be alm o st pulled ap art, so that prin ciples with little relation to one anoth er may op erate together. Social stru ctu re gains elasticity; the individual m erely loses com p o su re.

Chapter

11

Susan Shott EMOTION AND SOCIAL LIFE A s y m b o lic in te ra c tio n is t a n a ly s is

The socialization and construction o f feeling

S

OCIAL NORMS CLEARLY

H A V E S U B S T A N T I A L im pact on the

in terp retation , e x p re ssio n , and arousal of em otio n , a point succinctly m ade

by C lifford G e e rtz (1 9 7 3 , p. 8 1 ): “ N o t only ideas, but em otio n s to o , arc cultural artificats.” W h eth er em otional explan ations arc con sidered ap pro priate to a given situation , and w hich em o tio n , if any, is w arran ted , arc suggested by social n orm s. [. . .] T h ere is a social fram ew ork that m odifies the a c to r’s e x p e rie n c e , in terp retation , and expression o f em otion. This p ro ce ss o f affective socialization can probably be d escrib ed adequately by using b asic assu m p tion s about cultural and social influences com m on to m o st sociological (and an th ropological) persp ectives. . . . But there is another dim ension o f affective exp e rie n ce , the con struction o f em otion by the actor, w hich I believe can be b est u n d erstood by applying a sym bolic interaction ist persp ective. For this orien tation focu ses on the a c to r’s definitions and in te rp re t­ ations and on the em erg en t, co n stru cted ch aracter o f m uch hum an behavior, both o f w hich arc ccntral to the a c to r’ s c x p c ric n c c o f an em otio n : . . . M oreover, the sym bolic interactionist analysis to be presen ted here ties togeth er a n um ber o f em pirical studies o f affect by attribution theorists. Four m ajo r ten ets o f sym bolic in teractionism are especially ap pro priate for explicatin g the a c to r’ s co n stru ction o f affect: 1.

Study o f the actor’s definitions and interpretations is essential fo r an understanding

o f human conduct (M anis and M eltzer 1978, p. 8). W hen reflective hum an action is con cern ed ,

independent

variables do

not autom atically

influence

depen dent

variables. Instead, their im pact is m ediated by interp retation and definition, which

E M OTIO N A N D SOC I A L

LI F E

1 1 7

arc n ot ju st in te rv en in g v ariab les but “ fo rm a tiv e o r creative p ro c e ss[e s] in [their] ow n rig h t” (B lu m cr

1969 p. 1 3 5 ). H c n c c , d efin itio n s and in te rp re tatio n s arc

essen tial to social b eh avior and m u st be in clu ded in m o st so c io lo g ic al re se arch . 2. Human behavior is emergent, continually constructed during its execution (B lu m cr 19 6 9 , p. 8 2 ). T h e m ean in g o f an act is so m ew h at vo latile, sincc acts arc in te rp re ted and defined con tin u ou sly (by the a c to r and o th e rs) w hile b e in g ca rric d o u t. C o n ­ se q u en tly , hum an c o n d u c t is actively c o n stru cte d and can b e tran sfo rm e d in its m akin g through re in tc rp re tatio n and red efin ition . 3.

The actions o j individuals are influenced by their internal states and impulses in

addition to external events and stimuli, for actors’ perceptions and interpretations are shaped by theform er as well as the latter (H e w itt 1 9 7 6 , p. 4 7 ). P h y sio logical o r p sy ch o lo gical im p u lse s, on ce n o tic e d , fo rm the b egin n in g o f an act and m o tiv ate the ac to r towrard its c o n su m m atio n (M ead 1 9 3 8 , pp. 3—8, 2 3 —2 5 ). In n o sen se d o e s the im p u lse d e te rm in e the act, b u t it is a sign ifican t co m p o n e n t o f action and ad ds to its dy n am ic character. 4 . Social structures and normative regulation are theframework o f human action rather than its determinant, shaping behavior without dictating it. S tru c tu ra l fe atu re s (cu ltu re , sy ste m s, stratification , ro le s, e tc .) shape b eh avior only in so far as they influence the situ ation s that are the se ttin g o f action and p rovid e the sy m b o ls used to in te rp re t situ atio n s; they do not d e te rm in e h um an c o n d u ct. |. . .]

Social co n tro l and the rolc-tak in g-cm o tio n s 11 th ere is any area in w hich the so c io lo g ic al relevan ce o f sen tim e n ts is m o st ev id en t, it may be that o f so cial c o n tro l; and sy m b o lic in te ractio n ist th co rv is qu ite useful h ere, as w ell. O n e s o r t of fe elin g s, w hich I shall call ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, is really the fou n dation for the large p a rt o f social co n tro l that is se lf-c o n tro l. U nlike oth er feelin gs, w hich d o n ot require ro le takin g fo r th eir e v o catio n , ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s can n ot o c c u r w ith ou t p u ttin g o n e se lf in an o th e r’ s p o sitio n and takin g that p e r s o n ’ s p e r sp e c tiv e ; T h u s, an in dividual e x p e rie n c in g a ro le-tak in g se n tim en t (e .g ., e m b a rra ssm e n t o r sh am e) has first cogn itiv ely taken the ro le o f so m e real or im agin ary o th e r o r the g en eralized other, w hich M ead (1 9 3 4 , p. 154) d e sc rib e s as “the organ ized co m m u n ity o r social g ro u p w hich giv es to the in dividual his unit o f s e lf.” [T . .] R o le -tak in g sen tim e n ts are o f tw o ty p e s: reflexive ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, w hich arc d irc c tc d to w ard o n e se lf and c o m p rise gu ilt, sh am e, e m b a rra ssm e n t, p rid e , and vanity; and cm p ath ic ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, w hich arc evok ed by m entally placin g o n e se lf in an o th e r’ s p o sitio n and feelin g w hat the o th e r feels o r w hat on e w'ould feel in such a p o sitio n . R eflexiv e ro le-tak in g feelin gs entail co n sid e rin g how o n e ’ s se lf ap p e ars to o th e rs o r the g e n e ra lize d o th e r an d, un less e x p e rie n c e d em p ath etically , are d ire c ted to w ard o n e se lf. . . . B oth reflexive and em p ath ic ro le-tak in g e m o tio n s, as I shall atte m p t to show in this se ctio n , arc sign ifican t m o tiv ato rs o f n o rm ativ e and m o ral co n d u ct an d, h cn cc, facilitate social c o n tro l. [. . .] T h re e fu n dam en tal p ro p o sitio n s o f sy m b o lic in teractio n ism are p articu larly relevan t to this area: 1. Individuals have the capacity to treat themselves as objects (B lu m e r 1 9 6 9 , p. 8 2 ).

1 1 8

SUS AN

SHOTT

T h ough t, in fact, is nothing m ore than internalized conversation with o n e se lf and requires treatin g o n e se lf as a social o b ject. T h us, individuals can take them selves into account as facto rs in the situation (H ew itt 1976) and evaluate their actions and selves. 2. The self-conceptions o f actors and their capacity f o r mental self-interaction are derived largely from role taking (with specific others or the generalized other) H ence, individuals often learn ab out, and exp e rie n ce , them selves indirectly, by taking tow ard them selves the attitudes o f o th e rs; only in this m ann er can they b eco m e ob jects to them selves 3. Social control is, in large part, self-control. Because peop le can view them selves as others d o, social con trol can operate in term s o f se lf-criticism , e xertin g itself “intim ately and exten sively over individual behavior [and] servin g to integrate the individual and his actions w ith referen ce to the organ ized social p rocess o f e xp erien ce and behavior in w hich he is im plicated” (M ead 1934, p. 2 5 5 ). The gen eralized other is particularly im p ortan t for this kind o f social con trol, sincc it is the m eans by w hich the attitudes o f the com m un ity or g ro u p arc in corpo rated within individuals and influence their thinking and con duct (M ead 1934, p. 155). I low' do the reflexive role-taking sen tim en ts facilitate social con trol? M ost obviously, gu ilt, sham e, and em b arrassm en t check and punish deviant behavior; each, however, is evoked by different circum stan ces. G uilt is the feeling that ac co m ­ panies the “negative self-evaluation which oc c u rs when an individual ack n ow ledges that his behavior is at variance with a given m oral value to which he feels obligated to c o n fo rm ” (A usubel 1955, p. 379). H en ce, it is evoked w hen one com m its or con tem p lates so m e “ im m o ral” action , then takes the role o f the generalized other (or so m e significant other) and accepts its perceived judgm en t o f o neself as m orally inadequate. Sham e, however, d oes not stem from the sen se o f moral inadequacy that is the foundation of gu ilt; rather, it results from “an actual or presu m ed negative judgm en t o f [oneself] resulting in sclf-depreciation vis-a-vis the g ro u p ” (A usubel 1955, p. 3 8 2 ). R iczlcr (1 9 4 3 , p. 4 5 9 ) su ggests that sham e occu rs wrhcn on e is fo rce d , by taking the ro le o f o th ers . . . to sec that others do not acccpt an idealized self-im age that one has built up. Sham e is not the sam e as em b arrassm en t, even though em b arrassm en t is often treated as a form o f sham e. . . . For sham e is provoked by the realization that others . . . con sider o n e ’s self deficient, w hile e m b arrassm en t arises from aw areness that others . . . view o n e ’s presentation o f self as in ept. An inadequate se lf usually entails a bungled presentation o f self; hence, sham e is generally accom pan ied by em b arrassm en t. The con verse, however, is not tru e ; em b arrassm en t is n ot, as a ru le , follow ed by sham e. In M odiglian i’s (1 9 6 8 , p. 315) w ords, a “failure in sclf-prcscn tation . . . d oes not underm in e the indi­ vidual’s general identity, rather, it discredits a m uch m ore re stricte d situational identity which he is projectin g into the cu rrcn t in teractio n .” U nlike oth er em otio n s that foster social con trol (such as fear), these em otio ns are frequently evoked even w hen oth ers are not w atching, w'hen there is no threat o f being caught in o n e ’s m isd eed . O f these feelin gs, em b arrassm en t seem s to be the m ost closely linked with the actual presen ce o f oth ers, sham e seem s less con nected to the presen ce o f oth ers, and guilt least tied to il. This may be due to the possibility that em b arrassm en t is evoked m ost often by con siderin g how o n e ’ s se lf ap pears to specific oth ers, guilt depen ds prim arily on taking the role o f the gen eralized other, and sham e is in term ed iate in this resp ect. . . . In the final analysis, w ithout our

E M OT I O N A N D S OC I A L LI F E

1 1 9

capacity to exp erien ce these sen tim en ts, society as we know il w ould surely be im possible. The sam e is true o f pride and vanity, w hich olten rew ard n orm ative and m oral con duct, and em pathy, w hich m oves us to leel joy o r g r ie f at an oth er’ s situation and thereby tics us, at least m om en tarily , to that perso n . Pride and vanity accom pany an enhanced self-con ception that co m e s from taking the role o f real or im aginary others or the generalized other and discoverin g approbation . C ooley (1 9 6 4 , p. 2 3 2 ) d escrib es prid e as the “form social self-approval takes in the m o re rigid and sclfsufficicnt so rt o f m inds; the p erso n w ho feels it is assured that he stands well with others w hose opinion he cares for.” Vanity, unlike p rid e, is an unstable and transient em otio n ; it is the form social self-approval may take when one is not sure o f o n e ’ s self-im age or the approval o f o th ers (C o o le y 1964, p. 2 3 4 ). Vain p erso n s are th ere­ fore m ore im m ediately depen den t on oth ers for their self-con ceptio n s, which change each tim e they take the role o f another. But, clearly, both prid e and vanity may en courage n orm ative and m oral conduct (even w hen oth ers are not actually presen t) by rew ardin g such behavior w'ith pleasurable feeling. As I shall show below1, em pathy to o tends to p ro m p t m oral behavior. R eturn ing to gu ilt, sham e, and em b arrassm en t, these feelings not only punish deviant behavior but also con tribu te to social con trol in a m ore positive fashion. A n u m b er o f exp e rim e n ts have shown that guilt and em b arrassm en t en courage altruistic conduct by those experien cin g them . [. . .] W hat seem s to be com m on to these altruistic o r reparative acts is an attem p t to repair o n e ’ s self-con ception or self-presen tation and convince others o f o n e ’ s m oral w orthin ess o r com p eten ce. G uilt is relieved when role taking w ith others or the gen eralized other enables people to see them selves on ce again as m orally adequate. ( . . . ) The m otivation p rom pting altru istic con duct by em b arrassed p erso n s is in all likelihood, quite sim ilar. People suffering em b arrassm en t probably w ish to convince others (o r them selves) that they arc really c om p eten t p eo p le, capablc enough to assist oth ers, and not the clods indicated by their inept or foolish p erform an ce. By rep airin g their situational iden tities in this fashion, they m itigate their unpleasant feelings o f em b arrassm en t. And ju st as tran sg re sso rs arc reluctan t to interact w ith their victim s, em b arrassed individuals attem p t to m inim ize interaction w'ith those w ho have w itn essed their inept perfo rm an ce (Brow n and G arland 1971). [. . .] All o f the role-taking em otio n s, then, further social con trol by encouragin g self-con trol; they are largely respon sib le for the fact that a gre at deal o f p e o p le ’s behavior accord s with social n o rm s even w'hen no e xtern al rew ards or punishm ents are evident. T h e im portan ce o f this for social life is ob vious: since it is im possible fo r a society to m on ito r and sanction ev ery o n e’ s behavior all the tim e, selfregulation m u st be the basis o f m uch social con trol. W hile sym bolic intcraction ists have lon g stressed this poin t . . . they have ten ded to focus only on the cognitive asp ects o f self-con trol, particularly role taking and self-interaction . But even though the abilities to take the role o f the other and treat o n e se lf as an ob ject m ake role-takin g em otio n s possib le, these capacities arc nearly useless for social control w ithout their affective accom panim en ts. . . .

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References Ausubcl, David P. 1955. “Relationships between Shame and Guilt in the Socializing Proccss.” Psychological Review 62 (Septem ber): 378—90. Blumcr, H erbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prcnticc-Hall. Brown, Bert R ., and Howard Garland. 1971. “The Effects o f Incompctcncy, Audience Acquaintanceship, and Anticipated Evaluative Feedback on Face-Saving Behavior.” Journal i f Experimental Social Psychology 7 (Septem ber): 490—502. Cooley, Charles Horton, 1962. Social Organization. Ncwr York: Schockcn. — . 1964. Human Nature and the Social Order. New' York: Schockcn. G ccrtz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic. Hewitt, John P. 1976. Self and Society. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Manis, Jerom e G ., and Bernard N. Mcltzcr, cds. 1978. Symbolic Interactionism. 3d cd. Boston: Allvn & Bacon. J Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. — . 1938. The Philosophy i f the Act. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press. Modigliani, Andre. 1968. “Embarrassment and Embarrassability.” Sociometry 31 (Septem ber): 313-26. Riczlcr, Kurt. 1943. “Com m ent on the Social Psychology of Shame.” American Journal of Sociology 48 (January): 457—65.

Chapter

12

Arlie Russell Hochschild EMOTION WORK, F E E L I N G AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

W

HY

IS T H E

EMOTIVE

EXPERIENCE

RULES,

o f n orm al adults in daily

life as orderly as it is? W hy, generally speakin g, do p eop le feel gay at p arties,

sad at funerals, happy al w eddings? This question leads us to exam in e, n ot conven ­ tions o f appearan ce or outw ard c o m p o rtm e n t, but conventions o f feeling. C o n ­ ventions o f feeling b eco m e su rp risin g only when wre im agine, by con trast, what totally u n p attern ed , un predictable em otiv e life m ight actually be like at p arties, funerals,’ w ed dinOgs,7 and in the tamilvJ o r w ork life of n orm al adults. Ervin g G offm an (1 9 6 1 ) su ggests both the su rp rise to be explain ed and p art of the explan ation: “ . . . We find that participants will hold in check ccrtain p sy ch o ­ logical states and attitu d es, for after all, the very general ru le that one en ter into the

prevailing m ood in the en coun ter carrics the un derstandin g that con tradictory feelings w ill be in abeyance. . . . So generally, in fact, docs one su pp ress unsuitable affect, that w e need to look at offenses to this ru le to be rem in ded o f its usual op eratio n ” (G offm an 1961, p. 2 3 ). If we take this passage seriou sly , as I urge we do, we may be led back to the classic question o f social o rd e r from a particular vantage point— that o f em otion m anagem en t. From this vantage poin t, ru les seem to govern how' p eop le try to try n ot to feel in w ays “ap pro priate to the situ atio n .” Such a notion su ggests howr profoundly the individual is “so c ia l,” and “socialized” to try to pay tribu te to official definitions o f situations, with no less than their feelings. L et m e pause to poin t out that there are tw o possible approach es to the social ord erin g o f em otive exp erien ce. O n e is to study the social facto rs that induce or stim ulate prim ary (i.e ., n onreflective, though by definition con scious) em otio n s— em otio n s passively undergone. T h e other is to study secondary acts p e rfo rm e d upon the on goin g nonrcflective stream o f prim ary em otive exp e rie n ce . T h e first

1 2 2

A R LI E

R U SS E L L

H OC H S C H I L D

a p p r o a c h f o c u s e s on h ow s o c ia l fa c to r s a ffe c t w h a t p e o p le f e e l, th e s e c o n d on h ow s o c ia l f a c t o r s a ffe c t w h a t p e o p le th in k an d d o a b o u t w h a t th ey fe e l ( i .e . , a c ts o f a s s e s s m e n t an d m a n a g e m e n t) . T h o s e w h o ta k e th e fir s t a p p r o a c h m ig h t r e g a r d th o se

w ho

ta k e th e s e c o n d

as b e in g “ o v e rly c o g n it iv e .” B u t in la c t th e tw o

a p p r o a c h e s a r c c o m p a tib le , an d in d e e d th e s e c o n d , tak e n h e r e , r e lie s o n s o m e a c c u m u la tio n o f k n o w le d g e g a r n e r e d fro m th e fir s t. [. . .]

E m o tio n w o rk B y “ e m o t io n w 'ork ” I r e f e r to th e a c t o f tr y in g t o c h a n g e in d e g r e e o r q u a lity an e m o tio n o r fe e lin g . To ‘\ v o r k o n ” an e m o t io n o r fe e lin g is , fo r o u r p u r p o s e s , th e s a m e as “t o m a n a g e ” an e m o tio n o r to d o “ d e e p a c t in g .” N o t e th a t “ e m o t io n w o r k ” r e f e r s to th e e f fo r t — th e a c t o f tr y in g — an d n o t t o th e o u t c o m e , w h ic h m a y o r m a y n o t b e s u c c e s s fu l. F a ile d a c ts o f m a n a g e m e n t still in d ic a te w’h at id e a l f o r m u la tio n s g u id e th e e f f o r t , an d on th a t a c c o u n t a r c n o le s s in te r e s t in g th an e m o t io n m a n a g e ­ m e n t th a t w o rk s. T h e v e ry n o tio n o f an a t te m p t s u g g e s t s an a c tiv e sta n c e v is- a - v is fe e lin g . In m y e x p lo r a t o r y stu d y r e s p o n d e n t s c h a r a c te r iz e d th e ir e m o t io n w o r k b y a v a r ie ty o f a c tiv e v e rb f o r m s ; “ I psyched m yself up. . . . I squashed m y a n g e r d o w n . . . . I tried hard n o t to fe e l d is a p p o in te d . . . . g r a t e fu l. . . .

I m ade m y s e lf h ave a g o o d tim e . . . .

I tried to fe e l

I killed th e h o p e I h ad b u r n in g .” T h e r e w a s a lso th e a c tiv e ly p a ssiv e

f o r m , as in , “ I let m yself fin ally fe e l s a d .” E m o tio n w o r k d iffe r s fro m e m o t io n “ c o n t r o l” o r “ s u p p r e s s io n .” T h e la tte r tw o t e r m s s u g g e s t an e f fo r t m e r e ly t o stifle o r p r e v e n t fe e lin g . “ E m o tio n w o r k ” r e f e r s m o r e b r o a d ly to th e a c t o f e v o k in g o r sh a p in g , as w e ll as s u p p r e s s in g , fe e lin g in o n s e lf. I a v o id th e t e r m “ m a n ip u la t e ” b e c a u s e it s u g g e s t s a s h a llo w n e s s I d o n o t m e a n to im p ly . W e can s p e a k , th e n , o f t w o b r o a d t y p e s o f e m o t io n w o r k : evocation, in w h ic h th e c o g n itiv e fo c u s is o n a d e s ir e d fe e lin g w h ic h is in itially a b s e n t, an d suppression, in w h ic h th e c o g n itiv e fo c u s is o n an u n d e s ir e d fe e lin g w h ic h is in itially p r e s e n t . O n e r e s p o n d e n t , g o in g o u t w ith a p r ie s t 2 0 y e a r s h e r s e n io r , e x e m p lifie s th e p r o b le m s o f e v o c a tiv e e m o t io n w o r k : “ A n y w a y , I s t a r t e d t o tr y an d m a k e m y s e lf lik e h im . I m a d e m y s e lf fo c u s o n th e w ay h e t a lk e d , c c r ta in th in g s h e ’d d o n e in th e p a s t. . . . W h e n I w a s w ith h im I d id lik e h im b u t I w o u ld g o h o m e an d wrr it c in m y jo u r n a l h o w m u c h I c o u ld n ’ t sta n d h im . I k e p t c h a n g in g m y fe e lin g an d a c tu a lly th o u g h t I re a lly lik e d h im w h ile I w a s w ith h im b u t a c o u p le o f h o u r s a f t e r h e w a s g o n e , I r e v e r te d b a c k to d iffe r e n t fe e lin g s . . . . ” A n o th e r r e s p o n d e n t e x e m p lif ie s th e w o r k , n o t o f w o r k in g fe e lin g u p , b u t o f w o r k in g fe e lin g d o w n : L a s t s u m m e r I w a s g o in g w ith a g u y o f te n , an d I b e g a n t o fe e l v e ry s tr o n g ly a b o u t h im . 1 kn ew r th o u g h , th a t h e h ad ju s t b r o k e n u p w ith a g ir l a y e a r a g o b e c a u s e sh e h ad g o tt e n t o o s e r io u s a b o u t h im , so I w a s a fr a id t o sh o w

an y e m o t io n . I a lso w a s a fr a id o f b e in g h u r t , so I

a t t e m p t e d t o c h a n g e m y fe e lin g s . I talked m yself into not carin g about Mike . . . b u t 1 m u s t a d m it it d i d n ’ t wro r k fo r lo n g. To sustain th isfe e lin g 1 h ad to alm ost invent b ad things about him an d concentrate on them or continue to tell myself he d id n ’t care. It was a hardening of emotions, I’ d say . Il t o o k a lo t o f

EMOTION

WORK,

F E E L IN G

RU LES,

AND

SOCIAL

ST R U C T U R E

1 2 3

w ork and w as un pleasant, b ecause I had to concen trate on anything I could find that w as irritating about him . O ften em otion w ork is aided by settin g up an em otio n -w ork sy stem , for exam p le, tellin g friends o f all the w orst faults o f the p erso n on e w anted to fall out o f love w ith, and then goin g to th ose friends for rein forcem en t o f this view o f the ex-b eloved. T his su ggests anoth er poin t: em otion w ork can be don e by the se lf upon the self, by the se lf upon o th ers, and by others upon oneself. In each case the individual is con scious o f a m om en t o f “p in ch ,” or discrepan cy, betw een w hat one d o es feel and w hat one w'ants to feel (w hich is, in tu rn , affected by w hat one thinks one ought to feel in such a situation ). In resp o n se, the individual may try to elim inate the pinch by w orking on feeling. Both the sense o f d iscrepancy and the respo n se to it can vary in tim e. The m anaging act, for exam p le, can be a fivc-m inutc stopgap m easu re, or it can be a m ore long-range gradu al effort suggested by the term “w orking th rou gh .” Th ere are various techniques o f em otio n w ork. O ne is cognitive: the attem p t to change im ag es, ideas, o r thoughts in the service o f changing the feelings associated with them . A second is bodily: the attem p t to change som atic o r other physical sy m pto m s o f em otion (e .g ., trying to breathe slow er, trying not to shake). T h ird, there is expressive em otion w ork: trying to change expressive g e stu res in the service o f changing inner feeling (e .g ., trying to sm ile, or to cry ). This differs from sim ple display in that it is directed tow ard change in feeling. It differs from bodily em otion w ork in that the individual tries to alter o r shape one or anoth er o f the classic public channels for the expression ol feeling. Th ese three tech niques arc distinct theoretically, but they often , of c o u rse , go togeth er in practicc. For exam p le: I wras a star halfback in high sch oo l. Before gam es I d id n ’ t feel the u psurge o f adrenalin— in a w ord I wrasn ’ t “psyched u p .” (T his w as due to em otional difficulties I wras experien cin g and still e x p e rie n c e — I wras also an A stud ent w h ose grades w ere droppin g.) Having been in the past a fanatical, em otio n al, intense player, a “h itter” recogn ized by coach es as a very hard w orker and a player with “d e sire ,” this w as very upsetting. I did everything I could to get myself “up." I would try to be outwardly “rah rah” or get myself scared o j my opponents— anything to get the adrenalin flowing. I tried to look n ervous and intense b efore gam e s, so at least the coach es w ou ld n ’t catch on. . . . W hen actually I w'as m ostly b o re d , o r in any event, n ot “u p .” I recall before one gam e w ishing 1 w as in the stands w atching my cousin play for his sch oo l, rather than “out h ere .” [. . .] The sm oothly wrarm airline h o stess, the ever-ch eerful secretary , the un irritated com plaint clerk , the un disgusted p ro c to lo g ist, the teach er w ho likes every student equally, and GolTman’ s unflappable p ok er player may all have to engage in deep acting, an acting that g o es w ell beyond the m ere ord erin g o f display. W ork to m ake feeling and fram e consistent with situation is w ork in which individuals continually and privately engage. But they do so in obeisan ce to ru les not com pletely o f their own making.

1 2 4

A R LI E R U SS E L L

H OC H S C H I L D

Feeling rules W e fe el. W e try to fe el. W e w an t to try to feel. T h e social gu id elin e s that d irect how w e w ant to try to feel m ay b e d e sc rib ab le as a se t o f socially sh are d , alb eit often laten t (n o t th ough t ab o u t un less p ro b ed at), ru le s. In w hat w ay, w e may ask , are th ese ru le s th em selv es kn ow n and how arc they d e v e lo p e d ? To b egin w ith , let us co n sid e r several co m m o n fo rm s o f eviden ce fo r feelin g ru le s. In c o m m o n parlan ce, we often talk ab o u t o u r feelin gs o r th ose o f o th e rs as if righ ts and d u ties ap p lie d directly to th em . F o r e x a m p le , we often sp e ak o f “having the rig h t” to fe el an gry at so m e o n e . O r w e say w e “should feel m o re g r a te fu l” to a b en elacto r. We chide o u rse lv e s that a frie n d ’s m isfo rtu n e , a re la tiv e ’ s death , “should have hit us h ard er,” o r that an o th e r’ s g o o d lu ck , o r o u r ow n , should have in sp ired m o re jo y . W e know feelin g ru le s, to o , from how o th e rs react to w hat they in fer from o u r e m o tiv e display. A n o th er m ay say to u s, “You shouldn't feel so gu ilty ; it wra sn ’ t y o u r fa u lt,” o r “ You don’t have a right to feel je a lo u s, given o u r a g re e m e n t.” A n o th er m ay sim ply d cc larc an opin ion as to the fit o f feelin g to situ atio n , o r m ay cast a claim u po n o u r m an agerial sta n c e, p re su p p o sin g this o p in io n . O th e rs m ay qu estio n o r call for an ac co u n t o f a p a rtic u la r feelin g in a situ atio n , w h ereas they do n ot ask fo r an acco u n tin g o f so m e o th e r situ ated feelin g (L y m an and S c o tt 1 9 7 0 ). C laim s and callin gs for an acc o u n t can be seen as rule reminders. A t o th e r tim e s, a p e rso n m ay, in ad d itio n , ch id e, tea se, cajo le , sc o ld , shun— in a w o rd , san ction us fo r “m is-fe e lin g .” Such san ction s are a clue to the ru le s they are m e an t to en fo rce. R igh ts and d u ties se t o u t the p r o p rie tie s as to the extent (o n e can feel “t o o ” angry o r “n o t an gry e n o u gh ”), the direction (o n e can feel sad w hen one sh o uld feel h ap p y ), and the duration o f a feelin g, given the situ ation again st w hich it is set. T h ese righ ts and d u ties o f feelin g are a clue to the depth o f social con ven tion , to one final reach o f social c o n tro l. T h e re is a d istin ctio n , in th eory at le ast, b e tw e en a feelin g ru le as it is kn ow n by o u r sen se o f w'hat w e can expect to feel in a given situ atio n , and a ru le as it is knowrn by o u r sen se o f w hat we should feel in that situ ation . F o r e x a m p le , on e may realistically e x p e c t (k n o w in g o n e se lf and o n e ’ s n e ig h b o r’ s p a rtie s) to feel b o re d at a large N ew Y ear’s Eve p arty and at the sam e lim e ack n o w le d g e that it w ould be m o re fillin g to feel e x u b e ra n t. H ow ever, “ e x p e c t to fe el” and “ should ideally fe el” often c o in cid e, as b elo w : M a rria g e , ch a o s, u n real, c o m p le te ly d ifferen t in m any w ays than I im ag in e d . U n fo rtu n a te ly w e re h e arse d the m o rn in g o f o u r w ed d in g at eigh t o ’ c lo c k . T h e w ed d in g w as to be at eleven o ’ c lo c k . It w a sn ’ t like I th ough t (e v e ry o n e w o u ld know wrhat to d o ). T h ey d id n ’ t. T h at m ad e m e n e rv o u s. M y siste r d id n ’ t help m e g e t d resse d o r flatter m e (n o r did an yon e in the d ressin g ro o m until I asked th e m ). I w as d e p re sse d . I w an ted to b e so happy on o u r w ed d in g day. I n ever d rea m e d how anyone w ould cry at th eir w edding. A w ed d in g is “the happy day” o f o n e ’ s life. I c o u ld n ’ t b elieve that so m e o f m v b e st frien d s c o u ld n ’ t m ake it to m y w ed d in g and that ad ded to a lo t o f little thin gs. So I sta rte d o u t to the ch u rch and all th ese things that I alw ays th ough t w o u ld n ot h appen at m y w ed d in g w en t through m y m in d . I b ro k e d ow n — I cried

EMOTION

WORK,

F E E L I N G

R U L E S ,

AND

SO CIAL

S T R U C T U R E

1 2 5

g o in g d ow n . “ Be happy” I told m yself. Th in k of the frie n d s, and relatives that arc p re se n t. (B u t I finally said to m y self, “ Hey p e o p le a r e n ’t ge ttin g m a rrie d , you arc. It’ s fo r R ich [my h usband] and y o u .”) From dow n the pretty lon g aisle w e lo o k e d at each o th e r’ s eyes. H is love fo r m e ch an ged m y w h ole being. From that p o in t on w e join ed arm s. I w as reliev ed and the ten sion w as g o n e . In one sen se it m e an t m ise ry — b u t in the tru e sen se o f tw o p e o p le in love and w an tin g to share life— it m ean t the w orld to m e . It w as b e au tifu l. It w as in d e scrib ab le . In any given situ atio n , we o fte n invest w hat w e e x p e c t to feel w ith id ealization . To a re m ark ab le e x te n t th ese id ealization s vary socially . If the “o ld -fash io n ed b rid e ” above an ticip ates a “rig h t” to feel je a lo u s at any p o ssib le fu tu re infidelity, the y ou n g “flow er ch ild” b elow re je c ts just this righ t. . . . w hen I wras livin g d ow n so u th , I w as involved w ith a g r o u p o f p e o p le , frien d s. W e used to sp en d m o s t even in gs after w ork o r sch o o l togeth er. We u sed to do a lot o f d r u g s, acid , cok e o r just sm o k e d op e and we had this ph ilosoph y that we w ere very c o m m u n al and did o u r b est to share every th in g— c lo th e s, m o n ey , fo o d , and so on . I w as in volved w ith this on e m an — and th ough t I w as “ in love” w ith h im . He in turn had told m e that I w as very im p o rta n t to h im . A nyw ay, this one w om an w ho w as a very g o o d frien d of m in e at on e tim e and this m an sta rte d having a se x u al relatio n sh ip , su p p o sed ly w ith ou t my k n o w led g e. I knew' though and had a lot o f m ix e d feelin gs ab o u t it. I th ou gh t, in tellectu ally , that I had no claim to the m an ,' and b elieved in fact that J ’ no o n e should ever trv to own an o th er p e rso n . I bclicvrcd also that it w as n on e o f m y b u sin ess and I had n o reason to w o rry ab o u t th eir re la tio n ­ ship to ge th e r, for it had n othin g really to do w ith my frien dsh ip w ith e ith er o f th e m . I also b elieved in sharing. But I w as h orrib ly h u rt, alone and lon ely , d e p re sse d and I c o u ld n ’ t shake the d e p re ssio n and on to p o f th ose feelin gs I felt gu ilty fo r having th ose p o sse ssiv ely je alo u s feelin gs. A nd so I w ould con tin u e g o in g o u t w ith th ese p e o p le every n igh t, and try to su p p re ss m y feelin gs. M y e g o w as sh atte re d . I g o t to the p o in t w here I c o u ld n ’ t even laugh around th em . So finally I c o n fro n ted my frien d s and left fo r the su m m e r and trav eled w ith a new frie n d . I realized later w hat a heavy situ ation it w as, and it to o k m e a lon g tim e to g e t m y se lf to g e th e r and feel w h ole again. W h eth er the con ven tion calls for try in g joyfully to p o sse ss, o r try in g casually not to , the in dividual co m p a re s and m e asu re s e x p e rie n c e again st an e x p e ctatio n often idealized . It is left fo r m otivatio n (“w h at I w an t to fe e l”) to m ed iate b e tw e en feelin g ru le (“w h at I sh o uld fe el”) and e m o tio n wro rk (“w hat I try to fe el”). So m e o f the tim e m any o f us can live w ith a cc rtain d isson an ce b e tw e en “o u g h t” and “ w a n t,” o r b e tw e en “ w an t” and “try t o .” But the atte m p ts to rc d u c c e m o tiv e d isson an ce arc o u r p e rio d ic clu e s to ru le s o f feeling. [. . .]

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A R L I E R U S S E L L H OC H S C H I L D

References Goffman, Erving. 1956. “Embarrassment and Social Organization.” American Journal of Sociology 62 (November): 264—71. — . 1961. “Fun in G am es.” Pp. 17—84 in Encounters. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Lyman, S., and Marvin Scott. 1970. Sociology' o f the Absurd. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts.

Chapter

13

Theodore D. Kemper POWER, STATUS, AND EMOTIONS A s o c io lo g ic a l c o n trib u tio n to a p s y ch o p h y s io lo g ica l d o m a in

S

o c i o l o g i s t s

h a v e

g e n e r a l l y

e s c h e w e d

system atic

inquiry into the em otio n s. This is u nderstandable, in as m uch as sociologists

ordinarily con cern them selves with pattern s o f grou p organization and social stru ctu re. T h e em otio n s, on the other hand, are physiological and psychological ph enom en a, experien ced-b y and m easured-in individual organ ism s. Even social psychology— which deals w ith the effects o f social p attern s on individuals— has con cern ed itself little with em otio ns per se, though many o f the results o f social psych ological exp e rim e n ts are p ertin ent to the study o f em otio n s. [. . .] . . . The ccntral con tribu tion of a sociological approach to em otio n s is the specification o f a com prehen sive m odel o f the social environ m en t, as is detailed below. This allow s for the form u lation o f em pirically-based h ypoth eses linking variations in the social environm ent w ith varying em otio ns. . . .

Power and status as social environment A rem arkable convergen ce o f theoretical and em pirical w ork in the social sciences has gone relatively un rem ark ed. I refer here to the oft-rep eated findings that tw o central dim ensions characterize social relationships betw een hum an actors. . . . The tw o dim ensions arc variously nam ed but they refer unm istakably to relations o f power and status. Power im plies the ability to overcom e the resistan ce o f others w hen oth ers do not w ish to com ply (cf. W eber, 1946, p. 181). R elationsh ips can be structured in term s o f pow er, so that there is a probability that in specified dom ains each actor can achieve his o r her w ill to a certain exten t despite the resistan ce o f the other. T h ere is also process pow er: this entails all the acts design ed to overcom e the resistance o f the other, both actually and p rospcctively , including physical and verbal assaults, deprivatio n s, threats, and the like.

1 2 8

T H E O D O R E

D.

K E M P E R

S ta tu s re fe r s to the c o m p lia n c e that a c t o r s v o lu n tarily a c c o r d each oth er, u n a c c o m p a n ie d by th rea t o r c o e rc io n . A s w ith p o w e r th e re are s tr u c tu r a l and p r o c e ssu a l a sp e c ts. S tatu s s tr u c tu r e in re la tio n sh ip in d ica te s the p ro b a b ility o f v o lu n tary c o m p lia n c e w ith th e d e sire s an d w ish e s o f the o th e r, w h e th e r actu ally o r p ro sp e c tiv e ly . A s p r o c e s s , sta tu s e n ta ils th e ra n g e o f frie n d ly , c o n g e n ia l, s u p p o r tin g , re w ard in g , u ltim ately , lovin g b eh av io r that a c to rs volu n tarily acc o rd each other. . . . T h e p a r tic u la r u tility o f th e p o w e r and sta tu s d im e n sio n s is th at they p e r m it the h e u ristic a ssu m p tio n th at a ll so c ial re la tio n s can b e lo c a te d in a tw o -d im e n sio n a l p o w e r- sta tu s s p a c e , an d that c h a n g e s in so c ial re la tio n s m ay b e u n d e rs to o d as ch a n g e s in th e p o w e r and sta tu s p o sitio n s o f a c to r s . A c to rs re la te to cach o th e r in str u c tu r e s o f p o w e r and s ta tu s, and in th e ir in te ra c tio n s w ith cach o th e r e x p r e s s o r ch an ge the re la tio n sh ip str u c tu r e by a c ts th at sign ify p a r tic u la r lev els o f p o w e r and sta tu s. G r a n te d this view o f re la tio n sh ip , the fo llo w in g p r o p o s itio n is p o ssib le : A very large class o j human emotions results from real, anticipated, recollected, or im agined out­ comes o f power and status relations (K e m p e r , 1 9 7 8 ). T h is m e a n s th at if w e w ish to p r e d ic t o r u n d e rsta n d the o c c u r r c n c c o f m any h u m an e m o tio n s w e m u st lo o k at the str u c tu r e and p r o c e ss o f p o w e r an d sta tu s re la tio n s b e tw e e n a c to r s . T h is a p p ro a c h e n c o m p a ss e s b o th the d istr e ssfu l e m o tio n s — an g er, d e p r e ss io n , g u ilt, sh a m e , a n x ie ty — as w ell as th e p o sitiv e e m o tio n s — h a p p in e ss, s e c u r ity , p r id e , r ig h te o u s n e s s , an d lo v e . . . . O n e im p o r ta n t a ssu m p tio n a b o u t p o w e r an d sta tu s re la tio n s is that they arc c ro ss-c u ltu ra lly valid (c f. T ria n d is,

1 9 7 2 ), h en ce u n iv ersally a p p lic ab le

in the

p re d ic tio n o f e m o tio n s . H o w e v e r, th ree th in gs are n o t u n iv e rsa l: 1. T h e sp e c ific c u ltu ra l sig n ifie rs o f p a r tic u la r lev els o f p o w e r an d sta tu s o u t ­ c o m e s . F o r e x a m p le , K r o u t (1 9 4 2 , r e p r o d u c e d in H in d e , 1 9 7 9 , p. 6 0 ) in d ica te s IS d iffe re n t w ay s, d istr ib u te d a c r o ss 2 0 d iffe re n t c u ltu r e s , o f d isp lay in g hum ility, a c o n d itio n e x p r e ss in g v e ry low p o w e r-a n d -sta tu s fo r s e ll, o fte n in c o m b in a tio n w ith ac c o rd o l v e ry high sta tu s (an d p ro b ab ly v e ry high p o w e r) to the oth er. H e n c c d iffe re n t c o n c r e te b e h a v io rs in d iffe re n t c u ltu re s m ay e lic it and sign ify c e rtain e m o tio n s. 2. A lso n o t u n iv e rsa l arc th e p o w e r and sta tu s levels o f p a r tic u la r so cial p o s itio n s , e sp e c ia lly as d efin ed by a sc rip tiv e c a te g o r y . F o r e x a m p le , p r e litc r a tc so c ie tie s ten d to r c s p c c t o ld e r m e n fo r th e ir w isd o m and k n o w le d g e o f the s o c ie t y ’ s tra d itio n s. In m o d e r n s o c ie tie s, o ld e r m en arc c e d e d far le ss sta tu s. 3. F in ally , sp e cific so c ial o rg an iza tio n a l and so c ial s tr u c tu r a l p a tte rn s m ay e x a c e r b a te o r in h ib it the p r o d u c tio n o f c e rta in e m o tio n s . M a rx ( 1 9 6 4 ) p r o p o s e d the link b e tw e e n c ap italism an d alie n atio n . B la u n e r ( 1 9 6 4 ) sh o w e d h ow this link is m e d ia te d by a p a r tic u la r fo rm o f te c h n o lo g y an d d iv isio n o f lab or. L evy (1 9 7 3 ) . . . r e p o r t e d the “ h y p o c o g n itio n ” o f c c rta in e m o tio n s a m o n g T ah itian s (th is m e an s th e re is a lim ite d v o c a b u la ry fo r th e se e m o t io n s ). D e p re ssio n is o n e o f th e hypoc o g n a te d e m o tio n s , ap p a re n tly ra re ly e x p e r ie n c e d a m o n g T ah itian s. W h y? B e c a u se , w e se e , in L e v y ’ s d isc u ssio n , that th e so c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n a l p a tte rn d o c s n ot fre q u e n tly p r o d u c e the kin d o f sta tu s- lo ss o u tc o m e s that a rc a sso c ia te d

w ith

d e p r e ss io n . . . . U n iv e rsa lity o f e m o tio n d o e s n o t m e an that all so c ie tie s e x p e r ie n c e the sam e a m o u n ts o f d iffe re n t e m o tio n s . T h a t w o u ld re q u ir e that the so c ia l o rg a n iz a tio n and

P 0 W E R,

S T A T U S, A N D E M O T I O N S

1 2 9

the social stru c tu re o f the so c ietie s be the sam e. U n iversality o f e m o tio n s m ean s that w hen p a rtic u la r social relatio n al o u tc o m e s o ccu r, the sam e e m o tio n s w ill re su lt— re g a rd le ss o f how often such social relatio n al o u tc o m e s o c c u r in the so ciety over-all. I tu rn now b riefly to th ree so c io lo g ic ally relevan t co n sid e ratio n s ab ou t e m o ­ tion s: their e volu tion ary su rv iv al value, e m o tio n s in the so cietal social stru c tu re , and e m o tio n s in in te rp e rso n al and m ic ro -in te rac tio n . A fu n dam en tal idea ab o u t e m o tio n s is that they have ev o lu tio n ary su rv iv al value (D a rw in , 1 8 7 3 ; . . . P lu tch ik , 1 9 8 0 ). . . . B io lo g ical su rv iv al en tails n ot m e re ly the survival o f o rg an ism s, b u t the p re se rv atio n o f p a tte rn s o f social o rg an iza tio n , o r p erh ap s chan ge o f p attern to a m o re ad aptive fo rm . . . . Fear and an g e r e n e rgize (light o r fight in the face o f d a n g e r o r th reat from o th e rs. Love and attach m e n t e m o tio n s help sustain c o m m itm e n t to p regn an t w o m en and to in fan ts w h o c a n ’ t fo ra g e o r p r o te c t th e m se lv e s; also to ag ed p aren ts and o th e r e ld e r m e m b e rs o f the g ro u p w h o m ay have w isd o m to offer. R e sp e c t, and loyalty p e r m it allegian ce to le ad e rs w ho m an ifest re sp e ct-w o rth y qualities that au gm e n t the su rv iv al p r o sp c c ts o f the g ro u p . G u ilt and sham e allow for the e x e rcise o f relatively u n su p e rv ise d se lf-c o n tro l o f im p u lse s to ag g re ssio n , m alfe asan ce , and irresp o n sib ility . D u rk h eim (1 9 6 5 ) em p h asized the im p o rta n ce o f re lig io u s sen tim e n ts (aw e, re sp e c t, fe ar) in im p a rtin g a n e c essa ry fo rc e to m o ral c o m m itm e n ts to oth er m e m b e rs o f so ciety . F u rth er, D u rk h cim valued the “e m o tio n a l c lfc r v c sc e n c c ” . . . that sim p le physical c o m m u n io n and c o m m o n activity e n g e n d e r in p e o p le , givin g them a sen se o f so lid arity , se cu rity and stren gth via the iden tification w ith a larger social en tity. . . . H a m m o n d (1 9 7 8 ) su g g e ste d that fo r D u rk h e im , e m o tio n s rep lace in h um an s the m issin g re g u lato ry m ech an ism

o f in stin ct. W ith ou t e m o tio n s,

p re su m ab ly , h um an s w ould n ot bind th em selv es w ith sufficien t co n stan cy to any p a rtic u la r so c ial-m o ral p a tte rn , shunn in g o th e rs even il these are im m ed iately in stru m e n tal i.e ., im m ed iately re w ard e d . . . . H en ce it may be seen that e m o tio n s have n ot sim p ly b io lo g ic a l, but social su rv iv al value. A t the sam e tim e as w e se e the so c io lo g ic al facet o f the b io lo g ic al p h e n o m ­ e n on — the e m o tio n s— w e m u st n ot p ro c e e d as far as have the so c io b io lo g ists in this area (e .g ., W ilso n , 1 9 7 5 ). S o c io b io lo g ists p re su m e to d iscover u n derly in g b io lo gical p r o c e sse s and stru c tu re s that su p p o rt particular p a tte rn s o f social organ izatio n , e .g ., in relatio n s b e tw e en the se x e s, h ierarch y in so c ie ty , e tc. M y p ro p o sa l ab ou t the so cio lo g ic al relevan ce o f the e m o tio n s is differen t. 1 view the e m o tio n s as cap ab le o f su p p o rtin g e x tre m e ly b ro a d , even o p p o site , fo rm s o f social organ izatio n . D esp ite the g re a t v ariab ility o f cu ltu ral p a tte rn s and fo rm s o f so cietal organ izatio n , the sam e e m o tio n s u n d e rg ird th em . H en ce w e do n ot have d ire c t b io lo g ic al d e term in atio n o f social p a tte rn s, b u t a case w h ere social p a tte rn s— o f w h atever ty p e — rely upon e m o tio n s for stab ility and su p p o rt. W e m ay define social structure in so ciety as a m o re o r less stab le d istrib u tio n o f pow er, sta tu s, and re so u rc e s (usually w ealth ). So m e have m o r e , so m e less. M a rx (1 9 6 4 ) and W eber (1 9 4 6 ) p o in ted ou t that th ese arc p o te n tial b ases o f g ro u p fo rm a tio n , e .g ., social classe s and statu s g r o u p s, m o re o r less c o n sc io u s o f th eir c o m m o n in te re sts and certain ly aw are o f th eir stan d in g relative to each o th e r in the social stru c tu ral d im e n sio n s. Tw o kinds o f e m o tio n s are o f in te re st h ere : Integrating

130

THEODORE

D. K E M P E R

e m o t i o n s , w h ic h b in d g r o u p s t o g e t h e r , e . g . , lo y a lt y , p r i d e , l o v e ; an d Differentiating e m o t i o n s , w h ic h m a i n t a in th e d if f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n th e g r o u p s , e . g . , fear, a n g e r , c o n t e m p t , e n v y . [. . .] A c t u a l o r t h r e a t e n e d c h a n g e in so c ia l s t r u c t u r e — th e p r e v i o u s a r r a n g e m e n t s o f p o w e r , s t a t u s , a n d w e a l th — p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e l y in t e n s e e m o t i o n s . H i s t o r y r e c o r d s s o m e o f th e m o s t t e r r i b l e c r u e l t i e s a n d , w e m u s t a s s u m e , h a t r e d s t o have o c c u r r e d at s u c h t i m e s . T h r e a t e n e d g r o u p s a r e n o t o n ly fe a r f u l , the fe a r m a y b e c o m e a v ir tu a l p a r a n o i a . G r o u p s o n th e r is e m a y in d u lg e t h e m s e l v e s in th e m o s t e x t r a v a g a n t c o n f i d e n c e an d h o p e . N o s t a l g i a a n d d e p r e s s i o n

a r c p e c u l ia r ly a p p r o p r i a t e

fo r

g r o u p s w h o s e n s e th e ir d c c l i n c . C h c k o v w a s an e x q u i s i t e l it e r a r y r c c o r d c r o f th e e m o t i o n s o f th is p h e n o m e n o n . T h o s e a lr e a d y d e c l a s s e m a in ta in s e l f - e s t e e m th r o u g h p r iv a t e l y e x p r e s s e d c o n t e m p t fo r th e nouveaux riches. T h e s u c c e e d i n g c la s s o f p a r ­ v e n u s o r c o m m i s s a r s m u s t r id e fo r s o m e t i m e a c r e s t o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y o p t i m i s m a n d s e l f - a g g r a n d i z e m e n t , e v e n m e g a l o m a n i a ( s e e K e m p e r , 1 9 7 8 , p. 5 4 5 ) . B e n s m a n a n d V id ic h ( 1 9 6 2 ) d e ta il s y s t e m a t i c a ll y th e p o s s ib i li t ie s h e re . A t the m i c r o i n t c r a c t i o n

le v e l— i n t e r p e r s o n a l , m o m c n t - t o - m o m c n t , e t c . —

e m o t i o n s s h o u l d o p e r a t e b o t h t o in t e g r a t e a n d d if f e r e n t i a t e , j u s t as th e y d o in th e l a r g e r s o c ia l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s is b e c a u s e th e s a m e d e s c r i p t i v e c a t e g o r i e s can b e ap p lie d

at b o t h

lev els: p o w e r , s t a t u s , r e s o u r c e s .

I n t e r a c t io n

c o n s is t s o f d o i n g

te c h n ic a l th in g s t o g e t h e r ( c o o p e r a t i o n in s o m e f o r m o f d iv id e d l a b o r ) , a n d o f p o w e r a n d s ta tu s r e la t io n s . E m o t i o n s flow f r o m the o u t c o m e s o f th e p o w e r a n d s ta tu s r e la t io n s . . . . M o m c n t - t o - m o m e n t in t e r a c t io n a n d th e e n s u i n g e m o t i o n s a p p e a r t o b e g u i d e d by th r e e p r i n c i p l e s : F i r s t , th e r e is reciprocity. T h i s m e a n s th at b e h a v i o r s o f o n e kind f r o m a c t o r A a r e likely to b e f o l l o w e d by b e h a v io r s o f a s p e c i fic k in d f r o m a c t o r B, w ith g r e a t e r th an c h a n c e p r o b a b il it y . W e m a y in fe r th at th e e m o t i o n s e v o k e d in B b y th e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n s o f A p r o v i d e s o m e p u s h f o r a c t o r B ’ s r e s p o n s e . T h a t r e s p o n s e r e l e a s e s an e m o t i o n in t u r n in A , w h ic h l e a d s t o the s t a r t o f a n o t h e r r o u n d in th e in t e r a c t io n c y c lc . [. . .] . . . T h i s b r i n g s u s to th e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e : prior structure effects, th a t is th e in flu ­ e n c e on in t e r a c t io n a n d e m o t i o n s o f th e e x i s t i n g so c ia l a n d p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e . G o t t m a n et al. ( 1 9 7 7 )

fo u n d a m o n g d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s — t h o s e w ith a h is to r y

( i . e . , s t r u c t u r e ) o f h ig h - p o w e r , l o w - s t a t u s in t e r a c t i o n — th a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f d i s ­ a g r e e m e n t w a s a c c o m p a n i c d b y n e g a tiv e a ffe c t; a m o n g th e n o n d i s t r c s s c d b y n e u tr a l a ffe c t. A m o n g d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s m e s s a g e s s e n t w ith p o s i t i v e in t e n t w e r e m o r e likely to b e r e c e i v e d as n e g a ti v e . R a u s c h et al. ( 1 9 7 4 ) r e p o r t s im il a r fin d in gs. A m o n g n o n - d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s , t h e r e w a s g r e a t e r c h a n c e o f p o w e r b e h a v io r f r o m o n e p a r t n e r t o b e a n s w e r e d w ith c o n c i l i a t o r y o r s t a t u s b e h a v io r. A m o n g d i s t r e s s e d c o u p l e s , p o w e r b e h a v io r w a s v i r tu a l ly a lw a y s m e t w it h c o u n t e r p o w e r . [. . .] A th ir d p r i n c i p l e o f m i c r o i n t c r a c t i o n th a t a p p e a r s le s s d is tin c tly is th a t o f

devolution. In i n t e r a c t i o n , th in g s v e r y o f t e n s t a r t wrcll a n d e n d b a d l y , o r g o d o w n h ill. R au sch

(1965)

fo u n d

th a t in t e r a c t io n

seq u en ces tended

to d e v o l v e

o v e r five

e x c h a n g e s f r o m a b o u t 9 0 % fr ie n d ly to a b o u t 7 0 - 7 5 % f r ie n d ly . L o e h l i n ’ s ( 1 9 6 5 ) c o m p u t e r s im u l a t io n o f d y a d ic in t e r a c t io n fo u n d th at e v e n w h e n his “ p e r s o n a l i t i e s ” w e r e b o th e s s e n t ia lly “ p o s i t i v e ” they r e a c h e d a h a r m o n i o u s c o n c l u s i o n in a s e q u e n c e o f i n t e r a c t io n s o n ly w ith s o m e d iffic u lty . . . . L o v e r e la t io n s a p p e a r to b e p a r t i c u ­ larly v u ln e r a b le to m o v e m e n t in to h ig h - p o w e r s e q u e n c e s . I n t e g r a tiv e e m o t i o n s

P 0 W E R,

S T A T U S, A N D E M O T I O N S

1 3 1

ten d to be rep laced by differen tiatin g e m o tio n s in a som ew h at p red ictab le way (H o u sek n e ch t & M ack e, 1 9 8 1 ; Sw en sen , Eskew , & K o h lh ep p , 1 9 8 1 ). [. . .]

R eferences B ensm an, J., & V idich, A. Business cy cles, class, and personality. Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Review, 1 9 6 2 , 4 9 , 30—52. Blauncr, R . Alienation and freedom. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago P ress, 1964. D arw in , C. The expression o f emotions in man and animals. N ew York: A p pleton, 1973. D urkheim , E. The elementary form s i f the religious life. (Translated by Jo sep h Ward Sw ain .) N ew York: Free P ress, 1965. (O riginally published 1915.) G ottm an , J ., M arkm an, H ., & N o tariu s, C. The topography o f m arital conflict: A sequential analysis o f verbal and nonverbal behavior. Journal o f Marriage and the Family, 1977, 3 7 , 4 6 1 - 4 7 7 . H am m on d, M . D u rk h cim ’ s reality con struction m odel and the em ergen ce of social stratification. The Sociological Review, 1978, 26 (N ew S e rie s), 7 1 3 —7 2 7 . H indc, R. A. Towards understanding relationships. N ew York: A cadem ic, 1979. H ouscknech t, S. K ., & M acke, A. S. C om bin ing m arriage and career: The m arital adjustm ent o f profession al w om en . Journal o f Marriage and Family 1981, 4 3 , 651 661. K em per, T. D. A social interactional theory o f emotions. N ew York: W iley, 1978. Levy, R. Tahitians: Mind and experiences in the Society Islands. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago P ress, 1973. Lochlin, J. C. ‘ In terperson al’ exp erim en ts with a com pu ter m odel o f personality. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 2 , 580—584. M arx, K . Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. T. B. B ottom orc and M . R ubcl (E d s.), N ew York: M cG raw -H ill, 1964. Plutchik, R. The emotions: A psycho-evolutionary synthesis. N ew York: H arp er and Row, 1980. R ausch, H. L. Interaction sequen ces. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology', 1965, 2 ,4 8 7 - 4 9 9 . Rausch, H. L ., B arrv, W A ., H e rtcl, R. K ., & Sw ain, M . A. Communication, conflict, marriage. San Francisco. Jo sscy -B ass, 1974. Sw ensen, C . PL, Eskew, R . W , & Kohlhcpp, K . A. Stage o f family life cycle, ego developm en t, and the m arriage relationship. Journal o f Marriage and Family 1981, 43, 841-851. Triandis, H. C . The analysis o f subjective culture. N ew York: W iley, 1972. W eber, M . From M ax W eber: Essays in sociology'. H. G erth & C. W. M ills (E d s.), N ew York: O x fo rd U niversity P ress, 1946. W ilson, E. C . Sociohiology: The new synthesis. C am bridge: H arvard U niversity P ress, 1975.

Chapter

14

Randall Collins

T H E R O L E OF E M O T I O N I N SOCIAL STRUCTURE

H

OW I M P O R T A N T A R E T H E E M O T I O N S in society? I would argue that they are cjuite fundamental. This is especially so if one conceives of emotion as a form of social energy which can take any state ranging from com­ pletely passive inactivity on through strong affectual arousal. The crucial mid-range of this continuum is a scries of variations in social confidence, which manifest themselves in feelings of solidarity— membership in social groups. At their stronger levels, such feelings of confidence are important in the organization of property and authority. Emotional energy not only upholds the social structure, but is produced by it. That is, social social structure is nothing more, on the most fine-grained empirical level, than repeated patterns of facc-to-face interaction. These interactions have a ritual quality, which reproduce, increase, or decrease the emotional energies of individuals. Both the statics of repetitively reenacted social structure and the dynamics of social change are crucially mediated by the social production of emotions. The following sociological theory of interaction ritual is based on the theories of Emile Durkhcim (1947, 1954) and Erving Goffman (1959). I have suggested else­ where (Collins, 1975, pp. 90—111) that it is consonant both with Darwinian animal ethology and with rcccnt developments in cognitive micro-sociology, especially ethnomethodology. I have also attempted to show (Collins, 1975, pp. 49-89) how a variety of both hierarchic and egalitarian interactions produce the different emo­ tional tones and cognitive propensities that make up the varieties of class cultures. The “marketplace” of such ritual interaction makes up social networks. A fuller version of this discussion may be found in Collins (1981b).

THE

ROLE

OF

EMOTION

IN

SOCIAL

ST R U C T U R E

1 3 3

Emotion as a m icro basis o f m acro-sociology Both neo-rationalist self-criticism s (H eath , 1976) and m icro-sociological evidence (G arfinkel, 1967) agree that co m p le x contin gencies cannot be calculated rationally, and hence that actors m ust largely rely on tacit assum ption s and organizational routin e. But the actual stru ctu re s o f the social w orld, especially as cen tered around the n etw ork s upholding pro p erty and au th ority, involve con tin uous m on ito rin g by individuals o f each o th e r’s gro u p loyalties. Because the social w orld can involve quite a few lines o f authority and sets o f c oalition s, the task o f m on ito rin g them can be extrem ely c o m p le x . How is this possib le, given p e o p le ’s inherently lim ited cognitive capacities? The solution m ust be that negotiation s arc carried out im plicitly, on a different level than the use of con sciously m inipulatcd verbal sy m bols. I p ro p o se that the m echanism is emotional rath er than cognitive. Individuals m o n ito r o th e rs’ attitudes © tow ards social coalition s, and hence tow ards the degree of su p p o rt for ro u tin es, by feeling the am oun t o f confidence and enthusiasm there is tow ards ccrtain leaders and activities, o r the am oun t o f fear o f being attacked by a stron g coalition , o r the am oun t o f con tem p t for a w eak one. T h ese em otio n al en ergies arc tran sm itted by contagion am on g m em b ers o f a g ro u p , in flow s that operate very m uch like the set o f n egotiation s that p rodu ce prices within a m arket. The underlying em otional dynam ic, I p ro p o se , cen ters upon feelings o f member­ ship in coalitions. Briefly put: p ro p e rty (access to and exclusion s from particular physical places and things) is based upon a sense o f w hat kinds o f p erso n s do and do not b elon g w here. This is b ased, in tu rn , upon a sense o f w hat g ro u p s arc pow erful enough to punish violators o f their claim s. A uthority is sim ilarly organ ized : It rests upon a sense o f which peop le are con nected to which g ro u p s, to coalitions o f w hat exten siven ess and w hat capacity to en force the dem an d s o f their m em b ers upon others. . . . The m o st general explanation o f hum an social behavior en com p asses all o f these. It should specify: W hat m akes som eon e a m em b er o f a coalition? W hat determ in es the exten siven ess o f a coalition , and the intensity o f bonds within it? How do peop le judge the pow er o f coalitions? The answ ers to these qu estio n s, I am suggestin g, determ in es the way in which g ro u p s o f friends and other status g ro u p s are fo rm e d ; the d egree to which authority and prop erty routin es are uph eld; and w ho w ill dom inate others within these patterns. T h e basic m echanism is a p rocess o f em otio n al gro u p identification that may be d escrib ed as a set o f interaction ritual chains.

A theory o f interaction ritual chains From a m icro-translation view point, all p ro cesses o f form in g and ju d gin g coalition m em b ersh ip s m ust take place in interaction situations. The main activity in such situations is con versation . But no one situation stands alone. Every individual go es through m any situation s: indeed, a lifetim e is, strictly speaking, a chain o f in ter­ action situations. (O n e m igh t also call it a chain o f co n versation s.) The peop le one talks to also have talked to other peop le in the past, and w ill talk to oth ers in the

1 3 4

R A N D A L L

C O L L I N S

fu tu re. H en ce an ap p ro p ria te im age o f the social w orld is a b un dle of individual chains o l in teractio n al e x p e r ie n c e , c riss-c ro ssin g each oth er in sp ace as they flow alo n g in tim e . T h e dy n am ics of co alitio n m e m b e rsh ip arc p ro d u c e d by the e m o tio n al sen se in dividuals have at any on e p o in t in tim e , due to the to n e o f the situation they arc c u rre n tly in (o r last re m e m b e r, o r sh o rtly an ticip ate ), w hich in tu rn is influenced by the p re v io u s chains o f situ ation s o f all p a rtic ip a n ts. T h e manifest c o n te n t o f an in teractio n is usually n ot the e m o tio n s it involves Any co n v e rsa tio n , to the e x te n t that it is taken se rio u sly by its p a rtic ip a n ts, fo cu se s th eir atten tion upon the reality o f its c o n te n ts, the thin gs that arc talked ab ou t (G o ffm an , 1 9 6 7 , pp. 113

1 1 6 ). T h is m ay in clu de a focu s upon practical w ork that

is b ein g d o n e. W h at is sign ifican t a b o u t any con versation from the p o in t o f view o f social m e m b e rsh ip , how ever, is n o t the co n te n t, but the e x te n t to w hich the p a rticip a n ts can actually m ain tain a c o m m o n activity o f fo c u sin g upo n that co n ten t. T h e c o n te n t is a vehicle fo r establish in g m e m b e rsh ip . From this v ie w p o in t, any con v ersatio n may b e look ed upo n as a ritu al. It in vokes a c o m m o n reality , w hich from a ritu al v iew p oin t m ay b e called a “m yth ” : in this c ase , w h eth er the c o n v e r­ sation al “m yth” is tru e o r n ot is irrelev an t. T h e “m yth” o r c en ten t is a D u rk h eim ian sacred o b je c t. It sign ifies m e m b e rsh ip in a c o m m o n g r o u p , fo r th ose w ho truly rc sp e c t it. T h e p e rso n w ho can su ccessfu lly b e c o m e e n g ro sse d in a con versation al reality b e c o m e s ac c e p te d as a m e m b e r o f the g ro u p o f th ose w ho b eliev e in that con v ersatio n al en tity. In te r m s o f the D u rk h eim ian m o d e l o f re lig io u s ritu al, (D u rk h e im , 1 9 5 4 / 1 9 1 2 ; cf. C o ffm an , 1 9 6 7 ), a con versation is a cult in w hich all b e lie v e rs share a m o ral so lid arity . In fac t; il creates the re fe re n c e poin t o f m oral so lid arity : th ose w h o b elieve are the g o o d ; d e fe n se o f the b e lie f and h en ce o f the g r o u p is rig h te o u sn e ss; evil is d isb e lie f in, and even m o re so attack u p o n , the cogn itiv e sy m b o ls that h olds the g ro u p togeth er. T h e cogn itiv e sy m b o ls— h ow ever ban al, p a rtic u la riz e d , o r e so te r ic the con v ersatio n al c o n te n t m ay b e — arc im p o r ­ tant to the g r o u p , and d e fe n d ed by it, b e ca u se they arc the vehicle by w hich m ean s the g ro u p is able to unify itself. N o t all co n v e rsa tio n s, how ever, are equally su ccessfu l ritu als. So m e bind in d i­ viduals to g e th e r m o re p e rm an e n tly and tightly than o th e rs; so m e c o n v e rsa tio n s do n o t c o m c o ff at all. A m o n g th ose co n v e rsatio n s that d o su ccccd in evok in g a c o m m o n reality , so m e o f th ese p ro d u c c a feelin g o f egalitarian m e m b e rsh ip am on g the c o n v e rsatio n alists, w hile o th e rs p ro d u c e feelin gs o f rank d iffe ren c e s, in clu ding feelin gs o f au th ority and su b o rd in atio n . T h e se ty p es o f v ariab ility , in fac t, are e ssen tial fo r p ro d u cin g and re p ro d u cin g stratified social o rder. C on v ersatio n al in teraction ritu al, th en , is a m ech an ism p ro d u c in g varying am o u n ts o f so lid arity , varying d e g r e e s o f p e rso n a l iden tification w ith c o alitio n s o f vary in g d e g re e s o f im p ressiv e n e ss. W h at, th en , m ak es a con versation al ritu al su c ce ed o r n o t, and w hat kinds o f coalitio n s d o e s it invoke? I su g g e st the fo llo w in g in g re d ie n ts. (1 ) P articip an ts in a su c ce ssfu l c o n ­ v ersation al ritu al m u st b e able to invoke a c o m m o n cogn itiv e reality . H en ce they m u st have sim ilar conversational o r cultural resources. A su cc e ssfu l co n v ersatio n may also b e in egalitarian , in that on e p erso n d o c s m o st o f the cu ltu ral reality -in vok in g, the

o th e rs actin g as an au d ien c e ;

in this case

we

have a d om in ation -an d-

su b o rd in a tio n -p ro d u cin g ritu al. (2 ) P articip an ts m u st also be able to sustain a

THE

ROLE

OF

E MOTION

IN

SOCIAL

S T R U C T U R E

1 3 5

c o m m o n e m o tio n a l to n e. A t a m in im u m , they m u st all w ant to p ro d u c e at least m o m e n tary so lid arity . A gain , the e m o tio n a l p a rticip a tio n m ay be stratifie d , dividin g the g r o u p in to e m o tio n a l le a d e rs and fo llo w ers. T h e se tw o in g re d ie n ts— cu ltu ral re so u r c e s and e m o tio n a l e n e rg ie s— c o m e from in d iv id u als’ chain s o f p re v io u s in teraction al e x p e r ie n c e , and se rv e to r e p r o ­ d uce o r ch an ge the p a tte rn o f in te rp e rso n al relatio n s. A m o n g the m o st im p o rta n t o f the things re p ro d u c e d o r ch an ged arc feelin gs ab o u t p e r s o n s ’ relatio n sh ip s to physical p r o p e rty , and to the c o crc iv c co alitio n s o f au th ority . H ow in dividuals arc tied to th ese is the cru cial d e te rm in an t o f w hich co alitio n s arc d o m in an t o r su b o rd in ate. Conversational Resources.

P articu lar sty les and to p ic s o f co n v ersatio n im ply

m e m b e rsh ip s in differen t g ro u p s. A t any p o in t in tim e , the p re v io u s chain o f in teractio n ritu als that have b een su ccessfu lly n e g o tiated have m ad e cc rtain c o n v e r­ sation al co n te n ts in to sy m b o ls o f so lid arity . T h e ran ge o f th ese has b een d iscu sse d elsew h ere (C o llin s, 1 9 7 5 , pp. 1 1 4 —1 31). F o r e x a m p le , shop talk invokes m e m b e r ­ ship in o ccu p atio n al g r o u p s , political and oth er id e o lo g ic a l talk invokes co n te n d in g political c o alitio n s, e n te rtain m e n t talk in vokes g r o u p s w ith v ariou s ta ste s, gen eral discu ssio n invokes d ifferen t in tellectu al and n o n in tcllcctu al strata, w hile g o ssip and p e rso n al talk invoke specific and so m e tim e s qu ite in tim ate m e m b e rsh ip s. A gain , il is not im p o rta n t w h e th e r w hat is said is tru e o r n o t, but that it can be said and ac c e p te d as a c o m m o n reality fo r that m o m e n t, that m akes it an em b lem o f g ro u p m e m b e rsh ip . [. . .] Emotional Energies.

E m o tio n s affect ritu al m e m b e rsh ip in several w ays. T h ere

m u st be at le ast a m in im al d e g re e o f c o m m o n m o o d am o n g in te ractan ts if a con v ersatio n al ritual is to su cc e ed in in voking a sh ared reality . T h e stro n g e r the c o m m o n e m o tio n a l to n e, the m o r e real the in voked top ic w ill se e m to b e , and the m o re so lid arity w ill e x ist in the g ro u p E m o tio n al p ro p e n sitie s arc thus a p r e ­ re q u isite fo r a su cce ssfu l in te ractio n . But the in teraction also se rv e s as a m ach in e for in ten sify in g e m o tio n , and fo r g e n e ratin g new e m o tio n al to n es and so lid aritie s. T h u s e m o tio n al e n e rg ie s arc im p o rta n t re su lts o f in teractio n s at any p o in t in the ritual chain. T h e e m o tio n al so lid arity , I w ould su g g e st, is the p ayo ff that favorable con versation al re so u rc e s can p ro d u ce fo r an individual. If su c ce ssfu l in teraction al ritu als (IR s) p ro d u c e feelin gs o f so lid arity , stratifica­ tion both w ithin and am o n g co alitio n s is a fu rth e r o u tc o m e o f e m o tio n a l flow s along 1R chains. A s n o te d , co n v ersatio n al ritu als can be cith er egalitarian or asy m m e tric al. Both ty p es have stratify in g im p licatio n s. E galitarian ritu als arc n e v e rth e le ss stratify in g in that in sid e rs arc ac ce p te d and o u tsid e rs arc re je c te d ; h ere stratification e x ists in the form o f a coalitio n again st e x c lu d e d in dividu als, o r possib ly the do m in atio n o f on e co alitio n over another. A sy m m e tric al co n v e rsatio n s, in w hich on e individual se ts the en ergy to n e s (and invokes the cu ltu ral reality ) w hile the o th e rs arc an au d ien cc, arc in tern ally stratified. T h e m o st basic e m o tio n a l in gred ien t in in te ra c tio n s, I w ould su g g e st, is a m in im al ton e o f p o sitiv e se n tim en t to w a rd s the other. 1'he so lid arity se n tim e n ts ran ge from a m in im al display o f n on h ostility , up to w arm m u tu al liking and en th u siastic c o m m o n activity . W h ere d o such e m o tio n s c o m e fro m ? From p reviou s

1 3 6

R A N D A L L

COLLINS

e x p erien ces in IR chains. An individual w ho is successfully accepted into an in ter­ action acquires an increm en t o f positive em otional en ergy. This energy is m ani­ fested as what we com m on ly call confidence, w arm th , and enthusiasm . A cquiring this in one situation , an individual has m ore em otional reso u rces for successfully negotiating solidarity in the n ext interaction . Such chains, both positive and n egative, exten d throughout every p e r so n ’ s lifetim e. Let us con sider the variations p ossib le w ithin this basic m o d e l. The main con dition s w hich p ro d u ce em otional energy arc these: 1 . Increased em otional confidcncc is p rodu ced by every e xp erien ce o f su c c e ss­ fully negotiatin g a m em b ersh ip ritual. D ecreased em otional confidcncc results from rejection or lack o f success. 2. The m ore pow erful the group within which one successfully n e go ti­ ates ritual solid arity , the gre ater the em otional confidence one receives from it. The pow er o f a gro u p here m eans the am oun t o f physical p ro p e rty it successfully claim s access to, the sheer size o f its adherents, and the am oun t o f physical force (n um b ers o f fighters, in stru m en ts o f violen ce) it has access to. 3. The m ore intense the em otional arousal w ithin an IR, the m ore em otional energy an individual receives from participatin g in it. A gro u p situation with a high d egree o f enthusiasm thus gen erates large em otional in crem en ts for individuals. High d egrees o f em otio nal arousal are created especially by IRs w hich include an elem en t o f conflict against ou tsid ers: eith er an actual fight, a ritual punishm ent o f o llcn d e rs, o r on a low er level o f intensity, sy m bo lic denunciation o f enem ies (including conversation al gripin g) 4 . Taking a dom inant position within an IR increases o n e ’ s em otional en ergies. Taking a subordin ate positions w ithin an IR redu ces o n e ’ s em otional en e rgie s; the m ore ex tre m e the sub ordin ation , the g re ater the energy redu ction . [. . .)

References Collins, R. Conflict sociology. N ew York: Academ ic Press, 1975. Collins, R. On the m icro-foundations o f m acro-sociology. American Journal o f Sociology', 1981, 86 , 984—1014. (b) D urkhcim , E. The division o f labor in society. G lencoc, Illinois: Free Press, 1947. (O riginally published, 1893.) D urkhcim , E. The elementary forms o f the religious life. G lencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954. (O riginally published, 1912.) Garfinkcl, H. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prenticc-H all, 1967. Goffman, E. The presentation of self in everyday life. N ew York: D oubledav, 1959. Goffman, E. Interaction ritual. N ew York: D oubledav, 1967. Heath, A. Rational choice and social exchange. C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1976.

Chapter

15

Niklas Luhmann I N D I V I D U A L I T Y OF P S Y C H I C SYSTEMS

A N D U N D E R W H A T S O C I E T A L conditions can the individual’s insistence on individuality as self-description be perm itted or even dictated? With this question, one can return to the history o f how the sem antics o f indi­ vidual/individuality/individualism developed. The hypothesis w ould be that the history o f the concept m irrors a process in which individuals gradually becom e capable o f referring to their individuality when describing them selves. H eroism could be seen as a first attem pt at this— appropriate only to a few and perhaps inclined to discourage the many. Then follow ed a cult o f genius, which no longer distinguished individual w orks and utterances solely from the perspective o f their greater or lesser perfection , but took into account individuality-conditioned d is­ tinctions o f execution and innovative quality, and socially secured these by “taste.”

W

HETHER

The hommc universcl and alignm ent to the human universal w as a transitional phase: it allowed everyone to be included, but it was still bound to cultural conditioning, which ultimately caused the individual to be subsum ed in the universal. A ccord­ ingly, individuals that sought to conform to the individuality expected o f them were forced into deviation: they identified their autopoiesis with a m ethodology o f evil, with shocking norm ality, with avantgardism , revolution, a com pulsive critique of everything established, and sim ilar self-stylizations. But this, too, has devolved into imitablc gestures and has thereby becom e unsuitable as a form for the selfdescription o f the individual as an individual. . . . D oes this history prove that the rise o f the individual was a decline and that the expectation that the individual describe him self as an individual leads to m eaninglessness? O r can we, blinded by the cultural im perative o f value, not see correctly into which form s the individual decays when the dillcrentiation o f psychic and social system s has been carried so far that the individual can only use his individuality for self-description?

1 3 8

NIKLAS

L U H M A N N

G en erally, an individual psychic system ex p o se s itse lf to the contingency o f its environm ent in the fo rm o f expectation. . . . In con sequ en ce, the con cept o f e x p e c ­ tation m ust be in terp reted broadly to en com pass both a psychical and a social use, as well as their in terd ep en d ence. We can, lo r the m o m en t, leave open the d e p e n d ­ ence o f exp ectation s on historical con dition s, w hich later the nexus o f the psychic and social form ation o f e xpectation s. [. . .] An expectation rcco n n o iters unknow n terrain

using a difference it can

e xp erien ce within itself: it can be fulfilled or d isap poin ted, and this d ocs not depend on itse lf alone. The in determ in able en viron m ent, which d o c s not enter at all into the closed operation o f pure au top oicsis, is brough t into the form o f exp ectation s so that it can e x p re ss itse lf in a way that the system can understand and use operatively, in that the system p ro jects an expectation and then re co rd s w hether w hat w as expected actually occu rred or not. Form ing exp ectation s is a prim itive technique pure and sim ple. It involves alm o st no p resu pposition s. . . . It is only n ecessary fo r the expectation to be used au topoietically, n am ely, for it adequately to p rcstru ctu re access to the connection betw een thoughts. It then offers su b seq u en t exp erien ce as the fulfillm ent o r d is­ ap poin tm en t o f the exp ectatio n , thereby p re stru ctu rin g a further re p erto ire o f further behavioral possibilities. A fter a certain p erio d o f con scious life en riched by social ex p e rie n c e s, com pletely random exp ectation s cease to occur. In the n orm al succession that p ro gre sse s from one thought to another, one no longer en coun ters anything p e rv e rse . O n e is forced to orien t o n e se lf to o n e ’ s ow n history o f con scio usness, how ever unique il may be; and the determ in acy o f o n e ’s actual exp erien ce at any m om en t m akes sure that arbitrary contrary exp ectation s cannot be fo rm e d . T h erefore socially standardized types are at o n e ’ s disp osal, to hold on to as a kind ol rough orien tation . E xpectation s can be con den sed into claims. This oc c u rs by strength ening the self-com m itm en t and vulnerability establish ed and put into plav in the difference betw een fulfillm ent and d isap poin tm en t. This to o is possib le alm o st w ithout involving pre-su p p osition s, though only w ith correspon din gly increased risk. Sim ilarly, the p ro ccss o f internal adaptation to fulfillm ent o r d isap poin tm en t is m ore co m p lex and ap pears within the svstem as emotion. The transition from expectation s to claim s in creases the chance and the danger that em otion w ill fo rm , ju st as one can, con versely, cool dow n em otio n s by retreatin g to m ere expectation . T h e boun dary is fluid and can shift during the p ro ce ss; this con cern s a single dim en sion, w hich can assum e the quality o f an expectation or a claim depen ding on howr many internal in terd ep end en cies are at stake. The distinction betw een exp ectation s and claim s m akes it possib le to pursue the question o f w hat occu rs psychologically w hen individually grou n ded claim s arc increasingly socially legitim ated and w hen the social o rd e r finally incitcs individuals to put forw ard even their individuality as a claim — as the claim to recognition and as the claim to p rom otin g what m akes one happy. This “new right to be what one pleases” ap pears largely self-evident today. But how is it possible and how d ocs it com e about that an individual can groun d a claim to individuality— can, so to speak, claim the droit de seigneur, “tel est m on plaisir”? O ne m ust begin w ith the fact that claim s m ust be offset by m erits, because

I N D I V I D U A L I T Y

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P S Y C HI C

S Y S T E M S

139

o t h e r w i s e th e b a l a n c e w o u l d b e u p s e t a n d n o s o c i a l a g r e e m e n t w o u l d b e p o s s ib l e . [•

• •]

B u t w h a t d o e s all this m e a n f o r th e in d iv id u a l? W e h ad sa id th at e x p e c t a t i o n s o r g a n i z e e p i s o d e s o f a u t o p o i e t i c e x i s t e n c e a n d c l a i m s r e i n t e g r a t e s u c h e p i s o d e s in the p s y c h i c s y s t e m . F o r o n e th in g , th is i m p l i e s th a t, i f c l a i m s c a n n o t b e m a d e r o u t i n e , th e in d iv id u a l is in c r e a s i n g l y s u b j e c t t o th e in d i v i d u a l ’ s o w n e m o t i o n s . T h u s m o d e r n s o c i e t y is m o r e e n d a n g e r e d b y e m o t i o n a l i t y than o n e u s u a lly th in k s. For

a n o th e r ,

in d iv id u a ls

arc

cncouragcd

to

talk

about

th em selv es

and

th e ir

p r o b l e m s . If o n e a c c c p t s th a t an in d iv id u a l can ju st ify c l a i m s n o t ju s t b y m e r i t b u t by in d iv id u a lit y a lo n e , th en the in d iv id u a l m u s t p r o v i d e s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n s . T h e b lin d ly p r o g r e s s i n g a u t o p o i e s i s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is in s u ffic ie n t f o r th is; it m u s t be “ id e n t i fie d ” as a p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e f o r s t a t e m e n t s — th a t is, it m u s t b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g h a n d l e d as a d if fe r e n c e f r o m s o m e t h i n g e ls e . [. . .] A s i m p o r t a n t as th e lin g u is tic f o r m i n g o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is so c ia l s y s t e m s a ls o in flu e n c e p s y c h ic s y s t e m s in o t h e r , le s s m e d i a t e d w a y s. A b o v e a ll, o n e m u s t r e m e m b e r th e fu lfillm e n t an d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c l a i m s b y w'hich c o n s c i o u s n e s s ca n b e s o c ia lly d i r e c t e d , a lt h o u g h (a n d p r e c is e l y b e c a u s e ) it i t s e l f p o s i t i o n s e x p e c t a t i o n s in o r d e r t o o r i e n t itse lf. In this w a y , f o r e x a m p l e , a k in d o f c o n s c i o u s c e r t a in t y a b o u t ju d g i n g a n d fe e lin g c a n c o m c a b o u t , s o m e t h i n g like t a s te , w h ic h p r o v e s i t s e l f in th e o b j e c t s a n d th e s o c ia l r e s o n a n c e o f ju d g i n g . O n e m a y th e n a ls o b e a w a r e o f the im p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p r e s s i n g a j u d g m e n t , i n d e e d , m a y e n jo y this as a k in d o f s u p e r i o r i t y . G i v e n th e c o n c e p t u a l f o u n d a t i o n o f an a u t o p o i e s i s b a s e d o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , it is e a s y to g a in a c c e s s to a s p h e r e o f p r o b l e m s th at un til n o w have p r o v e d q u it e d ifficu lt f o r s o c i o l o g y ( a n d t h e r e f o r e have h a r d ly b e e n t r e a t e d ) , n a m e l y , th e w o r l d o f e m o t i o n s . E m o t i o n s a r is e a n d g r i p b o d y a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h e n th e a u t o p o i e s i s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is in d a n g e r . T h i s m a y have m a n y k in d s o f c a u s e s , s u c h as e x t e r n a l d a n g e r , th e d i s c r e d i t i n g o f a s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d e v e n n e w m o d e s o f c o n s c i o u s c o m m i t m e n t th at ta k e c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f by s u r p r i s e , like lo v e . E m o t i o n s a r c n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s th a t r e f e r t o the e n v i r o n m e n t b u t internal a d a p t a t i o n s to internal p r o b l e m s it u a t io n s in th e p s y c h ic s y s t e m th at c o n c e r n th e o n g o i n g p r o d u c t i o n o f the s jv s t c m ’ s e l e m e n t s b vj th e s jy s t e m ’ s e l e m e n t s . E m o t i o n s a r c n o t n e c e s s a r il y} f o r m e d in an o c c a s i o n a l an d s p o n t a n e o u s m a n n e r ; o n e can b e m o r e o r le ss d i s p o s e d to an e m o t i o n - l a d e n r e a c t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , e m o t i o n s a re u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e th e y d ie aw a y w h e n o r d e r is r e s t o r e d in th e s e l f - c o n t in u a t io n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B o t h , disp o s it io n a l it y a n d in s ta b ility , a r e i m p o r t a n t g iv e n s f o r s o c ia lly p r o c e s s i n g e m o t i o n s w h e n th e y a r is e , b u t t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f e m o t i o n r e s u l t f r o m its p s y c h i c , n o t its s o cial f u n c tio n . In terms o f their fu n ction , e m o t i o n s ca n b e c o m p a r e d t o i m m u n e s y s t e m s ; th e y s e e m to a s s u m e an im m u n i z i n g r o l e fo r th e p s y c h ic s y s t e m . W it h u n u s u a l m e a n s , th e y s e c u r e th e c o n t in u in g p e r f o r m a n c e o f a u t o p o i e s i s — h e r e n o t the a u t o p o i e s i s o f life b u t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — in th e fa c e o f p r o b l e m s th at a r is e , a n d in d o i n g s o th e y u s e s im p lif ie d p r o c e d u r e s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , w h ic h p e r m i t d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t c o n ­ s id e r i n g th e c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e y c a n a u g m e n t a n d w e a k e n w i t h o u t d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e to o c c u r r c n c c s in th e e n v i r o n m e n t , d e p e n d i n g o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s ’ s o w n e x p e r i e n c e o f itself. P e r h a p s th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t in s ig h t, h o w e v e r, is th at all e m o t i o n s o c c u r as

140

NI K L A S

L U H M A N N

e s s e n t ia lly u n ita r y a n d h o m o g e n e o u s . T h i s r e s u lt s n o t o n ly f r o m i n c r e a s e d i n t e r ­ d e p e n d e n c e w it h b o d ily o c c u r r e n c e s , t h r o u g h w h ic h o n e e x p e r i e n c e s e m o t i o n , b u t a ls o

from

th e

im m u n i z i n g

f u n c t io n ,

w h ic h ,

to

guarantee

au to p o iesis

a g a in s t

u n f o r e s e e a b l e d i s t u r b a n c e s , c a n n o t k e e p in s t o r e a s e p a r a t e e m o t i o n f o r e v e r y t h in g that h a p p e n s . O n e can e s t a b lis h in the b i o c h e m i c a l d o m a i n that e m o t i o n s o c c u r as a u n i ty , b u t e m o t i o n s a r c m o r e than i n t e r p r e t e d b i o c h e m i s t r y — th e y a r c th e p s y c h ic s y s t e m ’ s s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w ith r e g a r d t o w h e t h e r its o p e r a t i o n can c o n t in u e . T h e w e l l- k n o w n v a r ie t y o f d is t i n c t e m o t i o n s c o m e s a b o u t o n ly s e c o n d a r i l y , o n ly t h r o u g h c o g n i t iv e a n d lin g u is tic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; th u s it is s o c ia lly c o n d i t i o n e d , like th e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f all c o m p l e x i t y in p s y c h ic s y s t e m s . T h i s h o l d s e v e n m o r e fo r e v e r y t h in g o n e c o u l d d e s i g n a t e a “ c u lt u r e o f e m o t i o n s ” : fo r r e f i n e m e n t s o f th e o c c a s i o n s a n d th e f o r m s o f e x p r e s s i o n in w h ic h e m o t i o n s ta k e s h a p e . S u c h t r a n s ­ f o r m a t i o n s s e r v e , on th e o n e h a n d , to c o n t r o l e m o t i o n s s o c ia lly b u t , on th e o th e r , a r e b u r d e n e d w it h p r o b l e m s o f a u t h e n t ic it y . A n y o n e w h o ca n say w h a t he is s u f f e r ­ in g a lr e a d y find s h i m s e l f n o l o n g e r e n t ir e ly in th e s itu a t io n he w o u l d like t o e x p r e s s . T h u s s p e c i a l p r o b l e m s o f i n c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y c o n i c in t o b e i n g — n o t o f th e e m o t i o n s p e r s e , b u t o f th e ir a u t h e n t ic it y — w h ic h a ffe c t so c ia l s y s t e m s a n d m a y b u r d e n p s y c h ic o n e s . [. . .]

PART TWO

Embodying affect

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

4. Emotions, selfhood and identity

S

OCIAL

SCIENTISTS

HAVE

devoted much attention to questions con­

cerning selfhood and identity. On the one hand, they have documented historical

changes as well as cultural relativity in the conceptualization of individuals and their and identity (see, e.g. Heelas and Lock 1981; M o rris 1991, 1994; Hoffman, Sobel and Teute 1997; Turkle 1997; Seigel 2005). On the other hand, some have high­ lighted the p a rticu la r salience of the category of the self to late modern forms of organization (e.g. Giddens 1991; Rose 1996). Selfhood and identity are intimately related to affective life. D ifferent lived identity narratives, for instance, take up dif­ ferent evaluative orientations to the emotions in general or to specific affects. To give a stereotypical example, the warrior, the football hooligan and perhaps the city broker are, exceptions notwithstanding, apt to value the kind of self that can laugh in the face of danger, that is not sentimental in the face of the enemy pleading for pity, and that abhors weakness and tim idity in general. An observer of their socialization practices, their routine interactions, and their typical heroes and fantasies might see that certain emotions and sentiments are elevated in value and encouraged (pride, courage, excitement, anger, disgust) w hilst others are downgraded and scorned (fear, shame, pity, distress). To 'live' an approximation of such an identity would thus be to adopt p a rticu la r evaluative orientations towards pa rticu la r affective scenes of self and other, or to strive towards a form of life in which the likelihood of such a pattern­ ing of affects is enhanced. One might expect to find very different dynamics in play amongst members of the peace movement, environm entalists and human rights activists, again, exceptions notwithstanding. Em otions and our responses to them thus play a role in reproducing forms of subjectivity and the relations of power in which they are constituted. S im ila r issues apply amongst those more 'elevated' form s of identity that touch upon aesthetic orientations and philosophies. For the rom antic in the tradition of

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A F F E C T

Rousseau, Byron or Burke, the true self is associated with the deep, authentic feelings that alone reveal one's true nature, long hidden by the insincere layers of social pretentiousness. Salvation is not to be found in puny reason, but through follow ing the passions. Here, em otionality in general plays the role of ethical source to the stream of selfhood. The opposite applies to those who resonate with the more norm-centered orientations of figures such as Hobbes and Kant. Here the true self is to be found precisely in an avoidance of such 'irra tio n a l' impulses which are thought to speak more of our animal heritage than of true, civilized humanity. Only a complete subjuga­ tion of 'the em otions' in general by reason w ill lead to the peace, order and stability that are prized. W hether our emotional experiences denote the truth of our being or its degradation, or something else entirely, thus depends upon the ways in which we narrate those encounters into wider scripts and narratives, and this in turn depends upon the com plexities of our own experience and endowment, our socialization, our (gendered, raced and classed) positioning within ongoing strips of interaction, our relative power and status, and the broader social and cultural systems that provide the context for these. In our 'postm odern' days of reflexivity, irony, m u ltip licity and identity fragm entation, our evaluative (and em otional) relation to our affects has, arguably, become even more salient and troubled. This is due to the relative absence of explicit 'external' social dictates concerning who we are and should become (since any such dictates are increasingly packaged as 'choices'). In the introductory essay we remarked that Silvan Tomkins, from whose work the first extract in this sub-section has been drawn, is a key figure in the 'affective turn'. From the 1960s until his death in 1991, Tomkins offered a comprehensive social psychological theory grounded in a biological account of a sm all number of innate affects both positive (excitement and enjoyment), negative (shame, distress, disgust, fear, anger) and relatively neutral (interest). His work has been attractive to authors of the affective turn because, despite the biological nature and triggering mechanisms of these prim ary affects, Tom kins' theory holds that the affects can take on innumer­ able social objects and come to be subject to a good deal of social m odification and social causation. Tomkins also developed a comprehensive theory of personality grounded in the m otivational structure of the affect system and it is from this - his 'scrip t theory' - that we have selected our extract. A ffects are m otivational since, all else being equal, we strive to maximize our experiences of positive affect and minimize the negative. But in the com plexities of reality, of course, we involve our­ selves in a range of much more com plicated m otivational narratives, and it is these that Tomkins calls 'scripts'. A script is a regular way of organizing the relationships between a given number of scenes. A scene is a pa rticu la r affective encounter: an infant smiles in pleasure at the face of her mother; a child recoils in fear at the snarl of a dog. Given that we need not in itially learn how to experience affects, within the first few years of life any human being is likely to have experienced scenes of excitement and enjoyment as well as surprise scenes, terrifyin g scenes; distressing scenes, and so forth. A script, however, is a set of such scenes that has been co-assembled into a more complex form that serves to am plify certain affective aspects over others and to be associated with certain characteristic responses. An encounter with a snarling dog may be scripted by one person as a transient scene unlikely to recur, w hilst for another it may be

E M O T I O N S, S E L F H 0 0 D A N D ! D E N T I T Y

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developed into a full blown phobia generalizing to canines of all shapes and sizes, and perhaps beyond. In the latter case, the fear scene is magnified through co-assembly with other fearful scenes, w hilst in the form er case a different script is at play. We are not neutral with respect to our scripts, since we tend to want to repeat and improve enjoyable, interesting or exciting scenes and to avoid, escape or lim it the toxicity of scenes which are distressing, shameful, disgusting, infuriating or terrifying (316). In short, we aspire to command the scenes we wish to play. In practice, however, Tomkins show us that it is often the other way around: our scripts can come to define us. In their book Cool Rules, Dick Pountain and David Robins offer an 'anatom y of an attitude'. Although they do not engage with Tom kins' work, the notion of 'co o l' provides an interesting example of a script that has been highly influential in our modern mass-mediatized world, perhaps because it has been projected so forcefully via movies, jazz and pop-music, and the fashion industry. This indicates that scripts can be formed in a 'top-down' manner (e.g. via the emulation of popular cultural forms) as well as in a 'bottom -up' manner (e.g. via personal experiences), although it is of the essence of cool to escape any accusation of the form er (since the 'tru ly co ol' person just /scool). One of Pountain and Robins' definitions of cool is an oppositional attitude expressing defiance to authority. In the face of scenes that would scare, distress and humiliate others, the 'c o o l' individual shrugs their leather clad shoulders and oozes an 'I don't give a dam n' nonchalance. If the identity narrative of 'coolness' values a certain detachment from otherwise predictable emotional reactions, then the paper by Charles M organ and James Averill (1992) 'True Feelings, the Self, and Authenticity: a psychosocial perspective' deals with the more rom antic but equally prevalent script in which feelings are construed as the source of authentic identity. An unexpected episode of tearfulness may point the way to an unacknowledged loss and a moment of m ystical rapture might reveal a spiritual truth. But what are true feelings? The context for this extract is an em pirical study in which the first author surveyed 195 college students from the University of Massachusetts, Am herst using a series of questions about th eir experiences of 'getting in touch with true feelings'. In analyzing th eir findings, M organ and Averill conclude that, according to their participants, true feelings can serve creative (e.g. helping to modify or restore a coherent sense of self), practical (e.g. helping to cla rify values and guide decision making) and social (e.g. helping to make sense of relationships and one's place in society) functions. They also raise the issue of the extent to which a clam orous concern about 'who we really are' is a typ ically North Am erican preoccupation reflecting its history of individualism. Agneta Fischer and Jeroen Jan sz's (1995) 'Reconciling Em otions with Western Personhood' applies an anthropological lens to western culture. They pose the ques­ tion of whether or not a tension exists between the Western ideal of rational and selfcontained personhood and what is often presented as the ordinary conception of emotions as irrational and involuntary forces. Compared to the extensive scholarship devoted by anthropologists to ordinary conceptions of emotion amongst so-called 'non-western' peoples, little is known about how ordinary westerners conceive of th eir affective life. Drawing upon interviews with Dutch men and women undertaken by Fischer, this a rticle explores the 'emotion narratives' that are drawn upon to 'account' for emotional episodes of fear and anger. Through such emotion narratives,

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potentially discrediting episodes are rendered rationally intelligible and legitimate. In this way, any possible deviation from the rational, responsible and self-determining ideal of western personhood is mitigated by the image of rational, meaningful and potentially controllable emotional responses. A selection of social science readings on emotions, selfhood and identity would be incomplete w ithout e xplicit consideration of the affect we call shame. This is because shame is very much a 'self-conscious' affect (Tangney and Fischer 1995) im plicating the role of a significant other into the self-conscious experience (Lew is 1992). As Tomkins (1 9 6 3 :1 3 3 ) put it: 'In contrast to all other affects, shame is an experience of the self by the self. A t the moment when the self feels ashamed, it is felt as a sickness within the self'. W. Ray C rozier's (1998) a rticle 'Self-Consciousness in Shame: the role of the "o th e r" ' begins by claim ing that shame involves adopting the perspective of the other towards the self; that it is experienced on recognition that one's actions are given a specific interpretation by the other (irrespective of whether that interpretation is thought justified); and that it is distinct from embarrassment because it involves core aspects of the self. W h ilst these propositions are by no means firm ly established by the argument that follows, Crozier makes clear some of the complex relations between the experience of self-consciousness and the perspective of the other that have fascinated social theorists for many years.

References Giddens, A. (199 1) M od e rn ity and Self-Identity: s e lf an d society in the late modern age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Heelas, P. and Lock, A. (eds) (1 9 8 1 ) Indigenous Psychologies: an anthropology o f the self, Burlington, M A : Academ ic Press Inc. H offm an, R., Sobel, M . and Teute, F. J. (eds) (199 7) Through a Glass D arkly: reflections on personal identity in e arly A m erica, Chapel H ill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. M o rris, B. (1 9 9 1 ) Western Conceptions o f the Individual, London: Berg. M o rris, B. (199 4) A nthrop ology o f the Self: the in d iv id u a l in c u ltu ra l perspective, London: Pluto Press. Rose, N. (1 9 9 6 ) Inventing Our Selves: psychology, pow er and personhood. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Seigel, J. (200 5) The Idea o f the Self: thought an d experience in western Europe since the seventeenth century, Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press. Turkle, S. (199 7) L ife On the Screen: Identity in the Age o f the Internet, New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.

Chapter

16

Silvan S. Tomkins R E V I S I O N S IN S C R I P T T H E O R Y

S

C R I P T T H E O R Y , A S A T H E O R Y o f person ality, is built upon a p a r ­ ticular theory o f the innately endow ed nature o f the hum an being. Scrip t theory

assum es that the basic unit o f analysis tor un derstan din g p e rso n s, as distinguished Irom hum an b ein gs, is the scene and the relationships betw een scenes, as o rd ered by sets o f ru le s I have defined as scripts. [. . .] O ne class I labeled affluent scripts. T h ese w ere basically scenes w hich wrere aesthetic in nature. They wrere scenes w hich w ere rew ardin g in and o f them selves, not defined by affect per se but by their quality. The ocean is beautiful; a person is beautiful; m usic is w onderful; scien ce is w onderful - not defined in affect term s. T h ese arc scenes o f affluence and the critical question in describ in g a hum an being is w hat percen tage o f his lifc-spacc is taken up by affluent scripts. If it is sm all, it is a pity. If it is large, he is lucky. M o st o f us fall som ew 'here in betw een . Th e n ext class o f scrip ts w as one step away from heaven. I called these dam agereparation scripts. They w ere defined as scenes w hich changed from affluence to dam age, w hich could be rep aired. O ne lost som eth in g o f value, it m ight be re co v e r­ able; it m ight have been d am aged , and could be recoverable. That w as an optim istic kind o f scrip t in that it assum ed that life could be beautiful, but som etim es it w as dam aged and could be recovered. Th e n ext kind o f scrip t I called lim itation -rem ediation . H ere you confront those asp ects o f life w hich are less than ideal, but w hich m u st be con fronted and can be con fron ted . Frequently, for m o st p eop le in the w orld, this con stitutes the realm o f w ork. People think o f play as aesth etic, as affluent, w ork as en fo rced. For many p eo p le, it is. They m ust w ork. They w ould rather n ot, o r they w ould rath er do som eth in g else. People vary radically in their lim itation -rem edialion scrip ts, varying all the way from what I call com m itm en t scripts to the resignation o f slavery. If you

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SILVAN

S. T O M K I N S

arc b o rn a slave, you also have to sc rip t y o u r life, and y ou resign y o u rse lf to b e as g o o d a slave as y ou know how to be. T h at is n ot m u ch , but that is a lim itation w hich y ou m ay face. M illion s o f p e o p le o v e r th ou san ds o f y ears have faced lives less than p e rfe c t, to w hich they had to ad ap t in so m e w ay o r anoth er. T h is kind o f sc rip t g o t at that large class o f h um an co n c e rn s. T h e n e x t large class is w hat I called deco n tam in atio n sc rip ts. T h e se w ere sce n e s in w hich so m e im p u rity is in tro d u c cd -in to a life. It m ay have b een go od b e fo re , o r it may have alw ays b een b ad , but is re co g n ize d by the in dividual as, n o t a p e rm an e n t lim itatio n , b u t an im p u rity , a co n tam in atio n . T h is w as the way H itler re g ard e d Je w s in the life o f G e rm an y

a co n tam in atio n , so m e h o w to be p u rified .

T h e final g ro u p o f sce n e s I call an tito x ic. N o w you can se e we are g o in g from b ad to w o rse , w hich is the p sy c h o lo g ist’s w ay. In the an ti-to xic sc rip t, w e are d ealin g w ith scen es o f in to le rab le p u n ish m en t, w hich m u st be eith er e lim in ate d , a tte n u a te d , e sc a p e d , o r avoided — som eh ow d e stro y e d . T h ese arc co n d itio n s that hum an b ein g s find e x c e ssiv e ly to x ic for one reason o r anoth er. T h ey arc e x ile d from th eir native lan d; they are p u t in to chains. T h e re are all kin ds o f c o n d itio n s w hich they find in to lerab le. T h is is not th eir n o rm al lo t in life. It can h app en at any tim e , to any o f us. If w e g e t can cer, that is very to x ic . T h e re is n o way it can n ot b e. It is a d ise ase that is very difficult to d eal w ith , very pain ful, very life threaten in g. T h at is a to x ic sc e n e , and life is full o f to x icity . All o f th ese ty p es o f sc rip ts, and th ere are m any differen t ty p es u n d e r cach o f th ese classificatio n s, w ere d e sig n e d , . . . w ith no th ough t to affect. T h en one day a light bulb w en t on in my h ead. I realized that each o f th ese typ es o f sc rip ts, w hile very c o m p le x in affect stru c tu re and c o m p o sitio n , n o n eth eless had a p rim ary affect w hich m atch ed e x trao rd in arily w ell m y u n d e rstan d in g o f the n ature o f each o f the p rim ary affects. T h at w as a b on an za lo r m e , b e ca u se it w as alm o st like an in d e p e n d e n t validation ol b oth the sc rip t th eory and the affect th e o ry that thcv should hang to g e th e r so n icely. N ow that m ay b e an in san ity; it m ay b e a selfd e lu sio n , b u t I tell it to y ou like it is in my m in d . It w as very exciting. L e t m e tell you w hat th ose affects arc and how thcv m ap o n to th ese scrip ts. O b v io u sly , w ith the affluen t sc rip t, w e arc talkin g ab o u t the tw o m a jo r p ositive affects: e x c ite m e n t and en jo y m en t. N ow , o f c o u rse , e x c ite m e n t and e n jo y m en t arc tw o very differen t kinds o f affluen ce. T h ey can c o m c in to very se rio u s con flict w ith each other, as they d id , for e x a m p le , in T o lstoy , and as they did in any n u m b e r o f p e o p le fo r w hom on e o r the o th e r o f them is seen to b e very d a n g e ro u s and the o th e r very p u re. So I am n o t su g g e stin g that eith er on e o f them is n ecessarily d efin ed as affluen t by all p e o p le , far fro m it. P u ritan s w ould n o t re g ard e x c ite m e n t as affluent. It is p re tty c lo se to c o n so rtin g w ith Satan. B u t, n o n e th e le ss, the m ore e x c ite m e n t a n d / o r e n jo y m e n t, the m o re afflu en ce, and that is g o o d . W ith d a m ag e-re p arativ e scrip ts th ere is a very happy coin cid en ce w ith my u n d e rstan d in g o f the n ature o f sh am e, b e cau se , in my view , sham e is an affect au x iliary , w hich is trig g e re d by any p e rce iv e d im p e d im e n t to eith er e x c ite m e n t or e n jo y m en t. I b elieve the toxicity o f sham e has b een m uch e x a g g e ra te d by sham e th e o rists; sham e is an affluen t e m o tio n . It arise s only in the c o n te x t o f a stro n g bond w ith the other. You can n ot be ash am e d , p e r se, u n less you find the o th e r e x c itin g or lovable o r en joyable in so m e w ay, and you w ish to m aintain that b on d. B ecau se if that is n ot the case, sham e readily tu rn s so u r in to d isgu st and d issm e ll and rage

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an d s o m e t im e s fear. B u t if y o u slay w ith sh a m e , if y o u s e e a fa c e w h e r e sh a m e is d o m in a n t , o n e th in g y o u m ay b e su re o f is th a t th a t is a p o s itiv e ly o r ie n t e d h u m a n b e in g , e ith e r o n e g iv e n t o m u c h lo v e o r m u c h e x c it e m e n t . T h e sh a m e r e s p o n s e t e lls y o u th a t f o r th e tim e b e in g th e re h as b e e n an e x p e r ie n c e d i m p e d i­ m e n t to th a t a fflu e n c e . T h u s the d a m a g e - r e p a r a t iv c s c r ip t s m a p e x t r a o r d in a r ily w e ll to th e d y n a m ic s t r u c tu r e o f sh a m e as I u n d e r s t a n d th at a ffe c t to b e . S o if y o u have a s c r ip t w h ic h s p e a k s o f a r e t u r n to a p r o m is e d la n d , a s wra s t r u e fo r M a r x , an d as is t r u e in n u c le a r r e p a r a tiv e s c r ip t s b a s e d u p o n sib lin g r iv a lr y , th e n y o u k n o w th a t b o n d , w h ich w a s d a m a g e d b y sh a m e , is a lw a y s b e lie v e d to b e r e p a r a b le an d r e c o v e r a b le . . . . W ith lim ita tio n - r e m c d ia t io n s c r ip t s w e a r c d e a lin g w ith p e r m a n e n t , s e r io u s p r o b le m s , w h ic h , h o w e v e r, d e m a n d an d le n d th e m s e lv e s to r e m e d y . T h a t fits r e m a r k a b ly w e ll w ith m y u n d e r s t a n d in g o f th e n a tu re o f d is tr e s s . I h ave c o n tr a s t e d d is tr e s s w ith te r r o r . T e r r o r is an e m e r g e n c y r e s p o n s e w h ic h is u r g e n t an d c o s tly an d n e e d s t o b e a tte n d e d to im m e d ia t e ly , w h e r e a s d is tr e s s h as th e v e ry fine p r o p e r t y o f m o tiv a tin g y o u in a n e g a tiv e s c e n e b u t is n o t so p u n ish in g th a t y o u c a n n o t u tiliz e all o f y o u r r e s o u r c e s t o c o p e w ith th a t d is tr e s s in g s ta te o f a ffa irs. T h u s it fits v e ry b e a u tifu lly w ith th e d e fin itio n s o f s c r ip t s d e d ic a t e d to d e a lin g w ith lo n g - t e r m b ad s itu a tio n s , b u t s itu a tio n s w h ic h d e m a n d an d w h ic h c an b e im p r o v e d . W h e n w e c o m e to d e c o n ta m in a t io n s c r ip t s , w e a r e , o f c o u r s e , d e a lin g v e ry p r e c is e ly w ith w 'hat I u n d e r s t a n d t o b e th e d y n a m ic s o f th e d r iv e a u x ilia r y r e s p o n s e o f d is g u s t . D is g u s t is th e r e s p o n s e o f d is e n c h a n tm e n t. 1 s tr e s s b o th dis an d enchant­ ment. W h e n y o u ta k e s o m e th in g in to y o u r m o u th w h ic h y o u th o u g h t w a s g o o d e n o u g h to e a t , an d il tu r n s o u t to b e s o m e th in g y o u v o m it o u t , y o u a re d is ­ e n c h a n te d w ith th at fo o d an d w ith th a t o b je c t , i f y o u u se il m e ta p h o r ic a lly . T h e s ta tu s o f d is g u s t , o f c o u r s e , is q u it e d iffe r e n t fro m th a t o f an a ffe c t. It is a v e ry s tr a n g e s ta tu s , b e c a u s e i f 1 g iv e y o u a v e ry ta sty d ish w h ic h y o u e n jo y , an d a few m in u te s la t e r I te ll y o u th a t it c a m e Iro m th e e n tr a ils o f y o u r n e ig h b o r , y o u a rc d is e n c h a n te d an d y o u m ay v o m it . N o w th a t is an in n ate n a u se a r e s p o n s e to a le a r n e d s tim u lu s — v e ry s tr a n g e . . . . It illu s tr a te s s o m e th in g o f th e a m b ig u ity o f . . . d is g u s t , in th a t it can an d d o e s p lay a v e ry p o w e r fu l r o le in o u r liv e s b e c a u s e w e r e a c t t o s c e n e s as i f th e y w e r e b a d f o o d , w h ic h o n c e h ad b e e n o r w e r e th o u g h t to b e g o o d . T h a t is a v e ry p o w e r fu l m o t iv e . W e s e e it, fo r e x a m p le , in an e x t r a o r d in a r y w ay in th e O ’ N e ill fam ily o f w h ich E u g e n e O ’ N e ill, th e p la y w r ig h t, w a s a m e m b e r . T h e y w e r e all d is g u s t e d w ith c ac h o th e r b e c a u s e th e m o t h e r b e c a m e a d o p e a d d ic t , th e fa th e r w a s te d h is t a le n t, th e o ld e s t s o n w a s an a lc o h o lic , an d E u g e n e O ’ N e ill w a s sic k an d a t t im e s a lc o h o lic . T h e y t o r e e a c h o t h e r a p a r t in d is g u s t , a g ain an d a g a in . Long D a y ’s Journ ey into N ight p r o b a b ly w ill b e th e c la s s ic o f s h a r e d , fo u r- w a y d is g u s t fo r all tim e to c o m e . It is a v e ry p o w e r fu l play in w h ic h th e m a jo r d y n a m ic is sh a r e d d is g u s t o f p e o p le in love w ith c a c h o t h e r an d in d is g u s t w ith c a c h o th e r. . . . F in a lly , w e c o m e t o th e a n t ito x ic s c r ip t s . T h e s e a re m a p p e d q u ite w e ll o n to te r r o r , r a g e , an d d is s m e ll. W c k n o w th e t o x ic it y o f te r r o r . T h e b o d y w as n o t d e s ig n e d lo liv e in t e r r o r . Il is a v e ry p u n ish in g r e s p o n s e , w h ic h w c h ave to g e t rid o f as s o o n a s p o s s ib le . R a g e is n o t like d is tr e s s . . . . Il is su ffic ie n tly m o r e t o x ic so th at it d o e s n o t le n d i t s e lf to fin e, lo n g - t e r m u se . If w e g e t in to a d e e p r a g e , o u r to ta l r e s o u r c e s a re n o t a lw a y s a l o u r c o m m a n d . A m u te d r a g e m ay e m p o w e r an

1 5 0

SILVAN

S. T O M K I N S

organized life, but a hot rage rarely. Sim ilarly, with d issm ell; in con trast to d isgust, d issm ell is a very toxic response socially and o th erw ise, because it says the other is unfit for hum an con su m ption , basically. . . . In dissm ell you arc m oving y ou rself away from a bad-sm elling ob ject. . . . In co n tem p t, . . . you m ove tow ard the ob ject. . . .H e m eans to h urt and he m eans to reject. That is w hat co n tem p t is. It d e grad e s the other. It is m eant to. It is used in severely hierarchical relation sh ips, w hen the one w ho has the p ow er judges that the other is not only w eak and can be abused but d eserves to b e, m erits it, and asks for it. It is a rather ugly com bination . It is the least attractive o f hum an resp o n ses and it is very dan gerous. Lynchings in this coun try w ere based upon it. T h e w hites, en dan gered, w ere goin g to show the blacks their place and did it by killing, as an intim idation for other blacks, so that they should not be to o “u p p ity .” Th at is con tem p t. The other is judged less than hum an. This w as also true in H itle r’ s G erm an y. The Jew s w ere regarded as pollutin g the b lood o f the A ryan, and the only way to deal w ith that w as to kill —six m illion o f them . . . . So these . . . affects, . . . m ap extrem ely w ell on to sccn cs o f e xtrao rdin ary toxicity and danger for human beings. They exem plify the life in extrem is. If you have to live your life te r ri­ fied, dissm ellin g, and en raged, you are in big trouble and so are the p e o p le around you. . . . Let m e give you a little e xam p le, and I stress little, o f the kind o f illum ination that one can get from the em ploym en t o f such a set o f categories and affects. I will con trast tw o peop le, both distinguished at the d econ tam in ation , an titoxic end o f the scale. I refer to the ph ilosoph er W ittgenstein and the novelist H em ingw ay. Both, oddly enough, suffered from a very sim ilar problem o f gen d er identity. In the case o f W ittgen stein , it w as h om osexu ality. In the case o f H em ingw ay, it was that his m oth er often d ressed him as a girl and had him w ear long curls long beyond the stage that might norm ally h appen, and caused a great confusion in H em in gw ay ’s m ind. So he started out with a deeply con tam inated socialization. D id his m oth er w ant a boy? D id she w ant a girl? It certainly looked m ore like she w anted a girl, and he w as in terested in cro ss-sexed dressin g gam es m ost o f his life. H em in gw ay ’ s solution to the decon tam ination scrip t wras the gen eral strategy o f purification . If you have go t an identity p ro b lem , one ol the w ays o f handling a contam inated identity is to purify it. So he becam e ultram asculinc, as we all know. A friend o f m ine, w ho w as a fine athlete, an all-A m erican football player, used to know H em ingw ay in Paris. He said H em ingw ay w ould always be both erin g him to b ox w ith h im , and that H em ingw ay could not b ox w orth a dam n. But he had to show that he w as a man and used to bore my frien d, w ho w as, in fact, a very fine boxer. H em in gw ay’ s w hole life h istory is an attem p t, sadly, to prove som ething w hich he did n ot believe. . . . The com parison w ith W ittgen stein is in terestin g because W ittgenstein also suffered from gen d er confusion and he seriously con sidered suicide. T h ree o f his b roth ers had already su icid ed , and he talked o f it m uch o f his life. So he m oved from a decon tam ination scrip t to an an titoxic scrip t. He saw no way to purify h im self, so he m oved over one rung on the scale to an an titoxic solution — he could destroy him self. But the fascinating thing about W ittgenstein is that at one point he learned about Freud. I do not know w hether he w as analyzed, o r w hether he just read it,

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b u t it r a d ic a lly c h a n g e d h im . It m o v e d th e s c r i p t , w h ic h h ad s t a r t e d as d e c o n t a m i n ­ a tio n a n d h a d m o v e d to a n t i - t o x i c , t o r e m e d i a t i o n at th e e n d , a n d th at sav e d h im . I w ill r e a d to y o u his o w n a c c o u n t o f it. W h e n e v e r y o u ’ r e p r e o c c u p i e d w ith s o m e t h i n g , w it h s o m e t r o u b l e , o r w it h s o m e p r o b l e m w h ic h is a b ig th in g , as s e x is, f o r in s t a n c e , th e n n o m a t t e r w h a t y o u s t a r t f r o m , th e a s s o c ia t io n w ill le a d finallv an d in e v ita b ly b a c k t o th a t s a m e t h e m e . F r e u d r e m a r k s o n h o w a f t e r the an aly sis o f it, th e d r e a m a p p e a r s s o v e r y lo g ic a l a n d o f c o u r s e it d o c s , an d w o r s e it o f te n has th e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f g i v i n g a s o r t o f t r a g i c p a t t e r n to o n e ’ s life. It is all th e r e p e t i t i o n o f the s a m e p a t t e r n w h ic h w a s s e t tl e d l o n g a g o , like a t r a g i c fig u r e c a r r y i n g o u t the d e c r e e s u n d e r w h ic h the fa te s had p la c e d h im a t b i r t h . M a n y p e o p l e have at s o m e p e r i o d s e r i o u s t r o u b l e in th e ir liv e s, s o s e r i o u s as to le a d t o t h o u g h t s o f s u ic id e . T h i s is likely t o a p p e a r to o n e as s o m e t h i n g n a s t y , as a s itu a t io n w h ic h is t o o fo u l t o b e a s u b j e c t o f a t r a g e d y . A n d it m a y th e n b e an i m m e n s e r e l i e f if it ca n b e s h o w n th at o n e ’ s life h as th e p a t t e r n r a t h e r o f a t r a g e d y , the tr a g i c w o r k i n g o u t a n d r e p e t i t i o n o f a p a t t e r n . In o t h e r wro r d s , th is is a g iv e n lim it a t i o n o f th e life c o n d i t i o n o v e r w h ich y o u have v e r y little c o n t r o l . B u t t h e r e is a d ig n it y in s e e i n g th at this is an e x i s t e n t i a l p r o b l e m , a n d th a t e n a b le d W i t t g e n s t e i n to m o v e f r o m d e c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t o a n t i t o x i c , to r e m e d i a t i o n . It is n o t m u c h , b u t e n o u g h to sav e his life. I g iv e y o u th e se t w o v e r y s m a l l e x a m p l e s o f th e il lu m i n a t io n th at c o m e s fr o m th e in t e r a c t io n b e t w e e n k n o w i n g w h a t th e d o m i n a n t , p r i m a r y a ffe c ts a r e f o r la r g e c l a s s e s o f s c r i p t s a n d h o w th e y m a y m o v e a r o u n d in d e v e l o p m e n t . T h o s e c h a n g e s a r e v e r y d iffic u lt to d e a l w it h w i t h o u t s o m e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k . I h ave f o u n d th is f r a m e w o r k t o b e q u it e illu m i n a t in g in r e v e a l in g th e m a j o r o u t l in e o f a life h is t o r y . T h i s is an e x a m p l e o f w h a t I m e a n w h e n I say, i f w e have p o w e r f u l e n o u g h t h e o r y , w e ca n th e n g o to th e fa c e a n d say, i f y o u s e c th is a ffe c t is d o m i n a n t , l o o k fo r s u c h a n d s u c h a c la s s o f p r e o c c u p a t i o n , a n d if it s h ifts , l o o k f o r a shift in s c r i p t f o r m a t i o n . T h a t is th e u tility o f it.

Chapter

17

Dick Pountain and David Robins COOL R U L E S A n a to m y o f an a ttitu d e

[• ■ •]

H

ERE

. ..

IS A B A S I S

FOR

a rough w orking definition o f C ool that

may serve until m ore o f its p ro p erties are uncovered in later chapters. C ool

is an oppositional altitude ad opted by individuals o r sm all gro u p s to e x p re ss defi­ ance to authority — w hether that o f the parent, the teacher, the police, the boss or the prison w arden. Put m ore succin ctly, we see C o o l as a permanent state o f private rebellion . Permanent because C o o l is n ot ju st som e ‘phase that you go th rou gh ’ , som eth in g that you ‘grow out o f ’ , but rather som eth in g that if once attained rem ains fo r life; private b ecause C o o l is not a collective political resp o n se but a stance o f individual defiance, w hich d o es not announce itse lf in striden t slogans but con ceals its rebellion behind a m ask of ironic im passivity. This attitude is in the p rocess o f b eco m in g the dom in ant type o f relation betw een p eop le in W estern so cieties, a new secular virtue. N o-on c w ants to be good any m o re , they w ant to be C o o l, and this desire is no lon ger confined to teen agers but is to be found in a sizeable m inority even o f the over-50s w'ho w ere perm an ently affected by the ’ 60s coun ter-culture. T his brings us to a secon d difficulty in defining C o o l, nam ely its m utability. If C o o l is n ot inherent in ob jects but in p eo p le, then w hat is seen as C o o l w ill change from place to place, from tim e to tim e and from gen eration to gen eration . T h ose m arketing m anagers at Levi Strauss desperately trying to ‘crack the code o f c o o l’ know that their jeans w ere gran ted C ool status by an accident o f h istory, and advertisin g alone cannot recaptu re it for them . In any epoch , although C o o l w ill have a particularly pow erful m eaning for teen agers, as an an tidote to their ever-presen t fear o f bein g e m b arrasse d , being C o o l fo rm s part o f a risky series o f n egotiations about b eco m in g an individual w hile still being accepted into a gro u p — it’ s about both individuality and b elon gin g, and

COOL

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the ten sion betw een the two. O n ce acq u ired, C o o l d ocs not w ear oil quickly, and since in its m o d ern form it appeared in the ’ 50s, there arc now at least lour gen eration s alive w ho have their ow n — often seriously clashing — definitions of w'hat is C o o l. R ecen t stud ies of u n d e r-30 d ru g u sers reveal that a significant n um ber have paren ts w ho first exp erim en ted with dru gs in the ’60s and ’ 70s (w hen they w ere C o o l them selves) and w ho arc now in a quandary ab out w hat to tell their children. Each succeed in g gen eration feels that ‘re a l’ C ool is som eth in g pure and existen tial known only to them - it w as founded in iheir tim e, in the jazz clubs o f the ’ 5 0s, o r the hippy festivals o f the ’ 6 0 s, or the punk explosion o f the ’ 70s. O ne com po n en t o f C ool is certainly a retarded ad olescen ce, inspired in p art by a m orbid fear o f ageing

anyone w ho has been to a party w here 50-som eth in gs g e t dow n to

the strains o f ‘ G e t O ff o f My C lo u d ’ have had a glim p se o f the danse macabre. O n the other hand, C o o l is equally about teen agers behaving with p reco ciou s m aturity (especially about sex and political cynicism ), and o ld e r h ip sters arc d is­ covering that the behaviour they em ployed as provocation in the ’ 60s is nowaccepted as everyday routin e: city stre ets, cafes, m ovie theatres and clubs thronged w ith exu b eran t youth fo r w hom w earin g hair long or sp o rtin g a nose ring is con sidered quite a m ild social statem en t (it’s easy to forget that in ‘sw inging L o n d o n ’ in the ’ 60s the b u rger join t w as the only place open after 1 0 .3 0 p m ). [. . .] C o o l is a reb ellious attitude, an exp ression o f a b e lie f that the m ainstream m ores o f your socicty have no legitim acy and do not apply to you. It’s a selfcontained and individualistic attitude, although it places high value on friendship within a tightly defined p e e r g ro u p — indeed it strives to displace traditional family ties, w hich are to o intim ate and intrusive to allow sufficient space fo r self-invention. C o o l is profoun dly h edonistic but often to such a self-destructive degree that it flirts w ith death: by acciden t, suicide or som e am bivalent ad m ix tu re ol the two (for exam p le, a m o to rcy cle crash o r au to-ero tic stran gu lation ). C o o l w as once an attitude fo stered by reb els and un d erd ogs — slaves, p riso n e rs, political dissidents — for w hom open rebellion invited punish m ent, so it hid its defiance behind a w all of ironic d etach m en t, distancing itse lf from the so u rce o f authority rath er than directly confrontin g it. In the ’ 50s this attitude w as w idely ad opted by artists and in tel­ lectuals w ho thereby aided its infiltration into p op u lar eultu re, with the result that today it is b eco m in g the dom in ant attitude, even (o r perhaps especially) am on g the rich and privileged w ho can w ield it as m erely the latest in a lon g line o f w eapons writh which to put dow n their ‘ social in fe rio rs’ . C o n tem p o rary C o o l is equally at hom e in the ten em en t b asem en t and the m illion-dollar loft con version . At its m ost e x tre m e , C o o l can even be tu rn ed into a m anipulative strategy for separating peop le from their fam ilies and en couragin g depen den cy: ‘control fre ak s’ such as C h arles M anson, David K horcsh o f the Branch D ravidians (o f W aco n o to rie ty ), the Reverend Jim Jones and gu ru s like the Bagw han Shri Rajneesh have all deployed C o o l as an asp ect o f their m anipulative perso n as. [. . .]

The cool personality . . . C ool is an attitude o r personality type that has em erg ed in many different societies, durin g different h istorical ep och s, and w hich has served different social

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fu n ctio n s, but is n e v e rth e le ss reco g n izab le in all its m an ifestatio n s as a p a rticu la r co m b in atio n of th ree c o re . . . traits, n am ely n arc issism , ironic d e tach m cn t and h ed o n ism . N arcissism m e an s an e x a g g e ra te d ad m iration fo r o n e se lf, p articu larly fo r p e r ­ son al ap p e aran ce , w hich g iv e s rise to the feelin g that the w o rld rev o lv es arou n d you and sh ares y o u r m o o d s. A t its m o s t p o sitiv e such n arcissism is a healthy celeb ratio n o f the se lf, w hile even in its m o re negative m an ife statio n s it can be an effective ad ap tation to any o p p re ssiv e c ircu m stan c e s that sap se lf-e ste e m . Such c irc u m ­ stan ces w ould ap p e ar to in clu dc n ot only the ob v io u s c x p c r ic n c c o f p o v erty , political re p re ssio n and tyranny b u t even life in the c e leb rity -w o rsh ip p in g c o n su m e r d e m o c ra c ie s o f the d e v e lo p e d w o rld . O f c o u rse to any pu ritan c u ltu re , narcissism a p p e ars as the sin o f vanity. Ironic d c tac h m cn t is a stratag em fo r co n cealin g o n e ’ s feelin gs by su gg e stin g their o p p o site , fo r e x a m p le feign in g b o re d o m in the face o f dan ger, o r a m u sem en t in the facc o f in su lt. P h ilo so p h ers distin gu ish several ty p es o f iron y , in clu ding So cratic iro n y , w hich in volves saying less than one really m e an s to lull an op p o n e n t in to false se c u rity , w hile actually d e liv e rin g a tellin g blow to his a rg u m e n t, and R o m an tic iron y, a p ro fo u n d sce p ticism w hich q u e stio n s the validity o f everythin g (as e x e m p lifie d in the ap h o rism s o f N ie tz sc h e ). C o o l irony p a rtak es o f b oth these m e an in gs, m ak in g it a verb al w eapon equally effective in ag gre ssio n o r d e fe n ce , and cru cial to the m ain tenan ce o f a p ro te ctiv e C o o l p e rso n a . Irony allow s one to give d eep offen ce w hile o sten sib ly rem ain in g civil, as in the black A m erican trad ition o f ‘ sh u ck in g’ sp e e ch u sed to ad d re ss w hite au th ority fig u re s, w hich o ffers a s u b ­ se rv ie n c e so e x a g g e ra te d that it b e co m e s in so len t. Je w ish h u m o u r has a sim ilar trad ition of d e fe n siv e -ag gressiv e iron y, and it w as ’ 6 0 s c o m ic s such as M o rt Sahl and Lenny B ru ce , co m in g o u t o f this trad itio n , w h o fo rg e d a new strain o f ‘ sick h u m o u r’ , fo r e x a m p le by d e lib e rate ly usin g racial e p ith e ts as a w ay o f defu sin g th eir p o w e r to h u rt. T h is typ e of iron ic h u m o u r now so suffuses m o d e rn C o o l that display s o f sim p le sin cerity have b e co m e a lm o st im p o ssib lv U n co o l — Q u en tin Taran tin o can m ake m o p p in g sp lattere d b rain s o ff a car scat seem gen uin ely funny. H ed o n ism re q u ire s less e x p la n atio n , e x c e p t p e rh ap s to p o in t o u t that C o o l h ed on ism ten d s tow ard the w o rld ly , ad ven tu rou s and even o rg iastic rath e r than the p le asan t. A t its ligh test, C o o l h ed on ism is that p u rsu it o f h app in ess en shrin ed in the A m erican C o n stitu tio n and d e sc rib e d so w ell by de T o cq u eville as ‘ a love o f physical gratificatio n , the n otio n o f b e tte rin g o n e ’ s co n d itio n , the e x c ite m e n t o f c o m p e titio n , the ch arm o f an ticip ated s u c c e ss ’ . [. . .]

The c w ord A gre at so u rce o f con fu sio n in u n d e rstan d in g C o o l is the w o rd itse lf, w hich already has several closely re la te d m e ta p h o rical u sa g e s, d eriv ed from its ph ysical m ean in g o f low te m p e ra tu re . For e x a m p le , The Oxford English Dictionary o ffers this d efin itio n : C o o l: to lose the heat o f e x c itc m e n t o r passion , to b c c o m c less zealo u s o r ard en t. N o t affected by p assion o r e m o tio n , u n e x c ite d , d e lib e rate , c a lm .

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. . . w h ile Jo n a th o n G r e e n in h is D ictionary o f S lan g ( 1 9 9 8 ) g iv e s its v e r n a c u la r u s a g e s a s: C o o l : la te n in e te e n th c e n t u r y + : g o o d o r fin e o r p le a s in g ; tw e n tie th c e n tu r y : c a lm , s e lf- p o s s e s s e d , a w a re an d s o p h is tic a t e d ; 1 9 4 0 + : fa s h io n ­ a b le , c h ic o r w ith it. T h e s e m e a n in g s a c c u r a tc ly d e s c r ib e an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f th e C o o l a t titu d e , b u t at th e s a m e t im e th e y c o n c e a l its u n d e r ly in g t r a n s g r c s s iv c e le m e n t s , th e iro n ic an d d e fia n t c h a r a c te r th a t d is tin g u is h e s it fro m m a n y p r e v io u s v e r s io n s o f n o n ­ c h a la n c e an d s a v o ir - fa ire . [. . .] ‘ C o o l ’ in its m e a n in g o f ‘g o o d ’ , ‘ fin e ’ o r ‘ f a s h io n a b le ’ is n o w u s e d as a u n i­ v e rs a l t e r m o f a p p ro v a l a m o n g th e y o u n g in N o r t h A m e r ic a an d th e U K (a s w e ll as in m a n y n o n - E n g lis h - sp c a k in g c o u n t r ie s ) , r ig h t fr o m c h ild r e n in p r im a r y s c h o o l p la y g r o u n d s u p to c o llc g c - a g e a d u lts . [. . .] D o c s th is th e n im p ly th a t ‘c o o l ’ is a p r e c is e sy n o n y m fo r ‘g o o d ’ an d h as n o d e e p e r c o n te n t? O n th e c o n tr a r y , ‘ c o o l ’ alw ay s c a r r ie s an e x t r a , o fte n b a r e ly p e r c e iv e d , c o n n o t a tio n : d e s c r ib in g s o m e th in g (a r e c o r d , a m o v ie , a s o ft d r in k ) as ‘ c o o l ’ r a th e r th an ‘ s w e ll’ o r ‘ d a n d y ’ m a k e s th e s ta te m e n t , in h o w e v e r sm a ll a w a y , th a t th e p e r s o n w h o u t t e r s it is C o o l an d n o t a n e r d o r a c o n f o r m is t . O f c o u r s e th e n in c - y c a r - o ld in p r im a r y s c h o o l w ill n o t u n d e r s ta n d su c h c o n n o ta tio n s at fir s t, b u t th ey w ill g r a d u a lly a b s o r b p r e c is e ly w h at it is th at m a k e s s o m e th in g s C o o l an d o t h e r s n o t in th e e y e s o f th e ir p e e r s , so th at m e r e ly u sin g th e w o r d f o r m s p a r t o f an u n o ffic ia l, a lte r n a tiv e p r o c e s s o f s o c ia liz a tio n . ( . . . ) T h e im p lic a tio n is th a t in m a n y c o n t e x t s ‘ c o o l ’ a c tu a lly m e a n s th e p r e c is c o p p o s it e o f ‘ g o o d ’ . It s o m e o n e say s ‘ I t ’ s c o o l to d o c o k e ’ th ey d o n ’ t m e a n th at i t ’ s good c itiz e n sh ip to ta k e c o c a in e , o r good fo r v o u r h ea lth to ta k e c o c a in c : th ey m e a n it is in te n s e ly p le a s u r a b le to ta k e c o c a in e , an d th a t th e fa c t th a t i t ’ s ille g a l m a k e s ta k in g c o c a in c m o r e e x c itin g an d m a k e s th e m C o o l e r in th e e y e s o f th e ir p e e r s . T h is s o r t o f ir o n ic in v e rsio n o f v a lu e s u n d e r lie s m a n y o t h e r C o o l- s la n g t e r m s like th e u se o f ‘ w ic k c d ’ o r tr a d itio n a llyJ u n c lc a n t e r m s like ‘ s h it ’ an d ‘ fu n k Jy ’ a s t e r m s o f a p p r o v a l. [. . .] In th e U S A c o n tr o v e r s y h as s u r r o u n d e d th e su b c u ltu r a l o r ig in s o f th e w o rd cool r a th e r th an its e ty m o lo g y . S o m e h ave c la im e d th e e x p r e s s io n o r ig in a te d in th e ja z z c lu b s c e n e o f th e ’ 3 0 s : ‘ W h e n th e a ir o f th e s m o k e - fille d n ig h tc lu b s o f th a t e ra b e c a m e u n b r e a th a b le , w in d o w s an d d o o r s w e r e o p e n e d t o a llo w s o m e “ c o o l a ir ” in ...

By a n a lo g y , th e s lo w an d s m o o t h ja z z sty le th a t w a s ty p ic a l o f th a t la te - n ig h t

sc e n e c a m e to b e c a lle d “ c o o l ” . C o o l w a s s u b s e q u e n tly e x t e n d e d t o d e s c r ib e any p h y sic a lly a ttr a c tiv e m a le ja z z m u s ic ia n , o r a fic io n a d o w h o p a tr o n iz e d su c h c l u b s .’ T h is h as th e slig h tly b o g u s fe e l o f a ‘m y th o f o r ig i n s ’ , b u t w h a t is c e r ta in ly t r u e is th a t m u s ic an d s e x p la y e d a m a jo r p a r t in th e d e r iv a tio n o f C o o l, as in th e b lu e s ly ric ‘ S o m e like th e ir m a n h o t, b u t I lik e h im c o o l . ’ In fa c t th e w o rd cool b e c a m e a tta c h e d to o n e p a r t ic u la r sty le o f ja z z in th e la te ’ 4 0 s an d ’ 5 0 s , c o m p o u n d in g a c o n fu s io n b e tw e e n th e m u s ic a l sty le an d th e a ttitu d e (w h ic h w a s e x h ib ite d by fa r m o r e jazz m u s ic ia n s th an e v e r p la y e d th e s ty le ). B e s id e s , th e fin g e r - c lic k in g t e e n a g e r s o f West Side Story p r o b a b ly b ro u g h t th e w o r d in to th e c o n s c io u s n e s s o f m o r e w h ite , m id d le c la ss A m e r ic a n s th an jazz e v e r d id . A m o n g th e ’ 6 0 s h ip p ie s ‘ c o o l ’ to o k o n a slig h tly

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n arrow er m eaning — clo ser to its traditional im plication o f nonchalance — o f a calm ing dow n to b etter deal with a p ro b lem , which has m etam orp h osed into the cu rrcn t usage ‘to ch ill’ . H ow ever, it w as the hip-hop cultu re of the ’ 80s and ’ 90s that resto red to ‘c o o l’ (o r ‘k o o l’ ) those tran sgressive and defiant conn otation s that it still b ears for m any teen agers today. [. . .] Wc w ould hypothesize further . . . that C ool is preciselv one such m echanism that peop le use to sh o rt-circu it m aladaptive com parison s and avoid d ep ression . Sociological th eories such as ‘strain ’ theory su p p o rt the idea that school students w ho feel that thcv arc failing in the classro o m , or w ho do n ot ‘ fit in ’ socially, ad opt a strategy o f disen gagem en t from

school activities, and develop anti­

academ ic cliques, o r su b cu ltu res, that provide an alternative ro u te to self-esteem . By acting C o o l you declare y o u rse lf to be a n on-participant in the b igger race, for if you d o n ’t share ‘straigh t’ so c ie ty ’s values then you can stop com parin g y o u rse lf to them . C o o l cannot abolish social com parison s entirely, but it can re strict their scope to your im m ediate p e e r grou p. M ods, ro ck e rs, skinheads, punks, h ippies, c ru sties, goth s: for several successive gen eration s o f m arginalized and disaffected youn g p eop le these su b cu ltu res, w ith their ow n ru le s, rituals and ob ligation s, have provided a magical alternative to being w ritten off as a h opeless lo se r in the rat race. In the language o f youth su b cu ltu res, ‘I’m c o o l’ equates to ‘ I’ m in c o n tr o l.’ So what C o o l has offered to g ro u p s as disparate as field slaves, jazz m usicians, disillusioned w ar veterans, D etro it street gan gs, teen age runaw ays and m iddle-class high school dissen ters is a kind o f m ental em pow erm en t that their circum stan ces otherw ise lail to supplv. In this sense C o o l is a subcultural altern ative to the old notion ol perso n al dignity, since dignity . . . is a quality that is validated by the establish ed institutions o f church, state and w ork. C o o l, on the other hand, is a form of self-w orth that is validated prim arily by the way your perso nality , appearan ce and attitude arc ad jud ged by your ow n p eers. N everth eless, the asso c i­ ation betw een C o o l,’ addiction and suicide suoggests that as a real solution to living in o o a highly com petitive society , it is only partially effective. Studies continue to show that the academ ic perfo rm an ce o f many boys d e terio ra te s rapidly betw een thirteen and nineteen as they com e to see learn in g and academ ic su ccess as ‘girlish ' and ‘ u n c o o l’ , and this disabling ten den cy am ong boys is bein g accom pan ied by increases in the rate o f suicide and attem p ted suicide. . . . C o o l detach m en t if pu rsu ed to its limit w ould lead to sociopathy and total isolation, but there is w ithin it a coun tervailing ten dency that unites close peer g ro u p s through a shared idea about w hat ‘ c o o l’ m eans — precisely those selfinvented co d cs o f d ress, hairstyle, ritual, attitude and slang that M ajors and Mancini Billson call ‘expressive sty lin g’ . But it is also this very tendency that open s the loophole through w hich the advertisin g industry has colon ized C ool and used it to sell go o d s to the young (and n ot-so-y oun g). C o o l’s m echanism o f social coh esion, the counterbalan ce to its distancing effect, involves sharing kn ow ledge o f so m e secret that is denied to m em b ers o f respectable or m ainstream society. T his w as the original m eaning o f that synonym for C o o l, ‘ h ip’ , w hich w as used as in ‘ I’ m hip to th a t.’ T h e content o f this shared secret may be many different things, from the appreciation o f a certain style o f m u sic, to predilection for a particular illegal d ru g, participation in crim e, o r so m e

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fo rb id d en se x u al p ractice . H ow ever, in the b ac k g ro u n d th ere is alw ays the hint o f a b igger, se ld o m -v e rb a liz ed , m o re ab strac t se c re t, nam ely the p e rce iv e d h yp ocrisy o f ‘ straig h t’ so ciety . C o o l p e o p le share a b e lie f that so c ie ty ’ s tab o o s have no m oral fo rc e lo r th em , and that th ese tab o o s are in any case regularly b rok en by even its m o st su p p o sed ly re sp e c tab le m e m b e rs. [. . .] T h is quality o f w orld ly kn o w in gn ess is ab so lu tely ccn tral to the C o o l p e r so n a l­ ity , w hich alw ays w an ts to kn ow every th in g and loath es sc c rc c y , c o n c e alm e n t and d u p licity . In essen ce then the p sy ch o lo g ical c o re o f C o o l is self-in ven tion co u p le d to a h v p cr-acu tc aw aren ess o f such self-in ven tion by o th e r p e o p le . It am o u n ts to the creation o f a calm psy ch ic m ask to hide in n er d istu rb an ce , w h eth er rage at racist m istre atm e n t, an xiety in the face o f c o m p e titio n o r m erely a fu rio u s u rge for sexu al c o n q u e st. It’s n o coin cid en ce that C o o l b e ca m e the d o m in an t attitu d e in a H o lly w ood w h ere self-in ven tion is a w ay o f life. [. . .]

R eference Tadesi, M . (1 9 9 4 ) Cool: the signs and meanings o f adolescence. Toronto. P. 37.

Chapter

18

Charles Morgan and James R. Averill TRUE F E E L I N G S , THE SELF, AND AUTHENTICITY A p s y c h o s o c ia l p e rs p e c tiv e

[■ ■ ■]

I

N HIS

HISTORICAL

EXAMINATION

OF

the idea o f the self,

B a u m e iste r (1 9 8 6 , 1 9 8 7 ) e x p lo r e s how a p e r so n ’ s identity in c o n te m p o ra ry

so ciety has b e c o m e in creasin gly d e p e n d e n t on overtly am b ig u o u s “m e ta c rite r ia .” W h e re a s o n ce , fo r e x a m p le , p e o p le typically d e riv e d identity from cle ar-c u t re lig io u s and class e x p e c ta tio n s, now p e o p le m o re often defin e w h o they arc in relation to “ in n er” n eed s and cap ac itie s, lo o k in g inw ard fo r m a rk e rs o f “ au th entic b e in g ” that m ay let them kn ow th em selves. “T ru e fe elin gs” are taken by m any as e x e m p la ry m a rk e rs in this se arch . H ow ever, as p e rv asiv e as such feelin gs arc, w e know very little ab o u t th em . [. . .]

The problem o f authenticity True feelings are revealed from deep inside. Other experiences cover up jo u r true feelings. Truefeelin gs were more important . . . intense. They bothered me more. They were kind o f scary. I wasn’t able to control them. They were going to happen i f I wanted them to or not. In the d om ain o f fe elin g, w e ch a ra c te riz e as “tru e ” that w hich w e e x p e rie n c e as au th entic. W h at, th en , giv es “tru e fe elin g s” th eir au th enticity? In this se ctio n , wc e x am in e so m e o f the c h a ra c te ristic fe atu re s that help distin gu ish “tru e fe e l­ in gs” from other, m o re co m m o n p la c e e m o tio n a l e x p e rie n c e s. [. . .] A s the above q u o tatio n s fro m the study by M o rgan (1 9 8 9 ) su g g e st, “tru e fe elin gs” are often

TRUE

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ch aracterized as (1) d eep , (2 ) intense, and (3 ) passionate (in the literal sense o f “beyond c o n tro l”). T h ese ch aracteristics ap pear sim ple enough , but their sim plicity is deceptive. 1. For the m o st p a rt, as w e have seen . . . “tru e feelings” are p erceived not only as arising from deep inside o u rselv es, but as arising from a d e e p e r sou rce than the “ordinary” feelings ol everyday life. It is in the “d eep, dark reg io n s” o f ou r selves that society is presu m ed not to reside, and so feelings that w e im agine as surfacing from this so u rce arc felt to be m ore “ gen uine” and “ au th entic,” unvitiatcd by the influences o f habit, exp ectatio n , and tradition. But, . . . the them atic content o f “tru e-feelin g” e p iso d e s, as w ell as the exp erien ced feelings th em selves, arc draw n from the m uch vaster pool o f cultural m eanings. Ironically, it is our questionable percep tion o f them as deep dow n , hidden, that lends them credibility, that “ auth enticates” them . As Trilling (1 9 7 2 , p. 161) n o tes, “to see society in ourselves is to feel in authentic,” and so for “true feelin gs” to feel “tr u e ,” we m u st see them as arising from som e culturally-devoid, socially-im m une w ellspring. 2. “T ru e-feelin g” episodes arc intense e x p erien ces and the feelings they c o m ­ prise arc, m ore often than n ot, con sidered painful. (In com parison to ordinary feelin gs, 7 5 .7 % o f sub jects in the study ju dged “true feelin gs” as m ore inten se; 6 1 .3 % ju d ged them m ore painful.) It may be that intensity in this case reflects a state o f disorganization , durin g w hich old p attern s o f thought and behavior are kept in abeyance, allow ing the self-creative p ro ce ss to gain sway (Frank 1 9 7 4 ). But be that as it m ay, intensity, painfulness, and stru ggle lend credibility to “tru e-feelin g” ex p e rie n c e s, enhancing o u r faith in their truthfulness. A b e lie f in the authenticating pow er o f suffering has a noble history that em b races e p iste m o lo g ie s as diverse as Christianity and Freudian ism . Sennett (1 9 8 0 ) com m en ted on the tendency o f peop le in con tem p orary A m erican society to seek m oral legitim acy through suffering: M o st o f all, the ennobling ol victim s m eans that in ordinary m iddle-class life we are forced constantly to go in search o f som e in jury, som e affliction, in o rd e r to justifv even the contem plation o f question s of justice, right and en titlem en t in o u r lives. . . . The need to legitim ate o n e ’s b eliefs in term s o f an injury o r suffering to which one has been subjected attaches peop le m ore and m ore to the in juries them selves (p. 150). 3. Finally, “true feelin gs” are felt to be authentic insofar as they arise outsid e o f a p e r so n ’ s con trol. (In com parison to ordinary feelin gs, 6 0 .7 % o f sub jects claim ed “true feelin gs” w ere “ less under [their] c o n tro l”). This p resen ts a p arad o x. H ow can an cxp crie n c c that is free o f p erso n al con trol be con sidered true? Like many p arad o xes, this one can be resolved at a higher level o f analysis. The p ercep tion o f “tru e feelings” as out o f control can be seen largely as an artifact o f a larger idea: the b e lie f in the prehum an, organ ic nature o f “tru e fe elin gs,” the belief, in sh o rt, in their fundam ental “n atu raln ess.” [. . .] In the R om an tic A ge, the glorification o f organ ic bein g achieved new heights such that Sch illcr could w rite o f the soph isticated p e rso n ’s need for “ energizing b e au ty ,” the source o f w hich is “the strength |man] brought w ith him from the state

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o f sa v a g e ry .” T h is n otion o f a p rim o rd ia l in n er stren gth still c a rrie s g re at w eight in o u r cu ltu re (as the c o n tin u e d p o p u larity o f Ju n gian p sy ch o lo gy atte sts, n o t to m en tion the c u rre n t fascination w ith so c io b io lo g y ). In “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e rie n c e s w e see re fle cte d the b e lie f in a tran sfo rm a tio n a l organ ic e n d o w m e n t. T h e search lo r the tru e , the au th en tic, thus b e c o m e s a search tor the o rgan ic (a se a rch , it m u st be n o te d , that acq u ires ever g re a te r u rgen cy as w e e x p e rie n c e the re le n tle ss d e m o ­ lition o f o u r organ ic en v iro n m e n t). In o u r e rro n e o u s p e rce p tio n o f “tru e fe elin gs” as free from the im p in g e m e n ts o f social and in dividual p u r p o se , w e se e them as n atural and organ ic and w e read in to them an o th e rw ise elusive au th en ticity , a stay again st the fragm e n tatio n s o f e x iste n ce . In d e e d , in so far as “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e r ie n c e s arc sclf-cn h an cin g, they fo ste r a sen se o f tran scc n d c n c c over the d is­ orien tatio n and discon n ection o f o u r lives, that is, a sen se o f se a m le ss being. And as w e have se e n , this can se rv e useful and ad aptive p u r p o se s. B ut to the e x te n t that o u r e x p e rie n c e s o f fra g m e n ta tio n , alien ation , and d iso rie n tatio n are the p ro d u cts o f cu ltu ral m ach in atio n s

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se n sib ilitie s, “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e r ie n c e s arc m erely on e a sp e c t o f a p e rsc v c ran t cy cle o f loss and re c o v e ry , d am ag e and repair. A nd the u rgen cy in o u r search for au th en ticity , as w ell as the p e rv asiv e n e ss o f “tru e -fe e lin g ” e x p e r ie n c e s th e m se lv e s, m ay b e sp e a k , to parap h rase T rillin g, an in creasin g an xiety over the cred ib ility o f ou r very e x iste n c e . By se v e rin g the au th en tic from the so cial, by seek in g tru e b e in g only in the d ep th s o f o u r se lv e s, w e are den ied that sen se o f in te rsu b je ctiv ity w h ose ab scn cc has p rovok ed th ese very scv crin gs and se e k in gs, and w h ose recovery alone can re sto re lost m ean in g to o u r lives.

True feelin gs and the se lf Swarmed with problems and people for six weeks straight made me aware that I needed some time alone to pull myself together. 1 took a long walk by the fields resolving certain feelings and ideas that had bothered me for so long. It was enlightening. I had a boyfriend . . . he constantly manipulated me. Anything 1 liked, he hated. I thought we had some unbreakable commitment . . . [but] I realized I hcis inside . . . 1 was losing energy. . . . 1 really realized that he didn’t love me, he loved me only when I was what he wanted me to be. . . . / was waking up for the first time. And when this true feeling really came out, 1 left him f o r good. Room. That was it. Truefeelings help to form some answer to the question, who am I? T h e n ear c lam o ro u s c o n c e rn in o u r cu ltu re ab o u t “w h o w e really are ” has a lon g and in trig u in g h isto ry (B a u m e iste r 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 8 7 ; E lle n b e rg e r 1 9 7 0 ; M arcu se 1 9 6 6 ; T rillin g 1 9 7 2 ). And the ex ten t to w hich this c o n c e rn p e rv ad e s and c o lo r s all asp ec ts o f c o n te m p o ra ry A m erican life is the su b je c t o f n u m e ro u s b o o k s and artic le s (se e , fo r e x a m p le , B ellah , M ad se n , Sullivan, Sw idler, and T ip to n 1 9 8 5 ). “T ru e -fe e lin g ” e p iso d e s (le t alo ne this study itse lf!) arc on e m o re m an ifestation o f this c o n c e rn —

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an especially em blem atic m anifestation in that the question o f “true feelin gs” lies at the core o f o u r beliefs about the self. We have presen ted evidence su ggestin g that beyond their self-affirm ing attrib u tes, “true feelin gs” enable sell-adaptive p ro ce sse s, providing, in a sen se, creative solutions to p rob lem s in self-m aintenance. In fact, “ tru e-feelin g” ep isod es b ear striking parallels w ith creative p ro ce sse s in gen eral, and an exam in ation o f these parallels may help further illum inate the nature o f “true feelings” and their relation to the self. G ordon (1 9 8 9 ) n oted that an essential distinguishing ch aracteristic o f e m o ­ tional exp erien ce may be the sense o f self-discovery. H e suggested that through em otional e x p erien ce w e com e to realize previously unseen cap acitics, leading to the expan sion o f o u r sense o f self. In the ex p c ric n c c o f “tru e feelin gs,” we have seen a sim ilar relationship betw een self-discoverv through em otional expression and the en largem en t o f self-adaptive capacities. We have suggested that the self-discovery b orn in “tru e feelin gs” is, in p a rt, a creative solution to the tu rm o il, stasis, or confusion in a p e r so n ’s life. M ay’s assertion (1 9 7 5 ) that “creativity is one o f the essential ch aracteristics o f self-discovery” further su ggests the elose relationship b etw een creative acts and “tru c-fcclin g” exp erien ces. M o st accoun ts o f creativity (see May 1 9 7 5 ; R oth en b erg and H ausm an 1976; Ste rn b erg 1988) hold that the basic creative m otivation is an innate need to m ake o rd er out o f chaos. (S te rn ’s w ork [1985] provides em pirical su p p o rt for the fundam ental p attern -seek in g, order-creatin g p ropen sities o f h um ankind.) C risis and disord er, then, provide the stron gest occasion fo r both creative and “trucfcclin g” ep isodes. M oreover, in both kinds o f e p iso d e s, the m ost com m on affective sequence is an early sense o f turm oil and an xiety, an ensuing intensity o f feeling, and a subsequen t e xp erien ce o f re lie f and satisfaction. In creative acts the sense o f ending o r resolve is provided by the gratification o f discovery. In “tru e-feelin g” e p iso d es, it seem s to be the creation o r discoverv o f aspects o f se lf— and the gratification that ensues from self-un derstan din g and change— that provides a sense o f ending. In o rd e r to m ake these ob servation s m o re p recise, w e refer to the lo u r stages of the creative p ro ce ss en um erated by W allas (1 9 2 6 ), nam ely, prep aratio n , incubation, illum ination, and verification. T h e first o r p reparatory stage entails the “hard, con scio us, . . . and fruitless analysis” o f a prob lem . In “true fe elin gs,” this c o rr e ­ spon ds to the con scio u s, often d esp erate, and m ostly un successful attem p ts, in the days and w eeks b efore an e p iso d e, to m ake sense o f inner conflict and find som e m eans for resolvin g it. The second stage, incubation, is ch aracterized by an absence o f conscious effort. In the days, h ours, o r m in utes ju st precedin g a “tru e-feelin g” episod e, su b jects often d escrib ed a p e rio d o f stasis and frustration . U nable to un derstan d their tu rm oil or effect change, they b ecam e passive, at least m o m e n tar­ ily forgoin g con scious effort. In the e x p erien ce o f “tru e fe elin g s,” this stage, which may be sim ilar to incubation, is follow ed by an often tum u ltu ou s sense o f discovery and the exp erien ce o f understanding and change— that is, o f illum ination. The e xp erien ce o f illum ination, w hether in creative o r “tru c-fcclin g” e p iso d es, is m arked by a conviction o f validity that can be quite m isleading. In the precedin g scction , we saw how “tru e feelin gs” arc often e x p erien ced as d eep , intense, and beyond perso n al con trol. Features such as these lend the e xp erien ce an aura o f authenticity. But no m atter how “ tru e ” an e xp erien ce may seem at the m om en t o f

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illu m in ation , a fu rth e r step is re q u ire d — v erification . A creative discovery m u st be teste d and refin ed in light o f socially ac c e p te d stan d ard s. Sim ilarly, “tru e fe elin gs” req u ire a p e rio d o f verification , if only a m o m e n t in w hich the p e r so n ’ s new ly re sto re d sell is teste d in the w aters o f cu ltu ral e x p e rie n c e and social relatio n s. T his verification may c o m e from in tern alized sta n d ard s o r e x te rn a l e x p e rie n c e , but it is im p o rta n t in c o rro b o ra tin g the “tru th ” o l the feelin gs. . . . It is in A r ie ti’ s (1 9 7 6 ) elab o ratio n o l the p r o c e sse s o c c u rrin g b e tw e en stage s tw o (in cu b ation ) and th ree (illu m in atio n ) o f the creative p r o c e ss that the relation b etw een creativity and “tru e fe elin gs” is m o st in stru ctiv e. A rieti d e sc rib e s a kind o f p rc co n sc io u s cogn itio n w hich he calls the c n d o c c p t and w hich he ch a ra c te riz es as “a p rim itiv e organ ization o f p a st c x p c r ic n c c s, p e rc e p tio n s, m e m o ry tra c c s, and im ag es o f thin gs and m o v e m e n ts” (p. 5 4 ). A c co rd in g to A rie ti, a rtists w ho feel im m ob ilized by th eir c u rre n t fo rm s o f e x p re ssio n and w ho seek e scap e from the e x tern al im p in g e m e n ts on th eir in n er lives m ay find creative su sten an ce in a re tre a t to e n d o ce p tu al e x p e rie n c e . H is re se arch in dicates that a rtists and n o n -artists alike m ove re gu larly b e tw e en c n d o c c p tu a l and co n ce p tu al e x p e r ie n c e , b u t it is in m o m e n ts o f stru g g le that a p ro b le m -so lv in g rclian cc on c n d o c c p tu al stru c tu re s b e c o m e s m o st m an ifest. In the stru g g le ch a ra cte ristic o f “tru e -fe e lin g ” e p iso d e s th ere m ay be a sim ilar re tre at from h ig h e r-o rd e r co n c e p tu al activity in to a passively re ce iv e d , p reverb al e xp e rie n cin g. U n like W allas’ s stage o f in cu b ation , this re tre at (w hich m ay be e x p e rie n c e d m o re as a “su cc u m b in g to ”) is n ot in to u n co n scio u s activity , b u t into an alm o st p re co n sc io u s intensity o f im agery and feelin g, a se e m in g ju m b le o f c o g n itio n s, feelin gs, and sen sation s. For so m e o f o u r su b je c ts, the e x p e rie n c e took on “a dream y qu ality ” (1 7 .3 % o f su b je cts e n d o rse d this d e s c r ip to r ), fo r o th e rs it w as “n igh tm are-lik e” (1 7 .9 % ) , and fo r o th e rs it in clu ded a sen se that “ som eth in g false [w as] b e in g sh ed” ( 3 4 .7 % ) . For a m a jo rity , it w as d e e p , in ten se, su rp risin g , and b eyon d c o n tro l. T h is c n d o c c p tu al realm o l e x p e rie n c e can b e seen as a kind o f te x t: a h isto ry b o o k o f o n e ’ s se ll; a diction ary o f o n e ’ s p ast. It is a te x t of m e m o r ie s and fe elin gs, the c o m p o n e n ts o f se lf. A nd from this te x t, p erh ap s through an associative p ro c e ss im b u ed w ith p ro b le m -so lv in g in ten tio n , new selv es arc c o m p o se d , selfen h an cem en t e n su e s, and m ean in gful u n d e rstan d in gs o f the p re cip itatin g con flict arc d e riv e d . “To find and co n stitu te m e an in g ” (R o th e n b c rg 1 9 7 9 )— this is the creative p r o c c ss, in feelin gs as in p o e try .

True feelin gs and the social o rd er In high school I was a perfectionist. I was in a dance company. . . . 1 wanted to be thinner than anyone else. . . . I had bulimia Jo r fo u r and a h a lf years because o j this desire to look good. Then bulimia almost killed me. At that point the [truefeelings] experience began and f o r thefir st time I went to my parents . . . wc cried about it . . . and I realized people couldn’t really love me unless I loved myself. A couple o f months ago I was sitting in bed and myfrie n d called . . . myfrie n d who I ’d had a relationship with f o r four years. lie told me that he met someone

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else . . . and did not want to see me anymore. After that . . . 1 was very mixed up for days, hut after a while 1 got in touch with my true feelings about myself. I can deal with people and relationships better now. I was put into a situation between two friends . . . one o j which thought the other had betrayed a trust. 1 had to decide for m yself. . . the truth . . . whether to remain neutral or take a side. 1 had to let my good judgment and values decide my stand, even i f that meant giving up a friendship or possibly two. 1 was in my room after my motherfirst explained to me that 1 was adopted. 1fe lt like a “leftover” and that 1 wasn ’t really loved. I cried so hard. 1 was also angry. . . . I he true feelings made mefe e l that 1 could go on to other things . . . and I fe lt stronger. C u rren t developm en tal research (e .g ., Belenky, C linchy, G o ld g crg cr, and Tarulc 19 8 6 ; Jordan and 1986; M iller 1976; Stern 1985) su ggests that o u r sense o f w ho we are always ex ists w ithin the dialectic o f relation ships, that there is no such thing as a se lf ap art from the intrapsychic w hisperings o f our individual social h istories and the in terp erson al attu ncm cn ts o f our cu rrcn t lives. Wc are cach and alw ays a sclfin-rclationship; and the self-am endin g process o f “tru e-feelin g” e x p e rie n c e s, which w e have seen as a kind o f creativity in the servicc o f the self, is al the sam e tim e a process o f relocation , an attem p t to locale o n e ’s se lf within a dram atically shifted, o r shifting, relational m atrix. From inlancy we are taught the m eanings o f ou r em otio n s, at first by parents and siblings and later by teach e rs, television , and frien ds. We are taught the general cultural fo rm s o f in terp retin g o u r feelin gs, as w ell as m ore idiosyncratic, familial form s. And w e en large and refine these m eanings within the co n te x t o f subsequent e x p erien ces and relationships. Yet, how ever refin ed, our every em otion b ears with it an im perative cultural h istory , a h istory w hich gu id es and govern s the choice and expression o f our feelings. D u rin g “tru e-feelin g” e p iso d e s, w e im m e rse ou rselv es in this h istory , in a sense “ru m m agin g aroun d” for a feeling or com bination o f feelings that w ill be our respo nse to the tu rm o il, that will provide m eaning not only for w hat has occu rrcd but for w hat can occur. If we ultim ately feel anger, it ’s not only a ju d gm en t about precip itatin g o ccu rren ces, it ’s a co m m itm en t to a way o f u n d e r­ standing the p resen t: for e x am p le , by seeing o n e ’s se lf as an injured p arty , by con dem nin g a particular person or action , by assertin g o n e ’s b ou n daries in the face o f shifting relation ships. All “tru e fe elin gs,” from self-love and p rid e to anger and loss, establish the m eaning o f past and presen t events and create a c o n tcx t for future con duct. By establishing m eaning they am eliorate con fusion , by creating new con texts they enable com m itm ent. My friends and I w ere at the su perm arket and there w as a picket line. My frien ds started to go into the sto re and I said I d id n ’ t feel like it. They started teasing m e and I just sto od there . . . first em b arrassed , then m ad. My feelings cam c to m e and I knew I w asn ’ t crossin g that line.

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T h e c o m m itm e n t is to a way o f b e in g , a w ay o f relatin g— in su m , to a se t o f values ab o u t the w o rld , o th e r p e o p le , and o u rse lv e s. For this y o u n g m an w h ose frie n d s w ere taun tin g him to c ro ss a p ic k c t line, the con flict and con tu sion he initially e x p e rie n c e d w ere signals that a ch o ice w ou ld n eed to be m ad e n o t only ab o u t his c o m m itm e n t to th ese frien d s b u t ab o u t his c o m m itm e n t to con flictin © g se ts o f values. T h e an g e r he so o n e x p e rie n c e d (as a “tru e fe elin g”) h elped gu id e his su b seq u e n t c o n d u c t, n ot only by givin g the even ts m ean in g (d elin eatin g his frien d s as w orth co n d e m n atio n ), b u t by creatin g a c o m m itm e n t to a p a rtic u la r way o f b ein g (as a p e rso n w ho c o m p lie s and c x p c c ts o th e rs to co m p ly to p a rtic u la r stan d ard s) and way o f behaving (n o t c ro ssin g the p ick e t lin e). In this case, the y ou n g m an ren ew ed his c o m m itm e n t to values w hich he already h eld dear, p e rh ap s the values o f his father and fam ily. A n o th er y ou n g m an m igh t ju st as easily have had a “tru c -fc c lin g ” e x p e rie n c e that in d u ced him to c ro ss the p ic k c t line. If such w ere the ease, the y ou n g m an m igh t still e x p e rie n c e an initial con fu sio n and con flict, even an g er; but his an ger m igh t now reflect a ju d g m e n t ab ou t p ic k e te rs, and his c o m m itm e n t w ou ld b e to his frie n d s and th eir values an d, m o re gen erally p e rh a p s, to frien dsh ip rath er than fam ily. In n eith er case, it should be clear, w ou ld the “tru e fe elin gs” arise from the d ep th s o f so m e p re -so cial “tr u e ” self. O n the c o n tra ry , “tru e fe e lin g s,” like all fe elin gs, em b o d y a h istory o f social m ean in gs, and th eir p o w e r to gu id e is b ase d on that h istory . U ltim ately w e may b reak w ith that h isto ry , w c may c o m m it o u rse lv e s to values o th e r than th ose w e had previously held. But th ese new values, like o ld valu es, are still c irc u m sc rib e d by ou r view o f w ho we are and w ho w e w ish to b e, a view defin ed and co n strain ed by w hat w e have le arn e d , e x p e r ie n c e d , and felt as m e m b e rs of p a rtic u la r social o r d e rs in a p a rticu la r c u ltu re . [. . .]

R eferences A ricti, S. 1976. Creativity: The Magic Synthesis. N ew York: Basic Books. Baum eister, R. F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. N ew York: O x fo rd U niversityJ Press. — . 1987. “H ow the S e lf Becam e a Problem : A Psychological R eview of H istorical R esearch .” Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology 52: 163—176. Bellah, R. N ., R . M adsen, W. M . Sullivan, A. Sw idler, & S. M . T ip ton . 1985. Habits o f the Heart. N ew York: H arper & Row. Ellenberger, H. F. 1970. The Discovery o f the Unconscious. N ew York: Basic Books. Frank, J. D. 1974. Persuasion and Healing (rev. e d .). N ew York: Schocken Books. G ordon S. L. 1989. “Institutional and Im pulsive O rien tation s in Selectively A p p ro­ priating E m otions to Se lt.” Pp. 115—135 in The Sociology o f Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers, edited by D. Franks and E. M cC arthy. G reen w ich , C T : JAI Press. Jo rd an , J. V. and J. L. Surrey. 1986. “T h e Self-in-relation: Empathy and the M other D aughter R elationsh ip.” Pp. 81 —104 in The Psychology o f Today's Woman: New Psychoanalytic Visions, edited bv T. Bernay and D. W. Cantor. N ew York: Analytic Press. M arcuse, H. 1966. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press.

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M ay, R . 1975. The Courage to Create. N ew York: N o rto n . M iller, J. B. 1976. Toward a New Psychology o f Women. Boston: Beacon Press. M organ , C . 1989. True Feelings, the Self, and Authenticity: A Social Perspective. U npublished M asters T h esis, U niversity o f M assachusetts, A m herst. R othenberg, A. 1979. The Emerging Goddess. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. R othenberg, A. and C .R . H ausm an, eds. 1976. The Creativity Question. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. Sennett, R. 1980. Authority. N ew York: K nopf. Stern , D. 1985. The Interpersonal World o f the Infant. N ew York: Basic Books. Stern b erg, R . J. ed. 1988. The Nature o f Creativity. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. Trilling, L. 1972. Sincerity and Authenticity. C am bridge: H arvard U niversity Press. W allas, G. 1926. The Art o f Thought. N ew York: H arcou rt, Brace.

Chapter

19

Agneta H. Fischer and Jeroen Jansz R E C O N C I L I N G EMOTI ONS WITH WESTERN PERSONHOOD

Emotions at odds with Western pcrsonhood?

W

ESTERN

PHILOSOPHERS

HAVE

CHIEFLY

TREATED

em otio n s or passions as being in opp osition to reason (cf. P ott, 1992;

Solom on ,

197 6 ). In this dualist approach em otio n s have been d escrib ed as

irrational, involuntary or bodily fo rces, as ‘diseases o f the so u l'. Although not all ph ilosoph ers have advocated this line o f thought, the dichotom y betw een passion and ratio has un derlied W estern philosophical thought ever since Plato and Socrates. . . . This philosophical debate about the nature o f em otio n s raises the question o f how W estern p eop le in everyday life think and talk about their em otio ns. T h ere is relatively little known about the way in which W estern perso n s give m eaning to their em otio n s in everyday life (e x am p le s o f excep tio n s arc C raw ford et al., 1992; R ussell et a l., in p ress; Stearn s and Stearn s, 198 6 ), w hereas the n um ber o f studies o f non-W estern folk psy ch o lo gies ab out em otio n s has increased en orm o u sly over the past few years. . . . O ften , W estern everyday con ception s have been contrasted with non-W estcrn m eaning sy stem s, assum in g that in W estern cultu re em otional e x p erien ces are fram ed in term s o f in tern al, bodily en tities that d isru p t rational behaviour (W h ite, 1 9 9 3 ). M ore specifically, em otio ns in W estern culture have been associated with the follow ing ch aracteristics (cf. A verill, 1974, 1 9 8 2 , 199 0 ): irrationality, corp oreality , involuntarity and anim ality. [. . .] T h ese beliefs about the nature and w orkings o f em otio n s necessarily im ply that em otio n s arc at odds w ith what is con sidered to be a n orm al and respectab le person in W estern society . A lthough there are various m odels o f p crso n h ood in W estern cultu re, there arc shared con ception s o f what a person is, as well as what a person ought to be. . . . T h ese varieties o f public m od els offer us e xam p le s that may inspire o r frighten us. M o st o f these public m od els o f being a person share three

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1 6 7

fe atu re s that to g e th e r fo rm the d o m in an t versio n of W estern p e rso n h o o d (D e n n e tt, 1 9 7 8 ; H a rrc , 1 9 8 3 ; Ja n sz, 1 9 9 1 ). It is c h a ra c te rise d first bv rationality. P erso n s arc assu m e d to , and have to be able to ac co u n t fo r th eir w o rd s and actio n s in w ays that m e e t sta n d ard s o f ration al e x p la n atio n . T h e se co n d featu re is self-determination. P erson s can d istan ce th em selv es from their c o n te x ts, and from th eir ow n im m e d i­ ate e x p e rie n c e s. T h ey arc th e re fo re able to c o n sid e r alte rn ativ e s, and to plan their action s acc o rd in g to th eir ow n p re fe re n c e s. . . . T h is se lf-d e te rm in in g featu re is c losely linked to the third c h a ra c te ristic: Responsibility. T h e organ isation o f W estern so c ietie s is such that hum an b e in g s arc held in dividually re sp o n sib le fo r w hat they say o r do. . . . In su m , W estern p e rso n h o o d p ic tu re s p e rso n s as ration al ag e n ts, w ho are in ch arge o f th eir ow n lives, are p re d ictab le and reliab le, and re sp o n sib le for th eir actio n s. E m o tio n s, w ith th eir alleg ed irratio n ality , w ou ld seem to se rio u sly u n d e rm in e this cu ltu ral ideal o f p c rso n h o o d . [. . .] T h is b e in g the case, how arc p e o p le able to reco n cile th eir e m o tio n s w ith the re q u ire m e n ts o f civilised b eh aviour in W estern cu ltu re? D o p e o p le in d eed ju d ge th eir ow n o r o th e r s ’ e m o tio n al b eh aviou r as irratio n al? D o they think that they lack c o n tro l over th eir e m o tio n s? D o they sim ply deny the p re se n c e o f e m o tio n s? [. . .]

The social fun ction s o f em otion narratives N o t only b ecau se on e m igh t con ceiv e o f e m o tio n s as irratio n al, but also becau se they d isru p t the o rd in ary c o u rse o f social in te ra ctio n , e m o tio n s a lm o st alw ays d em an d an acco u n t. [. . .] A cco u n tin g is d o n e in several w ays. A s a ge n e ra l ru le , a c to rs try to con vince o th e rs that their b eh aviou r is n ot as irratio n al, in ap p ro p riate , stran g e , u n reason ab le, o r ab n o rm al as it m ay ap p e ar at first sigh t. T h ey often do so by p re se n tin g socially ac cc p tab lc , a g re e d -u p o n and con vin cin g reaso n s lo r their e m o tio n a l b eh aviou r in a sto ry -lik e fashion (se e A n tak i, 1 9 9 4 ; Ja n sz, in p r e ss): they tell an emotion narrative. E m o tio n n arrativ es arc ch a ra c te rise d as au th o re d , stru c tu re d sto rie s ab o u t e m o ­ tion al even ts. T h ey arc told from the p e rsp e ctiv e o f the n arrato r, w ho gen erally em p lo y s a first p e rso n voice (Jan sz, 1 9 9 3 ; in p r e ss). N a r ra to r s p re se n t their ow n p e rsp e ctiv e o f an em o tio n al even t and they try to con vin cc th eir au dien ce o f the p o ten tial and p lau sib le c au ses o f th eir e m o tio n al re a c tio n . In this w ay the p ro ta g o n ists set th eir ow n sto rie s again st the stan d ard s o f w hat is c o n sid e re d to b e in telligib le and le g itim a te . An e m o tio n n arrative also has an o rd e re d n atu re , that is, the e le m e n ts in the n arrative arc sequ en tially o rgan ise d . Stu d ie s o f e m o tio n k n o w le d g e, b oth in W estern and n o n -W cstcrn c o u n trie s, show that th ere is large co n se n su s a b o u t the se q u e n c e o f the m a jo r e le m e n ts in an e m o tio n n arrative. T ypically, an e m o tio n n arrative en tails the follow in g b asic se q u e n c e : ev e n t—> e m o tio n —^(so cial) re sp o n se (e.g. L u tz, 1 9 8 8 ; Shaver et a l ., 1 9 8 7 ; W h ite, 1 9 9 0 ). T h is se q u en tiality gen erally re su lts in a p lo t: the sto ry en ds in a d e n o u e m e n t b e ca u se the situ ation has b een re so lv e d , o r b e ca u sc the e m o tio n has b e en e x p r e sse d , o r b e ca u se on e has fou n d a way to c o p e w ith the even t o r o n e ’ s e m o tio n s. A n o th er ch a ra c te ristic o f e m o tio n n arratives is th eir in telligib ility: they arc in telligib le in the sen se that they p ro v id e re a so n s, a rg u m en ts and th ough ts that fit in the fra m e ­ w ork of shared cu ltu ral b e lie fs, ru le s and e x p e c tatio n s. [. . .]

1 6 8

A G N E T A

H.

F I S C H E R

AND

J E R O E N

J A N S Z

T elling e m o tio n n arratives is the p rim ary strategy by w hich p e o p le try to solve the ap p aren t con flict b etw een e m o tio n and p e rso n h o o d : e m o tio n n arrativ es not only d e sc rib e e m o tio n a l ev en ts, but also exp lain it and m ake o n e ’ s e m o tio n s in te lli­ gib le lo r o th e rs. H cn cc , the p rim ary fu n ction o f em o tio n n arratives is the re p a ir ol a p e r so n ’ s sta tu s as a re sp o n sib le m e m b e r o f so ciety (Sh otter, 1 9 8 4 ), and m o re specifically o f his o r h er th reaten ed iden tity . P eop le gen erally do n ot like to b e seen as a c o w ard , a h o th ead , o r a childish p e rso n . W hen e x p e rie n c in g o r e x p re ssin g e m o tio n s, p e o p le arc co n ce rn e d a b o u t how thcv w ill b e ev alu ated , and w h eth er th eir b eh aviou r had go od o r bad c o n se q u e n c es fo r th eir iden tity . M o st p e o p le arc gen erally aw are o f the fact that e m o tio n a l b eh aviou r m ay have eith er sh o rt- o r lo n g ­ te rm c o n se q u e n c es for the ch aracterisatio n and evaluation o f w ho on e is as a p e rso n . W e p re su m e that p e o p le w ill gen erally try to in te rp re t and ju stify their e m o tio n s in such a w ay that they d o n ot threaten the W estern ideal o f a p e rso n , or th eir specific iden tity . K n ow in g w hat an a p p ro p ria te re actio n is, a p e rso n can em p h asise th ose e le m e n ts in the sto ry that m ake the e m o tio n a l re a c tio n the m o st n atural and ob v io u s on e that w as con ceiv ab le in that c o n te x t. P eop le w ill thus preven t b ein g ju d g e d by o th e rs as irratio n al o r p rim itiv e b e in g s, o r as c o w ard s, or w h in ers. O n the o th e r h an d, so m e e m o tio n n arratives are to ld so often and are so co n siste n t ac ro ss tim e that they b e c o m e p a rt o f o n e ’ s id en tity . O n e m ay, for e x a m p le , find o n e se lf a n e rv o u s, en th u siastic, o r h o t-te m p e re d p e r so n . A secon d fun ction o f e m o tio n n arrativ es is re sto ra tio n o f the in te rru p te d in te ractio n . By givin g ac c cp tab lc re a so n s, e x p la n atio n s, o r e x c u se s fo r o n e ’ s behaviour, the e m o ­ tion al and social balancc in in teractio n s is re co v e re d : every th in g is re tu rn e d to n o rm al again. [. . .j

N arratives ab ou t an ger A s e x p e c te d , an te c ed en t even ts w ere an in d isp en sable c le m e n t o f an g e r n arratives. E very sto ry con tain ed a d e sc rip tio n of the even t that w as p e rce iv e d to be the just cause o f o n e ’ s an g e r o r an g e r e x p re ssio n . T h is can be illu strate d by the follow in g e x am p le . Im agin e a m an w h o is very an g ry , b e ca u se his w ife ’ s fam ily re p ro a ch c d him and his w ife fo r n ot atten d in g the fun eral o f the w ife ’ s sister. Initially, one m igh t think o f the m a n ’s an ger as b e in g in ap p ro p riate , and that he should have felt gu ilty , o r sad in stead . C o n sid e r, how ever, the follow in g n arrative: “I w as on holiday w ith m y fam ily , so m e w h e re in the m id d le o f Fran ce. W e re n te d a holiday h o m e , the n e arest village w as 3 km fu rth e r on , the n e arest train station w as 100 km aw ay. W h ile we w ere staying th ere, we g o t the m e ssag e that m y w ife ’ s siste r w as very ill and ab o u t to die. A siste r w ith w h om she w as n o t very c lo se , by the w ay. T h at sam e m o r n ­ ing the car b ro k e d o w n , and w e ju st had b ro u g h t it to the ga ra g e w hen w e re ce iv e d this m e ssag e . T h en w e sta rte d callin g and d elib eratin g , are w e g o in g b ack , o r n o t, and w e d e cid e d to w ait and se e fo r the tim e being. T h en the m e ssag e cam e that she had d ie d . M y w ife said: I w an t to g o b ac k , but how (sh e d o c s n ot speak Fren ch )? T h en I said, then I w ill g o w ith y ou. By the w ay, I m u st tell you that b e fo re this holiday w c had

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a very busy p e rio d , I w ork ed m y se lf to death . N o , my w ife said , I d o n ’t w ant th at, you n eed this h oliday. I w ill g o on my ow n . 1 did n ot w ant that, fo r I w as afraid that she w ould end up in M o ro c co . T h en we called the son o f the d e c e ase d sister, w e are rath er c lo se to h im , and he said he cou ld u n d erstan d very w ell w hv w e w o u ld n ot c o m e to the funeral (. . .): “You w ill b e late fo r the lun eral anyw ay” . It did leave a n egative m ark on o u r h oliday, o f c o u rse . But th en ,’ w e cam e J

h o m e,’ and an oth er

siste r did n o t even give us the chan ce to exp lain and she ju st w as very m ean to us. W ell, then I e x p lo d e d , and I said , th at’ s en o u gh , w hen you im m ed iately sta rt thin kin g the w o rst, if w c d o n ’ t even get the chance to e xp lain that w e w ere in the m id d le o f n o w h ere, and that it w as a m iracle that the p h on e w o rk e d , and that we did n o t know in advance that the holiday h o m e w as in the m id d le o f n o w h ere! I w as terrib lv an g ry , and now , tw o y e ars later, I still g e t an gry ab o u t i t .” R ead in g this n arrativ e, it is easy to im agin e that this m an g o t m ad . T h is sto ry is not m erely a d e sc rip tio n o f w hat h ap p en e d ; the d etails o f his sto ry build up a cred ib le accou n t o f his anger. H e and p a rticu larly his w ife w ere tre ate d un fairly. T h is u n fairn ess is stre sse d by pro v id in g v ario u s d etails o f the an te ced en t even ts in o rd e r to con vin ce the p o te n tial liste n e r that he and his w ife co u ld n ot b e b lam e d fo r their ab sen ce at the fu n eral: the car b ro k e d o w n , they w ere n o w h ere, and they did

n ot

stayin g in the m id d le

of

know in advan ce that the place w as that iso late d ; she

did not sp eak the lan gu age, and they did co n su lt the w ife ’ s nephew . So , all in all, th eir g o o d in ten tion s w ere m istru ste d and th ere should be no d o u b t that the w ife ’ s fam ily ’s re p ro a ch e s w ere e x tre m e ly unfair. T h e fun ction o f this accou n t is to re p air the p o te n tial threat o f his im ag e as a ration al and sen sib le m an , and it probably rem o v es poten tially u n pleasan t feelin gs ab o u t his an g e r in that situ ation . T h e sto ry k e e p s us fro m ju d g in g his an g e r as an irratio n al and u n co n tro lle d re a ctio n , and p r e sse s us to re g ard his an g e r as a reaso n ab le re actio n that se rv e s the g o al o f p u ttin g his w ife ’s fam ily m e m b e rs in th eir p r o p e r p lace. An in te re stin g q u e stio n is w h e th e r his w ife ’ s sto ry w ould have b een sim ilar. From

o th e r stu d ie s w e know that w o m e n ’ s an ger sto rie s are differen t from

m e n ’ s (C a m p b e ll, 1 9 9 3 ; C raw fo rd et a l., 1 9 9 2 ). O n e v ery c o m m o n in gre d ie n t o f w o m e n ’ s an g e r sto rie s is th eir crying. F u rth e rm o re , c o m p a re d to m e n , w om en seem to be less exclu sively fo cu sed on the un fair and stu p id b eh aviou r o f oth er p e r so n s, and seem to be m o re co n c e rn e d w ith (the c o n se q u e n ces o l) th eir own fe elin gs, and the very fact that they m igh t lo se co n tro l. H ere is a typ ical e x am p le o f a w o m a n ’ s an g e r n arrative: “ I had so m e g o o d frie n d s fo r w hom I did all kinds o f th in gs, takin g care o f th eir children and th eir an im als, m akin g clo th es fo r th e m , and so on. O n ce I invited th em for d in n er; w ell I d o n ’ t w ant to have anything in re tu rn fo r such th in gs, b u t then they b ro u g h t w ith them fo u r tw igs o f flow ers they p ick e d fro m th eir ow n vase! I w as so an g ry . Isn ’ t that h um iliatin g? L ast y e ar they w ere again on holiday and I had to g o to the vet w ith th eir cat twice. H e w as already ill before they w en t on h olid ay, so in the en d 1 had to let him co n sid e r lettin g him b e put to sleep . I w as

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J E R O E N

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terrib ly an gry then. I lay aw ake fo r n igh ts, I c o u ld n ’ t sle e p , b ecau se I d id n ’ t know w hat to do ab o u t the cat, and then I w en t to the vet, but it w as such an agony fo r this an im al. I w as cry in g th e re , at the v e t’ s p lace, te r r ib le .” T h e co n te n ts o f this sto ry are p artly sim ila r to the m a n ’ s , in the sen se that oth er p e o p le arc ac c u se d . H ere to o the an te c ed en t even ts ju stify h er anger. H ow ever, th ere arc also so m e in te re stin g d iffcrcn ccs b etw een this and the p re v io u s n arrative w hich seem illu strative fo r m o re ge n e ral g e n d e r d ifferen ces. W om en m o re often d e sc rib e th eir feelin gs d u rin g the e p iso d e . In this c ase , fo r e x a m p le , she m en tio n s the fact that she w as e x tre m e ly u p se t a b o u t the w h ole situ atio n , that she cou ld not sle e p , that she did n ot kn ow w hat to d o , and that she had been crying. In m any oth er sto rie s w om en also re fe r to th eir feelin gs o f p o w e rle ssn e ss, th eir con fu sio n ab ou t the situ ation , th eir sen se o f in c o m p e te n ce and u n certain ty ab o u t w hat to do. T his am bivalen ce in an ger situ atio n s is often o b se rv e d , and m ay b e re late d to an oth er n o ticeab le g e n d e r differen ce in an g e r sto rie s: w o m e n ten d to e x p r e ss som e em path y w ith the o b je c t o f th eir anger. T h ey try to lo o k at the even ts from the p e rsp e ctiv e o f the o th e r ( ‘ he is so m ise ra b le ’ ), o r they play dow n the faults or stu p id itie s o f the o th e r p e rso n (T kn ow she is like th at, and I sh o u ld n ’ t g e t angry ab ou t i t ’ ). An im p o rta n t fun ction o f th ese e le m e n ts in w o m e n ’s sto rie s may be the m itigation o f th eir ow n an ger: b ecau se stro n g an g e r re actio n s are n ot in k eep in g w ith th eir fem in in e id en tity , they try to to n e it dow n by stre ssin g th eir con fusion and am b ivalen ce w ith re sp e c t to th eir ow n an gry feelin gs. D esp ite th ese g e n d e r d iffe ren c e s, how ever, both the m en and the w om en in te rv ie w e d in this study gen erally provid ed ration al acco u n ts fo r their an ger re actio n s in te r m s o f the an te c ed en t even ts. M o re o v e r, they c o n sid e re d their e x p re ssio n s of an ger to be qu ite ap p ro p ria te , as w ell as their feelin gs. [. . .) P eop le also m en tion o th e r ra tio n ales fo r their an g e r e x p r e ssio n s, w hich fu n c ­ tion as ju stificatio n s fo r an g e r e x p re ssio n s in th eir sto rie s. T h is is illu strate d in the follow in g e x a m p le s given by tw o w o m en : “W h en y ou arc very an g rv at a p e r so n , and w hen that is e x p r e sse d , that is the tim e w hen it can be cleared u p .” “ H e should know how I feel. T h at is qu ite n o rm al i f you have to w ork togeth er. W hen you know how the oth er p e rso n feels and he kn ow s w hat is b o th e rin g y o u , y o u g e t to kn ow each o th e r b e tte r .” In both e x c e rp ts p o sitiv e c o n se q u e n ces o f w o m e n ’ s an ger e x p re ssio n se rv e as acco u n ts for the fact that they e x p r e sse d th eir an g e r T h e first acc o u n t claim s that an ger e x p re ssio n is righ t b e cau se it m ak es o n e ’s view s o r criticism o f an oth er p e rso n m o re e xp licit. In the se co n d acco u n t the focus is m o re on the w o m a n ’ s p e rso n a l relation sh ip w ith an oth er p e rso n and h er c o m m itm e n t to this p e r so n . In su m , p e o p le c o m e up w ith a variety o f re a so n s w hy they e x p re ss th eir anger. In terestin g in this re sp e c t is that the effects o f o n e ’ s an g e r e x p re ssio n n ot only seem to b e e x p e c te d , but arc also intended. A n g e r e x p re ssio n s arc largely d e sc rib e d as if they arc volun tary and in the se rv ic e o f p a rtic u la r g o als: on e e x p r e sse s o n e ’ s an ger

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. . . in order to show o th e rs how you fe el, o r in order to im prove o n e ’ s relation sh ip w ith an oth er p e rso n . T h u s, the re sp e ctab ility o l both m en and w o m en is re sto re d by p re se n tin g th e m se lv e s as a c to rs w ho arc in ch arg e: w hen they g e t an gry they have g o o d reason s fo r d o in g so and they gen erally ap p e ar to b e in co n tro l o f th eir anger. In these sto rie s, an g e r is seen as a fun ction al e m o tio n , w hich se rv e s ccrtain g o als. O u r assu m p tio n that ration ality and se lf-d e term in atio n arc d om in an t ch a ra c te ristics o f W estern p e rso n h o o d , in d e p e n d e n t o f gen d er, is su p p o rte d h ere: both m en and w om en gen erally p re se n t th em selv es as ration al b ein g s w h o have th eir an ger u n d er co n tro l, and e x p r e ss it in ten tion ally. O f c o u r se , w e can also think o f in cid en ts in w hich o n e ’ s an g e r is m o re e x tre m e , and m o re likely to b e in te rp re te d as irratio n al and in volu n tary . C o n sid e r the fo llo w in g e x am p le . “ I w as so an gry that I threw a cake at the m a n ’ s h ead. A ctually it w as ab o u t nothing. (. . .) A t that tim e I w as m o re o v e r-stre sse d than an gry . I g o t a m ist b e fo re my ey es, it w as a kind o f o u tb u rst in side m y se lf and I ju st sta rte d to ran t and rave. I cou ld n ot think any lo n g e r w hat to d o o r say, it w as ju st an e x p lo sio n . I did n o t have m y se lf u n d e r c o n tro l any lon ger. (. . .) A fte rw ard s I still think I w as rig h t, b u t, w ell y ou d o n ’t g e t any fu rth er, and m aybe I should n ot have acted that e x tre m e ly . But I co u ld n ot h elp m y se lf.” H e re, the p ro ta g o n ist ac k n o w le d g e s that the an te ced en t event w as a m in o r in ciden t in w hich he w as unjustly ac cu se d o f som eth in g. H ow ever, he ag re e s that this is n ot a sufficient reason fo r his e x tre m e b eh aviou r ( ‘actually it w as ab o u t n o th in g ’ ) and he ad van ces his b ein g o v e r-stre sse d as the real reason fo r the e x p lo sio n . A p p aren tly , this m en tal state is lo r him a m o re con vin cin g acco u n t lo r th row in g cak cs than an ger alone. It is also m ean t to exp lain why he co u ld no lo n ge r co n tro l his b eh aviou r: p e o p le w h o are u n d e r stre ss m ay act in a rath er devian t w ay. T h e social advan tage o f claim in g that on e w as o v e r-stre sse d , in stead o f an g ry , is that b ein g o v e r-stre sse d re fe rs to a te m p o ra ry state o f m en tal d istu rb an c e , so that it is im p li­ citly claim ed that he should n o t be re g a rd e d as fully accou n tab le at that tim e . [. . .]

N arratives ab ou t fear A s in an ger sto rie s, an te ced en t even ts w ere the m a jo r in g re d ie n ts o f fear n arratives. H ow ever, w h e reas the p r o ta g o n ist’ s iden tity is re p aire d by stre ssin g the faults o r un fair b eh av io u rs o f other persons in an ger n arra tiv e s, in fear n arrativ es it is the d an g er and in ability to do so m e th in g ab o u t the situ ation that is e m p h asise d in o rd e r to ac co u n t for o n e ’ s fear. T h is is especially tru e i f at face value the th reat d o e s n ot seem very se rio u s, as e x e m p lifie d in the fo llo w in g case. “ O n ce I w as very sc are d ; it w as a kind o f un real fear. M y w ife had a kind o f se b a ce o u s gla n d , ju st h ere, w hich had to b e cut away su rg ically . A t a ccrtain m o m e n t I co u ld n ot help thinking ab o u t variou s sto rie s o f

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someone who also had a cosmetic surgery in order to cut away some lumps; and he never came to. I was really very worried that she would not awake from the anaesthesia.” This man accounts for his fear by referring to a true story of someone who died following similar surgery. The narrator appears to consider his fear to have been somewhat inappropriate ( ‘it was a kind of unreal fear’); however, he tries to convince himself and the interviewer of the rationality of his fear by stressing the reality and actuality of the threat. This type of narrative is illustrative of the strategics used by men to protect their masculine identity (sec also Crawford et a l ., 1992): men try to justify their fears by claiming that the threat is real. However, we did not find support for the suggestion that men exaggerate the danger in fear episodes (Crawford et a h , I 992): men did not mention more dangerous events than women, nor did they go more into the details in describing the danger. Although the description of antecedent events was the major type of justi­ fication given in fear stories, we also noticed another type of account, which is illustrated by the following example. This is provided by a man who is always very worried when his wife is late from her work. “Well, she has to drive in heavy traffic, so then 1 ask myself, what has happened? You don’t know what to do, you feel powerless, and, it is quite ridiculous, but you are already worrying about the future. The fear becomes stronger and stronger, but that happens automatically. I did not do anything to reinforce it. And, what can you do? You can take pills, or call other people, but I just let it go. 1 was the victim of my own fear.” The protagonist of the story blames the nature ol the emotion. The fear is presented as an uncontrollable force that overwhelms him. As was the ease with the angry outbursts, this involuntary and irrational nature of the fear is used to account for the obvious fact that the intensity of the emotion is out of proportion with the antecedent event. This man even admits that his reaction is ridiculous, but he stresses that it cannot be helped and that the increase in his fear is an automatic process that cannot be stopped. This accounting practice is far more typical of fear than of anger, and is used by men as well as women. Because of this uncontrol­ lability, fear seems to be less acceptable, especially for men. Indeed, men more often maintained that there wrere no good reasons for their fear, although they considered it to be a reaction that could happen to anyone. Women, on the other hand, were more resigned and less upset; they clearly seemed to accept the irrationality and uncontrollability of the fear ( ‘I just let it happen’ , ‘If it comes, it comes’). [. . .) All in all, the fear narratives, collected in this study, suggest that fear, to a greater extent than anger, is conceived of as an irrational and uncontrollable emotion. This applies more to men than to women. In the accounts of fear, no rationales were given for its expression, except those referring to the involuntary workings of the emotion. Hardly any positive consequences of fear expressions were advanced; people just wanted to be rid of this emotion. Both men and women

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a r g u e d that they a lm o st alw ay s trie d to s u p p re s s th e ir fear, b e c a u se they co u ld h ard ly see any p o sitiv e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f e x p r e ss in g th e ir fear. T h e on ly p o sitiv e so c ia l c o n se q u e n c e that w as m e n tio n e d , large ly by w o m e n , w as g e ttin g s u p p o r t fro m o th e r s.

W estern p e rso n h o o d , g e n d e r an d em o tio n s In th is p a p e r w e have q u e stio n e d the a lle g e d c o n flict b e tw e e n the e x p e r ie n c e and e x p r e ss io n o f e m o tio n s an d the n o rm a tiv e c h a ra c te ristic s o f W e ste rn p e r so n h o o d : ra tio n a lity , se lf- d e te r m in a tio n , an d in d iv id u al re sp o n sib ility . T h e g e n e ra l p r e s u m p ­ tio n th at W e s te r n e r s , in c o n tr a st to so m e n o n -W e ste rn c u ltu r e s , c o n s id e r th eir e m o tio n s to b e b o d ily , p r im itiv e im p u lse s that arc irr a tio n a l an d h ard to c o n tr o l is d iffic u lt, if n o t im p o ssib le to m a in tain . W e a r g u e d that e m o tio n s arc n ot ab se n t fro m W e stern p e r so n h o o d and that o u r c u ltu ra l id eal o f a p e r so n r e q u ir e s a fo rm o f ‘ b o u n d e d ’ e m o tio n a lity : e m o tio n s sh o u ld b e felt an d e x p r e ss e d w ith in the stric t b o u n d a rie s o f the so c ia l c o n te x t. In c o n te x ts w h e re e m o tio n a l re a c tio n s are n o t su ita b le , h ow ever, r e p a ir w o rk h as to b e d o n e . In o r d e r to r e s to r e p o te n tia l lo ss o f p c r so n h o o d , p e o p le m u st d e m o n s tr a te that th e ir e m o tio n s are ra tio n a l, alth o u gh th ey m ay a p p e a r irra tio n a l. T h is is d o n e by te llin g a w e ll- o r d e re d sto ry a b o u t the e m o tio n a l e v e n t, in w h ich the n a r r a to r aim s to c o n v in ce the a u d ie n c e o f the ra tio n a lity , n a tu ra ln e ss, o r o b v io u sn e ss o f his o r h er e m o tio n s . A n arra tiv e n o t on ly m e e ts sta n d a r d s of ra tio n a lity by p r o v id in g re a so n s fo r o n e ’ s e m o tio n s , b u t th e v e ry ac t o f n a r ra tin g also p ro v e s th at o n e is o n c e again in c h a rg c . . . . T h e m a jo r ity o f n a r ra tiv e s in d e e d p ic tu re d a n g e r an d , to a le s se r e x te n t, fe a r as q u ite ra tio n a l e m o tio n s : th ey a rc ratio n al first and fo r e m o s t b e c a u se r e sp o n d e n ts gave g o o d re a so n s fo r th e ir e licita tio n . A n te c e d e n t e v e n ts w e re th e m o s t im p o r ta n t c o m p o n e n ts in th e c o n str u c tio n o f a c o n v in c in g s to ry in w hich the p e r s o n ’ s ow n v iew o n th e ‘ ra tio n a l o r lo g ic a l c a u s e ’ o f h is o r h er e m o tio n s is o u tlin e d . [. . .]

R eferen ces A n t a k i , C . (1 9 9 4 ). Explaining and Arguing. The Social Organization o f Accounts. L on don :

Sage. A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 7 4 ). A n analysis o f p sy ch o ph y siological sy m b o lism and its influence

on th e o rie s of e m o tio n . Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour, 4 , 147—190. A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 8 2 ). Anger and Aggression. An Essay on Emotion. N e w York: Sp rin ge r

Verlag. A v e r i l l , J. R . (1 9 9 0 ). Inner feelin gs, w ork s of the flesh, the b e ast w ith in , d ise ase s o f

the m in d , driv in g force, and pu ttin g on a show : six m e ta p h o rs of e m otio n and their th eo retical exten sion s. In D. E. L eary (E d .), Metaphors in the History o f Psychology. C am b rid g e : C am b rid g e U n iversity P re ss, pp. 104—132. C a m p b e l l , A . (1 9 9 3 ). Out o f Control. Men, Women and Aggression. L o n d o n : Pan dora. C r a w f o r d , J . , K i p p a x , S ., O n y x , J ., G a u l t , U . and B f.n t o n , P. (1 9 9 2 ). Emotion and

Gender. L o n d o n : Sage. D e n n f .t , D . C . (1 9 7 8 ). C o n d itio n s of p e rso n h o o d . In D. C . D en n ct (E d .), Brainstorms.

H asso ck : H arv ester, pp. 2 6 7 , 2 8 6 .

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H a r r e , R . (1 9 8 3 ). Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology'. O x fo r d : Blackw ell. J a n s z , J . (1 9 9 1 ). Person, S e lf and Moral Demands. Individualism Contested hy Collectivism.

L eid en : D S W O -P re ss. J a n s z , J. (1 9 9 3 ). H ct n a rra tic f als b e te k e n isv e rle n e r [N arrative and m ean in g]. Psycholo­

gic en M aatschappij, 6 4 , 2 1 2 —2 2 5 . J a n s z , J. (in p re ss). Self-n arratives as p e rso n al stru ctu re s o f m eaning. In A. O o ste r-

vvcgel and R .A . W ick lu nd (E d s .), The S e lf in European and North American Culture: Development and Processes. D o rd rc c h t: K luw er. L u t z , C . A. (1 9 8 8 ). Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and

their Challenge to Western Theory. C h icago : U n iversity o f C h icago P ress. P o t t , H . ( 1 9 9 2 ) . De liefde van Alcihiades. Over rationaliteit en moties [Alcihiades’ Love. On

Rationality and Emotions/. A m ste rd a m /M c p p c l: B oo m . R u s s e l l , J. A ., W e l l e n k a m p , J ., M a n s t e a d , A. S. R . and F e r n a n d e z D o l s , J. M .

(E d s.) (in p re ss). Everyday Conceptions o f Emotion. D o rd rc c h t: K luw er. S h a v e r , P., S c h w a r t z , J ., K i r s o n , D. and O ’ C o n n o r , c . (1 9 8 6 ). E m otion k n o w ­

le d g e : fu rth e r e x p lo ratio n of a p ro to ty p e ap p ro ach . Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 52 , 1 0 6 1 - 1 0 8 6 . S h o t t e r , J. (1 9 8 4 ). Social Accountability and Selfhood. O x fo r d : Basil Blackw ell. S o l o m o n , R. C . (1 9 7 6 ). The Passions: The Myth and Nature o f Human Emotion. N o tre

D am e , Indiana: U n iversity of N o tre D am e Press. S T E A R N S , P. N . and S t e a r n s , C . Z . (1 9 8 6 ). Anger: The Struggle for Emotional Control in

America’s History. C h icago : C h icago U n iversity P ress. W h i t e , G. M . (1 9 9 0 ). M o ral d isc o u rse and the rh e to ric o f e m o tio n . In C . A. L u tz and

L. A b u -L u gh od (E d s .), Language and the Politics o f Emotion. C a m b rid g e : C am b rid g e U n iversity P ress. W h i t e , G. M . (1 9 9 3 ). E m o tio n s in side o u t: T h e an th ro p o lo gy o f affect. In M . L ew is

and J. M . H aviland (E d s .), Handbook o f Emotions. N e w York: T h e G u ilfo rd P ress, pp. 2 9 - 4 1 .

Chapter

20

W. Ray Crozier S E L F - C O N S C I O U S N E S S IN S H A M E The ro le o f the 'o th e r'

Self and other in shame

O

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DIFFERENT

theoretical accoun ts o f

the role o f the sell in sham e is to con sider the em phasis thcv place upon self-

evaluation o f con duct relative to the in dividual’s aw areness ol o th e rs’ evaluations of con duct. Som e accoun ts em ph asise the in dividual’s own assessm en t of his or her behaviour. M ichael L ew is (1 9 9 2 ) p ro p o sed a cognitive attribution m odel that defined sham e as ‘a con sequen ce o f a failure evaluation relative to the standards when the p erso n m akes a global evaluation o f the se lf’ (p. 7 5 ). In sim ilar vein, Sch crcr (1 9 9 3 ) offers a system for distinguishing am ong the fundam ental em otions in term s o f a scries o f ‘stim ulus evaluation c h cc k s’ . W hether the individual ju d ges him o r h e rse lf to be the cause o f a p articu lar action and w hether that action is com patible w ith the individual’s self-im age are classed as tw o o f the evaluation checks for sham e. A ccordin g to each o f these accoun ts, the p erso n co m p ares his or her action with som e stan dard, and sham e ensues from the com bination o f ju d gm en ts that the action falls sh o rt and that he or she has caused or is responsible for it. Each o f these accoun ts involves the dual role for the se lf . . . the self; evaluates and is the ob ject o f evaluation. O th er accoun ts introduce a furth er com po n en t, w here the p erso n perceives his o r her behaviour through the eyes o f another. This accoun t is related to n otions that sham e is loss o f standing, loss o f face. It is linked to ideas o f rep utation , honour, dignity. T his position has been ad opted by influential philosophical accounts o f sham e, for ex am p le , those o f Sartre (1 9 4 3 / 1 9 5 6 ) and Taylor (1 9 8 5 ). Taylor w rites o f ‘the ag e n t’ s becom ing aw are o f the discrepancy betw een h er ow n assum ption about her state o r action and a possible detached

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o b serv er-d escrip tio n of this state or action , and o f h er being furth er aw are that she ought not to be in a position w here she could be so seen, w here such a description at least ap pears to fit’ (p. 2 6 ). Som e psych ological accounts also em ph asise the role of the ‘o th e r’ , fo r e xam p le, the theory of H .B . L ew is, cited above. C astelfranchi and Poggi (1 9 9 0 ) distinguish betw een ‘sham e b efore o n e se lf’ and ‘sham e b efore the o th e r’ , w here the fo rm e r con cern s loss o f self-esteem and the latter loss o f esteem in the eyes o f other. H arre (1 9 9 0 , p. 199) argu es that sham e is ‘ caused by the realisation that others have b eco m e aw are that w hat one has been doing has been a m oral infraction, a ju d gm en t w ith which I, as actor, c o n cu r’ . Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 , p. 1 2 5 6 ) refer to ‘ public exp o su re (and disapproval) o f so m e im p ro p riety o r sh o rt­ c o m in g ’ . Taylor (1 9 8 5 ) has argued that it is the a c to r ’s realisation how his or her behaviour m ight be seen rather than the actual ju d gm en t m ade by another that is im p ortan t. She provides the follow ing exam ple o f an a r tist’s m o d el (1 9 8 5 , p. 6 1 ). A m odel w ho has been p osin g for an artist for som e tim e com es to feel sham e w hen she realizes that he no lon ger regard s her as a m o d e l, but regards her as a w om an. The m od el d o c s not have to share any opinion ol her the artist m ight h old; she does not have to take an adverse view o f her ap pcaran cc; n or d ocs she have to believe that there is anything blam ew orthy in her action. The shift from her being c o m fo rt­ able in the situation to being asham ed d oes not req u ire any change in eith er her or the a r tist’s behaviour, but only a change in h er b e lie f as to how she is being seen. W hile her exp o su re is to the artist in one sense (he is the only other p erso n th ere), in the sense crucial for sham e her e x p o su re is to a particular view of her con duct. In sham e, she identifies w ith that other view of h erself, and the adverse ju d gm en t co m e s from h erself: ‘it [is] w ron g for her to be so seen , at least at this tim e and by this au dien ce. Being seen as she is seen is to be in a position in w hich no decent w om en should find h erscll . . . this is no fault o f h ers, but the question of re sp o n si­ bility is irrelevant to feelings of sham e. H ow ever it may have com e ab ou t, she is now in a false position and for this she is c o n d e m n e d ’ (Taylor, 1985, p. 6 1 ). Som e psychological th eories also take the view that it is the a c to r’s in te r­ pretation o f a potential o b se rv e r’s view that is im p o rtan t. Sem in and M anstcad ( 1981) distinguish the self-im age from the subjective public im age. An em otional reaction is elicited by a discrepan cy betw een these im ages occasion ed by the recogn ition that som e action unfairly reflects poorly on o n e ’ s subjective public im age. H iggins (1 9 8 7 ) defines sham e as a discrepan cy betw een o n e ’s actual se lf and o n e ’ s p ercep tion o f how an ideal other w ould evaluate the self. A ccou nts o f sham e that em ph asise sclf-cvaluation o f b ehaviour relative to p e r ­ sonal stan dards have a num ber o f disadvantages. F irst, it is difficult in term s o f their analysis to distinguish betw een sham e, on the one hand, and d epression and alternative kinds o f negative self-evaluation, on the other; indeed, in one o f the e xam p le s provided by M . Lew is to illustrate how the global se lf is involved in sham e, a case w here a patient forccd his date to have se x , the patient actually says, “ W h at’s w ron g w ith m e? I’ m d e p re sse d . D id n ’ t feel like gettin g out o f bed this m orn in g.” (1 9 9 2 , p. 7 2 ). Secon d, the accoun ts attach lo o m uch im portan ce to behaviour. As Sabini and

S E L F - C 0 N S C 10 U S N E S S I N S H A M E

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Silver (1 9 9 7 , p. 6) have a rg u e d , it is n ot b eh aviou r itse lf but w hat the behaviour e x p o se s to o th e rs ab o u t the sell that is cru cial lo r sh am e— an ap p aren tly trivial act can p ro d u c e in ten se sh am e. T h ird , these acc o u n ts have difficulty in e x p lain in g eases o f sh am e w h ere there is no se lf-a ttrib u tio n o f re sp o n sib ility fo r w ron g d oin g. In the e x am p le o f the a r tis t ’ s m o d e l the shift from b ein g at case in the situ ation to feelin g sh am e re q u ire s only a shift in aw are n e ss, to the realisation that an ad v e rse view o f h er b eh aviou r can b e e n te rtain e d . C astclfran ch i and P oggi (1 9 9 0 , p. 2 3 8 ) o ffer a sim ilar e x a m p le , o f a m an w ho has saved a w om an from drow n in g and w h o is giving h er m o u th -to -m o u th resp iratio n w hen he re a lise s that he is b e in g o b se rv e d by a p asse r-b y . T h e m an m ay feel sham e if he b e c o m e s aw are that he m igh t ap p e ar as if he w ere tak in g ad van tage o f the w o m an . Such e x a m p le s are n o t difficult to g e n e ra te . A p e rso n a l e x a m p le is w hen a fello w acad em ic w h om I did n o t know very w ell left m e in ch arge o f h er bag. A fte r a w hile I felt the n eed to g o to the b ath room and 1 b egan to lo o k through h er b ag to ch e ck if it co n tain ed anything valuable in o rd e r to d c c id c w h eth er o r n o t it co u ld safely b e le ft, w hen she su dden ly re tu rn e d . A lth ough she e x p re sse d n e ith er su rp rise n o r annoyance at my action I w as im m e d i­ ately d isco m fite d that she m igh t think that I w as lo o k in g for m on ey or, p erh ap s even m o re sh am in g, taking a p ru rie n t in terest in h er p riv ate b e lo n g in g s. In all o f these e x a m p le s, the ac to r behaves in g o o d faith and th ere is no self-evalu atio n relative to stan d ard s. W hat is cru cial is the a c t o r ’ s attrib u tio n to the au d icn cc , the re co g n itio n and e n d o rse m e n t o f the fact that his o r h er b eh aviou r is b ein g , o r can b e, ju d ge d in a m an n er that reflects badly upon him o r h erse lf. It is not n e c essa ry that an o b se rv e r is actually p re se n t (in the case o f the a r tis t ’ s m o d e l) o r that an o b se rv e r actually takes an ad verse view o f the a c t o r ’ s b eh aviou r (in all th ree c a se s). T h is p ap e r p ro p o se s a Iram cw o rk that can acc o m m o d a te the d ifferen t m o d e ls that have been o u tlin e d . T h e fra m e w o rk is b ased on the assu m p tio n that sh am e (and e m b a r ra ss­ m e n t) en tails a shift in p e rsp e ctiv e on the se lf, a p e rsp e c tiv e that is d e sc rib e d in lav p sy ch o lo gy as ‘ se lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss’ .

Self-con sciousn ess T h e n otio n that p e o p le can shift p e rsp e ctiv e so that they seem to be view in g th em selv es from

o u tsid e is n o t, o f c o u r se , a new o n e. T h e C o n c ise O x fo rd

D ic tio n ary re fe rs in its definition o f se lf-c o n sc io u sn ess to a ‘ p e rso n e m b a rra sse d o r u n n atu ral in m a n n e r from k n o w in g he is o b se rv e d by o th e r s ’ . H a rre (1 9 8 3 ) defin es it as the state w h ere ‘the n o rm al in tcn tion ality o f actio n s in w hich they arc th ough t o f as en ds o r o u tc o m e s is su sp e n d e d and the se lf-co n scio u s ac to r fo c u se s on the action s he o r she is p e r fo r m in g ’ . T h e th eory o f o b jec tiv e sclf-aw arcn css originally p r o p o se d by D uval and W ick lu n d (1 9 7 2 ) se e m s to en tail such a shift in p e rsp e ctiv e , and this is c ap tu re d in the c o n stru c t o f p u b lic self-aw aren ess d e v e lo p e d by C arv e r and Sch eier (e .g ., C a r v e r & Sch eier, 1 9 8 7 ). T h is c o n stru c t w as linked to sh am e by B uss (1 9 8 0 ). Su b sequ en tly th ere has b een criticism

on lo g ical and e m p irical

g ro u n d s o f the assu m p tio n that p u b lic sclf-attcn tio n re su lts in the in dividual taking an e x te rn a l p e rsp e c tiv e on the s e lf (F cn ig stc in , 1 9 8 8 , cited by C ro/.icr, 1 9 9 0 ; F en igstein & A b ram s, 1 9 9 3 ). We p r o p o se here that th ere is a useful d istin ction to be draw n b etw een tw o co n ce p tio n s o f s e lf evalu ation.

1 7 8

W.

RAY

CROZIER

The first entails an individual’s self-evaluation. We share the assum ption o f con tem p orary th eories o f the self-con cept that it is m ultidim ension al and hence any one o f a n um b er o f discrim inable asp ects o f the se lf can serve as the ob ject o f evaluation. T h ese can includc the kinds o f evaluations w hich arc em ph asised bv cognitive and attributional m od els o f sham e and related em otio n s o f shyness and em b arrassm en t, such as the evaluation o f the se lf as a social actor and also the ju d gm en t that the in dividual’s behaviour is discrepan t from any standards that arc relevant to him or her. An adverse self-evaluation gives rise to negative feelin gs, like re g re t, d isap poin tm en t, depression . In everyday language such e x p erien ces can be labelled as sham e, for e x am p le , one m igh t e xp re ss sham e that one had arrived late for an ap poin tm en t o r had failed an exam in ation. H ow ever, it is p ro p o sed here that the self-con scious em otio n s are characterised by a shift in p ersp ective w here the individual view s his o r her own behaviour as if through the eyes o f another. Many situation s— w alking across a public stage, arrivin g late at a social function, bein g (o r feelin g) con spicuous in appearan ce or d ress, beco m in g aw are that one is b ein g talked ab out (including bein g p raised, com plim en ted o r thanked), being in the presen ce o f an authority figure, drivin g in front o f a police car— p rodu ce self-con sciousn ess o f this kind. This often (perhaps alw ays) has a distinctive ph en om en ological quality (including feelin g ‘sm all’ ). It seem s often to be accom pan ied by blushing, even in the absence o f adverse selfevaluation. Psych ological th eories need to con sider the circum stan ces in w hich this state b eco m es sham e, or em b arrassm en t, o r p rid e, or any o f the other selfcon scious em otio n s. Il is p ro p o sed here that three facto rs arc relevant lo sham e: the attribution lo the oth er; the corresp on d en ce betw een the in dividual’ s ju dgm en t o f behaviour and his or her percep tion o f the o th e r’s judgm en t o f that behaviour; the aspect o f the se lf that is being ju d g e d , specifically w hether so m e core asp ect o f the sell is evaluated.

The other perspective Wc have already indicated so m e theoretical accoun ts that include the n otion o f another p ersp ectiv e on the self. Furth er discussion in the literatu re has con cerned w hether sham e is onlv experien ced in an actual social situation , and w hether the presen ce o f an audicn cc can help to distinguish sham e from em b arrassm en t. Buss (1 9 8 0 ) claim ed that no one is publicly sclf-focuscd unless there arc oth ers to ob serve them : ‘ E m b arrassm en t and sham e are both reaction s to specific events in a social c o n te x t’ (1 9 8 0 , p. 162). Evidence and argum en t suggest the contrary position ab out sham e. A survey re p o rte d by Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 ) found that participan ts recalled experien cin g sham e w hen they w ere alone. The analysis o f sham e provided by Taylor (1 9 8 5 ) concluded that it w as not essen tial that the ob se rv e r w as an actual o r particular p e rso n , w hether presen t or absent; the actor b e co m e s aw are o f a p articu lar view o f his o r her behaviour, and not n ecessarily o f any p articu lar individual holding that view. Tangney et al. (1 9 9 6 ) also re p o rte d that the presen ce o f an ob se rv e r helped differentiate sham e and em b arrassm en t. R ecalled ep isod es o f sham e w ere signifi­ cantly m ore likely than episodes o f em b arrassm en t to refer to occasion s when the individual w as on his o r her ow n; that em b arrassm en t clicilcd higher ratings on a

S E L F - C 0 N S C 10 U S N E S S I N S H A M E

1 7 9

scale asse ssin g the e x te n t to w hich p a rtic ip a n ts felt that o th e rs w ere lo o k in g ; that sham e w as m o re likely than e m b a rra ssm e n t to be e x p e rie n c e d in the p re se n ce o f th ose w ho w ere c lo se rath er than acq u ain tan ces o r stran g e rs. N e v e rth e le ss, these arc d ifferen ces o f e m p h asis, rath er than c ate g o rica l differen ces. W c p ro p o se that sham e and e m b a rra ssm e n t both req u ire the ad o p tio n o f an oth er p e rsp e ctiv e , and that this can take p la c c w h eth er the in dividual is alo n e o r in co m pan y and w h eth er the co m p an y is p sy ch o lo gically c lo se o r m o re d istan t. [. . .]

R eferen ces B u ss, A .H . (1 9 8 0 ). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco: Freem an. C a r v e r , C . S . & S c h f . i e r , M .F. (1 9 8 7 ). T h e blind m en and the elephant: Selective

exam ination o f the public-private literature gives rise to a faulty perception. Journal o f Personality, 5 5 , 525 540. C a s t e i . f r a n c h i , C . & P o g g i , I. (1 9 9 0 ). Blushing as a d iscou rse: Was D arw in w rong? In Shyness and embarrassment: Perspectives from social psychology (ed. W R . C rozier) pp. 230 251. N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press. C R O Z IE R , W .R. (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ). Shyness and embarrassment: Perspectivesfrom social psychology.

N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press. D u v a l , S. & W i c k l u n d , R .A . (1 9 7 2 ). A theory o f objective self-awareness. N ew York:

A cadem ic Press. F e n i g s t e i n , A . & A b r a m s , D. (1 9 9 3 ). Self-attention and the egocen tric assum ption o f

shared persp ectives. Journal o f E xperim ental Social Psychology, 2 9 , 287 303. H a r r e , R . (1 9 8 3 ). Personal being. O x fo rd : Blackw ell. H a r r e , R. (1 9 9 0 ). E m barrassm en t: A conceptual analysis. In Shyness and embarrassment:

Perspective from social psychology (ed. W .R. C rozier) pp. 181 204. N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press. H i g g i n s , E.T. (1 9 8 7 ). Self-discrepancv: A theorv relating se lf and affect. Psychological

Review, 9 4 , 3 1 9 340. L e w i s , H .B . (1 9 7 1 ). Shame and guilt in neurosis. N ew York: International U niversities

Press. L e w i s , M . (1 9 9 2 ). Shame: The exposed self. N ew York: Free Press. S a b i n i , J. & S i l v e r , M . (1 9 9 7 ). In defence o f sham e: Sham e in the con text o f guilt and

em b arrassm en t. Journ alfor the Theory o f Social Behaviour, 2 7 , 1 15. S a r t r e , J.-P. (1 9 4 3 /1 9 5 6 ). Being and nothingness (trans. H .E . B arn es). N ew York:

Pocket Books. S c h e r e r , K .R . (1 9 9 3 ). Studying the em otion-an teceden t appraisal process: An e x p e rt

system approach. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 325 355. T a n g n f . y , J . P , M i l l e r , R .S ., F l i c k e r , L . & B a r l o w , D .H . (1 9 9 6 ). Are sham e, guilt,

and em b arrassm en t distinct em otions? Journal o f Personality and Social Psychologyr, 7 0, 1256 1264. T a y i . o r , G. ( 1 9 8 5 ) . Pride, shame, and guilt: Emotions i f self-assessment. O x fo rd : Clarendon

Press.

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

5. Emotions, space and place

H

I S T O R I C A L LY, I S S U E S

O F space and place have been neglected by

natural and social scientists of emotion. Like objects, space and place have a

tendency to fade unnoticed into the background in favour of more obvious figures such as the pa rticu la r individuals experiencing p a rticu la r feelings, expressing them via their frowns, sighs, postures and gestures, or by talking about them. And yet, when writing about love and jealousy, a great novelist such as Proust draws our attention to the places in which Swann's feelings are played out and to the settings in which his encounters with Odette unfold (cf. Brown and Stenner 2001). Swann's jealousy is played out around the Verdurin salon and we sense that things 'feel different' outside of that pa rticu la r milieu. He feels its pangs when it dawns on him how frequently Odette is now away from Paris. Some places are 'haunted' by Odette and some are the haunts of the 'young Swann' who predates the affair. Likewise, Proust shows us how the m aterial objects populating spaces are woven into the relations configured by jealousy. The flowers accompanied by a note from Odette become so unbearable that Swann makes a detour to avoid them 'whenever he went in or out of the room'. When we begin to attend to them, space and place reveal themselves to be decisive ingredients in a social scientific understanding of affect. Fortunately, this fa c t has not escaped geographers, who in recent years have contributed significantly both to the textual turn and to the affective turn by taking the spatial aspects of affect and emotion seriously. There are now, for instance, a number of editorials and special issues discussing 'em otional geographies' and 'spatializing affect' (Anderson and Sm ith 2001; Davidson and Bondi 2004; Davidson and M illig an 2004), and no shortage of heated debate (Thien 2005; Anderson and Harrison 2 006) This move has required what M acK ia n

(2004) calls a 're-

subjectivization of space', since in what she ca lls 'sim ple modernity', space had been characterized by the removal of a ll subjectivity in favour of the objective space

1 8 2

E MB ODYI NG

A FF ECT

typified by the grid of the map. Some of this work has been spurred by practical and political interests such as fem inist critique of masculine detachment and the spatial mediation of dynamics of inclusion and exclusion which have emotional impacts of relevance to class, race, disability and sexuality (Sibley 1995; Pain 1997; Dwyer 1999; Listerborn 2002). This work is often based upon the notion of space as a site of discursively mediated shared sym bolic meaning. Geographical work in the affective turn, by contrast, sees in affect the possibility of attending to spatial encounters with 'a life and a force before and beyond . . . deliberative and reflective . . . repre­ sentational thinking' (M cC o rm ack 2003: 490; see also M cCorm ack 2 0 07). This has spurred some geographers to articu late 'non-representational' theories of the spacing of affect that aim to 'engage with questions of m ateriality' and 'provoke a rethinking of the nature of . . . subjects . . . and the emergence of subjectivities from more or less unwilled affectual . . . assemblages' (Anderson and Harrison 2006: 334). Our first extract is from Nigel T hrift's (2004) a rticle 'Intensities of Feeling: towards a spatial politics of affect'. T hrift exemplifies the attempt to develop 'nonrepresentational' theory proper to an 'affective tu rn ' capable of moving beyond a discursive version of social constructionism . This paper is as much about politics as it is about space, but we include it in this sub-section because T hrift discusses issues he claim s to be specific to the life of cities. Namely, he argues that the systematic engineering of affect is now central to the political life of Euro-Am erican cities. If so, one can no longer understand politics in relation to a discursive or 'id e olog ica l' plan or regime, since the engineering of affect bypasses such higher order cognitive and linguistic processes. He examines four such 'developments' that enroll affect directly into the political life of cities: the proliferation of neo-liberal 'agencies of choice'; the enhanced mediating role of the 'screen'; the increased use of technologies of 'calcu latio n in sensory registers' which permit a kind of corporeal communication; and the careful design of urban space to shape affective responses. The second extract from Rani Kawale (2004) 'Inequalities of the Heart' exemplifies a social constructionist concern to challenge the 'naturalness' of hetero­ sexuality through an analysis of the ways in which everyday places are 'fe lt'. She explores the notion of 'sexualized' emotional spaces through an examination of the accounts of the performance of emotion work given by a sample of lesbian and bisexual women in London. Heterosexuality, she points out, is an institutionalized phenomenon that regulates emotional expression through the mediation of law, religion and other institutions such as marriage. This regulation occurs in everyday spaces and places which thus take on emotional connotations that result in the 'spatial supremacy of heterosexuality'. Our third extract from M im i Sheller (2 004) is also about the 'feeling' of every­ day spaces, but in this case the focus in on what Sheller calls 'Autom otive Em otions': feeling the car. Autom otive emotions are about what it feels like to be 'in ' the car, but such feelings are also influenced by the broader cultural and social meanings that pa rticu la r types of car afford. Em otional investments in cars thus go beyond simple rational and economic calculations of costs and benefits since - as spaces embedded in broader personal, fam ilia l and national spaces - they include embodied experiences which often have deep affective resonances. This is something well understood by

E M O T I O N S,

S PAC E A N D P L AC E

1 8 3

those w ho sell ca rs, w ho rou tin ely dw ell on the feeling of the drivin g experience and other passions th a t haunt our a utom ob iles. The fin a l e x tra ct in th is sub-section is fro m Ben A n d e rso n 's (2 0 0 5 ) a rticle , 'D o m e stic G eographies o f A ffe c t'. A n derso n explo res some of the a ffe ctiv e d ynam ics involved in the operation o f m aking judgem ents in m undane dom estic spaces. He conducted research in 17 low er m id d le -cla ss households in Sheffield , England. P a rt of th is research involved e licitin g acco u n ts of how householders decide w h ich m usic to play in th e ir home. Denis, fo r exam ple, selects a song w h ich 'en e rg ize s' him a fte r returning home from w o rk. H is p a rtn er Jen n y d oesn 't like the song and leaves the room . On the b asis of such seem ingly m undane data, A n de rso n suggests th a t such judgem ents are m ade on the basis of w h a t 'fe e ls rig h t' a t a given m om ent and th a t w h a t is 'fe lt' is based on how 'b o d ie s' com pose w ith other bodies (e.g. how a 'b o d y ' of m u sic fits w ith p a rtic u la r people in p a rtic u la r m oods in p a rtic u la r spaces and tim es). F o r Anderso n , th is shows th a t o rd in a ry d om estic space and tim e is brou gh t into being by 'm u ltip le , in tersecting to p olo g ies of a ffe c t'.

References Anderson, K.an d Sm ith, S. (2 001) 'E m o tio n al geographies', Transactions o f the Institute o f B ritish Geographers, 26: 7 -1 0 . Anderson, B. and Harrison, P. (2 006) 'Questioning affect and em otion', Area, 38 (3): 3 3 3 -3 3 5 . Brown, S. and Stenner, P. (2 001) 'Being affected: Spinoza and the psychology of emotion, Internation al Jo u rn a l o f Group Tensions, 30 (1): 8 1 -1 0 5 . Davidson, J. and Bondi, L. (2 00 4 ) 'S p a tia lisin g affect; affecting space: an introduction', Gender, P la ce and Culture, 11: 3 7 3 -4 . Davidson, J. and; M illigan, C. (20 0 4) 'E d ito ria l: Embodying emotion sensing space: intro­ ducing em otional geographies', S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Geography, 5 (4): 5 2 3 -5 3 2 . Dwyer, C. (1 99 9 ) 'Con tradiction s of community: questions of identity for young British M uslim women, Environm ent and Plann in g 4 ,3 1 : 5 3 - 6 8 . Listerborn, C. (2 00 2 ) 'Understanding the geography of women's fear: toward a recon­ ceptualization of fear and space', in L. Bondi, H. Avis, R. Bankey, A. Bingley, J. Davidson, R. Duffy, V. I. Einagel, A. M. Green, L. Johnston, S. Lilley, C. Listerborn, S. M cEw an , M. Marshy, N. O'Connor, G. Rose, and B. Vivat, (eds) Subjectivities; Knowledges and Fem in ist Geographies: the subjects and ethics o f so c ia l research. London and Lanham, M D: Rowman and Littlefield. M acK ia n , S. (2 0 04 ) 'M a ppin g reflexive communities: visualizing the geographies of emotion', S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Geography, 5 (4): 6 1 5 -6 3 1 . M cC orm ack, D. P. (2 0 03 ) 'A n event of geographical ethics in spaces of affect', Trans­ a ctions o f the Institute o f B ritish Geographers, 26: 4 8 8 -5 0 7 . M cC orm ack, D. P. (2 0 07 ) 'M o le c u la r affects in human geographies', Environm ent and Plann in g A, 39: 3 5 9 -3 7 7 . Pain, R. (1997) 'S o cia l geographies of women's fear of crim e', Transactions o f the Institute o f B ritish Geographers, 22: 2 3 1 -2 4 4 . Sibley, D. (19 9 5) Geographies o f Exclusion. London: Routledge. Thien, D. (2 00 5 ) 'A fte r or beyond feeling? A consideration of affect and emotion in geography', Area, 37 (4): 4 5 0 -4 5 6 .

Chapter

21

Nigel Thrift I N T E N S I T I E S OF F E E L I N G T o w a rd s a s p a tia l p o lit ic s o f a ffe c t

[• ■ •]

O

F C O U RSE,

AFFECT

HAS

ALWAYS

b een a key e le m e n t o f p olitics

and the su b je c t o f n u m e ro u s p ow erfu l p olitical te c h n o lo g ie s w hich have

k n o tted thinking, tech n iqu e and affect to g e th e r in v ariou s p o te n t co m b in atio n s. O n e e x am p le is the m arsh allin g o f ag g re ssio n through v ario u s fo rm s o f m ilitary train in gs such as d rill. [. . .] Sim ilar p ro c e sse s have b een h app en in g in m any o th e r aren as o f social life, w h eth er on a d o m e stic o r larg e r sc alc, sufficient to su g g e st that the e n velop e o f w hat w c call the political m u st in creasin gly e x p a n d to take n ote o f ‘ the w ay that p olitical attitu d e s and sta te m e n ts arc p a rtly co n d itio n e d by in ten se au to n o m ic b odilv re a c tio n s that do n ot sim p ly re p ro d u c e the trace o f a p olitical in ten tion and can n o t b e w h olly re cu p e rate d w ithin an id e o lo gic a l re g im e o f tr u th ’ (Sp in k s, 2 0 0 1 , p. 2 3 ). In this section I w an t to illu strate how this e n velop e is e x p a n d in g in cities bv re fc rc n c c to fou r d e v e lo p m en ts. T h e first o f th ese d e v e lo p m e n ts c o n sists o f the ge n e ral ch an ges in the form o f such p o litics w hich are takin g p lace in the c u rre n t e ra , ch an ges w hich m ake affcct an in creasin gly visible e le m e n t o f the p o litic a l. In particu lar, I w an t to p o in t to w a rd s so -called ‘ ag cn cics o f c h o ic e ’ and ‘ m ix cd -actio n r e p e r to ir e s ’ in line w ith a g e n e ra l m ove to m ake m o re and m o re areas o f life the su b je c t o f a new se t o f re sp o n sib ilities called ‘ c h o ic e ’ . A s N o r ris (2 0 0 2 , p. 22 2) p u ts it: . . . R isin g levels o f h um an cap ital and so c ic tal m o d e rn iz atio n m ean that, tod ay , a m o re ed u cate d citizcn ry . . . has m oved increasin gly from ag c n cics o f loyalty to ag en cies o f ch o ice, and from e le cto ral re p e r to ir e s to w ard m ix e d -actio n re p e r to ir e s co m b in in g e le cto ral activities and p r o ­ test p o litics. . . .

I N T E N S I T I E S

OF

F E E L I N G

1 8 5

M any o f these new form s o f choice politics rely on an expan sion o f w hat has been conventionally regarded as the urban political sphere. For e xam ple, the political n ow ­ adays routinely takes in all m anner of fo rm s o f culture—nature relation (e.g. environ ­ m ental politics, anim al rights politics, pro-choice or anti-life politics). In turn , this redefinition o f what counts as political has allow ed m ore ro om for explicitly affective appeals w hich arc heavily depen dent upon the m edia, as w ell as sim ilar appeals w hich endeavour to redu ce these affective im pacts (e.g. by referrin g to scien ce, by various m eans o f decon struction o f the ‘ reality’ o f an im age and so on). . . . T h is b rin gs m e to the secon d d e v e lo p m en t w hich is the heavy and con tin u in g mediati/.alion o f p o litics. W c live in so cietie s w hich arc en velop ed in and satu rated by the m e d ia: m o st im p o rta n tly , it is difficult to c sc ap c the influen ce o f the screen w hich now sta re s at us from so m any m u n dan e lo catio n s

from alm o st every ro om

in the h ou se to d o c t o r s ’ w aitin g ro o m s, from a ir p o r t lo u n g es to sh o p s and sh o p p in g m a lls, fro m b a rs to m any w o rk p lace s . . . from the in sides o f ele v ato rs to w hole b uild in gs — that it is p o ssib le to argu e that the scrccn has taken on a n u m b e r o f the ro le s fo rm e rly ascrib e d to p a re n t, lover, tea ch e r and blan k sto o g e , as w ell as ad d in g a w-hole se rie s o f ‘p o s ts o c ia l’ relatio n s w hich seem to lie so m e w h e re b e tw e en early film th e o r y ’s b ru te tran slation o f scre e n -ic fo rc e (K racau e r, 1 9 6 0 ; B alasz, 1 9 7 0 ) and cogn itiv e film th e o r y ’ s later, m o re n u an ced in te rp re tatio n in w hich cogn itive p ro c e sse s arc strain ed th rough v ariou s con ven tion s and sty les (se c B o rd w cll and C a r ro ll, 1 9 9 6 ; T h rift, 2 0 0 4 b ). This m ed iatization has had im p o rta n t effects. As M cK en zie (2 0 0 1 ) has p o in ted o u t, its m o st im p o rta n t effect has b een to en shrine the p e rfo rm ativ e prin cip le al the h eart o f m o d e rn E u ro -A m e rican so c ie tie s and th eir p o litic a l to rm s. T h is has o c c u rre d in a n u m b e r o f w ays. To b egin w ith , the tech n ical fo rm o f m o d e rn m edia ten d s to fo re g ro u n d e m o tio n , both in its c o n ­ c en tration on key affective sites such as the face o r voice and its m agn ification o f the sm all d e tails o f the b ody that so o fte n signify e m o tio n . Political p re se n tatio n n ow adays o fte n fixes on such sm all d ifferen ces and m ak es them stand fo r a w h ole. O n e line of m o v e m e n t can b e co m e a p ro g re ssio n of m ean in g, able to b e actu alised and im p lan ted locally . [. . .] T h u s, political presen tation c o n fo rm s increasingly to m edia n o rm s o f p re se n ta­ tion which em ph asize the perfo rm an ce o f em otio n as bein g an in dex o f credibility. Increasingly, political legitim ation arises from this kind o f p erfo rm an ce (T h o m p so n , 2 0 0 1 ). A nd, as a final poin t, these kinds o f presen tation chim e w ith the increasingly ‘th e rap e u tic’ fo rm o f selfh ood w hich is b e co m in g com m on in E u ro-A m erican so ci­ eties (cf. G id d en s, 1991; R o se , 1996). Indeed, N olan (1 9 9 8 ) argu es that this th e ra­ peu tic o r ‘ e m o tiv ist’ eth os is em b ed d in g itse lf in the stru ctu re s o f the A m erican state to such a d e gre e that it is b eco m in g a key tech n ology o f go vern an ce, both challenging and to so m e

e x ten t rep lacin g the affectivc b ack gro u n d o f o ld er b ureaucratic

‘ m ach in e’ tech n o lo gies, by, for ex am p le , recogn isin g em otional labour, em otion m anagem en t and em otio n al learn in g as key skills (Sm ith , 2 0 0 2 ). [. . .] T h u s, a se rie s o f h e te ro g e n e o u s k n o w le d g es o f p e rfo rm a n c e m ove to cen tre stage in m o d e rn so c ietie s w hich co n stitu te a new ‘d isa g g re g a te d ’ m o d e o f d iscip lin e, an e m e rg e n t stratu m o f p o w e r and k n o w led g e. These k n o w le d g es c o n stru c t p o w e r in a n u m b e r o f w ays - by d e liv e rin g m e ssag e s w ith p a ssio n , fo r e x am p le (in d e e d , il is often the fo rce w ith w hich p assion is d eliv ered w hich is m o re im p o rta n t than the m e ssa g e ), by p rovid in g a new m in u te lan d scap e o f m an ip u lation (D o a n e , 2 0 0 2 ), by

1 8 6

NIGEL

THRIFT

adding new possibilities for m aking sign s, and generally by adding new openin gs out o f the event. But, m ost im portan tly , they provide a new m ean s o f creating ‘fractal’ sub jects challenged to p erfo rm across a se rie s o f different situations in a way w hich dem ands not so m uch open n ess as con trolled flexibility. As M cK enzie (2 0 0 1 , p. 19) puts it: The desire p rodu ced by p erform ative pow er and kn ow ledge is not m ould ed by distinct disciplinary m echanism s. It is n ot a rep ressive d esire: it is instead ‘e x c e ssiv e ’ , in term itten tly m odu lated and pushed across the thresholds o f various lim its by overlappin g and som etim es com p etin g system s. Further, diversity is not sim ply in tegrated, for in te­ gration is itse lf b eco m in g diversified. Sim ilarly, deviation is not sim ply n orm alised , for n orm s operate and tran sform them selves through their ow n tran sgression and deviation. We can un derstan d this developm en t b e tter w hen we realise that the m echanism s o f p erform ative pow er are nom adic and flexible m ore than sedentary and rig id , that its spaces are netw orked and digital m ore than en closed and physical, that its tem p oralities are polyrhythm ic and non-linear and not sim ply sequential and linear. O n the p erform ative stratu m , one shuttles quickly betw een differen t evaluative g rid s, sw itching back and forth b etw een divergent challenges to perform — o r else. A third developm en t is closely linked to m ediatization and the rise o f p erform an ce kn ow ledges. It is the grow th o f new fo rm s o f calculation in sen sory re g iste rs that w ould not have previously been deem ed ‘p o litical’ . In particular, through the advent of a w hole se rie s of tech n o lo gies, sm all spaces and tim es, upon which aflcct thrives and out of w hich it is often con stitu ted , have b eco m e visible and arc able to be enlarged so that they can be know ingly operated upon. Though it w ould be possib le to argue that o u tp osts w ere already bein g con stru cted in this continent o f ph enom enality back in the seventeenth century w ith, for exam p le, the grow th o f in terest in condition in g the m ilitary body through such practices as d rill, I w ould argue that the main phase o f colonisation dates from the m id-nineteenth century and rests on four developm en ts (T h rift, 2 0 0 0 ). First, there is the ability to sense the sm all spaces o f the body through a w hole array o f new scientific in stru m ents which have, in tu rn , m ade it possible to think o f the body as a se t o f m icro-geo graph ies. Secon d, there is the related ability to sense sm all bodily m ovem en ts. Beginning with the ph otograph ic w ork o f M arcy, M uybridge and oth ers and m oving into our currcn t age in w hich the cam cra can im pose its ow n politics o f tim e and sp acc, we can now think o f tim e as m inutely segm en ted fram es, able to be sp eed ed up, slow ed dow n, even frozen for a w hile. T h ird, n um ero us body practices have com e into existen ce w hich rely on and m anage such know ledge o f sm all tim es and spaces, m ost especially those con n ected with the p e rfo rm in g arts, including the ‘underp e rfo rm in g ’ o f film acting, m uch m od ern dancc, the insistent cross-hatched tem p o o f m uch m od ern m usic, and so on. Special perform an ce notation s, like Labanotation and other ‘ ch o rco -grap h ics’ , allow this m inute m ovem en t lo be re co rd e d , analysed and re co m p o se d . Th en , finally, a se rie s o f disco u rses con cernin g the slightest gestu re and utterance o f the body have been d eveloped, from the elaborate

I N T E N S I T I E S

OF

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tu rn -tak in g o f con versation al analysis to the in tim ate sp aces o f p ro x e m ic s, from the analysis o f g e stu re to the m ap p in g o f ‘b od y lan g u ag e ’ . [. . .] A lo u rth d e v e lo p m en t w hich in volves aHect is the carefu l d esign o l urban space to p ro d u c c p o litical re sp o n se . In creasin gly , u rban sp a cc s and tim e s arc b ein g d e sig n e d to invoke affective re sp o n se a c c o rd in g to practical and th eo retical k n o w ­ le d Oge s that have b e en d eriv ed from and c o d e d bv a h ost o f so u rce s. It co u ld be J claim ed that this has alw ays been the case — from m o n u m e n ts to triu m p h al p r o c e s ­ sio n s, from th eatrical aren as to m ass b ody displays — and I w ou ld ag re e . In the tw en tieth c c n tu ry , it cou ld be argu ed that m uch o f the activity o f the d esign o f sp acc w as p o w e re d up again , b e co m in g en tan gled w ith the evolution of k n o w le d g es o f shaping the b o d y (such as the m ic ro b io p o litic s re fe rre d to ab o v e), often in a p o litics o f the m o st frigh ten in g so r t. B ut w hat 1 w ould argu e is differen t now is both the sh eer w eight o f the gathering to geth er o f form al kn o w ledges o f affective r e s ­ p o n se (w h eth er from highly fo rm a l th e o retical b ac k g ro u n d s such as psy ch o an aly sis o r practical th eo retical b ack g ro u n d s like p e r fo r m a n c e ), the vast n u m b e r o f practical k n o w le d g es o f affective re sp o n se that have b e co m e available in a se m i-fo rm al gu ise (e.g . d e sig n , ligh tin g, even t m a n a g e m e n t, lo g istics, m u sic , p e r fo r m a n c e ), and the e n o rm o u s d iv ersity o f available cu es that are able to be w o rk ed w ith in the shape o f the p ro fu sio n o f im ag e s and o th e r sign s, the w ide sp e c tru m o f available te c h n o lo ­ g ie s , and the m o re ge n e ral archive o f even ts. I'he re su lt is that affective re sp o n se can be d e sig n e d into sp a c c s, often o u t o f w hat se e m s like very little at all. Though affective re sp o n se can clearly n ever be g u a ra n te e d , the fact is that this is n o lo n g e r a ran d om p ro c e ss either. It is a fo rm o f lan d scap e e n g in e e rin g that is grad u ally p u llin g itself in to e x iste n c e , p ro d u c in g new fo rm s of po w er as it g o e s. [. . .]

R eferences B A LA Z S, B. (1 9 7 0 ): Theory o f the Film. Character and Growth o f a New Art. N ew York: D over Press. B O R D W E L L , D ., C A R R O L L , D. (ed s) (1 9 9 6 ): Post-Theory. Reconstructing Film Studies. M adison: U niversity o f W isconsin Press. D O A N E , M .A . (2 0 0 2 ): The Emergence o f Cinematic Time. Modernity, Contingency, The Archive. C am bridge, M A : M IT Press. K R A C A U E R , S. (1 9 6 0 ): Theory o f Film. The Redemption o f Physical Reality. N ew York, M C K E N Z IE , J. (2 0 0 1 ): Perform or Else. From Discipline to Performance. N ew York: R outledge. © N O L A N , J .I ..(1 9 9 8 ): The Theurapeutic State. Justifying Government at Century's End. Albany, NY: N ew York U niversity Press. N O R R IS , P. (2 0 0 2 ): Democratic Phoenix. Reinventing Political Activism. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. SM IT H , P. (e d .) (2 0 0 2 ): ‘ R egim es o f em o tio n ’ , Special Issue o f Soundings 20: 9 8 —217. SP IN K S, T. (2 0 0 1 ): ‘Thinking the posthum an: literature, affect and the politics o f sty le ’ , Textual Practice, 15: 23—46. TH R IFT , N .J. (2 0 0 0 ): ‘ Still life in nearly presen t tim e: the ob ject o f n ature’ , Body and Society, 6: 3A—57. TH R IFT , N .J. (2 0 0 4 b ): ‘ Beyond m ediation ’ , in M iller, D. (e d .): Materialities. D urham , N C : D uke U niversity Press.

Chapter

22

Rani Kawale I N E Q U A L I T I E S OF T H E H E A R T The p e rfo rm a n ce o f e m o tio n w o rk by le sb ia n and b ise xu a l w om en in L o n d o n , E n g la n d

Feeling everyday places

E

V E R Y D A Y P L A C E S C L E A R L Y I N C L U D E T H E h om e. A ccordin g

to Valentine (1 9 9 3 a ), Joh n ston and Valentine (1 9 9 5 ) and Elvvood (2 0 0 0 ), the

‘ h eterop atriarch al’ parental hom e is a place w here sexuality is under surveillance and lesbians do not alw ays e xp erien ce em otio n al co m fo rt. Lesbians often actively con ceal or su pp ress their identity o r find discreet ways o f resisting their invisibility in the hom e. Lesbian h ou seh old s, however, while n ot n ecessarily elim inating survcillan cc o f sexu ality, can offer lesbians em otional co m fo rt. In my research , ap proxim ately 59 p e r ccnt o f questionnaire respo nd en ts and 80 per ccnt o f in te r­ view ees w ere out ab out their sexualityJ at h om e. T h cvJ wrcre likely to live alone or J with sam c-sex p artn ers a n d /o r friends. H ow ever, 41 p er ccn t o f questionnaire resp o n d en ts and 75 p e r ccnt o f in terview ees actively con cealed their sexuality from their paren ts at h o m e .' The in terview ees describ ed their h om es in em otional term s and it wras clear that Edw ina (w hite Irish, lesbian, aged late tw en ties), Sunita (South Asian, lesbian, aged late tw en ties) and Sharada (South A sian, lesbian, aged late tw en ties) w ere con cern ed about the feelings and em otio ns o f their paren ts: My parents w ou ld n ’t approve [o f m e bein g a lesbian) so therefore I’ m ‘ in ’ at hom e . . . the only issue is n ot u psettin g m y parents. I’m living in their house ren t-free because I’m a student and th at’ s a cou rtesy that I’ve go t to respect and [being out] w ould m ake m e very unhappy so why bother? T h e only reason [why] I [w ould] w ant to tell them is to m ake them happy for m e, that I’ ve found som eon e o r whatever. T h e y ’re not goin g to be, [so| why both er? . . . |T |h e y ’ ll think I’ ll’ ve gone a w rong

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path . . . they w ou ld n ’t be able to stand w hat I’ m doin g, I’ d be deviant, w ron g and it’ d be ‘their fau lt’ and that’ s n ot fair.

(Edw ina)

Rekha (South A sian, lesbian, aged late tw en ties) lived alone and explain ed that her girlfrien d Sunita lived w ith her paren ts w ho w ere unaw are of her lesbian sexuality. They did not allow Sunita to spend nights away from hom e so Rekha and Sunita m et regularly on the scene to share som e of their em otio n s and feelings for cach other. Like Edw ina, Sunita w as eager to m aintain an em otionally balanced atm osph ere w ith her paren ts at hom e so she kept her sexuality a secret from them . They both p erfo rm ed surface acting such as deliberately changing topics o f conversation s with their parents away from their social lives, p artn ers and m arriage, and hiding lesbian and gay m aterial. This helped them to avoid the fear o f bein g accidentally ‘found o u t’ by their parents and also to p ro te c t their parents from feelin g angry and upset. Many o f m y research participan ts lived in lesbian o r bisexu al (frien dly) h ouseh old s, but wrhether they visited their p a re n ts’ o r other relativ es’ at h om e, or w ere visited by them in their own h om es, the m ajority continued to conccal their sexuality from them even if they had already com e out to them . Sharada lived w ith her b rother w ho accepted her lesbian identity, and she w as out to her m other. Yet she continued to hide her sexuality from her parents when they visited b ecau se, as she explain ed to m e, ‘they d o n ’t w ant lo see il o r know about it’ . So a lesbian (friendly) h ou se­ hold may o ile r em otional co m fo rt but the feeling ru les change accordin g lo who is present. H ow ever, w hether a hom e is lesbian (friendly) or n ot, it certainly can be a site o f em otional c o m fo rt for lesbians w ho, like Edw ina, Sunita and Sharada, perform the em otion w ork o f concealing their sexuality in the in terest of their p are n ts’ feelin gs, and their ow n feelings. M o st em ploym ent organizations in corpo rate gen dered perfo rm an ces and scxualizcd in teraction s am on g em ploy ees such that h egem on ic h eterosexuality rem ains pow erful in them , and sexual m in orities rem ain invisible (B u rrell and H earn 1989; H alford and L eonard 2 0 0 1 ; Hall 1989; M cD ow ell 1995; Sch neider 1984; Valentine 1993a, 1993b ; W itz, H alford and Savage 1 996). L esbian s and gay m en often pass as h eterosexual in these environ m en ts by m anagin g and negotiatin g m ultiple sexual identities (Valentine 1993b ). The m ajority o f my research participan ts negotiated and m anaged sexual identities at w ork and p erfo rm ed em otion w ork to avoid, for exam p le, fear, anxiety and em b arrassm en t o f bein g found out o r rejected by their colleagues. They wrere selective about w ho they cam e out to in o rd e r to avoid or m inim ize unw anted em otio n s in their colleagu es and in them selves. W hether out or n ot, they often en coun tered aw kw ard situations w hen colleagu es e x p ressed h om oph ob ic thoughts and opin ion s, hcncc the participan ts con cealed and su p ­ pressed feeling offen ded, upset and angry by w hat may be regarded as surface acting. For e xam p le, Sujata (South A sian, lesbian, aged early tw en ties) ad opted a ‘lib eral’ stance at w ork w hen pointing out to colleagu es that their h om oph obic com m en ts w ere as unacceptable as they believed racist com m en ts to be. U pset, an ger o r offence have no inherent m ean in gs but exp ressin g these em otio n s in respo nse lo h om oph obic com m en ts at w ork w as no option for Sujata as this w ould have effectively e xp o se d her sexuality, som eth in g she con sidered to be unsafe. C om in g out to ‘gay-frien dly’ colleagu es d oes not necessarily gu aran tee a lesbian o r bisexu al w om an can then e xp re ss her sexuality at w ork in the sam e ways

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that h eterosexual w om en can. Again, the p erform an ce o f em otion w ork is required. For e xam p le, Kelly (w hite A ustralian, lesbian, aged m id-tw en ties) had been out at w ork for m ore than a year and developed a friendly rap p o rt w ith h er colleagues. She explain ed to m e that tw o h eterosexu al fem ale colleagu es regularly describ ed to her their w eekends flirting with different m en in pubs and bars. Kelly eventually decided to tell them about her night flirting w ith a w om an in a lesbian bar and w as ‘sh o ck c d ’ by their facial and verbal e xp ressio n s of disgust. It w as n ot K elly ’ s sexuality that w as reacted to unfavourably but her challenge to h eterosexual n orm s around em otio n s and feelings. H er c o lle ag u e s’ sto rie s relied on acts, ge stu re s, em otio n s and feelings that adhered to h eterosexu al n o rm s thus con tribu tin g to the h ctcroscxuaiization o f the w ork place. K elly’ s sto ry , however, ru ptu red this space. So she interven ed in her c o lle ag u e s’ ‘ s u rp rise ’ and disgu st and su pp ressed her own ‘sh o ck ’ and ‘u p se t’ by em ploying surface acting. She calm ly respo n d ed to them Every w eekend you guys go o u t and . . . try and pull . . . and I d o n ’t say anything about w hat I think. W hy is it so g ro ss that I m ight sn og a w om an? . . . I m ight think it gro ss to sn og m en all the tim e and I d o n ’t say anything, I d o n ’t go “ E R R R ! T h a t’s really g ro ss” like a 5-year-old. (Kelly) Like Sujata, Kelly frequently p e rfo rm e d em otion w ork lo m aintain and (re)creale an em otionally balanced w orking atm osph ere for her c o lle ag u e ’ s sake and her own w hen sim ilar con versations occu rred at w ork. Lesbians olten hide their sexualitv and pass as h eterosexu al in the streets (G re en 1 9 9 7 ; Valentine 1993a, 19 9 3 b ), and the p erlo rm an ce o f surface acting helps to con ceal em otio ns that w ould oth erw ise challenge h eterosexu al n o rm s, as ex p re sse d to m e by M egan (w hite Irish, lesbian, aged late tw en ties): [Lesbians] m ake so many allow ances for straight peop le all the tim e. Wc d o n ’t hold hands on the ro ad , w e d o n ’t kiss in fron t o f them , we d o n ’t snog in front o f th em , wc d o n ’ t talk about ou r relationship. I m ean so many [lesbians] d o n ’t talk ab out their relationship for fear o f em b arrassin g other [p eople], m aking other peop le feel aw kw ard. (M egan ) This con trasts w ith M eg an ’s on e-off sto ry about kissing her girlfrien d outsid e a busy pub and bein g ch ccrcd on by so m e m ale p u n ters. The act o f tw o (in this ease drun ken ) w om en kissing did not n ecessarily ru ptu re the h ctcro-sexu alizcd street bccausc o f the m ultiple wrays in w hich it could be read. M eg an ’s and her g irlfrie n d ’ s feelings and em otio n s w ere not read by the on look ers as bein g directed solely to each other but as tran sferable to h eterosexu al m e n .4 How'cvcr, when p e rfo rm e rs believe their em otional behaviour m ight be read as challenging h eterosexu al n o rm s, they may also feel other em otio n s: [My girlfrien d and I] now openly hug . . . have standing hugs in the m iddle o f Tottenham C o u rt R oad and occasionally kiss cach other as w e’ re saying ‘ B y e’ , d o n ’ t sn og or w hatever, and yet every tim e I split

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from h er I have this fleeting [thought] ‘ Shit! Is anyone ready to b eat m e up on the stre e t fo r d o in g th a t?’ (R ek h a) R e k h a’ s feelin gs o l love and affection fo r h er g irlfrie n d w ere en tw in ed w ith fear and an xiety o f n ot b e in g read as h ete ro se x u a l by h o m o p h o b ic o n lo o k e rs, and re m in d e d h er of n o t ad h erin g to h ctcro sc x u a lize d feelin g ru le s in the stre e t. T h is is n o t to su g g e st that sam e -se x co u p le s can n ever feel o r e x p r e ss love free o f fear o r an xiety b u t that h ctc ro sc x u a liz c d feelin g ru le s m e an s that such en tw in ed e m o tio n s are likely to o c c u r am o n g th ose w ho ch allenge these ru le s. In o r d e r fo r R ckh a and h er g irlfrie n d to rem ain safe from e x te rn al fo rm s o f h o m o p h o b ia th eir e m o tio n s w ere n ot to b e read as ru p tu rin g the h ete ro se x u a lize d sp ace. So rath er than kissin g passion ately they h u gg ed , p erh ap s like siste rs o r b e st frien d s. ‘ [T]he id en tity o f th ose p re se n t in a sp a ce , and thus the id en tity o f the sp ace b e in g p ro d u c e d , can so m e tim e s b e co n stru c te d by the gaze o f oth e rs p re se n t rath er than the p e r fo r m e r s ’ (V alentine 1 9 9 6 : 1 4 9 ). T h u s, sp a c c s arc n o t n ecessarily scx u aliz cd only by physical behaviour, but by the re ad in g o f e m o tio n s attach ed to th ose b od ily acts by o n lo o k e rs. Iden tities and e m o tio n s m ay not be re c o g n iz e d c o rre c tly by o n lo o k e rs and in n eith er R c k h a ’ s n o r M e g a n ’ s case w ere they know ingly u n d e r in creased threat from h o m o p h o b ic attack . Yet, the u n certain ty o f the p o ssib le read in gs m ean s that lesbian s rarely overtly e x p r e ss th eir se xu ality physically o r em otio n ally in everyday pub lic places. [. . .]

R eferences B urrell, G. and H earn , J. (1 9 8 9 ) Sexuality o f organ isation , in H earn , J ., Sheppard, D. L ., Tancred-Sheriff, P. and Burrell, G. (eds) Sexuality o f Organisation. London: Sage, pp. 1 -2 7 . Elw ood, S. A. (2 0 0 0 ) Lesbian living spaces: m ultiple m eanings o f h om e, in Valentine, G. (e d .) From Nowhere to Everywhere: Lesbian Geographies. N ew York: H arrington Park Press, pp. 11—27. G reen , S.F. (1 9 9 7 ) Urban Amazons: Lesbian Feminism and Beyond in the Gender, Sexuality and Identity Battles o f London. London: M acm illan. H alford, S. and Leonard P. (2 0 0 1 ) Gender, Power and Organisations. B asingstoke: Palgrave. Hall, M . (1 9 8 9 ) Private exp erien ces in the public dom ain: lesbians in organisations, in H earn , ]., Sheppard, L ., Tancred-Sheriff, P. and B urrell, G. (ed s) The Sexuality o f Organisation. London: Sage, pp. 125—1 38. John ston , L. and Valentine, G. (1 9 9 5 ) W h erever I lay my girlfriend, that’ s my hom e: the p erform an ce and surveillance o f lesbian identities in d o m estic environm ents, in Bell, D. and Valentine, G. (cds) Mapping Desire: Geographies o j Sexualities. London: R ou tledge, pp. 9 9 —11 3. M cD ow ell, L. (1 9 9 5 ) Body w ork: h eterosexual gen der p erform an ces in city w o rk ­ places, in Bell, D. and Valentine, G. (cds) Mapping Desire: Geographies o f Sexualities. London: R ou tledge, pp. 7 5 —95. Schneider, B. (1 9 8 4 ) Peril and p rom ise: lesbians’ w orkplace participation, in N ardi, P.M. and Schneider, B.E. (1 9 9 8 ) (cds) Social Perspectives in Lesbian and Gay Studies:A Reader. London: R outledge, pp. 377—389.

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Valentine, G. (1993a) (H ctcro)scxin g spacc: lesbian perceptions and experiences of everyday spaccs, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 1 1: 395—41 3. Valentine, G. (1993b) N egotiating and managing m ultiple sexual identities: lesbian tim e-space strategics, Transactions o j the Institute o f British Geographers 18: 237—248. Valentine, G. (1996) (Re)ncgotiating the ‘heterosexual street’ : lesbian production o f space, in Duncan, N. (cd .) BodySpace: Destabilizing Geographies o f Gender and Sexuality. London: R outledge, pp. 146—155. W itz, A ., H alford, S. and Savage, M. (1996) O rganised bodies: gender, sexuality and em bodim ent in contem porary organisations, in Adkins, L. and M erchant, V. (cds) Sexualising the Social: Power and the Organisation o f Sexuality. Basingstoke: M acmillan, pp. 173—189.

Chapter

23

Mimi Sheller AUTOMOTIVE

EMOTIONS

Fe eling the c a r

C

A R S E L I C I T A W I D E R A N G E o f feelin gs: the p leasures o f driving, the ou tb u rst o f ‘ road ra g e ’ , the thrill o f sp eed , the security en gen dered by driving

a ‘ safe ’ car and so on. They also gen erate intensely em otional politics in w hich som e peop le passionately m obilize to ‘stop the traffic’ and ‘ reclaim the str e e ts’ , while others vociferously defend their right to cheap p etrol. C ars are above all m achines that m ove peop le, but they do so in many sen ses o f the w ord. R ecen t ap pro ach es to the ph en om en ology of car-use have highlighted ‘ the drivin g b o d y ’ as a set o f social p ractices, em b odied disposition s, and physical aftordanccs (Sh eller and U rry , 2 0 0 0 ; D ant and M artin , 2 0 0 1 ; Edcnsor, 2 0 0 2 ; O ld ru p , 2 0 0 4 ; D ant, 2 0 0 4 ; T h rift, 2 0 0 4 ). M ore en com passin g ap proach es to the an thropology o f m aterial cultu res have also rcsitu atcd the car as a social-tech nical ‘h yb rid’ (M ich ael, 2 0 0 1 ; M iller, 2 0 0 1 a ) .1 This article builds both on this w ork and on recen t ap proach es in the sociology o f em otio n s (H och schild, 1983, 1997, 2 0 0 3 ; Bendelow and W illiam s, 1998; K atz, 2 0 0 0 ; G oodw in ct al., 2 0 0 1 ; A h m ed, 2 0 0 4 ) to e xp lo re the wavs in w hich the ‘dom inant eulture o f au to m o b ility ’ (U rry , 2 0 0 0 ) is im plicated in a deep c o n tcx t o f affective and em bodied relations betw een p e o p le, m achines and spaces o f m obility and dw elling, in wrhich em otio n s and the senses play a key part. Social co m m en tato rs have lon g ad dressed the problem o f car cultu res in an explicitly n orm ative m ann er con cern ed w ith the restitution o f ‘public g o o d s ’ (the cnvironcm nt, hum an health, the social fabric o f citics, d em ocratic public cultu res) that have been erod ed by con tem p orary car and road sy stem s (Jaco b s, 1 9 6 1 ; N ader, 1965; Sen n ett, 1990; K unstler, 1 9 9 4 ; D unn, 199 8 ). At stake in such d eb ates is not sim ply the future o f the car, but the future o f the entire ‘car cu ltu re ’ (and w ider tran spo rtation system ) in w hat m ight be ch aracterized as ‘ societies o f au to m o b ility ’ in wrhich the ‘coercive fre e d o m ’ o f d rivin g shapes both public and private spaces o f all scales and kinds (Sh eller and U rry , 2 0 0 0 ; U rry , 2 0 0 4 ). Yet m ost practical efforts at prom otin g m o re ‘eth ical’ fo rm s o f car con sum ption have been debated and

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im plem en ted as if the intense feelin gs, passions and em b odied e x p erien ces asso c i­ ated w ith au tom obility w ere n ot relevant. C ar cultu res have social, m aterial and above all affective dim en sions that are overlooked in cu rren t strategics to influence car-drivin g decision s. T h e in dividual­ istic ‘rational c h o ic e ’ m od el, w hich is so influential as to be taken lor granted in tran spo rtation policy deb ates, d isto rts o u r un derstan din g o f how peop le (and their feelings) arc em b ed d ed in historically sedim en ted and geograph ically etched p attern s o f ‘quotidian m o b ility ’ (K aufm an, 2 0 0 0 ). Paying attention to the e m o ­ tional con stituen ts o f car cu ltu res, however, need not im ply re so rtin g to black-box causal explan ation s such as the pop u lar yet ill-dcfincd n otions o f ‘au tom obile ad d ictio n ’ or a ‘love affair’ writh the car (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ). Ncwr ap proach es both to car cultu res and to em otional cultu res can aid us in shifting attention away from the counter-factual ‘rational a c to r’ w ho supposedly m akes carefully reason ed econ om ic ch o ices, and tow ards the lived e xp erien ce o f dw elling w ith cars in all o f its co m p lexity , am biguity and con tradiction. [. . .]

Feeling the car [. . .] Pleasure, fear, fru stration , euph oria, pain, envy: em otional respo n ses to cars and feelings about driving are crucial to the perso n al in vestm en ts p eop le have in buying, drivin g and dw elling with cars. C ar m anu factu rers, o f co u rsc, m anipulate brand desire through the em otional rcson an cc o f their advertising cam paigns; yet the ‘th rill’ o f driving, the ‘jo y ’ o f the ro ad , the ‘p assio n ’ o f the collector, the nostalgia for retro designs are not sim ply lexicon s o f the advertising im agination. The ‘feelin gs’ being gen erated around cars can be pow erful in dicators o f the e m o ­ tional cu rren ts and su b m erged m oral econ om ies o f car cultures. T his affective relationship with cars is not only about pleasure-seek in g, but also feed s into our d eep est fears, an xieties and frustration s. The sto m ach -turn in g feeling of w itnessing a car crash o r the te rro rs and perm an en t anxiety prod u ced by bein g in an accident arc the dark u n derside o f ‘au to -fre e d o m ’ . The very passions that feed into ccrtain kinds o f love for the car o r joy in driving may equally elicit opp osite feelings o f hatred for traffic, rage at other d riv ers, b oredo m with the sam e ro u te or anger at go vern m en t tran sp o rt policies (see M ichael, 2001 for a discussion o f road rage in te rm s o f ‘hum an non-hum an h yb ridity’ ). An advertisin g cam paign for the L exu s IS200 unsurprisingly p roclaim s: ‘It’s the feeling in sid e’ . E m phasizing the leather scats, the autom atic clim ate con trol and the digital audio sy stem , the te x t m akes d e a r that this slogan re fe rs both to the ‘fe e l’ o f the car in terior and the feeling it produ ces inside the body that dw ells within the car. The feel o f the car, both inside and ou tsid e, m ovin g o r stationary, sensuously shapes and m aterially p ro jects how m o to rists feel not only about cars but also about them selves and w ithin them selves. T h ese con cern s can be traced back to Roland B arth e s’ reading o f the m ythology o f the C itroen D S, in w hich he recogn ized the m ateriality o f this p articu lar car as m arking a shift in the dom in ant car culture. W ritin g o f the m agic and spirituality o f its lighter, less aggressive design , he d escrib es a clear cultural shift from ‘an alchem y o f speed lo a gourmandise o f d riv in g’ (B arth es, 1957: 1 52). [. . .j

A U T O M O T I V E E M O T 10 N S

1 9 5

O f c o u rse , view ing cars as prosth etic exten sion s o f d riv e rs’ bodies and fantasy w orlds (F reun d, 1993: 9 9 ; B ran don , 2 0 0 2 : 4 0 1 —2) is the standard fare not only o f m o to r show s and advertisin g, but also o f youth cu ltu res, pin-up calen dars, pop lvrics and hip-hop videos. T h e ‘love alla ir’ w ith the car (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ; Sachs, 2 0 0 2 ), its sexualization as ‘w ife ’ or lover (M iller, 1997 [1994]: 2 3 8 ), su gg ests a kind o f libidinal econ om y around the car, in w hich particular m o d els b e co m e ob jects of d esire to be collected and co sse te d , w ashed and w orsh ip ped . W h eth er phallic or fem inized, the car m aterializes p erso n ality and takes p a rt in the ego-form atio n of the owrncr o r driver as co m p e te n t, pow erful, able and sexually desirable. [. . .]

Being (in) the car It felt alive beneath my hands, som e m etal creature b red for w ind and speed . . . . It ran like the w ind. I ran like the w ind. It w as as though I bccam c the car, o r the car b ecam e m e , and which w as w hich d id n ’t m atter anym ore. (L esley H azleton cited in M osey, 2 0 0 0 : 186) M acnaghten and U rry argue that there are am bivalent and con tested ‘afford an ces’ that ‘stem from the reciprocity betw een the environm ent and the organ ism , deriving from how peop le are kinaesthetically active within their w o rld ’ (2 0 0 0 : 169; sec also C o stall, 199 5 ). D riving can be included am on g the active co rp orcal engagem en ts o f hum an b odies with the ‘ se n se d ’ w orld. Like other m od es o f m obility, such as w alking, bicycling o r riding trains, m od es o f d riving also arise out o f ‘ a specific tim e and place, and they have often developed in con trast to each other. They tend to have a history of both gen derin g and c lass’ (L o fgren , 1999: 4 9 ). D rivin g, then, su gg ests many different kinds o f affordanccs betw een varied b o dies, cars and spaces. [. . .) For so m e the m otion produ ces feelings o f h appin ess, e x c ite ­ m en t or an ticipation; others b eco m c fearful, anxious o r sick to the stom ach . T h ese feelings arc n either located solely within the p erso n n or p rodu ced solely by the car as a m oving o b jcct, but occu r as a circulation o f affccts betw een (different) p e rso n s, (different)

c ars,

and

historically

situated

car

cultu res

and

geograph ies

of

autom obility. In w hat sense might we have ‘em b odied d isp o sitio n s’ towrards the feeling o f driving? At 6 w eeks old m y baby already ex p re sse s an excited anticipation o f car rides. As I placc her in the car scat (w hile still in the h ouse) her countenance brigh tens and she look s around in exp ectation . As I fasten the scat into the back o f the car she turn s her facc tow ard the w indow and looks expectan tly for the show to begin as the car m oves. D urin g a ride she w atch es the w indow intently for as long as she can, until lulled to sleep. It is clear that many infants take pleasure in the kinaesthetic e x p erien ce o f the car rid e, and develop an early orientation tow ards four-w h eeled m obility within a car eulture that soon enables them to play with toy cars, ride on child-sized cars, and learn lo identify different kinds and brands o f m o to r vehicles by the age o f 2 years. At the sam e tim e, this seem ingly ‘ in stin ctual’ disposition is tightly cou pled with a very particular car culture in w hich any m oving vehicle is an extrem ely high-risk environm ent for children, shot through with legal

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interven tion s. T h e parent w ho places their infant in a car seal is faced w ith a w arning o f dire co n sequ en ces (w ritten in 11 languages in E u ro p e): ‘ D O N O T place rear lacing child seat on front seat w ith airbag. D EA TH O R S E R IO U S IN JU R Y can o c c u r.’ This w arnin g is an unnerving yet routine rem in d er o f the need to cultivate a prccisc drivin g disposition orien ted tow ards defensiven ess, safety and security . Installing the child and the scat in the car correctly induccs a sense o f having taken security m e asu re s; it is a self-discipline that m akes paren ts fe e l b e tter about being in the car, as discussed in the follow in g section on family cars and carin g p ra c tic e s.’ M otion and em o tio n , w e could say, arc kinaesthetically in tertw in ed and p r o ­ duced togeth er through a conjunction o f b o d ies, tech n ologies and cultural practices (that arc always historically and geograph ically loeated ). D raw in g on the research o f Jack K atz on driv ers in L os A ngeles, T h rift su ggests that w e should: . . . understan d

drivin g

(and

passen gerin g)

as

both

profoundly

em b odied and sensu ous ex p e rie n c e s, though o f a particular kind, w hich ‘requires and occasion s a m etaphysical m erger, an intertw inin g o f the identities o f the driv er and car that gen erates a distinctive on tology in the form o f a perso n -th in g, a hum anized car or, alternatively, an au to ­ m obilized p e rso n ’ (K atz, 2 0 0 0 : 33) in w hich the identity o f p erso n and car kinaesthetically intertw ine. (T h rift, 2 0 0 4 : 4 6 - 7 ) H um an b odies physically respond lo the thrum o f an engine, the gen tle glide through a ge a rb o x , o r the w hoosh o f effortless acceleration , and in som e cases the driver b eco m es ‘o n e ’ w ith the car (as in the quotation al the start o f this section ). D ifferent em otio n al re g iste rs are produced through the variations in the em b odied driving exp e rie n ce , w hich also have national variations. Som e Iccl con ten t w ith a sm ooth and silen t ride (historically aligned with ideas o f lu xu ry , privilege and w ealth), others prefer an all-w heel drive that shakes the bon es and fills the n ostrils with diesel and engine oil (h istorically aligned w ith ideas o f adven ture, m asculinity and challenge). Although p eop le also have ‘em b odied d isp o sitio n s’ tow ards w alk­ ing, bicycling o r riding a h orse, it is the ways in which these disposition s b cco m c ‘ culturally sc d im c n tc d ’ , as T h rift puts it, that m a tter.’ [. . .] Today a further key change in the em b odied feeling o f cars is due to d evelop ­ m en ts in digital con trol o f the car and in m obile inform ation tech n ologies, which further tran sform the very ways in which we ‘se n se ’ the w orld. T h ere is grow ing em phasis on the integration o f in form ation and com m un ication tech n ologies into the car (especially luxury c ars), leading to a lacing o f tech n ologies o f m obility with capacities for conversation, en tertain m en t and in form ation access (Sheller, 2 0 0 4 ). Many asp ccts involved in directin g the car as a m achinc have been co m p u terized , w hile, sim ultaneously, car-dw cllcrs have been insulated from the risky and dangerous environ m ents through w hich they pass, seem ingly p ro tected by se atb e lts, airbags, ‘ cru m p le zo n e s’ , ‘roll b a r s ’ and ‘bull b a r s ’ . Features such as autom atic g e arb o x e s, cruise co n tro l, voice-activated entry and ignition, G P S-navigation, digital m usic sy stem s and hands-free m obile ph ones all ‘fr e e ’ driv ers from d irect m anipulation o f the m ach inery, w hile em b eddin g them m ore deeply in its sociality, p roducin g what m ight be d escrib ed as a ‘ cy b e rca r’ (Sh eller and U rry, 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 4 ; Sheller, 2 0 0 4 ).4

A U T O M O T I V E E M O T 10 N S

1 9 7

The m arketing o f so-called ‘sm a r t’ cars em ph asizes not only their sm aller size but also their enhanced capabilities for inform ation or entertainm ent in con gested urban areas, w hich w ill increasingly be design ed as ‘intelligent en viron m en ts’ . 5 [. . .]

Family cars, caring and kinship [. . .] A key overlooked asp cct o f car cultu res is the em otional investm ents people have in the relationships betw een the car, the self, fam ilv and frien d s, creating affcctivc co n te xts that arc also deeply m aterialized in particular types o f vehicles, h om es, neigh bou rh oods and cities. A rcccn t advertisin g cam paign for the Toyota Yaris points out that, ‘You could end up loving it too m u ch ’ ; the Yaris is then show'n in a variety o f absurd yet believable social scenarios in which love is taken a bit too far (receiving p o stcard s, bein g treated to a candle-lit bath, m on op olizin g a huge em pty garage, e tc .). C learly cars have been deeply integrated into the affective netw ork s o f fam ilial life and d o m estic sp accs, as w ell as friendship netw ork s and public sociability. As Sim on M axw ell argu es, policy discussion s have n cglcctcd the ‘ positive social fram es o f m eaning o f car use associated w ith care and love for im m ediate o th e rs, as w ell as care for oth ers w ithin w id er social n e tw o rk s’ (M a x ­ w ell, 2 0 0 1 : 2 1 7 - 1 8 ). H e finds that ‘there are plural ethics associated w'ith car use in everyday life, and intense negotiation s betw een these ethical stan ces’ (2 0 0 1 : 2 1 2 ). Such fram es o f m eaning and ethics gen erate som e o f the feeling ru les that govern the em otio n al cultu res o f car use, in which needs to m anage personal iden tity, fam ilial relationships, and sociability can easily override any ethical qualm s about driving. For exam p le, driving offers many peop le a feeling o f liberation, em pow erm en t and social inclusion, while inability to drive may lead to feelings o f social exclusion and d isem p o w crm cn t in cultu res o f au tom obility . A study o f young suburban driv ers in Britain su ggests that ‘the car is p art of pattern s o f sociab ility ’ and the anticipation o f new p ossib ilities for such sociability gen erates ‘an extrao rdin ary and excitin g m om en t o f co n su m p tio n ’ for young driv ers (C arrab in c and L on gh urst, 2 0 0 2 : 192 3). In a largc-scalc survey study o f the expressive dim en sions o f car use am ong English d riv ers, Stephen Stradlin g found that feelings o f p ro jectio n , p rid e, pow er, self-expression or in dependen ce, vary by age, class and gen der: ‘different kinds o f p erso n s obtain different kinds o f psych ological benefit from car use. D rivin g a car is particularly attractive to the young and the p o o r because o f the sense o f displayed p erso n al identity it con veys’ (Stradlin g c t a l., 2 0 0 1 ; Stradling, 2 0 0 2 : I I ) . A long sim ilar lines, G ilroy su gg ests that A frican -A m erican flam boyant public use o f cars m akes up for feelings o f status injury and m aterial deprivation through ‘ com pen satory p re stig e ’ (G ilro y, 2 0 0 1 : 9 4 ). [. . .]

Notes 1

The concept o f hybridity has a com plex history which ranges from colonial theories o f race (Young, 1995) to debates about diasporic identities and multi culturalism (W erbner and M odood, 1997) and the human—nonhuman hybrids

1 9 8

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S H E L L E R

o f studies o f tech noscience (H araw ay, 1997), actor-netw ork theory (Law and H assard, 1999) and critical geograph y (W h atm ore, 2 0 0 2 ). This is n ot the place to discuss fully the im plications o f this theoretical gen ealogy, but it is w orth noting that the discou rse o f hybridity is a pow erful one writhin techno-cultures o f au tom obilitv and is itself in need o f carcful analysis vis-a-vis its effects o f denaturalization and rcnaturalization. 2

In other car cultures a blessing or a hidden charm m ight serve the sam e function o f m aking the occupants o f a vchicle feel they have taken appropriate safety precautions (sec V crrips and M eyer, 2001 on p rotectin g cars from w itchcraft and gh osts in G hana). R cccn t research carried out for the A A M o torin g Trust suggests that up to tw o-thirds o f child car scats used in the U K arc in any case installed incorrectly thus providing little protectio n in accidents (h tt p :/ /w w w . a a tr u s t.c o m /n e w s /re le ase _ v ie w .c fm ?id = 6 2 1).

3

Thus it is argued that electric m o to r vehicles and cars with fuel cclls o r hybrid pow er sources w ill have to feel like conventional cars and to deliver the sam e pleasures o f driving: quick acceleration, speeds over 65 m ph, and the capacity to drive at least 350 m iles w ithout rech arging (M otavalli, 2 0 0 1 ). It is for this reason that G eneral M o to rs’ electric EV-1 and F o rd ’ s Think are thought to have failed (A pcar, 2 0 0 2 ; D uffy, 2 0 0 2 ).

4

The T o yo ta/Son y Pod con cept car even prom ises that it will: . . . m easure your pulse and persp iration levels to gauge your stress levels. If you are beco m in g aggressive it w ill calm you w ith cool air and soothing m usic. It w ill even wrarn other drivers about your m ental state by changing the colou r o f the strip-lights on the bonnet! (R/1C Magazine, 2002: 14—15)

5

Such developm ents w ere already prefigured in the subcultures ol car custom iza­ tion critizcd by Paul G ilroy (2 0 0 1 : 9 8 —9 ), w hich p rodu ced ‘road m o n ste rs’ such as the G M C h evrolet Suburban ‘m ackcd o u t’ with TV, video library, tem perature con trolled cup h olders, digital com pass and th erm om eter, invisible speakers in so u n d p ro o f w alls and a satcllitc-controllcd security svstem .

R eferences A hm ed, S. (2 0 0 4 ) The Cultural Politics o f Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U niversity Press. Bendcknv, G. and S. W illiam s (ed s) (1 9 9 8 ) Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary Issues. London: R outlcdgc. Brandon, R. (2 0 0 2 ) Auto Mobile: How the Car Changed Life. Basingstoke and O x fo rd : M acm illan. Carrabine, E. and B. Longh urst (2 0 0 2 ) ‘ C on sum ing the C ar: A nticipation, U se and M eaning in C o n tem porary Youth C u ltu re ’ , Sociological Review 5 0 (2 ): 181—96 C ostall, A. (1 9 9 5 ) ‘ Socializing A ffordan ces’ , Theory ^Psychology 5: 4 6 7 —81. D an t, T. (2 0 0 4 ) ‘The D river-car’ , Theory, Culture St^Society 2 1 ( 4 / 5 ) : 61—79. D an t, T. and P. M artin (2 0 0 1 ) ‘ By C ar: C arryin g M odern Society ’ , in A. W arde and J. G runow (cds) Ordinary Consumption. London: H arw ood. D unn, J. (1 9 9 8 ) Driving Forces. W ashington, D C : Brookings Institution Press.

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E dcnsor, T. (2 0 0 2 ) ‘M aterial C ulture and N ational Identity’ , in National Identities in Popular Culture. O x fo rd and N ew York: Berg. Freund, P. (1 9 9 3 ) The Ecology o j the Automobile. M ontreal and New' York: Black R ose Books. G ilroy, P. (2 0 0 1 ) ‘D riving w hile B lack ’ , in D. M iller (e d .) Car Cultures. O x fo rd : Berg. G oo dw in , J., J. Ja sp e r and F. Pollctta (2 0 0 1 ) Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements. C h icago, IL and London: U niversity o f C hicago Press. H ochschild, A .R . (1 9 8 3 ) The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press. R eprin t, w'ith ncwr afterw ord, Berkeley: U niversity o f California P ress, 20 0 3 . H ochschild, A .R . (1 9 9 7 ) The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work. Ncwr York: M etropolitan Books. H ochschild, A .R . (2 0 0 3 ) The Commercialization o f Intimate Life: Notesfrom Home and Work. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press. Ja c o b s, J. (1 9 6 1 ) The Death and Life o f Great American Cities. N ew York: R andom H ouse. K atz, J. (2 0 0 0 ) How Emotions Work. C hicago, IL: U niversity o f C hicago Press. K aufm an, V. (2 0 0 0 ) Mohilite quotidienne et dynamiques urbaines: la question du report modal. Lausanne: P resses Polvtcchniqucs ct U nivcrsitaircs R om an dcs. Kunstlcr, J. (1 9 9 4 ) The Geography o f Nowhere: The Rise and Decline o f America’s Man-made Landscape. New' York: Touchstone Books. L ofgrcn , O. (1 9 9 9 ) On Holiday: A History o f Vacationing. Berkclcv and London: U niversity o f California Press. M acnaghtcn, P. and J. U rry (2 0 0 0 ) ‘ Bodies in the W oods’ , Special Issue ‘ B odies o f N atu re ’ , cds P. M acnaghtcn and J. U rry , Body Society 6 (3 —4): 166—82. M axw ell, S. (2 0 0 1 ) ‘N egotiatio n s o f C ar U se in Everyday L ife ’ , in D. M iller (c d .) Car Cultures. O x fo rd : Berg. M ichael, M . (2 0 0 1 ) ‘The Invisible C ar: The C ultural Purification o f R oad R a g e ’ , in D. M iller (c d .) Car Cultures. O x fo rd : Berg. M iller, D. (1 9 9 7 [ 1994]) Modernity, An Ethnographic Approach: Dualism and Mass Consump­ tion in Trinidad. O x fo rd and N ew York: Berg. M iller, D. (cd ) (2 0 0 1 a) Car Cultures. O x fo rd : Berg. M otavalli, J. (2 0 0 1 ) Forward Drive: The Race to Build ‘Clean’ Cars for the Future. San Francisco, C A : Sierra Club Books. N ader, R . (1 9 6 5 ) Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designer-ln Dangers o f the American Automobile. Ncwr York: G rossm an . O ld ru p , H. (2 0 0 4 ) ‘ From T im e-ou t to Self-control: Stories and Im agination o f A u to­ m ob ility ’ , PhD Thesis S eries, Institute o f Sociology, U niversity of C openhagen, D enm ark. Sachs, W. (2 0 0 2 ) For Love o f the Automobile. Looking Back into the History o f Our Desires. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press. Scnn ctt, R . (1 9 9 0 ) The Conscience o f the Eye: Design and Social Life in Cities. L o n d o n : Faber and Faber. Sheller, M . (2 0 0 4 ) ‘ M obile Publics: Bcvond the N etw ork P erspective’ , Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2 2 (1 ): 39—52. Sheller, M . and J. U rry (2 0 0 0 ) ‘The C ity and the C a r ’ , International Journal o f Urban and Regional Research 24: 7 3 7 —57. Shcller, M . and J. U rry (2 0 0 4 ) ‘The City and the C y b ercar’ , pp. 167—72 in S. Graham (e d .) The Cybercities Reader. London and N ew York: R outlcdge. Stradling, S. (2 0 0 2 ) ‘Persuading People O u t o f T h eir C a r s’ , Presented to the E SR C

2 0 0

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M obile N etw ork, h ttp :/ / w w w .its. lc cd s.ac.u k /p ro jccts/m o b ile n e tw o rk / m obilcnct-w ork.htm l (acccsscd 15 May 2003). Stradling, S .G ., M .L . M eadow s and S. Beatty (2001) ‘Identity and Independence: Two Dim ensions of D river Autonom y’ , in G.B. Grayson (cd .) Behavioural Research in Road Safety. Crow thorne: Transport Rcscarch Laboratory. Thrift, N. (2004) ‘ Driving in the C ity ’ , Theory, Culture S^Society 2 1 (4 /5 ): 41—59. U rry, J. (2000) Sociology heyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century. London and N ew York: Routledge. U rry, J. (2 004) ‘The “System ” o f A utom obility’ , Theory, Culture &_ Society 2 1 (4 /5 ): 2 5 -3 9 .

Chapter

24

Ben Anderson DOMESTIC GEOGRAPHIES OF A F F E C T

Feeling the m aking o f a judgem en t

M

AKING

A JUDGEMENT

I S A N e v e r-p re sen t p a rt o f th ose in tim ate

c n c o u n tc rs w ith the m a te ria lities o f re c o rd e d m u sic that fram e, and en liven ,

a ran ge o f p u b lic and p riv ate sp a ce -tim es. To b egin to attu ne to how such p rac tic c s o f ju d g e m e n t e m e rg e from w ithin the day to day lives o f specific h o m e s 1 w an t to d iv e rt in to the first event. D en n is, a

4 1 -y ear-old e n g in e e r w ho lives w ith his p a rtn e r and daugh ter, d e sc rib e s in a diary e x tra c t re tu rn in g h om e fro m w ork on a w eek day even ing and m ak in g a se rie s o f ju d g m e n ts ab o u t w hat m u sic to listen to. G o t h om e from w o rk — d c c id c d to play so m e m u sic for a w hile b e fo re pu ttin g on su p p e r— Jen n y w as b usy in the garden so had so m e tim e to my self. P u t on this album o f folk so n Ogs b u t tu rn ed them off J

-d id n ’ t feel

rig h t. Sk ip ped it fo rw ard to this on e w'ith a gre at m e lo d y , difficult to d e sc rib e w hat it d id — g u e ss it e n e rg iz ed m e a b it, really like that song. D ccid c d to flick o n to the ra d io — h eard so m e shit so n g on R ad io Tw o so sw itch ed that off. F.nd up listen in g to a b rillian t album by a M o d ern artist Ja m e s G reen w hich is go o d fo r takin g away the stre ss and m akin g tea to : it m oves ab o u t. (L iste n in g d iary e x tra c t: p u n ctu atio n un ch an ged) D en n is and I listen to the m u sic d e sc rib e d in the diary c x tra c t d u rin g a jo in t in terv iew several days later: I played this, you know' I’ d b een fe elin g a bit tire d , lo n g day at w o rk we had load s o f o r d e rs . . . and it ’ d tired m e o u t so I n e e d e d so m e th in g to b o o st m e up. T h is so n g is g o o d for that load s o f . . . u m m m . . . en ergy .

2 0 2

BEN

A NDE RSON

We listen to the end o f the song. D ennis then sw itches the CD. I w ou ld n ’ t norm ally play this but tor so m e reason it, 1 w as in a good m ood as I w as m aking tea and this m akes m e laugh and ju st . . . you know helped lighten the m ood even m ore and ge t on and enjoy being at hom e after w ork. ( ‘ Listen in g-w ith ’ , 17 D ec e m b e r 2 0 0 0 ) D ennis hints at the presen ce o f n u m ero u s practices o f ju d gem en t that cach serve to crcatc a set o f (d is)con n cction s betw een h im self and the different m usic he h e a rd / listened to. Initially, on return ing h om e, m usic is played and then turn ed off. It docs not Je e l right’ . He then skips forw ard to a different song and sings along. This 'energizes' him . D issatisfied w ith the n ext son g he sw itches to the radio. This is turn ed o ff and he m ention s how m uch he dislikes a son g he had ju st heard. Finally, he settles on an album because it 'is good Jo r taking away the stress and making tea to’ . Practiccs o f ju d ge m e n t arc here bound up w ith thought-im bued Jeelings and emotions that cnact the in scription , o r m odification, o f value to a range o f m usic. It is this form

of

spon tan eous

im m ediate

ju d gem en t,

m ixed

into

the

incorporeal-

c o rp o rcalities o f the b ody, that is m o st critical to understanding how ju d gem en t is o f everyday life. Feeling a son g in evaluative term s is not based on an already decided p refcren cc, o r taste, but instead is b odicd-fo rth w ithout deliberation from within the ‘im m ediacy o f a given situ atio n ’ (Varela 1999: 9 ). M aking a judgem ent d oes, o f co u rse , exten d out from the im m ediate now into incipient feelings that rem em b er both latencies o f what has-been and ten den cies o f what has not-yet com e to be. It is also em b edded in the m ore distanced circulation s that told togeth er to m ake up specific ‘everyday lives’ : in the above ease D ennis return s hom e and p repares fo r an evening m eal. Feeling a ju d gem en t, em bodying an evaluative stance that p ro d u ces value, therefore w orks through a n um b er o f proxim ate m odification s o f the body. In the case o f D ennis one song is, in his w o rd s, ‘pretty boring, it’s just slow . . . doesn’t move m e'. This changc in the sense o f m ovem en t folds into an cffcct in the visccral register. T h e m usic co m c s to Je e l souless’ . It d ocs not touch him . Given the proviso that ch oicc, and ju d gem en t, m ust always occu r Jrom within the p attern s o f ‘ everyday life ’ , wre can specify that recorded m usic b e co m e s entangled w ithin the space-tim e o f the hom e through types o f ‘m undane m e ta m o rp h o sis’ that em erge in ‘responsive recogn ition o f the invisible dim en sions that groun d routine social in teractio n ’ (K atz 1999: 3 2 3 ). T h ese arc passages in con du ct specific to the m ovem en ts o f ‘daily life ’ that, in K atz’s (1 9 9 9 : 3 35) w o rd s, arc based on ‘a sensual turn in g o f o n e ’ s attention to region s o f the body that, outside o f o n e ’s ow n direct aw aren ess, had been em ployed to co n stru ct b eh avior’ . E xam p les from this case include a sidep ercep tion o f a need to ‘ to take away the stress' or ‘ to be energized’ . Bonds are th ere­ fore fo rm e d , responsively, from w ithin a given situation betw een the m aterialities o f m usic and the body. This ‘turnin g in ’ to an aw areness o f the body takes a num b er o f different fo rm s and p o ssesses a range o f different forces. Each m etam orph osis is bound to, and e m erg es out of, the dem an d s o f the here and now. M usic is thereafter en cou n tered , and ju d ged , as ‘a p p ro p ria te ’ only if it ‘p ro m ise s’ lo create, in Sp in oza’ s te rm , ‘g o o d e n c o u n te rs’ . In the above case m usic ‘fits’ with ‘everyday

D O M E S T IC

G E O G R A P H I E S

0 F A F F E C T

2 0 3

life ’ b e c a u se it a llo w s an a u g m e n ta tio n : it g iv e s e n e rg y o r a b o o s t (s e e D e le u z e 1 9 8 8 ). N e g a tiv e ju d g e m e n ts, in c o m p a r is o n to the re la tio n s o f a g r e e m e n t b e tw e e n the m a te ria litie s o f m u sic an d his b o d y that D e n n is d c s c r ib c s , o c c u r d u e to the lack o f m a tc h b e tw e e n the m a te ria litie s o f m u sic and the m a n n e r in w h ich ‘as e m o tio n s e b b and How in e x p e r ie n c e , the p e r so n is a b s o r b e d in to an d w ith d ra w s fro m given re g io n s an d fe a tu re s o f the w o r ld ’ (K a tz 1 9 9 9 : 3 3 5 ). T h e c o n v e rsa tio n s, p e r io d s o f play in g m u sic to g e th e r and m o r e fo rm a liz e d in te r v ie w s , w e re fre q u e n tly e n liv en e d w ith e v alu ativ e p r a c tic e s o f talk that e x p r e ss e d a d im in ish in g re la tio n w ith m u sic a d im in ish m c n t th at fo llo w s fro m the p rin c ip le th at ‘ w h en a b o d y “ c n c o u n tc r s ” a n o th e r b o d y , o r an id ea a n o th e r id e a , it h ap p e n s that the twro re la tio n s s o m e tim e c o m b in e to fo rm a m o r e p o w e rfu l w h o le , an d s o m e tim e s o n e d e c o m p o se s the o th e r, d e stro y in g th e co h e sio n o f its p a r t s ’ (D e le u z e 1 9 8 8 : 19). To d e s c r ib e this p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o sitio n w e d iv e rt in to a se c o n d e x a m p le o f how ju d g e m e n t is fc c lin g - im b u c d . B e lo w is an e x tr a c t in w h ich Je n n y , D e n n is ’ s p a rtn e r, d isc u sse s the ev e n t ab o v e. She liste n s to m u sic that e n a b le s a ‘ p le a s a n t’ e n v iro n m e n t. Je n n y and I have b e en talk in g a b o u t th e m u sic w e d islik e . She b e g in s to talk a b o u t h e r h u sb a n d ’ s love o f ‘ d is c o r d a n t ’ m u sic , h ow sh e fe e ls at tim e s w-hen he p lay s it, an d w h at m u sic she d o c s ‘ lik e ’ : Je n n y : 1 d o n ’ t like m u ch o f the m o d e r n stulT . . . like . . . w ell 1 d o n ’ t kn ow . . . I d o n ’ t kn o w w h at y o u ’ d call it e v e n , an d I d o n ’ t like . . . m o d e r n c o m p o s e r s e ith e r actu ally • • • i t ’ s to o d isc o rd a n t, 1 d o n ’ t like the o d d sq u e a k s an d b an gs an d . . . B en : n o n o , th a t’ s w'hat 1 w as g o in g to ask y o u . . . y o u like tu n e s (y eah ) and y o u like . . . Je n n y : y es I like so m e th in g that m a k e s m e feel n icc and d isc o rd a n t so u n d s d o n ’ t. L ike D e n n is ’ m u sic that he had on y e ste rd a y w h en he g o t b a c k fro m w o rk . . . 1 m e an I’ m a b it o f a n e rv o u s so u l an yw ay . . . I m e a n , I ju m p w h en th e p h o n e rin g s . . . so . . . all . . . o d d . . . n o ise s . . . th ey [sh iv e rs an d screw 's facc up] B en : th ey . . • m a k e y o u . . .? Je n n y : n e rv o u s . . . Y E S , m a k e s m e v e ry u n c o m fo r ta b le , d o n ’ t like it at all . . .

I fe e l really on e d g e . . . u n se ttle s m e , I d o n ’ t like . . . b e in g

u n s e ttle d , I like . . . c a lm , h avin g a n icc calm level. (In d iv id u a l in te rv ie w , 19 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 ) In a se p a ra te in te rv ie w D e n n is e x p r e ss e s h ow h is ju d g e m e n t c o n tr a s ts w ith Je n n y ’ s talk o f the m u sic he d e s c r ib e d in th e p r e v io u s d iary e x tr a c t an d Jen n y d c s c r ib c s ab o v e: I g u e s s I liste n e d to that then b e ca u se . . . w ell I’ d had a d u ll day a l w o rk and w an te d to liven th in gs up a b it . . .

I like the w ay il m o v e s y o u

2 0 4

BEN

A N D E R S O N

arou n d load s . . . like you d o n ’ t know w h a t’ s co m in g n e x t . . . il just like . . . it ’ s e x c itin g and in te re stin g . . . you keep n o ticin g it. ( ‘ L iste n in g -w ith ’ , 17 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 0 ) Both p o sitiv e and negative ju d g e m e n ts ab o u t the relatio n b e tw e en m u sic and the im m e d iate situ ation b egin from the sam e p la ce: the affection of m u sic , as so u n d , on the (im )-m ate rial b ody by v irtu e o f the en v elo p in g function o f the se n se s. Jen n y d e sc rib e s how she ju d g e s the ‘ fit’ o f m u sic through e m b o d ie d affection s. She d is ­ likes D e n n is’ s m u sic b c ca u sc it in d u ce s an ‘ uncomfortable’ b ack g ro u n d e m o tio n that leaves h er ‘ unsettled’ . N e gativ e ju d g e m e n ts b egin from such d im in ish m cn ts, i.e . a real chan gc in the d istrib u tio n o f in ten sities that w ork s on and through the b o d ie s o f th ose tra n sfo rm e d . In c o n trast, for D en n is, fu n ction in g to alleviate a ‘ d u lle d ’ b o d y , the m a te ria lities o f the sam e m u sic re so n ate w'ith a re-in ten sification o f ‘ everyday life ’ : ‘ i t ’s exciting and interesting . . .you keep noticing it ’ . T h e m o st c o m m o n ty p es o f ju d g e m e n t that establish a d isco n n ectio n w ith m u sic arc th o se n ear co n stan t p ractic cs o f n o t-c h o o sin g a so n g , o r alb u m , b c ca u sc it d o e s n ot ‘ fit’ o r ‘ m a tc h ’ the im m e d iate situ atio n : so D en n is, fo r e x a m p le , d o e s not ch o o se m u sic that d o e s n o t en able him to ‘ lighten the mood . . . and enjoy being at home after work’ . T h e se p rac tic e s o f ju d g e m e n t c o -e x ist w ith o th e r p ractic e s o f ju d ge m e n t that by co n trast involved d e lib erately ch o o sin g -n o t-to listen lo a defin ed ge n re o f m u sic o r n am ed a r tis ts /b a n d s . E ach p a rtic ip a n t, fo r e x a m p le , co u ld n am e a ccrtain ge n re o f m u sic that they w ould n ever listen lo. O n ly occasio n ally , in re sp o n se to certain p ro x im ate affection s, do p rac tic e s o f ju d g e m e n t take the fo rm o f such a ju d g e m e n t-o v e r m u sic that is e x p re sse d in the act o l n am ing m u sic as ‘g o o d ’ or ‘ b a d ’ . Key to such an e n co u n te r is that a relation is p ro d u c e d in w hich the affcction of m u sic , and the dy n am ics of the situ atio n , are felt to su m m o n listen in g as an even t of ju d ge m e n t-o v e r. N e gativ e ju d g e m e n ts-o v e r m u sic , rath er than sim ply n o t-c h o o sin g m u sic , w ere n otably b ou n d up w ith the p ro d u ctio n o f a ran ge o f affects that act to en able d istin ction by e x p re ssin g a relation that is su sp en d ed or cu t. N o te , fo r e x a m p le , the irritatio n that is e x p r e sse d through Je n n y ’ s talk o f the ‘ discordant sounds’ o f ‘ modern music’ o r the in d iffcrcn cc that an im ates D e n n is’ talk o f ‘shit music’ . ( . . . )

R eferences D eleuze, G. (1 9 8 8 ) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. H urley, R. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Katz, J. (1 9 9 9 ) How Emotions Work. Chicago: C hicago U niversity Press. Varela, F. (1 9 9 9 ) Ethical Know-how: Action. Wisdom, and Cognition. Stanford, CA : Stanford U niversity Press.

6

. Emotions and health

T

HERE

I S A long history of research on emotion in connection to various

aspects of health and disease. As is the case for the study of emotion more

generally, the contribution of social scientists to this field is relatively recent. It is beyond the scope of this volume to review the diversity of medical, psychiatric and psychological approaches to the relation between emotions and health. It is worth mentioning, however, that these have ranged widely. A t one end of the spectrum we find experimental research on the psychophysiology of stress and immune responses (e.g. Vedhara and Irwin 2005; Evans et al. 2000); at the other end we find psycho­ analytic approaches, informing hypotheses on organic disease as the affect-mediated expression of sym bolic meanings (e.g. Chiozza 1998; Anzieu 1989). As we stressed in our introduction, there is no single uncontested way of constructing emotion: the medical, psychiatric, and psychological research in this sub-field reflects the diversity of meanings associated with the concept of 'em otion' itself. Im portant variations are equally evident in how social scientists have approached the connection between emotions and health. The variation occurs along different lines, and reflects different ways of relating to the work of clinical and experimental disciplines. Some social science research offers commentary, critique, and contextualization of medical con­ structs (of the role of emotion in health and disease), in the interest of facilitating an understanding of the norms and values these im plicitly reflect and promote (e.g. Riska 2000; Greco 2001). Additionally, research by social scientists may seek to complement, and eventually feed into, clinical expertise (e.g. W ilce 20 0 3). The 'c ritic a l' and the 'com plem entary' orientations need not be m utually exclusive, and in many instances researchers in this field have a background in both social and clinical disciplines (e.g. Kleinm an and Good 1985; Kleinman 1989). A further way in which social scientists have related to medical research on emotions and health is as a resource for the purpose of developing social theory, in the effort of revising

2 0 6

E MB ODYI NG

A FF ECT

assumptions concerning, for example, what a 'b o d y ' is (e.g. W ilson 2004; Lyon 1993). Selecting extracts for this section has been especially difficu lt in light of the richness, and indeed diversity, of m aterials available. W hile we have tried to provide a sense of this diversity through our selections, these should invite readers to explore further afield. The first extract in this section is from a much cited a rticle by Peter E. Freund, arguing for the relevance of an existential-phenom enological perspective in under­ standing the link between emotions and health. This a rticle is a relatively early example of the 'affective turn', in the sense that it takes issue with the dichotomy opposing positivism and (social) constructionism as the only epistem ological alterna­ tives. Freund argues that sociologists of health and illness have either accepted a biom edical/m echanistic view of bodies, or treated biological and m aterial processes as irrelevant - focusing instead on the study of medical knowledge (or ideas about bodies). The sociology of emotion, on the other hand, has been dominated by a 'pure' constructionism resulting in a very disembodied view of human emotions. Freund is also critica l of so-called biopsychosocial approaches, in that they 'present very m echanistic . . . and . . . static views of mind, body and society', rather than offering 'textured descriptions of embodied subjectivity and the part played by the whole living body interacting in p a rticu la r social networks'. In the biopsychosocial literature, attention to the body is characterized by an 'alm ost exclusive focus on neurohormonal activity', at the expense of other aspects of bodilyness, such as movement and facia l expression (1990: 45 5 ). Against this background, Freund proceeds in this extract to outline some general features of what he calls the 'expressive body'. He defines a new agenda for the sociological study of distressful feelings, society, and health, focusing on key concepts such as those of 'dram aturgical stress' and 'em otional false consciousness'. Our next selection is from a text by A lan Radley, a pioneer in the study of biographical, narrative and cultural aspects of the illness experience. Radley's text is included here as an example of a now vast body of literature in medical humanities. Already incorporated as an aspect of medical training in many programmes across the US, the U K and Australia, research in this area, broadly speaking, is intended to complement biomedical 'objectivism ' through the interpretive analysis of the experience of suffering. Arguably, a longer-term am bition of the field as a whole is to contribute towards a tranform ation of medical culture and practice, towards a greater ability to address the emotional components of health and disease processes. The extract included here explores the affective dynamics im plicit in visual portrayals of suffering. W hat is it about certain images of suffering that leads the viewer to turn away? Or, conversely, what types of image succeed in reaching the viewer, and with what consequences? In this extract, Radley argues that the process whereby images of suffering achieve communication, overcoming horror and anxiety, binds the observer and the bearer of suffering into a 'reciprocal loop' that, if com m unication is successful, is transform ative for both. Radley's piece is useful in highlighting how engagement with the affective dimensions of suffering always involves an ethical dimension. The extract from W ilce and Price is drawn from a volume, edited by Wilce, entitled S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. In this book, medical

E M OTIO N S A N D H E AL T H

2 0 7

anthopologists engage in a rare form of dialogue with medical researchers in psychoneuroimmunology ( P N I ), offering a form of critique that is designed to feed into and improve (rather than deconstruct or contextualize) P N I hypotheses on the role of emotions in health and illness. The chapter from which this extract is drawn outlines an agenda for the research of 'lo cal biologies', based on the premise that culturally variable images of bodies and healing are 'variably embodied within and across societies'. Their argument builds on experimental research that has demon­ strated the immune-boosting efficacy of guided imagery and/or verbal disclosure, proposing that these interventions, and their effects, enact metaphors that are cu l­ tu rally specific. Contrasting examples are offered from a range of Asian contexts, to suggest that psychoneuroimmunology cannot proceed on the assumption of a 'universal, preconceptual, precultural human body that responds in predictable ways to the "sa m e " emotions, meta-emotions, and behaviors'. Our next extract is from an a rticle entitled 'D isorders W ithout Borders? The expanding scope of psychiatric practice', a text that N ikolas Rose originally presented as the 18th Aubrey Lewis Lecture at the Institute of Psychiatry (K in g's College, London). In this piece Rose examines a number of hypotheses that might account for a seemingly uprecedented expansion in the prevalence of mental disorders (and pa rticu la rly anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and impulse control disorders) in European and US societies. In an adm irably synthetic presentation, Rose considers first the notion that there is simply 'm ore' mental disorder around today than in previous times; secondly, he considers the proposition that, through developments in psychiatric expertise, we have become better at recognizing existing mental disorder; thirdly, he examines the notion that the 'm oral entrepreneurship' of the psychiatric profession may be the reason behind the perception of an increased rate of mental disorder; next, he considers 'today's favourite cu lprit - " B ig P h a rm a "', and the idea that in pursuing market share, profit and stakeholder value, the industry may be distorting our perception and treatm ent of mental disorder; finally, Rose presents the case that an increase in the rate of mental disorder may arise from the fact that, in what he calls our 'A ge of Freedom', vague discontents that are inherent in the human condition are being reshaped in a psychiatric form. This text is usefully read alongside the one by De Swaan on agoraphobia (see section 1, above). The final extract in this section, by Elizabeth W ilson, exemplifies one of the ways in which engagement with the (natural) science of emotion can be productive of innovation in social theory. W ilson argues that the anti-biologism that characterizes most contem porary fem inist theory has resulted in a premature dismissal of every­ thing 'b io lo g ica l' as individualizing and reductive. In contrast to this orientation, W ilson proposes that 'effective p olitical engagement with the contem porary life sciences requires ongoing intim acy with their data', and that such data holds the potential for rethinking 'conventional models of biological substrate and psycho­ logical m alady'. Focusing on the example of 'new generation' antidepressants (S S R Is and SN RIs), she demonstrates how these drugs, contrary to the assumption that sees them as targeting the brain as if in a vacuum, actually im plicate the whole body. Fem inist historians and philosophers of the biosciences have critic a lly claim ed that these sciences espouse and reinforce problem atic conceptual schemata, in so far as they privilege the centre over the periphery, or draw radical distinctions between

2 0 8

E M B O D Y I N G

A F F E C T

(a ctive) agents and (passive) vessels. If th is can be said of the n e u ro lo g ica l and p h a rm a co lo g ica l sciences, w rite s W ilso n , 'it seems to be despite the d ata they are generating, not because of th em '. In re la tio n to the brain, fo r exam ple, the d ata suggest th a t th is organ 'is alw ays, n ecessarily im p lica ted in re la tio n s w ith other organs and other extra -b o d ily system s'. W ils o n 's a n a ly sis m akes room fo r the possi­ bility, ra re ly avowed o r explo red in the literature, th a t there m ay be su bstan tia l areas

of

m e ta -th eo re tica l

c o m p a tib ility

between

b io -m e d ica l

research

and

approach es tra d itio n a lly considered very d ista n t fro m it, such as psychoanalysis.

References Anzieu, D. (19 8 9) The S kin Ego. New Haven, M A : Yale University Press. Chiozza, L. A. (19 9 8) Hidden A ffe cts in S om atic Disorders. M adison, Connecticut: The Psychosocial Press. Evans, P., Hucklebridge, F. and Clow, A. (eds) (2 0 00 ) M ind, Im m unity and Health: the science o f psychoneuroim m unology. London: Free Association Books. Greco, M. (2 001) 'Inconspicuous anomalies: "a le xith ym ia " and ethical relations to the self', Health, 6 (4): 4 7 1 -4 9 2 . Kleinm an, A. and Good, B. (1 985) Culture and Depression: studies in the anthropology and cro ss-cu ltu ra l psychiatry o f affect and disorder. Berkeley: University of C alifo rnia Press. Kleinm an, A. (1 989) The Illness N arratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition. New York: Basic Books. Lyon, M. (19 9 3) 'Psychoneuroim m unology: the problem of the situatedness of illness and the conceptualization of healing', Culture, M edicin e and Psychiatry, 17 (1): 7 7 -9 7 . Riska, E. (2000) 'The rise and fall of Type A man', S o c ia l Science and M edicine, 5 1 :1 6 6 5 - 7 4 . Vedhara, K. and Irwin, M . (eds) (2 0 05 ) Human Psychoneuroim m unology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. W ilce, J. M. (ed) (2003) S o c ia l and C u ltu ra l Lives o f Immune Systems. London: Routledge. W ilson, E. (2 004) Psychosom atic: fem inism and the n e uro log ical body. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Chapter

25

Peter E. S. Freund THE

EXPRESSIVE

BODY

C o m m o n g ro u n d f o r th e s o c io lo g y o f e m o t io n s a n d h e a lth a n d illn e s s

E m otion al m o d e s o f b ein g [. . .] T r

IS

IMPORTANT

TO

UNDERSTAND

that the ‘ sc h e m a ta ’ o r

‘c a t e g o r ie s ’ by w h ich w e ‘ u n c o n sc io u sly ’ m ak e se n se o f fe e lin g are n o t sta tic e n titie s that sim p ly re sid e in m in d . T h e se m o d e s o f e x p e r ie n c in g fe e lin g o r ig in a te in the b o d y ’ s e n c o u n te r w ith th e w o rld — in the sa m e w ay th at m u ch c o g n itio n is an o u tc o m e o f th is p r o c e ss . Jo h n so n (1 9 8 7 ) a r g u e s th at the b o d y is in the m in d an d that c o g n itio n a r ise s o u t o f this b o d ily e x p e r ie n c e . W h ile it is th e str u c tu r e o r m e an in g o f fe e lin g th at c o m e o u t of the re la tio n sh ip o f the a c to r w ith e x is te n c e , th e se m e an in g s and s tr u c tu r e s arc n o t to b e seen as p r o c e s s e s o r e n titie s d iv o r c e d fro m b o d ily n e ss. T h e m e an in g o r s tr u c tu r e s o f fe e lin g s o r ig in a te p rc -lin g u istic a lly , th o u g h late r in life th ey arc re fin ed by sy m b o lic c o m m u n ic a tiv e a c tiv ity . A s Jo h n so n n o te s: It is im p o r ta n t to se e th at w e are n o t c o n sid e rin g h ere and h o w w e m ig h t talk a b o u t o u r e m o tio n s , n o r on ly h ow w e m ig h t conceptualise o u r e m o tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e . W e are a lso d e sc rib in g the structure o f our experience o f e m o tio n s. ( 1 9 8 7 :8 9 ) [. . .] T h e c c n tr a l n e rv o u s sy ste m in w hich su ch p a tte rn s arc e m b o d ie d in volve an a ctin g b o d y and h ig h er co g n itiv e fu n c tio n s, th e lim b ic and o th e r c o m p o n e n ts o f th e n e rv o u s sy ste m and ‘ m e c h a n ism s ’ that re g u la te m o v e m e n t. W e arc ab le lo p e r c e iv e m e an in g th ro u gh a v a rie ty o f se n so ry m o d a litie s (in c lu d in g p r o p r io c e p ­ tio n ). In fo rm a tio n fro m o n e m o d a lity m ay at tim e s b e tra n sp o se d to a n o th e r on e

2 1 0

P E T E R

E.

S.

F R E U N D

(D re y fu s 1 9 7 9 :2 4 9 ). T h u s w e have the p o ten tial lo ‘ s e e ’ vo ices and ‘ h e a r’ co lo u rs (M erleau -P o n ty 1 9 6 2 ). [. . .] T h e p ro b lem o f a pu re c o n stru c tio n ism (o r w hat Jo h n so n [1 9 8 7 ] w ou ld call ‘ id e a lism ’ ) o r po sitiv ism (wrhat he calls ‘ o b je c tiv ism ’ ) is that thcv ‘ both assu m e that the o rgan ism and its en v iro n m en ts arc tw o w holly se p a ra te th in gs, and then ask how the tw o are re la te d , and w hich one is re sp o n sib le to r the stru c tu re o f the w o r ld ’ (Joh n son 1 9 8 7 :2 0 7 ). In the ease o f c o n stru c tio n ism , it is d ise m b o d ied talk and th ou gh t; in the ease of po sitiv ism it is a n e u ro p h y sio lo g ic al ‘ su b stra te ’ . T h u s the qu estio n o f w hat c o n ie s first that

we

c x p c r ic n c c

in

n c u ro h o rm o n al arou sal o r the e m o tio n al m ean in gs

en v iro n m en ts

is

so m ew h at

m islead in g

(B u yten d iik

1 9 7 4 :1 7 3 ). A u n iversal e x p e rie n c e that ac co m p an ie s e m b o d im e n t is a sen se o f co n ta in ­ m e n t. T h is e x p e rie n c e that o u r b o d ie s are th ree d im en sio n al co n ta in ers e m e rg e s in o u r e n c o u n te rs w ith the e x te rn a l w o rld o f o b je c ts and p e rso n s w h o re sist u s, give w ay, etc. F rom the b egin n in g w e e x p e rie n c e c o n stan t ph ysical co n tain m en t in o u r su rro u n d in g s (th ose thin gs that en velop u s). We m ove in and out o f ro o m s, c lo th e s, vch iclcs and n u m e ro u s kin ds o f b o u n d e d sp a cc s. Wc m an ip u late o b jc c ts, placin g th em in co n ta in ers. In cach o f th ese cases th ere arc rep eatab le sp a tial-tem p o ra l organ isatio n s. In o th e r w o rd s, th ese are typ ical sch em ata for physical c o n tain m en t. (Jo h n so n 1 9 8 7 :2 1 ) t h us, m any o f o u r cogn itiv e sch em ata e m e rg e o u t ot bodily activities ot e n gagin g the en v iro n m en t. Sim ilarly , o u r w ays o f ap p re h e n d in g fe elin g s, the b asis o f e m o ­ tio n , e m e rg e in e n c o u n te rs w ith o th e rs. O n e m igh t argu e that th ere are structural iso m o rp h ism s on the level of m ean in g in o u r e x p e rie n c e o f the w orld o f physical and social ‘ o b je c ts ’ (M cC a rth y 1 9 8 4 ). Initially o u r e n co u n te rs w ith o th e rs co n sist o f n on -verbal g e stu re s, tou ch in g and m irro rin g the o th e r ’s e x p re ssio n (ic e n gagin g in activities in w hich w e align o u r rh yth m s w ith the b odily e x p re ssiv e n e ss o f o th e rs) (Joh n son 1 9 8 7 ; Levin 1 9 8 5 ). O u r c x p c r ic n c c o f physical c o n tain m e n t leads us to d e v e lo p an ‘ in sid c -o u tsid c ’ orien tatio n (the d e g re e and quality o f this e x p e rie n c e w ill vary h istorically and so cio cu ltu rally ) (E lias 1 9 7 8 ). So grad u ally o u r in teraction w ith o th e rs also lead s us to d e v e lo p a sen se o f se lf and o f e m o tio n a l b o u n d a rie s that e m e rg e o u t o f o th e r s ’ re sp o n siv e n e ss o r n o n -re sp o n siv e n e ss. Such c x p c r ic n c c s fo rm the gro u n d o f ou r sen se o f o n to lo g ical se c u rity o r in secu rity (L ain g 1 9 6 5 ; Levin 1 9 8 5 ). V arious fe e l­ ings o f b od ily e m o tio n a l and spatial b o u n d e d n e ss arc the b asis o f such m e ta p h o rs as ‘ I feel v u ln e ra b le ’ , T feel su rro u n d e d by frie n d s’ , ‘ I’ m tou ch ed by y o u r e x p re ssio n o f lo v e ’ , o r ‘ I feel sm o th e red by y o u r lo v e ’ . Feelin gs can b e d e sc rib e d in te r m s o f the b o d y ’ s o rien tatio n in sp a ce , such as in the case o f e m o tio n a l b alan ce. ‘ I feel on an even k e e l’ . [ . . .] B u y tcn d ijk (1 9 5 0 ) su g g e sts a n u m b e r o f m o d e s o f feelin g

‘ p le a sa n t’ o r

‘ u n p le a sa n t’ . T h e se m o d e s arc the o u tc o m e o f d ifferen t o n go in g c o n d itio n s o f e x iste n c e . M o d e s o f feelin g may be b roadly ch a ra cte rise d as the e x p e rie n c e o f eith er o b stru c tio n s o r e x p a n sio n s in o n e ’ s e x iste n ce (in te rm s o f ac c e ss to the

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ob jects o f ou r in tention). Being pleased includes being with som eb od y o r so m e ­ thing — a felt sense o f unity betw een se lf and other. It may be felt as a surging outw ard o r m ovem ent outw ard o f o n e ’s existen ce and an expan sion o f sell. This m ode may also be cxp c ric n c e d as a p ro cess o f assim ilating o b jccts outside of oneself. In con trast, fou r m o d es o f feeling unpleasant includc (1) bein g throw n back or en coun terin g resistance in o n e ’ s cn cou n tcr w ith o th ers, (2 ) bein g su b du ed, (3) bein g in jured, (4) losing a p a rt o f on eself, o r abandoning all o r a p art of oneself. In effect, these arc different felt w ays o f feeling em pow ered or d isem pow ered. Th ese feelings arc very m uch related to the conditions o f cxistcn cc cn coun tcrcd through out o n e ’ s biograph y. ‘ E x te rn a l’ social structural facto rs such as o n e ’ s position in differen t system s o f hierarchy o r various form s o f social con trol can influence the con ditions o f o u r existen ce, how we respond and apprehend these conditions and our sense o f em b odied self. T h ese con dition s can also affect our physical functioning (Freund 1982).

Em bodied subjectivity and physiological functioning [. . .] E m otion s are always in so m e ways em b od ied . It is one thing to argue that it is not essential for an em otion to be accom pan ied by ‘fe lt’ psychophysical sensations and quite another to argue that m o o d s and em otio n al states do not have bodily accom p an im en ts (Buytendijk 1974: 188). The body may e xp re ss em otio n s o r em otionality through n eu roh orm on al, m usculo skeletal physiological changes o r through those asp ects o f bodilyness that involve exch an ges o f nutrients and other substances with the e xtern al environm ent (eg breath in g). A ltered n euro-h orm onal reactivity, an inability to return to a state ol rest or eq uilibrium , m ight affect blood p ressu re, coron ary a rte rie s, ch o lesterol levels and perhaps the im m une svstem . M u scular ten sion and postural accom p an im en ts m ight facilitate o r aggravate o rth o p e d ic p rob lem s. A nxiety and related irregu larities in p attern s o f respiration could am plify resp iratory p rob lem s. A person may e x p re ss a sublim inal grasp o f the w orld as overpow erin g, the se lf as inadequate before it, by assum in g a sto oped body postu re. Years later the chronic back prob lem s that result com e before an o rth o ­ pedic su rgeon . A nother body takes up the classic p o st o f fight or flight in a stressful officc situation . O v er tim e the internal h ypcrm obility leads to gastritis, high b lood p ressu re, perhaps a h eart attack. The ovcrsccrction o f acid, the con stru ction o f an artery exh ibits the e x p re ssiv e ­ ness o f bodily m ovem en t no less than m otion s extern ally m anifested. (Leder 1 9 8 4 :3 9 ) Many o f these paths fo r exp ression are being studied in b io-psych osocial research. Yet even these ‘h olistic’ p ositivist approach es ‘find them selves leaping from one level o f d iscou rse to another, describ in g the cortical-cpin cph rin c pathways al one m o m en t, the n ext the beneficial effects o f spiritual b e lie f (L e d e r 1 9 8 4 :3 8 —39).

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Since the body is a m eans o f e x p ressin g m eaning, including socio cultural m ean in gs, it is not unrealistic to su pp ose that peop le m ight e x p re ss som atically the con dition s of their existen ce. Pain, lo r instance, can e x p re ss a sense o f an existen ce that w eighs heavily on one o r a sense o f pow erlessn ess. Kleinm an defines som atisation (the exp ressio n of painful existen ce som atically) as ‘the com m un ication o f personal and in terp erson al p rob lem s in a physical idiom o f distress and a pattern of behaviour that em ph asizes seeking m edical h elp ’ (1 9 8 8 :5 7 ). The fact that som atisation is the b o d y ’s wav o f saving som eth in g about life d o e sn ’t m ean that there aren ’ t m any w ays to say the sam e thing ‘physically’ . C ultural (as one o f m any) factors can shape the language o f the b ody. A p ersp ective w hich argues that we can som aticisc social-cm otion al cxistcn cc d o c s not n cccssarily lead to a specificity theory o f psy ch o so m atics (eg A lexan der 1 9 5 0 ). Em otion al respo n ses to m aternal rejection in early childhood will not necessarily be e xp re sse d as asthm a, and may not be physically e xp re sse d at all. [. . .]

Social status, control and physiology T h ere are no con dition s that universally and autom atically ‘elicit’ specific em otional respo nses. Individuals respond to situations on the basis o f individual and cultural appraisals o f ‘w hat is goin g o n ’ . T h ere are, however, a n um b er o f social structural features that con tribu te to the likelihood that situations w ill evoke ‘ p leasan t’ or ‘ un pleasan t’ em otio n al m o d es o f being. O n e ’ s position in a system o f social hierarchy and the activities involved in insuring social con trol are tw o features o f social stru ctu re that influence feelings. T h ese featu res may influence o u r physiology as well (Freund 198 2 ). A nim al stud ies (and a few hum an on es) show an interplay betwreen social stru ctu ral position and pattern s o f n euro-h orm on al reactivity o r levels ol n eu ro ­ tran sm itters such as seroton in (Freund 1988; K em p er 1987; M azur 1985; M adsen 1985; Sapolsky 198 2 ). A ‘top banana’ show s a different pattern o f reactin g to stress than a low status anim al. ( . . . ) A study by M adsen (1 9 8 5 ) claim s to distinguish hum an ‘pow er se e k e rs’ (those show ing Type A behaviour) from oth ers on the basis o f biochem ical m arkers (serotonin levels). Yet, m o st stud ies are drawn from animal sub jects and involve studying the activity o f one chem ical. In hum ans if there are biocultural correlates o f status they probably involve co m p le x and m o re subtle balances betw-een a n um ber o f n cu ro h orm on al activities that dynam ically interact with the in dividual’s self-organisin g activities (F austo-Stcrlin g 1 9 8 5 :1 3 1 ). H ow ever, should these studies have anything to say about hum ans, the im plication s w ould be that o n e ’ s position in any system o f social hierarchy and the m anner in w hich social relationships are m anaged both affect (and are affected by) biochem ical states and other asp ects o f bodilyn ess. C ertainly such h ypoth eses are w ell w orth pursuing. [. . .] A p e rso n ’s social position will determ in e the reso u rces he o r she has to protect the boun daries o f their se lf and how they w ill com e to define them selves. [. . .) The stru ctu re o f feelings is shaped by activities occu rrin g w ithin the con text o f socially organised em otional ‘ sp a ce s’ . C o ffm an s’ use o f spatial m etaph ors to describ e this space and the politics o f social com m un ication (1 9 5 9 ) are illustrative

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o f one way lo conceive o f ihe topography o f extern al and subjective social em otional space. D ram aturgical strategies o f im pression m anagem en t, the sending o f w hat others eith er intentionally or unconsciously m ake visible to us, are p art o f this topography that affects o u r con scious and un conscious subjective relationship to sell and others. How: d ocs the display and con cealm en t from others (and Irom on eself) o f em otio n s by acto rs and their use of dram aturgical space interact with em otional m o d es o f bein g and psyche som a? [. . .]

D ram aturgical stress Self-presentational and role playing activities and the em otion w ork that ac co m ­ panies th em , can, in and o f them selves, be stressful. If this stress is chron ic, it may, for in stance, affect n euroh orm on al regulation (Freund 1982). I have called this kind o f stress d ram aturgical stress (1 9 8 2 ). O n e ’ s social status affects the degree to w hich one has status shields available to one to p ro te ct the terrain o f the s e lf (H och schild 198 3 ). Status shields p ro te c t us against attacks on our self-esteem . A lack o f status shields is a structural sou rce o f not feeling em pow ered (Franks 198 9 ). T h ose who lack such shields are relatively p ow erless against the resistan ces and in trusions o f others and have a decreased capacity to resist. Status shields p ro te ct one against an o th er’s aggression . T h e feelings o f a low er status p erso n are not accorded the sam e w eight o r taken as seriously as those o f a higher status actor (Franks 1989) and thus they lack the status shields to p rotcct them selves (H och schild 1 9 8 3 :1 7 4 ). Having o n e ’ s feelings ignored or term e d as irrational is the analogue o f having o n e ’s p ercep tion s invalidated (H och schild 1 9 8 3 :1 7 3 ). Both are m ore likely to be exp erien ced by low er status p erso n s and to be inflicted by those in pow er. The invalidation o f o n e ’ s leclin gs, however, may be m ore threatening than the invalida­ tion o f p ercep tio n s, since feelings as a form of inform ation arc e x p erien ced as the deeply authentic, existen tial ground o f w ho w e are. In gen eral, the threats to on tological security arc gre ater for those in depen d en t, subordinate position s. The lack o f reso u rces to p ro tcct o n e se lf or to legitim ate o n e se lf further co n tribu tes to status-related in security. Less pow erful peop le face a structurally built-in handicap in m anaging social and em otional inform ation and this handicap may con tribu te to existential fear and anxiety.

Emotional false consciousness The political use o f status shields has con sequen ces other than sim ply enhancing the stress o f those w ho lack such shields. Such shields may be used by m ore pow erful actors as a m eans o f social con trol in various situations. The absence o f shields for low er status actors m eans that they b eco m e m ore vulnerable to bein g socially redefin ed as the kind o f peop le those in pow er ex p e c t them to be. They b eco m e m ore open to bein g ‘c o n stru c te d ’ as the kind o f em otio n al bein gs, for instance, who ge t ‘w hat they d e se rv e ’ . Status shields o f the m ore pow erful may be used to shift the blam e for the unpleasant em otionality exp erien ced by, for instance, a su b ­ ordinate away from them selves on to that less pow erful perso n . Fran ks’ pilot study

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P E T E R

E.

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(1 9 8 9 ) o f b atte re d w om en illu strate s the w ays in w hich th ese w om en defined situ ation s in such a w ay as to blam e th em selv es. To the e x te n t to w hich they have in tern alised trad ition al g e n d e r e x p e c ta tio n s, they can be m ad e to feel that it is they w ho have p rim ary re sp o n sib ility fo r w hat h ap p en ed

and fo r co n tin u in g the

relation sh ip , in o r d e r to , fo r e x a m p le , k eep the fam ily togeth er. Frank (1 9 8 9 ) and H o ch sch ild (1 9 8 3 ) thus su g g e st that a p e r s o n ’ s statu s in fluen ces how statu s shields arc used to validate the m o re pow erfu l and invalidate su b o rd in a te a c to rs as w ell as m u te th eir atte m p t to re sist. E g o ’ s invisibility to m o re p ow erfu l o th e rs m ean s that alte r n eed n o t re co g n ise b o u n d a rie s an d, in fact, ego can b e m ad e to feel re sp o n sib le fo r such tre atm e n t. S e lf b lam e and in validation lead to d e p re ssio n and an xiety . B ccau sc o f the g r e a te r ability o f th ose in p o w e r to defin e situ a tio n s, in clu d in g e m o tio n al o n e s, d e p re ssio n and an xiety often c o m e to re p la c e an g e r in the e x p e rie n c e o f s u b ­ o rd in ate ac to rs. T h e se e m o tio n a l state s m ay , in tu rn , be ph ysically e x p re sse d in, fo r in stan ce, se ro to n in levels. S e ro to n in , a n e u ro tra n sm itte r, along w ith such su b stan ce s as m elaton in have b een im p licated in fo rm s o f d e p re ssio n (W u rtm an and W u rtm an 1 9 8 9 ). I d o n o t in ten d to re d u ce d e p re ssio n as a feelin g to on e o r m o re n e u ro tra n sm itte rs. R ath er I w an t to su g g e st a m o re lim ited b u t n o n eth eless im p o rta n t ro le fo r b io c h e m istry in e m o tio n s. Is it p o ssib le that the physical a c c o m ­ pan im en ts o f re p ea te d e x p e r ie n c e s ol d e p re ssio n even tually acq u ire so m e d e g re e o f ‘ fu n c tio n al’ au ton om y ? [. . .] D ram atu rg ica l stre ss is p a rticu larly inten se w hen there is a g re at discrep an cy b etw een a stro n gly h eld sen se o f se lf that on e w ish es to e x p r e ss and the displays o f s e lf that social relatio n sh ip s fo rc e on on e (F reu n d 1 9 8 2 ). E x tre m e d issociation b e tw e en provok ed feelin gs and th eir e x p re ssio n arc su b je ctiv e p sy c h o so m atic w ays o f co p in g w ith ten sio n s foun d in social relatio n sh ip s. W ork, fo r in stan ce, may d em an d civility and often even ‘ sin c c r c ’ displays of frie n d lin e ss in the facc o f m o st uncivil c o n d itio n s of e x p lo itatio n and in validation . O rg a n isa tio n al p re ssu re s on w o rk e rs (e sp ecially o n es caugh t b etw een the d e m an d s from c u sto m e rs fo r c o u r te ­ ou s civility and the d e m a n d s to be n icc to a p re ssu rin g b o ss) m ay be d e alt w ith by sp littin g e m o tio n al physical ap p e aran ce s and the e x p e rie n c e d stru c tu re o f feelin gs. S o c io lo g ical m in o ritie s, such as w o m e n , b lack p e o p le , gays and o th e r m in o ritie s (such as p e o p le w ith d isab ilitie s) m u st often facc situ atio n s in w hich they arc ig n o re d , p atro n ised o r ab used but as a m a tte r o f survival o r b e ca u se o f their so cialised g u ilt (o r fear) a b o u t display in g h ostility , display a ‘ p le a sa n t’ accep tab le face. D o such c o n d itio n s e n g e n d e r d e p re ssio n (Z o la 1 9 8 2 ) even on ph ysical sy m p ­ to m s such as elevated b lo o d p re ssu re (H a rb u rg et a l 1 9 7 9 ; H a rb u rg et a l 1 9 7 3 )? C o n te m p o ra ry fo rm s o f social co n tro l p la c c d e m an d s on an a c t o r ’ s ability to m an age n o t only e m o tio n a l displays but in creasin gly th eir su b je ctiv ity as w ell (S te arn s and S te arn s 1 9 8 6 ). Such e m o tio n w o rk in volves not only su rface acting but w hat Ilo c h sch ild calls ‘d e e p a c tin g ’ . ‘ D e e p a c tin g ’ m ay b e c o m e a p a rt o f o n e ’ s w o rk p lace skills. It m ay b e u se d to p rovid e a se rv ice to a clien t o r as a w ay o f n avigatin g the e m o tio n a l w aters o f a tightly knit b u re a u c ratic str u c tu r e . Su b ord in ate a c to rs m u st also m a ste r the skills o f an ticip atin g, via e m o tio n a l c u e s, the m ore p ow erful a c t o r ’ s e m o tio n al d isp o sitio n . T h e re is evid en ce th at, in fact, lo w e r statu s a c to rs b e co m e m o re ad ep t at such skills (F ran k s 1 9 8 9 ; H en ley 1 9 7 7 ) — perh aps m akin g them m o re vu ln erab le to iden tifyin g w ith the o th e r (F ran k s 1 9 8 9 ).

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E m o tio n al displays (a ‘ sin c e r e ’ sm ile ) may be the c o m m o d ity that the ac to r p ro d u c e s as a se rv ice in the c o n te x t o f b ein g a w aiter, ste w ard e ss o r bank teller. Such w o rk , it is im p o rta n t to e m p h asise , in volves the m an agem en t n ot only o f physical displays but o f in tern al p sy ch o -p h y sical feelin gs. T h e se lf-reg u latio n o f e m o tio n s is e x p r e sse d through the b od y and fu rth e r m o re this reg u latio n in turn m ay affect o n e ’ s relation sh ip to o n e ’ s b o d y . H o ch sch ild sp e c u late s that the n eed to re w o rk o n e ’ s v isceral re sp o n se s lead s on e to ‘ d isc o n n e c t’ o n e s e lf from em o tio n al sign als. H o w is the stre ss o f e m o tio n w o rk so m a ticise d u n d e r in validatin g o r an gcrclicitin g situ ation s in w hich displays and su b jectiv ity m u st b e re w o rk e d ? T h e se kinds o f q u e stio n s p rovid e in terestin g p o ssib le areas o f in vestigation fo r both a so cio lo gy o f e m o tio n s as w ell as a so c io lo g y o f health . ( . . . )

R eferences Alexander, F. (1 9 5 0 ) Psychosomatic Medicine. N ew York: W. W. N o rto n and C om pany, Inc. Buytendijk, F. J. (1 9 5 0 ) T h e ph en om en ological approach to the problem o f feelings and em otio n s, in Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart Symposium in Cooperation with the University o f Chicago, M artin C. R ey m ert, e d ., N ew York: M cG raw -H ill C om pan y, Inc.: 127—141. Buytendijk, F. J. (1 9 7 4 ) Prolegomena to an Anthropological Physiology, Pittsburgh: D uquesnc U niversity Press. D reyfus, H. L. (1 9 7 9 ) What Computers Can’t Do: The Limits o f Artificial Intelligence. N ew York: H arper and R ow Publishers. Elias, N. (1 9 7 8 ) The Civilizing Process, Volume I. N ew York: U rizcn Books. Fausto-Stcrling, A. (1 9 8 5 ) Myths o f Gender, N ew York: Basic B ooks, Inc. Franks, D. D. (1 9 8 9 ) Pow er and role taking: a social behavioralist’ s synthesis o f K e m p e r’s pow er and status m o d el, in The Sociology-■ o f Emotions: Original Essays and Research Papers, D. D. Franks and E. D. M cC arth y, (c d s.), G reen w ich , C on n ecticut: JA I P ress: 1 53—177. Freund, P. E. S. (1 9 8 8 ) Bringing society into the body: understanding socialized human nature, Theory and Society, 1 7 :8 3 9 —864. Freund, P. E. S. (1 9 8 2 ) The Civilized Body: Social Domination, Control and Flealth. Philadelphia, PA: Tem ple U niversity Press. G offm an , E. (1 9 5 9 ) The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life. G arden C ity, N ew Jersey : D oubleday-Anchor. H arburg. E ., B lakelock, E. FI. and R ocpcr, P. J. (1 9 7 9 ) Resentful and reflective copin g w ith arbitrary authority and b lood p ressu re, Psychosomatic Medicine 4 1 , 1 89 -2 0 2 . H arburg, E. T ., H aunstcin, L ., Chare, C ., Schull, W. and Shork, M . (1 9 7 3 ) Socioecological stress, supp ressed hostility, skin co lo r and black-w hite m ale blood p ressu re: D etro it, Psychosomatic Medicine, 3 5 :2 7 6 . H enley, N. M . (1 9 7 7 ) Body Politics. Englew ood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall. H ochschild, A. (1 9 8 3 ) The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling. Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press. Johnson, M . (1 9 8 7 ) The Body in the Mind. Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. K em per, T. D. (1 9 8 7 ) H ow many em otions are there? W edding the social and the autonom ic com po n en ts, American Journal o f Sociology, 93, 263—289.

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K leinm an, A. (1 9 8 8 ) The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition. N ew York: Basic B ooks, Inc. Laing, R. D. (1 9 6 5 ) The Divided Self. B altim ore, M I): Penguin B ooks, Inc. Lcder, D. (1 9 8 4 ) M edicine and paradigm s o f em b odim en t, The Journal o f Medicine and Philosophy, 9, 29—43. Levin, D. M . (1 9 8 5 ) The Body Politics: political econom y and the human body, Human Studies, 8 :2 3 5 - 2 7 8 . M adsen , D. (1 9 8 5 ) A biochem ical p ro p erty relating to pow er seeking in hum ans, American Political Science Review, 7 9 , 4 4 8 —457. M azur, A. (1 9 8 5 ) A biosocial m odel o f status in facc to facc prim ate g ro u p s, Social Forces, 6 4 , 3 7 7 - 4 0 2 . M cC arth y, E. (1 9 8 4 ) Tow ards a sociology of the physical w orld: G eorge H erbert M ead on physical ob jects, in Studies in Symbolic Interaction, N. K. Denzin (c d .), G reenw ich , C T : JA I P ress: 105—121. M erleau-Ponty, M . (1 9 6 2 ) Phenomenology o f Perception. N ew York: H um anities Press. Sapolskv, R. M . (1 9 8 2 ) The endocrine stress-resp on se and social status in the w ild b ab oon , Hormones and Behavior, 1 :2 7 9 —292. Stearns, C . Z . and Stearn s, P. N. (1 9 8 6 ) Anqer: The struggle for Emotional Control in America’s History. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. W urtm an, R. J. and W urtm an , J. J. (1 9 8 9 ) C arbohydrates and d epression , Scientific American, 260, 6 8 —7 5 . Z ola, I. K. (1 9 8 2 ) Missing Pieces: A Chronicle o f Living with a Disability. Philadelphia: Tem ple U niversity Press.

Chapter

26

Alan Radley P O R T R A Y A L S OF S U F F E R I N G On lo o k in g away, lo o k in g at, and the co m p re h e n sio n o f illn e ss exp erien ce

Pain, horror and looking away

I

N ORDER

TO D EA L

WITH

the question o f w hat pictu res o f illness or

suffering portray , it is n ecessary to ask about w hat they do not depict and what

peop le avoid look in g at. T h ese tw o issues are closely related. Im ages o f w oun ds, the ravages of disease and the effects o f radical surgical treatm en t are e xam p le s o f these exclusion ary features. They con stitu te, in so m e sen se, the stigm a of disease that m ark o u t sufferers as different. W hat those w ho have suffered bodily trau m a do not wish to show and w hat other peop le do not w ish to sec coalesce in the fact that ill peop le live silently w ith the effects o f serio u s disease. B efore w e can e xp lo re how portravals o f illness m ight break this silen ce, it is n ecessary to exam in e w hat it is that peop le arc frightened o f in depictions o f the diseased or treated body. From w hat do w e turn o u r ey es, and w hom do w e deny un derstan din g beyond the pity that such pictu res m ight evoke? [. . .] Th ere is a ph otograph o f D oroth ea Lynch (n ot rep rod u ced h ere), taken by her colleague Eugene R ichards, show ing her lying in a hospital bed shortly after having u ndergone a m astectom y . T his ph otograph is one o f a n um ber in a b o o k chronicling her stay in hospital for treatm en t for b reast cancer (Lynch and R ich ards, 198 6 ). She lies on her b ack , naked to the w aist, a d o c to r holding up her bandaged left arm so that the sutu red w ound is open to view. T h ere are ban dages covering a drainage tube in her side. W hat do wc see in this ph otograph ? A t oncc to o m uch and too little. By too m uch 1 m ean that wc sec, in a literal sen se, the body uncovered and the body d e fo rm e d — a bare breast and the gash w here a breast once w as. This is a difficult pictu re lo look at, and one that probably many w ould be pleased to cover by the turn o f the page. It is not h orrific by som e stan dards, and

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yet the A m erican C an cer Society refused lo give such im ages to Lynch when she con tacted them follow ing her diagnosis because ‘ book s w ith pictu res o f cancer treatm en ts are n ’t con sidered suitable fo r non-m edical p e o p le ’ (Lynch and R ichards, 1986: 16). The ‘un suitability’ o f such pictu res — the fact that they arc rcstrictcd — also gives them a fascination,’ so that one looks to sec,' to see m ore than one is norm allyJ

O

able, o r to sec behind. B ecau se o f this, and b ccau sc o f D oroth ea Lynch’s partlv cloth ed state and forced passivity, that looking soon feels intrusive and violen t. It is a kind o f looking w ith out understan ding that, in its frustration , draw s the ob se rv e r again and again to see w hat is not norm ally show n. H ow ever, the violcn cc o f the o b se rv e r’ s gaze p ro m o te s (is repaid w ith) a pow er in the im age so that it ‘calls t o ’ the eye. As F.lkins (1 9 9 6 ) puts it, in these cases ‘the ob ject stares b a c k ’ . W hat happens when wre turn away from an exp licit im age o f this kind? In turnin g away from the im age the ob se rv e r co m p letes

in one p articu lar way

the act o f in terp retation , inasm uch as it is developed at all. W hen w e do this we rem ove the depiction from ou r view so that w ith its rem oval the ‘difficulty’ o f its appearan ce is su p p re ssed , if not entirely extin guish ed. In recogn izing this, w e are also ack n ow ledging that the pain and the im agination involved are o u r ow n, that w e, as o b se rv e rs, are caught up in the terrain that lies betw een the in expressibility o f pain and what is there pictured for us. The problem o f the ph otograph o f D oroth ea Lynch — as with any ph otograph — is that we arc used to reading these as if they w ere direct qu o tes from reality. C learly, the ph otograph d epicts Lynch’s suffering, and it w ould ap pear to be her pain that is at issue. And yet the fo rm o f this suffering is not sim ply given in the p h otograph , is not there to be read out from its pattern in g o f light and shade. The ‘u n m ed iatcd ’ form of the ph otograph with its stark p re se n ­ tation of the m undane w orld dep icts her pain at the site o f the surgical cutting o f her body. And vet the w ound in itse lf is insufficient to explain the o b se rv e r’ s reaction , b ecau sc it signifies (by the p resen ce of ‘the healthy b re ast’ ) the absence o f the p art o f the body that w as. It is the presentational form o f the depiction that evokes the horror, not m erely the revelation o f w hat is rem oved or d e fo rm e d . To react to a ph otograph ‘ with h o rr o r’ is to respond not only to a visual im age, but to reg ister in that denial the o th e r’s sufferin g in o n e ’ s bodily shudder. That shudder can be seen as the reciprocatin g asp cct o f the dcpiction how ever unintended that reveals the com plicity o f the o b server in the situation o f the sufferer. We do not turn from the im age as such, but from the depiction o f that w'hich exem plifies unbearable suffering. This poin ts up a m o d e o f representation that involves the ‘settin g fo rth ’ o f the su ffe rer’s situation. Such im ages do not ‘refer aw ay’ to their significant ob ject (pain) but arc presentational in their standing as ex e m p lars o f this con dition. (Ju st as one cannot [prim arily] substitu te the sem an tic content o f the w ords ‘I love y o u ’ for the saying [w riting] o f the w o rd s, so the sam e is true o f the exp ression o f suffering.) W hy, though, should peop le turn away from the difficult ph otograph ? Put sim ply, it is unbearable. H ow ever, from w hat we have just said, it is not the visual im age that is unbearable, but the appreh ension o f suffering that is instantiated in the ob se rv e r who lacks the im aginative fram ew ork w ithin which this pain can be given form . The ph otograph ic depiction o f suffering stands as an exam ple o f pain silence, in the sense that il is in articulate w ithout an im aginative fram ew ork to give il fo rm .

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We m ight say, paradoxically, that such im ages evoke a silent scream in the observer, fo r w hom this inarticulacy is m ade real. U nable to give form to the appreh en sion o f sutiering, the ob se rv e r might have no reco u rse but to turn away from the im age. And this often w orks precisely b ccausc the depiction o f a w oun d, un elaborated by accom panying narrative o r oth er presentational form at, is trap ped by its in articu ­ lateness into the m om en t o l viewing. We look and are h orrified; w e turn away and the im age, and the feeling, are gon e. This d o es n ot m ean that ph otograph ic im ages arc altogeth er forgettab le. W hat is forgettab le is an im age that is prcscn tationally in articulate, or one that through lack o f narrative com m en tary con dem n s it to the condition o f b ein g an instance, loeked in tim e and spacc. The idea o f givin g form to pain su ggests that, w henever this is achieved, then the situation o f the o b se rv e r can be alleviated. We can then look with u n d erstan d ­ ing. Howrever, a caveat is in o rd e r here. For this p roposal is m isleading to the exten t that it su ggests that fo rm lessn ess is the only prob lem . In fact, the presen tation o f the unw anted in the gu ise o f the m undane (cloaked in ordinary ob jects) can actually heighten the sen se o f h o rro r (R ad ley, 1 9 9 9 ). The allusive portrayal o f the unw anted and the feared unknow n provides fo rm for the exp ression o f horror. In this situation, the con ceptu al dim ension o f the portrayal also provides its tan gibility, its exten siven ess out o f the m om en t, so that (w h eth er w’C wish it o r n ot) the sense o f that h orror can be brought back lo us at another tim e. Wc can less easily turn away from ideas ( ‘ in o u r h ead s’ ) than from physically ren dered im ages. The issue o f what is bearable in ‘ difficult’ pictures o f illness is therefore m ore than a question o f what is seen. T h e reaction to the pictu rin g o f pain o r to d is­ figurem ent associated with surgical treatm en t is not com prehen sible as a visual issu e, fo r the sim ple reason that the p ow ers o f h orror invoke the absen t, the unseen. W hat the o b se rv e r turns away from is the visual im age, but d o es so in the cause o f tu rn in g off the fo rm less lears and anxiety that the im age open s up. T h e lack ol m ediation — the cultural fram ew orks o f co n stru ction — that allow the ob se rv e r to establish a coh erent subjectivity arc m issing. T h ese fram ew orks enable the im ag e ’ s m eaning and the o b se rv e r’s p ercep tion through the rep ression o f d esires and fears, which w ould oth erw ise prevent any ‘co m fo rtab le view in g’ taking placc. ‘ D ifficu lt’ im ages rem ain so, as one retu rn s again to look at th em , if they arc deprived o f fram ew orks that w ould enable the view er to fashion a position with re sp e c t to them . This need not be a facile or com fortab le positio n , b ut one that the a r tist/a u th o r m ight have fab ricated. In the case o f D oroth ea Lynch’ s treatm en t for b reast cancer, her p artn er Eugene R ichards (h im self a profession al p h otograph er) presen ts this photo-essay in the c o n tcx t o f Lynch’ s own diary. This m eans that the ph otograph s stand both as w orks in them selves and as illustrations o f the te x t which re fe rs to them . The narration around and w ith re sp e ct to the im ages releases cach instan ce, each painful m o m en t, from its tim e and space as it enables the v ie w e r/ read er to establish a position tow ard Lynch’s illness exp erien ce. As we understan d w here, how and why things happen in her treatm en t — and in her actions — so the im age o f the m astectom y scar b e co m e s bearable. That is, it b e co m e s bearable for us insofar as we arc able to com prehen d how she bore il. All this g o es to show that pictu rin g sufferin g is m ore than a m atter o f visual depiction , m ore than resem blan ce and revelation. W hat is at issue is the possibility o f the ob se rv e r sustaining a look , a look that is not overw h elm ed by the stare o f the

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ob ject p ortray ed. This stare is the pow er o f the im age lo overw h elm , lo suffuse the o b se rv e r w ith pity, h orror or revulsion. How the look o f the o b se rv e r m ight be sustained is a question o ( re presenting the suffering o f the ill p e rso n , allow ing pain to be given expressive lorm and thereby enabling the o b se rv e r to recip ro catc in the establish m en t o f a com passio n ate un derstan din g of the sick.

How

this

re-presen tation is achieved is the su b ject o f the section to follow.

Picturing, possession and the transform ation o f suffering In this scction I shall discuss tw o im ages o f individuals w ho have rccovcrcd from cancer, b ut w hose b od ies b ear the m arks o f their surgical treatm en t. In doin g this, I w ant to exam in e w hat it is that such im ages m ight achieve, w hat it is that they com m un icate and how they do so. For if pictu res show ing m astectom y scars are d e em ed h orrific, then how can pictu res w ith apparently sim ilar con ten t transcend this ju d gem en t? [. . .] The self-p o rtrait by Elissa H ugcn s A leshire is draw n from the collcction Art.Rage. Us. published by the Breast C an cer Fund o f A m erica (1 9 9 8 ). It show s four im ages o f her, three partial figures and on e, cen tre-fron t, a com plete figure. It is this figure that com m an ds attention as it show s her naked to the w aist, the scar o f her m issin g right breast alongside the ‘healthy’ left b reast. She looks straight ahead, into the m irro r that (she tells us) she used in o rd er to crcate the painting. It is an open look, w hat she term s in the accom panying co m m cn t ‘the first real look at m y self after su rg e ry ’ . To the side and behind this central figure are three oth ers. They are partly h idden, and in each case hide the m issing b reast. To the view er’ s left she is show n w earing a blouse. To the righ t, and behind, w e sec only her facc and a bare shoulder, her ch cst ob scu red by the tw o im ages in front. She holds her fingers to her chin, giving the im pression ol a quizzical attitude. The fourth figure, to the view er’ s right, is only h alf in the p ictu re, holding up her hand to cover the site o f the m issin g right b reast. By this device w e arc shown three part-figu res w hose anatom ical c o m p leten ess is preserved (bv o b scu ration ), and one w hole figure w ho reveals that she is anatom ically in com plete. The total picturc w orks to su gg est the achievem ent o f self-recognition against the b ack groun d o f fear o f revelation. In the co u rse o f this p ortray al, the m astectom y scar so clearly depicted is given a different co n te x t. It is re-figured along w ith the artist as sufferer. This d oes n ot m ean that its original (on e m ight say, ab-original) pow er to evoke h o rro r is entirely rem oved. (T hat this is not so can be dem on strated by show ing the pictu rc afresh to different view ers.) Rather, the sufferin g that is indicated by the w ound is given fo rm , rccontextualizin g the scar and giving it new' m eaning. The picture w as not created by attem p tin g to displace attention from the scar, but in con trast by facing it and refiguring it. As Elissa A leshire com m en ts: A w eek before the su rgery , I had draw n a ‘b e fo re ’ pictu rc, and I p ro m ­ ised m y self I w ould do an ‘a fte r’ . It took about three m onths to w ork up lo it. This painting w as the first real look at m y self after my su rg ery , and at first I w as em b arrassed to even show anyone. But in fact, the p rocess

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healed m e, siltin g in front o f a m irro r looking al an im age that scared m e. (B reast C an cer Fund, 1988: 101) This com m en t show s the act o f painting to involve confrontation w ith the m a st­ ectom y scar in o rd e r that it m ight be tran sfo rm ed . In o rd e r to look beyond the scar, she had first to look at it. T his indicates that h orror is not dism issed in the cou rsc of such portrayals but that its p ow ers arc dim inished in the co u rsc o f being given a fo rm , a shape. H ow ever, painting is not an objectification o f h orror as such (fo r then it could n ot ‘h eal’ ) but the projection o f the a r tist’s recovery o f h erse lf from the grip o f illness and its te rro rs. W hat the im age achieves

using m ultiple figures

is

a sense o f coh crcn cc for Flissa A lcshirc through an expressive portrayal o f that recovery. The pictu re is an exem plification o f her position it stands forth as an open ack n ow ledgem en t and acceptan ce o f w hat is - w hile also bein g an expression o f qualities that are elusive to specification. This is a key feature o f all artistic w orks, in that they sensuously relate asp ects o f exp erien ce by settin g forth p ro p e rtie s that are m etaph orically p o ssessed (G o o d m an , 196 8 ). The idea o f m etaph orical p o sse s­ sion refers here to the figurative projection o f a w orld (o f illness) o f w hich the im age stands as if a fragm en t. As a fragm en t o f such a figurative w orld (w hich in its assem blage o f feelings is as real as any literal dep iction ), the im age is b ounded by a spacc-lim c o f e x p erien ce (look ing al the pictu re, painting the pictu rc) that sets il o ff from the m undane w orld. This d ocs not imply a separation from the w orld o f disease and su rgery , but the fabrication o f a way o f being in relation to things, so that they are im bued with m eanings that previously did not belon g lo them .

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Although it is the im age that m etaphorically p o sse sses the qualities o f a re co v e r­ ing patient, it is the p erso n (or in this case the artist) w ho is credited with those qualities. W hat co m e s to be possessed is possessed bv her, and is achieved in the act of painting. Elissa A lcshire spells out this last point in her com m en t that ‘ the p roccss healed m e ’ . ( . . . ) The im aged w orld o f recovery (o f illn ess-as-b orn e) is a fabricated on e, dealing in m etap h ors, but it is n ot an ethereal on e, in the sense o f bein g w holly tran s­ cendent. It is fabricated by m ean s o f paint, and by virtu e o f rem aining engaged with the m undane w orld that our b od ies occupy. N o tran sform ation o f suffering could be achieved by a portrayal that had wholly lost touch w ith the possibility of pain. To portray a ‘w orld o f su ffcrin g -as-b o rn c’ it is necessary that the pictu rc rem ains an exem p lar o f pain, that it con tinues to show forth those features (the m astectom y scar) in the cou rse o f exp ressin g the self-possession referred to above. T his should not be thought o f as the projection o f any ‘s e lf’ at all, but is an aesthetic ju dgem en t based upon the fact that the painting (as o f Elissa A lcshirc) d ocs tw o things. It is exp erien ced as a restoration o f coh eren ce, and as the expression o f feelings that w ere previously inchoate. T his e xp erien ce is to be sought both in the act o f painting (w hich ‘h eals’ ) and in the con tem plation o f the im age by others. Inasm uch as it is seen as coh eren t, the im age is com preh en ded as a totality, and as such a fragm en t o f the w orld to w hich it refers (i.e . it is a sam p le o f ‘ illn css-as-b o rn e’). The im age thus stands both in the m undane w orld (o f paint, o f m edia, o f spaccs o f o b servation ) and in the figurative w orld w hich il fabricates. And because the fabrication o f this w orld requires w ork on the p art o f the artist, and the con tem plative effort on the part o f the viewer, its expressive potential is realized as the achievem ent o f distance from h orror and pain. That distan ce — w hich is com m on to all ascctic practice — is created by the practices of objectification (the skills o f the artist) through w hich pain and h orror can both be given com m unicative fo rm . To help ad d ress this issue o f tran sform ation wre can exam in e anoth er artw ork , this tim e a ph otograph , taken by a third party (h e rse lf a can cer su rv iv or) for an exhibition ‘I’m so lu ck y ’ (O g o n o w sk a-C o ate s and R o b e rtso n , 199 8 ). T his photocxhibition w as o f canccr su rv iv ors and included this im age o f a man — Stefan W ahrlich

standing on a bcach near a lake against the b ack drop o f a m ountain

range. He faces dircctly to cam cra, w earin g only a pair o f sh o rts, arm s outstretch ed and standing on one leg. The other leg is visible only as a stum p below his sh o rts, w here it w as rem oved as treatm en t for cancer o f the bon e. In the exhibition this im age wras displayed above a b rie f com m en tary explain in g the b ack groun d to his illness and his reaction s to it. Unlike the painting o f Elissa A lcshirc, Stefan W ahrlich’ s im age is different in that its ph otograph ic form reveals this as a m om en t in tim e. A t one level, the im age is a re co rd , an instance. And yet the pose is counterfactu al by virtue o f it both revealing the absent leg and defying that absence. This is a pose that is m ore than an alignm ent w ith w7hat G offm an (1 9 7 6 ) called ‘sch e d u le s’ for bein g pictu red in such situations. Ph oto-sch edules for can ccr patients (especially with one leg am putated) do not e x ist, so that the portrayal in this im age m ust m ake use of, in o rd e r to transcen d, som e o f the conventions by w hich individuals m ight be pictu red standing on a beach. In Stelan W ahrlich’s case, the im age conveys its m eaning through this tran scen den ce, w herein the achievem ent o f balance, o f the sym m etry o f his

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arm s, ovcrcom cs the literal instability that m ust follow from his having had a leg am putated. In this picturc he d o c s not ju st pose for the cam cra, but asse rts his position vis-a-vis the w orld and the c am e ra/o b se rv e r. T his im age to o is coh erent and expressive, in that it exem plifies a w orld o f ‘ su fferin g-as-bo rn e’ alluded to by qualities that it m etaph orically p o ssesses. It is these ch aracteristics that entitle this ph otograph — along w ith Elissa A lesh ire’s self-p o rtrait — to be called w ork s, in that they achieve their m eaning through figurative portray al, w hich is the condition for any w ork to be deem ed ‘a rtistic ’ . Scarry is helpful in defining such w ork and its artefacts as ‘n am es that are given to phenom ena o f pain and the im agination as they begin to m ove from being a self-con tained loop within the body to b eco m in g the equivalent loop nowprojected into the extern al w o rld ’ (S c a rry , 1985: 170). This m ean s that the private agony o f suffering b e co m e s social and sharable, resulting in the possibility o f a collective o u tcom e. Equally relevant to the argum en t here is her p roposal that an artefact (e.g. a painting, a p h otograph ) ‘is a fragm en t o f w orld alte ratio n ’ (1 9 8 5 : 171). In the previous way that 1 have used the w o rd , the artefact is a fragm en t o f the w orld rc-figu rcd , not m erely o f a m undane w orld that has u n d e r­ go n e change. I in troduce the con cept o f w ork here n ot only to identify once m ore the on tological status o f im ages o f suffering, but also to underline that the fabrication o f such im ages is an ach ievem ent (w e m ight call them ‘w orks o f illn ess’ ). It is in the act o f making that the pictu rc o f ‘ su ffcrin g -as-b o rn c’ is given shape and fo rm . This is m ore readily appreciated in re sp ect o f the painted p o rtrait, w here the laying on o f paint and the con struction o f the im age take tim e and rely upon the a r tist’ s skill. W hile the ph otograph er clearly uses her skill in the assem blage o f the pictured scene, we m ight see less easily how the ph otograph objectifies in the sense o f a p ro cess o f fabrication. In o rd er to try to unravel this p ro b lem , wc need to see such w ork as involving both artist and m o d e l, for it is in the fo rm o f the pose captured by the cam cra that Stefan W ahrlich’ s w orld is to be appreh en ded. Instead o f seein g it as a ‘ m ere p o s e ’ , we should recogn ize its m im etic pow er as a kind o f static dance, in that the various countervailing tensions are held in a dynam ic equilibrium in his balancing p osture.

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C on sid ered as a (static) dance, w hat w as originally an inchoate response to disease and its treatm en t is m ade visible; con sidered as the cap turin g o f that dance, the ph otograph b eco m es the artefactu al stru ctu re of this com m un icable act. We can understand Stefan W ahrlich’ s ‘d an cc’ as one that gives shape to his w orld o f ‘su fferin g-as-b o rn e’ , that says ‘this, precisely, this, is how it is’ . T h ere arc, th erefore, tw o possib le levels o f tran sform ation , one con cern in g the bodily style in w hich the p e r so n ’s illness w orld is m ade visible, and one w here this is given ob jective form in the m aterial o f paint o r light-sensitive film . And b ecau se, as G oodm an (1 9 6 8 ) points o u t, expressive paintings deal not in shapes and co lo u rs but in sounds and feelin gs, so the p o rtrait m akes som eth ing else tangible through the m edium o f visual rep resen tation .

From h orror to com prehension W hile there can be no gu aran tee that any given o b se rv e r w ill look in a co n tem p la­ tive way at cith er o f the im ages discusscd in the previous section , their expressive form provides the stru ctu re that m akes this possib le. A pprehension o f the o th e r’ s w orld o f suffering ( ‘su fferin g -as-b o rn e’ ) is the result o f w ork by the ob server, who m ust produce fo r h im self or h erse lf those stru ctu re s that enable them to touch what the artist is able only to show. This is m ade difficult to the exten t that the ob se rv e r may recoil w ith h o rro r from the sight o f disease and its radical treatm en t. C o m ­ prehension can only follow from the transccn den ce o f h orror, m ade possible by the com m unicable tran sform ation o f pain as ‘sufferin g b o rn e ’ . Portraits and ph otograph s o f suffering, con sidered as the objectification o f ideas-w ith-feelin gs, are invested w ith the pow er to recreate in the o b se rv e r that p rocess o f structuration . This ‘reciprocal lo o p ’ co m p le te s the act o f m aking, o f extern alizin g sufferin g, on e that is im plicit in the act o f productio n . That is, the com preh en sion of the su ffe rer’ s w orld is the logical con clusion (il that is not too final a w ord) of the a r tist’s m o d e l’ s p ortray al. The question then is w hat form does this act o f com prehen sion take? And by attem p tin g a description o f it, can we say m ore ab out the form o f signification involved in such portrayals? W hat the o b se rv e r com preh en ds when con tem p latin g the pictu rc is the illness w orld o f the sufferer. O r rather, it is the world re-made by virtue o f the su ffe rer’s way o f con fron ting the inevitability o f disease and its treatm en t. For that reason , it is not pain o r an objectified ph enom enon that is grasp ed in these pictu res, but rather the figuration o f the sufferer by virtue o f their role as au th ors o f their w orld. It is suffering as an expressive form that is g rasp e d , as signified through the m etaph orical p ossession o f qualities that the im age exem plifies. This is achieved in the o b se rv e r’s act o f sense-m akin g, w hich is less a ‘reading o f the p ic tu re ’ than a w illingness to engage their ab-original respo n se to disease to its various fo rm s o f pictorial re p re ­ sentation . For it is only by en gaging his or her fear and anxiety to the im agined o b jects fashioned in the portrayal that the ob se rv e r can m ove from a position o f h o rro r to one o f appreh ension . To com preh en d an oth er’ s sufferin g is not sim ply to see it ‘ for what il is’ , but to be brought w ithin the relationship o f arlist-and-herw orld that the pictu re ex p re sse s. It is only in the grou n ds o f the o b se rv e r’ s fear, anxiety and delight that such im ages achieve their poten tial. We are dealing here

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then, with a form o f signification w here the m eaning ap pears elusive not because it is vague, but because it cannot be d elim ited. T h e elusory asp ect o f o u r em b odim en t as perso n s — w hich is the w id er aspect o f ou r ab original shudder in the lace o f disease and death — is as n ecessary to explan ations of com preh en sion as it is to explanation s of h orror (R ad ley , 1995). N o adequate reason can be loeated on the canvas o r in the prin t fo r w hat wc see, b ccausc w hat we ‘ se e ’ is grou n d ed in our activity as o b se rv e rs. The en gagem en t o f the o b se rv e r’ s fears, their tran sform ation with resp ect to the figured w orld e xp re sse d bv the im age, is the n ecessary w ork for con tem plation through w hich the reciprocatin g loop o f com prehension is established. [. . .]

Rcfcrcnccs Breast Cancer Fund (1998) Art.Rage.Us.: The An and Outrage of Breast Cancer. San Francisco: Chronicle Books. Elkins, J. (1996) The Object Stares Back: On the Nature of Seeing. San D iego, CA : H arcourt Brace. Goffm an, E. (1976) ‘ Gender A dvertisem ents’ , Studies in the Anthropology' o f Visual Communication 3(2): 69—154. G oodm an, N. (1968) Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis: Bobbs-M errill. Lynch, D. and E. Richards (1986) Exploding into Life. New York: Aperture Foundation/ Many Voices Press. O gonow ska-Coates, H. and 1. R obertson (1 998) I Feel Lucky: Interviews and Photographs Celebrating Cancer Survivors. Booklet to accompany photo exhibition ‘I Feel Lucky’ , Palm erston N orth , New Zealand, February—March. Radley, A. (1995) ‘The Elusory Body and Social C onstructionist T h eory’ , Body &_Society 1(2): 3 -2 3 . Radley, A. (1 999) ‘The Aesthetics o f Illness: Narrative, Florror and the Sublim e’ , Sociology of Health and Illness 2 1: 7 78—96. Scarry, E. (1 985) The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York: O x ford University Press.

Chapter

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James M. Wilce Jr and Laurie J. Price M E T A P H O R S OUR B O D Y M I N D S L I V E BY

C ulture, im ages, and im agination

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Im agin e h er u n d e r the care o f

so m e o n e w ho h elp s h er relax by su g g e stin g she en vision h e r se lf lying on a sunny

b each . P ictu re an o th er p e rso n su g g e stin g that she im ag in e h er T -c e lls killin g, doin g b attle w ith , o r just go b b lin g up bad cells — g e rm s o r can ce r cells. We m igh t even overh ear such a gu id e tellin g the patien t that if she d o e s so , it w ill help h er b ody to fight oH h er illn ess. N ow im agin e a w om an in a less clinical se ttin g , say, a self-h elp w o rk sh o p c e n te re d on in tensive p e rso n a l jou rn alin g . T h e w ork sh op le a d e rs tell the w om an there is evid en ce su g g e stin g physical health b en efits c o m e to th ose w h o b reak through inn er b lo c k s and m ove b eyon d silen t ru m in atio n on lo ss, stre ss, o r trau m a, by b rin g in g th em selv es to w rite th eir m o st in tim ate feelin gs ab o u t the event. M any re a d e rs w ill b e able to en vision such sc e n a rio s; so m e w ill have p a rtic i­ pated in sim ilar on es. So, if w e now p ro p o se to define “c u ltu re s,” in p a r t, as aids to the im ag in atio n , you m igh t a c c c p t this as tru e in several sen ses. Sh aring a p a rtic u la r cu ltu re m e an s shared fam iliarity w ith a se t o f sc e n a rio s like th ose d e sc rib e d above. It also m e an s that p a rtic ip a n ts in such even ts b rin g to them — a n d / o r ach icve w ithin them — the im agin ation that the claim s o f c are g iv e rs and e x p e r ts (e.g . a b o u t im ag es and th eir th e ra p e u tic effe cts) m ake sen se. Scien ce in volves the im ag in atio n , and the hard scien ce and p o p u lar scie n ce invoked in the first p aragrap h involve p le n ty . But all scien ce is cu ltu ral activity . It fe ed s u po n and n o u rish e s cu ltu ral im ag e s. Even te x tb o o k s in im m u n o lo g y draw

u po n im ag e s o f such ob viou sly so cio c u ltu ral

p h en o m en a as class stratification , n atio n -state s, and w ar (M artin 1 9 9 4 ). And scien ce p ro d u c e s im ag es that e n te r the p o p u lar im agin ation . In the last several d e c ad e s, through a tric k lin g dow n o f im m u n o lo g ical re se arc h , the A m eric an p u b lic has co m e lo im agin e a ran ge o f d iv erse e le m e n ts — the skin, IgA , and C D - 4 s — as a single sy ste m , the “ im m u n e sy ste m .”

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C u ltu re s are n ot only aids to the im agin ation . We live by w hat w e im ag in e; this m ust in clu de o u r m e ta p h o rs (L ak o ff an d Jo h n son 1 9 8 0 ). In this ch a p te r w e m ake the even stro n g e r claim that cu ltu re s help to shape actual b o d ie s, partly by m e an s of w idely h eld m o d e ls, im ag e s, and m e ta p h o rs. K irm a y cr has arg u e d (1 9 9 2 ) that m e tap h o r n ot only arise s o u t o f e m b o d ie d e x p e rie n c e b u t, co n v e rse ly , b e co m e s e m b o d ie d . T h u s he calls fo r an in vestigation o f “the p sy ch o p h y sio lo gy o f m e ta p h o r” (3 3 6 ). M uch earlier, M o erm an (1 9 7 9 ) so u g h t in m e ta p h o r at least a partial e x p la n ­ ation fo r the efficacy o f sy m b o lic healing: “T h e co n stru c tio n o f h ealin g sy m b o ls is h ealing.” T h is shapin g poten tial o f signs (im a g e s, m e ta p h o rs, sy m b o ls) involves c ultu rally p a rtic u la r m u ltisto ry , reflexiv e, m etalevel p h en om en a

e.g. feelin gs

ab o u t feelin gs (m c ta sc n tim c n t, m e ta -e m o tio n ; G o ttm an et al. 1 9 9 6 ), and im ag e s o f how im ag e s w ork . Im agin e w e “ k n ew ” that gu id ed im ag e ry had high cu rative effi­ cacy w ith can cer and had re d u ce d this “fin d in g” to the re la x in g effect o f the im ag e , w hich in tu rn w as due to its asso ciatio n w ith so u rce s o f rea ssu ran c e . T h is is to say that the im age “re la x e s” p e o p le in p a rt b cca u sc o f a m eta-im agin atio n o f the efficacy o f im ag e s and sy m b o ls (L e v i-S trau ss 1 9 6 3 ), the assu ran ce that c e rtain im ag e s o r im agin ative acts c arrie d th e rap e u tic b en efit. W e p ro p o u n d ju st such a m o d e l o f c u ltu re -a s-m u ltisto ry /m e ta le v e l p h e n o m e n o n , and thus e xp lain c u ltu re s’ ro le s in m o b ilizin g im m u n e re sp o n se and healing. To do so , we draw on eth n o grap h ic as w ell as e x p e rim e n ta l evid en ce. [The] claim that im m u n e sy ste m s have cu ltu ral and social lives is an in feren ce from o th e r s o rts o f e v id e n ce, too. N o on e w ho acc e p ts the n otio n o f the im m un e sy stem d en ies that the life o f such sy ste m s is e m b e d d e d in the life o f h um an p o p u latio n s. A t one level, o u r claim that hum an im m u n e sy ste m s (and psychoim m u n e sy ste m s) e x ist in relation to the e m p irica l and sy m b o lic life o f so c ie tie s is fou n d ed on the m o st fu n dam en tal in sights of e p id e m io lo g y — that health and d isease have social co n te x ts. T h e relation sh ip is n o t on e-w ay b u t m u tu al. Wc se e the im p act o f im m un ityJ on social organ ization w hen w c co n sid e r the d iso rd e r and cultu ral O tu rm o il cau se d by d e p o p u latin g p la g u e s, in clu din g th ose b ro u g h t on by colon ial c o n tact. O n the o th e r h an d, the effects o f su b siste n ce and h ou sin g p a tte rn s on social n e tw o rk s and thus on p a tte rn s o f d ise ase and im m u n ity arc w ell know n to e p id e m i­ o lo g ists. P h y sio logical so c io lo g y (B arch as 1976) and an th ro p o lo gical field stu d ies (P art II, this v o lu m e) have given us evid en ce that key im m u n e m e d iato rs in the e n d o crin e sy stem

m ay reflect social statu s and social e x p e rie n c e . B ut hum an

n e u ro im m u n o lo g ic al p ro c e ss m u st be m e d iate d by p sy ch o lo gy an d, th e re fo re , by facto rs like cu ltu re that shape in dividual p sy c h o lo g y . M easu rab le im p acts o f id e o l­ ogy and o th e r d im e n sio n s o f cu ltu ral life on im m u n e fu n ction are less w ell stu d ied than the m o re p u rely so c io lo g ic al fac to rs - like the c o rre latio n b e tw e en high stre ss and low so c io -c c o n o m ic statu s — in hum an e n d o c rin o lo g y . . . . P o pu lar n otio n s o f the se lf and its b o u n d a rie s are n o t only sp e cific to cu ltu re s, to political e c o n o m ie s, and to the so rts o f im m u n e scien ce g e n e ra te d th erein . [. . .] T h ese c o n stru ctio n s o f se lf, e m o tio n , and e x p re ssiv ity m igh t also b e n on arb itrarily related to m e asu rab le p ro c e sse s in p a rtic u la r b o d ie s in p a rtic u la r so cial fo rm a tio n s. T h at en tails a p re ssin g re se arch ag e n d a, one foresh ad ow ed by F ran k c n b e rg ’ s (1 9 8 6 ) call for a re -v isio n in g o f sick n c ss as cu ltu ral p e rfo rm an c e (se e L o ck 1 9 9 3 : 1 4 2 ). We w ould su g g e st a re co n sid e ra tio n o f health and healing, to o , as p e rfo rm a n c e s o f cu ltu ral p o te n tialitie s. C u ltu re — social e x p e rie n c e and e x p e c ta tio n s as w ell as

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b eliefs, im ages, m etaph ors, and m eta-im ages — is em b odied (C so rd as 1 9 9 0 , Farnell 1996). O u r discussion to this point assu m es that cultu res have som e degree o f in te­ gration . We assum e that m em b ers o f social gro u p s define them selves by a com m on orien tation ol their actions to a cultu re, a sem i-sh arcd, sem i-in tegrated system o f values and ideas. M oreover, evidence poin ts to the im p o rtan ce, to those social a cto rs, o f feeling them selves to be in consonance w ith dom in ant cultural values and n o rm s (D e ck e r et al., this v o lu m e). D re ssie r et al. (1 9 9 8 ) have found evidence o f a correlation betw een feeling, on the one hand, that one is achieving a successful lifestyle as it is defined locally, and o n e ’ s physical and m ental health on the other. “W hen the individual is continuously chcckin g his o r her own cultural consonancc and finds it w anting, it is likely to be a frustratin g and depressin g circum stan ce. This is a p ro c e ss that is also exp ressed som atically” (D re ssie r et al. 1998: 4 4 0 ). [. . .]

M etaphor, m inds, and bodies W hen John son (1 9 8 7 ) and Lakofif and K ovecses (1 9 8 7 ) say that w e live by certain m etaph ors o f the b ody, they m ean that cultural m etap h ors reflect innate b iological, em b odied exp erien ces. C on versely , som e psy ch o n eu roim m u n ologists — including those w ho have en cou raged gu ided im agery to fight cancer (H all and O ’ Grady 1991) — go beyond this to hypothesize that im ages change som atic pro cesses. Wc pro p o se a revision o f even that m o d e l, adding the proviso that culturally variable im ages o f body and healing are variably em b odied within and across societies. What we are proposin g is “local b io lo gies” (L o c k 1 998). [. . .] The body is a rich m etaph or fo r society (Sch eper-H ugh es and L ock 1987). Body m etaph ors — including those w hose surface stru ctu re refers to individual som atic p ro ce ss — conventionally and m o st relevantly point to social processes. C ogn itive linguists and an th ropo lo gists have carried out a large p ro p o rtio n of the studies of cultural m etaph or to date (Lakofi and Johnson

1980). H ow ever,

e m b o d im en t th eorists w ho arc n ot so w ed to cogn itivist m o d els have con tribu ted to the area as well (Farncll 1996; Lyon, this v olu m e). Wc do not need to p osit a con scious cognitive processin g o f cultural sym bols through ritual, ctc. in o rd e r to im agine that cultural m etaph ors are both enacted and enfleshed in individuals’ bodies. It may be m ore accurate to pictu re actors doin g w ith their b od ies things that m ake sense in m etap h oric w ays b ecause o f a shared bodily gro u p o f action, cogn ition , and cultu re (C so rd as 199 0 ). M etaphor thus b e co m e s an analytic tool - a way for an th ropo lo gists to talk about iconicity betw een bodily p ro c e ss or action on the one hand and cultural values on the other — rath er than a trop e to accuratcly rep resen t the con sciousn ess o f actors. W ritin g about traum a has a therapeutic efficacy that has been w ell d e m o n ­ strated. Pennebaker and oth ers (P ennebaker et al. 1989; E sterlin g et al. 1994; Petrie et al. 1995) have studied the benefits o f w ritin g (in private journ al en tries) about trau m atic exp e rie n ce . Such in terven tion s, and their effects, enact particular cultural m etaph ors that research ers have not m ade explicit as such. W riting e x e rcise s, and the con clusion s draw n from them , reflect a w id e-spread vision W estern ers have o f how language (w ritten o r spoken ) com m un icates — a vision

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focusing on referentiality and neutrality that w e can sum up with “the conduit m etaph or.” T h e title o f a Pennebaker article, “ Putting stress into w o rd s,” m e ta ­ phorically takes stress as a fluid-like thing that can be put in w ords as container-like things. W ords achieve many things, including p e rfo rm in g and reshaping selves and social realities, as Booth and D avison im ply (this v olu m e). Yet W estern folk and philosophical im ages o f language tend to redu ce its function to referen ce to p re-existin g o b jects, including em otio n s m etaph orized as (fluid) things. This im agination o f com m unication also separates m essage form from m essage function, treatin g form

as a n eutral, n on -ob stru ctin g conduit through w hich sem antic

notions How unaffected (R eddy 1993). The m etaph or rep rodu ced in studies o f trau m a-w ritin g by Pennebaker (this volum e) and colleagues (Booth and D avison, this volum e) is that o f b odies as con tain ers and em otio n s as fluids to be pou red out into neutrally referrin g w ords b efore their pressu res dam age the container. We view language differently. W ords arc n ot neutral conduits for objcctifiable fluid-likc feelings. Rather, w ords and g e stu res perform quite m agically; the p erform ative (as o p p osed to m erely referen tial or reflective) powrer o f language is certainly central to ritual o f all so rts, including healing ritual (Tam biah 1 9 7 9 ). It is precisely the perform ative pow er o f w ords and other hum an signifying acts to unite b odies and cultural im ages that m ust be studied in an investigation o f PN I-relcvant therapeutic in terven tions across cultures. P sy ch on eu roim m un ology , or PN I, has taken for gran ted a universal, preconceptual, precu ltural hum an body that resp o n d s in predictable ways lo the “sam e” em o tio n s, m eta-em o tio n s, and behaviors. Such behaviors include rep rocessin g trau m a by w ritin g it, or participatin g in a gu ided im agery intervention fo r cancer patients — on e centering on m ilitary im ages o f the im m un e sy stem . By co n trast, we p ro p o se that sociocu ltu ral co n te xts that discou rage verbalizing of trau m a or paying any attention at all to cancer (even through “positive” im agery ) m ight en gen der local psy ch o im m u n ologies for w hich such acts have a neutral or even negative im pact on im m une function.

“ Healthy” expressive “ release” o f negative affect: a cultural m etaphor in com parative perspective I.akoff and John son (1 9 8 0 ) pion eered a useful exam p le o f an approach to culturally particu lar im ages and m etap h ors

though their w ork generally fails to draw on

actual o ccu rren ces in natural d iscou rse. They e xp lo red in som e detail the “body as con tain er” m etaph or com m on in E uropean languages. L ak off and K ovecses (1 9 8 7 ) link this m aster m etaph or w ith specific English m etaph ors fo r anger. The idiom s “bu rstin g w ith an ger” and “barely containable rage” evoke the con tain er m etaphor, w hile indirectly su p p o rtin g n otions that it is b e tter to “ let it o u t” in a con trolled way. L ak off and K ovecses claim that the association o f an ger w ith m etaph ors o f contained heat reflects e m b odied e xp erien ce and is thus likely to prove universal at least in outline (ib id .: 2 2 Of). G iven a m o d e l that holds idiom s to be p art o f an in tegrated sem antic netw ork (G o o d 1 9 7 7 ), we could take it as a w orking hypothesis that anyone w ho ex p e rie n ce s an ger as threatening them w ith “bu rstin g” might

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exp e rie n ce , along with anger, an oth er tension over the risk such anger posed to their “con tain er.” We can also hypothesize that those w ho “ live” such m etaph ors m ight leel the release o f tension and anger to be health-inducing. We arc not arguing that A m erican s share con scious n otions linking catharsis with immune function p e r sc, though that m ight be tru e (M artin 1994). Rather, we are assertin g tw o things: first, we claim that b ro ad er im ages that im plicitly link a “con tain ed” em otion w ith risk , and expression w ith health are culturally salient. Secon d, w e poin t to the likelihood that such trop es arc them selves em bodied in a p ro cess w hereby cultural signs (m etap h o rs, id io m s, im ages) som eh ow join with physiology (M o crm an 1979; D ow 1986; C so rd as 1988, 1990; C so rd as and K lcinm an 1990; K irm avcr 1 9 9 2 ; and cf. Barchas 1976, Lyon 1993). Re-evaluation C oun selin g (R C , also called “ C o-cou n selin g”) is a popular m ovem ent in the U S based on the conviction that em otional discharge is essential for psych ological and social w ell being. Founded in the 1960s, R C is now practiced by many thousands o f N orth A m ericans (including co-auth or P rice), and has organizations in many other locales around the w orld. A fter a m ultiw eek training p ro g ram , peop le learn how to be both cou n selor and coun selee. They exchange roles on a regu lar basis, typically halfway through a given session . In R C theory, when peop le have distressin g ex p e rie n c e s, they need to discharge the distress with the attention o f anoth er individual, som eon e w ho is listening carefully and su pp ortively, but not “telling them what to d o .” “ D isch arge” is signaled extern ally w hen the person bein g coun seled begin s to cry o r sob, trem b le w ith cold p ersp iration , laugh loudly, shout, talk in a fully engaged w ay, or m ove around vigorously. R C offers a cultural m odel that explicitly m andates exp ressio n ot em o tio n s, and perio dic catharsis, a m odel en d orsed by at least a portion ot the gen eral population in N orth A m erica. A n th ropo lo gists argue that such cultural m o d els need to be seen in b road, global, com parative p ersp ectiv e. T h eoretical links betw een local m o d els o f sell and em otion on the one hand and social stru ctu re on the other, w ere m ade bv M ichelle R osaldo (1 9 8 4 ). A rguing that “cultural idiom s provide the im ages in te rm s o f which our sub jectivities arc fo rm e d , and . . . these idiom s them selves arc socially ordered and co n strain ed ,” R osaldo left us a stron g form o f the social con stru ction ist argum en t in relation to m etap h ors o f em otio n and con tain m ent o r con trol. She prop osed that the expression o f anger is view ed as destru ctive in “b rid e se rv ice ” or hun ter-gatherer so cieties, w hereas in “m ore c o m p le x , tribal . . . ‘b rid ew ealth ’ g ro u p s . . . ‘an g e r’ held w ithin may w ork to other p e o p le ’s harm in hidden, w itchlike w ays.” E xten din g this, it seem s clear that in the p ostin d ustrial W est — and perhaps in classical G rcc cc , given A risto tle ’ s vision o f catharsis - it is the one with “un resolved ” or “re p re ssed ” anger and g r ie f w ho feels at risk. T his an thropology o f se lf m u st be taken into con sideration in any accoun t o f PNI — specifically, any accoun t o f how- w ritin g ab out traum a m igh t enhance im m une function — that presu m es to cover the diversity o f hum an societies. M etap h ors and im ages that involve the activity o f im m une system s arc a subset o f m etaph ors for the body and em otio n that have been well studied (Sch cper-FIughcs and L ock 1987; D csjarlais 1 992). We focus on a particular m etaph or that seem s lo have pow er over our con ception s and even our physiologies (Pennebaker et al. 198 9 ): “ Rid the b o d y /c o n tain e r o f dangerous rep ressed e m o tio n ”

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(L ak off and K ovecses 198 7 ). It exem plifies the sub set o f cultural m odels that link body and em otio n vis-a-vis health and im m unity, and on another im plicit m e ta ­ im age, n am ely, that active, assertive im aging can en gen der positive em otio n s and bodily states (K ie co lt-G lase r et al. 198 5 ). Both involve som eth in g like “cath arsis,” an ancicnt notion in the W est (Sch cff 1979) w ith new m anifestations in pop ular health and im m un e m etaph ors. Hall and O ’ G rady, review in g

exp erim en tal

psychosocial

in terven tions

designed to cnhancc im m u n ocom p ctcn cc, m ention a general benefit from re la x ­ ation o r sim ply from the relaxation dim ension o f a guided im agery ex e rcise , a benefit m easurable in several clinical p op ulation s. T h e con tcn t o f the im agery also counts for som ething. Som e im ages may have “n o xio u s” cffccts on som e p a rtic i­ pan ts; but this is tru e , m ore gen erally, o f psychological in terven tion s in conditions like cancer - they run the risk o f burden ing the patient with a sense o f re sp o n si­ bility for a condition that is in fact a cultural m etaph or for that w hich is out o f con trol (Balshcm

1 9 9 1 ). Hall and O ’ G rady cite such potential noxious co n ­

sequen ces as the induction o f a sense o f b u rden som e responsibility for the disease or healing (cf. Son tag 1 9 7 8 ). Particu lar individuals may resist particular im ages, recoiling at the aggressiven ess o f im agining “the se lf’ s” cells killing “ oth er” cells. O ne C ath olic p riest in a study o f the effects o f im agery in can ccr treatm en t su b ­ stituted a w eed-pullin g im age for it (H all and O ’ Grady 1 9 9 1 ). T h e poten tial for peop le to gen erate any such im ages arises in the p o st-1 9 7 0 s’ sociocultural environm ent in w hich the notion o f an “ im m une system" p er se has gelled and has captured the p op u lar im agination (M artin

1 99 4 ). M oreover, the poten tial for

em bodying the very im ages that im m une sciences present us (as they trickle dow n through National Geographic and Time (H araw ay 1993; M artin 1994) — including the com m only m ilitaristic on es — is real (N ap ier 1996: 3 3 5 f). T h e body and em otio n s provide am ple su b jects and ob jects for cultu re-specific tropin g o r im age-building. . . . Such tro p es or im ages arc often invented and p ro p a ­ gated through public d iscou rse. W hatever else they m ight b e, scientific discussion s o f “ e m o tio n s” arc also d isc o u rse s, and thus cultural p rod u cts. T h e e x p e rie n ce o f an em otion is not prccu ltu ral, not ultim ately separable from cultural disco u rses about it, including social evaluations o f the em otion (R oscm an et al. 1995). And the expression o f em otion cannot be u n derstood ap art from the h istories o f resp o n se to it predictable and therefore exp ected verbal and gestural resp o n ses to equally stereo ty p ed verbal and nonverbal expression s. [. . .]

Disharm ony, distress, and coping: Western and Asian m odels L itera ry sources o f Western m e ta-im agery o f coping If o u r read ers share a sense that it is a go o d thing to cry o r to tell o n e ’s w oes, the notion m ight w ell be traced back to Poetics, in w hich A ristotle m eta-im agines enacted im ages o f tragedy exercisin g a purifying or cathartic effect on the audience. Sch eff (1 9 7 9 ) links A risto tle ’s reflections on dram a w ith psych oth erapeu tic theories o f “em otion w o rk .” The historiography o f m ore reccn t W estern cultural th eories o f em otional im agery and the m eta-im age o f therapeutic rc -cx p c ricn c c o r expression

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m u st in clu de the w ork o f Sh ak esp eare. S o m e p sy ch o lo gical an th ro p o lo g ists reg ard him as a so u rce o f insight into “ u n iv ersal” h um an n ature and e m o tio n s. M o re likely, his w o rk re so n a te s w ith us b ecau se he h elp ed to re p ro d u c e o r re p resen t fu n d am en tal W estern cu ltu ral th em es. C o n sid e r S h ak e sp e a re ’ s T h irtieth So n n et: W h en to the se ssio n s of sw eet silen t thought O I su m m o n up re m e m b ra n c e o f things p ast, I sigh the lack o f m any a thing I sou gh t A nd w ith old w o e s new w ail my d e ar tim e ’ s w aste : T h en can I drow n an eve, u n u sed to flow For p re c io u s frien d s hid in d e ath ’ s d a teless n igh t, And w eep afresh lo v e ’ s lo n g -sin c e-c a n c e ll’ d w oe, And m oan the e x p e n se o f m any a vanisht sight: Then can I grieve at griev an ce s fo re g o n e , A nd heavily from w oe to w oe tell o ’ e r The sad account o f fo rc -b c m o a n c d m o an , W h ich I new' pay as if n ot paid b e fo re . But if the w hile I think on th ee, d e ar frien d All lo sse s are re sto re d , and so rro w s en d. (1 9 3 8 : 1 2 2 8 , em p h asis ad d e d ) T h e son n et e m b ra c e s the n eed to “g riev e al g rie v an c e s” — and not fo re g o o r re p re ss g riev in g — and “heavily fro m w oe to w oe tell o ’ e r the sad accou n t o f fo re -b e m o an e d m o a n s.” We find the sam e m e ta se n tim e n t in Alacbeth (IV, iii). M acduff is finally to ld the truth ab o u t the m u rd e r o f his w ife and ch ildren . M a lc o lm , stan d in g by, says: M ercifu l heaven! — W h at, m an! n e ’ e r p u ll y o u r hat u po n y o u r b ro w s; Give sorrow words: the g r ie f that d o e s n o t speak W h isp e rs the o ’ e r

fraugh t h e a rt, and b id s it b reak . (1 9 3 8 : 8 7 9 , em p h asis ad d e d )

Sh ak esp eare in h erited au d ien ces

b u t, m o re salien tly , p assed on to co u n tless W estern

a cu ltu ral m e ta-im age o f cath artic d isc lo su re o f im ag e s and feelin gs

to o aw'ful to b e ar w ithin. H is p o e m s and his d ram a tic ch a ra cte rs co u n se l verbal d isclo su re — givin g so rro w w o rd s. T h e im ag e s o f in tc rio rity (o n e ’ s in sid es as the sc at o f fe elin g), o f h earts that can b reak u n less relieved o f e m o tio n o b je c ts /flu id s over-filling th em , and o f n arrative as c a th a rsis/th e r a p y , c o m c dow n to us as p o w e r­ ful cu ltu ral affirm ation s. Sh ak esp eare leaves m o st o f the re sp o n sib ility fo r cop in g w ith the su ffe rer h im self. A s m uch as th ese m e ta se n tim e n ts stir u s, w e m ust reco g n ize that they are n o t u n iversal. T h at is m ad e clear by c o n trastin g m etascn tim c n ts from o th e r trad itio n s.

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C oping with can cer: a J a p a n e s e oncology m a n u a l C o n sid e r Ja p a n ese o n c o lo g ists, w h o se w ritin gs invoke id io m s o f con flict and s u p p o rt in d e sc rib in g g e n tle d isc lo su re o f can ce r d iag n o se s. We W estern re a d e rs m igh t skip to the end of the scrip t and p re su m e that the Ja p a n ese idiom parallels A m erican o n c o lo g y ’s e x p e r im e n ts w ith g u id ed im ag e ry in w hich patien ts m ay be le ft alone w ith their im ag in atio n s, but n ot left w ith o u t gu id an ce — m ay in fact b e e n c o u ra g e d to u se ag g re ssiv e im ag e s. A m erican c an c e r p atie n ts arc to ld to re la x , turn inward, and draw on and enhance in n er stren gth by en vision in g th eir go o d cells d efeatin g the invading can cc r cells (H all and O ’ G rad y 1 9 9 1 ). In co n trast, the Ja p a n ese o n c o lo g is ts ’ /Manual o f Terminal Care f o r Cancer Patients g u id e s physicians th us: “ [I]n form y ou r patients you are a co-fighter in this process . . . [Say ,] ‘ P rob ab ly , we have a lo n g term

fig h t.’ ” A late r “ le sso n ” su g g e sts, “ A n o th er e x am p le o f

d e m o n stratin g em path y and b ein g a ‘ c o -fig h te r’ is to tou ch the ab d o m in al area, p erh aps th us in dicatin g a v isceral co re , and ask ‘how is the common e n e m y ?’ . . . or [su ggest] ‘ We deal w ith the en em y w ith d c lib c r a tc n c ss’ ” (citc d by G o o d et al. 1 9 9 4 : 8 5 9 , em p h asis ad d e d ; and sec G o o d et al. 1 9 9 3 ). W h ile A m erican rc sc a rc h c rs re co g n ize the th e ra p e u tic value o f social su p p o rt, a gre at gap se p arate s those Ja p a n ese m e ta -im ag e s o f jo in t social e ffo rt from the in d ividu alistic m e ta p h o rs go v e rn in g the A m eric an m e ta c o m m u n icativ e p rac tic e o f gu id ed im ag e ry . P ron ou n s help m ark the co n trast — Ja p a n ese physicians arc told to say “ w e” lo convey a subtly different m ilitary m e ta p h o r su g g e stin g common e n gage m e n t in the stru g g le again st cancer.

C osts a n d b en efits o f w ith h o ld in g w ords in Sou th A sia T h e Ban gladesh i u se o f the m e ta p h o r “h oldin g so m e th in g in y o u r ab d o m e n ” invites o u r atten tio n fo r its d e ce p tiv e ap p e aran ce to W e stern e rs. A vcrv situ ated e x am p le arises from a m o o t, co u n try “c o u r t ,” o r c o n flict-re so lu tio n m e e tin g that W ilce atten d ed and re co rd e d d u rin g his Bangladesh i fieldw ork (W ilce 1 9 9 6 ). As I (W ilc c) listen ed to n e go tiatio n s that follow ed a violen t co n fro n tatio n n e e d in g re d re ss in my field villag e, I sen sed the ten sio n s w ere still palp ab le and violen ce w as still p o ssib le. A t one p o in t, my cu rio sity w as piq u ed w hen m y friend Jalu M iah gave his testim o n y and the m e d ia to rs o f the co n fron tation re sp o n d e d : they fram ed his revelation as so m e th in g that had e m e rg e d from his ab d o m en ! W h at Ja lu revealed w as that he had b een th reaten ed w ith a gu n . M y m in d qu ite naturally — and m istaken ly — h eard his testim o n y and the m e d ia to r ’ s rcfra m in g th e re o f in te rm s o f cath artic d isclo su re o f his p e rso n al trau m a. M y m isim p rc ssio n aro se , in particu lar, from the q u estio n one o f the m e d ia to rs asked Ja lu : “ H ow co u ld you have held the w o rd o f testim o n y in y o u r pet (a b d o m e n ) so lon g?” B ut the South Asian e th n oth eory im p licit therein m e tap h o rically casts the ab d o m en as a re p o sito ry fo r se c re ts. T h u s the ch airm an ch ides the ag grie v e d Jalu for his tard in e ss in speaking. But the B an glad esh i b od y m e ta p h o r is not a p arallel to o u r ow n eth n o th co ry o f e m o tio n w hich m ak es the b od y a d a n g e ro u s p lace lo sto re an g e r o r g r ie f as reified c m o tio n -lh in g s. R ather, the m e d iato r u p b raid ed Jalu fo r im p ed in g the “p h y siological p r o c e sse s” o f the body p o litic by w ith h oldin g his testim o n y until that poin t. A l least from the p e rsp e ctiv e o f th ose m ed iatin g the d isp u te , fo r Jalu to h old in his pet in fo rm atio n n ee d e d lo

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“d ise n tan g le ” a prob lem (W a tso n -G e g eo and W h ite 1 9 9 2 ) w as a social offen se; Jalu had b een p a rt o f the social p ro b lem rath er than co n trib u tin g to its social re so lu tio n . T h is m e ta p h o r is n ot iso lated . L ocally , it ap p e a rs in B engali lite ra tu re , w h ere w om en are so m e tim e s ch a ra c te riz ed as b ein g unable to sto re se c re ts in their pet. We find a p arallel even m o re relevan t to the co n sid e ratio n o f e m o tio n and its sto rab ility — though it c o m e s from the w este rn side of South A sia — in id io m s u sed by w om en w ho have sp ok en w ith V ccna D as a b o u t b ein g v ictim s o f to rtu re and rap e du rin g co m m u n a l vio le n ce in the Punjab. D o they tell the sto rie s again and again in an atte m p t to clean se th e m se lv e s by d isc lo sin g o r verb ally “refin in g” th eir trau m atic c x p c r ic n c c ? Q u ite the c o n trary . D as says the w om en co n sid e r m e m o r ie s o f rape a kind o f “p o iso n o u s k n o w le d g e ”

m e m o r ie s that dare n ot be re tra c ed

“ |N ]o n c o f

the m e ta p h o rs used to d e sc rib e the se lf that had b e co m e the re p o sito ry o f p o iso n ­ ou s k n o w le d g e em ph asized the n eed to give e x p re ssio n to this hidden k n o w le d g e ” (1 9 9 6 : 8 4 ). R ather, th ese w om en k eep the pain and its sto ry in side th eir ab d o m e n s, h idin g the sto rie s as b ab ie s arc hidden in the w om b . T h e “re p re ssio n ” hardly su g ­ g e sts agen cy at all, let alo ne v irtu e . T h e P unjabi m e ta p h o r su g g e sts b oth . A gen cy is su g g e ste d in tw o se n se s, first in te r m s o f the w o m e n ’ s ch o ice and v isceral stru g g le to h old thin gs in side. T h en , ac c o rd in g to D as the ab d o m en is also m ad e to re p re se n t a un iquely fem ale bodily p o w e r — the ability to tran sfo rm a g e rm in to som eth in g safe o r even g o o d , so m eth in g such as o c c u rs in prcgn an cy (1 9 9 6 : 8 5 ). T h e p e r ­ sp ectiv e distilled in the m e ta p h o r o f th ese P unjabi w om en c o n trasts starkly w ith p o st-F re u d ia n (but pre-F o u cald ian ) W estern sen sib ilities ab o u t re p re ssio n . W h en w e c o m p a re South A sian ab d o m en m e ta p h o rs w ith W estern m e ta p h o rs that involve sim ilar “h id in g” o f w o rd s “ in sid e ,” w e see d ifferen ces in the “t e x t ,” “ u p sh o t,” o r id e o lo g ica l shading o f the m e ta p h o rs. T h e value p o la ritie s arc sw itch ed w hen w e m ove from W estern tro p e s o f “g e ttin g it all o u t” to the P u njabi w o m e n ’ s h ope to keep it “in” and tran sfo rm “ it.” Even w hen d isclo sin g w as v alo rized as it w as in the co u n try c o u r t d isc o u rse re c o r d e d by W ilce , it w as fo r the sake o f the health o f the b ody p o litic , n ot Ja lu ’ s b o d y . A d m itted ly , w e lack even e th n ograp h ic evid en ce as to w h eth er the ph y sio lo g ical and im m u n o lo g ica l p r o c e sse s o f these w om en reflect th eir sen se o f the p o sitiv ely tran sfo rm a tiv e p o ten tial o f h oldin g s c c rc ts , o r w h eth er they w ould at least feel th em selv es to b e at risk if they b ro u g h t th eir sc c rc ts o u t o f th eir ab d o m en s. E viden ce o f that s o r t c o m e s from eth n o grap h ic w ork in In donesia.

S etre s, a b d o m en s, a n d sorcery in In d o n e sia B e r m a n ’ s fieldw ork in Java (1 9 9 8 ) sh o w s howr m en and w om en e x c rc isc careful c o n tro l, especially w hen sp eak in g Jav an ese, over how they e x p re ss e m o tio n . Javanese use the te r m , setres, b o rro w e d from English (str e ss), to design ate a ph en o m en o n so dread fu l that it is able to kill, at le ast in the case o f very y o u n g ch ild ren . P aren ts are, o b v io u sly , m otiv ate d to p ro te c t th eir ch ildren from this th reat. T h u s, Javan ese and A m erican s share the w ord “ s tr e s s ,” a b e lie f that it can d am ag e o n e ’ s h ealth , and a co n ce rn to m an age it. T h e re the sim ilarity en ds. W h ere at least m id d le class A m eric an s (se e K u ssero w 1 9 9 9 ) c n c o u ra g e th eir ch ild ren , as Sh ak esp eare w ro te , to “g iv e so rro w w o r d s ,” Javanese p aren ts w ork hard to d e sen sitize ch ildren to sudden ch an ges. T h at is, in stead o f train in g them to be aw are o f and e x p r e ss fe elin g s, they

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train them early to m aintain poise and equan im ity, to rise above em otional lability (B erm an 199 8 ). For d ecad es, an th ropo lo gists con cern ed w ith cu ltu re ’ s role in relation to illness and health have d escrib ed “culture-bound sy n d rom es” (Sim on s and H ughes 1 9 8 5 ), a con cept useful in theorizing A m erican and Indonesian illness pattern s. M o st socalled culture-boun d sy n d rom es — like amok and latah — p resen ted in the literature lend them selves to psychological or behavioral rather than som atic in terp retation . E xception al accounts includc an orexia n ervosa in the U S (Sw artz 1985) and Balinese “pregnan cy with sto n e s.” W ikan (1 9 9 0 ) d cscrib cs the Balinese syndrom e involving a bloating o f the abdom en with very hard lum ps. It is u n d ersto o d to be causcd by sorccry and can lead to death. Key to un derstandin g it, however, is a set o f im ages we could con sider m etap h oric if they w ere n ’t so real to the Balinese. The first is a body-ideal-im age in which a flat stom ach rep resen ts discipline and selfcon trol, linchpins o f a Balinese value sy stem . The bloated sto m ach , by con trast, is the very im age o f failure to live up to Balinese ideals o f hard w ork and sclf-dcnial (W ikan 1990: 2 5 8 ). It is feared, not only because o f those m oral-aesth etic con n ota­ tion s, but also because o f its in terp retab ilitv as a sign o f a so rc e r e r’s attack. That is, the ab dom en b e co m e s the site in w hich Balinese m ight involuntarily be m ade to em body status-conflict and social tensions as they boil over in that curse called “pregnancy w ith sto n e s.” W ikan w rites: If, as Hahn and Kleinm an [1983] asse rt, the m indful body [ScheperFlughes and L ock 1987] respo n d s to its biopsych osocial environm ent in term s o f cultural expectation s and beliefs that facilitate or im pede n oceb o [noxious beliefs] and placcbo effects, then pregnancy with stones m ight be seen as peculiarly Balinese: a culturally con stru cted exp ression o f p articu lar fears and despairs. It em b od ies basic Balinese con cepts o f b eau ty, m orality , and in terp erson al evil. The physical em b od im en ts o f fears w ork , to qu o te Hahn and K lcin m an , to retard “ integrated biopsych ical p ro c e sse s, d em oralizin g, reducing immunological competence and physiological activation” . . . C on versely , con tact w ith a kalian [traditional healer] m ight activate h ope, and w ith it, the p e r so n ’s internal th erapeutic system . (W ikan 1990: 2 5 8 f, em phasis added) W ik an ’s evidence that b odies take on local shapes reflecting local em otio n s points to the link betw een ph ysiological (and (p sy ch o )im m u n c) processes and societies that we arc claim ing is m ediated by cultural m etaph ors. [. . .]

Conclusion A nth ropology can enhance u n derstandin gs o f im m une function to the e xten t that it convinces various publics o f the relevance o f ethnography along writh other fo rm s o f research . Together, the several fo rm s o f research w e have drawrn on help us envision a cultural psy ch oim m un ology . They illum ine how variable are cultural m od els o f self, illness, healing, and im m un ological function. They point to possible

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e m b o d im e n ts o f th ese d iv erg en t m e ta p h o rs. We have argu ed fo r a d e e p cultu ral co n so n an ce , a m o d e l that joins tw o seem in gly in co m p arab le s o rts o f findings. It joins e th n ograp h ic acco u n ts o f cu ltu ral m e ta p h o rs and verb al im ag e s that bodym in ds “ live bv” on the on e h an d, w ith e x p e rim e n ta l ev id en ce from the U S that in dicates that in te rv en tio n s can teach patien ts a th e rap e u tic e m b o d im e n t o f im ag es (even o f the c o n d u it m e ta p h o r). F u rth e r re se arch to find m e asu rab le im m u n o ­ lo gical re fle ctio n s o f cu ltu rally c o n stru c te d m e ta p h o rs of b o d y and e m o tio n is a p ro je c t w orth pu rsu in g. A lth ough such re se arc h re m ain s to be d o n e , w e have put fo rw ard a h yp oth esis that re fle cts and m o v e s b eyon d the e x p e rim e n tal eviden ce o f P cn n cb ak cr and c o lle a g u e s, and the se t o f e th n ograp h ic ease stu d ie s w e rev iew ed . T h at h yp oth esis is that acts (e.g . w ritin g , d isc lo sin g , o r hiding w o rd s in o n e ’ s ab d o m en ) that are felt to be co n so n an t w ith d o m in an t values o f o n e ’ s cu ltu re are stre ss-re d u c in g and thus b en eficial. T h is h yp oth esis is a ste p to w ard a cu ltu ral im m u n o lo g y . A cu ltu ral m o d e l o f (p sy c h o )im m u n o lo g y h elp s c o rr e c t im b alan ce s and could thus be p a rt o f clinical in te rv en tio n s aim ed at en han cing h o p e. Such a m o d e l re sp o n d s critically to the m e ta p h o ric al lin kin g (in the self-h elp lite ra tu re , fo r in stan ce) o f can ce r (o r illn ess in ge n e ra l) w ith p e rso n a l failure (S o n tag 1 9 7 8 ; D iG ia c o m o 1 9 9 2 ; M artin 1 9 9 3 ), a link that re p ro d u c e s W estern in dividualism and reifies agen cy to the p o in t o f blam in g the victim fo r d ise ase . Yet, even critical m cd ical an th ro p o lo gy has the o p p o rtu n ity to b u ild , with hope, a so rt o f m u ltisto ry cdificc on its ow n partly p h e n o m e n o lo gical ro o ts. The first “sto ry to be b u ilt” is to d e m o n strate links b etw een b o d y , m in d , so c iety , and p o litical e con om y and h ealing in c u ltu ral specific w ays, w ith out co llap sin g on e in to an o th er (b od y into so ciety , e tc .; C o n e and M a rtin , this v o lu m e). But a se co n d sto ry can be ad d e d to this b u ild in g; a critical an th ro p o lo gy can also be clinically relevan t in shapin g th e ra p e u tic p ra c tic e , e.g. g u id in g the train in g o f ph ysician s w ho arc faccd w ith c h o iccs ab o u t m e ta p h o riz in g can ccr, A ID S, o r the c o m m o n c o ld . T h e d ile m m a fo r such an a p p lie d /c r itic a l an th ro p o lo gy b e c o m e s that o f su p p o rtin g p a tie n ts’ h o p e s w h ile avoiding an u n critical re p ro d u c tio n o f the hope in technology w hich d efin es U S o n c o lo g y ’ s “d isc o u rse on h o p e ” (G o o d et al. 1 9 9 0 ). A PN I that takes cu ltu ral variab ility se rio u sly could n o t su ccu m b so to a highly p a rtic u la r cu ltu ral m o d e l (h ope in te c h n o lo g y ). It is a m a tter o f reco g n izin g the sen se in w hich self-h ealin g is both re sista n ce to and a reflection o f oth er tec h n o lo g ie s o f the s e lf and health . [. . .]

R eferences Balshcm , M . (1 9 9 1 ). Canccr, con trol, and causality: talking about can cer in a workingclass com m unity. American Ethnologist, I 8 ( 1), 152—172. Barchas, P. (1 9 7 6 ). Physiological sociology : interface o f sociological and b iological processes. Annual Review o f Sociology, 2, 2 9 9 —333. Berm an, L. (1 9 9 8 ). Speaking through the silence: narratives, social conventions, and power in Java. N ew York: O x fo rd U niversity Press. C on e, R . and M artin, E. (2 0 0 3 ) ‘ C orp oreal flows the im m une system , global econ ­ om ics o f fo o d , and new im plications for health’ in J. M . W ilce (c d .) Social and Cultural Lives o f Immune Systems, R outledge.

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C sord as, T. (1 9 8 8 ). E lem ents o f chrism atic persu asion and healing. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 2 (2 ), 1 2 1 -1 4 2 . — (1 9 9 0 [1988]). Stirling Award Essay: E m bodim ent as a paradigm for an thro­ pology. Ethos, 18( 1), 5—47. — and A rthur Kleinm an (1 9 9 0 ). The therapeutic process. In T. M . Johnson and C. F. Sargent (c d s), Medical anthropology: contemporary theory and method. N ew York: Pracger. D as, V. (1 9 9 6 ). Language and the body: transactions in the con struction o f pain. Daedalus, 125( 1), 6 7 - 9 1 . D csjarlais, R . R. (1 9 9 2 ). Body and emotion: the aesthetics o f illness and healing in the Nepal Himalayas. Philadelphia: U niversity o f Pennsylvania Press. D iG iaco m o , S. M . (1 9 9 2 ). M etaphor as illness: postm od ern dilem m as in the re p re se n ­ tation o f body, m ind and disorder. Medical Anthropology, 14( 1), 109—137. D ow, J. (1 9 8 6 ). U niversal aspects o f sym bolic healing: a theoretical synthesis. American Anthropologist, # 7 (1 ), 56—69. D ressier, W. W., Balieiro, M . C ., and D o s Santos, J. E. (1 9 9 8 ). C ulture, socio-econom ic status, and physical and m ental health in Brazil. Medical Anthropology' Quarterly, 12(4 ), 4 2 4 - 4 4 6 . Estcrling, B. A ., A ntoni, M . PL, Fletcher, M . A ., M argulies, S ., and Sch n eiderm an, N. (1 9 9 4 ). E m otional disclosure through w riting o r speaking m odu lates latent Epstcin-B arr virus antibody titers. Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 6 2 (1 ), 1 3 0 - 1 4 0 . Farncll, B. (1 9 9 6 ). M etaphors we m ove by. Visual Anthropology, # (2 —4 ), 31 1—335. Frankcnbcrg, R . (1 9 8 6 ). Sickncss as cultural p erform an ce: D ram a, trajcctorv, and p ilgrim age ro o t m etaph ors and the m aking of disease social. International Journal o f Health Services, 16(4 ), 6 0 3 —626. G o o d , B. (1 9 7 7 ). The h eart o f w hat’s the m atter: the sem antics o f illness in Iran. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, / ( l ) , 25—58. G o o d , M .-J. D ., G o o d , B ., Schaffer, C ., and Lind, S. E. (1 9 9 0 ). A m erican oncology and the d iscou rse on hope. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 14( 1), 59—79. — , Flunt, L ., M unakata, T ., and Koybavashi, Y. (1 9 9 3 ). A C om parative analysis o f the culture o f b iom edicin e: disclosure and con sequen ces for treatm en t in the practice o f on cology. In P. C on rad and E. B. G allagher (c d s), Health and health care in developing countries: sociological perspectives (pp. 180—21 1). Philadelphia: Tem ple U niversity Press. — , M unakata, T ., Koybayashi, Y., M attingly, C ., and G o o d , B. J. (1 9 9 4 ). O n cology and narrative tim e. Social Science and Medicine, 3 8 (6 ), 8 5 5 —862. G ottm an , J. M ., K atz, L. F., and H ooven, C. (1 9 9 6 ). Parental m eta-em otion philosophy and the em otional life o f fam ilies: theoretical m o d els and prelim inary data. Journal o f Family Psychology, 10( 3), 2 4 3 —268. Hahn, R ., and Kleinm an, A. (1 9 8 3 ). B elief as pathogen, belief as m edicine. Medical Anthropology'Quarterly, 14(4), 16—19. Hall, N. R. S. and O ’ G rady, M . P. (1 9 9 1 ). Psychosocial interven tion s and im m une function. In R. Ader, D. L. Fcltcn, and N. Cohen (e d s), Psychoneuroimmunology (2nd edn ). San D iego: A cadem ic Press. Haraway, D. (1 9 9 3 ). The biopolitics o f p ostm od ern b odies: determ ination s o f self in im m une system discourse. In S. Lindcnbaum and M . L ock (e d s), Knowledge, power, and practice: the anthropology o f medicine and everyday life (pp. 364 4 1 0 ). Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press.

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M.

W I L C E

JR

AND

L A U R I E

J.

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Jo h n son , M . (1 9 8 7 ). The hotly in the mind. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. K iccolt-G laser, J. K ., G laser, R ., W illiger, D ., Sou t, J ., M essick, G ., Sheppard, S ., Ricker, D ., Rom isher, S. C ., Briner, W ., Bonnell, G ., and D on n crb crg, R . (1 9 8 5 ). Psychosocial enhancem ent of im m un ocom p eten ce in a geriatric population . Health Psychology', 4 (1 ), 25—4 1 . Kirm ayer, L. J. (1 9 9 2 ). The b od y ’ s insistence on m eaning: m etaph or as presentation and representation in illness cxp cricn cc. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 6 (4 ), 3 2 3 -3 4 6 . Kusscrow , A. S. (1 9 9 9 ). D c-h om ogcnizing A m erican individualism : socializing hard and soft individualism in Manhattan and Q ueen s. Ethos, 2 7 (2 ), 2 1 0 —234. Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M . (1 9 8 0 ). Metaphors we live hy. C h icago: U niversity o f Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. and K ovecses, Z . (1 9 8 7 ). T h e cognitive m odel of anger inherent in A m erican English. In D. Holland and N. Quinn (e d s), Cultural models in language and thought (pp. 195—2 2 1 ). C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. L ock, M . (1 9 9 3 ). Cultivating the b ody: anthropology and epistem ologies o f bodily practice and know ledge. Annual Review o f Anthropology, 22, 1 33—155. — (1 9 9 8 ). M enopause: lessons from an thropology. Psychosomatic Medicine, 6 0 (4 ) (Special Issue: C ro ss-C u ltu ral R esearch ), 4 1 0 —419. Lyon, M . (1 9 9 3 ). Psych oneuroim m unology: the problem o f the situatedn ess o f illness and the conceptualization o f healing. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 17(1), 7 7 -97. M artin, E. (1 9 9 3 ). H istories o f im m une system s. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 17(1), 6 7 -76. — (1 9 9 4 ). Flexible bodies: the role o f immunity in American culture from the days o j polio to the age o f AIDS. Boston: Beacon. M o crm an , D. E. (1 9 7 9 ). A nthropology of sym bolic healing. Current Anthropology, 20, 59 -8 0 . N apier, A. D. (1 9 9 6 ). U nnatural selection: social m odels o f the m icrobial w orld. In S. A. Plotkin and B. Fantini (e d s), Vaccinia, vaccination, vaccinology: Jenner, Pasteur and their successors (pp. 335—340). Paris: Elsevier. Pennebaker, J. W. (1 9 8 9 ). C on fession , inhibition, and disease. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 21 1—244. — , Barger, S. D ., and T ie b o u t, J. (1 9 8 9 ). D isclosure o f trau m as and health am ong H olocaust surv iv ors. Psychosomatic Medicine, 5 / ( 5 ) , 577—589. Petrie, K. J ., Booth, R . J., Pennebaker, J. W ., D avison, K . P., and T h om as, M . G. (1 9 9 5 ). D isclosu re o f traum a and im m une respon se to a hepatitis B vaccination p rogram . Journal o f Consulting and Clinical Psychology’, 6 J ( 5 ) , 7 8 7 —7 9 2 . R eddy, M . (1 9 9 3 ). The conduit m etaph or: a ease o f fram e conflict in our language about language. In A. O rto n y (c d .), Metaphor and thought (pp. 164—2 0 1 ). C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. R osaldo, M . Z . (1 9 8 4 ). Tow ards an an thropology o f self and feeling. In R. A. Shw cder and R . A. LcVine (c d s), Culture theory: essays on mind, self, and emotion (pp. 137—157). C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. R osem an , I. J ., D haw an, N ., R cttck , S. I., N aid, R. K ., and Thapa, K. (1 9 9 5 ). C ultural differences and cross-cultural sim ilarities in appraisals and em otional respon ses. Journal o f Cross-Cultural Psychology, 2 6 (1 ), 23—4 8 . Schcff, T. J. (1 9 7 9 ). Catharsis in healing, ritual, and drama. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press.

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Sch eper-H ughes, N. and L o ck , M . (1 9 8 7 ). The m indful body: a p rolegom en on to future w ork in m edical anthropology. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 1 (1 ), 6—4-1. Shakespeare, W. (1 9 3 8 ). Sonnet 30. In O x fo rd U niversity Press (e d .), The works o f William Shakespeare gathered in one volume (p. 1228). N ew York: O x ford U niversity Press. Sim ons, R. C. and H ughes, C. (cd s). (1 9 8 5 ). Culture-hound syndromes: folk illnesses of psychiatric and anthropological interest. D ordrcch t: D. R cidcl. Sontag, S. (1 9 7 8 ). Illness as metaphor. N ew York: Farrar, Strau ss, G iroux. Sw artz, L. (1 9 8 5 ). A n orexia n ervosa as a culture-bound syndrom e. Social Science and Medicine, 2 0 (7 ), 7 2 5 —7 3 0 . Tam biah, S. J. (1 9 7 9 ). A perform ative approach to ritual. Proceedings o f the British Academy, 65, 1 1 3—169. W atson -G cgco, K. and W hite, G. M . (c d s). (1 9 9 2 ). Disentangling: the discourse of interpersonal conflict in Pacific Island societies. Stan ford: Stanford U niversity Press. W ikan, U. (1 9 9 0 ). Managing turbulent hearts: a Balinese formula for living, Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago. W ilce, J. M . (1 9 9 6 ). R eduplication and reciprocity in im agining com m unity: the play of tropes in a rural Bangladeshi m o o t. Journal o f Linguistic Anthropology, 6(2), 1 8 8 -2 2 2 .

Chapter

28

Elizabeth A. Wilson T H E W O R K OF A NT I D E P R E S S A N T S P re lim in a ry notes on how to b u ild an a llia n c e betw een fe m in is m and p s y ch o p h a rm a co lo g y

O

N E O F T H E C E N T R A L D I F F I C U L T I E S in gen eratin g a useful dialogue

betw een

fem inism

and

psych oph arm acology

is

the

anti-

biologism o f co n tem p o rary fem inist theory. It has b eco m e axiom atic that eulture rather than nature is the p ro p e r sphere for fem inist politics. This presu m ption underpinned the success o f social con struction ism as the p rem ier m ode o f fem inist analysis in the social sciences in the 1990s. Indeed, the turn against b iological explanation w as so conceptually lucrative for fem inism that it now seem s a n o n ­ sense to think o f biology as a site o f tran sform ation or innovation (W ilson , 2 0 0 4 b ). This schism betw een p olitics and biology rem ains a significant ob stacle lo r fem inist w ork in the cu rren t psychocu ltural clim ate. W ithout con ceptu al in terest in how biology invents, tran sfo rm s, crafts, re d istrib u te s, in corp o rates and bequeath s, fe m ­ inists w ill rem ain p e rp le xe d by the ch aracter o f p sych o-ph arm aceu tical events. In this co m m en tary , I offer a prelim in ary analvsis o f how fem inism and psych oph arm acology could be brough t into a m ore dynam ic and fruitful alliancc. I w ill argue that close attention to p h arm acological data opens up new avenues for analysing the em b odim en t o f m elancholy.

Pharm acokinetics L et m e begin w ith a prosaic but im portan t datum about the new antidcprcssant m edication s: they are all adm in istered o ra lly .1 That is, they are m anufactured in tablet fo rm , and they are sw allow ed. W hile it is the case that m o st pharm aceuticals are adm inistered orally, there is p articu lar significance in the oral adm in istration o f an tidepressants: there is an intim ate connection betw een the gu t and depression , m aking interven tion via the gu t an especially felicitous m eans o f treatm ent for depressed m ood (W ilson , 2 0 0 4 a). W hile conventional ncuroscicn tific and

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2 4 1

psy ch iatric te x ts often p o sit a d irect link from d ru g to b rain , clo se atten tio n to the details o f d ru g a b so rp tio n , d istrib u tio n , m e ta b o lism and e x c re tio n (w hat is called the d r u g ’ s p h arm ac o k in e tics) show s that the v iscera are also essen tial to how d iso rd e rs ol m o o d b e co m e in stan tiated and how thcv can b e tre ate d . R ath er than validatin g a sin gle, cen tral site o f d e te rm in atio n tor m o o d (the b ra in ), the p h a r m a ­ co k in e tics o f an tid e p re ssan t d ru g s shed light on how d e p re ssio n is d istrib u te d , in both o rgan ic and p sy ch ic re g is te r s , all through the b o d y . W h at arc the p h arm aco k in ctic tra je c to r ie s o f an an tid e p rcssan t? F o r anv orally ad m in istered d r u g , the ga stro in te stin al (G I) tract is the site at w hich the d ru g is ab so rb e d in to the b o d y , and GI d istre ss (n au sea, delayed g a stric e m p ty in g and co n stip a tio n ) is a c o m m o n ly c x p c r ic n c c d ad verse cffcct. B ccau sc oral ad m in istra­ tion o f d ru g s is so w id e sp re a d , m a n a g e m e n t o f the g u t ’s re sp o n se to d ru g s has b e c o m e a cru cial p a rt o f p h arm ace u tical re se arc h . F o r e x a m p le , th ere are n u m e ro u s tec h n o lo g ie s available for co n tro llin g w h ere in the G I tra c t d ru g s are re le ase d . T ab lets can b e specially c oated so that they d o n ’ t d issolve in the sto m ach b u t w ill dissolve in the in te stin e ; o r p ills can b e m an u factu re d to float on the g a stric ju ic e s, thus e x ten d in g th eir tim e in the sto m ach (Jan tzen and R o b in so n , 2 0 0 1 ). In m o st case s, the gu t itse lf is n o t the targ e t o f th e ra p e u tic actio n ; the d r u g is b e in g released in to the b ody so m e distan ce from its in ten d ed site o f action (K a tzu n g , 2 0 0 1 ). T h e pathw ays from the gu t to that ta rg e t site arc often c irc u ito u s, and it is these pathw ays that have arre ste d my critical in terest. A d ru g like an an tid e p re ssan t that is in ten ded for the cen tral n e rv o u s system (C N S ) m u st first pass from the gu t lu m en into the b lo o d stre am . O n c e it has p assed though the g u t m u c o sa , the d ru g is tra n sp o rte d via the p o rta l vein to the liver w h ere e n zy m e s rem o ve a certain am o u n t o f the d ru g (this is called first-p ass cle ara n c e ). F rom the liver, the re m ain in g p e rce n tag e o f the d ru g m oves into ge n e ral (sy ste m ic ) circu lation in the b o d y , w h ere it is d istrib u te d in to the fluid in side and b e tw e en the ce lls o f the b o d y ’ s tissu e s and o rgan s. T h e brain is targ e te d rap id ly , as arc the liver, kidn eys and o th e r o rgan s that arc w ell su p p lied w ith b lo o d . E ven tually (this can take an yw here from several m in u te s to several h o u rs) m u scle tissu e , the rem ain in g v iscc ra, the skin and the b o d v ’ s fat w ill also b e infused w ith the d ru g (W ilk in so n , 2 0 0 1 ) .’ T h e first thing to n o te, th en , is that the ph y siolog ical itin erary o f an an tid cp rc ssan t takes in every organ o f the b o d y . M ight w e n o t w o n d e r ab ou t an tid cp rc ssan t cffccts o f d ru g action at th ese o th e r sites? T h e p a ssa g e o f a d ru g from sy ste m ic circulation in to the brain is also quite in tricate. T h e brain is p ro te cted by a b a rrie r that p re v e n ts the tran sit o f large m o le c u le s and p o ten tially to x ic so lu tes from the b lo o d into the brain itse lf (B e g ley , 2 0 0 3 ). S e ro to n in , for e x a m p le , can n o t p ass the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r (it is to o larg e ). Even though th ere are sign ifican t re se rv o ir s o f se ro to n in in the re st o f the b o d y ,5 the brain m u st syn th esize its ow n se ro to n in from oth er, sm alle r m o le c u le s that arc able to c ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b arrie r. To p u t this in qu o tid ian fo rm : it isn ’ t p o ssib le to in crease sero to n in levels in the brain sim ply by in gestin g m o re se ro to n in . O n e o f the w ays in w hich the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r fu n ction s is sim p ly o b str u c tiv e — the cells that m ake up the wralls o f the b ra in ’ s c ap illarie s are so tightly p ack ed to g e th e r that d ru g s are n ot able to p ass betwreen th ese cells in to brain tissu e , as they w o u ld in oth e r p a rts o f the b od y (B e g ley , 2 0 0 3 ). P reven ted from p assin g between ce lls, d ru g s m u st pass through the cc lls, and to do this they req u ire so m e assistan ce from a

2 4 2

E L I Z A B E T H A.

W I LSO N

ch em ical tra n sp o rt sy ste m . O n e o f the m o st w id ely used m e th o d s fo r g e ttin g d ru g s ac ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r is to m ake them lip id -so lu b le — the m o re lipoph ilic a d ru g is, the m o re readily it w ill c ro ss the b lo o d -b rain b a rrie r (W ilk in so n , 2 0 0 1 ). SSR Is are sm all m o le c u le s that are lip o p h ilic, and thcv readilv p ass ac ro ss the bloodbrain b a r rie r (B ro sc n and R asm u sse n , 1 9 9 6 ). O n c e inside the b rain , SSR Is (selectiv e sero to n in re u p ta k e in h ib itors) are th ough t to in crease the am o u n t o f se ro to n in that is available fo r n e u ro tra n sm issio n (bv inhibiting its rcu p ta k e in the sy n a p se ); and in turn this incrca.se in seroton in is th ou gh t to elevate m o o d . It has been con ven tion al (in both b io p sy ch iatric te x ts and the p olitical lite ra tu re s that ag itate again st th em ) to focu s on this p a rtic u la r destin ation o f an a n tid cp rc ssan t— as though the c crcb ral sy napse w ere an an ti­ d e p r e ssa n t’s natural o r m o st im p o rta n t co alface. M y in te re st has been d iv erted e lsew h e re — to the m any b io lo g ic al sites and p ro c e sse s im p licated in the in gestion o f an an tid e p re ssan t pill. It se e m s to m e that to o n arrow a fo cu s on the brain oc clu d e s o th e r im p o rta n t even ts in an tid cp rc ssan t m e ta b o lism , m akin g it difficult to think an ew ab o u t the n ature o f b o d y -m in d relation s.

Body an d brain T h e re are tw o issu es I w ou ld like to draw o u t o f th ese data that m ay h elp in form fem in ist th e o rie s o f b ody and m in d. F irst, d ru g s w ork w ith the w hole b o d y . W h ile an tid e p rc ssan ts may be in ten ded for the b rain , th eir th e ra p e u tic effects are gle an e d from a w id e variety o f re sp o n se s in o th e r organ s. G iven that SSR Is and S N R Is (se ro to n in -n o re p h in e p h rin e reu p take in h ib itors) are w idely d istrib u te d in the b od y by sy ste m ic circu lation and that they w o rk effectively on sy n ap ses in the C N S , it w ou ld seem likely that thev are also targ e tin g the sy n ap se s o f the n e rv e s in the pe rip h e ral n e rv o u s sy ste m , esp ecially the gu t. Any p h arm ac cu tic a l alleviation ol dy sth y m ic sy m p to m a to lo g y , th en , can n o t be attrib u te d solely to effects in c o rtic al and su b c o rtic a l stru c tu re s in the b rain , it m u st also in clu dc the so o th in g and an im atin g effects on the v iscera (W ilso n , 2 0 0 4 a , 2 0 0 4 b ). P h arm aco k in etic data su p p o rt m o d e ls o f the b o d v in w hich sim p le lin es o f cau se and cffcct (d ru g to brain to m o o d ) are rc fra c tc d ; and th ese data arc im m en sely valuable for fe m in ism , as it argu e s for m o re dy n am ic and e xpan sive acc o u n ts o f the b o d y . C lo se o b se rv a tio n o f th ese data finds n o t b io lo gical d e t e r ­ m in ism b u t b io lo g ical o v e rd e te rm in ism . Even though the v iscera are n ot m e n tio n e d as ta rg e t sites fo r SSR I action in p sy c h ia tric o r p h arm ac o lo g ic al t e x ts , the effective p h arm acc u tica l tre atm e n t o f d e p re ssio n re q u ire s e n g a g e m e n t w ith the organ ic p e rip h e ry as w ell as the brain . Perh aps b e cau se the g u t is the delivery sy stem for th ese d r u g s, it has been thought o f as sim ply a c o n d u it fo r d ru g action and not as a p a rtic ip a n t in the d r u g ’ s th e rap e u tic effects. C o n c e p tu al sch e m ata that p riv ile g e the cen tre over the p e r ­ iph ery , o r that draw radical distin ction s b e tw e en (active) ag en ts and (p assiv e) v essels have b een the targ e t o f o n go in g fem in ist in terv en tion (e .g ., K eller, 1 9 9 5 ). If the n e u ro lo g ical and p h arm ac o lo g ic al scic n c cs have b een p a rticu larly forcefu l sites for rein fo rcin g th ese p ro b lem atic c o n ce p tu al str u c tu r e s, it se e m s to be d e sp ite the data they are g e n e ra tin g , n ot b e cau se o f th em . In d eed , the n e u ro lo g ic al and

T H E

W 0 R K

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A N T I D E P R E S S A N T S

2 4 3

pharmacokinetic data on anti-depressants strongly indicate that the body as a whole is implicated in depressive states. The viscera aren’t mere transfer stations for agents that will have their effects elsewhere. Rather, the liver and the gut provide the bioaffectivc tone of depressions: if your depressions are agitated, or soporific, or angry, or anorectic that is due in no small part to the attitude of the visceral organs. It appears that the co-assembly of these traits with cognitive and ideational schemata (suicidality, hopelessness, guilt) is what generates a depressive condition serious enough to warrant intervention and treatment. The second issue I would like to consider in the pharmacokinctic data conccrns the brain and its intcrfacc with cxtra-ccrcbral systems. Just how isolated and auto­ cratic is the brain? Arc the biological bases of dysthymic states exclusively ccrcbral? Neurological and pharmacological descriptions of the blood-brain barrier often stress the sequestration of the brain: ‘a major function of the [blood-brain barrier] is that of neuroprotection. Over a lifetime the CNS will be exposed to a wide range of ncurotoxic metabolites and acquired xcnobiotics, which may cause cell damage and death’ (Begley, 2003: 84). Notions of the brain as an autonomous, self-contained organ are common enough in both the scientific and popular imaginary. However, the pharmacological work on the blood-brain barrier seems less interested in the defensive and segregating nature of the barrier, than in its function as a system of transportation and communication with the outside. As wc follow these data, wc find that the brain is always, necessarily implicated in relations with other organs and other extra-bodily systems; the blood-brain barrier is one particularly intensive site for such xenobiotic transmissions. For example, the brain doesn’t manufacture serotonin internally and inde­ pendently of the body. Rather, the synthesis of serotonin requires ongoing commcrcc bctw'ccn the brain and the gut and the cultural milieu. The basic building block of serotonin is tryptophan, an amino acid that is small enough to cross the blood-brain barrier. Tryptophan is an essential amino acid, which means it cannot be manufactured by the body— it must be supplied to the body as part of the diet. Chocolate, bananas, milk, meat and fish arc all high in tryptophan. The production of CNS serotonin is further complicated by the amount of carbohydrate that is ingested in the diet. If the diet is heavy in carbohydrates (bread, cakc, icecream), the body will producc insulin in order to control high blood sugar. The insulin will remove most of the other amino acids from the blood, reducing competition at the blood brain barrier, and allowing a disproportionate amount of tryptophan to pass from the blood to the brain (Wurtman et al., 2003). This means that levels of serotonin in the brain arc dependent on a number of cxtra-ccrcbral systems: for example, enzymes in the liver, conditions in the gut lumen, and the psychocultural milieu governing diet. No one of these systems entirely governs serotonin traffic. Rather, serotonergic activity is an overdetermined network of relations among organs, and among biological and cultural and psychological systems. Any regulation of the serotonergic system— including the ingestion of SSRIs to regulate mood— must grasp this network logic in order to be succcssful. A narrow focus on the brain as the sole biological source of psychological malady will obstruct the lines of conncction that tic organ to organ, and that underpin the biological possibility of recovery. To paraphrase Winnicoll (1964)— there is no such thing as a brain, there is always a brain and another system. My hypothesis is O

2 4 4

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W ILSO N

ih is: the b io lo gical d isin te gratio n o f m o o d is a b reak d ow n not o f the brain per se, or o f the liver o r the g u t— it is a b reak d ow n o f the relatio n s am o n g o rgan s. T h e p h arm aceu tical tre atm e n t o f d e p re ssio n has to be the m a n a g e m e n t— n ot of a place o r a cen tre o r even a n e u ro lo g ic al path w ay— but of an organ ic cap acity to co n n ect. W h en they w o rk , SSR Is re iterate the se ro to n e rg ic n e tw o rk s that trav erse the b ody and rean im ate the n atural affinities a m o n g organ s. E ffectively ad m in istere d , SSR Is can p ro m o te a p ro fo u n d , lo n g-lastin g, o rgan ic em path y.

B io lo gical p o litics O f c o u r se , fem in ists have argu ed that p sy c h o p h a rm a ce u ticals are often n o t e ffe c t­ ively ad m in istere d . T h e re is also e xten siv e d e b ate in the fem in ist and affiliated lite ra tu re s ab o u t w h eth er a n tid e p re ssan ts, in particu lar, w o rk in the m an n er p r o ­ m o te d by p h arm ac cu tic a l m a n u fa c tu re rs (e.g. H caly, 2 0 0 4 ). T h ese critics ten d to em p h asize the social m o tiv atio n s fo r k e e p in g w o m e n m c d ic a tc d ; they arc critical o f the p ractic e s o f p h arm ace u tical co m p a n ies and the d o c to rs w h o c o llu d e w ith th em , and they rem ain d u b io u s ab ou t the efficacy o f p h arm ace u tical tre atm e n ts fo r c o n ­ dition s they d iag n o se as essen tially cu ltu ral in o rig in (e.g . G r ig g e rs , 1 9 9 7 ; Z ita, 1 9 9 8 ). In this sh o rt c o m m e n tary , I have taken a d ifferen t ap p ro ach to the n e x u s o f fem in ism and p sy ch o p h a rm a cc u tic als— on e that is m o re directly en gaged w ith the b io lo gical su b strata o f p sy ch o lo gical d ise q u ilib riu m . This o rie n tatio n is go v e rn e d by my con viction that effective political e n g a g e m e n t w ith the c o n te m p o ra ry life scien ces re q u ire s o n go in g in tim acy w ith th eir d ata. Il is my e x p e c tatio n that c lo se , co n cep tu ally rig o ro u s atten tio n to b io lo gical d etail w ill p ro c u re m o re dynam ic m o d e ls o f d e p re ssio n than we have h ith erto su sp e c te d .

Notes 1

The new gen eration antideprcssants includc the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSR Is) P ro zac/flu o xetin e, Z o lo ft/se rtra lin e , P axil/p aro xetin e, C c lc x a /c ita lo p ra m , and L u vox/flu voxam in e. As w ell as the SSR Is there are new ‘atypical’ an tideprcssan ts that cam e onto the U S m arket around the sam e tim e: Serzo n e/n efazo d o n e, E ffexor/ven lafax in e and Wei Ibutr in /b u p ro p io n . These drugs are m o re h eterogen eous in their pharm acological action— they arc less specific to the seroton in system and act on other n eurotran sm ittcr system s, specifically nor-epincphrine (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). Thcv arc som etim es called third generation , heterocyclic o r seroton in -norepin ephrine reuptake inhibitors (SN R I) antidepressants. P ro zac/flu o xetin e is m anufactured in liquid and oral form . The other SSR Is and the other atypical antidepressants are only m anufactured in oral form (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). Som e o f the wellestablished tricyclic an tidepressan ts (e.g. E lavil/am itrip ty line and Tofranil/ im ipram ine) can be adm inistered by injection: ‘ Intram uscular adm inistration o f som e tricyclic antidepressants (notably am itriptyline and clom ipram ine [Anafranil]) can be p erfo rm ed under special circum stan ces, particularly with severely d ep ressed , an orexic patients w ho may refuse oral m edication o r E C T ’ (Baldessarini, 2 0 0 1 : 4 6 3 ).

T H E W 0 R K 0 F A N T I D E P R E S S A N T S

2

2 4 5

Each of the SSRI an tidcprcssan ts varies in term s o f how m uch o f the d ru g reaches system ic circulation. This is called a d r u g ’s bioavailability. T h e bioavailability o f P axil/p aro xetin e is around 50% , for exam ple, P rozac/flu oxetin e has a reasonably high bioavailability (7 0 % ) and L u vox/flu voxam in c is even higher (greater than 90 % ) (P otter and H ollister, 2 0 0 1 ). T h e differences in bioavailability arc further am plified bv the fact that the m etab olites o f the SSRIs (i.e. the substan ces p r o ­ duced by m etabolism o f the d ru g in the liver and elsew h ere) can also have antidepressan t effects. The m etabolite o f fluoxetine (n orfluoxctin e), for e xam ple, is four tim es m ore poten t as a serotonin rcuptakc inhibitor than is fluoxetine itself.

3

N inety-five percen t of the b o d y ’ s serotonin is stored outside the C N S— in the blood and in the extensive n etw ork o f n erves that encases the gu t (W ilson, 2 0 0 4 b ). In fact, serotonin w as first discovered in the b lood , w here it w as u n d er­ stood to be a vaso co n stricto r (thus the nam e sero-ton in: a scrum agent affecting vascular ton e). It w as som e years b efore it w as located in the brain and acccptcd as a neurotran sm itting substance, in both the ccntral and peripheral system s (G crsh on , 1998).

R eferences Baldessarini, R. (2 0 0 1 ). D rugs and the treatm ent o f psychiatric disorders: D epression and anxiety d isord ers. In H ardm an, J. & L im bird, L. (E d s), Goodman and Gilman’s The pharmacological basis o f therapeutics, 10th edn, 4 4 7 4 8 3 . N ew York: M cG raw -H ill. Begley, D. (2 0 0 3 ). U n derstan ding and circum venting the blood-brain barrier. Acta Paediatrica Supplement, 4 4 3 , 83—91. G ersh on , M .D . (1 9 9 8 ). The second brain. N ew York: H arper-Perennial. G rig ge rs, C. (1 9 9 7 ). Becoming woman. M inneapolis: U niversity o f M innesota Press. Jantzen, G. & R obinson, J. (2 0 0 1 ). Sustained- and con trolled-release drug-delivery system s. In G. Banker, & C. R h odes (E ds) Modern pharmaceuticals, 4th edn, 5 0 1 - 5 2 8 . N ew York: M arcel Dekker. K at/un g, B. (2 0 0 1 ). Basic and clinical pharmacology', 8th edn. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill. Keller, E.F. (1 9 9 5 ). Refiguring life: Metaphors o f twentieth-century biology. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press. Potter, W. & H ollister, L. (2 0 0 1 ). A n tidepressan t agents. In B. Katzung, (E d .), Basic and clinical pharmacology, 8 edn, 4 9 8 —51 1. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill. W ilkinson, G. (2 0 0 1 ). Pharm acokinetics: T h e dynam ics o f d ru g ab sorption , d istri­ bution, and elim ination. In H ardm an, J. & L. Lim bird (E ds) Goodman and Gilman's The pharmacological basis o f therapeutics, 10th edn , 3—29. N ew York: M cG raw -H ill. W ilson, E .A . (2 0 0 4 a ). G ut fem in ism , differences: A Journal o f Feminist Cultural Studies, 1 5 (3), 6 6 - 9 4 . W ilson, E .A . (2 0 0 4 b ). Psychosomatic: Feminism and the neurological body. D urh am , N C : D uke UP. W innicott, D.W. (1 9 6 4 ). The child, the family and the outside world. H arm ondsw orth : Penguin. W urtm an, R . W urtm an , J. R egan, M . M cD e rm o tt, J. T say, R. & Breu, J. (2 0 0 3 ). Effects o f norm al m eals rich in carbohydrates or protein s on plasm a tryptophan and tyrosine ratios. American Journal o f Clinical Nutrition, 77, 128—1 32. Z ita, J. (1 9 9 8 ). Body talk: Philosophical reflection on sex and gender. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press.

Chapter

29

Nikolas Rose DISORDERS WITHOUT BORDERS? The e xp an ding scope o f p s y c h ia tric p ra c tic e

An expan ding problem

I

N

2001

THE

WORLD

HEALTH

O RGANIZATION

(W H O )

published Mental health: New understanding, new hope, to draw attention to

the public health issues raised bv rates o f m ental d iso rd ers across the w orld. It estim ated that m o re than 25 per ccnt o f peop le are affected by m ental d iso rd ers at so m e point in their lives. It claim ed that d epression affects over 340 m illion peop le w orldw ide. It pred icted :

By the year 2 0 2 0 , if curren t tren ds fo r d em ograph ic and cpidcm iological transition continue, the burden o f d epression w ill increase to 5 .7 % o f the total burden o f disease, b eco m in g the sccon d leading causc o f DAI.Ys [disability adjusted life years] lost. W orldw ide it w ill be second only to isch em ic h eart disease for DAI.Ys lost for both sexes. In the developed reg io n s, d epression will then be the highest ranking cause o f b urden o f disease. (W H O , 2 0 0 1 : 30)

O th er re p o rts paint a sim ilar picture. In the U S, in Ju n e 2 0 0 5 , K essler and his colleag u es, on the basis o f a h ousehold survey o f over 9 ,0 0 0 p eo p le, using a diag­ nostic interview , re p o rte d that, in any one year, 26 .2 per ccnt o f adult A m ericans re p o rte d having sy m p to m s that w ould qualify them for a DSM-IV diagnosis o f m ental disord er, with the anxiety d iso rd ers leading at 18. 1 per cen t, follow ed by m ood d iso rd ers, notably d ep ressio n , at 9 .5 per cent and im pulse con trol d isord ers

DISORDERS

WITHOUT

BORDERS?

2 4 7

at 8 .9 per cen t— a total o f over 57 m illion A m erican s diagnosable w ith m ental diso rd er in any one year (K e ssler et a l., 2 0 0 5 ). . . . And they con cluded that ‘A bout h alf o f A m erican s w ill m eet the criteria fo r a DSM-IV d iso rd er som etim e in their life, w ith first on set usuallv in childhood o r ad o le sc e n c e ’ (K e ssler et al., 2 0 0 5 a). The b e lie f that around half of the population w ill m eet the criteria for a m ental d iso rd er at so m e tim e in their life w as originally p ro p o se d by K essler and his colleagues a decade ago (B lazer et al., 1994; K essler et a l., 1994; W ittchen et al., 1994). It is n ot a peculiarly A m erican p crccp tio n . In 2 0 0 5 , a Task Force of the E uropean C ollege o f N cu ro p svch op h arm acologv on ‘The Size and Burden o f M ental D iso rd e rs in E u ro p e ’ re p o rte d the results o f a series o f stud ies that aim ed ‘ to rcach a con sensus on w hat w e know ab out the size, burden and cost o f “d is­ o rd e rs o f the brain" in each European coun try and— ultim ately— in E urope as a w h o le ’ for a total o f 20 m ental and n eurological d iso rd ers (W ittchen et a l., 2 0 0 5 : 3 5 5 ). The results w ere truly alarm ing. . . . Som e 27 per ccn t o r 8 2 .7 m illion o f the adult E uropean U nion (E U ) p o p u la­ tion (1 8 - 6 5 years o f age): . . . is o r has been affected by at least one m ental d iso rd er in the past 12 m onths. Taking into accoun t the con siderable degree o f com orbidity (about one third had m ore than one d iso rd er), the m ost frequen t d is­ o rd e rs arc anxiety d iso rd ers, d epressive, som atoform and substance depen dency d iso rd ers. . . . Only 26% o f cases had any con sultation with profession al health care se rv ice s, a finding suggestin g a considerable degree o f u nm et need. (W ittch en and Jaco b i, 2 0 0 5 : 357) And the editorial o f this special issue su m m ed up the situation thus: Even though only a restricted range of all existin g m ental and n e u ro ­ logical d iso rd ers from the ICD 10 o r the DSM-IV w as con sid ered , there is d e a r cvidcn cc that m o re than onc-third o f the adult EU population is or has been affcctcd by at least one d iso rd er in the past year, or 50% o f the F.U population . . . if lifetim e risk is con sidered. . . . [M ]cntai d is­ o rd e rs are associated with im m en se co sts o f over 290 billion E u ros, the m ajority o f w hich w ere not healthcare costs. (W ittch en et al., 2 0 0 5 : 355—356) The m essage is self-eviden t— w c need m ore rcscarch , earlier d iagn oses, b etter treatm en t, and education and training o f policy m akers and the public about this public health prob lem . This re p o rt w as one basis for the E uropean C om m ission (E C ) G reen Paper, Improving the mental health o f the population: Towards a strategy on mental health fo r the European Union, w hich estim ated that ‘m ental ill health co sts the EU an estim ated 3% —4% o f GDP, mainly through lost p rod u ctiv ity ’ (E C H ealth and C o n su m e r P rotection D ircc to ratc-G cn cral, 2 0 0 5 : 4 ) and p ro p o sed a strategy lo p rom ote the m ental health o f all (2 0 0 5 : 8). It w ould be difficult to disagree. But how has this p ercep tion arisen at the start o f the tw en ty-first century? A perception o f a E u rop e, indeed a w orld, so ravaged by m ental ill health that a diagnosable

2 4 8

NIKOLAS

ROSE

m ental d iso rd er afflicts every third person each year, o f w hom probably tw o-thirds rem ain undiagnosed and untreated. Is it, perh aps, som eth in g to do with those ‘ risk fa c to rs’ identified by the W H O and rep eated in that G reen Paper— access to drugs and alcoh ol; displacem en t; isolation and alienation; lack o f education , tran sp o rt, housing; neighbourhood disorgan ization ; p e e r rejectio n ; p o o r social circu m stan ccs; p o o r n utrition ; pov erty ; racial injustice and discrim in ation; social disadvantage; urbanization; violen ce and delin quen cy; w ar; w ork stre ss; un em ploym en t (W H O , 2 0 0 4 b : 2 1 ). A doleful and fam iliar list, it is tru e. But can these travails have rcallv b eco m c m ore in ten se, in this, the m o st wealthy and healthy o f all p arts o f this plan et in the m o st wealthy and healthy cen tury o f human c xistcn cc. If not that, then w hat? Has the population o f E u rop e, indeed the w orld, alw ays been so b e se t by undiagnosed m ental illness? O r, as 1 w ill su ggest, do these figures arise from so m e ­ thing else? [. . .]

Accounting for expansion H ow should w e m ake sense o f such data? Can it really be that h alf o f us, over our lifetim es, w ill suffer from a m en tal disord er? O f c o u rse , w e w ou ld n ’t be su rp rised if h alf o f us, in o u r lifetim es, suffered from a physical d iso rd er— indeed we w ould be su rp rised if this w as n ot so. And w e w ould w ant to m ake health serv ices available to all and be scandalized if only a q u arter o f those con ditions w ere treated . Yet vvc arc trou b led by such a p crccp tion o f prcvalcncc o f m ental d iso rd ers. Why? Is this a residue o f an earlier age o f stigm a? A throw back to an earlier age o f anti-psychiatry? A suspicion o f the very idea o f a m ental disord er? A b elief that this perception serv es som e interests but not others? A specific w orry about d ru g treatm en t? O r is it, perhaps, the sense that the verv idea o f n orm ality o r m ental health is at stake. In w hat follow s, I w ould like to e xp lo re five interlinked h ypoth eses that might account for the p ercep tion s o f the rates o l m ental d iso rd er that I have sketched. •

first, that, in reality, there is m ore m ental d iso rd er today than in previous

•

second, that w e arc m o re awrarc o f m en tal d iso rd er and b etter at recogn izing it;

•

third, that this arises from w'hat the so cio lo gists term ‘m oral e n tre p re n e u r­

tim es;

sh ip’ on the p art o f psychiatrists as passionate advocates for a cause they believe in: a n eglected source o f m isery only they can identify and con quer; •

fourth , to d ay ’s favourite cu lprit, ‘ Big P h arm a’— that it is the pharm accutical com pan ies, in a cynical scarch for m arket share, profit and shareh older value, w ho, in a m ultitude o f w ays, arc d isto rtin g o u r pcrccp tion and treatm en t o f m ental disord er;

•

fifth , that this arises from a reshaping o f ou r disconten ts in a psychiatric fo rm — perhaps even a psychiatrization o f the hum an condition itself.

H ypoth esis 1: There is ju s t m ore o f it ab o u t The percep tion that m ental d iso rd er is on an alarm in g upw ard trend because o f the condition s o f m od ern life has been a recu rren t them e since al least the birth o f

D I S O R D E R S

WI T H O U T

B O R D E R S ?

2 4 9

psy ch iatry in the n in eteenth ce n tu ry . A ubrey L e w is h im se lf p o in ts this ou t in his classic p a p e r on Social P sy ch iatry, w hich he d eliv e re d in 19 5 7 : It has lo n g b een c u sto m ary to asse rt that m en tal d iso rd e r is on the in cre ase , b e ca u se o f the m o re and m o re c o m p le x strain s w hich society im p o se s on its m e m b e rs. A h u n dred and th irty y ears ago the psy ch iatrist E sq u iro l read a p a p e r in P aris on the q u e stio n : ‘A rc th ere m o re m ad m e n today than th ere w ere fo rty y e ars a g o ? ’ T h e re w as then w id esp read alarm at ‘ the [fjrigh tful in crease o f in san ity ’ , w hich p e o p le said m en aced Fran ce w ith calam ity . In his ad m irab le review E sq u iro l show ed that the alleg ed in crease wras sp u rio u s; m o re p e o p le had c o m e in to h o sp ita ls, b ut . . . the rep u tatio n o f the asy lu m s had ch an ged from that o f cru e l p riso n s to h um anely co n d u c ted h osp itals. M any q u ie t patien ts w ho w ou ld n ot fo rm e rly have b een sen t to th ese in stitu tion s w'cre now ad m itted and c am c w illin gly. H cn cc the ap p aren t in crease. (in L e w is, 1 9 6 7 a: 2 6 3 ) M o st social scie n tists are sim ilarly u n con vin ced that the rise in psy ch iatric d iag n o se s re fle cts a ‘ frigh tful in c re a se ’ in m en tal d iso rd er. There is g o o d eviden ce that p o v e rty , p o o r h ou sin g, stre ssfu l w ork in g e x p e rie n c e s and the like are a sso c i­ ated w ith in creased rates o f p sy ch iatric m o rb id ity . But I d o n ’ t think we can e x t r a ­ polate h isto ric al tren d s fro m th is, o r ag re e that c o n te m p o ra ry so cial co n d itio n s arc m o re path o gen ic than th ose o f e a rlie r tim e s. To be b lun t, the q u e stio n ‘ Is there m o re m en tal d iso rd e r today than b e fo r e ? ’ is im p o ssib le to an sw er b c ca u sc o u r ow n n o tio n s o f n o rm ality and m en tal d iso rd e r arc in escapab ly h istorically and cultu rally specific.

H y p o th esis 2: We a r e ju s t b e tte r a t re co g n izin g it Do

m en tal d iso rd e r s sim ply

aw ait th eir re co g n itio n

by ad eq u ate

d iag n o stic

sch e m e s? I d o n ’ t think so. O u r p e rce p tio n o f ‘ m en tal d is o r d e r ’ today b e ars little relation to that in oth er tim e s and p laces. From the m id -n in eteen th to the m idtw en tieth c c n tu ry , the w'alls o f the asylum m ark ed a d istin ction b etw een tw o e m p ire s, that o f m a d n ess and that o f n e rv o u s d is o rd e r s, the p r o p e rty o f differen t ex p la n ato ry

sy ste m s,

differen t in stitu tio n s,

d ifferen t

cu ltu ral

u n d e rstan d in g s,

differen t au th o ritie s. T h is distin ction w eaken ed in the m id tw en tieth ce n tu ry , w ith the u n lo ck in g o f w a rd s, day h o sp ita ls, o u t-p atie n t pro v isio n and so fo rth . F rom the 1 9 8 0 s, co m m u n ity p sy ch iatry m u ltip lied the sites fo r the p rac tic c o f p sy ch iatry — in psy ch iatric w'ards in ge n e ra l h o sp ita ls, sp ecial h o sp ita ls, m e d iu m sc c u rc u n its, day h o sp ita ls, o u t-p atie n t clin ics, child gu id an ce clin ics, p riso n s, c h ild re n ’s h o m e s, sh eltered h ou sin g, drop-in c e n tre s, co m m u n ity m en tal health c e n tre s, dom iciliary care by co m m u n ity psy ch iatric n u rse s, sc h o o ls an d, o f c o u r se , in the ge n e ral p r a c ti­ t io n e r ’ s su rg e ry . T h is b lu rred the d istin ction betw-een psy ch iatric p ro fessio n als w7ho tre ate d the m entally ill and th ose w ho tre ate d w hat on ce w ere te rm e d ‘n e u ro s e s ’— the co m p la in ts o f th ose w ho w ere unable lo function ac c o rd in g lo the n o rm s and e x p e c ta tio n s o f the v ariou s d e p a rtm e n ts o f life. In sh o rt, m o re and m o re p eo p le and p ro b lem s w ere o p e n e d up to the d iag n o stic gaze and th e rap e u tic in terv en tio n s o f psy ch iatry (R o se , 1 9 8 6 ).

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T his changing territo ry o f psychiatry has been em b odied in diagnostic m anuals and classifications across the secon d half o f the tw entieth cen tury. Many o f a psychoanalytic p ersu asion in the U S, and many social psychiatrists in the U K , argued that that there w as no clear distinction betw een n orm ality and m ental illness, that, as Karl M cn nin ger put it, ‘ m ost peop le have som e d egree o f m ental illness at som e tim e, and many ol them have a d egree of m ental illness m o st of the tim e ’ (M enn in ger et al.,

1965: 33). T his expan sion o f the psychiatric gaze,

em bodied in the first and sccond Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals published in 1952 and 1968, w as one clem en t in criticism s that psychiatry w as sim ply m edicalizing dififcrcncc and w as an apparatus o f social con trol. Som e su gg est that the publication o f DSM-I11 in 1980 w as a respo n se to that criticism (W ilson , 199 3 ). It stressed that that diagn osis m u st be based on a pattern o f sy m pto m s that w as not m erely an expectab le respo n se to an event, but a m anifestation o f a dysfunction in the perso n : ‘ N eith er deviant behavior . . . n or conflicts that are prim arily betw een the in di­ vidual and socicty arc m ental d iso rd ers unless . . . a sym ptom o f a dysfunction in the p e r so n ’ (A m erican Psychiatric A ssociation, 198 0 ). In a m om en t I w ill question the success o f that attem p t to avoid psychiatrizing p rob lem s o f living. But DSM -lll d o es not re strict the scope o f m ental disorder. Its claim s to provide neutral em pirical description s o f sym ptom p attern s did quite the reverse. It im plied that psychiatrists could diagn ose as m ental d iso rd e rs, things ranging from troub lesom e con duct in children to m e n ’ s p rob lem s in gettin g an crcction . The diagnostic m anuals o f o u r own age are an alogous to those that arose from the nineteenthcentury asylum s— they su ggest som e fundam ental conn ection s betw een all those under the gaze of the psychiatrist in our ow n A ge o f Freed om . Th ese changcs w ere accom pan ied by an oth er— a con tested and partial unifica­ tion o f treatm en t in the form of psychiatric d rugs. This is not the placc to tell that history, o r the w ays in which d ru gs b ecam e p art o f the treatm en t for alm ost all con dition s w ithin the expan ded psychiatric sy stem . N o t is it the place to discuss the im plication s of the new brain scien ces and the suggestion that variations in the n eu rotran sm ittcr system underpin not only frank m ental d iso rd ers but also vari­ ations in p erso n ality , as well as transien t fluctuations in m ood o r conduct. H ere I w ant to note ju st one con scqucn cc. Wc now have a gro u p o f loosely related drugs that claim to treat not ju st m ajo r psychotic break dow n s, but the m inor trou b les that im pair p e o p le ’s capacity to think, feel o r act in the ways in w hich they or others w ould w ant them to. T his m akes it possib le to believe that all these con ditions have a ‘fam ily re se m b lan ce ’— that con dition s from autistic d iso rd er to zoophilia are varieties o f the sam e so rt o f thing.

H ypoth esis 3: P sy ch ia trists a s ‘m o ral en trep re n e u rs’ U n doubtedly proclam ation s by public health b odies about the p erso n al and social harm from untreated m en tal d iso rd ers stem from genuine con cern s. Frank A y d’ s 1961 b o o k Recognizing the depressed patient has often been cited as contribu ting both lo the increase in diagn oses o f depression and to its fram ing as a condition treatable w ith dru gs. Ayd had carried out the clinical trials for am itryptiline as an antidepressan t for M erck w ho held the patent, and M erck d istrib uted his book w idely. As Emily M arlin (2 0 0 5 ) has pointed o u t, draw ing on his in terview w ith David

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H ealy, Ayd w as a passion ate believer in the need for psychiatric d ru gs to alleviate m ental illness: in 1957, he ‘spoke o f the em erg in g psych oph arm acology as a “ blessing fo r m ankind” ’— and his w ife so m e tim e s com pared him to John the Baptist prcach ing the com in g thing (H ealy, 1996: 8 5 ). In those days, ph arm accutical com pan ies w ere view ed as ethical allies w ith public health profession als in the defeat o f disease: on the evidence o f the recen t success o f new dru gs for physical con dition s, their p ro sp e c ts to im prove the hum an con dition , in alliance with p sy ch iatrists, seem ed en orm o u s. The so cio lo gist H ow ard B cck cr coincd a term for such cam paign s— ‘m oral en trep ren eu rsh ip ’ (B cckcr, 1963). This is not m eant to disparage them , but m erely to describ e their evangelical quality and the many ch aracteristics shared by such cam paigns for righting w ron gs. Today, after years in the d o ld ru m s, b iological psychiatrists and psy ch o ph arm acologists are e xcite d , perhaps with go od reason , about their capacity to treat and perh aps even to cure. T his excitem en t go es hand in hand w ith endeavours to convincc us o f the seriousn ess o f the prob lem to which these treatm en ts are a solution. But we need to in terrogate this w ay o f form u latin g the prob lem and its solution. I have su ggested that these alarm in g figures arise, in part at least, from the m eth ods o f inquiry th em selves— ep id em iological surveys using diagn ostic in te r­ view s. W H O asse rts that psychiatric d iagn oses, today, arc not just reliable but also valid. The debate over diagnosis in psychiatry has run for cen tu ries, and so have argum en ts over its desirability, reliability and validity. C ritics su ggest that many d iagn oses, especially those ‘on the b o rd e r s’ , are ju dgem en ts o f social deviance or prob lem s o f living that have no place in psychiatry, o r that they m isrecogn ize intelligible resp o n ses to social situations as sy m p to m s o f individual p sy ch o ­ pathology (D o u b le , 2 0 0 2 ; W akefield, 1992). DSMs from the 1980s claim ed to answ er this criticism . But their criteria fo r person ality d iso rd er and many other diso rd ers explicitly require an assessm en t of the con d u ct, m o o d or thoughts in question against a n orm o f social functioning, or a norm o f ap p ro p riate re sp o n ses to a p articu lar situation such as sexual attraction o r bereavem en t. T h ese diagnostic m anuals thus capturc behaviour that, as Je ro m e W akefield puts it, ‘need not originate in dysfu n ction s’ and som e that is ‘ clearly the resu lt o f conflict with others or w ith so c ic ty ’ (1 9 9 7 : 6 3 5 ). DSM-IV stipulates that diagn oses should not be m ade w here p attern s o f behaviour are re sp o n ses to extern al con dition s, rather than reflecting a dysfunction within the individual. W akefield h im self, in his research on con duct disorder, su ggests that clinicians can m ake that distinction . But he also poin ts out that while DSM-IV says this, the item s in its diagn ostic ch cck list, for con duct d iso rd er and many other d iso rd ers, con ccrn only the behaviour o f the individual (W akefield et al., 2 0 0 2 ). IIovv, then, can those using such checklists avoid ‘ false p o sitiv es’ ? DSM-IV tries to deal w ith this by adding a ‘ clinical significance c rite rio n ’ , o f the form ‘The sy m p to m s cause clinically significant distress o r im pairm en t in social, occupation al, or other im portan t areas o f fun ction in g’ (Sp itzcr and W akefield, 1999: 1857). But the cpid cm iolog ical surveys that gen erate such high prevalence rates are not con du ctcd by clinicians in clinical settings. Even in clinical settings, evidence show s that initial m edical diagn oses depen d a great deal upon the b ac k ­ grou n d expectation s and beliefs o f the doctor, and are shaped by such issues as the

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gender, age, race, social b ack groun d and d em ean o u r o f the patient. T h e sam e is true in psychiatry, w here diagnoses may also be shaped by prio r in form ation available to the diagnostician as to the b ack groun d o f the proto -p atien t, their pathway to the clinic, their previous historv and so forth . Further, in sites outsid e the clinic there are often incentives to diagn ose, rather than not to diagnose. C on sider, for e x am p le , A D H D . [O lfson and colleagues] su gg est that the overall ob served increase m ight have arisen as a resu lt o f the recogn ition by the U S D ep artm e n t of E ducation , in 1991, that A D H D w as a disabilitv that con ferred eligibility for spccial education. T h is, com bined with awrarcn css cam paigns and the activities o f A D H D advocacy g ro u p s, in creased the w illingness o f school tcach crs and oth ers to identify the con dition , the use o f sch ool-b ascd clinics to diagn ose it and the take-up o f assessm en t in stru m ents to m ake the diagnosis (O lfson et al., 2 0 0 3 ). [. . .] Psychiatric diagn oses today take place in a clim ate w here ideas o f risk, p re ­ caution , prevention arc in the asccndant. Wc know' from other e xam p le s— for instance, screen in g p ro gram m e s for b reast can cer or prostate cancer— that the health con sequen ces o f screen ing are am bigu ous— w id esp read screen in g gen erates false positives, leading to many bein g brough t w ithin the scope o f treatm en t and started on the career o f patient w ho w ould never, in fact, su llcr from o r be troubled by that con dition . H istorian s o f m edicine identify many sim ilar exam ples o f 'diagn ostic c rc e p ’ , often clicitcd by the tech n ology itself— diagnostic to o ls elicit signs that are taken as evidence o f p ath ologies that w ould previously have been invisible, and these ‘ p ro to -d ise ase s’ are them selves taken lo require treatm en t (R o sen b erg, 2 0 0 3 ). N o w onder, then, that many are so con cern ed w ith the w id e ­ spread use o f diagn ostic tests that tran sform m alaise into psychiatric classifications requiring treatm en t. Such tests are now found in sell-help form on in tern et w eb ­ sites, in checklist form in sch oo ls and clinics, and in screening p ro gram m e s such as those p ro p o sed by G e o rg e W. B ush ’ s N ew Freedom C om m ission on M ental H ealth. And such screen in g and testin g is often p ro p o se d o r su p p o rte d by ph arm aceutical com pan ies (L cnzcr, 2 0 0 4 ).

H y po th esis 4: B ig P h a rm a This leads m e naturally to my fourth hypothesis— Big Pharm a is to blam e. The in du stry, it is claim ed, uses its w ealth, its lobbyists, its tam e psy ch iatrists, the cunning o f the m arketing p rofession to influence go vern m en ts, reg u lato rs, re search ers, m edical p ractition ers and patients. Its aim is sim ply to increase m arkets, n ot m erely by selling new curcs for old diseases, but con structin g new diseases to fit the prod u cts that claim to treat them . T h ere has, o f co u rsc, been m uch con troversy over the safety and efficacy o f the new- generation o f p sy ch o ­ ph arm aceuticals. C ritics also su ggest that the ph arm aceutical com panies p rom ote the illusion that their different dru gs are each targeted to a specific con dition , a claim that has m ore to do with m arketing prod u cts to fit d iscrete DSM-IV diagnoses than any actual evidence o f such specificity. This is not the place to evaluate these argum en ts: 1 w ant to m ake som e different points. P h arm aceutical com pan ies certainly seek to increase the use o f their products through influencing the prescrib in g practices o f d o c to rs, though m ost d o cto rs claim

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to resist this influence. They also act directly on potential patients as co n su m ers o f their products. In the U nited States, the use o f ‘direct to c o n su m e r’ advertisin g for p sych oph arm aceuticals has com e under particular scrutiny— especially ad v e rtise ­ m en ts relating to m ild to m oderate d ep ressio n , anxiety d iso rd ers, con dition s such as p rc-m en stru al dysph oric diso rd er and even b ipolar disord er. Such advertisin g seeks n ot just to m arket a d ru g, but to reshape the potential patien t’ s un derstan din g and presentation o f their condition to their d o cto r in the form o f a particular DSM diso rd er fo r w hich a specific d ru g has been licensed and m arketed. D iso rd e r and rem edy arc m utually aligned. T h ere is so m e evidence that that physicians today feel un der p ressure from patien ts to prescrib e particular dru gs. C ertain ly, in m cdicinc as in con sum ption m ore gen erally, w e arc seeing a phenom enon that is driven , in p art at least, by the reshaping o f d em and. Pharm aceutical com panies seek to increase dem and for their prod u cts in many w ays. They fund, and so m e tim e s se t up, cam paigning g ro u p s for particular conditions. They su p p o rt and som etim es initiate disease aw areness cam paigns for conditions w here they have the paten t for the treatm en t. T h ese cam paigns point to the m isery caused by the apparent sy m pto m s o f this un diagnosed o r un treated con dition, and in terp ret available data so as to m axim ize beliefs about prevalen ce, shaping m alaise into a specific clinical fo rm . Such cam paign s often involve the use o f public relation s firm s to place sto ries in the m edia, providing victim s— som etim es celeb rities— w ho w ill tell their sto rie s and supplying e x p e rts w ho w ill explain them in term s o f the new disorder. For exam ple R o ch e ’ s 1997 cam paign for its an tidepressan t A u roxix (m o clo b em id e) fo r the treatm en t o f social phobia in A ustralia involved the use o f the public relations com pany to place sto rie s in the p ress, an alliancc w ith a patients gro u p called the O b sessive C om p ulsive and A nxiety D iso rd e rs Federation o f V ictoria, funding a large con feren ce on social phobia and pro m o tin g m axim al estim ates of prevalen ce (M oynihan, H eath et a l., 2 0 0 2 ). T h ese arc not covert tactics— as a quick glance at the ‘ Practical G u id e s’ published on the w eb by the m agazine Pharmaceutical Marketing w ill show. Th ere is, th erefore, som e evidence for H ypothesis 4 — that Big Pharm a is responsib le. But I think this is only p art o f the pictu rc. This is not to say that there is not c o rru p t p racticc, to con don e the n on -disclosu rc or m anipulation o f the results o f clinical trials, o r to deny that som e d o c to rs, and som e public health officials, and all ph arm aceutical com pan ies, have a vested in terest in pro m o tin g the beliefs in the w id esp read prevalence o f d iso rd ers, the dam age w rought to individuals and society by their inadequate or partial treatm en t, and their ready and effective tre at­ ability by dru gs. But I think that we n eed, at the very least, to situate it in a w ider con text.

H y p o th e sis 5: T h e p s y c h ia tr ic r e s h a p in g o j d isc o n te n ts The shaping o f discon ten t today certainly has novel featu res, including the role o f the ph arm accutical industry and the m assive capitalization o f ill health. But at any tim e and place, hum an disconten ts arc inescapably shaped, m ou ld ed , given e x p ressio n , ju dged and respo n d ed to in term s o f ccrtain languages o f description and explan ation , articulated by e x p e rts and au th orities, leading to specific styles and fo rm s o f in terven tion . W hat, then, is specific to today?

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As Sim on W essely points ou t, exp erien cin g sy m p to m s is the ru le, not the exception : In one early survey 14% of a com m unity sam ple re p o rte d having no sy m p to m s at all. . . . An A m erican studv of healthy university students taking no m edication found that no levvcr than 81% had exp erien ced at least one som atic sym ptom durin g the previous three days. . . . O v er a six w eek p erio d 4 3 % o f n orm al A m erican w om en re p o rte d at least one som atic sym ptom . . . w hilst w om en in South London experien ced sy m p to m s on one day out o f three, chicfly hcadachc and fatigue. . . . A population based survey o f the N o rd ic cou n tries w ill re p o rt that up to 75% o f subjects experien ced at least one subjective health com plaint in the last 30 days— with m ore than 50% experien cin g tired n ess, and 33% m uscular pain. (1 9 9 7 ) He is review in g cvidcn cc on som atic sy m pto m s. But as he recogn izes, e x p e r i­ encing a sym ptom is n ot, as it w ere, a ‘raw fe e l’ . And perhaps at least a p art o f the poo l o f m alaise available to be reco d ed as physical illness is also available to be recod cd in psychiatric term s. Il m ight be reco d ed by those carryin g out public heath surveys with a gaze attuned to the sy m ptom atic. It can be recoded by protopatients them selves, once catego ries such as gen eralized anxiety d iso rd er or p r e ­ m enstrual dysph oric d iso rd er b eco m e available lo them . It can be reco d ed by m edical m arket research agen cies seekin g to chart and delineate poten tial m arkets lo r their p rod u cts. And it can be re co d cd by psychiatrists and gen eral p ractition ers. Such recod in g d epen ds on tw o things— a n orm against w hich cx p c ric n c c can be judged as ab n orm al, and a set o f b eliefs and w ords to enable it to be un d erstood and com m un icated. T h ese d iso rd ers on the b o rd e rs, I su ggest, are exp erien ced and coded as such, by individuals and their d o c to rs, in relation to a cultural n orm of the active, respo n sib le, ch oosin g self, realizing his or her potential in the w orld though shaping a lifestyle. And they arc given form by the availability o f catego ries such as depression , pan ic, social anxiety d iso rd er and A D H D . For o u r d iso rd ers on the b o rd e rs, we can think o f a term such as depression which exists in a zone o f transaction betw een e x p e rts and lay p e o p le — as a ‘p ro b le m /so lu tio n c o m p le x ’ : it sim ultan eously ju d ges m o o d against certain desired stan dards, fram es discon tents in a certain w ay, ren d ers them as a prob lem in need o f atten tion, establishes a classification fram ew ork to nam e and delineate them , scrip ts a pattern o f affccts, cogn itions, d esires and ju d ge m e n ts, w rites a narrative for its origin s and destiny, attribu tes it m eaning, identifies som e au th orities w ho can speak and act w isely in relation to it and p re scrib e s som e resp o n ses to it. These are pow erful con den sations, w ays o f m aking aspects o f existen ce intelligible and practicable. It is to o sim ple to see actual o r potential patien ts as passive b ein gs, acted upon by the m arketing devices o f Big Pharm a who invent m edical conditions and m anipu­ late individuals into identifying w ith them . The process is m ore sub tle. C om p an ies e xp lo re and chart the exp erien ced discon ten ts o f individuals, link these with the p ro m ises held out by their d ru g s, and in corpo rate those into narratives that give

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those dru gs m eaning and value. It is this intertw in in g o f pro d u cts, exp ectation s, ethics and fo rm s o f life, that 1 think is involved in the developm en t and spread o f psychiatric dru gs. In en gaging with these im ages and n arratives, in the h opes, an xieties and discon tents they shape and foster, individuals play their ow n part in the m cdicalization o f p rob lem s o f living. Today, health has b eco m e a ccn tral ethical p rin ciple, and it is not su rp risin g that discon ten ts so often find their expression in m edical or psychiatric term s. O v er the first 60 years or so o f the tw entieth cen tury, hum an beings cam e to understand them selves as inhabited by a deep in terior psychological space, to evaluate th e m ­ selves and to act upon them selves in term s o f this belief. But over the past h alf ccn tury, human beings have also co m c to see them selves as ‘b io lo g ic al’ crcatu rcs— to understan d o u rselv es, speak ab out ourselv es and act upon ourselv es as the kinds o f bein gs w hose ch aracteristics are shaped by our b iology. This developm en t— I call it som atic individuality— is reshaping the b o rd e rs o f norm ality and path ology, o f m ental illness and m ental health. Wc arc com in g to think o f o u rselv es as individuals w hose m o o d s, desires, con duct and perso n alities are shaped, in p a rt, by the p a r ­ ticular configuration o f o ur n eu roch em istry , and w hich can therefore be m od erated or m odu lated by acting upon that n eu roch em istrv , acting upon our brains through drugs. This new way o f thinking has n ot effaced o ld er religiou s o r psychological styles o f thought about o u r discon ten ts. U nlike in many other d iso rd ers, the claim that psychiatric d iso rd ers have a biological basis is hotly con tested . O n the one hand, many individuals refuse to think o f their con ditions in these term s. O n the other hand, there is m uch evidence to su gg est that many still see m ental d isord ers as different in kind from physical illn ess, exclu d ed and stigm atized. But n on eth eless, I think these changcs that I have tried to d ocu m en t, shaped by many different facto rs, do indicate that w c arc w itn essin g a ‘psych iatrization ’ of the hum an con dition. In shaping ou r cthical re g im es, our relations to ou rselv es, o u r ju d gem en ts o f the kinds o f p erso n s w e w ant to b e, and the lives w e w ant to lead, psychiatry, like the rest of m edicine is fully engaged in m aking us the kinds o f p eop le w ho w e have b ecom e.

Conclusion The b ord erlin es o f illness have long been su b ject to debate: arc hcadachc, insom nia, back pain and the like diseases, sy m p to m s o f diseases o r inescapable conditions o f life itself? W ho should d ecide— d o c to rs, m edical ad m in istrators, patients th em ­ selves? W h ere are the b oun daries betw een condition s for w hich an individual is to be accorded responsib ility, and those fo r w hich responsibility is to be located else­ w here— in the organ s, in fate, in heredity (R o se n b e rg , 2 0 0 3 )? And m edicine has always practised beyond disease— in childbirth, in fertility, g r ie f and m uch m ore. W hy d o es the exten sion o f m edicine trouble us for so m e prob lem s and n ot oth ers? W hy is it preferable to place som e asp ects o f life un der one d e scrip tio n — as a p rob lem o f living for ex am p le — rather than anoth er— as a condition that can be alleviated by drugs? I

have taken my distance from som e critics. But I do still think that, for these

d iso rd ers on the b o rd ers and their treatm en t w ith d ru gs, there arc grou n d s for

2 5 6

N I K O L A S

ROSE

c o n c e rn . T h ey arise from a p a rtic u la r way in w hich th ese differen t p ro c e sse s are in terlin ked in c u rre n t c o n d itio n s— the e x ten sio n o f d iag n o stic c a te g o r ie s, the p e rce p tio n o f the pub lic health p ro b lem s g e n e ra te d by u n treated m en tal d iso rd er, the d e m an d s lo r d ise ase re c o g n itio n , m o v e s to scre e n in g , fe a rs o f risk and h op es fo r p reven tion bv early in terv en tio n at a p rc sy m p to m a tic level, and the w id esp re ad use o f the sim p le p re sc rip tio n o f p h arm accu tical re m e d ie s. All th is, I thin k, se rv e s to lo w e r the thresh old at w hich in dividuals arc d e fin e d , and define th e m se lv e s, as suitable c ase s fo r tre atm e n t. It in cre ase s the n u m b e rs o f th ose w h o e n te r upon a ‘ m o ral c a r c e r ’ as a p e rso n su fferin g from a treatab le co n d itio n , and re d u ce s the age at w hich m any e n te r upon this carccr. T h e se arc pow erfu l m ech an ism s fo r rc c ru itin g in d ivid u als, tu rn in g them from n on -p aticn ts to p ro to -p a tic n ts, to actual patien ts. T h ey are p ow erfu l m ech an ism s for retain in g in dividuals w ithin this d o m ain . N o w alls are now' n eed ed to sustain a life tim e c a re e r u n d er the p sy ch iatrist. W h eth er o r n o t the d ru g s cau se m o re d am ag e than they c u re , w h eth er o r n ot this g e n e ra te s c a r c c r s fo r p sy ch iatric rc sc a rc h e rs, d e m a n d s for psy ch iatric p ro fe ssio n als, satisfaction for p u b lic health p ro fessio n als o r p ro fits for p h a rm a ­ c e u tical co m p a n ie s, w e have y et to c o u n t the c o sts o f this w ay o f organ izin g and re sp o n d in g to d isc o n te n ts in o u r ow n A ge o f F re e d o m . [. . .]

R eferences A m erican Psychiatric A ssociation (1 9 8 0 ). Diagnostic and statistical manual o f mental dis­ orders: DSA1 111. W ashington, D C : A m erican Psychiatric A ssociation. O ’ J Avd, F. (1 9 6 1 ). Recognizing the depressed patient, with essentials o f management and treatment. N ew York: G run e & Stratton. Becker, U .S . (1 9 6 3 ). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology o f deviance. New' York: Free Press o f G len coe; London: C ollier-M acm illan. Blazer, D .G ., Kessler, R .C ., M cG on agle, K .A ., & Sw artz, M .S . (1 9 9 4 ). The prevalence and distribution o f m ajo r depression in a national com m unity sam ple— The N ational C om o rb id ity Survey. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 1 5 1(7): 9 7 9 —986. D ou b le, D. (2 0 0 2 ). T h e lim its o f psychiatry. British Medical Journal, .324(7342): 9 0 0 -9 0 4 . E C (E uropean C om m ission ) Health and C on su m er Protection D irectorate-G en eral (2 0 0 5 ). Improving the mental health o f the population: Towards a strategy on mental health for the European Union (G reen Paper). B russels: European C om m ission . H calv, D. (1 9 9 6 ). The psychopharmacologists: Interviews hy David Healy. Lon don , Chapm an ' & Hall. Kessler, R .C ., Berglun d, P., D em ler, O ., Jin , R ., M erikangas, K .R ., & W alters, E .E . (2 0 0 5 ). L ifetim e prevalence and age-of-on set distribution s o f DSM-IV disord ers in the N ational C om o rb id ity Survey Replication. Archives o j General Psychiatry, 6 2 (6 ): 5 9 3 - 6 0 2 . K essler, R .C ., C hiu, W .T., D em ler, O ., & W alters, E .E . (2 0 0 5 ). Prevalence, severity, and com orbidity of 12-m onth D SM -IV disord ers in the N ational C om orb id ity Survey R eplication. Archives o f General Psychiatry 6 2 (6 ): 6 1 7 —627. K essler, R .C ., M cG on aglc, K .A ., Zhao, S ., N elson , C .B ., H ughes, M ., Eshlem an, S. et al. (1 9 9 4 ). L ifetim e and 12-m onth prevalence of DSM-lll-R psychiatric-disorders in the U n ited-States— R esults from the N ational C om orb id itySurvey. Archives o f General Psychiatry, 5 / ( 1 ) : 8—19.

D I S O R D E R S

WI T H O U T

B O R D E R S ?

2 5 7

Lcnzcr, J. (2 0 0 4 ). Bush plans to scrccn w hole U S population for m ental illness. British Medical Journal, 328(74-54): 1458. Lew is, A .J.S . (1 9 6 7 a ). Inquiries in psychiatry: Clinical and social investigations. London: R outledge & Kcgan Paul. M artin, E. (2 0 0 5 ). Pharmaceutical virtue. Bergen : Vital M atters. M enninger, K .A ., with M aym an, M ., & Pruvser, P. (1 9 6 5 ). The vital balance: The life process in mental health and illness. N ew York: Viking. M oynihan, R ., H eath, I., & H enry, J. (2 0 0 2 ). Selling sickness: The pharm aceutical industry and disease m ongering. British Medical Journal, 3 2 4 (7 3 4 2 ): 8 8 6 —891. O lfson , M ., G am eroff, M .J., M arcus, S .C ., & Jen sen , P.S. (2 0 0 3 ). N ational tren ds in the treatm ent o f A ttention D eficit H yperactivity D isorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1 6 0 (6 ): 1 0 7 1 -1 0 7 7 . R ose, N. (1 9 8 6 ). Psychiatry: The discipline o f m ental health. In P. M iller & N. R ose (E d s), The Power o f Psychiatry, 4 3 —84. C am bridge: Polity Press. R osen berg, C. (2 0 0 3 ). W hat is disease? In m em ory o f O w sci Tcm kin. Bulletin o f the History o j Medicine, 77: 4 9 1 —505. Spitzer, R .L ., & W akefield, J.C . (1 9 9 9 ). DSM-IV diagnostic criterion for clinical signifi­ cance: D o cs it help solve the false positives prob lem ? American Journal o f Psychiatry, 7 5 6 (1 2 ): 1 8 5 6 - 1 8 6 4 . W akefield, J.C . (1 9 9 2 ). The con cept o f m ental d isord er— O n the boundary betw een b iological facts and social values. American Psychologist, 4 7 (3 ): 373—388. W akefield, J.C . (1 9 9 7 ). D iagnosing DSM-IV. 1. DSM-IV and the con cept o f disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 3 5 (7 ): 6 3 3 —649. W akefield, J.C ., Pottick, K .C ., & K irk, S.A . (2 0 0 2 ). Should the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for conduct d isord er con sider social con text? American Journal o j Psychiatry, 1 5 9(1): 3 8 0 - 3 8 6 . W cssely, S. (1 9 9 7 ). P sych ological, social and m edia influences on the experien ce of som atic sym ptom s. ESF W orkshop on ‘ C ogn itive Functions as M ediators o f E nvironm ental Effects on H ealth ’ , 15—17 Septem ber. W H O (W orld Health O rgan ization) (2 0 0 1 ). Mental health: New understandinq, new hope. G eneva: W H O . W H O (W orld Health O rganization) (2 0 0 4 b ). Prevention o f mental disorders: Effective interventions and policy options, summary report. G eneva: W H O . W ilson, M . (1 9 9 3 ). DSM-11I and the tran sform ation of A m erican psychiatry: A history. American Journal o f Psychiatry, 1 5 0(1): 399—410. W ittchen, H .U ., & Jaco b i, F .(2 0 0 5 ). Size and burden o f m ental disord ers in E urope— a critical review and appraisal o f 27 studies. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 15(4): 3 5 7 - 3 7 6 . W ittchen, H .U ., Jo n sso n , B ., & O leso n , J. (2 0 0 5 ). Tow ards a b etter un derstanding o f the size and burden and cost o f brain d iso rd ers in E urope. European Neuropsychopharmacology, 15 (4 ): 355—356. W ittchen, H .U ., Knauper, B ., & Kessler, R .C . (1 9 9 4 ). Lifetim e risk o f depression. British Journal o f Psychiatry, 165: 16—22.

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PART T H R E E

Political economies of affect

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

7. Emotion in work and organizations

O

NE OF T H E A R E A S W H E R E

the sociological and socio-psychological

study of emotions has been most readily embraced and most keenly developed is

that of research on work and organizations. Contrary to the assumption, prevalent until recently, that emotional expression is incom patible with the instrumental goal orientation of work life — and thus 'deviant' when and where it occurs — it is now increasingly acknowledged that emotion 'is not sim ply an adjunct to work; rather, it is the process through which members constitute their w ork environment by negotiating a shared reality' (Putnam and Mumby, 1993: 36). A rlie Hochschild's seminal book The M anaged H eart (1983) is widely credited with laying the ground for subsequent research on emotions in organizations. In this much-cited work, Hochschild proposed that feelings themselves are the object of 'm anagem ent' in both private and com­ mercial contexts, and that the capacity for managing feeling through 'emotion w ork' could be com m ercially exploited as 'em otional labour' to produce surplus value. From this initial impetus, research on the role of emotion in the context of different insti­ tutional and corporate enviroments, and/or in relation to pa rticu la r occupations has flourished and diversified, not only them atically but also m ethodologically (Fineman 2005; Fisher and Ashkanasy 2000; Domagalski 1999). The study of emotion management as part of work roles is only one of a whole range of issues addressed by this research. Broadly speaking, research may vary through a focus on the structural determinants and behavioral consequences of transient moods (W eiss and Cropanzano 1996), as distinct from dispositional affect (or 'tra it affectivity') (Staw et al. 1996). Alternatively, the focus may be on the emotional repertoires of specific occu­ pational or corporate cultures, to suggest that p a rticu la r emotional orientations to the world, or 'affective subject positions', can be institutionally produced (see, e.g. Watson 1999 on the police). Research may also adopt a them atic focus on issues like conflict, in connection with negotiating organizational change, work/life balance,

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among other situations or variables (Jordan 2006). A significant amount of research has explored the gendered dimensions of emotion at work (see, e.g. Lewis and Simpson 2007; Hochschild and Ehrenreich 2002). The first extract in this section addresses the relatively neglected topic of emo­ tion work in connection with 'race'. Kiran M irchandani's argument draws on anti­ racist fem inist theory to propose not only a focus on 'ra cia l silences' in the literature on emotion work, but also a m ethodological critique of dominant approaches in the field. The argument is based on M irchandani's review of the abundant literature on emotion work in its gendered dimensions, and on her analysis of the experiences of an ethnically diverse group of women who are small-business owners (the latter not included in this extract from her a rticle). Contem porary debates on emotion work, she proposes, tend to rely on racially homogenous samples and on the im plicit methodological assumption that workers are, by default, white. They also tend to assume that interactions themselves are racially homogenous. This norm alization of whiteness, argues M irchandani, is sym ptom atic of a more fundamental problem. Norms of emotional display and management relative to race, class, and gender hierarchies are studied as a function of (static and fixed) identities, whereas they should be analysed as a function of specific locations that are 'relational and shifting'. The following extract, by Stephen Fineman, also offers a set of critica l method­ ological reflections, this time directed at the recent growth in quantitative techniques for the study of emotion at work. The extract outlines the reasons for the increasing appeal of psychometric techniques in this area of research, and some negative con­ sequences of 'boxing' emotion through m etrication. W hile numbers tend to convey an impression of dispassionate objectivity and order, the practice of measuring emotion in an organizational context, Fineman argues, is 'no neutral act'. The extract focuses on the discussion of the construct of 'em otional intelligence', as an illustration of how experts use measurements to ascribe positive and negative value to individuals on the basis of their emotional intelligence quotients (EQ). In the concluding section of the article, not included here, Fineman presents alternative ways of 'know ing' emotions that are at risk of being m arginalized by the field's 'moving hegem onically' in the direction of quantification. He points to narrative and discursive methods (otherwise well represented in social scientific research on the emotions — and elsewhere in this volume) as ways of addressing the com plexities and nuances of affective experience that quantification tends to reduce and exclude. Our third extract in this section illustrates a different use for quantitative investi­ gation in the study of emotion at work. Using survey techniques, Reeves and colleagues explore the psychological ram ifications of euthanasia-related work in the context of animal shelters. A p a rticu la r point of interest of this piece lies in addressing the relatively neglected dimension of emotion in situations of interaction across species, rather than exclusively among humans. The result of the study by Reeves and colleagues indicate that 'perceived euthanasia-related strain is prevalent among shelter employees' and is associated with a number of other dimensions of stress, conflict, and ill-being. The extract concludes with a wide range of indicative suggestions for future research. The fourth and final extract in this section is by Allen Smith and Sherry I

E M O T I O N

IN

W O R K

AND

O R G A N I Z A T I O N S

2 6 3

K lein m a n , and lo oks a t em otion m anagem ent in the co ntext o f the profession o f m edicine. The ph ysical in tim a cy involved in m edical w o rk can be associated w ith strong e m otion a l experiences, ranging from feelings o f sexual a rou sa l to disgust and revulsion. T his is countered by a p rofessio nal ideology of 'a ffe c tiv e n e u tra lity '. The a u th o rs begin by considering that, w h ile th is ideology is strong in m edicine, em otion m anagem ent is neither e x p lic itly ta u g h t nor co lle ctiv e ly ta lk e d a b ou t by students in tra in in g . Based on e th no gra ph ic fie ld w o rk in a m edical school, S m ith and K le in m a n then illu s tra te the resources students em ploy to m anage th e ir feelings. The 'a ffe ctiv e s o c ia liz a tio n ' of d o c to rs relies on m ostly im p lic it and in fo rm a l strategies th a t both illu s tra te and reproduce the cu ltu re of m odern W estern m edicine.

References Dom agalski, T. A. (1 999) 'E m otion s in organizations: main currents', Human Relations, 52 (6): 8 3 3 -8 5 2 . Fineman, S. (2 005) 'A pp reciatin g emotions at work: paradigm tensions', International Jo u rn a l o f W ork, O rganization and Em otion, 1 (1): 4 -1 9 . Fisher, C. D. and Ashkanasy, N .M . (2 0 00 ) 'The emerging role of emotions in work life: an introduction', Jo u rn a l o f O rganization al Behavior, 21 (2): 1 2 3 -1 2 9 . Hochschild A. R. (1 98 3 ) The M anaged Heart: co m m ercializatio n o f human feelings. Berkeley, CA.: University of C a lifo rn ia Press. Hochschild, A. R. and Ehrenreich, B. (eds) (20 0 2) G lo b al Woman: nannies, m aids and sex workers in the new economy. New York: M etropolitan Press. Jordan, P. J. (20 0 6) 'E d ito ria l: emotions and coping with co n flict', Jo u rn a l o f M an age­ ment and Organization, 12 (2): 9 8 -1 0 0 . Lewis, P. and Simpson, R. (eds) (20 0 7) Gendering Em otions in Organizations. New York: Palgrave M acm illan . Putnam , L .L ., Mumby, D.K. (19 9 3) 'O rganizations, emotion and the myth of rationality', in S. Fineman (ed.), Em otion In Organizations. London: Sage. Staw, B .M ., Bell, N .E., Clausen, J.A . (19 8 6) 'The dispositional approach to job attitudes: a lifetime longitudinal test', A d m in istra tive Science Quarterly, 31: 5 6 -7 7 . Watson, S. (1 99 9 ) 'P o licin g the affective society: beyond governmentality in the theory of social control', S o c ia l and L e g a l Studies, 8 (2): 2 2 7 -2 5 1 . W eiss H .M ., Cropanzano R. (19 9 6) 'A ffective events theory: a theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at w ork', Research in O rg anization al Behavior, 1 8 :1 -7 4 .

Chapter

30

Kiran Mirchandani CHALLENGING RACIAL SILENCES I N S T U D I E S OF E M O T I O N W O R K C o n trib u tio n s fro m a n t i-ra c is t fe m in is t th e o ry

[• ■ •]

H

O CH SCH ILD’S

STUDY

OF

THE

EMOTION

w ork o f flight

attendants m arks the beginning o f the developm en t o f a m ultifaceted litera­

ture on the em otion w ork w hich is required in many paid w ork jobs. As su m m a r­ ized in Tables 1 and 2, there have been three distinct types o f w ork that have been ch aracterized as ‘em otion w o rk ’ : the m anagem ent o f self-feeling, the w ork o f m aking oth ers feel a certain way, and the effort involved in giving definition to o n e ’ s w ork. T h ese three fo rm s o f em otion w ork are in tercon n ected . For exam p le, m aking© oth ers l e d a ccrtain wav mav be a way fo r a w ork er to define her or his J J J w ork. Sim ilarly, pro m o tin g ccrtain definitions o f o n e ’ s w ork may be a way o f m anagin g o n e ’s ow n feelings. H ochschild term s em otion w ork don e for a w age as ‘em otion lab o u r’ and defines this as ‘the act o f tryin g to changc in degree o r quality an em otion or feelin g’ (1 9 7 9 : 5 6 1 ). The em otion labour o f flight attendants thus involves ‘trying to feel the righ t feeling for the jo b ’ (H och schild 1983: 118). As Finem an n otes, ‘em otio n al “ lab ou r” is the buying o f an e m p lo y e e ’s em otional dem ean or; the individual is being paid to “ look nicc” , sm ile, be caring, be p o lite ’ (1 9 9 6 : 5 4 6 ). T h eo rists also provide evidence o f the fact that w ork ers may c x p cricn cc stress and inauthenticity w hen there is a disju ncture betw een the way in w hich they are ex p e cted to feel and the way in w hich they actually feel (A shforth and H um phrey 1993; Finem an 1995; E rickson and W h arton 1997; T h oits 1990). A ccordin g to H ochschild (1 9 8 3 ), many job s require w orkers to p rodu ce a p articu lar em otional state in another perso n . Bill co lle cto rs, for exam p le, do e m o ­ tion labour lo deflate c u sto m e rs’ status and evoke gratitu de o r fear in clicnts. Building on the w ork o f H och schild, D aniels (1 9 8 7 : 109) n otes that em otion w ork involves fou r in terrelated behaviours: ‘ (1) attending carefully to how a sellin g

C H A L L E N G I N G

R ACI A L

affects o th e rs in it . .

S I L E N C E S

IN

S T U D I E S

OF

EMOTION

WORK

2 6 5

(2 ) focu sin g atten tio n through ru m in atin g ab o u t the

p ast and plan ning fo r the fu tu re ; (3 ) asse ssin g the re aso n ab le n e ss o f p relim in ary ju d g e m e n ts . . .; (4 ) creatin g a c o m fo rta b le a m b ie n c e ’ . D a n ie ls’ definition su g g e sts that e m o tio n w o rk involves n ot only m o n ito rin g o n e ’s ow n re actio n s to situ atio n s, but also carin g fo r o th e rs and establish in g links b e tw e en p e o p le and even ts. Ja m e s (1 9 8 9 ) sim ilarly argu e s that e m o tio n al lab o u r is a social p ro c e ss w hich is involved in d ealin g w ith o th e r p e o p le ’ s feelin gs. E x a m p le s in clu d c b ein g available fo r o th e rs, in te rp re tin g th eir n e e d s and p ro v id in g a p e rso n a l re sp o n se . O th e r th e o rists have fo cu scd on the e m o tio n lab o u r involved in defining o n e ’ s w ork . N e lso n and B ariev ( 1 9 9 7 ), fo r e x a m p le , e x am in e the e m o tio n w o rk o f paid and v o lu n te e r e m e rg e n c y m cd ical sy ste m s p e rso n n e l. Paid w o rk e rs em ph asized the highly sk ille d , co m m o d ifiab le qu alities o f e m e rg e n c y m ed ical w'ork, w hile v o lu n te e rs stre sse d the h um an itarian and c arin g n ature o f the sam e w ork . Fine (1 9 9 6 ), in a sim ila r w ay, d e m o n strate s the stra te g ie s u sed by re stau ran t co o k s to defin e th eir w ork as w orth y o f re sp e c t and p ro fessio n alizatio n .

C arin g , p ro fe ssio n alism a n d actin g: g e n d e r d im e n sio n s o f em o tion w ork R c sca rc h c rs have d o c u m e n te d the n uan ccd w avs in w hich em o tio n w ork is stru cJ tu rcd by g e n d e r p ro c e sse s. T h e focu s o f this literatu re is on the g e n d e re d a ssu m p ­ tion s im p licit in ccrtain jo b s, and the m e ch an ism s through w hich w o m e n ’ s w ork is often dev alu ed . A s S te in b e rg and F ig a rt (1 9 9 9 : ! 7 ) n o te, se rv ic e organ izatio n s w hich re q u ire the con stan t display o f frie n d lin e ss often hire w o m en to fill th ese ro les on the assu m p tio n that w om en are b e tte r at display s o f w arm th . T h e o rists n ote that do in g e m o tio n w o rk is fu n dam en tally an act o f d o in g g e n d e r in the c o n te x t o f ‘ w o m e n ’ s alleged ly g r e a te r facility w'ith e m o tio n s — the fem in ine cap acity to co n so lc and c o m fo rt, Hatter, cajo le , p e rsu a d e and s e d u c e ’ (F rith and K itzin g cr 1 9 9 8 : 3 0 0 ). P ierce sim ilarly argu e s that paraleg al w o rk , w hich involves d e fe re n ce and caretak in g, is fe m in ize d ; this is ‘n ot sim ply b e ca u se w o m en do it but b e cau se takin g care o f oth e rs is c o n stru c te d as so m e th in g that w o m en are w ell c o n stru c te d to d o ’ (1 9 9 5 : 2 4 ). T ab le 1 Types of Emotion Work Explored in the Literature Theorist

Sample

Aronson (1992)

Women who care lor their elderly m others

Aronson and Neysmith (1996)

Ilom e-care workers

Examples oj 7ypes of Emotion Work Explored -internalizing resentment that their affection for mothers is questioned by service providers -drawing boundaries in relation to m others about the extent lo which it was possible for them to provide care -dealing with inner conflicts as a result o f the incongruence between their ability to provide care and expectation that it is their responsibility to do so -breaking rules in official job descriptions by giv ing gifts, providing after-hours care, personalizing relations with care receivers

2 6 6

K I R A N

M I R C H A N D A N I

T a b le 1— Continued Theorist

Sample

Examples o j Types o f Emotion Work Explored

Bellas (1 9 9 9 )

A cadem ics

-p erfo rm in g in the classroo m -relating p erso n al e xp e rie n ce s in classroo m s -displaying positive em otio ns and con trollin g negative em o tio n s vis-a-vis stud en ts -diffusing volatile situations -advising stud en ts

C lark (1 9 9 0 )

T h eoretical

-using em otio n s strategically to elicit em otio n s in oth ers d uring face-to-face interactions in o rd e r to m ark o n e ’s place in the in teraction

Fine (1 9 9 6 )

R estaurant kitchcns

Finem an (1 9 9 5 )

H elping profession als

-justifying and legitim atin g their w ork to the public -m aintaining an em otion al distan ce from the client

(th eoretical)

in o rd e r to ap p ear profession al -creating the d esired em otion al im pression or

T h eoretical

-su ppressin g or rep resen tin g private feelin gs to

expression Finem an (1 9 9 6 )

achieve a socially acceptablc em otional facc -looking nice, sm iling, bein g polite Ghidina (1 9 9 2 )

C u stod ial w orkers

-assertin g the value o f the w ork -redefining w ork traditionally known as ‘ d irty ’ w ork

G u b riu m (1 9 8 9 )

C are giv e rs o f A lzh eim er’ s

-m an agin g self-feelin g against audience expectation s

patients Hall (1 9 9 3 )

W aiters and w aitresses

H eim er and

Social w orkers in a -tran sform in g p eo p le into clinical m aterial (in tegratin g paren ts into the hospital routine) neonatal unit

Stevens (1 9 9 7 )

-sm iling, d e fe rrin g to cu sto m e rs

-coping w ith variability -helping paren ts deal w ith the strain o f having a prem atu re child -m an agin g the risk o f law suits by paren ts or the state against the hospital H ochschild

Flight attendants

-feeling the right feeling for the job

(1 9 7 9 , 1983,

and bill c o lle cto rs

-m an agin g/ch an gin g feelings through surface and

D o c to rs, n urses and relatives o f can ccr patients

-anticipating, planning, pacin g, tim etabling and

1990) Jam e s (1 9 9 3 )

deep acting troub lesh ootin g -m an agin g negative feelings in a way that results in a n eutral or positive ou tcom e -ongoing inw wor k o f m anaging em otio n s is done bv relatives, n urses and jun ior d o c to rs

Kahn (1 9 9 3 )

Social science agency

-caregiving -balancing attachm en t and detach m en t from others

C H A L L E N G I N G

R A C I A L

S I L E N C E S

IN

S T U D I E S

OF

E M O T I O N

W O R K

2 6 7

Theorist

Sample

Examples oj 7ypes of Emotion Work Explored

Kunda and Van M aancn (1 9 9 9 )

M anagers and profession als

-building a m arket o f their own

L cid n er (1 9 9 9 )

Interactive service w ork ers

-sm iling, m aking eye con tact, rem aining calm

(M cD on ald s se rv e rs and

-being enthusiastic -trying to p ersu ad e cu sto m e rs to listen to the sales pitch

insurance salesp eo p le) L ois (2 0 0 1 )

High risk takers (volu n teer search

-accepting the unknow n -suppressin g feelings in high-risk situations

and rescue gro u p )

-releasing and redefining feelings

K e lso n and

Paid and volunteer -differential con stru ction o f em ergen cy m edical

Barley (1 9 9 7 )

em ergen cy m edical team s

te a m s’ w ork (as co m m o d ity o r com m un ity focus) -p rom otin g ow n poin t o f view through

Pierce (1 9 9 S )

L itigato rs and

-dom in atin g through intim idation (litigato rs)

m argin alizing others paralegals

-using strategic friendliness (litigato rs) -show ing deferen ce and providing em otional care to attorn eys (paralegals) -m anaging resen tm en t ab out bein g treated as if one is stupid (paralegals)

Ralaeli and

Bill c o lle c to rs and

Sutton (1 9 9 1 )

crim inal in terro gato rs

Rac (1 9 9 8 )

Paid c arcgiv crs o f p erso n s with A ltze im e r’s

-using a m ixtu re o f positive and negative em otion al displays to co n stru ct five ‘em otional con trast stra te g ie s’ -m anaging ow n em otio n s in relation to rc c e ip ie n ts’ inability to con trol their em otio n s -m anaging guilt -m anaging tension in family life o f patient

T h oits (1 9 9 0 )

T h eoretical

-coping with em otion al deviance (w hen feelings deviate from what is e x p e cted in a given situation)

Van M aanen

D isneyland

-participatin g in organizational rituals.

and Kunda

em ploy ees and

-con fo rm in g to p articu laristic stan dards o f

(1 9 8 9 )

em ploy ees o f a high tech firm

ap pearan ce, bein g nice.

W h arton and

Serv ice se cto r

-binding the g ro u p to ge th e r through integrating

E rickson (1 9 9 3 )

w ork ers (professional and non-

em otio ns -convoying auth ority through m asking em otio ns.

p rofcssion al)

-provoking clien t com plian ce through displays of anger, irritation -recognizing the ch aracter o f the clien t being

W isely and Fine (1 9 9 7 )

P o rtrait painters

W olkom ir (2 0 0 1 )

Gay and ex-gay Christian su p p o rt

-redefining situation and authenticating se lf -p rom otin g participation in gro u p s

gro u p s

-sustaining m e m b e rs’ com m itm en t

portray ed -negotiating the w ork er-clien t relationship

2 6 8

K I R A N

M I R C H A N D A N I

T h e o r is t s a lso n o te th at m a le - anti f e m a le - d o m in a t e d

o c c u p a tio n s r e q u ir e

w o r k e r s to p e r fo r m d iffe r e n t k in d s o f e m o t io n w o r k . F lig h t a t te n d a n ts , t h e r e f o r e , m ay fe e l a n n o y a n c e an d t ir e d n e s s , b u t a re e x p e c t e d to h ave a ‘sincere s m i l e ’ w h e n s e r v in g p a s s e n g e r s (H o c h s c h ild 1 9 8 3 : 1 2 0 ) . D o c t o r s o r c o u n s e llo r s m ay fe e l d e e p ly a b o u t a c lie n t ’ s s itu a tio n , b u t th e y a r c r e q u ir e d to b e c o o l an d c o n tr o lle d in th e ir r e s p o n s e (F in e m a n 1 9 9 4 : 1 9 ). E m o tio n w o r k is , t h e r e f o r e , n e e d e d to d e a l w ith the o u t c o m e o f th e g a p b e tw e e n re a l an d r ig h t fe e lin g , an d in d iv id u a ls o fte n h ave to m a n a g e th e r e s e n t m e n t (P ie r c e 1 9 9 5 ) o r c o n flic t (A r o n s o n 1 9 9 2 ) w h ic h th e y fe e l as a r e s u lt o f th is g a p . T a b le 2 D im ensions o f Em otion Work Management o f self-feeling

Making others feel a certain way

Defining one’s work

A ronson (1 99 2 )

Bellas, (1 9 9 9 )

A ronson (1 9 9 2 )

Bellas (1 9 9 9 )

C lark (1 9 9 0 )

A ronson and N eysm ith (1 9 9 6 )

Fincm an (1 9 9 5 , 1996)

Fine (1 9 9 6 )

Fine (1 9 9 6 )

G ub rium (1 9 8 9 )

Finem an (1 9 9 5 , 1996)

Ghidina (1 9 9 2 )

H och schild (1 9 7 9 , 1983, 1990)

H eim er and Stevens (1 9 9 7 )

H eim er and Stevens (1 9 9 7 )

H ochschild (1 9 7 9 , 1983, 1990)

Jam es (1 9 9 3 )

L cid n cr (1 9 9 9 ) Lois (2 0 0 1 )

Jam es (1 9 9 3 )

W isely and Fine (1 9 9 7 )

Pierce (1 9 9 5 )

Kahn (1 9 9 3 )

R ac (1 9 9 8 )

N elson and Barley (1 9 9 7 )

Stein b erg and Figart

Pierce (1 9 9 5 )

(1 9 9 9 )

R afeli and Sutton (1 9 9 1 )

T h oits (1 9 8 9 )

Stein b erg and F igart (1 9 9 9 )

Van M aanen and K unda (1 9 8 9 )

Van M aanen and Kunda (1 9 8 9 )

W h arton and E rickson

W h arton and E rickson

(1 9 9 3 )

(1 9 9 3 )

W olkom ir (2 0 0 1 )

W isely and Fine (1 9 9 7 )

N elson and Barley (1 9 9 7 )

A c c o m p a n y in g th e g e n d e r in g o f e m o t io n w o r k is a f r e q u e n t d e - s k illin g o f th is w o r k . H o c h s c h ild d is tin g u is h e s e m o t io n w o r k fro m e m o t io n la b o u r in t e r m s o f pay an d lo c a t io n , th a t is , e m o t io n w o r k is u n w a g e d w o r k d o n e in th e p r iv a te s p h e r e , w h ile e m o t io n la b o u r is wro r k in th e p u b lic s p h e r e d o n e fo r a w a g e . A n u m b e r o f o t h e r t h e o r is t s , h o w e v e r, h ave n o te d

th a t th e re is o fte n

c o n s id e r a b le

o v e r la p

b e tw e e n th e se tw o c a t e g o r ie s , an d th a t it is n o t alw ay s e a sy t o s e p a r a t e th e p a id an d u n p a id , o r p u b lic an d p r iv a te p a r t s o f a jo b ( s e e , f o r e x a m p le , G u b r iu m

1989;

M ir c h a n d a n i 1 9 9 8 , 1 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 0 ; U tt a l an d T o u m in e n 1 9 9 9 ) . T a n c re d n o t e s th a t it is o fte n a s s u m e d th a t ‘ w o m e n a r c b o r n w ith c c r t a in “ n a tu r a l” s k ills w h ic h r e q u ir e n e ith e r ta le n t n o r tra in in g , an d w h ic h a r c m e r e ly p a r t o f th e ir “n a t u r a l,” “ fe m in in e ” b e h a v io u r ’ ( 1 9 9 5 : 1 7 ). H a ll a r g u e s th at m u c h o f th e s e r v ic e w o r k d o n e by w o m e n is c o n s id e r e d an e x t e n s io n o f w o m e n ’ s r o le s in th e h o m e . R e s ta u r a n t s , fo r e x a m p le , c o n s tr u c t an d le g itim a te a g e n d e r e d im a g e o f th e s e r v e r as d e fe r e n tia l s e r v a n t (H a ll

C H A L L E N G I N G

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S I L E N C E S

IN

STUDIES

OF

EMOTION

WORK

2 6 9

1993: 4 5 5 ). A dkin s’ s study of hotel m anagers sim ilarly illustrates the ways in which m anagers are ex p e cted to be m ale, but m arried m anagers are seen to be m ore reliable because it is assum ed that m en cannot be coun ted on to carrv out m anv o f the essen tial, routin e tasks required fo r the job. T h ese tasks arc the hidden and unpaid respon sib ilities o f m an age rs’ w ives (1 9 9 5 : 7 6 ). Th ese discussion s o f em otion w ork have allow ed w rite rs to illum inate the relationships betw een d isco u rse s o f rationality and gen d ered stru ctu res within organizations. T h e o rists note that the em phasis on rationality within organizations has resulted in the fact that e m o tio n s have often been ‘w ritten ou t' (Fincm an 1994: I), treated as ‘handicapped appcn dagc[s] to re a so n ’ , or u n d erstood as c o m ­ m odities (M um by and Putm an 1992: 4 7 1 ; Ja m e s 1989: 130). Swan argues that given the historical association betw een w om en and em otion ality, this discou rse o f rationality within organizations has unique effects on w om en m an agers: ‘to be a “p ro p e r” m anager requires that a w om an re p ro d u ce s an accoun t o f h erse lf in term s o f attribu tes w hich com m only rep resen t a type o f m asculin ity’ (Sw an 1994: 105; Seron and Ferris 1995). For exam p le, w om en cite cryin g as an unprofessional and a ‘g ir lie ’ thing to do (Sw an 1994: 105). T h oits sim ilarly n otes that individuals’ feelings may deviate from

their required em otional displays, giving rise to

‘ em otional devian ce’ (1 9 9 0 : 1 81). Such deviance is likely when individuals hold m ultiple ro les ‘that have m utually con tradictory feelin g e x p e ctatio n s’ (T hoits 1 990: 188). In so far as w o m e n ’s professional w ork requires em otional m asking, w hile their family em otion w ork requires integrative em otio ns (W h arton and E rickson 1993: 4 7 1 ), em otional deviance fo r w om en in profession al jobs in likely to be high. Th e insights gen erated through the studies discussed above have furth ered our un derstandin g of the gen d er dim en sions o f em otion w ork as well as d ocu m en ted the nature o f the em otion w ork done by w om en in a variety o f co n texts. In m uch o f this analysis, there is an attem p t to m ove away from b iological un derstandin gs o f gender. [. . .] At the sam e tim e, . . . m uch o f the analysis has been based on a con cept o f a ‘universal w o m an ’ . Little attention is paid to the wavs in w hich w om en arc socially loeated within a m ultitude o f hierarchies which coin cide with and co n stru ct gen d er differences.

Racial silences and the norm alizing o f whiteness C o n tem p o rary debates on em otion w ork, as outlined in the section s above, norm alize w hiteness in tw o w ays: first, through the reliance on racially h o m o ­ gen eou s sam p les in em pirical stud ies, and secon d, through the assum ption that w ork ers arc, by d efau lt, w hite. W hile em pirical know ledge on em otion w ork has increased substantially in the past tw o decad es, studies continue to draw on sam p les that are only, or p re ­ dom inantly w hite (see, for e xam p le, Bulan et al. 1997; Lois 2 0 0 1 ; Pierce 1995; Seery 2 0 0 0 ; W h arton 1993; W olkom ir 2 0 0 1 ). This has led to the m asking o f a n um b er o f im portan t fo rm s o f em otion w ork. L ee-T rew eek ’ s (1 9 9 7 ) analysis o f nursing auxiliary w ork, for e xam p le, provides a nuanced and co m p le x u n d erstan d ­ ing o f the ways in w hich w ork ers deal with the often violent and dem ean in g

2 7 0

K I R A N

M I R C H A N D A N I

tre a tm e n t they re c e iv e fro m p a tie n ts and n u rse s. G iven w h at w e kn o w a b o u t the p re v a le n c e o f ra c ism in the h ea lth -c are s e c to r (C a lliste 1 9 9 6 ), it w o u ld b e w o rth e x p lo r in g how a u x ilia ry w o rk e rs w h o are w o m e n o f c o lo u r d o e m o tio n w o rk to d e al sim u lta n e o u sly w ith the low sta tu s o f th e ir w o rk and the ra cia l s te r e o ty p e s o f th e ir b a c k g ro u n d . S im ila rly , R afae li an d S u t to n ’ s (1 9 9 1 ) d isc u ssio n o f th e w o rk d o n e by b ill c o lle c to r s an d c rim in al in te r r o g a to r s to u n d e rm in e th e ir v ic tim s ’ e m o tio n a l d e fe n c e s by b e in g n asty is likely to have b e e n d iffe re n t if th eir an alysis h ad in clu d e d m a le b lac k in te r r o g a to r s (in the c o n tc x t o f th e s te r e o ty p e o f ‘ the v io le n t b la c k m a n ’ ). P ie r c e ’ s (1 9 9 5 ) a c c o u n t o f the n u rtu r in g d o n e b y fe m ale p a ra le g a ls ra ise s q u e stio n s a b o u t how this w o rk w o u ld b e d iffe re n t if e ith e r the p a ra le g a ls o r th e a tto rn e y s th ey w e re c a r in g fo r w ere o f A sian , A frican o r H isp a n ic d e s c e n t; an d h e r re se a rc h on the tre a tm e n t o f p e o p le o f c o lo u r in law firm s su g g e sts th a t c h a lle n g in g the d e e p ly ra c ia lize d n atu re o f this se ttin g in v o lv e s c o n sid e ra b le e m o tio n w o rk (P ie r c e , 2 0 0 3 ). N o t on ly have stu d ie s re lie d p rim a rily on w h ite s a m p le s , b u t m u ch o f the an aly sis o f e m o tio n w o rk to d a te h as b e e n b ase d on th e assumption o f racially h o m o g e n e o u s in te ra c tio n s, an d on the a ssu m p tio n th at the d o m in a n t e th n ic g r o u p d o e s n o t p o s s e s s a ‘ r a c e ’ (A n th ias 1 9 9 8 ). T h e o r is ts fre q u e n tly d o n o t p ro v id e the ra c ia l c h a ra c te ristic s o f sa m p le s on w h ich an a ly se s o f e m o tio n w o rk arc d e v e lo p e d (s e c , fo r e x a m p le , F in e 1 9 9 6 ; H all 1 9 9 3 ; R ac 1 9 9 8 ), m a k in g it d ifficu lt to th e o riz e the w ays in w hich this w o rk is ra c ia liz e d . F o r e x a m p le , in the in tr o d u c tio n to a re c e n t sp e cial issu e on e m o tio n w o rk in the Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science, S te in b e rg an d F ig a rt c o m m e n t on the w ays in w h ich c u ltu ral n o r m s o fte n s tr u c tu r e the a llo c a tio n o f p e o p le to d iffe re n t jo b s. T h e y n o te : ‘ G e n d e r is im p lic a te d w ith in th e se so c ia l n o r m s , w h ich vary by c u ltu re . In

the

U n ite d

S ta te s ,

fo r

e x a m p le ,

w h e re

s e r v ic e

o rg a n iz a tio n s

e m p h a siz e e m o tio n a l d isp lay s o f frie n d lin e ss, w o m e n are m o r e likely to b e h ired to w o rk in th e se o rg a n iz a tio n s b c c a u sc it is b e lie v e d th at, on a v e ra g e , th ey sm ile an d d isp lay m o r e w a rm th than m e n d o. Yet, in M u slim e u ltu re , su ch d isp lay s arc r c s tr ic tc d by e m p lo y e e s b c c a u s c they w o u ld p ro v o k e a se x u a l r e s p o n s e .’ (S te in b e r g and F ig a rt 1 9 9 9 : 1 7 - 1 8 ) W h ile this is an in te re stin g an a ly sis, it d o e s n o t p r o v id e m u c h in sig h t in to the e m o tio n w o rk d o n e by M u slim w o m e n w h o m ay b e w o rk in g in se rv ic e o rg a n iz a tio n s in the U S A , o r by n o n -M u slim w o m e n w o rk in g in o rg a n iz a tio n s w ith s o m e M u slim c u s to m e r s . A s G le n n a r g u e s , th is n o rm a liz in g o f w h ite n e ss in stu d ie s o f g e n d e r o c c u r s w h en

w h ite

w om en

arc p o sitio n e d

as the

‘ u n iv e rsa l fe m ale

s u b je c t ’

( 1 9 9 9 : 3 ). [. . .]

In te rlo c k in g h ie rarch ie s: race , class a n d g e n d e r [. . .] R a th e r than id e n tify in g the se p a r a te im p a c t o f ra c e , g e n d e r an d c lass on in d iv id u a ls’ liv e s, fe m in ist an ti-racist th e o ry str e ss e s the n e e d to d e v e lo p u n d e r ­ sta n d in g s o f h ow th e se fo r m s o f stratific atio n in tc rsc c t and o v e rlap . [. . .]

C H A L L E N G I N G

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2 7 1

Friedm an argu es, for exam p le, that individuals do not hold fixed race, gen der and class iden tities, n or do they con fron t static social divisions. She provides the follow ing exam p le to illustrate h er point: ‘ In relation to w hite p eo p le, Leslie M arm on Silko and Paula Gunn Allen are w om en o f colour, N ative A m erican s and partially w hite. In relation to w om en o f colour, they arc N ative A m erican . In relation to N ative A m erican s, they arc m e m b e rs o f the Laguana Pueblo. In relation to cach other, they arc individual w om en w ho characterize the Laguna Pueblo eulture in startlingly different w ay s.’ (Fried m an 1996: 125) [. . .] The focus on the interlocking nature o f race, class and gen d er raises two issues w hich can be used to exten d our understan din gs o f em otio n w ork. F irst, rather than possessin g p articu lar eth nicities, class positions and gen der traits, in di­ viduals occupy social locations w hich arc relational and shifting. The w ork o f re c o g ­ nizing, m anagin g and participatin g in these shifting relation s o f difference requires em otion w ork w hich is done in con jun ction w ith the w ork o f m anaging o n e ’ s own feelin gs, m aking oth ers feel a certain way and defining o n e ’ s w ork. Secon d, both racial m ajority and racial m in ority g ro u p s do em otion w ork w hich is racialized, that is, which is situated within hierarchies o f racial privilege and disadvantage. As Razack argu es, ‘ it is vitally im portan t to e x p lo re in a historically and site specificway the m eaning o f race, econ om ic status, class, disability, sexuality, and gen d er as they com e togeth er to stru ctu re w om en in different and shifting positions of pow er and p riv ile g e ’ (1 9 9 8 : 12). W om en do em otio n w ork to m aintain privilege o r to challenge disadvantage in con jun ction with the em otio n w ork they do as part of their jo b s. [. . .]

Conclusions [. . .] T h e focus on the gen dered nature o f em otion w ork n eeds . . . to be u n d erstood in the co n text o f the in teraction s betw een gen dered p ro ce sse s and other processes o f stratification. Two types o f projects w ould further facilitate this e xploration . F irst, it w ould be useful to d ocum en t the ways in which past un derstandings o f the em otion w ork done by flight attendan ts, service w o rk ers, n u rses, law yers, and so on change w hen racially diverse g ro u p s o f these w ork ers are placed at the centre o f analysis. W hile m uch o f the research to date has been con cern ed w ith the conn ections and distinctions betw een ‘ em otion la b o u r’ (that is, the m an age­ m en t o f feelings w hich arc done as p a rt o f o n e ’s jo b ) and ‘em otion w o rk ’ (fam ily or unpaid w ork ), the e x p erien ces o f racially diverse g ro u p s o f peop le is likely to reveal that the em otion w ork o f dealing w ith inequity is seldom rem u nerated and yet a fundam ental part o f paid w ork. Th rough such an analysis, new u n d e r­ standings o f em otion w ork (based not only on pay o r location o f w ork) can be advanced. A second set o f projects which w ould exten d ou r understan ding o f em otion w ork could focus on processes o f racialization w hich may be presen t even in racially

2 7 2

KIRAN

M I R C H A N D A N I

h om ogen eou s occupation s. Rather than an absence o f stratification, w ork ers in h om ogen eou s w ork settin gs m ay, in fact, do em otion w ork to e x e rt privilege and exclu sion , which w ould be w orthy of furth er study. T h ese exp loration s w ould con tribu te to the theoretical and em pirical un derstan din g of the em otion w ork involved in living and w orkin g in con tem p orary urban societies with coexistin g, m ultiple and in terlock in g fo rm s o f stratification.

References Adkins, Lisa 1995 Gendered work — Sexuality,family and the labor market. Buckingham: Open U ni­ versityJ Press. Anthias, Floya 1998 ‘Rethinking social divisions: Som e notes towards a thcorctical fram ew ork’ . The Sociological Review 63: 505 533. Aronson, Jane 1992 ‘W om en’s sense o f responsibility for the carc o f old people: “ But who else is going to do it?” ’ . Gender and Society 6 : 8 29. Aronson, Jane, and Sheila M. Neysmith 1996 ‘ “You’re not just in there to do the w ork” : D epersonalizing policies and the exploitation o f home carc w ork ers’ lab or’ . Gender and Society 10: 5 6 -7 7 . Ashforth, Blake F.., and Ronald H. Humphrey 1993 ‘F.motional labor in scrvicc roles: The influcncc o f identity’ . Academy o j Management Review 18: 88 115. Bellas, Marcia 1999 ‘F.motional labor in academia: The ease o f professors’ .Annals o j theAmerican Academy o f Political and Social Science 56 / 1 : 96 110. Bulan, Heather F., Rcbccca J. Erickson, and Amy S. W harton 1997 ‘D oing for others on the job: The affcctivc requirem ents o f scrvicc work, gender and em otional w ell-being’ . Social Problems 4 4 (May): 235 256. Callistc, Agnes 1996 ‘Antifeminism, organizing and resistance in nursing: African Canadian w om en’ . Canadian Review o j Sociology and Anthropology 3 3 /3 : 368 390. Clark, Candace 1990 ‘Em otions and m icropolitics in everyday life: Som e patterns and paradoxes’ in Research agendas in the sociology■ ojemotions. T. D. Kem per (cd .). N ew York: SU N Y Press. Daniels, Arlene Kaplan 1987 ‘Invisible w ork’ . Social Problems 3 4 / 4 : 403 415. Erickson, Rcbccca J., and Amy S. W harton 1997 ‘Inauthcnticity and depression: Assessing the conscqucnccs o f interactive sc r­ vicc w ork’ . Work and Occupations 2 4 / 2 : 188-21 3. Fine, Gary A. 1996 ‘Justifying w ork: Occupational rhetorics as resources in restaurant kitchcns’ . Administrative Science Quarterly 41 : 90 115. Fincman, Stephen 1994 ‘Introduction’ in Emotions in organization. S. Fincman (cd .). London: Sage.

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Fincm an, Stephen 1995 ‘ Stress, em otion and interaction ’ in Managing stress: Emotion and power at work. T. N ew ton (c d .). L on don: Sage. Fincm an, Stephen 1996

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‘ Beyond w hite and other: R elationality and narratives o f race in fem inist d iscourse. Signs 2 1 / 1 : 109—1 57. Frith, Hannah, and C elia Kitzinger 1998

‘ “ E m otion w ork” as participan t re so u rce : A fem inist analysis o f young w om en ’s talk in in teraction ’ . Sociology 3 2 / 2 : 2 9 9 —321.

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H ochschild, Arlie R. 1979 ‘ Em otion w ork, feeling ru les and social stru c tu re s’ . American Journal o j Sociology 85: 5 5 1 - 5 7 5 . H ochschild, Arlie R. The managed heart. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press. 1983 H ochschild, Arlie R. 1990 ‘ Em otion m anagem en t: A persp ective and path for future research ’ in Research agendas in the sociology o f emotions. T h eodore D. K em per (e d .), 1 17—142. N ew York: U niversity o f N ew York Press. Ja m e s, N icky 1989 ‘ E m otional labour: Skill and w ork in the social regulation o f feelin gs’ . The Sociological Review 37: 1 5—4-2. Ja m e s, N icky 1993 ‘ D ivisions o f em otional labour: D isclosure and can cer’ in Emotions in organiza­ tions. S. Fincm an (e d .). London: Sage. Kahn, W illiam A. 1993 ‘ C aring for the caregivers: Patterns o f organizational carcgivin g’ . Administrative Science Quarterly 38: 539—563. K unda, G ideon , and John Van M aanen 1999

‘ Changing scripts at w ork: M anagers and profession als’ . Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science 5 6 / 1: 64—76.

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L cc-T rcw cck , G eraldine 1997 ‘W om en, resistance and carc: An ethnographic study o f nursing auxiliary w o rk ’ . Work, Employment and Society 1 1 / 1 : 4 7 —63. Leidner, Robin 1999 ‘ Em otion labour in scrvicc w o rk ’ . Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science 5 6 / 1 : 81 —9 5. L ois, Jen n ifer 2001 ‘ Peaks and valleys: The gendered em otional culture of edge w o rk e rs’ . Gender and Society 15/3': 3 8 1 - 4 0 6 . M irchandani, Kiran 1998

‘ Protecting the boundary: Telew orker insights on the expansive concept o f “w ork” ’ . Gender and Society 1 2 / 2 : 167—186.

M irchandani, Kiran 1999

‘ L egitim izing w ork: Tclcwrork and the gen dered reification o f the w ork /n o n w ork dich otom y’ . Canadian Review o f Sociology and Anthropology 3 6 / 1: 87—107. M irchandani, Kiran 2000

‘ “The b est o f both w orlds” and “ C uttin g my own throat” : C on trad ictory im ages o f hom e-based w o rk ’ . Qualitative Sociology 2 3 / 2 : 159—182.

M um by, D enis K ., and Linda L. Putman 1992 ‘T h e politics o f em otion: A fem inist reading o f bounded ration ality’ . Academy o f Management Review 1 7 /3 : 4 6 5 —486. N elson , Bonalvn J ., and Stephen R . Barley 1997

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m an d ate’ . Administrative Science Quarterly 4 2 / 4 : 6 1 9 —653. P ierce, Jennifer 1995 Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms. Berkeley: U niversity o f California Press. P ierce, Jennifer 2003 ‘ “ Racing for innocence” : W h iten ess, c o rp o rate cultu re, and the backlash against affirm ative action ’ . Qualitative Sociology■■2 6 / 1: 53—70. Rae, Flazel M. 1998 ‘M anaging feelings: C aregivin g as em otion w o rk ’ . Research on Aging 2 0 / 1 : 137—160. Rafaeli, Anat, and R o b e rt J. Sutton 1991

‘ Em otional con trast strategics as m eans o f social influence: L essons from crim inal in terrogato rs and bill c o lle c to rs’ . Academy o j Management Journal

3 4 / 4 :7 4 9 - 7 7 5 . Razack, Sherene 1998 Looking white people in the eye. Toronto: U niversity o f Toronto Press. Sccry , Brenda 20 0 0 ‘W om en ’ s em otion w ork in the family: R elationship m anagem ent and the p rocess o f building father-child relation ships’ , lournal o f Family Issues 2 1 / 1 :1 0 0 - 1 2 8 . Scron, C arole, and K erry Ferris 1995

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Steinberg, Ronnie J ., and D eborah M . Figart 1999 ‘Em otional labour since The Managed Heart’. Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science 56 / 1: 8—26.

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Sw an, Elaine 1994 ‘ M anaging e m o tio n ’ in

IN

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Women in management. M . Tanton (c d .). London:

R outledge. T ancred, Peta 1995 ‘W om en ’s w ork: A challenge to the sociology o f w o rk ’ . Gender, Work and Organ­ ization 2 / 1 : 1 1 —20. T h oits, Peggy A. 1990 ‘ Em otional deviance: R esearch ag en d as’ in Research Agendas in Sociology■ o f Emotions. T. D. K em p er (e d .). N ew York: SU N Y Press. U ttal, Lynet, and M ary Tuom inen 1999

‘Tenuous relationships: E xploitation , em otion and racial ethnic significance in paid child carc w o rk ’ . Gender and Society 1 3 / 6 : 7 5 8 —780.

Van M aancn, John, and G ideon Kunda 1989 ‘ “ Real feelings” : Em otional expression and organizational cu ltu re’ . Research in Organizational Behavior 1 1: 4 3 —103. W h arton, Amy S. 1993

‘The affective con sequen ces o f scrvicc w ork: M anaging em otions on the jo b ’ .

Work and Occupations 2 0 / 2 : 2 0 5 —2 3 2 . W h arton, Amy S ., and R eb ccca J. Erickson 1993 ‘M anaging em otio n s on the job and at h om e: U nderstan ding the consequences o f m ultiple em otional ro le s’ . Academy o f Management Review 1 8 / 3 : 4 5 7 —486. W isely, N ancy, and Alan Fine 1997

‘M aking faces: Portraiture as a negotiated w orker-client relation ship’ . Work and Occupations 2 4 / 2 : 164—187.

W olkom ir, M ichelle 2001 ‘ Em otion w ork , com m itm en t and the authentication of the self: The case o f gay and ex-gay Christian su p p o rt g ro u p s’ . Journal o f Contemporary Ethnography 3 0 /3 : 305 -3 3 4 .

Chapter

31

Stephen Fineman G E T T I N G T H E M E A S U R E OF E M O T I O N - A N D T H E C A U T I O N A R Y T A L E OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

[• ■ •]

E

m o t i o n

p e n e t r a t e s

a n d

d e f i n e s

m a n y

o f the processes

and co n sequ en ces o f organizing. T h ese include the subjective m eanings o f w ork,

leadersh ip, decision m aking, n egotiation , m otivation , ethical conduct, com m u n ica­ tion , gen d er and ethnic relationships. M ore sharply, em otion draw s attention to the psychological injuries o f w orking, such as h arassm ent, bullying, violen ce, stress and em otio nal lab our (e.g. see Finem an, 2 0 0 3 a). E m o tio n ’s potential m ultifacetedn ess su gg ests that any one approach to un derstan din g ‘it ’ w ill be ju st that — one approach . It is n ecessarily p artial, m eaningful only in term s o f the philosophy that in fo rm s it, the m edium through w hich it is conveyed and the receiving audicnce. . . . Such strictu res have been broadly side-stepped by m ainstream organ iza­ tional re se arch e rs o f e m o tio n , schooled principally in redu ction ist research (e.g. see Ashkenasy et al., 2 0 0 0 ; D ien cr ct a l., 1999; P arrott & H crtcl, 1999; W eiss & B rief, 2 0 0 1 ). M etrication is a principal hallm ark o f their en deavours, reflecting a long history o f p sy ch o m etrics

the tran sform ation o f psychological qualities into

quantities. T h eir aim is to m ake the inchoate tangible through quantification. Size m atters. E m otion is ‘ u n ro lle d ’ and divided into convenient units, w hich are then susceptible to different fo rm s o f statistical m anipulation. As a ‘variab le’ , em otion can then be co rrelated , o r causatively linked, w ith other variables — such as pride w ith job satisfaction , fear w ith lab our turnover, anxiety w ith absen teeism (e.g. see de D reue et a l., 2 0 0 1 ; W eiss & B rief, 2 0 0 1 ). [. . .] N o academ ic discipline has exclusive rights to em otio n . It has been differently colonized by b io lo gists, an th rop o lo gists, historians, so cio lo gists, psychoanalysts, n eu rolo gists and several different branches o f psychology (e.g. clinical, evolution ­ ary, education al, organ ization al, p sy ch olin gu istics). And em otion is n ot, by any m ean s, the sole province o f the sciences. Poetry, creative literature, m u sic, dram a

G ETTI N G T H E

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2 7 7

an d the visu al a r ts have lo n g b e en c u sto d ia n s o f e m o tio n — b e in g at the v e ry so u l o f th e ir e n d e a v o u rs. Su ch an im p r e ssiv e array re v e a ls so m e th in g o f the c e n tra lity o f e m o tio n in h u m an affairs. M e a s u r e m e n t, o f c o u r s e , m a rk s o u t so m e o f th e m , b u t n o n - m e a s u r e m e n t c h a ra c te riz e s m an y o th e r s. In the la tte r w e have r e p o r t e d s to r ie s an d s p e e c h , c o n te x tu a liz e d o b se rv a tio n s o f b e h av io u r, p a r tic u la r o b s e r v a tio n s , e th n o g r a p h ie s, fre e - fo r m

d ia r ie s , d r a w in g s, in te rp re ta tio n s o f sy m b o ls , te x tu a l

an aly ses o f se c o n d a r y d a ta (e .g . a u to b io g r a p h ie s, le tt e r s , official r e p o r t s ) , actio n re se a r c h

an d p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l an a ly sis (D o m a g a ls k i,

1 9 9 9 ; F in e m a n ,

1993b,

2 0 0 0 b ; R e aso n & B ra d b u r y , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e se ail g e n e ra te ‘b ro a d b a n d ’ d a ta , r e p r e ­ se n tin g fe e lin g an d e x p r e ss e d e m o tio n in d y n a m ic , so cially s itu a te d , f o r m . T h ey c o n tr a s t to the m e a s u r e ’s in clin atio n to p r e - b o x , o r fre e z e , e m o tio n . E m o tio n , th e n , h as m an y p o ssib le r e p re se n ta tio n s, o f w hich r e c o n s tru c te d fe e lin g on re se a r c h e r -le d sc a le s are o n e

b u t a d o m in a n t o n e . A s S tu rd y (2 0 0 3 )

p o in ts o u t, this te n d s to p r iv ile g e o n e fo rm o f e m o tio n k n o w le d g e (e .g . sta tistic al tr e n d s , n u m e ric a l p r o file s) an d sile n c c s o th e r s (e .g . p e r so n a l m e a n in g s, in te r ­ p e r so n a l d y n a m ic s). E ven if the re p re se n ta tio n f e e l s / a p p e a r s c r u d e , r e m o te fro m the daily c irc u its o f ‘ r e a l- t im e ’ fe e lin g an d its a m b iv a le n c e s (Vim l a 1, 2 or 3 on this item? ‘I ’m sometimes a bit o f each ’; 7 can 't really remember how I “f e lt last week” ’), the sc a le , n e v e rth e le ss, sp e a k s a u th o ritativ e ly fo r itse lf. T h e c o n v e n tio n s o f validity and re lia b ility , an d th e ir n u m e ric a l sig n ific rs ('in tern al consistency r — . 7 8 ’, ‘correlation with other, similar, measure r = .4 2 ') , tak e on a life, and ju stific a to ry r h e to r ic , o f th e ir o w n . T h e re is a so cially c o n s tr u c te d , c o llu siv e , c o m f o r t in n u m b e rs. T h ey are a b stra c tio n s that sy m b o liz e a u th o rity an d ‘ f a c t ’ in w ays that o th e r r e p re se n ta tio n s o fte n fare le ss w ell in so c ia l scie n tific an d o th e r p r o fe ssio n a l c o m m u n itie s (Ie d e m a et a l., 2 0 0 3 ) . [. . .] T h e d o u b tin g o r u n e asy re s e a r c h e r ev e n tu a lly c e a se s to d o u b t o r fe el u n e a sv : ‘ It's just how we do i t ’; ‘i t ’s what my supervisor recommends’, 'it’s the only way to get published'. T h e r e s e a r c h e r s ’ u n d e rsta n d in g o l th e ir o w n fe e lin g s an d e m o tio n s , th e ir o w n p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l re a ltie s , a rc sp lit-o ff fro m th e ir ‘s u b je c t s ’ , via m e a s ­ u r e m e n t. R e fle x iv e n e ss and e x p e r ie n tia l v alid ity arc sq u e e z e d o u t. W h at is lo st — the fine te x tu r e , th e te n sio n s, the h ea t, the c o n tr a d ic to ry se n sa tio n s, th e su b tle p o s t u r e s , the n e g o tia tio n s, the in te rc o n n e c tio n s b e tw e e n re s e a r c h e r and re se a r c h e d arc n e ith e r n o tic e d n o r m o u r n e d , at le a st n o t p u b lic ly . . . . Such issu e s arc c o m p o u n d e d w h en e m o tio n m e a su r e m e n t and c o n tro l sp ills b e y o n d th e r e s e a r c h e r ’ s ow n c o m m u n ity tan gib ly to affe ct th e o r d e r in g and v a lu in g o f o th e r p e o p le ’ s w o rk lives. E m o tio n b e c o m e s d e fin e d as a v a lu ab le , and in str u m e n ta l, ‘ i t e m ’ fo r c o m m e r c ia l s u c c e ss. T h e re is, fo r e x a m p le , the p riz in g o f p e o p le w ith high s e lf- e ste e m in the w o rk p la c e — ‘ the prime determinant o f organiza­ tional an d personal success in the Information Age’ (B r a n d e n , 1 9 8 8 , b a c k c o v e r). In c u s to m e r - s e r v ic e in d u str ie s (fa st fo o d , a irlin e s, h o te ls, th e m e p a rk s, call c e n tr e s ), e m p lo y e e ‘ e n th u sia sm ’ , an d ‘ s m ile s ’ have b e c o m e p a r t o f the p r o d u c t, to b e m o n ito r e d an d m e a su r e d (e .g . I lo c h sc h ild , 1 9 8 3 ; L e id n e r, 1 9 9 1 ; T alw ar, 2 0 0 2 ; W ask o , 2 0 0 1 ) . H a p p in e ss h as fo llo w e d a sim ila r ro u te (L u b y o m ir s k i & L e p p e r, 1 9 9 9 ), n ow in c o r p o r a te d in to the o ffe rin g s o f m a n a g e m e n t c o n su lta n ts — as on e c o n su lta n c y a d v e rtis e s : M e a su re w o rk e r h a p p in e ss an d im p ro v e b u sin e ss s u c c e ss. S e e k in g o r g a n ­ iz a tio n s w h o value w o rk e r h a p p in e ss. T h is lo n g - te rm p r o c e s s / t o o l can

2 7 8

S T E P H E N

F I N E M A N

be the catalyst for positive change in organizations and im prove com m unication . T h e point here is not that self-esteem , enthusiasm and happiness are unw orthy pursuits (although all reflect a cultural valuation o f p articu lar em otio n states). The con cern is about en capsulating w hat m ight plausibly be regard ed as c o m p le x , shifting and m icro-con tex tu al ph en om en a, on m easuring in stru m ents, and the pow er that this invests in the m easu rers o r their sp o n so rs. W h at, w e may ask, arc the effects on those w ho fail to 'm easu re u p ’ on the em otio ns prescrib ed ? [. . .] W hen a dynam ic social or psych ological phenom enon is fram ed as a quantity or positio n , it acquires p articu lar political force

b ccau sc o f the sym bolic significance

attached to n um b ers. T h ere are, for instance, the life op p o rtu n ities o r constraints that tend to follow an individual’s level o f m easured intelligence or academ ic grad es (K am in , 1997; M ontague, 1 999). [. . .] C oun tin g, p e r se, creates a conveni­ en t, durable, and often seductive, shorthand o f value o r w orth . Its auth ority ap pears to derive from several so u rces: a redu ction in am biguity, m aking the co m p lcx and inchoate ap pear m eaningful and m anageable; the pervasiveness o f natural sciences w here n u m b ers are com m on ly taken as an indication o f precision and truth ; and a cultural prcdilcctio n to arran ge peop le (organizations, pro d u cts, events, services) in hierarchical o rd e r lo id e n lify /c re a lc w inners and lo se rs, high status and low status, eligible and non-eligible. Together, these influences can lock people into n u m b ers —and hold them there. [. . .] E m otion , when e x p o se d to such m easu rem en t, along w ith m arketplace dem ands and consultant in terv en tion s, is precariously p oised as a com m od ity to exp lo it. It also creates con dition s o f self-fulfilling proph ecy, w here the authority o f the m easure and its catego ries ( ‘low se lf-e ste e m ’ , ‘unhappy’ , ‘n e u ro tic ’ , ‘an x io u s’ , ‘stre sse d ’) can p erm eate individuals’ self-percep tion s in ways they find hard to con test or resist. E m otional intelligence illustrates this particularly w ell. [. . .] Em otional intelligence has em erged from a challenge to the suprem acy o f cogn itive, T Q ’ , intelligence. It has early ro o ts in the idea o f ‘m u ltip le ’ intelligences, w hich includes ‘em otional sen sitivity ’ (G ardn er, 1 993), and from findings from brain scien ces on the role o f em otion in thinking and problem solving (Bcchara ct a l., 2 0 0 0 ). M ayer and colleagues have been prom in ent in developin g these insights into a con ception o f em otional intelligence as, an ability to recognize the m ean in gs o f e m otio n s and their relationships, and to reason and p rob lcm -solve on the basis o f them . (M ayer ct a l., 1999: 267) From relatively quiet and cautious beginn in gs, em otional intelligence has rapidly been ad opted by academ ic practition ers, heavily p ro m o te d by m anagem en t c o n ­ sultants and extensively e xto lled in trade m agazines and n ew sp apers. ( . . . ) All em otional intelligence m easu res arc based on au th or-con trived dom ains and respo nse c ate go rie s, each one reflecting its ow n, particular, rendition o f e m o ­ tional in telligence. Som e au th ors attem p t to gauge em otional intelligence through hypothetical events. For exam p le, a test item

in the M u ltifactor E m otional

Intelligence Scale (M ayer et a l., 1988) d e scrib es a car hitting a d o g and asks the

G E T T I N G T H E M E A S U R E 0 F E M OTIO N

2 7 9

testee to d ecide ‘how likely the ow ner felt asham ed about not being able lo have b etter trained the d o g ’ . O th er item s require the rating o f em otio n s portrayed in p icto rial faces, and m aking em otio nal ju dgem en ts on w hat, fo r e xam p le, som eon e feels ‘when their em otion grow s even past h appiness and they arc out ol co n tro l’ . . . (see review in C iarroch i ct al., 2 0 0 1 ). The m o st com m on m easu res o f em otio n al intelligence arc of the se lf-rep o rt kin d, how peop le perceive their ow n em otional abilities, com p eten ce or sensitivity. In C o o p e r and Saw af’ s (1 9 7 7 ) ‘ EQ M a p ’ w e have, for exam p le, ‘I change my em otional expression depen din g upon the person I am w ith ’ and, T can recogn ise em otio n s in others by w atching their ey es’ (pp. 3 31—2 ). Total scores arc su m m a r­ ized as ‘optimal’ , ‘proficient’ , ‘ vulnerable’ o r ‘cautionary’ . The Boston Ei Q u estio n ­ naire (C h apm an , 2 0 0 1 ) asks 25 qu estio n s, including ‘ How well can you con centrate w'hen you are feeling an xiou s?’ and ‘ Are you able to d em on strate em pathy with o th e rs’ feelin gs?’ . For C h apm an, a high total score is an indication that ‘you seem to shape up pretty well’ , but a low score m ean s ‘ oh dearl’ . B a r-O n ’s E Q i scale contains item s such as ‘ I have go o d relations with o th e rs’ and ‘ I’m fun to be w ith ’ , ‘ I’ m sensitive to the feelings o f o th e rs’ (B ar-O n , 199 7 ). B ar-O n in cludes three factors con sidered as ‘facilitato rs’ o f em otional intelligence —h appin ess, optim ism and selfactualization (B ar-O n , 2 0 0 0 ; B ar-O n 8c Parker, 2 0 0 0 ). The E m otion al C om p eten ce Inventory (Boyatzis ct al., 2 0 0 0 ) is based on re p o rts o f ‘ self-aw aren ess’ , ‘ selfm an agem en t’ , ‘ social aw aren ess’ and ‘social sk ills’ . In addition lo the above m easures there are n um erous self-rep o rt questionn aires on the Web offering instant ‘ E Q ’ read o u ts, typically coupled with the p rom otio n o f a con sultan cy service. An exten sive review ol available m easures bv M atthew s et al. (2 0 0 2 ) fails to find evidence ol con vergent validity (trian gulation ). All such tech n iques arc highly ab stracted rep resentation s ol the m ulticu cd , real-tim e settin gs w here ‘em otionally in telligen t’ ju dgem en ts may occur. They also assum e that reportable em otional kn ow ledge, ju d ge m e n t o r decision s are p r e ­ d icto rs o f em otionally intelligen t action . In a real-tim e event w e m ay, fo r instance, intuitively act in an ‘em otionally in telligen t’ m anner, but be unable to re p o rt on our own or o th e rs’ em otio n s, especially on questio n s that arc gen eral, h ypoth etical, or both. Fu rth erm o re, if we acccp t a psychoanalytic p o rtrait o f reality, there is reason to believe that we often do not know w hat feelings im pel w hat action s, how ever hard we try. And when we do think we know, there is now con siderable evidence that o u r thinking is rarely, if ever, em otion free: cognition and affect in terpenetrate (Bechara et al., 2 0 0 0 ; de Sousa, 1 9 8 7 ; Fin em an , 1996, 2 0 0 3 a; Forgas, 2 0 0 0 ). . . . M easuring em otio n al in telligen ce, and assigning p eop le an ordinal value o f their w orth , is no n eutral act. A lthough em otional intelligence research ers m ight argue the niceties o f their p articu lar ap proach , and claim im partiality in m appin g an ‘ in terestin g fie ld ’ , em otional intelligence has now b eco m e ap p ro p riate d , heavily im pregn ated w ith a value stance o f the so rt: ‘high em otional intelligence is g o o d ; low em otio n al intelligence is not g o o d ’ (Finem an , 2 0 0 0 a; Paul, 199 9 ). The m apm ak er and m ap user arc com plicit in shaping the direction o f the field. This is baldly revealed in the caveats and evaluations that attend the sum m ary o f results on E Q -ty pe m easu res, and in the aggressive propagation o f the view that positive em otio n s p rodu ce ‘ w in n e rs’ and ‘sta rs’ . For G olem an , em otionally intelligent m anagers are en th usiastic, o p tim istic, hon est, e n ergetic, hopeful and persisten t;

2 8 0

S T E P H E N

F I N E M A N

they also exu d e em pathy, co m p o su re and self-assuran ce (G o le m an , 1966, 1988) — an A m ericanized p ortrait o f ‘positive m ental attitu d e’ , o r as M atthew s et al. (2 0 0 2 ) su gg est, ch aracteristics that are ‘ . . . little m ore that a dating-agency o f desirable qu alities’ (p. 531). U niversal prescrip tion s tor m anagerial su ccess have eluded research ers tor many d e cad e s, and it w ould be pru den t to regard em otional in telligen ce in such historical light. In cu rren t, popular, ren ditions o f em otional in telligen ce, the place o f ‘b a d ’ feelin gs, such as rage, jealo u sy , an xiety, guilt, b o re d o m , reven ge, disgust and h urt arc given little voice, even though these feature in many political po rtraits o f co rp o rate life and have, on occasion s, produced rem arkably successful business or organizational results evidenced in the reputation of, for instance, H enry Ford, Sam G oldw in , and Jack ‘N e u tro n ’ W elch o f G eneral F.lectric. A rguably, it w ould som etim es be em otionally intelligent to be an gry , p essim istic, h urtfu l, envious or vengeful. M ayer reflects: W hen, in the dark days o f W orld W ar II, W inston Churchill ottered the British p eop le ‘ B lood, sw eat and te a rs ’ , he w as not nice and it w as not optim istic b ut it w as arguably quite em otionally in telligent. It is for these reason s (and the fact that a century o f p erso nality research c o n tra­ dicts the likelihood) that El research ers w ho hope to som eh ow live up to the p op u lar claim s ab out su ccess by studying the positive asp ects o f personality arc likely to be disappoin ted. (M ayer, 2 0 0 1 : I 6) Paul’s sen tim en ts accord w ith this view : ‘ Should a child from a m in ority ethnic or religious gro u p be forced to en gage in trust-building activities with classm ates who tease him ? Should kids from abusive h om es teel com pelled to “share their feelings” with the entire class?’ (1 9 9 9 : 7 ). The em otional in telligence lens otters little insight into how em otio n s arc valued perfo rm ato rilv in different national cultu res and across ethnicity and gender. C u rren t applications o f em otional intelligence can be seen as a ‘discou rse tec h ­ n o lo g y ’ (Fairclough , 1 9 8 9 ), ap pro priatin g social scicntific, o r quasi-scicn tific, kn ow ­ ledge, to p ro m o te a particu lar value sy ste m , or doctrin c, on em otio n s. It is the coun tin g o f certain em otio n s that, su pp osed ly, count. Its ‘c ap tu re ’ is well described by one enthusiastic devotee — a sen ior executive in a global financial services organization: El [em otional intelligence] . . . is an evolutionary path tow ards gettin g a blend betw een acting and execu tin g tasks in a p articu lar w ay, with a spirit that pervad es everything that the organisation d oes . . . it is about gettin g peop le in the organisation to deliver the c o rp o rate values, to feel go od ab out th em selves, about cach other and m o re im portan tly , to p ro jcc t that passion to sell prod u cts in a sinccrc way. (C h apm an , 2 0 0 1: 102) The su b text here is that the em otionally less intelligent need correctin g in som e way (typically through training). E m otional intelligence is a leverage point for m ore sales. [. . .]

G ETTI N G T H E

M E A S U R E 0 F E M OTIO N

2 8 1

T h e ‘ le s s ’ e m o tio n a lly in te llig e n t are e x p o s e d to the a p p a re n t a u th o rity o f ‘ t h e ir ’ te s t s c o re — an d to a s c o r e r w h o h as a v e ste d in te re st in d e m o n stra tin g that e m o tio n a l in te llig e n c e ‘ w o r k s ’ . E m o tio n a l in te llig e n c e m e a su r e m e n t c re a te s a fo rm o f k n o w le d g e th ro u g h w h ich the w o rk e r is d e fin e d , an d can also c o m e to defin e him o r h e r se lf. It re n d e r s the e m o tio n a lly in te llig e n t, an d ‘ u n in te llig e n t’ , v isib le and m o r e g o v e rn a b le (M ille r & R o s e , 1 9 9 0 ). [. . .]

R eferen ces A sh kenasy, N .M ., H a rte l, C .E .J. & Z e rb e , W. (E d s). Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory and practice. W e stp o rt, C T : Q u o ru m B o o k s, 2 0 0 0 . B a r-O n , R . The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQi): A test o f emotional intelligence. T o ron to: M u lti-H ealth S y ste m s, 1997. B a r-O n , R . E m otion al and social in telligen ce: Insights fo rm the E m otion al Q u o tie n t Inventory (E Q -i). In R . B ar-O n & J.D .A . P arker (E d s), The handbook o f emotional intelligence. San F ran cisco , C A : Jo sse y B ass, 2 0 0 0 . B a r-O n , R . & Parker, J.D .A . (E d s). The handbook o f emotional intelligence. San F ran cisco, C A : Jo sse y -B ass, 2 0 0 0 . B ech ara, A ., D am a sio , H. & D am a sio , A .R . E m o tio n , decision m akin g and the o rbitofro n tal c o r te x . Cerebral Cortex, 2 0 0 0 , 10, 2 9 5 —307. B oyatzis, R .E ., G o le m a n , D. & R h ee, K .S . C lu ste rin g c o m p e te n ce in em otio n al in telli­ ge n ce . In R . B ar-O n & J.D .A . P arker (E d s), The handbook o f emotional intelligence. San F ran cisco , C A : Jo sse y -B ass, 2 0 0 0 . C h apm an , M . The emotional intelligence pocketbook. A rle sfo rd : M an agem en t Pocketb o o k s, 2 0 0 1 . C iarro c h i, J ., C h an, A ., C ap u ti, P. & R o b e rts, R . M easu rin g em otio n al in telligen ce. In J. C iarro c h i, J.P. F orgas & J.D . M ayer (E d s), Emotional intelligence in everyday life. P h iladelph ia, PA: P sy ch ology Press', 2 0 0 1 . C o o p e r, R .A . & Saw af, A. Executive EQ. L on d on : O rio n B u sin ess, 1977. D c D re u e , C .K .W ., W est, M .W ., Fischer, A .H . & M a c C u rtain , S. O rig in s and c o n ­ se q u e n ce s o f em o tio n s in organization al team s. In R . Payne & C .L . C o o p e r (E d s), Emotions at work. C h ich ester: W iley , 2 0 0 1 . D c So u sa, R. The rationality o f emotion. C am b rid g e , M A : M IT P re ss, 1987. D ien er, E ., Suh, E .M . & Sm ith , H .L . Su b jective w ell-b ein g: T h ree d e c ad e s o f p ro g re ss. Psychological Bulletin, 1 9 9 9 , 125, 2 7 6 . D o m ag alsk i, T.A . E m otion in organ ization s: M ain cu rren ts. Human Relations, 1 9 9 9 , 5 2 , 833^17. F airclough , N . Language and power. H arlow : L o n gm an , 1989. Fin em an , S. An em o tio n agen da. In S. Fincm an (E d .), Emotion in organizations. L on don : Sage, 1993b. Fin em an , S. E m o tio n and organizing. In S. C le g g , C . H ardy & W. N o rd (E d s), Handbook o f organization studies. L on d on : Sage, 1996. F in em an , S. C o m m o d ify in g the em otio n ally in telligen t. In S. Fin em an (E d .), Emotion in organizations, 2nd edn . L o n d o n : Sage, 2 0 0 0 a , pp. 1 0 1 —15. Fin em an , S. E m otion al aren as re v isite d . In S. Fin cm an (E d .), Emotion in organizations, 2nd ed n . L on d on : Sage, 2 0 0 0 b , pp. 1—24. Fin em an , S. Understanding emotion at work. L on d on : Sage, 2 0 0 3 a.

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For gas, J.P. (E d .). Feeling and thinking: The role o f affect in social cognition. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity P ress, 20 0 0 . G ardner, H. Multiple intelligences. N ew York: Basic B ooks, 1993. G olem an , D. Emotional intelligence. London: B loom sbury, 1966. G olem an , D. Workinq with emotional intelligence. London: B loom sbury, 1988. H ochschild, A. The managed heart. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia, 1983. Icdem a, R ., Braithw aite, J. & Sorensen , R . T h e reification o f n um b ers: Statistics and the distance betw een self, w ork and others. British Medical Journal, 2 0 0 3 , 3 2 6 , 771. K am in, L .J. The science and politics o f IQ H arm on dsw orth : Penguin, 1997. Leidner, R . Serving h am burgers and selling insurance: G ender, w ork and identity in interactive service jo b s. Gender and Society, 1991, 5, 1 54—77. L ubyom irski, S. & Lepper, H .S . A m easure of subjective happiness: Prelim inary reliability and con struct validity. Social Indicators Research, 1999, 4 6 , 1 37—55. M atthew s, G ., Z cider, M . & R o b e rts, R .D . Emotional intelligence: Science and myth. C am bridge, M A : M IT P ress, 2002. Mayer, J .D ., C aru so , D. & Salovey, P. T h e M ultifactor Em otional Intelligence Scale: M EIS. D ep artm en t o f Psychology, U niversity o f N ew H am pshire, 1988. Mayer, J .D ., C aru so , D. & Salovey, P. Em otional intelligence m eets traditional standards for an intelligence. Intelligence, 1999, 2 7 , 2 6 7 —98. Mayer, J.D ., C iarroch i, J. & Forgas, J.P. Em otional intelligence in everyday life: An introduction. In J. C iarroch i, J.P. Forgas & J.D . M ayer (E d s), Emotional intelligence in everyday life. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology P ress, 20 0 1 . M iller, P. & R ose, N. G overn in g econ om ic life. Economy and Society, 1990, I9 ( 1), 1—31. M ontague, A. Race and IQ. N ew York: O x fo rd U niversity P ress, 1999. Parrott, G.W . & H ertel, P. R esearch m eth ods in cognition and em otion. In T. D algleish & M . Power (E d s), Handbook o f coqnition and emotion. C h ich ester: W ilcv, 1999. Paul, A .M . Promotional intelligence. Salo n .co m , 1999. Available at: h ttp ://a r c h iv e .s a lo n , com / b o o k s /it / 1 9 9 9 / 0 6 / 2 8 /e m o tio n a l/p rin t.h tm l R eason, P. & Bradburv, H. (E ds). Handbook o f action research — Participative enquiry and practice. London: Sage, 2000. Sturdy, A. K now ing the unknow able? — D iscussion of m eth odological and theoretical issues in em otion research and organizational studies. Organization, 2 0 0 3 , 10, 81 —105. Talwar, J.T . Fast food, fast track. Boulder, C O : W estview P ress, 2002. W asko, J. Understanding Disney: The manufacture o f fantasy. M alden, M A: Blackw ell, 2001. W eiss, H .M . & B rief, A.P. Affect at w ork: A h istorical persp ective. In R .L . Payne & C .L . C o o p e r (E d s), Emotions at work. C h ichester: W iley, 2 0 0 1 .

Chapter

32

Charlie L. Reeve, Steven G.Rogelberg, Christiane Spitzmiiller and Natalie DiGiacomo THE CARING-KILLING

PARADOX

E u th a n a s ia -re la te d s tra in a m on g a n im a l-s h e lte r w o rk e rs

It’ s very difficult w hen we are inundated from spring until fall. Every single p erso n who w alks through the d o o r has one m ore litter o f kittens. And you only have X n u m b er o f cages in your facility, and they arc already full. So the anim al may com e in the front d o o r and go out the back d o o r in a b arrel. (Sh elter em ploy ee, as re p o rte d in Arluke & Sand ers, 1996) I think it’ s [anim al euthanasia] m ade m e an angry p e rso n . I w ant to be alone m o st ol the tim e. I drink som etim es to num b the stress o f the day. I eat and sleep m o re than I feel I need. I used to feel that my w ork w as helping “ save” the w orld. N o t anym ore. It d o e sn ’ t seem

to end.

Although I believe that euthanasia isn ’t the w orst thing that can happen to an an im al, it’ s taking a toll on my life! (A non ym ous shelter em ploy ee, perso n al com m un ication, A pril 6, 2 0 0 2 )

T

HE

M A GN ITU DE

OF

PET

OVERPOPULATION

in the U nited

States ap pears to m ake anim al euthanasia a tragic and n ecessary reality. Each

year, an estim ated 4 to 12 m illion com pan ion anim als are euthanized (cf. “ H SU S pet overpopu lation e stim a te s,” 2 0 0 0 ; N assar, Talboy, & M o ulton , 1992; O lso n , 199 0 ). Although som e have m edical p rob lem s severe enough to preclu de ad option and w arran t euthanasia, m any o f the anim als euthanized are healthy but unw anted. M o st typically, the job o f perfo rm in g euthanasia on unw anted anim als falls in the hands o f anim al-sh elter w ork ers. Though no large-scale effort has been m ade to investigate this p op u lation , n um erous eth nographic investigations and m edia re p o rts have suggested that individuals perfo rm in g anim al euthanasia are at increased risk o f em otional m ism an agem en t, physical ailm ents such as high blood

2 8 4

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L.

RE E VE ,

ET

AL.

pressure and u lcers, unresolved g rie f, depression , as well as substance abuse and even suicide (e .g ., A rluke, 1994; A rluke & Sand ers, 1996; Fogle & A brah am son, 1 990; F ro m m e r & A rluke, 1999; H art & M ader, 1 9 9 5 ;R o llin , 1986; San d ers, 1995; “Sh elter w o rk e rs,” 2 0 0 0 ). T h ese an ecdotal re p o rts certainly seem to su gg e st that sh elter w ork ers are experien cin g a severe form o f w ork strain stem m in g from w hat A rluke (1 9 9 4 ) calls a caring—killing paradox. That is, il suitable hom es arc n ot found in a tim clv m anner, shelter w ork ers arc cxp cctcd to euthanize anim als for which they have been p rovid ­ ing carc and p ro te ctio n . C on sisten t with this notion, Rollin (1 9 8 6 ) argued that shelter w ork ers arc e x p o sed to a type o f stresso r qualitatively different from the typical types o f physical, task, and ro le-p rocess stre sso rs studied in the w ork -stress literature: a “m o ral” stressor. N am ely , shelter w ork ers, m o st o f w hom en ter the occupation because they w ant to help anim als (R ollin , 1 9 8 6 ), are faced with a daily con tradiction betw een their ideal occupation al selves (i.e ., p ro te c to rs o f anim als) and the reality o f having to kill healthy but unw anted anim als. The cffects o f this stre sso r are likely to be am plified given the social stigm a attached to the killing o f com panion anim als. T h ere is reason to believe that the thousands o f peop le charged with p e r fo r m ­ ing anim al euthanasia in the U nited States arc a potentially at-risk population. In view o f the m agn itude o f the pet overpopu lation p ro b lem , lim itations on g o v e rn ­ m ental and private funding for the creation o f shelter facilities, and the persistence o f pet abandonm en t and relin quish m en t, the need for p erform in g euthanasia is unlikely to d ecrease in the n ear future. Taken together, it behooves applied psy ch o l­ ogists to ad dress the dearth o f substantive em pirical research aim ed at u n d erstan d ­ ing and helping individuals and sh elter m anagem en t deal with euthanasia-related issues. As the first quantitative investigation o f this top ic, the p u rp o se o f the currcn t study is to gain prelim in ary em pirical eviden ce of the prevalen ce and co rrelates o f euthanasia-related strain am on g shelter w ork ers. As any single field study in a new area o f inquiry can m ake only lim ited advances, a secon dary p u rp o se o f this study is to sensitize the applied research com m un ity to this unique population and to provide a stepp ing stone for the additional research required to understand fully the psych ological ram ifications o f perfo rm in g anim al euthanasia. [. . .]

D iscussion The cu rren t study show s evidence that anim al euthanasia is an im p ortan t source o f jo b strain for anim al-sh elter em ploy ees. F irst, w hen asked, m o st em ployees re p o rte d feelin g strain as a result o f their involvem ent w ith euthanasia. The prevalence o f these E R S p ercep tion s su p p o rts the suggestion by p rio r qualitative studies that euthanasia is a significant stre sso r for anim al-sh elter em ployees. Further, am on g a grou p o f peop le w ho all w ork in the sam e gen eral sheltering en vironm en t, the resu lts show a clear pattern o f differences in stress and w ell-being betw een those w ho are involved directly w ith euthanasia and those w ho are not directly involved. M ost notably, those w ho are directly involved in euthanasia re p o rte d

significantly

higher

levels

of

w ork

stre ss,

stress-related

som atic

TH E

C A R I N G - K I L L I N G

P A R A D O X

2 8 5

complaints, and WFC, and lower levels of satisfaction with the work that they actually do. Likewise, among those who are engaged in euthanasia, the results demonstrate that perceived ERS was correlated significantly to a number of well-being-related outcomes beyond that resulting from the variance shared with generalized work stress. Taken as a whole, these results, which are summarized in Table 1, indicate that among individuals for whom conducting animal euthanasia is part of their job, it is a salient, unique source of work stress that has a negative impact on their w'cll-bcing. These findings should be of additional importance to shelter management in that poor physical and affective well-being can lead to absenteeism and turnover (Chen & Spcctor, 1992; Hendrix Ovallc, & Troxlcr, 1985; Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). It is interesting to note that there was variability on ERS and the well-being indexes for employees involved in euthanasia activities. This suggests that not all employees arc affected by euthanasia involvement to the same extent. The observed diversity of reactions to a common stressor is not surprising and is consistent with a body of research from differential psychology in general, and work stress in particular, showing that the appraisal of a stressor as a threat depends on one’s T a b le 1 Sum m ary o f H ypotheses and R esults Hypothesis

cant findings

Individuals involved in euthanasia activities,

M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant

com p ared to shelter w ork ers not involved in euthanasia activities, w ill e x p e rie n ce m ore

differences in gen eral job stress,

w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic com plain ts, substan ce use, w ork stre ss, and

w ork-to-fam ily conflict, overall job satisfaction , and satisfaction with w ork itself, but not substan ce use

less job satisfaction Perceived F R S w ill be associated positively

Fully su p p orted

with w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic com plain ts, and substan ce u se ; and negatively w ith overall job satisfaction. Individuals w ho perceive higher levels o f

Fully su p p o rte d

E R S w ill re p o rt higher overall stress. Perceived E R S w ill be associated positively with w ork-to-fam ily con flict, som atic com plain ts, and substance u se ; and negatively w ith overall job satisfaction after

M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant

con trollin g for the variance as a resu lt o f overall w ork stress.

substance use

A ttitudes tow ard the n ecessity o f euthanasia (scored positively) will be correlated

M ostly su p p o rte d ; significant correlatio n s w ith E R S , overall job

negatively w ith E R S and positively w ith in dicators o f w ell-being.

satisfaction , w ork-to-fam ily conflict,

correlatio n s w ith overall job satisfaction , w ork-to-fam ily conflict, and som atic com p lain ts, but not

and som atic com p lain ts, but not substance use

Note. ERS = cuthanasia-relatcd strain.

2 8 6

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L.

RE E VE ,

ET

AL.

personal resou rces (L azarus & Folkm an, 198 4 ). A variety o f personal and organ iza­ tio n al/situ atio n al facto rs have reliable and im portan t influences on the propensity to e x p erien ce stress and the ability to cope with stre ss, presum ably by buffering or depletin g o n e ’s p erso n al reso u rces. The cu rrcn t analyses su ggest that variance in E R S and w ell-being is associated w ith individual, w ork , and organizational differences. For instance, we found that e m p lo y e e s’ attitudes towrard euthanasia w ere associated significantly writh perceived E R S. Individuals w ho arc m o re apt to evaluate euthanasia as n ecessary and ac c e p t­ able, given the m agn itude o f the overpopu lation o f unw anted p e ts, appear to p crccivc experien cin g less strain from their euthanasia involvem ent. It is possible, however, that this association is a con sequen ce, rather than an an teced en t, o f differ­ ences in the euthanasia respo n se. That is, those w ho have difficulty dealing with euthanasia may eventually develop negative attitudes tow ard it, w hereas those who do n ot e x p erien ce E R S may com e to hold a m ore positive evaluation o f the ac ce p t­ ability o f euthanasia. C learly, the ro les o f m any m ore individual differences in explain in g variation in E R S necessitate investigation. For p ragm atic reason s, the curren t study w as lim ited in the n u m b er o f scales that could be adm in istered to participan ts w ho w ere “ on the fly” at these con feren ces. This is clearly a lim itation o f the cu rrcn t study. H ow ever, we m ade the decision to forgo the assessm ent o f many o f these variables in the in terest o f increasing o u r respo nse rale , believing it m ore im portan t to gain reliable inform ation about a little rather than unreliable inform ation about a lot. Future research should continue to investigate association s betw een individual ch aracte r­ istics and E R S. For e xam p le, the gen eral w ork stress literatu re has indicated that a n um b er o f personality ch aracteristics (e .g ., h ardiness, locus o f con trol) arc related to differences in susceptibility to em otional and psy ch o lo gical strain, as w ell as copin g re sp o n ses (C o sta , Som erfield, & M cC rae, 1996; H ahn, 2 0 0 0 ; H avlovic & K cnnan, 1995; K obasa, 1982; K rohn e, 1996; L e fc o u rt, 1992). Inform ation such as this poten tially could be used to identify em ployees w ho may be m o re resilien t (or altern atively, to screen for those w ho may be especially susceptib le) to the adverse effects o f p e rfo rm in g animal euthanasia. O u r investigation o f the w ork-related factors and w ell-being su ggests that there is a difference betw een the total am oun t o f tim e a p erso n is engaged in euthanasia and how this tim e is distributed over the cou rse o f the w ork w eek. For exam p le, the results show that the n u m b ers o f h ours engaged in euthanasia per w eek w as asso ci­ ated w ith increased substance use. Sim ilarly, the frequency o f con ductin g euthanasia w as associated positively w ith W F C . T h ese results su gg est that the m ore a p erso n is engaged in euthanasia overall, the w orse the im pact on w ell-being. O n the other hand, am ong those w ho perform euthanasia, the im pact on w ell­ being ap pears to be associated w ith differences in how sh elters schedule this tim e. That is, those w ho engage in fewer, lon ger session s re p o rt less substance use and W F C com pared to those w ho con duct m ore frequ en t, sh o rter session s. T his may suggest that frequen t, sh o rt euthanasia sessions arc m ore em otionally taxin g in the aggregate than in frequen t, but lon ger sessions. Findings such as these clearly indi­ cate the need for further, m ore detailed investigations o f the ram ifications o f vari­ ations in euthanasia w ork p rocesses. The results also indicate that organizational differences are associated with

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differences in well-being. Specifically, the pattern o f results indicated that shelter type (private vs. g o v e rn m e n t/m u n icip al) w as associated with differences prim arily in w ork satisfaction in dicators, w hereas sh elter size w as associated prim arily with stress-related indicators (e .g ., E R S, overall stre ss, W F C ). W hile the cu rrcn t study is not able to investigate the specific shelter facto rs that arc associated w ith these differen ces, the finding that organizational size w as inversely associated with stress-related indicators of w’ell-bcing is consisten t with o u r initial suggestion that larger sh elters may have m ore social and financial re so u rce s to help em ploy ees deal effectively with E R S (e .g ., shelter size m ay act as a proxy for variables that may m od erate or directly influence the cx p c ric n c c o f stre ss). H ow ever, future research w ill be needed to identify specific ch aracteristics associated w ith these ou tcom es. As stated earlier, this study w'as seen as an effort to lay a foundation for further study, rather than an attem p t for a com prehen sive assessm en t o f all euthanasiarelated influences. Although a full discussion o f potential future research in this area is w ell beyond the scope o f this paper, wc provide a fcwr su ggestion s for general directions. F irst, staying w ithin the organizational psychology fram ew ork from wrhich w'e ap proach ed this study, future research can be thought o f as em phasizing either breadth or depth. That is, one stream o f future research n eeds to expan d the breadth o f the n exus o f variables associated with E R S. For in stance, a variety o f organizational-level variables m ight be related to differen ces in the am bient level o f E R S across organizations. Likew ise, as pointed out earlier, future studies need lo b etter sam ple the dom ain o f individual differences lo b e tter understand the full range o f an teced en ts o f E R S. M oreover, the potential fo r interactions and p e rso n — environm ent co rresp o n d en ce requires investigation. O n the oth er hand, rath er than casting a w ide n et, it also w ould be useful (or future stud ies to take a m o re focu sed , in-depth approach by focusin g on a sm aller sam ple (e .g ., a single sh elter) across tim e and using a full range o f research tech ­ niques (e .g ., su rv ey s, in terv iew s, w ork place ob servation , ex p e rie n ce sam pling tech niques, exp erim en tal d esign s). As one e xam p le, additional in terview s w'ith som e o f the participan ts regardin g how m anagem en t can help em ploy ees su ggests that the follow ing interventions may be w orth studying for their poten tial to redu ce E R S o r its effects: (a) establishing internal su p p o rt o r discussion g ro u p s; (b ) provi­ sion o f profession al coun selin g; (c) m anagem ent sp on sorsh ip o f self-care behaviors (e .g ., vouch ers o r discoun ts to health clubs, spon sored non-wrork gath erin gs or en tertain m en t, scheduling “quiet tim e” into w o rk e rs’ sch ed u les); (d) job redesign (e .g ., rotation o f d u ties); (e) increased euthanasia technical training; and (f) public aw areness initiatives (e .g ., in creased focus on the prevention o f anim al o verp op u la­ tion , gen eral public education o f euthanasia policies and p ro ce d u re s). A focused approach , though lim ited in other rc sp c c ts, is an ap p ro p riate way to evaluate the effectiveness o f in terven tion s such as these. Secon d, w'e believe that the investigation o f anim al-sh elter em ployees affords an opp ortu n ity to apply a variety o f theoretical persp ectives. To take but a single exam ple from the m anagem en t literatu re, A shlorth and K re in e r’ s (1 9 9 9 ) m o d el o f dirty w ork w ould seem highly applicable lo this population . In addition to the personal stru gg le lo deal with and recon cile the carin g— killing p arad o x, shelter w ork ers as a gro u p are often confronted with the social stigm a o f doing dirty work; that is, w ork that is m and ated , yet m orally stigm atized by society (H u gh es, 1951,

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196 2 ). By engaging in w ork that is regarded as m orally tainted (e .g ., “sinful”) by society , negative attribu tions likely may be attached to shelter w ork ers them selves, w hich, in tu rn , may add m ore strain by fru stratin g their desire to co n stru ct a positive sense o f sell and to seek social validation (A sh forth & K rciner, 1999). The point here is that this is m erely one o f many valuable th eoretical p ersp ectiv es that poten tially could be b rough t to b ear on this issue to b etter un derstand the ram ifica­ tions o f euthanasia-related w ork. Finally, over the past three decad es, anim al-w elfare issu es ap pear to have m oved from the fringe into the m ainstream o f social con science. This m akes salient questions such as w hether increased social aw areness increases or decreases the stress o f euthanasia-related w ork. O n the one hand, perhaps increased aw areness alleviates stress as a resu lt o f gre ater public understan ding o f the role that shelter w ork ers play and the p rob lem s they face, as well as increasing don ation s and volun teer help. O n the other hand, perhaps gre ater aw areness enhances the stress by increasing the saliency o f the social stigm a attached to this w ork. Likew ise, shelter w ork ers m ight e xp erien ce a sense o f h opelessn ess if they perceive increased social con cern , but fail to ob serve a con com itan t decrease in pet overpopu lation. We believe that the m yriad o f research questions that rem ain w ill require m ulti-disciplinary answ ers. Many o f these questio n s require an in tegrated co n sid er­ ation and understan ding o f social p ro b lem s, w orkplace dynam ics, individual m ental health, death and dying, anim al handling, and hum an-anim al in teractions. C learly, this requires exten din g the um brella o f participation lo fields outside o f psychology, such as socio lo gy , thanatology, and ethics. A lbeit based on lim ited e x p o su re , we believe that our colleagues across psychology and other social sciences w ill be pleasantly su rp rise d with how w illing the anim al-sh eltering com m unity is to e m b racc re se arc h e rs’ ideas and to participate in substantive research endeavors. This study is the first system atic attem p t to investigate quantitatively the im pact ot animal euthanasia on shelter w o rk e rs’ w ell-being. T h e findings d em on strate that euthanasia-related w ork is significantly related to a n u m b er o f w ell-being ou tcom es o f accepted im p ortan ce in applied psych ology. Further, the com parative analyses betw een those w ho arc and those w ho arc n ot subjected to euthanasia-related activities at w ork show substantial ditfcrences in various indicators o f well-being. Taken together, these results suggest that un derstan din g and w orking to am eliorate or cope with E R S is o f im p ortan ce, not only for individual w ell-being, but for organizational effectiveness as w ell.

References Arluke, A. (1 9 9 4 ). Managing em otions in an animal shelter. In A. Manning & J. Serpell (E ds.), Animals and human society (pp. 145—165). New York, NY: Routledge. Arluke, A ., & Sanders, C. R. (1 9 9 6 ). The institutional self o f shelter w orkers. In A. Arluke & C. R. Sanders (E ds.), Regarding animals (pp. 82—106). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Ashforth, B. E ., & Kreiner, G. E. (1 9 9 9 ). “ How can you do it?” D irty w ork and the challenge of constructing a positive identity. Academy o f Management Review, 24, 4 13-434.

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Chen, P. Y., & Spector, P. E. (1 9 9 2 ). Relationships o f w ork stressors with aggression , w ithdraw al, theft, and substance abuse. Journal o j Occupational and Organizational Psychology', 65, 177—184. C o sta, P. T ., Som erfield, M . R ., & M cC rae, R. R. (1 9 9 6 ). Personality and coping: A recon ceptualization . In M . Z cidn cr & N . S. Endlcr (E d s.), Handbook o f coping: Theory, research, applications (pp. 4 4 —6 1 ). N ew York, NY: John W iley and Sons. Fogle, B ., & A braham son, D. (1 9 9 0 ). Pet loss: A survey o f the attitudes and feelings o f practicing veterinarians. Antrhozoos, 3, 143—150. From m cr, S. S ., & A rluke, A. (1 9 9 9 ). Loving them to death: Blam e-displacing strategies of animal shelter w ork ers and su rren dercrs. Society and Animals, 7, 1—16. H ahn, S. E. (2 0 0 0 ). The effects o f locus of control on daily e xp o su re, coping, and reactivity to w ork in terperson al stre sso rs: A diary study. Personality and Individual Differences, 29, 7 2 9 - 7 4 8 . H art, L. A ., & M ader, B. (1 9 9 5 ). Pretense and hidden feelings in the hum ane society environm ent: A sou rce o f stress. Psychological Reports, 77, 554. Ilavlovic, S. J ., & Keenan, J. P. (1 9 9 5 ). C op in g with w ork stress: The influence o f individual differences. In R . C randall & P. L. Pcrrcw c (E d s.), Occupational stress: A handbook (pp. 179—192). W ashington, D C : Taylor & Francis. H en drix, W. H ., O valle, N. K ., & Troxler, R. G. (1 9 8 5 ). Behavioral and physiological con sequen ces of stress and its antecedent factors. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 70, 1 88-201. H SUS pet overpopulation estimates. (2 0 0 0 ). R etrieved February 18, 2 0 0 0 , from h t t p :/ / w w w .h su s.o rg /p r o g r a m s/c o m p a n io n / o v e rp o p u la tio n /o p_faq.h tm l H ughes, E. C . (1 9 5 1 ). W ork and the self. In J. H. R oh rcr & M . Sh erif (E d s.), Social psychology at the crossroads (pp. 31 3—323). N ew York, NY: H arper and Brothers. H ughes, E. C. (1 9 6 2 ). G ood peop le and dirty w ork. Social Problems, 10, 3—11. K obasa, S. C. (1 9 8 2 ). The hardy personality: Toward a social psychology o f stress and health. In J. Suls & G. S. Sanders (E d s.), The social psychology o f health and illness (pp. 3—32). H illsdale, N J: Law rence Erlbaum . Krohne, H. W. (1 9 9 6 ). Individual differences in coping. In M . Z cid n cr & N. S. Endlcr (E d s.), Handbook o j coping: Theory, research, applications (pp. 381—4 0 9 ). N ew York, NY: John W iley and Sons. Lazarus, R . S ., & Folkm an, S. (1 9 8 4 ). Stress, appraisal, and coping. N ew York, NY: Springer. L cfco u rt, H. M . (1 9 9 2 ). Perceived con trol, personal effectiveness, and em otional states. In B. N. C arp en ter (E d .), Personal coping: Theory, research, and application (pp. 111—11 3). N ew York, NY: Praegcr. N assar, R ., Talboy, J., & M oulton, C. (1 9 9 2 ). Animal shelter reporting study: 1990. E nglew ood, N J: A m erican H um ane A ssociation. O lso n , P. N. (1 9 9 0 ). C on cern ed about euthanasia of healthy h om eless anim als. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 196, 10. R ollin, B. E. (1 9 8 6 ). Euthanasia and m oral stress. Loss, Grief, and Care, 7 , 1 1 5—126. Sand ers, C. R . (1 9 9 5 ). K illing with kindness: Veterinary euthanasia and the social con struction o f perso n h ood . Sociological Forum, 10, 195—214. Shelter w ork ers suffer from dealing in death. (2 0 0 0 , May 15). The Washington Times, p. A2. W righ t, T. A ., & C ropanzano, R. (1 9 9 8 ). Em otional exhaustion as a p red ictor o f job p erform an ce and voluntary turnover. Journal o f Applied Psychology', 83, 4 8 6 4 9 3 .

Chapter

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Allen C. Smith, III and Sherryl Kleinman M A N A G I N G E M O T I O N S IN M EDICAL SCHOOL S tu d e n ts ' c o n ta c ts w ith the living and the dead

H ow do I set aside 25 years o f living? E xp erien ce w hich m ade close contact w ith so m e o n e ’s body a sensual event? M aybe it’ s attraction , m aybe disgust. But it isn ’t su p p osed to be part o f what I feel w hen I touch a patient. 1 feel som e o f those things, and I w ant lo learn not to. (T hird-year, m ale m edical stu d en t.)

T

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m edicin e; vet no co u rses in the m edical curriculum deal directly with em otion

m an agem en t, specifically learnin g to change o r elim inate in app rop riate feelings (H ochschild 1983). Rather, tw o years o f participan t observation in a m edical school revealed that discussion o f the stu d e n ts’ feelings is tab oo; their developm en t tow ard em otional n eutrality rem ains p art o f the hidden cu rricu lu m . U n der great pressure to prove them selves w orthy o f en terin g the p rofession , students are afraid to adm it that they have u n com fortab le feelings about patien ts or p ro ced u res, and hide those feelings behind a “cloak o f co m p e te n ce ” (H aas and Shaffir 1977, 1982). Beneath their surface p resen tatio n s, how do students deal w ith the “un profession al” feelings they brin g over from the perso n al realm ? B ccausc faculty m e m b e rs do n ot address the p ro b lem , students are left with an individualistic ou tlook : they c x p c c t to get con trol o f them selves through sheer w illpow er. D esp ite the silence surroun din g this to p ic, the faculty, the cu rricu lu m , and the organization o f m edical school do provide stud en ts with resou rces for dealing with their prob lem . T h e cultu re o f m edicine that in form s teaching and provides the feeling ru les also offers unspoken su p p o rts for dealing with unw anted em otio ns. Students draw on asp ects o f their e xp erien ce in m edical sch ool to m anage their

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em otio ns. T h eir strategies include tran sform in g the patient o r the procedure into an analytic ob ject o r event, accentuating the co m fo rtab le feelings that com e from learning and practicin g “ real m ed icin e,” blam ing patients, em pathizing with patients, joking, and avoiding sensitive con tact. [. . .)

The studen ts’ problem As they en coun ter the hum an b ody, stud en ts c x p cricn cc a variety o f u n com fortab le feelings including em b arrassm en t, disgu st, and arousal. M edical sch oo l, however, offers a b arrie r against these feelings by providing the anesthetic effect o f long h ours and academ ic pressure. You know the sto ry . O n call every third night, and stay in the hospital late m o st other evenings. I d o n ’t know how y o u ’re su p p o sed to think w hen y o u ’re that tired , but you d o, plod through the day insensitive to everything. (T hird-year m ale) W ell before en tering m edical sch oo l, students learn that their training w ill involve constant pressure and continuing fatigue. Popular sto ries prepare them for social isolation, the im possibility o f learn ing everything, long h ou rs, test anxiety, and the fact that m edical school w ill perm eate their lives (B ecker, G eer, H ugh es, and Strauss 1961). T h ese difficulties and the sacrifices that they entail legitim ate the special status o f the p rofession the students are entering. They also blunt the stu d e n ts’ em otio n al responses. Yet u n com fortab le feelings break through. T h rough out the p ro g ram , students face provocative situations— so m e p redictab le, oth ers surprising. They find p arts of their training, particularly dissection and the au top sy , bizarre o r im m oral when seen from the persp ective they had “ for 25 y e ars” b efore enterin g m edical school. D oing the pelvis, w e cut it across the w aist. . . . Big saw s! The m ad scientist! People w ou ld n ’ t believe w hat w e did in there. The cracking sound! T h at day w as m ore than anxiety. We w ere really violating that p erso n . . . D raw n and qu artered . (First-year m ale) I did my autopsy 10 days ago. That shook m e o ff m y feet. N othin g could have prepared m e for it. The person w as my age . . . She ju st looked (pause) asleep. N o t like the cadaver. Fluid, b lo o d , sm ell. It sm elled like a butch er shop. And they handled it like a butch er shop. The technicians. Slice, m ove, pull, cut . . .

all the organ s, insides, pulled out in 10

m in utes. I know it’ s ab surd, but what if sh e ’s not really dead? She d o e sn ’ t look like it. (Secon d-y ear fem ale). The “ m ad scien tist” and the “b utch er” violate the stu d e n ts’ im ages o f m edicine.

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Even in m ore routine kinds o f con tact, the students so m e tim e s feel that they are ign orin g the sanctity o f the body and breaking social taboos. M uch o f the stu d e n ts’ d isco m fo rt is based on the fact that the b odies thev have con tact with arc or w ere people. Suddenly stud ents feel un certain ab out the relationship o f the p erso n to the b ody, a relationship they had previously taken tor g ran te d .

O

It felt tough when wc had to turn the w hole body over from tim e to tim e (during d issection ). It felt like real peop le. (First-year fem ale) O K . M aybe he w as a father. But the father p art is go n e. This is just the body. That sounds religious. Maybe it is. How else can I think ab out it?. (First-year m ale). W hen the p erso n is som eh ow recon n ected to the b ody, such as w hen data about the living patient w ho died is brough t into the autopsy ro o m , students feel less confident and m ore uneasy. Studen ts find con tact w ith the sexu al body particularly stressful. In the anatom y lab, in practice session s w ith other stu d en ts, and in exam inin g patien ts, students find it difficult to feel neutral as contact approach es the sexual parts o f the body. W hen you listen to the heart you have to w ork around the b reast, and m ove it to listen to one spot. I tried to do it with m inim um con tact, w ithout starin g at her tit . . . b reast . . . T h e different w ords (pause) show s I w as feeling both things at oncc. (Secon d-y ear m ale) Though they arc rarely arou sed , students w orry that they w ill be. They feel guilty, know ing that sexuality is p ro scrib ed in m cdicinc, and they feel em b arrassed . M ost con tact involves som e feelin gs, but contact with the sexual body p resen ts a bigger p ro b le m . [. . . ] Studen ts also feel d isgust. They see feces, sm ell vom it, touch w ounds, and hear bone saw s, en coun terin g m any repulsive details w ith all o f their senses. O n e patient w as really g ro ss! He had som eth ing that kept him standing, and coughing all the tim e. C oughin g ph legm , and that really b oth ers m e. G ro ss! Ju st som eth in g I d o n ’t like. Som e sm elled real bad. I d id n ’t w ant to exam ine their axillae. Stinking arm p its! It w as just not so m e ­ thing I w anted to do. (Secon d-y ear fem ale). W hen the ugliness is tied to living patients, the aesthetic problem is especially difficult. O n open ing the bow els o f the cadaver, for exam p le, students perm it them selves som e silent exp ressio n s o f d isco m fo rt, but even a w ince is unacceptable w ith repugn an t living patients.

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To m ake m atters w orse, stud en ts learn early on that they are not supp osed to talk about their feelings w ith faculty m em b ers o r other students. Feelings rem ain private. T h e silence en courages students to think about their problem as an individual m atter, extran eou s to the “real w ork” o f m edical school. They speak of “screw in g up your co u rag c ,” “gettin g con trol o f y o u rse lf,” “being tough en o u gh ,” and “putting feelings asid e .” They w orry that the faculty w ould con sider them in com peten t and unprofession al if thcv adm itted their prob lem . I w ould be em b arrassed to talk ab out it. You’re su pp osed to be p r o ­ fessional here. Like th e re ’s an un w ritten rule about how to talk. (First-year fem ale)

The “un w ritten ru le ” is relaxed enough so m e tim e s to p erm it discussion, but the privacy that su rrou n ds these rare occasion s su ggests the d egree to w hich the taboo exists. At tim e s, stud ents signal their un com fortab le feelin gs— rolling their eyes, turning aw ay, and sw eating— but such con firm ation is lim ited. E xem plifyin g plu ral­ istic ignoran ce, each stud ent feels unrealistically inadequate in com parison with peers (yet an oth er u n com fortab le feelin g). Believing that other students are hand­ ling the problem b e tter than they are, each student m anages his or her feelings privately, only vaguely aw are that all students face the sam e prob lem . [. . .]

Emotion m anagem ent strategies How do stud ents m anage their u n com fortab le and “in app rop riate” feelings? The deafening silcn cc surroun din g the issue keeps them from defining the problem as shared, or from w orking out com m on solutio n s. They cannot develop strategics collectively, but their solutions arc not individual. Rather, students use the same b asic em otion m anagem en t strategics b ccausc social n o rm s, faculty m o d e ls, cu rricu lar p rio ritie s, and official and unofficial exp ectation s provide them with uniform guidelines and re so u rc e s for m anagin g their feelings.

Transform ing the contact Students feel u n com fortab le b ecause they are m aking physical con tact w ith people in ways they w ould usually define as ap p ro p riate only in a p erso n al co n te x t, o r as in­ ap pro priate in any co n te x t. T h eir m o st com m on solution to this problem is cogn i­ tive (H och schild 1979; Th oits 198 5 ). M entally they tran sform the body and their contact w ith it into som eth in g entirely different from the con tacts they have in their perso nal lives. Students tran sform the p erso n into a set o f eso teric body p arts and change their intim ate con tact w ith the body into a m echanical or analytic prob lem . I just told m yself, “ O K , d o c, y o u ’re here to find out w h at’ s w ron g, and that includes the axillae (a rm p its).” And I detach a little, redu ce the p erso n for a m om en t . . . Focus real hard on the detail al hand, the

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fact, o r the p roced u re o r the question. Like w ith the cadaver. Focus on a vessel. Isolate dow n to w hatever y o u ’re doing. (Secon d-y ear fem ale) [. . .] Students also tran sform the m om en t o f con tact into a co m p lex intel­ lectual puzzle, the kind o f challenge they faced successfully during previous years o f schooling. They in terp ret details accord in g to logical pattern s and algorith m s, and find answ ers as thev m aster the ru les. [. . .) The patient is really like a math w ord prob lem . You break it dow n into little pieces and put them together. The facts you get from a history and physical, from the labs and chart. They fit togeth er, on ce you begin to see how to do it . . . It’s an in tellectual challenge. (T hird -year fem ale) D efining con tact as a part o f scientific m edicine m akes the students feel safe. They are fam iliar w ith and confident about science, they feel su p p o rte d by its cultural and cu rricu lar legitim acy, and they enjoy rew ards fo r dem on strating their scientific know-how. In effect, scien cc itself is an em otion m anagem en t strategy . By c o m p etin g fo r years for the highest grad e s, these stud en ts have learned to separate their feelings from the substance o f their classes and to con ccn tratc on the im person al facts o f the sub ject m atter. In m cdical school they use these “educational skills” not only for academ ic su ccess b ut also for em otion m anagem en t. [. . .] The scientific, clinical language that the students learn also su p p o rts intellectualization. It is c o m p le x , e so te ric, and devoid o f perso nal m eanings. “ Palpating the ab do m en ” is less p erso nal than “feelin g the b e lly .” [■ ■ ■] Further, the stru ctu re o f the language, as in the stan dard fo rm at for the p re se n ­ tation o f a case, helps the stud ents to think and speak im personally. Sccon d-ycar students learn that there is a routine, acccptablc way to su m m arize a patient: ch icf com plain t, h istory o f presen t illn ess, past m edical history, family history, social history, review o f sy stem s, physical findings, list o f p ro b lem s, m edical plan. In many situations they m ust redu ce the sequen ce to a tw o- o r three-m inute sum m ary. Faculty m e m b e rs praise the students for their ability to presen t the details quickly. M edical language labels and conveys clinical in fo rm ation , and it leads the students away from their em otion s. Tran sform ation so m e tim e s involves changing the body into a nonhum an ob ject. Students think o f the body as a m achine or as an anim al sp ecim en , and recall earlier, com fortab le e x p erien ces in w orking on that kind o f ob ject. T h e body is no longer provocative b ecause it is no lon ger a body. A fter we had the skin o ff (the cadaver), it w as pretty m uch like a cat or som ething. It w asn ’t pleasan t, but it w asn ’ t hum an either. (F irst-year fem ale) (The pelvic exam ) is pretty m uch like checking a broken toaster. Il isn ’ t a prob lem . I’ m go o d at that kind o f thing. (Secon d-year m ale)

M A NA G I NG

EMOTIONS

IN

M E D I C A L

SCHOOL

2 9 5

You can ’ t tell w hat’ s w ron g w ithout looking under the hood. It’s d if­ ferent w hen I’m talking w ith a patient. But when I’m exam ining them it ’s like an au tom o bile engine . . . T h e re ’ s a bad con n otation with that, but it’ s literally what I m ean. (T hird-year m ale) [. . .] T h e

curriculum

su p p o rts

these

dehum anizing

tran sform ation s

by

elim inating the person in m o st o f the stu d e n ts’ con tact w ith the b ody. C on tact is usually in direct, based on ph otograph s, X -rays (and several new er tech n o lo gies), clinical re c o rd s, d iag ram s, and w ritten w ords. Studen ts w ould have to m ake an effo rt to recon n ect these im ages to the peop le they rem otely rep resen t. [. . .]

A ccen tu atin g the positive As we hinted in the previous section , tran sform in g body contact into an analytic event d o c s not m erely rid stud ents o f their un com fortab le feelings, producin g n eutrality. It often gives them op p o rtu n ities to have good feelings ab out what they are doing. T h eir com fortab le feelings include the excitem en t o f practicin g “real m ed icin e,” the satisfaction o f learn in g, and the prid e o f living up to m edical ideals. Students identify m uch o f their con tact w ith the body as “real m e d icin e ,” assertin g that such con tact separates m edicine from other profession s. As contact begin s in dissection and contin ues through the third-year clinical clerksh ips, students feel excited about their p rogress. [. . .] This (dissection ) is the p art that is really m cdical school. N o t like any other school. It feels like an initiation rite, som eth in g like when I joined a fraternity. We w ere really go in g to w ork on peop le. (First-vcar m ale) [. . .] Eventually stud en ts see con tact as their responsibility and their right, and forget the sen se o f privilege they felt at the beginning. Still, som e excitem en t retu rn s as they take on clinical responsibility in the third year. All o f these feelings can displace the d isco m fo rt which also attends m o st contact. C on tact also provides a com pellin g basis fo r several kinds o f learnin g, all o f w hich the stud ents value. They sense that they learn som eth in g im p ortan t in co n ­ tact, som eth in g rich cr than the “dry facts” o f tex tb o o k s and lcctu rcs. Physicians, they believe, rely on tou ch , not on te x t. [. . .]

L a u g h in g ab o u t it [. . .] By redefining the situation as at least partially h u m oro u s, students reassure them selves that they can handle the challenge. They believe that the problem can ’t be so serio u s if there is a funny side to it. Jokin g also allow s them to relax a little and to set ideals aside for a tim e. W here do students learn lo joke in this way? The faculty, including the residen ts (w ho are the real teach ers on the clinical team s), participate freely,

2 9 6

A L L E N

C. S M I T H ,

III

AND

S H E R R Y L

K L E I N M A N

leach in g the stud ents that h um or is an acceptable way to talk about uncom fortable en cou n ters in m edicine. [. . .] Unlike the stu d e n ts’ other strate gie s, jok in g oc cu rs prim arily w hen they are alone w ith other m edical p rofession als. Jo k es arc acccptable in the hallw ays, over coffee, o r in ph ysicians’ w o rk ro o m s, but usually are un acceptable w hen ou tsid ers m ight overhear. Jo kin g is b ackstage behavior. Early in their training, students so m e tim e s m ake jok es in public, perhaps to strengthen their identity as “m edical stu d e n t,” but m o st h um or is in-house, reserv ed fo r those w ho share the problem and have a sen se o f h um or about it.

Avoiding the contact Students som etim es avoid the kinds o f con tact that give rise to unw anted em otions. They con trol the visual field during con tact, and elim inate o r abbreviate particular kinds o f con tact. [. . .] K eepin g perso nal body p arts covered in the lab and in exam in ation s prevents m old , m aintains a sterile field, and p rotects the p atien t’s m odesty. C overs also elim inate disturb in g sites and p ro te c t students from their feelings. Such nonprofession al p u rp o se s are som etim es m ost im p o rtan t. Som e stu d en ts, for exam p le, exam ine the b reasts by reaching under the p atien t’s gow n , b ypassing the visual exam in ation em ph asized in training. [. . .]

Conclusion M edical students som etim es feel attracted to o r d isgusted by the hum an body. They w ant to do som eth in g about these feelin gs, but they find that the topic is taboo. Even am on g th em selves, stud en ts generally refrain from talking about their prob lem . Yet despite the silen ce, the culture and the organization o f m edical school provide stud en ts with su p p o rts and guidelines lo r m anaging their em otions. A ffective socialization p ro ce ed s w ith no d eliberate co n tro l, but with profoun d effect. [. . .] The . . . em otion m an agem en t strategies used by the stud en ts illustrate the cultu re o f m odern W estern m cdicinc. In relying on these strate gics, the students rep rod u ce that cultu re (Foucault 197 3 ), creating a new generation o f physicians w ho will su p p o rt the biom edical m odel o f m edicine and the kind o f d octor-patien t relationship in w hich the patient is too frequently dehum anized. Studen ts so m e ­ tim es criticize their teach ers for an apparen t insensitivity to their p atien ts, but they turn to desensitizing strategies them selves in their effo rt to con trol the em otio ns that m edical situation s provoke. T h ese strategies exclu d e the p atien t’s feelings, values, and social co n te x t, the im p ortan t psychosocial asp ects o f m edicine (Engel 1977; G orlin and Z u ck er 198 3 ). C on trad ictin g their previous values, students rein force biom edicin e as they rely on its em otion m anagem en t effects. ( . . . ) It w ould be unfair to con clude that m edical training is uniquely responsible for the specific character o f the stu d e n ts’ em otion m anagem en t problem and for its unspoken solution. The basic features o f the culture o f m edicine are con sistent with the w id er cultural con text in w hich m edicine exists. B iom edicine fits with the

M A NA G I NG

EMOTIONS

IN

M E D I C A L

SCHOOL

2 9 7

em phasis in W estern cultu re on rationality and scientific “ob jectiv ity .” In W estern societies the m ind is defined as su p e rio r to the body, and thoughts are defined as su p e rio r to feelings (M ills and K leinm an 1988; Tuan 1982; Turner 198 4 ). N ot surp risingly, stud en ts know the feeling ru les o f p rofession al life b elo rc they arrive at m edical sch oo l. C hildhood socialization and form al education tcach them to set aside their feelings in public, to m aster “ the fa c ts,” and to presen t them selves in intellectually defensible ways (B o w ers 1984). M edical situations provide vivid challenges, but stud ents co m e equipp ed w ith em otion m anagem en t skills that they need only to stren gth en . [. . .]

References Becker, II., B. Geer, E. Hughes and A. Strauss. 1961. Boys in White. N ew Brunswick, N J: Transaction. Bow ers, C. 1984. The Promise o f Theory: Education and the Politics o f Cultural Change. New York: Longmans. Engel, G. 1977. “The N eed for a New Medical M odel: A Challenge for Biom edicine.” Science 196(4286): 129—36. Foucault, M. 1973. The Birth o j the Clinic: An Archaeology ( j Medical Perception. N ew York: Pantheon. Gorlin, R. and II. Zucker. 1983. “ Physicians’ Reactions to Patients: A Key to Teaching 1Iumanistic M edicine.” New England Journal o j Medicine 308(18): 1 0 5 9 -6 3 . 1Iaas, J. and W. Shaffir. 1977. “The Professionalization o f Medical Students: Developing Com petence and a Cloak o f C om peten ce.” Symbolic Interaction 1:71—88. — . 1982. “Taking on the Role o f D octor: A D ram aturgical Analysis o f Professional­ ization.” Symbolic Interaction 5 :1 8 7 —203. lloch sch ild, A. 1979. “Em otion W ork, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure.” American Journal o j Sociology 8 5 (3 ):5 5 1 —75. — . 1983. The Managed Heart. Berkeley: University o f California Press. M ills, T. and S. Kleinm an. 1988. “Em otions, Reflexivity, and Action: An Interactionist Analysis.” Social Forces 66(4): 1009—27. Thoits, P. 1985. “Self-Labeling Processes in Mental Illness: The Role o f Emotional Deviance.” American Journal o j Sociology 91:2 21 —49. Tuan, Y.-F. 1982. Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Lije and Individual Consciousness. Minneapolis: University o f M innesota Press. Turner, B. The Body and Society. 1984. N ew York: Basil Blackwell.

T h is p a g e in ten tion ally left blank

8 . Emotions, economics and consumer culture

E

MOTIONS

ARE

CENTRAL

to economic processes of production and

consumption and, more generally, to processes of decision-making. This is

increasingly recognized among theorists of economic behaviour, an area trad ition ally dominated by models that assume a rational, self-interested actor as their norm. Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies of emotion, for example in connection with buying behaviour for marketing purposes (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy 2002); in relation to the management of uncertainty in the context of global financial institutions ( Pixley 2004); or for the purpose of revising theoretical models of risky choice behaviour ( P ilz 2007). Theorists of consumer culture, on the other hand, have long recognized that com m odities are invested with symbolic meaning; practices of consumption are em otionally significant in so fa r as they bear on the construction of individuals' identity and forms of belonging (D ittm ar 2007; Sassatelli 2007; Slater 1997). The first extract in this section is drawn from Colin Cam pbell's The Rom antic E th ic and the S p irit o f M odern Consumerism (1987). Campbell is one of a number of scholars who have argued against 'produ ctivist' historical narratives - namely narratives that im plicitly privilege the historical role of production, and that present consumer culture as emerging only at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a consequence of the industrial revolution. Campbell builds on Weber's thesis relating the protestant ethic of rationality, industry and emotional control to the rise of capitalism . He argues that a second 'ethic' associated with Sentim entalism and then Rom anticism proper (both with roots in eighteenth-century English Puritanism ), combined with the former to facilitate the industrial revolution. Cam pbell's longer term view thus suggests that this more 'em otionalist' Puritan strand is a key cause of the modern economy and not, as typically thought, merely its effect. He thus attempts to explain the consumer revolution of eighteenth-century England in terms of the

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spread of an 'em otionalist' ethic. Campbell sees in this ethics the origins of more recent forms of hedonism based on the endless creation of 'w ants' through the imputation of ultim ately illusory meanings and images onto a mass-produced procession of commodities. The second extract is drawn from Danny M ille r's A Theory o f Shopping (1998) and was selected as something of a counterbalance to those w riters who stress the illusory, shallow and hedonistic values associated with consumption. It is based on anthropological fieldw ork conducted in London and informed by the idea that, if we are to ta lk of the meaning of everyday consumption practices, then we had better talk to those doing the consuming. Drawing on the example of M rs Wynn, M ille r makes the case that much ordinary, working class supermarket shopping can be construed as a form of 'love m aking'. That is to say, the minutiae of daily purchasing decisions and actions are framed within broader and higher aims and values, such as sensitive care for one's family. Love figures also in our third extract, from Daniel Lefkow itz's a rticle 'Investing in Emotion: love and anger in financial advertising' (2003). In this piece Lefkow itz examines the television com m ercials for financial services companies that were shown during the late 1990s in the US. Lefkow itz finds that these ads frame and construct the financial services by way of discourses and images associated either with loving nurturance and care, or with anger and violence. He adopts a discursive approach that sees emotions as cu ltu rally constructed within 'perform ative texts', such as these T V com m ercials. Our last extract is from an a rticle by Jon Elster published in 1998, a pioneer in attempting to bridge the gap between emotion theory and economic theory - two fields, Elster wrote, 'that seem to exist in near-complete isolation from each other'. The a rticle as a whole accordingly proposes 'a general way of incorporating emotion into the to o lk it of economics'. Elster reviews the psychology of emotion and extracts a 'cost-benefit model of emotions'; this model concentrates on the m otivational dynamics of affects such as shame and guilt and promises to be of use in explaining and predicting behaviour. He suggests that emotions can shape the 'reward param eters' for 'ration al choice' (e.g. by changing people's preferences or acting as psychic costs or benefits). However, he also suggests that emotions can shape the very ability to make rational choices, either on a short term (a brief episode of anger) or a long term (a lifelong hatred) basis. References Dittmar, H. (200 7) Consum er Culture, Identity and W ellbeing: the search fo r the 'good lif e 'a n d the 'body perfect'. Hove: Psychology Press. O'Shaughnessy, J. and O'Shaughnessy, N. J. (2 0 0 2 ) The M a rk e tin g Pow er o f Em otion. New York: Oxford University Press. P ilz, F. (200 7) E m otions and R isk y Choice: an experim ental and theoretical study from the econom ic psycholog ical perspective. Saarbriicken: V D M Verlag Pixley, J. (200 4) E m otions in Finance: distrust and uncertainty in g lob al m arkets. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press. S assatelli, R. (2 0 0 7 ) Consum er Culture: history; theory and politics. London: Sage. Slater, D. (199 7) Consum er Culture and M odernity. Cam bridge: Polity.

Ch a p t e r 34

C o lin C a m p b e ll

T H E R O M A N T I C E T H I C and T H E S P I R I T OF M O D E R N C O N S U M E R I S M

Most attempts to describe the general development of modern thought tend to pay exclusive attention to the growth of rationalism. The result is a picture quite incompatible with historical facts and the world as we know it. Karl Mannheim

T

H E O X F O R D E N G L IS H D IC T IO N A R Y DEFINES the word ‘romantic’ as meaning ‘marked by or suggestive of or given to romance; imaginative, remote from cxpcricncc, visionary, and (in relation to literary or artistic method) preferring grandeur or passion or irregular beauty to finish and proportion’ . None of these connotations would appear to have much to do with those activities which are generally covered by the heading ‘consumption’ . The selection, purchase and use of goods and services arc all forms of everyday action which, on the contrary, we commonly tend to view as rather dull and prosaic matters, except perhaps on those rare occasions when we purchase a major item like a house or a car. It would appear, therefore, that consumption, being a form of economic conduct, should be placed at the opposite pole of life from all that we generally regard as ‘romantic’ . The reasonableness of this contrast is deceptive, however; something which becomes apparent once we recognize that there is one significant modern phenomenon which docs indeed directly link the two. This, of course, is advertising, for even the most cursory examination of the pages of glossy magazines and the contents of television commercials will serve to reveal how many advertisements are concerned with the topic of ‘romance’ , or with images and copy which deal with scenes which are ‘remote from everyday experience’ , ‘imaginative’ or suggestive of ‘grandeur’ or ‘passion’ . And it is not just romance in the narrow' sense which features so prominently in conjunction with perfume, cigarettes or lingerie advertisements —it is also that the pictures and

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sto rie s used are typically ‘ ro m a n tic ’ in the b ro a d e r sen se o f b ein g e x o tic , im ag in a­ tive and id e alize d ; w h ilst the very p u rp o se o f ad v e rtise m e n ts, o f co u rse , is to in duce us to buv the p ro d u c ts w hich are fe atu re d : in o th e r w o rd s, to c o n su m e . T h e fact that basically ‘ ro m a n tic ’ cu ltu ral m aterial is c o m m o n ly u sed in a d v e rtise m e n ts in this fashion has often been n o ted and h ence on e cou ld sav that a ge n e ral aw aren ess of the link b e tw e en ‘ro m a n tic ism ’ and ‘c o n su m p tio n ’ already e x ists. T h e assu m p tio n w hich has largely prevailed am o n g social sc ie n tists, h ow ­ ever, in deed a m o n g aca d e m ics and in te lle ctu als in ge n e ra l, has b een that it is the a d v e rtise rs w h o have ch o scn to m ake u se o f this m aterial in an atte m p t to p ro m o te the in te re sts o f the p r o d u c e rs they re p re se n t, and c o n seq u en tly that the relation sh ip should be seen as one in w hich ‘ ro m a n tic ’ b e lie fs, asp iratio n s and attitu d e s arc p u t to w o rk in the in te re sts o f a ‘ c o n su m e r so c ie ty ’ . T h at view is ch allenged in the p ages that follow (alth ough n ot d ism isse d ) w h ere it is argu ed that the rev erse relation sh ip should also be taken se rio u sly , w ith the ‘r o m a n tic ’ in gre d ie n t in cu ltu re re g ard e d as having had a cru cial p a rt to play in the d e v e lo p m en t o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism

itse lf; in d e e d , sin ce

co n su m p tio n

m ay

d e te rm in e

d em an d

and

d e m an d su p p ly , it co u ld be arg u e d that R o m a n tic ism itse lf played a critical ro le in facilitatin g the In du strial R ev o lu tio n and th e re fo re the c h aracte r o f the m o d e rn econom y,

f. . .]

The p ro b lem p o se d at the b egin n in g o f this b o o k w as that o f acco u n tin g fo r the c o n su m e r

revo lu tion

w hich

acco m p an ie d

the

on set

of

in du strialization

in

e igh teen th -cen tu ry E n glan d. N o tin g that e c o n o m ic h istorian s had iden tified the im p o rta n ce o f risin g d em an d as a cru cial fa c to r initiatin g that re v o lu tio n , and lo cate d its p rin cipal cau se in a ‘ new p ro p e n sity to c o n su m e ’ , the o rig in s o f this p ro p e n sity w ere then taken as the fo c u s o f d iscu ssio n . W h ilst the eviden ce show ed that this ste m m e d from ch an ges in values and a ttitu d e s, b e in g in so m e way related to such in novations as the rise of m o d e rn fash io n, ro m an tic love and the n ovel, it so o n b e ca m e cle ar that e x istin g acc o u n ts of these ch an ges w ere cith e r re d u ctio n ist o r circular. T h is p ro b lem

w as then show n to b e a ge n e ral featu re o f those

th e o rie s o f c o n su m e r b eh aviour c u rrc n t w ithin the social scie n c e s, w ith n eith er the in stin ctivist, m an ip u latio n ist n or V cblcn csqu c p e rsp e ctiv e s su p p ly in g satisfactory ex p la n atio n s o f that dyn am ic g e n e ratio n o f new w an ts w hich is so c h aracte ristic o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism . In d eed , th ese p e rsp e c tiv e s w ere seen to be serio u sly d eficien t in th eir ah istorical tre atm e n t o f the su b je c t, as w ell as in th eir co m m o n ten d en cy to re g ard w an tin g as an irratio n a l, in voluntary and ‘ u n w o rth y ’ fo rm o f behaviour. It th e re fo re proved n c c cssa ry , in o rd e r to re so lv e this h isto rical p ro b le m , n ot only to p ro v id e a m o re ad eq u ate c o n cep tu alizatio n o f the n ature o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism , b u t to d e v e lo p a th e o ry w h ich , w hile n o t re d u cin g this asp e c t o f hum an co n d u ct to a m a tte r o f in stin ctive im p u lsiv e n e ss o r en viron m en tal m a n ip u la­ tio n , n e v e rth e le ss c o m p e n sate d fo r the inability o f u tilitarian ism to c o n sid e r the q u e stio n o f the orig in o f w an ts. T h e so lu tio n ad o p ted w as to tu rn to a h ed on istic m o d e l o f hum an actio n , and esch e w in g the m islea d in g habit o f treatin g this te rm as a synonym fo r utility, focu s upon that featu re o f h um an co n d u ct in w hich pleasu re and not satisfaction is the g o al. R e c o gn itio n o f the fu n dam en tal and ex ten siv e d iffe ren ce s b etw een b eh aviou r d ire c ted to w ard th ese tw o e n d s, and h ence the fact that in dividuals livin g above the level o f su b siste n ce are likely to be faced w ith a

THE

ROMANTI C

ETHIC

& THE

SPIRIT

OF

MODERN

C O N S U M E R I S M

3 0 3

choice betw een them , m ade it possible to distinguish traditional from m odern h edon ism . The fo rm e r w as identified as a preoccu pation with sensory exp erien ce, with ‘ p le asu re s’ regarded as d iscrete and standardized events, and in the pursuit o f which there is a natural tenden cy for the h edonist to seek desp otic pow ers. M o dern hedonism is m arked, in co n trast, by a preoccu pation with ‘p le asu re ’ , envisaged as a potential quality o f all exp erien ce. In o rd e r to ex tract this from life, however, the individual has to su b stitu te illusory fo r real stim uli, and by creatin g and m an ip u ­ lating illusions and hcncc the em otive dim ension o f con scio u sn ess, con stru ct his own pleasurable en vironm en t. This m o d e rn , au ton om o u s, and illusory form o f hedonism com m on ly m anifests itse lf as day-dream ing and fantasizing. [. . .]

H edonistic self-interest and rom antic idealism The m ann er through w hich genuinely idealistic or m oral action m igh t decay over tim e into a m ere h edon istic self-con cern is readily ap preciated, and has already been referred to in discussing the decline o f the cult o f sensibility. T h ere it w as su ggested that an exaggerated display o f sen tim en tality m igh t not indicate eith er genuine feelings o f pity or co n cern , nor lead to ap p ro p riate benevolent o r sym pathetic action, being m ainly a sym ptom o f self-love. Joyce Tom pkins provides a go o d description o f this ph en om en on : again and again we find that en orm ity o f self-con gratulation w ith which the w eep er al once luxuriates in the beguiling softn ess o f tears and com plim en ts h im self on his capacity for shedding them , seein g in his m in d ’s eye not only the ob ject o f his attention [that is w hatever p ro m p ted the display ol em otion] but him sell in a suitable attitude in fron t o f it. Even earlier, w e had occasion to note w hat David Fordyce called that ‘ selfapproving jo y ’ w hich is open to the benevolent m an, and w hich Isaac Barrow dubbed ‘virtu o u s v o lu p tu o u sn e ss’ . C rane labelled it ‘egoistic h edonism ' of the kind that leads individuals to ‘entertain th em selves w ith pleasan t R eflections upon their own W o rth ’ It is especially easy to see how Puritanism m ight lead to this kind o f h ypocrisy and self-love, given the rep eated injunctions to exam ine o n e ’ s spiritual con dition, cou pled w ith the urgent need to have con firm ation o f o n e ’ s status as a m e m b e r o f the elect. Such continual reflection 011 o n e se lf and o n e ’ s con duct w as bound to provide am ple op p o rtu n ities for self-adm iration. It generally req u ires a g re ater e ffo rt, on the other hand, to recogn ize how it is that action o f an essentially h edonistic kind may also develop into ethical and idealistic fo rm s. H ere it is critically im p ortan t to recogn ize that ideals are n ecessarily im plicated in that variety o f im aginatively m ediated h edonism w hich has been taken to con stitute the spirit o f co n su m erism , and this for the sim ple reason that perfected o r ‘id ealized ’ im ages naturally offer the greatest pleasure. T his is clearly revealed in both W alter M itty ’ s and Billy L iar’ s fantasies for in each case idealized self-im ages are the central m eans through w hich pleasure is attained. O b viously, if il is pleasant to con tem p late p erfect im ages, then il is especially

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C A M P B E L L

pleasant lo con tem p late ourselv es as em bodying that perfection . W aller M itty obtain s pleasure from his fantasies because he envisages h im self as a dare-devil flying ace or w orld-fam ous su rgeon , w hilst the heroine o f V irginia W o o lfs story ‘ se e s’ hersclt as the epito m e of beauty. We may choose to regard such day-dream s as evidence o f self-love, or even childishness, but on e cannot escape the fact that thcv do involve the im aginative realization o f ideals, and, as such, can, un der ap pro priate circu m stan ces, b e co m e the basis for self-idealistic activity in reality. C on duct directed at realizing perfection in o n e se lf arising out o f im aginative exercises o f this kind thus m anifests a m ixtu re o f h edonistic and idealistic features. Striving to m ake o n eself beautiful is perhaps the m o st obvious and com m on exam ple o f such behaviour, and although it can justifiably be labelled ‘se lf-in te reste d ’ , it also c o n ­ stitutes ‘ id ealism ’ in the sen se o f bein g activity aim ed at fulfilling an ideal. Such self-directed idealism b e co m e s especially im p o rtan t, however, w hen the m oral rather than the aesthetic dim en sion is the focus o f attention. M orally idealized self-im ages can be just as m uch sou rces o f pleasure as aesthetic o n es, as Sim on e de B eauvoir revealed in her autobiography. T h ere she disclosed how, as a child, she played fantasy gam es w ith her sister, using exem plary figures as the basic p ro p s for their h edon ism . She d escrib es how, in the co u rse o f playing these ch aracter gam es, she often im agined h e rse lf to be M ary M agdalen e, ‘dryin g C h rist’ s feet w ith her long h air’ , o r alternatively, a heroine such as Joan o f A rc, or G enevieve dc Brabant, w om en who ‘only attained lo bliss and glory in this w orld o r in the n ext after sufferin gs inflicted on them by m a le s’ . T h ese roles enabled her to enjoy all m anner o f im aginary sufferin gs, and ‘revel in the delights o f m isfo rtun e and hum iliation’ , her ‘p ie ty ’ disposin g her ‘tow ards m aso ch ism '. H ere we can see how en couragin g children to em ulate ‘sain tly’ figures provides am ple opp ortu n ity tor self-illusory h edon ism . A lthough Sim on e dc B eauvoir shared these gam es w ith her sister it is also clear that she could easilvJ have acted them out in

O

isolation, o r even covertly; the pleasure itse lf derivin g from the ‘ fatefu ln ess’ of the situations accom panying the achievem ent o f saintliness, as w ell as the sim ple c o n ­ tem plation o f on eself in an idealized perso na. H ow ever, w hilst the habit o f identifying with ideal im ages may be em barked on in the first instance largely bccausc o f the op p o rtu n ities which this provides for im aginative p leasure-seek in g, the h ed o n ist’s sen se o f identity can easily b cco m c so m ould ed by this p ro cess as to com e to depend upon a b e lie f in a real sim ilarity. A lthough the e lem en t o f pretence rem ains - there is usually no desire to be the p erso n im agined, and certainly not to actually exp erien ce their fate — the pleasure gained from con tem plation o f the idealized self-im age en courages the b e lie f that one p osse sses sim ilar qualities. This can only be regarded as tru e , how ever, if the individual obtains som e extern al proof, and this m ust n ecessarily take the form o f con duct in the w orld. In o rd er to b o lste r and p rotect the idealized self-im age the individual m ust now en gage in som e ch aracter-confirm ing con d u ct; it b eco m es n ecessary to ‘do g o o d ’ in o rd e r to retain the conviction that one is g o o d . H ence the irony by w hich ‘d isin te re ste d ’ , idealistic action eventually b e co m e s required in o rd e r lo p ro te ct the ideal self-im age which the pursuit o f pleasure has been in stru m ental in constructing. A sim ilar result can occu r if im agination is put to w ork realizing the ideal in all those w ith w hom one co m e s into con tact, thereby casting oneself in the role

THE

ROMANTI C

ETHIC

& THE

SPIRIT

OF

MODERN

C O N S U M E R I S M

3 0 5

o f a pathetic and w orth less perso n . The em otional satisfactions provided by such self-den igration and d eb asem en t are sim ilar to those w hich w ere noted earlier to derive from C alvinism G oethe m akes the m elanch olic young W erther declare that ‘ O u r im agination , im pelled by nature to assert itself, n ourish ed by the fantastic im ages o f the p o e t’ s art, invents a hierarchy o f bein g of w hich w e arc the low est, w hile everyone else ap pears m ore splen d id , m ore p e rfe ct. A lthough there may be a p e rv e rse ten dency in so m e peop le for con duct to be d irected to the ‘realizatio n ’ o f such ‘m aso ch istic’ an ti-ideals, the use o f im agination in this way typically w orks to assist the developm en t o f idealism for it is the real se lf w hich is judged unfavourably as con sequen ce o f these com parison s. The d ream er realizes only too well how he is failing to live up to his ow n ideal im age, w hilst on the other hand, ‘ everyone else ap pears m o re splen did, m ore p e rfe c t’ . In either case, however, w hether the ideal is p rojected onto the se lf o r on to oth ers, aw areness o f the everw idening gap betw een that ideal and the nature o f the real se lf b e co m e s a critical feature o f life. A central problem for the im aginative h edonist, th erefore, is his aw areness o f this w idening disjunction betw een the con stru cted ideal and the e x p erien ced reality; the m ore the h edon istic im pulse causes im ages to be idealized, the gre ater the discrepan cy b e co m e s betw een these and the real-self. It is as if the pleasures gained by dream in g on the ideal arc ‘taken o u t’ o f those ex p e rie n ce d in reality, which is judged to be m ore and m o re unsatisfactory in con sequen ce. In this case, however, the reality w hich is thus ‘d e g ra d e d ’ is the individual’ s percep tion o f h im self as a virtu ou s perso n , leading lo a deepen in g sense o f w orth lessn ess and dem oralization . Indeed, for the m orally sensitive, in ner-directed p erso n the p o w e r­ ful feelings of guilt w hich are gen erated may spark off intense self-con dem nation. Th is, then, in tu rn , adds an extra intensity to the need for reassu ran ce that one is indeed g o o d . It can be seen from this analysis how fo rm s o f self-illusory hedonism can link up w ith a self-cen tred , m oral idealism ; while the search for pleasure may itself lead to the generation o f guilt and a con sequen t need for signs o f o n e ’s go o d n e ss. It m erely rem ains to ob serve that since virtue is usually defined in term s o f con duct which d ocs transcend con cern with the self, or at least involves som e subordin ation o f se lf to a higher g o al, it is nearly alw ays n ecessary actually to p e rfo rm som e genuinely disinterested act in o rd er to obtain such reassu ran ce. Self-in terested hedonism and altruistic idealism are thus con nected via im ages o f the se lf as ‘v irtu o u s’ , w ith, in both cases, character-con firm in g con duct acting as the critical fulcrum around which behaviour turns. The con ccpt o f ch aractcr fo rm s a com m on thread running through the m u lti­ tude o f m od ern vocabu laries w hich arc applicable to hum an actions. U sed to refer to that asp ect o f behaviour for w hich individuals accept respon sib ility, it enables all action to be view ed as m o ral, w ith ju d gem en ts m ade ab out the ‘g o o d n e ss’ o f each individual actor in the light o f prevailing ideals. It is not suggested h ere, however, that it is p e o p le ’ s direct desire to ‘do the go od th in g’ w hich is m ost affected by changes in con ception s o f the g o o d , the tru e and the beautiful, so m uch as the indirect cffect e x e rte d via the need for ch aracter con firm ation. It is the need people have to be convinced that they are go o d w hich is cru cial, som eth ing which is especially relevant in the case o f those social g ro u p s w hich have inherited a tradition

3 0 6

COLIN

C A M P B E L L

o f m o ral in n er-d ire ctio n , and h en ce are attu n ed lo the im p o rta n c e o f m e m b e rsh ip o f a m o ral elite o r ‘ e le c t’ . By re co g n iz in g that social co n d u c t is typically a c o m p o site

p ro d u c t o f

h ed on istic se lf-in te rest and altru istically in clin ed id e alism , w ith an o v e rrid in g c o n ­ ce rn w ith self-im ag e se rv in g to artic u la tc the tw o , it b e co m e s p o ssib le to see how the sp irit o f m o d e rn c o n su m e rism and the ro m an tic eth ic m igh t b e c o n n e cte d ; h ed on istic c o n c e rn s leadin g in to self-id ealism and ethical p re o c cu p atio n s creatin g o p p o rtu n itie s fo r h ed o n ism . In d e e d , the tw o fo rm s arc n ot m erely co n n e cte d but m u st be seen as in cxtricab ly in te rlo ck e d , b o u n d to g e th e r by p ro c e sse s through w hich a d e sire for p le asu re d e v e lo p s in to a gen uin e co n ce rn for id e als, and ethical im p u lse s ‘d e g e n e ra te ’ in to m e re n arcissism . If, th en , such in dividual p r o c e sse s arc ag g re g ate d and view ed in m a cro -so cial te r m s as so c io -cu ltu ral m o v e m e n ts, it b e c o m e s p o ssib le to pe rce iv e how a m o d e rn c o n su m e rist o u tlo o k and a ro m an tic ethic m ay b e linked in both g en erativ e and d e ge n e ra tiv e d ire ctio n s; that is to say, by ten d e n cie s fo r p e r io d s o f co m m c rcia l dyn am ism to d evelop in to idealistic ‘ re fo r m a tio n s’ , and id ealistic uph eavals to d e ge n e ra te in to se n tim e n talistic selfseeking. A s th ere is no g o o d re aso n fo r assu m in g that a one-w ay tren d g o v e rn s such ch an ges, it w ould seem re aso n ab le to p o stu late a recurso p a tte rn o f gen eratio n d e g c n cra tio n -rcg e n e ratio n to have typified the past tw o h un dred y e ars. T h u s, if R o m an ticism

did originally m ake m o d e rn h ed on ism

p o ssib le , then the spirit

o f h ed on ism has su b seq u en tly also fu n ctio n ed to give rise to fu rth e r o u tb u rsts o f ro m an tic fervour. T h is is a co n clu sio n w hich allow s us to o b se rv e that the R o m a n tic s w ere not n ecessarily w ro n g in assu m in g that p e o p le cou ld be m orally im p roved through the provisio n o f cu ltu ral p ro d u c ts that y ield ed p le asu re . N o r in d eed w ere they w ro n g in se e in g this p r o c e ss as on e w hich re lie d upo n in d ivid u als d rea m in g ab o u t a m o re p e rfc c t w o rld . Such activity can reaso n ab le be view ed as c re atin g o p p o rtu n itie s fo r the g e n e ratio n o f id ealism . T h is is only on e p o ssib le o u tc o m e , how ever, o f en c o u ra g in g p e o p le to p u rsu e im aginative p le asu re , and w ould seem to d e p e n d for its su c ce ss upon the p r io r acc e p tan ce o f a m o re ge n e ral ro m an tic o u tlo o k . For it is also cle ar that w h ere this is ab se n t, and largely m a te ria listic and utilitarian b eliefs p revail, then it se e m s only to o likely that ro m an tic p o e m s, n ovels and m u sic , w ill be e m p lo y ed as little m o re than the raw m aterial for a leisu re and re creatio n in d u stry ; w ith d rea m s used less to raise the vision o f an im aginatively ap p reh en d ed ideal w o rld w ith w hich to c o u n ter this o n e, than to o v e rco m e b o re d o m and alien ation . A s w e have had o ccasio n to n o te, how ever, irony p e rv a d e s the hum an c o n d itio n , c o n n e ctin g in ten tion and c o n se q u e n c e in stran ge and u n an ticip ated w ays, h ence w hile ro m an tic s m ay so m e tim e s have assiste d c o m m e rc ia lism , c o m m c rcia l in te re sts m ay also have un w ittin gly actcd so as to p ro m o te ro m an ticism .

C h a p t e r 35

Danny Miller

A T H E O R Y OF S H O P P I N G

F

OR

M ANY

PURPO SES

THE

M AIN

d iv is io n in th e s t r e e t w h e r e I

c o n d u c t e d f i e l d w o r k lies b e t w e e n the c o u n c il e s t a t e s o n o n e s id e a n d the

p r iv a t e h o u s in g o n th e o th e r . B u t th e s ig n ific a n c e o f this d iv is io n c a n n o t a lw a y s be a s s u m e d . A lt h o u g h she lives in an o w n e r - o c c u p i e d m a i s o n e t t e , M r s W y n n c o m e s a c r o s s i m m e d i a t e l y as q u in t e s s e n t i a l ly w o r k i n g c la ss. H e r h u s b a n d is an e le c t r i c ia n b u t h as b e e n u n e m p l o y e d f o r s e v e r a l m o n t h s o w i n g to a n in ju r y . She is a c h i l d ­ m in d e r , ta k i n g in to h e r h o m e o t h e r p e o p l e ’ s c h il d r e n w h ile th e y are o u t w o r k in g . B e t w e e n his in ju r y a n d th e fa c t th at s o m e o n e r e c e n t ly ra n in to th e ir c a r w h ile it w a s p a r k e d o u t s i d e th e ir h o u s e , th e y w e r e n o t h av in g an e a s y t i m e o f it. N e v e r t h e l e s s , as o f t e n p r o v e d to b e the c a s e , h e r c o n c e r n s in s h o p p i n g b e a r little u p o n the c o n t i n g e n c i e s o f the m o m e n t , an d r e la t e m o r e to l o n g e r - t e r m i s s u e s s u r r o u n d i n g th e p e r s o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f c a c h m e m b e r o f th e fa m ily . S h e w a s p r e t t y fe d u p writh th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e s e u n e x p e c t e d e v e n t s , b u t s h o p p i n g as a t o p i c d r e w h e r b a c k t o th in g s th at a t o n e lev el w e r e m o r e m u n d a n e . B u t th e s e w e r e r e la tio n s h ip s w h ic h she c a r e d a b o u t a g r e a t d e a l a n d w a s c o n s t a n t ly th in k in g a b o u t a n d f o r m i n g s t r a t e g i e s t o d e a l w it h . In c o n v e r s a t i o n sh e n o t e s : A M y h u s b a n d is q u it e fu ss y v e g e t a b l e w i s e a n d h e ’ s a b i g m e a t e a te r, b u t y e s I’ ve b e e n d o i n g a l o t o f s tir f r ie s b e c a u s e I f o u n d I c o u l d g e t h im to c a t a l o t m o r e v e g e t a b l e s if I d o s tir f r ie s , a n d he likes C h i n e s e . l i e lik e s s p ic y stu ff. H e ’ s g o t a lo t b e t t e r th an w h e n I first m e t h im b e c a u s e his m u m ’ s Irish a n d o v e r c o o k e d e v e r y ­ th in g a n d w a s p r e t t y b a s ic a n d h e ’ s g o t s o m u c h b e t t e r in th e y e a r s . Q D o th e k id s e a t th e s a m e as h im ? A N o . J a c k m y s o n ’ s g o t v e r y fu s s y , d e fin ite ly in th e l a s t year. I w o u l d say h e ’ s a g o o d v e g e t a b le a n d fr u it e a t e r b u t h e ’ s th e b a s ic c h ip s a n d b u r g e r a n d I’ m a fr a id so. Q D o y o u c o o k s e p a r a t e ly f o r t h e m ? A P a sta he lo v e s p a st a . Yes, a n d s e p a r a t e t i m e s a s w e ll. L a t e r o n in th e s a m e c o n v e r s a t i o n she n o t e s :

3 0 8

DANNY

M I L L E R

A I try not to buy a lot o f convenience [foods], 1 do buy m eat that is m arinated and stuff like that and then think what can 1 do w ith it, but now and again 1 w ill sit dow n and g e t my book s out and have a look . I did it last w eek just because 1 w as gettin g a bit tired o f things. But also w hat I w ill do is buy the sauces and the stirlry things, stuH like that, and then ju st add it to everything so it m akes a bit o f difference, but I seem to ge t stuck doing the sam e things over and over again. So, every now and then, I’ve go t to ge t my book s out to rem ind m y self o r think of som e new things. Q Is it you th at’s b ored? A N o. He w ill say as w ell, w e ’ ve had this a bit too m uch. I’ m a great chickcn eater and he says chickcn again! L ater still she starts discussing the purchase o f clothing for the fam ily, m akin g it clear that she buys her h usban d’ s clothes. She n otes that out o f preferen ce he w ould ju st w ear som e old T -sh irts, and often w ould then go on to use these as cloths during his w ork. It’ s n ot ju st his clothing she buys. In practice she p re fe rs not to let him do any o f the shopping. She feels that if she lets him shop, then he m isses things on the list she has m ade, or buys, h im self things like biscuits on a w him . A So it’ s m ore hard w ork. I’d rather him stay here and look after the children and I’ll do it. Then it ’s a break for m e and you know. T h ese view s w ere reiterated w hen we w ere out shoppin g in a local su p erm ark et. She again noted the prob lem s w ith gettin g her children to cat w hat she w ants them to eat rather than w hat they w ould choose for them selves. She claim ed lo be quite strict w ith the children that she w as paid to look after, but w ith resp ect to her ow n children, she ten ded to be m uch m o re lenient — ‘anything for a bit o f peace and q u ie t.’ Again and again her actual purch ases are related back to household p referen ces. W hen she buvs mintflavoured Iamb at the b u tch er’ s she n otes in passin g that this had go n e dow n really well the w eek before and that she had been asked to ge t it again. Equally, so m e jam tarts purchased previously b ecause they w ere un der offer (goin g cheap) had been well received. The only excep tion s to this orien tation to the h ousehold in her shopping com e w ith the purchase o f so m e bread rolls and fran k fu rters for a friend w ho will be com in g round for tea. Also at anoth er point in o u r expedition she buys a fancy ice cream called V icn ctta w hich she d eclares is ‘a treat for h e rse lf’ . By no m eans all the sh o p p ers I accom pan ied w ere like M rs W ynn, but she is representative o f a core o f households. She should anyway be quite a fam iliar figure from many previous fem in ist studies o f the h ousew ife. The fem in ist persp ective on such housew ives w ill be discussed below, but m any research ers have ackn ow ledged that w hich w ould be clearly evident h ere. H ow ever opp ressive the outside o b server m ight find this sub sum ptio n o f the individual to her husband and children, the housew ife h erse lf insists that she m erely e x p resses thereby a sc rie s o f re sp o n si­ bilities and con cern s with w hich she strongly identifies and o f w hich she is generally prou d. M rs Wynn ack n ow ledges that she is constantly m on ito rin g, even researchin g, the desires and preferen ces o f her h ousehold. T h ese includc both foundational g o o d s w hich are ex p e cted to be constantly presen t and available in the h ouse, but also transient d esires which arise from a preferen ce for at least a subsidiary elem ent o f change and innovation. But she w ould by no m eans regard h erse lf as m erely the passive rep resentative o f these desires. Indeed if she m erely bought w hat the other

A T H E O R Y

OF

SHOPPI NG

3 0 9

m em b ers o f her h ousehold asked for, shopping w ould be relatively easy. The problem is that she w ishes to influence and change her husband and children in quite a num b er o f w ays. She is constantlv con cern ed that they should eat healthier fo o d s than those thcv w ould ch o ose lo r them selves. By the sam e token she w ants them to w ear either b etter quality or at least m o re respectab le cloth es than those they prefer. She sees her role as selecting go o d s w hich are intended to be educative, uplifting and in a rather vague sense m orally superior. It is precisely their unw illin g­ n ess to be uplifted by her shopping choices that creates the an xieties and battles of shopping. In vindicating their d ecision s, such h ousew ives often lay claim to a w ider persp ective than that o f other family m e m b e rs. They see them selves as having the foresigh t to prevent the em b arrassm en t and disdain that others m ight feel if they let their fam ilies dress as they ch o ose, or determ in e their own food choices. O f c o u rse , all these efforts could be redu ced to her in terests. It could be argued that she is buying b e tter clothes because she feels she w ill be m ade to suffer the opp rob riu m o f criticism by others if she d o e sn ’t. She buys healthier foods bccausc she w ould have to look after the p erso n w ho otherw ise b e co m e s ill. But for us to try to figure out w hether the constant hassle o f arguing w ith her fam ily, in ord er to persu ad e them to ad opt her preferen ces, actually pays som e kind o f lon g-term dividend is the kind o f daft calculation we may safely leave to eco n o m ists, so c io ­ b iologists and their ilk. "I'herc is no reason lo supp ose that M rs Wynn engages in any such w eighing up o f cost o r benefit. As far as she is co n ccrn ed , the reason s that she research es their preferen ces and equally that she then tries lo im prove upon them are the sam e. Both are assum ed by her lo rep resent the o u tco m e o f a responsibility so basic that it d o es n ot need to be m ade explicit o r reflected upon. In sh o rt, her shopping is prim arily an act o f love, that in its daily con scien tiousn ess b e co m e s one o f the prim ary m eans by w hich relationships o f love and carc arc co n stitu ted by p ractice. That it is to say, shoppin g d o es not m erely reflect love, but is a m ajor form in which this love is m anifested and re p ro d u ce d . This is w hat I m ean to im ply when I say that shoppin g in su p erm ark ets is com m on ly an act of m akin g love. O n e could use oth er term s than love. C arc, co n cern , obligation , responsibility and habit play their roles in these relationships. So also may resen tm en t, frustration and even h atred. Can these latter be the in gred ien ts o f som eth in g we may properly term love? As long as it is clear that wc un derstan d by this term ‘love’ a norm ative ideology m anifested largely as a practice within lon gterm relationships and n ot just som e rom an tic vision o f an idealized m om en t o f c ourtsh ip , then the term is entirely ap pro priate. Love as a practice is quite com patible w ith feelings o f obligation and responsibility. [. . .] The term is certainly justified by ethnography in as m uch as these sh o ppers w ould be h orrified by the suggestion that they did n ot love the m em b ers o f their family o r that there w as not a b ed ro ck o f love as the foundation o f their care and con cern , though they m ight w ell ackn ow ledge som e o f these other attribu tes as w ell. I never knew M rs Wynn w ell enough to be able to gain a sense o f the m ore intim ate m om en ts within her h ousehold. I d o n ’t know how free she felt about exp ressin g her love in explicit form s. In gen eral, a reticen ce w ith regard lo m ore overt exp ression s o f em otion is regarded as a typically British ch aracteristic, and w as com m en ted upon by those b orn elsew h ere. But this reticence about love need n ot im ply its absen ce, so m uch as its being essentialized as so natural that it b eco m es

3 1 0

DANNY

M I L L E R

em b arrassin g to feel the need to e x p re ss it. O n e con sequen ce o f this reticen ce is that love has com e to be prim arily objectified through everyday practices o f co n ­ c e rn , care and a p articu lar sensitivity to o th e rs, w ithin w hich shopping plays a ccn tral role. D urin g the co u rse o f this essay the term ‘ love’ , w hich first ap pears here as the com m on term by w hich relationships arc legitim ated w ill b e co m e used to rep resen t a value that leads us tow ards the p ro b lem s o f co sm o lo g y and transcenden ce. These te rm s arc n ot intended to obfuscate or m ake co m p le x som e sim ple ph enom enon. They m erely rem ind us that w ithin a largely secular society alm o st all o f us still sec ou rselv es as living lives directed to goals and values which rem ain in som e sense higher than the m ere dictates o f in stru m entality. Daily decision s arc constantly w eighed in term s o f m oral questions ab out good and bad action indicated in traits such as sensitivity as against style, or gen erosity as against jealousy. Though these may n ot be m ade exp licit, the accoun ts we use to un derstand each o th e rs’ actions depen d on the continued existen ce o f cosm olog y as a realm o f tran scenden t value. The term s ‘co sm o lo g y ’ and ‘tran scen d en t’ su gg est values that are long lasting and o p p osed to the con tin gen cy o f everyday life. They are intended to im ply that although we focus upon the p articu lar p e rso n s, children, p artn ers and friends who occupy o u r con cern s at a given m om en t o f tim e, the way wc relate to them is m uch influenced by m ore gen eral b eliefs about w hat social relations should look like and how they should be carricd ou t. At one level then, love is a m od el o f one particular type o f identification and attachm ent. Il is one w e are socialized into and constantly in form ed ab out. This ideal is then triggered by an individual, such as a family m em b er w ho m akes it m anifest. A relationship then builds its own specificity and nuance w hich (so m etim es) g o es w ell beyond the tran scen den t m odel with w hich w e starte d . W hen the term ‘lo v e ’ is u se d , as h ere, in a m ore gen eral sen se, actual relationships arc found to develop on the basis o f m uch w id er n orm s and exp ectatio n s which p re-exist and rem ain after the relationship itself. The term ‘lo v e’ then in dicates m ore than a claim to affection m ade during courtsh ip. It stands for a m uch w id er field o f that to w hich life is seen as properly d evoted. In later p arts of this essay it will be m o re closely related back to devotional practices in w hich the term ‘c o sm o lo g y ’ is m ore obviously ap p ro p riate since the co n te x t is m o re clearly that o f religion . The ethnography su ggested that ju st as devotion is the taken -for-gran ted b ack drop to the carryin g out o f religiou s rites in other tim es and p laces, so in N orth Lon don love rem ains as a pow erful takenfor-gran ted foundation for acts o f shopping w hich w ill be argued to con stitute devotional rites w hose p u rp o se is to crcatc desirin g subjects. I w ould call M rs Wynn a h ousew ife, even though for the presen t she is the sole w agc-carn cr o f the fam ily, b ccau sc, for her, housew ifery is her principal raison d ’etre. As fem inist research has m ade clear, a p erso n such as M rs Wynn is m ore likely to view her earnings as sim ply p art o f her h ousew ifery than as a job equivalent to that w hich her husband w ould be engaged in w ere he fit. As som eon e who identifies with being a h ousew ife, the req u ests m ade by her fam ily fo r particular foods are not view ed with resen tm en t but are in fact d esired by her. [. . .|

Chapter

36

Daniel Lefkowitz I N V E S T I N G IN E M O T I O N Love and a n g e r in fin a n c ia l a d v e rtisin g

On the Structure o f Com m ercials

I

N ANALYZING THE D ISC O U RSE

O F television co m m e rcials, it is im p o rtan t to note that m o d ern ads focalizc em otion rather than in form ation .

As Tony Sch w artz ob serves: If you are selling a kitchen drain cleaner, the advertisin g effort might involve building an association in the liste n e r’ s m ind betw een the real annoyance o f a sto pped -u p sink and the real re lie f o f un clogging it, in the con text o f the product. [Sch w artz 1 9 7 3 :7 1 ) A d vertisem en ts thus ob scu re how they function— and they do so in m ultiple ways. In W illiam son ’ s (1 9 7 8 ) Freudian te rm s, view ers fail to recogn ize an a d ’s latent m essage because they are kept busy thinking about its m anifest con ten t. Ads w ork bccausc view ers respond em otionally to ideas suggested by the ad, w hile believing that they arc respond in g to in form ation actually stated in the ad. [. . .)

Finance and Family: Love The ju xtaposition o f love and an ger w as a striking pattern in advertisin g for financial services at the turn o f the m illenn ium . Individual com m ercials rarely them atized both em otio n s togeth er, but when advertisin g for the industry as a w hole is co n ­ sid ered , the ju xtap osition stands ou t. Many com m ercials from that tim e period

3 1 2

D A N I E L

L E F K O W I T Z

s itu a te d in v e stin g in th e h o m e an d th e fam ily by r e p r e s e n t in g in v e s tm e n t a s lo v e. By c o n t r a s t , m a n y o t h e r c o m m e r c ia ls s itu a te d in v e stin g in v io le n c e , c o n flic t, an d r e v o lu tio n by r e p r e s e n t in g in v e s tm e n t as a n g e r. A s 1 e x p la in f u r t h e r b e lo w , the th e m e o f a n g e r la te r d is a p p e a r e d fr o m f in a n c ia l- s c r v ic c s a d s , w h e r e a s th e th e m e o f lo v e r e m a in e d p r o m in e n t . In o r d e r to a d e q u a te ly c o n te x t u a liz e th e d is c o u r s e o f in v e stin g - a s- a n g e r, I w ill b e g in b y lo o k in g at an ad th at r e p r e s e n t s in v e stin g as lo v e . T h e R a y m o n d Ja m e s c o m m c r c ia l c a lle d “ P la y g r o u n d ” fe a tu r e s an e ld e r ly w h ite h a ire d m a n ta k in g a little g ir l to th e p la y g r o u n d . T h e ad b e g in s w ith a c lo s e - u p im a g e o f tw o c la s p e d h a n d s— o n e la r g e , o n e s m a ll. T h e c a m e r a th e n p u lls b a c k to re v e a l th e fa c c o f a y o u n g g ir l. T h e g ir l le ts g o o f th e la r g e r h a n d , t u r n s h e r b a c k to th e c a m e r a , an d r u n s to w a r d a p la y g ro u n d w h e r e o t h e r c h ild r e n a re play in g. A t th e p la y g r o u n d , th e g ir l p la y s h a p p ily w ith o t h e r c h ild r e n . T h e ad th en sh o w s the g ir l r e t u r n in g , r u n n in g t o w a r d th e c a m e r a an d a p p r o a c h in g an e ld e r ly m a n w h o is sittin g o n a sw in g . T h e g ir l c m b r a c c s th e o ld m a n in a w a r m h u g , an d h e t u r n s a c o n te n t e d s m ile to w a r d th e c a m e r a , th e final s h o t, th e c a m e r a p a n s u p w a r d an d to th e r ig h t , o v e r th e m a n ’ s s h o u ld e r , s e tt lin g o n an im a g e o f b lu e sk y an d w h ite c lo u d , w h e r e th e c o m p a n y ’ s n a m e , “ R a y m o n d J a m e s , ” an d th e a d ’ s ta g lin e , “ Y ou f ir s t ,” are d is p la y e d . L ik e th e A m c r it r a d c ad . . . , th is c o m m e r c i a l’ s a p p e a l lo th e v ie w e r is e n tire ly in d ir e c t— th r o u g h th e m e c h a n ism o f d e s ir e . L ittle in th is ad d ir e c tly r e la te s to the s e r v ic e s R a y m o n d Ja m e s p r o v id e s o r a s s e r t s th at R a y m o n d J a m e s p r o v id e s su c h s e r v ic e s b e t t e r th an o t h e r c o m p a n ie s . R a th e r, th e a d v e r t is e m e n t d e p ic ts a m o r a lly c h a r g e d site o f d e s ir e (su n n y d a y , lo v in g g r a n d c h ild , c a r e fr e e r e t ir e m e n t , e t c .) an d e sta b lis h e s in th e v ie w e r ’ s m e m o r y a r e s o n a n t a s s o c ia t io n b e tw e e n h is o r h e r d e s ir e s an d th e c o m p a n y ’ s n a m e (S c h w a r t z 1 9 7 3 ). T h e “ P la y g r o u n d ” c o m m c r c ia l can b e s e e n as a p a r a b le th a t s u g g e s t s a s im p le m o r a l m e s s a g e : In v e stin g w ith R a y m o n d Ja m e s k e e p s fa m ilie s to g e th e r . T h is m o r a l is c o m m u n ic a t e d th r o u g h th e a d ’s t h r e e - p a r t s t r u c t u r e : s e p a r a tio n a s d ile m m a : re u n ific a tio n as s o lu tio n (th r o u g h r e t ir e m e n t p la n n in g w ith R a y m o n d J a m e s ) : an d fa m ilia l lo v e a s th e d e s ir e d o u t c o m e . A b r i e f a n a ly sis— d ia g r a m m e d in T a b le 1 — h ig h lig h ts th e c o m p le x p o c t ic s o f th is ad . T h e t h e m a tic o p p o s itio n o f s e p a r a tio n an d u n ity is e s ta b lish e d th r o u g h th e im a g e r y o f m a k in g an d a b r e a k in g p h y sic a l e m b r a c e (h an d h o ld in g an d h u g g in g ). T h e ad b e g in s an d e n d s w ith im a g e s o f p h y sic a l e m b r a c e ; in b e tw e e n are im a g e s o f s e p a r a t io n . T h e v isu a l im a g e o f s e p a r a t io n c o in c id e s w ith th e o n s e t o f n a r r a tio n . T h e d e e p , s o n o r a n t m a le v o ic c o f th e n a r r a to r r e in f o r c e s th e r e p r e s e n t a t io n o f s e p a r a t io n b y b r e a k in g th e p r im a l s ile n c e o f th e e a r lie r im a g e s . T h e v o ic c o v c r n a r r a tio n r e in f o r c e s th is im a g e a s w e ll.

T a b le I Parable structure o f Raym ond Jam es com m ercial “The P layground.” Episode

Narrative Function

Themes

Imagery (plot elements)

A ct O ne A ct Two

D ilem m a Solution

Separation —> Fear

H ands p a rt; girl leaves caretaker. G irl retu rn s: tension ends.

Act T h ree

M ythical R esult

U nity —> Security Family —> Love

G irl and gran dfath er hug.

IN V E S T I N G

IN

E MOTI ON

3 1 3

In a w orld o f o p p o rtu n ity . H ow d o y o u find the financial ad v iso r w h o ’ s right fo r you. T h e w o rd s in a world of opportunity establish the ten sion at the ro o t o f the p a ra b le ’ s d ile m m a. T h e idea o f o p p o rtu n ity su g g e sts a ten sion b e tw e en d e sire (lo r so m e th in g g o o d to h app en ) and fear (o f the risk in v o lv ed ). T h e ad se ts up a p arallel b etw een the o p p o rtu n itie s and risk s facin g a y ou n g child (m ak in g new Irien d s on the play ­ g ro u n d , but having to leave the fam ilial e m b ra c e ) and th ose facin g an in vestor (m ak in g m o n e y , b u t having to take financial risk s). T h e ad then re in fo rc e s this sy m b o lic con n cction b e tw e en the (c h ild ’ s) p lay g ro u n d sccn e and the (a d u lt’ s) in vestm en t w orld by d e sc rib in g the scarch for a financial ad viso r in te r m s o f p erso n al relation sh ip (right f o r you). N arratio n and au d io effects c o n stru c t risk by p e rfo rm in g fear. T h e ad b egin s in silen ce. T h e first soun d w e h ear (b e fo re the n arration b e g in s) is a rh yth m ic sq u eak that co n tin u e s in the b ac k g ro u n d th ro u gh o u t m uch o f the co m m e rcia l. T h e sq u eak is a gratin g , un p leasan t soun d that establish es ten sio n . V oicing over im ag e s o f (u n h eard ) ch ildren at play, the n a rra to r con tin u es: D o y ou w ant on e w ho w ork s fo r the o ld e st com pan y? O r the y o u n ge st. D o y ou w ant on e w ith the faste st g ro w in g com pan y? O r the m o st deeply ro o te d in trad itio n . T h e se ph rases are p aired as c o u p le ts. T h e pairin g is acco m p lish e d through the p arallelism o f ju x tap o sin g an to n y m o u s m ean in gs (o ld —young, g ro w in g —trad itio n al), the altern atio n o f risin g and falling in ton ation s (m ark ed in the tran sc rip t by the q u e stio n m ark and c o m m a re sp e c tiv e ly ), and the sy ste m atic alig n m en t of the vocal p h rases w ith cu ts in the visual im ag e s o f ch ildren at play. T h e w orld of o p p o rtu n ity (g ro w in g up and m akin g m o n e y ) is thus p o rtray e d as sim u ltan eo u sly d e sirab le and threaten in g. T h e third p a rt o f the c o m m crcia l su g g e sts a re so lu tio n to the ten sio n . T h e n arration co n tin u es: O r do y ou sim ply w an t on e w h o listen s to y ou. L ike you. A re the only in vestor in the w o rld . R ay m on d Ja m e s. You first T h is n arrative re so lu tio n c o in cid es w ith several o th e r se m io tic re so lu tio n s. T h e g irl re tu rn s to h ug h er gran dfath er. T h e sq u e a k , w hich b egan w hen the g irl left the g ra n d fa th e r’s h an d, sto p s p recisely at the m o m e n t w hen g irl and gran d fath er e m b ra ce . A t this ju n ctu re the v iew er can re co g n ize fo r the first tim e that the squ eak c o m e s from the sw in g the g ran d fath er is sittin g on . The c h ild re n ’s play, w hich until that poin t had been seen b u t not h ea rd , is now h eard but n ot seen. T h is c o m m e rcia l e lab o rate s the p e rfo rm a n c e o f the e m o tio n s o f h ap p in ess, fear, and love. H ap p in e ss is p e rfo rm e d through re p e a te d visual im ag e s o f ch ildren

3 1 4

DANIEL

LEF K O W IT Z

sm iling, laughing, playing, and o f the gran dfath er sm iling tow ard the cam era. Fear, enacted through the audio channel, is p erfo rm ed through the un pleasan t, rhythmic squeak. Love is p e rfo rm e d by the hand holding and hugging that iram e the a d ’ s beginning and end. T h e ad v e rtise m e n t’s im plied analogy, that R aym ond Jam es financial ad visors carc lo r their clicnts ju st as a gran dfath er cares for his g ran d ­ daughter, c o m p letes the m oral: Investing w ith the sp o n so r enables parental love, keeps fam ilies togeth er, and m akes children value their fam ily.

Finance and Anger The Raym ond Jam es com m ercial describ ed above is typical o f a w ide range o f financial serv ices ads that situate investing in the fam ily by linking investm ent to n u rtu rin g love. A longstan din g ad cam paign for the A llstate Insurance C om p an y had as its tag line “Y ou’re in good hands w ith A llstate.” Banks often advertise their loans by su ggestin g that they help send the v iew er’s children to college. In a survey o f seventy financial-services com m ercials that aired in M arch and A pril o f 2 0 0 1 , roughly h alf co n fo rm ed to this general pattern . [. . .]

References Schw artz, Tony 1973 The Responsive Chord. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press. W illiamson, Judith 1978 D ecoding Advertisem ents: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London: M arion Boyars.

Chapter

37

Jon Elster

EMOTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY

E m o t i o n s a n d in te r est

F

ROi Vl T H E

POINT

OF VIEW

o f e c o n o m i c t h e o r y , th e m o s t i n t e r e s t in g

is s u e c o n c e r n i n g th e e m o t i o n s m a y b e th e n a t u r e o f th e in t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n

e m o t i o n a n d o t h e r m o t i v a t i o n s . A m o n g th e latte r, I sh all o n ly c o n s i d e r m a t e r i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t (“ i n t e r e s t ” fo r s h o r t ) , a lt h o u g h s im il a r p r o b l e m s a r is e f o r th e re la tio n b etw een

em o tion s

and

im p artial

m otivation s.

For

in s ta n c e ,

a w e a lth y

lib e ra l

m ig h t o n i m p a r t i a l g r o u n d s p r e f e r to s e n d his c h il d r e n to a p u b li c s c h o o l , b u t his e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t t o th e c h il d r e n m i g h t in d u c e a p r e f e r e n c e f o r a b e t t e r - q u a l i t y p r iv a t e e d u c a t i o n .

The cost-ben efit m odel o f em otions By fa r th e m o s t c o m m o n w ay o f m o d e l i n g th e in t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n e m o t i o n s a n d i n t e r e s t s is to v ie w th e f o r m e r as p s y c h ic c o s t s o r b e n e fit s th at e n t e r in to the u tility f u n c t io n o n a p a r w it h s a t is fa c tio n s d e r i v e d f r o m m a t e r i a l r e w a r d s . In this p e r s p e c t i v e , th e o n ly r e le v a n t a s p c c t o f th e e m o t i o n s is th e ir valence. W e m a y u se B e c k e r ’ s a n aly sis o f b e g g a r - i n d u c e d g u il t t o illu s t r a t e t w o w a y s in w h ic h the p l e a s u r e a n d p a in a s s o c i a t e d w it h th e e m o t i o n s m a y e n t e r in t o th e u tility f u n c tio n . F i r s t , the g u il t i t s e l f is a c o s t . E v e n i f I d o n o t have any m o n e y w ith m e , I m a y c r o s s th e s t r e e t to avo id c o m i n g fa c c t o fa c c w ith a b e g g a r w h o s e v isib le m i s e r y w o u ld in d u c e th e u n p l e a s a n t fe e l in g o f g u il t . S e c o n d , th e g u i l t m a y i n d u c e b e h a v io r th at is c o s t ly in the m a t e r i a l s e n s e . If I d o have m o n e y writh m e , I k n o w th a t i f I c o m e face t o fa c e writh the b e g g a r I w'ould g iv e h im s o m e t h i n g t o a lle v ia te m y g u il t . M o r e a c c u r a t e l y , I w o u l d g iv e u p t o th e p o i n t w'here th e m a r g i n a l u tility o f m o n e y in

3 1 6

JON

E L S T E R

alleviatin g my gu ilt equ als its m argin al utility fo r o th e r p u rp o se s. (If c ro ssin g the stre e t is c o stly , this w ou ld also have to be taken into a c c o u n t.) In o th e r an alyses, the e n c o u n te rs that trig g e r the e m o tio n is taken lo r given and n ot su b je c t to ch o ice. T h e q u e stio n o f ch o ice arise s only b e ca u se the agen t has to w eigh e m o tio n a l satisfactio n again st o th e r satisfactio n s, as in the ch o ice o f the am o u n t to give to the b eggar. In m o d e lin g envy, w e m ay assu m e that the ag e n t is w illin g to invest re so u r c e s in m akin g the rival w o rse o f! up to the p o in t w h ere he d e riv e s m o re utility from m ak in g h im self b e tte r off (H irsh lc ifc r 1 9 8 7 ). In m o d e lin g a ltru ism , w e can m ak e a sim ilar assu m p tio n (B e c k e r 1 9 7 6 , chs.

12 and

13).

E co n o m ic an alyses o f r e g re t (D avid Bell 1 9 8 2 ; G rah am L o o n ie s and R o b e rt Sugden 1 9 8 2 ) also assu m e that ag en ts w eigh satisfaction from actual o u tc o m e s and e m o ­ tion s g e n e ra te d by c o u n terfactu al b eliefs. Strictly sp eak in g, n on e o f th ese an alyses n eed to rely on valen ce, in the sen se o f su b jectiv e feelin gs o f p le asu re and pain. All that is n e e d e d is that w e can draw in differen ce c u rv e s that re fle ct the trad eo ffs involved. W c m ay think o f e m o tio n a l valen ce as the un d erly in g m ech an ism behind th ese trad e o ffs, but it n eed not b e d irectly re fle cte d in the fo rm a l analysis. In a m o d e lin g p e rsp e c tiv e , “ e m o tio n a l a ltru ism ” is indistin guish ab le from “re aso n -b ase d a ltr u is m .” In the fo llo w in g I asse ss the u se fu ln e ss o f this ap p ro ach w ith re sp e c t to gu ilt, sh am e, envy, in dign ation , love, vin d ictiv en ess, h atre d , and c o n te m p t.

Guilt L et us assu m e that a p e rso n is te m p te d lo steal a b o o k from the lib rary . If he feels gu ilty a b o u t do in g it, he m ay abstain . If he ste a ls the b o o k and then feels gu ilt, he may re tu rn the b o o k to the lib rary . O n the B eck er-F ran k assu m p tio n that g u ilt is to be m o d e le d as a c o st, both the ab sten tio n from ste alin g and the re tu rn o f the b o o k w ou ld b e exp lain e d by a sim p le c o st-b e n c fit an alysis. T h is ap p ro ach has the g re at advan tage that it allow s us to acco u n t for the u n den iab le e x iste n ce o f a trad eo ff b etw een m o ral e m o tio n s and se lf-in te re st. T h e w orld is n o t m ad e up o f tw o e xclu siv e and e xh au stiv e c a te g o rie s, th ose w ho w ould steal a b o o k w h en ever th ere w as n o risk o f d e tec tio n and th ose w ho w ould n ever do so. M any p e o p le w ould g o ahead and steal the b o o k if b u t only if its value to them w as sufficiently high o r its value to o th e rs sufficiently sm all. To m o d e l such behavior, w e cou ld talk “as i f ’ g u ilt and in te re st add up to an in clu sive u tility, w ith the m argin al disutility from g u ilt b e in g an in creasin g fun ction o f (say) the n u m b e r o f p e o p le on the w aitin g list fo r the b o o k and the m argin al utility from in te re st a d e cre a sin g fun ction o f (say) the tim e the ag e n t e x p e c ts to use the b o o k . W 'hcthcr o r not this m o d e l o f the in te ractio n b e tw e en e m o tio n and in te re st is p red ictiv ely ad eq u ate , I su b m it that it is basically flaw ed. If gu ilt w ere n othing but an an ticip ated o r e x p e rie n c e d c o st, an agen t w h ose gu ilt d e te r s him from stealin g or retain in g the b o o k should b e w illin g to buy a g u ilt-erasin g pill if it w as sufficiently cheap. I submit that no person who is capable o f being deterred by guilt would buy the pill. In fact, he w ould fe el gu ilty ab o u t buying it. For h im , takin g the pill in o rd e r to e scap e gu ilt and be able to steal the b o o k w ould b e as m orally b ad as ju st stealin g it. He w ould n ot sec any m o ral relcv an cc b e tw e en stealin g the b o o k in a tw o -step o p e ratio n (tak in g the pill to steal the b o o k ) and stealin g it in a o n e ste p o p e ratio n . T h e re is a strict an alogy b etw een this argu m en t and a poin t that I have m ade

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elsew here (E lsle r 1 9 9 7 ), viz. that a person w ho discoun ts the future very highly w ould not be m otivated to buy a pill that w ould redu ce his rate o f tim e discounting. To w ant to be m otivated by rem o te con sequen ces of presen t behavior is to be m otivated by re m o te con sequen ces of presen t behavior. Sim ilarly, to w ant to be im m oral is to be im m oral. A p erso n w illing to take the gu ilt-erasing pill w ould not need it. We n eed, th erefore, a m odel that can accoun t for the tradeoff betw een Oguilt and in terest and yet d o es not im ply that a reluctant agent w ould buy the gu ilterasing pill. I con jecture that the m odel w ould involve som e kind o f non-intentional psychic causality rather than d eliberate choice. To illustrate w hat I have in m ind, I shall sketch a m odel draw n from catastroph e th eory, along the lines o f a m odel o f the relation betw een personal opinion and con form ism proposed by Abraham Tesser and John Achee (1 9 9 4 ). In a catastroph e m o d e l, the surface describ in g the behavior o f a d epen den t variable as a function o f tw o in depen den t variables folds in on itse lf in a cusp. W ithin a ccrtain range, a given constellation o f the in depen dent variables is thus consisten t w ith several values o f the depen den t variable. Sup pose that the agen t is initially unw illing to steal the b o o k , but that as its value to him in creases he finally decides to do so. Suppose conversely that the agent has stolen the b ook , but that as its value to others in creases he finally retu rn s it to the library. In the first case, su pp ose that its value to others is 10 and that he decides to steal it just when its value to him rcachcs 15. In the second case, su pp ose that its initial value lo him is 1 5 and the initial value to oth ers is 6. O n the cost-ben efil m od el, he w ould retu rn il w hen its value to others reaches 10. O n the catastrophe m od el, he might not do so until its value to others reached 15. The reason for this asy m m etry is found in the m echanism of disson an ce redu ction (L eon Festinger 1957). An individual who is sub ject to several m otivation s that point in different direction s w ill l e d an unpleasant feeling o f ten sion. W hen on balance he favors one action, he w ill try to redu ce the tension by looking for cogn itions that su p p o rt it; when he favors another, he will look fo r cogn itions w hich stack the balance of argum en ts in favor of that action . . . . Thus the tim ing o f the sw itch in behavior w ill be path-depen den t. D issonance theory is m ore realistic than the cost-bcn cfit m odel in that it view s individuals as m aking hard choices on the basis o f reasons rather than on the basis o f in trospection s ab out how they feel. Although the person w ho has stolen the book but feels guilty about it may try to alleviate his gu ilt, he w ould do so by com in g up w ith ad ditional reason s that justify his behavior rath er than by accepting a guilterasing pill. It is a fundam ental feature o f hum an bein gs that they have an im age o f them selves as acting f o r a reason. G uilt, in this p e rsp ectiv e, acts not as a cost but as a psychic force that induces the individual to rationalize his behavior. Beyond a certain point, when the argum en ts on the other side b eco m e to o stron g and the rationalization breaks dow n , a sw itch in behavior o ccu rs. Although we may w ell say that the sw itch occu rs w hen the gu ilt b e co m e s unbearable, we should add that the point at w hich it b eco m es unbearable is itse lf influenced and in fact delayed by the gu ilt. This dual role oj emotions in decision making is an im portan t ph enom enon lo which I shall return . As in dicated, the “ten sion” in this exam ple w ould be guilt if the person on balance preferred to steal the b ook , and perhaps regret if he preferred lo

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ab stain fro m ste a lin g it. A s p s y c h o lo g ists have n o t c o n sid e re d e m o tio n s as s o u r c e s o f c o g n itiv e d isso n a n c e an d o f d isso n a n c e re d u c tio n , the a r g u m e n t in v o lv e s an e x te n sio n o f d isso n a n c e th e o r y as u su allv sta te d . Yet th e re s e e m s to b e n o re a so n w hy e m o tio n s c o u ld n o t be s o u r c e s o f d isso n a n c e . A lth o u g h it is d e sc rip tiv e ly a c c u r a te that d isso n a n c e th e o ry p la c e s the “ e m p h a sis on the in d iv id u a l’ s c o n c e p t o f what he is ra th e r than h is c o n c e p t o f what he should he” (F e stin g e r an d D an a B ram e l 1 9 6 2 , p. 2 7 1 ) , this lim ita tio n on th e s c o p e o f th e th e o rv s e e m s a rb itra ry . A s e c o n o m is ts arc n ow in c o rp o ra tin g d isso n a n c e th e o ry in to th e ir fra m e w o r k (G e o r g e A k e r lo f and W illiam D ic k e n s 1 9 8 2 ; R ab in 1 9 9 4 ), the in c o rp o ra tio n o f g u ilt and o th e r se lf-e v a lu ativ e e m o tio n s (E . T ory H ig g in s 1 9 8 7 ) in to d isso n a n c e th e o r v w ou ld a lso lead to th e ir in c o rp o ra tio n in e c o n o m ic s.

Shame A n an alysis o f sh am e w ill allo w m e to s u g g e st fu rth e r a lte rn a tiv e s to the sim p le c o st-b e n e fit m o d e l. E m p iric a lly , w e k n o w that p e o p le can tak e e x t r e m e ac tio n s w h en ta r g e te d by so c ial o s tr a c is m . T h e c ase o f the N av y A d m ira l w h o k ille d h im se lf w h en it w as sh o w n that he w as n o t e n title d to d e c o ra tio n s he w a s w e a rin g (P e te r B o y e r 1 9 9 6 ) is o n e e x a m p le . T h e five F re n c h m e n w h o k ille d th e m se lv e s in Ju n e 1 9 9 7 a fte r they had b e e n c au g h t in a c ra c k d o w n on p e d o p h ilia is an oth er. The tw o e x p la n a to ry issu e s that a r ise a r c , first, w h e th e r th e d e c isiv e fa c to r w as fe ar o f m a te ria l sa n c tio n s o r ra th e r an e m o tio n o f sh a m e ; an d , s e c o n d , a ssu m in g il w as sh a m e , w h e th e r it can sim p ly b e m o d e le d as a c o st. In th e se d r a m a tic c a se s few w o u ld d isp u te that the e m o tio n o f sh am e m u st have b e e n a d e c isiv e facto r. It is n o t g e n e ra lly a c c e p te d , h ow ever, th at so c ia l n o r m s in g e n e ra l o p e r a te th ro u g h the e m o tio n o f sh a m e . M an y w r ite r s (A k e r- o f 1 9 7 6 ; R o b e r t A x e lr o d 1 9 8 6 ; D id ie r A b re u 1 9 8 8 ; Ja m e s C o le m a n 1 9 9 0 ) have a rg u e d that so cial n o r m s w o rk th ro u g h m a te ria l s a n c tio n s, in v o lv in g h ig h e r - o rd e r sa n c tio n s o f th o se w h o fail to san ctio n n o r m - v io la to r s o r n o n - sa n c tio n e rs. [. . .] I w o u ld like to g o b e y o n d m y e a r lie r a r g u m e n ts , h ow ever, to a s s e r t th at the m a te ria l sa n c tio n s th e m se lv e s arc b e st u n d e r s to o d as v e h ic le s o f the e m o tio n o f c o n te m p t, w h ich is the d ire c t t r ig g e r o f sh a m e . W h en a p e r so n re fu se s to d e al w ith s o m e o n e w h o h as v io late d a so cial n o r m , the la tte r m ay su ffe r a financial lo ss. M o re im p o r ta n t, he w ill se e the san c tio n as a v eh icle fo r th e e m o tio n s o f c o n te m p t o r d isg u st, an d su ffe r sh am e as a re su lt. T h e m a te ria l a sp e c t o f the san c tio n that m a tte r s is how much it costs the sanctioner to penalize th e t a r g e t, n o t how m u c h it c o sts th e ta r g e t to b e p e n a liz e d . (T h u s th e p h ra se “ T h is h u rts m e m o r e than it h u rts y o u ” m ay b e in te n d e d to ad d to the p u n ish m e n t, n o t to so fte n it.) T h e m o r e it c o s ts the s a n c tio n c r to re fu se to d e al w ith the ta rg e t p e r s o n , the s tr o n g e r w ill the la tte r feel the c o n te m p t b e h in d th e re fu sal and th e m o r e a c u te w ill b e his sh a m e . A lth ou gh h igh c o s ts to th e sa n c tio n e r o fte n g o to g e th e r w ith h igh c o s ts fo r the ta r g e t, as w h en th e s a n c tio n e r re n o u n c e s on th e o p p o r tu n ity fo r a m u tu ally p ro fitab le b u sin e ss tra n sa c tio n , this n e e d n o t b e th e c a se ; an d even w h en it is th e c a se , m y claim is that the c o s ts to the s a n c tio n c r a rc w h at m a k e s th e sa n ctio n really pain fu l to the ta rg e t. It te lls him that o th e r s se e him as so bad that they arc w illin g to fo re g o valu ab le o p p o r tu n itie s ra th e r than have lo d eal w ith h im . The se c o n d q u e stio n c o n c e rn s th e m o d e o f o p e r a tio n o f sh a m e in sh ap in g

A

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b eh avior. A c c o r d in g to the c o st m o d e l, p re se n t and fu tu re sh a m e e n te r s in to the u tility fu n c tio n on a p a rt w ith m a te ria l c o s ts and b e n e fits. A p e r so n w h o h as b e en p u b licly e x p o s e d to c o n te m p t m ig h t c o m p a re th ree o p tio n s: su ic id e , m o v in g e ls e ­ w h e re to tak e up a n ew p r o fe s s io n w ith a n ew n a m e , an d stic k in g it o u t in the e x p e c ta tio n that the c o n te m p t o f o th e r s and the fe e lin g o f sh a m e w ill fade a fte r a w h ile . II th e im m e d ia te fe e lin g o f sh a m e is im m e n s e , su ic id e m ig h t w ell b e p r e fe r ­ ab le to the d isc o u n te d p r e se n t valu e of th e o th e r o p tio n s. It w o u ld b e h ard to re fu te this a c c o u n t, as the d isu tility o f sh a m e can alw ay s b e stip u la te d to b e arb itra rily h igh . I b e lie v e it is at le a st e q u a lly p la u sib le , h ow ever, to a ssu m e that sh a m e in d u c e s a t e m p o r a r y h eig h te n in g o f the d isc o u n tin g ra te . W ith r e s p e c t to d r u g s , B c c k c r ( 1 9 9 6 , p. 3 2 9 ) a r g u e s th at “ A h ab it m ay b e ra ise d in to an ad d ictio n by e x p o s u r e to the h ab it itse lf. C e rta in h ab its, like d r u g u se and h eavy d rin k in g , m ay re d u c e the a tte n tio n to fu tu re c o n s e q u e n c e s — th e re is n o re a so n to a ssu m e d isc o u n t ra te s on the fu tu re are ju st g iv e n an d f ix e d .” T h e a r g u m e n t s e e m s e q u ally a p p lic a b le to s tr o n g e m o tio n s. A lte rn a tiv e ly , w e m ig h t fo llo w L o c w e n stc in (1 9 9 6 ) and arg u e th at sh a m e , like o th e r v isc e ral fa c to r s , u n d e rm in e s o u r ab ility to p r e d ic t fu tu re su b je c tiv e sta te s. W h en o n e is in in te n se pain o r su ffe rin g fro m in te n se sh a m e , it is h ard to im a g in e that th e sta te w ill n ot last fo r e v e r .11 T h e o v e rw h e lm in g d e sire is fo r im m e d ia te re le a se . By c o n tin u ity , a sh am e o f le ss in te n se stre n g th w ill also have a cau sa l e ffe c t on the ev alu atio n and p e r c e p tio n o f o th e r re w a r d s over and above its own role as a (negative) reward. T h is is a n o th e r in stan ce o f the d u a l ro le o f e m o tio n in d e c isio n m akin g. [. . .]

R eferen ces A b r e u , D i d i e r . “ O n the T h e o ry o f Infinitely R ep e ate d G a m e s w ith D isc o u n tin g ,”

Econometriea, M ar. 1 9 8 8 , 5 6 (2 ), pp. 383—96 . A k f .r l o f , G e o r g e . “ T h e E co n o m ics o f C aste o f the R at R ace and O th e r W oeful T a le s,”

Quart. J. Econ., Nov. 19 7 6 , 9 0 (4 ), pp. 5 9 9 - 6 1 7 . A k f . r l o f , G f.o r g f . A . a n d D i c k e n s , W i l l i a m T. “T h e E co n o m ic C o n se q u e n ce s o f

C og n itive D isso n a n c e ,” Amer. Econ. Rev., Ju n e 1 9 8 2 , 7 2 (3 ), pp. 3 0 7 —19. A x e l r o d , R o b e r t . “ A n E v o l u t i o n a r y A p p r o a c h t o N o r m s , "Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., D e c .

1 9 8 6 , o f R e a s o n .”

The great fear o f 1789 In the eigh teen th ce n tu ry , the philosophes o f the E n lig h ten m en t ch am p ion ed the cause o f scien ce and reason over ign o ran ce , su p e rstitio n , and tyrann y. M uch in tellectual lead ersh ip cam e fro m such French w rite r s as V oltaire, M o n te sq u ie u , R o u sse a u , and D id e r o t, w h o ch allen ged the trad ition al le gal, m o ra l, h ierarch ical, and re lig io u s fou n d atio n s o f French so c icty . By 1 7 8 9 , large se c tio n s o f F ra n c e ’s p ro fessio n al and m id d le classe s had b een co n v e rte d to th ese rev o lu tio n aryJ id e as,’ and thcv b e ca m e J active in try in g to ach ieve the ch an ges in French so ciety that they th ou gh t n e cessary . In fact, so m e o f th ese ad v o cates o f re aso n b egan to try to fo rce so cial change. R easo n and p e rsu asio n so o n gave way to hate and terro r. R u m o rs began to c ircu late that the R oyal C o u r t and aristo c ra c y w ere p lo ttin g to take over Paris by c o u n tc rfo rc e . P eop le fled P aris in fear. A s they tru d g e d alo n g cou n try ro ad s on th eir way to the Fren ch c o u n try sid e, they sp rea d ru m o rs o f an im p en d in g assault on the pro v in ces by a m e rc e n ary arm y o f crim in als and fo re ig n e rs in the pay o f the aristo c ra c y . Fran ce b e ca m e g r ip p e d by an alm o st u n iversal pan ic. Fear b red fear. L ocal au th o rities and citizen s b c ca m c con v in ccd that the crim in al arm y w as n ot ju st on the m arch , b u t w as at the d oo r. T h is led to the b reak d ow n o f local g o v e rn m e n t, the a rm in g o f the p o o r, and fo o d rio ts , and furn ish ed a d ram a tic im p e tu s to revo lu tion in the p ro v in ces (B e rn ste in , 1 9 9 0 ; C o o k , 1 9 7 4 ; H e a d le y , 1 9 7 1 ; L e fe b v re , 1 9 7 3 ). A fter the sto rm in g o f the B astille in 1 7 8 9 , h istorian s d e sc rib e d the y e ars that later en su ed as the R eign o f T e rro r

a term su g g e stin g that e m o tio n al con tagion

m ay have a life w ell b eyon d the w alls o f the lab o rato ry .

The New York City draft riots o f 1863 N e w York C ity , in the h ot su m m e r o f 1 8 6 3 , wras a p lace o f e x tre m e s. T h e C ivil W ar had b ro u g h t ever g r e a te r w ealth to a few and in creasin g p o v erty to m an y . W artim e inflation e ro d e d the b uy in g p o w e r o f the poo r. T h e c ity ’ s stru g g lin g im m igran t p o p u latio n lived in ru n -d o w n , cro w d cd te n e m e n ts. Im m ig ran ts, cspccially the Irish, w ere o u tra g e d at the u se o f b lack s to re p la c e strik in g Irish lo n gsh o re m e n . N ew York w as an an tiw ar city, c o n tro lle d by a lo cal D e m o c ra tic p olitical m ach in e, w hich had lo st p o w e r and in fluence to the n ation al R ep u b lican “w a r” p a rty . T h e c ity ’ s D e m o c ra tic p re ss and p o litician s skillfully played up the them e that N o r th e r n w hite w o rk e rs w ere b etray in g th eir ow n b e st in te re sts by fighting to free slaves w ho w ou ld then c o m p e te fo r th eir jo b s.

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In the m id st o f th is, a n ation al m ilita ry d ra ft c o m m e n c e d d u r in g th e su m m e r o f 1 8 6 3 . T h e n ew law p e r m itte d a c o m m u ta tio n o f m ilita ry s e r v ic e fo r an y on e w h o c o u ld pay a S 3 0 0 fee. T h is se t the sta g e lo r v ie w in g the d ra ft as a sy m b o l o f R e p u b lic a n o v e r D e m o c r a t , n atio n al o v e r lo cal g o v e r n m e n t, n ativ e o v e r im m ig r a n t, an d rich o v e r p o o r. T h e first 1 ,2 3 6 n a m e s o f N e w Y ork C ity d r a fte d m e n a p p e a r e d in the m o r n in g p a p e rs at the sa m e tim e that casu a lty lists fro m G e tty s b u rg (th e b lo o d ie s t b attle e v e r fo u g h t on th e N o r th A m e ric a n c o n tin e n t) w e re p o ste d aro u n d th e c ity . E arly th e n e x t m o r n in g , m e n , w o m e n , and b o y s b e g an to m o v e a lo n g s tr e e ts c a r ry in g the w e a p o n s o f th e p o o r

c ro w b a r s and clu b s. M o b s q u ick ly fo r m e d an d g re w , cau g h t

u p in and c a r rie d aw ay w ith an ger. F o u r d ay s o f s u b se q u e n t u n c o n tro lle d v io le n c e b u rn in g o f

12 b lac k s — le ft

119 p e r so n s d ead

in clu d in g th e ly n ch in g and and

3 0 6 in ju r e d . F o rty -th re e

re g im e n ts o f u n io n tr o o p s h ad to b e sta tio n e d in an d a ro u n d th e city to e n su re o r d e r (C h u r c h , 1 9 6 4 ; M c C a g u c , 1 9 6 8 ).

The era o f mass media R e se a rc h on e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n has fo c u se d on th e e ffe c t o f in te r p e r s o n a l in te r ­ a c tio n s; th e re is, h ow ever, h isto ric a l e v id e n c e to s u g g e st that the d isse m in a tio n o f e m o tio n s d o c s n o t alw ay s re q u ir e d ire c t p h y sical c o n ta c t o r p r o x im ity . A s r u m o r s s p r e a d , e m o tio n s m ay a c c o m p a n y th e m . M a ss c o m m u n ic a tio n s — film s, n e w s p a p e r s, ra d io , an d (p a rtic u la rly ) te le v isio n — can tra n sm it p e o p le ’ s e m o tio n s far b e y o n d th e ir g e o g ra p h ic a l p e r im e t e r s . O u r v e ry im a g e o f th e m o b is lin ked in e x tric a b ly w ith n o tio n s o f the sp re a d o f an g e r, le a d in g to the o u t- o f-c o n tro l b e h a v io rs o f m u r d e r, lv n c h in g s, and la r g c - sc a lc d e s tr u c tio n . W c se c daily on te le v isio n the p ic tu re s o f w e e p in g an d a n g ry c ro w d s m o u r n in g th e death o f a P alestin ian g u e r r illa o r an Israeli c h ild , a m u r d e re d le a d e r and h er m o u r n fu l fo llo w e r s, o r the d efian t and a n g ry o p p o s itio n . W'e re p la y th e w ee k e n d o f m o u r n in g by an e n tire n ation (p e r h a p s even the e n tire w o rld ) on th e assa ssin a tio n o f Jo h n F. K e n n e d y . A re th ese in sta n c e s o f e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n , o r are th e se p h e n o m e n a to o c o m p lic a te d to b e so la b e le d ? H isto ric a l e x a m p le s c a n n o t b e t e s te d in th e la b o r a to r y , b u t they d o h in t at the re a lity o f e m o tio n a l c o n ta g io n and su g g e st that it m ay have o c c u r r c d on a large scale in m an y h isto ric a l e ra s. T h e y also s u g g e st that th e m a ss m e d ia o f o u r day m ay p o s s e s s p o w e r even g r e a t e r than g e n e ra lly re a liz e d b e c a u se o f th e ir p o te n tia l to p r e c ip ita te th e sp re a d n o t ju st o f in fo rm a tio n an d e n te r ta in m e n t, b u t also o f e m o tio n s. ( . . . )

References B ern stein , I. (1 9 9 0 ). The New York City draft riots. N e w York: O x fo r d U n iversity P ress. C h u rch , W. F. (E d .). (1 9 6 4 ). The influence o f the enlightenment on the French revolution: Creative, disastrous or non-existent? L e x in g to n , M A : D. C . H eath. C o o k , A . (1 9 7 4 ). The armies o f the streets: The New York City draft riots o f 18 6 3 . L e x in g to n , KY: U n iversity o f K en tuck y P ress.

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H A T F I E L D

AND

R I CH ARD

L.

RA P SON

H atfield, E ., C aciop po, J. T ., & R ap so n , R . L. (1 9 9 3 ). Emotional contagion (p. 5). N ew York: C am bridge U niversity Press. H eadley, J. T. (1 9 7 1 ). The great riots o j New York 1712 to 1873. N ew York: Dover. L cfebvre, G. (1 9 7 3 ). The great fear o f 1789 (trans. J. W h ite). N ew York: Pantheon. M cC ague, J. (1 9 6 8 ). The second rebellion: The story o f the New York City draft riots o f 1863. N ew York: Dial Press.

Chapter

55

Nathan Sznaider THE COMPASSIONATE TEMPERAMENT

C

O M P A S S I O N — T H E O R G A N I Z E D C A M P A I G N T O lessen the suffering o f stran gers— is a distinctly m o d e rn form o f m orality . It played a

historically im portan t role in the rise o f m odern society , and it con tin ues to play an im portan t role today. And if we understand the nature o f com passion and its con n ection to social stru ctu re, we can explain many social m ovem en ts today that oth erw ise seem acciden tal, u n preceden ted, and p o stm o d e rn . Th e idea that the sight o f suffering im p oses a duty to am eliorate it seem s like it should be a very old notion but is in fact a very recen t on e. T h ere is a big distance betw een a duty that once bound saints and one that is now con sidered incum bent on all reasonable peop le. So little w as sufferin g con sidered an evil before the nineteenth cen tury that the guardians o f m orality paraded the spectacular suffering o f evildoers b efore the public as a m ean s of im provem en t. Public hangings c o n ­ tinued until the end of the eighteenth ccn tury. And during the R efo rm atio n , often thought o f as the first turning on the road tow ard m od ern ity , people w hose only crim es w ere doctrin al w ere routinely b urn ed in the city squares o f E u ro p e ’ s capitals. T h e m ovem en t to refo rm such cruelties reflected a change in the con ception o f hum an nature. N o lon ger w ere public displays o f cru clty thought to be salutary. T hey w ere thought rather to be brutalizin g— to the peop le w ho w atched them . The idea that w e m ust rem ove “b rutalizin g” con dition s in o rd er to “ civilize” people developed in tandem w ith the developm en t o f capitalism . C oeval w ith the rise o f capitalism and its “dark satanic m ills,” as W illiam Blake d escrib ed it, w as a qualita­ tively new ou tp ou rin g o f com passion . C om p assion is the m oral self-organization o f society . Il is the first m oral cam paign not organ ized by the church or the state. The stru ctu res o f m odern ity arc what m ake this self-organization o f society possible. And the m oral sentim en ts that result from this p rocess con stitute qualitatively new social bonds.

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My argum ent in a nutshell is that it is in the nature o f m od ern ity to foster com passion . D esp ite the h istorical re co rd , this is a m in ority view am on g to d ay ’s in tellectuals. M o st tend to think o f m odern ity as corro siv e o f m oral sen tim en ts. Thev sec clearly the way in which m odern ity breaks dow n old er social b on ds, but they are m uch less attentive to the wav in which it builds new ones. And when w aves o f com passio n break ou t into dem ands for political action , they are forced to con sider it an atavism , an c x c u sc, a su b terfu g e, or an irrelevan cy. [. . .] I have tried to show that com passion as m oral sen tim en t and as hum anitarian praxis exists. I used the exam p le o f children and the cm crg cn ce o f com passion tow ard them . But can w e really claim that m odern society is a com passion ate society? Has our ccn tury n ot been the cen tury o f h orror, m ass exterm in ation , gen ocide, the c ru e le st and m o st callous con du ct m ankind has ever seen? D o not the ovens o f the exterm in ation cam ps in the 1940s cry out that com passion is not a feature o f m od ern ity , especially argued by those w ho see the H o lo cau st even as the logical con scqu cn cc o f m odern ity? I low can the attem p t to curb violcn cc against children com pare to these h o rro rs? Is it enough to just have a language that gives us the opp ortu n ity to recognize these h o rro rs as such and cry out in lam entation about evil? Is that all that is left? Clearly this has been the ccntury o f cru elty, and it also has been the ccntury o f com passion. If w e understand the m oral foundations o f m odern society as the interplay betw een com passion and barbarism that results from the w o rld ’s m oving betw een a com m un al m orality and a universal on e, then we w ill be able to see not only the breakdow n o f ethics but also its con struction and the processes that accom pany both o f them . T h e French R evolution also played a key role in the history ol com p assio n . It produced the D eclaration o f the R ights o f M an, perhaps the founding d ocum en t in the history o f hum an rights, and in its arm ies the ideal of equality literally con quered E urop e. But the French Revolution w as also the site o f h orrific cru elty . H ow can these tw o things be recon ciled? Hannah A rendt gives a d irect answ er: com passion has no placc in politics, and w hen it e n te rs, it leads to cru cltv. She believes that m odern ity begin s with the m ob s o f the Frcnch R evolution, and clim axcs in the m o b s o f totalitarianism (A ren dt 1963). For her, com passion is not politics. I have shown that it is. C om p assion abolishes distance betw een p e o p le, so says A rendt (sec also Canovan 1992 and Hansen 199 3 ), but it is exactly distance that can create the kind o f public com passion that A rendt w ould con sider an oxy m oron . Suffering p e o p le, children, anim als do not have to be turn ed into ab stract m asses. The danger e x ists; sen tim entality alw ays lurks in the back o f com passio n, but it is not intrinsic to it. For A ren dt, at the base o f com passion is disdain for the real suffering o f peop le. It is the cause that b cco m c s im p o rtan t, the first step to totalitarianism . C om p assion cannot m ake one free. A ren dt m ight be right here. C om p assion w as not m ean t to m ake one free. But d oes it im prison us? H er theoretical influence em pow ered an entire tradition suspicious o f m od ern fo rm s o f politics that do not share the highm indedness o f the Athenian polis. A rcn d t’s line o f thought con ics to its con scqu cn cc by tryin g to show not only how m uch totalitarianism is a sign o f m od ern ity , but even m o re: that the realm con ­ sidered the evilcst o f all by m ost peop le, N azi G erm an y and the concentration cam p s, the w orld w here com passion en ded, is a consequence o f m odern ity . The en terin g o f com passion into politics b egot the m ost cruelty o f all, the w orld o f the

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co n cen tratio n cam p. D o e s that m ean that the m o d e rn te m p e ra m e n t is rath er b arb arian , as M e stro v ic (1 9 9 3 ) arg u e s? C an the H o lo ca u st be co n sid e re d the b reak d ow n o f c o m p a ssio n ? Is b arb arism the tru e face of m o d e rn ity ? T h u s, the c ritics of m o d e rn ity arg u e , the b reak d ow n of civilization is p a rt and p a r e d o f the p ro c e sse s o f ration alizatio n and b u re au cratizatio n . A ren d t hinted to this view ; H o rk h e im c r and A d o rn o rad icalized it in their Dialectics o f the Enlightenment (1 9 7 1 ). F ou cau lt and B aum an con tin u ed this view o f m o d c rn itv . For F ou cault (1 9 6 5 , 1 9 7 7 ), h um an itarian actio n s, w hich I analyzed ab ov e, arc e x p re ssio n s of d iscip lin e and violen ce. For B aum an (1 9 8 9 ), the atte m p t in m o d c rn itv to create o r d e r— and p u b lic co m p assio n d o c s, o f c o u r sc , cx ac tlv th at-

is a fo rm o f violcn cc

w ith the w o rst co n sc q u c n c c s. B ut is this tru e ? Can it n ot b e argu ed that m o d e rn ity is a form o f c o n sc io u sn e ss and b e in g that is aw are o f its poten tial for cru e lty and that trie s to o v e rco m e it in a p ro c e ss o f civilization? But in o r d e r to do this, it n e e d s c o n c e p ts o f civility , w hich in tu rn ask fo r the re co g n itio n o f o th e r p e o p le ’ s su fferin g ( i.e ., c o m p a ssio n ). In co m p le te as it m igh t be w hen faccd w ith the c ru e ltie s o f this w o rld , this state o f m in d and action is only p o ssib le in a m o d e rn ity o f a sp ecial k in d, n am ely in a d e m o c ra tic m a rk e t so ciety . T h e q u e stio n re m ain s w h eth er w e talk a b o u t “m o d e rn ity in g e n e ra l” o r w h e th e r

wc

talk

ab o u t “ p e cu liar

G e rm an

h isto ry ” w hen

talkin g ab o u t

the

H o lo ca u st. 1 w ould like to su g g e st that “m o d e rn ity ” the way B aum an u n d e rstan d s il is to o w eak a c o n c e p t to try to e n c o m p a ss such an event as the H o lo ca u st. T h is c o m p le te b reak d o w n o f civilization , and w ith it the b reak d ow n o f c o m p a ssio n , w as first o f all an even t that involved G e rm a n s and Je w s. T h e G e rm an N azis iden tified th em selv es w ith the h eroic life, w hich thev co n traste d w ith “Je w ish p a ra site s” and m u n dan e everyday life. N o th in g scared them m o re than the p e rce iv e d declin e o f h ero ic e th ics, w hich they id en tified — and rightly so — w ith the rise o f co m m e rcia l c ap italism . But for th em , co m m c rcia l cap italism w as e m b o d ie d in the Jew . T h e d eclin e o f h ero ic eth ics im p lie d at the sam e tim e a “fem in ization ” o f cu ltu re . B ut the “ fem in ization ” o f eu ltu re very often m e an t to the N azis the Ju d aizatio n of eu ltu re as w ell. A n ti-S em itic im ag e ry n o t only iden tified the Je w w ith the so u lle ss sp irit o f c ap italism , b u t also as an in c o m p le te m an , a w om an actually. H cn cc , for m any w ho identified the c o m m c rcia l sp irit w ith a d cclin c o f m anly h e ro ism , the iden tification o f Je w s and w om en w as a lm o st c o m p le te . In m o re so p h isticated fo rm s, on e can o b se rv e th ese ten d e n c ie s in G e rm an so c io lo g y as w ell. T h e h atred o f the b o u rg e o is and his sp irit w as cle ar in the w o rk s o f G e rm an social th in kers like T o n n ie s, S o m b a rt, and Sch eier, often m ix e d w ith an ti-S em itism as w ell. E lias, in his study titled The Germans (1 9 9 6 ), p o in ts o u t that even d u rin g the end o f the n in eteen th and b egin n in g o f the tw en tieth cc n tu ry , the so cial statu s o f rich b an k ers and m e rch an ts w as significantly lo w er than that o f high civil se rv a n ts and m ilitary m e n . T h e p re d o m in an ce o f the d uel in G e rm an so ciety is a case in p oin t. E lias talks ab ou t the b o u rg e o isifie d w a rrio r eth os o f W ilh elm in e G e rm an so ciety . T h is m ilitary eth os w as also d om in an t in the in d u strial sp h e re s o f lives. M any w ritten te stim o n ie s sp e ak ab o u t the p a ra lle ls o f ru n n in g a facto ry w ith the sam e m ilitary d iscip lin e as ru n n in g an arm y cam p . T h is m ay n ot have b een typ ical only for G e rm an y , but th ere it w as h eg e m o n ic. O p p o se d to this n otio n o f G c rm a n n c ss ro o te d in the so il, d e fe n d ed by w a r rio rs e v e r w illin g lo die an h o n o rab le death and fight w ith ou t m e rc y and c o m p a ssio n , w as the “h o m e le ss,” the g lo b a l, the

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c o m m e rcia l, in sh o rt, the “ fem in in e” Jew . R em ain in g in the fram ew o rk o f Elias and his d istin ctio n b e tw e en “ Kultur" and “Zivilisation,” the Jew w as rep re se n tativ e of civilization and the G e rm an o f cu ltu re. T h e Jew

re p re se n te d m on ey and

ab stractio n ; in sh o rt, in the an ti-S em itic G e rm an m in d , the Jew sto o d fo r ro o tle ss cap italism . I have show n that on e can think of m on ey and “alie n ate d ” relatio n s also in te rm s o f im p e rso n a l relatio n s b e tw e en p e o p le . O b lig a tio n s arc an o n y m o u s and are tu rn ed in to se rv ic e s. M on ey th e re fo re ten ds to e x ten d a c o n c e p t o f eq u ality , in so far as the p e rce p tio n of in equ ality b c c o m c s b ased u po n d ifferen ces in p e rso n . T h is m e an s that the p re d o m in an c e o f m o n ev relatio n s can u n in ten tion ally also fo ste r m o ral relatio n s like co m p a ssio n b etw een stran g e rs. T h e an alysis o f the m e tro p o lis is a ease in p o in t. W h ile it w as S im m el (1 9 0 0 ) w ho analyzed the “m e tr o p o lis” as the site o f freed o m fo ste re d by c o m m e rcia liz e d and d e p e rso n a lize d relation s b etw een p e o p le , the very sam e “ m e tr o p o lis” w as analyzed by G e rm an so c io lo g ists like S o m b a rt (1 9 1 1 ) and T o n n ie s (1 9 6 5 ) as the site o f alien ated and cold re la tio n s, as the site w h ere Je w s ru le . T h u s S o m b a rt, in his Jews and Capitalism , w ro te , “ N o w the m o d e rn city is n oth in g else but a g re at d e s e r t, as far rem o ved from the w arm earth as the d e se rt is, and like it fo rcin g its in habitan ts to b e co m e n o m a d s” (191 1, 4 2 3 , tran slation m in e ). A n d , o f c o u r se , S o m b a rt b elieved the Je w s to b e n atu ral in habitants o f the d e s e r t, and by e x te n sio n o f the city. D u rin g W ord W ar I, S o m b a rt, in his Handler und Ilelden (M e rch an ts and H e ro e s; 1 9 1 5 ), to o k E ngland lo be the m erch an t n ation ( i.e ., civilization ) par c x c c llc n c c , w hile the G e rm a n s re p re se n te d c o n c re te h eroism ( i .e ., cu ltu re ). In d eed , so m e th in g d ifferen t w as g o in g on in G e rm an y . In The Germans (1 9 9 6 ), E lias sp eak s ab ou t fun ction al d e m o c ratiz atio n , the e m e rg e n c e n ot only of a m id d le c lass, but ol m id d le -class values. In G e rm an y , the a risto c ra tic c o n c e p t ol h o n o r and glo ry o u tw eig h ed b o u rg e o is c o n c e p ts o f se lf-in te reste d e c o n o m ic behavior. W hat I trie d to show above is that a m o d e rn n o tio n o l c o m p a ssio n arise s o u t of these b o u rg e o is, so -called se lf-in te re ste d actio n s. Can w e, th e re fo re , speak o f a G e rm an “special path ” to h isto ry , a n otion that se e m s to be in creasin gly d iscre d ite d am on g h istorian s and social scien tists? I b elieve w e should n ot d ism iss G e rm a n y ’ s “ special path ” rig h t aw ay. E lias (1 9 9 6 ) talked a b o u t “h o n o r” in the c o n tc x t o f the d u e l, a h abit that in creasin gly b e ca m e d iscre d ite d in c o u n trie s o u tsid e o f G erm an y as an atavistic re sid u e o f aristo c ra tic c o n d u c t, w hile in G e rm an y itse lf (as show n by F re v e rt 1991 and M cA le er 1 9 9 4 ) d u e lin g b e ca m e p a rt o f the habitus o f a feudalized b o u rg e o isie . C le arly , h on or and death are very m uch co n n e c te d in the n otio n o f the “h on orab le d e a th .” H o n o r is a p o sitio n a l g o o d (in the w o rd s o f C h arles Taylor 1 9 9 2 ); m y h on or is a n o th e r’ s d isg rac e . M y h o n o rab le death is so m e b o d y c ls e ’ s d isg rac e fu l death . C a ssire r (1 9 4 6 ) has show n how this a risto c ra tic thinking is the b rid g e to racism and an ti-S em itism . A s E lias p o in ted o u t often en ough in The Germans, the way from a risto cra tic to N ation al So cialist c o n c e p ts w as sh o rt en ou gh . W h ile m id d le classe s in o th e r c o u n trie s, esp ecially in the A n g lo -Sax o n c o n te x ts, d e v e lo p e d n otio n s o f in stitu tion alized c o m p a ssio n , co u n terac tin g in m any w ays the b ru talitie s and e x c e sse s o f m o d e rn life and co lo n ialism , in G erm an y the b ru taliz a­ tion o f the m id d le classe s p reven ted this n otio n o f c o m p a ssio n from e m e rg in g as a cu ltu ral value. The m a jo r ch allenge lo this view has b een launch ed by Z y g m u n t B aum an . For L evinas ( 1 9 9 0 ), the social is an e x ten sio n o f the in te rp e rso n a l. B aum an (1 9 8 9 )

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m isre ad s L evinas as p ro p agatin g a p reso cial m o rality , a m orality that w ith stan ds socializatio n , that w ith stan ds so c iety . L e v in a s’s “b ein g w ith o th e rs” is tra n sfo rm e d in B aum an to a m o ral p rin cip le that o p p o se s socialization . Bv th at, B aum an look s at the in dividual as o u tsid e o f so c ie ty , even as o p p o se d to so c iety . T h is view is ah isto rical. It o v e rlo o k s the h istorical and stru c tu ral p re co n d itio n s fo r the e m e r ­ g e n c e o f in dividualism (as w as don e by Elias 1 9 7 8 ). L evinas (1 9 9 0 ) sp e ak s ab ou t the e xisten tial m o d a lity o f in teraction b etw een p e o p le , a view that has b een treated so cio lo gically by M ead (1 9 6 2 ), E lias (1 9 7 8 ), and H a b e rm a s (1 9 6 2 ). B aum an also “ d c -Ju d a iz c s” L evin as, n e g le ctin g c o m p le te ly the p o in t that fo r L evinas eth ics is Jew ish eth ics. Je w ish n e ss is the p a rtic u la ristic iden tity that is by nature univ crsa listic. It is ab o u t re lig io u s iden tity . It is a b o u t iden tifyin g the d e e p e st ro o ts o f Je w ish n e ss w ith m o d e rn ity , n ot as so m e th in g fo re ig n , b u t as so m e th in g the Je w s in ven ted. It is the an tith esis to the above m en tio n ed G e rm an habitus. R ecall how S o m b a rt c o m p a re d the city to the d e se rt and located the Je w in both th ose site s. As o p p o se d to this, the G e rm a n lives in the c o n c rc tc fo re st. F o rest and d e s e r t have b een the arch etyp al o p p o site s o f G e rm a n s and Je w s. T h is is tru e n o t only in the an ti-S em itic m in d . L evinas in Difficult Freedom (1 9 9 0 ) tells us that the Jew ish p e rso n d isco v e rs o th e r p e o p le b e fo re he d isc o v e rs lan d scap es. H e is at h o m e in a society b e fo re he is at h o m e in a h ou se. To be a Jew m ean s to be fre e , to be d isc o n n cc tc d , to b e w ith ou t ro o ts. In the w o rd s o f L evinas: “M an is no tre e and m ankin d no fo re st” (3 6 ). T h is ab stract relation to the o th e r is c o n fu sed by Baum an w ith an aso cio lo g ical poin t o f view. S im m e l, M e a d , and E lias knew o th e rw ise . And so did the N azis. W h at I w ant to say w ith all this is that it w as n ot m o d e rn ity that killed the Je w s d u rin g the H o lo ca u st in the m o st b ru tal m anner. W hat killed the Je w s w as the d irect o p p o site to th eir b ein g , n am ely the G e rm a n s. To be a G e rm an m ean t first o f all to be n ot a Jew . For G e rm a n s to be G e rm a n s, the Je w had to d ie , and n o t only die the n o rm al death o f an en e m y , b u t a death w ith ou t h onor. A death w ith ou t co m p a ssio n . Th ink ab o u t how Je w s w ere c a rrie d in w ago n s all over E u ro p e for w eek s ju st fo r the sole p u rp o se of b e in g killed . T h ey w ere den ied an “h on orable d e a th .” I think G old h agcn (1 9 9 6 ) in his very co n tro v ersial study has p u t his fin ger on that. It w as n o t “in d ifferen ce” that killed the Je w s , b u t an active, v olu n taristic dem and to to rtu re and to annihilate th em . Think o f A u sch w itz as a co sm o p o litan so cicty o f u p ro o te d Je w s , sp eak in g d o z e n s o f lan g u ag es, having n o t m uch in c o m ­ m on b e sid e s b e in g Je w s. T h is w as the n igh tm arish civilization that G e rm an cu ltu re cre a te d . A w o rld w ith ou t c o m p a ssio n and w ith o u t eth ics. T h e very an tith esis o f m o d e rn ity . To b e m o d e rn m ean s n o t to be b arb a ric . To be m o d e rn m ean s to be able to re c o g n iz e b arb a rism as su ch , to have a c o n c e p t o f it, to b e able to n am e it. C o m p assio n is key to this.

References A rendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press. ------ . 1963. On Revolution. N ew York: Viking. Baum an, Z ygm unt. 1989. Modernity and the Holocaust. C am bridge: Polity Press. Canovan, M argaret. 1992. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation o f Her Thought. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press.

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C assirer, E rn st. 1946. The Myth o f the State. N ew Haven: Yale U niversity Press. Elias, N o rb e rt. 1978. The Civilizing Process. Edm und Jep h cott, trans. R eprin t, N ew York: Pantheon. O rig. pub. 1939. ------ . 1996. The Germans. C am bridge: Polity Press. Foucault, M ichel. 1965. Madness and Civilization. N ew York: Random H ouse. F rcvcrt, Lite. 1991. “ B ou rgeois H onor: M iddle Class D uelists in G erm an y from the Late Eighteenth C cntury to the Early Tw entieth C cn tu ry .” In The German Bourgeoisie, cd. David B lackbourn and Richard J. Evans. London. G oldhagen, D aniel Jon a.

1996. Hitler’s IYilling Executioners. N ew York: Random

H ouse. H aberm as, Ju rgen . 1962. Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit. D arm stad t: N euw ied. H ansen, Phillip. 1993. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship. Stan dford: Stanford U niversity Press. H orkheim er, M ax, and T h eod or A dorno. 1971. “Ju liette o d cr Aufklarung und M o ral.” In Dialektik der Aufklarung. R eprin t, Frankfurt: Fischer. 93. O rig. pub. 1944. Levinas, E m m anuel. 1990. Difficult Freedom. B altim ore: Johns H opkins U niversity Press. M cA leer, Kevin. 1994. Duelling: The Cult o f Honor in Fin-de-Siecle Germany. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. M cstrovic, Stjepan. 1993. The Barbarian Temperament. London: R outlcdge. Sim m el, G eorg. 1900. Philosphie des Geldes. Berlin: H um bolt. So m b art, W erner. 1911. Die fuden und das Wirtschaftslehen. Leipzig: D uncker.

Guide to further reading

This collcction of annotated rcfcrcn ces is intended as a resou rce for fu rth er study on cach o f the areas ad dressed in the diff erent Parts o f the R eader. Wc have also included a section specifically devoted to the ‘affective tu rn ’ . As the literatu re in cach of these areas is rapidly expan ding, the list aim s to be suggestive and illustrative rath er than com prehen sive.

General A rm on Jo n e s, C . (1 9 9 1 ) Varieties o f Affect. L on don : H arv ester W heatsheaf. (A sustained argum en t ab out the intentionality and rationality o f em otion al states by an influential figure in the developm en t o f a social con stru ction ist accoun t o f affect.) A verill, J. (1 9 8 2 ) Anger and Aggression: an essay on emotion. N ew York: Springer-V crlag. (Based on em pirical and theoretical w ork on anger, this volum e is also a classic ex am p le o f a social con stru ction ist approach to em otio n in g e n e ra l.) C alh oun , C. and S o lo m o n , R. (ed s) (1 9 8 4 ) What is an Emotion? Classic readings in philosophical psychology. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collcction draw ing to ge th e r classic readin gs on em otio n by A risto tle, D e sc a rte s, Spinoza, H um e, D arw in , Jam e s and Freud; the last tw o section s includc readin gs by tw en tieth-century E uropean and AngloA m erican p h ilosop h ers.) D am asio, A. R . (1 9 9 9 ) The Feeling of What Happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. N ew York: H arcou rt Brace. (An influential n euroscientific accoun t based on the distin ction betw een ‘e m o tio n ’ as physical p ro cc ss and ‘fe elin g’ as con scious e x p e rie n c e .) D e Sousa, R . (1 9 8 7 ) The Rationality o f Emotion. C am b rid ge, M A : M IT Press. (An in terestin g and influential philosoph ical argu m en t from w ithin a b roadly cognitive tradition co n ­ cern in g the w ays in w hich em otional vocabu laries arc learned via the application o f paradigm atic scen arios from early life c x p c ric n c c .)

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F rijda, N. (1 9 9 3 ) The Emotions. C am b rid ge : C am b rid ge U niversity Press. (A classic and highly influential te x t in the psychology o f em o tio n s that takes a cognitive ‘ inform ation p ro c e ssin g ’ approach to em otio n s as events related to con cern -b ased ap praisals that m odify states o f action -readin ess.) G riffith s, P. (1 9 9 7 ) What Emotions Really Are: the problem o j psychological categories. C h icago: U n iversity o f C h icago P ress. (T his te x t presen ts a psychoevolution ary approach to em otio n w ith a critical review o f altern ative existin g m o d els. O n e ch apter is dedicated to the discussion o f social co n stru ctio n ism .) K agan , ]. (2 0 0 7 ) What is Emotion? History, measures and meanings. N ew Haven: Yale U n iversity Press. (An overview o f em otio n s by a H arvard em eritu s p ro fesso r o f psych ology, in tegrating findings from an th ropology , b io lo gy , and psy ch o lo gy .) K atz, J. (2 0 0 0 ) How Emotions Work. C h icago: U niversity o f C h icago P ress. (T his b ook com b in es h erm en eu tic, p h en om en ological and in teraction ist accoun ts o f em otion with evolution ary theory and is particularly stron g w ith re sp e ct to the com m unicative fu n c­ tions o f em otio n al scenes. C h apters con centrate on anger, laughter, crying and sham e through a se rie s o f im aginative stud ies involving ‘ pissed o ff’ d riv ers, fun-fair distortin g m irro rs, w hinging children and con fessin g m u rd e re rs.) L c D o u x , J. (1 9 9 9 ) The Emotional Brain. Lon don: Phoenix. (An influential tex t on the neurophysiology o f em otio n s draw ing upon a w ealth o f exp erim en tal data in su p p o rt o f a thesis for the prim acy o f affect w ith rc sp c ct to ‘h igh er’ fo rm s o f cognitive pro cessin g). N u ssb au m , M . (2 0 0 1 )

Upheavals o f Thought: the intelligence o f emotions. C am b rid ge:

C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (A provocative con tribu tion to the debate around the rationality o f e m otio n s by a prom in en t U S ph ilosoph er.) O atlcy , K. and Jen k in s, J. M . (1 9 9 6 ) Understanding Emotions. O x fo rd : B lackw ell. (A te x t­ book w ritten by tw o w ell-establish ed psy ch o lo gists that im pressively spans across a broad range o f disciplin es and con sid ers em otio n s as functional elem en ts in a broadly developm en tal c o n te x t.) Panksepp J. (1 9 9 8 ) Affective Neuroscience: thefoundations o j human and animal emotions. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (An attem p t to define a new field o f n euroscien ce based on the study o f affect.) Parkinson, B ., Fischer, A. H. and M an stead , A. S. R . (2 0 0 5 ) Emotion in Social Relations: cultural, group, and interpersonal processes. H ove: P sych ology P ress. (A n overview and in tergration o f a large am oun t o f em pirical data dem on stratin g the im plication o f em otio n s in social events and in the allignm en t o f relation ships bew teen p e o p le .) P arrott, C . W. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions in Social Psychology: key readings. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. (A collection o f inlluential articles on the nature o f em otio n s and th cr ro le in social psy ch o lo gical ph en om en a.) R o rty , A. O . (c d .) (1 9 8 0 ) Explaining Emotions. Berkeley: U niversity o f C aliforn ia Press. (An edited collcction w ith co n tribu tion s from n um erous influential auth ors that tackles the classification o f em otio n s from n europ h vsiological, p sy ch o lo gical and philosophical p e rsp e ctiv e s.) Sch crcr, K . and E km an, P. (cd s) (1 9 8 4 ) Approaches lo Emotion. H illsdale, N J: E rlb aum . (A classic collcction edited by tw o prom in ent psy ch o lo gists o f em otion which brings togeth er the w ork o f m any o f the m o st influential psy ch o lo gists o f em otion o f the tw entieth cen tu ry .) S o lo m o n , R. (1 9 7 6 ) The Passions. N ew York: A n ch o r/D o u b led av . (An influential accoun t o f the passion s w hich takes issue with their con stru ction in con tradistin ction to ration ality.) S o lo m o n , R. (e d .) (2 0 0 4 ) Thinking about Heeling: contemporary philosophers on emotion. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collection o f essays by co n tem p o rary A n glo-A m erican ph ilosoph ers w ith in terdisciplin ary in terests.)

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Affective turn Ball, K . and R cstu ccia, F. (cd s) (2 0 0 7 ) Traumatizing Theory: the cultural politics o f affect in and beyond psychoanalysis. N ew York: O th er Press. (A collection o f essays that go beyond psychoanalysis in rethinking the cultural significance of trau m atic an xiety, m elan ch oly, and the rep resen tation o f sufferin g in testim on y, self-n arration , and p o litics.) Blackm an, L. and C ro n ib v, J. (2 0 0 7 ) International Journal o f Critical Psychology. Special issue on ‘ A ffect and F eelin g’ . 21. (A collection o f essays from au th ors critical o f m ainstream e x p erim en tal psy ch o lo gy .) Brennan, T. (2 0 0 3 ) The Transmission o f Affect. Ithaca: C o rn ell U niversity Press. (T his b ook ad dresses the b e lie f that the em otio n s and en ergies o f one perso n o r g ro u p can be ab sorbed by o r can e n ter directly into another. The au th or details the relationships am on g alTcct, en ergy , and “new m aladies o f the so u l," including attention deficit disord er, chronic fatigue sy n d rom e, co d cp cn d en cy , and fib rom yalgia.) D cleu/.e, G . (1 9 8 8 ) Spinoza: practical philosophy. San Fran scisco, C A : City Lights Books. (A uthoritative discussion o f Sp in oza’s con ception o f affect that decisively influenced the affective tu rn .) M assum i, B. (2 0 0 2 ) Parables o f the Virtual: movement, affect, sensation. D u rh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A key referen ce for the ‘ affective tu rn ’ , M assum i ren ew s and assesses W illiam Ja m e s’ s radical em piricism and H enri B e rg so n ’s philosophy o f p crccp tion through the filter o f the post-w ar French philosophy o f D eleu ze, G u attari, and F ou cault.) M iller, W. I. (1 9 9 8 ) The Anatomy oj Disgust. C am b rid ge : H arvard U niversity Press. (P resen ts disgust in relation to the draw ing o f b oun daries and poin ts to the d epen den cy o f d em ocracy upon class b oun daries organ ised via d isgu st.) N gai, S. (2 0 0 5 ) Ugly Feelings: literature, affect and ideology. C am b rid ge : H arvard U niversity Press. (M akes the case that ‘ u n p re stigio u s’ negative affects such as envy, irritation and paranoia are particularly diagn ostic o f late m odern cultu re and discu sses cu riou sitics such as ‘an im ated n ess’ and ‘stu p lim ity ’ .) R eddin g, P. (1 9 9 9 ) The Logic o f Affect. Ithaca: C o rn ell U n iversity Press. (M akes a h istorical case for the relevance o f the idealism and G erm an Naturphilosophie to the con tem p orary psychology o f affect). R ilev, D. (2 0 0 5 ) Impersonal Passion: language as affect. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A fem inist th eo rist and p o e t, Riley exam in es the em otion ality o f everyday lan guage.) Sed gw ick, E. K . and Frank, A. (e d s) (1 9 9 5 ) Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader. D u rh am , N C : D uke U n iversity Press. (A collection o f the w ork o f Silvan Tom kins with som e original essays from oth er au th ors using his w o rk .) Sed g w ick , E. K . (2 0 0 3 ) Touching Feeling: affect, pedagogy, performativity. D urh am , N C : D uke U n iversity Press. (B est know n for her w ork in q u eer th eory, this author dravvns upon the ph en om en ology o f em otio n and the w ork o f Tom kins to develop the notion o f affects as m o tiv ato rs o f p erfo rm ativ ity .) Terada, R . (2 0 0 3 ) Feeling in Theory: emotion after the 'death o f the subject'. N ew Haven M A : H arvard U niversity Press. (A p o ststru ctu ralist and decon stru ctive p e rsp ectiv e on the relation betw een em otion and su b jectiv ity , en gagin g deb ates in ph ilosoph y, literary criticism , psychology and cognitive scicn cc.) T icin eto C lou gh , P. and H ailey, J. (2 0 0 7 ) The Affective Turn: theorizing the social. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A collcction of essays on the ‘affective tu rn ’ , ad dressin g the im plication s o f this m ovem en t fo r theorizing new con figurations o f b o d ies, tech n ologies and m atter.)

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Em otions, h istory an d civilization Bound A lb erti, F. (cd ) (2 0 0 6 ) Medicine, Emotion and Disease, 1700 1950. L on don : Palgravc M acm illan. (An edited collection o f co n tribu tion s from sch olars w ork in g on the history of m edicine w ho ad dress m edical co n stru ctio n s o f the relation betw een em otion and d isease.) B ou rk e, J. (2 0 0 6 ) Fear: a cultural history. Sh oem ak er and H o ard . (A survey o f fear in the ‘long tw entieth c e n tu ry ’ ). C u b b itt, C . (2 0 0 1 ) Early Medieval Europe. Special issue on ‘The history o f e m o tio n s: a d e b ate ’ . 10 (2 ). (A collcction o f five articles along w ith an in troduction dealing with broadly h istoriograph ical issu es around the study o f e m otio n s in M edieval E u ro p e.) Jam e s, S. (1 9 9 9 ) Passion and Action: the emotions in seventeenth-century philosophy. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (T his b o o k exam in es the role o f em otio n s in seventeenthcentury philosophical u n derstan din gs o f the m in d-body relation and o f the reason in g / action interface. It provides a grou n d in g in A ritotclian and T h o m ist con ception s of passion and action b efore con cen tratin g on D csc a rtc s, M eleb ran ce, H o bb es and Spin oza.) O atley , K . (2 0 0 4 ) Emotions: a brief history. O x fo rd : B lackw ell. (An attem p t to synthesize ancient and m o d ern accoun ts of affect by a p rom in en t cogntive psy ch o lo gist. C om b in es a conventional notion o f h istory w ith evolutionary and developm en tal ‘h isto rie s’ .) R eddy , W. (2 0 0 1 ) The Navigation oj Feeling: a framework for the history of emotions. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A theory o f em otio n s and historical chan gc, draw ing on m ultidisciplinary so u rce s, and critical o f stron g con stru ction ist ap pro ach es to em otio n . The theory is applied in an investigation o f R evolutionary Fran ce). R osen w ein , B. H. (e d .) (1 9 9 8 ) Anger’s Past: the social uses o f an emotion in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: C o rn ell U n iversity Press. (A collection o f essays on the m eaning and u ses of anger in m edieval E u ro p e). R osen w ein , B. H . (2 0 0 6 ) Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages. Ithaca: C orn ell U niversity P ress. (A study o f em otion al d isco u rse in the Early M iddle A ges and a con tribu tion to the d eb ates am on g h istorians and social scien tists ab out the nature o f hum an e m o tio n s. The author p ro p o se s the notion o f ‘em otio n al c o m m u n itie s’ and e x p lo re s it through various case stu d ies.) S o rab ji, R . (2 0 0 0 ) Emotion and Peace o f Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity Press. (A study o f ancicnt G reek view s on passions and their influence on the subsccjuen Christian tradition o f sch olarsh ip .) Stearn s, C. and Ste arn s, P. (1 9 8 6 ) Anger: the struggle fo r emotional control in America's history. C h icago: U n iversity o f C h icago P ress. (T he te x t in augurating ‘ e m o tio n o lo g y ’ as a field o f study fo r h istorians. The auth ors trace the developm en t o f an ger over tw o cen turies beginn in g w ith p rcm o d c rn colonial A m erica, draw ing on diaries and p op u lar advice literatu re.) Stearn s, P. (1 9 8 9 ) Jealousy: the evolution oj an emotion in American history. N ew York: N ew York U niversity Press. (P articularly in terestin g w ith re sp cct to the ro le played by p sy ch o ­ logical kn ow ledge in tran sform in g the cultu ral m eanin gs o f jealousy to suit early tw entieth-cen tury social arran gem en ts.) Stearn s, P. (1 9 9 4 ) American Cool: constructing a twentieth-century emotional style. N ew York and L on don : N ew York U n iversity P ress. (An in terestin g application o f S te arn s’ notion o f shifting fo rm s o f cm o tio n o lo gy to the n otion o f ‘c o o l’ .) Stearn s, P. (2 0 0 6 ) American Fear: the causes and consequences o f high anxiety. N ew York: R ou tle d ge . (A study o f how A m ericans have traditionally coped w ith and m anaged their an xieties in the p ast, and how the m edia, b u sin esses, and the go vern m en t have h isto ric­ ally used fear to m anipulate the co n su m e rs and the public. Stearn s argues that c o n tro l­ ling fear has b e co m e a significant problem in A m erican so c iety .)

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Z e ld in , T. (1 9 8 2 ) A History o j French Passions. O x fo r d : C lare n d o n P ress. (An atte m p t to exp lain the id io sy n cracics o f the Fren ch w ith re sp e c t to a ran ge o f issu es su ch as national id en tity , taste in a r t, n o tio n s o f h ap p in e ss, frien d sh ip and quality o f life, e tc .)

E m otions an d culture A b u -L u g h o d , L . ( 1 9 9 9 ) Veiled Sentiments: honour and poetry in a Bedouin society. B erk eley : U n iv e rsity o f C h icago P re ss. (A p o ststr u c tu r a list in fo rm e d social c o n stru c tio n ist acco u n t b ase d on e th n o grap h ic w o rk in a B e d o u in s o c ie ty .) B o e lsto rff, T. and L in d q u ist, J. (e d s) (2 0 0 4 ) Ethnos. Sp ecial issu e on ‘ B o d ie s o f e m o tio n : reth in k in g cu ltu re and e m o tio n th ro u gh Sou th ea st A sia ’ . 6 9 (4 ). (A c o lle c tio n o f a rtic le s illu stratin g the ro le o f e m o tio n s in the tu rn to e m b o d im e n t a m o n g st an th ro ­ p o lo g ists.) B rig g s, J. L . (1 9 7 0 ) Never in Anger: portrait o j an Eskimo family. C a m b r id g e : H a rv a rd U n i­ v e rsity P re ss. (A n influen tial an th ro p o lo g ic al stud y o f the Inuit w ith so m e o b se rv a tio n s ab o u t the c u ltu ral p re ssu re to con tain a g g r e ssio n .) G r im a , B. (1 9 9 2 ) The Performance o f Emotion among Paxtun Women. A u stin : U n iv e rsity o f T exas P ress. (B a sed on e th n o grap h ic field w ork am o n g an Islam ic, P a x to -sp cak in g g ro u p living in both A fghan istan and Pakistan . C o n c e n tra te s on ritu alistic sto rie s o f g r ie f and sa d n e ss.) H ard m an , C . ( 2 0 0 0 ) Other Worlds: notions o f se lf and emotion among the Lohorung Rai. O x fo r d : Berg. (A n e th n o grap h ic stud y o f the L o h o ru n g R ai o f E aste rn N e p a l.) H a rre , R . (e d .) (1 9 8 9 ) The Social Construction o f Emotion. O x fo r d : B lack w ell. (A m u ch cited in te rd iscip lin ary co lle c tio n o f essay s on the social c o n stru c tio n o f e m o tio n .) H o vlan d , I. (c d ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) Anthropology Matters. Sp ecial issu e on ‘ Field in g E m o tio n s’ . 9 (1 ). (A co lle ctio n o f a rtic le s d ealin g w ith v a rio u s m e th o d o lo g ic al and th e o retical issu es c o n c e rn in g the stud y o f e m o tio n and the ro le o f e m o tio n in the re se arch p r o c e ss.) K itay am a, S. and M a rk u s, H . R . (e d s) (1 9 9 4 ) Emotion and Culture: empirical studies o j mutual influence. W ash in gton , D C : A m erican P sy ch o lo gical A sso c iatio n . (A n ap p ro ach to e m o ­ tion and cu ltu re draw n from the e m p iric a l trad itio n s o f c ro ss cu ltu ral p sy c h o lo g y .) L u tz, C . A . (1 9 8 8 ) Unnatural Emotions: everyday sentiments on a Alicronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory. C h ic a g o : U n iv ersity o f C h icago P re ss. (A n eth n ograp h y o f e m o tio n a l life on a Pacific islan d and an e x e m p la ry stud y in the c o n stru c tio n ist tra d itio n .) Lynch , O . M . (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ) Divine Passions: the social construction o f emotion in India. B erk eley : U n iv e rsity o f C alifo rn ia P re ss. (A c o llc c tio n o f p a p e rs largely sp ecializin g on th e ro le played by re lig io n in sh apin g e m o tio n a l e x p re ssio n in In dia.) M a n stcad , A . S. R . and Fischer, A. H . (c d s) ( 2 0 0 2 ) Cognition and Emotion. Sp e cial issu e on ‘ C u ltu re and e m o tio n ’ . 16 (1 ). (E igh t a rtic le s p re se n tin g c ro ss-c u ltu ral an alyses o f v ario u s asp e c ts o f e m o tio n . T h e in tro d u c to ry essay by the e d ito r s re v ie w s key p o sitio n s on the ‘ u n iv e rsa lity -sp c c ific ity ’ d ic h o to m y .) M ilto n , K . and S v a sck , M . (c d s) ( 2 0 0 5 ) Mixed Emotion: anthropological studies o f feeling. O x fo r d : Berg. (T h is b o o k a tte m p ts a co n c ise in tro d u ctio n to the a n th ro p o lo g y o f e m o ­ tio n s w hich is sen sitiv e to the co n n e c tio n s b e tw e en e m o tio n s, m e m o r y , c o n sc io u sn e ss, id en tity and p o litic s.) M ilto n , K . (2 0 0 2 ) Loving Nature: towards an ecology' o f emotion. L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e . (A so cial an th ro p o lo g ist e x p lo r e s the m e an in gs o f n atu re in W estern so c ie tie s and cu ltu re , p a rtic u la rly in relation to how e m o tio n a l c o m m itm e n ts to w a rd s n atu re are d e v e lo p e d .) O ’ N e il, T. D. (1 9 9 8 ) Disciplined Hearts: history, identity and depression in an American Indian

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community. Berkeley and I.os A n geles: U n iversity o f C aliforn ia Press. (An enthopsychological study o f d epression am on g the Flathead Indian p eo p le o f M ontan a, by a m edical an th ro p o lo gist.) R osaldo , M . Z . (1 9 8 0 ) Knowledge and Passion: llongot notions o f se lf and social life. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (An ethnography o f a g ro u p o f h un ters and h orticu ltu rists from N o rth ern Luzon in the Philippines with a focus on the practice o f headhunting.) Shw eder, R . A. and L cV inc, R . A. (c d s) (1 9 8 4 ) Culture Theory: essays on mind, self and emotion. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity P ress. (An influential collcction o f articles articu lat­ ing the relationship betw een cultu re and psychology w ith a particu lar em ph asis on e m o tio n .) Ste w art, K . (2 0 0 7 ) Ordinary Affects. D urh am , N C : D uke U niversity Press. (A n exam p le o f the ‘affective tu rn ’ in an th rop o lo gy .) W ierzbick a, A. (1 9 9 9 )

Emotions across Languages and Cultures: diversity and universals.

C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U niversity P ress. (A con tribu tion to the debate on the u n i­ versality or cultural specificity o f em otio n s from a linguistics ap p ro ach .) W ulff, H . (c d .) (2 0 0 8 ) The Emotions: A Cultural Reader O x fo rd : Berg. (A collcction o f w ork that highlights so m e o f the theoretical and m eth od o logical issu es at play in the cultural con struction o f em o tio n .)

Em otions an d society Barbalet, J. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions, Social Theory, and Social Structure. C am b rid ge : C am b rid ge U n i­ versity Press. (A study o f the role o f em otio n s such as fear, resen tm en t, sham e and confidence in social p ro ce sse s.) Barbalet, J. (c d .) (2 0 0 2 ) Emotions and Sociology. O x fo rd and M alden, M A: W iley-Blackw ell. (A collection o f eigh t essays on em otio n s by so cio lo g ists from five co u n tries, cach focusin g on a specific subfield including political so cio lo gy , econ om ic sociology and the sociology o f scien ce.) Becker, D. (e d .) (2 0 0 4 ) Soziale Systeme. Special issue on ‘Wo/.u G efiih le?’ . 10 (1 ). (A special issue critically ad dressin g Luhm annian theory in relation to em otio n s w ith articles in G erm an and E nglish.) Bcndclow , G. and W illiam s, S. J. (ed s) (1 9 9 8 ) Emotions in social Life: critical themes and contemporary issues. L on don : R o u tlcd gc. (An edited collcction design ed to illustrate the value o f taking an em otio n s p ersp ectiv e in socio lo gical research and social th e o ry .) D enzin, N . (1 9 8 4 ) On Understanding Emotion. San Fran cisco: Jossey-B ass. (A p h en om en o­ logical approach to the study o f e m o tio n .) E lliott, A. and L c m e rt, C . (2 0 0 6 ) The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs o f Globali/.ation. London and N ew York: R o u tlc d gc . (A im in g to challenge the o rth o d o xy w hereby g lo b a l­ ization c o rro d c s private life, this tex ts exam in es p e o p le ’ s em otio n al ex p e rie n c e s o f copin g w ith new in dividualism .) Fish, J. S. (2 0 0 5 ) Defending the Durkheimian Tradition: religion, emotion and morality. A ld ersh ot: A shgatc. (An im portan t con tribu tion to the study o f D urkhcim and the D urkheim ian trad ition , this book argues that religion is an essen tial back drop for un derstan din g e m o tio n .) Fran ks, D. D. (c d .) (1 9 8 5 ) Symbolic Interaction. Spccial issue on ‘The sociology o f e m o tio n s’ . 8 (2 ). (Includes articles by D enzin, Scheff, Baldw in, Loflan d, Z urch er, W asielew ski, H arris and Sand reski.) K em per. T. (e d .) (1 9 9 0 ) Research Agendas in the Sociology o f Emotions. N ew York: State U niversity o f N ew York Press. (A collection o f essays by so cio lo gists o f em otion exem plifyin g ap pro ach es that range from positiv ist to social co n stru ctio n ist).

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Sch cff, T. (1 9 9 4 ) Microsociology: discourse, emotion, and social structure. C h ic a g o : U n iv e rsity o f C h icago P re ss. (A th e o ry o f the m icro fo u n d a tio n s o f social stru c tu re b ase d on the analysis o f m o tiv atio n al sy ste m s, to w hich e m o tio n s are c e n tr a l.) Scheflf, T. J. ( 1 9 9 7 ). Emotions, the social bond, and human reality: Part/whole analysis. N ew Y ork: C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P ress. (A sy n th esis o f social th e o ry , m ic ro so c io lo g y and p sy c h o lo g y by on e o f the p io n e e rs o f the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n that y ield s a p ro m isin g m e th o d o lo g ic al o r ie n ta tio n .) S te ts, J. E. and T u rn er, J. II. (e d s) (2 0 0 6 ) Handbook o j the Sociology o j Emotion. Sp rin ger. (A n e ar-c o m p re h e n siv e review' o f d e v e lo p m e n ts in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n o v e r the last th irty y e ars. In cludes a se ctio n o rg an ise d by fo c u s on sp e cific e m o tio n s — and m u ch m o r e .) T u rn er, J. H . and S te ts, J. E. ( 2 0 0 5 ) The Sociology o f Emotions. C a m b r id g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity P re ss. (R e v ie w s th e o retic al and e m p iric a l w o rk in the so c io lo g y o f e m o tio n , grou ped

into

seven

b asic

ap p ro a c h e s:

c u ltu ra l,

d r a m a tu rg ic a l,

in te ractio n

ritu a l,

sy m b o lic in te ra c tio n ist, e x c h an g e , stu c tu ra l, and b io lo g ic a l.) W illiam s, S. (2 0 0 1 ) Emotions and Social Theory: corporeal reflections on the (ir)rational. L o n d o n : Sage. (A n o v e rv iew o f so cial th e o retical w o rk on e m o tio n s w ith a c o n c e rn to c ritiq u e the r e a s o n /e m o tio n d istin c tio n .)

E m otion, self an d identity B o sm a , H . A . and Sask ia K u n n en , E. (e d s) (2 0 0 8 ) Identity and Emotion: development through self-organization. C a m b r id g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss.(A c o lle c tio n o f a u th o rs takin g a d y n am ic sy ste m s ap p ro ac h to s e lf and id en tity as se lf-o rgan iz in g p r o c e sse s ro o te d in e m o tio n a l d y n am ic s.) C a m p b e ll, J. R . and R ew , A . (1 9 9 9 ) Identity and Affect: experiences o f identity in a globalising world. L o n d o n : P lu to P re ss. (B a sed on case stu d ie s o f local id e n titie s and th eir affective asp e c ts in South A sia, E ast A frica , M elan esia and E u ro p e .) C ra w fo r d , J . , K ip p a x , S ., O n y x , J ., G a u lt, U . and B e n to n , P. (1 9 9 2 ) Emotion and Gender: constructing meaning from memories. L o n d o n : Sage. (E x p lo r e s the relatio n s b e tw e en e m o ­ tio n , m e m o ry and iden tity in situ atio n s o f fear, an g e r and h ap p in ess u sin g ‘ m e m o ry w o rk ’ m e th o d o lo g y .) Fisher, A . ( c d .) (2 0 0 0 ) Gender and Emotion: social psychological perspectives. C a m b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv e rsity P re ss. (A c o lle c tio n o f essay s in vestigatin g the ste re o ty p e o f w o m e n as the ‘ e m o tio n a l s e x ’ , su rv ey in g a w id e ran ge o f sp ecific e m o tio n s on the b asis o f so cial p sy c h o lo g ical re se a rc h .) L c tw in , O . ( 1 9 8 7 ) Ethics, Emotion and the Unity o f the Self. N e w York: M eth u en . (A p h ilo ­ soph ical ex am in a tio n and c ritiq u c o f the ro le o f s e lf in ro m a n tic ism .) L u p to n , D. ( 1 9 9 8 ) The Emotional Self: a sociocultural exploration. L o n d o n : Sage. (A social c o n stru c tio n ist analysis o f the re la tio n s b e tw e en s e lf and e m o tio n s that draw’s u p o n a b road ly p o ststr u c tr u c tu r a list n o tio n o f d isc o u rse .) M u n t, S. R . (2 0 0 7 ) Qiieer Attachments: the cultural politics of shame. L o n d o n : A sh gate. (D e a ls w ith the ro le o f sh am e in tran sfo rm a tio n a l n arrativ es as p o rtray e d in p o p u la r and p u b lic c u ltu re s, w ith a p a rtic u la r e m p h asis on L G B T id en tity issu e s.) N ath an so n , D. L . ( 1 9 9 4 ) Shame and Pride: ajfect, sex, and the birth oj the self. N e w York: N o r to n . (A n e x te n sio n and ap p licatio n o f T o m k in s’ th eo ry o f affect w h ich m ak es the case fo r the ce n trality o f affect to the e m e rg e n c e and fo rm a tio n o f se lf.) P ro b y n , E . (2 0 0 5 ) Blush: Faces o f shame. M in n e ap o lis: U n iv e rsity o f M in n eso ta P re ss. (An co n fro n tatio n o f T o m k in s’ co n c e p tio n o f sh am e and B o u rd ie u ’s n otio n o f h abitus d e v e lo p e d as a re so u rc e fo r reth in k in g ‘ w h o w e arc and w ho we w an t to b e ’ .)

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Sch ocm an , F. (c d .) (1 9 8 7 ) Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: new essays in moral philosophy. (An edited volum e o f essays on m oral philosophy w hich ad d ress the relation ­ ship betw een em otio n s and the responsibility individuals have for their actions and c h aracters.) Sh ields, A . S. (2 0 0 2 ) Speaking from the Heart: gender and the social meaning o f emotion. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A study o f how culturally shared b eliefs about em otio n are used lo shape o u r iden tities as w om en and m e n .) T om kins, S. and I/./.ard, C . (cd s) (1 9 6 5 ) Affect, Cognition and Personality. N ew York: Springer. (An early collection o f psych ological w ork on the cognitive scrip tin g o f affect into personality stru c tu re s.)

Em otion, space an d place A n d erson , K. and Sm ith, S. (c d s) (2 0 0 1 ) Transactions of the Institute o f British Geographers. Special issue on ‘ E m otion al g e o g ra p h ie s’ . 26. (A collcction o f essays illustratin g the affcctive turn in geo g rap h y .) Brandstattcr, H . and E liasz, A. (cd s) (2 0 0 1 ) Persons, Situations and Emotions: an ecological approach. O x fo rd : O x fo rd U niversity P ress. (A collcction that e xam in es the ro le o f tem p e ram en t, person ality and situation variables in everyday em otion al c x p c ric n c c in real-w orld settin gs, using tim e-sam p lin g diaries.) B run o, G. (2 0 0 2 ) Atlas o f Emotion. L on don : Verso. (An in terestin g attem p t to m ap the cultu ral history o f the visual a rts w hich tou ch es upon a range o f fields including geograph y, arch itectu re, film and d e sign .) C atald i, S. I.. (1 9 9 3 ) Emotion, Depth and Flesh: a study o f sensitive space. A lbany, NY: State U n iversity o f N ew York. (F.xplorcs the to p ic o f em otional depth draw ing on the w ork o f ecological p sy ch o lo gist J. J. G ibson and ph en om en ologist M . M crlcau-P o n ty .) D avidson , J. (2 0 0 3 ) Phobic Geographies: the phenomenology' and spatiality o f identity. A ld ersh ot: A shgale. (A geograph ical study o f agoraph obia that expan ds the understan din g o f the relation betw een gen der, em b o d im en t, space and m ental health .) D avidson , J. and B ondi, L. (cds) (2 0 0 4 ) Gender, Place St^Culture. Special issue on ‘ Spatialising affect; affecting sp a c e ’ . 11. (T h eoretical and m eth od o logical reflection s on the relation ­ ship betw een spacc and aflect.) D avidson , J ., B ondi, L. and Sm ith, M . (e d s) (2 0 0 7 ) Emotional Geographies. A ld ersh ot: A shgate. (An interdisciplin ary collection gath ering w ork by ge o g ra p h ers and so c io lo ­ gists, this b o o k e x p lo re s key in tersection s betw een em otio n s and co n cep ts o f spacc and em b o d im e n t.) D avidson , J. and M illigan, C . (cd s) (2 0 0 4 ) Social and Cultural Geography. Spccial issue on ‘ E m otion al g e o g ra p h ie s’ . 5 (4 ). (A collcction o f articles on different asp ects o f em otion in relation to spacc, place, and e m b o d im e n t.) T h rift, N. (2 0 0 8 ) Non-representational Theory: space/politics/affect. L ondon: R o u tlcd gc. (A collcction o f T h rifts essays on w hich presen ts an approach to the politics o f everyday life grou n ded in the notion of affcct.)

E m otion a n d health A nzieu, D. (1 9 8 9 ) The Skin Ego. N ew H aven, M A : Yale U niversity Press. (A psychoanalytic approach to em b od ied affect and h ealth.) C hiozza, I.. A. (1 9 9 8 ) Hidden Affects in Somatic Disorders. M adison, C on n ecticu t: The

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P sychosocial Press. (P resen ts an overview o f the path obiograph ical technique for accessin g the uncon scious m ean ings o f illness as developed at the W eizsackcr C e n te r in Buenos A ries.) G rec o , M . (1 9 9 8 ) Illness as a Work o f Thought: a Foueaultian perspective on psychosomatics. L on don : R ou tle d ge . (A gen ealo gy o f p sy ch o so m atic d isco u rse that com b in es Foucaultian and Eliasian influences. Particularly relevant is the historical and theoretical focus on the inability to e x p e r ie n c e /e x p re s s em otio n s that is labeled ‘alexith y m ia’ .) Jam e s, V. and G abe, J. (e d s) (1 9 9 7 ) Health and the Sociology o f Emotions. O x fo rd and M alden , M A : W iley-B lackw ell. (A collection o f essays e x p lo rin g the poten tial for m utual c o n ­ tribu tion betw een the fields o f the sociology o f em o tio n , and the sociology o f health and illness.) K lcin m an , A. and G o o d , B. (1 9 8 5 ) Culture and Depression: studies in the anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry o f affect and disorder. Berkeley: U n iversity o f C aliforn ia Press. (An edited collcction that m akes an an thropologically gro u n d ed in terven tion into the debate con cern in g the cultu ral relativity versu s un iversality o f d epression and d y sph oria.) K leinm an , A . (1 9 8 9 ) The Illness Narratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition. N ew York: Basic B ooks. (A H arvard psych iatrist and an th ropo lo gist en deavours to cnhance the sensitivity to the em otional dynam ics and oth er relation s at play betw een d o cto r and patien t.) Pcnncbakcr, J. W. (c d .) (2 0 0 2 ) Emotion, Disclosure and Health. W ashington, D C : A m erican Psych ological A ssociation . (A collection o f essays exam in ing the health benefits o f se lf­ d isclosu re and em otio n al e x p re ssio n .) R o u sseau , G. (2 0 0 4 ) Nervous Acts: essays on literature, culture and sensibility. N ew York: Palgrave M acm illan. (A collection o f cssavs ab ou t the role o f m edical accounts o f the n ervous system in the rise o f eighteenth cen tury literatu re and sen sib ility.) Scheff, T. J. (1 9 7 9 ) Catharsis in Healing, Ritual and Drama. Berkeley: U n iversity o f C alifornia Press. (Sch eff argues that the healing pow er o f catharsis lies in facilitating a form o f distancin g through w hich individuals can sim ultan eously be p articipan ts and o b se rv e rs.) Spiro, H. (1 9 9 8 ) The Power o f Hope: a doctor’s perspective. N ew H aven: Yale U niversity Press. (An argu m en t that the em otion al re lie f o btained from hope and from a con ccrn ed focus upon p atien t’s feelings o f pain and anxiety can lessen the sufferin g causcd by illness.) V ingerh oets, A ., N y klicek, I. and D en o lle t, J. (2 0 0 8 ) Emotion Regulation: conceptual and clinical issues. N ew York: Springer. (A d d resses the health im plications o f copin g styles and aggression , alexithym ia, em otion al in telligen ce, em otio n al exp ression and d ep ression , em otion al exp ression and anxiety d iso rd e rs, in addition to the em otion al co m p cte n cc in ch ildren .) W ilce, J. M . (ed ) (2 0 0 3 ) Social and Cultural Lives oj Immune Systems. London : R ou tlcd gc. (In troduces the hypothesis that im m un e sy stem s function as cultu ral sym bols as w ell as m aterial en tities and hence that im m unity and disease arc in part socially c o n stitu te d .)

E m o t i o n in w o r k a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s Ashkanazi, N . M ., H a rte l, C. E. J. and Z e rb e , W. J. (e d s) (2 0 0 0 ) Emotions in the Workplace: research, theory and practice. W e stp o rt, C T : G reen w ood P ress. (An interdisciplin ary co lle c ­ tion e x p lo rin g the facto rs that provoke em otio n s in the w ork place, their effects, and how they should be m anaged, startin g from the prem ise that organ ization s arc em otional p laces.)

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E M O N E T . An em ail list that facilitates sch olarly d isc u ssio n o f all m a tte rs rela tin g to the stu d y o f e m o tio n

in organ ization al se ttin g s. A vailable at: h t t p :/ / w w w .u q .e d u .a u /

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Em otion, eco n o m ic s an d c o n su m e r culture A g rc s, S. J . , E d c ll, J. A . and D u b itsk y , T. M . (e d s .) (1 9 9 0 ) Emotions in Advertising: theoretical and practical explorations. W e stp o rt, C T : G re e n w o o d P ress. (A co llc ctio n e x p lo r in g the relation sh ip b e tw e en e m o tio n and ad v e rtisin g.) D ittm ar, H . ( 2 0 0 7 ) Consumer Culture, Identity and Wellbeing: the search f o r the 1good life* and the

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York: O x fo rd U n iversity Press. (An analysis o f the significance o f em otion in m arketing and co n su m er e x p e rie n c e .) Pilz, F (2 0 0 7 ) Emotions and Risky Choice: an experimental and theoretical study from the economic psychological perspective. Saarbriicken : V D M Verlag (A data-grou nd ed argu m en t that an accoun t o f the em otio n s m ust be in corp o rated into any p ro p e r un derstan din g o f risky econ om ic behaviour.) Pixlcy, J. (2 0 0 4 ) Emotions in Finance: distrust and uncertainty in global markets. C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iversity Press. (A study o f the view s o f e x p erien ced elites in the financial w o rld , offering an account o f the influence o f em o tio n and speculation on the w o rld ’s increasingly volatile financial sector.) R ick, S. and L oew en stein , G. F. (2 0 0 7 ) The Role o f Emotion in Economic Behavior. Available at S S R N : h t t p :/ /s s r n .c o m / a b s t r a c t = 9 5 4 8 6 2 (An article p repared for the forth com in g third edition o f The Handbook o f Emotion w hich review s behavioral eco n o m ic and ncuroecon om ic rcscarch on em otion al influences on risky decision m aking, in tertem p oral ch oice, and social p re fe ren ce s.) Strasser, S ., M cG o vern , C . and Ju d t, M . (c d s) (1 9 9 8 ) Consuming Desires: consumption, culture, and the pursuit o f happiness. C am b rid ge : C am b rid g e

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Em otion an d politics A h m ed, S. (2 0 0 4 ) The Cultural Politics o f Emotion. L on don : R ou tled ge. (An analysis o f the role o f em otio n s in deb ates on international te rro rism , asylum and m igratio n , and recon ciliation and rep aration , with reflection s on the ro le o f em otio n s in fem in ist and q u eer p o litics.) C larke, S ., H o ggctt, P. and T h o m p so n , S. (c d s) (2 0 0 6 ) Emotion, Politics and Society. L ondon: Palgravc M acm illan. (A psychosocial approach aim ing for an in tegration o f rationalism and em otio n in an un derstan din g o f p olitical issues such as racism , pop u lism , p ro te st and terro r.) Flam , H . and K ing, D. (e d s) (2 0 0 5 ) Emotions and Social Movements. L on don : R ou tledge. (An edited collection o f p ap e rs on the em otio n al dim en sions and dynam ics o f social m ovem en ts and p ro te st.) F ro g g c tt, L. (2 0 0 2 ) Love, Hate and Welfare: psychosocial approaches to policy and practice, Bristol: Policy Press. (An argum en t for a psy ch osocial con ception o f w elfare practice w hich cen tres on hum an affectivity.) Furedi, F. (2 0 0 5 ) Politics o f Fear: beyond left and right. C on tin uum P ress. (A rgu es that m odern p olitics has com e to revolve around personal topics. A ntagon istic to the pcrceivcd en fccb lcm cn ts o f ‘therapy c u ltu rc ’ , it m akes the ease that human are m ore resilien t and adaptive than is so m etim es th ough t.) G andhi, L. (2 0 0 6 ) Affective Communities: anticolonial thought, Jin-de-siecle radicalism, and the politics oj friendship. N ew H aven, M A : H arvard U n iversity Press. (A study o f crosscultural collaboration betw een o p p re sso rs and o p p ressed in late n inteenth-century e m p ire .) G irlin g, J. (2 0 0 6 ) Emotion and Reason in Social Change: insights from fiction. N ew York: Palgravc M acm illan. (A study o f the em otion al asp ects o f glo balizatio n , n eo-im p erialism , m odern izatio n and oth er political issu es through the m edium o f w orks o f fiction .) G oo d w in , J. and Jasper, J. M . (2 0 0 4 ) (ed) Rethinking Social Movements: structure, meaning and emotion. Totow a, N J: R om an and L ittlefield. (A volum e w hich gath ers the key players in social m ovem en t th corv and strives to overco m e the theoretical divide betw een stru ctu ral and cultural ap p ro ach es.)

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