Emotion and Historiography in Polybius’ Histories [1 ed.] 9781032423623, 9781032423630, 9781003362432, 1032423625

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Effective Emotion in Historiography
Summary of Chapters
1 Fundamentals of Emotion: Social Science, History, and Human Behavior
What Makes an Emotion
Social Scientific Terminology and Framework
How Emotions Matter: Import, Appropriateness, Proportionality, and Direction
Complicating Emotion: Orientation and Multidimensionality
Ancient Emotion: Terms and Philosophies
Ancient Greek Terminology for Emotion
Passion/Spirit
Ancient Philosophy on Emotion
Culture and Emotion
Conclusion
2 Individual Emotions in Context: Polybius, Aristotle, and the Classical Historians
Emotions of Disapproval
Anger
Hatred
Resentment
Indignation
Shame
Conclusion
Emotions of Anticipation
Fear
Hope
Emotions of Positive Affect
Joy and Gladness
Gratitude
Gentleness
Love
Reflective Emotions
Sympathy and Empathy
Pity
Conclusion
3 Internal State Change: The People’s Moral Emotions
Collective Emotion in Theory: The Anacyclosis
The Development of Human Community
Cycle of Constitutions
Tyranny
Oligarchy
Ochlocracy
The Collapse of the Mixed Constitution
Comparison to Plato and Aristotle
Collective Emotion in Practice: Agathocles’ Downfall
Background and Context
Development of the Emotions Against Agathocles
Violence, Emotion, and Punishment
Conclusion
4 Emotions at War: Causal Anger and Justifying War
Emotions During and After War
Anger as a Cause of War
The Second Punic War
Causing the Second Punic War: Justifiable Anger
Unjustifiable Anger
Justifying War to Others: Pretexts
Emotion and Strategic Prudence
Emotion as a Causal Link
Conclusion
5 Learning From History: Audience-Based Emotion and Conclusions
Emotional Persuasion and Learning How to Feel
The Indefinite Pronoun and Historiographic Readers
Observers, Both Internal and External
Pity as a Response
The Achaean War and the Power of Pity
Conclusion
Conclusions: Emotions in the Histories
Index
Index of Passages

Citation preview

Emotion and Historiography in Polybius’ Histories

This volume explores emotion and its importance in Polybius’ conception of history, his writing of historiography, and the benefits of this understanding to readers of history. How and why did ancient historians include emotions in their texts? This book argues that in the Histories of Polybius – the Greek historian who recorded Rome’s rise to dominion in the ancient Mediterranean – emotions play an effective role in history, used by the historian to explain the causes of actions, connect events, and make sense of human behavior. Through analysis of the emotions in the narrative and theory of Polybius’ Histories using critical terminology and frameworks from modern philosophy, psychology, and political science, this work calls into question assumptions that emotions were purely irrational and detrimental in ancient history, politics, and historiography. Emotions often positively shape Polybius’ historical narrative, provide criteria for the success and morality of agents, actions, and even historians, and aid the historian in guiding readers to become intelligent leaders and citizens of a new world centered on Rome. Emotion and Historiography in Polybius’ Histories is a fascinating read for students and scholars of ancient historiography and history, as well as those working on ancient political thought, emotions in the ancient Greek world, and emotion in history and literature more broadly. Regina M. Loehr is Lecturer in Classics at Cornell College in Mt. Vernon, Iowa, USA. Her research explores the intersection of psychology, ethics, and politics in ancient historiography. She edited digital texts published in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library from 2018 to 2022.

Routledge Studies in Ancient History

Titles include: The Plight of Rome in the Fifth Century AD Mark Merrony Geopolitics in Late Antiquity The Fate of Superpowers from China to Rome Hyun Jin Kim Image and Reality of Roman Imperial War in the Third Century AD The Impact of War Lukas de Blois Sallust’s Histories and Triumviral Historiography Confronting the End of History Jennifer Gerrish A History of the Pyrrhic War Patrick Alan Kent Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace The Origins of War in the Ancient Middle East Jason M. Schlude Sister-Queens in the High Hellenistic Period Kleopatra Thea and Kleopatra III Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and Alex McAuley Emotion and Historiography in Polybius’ Histories Regina M. Loehr For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/classicalstudies/series/RSANHIST

Emotion and Historiography in Polybius’ Histories Regina M. Loehr

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Regina M. Loehr The right of Regina M. Loehr to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Loehr, Regina M., author. Title: Emotion and historiography in Polybius’ histories / Regina M. Loehr. Description: New York : Routledge, 2024. | Series: Routledge studies in ancient history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023038775 (print) | LCCN 2023038776 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032423623 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032423630 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003362432 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Polybius. Historiae. | History, Ancient—Historiography. | Emotions—Historiography. | History—Methodology. | Rome— History—Republic, 510–30 B.C.—Historiography. | Greece— History—146 B.C.-323 A.D.—Historiography. Classification: LCC D58.P8 L64 2024 (print) | LCC D58.P8 (ebook) | DDC 930.072—dc23/eng/20230914 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023038775 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023038776 ISBN: 978-1-032-42362-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-42363-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-36243-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction: Effective Emotion in Historiography Summary of Chapters  8

1

Fundamentals of Emotion: Social Science, History, and Human Behavior What Makes an Emotion  17 Social Scientific Terminology and Framework  17 How Emotions Matter: Import, Appropriateness, Proportionality, and Direction  18 Complicating Emotion: Orientation and Multidimensionality 21 Ancient Emotion: Terms and Philosophies  23 Ancient Greek Terminology for Emotion  23 Passion/Spirit 25 Ancient Philosophy on Emotion  27 Culture and Emotion  29 Conclusion 33

2

Individual Emotions in Context: Polybius, Aristotle, and the Classical Historians Emotions of Disapproval  46 Anger 47 Hatred 52 Resentment 58 Indignation 63 Shame 68 Conclusion 70

viii 1

16

45

vi  Contents Emotions of Anticipation  70 Fear 70 Hope 72 Emotions of Positive Affect  74 Joy and Gladness  74 Gratitude 75 Gentleness 76 Love 78 Reflective Emotions  80 Sympathy and Empathy  80 Pity 81 Conclusion 85 3

Internal State Change: The People’s Moral Emotions Collective Emotion in Theory: The Anacyclosis  106 The Development of Human Community  107 Cycle of Constitutions  110 Tyranny 111 Oligarchy 113 Ochlocracy 113 The Collapse of the Mixed Constitution  116 Comparison to Plato and Aristotle  118 Collective Emotion in Practice: Agathocles’ Downfall  120 Background and Context  121 Development of the Emotions Against Agathocles  121 Violence, Emotion, and Punishment  128 Conclusion 132

104

4

Emotions at War: Causal Anger and Justifying War Emotions During and After War  153 Anger as a Cause of War  155 The Second Punic War  156 Causing the Second Punic War: Justifiable Anger  158 Unjustifiable Anger  161 Justifying War to Others: Pretexts  165 Emotion and Strategic Prudence  171 Emotion as a Causal Link  176 Conclusion 180

152

Contents vii 5

Learning From History: Audience-Based Emotion and Conclusions Emotional Persuasion and Learning How to Feel  198 The Indefinite Pronoun and Historiographic Readers  198 Observers, Both Internal and External  200 Pity as a Response  205 The Achaean War and the Power of Pity  206 Conclusion 208 Conclusions: Emotions in the Histories 209

197

Index222 Index of Passages 226

Acknowledgments

This work began as a dissertation at the University of California, Santa Barbara. I thank the committee, Craige Champion, John Lee, and Helen Morales, for their feedback which sparked the process of sharing my research more broadly. My advisor Robert Morstein-Marx has been invaluable even beyond his excellent supervision of the dissertation, providing guidance, feedback, and encouragement through the following years. I thank my colleagues at Furman University, the University of California, Irvine, and Grinnell College who supported me in this research. I appreciate the reception and feedback from audiences who listened to and engaged with material from this project at Furman, CAMWS, the SCS, and Grinnell. Comments from Arthur Eckstein, Robert Kaster, David Konstan, Christopher Baron, and anonymous reviewers for Routledge challenged me to improve this project in many ways; I am deeply grateful for their time and constructive feedback. My scholarship has benefited immensely from their engagement. I apologize if I have fallen short of the potential they saw; any errors which remain are wholly mine. Part of Chapter 3 was published as the article “The People’s Moral Emotions in Polybius’ Cycle of Constitutions” in Classical Philology; I thank the University of Chicago for permission to reuse this material. I am grateful to Amy Davis-Poynter, Marcia Baker, and all at Routledge Publishing who made sharing this work possible. Lastly, my friends and family have encouraged me along this journey. I appreciate their companionship and all their support.

Introduction Effective Emotion in Historiography

What place does or should emotion have in a historical text? The ancient Greek historian Polybius critiqued his historiographical predecessor Phylarchus for writing overly emotional historical narrative and unduly attempting to instill emotion in his audience. This critique of emotion in writing history aligns with both Polybius’ reputation as a ‘pragmatic’ historian, concerned with promoting rational calculation, and modern approaches to history. Where studies on emotion in psychology, neuroscience, sociology, philosophy, politics, the fine arts, and literature flourish, history seems behind on investigating emotions directly.1 This may be due in part to the twentieth-century idealization of so-called scientific history and a philosophical foundation in political Realism. This study examines the historiographical role of emotion in Polybius’ Histories and emphasizes three main points. Within Polybius’ text, emotions played significant roles in history. Pragmatism, rationality, and morality were not diametrically opposed to emotion. Lastly, emotion was an explicit and important payoff of reading history. These findings inform our understanding of Polybius’ historiographical practice, criticism of Phylarchus, and conception of history. Of ancient historians, Polybius most vociferously criticized emotion.2 Writing in the middle of second century bce, this Greek historian strove to provide a history of the Romans’ recent and meteoric rise to international dominance from the Second Punic War (218–202 bce) to the Romans’ dissolution of the Macedonian monarchy in 167 bce. Polybius then continued his historical narrative to 146 bce with the Romans’ destruction of both Corinth at the conclusion of the Achaean War and Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War. Polybius himself held the office of hipparch of the Achaean League at only age 30 in 170/169 bce and served on an embassy to Ptolemaic Egypt, set to follow in his father Lycortas’ political steps, who had served as general within the Achaean League at least twice.3 However, after the Romans defeated Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, they demanded and detained for 17 years a thousand leading Greek statesmen on suspicion of proMacedonian leanings. Polybius was one of these, and he happened to be detained in Rome, where he made connections with leading Romans, including Scipio Aemilianus.4 He began writing his Histories during this time. After the Romans decided to release the Greek detainees, Polybius traveled widely, returned to Greece, and was requested to serve as advisor to Scipio Aemilianus in the Third Punic War. DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-1

2  Introduction During this war, however, Polybius’ homeland was defeated by the Romans in the Achaean War. After these wars, Polybius returned and facilitated the rehabilitation of Greece. As a former leading statesman from Megalopolis in the Achaean League, Polybius wrote to educate aspiring state leaders about these events and developments.5 His historical narrative is presented in a bureaucratic language and frequently offers authorial commentary and explanatory digressions.6 Overall, Polybius’ style, topics, and goals seem pragmatic, realistic, rational, and serious. Emotion simply has not seemed to fit with these characteristics. Moreover, Polybius actively distanced himself from earlier Hellenistic historians, like Phylarchus, who had a reputation for emotional scenes. Much of our information about these historians, however, including many fragments of their works, comes from Polybius’ Histories. As Christopher Baron and Lisa Irene Hau have recently and persuasively demonstrated, it is irresponsible to take Polybius’ presentations of these authors at face value.7 It is worth beginning with Polybius’ criticism of the earlier Hellenistic historian Phylarchus for his over-emotional depiction of the fall of Mantinea in 223 bce.8 This city fell to the Macedonians and Achaeans in their war against Sparta under Cleomenes.9 Phylarchus claimed that the Macedonians and Achaeans executed a large number of leading citizens, enslaved the population, and refounded the city as Antigoneia. Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus demonstrates three core features of Polybius’ qualifications for good history writing. First, a work of history must be based in and have the supreme purpose (τέλος) of relating the truth. Second, the cause (αἰτία) and manner (τρόπος) in which something happened are important. Third, Polybius aimed for his readers to be able to feel pity reasonably and appropriately grow angry in response to events. These criticisms establish parameters for evaluating Polybius’ own depiction of emotion, namely whether the historian provides reasons behind the emotion, how appropriate these emotions are for the circumstances, how to evaluate the emotions themselves, and what effect emotions may have. Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus’ historiographical methods and ends which follows the fall of Mantinea deserves quoting in full: Wishing to make very clear the cruelty of Aratus and the Achaeans, [Phylarchus] says that the Mantineans suffered great misfortunes when their city was captured, and that this oldest and greatest city of the Arcadians struggled through such a drastic disaster in order to bring all the Greeks to awareness and tears (ὥστε πάντας εἰς ἐπίστασιν καὶ δάκρυα τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀγαγεῖν). And endeavoring to evoke pity in his readers and make them share the experience with those in the narrative (σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις), he takes up the frenzied women tearing their hair and striking their breasts, and adds on the tears and wailings of men and women being led away together with children and aged parents. He does this throughout his whole history, striving in each section always to place the whole scene before one’s eyes.

Introduction  3 So, let us bypass the ignobility and womanliness of his choice but rather examine what is suitable and useful in history. Indeed, it is necessary that the author not shock those who take up his history through recording what is astonishing nor seek the probable words and enumerate the possible circumstances of the participants, just as the writers of tragedies do. Rather, [it is necessary that the author] recall everything according to the truth of what was done and said, even if this happens to be entirely mediocre. For the purposes of history and tragedy are not the same but the opposite. For in that genre, it is necessary through the most believable words to shock and deceive the audience for the moment, but in this genre it is necessary to teach and to persuade those who love to learn through genuine deeds and words for all time (ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας). Thus, in fact, in tragedies what is believable is related, even if it is false, for the deception of the viewers, but in histories the truth [is related] for the benefit of those who love to learn. And without these elements [Phylarchus] narrates the majority of catastrophes, not presenting the cause or method to the events (οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις), without which it is possible neither to pity reasonably nor to grow angry appropriately in response to any of the occurrences (ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ’ ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὔτ’ ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων).10 Polybius insinuates that Phylarchus wrote too sensationally (τερατευόμενον) without regard for truth, causation, or method. Thus, his arousal – and depiction – of emotion was inappropriate to the genre of history. This passage and its criticism have given rise to the so-called Hellenistic subgenre of “tragic historiography”.11 Partly from his criticism of others’ style, Polybius presents himself and has appeared to be a pragmatic historian. Because the “tragic” historiography of the Hellenistic period forsook the Thucydidean, pragmatic model of history, it was assessed as a lesser, more degenerate form of history. Recently, however, John Marincola and others have criticized the existence of a subgenre of “tragic” historiography and refined the terms of criticism.12 To understand Polybius’ approach to emotion, let us consider how Polybius faults Phylarchus concerning truth, cause and manner, and appropriate response. Polybius specifies that a history must be based in and relate the truth. Ancient historians’ most persistent claim to truth surpasses that of any other genre of ancient literature.13 Within this genre, historians varied immensely in their adherence to “the truth” and sometimes even plausibility. Polybius, like (almost) every ancient historian, made claims to truth and is known for his criticisms of other historians, such as that quoted, based primarily on their deviation from “the truth”. Moreover, Polybius was – and is – known as one of the more reliable ancient historians. Polybius characterized his history as pragmatic, depicting serious political affairs, and shares affinities with the seriousness of Thucydides, who provides the ancient precedent for objective historiography.14 Thucydides and Polybius were perceived to

4  Introduction promote cold calculation, expediency, and rationality. These “pragmatic” historians thus seem to fit most closely with the modern ideal of objective, scientific, Rankean history. Polybius’ bureaucratic style of writing, meticulous attention to detail, careful examination of sources, emphasis on rationality (λογισμός), and both practical and reasoned digressions contribute to this reputation. “Subjective” factors, such as morality and emotion, seem foreign or contrary to such serious pragmatism.15 Despite that, all material in a written account is necessarily framed and structured by the choice of the author. The postmodern study of “rhetorical” historiography challenges the seemingly straightforward and pragmatic nature of ancient historians’ approaches and emphasizes this literary construction of their texts.16 As A.J. Woodman argued in Rhetoric in Ancient Historiography, it is impossible to record the actual experience of a historical occurrence, let alone the myriad of perspectives. Even eyewitness accounts rely on interpretations of outward expressions which could only be inferred as emotive.17 All historical accounts, therefore, come with the disclaimer that they stand at a remove from “what really happened”. How could one prove, for example, that Hamilcar and Hannibal hated the Romans – the (in)famous “Barcid wrath”?18 Except for attestation by Hannibal himself, this hatred is inferred solely from Hannibal’s expressions and actions. Given that Polybius did not meet Hannibal in person to observe his expressions, this emotion becomes even more elusive. However, ignoring emotion does not bring us closer to the events or to the principles guiding the historians who wrote about such events. This leads to one of the main points of this study: ancient historians made conscious choices to record emotion in their narratives. That the historian includes emotions shows that emotions were considered an important part of history, and, when taken seriously, are what the historian thought happened in accordance with the truth. Thus, although – or rather, because – the existence of emotion in a historical event remains unproven and unprovable, historians’ references to emotion in historical events represent a significant and serious literary choice. It is important to distinguish that this does not necessitate that emotion is then by default “made up”, “fabricated”, or “not true”; rather, how Polybius narrates, portrays, and evaluates the emotions of historical agents in his Histories illuminates his historiographical practice and conception of history itself. The historians’ own claims to portray events as truly as they could constrain them to incorporating emotions in understandable and plausible ways. Polybius criticizes a Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, for misrepresenting emotion and uses the disjuncture between the emotion cited and the actions taken to warn his readers not to trust Pictor’s history too readily.19 Because ancient historians endeavored to portray events as plausible and true to human experience, in opposition to outright fictitious and mythologically based literature, their portrayals of emotion should have been closely recognizable to their contemporaries as anger, pity, fear, and so forth. However, other genres have received more attention to their portrayals of emotion. Philosophical treatises, for example, sought to explicate what emotions were and how to frame, understand, and control them to live good lives.20 Tragedy, as Polybius characterized in our passage, self-consciously represented fictional emotion which in turn would have deceptive effects on its audience.21

Introduction 5 Rhetorical treatises taught aspiring orators how to incorporate and elicit emotions in their intended audiences of juries, and the extant corpus of Classical Athenian orators provides many examples of emotion in action within speeches.22 However, ancient historiography is different even from oratory in its focus on depicting – as opposed to overtly influencing – reality. Where oratory and tragedy sought to influence and lead their audiences to particular emotional responses or interpretations of emotion, historiography focused on the depiction of emotion as it (supposedly) happened. This leads us to Polybius’ second criticism. Phylarchus did not give due attention to the manner in which events unfolded nor to the causes or reasons behind events (οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις).23 As something entirely undocumentable, intangible, and occurrent, emotions could be left out of a historical account entirely, depending on the author’s agenda and preferences. Polybius thought that a historical account needed to show how the actions, decisions, and events happened to teach his readers about patterns in human behavior. Because of this emphasis on process, alongside historiography’s concern with reality, modern theories of emotion from the social sciences provide useful heuristic frames for analysis of emotions in Polybius’ Histories. Modern studies of emotion stress the social nature of emotion: emotion is constituted in interactions between human beings who are embedded in a social context which conditions their expressions of emotion and response to it.24 This focus on the social nature of emotion emphasizes how emotions happen, similar to Polybius’ concern for narrating how historical events occur. Emotions in ancient historiography are innately social as well. That is, they occur between people: the Aetolians were angry at the fallout of the Second Macedonian War, which led them to encourage Antiochus III to invade Greece. Those who survive after defeat are pitied, which Hannibal uses to motivate his soldiers before their first battle against the Romans in Italy. In these examples, emotions provide the explanation of how one event affects the next. Emotions explain how and why something happens between agents in the historical narrative. These examples do not rely on or depict internal cognitive or affective processes. The emotions have no purpose in ancient historiography if they are not social in nature: historiography claims to depict what happened in the past, as opposed to fictionalized representations of emotion or abstract theorizing about emotion. A purely cognitive approach to emotion, which examines and elucidates how emotions occur as mental processes within an individual, does not provide the most useful frame for analyzing emotion in historiography. Social sciences study how emotion works in everyday life. Ancient historiography and modern social sciences overlap in this concern for understanding human behavior. In this study, modern psychology and sociology of emotion provide critical terminology through which the emotions in Polybius’ Histories can be analyzed to greater depth. Philosophies of collective emotion and political thought enhance our analysis of ancient historiographical emotion and elucidate its significance in Polybius’ political theory, narrative, and theory of universal historiography. Polybius’ criticism that Phylarchus did not pay close enough attention to causes also brings up a key feature in his historiography – the prioritization of causes.

6  Introduction After narrating events leading up to the outbreak of the Second Punic War as a twobook “prologue”, Polybius begins his history proper in Book Three by distinguishing causes from beginnings in the context of war.25 Causes precede and influence agents’ decisions and actions, whereas beginnings are those very actions. Emotions, such as the anger of the Aetolians or the pity of observers, motivate action and thus serve as causes. Emotions connect morality to action by motivating agents to act on what they value. This highlights a second major point of this study: as motivators – or causes – of actions, emotions connect with morality and rationality. This connection between emotion and morality advances recent scholarly interest in morality in ancient historiography. However, in line with the reputation of Polybius as a “pragmatic” historian, scholars have assumed that for Polybius emotion fell on the wrong side of a dichotomy with reason. Arthur M. Eckstein in Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius argues that emotion characterizes the barbarian, the woman, the common person, the mercenary – that is, emotion represents the opposite of the good aristocratic man.26 Eckstein persuasively argues that Polybius did not present an amoral, Machiavellian perspective on history; instead, morality and a concern for aristocratic ethos pervade and characterize his Histories. However, “hyperemotionality” played a part in Eckstein’s characterization of those of whom Polybius disapproved. Eckstein states that “[e]very multitude is unstable in character, and filled with totally lawless desire, unreasoning anger, and violent passion.”27 Indeed, “uncontrolled emotion was to him the most prevalent – and dangerous – ­characteristic of the masses and their conduct.”28 Barbarians “always acted out of blind passion,” and women are characteristic of “hyperemotionality.”29 Nonetheless, in arguing that “honor – both in the public sphere and as an inner feeling – was to Polybius more important” than success by any means, Eckstein himself employs emotional language.30 In his second chapter, Eckstein argues that Polybius’ own feelings and emphasis on emotions demonstrate his deep concern for morality, although Eckstein never explicitly acknowledges the role of emotion itself in this connection. So Eckstein tells us that “Polybius expresses bitter anger” and mentions “Polybius’ angry criticism” and “an idea about which he felt very strongly.”31 These emotional phrases seemingly do not register as “emotional” but only as “moral” to Eckstein. Thus, Eckstein describes Polybius as feeling emotions to exemplify Polybius’ morality but does not characterize Polybius, although he shows emotion, in any way similar to his description of “hyperemotional” masses, barbarians, and women. Likewise, Craige B. Champion in his monograph Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories examines the trajectory of the decline of Roman culture in the Histories. Champion analyzes the language of barbarology and ochlocracy (rule of the mob) as a paradigm by which Polybius evaluates groups of people in the Histories. Champion shows how Polybius portrayed the Aetolians, Gauls, and Illyrians as barbaric and shows the connotations associated with this – irrational, impulsive, uncivilized, passionate, and so forth.32 Champion does not assume that emotion in general is as inherently negative as Eckstein does throughout his work. He does, however, use a Greek emotional term, thumos, as the shorthand for all language of

Introduction 7 barbarology, which thus implies that emotion on some level was assumed to be part and parcel of this negative characterization. This assumption takes into account neither the various manifestations of emotion in the Histories nor its variable motivations and results. However, Eckstein’s identification of Polybius’ moral vision and aristocratic ethos and Champion’s argument about the politics of cultural indeterminacy by which Polybius complicates the portrayal of the Romans as at times sharing in barbaric thumos, or “passion”, and at times in Hellenic logismos, “reason”, both inform my analysis. I take what Eckstein describes as Polybius’ aristocratic ethos and Champion’s descriptive category of logismos as the models by which Polybius judges emotional behavior. This study builds on these observations by analyzing the emotions themselves but challenges the assumption that emotions had to be naturally irrational. More recently, Lisa Irene Hau’s Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus emphasizes Polybius’ moral didacticism.33 Hau stresses the convergence of moral lessons with practicality in Polybius’ text, calling Polybius a “material moralist” who sees practical benefit result from moral behavior.34 In Hau’s analyses of Polybius’ moralizing techniques, emotion is absent.35 This merely highlights how, even in scholarship insightfully reevaluating pragmatism and cold calculation as characteristic of Polybius, emotion has not featured in its own right. This study ­corroborates and advances Hau’s emphasis on Polybius’ moral rhetoric to demonstrate how emotion itself can exemplify morality, rationality, and pragmatism within the Histories. Lastly, Polybius criticized Phylarchus for trying to instill certain emotions unduly in his readers. Without causes, Polybius asserts, one would not be able to feel pity logically or anger appropriately (ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ’ ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὔτ’ ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων).36 In this statement, Polybius implies that one can pity rationally and grow angry appropriately. This is one of the most important statements about emotion in the Histories and brings up a third major point of this study: Polybius considered emotion a payoff of reading history. Not only is emotion present in the course of events, but, through paying attention to causes, Polybius’ readers should learn how to feel emotion. Moreover, Polybius includes the important distinctions of feeling these emotions appropriately and reasonably. This emphasizes the connection between emotion and morality; for Polybius, emotions could and should be appropriate and reasonable and thus not inherently or necessarily irrational and uncontrollable. Moreover, one of the purposes of his history was affective, not purely pragmatic. Beyond Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus, emotions within his own text are intrinsically important. Emotions influence individuals’ and groups’ decisions, motivate uprisings and coups, spark wars, and reflect agents’ moral values. In Polybius’ many digressions and explanatory passages, emotions justify and exemplify typical human behavior. In sum, in Polybius’ text emotions play an effective role in history, and the historian uses them significantly to explain the causes of actions, connect events, and make sense of human behavior. Lastly, Polybius’ place in ancient literature offers a unique contribution to the history of emotions. Very little exists of Greek literature from the second century

8  Introduction bce. The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Digital Library contains 146 authors identified as living and writing in this century. Polybius is the largest extant author of these.37 Likewise, Polybius stands out in his place in extant Greek historiography. Lisa Irene Hau captures this well in her recent analysis of “fragmentary” Hellenistic historical texts: “Between the Hellenica of Xenophon, written in the 350s bce, and the Histories of Polybius, written in the middle of the second century bce, we know of hundreds of names of historians, but not a single work is extant.”38 Polybius represents a bulwark in the midst of so many lost texts and historians. His text takes on greater significance as an example of how emotion was conceived during this time.39 This is not to say that Polybius should be seen as a spokesperson for all these lost authors and texts. Polybius is idiosyncratic in several of his usages of emotive terminology, for example, but we cannot say definitively that these usages represented his own innovations or were indicative of current, common usage. Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus highlights and emphasizes the value of these idiosyncrasies, for it attests to Polybius’ heightened sensitivity to the role of emotion in a historical text. Summary of Chapters Chapter 1 provides the fundamental terminology and methodology for analyzing emotions in Polybius’ Histories. This chapter introduces relevant terms, modes of critical analysis, and major trends and debates from studies in philosophy, psychology, and sociology on emotion concomitantly with passages from Polybius’ Histories. Using this framework, the chapter illuminates what historiography offers for an analysis of emotion, the difference between Polybius’ approach to emotions and cognitive approaches of Hellenistic philosophies, and the universality or culturally specific nature of emotions. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive analysis of individual emotions. These are grouped into four categories by their functions in the historical text as emotions of disapproval, anticipation, positive affect, and reflection. To better understand these emotions, Polybius’ usage is contextualized within his historical time and genre. Aristotle’s Rhetoric sets out the most explicit extant definitions of ancient Greek emotions and forms the foundation for modern studies on ancient Greek emotions, seen in David Konstan’s groundbreaking work, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. Thus, Aristotle provides a strong sounding board to identify idiosyncrasies in Polybius’ usage of emotion. Polybius’ use of emotion is also contextualized within the genre of ancient Greek historiography by comparison to his Classical predecessors Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Through such contextualizations, the analyses of individual emotions illuminate the variability of emotion in time and genre and the intrinsic importance and unique usages of emotion within Polybius’ own narrative. Chapters  3 and 4 turn from individual emotions to the complex combination of emotions in collective groups and focus upon the implications of emotion in political life. Each chapter tackles a particular sphere of political life. Chapter 3

Introduction 9 investigates emotions at the heart of change within the state, affecting the structure of civic life and identity, in Polybius’ political theory of constitutional change and in the narrative of Agathocles’ fall from power in Ptolemaic Egypt. Chapter 4 examines the complexity of emotion, specifically anger, between states in causing wars, examining the complex case of the Second Punic War alongside other wars sparked by anger, such as Carthage’s Mercenary War, Rome’s First Illyrian War, and the Social War in Greece. The concluding chapter shifts from analysis of historical agents’ emotions to the emotions of readers and addresses how Polybius engages in emotional rhetoric to affect his readership. Polybius establishes the emotional responses of internal observers to condition the emotional responses of his external readers and ultimately affect the impression those readers take away about the meaning of historical events. Lastly, this chapter ties together the main findings of the previous four chapters and evaluates the effectiveness of emotion in Polybius’ Histories. Notes 1 Few general historical studies focus on emotion, limited mostly to the Medieval Ages and the French Revolution. See Febvre 1973; LaCapra 2001; Reddy 2001; Rosenwein 2002; MacMullen 2003; Hunt 2006; Harris 2010. 2 Polyb., 2.56.6–13. See Marincola 2017, xlvi–l for an introduction to the criticism of emotion in historiography. 3 See Eckstein 1995, 1–16 on Polybius’ life. 4 See Henderson 2001; Erskine 2012 on Polybius as a detainee. 5 On Polybius’ target audience, see Walbank 1972, 3–6; Eckstein 1995, 16–17; Champion 2004, 4 note 5, 7; McGing 2010, 67; Moore 2017, 146–148. 6 On Polybius’ style as serious, pragmatic, and unemotional, see Eckstein 2013, 335. On Polybius’ style generally, see Dubuisson 1985. 7 See Baron 2013; Hau 2021. See too Marincola 2013. For an introduction to the Hellenistic world, see Green 1990; Erskine 2003. For our purposes, Polybius’ criticism of his historiographical predecessors illuminates his self-portrayal and values; see Eckstein 2013, 316–317. See too Vercruysse 1990; McGing 2010, 52, 65. On sensationalism or exaggeration, see Walbank HCP 1.259–260, 1962, 1972, 32; Eckstein 2013, 327–336. On historiographical polemic, see Marincola 1997, 225–229. 8 On Phylarchus’ historiography and Polybius’ criticism, see Walbank HCP 1.264, Gabba 1957; Africa 1961; Walbank 1962; Meister 1975; Sacks 1981, 192; Boncquet 1982– 1983; Labuske 1984; Vercruysse 1990; Engels 1993; Pretzler 2005; Schepens and Bollansée 2005; McGing 2010, 74–75; Vanhaegendoren 2010; Eckstein 2013; Marincola 2013; Farrington 2016. 9 On the historical details, see Eckstein 2013. 10 Polyb., 2.56.6–13. All translations are my own. See Plut. Them. 32.4, which corroborates Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus’ overemotional portrayals. 11 On “tragic history”, see especially Schepens and Bollansée 2005. See further Sacks 1981; Bringman 1997; Marincola 2003, 2011, 2013; Gowing 2010; Rutherford 2011; Baron 2013; Eckstein 2013; Wiemer 2013. 12 Marincola 2013; See recently Baron 2013; Eckstein 2013; Farrington 2016. See Marincola 2001, 110–112, for background. 13 Just what this claim to truth meant to the ancient historians and how it related to reality remains a contested issue. For introduction and various approaches, see Woodman 1988; Marincola 1997; Batstone 2009; Dench 2009; Lendon 2009.

10  Introduction 14 See Walbank 1972, 40–48; Sacks 1981 on Polybius as a pragmatic historian. Eckstein 1995, 17–20 sets out a brief history of Polybius’ reception. See Baron 2013, 203–209 on styles of historiography and Polybius’ perceived alignment with Thucydides; see ­Grethlein 2013 for a different categorization of historians. A  similar trend occurred in Roman historiography; see, for example, Syme 1958, 1964 on Tacitus and Sallust, respectively. Cf. the similar emphasis on pragmatic calculation in political Realism, Crawford 2000, 120–129. 15 See Harris 2010 on the debate between positivistic history and empathic history, which arose prominently in how to write the history of the Holocaust, for which, see LaCapra 2001. Even Tacitus’ famous statement at the beginning of the Annales, to read history “sine ira et studio” is addressed not as a testament to emotion per se (or the lack thereof) in history but as a discussion of bias, Tac. Ann., 1.1. See, for example, Luce 1989; MacMullen 2003 represents a dissenting voice and shows the connection between emotion and motivation implicit in Thucydides and Roman Republican historians, such as Nikolaos. MacMullen ties this significance to scientific understandings of emotion. 16 See White 1973; Woodman 1988 for seminal works. See Dench 2009; Marincola 2001; Marincola 2009; Grethlein 2013; Hau 2016 more recently. Scholarship which explores moral and rhetorical aspects of ancient historiographical texts and deemphasizes the truth claims of the ancient historians does not focus on emotion. 17 See Woodman 1988, 1–69 on how different perspectives create varying interpretations of events. 18 See Rich 1996, 14–15, for discussion and sources involved in “Barcid wrath”. 19 Polyb., 3.8.9. See Chapter 2, 65–66. 20 See on Aristotle and Plato on emotions, Fortenbaugh 1975; Konstan 2006. On Hellenistic philosophy and emotion, see Annas 1992, 1993; Nussbaum 1994. See recently Baltzly 2018; Konstan 2014 on the Stoics and Epicureans. 21 See Farrington 2016. See on emotion in tragedy Visvardi 2015; Harder and Stöppelkamp 2016; Marincola 2003 challenges the contrast between history and tragedy. 22 On Aristotle’s emotions and rhetoric, see Fortenbaugh 1975, 2008; Cooper 1994, 1999; Furley and Nehamas 1994; Garver 1994; Frede 1996; Rorty 1996; Nieuwenburg 2002; Garsten 2006; Konstan 2006, 2007; Sokolon 2006; Price 2009; Remer 2013. On emotion and rhetoric recently, see Sanders and Johncock 2016. 23 Polyb., 2.56.13. 24 See, for example, Ahmed 2004; Schmid 2009; von Scheve 2013; de Sousa 2014; von Scheve and Salmela 2014; Ahäil and Thomas 2015; Fierke 2015; Koschut 2020. 25 Polyb., 3.6.6–7. See on Polybius’ theory of causation, Walbank HCP 1.306–309, 1972, 157–164, 1994; Pédech 1964, 80–88, 99–203; Derow 1979, 1994; Eckstein 1989, 2–6, 1995, 57–59, 2012, 208–209; McGing 2010, 76–80; Beck 2011, 225. On Polybius’ textual structure, see Walbank 1972, 97–129, 1975, 1994; McGing 2010, 17–50; Wiater 2016. 26 Eckstein 1995. 27 Eckstein 1995, 136. 28 Eckstein 1995, 131. 29 Eckstein 1995, 123, 152. 30 Eckstein 1995, 9. 31 Eckstein 1995, 52, 24, 22. 32 Champion 2004, 30–66. 33 Hau 2016. 34 Hau 2016, 43. 35 Hau analyzes several passages which include emotive terminology but does not address these terms. See Hau 2016, 53–54, however, on tears. 36 Polyb., 2.56.13. 37 This excludes long ranges and texts labelled as varia or incerta. Polybius’ text is 316,866 of the 838,168 words in the corpus of second-century texts (37.8%). See Pantelia 2022, xxv, on assigning dates in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Digital Library corpus. Most

Introduction 11 of these authors, including the second largest, Posidonius, are preserved as “fragments”, and this may include citations, testimonia, or part of their cover text. See recently Hau 2021 on these distinctions and issues of discerning such “fragments”. This fact would bolster Polybius’ status as the largest extant author of the second century (and recall his own text is partially preserved as extracts). See Moore 1965 on Polybius’ manuscript tradition and Németh 2018 on Byzantine excerptions. 38 Hau 2021, 238. 39 Studies on emotion focus on Classical Athens and late Republican to early Imperial Rome, due partly to the large quantity of primary sources. On Athens, see McHardy 2008; Sternberg Hall 2005; Sanders 2014; Visvardi 2015. On Rome, see, for example, Kaster 2005; Keane 2015.

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1

Fundamentals of Emotion Social Science, History, and Human Behavior

Achaeus, a rival contender for the Seleucid throne, was betrayed and caught trying to escape from Sardis under siege in 213 bce. His extremities and head were cut off and his body impaled. His captor, King Antiochus III, wept at Achaeus’ startling change of fortune. Antiochus’ army, however, felt and exhibited such excitement that Achaeus’ wife, Laodike, realized that Achaeus was caught and despaired, surrendering Sardis shortly thereafter. The historian Polybius explains later that all those who witnessed Achaeus’ demise hated those who betrayed him and pitied him as the victim suffering undeservedly. Within this narrative from Polybius’ Histories, Achaeus’ demise sets off chain reactions of emotions which stimulate concrete results, influence important decisions, and shape the readers’ judgment of the scene.1 The highly emotional story of Achaeus’ capture raises the issue of emotion in Polybius’ Histories. When, where, how, and why do these emotions arise? What motivates emotions? What results from them? How does the historian frame and evaluate these emotions? In this chapter we introduce fundamental terminology to frame our analysis of how emotions work in Polybius’ Histories.2 This chapter highlights the social nature of emotion. In the narrative of Achaeus’ capture and death, agents express a wide variety of emotions. Each of these emotions occurs in a social context, reflects what each character valued, is expressed according to cultural norms, and motivates and influences characters’ decisions and actions. Using the set of terms and features established in the first section of the chapter as a guide, we explore generic terms for emotion itself in the Histories and distinctions between emotion and other cognitive and affective states. The approaches of the Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism, which flourished contemporary to Polybius, highlight the social nature of Polybius’ portrayals of emotion. The final section situates Polybius’ portrayal of emotions within debates (both modern and ancient) over who could and stereotypically did feel emotion and whether people feel the same emotion across cultures. This chapter therefore both establishes critical terminology and begins to unpack the structure and process of emotion in Polybius’ Histories.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-2

Fundamentals of Emotion 17 What Makes an Emotion Social Scientific Terminology and Framework

Defining emotion is a notoriously difficult task: “The question ‘What is an emotion?’ has haunted philosophers and psychologists for many years.”3 To study emotions in Polybius’ Histories requires us to clarify the parameters of what an emotion is. Douglas Cairns, in a recent introduction to the study of emotion in Classics, states that The absence of a single and definitive set of criteria for membership of the category “emotion” is a significant feature of the phenomena under investigation, not something to be eliminated through redefinition of the phenomena and remodeling of the categories to which they belong. All the problems with the definition of “emotion” in English, as well as the problems associated with the difference in extension between modern English “emotion” and the various conceptual categories that preceded it or the categories of other languages in both past and present, are inherent in the enterprise of studying phenomena of this type.4 Cairns identifies two key aspects which seem to delimit emotions; they are intentional, or have an object, and phenomenal, or have a felt dimension.5 This chapter follows Cairns in exploring the parameters of emotions rather than imposing a specific definition on emotion. As we shall see, even the term often taken to translate to “emotion” in ancient Greek does not describe phenomena recognizable as emotions in Polybius’ Histories. Taking the basic parameters and frames for examining emotions in modern social sciences helps to focus our analysis on emotions in Polybius’ text. Emotions share basic features: someone feels them, someone or something stimulates them, they are about something one cares about, and they cause some expression or result. Studies of modern emotion use the terms subject, object, import, and result to describe these factors.6 The subject feels the emotion; they experience it, it is theirs. The object of an emotion is the person or thing toward or against whom the subject feels their emotion.7 The subject directs their emotion toward the object with the result that the objects “receive” the emotion, so to speak. In the Histories, for example, when Polybius narrates that the Achaeans grew indignant (ἠγανάκτει) with Aratus after he disastrously mismanaged their campaign against the Aetolians at Caphyae, the Achaeans are the subject of the emotion.8 They feel indignation. Aratus is the object of the Achaeans’ indignation, for they grow indignant at him.9 Emotions display intentionality in that they have objects.10 In modern studies, intentionality importantly often distinguishes emotion from other psychological and affective states, such as feelings, moods, dispositions, and sensations.11 The

18  Fundamentals of Emotion Achaeans’ indignation has intentionality because they direct it against an object, Aratus. However, as the passage continues, the Achaeans redirect their indignation. Aratus sways the Achaeans to pardon him, which cause them to redirect their indignation to his political rivals, who had tried to capitalize on the Achaeans’ indignation by accusing Aratus.12 Thus, the intentionality of the Achaeans’ indignation changes. Aratus ceases to be the object of their emotion, and his rivals become the objects. In this situation, the Achaeans either found their emotion misdirected at Aratus or found the rivals’ actions more egregious than Aratus’ in relation to the Achaeans’ values.13 Polybius uses the misdirection of emotion to reflect positively on the character of Aratus. As the object of a negative emotion, indignation, Aratus calmly appealed to the Achaeans’ values, engineered the transference of indignation to his own rivals, and proved himself an emotionally competent statesman. This example also shows that emotions lead to a result.14 They stimulate subjects to make decisions and to act in ways they otherwise likely would not have acted. The Achaeans’ indignation leads them to be sharply opposed to Aratus, which motivates his rivals to accuse him, leading to further action.15 How Emotions Matter: Import, Appropriateness, Proportionality, and Direction

The subject must care about something relevant to themselves and their values to feel an emotion, which is called the import.16 The Achaeans cared about a successful result to the campaign at Caphyae. Aratus’ failure to be successful harmed these interests, leading to indignation. Aratus’ disastrous management of the campaign and consequent loss of Achaean lives constitute the import of the Achaeans’ indignation. Polybius describes four faults Aratus committed in his recent political and military leadership, making explicit further why the Achaeans grew indignant at Aratus: he took office too early, released the army while the Aetolians were still in Achaea, engaged them though he was unprepared, and conducted the battle poorly.17 Polybius assumes that the Achaeans valued the lives of their troops and their military aims against the Aetolians. These values constitute the import. They explain why the Achaeans became indignant. Aratus failed to protect his troops and succeed against the Aetolians, and this stirred the Achaeans’ indignation. Polybius rarely defines the import of an emotion, and, compared to the other features discussed, import is often difficult to identify clearly because it represents a value of the subject rather than a concrete person, thing, or event, yet import is a defining feature of emotions, for they are felt for reasons.18 The import of an emotion represents the basis for the justification of an emotion, demonstrating that subjects feel an emotion for a reason.19 For example, near the beginning of the Social War waged by the Aetolians against the Achaeans and Macedonians, Philip V makes a surprise attack on the Aetolian capital of Thermum in part due to his anger at the Aetolians’ destruction at the Macedonian and Greek sacred sites of Dium and Dodona.20 Philip’s plan to make a surprise attack on Thermum receives a favorable evaluation from Polybius: Aratus, one of Polybius’ most positively portrayed characters, approves and promotes Philip’s plan, while

Fundamentals of Emotion 19 Leontius, who we are told is complicit in a scheme to foil all of Philip’s actions, argues against it.21 Polybius clearly portrays the project to attack Thermum as the most prudent choice. After Philip takes Thermum and ordered his men to heap up all the moveable property, Polybius remarks that up to this point all was done nobly and justly (καλῶς καὶ δικαίως), but he does not know what to say about Philip’s next actions22: [F]or, considering what the Aetolians did in Dium and Dodona, [the Macedonians] burnt the stoas and destroyed the rest of the dedications, which were luxurious in their ornamentation and of which some were crafted with much care and expense. However, not only did they destroy the roofs with fire, they even razed them to the foundation. They also overthrew the statues, not less than 2,000, and they also destroyed many statues, except those which had dedications to the gods or were in the gods’ images.23 Philip’s actions imply that he cared about the sanctuaries at Dium and Dodona, thought that the Aetolians acted wrongfully, and thought he had justly and appropriately punished them through his reciprocal destruction at Thermum.24 The import, Philip’s valuing of the religious centers of Dium and Dodona, is both deeply intertwined with the events which provoked his anger, namely the Aetolians’ destruction of these religious sites, and motivates him to act. Polybius often assumes that his reader already knows why a subject feels a particular emotion. For Philip’s anger, Polybius does not specify why Philip cares about Dium and Dodona; the moral principle, or import, is assumed while the event motivating Philip’s anger, the destruction of these places, is mentioned. However, for an analysis of the workings of ancient Greek emotions, the identification of import as an underlying value which motivates the emotion is distinct from the event which sparks the emotion.25 Emotions can be appropriate to their import and the event which stimulates the emotion.26 If the emotion accords with the import, it is appropriate. To turn back to our previous example, Aratus swayed the Achaeans by arguing that the Achaeans’ response and scale of indignation constituted an inappropriate response: the Achaeans should not have felt such indignation.27 In the case of Philip V at Thermum, Polybius shows that Philip rightfully felt anger against the Aetolians for their previous desecrations, and – had he stopped his destruction with the movable property – he would have acted correctly as a result of his appropriate anger (χρωμένου τῇ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ).28 Closely related to appropriateness is the concept of proportionality. Both appropriateness and proportionality measure whether an emotion is correctly aligned with moral values.29 The appropriateness of an emotion refers to whether the emotion itself is a correct response to the event which stimulates the subject’s emotion. Proportionality refers to whether the action resulting from the emotion correlates to the emotion. In other words, appropriateness looks back from the emotion to motivation, and proportionality looks ahead to the result of the emotion. This distinction allows for a nuanced reading and appraisal of emotions and their subjects in the Histories. In the case of Philip’s destruction of Thermum, Polybius finds

20  Fundamentals of Emotion Philip’s response to his anger disproportionate.30 Philip went too far in his anger by destroying sacred structures. Nevertheless, Polybius does not characterize Philip’s anger itself as inappropriate: he rightly grew angry at the Aetolians’ destruction at Dium and Dodona.31 Presumably, destroying only the secular structures would have marked a proportional response for his anger. Philip overreacted disproportionately to his appropriate anger, and Polybius makes clear his criticism of Philip for this disproportionate response. In addition to responding disproportionately, Philip V misdirected his anger. Misdirection occurs when the subject directs their emotional response toward the wrong object, as also happened with Aratus’ redirection of the Achaeans’ indignation. Philip grew angry at the Aetolians, the correct objects of his anger, but misdirected his response to another object, the (property of the) gods. In this case, Philip’s misdirection and disproportionate response reaffirm each other.32 Polybius explains his evaluation of Philip’s behavior at Thermum, “for committing the same fault as the Aetolians’ impieties, and because of his passion (διὰ τὸν θυμόν), healing evil with evil, Philip thought that he did nothing wrong.”33 Philip often blamed the Aetolians Scopas and Dorimachus for their lack of inhibition and unscrupulousness (εἰς ἀσέλγειαν καὶ παρανομίαν ὠνείδιζε), often bringing up their impiety (τὴν ἐν Δωδώνῃ καὶ Δίῳ προφερόμενος ἀσέβειαν εἰς τὸ θεῖον) against the divine at Dium and Dodona.34 But he himself, doing the very same, did not think that he would create the same reputation as they had among his audience, Polybius concludes.35 Thus, Philip erred because he committed the same wrongs as the Aetolians with his tit-for-tat strategy.36 Polybius explains why he condemns Philip by an appeal to proper conduct within war. He specifies that according to the laws and rights of war, generals can take away and destroy enemies’ forts, harbors, cities, soldiers, ships, produce, and anything else like these which, when lost, would weaken the enemy and which would enhance one’s own strength when gained.37 Destroying what does not weaken the enemy or strengthen oneself is clearly the work of a mad passion (θυμοῦ λυττῶντος).38 Polybius explains further that good men wage war not to eliminate the enemy but to correct him, and thus a good man should direct his attention and actions against wrongdoers, not innocents.39 These sentiments reflect Polybius’ philosophy on the correct method of making war and demonstrate that Philip did not meet Polybius’ standards. Thus, Philip’s misdirected and ­disproportionate response to his albeit appropriate anger receives censure from Polybius, who provides this evaluation to discourage his readers from similar courses of action.40 Polybius makes one last point to prove that Philip V’s actions in response to his anger were not beneficial, both practically and morally. He remarks that one could recognize Philip’s mistake if one takes the Aetolians’ perspective and thinks about how they would be disposed if Philip had acted differently. Polybius states emphatically that he thinks they would have had the best and most humane opinion of Philip (βελτίστην καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτην [διάληψιν]), knowing and reflecting on what they did at Dodona and Dium and realizing Philip could have rightly done anything he wanted at Thermum.41 In this counterfactual example, Philip would

Fundamentals of Emotion 21 have chosen to do nothing similar to them because of his mildness and magnanimity. Polybius concludes his criticism of Philip by stating, For it is clear from these [arguments] that they [the Aetolians] were likely to blame themselves on the one hand, but on the other to approve of Philip and wonder at his magnanimity and kingliness when he showed piety to the divine and anger towards them (χρωμένου τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ).42 In this concluding statement Polybius makes clear that Philip’s anger was an appropriate response. If he had directed it correctly – toward the Aetolians (πρὸς αὐτούς) instead of the divine (πρὸς τὸ θεῖον) – his anger would have also been proportional, as the correct response against the Aetolians. Thus, in the end, it becomes apparent that anger as such was not Philip’s mistake: he misdirected a disproportionate response, committing a twofold error. In describing Philip’s anger, as elsewhere throughout the Histories, Polybius employs nouns and verbs rather than adjectives.43 This exhibits a tendency to think of emotions and affective states not as descriptive of an inborn tendency but as particular to events or moments and thus embedded in the social context. This aligns with modern studies’ emphasis on emotions as occurrent rather than dispositional.44 Emotions are characterized by their brevity, as occurring in the moment, whereas dispositions and moods last much longer than emotions.45 Nevertheless, the emotions Polybius describes sometimes extend far beyond the particular moment or occurrence, such as the (in)famous “wrath of the Barcids”, which extended from the end of the First Punic War in 241 bce to the beginning of the Second Punic War in 218 bce.46 Emotions for Polybius do not serve to describe a person’s inherent character but rather connect motivation and action within a specific social interaction. When Polybius describes the anger of Philip V, for example, he never calls Philip “prone to anger” or implies that Philip’s disposition in and of itself is angry, although Philip feels instances of anger more than any other individual in the Histories.47 Philip’s response to his moments of anger – by reacting disproportionately, for instance – characterizes his behavior at that time and contributes to his reputation, but Polybius certainly attested to the ability for character to change, not least in Philip V’s case.48 Subjects feel emotion not because they necessarily have an inherent disposition to feel such an emotion but because they react to an event, and this reactive emotion can remain latent for a duration of time until a later situation awakens the residual emotion.49 Complicating Emotion: Orientation and Multidimensionality

The previous two sections set out terms for describing emotions in a social context. This section introduces two further qualities of emotion which can help distinguish emotions from other cognitive and affective states. Generally, people feel emotions on their own account and for others. Here I shall call emotions felt on one’s own behalf personal.50 For example, the powerful Seleucid courtier Hermeias

22  Fundamentals of Emotion grew angry at his rival Epigenes for speaking up against his own plans.51 Hermeias grew angry on his own behalf. Similarly, the Achaeans were indignant with Aratus because he managed their own affairs so poorly. By contrast, in this chapter’s opening passage, external observers feel pity for Achaeus after he was captured and killed despite his best efforts.52 These observers feel an emotion on the behalf of another person, Achaeus. These observers also hate Achaeus’ betrayers – not because the betrayers harmed the observers themselves, as would be the case with a personal emotion – but because the betrayers harmed Achaeus, with whom the observers sympathize. These emotions – the observers’ pity and hate – are oriented toward another.53 However, these are not necessarily altruistic emotions. It is unclear and debated whether emotion can be purely altruistic or felt completely on the behalf of another.54 In this example, the observers implicitly refer to their own values to react with pity for Achaeus and hatred for his betrayers.55 Even with emotions felt purely on others’ behalf, the subjects’ values condition their emotional expression. The observers of Achaeus’ demise pity him because they considered that he did not deserve such a fate, and they hated his betrayers because of their values of loyalty and honesty.56 These other-oriented emotions still relate to the subject expressing that emotion through its import. Polybius narrates this type of emoting when he describes how Antiochus III, Achaeus’ enemy, reacts when Achaeus is brought to him bound.57 Antiochus, Polybius says, remained silent for a long time then burst into tears (πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἀποσιωπῆσαι, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον συμπαθὴς γενέσθαι καὶ δακρῦσαι), for he reflected on the vicissitudes of fortune and how Achaeus just before had been at the prime of his life in his power and fortune but now was reduced to nothing.58 Antiochus’ reflection leads him to react with raw emotion – an outburst of tears. This reflection and emotive response by Antiochus are employed by Polybius to enhance his character. Antiochus shows wisdom not customary in a young king, and his reflection on fortune hearkens back to Herodotus’ narrative of Solon’s advice to Croesus and Croesus’ subsequent reversal of fortune.59 Antiochus, on witnessing such a reversal at Croesus’ former capital, Sardis, shows good moral character and is a thoughtful student of history through his emotion, stimulated by Achaeus’ situation.60 In addition to both personal and other-oriented emotions, Polybius portrays seemingly opposite emotions occurring simultaneously in response to the same event. Studies on modern emotion call this feature of emotions multidimensionality.61 The observers who felt pity for Achaeus and hatred for his betrayers felt multidimensional emotions.62 Not only did they experience multiple emotions simultaneously, but they felt very different kinds of emotions with different objects. Likewise, after the Romans conquered Syracuse, Polybius describes the repercussions for when conquerors overstep the bounds of propriety in taking spoils.63 He says that instead of feeling happy for the conquerors, observers pity the conquered.64 Polybius explains that they no longer only pity the conquered but reflect on their own misfortunes and pity themselves (Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς). From this they grow to resent and be angry with the conquerors (Ἐξ ὧν οὐ μόνον φθόνος, ἀλλ’ οἷον ὀργή τις ἐκκαίεται).65

Fundamentals of Emotion  23 The reflective process itself acts as a stimulant for hatred (ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων περιπετειῶν ἀνάμνησις ὡσανεὶ προτροπή τίς ἐστι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τῶν πραξάντων μῖσος). This digression provides us with one of the densest emotional passages of the Histories and a prime example of multidimensionality.66 The observers feel five emotions in response to what they see – pity (ἔλεος), resentment (φθόνος), self-pity (σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλεεῖν), anger (ὀργή), and hatred (μῖσος). The observers’ self-pity represents a purely personal emotion, whereas their pity of those who were conquered and suffered was other-oriented. The merging of these observers’ pity and self-pity intensifies their anger, hatred, and resentment of the conquerors. In sum, they present the complexity and depth of an observer’s reaction to and judgment of the situation Polybius describes. The features discussed earlier help distinguish emotions from related cognitive and affective phenomena in modern studies and in Polybius. Categories such as moods, dispositions, feelings, sensations, desires, and beliefs all overlap in features with emotions.67 Polybius does not define the difference between emotions and dispositions, moods, feelings, or sensations – unsurprisingly, for he wrote narrative history, not philosophy.68 These affective phenomena lack the intentionality of emotion.69 Emotions have more prominent cognitive elements such as import, intentionality, appropriateness, direction, and proportionality than moods, feelings, or dispositions.70 Polybius qualifies desires and beliefs with their own distinct terminology, ἐπιθυμίαι and δόξαι respectively. Beliefs and desires share intentionality with emotions, but they do not share the same motivations or results, and they lack the affective element of emotion.71 While desires share the basic attributes (subject, object, import) and other implicit characteristics, such as a combination of physical and cognitive factors, they work differently from emotions in the Histories.72 Desires can create emotions, but they often lack import, that is, motivation based on values, and do not have the potential to be other-oriented.73 Ancient Emotion: Terms and Philosophies Ancient Greek Terminology for Emotion

Now that we have established parameters and terminology for analyzing emotion in Polybius’ Histories, let us examine the terminology often used for “emotion” generally, namely the terms πάθος and θυμός. This discussion leads to comparison of Polybius’ portrayal of emotion with the contemporary Hellenistic philosophies of emotion in Stoicism and Epicureanism. This section highlights how a historiographical context differs greatly in its portrayal of emotion from philosophical contexts. There is no word which Polybius uses which maps entirely onto the concept of “emotion” in English. This is quite understandable: the word “emotion” in English covers such a wide array of cognitive and physical concepts that, unless parameters are set beforehand, it can become almost meaningless. So too, Greek terminology for mental states similar to the concept of emotion varies. Hellenistic philosophers wrote treatises, now lost, focused on πάθη, which aligns with what we could call

24  Fundamentals of Emotion emotions, and Aristotle discusses a list of emotions in the Rhetoric and likewise calls these πάθη.74 Polybius’ limited usage of this term, however, denotes generalized experience, occurrence, or feature.75 For example, Polybius uses πάθος to describe natural features such as the conditions in the Strait of Messina or the regular character of the sea.76 It also denotes general suffering from illness, ambush, loss, or the destruction of war.77 The scant use of this term by Polybius highlights the divergence of the purpose of history from philosophy. Whereas the field of philosophy burgeoned with works entitled Περὶ Παθῶν in the Hellenistic period and beyond, Polybius’ Hellenistic history ignores the specialized theories and definitions of πάθη altogether.78 Let us examine in detail Polybius’ sole usage of πάθος which carries emotional traits and meaning. When Scipio Africanus wanted to run for aedile, although he was too young, he told his mother, who was religious, that he dreamed twice that he and his brother were aediles together.79 She wished for that, overcome by womanly feeling (τῆς παθούσης τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος).80 This statement confirms and aligns with certain common assumptions about emotions. First, the feeling overwhelms Scipio’s mother, implying that emotion is a force that can overpower. Second, Polybius characterizes this feeling as typical of a woman, and a woman feels it here. This aligns with the view that women and others who were not elite Greek or Roman men were especially prone to emotion and unable to control such emotion.81 Moreover, Polybius’ portrayal of Scipio’s mother corresponds with his characterization of the Roman people as superstitious.82 Lastly, this example of πάθος also puts emotion on the other side of a dichotomy with reason. Polybius explains that Scipio rationally and cleverly planned this tale and manipulated his mother’s and the people’s beliefs, as Polybius also claims the ancient Romans did when they set up the state’s religious practices to contain and control the masses.83 Those who unquestioningly believe in dreams and divine inspiration and who subscribe to religion in short do not partake in Polybius’ rationalist view. People who subscribe to such religiosity, like Scipio’s mother, may be susceptible to “womanly passion” (τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος). This includes the masses, and so this passage and its πάθος support Eckstein’s observations about Polybius’ portrayal of women and of the masses as irrational, subject to emotion, and uneducated.84 Thus, Polybius’ single use of πάθος as a term with emotional content, that is, where a subject feels some feeling or emotion about something or someone else, seems to confirm the assumptions about his and historians’ views on emotion in the ancient world. Emotion was felt by those inferior to the elite aristocratic GrecoRoman man, irrational in origin and uncontrolled in expression and result. However, it is important to recall that this is the sole usage of πάθος as an emotion. While the prevailing view of emotion in history as irrational and negative receives validation in the one emotional usage of this term, it is equally important to keep in mind that that particular use of this term represents but a minority of the meanings it can hold. From this discussion, then, it becomes clearer that emotional terminology and usage differ in a historical text from that of philosophy, and that terminology for emotions can vary immensely and carry other, nonemotional, meanings.85

Fundamentals of Emotion 25 Passion/Spirit

Another broadly used term with emotion connotations is θυμός. Starting with Homer, this term can encompass meanings related to the seat of feelings, life, soul, and even perception.86 This term has a rich history and held important and shifting meanings throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. While θυμός plays emotional roles in the Iliad and the Odyssey, in Classical philosophy, θυμός more often denoted a part of the soul rather than an emotion.87 For Plato, for example, the θυμός constituted the middle part of a person’s soul, which could either be drawn down to base desires through the appetitive part of the soul, or it could be drawn to enlightened values by the rational part of the soul.88 Aristotle follows Plato in specifying θυμός as part of the soul and does not address θυμός as an emotion in his catalogue of emotions in Book 2 of the Rhetoric.89 Arno Mauersberger in the Polybios-Lexicon classifies Polybius’ usages into five types of usages: excitement and emotion; drive and desire; courage; anger, resentment, fury, or displeasure; and soul, heart, or mind.90 In Polybian scholarship, θυμός is treated often as paradigmatic of all emotion, and this section addresses this usage.91 In many ways, this term exemplifies the characteristics normally associated with emotion in scholarship on ancient history and noted in our discussion of emotional πάθος – irrational, non-elite, and uncontrolled. Craige Champion, in Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories, bases his category of barbarism on this Greek term in his analysis of Polybius’ contrast between Hellenic logismos and barbaric thumos.92 In this dichotomy, characters exhibit Hellenic logismos when they act rationally and nobly, and they demonstrate barbaric thumos when they behave irrationally, impulsively, and driven by personal desires. Champion argues that some characters demonstrate Hellenic logismos much more frequently than barbaric thumos and vice versa. While certain groups demonstrate a dispositional inclination to one side or the other, all characters are capable of either, and some, most notably the Romans, follow a trajectory from one type of behavior to the other throughout the Histories. Champion provides an appendix on Polybius’ uses of λογισμός, often translated as “rationality”, and its cognates but does not provide a parallel appendix for Polybius’ usage of θυμός, nor does Champion define this term within Polybius’ text.93 However, Champion’s understanding of thumos becomes clear from analysis of his text, which centers on two passages. First, Polybius states that the Celts’ decision to fight the Romans during the Second Punic War followed their θυμός rather than λογισμός.94 Second, in Polybius’ political theory of the mixed constitution, the people in a state with a degenerative mixed constitution follow forceful θυμός (and irrational ὀργή) in pressing for more power, driven by their personal greed.95 The first passage exemplifies the preference of θυμός over λογισμός by barbarians, and the second shows the irrationality, violence, and greed which accompany θυμός in the masses, particularly within a degenerative state of mob-rule.96 Through these and more passages, Champion correlates thumos with irrationality, irresolution, impulsiveness, courage, passion, violence, personal ambition, aggression, and desires. He describes thumos as barbaric,

26  Fundamentals of Emotion shortsighted, unreflecting, mindless, intemperate, rash, vainglorious, and grasping. Although Champion does not conflate all these terms at once to describe a passage, these terms provide an idea of what thumos represents to Champion, who constructs a network of associations. For Champion, thumos represents a range of negative characteristics, behaviors, and vices which Polybius used repeatedly to characterize actors. Champion’s concept of thumos, based in his analyses of θυμός in Polybius’ important passages at 2.35.3 and 6.56.11, is indicative of prevailing assumptions about the qualities of emotions in ancient history. We shall now turn to investigate Polybius’ use of the term θυμός throughout the Histories to see how it relates to these interpretations. Θυμός in Polybius’ Histories shares connotations with the concept of passion. It is something one has or which can come over one, one can arouse in another, and it does not necessitate an object. In English, “passion” is often thought of as irrational, violent, unpredictable, and impulsive. In other works in ancient Greek, it stands in as a general term for all emotion, much as passion is sometimes used as a synonym for emotion in English.97 “Passion” in English does not function as an emotion in the same way as hatred, anger, or indignation, for instance, but indicates intensity of feeling or an overwhelming of the senses. In Polybius’ Histories, characters act upon their passion (θυμός) differently from the other negative emotions.98 Throughout the text, θυμός often aligns with Champion’s concept of thumos: it is irrational, contrasted to rationality, or outright mad.99 Moreover, as Champion notes, Polybius matches θυμός with violence or force (βία) and other negative terms several times.100 Sometimes, θυμός motivates characters to act unexpectedly or impulsively.101 Of the emotions, anger (ὀργή) coexists with θυμός most frequently, but they are not synonymous.102 Ὀργή can contribute to and exemplify one’s θυμός.103 Of these occurrences, three involve Philip V’s actions at Thermum, which we discussed ­earlier. However, in this context, Polybius only directly unites ὀργή and θυμός once.104 The other instances help illuminate the differences between these two terms. In discussing a second raid on Thermum, Polybius narrates that Philip V then worked out his passion wrongly (κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ); for dishonoring the divine when angry at men is a sign of complete insanity (τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ὀργιζόμενον εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν τῆς πάσης ἀλογιστίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον).105 Θυμός characterizes Philip V’s response, which Polybius equates with madness. Anger occurs temporally before Philip’s use of θυμός: he grows angry at men before he acts with thumotic madness, a response to that very anger. As we discussed previously, Philip’s motivations for his anger were not irrational or inappropriate. We noted that he errs in choosing to avenge sacrilege with sacrilege, thus committing a moral failure and misdirecting his response. Similarly, here Philip has grown angry (ὀργιζόμενον) at the Aetolians, but his incorrect response of further sacrilege is characterized by θυμός. Θυμός, not ὀργή, provides the negative, irrational, and

Fundamentals of Emotion 27 condemned force to Philip’s behavior, and Polybius criticizes Philip’s θυμός by correlation with madness. Later in the Histories, referring to Philip V’s initial destruction at Thermum, Polybius says, “Philip, rejoicing as if gratifying his mad passion (χαριζόμενος γὰρ οἷον εἰ λυττῶντι τῷ θυμῷ), directed his anger more against the gods than against men (τὸ πλεῖον τῆς ὀργῆς οὐκ εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς διετίθετο).”106 This passage condemns the same kind of behavior – a misdirected and disproportionate response to anger. His θυμός guides Philip to act wrongfully and irrationally on his anger. Thus, θυμός holds negative and irrational connotations which anger (ὀργή) does not seem to hold inherently. However, Polybius does use θυμός in the context of war without these inherently negative connotations. Hamilcar’s θυμός drives him to seek to prepare a new war with the Romans after the unsatisfactory ending of the First Punic War.107 Because Hamilcar had acted as a good leader, undefeated in Sicily, his θυμός arose and motivated Hamilcar to expand Carthaginian power in Spain. Hannibal likewise is lifted up in his θυμός to continue his operations within the Second Punic War, and Scipio Africanus at the end of the Second Punic War uses his θυμός and sharpness.108 In these military contexts, θυμός could positively signify a general’s fortitude and vigor.109 In general, as a designation for the intensity of one’s feeling, θυμός does not act like the other emotions and thus should not be taken to represent Polybius’ views on emotion in general. Ancient Philosophy on Emotion

The Stoics and Epicureans, two of the largest philosophical schools during Polybius’ lifetime, conceptualized emotions as internal, cognitive processes of an individual. They designed their theories of emotion (πάθη) to explain how emotions work within an individual and how they should (not) affect the ideal sage’s state. Emotions, for the Hellenistic philosophers, stimulated interest in how they affected rational thought and required a therapy to be moderated or eliminated.110 Polybius, on the other hand, as a historian and not a theorist, does not address where emotions are seated in a person, whether the “spirited” part of the soul like Plato, or with more cognitive placement, as Aristotle.111 Occasionally, Polybius will mention that someone felt an emotion “in their soul” (τῇ ψύχῃ).112 However, these instances do not seem to provide conclusive evidence for any particular theory of the seat of emotions for Polybius but add to the depth of feeling. The Hellenistic Stoics concerned themselves with the internal step-by-step cognitive process of emotions.113 They theorized that first an appearance or perception appeared, to which one crucially had to assent. This internal step of assent held the most important – and controversial – role in the Stoics’ general theory.114 Assent marked the transition between the pre-emotion feeling and emotion proper. Stoic sages never assented to these feelings and so remained free from emotions and their impulses and troubles. Sages practiced and habituated themselves to withholding assent when pre-emotions (προπάθεια) arose.115 In contrast to Polybius and ordinary language, Stoics subordinated all emotions to conscious rational judgment.

28  Fundamentals of Emotion Polybius’ Histories do not explicitly attest to this internal model, mostly because the narrative lacks attention to internalized cognitive processes. Instead, Polybius notes only the result of any internal process of coming to have an emotion. This leaves the conscious rational consent to an emotion out of the Histories, and so it makes any definite conclusion on Polybius’ convergence or divergence with this Stoic theory ultimately unknowable.116 Nevertheless, the rationality which lies behind emotions in Polybius’ Histories represents a similar strand of thought, that is, that rationality and emotions could work together. However, the Stoics aimed to eliminate emotions, as irrational disturbances, from the life of the sage. The sage would recognize an emotion and not assent to it, thus correctly identifying it as irrational and unnecessary. In a few passages in the Histories, some characters show greater explicit control over their emotions, which may imply some form of control comparable to Stoic assent.117 Stoics categorized emotions in four ways according to temporality and preference. Pleasure (ἡδόνη) is the present preferred emotion, desire (ἐπιθυμία) is the future preferred emotion, fear (φόβος) is the future unpreferred emotion, and pain (λύπη) is the present unpreferred emotion.118 These classifications can be helpful for analyzing some emotions in the Histories, but they do not map onto Polybius’ narrative use of emotions. Instead, the Histories’ emotions function in much more diverse ways than these four basic emotions, as we shall see in Chapter 2. Epicureanism, on the other hand, treated emotions alongside desire, pleasure, and pain.119 Uncontrolled emotions could draw away from the Epicureans’ goal of freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξία). Thus, they could be detrimental to life quality.120 Epicureans divided desires into categories according to nature and necessity. Individuals logically must satisfy natural and necessary desires, whereas ancient Epicureans advocated eliminating unnatural and unnecessary ones. Emotions fell into the middle ground of natural but unnecessary desires. The sage Epicurean could indulge in them with moderation, but they were not considered essential to the Epicurean’s end goal of freedom from disturbance.121 As with Stoic classifications, the emotions in Polybius’ Histories could be analyzed through an Epicurean lens, to see if the characters feel these emotions for the right amount and reason (i.e., to vary the sage’s state of pleasure), but this does not come intrinsically to Polybius’ narrative, for Polybius evaluates one’s emotion based on its accordance with his moral standard of aristocratic behavior and Hellenic values, whereas Epicureans evaluated emotion on whether it created a change in pleasure or else disturbed one’s freedom from distress. This brief overview of the Stoics’ and Epicureans’ complex philosophies of emotion highlights the difference in focus and context from the historiographical passages discussed in this chapter from Polybius’ Histories. The philosophies focus on how one understands, moderates, and learns to control one’s own emotions. These understand and discuss emotions primarily as internal and individual processes. The emotions in the Histories – and in ancient historiography broadly – occur in social contexts and matter because of how they affect the decisions, actions, and events in these social contexts. Emotions are important in history because they occur between people rather than as internal processes.

Fundamentals of Emotion 29 However, both Polybius and the Hellenistic philosophies included emotion so that their audiences could learn about emotions and act upon them appropriately. The Hellenistic philosophies in general strove to provide their adherents with strategies to live their lives the best they could with respect to the individual school’s highest good, which includes moderating or regulating emotions in some way or another.122 Polybius aimed to teach and lead his target audience of future statesmen to successful careers in the political world as he knew it. This included recognizing – and even moderating or manipulating – emotions as well.123 Philip V, as we have seen, did not moderate his emotion of anger, whereas we saw Aratus recognize and moderate the Achaeans’ indignation, making Aratus a model for Polybius’ audience. Culture and Emotion In this final section, a social constructivist conceptualization of emotion helps elucidate the role of emotions in Polybius’ Histories and explains the connection in Polybian scholarship between emotion and irrational barbarism. Polybius attributed emotion to all kinds of subjects – civilized, Hellenic, barbarian, and even animals. How we understand these emotions and their subjects depends on the social context and cultural norms. Modern theories of emotion propose two models for understanding emotion as either universal or as culturally determined, described as naturalistic or social constructivist interpretations of emotion.124 The modern evolutionary theory of emotions or naturalistic interpretation of emotion stems from Charles Darwin’s work on emotions. Paul Ekman’s studies on facial expression of emotions best exemplifies this. This theory categorizes six basic, universal emotions each of which shares similar facial expressions around the world, regardless of culture.125 Across the cultures, participants reacted with similar facial expressions to images inducing anger, surprise, fear, disgust, happiness, and sadness in Ekman’s studies. This understanding of and perspective on emotion exemplify the naturalistic interpretation of emotion. Naturalists “focus on emotion as embodied experience and argue in favor of innate universals as opposed to cultural relativism.”126 In the ancient world, the Stoics’ theory of affects, or προπάθεια, shares similarities with this modern evolutionary theory of basic emotions (πάθη). For early Stoics, propositional thinking was necessary for the assent needed for emotion proper.127 Only adult human brains were capable of such propositional thinking. However, some Stoics thought that children and animals were capable of feeling affects (προπάθεια), such as fear. They reconciled these two factors – children’s and animals’ lack of propositional thinking with the fact that they still felt and exhibited “emotions” in ordinary language – by denying fear the status of a proper emotion, which required assent.128 The instinctual nature of προπάθεια mirrors the instinctive, universal reactions of basic emotions in naturalism. In Polybius’ Histories, animals express fear, which the modern theory of naturalism and ancient Stoicism help elucidate. Hannibal’s elephants become afraid as they cross the Rhone River on their journey to Italy.129 Polybius’ portrayal of

30  Fundamentals of Emotion the elephants’ fear can be reconciled with Stoic theory by reference to the emotion’s import: the elephants have no underlying value or rationale for their fear, as Polybius makes clear when some elephants fall into the river with no harm to themselves.130 Polybius’ narration of the elephants’ fear enables us to take a look into the applicability of Stoic philosophy in the Hellenistic world but at the same time highlights the distinction between philosophy and historiography. Polybius narrates emotion, whereas the Stoics observed, theorized, and expounded upon the same phenomenon and classified it as affect rather than emotion proper. Where Polybius described in a few sentences how elephants typically or actually (were thought to) have felt fear, philosophers interpreted and analyzed such assumptions and observations of actuality to develop theories distinguishing and justifying the place and role of emotion in human life.131 However, beyond this example of animals expressing naturalistic emotion, the question remains of whether Polybius portrayed human emotions as constructed by culture and society or as the same basic emotions felt by all.132 That is, does Polybius portray emotions as constructs exclusively belonging to one’s culture, so that “Gallic anger” differed from “Roman anger”, or do all of the characters in his Histories feel the same human repertoire of emotions? To answer these questions, we address issues brought up by Arthur Eckstein in Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius. Eckstein states that emotion typically characterizes barbarians, women, and the masses and is far from alone in this understanding of Polybius’ treatment of emotions.133 This has repercussions for our understanding of the universal or socially constructed basis of emotion. This claim can have two applications, which are not mutually exclusive – that these characters feel emotion more frequently than others or that they react more vehemently or destructively to their emotions. Let us examine the first claim, that these characters feel emotion more than others. Within the extant text of the Histories, these groups do not feel the (nonbasic) emotions of anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and pity more often than other groups, that is, aristocrats, generals, citizens, politicians, Greeks, or the civilized. In fact, the paradigms of irrationality and barbarity, the Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls, combined express these emotions less often than the representatives of civilization, the Achaeans or the Romans.134 Likewise, individuals in positions of power express emotion just as much as those of lower status.135 Polybius seems to portray emotions as universal in that he does not characterize any emotion as a fixed trait of any group, despite scholarly assumptions that barbarians and other non-aristocratic elite group express emotions more.136 Emotion by itself thus does not conform to traditional Polybian categories of identity. Barbarians, women, and the non-elite do not express emotion more frequently than those who exemplify Hellenic values and the aristocratic ethos. Moreover, the occurrent rather than dispositional portrayal of emotion may suggest something about Polybius’ way of thinking about emotions in that they happen rather than describe one’s inherent nature. In English, the phrases “the angry man” and “the man who is angry” have slightly different connotations: the first can apply to the man’s disposition as a habitually angry person. The latter, “the man who is

Fundamentals of Emotion  31 angry”, applies to the moment: the man is angry now, at this particular time. So too, Polybius’ use of emotional nouns and verbs, as discussed earlier in the case of Philip V, applies emotions to situations rather than serves as description of an inherent identity. However, there is much evidence to support the second application to Eckstein’s claim, that certain characters react poorly to their emotions. This difference is best explained by a social constructivist interpretation of emotion, that “what people feel is conditioned by socialization into culture and by participation in social structures.”137 There are three core components of a social constructivist interpretation of emotion. First, the import of emotion is formed from culture. Put another way, “emotions are characterized by cultural appraisals and moral attitudes about how the world should be.”138 For example, Philip V’s import for his anger against the Aetolians was his valuation of Dodona and Dium as sacred spaces which should not be violated. He felt emotion because there was a disjuncture with the way he viewed how the world should be, that is, with those sanctuaries exempt from the direct actions of war. This view and import, or moral backing for his emotion, is grounded in Philip’s culture. Second, social constructivist accounts of emotion stress that emotion is learnt, not innate. Philip learned that Dium was a sacred site as part of his socialization in Macedonian culture, reinforced by shared memories and participation in rituals and activities which further strengthened collective identity. Third, emotions have purpose. Certain behaviors and actions result from emotions, seen in Philip’s (appropriate but disproportionate and misdirected) response in angrily destroying sacred property at Thermum. Social constructivist interpretations of emotion clearly clash with naturalistic interpretations of emotion. Within social constructivist interpretations, some on the extreme side of this perspective argue that emotion does not exist at all if not in a social context. However, naturalism and social constructivism are not mutually exclusive, and many see emotions in a spectrum between purely social and universal.139 Polybius seems to portray emotions in this spectrum, though he does not articulate this. His portrayal of elephants’ fear seems naturalistic while Philip’s anger clearly occurs in a social context and is socially conditioned. Some complicated emotional passages demonstrate social constructivism at work in Polybius’ Histories and help elucidate cultural differences in emotional responses which Eckstein identified between types of characters. The Epirotes and Philip V became indignant with the Aetolians, who had attacked the Messenians despite being officially at peace and in alliance with them.140 Polybius says of the Epirotes, [T]hey immediately felt indignation at what the Aetolians did (παραυτίκα μὲν ἠγανάκτησαν), but they were not very surprised at it because it was nothing out of the ordinary (οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον), since they were used to the fact that the Aetolians did this kind of thing (τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς).141

32  Fundamentals of Emotion For this reason, they were not too angry (διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον), and so they decided to remain at peace with the Aetolians.142 This implies that normally humans would be surprised and act upon their indignation at the Aetolians for such behavior. The Epirotes’ culture shaped both their emotions and reactions. Because of their proximity and frequent contact with the Aetolians, the Epirotes’ anger is diminished, as compared to Philip V, who with his allies the Achaean League goes to war against the Aetolians. Exceptionally, the Epirotes do not act purely because of cultural factors: the Aetolians’ habitual injustice has changed the Epirotes’ natural urge to act upon indignation. The Epirotes’ failure to act upon their natural indignation reflects poorly on both the Aetolians and the Epirotes. The Aetolians behave contrary to established and accepted norms for behavior, norms which Polybius promotes throughout the text, and have worn down their neighbors’ natural inclination to reject and censure such behavior.143 Although the Epirotes felt indignation, their cultural norms shape their (lack of) reaction to it. In addition to acculturating the Epirotes’ emotional responses, the Aetolians represent a stark case of how culture and socialization determine their emotion, for Polybius claims that they are not only unique in their uninhibited urge to plunder but mock others who call them to account for such behavior.144 In a later passage, the Aetolians quickly grow indignant (οὐδένα χρόνον διαλιπόντες δυσηρέστουν) at their leader for having made a successful peace treaty, thus eliminating their source of plunder.145 Aetolian cultural standards underlie their indignation, which normally would not be felt by the Aetolians but by their victims. Culture changes the import for the Aetolian indignation, but the expressed emotion of indignation itself is not ostensibly different from that expressed by the Epirotes. The Aetolians, who often represent the foil to what Polybius considered traditional Hellenic values and behavior, grow indignant because the import – what they valued and thought right, plundering – was threatened.146 The Aetolians’ idiosyncratic emotional culture is highlighted because of the assumption of shared values and culture prevalent in Polybius’ theorizing passages, which attest to his belief in common human behavior and emotion. Polybius often explains an emotion or judgment (often both) through a generalizing “anyone” (τις).147 Whenever Polybius expounds in depth on general human behavior, including emotion, he writes on a universal level. At the beginning of his Book Six, Polybius lays out his theory of how humans first form a community and how a state in nature would change governmental forms.148 This, alongside his other explanatory passages on emotions, assumes that all people naturally behave in the same way regardless of culture. When external factors, such as climate, geography, and culture influence people, their progress and state forms differ, and presumably the import for and reaction to emotions and result differ too.149 Moreover, Polybius wrote for an audience of Greeks and Romans, and more specifically, for Greek and Roman elite statesmen.150 Whenever he uses generalizing terminology, such as his generalizing τις-statements or passive periphrastic constructions (“one must”), he may conceivably refer only to this inclusive target audience. However, we can never distinguish this intent on Polybius’ part from the text itself without making large assumptions.151 For example, Polybius does

Fundamentals of Emotion  33 not – and perhaps cannot – distinguish in ancient Greek how the Aetolians felt indignation differently from the indignation of Antiochus III’s court against Hermeias or from the Achaeans’ or Roman indignation.152 Polybius’ universal theorizing, such as the rise and development of human community, cannot only refer to his male, aristocratic target audience, for in passages such as these, he often describes the typical, universal behavior of children, parents, rulers, the ruled, and aristocrats. Polybius gives an interesting depiction of how personal socialization affects emotion, even within a culture. At the end of the Second Punic War, Hannibal pulls down a speaker who was arguing to the council for the Carthaginians to continue the war after the battle of Zama.153 The Carthaginian senators grow angry with Hannibal, who then explains his actions and apologizes for his incompetence in cultural norms at home since he lived most of his life abroad and at war. The Carthaginian senators grew angry precisely on the basis of cultural standards. However, Hannibal as a Carthaginian should have shared such cultural standards. He did not because he lived a different lifestyle, away from his own native culture and home. Hannibal’s misunderstanding stemmed not from a disjuncture in the emotion of anger itself or because he was not Carthaginian but from the cultural import in terms of his life path. Hannibal’s cultural disjuncture with his own people highlights the degree to which Polybius did not subscribe to blanket cultural stereotypes or to a purely naturalistic view of emotion. Lifestyle and behavior – or social context – influenced the Carthaginians’ anger and Hannibal’s mistake rather than inborn, national tendencies. Moreover, Hannibal successfully explained his behavior and mitigated the Carthaginians’ anger, demonstrating his excellence in emotional intelligence.154 Like Polybius’ political theory of the universal development and degeneration of human communities, so too the emotional behavior of humans forms a universally applicable foundation, which variables such as culture, environment, and other influences can affect.155 While all kinds of characters in the Histories felt emotions with similar types of motivation, expression, and resulting action, culture and social interaction shaped the subjects’ emotions. Characters’ emotions are evaluated based on why they feel the emotion, how they exhibit it, and how they react to it. Thus, the stereotypical “barbarian” peoples may feel anger similarly to the representatives of civilization, but they display barbaric behavior when they express emotion inappropriately, misdirect their response, or respond disproportionately. Conclusion In this chapter, we identified features of emotion, providing a critical vocabulary through which we analyzed key passages from the Histories, such as Philip V’s first sack of Thermum. From an analysis of emotional features, we saw that Polybius established parameters for judging characters by reference to the appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of their emotion. Using the specific terminology of emotion in the modern social sciences provides direction to the study of ancient emotions, particularly in ancient historiography, whose portrayal of emotion both had to be plausible and represents a choice by the historian.

34  Fundamentals of Emotion Historiography provides a broad social context for investigating and understanding emotions. Social contextualization elucidates the motivations, results, and direction of emotions, and the historian may direct his reader’s attention to the import, proportionality, and appropriateness, as Polybius did with Philip V’s anger at Thermum or the Achaeans’ indignation with Aratus. Emotions work within their context, highlighting their social embeddedness in the culture they exhibit, as framed by the historian. It is important to note on whose behalf an emotion is felt, whether personal or other-oriented. The culturally specific import of the Aetolians’ indignation, the Epirotes’ acculturated response to their own indignation of the Aetolians and resulting inaction, and Hannibal’s cultural divide within his own native city show the importance of social context and cultural norms for understanding emotion. The terms and issues discussed in this chapter open the way to evaluating how Polybius’ portrayal of individual emotions relates to his historiographical predecessors’ use of emotions and how closely his portrayals match Aristotle’s standard list and description of emotions in the Rhetoric. Notes 1 Polyb., 8.15–21, 36. See Hau 2016, 50–53, on Polybius’ moral lessons of Achaeus’ reversal and Antiochus’ reaction. 2 For recent introductions to ancient emotions, see Cairns 2008, 2019; Cairns and Nelis 2017. 3 Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1, 2000, xiii states “It is easier to express emotion than to describe them and harder, again, to analyze them.” See also Cowie 2009; Deigh 2009; de Sousa 2009 on defining emotion. 4 Cairns 2019, 3. 5 Cairns 2019, 4. 6 Helm 2009, 1–15 and de Sousa 2014 (Section 3). 7 Even in Polybius’ text, subjects can feel emotion against or toward inanimate or nonhuman objects. See 3.112.2, 3.46.11, 15.12.4, and 18.37.7. 8 Polyb., 4.14.2. 9 Objects frequently stimulate emotion in the subjects, with the result that the objects seem to cause the emotion and so seem to have more agency in the situation. However, the emotion’s subjects and objects do not necessarily correspond with grammatical or active subjects and objects. 10 See Goldie 2000, 16–27; de Sousa 2014, Section 3; Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 4 on limiting emotions to feelings with intentionality. 11 The affects of shock (κατάπληξις/ἔκπληξις), confidence (θάρσος), and hope (ἐλπίς) which dominate the military narrative in Polybius seem generally to indicate a disposition (or more succinctly a mood) rather than occurrent emotions. See for the occurrences and uses of shock, Mauersberger 2.1.375, 1.3.1323–1327, 1.2.732–734, 1.2.946–947. See for useful examples of shock, 1.3.1136–1137, 1.3.1156–1157. See Chapter 2, 72–74 on ἐλπίς. 12 Polyb., 4.14.7–8. 13 Their original motivations for their emotions were still correct; the justifications used for evaluating the emotion changed. 14 See Greenspan 2000, 475–479; Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1–15. 15 Polyb., 4.14.1–2.

Fundamentals of Emotion  35 16 See Helm 2001, 60–122 for this terminology. Ben-Ze’ev 2000, on the other hand, prefers the terminology of “concern” while Helm 2009, 4 adds “focus” as a definition for import. Nussbaum 2001, 27–28 calls this “aboutness”. 17 Polyb., 4.14.2–6. 18 The Achaeans’ value of life, victory, and honor make up the implicit import behind their indignation against Aratus, the object, but Polybius lists Aratus’ political failures as the explicit import. Historical causes are closely related to import, for causes represent an agent’s reason to act, just as import represents the subject’s reason to feel. 19 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 6–7, 76–89, 96–102 for an introduction to these aspects. 20 Polyb., 5.6–12. 21 Polyb., 5.6–8. See Walbank, HCP 1.546–549 on Philip at Thermum and Soteriadis 1900, 1903, 1905 on archaeological signs of destruction at Thermum. 22 Polyb., 5.9.1. 23 Polyb., 5.9.2–3. 24 Polyb., 5.9.6. 25 The import explains why a character felt an emotion; the motivating event explains when and under what circumstances the subject felt an emotion. See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 98–102. This distinction is particularly important when considering Polybius’ emphasis on historical causation and distinction between causes (αἰτίαι) (and pretexts (προφάσεις)) and beginnings (ἀρχαί), 3.6–7. 26 See D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 65–90; Deigh 2009, 1–15. 27 Cf. Polyb., 11.28, where Scipio Africanus argues away the causes for the mutineers’ indignation. 28 Polyb., 5.12.1. Cf. 5.9.1 and 11.28. 29 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 67, 76–89. See D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Prinz 2007 for varying accounts of emotion’s relation with morality. 30 Polyb., 5.9.7. 31 Polyb., 5.9.1. 32 Orators in the Histories make this interconnection between misdirection and disproportionality the foundation of their arguments. See Erskine 2015 for an analysis of this strategy. See Walbank 1965; Wooten 1974 on the rhetoric of the speeches in Polybius. 33 Polyb., 5.11.1. 34 See Mauersberger 1.1.239 for ἀσέλγεια as a lack of inhibition in this passage and largely emphasizing lack of control, restraint, and propriety in Polybius generally. See Mauersberger 2.1.95–96 on Polybius’ use of παρανομία. 35 Polyb., 5.11.1–2. 36 Polyb., 5.9.6 specifies that Philip had no moral issue with his behavior, which implies that such a Realist strategy was an accepted view at the time. See Eckstein 2006 on the prevailing Realist atmosphere in the Hellenistic period. 37 Polyb., 5.11.3. Cf. Plat., Rep. 5.470a–5.471a. See Walbank, HCP 1.549. 38 Polyb., 5.11.4. Dorimachus’ actions at Dodona in 4.67.1–4 also fall into this category: they go beyond what Polybius determined necessary in war. Cf. Polyb., 9.10. 39 Polyb., 5.11.5. Cf. Seneca’s Stoic purpose of correction in De Ira. See too Cic., De Off. 1.35, Graver 2002. See Irwin 1998; Brennan 2003, 2005; Inwood 2003; Baltzly 2018 (Section 5) on Stoic moral ethics. 40 Polybius’ stringent distinctions between civilian and military targets find parallels with modern just war theory. See Walzer 2015, 127–224; Lazar 2016, Parts 4.1–4.3. 41 Polyb., 5.11.7–9. It is remarkable that Polybius argues – optimistically – that the Aetolians would think like this, reflecting and changing their view. Polybius, in his imagined scenario, attributes to them three important factors – that they recognized their own faults at Dium and Dodona, that they would have recognized the correct direction of

36  Fundamentals of Emotion Philip’s anger toward them but also his restraint, and that they would have fundamentally changed their opinion of Philip because of this. In short, Polybius assumes the Aetolians would have seen and respected the same ethical logic as himself. Polybius’ own account of the Aetolians’ behavior and their set of values contradicts this view. Within this scenario, they celebrated Scopas’ destruction at Dium as the work of a noble hero, 4.62.4. The Aetolians are one of the last peoples to whom one would expect Polybius to attribute rational reflection and recognition of his ethical standards; see Champion 2011. This paradox – rational and reflecting Aetolians – either marks an inconsistency in his thought or strengthens Polybius’ point – even the Aetolians could have recognized Philip’s restraint, and so his real actions reflect even more poorly on himself for failing to see this. Polybius’ argument about what the Aetolians “clearly” (δῆλον) would have thought demonstrates that Polybius assumed that all people were capable of such rational reflection and disposed to reach his ethical and rational conclusion. 42 Polyb., 5.12.1. 43 Out of 274 total occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, Polybius uses verbal forms 50.7% of the time, nouns 46.7% of the time, and adjectives and adverbs 2.6% of the time. All seven occurrences of adjectives or adverbs are forms of pity. Compare these statistics to forms of fear, which occur slightly less (223 times) than the combined total of the above emotions (274). Of this emotion, Polybius uses a verb 45.9% of the time, nouns 46.5% of the time, and adjectives or adverbs 7.6% of the time. Although there are more fear-related adjectives, nouns and verbs dominate Polybius’ emotional vocabulary. 44 See Slaby 2014, 32–46, for modern theory on the interactive (and thus occurrent) nature of emotion. 45 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 104–109 on this distinction. 46 Polyb., 3.9.6–3.10.6. See Chapter 4, 158–160. 47 Polyb., 5.12.1, 5.15.9, 11.7.3, 16.1.2, 16.1.4, 16.28.8, 18.36.4, 22.13.2. 48 Polyb., 5.13. See too McGing 2013. 49 For a discussion of the temporality of emotion in modern studies, see von Scheve 2013. 50 This has different terminology in modern studies. Deonna and Teroni 2012, 18, for example, call these non-reflexive and reflexive. 51 Polyb., 5.49.3. 52 Polyb., 8.36.9. 53 The previous example of Philip V’s anger at Thermum complicates personal emotions. He expresses anger on behalf of Dodona and Dium, which could make his anger otheroriented. However, since he identifies with these sites as a Macedonian, the harm done to these sites signifies harm done to Philip himself, making this a personal emotion. 54 Altruistic emotions do not feature in Polybius’ text, and Polybius narrates how emotions are often inherently personal, even when they seem to be directed wholly on another’s behalf, 9.10.9. See too 4.6, 8.36, 15.17.1–2, discussed in Chapter 2, 82. See Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 3 for the nonexistence of altruistic emotion; see for existence, Konstan 2006, 85; Tappolet 2009. 55 The process of reflection happens almost instantaneously. Greenspan 1988; Damasio 1994 discuss the temporality of emotional processes. See Stueber 2017 for a modern overview of empathy. 56 Both these imports tie into values Polybius expresses and promotes in other, digressive passages, aligning with Polybius’ aristocratic ethos, Eckstein 1995, 28–55. 57 Polyb., 8.20. 58 Polyb., 8.20.9–10. 59 Hdt., 1.29–33 and 1.86–87. Cf. Scipio Aemilianus’ tears at the fall of Carthage: Polyb., 38.20–22 (from App., Pun. 132). 60 This characterization of Antiochus as a thoughtful and reflective king does not persist throughout the Histories. Polybius treats Antiochus III and Philip V fairly even-handedly

Fundamentals of Emotion  37 throughout the Histories, praising and chastising them as their behavior dictates. See McGing 2013. 61 See de Sousa 2014 (Section 4). 62 Polyb., 8.36.9. 63 Polyb., 9.10.1–12. 64 Polyb., 9.10.7. Cf. Polybius’ reception of Philip V at Thermum, discussed earlier. 65 Polyb., 9.10.9–10. 66 Examples of multidimensionality with select emotions (ὀργή, μῖσος, αἰσχύνη, δυσαρέστησις, προσκοπή, τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, φθόνος, ἔλεος, and θυμός): 8 emotions: 9.10; 7 emotions: 6.6; 6 emotions: 15.25; 5 emotions: 6.7, 15.17, 21.31, 30.29; 4 emotions: 6.9, 11.28, 30.31; 3 emotions: 1.57, 2.56, 27.7, 38.1; 2 emotions: 1.31, 1.82, 2.8, 3.7, 3.31, 4.4, 5.11, 8.8, 8.36, 2.59, 7.5, 4.14, 15.30, 23.15, 24.7, 38.16. 67 Compare Ekman’s classification of basic emotions by facial expression, 1994, to Greenspan’s rationally based emotion, 1988. See Deonna and Teroni 2012; de Sousa 2014 (Section 2–6) for introduction and bibliography. 68 Likewise, moods, dispositions, and other cognitive states differ structurally from emotions in English. Limiting my discussion to emotion, as circumscribed by intentionality and the rest of the features discussed, allows coherent and meaningful discussion of Polybius’ use of terminology which naturally falls into this category of emotion. See de Sousa 2014 (Section 1) for an overview of this topic and bibliography. 69 Goldie 2000, 141–175; Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 8–9; de Sousa 2014 (Section 3). 70 See Damasio 1994 on the distinctive cognitive connections of emotion in neuroscience. I address a few terms from the Histories such as πρᾳότης, χάρις, and ἐλπίς which fall between these categories in Chapter 2, 72–74. 71 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 28–39 on these differences and de Sousa 2014 (Section 10) on the Stoic foundation for the convergence of belief and emotion. 72 See Chapter 3, 111–113, for an analysis involving desires and emotions. 73 See Helm 2009, especially 2–3, on this distinction. 74 See Arist., Rhet. 2.1378a.19–29. Fitzgerald 2008, 1–26. 75 Polyb., 3.53.2, 3.86.6, 10.4.7, 11.29.9, 34.3.10, 38.1.4. Cf. Polybius’ widespread usage of παθεῖν, “to experience”. For Polybius’ broad use of these terms, see Mauersberger 2.1.187–189. 76 Polyb., 34.3.10, 11.29.9. 77 Polyb., 3.53.2, 3.86.6, 38.1.4. Cf. Thuc., 4.30.1, 4.51.1, 7.30.3, 7.33.3. 78 Fitzgerald 2008, 1–26, discusses these works in Hellenistic and Imperial Greek thought. Although Hellenistic philosophy diverges from Classical philosophy in its focus on common or popular issues, particularly in a therapeutic manner, philosophy in the Hellenistic period continued to diverge from commonplace or popular conceptions of emotion. See especially Annas 1992, 1993; Nussbaum 1994 for analyses of Hellenistic philosophical thought on the emotions and their therapeutic functions. I am not claiming that historiography does indeed reflect everyday concepts and vocabulary completely accurately; after all, history was literature by and for elite men. I argue that historiography portrays everyday popular concepts and vocabulary perhaps more realistically than philosophy. 79 Polyb., 10.4. See Walbank, HCP 2.199–200 on the historical inaccuracy of Polybius’ anecdote. Cf. Liv., 25.2.6–8. 80 Polyb., 10.4.7. 81 See Harris 2001, 264–282; Munteanu 2011 for discussions on women and emotion in the ancient world. 82 Polyb., 10.4.4; the Roman People’s religiosity: Polyb., 10.5.5–8. Cf. 6.56.6–15, where Polybius approves religion as of utmost importance for the coherence of the Roman state. See Champion 2017 for a recent analysis of the Romans’ religiosity in the Republic. 83 Polyb., 6.56.9–12, 10.5.6–7.

38  Fundamentals of Emotion 84 Eckstein 1995, 150–157 (women), 129–140 (masses). 85 Cf. Thucydides’ use of πάθος, which refers to disasters: Thuc., 4.30.1, 4.51.1, 7.30.3, 7.33.3. 86 See Liddell 1996, 810. On Homer’s usage, see Cunliffe 2012, 192–193. See Powell 1977, 169, who identifies Herodotus’ usages of this term as the heart, courage, desire, or anger. 87 See Koziak 2000 for a history of θυμός in Archaic and Classical Greek. See too Lynch and Miles 1980; Koziak 2000; Harris 2001; Braund and Most 2003; Faraone 2003; Armstrong 2008; Ludwig 2009; Kalimtzis 2012; Lebow 2015. 88 See Lorenz 2006 on the soul’s divisions and Carone 2007; Warren 2014 on Plato on passions. 89 See Koziak 2000, 81–99, for Aristotle on θυμός. See too Cooper 1999a; Sokolon 2006. 90 Mauersberger, 1.3.1160–1161. 91 Θυμός does not appear even in Konstan’s index. See Eckstein 1989, esp. 7, 11–12. Erskine 2015 too treats θυμός as emotion and synonymous with ὀργή. 92 Champion 2004. What follows is necessarily a simplification of Champion’s analysis. I use “thumos” to refer to Champion’s use of this term rather than to refer to an occurrence of the term in Polybius’ text. 93 Champion 2004 provides an appendix on ochlocracy and the language of barbarology, but this does not include θυμός in the list of negative traits, 241–244. 94 Polyb., 2.35.3. Champion 2004, 117, 139. 95 Polyb., 6.56.11. Champion 2004, 89, 118, 121, 185, 202, 232. 96 Champion 2004, 89 takes this statement out of context by claiming “every multitude is for Polybius full of lawless desires, unreasoned passions, and violent anger,” citing this passage. 97 See Koziak 2000; Lynch and Miles 1980. 98 Polybius describes the action which θυμός motivates as often as the motivation for θυμός. For the motivation of θυμός, see Polyb., 3.29.1, 4.7.8, 5.10.3, 5.16.4, 15.4.11. 99 Polyb., 2.21.2, 2.30.4, 2.35.3, 3.15.9, 3.81.9, 5.11.4, 6.7.3, 6.56.11, 8.8.1, 16.1.2. Polybius directly contrasts using θυμός with using reason several times, Polyb., 2.35.3, 6.7.3, 8.8.1. 100 Polyb., 6.44.9, 6.56.11. Champion 2004, 89–91, 121. 101 See for unexpectedness: Polyb., 2.30.4, 5.11.4, 5.76.3, 20.6.11. See for impulsiveness: 2.19.10, 2.21.2, 2.30.4, 3.82.2, 5.16.4, 5.76.3, 18.37.7, 20.6.11. 102 Polyb., 3.10.5, 6.56.11, 6.57.8, 11.7.2, 16.1.2, 16.28.8. See Erskine 2015 for a discussion of similarities and differences, although he concludes that they are nearly synonymous. 103 Polyb., 6.56.11, 11.7.2–3, 16.1.2, 16.28.8, 38.18.10. 104 Polyb., 16.28.8. 105 Polyb., 11.7.2–3. 106 Polyb., 16.1.2. 107 Polyb., 3.9.6–7. 108 Polyb., 3.34.7 (Hannibal), 15.4.11 (Scipio Africanus); see too 18.37.7 (Flamininus spoke θυμικώτερον). Each of these examples features a strong, favorably portrayed general. Other passages lack direct, negative outcomes, but these do not necessitate that θυμός is rational: Polyb., 4.7.8, 15.4.11, 18.37.7, 20.6.11. 109 Cf. for similar, positive connotations, Hdt., 5.56.1; Thuc., 1.49.3, 2.11.8, 5.80.2. See Polyb., 2.21.2, 2.33.2, 2.35.3, 3.9.6, 3.15.9, 15.33.10, 20.11.5 (as a false characterization) for examples of θυμός as characterization. 110 Nussbaum 1994. The Hellenistic philosophies responded to Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of emotion. See Fitzgerald 2008, 29–47, on the history of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy and a list of known (but lost) works on the passions. See Fortenbaugh 2008, for Aristotle’s effect on Hellenistic philosophy of emotion. For the history

Fundamentals of Emotion  39 of emotion generally, see Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Knuuttila 2004. I do not address Cynics’ and Skeptics’ (lack of) theory of emotion; see Bett 1998; Aune 2008; see Thom 2008 on Neopythagorean emotion. Plato’s views on emotion are less systematic than Aristotle’s; see the Philebus for fullest discussion. Aristotle’s fullest discussion of emotion comes in Book 2 of his Rhetoric. 111 Lorenz 2006. 112 Polyb., 1.87.1, 2.23.7, 3.116.13, 4.54.3, 5.74.3, 9.21.1, 14.6.8, 18.41.4. 113 See especially Graver 2007; Baltzly 2018 (Section 5). 114 Brennan 1998; Cooper 1999c; Knuuttila 2004. 115 See Cooper 1999c; Knuuttila 2004 on Stoic theory of this emotional process. 116 See von Scala 1890, 201–255, 325–333 on Polybius’ links with Stoicism; see contra, Walbank 1972, 94. 117 See, for example, Polyb., 20.10.7. The historian closely parallels a Stoic sage, who should be free from emotional attachment, 2.7.1–3. To narrate events clearly and with retrospective understanding, a historian must have completed any emotional response to the events to present and make compelling to readers. See Sacks 1981; Moore 2017 on Polybius’ portrayal of the didactic historian. 118 Brennan 1998; Knuuttila 2004; Gill 2009. 119 See Annas 1989; Procopé 1998; Cooper 1999b; Konstan 2014 on Epicurean beliefs of emotion. See too Warren 2009; O’Keefe 2010; Konstan 2014. 120 In general, Epicureans did not dissect internal emotional functions like the Stoics, but they evaluated emotion by how it affects their pleasure and pain. 121 See Procopé 1998; Cooper 1999b on this aspect of Epicureanism. 122 Annas 1992; Nussbaum 1994. See Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism for ancient criticism of the failures of Stoicism and Epicureanism to provide this adequately. 123 See, for example, Polyb., 3.31. 124 See de Sousa 2014; Koschut 2020 for introduction. 125 On evolutionary theory of emotions, see Ekman and Davidson 1994, especially Ekman 1994; Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 104–112; de Sousa 2014 (Section 4). Ekman’s codification of universal emotions has been criticized, especially for reduction to emotion terms in English. Konstan 2006, 1–40, especially 7–16, as well as Fierke 2015, 46, complicates Ekman’s universalism. See Wierzbicka 1999 on the importance of language in understanding emotion. 126 Koschut 2020, 6. 127 Ancient Stoicism developed over centuries. Understandably, not all Stoics would have agreed with this detail, for example, Seneca. When referring to Stoics, I try to limit my discussion to the fragments of Stoics earlier than or contemporary with Polybius. For Stoic fragments on emotion, see von Arnim 1903, especially 3.110–134. 128 For this type of Stoic distinction, see Brennan 1998; Armstrong 2008; Gill 2009. 129 Polyb., 3.46.11. See too 15.12.4, where elephants flee the battle because of fear. See Konstan 2006, 22, 26, 129 on Aristotle’s willingness to attribute fear as an emotion to animals due to its basic nature. On animal emotions, see Nussbaum 2001, 89–138. 130 Polyb., 3.46.11–12. The elephants’ fear could have been based in a concern that they would come to harm, but Polybius’ straightforward narrative seems to dismiss this rationale for the elephants. 131 Polybius does not generally extrapolate human behavior from animal behavior. However, see 6.5. 132 See de Sousa 2014 (Sections 7–8) on the major theories. See Fierke 2015, 46–49, for an exceptional summarization and reconciliation of these views, which informs my approach. 133 Eckstein 1995, 119. On barbarian emotion, 123–124, on the masses’ emotions, 131– 132, on emotions of women, 152.

40  Fundamentals of Emotion 134 Aetolian, Illyrian, and Gallic emotion – 17 occurrences, Achaean – 23, Roman – 44. Champion 2004 draws out the complexity of the Romans’ portrayal within a spectrum between barbarian and Greek, but the Romans are often contrasted with the Illyrians, Celts, and Aetolians throughout the narrative. 135 Because of how rarely women appear in the Histories, it is difficult to compare their emotion to men’s. Out of 274 occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, women express emotion directly in only two passages: 2.8.12 (Teuta is angered), and 15.30.1 with both anger and hatred. However, the people, whether τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, ὁ δῆμος, or πάντες, do feel emotion rather often, 33 times of the stated 274 occurrences. See Walbank 1995, for the uses of terms for the people. 136 If any one group were identified as emotional, it would be the Romans. 137 Koschut 2020, 7. The following discussion draws on Koschut 2020. 138 Koschut 2020, 7. 139 See Fierke 2015. 140 Polyb., 4.16.1–2. Here I refer to the Epirotes for the sake of simplicity, but Philip V is included. 141 Polyb., 4.16.2. 142 Polyb., 4.16.3. 143 On the Aetolians, see Champion 2004, 129–135, 140–143, 2011. 144 Polyb., 4.16.4. 145 Polyb., 5.107.6. 146 See Champion 2011 on Aetolians as a foil for Hellenic values. 147 Polyb., 1.14.4 (twice), 2.7.3, 3.26.6, 38.1 (twice). See Chapter 5, 205–209. 148 Polyb., 6.4–9. 149 People feeling emotions react differently based on culture, but the script or expression of emotion remains the same. See Kaster 2005, 3–12, on scripts and their potential to elucidate emotion. 150 See Eckstein 1995, 1–16; Champion 2004, 1–12 on Polybius’ audience. 151 See Skinner 1988a, 1988b on assumptions about authorial intentions. 152 Polyb., 5.107.6, 5.56.4, 4.76.5, 9.28. 153 Polyb., 15.19.3. 154 Hannibal utilizes skills which modern studies on emotional intelligence promote – awareness and active engagement in negotiating emotions. See Salovey and Mayer 1990; Goleman 1995. Scipio Africanus also demonstrates excellent emotional intelligence; see, for example, 10.18, 11.28. 155 Polyb., 6.9.3, 6.10.2–5. See too Fierke 2015.

References Annas, Julia. 1989. “Epicurean Emotions.” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies. 30.2.145–164. ———. 1992. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. University of California Press. ———. 1993. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford University Press. Armstrong, D. 2008. “ ‘Be Angry and Fear Not’: Philodemus Versus the Stoics on Natural Bites and Natural Emotions.” In Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Ed. J.T. Fitzgerald. Routledge. 79–121. Aune, David E. 2008. “The Problems of the Passions in Cynicism.” In Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Ed. John T. Fitzgerald. Routledge. 48–66. Baltzly, Dirk. 2018. “Stoicism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/stoicism/. Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron. 2000. The Subtlety of Emotion. MIT Press.

Fundamentals of Emotion 41 ———. 2009. “The Thing Called Emotion.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Bett, Richard. 1998. “The Sceptics and the Emotions.” In The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Kluwer Academic Press. 198–218. Braund, Susanna Morton, and Most, Glenn W. 2003. “Introduction.” In Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen. Ed. Susanna Morton Braund and Glenn W. Most. Cambridge University Press. 1–10. Brennan, Tad. 1998. “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions.” In The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Kluwer Academic Press. 21–70. ———. 2003. “Stoic Moral Psychology.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge University Press. 257–295. ———. 2005. The Stoic Life. Oxford University Press. Cairns, Douglas. 2008. “Look Both Ways: Studying Emotion in Ancient Greek.” Critical Quarterly. 50.4. 43–62. ———. 2019. “Introduction: Emotion History and the Classics.” In A Cultural History of the Emotions in Antiquity. Ed. Douglas Cairns. Bloomsbury. 1–16. Cairns, Douglas, and Nelis, Damien, eds. 2017. Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions. Franz Steiner Verlag. Carone, Gabriela R. 2007. “Akrasia and the Structure of the Passions in Plato’s Timaeus.” In Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. Ed. C. Bobonich and P. Destree. Brill. 101–118. Champion, Craige. 2004. Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories. University of California Press. ———. 2011. “Polybius and Aetolia: A  Historiographic Approach.” In A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography. Ed. John Marincola. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 356–362. ———. 2017. The Peace of the Gods: Elite Religious Practices in the Middle Roman Republic. Princeton University Press. Cooper, John M. 1999a. “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions.” In Reason and Emotion. Ed. John M. Cooper. Princeton University Press. 406–423. ———. 1999b. “Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus.” In Reason and Emotion. Ed. John M. Cooper. Princeton University Press. 485–514. ———. 1999c. “Posidonius on Emotions.” In Reason and Emotion. Ed. John M. Cooper. Princeton University Press. 449–484. Cowie, Roddy. 2009. “Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring That Pervade Everyday Life.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Cunliffe, Richard John. 2012. A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect: Expanded Edition. University of Oklahoma Press. Damasio, Antonio. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotions, Reason, and the Human Brain. G.P. Putnam’s Sons. D’Arms, Justin, and Jacobson, Daniel. 2000. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 61.1. 65–90. Deigh, John. 2009. “Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Deonna, Julien A., and Teroni, Fabrice. 2012. The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.

42  Fundamentals of Emotion de Sousa, Ronald. 2009. “The Mind’s Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. ———. 2014. “Emotion.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotion/. Eckstein, Arthur M. 1989. “Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3.15 and the Power of Irrationality.” Classical Philology. 84.1. 1–15. ———. 1995. Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius. University of California Press. ———. 2006. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome. University of California Press. Ekman, Paul. 1994. “All Emotions Are Basic.” In The Nature of Emotions: Fundamental Questions. Ed. Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson. Oxford University Press. 15–19. Ekman, Paul, and Davidson, Richard J., eds. 1994. The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions. Oxford University Press. Erskine, Andrew. 2015. “Polybius and the Anger of the Romans.” In Emotions Between Greece and Rome. Ed. Douglas Cairns and Laurel Fulkerson. Institute of Classical Studies, University of London. 105–127. Faraone, Christopher A. 2003. “Thumos as Masculine Ideal and Social Pathology in Ancient Greek Magical Spells.” In Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen. Ed. Susanna Braund and Glenn W. Most. Cambridge University Press. 144–162. Fierke, K.M. 2015. “Human Dignity, Basal Emotion and a Global Emotionality.” In Emotions, Politics, and War. Ed. Linda Ahäil and Thomas Gregory. Routledge. 45–57. Fitzgerald, John T. 2008. “The Passions and Moral Progress: An Introduction.” In Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Ed. John T. Fitzgerald. Routledge. 1–26. Fortenbaugh, William W. 2008. “Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions.” In Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Ed. John T. Fitzgerald. Routledge. 29–47. Gill, Christopher. 2009. “Stoicism and Epicureanism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Goldie, Peter. 2000. The Emotions: A Philosophical Explanation. Clarendon Press. Goleman, Daniel. 1995. Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ. Bantam Books. Graver, Margaret. 2000. “Emotional Strategies and Rationality.” Ethics. 110.3. 469–487. ———. 2002. Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4. University of Chicago Press. ———. 2007. Stoicism and Emotion. University of Chicago Press. Greenspan, Patricia. 1988. Emotions  & Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification. Routledge. Harris, William V. 2001. Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity. Harvard University Press. Hau, Lisa Irene. 2016. Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus. Edinburgh University Press. Helm, Bennett W. 2001. Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. “Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Inwood, Brad, ed. 2003. The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge University Press. Irwin, T.H. 1998. “Stoic Inhumanity.” In The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Kluwer Academic Press. 219–242.

Fundamentals of Emotion  43 Kalimtzis, Kostas. 2012. Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason. Bristol Classical Press. Kaster, Robert A. 2005. Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome. Oxford University Press. Knuuttila, Simo. 2004. Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Clarendon Press. Konstan, David. 2006. The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. University of Toronto Press. ———. 2014. “Epicurus.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/epicurus/. Koschut, Simon. 2020. “Emotion, Discourse, and Power in World Politics.” In The Power of Emotions in World Politics. Ed. Simon Koschut. Routledge. 3–28. Koziak, B. 2000. Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender. Pennsylvania State University Press. Lazar, Seth. 2016. “War.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/war/. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2015. “Thumos, War, and Peace.” Common Knowledge. 21.1. 50–82. Liddell, Henry George. 1996. A Greek-English Lexicon. Ed. Robert Scott and Henry Stuart Jones. 9th ed. Oxford University Press. Lorenz, Hendrik. 2006. The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Clarendon Press. Ludwig, Paul W. 2009. “Anger, Eros, and Other Political Passions in Ancient Greek Thought.” In A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought. Ed. Ryan K. Balot. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 294–307. Lynch, John P., and Miles, Gary B. 1980. “In Search of Thumos: Towards an Understanding of a Greek Psychological Term.” Prudentia. 12. 3–9. Mauersberger, Arno. 1956–1968. Polybios-Lexicon. Akademie-Verlag. McGing, Brian. 2013. “Youthfulness in Polybius: The Case of Philip V of Macedon.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 181–199. Moore, Daniel Walker. 2017. “Learning from Experience: Polybius and the Progress of Rome.” Classical Quarterly. 67.1. 132–148. Munteanu, Dana LaCourse, ed. 2011. Emotion, Genre, and Gender in Classical Antiquity. Bristol Classical Press. Nussbaum, Martha Craven. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton University Press. ———. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. O’Keefe, Tim. 2010. Epicureanism. Acumen. Powell, J. Enoch. 1977. A Lexicon to Herodotus. 2nd ed. Georg Olms. Prinz, Jesse J. 2007. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press. Procopé, John. 1998. “Epicureans on Anger.” In The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen. Kluwer Academic Press. 171–197. Sacks, Kenneth. 1981. Polybius on the Writing of History. University of California Press. Salovey, Peter, and Mayer, John D. 1990. “Emotional Intelligence.” Imagination, Cognition and Personality. 9.3. 185–212. Sihvola, Juha, and Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, eds. 1998. The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Press. Skinner, Quentin. 1988a. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” In ­Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Ed. James Tully. Princeton University Press. 29–67.

44  Fundamentals of Emotion ———. 1988b. “Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretations of Texts.” In Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Ed. James Tully. Princeton University Press. 68–78. Slaby, Jan. 2014. “Emotions and the Extended Mind.” In Collective Emotion. Ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela. Oxford University Press. 32–46. Sokolon, Marlene K. 2006. Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion. Northern Illinois University Press. Soteriadis, G. 1900. “Anaskaphai en Thermo.” Archaiologiki Ephimeris. 161–212. ———. 1903. “Anaskaphai en Thermo.” Archaiologiki Ephimeris. 71–96. ———. 1905. “Anaskaphai en Thermo.” Archaiologiki Ephimeris. 55–100. Stueber, Karsten. 2017. “Empathy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/empathy. Tappolet, Christine. 2009. “Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Thom, Johan C. 2008. “The Passions in Neopythagorean Writings.” In Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Ed. John T. Fitzgerald. Routledge. 67–78. Von Arnim, Hans Friedrich, ed. 1903. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 4 Vols. Teubner. Von Scala, Rudolph. 1890. Die Studien des Polybios. Verlag von W. Kohlhammer. Von Scheve, Christian. 2013. Emotion and Social Structures: The Affective Foundations of the Social Order. Routledge. Walbank, Frank W. 1957–1979. A Historical Commentary on Polybius (HCP). Vol. 1–3. Clarendon Press. ———. 1965. Speeches in Greek Historians. Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 1985. Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography. Cambridge University Press. 242–261. ———. 1972. Polybius. University of California Press. ———, ed. 1985. Selected Papers: Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography. Cambridge University Press. ———. 1995. “Polybius’ Perception of the One and the Many.” In Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz. Ed. I. Malkin and Z.W. Rubinsohn. Brill. 201–222. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 212–230. ———. 2002. Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. Walzer, Michael. 2015. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 5th ed. Basic Books. Warren, James, ed. 2009. The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism. Cambridge University Press. ———. 2014. The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists. Cambridge University Press. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1999. Emotion Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals. Cambridge University Press. Wooten, Cecil. 1974. “The Speeches in Polybius: An Insight into the Nature of Hellenistic Oratory.” The American Journal of Philology. 95.3. 235–251.

2

Individual Emotions in Context Polybius, Aristotle, and the Classical Historians

This chapter seeks to address four related questions. First, what emotions appear in Polybius’ Histories? How does each of these emotions function within the text, and how are they distinguished from one another? Lastly, are Polybius’ emotions unique? To answer these questions, this chapter surveys the emotion terminology in Polybius’ Histories.1 Emotions can be analyzed in three main ways according to Simon Koschut in The Power of Emotion in World Politics – through emotion terms, emotional connotations, or emotion metaphors, comparisons, and analogies.2 Studying emotion cross-culturally raises issues for each method. The first method is a lexical approach, focusing on direct references to emotion and relies on authors specifying and identifying emotions directly. The second method of identifying and analyzing emotional connotations contain “a context-invariant value judgment or opinion that conveys the emotional attitude of the speaker.”3 Koschut provides the modern terms “genocide”, “terrorism”, or “massacre” as opposed to the terms “freedom fighter” or “patriot” as examples of this kind of emotion-laden terminology. These terms are not emotions themselves but are used to convey and evoke certain emotive responses in the audience. The third category, emotion metaphors, comparisons, and analogies, likewise entails analysis of speech acts meant to illustrate the speaker or author’s emotional state. The second and third methodologies rely on analysis of deeply embedded cultural meaning which is difficult to recognize fully from a perspective outside of the culture. For this reason, this study remains grounded in the direct language of Polybius’ Histories to provide a clear foundation for analysis of how emotions work in ancient historiography. This chapter examines the processes of each emotion term to identify patterns in the functions of each emotion, dispel stereotypes about emotions, and illuminate passages in the Histories through understanding of the emotions themselves. This chapter is divided into categories of emotions based on their social functions. Like other ancient historians, Polybius had little interest in identifying, classifying, or theorizing emotions as such, which is precisely why his text – and other historical texts – are fruitful for studying the normative or standard usages of emotion. Polybius’ claims against other “emotional” historians such as Phylarchus call for analysis of how Polybius did use emotion and what the “correct” portrayal would be. Therefore, the four categories in this chapter group emotions by their DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-3

46  Individual Emotions in Context shared functions within Polybius’ Histories: emotions expressing disapproval, emotions of anticipation which are future-oriented, emotions expressing or indicating positive affect, and reflective emotions which involve a sense of fellow-feeling.4 Contextualization of Polybius’ use of emotions with the usages of the extant Classical historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in his Hellenika and Anabasis provides a basis to evaluate the idiosyncrasy of Polybius’ use of emotion. Polybius holds a unique place in Greek historiography as the largest extant historian after the foundational Classical historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Thucydides’ continuator Xenophon, but he also follows many important lost histories of the late Classical period, such as Theopompus and Ephorus, and early Hellenistic period, such as Phylarchus and Timaeus.5 Polybius continued to portray many emotions similarly to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, which highlights that this genre was grounded in a recognizable reality within systems of social interaction. However, Polybius both developed usages beyond these historians and innovated in his use of a broader array of emotive terminology. To ground Polybius’ use of emotion terminology in the broader context of ancient Greek emotions, this chapter also discusses how Polybius’ use of emotions compares to Aristotle’s discussion of emotions in Book Two of the Rhetoric. David Konstan in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks discusses the list of emotions Aristotle provides and examines the applicability of Aristotle’s definitions with Classical usages of these emotion terms.6 Polybius, as a historian, provides no definition or list of emotions. The emotions which occur in Polybius’s Histories differ from Aristotle’s and Konstan’s and include other emotive vocabulary, such as the terms δυσαρέστησις (indignation) or ἔλπις (hope).7 The variation in terminology and usage not only shows a difference in focus between Aristotle and Polybius but also complicates our understanding of ancient Greek emotion. Polybius’ historical text from the Hellenistic period broadens the range of ancient emotional vocabulary and presents a unique dataset for understanding how emotions work, through a second century bce historian’s description of reality. Lastly, this chapter provides the empirical evidence that Polybius did not criticize Phylarchus for his inclusion of emotion but for the way he portrayed and used it. Polybius himself portrayed a wide array of emotions in his text and showed a keen awareness of the social functions, variety, and effects of emotion in history. Emotions of Disapproval The most prominent cognitive category of emotions in Polybius’ Histories are emotions with negative affect such as anger, hatred, resentment, jealousy, indignation, and shame.8 These emotions all express disapproval of some sort. One often feels indignation, for example, because one perceives that an injustice has occurred. Thus, a subject can feel bad and decide to take action to rectify a situation because of their negative emotion. Anger, hatred, indignation, and resentment, for example, are often connected to a subject’s sense of morality and set of values and often motivate a character to take action. Nevertheless, these individual emotions are distinguished through their processes, or “scripts”, as Robert Kaster describes them

Individual Emotions in Context 47 in Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Republican Rome.9 Through examining these processes, we can discern what each of these emotional terms meant in Polybius’ text and how his usages relate both to Aristotle’s definitions and to the usages of his historiographical predecessors. Anger10

Anger is a prominent emotion, both in Polybius’ Histories and in scholarship on ancient emotion.11 It is often associated with the stereotypical traits of emotion – negative, irrational, destructive, and uncontrolled. Also, anger is one of the most persistent emotion terms in Greek historiography. This section analyzes how Polybius presents anger and how his usage compares to his historiographical predecessors Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon and to Aristotle’s definition in the Rhetoric. This analysis complicates anger’s characterization as entirely negative, irrational, destructive, or uncontrolled. Contextualization of Polybius’ usages within his genre illuminates the persistent function of anger in history. It also highlights the historians’ idiosyncratic usages, which often reflect and corroborate their principles and practice of writing history. Comparison of Polybius’ usages to Aristotle’s definition draws out the common, recognizable attributes of ὀργή as anger but also demonstrates the importance of looking beyond Aristotle’s definitions and in particular, the value of historiography with its emphasis on reality for coming to holistic understandings of ancient Greek emotions. Since anger is such a prevalent emotion, with a fulsome representation in Polybius and all three Classical historians as well as a prominent and lengthy discussion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, anger serves as a case study for contextualizing Polybius’ usage. In the previous chapter, we discussed common features of emotion using the anger of the Macedonian king Philip V as an example. When in control of the Aetolian sanctuary at Thermum, Philip decided in anger to destroy the structures completely because he and the Macedonians recalled the Aetolians’ transgressive destruction at the sanctuaries of both Dodona and Dium. In Chapter 1, we showed that Polybius portrayed Philip’s anger as an appropriate response to the Aetolians’ destruction at Dodona and Dium but that Polybius censured Philip for reacting disproportionately by destroying too much at Thermum and misdirecting his anger by targeting the gods’ property instead of only the Aetolians’. Philip continued such behavior throughout the Histories, misdirecting his anger and reacting disproportionately, often wronging the gods and destroying places overzealously.12 Polybius used Philip’s incorrect reaction to his anger to teach his readers about the practical and moral utility of reacting proportionately and directing one’s response to anger correctly. Philip’s anger highlights core components of anger in Polybius’ text. First, Philip expressed anger as a result of a perceived wrong or injustice – in this case, the Aetolians’ previous destruction of two sanctuaries. Other passages in the Histories corroborate this. The Illyrian Scerdilaidas felt angry because the Aetolians breached their treaty with him over plunder.13 Polybius records that the Roman commander Caecilius became so angry because he did not receive what

48  Individual Emotions in Context he wanted or thought he deserved.14 The Achaeans became angry at Spartan exiles for their complaints because they seemed ungrateful.15 In these examples, Polybius shows that anger follows some provocation which the subject perceives as detrimental or contrary to their own values.16 Through this motivation, anger carries on meaning from past events. This feature of anger in Polybius’ text continues from the Classical historians. For example, Herodotus records that Megacles, responding in anger to what he considered a grave insult by Peisistratus, reconciled with his political enemies to oppose Peisistratus.17 At the beginning of his history of the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides records that the Corinthians decided to prepare a fleet because of their anger with the Corcyreans for spurning them.18 Xenophon records that because Pharnabazus was angry at the Spartans for his losses at their hands, he prioritized invading Spartan territory at Abydus and harming their interests.19 In all of these, the subject expresses anger at a past grievance. These examples demonstrate a second common characteristic of anger in Polybius and the Classical historians: anger directly motivates a specific action. Philip V destroyed Thermum, Megacles reconciled with his opponents, the Corinthians sent a fleet, and Pharnabazus invaded Abydus. The historians rely on the motivating force of anger to explain why characters decided to take action. Polybius records that Alexander the Great was so enraged at Thebes that he decided to enslave the inhabitants and razed the city.20 This result clause (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξοργισθεὶς Θηβαίοις ὥστε . . .) places anger as the reason or cause of Alexander’s action. This connects anger with Polybius’ historiographical precept that the value of history lies in identifying and exhibiting causation.21 Xenophon uses anger similarly as a psychological rationale for the progression from one event to another, highlighting the series of consequences of human action while reserving evaluation of the emotion itself.22 He records that the Spartan commander Dercylidas grew angry and decided to attack the city of Cebren because its Persian garrison commander did not receive Dercylidas in his attempt to retain the city for Pharnabazus.23 Xenophon does not comment on this anger but instead uses anger as a crucial explanation connecting Dercylidas’ motivation to his decisions and actions.24 As discussed in the case of Philip V at Thermum, anger can be approved. Philip also acts positively on his anger during the Social War in Greece and imprisons his companions, Megaleas and Krinion, who, Polybius has informed us, were part of Apelles’ internal plot to ruin Philip’s affairs.25 By stopping them, the young and (mostly) noble Philip took a great step toward eradicating this coup.26 Later in the Histories, Polybius praised Philip in a war against Attalus and Rhodes, immediately after praising them and criticizing Philip. Polybius self-consciously defends this about-face, reminding his readers that a good historian must distribute praise and blame as characters’ behaviors merit.27 For, he continues, Philip, although having suffered defeat, immediately and vehemently changed to meet the circumstance and succeeded in opposing Attalus and the Rhodians, most of all acting on his anger and passion (τὸ πλεῖον ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ).28 Polybius praises this determination

Individual Emotions in Context 49 and perseverance in the face of harsh circumstances. Thus, Philip’s anger (ὀργή) – and even his θυμός – could have positive results, provided he react correctly. As in Polybius’ text, the evaluation of anger in the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon relies on its context, appropriateness, direction, and proportionality. In Herodotus, characters show development by putting aside their anger.29 Periander put aside his anger at his younger, recalcitrant son because this son had been reduced to squalor and hunger following Periander’s angry ordinances that no one in Corinth take him in.30 Cyrus put aside his anger because Croesus provided him excellent advice.31 Thucydides’ characters speak about the suitability of anger in certain situations, and Aristogeiton and Harmodius in their assassination of Hipparchus feel anger in response to (perceived) injustices.32 However, these examples from Classical historians do not quite depict anger as an actively positive force. In Polybius’ political theory in Book 6, tyranny is dissolved when anger and other emotions arise in the people, and democracy comes into existence when the people become angry at their oligarchic leaders’ injustices.33 In both cases, anger brings a positive result: the degenerate forms of government of tyranny and oligarchy are overthrown and change to good forms, aristocracy and democracy. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon do not record anger as having such positive or beneficial results.34 However, anger can negatively characterize subjects, and agents who successfully manage or deny their own anger receive favorable portrayals or results.35 Hermeias, the Seleucid courtier to whom Polybius attributes anger most of individuals after Philip V, twice became so angry at another powerful Seleucid courtier, Epigenes, that he interrupted and reviled him, and their mutual anger became so great that others could not use the army effectively.36 Polybius consistently portrays Hermeias negatively and characterizes one instance of his anger explicitly as uncritical and rash (πάλιν Ἑρμείας ἀκρίτως καὶ προπετῶς ἐξοργισθείς).37 However, throughout his Histories, Polybius did not characterize anyone as inherently negative due to their dispositional anger. Philip V certainly displayed anger the most, as discussed in Chapter 1, and other historical agents in the Histories recognized Philip’s propensity for anger. After the end of the Second Macedonian War, Amynander, the king of Athamania, Macedon’s neighbor to the southwest, and an ally of Rome, requested that the Romans stay in Greece. For, he says, when they will have left, Philip would vent his anger on him.38 Philip had a reputation for overworking his anger even among his contemporaries. This brings up the issue of when a “propensity towards anger” becomes an irate disposition or character trait. In reality, the two blend together.39 My point is not that Philip was not an irate historical agent in Polybius’ Histories; rather, Polybius refrained from characterizing Philip himself as angry as opposed to acting on his anger, whether positively or, more often, negatively. As discussed earlier, Polybius in fact explicitly called attention to the duty of the historian to describe and evaluate agents’ actions, giving praise at one moment and censure at another.40 The Classical historians at times depict anger explicitly as a trait, especially Herodotus. For example, Cyaxares maltreats Scythians under his charge because

50  Individual Emotions in Context of his characteristic anger, and Democedes left home in Croton because his father habitually displayed fierce anger.41 More generally, anger reflects poorly on characters. Herodotus characterizes Cambyses negatively because anger drove his decision to campaign against Ethiopia without any tactical or practical preparation. Theramenes is portrayed poorly at the end of Thucydides’ text when he displayed anger at the soldiers at Peiraeus. In Xenophon’s Hellenica, Teleutias commits his force at Olynthus and draws too close to the walls, driven by anger, resulting in his own and many soldiers’ deaths.42 Similarly, in Polybius’ Histories, Boeotian anger that the Megarians chose to renew their long-standing alliance with the Achaean League is portrayed negatively, for the Boeotians attack Megara in a rage and fail because of a panic among them.43 Following such negative connotations, anger, perhaps most of all the emotions, has been considered irrational and detrimental. However, all kinds of characters express anger. Traditionally good characters, that is, those who best exemplify Eckstein’s aristocratic ethos and Champion’s Hellenic logismos, such as the Achaeans and the Romans, both grow angry and are the objects of others’ anger. In fact, of the groups who grow angry, the Romans express anger the most of all.44 Moreover, they cause anger in others second most frequently, only behind the Aetolians.45 This statistical preponderance of Roman anger, however, does not necessarily mean that the Romans were more irascible and therefore more aggressive by nature.46 Polybius structured his history around the Romans, so it is likely that they as the main characters frequently were associated with anger or any emotion.47 Roman anger increases in the later books, for which Andrew Erskine provides a thoughtful analysis. Erskine argues that Polybius portrayed Roman anger from the perspectives of those feeling the brunt of that anger or advocating on behalf of the objects of anger. Erskine shows that this perspective reflects Polybius’ role and identity as a Greek navigating the new dynamics of interstate relations with Rome and supports this by contrasting Polybius’ angry Romans to Livy’s lack of anger in the same narrative points. Polybius thus does not present Roman anger as inherently irrational or necessarily negative, provided one could find grounds to assuage it appropriately.48 On the other hand, groups whom scholars typically associate with irrationality do not have strong records of growing angry: Aetolian anger is mentioned four times, Illyrian anger three times, and Gallic anger only twice. These groups represent the traditionally negative, barbaric irrationality which Polybius abhorred. Anger in itself, then, does not form a key component of their irrationality.49 Philip V by far expresses the most anger as an individual in the Histories.50 Collectives more often feel anger, with the collective Romans (16 times) and “the people” (eight times) feeling anger more than or as often as Philip V. As discussed earlier, this king demonstrates the possibility of both negative and positive anger. Moreover, social status does not seem to limit who expresses anger in Polybius’ text. Those defeated, for example, grow angry at superiors in the Histories regularly; their lower social status or status of being defeated in war does not lead them to endure passively others wronging them.51 The Carthaginians, after their defeat in the First Punic War and during their internal struggles against their

Individual Emotions in Context 51 former mercenaries and Libyans, grow angry at Rome for demanding and taking Sardinia.52 As an independent and powerful state, Carthage clearly thought of itself as an equal to Rome, but because of its constrained and even dire present circumstances, Carthage pursued a policy of appeasement to Rome’s aggressive taking of Sardinia. Similar to Carthage’s response to Rome, Achilles’ μῆνις (implacable anger) at the start of the Iliad occurs precisely to contest Achilles’ “inferior status” to Agamemnon.53 Even those in inferior positions eventually retaliate, such as the Aetolians, who worked to provoke the war between the Romans and Antiochus III, or Hannibal and the Carthaginians, beginning the Second Punic War because of long-term anger at the result of the First Punic War and the Romans’ later seizure of Sardinia.54 Although he does not explore how collective emotion works on a psychological level, Polybius acknowledges the importance of emotion beyond interpersonal relations in his attribution of emotions to groups of people or even states, a topic we shall address in detail in Chapters 3–4. Not only formal states in the Histories express anger, but so do nonpolitical groups: the women of Alexandria grow angry at Ptolemy V’s first regents, mercenaries grow angry at their employers, and the common people grow angry at their rulers.55 As one of the most potent emotions in the Histories, anger (ὀργή) shapes the narrative dramatically. Along with its common companion hatred (μῖσος), anger (ὀργή) acts as a catalyst for important political changes and for the causes, pretexts, and outbreaks of wars. Regimes are changed clearly three times; three times Polybius explicitly gave ὀργή as the causation for the war.56 Let us examine how Polybius’ usages of anger compare to Aristotle’s specifications in the Rhetoric to evaluate the idiosyncrasies of Polybius’ portrayal of anger. In this work, Aristotle wrote about how emotions affect rhetoric and could be manipulated by an orator and structured emotions in dichotomies. Aristotle begins his catalogue of emotions with anger (ὀργή). Receiving a slight from an inferior constitutes the defining feature of Aristotelian anger. Aristotle claimed that one feels anger because of a perceived slight either from one’s equal or from an inferior.57 From this, anger is an immediate and personal response and is determined by social status.58 David Konstan in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks argues that Aristotle’s definition is reducible to a desire for revenge and provoked by a slight.59 Konstan also notes the restrictiveness of slighting as the only cause of anger according to Aristotle and postulates that Aristotle limited his definition of anger to make room for his unique use of indignation, τὸ νέμεσαν.60 Lastly, Aristotle focused on individuals and distinguished anger from hatred by the fact that individuals feel anger, groups hatred.61 Polybius’ usage clearly differs from Aristotle’s limited definition. For one, Polybius regularly attributed groups with feeling anger. As discussed with the case of Carthaginian anger at Rome for their seizure of Sardinia, social status and inferiority are not as clear-cut in the realm of interstate politics as in a domestic context with individuals. The distinction, however, that the perception of social status may differ from actuality or others’ perceptions is important. Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul of 218 bce, argued that the Carthaginians occupied a lower social status

52  Individual Emotions in Context than the Romans, likening them to slaves, in his speech to his army before the initial battle in Italy at the river Ticinus.62 The difference in perception of status affected how these agents considered the justifiability and responsibility for this war. However, the people’s anger at the tyrants’ abuse of power in Polybius’ political theory also challenges this Aristotelian constraint that inferiors do not express anger. These examples from Polybius’ Histories highlight that social status in the political realm – especially when dealing with states and other, collective, nonindividual agents – may not be as clear as Aristotle’s definition suggests for individuals’ domestic or civic status. These examples show that Aristotle’s focus on individuals eliminates the complications which group emotions entail. The differences between Polybius and Aristotle show the historian’s concern for reality and how a rhetorical argument such as Aristotle’s does not necessarily represent ancient Greek emotion historically or realistically. This point supplements Konstan’s work in identifying the relationship between Aristotle’s definitions of emotions and the more expansive portrayal of emotions in Classical literature. Although anger by nature is unverifiable, it was important to Polybius as part of historical reality. Unlike the domestic sphere for which Aristotle wrote, in interstate relations there was no predefined, set social status of state actors in the ancient world. The divergence between Aristotle’s emphasis on individual social status as a determining factor in one’s expression of anger and Polybius’ less restricted portrayal of individuals, states, and collectives who express anger highlights this fact about interstate politics and draws attention to the difference between reality and rhetoric as a subject matter.63 All the ancient Greek historians included anger (ὀργή) in their texts, and the continuity of meaning between Polybius and his predecessors attests to its recognizable and realistic portrayal by the historians. However, Polybius’ use of anger does not support common assumptions; anger was not always irrational, detrimental, or negative. The evaluation of anger resided in the appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of the response. In his writing, Polybius did not portray anger as itself indicative of characters’ inherent dispositions, even though Philip V appeared irascible. However, by explicitly praising and blaming Philip V for his anger at various moments in the text, Polybius illuminated the social nature of anger, in that it occurred in specific contexts and was evaluated in each instance. Hatred

How does hatred differ from anger? This question forms the core of Aristotle’s discussion of the emotion hate (μῖσος). In this section, first we address what constitutes hatred (μῖσος) in Polybius’ text and how his usages compare to earlier historians before analyzing how hate compares to anger. Hatred functions as a potent motivator. Parallels between Polybius’ portrayal of hate with modern theory on the nature of hate illuminate the role of this emotion in the text. Lastly, hatred occurs frequently in multidimensional contexts, and Polybius uses a variety of terms for this emotion. These factors exhibit Polybius’ greater use of this emotion than seen in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.

Individual Emotions in Context  53 Polybius’ digression on traitors helps elucidate his conception of hatred.64 Traitors are not those who shift alliances and in doing so benefit their own country. So, Polybius argues, Demosthenes wrongly called certain Arcadians traitors who allied with Philip II of Macedon, an alliance which greatly benefited the Arcadian cities and people of the Peloponnese by curtailing Sparta’s power. Instead, he states, a traitor should be defined as one who betrayed his own country by admitting a garrison or submitting his own country to a foreign power. Polybius argues that traitors do not benefit from their actions: they do not lead happy lives afterwards, receive punishment from those whom they sought to save, and are treated as traitors afterward even by those to whom they betrayed their country. Even if the traitors escape punishment at their hands, they would hardly escape punishment at the hands of those betrayed. Even still, Polybius continues, if they slip out of that situation, the reputation they earned as traitors would haunt them for their entire lives, creating both false and true fears all the time (πολλοὺς μὲν φόβους ψευδεῖς, πολλοὺς δ’ ἀληθεῖς), assisting others in plotting against them, and finally permitting them no respite from their past actions even while asleep but also compelling them to dream of every sort of plot and downfall, just as if they knew in their hearts the alienation of all and the shared hatred (τὸ κοινὸν μῖσος) against them.65 Emotion abounds in this argument against traitors. They cannot attain happiness, fears plague them both conscious and unconscious, and hatred, a universal hatred, is identified as the root of the traitor’s problems, tied to their reputation as traitors. Polybius treats the common hatred against traitors as a fact so strong that the traitors’ constant vigilance and paranoia seem to stem from the traitors’ latent realization of this hatred and alienation. This passage has two aims: explicitly to clarify between true traitors and what Demosthenes called a traitor, and implicitly to dissuade readers from becoming one. Here Polybius generalizes and describes universal human behavior. His comments about hatred further the general applicability of these claims, specifying the hatred as shared (τὸ κοινὸν) and the alienation as coming from everyone (ἐκ πάντων). This passage on traitors also highlights a perspective not normally explored – that of the object of emotion. Traitors experience the results of shared hatred against them, but this hatred, if applied to future cases, could motivate subjects to alienate the traitors. This shows sensitivity to the realities of emotion, which Polybius capitalizes on to emphasize the negative experience of being hated. Polybius’ depiction of the traitor as the object of universal hatred aligns with the theory of hatred by Robert Sternberg and Karin Sternberg. Sternberg and Sternberg formulated a tripartite nature of hatred based on their observations from twentiethcentury depictions, exhortations, and manifestations of hate, focusing largely upon Nazi hatred of Jews. The three major components of hate, according to Sternberg and Sternberg, are a negation of intimacy, passion, and devaluation.66 Negation of intimacy represents a distancing from the object of hatred. Passion represents the intensity or vehemence of the stance toward the object of hate, often manifested in language and images linking the object with disgust. Lastly, devaluation is a cognitive commitment to keep the object away from the purity and integrity of one’s own group.

54  Individual Emotions in Context Polybius’ theoretical traitor experiences all three of these components. Both the receiver of the betrayal and the traitor’s original community exclude the traitor. Passion is shown against the traitor in the form of his obsessive fear and paranoia, which Polybius depicts as reaching such an intensity that the traitor even dreams of plots. Polybius foregrounds the cognitive commitment to keep the traitor away from one’s own society in his claims that the traitor’s reputation and distancing because of it follow and affect him for the entirety of his life. All of these behaviors manifest the “universal hatred” against the traitor. The correspondence of Polybius’ digression on traitors with Sternberg and Sternberg’s theory of the tripartite nature of hate highlights the impact and importance of hatred for Polybius’ point.67 In the narrative, Polybius describes three anecdotes as evidence of the prevailing hatred for Andronidas and Callicrates, Achaean politicians, after the return of an embassy to the Romans, which furthers this reading of the theoretical hatred against traitors.68 The exact embassy, its mission, and the Roman response are unclear.69 What is clear is that Polybius’ use of these specific Greek reactions manifested the prevalent hatred against these politicians, for this passage is bookended by statements about the hatred it contains. Polybius first describes the Achaean reception of the response from the embassy as escalating from tumult to anger and hatred (οὐκέτι θόρυβος ἦν, ἀλλ’  ὀργὴ καὶ μῖσος ἐκφανές).70 He next introduces three specific anecdotes as indicative of the hatred against these politicians.71 At the end of the passage, Polybius sums up these three examples similarly, by stating that “some such indignation and hate against the aforementioned men came over [the Greeks] (τοιαύτη τις ὑπέδραμε προσκοπὴ καὶ μῖσος).”72 Polybius characterizes the emotions variously as anger, hatred, and indignation. This combination obscures how these particular terms differ. However, Polybius consistently and most directly describes these responses as signs of hatred in all three places, so we can identify – and are invited to by Polybius (τοῦ μίσους. . . ἄν τις τεκμήραιτο) – common characteristics of hatred at work in the narrative.73 First, Polybius relates that after a festival in Sicyon, when the public baths opened not only the large but also the smaller, usually elite bathrooms, no one waiting in line would enter a bath after Andronidas, Callicrates, or one of their party had used that particular bath until the water had been drained and fresh water provided.74 They did this, Polybius explains, because they considered that they would be contaminated (μιαίνεσθαι) by bathing in the same water as these men.75 This example shows both a cognitive and a visceral, physical reaction to the politicians, similar to disgust.76 This example demonstrates Sternberg and Sternberg’s criteria that hatred involves a separation, often physical, of the subject from the object and that a rhetoric of purity is invoked to justify such separation. Likewise, Sara Ahmed in Cultural Politics of Emotion theorizes the visceral reactions of hate and disgust and how these emotions can distance the subject from the object. Ahmed writes that hate “functions to substantiate the threat of invasion and contamination in the body of a particular other, who comes to stand for and stand in for, a group of others.”77 This example shares similarities with disgust, but it is important that these Achaeans decide not to enter the baths because of an intentional cognitive commitment to devaluing the object rather than deciding based on a purely visceral, culturally ingrained reaction. Moreover, the Achaeans at the bath choose to

Individual Emotions in Context 55 wait, postponing their own benefit, to avoid any physical contamination from these politicians. This shows another trait of hatred - that subjects act on their hatred in potentially detrimental ways to their own interests. Next, Polybius claims that no one could easily describe the hissing and jeering at panhellenic festivals whenever someone would try to announce one of these politicians.78 This anecdote broadens the scope of hatred beyond the parochial bounds of the Achaean League to include all of the Greeks present at the common, panhellenic festivals (ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς πανηγύρεσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων). This example manifests the passion and intensity present in this hatred, and Polybius again co-opts his readers into this judgment through his framing that “no one could easily describe” (οὐδ’ ἂν ἐξηγήσαιτο ῥαδίως οὐδεὶς) the hissing and jeering. The extent of the passion manifested against Andronidas, Callicrates, and their party surpasses human ability – including Polybius’ – to describe it. Lastly, Polybius states that children in the streets as they returned home from school were emboldened to call Andronidas and Callicrates traitors (προδότας) to their faces.79 Although it is doubtful that the children realized the full implications of calling someone a traitor as described by Polybius, this passage brings to life the theoretical hatred Polybius claimed arose against traitors. The innocence of those making this judgment further corroborates Polybius’ theorization of the universality of hatred. Even the innocent children experience the passion of hatred, enough to motivate them to call leading politicians traitors in public, transgressing the usual bounds of social propriety. This passage as a whole illuminates some other characteristics of hatred. The Achaeans, Greeks, and children hate the politicians not for their identities as politicians per se, or any other inherent traits, but for their recent, specific actions or policies which brought about the ambassadors’ message from the Romans. The intensity of the feeling against these politicians demonstrates the passion, distancing from the object, and cognitive commitment to devaluing the object. Polybius’ correlation of hatred and anger at the start of this passage is indicative of Polybius’ prevalent use of hatred in multidimensional contexts.80 Anger sometimes stimulates and is correlated often with hatred in the Histories.81 Polybius more often specifies what causes or motivates hate, whereas he sometimes omits this information in the case of anger.82 Hatred appears alongside anger (ὀργή), indignation (δυσαρέστησις, ἀγανακτεῖν, and προσκοπή), and resentment (φθόνος).83 Hatred is set in contrast with loving (φιλεῖν and συναγαπᾶν) or pity (ἔλεος).84 Polybius contrasts hating with loving twice in the context of writing history: normal individuals can and should hate their friends’ enemies and get along with their friends’ allies, but historians must avoid such favoritism.85 Likewise, citizens of a state are particularly prone to this, according to Polybius, and in politics the people are prone to find any pretext for action when swayed by extreme hatred or love.86 In both of these examples, hatred functions as a potential source for action, and Polybius draws a distinction about the appropriateness of hate and love as motivators. Hate – and affection – could motivate a historian to write biased history, and Polybius demonstrates how powerful hatred can be as a motivator by the fact that people will fit their reasoning to actualize this emotion.

56  Individual Emotions in Context Polybius contrasts hatred with pity twice. Those who witnessed or heard about the capture of Achaeus, who was taken captive by deceit at Sardis and handed over to Antiochus III, from whom he revolted, felt pity for Achaeus and hatred for his captors.87 Similarly, those who fake their own suffering, such as courtiers, do not arouse pity as intended but rather arouse anger and hatred in those who observe them.88 In both passages, Polybius does not focus on hatred as a motivation but as an undesirable result, which parallels his digression on traitors. Similar to his multidimensional use of hatred (μῖσος), Polybius uses a variety of terms which can convey a sense of hatred. In addition to the term μῖσος, Polybius uses the term ἀπέχθεια to portray a sense of hostility which often characterizes state rivalries and alliances.89 This kind of hatred or hostility is given as a reason for starting war and for taking sides.90 Moreover, Polybius frequently uses this term to express the hatred or hostility against a group or people, which most closely parallels Aristotle’s distinction for hatred, as we shall see.91 Lastly, Polybius also uses the term ἔχθρα, which seems to pertain exclusively to rivalry more than hatred.92 By contrast, the term μῖσος occurs more frequently and functions most often as a potent motivation. Polybius’ multidimensional use of hatred (μῖσος) and use of a variety of terms is unique. Throughout the narrative, Polybius specifies hatred as the motivation for historical agents’ decisions and actions. On his campaign in Picenum in the Second Punic War, Hannibal kills all men in their prime because of his natural hatred of the Romans.93 Hate also motivates groups of people. Those in Antiochus III’s court work against the courtier Hermeias because of their hatred of him.94 The Sidetai choose not to help the besieged Pednelissans because of their hatred of the Aspendians (who do help).95 The Megarians ally with the Achaean League simply because they hate the Boeotian state of governance.96 Polybius’ usage of hatred as a motivator for action builds upon his Classical historiographical predecessors. Herodotus uses the term μῖσος twice, both as explanations of the behavior of the Egyptians. Menelaus was hated (μισηθείς) and pursued by the Egyptians because he had seized and killed two local children to sacrifice for good winds.97 Because of their hatred for the two kings who had the pyramids built, the Egyptians do not even want to name them.98 In both examples, Herodotus explains the behavior of the Egyptians through hate as the motivation. Thucydides uses this term for hatred (μῖσος) more frequently than Herodotus. This historian similarly mentions hatred as the underlying reason for agents’ behavior but also describes what leads to hatred.99 The Athenians, Thucydides explains, gained ascendency and the leadership of the Greeks after the Persian Wars because of the general hatred of Pausanias (διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος).100 Likewise, the Corinthians chose to aid the Epidamnians partly because they hated the Corcyreans.101 Thucydides further explains the reason the Corinthians hate the Corcyreans, that is, the Corcyreans as colonists disrespected (παρημέλουν) the Corinthians. Later, the Corinthians hated the Athenians primarily because the Athenians built long walls between Megara and Nisaea. Hatred motivates these agents’ behaviors and informs their choices. Xenophon uses hatred as an explanation for behavior, especially as a connection between events, similar to his use of anger.102 So, for example, in the Hellenica the

Individual Emotions in Context 57 realization of one Theban exile that another Theban exile hated what was happening in Thebes led them to plot and effect the assassination of the polemarchs.103 In the Hellenika, individuals and states hate Sparta most of all.104 This hate is used by agents to create alliances against Sparta.105 Xenophon highlights the Spartans’ self-discipline when they abstain from harming those they hate when they had the opportunity to do so, and Xenophon as narrator describes soldiers’ hatred toward their commander, along with low morale, as the least conducive state in which to enter battle.106 Lastly, in the Anabasis, Xenophon records his own speech concerning the Thracian Seuthes’ prevarications and lack of pay to his soldiers, arguing against their blaming and hating of Xenophon rather than Seuthes.107 He deconstructs the reasons behind their hatred, arguing that since he himself was at odds with Seuthes for the same reasons as the soldiers, their hatred and blame were misdirected and should fall squarely on Seuthes. As noted earlier, Polybius’ multidimensionality and variety of terminology for hate distinguish him from his extant historiographical predecessors. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon do not use the term ἀπέχθεια at all and use μῖσος with less frequency than Polybius.108 Polybius’ increased attention to hatred is not unique in context with later Greek historians, but Polybius represents the extant beginning to a general upward trend in the use of (explicit) emotive terminology, not limited to hatred. Josephus, whose history of the Jewish War is less than half the size of Polybius’ Histories and roughly comparable to Xenophon’s Anabasis and Hellenika combined, uses the term μῖσος (and its cognates) 67 times, compared to Polybius’ 38 and Xenophon’s 12.109 Josephus is an outlier, but his increased usage exemplifies that later historians included μῖσος much more frequently.110 For Polybius, hatred (predominantly μῖσος) seems to exemplify the combined force of negative emotion. This complicates any effort to distinguish hate from anger precisely. However, this ambiguity attests to the affinity of anger and hate as negative feelings which stem from a perceived injustice and motivate action within Polybius’ thought. For him, anger and hate were conceptually similar but not necessarily distinct. From the evidence available in the Histories, for Polybius, hatred functioned as a potent motivator of action and seems to convey greater intensity, even motivating agents to act against their own pragmatic benefit. To investigate Polybius’ portrayal of hatred against anger, let us turn to Aristotle’s distinctions between hatred (μῖσος) and anger (ὀργή) in the Rhetoric. First, anger is felt against individuals, hatred against groups of people. Second, anger can be curable, but hatred is inexorable. Third, an angry person wants to hurt his object, while a hater wants to cause his object evil, and the angry person wants to see his revenge, while the other is not concerned with revenge. Fourth, anger necessitates pain for the subject where hatred does not. Lastly, an angry person can come to pity his object, for all he wants is to see his object suffer, while the hater cannot come to this state, for he wants his object not to exist.111 In this list, the specificity and temporality of these two emotions stand out. For Aristotle, anger requires specificity of object, motivation, and result. Anger must be directed at a specific individual, must be a response to a specific slight, and thus must require a specifically equal or proportional response or vengeance. In terms of

58  Individual Emotions in Context temporality, anger differs from hatred in its limited time frame from the moment of motivation to the fulfillment of a proportional response. This view justifies Aristotle’s comment that an angry person can come to pity his object, for the anger only lasts until a proportional reaction occurs. Hatred, according to Aristotle, lacks both specificity and temporality in these senses. Polybius’ portrayal of hatred differs from Aristotle’s claim that hatred arises only against groups, not individuals as such.112 Both anger and hatred are felt against individuals and groups.113 Yet in commenting on Philip V’s destruction at Thermum, Polybius provides the gnomic statement that “it is a sign of a tyrant that he is hated by his subjects and that his subjects hate him.”114 This statement corroborates Aristotle’s conception of hatred as felt against groups of people, since both the subjects and tyrants serve as generalized categories of people in this passage. This statement also implies that both the tyrant and the subjects are not concerned with revenge or with pain but that both resent the existence of the other, further corroborating Aristotle. However, this statement does not represent how Polybius portrayed hatred uniformly, as discussed earlier. Most often in the Histories, positively portrayed characters hate, and many are victims of injustice or suffering or are observers and sympathizers with these who suffer unjustly.115 In conclusion, Polybius’ use of hatred builds upon and beyond the Classical historians’ usage as a motivation for decisions and actions of states and individuals. Polybius’ theoretical passage on traitors shows that hatred involved a separation of the subject from the object, intense feeling, and an intentional, cognitive devaluation of the object of hatred, and Polybius’ narrative anecdotes of the hatred manifested against Andronidas, Callicrates, and their political party support these observations. Following the Classical historians, Polybius does not constrain his usages of hatred to Aristotle’s limitations that hatred be felt against only groups or only for long-term reasons. However, Aristotle’s definition highlights the passion or intensity inherent to hatred, which Polybius also portrays. Moreover, Polybius does not distinguish as clearly as Aristotle between anger and hatred, often linking the two. This represents a common trend by Polybius to note hatred in combination with other emotions, in which hatred seems to represent an intensification of negative affect. Resentment

Polybius’ use of the term φθόνος reflects a negative affect often felt in response to someone overstepping their role. I use the term “resentment” throughout this section to express this emotion and avoid the usual translation of “envy” because envy imposes certain preconceptions onto Polybius’ usage of this term. The work of Ed Sanders on scripts of φθόνος in Classical Athenian literature and David Konstan’s discussion of Aristotle’s definition of φθόνος provide structure for evaluating and understanding Polybius’ use of this term. In the final part of this section, I address the term ζηλοτυπία, which is often translated as “jealousy” and which Polybius uses sparingly.

Individual Emotions in Context 59 Sanders recently analyzed Classical and Archaic usages of resentment (φθόνος) and other terms of envy and jealousy, using studies of modern envy and jealousy as comparanda.116 Sanders identifies twelve “scripts”, that is, types or processes, of resentment at work in Archaic and Classical Greek: begrudging refusal, odious/ hateful, spite/malice/Schadenfreude, censure, phthonos theon, begrudging envy, covetous envy, rivalry, begrudging sharing, jealous of one’s position, possessive jealousy, and sexual jealousy.117 As can be seen in Sanders’ labels for these scripts, this term φθόνος expansively includes ideas of withholding something from another (begrudging), holding it against someone for having something, striving for something, and wanting an exclusive relationship with someone or something ( jealousy). Not all of these scripts appear in Polybius’ Histories, so I highlight and explain those that do. In Aristotle’s discussion of emotions, the term φθόνος (envy/ill-will/resentment) falls in a triad with the term for righteous indignation (τὸ νέμεσαν) and pity (ἔλεος).118 Konstan notes that Aristotle’s term τὸ νέμεσαν “was not commonly conceived of as an independent emotion in Aristotle’s time.”119 It was archaic by Aristotle’s time, increasingly referred to the divine in the Classical and Hellenistic periods but increased in usage by later authors such as Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and Second Sophistic authors.120 While φθόνος was felt when one’s equal achieved something better regardless of merit, τὸ νέμεσαν was felt when another appeared to succeed undeservedly.121 Polybius, similar to the historians who follow him, uses τὸ νέμεσαν not in Aristotle’s restricted sense but as a manifestation of divine displeasure, which fits Konstan’s observations from Classical and Hellenistic literature. Aristotle defines the term φθόνος as pain at an equal doing better. Konstan qualifies Aristotle’s stance, stating that “phthonos is the only one [emotion] that he treats as unqualifiedly negative,” for the subject only feels this emotion because the object is doing better, not because the object does not deserve better.122 According to Konstan, resentment (φθόνος) did not carry entirely negative overtones in the context of Classical Athenian democracy but rather functioned to regulate the behavior of the rich and powerful, thus embodying “a natural response to a systemic inequality” through its use in social movement.123 He rationalizes Aristotle’s negative interpretation of φθόνος as due to Aristotle’s suspicion of egalitarian democracy and states, “it was thus natural that he should have regarded phthonos as a vice endemic to democracy, one that is excited by the prosperity of those we deem our equals.”124 However, Konstan also describes φθόνος as completely negative and well-suited for the mob. In Polybius’ Histories, resentment (φθόνος) fulfills complex functions. Similar to Polybius’ use of anger (ὀργή) and hate (μῖσος), Polybius’ use of resentment likewise exceeds the bounds Aristotle strove to impose on this term. Once again, social status does not limit who expresses resentment in the Histories, which includes instances of the people feeling resentment against victors or other leaders and rulers.125 Through Polybius’ focus on the object, this emotion is not unqualifiedly negative for one to express. However, resentment does appear prominently in

60  Individual Emotions in Context moments of social movement, such as Konstan observed with Classical Athenian democracy.126 Polybius more often focuses on the object of resentment than the subjects. This trend is opposite to both modern studies’ focus, the Archaic and Classical examples analyzed by Sanders, and the usages of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.127 In only five sentences, Polybius focuses on the subjects feeling resentment.128 In these passages, feeling resentment reflects negatively on these characters, as might be expected, following the analysis of Sanders or Aristotle’s specifications. In the remaining 17 instances of resentment (φθόνος and φθονεῖν), however, attention is directed to the object. In this majority of instances, the subject is not stressed or even mentioned explicitly, and a negative reading of the subjects of resentment (φθόνος) often contradicts the meaning of the passage. Polybius’ usage of resentment sometimes follows a script of “begrudging”, that is, to withhold something from someone else or to stop someone from doing something, a use which Sanders found prevalent in Archaic texts, though Polybius’ use does not quite reach the emotionless “deny” or “refuse” which Sanders identifies as a script of begrudging refusal.129 Polybius also uses the term φθόνος to indicate a sense of offense created by someone’s attempt to overreach their social status in some manner.130 Lower classes, social peers, and superiors all feel resentment in the Histories. In several passages, resentment provides intriguing cases of multidimensionality, combining variously with indignation, anger, hatred, and even pity.131 Polybius often uses this term to represent resentment of others’ improper use of power, success, wealth, or other resources, although this resentment is not necessarily justified, similar to the Classical historians.132 For example, Polybius attributes the death of Scopas, a well-paid mercenary leader in Alexandria, to his greed and the resentment he aroused in those who paid him (διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς διδοῦσι φθονηθεὶς τὸ πνεῦμα προσέθηκε τῷ χρυσίῳ).133 It is important to note that in this passage, Polybius focuses on and blames Scopas’ underlying moral deficits rather than the fact that Scopas attempted to stage a coup.134 For Polybius, Scopas’ inability to recognize the resentment he generated explains his rebellious behavior and leads to his downfall. Similarly, Herodotus explains that Cambyses sent his brother Smerdis back to Persia from Egypt because of his resentment (φθόνῳ) that Smerdis drew back a bow no other Persian had drawn.135 Smerdis appeared to Cambyses to have overstepped his rightful place, inspiring resentment in Cambyses, who used his power to act upon this emotion, which appeared unjustified and trivial as a rationale in Herodotus’ narrative. However, unlike Polybius’ focus on Scopas as the object of resentment, Herodotus focalizes this passage on Cambyses as the subject of resentment rather than Smerdis. It is Cambyses who appears to use his power autocratically and precariously. Thucydides also describes how leading Spartans leverage political power to act on their resentment by ascribing the Spartans’ lack of support for Brasidas in the Chersonese in part to the leading citizens’ envy of his success.136 The Spartans, although acting on their envy of Brasidas’ success, harm their own interests as well as Brasidas. This gives negative connotations to the role of resentment.137

Individual Emotions in Context 61 In a few generalizing statements, Polybius describes resentment in terms similar to what Sanders identifies as “covetous envy”, which is a desire to rid someone of some good they may enjoy (whether deserved or not).138 For example, Polybius generalizes, “For resentment (φθόνος) gives birth to plots and has the greatest effects on physical and mental health (καὶ γὰρ φθόνους γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ πρὸς διαφθορὰν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς μεγίστας ἔχει ῥοπάς).”139 Polybius likewise explains that “brilliant and extraordinary deeds give birth to deep resentment and sharp slanders (αἱ γὰρ ἐπιφανεῖς καὶ παράδοξοι πράξεις βαρεῖς μὲν τοὺς φθόνους ὀξείας δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς γεννῶσιν).”140 Here, similar both to Konstan’s observations of Classical Athenian resentment (φθόνος) and to several of Sanders’ scripts (rivalry, jealous of position, covetous envy, spite/malice), resentment provides a social check against reaching too far and overstepping the bounds of human achievement.141 Polybius, uninterested in the exact psychological orientation of resentment, instead focuses on conveying a simple but important message: the better one does, the more difficult it becomes to succeed and fare well because of resentment, no matter which of these potential scripts may manifest in the subject.142 Polybius’ description of how observers react to conquerors when they overstep the bounds of propriety in despoiling the defeated centralizes the role of resentment. In this passage, resentment demonstrates a trend Sanders identifies as beginning at the end of the fifth century, when the term φθόνος “starts to mean justified ‘moral censure’.”143 The Romans’ conquest of Syracuse forms the context and inspiration for Polybius’ theorizing digression.144 Polybius starts from the premise that one would call it a fault to abandon conquerors’ customs and to imitate the losers’, stimulating the resentment which follows such behavior (τὸν ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον) and which most of all scares those in superior positions. For, he continues, an observer does not deem happy (μακαρίζει) those who take others’ property, since he feels resentment (φθονεῖ), and some pity (τις ἔλεος) arises in him for those who lost their property.145 As mentioned earlier, this emotion tends to arise against those who have or want more than they should. The subjects feeling the emotion evaluate what constitutes “more than they should”. Throughout the Histories, this is evenly divided between correct and incorrect evaluation: three times characters feel φθόνος against others in accordance with Polybius’ portrayal and thoughts on these figures, and four times characters wrongly feel resentment against characters whom Polybius defends.146 Here, the victors take more than they should. Polybius took it for granted that people automatically and naturally feel resentment (φθόνος) in response to victors overreaching the bounds of propriety, despite their legitimate power. Polybius thus appeals to an abstract sense of morality, which forms the base for this resentment and strengthens his generalized “resentment following such actions” (τὸν ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον) as a resentment “which is most frightening of all for those seeking superiority” (ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ φοβερώτατον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς). This usage aligns with Konstan’s analysis that resentment most potently is directed against those in a superior position.147 However, this emphasizes the object of the

62  Individual Emotions in Context emotion much more than the subject actually feeling it: the subject’s social status matters hardly at all, but the objects, the victors here, are focalized and criticized for not understanding or using their status properly.148 This usage is paralleled in other passages of the Histories. In the anacyclosis in Book 6, kings followed reason in accordance with their subjects’ good, but hereditary tyrants did not act in accordance with how their power was originally acquired by the kings.149 This stirred up resentment along with many other negative emotions.150 Likewise, the Syracusan tyrant Hieronymus failed to act according to the principles of his predecessor Hiero II, who had exceptionally avoided all resentment with his power in Syracuse and Sicily.151 Hieronymus lost power due to his failure to adhere to Hiero’s principles, which kept resentment at bay.152 Polybius’ Megalopolitan hero, Philopoemen, like Hiero, exceptionally stands outside of resentment because of his self-restraint, strong evidence for Polybius of Philopoemen’s great character.153 In a similar vein, Xenophon praised Cyrus in the Anabasis for the fact that he did not envy the rich elite in his expedition.154 Again, there is a contrast in Polybius’ frame of focusing on Philopoemen and Hiero as avoiding becoming objects of resentment as opposed to Xenophon’s praise of Cyrus for avoiding becoming a subject feeling resentment. Similarly, in Polybius’ digression at 9.10, by not following their original, successful principles, the conquerors forfeited their just claim to higher status because they emulate unworthy customs. Thus, they attract resentment. Sanders includes another term for jealousy, ζηλοτυπία, in his discussion of types of envy. Sanders states that “in the fourth century it means either ‘possessive jealousy’ or ‘covetous envy,’ normally in a sexual scenario and if not then at least as a sexual metaphor.”155 Moreover, Sanders claims that this term is “regularly mistranslated as (sexual) jealousy, a meaning it does not in fact acquire until after the Classical period.”156 Polybius’ uses of this term in fact hold no sexual content but refer to what David Konstan characterizes as “invidious rivalry”, more closely aligning with Sanders’ scripts of covetous envy and jealousy of position, which involve having an exclusive relationship which one does not want a rival to possess similarly.157 Konstan discusses “jealousy,” ζηλοτυπία, in his list of Greek emotions, although Aristotle does not address this term.158 Polybius, whose Classical historiographical predecessors did not use this term, likewise, rarely uses ζηλοτυπία, and when he does it does not denote English “jealousy” so much as rivalry; other, later historians rarely use this term.159 In the four uses of the term ζηλοτυπία and its cognates in Polybius’ Histories, insidious rivalry represents the degeneration courtiers and court society could reach. In the first and most pointed instance, Polybius records that the Macedonian courtier Apelles duplicitously praised Taurion, the Macedonian in charge of Peloponnesian affairs, to bring him down. Polybius explicitly remarks that this constitutes a new form of slander: such aptitude for doing bad (κακεντρέχεια), malice (βασκανία), and insidiousness (δόλος) first could be found among courtiers and their invidious rivalry and greed (τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζηλοτυπίας καὶ πλεονεξίας).160 Konstan takes Polybius’ general disparagement of courtiers and their new kind of slander, invented to further their rivalries and greed, as part of the

Individual Emotions in Context  63 turn toward court culture.161 Konstan discusses the Stoics’ emphasis on ζηλοτυπία as jealousy at another having what another has, which reflects Apelles’ motivation against Taurion and matches Polybius’ joining of the term ζηλοτυπία with avarice (πλεονέξια).162 In this passage, invidious rivalry notably occurs between the courtiers, expressing a perverted sort of rivalry between equals. This reading of ζηλοτυπία as indicative of courtiers’ invidious rivalry continues in Polybius’ Histories. All of the passages of ζηλοτυπία reflect poorly on the subjects of the emotion and indeed demonstrate Polybius’ distaste for court intrigues and court culture, as Konstan claims.163 However, to claim that these instances show a turn toward court culture more broadly stretches this evidence. This emotion – and discussion of courtiers generally – remains a minority of emotions and topics represented in Polybius’ text.164 Resentment (φθόνος) in the Histories stands out for its focus on the objects, highlighting their transgressions as opposed to criticizing the subjects for feeling a morally bad emotion, as is analyzed in Classical literature and Aristotle by Sanders and Konstan.165 Through this emotion Polybius teaches the historiographical reader the dangers of exceeding the bounds of propriety and of disregarding and disrespecting others. On the other hand, the term ζηλοτυπία more closely represents the feeling of envy as a negative description of the invidious rivalry present between courtiers. Indignation

Polybius is unique among Greek historians for the frequency and variety of his use of terms for indignation.166 Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon incorporated indignation at least partly in their use of the term ὀργή. Later historians use the term ἀγανάκτησις and its cognates for indignation at a higher frequency than Polybius but do not continue his use of δυσαρέστησις (Diodorus Siculus alone uses this term five times only). In fact, Polybius uses the terms δυσαρεστεῖν and δυσαρέστησις most of all the authors contained in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library. Similarly, Polybius uses προσκοπή third most of all authors in the TLG, after Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, whose usages are quotations of Polybius, and Theodore Studites.167 Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Classical historians do not provide terminology parallel to Polybius. Konstan begins his discussion of indignation with the term τὸ νέμεσαν, which, we noted in the previous section, was archaic and not used by Polybius in this way. Polybius instead uses the terms δυσαρέστησις, προσκοπή, and ἀγανακτεῖν.168 The Classical historians use ἀγανακτεῖν rarely, and while terms related to ἀγανάκτησις increase after Polybius’ time, the terms δυσαρέστησις and προσκοπή occur only a handful of times in later historians. Throughout Polybius’ Histories, indignation sparks change but does not always lead to direct action, as anger and hatred more often do. Indignation is often offense taken at transgression of social and moral standards. These Greek terms, which all convey a sense of indignation generally, shade from being dissatisfied and taking offense to nearly feeling disgust. Indignation occurs both in important theoretical passages and in narrative episodes.

64  Individual Emotions in Context Characters feel righteous indignation (ἀγανακτεῖν) when someone oversteps their bounds, often harming or at least insulting the subjects of indignation in the process.169 Before Polybius, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon use the term ἀγανακτεῖν only five times in total. Their usages foreshadow Polybius’ broader application of indignation. In Thucydides’ text, this term represents feeling wronged: Pericles claims that Athens’ enemies cannot be indignant with them after the enemies’ defeat, Tissaphernes is offended by the Spartan Lichas’ refusal to acknowledge previous treaties, and Thucydides describes the atmosphere of oligarchic Athens as such that one could not display indignation or speak his opinion to others because of the prevalent level of distrust.170 Xenophon uses this term twice in the Hellenika: the Spartan Teleutias, in his disastrous attempt on Olynthus, was spurred by the indignation or contempt he felt when the Olynthian cavalry emerged from their city, and those in charge at Phleious indignantly fined those who had gone to Sparta to complain without authorization.171 In these two cases, indignation leads directly to action against the offenders. In Polybius’ Histories, characters often take what belongs to another for themselves, causing their victims to feel indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν). In the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians detained supply ships and crews from Italy headed for the Carthaginians’ foes, causing the Romans to feel indignation (ἠγανάκτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι).172 Reciprocally, the Romans took Sardinia at the end of the same war, causing the Carthaginians to feel indignant (Τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἀγανακτούντων).173 Although the Carthaginians did not have the power to resist the Romans at the time, for nearly two decades they held onto this insult and injury, which became the primary cause of the Second Punic War. Similarly, characters do not grow indignant over material goods and physical loss but over (perceived) insults. In the later books of the Histories, the Roman Senate became indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) with the treachery and deception of the Dalmatians and at the Achaeans’ disrespect to Roman envoys, signifying a transgression of social protocol by these groups.174 To feel indignant together with others, συναγανακτεῖν, demonstrates positive character, for all four instances in the Histories concern characters who grow indignant on behalf of those who have suffered.175 During the Achaeans’ alliance with Philip V in the Greek Social War, Philip’s courtier Apelles took advantage of his position of power while serving as Philip’s representative in Achaea.176 According to Polybius, he intended to make the Achaeans completely subservient to Macedonian power, treating them as if they were subjects instead of the allies they were. He evicted Achaean soldiers from their housing, allowed the Macedonians to appropriate the Achaeans’ booty, and, through his henchmen, did violence to them for whatever reason he could find. He himself led away those who grew indignant (τοὺς δὲ συναγανακτοῦντας) or who aided those who were flogged.177 Polybius both makes clear that Apelles did this unjustly and praised Philip for stopping these actions as soon as he heard of them from Aratus and the Achaeans. The term συναγανακτεῖν represents a reflective reaction to injustice. The subjects feeling this emotion feel it on others’ behalf and importantly express their indignation, to which Apelles in turn reacted by arresting them.

Individual Emotions in Context 65 Similarly, indignation serves as a reaction against injustice, representing a moral emotion. During an Achaean Federal Assembly, members from Patrae and Pharae and envoys from Messene related the damage these communities sustained in a recent incursion by the Aetolians, with whom the Achaeans at this point had a treaty. The Achaeans listened, grew indignant together with the Patraeans and Pharaeans (συναγανακτοῦντες μὲν τοῖς Πατρεῦσι καὶ Φαραιεῦσι), sympathized with the Messenians (συμπάσχοντες δὲ ταῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίαις), and thought that the Aetolians’ unprovoked and unrequited incursion was terrible.178 The Achaeans voted to aid the Messenians and raise an army. In this example, the Achaeans again show indignation at undeserved suffering and sympathize with the victims, leading to the start of war with the Aetolians. Indignation with others (συναγανακτεῖν) represents a reflexive and moral emotion, stimulated by the suffering of others, which casts the subject in a favorable light. The term δυσαρεστεῖν and its cognates occur much more frequently in the Histories than the other terms expressing indignation, ἀγανακτεῖν or προσκόπτειν. This term, δυσαρεστεῖν, unlike ἀγανακτεῖν, is rarely felt on another’s behalf, but it occurs often as the result of a (perceived) wrong. This term is more prevalent in the Histories and exhibits a range of meanings. At 3.112.2, Polybius uses the term δυσαρεστεῖν to describe Lucius Aemilius’ feeling about the suitability of the land near Cannae for battle against Hannibal. Just as with emotional vocabulary in English, so too emotional vocabulary in Greek does not always convey a strong sense of emotion.179 A translation of “indignation,” let alone “resentment” or “disgust”, would not convey the correct sense here, whereas “dissatisfaction” would.180 In this passage, the term δυσαρεστεῖν denotes Aemilius’ disappointment and dissatisfaction with the topography rather than a strong moral reaction of disapprobation. However, Polybius chose the term δυσαρεστεῖν instead of another term for dissatisfaction.181 Aemilius’ reaction of disgruntlement (δυσαρεστεῖν) shows his thoughtfulness and accords with the correct judgment about the topography, thus strengthening his characterization as a sensible general. His sense of dissatisfaction (δυσαρεστεῖν) coincides with his rationale that the Romans should not do battle against Hannibal in this terrain at Cannae, which turned out – counterfactually – to be the correct attitude. At 3.8.9, Polybius argues against other writers’ depictions of the causes and outbreak of the Second Punic War, taking Fabius Pictor’s account into detail.182 He sets out how Pictor’s account contradicts itself. For, he writes, Pictor attested that the Carthaginians felt indignant with Hannibal (ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυσηρεστοῦντο), but their deeds, in Pictor’s same account, did not accord with this evaluation and emotional response against Hannibal.183 Polybius’ criticism stems from the contradiction between feeling and action. For his criticism to have force, the congruence between these must be strong. For Polybius, after one feels indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν), they should act upon such a feeling. However, in Pictor’s account, the Carthaginians grew indignant at Hannibal’s actions in Spain but did not act at all in accordance with their emotion. This means that, to Polybius, they were not indignant with Hannibal in the first place.

66  Individual Emotions in Context This example holds particular significance for understanding the place of emotion in Polybius’ historiography. Here, Polybius strives to disprove Pictor’s historical and factual accuracy based on an emotion. This passage is also thus a testament to the importance of looking beyond Aristotle’s list of emotions for a study of other authors. For Polybius, the evidence that the Carthaginians did not act on their indignation was sufficient to disprove the existence of that indignation as their emotional state. This shows that for Polybius not only does indignation seem to require later action but also that for emotion to be present in a historical account, it should be congruent with action and so have a purpose within the history. Of course, neither Pictor nor Polybius – nor anyone else – could ever prove or disprove the existence of Carthaginian indignation at that moment, but it is meaningful that Polybius holds indignation as recorded in a history to such a high standard of correspondence with agents’ behavior. Polybius also describes indignation when considering the end of the First Punic War. This falls within Polybius’ larger discussion of historical causation generally and specifically the causation of the Second Punic War. Leading up to the conclusion we examine here, Polybius discusses the pro-Carthaginian and proRoman accounts of the First Punic War by Philinus and Fabius Pictor, respectively. Polybius also takes care to present and explain the evidence of all the RomanoCarthaginian treaties he can find. To sum up this entire discussion of this evidence, Polybius states, If someone (τις) considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, that they took the Mamertines generally into their friendship and after this aided them in their moment of need, people (the Mamertines) who had betrayed not only the Messenians’ city but also that of the Rhegians, he would reasonably grow indignant (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν); but if someone considers that the Romans made the crossing against their own oaths and treaty, clearly he is ignorant.184 Within the example, Polybius is concerned with justice and what was right, appealing to people’s sensibilities. To feel indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν) is the result of considering moral factors, such as the breaking of agreements by the Mamertines. Polybius’ unspecified observer, τις, considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily to aid these reprehensible Mamertines to have been wrong ethically, which the emotion of indignation conveys. As a final example of the nuances of the term δυσαρεστεῖν, let us investigate how Scipio Africanus shapes a sense of indignation in his speech to mutinying soldiers in Spain.185 In this speech, Scipio Africanus establishes a series of reasons for revolt and then eliminates them. That soldiers feel indignant or are dissatisfied (τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι δυσαρεστῶσιν) with present affairs is the second of Scipio’s list of three possible reasons to mutiny, and it is the reason for which Scipio thinks his soldiers revolted.186 He then focuses on the reason behind the soldiers’ indignation. He states that they are indignant that he did not provide their food allowance (Ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε, διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν

Individual Emotions in Context 67 οὐκ ἀποδίδουν). But, he counters, he did pay them what they were owed while he was their leader. Perhaps it is over past debts from Rome?187 Scipio elides answering this claim directly but rather shifts his attention to the correct response to this indignation. If past arrears from Rome motivated the soldiers to grow indignant and thus to revolt, Scipio asks if it would not have been better to call on and speak with him about it or at least to gather their friends to aid them in their claim rather than to revolt from their country and home.188 At this point, Scipio demonstrates the moral superiority of this choice, talking to him, over revolting through comparison with mercenaries, emphasis on the high stakes of citizen fighters, such as his audience, and analogy with parricide in response to a debt.189 Scipio concludes this portion of his speech by asking again at what they were indignant (Τί οὖν ἐστιν, ἐφ΄ ᾧ δυσαρεστούμενοι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἡμῖν τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἐποιήσασθε;). He takes their choice not to speak with him as evidence that they had no reason or claim to indignation at all.190 Scipio’s speech centers on the convergence of rationality and indignation. In this speech, the use of δυσαρεστεῖν means something between “dissatisfaction” and “indignation”. Scipio focuses his attention on the motivations for the soldiers’ feeling and on their response to it. Scipio’s interest in why the soldiers feel indignation reflects the significance of an emotion’s import and rationality. By skipping directly from motivation to the impropriety of revolting, Scipio challenges the import of the soldiers’ indignation. He contrasts mercenaries fighting for pay with citizens fighting for their families and country.191 This contrast challenges the mutineers’ concern over owed pay and implies that they should care more about their families and country, that is, what should be the true import for any emotion they have. In this shifting of import, Scipio directly points out that they responded disproportionately to their indignation. They chose to revolt when conversation with him would have been a proportional response. Moreover, by shifting the import, Scipio denies their claim to feel indignation appropriately; they should not have felt indignation based on such motivating factors as pay instead of the safety of their loved ones. Scipio directly eliminates indignation from the picture when he says that the mutineers had no reason behind this emotion. He takes the mutineers’ disproportionate response and avoidance of the easier, proportionate response as evidence for a lack of reason for indignation. Thus, Scipio’s speech highlights important factors for understanding indignation. Motivation, import, and response are essential for this emotion. In sum, δυσαρεστεῖν represents a light version of “indignation,” as etymologically “dis-pleasure” (δυσ-αρεστεῖν), and therefore closer to dissatisfaction and so easier to assuage. However, it often carries the moral implications of indignation, which, in this passage, Scipio argued did not exist for the mutineers, and thus they should not have felt indignation proper. The last term which Polybius uses to express indignation, προσκοπή, falls between offense, resentment, or disgust.192 This emotion clearly marks a deeper level of indignation than the term δυσαρέστησις, for several times Polybius uses the combination οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστεῖν. . . ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόπτειν.193 Polybius thus uses the term προσκοπή to portray the depth and vehemence of a character’s indignation. The active usage of indignation (προσκοπή) emphasizes the causation of the

68  Individual Emotions in Context emotion rather than the subjects’ feeling and experience of it and denotes causing offense. Isocrates, according to Polybius, caused the Greeks offense (προσέκοπτε) at his talkative and accusatory nature.194 Conversely, Polybius explains his choice of varying his proper name with first-person pronouns by stating that he does not want to cause any offense (προσκόπτωμεν) in his readers.195 In his character assessment of Hannibal, Polybius explains that because Hannibal had to abandon some places which he had promised to protect, some people resented (or were disgusted with) his impiety (προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν) while others condemned his savagery.196 In this example, the subjects’ evaluation and experience are highlighted. All three of these terms represent feelings of indignation in ways new to historiography. Moreover, none of these responses are depicted by Polybius as irrational. These terms represent a range of feelings centered on the idea of indignation, from a response grounded in a sense of morality to a perceived disadvantage, such as Aemilianus’ dissatisfaction with the terrain at Cannae, grounded in his (moral) duty to preserve his troops, to unfairness, such as the Romans’ indignation that the Carthaginians commandeered supplies, or to severe violation of human rights, such as the Italians’ reactions to Hannibal’s impiety during the later phases of the Second Punic War. These three terms τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, and προσκοπή thus represent a spectrum of indignant responses, ranging from mere dissatisfaction to taking offense and feeling righteous indignation.197 Shame

Shame, αἰσχύνη and its cognates, is a felt sensation, according to Aristotle in Konstan’s analysis.198 Shame denotes moral appropriateness and conformity to social norms.199 Polybius portrays two types of shame – internalized shame, which Aristotle addresses in the Rhetoric, and social shame (or lack of it) as a judgment made by others concerning one’s conduct. Sara Ahmed in Cultural Politics of Emotions stresses that shame in both types is felt by a subject based on the subject’s falling short of an ideal self and is crucially witnessed by others, which finds parallels in the Histories.200 One can feel ashamed of one’s own conduct, but witnesses can also deem one shameful, or shameless, based on the subject’s conduct in relation to communal ideals. Polybius teaches his audience in what context it would be appropriate and socially responsible to feel shame, for often the narrator or external observers note the shame which follows actions. Social shame (αἰσχύνη) occurs more often than internalized shame in the Histories and concerns social reputation and virtue. For example, Polybius states that one man brought shame through his actions to the reputation of the Cleitorians as those who love freedom and nobility (τὸ μὲν γὰρ Κλειτορίων φιλελεύθερον καὶ γενναῖον εἷς ἀνὴρ κατῄσχυνε διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κακίαν).201 The Cleitorians, however, claimed that this man was not actually a Cleitorian but the son of a soldier from Orchomenos. One man’s shameful actions jeopardize the entire community’s reputation, something of great value as seen by the Cleitorians’ attempts to distance themselves from the shameful outlier. Moreover, Polybius regards this

Individual Emotions in Context 69 distancing claim as reasonable (εἰκότως), again showing both the important connection between shame and reputation and the value of witnesses for judging the Cleitorians. The Cleitorians’ own past record of loving nobility supports their claim that the man was not one of them, at least in Polybius’ account. In this passage, the subject does not internalize the feeling of shame, but rather witnesses seek to distance themselves from this man’s reputation because of the social stigma he might attach to them by association. However, αἰσχύνη occasionally involves a strong, internalized, affective feeling in Polybius’ Histories.202 Polybius centers directly upon the issue of emotional, felt shame versus detached judgmental shame (αἰσχύνη) in describing Aratus’ dying by poison at Philip V’s orders. As Philip unsuccessfully attacked Messene, Polybius says, he showed great lack of restraint against those closest to him (εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τῶν φίλων τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν ἐναπεδείξατο).203 For, through a slow-acting poison, Philip killed Aratus, who felt that Philip’s attack of Messene was wrong (δυσαρεστηθέντα τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένοις ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ).204 To add to the scale of Philip’s wrongdoing, Aratus knew that Philip was poisoning him.205 Polybius sums up that “thus modesty is a great and noble thing,” when Aratus, although the victim, felt ashamed at what was happening rather than the perpetrator Philip (οὕτως ἐστὶ μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν χρῆμα μετριότης, ὥστε μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος ᾐσχύνετο τὸ γεγονός).206 This charged statement lays bare the usual working and understanding of shame. Clearly, Polybius thought that Philip should have felt shame. His actions met with disapprobation by the narrator and observers, yet Philip clearly did not experience internalized, reflective shame. Aratus, on the other hand, felt the emotion of shame, even though his actions did not merit disapprobation – rather the opposite: he aided Philip in many exploits, which further highlights Philip’s shamelessness.207 Aratus’ internalized shame thus exalts the nobility and virtue of his character, to Philip’s discredit.208 Polybius focuses more on the correct course of action to avoid shame than on the dynamics of internalized shame.209 For example, Polybius comments on the shamefulness of the content of previous writers, teaching his readers to avoid that kind of history.210 The terms Polybius uses, αἰσχύνη and αἰσχρός, have high moral content, and whenever they are used, they chastise bad behavior and inculcate good morals. Appropriateness features prominently in this emotion, and in fact shame might be described better as the emotion of inappropriateness. It corresponds with Konstan’s observation that it constitutes an outward-oriented judgment; that is, external observers’ judgment forms the crucial motivating factor for the subject’s feeling shame.211 Should shame (αἰσχύνη) be called an emotion? Shame is more of a moral judgment than an emotion. Shame, as a moral judgment, most often is framed from the perspective of an observer or the narrator, and it reflects back to the observer’s own values and standards. As with many emotions, with shame the characters who elicit shame do not recognize their own shame. In fact, their ignorance often motivates identification of shame by the narrator or observer. Since shame in this form lacks any feeling, it works more as a moral or a judgment than an emotion. Who

70  Individual Emotions in Context would feel this shame, after all? The narrator or observer would not. The characters viewed are oblivious to their shame, even though they should have felt it. In these cases, no true subject experiencing and feeling the emotion exists. Conclusion

The emotions of disapproval each operates on its own script, but they share several key features. They involve negative affect and feel bad. This stems from the motivation or reason behind the emotion, which leads the subject to action. Morality often plays a large role with these emotions. We saw that historiography broadens Aristotle’s more constrained specifications, which should not cause surprise. Ancient historians claimed to depict reality, and the lack of constraints on portraying emotion follows this purpose. Within this genre, Polybius largely follows the “realistic” portrayals of emotions of disapproval by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, but even within this category of emotions, Polybius’ expansiveness and broader use of emotion can be seen. Emotions of Anticipation Fear and hope feature throughout the narrative of the Histories. Stoics classified fear and hope together as the two future-oriented – hence anticipatory – emotions, incorporating either negative or positive affect. Polybius and the rest of the Greek historians use these two emotions most frequently of all the emotional terms studied here.212 Along with the affective states of courage and shock, fear and hope most often occur within the narrative of military events. They both affect characters’ military and political decisions. As opposed to the category of negative emotions, fear and hope do not share a strong connection to moral evaluation. Fear

For the Stoics, fear represented the future unpreferred emotion.213 Fear to Aristotle represented pain at some future event.214 For one to fear something, however, the threat must be close, for people do not fear something that is remote.215 Konstan clarifies that fear acts as a response to a danger, especially to an enemy in a position to do one harm.216 For Aristotle, in Konstan’s analysis, fear represents the most universal of all emotions, for even animals feel it. However, for humans, Aristotle also found that fear led people on the whole to become more deliberative, not irrational.217 Within Polybius’ Histories, fear functions largely to motivate or explain actions, similar to the (other) negative emotions, but it uniquely often is used in a causal sense of intending to inspire fear. Lastly, Polybius’ description of the Romans’ fear after their army’s defeat at Lake Trasimene in the Second Punic War provides insight into Polybius’ portrayal of Roman character. Polybius’ usage of fear, whether derived from φόβος or δέος, corresponds to Aristotle’s description of fear.218 All the fear words (φόβος, δεδιότες, etc.) are intentional: the subject feels fear of someone or some situation. The adjective φόβερος

Individual Emotions in Context 71 reverses the intent: one who is fearsome (φόβερος) causes fear rather than feeling fear. Fear can be a tactic (“scare tactics” literally), a motivator for positive or negative ends, or a sign of strength, youth, desperation, or inexperience. Characters intend to create fear most often of the emotions, and the vocabulary for fear reflects this type of usage, with both active and passive forms.219 Marie-Rose Guelfucci in her article “La peur dans l’oeuvre de Polybe” synthesizes Polybius’ usage of fear in the Histories.220 She argues that Polybius utilizes fear for a political purpose: good generals manage fear, while bad ones do not. Guelfucci focuses most on Roman generals, although other leaders also manage fear. For example, Hannibal deliberately instills fear (φόβος) in others.221 Hasdrubal also utilizes the Numidian cavalry at Cannae due to its excellence in causing fear (φόβος) to those fleeing, an action which Polybius praises.222 Demetrius of Pharos recognizes the Romans’ fear of Carthage and tries to use it to his advantage, thus showing good generalship in understanding his enemy.223 Moreover, Guelfucci notes the prominent use of fear in Book 6 of the Histories. Fear imposes restraint on the different components of the Roman mixed constitution, deterring the People, Senate, or consuls from overstepping their allotted powers. Fear also compels the Roman soldiers to maintain their renowned discipline. In sum, Guelfucci persuasively draws out the political importance of fear in Polybius’ account of Roman institutions and in the Histories as a whole. Fear in Polybius’ Histories could play a beneficial role. After the battle of Trebia early in the Second Punic War, the defeated general, Tiberius Gracchus, sent a deceptive report to Rome.224 However, the news trickled into the city that the Romans had lost, and Polybius describes the extensive preparations that the Romans began.225 For, Polybius explains, the Romans become most fearsome when a true fear surrounds them (Τότε γάρ εἰσι φοβερώτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῇ φόβος ἀληθινός).226 Here, the true fear (ἀληθινὸς φόβος) does not have a stated import. One must read in “for survival” or something similar from the context. A complete system of fear exists: the Romans both cause fear and feel fear. Not only that, they cause fear because they feel fear. Moreover, the object of the adjective “most fearsome” (φοβερώτατοι) is left unstated. Such a generalizing statement comes closest to Polybius using emotion to depict a group’s identity or disposition. Although Polybius is explaining why the Romans immediately began such extensive preparations, the generalized nature of this economy of fear carries significance for understanding the Romans broadly and links with Polybius’ emphasis on the Romans’ persistence after Cannae.227 Likewise, fearing saves the Carthaginians at one point in their crossing of the Alps. Polybius states that they would have all been destroyed if they were not afraid (ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ ἂν ἄρδην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ μὴ δεδιότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσόν).228 Because they feared the treachery of some inhabitants in the Alps, the Carthaginians prepared for a surprise attack, placing the heavy infantry in the rear, which the Gallic tribe indeed attacked. Fear motivates the Carthaginians here to make strategic decisions, saving, as Polybius attests, their whole force.229 Fear could bring beneficial results. It was not necessary for anyone, even a good general, to recognize, let alone control, the fear for it to have positive effects.230

72  Individual Emotions in Context Lastly, Polybius emphasizes repeatedly the fear Romans felt after their catastrophe at Cannae.231 This suits his narrative purpose in marking Cannae as an extraordinary event and building on his earlier generalization that in fear the Romans become most fearsome.232 Fear dramatizes the desperation of the situation and helps to justify Polybius’ decision to divert from the historical narrative to discuss Rome’s constitutional strengths. Hope

The term which denotes hope, ἐλπίς, one of the most frequent (potentially) emotional terms in Polybius’ Histories, conveys a range of meanings which align with the concepts of hope, expectation, plans, fortunes, or even (material) resources. Polybius mentions this term (ἐλπίς) more often than the negative emotions combined (anger (ὀργή), hate (μῖσος), resentment (φθόνος), indignation (δυσαρέστησις, τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκοπή), jealousy (ζηλοτυπία), and shame (αἰσχύνη)).233 This term ἐλπίς (with its cognates) challenges our parameters for emotion, for it often does not have emotional content in its usages. This section complicates the conception of hope by examining different scripts of ἐλπίς in the Histories, using Douglas Cairns’ and Laurel Fulkerson’s analyses of this term for comparison. The Stoics conceptualized hope (ἐλπίς) as the preferred future-oriented emotion and as the opposite of fear. For the Stoics, hope represented the desire for something which one could prefer at a future time but which was indifferent in terms of virtue. So one would hope (ἐλπίζειν) for a friend’s recovery from illness and good health. While this was not necessary for the Stoic to be a good, virtuous person, the objects of one’s hope could make life more comfortable; hence, ἐλπίς was considered a preferred indifferent.234 In his analysis of metaphors for hope in Archaic and Classical Greek, Douglas Cairns recently found that Greek hope (ἐλπίς) could have an affective element (feeling hopeful) as well as denote general expectation. While this term had positive connotations for humans, it could be unreliable and deceptive.235 Likewise, Laurel Fulkerson analyzed the working of hope (ἐλπίς) within Plutarch’s texts, focusing on the Lives.236 Fulkerson notes the wide ground that this term covers in Plutarch’s corpus, between “hope” and “expectation”, comparable to Polybius’ usage. She rationalizes the convergence of these meanings by postulating that “my best guess about what is likely to happen is, very regularly, likely to be also the thing I would most like to happen.”237 In this optimistic interpretation, the two senses of “expectation” and “hope” thus inform each other. A  word in English which comes close to covering this nuance is “prospect”, which implies waiting on or expecting something positive in the future. In her analysis of Plutarch’s corpus, Fulkerson found that Plutarch used ἐλπίς three to four times more frequently in the Lives than in the Moralia.238 Polybius uses hopes (ἐλπίδες) similarly to the usages identified by both Cairns and Fulkerson. On the one hand, hopes represent something positive for humans, but on the other they can be unreliable, and, similar to the increased usage of this term in Plutarch’s Lives, they are closely correlated

Individual Emotions in Context  73 with action. As the most common emotional term in Polybius’ Histories, hopes occur most frequently in narrative military contexts rather than in the digressions or explanations in which we often see the other emotions. Let us examine narrative usages of this term in Polybius’ Histories. States trust in the prospects (ἐλπίδες) of themselves or their allies and share the same prospects as their allies, where the affective feeling of hopes does not fit as well as expectations, fortunes, or goals.239 Their expectations (ἐλπίδες) are not anything ethereal or insubstantial; rather, they are the foreseeable outcome and future result of the state’s actions and involve risk, chance, and a future orientation. These ἐλπίδες represent chances or prospects, as when a commander or state chooses to follow a line of action based on the prospect or chance of a better outcome.240 These examples come close to an unemotional meaning of expectation.241 Within this usage, ἐλπίδες of salvation (τῆς σωτερίας) may contain some connotations of hope.242 The calculated nature of this term in Polybius’ narrative creates difficulty in distinguishing emotional connotations of hope from an unemotional sense of expectation.243 This presents a fact that we may not find comfortable in English usage, as we usually hope when we cannot (or choose not to) reason out and make decisions to change our lives accordingly. We hope when we have no control. The difficulty we may have with the connotations of hope (ἐλπίς) stems from our own preconceptions of the dichotomy between reason versus emotion. A good example of the ambiguity the term ἐλπίς has in the Histories comes in Scipio Africanus’ speech to his mutinying troops in Spain, in which we analyzed his deconstruction of indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν).244 After Scipio eliminated indignation as a valid reason for why the soldiers revolt, he turned to the third in his list of general reasons soldiers revolt: to strive for greater and nobler prospects (μειζόνων . . . καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων).245 Scipio challenges the soldiers to think of when Rome had more benefits, prosperity, and more prospects for the soldiers (πότε δὲ τοῖς στρατευομένοις μείζους ἐλπίδες ἢ νῦν;).246 He brings up a counterargument, couched in the words of a despondent person, that Rome’s enemies have more profits and greater and steadier prospects (Ἀλλ’ ἴσως τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων ὅτι πλείω τὰ λυσιτελῆ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς προυφαίνετο καὶ μείζους ἐλπίδες καὶ βεβαιότεραι).247 Scipio responds by asking who these enemies are. He states that Andobales and Mandonius, two native leaders in Spain, had revolted from the Carthaginians before and now are traitors to their Roman alliance. He snidely comments on how noble it would be to trust them and thus betray one’s country.248 Moreover, Scipio tells the soldiers that these enemies have no power comparable to the Romans. The mutineers do not have hopes even of conquering Spain, with or without Andobales (Οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν αὑτοῖς εἴχετε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς κρατήσοντες τῆς Ἰβηρίας).249 As with his refutation of the soldiers’ indignation, Scipio ends by questioning the existence of their hopes or expectations at all. Throughout this passage and the Histories, the term ἐλπίδες renders concepts with connotations ranging from prospects to hopes, expectations, or even plans. There is little resemblance to emotion. Instead, as throughout the narrative in general, prospects (ἐλπίδες) function as a part of calculation. Thus, the Romans,

74  Individual Emotions in Context according to Scipio, can say they have better prospects than their enemies, in an objective sense. Scipio denies any grounds for the soldiers’ prospects, again using the features of emotion to deny the soldiers any rationale for their revolt. The compound εὔελπις, however, conveys an emotional, positive outlook and wish for the future in the Histories. Characters become hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) over events they did not expect to happen so positively, and they modify their behavior to try to take advantage of their positive turn of affairs. In negotiations to end the war between the Aetolians and the Romans, Polybius states that the Aetolians became hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) at the outset, when the Roman commanders seemed willing to negotiate terms.250 However, their hopefulness leads to greater disappointment, for the Romans do not offer any better terms than those already offered.251 Their hopefulness, then, only leads them to a deeper disappointment than they would have experienced. Later in the Histories, the Achaeans become hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) at what seems to be a favorable state of affairs for them with the Romans, and so they send another embassy to ask the Romans to release those Achaeans detained after the Third Macedonian War, of whom Polybius was one. The Romans deny this request. While I doubt that Polybius disapproved of the Achaeans’ embassy, especially since Polybius himself pressed for the release, he still portrayed actions based on feeling hopeful (εὐέλπιδες) as likely to fail.252 The dual nature of hope as a positive feeling but often leading to or connected with dubious results leads into Polybius’ portrayal of positive affects. Emotions of Positive Affect Positive emotions, or emotions which express feeling good, though frequent in the Histories, lack a causal function in the dynamics of the narrative.253 Unlike the emotions of disapproval, they do not motivate action or stimulate any change. Unlike anticipatory emotions, they do not look ahead but serve as reactions to past and present events. Moreover, these emotions lack major characteristics of typical emotions such as intentionality or result. What do positive emotions or feelings, then, do in the Histories if they both lack such important features and have little-to-no strategic or practical value? Positive emotions in general seem to add description and enhance the continuity of the narrative, especially in light of the historiographical motif of showing the rises and falls of states. In this section, discussion of common positive emotions draws out how they enhance the narrative and can have complicated or even negative consequences.254 Joy and Gladness

Joy (χαρά) occurs solely as a result. It does not motivate further action.255 For example, at the end of the Second Punic War, Polybius describes the return of Scipio Africanus to Rome and explains why he received great pomp and goodwill: For the Romans never expected (Οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν ἐλπίσαντες) to expel Hannibal from Italy nor to relieve the danger over themselves and their relatives;

Individual Emotions in Context 75 but at that time seeming already not only to be securely free from all fear and trouble (οὐ μόνον ἐκτὸς γεγονέναι πάντος φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως) but also seeming to rule over their enemies, they did not cease from joy (οὐ κατέλιπον χαρᾶς).256 Here we observe several aspects of a positive feeling. Joy comes only at the successful termination of a negative state of being (φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως), one which seemed interminable. Thus, it is a response to the unexpected (οὐδέποτε. . . ἐλπίσαντες). This positive emotion represents a result and dramatizes the reversal of fortune or expectations. This positive emotion therefore fits into one of the purposes of historiography as stated in Herodotus’ prologue – to highlight the rise and falling of states.257 The joy expressed by the Romans in this passage may not function on such a grand level, but it vivifies the narrative by focusing on the experience of the participants.258 The only actions to come from the joy are intended solely as expressions of emotion, not as actions with further, pragmatic consequences.259 Likewise, the Greeks at the Isthmian Games nearly kill Flamininus in expressing their joy (διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς μικροῦ διέφθειραν τὸν Τίτον εὐχαριστοῦντες).260 This comes the closest example in the Histories of joy as a motivation for future action, but joy merely motivates expression of the emotion itself – danger to Flamininus was a clearly unintended side effect of the emotion.261 Joy as a result always follows something directly, but it does not directly lead to future action. It is wholly concerned with the dire or less preferable circumstances of the recent past and the surprisingly better present.262 Gladness (ἀσμενίζω/ἀσμένως) works similarly to joy but denotes less intensity of feeling and also does not drastically affect the turn of events.263 People react to unexpected results in their favor with gladness.264 Subjects continue upon their path when they are in a good mood (ἄσμενοι).265 For example, the guard at Tarentum opened the gate gladly for the citizen who then betrayed the city to the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War because he was accustomed to doing so for this man’s hunting excursions.266 The fact that Achaeus gladly listened to the Pednelissians’ request for aid (τοῦ δ’ ἀσμένως ὑπακούσαντος) motivates them to endure enthusiastically being besieged by the Selgians (οὗτοι μὲν εὐθαρσῶς ὑπέμενον τὴν πολιορκίαν).267 In this case, the gladness of another is enough to keep the Pednelissians confident in their course of action. Finally, Polybius mentions when people feel glad or pleased at a result, but he also describes it as a sentiment fit for a child, which reflects the simplicity of this emotion’s role in the narrative.268 Gratitude

Polybius’ widespread use of the term χάρις corresponds with Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle’s restrictive definition of this term. Konstan argues that, for Aristotle, χάρις denoted “gratitude”.269 Konstan, interpreting Aristotle, found that gratitude (χάρις) needed to occur directly in response to an action to be an emotion, as opposed to a favor. Konstan argued that Aristotle postulates a specific definition for gratitude (χάρις) which suits his own theoretical and rhetorical purposes but which

76  Individual Emotions in Context did not find many parallels within Classical literature.270 Polybius uses gratitude (χάρις) not in a restricted sense as Aristotle advocates but as a term which often denotes a concrete favor, thanks, grace, as well as gratitude.271 This term, χάρις, functions as a calculated, not felt, sentiment in Polybius’ Histories. “Thank” can often serve as a fitting parallel in English, but again the reciprocity and calculated, pragmatic nature of the term χάρις renders it, much like the term ἔλπις, as not much of an emotion.272 Gentleness

Polybius’ use of the term πρᾳότης highlights the restricted nature of Aristotle’s definitions and illuminates the differences between and complexities inherent in dispositional traits and emotions. Aristotle defines gentleness (πρᾳότης) as the opposite of anger. In his analysis of Aristotle, Konstan translates πρᾳότης as “satisfaction” because it thus represents the feeling one experiences after revenge, which Aristotelian anger (ὀργή) necessitates.273 This definition and its translation into English as “satisfaction” rely on the dichotomy Aristotle establishes between opposite emotions and rely on the specificity of his definition of anger (ὀργή). Konstan notes that in ancient Greek literature no uniform definition prevailed, ranging from concepts of gentleness, calm, satisfaction, self-importance, and even confidence. Konstan demonstrates that Aristotle made a forced argument and characterized gentleness (πρᾳότης) with the sense “satisfaction” has in English to match gentleness (πρᾳότης) as the opposite of anger (ὀργή).274 Instead, Konstan sees gentleness (πρᾳότης) function in Classical literature as a quality which leads to Polybian benevolence (φιλανθρωπία) and Roman clementia.275 Polybius’ usage of gentleness (πρᾳότης) does not contrast with anger (ὀργή), although it does contrast with behavior guided by passion (θυμός).276 Interestingly, Polybius uses this term and its cognates far more frequently than the other extant historians.277 This term for Polybius generally denotes a positive trait, demonstrating mildness and clemency, and at times gentleness (πρᾳότης) functions more like a dispositional trait than an emotion.278 Polybius’ narrative of the release of Iberian hostages from the Carthaginians to the Romans’ credit displays the nuances of gentleness (πρᾳότης).279 After Hannibal departed for his Italian campaign, he left Bostar in charge of the Carthaginian forces at Saguntum, where he also left hostages taken from the Iberian leaders who did not have sons to accompany him to Italy.280 An Iberian ally serving with Bostar, Abilux, was wealthy, of good repute, and loyal to Carthage, but he saw the Roman successes in Spain and considered their prospects (ἐλπίδες) better than those of the Carthaginians. Polybius comments that Abilux contemplated his betrayal of the Carthaginians with an Iberian and barbarian rationale (συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν).281 Because he thinks he will become influential with the Romans if he betrays the Carthaginians, Abilux plots to release the Carthaginians’ Iberian hostages to the credit of Rome. Abilux observes that Bostar is naturally mild (πρᾷος τῇ φύσει), and so he argues to Bostar that he should release the Iberian hostages

Individual Emotions in Context 77 because the Romans are drawing near and because such a release would gain the Carthaginians much-needed goodwill from the Iberians, to which Bostar agrees.282 At this point, Abilux crosses to the Roman camp and makes the same argument: if Abilux betrayed the Iberian hostages, the Romans would benefit and gain the goodwill of the Iberians and a good reputation.283 The Romans agree, and after Abilux receives the hostages from Bostar, he goes to the Roman camp, receives rewards from them, and then proceeds to the Iberian cities, releasing the hostages in Rome’s name and praising the Romans’ mildness and magnanimity (πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία).284 When the Carthaginians hear of Abilux’s treachery, Bostar barely escapes with his life, being judged to have acted more naively (παιδικώτερον) than a man of his age should.285 Throughout this narrative, Abilux both controls events and forms the focus for the passage. Abilux decides to betray the captives for Rome, sees that Bostar is mild and acts on it, and frames the Carthaginians’ and Romans’ decisions with his speeches. Polybius explicitly calls Abilux’s rationale treacherous and barbaric. This shows his disapproval of this type of behavior, and Abilux’s behavior both in becoming a traitor and double-crossing for his own benefit finds other parallels disapproved by Polybius.286 Thus, Polybius implies that Abilux’s considerations and plan should not be emulated, though Abilux seems to have profited at the time. Polybius also frames Bostar’s mild disposition through Abilux’s perspective. This usage of gentleness (πρᾳότης) seems more like a disposition than an emotion, for it implies Bostar is habitually and inherently mild. Moreover, Abilux judges he can take advantage of Bostar because he is πρᾷος – naive – by nature. Abilux indeed succeeds in deceiving Bostar, which costs Bostar dearly: Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians blamed Bostar so much that he almost lost his life. Clearly, having a mild (πρᾷος) disposition can have negative effects. Despite this, Abilux speaks of gentleness (πρᾳότης) as a positive and desirable trait. He boasts of the Romans’ gentleness and nobility (πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία) to the Iberians, showing that gentleness (πρᾳότης) was the goal of this episode – both the Carthaginians and the Romans wanted to release the hostages to gain such a reputation.287 Moreover, both Bostar and the Romans react in the same way to Abilux’s similar speeches. Since Bostar’s mild disposition led him to trust Abilux, the Romans too could be said to share this quality in their trust of Abilux. Thus, they both can be characterized with gentleness (πρᾳότης) in a sense: they both acquiesce to Abilux’s arguments and, because of their desire to show gentleness (πρᾳότης), are both susceptible to whatever outcome he decides. Thus, gentleness (πρᾳότης) as a trait, virtue, and vice plays a complicated role in this passage. Bostar fails and suffers for his gentleness (πρᾳότης), but the Romans benefit for their identical decision and their gentleness (πρᾳότης). In Polybius’ text, gentleness (πρᾳότης) is a desirable and positive trait, but, when one like Abilux takes advantage of it, it can lead to negative results. This corresponds with the trend in positive emotions seen so far that overreliance or overreaction to the emotion can lead to detriment, but this term πρᾳότης does not carry the same kind of emotional content.

78  Individual Emotions in Context Love288

This discussion focuses on the term ἔρως because it most closely relates to any emotional content covered by the label “love” in Polybius’ Histories. Polybius, along with Herodotus and Thucydides, treats love or, more accurately, sexual desire (ἔρως) as an impediment to a statesman.289 However, Polybius uses the terms for a lover or beloved in a homoerotic relationship in two charged political contexts, in which Polybius relies on the strength of this emotional bond to represent effectively the extent and nature of the historical agents’ political relationships. Within the text, Polybius mentions this term (ἔρως, or the verb, ἐρᾶν) as a sign of undue bias for a historian or a sign of depravity and extreme unsuitability for a monarch or citizen.290 Men who fall in love (ἔρασθαι) lack good judgment.291 Polybius often links sexual desire (ἔρως) with drinking and music.292 In the correlations between sexual desire and drinking, the emotion itself becomes inherently negative: Polybius uses this term as evidence for why an individual deserves censure or repudiation. However, in an exceptional usage, Polybius calls Philip V the beloved (ἐρώμενος) of the Greeks when he was young because of his eager promotion of their interests (καθόλου γε μήν, εἰ δεῖ μικρὸν ὑπερβολικώτερον εἰπεῖν, οἰκειότατ’ ἂν οἶμαι περὶ Φιλίππου τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι, διότι κοινός τις οἷον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως εὐεργετικόν).293 Polybius qualifies this phrase, saying that it is extravagant (ὑπερβόλικον) but also most pertinent (οἰκειότατ’) to describe Philip V this way. Throughout the Histories, the beloved (ἐρώμενος) reflects the bad character of their lovers. Apelles, the crooked and scheming courtier of Philip V, finally faces punishment for his plots against Philip and his allies.294 Polybius says that Philip imprisoned Apelles, his son, and his ἐρώμενος, and that a few days later these lost their lives, as they deserved. The ἐρώμενος was implicated and punished simply for his association with Apelles.295 Likewise, Polybius extols Scipio Aemilianus’ moderation and prudence as a youth when most young Roman men were engrossed with ἐρώμενοι or hetairai, paying even a whole talent for an ἐρώμενος.296 Neither of these examples admittedly contains much emotional content. However, that fact shows just how unimportant the emotion of “love” was as an emotion in the Histories. Associations with an ἐρώμενος reflected poorly on a character, consistent with Polybius’ use of the term ἔρως. However, when referring to Philip V and the Greeks, this emotional relationship carries additional connotations of power. As seen in the other Polybian examples, the ἐρώμενος has little power or agency and is dependent on his lover for political status. Apelles’ ἐρώμενος, for example, has no other identity except his relationship to Apelles, and in this role he is held as complicit with Apelles’ misdeeds. By calling Philip the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks, Polybius implicitly transfers this dependence and potentially places him in a position of lower status than the Greeks. Polybius’ other examples of ἐρώμενοι, such as Scipio Aemilianus’ avoidance of them, imply that this relationship between the Greeks and Philip reflects poorly on their dispositions or characters: the Greeks, being too caught up with affection for Philip, may have made mistaken choices due to their infatuation.297

Individual Emotions in Context 79 In context, however, these negative connotations counter Polybius’ main point that Philip’s character changed over time from better to worse, under different influences. Emma Nicholson argues that, in fact, Polybius uses this term to reflect the peak of Philip V’s career.298 Nicholson demonstrates how the social connotations of this term of being a youth educated in elite Greek social norms are present in Philip’s case. However, Nicholson continues, Philip’s actions afterwards put him in the role of a man. His turn to thinking about the West presents him outside this role. Nicholson argues that this self-consciously hyperbolic term and usage by Polybius aligns with Greek experience up to this point in the narrative: Philip exceeded expectations in caring for the affairs of his Greek allies, and so the use of this hyperbolic term furthers the disappointment and reversal of opinion or reputation portrayed in Philip’s next actions. Nicholson concludes that the term ἐρώμενος “must have been incorporated deliberately for rhetorical effect: by declaring that Philip was ‘the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks’ Polybius intensifies the king’s relationship with them and brings about an emotional quality to its interpretation.”299 My analysis supports Nicholson’s argument. In calling Philip the Greeks’ ἐρώμενος, Polybius emphasized the esteem and goodwill of the Greeks for Philip, which enhanced Philip’s character. However, understanding the connotations of such erotic relationships highlights the flawed and shaky foundation of this relationship and both foreshadows the later degeneration of Philip’s character and casts the Greeks’ relationship with Philip in a critical light. Polybius provides a contrasting political metaphor of love (ἔρως). In introducing Aratus, the Achaean League hero, Polybius says that from the beginning Aratus was a lover (ἐραστής) of the Achaeans’ policy (προαίρεσις).300 This represents the only usage of the term ἐραστής, the lover in a pederastic relationship, in the extant Histories. Once again Polybius relies upon the intensity and strength of the emotional relationship to elucidate Aratus’ political stance. Unlike his qualifications in calling Philip an ἐρώμενος, in this passage Polybius does not qualify his term as a metaphor or analogy; Aratus simply is (γεγόναι) a lover (ἐραστής) of the political policy. The direct nature of this relation emphasizes the strength of Aratus’ ardor for the Achaean League. He acts as any lover would act to promote the interests of his beloved. As with the metaphor of Philip as a beloved (ἐρώμενος), this usage carries political connotations. Aratus holds a position of superiority over the Achaean League as its lover. Polybius’ politicized usage of lover here recalls Thucydides’ politicization of love in the Funeral Oration of Pericles in Book 2 of his history. Pericles encourages the citizens of Athens to become lovers (ἐραστεῖς) of their city, doing whatever needs to be done to win its approval.301 Aratus in Polybius’ text seems to fulfill this Periclean ideal, which, however, failed as a model in Thucydides’ history. Emotions of positive affect – while all denoting feeling good or a positive disposition – diverge greatly in their relation to other categories of emotions. Joy and kind feelings represent the end result of an event or series of events. Gentleness as a disposition and being a lover or beloved complicate this rosy picture and represent something which could – and often does – go awry.

80  Individual Emotions in Context Reflective Emotions Reflective emotions involve a subject witnessing another’s condition, reflecting on this in relation to themselves, and feeling for the other person. This reflection elicits a response of fellow-feeling. This category of emotions includes empathy, sympathy, and pity, each of which necessitates differing degrees of reflection and fellowfeeling. While the Greek terms on which the words “empathy” and “sympathy” are based do not necessarily correspond to the modern concepts, Polybius does describe reflective emotional processes which relate to these modern emotions. Sympathy and Empathy

The difference between empathy and sympathy is a disputed matter.302 At a basic level, empathy is agreed to denote a feeling or experience shared with another, whereas sympathy involves emotion felt on another’s behalf and is often concerned with the other’s welfare.303 Polybius is unique in his increased usage of the term συμπάθεια and interest in reflective emotions in general.304 In the Histories, συμπάθεια and its cognates (συμπαθής, συμπαθεῖν) cover the ground between both of the modern concepts of sympathy and empathy.305 In describing Roman customs which preserve virtue, Polybius states that the performance and similarity of those dressed as the deceased at Roman funerals infused empathy (συμπάθεια) with the deceased’s family into the whole audience, so much so that the family’s loss seems to become a public loss.306 This instance of empathy (συμπάθεια) creates a correspondence of feeling and the public’s identification with the family. This passage emphasizes that family and the public share the same experience here, which is the defining feature of empathy.307 Otherwise, the term συμπάθεια can range toward the English concept of sympathy.308 Agathocles of Egypt thinks that he has made his mercenaries sympathetic (συμπαθεῖς) to none of his predecessors in the Alexandrian court because he alone enlisted and paid them and because he got rid of his previous rivals in one way or another.309 Phylarchus, a Hellenistic historian whom Polybius criticizes, endeavored so much to make his readers sympathetic (συμπαθεῖς) to his characters that he provided extreme details of suffering unnecessarily.310 In both of these examples, Agathocles and Phylarchus intended to create emotion in others for themselves or the characters and, Polybius implies, failed. In both circumstances, the intent to create sympathy reflects poorly on these.311 However, one could inculcate sympathy to good effect. Polybius states explicitly that Scipio Africanus was naturally talented at making those he called upon to be sympathetic or enthusiastic toward him and his endeavors (πρὸς τὸ θάρσος ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιῆσαι τοὺς παρακαλουμένους).312 A form of empathy, perspective taking, appears in the Histories when Scipio Aemilianus famously sheds tears when viewing the fall of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War in 146 bce.313 Scipio Aemilianus, although the conquering general, cried and quoted Homer on the destruction of Troy but referred to his own city, Rome. Scipio’s reflection on the fall of Carthage, similar to Antiochus III’s reflection on his rival Achaeus’ fall from the height of prosperity to ignominious

Individual Emotions in Context 81 capture, marks Scipio as a good student of history: he reflected on the past fall of Troy, related it to the present circumstance of Carthage, and applied it to his own city of Rome in the future.314 Such perspective taking is part of the process of empathy, as defined in modern studies.315 Scipio’s emotional reaction of crying further exemplifies his empathetic concern. Pity

Aristotle and Polybius share views on pity, ἔλεος. Aristotle defined pity as a pain elicited from observing genuine suffering.316 He specified that the subject must be able to relate to the one pitied, as the same misfortune must present a potential threat on some level to the subject. Thus, Aristotle considered that those who have lost everything cannot feel pity, for they (think that they) do not have anything to lose. Likewise, those at the height of prosperity cannot feel pity because they think that nothing bad could happen to them. Moreover, one cannot pity those close to one, for then, Konstan interprets, the affect fades from pity to a self-oriented form of sympathy.317 Konstan summarizes Aristotle’s conception well: “To experience pity one has to recognize a resemblance with the sufferer, but at the same time not find oneself in precisely the same circumstances.”318 Since the Classical historians only rarely use this term, this analysis will focus on Polybius’ usages and how they relate to Aristotle’s parameters.319 Pity (ἔλεος) is a complex emotion in the Histories, for it is characterized by different and potentially contradictory processes or scripts.320 For Polybius, pity correlates closely with Aristotle’s parameters. External observers most often feel pity in the Histories, which aligns with Aristotle’s call for distance between subject and object.321 Polybius’ focalization of pity through an external observer allows the audience, also in the position of external observers, to recognize the similarity between themselves and the sufferers. That is, the observers see the one pitied and, because Polybius establishes them as pitiable, reflect in such a way as to understand how and why the character is pitied. Pity occurs in multidimensional contexts with anger (ὀργή), hate (μῖσος), shame (αἰσχύνη), and resentment (φθόνος).322 Pity, as compared to anger, occurs in response to an external situation and another’s condition, which then is reflected back to oneself. The feeling resulting from applying another’s condition to one’s own situation becomes pity.323 By comparison, anger (ὀργή) occurs as a personal feeling, oriented through oneself, and concerning oneself or one’s community. In his discussion of the impropriety committed by conquerors at 9.10, Polybius explicitly lays out the reflective process of pity, which then stirs anger for the conquerors: But whenever their prosperity increases and the victor gathers to himself all the others’ property, and he calls in some way those deprived to a display of these things, the evil is doubled. For no longer do the viewers pity the others, but they pity themselves, remembering their own misfortunes (Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἀναμιμνησκομένους τῶν οἰκείων συμπτωμάτων).324

82  Individual Emotions in Context Pitying, in this theory, requires self-reflection. In Book Two, Polybius qualifies when pity makes an appropriate response. Polybius first narrated the decision of the Epirotes to ally with the Illyrians against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, despite those leagues’ recent assistance for them after the Illyrians successfully raided Epirus.325 He states that when people suffer from no fault of their own, intelligent people pity and pardon them (Διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν ἔλεος ἕπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης καὶ ἐπικουρία). Otherwise, if some people brought on their own disaster through folly, intelligent people blame and reproach them (τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος καὶ ἐπιτίμησις συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν).326 Polybius distinguishes pity here as a response appropriate only to undeserved suffering, as opposed to merited suffering. Accordingly, the Epirotes brought on their own disasters through allying with the aggressive Illyrians, despite suffering from their previous raids. Polybius validates and strengthens this assessment when speaking of courtiers. He specifies that we are moved by pity when we observe someone genuinely overcome by the magnitude of his troubles (ὅταν μὲν αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός). However, when someone fakes such suffering to elicit pity, which Polybius often sees courtiers do, he stimulates only anger and hate (ἐπὰν δὲ φαίνηται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ’ ὀργὴν ἐξεργάζεται καὶ μῖσος).327 Again Polybius distinguishes pity as appropriate only in response to genuine suffering. However, those who deserve reproach and blame for suffering because of their own folly differ from those who fake their display of suffering: the latter do not necessarily suffer. They err not in the cause of their suffering but in their display. These parameters constrain how appropriate a response pity is. Others respond with pity only to undeserved suffering, displayed genuinely. Polybius’ discussion of the Abydenes’ decision to commit mass suicide at the threat of Philip V’s capture of their city illustrates this point.328 For, Polybius says, one would blame Fortune over the Abydenes’ misfortune, because Fortune immediately (παραυτίκα) straightens the downfall of those in misfortune, as if pitying them (οἷον ἐλεήσασα), by granting victory together with safety to the hopeless. However, for the Abydenes, Fortune had the opposite disposition.329 Fortune should have pitied the Abydenes because they did nothing to deserve Philip V’s attack and siege. Moreover, they took steps to fight against him nobly, and they as a whole decided on the honorable (and thus preferable in Polybius’ account) course of mass suicide as opposed to shameful surrender.330 Pity as a response to undeserved suffering was appropriate for the Abydenes’ situation, although such pity from Fortune failed to materialize here. However, in a different process, pity can carry connotations of shame. While shame and pity seem to entail opposite judgments of the object – reproach and sympathy – Polybius uses both to describe the same action, namely men throwing away their weapons and fleeing while being killed.331 Near the end of the Second Punic War, when Scipio Africanus set fire to the Carthaginian camp unexpectedly in the night, the rest of the Carthaginian men and animals in the camp died

Individual Emotions in Context  83 wretchedly and pitifully from the fire (ἀτυχῶς μὲν καὶ ἐλεεινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπώλλυντο).332 Some of these men dying pitifully also died shamefully and full of reproach (αἰσχρῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπονειδίστως), trying to escape the fire and being killed, though defenseless, by the enemy.333 The objects do not act nobly, but the situation and misfortune surrounding them genuinely overwhelm them as to cause pity. Living well and honorably to the end – a common Polybian theme – has import with the audience and narrator, and so they judge that those men die shamefully in throwing away their arms attempting to escape the fire.334 Moreover, for an aristocratic male, invoking pity did not receive social approbation. Scipio Africanus tells his troops before the battle of Zama at the end of the Second Punic War that those who flee battle have the most shameful and most pitiable life left (οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες αἴσχιστον καὶ ἐλεεινότατον τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον).335 Scipio leaves no room for distinction between these two terms of shame and pity. Falling prey to such circumstances in the first place, and thus becoming pitiable, was considered shameful. Not suffering unforeseen, utterly destructive, and inescapable misfortune also holds import for the audience and narrator, so they also pity those men who have no options but to die one way or another. These sentiments create the multidimensional emotional response of shame and pity. The Celtic duel displayed for the Carthaginian army before their first encounter with Romans in Italy provides a complex narrative of pity in action.336 After his journey across the Alps, Hannibal orchestrated a duel between Celtic prisoners to encourage his soldiers. Hannibal devises the Celtic duel to have more impact than a mere speech would, and through his speech he leads his soldiers to internalize the reflective process of pity. Polybius is explicit that Hannibal planned this emotional demonstration: Hannibal kept these Celtic prisoners deliberately malnourished and maltreated for this purpose.337 He set up a lottery for the Celts to see which prisoners would fight, and he set out splendid arms for them to win. After the duel, Polybius narrates that the Celts deemed happy (μακαρίζειν) the ones winning and the ones dying, and that they pitied (ἤλεον) those continuing to live in such wretched conditions (i.e., themselves).338 Here emotion functions as a judgment: the Celts express their approval and disapproval of others through emotion. Next, Polybius notes that the Carthaginians felt the same way (τὸ παραπλήσιον).339 The observers did not pity the one who died but only the ones who lived, especially in their maltreated state. Now Hannibal, having established the situation as he intended, gives a speech identifying these reactions and applying them as appropriate to their current condition facing the first battle with the Romans in Italy.340 He says that Fortune brought the Carthaginians to the same predicament as the Celtic prisoners: they could win or die, or they could become prisoners taken alive.341 The rewards for winning against Rome were higher, for they would become the most fortunate (μακαριωτάτους) of all people. Dying while fighting over the noblest hope (ὑπὲρ τῆς καλλίστης ἐλπίδος) would be to experience no evil, but to survive defeat would be, like the Celtic prisoners, to suffer every evil and misfortune.342 Hannibal rationalizes the Carthaginians’ choice, noting the impossibility of returning home alive after defeat. For, he says, just as all deemed happy (ἐμακάριζον) both the winner and the one

84  Individual Emotions in Context dying, and as they all pitied (ἤλεον) the living, they should consider that the same outcome lies before them in their own lives.343 Therefore, they should go forth to the contest to win or die trying. Hannibal relates his soldiers – if they choose to survive defeat – to the abused Celtic prisoners, whose lives are so miserable that they all wished to be freed from it by death. In Hannibal’s speech, the emotion is not just external or reflective; the audience who felt those emotions are now in the situation of the other, and they are judged based on their own behavior. Thus, Hannibal himself puts his audience in the situation of those winning, dying, or living in misery, and they are made to feel for themselves what spurred them to deem blessed (μακαρίζειν) and feel pity (ἐλέειν) for the others. Since they are no longer just exterior judges or bystanders of the situation, the emotions differ slightly: Hannibal describes them as the happiest themselves, μακαριωτάτους, (instead of deeming others happy) or as without any hope (οὐδὲ . . . ἐλπίσαι) which then may be the opposite, internalized, felt form of pity (ἔλεος): others pity those who are in a situation without any hope left for them. This passage demonstrates the emotional mastery by Hannibal (and Polybius for his framing and narrative of it): Hannibal carefully planned and mimicked the process of sympathetic emotion with his rhetoric and duel. This, then, is successful emotional rhetoric.344 In arguing that the Greeks deserved pity after the Achaean War with Rome in 146 bce, Polybius lists what to him, and plausibly his audience, thought were the worst Greek disasters – Xerxes’ invasion and destruction of Athens, Athens’ loss to Sparta after the Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta’s loss to the Thebans after the Battle of Leuctra in 371 bce, the Spartans’ expulsion of the Mantineans, Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, and Macedon’s “enslavement” of Chalcis, Corinth, and other cities by the Antigonids.345 In these cases, Polybius emphasizes the light punishment or (relatively) quick recovery of the sufferers, and he stresses the blame that fell on the victors, or at least the lack of blame for the sufferers. Moreover, Polybius highlights the advantage of others’ pity for overcoming these misfortunes. He concludes that these all suffered misfortunes but did not bring disaster on themselves.346 The Greeks in the Achaean War, on the other hand, brought their misfortune upon themselves, gave no reasons or pretexts for others to aid them, and deserved the blame.347 As we have seen, Polybius emphasizes injustice (ἀδίκως) and undeserved suffering (τὰς τῶν παραλόγως ἠτυχηκότων περιπετείας) in judgments of pity, whereas he clearly thought that in the Achaean War the Greeks brought on their own disaster.348 On the other hand, Polybius also stresses that those who survive are pitiable, like Hannibal’s Celtic prisoners. The Greeks of the Achaean War thus were to be considered more pitiable not only because they suffered more genuinely or undeservedly but also because they “chose” to survive, similar to the Celtic prisoners. That is, the Greeks’ situation becomes more pitiable because of its inherent shamefulness. These two conflicting ideas demonstrate the complexity of pity, particularly in the Achaean War: Polybius’ statement aligns with the model of pity from genuine, undeserved suffering, as shown in 2.7.1–3 and 15.17.1–2, while Polybius’ argument that the Greeks brought their own disaster and deserve more

Individual Emotions in Context 85 pity as survivors aligns with the second model of pity, denoting a shameful state of suffering, seen with the Celtic prisoners in 3.62–63. Both types of pity arise in Polybius’ argument about the Achaean War. Conclusion The categorizations of emotions into groups, not Aristotelian dichotomies, help illuminate patterns in the emotions of Polybius’ text. Emotions of disapproval often arise from bad situations, but they also most frequently involve moral evaluation, and they are not necessarily negatively judged. The anticipatory emotions of fear and hope connect common narrative events and are prevalent in military affairs. These emotions help explain behavior but do not often involve moral evaluation. Likewise, positive feelings work in common ways throughout the narrative, denoting the fruition and result of an action, but they can sometimes lead to negative evaluations of their subjects. Lastly, the reflective emotions which denote concepts of empathy, sympathy, and pity function similarly to the negative emotions in their connection with moral evaluation. Reflective emotions work to draw the audience, observer, and subject of the emotion in to understand and relate to another in a different situation. Such a process teaches the audience with whom and in which situations pity and sympathy deserve to be felt. Polybius complicates Aristotle’s fourth-century definitions of emotions. Polybius’ overall usage of emotions shows a sensitivity to their social roles: historical agents feel emotions in response to events and with regard to what they value. Polybius does not use certain concepts at all which Aristotle mentions, such as τὸ νέμεσαν, and uses terms without emotional senses, such as φιλία, χάρις, or πρᾳότης. On the other hand, a variety of other terms with emotional meaning feature in Polybius’ text which Aristotle does not list, such as indignation (προσκοπή, τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις), hope (ἔλπις), joy (χαρά), love (ἔρως), or empathy (συμπάθεια). Polybius also reaffirms the validity of Aristotle’s sense and definitions of some emotions even within the Hellenistic period. For the most part, Polybius demonstrates continued Aristotelian understanding and usage of shame (αἰσχύνη), fear (φόβος), and pity (ἔλεος). The nuances of some of Aristotle’s emotional terminology differ, however, such as for anger (ὀργή), hate (μῖσος), resentment (φθόνος), gratitude (χάρις), and gentleness (πρᾳότης). Aristotle’s specificity in his definitions, such as his dichotomy of anger (ὀργή) and satisfaction (πρᾳότης), does not find parallels in Polybius’ more varied description of realistic social interactions. These differences in terminology highlight two factors: genre and time. First, Aristotle established his list of emotions in a philosophical treatise on the art of rhetoric. He set them as a guide for which emotions an orator should try to elicit in certain situations. This philosophical and rhetorical purpose differs greatly from Polybius’ dual historiographical purpose of portraying events realistically and of educating future statesmen about typical human behavior through past events. Polybius recorded each instance of emotion as he thought suitable and plausible, or rather, as he considered actually happened, within the historical narrative. Second, the difference in time and context between Aristotle and Polybius influences

86  Individual Emotions in Context their usage of terminology. Aristotle, already archaic in his usage of some terms as Konstan has shown, addressed terms which suited his audience in the late Classical period. Polybius, however, wrote in the second century bce, when the ordinary usages and nuances of some terms seem already to diverge from Classical uses.349 Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle in the context of Classical Greek literature provided a basis for comparison for Polybius’ use of terminology and concepts in his Hellenistic history. This comparison to Aristotle and Classical usage helps to ground Polybius’ use of emotions in a Hellenistic and historiographical context, attested by the shifting meanings and focuses seen throughout this chapter. Polybius’ zeal to argue against Phylarchus’ portrayal of emotion is mirrored in his own careful incorporation of emotions into the historical narrative appropriately. Polybius dissects Philip V’s anger at Thermum to emphasize its inappropriate result. He displays the masterful manipulation of emotion by Hannibal to motivate his troops after their journey through the Alps and the arguments by Scipio Africanus to negate the mutineers’ basis for mutiny and to intensify the shock and compliance of the soldiers at the deaths of the ringleaders. Examining the social basis and function of each emotion illustrates that behavior and emotion correspond in Polybius’ historical account. Contextualization of Polybius’ emotions with the usages of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon illuminates several factors. On the one hand, the genre of historiography’s concern with reality can be seen through shared, common usages of emotions such as anger, fear, or hope. On the other hand, Polybius shows an awareness of the social, situational nature of emotions, that they were occurrent and not necessarily dispositional, whereas anger (ὀργή) could be dispositional for Herodotus and to a lesser extent Thucydides. Polybius utilizes a broader range of emotions, which could have been influenced by or in reaction to earlier Hellenistic historians or on his own accord. Lastly, Polybius shows increased interest in reflective emotions in particular. Finally, this chapter’s survey highlights the frequency and usages of emotional terms in the Histories and provides a basis for examining the key role of emotions in significant passages. Through such an overview, it becomes clear that the variation of usages of emotion are important for portraying events and agents realistically within the social context. While this chapter introduced the individual emotions separately, the following chapter investigates the complex combination of emotions at work together in charged political situations and examines emotion felt by collective groups as opposed to the emotion of individuals. Notes 1 The emotional terminology discussed in this chapter is not a comprehensive analysis of ancient Greek emotion. Rather, it is a near-comprehensive treatment of emotive terminology found in Polybius’ Histories. I specify “near comprehensive” because it would be near impossible to analyze all of the emotions of Polybius’ Histories from this temporal and cultural distance. See Cairns 2019. 2 Koschut 2020, 9–10. 3 Koschut 2020, 10. 4 See, for example, Ben Ze’ev 2000; Jasper 2018 for different categorizations of emotions.

Individual Emotions in Context 87 5 The changes between Polybius’ usages and those of the Classical historians could be indicative of Polybius’ time period and reaction to the lost historians or idiosyncratic to Polybius himself. Since Polybius’ usages cannot be contextualized by reference to the historical narratives and usages of emotions by his lost predecessors, claims differentiating usages as unique to Polybius from these predecessors cannot be made. Any claims to the uniqueness of Polybius’ usages are made solely in reference to his extant predecessors. 6 Konstan 2006, 15; Fortenbaugh 1975, a seminal work on ancient emotion, investigates Aristotle’s Rhetoric. See too Cooper 1999, for the rhetorical context’s importance for Aristotle’s theory. Because scholarship on ancient Greek emotion starts from Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its “standard” list of emotions, I compare Polybius to Aristotle even though it is unclear whether Polybius had access to Aristotelian texts. The closeness of their dates – within extant Greek literature – makes such a comparison valuable for evaluating sociocultural continuities in ancient Greek emotion on a broad scale. Konstan’s seminal scholarship in this field examines Aristotle’s fit with Classical literature, and so I engage with Aristotle’s list with a similar purpose to illuminate emotions in Polybius’ text, time, and genre as opposed to Konstan’s focus on Classical Greek literature. See on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Cooper 1994, 1999; Garver 1994; Frede 1996; Nieuwenburg 2002; Gross 2006; Sokolon 2006; Fortenbaugh 2008; Price 2009; Warren 2014. 7 I omit discussion only of λυπή (sorrow, grief, or pain), which Konstan addresses although Aristotle does not include it in his list. 8 “Negative” can refer both to affect and to morality. Whenever I refer to “negative emotions”, I use the former sense, emotions with negative affect, which feel bad, but which are not necessarily negative in a moral sense. 9 Kaster 2005, esp. 4. 10 For all the emotions, my analysis includes all forms and cognates of the emotional term, but I shall refer to each emotion in the text by the noun form for consistency, unless Polybius never uses such a form (for example, he does not use ἀγανάκτησις). 11 See Harris 2001; Braund and Most 2003; Faraone 2003; Armstrong 2008; Ludwig 2009; Kalimtzis 2012; Erskine 2015. 12 Polyb., 5.12.1, 11.7.3, 16.1.2, 16.1.4, 22.13.2. 13 Polyb., 4.29.7. 14 Polyb., 22.10.3. 15 Polyb., 22.11.8. 16 See too Polyb., 21.31.3, 30.31.17. 17 Hdt., 1.61.2. 18 Thuc., 1.31.1. 19 Xen., Hell. 4.8.30. 20 Polyb., 5.10.6. See too 23.15.1–3, where Polybius warns against acting on anger to a disproportionate extent and thus inculcating anger in one’s victims. 21 Polyb., 3.6. 22 Xen., Hell. 1.6.7, 3.1.17, 3.5.5, 4.8.6, 4.8.30, 5.3.5, 5.4.63, 7.2.4, 7.2.10; An. 1.2.26, 1.5.11. 23 Xen., Hell. 3.1.17. 24 However, Dercylidas does not even go through his angry plan of attack because of inauspicious sacrifices. 25 Polyb., 5.15.9. 26 On young Philip V, see McGing 2013. Polybius also praised Philip’s acting on his anger at 1.61. 27 Polyb., 16.28.5. 28 Polyb., 16.28.8. 29 Hdt., 1.156.2, 3.52.3, 7.105.1. 30 Hdt., 3.52.3.

88  Individual Emotions in Context 31 Hdt., 1.156.2. 32 Thuc., 6.57.3. Thucydides’ speakers discuss the suitability of anger: 1.32.1, 1.122.1; cf. anger as a response to (perceived) injustice or wrongs: Thuc., 2.8.5, 5.52.1, 6.57.3, 6.60.2. 33 Polyb., 6.7.8 and 6.4.9. 34 These historians record neutral results of anger, particularly Xenophon. In Thucydides, Gylippus exhorts the Syracusans to vent their anger against the Athenians, 7.68.1. Aristogeiton and Hermodius act on anger in their assassination, 6.57.3. At 4.123.3, anger motivates the Athenians to act immediately against the revolt of Scione and Mende. 35 For negative characterizations, see Hdt., 1.141.4, 3.25.1, 3.35.1, 6.85.2 (speech); Thuc., 2.59.3, 3.36.2, 3.43.5 (speech), 3.44.4 (speech), 3.45.4 (speech), 3.82.3, 5.44.3, 5.46.5, 5.63.2, 8.1.1, 8.83.3, 8.92.9; Xen., Hell. 5.3.5, An. 2.6.9. For managed emotion, see Hdt., 2.121.3; Thuc., 1.74.3 (speech), 1.92.1, 1.133.1, 2.60.1 (speech), 2.64.1 (speech), 2.65.1, 2.65.8, 3.38.1 (speech), 6.89.3 (speech), 7.68.1 (speech), 8.86.5; Xen, Hell., 6.5.5, An. 2.6.9. 36 Polyb., 5.42.1, 5.49.3, 5.50.3. Explicitly negative portrayals of anger: 1.67 (mercenaries), 2.8 (Teuta), 4.4.4 (Dorimachus), 6.56.11 and 6.57.8 (the people), and 12.14.5 (historians). 37 Polyb., 5.49.3. The use of πάλιν implies that Hermeias’ earlier angry outburst shared these characteristics, 5.42.1. 38 Polyb., 18.36.4. 39 Psychology works to identify and classify this distinction in behavior. See, for example, the standard Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 2017. 40 Polyb., 16.28.5. 41 Hdt., 1.73.4 (ἦν γάρ, ὡς διέδεξε, ὀργὴν [οὐκ] ἄκρος), 3.131.3 (πατρὶ συνείχετο ἐν τῇ Κρότωνι ὀργὴν χαλεπῷ); see also 6.128.1 (Cleisthenes observes ὀργή in his testing of the suitors for a year). See too Thuc., 1.130.2 (Pausanias: τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι). 42 Hdt., 3.25.1; Thuc., 8.92.9; Xen. Hell. 5.3.3. Thucydides and Xenophon also contrast anger to rationality explicitly; Thuc., 2.22.1, 3.42.1 (in speech), 3.84.1–2; Xen., Hell. 5.3.7. 43 Polyb., 20.6.10. 44 This includes the group Romans, individual Romans, and the Senate. Six times anger is attributed to the Romans in speeches: 21.31.7–8 (Athenian envoys’ speech, two instances), 30.31 (Astymedes’ speech, four instances). Roman anger: 2.8.13, 6.52.7, 15.4.2, 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 21.31, 21.34.8, 22.5.6, 22.10.13, 30.4.2, 30.23.2, 30.31, 33.7.3, 38.18.10. 45 Aetolians as the object of anger: 4.4.7, 4.29.7, 5.12.1, 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 21.31 (four instances). Aetolian anger: 3.3.3, 3.7.1–2, 4.4.4. Polybius comments on the lack of anger against the Aetolians, though expected: 4.16.3, 20.10.7. Romans as the object of anger: 2.8.12, 3.3.3, 3.7.1–2, 3.9.7, 3.10.5, 3.13.1, 3.40.8, 3.78.5. 46 See Eckstein 2006 for an argument against Roman exceptionalism, contra Harris 1979. See too Harris 2010, 15, who takes Polybius as evidence for the Romans’ emotionally driven aggressiveness. 47 Two of the preserved four groups of Constantinian excerpts are the embassies to and from the Romans, making them central to the narrative more than any other single group. See Moore 1965 on the manuscript tradition. 48 Erskine 2015, 107–123. Erskine also noted that Polybius considered anger acceptable depending on how the subject reacted to it and emphasized the social nature of anger in Polybius’ portrayal, as opposed to internalized anger seen in philosophies. 49 Interestingly, the Aetolians provoke or receive anger most often. Their inability to mitigate others’ anger and give due weight and consideration to others’ values reflects poorly on them, and their prime status as objects of anger can attest to their

Individual Emotions in Context 89 characteristic short-sightedness and lack of diplomacy. Polyb., 4.16.3, 4.29.7, 5.12.1, 20.10.7, 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 21.31.3 (twice), 21.31.7, 21.31.8. 50 Philip V’s anger: Polyb, 5.12.1, 5.15.9, 11.7.3, 16.1.2, 16.1.4, 15.28.8, 18.36.4, 22.13.2. 51 Polyb., 1.67.5–6, 2.8.12–13, 3.7.1, 3.9.7, 3.10.5, 3.78.5, 4.4.4, 4.4.7, 6.4.9, 6.56.11, 9.10.10, 15.25.20(13), 15.25.25(18), 15.27.1, 15.30.1, 16.1.2, 16.1.4, (possibly 30.29.1 – impersonally formulated). 52 Polyb., 3.10.5. 53 Hom., Il. 1.1. 54 Polyb., 3.3.3, 3.7.1. 55 Polyb., 15.30.1; 1.67.5–6, 1.70.4, 1.82.9; 6.4.9, 6.7.8, 6.56.11, 6.57.8. All these examples involve those whom Polybius characterizes as irrational, barbaric, and a threat to social order, according to Eckstein’s analysis, 1995, 118–160. Although some of these instances validate this, the rest challenge the lack of moral social order and aim to rectify this disjuncture. See Chapter 3 for the latter analysis and Chapter 4 for the former. 56 For anger as the explicit cause of war, see Polyb., 3.7.1, 3.78.5, 4.49.4. 57 Arist., Rhet. 2.1378a.30–32; Konstan 2006, 41–75. 58 Konstan 2006, 47. 59 Konstan 2006, 43–46. 60 Konstan 2006, 68. 61 Arist., Rhet. 2.1382a1–14. 62 Polyb., 3.64.3–4. The Romans’ aggressive actions might have seemed to them not to stir anger in the Carthaginians if they strictly followed Aristotle’s line of thought about inferiors and anger, but this would come back to haunt them in the form of the Second Punic War. 63 In the rest of the chapter, I highlight Polybius’ portrayals’ relations to Aristotle’s definitions to show that these observations persist beyond the emotion of anger and to draw attention to Polybius’ idiosyncratic usages. 64 Polyb., 18.15. 65 Polyb., 18.15.12–13. This vivid depiction of what happens to traitors applies universally. Cf. other generalizing statements about hatred: Polyb., 1.14.4 (good man), 5.98.7 (bad generals), 9.10.10 (conquerors), and 15.17.2 (false sufferers). See too Thuc., 2.61.4 and 2.64.5 (both in Pericles’ speeches). Polybius concludes this digression by remarking that despite all of this, no one did not find a traitor when one was needed and that this makes humans the evilest and therefore most worthless of animals for failing to follow reason despite having it (as opposed to animals who have and follow only desire). 66 Sternberg and Sternberg 2008, 58–71. 67 This correspondence highlights Polybius’ sensitivity to realistic emotion, in that his portrayal of hatred shares characteristics with hate in the twentieth century. 68 For Polybius’ negative stance toward Callicrates, see Polyb., 24.10, 30.13, 32.1–2; Eckstein 1995, 204–210; Champion 2004, 155–156, 167, 225–226; McGing 2010, 133–134, 138–140. On Callicrates in Achaean politics, see Gruen 1984, 496–502; on Callicrates’ embassy and Roman politics, see also Derow 1970. 69 See Walbank, HCP 3.455. This passage is preserved in the Constantinian Excerpts and lacks context. 70 Polyb., 30.29.1. 71 Polyb., 30.29.2: Ὅτι τοῦ περὶ Καλλικράτην μίσους καὶ Ἀνδρωνίδαν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς (τοὺς) ὁμογνώμονας τούτων οὕτως ἄν τις τεκμήραιτο: the use of the generalizing optative construction with τις invites the reader to come to this conclusion. 72 Polyb., 30.29.7. 73 Polyb., 30.29.2. 74 Polyb., 30.29.3–4. 75 Polyb., 30.29.5.

90  Individual Emotions in Context 76 See, for example, Ahmed 2004, 42–61 on hate and 82–100 on disgust, and for a discussion of the relation of hate and disgust, see Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 387–390. 77 Ahmed 2004, 53. See 87–100 on what Ahmed terms the “stickiness” of disgust and the idea that contact with the object of disgust creates emotion. 78 Polyb., 30.29.6. 79 Polyb., 30.29.7. 80 Polyb., 30.29.1. 81 Ὀργή as motivation for μῖσος: Polyb., 9.10.10, 15.30.1. Ὀργή parallel with μῖσος: 1.82.9, 6.7.8, 15.17.2, 30.29.1. 82 Polybius omits the motivation for anger nine times (out of 37 occurrences): 1.14.4, 1.82.9, 3.3.20, 3.86.11, 5.11.6, 7.3.2, 15.25.11(8), 16.14.9, 18.15.13. 83 14 of 37 instances of hatred occur with other emotions: with ὀργή: Polyb., 1.82.9, 6.7.8, 9.10.10, 15.17.2, 15.30.1, 30.29.1; with indignation: 6.7.8, 8.8.1, 15.25.23(16), 15.27.3, 30.29.7; with φθόνος: 6.7.8, 6.9.1, 9.10.10. Interestingly, hatred does not occur with mention of θυμός. 84 Against love: Polyb., 1.14.4, 16.14.9, 33.20.1; against ἔλεος: 8.36.9, 15.17.2. 85 Polyb., 1.14.4. 86 Polyb., 16.14.9. 87 Polyb., 8.36.9. 88 Polyb., 15.17.1–2. 89 For a detailed list of this term and its cognates, see Mauersberger 1.1.165. This term is not common in ancient Greek texts; the most frequent uses of the noun form occur in Demosthenes (29) and Plutarch (29), followed by Josephus (16), then Polybius (14). Interestingly, Demosthenes, Plutarch, and Josephus, alongside Origen, use other terms (from μῖσος, ἀπέχθεια, and ἔχθρα) – especially verbal forms – for hatred most frequently of ancient authors. Polybius, however, consistently prefers noun forms of these emotion and uses ἀπέχθεια fourth most of ancient authors and μῖσος 23rd most, which, given the comparative size of Polybius’ corpus, is surprisingly frequent. Numbers based on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed June 5, 2023). 90 Polyb., 1.88.12, 2.46.6, 4.30.4. 91 Polyb., 1.88.12, 2.45.4, 2.46.6, 4.30.4, 4.35.6, 5.35.2, 38.12.3. 92 See, for ἔχθρα and its cognates, Mauersberger 1.2.1067–1069. 93 Polyb., 3.86.11. 94 Polyb., 5.56.9. 95 Polyb., 5.73.4. 96 Polyb., 20.6.7. 97 Hdt., 2.119.3. 98 Hdt., 2.128.1. 99 For hatred as the underlying reason for behavior, see Thuc., 1.25.3, 1.96.1, 3.67.5 (speech), 5.27.2 (indirect speech), 6.17.6 (speech); for the reason behind hatred, see Thuc., 1.103.4, 3.64.4 (speech), 4.128.5; as a sign of unpopularity, see Thuc., 2.64.1 (speech), 3.64.5 (speech), and 3.83.2. 100 Thuc., 1.96.1. 101 Thuc., 1.25.3. 102 Xen., Hell. 1.3.19, 1.7.35, 3.5.11 (speech), 5.2.6, 5.2.15 (speech), 5.2.25, An. 6.2.14, 7.6.15 (speech). See too Hell. 3.5.2 and 5.4.2 for intentional manipulation of hatred. 103 Xen., Hell. 5.4.2. See too 5.2.25. 104 Xen., Hell. 5.2.25. 105 Xen., Hell. 1.3.19, 3.5.2. 106 Xen., Hell. 5.2.6 for the Spartans’ self-restraint. Cf. Hell. 5.2.15, the speech of the Acanthian and Apollonian envoys to the Spartans: they claim that although the cities on Pallene hate Olynthus, they do not act because they are too afraid. Both examples

Individual Emotions in Context 91 portray hatred as a motivator that is overcome by more powerful positive (self-­ discipline) or negative (fear) factors which reflect on the agents’ characters. See Hell. 6.2.19 for hatred leading to low morale. 107 Xen., An. 7.6.15. 108 This includes verbal usages as well. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon do use ἐχθρός with some frequency but similarly to Polybius to refer to enemies. 109 Josephus’ Jewish War contains 125,274 words, Polybius’ Histories 316,662, and Xenophon’s combined Anabasis and Hellenika 123,721 words. 110 Diodurus Siculus uses this terminology 93 times (of a text of 464,305 words), Dionysius of Halicarnassus 67 times (of 284,383 words); Appian is a low outlier with only 24 usages of 226,555 words; Cassius Dio and Herodian use these terms extensively – Cassius Dio includes 250 uses with a text of 546,720 words, and Herodian includes 45 usages in a text of only 46,838 words. Based on searches in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed June 5, 2023). These numbers elicit the question of why there is such an upward trend in the usage of hatred, specifically μῖσος and its cognates, starting with Polybius. Polybius shows greater sensitivity to the role or function of hatred. Polybius expressed concern about the earlier historian Phylarchus’ “inappropriate” attempt to inculcate emotion in his audience, so we know that Polybius was attuned to the issue of emotions in historical texts. This also shows his historiographical predecessor Phylarchus along with others – who survive unfortunately only in excerpts by later authors, including Polybius – were supposedly attuned to and portrayed emotion in their histories. At the same time, the abundance of philosophical treatises entitled Περὶ Πάθων as well as the development of Stoic and Epicurean theories of emotion attest to greater cultural attention to emotion, even if these too are fragmentary or only attested as titles. On the treatises, see Fitzgerald 2008. There is also the possibility of the role of historical or societal change which motivates this increased attention on emotion and hatred specifically. Sternberg and Sternberg reflect a trend in studies on hatred to address specific historical events from the twentieth century, in particular the Holocaust and hatred of the Nazis. Intellectuals felt a greater push to explain, incorporate, and analyze the roles of emotion and emotional rhetoric following such historical events; see LaCapra 2001. Unlike the twentieth century, there is not a major, singular historic event which creates such obvious waves in or directly preceding Polybius’ life, beyond his self-identified change of Roman rule. In fact, the broad continuity of culture and the progression of historical events facilitates the writing of ancient history as we have it, which retains generic characteristics throughout antiquity and allows historians like Polybius to make claims of utility for his readers to learn from similar events, see Marincola 1997, 19–33. Moreover, within his Histories, different characters hate and are hated, unlike the singular focus on the Nazis. 111 Arist., Rhet. 2.1382a1–14, analyzed by Konstan 2006, 185–200. 112 Polybius’s passage on traitors is the best example of μῖσος against a type of people: 18.15.13; see also 5.98.7, 15.17.2 (with ὀργή), and 16.14.9. Konstan 2006, 186–191, observes that hatred can be directed against an individual (contra Aristotle), a type, or a collective. Konstan also rationalizes Aristotle’s specifications on hating only groups. Konstan argues that anger occurs specifically against a person while hatred can occur against someone as a member of a group not for any other reason than that they share attributes the subject identified in another member of that group. 113 It is felt more often against groups than against individuals. Examples against individuals: 5.11.6, 5.56.9, 8.8.1, 15.23.7, 15.25.11(8), 15.25.23(16), 22.8.8, 30.29.1, 32.6.6. Hatred against groups: 1.14.4, 1.82.9, 3.86.11, 5.11.6, 5.73.4, 5.98.7, 6.7.8, 6.9.1, 6.43.4, 7.3.2, 8.36.9, 9.10.10, 9.29.12, 9.39.1, 15.17.2, 15.27.3, 18.15.13, 20.6.7, 30.29.2, 30.29.7, 33.20.1, 38.3.4. More distinctly, individuals feel hatred less than groups: 1.14.4, 3.86.11, 5.11.6, 9.39.1. 114 Polyb., 5.11.6.

92  Individual Emotions in Context 115 For subjects of hatred who are portrayed positively or at the least neutrally, see Polyb., 1.14.4, 5.11.6, 5.56.9, 5.98.7, 6.43.4, 8.8.1, 8.36.9, 9.29.12, 9.39.6, 15.17.2, 15.23.10(7), 15.25.11(8), 15.25.23(16), 15.27.3, 15.28.8, 15.30.1, 18.15.13, 20.6.7, 22.8.8, 30.29. 116 Sanders 2014. 117 See Sanders 2014, 45–46 for a table of these scripts. 118 Arist., Rhet. 2.1387b22–1388a30. 119 Konstan 2006, 111. For full discussion of indignation, see 111–128. 120 Konstan 2003, 77–78. Polybius uses νέμεσαν twice in the context of justice and the divine: 12.23.3., 27.8.4. There are limited usages of this verb by the other Greek historians: none by Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon, and limited usage by Diodorus Siculus (4), Dionysius Halicarnassus (10), Josephus (3), Appian (4), and Cassius Dio (4). Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed June 14, 2023). 121 Konstan 2006, 112–113. 122 Konstan 2006, 113. 123 Konstan 2003, 80–86, gives a fuller exposition of this democratic context but is reiterated at Konstan 2006, 119–127, in comparison with Aristotle’s view. 124 Konstan 2006, 127. 125 See, for example, Polyb., 9.10. 126 Konstan 2006, 119. 127 Through its connotations as one of the “Seven Deadly Sins” of Christianity, “envy” in English symbolizes a fault on the part of the subject, the one envying; it is the one who envies who sins. 128 Polyb., 2.45.1 and 2.46.2 (Aetolians), 5.41.3 (Hermeias), 9.29.11 (Antigonus Doson, in Chlaeneas’ speech), and 13.2.5 (Scopas). 129 On begrudging scripts, see Sanders 2014, 33–39. 130 For a script of “begrudge”, see Polyb., 5.42.8, 6.58.5, 11.6.8, 11.34.3. For a meaning of “offense”, see 1.36.3, 2.45.1, 2.46.2, 5.41.3, 5.46.8, 5.50.7, 6.7.5, 6.7.8, 6.9.1, 6.9.11, 7.8.4, 9.10.6, 9.10.7, 9.10.10, 9.10.12, 9.29.11, 13.2.5, 18.41.4, 23.12.8, 28.7.5, 39.8.2. 131 Polyb., 2.46.2, 6.7.8, 6.9.1, 6.9.11, 9.10.6, 9.10.10, 9.29.11. 132 Subjects feeling φθόνος receive negative portrayals more frequently in the Classical historians: Hdt., 3.30.1, 3.80.3–4, 3.146.1, 6.61.1, 6.137.2, 7.236.1 (speech), 7.237.2 (speech), 8.69.1, and 9.71.3; Thuc., 2.35.2 (speech), 2.45.1 (speech), 2.64.4–2 (speech), 3.43.1 (speech), 3.82.8, 4.108.7, and 6.16.3 (speech); Xen., Hell. 2.4.29, 3.2.13, 3.4.8, and 5.2.2 (indirect speech). 133 Polyb., 13.2.5. 134 See Polyb., 18.53–55. 135 Hdt., 3.30.1. 136 Thuc., 4.108.7. Sanders 2014, 38–39, characterizes both this and the preceding passage of Herodotus as begrudging envy. 137 This is the only use of φθόνος in Thucydides’ historical narrative. 138 See Sanders 2014, 33–46. Thucydides also generalizes broadly about φθόνος, frequently in speeches: 2.32.2 (speech), 2.45.1 (speech), 2.64.4–5 (speech), 3.43.1 (speech), 3.82.8, 3.84.2, 6.7.2–3 (speech). See too Hdt., 3.52.5, 3.80.3–4, and 7.237.2 for generalizing comments. 139 Polyb., 18.41.4. 140 Polyb., 1.36.3. 141 Herodotus stresses the φθόνος of the gods in this sense, see Hdt. 1.32.1 (in speech), 3.40.2 (in speech), 4.205.1, 7.10e.1 (in speech), 7.47.1 (in speech), 8.109.3 (in speech), 8.124.1, and 8.125.1; see too Thuc. 7.77.4 (in speech). 142 Sanders 2014 ascribes multiple scripts to some passages in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. For example, Hdt. 6.137.2 is cited under Sanders’ scripts of “covetous envy” and “jealous of position”. This attests to the potential of this emotion to have multiple valences and nuances within the same passage.

Individual Emotions in Context  93 143 Sanders 2014, 43. 144 Polyb., 9.10. This passage is often discussed in terms of the Roman triumph and the degenerative importation of Hellenic luxury into Rome: see Cic., Verr. 2.4, Plut., Marc. 21; Walbank HCP 2.134–136; Pollitt 1978; Gruen 1984, 308, 345–346, 1992, 86–98, 2013, 260; Eckstein 1995, 229–230, 245–246; Beard 2007, 147–168, 178–181; McGing 2010, 41, 159–160; Champion 2013, 146; Davies 2013, 327. 145 Polyb., 9.10.6–7. 146 Together with Polybius’ portrayal: 5.41.3 (of Hermeias), 5.46.8 (of Molon), 13.2.5 (of Scopas); Against Polybius’ appraisal: 2.45.1 (Aetolians), 2.46.2 (Aetolians), 9.29.11 (Antigonus Doson in Chlaineas’ speech), 28.7.5 (some Achaeans). 147 However, Konstan 2006, 119–127 stresses the egalitarian and democratic nature of this emotion while in this passage, as elsewhere in the Histories, φθόνος is felt by those who have no claim to equality. 148 Contrast Thuc. 6.78.2–3, where Hermocrates argues that the other Sicilians should direct their φθόνος at Syracuse than suffer otherwise. Cf. Hdt. 3.52.5: Periander tells Lycophron that it is better to have φθόνος toward oneself than pity. 149 Polyb., 6.7.7. 150 Polyb., 6.7.8. 151 Polyb., 7.8.4. Although Polybius contrasts Hieronymus with Hiero and is explicit that Hiero received no φθόνος and that Hieronymus acted oppositely, φθόνος is not directed explicitly at Hieronymus in the extant text of the Histories. 152 Polyb., 7.7–8. 153 Polyb., 23.12.8. Attalus also exceptionally avoids φθόνος, 18.41.4. Cf. Xen., An. 1.9.19 (Cyrus). See too Xen., An. 5.7.10, where Xenophon the character argues that the soldiers should not feel φθόνος as unfounded. 154 Xen., An. 1.9.19. Cf. 5.7.10, where Xenophon in his speech to disgruntled soldiers attempts to remove himself from jealousy by citing his egalitarian practices. 155 Sanders 2014, 49. 156 Sanders 2014, 49. 157 Sanders 2014, 45. 158 Konstan 2006, 219–258. 159 Polyb., 4.87.4, 16.22.6, 29.7.2. Diod. Sic., 3.68.4, 4.9.6, 4.54.7; Joseph., BJ, 1.443; App., Hann., 82.6, 84.1, Syr., 41.4, Mith., 111.4, 468.6, B. Civ., 4.4.24. 160 Polyb., 4.87.4. 161 Polyb., 4.87.4; Konstan 2006, 225. 162 Konstan 2006, 223–224. 163 Polyb., 16.22.6, 29.7.2. 164 The majority of the extant text, especially the books surviving complete, 1–5, does not give court society a central role in the Histories. 165 Cf. Sanders 2014, 63: “envy is destructive, not moral; bad.” The emotion of φθόνος as seen in Polybius’ Histories does not fit this description. 166 I am not suggesting that Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon did not express indignation in their historical texts; rather, they simply did not utilize the same variety of terminology as Polybius. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed June 7, 2021). 167 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed July 17, 2023). 168 Polybius does not use the noun form ἀγανάκτησις in the extant Histories. 169 See Polyb., 1.83.7, 1.88.9, 2.46.4, 2.59.2, 4.3.11, 4.14.2, 4.16.2, 8.8.1, 8.24.3, 15.27.3, 18.35.6, 20.10.7, 24.7.5, 24.7.7, 25.5.1, 32.13.4, 38.9.3. 170 Thuc., 8.43.4 and 8.66.4. Thuc., 2.41.3 represents indignation (ἀγανακτεῖν) as similar to envy (φθόνος) within Pericles’ speech. 171 Xen., Hell. 5.3.3, 5.3.11. 172 Polyb., 1.83.7. 173 Polyb., 1.88.9.

94  Individual Emotions in Context 174 Polyb., 32.13.4 and 38.9.3. 175 Polyb., 2.59.5 (readers – intended by Phylarchus), 4.7.3 (Achaeans), 4.76.5 (Achaeans), 6.6.6 (observers). 176 Polyb., 4.76. 177 Polyb., 4.76.5. 178 Polyb., 4.7.3. 179 Compare the saying in English, “what a pity”, which often expresses not a feeling of pity but perhaps slight disappointment. 180 This passage uniquely concerns an inanimate object as the object of the emotion. 181 Polybius could have used δυσχεραίνειν or βάρεως φέρειν, for example. For these as frequent senses of dissatisfaction (and not an emotional, moral response) in Polybius, see Mauersberger, 1.2.593, and 1.1.315 (under B.), respectively. 182 See Walbank, HCP 1.310–311 on Pictor’s version. See Cornell 2013, 1.160–178, 2.32–105 on Pictor and the fragments of his text. 183 Polyb., 3.8.9–10. 184 Polyb., 3.26.6–7. 185 Polyb., 11.28–29. Cf. Liv. 28.27.2–28.29.8. 186 Polyb., 11.28.1–3. 187 Polyb., 11.28.4–5. 188 Polyb., 11.28.6. 189 Polyb., 11.28.7–10. 190 Polyb., 11.28.11. 191 See 6.52.3–8 for Polybius’ similar arguments about the superiority of the Roman politeia over Carthage’s. 192 Polyb., 1.31.7, 5.7.5, 5.49.5, 6.6.2, 6.6.6, 6.6.8, 6.7.8, 7.5.6, 9.26.8, 24.12.3, 27.7.10, 28.7.11, 30.29.7, 31.10.4, 32.2.5, 33.12.5, 36.12.2, 38.4.4, 39.1.3. See too Mauersberger 2.2.913–914. Of the emotional vocabulary of the Histories, προσκοπή seems to come closest to a feeling of disgust because it conveys deep-seated negative feeling. Like disgust, it is socially and culturally specific to keeping oneself and one’s state clean of immoral or offensive influences. See Ahmed 2004, 82–100, for a nuanced interpretation of the cultural work of disgust. See Lateiner and Spatharas 2017, on ancient disgust. When paired with μῖσος, προσκοπή seems to take on and emphasize hatred’s long duration, Polyb., 6.7.8, 30.29.7. 193 Polyb., 1.31.7, 6.6.2, 6.6.6, 7.5.6. 194 Polyb., 32.2.5. 195 Polyb., 36.12.2. Cf. a similar sense with the term φθόνος at Hdt. 7.139.1 (in speech). 196 Polyb., 9.26.8. I prefer “resentment” to “disgust” because it is difficult to distinguish the viscerality of “disgust” from text. Ahmed 2004, 82–100, argues for the effect of disgust as something which invades oneself. Polybius’ usage of προσκοπή seems to come closest to this threatening of one’s integrity. 197 See Ahmed 2004, especially 53–54, for a discussion of these feelings which seems to approximate these Greek terms for indignation in Polybius’ text. 198 Konstan 2006, 90–109. Polybius never uses the term αἶδος. Konstan discusses this term briefly as an Archaic Greek term for shame, 93–98. See Cairns 1993 for a detailed analysis of this term. 199 Ahmed 2004, 106. 200 Ahmed 2004, 106. Cf. Polyb., 29.8.7 and 35.4.6. See too Polyb., 3.20.7, 3.116.13, 4.31.7–8, 4.58.11, 5.58.5, 6.44.6, 8.9.9, 8.10.2, 8.11.1, 8.11.8, 9.18.9, 11.2.7, 11.2.11, 11.5.3, 11.5.7, 11.12.3, 12.13.1, 12.13.3, 14.5.10, 15.10.3, 16.20.1. For a full list of αἰσχύνη, its cognates, and its uses, see Mauersberger, 1.1.29–31, 1.1.98, 1.3.1301, 2.1.15. 201 Polyb., 2.55.9.

Individual Emotions in Context 95 202 Examples of internalized shame in Polybius’ Histories: 8.12.6 (Aratus), 9.18.9 (Philip V); focalized through others: 2.46.1 (Aetolians), 6.46.3 (Cretans); lack of internalized shame: 6.56.2 (Carthaginians), 9.3.6 (Aetolians), 12.13.3 (Timaeus), 15.20.1 (Philip V and Antiochus III); negated, for a positive result: 4.20.11 (Achaeans), 12.13.11 (Demetrius of Phaleron). See too Polyb., 15.23.5. This is out of 43 occurrences of shame vocabulary. 12.13.11 and 15.23.5 are negative statements, indicating that the character did not feel shame, thus reducing the number of occurrences of the felt emotion of shame even further. 203 Polyb., 8.12.1. 204 Polyb., 8.12.2–3. 205 Polyb., 8.12.4–5. 206 Polyb., 8.12.6. Aratus in some ways feels shame on behalf of Philip, much as in English usage one feels embarrassment for someone. This “feeling for” someone else reflects the subject’s sense of morality, here Aratus’ superior sense of morality by comparison to Philip V. 207 Polyb., 8.12.6–7. 208 This is particularly the case as this passage begins Polybius’ death notice of Aratus. See Pomeroy 1986 on Polybius’ death notices generally, although he does not address Aratus at length, partly since this passage does not survive in full. 209 In several cases, those who should feel the shame or are shameful are already dead: Polyb., 3.81.6, 3.84.6, 18.53.4. 210 Polyb., 12.13.1–3, 16.20.1. 211 Konstan 2006, 90. See Ahmed 2004, 101–121, for a detailed analysis of the process of shame. 212 Polybius uses ἐλπίς 345 times and fear terminology 197 times. The term χάρις, which is used primarily without emotional content, occurs 283 times. All of the other negative emotions combined occur 330 times, and positive feelings occur 68 times. Compare Thucydides’ predominant usage of fear (317 times) and hope terminology (129 times) compared to the combined negative emotions (147) and positive emotions (72 times, including χάρις). All of the historians use terms for fear most frequently of the emotive terminology studied here, followed by hope and χάρις, both of which can have entirely emotionless usages. Statistics and observations made based on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed July 24, 2020). 213 See Brennan 1998; Graver 2007 on Stoic emotions, including fear. See Armstrong 2003 on an Epicurean account of fear in Philodemus. 214 See Konstan 2006, 129–155, for analysis of fear. 215 Arist., Rhet. 2.5 1382a21–25; discussed by Konstan 2006, 130. 216 Konstan 2006, 133. 217 Konstan 2006, 135. 218 See Guelfucci 1986 for analysis of fear in Polybius’ Histories. 219 Polybius describes feeling fear far more often (78.5% of the occurrences of fear terminology) than causing or intending fear (21.5%), but even this differs from all other emotions, which are rarely phrased in the active sense of intending to cause the emotion. The terminology used for causing or intending fear include φόβερος, φόβος (which also refers to subjects feeling fear, based on context), and ἐκφοβεῖν. All forms from δέος and all other forms of φόβος refer to feeling fear. 220 Guelfucci 1986, 227–237. 221 Polyb., 3.51.13, 3.60.10, 3.94.7. 222 Polyb., 3.98.6. 223 Polyb., 3.16.2. 224 Polyb., 3.75.1. 225 Polyb., 3.75.2–7.

96  Individual Emotions in Context 226 Polyb., 3.75.8. 227 Polyb., 6.58. See Bellen 1985 on Roman fear based in Gallic and then Punic invasions. See Williams 2001 on the historical background and continuance of Roman fear of Gauls. 228 Polyb., 3.53.1. 229 Guelfucci 1986, 232, notes that δείδειν leads to a better appraisal of the situation more often than φοβεῖν. 230 Interestingly, Polybius does not mention τύχη even though this type of situation would fall under its jurisdiction. See especially Walbank 2011 on Fortune. 231 Polyb., 3.107.15, 3.112.6, 3.118.5–6. 232 See McGing 2010, 17–50, on how Polybius’ structure relates to his content. 233 Polybius uses ἐλπίς 345 times, whereas the negative emotions of anger, hate, indignation, resentment, jealousy, and shame occur a total of 314 times. For a full list of ἐλπίς and ἐλπίζειν, their uses, and their cognates, see Mauersberger 1.2.756–761, 1.2.1017–1018, 1.3.1354; for its negated or opposite forms, see 1.1.119, 1.1.162–163, 1.2.589. 234 I do not discuss the Stoics’ present “emotions” of pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη). Konstan does not address ἡδονή. See Mauersberger, 1.3.1110 for Polybius’ usage of this term. Aristotle uses λύπη to denote pain, and Polybius’ rare use of this terminology follows suit. Konstan redefines λύπη as grief, which does not find traction in Polybius’ text. See Mauersberger, 1.4.1498–1499 for Polybius’ usage of this term. Aristotle did not include discussion of ἐλπίς in Book Two of the Rhetoric. 235 Cairns 2016, 13–44. 236 Fulkerson 2015, 67–86. See Caston and Kaster 2016, for recent scholarship on hope in Classical literature. 237 Fulkerson 2015, 68. 238 Fulkerson 2015, 70. 239 For examples of ἐλπίδες found in alliances, which has a material sense of fortunes or resources, see Polyb., 1.44.6, 1.55.1, 1.62.4, 1.82.3, 1.82.6, 1.83.1. Since this term is so prevalent, I provide representative examples from Book 1 for each script. 240 Polyb., 1.20.1, 1.21.5, 1.27.12, 1.36.5, 1.37.6, 1.49.10, 1.61.5, 1.66.12, 1.71.3, 1.87.1. 241 For “expectation”: Polyb., 1.44.4, 1.53.12, 1.66.5. 242 See for this phrase, ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτερίας, Polyb., 2.35.1, 3.58.9, 3.58.11, 3.96.3, 3.109.11, 4.86.5, 8.17.9, 8.19.2, 11.1.8, 11.17.5, 18.25.4, 22.8.12, 29.19.8, 30.32.8, 38.7.8. 243 Of Book 1, the occurrences of ἐλπίς with “hopeful” connotations are 1.56.9 and 1.67.1. 244 Polyb., 11.28–29. 245 Polyb., 11.28.2. 246 Polyb., 11.29.1. 247 Polyb., 11.29.2. 248 Polyb., 11.29.3–4. 249 Polyb., 11.29.5. 250 Polyb., 21.4.11. 251 Cf. Polyb., 21.2. 252 See Henderson 2001; Erskine 2012 on Polybius as a detainee. 253 Polybius is unusual compared to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon for his large use of the terminology for positive emotions. Of the terms covered in this section, these three historians combined use terms for these emotions 190 times. Polybius cites the same terms 361 times. Of the later Greek historians, only Dionysius of Halicarnassus (391), whose text has fewer words than Polybius’, and Cassius Dio (430) use terms for positive feelings more frequently. Observations made based on searches from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed July 24, 2020). 254 See Caston and Kaster 2016 for recent scholarship on positive emotions.

Individual Emotions in Context 97 255 As seen in these passages, where joy is purely a result: Polyb., 1.20.1, 1.34.12, 1.36.1, 1.44.4, 1.44.6, 2.4.6, 2.50.5, 3.62.9, 3.70.1, 3.74.10, 3.87.5, 3.96.6, 3.103.1, 5.2.6, 5.14.10, 5.15.1, 6.58.13, 8.17.2, 8.24.11, 8.29.11, 10.5.4, 10.14.1, 10.17.8, 11.3.5, 11.33.7, 15.4.8, 15.5.13, 15.22.1, 15.32.4 (twice), 16.23.4, 16.25.4, 18.24.6, 18.45.1, 18.46.11, 20.8.2, 20.12.3. See Mauersberger, 3.2.1011–1012, 3.2.1007–1009, 2.1.314– 315, 3.2.776 for joy and its cognates. Of Polybius’ predecessors, only Xenophon uses χαρά twice. Polybius mentions the noun form of joy more frequently than later Greek historians except for Diodorus Siculus: Polybius 13 of 316,662 words, Diodorus Siculus 16 of 464,305 words. Statistics from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed July 24, 2020). 256 Polyb., 16.23.4. 257 Hdt., 1.5.3–4. 258 See Grethlein 2013 on the perspective of experience in historiography. 259 This may seem intuitive that people in a positive emotional state do not want to change their positive state of affairs, but it deserves mention in contrast to the other emotions studied. 260 Polyb., 18.46.11. 261 Eckstein 1995, 131, discusses this as an example that all emotion is disruptive. 262 This simplicity might validate its status in Stoic theory as a pre-emotion and one which sages could feel appropriately. 263 See Mauersberger 1.1.241 for a full list of usages. 264 Polyb., 31.10.5; see too 5.40.3, 5.87.3. 265 Polyb., 1.35.5, 1.46.5, 3.97.4, 4.49.4, 5.29.4, 8.29.6, 21.4.3, 21.26.13, 24.6.2, 27.1.4. 266 Polyb., 8.29.6. 267 Polyb., 5.72.2. 268 Polyb., 3.11.7. 269 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385a16-b10. Konstan 2006, 156–184. 270 Konstan 2006, 165. 271 Clearly distinct examples of favor: Polyb., 1.31.6, 4.38.10, 4.51.2, 6.11a.7, 9.29.7, 11.6.3, 12.8.1, 12.25e.3, 15.8.12, 15.21.7, 15.23.2, 15.25.31(23), 16.14.8, 16.21.9. 16.21.12, 20.5.12; gratitude/thanks: 2.6.4, 2.58.5, 3.109.12, 3.111.3, 5.40.2, 5.56.4, 5.88.4, 5.104.1, 6.6.2, 6.8.2, 9.30.6, 9.35.1, 10.34.5, 20.5.11; kindness/grace: 2.11.5. See Mauersberger, 3.2.1007–1009, 1016–1022 for full examples of the usage of χάρις and its cognates. 272 A translation closer to the English conception of “thanks”, which can be heartfelt or calculated and polite, is the term εὐχαριστία in Polybius. See Mauersberger, 1.2.1049 for this term and its cognates. 273 Arist., Rhet. 2.1380a6-b34; Konstan 2006, 77–89. 274 Konstan 2006, 77–83. 275 Konstan 2006, 88. 276 Polyb., 5.11.3. Philip II did not act τῷ θυμῷ but used the opportunity of his victory at Chaeronea to display his πρᾳότης and μεγαλοψυχία. 277 Polybius uses this term and its cognates 33 times, whereas Herodotus uses it three times, Thucydides once, and Xenophon (in the Hellenica and Anabasis combined) twice. Later historians, most of whose texts are larger than Polybius’, use this term or its cognates more frequently than the Classical historians, but less frequently than Polybius: Diodorus Siculus has 14 occurrences, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 17, Josephus 10, Appian 6, Cassius Dio (whose text is almost twice the size of Polybius’) 29, and Herodian 11. Statistics derive from searches of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed June 7, 2021). 278 See Mauersberger, 2.2.659–660. 279 Polyb., 3.98–99. Compare Livy’s version, 22.22.4–21. 280 Polyb., 3.98.1–2.

98  Individual Emotions in Context 281 Polyb., 3.98.3. 282 Polyb., 3.98.5–11. 283 Polyb., 3.99.1–6. 284 Polyb., 3.99.7. 285 Polyb., 3.99.8. 286 Cf. Polybius’ portrayal of Bolis the Cretan, who betrays Achaeus, 8.15–20. See too 18.13–15. 287 See Polyb., 5.11.3 for a parallel case. 288 Konstan includes φιλία as “love” in his description of emotions, Konstan 2006, 169– 184. Polybius treats φιλία as a marker of political alliance or, in two instances, to denote friendship or personal (political) alliance: Polyb., 31.23.3 (Scipio and Polybius), 23.5.1 (as personal allies, of Deinocrates and Flamininus). For Polybius’ use of φιλία, see Mauersberger 3.2.918–923. 289 For the negative effects of love in the Classical histories, see Hdt., 1.8.1, 2.131.1, 3.31.2, 3.31.6, 6.62.1, 9.108.1–2, 9.133.2; Thuc., 3.45.5 (in speech), 6.24.3. See Ludwig 2009; Sissa 2009; Wohl 2017 on emotion in Thucydides, which address his use of love. Xenophon’s four usages do not show negative consequences, and in fact, love can benefit the life of the beloved; see Xen., Hell. 4.1.40, An. 4.6.3. Polybius only mentions love as many times as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon each, despite the larger size of his text. 290 Polyb., 1.14.2, 5.34.10 (Ptolemy IV), 8.10.4 (Sardanapalus), 23.5.9 (Deinocrates of Messene). 291 Polyb., 12.26.4, 20.8.2. 292 Polyb., 5.34.10, 8.10.4, 20.8.2, 23.5.9, 31.25.4–5. 293 Polyb., 7.11.8. 294 Polyb., 5.28.5–8. 295 Polybius does not specify whether the ἐρώμενος participated actively in the coup. Such severe consequences for those who were objects of love find parallels in Herodotus’ narrative: Hdt., 2.131.1, 9.108.1–2. 296 Polyb., 31.25.4–5. 297 For example, Eckstein 1995, 226–227 uses this passage as indicative of Polybius’ idealization for a monarch, in accordance with Hellenistic norms of kingship. McGing 2010, 161, calls Philip V here “hugely successful”. 298 Nicholson 2018. 299 Nicholson 2018, 248. 300 Polyb., 2.43.3. 301 Thuc., 2.43.1. Walbank in his Historical Commentary on Polybius does not note this parallel. See Ludwig 2009, 296–298 on Thucydides’ model of failed political love. See also Sissa 2009, 287–292. Herodotus is less explicit on the repercussions of love of power or politics: Hdt., 1.96.2 (Deioces), 5.32.1 (Pausanias). 302 See Copland and Goldie 2011; Lamm and Silani 2014; Maibom 2017, 2020 for recent discussion in modern social sciences and Stueber 2017 for its use in modern philosophy. See Pinker 2011, 571–593, for an assessment of the history of the concept of empathy. For discussion in ancient emotion, see Konstan 2001. 303 See Maibom 2017a, 22–23. 304 Historiographical occurrences of terms related to συμπάθεια appear only in Polybius (11 times), Diodorus Siculus (22 times), Dionysius Halicarnassus (18 times), Josephus (4 times), and Appian (1 time). 305 The Greek root for English “empathy”, ἐμπαθεία, emphasizes the zeal or impassioned nature of an action in Polybius and is used once, 31.24.9, when Scipio Africanus expresses how much he wants Polybius to accompany and advise him. 306 Polyb., 6.53.3. 307 See, for example, Copland and Goldie 2011, especially Copland 2011, 3–18; Pinker 2011; Maibom 2017; Stueber 2017.

Individual Emotions in Context 99 308 This parallels the lack of clear, agreed distinctions between the two terms empathy and sympathy in English. 309 Polyb., 15.25.18. 310 Polyb., 2.56.7. See Levene 1997; Eckstein 2013 for discussion. 311 Cf. 15.17.1–2 on the importance of genuineness to create emotion. 312 Polyb., 10.14.10. This example seems to have less emotional depth than the others. 313 Polyb., 38.22, which is preserved in Appian’s Punic Wars, 132. See Maibom 2017 on definitions and components of empathy. See especially Maibom 2017a, 2017b on perspective taking versus other forms of empathy. 314 Polyb., 8.20.9. Antiochus III feels what we would call empathy when he sees his rival Achaeus bound and helpless in front of him and reflects on the frailty of human prosperity. Other instances which could denote empathy: 2.56.7, 27.9.5. 315 This roughly parallels the processes of cognitive empathy; see Spaulding 2017. 316 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385b11–20; Konstan 2006, 201. 317 Konstan 2006, 211–213. 318 Konstan 2006, 202. 319 Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon in their historiographical works use ἔλεος only twice: Thuc. 3.40.3, and Xen., Hell. 1.5.19. These authors use the terms related to οἶκτος and its cognates more frequently (27 times), which Polybius only uses three times. See Mauersberger 1.4.1698–1699 on Polybius’ usage. See Lateiner 2005 on pity in Herodotus and Thucydides. 320 On scripts, see Kaster 2005, 8–10. 321 17 out of 39 instances of pity are focalized through an external observer as the subject. 322 For combinations with ὀργή, see Polyb., 2.56.13, 9.10.9–10, 15.17.2; μῖσος – 8.36.9, 9.10.9–10, 15.17.2; αἰσχύνη – 1.5.10, 11.10.3. φθόνος – 9.10.7. (With a judgment of happiness or blessedness, μακαρίζειν – 3.62–63.) 323 This does not represent altruistic emotion but rather emotion stimulated by another person’s circumstances. See too Polybius’ usage of reflective συναγανακτεῖν and ἀγανακτεῖν: Polyb., 2.59.2, 4.7.3, 4.76.3, 6.6.6, 24.7.7. 324 Polyb., 9.10.8–9. 325 Polyb., 2.5–6. 326 Polyb., 2.7.1–3. See too Hau 2016, 32–33. 327 Polyb., 15.17.1–2. 328 Polyb., 16.32. See Hau 2016, 40–42 on Polybius’ moralizing correlation between action and result. 329 Polyb., 16.32.5. See too Polyb., 15.5.10. 330 Later some Abydenes change their minds, supplicating and surrendering to Philip V, 16.33.4–5. 331 Polyb., 14.5.10–11, 15.10.3. 332 Polyb., 14.5.10. 333 Polyb., 14.5.10–11. 334 This interpretation seems harsh, even for Polybius, who tends to promote pardon for those caught by circumstances, as the Carthaginian soldiers were. For this sentiment, see 8.36. 335 Polyb., 15.10.3. 336 Polyb., 3.62–63. Cf. Liv., 21.40–44. 337 Polyb., 3.62. 338 Polyb., 3.62.9–10. 339 Polyb., 3.62.11. 340 Polyb., 3.63. 341 Polyb, 3.63.1–4. 342 Polyb., 3.63.4–6. 343 Polyb., 3.63.9. 344 With most instances of emotion, Polybius simply narrates its occurrence, but sometimes a character intends to create emotion in another. Their success in creating the

100  Individual Emotions in Context emotion they want often contributes to a favorable portrayal of the intender. Hannibal intends to and succeeds in creating emotion in others most of all in the surviving text of the Histories: 3.13.6, 3.17.5, 3.34.4, 3.51.13, 3.52.6, 3.54.7, 3.60.10, 3.60.13, 3.61.4, 3.61.5, 3.62–63, 3.69.3, 3.78.5, 3.89.1, 3.90.12, 3.94.7, 3.101.4, 3.111.3, 3.111.5, 6.58.9–10, 9.4.7, 9.6.1, 9.22.5, 9.3.6, 15.19.3, 15.19.6. Characters who try to manipulate others’ emotions and fail, on the other hand, suffer and are portrayed negatively. 345 Polyb., 38.2.1–3.4. 346 Polyb., 38.3.6–7. Unfortunately, the sections in which Polybius explicitly justifies how and why the Greeks’ loss in the Achaean War was the worst disaster are lacunose, 38.3.9–13. See Walbank, HCP 3.688. 347 Polyb., 38.1. 348 Polybius consistently characterizes the Greeks’ decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, and mad. See, for example, 38.3.8–13, 38.10.12, 38.11.6, 38.18.7–8. 349 See Dubuisson 1985 on Polybius’ language.

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3

Internal State Change The People’s Moral Emotions

People do not always feel emotions one at a time, nor do they always feel them alone, as an individual. Collective emotion, or emotion ascribed to a group of people, complicates the process of feeling emotions. So too combined emotions, that is, a variety of emotions felt simultaneously by someone, complicate the effects (and affects) the emotions may have. How do collective and combined emotions differ from the single emotions of individuals? Scholars of modern collective emotion theorize how group emotion relates to individual emotion through two basic frames.1 Plural subject theory posits that a group expresses an emotion as a group rather than as individuals. That is, the emotion is a single expression of the group, as the individuals commit to the identity and values of the group, which holds greater weight in this emotion than individual identity. This framework works well in analyzing expressions of emotion by collectives such as a corporation. The corporation may express regret, joy, indignation, or sympathy, for instance, on behalf of its employees; yet this expression of collective emotion is not contingent upon each employee or individual member actually feeling the full or even the same emotion. This frame maps well onto the emotions attributed to states. The anger of the Romans against Rhodes after the Second Macedonian War which various Greeks attempt to appease in Polybius’ Histories would best be conceived in terms of plural subject theory.2 The second model, the theory of shared emotion, takes the emotion of the individual as the basis for group emotion. According to the theory of shared emotion, collective emotion is constituted by the emotion of the individuals in the group. They feel the same emotion toward the same object. This can be either conscious or automatic. This theory explains and analyzes collective emotion of groups which are not a formal unity better than plural subject theory and helps to investigate the phenomenon of emotional contagion. The effusive joy which all in Rome experienced at the news of Scipio’s victory at Zama at the end of the Second Punic War is best conceived of as shared collective emotion.3 Bennett Helm’s theory of emotional communities of respect builds on this theory of shared emotion and provides a particularly useful frame for analyzing the collective emotion of the people in Polybius’ Histories. Helm theorized that communities share emotions which reinforce and validate their values.4 Membership DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-4

Internal State Change 105 in the community is constituted through feeling these emotions based in the communal values. In this chapter, we shall focus on two passages of collective, combined emotions and their significant impact on politics. The first passage is Polybius’ theory of how states develop and change between types of governance or state-forms ( politeiai). This passage provides a theoretical account and most closely approximates the investigations of modern social scientists. The second passage provides an extended narrative account of the increasing collective emotion which eventually led to the violent end of the Ptolemaic minister Agathocles and his family. This passage vivifies the growth and effect of combined, collective emotions when they go unchecked. In both of these passages just who constitutes the collective group is important: the people. However, Polybius does not designate a unified political entity, such as “the People” (ὁ δῆμος) but rather refers to “the crowd” (τὸ πλῆθος), “the many” (οἱ πολλοί), or “the citizens” (οἱ πολῖται), or in a particular circumstance, “the mob” (ὁ ὄχλος).5 Thus, I use the phrase “the people” throughout this chapter similarly to refer to an undefined, heterogeneous collective group as distinguished from the rulers or those with political authority. The nature and extent of the people’s involvement in ancient Greco-Roman politics is debated.6 In Polybius’ text in particular, scholars have identified the people’s involvement in politics as an unwelcome intrusion. Arthur Eckstein remarks that “[t]o Polybius popular assemblies are in general places of confusion and charlatanry, sites of uproar and irrationality. This is because the emotions of the polloi are naturally like a raging fire,” and that “[i]n the worst possible cases, the eruption of the masses into the politics of the state results in convulsive civil violence.”7 Craige Champion likewise states that “every multitude is for Polybius full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger,” and that “the plethos, also like barbarians, lack the critical rational faculty.”8 These scholars’ observations are applicable to parts of Polybius’ text. However, the passages under discussion here discourage broad generalizations of both the people in politics and the role of emotion. In fact, in both passages the emotions of the people coalesce with reason and morality and lead to an improvement in the political state of affairs. Finally, these passages hit at the heart of the relation of emotion to rationality and morality. Rationality has traditionally been contrasted with emotion, both in ancient philosophy and in modern preconceptions. However, scholarship in neuroscience and philosophy have reevaluated the dichotomy between reason and emotion, as have studies on Aristotle’s theory of emotion and the Stoics’ conceptions of emotion, indicating their cognitive basis.9 In Polybius’ Histories, the people feel anger, hate, and indignation, which have rational and moral foundations. As we shall see, Polybius does not condemn the people as inherently worthless for p­ olitics or denigrate them as irrational because of their collective emotions.10 Rather, as a community, they preserve social morality, seen in their negative emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses, and act as a catalyst for positive social and political change.

106  Internal State Change Collective Emotion in Theory: The Anacyclosis11 Polybius wrote his 40-book Histories to record “how the whole world fell under the Romans’ power in fifty-three years.”12 He extends his work, Books 30–39, to relate how the Romans maintained their power and what others thought about this. Book 6 divides the text (as do Books 12 and 34). Polybius designed Book 6 as a political reflection and discussion of the strengths of the Roman politeia, and he sets up this discussion to emphasize the Romans’ comeback after their disaster at Cannae in the Second Punic War. The discussion of Book 6 thus not only explains how the Roman state was able to take over the world but also how they survived and prospered after such a catastrophic defeat. While this fragmentary book contains much on Roman institutions such as military camps, funeral orations, and religious scruples, the extant text begins with a theory of how states change from one constitution to another and revolve back in a cyclical manner, called the anacyclosis.13 Polybius’ anacyclosis provides a theoretical model for internal changes of state-forms (politeiai) in a hermetically sealed state. That is, the state Polybius sets up has no neighbors, foreign relations, or any other external factors.14 As a state in isolation, the changes inherent in it by nature can be identified and examined, as Polybius explains with an analogy to rust and woodworms: For just as rust is an inborn evil to iron, and woodworms and termites to wood, even if the iron and wood should escape all external evils, they are destroyed through the rust and woodworms inherent in their natures, so in the same way a certain kind of evil is born in each of the state-forms and pursues it: tyranny for kingship, oligarchy for aristocracy, and brute rule of violence for democracy. It is impossible for all this not to change over time in this way.15 Thus, Polybius sees a cyclical type of decline as natural and inescapable for each state. Within this isolated state, the type of governance revolves naturally from a good form of governance, which is labelled kingship, aristocracy, or democracy, down into a degenerate form of the same generic type of governance: tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy respectively. Moreover, Polybius posits that this isolated state in nature follows a certain path of which type of governance it takes up in succession, starting with monarchy, moving to rule by few, and finally settling on democracy. Thus, two different cycles exist in the anacyclosis or cycle of constitutions: the larger overall cycle progresses through all six forms (namely, kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy, and back to a state of nature), and the inner three cycles cycle from good to bad within the types of rule: rule by one, by few, or by all.16 First, let us get a picture of the entire process. Polybius begins the cyclical theory with a clean slate of the world and human race, after some massive disaster.17 Humans first gather into herds like animals and follow a bold, courageous, and strong leader, called by scholars the primitive monarch.18 When humans have congregated, the development of social values occurs. After this system of social behavioral standards develops, the primitive monarch begins to take heed in his

Internal State Change 107 leadership of the society’s new moral standards. Kings then rule by rational thought instead of brute force and use their power to improve public affairs.19 Through the three inner cycles of constitutions, the processes of dynamic change occur in very similar ways. In Polybius’ cycle of constitutions, the good forms – kingship, aristocracy, and democracy – are governed for the good of the people.20 The constitutions begin to change to the worse forms – that is, tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy, respectively – when new rulers without experience inherit power.21 Then the rulers turn to fulfilling their personal desires.22 In the next change, Polybius’ model is unique. In the degenerate states of tyranny and oligarchy, the people react with hatred, anger, indignation, and resentment to the bad rulers’ private indulgences. This reaction destroys the bad constitutional form and establishes a good form of a new type of rule: aristocracy after tyranny and democracy after oligarchy. The last change in the cycle, that of democracy’s perversion into ochlocracy, or mob rule, leads to the complete dissolution of the state. After that, the people (τὸ πλῆθος) rediscover a primitive monarch and presumably the larger cycle restarts.23 The Development of Human Community

In the development of human society, emotion acts as the catalyst for distinguishing human behavior from the habits of animal flocks.24 Through emotion, humans form a set of social norms, which define and solidify group identity into a community and later a state. I argue that Polybius’ theory of the development of human society and morality finds a parallel in Bennett Helm’s modern theory of communal emotions, which contends that “reactive emotions play a fundamental role in constituting distinctively human communities.”25 Polybius gives three examples of how humans start to form a community instead of a flock and how morals develop in that context.26 In all three, Polybius focalizes the narrative through the bystanders.27 Polybius begins by specifying that the moral conceptions of what is good and just develop in the people: “And then for the first time a notion of good and justice came to humans (καὶ τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), and likewise a notion of their opposites.”28 Polybius then exemplifies this process: For, whenever a child who has reached its prime neither shows gratitude (μὴ νέμοι χάριν) nor gives protection to those by whom it was brought up, but on the contrary undertakes in some way to speak or act badly against them, it seems clear that their neighbors, witnessing the parents’ care and sufferings on behalf of their children and their attention and nourishing of them, take offense and are indignant (δῆλον ὡς δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν εἰκὸς τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας).29 The negative emotional reactions of indignation and offense (δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν) are important here. So far, humans have behaved like beasts: they

108  Internal State Change follow a strong leader for their own protection, and they are naturally inclined to have sex. Whereas they may have thought it wrong for themselves to suffer harm before, now they extend this moral notion of right and wrong to others. Emotion – here, indignation at harm to another – is the mechanism by which humans recognize and are impelled to pursue what is good and just in society. For Polybius, this emotion demonstrates the existence of a concept of justice, new to humans.30 The child’s lack of respect stimulates the bystanders to judge good and bad treatment implicitly based on what David Hahm calls a “reciprocity of benefit”. Hahm explains that these examples “assume that it is normal for a beneficiary to repay a benefit with a reciprocal benefit for the benefactor.”31 Thus, the bystanders expect the children to give reciprocal gratitude in return for the parents’ care of them. Polybius further explains the bystanders’ reaction: For, since humankind differs from the other animals in that they alone partake in thought and rationality (μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ), it is clear that they probably do not pass over the aforementioned difference [in treatment], just as among the other animals, but that they take notice of what happened and take offense at the present circumstances (ἀλλ΄ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι), foreseeing and considering that a very similar thing would happen to each of them (προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει).32 Polybius correlates rationality (λογισμός) with humans’ ability for reflection and predictive application to their own potential situations.33 Because the bystanders can reflect and reapply a situation to themselves, humans are developing social and moral sensibilities. In Helm’s modern theory of emotional communities of respect, reactive emotions such as these are rational emotions.34 According to Helm, emotions have import for the subject; that is, they are “about” something the subject cares about.35 Emotions thus are rational and intelligible responses based on the emotion’s import.36 For Polybius, this rational ability to reflect governs the bystanders’ reactions of sympathy and indignation. Polybius’ second example furthers the development of a sense of duty and justice: Indeed, whenever one man who had received assistance or aid from another in a terrible situation but failed to give thanks to his rescuer and even undertook to harm this man sometime, clearly those who saw this would be indignant and take offense (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) with such a man, feeling indignation on behalf of (συναγανακτοῦντας) their neighbor, and considering something similar in their own cases.37 Once again, onlookers reflect on the situation, apply it in their minds to themselves, and feel indignation (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) and sympathy or shared indignation (συναγανακτοῦντας). These reflective and sympathetic emotions still exhibit personal concerns and are not wholly altruistic, for the observers think about themselves in these situations.38 Nevertheless, these reflective emotions

Internal State Change 109 for others help create a group identity, even when no such group seemed to exist previously. Polybius explains the significance of this example: “From these [circumstances] some notion of the meaning of duty (τοῦ καθήκοντος) comes about for everyone: this is the foundation of justice.”39 In Helm’s theory, reactive emotions such as resentment, gratitude, guilt, approbation, and indignation ensure that community members take responsibility for their actions and are expressed to call attention to one’s respect (as either transgressed in the case of resentment, or highlighted, as with gratitude). Thus, reactive emotions “are bound up with seemingly moral notions like respect and dignity” for members of a community bound by norms.40 Helm explains that it should be clear that resentment and other reactive emotions, as ways of holding others accountable to the norms of the community, simultaneously involve a commitment to the standing of the perpetrator as responsible to those norms. Moreover, they also involve a commitment to the dignity of witnesses as members of the community insofar as they call on witnesses to respond with appropriate vicarious reactive emotions, a call that is rationally connected to further reactive emotions such as resentment when witnesses fail to respond, or gratitude when they do in notable ways. In short, we cannot dissociate your commitment to your own dignity as a member of the community to your commitment to that of all other community members.41 Through his example, Polybius similarly stresses the development of a sense of community rather than power-oriented reciprocity. The bad neighbor who harmed his benefactor may have benefited temporarily, but his standing in the community has fallen. It is more important that the good neighbor decide to help others, taking into consideration the good of the community over his own personal good.42 The development of the social values of duty and justice represent a greater cognizance of the common good and the importance of the wider community. People now care about others. In Polybius’ final example, the bystanders finally take action themselves. Likewise in turn, whenever someone provides protection for all in dire circumstances, and he withstands and halts the attacks of the fiercest animals, on the one hand it is likely that such a man meets with signs of goodwill and honor from the multitude, but on the other that one who does the opposite to him meets with condemnation and indignation.43 In this example, the people solidify their community of respect and create a system of rewards and punishments embodied within their evaluative reactions.44 Polybius qualifies this example: From this in turn, a certain reasonable theory of shame, good conduct, and of the difference between them formed in the people, and the one was followed with eagerness and imitation because of its advantage, and the other was shunned.45

110  Internal State Change Communal interest becomes the measure for imitation and likewise for reward. What is beneficial, τὸ συμφέρον, determines the system of social behavior – what behavior to imitate or shun. The good of the community in this example is privileged over the good of the individual, at least in the sense of personal safety and self-interest. Through this example Polybius describes the development of the crucial cultural virtue of putting the good of the country – here the community of other humans – above one’s own personal concerns. Moreover, communal good encompasses personal benefit. Those who behave this way receive praise and honor, certainly forms of personal benefit.46 Since they receive this praise and honor for prioritizing the common good, their personal benefit falls within the common good. That is, they cannot achieve this particular valued kind of personal gain without aiding the community’s interests. Although “what is profitable” (τὸ συμφέρον) is often opposed to “what is good” (τὸ καλόν) and is often thought of in terms of purely pragmatic, cost–gain calculations, a meaning of “expediency” or pure self-interest rather than moral right for τὸ συμφέρον is out of place here. The person to be emulated for his “advantage” involves great personal risk – coming head to head with the attacks of the fiercest beasts on others’ behalf. This phrase, τὸ συμφέρον, makes much more sense as “beneficial” on a wider, more communal scale of advantage. The common good triumphs over pure self-interest. “The expedient or beneficial,” τὸ συμφέρον, contributes to the communal benefit of the community by safeguarding its interests, which include the interest of its individual members.47 Those reflecting back onto their own situations do so at this point as members of the community: they are considering what would happen to them in such a situation if the group did not uphold and reaffirm its values and standards.48 Valuing the public good and upholding it through a system of communal respect constitute the development of moral principles in humans in Polybius’ text. It is humans’ ability to reflect and predictively apply another person’s situation to oneself and possession of rationality which distinguish humans from animals and promote the good of the community over purely personal interest at the expense of others. Indignation or sympathy toward others demonstrates that humans possess and use their notions of what is right and just. Through reacting emotionally in adherence with their social values, humans develop a sense of community. Cycle of Constitutions

Throughout the development of the human community, a leader also develops.49 At first he serves as a strong protector, similar to bulls or cocks in the animal world. Yet as the human community develops, so too this primitive monarch adapts his behavior from rule by brute force to rule in accordance with communal values, or else he loses his position as monarch. Polybius is explicit that the form of leadership practiced follows rather than sets the norms and values of the community. Through his alignment with the people’s rationally based sense of morality, the primitive monarch becomes a king. Community-oriented reason distinguishes

Internal State Change 111 kingship from primitive monarchy: “Kingship comes into being surreptitiously from monarchy whenever reason (λογισμὸς) takes over the leadership in place of bravery and strength.”50 The same moral priorities that develop at the beginning of the community in Polybius’ anacyclosis play a large role in the characterization of and transition between state-forms. These behavioral standards regulate the people’s emotional reactions against tyranny and oligarchy but not against ochlocracy. Tyranny

Kings ruled by using their rationality for the benefit of their subjects, but their descendants turned away from these principles: But when they inherited the power to rule, they found everything safe and secure already, and provisions more than sufficient for their nourishment. Then indeed, they follow their desires because of the abundance of resources and think that leaders must have different clothing from their subjects, have different and elaborate enjoyment and preparations of their food, and be unopposed in their sexual practices and intercourse, however improper.51 In the transition into tyranny, the rulers “follow their personal desires” (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι). Personal indulgence contradicts the norms of the social behavioral system: personal satisfaction instead of attention to the public good would not receive marks of honor from the community, as happened both in the development of the community and under kingship.52 Moreover, the tyrants selfconsciously separate themselves from the members of the community, which, according to Helm, marks a disjuncture both from the group itself and from its values.53 The people, however, react to these transgressions: When resentment (φθόνος) and indignation (προσκοπή) arose in some cases and when in other cases hatred (μῖσος) and inimical anger (ὀργή) were kindled, tyranny came about from kingship, and the beginning of its downfall emerged along with the formation of a plot against the leaders.54 Polybius seems to split the reactions into two groups, roughly parallel to the tyrants’ transgressions. Resentment and indignation arise against those who elevated themselves beyond their subjects in physical trappings and material goods, and hatred and anger rose up against the tyrants who committed sexual outrages.55 When the subjects indicated that they disagree with the rulers’ actions, a change of state-form occurs.56 The good state-form of kingship relied on the consent of the whole community while the loss of that consent, expressed by the people through negative emotions, marks the change to tyranny.57 The people’s emotional reactions of hate, anger, indignation, and resentment lead them to public action (ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς).58 The tyrants’

112  Internal State Change desires to have different standards of clothing, food, and sex were not based on the rational reflection characteristic of the moral principles of the human community. They implicitly did not consider the effects of their actions on others – like the disrespectful child and the harmful man.59 The people’s resentment, indignation, hatred, and anger (φθόνος, προσκοπή, μῖσος, ὀργή), on the other hand, were based on rational social behavioral standards.60 They felt these hostile emotions for the tyrants, and are similar to the bystanders in the original community, who felt resentment and indignation.61 The people, under the leadership of the noblest and bravest of the community (ἐκ τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτάτων ἔτι δὲ θαρραλεωτάτων), act upon these emotions to fulfill a beneficial, practical purpose. They remove a bad ruler, and then the people themselves (τὸ πλῆθος) reestablish the state to be led by new leaders who heed social standards.62 The people, therefore, serve as a foundational source of rational social and moral values, based on fair treatment, in their reactions. The people’s emotions themselves stem from the ruler’s transgression of their sense of morality (τὸ καλόν).63 Since their morality exemplifies human thought and rationality (νοῦς καὶ λογισμός), the emotions themselves demonstrate and exemplify the people’s rationality. Thus, emotions and rationality align.64 To be clear, self-interest can also be at play in the people’s reactions of resentment, indignation, hatred, and anger. However, their self-interest aligns with the social and moral standards.65 Like the bystanders in the development of the community, the people may reflect upon the others’ negative situations and have no wish to be in the same place themselves. However, they do not fully follow their own self-interest without any concern for others. The superiority of collective benefit over self-interest distinguishes the people as a reserve of social morality.66 As such they provide the impetus for constitutional change. Emotional reactions then lead to the creation of the new, better state-form of aristocracy: And when the people (τοῦ πλήθους), after they chose leaders, prevailed against the rulers, first the form of kingship and monarchy completely disappeared, and in turn the form of aristocracy took up its beginning and birth: for the people (οἱ πολλοί), as if giving thanks to those who destroyed the monarchs, set up these men as leaders and handed over their affairs to them.67 Polybius specifies that these aristocratic leaders follow the social and moral principles and use their power for the benefit of the whole community: “The new aristocrats first enthusiastically did nothing more energetically than managing the common good (τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος), and they undertook everything carefully and diligently, both the private and public affairs of the crowd (τὸ πλῆθος).”68 Without the people’s preservation of social rules and moral principles through their emotional reactions, a better state-form would not have come about. Although the aristocratic elite lead the revolt against the tyrants, the people react, provide the decisive impetus, and choose to turn over their affairs to them.69

Internal State Change  113 The aristocracy’s and people’s positive emotions reaffirm the community’s social norms through their personal reactive emotions. The people give gratitude to the aristocrats for their leadership in the overthrow of the tyrants. The aristocracy, likewise, are pleased by this honor and attempt to reciprocate this in their management of the state. Both positive emotions thus reaffirm the community in its adherence to their social norms.70 Oligarchy

The aristocrats hand power over to their descendants, who then turn to various private desires, as did the tyrants, and become oligarchs instead of aristocrats.71 The people (οἱ πολῖται, τὸ πλῆθος) react as they did against tyrants, and these oligarchs experience the same result as the tyrants. Polybius specifies that someone notices the resentment, hatred, and anger (φθόνος, μῖσος, ὀργή) among the people and undertakes some action against the oligarchs with the full support of the community.72 These reactions against oligarchs mirror the reactions of indignation (προσκοπή) and condemnation (κατάγνωσις) in the bystanders during the development of the community. These negative emotions originate in the people’s social behavioral standards, as the oligarchs oppose the public good by treating others wretchedly.73 Emotional reactions serve as a spark for the overthrow of the oligarchs.74 Polybius next describes the actual downfall of the oligarchs, some of whom are slain and others exiled (οὓς μὲν φονεύσαντες, ).75 The people’s emotional reactions lead up organically to violence against the rulers. This violence can be seen to represent a more natural state where strength and might play the most important roles.76 The paradox in this stage comes from the fact that the violence stems from and backs the people’s reactions, which are based in their social sensibilities. So the demise of the worse constitution starts with offended social values but concludes with force. Ochlocracy

The people’s emotional reactions create democracy out of oligarchy. The people decide to take over affairs themselves rather than entrusting the state to one leader or a few, as previously (τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀνέλαβον).77 Democracy begins on the premise that all the people would rule and keep in mind the public good, found in the accepted social behavioral standards preserved in the people thus far. In democracy, the people no longer represent the ruled subjects but are themselves rulers. However, throughout democracy’s degeneration into ochlocracy, Polybius identifies two groups of rulers: those whom I shall call the ambitious politicians (ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν· μάλιστα δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) and the crowds.78 This symbolizes a split in the collective group. This split between an active group and the multitude resonates with the traditional divide between the politically

114  Internal State Change active elite and the masses in Graeco-Roman political practice.79 Social morality and considerations of group benefit are also shattered. Reflection back to oneself as part of the community – and therefore to uphold the social norms for potential future personal benefit – no longer applies because that in-group, as defined by its norms, no longer exists as such. Now, multiple groups with divergent (self-) interests, needs, and norms exist.80 In addition, the state-forms of democracy and ochlocracy do not feature the language of emotion in Polybius’ narrative. As such, ochlocracy brings into perspective just how much the emotions and their underlying values truly matter to the human community. After the democrats inherit power, and personal desire for more power has arisen, the ambitious politicians begin the degeneration into ochlocracy.81 Polybius specifies that this richer group (οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) especially (μάλιστα) falls into wanting more than the rest (ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν).82 The ambitious politicians destroy their affairs by “enticing and corrupting the crowds in every way” (δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὰ πλήθη κατὰ πάντα τρόπον).83 However, they do not yet convince the people (μὴ δύνωνται δι’ αὑτῶν). As Polybius notes in the transition to democracy, the people take the government into their own hands.84 The ambitious politicians corrupt (λυμαινόμενοι) the collective (τὰ πλήθη) who both have ruling power and whom the state should benefit, and so they lead the decline of democracy into ochlocracy. Next, the ambitious politicians’ need for fame (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν) conditions the many to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλούς).85 The people (οἱ πολλοί) merely seem to be the objects of the ambitious politicians’ efforts. Plato similarly likens the poorer sections of democracy to complacent drone bees, always reliant on their poor and ambitious friends’ efforts.86 In Polybius’ model, the more ambitious politicians likewise condition the crowd to take a more passive role in the state. However, the people do still share in power to rule, despite their complacency, and so the ambitious politicians never can assume full, autocratic power. Ochlocracy continues because the people still hold nominal authority to rule as democrats. Nevertheless, the crowds themselves contribute to the state’s decline. They no longer represent the community who preserve social rules and moral principles, as the people did in tyranny and oligarchy. The people become accustomed to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλούς). Instead of reacting emotionally to the ambitious politicians’ efforts to further their own personal interests (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν), the people also fall prey to pursuit of personal gain. No indignation or hatred arises. Because the people share in ruling power, they have lost their role as a reservoir of social morality and source of resistance. Power corrupts the people, destroying their sense of community and hence any constraint against their pursuit of self-interest. Polybius further expands on the prevalence of personal gain at public cost, for he states that the people have grown accustomed to live on others’ property and expect to live off of their neighbors (Συνειθισμένον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐσθίειν τὰ ἀλλότρια καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ ζῆν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας).87 At this point in the state-forms of tyranny and oligarchy, the ruled people would have reacted

Internal State Change 115 negatively to such antisocial behavior, but now no group represents those ruled, whose emotions brought correction to the state. Instead, everyone forsakes social values. Most importantly, the crowd takes action as sovereign power in its degenerate, complacent state by accepting bribes and making political decisions for each person’s own private gain. This condition recalls the negative examples of a child maltreating its parents or someone taking advantage of another who helped him during the development of the community. The people no longer exhibit the ability to put themselves in others’ places and to feel moral indignation at any mistreatment of others.88 Rather, the crowds live parasitically for their own private welfare at others’ expense, shown by their consumption of others’ property (τὰ ἀλλότρια) and living off of their neighbors (ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας). They represent those who mistreat others without reflection and do not resemble the ruled people or bystanders, who had decisively brought about the change for the better in earlier cycles. During these processes Polybius notes the change from democracy to ochlocracy. Democracy is destroyed (καταλύεται) and is changed into force and violent rule (μεθίσταται δ’ εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἡ δημοκρατία).89 The moment of constitutional change happens almost imperceptibly.90 Instead of the rulers’ irresponsible turn to private desires and resulting emotional indignation from the ruled, the change into ochlocracy involves pursuit of personal ambition in both ruling groups. Ochlocracy, contrary to tyranny and oligarchy, lacks any resistance from a community of people who heed rationality and social standards and are uncorrupted by the temptations of rule. Whereas the people had assiduously remained a repository of the social values, now they act like the unreflecting rulers. As rulers of the ochlocratic state, they become codependent and complicit with the ambitious politicians’ efforts to seek personal gain at public expense. After they have chosen a daring and arrogant leader but one who is excluded from the honors in the state, the people end or complete the rule of violence (τότε δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ).91 This would mark the critical moment of change between state-forms, as the people’s emotions do for tyranny and oligarchy, except here ochlocracy continues on its downward trajectory due to a lack of reactive emotions. The state reverts further, since the people choose a leader (προστάτην) with characteristics similar to the primitive monarch and animal leaders (μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν).92 Polybius’ statement about this leader’s penury and exclusion from honors (ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τιμίων) echoes Plato’s description of the end of democracy into tyranny.93 This excluded leader can be seen as a demagogue, whom both Plato and Aristotle identify as important in constitutional change.94 The leader is mentioned as someone the masses choose, and he never actually takes action in Polybius’ narrative. When the people choose this leader, social morality and rationality – as defined by Polybius at the beginning of the cycle – clearly have no place in ochlocracy.95 The ambitious politicians do not use reason or heed social values in their mindless hunger for distinction, the crowds forsake social rationality in not caring how they treat others and private property, and the leader is chosen only for his more natural and animal-like traits, not in combination with adherence to social rules and moral principles.96

116  Internal State Change The lack of social morality – and absence of reactive emotions to reaffirm these – leads to the complete destruction of the political state, society, and semblance of human characteristics (ἀποτεθηριωμένον). This implies that an organized human community ends altogether.97 Polybius distinguishes the steps in the process: the people (τὸ πλῆθος) take the excluded man (ἐκκλειόμενος) as a leader, then indeed ochlocracy is completed, and then the people murder and banish until, after they have turned to beasts, they find anew a master and monarch (τότε δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τότε συναθροιζόμενον ποιεῖ σφαγάς, φυγάς, γῆς ἀναδασμούς, ἕως ἂν ἀποτεθηριωμένον πάλιν εὕρῃ δεσπότην καὶ μόναρχον).98 In noting this end of the state, Polybius shows that ochlocracy differs significantly from tyranny and oligarchy. There are no ruled people to act upon their social values, revolt, and overthrow the worse constitutional form. Clearly, the ruled people’s role as a reserve of social morality and their rational emotional reactions constitute a crucial factor in determining and ensuring good governance in the anacyclosis. In Polybius’ narrative, collective emotion as rehabilitative for a state only works with the people uncorrupted by power. Ochlocracy and its demise serve as a crucial comparison for the other cycles and define the importance of the people as the reserve of social morality. Only those uncorrupted by power and rule preserve a sense of morality and demonstrate this through the reactive emotions of resentment, indignation, hatred, and anger.99 The Collapse of the Mixed Constitution

The mixed constitution provides an addendum to Polybius’ anacyclosis as an exposition of how even the balanced state-form naturally changes and reinforces the importance of the people and their emotions which reflect their sense of social morality.100 In our extant text, Polybius describes the Roman politeia’s exemplary institutions – such as the funeral oration, Roman superstition, and faithfulness in oaths and finance.101 Polybius then concludes his Book 6 “digression” (παρέκβασις) with the natural decline of a balanced politeia.102 While this section does not fall within the anacyclosis, the end of the mixed constitution follows a process of moral degeneration leading to political demise similar to ochlocracy. This theory of the balanced state as the original theorization of Rome’s republican system of checks and balances incorporates all three types of rule – by one, by few, and by all. This combination puts the brakes on the state’s natural degeneration, for it builds in checks against the unrestrained use of power by any sector of the government. As exemplified in the Roman state, the consuls represent kingship, the Senate represents aristocracy, and the People (ὁ δῆμος) represent democracy. Each sector holds particular powers over each other, ensuring that they all maintain high standards of caring for the state’s best interests. While many issues could arise over how the power was actually wielded in these states, in Polybius’ theoretical construction the participation of all in rule has a crucial effect of slowing the

Internal State Change 117 process of decline. However, this state too eventually succumbs to natural decline, Polybius theorizes. Since every group shares in power in the “pure” mixed constitution, when a segment utterly disregards the balances established, civil strife, anarchy, and dissolution follow, as with ochlocracy.103 The process of change found in ochlocracy reappears in the mixed constitution, as individuals develop excessive desires for offices and other honors due to their “inherited” prosperity from their forefathers’ conquests and world supremacy.104 Private gain leads to both ambition and complacency. Eventually, the mixed state will end from internal competition: “As these tendencies continue, the love of power and shame from lack of repute will begin the decline, and in addition to these, ostentatiousness and extravagance will enter their lives.”105 The qualities here mirror the want for more private gain found in ochlocracy.106 These attempts to secure greater private renown and resources lead to a multifaceted reaction from the People. The People (ὁ δῆμος) will begin the change to worse whenever they both seem to be injured by some [ambitious politicians] because of their greediness, and flattered by other [ambitious politicians], by whose flattery they are puffed up because of their love of power.107 The People (ὁ δῆμος) – here a political unity – focus on their own personal interest. First, like the crowds of ochlocracy, they do not reward the ambitious politicians in their greed. The People of the mixed constitution consider themselves wronged, and so they do not deliberately reward those who greedily wrong them. In this, the People seem to follow social behavioral standards. At the same time, they are successfully flattered by some other ambitious politicians (κολακευόμενος) and prioritize their own personal gain, abandoning their moral principles.108 The ambitious politicians rely on the crowd for more offices, and the People rely on the ambitious ones to flatter them and fulfill their private needs. As with the decline into ochlocracy, the collective community splits into separate in- and out-groups. With this split, the shared collective norms – and emotions to reinforce and give expression to them – also become disjointed. The ambitious politicians and the people prioritize their own self-interests, no longer members of a unified social group.109 After this, as in oligarchy, excessive private desires for more invade public policy: For then, having been provoked, and considering everything with passion, the People no longer will want to obey nor to have an equal share with the leaders but will want to have everything and the majority share itself (Τότε γὰρ ἐξοργισθείς, καὶ θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος, οὐκέτι θελήσει πειθαρχεῖν οὐδ’ ἴσον ἔχειν τοῖς προεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός).110 Here the People grow angry (ἐξοργισθείς), but they do so without recourse to morality, instead using only their passion (θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος), unlike the

118  Internal State Change people under oligarchy or tyranny.111 These people of the degenerating mixed constitution were injured then flattered because of the ambitious politicians’ greediness and self-interest, but they go on to want the most for themselves (ἀλλὰ [θελήσει ἔχειν] πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός) – the same vice they grew furious at! This type of anger, reliant on irrational deliberation, leads them to pursue their own, excessive personal interest, in contrast to the people’s negative reactive emotions of the anacyclosis, which supported communal values. The people of the mixed constitution feel the right emotion for the wrong reasons. Moreover, they deliberate in the wrong way, through passion (θυμός) and not reason (λογισμός).112 Here, the people wish to take more power for themselves, which undermines the balanced nature of this state-form: self-interest drives their emotions and deliberations, forsaking the communal values and the rationality which governed those emotions in the anacyclosis. Through this merging of emotional reactions with pursuit of personal gain, the decline of the mixed constitution mirrors the change into ochlocracy, as Polybius states, “When this has happened, the state will take over the best of names, freedom and democracy, but it takes over the worst form in actuality, ochlocracy.”113 While the occurrence of anger creates similarity to democracy’s origin, the social morality underlying emotions does not exist here in the decline of the mixed constitution. This absence of social morality as motivation shifts the mixed constitution to the model of ochlocracy. Because the mixed constitution’s people lacked social behavioral standards and moral principles, expressed in their rational reactive emotions, they too find themselves in a degenerate state, despite all the benefits of the mixed constitution.114 Comparison to Plato and Aristotle

In ascribing an important role to the people and their emotions, Polybius’ description of constitutional change differs notably from his philosophical predecessors.115 For Polybius, rationality, inherent in social behavioral standards and moral principles, was exhibited by the ruled people in their emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses. The people and no one else retained their rational capacities of reflection and predictive application of a situation to themselves. When bad rulers provoked this sensibility, the people reacted with anger, hate, and indignation and actively transformed the state – except in ochlocracy. Plato and Aristotle, by contrast, do not appear to portray the people as a reserve of social values and moral judgment, nor do they portray the people’s emotions as rationally based. The ruled people in Plato and Aristotle’s texts on constitutional change do react resentfully against the rulers, but they are motivated more by personal injury and self-interest than by consideration of social and moral standards. Plato, in his description of constitutional changes in Book 8 of the Republic, describes the resentment among the people as arising from personal wants, not concern for the common good. In particular, he describes the people as some owing debts, other having become injured, some suffering both, hating and plotting against those who took possession of their property and against

Internal State Change 119 the rest, they love a revolution (οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὑτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες).116 Personal debt and dishonor, and especially their personal loss of property at oligarchs’ hands, cause the people to hate and plot, besides the fact that they generally love new revolutionary things. The emotions here are personal and entirely self-interested, not the same sort of reactive emotions seen in the anacyclosis or in Helm’s parallel modern theory. Aristotle, in Book 5 of the Politics on the various causes of change in stateforms, does not present the people as a collective foundation for rationally based social rules and moral principles, nor does he focus on reason as a basis for the emotions and reactions against rulers. The insurgents focus on their self-interest in comparison with the rulers: “For they, both being dishonored and seeing other people honored, revolt.”117 He sums up revolt as stemming from inequality: For some, desiring equality, revolt since they think that they have less though they are equal to those with more, and others, desiring inequality and superiority, suppose that they do not have more but rather have equal or less, though they are unequal (and of these, some are stirred up justly, and others unjustly).118 Both earlier authors tend to attribute constitutional change to personal desires and individual self-interest.119 Lastly, internal disturbance (stasis) for Aristotle and Plato is begun within the ruling class or by demagogic leaders, whereas for Polybius the ruled people first react emotionally, and then leaders of revolt emerge from the nobler members.120 For Polybius, emotion stimulated the people with a reason to revolt and to bring about change for the better most of all because their moral sensibilities were offended. In contrast to Aristotle and Plato’s emphasis on class in constitutional change, Polybius characterized state-change with social morality. In Polybius’ model for change to a better state, the people’s moral and emotional reactions connect the process of internal dynamic change in the anacyclosis, and the people have a deciding role in how they are ruled and in determining what good governance is.121 This internal model can give practical advice to Polybius’ audience on how collective action can affect how they are governed – through paying heed to social morality and acting against its transgressions. Moreover, the anacyclosis’ inevitable end in ochlocracy and the mixed constitution’s eventual demise warn that ruling power corrupts even the people to the extent that they can no longer fulfill their moralizing function. Polybius’ model thus advocates that a public dispassionate about the transgressions of social behavioral standards by rulers only forsakes its moral duty and contributes to the decline of the state. Let us now turn to examine how and whether these popular moral emotions play a role in Polybius’ historical narrative.

120  Internal State Change Collective Emotion in Practice: Agathocles’ Downfall At 15.25–33, Polybius provides one of his most vivid and detailed narratives – that of the courtier Agathocles’ accession to power in Alexandria and subsequent downfall in 203 bce. This passage is noted for the extreme violence of the people.122 Arthur Eckstein uses this passage as the marker of the catastrophic involvement of the people in politics: It is not surprising, then, that Polybius deemed that the success of an angry plēthos in interfering with the running of the state to be the gateway to catastrophe. The anger of the Alexandrian mob in 203 leads to scenes of horror as the government of Agathocles is bloodily overthrown.123 (italics in original) He further identifies aspects from this passage which exemplify the negative paradigms of the greed of mercenaries, Polybius’ contempt for demagogic leaders such as Agathocles, excessive drinking, and women’s emotional intrusion into public life.124 Scholarship corroborates this negative interpretation.125 However, Eckstein’s comments particularly on the intrusion into politics by the people and by women do not take into consideration the causes Polybius attributes for such “intrusion”. Using this passage of Agathocles’ downfall as an example, Eckstein states, The dark situation here is exacerbated by yet another human trait: just as people react with loyalty to kind treatment from the powerful (4.33.7), so they tend to react with hatred to the cruel and arrogant treatment of the powerful.126 This event indeed marks a “dark situation”, with several of Eckstein’s negative paradigms at their worst. However, Eckstein’s focus both in this statement and throughout lies with the violent result of people’s emotions, not the causes and their underlying values, which form the main focus of this study. In this narrative passage, the people’s emotions reaffirm human society’s basic social and moral norms, functioning in the same ways as the emotions of the anacyclosis. Communal values cause emotions in the people when they perceive transgressions of others’ basic human rights and harm of innocent members of the community. After several incidents, the people take action to bring about the downfall of Agathocles, his family, and political supporters. In contrast to the hermetically sealed state in the theory of the anacyclosis, this historical narrative complicates the role of the people and their emotions. First, the lack of unity or definition of the collective group “the people” delays the collective’s recognition and motivation to act on their emotions. Where Polybius’ theory presented the change in state-forms, emotions, and overthrow of the worse stateform seamlessly, this narrative shows that historical reality was and could be unsurprisingly less-coordinated, murkier, and lengthier. Second, the roles of individuals and of specific incidents in the historical narrative bring new details to the story of state-change than the generalized theory. Lastly, the details of the people’s violence

Internal State Change 121 and its realness challenge the cleanliness of the anacyclosis and call into question how moral emotions could justify such ends. Nonetheless, this narrative provides a powerful parallel to the process of theoretical state-change. Background and Context

Unfortunately, Polybius’ extended narrative of this event in Alexandria is fragmentary due to its preservation only in the Byzantine Constantinian Excerpts and in the Excerpta Antiqua of Polybius’ manuscript tradition.127 The order of some of the episodes is uncertain, and it is unknown how much of the rest of the passage has been lost.128 For these reasons, reconstructing the complete record of events and the causal connections between the various events is difficult.129 Moreover, Polybius is our main source for these historical events.130 Other sources only confirm that Agathocles was a courtier of Ptolemy IV, who reigned from February 221 to August 204 bce, that he is thought to have aided Sosibius and Ptolemy IV at the battle of Raphia, and that he was a priest of Alexander in 216/215 bce.131 By the time of the event under discussion, it is clear that Agathocles holds a position of power in the Ptolemaic court. After the death of the more adept courtier Sosibius, Agathocles takes sole charge of the child king Ptolemy V, thus effectively assuming the role of his regent. Development of the Emotions Against Agathocles

Ptolemy IV and his sister-wife Arsinoë III died in mysterious and suspicious circumstances in autumn 204 bce., leaving a child, Ptolemy V, to become the next king.132 Sosibius, who died shortly thereafter, and Agathocles were named in a forged (πεπλασμένην) will as the boy’s guardians.133 Polybius states that after Sosibius and Agathocles ended the funerals and official mourning, the real nature of Arsinoë’s death came out, for when all heard that she died, they inquired about how it happened. Since no one gave any other pretext, the true manner (τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς) was stamped upon everyone’s minds.134 Arsinoë III’s suspected murder caused renewed signs of mourning, interpreted as general signs of hatred against Agathocles. Unfortunately, our extant Polybian text on the deaths of Arsinoë and Ptolemy IV begins only with their funerals. However, we have a fragment from John of Antioch, a sixth-century Byzantine historian whose Historia mundi is also partly preserved in the Constantinian Excerpts. John relates that Agathocleia, Agathocles’ sister, had Arsinoë killed after Ptolemy IV’s death (ἡ Ἀγαθόκλεια Ἀρσινόην διαφθείρει δόλῳ).135 John’s text specifies Agathocleia as initiating the murder of Arsinoë, which also implicates her in the guilt of Agathocles’ regime. Polybius too implicates Agathocleia in the demise of Arsinoë in an earlier passage in which he discusses the influence of courtesans and says of Agathocleia, “and over the king Ptolemy Philopator (IV) did not Agathocleia the courtesan rule – she who also overthrew the entire palace (ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνατρέψασα τὴν βασιλείαν)?”136 After the

122  Internal State Change death of Arsinoë, the child Ptolemy V is entrusted to the care of Agathocleia and Agathocles’ mother, Oenanthe, reflecting Agathocleia’s further success in transferring power from the legitimate queen to herself.137 Agathocleia’s supposed involvement in Arsinoë’s death will hold significance for understanding why the people direct their emotions and violence against her and Oenanthe.138 Moreover, Polybius does not doubt that Arsinoë was murdered, seen in his narration of rumor (or lack thereof) concerning it. This by itself does not prove that it was murder, but later statements confirm this interpretation. At 15.25.2, Polybius lists those of whom Sosibius had arranged murders (ἀρτῦσαι φόνον), and Arsinoë is fifth in this list. At 15.25.12(9), in the context of Agathocles’ arrangement of governmental posts, Polybius introduces Philammon as “the one in charge of the murder of Arsinoë” (Φιλάμμωνα τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ τῆς Ἀρσινόης φόνῳ). This assumes Arsinoë’s murder as well enough established to back the introduction of a new character.139 Lastly, Polybius argues that the death of Deinon, a government official, was justified, in fact, as Agathocles’ most just deed, for Deinon had known about the plot to murder Arsinoë, did nothing, and later spoke of his regret for not trying to save her.140 Polybius’ entire tale about Deinon presupposes the murder of Arsinoë by Agathocles’ regime. After the funeral of Arsinoë III, the people, ostensibly the Alexandrian community, reflect upon Arsinoë’s life and all that she undeservedly suffered: her orphanhood, the hubris against her while alive, and her assassination.141 This provokes tears, some goodwill for Arsinoë, but mostly hatred toward Agathocles’ regime (Ταῦτα δ’ ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις οὐχ οὕτω τῆς πρὸς Ἀρσινόην εὐνοίας τεκμήρια, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα μίσους).142 Because the people did not believe Arsinoë deserved to be murdered (or to suffer throughout her life), they hated the perpetrators. That is, they considered it wrong that Agathocles and his group caused Arsinoë to suffer. This negative reactive emotion parallels Helm’s theory of communal, third-party reactive emotion based upon moral standards: harm to an innocent or even a benefactor was unacceptable, just as in the development of the community in the anacyclosis.143 Agathocles counteracted the hatred against him by paying his soldiers two months’ wages as an indulgence (πεπεισμένος τὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς μῖσος ἀμβλύνειν).144 However, he fails to manage the emotions against him.145 Agathocles’ failure contrasts successful management of emotions; for example, Aratus in the assembly of the Achaeans completely reversed their indignation against him, as did Hannibal with the anger of the Carthaginians, as discussed in Chapter 1.146 These successful leaders first acknowledged the negative emotions against them and then worked to reestablish their position in society by calling to mind the moral values which underlie such emotions. Agathocles recognized the negative emotion against him but failed both to acknowledge it and to identify the underlying social and moral values.147 Agathocles also failed to recognize the intensity of hatred against him and made the wrong move. He assumed that for others, like himself, self-interest trumped emotional moralism.148 While the pay Agathocles distributed successfully blunted the potency of the negative emotions, he did not entirely dispel the people’s hate, and he certainly did not completely reverse the negative feeling as Aratus did.149

Internal State Change  123 After removing the esteemed and competent men from the city and enlisting his own group of mercenaries, Agathocles, similar to the tyrants and oligarchs in Polybius’ anacyclosis, became excessively drunk and “spent time in the accompanying excesses, not sparing matrons, brides, or maidens.”150 Moreover, Polybius specifies that he carried out these immoral and transgressive behaviors with the vilest ostentation (μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας). Such behavior resembles the transgressions observed throughout the anacyclosis, that is, harming and taking undue advantage of others for one’s own self-interest.151 Polybius describes the results of Agathocles’ behavior: From this, although much indignation of all sorts arose (Ὅθεν πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως), but since no care or aid was offered, but rather the opposite – outrage, arrogance, and negligence were added on – again the previous hatred arose up in the people (ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος) and all (πάντες) remembered the previous misfortunes concerning the royal house because of these people.152 Agathocles clearly harmed the women he raped and their families.153 However, his actions stirred indignation and hatred not only in these personal victims but also in everyone. The whole community felt the whole spectrum of feelings of indignation (πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως). Such feelings of indignation react explicitly (ὅθεν) to Agathocles’ transgressions of communal standards of acceptable behavior. Agathocles’ behavior jeopardized the community’s integrity and common respect. If the particular women whom Agathocles raped and their families as members of the community were open to such disrespect and undeserved suffering, then no one in the community was guaranteed respect for their basic human dignity and safety.154 The basis for the community, as a union of members with the same respect and safety guaranteed to all through adherence to socially acceptable moral behaviors, has been nullified through Agathocles’ prioritization of his self-interest. Agathocles makes a claim to have higher status and not be subject to the communal codes of moral behavior.155 In this way, Agathocles transgressed the social norms of the community and naturally stimulated the negative reactive emotions of indignation and hatred. Indignation serves in its characteristic role as a response to some injustice or social transgression. Polybius even notes that some aid or remedy was expected (yet not forthcoming) (οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης). If Agathocles had noticed the indignation and cared about communal values, he could possibly have rectified the situation. The community expected an expression of guilt and a subsequent attempt to remedy it from Agathocles, but his failure to feel or show any remorse confirms his separation from communal values.156 Agathocles thus falls outside of the community and fails to note and abide by moral standards. Αdding insult to injury with his hubristic, predatory, and self-interested behaviors, Agathocles rekindles the people’s hatred (ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος), which had begun in response to the treatment and death of Arsinoë.157 Hatred is perpetuated by memory of past transgressions and emotions.158 Emotional memory is a newer topic in the social sciences, which analyze

124  Internal State Change the impact of emotion on both memory accuracy and the process of recalling emotions.159 In Polybius’ narrative, we see the process of emotional recollection at work, for the people recall their preexisting hatred, and this negative emotion resurfaces due to new stimuli.160 Polybius continues, “But in that they had no public figure to take the lead worthy of mention, and through whom they would work out their anger (τὴν ὀργὴν) towards Agathocles and Agathocleia, they kept quiet.”161 Here the people keep quiet simply because no suitable leader is present, betraying the presupposition that if a suitable leader were present, the people could and would act on their anger.162 This statement introduces a new emotion to this episode – anger (ὀργή). We already know that the murder of Arsinoë, Agathocles’ rapes, and his further ostentatious display of power form the basis for popular indignation and hate. Indignation comes first, directly tied to the moment of transgression, hatred, as cognitive reflection on previous similar circumstances, intensifies the negative affect, and anger is narrated last in its tendency toward expectation of future action, though Polybius notes the lack of action-fulfillment here.163 The extant text shifts to Tlepolemus, a general in Pelusion and potential leader for the people. Tlepolemus, having figured out that Agathocles and his regime were in charge in Alexandria, instead of a council of the leading citizens, begins to plot against Agathocles due to their personal hostility (ἔχθρα) and his confidence that he would make a better guardian for the king. Tlepolemus’ careless slander of Agathocles arouses reciprocal slander from Agathocles.164 At this point, there is a break in this narrative, but our text resumes with a sentimental and sensational display staged by Agathocles and his sister Agathocleia.165 Overwhelmed with tears, Agathocles pleads to the Macedonian troops and entrusts the king to their care against an alleged conspiracy by Tlepolemus.166 Here, Agathocles and Agathocleia fail at eliciting pity from the Macedonian troops, who do not even give any credence to Agathocles’ words (οὐχ οἷον ἠλέουν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς οὐδὲν προσεῖχον τῶν λεγομένων).167 One could read an earlier excerpt from Book 15 to explain this failure. At 15.17.1–2, Polybius explains that faked suffering often elicits anger (ὀργή) and hatred (μῖσος). Polybius states, When one seems to be overcome by feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from those who see and hear him (ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι), and the novelty moves each of us in some way. But on the contrary, whenever such behavior appears to happen for the sake of trickery and as an act, not pity but anger and hate are what he stimulates (ἐπὰν δὲ ϕαίνηται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ’ ὀργὴν ἐξεργάζεται καὶ μῖσος).168 In this statement, Polybius targets courtiers in particular, who do not feel genuinely (αὐτοπαθῶς) but feign what they calculate will bring them profit. Agathocles, who worked his way to power as a courtier, displays fake suffering; therefore, no pity arises.169 If we read Polybius’ statement at 15.17.1–2 to hold true for Agathocles’

Internal State Change 125 faked display, anger (ὀργή) and hatred (μῖσος) may arise instead in the Macedonian troops, though Polybius’ narrative at 15.26 does not specify this. However, the magnitude of Agathocles’ failure to elicit a particular emotion starkly contrasts the popular emotional response to the death of Arsinoë. The city’s sympathizing with Arsinoë was quite potent, expressed by tears, the deepest expression of sympathy, and this response aligns with Polybius’ theory of how people reflect and apply the situation to themselves.170 Conversely, Agathocles’ tears involve no reflection, no genuine suffering, and no shared emotions, thereby lacking the same, genuine and sympathetic reception. Thus, Agathocles runs the risk of perpetuating the morally based, negative reactive emotions felt by the people against himself through his own emotional mismanagement. Although he does occasionally recognize that there are negative reactions against him, he never acknowledges them or their underlying communal values. In addition to his failed display of emotion, Agathocles ordered that Tlepolemus’ mother-in-law, Danaë, be shamefully dragged unveiled through the streets from the temple of Demeter and put under guard to make manifest his hostility with Tlepolemus.171 This move backfires, for the people grow indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) again and make public their hatred (μῖσος) through graffiti.172 Agathocles and his group then attempt to leave, but they fail through their own ineffective planning, and instead, Polybius states that they take up tyrannical power, killing some rivals, imprisoning others.173 Polybius frames the episode of Danaë’s public shaming and imprisonment with reference to emotions. First, Polybius establishes the episode as an example for the anger against Agathocles: “This affair extended the anger both of the people and Tlepolemus against Agathocles (Ἐγένετο δέ τι  .  .  . συνέργημα πρὸς τὸ τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπιτεῖναι τήν τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Τληπολέμου).”174 Agathocles merits the anger against him, because of his outrage against Danaë, for by this act he transgresses all standards of decency and community expectations and norms.175 The treatment of Danaë – transgressive, immoral, and self-interested – motivates communal reactions of negative emotion. The people respond with public expression of indignation to Agathocles’ acts (Ἐφ’ οἷς τὸ πλῆθος ἀγανακτοῦν οὐκέτι κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐδὲ δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἐποιεῖτο τοὺς λόγους) and make manifest their hatred of Agathocles and his government (φανερῶς ἐξέφερον ἤδη τὸ μῖσος εἰς τοὺς προεστῶτας).176 As we saw earlier, indignation directly responds to transgression of the social and moral standards.177 Next, we hear the story of Moiragenes, a Macedonian bodyguard suspected by Agathocles of collusion with Tlepolemus.178 What happens to Moiragenes acts as a catalyst for the conversion of all the anger, hatred, and indignation into action. Agathocles, as part of his assumption of tyrannical power, identifies Moiragenes as a threat because of his kinship and the rumor of his aid to Tlepolemus and gives orders to Nicostratus to detain and intensely interrogate him.179 Because Moiragenes denied all allegations of his aid to Tlepolemus, Nicostratus has him stripped and prepared for torture.180 However, Nicostratus receives a message and leaves the room without giving any instructions to his subordinates standing ready

126  Internal State Change to whip and torture Moiragenes.181 These cronies eventually all drift off, leaving Moiragenes alone, who runs off through the palace, eventually to find the Macedonian troops and tearfully persuade them of his situation and of the need to capitalize on the prevalent popular hatred (ἀκμάζει τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μῖσος) to secure his, the boy king’s, and their own safety.182 They are persuaded and percolate through the rest of the troops until, not four hours later, troops and citizens were gathered, ready for action and revolution.183 The Moiragenes episode ignites the latent negative emotion.184 Moiragenes recognized the hatred of the people and called upon the elite troop corps, the Macedonians, to act upon it. He tells them that there was clear destruction for them all unless they took advantage of the opportunity in which the hatred of the many peaked and all were ready for Agathocles’ punishment (πρόδηλον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τὸν ὄλεθρον, ἐὰν μὴ συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ, καθ’ ὃν ἀκμάζει τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μῖσος καὶ πᾶς ἕτοιμός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κατ’ Ἀγαθοκλέους τιμωρίαν).185 Like Agathocles previously, Moiragenes recognizes, identifies, and acts upon others’ emotion, but, unlike Agathocles, Moiragenes seeks to exploit rather than counteract this emotion (συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ). From this point on, the actions resulting from the emotions, rather than the emotions themselves, drive the narrative. This episode brings up several important issues. First, it demonstrates Agathocles’ tyrannical power. He detains Moiragenes to be tortured based on an allegation (προσέπεσε διαβολὴ κατά τινος Μοιραγένους).186 While the state technically remained a monarchy under Ptolemy V during and after this historical narrative, Polybius treats Agathocles fully as a tyrant. Next, it brings up the issue of Moiragenes’ identity. He is one of the bodyguards and related to the commander at Boubasos.187 Thus, he has an intimate position at the court, with access to the king. In his detention and stripping, his status is entirely undermined. He was not a citizen at that moment, nor a member of the bodyguard or court, nor even a free man. This undermining and indeterminacy of social status come into greater contrast when he is left alone in the center of the palace: he is left perplexed because he is excluded from all roles he should have had – free man, citizen, bodyguard.188 Moiragenes runs out and persuades the elite troops to take action. Moiragenes becomes an unlikely leader for the movement against Agathocles. In the narrative thus far, one expects that Tlepolemus will become the long-expected leader for the people to work out their anger and hatred against Agathocles, but in our extant narrative, it is Moiragenes who takes up this role and begins to act upon the people’s emotions.189 However, Moiragenes’ indeterminate status puts him both outside the political and within it. He is similar to the excluded leader found in the state form of ochlocracy in the anacyclosis of Book Six, but he also acts like the leaders of the overthrow of tyranny due to his somewhat high (former) status as a royal bodyguard, and yet again he is similar to the one who leads the change into democracy by saying or doing something against the oligarchs.190 Moiragenes thus embodies

Internal State Change 127 traits found in the final stages of a degenerate state form as it begins to transition to a better form. He embodies Polybius’ theoretical model and complicates it through his more detailed, lived experience. He fits as a key figure in the overthrow of a degenerate government, completed by the fruition of emotion into action. Moiragenes’ paradoxical situation explicitly brings the soldiers to listen to and believe Moiragenes (Οἳ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἠπίστουν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁρῶντες αὐτὸν γυμνὸν ἠναγκάζοντο πιστεύειν).191 His status as an excluded figure – naked, nearly tortured, bodyguard and citizen – determines his new role as one capable of changing the state, by recognizing and activating the people’ emotions.192 Moiragenes demonstrates his unique position by identifying the hatred of the people as if from a third-party perspective. Ironically, only Agathocles has explicitly recognized the people’s hatred and tried to combat it.193 Here, Moiragenes’ recognition of hatred marks the climax of the entire passage. From the beginning, negative emotions have built up over several examples, and here they finally begin to turn to action.194 At this point in the narrative, as others gather to protest against Agathocles, Polybius relates a final addition to the negative emotion. Oenanthe, Agathocles’ mother, sat alone at the temple of Demeter, distraught at the circumstances.195 Some women who did not realize the political situation and gathering mob, tried to speak comfortingly to her, but she shouted loudly at them, calling them monsters, wishing that they would one day taste the flesh of their children, and ordered her attendants to drive them away with beatings.196 Thus, the women left and cursed Oenanthe to experience the same as what she threatened others, and their anger “doubled the hatred in the households (ἐπιγενομένης καθ’ ἑκάστην οἰκίαν καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργῆς, διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος).”197 Agathocles, meanwhile, gathered the king and Agathocleia in a secure part of the palace and, after failed negotiations, handed over the king, whom the Macedonians jubilantly took to the stadium. Polybius highlights the multidimensional emotional experience of the collective, who, he states, experienced joy and pain (περὶ δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους ἐγένετο τις ἅμα χαρὰ καὶ λύπη). For, he explains, they were overjoyed (περιχαρεῖς) that the boy king was brought, but they were indignant again (τὰ δὲ πάλιν δυσηρέστουν) at the escape of those guilty, who had departed to their own homes from the palace.198 Sosibius, the son of the astute yet now deceased courtier Sosibius, persuades the child king, already upset, to agree to hand over the guilty to the mob and removes the distraught boy from the riot.199 Up to this point, Polybius’ own narration gives positive, moral validity to the emotional reactions from the people. These emotions themselves are not condemned. Rather, the similarity of this narration to the anacyclosis, in which the people’s emotions stimulate dynamic change for the better consistently and exemplify human rationality and a sense of justice, attests to the positive values which these same emotions of indignation, hate, and anger represent in this narrative.200 Furthermore, the detailed episodes of this narrative are framed so as to elicit both disapproval of Agathocles’ management of affairs and sympathy with his victims.201 At the end of this passage, Polybius clearly denotes his disapproval and utter disdain for Agathocles, calling him unworthy for history and naming others who displayed worthiness for history.202 From this stark negative judgment of

128  Internal State Change Agathocles, we could surmise that Polybius sympathized with the people’s assessment of Agathocles as unworthy and morally flawed. The people preserved the same moral values of communal interest over self-interest, of indignation at undeserved harm to innocents, and of rule in harmony with the subjects. Violence, Emotion, and Punishment

However, the emotions of this narrative finally break out into action, resulting in extreme violence. The mob indulges their passionate cruelty on Agathocles, Agathocleia, their flatterers, and their families.203 They first commit violence against Agathocles’ flatterer, Philo, who rebukes the mobs and threatens punishment from Agathocles, as he was unaware of the situation. First he is reviled and pushed, his clothes are torn off, then he is stabbed and dragged to the middle of the stadium while still breathing.204 When Agathocles arrives in chains, some people run up and stab him.205 Agathocles’ sister Agathocleia, her sisters, and other family and associates were then brought into the stadium. Oenanthe was led naked on a horse from the temple of Demeter to the stadium. All these were humiliated and killed, as some bit or stabbed them, gouged their eyes, and finally tore them limb from limb. “For,” Polybius explains, “some terrible savagery exists in the passions in the people in Egypt (δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων).”206 Lastly, the supposed killer of Arsinoë, Philammon, was stoned to death in the street by Arsinoë’s friends, who also choked his son and killed his wife, naked, after dragging her into the road.207 Even within this violent and dark episode, Polybius does not condemn Agathocles’ own violent punishment but rather comments on its light nature: [S]ome ran up and suddenly stabbed him as he entered, doing a deed not characteristic of enemies but of good-willed friends (ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλ’ εὐνοούντων); for they became responsible for his escaping a suitable destruction (τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς).208 Polybius manifestly considered that Agathocles deserved a harsher punishment than being violently stabbed to death.209 However, because extreme violence surrounds Agathocles’ death, with the dismemberment of his friend Philo and the stoning of Philammon’s family even by young girls, Polybius’ judgment of the “leniency” of Agathocles’ own death is often overlooked.210 Polybius’ evaluation of Agathocles’ punishment highlights the appropriateness of the emotions against him. The Histories provide further examples that Polybius thought that some individuals, like Agathocles, deserved to suffer extreme violence as a punishment. The most extended – and debated – judgment involves Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus, the earlier Hellenistic historian, on the death of Aristomachus, the tyrant of Argos.211 According to Polybius, Phylarchus narrates Aristomachus’ death thus: “Becoming Antigonus’ and the Achaeans’ captive, Aristomachus was taken to Cenchreae and tortured to death on the rack, suffering most unjustly and terribly (ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα) of all people.”212 Phylarchus, Polybius tells us,

Internal State Change 129 continues with Aristomachus’ cries from the rack that night, the neighbors’ horror, disbelief, and indignation, and how they then ran to the house where he was.213 Against Phylarchus’ narration emphasizing the extraordinary and wrong use of torture against Aristomachus, Polybius counters with his own evaluation: but I (ἐγὼ δ’) judge that, even if Aristomachus were guilty of nothing else against the Achaeans, according to the manner of his life and his offenses (παρανομία) towards his country, he deserved the greatest punishment (τῆς μεγίστης ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας).214 After all, Aristomachus was a tyrant – the worst possible word to all (αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα [τύραννος] περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας)!215 In fact, Polybius continues, “even if Aristomachus suffered the most terrible punishments, as Phylarchus states, in this way he did not receive a sentence suitable for one day of his life (ὅμως οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας).”216 Now, Polybius had a specific day in mind – the one on which Aristomachus had 80 Argive citizens tortured to death in front of their families based merely on a suspicion that they colluded with the besieging Achaean force.217 But Polybius is not finished yet. He asserts: [F]or this very reason it must not be thought terrible if [Aristomachus] faced something similar, but rather it must be considered more terrible if he should die untouched, having no experience of these punishments (πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν).218 For Polybius, it is not morally wrong for Aristomachus to suffer extreme violence; rather, it is morally wrong for Aristomachus not to suffer extreme violence. Finally, Polybius concludes that Aristomachus should not have died on the rack at Cenchreae in the night as Phylarchus says, but that he should have been marched around the Peloponnese and made an example of with his punishment (μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζόμενον) and in this way lost his life.219 Instead, Polybius states subtly, undermining Phylarchus’ account, he died by “merely” being drowned by the Achaean officers at Cenchreae quietly at night.220 Polybius’ judgment that Agathocles died too soon, stabbed as if by friends, aligns with his opinions about the death of Aristomachus, and this supports the value of emotions. Polybius sets up Phylarchus’ account of Aristomachus’ death as a paradigm for judging history wrongly. This parallels Polybius’ statement at the end of our passage that Agathocles was unworthy of serious history. Phylarchus failed to take account of Aristomachus’ past and faults, namely being a tyrant, a title which Polybius also specifies in Agathocles’ case. For Polybius, Phylarchus’ account is tantamount to pardoning and even forgetting Aristomachus’ deeds and life as a tyrant. Deploring his death presumes he lived an innocent life. Rather, Polybius stressed that Aristomachus’ major fault of pursuing the life of a tyrant should be publicized (παραδειγματιζόμενον) through the horror of his death. For Polybius, death should

130  Internal State Change be proportional to one’s crimes, and the people’s emotions in Book 15 justify the similar need for Agathocles to be punished. In addition, Polybius makes an example of Aristomachus for the scale of his punishment. Phylarchus oversensationalizes Aristomachus’ death by appeal to the horror and cruelty of it. Polybius clearly did not agree and made clear that Aristomachus deserved worse, just as Agathocles deserved a fate worse than being led in chains and stabbed to death.221 In these examples, Polybius did not deem the punishment cruel but instead blamed those punished. They created an environment conducive for cruelty, violence, and violation of human norms.222 Aristomachus began the violence and extreme cruelty against others when he tortured 80 citizens in front of their families. Agathocles began and perpetuated an environment of violence and violation of universal human standards of behavior. For this, Polybius finds his punishment not only merited but even too lenient.223 Likewise, Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus’ historical narration of the punishment of the Mantineans by the Achaeans highlights the importance of causation for evaluating violence and informs our analysis of the people’s violence against Agathocles and his supporters.224 First, Polybius claims that Phylarchus wished to make clear the cruelty (ὠμότης) of Antigonus Doson, Aratus, and the Achaeans, and so he described the sufferings of the Mantineans by drawing out the women’s strident lamentations and the young children and despondent elderly being led into slavery.225 Here Polybius teaches that history should not be like tragedy, aimed at pleasure, and so history should not be filled with incidental details of no significance nor with exaggerations. History should give the causes and motives for actions and events, for otherwise one cannot appropriately feel pity or anger.226 Polybius continues by justifying the importance of causes for evaluating punishment. Who, for instance, does not think that it is terrible for a free man to be hit? But if this should happen to one who first used violence, it is thought that he suffered justly; but if the same thing is done for correction and as a lesson, those striking free men are deemed worthy of both thanks and yet more of praise.227 Polybius approves and grants praise to violence done for good intentions, or in Agathocles’ passage, morally justified emotions. Thus, praiseworthy violence fulfills the same higher goals – correction and teaching a lesson – Polybius sets for history.228 Polybius expands on this example: And certainly to kill citizens is considered the greatest impious act and deserving of the greatest punishments; however, clearly one who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and one who kills a traitor or tyrant meets with honors and distinctions among all.229

Internal State Change  131 In this example, the victim’s past actions determine Polybius’ proscribed judgment, and it is important to note that, for Polybius, a tyrant deserves his death so much that the killer receives universal praise. Polybius sums up his point: So in everything a final judgment on these cases does not rest in what results, but in the reasons and purposes of the agents and in the differences between these (ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαιρέσεσι τῶν πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοραῖς).230 For Polybius, causes and intentions carry the most weight.231 Polybius’ challenge to Phylarchus’ history of Mantinea’s fall provides a useful comparison for his narrative of the punishment of the Agathocleans. Polybius rebukes Phylarchus for lack of contextualization and attention to causes and motives and demonstrates his own careful attention to context and causes with Mantinea – exhibiting so much care, in fact, that scholars have attributed it to Polybius’ Achaean bias.232 In the context of Agathocles’ tyrannical abuse of power, the people’s collective emotions serve as causes and inform Polybius’ judgment of the guilty party’s punishment. The Agathocleans’ hubristic treatment of members of the Alexandrian community – including Agathocleia’s involvement in Arsinoë’s murder, Agathocles’ rapes of various women, the humiliation of Danaë being dragged through the streets, Oenanthe’s beating of women at the temple, and even Moiragenes’ ignominious near-torture experience – all stimulated indignation, increased hatred, and ignited the anger ready to burst into action. These, the causes for the extreme violence, should inform one’s judgment on the punishments, according to Polybius’ precepts. However, when Polybius relates the deaths of the rest of Agathocles’ family and friends, he explains (γὰρ) the violence against them by noting the Egyptians’ natural tendency to be savage or cruel (ὠμότης), instead of referring to the gravity of the Agathocleans’ crimes.233 He does not assert that those who suffered such extreme violence did not deserve it. Rather, Polybius says that such cruelty is characteristic of people in Egypt (τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων), not of “the People” as a political group. This acknowledgment of their cruelty explains the extreme extent of violence, that is, the complete dismemberment of the Agathocleans after the mob actually tastes their blood by biting them, alongside stabbing them and gouging their eyes out. As such, Polybius implies that all the Agathocleans did not deserve such an extreme and violent punishment as they received. Nevertheless, Polybius refrains from criticism beyond this explanatory statement. In comparison with Polybius’ verdict on Aristomachus’ light punishment, this comment on the Egyptians’ savagery seems tame.234 The Egyptians’ savagery or cruelty (ὠμότης) appears at a particularly marked moment.235 It erupted when they were punishing those guilty for killing Arsinoë, for harming members of the community, and for flouting established human norms of acceptable behavior. Circumstances prolonged Agathocles and his group’s iniquitous behavior, since they continued to escape retaliation and instead increased the

132  Internal State Change people’s hatred, even escaping punishment when cornered in the palace.236 By the time the people could and did exact punishment, they certainly had no inclination to show tolerance and humanity.237 Their extreme violence occurred at least in part because the circumstances did not allow for an earlier, less violent outlet to their sense of indignation that those who did wrong should be punished.238 The violent actions of the Alexandrian mob eventually do bring about a change of governmental personnel, alleviating the people’s situation of being prey to the excessive, transgressive, and tyrannical behavior of Agathocles’ clique. Although the downfall of the courtier Agathocles does not constitute a change of official state-form, as Egypt remained a monarchy under the Ptolemaic dynasty, popular emotion sparks a serious political change. However, with the arrival of Tlepolemus, the running of the Ptolemaic state still did not function as well as possible. In Polybius’ extant narrative, Tlepolemus was neglectful and financially irresponsible, but he did not abuse the people’s human dignity.239 The violent actions taken which stemmed from negative reactive emotions did effect a change for the better for the people, despite the fact that their motivations were grounded solely in the past – to eliminate those responsible for the earlier state of affairs – rather than planning for the future.240 An analysis of the role of emotions in this passage helps to elucidate a new understanding of Agathocles’ downfall, not as a paradigm of government gone all wrong because of the “interference” of the people but rather as an exemplum of how the people’s emotions based upon communal human values can function as a trigger for salutary – though violent – action, call for social reform, and the overthrow of a corrupt regime. This narrative passage and the intensive role of emotions in creating violence call into question moral justification. While excessive violence does occur, the people followed through with morally based emotions. The people’s negative reactive emotions, based upon the community’s social standards of behavior and moral values, caused the violent downfall of Agathocles. Without these emotions, this historical event would not have happened, according to Polybius’ narrative. Indignation emphasizes the hubris and transgression against the community’s sense of social norms, hatred exemplifies the prolonged negative affect, and anger motivates future action. The combination of emotions intensified the circumstances to such a degree that excessive violence broke out, challenging traditional political roles and bringing down punishment upon those whom the people decided needed to be punished. Conclusion The historical narrative of popular emotion against Agathocles highlights a crucial issue obscured in the clean theory of the anacyclosis: rationally and morally justified collective emotions can cause extreme violence. Polybius makes clear that the final results of the emotion-stimulated processes of dynamic change were better on the whole than before for both the states of aristocracy and democracy in the anacyclosis and the state in Egypt.

Internal State Change  133 Combined, negative emotions represent the people’s moral disapproval of the transgressors’ behaviors according to their communal values, which reinforce their sense of communal identity, aligning with Helm’s modern theory of collective emotion and communities of respect. Polybius’ theory of how states form and change especially highlights the rational and moral foundations for emotions, countering the persistent assumption that emotions could only be irrational and detrimental to one’s benefit. This passage, along with the emotions against Agathocles and his faction, also demonstrates the beneficial and morally motivated initiative of the people in internal politics. In both passages, the people as a community with shared values express emotions of disapproval at the transgressive behavior of rulers, which lead to the overthrow of those rulers and a chance for better governance. Emotions, even – or especially – under restrictive regimes which do not incorporate “the People” as part of the government, present a way for those in the community to affect politics. The sense of collective identity which these emotions make manifest and corroborate becomes a powerful tool for social change, seen markedly in Moiragenes’ appeal to the Macedonian troops in Alexandria. The emotions of the people in these passages challenge the purpose of government and lead to the removal of those who do not rule for the good of the community. However, the good intentions of the people lead to violent outcomes. These results reveal something further about reality: emotions, their causes, and their results can be messy. Polybius’ historiographical narrative of the mob lynching of Agathocles and his associates does not sugarcoat these atrocities, though Polybius does not belabor them. The mess of combined emotions expressed by multiple people at once and leading to actions at odds with their moral motivations does not quite suit the (relatively) clean theorizing of emotion in ancient philosophy, rhetorical theory, or Polybius’ political theory in Book Six. The historical circumstances of the uprising against Agathocles ground the emotions. This foundation in and reflection of reality and its potential for disorder distinguish historiography. Moreover, this use of violence problematizes the positive outcomes seen with the turn to aristocracy and democracy in the anacyclosis and raises the issue of where justification for actions lies. Polybius seems untroubled by the fact that the outcome in Egypt was violent, beyond his remark about the extremity of the Egyptians’ natural savagery. Agathocles’ violent death even falls short of Polybius’ moralizing expectations. Polybius’ emphasis on causes, which we shall investigate in the next chapter, applies to these passages: the people’s emotions, grounded in their communal values, represent a moral outrage in line with Polybius’ standards. Looking to the emotions behind the violence and to the values behind those emotions justifies the violence against bad rulers, at least by Polybius’ standards. In this, however, the disjuncture between Polybius’ sense of morality and conventional modern standards of morality, such as expressed in just war theory, stands out. Although his standards for punishments diverge from modern conceptions, Polybius did show interest and concern over appropriate and moral behavior. In the following chapter, we shall continue this inquiry of collective emotion in the political realm and how Polybius portrayed emotion as a cause of war.

134  Internal State Change Notes 1 Unlike modern studies on emotion, Polybius seems unconcerned about how exactly a group can feel the same exact emotion, much as he seems unconcerned about how a group entity can intend or have a common mind. On collective emotions, see Konzelmann Ziv 2009; Salmela 2012; von Scheve and Salmela 2014. On issues of group responsibility, intentionality, guilt, and mind, see Gilbert 2000; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Flam and King 2005; Tollefsen 2006; Tuomela 2007; Schmid 2009; Smiley 2011; Schweikard and Schmid 2013; von Scheve 2013. 2 This theory pertains to our analysis in Chapter 4. 3 Polyb., 16.23.4. 4 Helm 2014. See too Helm 2001. 5 I distinguish which collective noun Polybius utilizes throughout these passages. In general, Polybius is consistent in using ἄνθρωποι during his narration of human development and uses τὸ πλῆθος (ten times) and οἱ πολλοί (six times) in the cycle of constitutions. He uses the term ὁ δῆμος once in the Book 6 passages under discussion, in the fall of the mixed constitution, where this term represents a unified political entity with authority and agency in the state, 6.57.7. He uses ὁ δῆμος in his summary of the anacyclosis as shorthand for δημοκρατία, 6.4.9: τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ὀργῇ μετελθόντος τὰς τῶν προεστώτων ἀδικίας, γεννᾶται δῆμος. In 15.25–33, Polybius uses these terms similarly, using τὸ πλῆθος (seven times) and οἱ πολλοί (eight times) throughout the narrative, ὁ ὄχλος to refer to those who gathered to protest Agathocles, and ἄνθρωποι once to describe a particular characteristic. See Mudde 2004 to compare similarly unspecific uses of “the people” in the modern rhetoric of Populism. 6 See Morstein-Marx 2021, 3–9 for a recent synopsis of the debate over the role of the People in Roman Republican politics. See Jasper 2018, 171–196 for a survey of the history of emotion in political thought. 7 Eckstein 1995, 136, 131. 8 Champion 2004a, 89. 9 See especially Damasio 1994; Solomon 2004; Goldie 2009. See Jasper 2018, 1–33 for a recent overview of the history of this dichotomy. See Nussbaum 2001; Graver 2007 on the cognitive base of emotion. 10 See Eckstein 1995, 129–140; Walbank 1995; Champion 2004a, esp. 89. I am not arguing that these scholars are categorically wrong. Their observations, however, pertain more limitedly to the degenerate state-form of democracy. However, this particular state-form is unique in that it lacks emotional reactions from the people. 11 This section reproduces a revised version of the article “The People’s Moral Emotions in Polybius’ Cycle of Constitutions”, Classical Philology 116 (2021): 155–182. Copyright 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 12 Polyb., 1.1.5. 13 This discussion is referred to specifically at Polyb., 3.2.6, 3.118.12, and 5.111.10. Some recent and influential works on the sixth book include Pédech 1964, 308, 313–315, 322– 323; Petzold 1969, 64–90; Eckstein 1995, esp. 194–271; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 1995, 1998; Lintott 1999, 23–26, 218; Williams 2000; Champion 2004a; Candau Morón 2005; Zecchini 2006; McGing 2010, 171–177; Baronowski 2011, esp. 149–163; Longley 2012; Erskine 2013; Seager 2013; Thornton 2013; Straumann 2016, 150–161; Moore 2017, 133–136. For scholarship on the anacyclosis specifically, see Ryffel 1949; Brink and Walbank 1954; Cole 1964; Podes 1991; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 1998; Williams 2000; Loehr 2021. 14 Straumann 2016, 150 likewise stresses the normative, not descriptive, nature of the anacyclosis. 15 Polyb., 6.10.3–5. The term “ochlocracy” is generally used by scholars to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the anacyclosis. Polybius does not use the term ὀχλοκρατία in this section itself, but he does call degenerate democracy ochlocracy

Internal State Change  135 in the summary at 6.4.6 and 6.4.10, as well as the degenerate mixed constitution at 6.57.9. Within the anacyclosis at 6.9.7, Polybius says that the state turned εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν. For the purpose of clarity, I  use the term “ochlocracy” to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the anacyclosis. 16 Erskine 2013, 240 calls the anacyclosis a “chaotic cycle” in contrast to the “stability and clear divisions of responsibilities” in the Roman constitution. Scholars have often disparaged Polybius’ theory: Brink and Walbank 1954, 97: “It is in many respects a failure.” Von Fritz 1954, 67: “The cycle theory . . . presented by Polybius is anything but profound. It is a gross oversimplification.” Cole 1964, 456; Momigliano 1969, 27: This section “is a big digression.” Polybius, according to most of these, could not reconcile a cyclical pattern, a biological pattern, and the theory of the more stable mixed constitution. Walbank 1943, 74; Brink and Walbank 1954, 102, 115. Walbank in particular focuses on what he identifies as the two questions of Book Six – how Rome was so successful and how states decline – yet concludes that Polybius was uninterested in decline. See also Walbank 1980, 50; Alonso-Núñez 1986, 22. For a logical explanation of this cyclical and biological system, see Hahm 1995, 13–15. 17 Polyb., 6.5.5–6. Ryffel 1949, 191–192 notes the strong parallelisms with Plato in the beginning of human society from disaster to herds to civilization. Cf. Pl. Protag. 320c8–322d5. However, the Protagoras notably attributes the development of justice to Zeus rather than to natural human development and reason. 18 Polyb., 6.5.7–9. Walbank, for example, uses the term “primitive monarch” for this leader consistently. Polybius does not specify a title but describes that the strongest and most daring takes the lead, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, 6.5.7. 19 Polyb., 6.6.10–6.7.5. See esp. Polyb., 6.7.3. 20 Polyb., 6.7.4, 6.8.3, 6.9.4. 21 Polyb., 6.7.6, 6.8.4, 6.9.5. Polybius’ model shares similarities with Plato and Aristotle’s theories of state-change: on heredity, see Arist. Pol. 4.1292a39–1293a34, 1313a10– 1316a16, which states that power from heredity is easiest to despise and so quickest to be overthrown. Cf. Arist. Pol. 5.1313a10–17. See Hahm 1995, 22–28; Champion 2004a, 88–89; McGing 2010, 173. On bad upbringing as a key to bad rule, see Pl. Leg. 3.694d, 695e. Polybius writes a narrative of decline into tyranny, not a philosophical treatise with fulsome explanation of a theory like Aristotle or Plato, much to modern scholars’ discontent: Von Fritz 1954; Cole 1964; Alonso-Núñez 1986. Polybius gives the causal chain of events, often without explanation. See Hahm 2000, 462, for scholarship on Polybius’ philosophical sources. Plato attributes to new rulers the need to differentiate their lives from their fathers’, which leads to abuse of their power: Pl. Resp. 8.545–546, 550d-551a, 555–557, 562e-563b. 22 For the role of desires as central to the downfall of the ruler, see Pl. Plt. 301b10; Resp. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691a, 695b, 701b; Arist. Pol. 5.1310b40–1311a8. Desires represent abandonment of the public welfare for private advantage. Cf. Polyb., 6.7.3. 23 Polyb., 6.9.9. 24 Polyb., 6.5.4–10, 6.6.1–9. 25 Helm 2014, 48. This theory of collective emotion is appropriate to Polybius’ own method of narration, it is easily understandable and generally applicable, and it does not rely on highly specialized terminology. Salmela 2012 provides a comparable model and theory of collective emotion which does not fulfill these standards but is beneficial to compare to Polybius’ theory. 26 Hahm 1995, 20 reduces these to an ethics based on reciprocity of benefit. 27 Straumann 2016, 155 notes the importance of bystanders and links Polybius’ thought to Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator”. See also Davidson 1991, on the importance of viewers in the Histories. 28 Polyb., 6.5.10. Von Fritz 1954, 55 calls τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον “enlightened selfinterest”.

136  Internal State Change 29 Polyb., 6.6.2–3. 30 The observers theoretically already have some sense of justice – that harming one’s benefactor is inherently wrong, but Polybius does not draw back to this level; he goes back only to the level of emotion to explain why people do not like others to harm their benefactor. 31 Hahm 1995, 20–21. 32 Polyb., 6.6.4. Polybius’ verb of “considering”, συλλογιζομένους, demonstrates the rational nature of humans, as a cognate of λογισμός. See Champion 2004a, 258. 33 This correlates with the observations of Champion 2004a, 256–257 that the most frequent usage of λογισμός in the Histories is “reasoned reflection and consideration”. 34 Helm 2014, 51–53. 35 Helm 2014, 49. 36 Helm 2014, 49–50. 37 Polyb., 6.6.6. 38 On altruistic emotions, see Konstan 2006, 85; Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 3; Tappolet 2009. Maibom 2017 refers to such empathizing through one’s one perspective “self-oriented empathy”. See Maibom 2017; Coplan and Goldie 2011 for models of empathy. 39 Polyb., 6.6.7. 40 Helm 2014, 51. 41 Helm 2014, 54. 42 In all other examples, the two people or groups exist in a relationship based on an imbalance in power: one of them is obligated to show gratitude to the more powerful. Polybius thought the Romans were exceptional in inculcating self-sacrifice for the country in their culture. See Polyb., 6.52–55 on the Roman funeral and the example of Horatius Cocles. 43 Polyb., 6.6.8. 44 See also Polyb., 6.14.4, where he stresses the importance of rewards and punishments in his discussion of the people’s role in the Roman politieia: “for in the state the People (ὁ δῆμος) alone has control over honor and punishment: by only these are dynasties, states, and in a word the whole of human activity held together.” Walbank 1972, 26 says τὸ πλῆθος exemplifies the political public of a democratic state. Walbank 1995, 203 writes, “the people – οἱ πολλοί, ὁ ὄχλος, or ὁ δῆμος – do not normally assume the initiative.” He adds, “[t]hey are there to be played on, easily swayed, liable to lawless passions, irrational rage and violent anger,” 214. However, while Walbank here focuses on the role of the Roman people specifically and gives examples of terms other than τὸ πλῆθος, his comments nonetheless may be pertinent to the anacyclosis. In this passage, these comments describe the exact opposite of the situation of people Polybius describes, who take heed, follow reason, take action, but do not overreact in their distribution of merits. Compare Walbank 1998, 49 who comments concerning the anacyclosis itself: “In each case it is the people who overthrow the corrupt rulers and then hand over power” and adds that “the social base is always ‘the people’ and the circumstances leading to the violent change are of a moral nature, namely corruption in the rulers, which arises naturally”, 281. Thus, he notes the social and moral importance of the people, although he does not identify or analyze how it is their emotions which paradoxically reflect morality and rationality. Cf. Gruen 1976, 67, 48 n. 21. 45 Polyb., 6.6.9. 46 See Morstein-Marx 2009, 117–122, on this pattern within Roman Republican culture. His discussion of the bene meritus in Roman terms parallels Polybius’ description of the savior in this passage: The phrases bene meritus in rem publicam (‘one who has served the state well’) and bene meritus de re publica (‘one who has earned the gratitude of the state’) . . . refer to the same kind of man and the same kind of actions, but the former stresses his services to the community and the latter emphasizes the debt the community owes him as a consequence of those very actions. 122

Internal State Change  137   So too the protector receives praise and serves the state all at once, though the Polybian terminology does not reflect this as subtly as the Latin. 47 See Tuomela 2007 for an important analysis of how communal interest is built on the interest of individuals. At 6.54.4–6 Polybius praises the Romans for inculcating such a strong desire to consider the common good as one’s own interest. See Gilbert 2000, for a different view of group responsibility. 48 See Salmela 2012, 39. 49 This figure is referred to as the “primitive monarch” to distinguish him from the king. 50 Polyb., 6.6.12. Hahm 1995, 19, 2000, 468: βασιλεία is a change in relations to a “shared conception of ‘what is just and admirable’.” 51 Polyb., 6.7.6–7. 52 Polyb., 6.7.3. Under kings, the people would come to the king’s aid if he were in trouble or ill, Polyb., 6.6.10–11. See Arist. Pol. 3.1279b3–10; Eth. Nic. 8.1160b2–11, on how a tyrant looks to his own good, but a king looks to his subjects’ good. See Hahm 1995, 19–20; Champion 2004a, 88–99. 53 Helm 2014, 53. 54 Polyb., 6.7.8. Polybius’ use of the plural for tyranny is somewhat perplexing, but I take it to refer to plural states in general at this universal stage of development. Cf. Pl. Resp. 8.569, and Polyb., 10.26, 13.6–8 which emphasize the tyrant’s cruelty. Polybius more often emphasizes the cruelty of advisors and demagogues: 13.4, 15.24a36, 16.21–22, 23.5, 28.3–5, 32.5–6. See Champion 2004b on Polybian demagogues. 55 This mirrors the usage of these emotions in the Histories – φθόνος at those overstepping the bounds of propriety and elevating themselves over others: 5.41.3 (Hermeias), 9.10 (conquerors), 13.2.5 (Scopas the Aetolian), 28.7.5 (Achaean friends of Attalus); 7.8.4 (Hieron escapes φθόνος), 23.12.8 (Philopoemen escapes φθόνος); προσκοπή for the same reasons: 24.12.3, 31.10.4, 30.29.7; ὀργή from outrages against women or children: 6.52.7, 15.25.25(18), 15.27.1, 15.30.1. For ὀργή as motivation for μῖσος: 9.10.10, 15.30.1; for ὀργή as parallel with μῖσος: 1.82.9, 15.17.2. For the importance of μῖσος in recognizing tyrants, see 5.11.6, and see 9.10 (against conquerors who overstep propriety), 15.25–30 (against Agathocles of Egypt), and 30.29 (against Callicrates). 56 By comparison, in oligarchy, Polybius reverses his narration of the change for the worse from his narration of tyranny, 6.8.5–6: he first narrates the change to oligarchy, then the popular emotional reactions. Both changes are narrated with μέν . . . δέ clauses. By correlating these events, Polybius shows the close connection. 57 The agreement of ruler and ruled for good governance is a common theme; see Hahm 2000, 467. 58 Polyb., 6.7.7–8. On these as psychological explanations, see Walbank 1972, 40–43, 58–59, 157–159; Podes 1991; Hahm 2000, 467. For psychological explanations, see Pl. Resp. 8.555d9-e2; Arist. Pol. 5.1312b17–19; see Hahm 2009. 59 Polyb., 6.6.2–3. 60 Cf. narrative sections where several of these emotions arise in subjects against others in positions of greater authority: Polyb., 9.10 (the siege of Syracuse), 15.25–30 (Agathocles), 18.15 (traitors), 30.29 (Callicrates), 38.4–11 (Greece’s downfall). 61 The people – or at least some members of this community – are not merely bystanders or observers of the tyrants’ depredations but suffer personally as well. However, the importance of bystanders or witnesses is crucial; see Helm 2014, 51–59. 62 Polyb., 6.7.9. The people are led by the noblest who are least able to bear such transgressions. These noblest and bravest are part of the subjects, and Polybius seems to presume that they felt the emotions more than most of the subjects. See Gruen 1976, 67 for a parallel case of the inclusivity of elite within the people (τὸ πλῆθος). 63 Polyb., 6.5.10. 64 See Greenspan 2000 on how emotions function in rational plans and for rational effects by focusing on rational, moral indignation in certain moments, not necessarily consciously. Damasio 1994 focuses on the neurological connection between emotional reactions and the ability to reason. Contra, Hahm 1995, esp. 16.

138  Internal State Change 65 This passage aligns with the theory of Salmela 2012, 39. Collective emotion is formed when one believes others also care and share the same concerns, which can include overlapping private concerns. 66 See Straumann 2016, 159: “Polybius recommends his preferred constitutional order, his equilibrium, precisely on grounds of justice and liberty, not simply on grounds of mutual fear and self-interest narrowly conceived.” Moreover, not every individual could have been a direct victim of the tyrants. 67 Polyb., 6.8.1–2. 68 Polyb., 6.8.3. Joy here may be a good example of contagious emotion. Here it is reciprocal, felt in response to the people’s choice of them as leaders. Joy is one of the most contagious emotions, so it would make sense if the leaders and people all shared the affect of joy in the positive state-form of aristocracy, as juxtaposed to the negative atmosphere of tyranny. 69 It is logical that the next form be aristocracy in Polybius’ narrative. The aristocrats exhibit courage and leadership just as the first monarch and king did. They rule with rationality. So they are the next best element as leaders (προστάτας) for the people who would not be satisfied with a monarch any longer: τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μοναρχίας εἶδος ἄρδην ἀνῄρετο, 6.8.1. Cf. Helm 2014, 54. Moreover, the people’s choice to turn over affairs to the elite shows that they realize they are either not the best-suited to govern or are not willing to govern themselves. While their turning over power to their “betters” seems to corroborate scholars’ claims of Polybius’ anti-popular stance, Polybius still attributed agency and the rationality to the people themselves to turn over their affairs. 70 Helm 2014, 54. 71 Polyb., 6.8.5–6. Some oligarchs turn to greed and unjust love of money (πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον), a desire which did not occur in tyranny but one which Plato and Aristotle closely connected with oligarchy: Pl. Resp. 8.547b2–3, 8.550d-551a, 8.555c-e; Arist. Pol. 5.1302a38-b3 states that faction underlies all constitutional change. Williams 2000, 131–148, esp. 132–133 states that greed causes all degeneration. The new oligarchic rulers all aim toward self-indulgence rather than justification of their right to rule. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 8.1160b12–16, on self-oriented rule. Perhaps, the oligarchs jostled for position with one another, which could not happen in tyranny. 72 Polyb., 6.9.1. 73 Polyb., 6.6.3, 6.6.5, 6.6.6. Ryffel 1949, 193 connects the two reactions in the people against tyranny and oligarchy and ties them loosely to morality, but he does not link these reactions with the development of social values and the emotions at the beginning of the community. 74 See Greenspan 1988, 7–14, 81–176, on emotions as adaptive, that is, as the foundation for rational planning. See Greenspan 2000, esp. 469–475, on how emotions fit into longterm rational plans without losing their force in the moment. 75 Polyb., 6.8.6–6.9.2. This implicitly happens also to the tyrants. Casaubon added the text in brackets, which all recent editions print. This phrase provides a correlative δέ to the μέν clause. 76 Cf. Polyb., 6.5.7–9, 6.6.12. Violence in constitutional change: Hdt. 3.82; Pl. Resp. 8.566a, 8.557a2–5. Bestial traits, such as strength and violence, resurface for the overthrow of the worse form, and so do not belong solely on the other side of a dichotomy with reason. Polybius sanctions or praises violence throughout the Histories, depending on the merits or causes of such violence. See Polyb., 1.88.5–6 (Mathis, the mercenary leader), 2.56–60 (Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos), 8.35 (generals who deserved their downfalls), and 15.33.6 (Agathocles of Egypt), with Pomeroy 1986; Eckstein 2013. In these examples, Polybius does not find the punishment cruel; he blames those punished. 77 Polyb., 6.9.3. The subject of this sentence is unstated, but it follows from the previous sentence that it is all the people, including whoever (τις) noticed the emotions.

Internal State Change  139 78 Polyb., 6.9.5. 79 See Ober 1989 for this dynamic within Classical Athenian democratic politics. For an analysis of the split between elite and people in Roman politics, see Millar 1998; for the people’s role in Roman politics, see Morstein-Marx 2004. See too Musti 1967 on Polybius’ portrayal of democracy and the role of the people. 80 See Kelly, Iannone, and McCarty 2014, 181–183, who note that intragroup differences may lead to further cooperation but may also lead to a split of common interest and thus hinder group productivity. 81 Polyb., 6.9.5. 82 See Williams 2000, esp. 131–136, on the prevalence of greed. 83 Polyb., 6.9.6. In the summary of the anacyclosis, Polybius mentions that ochlocracy comes about Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου πάλιν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας, 6.4.10. These two vices exemplify different factors than τὸ φιλαρχεῖν specifically. They characterize the whole process of ochlocracy of 6.9.5–9. 84 Polyb., 6.9.3. Cf. Polyb., 6.8.3. 85 This helps qualify how the ambitious people ruin their own affairs, Polyb., 6.9.6. On the word δοξοφαγία, see Walbank, HCP 1.657. This is the only usage in the extant Histories of Polybius and the current corpus of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed April 22, 2020). 86 On complacency as characteristic of the crowds, see Pl. Resp. 8.564; Arist. Pol. 5.1303a13. On ambition as characteristic of demagogues, see Pl. Plt. 301 b10; Arist. Pol. 5.1312a21. 87 Polyb., 6.9.8. “Living off of others” can be analogous to the radical popular politics of cancellation of debt and redistribution of property, seen as a threat to the elite from Solon’s reforms to Cicero’s criticisms of Catiline, Polybius included: 13.6 (Nabis of Sparta), 32.5–6.3 (Charops of Epirus). 88 Polyb., 6.5.10–6.9. 89 Polyb., 6.9.7. Polybius uses the verb καταλύειν most often with monarchs, so this usage with democracy is unique. See Mauersberger 1.3.1312–13. However, this phrase (δῆμος/ δημοκρατία καταλύεσθαι) is commonly used by the Attic orators, Thucydides, and later authors writing about this period (i.e., Plutarch in his Lives, Dionysius Halicarnassus on the orators et al.). See Ober 1996, 118 on this phrase in Classical Athens. 90 See Cole 1964, 462; Walbank 1998, 218. Zecchini 2006, 23 identifies in passing two “intermediate” stages between the larger stages of democracy and dissolution: “demagogia e ochlocrazia”. 91 Polyb., 6.9.9. 92 Polyb., 6.9.8. Cf. Polyb., 6.5.7–9: τὸν τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ διαφέροντα. 93 See Pl. Resp. 8.562e-563b on the demagogue’s transition into a tyrant. In Polybius’ text, this man’s exclusion complicates ochlocracy, since theoretically everyone is entitled to some place of rule, although the rich have an advantage on appropriating public resources. Choosing or following a leader also occurred in the downfall of tyranny and oligarchy. 94 For demagogues as bringers of state-change, see Pl. Resp. 8.562e-563b, 567–569; Arist. Pol. 5.1304b19–1305a35, 5.1305b22–1306a12, 5.1306b22–1307a5, 5.1310b14–16. 95 My description of rationality falls close to Max Weber’s concept of “value-rationality”, which promotes action based in some belief or value, as opposed to his concept of “instrumental rationality”, which promotes action in service of our own desires. Weber specifies that value-rational action is done consciously for its own sake, which I do not think that Polybius’ text also depicts: the people may show value-rationality through their social rationality, but whether they self-consciously act for these particular reasons is dubious. See Kim 2012 for an overview of Weber’s thoughts on rationality; for definitions of Weber’s distinctions between value- and instrumental rationality, see Swedberg 2005, 126–127, 287–288.

140  Internal State Change 96 Contrast the new aristocrats, who share traits of boldness but who crucially rule for the common good, 6.8.3. Cf. the new democrats, 6.9.2. 97 Walbank HCP 1.658 notes this cyclic return to the beginning of the cycle. Ryffel 1949, 196 seems, to my knowledge, to have first noted this return to the beginning of the cycle, particularly in terms of animalization. 98 Polyb., 6.9.9. There are many temporal markers (τότε δὴ . . . καὶ τότε . . . ἕως) between the choice of the ἐκκλειόμενος of ochlocracy and the discovery of the new monarch. Cole 1964, 462 interprets this figure, the ἐκκλειόμενος, as one existing within ochlocracy and also as the source of the slaughters, exiles, and land distributions. His agency in these last actions terminates the independent rule of the people. This interpretation anticipates the end of cheirocratia and transposes agency for actions done later, with the people (τὸ πλῆθος) still as the grammatical subject, back to the ἐκκλειόμενος. Walbank 1995, 218 interprets the end of ochlocracy: Polybius does not say, though he perhaps implies, that this monarch, who in order to close the cycle has to correspond to the original leader of the primitive horde is the bold and ambitious poor man who has initiated the rule of violence. Walbank assumes that the ἐκκλειόμενος controls the transition from democracy to cheirocratia. Cole and Walbank see the ἐκκλειόμενος figure as a major agent in either the beginning or the completion of cheirocratia. Polybius does not state either of these options so clearly. Walbank’s assumption that this figure does have a say in instituting the slaughters, banishments, and land redistributions seems very likely, but this figure cannot also be the primitive monarch. Polybius would not have used a verb of finding or discovering if the same man who had been the leader before were to be the new leader. 99 This may exemplify Polybius’ anti-popular stance: Polybius describes the people in complete (democratic) authority negatively, as Eckstein 1995, 129–140; Champion 2004a show, but perhaps this is because he recognized their abandonment of their proper role as the preservation of social morality in the state. 100 Polyb., 6.57. Alonso-Núñez 1986, 20 highlights that Rome’s ability to be everlasting is unclear: 6.57 implies that it is not while 6.18 implies it is. 101 See Polyb., 6.43–52, for comparison of constitutions (including Crete, Thebes, Athens, Carthage, and Sparta; Polybius mentions Plato to dismiss such a comparison between real states and theory). See 6.53–56 for virtuous Roman institutions, such as funeral orations, the valor of Horatius Cocles, superstition, and faithful oath-taking. See Moore 1965 on the fragments of Book 6. 102 Polyb., 6.57.1. Here Polybius does not name the mixed constitution, nor does he directly mention the Romans, though they are the target case. Walbank’s 1943, 76 comment, “In short, when he was considering the mixed constitution Polybius was not concerned with the question of ultimate deterioration,” is hard to understand. 103 Polyb., 6.9.3. Lintott 1999, 218 remarks that stasis is embodied in Rome’s constitution, much like ochlocracy. Scholars have noted the similarities between this passage and the passage concerning ochlocracy: Cole 1964, 480–481; Champion 2004a, 89–96; Baronowski 2011, 156; Longley 2012, 75–78. These commonalities are important – a decline starting from heredity, desires and ambitions for private gain, and lack of rational judgment. See Hahm 1995, 42–45, 2000, 475–476, 2009, 191–197, Williams 2000, 136; Champion 2004a, 89–96, 186–193. 104 Polyb., 6.57.5. Polybius expounds on private desires and the want for more power in 6.57.6–7. See Hahm 2000, 476. 105 Polyb., 6.57.6. See also Hahm 2009, 196–197. 106 The terminology here is close to what Williams 2000 discusses and traces. These terms fall closer to desires than emotions. See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 28–40 for modern distinctions between these categories; see Champion 2004a, 241–244 on the classifications of these terms within Polybius.

Internal State Change 141 107 Polyb., 6.57.7. This is the only instance in his theory of state-change in which Polybius uses ὁ δῆμος for “the people”. This usage reflects the unity and political power of the people within the mixed constitution as opposed to the “pure” state-forms found in the anacyclosis, in which “the people” do not represent an official and unified political agent. 108 Polyb., 6.57.8. 109 See Kelly, Iannone, and McCarty 2014, 181–183. 110 Polyb., 6.57.8. 111 This passage forms one of the two key passages for Champion 2004a’s conception of thumos. See Chapter 1, 25–27. 112 See Champion 2004a on these negative connotations. See the appendix on Polybian language of barbarism, which includes terms of excessive personal desires, not emotions, 241–244. 113 Polyb., 6.57.9. 114 Polyb., 6.57.9. See Champion 2004a, 75, 80–82. 115 Many commonalities exist, however, as noted throughout. On heredity, see Arist. Pol. 4.1292a39–1293a34, 5.1313a10–1316a16. On luxury as a cause of decline, Pl. Resp. 8.556b-c; Arist. Pol. 5.1302b3, 1303b33, 5.1305b39. On passions, Pl. Plt. 301b10; Resp. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691a, 695b, 701b; Arist. Pol. 5.1310b40–1311a8. See Arist. Pol. 4.1301b–1302a, on the primacy of internal faction for constitutional change. On reactions: Pl. Resp. 8.555d9-e2; Arist. Pol. 5.1312b17–19. On violence in transitions, Pl. Resp. 8.557a2–5, 8.566a; Hdt., 3.82. On ambition, see Pl. Plt. 301b10, Arist. Pol. 5.1312a21. On demagogues: Pl. Resp. 8.562e-563b, 567–69; Arist. Pol. 5.1304b19– 1305a35, 5.1305b22–1306a12, 5.1306b22–1307a5, 5.1310b14–6. For further commonalities and research on Polybius’ sources, see Ryffel 1949, esp. 186, 203–220; Cole 1964. See Straumann 2016, 150–161 (esp. 151) on how Polybius aligns more with Roman constitutional thought than Greek predecessors. 116 Pl. Resp. 8.555d9-e2. 117 Arist. Pol. 5.1302b11–12. Cf. also 5.1302b21–23, 5.1302b25–27. 118 Arist. Pol. 5.1302a24–29. This perception of the lack of equality comes close to the emotion of φθόνος. See Walcot 1978, esp. 30–31; Konstan 2003 on the development of the concept of equality with this emotion. Φθόνος is named once within Polybius’ anacyclosis, 6.7.8. 119 On personal desires and self-interest as a cause of decline: Pl. Resp. 550d7–9, 551a, 555c1–5; Plt. 301b10; Leg. 3.690e, 3.695b; Arist. Pol. 5.1302b1–21. In addition, they attribute the difference in good and bad constitutions not to a sense of social morality in the people but to adherence to law. While social values and laws have much in common, the language of Plato and Aristotle emphasizes law, whereas ­Polybius completely omits it. On lawlessness specifically as the cause of decline: Pl. Resp. 8.556a4-b4, 563d; Plt. 291e1–5, 294a, 301a-b; Leg. 3.701b; Arist. Pol. 4.1292a, 4.1293a32. 120 See Polyb., 6.9.1. On internal origins of dissent, see Pl. Resp. 8.545d1–2, 546a1–5, 556e5–6; Leg. 3.683e; Arist. Pol. 5.1301a35-b1, 5.1304a33-b2, 1304–1313. 121 This provides evidence for a reevaluation of both the reason–emotion dichotomy and Polybius’ anti-popular stance. 122 McGing 2010, 28–29, 70, notes Polybius’ criticism of dwelling on unworthy characters such as Agathocles and sensationalism only after ten long sections. Dreyer 2013, 211, however, comments on Polybius’ details as stemming from Ptolemaic court sources, and Polybius notes that other ancient writers covered these events. On a larger ­narratological scale, Champion 2004a, 147, classifies Agathocles as one among many failed individuals in the extant Books 7–15. These scholars use this passage as an example of broader observations. See also Walbank 1972, 111–112, 1990, 231; Marincola 2013, 84–85.

142  Internal State Change 123 Eckstein 1995, 132. This stance does not comment on the blood-stained nature of the government which is “bloodily overthrown”. On popular intrusion into politics, see 132–136, 247. 124 On the greed of mercenaries, Eckstein 1995, 125–127; Polybius’ contempt of demagogic leaders (with Agathocles), 139; excessive drinking, 141, 286–287; and women’s emotional intrusion into public life, 152–153. 125 Walbank 1979, 59; Eckstein 1995, 37, esp. 136, 151–152, 246; Champion 2004a, 28; McGing 2010, 28–29; Hau 2016, 68–70. 126 Eckstein 1995, 247. 127 The Constantinian Excerpts, compiled from Greek historians under Roman power by the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the tenth century, provide 15.25.1–2 and 15.20–25 in the De Virtutibus et Vitiis (Turonensis 980 “Peirescianus”), and 15.26a and 15.34.1–36.11 in the De Sententiis (Vaticanus gr. 73). Each of these Constantinian selections survives in a single manuscript, both dating to the tenth–eleventh centuries. The Excerpta Antiqua, preserved alone in some manuscripts and in some manuscripts with the whole of Books 1–5, provide 15.26–15.36.10. Thus, the only overlap between these two traditions is the historiographical digression from 15.34 to 15.36.10. For Polybius’ manuscript tradition, see Moore 1965. On the Constantinian Excerpts’ literary context, see Németh 2018. 128 See Maas 1949, 443–446, on reconstructing the order. 129 My focus, a moral one, aligns greatly with the Constantinian Excerpts of the De Sententiis (Vaticanus gr. 73), which as noted by Champion 2004a, 26 note 46, contains the largest amount of Polybian moralizing and digressive passages. 130 See Walbank, HCP 2.434–437, 480–496 on the historical importance of Polybius’ narrative. Unfortunately, no other extant source focuses on these events. 131 See Walbank, HCP 1.588 and HCP 2.437–438. On Agathocles and his family, see Maas 1945, 74. 132 Polyb., 15.25.1(3)-2(4). This passage is the main historical source for the succession of Ptolemy V and the deaths of Arsinoë III and Ptolemy IV. Polyb., 14.12.5 seems to have recorded Ptolemy IV’s death here, in summer 204 bce, whereas the events of 15.25–33 were to have taken place that fall. See Walbank, HCP 2.434–437 on issues of chronology. I use the numbering system and order of the text from the latest critical edition (Budé) by Foulon and Weil 1995. The Büttner-Wobst section numbers are in parentheses where they differ, as this has been the standard edition. For the manuscript tradition here, see Walbank, HCP 2.22–23; Foulon and Weil 1995, 7. 133 Polyb., 15.25.3(5). 134 Polyb., 15.25.6(8). 135 John Ant. fr. 54. See Müller Fragmenta historicorum graecorum 4.558, along with Walbank HCP 2.482. John’s text also states that Ptolemy IV put aside his queen for a hetaira. While the names do not consistently match up, it is clear that this refers to Arsinoë being put aside for Agathocleia. 136 Polyb., 14.11.5. 137 Polyb., 15.25.12. 138 Agathocleia is implicated directly in Agathocles’ regime at Polyb., 15.25.28(25), and participates in his plea to the troops, 15.26.1, and withdrawal into the palace, 15.31.13. 139 Polyb., 15.33.11 echoes this phrase: τὸν Φιλάμμωνα . . . τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ φόνῳ τῆς βασιλίσσης. Philammon and his family’s deaths occur only because Arsinoë’s friends perceived him as her assassin. 140 Polyb., 15.26a.1. See Fulkerson 2013 on regret in antiquity. 141 Polyb., 15.25.7(9). 142 Polyb., 15.25.8(10). These two results of εὔνοια and μῖσος have different objects – Arsinoë and Agathocles. This exemplifies how opposite but complementary emotions can exist at the same time, especially in a collective.

Internal State Change  143 143 Polyb., 6.6.2–9. See Helm 2014, 47–60. Although Polybius mentions both reactions of goodwill and hatred of the tears and mourning, μῖσος proves more important than εὔνοια for the future. 144 Polyb., 15.25.11. 145 Polyb., 15.25.11, 15.25.23(20). 146 Polyb., 4.14.2–8; 15.19.3, 11.28, and 11.34.3 for individuals’ successful management and negotiation of others’ emotions. See Guelfucci 1986, 227–237, on how masterful generals manage fear. 147 Thus, Agathocles, like the tyrants, separates himself from the community. He fails to feel any self-reactive emotion, such as guilt; see Helm 2014, 54. 148 This assumption would assimilate the people to the people of ochlocracy, 6.9.5–8, and the degenerate mixed constitution, 6.57.6, 6.57.8. 149 Polyb., 4.14.8. Agathocles’ bribery works well enough to resume his usual habits, which in turn lead to more negative emotions at 15.25.26(23)-15.25.28(25). 150 Polyb., 15.25.25(22). 151 Polyb., 6.6.2, 6.6.4, 6.6.6, 6.6.8, 6.7.7, and 6.8.5. 152 Polyb., 15.25.26(23)-27(24). 153 Agathocles’ habits of drinking and debauchery match the tyrants’ and oligarchs’; 6.7.7 and 6.8.5. See for this stereotype of tyranny, Pl., Leg. 3.695b; as fault of the ruling class, Arist., Pol. 1302a38-b3, 1295b9–11. See Eckstein 1995, 286–287 on Agathocles as an example of drunkenness and debauchery. 154 See Fierke 2015 on human dignity and emotion. 155 Helm 2014, 54–59. Cf. the tyrants’ motives and behaviors, Polyb., 6.7.6–7. 156 This constitutes a failure to show a “self-reactive emotion” in Helm’s terminology. On first-person or “self-reactive emotions”, see Helm 2014, 51–52, 56. 157 Polyb., 15.25.27(24); Polyb., 15.25.8(10). 158 Polyb., 15.7(9)-8(10), 15.25.27(24), and 15.27.3. 159 See, for example, Kensinger 2007; Brainerd et al. 2008; von Scheve 2013. 160 This occurs without the complex process of rational reflection explicitly reoccurring, per von Scheve 2013, 56–63. Those who felt hatred without any adequate result do not continuously feel hatred thereafter, but rather they feel unfulfilled hatred whenever they are reminded of and consciously remember this emotional experience. This occurs explicitly at 15.27.3, where, through the act of hubris by Agathocles against Danaë, the people grew indignant more publicly and displayed their hatred clearly. 161 Polyb., 15.25.28(25). 162 Cf. Polyb., 6.8.1, 6.9.1. 163 Polyb., 15.25.23(20), 15.25.28(25); 15.27.1, 15.30.1. 164 Polyb., 15.25.29(26)-40(37). This foreshadows Tlepolemus’ own inadequacy as a leader. 165 The breaks are due to a change in the main manuscript traditions, transferring from the Constantinian Excerpts to the Excerpta Antiqua. The order of the passages from the Constantinian Excerpts and how much of this passage has been lost are unknown. See Maas 1949, 443–448. Unfortunately, we do not know what motivated Agathocles to make this failed plea. 166 Polyb., 15.26.1–7. 167 Polyb., 15.26.8. 168 Polyb., 15.17.1–2. 169 Polyb., 15.26.2; 15.26.8. 170 Polyb., 15.25.9(6). 171 Polyb., 15.27.2. 172 Polyb., 15.27.1–3. Compare the Roman people expressing their values through graffiti in the case of Tiberius Gracchus. See Morstein-Marx 2012. 173 Polyb., 15.27.4–5.

144  Internal State Change 174 Polyb., 15.27.1. 175 Here Polybius does not invoke transgression against the gods, as he does in the case of Philip V’s despoliation of the sanctuary at Thermum, because Danaë was taken from the temple of Demeter. See, for example, 5.12, 11.7, 16.1, 23.10. 176 Polyb., 15.27.3. 177 Polyb., 15.25.25(23). 178 Polyb., 15.27.6–29.3. 179 Polyb., 15.27.6. 180 Polyb., 15.27.7. 181 Polyb., 15.28.3. 182 Polyb., 15.28.4–28.9. Cf. Agathocles’ failure to persuade these Macedonian soldiers, 15.26.3. 183 Polyb., 15.29.1–4. 184 Polyb., 15.27.6–29.1. Polybius does not narrate Moiragenes’ own feelings. He allows the narrative with its paradoxical turns to elicit reflective emotion in the internal audience. While I do not focus on how the text might elicit audience emotion, this would be a good example. Polybius does not need to say that Moiragenes was afraid; he would be illogical not to be in this situation. The audience can sense this fear in a reflective way by thinking about what they would feel in like circumstances. The audience presumably resents Agathocles, Nicostratus, and their cronies because they act unjustly and unjustifiably. Moiragenes, we may assume, implores the Macedonians to become indignant and join in feeling resentment toward Agathocles. His appeal and the context were conducive for eliciting emotions, although Polybius does not further depict these emotions or their implications for the audience of Macedonians. This argument exemplifies another line of thought for emotional processes in ancient narratives. 185 Polyb., 15.28.8. 186 Polyb., 15.27.6. 187 Polyb., 15.27.6. Walbank, HCP 2.489 argues that Moiragenes was Macedonian and of the same status as the younger Sosibius. See Griffith 1968 for mercenaries’ status in the Hellenistic world. 188 My observations here align with the theory of Agamben 1998, 17–18. 189 Cf. Polyb., 15.25.28(25). Regardless of the narrative lost after 15.33, Moiragenes was certainly the first leader for acting upon the people’s emotions, as Tlepolemus was journeying toward Alexandria. 190 Polyb., 6.9.8, 6.7.9, 6.9.1. 191 Polyb., 15.28.6. Polybius expressly comments earlier on the paradoxical nature of Moiragenes’ situation, 15.28.1: Περὶ δὲ τὸν Μοιραγένην ἄφατον ἦν καὶ παράλογον τὸ συμβαῖνον. The excluded status of Moiragenes marks him a special figure. He can recognize the feeling of the people from an (insider) outside perspective. He no longer belongs as a member of the community of soldiers and citizens, but his own experiences of having his identity challenged and of uniquely suffering firsthand enable him to identify and call upon the troops to take action. 192 The ability to recognize and name emotions is an important aspect of emotional intelligence; see Bass 1990; Salovey and Mayer 1990; Brackett and Salovey 2013. 193 Polyb., 15.25.11. 194 Their violent action does not find completion until 15.33. After this, the passage does not continue in the extant Histories until 16.21–22, and even that is murky, with reference mostly to Tlepolemus’ military competence but financial incompetence. 195 Polyb., 15.29.8–30.1. Perhaps she is seeking asylum? Her behavior does not fit that of one seeking asylum, but she is aware of the state of affairs in the city, unlike some of the women at the temple and unlike Agathocles. 196 Polyb., 15.29.10–13.

Internal State Change 145 197 Polyb., 15.29.14–30.1. See Harris 2001, 270, on this passage as evidence for “the classic stereotype” of angry women as derisive and contemptible. See too Eckstein 1995, 152–153. 198 Polyb., 15.32.4. 199 Polyb., 15.32.5–9. 200 Polybius does not designate this episode as an example of his theory in the anacyclosis in practice. The similarities between the passage of Agathocles’ downfall and the cycle of constitutions lies in an intratextual interpretation of the language of emotions rather than any explicit intention. See Skinner 1988a, 1988b on intentionality and consistency in texts. 201 Cf. Polybius on arousing pity, 15.17.1–2. 202 See Walbank, HCP 2.493–495, on Agathocles and Dionysius of Syracuse. 203 Polyb., 15.33. 204 Polyb., 15.33.4–5. 205 Polyb., 15.33.6. 206 Polyb., 15.33.10. 207 Polyb., 15.33.11–12. 208 Polyb., 15.33.6. 209 See Pinker 2011, on the (decreasing) history of violence. 210 Contrast Pomeroy 1986, 411, who discusses the deaths of the villains of the Histories and deemed Agathocles’ death appropriate. Pomeroy emphasizes, however, Polybius’ attempt to focus on praise; see too Farrington 2011. 211 Polyb., 2.59–60. See Eckstein 2013, 322. 212 Polyb., 2.59.1. 213 Polyb., 2.59.2. 214 Polyb., 2.59.4. 215 Polyb., 2.59.6. 216 Polyb., 2.59.7. 217 Polyb., 2.59.7–10. See Walbank, HCP 1.260: “Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P., who writes from the harder background of the second century, when the fate of Mantinea had become the common lot of captured towns.” See Eckstein 2013, 314–338, on the contrary. 218 Polyb., 2.60.1. 219 Polyb., 2.60.7. Cf. the parading of Mathos, 1.88.6. 220 Polyb., 2.60.8. Polybius slips in this version of Aristomachus’ death only at the end, without comment. By narrating this in a simple statement, he removes emphasis from qualms about this type of death, which could be seen as cruel. Scholars echo Polybius’ offhand way of narrating the death: McGing 2010, 74: Aristomachus suffered “nothing more terrible than drowning;” Champion 2004a, 126: “The Achaeans did no more than to drown him” (my italics). 221 Polyb., 2.59.3, 2.59.7, 2.60.1, 2.60.7. Polyb., 15.33.6. 222 Modern studies on violence explore this issue of “structural violence”. See, for example, Vorobej 2016, 42–54, and extended discussion, 63–144. 223 For examples of too lenient punishment with Polybius’ explicit judgmental language, see Polyb., 15.33.6 (Agathocles): μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς, 2.59.7 (Aristomachus): ὅμως οὐκ ἱκανὴν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, 1.88.5 (Mathos): τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως, 15.26a.2 (Deinon): τυχὼν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας. See Walbank 1962, 1–12; McGing 2010, 71–74; Marincola 2013, 74–77 on Polybius’ polemic. 224 Polyb., 2.56–58. This passage has received much scholarly attention, focusing on Polybius’ polemic against “tragic” historiography or on his excessive bias toward the Achaeans; see Walbank, HCP 1.259–266 and Champion 2004a, 125–126 on Polybius’

146  Internal State Change Achaean bias. McGing 2010, 74 argues that Polybius’ description of Aristomachus “is not rational, argument-based criticism but polemic”. Although Polybius engages on polemic on two levels – against Phylarchus and his brand of historiography and against Aristomachus and his tyrannical lifestyle – his argument rests on rational argument, for it must be plausible on some level to be persuasive to his audience. I argue that his argument is based rationally on moral values which he espouses throughout his narrative, as seen in the examples I cite in this discussion. 225 Polyb., 2.56.7. 226 Polyb., 2.56.13. See Marincola 2013, 73–90 on Polybius’ criticisms of Phylarchus and tragic historiography. 227 Polyb., 2. 56.14. 228 Polybius’ views on violence differ greatly from common conceptions of violence today, one of which is the assumption that for something to count as “violence” it is inherently disapproved. See Vorobej 2016, 1–62, on the assumptions and issues inherent in the modern usage of violence. 229 Polyb., 2.56.15. Polybius’ examples here align closely with Vorobej’s modern example of the Benevolent Attacker. However, whereas Polybius is concerned with the cause stimulating the action, Vorobej focuses on the attacker’s intention. See Vorobej 2016, 10–12, 14–15, 22–27, 32, 177. 230 Polyb., 2.56.16. 231 The statement at 2.56.16 raises the issue of the difference between cause and result. Polybius applies these precepts to the Mantineans. Because the Mantineans treacherously invited the Spartans to massacre their friendly Achaean garrison, they deserved a far worse punishment than they received. In fact, all the Greeks should have praised the Achaeans’ punishment of the Mantineans and of their impiety (ἀσέβεια). Polyb., 2.57– 58, culminating with Polybius’ exclamations at 2.58.8–9: πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστιν ἄξιον; τί δ’ ἂν παθόντες οὗτοι δίκην δόξαιεν ἁρμόξουσαν δεδωκέναι; But, Polybius writes, the Achaeans only pillaged their property and enslaved the Mantineans, which happens even to the innocent in war, 2.58.10–11. Thus, the Mantineans did not suffer any extraordinary punishment but the norm for warfare in the Hellenistic Age, for which see Eckstein 2006. 232 Polyb., 2.58.8. See Eckstein 2013 for counterarguments against this bias. 233 Polyb., 15.33.10. 234 For broader representations of Polybius’ virulent criticism, see Book 12 and Walbank 1962, 1–12, 1972, 33–65, esp. 34–40; Pédech 1964, passim; Sacks 1981; Eckstein 1995, 112–113, 248–251, 274; Marincola 1997, 223–239, 2001, 133–140, 2013, 73–90; Schepens and Bollansée 2005. 235 Throughout the Histories, this term for savagery or cruelty, ὠμότης, carries negative connotations. One’s associates and circumstances could affect one’s natural traits, including ὠμότης, 9.22–26. See too Hau 2016, 68–70. 236 Polyb., 15.31–32. For modern parallels of how circumstances prolong and inflame the depth of negative emotions, especially hate, see Flam 2005; Halperin 2014. 237 Polyb., 15.33.1. They may have had this inclination had their emotions and moral qualms been assuaged at an earlier point. 238 Polyb., 15.32.4 demonstrates their continued, unremitted indignation and its demand for punishment. For their violence, see 15.33.9. 239 Polyb., 16.21–22. 240 See Mudde 2004 on this as a common issue in modern Populism.

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Internal State Change 149 Konstan, David. 2003. “Nemesis and Phthonos.” In Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold. Ed. Geoffrey W. Bakewell and James P. Sickinger. Oxbow Books. 74–87. ———. 2006. The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature. University of Toronto Press. Konzelmann Ziv, Anita. 2009. “The Semantics of Shared Emotion.” Universitas Philosophica. 26.52. 81–106. Lintott, Andrew. 1999. The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Clarendon Press. Loehr, Regina M. 2021. “The People’s Moral Emotions in Polybius’ Cycle of Constitutions.” Classical Philology. 116.2. 155–182. Longley, Georgina. 2012. “Thucydides, Polybius, and Human Nature.” In Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius. Ed. Christopher Smith and Liz Mariah Yarrow. Oxford University Press. 68–84. Maas, P. 1945. “Oenanthe’s Husbands.” The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. 31. 74. ———. 1949. “Sosibios als ψευδεπίτροπος des Ptolemaios Epiphanes.” Annuaire de l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales et slaves. 9. 443–448. Maibom, Heidi L. 2017. “Introduction to Philosophy of Empathy.” In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Ed. Heidi L. Maibom. Routledge. 1–10. Marincola, John. 1997. Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography. Cambridge University Press. ———. 2001. Greek Historians. Oxford University Press. ———. 2013. “Polybius, Phylarchus, and ‘Tragic History’: A Reconsideration.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 73–90. Mauersberger, Arno. 1956–1968. Polybios-Lexicon. Akademie-Verlag. McGing, Brian. 2010. Polybius’ Histories. Oxford University Press. Millar, Fergus. 1998. The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic. University of Michigan Press. Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1969. “Time in Ancient Historiography.” In Quarto contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico. Ed. Arnaldo Momigliano. Edizioni di storia e letteratura. Moore, Daniel Walker. 2017. “Learning from Experience: Polybius and the Progress of Rome.” Classical Quarterly. 67.1. 132–148. Moore, John. 1965. The Manuscript Tradition of Polybius. Cambridge University Press. Morstein-Marx, Robert. 2004. Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Republic. Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. “Dignitas and res publica: Caesar and Republican Legitimacy.” In Eine Politische Kultur (in) der Krise?: Die “letzte Generation” der römischen Republik. Ed. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp. Oldenbourg. 115–140. ———. 2012. “Political Graffiti in the Late Roman Republic: ‘Hidden Transcripts’ and ‘Common Knowledge’.” In Politische Kommunikation und öffentliche Meinung in der antiken Welt. Ed. C. Kuhn. Franz Steiner. 191–217. ———. 2021. Julius Caesar and the Roman People. Cambridge University Press. Mudde, Cas. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition. 39. 541–563. Müller, C., and Müller, T. 1841–1870. Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum. 5 Vols. Minerva. Musti, Domenico. 1967. “Polibio e la Democrazia.” Annali della Scuola normale superiore di Pisa: Lettere, storia, e filosofia. 2.36. 155–207. Németh, András. 2018. The Excerpta Constantiniana and the Byzantine Appropriation of the Past. Cambridge University Press.

150  Internal State Change Nussbaum, Martha Craven. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. Ober, Josiah. 1989. Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People. Princeton University Press. ———. 1996. The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory. Princeton University Press. Pédech, Paul. 1964. La Méthode Historique de Polybe. Les Belles Lettres. Petzold, Karl-Ernst. 1969. Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung. C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Viking. Podes, Stephan. 1991. “Polybius and His Theory of Anacyclosis: Problems of Not Just Ancient Political Thought.” History of Political Thought. 12.4. 577–588. Pomeroy, Arthur J. 1986. “Polybius’ Death Notices.” Phoenix. 40.4. 407–423. Ryffel, H. 1949. Μεταβόλη πολιτειῶν: Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen. P. Haupt. Sacks, Kenneth. 1981. Polybius on the Writing of History. University of California Press. Salmela, Mikko. 2012. “Shared Emotions, Philosophical Explorations.” An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action. 15.1. 33–46. Salovey, Peter, and Mayer, John D. 1990. “Emotional Intelligence.” Imagination, Cognition and Personality. 9.3. 185–212. Schepens, Guido, and Bollansée, Jan, eds. 2005. The Shadow of Polybius: Intertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek Historiography. Peeters. Schmid, Hans Bernhard. 2009. Plural Action: Essays in Philosophy and Social Science. Springer. Schweikard, David P., and Schmid, Hans Bernhard. 2013. “Collective Intentionality.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2013/entries/collective-intentionality/. Seager, Robin. 2013. “Polybius’ Distortions of the Roman ‘Constitution’: A  Simpl(istic) Explanation.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 247–254. Skinner, Quentin. 1988a. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” In Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Ed. James Tully. Princeton University Press. 29–67. ———. 1988b. “Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretations of Texts.” In Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics. Ed. James Tully. Princeton University Press. 68–78. Smiley, Marion. 2011. “Collective Responsibility.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ collective-responsibility/. Solomon, Robert, ed. 2004. Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press. Straumann, Benjamin. 2016. Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution. Oxford University Press. Swedberg, Richard. 2005. The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts. Stanford University Press. Tappolet, Christine. 2009. “Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. Peter Goldie. Oxford University Press. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library. Ed. Maria C. Pantelia. University of California. http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu.

Internal State Change 151 Thornton, John. 2013. “Polybius in Context: The Political Dimension of the Histories.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 213–230. Tollefsen, Deborah. 2006. “The Rationality of Collective Guilt.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 30. 222–239. Tuomela, Raimo. 2007. The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. Oxford University Press. Von Fritz, Kurt. 1954. The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius’ Political Ideas. Columbia University Press. Von Scheve, Christian. 2013. Emotion and Social Structures: The Affective Foundations of the Social Order. Routledge. Von Scheve, Christian, and Salmela, Mikko, eds. 2014. Collective Emotions: Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. Oxford University Press. Vorobej, Mark. 2016. The Concept of Violence. Routledge. Walbank, Frank W. 1943. “Polybius on the Roman Constitution.” Classical Quarterly. 37.3–4. 73–89. ———. 1957–1979. A Historical Commentary on Polybius (HCP). Vol. 1–3. Clarendon Press. ———. 1962. “Polemic in Polybius.” Journal of Roman Studies. 52. 1–12. ———. 1972. Polybius. University of California Press. ———. 1979. “Egypt in Polybius.” In Glimpses of Ancient Egypt: Studies in Honor of H. W. Fairman. Ed. J. Ruffle, G. A. Gaballa, and K.A. Kitchen. Aris & Phillips, Ltd. 180–189. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 53–69. ———. 1980. “The Idea of Decline in Polybius.” In Niedergang: Studien zu einen geschichtlichen Thema. Ed. S. Koselleck and P. Widmer. Klett-Cotta. 41–58. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 193–211. ———. 1990. “Profit or Amusement: Some Thoughts on the Motives of Hellenistic Historians.” In Purposes of History. Ed. H. Verdin, Guido Schepens, and E. de Keyser. Lovanii. 253–260. ———. 1995. “Polybius’ Perception of the One and the Many.” In Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz. Ed. I Malkin and Z.W. Rubinsohn. Brill. 201–222. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 212–230. ———. 1998. “A Greek Looks at Rome: Polybius VI Revisited.” Scripta Classica Israelica. 17. 45–59. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 277–292. ———, ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. Walcot, Peter. 1978. Envy and the Greeks: A Study in Human Behavior. Aris and Phillips Ltd. Williams, Mary F. 2000. “Polybius on Wealth, Bribery, and the Downfall of Constitutions.” The Ancient History Bulletin. 14. 131–148. Zecchini, Giuseppe. 2006. “Polibio e la corruzione.” Rivista Storica dell’ Antichita. 36. 23–33.

4

Emotions at War Causal Anger and Justifying War

In the previous chapter we examined the collective, combined emotions of the people in political change within a state. This chapter also addresses collective emotion in politics but turns to the emotion involved in interstate conflict and focuses on the role of anger in motivating or causing war. Collective emotion, as we saw at the beginning of Chapter 3, falls into the two basic theories of shared emotion or plural subject theory. In the previous chapter, Bennett Helm’s shared emotion theory of communities of respect in which collective emotions reaffirm the values and norms of the community provided a useful heuristic parallel to Polybius’ theory of the cycle of constitutions and narrative of the collective emotions against Agathocles of Alexandria. Helm’s model is based on the theory of shared emotions, in which emotions are shared by individuals who feel the same emotion for the same object, either consciously or unconsciously. Plural subject theory, on the other hand, best matches the type of collective emotion seen in interstate relations and conflict. Plural subject theory analyzes the expression of emotion by a unified group. In this theory, the individuals do not necessarily have to experience the same emotion; rather, through their commitment to a group identity and its values, emotion is expressed on their behalf. Corporations, governments, and ethnic or religious groups, as highly unified groups, are best analyzed through this frame. Ancient states are often treated as solid units in their political decisions, actions, and emotions.1 When analyzing the anger of the Aetolians through plural subject theory, for instance, we focus more on the implications of this blanket anger, the perceived justification of their actions, and their interstate reputation, than on how this anger relates to their position within a community and its values. The behaviors of states in warfare are analyzed through three basic lenses – pacifism, just war theory, and realism. Briefly, pacifism posits that war is never morally justifiable. Just war theory investigates the ethics of justifying warfare and norms of behavior in beginning, waging, and concluding wars. International realism, by contrast, operates on the basis that all states and agents strive for their own survival, and therefore all decisions and actions relate back to this foundational premise.2 International realism is the dominant lens currently for conceptualizing the ancient Mediterranean political world.3 DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-5

Emotions at War  153 The theory of International Realism provides a compelling frame for analyzing and understanding ancient Mediterranean history. Nevertheless, it does not suit historiographical accounts as well for it often bypasses the historians’ moralizing evaluations as well as emotions.4 Just war theory investigates issues such as the justifiability and responsibility of starting war, how agents portray themselves and their decisions to go to war, moral and legal accountability, and the relation of moral factors to strategic and pragmatic concerns. In this chapter, we will address these just war issues in Polybius’ Histories and how emotions inform these issues. This chapter investigates the role of emotions in motivating and starting wars, how emotions affect agents’ behaviors and choices during war, and the role of emotion in signaling a fitting or proportional end to war. While more can be said about emotions in and after war, we shall focus on the role of anger in leading to and starting war. This focus mirrors just war theory’s primary attention on jus ad bellum. After briefly discussing emotions which arise in the course of warfare or at the end of war, we examine the role of anger specifically as a cause of war. Polybius’ extended and controversial discussion of the causation of the Second Punic War is the primary case under discussion. Starting from a summary of this extended passage, we address Polybius’ definitions for causes, analyze the three main causes which Polybius proposes, and address the issue of these causes’ justifiability by reference to other wars caused by anger in the Histories. Loosely following the structure of Polybius’ narrative, we turn to the agents’ own justifications for their decisions and actions (προφάσεις), the importance of which is debated. The next section addresses the relation of emotion to pragmatic and strategic concerns, including how moral considerations, which are often reflected in emotion, relate to legal accountability in Polybius’ discussion of treaties. The final section addresses how causal emotion holds significance for Polybius’ specifications about causation and prioritization of the genre of universal history. Emotions During and After War Emotions serve various purposes before, within, and after war. Anger most prominently of the emotions causes war. To contextualize the importance of anger in causation, I briefly examine the role of emotions during and at the end of war to provide an emotional context for understanding causal anger.5 Indignation and hatred feature in the course and conduct of war. Indignation motivates agents to enter war, change their alliances, or alter the course of their activities entirely.6 For example, the Achaeans and the Phigalians choose to enter in the Social War against the Aetolians from 220 to 217 bce because of their indignation (συναγανακτοῦντες and δυσαρεστούμενοι).7 Similarly, the Megarians chose to leave the Boeotian League, because they grew indignant and hated the governance and politeia of the Boeotian League.8 The Carthaginians in the First Punic War, after they suffered defeat and seemed without hope, both grew indignant at the terms of the Roman treaty offered by Regulus and were offended at his harshness (οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοῖς προτεινομένοις ἐπανῆλθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες

154  Emotions at War τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρκου).9 They decided to continue fighting rather than succumb to what they thought were degrading terms, a decision Polybius praises as honorable.10 Shortly afterwards, the Carthaginians won a major victory, even capturing Regulus.11 Their indignation and decision to act on it led to significant results – in this case, a victory, albeit short-lived. Polybius cites hatred to explain why agents decide upon and continue their behavior. For example, Hannibal’s “inborn hatred of Romans” (μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους) explains why he ordered his troops to kill all adults they encountered in Picenum.12 Hatred occasionally does not bring about significant results, as in the case of the people of Side’s hatred for the city of Pednelissus.13 Because of their hatred, the people of Side chose not to send aid to the besieged city of Pednelissus, which nevertheless was relieved without their aid. In these examples, hatred serves an explanatory purpose for an agent’s decision and action. Likewise, the Thebans of the Classical Age, Polybius explains, capitalized on the preexisting hatred of Sparta’s own allies to overthrow the Spartans’ position of power and establish their own hegemony.14 In this case, hatred serves an explanatory purpose but also results in success for the Thebans. While hatred may stir agents to perpetuate or decide on courses of action, it does not automatically help or hurt the subject in their endeavors. While indignation and hatred influence action and perpetuate conflict, pity serves as a direct marker that wars should have ended. For example, Polybius states that near the end of the Mercenary War Utica left no room for the Carthaginians to pity or pardon them.15 Despite Utica’s former steadfast loyalty to Carthage, this city had defected to the revolutionaries in the Mercenary War at a most inopportune moment for Carthage. The punishment for Utica accordingly had to be high to match such behavior. Near the end of the war between Rome and Antiochus III, the Aetolians consciously surrendered to Rome to draw greater pity to themselves from the Romans than if they had not surrendered, although they fail in this attempt.16 Near the end of the Histories, Polybius emphasized the pity which the Greeks deserved in Rome’s Achaean War. In the narrative, Polybius mentions that even an enemy would pity them, indicating circumstances were right to conclude the war and abate Roman anger.17 Anger also profoundly shapes the course of events near the ends of wars. The Romans often are characterized as angry at the end of war.18 Andrew Erskine analyzed these instances of Roman anger in detail and notes how Polybius focalizes this anger through the objects’ perspective, not through the Romans’ (or subjects’) perspective.19 Others, either the victims or third parties, see, try to appease (παραιτεῖν), or strive to perpetuate the Romans’ anger.20 This Roman anger perpetuates war and marks the implicit Roman assessment that their opponents have not suffered enough and involves the idea of proportionality, that the means and ends of war should be proportional to what stimulated the war.21 The Romans continue their anger, often, in Polybius’ portrayal, beyond any substantial resistance by the enemy.22 The Romans deemed that the objects of their anger transgressed to a greater degree than these objects admit. The Romans’ anger thus marks the absence of a proportional punishment for their objects’ wrongdoing.

Emotions at War 155 Because Polybius frames Roman anger through a Greek perspective, however, we never see or hear this defense of anger as a mark of proportionality explicitly from the Romans themselves. Rather, the Greeks try to appease (παραιτεῖν) the anger of the Romans, showing that they thought that the offender and object of anger had suffered proportionately to their offense and that the war should have ended.23 Polybius comments that all Greeks should endeavor to appease Roman anger on each other’s behalf.24 This attests to the overall disjunction between Roman and Greek perspectives on proportionality, a disjunction highlighted by Erskine. Anger as a Cause of War Anger features often as a cause of war.25 The prevalence Polybius gives to anger as a cause may surprise some who are accustomed to think of Polybius as one of the most “pragmatic” historians alongside Thucydides.26 Because of Polybius’ pragmatism, scholars of Polybius have often imputed a type of Realist worldview to Polybius himself.27 Eckstein persuasively demonstrates that concerns of practical survival lay at the heart of Hellenistic warfare and that prestige contributes to this basic goal. Eckstein argues that fear plays a large role in deciding to go to war and in securing one’s survival in an anarchic interstate system.28 Thucydides grants the emotion of fear a large role as a motivator of war and even attributes Spartan fear of growing Athenian power as the cause for the Peloponnesian War.29 This chapter does not argue against a Realist analysis of historical phenomena but rather brings into focus the importance Polybius attributes to anger as a cause.30 As noted previously, anger (ὀργή) and its close associate passion (θυμός) often have been seen as characterizing barbarians, the uncivilized and uneducated, and groups of lesser social status, such as the masses, women, and mercenaries.31 Anger thus belongs with barbaric thumos and against Hellenic logismos in the dichotomy Craige Champion observes: Hannibal’s “actions in the preliminaries to the [Second Punic War] demonstrate emotional, impulsive behavior, which in Book 2 is characteristic of Illyrians and Gauls.”32 Thus, emotion and impulse are understood as deficiencies of collective Carthaginian character at the start of this war.33 Likewise, William Harris argues that Polybius thought that anger clouds judgment.34 Harris does not provide many examples for his broad statements about Polybius’ views on anger and even doubts “if he had any.”35 Nevertheless, Harris contends that Polybius characterizes enemy rulers as wrathful and angry and associates them with barbarians.36 Arthur Eckstein argued similarly that anger was a crucial, determining factor in Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal when giving his pretexts for attacking Saguntum and beginning the Second Punic War.37 Eckstein argued that emotion in Polybius is contrasted with reason and although he admits of combinations of reason with emotion, he still concluded that one always predominates.38 Eckstein’s argument revolves around the idea that for Polybius emotions were irrational and that acting upon them in war marked poor generalship and invited disaster. Moreover, Eckstein put forth the idea that wars undertaken from “cold, rational calculation” receive Polybius’ approbation, and conversely wars “emerging from

156  Emotions at War sheer, unrestrained emotion” receive his disapproval.39 Although Andrew Erskine analyzed the anger of the Romans in the later books of the Histories along different lines, as discussed in Chapter 2, he concluded that in the early books of the Histories anger characterizes Rome’s opponents, people who could all be called barbarians.40 My argument in this chapter challenges anger’s placement on the side of barbarians in a dichotomy between barbarian and civilized. Characters often choose to go to war because of morally justified anger, which they feel for a reason. While some characters feel unjustified anger, the negative identification of anger in the Histories does not do justice to the significant role of anger as a justifiable cause of war. In the Histories, anger is often adduced as the pretext or the cause of war, can serve as both pretext and cause, or is occasionally felt in a chain reaction and thus causes war. The Second Punic War

Polybius begins his main history in Book Three with a detailed account of the causes of the Second Punic War.41 He frames this discussion with his definitions of cause, pretext, and beginning and with an explanation of why causes are important for history. Thus, his discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War holds importance as the central case of causation in the Histories. First, Polybius summarizes what he will cover in the Histories and why the Olympiad around 220 bce was so important as the start of his universal history: four wars began at nearly the same time and thence world affairs began to intertwine in a distinct way.42 As we shall see, the causation and responsibility for the Second Punic War in Polybius’ narrative is never completely or successfully divorced from the First Punic War because of anger. David Potter in particular argues persuasively that the lack of envisioned goals and outcomes for the First Punic War led to its unsatisfactory result and hence directly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Punic War about 20 years later, which parallels in many ways the connection between the First and Second World Wars in the twentieth century, in which anger at the unsatisfactory result of the First World War and Treaty of Versailles similarly carried over to the outbreak of the Second World War.43 Because this analysis focuses on Polybius’ account of the Second Punic War’s causation and its significance, it is important to gain a sense of the full passage in summary. Polybius defines causes in order to refute claims that Hannibal’s capture of Saguntum was the cause of the Second Punic War.44 Marking the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum as the cause of the war, Polybius argues, highlights one’s ignorance of the difference between a beginning and a cause or pretext.45 He continues, I define the beginnings (ἀρχὰς) of everything as the first attacks and the enactment of what has already been decided, but on the other hand I define causes (αἰτίας) as the thoughts which precede the decisions and plans (τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων): I mean the ideas, plans, rationale about these, and how we come to deciding and setting off on some affair.46

Emotions at War 157 This description of the differences between a cause and a beginning provides a template for distinguishing potential causes.47 Polybius then refutes the claims of causation made by the Roman senatorial historian and contemporary of the war, Fabius Pictor.48 Polybius presents Pictor’s attestation of causes as the prevailing view in his own time. Pictor, according to Polybius, narrated that Hannibal’s ambition and lust for power, which he took from Hasdrubal, his predecessor in Spain and brother-in-law, caused the war. Pictor depicted Hasdrubal as relatively independent from and even at odds with Carthage, aiming for monarchical power. Hannibal, because of this drive for power which he inherited from Hasdrubal, sought war with Rome independently from and against the wishes of Carthage. However, Polybius faults Pictor’s ascribed causation because the Carthaginian Senate did not show its indignation toward Hannibal nor did they hand him over to Rome to avoid war.49 Polybius cautions against trusting Fabius Pictor entirely based on his elite – and therefore implicitly trustworthy – status as a senator.50 Polybius then identifies three causes (αἰτίαι) of the Second Punic War: Hamilcar’s passion and dissatisfaction with the ending of the First Punic War, the Roman seizure of Sardinia and additional tribute imposed on Carthage between these two wars, and Carthaginian confidence in their strength in Spain. Polybius justifies how Hamilcar’s passion caused the war. Hamilcar brings his young son Hannibal to a sacrifice and makes him swear an oath that he will always hate the Romans. Hannibal recalls this anecdote as an older man for Antiochus III, after Hannibal had waged and lost the Second Punic War. Next, Polybius narrates the events leading up to the Second Punic War. He briefly summarizes Hannibal’s energetic, successful, and popular leadership in Spain before the siege of Saguntum.51 The Romans, to whom the Saguntines had sent several pleas for aid, sent an embassy to Hannibal to warn him to stay away from Saguntum.52 Hannibal, young and passionate, replied that the Carthaginians were coming to the aid of those wronged by Saguntum.53 Hannibal, however, sent to Carthage for further instruction, and the Roman embassy conveyed the same message to the Carthaginian senate as they had given to Hannibal, foreseeing war only in Spain.54 The siege and capture of Saguntum by Hannibal follows.55 When news of Saguntum’s fall reached Rome, Polybius states that the Romans sent envoys to Carthage and argues against Pictor’s view that the Roman Senate held a tense and secret debate at that time on the grounds that such a debate was illogical.56 The Carthaginians, on receiving the Roman envoys, argued that no treaties bound their actions in Spain. The treaty of Hasdrubal with Rome, that the Carthaginians stay south of the Ebro, was not ratified at Carthage, and the treaty of Lutatius, made after the First Punic War and stipulating that neither would harm the other’s allies, also did not apply, so they argued. The Roman envoys replied that the Carthaginians should show that they are not guilty or else accept war.57 Polybius here digresses to clarify the issue of the treaties.58 He quotes or paraphrases three treaties which he found at Rome, the earliest of which he dated back to the beginning of the Roman Republic. After relating these three early treaties,

158  Emotions at War Polybius reflects on the beginning of the First Punic War.59 In short, he found that the Romans did not breach a treaty in crossing to Sicily (nor did the Carthaginians earlier), for he did not find evidence of a prohibition of Romans from Sicily or Carthaginians from all of Italy.60 Next, he reproduces the terms of the treaty between Rome and Carthage after the First Punic War, which were expanded after Carthage’s Mercenary War, and demanded that Carthage pay indemnities and evacuate first Sicily then Sardinia. Lastly, he gives the addendum of the treaty with Hasdrubal that the Carthaginians not cross to the north of the Ebro in arms. Polybius then sums up his judgment that the Romans had no reasonable pretext or reason for taking Sardinia.61 After this digression, Polybius returns to the Roman responses to Hannibal’s capture of Saguntum. The Romans of his day, Polybius states, argue that, in sum all the treaties and their terms were valid.62 Thus, Hannibal and the Carthaginians broke the treaty made by Hasdrubal in crossing the Ebro and by attacking Saguntum broke the treaty of Lutatius concluded after the First Punic War. Finally, Polybius concludes his discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War with his judgment. If one takes the destruction of Saguntum as the cause, the Carthaginians were wrong, but if one takes the seizure of Sardinia as the cause, then the Romans were in the wrong.63 To wrap up this discussion of the causation of the Second Punic War, Polybius expresses how important causes were for history and its purpose of educating statesmen.64 Universal history in particular, because it covers a broader scope of events, times, and places, excelled at illuminating deeper causes.65 This entire passage, spanning nearly 30 sections, emphasizes the importance of causation for history and misguided attributions of causation, such as Pictor’s, which prevailed. Polybius argues against the view that Saguntum’s fall was the cause of the Second Punic War. He defines causes in a specific way, refutes Pictor, argues against interpretations of treaties, and provides evidence from treaties at Rome to support his view. It is important to note, then, what he does cite as the causes of the war and how these causes differ from what he frames as the prevailing attribution of causes at that time. Polybius’ identifications of causes have repercussions for the responsibility, justifiability, and guiding rationale of the Second Punic War. That Polybius includes emotion in the causes, then, is notable. The following sections address the emotions which occur throughout this extended passage, starting with Polybius’ three causes of the war. Causing the Second Punic War: Justifiable Anger

How war is justified, morally, is the central concern for just war theory. In one modern formulation, a just (or justified) war is not a war of aggression, is declared beforehand, is proportionate to the wrong suffered, and is the last resort. These strictures have developed – and are still developing – through centuries of accumulated knowledge and updated standards.66 It would be anachronistic to expect Polybius to hold these same standards. However, we can evaluate whether and on

Emotions at War 159 what grounds Polybius thought a war justified in some moral or ethical sense. Let us examine Polybius’ first cause: The first cause must be considered the passion (θυμός) of Hamilcar Barca, the biological father of Hannibal. For he, undefeated in his soul in the war over Sicily, in that he seemed to have preserved his army around Eryx intact in the battles in which he took part, but also because of the Carthaginians’ loss in the sea battle, yielded to the situation, made the treaty, and remained in his anger (ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς), always looking out for an opportunity.67 Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, served as a general for Carthage in the First Punic War, remaining in command of Eryx in western Sicily through the end of the war. After the First Punic War, Hamilcar served as a general in the Mercenary War, 241–238 bce, and defeated the revolutionaries, after which he traveled to Spain to expand and solidify Carthaginian power and resources until his death in 229 bce. The first reason for the war is an emotional element, Hamilcar’s passion, (θυμός). As noted in Chapter 1, θυμός throughout the Histories denotes the intensity of feeling, often aligning with themes of uncontrolled passion, irrationality, and barbarism.68 Here, however, θυμός refers to Hamilcar’s courage and determination, in the context of not conceding defeat personally.69 Polybius does not seem to disapprove of Hamilcar.70 He emphasizes the military accomplishment and noble steadfastness of Hamilcar in continuing to hold Eryx despite the Carthaginians’ losses. Hamilcar’s leadership preserves the morale of the soldiers and maintains his anger (ὀργή).71 Hamilcar yielded to circumstance in signing the treaty with Rome to end the First Punic War, for Polybius says that “in these circumstances, when he had omitted nothing reasonable for saving those under his command, altogether sensibly and practically (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς) he yielded to the present situation and sent envoys to discuss truces and a peace treaty.”72 Moreover, Polybius approves of Hamilcar directly: “He very much did the work of a good and prudent leader (ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου).”73 Hamilcar’s personal status as undefeated, however, leads him to desire to wage war in the future. Hamilcar’s passion (θυμός) continues precisely because Hamilcar acted prudently as a good general by yielding to circumstances. Thus, Hamilcar’s noble actions and passion (θυμός) contribute to the causation of the Second Punic War. While θυμός most often aligns with irrationality, barbarism, and excess, there are other moments when θυμός has positive effects in battle.74 For example, θυμός motivates soldiers to have courage and return to the fight, and the Gauls in particular fight with passion, terrifying their opponents.75 The Roman seizure of Sardinia and imposition of additional tribute on Carthage constitutes the second, and greatest, of the three causes for the Second Punic War, according to Polybius. But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they resolved the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed to everything,

160  Emotions at War thinking that they would win in their just claims,. . . But when the Romans did not compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and t­ aking it hard, not having power to do anything, withdrew from Sardinia and u­ ndertook to pay another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute. On account of this they averted war at that time. For this reason, this must be placed as the second and greatest (δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ) cause of the later war.76 Polybius stresses the seizure of Sardinia as a reason for the Second Punic War throughout the text, and he also emphasizes the injustice of the Romans in this act.77 At one point he even calls this the “second war between Rome and Carthage, that over Sardinia” because the Romans had declared war on Carthage.78 Because the Carthaginians decided to capitulate to the Roman demands, actual warfare was averted. Polybius then establishes a psychological frame through which to understand the rest of the events: “Hamilcar took up the citizens’ anger (τὴν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὀργὴν τῶν πολιτῶν) in addition to his own passions (τοῖς ἰδίοις θυμοῖς).”79 The citizens’ anger (ὀργή) functions as we have seen anger regularly function – as a response directly to a provocation, injustice, or slight. The seizure of Sardinia aggravated not only Hamilcar but also the citizens. Their anger, combined with Hamilcar’s personal urge (θυμός) to renew war and redeem himself and his country, made the seizure of Sardinia a cause even more important than the sour ending of the First Punic War. The Carthaginians’ emotions of passion (θυμός) and anger (ὀργή) appear rational.80 Not only did the Carthaginians react in anger in response to the Romans’ injustice, but their anger follows the same rational paradigm as the emotions of the community in the anacyclosis. They perceive that the Romans hurt their interests by taking Sardinia, thus committing injustice, and they react like the people of the anacyclosis with anger to this transgression.81 Things they value – territorial integrity, resources from Sardinia, and state autonomy – were challenged by Roman aggression. The third cause for the Second Punic War, Polybius briefly says, is the Carthaginian confidence in their strength in Spain.82 This final cause highlights the Carthaginians’ pragmatism. They chose to delay hostile activities against the Romans for taking Sardinia until they had built up military strength and resources. However, this cause still involves emotion in the Carthaginians’ confidence (εὐθαρσῶς). Emotion works with pragmatic calculation in this instance. In all three of the causes of the Second Punic War, Polybius focalizes the causation of the war through a Carthaginian perspective; that is, he states the Carthaginians’ reasons to go to war with Rome as his “official” causes.83 However, nowhere does a Carthaginian character attest to the three causes Polybius identifies.84 Moreover, Polybius does not clearly present the Roman reasons for going to war. Even when Polybius addresses the Roman perspective, he does so to present and correct later Roman, revisionist, accounts of why and how this war began.85 The perspective Polybius chooses for the causes conveys historiographical judgment.86 If Polybius seriously took up the Roman historical perspective in his considerations of causation, the attack on Saguntum appears as a strong cause for the Romans to go

Emotions at War 161 to war themselves. The attack on Saguntum occurred before they decided to take hostile action, therefore it constitutes a “just cause” for war, which would classify as “other protection or agency” in terms of modern just war theory.87 Polybius’ focus both puts the decision for and beginning of war in the Carthaginians’ hands and centers upon the Carthaginian grievances and justifications.88 The Carthaginians seem to have justice on their side according to Polybius’ account. The Romans initially acted as unprovoked aggressors in taking Sardinia and imposing more tribute, and so the Romans were morally responsible for this war. Lastly, and most importantly, Polybius assumes that the Carthaginians knew and intended to go to war with Rome, an assumption made from retrospect.89 At the end of the extended passage, Polybius concludes his discussion of causes of the Second Punic War with a judgment90: For this reason, if on one hand someone should make the destruction of Saguntum the cause (αἰτία) of the war, it must be assented to that the Carthaginians wrongly began the war, both according to the treaty by Lutatius, in which there must be safety from each for the allies of each, and according to the treaty by Hasdrubal, in which the Carthaginians must not cross the river Ebro in war. But on the other hand, if [someone makes the cause of the war] the acquisition of Sardinia and the tribute with this, it must be agreed altogether the Carthaginians with good reason (εὐλόγως) began the Hannibalic War; for having been compelled by the circumstances, they were repelling those who harmed them at the time as circumstances allowed.91 If one considers the seizure of Sardinia the main cause of the war, as Polybius explicitly did (μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν), then the Carthaginians waged war justly on Rome.92 From a holistic view of Polybius’ account of the causes, the Carthaginians were responsible for beginning war with the siege of Saguntum, but they did so acting on morally justifiable anger.93 Those who wronged them were at fault. This perspective on causes emphasizes emotion and its justification. The most emotional causes also happen to be the most just and most appropriate causes for the Second Punic War, in Polybius’ view. Carthaginian anger, as a response to injustice, therefore functions as a morally justifiable cause for war. Unjustifiable Anger

By contrast, Polybius attributes anger as a cause for war with explicit negative judgment on other occasions. These passages indeed support negative stereotypes of emotional mercenaries, Aetolians, and women in the Histories. This further highlights the justifiability of the Carthaginians’ anger as a cause of war. The Mercenary War, also called the Libyan War or Truceless War, provides a negative paradigm of the causal power of anger.94 At the end of the First Punic War, Carthage found itself in financial difficulties and needed to pay many mercenaries. Originally, the commander Gesgo had sent back the mercenary soldiers from Sicily to Carthage in separate shipments so that the Carthaginians could pay them and let them disperse

162  Emotions at War to their different homelands. This would alleviate the strain on Carthage to hold them and allow space between their shipments so that they could not gather and compare their experiences and pay.95 The Carthaginians, however, gathered them in Carthage, hoping to persuade them to cancel the Carthaginians’ obligation to pay them. Since the mercenaries committed crimes indiscriminately while waiting in Carthage, the Carthaginians sent them out to a camp at Sicca and made them take their possessions and families.96 During their idle time at their camp at Sicca, the mercenaries began to meet and discuss the pay they were owed, figuring the sum extortionately. They began to make demands, and the Carthaginians, now realizing their folly, succumbed to every demand from them, sending supplies as appeasement. Although the Carthaginians attempted to propitiate their anger (σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν), the mercenaries kept coming up with new demands.97 Eventually, the Carthaginians sent a favored commander, Gesgo, who began to pay the mercenaries successfully by nation. At this point, the conflict could have ended. Two individuals, Spendius, a runaway Roman slave, and Mathos, a Libyan subject of Carthage, persuaded the mercenaries of the Carthaginians’ deceit. Because he feared being deported to his Roman master, tortured, and killed, Spendius strove to prolong their dispute with Carthage.98 Mathos, likewise, feared that he would be called to account and punished for habitually stirring up disturbances.99 After being declared generals by the mercenaries, these two persuaded the as-yet-unpaid Libyan troops that they alone as subjects under Carthage would bear the brunt of the Carthaginians’ anger once the rest left.100 The Libyans went to Gesgo to demand their pay, to which Gesgo retorted that they should ask their “General” Mathos to pay them.101 This immediately angered them so much (οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’) that they looted his and the Carthaginians’ property in the camp and, under Spendius’ and Mathos’ leadership, detained him.102 Polybius then sums up, “then they were clearly already at war against the Carthaginians.”103 Spendius and Mathos succeed at inducing anger in the Libyans. They play upon the Libyans’ fears and persuade them that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to injure them.104 Thus, the Libyans reacted vehemently to Gesgo’s snide remark because they perceived it as a slight to themselves and as indicative of Gesgo’s intention to harm their interests.105 The fickle character of the mercenary troops also contributes to how quickly the perceived slight escalated into anger and how in turn such anger quickly escalated into violence.106 Amid the rising tensions leading to the Mercenary War, the mercenaries’ anger does not provide a justified reason to go to war according to Polybius’ standards. Polybius consistently portrays the mercenaries and their motives negatively. Polybius assumes the Carthaginians’ perspective, which views any such disruption of diplomatic proceedings as negative. Polybius emphasizes the Libyans’ overzealousness for their money (οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως) and their quick, unreasoned reaction of violence to Gesgo’s slight (οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν). The Libyans reacted only to their anger (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’), with no deliberation underlying

Emotions at War  163 this.107 Since the mercenaries’ anger could be justified only by reference to the slight by Gesgo and their desire for money, the outbreak of the Mercenary War provides a model of the “wrong” kind of anger – premature, based solely on personal gain and a slight, and acted upon rashly.108 They do direct their anger correctly at the Carthaginians, but their response is not proportional to the wrong they suffered. The shared anger of the mercenaries differs greatly from that of the people in the passages examined in Chapter  3. The mercenaries as a group do not form a community of respect. They do not seem to care if their members are harmed, for they stone any of their own members who attempt to speak at assemblies besides Spendius and Mathos.109 This difference is crucial in Polybius’ presentation of the mercenaries’ character and motivations. In addition, the mercenaries react angrily because of prior persuasion by their demagogic leaders, Spendius and Mathos. In the anacyclosis and the popular uprising in Alexandria, the people awaited a leader to direct their anger. Within this episode, the mercenaries do not explicitly grow angry until Spendius and Mathos insinuate that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to insult them.110 The mercenaries’ anger thus also differs from the Carthaginians’ anger over Sardinia which caused the Second Punic War. The Carthaginians felt anger of their own accord over Sardinia, and then they combined their anger with the passion of Hamilcar, the opposite kind of leader from Spendius and Mathos. Moreover, they feel anger for the wrong sorts of reasons, money and an insult.111 They could have let this anger go and accepted the supplies and compensation from the Carthaginians. Gesgo exacerbated the situation with his taunt, but he does not appear to be wholly at fault in the narrative.112 Polybius provides details into the backgrounds and inclinations of Spendius and Mathos to illuminate their bad character and self-interested motivations. Their bad intentions and character taint their endeavors and the anger which it instills in the mercenaries.113 The outbreak of Rome’s First Illyrian War, however, juxtaposes unjustified with justifiable anger. Italian merchants complained to Rome about Illyrian depredations on their trading vessels, but then Illyrians even attacked and killed Italian merchants on the Adriatic Sea.114 In response, Rome sent two ambassadors, a pair of brothers Coruncanii, to ask Teuta, Queen of Illyrians, to stop these piratic raids. Polybius relates that Teuta received and listened to them haughtily, which upset the younger, fiery Coruncanius.115 He replied rightly, but not opportunely, Polybius specifies.116 His speech angers Teuta to such a degree (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς τὸ ῥηθὲν) that she sent assassins after him.117 When news of his murder at Teuta’s behest arrives at Rome, the Romans also grow angry (διοργισθέντες) and prepare for war.118 Teuta first grows angry, reacting irrationally and passionately to the Roman use of frankness (ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κἀλογίστως δεξαμένη τὴν παρρησίαν). Teuta’s anger appears negative and unjustified. Polybius repeatedly characterizes Teuta with arrogance (ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφανῶς), womanly passion (γυναικοθύμως), irrationality (ἀλογίστως), desires, and greed, which all contrast with traditional aristocratic values.119 Like the Libyan mercenaries as well as Gesgo, Teuta reacts immediately, responding arrogantly.120 She grew angry at the younger Coruncanius’ censure and threat to her dignity and piratic way of life. However, Polybius

164  Emotions at War saw such a way of life and sense of arrogant dignity as unjustifiable, and so he portrayed Teuta, her response, and her anger as negatively as possible. However, the Romans reciprocally grow angry. They grow angry at how Teuta manifests her unjustified anger in the murder of Coruncanius, an ambassador, and how she commits an act of transgression of the interstate code of behavior (ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων).121 This anger directly causes the Romans to begin war against the Illyrians: “When the news of what happened arrived in Rome, growing angry at the lawlessness of the woman, they were immediately busy making ready their preparations, enrolling an army, and gathering a fleet.”122 Eckstein examines Teuta as an example of Polybius’ negative judgment against Rome’s opponents. “But what disturbs Polybius here is not so much opposition to Rome per se,” he writes, “as poor-quality decision making: Leaders who lose control of their emotions and act irrationally, thereby becoming derelict in their solemn duty to provide guidance to their polities during seasons of difficulty.”123 Eckstein’s analysis of Teuta rings true, but his analysis could apply equally well to the Romans. They grow just as angry (διοργισθέντες) and immediately decide upon war from this anger. The Romans make no strategic consideration, beyond retaliation, in this narrative. While the Romans are not characterized as “acting irrationally” or “becoming derelict” in their duty to protect their state, by either Polybius or Eckstein, they could be said to demonstrate “poor-quality decision making” because they react to anger just as much as Teuta does. The crucial point, therefore, lies not in regulating emotions as such but in the reasons for the emotions which elicit Polybius’ censure. Polybius does not call the Romans’ move to war “poor decision making,” for he sees their reaction to go to war as justified, just as their anger was justified. The Romans’ anger shares similarities with the anger of the people against despotic rulers in the anacyclosis and in Alexandria and the Carthaginians’ anger at the injustice they suffered with the loss of Sardinia. The Roman people grew angry at Teuta’s obvious transgression of international norms and her affront to their own dignity and status.124 This anger immediately motivated the Romans to prepare war against the Illyrians, which confirms that anger could be seen as reasonable and justifiable for war. Again, anger in itself does not constitute a condemned, irrational, or unjustifiable motive for war. Within the prefatory section of Book Three, Polybius similarly does not pass judgment upon the Aetolians for their anger in causing the war between Rome and Antiochus III. The Aetolians grew angry because of the distribution of spoils and credit at the end of the Second Macedonian War in 196 bce, when they aided Rome in defeating Philip V decisively at Cynoscephalae. Polybius regularly presents the Aetolians as notoriously self-interested and habitually transgressing the norms of interstate relations.125 He likewise portrays in an unfavorable light their motives and behavior between the end of the Second Macedonian War, which they won together with Rome, and the Roman war with Antiochus III.126 The near-barbarian Aetolians never provide a model for emulation, but Polybius does not condemn the fact that anger caused the war. Rather, he criticizes the selfish motivation and

Emotions at War 165 inappropriate direction of their anger.127 Anger as a cause as such does not seem to bother Polybius. Anger as a cause which stems from unjustifiable motives, however, does. Polybius and the agents in the Histories regularly saw anger as a common and acceptable cause for war, yet anger has been judged as an inherently negative term. This is not so. Anger could certainly – and often does – have unjustified motivations and could lead to unjustified wars, as seen with the Mercenary War. Nevertheless, anger could have justified motivations, such as that of the Romans against Teuta, who react to arrogance and lawless behavior – and unmoderated anger – with their own righteous anger. As with many emotions, the evaluation of anger as a cause of war lies in its own motivation. So too, the passion of Hamilcar and the anger of the Carthaginians were motivated by a sense of honor and justice, respectively. Polybius made clear that Hamilcar acted nobly and rightly in first yielding to the situation at the end of the First Punic War and in persevering later. While we might expect Polybius to criticize holding onto and beginning a new war for such reasons as anger, he does not. Likewise, Polybius repeatedly stressed the injustice of the seizure of Sardinia, thus showing the anger that arose from it as rationally and morally grounded. Following Polybius’ account, Carthaginian anger was justified as a cause of the Second Punic War. Justifying War to Others: Pretexts

The justifiability of a cause for war mattered to Polybius. Pretexts (προφάσεις) represented the justification of an agent’s actions to the world and so were important to Polybius. Donald Baronowski, however, argues against the value of pretexts for Polybius. Baronowski sees pretexts as merely expedient, a “feeble justification,” “clumsy invention,” or “an unreasonable and false claim.”128 Pretexts merely covered up aggression – which Baronowksi argues Polybius approved – to external observers who knew better and recognized the deception anyway.129 While Baronowski correctly points to some “feeble justifications”, his argument is at odds with Polybius’ text, including some of the major passages Baronowski addresses. Polybius puts emphasis on these justifications, precisely in their moral validity and thus good appearance to the rest of the world, which therefore increases their practical benefit. Although Polybius does not quite distinguish a cause (αἰτία) from a pretext (πρόφασις) in his passage on definitions, the examples following these definitions clarify this distinction.130 A pretext is an aggressor’s public reason to go to war while the cause represents what motivates his actions.131 Philip II’s pretext or alleged reason, for example, for his planned invasion of the Persian Empire was punishing the Persians for their transgression against the Greeks while for the Romano-Syrian War, Antiochus III proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks as his pretext. The ostensible difference between the cause and pretext lies in the perspective. The character himself gives a pretext while the narrator identifies the cause, but the cause and pretext do not have to be different or separate, as we shall see. The historian relates the causes from a position of greater knowledge, for he

166  Emotions at War can review the course of events in retrospect and determine the truth about what actually began a war. The agents, however, decide upon pretexts with their limited view of the foreseeable future. Polybius’ examples of pretexts represent claims by the active party to the world, justifying their actions.132 Polybius’ discussion of the beginning of the Third Macedonian War between Rome and Perseus, Philip V’s son and successor, clarifies this relation between cause and pretext.133 Polybius criticizes others’ attribution of causes and reemphasizes his distinctions between cause, pretext, and beginning. Others attribute the cause of the Third Macedonian War to a number of immediate events such as the Thracian king Abrupolis’ expulsion, the invasion of Dolopia, and Perseus’ actions at Delphi.134 Polybius disagrees with distinguishing any of these as a cause. Instead, he clarifies, these are all pretexts (for the Romans against Perseus). In addition, he continues, others classify as causes a plot against Eumenes, the Pergamene monarch, and the murder of Boeotian envoys, whereas Polybius specifies these events as the beginning of the war. Polybius, in contrast to other writers, attributes the cause to Philip V, Perseus’ father. Philip V planned to wage war against Rome but died before he could execute this plan, comparable to both Philip II’s planned invasion of Persia which was left to Alexander the Great and to Hannibal’s inheritance of Hamilcar’s unresolved tension and hatred of Rome.135 In this passage, Polybius distinguishes alleged causes or pretexts with what he as a historian identified as a cause. However, Polybius does not cast aspersions on pretexts as such. His primary concern in this brief passage remained clarifying the historical causes from others’ attributions. In his analysis of the Romans’ decision-making leading up to the Third Punic War, Polybius explains how crucial a suitable pretext is, morally and pragmatically. The Romans, he states, had the strategic power to wage war, but they delayed declaring war until they could find a suitable pretext (πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός).136 Despite the practical, strategic, and expedient benefit of beginning war sooner, the Romans hesitated because they considered maintaining a good reputation so important. Polybius explicitly approves of the Romans’ consideration and privileging of pretexts.137 Not only does a good pretext give them the appearance of justice, he remarks, but it makes the victory seem better and more secure.138 Polybius stresses the judgment of external observers (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαλήψεως), further highlighting that pretexts assume great importance to the rest of the world because of the sense of justice they promote.139 Therefore, having a good pretext when beginning a war can go a long way toward bolstering one’s reputation.140 Although Polybius does not mention anger in causing this war in the surviving text of the Histories, this passage on the Third Punic War provides evidence for the importance of both causes and pretexts.141 Polybius was keen to distinguish true historical causes, as identified correctly by a historian using retrospect and understanding the connections between events, as opposed to other alleged reasons for the war. Polybius does this without casting explicit judgment on those pretexts. However, within the extended passage on the start of the Second Punic War, Polybius criticizes the content of Hannibal’s pretexts. Hannibal justifies his

Emotions at War 167 presence at Saguntum to the Roman embassy with what Polybius calls “illogical” pretexts (προφάσεις ἀλόγους).142 Polybius says, But Hannibal, as he was a young man full of impulsiveness for war, successful in his endeavors, and stirred up in his long-time enmity against Romans (πάλαι δὲ παρωρμημένος πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔχθραν), charged the envoys, as if concerned for the Saguntines, that, when the Saguntines were in civil strife just a few years before, the Romans in resolving it had some of the leaders killed unjustly (ἀδίκως ἐπανέλοιντό τινας τῶν προεστώτων): He said that the Carthaginians would not overlook those who had been betrayed (παρεσπονδημένους). For it was the Carthaginians’ ancestral custom not to overlook anyone being injured unjustly.143 That Hannibal himself deemed these pretexts as worthy attests to their importance as public justifications to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, contra Polybius. Immediate events and perceived injustices served as legitimate reasons or pretexts for going to war, and Hannibal arguably considered them reasonable and suitable to his audiences of Romans, Carthaginians, and anyone else observing the war. Otherwise, they would not serve his purpose at all to claim as reasons for his actions in the first place. However, Polybius severely criticizes these pretexts, something that he does not do for other – sometimes flimsier – pretexts.144 At the heart of his pretext Hannibal claims to protect and avenge others the Romans had wronged (or at least ignored). In the Histories, claims to protect one’s wronged allies are both noble and acceptable as reasons to commence hostilities. Philip V’s motivations to participate in the Social War fall under this category. Polybius portrays Philip V coming to aid Peloponnesians against Aetolian raids as noble, even overcoming the disadvantage of being young, and therefore more prone to irrational and rash impulses.145 Likewise, the Achaean League nobly took up the Messenians’ just cause in the Social War, in direct contrast to the Messenians themselves, who received unrestrained censure from Polybius for their indecision in joining the allies against the Aetolian League, especially since they themselves were the wronged party.146 Despite the Messenians’ indecision, the Achaeans resolved to right the wrong done by the Aetolian League. Of course, the Achaean League had other motives for curtailing Aetolian power, particularly in the Peloponnese itself, but Polybius focuses on their nobility in defending those wronged and standing up for their allies as their reason for going to war.147 Lastly, the Romans commonly claimed it was their patriotic duty to defend those wronged and to support their allies – a claim identical to Hannibal’s in his pretexts.148 Polybius does not criticize this tendency of the Romans.149 In sum, Polybius’ criticism of the content of Hannibal’s pretexts contradicts Polybius’ tendency to praise this type of behavior. Polybius criticizes not the content, then, but Hannibal’s interpretive move. Polybius begins his criticism of Hannibal for his succumbing to his youth, for he responded “full of irrationality and forceful passion (καθόλου δ’ ἦν πλήρης

168  Emotions at War ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου).”150 Eckstein has analyzed the disapproving behavior and characterization of the youthful, rash Hannibal in the passage, and Champion insightfully analyzed the language of barbarism and irrationality in this passage.151 They demonstrate that Polybius disapproved of Hannibal in this passage and framed such disapproval in terms of his age and characterization. Polybius continues: For this reason also, he did not use the true causes, but fled to irrational pretexts, which those who make light of duty are accustomed to do because of the urges in them. For how much better was it to think that the Romans must give back to them Sardinia and the tributes arranged together with this (πόσῳ γὰρ ἦν ἄμεινον οἴεσθαι δεῖν, Ῥωμαίους ἀποδοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἅμα ταύτῃ φόρους), which they took unjustly from them in taking advantage of the circumstances (οὓς τοῖς καιροῖς συνεπιθέμενοι πρότερον ἀδίκως παρ’ αὐτῶν ἔλαβον), and if not, to declare war (εἰ δὲ μή, φάναι πολεμήσειν)? But now, keeping the true cause quiet (νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν), and fabricating a nonexistent cause about the Saguntines, he seemed to begin the war not only irrationally but, even more so, unjustly (οὐ μόνον ἀλόγως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀδίκως κατάρχειν ἐδόκει τοῦ πολέμου).152 Polybius accuses Hannibal of fabricating (πλάττων) these reasons rather than giving the real causes. In his criticism, Polybius ignores two key considerations – first, the historical realities underlying Hannibal’s “fabricated” pretexts, which Walbank, for one, shows to be plausible, and second, the fact that Hannibal was justifying his attack and treatment of Saguntum, not a potential war with Rome.153 Retrospection may have blinded Polybius to Hannibal’s foreseeable situation and goals at that moment in 220/219 bce.154 However, in this statement, Polybius emphasizes the positive value of what he identifies as the true causes for their use as a pretext. According to Polybius, the injustice of the Romans’ seizure of Sardinia, imposition of additional tribute, and the anger resulting from this serve as suitable, plausible, and beneficial pretexts for Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Despite Polybius’ affirmation that Hannibal and the Carthaginians had justice on their side, Hannibal’s poor choice of pretext made his cause appear unjust. As specified with the Romans’ need for pretexts before with the Third Punic War, pretexts were considered important for gaining the goodwill of others and for securing one’s victory.155 Polybius emphasizes through his rhetorical question and language of justice that the true reasons (αἰτίαι) for Carthage to go to war with Rome were better than what Hannibal gave. Hannibal failed because he did not cite the Romans’ injustice – and, implicitly, the anger associated with it – in his pretext. While Polybius did not specify that Hannibal should have used anger explicitly as his pretext, the Gauls who join him in Italy do. They choose to begin hostilities against Rome “in word because of their anger against the Romans, but actually more so because of plunder (προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ

Emotions at War 169 πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας).”156 Here Polybius explicitly distinguishes the pretext of anger from the cause. The Gauls use anger as a pretext, but self-interested material gain drives them to war. This example, though brief, demonstrates an essential assumption by both the Gauls and Polybius. They presume that anger is a suitable pretext (πρόφασις), or public reason, to go to war. Of course, many pretexts for war in the ancient world seem less than ideal or even coherent – not least Polybius’ own exemplary case for distinguishing causes, pretexts, and beginnings, that of Alexander’s invasion into the Persian Empire.157 However, pretexts presented the outward justification of a state to the wider interstate community, in which appearance and reputation mattered. Therefore, pretexts had to have some form of plausibility as a reasonable justification. Gauls, however, are often cast as the stereotypical barbarians.158 The Gauls’ anger seems morally unjustified when seen purely as an indication of their barbarian behavior. However, their anger is grounded in their desire for retaliation against the Romans, who, as recently as 225 bce, had waged wars against them and taken their land. The conflicts between Gauls and the Romans stretch back almost unabated to 390 bce.159 Considered within this background, the Gauls’ anger appears justified as part of retaliation and less of a barbaric outburst. In addition, anger seemed more plausible as a public explanation to wage war on the Romans than pursuit of material gain.160 Anger, therefore, could stand as a suitable pretext or cause even for the Gauls and could appear justifiable in consideration of its context and motivations. Because Polybius considered Carthaginian anger justified, Hannibal, like the Gauls, could – and should – have cited his country’s anger against Rome as his pretext. However, the anger between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenian Scyron, which formed Dorimachus’ pretext for stirring up the Social War, presents a negative paradigm for anger as a pretext.161 The Social War was fought between the Aetolian League and its allies against the Achaean League, Macedonians, and their allies from 220 to 217 bce. According to Polybius, a dispute between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenians initiated the conflict. The Messenians, who had put themselves under Aetolian protection, nonetheless continued to suffer raids by bandits, until one raid resulted in the death of a Messenian landholder.162 The Messenians consulted Dorimachus, the Aetolian commander in Messene, who had condoned and profited from the raids. Scyron, a Messenian councilman, proposed that Dorimachus, as leader of their Aetolian protectors, should be held responsible for the damages from the raiding and that he should not depart until he had paid damages for their losses.163 Dorimachus, angered (διοργισθεὶς) both at Scyron’s ­suggestion and the council’s agreement with him, responded vehemently that they were all fools, as they were speaking not only against him but also against the whole Aetolian League.164 Dorimachus’ response angered Scyron in turn (περιοργισθείς), who mocked Dorimachus by associating him with a notorious, emasculated Messenian local who resembled Dorimachus.165 Dorimachus then left for Aetolia, having paid the damages, and used no other pretext (οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν) for making war against the Messenians.166 Frank Walbank downplays the importance of this episode: “the responsibility for the war is to be attributed

170  Emotions at War neither to so small a group as Dorimachus and his colleagues, nor to an incident so trivial as this insult; these are clearly excuses for a policy already decided.”167 This historical, pragmatic point highlights the importance Polybius put on pretexts and emotions as causes. Dorimachus – and Polybius – still thought this episode and its anger valid enough as a pretext, to the exclusion of all other considerations. Polybius does not classify anything as a cause (αἰτία) specifically, although he describes the Aetolians’ motives for desiring war in general: they live off their neighbors’ property, and they saw the youth of Philip V as a weakness which they could exploit.168 Aetolian greed and aggression due to the perceived weakness of Macedon seem to cause the war in Polybius’ narrative, even if he did not directly label it as the cause.169 If this is so, the Aetolians’ cause and pretext are similar to the Gauls’ cause and pretext in joining Hannibal in Italy against the Romans – greed and anger, respectively. The Aetolians’ case furthers the conclusion that anger appeared more acceptable than greed as a public reason to join war. Anger could be justified, whereas greed could not. In this scenario, Dorimachus grows angry and specifically uses Scyron’s jibe against him as the only pretext to go to war (ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον), similar to the Libyans’ angry response to Gesgo’s taunt before the Mercenary War and Teuta’s murderous response to Coruncanius’ frankness, and Polybius implies that Dorimachus and the Aetolians should have had a better (εὔλογον) pretext.170 Polybius described Dorimachus after his return to Aetolia as sneaking around, making backroom deals with Scopas, the leading Aetolian, and setting off on war without the proper legislative measures or the vote of the Aetolian assembly.171 If Dorimachus’ pretext were justified, he presumably would not have needed to bypass proper ­Aetolian measures for going to war, even in Polybius’ hostile narrative against Aetolians. Dorimachus’ actions cast doubt further on the justifiability of his pretext, even in Aetolia, which does not generally meet Polybius’ standards for acceptable behavior. Consider, for example, Polybius’ description of the Aetolians’ characteristics and behavior in plundering others: So indeed the Aetolians live in this way of life and constantly plunder Greece, and, conducting unannounced wars against many, they do not deem their accusers worth giving a defense to, but they even revile anyone who calls them to account about what has happened or even concerning what they are about to do.172 Even within this culture – as portrayed by Polybius – which devalued accountability, Dorimachus still hid his true motives for war. Polybius’ narrative of Dorimachus’ behavior smears the Aetolians, who did have agency in agreeing to go to war for their own, presumably less personal and petty, motives.173 Through this scenario Polybius frames both Dorimachus and the Aetolians as beginning the war wrongly: Dorimachus wants war for personal, unjustified reasons, and the Aetolians began war without proper measures because of him. Of course, Polybius’ portrayal of Dorimachus and the Aetolians puts their opponents

Emotions at War 171 in this war, the Achaeans, in a particularly favorable light by comparison, and Polybius’ highlighting of the Aetolian injustice against the Messenians leaves him the opportunity to call the Messenians’ inaction into question later.174 The particular details of this passage allow Polybius to cast doubt on Dorimachus’ character and motivations, the legitimacy of the war for the Aetolians, and the Messenians’ claim for neutrality during the war. Dorimachus provides a negative paradigm of citing anger as a pretext, compared to Hannibal. Dorimachus did not feel justifiable anger and did not use a pretext which would show justice and make victory secure. The Messenian Scyron, on the other hand, felt anger and shared Polybian values, such as freedom of speech (παρρησία), calling wrongdoers to account, and defending one’s people, property, and territory – values which we observed in the good state forms of the anacyclosis. Thus, when Scyron grows angry (περιοργισθεὶς) at Dorimachus’ impetuous and arrogant speech insulting the Messenians and threatening their city, Polybius does not explicitly criticize Scyron’s anger.175 Even Scyron’s mockery of Dorimachus, which Polybius decided worthy to quote in detail, is set as an appropriate response to Dorimachus’ bravado, for it succeeds in causing Dorimachus to assent to pay damages and leave. Scyron grows angry at Dorimachus because the Aetolian failed at his duty to protect the Messenian community and actively harmed it. For these reasons, as well as Dorimachus’ disrespect for Scyron and the Messenians in his speech, Scyron justifiably grew angry. Whereas Dorimachus provides a negative paradigm of invoking anger as a pretext, Scyron’s anger provides a parallel to the anger which Hannibal could have used as a successful pretext. Anger could be presented as a pretext and found acceptable by Polybius, historical agents, and implicitly their audiences. Baronowski states: “since every pretext, even one that involves honor and morality, is by nature a diversionary artifice, it must be judged by the criteria of expediency, not of morality.”176 This contradicts the emphasis Polybius himself puts on good pretexts: external observers judge a pretext as the moral justification of one’s cause, not for its strategic expediency. Polybius criticized Hannibal for his pretext not only as a “clumsy invention” but also as a hindrance to his own cause: Hannibal portrayed his actions as unjust and therefore immoral, the opposite of the purpose of a pretext. Citing the justifiable anger of the Carthaginians at the unjust loss of Sardinia, however, would have served his purpose. Emotion and Strategic Prudence

Emotion does not always oppose strategic prudence and expediency. Pretexts serve a moral purpose and thus provide characters with access to a better reputation, something of practical benefit even in the Realist theory of international relations.177 Polybius also shows how anger can – and should – combine with prudent considerations.178 This section presents how emotion and strategic considerations relate in wars caused by anger. The Carthaginians and Prusias I of Bithynia delay acting on their anger for strategic reasons while the mercenaries in their “truceless” war against Carthage completely ignore advantages in their reasons for war,

172  Emotions at War according to Polybius’ narrative. The sets of paired anger of Teuta and Coruncanius and of Dorimachus and Scyron highlight differing responses and evaluations of anger. These discussions then inform our reading of Polybius’ conclusions about the legal, strategic, and moral responsibility for the Second Punic War. All three causes of the Second Punic War involve emotion, and all three also attest to the Carthaginians’ strategic sensibilities. Hamilcar first postpones his drive for war – motivated by his passion and anger – until a better opportunity presents itself, which did not occur in Hamilcar’s own lifetime. Polybius records several hereditary wars: Philip II passed down the will to make war against Persia to Alexander, and Philip V passed down the preparations for war to Perseus, thus stimulating the Third Macedonian War.179 So too, Hamilcar, motivated by his emotions, passed down his drive to make war against Rome to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, who were willing supporters, given their own hatred and anger against the Romans. Just as Hamilcar postponed acting on his emotion against Rome, the Carthaginians likewise averted war and acceded to the Romans’ demands for Sardinia and additional tribute, which deserves requoting: But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they resolved the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed over everything, thinking that they would win in their just claims (ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις), . . . But when the Romans did not compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and taking it hard, not having power to do anything (εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν), withdrew from Sardinia and undertook to pay another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute. On account of this they averted war at that time. For this reason, this must even be placed as the second and greatest cause of the later war.180 The Carthaginians strategically held back any negative feelings (καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν) and used prudence (εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν), even if they had justice on their side (ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις). The third cause, Carthage’s strength in Spain, also exemplifies the Carthaginians’ strategic prudence. Because they did not act immediately on their justified anger at the loss of Sardinia, they began to create their power in Spain. This cause alone focuses primarily on a pragmatic and strategic aspect, but it does not completely omit affect, as the Carthaginians confidently (εὐθαρσῶς) rely on their Iberian power. Polybius relates emotions in these three causes in agreement with concerns about expediency. Anger can function together with strategic prudence: anger motivates agents’ decision to want to wage war, and since they decided upon war, they use strategic prudence to maximize their probability of success, which Hamilcar and the Carthaginians did by building their power in Spain rather than accepting immediate war over Sardinia.181 Interestingly, then, agents can feel anger and be motivated to act but delay their actions until they are prepared in a practical sense. This delay does not seem to blunt the causal force of anger.

Emotions at War  173 Prusias I, the king of Bithynia, similarly delays in acting upon his anger until a suitable opportunity arose. His latent anger for the Byzantines motivated him to join Rhodes in a war against Byzantium in 220/219 bce.182 The Rhodians declared war on Byzantium for levying a toll on ships from the Black Sea. Prusias uses the Rhodians’ invitation and their causes for war as his pretext for making war against the Byzantines. For Prusias, however, deep-seated anger formed his cause. Polybius gives three reasons for this anger against Byzantium. First, the Byzantines had voted to put up statues for Prusias but forgot about them. Second, the Byzantines had endeavored to reconcile Prusias’ neighboring rivals, Attalus of Pergamum and Achaeus, the Seleucid satrap of Asia Minor, which was not beneficial for Prusias. Lastly, the Byzantines sent representatives to Attalus’ festival for Athena in Pergamum but neglected to send anyone to Prusias’ festival of Soteria when he invited them.183 Prusias felt anger against Byzantium because of these past, perceived slights. He gladly joined the war with his anger lurking behind the pretext of aiding his allies, the Rhodians (διόπερ ἐκ πάντων τούτων ὑποικουρουμένης παρ’ αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς ἄσμενος ἐπελάβετο τῆς τῶν Ῥοδίων προφάσεως).184 In this passage Polybius does not explicitly condone or condemn Prusias’ motives or choice to go to war. Polybius stresses that the anger of Prusias was the actual cause for his decision to wage war. This, coupled with Polybius’ lack of judgment or negative portrayal of Prusias I, supports the view that anger formed a suitable and usual cause for war, even if aiding his allies seemed to be a better choice in this case for a pretext than anger at past grievances.185 Prusias demonstrates the agreement of expediency and emotion. He did not forget his anger and initial motivation against the Byzantines, but he demonstrates strategic prudence by delaying until the Rhodians provided added strength and a pretext to commence hostilities against the object of his anger. Moreover, Prusias ensures a good reputation for coming to his allies’ aid. Prusias maximized his probability of success by waiting and gaining allies. This strategic delay paid off, for Prusias and the Rhodians quickly defeated Byzantium.186 By contrast, in the escalation to the Mercenary War, the mercenaries, Libyans, Spendius, and Mathos never allege strategic advantage as a reason to go to war. Polybius, in fact, acknowledges the strategic potential the mercenaries possess. They are close to Carthage, which is stripped of its manpower from the war. They consist entirely of experienced fighting men, and they even have Carthaginian resources – the pay from Gesgo and the confiscated funds – at their disposal. However, Polybius presents these considerations through the Carthaginians’ perspective; the mercenaries and their leaders do not notice, let alone cite, these strategic advantages.187 Strategic advantage and prudential considerations could have contributed to the reason for the mercenaries’ decision to go to war in Polybius’ narrative, but they do not. Only anger motivates the mercenaries. Both Teuta and Dorimachus exemplify how characters act on emotion rather than strategy. Both the Romans and the Messenians diplomatically request Teuta and Dorimachus to take responsibility for the destruction of property and life, but Teuta and Dorimachus each grow angry and highlight their power, provoking anger in Coruncanius and Scyron respectively. After these men’s angry and

174  Emotions at War outspoken responses, Teuta and Dorimachus angrily interpret Coruncanius’ and Scyron’s freedom of speech as a personal provocation and decide to act because of their own anger. Teuta ignores international custom by assassinating Coruncanius, with no strategic gain feasible from this action, and Dorimachus sets in motion plans for war, motivated by one incident alone, Polybius says. In both cases, Teuta’s and Dorimachus’ anger mark the breakdown of diplomacy and lead to war.188 The Romans declare war on Teuta, spurred by their righteous anger. Dorimachus uses his personal anger as a pretext for his state, the Aetolian League, to make war on the Messenians and the Peloponnese. In Teuta’s case, the Romans in their justified anger began war while in the Greek scenario Dorimachus and the Aetolians begin war with unjustified anger. The Romans’ anger drives them immediately to make strategic preparations. The Messenians differ starkly from the Romans in their actions, and Polybius later sharply criticizes their utter inactivity, characterizing them as “ignorant and failing at what needed to be done, according to my judgment at least.”189 When the war is already in full swing, the Messenians continue to hold back from joining the alliance of the Achaeans and Macedonians against the Aetolians.190 By contrast, the Romans immediately set forth in their preparations for war, and Polybius emphasizes their celerity (εὐθέως), which stems directly from their anger. The Messenians’ inactivity, on the other hand, reflects poorly on their character and calls into question the appropriateness or intensity of Scyron’s anger at Dorimachus.191 Polybius criticizes this Messenian failure to act on sufficient anger. In both cases, negotiations broke down when anger provoked more anger, resulting in a complete dissolution of diplomacy and leading to war. Thus, anger indeed is a powerful cause of war, whether unjustified or justified. However, in both passages, Polybius and his characters focus on anger, not strategic prudence even when anger led to strategic action. With these cases in mind, let us return to the Second Punic War. The treaties between Rome and Carthage, which receive much scholarly attention, emphasize prudent expediency and tend to exclude considerations of morality and emotion.192 This tendency to focus on legal and pragmatic expediency has significant ramifications for a discussion of responsibility for the Punic Wars. Polybius discusses the First Punic War’s causes, its justification, and relevant treaties as a comparison to the identification of the cause and responsibility of the Second Punic War. Nicolas Wiater has recently demonstrated that Polybius structured his discussion of the treaties to replicate diplomatic arbitration as shown on contemporary inscriptions.193 Wiater argued that Polybius presented the polyphony of Carthaginian and Roman views then laid out his views as a rational and authoritative arbiter. As Wiater notes, Polybius emphasizes the need to investigate and understand treaties and their terms but also demonstrates that treaties and their legalistic reckoning of guilt and responsibility do not necessarily correspond with or represent morality and moral responsibility for the war.194 A legalistic framework, in fact, does not provide the only or the best means for understanding morality.

Emotions at War 175 Concerning the First Punic War, Polybius states: [I]f one considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, that they took the Mamertines generally into their friendship and after this aided them in their moment of need, people who had betrayed not only the Messenians’ city but also that of the Rhegians, he would reasonably grow indignant (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν); but if someone considers that the Romans made the crossing against their own oaths and treaty, clearly he is ignorant.195 Polybius not only corrects unnamed others about the lack of a treaty forbidding the Romans access to Sicily but also emphasizes moral considerations, which arouse a moral emotion, indignation.196 The Romans allied with treaty-breakers and wrongdoers (παρεσπόνδησαν) when accepting the Mamertines into their friendship. Indignation is the correct response to this (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν). Polybius expresses moral condemnation of the Romans’ decision solely through the emotion of indignation in an indefinite observer (τις).197 This judgment on the Romans extends implicitly to the beginning of the First Punic War.198 Polybius takes great effort to argue against the existence of a treaty mentioned by Philinus, and he meticulously details how the Romans (or Carthaginians) did not breach a treaty.199 He is clearly concerned with discerning responsibility. Despite the Romans’ correctness according to the treaties, Polybius’ statement that one should grow indignant at their alliance with the Mamertines demonstrates that moral behavior extends beyond the constraints of treaties. Put another way, treaties and other legal rules do not guarantee moral or just behavior.200 The Romans, therefore, could be considered at fault morally, though not legally. This example differs significantly from the anger cited as a reason for the Second Punic War. The indignation at the Romans’ alliance with the Mamertines is not a stated cause (αἰτία) of the First Punic War. Instead, it is a value judgment of the reader on who had right or wrong on their side at the beginning of the war.201 It exemplifies what Hannibal failed to inspire through his “falsified” pretexts: he failed to stir up indignation or a similar moral response against the Romans in the audience of everyone else viewing the war. In Polybius’ assessment, the true reasons would have succeeded. Legal arguments, it seems, do not need to take a broad perspective or give moral considerations their full due. They necessarily involve immediate and local events such as the crossing of a boundary at a particular place and time. Detailed calculations of boundaries and allies do matter to Polybius, as seen in his meticulous discussion of all the past Romano-Carthaginian treaties he could find and attention to boundaries and allies throughout the Histories. However, like bad pretexts, purely legalistic considerations ignore the underlying causes and reasons behind a state’s crossings or alliances. By the time a state crosses a boundary, the decision has already been made. For Polybius, psychological and rational underpinnings matter more than the immediate action, and this leads to the failure of legalistic reckoning to account fully for the responsibility of war.

176  Emotions at War Theoretically, the treaties and legalistic rules were meant to uphold moral standards and expectations; that is, breaking the treaty should mean breaching a moral standard and therefore being morally responsible.202 Polybius’ discussion of the Roman-Carthaginian treaties and conclusion show that this does not always hold true. States can respect treaties and claim that they come to defend their allies, as the Romans did in crossing to Sicily, but they can also be at fault morally, seen by Polybius’ disapproval of the Romans’ alliance with the Mamertines. Likewise, with the Second Punic War, one can still commit injustice while upholding treaties, such as the Romans’ actions in Sardinia, and one could then break a treaty for a justified cause.203 Those, such as the Romans, who in retrospect mark the fall of Saguntum as the cause of the war rely on legalistic arguments: Hannibal broke treaties, therefore he was wrong.204 Like most pretexts, legalistic rationale falls short of representing what is most significant to Polybius – morality and true causes. Morality, and the emotion which conveys this, sometimes is juxtaposed with practical, strategic, and legalistic rationales, as in the cases of the treaties and beginnings of the First and Second Punic Wars. In Polybius’ view, the moral course of action often comes away as more honorable and preferable as causes than either pure expediency or legal reasoning. Emotion works in combination with strategic prudence, as we saw with Hamilcar and Prusias I when they delayed beginning or joining war until they and their successors built up more military strength. Emotion also contrasts with strategic rationale when agents prioritize anger as the reason to make war and allege little or no strategic considerations, such as the mercenaries, Romans, or Aetolians. Moreover, emotional and moral logic may take precedence over legalistic thinking in determining responsibility. In all of these aspects, however, emotion serves as a link between past events and the present conflict and exemplifies the benefit of universal history, as the next section shows. Emotion as a Causal Link

At the end of his long discussion and narration of the causes and beginning of the Second Punic War, Polybius distinguishes how his subgenre of history, universal history (καθόλου), best illustrates causes, especially in comparison to monographic history (κατὰ μέρος), that is, histories which deal with one subject or event.205 Polybius does not claim that all monographic histories neglect treating causes; any such work that he might have argued against does not survive, at any rate.206 Rather, Polybius compares universal histories to monographic histories to show why his choice of universal history is better. In particular, he argues against those who already had criticized him for his lengthy work and preferred the seemingly shorter, monographic works which covered the same events.207 Others’ monographs, he states, are even longer but cover a narrower scope, and they both focus only on the events – without comparisons between contemporary affairs – and relate the same content in different manners.208 Most importantly, they do not adequately emphasize as much as universal history the most crucial parts of history itself – what accompanies war, what follows war, and especially what concerns its

Emotions at War 177 causation (ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστωρίας εἶναι τά τ’ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὸ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας).209 Polybius then provides an example of the importance and longevity of causation. The Romans’ war with Antiochus III took its origins from their Second Macedonian War with Philip V, and that from their Hannibalic War, and that took its origins from the First Punic War.210 Only a general, or universal, history can provide such knowledge and understanding for the reader, unlike a history of only the Second Punic War or the Second Macedonian War.211 Polybius drives his point home with two analogies. He relates that claiming that one can understand history without causes is like claiming one understands a whole war’s management and status from descriptions of individual battles.212 Similarly, he continues, the difference between what one understands from universal history versus what one understands from a monographic history differs as much as active learning differs from hearing. For Polybius, universal history best provides this most crucial part of history, causation, and universal history best provides the lessons and benefits of history, since universal history privileges causation, comparison, and what accompanies the events themselves. Polybius sees causation as the link between various world events, a link which explains the origins of each separate event.213 Although this argument about the superiority of universal history seems forced, especially in comparison to Thucydides’ and other ancient historians’ critical attention to causation despite their limited scope, it is significant in showing Polybius’ self-conscious effort to privilege long-term causation.214 Emotions come into play in this scheme as causal links between distant events. For the Second Punic War, anger and passion reach back to the First Punic War and its aftermath with Sardinia. These emotions explain how the Hannibalic War drew its origins from the First Punic War over Sicily. Likewise, the Aetolians’ anger at the Romans provides the origins for the war between Antiochus III and the Romans.215 Polybius prioritizes emotions and psychological factors as causal links. Emotions thus often contribute as causes which distinguish and elevate Polybius’ genre of universal history from monographs. Let us take a closer look at how emotion persists between distinct events separated by many years. The first cause of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar’s passion and drive for retaliation, draws causation back to 241 from 220 bce, over 20 years, linking the Second Punic War back to the First Punic War. Walbank criticizes the length of this gap, backing up his criticism with Hamilcar’s lack of hostile action against Rome. He concludes, “in short, the ‘wrath of Hamilcar’ was a later invention, designed to establish a long-cherished Barcine plan of revenge.”216 Whether or not Polybius invented “Barcid wrath,” it is significant that emotion provides the link between two wars separated by 20 years and different actors.217 Polybius identifies passion (θυμός) as a true cause of the Second Punic War, and this identification attests that causation for Polybius traced back much further than Walbank and many other scholars believe plausible.218 Polybius thought emotion carried over and provided the first initiative for the Second Punic War to come about. Polybius’ theory of universal history, moreover, requires and privileges such long-term accounts of causation. Other reasons, such as the immediate events and context,

178  Emotions at War pale in Polybius’ causation in comparison to the emotion, Hamilcar’s passion (θυμός), which continued from the end of the First Punic War. However, Hamilcar’s passion raises an issue with the nature of emotions. By the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar had been dead for nine years, which scholars have noted and criticized.219 How does emotion transfer from one person to others in such a way as to continue after his death and start a war in the process? Surely Hamilcar’s passion died with him.220 We have one clear example which details how Polybius envisioned the transference of emotion went from one person to another.221 Hamilcar transferred his hatred of Rome to Hannibal in the famous oath scene, in which Hannibal recalls later for Antiochus III that he swore to hate the Romans forever at a sacrifice with his father, Hamilcar.222 This scene of emotional transference holds special significance in the text as a powerful and enduring moment which profoundly shaped Hannibal’s character. Hamilcar inculcates hatred in Hannibal by exploiting his senses: Hannibal was experiencing something new, exciting, and special as a religious rite. Hamilcar takes advantage of Hannibal’s susceptibility as a young child. Hannibal continued to live in a community which hated Rome, and he clearly subscribed rationally to this emotion, for he brought up this experience as indicative of his own feelings even at a much later date.223 Another way in which Hamilcar transferred his feelings of animosity toward the Romans to the Carthaginians is through shared emotions. The Carthaginians may not have received Hamilcar’s actual (personal) passion (θυμός), but they clearly shared his sentiments, for they were all angered (ὀργή) by the loss of Sardinia.224 Hamilcar’s strong feelings over the end of the First Punic War, combined with the similar sentiments that the Carthaginians held over the loss of Sardinia and perpetuated and fostered through their culture, would have persuaded the Carthaginians to work toward a future war. Despite these methods of inculcating or sharing actual emotions, Hamilcar did not necessarily need to pass on his passion or emotion as such. For his passion to count as a cause of the Second Punic War, it need merely have been his original impetus to persuade others to decide upon and work toward war, much as the Aetolians’ anger motivated them to persuade Antiochus III to invade Greece and wage war, even though they did not transfer or share their emotion of anger with him. Hamilcar, motivated by his own passion, persuaded the Carthaginians to support his projects of going to Spain and increasing Carthaginian power there in order best to wage war against Rome in the future. Along with Hamilcar’s passion, the anger (ὀργή) of the citizens causally links the earlier seizure of Sardinia and the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Without the emotion and its psychological framework, Polybius’ assertion that the Mercenary War contributed directly to the Second Punic War – through the loss of Sardinia – lacks force.225 Instead, here Polybius provides a key insight into his envisioned importance for history, that emotion carries over from one war to the next. Hamilcar’s passion carries over from the First Punic War, and the Carthaginians’ anger from the seizure of Sardinia motivates them to take steps leading to the Second Punic War. Without the emotions at the center of the causes, Polybius’ claims of true causation and their importance falter.

Emotions at War 179 The perspective Polybius adopts of relating the Carthaginians’ causes affects his long-term attribution of causation as well. While he relates the Carthaginians’ reasons, no Carthaginian character alleges or attests to these causes: Hannibal cites immediate pretexts from the situation in Spain to the Romans at New Carthage, and the Carthaginian Senate argues about the inapplicability of treaties’ terms. What the actual agents may have thought or adduced as their reasons for war matters far less to Polybius than what the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course of events discerns as the causes. Moreover, Polybius’ sequence of causation differs from what modern (and other ancient) historians trace as the sequence of events.226 Polybius tries to stretch the causation of the Second Punic War back much further than a pragmatic, modern historian would – despite the similar emotional connection between the First and Second World Wars in modern history.227 Hannibal, as noted earlier, alleged immediate events and reasons as his pretexts, instead of the causes Polybius identified. However, for Polybius’ chain of causation from the First Punic War and Mercenary War are to hold true, Hannibal must have intended war against Rome, not Saguntum. In arguing for the greater value of universal history over monographs, Polybius stresses that world events and different wars affected other wars.228 The Second Punic War provides Polybius’ prime example of how he thought universal history was superior to monographs: its causes lay in previous wars included within the same text. Without the knowledge of these one could not understand the Second Punic War itself.229 Therefore, it is essential for Polybius’ universal history and theory of interconnected causation that Hannibal intend to wage a Roman war as his ultimate goal.230 It is important, therefore, for Polybius’ project in universal history that the real causes be interconnected and acknowledged. Polybius saw Hannibal as commencing the Second Punic War, and he thought Hannibal at that moment would have presented a better case for the justice of the Carthaginian cause by stating the true reasons for war with the Romans. For Polybius, true causes hold greater weight than immediate circumstances.231 He criticizes Hannibal so heavily for his pretexts not because they were bad in and of themselves, but because the true causes were just and right, and therefore they would better convince his audience of the justness of his cause as a pretext should.232 Hannibal’s audience did not consist merely of the Roman embassy or the Romans in general; it was highly unlikely that the Romans would have conceded that they unjustly seized Sardinia. In discussing the Romans’ search for pretexts to begin the Third Punic War, Polybius stresses the importance of pretexts for an external audience (πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός and περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαληψέως).233 Hannibal’s audience included the rest of the world, that is, anyone who cared about this war and its outcome, including later generations. Pretexts are important for presenting oneself as just, which is the substance behind Polybius’ criticism: Hannibal should have portrayed himself better and should have justified war against Rome instead of Saguntum. The emotion of anger, feeling of confidence, and passion all contributed to the causes for the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s pretexts did not feature any emotions but a claim of injured allies and involved only recent and local events, compared to Polybius’ list of three causes.234 Emotions help to connect past events to the current circumstances and allow Polybius to emphasize the interwoven nature of history.

180  Emotions at War That is, events seemingly remote in place or time still have an effect on later events, and the causation for the Second Punic War provides the cornerstone example of this. These emotional causes exemplify Polybius’ own precepts and aims for how his history is the best: causes are linked to past events through emotion.235 Conclusion Against scholarly opinion that “war undertaken without rational calculation, but emerging from sheer, unrestrained emotion” was the only way emotions led to war, Polybius saw anger as justifiable as a motive for war.236 If justified, anger provided a suitable and moral reason to initiate hostilities, particularly when combined with strategic prudence. As such, anger could be cited as a pretext – as Hannibal could and should have done – and thus fulfill the important role of a pretext as outward justification for one’s actions. Anger is most important in its role as a link back to past affairs, connecting separate events into a cohesive and intertwined history. Emotion and its place in causation thus play a significant role in Polybius’ project and theory of history. Notes 1 See Saxonhouse 2016. 2 On emotions in politics and international relations, see Crawford 2000; Goodwin and Polletta 2001; Flam and King 2005; Mercer 2005; Ross 2006; Sasley 2011; Ahäil and Gregory 2015. See Crawford 2000, 120–129, for a detailed discussion of Realist scholars who have made statements about emotions without drawing attention to the emotion itself. 3 See the persuasive analysis of Eckstein 2006 of Hellenistic interstate politics and the imposition of Roman hegemony. Polybius forms a key historical source for Eckstein’s persuasive and influential analysis, yet Polybius’ own moralizing often must be worked around in Eckstein’s Realist analysis. 4 See on ancient historians’ moralizing, Hau 2016. See Crawford 2000; Lazar 2016; Hutchison and Bleiker 2020. 5 See Chapter 2, 70–74, for the emotions which feature mostly during warfare, such as fear or shock. This chapter’s survey includes only those emotions which, as we have seen in the last chapter, have unique and varied roles in crucial moments of the Histories. 6 See Polyb., 1.31.7, 5.7.5, 5.57.6, 18.9.1. 7 Polyb., 4.7.3, 4.79.5. 8 Polyb., 20.6.7–9. 9 Polyb., 1.31.7. 10 Polyb., 1.31.7–8. 11 Polyb., 1.32–35. 12 Polyb., 3.86.11. 13 Polyb., 5.73.4. 14 Polyb., 6.43.4. 15 Polyb., 1.88.2. See for similar examples, 30.8.3; 15.1.13 and 15.17.6 (both in Roman speeches to Carthage near the end of the Second Punic War). Cf. the lack of pity for Agathocles, Polyb., 15.25.11, 15.26.8. 16 Polyb., 20.9.11. Cf. 21.31.3: Philip V works to ensure that the Romans withhold pity and prolong their anger against the Aetolians.

Emotions at War 181 17 Pity features at the end of the Achaean War between Rome and the Achaean League in 146 bce, as a response to Roman anger and a sign of ignoble behavior. Polybius repeatedly characterizes the Greeks as pitiable, from the view of the narrator and from the Achaeans’ own perspective. Narrator: 38.1.3 and 7, 38.16.4 and 7, 38.17.7; Achaeans: 38.15.9. Polybius deems the need for the end of war based on how much they “should have” suffered, not by their actual behavior but by how he wished they had behaved. See Chapter 5, 206–208, for discussion of the Achaean War. 18 From Book 20 on, Romans are the subjects of anger 19 of 27 occurrences in the extant text: 20.10.7, 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 21.31.3 (twice), 21.31.7, 21.31.8, 21.34.8, 22.5.6, 22.10.13, 30.4.2, 30.23.2, 30.31.12, 30.31.13, 30.31.17 (twice), 33.7.3, 38.4.7, 38.18.10. The exceptions are 20.6.10 (Boeotians), 22.11.8 (Achaeans), 22.13.2 (Philip V), 23.11.2 (brothers), 23.15 (twice; people and cutters of trees), 28.20.5 (Antiochus IV), 30.29.1 (Achaeans). 19 Erskine 2015. 20 See (θεωρεῖν): Polyb., 30.4.2, 30.23.2; struck by (καταπλήττειν): 21.34.8; appease (παραιτεῖν): 21.25.11, 21.29.9, 31.31.7–8, 22.5.6, 38.4.7; perpetuate (καινοποιεῖν): 21.31.3. See Erskine 2015, 113–116, for discussion of appeasing anger. Only once does a Roman manifest his own anger, and only once does the narrator note the quenching of Roman anger: Polyb., 15.4.4 (Scipio Africanus), and 38.18.10. See too Erskine 2015, 123. 21 Orend 2013, 62–63; Walzer 2015, xxi–xxii, 127–133. 22 Erskine 2015, 109–113. With Aetolians: Polyb., 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 21.31; With Rhodians: 30.4.2, 30.23.2, 30.31. 23 Erskine 2015, 113–115. Greeks et al. trying to assuage Roman anger: Polyb., 21.25.11, 21.29.29, 22.5.6, 20.31 (speech designed to assuage Roman anger), 38.4.7. 24 Polyb., 38.4.7, discussed by Erskine 2015, 110. 25 See, for examples, Polyb., 1.67–70, 1.82.9, 2.1.8, 3.3.3, 3.7.1, 3.9–13, 3.40.8, 3.78.5, 4.49. 26 See, for example, Longley 2012. See Grethlein 2013, 224–267, for a juxtaposition of Polybius’ historical style with Thucydides’. Eight wars – in addition to those mentioned previously – begin after Book Five, and most of their causes are not discussed or extant. The Third Macedonian War is a notable exception, 22.18. 27 Walbank 1972, 34–40; Harris 2001, 20; Baronowski 2011. 28 Eckstein 2006, 50–52, observes at least 16 instances of fear motivating characters’ decisions in Thucydides’ history. See too Kauppi 1991. 29 Thuc., 1.23.6. 30 Fear motivates characters to take action often, but Polybius rarely cites it as the motivating factor, let alone official cause (aitia), of war: 1.10.6 (Roman fear of Carthaginians), 2.13.3 (Roman fear of Gauls), 5.41.1 (Molon fears Hermeias’ cruelty), 38.10.10 (Achaeans falsely think Romans fear war in Greece). 31 Eckstein 1995, 118–160. 32 Champion 2004a, 102. Champion discusses ὀργή in the context of ochlocracy and the dissolution of the mixed constitution, 89, 121, 185. 33 Champion 2004a, 103. Champion shows that the Carthaginians were further along on the path of decline than the Romans in the early books of the Histories, not that they had degenerated to a state of complete barbarity. He notes that the Second Punic War was “not a simple matter of logismos against thumos,” 117. However, emotion or passion served for Champion as a prime factor in Carthage’s irrationality in beginning the Second Punic War; see esp. 117–121. 34 Harris 2001, 198–199. 35 Harris 2001, 75. See 270, note 19, for an unexamined citation of Polybius on anger as an example of “the classic stereotype” of angry women as derisive and contemptible, which does not fit the context (15.30.1; see Chapter 3, 127).

182  Emotions at War 36 37 38 39 40

Harris 2001, 198–199, 240. Eckstein 1989. Eckstein 1989, 2. Eckstein 1995, 57. Erskine 2015. See too Erskine 2013 on the categorization of Carthaginians as barbarians in ancient Greek thought. 41 Polyb., 3.6–32. See Walbank 1972, 97–129, 1975, 1994 on Polybius’ starting point and organization. Polybius is the fullest and closest contemporary major source for the outbreak of the Second Punic War, supplemented by Livy 21.1–20, App. Hisp. 5–13, Hann. 1–3, Pun. 6, Cass. Dio fr. 55, Zonaras 8.21–22. See Rich 1996, 3–14 for a discussion of lost sources and their influence on extant authors as well as a discussion of the merits of these sources. For a start to scholarship on the outbreak of the Second Punic War, see Walbank, HCP 1.292–361, 1983; Astin 1967; Errington 1970, 26–32; Hoffman 1972; Sumner 1972, 469–480; Welwei 1977; Schwarte 1983; Eckstein 1989, 1995, 101–105, 144, 175, 2010, 2012; Rich 1996; Champion 2004a, 118–121; McGing 2010, 77–78; Baronowski 2011, 68–75; Beck 2011; Wiater 2018. See Rich 1996, note 1; Beck 2011 for fuller bibliography. 42 Polyb., 3.1–5. 43 Potter 2016. 44 Polyb., 3.6.1. 45 Polyb., 3.6.6. See on Polybius’ theory of causation, Walbank HCP 1.306–309, 1972, 157–164, 1994; Pédech 1964, 80–88, 99–203; Derow 1979, 1994; Eckstein 1989, 2–6, 1995, 57–59, 2012, 208–209; McGing 2010, 76–80; Beck 2011, 225. 46 Polyb., 3.6.7. Walbank, HCP 1.159–160, notes and criticizes the vagueness of Polybius’ definition. Note that causes include both psychological states alongside rational calculations. See Walbank, HCP 1.157–159, for how Polybius’ definitions of causation differ from Thucydides. 47 Polybius does not consistently label causes, pretexts, or beginnings. He provides this section of definitions to teach his readers how to identify causes from beginnings. It would be redundant to have to identify all causes, pretexts, and beginnings fastidiously throughout the text; his readers have the information necessary to make such identifications themselves. Scholars have disagreed on this completeness of instruction for identification. See Walbank HCP, 1.305–309; Pédech 1964, 75–98; Walbank 1972, 157–164; McGing 2010, 76–80. 48 The narratives of the historians who lived during this war, namely the pro-­Carthaginian Philinus and the Roman senator Fabius Pictor, do not survive. Other contemporary sources, for example, Sosylus, have also been lost. See Cornell 2013, 1.160–178, 2.32– 105; Frier 1999, esp. 227–254, on Fabius Pictor. On Polybius’ use as a cover text for fragmentary historians, see Baron 2013; Schepens and Bollansée 2005. On Polybius’ reliability, see, for example, Hoyos 1998, 162–163. 49 Polyb., 3.8.9–12. See Chapter 2, 65–66. 50 Polyb., 3.9.1–5. 51 Polyb., 3.13–14. 52 Polyb., 3.15.1–5. 53 Polyb., 3.15.6–12. 54 Polyb., 3.15.8, 3.15.12–13. 55 Polyb., 3.17. Polybius also narrates the Romans’ involvement with Demetrius of Pharos in the Second Illyrian War to shed light on his interpretation of the Romans’ perspective at the time, that they did not foresee or intend war against the Carthaginians beyond Spain and Africa, let alone in Italy. Narration of the Second Illyrian War: 3.16, 3.18–19. See on Saguntum, Walbank, HCP 1.170–172; Badian 1958, 47–52; Astin 1967; Welwei 1977; Harris 1979, 201–202; Eckstein 1984; Hoyos 1998, 154–173; Wiater 2018, 133. 56 Polyb., 3.20.

Emotions at War  183 57 Polyb., 3.21.1–8. 58 Polyb., 3.21.9–3.27. 59 See Eckstein 1980; Hoyos 2011; Rood 2012; Bellomo 2013 for recent scholarship on the First Punic War’s causes. 60 Polyb., 3.26.4–7. 61 Polyb., 3.28.1. 62 Polyb., 3.29. 63 Polyb., 3.30. 64 Polyb., 3.31. 65 Polyb., 3.32. See Walbank 1972, 66–96; Sacks 1981, 96–121; Dreyer 2011, esp. 91–92; Kloft 2013, 13–24, on universal history. 66 See Orend 2013, 9–32. 67 Polyb., 3.9.6–7. The reading of “ὀργῆς” is not entirely secure. The oldest manuscript, Vaticanus gr. 124, reads “ὀρ*ῆς” while the other main manuscripts have “ὀργῆς”. However, modern editions print “ὁρμῆς”, except for the Budé critical edition. Here I follow the manuscripts and the most recent critical edition. Because of this ambiguity, I do not rest my argument for anger as a cause of war on this text. 68 Champion 2004a; Erskine 2015, 107. See too Chapter 1, 25–27. 69 See Koziak 2000, 37–62, especially 53–55, for an overview of Homeric θυμός. 70 Eckstein 1989, 2–7, criticizes Hamilcar only in his θυμός here. Pédech 1964, 212, however, presents a positive picture of Hamilcar. 71 Polyb., 3.9.7. 72 Polyb., 1.62.5. Hamilcar exemplifies Polybius’ precepts for good generals, seen in Hannibal’s speech to Scipio at the battle of Zama about the vicissitudes of fortune (15.5–8), and his speech to the Carthaginian senate to accept the Roman terms as a blessing considering their position at the end of the Second Punic War, 15.19. See Polyb., 9.12–20 on good generalship. See too Eckstein 1995, 28–40. 73 Polyb., 1.62.3. 74 Eckstein 1995, especially 21, 34–35, 43–44, 55, 91, 174–179, 192–193, and 274–275 on Polybius’ positive portrayal and admiration of Hamilcar. Hamilcar’s θυμός here aligns with his rationality, prudence, civility, and aristocratic nobility. 75 See Polyb., 2.19.10, 2.30.4, 4.7.8. It may have positive value in 2.24.7 and 15.4.11. 76 Polyb., 3.10.1, 3–4. 77 Polyb., 1.88.8–12, 3.13.1–2, 3.15.10–11, 3.27.7–8, 3.28.1–4, and 3.30.4. Polybius’ narrative of the Mercenary War describes how the Carthaginians lost Sardinia to the mutinous mercenaries in detail at 1.79. He describes Sardinia as lost to the mercenaries (not to the Romans) already at 1.82.7 (τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σαρδόνα, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἐτύγχανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα), and even refers to the Romans’ refusal to accept Sardinia from the mercenaries at 1.83.11 (τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν). Only at the end of the Mercenary War, 1.88, do the Romans undertake to subjugate Sardinia and accept the mercenaries’ invitation. The Carthaginians protest that Sardinia still belongs to them, and the Romans use this and the Carthaginians’ preparations for war against the mutineers in Sardinia as a pretext to declare war on Carthage. 78 Polyb., 3.28.1. 79 Polyb., 3.10.5. This use of θυμός in the plural with a single subject is unique. It appears in the plural at 1.81.8 (mercenaries), 2.33.2 (Gauls), 3.10.5, 15.33.10 (Egyptians), 22.16.3 (men in general). This use of plural θυμοί with a singular subject may merely mean his “passions”. Otherwise it may align with the Platonic version of θυμός, as a part of the soul in which an individual feels emotion. On difficulties of distinguishing θυμός, see Lynch and Miles 1980; Koziak 2000; Champion 2004a, declines to define θυμός. Erskine 2015, 107, briefly distinguishes θυμός from ὀργή.

184  Emotions at War 80 See Mercer 2005, on rationality and emotion in decision-making in international relations. 81 Eckstein 1995, 101–102, stresses Polybius’ repeated disapproval of Roman injustice here. In the anacyclosis, Polybius emphasized the congruence of reason with rule in accordance with the community’s good in mind. Here, the Romans take advantage of their power and the Carthaginians’ weakness for their own benefit, and thus they fall closer toward the role of the bad rulers of the anacyclosis. 82 Polyb., 3.10.6. 83 Walbank 1972, 163; McGing 2010, 77. 84 Polyb., 3.9.6–10.6. Hamilcar hates the Romans (3.9.6–9), Hannibal adduces immediate pretexts concerning Saguntum (3.15), and the Carthaginian Senate discusses minute details of a treaty (3.21). Thus, Polybius’ true causes, even though conveying a Carthaginian and not Roman perspective, lie at a remove from the historical events. 85 Polyb., 3.29.1 stresses the difference between what the Romans said after Saguntum, which he presents as straightforward narrative in 3.20–21, and what the Romans of his time gave to make his counterargument. 86 What the actual agents may have adduced as their reasons for war matter less to Polybius, who discerns the causes as the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course of events. 87 See Orend 2013, 90–103. 88 Polybius nowhere doubts that the Carthaginians began the war in their attack on Saguntum, nor does he cast aspersions for this initial hostile action. 89 On historical retrospect here, see Hoyos 1998, 198–211. 90 These legalistic arguments circulated in the second century bce to justify the Roman’s behavior, especially in light of the Romans’ concern over Carthage before the Third Punic War; see Rich 1996. Polybius explicitly notes that he cites contemporary Roman views, not sentiments expressed by past Romans, 3.29.1. 91 Polyb., 3.30.3–4. 92 Polyb., 3.10.3. 93 Champion 2004a, 119, calls Polybius’ discussion of causes “inconclusive” on the responsibility for the war. Champion states that although this passage admits that the Roman seizure of Sardinia was an unjust and provocative act, it also shows that in any case Carthage actually initiated the war. In this regard this war is in accord with the pattern of the First Romano-Carthaginian, Illyrian, and Gallic wars: Rome is on the defensive. Champion does not say explicitly that therefore the Carthaginians are morally responsible and the Romans have right on their side, but his analysis leads toward that conclusion. Champion’s statement sets out the Carthaginians as the aggressors and therefore at fault by modern standards, see Walzer 2015, 3–33, 51–73. (There are some major exceptions to this statement in modern times; see Walzer 2015, 51–126 for discussion of these cases.) Polybius, though he shares many views with modern just war theory, does not share the modern condemnation of aggressors and the support of those waging defensive wars. Baronowski 2011, 68–73, however, goes too far in dismissing aggression and the justice of one’s cause in the outbreak of the Second Punic War. He sees Polybius track the causes of this war back to Roman aggression and injustice in seizing Sardinia, but he concludes that Polybius’ admiration of imperialistic expansion outweighs these considerations. I disagree and argue that Polybius’ text shows great concern for the justice and the moral responsibility for wars. 94 Polyb., 1.66–70. See Gibson 2013, 159–179, on the Mercenary War as a negative paradigm. See too Hoyos 2007. 95 Polyb., 1.66.2–4. Polybius approves of this plan, 1.68.2. 96 Polyb., 1.66.6–12. This was the wrong move, Polybius notes: they should have kept their possessions and families in Carthage as a guarantee for good behavior.

Emotions at War 185 97 Polyb., 1.68.5–6. Here appeasing the mercenaries’ anger is also a strategic move by countering any future actions based on this hostility. 98 Polyb., 1.69.4–5. 99 Polyb., 1.69.6. 100 Note the lack of Carthaginian anger in the narrative. This is a case of disjuncture between emotions in speech and narrative: Spendius and Mathos attribute anger to those whom they think are likely to be angry, though Polybius has not mentioned Carthaginian anger. 101 Polyb., 1.70.3. 102 Polyb., 1.70.4–5. 103 Polyb., 1.70.6. 104 This is a plausible threat, for the Carthaginians did aim to insult them in removing them from Carthage, 1.66.9. 105 For examples of perceived slights motivating anger and war, see Polyb., 2.8, 3.7, 4.49, 5.58.11 (Ptolemy III against Seleucids) and 20.6.10–11 (Boeotians against Megara). 106 Unlike the people in internal state communities examined in Chapter  3, the mercenaries’ emotions are driven only by self-interest. Agathocles temporarily succeeded through paying the troops in Egypt, and likewise he failed to appeal to them in his tearful request to care about his safety and the boy king’s against the threat of Tlepolemus; Polyb., 15.25.13(20) and 15.26. Plato likewise represented mercenaries as concerned only about pay. In his linear narrative of constitutional change in the Republic, Plato writes that the tyrant establishes himself among citizens by enrolling foreign mercenaries dependent solely upon him, and when these bodyguard mercenaries eventually begin to assimilate into the citizens’ community, the tyrant must do away with these and enroll new foreign mercenaries; Pl., Rep. 567d. See Trundle 2013 on mercenaries in the late Classical and Hellenistic age. 107 In the mercenaries’ case, words alone spark their anger, and they react with violence immediately. Recall from Chapter 3 the long periods of time between the first insults and harm from tyrants, oligarchs or from Agathocles, Agathocleia, and Oenanthe and the eventual outbreak of violence under some leadership. 108 The mercenaries’ anger does not meet Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger: Erskine 2015, 108, 122. The mercenaries’ anger can be justified, however, from their perspective in that they saw the Carthaginians as aiming to withhold their pay – which was at least partially true, 1.66.2–4. Anger based on this kind of injustice, taking advantage of the mercenaries by using their “labor” but not paying them for it, clearly could be justifiable. Polybius, however, nowhere portrays the mercenaries’ anger this way. He frames the Mercenary War as a didactic warning to those who hire mercenaries and dismissively portrays the mercenaries’ claims and reckoning of their wages as inaccurate. 109 Polyb., 1.69.10–14. I use “community” in the sense which Helm 2014 describes – as a unified group which cares about its members. The mercenaries do not represent a community which cares for its members. The mercenaries who received their pay first and departed before the Libyans confronted Gesgo did not care about the others, and those who stayed did not care about the other members whom they stoned to death for attempting to speak. See 1.69.3. 110 Critolaus and the other demagogic leaders of the Achaean League during its war with Rome also inculcate emotions in the people, 38.11.9. See Champion 2004b on Polybius’ portrayal of demagogues. 111 In an anarchic world, insults required retaliation so that one would not be perceived as weak. See Eckstein 2006 on the anarchic atmosphere prevalent in the ancient world and particularly in the Hellenistic period. Polybius, however, emphasizes morality over Realist expediency. Pure expediency, such as retaliating only because of a perceived insult and because of money, pales in comparison to reasons based on Polybius’ aristocratic values. See Eckstein 1995, 28–55 on Polybius’ moral values.

186  Emotions at War 112 Unlike the mercenaries, Gesgo had some reason for his slight. His strategy, however, completely backfired, and Gesgo later paid the price for this, being mutilated and thrown into a ditch to die, Polyb., 1.80.11–13. Polybius describes Gesgo’s death as undeserved, 1.80.5–10. 113 Similar to the mercenaries, Polybius conveys how the Achaeans began the Achaean War against Rome in 146 bce without justifiable cause. Although Polybius’ account of the causes and pretexts does not survive, Polybius clearly presents the Achaeans as neither having moral grounds for beginning war nor using strategic prudence. He consistently characterizes the Greeks in this war with folly, madness, and lack of judgment: ἀγνοία: 38.3.13, 38.10.12, 38.11.16, 38.18.8; ἀνοῖα: 38.18.7, 38.18.8; ἀβουλία: 38.3.8; ἀπιστία: 38.3.10; ἀνανδρία: 38.3.10; ἀκρισία: 38.18.7; μανία: 38.18.8. Cf. Champion 2004a, 241–244 on the language of barbarology. Their behavior and Polybius’ criticism in such stark terms belie his view that this war was unnecessary, foolish, and unjustified. Moreover, the Achaean War contains some anger. At 38.11.9, Critolaus the Achaean demagogue works anger and hatred into the mob, much as Spendius inculcates a quickness to anger in the Libyans. See Champion 2004b on demagogues. At 38.18.10, Polybius states that because of the quick defeat of the Achaeans, Roman anger did not continue further, suggesting that they felt an appropriate and proportional anger to insult from the Achaeans. However, Polybius makes it clear that the Achaeans began and held responsibility for the war. 114 Polyb., 2.8.1. See Walbank, HCP 1.156–160 for the historical details of this event and embassy. Champion 2004a, 112, 140–141, identifies such behavior as the opposite of Roman communal values; the Illyrians use public resources for private gain. Both Gibson 2013, 177 and Walbank, HCP 1.159 note the Romans’ failure to address earlier complaints from Italian traders and fit this into a trend of Romans storing up grievances to use later, seen explicitly with the murder of Octavius in Antioch, 32.2. 115 Polyb., 2.8.7. I refer to this, the younger Coruncanius, as “Coruncanius” for the rest of the chapter, as the elder plays no significant role. 116 Polyb., 2.8.9. Walbank, HCP 1.159, says that Coruncanius’ speech “has the appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify the victim of the subsequent outrage,” but his analysis does not address Polybius’ slight criticism of Coruncanius’ speech at 2.8.9. McGing 2013, 183, fills in Polybius’ implication that Coruncanius spoke rashly. 117 Polyb., 2.8.12. 118 Polyb., 2.8.13. 119 Polyb., 2.8.7, 2.8.12. For an example of desires and greed, see 2.8.4, where she sends out her pirates because she saw the beauty and amount of the goods taken from Phoenike. See for her negative characterization, Eckstein 1995, 154–156, 210. Teuta represents what Champion calls “barbaric thumos”, the opposite of “Hellenic logismos”: Champion 2004a, especially 6, 70–75, 139. 120 Moreover, Polybius treats Teuta’s gender as another negative characteristic: she cannot control her womanly passions (γυναικοθύμως) (χρωμένη δὲ λογισμοῖς γυναικείοις) and reacts without reflection (κἀλογίστως) (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀποβλέπουσα), 2.8.12, 2.4.8. 121 Polyb., 2.8.12. Eckstein 1995, 196. 122 Polyb., 2.8.13. 123 Eckstein 1995, 210; Champion 2004a, 140, likewise sees Teuta’s ἀλογία as characteristic of a Roman enemy, although he does not make a similar claim about the emotion. 124 This, according to Realist theory, constitutes a real danger to survival. See MorsteinMarx 2009, on claims of upholding dignity; see Eckstein 2006, 63–65, for this as a common line of thought in interstate anarchy. See Champion 2013 on early Roman virtue, with some counterexamples; see Champion 2004a, especially 100–143, for further on Roman virtue throughout the Histories. 125 See, for example, Polyb., 4.3, 4.16, and 13.1. See Champion 2011 on Polybius’ portrayal of Aetolians.

Emotions at War 187 126 Polyb., 18.34.6–8, 18.39, 18.45.1–9. Polybius elsewhere emphasizes their greed, turbulence, and dissatisfaction with Agelaus (the one Aetolian he portrayed favorably), 5.107.5–7. 127 Thus, the Aetolians’ anger fails to fulfill Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger; Erskine 2015, 121–123. 128 Baronowski 1995, 17 uses these terms as generalizations of all pretexts but cites 3.6, 3.15, and 36.2 for evidence. We address these passages later. 129 Baronowski 1995, 22. See Baronowski 2011 on Polybius and imperialism. 130 Polyb., 3.6.9–7.3. 131 I translate the term πρόφασις regularly as “pretext” for clarity. This term can mean anything from motive, causes, purpose, pretext, pretense, allegation, excuse, to persuasion, suggestion, or preface. Polybius predominantly uses this term in its sense of alleged motive or cause, pretext, or pretense. See LSJ, 1539 on this term broadly and Mauersberger 2.2.963–965 for Polybius’ specific usages. 132 Polyb., 3.15.10–11, 3.30.3–4. See Grethlein 2013, 224–267, on Polybius’ prominent use of retrospect. 133 Polyb., 22.18. 134 Polyb., 22.18.1–5. The narration of most of these events does not survive. Cf. Liv. 39.23–24, 41.22. See Walbank, HCP 3.205–209 on the historical events. 135 Polyb, 22.18.10–11. Polybius does not specify the cause (αἰτία) of the Third Macedonian War. He correlates Philip II and Philip V’s plans and emphasizes Philip V’s intent to wage war, with his preparations as evidence. This passage is preserved in the De Sententiis of the Constantinian Excerpts, and so the excerptor may have left out Polybius’ direct attribution of the cause. See Moore 1965 on the manuscript tradition.   Livy records a similar transfer of the drive to war from Philip V to Perseus, 36.28–29, yet he portrays Perseus as autonomous and directing war more toward Eumenes than the Romans, 42.15. Livy states the reasons for the war in Philip V’s speech, in which emotion is not mentioned explicitly, although it is clear to see Philip’s disgruntlement. Philip mentions what we would call strategic reasons for his complaint against Rome. Likewise, Eumenes’ speech, 42.11–12, which greatly influences the Roman Senate to declare war against Perseus, includes strategic and immediate events. Appian, Mac. 1.2–3, also emphasizes Eumenes as the object of Perseus’ attention. He mentions that Rome did not want a popular and hard-working king and hereditary enemy as their neighbor. 136 Polyb., 36.2.1. 137 Polyb., 36.2.2. 138 Polyb., 36.2.3. 139 Polyb., 36.2.4. See Chapter 5, 200–205, on observers. For Polybius’ stress on pretexts, the Romans’ actual pretext is not preserved in the De Sententiis excerpts. 140 See Eckstein 2006, especially 63–69, on the importance of reputation in ensuring one’s survival, according to Realist theory. Cf. 36.5.1–6, where a Carthaginian argues for the necessity of choosing expediency over what is honorable in the dire situation of the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War. 141 Appian, Pun. 9.74, similarly states that the Romans tried to come up with a pretext for declaring war on the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War. He relates that the Romans were hostile (δυσμεναίνοντες) toward the Carthaginians and used their action against Masinissa, in which they both lost overall and lost many lives, as a reason to go to war quickly against them, despite their embassies seeking peace. 142 Polyb., 3.15.9. 143 Polyb., 3.15.6–7. 144 Consider Antiochus III and the Aetolians: Polyb., 3.6.4–5 and 3.7.1–3, which Eckstein 1995, 57, uses as an example for weak pretexts. McGing 2010, 77, also discusses the unimportance of pretexts. 145 See especially Polyb., 5.77 and throughout Books 4–5 in Philip’s campaigns in the Social War. See too McGing 2013, on Philip V as a good leader while young.

188  Emotions at War 146 Polyb., 4.31–33. 147 Polyb., 4.7, especially 4.7.3–4. See Champion 2004a, especially 100–143, on Achaean virtues. Polybius’ bias for and against certain peoples, such as the Achaeans or the Aetolians, has been noted in scholarship; See, for example, Champion 2011. The conclusion that Polybius blames only those he does not agree with politically or whom it is expedient to blame runs contrary to Polybius’ own precepts for a historian in 1.14.4–5. 148 Polyb., 3.15.6. Cf. Coruncanius’ speech at 2.8.10–11. Coruncanius’ speech to Teuta also comes in a youthful outburst, much like Hannibal’s. Both adduce their custom to aid wronged allies at the end of their speech. In both cases, their claim does not have much backing and seems to exhibit the youthful rashness Polybius explicitly attributes. Nevertheless, the claim itself did hold weight as an argument in its own right; these two young men merely did not set up their speeches to bring out the full potential of this claim. See Walbank HCP, 1.159, for further examples and counterexamples. 149 Cf. Polyb., 3.26.6: Polybius criticizes the Romans’ choice of disreputable allies, not their choice to aid their own allies. 150 Polyb., 3.15.9. Clearly, θυμός here conforms to the typical negative connotations in Polybius, especially modified as “violent”. Hannibal, unlike Hamilcar, does not show prudence and swallow his emotion for the time being, providing us with a clear instance of inexpedient emotion. 151 Eckstein 1995, 144; Champion 2004a, 118–121. See too Eckstein 1989; Wiater 2018, 143–144. See Moore 2020, 38–41 on Hannibal’s youth. 152 Polyb., 3.15.9–11. 153 See Walbank, HCP 1.319–324 for the historical context. See Hoyos 1998, 196–218, and more recently Beck 2011. 154 On retrospection in historiography, see Grethlein 2013, especially 224–267 on Polybius. 155 Polyb., 36.2.1–4. 156 Polyb., 3.78.5. 157 Polyb., 3.6.9–7.3. See Walbank, HCP 1.305–309. 158 See especially Champion 2004a, 113–115. See Williams 2001, on early Gallic-Roman relations and Polybius as an early source of Greco-Roman portrayals of the Gauls. 159 Polyb., 2.18–35 details this series of Gallic-Roman conflict in summary form. In this period, the longest break from hostilities lasted only 45 years, according to Polybius. Moreover, in their recent interactions, the Romans even colonized and resettled the area, killing and displacing many Gauls. 160 In fact, Champion 2004a, 115, adduces this passage as describing a common Gallic pattern of behavior: “Gauls subordinate collective interests and communal concerns to individual desires.” Their prioritization of desire for plunder as a cause to anger, which represents their collective disgruntlement with the Romans, as a pretext fits this characterization. Champion’s definition of “collective interests and communal concerns” describes Polybius’ universal standards, as set out in his discussion of the prototypical human community in the anacyclosis. Thus, ὠφελεία, in denoting plunder, does not represent the good of the community rather than the benefit for an individual. However, within the context of this passage (and not the anacyclosis), ὠφελεία does represent a Gallic communal benefit in terms of what the Gallic community values rather than Polybius’ universal standards. 161 Polyb., 4.4. 162 Polyb., 4.3.8–4.1. 163 Polyb., 4.4.3. 164 Polyb., 4.4.4. 165 Polyb., 4.4.5: ἦν δέ τις κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀσυρὴς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, τῶν ἐξῃρημένων τὸν ἄνδρα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. The reading of “ἐξῃρημένων” differs between the major manuscripts. The oldest, Vaticanus gr. 124, reads “ἐξηρμένων”,

Emotions at War 189 but Liddell 1996, 582 classifies this as likely a falsa lectio. The reading I have used, “ἐξῃρημένων”, “removed”, is found in the rest of the major manuscripts. Modern texts print “ἐξηρμένων”. 166 Polyb., 4.4.9. 167 Walbank, HCP 1.453. 168 Polyb., 4.5.3–6. See also Champion 2004a, 129–137, on Aetolian characteristics in Polybius’ Histories. 169 The beginning of the war occurred later when the Aetolians raided Achaea, and the Achaeans tried (and failed) to repel them. Polyb., 4.6–7, 9–13. 170 Polyb., 4.4.9. Polybius does not specify the Libyans’ and Teuta’s anger as pretexts. They seem to be causes, and all three are sparked by insults. 171 Polyb., 4.5. Polybius’ focus on Dorimachus draws attention away from the Aetolians themselves. They had to agree to go to war, as Walbank HCP 1.453 notes. 172 Polyb., 4.16.4. See Champion 2011. 173 See Grainger 1999 on the Aetolian federation and its procedures. 174 Meadows 2013 argues that Polybius took this scenario from a local source because of its detail. 175 This is the only occurrence of περιοργίζεσθαι in the extant Histories and the earliest preserved usage of this compound verb in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed July 25, 2023). 176 Baronowski 1995, 17. 177 See Eckstein 2006, 63–69, on the importance of reputation for survival. 178 Modern studies in international relations until recently contrasted strategic prudence with irrational and emotional decision-making. See Crawford 2000 for a review and reassessment of this trend. For recent studies which address the importance of emotion in international relations, see Mercer 2005; Ross 2006; Sasley 2011; Ahäil and Gregory 2015; Koschut 2020. 179 Philip II: Polyb., 3.6.5, 3.6.10–14; Philip V as originator of the Third Macedonian War: Polyb., 22.18. 180 Polyb., 3.10.1, 3–4. 181 Scholars dispute Polybius’ reasoning for Carthage’s determination to build their strength in Spain. See Errington 1970; Hoffmann 1972; Hoyos 1998, 150–173.   Cf. the Carthaginians’ choice of putting aside the honorable course of resistance for expediency at the outset of the Third Punic War and Polybius’ praise of a Carthaginian argument for this, 36.5.1–6. On the other hand, the Achaean leaders did not take either an expedient or an honorable course of action in the Achaean War, and Polybius consistently characterizes their decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, and mad. See 38.3.8–13, 38.10.12, 38.11.6, 38.18.7–8. 182 This passage receives little scholarly attention. Walbank, HCP 1.502–503 focuses on the festivals. 183 Polyb., 4.49.1–3. 184 Polyb., 4.49.4. 185 Prusias’ anger may have seemed less viable as a pretext than the Gauls’. Note that Prusias did not take the initiative to begin war against Byzantium and ask the Rhodians for their support. 186 Polyb., 4.50–52. The war between Byzantium and the alliance of Rhodes and Prusias did not last long; Polybius narrated it in three sections. In comparison, Polybius spent six sections narrating the circumstances leading to the Rhodians’ deliberation of war, in addition to 4.49 on Prusias’ motivations. Causation held greater significance for Polybius than this actual war. Polybius also digresses on the geography of the Black Sea for five sections in relation to this war. This war allowed Polybius to discuss other matters, whether causation or geography in this part of the world, more than its intrinsic worth as a war narrative.

190  Emotions at War   Moreover, Polybius cites it as one of the four contemporaneous wars, alongside the Second Punic War in the West, the Social War in Greece, and the war over Coele-Syria in the East. The beginning of these wars at approximately the same time marked the beginning of the confluence of world affairs for Polybius, Polyb., 3.2.1–5. Walbank 1972, 104, notes this importance. 187 Polybius consistently focalizes the strategic advantages of the mercenaries through the perspective of the Carthaginians, but they notice too late their own disadvantageous position. Likewise, Polybius emphasizes the carefree nature of the mercenaries in their move to Sicca, 1.66.10–12. The Carthaginians failed to reestablish control and assuage the mercenaries’ anger, and the passage traces the exaggerated and unnecessary inflammation of the mercenaries’ anger. See Polybius’ disapproval of the Carthaginians, 1.66.6–12, 1.68.2. 188 This pattern of reciprocal anger between these passages is unique in the Histories. Only one other case of reciprocal anger survives, between the advisors of the young king Antiochus III, Hermeias and Epigenes, Polyb., 5.42–50. Hermeias’ anger aligns with Teuta and Dorimachus, and Epigenes appears justified in his anger, similar to Coruncanius and Scyron. 189 Polyb., 4.31.2. See 4.31–33. 190 Polyb., 4.36.7–9. 191 Conversely, Scyron’s activism against Dorimachus sets him in the Romans’ company, in contrast to typical Messenian lethargy. 192 See for differing positions on the treaties, Walbank 1945; Heisserer 1985; Hoyos 1998; Serrati 2006; Erdkamp 2009; Eckstein 2010, 2012; Bellomo 2013; Wiater 2018. 193 Wiater 2018, esp. 151–165. 194 Wiater 2018, 134. Wiater frames this distinction in terms of justice rather than morality. 195 Polyb., 3.26.6–7. 196 Hoyos 1998, 42, notes the morality involved in this passage. He does not, however, note that that very morality is conveyed through emotion alone. The observation of Hoyos 2011, 136–140, that more time elapsed between the various actions of the Mamertines (in crossing to Sicily, calling in the Romans) than it seems in Polybius’ narration furthers my point that Polybius saw emotion as bridging a wider time gap in causation. See too Champion 2013 on this passage. 197 The Mamertines were judged through the term παρασπονδεῖν, but this does not apply directly to the Romans. See Chapter 5 on the indefinite observer. See Polyb., 1.7–11 and 1.20 for Polybius’ narrative involving the Mamertines. 198 It does not necessarily follow that the Carthaginians were right. 199 See Eckstein 2010. 200 See Waldron 2015 on the important distinction between conventions and moral norms in war. While ideally a treaty or other convention in warfare would prohibit immoral behavior, such as allying with the unjust, this result would be impossible to administer. Buchanan 2015, 7, likewise distinguishes the roles of morality and law. On this distinction, see Rodin and Shue 2008. See Lamb 2013 for modern just war theory and international law. 201 The person making the value judgment is a generalized person. This includes the external audience: we, the readers, consider the situation before us, that the Romans allied with those who broke treaties, and we are to grow indignant, if we are normal individuals, that is. The implication is that we are, otherwise we would be ignorant. See Chapter 5, 198–199. 202 See Waldron 2015 on this disjuncture. 203 Polyb., 3.30. 204 The Roman argument does not dwell upon how unjustly the innocent people of Saguntum suffered or how Hannibal attacked them unprovoked. It focuses entirely on the treaties and Hannibal’s transgression of these rather than humanitarian consideration, even though breaking treaties is morally wrong as a breach of trust. Hannibal too, in

Emotions at War 191 his “misguided” pretexts relied upon legalistic arguments in that the Romans broke a treaty by interfering in Saguntum previously. This focus contrasts the concerns of modern just war theory, which emphasizes human rights. See Orend 2013, 22–32. 205 Polyb., 3.32. 206 Polybius shared characteristics with the Classical historians whose texts are extant. His argument does not pertain to their texts, for they show clear interest in causation. See Longley 2012; Rood 2012 on Thucydides and Polybius, McGing 2012 on Herodotus and Polybius, and Gibson 2013 on Xenophon and Polybius. 207 See Walbank 1972, 97–129 on Polybius’ publication. 208 Polyb., 3.32.4–5. 209 Polyb., 3.32.5–6. 210 Polyb., 3.32.7–8. 211 While Polybius’ narration of the causes and beginning of the Second Macedonian War does not survive, Livy, 31.1, attributes Roman anger at Philip V for his treachery in the peace with the Aetolians and his aid to Hannibal during the Second Punic War as motives to declare war. 212 Polyb., 3.32.9. 213 Walbank 1994 on how Polybius sometimes forces material into his historiographical scheme. 214 See especially Derow 1994; Walbank 1994 on contextualizing Polybius’ account of causation with other ancient historians. See too Marincola 2011, 171–179, on universal history. 215 The causal link between the Second Punic War and the Second Macedonian War does not explicitly include emotion. The narrative sections detailing the Aetolians’ anger after the Second Macedonian War do not survive. 216 Walbank, HCP 1.313. See too, Walbank 1983, 62–63. 217 See Rich 1996, 14–15, for discussion and sources involved in “Barcid wrath”. Polybius is our first extant source of this. 218 See Walbank 1972, 310–313, and especially Hoyos 1998, with discussion and scholarship. Rich 1996, 6, praises Polybius’ longevity of his causes: It is to Polybius’ credit that he insisted on the need to search for the remote causes of wars, and, in the case of this war, drew attention to its causal connection with the First Punic War and to the significance of the new Carthaginian empire in Spain.   Eckstein 1995, 175, notes that passion drives the Carthaginians from the First to the Second Punic War but does not fit this within what he identifies on p. 57 as an important trend, wars begun for honor which receive Polybius’ approbation. 219 Rich 1996, 14–16; however, Champion 2004a, 120 notes this innovation of Polybius. 220 Ancient Greek conceptions of θυμός do not carry over into the afterlife generally; more often the ψυχή or φρήν carry over. See Lorenz 2006. 221 Polyb., 3.10.7. 222 Polyb., 3.10.7–3.12. 223 Unfortunately, these factors of inculcation and environment are also how racism, sexism, and other strong prejudices tend to survive across generations – from strong inculcation from elders, living in an environment in which it was accepted, and eventually feeling strong feelings of aversion or disgust when confronted in this kind of hatred. See, with particular emphasis on emotions during wartime, Halperin 2014. On hate, see Sternberg and Sternberg 2008. 224 This provides evidence against subscription by Polybius to θυμός as the middle part of Plato’s tripartite soul. 225 Many scholars have noticed the weakness of Polybius’ claim. Most recently, McGing 2010, 45, Gibson 2013. 226 See, for example, Walbank, HCP 1.319–324, 1972, 160: “in reality many wars are the result of a gradual buildup of hostile feeling and will to war on both sides.” See Rich 1996, 3–14, for a discussion of other ancient sources.

192  Emotions at War 227 See Potter 2016 on the similarity of these wars. 228 Polyb., 3.32.6–9. 229 Polybius stresses the importance of the First Punic War and the Mercenary War for understanding the Second Punic War: 3.10.1–2, 3.28.5. 230 Hannibal could have intended war against Rome but did not foresee that Rome would react thus to his attack on Saguntum. Rich 1996, 6 finds intentionality Polybius’ greatest weakness in his theory of causation. 231 Walbank 1983, 63, notes the temporal differences between the stated αἰτίαι of 3.9–10 from Hannibal’s claims at 3.15. 232 Eckstein 1989 does not discuss the content of Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal’s pretexts. He focuses on Polybius’ characterization of Hannibal as young, emotional, impulsive, and chiefly irrational. He concludes that Hannibal’s “depiction inevitably implies a negative Polybian judgment on Carthaginian policy leading to the Second Punic War: a policy based on emotion invited disaster, and disaster was the final result.” However, Eckstein ignores Polybius’ determination that the true causes (from 3.9–10) would have given Hannibal the appearance of justice. Eckstein’s statement relies on the assumption that a bad cause for a war entails a bad result. This is neither true in Polybius’ Histories nor in history (unfortunately). The Carthaginians lost the war not because they began it on unjust principles but because of the way they and the Romans managed it. For the (moral) importance of the distinction between the reasons for a war and the conduct of a war, see Walzer 2015; Potter 2016 on ancient wars. 233 Polyb., 36.1–4. 234 Most pretexts usually involve immediate circumstances, but recall that both the Gauls and Dorimachus used the emotion of anger as their pretexts. 235 See Polybius’ criticism of Fabius Pictor, 3.8.9, whose attribution of indignation to the Carthaginian Senate does not cohere with his narration of events. 236 Eckstein 1995, 57.

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194  Emotions at War Harris, William V. 1979. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C. Clarendon Press. ———. 2001. Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity. Harvard University Press. Hau, Lisa Irene. 2016. Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus. Edinburgh University Press. Heisserer, Andrew J. 1985. “Polybius iii,25,3 (An Alliance Concerning Pyrrhus).” Gerión. 3. 125–139. Helm, Bennett W. 2014. “Emotional Communities of Respect.” In Collective Emotions: Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. Ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela. Oxford University Press. 47–60. Hoffmann, W. 1972. “Karthagos Kampf um die Vorherrschaft im Mittelmeer.” Aufstieg un Niedergang der römischen Welt. 1.1. 341–363. Hoyos, Dexter. 1998. Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars. Walter de Gruyter. ———. 2007. Truceless War: Carthage’s Fight for Survival, 241 to 237 BC. Brill. ———. 2011. “The Outbreak of War.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars. Ed. Dexter Hoyos. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 131–148. Hutchison, Emma, and Bleiker, Roland. 2020. “Emotions, Agency, and Power in World Politics.” In The Power of Emotions in World Politics. Ed. Simon Koschut. Routledge. 185–196. Kauppi, M.V. 1991. “Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Peloponnesian War.” In Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age. Ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss. Westview Press. Kloft, Hans. 2013. “Polybios und die Universalgeschichte.” In Polybios und seine Historien. Ed. Volker Grieb and Clemens Koehn. F. Steiner. 13–24. Koschut, Simon, ed. 2020. The Power of Emotions in World Politics. Routledge. Koziak, B. 2000. Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender. Pennsylvania State University Press. Lamb, Antony. 2013. Ethics and the Laws of War: The Moral Justification of Legal Norms. Routledge. Lazar, Seth. 2016. “War.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/war/. Longley, Georgina. 2012. “Thucydides, Polybius, and Human Nature.” In Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius. Ed. Christopher Smith and Liz Mariah Yarrow. Oxford University Press. 68–84. Lorenz, Hendrik. 2006. The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Clarendon Press. Lynch, John P., and Miles, Gary B. 1980. “In Search of Thumos: Towards an Understanding of a Greek Psychological Term.” Prudentia. 12. 3–9. Marincola, John. 2011. “Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus.” In A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography. Ed. John Marincola. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. 171–179. McGing, Brian. 2010. Polybius’ Histories. Oxford University Press. ———. 2012. “Polybius and Herodotus.” In Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius. Ed. Christopher Smith and Liz Mariah Yarrow. Oxford University Press. 33–49. ———. 2013. “Youthfulness in Polybius: The Case of Philip V of Macedon.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 181–199.

Emotions at War 195 Meadows, Andrew. 2013. “Polybius, Aratus, and the History of the 140th Olympiad.” In Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank. Ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison. Oxford University Press. 91–116. Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.” International Organization. 59.1. 77–106. Moore, Daniel Walker. 2020. Polybius: Experience and the Lessons of History. Brill. Moore, John. 1965. The Manuscript Tradition of Polybius. Cambridge University Press. Morstein-Marx, Robert. 2009. “Dignitas and res publica: Caesar and Republican Legitimacy.” In Eine Politische Kultur (in) der Krise?: Die “letzte Generation” der römischen Republik. Ed. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp. Oldenbourg. 115–140. Orend, Brian. 2013. The Morality of War. 2nd ed. Broadview Press. Pédech, Paul. 1964. La Méthode Historique de Polybe. Les Belles Lettres. Potter, David. 2016. “ ‘War Guilt,’ ‘National Character,’ ‘Inevitable Forces,’ and the Problematic Historiography of ‘Unnecessary Wars’.” In Our Ancient Wars: Rethinking War Through the Classics. Ed. Victor Caston and Silke-Maria Weineck. University of Michigan Press. 75–95. Rich, John. 1996. “The Origins of the Second Punic War.” In The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal. Ed. Tim Cornell, Boris Rankov, and Philip Sabin. Institute of Classical Studies, University of London. 1–38. Rodin, David, and Shue, Henry, eds. 2008. Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers. Oxford University Press. Rood, Tim. 2012. “Polybius, Thucydides, and the First Punic War.” In Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius. Ed. Christopher Smith and Liz Mariah Yarrow. Oxford University Press. 50–67. Ross, Andrew. 2006. “Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions.” European Journal of International Relations. 12.2. 197–222. Sacks, Kenneth. 1981. Polybius on the Writing of History. University of California Press. Sasley, Brent. 2011. “Theorizing States’ Emotions.” International Studies Review. 13. 452–476. Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 2016. “Deciding to Go to War: Who Is Responsible?” In Our Ancient Wars: Rethinking War Through the Classics. Ed. Victor Caston and Silke-Maria Weineck. University of Michigan Press. 167–183. Schepens, Guido, and Bollansée, Jan, eds. 2005. The Shadow of Polybius: Intertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek Historiography. Peeters. Schwarte, K.H. 1983. Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Krieges: Rechtsfrage und Überlieferung: Historia. F. Steiner Verlag. Serrati, J. 2006. “Neptune’s Altars: The Treaties Between Rome and Carthage (509–226 BC).” Classical Quarterly. 56. 113–134. Sternberg, Robert J., and Sternberg, Karin. 2008. The Nature of Hate. Cambridge University Press. Sumner, G.V. 1972. “Rome, Spain, and the Outbreak of the Second Punic War: Some ­Clarifications.” Latomus. 31.2. 469–480. Trundle, Matthew. 2013. “The Business of War: Mercenaries.” In The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World. Ed. J.B. Campbell and Lawrence A. Tritle. Oxford University Press. 330–350. Walbank, Frank W. 1945. “Polybius, Philinus, and the First Punic War.” Classical Quarterly. 39. 1–18. ———. 1957–1979. A Historical Commentary on Polybius (HCP). Vol. 1–3. Clarendon Press.

196  Emotions at War ———. 1972. Polybius. University of California Press. ———. 1975. “Symploke: Its Role in Polybius’ Histories.” Yale Classical Studies. 24. 197–212. ———. 1983. “Polybius and the Aitiai of the Second Punic War.” Liverpool Classical Monthly. 8.4. 62–63. ———. 1994. “Supernatural Paraphernalia in Polybius’ Histories.” In Ventures into Greek History. Ed. Ian Worthington. Oxford University Press. 28–42. Reprinted in Walbank, Frank W., ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. 245–257. ———, ed. 2002. Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World: Essays and Reflections. Cambridge University Press. Waldron, Jeremy. 2015. “Deep Morality and the Laws of War.” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War. Ed. Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe. Oxford University Press. Walzer, Michael. 2015. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 5th ed. Basic Books. Welwei, K.W. 1977. “Die Belagerung Sagunts und die römische Passivität im Westen 219 v. Chr.” Talanta. 8.9. 156–173. Wiater, Nicolas. 2018. “Documents and Narrative: Reading the Roman-Carthaginian Treaties in Polybius’ Histories.” In Polybius and His Legacy. Ed. Nikos Miltsios and Melina Tamiolaki. De Gruyter. 131–165. Williams, J.H.C. 2001. Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy. Oxford University Press.

5

Learning From History Audience-Based Emotion and Conclusions

In 3.31, Polybius affirms the importance of causes. He justifies his decision to go through such a detailed and lengthy account of the causes of the Second Punic War by arguing that knowledge of causes is useful for individuals in their future actions, both public and private. First, he relies on the common historiographical motif that no one can assume continued prosperity for one’s whole life. Because of this, each person must actively maintain their well-being.1 To do this, one must be able to persuade others to take one’s side and contribute to one’s projects. Studying another’s past actions will allow one to find someone to empathize with oneself and thus to share in one’s actions: “From [the study of past events] one can discover the one who will pity, the one who will grow angry together with one, and in addition the one who will seek justice” (ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα).2 Thus, Polybius concludes, studying past events, especially why people do what they do, will lead one to be able to persuade others so as to make them empathize, or share emotions, with oneself, which is the greatest aid for life (ἅπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον).3 History, with its emphasis on causes, is distinguished as useful to the reader through emotion.4 Polybius’ goal for history is grounded in emotion – something remarkable given his reputation as a pragmatic historian with little tolerance for “tragic” history. This emotional goal of knowing how to make others share emotion with oneself, alongside emotions that serve as causal links, foregrounds a basic but important element of Polybius’ thought: emotion is a crucial factor for history. Not only does emotion serve a vital role in causation, tying temporally distinct events together in the “woven” project of history, but it is a vital tool for the statesman to recognize and use and for the historian to recognize and explain.5 Causation provides the key shared element between these two functions of emotion. Emotion serves as a cause, as analyzed in the previous chapter, and causation teaches the statesman how to persuade others to see and feel his side. Therefore, emotion is important to the project of history – important to recognize in causes and important as a goal or tool for the reader to take away from the study of history. This final chapter investigates how Polybius guides his readers to feel in the Histories. Polybius criticizes Phylarchus’ attempt to make readers share the experience of historical characters. Does Polybius attempt to bring his readers to feel DOI: 10.4324/9781003362432-6

198  Learning From History certain emotional states, especially given his emotional goal for history and criticism of Phylarchus? Although Polybius intrudes upon the flow of his narrative more than any other ancient historian, he does not directly enjoin his readers to feel emotions, as he does for other topics.6 Polybius guides his readers to appropriate emotional responses through two approaches. First, he presents his readers with a model for a good reader of history with the indefinite pronoun (τις). Second, Polybius describes the emotional reactions of observers within the historical narrative, on whom readers are invited to model their own reactions to similar behavior. Lastly, Polybius utilizes such rhetorical frames and observers to persuade his readers to feel the emotion of pity appropriately regarding the contemporary aftermath of the Achaean War. Emotional Persuasion and Learning How to Feel This section builds on recent scholarship on emotions in ancient historiography and rhetoric.7 David Levene established two types of emotion in historiography, character-based and audience-based.8 John Marincola, building on Levene’s observations, describes the latter category as the historians’ attempt to arouse the emotions of his audience, a topic that is in turn made up of several components: what emotions are to be aroused; what sorts of incidents can be narrated to arouse the emotions; and finally (and most difficult of all), the purpose of arousing the emotions of the audience of a literary work.9 This section focuses exclusively on this category of audience-based emotions and address Marincola’s concerns about what emotions, situations, and purposes are involved in Polybius’ emotional persuasion.10 The Indefinite Pronoun and Historiographic Readers

Polybius often uses the indefinite pronoun τις, “someone” or “anyone”, to provide a seemingly impersonal conclusion and normative evaluation of some event or behavior. As a singular, nominative pronoun, τις occurs frequently in the H ­ istories in potential optative constructions and in the contexts of judging with verbs of marking, finding, reckoning, seeing, blaming, or judging.11 Polybius frequently uses this construction to confirm a specific reading and analysis of the historical events.12 Polybius invites his readers to share his conclusions after a long discussion of the variety of accounts on the causation of the First Punic War in a passage which we examined as evidence of moral indignation in Chapters 2 and 4. To sum up his discussion of the evidence leading up to the First Punic War, Polybius states, If someone (τις) considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, that they took the Mamertines generally into their friendship and after this aided them in their moment of need, people (the Mamertines) who had betrayed not only the

Learning From History 199 Messenians’ city but also that of the Rhegians, they would reasonably grow indignant (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν); but if someone considers that the Romans made the crossing against their own oaths and treaty, clearly he is ignorant (ἀγνοεῖ προφανῶς).13 In considering the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, Polybius’ indefinite person makes a judgment based on historiographical considerations. This individual has followed Polybius’ discussion of the accounts of the historians Fabius Pictor and Philinus. To come to this conclusion, judgment, and emotion, the indefinite person τις must be a reader of historiography – namely a reader of Polybius’ detailed analysis of the situation. The premises of the unnamed observer follow the facts Polybius has set out and makes explicit an assessment of these historical facts. This unnamed observer considers moral sensibilities important – that treaty-breakers (παρασπονδεῖν), the Mamertines, should not receive aid for their transgressions. These moral sensibilities find fruition wholly in the emotion of indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν), the correct response to this guided historiographical analysis. The indefinite someone (τις) feels what any “normal” person would rightly feel.14 Polybius sets up two premises and two results in this concluding statement, that someone either feels indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν) or is ignorant (ἀγνοεῖ), both based on the evidence he presented over four sections.15 With these two options, we see a successful (εἰκότως δόξειε) and an unsuccessful (ἀγνοεῖ) reader of history. The successful reader has taken into account moral and ethical criteria – the repeated breaches of faith by the Mamertines – whereas the unsuccessful reader has misread and misunderstood the treaties, which Polybius’ preceding discussion clarified.16 In the end, this conclusion shows readers that they are invited to find the Romans’ support for the Mamertines morally reprehensible, but they should also know that the Romans committed no breach of their own treaties and agreements. In another digression on the historiography of the First Punic War, Polybius discusses the issue of bias in Philinus’ account. He draws attention to Philinus’ pro-Carthaginian partiality in his history and Fabius Pictor’s pro-Roman favoritism.17 To make his point that favoritism should stay out of writing history, Polybius generalizes: In the rest of life one (τις) might not perhaps reject such favoritism; for it is necessary (δεῖ) that the good man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα) love his friends and country and that he both hate his friends’ enemies and love their friends (συμμισεῖν τοῖς φίλοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ συναγαπᾶν τοὺς φίλους). But when someone (τις) assumes the role of a historian, it is necessary (χρὴ) to be freed from all such concerns, and often it is necessary to speak well of and bestow the greatest praises on one’s enemies when their deeds require this, and conversely it is often necessary to criticize and blame reproachfully those closest to one whenever the errors of their endeavors point this out.18 Polybius uses the indefinite pronoun τις to represent anyone in the course of a normal life. This person can succumb to favoritism and indeed, according to Polybius,

200  Learning From History should, in order to be considered a virtuous man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα). A  regular person (τις) should therefore think emotions of favoritism (συμμισεῖν. . . καὶ συναγαπᾶν) appropriate in everyday life because the moral paradigm, the normative good person, should love and hate together with their friends. Polybius thus directs his readers to the correct moral reference of “the good man” and implies that, as normal people living their lives normally (ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ), that is, not as historians, they too should deem these emotional ties of favoritism toward their friends appropriate. Through using the indefinite pronoun as inclusive of his general readership and creating a moral paradigm with the required behavior of a good person, Polybius presents his readers with an emotional paradigm to conform to, provided one is not fulfilling the role of a historian. However, to be a historian, Polybius tells his readers, someone (τις) must (χρὴ) shun such emotional attachments and base how one writes on the merit of deeds instead of personal attachment. Although Polybius wrote to teach his audience how to become good historians, it would be unreasonable for Polybius to suppose that all of his readers were to become historians.19 Nevertheless, his comments on the requirements for a good historian both guide all his readers in evaluating historians and their historical accounts and implicitly invite his readers to consider writing good history themselves, all while excusing the historian from seeming hostile to his own country when criticizing its actions and statesmen. Interestingly, this implies that one should feel emotion to understand and learn from history but must be done feeling emotion by the time of writing.20 To narrate events clearly and with retrospective understanding, a historian must have completed and fully synthesized any emotional response to the events which they then must present so as to make the events and their appropriate emotions compelling to the readers.21 Observers, Both Internal and External

In “The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories”, James Davidson carefully draws attention to the differing perspectives within the Histories between generals, their troops, third parties (such as a king from an uninvolved country), and the audience. He states, “we are presented in the Histories with a complex network of appearances and perceptions, where events are always mediated through the gaze of the inhabitants of his history and that of his supposed readers,” and that “Polybius provides us with an audience for the readers to model themselves on, together with a paradigmatic gaze and exemplary responses.”22 In this section, I extend Davidson’s emphasis on perspectives to examine how Polybius incorporates the emotions of observers to guide his readers to correct appraisals of the behaviors, choices, and events described.23 Polybius attributes emotions to observers, who provide a model for the readers for which emotions are appropriate as exemplary responses in particular situations. I refer to Polybius’ audience or readers in an inclusive way. Polybius specifies his target audience as future statesmen who will have to deal with problems both similar to those in the past and problems particular to the new, Roman-dominated world. This narrower, target audience includes those who derive benefit from

Learning From History 201 readings others find boring. In addition, Polybius expends much effort in teaching his audience how to judge good historians. However, Polybius also reaches beyond this narrow, target audience to anyone who wants to know how the whole world fell to the Romans and whoever wants to learn from the past. His assimilation of the audience to characters in the text aligns with both the narrow, target audience of future statesmen and any reader who wishes to benefit from history.24 In Polybius’ political theory of the cycle of constitutions which we examined in Chapter 3, bystanders within the narrative observe and grow indignant at the maltreatment of others during the initial development of a human community. Recall that people begin to develop their sense of morality by observing how children (mal)treat their parents: Whenever one of those who have been reared does not on growing up show gratitude to or defend those who reared them, it is evident that this child will displease and offend (δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν) those who have been familiar with the parents and have witnessed (συνιδόντας) the cares and pains they spent on attending to and feeding their children.25 In this passage, the observers play an essential role in the formation of judgment and morality.26 Reason and a sense of justice do not develop through the agents, that is, the parents and the child. Instead, Polybius focalizes the development of human morality through the observant bystanders. These observers are clearly present physically at this scene in the text, and later in the development of the community, they eventually take action to reward virtuous, community-oriented behavior and to censure destructive and selfish behavior.27 They observe and then make a rational judgment about the ungrateful child’s actions, and these actions provide an internal model for the readers, who also observe this scene and are invited to grow righteously indignant at the maltreatment of the parents. Furthermore, Polybius’ prime feature distinguishing humans from animals is humans’ ability to apply the situation they have observed to themselves in the future (προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει).28 The observers in this scene do that. They are indignant and displeased by the thought of their potential children maltreating them. The language of rationality, justice, and a sense of duty, and Polybius’ specification that applying a situation to oneself in this way is particular to humans all frame the response of growing indignant as a correct emotional response to the child’s negligent behavior. Polybius’ readers, as external observers, can see that indignation is a morally responsible reaction to this type of situation and as humans, are encouraged to feel such indignation themselves. In Book Five, Polybius digresses to discuss the implications of Philip V’s failed attempt to take Melitea in the Greek Social War. Polybius narrates that Philip made an excellent, quick, and sudden attack on Melitea unexpectedly but that Philip then wasted such an opportunity because he failed to measure the ladders correctly for scaling the walls. In the digression which follows, Polybius provides his readers with models of observation and judgment, using the indefinite pronoun “τις” with optative

202  Learning From History verbs of evaluation (blaming, finding) and posing rhetorical questions. In describing the future detriment resulting from the censured behavior, Polybius describes viewers who represent a perspective – and emotion – his readers could adopt. Polybius discusses the future detriment which comes to leaders because of carelessly failing to measure ladders correctly: “Concerning future events, [these generals] actually stimulate distrust and hatred (ἀπιστίας καὶ μῖσος) for themselves in general (ὁμολογουμένως), and they announce to all (πᾶσιν) to be on guard.”29 In both clauses, the ambiguity and openness of who reacts allows and invites readers to share these reactions. Those who may distrust, hate, and guard against such leaders exist in the future relative to the leaders in Polybius’ historical narrative (πρός γε τὸ μέλλον), as are the readers. Thus, they have the opportunity to become distrustful of and hate leaders who display such carelessness, should they encounter such a situation. These reactions fit within Polybius’ conclusions. Polybius explains these claims: “Not only to those who suffered, but also to those who learned about what happened in some way (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονὸς τρόπον τινὰ) a forewarning is given to watch out for themselves and be on their guard.”30 Here Polybius emphasizes that not only those present at the event but those who witness it have the opportunity to learn from and react to the leaders’ actions. The participle συνεῖσι, from συνίημι, incorporates both observing and understanding, or more precisely, understanding based on one’s observations and perceptions.31 In this passage, it is unclear who these observers (τοῖς συνεῖσι) could be, except that they are not the actual victims (τοῖς παθοῦσι).32 Polybius’ readers fulfill this role. They observe the discreditable behavior in the historical narrative and understand that they should watch out for and guard against such leaders in the future. While Polybius ostensibly advises generals what not to do, he also provides information for their potential victims through the observers’ reactions.33 They now know both to prepare against sudden attack by this kind of general and not to trust such a general as a leader or ally. This digression models the purpose of historiography, that is, to learn from the past. For an astute reader of Polybius, the observers’ reaction provides a guide for action. Polybius’ own text provides the means (τρόπον τινὰ) for those learning what happened (τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονός). The readers learn about and “observe” this situation by reading Polybius’ text, much as the internal observers learn about the situation “in some way”. Moreover, emotions from external observers help the historian to fulfill his didactic purpose – to teach his readers through the experiences of others. Polybius’ target audience not only learns what behavior to avoid if they become generals but also gain insight into how to recognize and react to other, negligent leaders. The emotion, here hate (μῖσος), is also tied to the practical benefit of not trusting such generals.34 Polybius uses external observers and their emotions as powerful models for his readers in his digression on victors’ appropriation of property after the fall of Syracuse to the Romans, which we addressed in Chapters 1 and 2.35 First, observers feel resentment (φθόνος) at the prosperity of the victors, because the victors have changed their customs.36 Observers (τοὺς θεωμένους) feel pity for others in misfortune, then feel pity for themselves upon reflection on their own misfortunes.37 This

Learning From History  203 self-pity then incites anger and hatred, which implies that these observers have suffered similarly and therefore are not in the position of power.38 In this passage, the observers feel a wide range of emotions – resentment (φθόνος), pity (ἔλεος), self-pity (ἐλεεῖν . . . σφᾶς αὐτούς), anger (ὀργή), and hatred (μῖσος). The point of this digression in the Histories ostensibly is that conquerors should not change their habits. To show this, Polybius narrates the emotions the conquerors should strive to avoid. If they do not change their customs and do not take away property unnecessarily, they will not incur these emotions. The observers’ emotions therefore are appropriate responses, meant to motivate conquerors to act ethically. Moreover, this digression shows that emotions from observers can have practical repercussions. According to Polybius, these emotions should deter conquerors from their offensive behavior and should therefore cause the conquerors to change their behavior, or else they will create tension in the conquerors’ rule.39 Finally, in this situation a range of emotions is appropriate. While φθόνος or ὀργή may seem inappropriate or irrational emotions in other situations, here they are the appropriate, moral, and normative response, as exemplified by these generalized, external observers.40 These emotions act as a corrective, as Polybius seems to view them, if observers actually express them. Through this digression, Polybius provides observers as a model whom his readers could and should emulate if they find themselves in the same situation. We began Chapter 1 with Polybius’ narration of the reactions to the downfall of Achaeus, a rival claimant for the Seleucid throne against Antiochus III until 214 bce.41 Achaeus, Polybius concludes, exemplifies someone who did all in his power to secure his safe escape, but since no one can entirely avoid having to trust others, he happened to entrust his life to the wrong people.42 Therefore, what happened actually stimulated pity and sympathy for him as the sufferer from those outside (τό γε μὴν συμβὰν ἔλεον μὲν τῷ παθόντι καὶ συγγνώμην ἀπειργάσατο παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός), and it generated condemnation and hatred against the perpetrators (διαβολὴν δὲ καὶ μῖσος τοῖς πράξασι).43 The use of impersonal and passive vocabulary (τὸ συμβάν, ἀπειργάσατο) make this statement applicable to whoever finds themselves in this situation. Often, Polybius uses the masculine plural article with ἐκτός as a substantive without modifiers (such as a limiting genitive or noun in agreement with the article) to denote “those outside”.44 This usage stems from its original geographical and spatial sense of someone outside of a certain area.45 Moreover, the substantive “οἱ ἐκτός” often refers to unspecified people outside of the sphere of action. In an important passage on pretexts addressed in Chapter 4, the Romans attempt to present to “those outside” (πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός) a suitable pretext for declaring what became the Third Punic War on Carthage: and since this (the war) had been decided upon in the minds of each (of the Roman senators) for a long time by then, they sought a suitable opportunity and a reasonable pretext to give to those outside (πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός).46

204  Learning From History It is deliberately vague who these “outsiders” are, but two aspects are known: they clearly are not those involved, and they and their opinions clearly are important to the Romans, for the Romans delay war in order to save face with them. Polybius expounds on how the Romans take special care over this, being thoughtful in this aspect (καλῶς φρονοῦντες).47 For, he continues, the beginning of a war can be just, but the pretext can make the whole endeavor and any victory from it shameful and indecent (ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη).48 Polybius concludes this discussion by stating, “for this reason even, because [the Romans] disagreed at that time amongst one another concerning the judgment of those outside (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαλήψεως), they refrained from the war.”49 While it is not clear who “those outside” are, they both do not play an active role in the narrative yet have the potential to cause the Romans not to make war wholly through (perception of) their reactions and judgments.50 Similarly, the outside observers of Achaeus’ downfall clearly are not personally present and cannot step directly into Achaeus’ situation. In the passage, the external observers’ emotions end a digression on how to judge the demises of characters. The readers too witness Achaeus’ fate through the text and can thus come to feel the same emotions in response to Achaeus’ demise. In this way, the emotions of “those outside” constitute an appropriate guide for Polybius’ own audience in interpreting Achaeus’ story. The vagueness of this expression οἱ ἐκτός allows Polybius to make claims of emotions without qualifications in time or space. That is, anyone not at the scene can be classified as “outsiders” and could feel and judge in such a way. This phrase could include Polybius’ readers, who are situated beyond the confines of the scene. In sum, Polybius often uses those outside (οἱ ἐκτός) to reflect on and judge the characters within the historical situation, and these judgments align with the historian’s prerogatives.51 These external observers were but one party among several in the larger, scattered narrative who reacted emotionally to Achaeus’ demise. Antiochus’ soldiers, by contrast, felt surprise (θαυμάζοντες), yet in Sardis, Achaeus’ wife Laodike lost hope (ἀνέλπιστον) and was shocked.52 Antiochus himself felt relief and shed tears (δακρύειν) in contemplation of a complete reversal of fortune.53 These characters’ emotions exemplify the layers of viewers which Davidson analyzed. All of them present an emotional model, but each is directed at different objects – hatred for betrayers, pity for Achaeus, despair at the future, and surprise or relief from the event’s result. Of all of these, the external observers (οἱ ἐκτός) most closely approximate the perspective of the readers, suggesting that the external observers’ ­emotions – pity for Achaeus and hatred for the betrayers – most closely ­approximate what the readers should feel.54 These emotions not only come from those whose perspective most closely aligns with the readers, but these emotions align with the point of Polybius’ digression, giving force to the conclusion that Achaeus – and others who take the necessary precautions – do not deserve to be blamed. Through the last few examples, the observers have no other part in the text except to witness and react to an event. These observers’ reactions do not actively affect the course of narrated historical events, but instead they provide a normative judgment on the events of the narrative and can serve as evidence on the repercussions of actions from the narrative, such as the potential repercussions for looting

Learning From History 205 and displaying the property of the defeated. Thus, these observers form an intermediary between the historical text and the readers. These external observers provide for the readers a model of correct, normative, and potentially powerful emotional reactions. Pity as a Response

The next three examples demonstrate a complex understanding of and appeal to the emotion of pity in the Histories. This section will readdress passages discussed briefly in Chapter 2 but focuses on how these passages teach and draw in the reader. There we observed that pity (ἔλεος) is an emotion felt on another’s behalf, and it usually requires distance between the subject who pities and the object pitied.55 Polybius mentions pity (ἔλεος and its cognates) more frequently than his extant historiographical predecessors, and the Achaean War – in the aftermath of which Polybius was heavily involved – provides a unique and significant appeal to engaging readers’ pity at the end of the Histories.56 In Book Two, the Epirotes decided to ally with the Illyrians against the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues, despite the fact that the Illyrians had recently raided Epirus, and the Leagues had aided Epirus at that time.57 Polybius begins his digression: “When humans, being what they are, fall into some kind of trouble contrary to expectation, the blame goes to Fortune and the perpetrators, not on those who suffer.”58 He continues, “But conversely, when people recklessly and manifestly throw themselves into the greatest misfortunes, the fault is agreed (ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι) to be of those suffering.”59 Polybius highlights the difference in circumstance with the adverbs “recklessly and manifestly” (ἀκρίτως καὶ προφανῶς) to counter the previous premise’s “contrary to expectation” (παραλόγως). Thus, according to Polybius, it is well known that while some become victims of circumstances through no agency of their own, other people “ask for it” through their own actions, and, most importantly, that the latter are at fault for their own sorry situation while for the former, Fortune and the actual perpetrators who caused their misfortune are to blame. Polybius concludes, “For this reason (διό), among those who think sensibly (παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν), pity and aid as well as pardon accompany those who fall from Fortune, but reproach and blame follow those who suffer because of their own folly.”60 Polybius establishes this conclusion as the natural result (διὸ) of the previous premises and characterizes this as the response of prudent people (τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν). This last phrase, “τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν”, frames this as the socially accepted conclusion, and in doing so Polybius puts pressure upon his readers: if a reader wants to be among “τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν”, then they should also come to this same conclusion. Thus, Polybius provides his external readers with an internal model who makes a judgment corroborating Polybius’ authorial argument. Through this internalized but unobtrusive group, the “τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν”, Polybius guides his readers to come to the correct appraisal. In this case, the correct appraisal involves expressing the emotion of pity. This reinforces that for Polybius pity constituted a correct emotional response to

206  Learning From History the misfortunes of those who did not cause their own downfall, as seen also in Achaeus’ case. In sum, this digression teaches readers when pity was appropriate as a response to historical events and behaviors. In a digression on the difference between flatterers and genuine supporters, Polybius explains that, when one seems to be overcome by feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from those who see and hear him (παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι), and the strangeness moves each of us (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν) in some way.61 First, pity is brought out in observers, who see and hear the one suffering.62 Again, this category of observers is broad enough to include the reader, who may witness this suffering through the medium of history. Second, Polybius uses a first-person plural pronoun (ἡμῶν) to incorporate his audience directly in this sentiment. He elides the potential difference between those who observe and “us”: some observe (παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι) the situation and feel pity, and each of us (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν) is moved by the situation. This statement only makes sense if we as readers observe, are moved by the strangeness, and feel pity. In this way, Polybius guides his reader to feel pity appropriately. In addition to including his readers, Polybius establishes two parameters for appropriate pity through these two digressive passages. First, pity comes to those who did not bring their misfortune on themselves actively, and second, the magnitude of one’s sufferings may elicit pity. In the final passage under discussion, Polybius draws upon both features to persuade his readers that they should pity the Greeks after their downfall in the Achaean War. The Achaean War and the Power of Pity

Polybius’ text, as we now have it, ends with the narrative of the Achaean War, which concluded in 146 bce with the destruction of Corinth, dissolution of the Achaean League’s interstate power, and establishment of a Roman-sanctioned constitution.63 Polybius argues that the Greeks in the Achaean War suffered more than in any previous Greek disaster and that they both brought it upon themselves and deserved the blame.64 Moreover, Polybius contrasts the Greek disaster with the concurrent fall of Carthage in the Third Punic War, in which the Romans destroyed the city and the Carthaginian people themselves.65 Pity features largely in Polybius’ introduction of the Achaean War. In Chapter 2, we argued that Polybius appealed to two types of pity – those who do not bring disaster upon themselves or who suffer genuinely deserve pity, seen in the aforementioned examples, and those who shamefully survive defeat, seen in Hannibal’s staged duel of Celtic prisoners, deserve pity. We found that Polybius combined these sentiments about pity in the case of the Greeks after the Achaean War. By “choosing” to survive and pass on a legacy of shame to their descendants, similar to Hannibal’s defeated Celtic prisoners, as well as suffering genuinely, Polybius

Learning From History 207 argued that the Greeks deserved pity. In this section, we focus on how Polybius framed this argument for pity. First, Polybius describes how a generalized individual (τις) would evaluate the fall of Greece. “For not only would one (τις), considering the truth of each matter (πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας), pity the Greeks for what they suffered, but still more one might think that they fell into disaster for their own actions.”66 No one in particular observes, judges, and feels. The indefinite someone (τις) again represents a normative judge of the situation and a good reader of history. Polybius strengthens his rhetoric through the phrase πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας (“considering the truth of each matter”). By realizing the truth, one sees the genuine suffering involved and presumably can thus deem the Greeks all the more pitiable. This generalized person who finds the Greeks pitiable marks an ideal reader for Polybius because this individual not only observes and reflects on the historical situation but also calculates the truth, which the historian always strives to convey.67 Polybius then states that the suffering of the Carthaginians was thought to be the greatest, yet he asserts that someone (τις) might consider the Greek experience not less but even greater than the Carthaginian disaster.68 For, he explains, the Carthaginians gave posterity some defense for their resistance, whereas the Greeks gave no reasonable pretext for those who wished to help them.69 Moreover, Polybius states that the Carthaginians, being destroyed entirely in their downfall, had no experience of consequent disadvantages or evils, but the Greeks, looking on their own disaster, pass on to future generations an unjustifiable misfortune.70 Polybius expounds on how much pity the Greeks deserved after their survival of the Achaean War: So that, by as much as we consider (νομίζομεν) that those who survive in punishment are more pitiable than one of those who lost their lives in the thick of troubles, by so much it must be considered (νομιστέον) that the ­misfortunes of the Greeks at that time were more pitiable than what happened to the Carthaginians, unless someone makes their judgment spurning duty and right (τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ) but looking only towards expediency itself.71 Here Polybius combines several layers of persuasion. He frames his argument with the first-person plural as what “we” consider (νομίζομεν), taking the readers’ agreement on this premise for granted.72 In the second half of this correlative sentence, Polybius uses a statement of calculated necessity, as “what must be thought” (νομιστέον) to stress the rationality and inevitability of this conclusion. Any reader who disagreed would therefore be irrational. Lastly, Polybius incorporates moralistic language (τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ) to co-opt his readers further. By providing a hypothetical antithesis (εἰ μή τις) to his conclusion, Polybius applies ethical pressure on his audience to agree with him and thus be on the side of duty and what is right.73 Through these various layers of normative pressure on his readers, Polybius constructs a plausible argument that the Greeks actually deserved more pity than the Carthaginians.74

208  Learning From History Finally, after a digression on other Greek disasters, Polybius explains the power of pity: for pity from those outside (Ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος) is not an insignificant aid to those suffering unjustly (ἀδίκως), since often it is possible to see both Fortune being changed, together with the inclinations of the many, and the conquerors themselves changing their minds and rectifying the ills of those who fell into misfortune unexpectedly.75 External observers (παρὰ τῶν ἐκτός), similar to those who observed and judged Achaeus’ demise, feel pity. Ηere Polybius explicitly acknowledges why these observers are so important: the judgment and pity of others has the potential to create change in Fortune and the conquerors. Applied to the Greeks after the Achaean War, Polybius wanted “those outside” to pity the Greeks in their disaster, thus mitigating the Greeks’ suffering and any possible further punishment from the Romans.76 Observers, including his readers, should now pity the Greeks more than the Carthaginians, for the Greeks deserved pity not only because their past actions were shameful and their suffering genuine but also because they needed that pity for their future. The surviving narrative of the events of the Achaean War supports this reading of pity. Polybius narrates that the cities pity those leaving to fight as if they foresaw the future result.77 He describes the panic at Patras as more pitiable than what happened elsewhere in the Peloponnese.78 When summing up the extent of the rampant madness, Polybius states that “even an enemy would feel pity for the Greeks, seeing their misfortunes (κἂν ἐχθρὸν ἐλεῆσαι θεασάμενον τὴν τότε περιπέτειαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος).”79 The Greeks despaired of pity from the Romans, but Polybius emphasized that the quick termination of the war and the mildness of the Romans saved the Greeks.80 Polybius highlights the folly of the Greek leaders and treats the rest of the Greeks as swept away by these leaders’ mania.81 This allows him to claim pity for the Greeks in general as suffering genuinely yet not wholly responsible and allows him to blame the demagogic leaders and thus show the responsibility and blame for the war to be entirely Greek, not Roman.82 Conclusion

Polybius employed a variety of rhetorical techniques to inculcate a sense of normative emotion in his readers. Observers approximate the readers’ position and provide a model of appropriate emotional reactions. They and the generalized “anybody” who often stands in as an astute student of history are invited to feel a wide range of emotions – indignation, resentment, anger, hatred, and pity – in response to a variety of incidents, such as the maltreatment of parents, a sudden reversal of fortune, failed surprise attacks, erroneous judgments of historical events, historiographical favoritism, and various appraisals of who is worthy of pity.83 In all of these, the reader becomes a better student of history by learning both to feel correctly in response to types of incidents and to judge characters morally through emotional

Learning From History 209 reactions. They also learn about the (emotional) consequences of making the same mistakes as those whose behavior Polybius criticizes. Moreover, readers are shown that emotions themselves can be appropriate responses in and to history. Polybius’ extant prologue and narrative of the Achaean War affirm to the readers that the Greeks deserved pity (ἔλεος). In this prologue he utilizes emotional persuasion to promote a complex understanding and response of pity. Through his emotional persuasion, Polybius guides his reader to judge that the Greeks as a whole deserved pity and could benefit from the readers’ pity as well. Polybius shows us that not only do emotions play an important role in the course of historical narrative, but emotionally astute readers also have the potential to change the course of future events. The contemporary importance of pity in reacting to the Achaean War takes emotion from an abstract, historiographical use and brings out its immediacy: Polybius’ first readers lived through and likely were affected by or participated in these events, on one side or another. Throughout the Histories, Polybius emphasizes the didacticism of historiography. Reading historiography should teach one how to apply the lessons from past events to one’s own situation. In 3.31, Polybius saw emotion itself as a benefit of reading history: one could learn how to identify and persuade people to join in one’s anger, pity, or pursuit of justice. In this final section, we argued that Polybius also teaches when and with which emotion it is appropriate for readers to sympathize. The immediate relevance of the Achaean War vivifies these historiographical precepts for Polybius’ contemporary audience. Learning from past events had direct relevance, as did the emotional responses to such events. Polybius’ portrayal and advocating for pity after the Achaean War had immediate significance, as did the reading of history. Conclusions: Emotions in the Histories Agents feel emotion in the Histories for a reason. Philip V cited the Aetolian destruction at Dodona by Dorimachus and at Dium by Scopas as his reason and justification for destroying parts of the Aetolian capital at Thermum. The people of Alexandria vented their anger on Agathocles’ family and followers because they felt that Agathocles and his regime had abused their power and committed outrages against members of the community. The Carthaginians held onto their anger and began the Second Punic War because they considered the Roman seizure of Sardinia unjust. Scipio Africanus quelled a mutiny by arguing that the mutineers’ indignation had no rational basis and therefore was unjustified indignation. Reasons underlie these emotions. Similar to the Bennett Helm’s theory of moral emotions, in Polybius’ text characters feel emotions because they care about something, and something happened either to benefit or to promote what they care about, thus arousing positive emotions, or more often something happens which harms what they value. In this way, emotions can be rational and moral in Polybius’ Histories. Not all emotions are rational and moral, however. Polybius judges emotions on how appropriately characters are motivated and how they act on their emotion. Teuta, the Queen of Illyria, felt inappropriate and unjustifiable anger at the Roman

210  Learning From History envoy Coruncanius’ outspokenness and reacted disproportionately by assassinating him. The people of Alexandria felt appropriate and rational negative emotions against Agathocles and his regime but reacted disproportionately; Agathocles himself did not receive a punishment severe enough for his crimes, despite the savage violence enacted by the Alexandrian mob against his family and associates. Philip V at Thermum felt appropriate anger against the Aetolians but misdirected his anger against the property of the gods, causing disproportionate destruction. In wars, the moral appropriateness of an emotion is shown in its suitability for use as a pretext and acceptability as a cause. Polybius criticizes Hannibal for using a pretext less justifiable than the cause – Carthaginian anger at the Roman injustice in seizing Sardinia. However, Polybius does not criticize but rather characterizes as justified the Carthaginians’ ire over the Romans’ seizure of Sardinia as the primary cause of the war. Polybius discusses the importance of the convergence of justified moral grounds with strategic prudence with regard to the Romans’ choice to delay declaring war upon Perseus until they found a suitable pretext. The combination of justified moral reasons to begin a war, expressed through anger, with strategic prudence is important. Emotions thus are not inherently negative or irrational. Their motivation and result determine how to evaluate an emotion, even in the pragmatic genre of historiography. Moreover, as emotions are not categorically irrational, so too they do not characterize only those of whom Polybius disapproved – barbarians, women, the masses, mercenaries, and the youth. The people under tyranny or oligarchy in the anacyclosis felt rational emotions based on their sense of social morality and created the positive changes to aristocracy and democracy, respectively. On the other hand, the people in the mixed constitution felt anger based on ambition and greed, forsaking any thought for the good of others, and thus they accelerated their decline into ochlocracy. All characters, including those who stereotypically show reason, the Achaeans and the Romans, expressed emotions as much as the paradigms of barbarity, that is, the Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls. Only in why they felt emotion and how they reacted does Polybius evaluate emotion. The justifiability of wars demonstrates this point: Romans, Carthaginians, Gauls, Libyan mercenaries, a Bithynian monarch, an Illyrian woman, an Aetolian, and a Messenian all felt anger which led to war. Only those whose anger did not refer back to a moral and acceptable cause are portrayed negatively by Polybius. Emotions bring moral principle into action. Only after the people of the anacyclosis or of Alexandria felt emotion did they create change for the better in the state. The transgression of their moral values elicited anger, hatred, and indignation, which propelled the people and their leaders to action. Through this same process, emotion links wars separated in time: Hamilcar and the Carthaginians felt anger at the unsatisfactory, dishonorable, and unjust endings of their previous conflicts with Rome, and thus Polybius cited their anger in the causation of the Second Punic War. Even in speeches, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus cited emotion based on what was (not) honorable as a motivation for action. Hannibal motivated his soldiers to pursue action and death in battle rather than to survive in dishonor and become pitiable. Scipio Africanus challenged the rational basis for his soldiers’

Learning From History 211 indignation, arguing away any rational or moral foundation for such emotion and thus depriving them of a reason to continue their actions as mutineers. Contextualization of Polybius’ use of emotions challenges the universal applicability of Aristotle’s Rhetoric as “the standard” account of ancient Greek emotion, supplementing the comparisons made by Konstan to Classical authors’ usages. Polybius used the emotional terms τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, and προσκοπή to express moral disapproval in his narrative, yet these terms are absent in Aristotle’s list of emotions. In the Histories, the people as a collective community reacted together with anger, hatred, resentment, and indignation to cause social change within the state, even when they technically had no political status, such as under the monarchy in Alexandria. Polybius’ historical text includes also the emotions of a state as a unity, such as the Aetolians’ or Carthaginians’ anger against Rome. While the anger of these states follows the same basic processes as that of the anger of individuals, that is, in response to a transgression or slight, Aristotle’s focus on social hierarchy does not apply in the international arena, where those defeated, such as Carthage after the First Punic War, still grow angry and eventually begin war. Polybius’ historical text gives insight into collective emotion, for example, beyond the discussion of individual, interpersonal emotion which Aristotle discusses. Within the genre of ancient historiography, Polybius continues portrayals of emotion seen in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. This continuity serves as a testament to the historians’ project of grounding their texts in reality. However, Polybius’ use and terminology of emotions is more expansive than that of the Classical historians. This attests to a broader interest in emotion, such as hatred, indignation, resentment, pity, and reflective emotions. This broader interest and portrayal may reflect various influences. Many philosophical works in the early Hellenistic period theorized emotions and affective experience (πάθη). The influence of the so-called tragic historiography and its sensational and emotional style motivated Polybius to frame part of his own historiographical theory as a rebuttal to these trends. However, some emotional terminology used by Polybius was not continued by later authors, historiographical and other. The word form for indignation, δυσαρέστησις, does not occur as pervasively in any other text as in Polybius’ Histories. The trends noticed may therefore attest to Polybius’ intellectual context, with both Hellenistic philosophies focusing on emotion and historians paying greater attention to feelings as well, or they may simply be idiosyncratic to Polybius’ style and interest. The unfortunate loss of much of Hellenistic literature makes any conclusion on this topic tenuous. However, Polybius’ Histories provides an important and unique view into the portrayal and understanding of emotions in the late Hellenistic period. Along with other ancient historians, Polybius provides a unique dataset for identifying and analyzing emotions – historical reality. As opposed to the ancient philosophies, especially Polybius’ near-contemporary Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism, Polybius’ historical text provides examples of emotion at work affecting events, influencing decisions, and causing historical change. The Hellenistic philosophies, on the other hand, examined and theorized emotions

212  Learning From History specifically in accordance with their larger philosophical framework. The Stoics, in idealizing a sage who can choose to remain undisturbed by the world, described emotions cognitively as judgments to which one must rationally assent. Thus, their sage was thought not to assent to feelings which might disturb him, which would then become emotions. The Epicureans likewise theorized emotions in how they pertain to their sage’s goal of pleasurable ataraxia. Emotions could vary the sage’s pleasure, but they were unnecessary desires, unessential to the Epicurean lifestyle. Polybius does not focus on the cognitive processes of emotion but instead portrays emotion within their social contexts; he describes emotions as they regularly happened in the world. Polybius’ historiographical portrayal of emotions shares similarities instead with the analysis of emotions in modern philosophy and psychology. These modern studies found their analyses on empirical observations of emotions in social contexts, and they theorize generalized human behavior. Polybius too records emotions within their social contexts and comments on generalized human behavior in history. Moreover, Polybius in some ways anticipates the modern social sciences in his portrayal of emotions. For example, he portrays emotions as rationally based, something the social sciences began to emphasize in the 1990s and 2000s.84 He describes collective emotion, which recently has seen increased attention, particularly in causing social change.85 The good generals of Polybius’ narrative, specifically Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, demonstrate excellent emotional awareness, a component of what is identified now as emotional intelligence.86 Polybius narrates emotions as embedded in social contexts: emotions facilitate interaction (whether positive or harmful) between different individuals and groups.87 Polybius’ portrayal of emotions at work in his historical narrative anticipates and corroborates these modern views from the social sciences. Emotion plays an integral role in Polybius’ attribution of historical causation. Polybius portrayed emotion, particularly anger, as acceptable and justifiable as a cause of war. Emotion was so important that Polybius cites it in his prominent discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War. The “wrath of the Barcids” has featured in scholarship on the causation of the Second Punic War as an embarrassment and an unfortunate fault in Polybius’ judgment.88 Yet Polybius deliberately attributes anger as a cause and argues against views which attribute the immediate circumstances surrounding the siege of Saguntum as a cause. Anger explains why Hamilcar expanded Carthaginian strength in Iberia and why the Carthaginians supported both him and his son Hannibal. Anger unites the state of Carthage. Anger links the Second Punic War back to the First Punic War and the Mercenary War. Anger explains and justifies their human behavior, providing the psychological underpinnings of Hamilcar’s and the Carthaginians’ decisions and thus fulfilling the role of a cause (αἰτία) in Polybius’ theory of causation. Moreover, to understand history, readers should pay closest attention to causes, which affect agents’ decisions, so that they too can persuade others to join in their own feelings and endeavors. Emotions as causal mechanisms in human decision-making not only justify individuals’ actions, explain why states change from worse to better, and link the

Learning From History  213 beginning of wars to past events. They also provide the basis for persuading one to sympathize with and join in one’s own actions. Thus, emotions are effective in and for history. They reflect Polybius’ moral values. Sometimes, they arise because the morals and standards of reasonable agents have been thwarted and trampled. At other times, emotions highlight a character’s incongruence with Polybius’ own moral values and provide the basis for criticism of the character. Polybius provides insight into human emotion by describing how emotions connect historical events and motivate action. As a historian, Polybius set out to narrate what happened, what was likely to happen, and only what was important to the events. Emotions were important enough to include in his historical narrative. To conclude, let us return to Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus. Polybius censures Phylarchus for “endeavoring to bring his readers to pity and to make them share the experience with what they were reading” (σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις) in the passage with which we began this monograph.89 In this final chapter we showed that Polybius indeed engaged in “attempting to bring his readers to pity” and “to share the experience with what they were reading.” Scholars have examined Polybius’ criticism of Phylarchus through several different – and effective – angles. Polybius is not just replicating Achaean political bias, Polybius is not criticizing a whole “tragic” subgenre of history, Polybius is not criticizing emotion per se.90 In this book, I have attempted to build on these findings of what Polybius did not do in this passage to show what Polybius did do throughout the Histories, so that we can evaluate whether he succeeded according to his own principles in criticism of Phylarchus, in which he claimed that one could not grow angry appropriately or pity reasonably without giving due attention to causes (ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ’ ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὔτ’ ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων).91 So how did Polybius do? Polybius wrote an affective history, in which a wide variety of emotions pervaded the narrative and emotion formed a goal of the project of history. Polybius himself portrayed emotion as a crucial element in causation and as a bridge between moral principle and action. Polybius narrated characters’ emotions as appropriate or inappropriate to their motivations and as correctly and proportionately acted upon (or not). In learning how to react appropriately through the perspective of observers, readers were encouraged to apply that which in Polybius’ estimation distinguished humanity from animals, the ability to apply another’s situation to oneself. This lesson applied not only to Polybius’ contemporary readers, who, through reading the Histories, were learning how to manage and survive in the changing world of the second century bce, but also to future readers who identify themselves as part of humanity and who likewise need to navigate other people’s behavior. Through his portrayals of emotions, through their motivations, results, and tendencies, and through his guidance to appropriate evaluations of emotions, Polybius challenges readers to consider emotions carefully as part of history, calibrate their own emotional reactions appropriately, and learn from and apply other people’s experiences to their own lives.

214  Learning From History Notes

1 Polyb., 3.31.2–4. 2 Polyb., 3.31.5–9, esp. 3.31.8–9. 3 Polyb., 3.31.10. 4 Polyb., 3.31.11–12. 5 See Walbank 1975 on Polybius’ metaphors of weaving history. 6 See Longley 2013 on Polybius’ use of the first-person; see Sacks 1981; Moore 2020 on Polybius’ direct didacticism. 7 Emotion has a clear place in studies of ancient rhetoric, supplemented and broadened recently by the volume Emotion and Classical Rhetoric, which sought to include analyses of emotion in rhetoric beyond Classical Attic oratory, Sanders and Johncock 2016. See also Gill 1984; Wisse 1989; Rorty 1996; Graver 2002; Garsten 2006; Konstan 2007; Oliver 2006; Remer 2013.   Within Polybius’ Histories, Longley 2013; Miltsios 2013; Farrington 2015 have recently analyzed the historian’s rhetoric in his narrative. Longley 2013 analyzed Polybius’ conscious use of the first-person singular pronoun and concluded that this usage enhanced his didacticism. Farrington 2015 provides us with details on how Polybius used rhetoric to make his history seem accurate and credible. Miltsios, in his 2013 narratological study of Polybius’ Histories, provides a starting point for analyzing Polybius’ rhetorical techniques. Miltsios 2013, 142–143 lists several types of techniques the historian may use to persuade his audience of his correctness as a historian. Both Marincola 1997, 10–11 and Grethlein 2013, 224–267 commented that Polybius presents the most active and intrusive narratorial presence of the extant ancient historians. 8 Levene 1997. 9 Marincola 2003, 293–294. See too Davidson 1991; Levene 1997. 10 This analysis moves beyond an examination solely of the audience’s sympathizing with characters, which Davidson 1991and Levene 1997 bring up in their analyses. This analysis supports Wiater 2016’s argument that Polybius considered the author and readers as active roles in constructing historical understanding. 11 See, for multiple examples per passage, Polyb., 1.4, 1.15, 1.20, 1.81, 2.15, 2.56–62, 3.58, and 3.81. 12 For examples of τις representing one who makes a judgment or calculation based on evidence, see, for example, in Book 1: Polyb., 1.20.11, 1.20.13, 1.26.9, 1.35.1, 1.57.4, 1.64.5, 1.65.6, 1.81.5. For usages involving judgment of a historian, see 1.4.11, 1.14.5, 1.15.12; for instances which clearly involve judgment or calculation from the reader, see 1.64.1. The indefinite pronoun τις also frequently appears in dependent clauses with the subjunctive in a different sense of establishing conditions, not of coming to a conclusion or judgment; for examples in books 1–5, see Polyb., 1.14.4, 1.81.6, 2.33.3, 2.56.14, 3.22.6, 3.22.10, 3.23.3, 3.24.10, 3.31.2, 3.58.9, 3.71.4, 3.81.11, 4.27.7, 4.35.3, 4.76.6, 5.11.3, 5.24.3, 5.90.3. τις with εἰ and the optative often denote someone more specific than the uses of the potential optative; see Polyb., 3.8.9, 4.11.5, 4.63.4. τις and the indicative (often in the future tense) denote something specific and related to the particular and actual narrative circumstances rather than to the general takeaway points which the potential optative open up; see Polyb., 3.6.4, 3.31.2, 3.32.9. 13 Polyb., 3.26.6–7. 14 See too Chapter 4, 175. See, for example, Smyth 1984, 310 on the use of the singular for a collective “everybody”. 15 Polyb., 3.21.8–3.26.7. Polybius’ discussion of treaties continues through 3.28. 16 Interestingly, both of Polybius’ readers consider the Romans’ crossing to Sicily to have been wrong (ethically) or at fault (legally). Polybius does not present a conclusion regarding the Carthaginians as wrong or at fault. Perhaps this reflects Polybius’ own judgment or reflects the most common reactions to the Romans’ crossing to Sicily. 17 Polyb., 1.14.1–3.

Learning From History 215 18 Polyb., 1.14.4–5. 19 On Polybius’ target audience, see Walbank 1972, 3–6; Eckstein 1995, 16–17; Champion 2004a, 4 note 5, 7, McGing 2010, 67; Moore 2017, 146–148. 20 See too Polyb., 20.10.7. This emotional control seems to parallel a Stoic sage, in that the historian should be free from emotional attachment. See von Scala 1890, 201–255, 325–333 on Polybius’ links with Stoicism; see contra, Walbank 1972, 94. See Graver 2007 for a discussion of Stoic theory of emotions, including discussion of sages. 21 See Sacks 1981; Moore 2020 on Polybius’ portrayal of the didactic historian. 22 Davidson 1991, 14. 23 James Davidson classifies a type of perspective-taking in Polybius’ Histories which he calls the “empathetic gaze”: readers project the sufferings of others onto their own circumstances, Davidson 1991, 16. I move beyond sympathy and show that Polybius encouraged a range of emotions in his readers. The closest emotion to sympathy which I discuss is pity (ἔλεος). While pity involves seeing others’ suffering and feeling badly for them, it is not the same as our version of sympathy. See Konstan 2001 for nuances of the Greek ἔλεος in comparison to “pity” in English. Similarly, Levene 1997, 134, observers that Polybius appears to suggest that these “audience-based” emotions have in themselves a valid role to play in historiography. Provided that the author arouses appropriate emotions in the audience, by ensuring that the characters with whom they are encouraged to sympathize actually deserve their sympathy, “audience-based” emotions are not only derived from, but may reinforce and underpin, the moral and historical analysis. Both scholars focus on the reader’s unmediated sympathizing or feeling for characters in the narrative; however, Polybius often presents his readers with third parties who provide models of various emotional reactions. Davidson 1991 addresses third-party perspectives which Polybius uses to mediate the historical scene, but he does not address how third parties provide models for emotion. The elements of appropriateness and the historical and moral significance of emotions are central in Polybius’ rhetoric, but Polybius employs a broader range of emotion beyond sympathy which his readers are encouraged and manipulated to feel in response to the narrative of his Histories. 24 The methods and lessons Polybius employs are conducive for both sets of readers. 25 Polyb., 6.6.3. 26 Polyb., 6.6.7. 27 Polyb., 6.6.7–9. 28 Polyb., 6.6.4. 29 Polyb., 5.98.7. 30 Polyb., 5.98.8. 31 Polybius uses συνίημι more frequently than most Greek historians: Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon use this verb 27 times, whereas Polybius uses this verb 53 times. Even Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the extant historians closest in time following Polybius, use this verb only 17 times, despite the large size of their texts. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed August 21, 2020). Polybius uses this verb most often to denote that someone has gained information about an event that occurred (τὸ γεγόνος): 1.19.14, 1.22.1, 1.38.1, 1.76.1, 2.3.3, 3.76.8, 3.84.13, 5.27.5, 5.47.1, 5.73.7, 5.94.5, 5.96.8, 5.98.8; or the presence of the enemy (τὴν παρουσίαν): 1.60.4, 2.27.7, 3.40.12, 3.89.1, 4.11.1, 4.68.4, 4.73.1, 5.72.4; or movement of the enemy: 2.5.7, 2.11.9, 4.13.1, 4.80.3, 5.95.7, 9.5.3, 9.5.7. With reference to other events: 2.21.6, 2.63.2, 5.16.2; with reference to others’ plans or intentions: 3.18.1, 5.57.7, 5.92.3, 7.3.9, 8.20.5. 32 Polybius does not specify that these perceivers must be physically present at the event, nor do they have to be contemporaries. They merely must observe Philip V’s actions at Melitea or similar behavior in other leaders and come to this conclusion. 33 On Polybius’ advice to generals, see Sacks 1981, 128–170; Eckstein 1995, 16–27. 34 This analysis aligns with Sacks 1981, 134; Davidson 1991; Levene 1997.

216  Learning From History 35 Polyb., 9.10.6–12. This passage is preserved in both the Constantinian Excerpts under the title De Sententiis and in the Excerpta Antiqua selections. 36 Polyb., 9.10.6. On envy/φθόνος, see Walcot 1978; Konstan 2003; Konstan and Rutter 2003; Kaster 2005; Sanders 2014. 37 Polyb., 9.10.7–8. This self-pity comes close to Davidson’s empathetic gaze, for the viewers here first feel sympathy for the others’ sufferings but then feel wholly for themselves, Davidson 1991, 14. 38 Polyb., 9.10.10. 39 Polybius specifies that φθόνος causes the most fear in rulers, Polyb., 9.10.6. 40 See especially Harris 2001 on anger as irrational. See Konstan 2006, 111–128; Sanders 2014 on negative consequences of φθόνος in the ancient world. 41 This resumes and concludes the narrative of Achaeus which had begun with Antiochus’ succession to the throne in 223 bce at 5.40.7, when Antiochus appointed Achaeus as governor of all to the west of the Taurus mountain range. Throughout his narrative of affairs in Asia in Book 5, Achaeus pops up as a character Antiochus’ immediate rivals hope will plot against Antiochus. At 5.57, Achaeus officially revolts against Antiochus and takes up the diadem and title of king and leads an army to the east against Antiochus, but his soldiers mutiny. Shortly thereafter, Antiochus and Ptolemy cannot come to terms with a truce primarily because of the figure of Achaeus, Polyb., 5.67.12. By the end of Book Five, the last complete book of Polybius’ Histories, Antiochus leads an army across the Taurus mountain range against Achaeus. Because the rest of the books are only in excerpts, we do not see Achaeus again until 7.15–18, where Antiochus has already laid siege to Achaeus in Sardis. Polybius narrates Antiochus’ taking of the city of Sardis except for the citadel due to a ruse by Lagoras the Cretan and a coordinated assault by Antiochus. The narrative of 8.15–21 describes how Bolis, a Cretan mercenary in Ptolemaic service, was asked to free Achaeus and how he decided instead to betray Achaeus to Antiochus. 42 Polyb., 8.36.7–8. 43 Polyb., 8.36.9. 44 See, for examples involving people, Polyb., 3.82.8, 5.37.6, 6.18.5, 6.53.3, 8.36.6, 8.36.9, 9.13.2, 9.23.4, 15.37.2, 16.8.7, 16.22.2, 18.25.1, 18.41.2, 28.21.4, 32.13.9, 36.2.2, 36.2.4, 38.2.8, 38.3.2, 38.6.1, Fr. 23. For Polybius’ use with a limiting genitive: 1.5.2, 1.18.3, 1.45.9, 1.57.8, 1.73.4, 2.28.5, 3.24.2, 3.117.3, 3.117.7, 5.53.9, 5.81.5, 6.7.5, 6.13.6, 6.46.8, 9.10.12, 9.37.1, 10.16.3, 10.21.6, 13.3.2, 14.1.7, 14.2.8, 15.6.4, 15.36.7, 16.6.2, 16.12.6, 16.23.4, 16.29.14, 16.30.6, 18.25.1, 21.5.4, 24.11.7, 25.21.3, 30.28.1, 31.15.7. 45 See, for example, Hdt., 7.22.3; Thuc., 2.7.2, 2.12.2; specifically outside of the Peloponnese: Thuc., 5.77.6, 5.77.7, 5.79.4; Xen., Hell. 1.2.3. Geographical usages: Polyb., 1.5.2, 1.73.4, 3.24.2, 3.37.9, 6.13.6, 10.16.3, 15.6.4, 16.29.13, 30.10.3, 30.28.1, 31.15.7, 38.6.1. Referring to affairs: Polyb., 1.12.7 and 2.1.1 (τοῖς ἐκτὸς . . . πράγμασιν), 23.17.4. Unlike the Classical historians, Polybius frequently uses ἐκτός without a genitive specifying of what something or someone is outside: Polyb., 1.12.7, 2.4.8, 3.46.2, 4.84.4, 5.34.2, 5.37.6, 6.18.5, 6.53.3, 6.57.2, 8.36.6, 8.3.9, 9.13.2, 9.23.4, 9.42.1, 10.9.7, 11.25.2, 12.25e.4, 12.25h.3, 15.37.2, 16.8.7, 16.22.2, 16.29.13, 18.41.2, 21.27.7, 23.17.4, 28.21.4, 30.10.3, 30.19.4, 32.13.9, 36.2.2, 36.2.4, 38.2.8, 38.3.2, 38.6.1, Fr. 23. 46 Polyb., 36.2.1. 47 Polyb., 36.2.2. 48 Polyb., 36.2.3–4. 49 Polyb., 36.2.4. 50 See Baronowski 1995 for a different interpretation. 51 See, for external people who judge characters and events of the narrative: Polyb., 5.37.2, 8.12.3, 8.36.6, 8.36.9, 9.23.4, 16.8.7, 30.19.4, 36.2.2, 36.2.4, 38.3.2. This sometimes takes the form of someone attempting to form a potentially deceitful appearance for

Learning From History 217 themselves to “those outside”, 5.37.2. For the reverse, where outsiders are not deceived but cannot be kept ignorant, 8.12.3. Polybius thus uses this phrase in complex ways. For external observers generally: 2.47.10, 3.82.8, 4.84.8, 6.53.3, 9.13.2, 12.25e.4, 15.37.2, 16.22.2, 28.21.4. 52 Polyb., 8.21.1 and 8.21.6–7. 53 Polyb., 8.20.9–10. 54 Konstan 2006, 201–218, especially 202, 211–215, argues that pity (ἔλεος) requires distance between the subject and object of the emotion. This example corresponds with this. 55 See Arist., Rhet. 2.1385b11–20; Konstan 2006, 211–213 on pity in the ancient Greek world. See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 18, on the modern categories of non-reflexive and reflexive emotions. 56 Thucydides and Xenophon use ἔλεος or ἐλέω once each: Thuc., 3.40.3, Xen. Hell. 1.5.19. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon do not use the adjective at all. Polybius, on the other hand, uses this term 40 times in total. The use of this term for pity increases with the Imperial Greek historians: Diodorus Siculus has 90 usages, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 41, Josephus 44, Appian 48, and Cassius Dio 65. While the size of the later historians’ texts are, on the whole, much larger than the Classical historians, it seems clear that this terminology for pity increases in later Greek historians. Search from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae© Digital Library (accessed August 21, 2020). 57 Polyb., 2.5–6. 58 Polyb., 2.7.1. 59 Poly., 2.7.2. 60 Polyb., 2.7.3. 61 Polyb., 15.17.1. 62 See Polyb., 12.25d-25e, Sacks 1981, 32–40; Marincola 1997, 63–86 on seeing, hearing, and personal experience as important to the historian and as the means of synthesizing history. 63 Book 39, of which little survives, would have covered the final part of the war and part of the reconstruction period of Greece after its loss to the Romans, including Polybius’ prominent role in aiding the Greeks to accept the Roman terms. The extant account of the Achaean War in Polybius’ Histories comes solely from excerpts from the Byzantine compilation of the tenth century, the Constantinian Excerpts. Our analysis of this partial text, then, must necessarily hold a disclaimer that the rest of the Histories may have elucidated the points at issue. Moreover, the passages on the Achaean War come from different titles within the Constantinian Excerpts, so their exact relations to one another are unknown. The prologue, 38.1–4, on which I focus here, comes from the selection entitled De Sententiis, and so this segment can more securely be read as a unified entity. The narration of the war, 38.14–18, comes from the lone manuscript of the title De Virtibus et Vitiis. The Excerpts have been shown to be unaltered except for the beginnings and ends by comparison of the excerpts from Books 1 to 5 with the full text of these books from their independent manuscript tradition. See Moore 1965 for the fullest discussion of Polybius’ manuscript tradition, and see Kaldellis 2015, 35–42; Németh 2018 on the Constantinian Excerpts.   See Kallet-Marx 1995a, 42–56 on the debated role of Rome in the Achaeans’ governance after the war and the extent of the League’s “dissolution”. See too Kallet-Marx 1995b; Champion 2007 on interpreting the Roman presence in Greece through the Dyme inscription. 64 Polybius specifies that he deems that the leaders in particular were responsible at 38.3.13, and the extant narrative follows this judgment. 38.3.13 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἠγνοηκέναι πολ καὶ παραπεπαικέναι , ἡμαρτ γεγονότας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοίας. Unfortunately, the text from 38.3.8–13 is largely illegible in the single manuscript of the Constantinian Excerpts preserving this section. 65 Polyb., 38.1–3. See Le Bohec 2011 on the events of the Third Punic War. 66 Polyb., 38.1.3.

218  Learning From History 67 See Marincola 1997, 71–75 on historians’ truth claims. See Polyb., 2.7, 15.17.1–2, and 16.32 for pity based on genuine suffering; see Polyb., 3.62–63 and 14.10 for pity which accompanies shameful behavior. 68 Polyb., 38.1.4. 69 Polyb., 38.1.5. 70 Polyb., 38.1.6. This is quite a claim, even in the context of Polybius’ aristocratic ethos, see Eckstein 1995, 28–55. While the shame may have been so great that all the Greeks felt they would have been better off if they had all died, I find it unlikely. Polybius goes to great lengths to make this claim. Understanding the emotional persuasion elucidates this argument’s significance. 71 Polyb., 38.1.7–8. 72 See Polyb., 3.62–63 for expansion on this premise. 73 The “τις” here represents an outlier to Polybius’ normative view and may represent some who disagreed with Polybius and against whom he argues for pitying the Greeks. This indefinite someone does not take into consideration the points and evidence Polybius has thus far provided in his historical narrative. Polybius’ highly moralizing vocabulary and previous use of νομίζομεν warns his audience from thinking like this outlier, who considers only τὸ σύμφερον – here only (amoralistic) expediency. The view expressed here aligns with behavior Polybius condoned throughout the Histories and is highlighted especially by the concern for duty and what is right. See Cic., De Off. 2.9–10 and Book 3 on the Stoic distinction (and reconciliation) between these concepts. 74 The effort to make this argument may provide evidence that, contrary to Polybius, not everyone agreed that the Greeks deserved more pity than the Carthaginians. While this allows that the persuasive techniques analyzed may not have always succeeded, the fact that Polybius made this argument potentially against the grain of public opinion only heightens its importance within Polybius’ text. 75 Polyb., 38.3.2. 76 While this explanation of the power of pity comes in the context of discussing previous Greek disasters, the reason for discussing those disasters is to relate back to the Greeks after the Achaean War, so it is appropriate to apply Polybius’ generalizations, comments, and conclusions to the Greeks after the Achaean War.   Polybius minimizes any “punishment” from the Romans in the extant narrative. See 38.18.10–12. 77 Polyb., 38.15.9. 78 Polyb., 38.16.4. 79 Polyb., 38.16.7. This passage is preserved in the Constantinian Excerpts De Sententiis as an attestation of this common saying. 80 Polyb., 38.17.7, 38.18.9–12. 81 See Polyb., 38.9.5, 38.10.13, 38.11.9, 38.16.2, 38.16.9, and especially 38.18.7–9 for the blameworthiness of the leaders. 82 See Champion 2004a, 166–167 on the fault of the Greek demagogues. See Champion 2004b on Polybius’ portrayal of Greek demagogues as instigators of the crowd. 83 Interestingly, the typical “positive” emotions or feelings, such as joy, hope, gladness, or gratitude, do not appear in these persuasive contexts. 84 See, for example, Damasio 1994; Goldie 2000. 85 See Flam and King 2005; von Scheve and Salmela 2014. 86 See Bass 1990; Salovey and Mayer 1990; Goleman 1995; Bradberry and Greaves 2009. 87 The social foundation for emotions has recently seen increased attention, especially in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an internal, personal phenomenon. See, for example, Ahmed 2004; von Scheve 2013; Koschut 2020. 88 See Rich 1996, 14 nt. 55 for bibliography. 89 Polyb., 2.56.7.

Learning From History 219 90 See esp. Eckstein 2013; Farrington 2016; Marincola 2013. 91 Polyb., 2.56.13.

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Index

Abilux 76 – 77 Abrupolis 166 Abydus 48, 82 Achaea 1 – 2, 17 – 20, 22, 29 – 30, 32, 34, 48, 50, 54 – 56, 64 – 65, 74, 79, 82, 84 – 85, 122, 129, 131, 153 – 154, 167, 169, 171, 174, 198, 205 – 210, 213 Achaean War 1 – 2, 84 – 85, 154, 198, 205 – 209 Achaeus 16, 22, 56, 75, 80, 173, 203 – 204, 206, 208, 216n41 Aetolia 5 – 6, 17 – 21, 26, 30 – 34, 47, 50 – 51, 65, 74, 82, 152 – 154, 161, 164, 167, 169 – 171, 174, 176 – 178, 205, 209 – 211 Agathocleia 121 – 122, 124, 127 – 128, 131 Agathocles (of Alexandria) 9, 80, 105, 120 – 133, 152, 209 – 210 Alexander III 48, 84, 121, 166, 169, 172 Alexandria 51, 60, 80, 120 – 124, 131 – 133, 154, 163 – 164, 209 – 211 Alps 71, 83, 86 Amynander 49 Andobales 73 Andronidas 54 – 58 animals 29 – 30, 70, 82, 106 – 110, 115, 201, 213 Antigonus Doson 128 – 129 Antiochus III 5, 16, 22, 33, 51, 56, 80, 154, 157, 165, 177 – 178, 203 – 204, 216n41 Apelles 48, 62 – 64, 78 Aratus 2, 17 – 20, 22, 29, 34, 64, 69, 79, 122, 130 Arcadia 2, 53 Argos 129 Aristomachus 128 – 131

Aristotle 8, 24 – 25, 27, 34, 46 – 47, 51 – 52, 56 – 60, 62 – 63, 66, 68, 70, 75 – 76, 81, 85 – 86, 87n6, 105, 115, 118 – 119, 135n21, 211 Arsinoë III 121 – 125, 128, 131 Aspendus 56 Athens 56, 64, 79, 84, 155 Attalus 48, 173 barbarians 6 – 7, 25, 29 – 30, 33, 50, 76 – 77, 105, 155 – 156, 159, 164, 168 – 169, 210 Bithynia 171, 173, 210 Black Sea 173 Boeotia 50, 56, 153, 166 Bostar 76 – 77 Byzantium 173 Caecilius 47 Callicrates 54 – 58 Cannae 65, 68, 71 – 72, 106 Caphyae 17 – 18 Carthage 1, 9, 27, 33, 50 – 51, 64 – 66, 68, 71, 73, 75 – 77, 80 – 83, 122, 153 – 165, 167 – 169, 171 – 176, 178 – 179, 199, 203, 206 – 212 Cenchreae 128 – 129 Chalcis 84 Cleitor 68 – 69 community 32 – 33, 54, 68, 81, 105, 107 – 117, 120, 122 – 123, 125, 131 – 133, 152, 160, 163, 169, 171, 178, 201, 209, 211 Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus 63, 121, 142n127, 217n63 Corinth 1, 48 – 49, 56, 84, 206 Coruncanius 163 – 164, 170, 172 – 174, 210

Index  223 court and courtiers 21, 33, 49, 56, 62 – 64, 78, 80, 82, 120 – 121, 124, 126 – 127, 132 Croesus 22, 49 Cynoscephalae 164

Illyrian Wars 9, 163 import 17 – 19, 22 – 23, 30 – 34, 67, 71, 83, 108 Italy 5, 29, 52, 64, 68, 74, 76, 83, 158, 163, 168, 170

Danaë 125, 131 Deinon 122 Delphi 166 Demetrius of Pharos 71 democracy 49, 59 – 60, 106 – 107, 113 – 116, 118, 126, 132 – 133, 210 Demosthenes 53 Diodorus Siculus 59, 63 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 59 Dium 18 – 20, 31, 47, 209 Dodona 18 – 20, 31, 47, 209 Dolopia 166 Dorimachus 20, 169 – 174, 209 duels 83 – 84, 206

John of Antioch 121 Josephus 57

Ebro 157 – 158, 161 Egypt 1, 9, 56, 60, 80, 128, 131 – 133 environment 33, 130, 191n223 Ephorus 46 Epicureanism 16, 23, 27 – 28, 211 – 212 Epigenes 22, 33, 49 Epirus 31 – 32, 34, 82, 205 Eryx 159 Eumenes 166 Fabius Pictor 4, 65 – 66, 157 – 158, 182n48, 199 Fortune 22, 82 – 83, 204 – 205, 208 funerals 80, 106, 116, 121 – 122 Gesgo 161 – 163, 170, 173 Hamilcar 4, 27, 157, 159 – 160, 163, 165 – 166, 172, 176 – 178, 210, 212 Hannibal 4 – 5, 27, 29, 33 – 34, 51, 56, 65, 68, 71, 74, 76, 83 – 84, 86, 122, 154 – 159, 161, 166 – 172, 175 – 180, 206, 210, 212 Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal 71 Hasdrubal, son-in-law of Hamilcar 157 – 158, 161 Hermeias 21 – 22, 33, 49, 56 Herodotus 8, 22, 46 – 50, 52, 56 – 57, 60, 63 – 64, 70, 75, 78, 86, 211 Hiero II 62 Hieronymus 62

Krinion 48 Lake Trasimene 70 Laodike 16, 204 legality 153, 172, 174 – 176 Leontius 19 Leuctra 84 Libya 51, 161 – 163, 170, 173, 210 Macedonia 1 – 2, 18 – 19, 47, 49, 62, 64, 84, 124 – 127, 133, 169 – 170, 174 Macedonian Wars: Second 5, 49, 104, 164, 177; Third 1, 74, 166, 172 Mandonius 73 Mantinea 2, 84, 130 – 131 manuscript tradition 11n37, 88n47, 121, 142n127, 142n129, 142n132, 143n165, 183n67, 187n135, 188n165, 217nn63 – 64 Mathos 162 – 163, 173 Megaleas 48 Megalopolis 2, 62 Megara 50, 56, 153 Melitea 202 mercenaries 6, 9, 51, 60, 64, 67, 80, 120, 123, 154 – 155, 158 – 159, 161 – 163, 165, 170 – 173, 176, 178 – 179, 210, 212 Mercenary War (Truceless War) 9, 64, 154, 158 – 159, 161 – 163, 165, 170, 172 – 173, 178 – 179, 212 Messene 31, 65 – 66, 69, 167, 169, 171, 173 – 175, 199, 210 Moiragenes 125 – 127, 131, 133 multidimensionality 21 – 23, 52, 55 – 57, 60, 81, 83, 127 mutiny 66 – 67, 73, 86, 209, 211 New Carthage 179 Nicostratus 125 – 126 Oenanthe 122, 127 – 128, 131 oligarchy 49, 64, 106 – 107, 111, 113 – 119, 123, 126, 210

224 Index Orchomenos 68 orientation 21, 61, 73 Pednelissus 56, 75, 154 Pelusion 124 Pergamum 166, 173 Perseus 1, 166, 172, 210 Phigalia 153 Philammon 122, 128 Philinus 66, 175, 182n48 Philip II 53, 165 – 166, 172 Philip V 18 – 21, 26 – 29, 31 – 34, 47 – 50, 52, 58, 64, 69, 78 – 79, 82, 86, 164, 166 – 167, 170, 172, 177, 201, 209 – 210 Philo 128 Philopoemen 62 Phylarchus 1 – 3, 5, 7 – 8, 45 – 46, 80, 86, 128 – 131, 197 – 198, 213 Picenum 56, 154 Plato 25, 27, 114 – 115, 118 – 119, 135n21, 185n106 Polybius: life 1 – 2; audience 9n5, 29, 32 – 33, 68, 200 – 202, 204, 209, 215n19; style 2 – 4, 9n6, 181n26 Prusias I 171, 173, 176 Ptolemy IV 121 Ptolemy V 51, 121 – 122, 126 Punic Wars: First 21, 27, 50 – 51, 66, 153, 156 – 161, 165, 174 – 179, 198 – 199, 211 – 212; Second 1, 6, 9, 21, 25, 27, 33, 51, 56, 64 – 66, 68, 70 – 71, 74 – 75, 82 – 83, 104, 106, 153, 155 – 161, 163, 165 – 166, 172, 174 – 180, 197, 209 – 210, 212; Third 1, 80, 166, 168, 179, 203, 206 reflective 23, 46, 64, 69, 80 – 86, 108, 211 Regulus, Marcus 153 – 154 religion 19, 24, 37n82, 106, 152, 178 revolt 56, 66 – 67, 73 – 74, 112, 116, 119 Rhegium 66, 175, 199 rhetoric 4 – 5, 7, 9, 51 – 52, 54, 75, 79, 84 – 85, 133, 168, 198, 202, 207 – 208 Rhodes 48, 104, 173, 189n186 Rome 1 – 2, 4 – 7, 22, 24 – 25, 27, 30, 32 – 33, 47, 49 – 52, 54 – 56, 61, 64 – 66, 68, 70 – 78, 80, 83, 104 – 106, 114, 116, 153 – 170, 172 – 179, 198 – 204, 206, 208 – 210

Saguntum 76, 155 – 158, 160 – 161, 167 – 168, 176, 179, 212 Sardinia 51, 64, 157 – 161, 163 – 165, 168, 171 – 172, 176 – 179, 183n77, 184n93, 209 – 210 Sardis 16, 22, 56, 204 Scerdilaidas 47 Scipio Aemilianus, P. Cornelius 1, 68, 78, 80 – 81 Scipio Africanus, P. Cornelius 24, 27, 66 – 67, 73 – 74, 80, 82 – 83, 86, 104, 209 – 212 Scipio, P. Cornelius, father of Africanus 51 Scopas 20, 60, 170, 209 scripts 46, 58 – 62, 70, 72, 81 Scyron 169 – 174 Sicca 162 Sicily 27, 62, 66, 158 – 159, 161, 175 – 177, 198 – 199 Side 56, 154 sieges 16, 56, 75, 82, 154, 157, 161, 212 Social War 9, 18, 48, 64, 153, 167, 169, 201 Solon 22 Sosibius 120 – 121, 127 Sosibius, the son 127 Spain 27, 65 – 66, 73, 76 – 77, 157, 159 – 160, 172, 178 – 179, 212 Sparta 2, 48, 53, 57, 60, 64, 84, 154 – 155 Spendius 162 – 163, 173 Stoicism 16, 23, 27 – 30, 63, 70, 72, 105, 211 – 212 suicide 82 Syracuse 22, 61 – 62, 202 Syria 165 Tarentum 75 Taurion 62 – 63 Teuta 163 – 165, 170, 172 – 174, 209 Thebes 48, 57, 84, 154 Theodore Studites 63 Theopompus 46 theory: anacyclosis 62, 106 – 107, 111, 116, 118 – 123, 126 – 127, 132 – 133, 134n13, 135n16, 160, 163 – 164, 171, 210; communities of respect 104, 108 – 110, 133, 152, 163; gaze 200, 215n23; just war 35n40, 133, 152 – 153, 158, 161, 184n93, 190n200, 191n204; mixed constitution 25, 71, 116 – 119, 135n16, 210; naturalism 29 – 31, 33;

Index  225 nature of hate 53 – 54; plural subject 104, 152; populist 134n5, 146n240; shared emotion 104, 125, 152, 178; social constructivism 29, 31 – 32 Thermum 18 – 21, 26 – 27, 31, 33 – 34, 47 – 48, 58, 86, 209, 210 Thrace 57, 166 Thucydides 3, 8, 46 – 50, 52, 56 – 57, 60, 63 – 64, 70, 78 – 79, 86, 155, 177 Tiberius Gracchus 71 Ticinus 52 Timaeus 46 Tlepolemus 124 – 126, 132 tragedy 3 – 5, 130; tragic historiography 3, 197, 211, 213 traitors 53 – 56, 58, 73, 77, 130 Trebia 71

tyranny 49, 52, 58, 62, 106 – 107, 111 – 116, 118, 123, 125 – 126, 128 – 132, 210 Utica 154 violence 6, 25 – 26, 64, 105 – 106, 113, 115, 120, 122, 128 – 133, 162, 210 women 2 – 3, 6, 24, 30, 40n135, 51, 120, 123, 127, 130 – 131, 155, 161, 163 – 164, 210 Xenophon 8, 46 – 50, 52, 56 – 57, 60, 62 – 64, 70, 86, 211 Xerxes 84 Zama 33, 83, 104

Index of Passages

App., B. Civ. 4.24 93n159 Hann. 1 – 3 182n41 Hann. 82 93n159 Hann. 84 93n159 Hisp. 5 – 13 182n41 Mac. 1 187n135 Mith. 111 93n159 Mith. 468 93n159 Pun. 6 182n41 Pun. 9 187n141 Pun. 132 36n59, 99n312 Syr. 41 93n159 Arist. Eth. Nic. 8.1160 137n52, 138n71 Pol. 3.1279 137n52 4.1292 – 1293 135n21, 141n115, 141n119 4.1295 143n153 4.1301 141n115, 141n120 5.1302 119, 138n71, 141n115, 141n117, 141n119, 143n153 5.1303 139n86, 141n115 5.1304 – 1313 141n120 5.1304 139n94, 141n115, 141n120 5.1305 139n94, 141n115 5.1306 139n94, 141n115 5.1307 139n94, 141n115 5.1310 135n22, 139n94, 141n115 5.1311 135n22, 141n115 5.1312 137n58, 139n86, 141n115 5.1313 – 1316 135n21 5.1313 135n21 Rhet. 2.1378 37n74, 51 2.1380 76 2.1382 51, 57 – 58, 70 2.1385 75 – 76, 81, 217n55 2.1387 59

Cass. Dio fr. 55 182n41 Cic., De Off. 1.35 35n39 De Off. 2.9 – 10 218n73 Verr. 2.4 93n144 Diod. Sic., 3.68 93n159 4.9 93n159 4.54 93n159 Hom., Il. 51 Hdt. 1.5 75 1.8 98n289 1.29 – 33 22 1.32 92n141 1.61 48 1.73 49 – 50 1.86 – 87 22 1.96 98n301 1.141 88n35 1.156 49 2.119 56 2.121 88n35 2.128 56 2.131 98n289, 98n295 3.25 50, 88n35 3.30 60, 92n132 3.31 98n289 3.35 88n35 3.40 92n141 3.52 49, 92n138, 93n148 3.80 92n132, 92n138 3.82 138n76, 141n115 3.131 49 – 50 3.146 92n132 4.205 92n141 5.32 98n301 5.56 38n109 6.61 92n132

Index of Passages  227 6.62 98n289 6.85 88n35 6.137 92n132, 92n142 7.10 92n141 7.22 216n45 7.41 92n141 7.105 49 7.139 94n195 7.236 92n132 7.237 92n132, 92n138 8.69 92n132 8.109 92n141 8.124 92n141 8.125 92n141 9.71 92n132 9.108 98n289, 98n295 9.133 98n289 John. Ant., fr. 54 121 Joseph., BJ 1.443 93n159 Liv. 21.1 – 20 182n41 21.40 – 44 99n336 22.22 97n279 25.2 37n79 28.27 – 29 94n185 36.28 – 29 187n135 39.23 – 24 187n134 42.11 – 12 187n135 42.15 187n135 Pl. Leg. 3.683 141n120 3.690 141n119 3.691 135n22, 141n115 3.694 135n21 3.695 135nn21 – 22, 141n115, 141n119, 143n153 3.701 135n22, 141n115, 141n119 Plt. 291 141n119 294 141n119 301 135n22, 139n86, 141n115, 141n119 Protag. 320 – 322 135n17 Resp. 5.470 – 471 35n37 8.545 – 546 135n21, 141n120 8.547 138n71 8.550 – 551 135n21, 138n71 8.550 141n119 8.551 141n119

8.555 – 557 135n21 8.555 118 – 119, 137n58, 138n71, 141n115, 141n119 8.556 141n115, 141n119, 141n120 8.557 138n76, 141n115 8.562 – 563 135n2, 139nn93 – 94, 141n115 8.562 135n22, 141n115 8.563 141n119 8.564 139n86 8.566 138n76, 141n115 8.567 – 569 139n94, 141n115 8.567 185n106 8.569 137n54 Plut., Marc. 21 93n144; Them. 32 9n10 Polyb., Hist. 1.1 106 1.4 214nn11 – 12 1.5 99n322, 216nn44 – 45 1.7 – 11 190n197 1.10 181n30 1.12 216n45 1.14 32, 55, 78, 89n65, 90n82, 90n84, 91n113, 92n115, 188n147, 199 – 200, 214n12 1.15 214nn11 – 12 1.18 216n44 1.19 215n31 1.20 73, 97n255, 190n197, 214nn11 – 12 1.21 73 1.22 215n31 1.26 214n12 1.27 73 1.31 37n66, 67, 94n192, 97n271, 153 – 154, 180n6 1.32 – 35 154 1.34 97n255 1.35 75, 214n12 1.36 61, 73, 92n130, 97n255 1.37 73 1.38 215n31 1.44 96n239, 96n241, 97n255 1.45 216n44 1.46 75 1.49 73 1.53 96n241 1.55 96n239 1.56 96n243 1.57 37n66, 214n12, 216n44 1.60 215n31 1.61 73 1.62 96n239, 159 1.64 214n12

228  Index of Passages 1.65 214n12 1.66 73, 96n241, 161 – 162, 185n104, 185n108, 190n189 1.67 – 70 161 – 163, 181n25 1.67 50 – 51, 88n36, 96n243 1.68 162, 184n95, 190n189 1.69 162 – 163 1.70 51, 162 1.71 73 1.73 216nn44 – 45 1.76 215n31 1.79 183n77 1.80 186n112 1.81 183n79, 214n11, 214n12 1.82 37n66, 51, 90nn81 – 83, 91n113, 96n239, 137n55, 181n25, 183n77 1.83 64, 93n169, 96n239, 183n77 1.87 27, 73 1.88 56, 64, 93n169, 138n76, 145n219, 145n223, 154, 160, 183n77 2.1 181n25, 216n45 2.3 215n31 2.4 97n255, 186n120, 216n45 2.5 – 6 82, 205 2.5 215n31 2.6 97n271 2.7 32, 39n117, 82, 205, 218n67 2.8 37n66, 40n135, 88n36, 88nn44 – 45, 50, 163 – 164, 185n105, 188n148, 189n179 2.11 97n271, 215n31 2.13 181n30 2.15 214n11 2.18 – 35 188n159 2.19 38n101, 183n75 2.21 26, 38n101, 38n109, 215n31 2.23 27 2.24 183n75 2.27 215n31 2.28 216n44 2.30 26, 38n101, 183n75 2.33 38n109, 183n79, 214n12 2.35 25 – 26, 38n99, 38n109, 96n242 2.43 79 2.45 56, 60, 92n130, 93n146 2.46 56, 60, 92nn130 – 131, 93n146, 93n169, 95n202 2.47 217n51 2.50 97n255 2.55 68 2.56 – 60 128 – 131, 138n76, 214n11

2.56 2 – 3, 5, 7, 9n2, 37n66, 80, 99n314, 99n322, 130 – 131, 138n76, 146n231, 213, 214nn11 – 12 2.58 97n271, 131 2.59 37n66, 64, 93n169, 99n323, 128 – 129 2.60 129 – 130 2.63 215n31 3.1 – 5 156 3.2 134n13, 190n186 3.3 51, 88n45, 90n82, 181n25 3.6 – 32 156 – 180 3.6 6, 35n25, 48, 156 – 157, 165 – 166, 169, 187n128 187n144, 189n179, 214n12 3.7 35n25, 37n66, 50 – 51, 88n45, 89n56, 165 – 166, 169, 181n25, 185n105, 187n144 3.8 4, 65 – 66, 157, 214n12 3.9 – 10 21, 50, 157, 181n25, 192n231, 192, 235 3.9 27, 38n109, 159 – 160 3.10 26, 50 – 51, 88n45, 159 – 161, 172, 178, 183n79, 192n229 3.11 75 3.13 88n45, 100n344, 157, 160 3.15 26, 38n109, 157, 160, 166 – 168, 184n84, 187n128, 192n231 3.16 71, 182n55 3.17 100n344, 157 3.18 – 19 182n55 3.18 215n31 3.20 94n200, 157, 184n85 3.21 – 27 157 – 158, 199 3.21 184n84 3.22 214n12 3.23 214n12 3.24 214n12, 216nn44 – 45 3.26 32, 66, 158, 175, 188n149, 198 – 199 3.27 160 3.28 158, 160, 192n229 3.29 38n98, 158, 160, 184n90 3.30 158, 160 – 161, 166, 176 3.31 37n66, 39n123, 158, 197, 214n12 3.32 158, 176 – 178, 214n12 3.34 27, 100n344 3.37 216n45 3.40 88n45, 181n25, 215n31 3.46 29 – 30, 216n45 3.51 71, 100n344 3.52 100n344 3.53 24, 71 3.54 100n344 3.58 96n242, 214nn11 – 12

Index of Passages  229 3.60 71, 100n344 3.61 100n344 3.62 – 63 83 – 84, 99n322, 100n344, 218n67, 218n72 3.62 97n255 3.64 51 – 52 3.69 100n344 3.70 97n255 3.71 214n12 3.74 97n255 3.75 71 3.76 215n31 3.78 50, 88n45, 89n56, 100n344, 168 – 169, 181n25 3.81 26, 95n209, 214nn11 – 12 3.82 38n101, 216n44, 217n51 3.84 95n209, 215n31 3.86 24, 56, 90n82, 91n113, 154 3.87 97n255 3.89 100n344, 215n31 3.90 100n344 3.94 71, 100n344 3.96 96n242, 97n255 3.97 75 3.98 71, 76 – 77 3.99 77 3.101 100n344 3.103 97n255 3.107 72 3.109 96n242, 97n271 3.111 97n271, 100n344 3.112 34n7, 72 3.116 27, 94n200 3.117 216n44 3.118 72, 134n13 4.3 93n169, 169, 186n125 4.4 37n66, 50, 88n36, 88n45, 169 – 171 4.5 170 4.6 36n54 4.7 38n98, 38n108, 64 – 65, 99n323, 153, 167, 183n75 4.9 – 13 189n169 4.11 214n12, 215n31 4.13 215n31 4.14 17 – 18, 37n66, 93n169, 122 4.16 31 – 32, 88n45, 89n49, 93n169, 170 – 171, 186n125 4.20 95n202 4.27 214n12 4.29 47 – 48, 88n45, 89n49 4.30 56 4.31 94n200, 167, 174 4.35 56, 214n12

4.36 174 4.38 97n271 4.49 75, 89n56, 173, 181n25, 185n105 4.50 – 52 173 4.51 97n271 4.54 27 4.58 94n200 4.62 36n41 4.63 214n12 4.67 35n38 4.68 215n31 4.73 215n31 4.76 33, 64 – 65, 99n323, 214n12 4.79 153 4.80 215n31 4.84 216n45, 217n51 4.86 96n242 4.87 62 – 63 5.2 97n255 5.6 – 12 18 – 21 5.7 94n192, 180n6 5.9 19, 35n28, 35n36 5.10 38n98, 48 5.11 26, 37n66, 38n101, 58, 76, 90n82, 91n113, 92n115, 98n287, 134n13, 137n55, 214n12 5.12 19, 21, 48, 88n45, 89nn49 – 50, 144n175 5.13 21 5.14 97n255 5.15 21, 48, 89n50, 97n255 5.16 38n98, 38n101, 215n31 5.24 214n12 5.27 215n31 5.28 78 5.29 75 5.34 78, 216n45 5.35 56 5.37 216nn44 – 45, 216 – 217n51 5.40 97n264, 97n271, 216n41 5.41 60, 92n130, 93n146, 137n55, 181n30 5.42 – 50 190n188 5.42 49, 92n130 5.46 92n130, 93n146 5.47 215n31 5.49 21 – 22, 49, 94n192 5.50 49, 92n130 5.53 216n44 5.56 32 – 33, 56, 91n113, 92n115, 97n271 5.57 180n6, 215n31, 216n41 5.58 94n200, 185n105 5.67 216n41 5.72 75, 215n31

230  Index of Passages 5.73 56, 91n113, 154, 215n31 5.74 27 5.76 38n101 5.77 187n145 5.81 216n44 5.87 97n264 5.88 97n271 5.90 214n12 5.92 215n31 5.94 215n31 5.95 215n31 5.96 215n31 5.98 89n65, 91nn112 – 113, 92n115, 201 – 202, 215n31 5.104 97n271 5.105 187n126 5.107 32 – 33 6.4 – 9 32, 106 – 116 6.4 49 – 51, 134n5, 135n15, 139n83 6.5 39n131, 106 – 107, 112, 115, 138n76, 139n92 6.6 37n66, 64, 67, 94n192, 97n271, 99n323, 107 – 113, 115, 122 – 123, 138n76, 201 6.7 26, 37n66, 38n99, 49, 51, 62, 90n81, 90n83, 91n113, 92nn130 – 131, 94n192, 107, 111 – 112, 123, 126, 135n22, 141n118, 143n153, 143n155, 216n44 6.8 97n271, 107, 112 – 113, 123, 137n56, 139n84, 140n96, 143n153, 143n162 6.9 33, 37n66, 90n83, 91n113, 92nn130 – 131, 107, 113 – 117, 119, 126, 135n15, 140n96, 143n148, 143n162 6.10 33, 106 6.11 97n271 6.13 216nn44 – 45 6.14 136n44 6.18 216nn44 – 45 6.43 – 52 140n101 6.43 91n113, 92n115, 154 6.44 26, 94n200 6.46 95n202, 216n44 6.52 – 55 136n42, 140n101 6.52 88n44, 94n191, 137n55 6.53 80, 216nn44 – 45, 217n51 6.54 137n47 6.56 24 – 26, 37n82, 50 – 51, 88n36, 95n202 6.57 26, 51, 88n36, 116 – 118, 134n5, 135n15, 141n104, 143n148, 216n45

6.58 71, 92n130, 97n255, 100n344 7.3 90n82, 91n113, 215n31 7.5 37n66, 67, 94n192 7.7 62 7.8 62, 92n130, 137n55 7.11 78 7.15 – 18 216n41 8.3 216n45 8.8 26, 37n66, 38n99, 90n83, 91n113, 92n115, 93n169 8.9 94n200 8.10 78, 94n200 8.11 94n200 8.12 69, 95n202, 216 – 217nn51 8.15 – 21 16, 98n286, 216n41 8.17 96n242, 97n255 8.19 96n242 8.20 22, 81, 204, 215n31 8.21 204 8.24 93n169, 97n255 8.29 75, 97n255 8.35 138n76 8.36 22, 36n54, 37n66, 56, 90n84, 92n115, 99n322, 99n334, 203 – 205, 216nn44 – 45, 216n51 9.3 100n344 9.4 100n344 9.5 215n31 9.6 100n344 9.10 22, 35n38, 36n54, 37n66, 50, 61, 81, 89n65, 90n81, 90n83, 91n113, 92n115, 92nn130 – 131, 99n322, 137n55, 137n60, 202 – 203, 216n44 9.12 – 20 183n72 9.13 216nn44 – 45, 217n51 9.18 94n200, 95n202 9.21 27 9.22 – 26 146n235 9.22 100n344 9.23 216nn44 – 45, 216n51 9.26 68, 94n192 9.28 32 – 33 9.29 60, 91n113, 92n115, 92nn130 – 131, 93n146, 97n271 9.30 97n271 9.35 97n271 9.37 216n44 9.39 91n113, 92n115 9.42 216n45 10.4 24 10.5 24, 37n82, 97n255 10.9 216n45 10.14 80, 97n255

Index of Passages  231 10.16 216nn44 – 45 10.17 97n255 10.18 40n154 10.21 216n44 10.26 137n54 10.34 97n271 11.1 96n242 11.2 94n200 11.3 97n255 11.5 94n200 11.6 92n130, 97n271 11.7 21, 26 – 27, 47, 89n50, 144n175 11.10 99n322 11.12 94n200 11.17 96n242 11.25 216n45 11.28 27 – 28, 37n66, 40n154, 66 – 67, 73, 122 11.29 24, 73 – 74 11.33 97n255 11.34 92n130, 122 12.8 97n271 12.13 69, 94n200, 95n202 12.14 88n36 12.23 92n120 12.25d-e 217n62 12.25e 97n271, 216n45, 217n51 12.25h 216n45 12.26 78 13.1 186n125 13.2 60, 92n130, 93n146, 137n55 13.3 216n44 13.4 137n54 13.6 – 8 137n54, 139n87 14.1 216n44 14.2 216n44 14.5 82 – 83, 94n200 14.6 27 14.10 218n67 14.11 121 14.12 142n132 15.1 180n15 15.4 27, 38n98, 38n108, 88n44, 97n255, 181n20, 183n75 15.5 – 8 183n72 15.5 97n255 15.6 216nn44 – 45 15.8 97n271 15.10 83, 94n200 15.12 34n7, 39n129 15.17 36n54, 37n66, 56, 82, 89n65, 90n81, 90nn83 – 84, 91nn112 – 113, 92n115, 99n311, 99n322, 124,

137n55, 145n201, 180n15, 206 218n67 15.19 33, 100n344, 122, 183n72 15.20 – 25 142n127 15.20 95n202 15.21 97n271 15.22 97n255 15.23 91n113, 92n115, 95n202, 97n271 15.24a 137n54 15.25 – 33 121 – 132, 134n5, 137n55, 137n60, 142n132 15.25 37n66, 50, 80, 90nn82 – 83, 91n113, 92n115, 97n271, 121 – 127, 137n55, 142n127, 185n106 15.26 – 36 142n127, 180n15, 185n106 15.26 122, 124 – 125, 142n127, 142n138, 144n182, 144n189, 145n223, 180n15 15.27 50, 90n83, 91n113, 92n115, 93n169, 124 – 126, 137n55, 143n160 15.28 89n50, 92n115, 125 – 127 15.29 126 – 127 15.30 37n66, 40n135, 50, 90n81, 90n83, 92n115, 124, 127, 137n55, 181n35 15.31 131 – 132, 142n138 15.32 97n255, 127, 131 – 132 15.33 38n109, 128 – 132, 138n76, 142n139, 144n189, 144n194, 183n79 15.34 – 36 142n127 15.36 216n44 15.37 216nn44 – 45, 217n51 16.1 19, 21, 47, 50, 89n50, 144n175 16.6 216n44 16.8 216nn44 – 45, 216n51 16.12 216n44 16.14 55, 90n82, 90n84, 91n112, 97n271 16.20 69, 94n200 16.21 – 22 132, 137n54, 144n194 16.21 97n271 16.22 62 – 63, 216nn44 – 45, 217n51 16.23 74 – 75, 97n255, 104, 216n44 16.25 97n255 16.28 21, 26, 48 – 49 16.29 216nn44 – 45 16.30 216n44 18.13 – 15 98n286 18.15 53 – 54, 90n82, 91nn112 – 113, 92n115, 137n60 18.19 180n6 18.24 97n255 18.25 96n242, 216n44 16.32 82, 218n67 16.33 99n330

232  Index of Passages 18.34 164 – 165 18.35 93n169 18.36 21, 89n50 18.37 34n7, 38n101, 38n108 18.39 164 – 165 18.41 27, 61, 92n130, 93n153, 216nn44 – 45 18.45 97n255, 164 – 165 18.46 75, 97n255 18.53 – 55 60, 95n209 20.5 97n271 20.6 38n101, 38n108, 50, 56, 91n113, 92n115, 153, 181n18, 185n105 20.8 78, 97n255 20.9 154 20.10 39n117, 47 – 48, 88n45, 89n49, 93n169, 181n18 20.11 38n109, 48 20.12 97n255 20.31 181n23 21.2 96n251 21.4 74 – 75 21.5 216n44 21.25 88n45, 89n49, 181n18, 181n20, 181nn22 – 23 21.26 75 21.27 216n45 21.29 88nn44 – 45, 89n49, 181n18, 181n20, 181nn22 – 23 21.31 37n66, 87n16, 88nn44 – 45, 89n49, 180n16, 181n18, 181n20, 181n22 21.34 88n44, 181n18, 181n20 22.5 88n44, 181n18, 181n20, 181n23 22.8 91n113, 92n115, 96n242 22.10 88n44, 181n18 22.11 181n18 22.13 21, 47, 89n50, 181n18 22.16 183n79 22.18 166, 181n26, 189n179 23.5 78, 98n288, 137n54 23.10 144n175 23.11 181n18 23.12 62, 92n130, 137n55 23.15 37n66, 87n20, 181n18 23.17 216n45 24.7 37n66, 93n169, 99n323 24.10 89n68 24.11 216n44 24.12 94n192, 137n55 25.5 93n169 25.21 216n44 27.1 75 27.7 37n66, 94n192

27.8 92n120 27.9 99n314 28.3 – 5 137n54 28.7 92n130, 93n146, 94n192, 137n55 28.20 181n18 28.21 216nn44 – 45, 217n51 29.7 62 – 63 29.8 94n200 29.19 96n242 30.4 88n44, 181n18, 181n20, 181n22 30.8 180n15 30.10 216n45 30.13 89n68 30.19 216n45, 216n51 30.23 88n44, 181n18, 181n20, 181n22 30.28 216nn44 – 45 30.29 37n66, 54 – 55, 88n51, 90n81, 90n83, 91n113, 92n115, 94n192, 137n55, 137n60, 181n18 30.31 37n66, 87n16, 88n44, 181n18, 181n22 30.32 96n242 31.10 75, 94n192, 137n55 31.15 216nn44 – 45 31.23 98n288 31.24 96n305 31.25 78 31.31 181n20 32.1 – 2 89n68 32.5 – 6 139n87 32.2 68, 94n192, 186n114 32.5 – 6 137n54 32.6 91n113 32.13 64, 93n169, 216nn44 – 45 33.7 88n44, 181n18 33.12 94n192 33.20 90n84, 91n113 34.3 24 35.4 94n200 36.1 – 4 179 36.2 166, 168, 187n128, 203 – 204, 216nn44 – 45, 216n51 36.5 187n140, 189n181 36.12 68, 94n192 38.1 – 4 206 – 208, 217n63 38.1 24, 32, 37n66, 84, 181n17, 206 – 207 38.2 – 3 84 38.2 216nn44 – 45 38.3 84, 91n113, 100n346, 100n348, 186n113, 189n181, 208, 216nn44 – 45, 216n51, 217n64 38.4 – 11 137n60 38.4 94n192, 155, 181n18, 181n20, 181n23

Index of Passages  233 38.6 216nn44 – 45 38.7 96n242 38.9 64, 93n169, 218n81 38.10 100n348, 181n30, 186n113, 189n181, 218n81 38.11 100n348, 185n110, 186n113, 189n181, 218n81 38.12 56 38.14 – 18 217n63 38.15 181n17, 208 38.16 37n66, 181n17, 208, 218n81 38.17 181n17, 208 38.18 26, 88n44, 100n344, 181n18, 181n20, 186n113, 189n181, 208, 218n76, 218n81 38.20 – 22 36n59 38.22 80 – 81 39.1 94n192 39.8 92n130 Fr. 23 216nn44 – 45 Sen., De Ira 35n39 Tac., Ann. 1.1 10n15 Thuc. 1.23 155 1.25 56, 90n99 1.31 48 1.32 88n32 1.49 38n109 1.74 88n35 1.92 88n35 1.96 56, 90n99 1.103 90n99 1.122 88n32 1.130 88n41 1.133 88n35 2.7 216n45 2.8 88n32 2.11 38n109 2.12 216n45 2.22 88n42 2.32 92n138 2.35 92n132 2.41 93n170 2.43 79 2.45 92n132, 92n138 2.59 88n35 2.60 88n35 2.61 89n65 2.64 88n35, 90n99, 92n132, 92n138 2.65 88n35 3.36 88n35 3.38 88n35

3.40 99n319, 217n56 3.42 88n42 3.43 92n132, 92n138 3.44 88n35 3.45 88n35, 98n289 3.64 90n99 3.67 90n99 3.82 88n35, 92n132, 92n138 3.83 90n99 3.84 88n42, 92n138 4.30 37n77, 38n85 4.51 37n77, 38n83 4.108 60, 92n132 4.123 88n34 4.128 90n99 5.27 90n99 5.44 88n35 5.46 88n35 5.52 88n32 5.63 88n35 5.77 216n45 5.79 216n45 5.80 38n109 6.7 92n138 6.16 92n132 6.17 90n99 6.24 98n289 6.57 49, 88n32, 88n34 6.60 88n32 6.78 93n148 6.89 88n35 7.30 37n77, 38n83 7.33 37n77, 38n83 7.68 88nn34 – 35 7.77 92n141 8.1 88n35 8.43 64 8.66 64 8.83 88n35 8.86 88n35 8.92 50, 88n35 Xen. An. 1.2 48 1.5 48 1.9 62, 93n153 2.6 88n35 4.6 98n289 5.7 93nn153 – 154 6.2 56 7.6 56 – 57 Hell.

234  Index of Passages 1.2 216n45 1.3 56 – 57 1.5 99n319, 217n56 1.7 56 1.67 48 2.4 92n132 3.1 48 3.2 92n132 3.4 92n132 3.5 48, 56 – 57, 90n102

4.1 98n289 4.8 48 5.2 56 – 57, 90n103, 90n105, 92n132 5.3 48, 50, 64, 88n35, 88n42 5.4 48, 56 – 57, 90n102 6.5 88n35 7.2 48 Zon. 8.21 – 22 182n41