Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations 9781685853204

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Introduction
1 Initial Bilateral Tensions: Some Historical Background
2 The United States and Chile: From the Postwar Period to 1973
3 The United States and the Military Regime
4 Conclusions
5 Postscript
Index
About the Book and the Authors

Citation preview

Elusive Friendship

LACC Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean Published with the Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University General Editors Mark B. Rosenberg, Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, and Richard

Tardanico

Editorial Board Gustavo Pérez Firmal Duke University U.S.A.

Alcida K Ramos Universidade de Brasilia Brazil

Larissa A. Lomnitz Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México México

Evelyne Huber Stephens Northwestern University U.S.A.

Roberto Macedo Universidade de Sao Paulo Brazil

Edelberto Torres-Rivas FLACSO Costa Rica

Sidney W. Minlz T h e J o h n s Hopkins University U.S. A

Miguel Urrutia Inter-American Development Bank U.S.A.

Alejandro Portes T h e J o h n s Hopkins University U.S. A.

Augusto Varas FLACSO Chile

Elusive Friendship A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations Heraldo Munoz Carlos Portales translated by Orlando Garcia Valverde

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Munoz, Heraldo. [Amistad esquiva. English.] Elusive friendship : a survey of U.S.-Chilean relations / by Heraldo Munoz and Carlos Portales, p. cm. Translation of: Unsa amistad esquiva. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-139-9 1. United States—Foreign relations—Chile. 2. Chile—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—19454. Chile—Foreign relations—1920-1970. 5. Chil Foreign relations—1970- I. Portales, Carlos, n . Title. E183.8.C4M813 1990 327.73083—dc20 90-45042 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Preface

Introduction 1

Initial Bilateral Tensions: Some Historical Background

2

T h e United States a n d Chile: From the Postwar Period to 1973

21

3

T h e United States a n d the Military Regime

49

4

Conclusions

93

5

Postscript

97

Index About the Book and the Authors

101 110

Preface

This book is the result of research carried out jointly on a subject of great academic a n d political relevance: bilateral relations between the U n i t e d States a n d Chile. T h e past a n d c u r r e n t i m p o r t a n c e of the United States in Chilean foreign affairs is unquestionable, a situa t i o n t h a t is e x p e c t e d to r e m a i n u n c h a n g e d in f u t u r e years. In recognition of this fact, we have d e e m e d it necessary to analyze carefully t h e evolution of this r e l a t i o n s h i p t h r o u g h o u t its history, in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d t h e f l u c t u a t i o n s t h a t have o c c u r r e d a n d to make it easier to propose f u t u r e alternatives. Systematic academic studies o n contemporary Chile-U.S. relations are noticeably scarce, a n d we h o p e that this book will stimulate f u r t h e r discussion on this crucial area of Chile's foreign affairs. O u r work has been d o n e as part of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Latin A m e r i c a n School of Social Sciences (FLACSO-Chile) a n d the Program on Latin American Foreign Policies (PROSPEL) of the Academy of Christian Humanism. Both projects have received financial s u p p o r t f r o m the Ford Foundation. In the course of this research, we have benefitted from valuable c o m m e n t s on the part of n u m e r o u s colleagues. We wish to express o u r appreciation especially to J o s é Miguel Barros, Augusto Varas, Alicia F r o h m a n n , Sol S e r r a n o , J o s é G a r r i d o , a n d J o s é A n t o n i o Cousino. T h e i r o p i n i o n s o n previous d r a f t s are r e f l e c t e d in this book a n d allowed us to improve specific aspects of the text. We also wish to mention the assistance, provided in the course of n u m e r o u s conversations in Santiago a n d in Washington, D.C., of several politicians a n d diplomats from b o t h Chile and the United States. Nevertheless, t h e a u t h o r s a r e solely r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o p i n i o n s expressed herein. We c a n n o t neglect to m e n t i o n the support given us in gathering vii

vili

Elusive

Friendship

the information by Isaac Caro, María Eliana Castillo, Daniel Asenjo, and, quite especially, Enrique Hermosilla. The typing of the different versions was done by Cristina de los Ríos and Alejandra Cea. Last, we wish to express our recognition of the interest and professional encouragement displayed by Florida International University in translating the Spanish version of the book into English to make possible its publication in the United States by Lynne Rienner Publishers. The updated English-language edition includes a brief final chapter that covers U.S.-Chilean relations during the critical period in Chilean political life between the national plebiscite in October 1988 and the democratic election of Patricio Aylwin to the presidency of Chile in December 1989. Heraldo Muñoz Carlos Portales

Elusive Friendship

Introduction

Relations between Chile a n d the U n i t e d States have b e e n historically characterized by signs of divergence. D u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d the first half of t h e t w e n t i e t h century, t h e conflict between the two countries focused on interstate political relations. After World War II, bilateral tensions shifted to the area of U.S. econ o m i c interests in Chile a n d the increasing U.S. i n f l u e n c e in the country's socioeconomic a n d political systems. Thus, the conflictcooperation cycle, which was previously expressed in interstate relations, partially c h a n g e d c o n t e x t a n d progressively r e f l e c t e d the transnational linkages between the United States a n d several actors in the Chilean political system. After the overthrow of the constitutional system in 1973, t h e ties b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s w e r e marked by a policy of U.S. s u p p o r t for the military regime, particularly d u r i n g its stages of installation a n d consolidation. However, by 1989 r e l a t i o n s between G e n e r a l P i n o c h e t ' s g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e George Bush administration were not without considerable differences for reasons that shall b e examined later. In this book, we argue that the difficulties affecting U.S.-Chile relations are not new, a n d that, in fact, the periods d u r i n g which the aims of both countries have fully coincided have b e e n an exception. In o t h e r words, t e n s i o n s a n d d i s c r e p a n c i e s have p r e v a i l e d over a g r e e m e n t and cooperation. T h r o u g h o u t the history of these bilateral relations, Chile has not shown substantial s u p p o r t for the Latin American policies of the United States. F u r t h e r m o r e , the increasing impact that Washington's state a n d transnational policies have h a d within Chilean society affected n o t only the bilateral relationship, but Chile's internal development. In addition, the links between the two countries are not viewed alike by the different sectors of Chilean 1

2

Elusive

Friendship

society; in fact, the perceptions the different Chilean groups have o f U.S. policy—together with their demands or accusations o f neglect with respect to such policy—are varied and, in many cases, clearly divergent. T h e basic thrust o f this b o o k is to analyze the relations between t h e U n i t e d States a n d C h i l e u n d e r t h e military r e g i m e , p u t t i n g t h e m into historical perspective. M o r e precisely, we would like to address several questions: What are the areas o f bilateral controversy and convergence? How have the g o v e r n m e n t s and differing local Chilean actors a p p r o a c h e d the political, e c o n o m i c , international, and human rights problems? Have the differences b e e n constant or have they continuously c h a n g e d over the 175 years o f the bilateral relationship? O f the factors that explain what we call an "elusive friendship" between the U n i t e d States and Chile, the following are worthy o f mention: ( 1 ) the r e m n a n t from the past of a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between two powers that b e c a m e adversaries as they s o u g h t i n f l u e n c e in South America during the n i n e t e e n t h and early twentieth centuries; ( 2 ) the existence o f U.S. e c o n o m i c interests in Chile, particularly since the second decade o f this century, which clashed with the policies and concepts of Chilean national development; ( 3 ) the emerg e n c e in Chile o f a strong anti-American political culture, which spanned the entire ideological spectrum from right to left; (4) an interventionist attitude on the part o f the United States, which purported to influence decisively the process o f c h a n g e in the country, first by encouraging, and later by hampering it; and (5) the emerg e n c e in C h i l e o f a m i l i t a r y - t e c h n o c r a t i c m o d e l t h a t p r o m o t e d transnationalization in the e c o n o m i c sphere, but whose basic political f e a t u r e — p e r s o n a l i s t i c authoritarianism—was c o n t r a d i c t o r y to certain basic orientations and interests of U.S. foreign policy. T h e first c h a p t e r o f this b o o k provides a c o n c i s e a c c o u n t o f C h i l e a n - U . S . relations until World War II. From the outset o f these relations, conflict p r e d o m i n a t e d over c o o p e r a t i o n . H e r e were two nation-states f o r m i n g and on the rise during the n i n e t e e n t h century, and they were contesting for influence in South America. T h e rivalry between the two states gave rise to indelible images, and created concepts o f opposing interests between the elites o f both countries T h e first half o f the twentieth century showed gradual consolidation o f U.S. power as a global hegemony, while Latin A m e r i c a attempted to c o u n t e r a c t such power t h r o u g h coalition. Yet, m o r e important for bilateral relations was the increasing weight o f U.S. investments in the Chilean economy.

Introduction

3

C h a p t e r 2 briefly reviews the bilateral relationship d u r i n g the p e r i o d of the establishment of U.S. h e g e m o n y at the global level. Concepts a n d strategies based u p o n U.S. security a n d foreign policy needs—with narrow limits d u r i n g "bipolarity" and, later, wider margins d u r i n g "détente"—were d o m i n a n t in the relationship between the U n i t e d States a n d Chile. T h e a d j u s t m e n t to Cold War requirem e n t s d u r i n g the Gonzâlez-Videla administration i n f l u e n c e d b o t h t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of t h e r u l i n g coalition a n d t h e b a n n i n g of t h e C o m m u n i s t party. T h e A g r e e m e n t o n U.S. Military Aid to Chile was approved at the e n d of that governmental term. However, as of the mid-1950s, the Chilean administrations began not to observe autom a t i c a l l y t h e p o s t u l a t e s set f o r t h by W a s h i n g t o n , a n d , u n d e r Alessandri, Frei, a n d Allende, even gradually sought m o r e autonomous courses of action that finally clashed with U.S. foreign policy, particularly at the regional level. T h e overall e c o n o m i c p r e d o m i n a n c e of the United States during the postwar period, with its deeply r o o t e d investments in Chile, g r a n t e d the United States a significant position in Chile's internal e c o n o m i c and social-political processes. U.S. policies of e n c o u r a g i n g some processes of c h a n g e in Chilean society a n d preventing others i n f l u e n c e d bilateral r e l a t i o n s f o r twenty-five years. T h e p r e s s u r e exerted in favor of certain transformations within the framework of the Alliance for Progress alienated the Chilean right a n d widened the existing gap with t h e left. T h e w e a k e n i n g of the Alliance for Progress a n d its later a b a n d o n m e n t caused f u r t h e r deterioration of ties between Washington a n d the Chilean political establishment. Not only did the U.S. position against the socialist project intensify the confrontation with the left, but it contributed to the collapse of the democratic regime. T h e issues that d o m i n a t e d the bilateral a g e n d a from the date of i n d e p e n d e n c e u p to the first decades of the twentieth c e n t u r y were replaced in i m p o r t a n c e by issues relative to the internal organization of Chilean society. This c h a n g e b e c a m e fully a p p a r e n t with the establishment of the military government. T h e t h i r d c h a p t e r , " T h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e Military Regime," is the most extensive and detailed part of the book. Its purpose is to describe the orientations of U.S. policy a n d the factors that d e t e r m i n e d its changes d u r i n g the military regime, taking into account economic, political and military dimensions. This chapter starts with an analysis of U.S. s u p p o r t f o r the establishment of the regime, a n d the effects this policy h a d u p o n b o t h internal Chilean actors, a n d the forces that o p p o s e d such s u p p o r t in

4

Elusive

Friendship

the United States. Then a study is made of the policy changes concerning Chile, which the U.S. Congress adopted in the mid-1970s, and the nature and scope of President Carter's human rights policy. Finally, the chapter focuses on the Reagan administration's Chile policy. Its conceptual basis, the components involved in policy formulation and implementation, and the revision processes to which it was submitted are examined. Special importance has been given to the linkages among the political, economic, and military factors involved in both the formulation of policy and the determination of the tools required for its implementation. The future of U.S.-Chile relations will be conditioned by the characteristics of the impending transition toward democracy. The process of overcoming authoritarianism provides an opportunity for rebuilding ties between the United States and Chile. A U.S. policy of noninterference in the Chilean internal processes and the opening of channels and procedures for settling inevitable bilateral conflicts of interest are indispensable for strengthening cooperative relations between the countries in the coming years.

1

Initial Bilateral Tensions: Some Historical Background

Chilean-U.S.

Rivalry

During the Nineteenth

Century

Relations between the United States and Chile were antagonistic almost from the time the two became independent. The first controversies entailed the recognition of Chilean independence and the establishment of formal ties between the two countries. T h e presence in Chile of U.S. diplomat Theodorick Bland 1 who arrived in 1817 soon became a matter of controversy that affected bilateral relations, as Bland became involved in Chilean internal political disputes. His negative opinion of Chilean patriots was matched by the aversion Bernardo O'Higgins felt for the U.S. envoy. The refusal on the part of the United States to support specific Latin American d e m a n d s in the struggle for i n d e p e n d e n c e was interpreted in Chile as a lack of interest in the independence movement, which awakened feelings of mistrust and resentment against the United States. In 1819, Admiral Cochrane, who was in command of the Chilean Freedom Fleet, blockaded the Peruvian coast. Washington refused to recognize this action; subsequently, several U.S. vessels a t t e m p t e d to break the b l o c k a d e a n d were c a p t u r e d by Cochrane and sent to the Chilean port of Valparaiso. 2 Relations between Washington and Santiago took on a friendlier note only after the United States formally recognized Chile as an independent republic in January 1832. However, U.S. reluctance to sign a Friendship, Trade, and Navigation Agreement with Chile d a m a g e d the bilateral ties again, a situation that lasted until the enactment of that treaty in 1834. The signing of the agreement was achieved as a result of negotiations conducted by Andres Bello with the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Santiago. 3 5

6

Elusive

Friendship

During the following decades, several conflicts over trade along the South Pacific coast pitted Chilean and U.S. citizens and their respective foreign ministries against each other. By the mid-1830s, for instance, Chile and Peru were prepared to sign a trade treaty, through which special import tax exemptions were to be mutually exchanged. Since this treaty was not applicable to third parties, the United States felt highly affected by it. Consequently, a dispute broke out between Chile's Foreign Minister, Joaquin Tocornal, and the U.S. representative in Santiago, Richard Pollard, who even went so far as to contest President Prieto's economic policy. According to Carlos Mery, "the American diplomat's brazen interference with the Chilean government's policy was truly inexcusable, especially in view of the fact that the government of the United States had imposed as a rule that its diplomats abstain from intervening in the political affairs of the countries where they were accredited." 4 Because of commercial and political reasons, the United States tried at all costs to prevent the war between Chile and the PeruBolivia Confederation. Washington maintained a neutral position, although it actually sympathized with the Confederation. The United States felt that if Chile won, it would impose terms of victory that would lead to an imbalance in the subregional power structure and to the propagation of the protectionist policy fostered by the Santiago government at the time, which would, in turn, be economically detrimental to the United States. 5 During this same period, an incident occurred between the American representative, Seth Barton, and the Archbishop of Santiago that resulted in Barton's abrupt departure, after the Chilean government demanded his withdrawal before Washington authorities. The most significant tensions during the 1840s and the 1850s evolved as a consequence of U.S. displeasure with Chile's firm support of Mexico in its conflict with the United States (1845-1848), and because of the disgust felt in Chile at the degrading treatment of Chileans during the gold rush in California. By 1855, relations between the United States and Chile had so deteriorated that the U.S. representative in Santiago reported the following: "Both the United States and its citizens are constantly and viciously attacked, and have become the target of all kinds of abuses on the part of the local press." 6 The Chilean political elite viewed the United States with concern and mistrust because of territorial annexations resulting from the war with Mexico, the interest displayed by the Americans in Cuba and in the Lobos Islands near the Peruvian coast, and the

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

1

activities of U.S. adventurers in Baja California. This is why, accordi n g to R o b e r t Burr, "Chile r e a c t e d with c o n s t e r n a t i o n w h e n , in 1854, the United States a n d Ecuador signed an a g r e e m e n t whereby the latter risked b e c o m i n g m o r e or less an American protectorate." 7 In fact, the Santiago g o v e r n m e n t sent a special mission to Quito in an a t t e m p t to prevent the ratification of the a g r e e m e n t , or at least to offer assistance to the E c u a d o r e a n government, as a m e a n s to count e r b a l a n c e the new U.S. p r e s e n c e t h e r e . At the same time, Chile tried to rouse the r e m a i n i n g Latin American countries into offering their cooperation to Ecuador, so as to h a m p e r U.S. policy. Relations between the United States a n d Chile improved considerably between 1860 a n d 1865, d u r i n g the American Civil War, since "the cause for which Lincoln a n d the U n i o n were fighting was supp o r t e d by the p e o p l e of Chile, a n d Chilean public o p i n i o n clearly o p p o s e d slavery and the expansion thereof." 8 However, in 1865 the relations between the countries cooled again because t h e U n i t e d States sympathized with Spain d u r i n g its wars against Chile, Peru, a n d Ecuador, although it disguised its position in an official proclamation of neutrality. A mission to Washington, h e a d e d by Benjamin Vicuna-Mackenna in 1865-1866, whose p u r p o s e was to obtain ships a n d weapons, was officially rejected by the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , a n d resulted in the incarceration of the Chilean envoy u n d e r the charge of having violated U.S. neutrality. 9 This war also d e m o n s t r a t e d to b o t h the Chilean g o v e r n m e n t and the public the uselessness of the M o n r o e Doctrine, since the b o m b i n g of Valparaiso by the Spanish forces in March 1866 took place before the eyes of a powerful U.S. fleet, which did n o t h i n g to prevent the destruction of the port. T h e posture of the United States d u r i n g the War of the Pacific, when Chile c o n f r o n t e d Peru and Bolivia, intensified the differences between Washington a n d Santiago. From the beginning of the conflict, the United States intervened t h r o u g h a mediation effort that, in t h e o p i n i o n of C h i l e a n s , c l e a r l y l e a n e d in f a v o r of t h e Peruvian-Bolivian cause and, ultimately, U.S. interests. Secretary of State J a m e s G. Blaine's hostile attitude toward Chile, the personal involvement of the U.S. Minister Counsellor, Stephen Hulburt, with Peruvian business e n t r e p r e n e u r s in Lima, a n d H u l b u r t ' s intervention in favor of the U.S. Peruvian Company, were clear a n d specific signs of the anti-Chilean position a d o p t e d by Washington. According to historian Gonzalo Vial, the United States suffered f r o m a strong case of Anglophobia, and construed Chile simply as a servant of Great Britain. T h e guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy d u r i n g the entire war was to prevent losses of Peruvian territory

8

Elusive

Friendship

to Chile. Blaine and U.S. officials wished such corporations as the Peruvian Company and Credit Industrial to make loans to Peru in o r d e r for t h e latter to pay an i n d e m n i t y to Chile, with T a r a p a c a region as collateral. T h e United States also was o f the opinion that if the territories in dispute r e m a i n e d the property o f their original owners, the strategic balance, which had b e e n altered by the war, would be reestablished in the South American Pacific. 1 0 It was n o t until February 1882, after Blaine was replaced as secretary o f state, that the United States a c c e p t e d the Chilean thesis that a transfer o f territories was a prerequisite for a p e a c e agreement. Nevertheless, the United States c o n t i n u e d to e x e r t pressure for a negotiation between Chile and Peru in which Washington was expected to play a decisive role. Contrary to the U.S. wishes, however, the situation was resolved by a direct understanding between C h i l e a n d P e r u , which c u l m i n a t e d in t h e A n c ó n Treaty, s i g n e d O c t o b e r 2 0 , 1 8 8 3 . B u t the treaty left p e n d i n g t h e f u t u r e o f t h e provinces o f T a c n a and Arica, which paved t h e way for r e n e w e d interventionist pressure on the part of the U.S. Most students of U.S. policy with respect to the War o f the Pacific c o n c l u d e that t h e C h i l e a n s i n t e r p r e t e d the U.S. position as interventionist and pro-Peruvian, an interpretation that damaged the image o f the United States in Chile and increased the lack o f trust of the local political elite toward Washington. A c c o r d i n g to Cristian G u e r r e r o , " t h e r e is n o d o u b t that t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s u f f e r e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e loss o f p r e s t i g e in C h i l e , because o f its intervention in the problems o f the War of the Pacific. While it is true that U.S. interference prevented a E u r o p e a n interv e n t i o n , C h i l e did n o t a c c e p t in any way t h e i m p o s i t i o n B l a i n e wished to m a k e , and, as a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e o f , C h i l e a n p u b l i c opinion grew m o r e wary than ever c o n c e r n i n g American policy." 11 Similarly, Frederick Pike maintains that "as a result o f the War o f t h e Pacific, t h e r e e m e r g e d , a m o n g C h i l e a n s , a lasting mistrust with r e s p e c t to the U . S . " A c c o r d i n g to C h i l e a n diplomats, t h e U n i t e d States was trying to keep a weak country such as Peru from losing territories to Chile, while the United States itself "was attempting to establish its domination over Peru, and perhaps over all o f South America." 1 2 During the following years, other situations affected negatively bilateral relations between Santiago and Washington. D u r i n g t h e Chilean civil war o f 1891, Washington, and most specifically the U.S. representative Patrick Egan, gave its wholehearted support to Presid e n t J o s é M a n u e l B a l m a c e d a , who was c o n f r o n t i n g t h e I q u i q u e

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

9

J u n t a a n d the congressional rebel forces. T h e so-called "Itata incid e n t " — t h e U.S. government's refusal to allow delivery to the congressional forces of a s h i p m e n t of arms acquired in California, o n the g r o u n d s that the d e p a r t u r e of the Itata h a d violated U.S. neutrality laws, created a p r o f o u n d r e s e n t m e n t against the U n i t e d States on t h e part of the forces that were about to e m e r g e victorious in the civil war. Anti-American feelings were s p u r r e d by an a n o t h e r incident, which occurred at the e n d of the revolution. U.S. Admiral George Brown took his ship to Q u i n t e r o to witness the landing of the revolutionary forces, w h e r e u p o n h e cabled the news to his superiors. T h e message fell into the hands of the anti-Balmaceda forces, which led to fierce attacks a n d accusations of espionage against Brown. 1 3 Later, a n o t h e r serious p r o b l e m , known as the "Baltimore case," b r o u g h t Chile a n d t h e U n i t e d States i n t o bitter d i p l o m a t i c conf r o n t a t i o n . This crisis s t a r t e d in Valparaiso p o r t , w h e n two U.S. sailors f r o m the U.S.S. Baltimore were killed in a brawl with Chilean civilians. According to the State D e p a r t m e n t , far f r o m being a comm o n incident, this was an act of p r e m e d i t a t e d aggression against the U n i t e d States. President Benjamin Harrison d e m a n d e d an official explanation f r o m the Chilean government, as well as the payment of an indemnity. In J a n u a r y 1892, Harrison sent a message to the U.S. Congress concerning both the Baltimore case a n d the p r o b l e m of several Balmaceda followers who sought asylum in the U.S. embassy in Santiago. H e requested legislative authorization to take the necessary steps, should Chile not comply with his demands. T h e situation b e c a m e so serious t h a t the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t felt t h a t a war between the United States a n d Chile was imminent. 1 4 T h e conflict was finally resolved w h e n the Chilean g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d to pay indemnity of $75,000 to the families of the dead sailors. In Chile it was felt that Washington h a d unjustifiedly t u r n e d a relatively minor incident into an international crisis. D u r i n g the same period, the Chile-U.S. rivalry was again evident in the sending of the cruiser Esmeralda to P a n a m a in 1885 with the p u r p o s e of d e f e n d i n g the rights of Colombia o n the Central American isthmus. Rivalry c o n t i n u e d in r e p e a t e d f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e navies of b o t h countries d u r i n g t h e 1898 S p a n i s h - A m e r i c a n War and t h r o u g h Chilean resistance to U.S. attempts to occupy the Galapagos Islands. 15 T h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y c a m e to an e n d while Chile a n d the United States were quarrelling over such issues as t h e Lord contract a n d the Alsop reclamation case. T h e Lord contract was signed by

10

Elusive

Friendship

Chile a n d t h e N o r t h a n d S o u t h A m e r i c a n C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, d u r i n g B a l m a c e d a ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a railr o a d . B a l m a c e d a r e s c i n d e d t h e c o n t r a c t for alleged n o n c o m p l i a n c e o n t h e p a r t of t h e c o m p a n y — w h i c h h a d s o l e m n l y r e n o u n c e d its c o u n t r y ' s diplomatic p r o t e c t i o n . However, since the C h i l e a n governm e n t r e f u s e d to r e c o g n i z e t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c o u r t provided for u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e c o m p a n y d e c i d e d n o t to "give u p t h e i r r i g h t to r e q u e s t that type of p r o t e c t i o n . " Finally, t h e d a m a g e s claimed by t h e company, a m o u n t i n g to $150 t h o u s a n d , was p a i d by Chile in 1896. 1 6 D u r i n g the Alsop r e c l a m a t i o n case, derived f r o m d a m a g e s suff e r e d d u r i n g t h e W a r of t h e P a c i f i c , t h e U.S. s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e t h r e a t e n e d to b r e a k diplomatic relations if Chile did n o t a c c e p t his terms. This dispute was finally settled in 1911 t h r o u g h t h e arbitration p r o v i d e d by G r e a t Britain, a m i d s t t h e protests of t h e C h i l e a n Congress a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n against t h e a t t i t u d e a d o p t e d by Washi n g t o n . Vial points o u t that t h e Alsop case chilled relations between t h e two c o u n t r i e s , w h i c h b e c a m e e v i d e n t a t t h e F o u r t h I n t e r A m e r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e h e l d in 1910 in B u e n o s Aires. O n this occasion, t h e U n i t e d States, t h r o u g h Brazil, a t t e m p t e d to o b t a i n a kind of " h e m i s p h e r i c institutionalization" of t h e M o n r o e D o c t r i n e , b u t Chile o p p o s e d this suggestion, m a i n t a i n i n g it was necessary to give f u r t h e r t h o u g h t to t h e m a t t e r , w h e r e u p o n t h e d i s c u s s i o n was postponed.17 T h e s u b s e q u e n t crises a f f e c t i n g bilateral relations, particularly a f t e r t h e War of t h e Pacific, p o i n t e d to t h e rivalrly w h i c h existed between two e m e r g i n g powers, o n e of which was p r o j e c t i n g itself at worldwide level, while t h e o t h e r was d o i n g so regionally. D u r i n g the s e c o n d half of t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, a n d particularly a f t e r having won t h e War of t h e Pacific, Chile h a d c o m e f o r t h as a t r u e power in S o u t h A m e r i c a , a n d its i n t e r n a t i o n a l political p r e s t i g e was amply recognized; this, a c c o r d i n g to G u e r r e r o , gave rise to "a s t r o n g o p p o sition in t h e U n i t e d States at t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l level, a n d a m o n g certain public o p i n i o n sectors." 1 8 G o n z a l o Vial s u m m a r i z e s Chile's i n t e r n a t i o n a l situation at t h e time thus: Actually, what the United States feared was the rivalry of Chile in the Pacific. Today this seems absurd in view of the diverging dimensions of each of these countries; however, taking into account their power resources then, it was not so absurd at the time. With the exception of the United States, Chile was the only nation on the Continent which was politically organized and stable. Until 1879, we had experienced a modest but steady rate of development. Nitrate opened up an unlimited economic potential, and many even thought, erroneously, that guano offered as

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

11

many possibilities. Our military capacity had been clearly demonstrated, and the Chilean Army had everything: combat-ready soldiers, q u a l i f i e d o f f i c e r s , e x p e r i e n c e , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d the weapons of '79. Of greater importance still was the navy, which included its own warships, the Huascar, and other smaller vessels captured from Peru. Which army or navy could challenge us on the Pacific Coast? Certainly not the United States, whose navy was quite inferior as compared to ours, however incredible this may seem to be nowadays! 19

In fact, the U.S. representative in Santiago submitted a r e p o r t in 1898 asserting that, in spite of its small population, Chile was "number thirty-three a m o n g the civilized nations of the world, although its navy had moved u p to the eighth position in the world, a n d to second place a m o n g the nations of the hemisphere." T h e d o c u m e n t went on to say that the Chilean army "was second to n o n e in the Americas, except the U.S. army." 20 Burr agrees with this assertion, a n d writes that by 1890 Chile had completed a decade of accumulation of power "as a result first of its victory in the War of the Pacific, a n d , second, its intensive exploitation of the spoils of that victory." Chile had even a b a n d o n e d its traditional power balance a p p r o a c h for South America, a n d h a d a d o p t e d an attitude of military superiority as the best d e t e r r e n t to any a n t i - C h i l e a n c o a l i t i o n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e c o u n t r y h a d e n t e r e d into the h e m i s p h e r i c power struggle, thus e x c e e d i n g the limits of its old subregional project, which had focused o n the South American Pacific Coast sphere of interest. 2 1 In parallel fashion, the U n i t e d States was clearly c o m i n g t h r o u g h as a global power with h e g e m o n i c intentions in the Western Hemisphere, 2 2 a n d with conc r e t e political, e c o n o m i c , a n d strategic interests to which Chile could not r e m a i n i n d i f f e r e n t . I n d e e d , after the 1898 war against Spain, which the United States won, the government, the press a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n in Chile e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n with r e s p e c t to t h e industrial advancement of the United States, and the strong expansionists and imperialistic traits of U.S. foreign policy. This competition between the United States a n d Chile shaped the historical m e m o r y of their relationship, and, to a certain extent, explains the reservations that have b e e n characteristic of their curr e n t relationship. D u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, this historical m e m o r y became o n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l traits of a kind of "antiAmerican culture," 2 3 which thrived a m o n g different Chilean social and political groups, including conservatives a n d liberals, 24 radicals and socialists. O n e of the initial a n d most widely acknowledged expressions of

12

Elusive

Friendship

this current o f mistrust and hostility toward the U n i t e d States was the o p i n i o n o f Chilean statesman D i e g o Portales. R e f e r r i n g to President James M o n r o e ' s declaration, which w o u l d in 1823 b e c o m e the M o n r o e Doctrine, he issued a warning about the danger o f " f r e e i n g ourselves from o n e f o r m o f domination only to fall into another," and about the n e e d to distrust those w h o praised the struggle f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e (the U n i t e d States, in this case) but "did not help in any way." It s e e m e d to many n i n e t e e n t h century politicians and intellectuals that the United States was involved in an expansionist drive, which became evident in the war against M e x i c o , the activides o f U.S. adventurer W i l l i a m Walker in Nicaragua, and the war against Spain. In 1896, British minister Kennedy heard President J o r g e M o n t t say that the M o n r o e Doctrine "meant a potential submission o f the entire American Continent to the U n i t e d States"; that several countries, including Chile of course, were therefore "on the alert to resist any seemingly friendly advance" ( o n the part o f the Americans), and that the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t was "unscrupulous and corrupt." 2 5 Other Chilean leaders, such as Benjamín Vicuña-Mackenna, Manuel Antonio Matta, Francisco Bilbao, P e d r o Félix Vicuña, Galvarino Gallardo, Manuel Carrasco-Albano, and Marcial Martínez, not only censured U.S. f o r e i g n policy, but also criticized the individualistic materialism o f the U n i t e d States, and p r o p o s e d Hispanoamerican unity against Anglosaxon power. During the twentieth century, the utmost right-wing p r o p o n e n t of the tradition that depicts the United States as a materialistic society without spiritual or strong ethical values was the historian Jaime Eyzaguirre; on the left, Ricardo Latcham and Chilean socialists in general became the main promoters of the Latin-Americanist perspective, w h i c h c o n t a i n e d e v i d e n t a n t i - A m e r i c a n i n g r e d i e n t s . 2 6 Despite the anti-American feelings that prevail in Chilean political circles, as Joaquin Fermandois notes, in Chilean society as a whole, such an attitude does not seem to b e deeply rooted; o n e c o u l d assert that the average Chilean admires the "American way o f l i f e " and the modernization values associated with it. 27

U.S. Hegemony and the Decline of Chilean Power: 1900-1950 A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the twentieth century, C h i l e v i e w e d the U.S. with increasing concern. For the Chilean ruling elite, both the war b e t w e e n the U.S. and S p a i n — w h o s e c o n s e q u e n c e s i n c l u d e d the

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

13

annexation of Puerto Rico and virtual American control over Cuba — a n d Washington's conspicuous participation in the independence of Panama from Colombia—which would allow the U.S. to obtain the rights to build the canal—were enough proof of the imperialistic m o m e n t u m which the American presence had gained in the region. This is why, as of 1913, Chile "began to assume the role o f an active leader against all signs of expansion of U.S. influence in Latin America." 2 8 Anti-American criticism focused first on the issue of pan-Americanism, a concept that became seriously contested under the allegation that it concealed the desire o f the U.S. to dominate the region, and second, on the Monroe Doctrine, which was also strongly questioned. T h e cold reception given T h e o d o r e Roosevelt during his visit to Chile at the end of 1913 reflected the country's prevailing attitude with respect to Washington. T h e C h i l e a n c o n c e r n was c o n f i r m e d by Woodrow Wilson's interventionist policy during the Mexican Revolution, and particularly by the occupation of Veracruz by U.S. troops in April 1914. Together with Argentina and Brazil, Chile participated in mediation efforts that contributed to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, and to the ending of the Mexican-American conflict. Despite the fact that these mediation efforts were not entirely well received by the Mexicans, 2 9 they reaffirmed the regional presence of the ABC countries, and reinforced the idea that cooperation among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile was an e l e m e n t o f b a l a n c e and i n d e p e n d e n c e in the region vis-à-vis the United States. In fact, by means of an agreement with Argentina and Brazil, in 1916 Chile led the successful opposition to Wilson's attempts to introduce a Pan-American Pact, which appeared to be a new instrument for intervention and imperialism. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the formation of the ABC group intended to counteract U.S. influence in the region, while at the same time, seeking an understanding with the United States from a more solid bargaining position. In 1917 the United States became involved as an active military force in World War I. No sooner had it entered the war than it started to exert pressure on Chile to break relations with the Central Powers. Chile, which had proclaimed its neutrality, 30 maintained a policy of nonalignment during the conflict. Representatives of a broad spectrum of the Chilean political elite held that neutrality was an essential commitment within any strategy intended to consolidate a South American coalition of countries that could balance U.S. influence in hemispheric affairs. 31 During this period, Chile-U.S. relations were "normal," and the

14

Elusive

Friendship

U.S. legation was even p r o m o t e d to t h e r a n k of embassy, which led Chile to d o t h e s a m e with its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n . 3 2 But, while Wilson was still in office, new tensions arose. T h e d e f e a t of t h e C e n t r a l Powers caused s o m e c o n c e r n in Chile, especially w h e n Wilson did n o t r e a c t favorably to a c o n g r a t u l a t o r y m e s s a g e s e n t t o h i m by s e v e r a l C h i l e a n l e a d e r s . T h e m e s s a g e a f f i r m e d t h a t C h i l e a n n e u t r a l i t y h a d n o t b e e n b i a s e d against t h e U n i t e d States, a n d r e f e r r e d to t h e u r g e n t n e e d f o r the reestablishm e n t of friendly ties between Chile a n d P e r u , t h e latter having b e e n a m o n g t h o s e w h o b r o k e relations with t h e C e n t r a l Powers. In o r d e r to p r e v e n t a n initiative o n t h e p a r t of t h e Allies at t h e p r o j e c t e d L e a g u e of Nations to give back to P e r u t h e territories of T a c n a a n d Arica, Chile l a u n c h e d a publicity c a m p a i g n in W a s h i n g t o n , a n d even sent journalists f r o m El Mercurio n e w s p a p e r to t h e U.S. capital, in an e f f o r t to exalt C h i l e a n f r i e n d s h i p with t h e U n i t e d States, a n d to explain Chilean neutrality d u r i n g t h e War. 3 3 U.S. e c o n o m i c d o m i n a n c e in C h i l e s t a r t e d t o f l o u r i s h a f t e r World War I (see Table 1.1). As h a p p e n e d in t h e rest of t h e r e g i o n , t h e U n i t e d States gradually displaced G e r m a n y a n d G r e a t Britain in Chilean f o r e i g n investments a n d trade. In parallel f a s h i o n , Chilean p o w e r was d e c l i n i n g , d u e b o t h to t h e p o s t w a r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of world power, a n d to domestic factors, a m o n g which were t h e political a n d social p r o b l e m s that h a d b e e n intensified in t h e 1891 civil war. At t h a t time, C h i l e - U . S . r e l a t i o n s w e r e n o t only international linkages, b u t ever m o r e transnational relations, as U.S. actors a n d policies increasingly d o m i n a t e d t h e economy, t h e society, a n d t h e politics of Chile. T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s were to b e c o m e gradually a t t a c h e d to t h e evolution of t h e Chilean i n t e r n a l political processes. Table 1.1

Chile: Exports to and Imports from the United States Percentage of Total Trade

Year

Imports

Exports

1913 1914 1915 1916 1917

16.7 20.5 33.3 42.4 49.0

21.0 36.8 42.9 49.9 64.4

Source: R. Couyoumdjian, "En torno a la neutralidad de Chile durante la Primera Guerra Mundial," in 150 años de política exterior chilena, Walter Sánchez and Teresa Pereira, eds. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1979.

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

15

In r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e inevitable p r e s e n c e o f t h e U.S. in t h e region, Arturo Alessandri's g o v e r n m e n t sought Washington's mediation to arrive at an a g r e e m e n t with Peru over T a c n a and Arica and find a final solution to the n o r t h e r n b o r d e r p r o b l e m . After b o t h c o u n t r i e s a c c e p t e d submitting t h e issue to the arbitration o f t h e United States, President Calvin Coolidge d e t e r m i n e d that the future o f b o t h territories had to be decided u p o n by means o f a plebiscite u n d e r the supervision o f the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t . T h e task was later entrusted to a committee headed by G e n e r a l J o h n Pershing. Relations between Pershing a n d the Chilean g o v e r n m e n t were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by multiple tensions and disputes, and, in J a n u a r y 1926, Pershing left his position to b e replaced by G e n e r a l William Lassiter. T h e latter, however, m a d e the Chilean public furious by suggesting that the plebiscite was n o t feasible, and that the problem had to be resolved through the g o o d offices o f the United States. T h e U.S. representatives did not believe there would b e the appropriate c o n d i t i o n s in C h i l e to c o n d u c t a plebiscite with sufficient guarantees to the parties involved, since they had d o n e some surveying that suggested the existence o f certain irregularities. 3 4 Despite the fact that t h e Chilean g o v e r n m e n t a c c e p t e d t h e o f f e r o f g o o d offices, Lassiter's suggestion was regarded in Chile as an insult, and yet a n o t h e r attempt on t h e part o f the Americans to impose their will on South America. 3 5 A r t u r o A l e s s a n d r i even m a i n t a i n e d that, t h r o u g h L a s s i t e r ' s actions, Washington had demonstrated utter i g n o r a n c e with respect to international law. "During my five years in office," h e asserted, "I worked to keep pan-Americanism alive. But I shall now dedicate all the energy I have left to preach that we [the Latin American countries] must rise together, united, and cry aloud: 'Latin America for the Latin Americans'." 3 6 D u r i n g the Ibanez dictatorship, relations between the U n i t e d States and Chile b e c a m e somewhat m o r e cooperative. Ibanez a c c e p t e d U . S . p r e d o m i n a n c e in t h e i n t e r - A m e r i c a n system as inevitable, even though h e and his advisors greatly mistrusted the United States and opposed the imperialistic expressions o f the Monr o e D o c t r i n e . In effect, the I b a n e z g o v e r n m e n t r e e x a m i n e d t h e issue o f Latin American unity, and sternly c o n d e m n e d U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, which started in 1926. T h e world crisis o f 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 1 h a d s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s in Chile. At the time of the fall o f Ibanez, in 1931, Chile had o n e o f the world's highest per capita e x t e r n a l debts, which it h a d i n c u r r e d especially with U.S. banking institutions. In J u l y 1931, a moratorium was executed, partial until August of that same year, and total there-

16

Elusive

Friendship

after, o n the payments d u e u n d e r such obligations. T h e situation b e c a m e worse u p o n the passage in t h e U n i t e d States of the 1930 Tariff Law, which created new tariff barriers against Latin American products; a n d the 1932 Income Law, which prescribed a tax of four cents p e r p o u n d o n i m p o r t e d copper, a n d which affected Chile, Peru, and Mexico. 3 7 During the sixteen-day r u l e of the Socialist Republic, relations between the United States a n d Chile r e a c h e d o n e of their lowest levels. T h e U.S. ambassador in Santiago r e c o m m e n d e d postponing the recognition of the new government until he could learn the reaction of the socialist authorities to U.S. interests in Chile. Despite the fact that Chilean leader M a r m a d u k e Grove gave assurances to the U.S. ambassador that U.S. interests, with the exception of nitrates, were not going to be affected, the White House worked in coordination with U.S. companies to obstruct any nationalization attempts on the part of the short-lived socialist government, a n d warned the Chilean authorities that any interference in U.S. nitrate a n d c o p p e r investments would be cause to freeze Chilean deposits in U.S. banks and block loan applications that h a d b e e n submitted. Similarly, the undersecretary of state warned that the socialist r e g i m e would be the t a r g e t of p r o t e s t s if f o r e i g n d e p o s i t s in C h i l e a n b a n k s were seized, which thwarted the revolutionary j u n t a ' s intentions in this respect. 3 8 T h e experience of the Socialist Republic r e i n f o r c e d the opinion that prevailed a m o n g the left and centrist political sectors in Chile that the United States was an imperialistic power. Until 1933, Chile continued to look for unity in the region. T h e differences between Argentina a n d Chile became considerably less critical d u r i n g this period, as a consequence of a c o m m o n effort to balance U.S. influence in the pan-American movement. As of 1933, however, the relations between Washington a n d Santiago improved significantly. O n e of the main reasons for such a c h a n g e was Washi n g t o n ' s a c c e p t a n c e of the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n d u r i n g t h e Seventh Pan-American C o n f e r e n c e , within the framework of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, which cont r i b u t e d to a m o r e positive i m a g e of t h e U n i t e d States a m o n g Chilean a n d o t h e r Latin American political elite. However, at the beginning of World War II the bilateral relationship relapsed into difficulty. W h e n the U n i t e d States e n t e r e d the war, Washington's Latin American policy centered, as it h a d d o n e d u r i n g World War I, o n the r e q u i r e m e n t for all nations of the hemis p h e r e to b r e a k d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Axis c o u n t r i e s . Argentina a n d Chile were the only countries that did not r e s p o n d to

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

17

this pressure (until almost the end of the war). Although the Socialist party as well as some liberals, radicals, and others, advocated such a rupture of relations, Chile was initially neutral. T h e Chilean position greatly upset the White House, and gave rise to constant pressure and threats against the radical Chilean g o v e r n m e n t s of the time. O n e of the main bilateral difficulties during the war was due to the price of 11.7 cents per pound, which the U.S. had set for copper. This caused the Chilean treasury to sustain losses a m o u n t i n g to some $1.1 billion by virtue of lower sale prices, and approximately $ 9 0 0 million by virtue of uncollected taxes. 3 9 U.S. political pressure, applied to its m a x i m u m extent, finally forced Chile to break relations with the Axis powers and declare war on J a p a n . But, having not sold copper at market prices during the war, Chile was unable to defend itself from the post-war increase in the prices of manufactured products.

Notes 1. The first U.S. diplomatic agent in Chile was actually Consul Joel Poinsett, who was officially received in Santiago in February 1812. Known as a staunch supporter of Chilean independence from the Spanish crown, Poinsett excelled as a "true revolutionary agent who was fully committed to his mission as a theoretical counselor to the new rulers of Santiago and Buenos Aires." See FA. Encina and L. Castedo, Resumen de la historia de Chile (Santiago: Zig-Zag, n.d.), p. 534. 2. See Cristián Guerrero, "Chile y Estados Unidos: relaciones y problemas, 1912-1916," in Walter Sánchez and Teresa Pereira (eds.), 150 años de política exterior chilena (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1979), p. 67. 3. By means of this agreement, Chile obtained some concessions that the United States had denied other Latin American nations. See Guerrero, "Chile y Estados Unidos," pp. 67-70. 4. Carlos Mery-Squella, Relaciones diplomáticas entre Chile y los Estados Unidos de América, 1829-1841 (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1965), p. 61. 5. Ibid., p. 139. 6. Quoted by Frederick Pike, Chile and the United States: 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 24. 7. Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) pp. 84-85. 8. Guerrero, "Chile y Estados Unidos," p. 72. 9. Ibid., p. 73. 10. For a detailed account of U.S.-Chile relations during the War of the Pacific, see Pike, Chile and the United States, Chapter 3, pp. 47-62, and Gonza-

18

Elusive

Friendship

lo Vial, Historia de Chile (1891-1973) (Santiago: Santillana, 1981), pp. 335-345. 11. Guerrero, "Chile y Estados Unidos," p. 77. 12. Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 59. 13. Vial, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 342. 14. See Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 78, and Vial Historia de Chile 2, pp. 158-175. For a detailed account, see José Miguel Barros, El Caso del Baltimore (Santiago: Casa Nacional del Niño, 1950). 15. See Emilio Meneses, "Los límites del equilibrio de poder: la política exterior chilena a fines del siglo pasado, 1891-1902," Opciones, Santiago, No. 9, May-September 1986, p. 95. 16. Vial, Historia de Chile2, p. 172. 17. Ibid., pp. 488-489. 18. Guerrero, "Chile y Estudos Unidos, p. 74. 19. Vial, Historia de Chile2, pp. 340-341. 20. Report cited by Meneses, "Los límites," p. 20. 21. See Burr, By Reason or Force, pp. 107-108, 192-193. 22. In 1895 the United States had announced the Monroe Doctrine's Olney Corollary, according to which the will of the United States was the law in the Western Hemisphere. 23. In Chile and the United States, Pike gives three Chilean political and cultural traditions concerning the United States: (1) the Portales isolationist and anti-American tradition; (2) the anti-American tradition based on the concept of Latin American unity; and (3) the inter-American international law tradition. T h e latter is the most moderate, since it intended to seek areas of understanding between the United States and Latin America (pp. 23-30). It is also necessary to recognize that, in the Chilean intellectual and political domain, there were enthusiastic admirers of the U.S. political system and culture, such as Lastarria. 24. The fact that the right has harbored strong anti-American feelings does not mean that it has not often associated with Washington. The ties between the Chilean right and the United States may be explained by the fact that, traditionally, U.S. policy served as support for conservatives in their attempts to maintain the status quo, and that right-wing leaders have tended to hide their cultural and intellectual objections to U.S. society in exchange for the material and specific benefits emanating from a close relationship with a developed capitalist power. When the United States has encouraged change in Chile, those objections have surfaced. 25. Vial, Historia de Chile 2, p. 174. 26. With r e s p e c t to the Chilean socialists, m o r e than an "antiAmerican" attitude, theirs was an "anti-imperialistic" position. On certain occasions, notably during World War II, the Socialist party maintained friendly relations with the U.S. government. T h e innovative and progressive measures introduced by Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, for example, also contributed to the development of a more complex view of the United States on the part of the socialists. For further references on these subjects, see Heraldo Muñoz, "La política internacional del Partido Socialista y las relaciones exteriores de Chile," in E. Ortiz (ed.), Temas Socialistas (Santiago: Vector, 1983), and Boris Yopo-H. "EE, UU. y el Partido Socialista chileno, 1933-1946: Un estudio de percepciones políticas," thesis, Master's

Initial

Bilateral

Tensions

19

International Studies Institute, University of Chile, September 1984. 27. See Joaquin Fermandois, Chile y el mundo 1970-1973: La política exterior de la Unidad Popular y el sistema internacional (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985), pp. 257-258. Fermandois maintains, and we agree, that the "anti-American feelings" of the Chilean political elite—particularly the right, in our opinion—is highly rhetorical. 28. Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 144. 29. With respect to this issue, see Sol Serrano, Chile y la Revolución Mexicana, mimeo, CERC, Santiago, 1985. 30. Because of German migration to Chile, the German influence in the Chilean army, and German sympathy toward Chile during the War of the Pacific, Chilean neutrality, according to some, concealed a pro-German, anti-American slant. Couyoumdjian maintains, however, that Chilean neutrality was not pro-German to any significant degree, and that "the alternative to break relations with the Central Powers was given serious thought, which demonstrates the considerable political and economic influence of the United States." (See Ricardo Couyoumdjian, "En torno a la neutralidad de Chile durante la Primera Guerra Mundial," in W. Sánchez and T. Pereira (eds.), 150 años, p. 203). 31. See Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 156. 32. Vial, Histora de Chile 2, Vol. II, p. 641. 33. Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 158-159. 34. Concerning this issue, see Joe F. Wilson, The United States, Chile, and Peru in the Tacna and Arica Plebiscite (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1979) pp. 207ff. 35. In 1929, the Tacna and Arica problem was resolved directly between Chile and Peru: Arica remained as a possession of Chile, and Tacna was given back to Peru; in addition, Chile gave Peru an indemnity of $6 million. 36. In Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 219. 37. See Yopo-H., "EE, UU," p. 9 38. Ibid., p. 13 39. See Alexander Sutulov "Evolución de la política nacional del cobre y sus consecuencias en la relaciones con Gran Bretaña y los Estados Unidos, in W. Sánchez and T. Pereira, 150 años, p. 240.

2 The United States and Chile: From the Postwar Period to 1973

The Cold War and Bilateral Ties During the Administrations of Gonzàlez-Videla and Ibanez (1946—1958) U.S.—Chilean relations c h a n g e d qualitatively at the e n d of World War II: the Cold War imposed strict bipolarity u p o n international relations, while the e m e r g i n g institutions of the inter-American system served the p u r p o s e of aligning Latin America with the United States within the framework of global confrontation. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the inter-American institutions a n d the a d o p t i o n of bilateral military agreements were the main aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations between the e n d of the 1940s and the b e g i n n i n g of t h e 1950s. T h e political a n d military a r r a n g e m e n t s were s u p p l e m e n t e d with economic aid. Latin Americans viewed economic cooperation as the vital c o u n t e r p a r t to political a n d military links, while for the United States it was merely secondary. This diff e r e n c e in emphasis b e c a m e evident in r e c u r r e n t controversies that affected inter-American relations until the launching of the Alliance for Progress. Nevertheless, it was d u r i n g the very early stages of the postwar p e r i o d that the e c o n o m i c aid programs, which were to b e c o m e a crucial influence over the following decades, b e c a m e institutionalized. A review of the statistical data c o n c e r n i n g U.S. grant a n d loan p r o g r a m s for Latin America shows how high a priority was assigned to Chile which, save for exceptional periods, received grants a n d loans in m u c h higher p r o p o r t i o n than its participation in the product or population of Latin America (see Tables 2.2 a n d 2.4). I n f o r m a t i o n o n e c o n o m i c a n d military aid has b e e n g r o u p e d according to U.S. presidential terms. In o r d e r to simplify the analysis of the policies i m p l e m e n t e d by means of grants a n d loans, we 21

22

Elusive

Friendship

.ti

te < «

co

u -o 5 S a 5 . « .2 Q •a y u 73 S S 3 § 0 - CJ 2 i •r] « 1 S i Jì I 3

CN ÌP.

(S SO

C; OS SO a 3

a •e E W

i n S• -a § 8 u u S Q s §• ö " 3 " - g 1 3 § « u ß, s; -a •a £ g 1a |3 °§ Jä | E| u o« i ' S S ^ S u a

Elusive

Friendship

>n m r(N

00

\Ó OÓ

00 in (SÌ rfi S