Electoral Violence in the Western Balkans: From Voting to Fighting and Back (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9780415788366, 9781315225319, 0415788366

Table of contents :
Cover
Endorsement
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of contents
Figures
Tables
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 Plan of the book
Notes
2 From violence to electoral violence: Defining electoral violence
2.1 Violence
2.2 Collective violence
Marxist approach versus non-Marxist approach
Micro versus macro
Contingency versus inherency
Critical approaches
2.3 Political violence
2.4 Elections and conflict
2.5 Electoral violence: roots of the concept
2.6 Electoral violence: operational definition
Notes
3 Contexts of electoral violence
3.1 Evidence of electoral violence in post-communist Europe
3.2 Electoral violence in post-communism: a typology
3.3 Different contexts – different styles
Democratizing and transforming societies
Consolidated democracies
Modern autocracies
Notes
4 Patterns of electoral violence
4.1 Electoral violence in the Western Balkans
Croatia
Serbia
Montenegro
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo
Macedonia (FYROM)
Albania
4.2 Patterns of violent interactions
4.3 Varieties of violence
Notes
5 Recipes for electoral violence in the Western Balkans
5.1 QCA: the method
5.2 Explaining electoral violence in the Western Balkans
Outcome
Conditions
MDSO-MSDO analysis and the calibration of conditions
Ethno-cultural conflict (ECC)
Quality of democracy (QD)
Security dilemma (SD)
Electoral integrity [EI]
Socio-economic conflict (SEC)
5.3 Models of electoral violence
5.3.1 Model 1
Discussion
5.3.2 Model 2
Discussion
5.3.3 Model 3
Discussion
5.3.4 Model 4
Discussion
5.3.5 Model 5
Discussion
5.4 Conclusion: models and solutions
Notes
6 Conclusion: Electoral violence, the Western Balkans and the world
Note
Appendix
References
Index

Citation preview

 i

“Recent research has shown elections in a positive light – they are moments when democratic actors have an opportunity to defeat authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian rulers. Michal Mochtak, however, sheds light on a darker side of elections, their potential to provoke conflict and violence. This book provides nuanced arguments grounded in both data and qualitative fieldwork that will help policymakers to not only predict when electoral violence is going to occur, but also prevent it from happening.” Andrew Roberts, Northwestern University, USA “This comprehensive study of post-Communist electoral violence in the Western Balkans is a welcome addition to the literature which has tended to focus on Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is a salutary warning to optimists who expect strong external interest and support for democratic practices to ensure a smooth transformation to democracy.” John O’Loughlin, University of Colorado, USA “A must-read book for anybody interested in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). In this insightful and empirically enormous work, Michal Mochtak explains why electoral violence emerges in some places and does not in others. This book generates both reflection and desire to research.” Julián Cárdenas, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

ii

 iii

Electoral Violence in the Western Balkans

Since the end of the Cold War there have been a number of cases where the democratization process has been turbulent, or even violent. Addressing electoral violence, its evolution and impact in the Western Balkans, this book explores the conflict logic of election and tries to understand its basic patterns. Two decades of electoral competition in the region are analysed to identify an interesting evolution of electoral violence in terms of forms, actors, motivations and dynamics. By identifying the potential drivers of electoral violence and explaining the escalation and stimulus of violence-​related events, the author combines a theoretical approach with original data to emphasize the variability of the phenomenon and its evolution in the region. The book will appeal to students and scholars of post-​communist Europe and democratization processes and the Western Balkans in particular. It should also be of interest to political advisors and those involved in developing or implementing democratization programmes. Michal Mochtak is a Research Fellow at the International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University. His research interests cover hybrid regimes, electoral violence and conflicts. He published his papers in Terrorism and Political Violence, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Democracy and Security and World Political Science. He is one of the co-​authors of the publications Challenges to Democracies in East Central Europe (Routledge, 2016)  and Demokratizace a lidská práva. Středoevropské pohledy (MUNI Press/​SLON, 2013 and Osrodek Mysli Politycznej/​Uniwersytet Masaryka, 2016). He regularly lectures on transformation processes and political violence in Central and Eastern Europe. See more at www.mochtak.com.

iv

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber

The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times, including democratization, economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging that seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-​edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives, the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-​level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics, and is accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond.

Most recent titles Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges Jelena Džankic Austerity and the Third Sector in Greece Civil Society at the European Frontline Jennifer Clarke and Asteris Huliaras State-​Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina Soeren Keil and Valery Perry

Forthcoming titles: Electoral Violence in the Western Balkans From Voting to Fighting and Back Michal Mochtak

 v

Electoral Violence in the Western Balkans From Voting to Fighting and Back Michal Mochtak

vi

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Michal Mochtak The right of Michal Mochtak to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Mochtak, Michal, author. Title: Electoral violence in the Western Balkans : from voting to fighting and back / Michal Mochtak. Description: First published 2018. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y. : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Southeast European studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017009854 | ISBN 9780415788366 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315225319 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Political violence–Balkan Peninsula. | Elections–Balkan Peninsula. | Post-communism–Balkan Peninsula. | Balkan Peninsula–Politics and government–1989– Classification: LCC JN97.A95 M63 2018 | DDC 303.609496–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017009854 ISBN: 9780415788366 (hbk) ISBN: 9781315225319 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out of House Publishing

 vi

To my wife Alexandra

vi

 ix

Contents

List of figures List of tables Foreword Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

x xi xiii xv xvi

1 Introduction

1

2 From violence to electoral violence: defining electoral violence

9

3 Contexts of electoral violence

39

4 Patterns of electoral violence

63

5 Recipes for electoral violence in the Western Balkans

120

6 Conclusion: electoral violence, the Western Balkans and the world

188

Appendix References Index

194 196 216

x

Figures

2.1 The predicted risks of contentious elections in various regime types 2.2 Venn diagram of electoral violence 2.3 Narrowed definition of electoral violence 3.1 Temporal distribution of electoral violence (1990–​2010) 3.2 Venn diagram of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe (1990–​2010) 3.3 Clusters of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe (1990–​2010) 3.4 Struggles during the period of transformation 3.5 The predicted risks of contentious elections in various regime types based on data from post-​communist Europe 4.1 Number of elections affected by violence (1990–2015) 4.2 Property space of electoral violence 5.1 Theories of collective violence (overview) 5.2 Summary of remote conditions 5.3 Potential proximate and remote conditions of electoral violence in the Western Balkans 5.4 XY plot of consistency for the term ~SEC*EI*QD (Model 1) 5.5 XY plot of consistency for the term SEC*SD*ECC (Model 1)

30 37 38 47 48 50 55 62 83 89 131 138 139 185 186

 xi

Tables

2 .1 2.2

Summary of main definitions Summary of the main traditions in the research of collective violence 3.1 NELDA variables for potential types of electoral violence 3.2 Summary of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe 3.3 Intersection of various forms of electoral violence (summary) 3.4 Typology of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe 4.1 Systematization of various categories of election violence 4.2 Pros and cons of data from monitoring mission reports 4.3 Electoral violence in the Western Balkans (simple summary of analysed elections) 4.4 Elections affected by hard and soft forms of violence 4.5 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Croatia (1990–​2015) 4.6 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Serbia (1990–​2015) 4.7 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Montenegro (1990–​2015) 4.8 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990–​2015) 4.9 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Kosovo (1999–​2015) 4.10 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Macedonia (FYROM) (1990–​2015) 4.11 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Albania (1990–​2015) 5.1 Fuzzy-​set membership scores of the potential outcomes 5.2 Summary of the potential theories and conditions of collective violence 5.3 Possible sources of violence 5.4 Summary of drivers of community conflicts in Europe (Peace-​Com project)

15 21 42 46 48 51 68 70 84 87 91 93 97 100 104 106 114 128 132 135 136

xi

xii  List of tables 5 .5 5.6 5.7 5 .8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 5.25 5.26 5.27 5.28 5.29 A1

MDSO-​MSDO analysis; outstanding pairs (D0/​D1 and S0/​S1) Potential explanatory variables of electoral violence in the Western Balkans (shortlisted after MDSO-​MSDO analysis) Potential explanatory variables of electoral violence in the Western Balkans Summary of guidelines for calibration Summary of models tested with fsQCA Analysis of necessary conditions (Model 1) Results of fuzzy truth table algorithm (Model 1) (EV; consistency level 0.75) Standard analysis results; Model 1 Summary of cases possibly covered by the solution ~SEC*EI*QD + SEC*SD*ECC → EV Analysis of necessary conditions (Model 2) Results of fuzzy truth table algorithm with recoded outcome (Model 2) (EVs; consistency level 0.80) Analysis of necessary conditions (Model 3) Results of fuzzy truth table algorithm (Model 3) (EVh; consistency level 0.89) Standard analysis results; Model 3 (consistency level 0.89) Summary of cases possibly covered by intermediate solution SEC*SD*ECC + ~SEC*EI*SD*QD + ~SEC*EI*QD*ECC → EVh Analysis of necessary conditions (Model 4) Results of fuzzy truth table algorithm (Model 4) (EVpr; consistency level 0.8) Standard analysis results; Model 4 Summary of cases possibly covered by the solution EI*QD*~ECC + ~SEC*EI*QD + SEC*SD*ECC → EVpr Analysis of necessary conditions (Model 5) Results of fuzzy truth table algorithm (Model 5) (EVpa; consistency level 0.79) Standard analysis results; Model 5 Summary of cases possibly covered by intermediate solution EI*SD*QD + ~SEC*EI*QD*ECC + SEC*SD*QD*ECC → EVpa Summary of intermediate solutions for the tested models (Models 1–​5) Summary of cases covered under intermediate solutions (Models 1–​5) Thresholds used for the crisp set coding of the conditions (MDSO-​MSDO)

143 144 146 153 154 156 157 158 162 163 164 165 166 166 169 171 171 172 174 176 176 176 179 180 184 194

 xi

Foreword

Election as a centrepiece of democracy has been studied from every possible angle for the past two centuries. Its position in terms of defining the very nature of the regime has become the most important reference point of Western democrats who see elections as not only crucial but as an utterly essential pillar of functioning democracy. In this context, the study of elections is inherently also the study of democracy, its changes, development, wins and losses. Although the position of elections in the democratic discourse has changed during the past decades, the key aspect remains intact –​ there is no democracy without free and fair elections. This argument can be developed into a broad discussion covering theoretical as well as empirical aspects of electoral competition and its implications for the stability of democratic regimes as well as the vitality of democratic rule. There is, however, an alternative perspective. I approach electoral coemption as a very dynamic form of social interaction that may generate contentious behaviour, open hostility or even violence. The book focuses on a special subcategory of political violence in the unique environment of election where electoral competition is seen as a form of political conflict. In the past two decades, the phenomenon has received increased attention stemming from the consequences of violent outbursts during elections in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well as Eastern Europe. More recently, the phenomenon has also started to be relevant in some parts of the Western world, where political as well as socio-​economic problems have outgrown institutional capacities to handle the existing tension non-​violently (for example, the 2007 presidential election in France or the 2016 presidential election in the United States of America). Although  the impact cannot be compared with the situation in less developed parts of the world, it certainly shows the relevancy of the problem and the anxieties it causes. As a matter of fact, electoral violence does occur in different forms all around the world and should be studied in its full range in diverse contexts. The book builds on this argument and focuses on electoral violence in the empirically fascinating region of the Western Balkans. It is one of the first attempts to map and study the phenomenon of electoral violence over a longer period of time outside the notoriously fragile environments of

vxi

xiv Foreword Sub-​Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. When I  started writing the book, I had no idea how challenging it would be to finish it. My original idea was to conduct research that would be novel in terms of the topic and original in terms of applied methods. I was convinced that electoral violence could be studied in an environment where the patterns of interaction evolve almost every year and the dynamic of conflict was affected by a system of mutually interacting factors. I fully realized this complexity during my research stay at the University of Belgrade, where I spent almost a year. Through my research trips, I  met wonderful people who inspired me and helped me discover the mentality of the Balkans, their dreams, disappointments and grievances. I would like to thank them.

 xv

Acknowledgements

This whole project would not be possible without my family, friends and colleagues who encouraged me to finish the book on time and supported me endlessly. Especially I  would like to thank my wife Alexandra, my mother and brother, my parents-​in-​law and my closest friends. I am very lucky to have you all. My special thanks go to Jan Holzer who gave me the chance to grow academically and was always supportive to my ideas and suggestions. The same can be said about my former teachers and now colleagues Věra Stojarová, Pavel Dufek, Roman Chytílek, Miroslav Mareš and Tomáš Šmíd. I also would like to thank to my peers Václav Walach, Petr Kupka, Michael Murd, Petr Ocelík and Sladjana Lazić for their help, insightful discussions and inspiration. My thanks go also to Slaviša Orlović from the University of Belgrade, Valérie Pattyn from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Dr Julián Cárdenas from the Freie Universität Berlin and Ingo Rohlfing from Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer(s) for their suggestions, which helped me to improve the overall quality of the manuscript. Last but not least, big thanks go to the editor of the series, Florian Bieber, managing editor Robert Sorsby and my proofreader Marni Kristin. Portions of this book rely on research that has been published in peer-​ reviewed journals in the past few years. Chapter 3 builds on a paper published as “Fighting and Voting: Mapping Electoral Violence in the Region of Post-​ Communist Europe” in Terrorism and Political Violence (Mochtak 2016a). The parts of Chapter 4 focused on Montenegro and Serbia have appeared as “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Post-​Communism. A Study of Montenegro” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (Mochtak 2015) and “Explaining Electoral Violence in Serbia: fsQCA Analysis of Contentious Behavior in the Electoral Arena” in Democracy and Security (Mochtak 2016b). All permissions for using this material as part of this book are granted.

Funding The book was supported by the research grants Current Issues in Political Science III (code MUNI/A/1159/2016) and Electoral Violence in the Western Balkans: From Voting to Fighting and Back (code MUNI/E/0767/2016).

xvi

Abbreviations

Croatia CDU SDP

Croatian Democratic Union Serbian Democratic Party

Serbia BDC DOS LAPMB PDA SNP SPP SPS SRP

Bosniak Democratic Community Democratic Opposition of Serbia Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac Party for Democratic Action of Sandžak Serbian National Party Serbian Progressive Party Socialist Party of Serbia Serbian Radical Party

Montenegro DPS Democratic Party of Socialists LAM Liberal Alliance of Montenegro SPP Serb People’s Party SPPM Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro YL Yugoslav Left

Bosnia and Herzegovina CDU DPU PDA SDP

Croatian Democratic Union Democratic People’s Union Party of Democratic Action Serbian Democratic Party

Kosovo DLK

Democratic League of Kosovo

 xvi

Abbreviations xvii DPK Democratic Party of Kosovo KFOR Kosovo Force

Macedonia (FYROM) DPA DUI DUM FYROM IMRO-​DPMNU NDP PTER SDUM TM UPRM

Democratic Party of Albanians Democratic Union for Integration Democratic Union of Macedonia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization –​ Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity National Democratic Party Party for the Total Emancipation of Roma Social Democratic Union of Macedonia Together for Macedonia United Party of Romas in Macedonia

Albania DPA Democratic Party of Albania PLA Party of Labour of Albania SHIK Shërbimi Informativ Kombëtar (National Intelligence Service, Albania) SPA Socialist Party of Albania

Others AAG AT CiC CPC csQCA fsQCA ECC EDS EI EII EV FDI IC IFES MDSO-​MSDO

average annual rate of growth authoritarian tendencies citizenship conflict centre/​periphery conflict crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis ethno-​cultural conflict Ethnic Diversity Score electoral integrity electoral integrity indicator electoral violence Freedom house index identity conflict International Foundation for Electoral Systems maximum difference similar outcome/​maximum similarity different outcome mvQCA multi-​value qualitative comparative analysis N nationalism

xvii

newgenprepdf

xviii Abbreviations PR OSCE QCA QD SEC SD tQCA UCDP UNDP VI

political rivalry Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe Qualitative Comparative Analysis quality of democracy socio-​economic conflict security dilemma temporal qualitative comparative analysis Uppsala conflict data programme United Nation Development Program violent ideology

 1

1 Introduction

Electoral violence as a form of political struggle has become one of the most challenging topics of democratization studies, peace studies, conflict resolution studies and state-​building processes in recent years. It can be seen as a reaction to the rising relevance of the phenomenon that has the capacity to cripple the society for months and hinder democratic progress or affect the regime’s stability for years, even decades. Elections in this context are an arena in which antagonistic positions may intensify and contentious behaviour may enter the competition and modify it. It does not matter if it is an election in Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Kenya, Egypt, Russia, Ukraine or the Western Balkans, the results can be equally devastating (Bekoe 2012; Norris 2014; Norris et al. 2015). Scholars and academics attempt to analyse these conflict-​prone dynamics that intensify the electoral competition to the point where the various forms of violence may severely harm the contest itself. It is often fuelled by the disputes that elections usually further escalate through the logic of conflict, which is an essential part of any form of human interaction (Bartos and Wehr 2002; Kriesberg 1998). Although a majority of scholars do believe that elections do not cause violence per se, the incentives coming from the conflict-​based logic of competition may heavily affect the reasons for the escalation of violence in the electoral arena (see Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008; Norris 2014). This preliminary claim can be supported by the NELDA project, which showed that between 1945 and 2010, one-​fifth of electoral rounds organized throughout the world faced electoral violence with human casualties (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The truth is that many politicians elected to office, their supporters, and political activists have altered their perception of electoral competition in a form of zero-​sum logic with direct consequences for their opponents (in terms of access to offices, goods, services and other benefits). Violence in this context is often perceived as an ultimate tool to be employed in a broader strategy of campaigning by those who have been defeated and/​ or challenged (Horowitz 1985; Dunning 2011; Chacon et al. 2011). Although a number of case studies have been published that map electoral violence as part of an effort to understand the phenomenon and prevent the recurrence of violent exchanges, a broader empirical (comparative) basis has started to

2

2 Introduction develop only recently, with significant implications for forming a conceptual framework (see Norris et al. 2015). Discussing electoral violence requires approaching the election as a potentially delicate period when stability and cohesion are condensed into a short timeframe that may be easily disrupted. This perspective sees the election as a legitimization channel that may be contested in various ways with serious implications for electoral integrity, regime stability and overall regime performance (compare Norris 2014). It may even be claimed that if the electoral integrity is disturbed, political stability may deteriorate significantly. The problem is pressing, especially in contexts in which existing institutions are incapable of mitigating emerging conflict through communication, negotiation or other deliberative strategies while intra-​societal tensions continuously rise and conflicts reoccur. Existing dysfunction then accumulates to the point where it exceeds a critical threshold, causing a crisis, political imbalance or even escalation of massive violence (see Norris et al. 2015; Norris 2014). We should then ask what the reasons for the escalation of electoral violence are, what drivers are relevant for the increase of existing tension and what can we do to mitigate it. Post-​communist Europe and especially the Western Balkans are regions where these concerns should be systematically addressed and developed. After the fall of communism at the end of 1980s, the region stood at a crossroads. This period of imbalance and uncertainty affected the political interaction in the newly reformed electoral arena with serious consequences for legitimizing democratic change (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz 1990). Despite the well-​documented tensions that existed in the region, the importance of violence in the electoral arenas has been rather neglected. As I have shown in a recent study (Mochtak 2016a), more than a quarter of electoral rounds in post-​communist Europe between 1990 and 2010 (26.3%) have witnessed some coercive practice as a part of the electoral contest, of which 46.5% were marked by human casualties. Even though the share of violence-​affected elections was smaller than in Africa (Straus and Taylor identified 58.4% of elections in the period 1990–​2008), the number is high enough to argue for its relevance, especially given that almost half of the electoral rounds with reported violence ended with losses (Straus and Taylor 2009; compare Mochtak 2016a). The empirical evidence encourages preliminary motivations to study electoral violence in a more complex way with a special attention paid to potential drivers of escalation that may affect the dynamics of contentious behaviour in electoral arenas all around the world, including those parts that are not notoriously fragile and conflict-​prone. This book deliberately abandons an approach that is locked in a vicious circle typified by geographic clusters of Sub-​Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and logic that extreme cases of electoral violence are empirically more important than less striking examples. The rationale of this book is based on an assumption that electoral violence comes in various forms, implying different conditions and contexts, with important implications for the research, as well as designing practical policies of

 3

Introduction 3 prevention. In light of this, the theoretical basis of the current debate provides several opportunities for contribution to the discussion about the conceptualization of the phenomenon with a wide range of applications. With this in mind, the book focuses on the Western Balkans region where contentious politics, violent conflicts and never-​ending disputes have influenced the political arena and elections for decades. In the early 1990s, all countries of the region stood at a virtual crossroads with a very uncertain vision of democratic transformation. From the very beginning, the electoral arena was a place where political and societal conflict often intensified. This book analyses two decades of electoral competition in the region and identifies an interesting evolution of electoral violence in terms of forms, actors, motivations and dynamics. Although the phenomenon is still a part of the elections in some countries of the region at the present time, the patterns have changed significantly. The motivation to study electoral violence in the Western Balkans comes from its interesting, mostly understudied and often neglected dynamics that are different (or at least differing) from the notoriously fragile regions of Africa and Southeast Asia. The book presents original data from the Western Balkans collected over the past six years and analyses them in order to understand the acts of electoral violence, their motivations, dynamics, intensity and overall evolution. The scope focuses primarily on the confrontational patterns in electoral arenas in order to grasp the existing variability that has affected electoral competition in the region for decades. I intentionally omit broad discussion of well-​known historical events (communist era, dissolution of Yugoslavia, Balkan Wars, ethnic tensions, etc.), which, although relevant from contextual point of view, can be found elsewhere (see Wolchik and Curry 2011; Jennings 2013; Kopeček and Wciślik 2015). The focus is primarily on the identification of incidents of electoral violence and their potential macro-​structural preconditions (or their combinations) that might be relevant as drivers of electoral violence in the Western Balkans. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, 55 out of 85 elections (64.7%) organized in the region during the period 1990–​ 2015 were affected by various forms of election-​related violence. The book presents evidence that the phenomenon has occurred in various stages of the political transformation and, as such, it is not solely limited to deeply divided communities with serious structural problems. The picture is more complex than that. Based on empirical data, I approach the electoral violence in the Western Balkans as a phenomenon generally characterized by specific sets of precursors whose variability implies different scenarios of violent interaction (Sisk 2008; Collier 2009; Laakso 2007; Mehler 2007). When scholars talk about the potential causes of electoral violence, they usually stress that different drivers of political instability in the electoral arena relate to different contexts. There is no single pattern that can be applied universally. Arriola and Johnson (2011) identify clientelistic corruption as one of the strongest instigators of pre-​electoral violence. Hafner-​Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2013) argue that

4

4 Introduction information predicting a loss by incumbent elites in an election may raise the probability of pre-​electoral violence. Pevehouse, Straus and Taylor (2012) present evidence that in Sub-​Saharan Africa most violence is committed by incumbents seeking re-​election. They also demonstrate that pre-​existing social conflict and the quality of founding elections shape pre-​election violence, while the stability of democratic institutions and weaker economic growth shape violence after the closing of polling stations (see Kuhn 2015). Several other theories point to the electoral system and the effectiveness of related institutions (Lijphart 1977; Linz 1990; Sisk and Reynolds 1998), ethnic division (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985; Wilkinson 2004) and the general socio-​economic situation in a country (Londregan and Poole 2011; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003) as contributing factors. These conditions and their combinations are seen as the potential “drivers” of electoral violence (Bekoe 2012). The variations hold important implications for research, as well as for designing practical policies of prevention. The region of the Wester Balkans is a perfect place for analysing the complexity of different settings of electoral violence that existing theories predict (Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; Gillies 2011). The book is contextually covered by the period of transformation, a phase in which the old system was weakened or no longer existed, and a new modus vivendi of governance was not fully implemented yet (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Tilly 1998; Burnell and Ware 1998; Huntington 1991). This period of ambiguity reveals a great deal of tensions that –​in addition to the political arena –​can penetrate also the most important structures of society (based on culture, ethnicity and/​or religion). Generally speaking, the process of change (transition) is or may be influenced  –​directly or indirectly  –​by the tensions that exist in communities and affect the everyday life of ordinary people (for more detail see Chapter  3). The whole idea is further highlighted by the patterns of social interaction and stage of mutual hostility that is related to political imbalance (UNDP 2009; Höglund 2008). History and context potentially contribute to confrontation and mutual hostility that may be hidden. In this notion, it is important to realize that every type of society has a conflict potential with its own logic of escalation and so-​called “tension triggers”; however, not all of them are at permanent risk of violent outburst in the electoral arena (for more detail on violence, see Chapter 2).

1.1  Plan of the book The overall structure of the book consists of six chapters, which cover theoretical as well as empirical problems concerning electoral violence in the Western Balkans. After the introduction, the second chapter (“From violence to electoral violence: defining electoral violence”) discusses the existing theoretical arguments about electoral violence, its relevance and applicability for the studied region. The state of the discipline is critically evaluated and presented in a systematic way, while forming an analytical framework applicable

 5

Introduction 5 in empirical analysis. The chapter presents substantial debate about violence, which is narrowed through the concepts of political violence and election. As such, electoral violence is approached as a genuine subcategory of political violence that is placed in a special context –​the electoral arena –​where the stakes and possible losses may initiate a violent action in order to affect or modify the results. One of the elementary factors that drive this logic is the concept of conflict in its destructive form that is reinforced by the dynamic embodied in the nature of the society. When discussing elections, conflict as a pursuit of incompatible objectives needs to be considered. Based on this overview, I identify several potential drivers (conditions/​causes) of electoral violence in the Western Balkans region as independent variables. This contextualizes qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research method used in this book, which looks for causal links with the outcome  –​in this case electoral violence (as a dependent variable) (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Berg-​ Schlosser et  al. 2009). This approach imparts preliminary, yet substantive, theoretical knowledge that is further evaluated. In the third chapter (“Contexts of electoral violence”), the theoretical outline is accompanied by the contextual elements of democratization and post-​conflict reconstruction. It identifies the main contexts in which violent behaviour and contentious elections occur and evolve. The theoretical arguments about violence are interlinked with the strategies of democracy promotion based on elections and their role in constituting democratic order. This connection is crucial for the interpretation of violence, which can be generally perceived as a widespread phenomenon with a stable position in human interaction (see Sisk 2008; Höglund 2008; Mochtak 2016a). The discussion is based on original data collected and analysed in post-​communist Europe (as reported in the NELDA database). Through the combination of descriptive and analytical strategies I typologize observed trends in order to grasp the prevailing patterns of electoral violence in the region and try to generalize them. Based on a comparative overview, I stress that electoral violence is highly relevant for the region and it can occur in typologically different environments defined on the democracy–​non-​democracy continuum. The chapter presents a preliminary typology of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe and discusses different contexts in which the phenomenon occurs and how it is relevant for the Western Balkans. The fourth chapter (“Patterns of electoral violence”) constitutes the empirical basis of the book, for which I collected data on electoral violence in the Western Balkans. It can be seen as the first attempt to analyse evidence on electoral violence in a region where conflicting incentives exist, evolve over time and affect the overall state of democracy. In line with theoretical arguments, evidence of violent interaction is further systematized and critically evaluated while the list of potential drivers of electoral violence is further amended. This approach enables the identification of prevailing patterns of electoral violence that can be generalized. The primary source of information (data) is the OSCE/​ODIHR database, which administers election monitoring

6

6 Introduction reports from the electoral monitoring mission conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE/​ODHIR 2016). The OSCE/​ ODIHR database is used due to its high level of standardization, its relatively stable methodology and systematic approach. Missing information is supplemented by other monitoring organizations, secondary literature and personal non-​standardized interviews that were conducted during research trips to the Western Balkans in 2013. Eighty-​five elections are selected and analysed; 55 of them experienced violence, which equals 64.7% of the sample  –​a share indicating the highly relevant subject of study. In this context, the election is the main unit of analysis, covering presidential and parliamentary elections on the national level during the period of 1990–​2015. Collected data are systematized and general patterns are identified so the proto arguments about electoral violence can be later tested. The fifth chapter (“Recipes for electoral violence in the Western Balkans”) is the core chapter of the book. It joins theoretical arguments with empirical evidence in order to answer the main research question, which is “What are the drivers of electoral violence in the region of the Western Balkans?” The theoretical assumptions are confronted with real-​life data through qualitative comparative analysis in its fuzzy set version (fsQCA).1 fsQCA was chosen for its ability to cover the complexity of a social phenomenon (in our case electoral violence), as well as to provide technical precision for the analysis. Due to the lack of any systematic database that would cover electoral violence in the Western Balkans, there is no solid base for proper theorizing. Therefore, a tool that operates within the boundaries of complexity while considering set-​theoretic relations is much needed. This is even more important in the context of data that are frequently contradictory and unclear. Systematization through the truth tables seems to be a good way to visualize acquired information and look for those contradictions. On the basis of formal proficiency it also supports transparency in research, which subsequently enhances the validity and the reliability of possible conclusions. Preliminary theoretical assumptions are tested using configurational logic of fsQCA on five models (for the outcomes: electoral violence, soft form of electoral violence, hard form of electoral violence, electoral violence during a presidential election, electoral violence during a parliamentary election; see more in Chapter 5). Through the process of minimization, the unlikely causes of the outcome in each of the models are eliminated and the potential paths –​ “recipes” –​are interpreted as quasi-​causal statements. Subsequently, defined formulas are linked back to the cases under review and further discussed. It is important to mention that this approach is not exclusively focused on collecting information and their systematization but also on forming the “substantive knowledge” that is utilized throughout the whole book. Research of electoral violence strongly benefits from this design, where holistic theorizing is interconnected with collected data in order to identify prevailing empirical patterns. It is further developed in theoretical arguments suitable for further testing. This back-​and-​forth logic can be perceived as an enhancing strategy,

 7

Introduction 7 which keeps track of important data as well as preserves the consistency of our presumptions. In other words, this is a theory-​building approach that covers the collection, systematization and analysis of data that subsequently (re-​) formulates theoretical statements in the form of hypotheses. Equally important, the analysis applies also a theory-​testing approach that focuses on testing preliminary assumptions that are based on existing theoretical knowledge and on-​ground data.2 Put differently, the identified conditions based on discussed theories and collected data are tested on the macro-​level of the Western Balkan region, where the arguments are reviewed and evaluated through formal Boolean logic. Searching for so-​called “recipes” may help to better understand what the causes of violence could be and how to prevent them. Also, it enables the identification of those factors (theories) that are not relevant and can be omitted. The logic is similar to the process-​tracing strategy through which all the potential theories that might be relevant for the study are given a proper consideration (Chenoweth 2014; Porta 2013; Katzenstein and Okawara 2002). Further, it is important to stress that electoral violence, its presence or absence, is seen as the outcome –​the dependent variable. The election serves as a contextual unit that is sub-​derived from the broader context of democratization (our contextual background). In its essence, the election is perceived as a specific period of time when the vulnerability is contrasted with the possibility of imbalance. The possible conditions (independent variables) for the occurrence of violence are identified in accordance with theories and minimized through MDSO-​ MSDO analysis (maximum difference similar outcome/​maximum similarity different outcome). Subsequently, the selected “most relevant” conditions are analysed through fuzzy-​set QCA (fsQCA) and the results are interpreted in light of the substantive theoretical and empirical knowledge presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The results show that electoral violence in the Western Balkans may be explained by a complex framework of causes that are mutually combined and strengthened by each other. This complexity is approached as an inspirational perspective, which shows how an escalation stimulus may occur and interact with non-​political as well as political dimensions in the society. In light of this, the results identify two causal recipes that explain the occurrence of electoral violence in the Western Balkans and have defined their limitations in terms of explanatory capacities. To sum up, the core idea of the book concerns the effort to understand the causes of electoral violence during the democratization process in the Western Balkans that has accompanied post-​conflict reconstruction and persisting intergroup contestation. It contributes to the current debate and reflects the interests of international coalitions and national authorities that try to prevent the escalation of violence in their respective regions. The social relevance refers to the need to prevent electoral violence and –​in cases of its appearance –​the ability to mitigate it. The practical result can also serve as a stimulus to apply research in the context of election-​related violence, which might

8

8 Introduction subsequently broaden the application of the theoretical framework that may be relevant to other related issues (such as state-​building, post-​conflict reconstruction, democratization, etc.).

Notes 1 The research design tries to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches through the pattern of cross-​fertilization in order to eliminate the weaknesses and amplify the benefits of both traditions. 2 “On-​ground data” refers to qualitative information that forms the assumptions that are subsequently reformulated into preliminary statements and tested on the macro level with all the evidence (positive as well as negative).

 9

2 From violence to electoral violence Defining electoral violence

The discussion about electoral violence is often affected by the nature of election-​related incidents, the impacts they have and the effects they generate. Scholars often see violence in the electoral arena as something that naturally exists, and less attention is paid to the origins or roots of the concept. Although a number of scholars do try to apply a systematic approach to the phenomenon, they are often limited by space and the more explicit goals of their work. The following chapter aspires to fill this gap and provide a brief theoretical introduction to the study of electoral violence that may act as theoretical overview and, more importantly, as a conceptual addition to the study of the phenomenon. I approach the concept in three overlapping steps and create a well-​founded theoretical background suitable for further theoretical as well as empirical development. The primary goal here is to conceptualize the phenomenon of electoral violence and present a preliminary analytical framework that is applied in the empirical part of the book and potentially also to future research. The logic of this chapter is set as follows. The discussion starts with a substantial debate about violence, which is narrowed through the concepts of political violence and election. The core debate is further amended with the problem of the different contexts in which the electoral violence may occur (see more in Chapter  3). The final part then summarizes potential macro-​ structural factors that according to theory may play a role of triggers of political violence in electoral arena. This approach goes back to the potential roots of violence, which are further discussed in order to present a logically consistent framework to the study of electoral violence in the Western Balkans and worldwide. The whole idea is based on a narrowing strategy that follows the theoretical discussion in a systematic way in order to select those parts of the theory that are relevant for the further understanding of electoral violence as a unique political construct. In this context, I start with the concept of violence itself as a destructive form of human interaction that is intensified by existing conflicts (Fromm 1973; Tilly 2003; Conteh-​Morgan 2004; Malešević 2010). This approach is crucial for understanding the fact that electoral violence is not a new kind of hostile behaviour, but rather a substantive derivative of a much broader

10

10  From violence to electoral violence phenomenon. In this sense, the initial discussion puts the idea of violent interaction in a very special environment in which the concentration of stakes can produce incentives for unrest –​the election. The concept of violence is therefore an integral part of the research problem (electoral violence), which is in many ways still underdeveloped but well studied generally (Flannery et  al. 2007). This theoretical assumption is very important for defining the analytical framework within which the research problem is identified. As the book deals with the context of the Western Balkans, where electoral violence has not been studied systematically, the applied approach stands in contrast to a simple reformulation of existing approaches from different environments with significantly different contexts. This is particularly relevant for cases in which electoral violence has different forms and, more importantly, evolves over time. In other words, as the scope of the book is much broader than a single case study, the theoretical framework needs to reflect the existing variations.

2.1  Violence It is not a surprise that violent behaviour has always been a part of human history (Tolan 2008: 7–​9; Arendt 1970: 8). It is also not surprising that people have long been trying to find a way to suppress the destructive behaviour that affects the everyday interactions of individuals as well as communities as a whole. Although this subject has fuelled academic debate for centuries, the dispute has not yet been resolved and there are serious doubts if it ever can be (Flannery et al. 2007). Although this chapter does not aspire to bring new arguments to the very essential parts of the discussion, it is important to present some key perspectives on violence and how it is understood. These will then be further developed in the subcategory of political violence, and subsequently electoral violence as a second-​level derivate. The starting point of this debate is the assumption that there is little controversy about the need to address the problem of violence and to view the occurrence of violence as problematic (Tolan 2008:  10; compare Jackman 2002). Existing literature documents very well that violence imposes great costs on human societies through increased mortality and morbidity, decreased capability, related legal, health and welfare costs, and unrealized human potential (Tolan 2001; compare with more provocative arguments in Ginsberg 2013; Luttwak 1999). On the other hand, it is important to realize that “no one engaged in thought about history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs” (Arendt 1970: 8). The common meaning of violence nowadays significantly differs from unintentional injuries or diseases with possible fatalities. As Krug et  al. (2002:  5)  stress, the concept predominantly refers to an intention to cause injury. The question is how to recognize the intention, which is often a pure result of the subjective projection of interests and concerns. And what about coercion and intimidation? Does the act of violence have to harm somebody

 1

From violence to electoral violence 11 or something or it is enough to identify coercive action (Tolan et al. 2006)? For example, is or is it not possible to label the threat of being beaten as violence? Where is the threshold that recognizes intimidation as violent action? As a matter of fact, scholars and (even more so) stakeholders widely disagree where the borderline should be drawn (Jouriles et al. 2001; Chalk 1998). Similarly, they broadly disagree on whether engaging in what is considered oppressive or coercive practices toward another might be considered violent (Tolan 2008: 6–​7). Potential disagreement can also emerge when we start to think about the victim’s perception of potential harm or threat of injury (Hines and Malley-​Morrison 2005; Johnson 1995). Another layer of the debate reveals itself when we recognize the cultural and societal meanings of violence. This begins with simple concepts like injury or harm. Do we have to take into consideration local (regional) perceptions of terms that can operate within different definitional criteria (Walters and Parke 1964)? For example, things that are considered very offensive in one culture may be considered acceptable, even expected, behaviour in another. Should we consider these alternatives? The answer is not easy. As Tolan notes, we are dealing with an extremely controversial topic that is based on a universalistic notion of nature, so often criticized and disputed (2008: 8). Another dimension of studying violence emerges from the tradition of gender studies. It differentiates between who (in gender terms) commits violent acts. Evidence clearly shows that males experience greater levels of violence than females (Farrington et al. 2004). The perspective on (gender) differences further operates with the assumption that male aggression includes more violence, ability to harm, intimidation, and other threatening aspects than female aggression (Tolan 2008). However, recent research on violence during elections shows that the participation of women should not be underestimated, even if it is less intense (see Bardall 2011). Despite these controversies, most existing definitions operate within the borders of the exhibition of physical force with the intent to coerce or harm. For example, the World Health Organization summit on violence in 1996 prepared a formulation that defines “violence” as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (WHO 1996: 5; compare Jackman 2002: 389; Chalk 1998; Jouriles et al. 2001). This notion has been very influential in the past couple of years, when various branches of sociology, psychology, and political science have utilized this definition in their own respective fields of research. However, the problems have not disappeared. One of the main challenges is the nature of the definition itself. Too-​narrow definitions pose the threat that research design will miss some important parts of the phenomenon, potentially neglecting essential theoretical as well as empirical features. On the other hand, broad and inclusive definitions bear a significant flaw that is inherently linked to the fact that they are not specific

12

12  From violence to electoral violence enough to allow a consistent, confident determination of whether a given act is violent. Therefore, it becomes difficult to presume what the label of violence means, even if the definition is accepted. This often results in an unintended vagueness that comes from various conceptualizations of the term “violence”, a problem commonly discussed in the social sciences (Tolan 2008: 7). All this is brought into consideration in order to recognize the complexity that scholars dealing with electoral violence need to be aware of. As was already suggested, any definition of violence will always be a result of trade-​ offs. However, the important thing is to reveal the motivation for the choice of a particular definition and to defend its application in a specific context and on particular issue. One that is suitable for anthropological research may not be appropriate for legal studies; however, the relevance of both can be justified depending on the nature of the research problem (see Bart and Moran 1993; Gurr 1980; Graham and Gurr 1969; Reiss and Roth 1993). I begin this effort with an ambitious definition prepared by Reiss and Roth in 1993. Their formulation highlights the emphases and inconsistencies that characterized research until the early 1990s. According to them, violent behaviour is limited to interpersonal violence, which they defined as behaviour by persons against persons that intentionally threatens, attempts or actually inflicts physical harm. In other words, the definition itself restricts the violence to behaviour that is interpersonal, inflicts or threatens physical harm, and is motivated by harmful intent (compare Jackman 2002: 390; see the whole definition in Reiss and Roth 1993:  35–​7). These criteria are perceived as a body of relaxed conditions that can be amended on an ad hoc basis. When they become inconvenient for a particular reason, it is possible to include features that have come under scrutiny in a specific line of research. This opens up a whole new perspective on violence that can be further specified and operationalized. For example, psychological injuries are selectively included in the context of family and sexual violence only when they result from threats of physical injuries and therefore seem important (see Russell 1982; Finkelhor et al. 1983; Stanko 1985; Darke 1989). This strategy is, however, not unproblematic. Critics point out that the approach can be misleading because it implies situations in which only certain contexts and certain types of injuries (e.g., psychological harm, trauma, etc.) are seen as serious enough to warrant attention (Jackman 2002: 390). An alternative approach to the definition of violence can be extracted from the framework of non-​violence, as the concept consists of the renunciation (negation) of the former term. However, this notion is even more complicated than the definition before: Physical violence, which is what we most often have in mind when we speak about violence, is the use of physical force to cause harm, death, or destruction, as in rape, murder, or warfare. But some forms of mental or psychological harm are so severe as to warrant being called violence as well. People can be harmed mentally and emotionally in ways that are

 13

From violence to electoral violence 13 as bad as by physical violence… Although physical violence often attends the infliction of psychological violence, it need not do so… [People] can also be terrorized without being harmed physically… An unlimited commitment to nonviolence will renounce psychological as well as physical violence. (Holmes 1990, 1–​2; cf. commentary in Jackman 2002) I could further proceed with this discussion and present more definitions, but the point is, I hope, clear. Neither of these definitions can be perfect, nor are they totally irrelevant. Before I provide a provisional, operational definition of violence (operational because it is not an ultimate definition) for the purpose of this book, I should clearly stress one more point in this discussion. Many scholars who deal with violence conceive of the phenomenon in terms of the legal definitions of violent crime. In other words, they rely primarily on definitions that stress codified behaviours formalized in the system of justice as legal norms (Fagan and Browne 1994: 131). This approach is highly flawed in cases where behaviour or acts of ostensible violence are not classified as de jure criminal (e.g., activities of central authorities “protecting” public order). In other words, they are not criminalized in certain contexts (time, place), while in others they are; this again depends on cultural and legal heterogeneity which stands in opposition to universalism (see Jackman 2002: 392–​3). On the basis of the arguments stated above, it becomes clear that we need a definition that is not too restrictive in essence; however, it must be precise enough to cover the substantive idea of violent acts. This matters especially if we want to apply the concept in a global framework. Therefore, for the purpose of the book, I utilize the definition prepared by the WHO and the approach presented by Mary Jackman (WHO 1996; Jackman 2002). Once again, the WHO defines violence as the “intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (WHO 1996: 5). In light of this, Jackman stresses that if the definition intends to include power as something separate from physical force, the range of relevant acts is in fact widened, which is not an unproblematic move and can be criticized (Jackman 1994, 2002: 392; Dahl 1971; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Gramsci et al. 1972; Lukes 1974). Unfortunately, we can only assume what kind of power differs from physical force (e.g., economic, mental?). There is also no exact definition of alternative, mostly non-​physical acts of violence that may potentially cause mental or even physical harm (e.g., strokes, heart attacks, headaches, etc.). It is only indicated through the word “threatened”, which can be misleading. This opens a space for potential reformulations that are empirically as well as theoretically relevant for the discussion about the operational definition of electoral violence. Inspiration for improving on the WHO’s definition can found in the work of Mary Jackman (2002). She presents one of the broadest definitions of

14

14  From violence to electoral violence violence and includes differentiation based on the character of violence. She indicates that violence can refer to any acts that inflict, threaten or cause injury. These actions may be corporal, written or verbal. Thus, the injuries may be corporal, psychological, material or social (Jackman 2002: 393–​5). In addition to mainstream arguments, she incorporates a materialistic dimension into her definition as well, which overcomes the exclusivity of interpersonal relations defined by Reiss and Roth (1993). If we take a deeper look at her argumentation, she outlines a great scale of violent incidents, some of which would be difficult to cover by the WHO definition, even though they have a high likelihood of resulting in injury and perhaps even death, and definitely psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. One good example can be seen in attacks on private property that may cause frustration, psychological harm and even physical pain if the situation is particularly stressful (see Pennebaker et al. 1988; de Loos 1990; Mcfarlane et al. 1994; Resnick et al. 1997). However, the intention need not be interconnected with a particular person in the conventional sense. What Jackman tries to say is that violent incidents can vary greatly and an excessively restrictive delimitation can be misleading (Jackman 2002: 393). As I am trying to present a relatively broad definition of violence, I find it particularly helpful to merge Jackman’s concept of violence with the WHO definition, still one of the most used definitions applied today. This provides us with an approach that reaches a certain level of restrictiveness, but is not too rigorous or limiting. With this decision, we obtain a hybrid definition that can be placed between both approaches. Therefore, for the purposes of this debate, violence is defined as: the intentional use of physical force, verbal or written attacks, and/​or manipulation of structural settings in an inflicted, threatened or actual form, against oneself, another person, against a group or community, or property of any kind that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage. This definition tries to take into consideration most of the mainstream arguments concerned with a formal definition of the concept and to formalize the physical, psychological and structural dimensions of violence. However, one must be aware that such a definition is not universal, or even applicable, in every scientific or real-​life field. Further portions of this chapter clarify and defend the reasons for the formulation of this definition (and not another) in order to present the most accurate way of defining electoral violence as a phenomenon on its own. For now, it is enough to argue that this book sees violence as an intentional act that is not restricted to the interpersonal, but also involves materialistic incentives and structural settings (see summary of presented definitions in Table 2.1).

 15

From violence to electoral violence 15 Table 2.1 Summary of main definitions Author(s)

Definition

World Health Organization summit (1996)

The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation. Behaviour by persons against persons that intentionally threatens, attempts, or actually inflicts physical harm. In other words, the definition itself restricts the violence to behaviour that is interpersonal, inflicts or threatens physical harm, and is motivated by harmful intent. Physical violence, which is what we most often have in mind when we speak about violence, is the use of physical force to cause harm, death, or destruction, as in rape, murder, or warfare. But some forms of mental or psychological harm are so severe as to warrant being called violence as well. Violence is understood in terms of the legal definitions of violent crime. Codified behaviours are formalized in the system of justice as legal provisions define violence. Violence can refer to an act that inflicts, threatens, or causes injury. These acts may be corporal, written, or verbal. Thus, the injuries may be corporal, psychological, material, or social. The intentional use of physical force, verbal or written attacks, and/​or the manipulation of structural settings in an inflicted, threatened or actual form, against oneself, another person, a group or community, or property of any kind that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage.

Reiss–​Roth (1993)

Holmes (1990)

Fagan–​Browne (1994) Jackman (2002)

Operational definition

2.2  Collective violence The same argument made about the concept of violence can also be reformulated in its derivative, a form that is defined by collectivity. Charles Tilly talks about collective action as joint action in pursuit of common ends. It is driven by a degree of shared interest, the intensity of the organization and mobilization (Tilly 1978: 84). Human history has shown that violence often occurs in a collective form, with millions of victims and significant property loss. Moreover, recent decades seem to have been greatly affected by the scope (extent), intensity (gravity) and duration of violent conflicts worldwide that result in collective violence that is more effective, coordinated and fatal (Conteh-​Morgan 2004; World Bank 2016; UCDP 2016). This section does not intend to cover all of the subtle differences that exist in the research of collective violence. Rather, it tries to identify key aspects of the debate that are crucial for understanding electoral violence, which is often

16

16  From violence to electoral violence a subset of the more general concept of collective violence. We start with the statement that the field that we are trying to cover is extremely complex, with important nuances that may be relevant in certain contexts but not in others.1 Basically, the logic copies arguments mentioned in the previous section and argues for a cautious approach, aware of most of the limitation that it brings. I start this theoretical overview with the statement that was already mentioned in the introductory part of the book. Electoral violence is part of the broader concept of political violence, which is often collective in its nature. Discussion around the roots of electoral violence therefore often overlaps with more a general debate concerning the traditional forms of violent confrontations. As we try to understand electoral violence and describe its roots, discussion about the origins of collective violence seems reasonable (at least in a theoretical sense). The following section tries to identify key branches of theories that try to explain the occurrence of violence in its collective form while discussing particularities relevant for the escalation of electoral violence. Although the individual level of violence is inherently covered in this discussion, the main emphasis is aimed at collective forms of violence, as this refers to more common incidents of electoral violence. This is supported by the fact that violent outbursts that directly affect elections are often larger in scale, where more than one individual is involved (Mochtak 2016a; Straus and Taylor 2009). This does not imply that the identified processes are not also relevant to individuals; however, the level of analysis and scope of this book is designed differently (level of national elections, macro-​perspective; see above). Therefore, the main emphasis is put on the concept of collectivity, with a lesser intention of including a purely individual dimension in terms of grasping state of mind or individual motivations. First of all, I  start my elaboration with the definition of collective violence. The World Health Organization defines the concept as the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group –​ whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity –​against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives (WHO 2002; cf. Barkan and Snowden 2001; Summers and Markusen 1999; Hall and Whitaker 1999). In accordance with the definition of violence presented previously, I adjust this definition slightly towards the inclusion of a more materialistic dimension, in which collective violence can be used against property, with possible material damage. Additionally, the threat of its use –​with possible effects on the subject and or structural settings –​should also be taken into consideration. To some extent, this notion echoes what Tilly calls “non-​violent violence” and reflects the process of continuing sophistication of coercive practices in recent years (Tilly 2003: 4; cf. Weigert 1999). When discussing interpersonal interactions (in a negative sense), the vast majority of collective transactions proceed predominantly without violence. The “breaking point”, which is characterized by a turn of events when a certain confrontation becomes violent, is the moment that draws our attention

 17

From violence to electoral violence 17 to the causes of the incidents. We should then ask when, how and why people get involved collectively in inflicting damage on other people (Summers and Markusen 1999). Obviously it is not an easy task, and a straightforward, simple answer accompanied by clear statements in the form of some grand strategy cannot be provided (Tilly 2003: 12). On the other hand, the level of complexity must be reduced in order to form at least a limited framework that is able to identify the most important drivers of violence and analyse them. Again, one must be aware of this reduction and take it into account when presenting any generalized statements. I start with the general distinction that divides the existing theories of collective violence into a structure based on three twofolded categories (Marxist versus non-​Marxist approaches; micro versus macro approaches; and contingent versus inherent approaches), which are further supplemented by critical tradition in the social sciences (Conteh-​ Morgan 2004; compare typology in Churchman 2013). The following overview summarizes their main ideas while developing the preliminary system that will be further developed in the empirical part of the book. Marxist approach versus non-​Marxist approach The German philosopher Karl Marx, one of the most influential thinkers of the nineteenth century, argued that revolutions (in general) are inevitable, embodied in the very nature of the structure of societies. This conflict-​prone idea is based on the assumption that societies and their social systems reflect the interests of those who possess control over resources. In other words, a society’s institutions, its political system and economy, are designed to allow those who have power to exploit those who do not (Worsley 2002:  12–​32). Society is subsequently alienated on the basis of a psychological division that comes from a materialistic monopoly over the economic system and social stratification that is materialized into a so-​called class system. In this sense, revolution is natural because it reduces and finally overcomes social inequality as a source of conflict (Wood 1981:  xxxi). Supporters of this approach in its traditional form call for the elimination of private property and the class system. Present-​day arguments have abandoned the original ideas of the struggle against class division and instead stress criticism of the existing social structure, characterized by a high level of inequality that ignites a vicious circle of poverty, ignorance, deprivation, hunger, disease, crime and, ultimately, violent eruptions (Conteh-​Morgan 2004: 10; Fukuyama et al. 2012). Non-​Marxist traditions on the other hand stress different causes for violent struggles in a society and use functionalism, theories of mass society and rational choice theory to explain such phenomena. The functionalist perspective tends to emphasize why societies persist even though conflict is endemic to society. The key factor for functionalists is the existence of traditional arrangements that allow society to preserve its structure, which is manifested in economic equilibrium, peaceful adaptation to change and normative and political conformity to the maintenance of political stability (Conteh-​Morgan 2004: 11).

18

18  From violence to electoral violence Based on the theory of mass society, Talcott Parsons viewed the living society as governed by self-​correcting processes that produce equilibrium or a steady state. Social systems are maintained and regulated through a process of value integration in which commonly held values are central to ensuring the perpetuation of society (Parsons 1971). Alternatively, rational choice tradition explains collective violence through an individual’s ultimate, benefit-​maximizing choice. Theorists in this case assume that that the decision whether or not to participate in violence is a rational choice based on a cost–​benefit analysis by the individual confronted with either negative or positive incentives (cf. Olson 1965). Micro versus macro The micro–​macro division is by definition a clear-​cut approach that can be embedded in the debates of reductionist and holistic traditions. The micro approach tends to inquire into the underlying causes of conflict in the nature of human beings, whereas the macro approach focuses on a society’s or a state’s structure and institutions. The division itself can also be differentiated according to the level of analysis, which is crucial for certain fields of academia. For instance, biologists, psychologists, social psychologists, socio-​ biologists, psycho-​biographers, decision-​making theorists and rational choice theorists all underscore the behaviour of individuals and subsequently generalize the behaviour of groups and/​or communities. On the other side of the spectrum are political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, organizational and communication experts, international relations theorists, and geographers who focus on groups, organizations, institutions, social classes, ethno-​communal or religious entities, political movements, cultural systems, nation-​states or the structure of the international system and via their analysis try to explain the occurrence of collective violence, its precursors and stimuli (Skocpol and Pierson 2002; Conteh-​Morgan 2004: 12; Nau 2007). Today, however, this distinction is a bit static and somehow artificial. Scholars often operate within a framework filled with a mixture of approaches where the micro-​level is supplemented by a macro perspective and vice versa (see Cohan 1975; Gurr 1970; Muller 1979). The bitter disputes that existed in the early 1900s, much like those between Freudian analysis and Marxist dialectic, are today mostly overcome despite the fact that some fields of scientific research emphasize one level over the others. A  clearly exclusionist approach in mainstream research has been largely abandoned, however. This is mainly due to a process that narrowed the methodological and substantive gap between the micro and macro branches with the prevalence of psycho-​ social and psycho-​cultural analyses. Contingency versus inherency The last dichotomized division in the research of collective violence is represented by an approach designed by Harry Eckstein (1980). He developed

 19

From violence to electoral violence 19 a twofold model through which violent incidents are perceived in which the most important standpoint is based on the recognition of potential causes as either “contingent” (conditional) or “inherent” (routine). In this context, if collective violence is assumed to be contingent, the occurrence rests on conditions that occur accidentally, or in the presence of unusual (aberrant) conditions, or conditions that involve a great deal of chance. This contingency further assumes that members of the community and the community itself would rather resort to peaceful resolutions of disputes before they escalate into violent conflicts (see Eckstein 1980). On the contrary, the inherency model is perceived through the scope of maximizing political influence and a greater ability to influence decisions. It is viewed as an extreme but normal “power seizure”. Generally speaking, due to the existence of alternatives to the acquisition of power that are essentially peaceful, the use of (collective) violence must therefore be a rational choice or a tactical decision that is based on a rational cost–​benefit calculus. Violence as a tool is not a first-​choice strategy, but rather a part of a set of alternatives that are usually applied based on the existing dynamic and strategic decision-​ making. Moreover, only if there is a definite chance for success will violence be employed. In this theory, a culture of violence or previous violent incidents does not necessarily affect the decision to resort to violence; that is, in its pure form, the decision is disconnected from any form of affective (emotional) factors. In other words, the decision is a purely logical outcome driven by a goal-​ oriented approach (Conteh-​Morgan 2004: 15; Tilly 1978). Critical approaches The last note of this brief overview belongs to critical theories in the research of collective violence and conflicts. The mainstream view of the theoretical meta-​structure presented above underscores the positivistic tradition, which is strongly criticized by less dominant but increasingly influential approaches such as constructivism and feminism (see Chandra 2012). The constructivist understanding of violent collective (political) behaviour could be explained and even understood by focusing on the role of norms and ideas as determinants of such behaviour (Onuf 1998). In contrast to Marxist, neoliberal and neorealist arguments, constructivism emphasizes both material and discursive (communicative) power as avenues for a better understanding of violent outbursts. As Max Weber put it, humans are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance (see discussion in Tilly 1978:  37–​9). Basically, constructivists claim that social reality is created by actors that are able to form their own ideas of reality and its importance. Overall, constructivism emphasizes the understanding of a phenomenon and not necessarily its explanation (Omelicheva 2010: 470–​5). In this context, John Ruggie identified three assumptions of social constructivism that formalize how the process happens. The first claim stresses

20

20  From violence to electoral violence that, to a large extent, group affiliations “construct” peoples’ identities, ideas, and goals. The second assumption formalizes the contention that ideas are shaped by historical circumstances (often materialized in collective memory and/​or general public opinion). The third assumption operates on the idea that issues of conflict and cooperation are conditioned by socially constructed understandings among groups, nations or the international system (Ruggie 1998). As ideas or beliefs become more shared, they develop into “intersubjective beliefs”, or what John Searle refers to as “collective intentionality” (Searle 1995: 1–​31). In order to understand collective violence, one must understand the beliefs and worldviews of actors, how they perceive the use of violence and what the essence of the conflict that ignites the contestation is. An abstract model of rationality is not applicable for a proper understanding of this behaviour in a situation where a decision is often made and defined by values that are shared by the members of a community. Feminism perceives social reality slightly differently. In contrast to traditional approaches, feminists underscore the changing of collective identities, the role of culture or normative factors in order to show how identities, interests and power affect women within and across societies (see Tickner 2001). It is possible to identify an explicit focus on various types of marginalization that women have to face in international politics, war and c­ onflicts (­violent or non-​violent) because of the hierarchical relations developed by the male-​ dominated world. Radical feminists use the term patriarchy to describe the environment in which men declare their supremacy over women who, from this unequal relation and de facto subordination, suffer (Waylen 1996). Liberal feminism sees the problem in terms of the “rigged” socialization that prescribes men and women different roles and destinies. Women are subsequently marginalized, discriminated against and abused. In terms of security, the feminist tradition perceives violence as predominantly a product of male interaction. In contrast to other theories (neorealism, neoliberalism, Marxism, etc.) that operate on the scale of top-​down logic, feminism tries to understand conflict, security and peace through a bottom-​up approach in which social ties are emphasized. In critical-​ theoretical terms, gender structures are socially constructed and maintained through power relations (Conteh-​Morgan 2004:  21–​3). Feminism generally calls for re-​approaching the concept of wars and conflicts and emphasizing the role of women in them. All these divisions (Marxist versus non-​Marxist; micro versus macro; contingency versus inherency and critical approaches) are embedded in most of the research of collective violence and have been built into a system in which the subject under review falls into predefined categories or is understood through them. This systematic coverage is crucial for further selection of theories that offer a list of conditions (causes) necessary for determining the occurrence of violence (Table 2.2, see more in Chapter 5). This brief overview should give the reader the gist of the complicated research field that stands behind the concept of collective violence and which also spills over into the study of electoral violence. The book cannot cover all

 21

From violence to electoral violence 21 Table 2.2 Summary of the main traditions in the research of collective violence Approach

Main features

Marxist

Revolutions and conflicts are natural parts of social interactions; inequality as a source of conflict. Non-​Marxist Conflict is endemic to society; violence is a result of disequilibrium; collective violence is an ultimate decision that is represented by individual, benefit-​maximizing choice. Micro Underlying causes of conflict are a part of human nature; individual behaviour is generalized into group and/​or community behaviour. Macro Focus on a society’s or a state’s structure and institutions; focus on groups, organizations, institutions, social classes, ethno-​communal or religious entities, political movements, cultural systems, nation-​ states, or the structure of the international system. Contingent Occurrence of violence is an accident or a result of unusual (aberrant) conditions, or conditions that involve a great deal of chance; a member of the community and the community itself would rather resort to peaceful resolutions of disputes than violence. Inherent Maximization of political influence and general increase in leverage over decisions; violence is a rational choice or a tactical decision that is based on a rational cost–​benefit calculus. Constructivist Focus on the role of norms and ideas as determinants of violent behaviour; emphasis on both material and discursive sources of violence; group affiliations “construct” peoples’ identities, ideas, and goals; importance of historical circumstances; issues of conflict and cooperation are conditioned by socially constructed understandings among groups, nations, or the international system. Feminist Marginalization of women; hierarchical relations developed by male-​dominated world; violence is predominantly product of male interaction.

the positions under discussion; however, a preliminary structure can help us identify the potential drivers of contentious behaviour in the electoral arena that routinely escalate into violence.

2.3  Political violence I have discussed the factor of collectivity in violence as a more serious, more dangerous and more fatal form of violent behaviour that affects many. The initial overview of the main traditions set the grounds for discussion that is crucial for understating the roots of electoral violence. Now the subject of study can be further specified and narrowed through the scope of politics. Although this might seem to be an obvious argument, it is important to point out that electoral violence is a concept that has a strong (even dominant) political dimension. The space where the violence takes place is defined by the electoral arena. Within this arena, the competition over power affects the

2

22  From violence to electoral violence form of interaction and the intensity of potential political conflict as well as its dynamics. This assumption can be transformed into a more general idea that sees incentives for electoral violence as primarily political. In other words, the formal logic presupposes that existing goals are predominantly political (Honderich 1976; Chenoweth 2014; Porta 2013; Ruggiero 2006; Abraham et al. 2010; Guelke 2006). These positions are seen as the next step in defining the general framework of the book, in which the general concept of violence is narrowed down to its collective form and finished with the substantive element of its political nature. Here, political violence has traditionally been referred to as physical injury or the threat of physical injury by domestic groups engaged in political struggle, and to harmful physical acts perpetrated by groups against the state internally or vice versa (political violence may also be the unintended violence that occurs in the course of such struggles). The original meaning of the definition was applied to a wide range of internal expressions of opposition to governments, from revolutionary conflict, assassination and other terrorist acts to political riots and demonstrations. Later usage of the term also included violent and repressive acts of governments against their own citizens (Herbst 2003:  180; Chenoweth 2014; Porta 2013). Criticism of the narrow conception of political violence as mere physical harm has widened the definition to include structural violence, which includes deprivation and social injustice as forms of violence inflicted on people (Krieger 1993, see definition of “violence” above). Ted Honderich provides an alternative approach in which political violence is defined as the destructive use of force against persons or things. This force is forbidden by law and is meant to change the policies, system, territory or personnel of the government, or the government itself, as well as the lives of individuals within society (Honderich 1976; Merkl 1986: 20; cf. Porta 2013). Despite the relatively broad definitional criteria, political violence is nowadays predominantly affected by the debate on terrorism and terrorist acts as a matter of pursuing political goals. This approach comes from the perception of threat that has modified the whole academic debate and counteracts the notion that collective violence is an integral part of political life (Weber 1965; cf. Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; Bates 2001). As a matter of fact, this is not only because of the widespread occurrence of terrorist acts, but rather due to the delegitimizing effect of claiming that something is terrorism or somebody is a terrorist (Case 2010, 115–​16; cf. Porta 2013; Ruggiero 2006). This perspective is deliberately excluded from the analytical framework of the book, as it concentrates on the more general roots of political violence as the means of achieving political goals (see Arendt 1970; Held 1997, 188). This predisposition helps us distinguish political violence from other forms of violent behaviour, such as criminal acts. In this context, political violence not only has to violate the taboos of prevailing orders, but also has to address the impression that the attempt is not simply a “nudge” or mere circumvention of society’s legal structures (Merkl 1986: 20; Stephens 2010: 109).

 23

From violence to electoral violence 23 Perpetrators of political violence invariably use justification rather than excuses; they accept responsibility for their actions but deny the pejorative quality associated with them (Schlenker 1980; Cromer 2004). Political violence seeks to maintain or reshape relations among rulers and the ruled by targeting public institutions insofar as they affect the freedom of speech and action available to individuals or communities. Subsequently, it has direct consequences for a state’s capacity to deliver public goods, such as welfare, political order or security (Devetak 2008: 10). As a result, political violence constitutes a type of constitutional emergency in a very specific sense and a challenge to the task of constitutional maintenance in a larger sense (Finn 1991: 6). This notion amends the theoretical framework of collective violence and provides a political dimension to the research of electoral violence. It is important to recognize that through step-​by-​step logic we reveal the mechanisms that tell us how things may happen. The next sections will follow this lead and further build on it in order to create a “birth certificate” of electoral violence.

2.4  Elections and conflict Before I  begin to talk about electoral violence as a unique concept, it is important to briefly discuss the framework that distinguishes the electoral violence from other forms of political violence  –​the election. As this is one of the most studied concepts in political science, it is almost impossible to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the nuances of electoral competition. Therefore, I limit this overview to only the most important remarks while broader discussion can be found elsewhere (Bogaards 1998; Lijphart 1999; Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Lindberg 2009; Norris 2014). Let’s start with the argument that elections embody democratic competitiveness and the logic of competition creates a “battlefield” that can be very peaceful but also violent (see Sisk 2008; UNDP 2009). Elections, as a cornerstone of democratic rule, possess certain qualities that cannot be removed or substituted. This is put in contrast to the existing challenges that elections cause during the process of democratization and the consolidation of democracy. Based on the theoretical discussion, I develop an argument that conceptualizes elections as a source of legitimacy that may be subjectively (or objectively) perceived as dangerous. In other words, the discussion introduces the context of elections in terms of their conflict-​ generating logic as an integral part of democratization processes as well as democracy as political system. If we discuss the concept of democracy, we also have to talk about elections, competition and accountability. Democracy is generally based on elections as well as defined by them (Lindberg 2006: 21). This idea can be also reformulated into a position that sees the development of an electoral system as a part of the development of a democracy rather than something established at the early stage of democratization (Taagepera 2002: 248). We may

24

24  From violence to electoral violence argue that even though an election does not equal democracy, the strong bond between them cannot be ignored or diminished (Schumpeter 1950; Dahl 1971, 1973, 1989; Diamond 2002; cf. Section 3.1). A closer look at the discussion about the concept of modern democracy reveals another substantive finding –​each of the existing definitions includes elections as a defining feature (Whitehead 2002; Dahl et al. 2003; Held 2006). Moreover, in the context of transforming societies, the organization of elections is usually accompanied by a great deal of expectation about successful democratization, with democracy as the stable outcome (virtual or actual). During the past two decades, politicians as well as respected scholars simply assumed that in attempted transitions to democracy, elections would not just be a cornerstone but also a key generator of further democratic reforms over time (Carothers 2002: 8). This idea did not last long and it turned out to be false. On the contrary, a new trend occurred. Authoritarian regimes as well as “new democratic elites” –​among others –​have “discovered” their ability to adjust legal standards in a way that meets the minimum criteria that the international community and Western democrats call for. The crisis of democracy-​promotion programmes emerged almost immediately (Carothers 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 2007). According to Benjamin Reilly, elections truly do play a formative role in shaping the broader norms of political behaviour; however, the positive effect is neither linear nor unproblematic. In this context, voting may refer to a specific manipulable instrument of politics that is amenable to being engineered in order to achieve specific objectives and outcomes (Reilly 2006:  97; McEvoy and O’Leary 2013). Lijphart adds in this context that if one wants to change the nature of a particular democracy, the electoral system is likely to be the most suitable and effective instrument for doing so (Lijphart 1995, 412). Two arguments are important to mention here. The first is about the strong position of elections in the framework of democracy promotion (Carothers 2007; cf. Lindberg 2009). The second argument refers to a situation symptomatic of transforming societies in which the period of power struggle is characterized by a higher rate of conflict-​prone situations. If we reformulate this idea, the period of democratization is characterized by potentially conflicting goals that are often institutionalized through the electoral arena, where the notion of conflict (positive or negative, see below) is crucial in terms of expectations and outcomes (Mansfield and Snyder 2007: 5–​7). For the purpose of the book, an election can be simply defined as a specific setting with institutional expressions (habits/​norms), rules, and regulations that refer to a mechanism for selecting the individuals and groups –​political parties and their candidates –​who will enjoy legislative and executive power for a limited period of time (Lindberg 2006, 35–​6). Elections, in an unproblematic form, must further guarantee equality in participation and free competition. If all these qualities are ensured, election results should be seen as legitimate by political candidates and elites, as well as by voters. Through

 25

From violence to electoral violence 25 this channel, power is legally (de jure) legitimized and consequently empowers its holders with, among other things, the monopoly on legitimate use of physical force. There is almost no dispute about how important elections are for establishing democracy and how crucial the outcome of competition can be for a country’s future. As trivial as it may seem, democracy is bound to elections and the success of democracy is presupposed by the success of its elections. There are many other relevant factors that allow democracy to take root and consolidate; however, the crucial position of elections is still predominant (there cannot be democracy without free and fair elections). This context shows how much pressure elections can amass and what the possible stakes are. Elections define a specific arena where broader political, societal and economic disputes occur and may further escalate under either a constructive or destructive dynamic (Carothers 2002, 2004, 2007). Let me take a small detour here. I have already discussed the general sources of the incentives for violence that may ignite confrontational dynamics in the electoral arena. However, the logic of the actual struggles has so far been only slightly touched on. The idea that fills the gap is the concept of conflict. Conflict is generally perceived to be a form of confrontation that embodies an element of change through which the life of society may be modified, either enhanced or destroyed (Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Gurr 1980; Eagly et al. 2004; Reilly 2011). Bartos and Wehr (2002) define conflict as a situation in which actors use conflict behaviour against each other to attain incompatible goals and/​or to express their hostility (cf. Wärneryd 2014; Schellenberg 1996; Myerson 1991; Nye et al. 2011). In elections, conflict is an integral part of the competition for public offices. They are perceived as stakes in the public arena that the candidates try to win. Part of this process is an effort to gain enough of the symbolic capital that is so important for the legitimacy of power in democracy. When referring to the actors in a conflict, we can be talking either about individuals or groups. This preserves the uniformity of terminology and also covers the whole conceptual space of the possible organizers of (electoral) violence. Moreover, the complexity is sustained. This simple delimitation is minor in contrast to the other three concepts mentioned in the definition above –​incompatible goals, hostility and conflict behaviour. Let’s start with incompatible goals as the most important term for referring to different positions in human interaction. In this context, interests (goals) are incompatible if, in general, they are negatively correlated: when the party’s payoff for an outcome is high, the opponent’s payoff tends to be low, a logic that basically defines the whole idea of election (Bartos and Wehr 2002:  17; Gurr 1980; Nye et al. 2011). The problem is that it is often difficult to reliably determine whether goals are or are not in fact incompatible. To solve this dilemma, two approaches are available. The first one refers to the question of whether it is logically impossible for both parties to achieve their goals simultaneously. The second approach is more complex and lies in the question of whether the two

26

26  From violence to electoral violence parties have incompatible “payoffs” (cf. Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Eagly et al. 2004; Bartos and Wehr 2002). If the answer to both these hypothetical question is yes, conflict occurs. Elections and election logic fulfil both of these conditions utterly, although different dynamics in different environments are naturally expected. The concept of hostility can be seen as an alternative approach to incompatible goals, where the conflict behaviour can occur not only because of the supposed incompatibility but also because the involved parties feel hostile toward each other. The difference can be pictured through the distinction between rational and non-​rational behaviour, where irrationality affects the actual decisions. An action is rational if it is reached when an actor considers a set of all relevant alternatives, assesses their outcomes rationally, evaluates them in accordance with his, her or the group’s values and then, upon deliberate consideration, chooses the action that is the best. An action is non-​rational if it is not the best option (not highest-​valued) in this sense (Bartos and Wehr 2002: 21). More formally, hostility can be defined as antagonism, opposition, or resistance in thoughts or principles (Webster Dictionary 1973: 553; Deutsch and Coleman 2000; Gurr 1980). In an election, various forms of hostility can occur and escalate into violence. The most prominent examples come from ideological, ethnic or religious antagonism, which combine rational as well irrational motivations for using violence. The final concept focuses on the active part of the conflict, where any act or behaviour that helps the party to achieve a goal that is incompatible with the goals of their opponent(s) can be labelled as conflict behaviour. The same can be said about the need to expresses the hostility toward him, her or the whole group (the opponents). One small remark should be mentioned about the distinction between conflict action and conflict behaviour, and stress the structure that defines them. In this context, conflict action is guided by rational consideration, which is linked to the concept of incompatible goals. On the other hand, when we assume that the act may be rational or non-​rational, we use the term conflict behaviour, which includes acts of hostility but also supposedly rational decisions. In this scheme, conflict behaviour is a superset of conflict action (Bartos and Wehr 2002, 22–​3; Nye et  al. 2011; Eagly et al. 2004). Although I discuss the concept of conflict as primarily destructive, it does not have to be inevitably violent or even negative. I should mention here again that conflict is often the force behind that which can be peaceful and deliberative. It is important to distinguish that conflict, in more general terms, can be either constructive or destructive. Constructive conflict is characterized by using persuasion or the promise of benefits and is characterized by problem-​ solving approaches; opponents wage conflict constructively and accept the other as a legitimate part of discussion and do not question its existence. On the other hand, destructive conflict is about unilateral demands that have little or no regard for the interests or needs of the party imposed upon. The conflict is perceived by one or more parties as oppressive and thus calling for

 27

From violence to electoral violence 27 redress, or as humiliating and thus requiring revenge. Destructive conflict, like constructive conflict, tends toward its own reproduction; however, destructive struggles lead to a relationship among the parties in which future conflicts will also be waged destructively (Kriesberg 1998; Held 1997; Bartos and Wehr 2002; Tarrow 2013). In terms of electoral violence, we should think about destructive conflict based on conflict dynamics and unilateral impositions. In this context, election as a competitive framework embodies an idea of conflict that is based on the existence of incompatible goals and preferences often accompanied by hostile attitudes. In everyday politics, this logic is present no matter what kind of election is organized or who takes part in it. It does not mean that violence has to occur but neither can we entirely exclude the possibility. If we want to talk about elections, it is important to recognize the electoral arena as a space where open political conflict regularly takes place and may escalate. This is extremely important for understanding electoral violence, its logic and dynamics. No matter how peaceful the competition is, it is always based on conflict that produces some winners and losers. Academics interested in electoral violence should recognize this conflict-​generating rationale and integrate conflict theory into existing theoretical frameworks, where conflict characterizes the escalation of violence affecting the stability of the system, the credibility of election, and in the end also the lives of the millions people who take part in it.

2.5  Electoral violence: roots of the concept The previous sections have discussed the segment of theories that seem to be relevant for the understanding of electoral violence as a unique concept with its own rationale and roots. As I have shown, the research of violence operates within a relatively broad theoretical framework that needs to be systematically narrowed in order to focus on more specific research problems. This logic was applied in the previous sections where the gradual conceptualization narrowed the general notion of violence down to more specific concepts of collective and political violence. The following paragraphs build on this structure and present electoral violence as a concept rooted in the aforementioned debates.2 The study of electoral violence was “rediscovered” only a decade ago, when an increasing number of violent outbreaks during elections in Africa and Asia linked the existing debate over the institutional design of electoral systems (including electoral bodies) in divided societies to the more acute problems of contentious elections in democratizing and post-​conflict societies (IFES 2011; Fischer 2002; UNDP 2009; Höglund 2009). The existing discussion has turned to the conflict potential in elections − a potential that may generate a significant threat, proportional to the risk of what may be lost or gained in the voting process (Sisk 2008). In this context, electoral disputes accompanied by violent outbreaks have become a serious problem in societies under transformation, in authoritarian regimes, as well as in young democracies (Norris

28

28  From violence to electoral violence 2014). This preliminary claim can be supported by the NELDA project, which showed that between 1945 and 2010, one-​fifth of electoral rounds organized throughout the world faced electoral violence with human casualties (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The truth is that many politicians elected to office, their supporters and political activists have altered their perception of electoral competition in the form of zero-​sum logic with direct consequences for their opponents (in terms of access to offices, goods, services and other benefits) (Horowitz 1993; Straus and Taylor 2009; Wilkinson 2004). Violence in this context is often perceived as the ultimate tool to be employed in a broader strategy of campaigning by those who have been defeated and/​or challenged (Horowitz 2001; Chacon et al. 2011). Although a number of case studies have been published that map electoral violence as part of an effort to understand the phenomenon and prevent the recurrence of violent struggles (Hickman 2009; Boone and Kriger 2012; Campbell 2010), a broader empirical (comparative) basis has only recently started to develop, with significant implications for the conceptual framework (Höglund 2009; Bekoe 2010; Norris et al. 2015). The existing “state of the discipline” is strongly influenced by electoral engineering research and the polemic concerning the suitability of various types of electoral systems and electoral institutions in differing types of divided societies (Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Bogaards 1998; Horowitz 2001; Lijphart 1999). They are complemented by the dimension of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts related to escalating violence and the logic of galvanized intergroup struggles (Horowitz 1985; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Cederman et al. 2012). This traditional view is also transferred to the pure institutional dimension that characterizes the practical strategies and policies of international organizations and non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) (IFES 2011; UNDP 2009). Existing approaches are nevertheless locked in a vicious cycle typified by geographic clusters and, more importantly, empirical significance (extreme cases of electoral violence are more important than less striking examples). This results in the omission of a great part of the research field, where political violence enters the electoral arena and affects its outcome. Post-​communist Europe, with its dynamics and development, is a good example for supporting this claim. The existing academic debate generally defines electoral violence as consisting of acts of violence that disturb the electoral cycle and its outcome. These instances are distinguished from criminal activity by their direct relationship to the events, personalities and issues comprising specific electoral contests (Wasserman and Jaggard 2007). Various definitions add more precise categories in order to identify the formal aspects of electoral violence and set criteria for a special subcategory of political violence. These focus on timing, the relationship to concrete issues, instrumentality (violence intended to achieve defined goals) and any potential or actual consequences (Norris et al. 2015; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008). In this context, Kristine Höglund adds that the definition becomes principally a matter of classifying actors, activities, timing and motives (Höglund 2009).

 29

From violence to electoral violence 29 Although there is no consensus about the causes of electoral violence, at least a few alternative perspectives can be identified in the relevant literature. Several authors traditionally see electoral violence as a way of manifesting political instability during a process of transformation and/​or as a tool used by an authoritarian/​hybrid rule in order to advance its own goals and strategies (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1968, 1991; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006). In recent years, scholars have developed a more complex approach according to which the phenomenon of electoral violence is not the sole by-​product of troubled political liberalization, but may also play a significant role in electoral campaigning (Austin 1995; Laakso 1999, 2007; Klopp and Zuern 2007; Hickman 2011; Bekoe 2010). In this context, electoral violence is seen by the scientific community as a functional tool with clearly defined goals, strongly associated with the idea of influencing the outcome of an electoral competition (cf. concept of contentious elecition in Norris et al. 2015; compare Höglund 2009). Identifying the conditions that underlie these goals is one of the most important challenges in the contemporary research of electoral violence. When scholars talk about the potential causes of electoral violence, they usually stress that different environments should be characterized by different drivers of political instability in the electoral arena. There is no universal pattern that can be applied. When looked at this way, electoral violence is usually caused by a combination of several factors whose relevancy changes by ­context. As was already mentioned, Arriola and Johnson (2011) identify clientelistic corruption as one of the strongest inhibitors of pre-​electoral violence. Hafner-​Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2013) propose that information predicting a loss by incumbent elites in an election may raise the probability of ­pre-​electoral violence. Pevehouse, Straus and Taylor (2012) present evidence that in Sub-​Saharan Africa most violence is committed by incumbents seeking re-​election. They also demonstrate that pre-​existing social conflict and the quality of founding elections shape pre-​election violence, while the stability of democratic institutions and weaker economic growth shape violence after the closing of polling stations. Several other theories mention the form of an electoral system and the effectiveness of relevant institutions (Lijphart 1977; Linz and Stepan 1996; Sisk 1998), ethnic division (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1993; Wilkinson 2004) or the general socio-​economic situation in a country (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003). The potential drivers and the combination of those drivers may be seen as the ingredients for electoral violence that mix into different “recipes” (Bekoe 2010). These variations hold important implications for research, as well as for designing practical policies for prevention (Gillies 2011; Norris et al. 2015; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001). To support this claim, this book attempts to highlight the existing plurality of forms of electoral violence in a region where the phenomenon stands apart from mainstream research interests and to identify the potential drivers of the escalation of violence. Under discussion are the elements of a conceptual field broadened to include democratic

30

Risks of contentious elections

30  From violence to electoral violence

Autocracies

Hybrid regimes

Democracies

Level of democracy

Figure 2.1 The predicted risks of contentious elections in various regime types Source: Adapted from Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma (2015)

regimes as well as forms of authoritarian rule. This can be supported by the work of Mansfield and Snyder (2005), who provide one of the most plausible structural arguments about regime types associated with the curvilinear patterns of democratization. The argument says that the chance of violence rises with the initial phase of transition from stable autocracy and falls with the final stages of democratic consolidation. This continuum defines the spectrum where electoral violence can occur while maintaining the argument that stable autocracies and consolidated democracies are the endpoints where electoral violence is mitigated (although with different strategies). Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma (2015) add that various regime types can be accompanied by electoral violence of varying intensity. They combine a country’s level of democratization with their risk of contentious elections in order to demonstrate different dynamics of contentious behaviour in the electoral arenas of different regimes. The main argument points out that hybrid regimes are the most prone to electoral violence (positioned in the grey area between democracy and non-​democracy) and as such differ significantly from the contentious dynamics of stable democracies as well as autocracies (see Figure 2.1). In this context, competition and conflict are seen as central components of the electoral arena, where decisions and particular actions may be perceived either constructively or destructively (Kriesberg 1998; Bartos and Wehr 2002; Norris et al. 2015). It does not matter what kind of regime organizes it. In general terms, elections provide a deliberative way of solving conflicts (mainly political) if basic preconditions are present (Sisk 2008; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; Reilly 2008). If not, power may be seized on the basis of heredity or through violence, opening a path to alternative types of confrontation (Lopez-​Pintor 1997). As previously mentioned, different contexts and environments presuppose different scenarios in which violence may or may not occur. What is important here is the reference to a position that sees

 31

From violence to electoral violence 31 elections in countries ravaged by destructive conflict as fundamentally unlike those organized under normal circumstances defined by peaceful electoral activity accompanied by free competition and acceptance of the outcome (Lopez-​Pintor 1997; Kriesberg 1998). The events under discussion range from personal attacks (e.g., intimidation in the Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections of 2012), to unrest in the streets and civil disobedience (like the protests in Macedonia in 2002 and 2006, the demonstrations against the Milošević regime in 2000 or the crackdown on protesters during the presidential election in Belarus in 2010), to massive violations of the electoral process and serious clashes resulting in human casualties (Albania in the 1990s). Historically speaking, one of the first systematic efforts to study the phenomenon of electoral violence was put forward by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The Election, Violence, Education and Resolution programme (EVER) was launched as a response to the escalation of electoral violence in the world’s most fragile regions with the intention to better understand the violent dynamics of electoral completion and prevent it (IFES 2011). The framework was based on research by Jeff Fischer, published as a working paper in 2002, and further developed by a number of scholars (Fischer 2002; Höglund 2008; Sisk 2008). In this context, the EVER project defined electoral violence as any act or threat of violence (violence being physical or psychological harm to a person or damage to property) directed at anyone directly involved in an electoral event/​process (voter, candidate, party officer, election worker, election monitor, journalist, etc.), or any act or threat of violence that disrupts or attempts to disrupt any aspect of the electoral event/​process (campaign, registration, voting, vote counting, etc.) (IFES 2011; compare Fischer 2002). Stimuli for violence can occur at virtually any level of competition, which subsequently may affect the organization of elections in a negative way. Fischer (2002) notes five stages of the electoral cycle in which conflict may escalate and violence often takes place. The first of them, called an identity conflict, describes the period before the start of electoral campaigning when the registration process takes place and refugees or other conflict-​forced migrants cannot establish or re-​establish their officially recognized identities. This creates tension, which may escalate to open hostility and violent clashes. The second stage, called campaign conflict, is based on a type of rivalry between competing subjects/​candidates who seek to disrupt their opponents’ effort to campaign effectively, intimidate voters and candidates, and use threats and violence to influence the participation in an upcoming election. The third stage is balloting conflict. It occurs on polling day, when rivalry and tension may rise to a critical point and various forms of violence spread. Rivalries are played out at the polling station or nearby. After polling day, there is a chance of results conflict, which is basically a dispute over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve the potential controversy in a fair, timely and transparent manner. Fischer closes this list with representation conflict, which occurs when elections are organized as a “zero-​sum” game and the “losers” are excluded from government participation (Fischer 2002: 9–​11).

32

32  From violence to electoral violence IFES builds on this structure in its analytical framework and recognizes five categories that describe the key patterns of violent interaction while defining the possible causes of the behaviour (Fischer 2002: 4; IFES 2011): • • • • •

Voter-​motivated conflict –​voters challenge the state and claim unfairness in the election process. State-​motivated conflict  –​the state initiates conflicts with voters who challenge the results of elections. Rival-​motivated conflict –​political rivals are in conflict with each other for political gain. Insurgent-​motivated conflict  –​forces capitalize on the visibility of an election to promote their insurgencies. A combination of the categories above.

A similar approach was applied by the UNDP’s project Election and Conflict Prevention (ECP), which saw a need to address the problem of electoral violence more systematically. In fact, the UNDP framework continued where the EVER project ended. It developed theoretical arguments about the sources of potential conflict and stressed that elections do not cause violence per se, but instead sharpen existing animosities in a society and adjusts them to a specific environment (UNDP 2009: 4). The framework defines electoral violence (which it terms “election-​related violence”) as acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect the electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition. Violence may be employed to influence the process of elections (such as efforts to delay, disrupt or derail a poll) or to influence the outcomes (determining winners in competitive races for political office, or securing the approval or disapproval of referendum questions) (UNDP 2009: 4). Electoral violence is seen as a subtype of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way in order to advance their interests. How the election process and administration is designed, managed and implemented has a strong influence on the acceptance of the electoral results (UNDP 2009: 4–​5). The UNDP also addresses the question of risk-​bearing conditions relevant for the occurrence of violence during the election. The analytical framework creates a model of three essential causes that mostly contextualize the occurrence of electoral violence in conflict-​prone societies and can be further developed: •

The major contextual factor is a period of democratization and political change in which a state of imbalance affects the incentives for conflict and violent behaviour. In terms of the contextual framework, the communities most at risk are those that have undergone or are still undergoing transition, a phase of consolidation, a period of post-​war settlement, a ratification process of a peace agreement, or are resolving the sovereign status of a disputed territory (UNDP 2009: 8).

 3

From violence to electoral violence 33 •

•

Another suspected factor is the effect of specific types of electoral systems on conflict management and conflict resolution in conflict-​prone societies. One general assumption that has been repeatedly evaluated by many scholars is one that sees the type of electoral system and its setting as an important factor in the process of escalation or mitigation of the potential for conflict in a risky environment (Lijphart 2004; Norris 2004; Reilly 2001; Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Blanc et  al. 2006; Wolff 2012). The type of electoral system is seen by various scholars as a crucial factor in the analysis of the “rules of the game” under which elections are held and what the effects of these settings are. Electoral systems are fundamentally and critically interdependent on party system structure, candidate appeal tactics and the overall character of the competition in the political arena. Based on these and many other contextual factors, electoral system design can be crafted in terms of electoral formula, district magnitude, vote-​to-​seat ratio and boundary delimitation (UNDP 2009; O’Leary 1962; Seymour 1970). The vaguest and the broadest category of UNDP’s explanatory framework refers to what the UNDP calls “dynamics and the nature and patterns of political mobilization”. This basically focuses on the stakes of the competition, expectations about winning and losing in election contests, as well as the incentives that the electoral process creates, or how the rules of the electoral game may provide reward or return for certain behaviour or action (UNDP 2009: 11–​13).

Recent, expanding academic debate takes a similar approach to electoral violence. Timothy Sisk claims that electoral violence is a special kind of political violence, one that is utilized in order to achieve political ends. He further forms an argument that electoral violence is inherently linked to other forms of electoral misconduct, such as fraud, while different political contexts are accompanied by different forms of illicit behaviour. According to Sisk, electoral violence is no longer a deviant feature confined solely to the category of democratizing societies (compare Chapter 3; Sisk 2008; cf. Donno 2013a). Much like Sisk, Kristine Höglund argues that electoral violence deserves to be studied as a phenomenon in itself. She distinguishes two strands of research that see electoral violence as a subset of activities in a larger political conflict or as the ultimate kind of electoral fraud. In her interpretation, both approaches focus on the goal-​oriented or instrumental character of violence (Höglund 2009:  415–​16; Hanham 1959; Gash 1953; Wasserman and Jaggard 2007, 125–​6). The definition of this subcategory becomes a matter of classifying the actors, activities, timing and motives. In fact, the acts are distinguished from other types of violence by both their timing and motives. This underscores the aforementioned argument of the distinctiveness of electoral violence as a unique socio-​political phenomenon (Höglund 2009: 416–​17).

34

34  From violence to electoral violence In terms of motives, the ultimate goal of electoral violence is to influence the outcome of voting in order achieve more general goals (e.g., to seize power, to prevent the victory of an opponent, to disturb the organization of elections, etc.). The motivation for the use of violence is, however, often deeper and refers to more rooted causes that are complex in nature (ethnic division, land, political rivalry, economic stimulus, grievances, etc.; compare Cederman et al. 2013). This remark is important for the logic that this book follows, i.e., trying to identify the possible causes of violent outburst during an election using QCA. In other words, motives are the conditions that we are looking for. The second dimension that distinguishes electoral violence from other forms of collective violence is timing. Violence occurs during the entire electoral process. This includes the pre-​election phase, polling day(s) and the post-​election stage (tallying votes and announcing, accepting or not accepting the results). Moreover, the violence must have a distinct link with the elections in terms of goals and intended outcomes (Höglund 2009:  415–​16; Hoppen 1994: 606). Höglund further identifies the precursors that trigger violent outbreaks. This can be seen as a much-​needed approach to better understand the processes of violent contestation in the electoral arena (see above). She talks about the nature of politics, the conflict-​generating dimensions of electoral processes and the design of electoral systems and administration (Höglund 2009: 420–​4; cf. Sisk 2008; Ahmed 2013). Her central conclusion stresses that electoral violence not only harms the process of democratization and consolidation, but may also hamper conflict management attempts and may have negative influences on the dynamics of a conflict (Höglund 2009: 413). Other authors who have at least partially dealt with the topic of electoral violence present similar conclusions, where the main emphasis concerns the destructive effects of negative conflict behaviour (Goldsmith 2012; Koch and Gartner 2005; Hollander 2009; Mueller 2011). The common position is that phenomenon needs to be studied more properly, with the intention of locating possible sources of violence and preparing strategies for mitigating it. This is a mainstream goal that is often expressed in an effort to prevent atrocities and massive abuse of power against civilians. Generally speaking, an escalation of violence can emerge in different forms and various intensities, and this usually initiates a counteraction. The general logic of conflict behaviour in this context postulates a critical threshold that is reached in which the people or the government(s) are not willing or able to perceive other means as effective. The source of conflict behaviour comes predominantly from the tensions within the society, mixing conflicts of various significance, intensity and dynamics. This notion is rooted in empirically oriented conflict theory that tries to explain contestation patterns in various situations where the sources of imbalance influence the everyday life of communities (cf. Bartos and Wehr 2002). Jon Lawrence (1998) sees electoral violence through a slightly different lens and emphasizes the dimension of goal-​oriented decisions. In

 35

From violence to electoral violence 35 other words, violence is a part of a strategy in which the willingness to use force is well considered and excused (Chaturvedi 2005: 189–​202; Lawrence 1998:  182). Akhatara even uses the term “electoral tool” (2001:  149–​50). Various authors then distinguish among several types of electoral violence that have occurred in the modern history of electoral competition (Manor 1992: 127–​8; Lawrence 1998: 182; Chaturvedi 2005; Akhatara 2001: 149–​ 50). Wasserman and Jaggard (2007:  128)  have systematized this list and subsequently defined three types of electoral violence where the main definitional dimension combines the level of significance with its intensity. They introduce the categories of (electoral) riot, (electoral) disturbance and (electoral) incident: •

•

•

A riot is defined as a serious and sustained outbreak of collective violence, involving the implicit or explicit use of force, intimidation or coercion, which results in physical damage to persons or property  –​or the immediate fear that such would occur. A disturbance is classified as a less serious breach of the peace than a riot, and involves episodic outbursts of crowd violence rather than the type of sustained disorder characteristic of a riot. A disturbance generates a degree of public alarm and elicits some measure of official response. An incident is defined as a noisy or demonstrative action by a crowd of people that interferes with, or disrupts, the proceedings of an election campaign. An incident is a relatively short-​lived event that involves little overt violence and invokes a limited official response. Although less serious than a riot or a disturbance, an incident nevertheless represents an interruption to electoral procedure.

Thad Dunning adds to this discussion a very interesting viewpoint about the position of violence in the power structure of elites and/​or political groups that –​as was previously mentioned –​seeks to establish or to maintain subjective equilibrium in terms of political settings. Dunning’s argument sees fighting and voting in two stages –​as strategic substitutes or as strategic complements. “Strategic substitutes” refer to a situation in which one alternative or the other may occur depending on the context. “Strategic complements”, in contrast to substitutes, describe a more goal-​oriented approach where both strategies are used as tools for achieving defined objectives. According to Dunning, fighting may be more attractive when opposing parties are more equally matched on electoral grounds and the electoral competition is perceived as an ultimate arena for solving the existing conflict (Dunning 2011: 328; cf. Chacon et al. 2011). This idea stands in stark contrast to the arguments presented by Adam Przeworski (1991), who claimed that power balance and uncertainty in the electoral arena are crucial for democratization and further consolidation of the democratic political system. Based on this brief review of major ideas regarding electoral violence, it is appropriate to provide an operational definition that broadens existing notions

36

36  From violence to electoral violence of the concept and systematizes it in a more complex way. This is undertaken in accordance with previous lines of argumentation that were formed to analyse the occurrence of electoral violence in the area of the Western Balkans.

2.6  Electoral violence: operational definition Let me start the discussion of the operational definition with a few remarks about the limitations of the existing concepts in terms of their scope and application. These arguments are linked to the universal meaning of a phenomenon such that, if it occurs, possesses certain features that are, at least in general terms, universal. This means any formulated theory should be applicable in different contexts whenever the object of study (electoral violence) occurs, so that the concept is not reserved a priori to certain contextual preconditions (e.g., conflict-​ridden societies) (cf. Coppedge 2012). Existing definitions “violate” this assumption to a certain extent and presuppose a single “favourable” context based on a period of significant societal and/​or political change (UNDP 2009; Fischer 2002; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008). Such definitions, however, omit certain factors that could broaden the meaning of the concept to make it inclusive rather than exclusive and able to take in a wider conceptual field. Based on the empirical evidence, we must therefore introduce an alternative definition incorporating the lively discussion of possible forms of violence (e.g. structural), while maintaining the material dimension of attacks (e.g., property damage, attacks on polling stations, attacks on campaign facilities and property, etc.; cf. Tolan 2001, 2008; Arendt 1970; Krug et al. 2002; WHO 1996; Jackman 2002; Chalk 1998). In order to approach this systematically, I  present two definitions that differ in their level of generalization in terms of narrowness and broadness. I employ the theoretical discussion of violence and its subcategories presented in the previous parts of this chapter and visualize the framework that I will further build on. Applying a set-​theoretic approach involving the virtual intersection of sets consisting of violence and elections/​the electoral process within a generalized framework, I address the concept dependency that was developed throughout the whole chapter (see Figure 2.2). In other words, the definition of (political) violence, with its strengths and shortcomings, is combined with the specific electoral setting, resulting in a “new” concept, that of electoral violence, and is further developed. The visualization of the conceptual field in Figure 2.2 provides a simple and transparent map of the position of electoral violence in the system of more complex concepts that I  have discussed. With this “map”, I  will now approach the two working (operational) definitions (broad and narrow) that are used in the following chapters. Electoral violence is in this context an integral part of a very vibrant discussion that should not be left out just because the phenomenon is expected to be self-​explanatory. It is not. Let’s move now to the broad definition of electoral violence (in terms of possible application). It builds on the simple assumption that the phenomenon

 37

From violence to electoral violence 37

Collective Violence Violence

Electoral Violence

Political Violence

Figure 2.2 Venn diagram of electoral violence Note: The sizes of sets are not intended to represent complexity or importance.

(electoral violence) is a subcategory of (political) violence that is intentionally employed in order to affect the electoral process or its outcome. This definition grasps the essence of electoral violence that is based on intentionality and has a goal-​oriented strategy as a part of “electoral campaigning” while preserving a strong accent on its political dimension. The strength of this definition lies in its simplicity, which allows the concept to be applied to any context or environment where elections are held, irrespective of which regime, conflict situation or type of violence is analysed. It defines the necessary boundaries that distinguish the phenomenon from other forms of coercive acts that exist in our predefined “universe” (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, it is seen as preliminary structure, a puzzle if you will, which allows scholars to fill in further conceptualization as needed. In this context, the concepts of “violence”, “electoral process” and “effect/​result” are seen as analytical pieces that define possible event dynamics with no need to reform the original definition of electoral violence. In other words, we can talk about forms of violence, outcome and operational framework, and yet we can still keep the original definition valid without needing to reformulate or amend it. This reflects the broad discussion presented in the previous sections and the general shortcomings of the existing definitions of electoral violence while applying the logic of Occam’s razor (lex parsimoniae). The distinction itself helps us understand that electoral violence can be defined as a valid subcategory of (political) violence. In terms of application, the question of what violence is or is not is answered outside the definition of electoral violence and then utilized again in order to address the phenomenon. To better demonstrate this approach, I apply it to the second narrow definition of electoral violence (in terms of restrictiveness), which incorporates the discussion on (political) violence already presented in this chapter.

38

38  From violence to electoral violence Electoral violence is defined as intentional threat or infliction of physical force and/or verbal or written attacks against oneself, another person, a group or community or property of any kind, with the intention of disrupting the electoral process or the context of electoral competition (pre-post-polling period). The outcome of this violence may result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage that may or may not influence the electoral framework, either partially or in its entirety, directly or indirectly.

Violence Electoral Process

Effect or Result

Figure 2.3 Narrowed definition of electoral violence

As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, our broad definition has three parts that can be further specified for a better understanding of electoral violence in a particular setting (“violence”, “electoral process” and “effect/​ result”). As the book is interested in the Western Balkans, my intention is to define violence, the electoral process and the effect/​result as context-​sensitive parts of the main definition that would narrow a more general notion of electoral violence (see Figure 2.3). In this context: Electoral violence is defined as the intentional threat or infliction of physical force and/​or verbal or written attacks against oneself, another person, a group or community or property of any kind, with the intention of disrupting the electoral process or the context of electoral competition (pre-​or post-​polling period). The outcome of this violence may result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage that may or may not influence the electoral framework, either partially or in its entirety, directly or indirectly. To briefly elaborate, this definition opens up additional space for discussing various contexts of electoral violence that are not less relevant but simply different. It helps us grasp the variation in possible acts of electoral violence occurring in different contexts but sharing the same core notion of disrupting the electoral cycle and its outcome. The definition covers mainly physical and psychological forms of violence while omitting more complicated structural and symbolic dimensions. This is crucial for the empirical part of the book that presents data on electoral violence in the Western Balkans with a particular focus and scope.

Notes 1 David Churchman (2013) identified two dozen academic disciplines, describing more than 100 theories, which sought to explain a broad range of human aggression and conflict, and over 75 methods for managing them. 2 Part of this section is based on Mochtak (2016a).

 39

3 Contexts of electoral violence

Before I  get to the actual incidents of electoral violence in the Western Balkans I have to address one more question highly relevant for the understanding of electoral violence  –​the one regarding the context. Going back to previously mentioned arguments put forward by Sisk (2008) and Norris at al. (2015), electoral violence is not restricted only to societies that undergo political transformation. As a matter of fact, violence can occur in different environments defined by different contextual factors. Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans are not exceptions. The end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the third wave of democratization affected a number of cases where the transformation process was turbulent, even violent. Elections, as one of the pillars of the transformation effort, both stood at the centre of these changes and stimulated the confrontational dynamics of highly incompatible goals (ideological, ethnic, political, etc.; see more in Schedler 2006, 2013; Bartos and Wehr 2002). In this context, electoral struggles accompanied by violent outbreaks have become a serious problem for transforming societies that are prone to polarization and confrontation. However, these highly unstable societies are not the only ones that can experience electoral violence as a result of existing tensions. As a matter of fact, the phenomenon can theoretically occur in any kind of environment where elections are held. This argument can also be supported empirically. As I have shown in one of my papers about electoral violence in Post-​communist Europe, various forms of violent confrontation have been reported throughout the region in the past 25 years (Mochtak 2016a). I am referring to notoriously conflict-​ridden societies undergoing turbulent transformation (typically the Wester Balkans) but also authoritarian regimes (Russia, Belarus) and more or less stable democracies (Bulgaria, Romania). Violence has become the ultimate tool of those who perceive violent means as another form of electoral campaigning and their last resort (Dunning 2011: 328; Chacon et al. 2011). Contextually –​despite the mainstream approach –​democratizing societies are not the only risky environments where electoral violence can jeopardize the stability of the regime and the country as a whole (cf. Sisk 2008; Bekoe 2012; Höglund 2009; Straus and Taylor 2009; Dunning 2011). As I mentioned before, the various shapes, sizes and colours of electoral violence and the

40

40  Contexts of electoral violence potentially different conditions and contexts have important implications for the research as well as for designing practical prevention policies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2001: 16). Although we can see a great deal of progress in the study of electoral violence in recent years, the field of electoral violence is still relatively biased, with the majority of works focused on the massive violent outbreaks that have the ability to cripple a whole society for years and drag it close to something resembling violent conflict or even civil war (Bekoe 2012; Norris et al. 2015). As a result, the existing approaches are often locked in a vicious circle typified by geographic clusters and, more importantly, empirical significance (extreme cases of electoral violence are more important than less striking examples). This results in the omission of a great part of the research field where political violence enters the electoral arena and affects its outcome. This chapter tries to address this gap in order to initiate a more complex study of electoral violence as a phenomenon that can affect far more countries than the current mainstream research suggests. The following paragraphs are aimed at distinguishing and further conceptualizing three main clusters of electoral violence that differ in their respective contextual bases and define the distinct environments where electoral violence may take place: democracies, regimes in transition and modern-​day autocracies. This division is based on theoretical remarks made by Timothy Sisk and is further supported by empirical evidence collected by the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) project. On the basis of the NELDA database, Pippa Norris analysed elections from the period of 1945–​2010 (n = 2,948) in order to identify electoral campaigns affected by electoral violence (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 2015; Norris 2014). The main findings indicate that: (1) electoral violence is a widespread challenge, observed in roughly one-​fifth of all contemporary elections worldwide and distributed across multiple countries in many global regions; (2) several types of electoral malpractice significantly exacerbate outbreaks of electoral violence, as expected, with the highest risks (not surprisingly) associated with government repression against demonstrators, riots and protests after elections, and government harassment of opposition parties; (3) the perils of violence are also strongly affected by the type of regime, with conflict most commonly occurring in hybrid regimes stranded in the middle “grey” zone between autocracy and democracy (Norris 2014: 145–​50). My own research on electoral violence in post-​communist Europe further supports these findings while identifying general contexts of electoral violence that can be conceptualized (Mochtak 2016a). I build the theorization on data from post-​communist Europe collected as a part of an ongoing project on the roots of electoral violence in the region. To cover the aforementioned variability, I use the NELDA project database (3rd version), which has collected information on all election events for the period of 1945–​2010. The scope of this research focuses on the period after the fall of communist rule in Europe when the third wave of democratization was accelerated in the region and different stages of transformation occurred (1990–​2010; 270 election rounds). I follow the democratic progress and map

 41

Contexts of electoral violence 41 the violent electoral struggles witnessed in the region until 2010 when the dataset ends. On the basis of preliminary analysis, the positive evidence of electoral violence is investigated and general patterns are identified. Through the combination of descriptive and analytical strategies, I typologize observed trends in order to grasp the prevailing patterns. Based on a comparative overview, I  stress that electoral violence is highly relevant for the region and it can occur in typologically different environments defined on the democracy–​ non-​democracy continuum. This distinction is important in order to understand the negative dynamic that elections are accompanied by and to emphasize the fact that electoral violence is not reserved only for deeply divided societies but also impacts struggling societies (politically, economically, culturally) in which electoral violence is often a sign of malfunction (both  in terms of democratic and non-​ democratic performance) (see discussion in Perspective on Politics on the ethics of combatting political extremism in Pappas 2015; Lazar et al. 2015; Capoccia 2015; Mudde 2015).

3.1  Evidence of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe I would like to start this discussion with the argument that all sorts of conflicts that escalated after the fall of communism affected the process of transformation and the overall performance of newly established regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. Ethnic tension bursting with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, political turbulence in the former Soviet republics and the increasing sophistication of intimidation techniques throughout the region played a significant role in the process of legitimizing political power and stabilizing the governments (Norris 2014; Jennings 2013). The following section maps the incidents of electoral violence reported in the region in the period 1990–​2010 as listed in the NELDA database (3rd version). To be included, elections must be held for a national executive position, such as president, or for a national legislative body, such as parliament, legislature, constituent assembly or some other directly elected representative body. Moreover, voters must directly elect the person or persons on the ballot to the national post in question. Voting must also be direct, or “by the people”, in the sense that mass voting must take place. The unit of observation is the election round (see below). All rounds of an election are coded, regardless of the number of seats remaining to be filled (Hyde and Marinov 2012). The NELDA database codes 58 variables with four values: yes (present), no (absent), not clear and not available (N/​A). This complex framework provides an informative perspective on the quality of electoral processes in each of the studied countries. Moreover, it sheds light on elections that were affected by electoral violence or serious disturbance of the electoral competition. As I intend to analyse electoral violence in post-​communist Europe, I inquire into each of the variables in order to select those that may cover election-​related violence. I  define electoral violence as a phenomenon based on intentional threat or infliction of physical force and/​or verbal or written attacks against

42

42  Contexts of electoral violence Table 3.1 NELDA variables for potential types of electoral violence Code

Description

Label

NELDA15

NELDA15 codes the variable that answers the question Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition(?). Harassment may include detaining opposition leaders, disrupting opposition political rallies with state forces, and shutting down opposition newspapers and offices. Yes/​no/​unclear is assigned accordingly. If opposition was banned, or if there was no opposition then it is coded as “N/​A”. NELDA29 codes the variable that answers the question Were there riots and protests after the election(?). The riots and protests should be at least partially related to the handling or outcome of the election. Yes/​no/​unclear is assigned accordingly. NELDA31 codes answers to the question Did the government use violence against demonstrators when riots and protests occur(?). “Yes” is coded if the government responded with violence against the protests or riots. “No” when no violence was used. If there was violence, but it was not associated with government actors, the answer is “no” as well. If NELDA29 is coded “no” “N/​A” is assigned. NELDA33 codes an answer to a question Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election (?). If there was any significant violence relating to the elections that resulted in civilian deaths, a “yes” is coded. Otherwise no or unclear is assigned.

Electoral harassment by the government

NELDA29

NELDA31

NELDA33

Electoral riot or protest

Governmental violence against protesters

Deadly electoral casualties

oneself, another person, a group or community or property of any kind, with the intention of disrupting the electoral process or the context of electoral competition (pre-​or post-​polling period). The outcome of this violence may result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage that may or may not influence the electoral framework, either partially or in its entirety, directly or indirectly (see discussion about electoral violence in the previous chapter). On the basis of this initial screening, I select four variables that fit the aforementioned definition and refer to potential incidents of electoral violence (Table 3.1) (cf. on the process of coding and calibration in Hyde and Marinov 2012). These four categories/​variables help me to analyse 270 electoral rounds in the region of post-​communist countries in the period of 1990–​2010. Although the categories alone cannot cover the whole range of potential examples

 43

Contexts of electoral violence 43 of electoral violence (e.g., vandalism or skirmishes), they include the most important dynamics of contentious behaviour during the elections and as such are analysed. The election round (our main unit of analysis) refers to the polling period. In other words, every round of voting is analysed separately so that potential electoral violence is not reported in chunks if more than one round of casting votes is organized.1 Even though the variables do not provide all the information on electoral violence in its full range (e.g., actors, timing, motives or dynamics), they can be seen as systematic testimony to the occurrence of fraudulent violent electoral behaviour. In this context, the NELDA project is the most complex and systematic source of information that is currently available (Norris et al. 2015; Hyde and Marinov 2012; Goldsmith 2012). I start with the general description of each of the previously mentioned NELDA categories of electoral violence and follow with an analysis of prevailing patterns in order to present the preliminary map of electoral violence in the region of post-​communist Europe. Applying the Venn diagram and using network analysis, the paper then formulates a preliminary typology of electoral violence relevant for the region, which can be further specified and tested. Based on this typology, different contexts of electoral violence are conceptualized. The first category defined by the NELDA codebook covering incidents of electoral violence is “electoral harassment by the government”. It includes government harassment incentives that occurred during the electoral cycles and interfered with the general outcome of the contest. Thirty-​four out of 270 electoral rounds in the region were affected by this type of disturbance (12.6%). Two hundred and twenty-​four electoral rounds were harassment-​free (83%) and 12 were unclear (4.4%). If we take a look at countries that witnessed the harassment, the list includes Albania in the 1990s, Belarus in the 2000s, Croatia in 2000, Hungary in 1994, Latvia in 2006, Moldova in 2005, Romania in 2004, Russia in the 2000s, Serbia in the 1990s and the Ukraine from 1999 to 2004. This brief overview shows that soft forms of electoral violence (without physical violence) occur in various types of regimes with different democratic standards and performance, all around the region (compare scores in Polity IV Project 2012). The common denominator of the cases are shortcomings in democratic performance that each of the events accompanied. This form usually refers to electoral irregularities that are part of broader strategies of fraudulent electoral behaviour and are strongly connected with the general standards of electoral integrity (Norris et al. 2015). It is often a symptomatic feature of autocratic or hybrid regimes that organize elections as a part of democratic deception. However, intimidation and harassment also occur in transforming societies where the existing conflicts escalate into violence as a part of political campaigning. As the data show, democracies (although non-​consolidated or partially consolidated) can also witness electoral irregularities, generally interpreted as occasional shortcomings in democratic performance.

4

44  Contexts of electoral violence The second category “electoral riot or protest” refers to public gatherings reported after the election that may or may not be accompanied by extensive violence. Thirty out of 270 electoral rounds witnessed post-​electoral gatherings that accompanied electoral results and their acceptance (11.1%). Two hundred and forty electoral rounds were protest/​riot-​free (88.9%). The list of elections includes Albania in 1991 and 1996, Belarus in the 2000s, Bulgaria in 1990, the Czech Republic in 2008, Macedonia in the 1990s and 2000s, Moldova in 1991 and 2009, Montenegro in 2008, Serbia in 1992, 1996 and 2000, and the Ukraine in 2004. Most of these cases are strongly affected by the deep political and societal problems that accompanied revolutionary changes in post-​ communist Europe. This form of contentious behaviour is usually a result of the nexus between electoral integrity and acceptance. If there is a subjective suspicion that elections did not fulfil their primary purpose, the chance for escalation of tension rises rapidly (compare Norris 2014). An exception in this group is the senatorial election in the Czech Republic in 2008. On the polling day, a protest gathering by an extremist group was organized. More than 300 extremists marched in the Czech town of Litvinov and clashed with the police. Although the march had no direct link to the elections (election to the Senate was organized only in one-​third of districts; the district of Most, in which Litvinov is located, was not among them), the magnitude of the event and the reported skirmishes were serious. The NELDA database recognizes this as a potential polling day violation of electoral integrity; however, it is questionable whether there is enough empirical evidence to categorize this incident within the overall pattern of electoral violence in the area. The third category, “governmental violence against protesters”, expands on the previous one. It maps whether any of the riots/​protests were affected by the violence initiated by the state (as a response to previous violence or as a preventive act). Ten out of 30 electoral rounds with reported riots/​protests witnessed a confrontation in which state law enforcement units struck against participants of the gatherings (33% of all riots/​protests but only 3.7% of all electoral rounds). State-​led violence was reported in Albania in 1991 and 1996, Belarus in 2000s, Serbia in 1996, the Czech Republic in 2008 and Moldova in 2009. The motivation for such reactions differs, however. In the Czech Republic, police tried to stop a group of extremists that had started to act violently, while in Moldova it was a reaction to looting and vandalism that protesters had started. On the other hand, the situations in Albania, Belarus and Serbia were affected by the autocratic tendencies of the ruling elites and the general shortcomings in the electoral process which had generated frustration among voters. The last analysed category “deadly electoral casualties” covers incidents that resulted in deaths immediately before, during or after an election and were connected with the electoral competition. According to collected data, 33 out of 270 electoral rounds witnessed some kind of violent death (12.2%), while 234 did not (86.7%) and three cases were unclear (1.1%). We are talking about unrest in Albania in the 1990s, Belarus in 2006 and 2010, Bosnia

 45

Contexts of electoral violence 45 and Herzegovina in 1996 and 2010, Croatia in the 1990s, Macedonia in 2008, Moldova in 1991 and 2009, Russia in 1991, 2003 and 2004, and Ukraine in 1998 and 1999. If we take a closer look, the majority of the cases share authoritarian tendencies, political repression and often an illiberal nature. On the other hand, electoral violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Moldova was affected by deep political struggles mixed with ethnic identification and unfinished democratic transformation. If we sum up the collected data we can identify 71 out of 270 electoral rounds affected by some kind of electoral disturbance based on soft (no physical violence) and/​or hard (physical violence) forms of violence (see Table 3.2). This means that more than one quarter of electoral rounds (26.3%) witnessed some coercive practice as a part of the electoral contest, of which 46.5% was marked by human casualties (compare global trends in Norris 2014). Even though the share of violence-​affected elections is smaller than in Africa (Straus and Taylor (2009) identified 58.4% of elections in the period 1990–​ 2008), the number is high enough to argue for its relevancy especially if we realize that almost half of the electoral rounds with reported violence ended in death(s). If we take a look at temporal distribution, we can see that the occurrence of violent incidents during elections has a slightly decreasing tendency (Figure 3.1). The trend aligns with general progress in democratic performance in the 1990s, with acceleration between 2000 and 2004 (democratic performance is measured as an average value of the Polity IV index in the region during the respective time period). The share of violence-​affected elections ranges from one-​third in the early 1990s to one-​fifth in the late 2000s. We can also observe a moderate shift from massive acts of physical violence in the 1990s to a more sophisticated mixture of psychological and physical pressure in the 2000s. The incidents include many examples of the law-​enforcement measures taken by the state, violent uprisings, state-​sponsored and rivalry-​ motivated intimidation, harassment, vandalism, verbal and physical attacks and violent marches. We can identify top-​down as well as bottom-​up incentives for the electoral violence fuelled by various combinations of conditions, ranging from authoritarian and non-​democratic practices, socio-​economic problems, institutional shortcomings, corruption, ethno-​ cultural conflicts and various forms of political rivalry. The presented overview has shown that the region of post-​communist Europe is not immune to electoral violence, nor is it irrelevant in the research of the phenomenon. In fact, in its most violent form, electoral violence in this region is no less important than in other regions in the world (e.g., Africa), although the events often differ in intensity. When we talk about post-​communist Europe we can argue that electoral violence has its place within the power structure of authoritarian regimes, during the transformation period of divided societies as part of ongoing conflicts, and also as one of the defensive measures taken by functioning democracies. This variability seems to be very important in terms of the explanatory capacities of various

46

newgenrtpdf

Table 3.2 Summary of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe Electoral harassment by the government

Electoral riot or protest

Governmental violence against protesters

Deadly electoral casualties

ALB_​1991_​L_​1; ALB_​1991_​L_​2 ALB_​1991_​L_​3; ALB_​1996_​L_​1 ALB_​1996_​L_​2; ALB_​1996_​L_​3 ALB_​2001_​L; BEL_​2000_​L_​1 BEL_​2000_​L_​2; BEL_​2001_​E BEL_​2004_​L; BEL_​2006_​E BEL_​2008_​L; BEL_​2010_​E CRO_​2000_​L; HUN_​1994_​L_​1 HUN_​1994_​L_​2; LAT_​2006_​L MLD_​2005_​L; ROM_​2004_​L ROM_​2004_​E_​1; ROM_​2004_​E_​2 RUS_​2003_​L; RUS_​2004_​E RUS_​2007_​L; RUS_​2008_​E SRB_​1992_​L; SRB_​2000_​L SRB_​2000_​E; UKR_​1999_​E_​1 UKR_​1999_​E_​2; UKR_​2002_​L UKR_​2004_​E_​1; UKR_​2004_​E_​2

ALB_​1991_​L_​1; ALB_​1991_​L_​2 ALB_​1991_​L_​3; ALB_​1996_​L_​1 ALB_​1996_​L_​2; ALB_​1996_​L_​3 BEL_​2004_​L; BEL_​2006_​E BEL_​2010_​E; BUL_​1990_​L_​1 BUL_​1990_​L_​2; CZE_​2008_​L MAC_​1994_​L; MAC_​1994_​E_​1 MAC_​1994_​E_​2; MAC_​1999_​E_​1 MAC_​1999_​E_​2; MAC_​1999_​E_​3 MAC_​2004_​E_​1; MAC_​2004_​E_​2 MLD_​1991_​E; MLD_​2009_​L MNG_​2008_​L; SRB_​1992_​L_​1 SRB_​1992_​L_​2; SRB_​1996_​L SRB_​2000_​E; UKR_​2004_​E_​1 UKR_​2004_​E_​2; UKR_​2004_​E_​3

ALB_​1991_​L_​1 ALB_​1991_​L_​2 ALB_​1991_​L_​3 ALB_​1996_​L_​1 BEL_​2004_​L BEL_​2006_​E BEL_​2010_​E CZE_​2008_​L MLD_​2009_​L SRB_​1996_​L

ALB_​1991_​L_​1; ALB_​1991_​L_​2 ALB_​1991_​L_​3; ALB_​1992_​L_​1 ALB_​1992_​L_​2; ALB_​1996_​L_​1 ALB_​1996_​L_​2; ALB_​1996_​L_​3 ALB_​1997_​L_​1; ALB_​1997_​L_​2; ALB_​1997_​L_​3; ALB_​2009_​L BLR_​2006_​E; BLR_​2010_​E BOS_​1996_​L; BOS_​1996_​E BOS_​2010_​E; BOS_​2010_​L CRO_​1992_​L; CRO_​1992_​E CRO_​1993_​L_​1; CRO_​1993_​L_​2 CRO_​1995_​L_​1; CRO_​1995_​L_​2 MAC_​2008_​L; MLD_​1991_​E MLD_​2009_​L_​1; RUS_​1993_​L RUS_​2003_​L; RUS_​2004_​L UKR_​1998_​L; UKR_​1999_​E_​1 UKR_​1999_​E_​2

Note: The first three letters refer to the state abbreviation (ALB Albania, BLR Belarus, BOS Bosnia and Herzegovina, BUL Bulgaria, CRO Croatia, CZE Czech Republic, HUN Hungary, LAT Latvia, MAC Macedonia, MLD Moldavia, MNG Montenegro, ROM Romania, RUS Russian Federation, SRB Serbia, UKR Ukraine), year, type of elections (L –​ legislative, E –​executive) and number of electoral rounds in the respective election.

 47

Contexts of electoral violence 47 72

71

64

63

21

17

(33.3%)

19

(26.6%)

(26.4%)

5

4.7

6.6

1990–1994

1995–1999

Elections organized

2000–2004 Elections with electoral violence

14 (19.7%)

7

2005–2010 Polity IV

Figure 3.1 Temporal distribution of electoral violence (1990–​2010)

theoretical approaches that tend to perceive the essence of electoral violence as a subcategory of political violence. The Western Balkans stands in this context as small universe covering most of the dynamics. Although the initial transformation phases were quite similar in the majority of countries of the region, they have changed significantly as time progressed. As I  will show in the next chapter, what seems to be relevant on the macro-​level of post-​ communist region also applies to the Western Balkans where the patterns are even clearer.

3.2  Electoral violence in post-​communism: a typology The collected data have shown great variability in terms of dynamics, motivations, actors and outcomes. In order to further progress with the analysis and to systematize the observed patterns, I  attempt to go deeper into the complexity of contentious behaviour and identify the prevailing types of electoral violence in the region. The preliminary typology of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe is formulated based on these patterns. In order to approach the analysis systematically, I utilize a Venn diagram with four sets, each representing one of the categories of electoral violence (electoral harassment by the government, electoral riot or protest, governmental violence against protesters, deadly electoral casualties; see Figure  3.2) and visualize them using the Yifan Hu proportional layout based on a force-​directed algorithm (the algorithm is based on spring-​electrical and stress models; Hu 2011) in Gephi (version 0.9), a network analysis programme. Starting with a simple set-​theoretic approach, we can see that the majority of studied electoral rounds are defined by just one “type” of electoral violence, while some of them mix two, three or even four categories (sets) (see Table 3.3).

48

Deadly electoral casualties (33)

Electoral riot or protest (30) 14 Electoral harassment by the Government (34)

3 19

23 1

2 3

0 0

4 0

Governmental violence against protesters(10) 0

3 3

0

Figure 3.2 Venn diagram of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe (1990–​2010)

Table 3.3 Intersection of various forms of electoral violence (summary) No intersection Electoral harassment by the government (19) ALB_​2001_​L; BEL_​2000_​L_​1; BEL_​2000_​L_​2; BEL_​2001_​E; BEL_​2008_​L; CRO_​2000_​L; HUN_​1994_​L_​1; HUN_​1994_​L_​2; LAT_​2006_​L; MLD_​2005_​L; ROM_​2004_​L; ROM_​2004_​E_​1; ROM_​2004_​E_​2; RUS_​2004_​E; RUS_​2007_​L; RUS_​2008_​E; SRB_​1992_​L; SRB_​2000_​L; UKR_​2002_​L Electoral riot or protest (14) BUL_​1990_​L_​1; BUL_​1990_​L_​2; MAC_​1994_​L; MAC_​1994_​E_​1; MAC_​1994_​E_​2; MAC_​1999_​E_​1; MAC_​1999_​E_​2; MAC_​1999_​E_​3; MAC_​2004_​E_​1; MAC_​2004_​E_​2; MNG_​2008_​L; SRB_​1992_​L_​1; SRB_​1992_​L_​2; UKR_​2004_​E_​3 Deadly electoral casualties (23) ALB_​1992_​L_​1; ALB_​1992_​L_​2; ALB_​1997_​L_​1; ALB_​1997_​L_​2; ALB_​1997_​L_​3; ALB_​2009_​L; BLR_​2006_​E; BLR_​2010_​E; BOS_​1996_​L; BOS_​1996_​E; BOS_​2010_​E; BOS_​2010_​L; CRO_​1992_​L; CRO_​1992_​E; CRO_​1993_​L_​1; CRO_​1993_​L_​2; CRO_​1995_​L_​1; CRO_​1995_​L_​2; MAC_​2008_​L; MLD_​2009_​L_​1; RUS_​1993_​L; RUS_​2004_​L; UKR_​1998_​L Intersection of two sets Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest (3)

Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Deadly electoral casualties (3)

Electoral riot or protest ∩ Deadly electoral casualties (1)

Electoral riot or protest ∩ Governmental violence against protesters (3)

SRB_​2000_​E UKR_​2004_​E_​1 UKR_​2004_​E_​2

RUS_​2003_​L UKR_​1999_​E_​1 UKR_​1999_​E_​2

MLD_​1991_​E

CZE_​2008_​L MLD_​2009_​L SRB_​1996_​L

 49

Contexts of electoral violence 49 Table 3.3  (cont.) Intersection of three sets Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest ∩ Deadly electoral casualties (2)

Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest ∩ Governmental violence against protesters (3)

ALB_​1996_​L_​2; ALB_​1996_​L_​3

BEL_​2004_​L; BEL_​2006_​E; BEL_​2010_​E

Intersection of four sets Electoral harassment by the government∩Electoral riot or protest∩ Governmental violence against protesters∩Deadly electoral casualties (4) ALB_​1991_​L_​1; ALB_​1991_​L_​2; ALB_​1991_​L_​3; ALB_​1996_​L_​1

The Venn diagram identifies ten empirical clusters (groups) of electoral violence as reported by the NELDA database in the region (see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3). Although empirically relevant, the analytical complexity prevents any meaningful systematization. I therefore further narrow the list and identify those patterns that are the most relevant and potentially useful for further theorizing. In order to do so, I apply network analysis focused on clustering the evidence based on divisive methods (Bailey 1994) into a visualized map of electoral violence in the region of post-​communist Europe. The cluster analysis seeks to group a sample of objects into homogenous classes on the basis of their similarity on M variables (Bailey 1994). In our case, the procedure is based on a grouping of cases of electoral violence (electoral rounds) in one of the categories as defined by the NELDA database. Both the electoral rounds and the forms of electoral violence are seen as nodes while their connections are perceived as edges. Each edge is undirected (the order in pairs does not matter) and the weight equals one (the strength of the connection is the same in all pairs). It creates a simple data matrix of unique pairs that are analysed using a force-​directed algorithm (Yifan Hu proportional) in order to identify the most dominant categories (clusters) of electoral violence in the region (see visualization in Figure 3.3) (Hu 2006; Bailey 1994). It is not a surprise that the majority of the cases are located around the single categories of electoral violence, as most of the incidents are representative of single-​dimension violence. These corners are based on the previously discussed categories “deadly electoral casualties” (A1), “electoral harassment by the government” (A2) and “electoral riot or protest” (A3). Following inductive logic, these meta-​categories stand as basic types of electoral violence in the region while their intersections are seen as empirical subsets that provide an additional layer of theoretical insight (B1, B2, B3). In this context, the initial clustering identifies a total of six types of electoral violence that might be seen as typical for the region of post-​communist Europe. The Moldavian executive election in 1991 stands apart as a deviant case that does not fit any

50

50  Contexts of electoral violence

A1

CRO_1995_L_2 ALB_1997_L_1 RUS_2004_L BLR_2010_E CRO_1993_L_1 ALB_1997_L_3 CRO_1995_L_1 ALB_1992_L_2 ALB_1997_L_2 MAC_2008_L BOS_1996_L BLR_2006_E BOS_2010_E RUS_1993_L ALB_1992_L_1 ALB_2009_L CRO_1992_L UKR_1998_L CRO_1992_E BOS_1996_E MLD_2009_L_1 Deadly electoral causalities BOS_2010_L CRO_1993_L_2

B1 RUS_2003_L

A3

UKR_1999_E_2 UKR_1999_E_1 HUN_1994_L_1 RUS_2008_E ALB_2001_L SRB_2000_L LAT_2006_L

BEL_2008_L BEL_2001_E HUN_1994_L_2 CRO_2000_L Electoral harassment by the government ROM_2004_E_1 ROM_2004_L

SRB_1992_L

RUS_2007_L

BEL_2000_L_2 BEL_2000_L_1

MLD_1991_E

B3

Governmental violence against protesters

RUS_2004_E UKR_2002_L MLD_2005_L ROM_2004_E_2

ALB_1996_L_2 ALB_1996_L_3 ALB_1991_L_3 ALB_1996_L_1 ALB_1991_L_2 ALB_1991_L_1

BEL_2006_E SRB_1996_L

BEL_2004_L

SRB_2000_E CZE_2008_L BEL_2010_E UKR_2004_E_1 Electoral riot or protest BUL_1990_L_1 MLD_2009_L UKR_2004_E_2 MAC_1994_E_1 BUL_1990_L_2 UKR_2004_E_3

B2

MAC_2004_E_1 MNG_2008_L SRB_1992_L_1 MAC_1994_L MAC_1999_E_1 SRB_1992_L_2 MAC_2004_E_2 MAC_1999_E_3 MAC_1994_E_2 MAC_1999_E_2

A2 Figure 3.3 Clusters of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe (1990–​2010)

of the identified clusters, although empirically it is close to one of the central groups of the property space (B2 or B3).2 These categories are constructed as ideal types, although they are based on empirical evidence (see summary in Table 3.4). In order to further conceptualize these clusters, I apply Höglund’s basic four-​ dimensional structure identifying actors, activities, timing and motives of the events in order to describe the character of the respective types. This framework helps us grasp the essence of electoral violence in its empirical plurality while maintaining a reasonable level of theoretical complexity

 51

newgenrtpdf

Table 3.4 Typology of electoral violence in post-​communist Europe Type

Activities

Actors

Timing

Motives

Deadly electoral casualties

personal attacks; shooting; looting; skirmishes; others marching; protesting; vandalism; harassment and threatening various forms of harassment and intimidation

non-​state actors; state actors are hidden

the whole electoral cycle

authoritarian tendencies; ethno-​ cultural clashes; others

non-​state actors

predominantly post-​ electoral period

state authorities and their agencies

the whole electoral cycle; most incidents in the pre-​electoral period

personal attacks; shooting; looting; skirmishes; various forms of harassment and intimidation marching; protesting; vandalism; harassment and threats; personal attacks; skirmishes; arrests marching; protesting; vandalism; harassment and threatening; personal attacks; skirmishes; arrests

non-​state actors; state actors

the whole electoral cycle

non-​state actors; state actors

predominantly post-​ electoral period

non-​state actors; state actors

the whole electoral cycle; predominantly post-​ electoral period

socio-​economic and political problems; disturbed electoral integrity political conflict; ethno-​cultural tension; authoritarian style of governance; political insecurity political conflict, authoritarian style of governance; ethno-​ cultural and socio-​economic conflict; general frustration; insecurity political conflict, authoritarian style of governance; socio-​ economic conflict; general frustration; electoral integrity; insecurity political conflict, authoritarian style of governance; socio-​ economic conflict; general frustration; electoral integrity; insecurity

Electoral riot or protest Electoral harassment by the government Authoritarian electoral violence

Revolutionary-​like electoral violence

Electoral war

52

52  Contexts of electoral violence (Höglund 2009). Empirical examples supporting the following conceptualization can be found in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3. The category deadly electoral casualties (A1; see Deadly electoral casualties in Table 3.3) refers to incidents that resulted in deaths immediately before, during or after an election, which were connected with the electoral competition. It includes personal attacks, shooting, looting, skirmishes and other forms of contentious behaviour that resulted in human casualties. In terms of actors, the events were predominantly affected by the contentious behaviour of non-​ state parties including political supporters, activists and regular voters. State parties and their agencies are usually not openly involved, although at least some of the incidents are tolerated or covertly supported. Regarding the timing, the incidents occur throughout the whole electoral cycle and they are not exclusively bound to any specific part. In terms of motives, a complex mixture of macro and micro structural preconditions are usually considered to be the potential drivers of the escalation of violence (such as political rivalry, ideology, socio-​economic problems, religion, ethnic division, etc.). Particularly, authoritarian tendencies with political rivalry and ethno-​cultural divisions soundly resonate here. Electoral riot or protest (A2; see Electoral riot or protest; Electoral riot or protest ∩ Governmental violence against protesters in Table  3.3) refers to post-​election public gatherings that may or may not be accompanied by extensive violence. It includes marches, riots, protest gathering as well as organized acts of vandalism, harassment and threats. Actors involved come from various backgrounds including the general public, political supporters, political parties and activists on one side, and a state authority that potentially uses repressive measures on the other. The timing is predefined by the category itself and covers the post-​electoral period. Motivation for engagement in public gatherings is usually a mix of socio-​economic and political problems accompanied by disturbed electoral integrity (e.g., an allegation of fraud, manipulation, intimidation, unfair competition, etc.). Electoral harassment by the government (A3; see Electoral harassment by the Government in Table 3.3) is a specific category of electoral violence that covers the harassment incentives of the government (incumbents). It occurs during the electoral cycle and interferes with the general outcome of the contest. It includes a wide range of offensive behaviour in the public space as well as in work and family environments (interrogations, unauthorized warrants, personal threats, pressure at work, prosecutions, etc.). Often combined with threats aimed at maximizing outcome in the election, the actions are part of electoral campaigning. The actors involved are exclusively state authorities and their agencies, who are willing to act on behalf of incumbent elites. This form of electoral violence can occur in virtually any part of the electoral cycle although a majority of the events are connected with the pre-​electoral period. Motivations are usually complex, combining political conflict, ethno-​cultural tension, an authoritarian style of governance and/​or political insecurity.

 53

Contexts of electoral violence 53 The following three clusters of electoral violence are much smaller, albeit more complex in nature. They combine more than one of the previous forms of electoral violence and define their own dynamics of contentious behaviour. We can even claim that these forms are in reality more dangerous to the stability of a political regime than the previous types as long as the consequences are more dangerous. The first of these smaller clusters, authoritarian electoral violence (B1; see Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Deadly electoral casualties in Table 3.3), can be defined as a specific category of electoral violence based on the repressive practices of central authorities against their opponents and challengers but without massive clashes, mass protest or riots (which are undesirable to central authorities). Similar to deadly electoral casualties, the category covers personal attacks, shooting, looting and skirmishes that potentially result in human casualties. The involvement of authorities is well-​known, although usually not publically admitted. They use intimidation tactics as a part of political campaigning in order to affect the form of completion or its result. The actors involved are usually either political activists, supporters and politicians, or state authorities and incumbent elites. The violence can occur any time during the electoral cycle, escalating episodically and irregularly. Motivation for these incidents comes from political conflict, an authoritarian style of governance as well as ethno-​cultural and socio-​economic conflict or general frustration and insecurity (political as well as personal). The second intersectional category of violence, revolutionary-​like electoral violence (B2; see Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest; Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest ∩ Governmental violence against protesters in Table  3.3), refers to gatherings reported during an election that are accompanied by extensive violence directed at the challenging parties and their supporters. It covers a wide array of activities, usually under the umbrella of protest gatherings demanding immediate change in political and/​or social life. Because of this revolution-​ like mode, the range of actors involved is quite broad and includes the general public, political activists and party officials, politicians and their supporters, and state authorities. Although signs of unrest are present during the whole electoral period, the main outbursts come after the closing of polling stations and the announcement of the results (the post-​electoral period). The confrontation is fuelled by disturbed electoral integrity, authoritarian tendencies and repression as well as political and socio-​economic problems. It is a classic example of regime shakedown that usually (but not necessarily) takes place continuously throughout a political transformation as a reaction to publically formulated demands. The last type of electoral violence, the electoral war (B3; see Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest ∩ Governmental violence against protesters ∩ Deadly electoral casualties; Electoral harassment by the government ∩ Electoral riot or protest ∩ Deadly electoral casualties in Table 3.3), is a borderline category of an extreme form of electoral

54

54  Contexts of electoral violence conflict that is usually connected with deep social struggles, ongoing armed conflict and extreme polarization. It combines all three major categories of electoral violence in the region while describing truly tense situations with a number of casualties, nationwide clashes and a general state of chaos. In the region of post-​communist countries, it uniquely includes the bizarre example of Albania in the 1990s, when two major political parties tried to monopolize political power. All sorts of actors were involved, including the general public, political parties and their supporters, central authorities, criminal groups and foreign agents. The whole period was strongly affected by a state of insecurity and instability, which also spilled over into the electoral arena. As a result, the incidents of violence occurred throughout the whole electoral cycle. Motivations for the conflict came from deeply rooted political hostility, economic problems and the ideological heritage of communism. It was further escalated by the authoritarian tendencies of the main political parties and their constant desire for revenge. The presented typology of electoral violence can be seen as an empirical map of the phenomenon in the region of post-​communist Europe. As was shown in the previous paragraphs, the region reveals the various dynamics in terms of reported incidents and their patterns. It occurs throughout the whole democracy–​non-​democracy spectrum, with several implications for the study of electoral violence from a comparative perspective. Especially, the evidence on electoral violence in stable authoritarian regimes of the region shows the potentially strong instrumental nature of the phenomenon for incumbent authoritarian elites. With the increasing sophistication of new forms of authoritarian rule, the methods used to influence electoral contests are likely to continue to develop. Moreover, we can expect that the identified shift from massive and extremely violent election-​related confrontation to subtler but equally effective strategies of coercion will further continue. In this context, electoral violence as a strategic complement is seen as a goal-​oriented approach, with voting and fighting as equally relevant strategies for achieving defined objectives in the political arena (cf. Mochtak and Holzer 2017).

3.3  Different contexts –​different styles With the data at hand and the initial analysis of patterns in the region of post-​ communist Europe we can now approach the conceptualization of different contexts in which electoral violence can occur. Although some of the features have already been mentioned, the following section summarizes them and creates a preliminary structure that can be used to further develop a more general comparative perspective. Democratizing and transforming societies Various theories of democratization identify different conditions that favour or directly predict the success or failure of a democracy. As a result, there is

 5

Contexts of electoral violence 55 Democracy

Democratization

Obstacles Authoritarianization Autocracy

Democracy Democratization

Figure 3.4 Struggles during the period of transformation

a complex web of mutually interconnected conditions that may or may not result in successful democratization. This uniqueness of alternative paths is an important part of ongoing debates of when, how and where to democratize (internally or externally) and what the outcomes could or should be. Indeed, any emerging democracy will likely have to face a number of challenges, particularly if they are not addressed in advance. I am referring to institutional (functioning democratic institutions) as well as functional (actual performance of the elected elites, business entities and general public) requirements associated with the democratic systems. The reason why this happens comes from the general logic of democratization processes, where the concepts of uncertainty and imbalance drive the decisions of the actors involved. In other words, when imbalance occurs and the power equilibrium is disrupted, the motivation for change is equal to the estimated possible gains and losses in the end. This simple math is perhaps too narrow, but describes the logic of the initiation phase of democratization. If uncertainty is added into this equation (in which irrational motivations may play an important role), power struggles operate not only within the boundaries of rationality, but outside of them as well. The occurrence of violence during a democratization period generally, and during elections specifically, can be seen as an upward sloping plane. If we imagine a ball (symbolizing the effort to democratize) being pushed up a slope, the angle of the plane represents obstacles in various forms (see Figure 3.4). This means that democratization faces the possibility of backlash, which could decelerate the whole transformation, and may even prevent a society from reaching the top of the sloping plane –​in other words, democracy. The tension between efforts to democratize and autocratic backlash is characterized by conflict that may or may not be resolved peacefully (e.g., transformation agreed upon through pact, revolution, coup d’état, etc; see Karl 1990). If not, parties may use force to pursue their goals and violently take control of a situation. Said in a more straightforward way, there may be too many variables involved in a transformation period, and almost all of them can affect the process positively as well as negatively. Transformation is indeed about power struggles, when the old system is deteriorating or breaking

56

56  Contexts of electoral violence down, but the new one is still not established. These uncertainties open up a whole new dimension of interaction that may cause even worse atrocities than the stable autocracy did (e.g., the situation in Egypt after the fall of Hosni Mubarak; see Schmitter and Karl 1991). This contextual factor is part of the research that tries to understand the negative impacts of the transformation period in one particular dimension –​the electoral arena. As discussed quite broadly in the previous parts of the book, this is the first cluster of electoral violence that lies at the heart of ongoing mainstream research initiatives. Let me, however, summarize the main argument, which will be further developed in the last part of the chapter and is crucial for the understanding of electoral violence in the Western Balkans region. Its relevancy stems from the pressure that electoral violence brings to unstable and often fragile societies that attempt to define the “only game in town” (Przeworski 1991:  26). Massive outbreaks of violence in Kenya (2007), Nigeria (2007) and the Ivory Coast (2010) have shown how devastating conflict that is fuelled by electoral competition –​and the stakes that are involved (e.g., natural resources, land, political power, religion, ethnicity) –​ can be (Boone and Kriger 2012; Mueller 2011; Sisk 2012; Campbell 2010). In terms of post-​communist Europe, the Western Balkans, the Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s are in this category as well. The common denominator is found in the contextual circumstances that are defined by a period of transformation from authoritarian rule to an open-​ended democratic or autocratic alternative, and/​ or that post-​ conflict arrangements are such that a consolidated democracy is perceived to be the most desired, albeit however remote, possibility (practically and/​or rhetorically) (see Whitehead 2002: 27; Svolik 2012). The conceptual framework related to this is based on the uncertainty that motivates participants to engage in alternative means of electoral competition, including the violent means that potentially (re-​)ignite longstanding societal divisions (Sisk 2008: 10). It is a period when electoral violence in its mass form is not limited to single and isolated incidents, but rather defines the state of society (Höglund 2008, 2009; Paris 2004: 1–​40). Timothy Sisk and Kristine Höglund argue that a period of democratization, with its competitive logic, may harden the already-​existing conflict lines that have been present in a society for a long time (Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008). The truth is that electoral violence is an extremely complex phenomenon that combines a number of mutually reinforcing factors, often with zero-​sum logic (Sisk 2012:  48; UNDP 2009; Porta 2013). The most distinguishable feature of the phenomenon is the high level of variability, based on a dimension of intensity that covers “soft” forms of violence such as harassment, intimidation and threats, but also extensive “hard” acts of brutality, such as physical attacks, assassinations, massive clashes between rivalling camps and state repression. This may occur in virtually all parts of the electoral cycle and problematize the transformation for years.

 57

Contexts of electoral violence 57 Consolidated democracies The second cluster refers to functioning (consolidated) democracies that utilize their ability to settle conflict situations peacefully in a deliberative way (see the competition of ideas in Schumpeter 1950). A  framework of de-​escalation operates primarily within communication channels that mitigate the potential for conflict through non-​violent procedures like courts of appeal, activities of the office of the ombudsman or other public institutions. These democratic tools are intentionally aimed at decreasing tensions and subsequently reinforce social cohesion through the institutional environment and the rule of law (Cederman et al. 2012: 5; Reilly 2008: 159). The channels themselves can be characterized by the presence of an effective setup that is internally linked to the quality of governance and the formal effectiveness of democracy (in terms of the benefits that it brings; see Dahl 1971, 1973; Schumpeter 1950). It does not mean that consolidated democracies cannot face violent outbursts (such as a demonstration accompanied by vandalism, or simple street clashes), but the logic and the intensity has its own pattern. This is due to the generally different conditions that influence the perception of violence in society (Sisk 2008: 4; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; e.g., the assassination of Pim Fortuyn before the 2002 parliamentary election in the Netherlands; the physical attack on Bohuslav Sobotka during the campaign leading up to the 2010 parliamentary election in the Czech Republic; unrest after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president in 2007 in suburbs of Paris; or recent protests as a result of the US presidential election in 2016). Based on the theoretical discussion presented in the previous chapters, we can argue that if a consolidated democracy is functioning correctly, the political and electoral arena should not generate incentives for violent means as a result of a deliberative, problem-​solving approach (see more on the breakdown of democratic regimes in Linz and Stepan 1978; Chou 2013; Norris 2014). This does not mean that violence cannot occur at all, but rather that the institutional setting possesses the ability to manage conflicting interests outside the electoral (political) arena (see Krause 2008; Misak 2002; Gastil 2008). This leads us to the second argument, which sees electoral violence in consolidated democracies as a sign of a malfunction. Conceptually, electoral violence in this context may be framed as a part of broader dissatisfaction and crisis that materialize as an instrumental strategy of political competition and/​or as individual/​collective acts of frustration and anger. Both forms result from the (objective or subjective) shortcomings that exist in a democratic system. They may be seen as part of a broader societal crisis, possibly caused by external factors (such as institutional, political and socio-​economic problems) and/​or internal democratic processes (stemming from the nature of the democracy and resulting from a weakening democracy) (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; see more about democide in Chou 2013).

58

58  Contexts of electoral violence It seems that the occurrence of violence (in reference to elections) in consolidated democracies is mostly caused by imbalances or shocks that ignite various precursors of aggression (frustration, anger, hatred, etc.), and violence may be perceived as an outcome of the inability of the system to peacefully mitigate these imbalances outside the electoral arena (e.g., the unrest after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president in 2007 in the suburbs of Paris). This motivation –​in contrast to that of democratizing societies –​is not so much about the political stakes (as in transforming societies), but rather about the message that the violence carries. Whether it is political or economic exclusion, direct or indirect discrimination, general inequality or a subjective feeling of grievance, an act of violence is usually utilized as a method to bring attention to particular problems. It combines the highly competitive electoral arena that is a centrepiece of the political context with the urgency of a particular problem that generates frustration and anger. Unlike democratizing societies, consolidated democracies do not face massive outbreaks of violence that take the form of civil war, nor typically are the number of fatalities high or widespread. However, violence does affect the organization of elections and influences the form of the campaign due to the shock value it generates (see an analysis of the effects of Pim Fortuyn’s assassination on the elections in Netherlands; van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). If violence persists  –​or even re-​escalates  –​and the democratic regime cannot handle it swiftly, it becomes questionable whether we can still even talk about consolidated democracy. In this context, electoral violence becomes an alternative means of political competition that destabilizes the basic pillars of the political system and moves the regime toward or even into a grey area of the predefined regime spectrum democracy –​non-​ democracy (see above; compare Sisk 2008: 10). The most notorious cases reported by the media lead us to the preliminary conclusions that violence occurs predominantly in the pre-​electoral period, that fatalities are low, violence is found in its “softer” version (intimidation, harassment, vandalism) and that the actors are almost entirely on the side of challengers (state institutions and officials are not usually involved; this stems from the nature of regime, and if it does occur, it is almost always a reaction to the escalation of violence) (see Rapoport and Weinberg 2001). However, there is also a group of less common, highly violent incidents that strike the society more profoundly –​in addition to the aforementioned 2002 assassination of Pim Fortuyn, this group includes incidents such as the civil unrest after the 2007 presidential election in France, the assassinations of Robert Kennedy in 1968 and Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the murder of a young demonstrator by the neo-​fascist candidate Sandro Saccucci in 1976, and so on. We can honestly claim that the study of electoral violence in consolidated democracies is strongly underdeveloped despite the fact that related research topics may possess relevant tools that could be applied in order to better understand this social phenomenon (e.g., studies of militant democracies or terrorism; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; Shapiro 2013).

 59

Contexts of electoral violence 59 Modern autocracies The last context under review is defined by authoritarian rule, which can be perceived as politically stable and economically advanced. These are modern autocratic regimes that have responded to calls from Western democrats and have adjusted their political environment to a rhetorically defensible form while preserving its authoritarian nature (see Schedler 2006, 2013; Donno 2013a; Brooker 2000; Linz 2000). These regimes are capable of reshaping the national understanding of democracy (the Russian Federation, China, Venezuela); they use advanced and well-​funded techniques to subvert legitimate online discourse (e.g., censorship on the internet in Russia, Egypt and China); they spend billions of euros in no-​strings-​attached “development” aid (e.g., China’s spending in Africa, Russian aid to central Asian autocracies); they actively undercut or cripple democracy promotion and human rights efforts (Russian Federation and foreign-​funded NGOs, similar attempts in the Ukraine); and they promote a so-​called illiberal education that is based on attitudes of hostility to democracy and suspicion of the outside world (Freedom House 2009: 3–​6). These regimes know that there is no need for absolute control over information and economic activity. Advanced methods allow them to “guide” and “manage” political discourse, rather than form it. Moreover, their elites try to co-​opt or parasitize their country’s most important business entities and control financial flows in the country through a set of various tools (formal/​informal, direct/​indirect, legal/​illegal). A modified policy of “carrot and stick” rewards the winners and punishes the losers, who become the political opposition with limited resources and legitimization, which nevertheless cannot be strengthened via major repressions or atrocities (see Stenner 2005; Svolik 2012; Ambrosio 2009; Diamond et al. 2016). These modern autocracies have incorporated the electoral game into their respective power structures, which are hegemonic in nature and provide competition that only resembles a true contest of ideas and preferences. The illusion of choice is often only a theatrical performance for the masses, supported by media coverage, political activities and financial resources that demonstrate the inequality of the campaigns. This kind of election possesses certain features of both categories presented above, and blends them in its own hybrid version (Schedler 2006, 2013; Diamond et al. 2016). Much like democracies, the non-​occurrence of electoral violence comes from the comprehensive system of governmental tools that are employed by incumbent elites to control the conflict lines in a society (Svolik 2012). Unlike in democracies, this control is exerted through the threat or use of power and not through the use of deliberative tools that resolve conflicts peacefully, with a general acceptance of the outcome. Despite the broad adjustment that authoritarian regimes have undergone in the past two decades, the core of the control apparatus is still based on the utilization of raw brutality and enforcement accompanied by innovations that use repression and informal

60

60  Contexts of electoral violence measures as tools for achieving defined goals. The dominant source of violence is linked to the state apparatus even though from time to time the contenders try to fight back against authoritarian structures (Schedler 2013). A logic of pre-​emptive deterrence follows, with an implied threat of (state-​ initiated) violence to discourage possible violent outbreaks or acts of resistance. In other words, violence is prevented by the fear of violence (e.g., see situation in Belarus in 2001 and 2006; Donno 2013a; Silitski 2006). Usually the quick and brutal suppression of suspicious activities (violent or non-​ violent) or even the threat of such a counteraction brings the system back to autocratic equilibrium (compare with the concept of strategic complements in Dunning 2011: 328). If violence continues to occur and the regime does not control it, it becomes questionable (compare with consolidated democracies above) whether the system can still be considered an autocracy, or whether it is instead experiencing a potential democratic opening (Brooker 2000: 112–​28). As with consolidated democracies, electoral violence in autocracies is understudied, without any major comparative work that identifies basic patterns of interaction. In recent years, however, some trends have been spotted that may be relevant for further evaluation and discussion that differ from the mainstream power-​model of authoritarian regimes. As one example, the 2011 parliamentary and presidential elections in the Russian Federation brought about interesting dynamics of the authorities’ behaviour in terms of the systematic use of violence. It was utilized purely as a tool, strategically deployed in order to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of the coercive acts (OSCE 2012a, 2012b). As a matter of fact, the regime did not initiate broad violent action, but rather tried to intimidate and to discourage the opposition through official channels (media, medical recommendations) as well as through structural settings (bans on rallies, procedural obstacles). On the other side of the barricade, demonstration participants called for non-​violence and provocateurs were explicitly dissuaded from violence. Authorities did not apply violent means until it was safe for the stability of the regime after the presidential election, when Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency. The day before Putin’s inauguration (6 May 2012), 20,000 people mobilized in Moscow and protested against the situation in the country. The police cracked down on the demonstration quickly, with more than 400 people arrested and 80 injured. The next day, another 120 arrests were reported in Moscow. When put in contrast to events from the end of 2011, the mode of interaction had changed completely. The regime did not tolerate further expressions of discontent and struck violently (see more profound analysis in Mochtak and Holzer 2017). The central authorities utilized both the election and violence in order to achieve their major goal and their practical objectives, i.e., they maintained control of the political realm, and they intimidated and eliminated their political rivals (Dunning 2011). According to the logic, the decision to use or withhold violence was linked to an effort to organize “smooth” presidential elections a few months later and not to

 61

Contexts of electoral violence 61 provoke thousands of people in the streets who gathered there at the end of 2011. After Vladimir Putin’s re-​election, a modified carrot-​and-​stick policy was instrumentally adjusted and activities in opposition were no longer tolerated. In other words, when the victory of United Russia/​Vladimir Putin was secured on both fronts (legislative and presidential), there was no need to pretend that acts of plurality were welcome. As long as the power structure was secured and Putin was back in office, the regime no longer had any obligation to play it safe. Violence was used as an instrumental tool with a demonstrative message towards the contestants and their supporters (Dunning 2011). This typology only rarely reflects the noisy data of real life perfectly. But it does provide a basic framework that may be further specified and utilized. Scholars should recognize the major distinction provided by this scheme and try to understand it as a simplified structure that may overlap, be magnified or modified through the course of time or region. The overarching argument is that electoral violence may occur in virtually any political environment that possesses at least a minimum amount of competition and where elections are organized on a regular basis. It extends the existing approach, which predominantly focuses on conflict-​ridden (transforming) societies and has minimal interest in other contextual frameworks. This theoretical shortcoming is at least partly overcome by assuming a position that sees electoral violence in other contexts as equally relevant. Based on the collected data, the preliminary argument put forward by Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma (2015) about the predicted risks of contentious elections in various regime-​types can, with some minor adjustments, be supported. The most electoral violence-​prone environment in post-​communist Europe is the one defined by a period of transformation when a hybridized form (partly democratic and partly autocratic) of government prevails. However, the dynamics of confrontation is not the same for autocracies and democracies, as Figure 2.1 in the previous chapter suggests. Based on evidence from the region of post-​communist Europe, the ongoing hybridization of authoritarian regimes is accompanied by a higher level of competition that integrates conflictual incentives into the electoral arena. I am not talking about the transformation period but rather about new forms of modern authoritarianism that incorporate democratic procedures without changing the inner nature of the autocratic regime (e.g., Russia and Belarus). Although the confrontation is usually less fatal than in the transformation period, it differs significantly from the dynamics typical of democracies. In other words, the rising slope on the side of autocracy is steeper than the one on the side of democracy. Moreover, democratic systems have a more efficient “buffer” in the form of institutions that prevent the escalation of electoral violence as soon as minor democratic struggles occur (Figure 3.5 portrays this). The following chapter builds on these findings and tries to understand the specific motives and dynamics that lead to the escalation of violence in the

62

Risks of contentious elections

62  Contexts of electoral violence

Autocracies

Hybrid regimes

Democracies

Level of democracy

Figure 3.5 The predicted risks of contentious elections in various regime types based on data from post-​communist Europe

electoral arenas of the Western Balkans while providing information on how the process may take place. Because of these general patterns, further inquiries in the region are not a shot in the dark, rather they are seen as a relevant addition to the field of study of electoral violence.

Notes 1 Example: during the 1994 Ukrainian legislative elections, six rounds of vote casting were held –​all six rounds appear in the dataset. 2 The independence state-​building process of the former Soviet Republic ignited conflict between the Russian-​speaking Trans-​Dniester and Gaganzia regions and the central government in Kishinev. Ethnic tension then escalated into open hostility and violent clashes that affected the form of the electoral competition.

 63

4 Patterns of electoral violence

4.1  Electoral violence in the Western Balkans Tensions and disputes that occurred in the Western Balkans at the end of the 1980s and primarily during the bloody 1990s have affected almost every part of public as well as private life in the region (Bitzenis 2009). Simply generalized, this was a direct outcome of tensions that were intentionally crushed under the communist regime in the former Yugoslavia and Albania after World War II. Especially after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the stability of Yugoslavia started to deteriorate significantly, partly as a result of nationalistic tendencies but mostly due to economic stagnation (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007; Wachtel 2008). The federation was not able to further operate according to the motto “brotherhood and unity”, and the republics’ governments started to strengthen their positions in the weakened federation. The ultimate solution was a proclamation of independence by most of the states in order to do away with the federal government in Belgrade. This was made possible by the constitution adopted in 1974 and enacted on 4 May 1980. In addition to political appeals, the leaders of the republics adopted strong nationalistic rhetoric that went against many of the ideas that were maintained by the communist regimes after World War II. This opened up a Pandora’s Box of old grievances and hatred along ethnic lines in order to mobilize public support for the eventual separation and independence (Stojarová and Emerson 2010). If we talk about the emerging conflicts in the Western Balkans, the perspective should recognize the existing complexities that accompanied the incompatibilities behind the tensions. Economic stagnation, nationalism, old grievances fuelling hatred and revenge, myths, propaganda, ideological strife, political self-​interests, religious and cultural conflicts and authoritarian tendencies affected how the situation in the region was understood and eventually handled. It fully developed during the conflicts in the 1990s when ethnically motivated violence struck the region heavily. The incentives for conflict were influenced by a wave of nationalism and mobilization that showed the sad truth about the unity of the former Yugoslav federation. Verbal attacks filled with nationalistic ideology created insurmountable barrier-​defining categories of “Us” and “Them” (the primary category was the nation, followed by ethnicity, religion and many others; see definition of “zadruga” in Diamandouros

64

64  Patterns of electoral violence and Larrabee 2000; Bianchini and Schöpflin 1998). It is important to say that not all of the citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) supported this division; however, a mobilization on non-​ethnic grounds was not successful. Croat, Serb and Bosniak/​Muslim leaders intentionally used disinformation, propaganda and lies in order to allegedly preserve “the land and the traditions of their fathers”. In this environment, the newly formed “quasi-​democracies” were built on distrust and hostility that hindered the actual democratic transformation for more than a decade (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007; Stojarová and Emerson 2010). A similar scenario of violent confrontation could be also observed in Albania where the transformation process was strongly affected by the heritage of communist rule. Moreover, Albania could not rely on even a minimal democratic tradition that might have helped to provide basic democratic standards including institutions and political capacities (Biberaj 1998; De Waal 2005). As a result, elections were continuously questioned and boycotted, which further escalated political conflict and distrust. This was deepened by the high level of privatization of the political arena, which was controlled by wealth, and its role in the process of candidate selection and chances for success. The general frustration and an atmosphere of injustice subsequently initiated social changes that caused an earthquake in the public as well as private sphere (Bogdani and Loughlin 2007: 41–​3; Kaltsounis 2010). The Western Balkan countries were, and some of them still are, perceived as special cases of transformation, represented by chronic political instability and a lack of socio-​economic modernization (Jennings 2013; Gallagher 2005). In the early 1990s, the prospects of democratization and accession to the European Union were much poorer than for the Central European countries. The reason for this scepticism came from the lack of widespread liberal values, weak and sometimes even missing elements of civil society and oligarchical tendencies with loosely accountable governments. Moreover, the elite-​centred perspectives crippled the democratic potential of ruling parties and their leadership for almost a decade. Also the fact that there was no flourishing business-​oriented middle class committed to the rule of law and political pluralism meant that democracy was not developed within a solid cultural context (Pridham 2000; Jennings 2013). When discussing electoral violence in the Western Balkans region, it is important to start with some preliminary findings that may seem trivial, but actually serve as a departure point for the main analysis in the following chapter. The region has been a crossroads of cultures, religions and ideologies for centuries, and this has significantly affected the patterns of everyday interactions. This contextual feature played (and in certain parts of the region still plays) a significant role in the transformation period, the initiation phase of which can be dated back to the 1980s, when the communist leadership in the region started to change (Wachtel 2008; Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). The form of competition and dynamics that occurred thereafter paved the path for further confrontation and hostility that ultimately

 65

Patterns of electoral violence 65 ended up in a war and atrocities (in the case of the former Yugoslav republics) and/​or political rifts (especially in the case of Albania). In such an environment, there was no way that the newly reintroduced level of competitiveness in national and federal politics could not have been affected, and politics became a showroom for incumbent elites (Orlović 2011, 2012a; Goati 2001; Hamann and Kelly 2011; Gherghina 2015). Conflict, in this context, transformed into its purely destructive form, with deeply rooted hostility and hatred (Bartos and Wehr 2002). At the beginning, elections did not play a dominant role as a driver of democratization in which democratic forces emerged and mobilized themselves. In some cases, they were postponed almost a decade (e.g., Serbia, Albania) and the process is still in progress with several problems and setbacks (e.g., see the situation in Montenegro in Mochtak 2015; Engström 2009). Elections, however, can be seen as an arena where competition (even rigged) took place regularly and eventually opened up a formal space to challenge the regime and its leaders. From this starting point, the position of elections has evolved, and since the late 1990s a continual modification of electoral contest can be observed. The opportunity to challenge the incumbent elites in the electoral arena eventually tore down the old governing structures, formally as well as institutionally, and played an important role in the transformation process all around the region (see below; Keil 2014; Petrovic 2013; Cohen and Lampe 2011). As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of electoral violence can have different dynamics that allows it to be placed on a scale of varying intensity and form. These include acts of small provocation and teasing, intimidation, the destruction of electoral flyers and posters, acts of vandalism, but also physical attacks, marches and riots, assassination attempts, bombings and kidnappings. All these acts are put into a mosaic that creates a picture of violent interaction in the region of post-​communist Europe in general and in the Western Balkans in particular and are connected to the electoral arena and electoral competition. To further develop the aforementioned discussion about electoral violence in post-​communist Europe I now move to the Western Balkans in order to show how complex electoral violence is while identifying unique evolutionary paths affecting the dynamics of contentious behaviour in the electoral arenas of the region. Together with the mainstream research initiatives, I would like to argue that ethnicity is not necessarily the main driver of violent behaviour in the Western Balkans, even if it is the most visible. On the contrary, I try to present electoral violence as a phenomenon complex in nature with different forms and dynamics affected by various drivers. I have already talked about electoral violence from the conceptual perspective, and have tried to present a theoretically fruitful debate that should help us to utilize existing approaches for future research. The following chapter is devoted to an empirical study of electoral violence that is contextually rooted in the conflict-​prone environments of the Western Balkans, where a variety of

6

66  Patterns of electoral violence incentives drive disputes in the public arena and escalate into violence, and even war. The following parts systematically present data collected on electoral violence in the Western Balkans, and then show how this data has been prepared for further processing. This is a crucial element of applying QCA logic to the study of electoral violence, where transparency and openness stand as important pillars of the research. The following sections summarize evidence on electoral violence in the Western Balkans and identify general patterns that are further discussed and tested. I cover the period from early 1990 to 2015, focusing on the level of national elections of each of the Western Balkan countries (Croatia, Serbia,1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,2 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo).3 Much like the study presented in the previous chapter, elections must be for a national executive figure, such as president, or for a national legislative body, such as parliament, legislature, constituent assembly or other directly elected representative bodies. Moreover, voters must directly elect the person or persons appearing on the ballot to the national post in question. Voting must also be direct, or “by the people”, in the sense that mass voting must take place (85 elections; compare Goati 2001: 53). This does not mean that elections at different levels of governance are irrelevant; however, the availability of data is more problematic, as well as there being a lack of standardized sources of information. Moreover, legislative as well as presidential elections are generally seen as the highest level of political competition, which is most significant in terms of stakes, gains and losses (first-​versus second-​order elections in Reif and Schmitt 1980, 1997; Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). Each country is analysed as a single case study in order to identify actual acts of violence during the elections. The operational definition of electoral violence that is applied in the region of Western Balkans is derived from the discussion presented in Chapter 2. In this context, electoral violence is understood as “a subcategory of (political) violence that is intentionally employed in order to affect the electoral process or its outcome”. Violence refers to an intentional threat or the infliction of physical force and/​or verbal or written attacks against oneself, another person, a group or community or property of any kind.4 It may result (the effect) in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage that may or may not influence the electoral competition (elections). In light of this, elections are analysed in a broader sense, which includes not only the process of voting itself, but also campaigning before the election and accepting the results after the polling day (see more on elections in Chapter 2; see Norris 2014: 33–​4). This approach integrates the existing mainstream schools of thought in the research of elections and electoral cycles. This is also the view of international monitoring missions whose strategies consist of the deployment of long-​term observers as well as off-​ election observations before the actual “competition” takes place. It is hard to give an exact threshold for the time range that should be covered under this

 67

Patterns of electoral violence 67 framework, but in terms of defining reasonable context for electoral violence, we are talking about a period of approximately 90 days before and 90 days after the given polling day. Of course it might be even longer if the situation requires it or if the design of the electoral system calls for it, but any “modification” is applied only if it is needed on a case-​by-​case basis (compare with a macro-​Duvergerian agenda in Taagepera 2007; IFES 2011; UNDP 2009). For the purposes of analysis and systematization, the incidents are processed in a simple matrix that basically combines the frameworks designed by the UNDP and the IFES in their programmes for the study of electoral violence. The matrix does not act as a strict technical tool, but rather as a way of organizing data that are too complex to completely present in the main body of the book. Due its semi-​standardized form, this is an open-​ended list that can be amended by new types of information as needed, all according to empirical evidence (see Table 4.1). The logic of this approach is simple. Each election is systematically analysed to see if electoral violence took place. According to the definition, the acts of violence are identified, analysed and systematized in the data matrix, which then summarizes the occurrence of violence in the particular country. These results help us better understand the patterns of electoral violence in a specific contextual environment where various possible explanatory conditions occur. The goal of this approach is to use the data from the Western Balkans to examine existing theoretical assumptions, and modify (if needed) unclear or misleading parts of these theories. One of the many reasons to study electoral violence in the Western Balkans is to uncover different factors (conditions) in each country that may generate violent interaction at the national level. In this perspective, the preliminary assumption is that the region is not predominantly affected by one single condition in terms of the occurrence of electoral violence, but rather by a combination of various aspects (conditions). In contrast to more “extreme” environments like those in Africa or Asia, we cannot talk about “plain” drivers such as ethnicity or regional division in all of the Western Balkan countries. These patterns are more complex. Therefore, such an environment serves as a perfect place to study similarities and differences in various settings in order to find multiple causal recipes that may be valid for a particular context. The empirical richness of the environment is supported by the sets of various contextual factors that differ throughout the region –​economic performance, political conflict, ethnic tensions, war, the presence of the international community, diasporas, land disputes, centre–​periphery cleavages and many others. All these are possible explanations for the occurrence of violence, but they significantly differ in terms of form throughout the region. The source of data on electoral violence is largely homogenous. I focus on an analysis of (election) monitoring reports prepared by the Organization for Security and Co-​operation in Europe (OSCE). It is further supported by findings of the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the European Union (EU). One exception is the period of the early 1990s, when a systematic effort

68

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.1 Systematization of various categories of election violence Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

• Presidential

• Identification • Polling station • Domestic (e.g., name, (inside or or external victims) near) state/​agent of state • Parlia­mentary • Registration • Political office (inside party or or near) candidate or affiliated actor • Election • Election commission worker office • Other election • Election office/​facility monitor

Instigators

Type of violence

Consequences Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

• Domestic or • Eyewitness external state/​ agent of state

• Murder

• Number of people killed

• Pre-​electoral period

• Electoral campaign

• Political rivalry

• Political party • Media or candidate or affiliated actor

• Attempted murder

• Number of people wounded

• Polling day

• Electoral results

• Economic rivalry

• Militia

• Private security actor

• Political party office

• Journalist/​ Media

• Mob/​civil unrest

• Media office

• Voter(s)

• Insurgent

Sources of information

• Police • Kidnapping/​ • Number • Post-​electoral • Voting report/​ attempted of people period official kidnapping kidnapped • Hospital • Physical harm/​ • Voter report/​ torture registration official disrupted • State agent/​ • Sexual assault • Interference actor with voting/​ statement voters dispersed or left area • 2nd hand • Threat of • Disrupted vote account/​ physical count rumour harm

• Electoral system • Electoral admin­istration

 69

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.1  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences Timing

• Private home

• Election ballot, material or process

• Criminal element

• Other

• Intimidation/​ psychological abuse

• Street/​public area

• Election office • Other

• Insult/​ verbal harassment

• Vote tallying centre

• Political party office

• Theft

• Auth. public campaign location • Non-​election state office /​ property • Other

• Private property/​ building • Non-​election state office /​ property • Bystander

• Vandalism/​ destruction of property • Jail/​arbitrary detention

• Damage/​ destruction of election property/​ materials • Damage/​ destruction of other property • Complaint filed with Election Commission • Cancelled election

Other

• Blackmail Other

• Postponed election • Rerun election Other

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

70

70  Patterns of electoral violence Table 4.2 Pros and cons of data from monitoring mission reports Pros

Cons

• Data about electoral violence are collected with a certain methodology that is standardized and relatively unchanged (reliability). • Indirect information is continuously checked (validity). • Monitoring programmes have been conducted for more than two decades (durability). • Coverage usually includes a relatively long period of time (a few months). • Outcomes are presented in standardized reports that may be further analysed. • Violence mentioned in the monitoring mission can be a priori labelled as “electoral” due to a confirmed link to the organization of an election that was supported by the presence of dozens or hundreds of members of the monitoring mission. • The results of the reports are usually accepted by the governments as well as by the international community. • The level of ethnocentric bias is lower due to the international composition of the team.

• Possible mistakes in methodology. • Limited sources of information. • Exclusion of certain acts of violence as not “electoral”. • Higher level of generalization. • Possible ethnocentrism. • Covered period of monitoring is not long enough. • Lacking depth. • No systematic focus on electoral violence.

to monitor elections in the Western Balkans did not exist. This gap is overcome by other sources including books, academic papers and media coverage. The standardized data collected by monitoring missions significantly increases the validity as well as reliability of the outcomes. This is because they take an approach that utilizes primary analytical outcomes whose standards and methodology have remained stable over the time; this makes data more reliable over long term (see pros and cons in Table 4.2). The main benefit that comes from the analysis of monitoring reports is based on their relative simplicity and transparency; this allows me to process a huge amount of data, over a long period of time, in a systematic way. Of course it is not possible to cover all the events that may be labelled as electoral violence; however, the level of standardization provides a solid basis for promising conclusions. Based on this simple analytical framework, data are collected and systematized. Although there is not enough space to discuss all the incidents individually, a few general remarks are important here. I start with the argument that each of the studied countries is different in terms of political transformation and general democratic progress. As collected data show, despite the common

 71

Patterns of electoral violence 71 historical roots, the actual process of transformation can vary significantly. This is relevant empirically as well as theoretically. It further supports the idea of electoral violence as a complex social phenomenon. The following paragraphs focus on a brief discussion of electoral violence in the national context of seven Western Balkan countries. Although not proper case studies, they provide a supplementary commentary to data matrixes presented at the end of the chapter that summarize the recorded incidents (Tables 4.5–​4.11). The evidence is seen in this context as a unique testimony about electoral violence in a region in which the political reality differs significantly from that of Africa or Southeast Asia. The goal of this section is not to repeat known facts and historical circumstances that are studied from multiple perspectives elsewhere. The focus is solely on the incidents of electoral violence that are the centrepieces of the research. For historical circumstances and political situations in the region see some of the more generally focused books out there (Keil 2014; Gordon 2013; Keil and Perry 2015; Ringdal and Simkus 2012). Croatia The situation in Croatia at the beginning of 1990s was strongly influenced by a chain reaction that characterized the democratization process, efforts to establish an independent state and incentives to uplift the Croat nation (Keil 2014). These motives were utilized by newly formed political elites in the electoral arena where the idea of competition was used in order to contest the existing form of government within the Yugoslav state. Separatist tendencies in combination with nationalism boosted the incentives to conflict that continuously escalated thorough the 1980s (Ceh and Harder 1996; Paris 2004). The organization of the first supposedly democratic election was persistently influenced by ethnic tensions that further escalated into open hostility and excessive acts of violence. These clashes were predominantly led by disputes between Croats and Serbs, which were not solely symptomatic of the electoral arena, but rather defined mutual relations throughout the region. Relatively complex interactions mixing numerous socio-​political dimensions were oversimplified as ethnic identification, which dominated the region for most of the 1990s. These supposedly ethnic-​based animosities have been historically founded on grievances that have existed in the region for decades. Therefore, even though a majority of those incidents occurred outside the electoral arena, we cannot ignore the fact that their influence on the election might be relevant (e.g., as a source of mobilization). The electoral campaign was often abused in order to utilize the nationalistic potential that had accumulated in the Croat society for decades. In the context of Tuđman’s Croatia, the formal position of elections cannot be viewed as a deliberative approach capable of solving emerging conflicts peacefully. Rather, it was utilized as a tool in order to achieve particular goals and legitimize politically controversial decisions at that time. The situation changed after the sudden death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999 and after the decline in support of the Croatian

72

72  Patterns of electoral violence Democratic Union (CDU) a few years later. We can identify a great difference between the violence that took place in the early and late 1990s and the subsequent abandonment of violent means of competition in recent years. All these can be added to the analytical matrix where ethnicity, political rivalry and authoritarian tendencies play an important role in explaining electoral violence (Fisher 2006; Ramet and Matić 2007; Tanner 1997). The studied period covers 14 elections (eight parliamentary and six presidential) that were held in the period of 1990 to 2015. Violent events occurred in five of them (three parliamentary and two presidential), which in terms of a quantitative summary is 35.71%. The majority of violent events occurred in the pre-​election period and were related to the electoral campaign. The form of violence varied from small-​scale verbal attacks, intimidation, blackmailing and vandalism, to group provocations and clashes, to violent incidents that resulted in death or that may be described as an assassination attempt. With the rising prominence of the new elite in the early 1990s, the political tension in the electoral arena escalated due to nationalistic rhetoric and the mobilization of the “Croat idea”. In this sense, political statements clearly identified the category “Them”, which was in direct opposition to a primordial notion of “Us” as a nation –​in this case, Croats. The first four elections were accompanied by violence that was not directly linked to the extensive conflict in the region, although this was not totally irrelevant. Put differently, the political conflict in the electoral arena was not driven by the same lines as the cleavages outside the arena, rather it was utilized for the purpose of electoral competition. In the post-​war elections, day-​to-​day political interaction and structural predispositions began to consolidate; according to Kasapović, this has had an effect on the level of political conflict during the elections (Kasapović 2001; Kasapović et al. 1998). The most serious acts of violence were linked to the presidential election in 1997, where attacks on opposition candidates revealed politically motivated conflict (political rivalry) between Tuđman’s politics of confrontation and its critics who did not agree with the form of political or societal transformation. After the death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999, the situation changed and acts of violence started to disappear from the electoral arena entirely. Serbia Throughout the twentieth century, the modern history of Serbia was nagged by the question of statehood and its interpretation in the region of the Balkan Peninsula. The mobilization effect that emerged from nationalistic appeals penetrated almost every sector of public life and affected the nature of politics to its core. The electoral arena was not an exception. Much like the situation in other Western Balkan countries, this turbulence culminated in the early 1990s, when political struggles spilled over to astonishing violence (Uvalić 2010; Popov and Gojković 2000; Dale 2011). It would be a mistake to claim that questions of statehood and nationalism

 73

Patterns of electoral violence 73 were the only leading factors driving the whole dynamic of electoral conflict, but they were definitely important ones. In this context, it is better to say that electoral competition and campaigns took place in an environment where incentives for violence were present and intense; however, a massive outbreak of violence as a consequence of electoral competition (e.g., civil war, sieges, etc.) never occurred. More demonstratively, both arenas –​represented by military operations and elections –​coexisted but never merged. The electoral dynamic started to change when Milošević’s power started to deteriorate in the late 1990s and opposition forces gained more support and prestige (Goati 2001: 45; Clark 2000). The electoral violence occurring at the beginning of the 1990s can be seen through a lens of a specific pattern of interaction. The basic impetus was led by the effort of opposition representatives to maintain their popular support and weaken the position and structures of the old elite. Due to the character of conflict in the Western Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the ongoing strife with the Kosovar elites, violent interaction inside the electoral arena can to a large extent be interpreted through the cleavage between the democratic opposition and the pro-​Milošević autocratic regime on one hand and ethno-​cultural tensions on the other (especially in the southern regions). In this context, the representatives of the opposition in the 1990s tried to use any legal form of resistance to call for early elections and to contest the entrenched position of Slobodan Milošević and his supporters. As a reaction, the ruling regime fought back with repressive policies and fraudulent strategies (Goati 2001; Orlović 2011, 2012b; Jennings 2013; Greenberg 2014). In the period of 1990 to 2015 the country organized 20 elections (ten parliamentary and ten national presidential elections).5 Fifteen out of 20 elections (75%; seven parliamentary and eight national presidential elections) witnessed electoral violence on a scale that included verbal attacks, intimidation, vandalism, property damage and physical attacks that resulted in injuries and even death. The majority of the events occurred in the pre-​election campaign period and were related to the dynamics of political contestation characteristic of election campaigns. A number of the violent incidents were initiated by the state itself as part of a power-​protective policy in order to maintain the deep-​rooted position of incumbent elites. For the purposes of further identification of interaction patterns, it is useful to divide the post-​1990 era into two distinctive periods that are evident from the collected data. The first one covers the 1990s, represented by Milošević’s dominance, when the mode of social interaction was influenced by shortcomings in the electoral process and intended violations of electoral integrity. Political resistance mobilized on violent as well as non-​violent bases, with a strategy of casting doubt on the legitimizing effect of elections. Opposition representatives played the leading role in this process and presented themselves as victims of an unfair game. The goal was to mobilize support in light of rising dissatisfaction with economic sanctions and armed conflicts in the Western Balkans. The strategy for change then manifested itself in the

74

74  Patterns of electoral violence organization of rallies and demonstrations with list of demands for a “truly” democratic transformation. This process “provoked” the authorities, who considered the activities to be public disorder and acted accordingly. The second period of violent interaction in the electoral arena can be identified as the time after the downfall of Milošević’s regime and the transfer of power to new elites, represented by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and its supporters. The situation in the country began to calm down and widespread demonstrations with violent clashes were replaced almost entirely by acts of intimidation. In contrast to the previous period, harassment became one of the primary tools of illegal election campaigning. The emerging pattern abandoned the aggressive rhetoric defined by autocratic behaviour and ethnic division, and instead focused on popular political figures or high-​level officials that took part in the electoral arena. Lately, incidents of vandalism and undisclosed attacks on political activists are becoming more common. Montenegro Throughout the twentieth century, the history and political fate of Montenegro was bound up with that of Serbia (Darmanović 1992). Its subordinate position was a primary source of conflicts, which significantly impacted the country’s politics in the 1990s and early 2000s, reflecting the struggle between two rival camps. In a move by the political elite to exploit the reconstruction of the state, the democratization process was frozen at an early stage (Grzymała-​Busse 2007: 1). The only transfer of power occurred inside the ruling party itself, with the old elite giving way to the new, without any significant role played by civil society or the newly formed democratic camp (Vuković 2010: 62). The opposition at the beginning of the 1990s was generally weak, and virtually incapable of challenging the secure position held by the League of Montenegrin Communists (LMC), later renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) (Darmanović 2003: 147). This situation remained unchanged until the beloved (and hated) DPS was riven by an internal disagreement between two party factions. One, led by Prime Minister Milo Djukanović, was anti-​Milošević. The other, led by Montenegro’s President Momir Bulatović, was pro-​Milošević (Vuković 2010). This conflict was further intensified by personal disputes among major political figures inside the party (Morrison 2009: 441–​6). Electoral violence in Montenegro can be seen as a consistent part of the national electoral cycle, where political violence enters the electoral competition in an effort to influence voters. The period under review covers 17 elections (eight presidential and nine parliamentary elections) with violent events in eight of them (47.06%; five parliamentary, three presidential elections). The vast majority of violent events occurred in the pre-​election period, mainly during the electoral campaign when the mutual rivalry ignited open hostility. All violent events, in terms of numbers and injuries, occurred after the results of the 1997 presidential election were disputed, when thousands of

 75

Patterns of electoral violence 75 people were involved in rallies and protests. Subsequently, more than half of the elections reported violence of some kind. In other words, before the dispute between Bulatović and Djukanović and the split of the main political party (DPS), no serious violent events –​according to available sources –​were reported. The situation changed when a major political cleavage materialized in the form of pro-​federation and pro-​independence camps and escalated into open hostility. With the exception of the widespread, violent events surrounding the 1997 demonstration, which was predominantly provoked by the losing camp, most acts of electoral violence reported in Montenegro typically took the form of intimidation, while attacks on individuals, groups and property were less frequent. The top-​down misconduct of some police officers who tried to influence the contest by taking advantage of their positions in order to intimidate opposition candidates is particularly interesting. Although not so massive in terms of size, the reported incidents are important mainly because of the position the central authorities took. Although official governmental representatives and the police did not support these activities openly, they did not take any serious action to prevent the incidents or punish the violators (OSCE 2001: 13). In terms of timing, violence has occurred in every stage of the electoral process, predominantly during the pre-​election period. This may be the result of the simple logic that leads the perpetrators to influence the outcome of the election in a more “secure” way. However, the most serious event occurred in the post-​election period, when the logic of a supposed zero-​sum game created a motivation for the use of excessive violence in order to reverse the election results (1997 presidential election). The motives for violence seemed to be almost exclusively driven by political rivalry that, despite the pro-​and anti-​Serbian debate, did not possess a primordial undercurrent per se. Even though ethnicity has recently begun to play a more important role for the political opposition in Montenegro, it is strongly interconnected with anti-​ establishment attitudes and the criticism of neoliberal reforms implemented by DPS. Ethnic activity instead indicates that the delayed process of nation-​ building is still in process, forming continuous connections to contemporary political conflicts. As regards the escalation of electoral violence, we can view DPS as a potential incendiary factor igniting political conflict, so long as we agree that its dominant position in one form or another has been accompanied by serious flaws in the way powers have been executed. The truth is that some acts of violence reported by the monitoring missions were committed by party supporters and even police officers closely allied with the party organization and its official representation. Bosnia and Herzegovina The ethnic tensions that animate the conflicts in the Western Balkans can be seen as a leading feature of the political struggles and they affect many of the

76

76  Patterns of electoral violence political and social interactions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Šedo 2010: 85–​7). Provocative forms of ethnic identification emerged almost immediately after the fall of the Communist Party as a reaction to the political vacuum in a public arena with limited opportunities for political pluralism based on a civic platform (Andjelic 2003: 149–​52; Chandler 2000: 29). Fragile mutual respect among the three major ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) was quickly replaced by mistrust and fears of political domination after the first disputes. The result was horrifying conflict in which the fighting parties were not in a stable coalition but rather in ad hoc mutually beneficial agreements that changed multiple times during the war. Due to the whole range of atrocities, elections were abandoned and the first formally democratic election only took place in 1990. It was not possible to reintroduce voting until the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. The era of post-​Dayton settlement was subsequently affected by a status in which an international authority was in charge of organizing the electoral competition, thus distorting the normal patterns of electoral dynamics (Chandler 2000; International Crisis Group 1996). This is crucial for the analysis of electoral violence in an environment in which interactions in the electoral arena are strongly influenced by the presence of an external authority and its custodial position in the political system. Regardless of the internal arrangement that resulted from the Dayton Accords and the de facto autonomous Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,6 this section follows the pragmatic decision of the OSCE monitoring missions and focuses on the highest (federal) level of state organization (as the unit of analysis) (OSCE 2017; Chandler 2000). This is motivated by an effort to preserve a certain level of consistency and standardization, which OSCE electoral monitoring reports provide. Moreover, the federal level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to its specific organization, echoes circumstances found in different “national contexts” in the region. When talking about electoral violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we need to recognize the challenging circumstances under which the elections were organized in the era of post-​communism and  –​more importantly  –​ post-​Dayton settlement. These challenges stem from the heavy presence of the international community in the country, which both positively and negatively affected the type of violent conflict as well as the escalation of violence (see, for example, Jung 2012). The first supposedly democratic election, held in 1990, perfectly embodied the tensions of the whole region with its escalation dynamic and progressing deterioration of political as well as social relations. For the next six years, the war-​torn society abandoned electoral practice altogether and reintroduced it only under the supervision of the international community in 1996. Until 2006, the 1990 election was virtually the only case of an independently organized election in the country. In this period, the pattern of violent incidents related to elections did not significantly differ from the tendencies observed in the rest of the region –​with one exception. Ethnicity played a dominant role in the existing political tension in the country (Kreimer 2000; Eralp 2012; Andjelic 2003; Chandler 2000).

 7

Patterns of electoral violence 77 Based on an analysis of violent events, it would however be a mistake to argue that the period of war and violence marked by widespread brutality unconditionally fuelled the electoral arena over the whole studied period. The reality is more complex. Although, the political narratives and implicit or explicit references to the war period have often intensified the electoral competition, its escalation dynamics were strongly limited by the international community’s oversight. Moreover, the electoral arena was not always perceived by the opposing parties as a relevant place to resolve existing disputes and was ignored. With recent developments in the region, the current status of elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina is nearing what can be seen as standard in the Western Balkans. The analysed period of 1990 to 2015 covers eight general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we take a look at collected evidence, only the 2010 parliamentary election was marked by a violence-​free environment and peaceful acceptance of the results. The rest of the elections (87.5%) were affected by some kind of electoral violence often connected with other forms of violation of electoral integrity. However, it is important to note that the intensity and relevance of violence did vary greatly and more or less copied the de-​escalating logic of the post-​Dayton era. In terms of timing, the majority of events occurred in the pre-​election period, during the campaign. Instigators were mostly party-​ supporters and affiliates who approached electoral violence as another form of campaigning. Two elections (1996 and 2006) were affected by widespread acts of intimidation and coercion, causing a serious blow to electoral integrity (the 1996 election was the first post-​war election; the 2006 election was the first independently conducted election in the post-​Dayton era). In terms of dynamics, interesting evidence was collected on electoral violence that took place in 2013. Several incidents were reported that were characterized by low levels of sophistication and were generally limited in size but brutal in nature. Although not relevant in terms of effects on the election, the form the violence took strongly resembled the period of political struggles in the 1990s. The Dayton settlement appeared to strengthen the standards of electoral integrity and applied pressure for non-​violent coexistence under the oversight of the international community. Although not without problems, it can be argued that the international presence affected the form of competition, the dynamics of interaction and the acceptance of results tremendously (Bose 2002; Belloni 2007). Moreover, the external actors not only provided guaranties for stability; they also provided the authority and necessary institutions for the election. The society, as a recipient of this “help”, responded peacefully and accepted the predefined status quo as a strategy for the de-​escalation of existing conflicts within the divided communities, while implementing the project of political socialization and democratization. However, this acceptance has not affected the willingness to overcome the ethno-​communal barriers that are still part of the socio-​political conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, due to persistent tensions, incidents like those in 2013 cannot be entirely ruled out in the future.

78

78  Patterns of electoral violence Kosovo The analysis of violent events during the elections in Kosovo is more problematic than other countries in the region. Even if we omit the fact that independence was proclaimed in 2008 and an international protectorate has provided de facto sovereignty since 1999, the character and development of the country within Yugoslavia in the pre-​1999 era is complicated (Smith and Latawski 2003; Ker-​Lindsay 2009). Similarly, despite its rising acceptance worldwide, the country is not recognized by all EU member states or by important players in the UN (e.g., the Russian Federation, China, India). This situation obstructs any simple decision to include Kosovo in the group of countries under review. On the other hand, the majority of the states in the world do recognize Kosovo, which should be taken into consideration and somehow reflects the existing status quo. This overview does not try to answer the question regarding the status of Kosovo, nor does it make any attempt to indicate any position that favours one of the side of the dispute (see Stahn and Zimmermann 2001; Yannis 2009). Formally, the status of Kosovo until the declaration of independence in 2008 was de jure defined by its relationship to the government in Belgrade. This dependency problematizes any analysis that tries to separate the electoral arena of Kosovo from the electoral arena of Serbia. Moreover, Kosovar authorities boycotted centrally administered elections for a long period of time; this was accompanied by a parallel system of local government with its responsibilities and commitments (Clark 2000; Stojarová and Emerson 2010). On a practical level, one can identify two electoral arenas, where the first one is boycotted but legal (federal/​national level in Serbia) while the second one is illegal but possesses relevant legitimacy (local level in Kosovo) (Ker-​Lindsay 2009:  17; Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 17; Judah 2008: 70). As I try to approach this systematically in order to not violate the logical consistency of the analytical framework, the section on Kosovo includes only the parliamentary elections in 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2014; in other words, the period of Kosovo’s legal aspirations for independence (post-​1999). The period before 1999 is covered under the scope of Serbia during the period when the southern region was still part of the country. In this context, the evidence on electoral violence in Kosovo functions as an amendment to the overview of Serbian elections presented above. This provides important missing information that has not been included in the section on Serbia due to the post-​conflict settlement in Kosovo after 1999. Collected data show that incidents of electoral violence in Kosovo are less intense in terms of fatalities than other countries in the region; however, a common pattern can be still identified. The main difference can be seen in the missing occurrences of major demonstrations related to the electoral arena and accompanied by violent contestation. This positive deviation may be explained by the longstanding unifying policy of resistance, the permanent presence of an international mission in the country, and insurgent activities

 79

Patterns of electoral violence 79 that took place somewhere other than the electoral arena (Ker-​Lindsay 2009; Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000; Judah 2008). In this context, the data matrix covers four parliamentary elections that were organized in the period of post-​1999 settlement. Two of them (2001 and 2010) faced violent incidents that surprisingly peaked in 2010, when tension escalated as a result of political rivalry. Data further identified eight clusters of electoral violence that took place over the course of the whole election cycle (in contrast to other countries in the region, where the majority of events occurred in the pre-​election period). Violence was mainly motivated by political rivalry and personal disputes between candidates, their supporters and affiliated individuals. It varied on a wide scale of intensity, with a number of incidents including intimidation, verbal attacks and vandalism, but also physical violence with serious casualties such as injuries and deaths. Ethnicity plays a role only regionally; particularly in the districts where Serbian minority has refused to accept the secessionist position of Kosovo. This kind of tension is, however, limited by the presence of the international community and, much like in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a great deal of uncertainty about what kind of dynamic the competition may have if the situation with the international oversight were different. Macedonia (FYROM) The process of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia significantly influenced Macedonia both politically and economically. During the first months of its new “democratic” era it was not clear what kind of change the country would pursue and what the outcome of this decision would be (Cowan 2000). Moreover, the whole transformation period was further complicated by the disputes over the name of the new state as well as its cultural and historical heritage with Greece (Rossos 2008). As a result, public opinion and a common position were mobilized around national unity and mistrust towards everything not autochthonous. A gradual abandoning of the idea of Yugoslav unity on a federal level was accompanied by the constitutional changes that facilitated Macedonian independence; this simultaneously deepened the gap between the majority population and the Albanian minority (Phillips 2004). This environment was further influenced by the uncertainty that came from the ongoing conflict in other parts of the collapsing federation, as well as growing international isolation. However, in contrast to other parts of the country (federally), Macedonia was surprisingly headed towards a democratic transformation with modern institutions and a functional political system almost completely free of upheaval. The same can be said about the organization of elections, where violent contestation was not a relevant aspect of competition in the early 1990s (Daskalovski 1999). As the data show, electoral violence emerged predominantly in the second part of the studied period (mostly 2000s). The development

80

80  Patterns of electoral violence characterizing the change in the interaction patterns can be linked to the general transformation of relations in the Western Balkans and the shifts that occurred as a result of conflicts in the neighbouring countries (Phillips 2004; Koktsidis 2012). The generally peaceful 1990s were replaced by the turbulent 2000s. Based on the collected data, we can assert that patterns of reported violence follow a two-​level scheme of conflict interaction where the first cleavage is based on political rivalry and the form of political mobilization; the second operates on ethnic divisions defined by primordial notions of nation/​community. These cleavages are, however, not totally indicative of ethnicity. These disputes exist in ethnically homogenous as well as heterogeneous communities, which are segmented and subsequently represented by their own political parties with different ideological backgrounds (Hollander 2009). Thirteen elections (eight parliamentary, five presidential) were organized in the period of 1990 to 2015. Eleven of them were affected by electoral violence (84.6%; seven parliamentary, four presidential) with only the 1990 parliamentary and 1994 presidential elections reported as being free of violence. The collected incidents can be characterized by similar dynamics as found in other parts of the region. The source of violence was mainly political rivalry, which has recently been increasingly accompanied by ethnic contestation between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority. The scale of violence has spanned verbal attacks, intimidation and harassment, property damage, kidnapping, physical attacks that resulted in injuries or deaths, blockades and general unrest. Only the first two formally democratic elections did not see any violent outbursts whatsoever. The rest of the investigated elections have had gradually increasing violent tendencies with important peaks in 2002 and 2008. The majority of these events occurred in the pre-​election period and were linked to the organization of election campaigns as a part of broader political competition. Victims and organizers predominantly line up according to political camps and/​or ethnically based groups. The most interesting finding in the case of Macedonia is the fact that the majority of incidents qualifying as electoral violence occurred in a period when the rest of the Western Balkans was becoming calmer. On the other hand, when the conflicts in the region escalated (the 1990s), Macedonia had a relatively stable government, without the vicious cycle of early elections and imbalance. The turning point can be seen at the beginning of the twenty-​first century, when ethnic rivalry and mutual allegations of fraud increased societal tensions, which led to the escalation of violence and its reoccurrence. Albania Similar to other countries, the transformation process in Albania was defined by turbulence and a series of dynamic events. The country was the last in the region to organize its first supposedly democratic election and generally unprepared institutions signalized a complicated and even painful period of

 81

Patterns of electoral violence 81 transition. Albania’s previously addressed lack of at least minimal democratic heritage (similar to other countries in the region) caused significant problems in implementing the basic democratic standards and in establishing stable democratic institutions (Biberaj 1998; De Waal 2005). It is no surprise that this environment was susceptible to incentives that rewarded violence and that the violence also transferred to the electoral arena (Bogdani and Loughlin 2007; Kaltsounis 2010). Occurrence of violence during the election cycle in Albania can be seen as a very “natural” phenomenon that reflects the character of Albanian society, its cleavages and its predisposition for violence. The most important conflict line is based on ideological elements (dichotomy left-​right) that divide the society into two camps –​supporters of the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) and supporters of the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA) (Hollander 2009; Kaltsounis 2010; Vickers 1999). This cleavage, however, is by no means the sole element that defines the disputes present in Albanian society since the fall of the communist regime. The sources of violent behaviour can be identified in the criminal activities of local gangs, ongoing conflict in the Western Balkans, the high number of accessible guns, and alleged activities of the financially strong Albanian diaspora abroad. In particular, the “gun culture” has affected the way regular people have transformed their thinking from opportunistic decision-​making to systematic planning based on coercion. These standards entered an electoral arena in which social cleavages are combined with an authoritarian style of governance and weak institutions, in addition to a violence-​prone culture. In the period 1990–​2015, Albania organized eight elections (all of them parliamentary). Seven of them –​87.5% (with the exception of the one held in 1992) –​were accompanied by violence of various intensity that included intimidation, verbal attacks, vandalism, property damage and physical attacks that resulted in injury or death. The incidents occurred in all phases of the election cycles; however, the pre-​election period was particularly violent in terms of fatalities and intensity. It subsequently affected the perception of electoral integrity and the acceptance of outcomes. What is interesting here is the number of reported incidents that belong to the group of extremely violent deaths, looting, high-​scale intimidation and flagrant abuse of law-​enforcement (with the peak turbulent period around 1996–​1997), which is often symptomatic of the massive electoral violence reported in Africa. In terms of patterns, we can clearly identify at least two distinctive types of violent incidents in Albania. The first is based on broadly defined social and financial scarcity, fuelled by general frustration, economic deprivation and problems that force people to utilize otherwise unacceptable solutions (e.g., looting). Public narratives are then used in the emerging crisis as a mobilization tool against the putative source of problems  –​the political/​societal/​ cultural opponents. This top-​down logic is merged with bottom-​up processes that are embodied in an everyday life experience affected by violence, hunger, uncertainty and frustration. In other words, voters/​citizens actively enter

82

82  Patterns of electoral violence the political contest and use violence as an expression of political will. The second group of incidents come from the type of political environment in which the ruling elites try to erase the lines between the governmental party and the state. In the case of Albania, the main parties apply this strategy in a zero-​sum logic that affects the competition that defines it. For example, involvement of police officers may be seen as a clear authoritarian tendency in order to monopolize the power legitimized by an election. This incentive to maintain power is seen almost exclusively at the highest organization levels. It significantly affects the election results as well as the general perception of the fairness and the openness of the competition.

4.2  Patterns of violent interactions The brief overview presented above has shown that electoral violence has played an important role in the Western Balkans’ electoral arenas for decades. The collected data have identified conflict behaviour associated with political, cultural, religious and societal disputes that reoccur continuously with rising intergroup tensions. Although the dissolution of Yugoslavia, nationalistic sentiments and the introduction of democratic procedures into an environment with minimal democratic experience have played an important role in the escalation of conflicts in the region, the data suggest that the phenomenon of electoral violence is more complex (Bowen 1996; Oberschall 2000). Even if there is a dominant conflict between an undemocratic leader and pro-​ democratic opposition (Croatia, Serbia), a dispute about statehood (Montenegro), political conflict between competing political parties (Albania) or ethnic tension (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia), the causes of violence are complex and vary significantly. These incentives may indeed change in terms of the form or dynamics and this results in a predominantly negative model of confrontation that influences the overall democratic performance and political environment in the counties of the region (see Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008). Having investigated the Western Balkans in the early 1990s and tracked the changes to the present day, significant improvements in terms of the ability to handle democratic responsibilities in accordance with international standards have been identified. The path to consolidated democracy, however, has not been smooth –​indeed, it has been rather turbulent, with many obstacles and problems that are still relevant today (Cohen and Lampe 2011; Keil 2014). The period of change has been accompanied by a series of conflicts escalating into violence that can be attributed to a wide range of motivations, actors, places, outcomes, intensity, forms and many other criteria. The data further show that there is no “single causal path” explaining electoral violence and no “universal model” that can be applied. This can be concluded even for the relatively small region of the Western Balkans, where commonalities often outweigh existing differences.

 83

Patterns of electoral violence 83

7 6

6

5

5 4

Cluster A

4

1

3

3

3 2

Cluster C

5

2 1

2 2

2

2 1 1 1

3 3 3

3

1 1

1

1 0

0

0

0

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 97 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 20 14 20 15

Number of elections affected by EV

Cluster B

Year

Figure 4.1  Number of elections affected by violence (1990–2015)

As Figure  4.1 shows, the occurrence of electoral violence follows the periods of “greater” instability that accompanied major political and social changes in the region. It confirms the general assumption that a period of transformation is likely to be affected by shocks and unrest, with patterns of violent confrontation (compare Norris et al. 2015). There are at least two major clusters of electoral violence that are connected with political/​societal change in the region and are consistent with the existing theories (Cluster A and Cluster B). Moreover, data indicate one more cluster (Cluster C) signalling existing tensions. This may refer to the more complex socio-​political problems the countries have to deal with. Cluster A refers to the initial phase of transformation at the beginning of the 1990s when Yugoslavia started to fall apart. Cluster B covers the second attempt at transformation that is associated with the death of Tuđman, the downfall of Milošević, the change of geopolitical orientation in Montenegro and civil unrest in Albania. While the first “peak” can be labelled as “nationalistic and ethnic”, the second is more about “political rivalry” and “political conflict”. Although, there is a third peak around 2012–​2014, the intensity of electoral violence does not match the previous two clusters and cannot be seen as equally relevant. However, it may signal rising tensions and existing conflicts that may further escalate into more serious forms of violence in the future. The data have shown how “routine” the occurrence of violence in the electoral arenas is and what the presumed drivers (conditions) of violent behaviour might be in particular cases (see collected data at the end of the chapter). In the context of further analysis, it is important to recognize these patterns

84

84  Patterns of electoral violence Table 4.3 Electoral violence in the Western Balkans (simple summary of analysed elections) State

Elections

Parliamentary Presidential

All Violence All Violence All Croatia Serbia Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosovo Macedonia (FYROM) Albania SUMMARY

Violence-​affected elections

Violence Parliamentary Presidential

14 20 17 8

5 15 8 7

8 10 9 8

3 7 5 7

6 10 8 0

2 8 3 0

37.5% 70% 55.6% 87.5%

33.3% 80% 37.5% –​

5 13

2 11

5 8

2 7

0 5

0 4

40% 87.5%

–​ 80%

8 85

7 55

8 56

7 38

0 29

0 17

87.5% 67.9%

–​ 58.6%

Note: Zeroes in presidential elections indicate that direct elections are not held.

and study them in order to present more generalized statements as a part of the theoretical framework. The dataset covers a total of 85 elections in the period between 1990 and 2015 (56 parliamentary and 29 presidential) in seven Balkan countries  –​Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. On the basis of the collected data, 55 elections were accompanied by electoral violence (64.7%), of which 38 of the elections were parliamentary (44.7% of all elections) and 17 were national presidential (20%) (see Table 4.1; Appendix). In the studied period, 67.9% of parliamentary elections held in the region were accompanied by violence compared to 58.6% of presidential elections. Although presidential elections have a slightly better score in this comparison, it does not mean the violence differs in motivations, actors, forms and strategies. The difference might be explained by the fact that the president is not directly elected in all the studied countries. Based on collected data I argue that presidential and parliamentary elections in the Western Balkans are potentially affected by the same precursors (conditions) and the dynamics of violence is closely linked with the overall conflict situation inside the electoral arena and the country  –​if conflict exists and both types of elections matter (the stakes are high), the chances for electoral violence are equally high. This can also be supported by existing correlations between the share of violence-​affected parliamentary and presidential elections in the studied countries (compare Table 4.3; Reif and Schmitt 1997; Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). Although seemingly deviant, Montenegro supports the claim accordingly. The position of the president is significantly weaker than the position of the prime minister or the government. In this context, the core of political conflict shifts away from the presidential elections as long as the parliamentary

 85

Patterns of electoral violence 85 arena dominates the politics. Because Montenegro has a parliamentary form of government with a strong position of the DPS in the party system and a strong prime minister, presidential elections may seem less important in terms of the decision-​making capacities, so there are fewer tensions during these elections (Svolik 2012; Vuković 2010, 2015; West 1995). Although potential conflict exists, the presidency appears not to be salient enough to engage in violence because the stakes are not high enough. This model is supported by the tensions during the 1997 presidential election when conflict inside the DPS spilled over to the electoral campaign and the election itself. Suddenly the electoral contest was not only about the presidential office but also about the leadership of the party and de facto control over the country. In this context, the 1997 presidential election temporarily gained importance in terms of decision-​making capacities that subsequently affected the political interaction and confrontation.7 The collected data have identified various patterns of electoral violence in the region that significantly differ country by country and seemingly do not correspond to the progress in other positive developments (e.g., in quality of democracy, economic performance, rule of law; see Freedom House 2016; World Bank 2016). An expected path would be the one identified in Croatia. After the death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999 and the modifications in political strategies, the previously conflict-​prone environment changed dramatically and, since the 2000 presidential election, electoral violence has completely disappeared. In other words, after the elimination of authoritarian practices and general progress in political and economic performance, despite some problems, electoral violence has not occurred in the country. The pattern is, however, different in other Balkan countries, each with its own logic and motivations. Macedonia, for example, is the complete opposite. Electoral violence here breaks out exactly when the rest of the Balkans starts to calm down and their political arenas are becoming democratic (see aggregated data on electoral violence below). This finding points to the fact that violence in the electoral arena may intensify despite the general progress in socio-​economic and democratic performance over the last two decades (Freedom House 2016; Hayden 2013). This mixed evidence can also be found in other countries of the region, such as Serbia or Montenegro; however, the dynamic is not as dramatic as in the Macedonian case. In order to further investigate the parliamentary and presidential elections in terms of the occurrence of electoral violence, categories of electoral violence are outlined. As the collected data show, the majority of events occurred in the public space, where the typical victims were voters or similar actors and political rivalry was the cause. Systematic police and military involvement is less frequent, but if it occurs it predominantly consists of intimidation and harassment; in other words, the “soft forms” of violence (see data on Macedonia, Serbia or Montenegro). This does not mean hard forms of violence did not occur at all, but rather that, with progressing democratization,

86

86  Patterns of electoral violence the actions of the authorities become more sophisticated. The overall pattern of electoral violence identifies different organizational structures that may cover a small group dynamic, continue with a local or regional cluster, and end with party coordination at the highest level or even the involvement of state authorities. There is a residual category of sporadic incidents caused by individuals without a clear connection to elections, which are difficult to distinguish from criminal behaviour, and so the category remains blurred and should be treated with caution. Two broad categories of electoral violence:  soft and hard (see discussion on electoral violence in Chapter 2) dominate in different parts of the period under analysis. The soft form does not consist of any physical violence and is based on psychological methods of coercion that are applied in order to achieve a certain outcome –​for example, intimidation, threats, verbal attacks and harassment, as well as structural violence. A majority of the investigated countries, with the exception of Macedonia, experienced a decrease in violence since 2000 and a modification of violent patterns based on psychological forms of coercion that might be seen as a sign of a de-​ escalation or a sophistication of available methods of coercion. The second category, the hard form, on the other hand, refers to a more coercive type of pressure that uses physical force in order to influence the election, either in terms of its results or in its organization. This includes physical attacks, kidnapping, assassinations, damage to property, arrests, riots, uprisings and household searches without warrant. This kind of violence refers to the direct confrontation that was present mainly during the 1990s. As the data show, this structure applies equally to both presidential as well as parliamentary elections. The analysis identified 154 clusters (incidents) of electoral violence of which 87 (56.5%) are defined as the hard form of violence and 61 (39.6%) as the soft form. Six clusters are unclear (3.9%). Data from the Western Balkans show that hard-​form incidents are usually also accompanied by soft-​form attacks that tend to be a part of an escalation spiral or conflict dynamics that are usually accompanied by other forms of electoral fraud. In order to transform the clusters of electoral violence into a single category describing a specific election, an approach is required that sees an election affected by soft-​ form violence only if no hard forms of violence are reported. On the other hand, an election is labelled as affected by hard-​form violence when actual hard forms of violence are reported irrespective of whether soft-​form violence also takes place. In these terms, 41 elections were affected by hard and 14 by soft forms of violence (see Table 4.4). Looking at the timeframe in terms of the changes that have occurred in the past 25 years, another pattern that is relevant for the occurrence of electoral violence in the region emerges. Four out of seven investigated countries had a clear turning point that defined two periods in their modern history that differed in the scale of intensity of violence and/​or its profile. In Serbia, this was the fall of Milošević (2000); in Croatia, this was the death of Tuđman (1999);

 87

Patterns of electoral violence 87 Table 4.4 Elections affected by hard and soft forms of violence Hard form

Soft form

CRO_​PaE_​1990; CRO_​PaE_​1995; CRO_​PrE_​1997; SRB_​PaE_​1990; SRB_​PrE_​1990; SRB_​PaE_​1992; SRB_​PrE_​1992; SRB_​PaE_​1993; SRB_​PaE_​1997; SRB_​PrE_​1997a; SRB_​PrE_​1997b; SRB_​PaE_​2000; SRB_​PaE_​2012; SRB_​PrE_​2012; SRB_​PaE_​2014; MNE_​PrE_​1997; MNE_​PaE_​1998; MNE_​PaE_​2001; MNE_​PaE_​2002; MNE_​PaE_​2012; BiH_​PaE_​1990; BiH_​PaE_​1996; BiH_​PaE_​1998; BiH_​PaE_​2013; KSV_​PaE_​2001; KSV_​PaE_​2010; MAC_​PaE_​1994; MAC_​PaE_​1998; MAC_​PrE_​1999; MAC_​PaE_​2002; MAC_​PrE_​2004; MAC_​PaE_​2006; MAC_​PaE_​2008; MAC_​PaE_​2011; MAC_​PaE_​2014; MAC_​PrE_​2014; ALB_​PaE_​1991; ALB_​PaE_​1997; ALB_​PaE_​2005; ALB_​PaE_​2009; ALB_​PaE_​2013

CRO_​PaE_​2000; CRO_​PrE_​2000; SRB_​PrE_​2002a; SRB_​PrE_​2002b; SRB_​PrE_​2004; SRB_​PaE_​2008; MNE_​PaE_​2006; MNE_​PrE_​2013; BiH_​PaE_​2000; BiH_​PaE_​2002; BiH_​PaE_​2006; MAC_​PrE_​2009; ALB_​PaE_​1996; ALB_​PaE_​2001

Note: Each label consists of country code (ALB –​Albania, BiH –​Bosnia and Herzegovina, CRO –​Croatia, KSV –​Kosovo, MAC –​Macedonia [FYROM], MNE –​Montenegro, SRB –​Serbia), type of elections (PaE –​ parliamentary election, PrE –​presidential election), year, a/​b –​more than one election.

in Montenegro, disputes surrounding the 1997 presidential election; and in Macedonia, the radicalization of the Albanian minority (early 2000s). A different model was identified in Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where national specifics obscured similar dynamic patterns (Bosnia and Herzegovina because of the heavy presence of international community; Albania because of its prevailing political conflict and unique position of violence in the society; and Kosovo because of the unevenly distributed sovereignty and ad hoc political conflicts; see more in previous sections).

4.3  Varieties of violence The analysis of electoral violence in the Western Balkans revealed an interesting dynamic. It can be argued that electoral violence in the region includes incidents that greatly vary in intensity and significance. The collected data include events that may be called soft forms of electoral violence (such as intimidation, harassment, verbal attacks) and also events that may be termed hard forms of electoral violence (such as vandalism, physical attacks, violent marches, law-​enforcement measures by the state, violent uprisings). According to the existing framework, all these incidents

8

88  Patterns of electoral violence are referred to as electoral violence that is understood through its link to the electoral arena rather than through other factors (e.g., motivations, intensity, organization, etc.). It is argued that such an approach does not help form a comprehensive understanding of the incidents, which is critical in developing effective measures of prevention. In more practical terms, the nature, organization and implementation of violent means by individuals may significantly differ from those by an organized group or by the state, which conversely also affects the form of violence and also its intensity. In this context, it is therefore important to regard electoral violence as a concept that refers to certain activities in the public sphere but which cannot grasp all the respective nuances of real-​life situations. I try to develop this approach and present a more nuanced and complex framework of electoral violence that is able to reflect the organizational as well as dynamic dimensions of electoral violence. This approach is not entirely new in the study of electoral violence; however, it also has never been fully developed into an applicable tool. Several authors have already addressed the problem of subcategories of electoral violence, but their conceptualization for further analysis is insufficient or limiting (Manor 1992; Lawrence 1998; Chaturvedi 2005; Akhatara 2001). I start my theorization with reference to the previously discussed framework by Wasserman and Jaggard who developed a basic theoretical structure for electoral violence based on the combination of duration and scale of response to electoral violence (see more in Chapter 2; Wasserman and Jaggard 2007). One shortcoming of this approach can be described as an “intensity bias” coming from an overemphasis on the intensity dimension; this is in fact a result of a combination of different categories. In their approach, “intensity” refers to the degree of possible damage that may be caused by acts of violence. This is understandable considering that Wasserman and Jaggard based their concept of electoral violence in Victorian England, where the violent acts were mostly collective and defined more by physical force than so-​called “soft forms of violence” (Wasserman and Jaggard 2007). In order to analyse the current data based in the Western Balkans, which are more complex in terms of dynamics, an alternative model is required that would cover a wider range of violent incidents that may actually occur in the electoral arena. To do that, a modified analytical framework based on the research of Charles Tilly, who worked with the concepts of contentious politics and violent behaviour, is applied (Tilly 2003; McAdam et al. 2001). Tilly classified occurrences of collective violence on a two-​dimensional scale, which could explain the majority of violent interactions in real life. This includes individual attacks by one person on another as well as extensive violence with lethal impacts on the society (Tilly 2003). The first dimension is the salience of short-​term damage. Here, interactions between the parties are examined in terms of the extent that inflicted or received damage dominates interactions. At the low extreme, damage

 89

Patterns of electoral violence 89 occurs only intermittently or secondarily in the course of transactions that remain predominantly non-​violent. The second dimension represents the extent of coordination among violent actors. The definition of collective violence employed in this text takes a minimal position: at least two perpetrators of damage and some coordination among perpetrators. Below that threshold, the violent event is referred to as individual violence. Salience and coordination identify coherent variations in relevant combinations of outcomes and causal mechanisms. They also locate clusters of collective violence with similar causes. The most important feature of this approach is the ability to explain the variation of dynamics according to scale, duration, level of destruction, asymmetry and proximity to governmental institutions, rival camps and/​or their associates (Tilly 2003; Bonneuil and Auriat 2000). Combining three components –​data from the Western Balkans, Wasserman and Jaggard’s classification, and Tilly’s conceptualization of collective violence –​results in a deeper analytical framework that is, according to my knowledge, currently not fully developed in the field and can be applied in different contexts. It enables us to identify categories of electoral incidents, electoral disturbances and electoral struggles that differ on the scale of salience and coordination (Figure 4.2).

1 Electoral violence

Intensity

Electoral struggles

Coordination

Electoral disturbances

Electoral incidents

0

0

Salience

1

Figure 4.2 Property space of electoral violence Note:  Categories of salience and coordination are defined on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for no coordination at all and minimum salience, whereas 1 stands for maximum organization (e.g., paramilitary group) and maximum salience (e.g., assassination attempt).

90

90  Patterns of electoral violence Electoral violence is a meta-​concept that defines the property space of a particular field. Three subcategories that differ in their level of salience and coordination are identified as generic subtypes that mutually interact and may evolve into each other. These subcategories are not ideal types but rather a reflection of real-​life situations with the ability to change quickly according to situation dynamics and/​or on the basis of decisions made by leaders. I  am talking about electoral struggles, electoral disturbances and electoral incidents: •

•

•

Electoral struggle is defined as an outbreak of collective violence including implicit or explicit use of extensive force of great intensity in relation to the organization of an election. Usually it is accompanied by intimidation and coercion, which together may result in physical damage of persons or property, or fear. Electoral struggle differs from other categories of electoral violence in its durability and intensity. In terms of salience and coordination, it occupies the upper-​right corner of the property space (Figure 4.2; Albania in the 1990s, Macedonia in the 2000s, Serbia in 2000, Montenegro in 1997). Electoral disturbance is classified as a less serious violent incident than a struggle. It involves episodic outbursts of violence rather than sustained disorder. A  disturbance generates a degree of public alarm and elicits some measure of official response. It may be accompanied by acts of intimidation and coercion that, however, do not take the form of systematic effort. In terms of the salience/​coordination nexus, it occupies the middle part of the property space (Figure 4.2; see Croatia in the 1990s, Serbia in the 1990s, post-​Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina). Electoral incident is defined as a noisy, demonstrative or coercive action by individuals or a group of people that interferes with or disrupts an election. An incident is relatively short-​lived event that involves violence and triggers a limited official response. In terms of salience and coordination, it occupies the lower-​left corner of the property space (Figure 4.2; see Montenegro in the 2000s, Serbia in the 2000s).

This structure broadens the existing analytical framework and identifies an alternative approach to the study of the dynamics of electoral violence in the world. Although based on data from the Western Balkans, the idea about changing dynamics can be adjusted to almost any cultural context with different prerequisites and conditions. It may help us to better map the empirical space and, more importantly, to define a structure that further develops the overwhelmingly general concept of electoral violence. In other words, this is an analytical attempt to locate the outcomes of different forms of electoral violence in a damage/​collectiveness nexus framework that characterizes the most visible patterns of violent interaction in the electoral arenas.

 91

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.5 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Croatia (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 1990

Election meeting of CDU

Public area (Benkovac)

Party-​affiliated Mob/​civil Media actor(s) unrest; non-​ and/​or organized voter(s) group (?)

Verbal attacks; Threat of physical attack

Disrupted election meeting

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; Ethnicity

PaE 1990

Election meeting of CDU and march through Benkovac

Public area (Benkovac)

Party-​affiliated Political party; Media actor(s) Party-​ and/​or affiliated voter(s); actor(s) and/​ Candidate or voter(s)

Verbal attacks; Physical attack

Assassination attempt

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; Ethnicity

PaE 1990

Reaction to the election results

As a reaction to the post-​electoral euphoria and indirect proclamations about Croatian sovereignty, the local Serbian minority provoked violent contestation with varying intensity (e.g., street fights, attacks on Croatians, etc.)

PaE 1990

Violence Public area between (Football football fans stadium, Zagreb)

Football fans

Football fans

PaE 1995

Law N/​A enforcement unites’ attack on opposition

Candidates; Party-​ affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Law Monitoring enforcement mission unites; Party-​ affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

Media

Verbal attacks; Physical attacks

1 death; other (attacks on property; wounded; etc.)

Physical attack N/​A

Motivations (proximate)

Post-​election period

Election results

Political rivalry; Ethnicity

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political violence motivated by state (or threat)

92

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.5  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

PrE 1997

Attack on opposition candidate

Public area (Pula)

Candidate (Gotovac)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s); army(?)

PrE 1997

Attack on opposition candidate

Public area (N/​A)

Private property (Tomac)

N/​A

Timing

Related to

Physical attack Disrupted election meeting; physical harm

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Vandalism; property damage; blackmail

Intimidation; property damage

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (or other)

PrE 1997

Attack on Public area personnel of (N/​A) monitoring mission

Electoral monitoring mission

Law Monitoring enforcement mission unites

Threat of physical attack; prison(?)

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political violence motivated by state(or threat)

PaE 2000

Intimidation

N/​A

Voter(s)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

N/​A

PrE 2000

Intimidation

N/​A

Voter(s)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Type of violence

Consequences

Note: PaE –​parliamentary election, PrE –​presidential election, N/​A –​not available, (?) possible but not supported by direct evidence.

Motivations (proximate)

 93

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.6 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Serbia (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

PaE; PrE 1990

The first demonstration of opposition (19. 5. 1990)

Public area (Belgrade)

Political party; Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

State; law enforcement unites (Police)

Media

Threat of physical attack; Physical attack

Wounded (unknown number)

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; partially demonstrators

PaE; PrE 1992

Peaceful Public area demonstrations (mostly Belgrade)

Political party; Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

N/​A

Media

N/​A

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

N/​A

PaE; PrE 1992

Electoral campaign in Kosovo

Public area (Kosovo; Pristina)

Voter(s); civil society

Political party (SRP); private security actor (Arkan)

Media

Threat of Intimidation physical attack; verbal attacks; limited acts of physical violence

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Combination: Political rivalry; Ethnicity; Politically motivated conflict

PaE 1993

Demonstration (1. 6. 1993)

Public area (Belgrade)

Political party; Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

State; Law enforcement unites (police commandos)

Media

Physical attack 1 death; 28 wounded; Arrest of Dražkovič

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; partially demonstrators

PaE 1993

Nadežda Bulatović incident

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Law enforcement unites (Police)

Media

Physical attack Nadežda Bulatović

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state

94

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.6  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

PaE; PrE 1997

Intimidation (electoral observers of the OSCE mission)

Public area; Electoral Polling station monitoring (Peć) mission

Members of the local electoral commission; Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Threat of Complaint Polling physical filed with day attack; Verbal Electoral attacks; Commission; Limited Intimidation violent incidents

PaE 1997

Worsening of the security situation in Kosovo

After the talks on the new government led by SPS (1998), the wave of mostly peaceful demonstrations located in the area of Kosovo and Metohija was organized. The core appeal was aimed at the independence of the province. These events were accompanied by increasingly violent confrontation between Albanian minority (KLA) and the police backed by maverick paramilitary forces affiliated to Vojislav Šešelj’s SRS and to Arkan. It created an atmosphere of crisis which allowed Milošević to initiate ferocious counteroffensive against KLA. These clashes caused hundreds of wounded and numerous deaths.

PaE 2000

The reaction of the regime on forming the opposition –​ demonstration

Public area (Belgrade)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s); Voter(s); Political party

PaE; PrE(f) 2000

Post-​electoral tension –​ federal presidential election

Public area (Belgrade)

Party-​affiliated Civil disorder; Law Monitoring actor(s) and/​or enforcement mission voter(s); Voter(s); unites (Police) private and public property

State; law enforcement unites(Police)

Monitoring mission

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Voting/​ Individual violence Monitoring of the members of election of electoral commission

Homicides; Physical attacks; Prison

Several people wounded or dead; Tens of demon­ strators arrested

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Vandalism; Attacks on property; Physical attacks

Property damage; Several wounded; 2 deaths

Post-​election Election period results

Violence initiated by the state

Violence initiated by voter(s)

 95

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.6 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

PaE 2000

Violent attacks in the southern regions of Serbia

Public area

Law enforcement unites (Police)

Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (LAPMB)

Monitoring mission

PrE 2002

Posters War

Public area (mostly Belgrade)

Candidates for president

Political party; Party- ​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s);

PrE 2004

Intimidation during the campaign

PaE 2008

Intimidation during the campaign

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Physical attacks N/​A

Pre-​election period

Represen­ tation; Identity

On-​going conflict; ethnicity

Monitoring mission

Intimi­dation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s); Political voter(s); Political parties parties

Intimi­dation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area

Officials

Organization –​ Family of Serbian fans

Intimi­dation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE/​PrE 2012

Attack of Public area SNP supporters (Zemun) in Zemun

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s) of SRP

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) of SNP

Physical attack One arrested; minor injuries

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE/​PrE 2012

Clashes of activists in Tutin

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s) (BDC; PDA)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s) (BDC; PDA)

Physical N/​A attacks; Intimi­dation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area (Tutin)

Monitoring mission

Monitoring mission

Conse­quences

96

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.6  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Conse­quences

Timing

Related to

PaE/​PrE 2012

Intimidation all around the country

Public area; Private businesses

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) of political parties

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2014

Attacks on activists

Inđija, Jelašnica, Activists Priboj, Prijepolje, Stara Pazova, Vranjska Banja and Zaječar

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack No Pre-​electoral Electoral complaints period campaign were lodged

Political rivalry

PaE 2014

Arson and attacks Kruševac, on party Požarevac, premises Topola and Užice

Property; party officials

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Arson

No Pre-​electoral Electoral complaints period campaign were lodged

Political rivalry

PaE 2014

Intimidation of voters and public sector employees

Voters; public sector N/​A employees

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

No complaints Pre-​election were lodged period

Political rivalry

N/​A

Minorities (mainly Roma); employees

Note: PaE – parliamentary election, PrE – presidential elections, PrE(f) – presidential election on federal level; N/A – not available.

Electoral campaign

Motivations (proximate)

 97

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.7 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Montenegro (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Organizer

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PrE 1997

Non-​recognition of election results

Public area (countryside, Podgorica)

Public offices and/​or property; Police

Political party; Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Threat of attack

Physical harm (45 demon­ strators)

Post-​election period

Election results

Political rivalry; Violence initiated by voter(s)

PaE 1998

Illegal action Private property; Party-​affiliated Law enforcement by police squad Public area actor(s); political unit (Police) (e.g. Budva) parties (SPP; SPPM)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation

House Pre-​election inspections; period Physical and psychological intimidation

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Illegal action Public area; by police squad

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s); Voter(s) of LAM

Law enforcement unit (Police)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation

Physical and Pre-​election psychological period intimidation; harassment

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Tear gas at SPP rally

Public area (Nikšić)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s); Voter(s) of SPP

Supporter(s); Voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

Physical harm (respiration problems)

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Skirmish in Podgorica

Public area (Podgorica)

Voter(s) and supporter(s) of YL

Supporter(s); Voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

Intimidation; Pre-​election minor injuries period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Bomb rumour at Public area DPS Coalition (Podgorica) rally

Party-​affiliated Supporter(s); actor(s) and/​or Voter(s) voter(s); Voter(s) of DPS Coalition

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidation; minor injuries

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Pre-​election period

Motivations (proximate)

98

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.7  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Organizer

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

PaE 2001

Abuse of power (harassment)

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Law enforcement unit (individuals in police)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation

Physical and Pre-​election psychological period intimidation

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (Violence possibly initiated by the state)

PaE 2001

Abuse of Public area power (use of force against protesters)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Law enforcement unit (police individuals)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

Physical injury

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (Violence possibly initiated by the state)

PaE 2001

Abuse of power

Party-​affiliated Law enforcement actor(s) and/​or unit (police voter(s); Political individuals) party headquarters

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation; Vandalism

Physical and Pre-​election psychological period intimidation; property damage; 1 person treated

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (Violence possibly initiated by the state)

PaE 2001

Individual Polling station incident at (Nikšić) polling station

Ballot box

Supporter(s); Voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Vandalism

Intimidation

Electoral campaign

N/​A

PaE 2002

Intimidation

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s);

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Intimidation; limited violent incidents

Intimidation; Polling day Boycott of the election

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 2006

Small-​scale incidents; Intimidation

Polling station; Public area

Voter(s); electoral official

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidation; influenced voting

Voting

Political rivalry

Public area (Bijelo Polje)

Timing

Polling day

Polling day

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

 9

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.7 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Organizer

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

PaE 2012

Attack on journalists in Pljevlja

Public space

Journalists

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

Intimidation; Physical harm (?)

Pre-​electoral period

Electoral campaign

N/​A

PaE 2012

Intimidation of employees

Private property (Genex factory)

Voters (employees)

Supporters of List Monitoring 11 (employers) mission

Intimidation

Dismissed from work

Pre-​electoral period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2012

Acts of vandalism (SPP; NOVO)

Private property (Podgorica; Danilovgrad)

Buildings of SPP and NOVO

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Vandalism

Intimidation; Damage to property

Pre-​electoral period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (ethnicity?)

PrE 2013

Provocations at Public space demon­stration (Podgorica)

Supporters

Supporters

Media

Provocation

N/​A

Post-​electoral period

Election results N/​A

Note: PaE – parliamentary election, PrE – presidential elections, N/A – not available, (?) possible but not supported by direct evidence.

10

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.8 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 1990

Attack on Mayor’s car

Public area (Sarajevo)

Mayor of Sarajevo; private property

Civil society Secondary Threat of (civil source physical disobedi­ence) (literature) attack; Vandalism

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Representation Combination (pol. rivalry; frustration; Ethnicity)

PaE 1990

Dispute Public area about the recall of (Region Foča) factory director

Pre-​election period

Representation Combination (pol. rivalry; frustration; Ethnicity)

PaE 1990

Intimidation

The whole atmosphere of the election was affected by threats and intimidation based on ethnic divisions.

PaE 1996

Attack on political activists

Public area (Republika Srpska)

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s) (SDP)

Physical attacks; Intimidation; Threat of Disruption of physical attack; electoral meetings Verbal attacks

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1996

Intimidation in the working envir­onment

Factories (Republika Srpska)

Party-​affiliated Employers Monitoring actor(s) and/​ (mostly mission or voter(s) supporters of SDP)

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1996

Disruption of Public area electoral meetings (Republika Srpska)

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s) (SDP)

Physical attacks; Intimidation; Threat of Disruption of physical electoral meetings attack; Verbal attacks

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1996

Small-​scale fighting Polling stations in front of polling stations

Voter(s)

Verbal attacks; Small scale violent incidents

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry; Frustration

Voter(s) (ethnic Voter(s) basis) (ethnic basis)

Voter(s)

Sources of information

Type of violence

Secondary Physical Wounded; Property source attacks, damage; (literature) Vandalism; Intimidation Intimidation

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Disruption of electoral process

Motivations (proximate)

 10

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.8 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

PaE 1996

Disruption of electoral process

Polling station (Kozluk)

N/​A

N/​A

Monitoring mission

N/​A

Disruption of electoral process

Polling day

Voting

N/​A

PaE 1996

Disruption of electoral process

Polling station (military base)

N/​A

N/​A

Monitoring mission

N/​A

Cancelled election

Polling day

Voting

N/​A

PaE 1996

Damage of ballots of opposition parties

Polling station Campaign (Velika Kladuša, materials Mrkonjić Grad and Kotor Varoš)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) (SDP)

N/​A

Damage of ballots; deterioration; Disruption of electoral process (voting)

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Attack on members Public area of OSCE mission (Tuzla)

Members of election monitoring mission

Voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Vandalism

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Frustration

PaE 1998

Attack on a member Political of DPU party head­quarters

Party-​affiliated Candidates actor(s) of PDA and/​or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Vandalism

Damage of property (offices of DNZ)

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Intimidation of candidates

N/​A

Candidates of CHDS

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidated candidates

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Disruption of a public event

Public area

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s) (CDU)

N/​A

Disruption of public event

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Leaders of CDU

102

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.8  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

PaE 2000

Intimidation

Public area

PaE 2002

Hate speech

PaE 2002

PaE 2006

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s) (SDP)

Intimidation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s); Candidates

Verbal attacks

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Vandalism of campaign materials

Public area

Campaign materials (posters)

Vandalism

Damage of campaign Pre-​election materials period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Small-​scale incidents

A few public speeches calling for violent mobilization were held during the electoral campaign. Some incidents of vandalism were reported as well (destroying posters, etc.). Acts of intimidation and the vandalism of religious buildings also occurred. None of these incidents initiated violent outbursts in terms of physical confrontation, and their relevance was linked to local contexts. Monitoring reports do not provide any concrete information about the motivation or victims/​ instigators. We can only assume a common electoral campaign pattern which occurs in the pre-​election period and exhibits some sort of political rivalry.

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s)

 103

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.8  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

PaE 2014

Beating of SDS activist

Public area (Banja Luka)

PaE 2014

Verbal attacks

PaE 2014

PaE 2014

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence Consequences

Timing

Related to

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​or mission or voter(s) voter(s)

Physical attack

Injury

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Polling station (Mokronoge)

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​or mission or voter(s) voter(s)

Verbal attack/​ dispute

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Attack with axe

Public space (campaign stand of SDS in Trebinje)

Property; Candidate Party-​ of SP affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

Physical attack/​ Damage of vandalism the property; intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Physical and verbal attacks on journalists

N/​A

Journalists

Physical/​verbal attacks

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; authoritarian tendencies

Monitoring mission

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s)

Note: PaE – parliamentary election, PrE – presidential elections, N/A – not available.

Injuries; intimidation

Motivations (proximate)

104

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.9 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Kosovo (1999–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 2001

Attack on an old woman

Registration office (in front of it; Gjilan)

Voter

Individuals/​ Voter(s); Supporters of political party (?)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation

Physical harm

Pre-​election period

Voting; Identity

Violence initiated by voter(s); Ethnicity

PaE 2001

Attack in the town of Skenderaj1

N/​A

Journalist

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; homicide

2 deaths; 1 seriously Pre-​election wounded period

N/​A

N/​A

PaE 2001

Attack on supporter of ADK

Public area

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Physical attack; Intimidation

Physical and Pre-​election psychological period intimidation; property damage (flyers)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2010

Intimidation and harassment of voters and observers

Several polling stations

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ actor(s); or voter(s); Political Observers activists

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Physical and psychological intimidation; self-​censorship

Polling day

Voting

N/​A

PaE 2010

Attack on KFOR unit

Zubin Potok

Members of KFOR

Media

Physical attack

Property damage; Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

N/​A

N/​A

 Neither the monitoring mission nor the relevant departments were able to clearly confirm possible links to the election.

1

Motivations (proximate)

 105

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.9 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location ( place)

Victims

PaE 2010

Blockade of polling station in Banska

Polling station in Banska

PaE 2010

Assassination of the leader of Kosovo’s Bosniak community

PaE 2010

Murder in Banje, Malisheve

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Party-​affiliated Serbian actor(s) and/​ minority in or voter(s) Banska

Media

Intimidation

Intimidation; Interruption of voting process

Polling day

Voting

Ethnicity; Political rivalry

Pristina

Leader of Kosovo’s Bosniak community and his companion

Media

Physical attack

1 dead; 1 injured

Pre-​election period

N/​A

Ethnicity (?)

Banje, Malisheve

Affiliated actor Supporters of (DPK) and Vetevendosje his family movement members

Media

Physical attack

1dead; 2 injured

Post-​election Electoral period campaign; personal disputes

N/​A

Note: PaE –​parliamentary election, PrE –​presidential elections, N/​A –​not available, (?) possible but not supported by direct evidence.

Motivations (proximate)

Political rivalry; personal disputes

106

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Macedonia (FYROM) (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

PaE 1994

Intimidation and violence (1st round)

Public area

PaE 1994

Attack on observers of IMRO-​ DPMNU

PaE 1994

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Voter(s); N/​A Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Threat of physical attack; Verbal attacks; Small incident of phys. Violence

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Polling station (Struga)

Electoral observers

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Threat of physical attack; Verbal attacks; Small incident of phys. violence

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

Intimidation of voters

Public area (Bitol)

Voter(s)

Supporters (TM)

Monitoring mission

Threat of physical attack; Verbal attacks

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; Ethnicity

PaE 1994

Intimidation of voters

Public area (Gavgelija)

Voter(s);

Supporters (DUM)

Monitoring mission

Threat of physical attack; Verbal attacks

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Attack of SDUM activist in District 8

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s); Candidates (IMRO-​ DPMNU)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) of SDUM

Physical attack

N/​A

Pre-​election period (2nd round)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Attacks by activists

Public area (Kočani)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s); Police

Physical attack

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1998

Disruption of electoral process

Polling stations (Gorno Količani; Morane)

Voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) (mostly SDUM)

Intimidation

Intimidation of voters

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

 107

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 (cont.) Elections

Event

PaE 1998

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Intimidation Public area Voter(s) and Physical (Šuto Orizari) attacks of candidates

Candidates

Monitoring mission

Intimidation; Physical attacks

Intimidation; Pre-​election Forced removal period; of voter’s ID Polling day

PaE 1998

Intimidation Public area and Physical attacks of local elites

Local elites; Entrepreneurs

Monitoring mission

Threat of Intimidation of physical voters attack; verbal attacks; Small incidents of physical violence

PrE 1999

Damage of Political party Political party political offices property party offices (Studeničani) (offices)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

PrE 1999

Faked car accident

Candidate

N/​A

Monitoring mission

PrE 1999

Workplace Factories and intimidation firms

Voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) mission (managers and owners)

PrE 1999

Violent clashes Public area between supporters

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) voter(s)

Public area (Delčevo)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s); Voter(s)

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Voting

Political rivalry

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Property damage

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

An attempt to prepare fake car accident to eliminate one of the candidates

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Intimidation

Intimidated voters Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Physical attacks; Wounded; 1person Polling day Verbal attacks hospitalized

108

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

PrE 1999

Intimidation of voters

During the whole election period, several cases of intimidation were reported. The threats were aimed at political activists as well as regular voters. Motivation came from political conflict and rivalry.

PaE 2002

Attack on police officers

Public area

Police officers

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

3 deaths

Pre-​election period

N/​A

Combination: insurgency and voter conflict

PaE 2002

Attack on police officers

Public area

Police officers

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

N/​A

Pre-​election period

N/​A

Combination: insurgency and voter conflict

PaE 2002

Kidnapping civilians

Public area (highway Tetovo –​ Gostivar)

Civilians; Voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) (ethnic Albanians)

Kidnapping

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Representation Insurgency; of fraction Political in society rivalry

PaE 2002

Bomb Headquarters attacks on of political headquarters parties of political (Skopje) parties

Headquarters of political parties (DUI; NDP)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

Property damage; Pre-​election Intimidation period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2002

Attack on car of Ljupco Palevski

Private property (car)

N/​A (Ministry of Monitoring Interior?) mission

Vandalism; Property damage

Property damage; Pre-​election Intimidation period

Electoral campaign

State-​ motivated conflict

Public area

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

 109

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

PaE 2002

Attack of former members of police squads

Public area (Prilep)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and voter(s) of SDUM

PaE 2002

Attack on one N/​A (Prilep) of the leaders of SDUM

SDUM Candidate

PaE 2002

Attacks on the offices of political parties

PrE 2004

Bomb attack Political party of SDUM’s headquarter office (Tetovo)

Property of political party (SDUM’s office)

N/​A

PrE 2004

Intimidation Public area of electoral observers

Domestics observers

PrE 2004

Attack on Polling station electoral commission

Members of electoral commission; ballot box

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Former members Monitoring of police mission squads

Intimidation; Physical attacks

Intimidation; disruption of meeting

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Former police officers

Physical attacks

Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Monitoring mission

During the electoral campaign various acts of vandalism were committed which affected the general conditions of organizing elections (e.g., intimidation).

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

Property damage; Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s)

Intimidation; Physical attacks

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

Candidates; Monitoring Party-​affiliated mission actor(s) and/​or voter(s) of DPA

Physical attack; Theft

Disruption of voting; Intimidation; Damage to ballots

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

10

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

PaE 2006

Attacks on offices of political parties

Offices of Headquarters of N/​A political political parties parties (Tearce, Saraj, Lipkovo, Studeničani, Tetovo and Struga)

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

PaE 2006

Shooting in Saraj

Public area (Saraj)

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) (DUI voter(s) (DUI and DPA) and DPA)

PaE 2006

Clashes in Public area town Rašče (Rašče)

PaE 2006

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Property damage; Pre-​election Intimidation period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Physical attack (shooting)

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) (DUI voter(s) (DUI and DPA) and DPA)

Physical attack (shooting)

2 wounded

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Physical Public area attacks in (Skopje) the centre of Skopje

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) or voter(s) (IMRO-​ (IMRO-​ DPMNU and DPMNU and SDUM) SDUM)

Monitoring mission

Physical attacks

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2006

Attacks on voters of DPA

Public area (Kičevo, Oslomej and Zajas)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) of DPA

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attacks; Intimidation Intimidation

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2006

Intimidation of voters

N/​A

Kidnapping; Members of DUI

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Kidnappings

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

N/​A

Timing

 1

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

PaE 2008

Attacks on private property

Private property

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

2 attacks on N/​A property of DUI members

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

Property damage; Pre-​election Intimidation period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2008

Attack on Office of Property of N/​A DPA’s office political party political party

Monitoring mission

Vandalism; Property damage

Property damage; Pre-​election Intimidation period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2008

Shooting

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) of DPA

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attacks

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2008

Disruptions Public area during the polling day

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attacks; 1 death; several Verbal people attacks wounded

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 2008

Disruptions Public area during the (Aračinovo) polling day

Police

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s); Criminal actors

Monitoring mission

Physical attacks; 1 person seriously Polling day Verbal wounded; attacks several minor injuries

Voting

Violence initiated by voter(s)

PaE 2008

Stolen ballot box

Polling station (Gorna Banjica)

Ballot box

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Theft

Disruption of voting process

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 2008

Stolen ballot box and voting materials

Polling station Ballot box (Gostivar, Saraj, Čučer-​ Sandevo)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Theft

Disruption of voting process

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

12

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

PaE 2008

Intimidation Polling station of electoral observers

PaE 2008

Intimidation

Intimidation and acts of physical violence were perceived more than sensitively which subsequently affected the general atmosphere of the campaign and polling day.

PrE 2009

Intimidation

Electoral campaign was again affected by the number of acts of intimidation but in comparison to previous years, the intensity level was much lower.

PaE 2011

Inter-​ethnic Šuto Orizari tension in Roma community

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) of political parties (UPRM; PTER)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) of political parties (UPRM; PTER)

Physical violence; Skirmish; Intimi­dation Intimidation

PaE 2011

Intimidation organized by IMRO-​ DPMNU

Voters

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ mission or supporter(s) of IMRO-​ DPMNU

PaE 2014

Voter Countrywide intimidation

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s); voter(s); state authorities

N/​A

Instigators

Electoral N/​A observers of OSCE mission

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Monitoring mission

Threat of physical Intimidation attack

Timing

Related to

Polling day

Voting

Motivations (proximate) N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Intimi­dation

Intimidation (loss Pre-​election of job; pension, period etc.)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; Violence initiated by the ruling party

Intimi­dation

Intimidation (loss Pre-​election of job; pension; period physical threats, etc.)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; ethnicity

 13

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.10 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place) Victims

PaE 2014

Vandalism; attacks on campaign offices

PaE 2014

Harassment of teacher

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Prilep, Campaign offices Party-​affiliated Monitoring Negotino, actor(s) and/​or mission Makedonska voter(s); state Kamenica, authorities Gjorče Petrov; Čair, Skopje, Butel

Vandalism; intimidation

Property damage

Polling day

Electoral campaign; voting

Political rivalry; ethnicity

School (Gostivar)

Monitoring mission

Harassment

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PrE 2014

Voter Countrywide intimidation

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s); voter(s); state authorities

Intimidation

Intimidation (loss Pre-​election of job; pension; period physical threats, etc.)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; ethnicity

PrE 2014

Vandalism; attacks on campaign offices

Vandalism; intimidation

Property damage

Electoral campaign; voting

Political rivalry; ethnicity

Teacher and candidate of the NDR

Instigators

Supervisor and supporter of DUI

Sources of information

Prilep, Negotino, Campaign offices Party-​affiliated Monitoring Makedonska actor(s) and/​or mission Kamenica, voter(s); state Gjorče Petrov; authorities Čair, Skopje, Butel

Note: PaE – parliamentary election, PrE – presidential elections, N/A – not available; (?) possible but not supported by direct evidence.

Polling day

14

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.11 Occurrence of violence during the elections in Albania (1990–​2015) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 1991

Intimidation Pogradec district

Public area (Pogradec)

Party-​affiliated Party-​ actor(s) affiliated and/​or actor(s) voter(s) of and/​or political voter(s) parties PLA;

PaE 1991

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Boycotting election

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; Political rivalry

Intimidation in Public area rural areas

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) actor(s) mission and/​or and/​or voter(s) of voter(s) opposition PLA; parties

Intimidation

Intimidation of voters

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Violence initiated by the state; Political rivalry

PaE 1991

Shooting

Public area

Voter(s)

Supporters of PLA

Threat of N/​A physical attack; Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 1991

Attacks on farmers

Public area (Shkoder)

Voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) mission and/​or voter(s) of DPA

Physical attack Physical and Post-​election Psychological period injuries; Property damage

Election results

Political rivalry

PaE 1991

Shooting in Shkoder

Public area; Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring Political party actor(s) actor(s) mission headquarter and/​or and/​or (Shkoder) voter(s) of voter(s) DPA PLA; Police

Physical attack; 4 deaths; several Post-​election murder people period wounded

Election results

Political rivalry; Violence initiated by the state

Monitoring mission

Motivations (proximate)

 15

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.11 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

PaE 1996

Meetings of opposition parties

Public area

PaE 1996

Activities of armed groups

PaE 1997

Instigators

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

Party-​affiliated Police; SHIK; Monitoring actor(s) and/​or Party-​affiliated mission voter(s) (mostly actor(s) and/​or SPA) voter(s) DPA

Intimidation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry; Violence initiated by the state

Public area

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) (mostly voter(s) DPA SPA)

Intimidation

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

Assassination attempt on the president

Public area

President (Berisha) N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 1997

Attacks during the polling day

Public area

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

At least 4 Polling deaths and day several wounded

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 1997

Intimidation and terror

The Democratic party of Albania proclaimed the election as flawed and affected by intimidation and terror. Many supporters of President Berisha left the country.

PaE 2001

Vandalism

Public area

Campaign materials (posters and flyers)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s) of SPA

Vandalism

PaE 2001

Intimidation

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​or mission voter(s)

Threat of N/​A physical attack; Intimidation

N/​A

Sources of information

Damage of campaign materials

Motivations (proximate)

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

16

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.11  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence

Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 2001

Intimidation

Public area

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​ or voter(s) of opposition

Police

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry (state?)

PaE 2001

Intimidation

Public area (Tirana; Durres)

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

N/​A

Pre-​election period (2nd round)

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2005

Shooting

Public area (Tirana)

Electoral official

N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

1 death

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2005

Shooting

Public area; Office of political party (Tirana)

Supporter of DPA N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

1 death

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

PaE 2005

Intervention of Public private security area group

Party-​affiliated actor(s) and/​or voter(s)

Monitoring mission

Intimidation

Intimidation

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

PaE 2005

Physical attack

Voter(s); journalist N/​A

Monitoring mission

Physical attack

Minor injuries

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area (zone 90)

Private security group (actor)

Motivations (proximate)

 17

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.11 (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

PaE 2005

Raid in a household

Private property

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) of or voter(s) of DPA SPA

PaE 2005

Vandalism

Offices of Offices of political political parties (Fier, parties Korce, Lac, Shkoder, Tirana)

PaE 2005

Intimidation in The whole electoral campaign was affected by intimidation, blackmail, vandalism, and small-​scale incidents of physical violence. the workplace

PaE 2009

Small-​scale incidents

Public area N/​A (regions Korče and Lezhe; cities Tirana and Diber)

PaE 2009

Verbal attacks

Public area

PaE 2009

Disputes about Public area flyers (Tirana)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) mission and/​or voter(s)

N/​A

Candidates; Candidates; Party-​ Party-​ affiliated affiliated actor(s) and/​ actor(s) or voter(s) and/​or voter(s)

Type of violence Consequences

Timing

Related to

Motivations (proximate)

Physical attack; Minor injuries; Pre-​election Vandalism Vandalism period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Vandalism

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Vandalism; Property damage

Pre-​election period

Monitoring mission

N/​A

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Monitoring mission

Verbal attacks

N/​A

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) and/​ actor(s) and/​ mission or voter(s) or voter(s) (DPA; SPA); (DPA; SPA) Campaign materials

Verbal attacks; Small injuries; Physical Vandalism attacks

18

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.11  (cont.) Elections

Event

Location (place)

Victims

Instigators

Sources of information

Type of violence Consequences

Timing

Related to

PaE 2009

Death of supporter

Public area (Qerret)

Supporter of DPA

Supporter of SPA

Monitoring mission

Physical attack 1 death

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

PaE 2009

Intimidation

The campaign was affected by number of small incidents of intimidation, blackmail, vandalism and small-​scale incidents of physical violence.

PaE 2013

Shooting

Public space (Shtiqen)

PaE 2013

Detonation of bomb

PaE 2013

Beating of candidates

PaE 2013

Violent clash Polling station in front of (Lac) polling station

PaE 2013

Vandalism

Party-​affiliated Local actor(s) and/​ commission or voter(s) chairperson (nominated by DP)

Motivations (proximate) Political rivalry

Monitoring mission

Physical attack/​ N/​A shooting

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Residence of Candidate of DP candidate DP (Vlore)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) mission and/​or voter(s)

Physical attack/​ N/​A property damage

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Public area (?) (Fiere; Berat)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s) mission and/​or voter(s)

Physical attacks Injuries

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Physical attacks 1 death; injuries

Polling day

Voting

Political rivalry

Vandalism

Pre-​election period

Electoral campaign

Political rivalry

Candidate of NDS; Candidate of SP

Party-​affiliated Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s); actor(s); mission candidates candidates

Campaign Campaign offices (Vlore, offices Tirana)

Party-​affiliated Monitoring actor(s); mission candidates

Property damage

Note: PaE –​parliamentary election, PrE –​presidential elections, N/​A –​not available, (?) possible but not supported by direct evidence.

 19

Patterns of electoral violence 119

Notes 1 Remarks on Serbia were published as part of my paper in the journal Democracy and Security in autumn 2016 (Mochtak 2016b). 2 Remarks on Montenegro were published in a paper in the journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies in spring 2015 (Mochtak 2015). 3 “The Western Balkans” is generally perceived as a political construct that covers the states of the Balkan Peninsula that share certain socio-​political features and face similar challenges and problems (Pond 2006; Taylor et al. 2013). 4 Due to the level of complexity and problems with data availability, our operational definition excludes structural violence and focuses on physical and psychological violence only. Even though structural violence might be present as well as relevant, its detection and analysis is too challenging for this research design. 5 Electoral violence during the 2000 federal presidential election is not included in the overview because of the scope of the framework. However, due to its importance, the incidents are formally reported in the respective matrix and the case is further discussed later. 6 The first dimension is represented by the division of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second dimension distinguishes federal settlement between Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CIA 2017). 7 Similar dynamics can also be observed during the presidential election of 2013, although with different context and intensity (for more detail, see Mochtak 2015).

120

5 Recipes for electoral violence in the Western Balkans

So far, I have discussed the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from the Western Balkans separately. The following chapter overcomes this formal division and merges the theoretical assumptions with real-​life data collected in the Western Balkans. In order to do so, I  apply qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research method that is capable of grasping the complexity of the phenomena, systematizing data and selecting possible causal links, which are then interpreted as potential recipes for the occurrence of electoral violence in the region. Insofar as qualitative comparative analysis can still be perceived as a novel approach in the social sciences (at least in the mainstream of political science and definitely in the field of study of the Western Balkans), the plan is to also present a brief justification of the applied analytical procedures, which differ from the more commonly known statistical methods. After the brief introduction to QCA, which serves scientific as well as didactic purposes, I approach once again the discussion of potential conditions as drivers of electoral violence and select those that might be relevant (from a theoretical point of view) for the Western Balkans. The list of conditions is then combined with empirical evidence and further narrowed through an MDSO-​MSDO analysis, another set-​theory method that helps to identify empirically relevant conditions in a specific contextual setting. I then prepare and test five models, which are designed to identify potential causal explanations for the occurrence of electoral violence that may tell different stories about the escalation of violence during elections in the region. After the selection of possible causal paths, the terms are interpreted and evaluated in order to answer the aforementioned research question (What are the drivers of electoral violence in the region of the Western Balkans?) and to formulate theoretical arguments about the occurrence of electoral violence in general. It is important to stress that the results are not interpreted as true causal statements, but rather as empirically supported patterns that can be, to a certain extent, generalized. In light of this, electoral violence is presented as a phenomenon that is complex in nature, yet possible to understand, at least to a limited degree.

 12

Recipes for electoral violence 121

5.1  QCA: the method Methodological proficiency is a cornerstone of scientific inquiry, presupposing logical and empirical consistency. Before I  start to talk about QCA as an approach/​technique that is capable of addressing this, I should say something about set-​theoretic methods generally. These brief introductory notes are aimed at familiarizing readers with the application of QCA in the social sciences, which differs significantly from the mainstream logic of statistical (inferential) methods. The methodological tools that can be considered to be set-​theoretic share at least three common traits. First, they work with membership scores of cases in sets. Second, they perceive causal relations as set relations. And third, these set relations are interpreted in terms of sufficiency and necessity (Schneider and Wagemann 2012:  4–​6). Moreover, the core ideas of the approach are closely related to propositional logic and Boolean algebra, fields of mathematics where the application of superset and subset relations is an integral part of the calculations. A  closer look at the logic reveals that the set-​theoretic approach is not that novel, and many applications across the field can be identified nowadays. Mahoney in this context even argues that many comparative/​ case studies apply a set-​theoretic reasoning in an informal and intuitive manner without acknowledging the specific kind of logic that is applied (Mahoney 2010: 135). QCA distinguishes itself from other set-​ theoretic approaches mainly through its search for causal interpretation. Procedurally, truth tables are applied as a map of potential causality, representing important logical features that help the researcher to visualize and organize information into a coherent dataset. It provides an opportunity to analyse elements of causal complexity, such as equifinality, conjunctural causation, and the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an outcome (see below). In terms of formality, the QCA analyses the information that is added to a truth table and, in accordance to logical consistency, logical minimization is applied. This is a process by which empirical information is expressed in a more parsimonious yet logically equivalent manner by looking for commonalities and differences among cases that share the same outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 8–​9). Moreover, the whole framework is supported by a substantive theoretical knowledge and deep-​insight familiarity with the studied cases. The idea of making use of the set-​theoretic approach for the interpretation and analysis of social science data (in QCA) was put forward by Charles Ragin, a professor of sociology and political science at the University of Arizona back in the 1980s (Ragin 1987). He created a research program that was dedicated to the principled alternative in social research, with the modest aspiration of addressing the disputes that exist in methodological debate. In his book Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, Ragin claims that he tries to offer a “real alternative to conventional practices” that “is

12

122  Recipes for electoral violence not a compromise between qualitative and quantitative” but rather “transcends many of their respective limitations” (Ragin 2008: 6). His work reflects the methodological debate that criticized the lack of complexity on the one hand, and the formal weaknesses on the other, in the traditional quanti/​quali dispute. In this context, traditional linear models are seen as problematic because of the assumptions that diverge from complexity with the intention of searching for linear, additive and independent causal forces. On the other hand, most case-​based methods are criticized for covering the dimension of complexity but lacking the formality that is needed in case of validation and repetition of the results. According to Ragin, this shortcoming can be overcome in case-​based research by extending the quantitative analysis of the set-​ theoretic approach with the application of Boolean algebra laws. The benefits that come from this constellation can be utilized if we think about cases as a configuration of conditions rather than single units of analysis with a certain level of uniqueness or a simple linear product of independent causal forces. Additionally, the entire approach can be seen as a powerful and productive alternative capable of detecting patterns that are invisible to standard (statistical) techniques (Ragin 2008: 1). Although some criticism has been raised in recent years, the overall integrity of the method –​if rigour standards are maintained –​remains primarily intact. In fact, the discussion about the capacity of the method to grasp and understand social reality can further help to increase the technical aspects of analysis and push the approach forward in terms of its reliability (Seawright 2014; Hug 2013; Marx et al. 2014; Fiss et al. 2013; Magetti and Levi-​Faur 2013). If we talk about QCA as an approach, we should be aware that its logic stands on the border between qualitative and quantitative traditions. The application of Boolean algebra in cross-​case analysis defines the inquiry framework in order to establish the potential relations of necessity and sufficiency between alleged causal conditions and selected outcomes. Similarly, QCA at its core tries to identify and subsequently to explore the pattern of causes (some sort of “recipe”) that are sufficient or quasi-​sufficient for the outcome. The whole idea is very similar to former approaches in qualitative sociology that often used a combination of analytical induction and grounded theorizing (Cooper et al. 2012). Moreover, initial assumptions do not necessarily start with the idea that all social sciences are inevitably hermeneutic in their nature (Cooper et al. 2012). Furthermore, using QCA does not discount the use of more interpretive strategies based on deep theoretical as well as empirical knowledge (Rantala and Hellström 2001). The motivation for using QCA is to unravel the causally complex structures in terms of equifinality,1 multifinality2 and asymmetric causality.3 Despite the general assumption that QCA is limited to small-​N designs, the truth is that the approach itself does not have any serious limitations in terms of applicability to larger studies. A more appropriate discussion would be one aimed at the suitability of the method for a particular design if there is any suspicion or uncertainty (Ragin and Fiss 2008; Ragin and Bradshaw

 123

Recipes for electoral violence 123 1991). As Ragin stresses, while standard statistical techniques are good at distilling the net effect of single variables, QCA, by virtue of focusing on causal complexity, seeks to detect different conjunctions of conditions (configurations) that all lead to the same outcome (Grofman and Schneider 2009: 663; Ragin 2008). The main argument that should be taken into account (if we consider the best practices of QCA) is the fact that the phenomenon can be described and understood in terms of set relations. This means that theoretical statements can be rearranged in terms of subset and superset dependency. This benefit is even more important than sample size, which often comes –​especially in comparative studies  –​from real-​world limitations and cannot be overcome by a simple increase in the number of cases (George and Bennett 2005). This idea stands in opposition to the main recommendations for the proper usage of statistical tools that are designed to identify the net effect of an independent variable. As Schneider and Wagemann note, the motivation to use QCA should be led by the researcher’s interest in set relations, rather than by the number of cases under study (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 13). One of the major advantages of QCA is the capacity to handle causal inference in a manner similar to linear models. The difference comes in the way the methods approach multiple causes of an event. QCA searches for causal recipes whose individual conditions are together sufficient to produce an outcome with at least some degree of regularity. Linear models begin with a null hypothesis of causal simplicity but might be persuaded (if asked) to include some complexity with interaction of terms; QCA, by contrast, begins with the null hypothesis of causal complexity and can be simplified only with positive evidence (Vaisey 2009: 310). Despite the specific characteristics of QCA, the approach nevertheless operates under the logic of correlation, although the traditional way of understanding symmetry cannot be applied here (rXY [correlation between X and Y] is the same as rYX; the order does not matter because the correlation is symmetric). The set-​theoretic approach assumes an asymmetric logic with an important emphasis on the way things actually happened. That is, the proportion of Xs that are also Ys need not be the same as the proportion of Ys that are also Xs. As one example, if the theory postulates that developed countries are peaceful, in essence it only says that the group of developed countries is a subset of the set of peaceful countries. The fact that there are also less-​ developed countries that belong to the group (set) of peaceful societies does not undermine the stated set-​theoretic claim. On the other hand, such a claim does undermine the correlation between development and peacefulness –​that is, they would count against the argument if it had been formulated symmetrically (developed countries are peaceful) (Ragin 2008). In contrast to the traditional (statistical) approaches, QCA uses calibrated values that refer to the membership of the defined set. For the purpose of better explaining what “membership of defined set” means, it is important to briefly present the two most common techniques of the QCA family, which

124

124  Recipes for electoral violence are similar in logic, but different in procedure. As was indicated, QCA consists of more than one technique. The main two variants are crisp-​set QCA (csQCA) and fuzzy-​ set QCA (fsQCA) (Compasss 2017; see more about multi-​value QCA and temporal QCA in Caren and Panofsky 2005; Ragin and Strand 2008; Cronqvist and Berg-​Schlosser 2009). csQCA operates exclusively on binary values of membership where “one” (1) stands for full membership in a set, and “zero” (0)  indicates non-​membership in the same set. fsQCA applies the same logic; however, the cases are allowed to have a gradation of their set membership –​the value can vary from 0 to 1. Let me provide a quick example to clarify this: a country can be a partial member of the set of democracies, with this membership indicated through a fuzzy set score –​ let’s say 0.9. The value of the membership provides us with information that the case can be perceived as more of a democracy than a non-​democracy, but with certain shortcomings that affect the ability of fulfilling all the criteria for a fully fledged democracy (e.g., Hungary and Norway are both democracies but Norway’s democracy might be seen as qualitatively more evolved, while Hungary on the other hand is less so; this results in different membership scores in the particular set; Berg-​Schlosser et  al. 2009; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). In contrast to the measured, arbitrary variable units characteristic of linear models (e.g., kilograms or euros), calibrated sets, on the other hand, reflect each case’s membership (0 or 1)  or degree of membership (from 0 to 1)  in predefined conceptual categories (e.g., “violent” or “developed” in a specific setting). Set membership values are therefore concept-​relative as well as case-​relative. Essentially, calibration is a process of translating a variable into a set using a function derived from substantive theoretical and empirical knowledge (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Vaisey 2009). During the calibration of fuzzy sets, the researcher establishes when a case is “fully in” a set, “fully out” of it and when it is “neither in nor out” of the set (the so-​called “crossover point”) using external criteria (Ragin 2000: 169, 2008: ch 4–​5; see below). This approach translates information into numbers that can be analysed with QCA algorithms (with QCA software) in order to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the event (outcome). In other words, calibration is a way to decide where to put a particular case and what value it should have in reference to the definition of the set. As was already mentioned, the case can have a membership of 0.8, which means that it belongs more to the group (set) than it does not; however, a case with a 0.9 value of membership has a stronger relation to the set, even though it does not fully belong to it either (full membership must have a membership score 1.0). Both cases therefore reflect the relation to the superset as well as the differences between them (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 27–​9). The thing that makes QCA a very powerful tool for certain situations (like the study of electoral violence) is not exclusively related to the formal precision that comes from the logical narratives of Boolean algebra. The Q in QCA stands for qualitative. This means that a deep understanding of the examined

 125

Recipes for electoral violence 125 cases should be in place before research is initiated. The quality of the information that is processed and calibrated stems from informed insight, and that information is then further processed and evaluated. Ragin refers to this process as the “back-​and-​forth between ideas and evidence” (Ragin 1987; Marx et al. 2014). Schneider and Wagemann (2012) stress in a very similar way that the researchers’ insights, and the knowledge they have acquired before and after the analytic period are crucial for making the results of the analysis both robust and plausible. Such knowledge is particularly needed if the aim consists of drawing “causal inferences”. Moreover, this approach is able to deal with the problem of complexity in the real world, where equifinality, a situation in which there is more than one way in which a specific outcome can come about, is likely. It is also superior to in-​depth case studies that can deal with the complexity of phenomena, but lack a great deal of formality. The study of electoral violence can greatly benefit from these strategies and capitalize on the advantages they bring. The approach, however, is not perfect, and the limitations and difficulties in the generalization of findings should be recognized and properly addressed (Vis 2010: 29–​30; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). The next parts of the chapter will examine the benefits of using this method in the research of electoral violence. QCA is able to combine the best of qualitative and quantitative techniques, allowing for the replication of findings as well as for capturing both qualitative and quantitative changes (Berg-​Schlosser et al. 2009: 13). Moreover, QCA possesses many of the virtues of conventional interval-​scale variables, especially their ability to make fine-​grained distinctions, while at the same time permitting set-​theoretic operations (Vis 2010: 31). QCA has been chosen for the research in order to address the complexity of electoral violence in an environment where so many explanatory conditions are considered and alternative paths to the outcome (electoral violence) may exist. Moreover, the number of cases in the region under study does not allow for the traditional use of statistical approaches (King et al. 1994). The research questions also reflect a set-​theoretic approach, looking for causal paths that are able to describe the occurrence of an outcome that is complex in nature (see the principle of equifinality above). In light of this, the formal logic allows me to formulate arguments that are based on substantive knowledge but also complexity and formality that comes from the precision of Boolean algebra. I proceed further with the fuzzy-​set QCA (fsQCA), an advanced method of the set-​theoretic tradition, which is better suited to the available data that can be organized into degree of membership. The superiority of fsQCA over other forms of set-​theoretic methods is further supported by the level of complexity that is preserved through the concept-​relative as well as case-​relative logic. In other words, during the process of coding and calibration, fsQCA loses less information than other variants of set-​theoretic approach (csQCA, mvQCA, tQCA; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). There are several reasons why it is crucial to properly apply fsQCA in order to achieve the goal of this book. First of all, due to the lack of any

126

126  Recipes for electoral violence systematic database that covers electoral violence in the Western Balkans, we do not have any solid empirical basis for more comprehensive theorizing. Therefore, a tool that operates within the boundaries of complexity is much needed. This is even more important in the context of data that are frequently contradictory and unclear. Systematization through the truth tables seems to be a good way to visualize acquired information and look for those contradictions. On the basis of formal proficiency, it also supports transparency in research, subsequently enhancing the validity and the reliability of potential conclusions. Set-​theoretic methods generally, and QCA particularly, are well suited to work with raw data collected in a region as complex as the Western Balkans. It is important to mention that this partial approach is not exclusively focused on the collecting of information, but also on forming the “substantive knowledge” that is utilized throughout the whole book. In this context, QCA logically systematizes qualitative data and strengthens the dimension of formality. Specifically, this is important when the research starts from scratch and no data are available and/​or only limited systematic research has been done before. Research of electoral violence can strongly benefit from this design, where proper theorizing is interconnected with data, supported by the formality and complexity of the approach. This is further developed into robust statements in the form of theoretical arguments about electoral violence. This back-​and-​ forth logic can be seen as an enhancing strategy that keeps track of important data as well as preserves the consistency of assumptions. In other words, we are talking about a theory-​building approach that covers collecting, systematizing and analysing data that subsequently (re-​)formulates theoretical statements in the form of hypotheses. An equally important application of QCA is the theory-​testing that can supplement mainstream statistical techniques based on statistical inference. The approach applies a strategy based on testing preliminary assumptions derived from existing theoretical knowledge and on-​ground data.4 It the context of this book, the approach tests existing theoretical arguments on data collected in the region of the Western Balkans, where the evidence is reviewed and evaluated through formal Boolean logic. Searching for recipes helps us to better understand what the causes for the occurrence of violence could be and how to prevent them. This subsequently brings us back to our data, which needs to be explained through the obtained formulas (back-​and-​forth logic). If needed, the arguments can be reformulated into an operational theory that is able to explain the phenomenon in the region of the Western Balkans and can be further tested in different environments.

5.2  Explaining electoral violence in the Western Balkans Before I start with the main analysis of the collected data, I need to make a few initial remarks. First, in terms of the set-​theoretic framework, the outcome (dependent variable) refers to an occurrence of electoral violence that

 127

Recipes for electoral violence 127 may vary in terms of form, organization or intensity. A zero value refers to a violence-​free competition that need not, however, be democratic. The chapter has no aspiration to assess the type of regime in the respective countries nor does it try to elaborate on the quality of democracy. Second, the term “case” refers to electoral cycles defined by parliamentary and presidential elections during the period of 1990–​2015 in the region of the Western Balkans (85 elections). Third, the analysis applies the fuzzy-​set form of QCA (fsQCA) as an advanced variant of the set-​theoretic approach. Fuzzy sets are seen as a functional derivative of the crisp-​ set variant of QCA and fsQCA possesses several application advantages over its counterpart(s) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Fourth, the primarily qualitative nature of the data on electoral violence (the outcome) does not favour the application of the “direct method of calibration” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 35–​8). A more appropriate solution may therefore be found using the indirect method, which requires first grouping cases according to set-​membership scores. The grouping is preliminary and open to revision; however, it is based as much as possible on existing theoretical and substantive knowledge (collected data and theoretical arguments) that is transformed/​coded/​calibrated (Ragin 2008:  85–​105). In order to provide more precise calibration and to utilize the available advantages of fsQCA, the analysis applies a scale employing six predefined categories of set-​membership scores (1.0 in the target set; 0.8 mostly but not fully in the target set; 0.6 more in than out of the target set; 0.4 more out of than in the target set; 0.2 mostly but not fully out of the target set; 0.0 out of the target set) that are further approximated to accommodate noisy data. More categories mean a higher level of concept-​relative as well as case-​ relative information; however, the relationships need to stay meaningful and the data sensitive (see more on selection of number of categories in Ragin 2008: 95–​6). Fifth and finally, explanatory conditions are calibrated with the “direct method of calibration”. The direct method uses a logistic function to fit the raw data in between three qualitative anchors at 1 (full membership), 0.5 (point of indifference) and 0 (full non-​membership). The location of these qualitative anchors is established by using criteria external to the data at hand (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 35–​8). The following sections build on the collected data presented in Chapter 4 and summarized in Tables 4.5–​4.11. In addressing the coding, I pay specific attention to the transparency of the whole process so the logical consistency can be easily traced back. Outcome Based on the presented discussion and collected data, I now approach the phenomenon of electoral violence (EV) as the outcome I am trying to explain. As

128

128  Recipes for electoral violence I have already discussed, electoral violence is defined as the intentional threat or infliction of physical force and/​or verbal or written attacks against oneself, another person, a group or community or property of any kind, with the intention of disrupting the electoral process or the context of electoral competition (pre-​or post-​polling period). The outcome of this violence may result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, deprivation or any sort of material damage that may or may not influence the electoral framework, either partially or in its entirety, directly or indirectly (see more in Chapter 2). In order to specify the set relations among the respective cases (elections) and the degree of electoral violence that was reported, it is necessary to acknowledge crucial benchmarks that help us to group the cases into predefined membership score categories (see Table 5.1). The first and most straightforward value is the membership score of 0.0 (outside the target set); this describes a situation in which no electoral violence whatsoever has occurred during an electoral cycle. Other scores, however, need to be handled more systematically. To follow this, therefore, I apply a threefold structure of form, organization and salience that helps me to define the character of violence during the elections and systematically approach the various types of violence. In other words, three qualitative indicators (as categories defining violent behaviour) are combined in order to grasp the dynamics of violent contestation as well as to determine the degree of contestation. When I talk about form, I differentiate between “soft” and “hard” categories of electoral violence. The soft form entails no physical coercion but instead Table 5.1 Fuzzy-​set membership scores of the potential outcomes Hierarchy

Form/​organization/​salience

Set-​membership score (electoral violence [EV])

Cases

A2B2C2 A1B2C2

hard/​collective/​high soft/​collective/​high

1 0.9

A2B2C1

hard/​collective/​low

0.8

A1B2C1

soft/​collective/​low

0.7

in the target set almost fully in the target set mostly but not fully in the target set more in than out of the target set

A2B1C2

hard/​individual/​high

0.4

A2B1C1

hard/​individual/​low

0.3

A1B1C2

soft/​individual/​high

0.2

A1B1C1

soft/​individual/​low

0.1

A0B0C0

non-​occurrence of violence

0.0

threshold area of more out than in the target set more out of than in the target set mostly but not fully out of the target set almost fully out the target set out of the target set

 129

Recipes for electoral violence 129 involves psychological methods applied to achieve a particular outcome –​for example, intimidation, threats, harassment or structural violence. The second category, that of the hard form, refers to coercive pressure involving the use of physical force to influence the election, either in its outcome or its organization –​physical attacks, kidnapping, assassination, property damage, arrests, riots, uprisings, warrantless searches, etc. Organization refers to the element of collectiveness. We may distinguish whether acts of violence have been committed by individuals or by a group of people. Insofar as “collective” refers to a greater number of participants, we assume that collective is more serious, as the chances for the occurrence of violence multiplies. It does not mean that individual acts are less relevant; however, in terms of actual capacities, the limits are set by numbers (more people can cause more damage). Moreover, individual acts may merely exist as criminal acts that occur in a blurred area at the time an election takes place. The last category, salience, refers to the potential damage that may have been caused by the violence. We need to look at interactions among the parties, asking to what extent infliction and reception of damage dominate the interactions as a part of the electoral contest. The framework recognizes both high and low levels of salience. At the low extreme, damage occurs only intermittently or secondarily in the course of transactions, which may otherwise remain non-​violent. We are typically talking about localized incidents of harassment or small-​scale violence. At the high extreme, almost every transaction inflicts damage, as the infliction and reception of damage dominate the interaction. Regarding the analytical approach, I  ask whether the election witnessed any sort of electoral violence. If not, the membership score of the outcome is 0.0. If yes, a grouping is made on the basis of the structure combining the categories of form, organization, and salience. We must decide what the hierarchy of combination should look like in order to link the indicators with the real-​life data. Since I have three indicators, each of which may have two values (form [A]‌:  soft [1]/​hard [2]; organization [B]:  individual [1]/​collective [2]; salience [C]: low [1]/​high [2]), there are eight possible combinations available (A1B1C1; A1B1C2; A1B2C1; A1B2C2; A2B1C1; A2B1C2; A2B2C1; A2B2C2). These combinations need to be placed into a hierarchy whose form matches the predefined sixfold membership scale (1.0 in the target set; 0.8 mostly but not fully in the target set; 0.6 more in than out of the target set; 0.4 more out of than in the target set; 0.2 mostly but not fully out of the target set; 0.0 out of the target set). The hierarchy is based on an assumption concerning the intensity of electoral violence and the potential fatalities that may result from the contentious behaviour. The primary dimension in the context of dividing the scale of electoral violence is collectiveness. Empirically as well as theoretically it is appropriate to argue that collective acts are almost always more serious than individual acts because of the potential damage they can cause (see Table 5.1). It

130

130  Recipes for electoral violence divides the scale of electoral violence into two parts, where one (the collective dimension) describes incidents that are more in than out of the set while the second (the individual dimension) covers acts more out than in. The remaining two dimensions (form and salience) further divide the subsets and develop the complexity of the system. The logic of this process is, however, slightly different in both parts of the scale. In the case of the subset “more-​ in-​than-​out”, the second most important dimension is the level of salience (high/​low), while the subset “more-​out-​than-​in” applies the dimension of form (hard/​soft) first. This logic comes from the collected data, which suggests that collective acts of violence, if combined with high salience, are usually part of a broader attempt to affect the electoral contest and its outcome. Form is just the manner in which the goals are pursued and often reflects the level of sophistication of those who use violent means. Individual acts of violence, on the other hand, deal with interpersonal confrontation that is more dangerous when hard violence occurs and when potential physical injuries are involved (although important, salience comes second in this equation). The cut-​off point is intentionally set in a blurred area around the anchor 0.5 in order to clearly avoid any ambiguity in terms of numerical expression. The assignment of each of the elections to their respective categories is driven by simple logic that analyses the entire electoral cycle and defines each category of electoral violence. If more than one formula may be assigned based on electoral incidents, the one with the prevailing (dominant) set membership score is selected. Conditions Electoral violence as a phenomenon accompanying electoral competition is often influenced by various drivers that stem from everyday political and social life as well as from history. The brief discussion of the primary theories of collective violence in Chapter 2 set the ground for further theorizing based on a holistic approach to the potential triggers for electoral violence. This approach differs from mainstream research attempts that are based on empirical evidence generalized to more abstract frameworks. The book in fact operates under slightly different logic. The relatively long list of potential drivers of electoral violence found in the theoretical debate is narrowed down with the evidence from the Western Balkans so the results are context-​relevant but also complex. At this stage, my intention is not to present a theoretical debate that would discuss in detail every potential theory on the inner logic of electoral violence. I start with the general overview presented in Chapter 2 and build on it in order to select the preliminary list of theories that can be further narrowed based on data from the Western Balkans. As I already mentioned, the motivation to approach the supposed causes of electoral violence systematically comes from an assumption that electoral violence is a very complex phenomenon with multiple sources of origin, all of which may vary. However, it is important to be aware that not all of these conditions have to be relevant everywhere, on every level of analysis, in all the existing contexts.

 13

Recipes for electoral violence 131 Rational choice theory

Socio-structural theories

Leaders

Psycho-cultural theories

Macro-structural theories

(neo)Marxism

Aggression

Nationalism

Functionalism

Deprivation

Collective behaviour

Innate motivation

Inter-ethnicity and identity

Mass society

Environmental motivations

Theory of war

Anthropological perspective

Figure 5.1 Theories of collective violence (overview)

The discussion presented in Chapter  2 identified eight approaches for explaining the occurrence of collective violence (Marxist approach, non-​ Marxist approach, micro approach, macro approach, contingent approach, inherent approach, constructivist approach, feminist approach). These meta-​ approaches need to be systematized into more specific theories that postulate the particular logic under which the incidents of violence may occur. In order to introduce a system to this very complex field, I divide the most prominent approaches into five main theoretical baskets  –​socio-​structural theories, psycho-​cultural theories, rational choice theory, macro-​structural theories and theory of leaders (see Figure 5.1). These baskets further systematize different approaches to the potential roots of collective violence which may be interpreted as potential conditions in the sense of set-​theoretic logic. As most of the theories are well-​known among academics and scholars and are broadly discussed elsewhere, I limit this overview to a few necessary notes that identify the potential conditions stemming from this framework. The list is summarized in Table 5.2. This aggregated framework identifies 14 major theories that might be relevant for the subject of study (electoral violence) and selects 15 potential conditions that have been extracted from nomothetic statements (see Table 5.3). Although a closer look shows a great diversity of possible drivers of politically motivated violence, not all of them can be easily tested. Some of them are too complex, covering a level of abstraction that is hard to process. Moreover, the identified conditions can be further developed through a discussion about their origins, which makes the whole framework even more complex. Frustration, for instance, can be fed by economic, social, cultural or political struggles and may escalate violence as a result of complex social processes. This perspective broadens the list of possible conditions exponentially and thus prevents any meaningful theorization and generalization. A strategy able to cope with this challenge must be therefore considered.

132

newgenrtpdf

Table 5.2 Summary of the potential theories and conditions of collective violence Theory

Summary

Statement

Condition

Neo(Marxism)

An attitude on social matters reflects one’s relative status in society that is Class inequality determined by praxis. Subsequent conflict occurs because each of the groups creates incentives for (classes) in society sooner or later realizes that its material success depends contestation in public on the economic failure of the others. The conflict in turn defines each class’s space. political attitudes (Barnett 2009; D’Amore and Ishiyama 2011: 651; cf. McLellan 1974).

Functionalism

In a situation when the system is incapable of responding adequately to a massive change of conditions in the environment, a phase of disequilibrium emerges. This period of imbalance is usually accompanied by massive tension and violence that may result in erosion of social structures in order to define the new equilibrium in a struggling society (Johnson 1966; Collins 1975; Parsons 1971; Conteh-​Morgan 2004).

Imbalance in society Imbalance in society (equilibrium: economic, social, cultural, political, etc.) fuels incentives for collective violence.

Collective behaviour

Collective violent action is a non-​institutionalized behaviour that results from the failure (or inadequacy) of conventional modes of dispute resolution, which are unable to cope with the imbalance through routine procedures. Collective behaviour in this context refers to action formed on the basis of generalized belief about the existence of extraordinary forces. This generalized belief is then manifested in the form of negative or threatening forces (Smelser 1963; Weeber and Rodeheaver 2004).

A generalized belief in the existence of extraordinary forces (threats, conspiracies, crises, etc.) causes violent outburst.

Generalized belief

Mass society

The absence of links to work, community, family or school result in a higher probability of getting involved in mass mobilization. Collective violence occurs in situations when masses seek political ends directly and political stability, in terms of maintaining the state of equilibrium, is overridden by dominance of self-​interested political/​social challengers (Kornhauser 1959: 45; Le Bon 2009; Staggenborg 2011).

Atomized society with violent ideological motivations is prone to collective violence.

Atomized society; violent ideology

Class inequality (material dimension)

 13

newgenrtpdf

Table 5.2  (cont.) Theory

Summary

Statement

Aggression

Frustration-​aggression model. Frustration as interference with the fulfilling of an instigated goal-​response in the behaviour sequence. When frustration occurs, aggression usually accumulates until a critical breaking point, which reveals the hostility towards the alleged source of frustration (Dollard et al. 1939: 7; Feshbach and Frączek 1979).

Frustration in a society Frustration causes violent outbursts (economic, (aggression). political, social, cultural, emotional, etc.)

Deprivation

Psychological gap between expectations (political, economic, cultural, ideological, etc.) and reality (crisis, downfall, shock, etc.) fuels frustration based on an imbalance of “want formation” and “want satisfaction”. When needs and capacities are out of balance, the outcome is likely to be social instability (Feierabend et al. 1972; Gurr 1970, 1980).

A psychological gap between expectations and reality results in frustration that can ignite collective violence.

Innate motivation

Human propensity for violence lies deep in biological factors that are beyond Innate predisposition man’s ability to control (Lorenz 1966; Wilson 1978; Fromm 1973; Kurtz and causes violent Turpin 1999). behaviour.

Innate predisposition

Environmental motivation

Violence as a result of social and cultural determinants. Individuals are born essentially “good” but the combination of bad institutions, bad education and bad example results in aggression and hostile tendencies (Conteh-​ Morgan 2004; Fromm 1973; Skinner 1953).

Environmental predisposition

Anthropological Violence as a result of clash of cultures (states and non-​states) and systems of perspective beliefs that can ignite tensions (Gelfand and Brett 2004; Conteh-​Morgan 2004, 87; Kurtz and Turpin 1999).

Environmental predisposition (culture of violence, cruelty, policy of punishment, poverty, social exclusion, etc.) creates incentives to violence.

Condition

A gap between expectations and reality

Cultural (anthropological) Cultural differences cause violent (anthropological) outbursts. differences

134

newgenrtpdf

Table 5.2 (cont.) Theory

Summary

Statement

Rational choice

Goal-​seeking decisions are driven by a need to possess the good, which can be Collective violence is Rational calculus recognized as anything that increases the pleasure or diminishes the pain of caused by rational any individual. In terms of collective action, a human being is involved in calculus based on cost–​ this kind of interaction purposefully in order to achieve his or her own goals benefit assumptions. that may or may not be identical with the goals of others. Violence, in this context, is seen as a part of an instrumental decision (Dowding and King 1995; Lindblom 1950; Simon 1976; Murshed 2010).

Nationalism

Idea of conflicting incentives comes from the feeling of devotion to one’s country or nation where the existing ties create kinship to other members of the community; this creates groups of Us and Them (Barnard 2003; Gellner 1994; Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1953).

Inter-​ethnicity and identity

Identity affiliation and one’s identification on an ethnic basis may play an Ethnic division and important role in escalating violence and social struggles. Ethnic conflicts related differences often intensify and become unmanageable because of opposed identities that causes violence. presuppose certain patterns of behaviour, systems of symbols and cultural characteristics that highlight differences rather than similarities with other groups (e.g., ceremonies, rituals, events, cultural traits, etc.) (Kriesberg 1998; Horowitz 1985; Petersen 2002).

Ethnicity/​ different identity

Theory of war

If “commodities” associated with the state are threatened, the state or the Involvement in a war self-​recognized group may apply various tools to cope with the source of ignites additional the threat. The final stage is the application of violent means as a strategy to collective violence. achieve declared goals –​war (Herberg-​Rothe 2007; Aron 1966; Gurr 1980).

Involvement in a war

Leaders

Violent uprisings are usually characterized by a certain level of organization, where extraordinary individuals –​known as leaders –​articulate the goals that masses subsequently follow and further maintain. According to this approach, the revolutionary elite play the dominant role in the organization, mobilization, and ideological indoctrination of paramilitary groups and the general public (Goethals and Sorenson 2006; Hermann and Preston 1994; Hermann 1983; Cook 2000).

Violence-​prone leader(s)

Nationalism causes conflict.

Communities led by violence-​prone leaders are in danger of escalating violence.

Condition

Nationalism

 135

Recipes for electoral violence 135 Table 5.3 Possible sources of violence Class Imbalance in inequality society

Generalized belief

Atomized society

Violent ideology

Frustration

Gap between expectation and reality

Innate predis­ positions

Environmental predis­ positions

Cultural (anthropological) differences

Rational calculus

Nationalism

Ethnicity

Involvement in war

Violence-​oriented leader

A similar problem was faced by the project Community Conflicts in Europe:  From Understanding the Roots of Conflicts to Conflict Resolution, coordinated by the Université catholique de Louvain  –​Centre de Politique Comparée (UCL–​ CPC) and the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Comparative en Sciences Sociales (CIR) (Peace-​Com 2007b). A  research team led by Elise Ferón identified three major approaches in the study of community (collective) conflicts in Europe and developed them into a complex theoretical map (a strategy similar to the selection of possible conditions presented above). The project first addressed the concept of minorities, with terminology based on ethnic diversity. They then categorized the national groups or nations without states and their struggles for independence or recognition (Guibernau 1999). The last, third classification, recognized community conflict as a matter of regionalism based on unfulfilled, unsuccessful or late-​coming nationalism (Peace-​Com 2007a: 5–​8). These categories were transformed into a framework in which 12 groups of possible conditions are taken into consideration and conceptualized in order to identify causal paths for the occurrence of violent conflicts. The framework is based on theoretical assumptions that select suspected causes of conflicts in Europe and systematizes them into a matrix structure with four typological clusters of potential conflicts:  cultural, socio-​economic and geographical, political, and external (Peace-​Com 2007a: 15–​17; see summary in Table 5.4). These four clusters form the main space of the analytical framework, which significantly overlaps with the theoretical arguments presented in Table 5.2. The identified variables are predominantly the contextual characteristics that come from macro-​structural preconditions that differ society by society. The general factors (remote conditions) define what kinds of conflicts may exist within the society and how they might escalate into violence. However, there may also exist an alternative category of drivers that are more episodic, temporal and grounded. These proximate conditions may occur as a result of dynamics linked to a specific situation/​event –​in our case an election. In order to talk about the drivers of electoral violence it is therefore beneficial to divide the field into two levels where potential conditions are positioned based on their virtual proximity to the incidents of electoral violence. In this context, the remote conditions come from the contextual features that are stable in

136

Table 5.4 Summary of drivers of community conflicts in Europe (Peace-​Com project) Cultural dimensions. Conflict Religious conflicts. According to this view, derives from the fact that conflicts derive from conflicting ideological groups in the presence of each views or religious faiths (e.g., Huntington and other (be it two communities his “clash of civilizations”). of comparable size, or an Identity conflicts. Community conflicts are ethnic minority subordinated viewed as struggles for basic needs such as to a much stronger majority) recognition. Communities stress both the are characterized by cultural differences that exist between them and elements (religion, history, their neighbours and the animosity that has traditions, language, etc.) that “always” opposed them. An important process make them irreconcilable. of “victimization” is at play, using media, In other words, it is the historical narratives, etc. nature of the very definition of the groups themselves Cultural/​linguistic conflicts. Conflicts here derive that explains the conflict mainly from linguistic and cultural differences situation. Three main types that communities wish to preserve as part of of opposition have been their basic identity and character. identified: Socio-​economic and geographical Socio-​economic conflicts. Conflicts here dimensions. In essence, the are explained by the differences in socio-​ material living conditions of economic resources available for the the concerned communities concerned communities. This cluster of explain the modus of theories encompasses Marxist theories as coexistence that leads or has well as “frustration/​aggression” and “relative led in the past to an open or deprivation” theories. underlying confrontation. Conflicts linked to demographics and population Three main “material” shifts. Conflicts here derive from various reasons for opposition have processes leading to demographic changes, been identified: such as migration, haphazard border drawing, differences in birth rates, etc. These changes often create discrepancies between political structures and communities’ demographic weights. They can also generate fears of extinction or of “minoritization”. Territorial conflicts. The most intractable conflicts are those fought over territory, as it is often seen as indivisible, and bears a symbolic meaning. Political dimensions. Conflict Centre-​periphery conflicts. The conflicts oppose emerges as an outcome from a peripheral region or territory to central state the nature of political claims structures, which are accused of neglecting that are put forward, or via the them, or of preventing them from preserving channels through which these and developing their own culture, identity and claims or issues are politicized. interests. Security dilemmas and access to the political arena. Conflicts here arise from the distrust and estrangement a community may feel towards state structures and apparatus, which seem to prevent them from participating in discussions and debates about their own conditions of life and future.

 137

Recipes for electoral violence 137 Table 5.4  (cont.) Conflicts beginning among political leaders –​“top-​ down conflicts”. Conflicts here result either from the policies of states and of governments, which either give preferential treatment to one group, or incite violence as a way to divide the population and rally support around them, or from the propaganda and actions of a small group of political leaders whose position and power are legitimized and reinforced by conflict. Conflicts caused by the denial of citizenship. When citizenship is framed in terms of a national belonging that is strictly defined in terms of language, ancestry or religion, access to citizenship can be difficult for some communities; in this case, distrust, frustration and even revolt might appear. External dimension. Some exogenous factors may have fuelled or even caused the concerned conflict. It is an event, action or actor located outside the geographical borders of where the conflict is taking place that is held responsible for the emergence or persistence of opposition.

Conflicts as a result of decolonization, globalization and the aftermath of WWI and WWII. These concern mainly “decolonization”, “democratization” or “transition” wars and conflicts. Conflicts here are linked to geopolitical transitions; they sometimes result from the resurgence of ancient hatreds kept under control by colonialism and/​or the Cold War. Globalization has also been accused by numerous authors of provoking identity withdrawals and community conflicts, because it entails the erosion of a state’s autonomy. Conflicts caused by neighbouring countries, diasporas and bordering communities. Conflicts can be created and sustained by external factors, such as neighbouring countries competing for territorial control and favouring allegiance of one of the communities in opposition.

time, while the proximate ones occur for a limited period of time and influence a particular situation. Proximate in this context means immediate. If we summarize these arguments, the framework provides a solid base for a list of potential conditions (drivers of electoral violence) that can be further studied and analysed. In order to maximize the potential of the research design, both approaches presented above are combined and tested on data from the Western Balkans. Except for a few sharply defined variables (nationalism, violence-​oriented leader, violent ideology), we can see that the majority of the explanations summarized in Table  5.2 are represented in more than one of the conditions defined by the Peace-​Com Project in Table  5.3. This

138

138  Recipes for electoral violence supports the overall logic of a complex approach that is further narrowed with empirical evidence. This then brings us to the process of evaluating the logical consistency of the selected conditions within the specific region and time. Based on collected data, I  argue that all of the selected variables except one can be tested as a potential explanatory driver of electoral violence in the Western Balkans. The only logically inconsistent condition is the Cold War conflict that ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s (the variable does not vary across the cases). In order to present a logically consistent list of potential conditions, “Cold War conflict” is excluded from the list and replaced by a more general factor that reflects the logic of external influence. In this context, I add the condition presence of external actor, as it better describes the situation in the Western Balkans (category “external factors”), especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania. It also reflects different forms of externality (e.g., influence, interference, pressure). This condition simply adds the argument that an external actor, defined as external authority (non-​autochthonous), may affect the interaction dynamic of conflict potential (negatively as well as positively; Kurki 2013; Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig 2007; Cowles et  al. 2001). Since the whole region has often been a priority for foreign powers, I apply a narrow criterion for identifying their presence, i.e., the extent of military, police and administrative assistance in the specific period under study (see summary in Figure 5.2).

Cluster 2: Socio-economic and geographical dimension Remote c. C2: social and/or economic conflict demography and population conflict territorial conflict

Cluster 1: Cultural dimension Remote c. C1: religious conflict identity conflict cultural/linguistic conflict

Proximate conditions Remote c. C3: security dilemma citizenship conflict centre/periphery conflict conflict among political leaders violent ideology nationalism violence-prone leader(s)

Remote c. C4: *Cold War conflict conflict abroad; diasporas presence of external actor

Cluster 3: Political dimension

Cluster 4: External dimension

Figure 5.2 Summary of remote conditions Note:  Light grey highlights the added conditions; “violence-​prone leader(s)” is a broader category that covers also “conflict among political leaders”, which is also represented in the list of proximate conditions (see Figure 5.3).

 139

Recipes for electoral violence 139 Proximate conditions in this model refer to variables that are directly connected with electoral competition and/​or that indirectly –​through unexpected incidents  –​affect the organization of election (e.g., accidents or crimes). Although the current state of mainstream research does not provide a straightforward list of potential proximate conditions in the Western Balkans, the collected data presented in Chapter 4 might stand as a solid basis for further theorization. If we take a look at the data matrices, the list of possible explanatory factors (proximate conditions) includes political rivalry, ethnicity, state-​instigated violence (authoritarian tendencies), ongoing violent conflict/​insurgency and the frustration-​deprivation nexus (violence instigated by voters as a result of scarcity). I further add experience with electoral violence in the previous election cycle as a possible trigger for the escalation of violence and shortcomings in electoral integrity as sources of potential tensions. These categories are merged with the list of remote conditions and create a model of potentially explanatory factors (conditions) for electoral violence in the Western Balkans which can be further tested (Figure 5.3). The new list proposes a set of potential explanatory factors of electoral violence that is going to be tested in terms of necessity and sufficiency in order to identify an empirically relevant causal path able to explain electoral violence in the region. The problem here is that the number of potential conditions is too high, which is a serious problem in terms of good practice in QCA but also in terms of available resources and capacities. Moreover, not all

Cluster 1: Cultural dimension Remote c. C1: religious conflict identity conflict cultural/linguistic conflict

Remote c. C3: security dilemma citizenship conflict centre/periphery conflict violent ideology nationalism violence-prone leader(s) Cluster 3: Political dimension

Cluster 2: Socio-economic and geographical dimension

Proximate conditions political rivalry ethnicity violence instigated by state (authoritarian tendencies) ongoing violent conflict/ insurgency frustration-deprivation nexus (violence instigated by voters) previous experience with EV shortcomings in electoral integrity

Remote c. C2: social and/or economic conflict demography and population conflict territorial conflict

Remote c. C4: presence of external actor conflict abroad; diasporas

Cluster 4: External dimension

Figure 5.3 Potential proximate and remote conditions of electoral violence in the Western Balkans Note: Light grey rectangle indicates added conditions.

140

140  Recipes for electoral violence conditions must be empirically significant in the region. From a technical perspective, it is quite complicated to code and calibrate 21 variables for 85 elections and then analyse them in terms of fuzzy sets (due to limited diversity, the imbalance between the number of conditions and the number of cases, and the overall time needed to find and code the indicators). Therefore, it is important to further generalize the data in order to reduce the complexity to a reasonable level (x