Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004 [1 ed.] 9780798302333, 9780798302104

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Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved. Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY CONSOLIDATION

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved. Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY CONSOLIDATION Contextualising the African multiparty elections of 2004

Edited by Korwa G. Adar, Abdalla Hamdok

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

and Joram Rukambe

Africa Institute of South Africa

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

First published in 2008 by the Africa Institute of South Africa PO Box 630 Pretoria 001 South Africa ISBN: 978-0-7983-0210-4 © Copyright Africa Institute of South Africa 2008 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission from the copyright owner. Publisher: Solani Ngobeni

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Editing, design, and layout by Acumen Publishing Solutions Cover design by Acumen Publishing Solutions Printed and bound by Creda Communications The Africa Institute of South Africa is a statutory body and research organisation, focusing on political, socio-economic, international and development issues in contemporary Africa. The Institute conducts research, publishes books, monographs and a quarterly journal, and holds regular seminars on issues of topical interest. It is also home to one of the best library and documentation centres world-wide, with materials on every African country. For more information, contact the Africa Institute at PO Box 630, Pretoria 0001, South Africa; email: [email protected]; or visit our website at http://www.ai.org.za.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

CONTENTS

ABOUT THE EDITORS

vi

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

viii

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION Korwa G. Adar, Abdalla Hamdok, and Joram Rukambe

1

1

THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS Faten Aggad

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2

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN CAMEROON John W. Forje

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3

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GHANA Beatrix Allah-Mensah

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4

CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY Boniface Dulani

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5

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE Iraê Baptista Lundin

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6

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA Khabele Matlosa

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CONCLUSION Korwa G. Adar, Abdalla Hamdok and Joram Rukambe

139

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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ABOUT THE EDITORS

Korwa G. Adar is Research Director for Area Studies at the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Pretoria, South Africa. He received his BSc and MSc in Political Science at Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, United States, followed by an MA and PhD in International Studies at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, United States. He was one of the recipients of the 1992 Fulbright Research Grant awarded to senior African scholars. Prior to joining AISA, Professor Adar lectured at Rhodes University, South Africa (1997–2002), United States International University-Africa, Nairobi, Kenya (1994–1997), and the University of Nairobi, Kenya (1987–1994). While at the universities he served in various senate and faculty committees. He was the National Chairman of the Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU), a union established by the academic members of staff in the public universities. Korwa G. Adar has extensive research experience, particularly in international relations, foreign policy analysis, and African international relations, with a special focus on the Horn of Africa and East Africa. In addition to having attended and presented papers at many national, continental and international conferences, he has also authored and co-edited many books and chapters, and has published numerous articles in internationally recognised and accredited journals. He is the author of: Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior Towards Somalia 1963–1983. 1994. Lanham: University Press of America; and co-editor of The United States and Africa: From independence to the end of the Cold War. 1995. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers; Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States Foreign Policy-making Process: A comparative perspective of Southern Africa. vol. 1. 2002. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers; Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and future prospects. 2004. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; The State of Readiness of African Parliaments on the Eve of the Pan-African Parliament. 2004. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; Somalia Peace Process: Challenges and future prospects for the reconstruction and restoration of legitimacy. 2006. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa; and Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States Foreign Policy-Making Process: A comparative perspective of Eastern Africa. 2007. Lanham MD: University Press of America. His articles have been published in many accredited scholarly journals such as: Politeia: Journal for Political Sciences and Public Administration; African Studies Quarterly; African Sociological Review; Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution;

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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Abdalla Hamdok is the Regional Director for Africa and the Middle East at the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Dr Abdalla Hamdok received his PhD and MA (Econ) in Economics from the School of Economic Studies at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom, and his BSc (Hons) from the University of Khartoum, Sudan. He is a policy analyst/economist with over 25 years experience in addressing governance challenges in Africa at the national, sub-regional and continental level. Over the years he has developed an interest in policy-oriented research and analysis, focusing on issues of governance, democracy, institutional analysis, public sector reforms and resource management. Dr Hamdok is the author of many publications on governance and other related issues. From 2001 to 2003, he worked as senior governance expert/co-ordinator of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Africa Governance Project and was Director of the Development Policy Management department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. From 1997 to 2001, he worked as principal policy economist in the Central Operation department of the African Development Bank in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. He played a leading role in the development of the African Development Bank’s policy on good governance. From1995 to 1997, Dr Hamdok was chief technical advisor on the International Labour Organisation/Southern Africa Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (ILO/SAMAT) in Harare, Zimbabwe. At the ILO/SAMAT, he provided technical assistance on poverty measurement and mapping, and then assisted in the design of projects and programmes that address issues of poverty alleviation. He also participated as a technical advisor in the preparation and development of the first regional Human Development Report for the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The report was on the theme of governance and civil society. From 1993 to 1995, he was Principal Consultant and Head of the Public Sector Group (PSG), and a member of the management committee of Deloitte & Touche Management Consultants, Zimbabwe. Joram Rukambe is the programme manager for Africa at the IDEA. He received his MA degree in Media and Cultural Studies from the University of Natal, South Africa, and holds a BA (Hons) in Development Studies from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He is currently finishing his Master of Law in International Trade of Law at the University of Namibia. Prior to joining IDEA, Rukambe worked as Director of Elections and Chief Executive of the Electoral Commission of Namibia. Between 1994 and 2001, he

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics; Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies; Human Rights Quarterly; Ocean Development and International Law; Indian Journal of International Law; Strategic Studies; and Journal of Third World Studies.

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served as a consultant and technical advisor to various electoral management bodies in Southern Africa, including South Africa and Zambia, and has observed elections in many southern African countries over the last 10 years. He was the Executive Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia and Head of Communication and Corporate Marketing from 1994 to1997.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS Faten Aggad is Assistant Researcher at the Africa Institute of South Africa in Pretoria, South Africa. John W. Forje is Professor of Political Science at the University of Yaunde II-Soa in Cameroon.

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Beatrix Allah-Mensah is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana in Accra. Boniface Dulani is a lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College in Malawi. Irae Baptista Lundin is a lecturer at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at the Higher Institute of International Relations in Maputo, Mozambique. Khabele Matlosa is Senior Advisor, Research at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, South Africa.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

INTRODUCTION

MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL TRENDS IN AFRICA IN 2004

Korwa G. Adar, Abdalla Hamdok, and Joram Rukambe

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

T

HE AFRICA INSTITUTE of South Africa (AISA), and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have embarked on a long-term project designed to periodically assess electoral processes in Africa. This volume focuses on the 2004 elections conducted in selected African countries, and offers a general assessment of the electoral processes in these countries. While local, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in some countries such as Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Nigeria and Tunisia, for example, these countries are not included in this first volume because the reports covering these electoral outcomes, though analytically and theoretically sound, did not meet the criteria for investigating multiparty related issues. The chapter contributors examine a number of pertinent multiparty related questions. These include, but are not limited to: the environments in which elections were conducted – that is, whether or not elections were free and fair – electoral laws; the independence of electoral commissions; the role of national and international election monitors and observers; the role of civil society; the role of the ruling party and the opposition political parties; media coverage; voter registration; and individual rights enshrined in the constitutions. In summary, the chapters attempt to provide electoral audits. This is crucial, particularly in Africa where multiparty electoral practice, good governance, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law and human rights principles are still facing many internal challenges from the regimes in power as well as opposition parties. Since 2000, there has been an increase in multiparty electoral experiments in Africa, which are gradually paving the way for participatory democratic systems. Rudimentary as these systems may be, they are slowly rolling back the patron-client relations inherent in the authoritarian ancient régimes reminiscent

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of the Cold War era.1 For example, in Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki of the ruling National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) failed to deliver a comprehensive constitution within 100 days as promised by NARC during the 2002 general election campaigns and instead, since assuming the presidency, he has adopted his predecessor, Daniel arap Moi’s tactics. President Kibaki was defeated in the 2005 referendum on the draft Constitution by some of NARC’s own partners, who pulled together under the banner of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). However, while this was originally interpreted as a good example of the gradual movement towards the consolidation of multiparty participatory democracy, the controversy surrounding the 2007 elections, and the subsequent outbreak of post-election violence has done grievous damage to democracy and the multiparty electoral process in Kenya. Even coups d’etat, which were common in Africa during the Cold War period, are aberrations under the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). The Act, for example, condemns and rejects ‘unconstitutional changes of governments’.2 The member states, for example, went beyond mere rhetoric by rejecting the manner in which Faure Eyadema took over the presidency in Togo following the death of his father Gnassingbe Eyadema in February 2004. Pressure by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forced President Faure Eyadema to call for elections, which later brought him to power in April 2004. The AU, in an attempt to differ from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in Article 3(g), clearly provides for the promotion of ‘democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’ [our emphasis]3 It is important to stress that for the first time the issue of the right of the African people to participate in elections is unambiguously provided for in the Charter governing continental principles and rules of behaviour. Indeed, the decision by the AU member states in January 2006 to elect Congo (Brazzaville), instead of Sudan, to chair the AU’s Heads of State and Government (HOSG) summit for the next year was not only symbolic but indicates that continental normative principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act and Protocols are gradually taking root. These principles are increasingly guiding member states’ operations and constitute Africa’s central modus operandi. The international community accuses Sudan, for example, of direct involvement in genocide in Darfur, Western Sudan, where more than 300 000 people have been killed. However, the debate surrounding the merits and demerits of the AU’s chairmanship and normative principles of continental behaviour are outside the scope of this study. Multiparty electoral practice is not an alien concept in Africa. Even before decolonisation, Africa conducted competitive electoral practices. Multiparty electoral processes became more widespread as African countries acquired sovereign responsibilities and assumed their international legal personalities at the time of independence.4 However, sustained free and fair electoral processes and the

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INTRODUCTION

consolidation of democratic systems still remain distant dreams for pro-democracy and human rights activists and specifically the people of Africa.5 As some scholars have observed, ‘a detailed analysis of elections is part of an understanding of the possibilities and constraints of democratisation in Africa’.6 In other words, elections and democratisation complement each other in many ways. One of the objectives of an election is that it is meant to transform the state and the political system to allow pluralism. In other words, ‘the actual form and content of the electoral process is one aspect by which one can gauge the extent to which liberal democracy is realised’.7 Tangible democratic elections cannot be realised in any African country where the multiplicity of political parties and undemocratic internal party elections continue to dominate electoral systems. Do elections in the African countries under study reflect voter choice or are they conducted largely to legitimise the political systems or state authorities dominated by the regimes in power? Under the voter choice concept, the electoral process is open, competitive and democratic, leaving room for an unpredictable outcome. In other words, the electoral process is conducted in a democratically instituted political system. On the other hand, in situations where elections merely legitimise state authority, the outcome, as in the case of a number of African countries, is predictable or generally known in advance.8 Specifically, in ‘conditions of high uncertainty or serious threat (to the ruling party), self-interested actors will prefer or tend to choose electoral rules creating low opportunities for them to become absolute losers’.9 Voting is an important aspect of electoral process. Voting provides an opportunity for the electorate to express its interest in the political process, which shapes the fundamental aspects of a political system. Voting also presupposes the autonomy of the electorate. In other words, at the time a voter casts his or her vote in an election after the political parties and other actors in the political system have completed voter education exercises, it is assumed that the decision made by the voter conforms to his or her interests, a decision which cannot be substituted by any other electorate, let alone the system. Political parties engage in vigorous campaigns enlightening electorates on what they will offer when elected into the office. Specifically, the underlying presupposition is that the electorate is the final judge of his interests. Voting is therefore a rational process.10 It is in the interests of political parties to win the confidence of the electorate, if they want to govern. What is an electoral system? Electoral systems consists of the following: r
Institutional structures for managing elections r
Laws or legal framework for managing elections r
Activities carried out that relate to elections (registration, observation, monitoring, vote counting, and so on).11

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INTRODUCTION

This study does not focus on different categories of electoral systems such as proportional representation, single-member districts, and multi-member districts, single-member plurality, mixed electoral system, majoritarian electoral system, among others. Instead, the chapters have focused mainly on electoral processes. The authors’ central point for departure was whether or not elections were conducted in a free and fair environment. Specifically, the authors have focused on the impact of ethnicity, electoral laws, voter education, ruling and opposition political parties, media coverage, and institutional structures in the electoral process. Consolidation of free and fair electoral process is not the sole responsibility of the ruling parties. The opposition political parties and other stakeholders also have roles to play in the electoral process. Each country has its own unique experience. These experiences are put into proper perspectives by the authors.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND ELECTORAL PROCESS POLITICAL PARTIES In many respects, the outcome of elections depends on the behaviour of the ruling party as well as the opposition political parties, particularly with respect to the extent to which they adhere to the rules and laws governing electoral process. Political parties vie for elections to compete for power and opportunities to govern, that is, to serve the electorate. Simply put: The political party is the major organising principle of modern politics. Whether they are great tools of democracy or sources of tyranny and oppression, political Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

parties are the vital link between the state and civil society; between the institutions of government, and the groups and interests that co-operate within society.12

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Political parties that are not democratically governed and do not adhere to their own party constitutions by ‘flouting democratic processes in their respective parties’, cannot adhere to good governance, accountability, and the rule of law if they win elections.13 In other words, the pertinent elements and characteristics of democracy must first of all be rooted within the political parties themselves. Free and fair elections, if conducted democratically within political parties, would provide important ingredients for the promotion and consolidation of democracy at the national level. Undemocratically governed political parties that engage in grand coalitions for the purposes of power sharing are, in our view, bound to fail and have the potential of disintegrating ab initio. One of the common features in the African polity is the lack of a culture of

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

INTRODUCTION

political tolerance. Intolerance of dissenting opinions within political parties has frequently led to splits within political parties or their disintegration. Similarly, one of the major drawbacks to multiparty electoral process and democratic consolidation in Africa is violence, ethnically oriented or otherwise, which is instigated by the state, and the ruling and opposition political parties during elections. The phenomenon of political violence is a common feature in transitional multiparty electoral systems in Africa. Inherent divisions in African states, and tendencies towards fragmentation, may take the form of ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious or other polarised splits. There appears to be a correlation between political violence and the liberalisation of the political process.14 However, it should be noted that the regimes in power, and the opposition political parties and their supporters, largely instigate these forms of violence, which are prevalent in Africa. In the case of Kenya, for example, President Moi’s government was accused of engineering the violence experienced in the country between 1990 and 1993.15 The fact that violence impedes the electoral process is the central focus of this book.

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ELECTION OBSERVATION AND MONITORING Election monitoring, whether by internal or external actors, is an important ingredient for the consolidation of democracy. Election monitoring not only deals with the electoral process per se, but it also helps in limiting the power of the state and enhances ‘the overall quality of the democratic process’.16 Electoral monitoring groups play an important role in Africa as watchdogs for free and fair elections. As part of the larger instrument for democratic consolidation, election monitoring ‘plays a crucial role in deterring electoral fraud, identifying where it occurs, and validating the fairness of an election that losers are almost invariably bound to dispute’.17 Electoral monitoring is a process and an end in itself. As a process, election observers help to monitor and publicise fraud and other election-related malpractices. As an end, political authorities, whether from the ruling party or the opposition political parties, may refrain from rigging elections for fear of being exposed by the monitors as well as the media. However, it should be noted that without the co-operation of the political parties and other stakeholders, election observers couldn’t, in themselves, deter electoral fraud and other anomalies. Election observers may also not be familiar with the internal situation of the country in question, thus giving rise to inaccurate reports.18

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CIVIL SOCIETY Civil society in Africa continues to play an important role in pushing for democratic space and in fighting against authoritarian and oppressive regimes. Civil society is a ‘system of self-organised intermediary groups’ that operates independently, in theory at least, from any authority when performing its prescribed functions.19 One scholar has correctly observed that: Civil society performs many … crucial functions for democratic development and consolidation: limiting the power of the state more generally, and challenging its abuses of authority; monitoring human rights and strengthening the rule of law; monitoring elections and enhancing the overall quality and credibility of democratic process … opening and pluralising the flows of information; and building a

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constituency for economic as well as political reforms.20

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Civil society in Africa has been instrumental in broadening the political space, despite limited resources and the risks involved in performing its duties in difficult situations.21 Civil society, and in particular the media, continues to feel the brunt of the state, mainly in countries where the leadership feels threatened by media coverage. Civil society still faces a lot of challenges, particularly with regard to election coverage. The authors analyse these and other issues in detail. In Chapter 1, Faten Aggad identifies three major problems that plagued the 2004 electoral process in Algeria, namely: violence; the split within the ruling party, which created tensions among the supporters of the different candidates; and the rejection of some candidates by the state-controlled Constitutional Court. However, as Aggad notes, there were some positive developments in the 2004 Algerian elections, which, in many respects, paved the way for free and fair elections. For example, she observes that the army’s decision to explicitly and publicly express its neutrality during the elections clearly sent the right signals to the internal and external stakeholders that multiparty elections was taking more open root in the Algerian polity. For example, Faten Aggad argues that electoral law amendments which led to the removal of special election bureaus for the armed forces stationed in the military bases, clearly indicated that the Algerian electoral process was taking a positive direction towards the consolidation of democracy. The army’s role in the cancellation of the 1992 elections was still fresh in the minds of Algerians. The National Political Commission to Oversee the Presidential Election appointed by the president also provided another avenue for monitoring the electoral process. Faten Aggad observes that Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s election to the presidency was due to his appeal to voters across the ethno-linguistic divide and more so because of what Aggad calls the ‘triple comeback’ of Algeria, that is: Bouteflika’s success in promoting Algeria’s good image abroad; his success in

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

INTRODUCTION

restoring national security and stability; and the improved economy during his tenure. These positive developments provided an amenable environment for elections. John W. Forje, in Chapter 2, provides a detailed historical account of the political landscape that has hampered a free and fair electoral process in Cameroon. He identifies what he calls ‘policies of exclusion’ based on ethno-religious and cultural differences as well as an Anglophone/Francophone divide. In many respects, Forje contends, the introduction of a multiparty electoral system in 1992 has not altered the political landscape; nor the authoritarian character of the state, with power still centred in the presidency. Under these circumstances, free and fair elections remain a distant dream. The 2004 election was no exception. These difficulties notwithstanding, estimated voter turnout in the 2004 Cameroonian elections was more than 80 per cent. This was due to a number of factors such as competition among presidential, parliamentary and civic candidates as well as campaigns by political parties. However, the challenges that face Cameroon’s multiparty electoral process are daunting. Firstly, one of the major challenges is lack of political will on the part of the leadership to institute independent institutions for conducting free and fair elections. Secondly, the multiplicity of political parties, which reached 200 at the time of elections, also laid the groundwork for the disintegration of the opposition political parties, weakening the chances of defeating the incumbent ruling party. Forje also points out that civil society in Cameroon, a useful watchdog in any vibrant democracy, remains passive. In Chapter 3, Beatrix Allah-Mensah points out that the success of the 2004 multiparty elections in Ghana is a culmination of viable electoral institutions incrementally moulded since the introduction of multipartism under the leadership of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings in 1992. Allah-Mensah states that, notwithstanding the difficulties associated with voter registration, a shortage of registration materials, a lack voter education, and the abuse, by the presidency, of state resources and machinery during elections, the 2004 elections were conducted in a free and fair environment amenable for democratic consolidation. In Chapter 4, Boniface Dulani discusses Malawi’s third multiparty general elections, which saw the United Democratic Front (UDF) candidate, Bingu wa Mutharika, win the elections, replacing Bakili Muluzi who had served a second term as president. The author argues that the ‘third term’ debate introduced by Muluzi reflected the ‘big man syndrome’ and the difficulties of clear leadership succession, one of the common vices in post independence Africa. Dulani observes that the rejection of the ‘third term’ proposal by Muluzi himself demonstrated the extent to which Malawi’s democratic consolidation had taken root. Dulani also states that the fact that the opposition party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), won the parliamentary elections with a strong showing by the Republican Party

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INTRODUCTION Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

(RP), was an indication that a multiparty electoral process was gaining credence and legitimacy in the country. However, as Dulani observes, the inability of the opposition parties to field a single presidential candidate undermined their chances of winning the presidency. The author identifies some of the challenges that still face Malawi in its attempt to consolidate political pluralism. Firstly, the author observes that the outcome of Malawi’s elections sparked debate on the need for the inclusion of a provision in the electoral laws that would allow a run-off in a situation where, for example in the 1999 and 2004 elections, no clear winner emerges from the general elections. Secondly, he also argues that an ethnic-centred regional voting pattern remains one of the main challenges that faces Malawi’s multiparty electoral system. In Chapter 5, Irae Baptista Lundin observes that the Mozambican political landscape is still dominated by the ruling party FRELIMO and the opposition party RENAMO. No third party with a similar domestic constituency has emerged since independence. The other smaller parties have not yet succeeded in selling their agenda to the electorate and in consolidating their impact on the people of Mozambique. In the 2004 elections, Lundin states that among the opposition parties only RENAMO managed to garner 29 per cent of the parliamentary votes. The other opposition political parties, namely: PDD, PARENA, SOL and PED-MT only received 2 per cent, 0,6 per cent, 0,46 per cent, and 0,4 per cent of the parliamentary votes respectively. The poor performance by the opposition political parties, other than RENAMO, was repeated in the presidential elections. As in the case of Malawi, the issue of an ethnic-centred regional voting pattern still dominates, with FRELIMO and RENAMO receiving the bulk of their support from the south and the centre of the country respectively. As Khabele Matlosa states in Chapter 6, the 2004 multiparty election in South Africa was unique, in that it marked the first decade of democratic political transformation in the country. In many respects, the elections also provided an opportunity for the government, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, the opposition political parties and the other stakeholders to reflect on their achievements and failures and of course to chart the best way forward. The author observes that the 2004 electoral process in South Africa was well managed by the IEC throughout the three stages, namely: pre-election phase; polling phase; and post-election phase. He observes that the proportional representation model adopted by South Africa has served the country well in many respects, particularly in the areas of representation in the legislative assembly, gender balance, reconciliation, and participation by voters during elections. Khabele Matlosa correctly observes that South Africa’s electoral process rests on solid constitutional and institutional foundations, paving the way for the institutionalisation and consolidation of democratic governance.

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Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding these positive developments on the political front, Matlosa argues that South Africa, like other African countries, is still facing a number of challenges. Firstly, the dominant party syndrome remains one of the main challenges to democracy consolidation in the country. The ANC’s dominance is historical in the sense that the formerly disadvantaged groups, who constitute the majority of the population in the country, associate their liberation and selfdetermination with the party. The decades-old, deeply entrenched socio-cultural and econo-political racial discrimination and its vices reminiscent of the apartheid era still linger in the minds of the majority of South African voters.22 This book address the issues that underpin electoral processes in the countries under study. The challenges that these countries still face, particularly on the question of the consolidation of multiparty and democratic electoral process, remain and will continue to spark debate among Africans and Africanists. As expected, these challenges vary from country to country, with South Africa, irrespective of its recent democratic dispensation, allowing a more liberal electoral process compared to the other countries under study. The South African historical situation differs markedly with the rest of the African countries, which for decades were dominated by one-party state systems with ‘big men’ at the helm of the presidency.

ENDNOTES 1

For detailed analysis of these concepts see: Eisenstadt S. N. 1972. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. London: Sage. Jackson R. H. and Rosberg C. G. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. Joseph R. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levine V. T. 1980. ‘African patrimonial regimes in compara-

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tive perspective’, Journal of Modern African Studies. vol. 18. pp. 657–673. 2

Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/ act_Of African Union.htm.

3

Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/ act_Of African Union.htm.

4

See, for example: Cowen M. and Laakso L. 2002 ‘Elections & election studies in Africa’. In Cowen M. & Laakso L. (eds). Multiparty Elections in Africa. New York: Palgrave. pp. 1–26. Bennet G. 1963. Kenya: A Political History. London: Oxford University Press. Mamdani M. 1996. Citizens and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Post K. W. J. 1963. The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and administration in a developing political system. London: Oxford University Press.

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Osahgae E. 1999. ‘Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering prospects, new hopes’. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. vol. 17. no. 1. pp. 5–28. For the concept

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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of the ‘Third Wave’, see Huntington S. P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the twentieth century. Norma: University of Oklahoma Press. 6

Cowen M. and Laakso L. 1997. ‘An overview of election studies in Africa’. University of Helsinki Institute of Development Studies Working Paper no. 1 & 2.

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Cowen and Laakso. 2002. op cit.

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See, Cohen D. 1983. ‘Elections and election studies in Africa’. In Yolamu Barabgo (ed). Political Science in Africa: A Critical Review. London: Zed Books. pp. 72–93. Przeworski A. 1988. ‘Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflict’. In John Elster J. & Slagstad R. (eds). Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 34–54.

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Colomer J. M. 2003. ‘It’s parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger’s Laws upside down)’. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting. Section: Representation and electoral systems. Panel: The choice of proportional representation. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 28–31 August. Duverger M. 1954. Political Parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: Wiley. Lijphart A. 1994. Electoral Systems and Political Systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945–1990. New York: Oxford University Press.

10 For a comprehensive analysis of the conceptual relationship between democratic citizen and electoral process, see: Thompson D. F. 1970. The Democratic Citizen: Social science and democratic theory in the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11 For detailed analysis of electoral systems, see generally: Reynolds A. Reilly B. & Ellis A. 2005. Electoral System Design: The new international IDEA handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA. Colomer J. (ed). 2004. Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Farrell D. M. 2001. Electoral Systems: A comparative introduction. London: Palgrave. Nohlen D. 1996. Elections and Electoral Systems. New Delhi: Macmillan. 12 Heywood A. 2002. Politics. (2nd ed). Houndmills: Palgrave. 13 Musoke I. K. 1994. ‘Political parties: Problems in power and opposition’. In Maliyamkono T. L. (ed). The Cost of Peace: Views of Political Parties on the Transition to Multiparty Democracy. Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Dar es Salaam: Tema Publishers Co. Ltd. p. 119. 14 On the correlation between electoral openness and political violence, see for example: Crescenzi M. 1999. ‘Violence and uncertainty in transitions’. Journal of Conflict Resolution. vol. 43. no 2. pp. 192–212. Klopp J. 2002. ‘Ethnic clashes and winning elections: The case of Kenya’s electoral despotism’. Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 35. no 3. pp. 31–75. Snyder J. 2000. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Tilly C. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 15 See, for example: Adar K. G. 2000. ‘Assessing democratization trends in Kenya: A postmortem of the Moi regime’. In Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. vol. 38. no. 3. November. pp. 103–140. Adar K. G. 2000. ‘The internal and external contexts of human rights practice in Kenya: Daniel arap Moi’s operational code’. African Sociological Review. vol 4. no.1. pp. 74–96. Republic of Kenya. 1992. Report of the Parliamentary Select

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Government printer. 16 Diamond L. 2006. ‘Developing democracy in Africa: African and international imperatives’. p. 12. Accessed 8 February. http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/ DiamondAfrica.htm.

INTRODUCTION

Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other Parts of Kenya. Nairobi:

17 ibid p. 13. 18 See generally: Carothers T. 1997. ‘The rise of election monitoring: The observers observed’. Journal of Democracy. vol. 8. no. 3. July. pp. 17–31. Fox G. H. 1995. ‘Multinational election monitoring: Advancing international law on the high wire’. Fordham International Law Journal. vol. 18. May. pp.1658–1667. 19 Schmitter P. 1997. Civil society east and west’. In Larry Diamond et al. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 240. 20 Diamond L. 1997. ‘Prospects for democratic development in Africa’. Paper presented to the University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Democratic Governance Project. Harare: Department of Political and Administrative Studies. p. 24. 21 See, for example: Nordlund P. 1996. Organising the Political Agora: Domination and democratisation in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press Sachikonye M. (ed). 1995. Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social movements in Southern Africa. Harare: SAPES Books. Fatton R. 1995. ‘Africa in the age of democratization: The civic limitations of civil society’. African Studies Review. vol. 38. no. 2. pp. 67–100. 22 For the debate on the pros and cons of party dominance in South Africa, see: Mwangi O. G. 2002. ‘Democracy and party dominance in Kenya and South Africa: A comparative study of the Kenya African National Union and the African National Congress’. PhD thesis. Grahamstown: Rhodes University. Giliomee H. & Simkins C. (eds). 1999. The Awkward Embrace: One-party domination and democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg. Pempel T. J. (ed). 1990. Uncommon Democracies: The one-party dominant regimes. Ithaca:

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Cornell University Press.

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CHAPTER 1

THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS Contextualising the 2004 elections

Faten Aggad

INTRODUCTION The dramatic political changes that have taken place in Algeria since 1988 have baffled even the most seasoned political actors and analysts. The Algerian regime’s unexpected move towards political liberalisation in 1988 set in motion one of the first, and most thorough, processes of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa. This process of political liberalisation took an unexpected turn in 1990/91, when a newly created Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),

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took the lead in the local and parliamentary elections1.

The ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation was introduced to Algeria in the late 1980s, and at a costly price. Algeria’s sudden and swift political transition to democracy marked a major turning point in the country’s history. An internal security and political crisis followed, which continued for a decade. The failure of the democratic transition and the outbreak of terrorism in the country led many sceptics to declare the official failure of Algerian democracy. A decade later, and although many reject the claim that a democratic transition is regaining momentum in Algeria, it is necessary to recognise some progress; a progress that is supported by a number of analysts and international observers. However, this is not to claim the maturity of the democratic process in this North African country. Nonetheless, democratisation is a gradual process, and should recognise internal socio-economic and political rights as well as individual rights and liberties. Our aim in this chapter is to reflect on the role elections played in bringing about a democratic establishment in Algeria, if that has indeed been achieved.

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Although we do not specifically aim at discussing the Algerian political development in general, we will first briefly review the democratic transition in order to trace the political progress in the country. The chapter will subsequently focus on the April 2004 presidential election. In our discussion we will evaluate the key fields that serve as benchmarks for the assessment of a democratic electoral process.

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THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS SINCE THE POLITICAL REFORMS: 19892004

14

The leadership of the National Liberation Front (FLN) dominated the postindependence Algerian political scene. The FLN was an anti-French liberation movement that became a political party following the independence of the country in 1962. Algeria was then a one-party state, deeply rooted in socialist ideology. It wasn’t until 1989 that the country embraced multipartism, with the introduction of a new constitution, following a national referendum in February 1989. The most significant riots in the history of post-independence Algeria shook the country in October 1988, forcing political reforms. Faced with a popular uprising and a changing international balance of power, the then president, Chadli Ben Djadid, introduced major political reforms that were to change the history of the country for the next decade, and pave the way for a democratic transition. A new ideological tone characterised the 1989 constitution, which officially announced the end of socialist Algeria, and the introduction of multipartism. The constitution was followed by numerous legislative adjustments, allowing the establishment of a system of proportional representation, and legalising the creation of political parties, thus allowing multiparty elections. In January 1992, the country held its first multiparty elections. Nearly fifty political parties contested the first round.2 The political establishment fiercely opposed the election results, fearing the emergence of an extremist Islamic government modelled on the Afghan and Iranian example. The election results were nullified, sparking the Islamist conflict, which had already started to simmer in the early 1980s. Following the 1992 elections, the Algerian political scene entered a critical phase. The assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992 was followed by the appointment of Ali Koufi as interim president, and then by the five-member Presidential High Council, which eventually appointed Liamine Zeroual as an interim president in 1994. General elections were subsequently held in 1995, in which Liamine Zeroual was elected president of the Republic. However, the legitimacy of the elections was once again questioned. The Zeroual era was marked by key developments in the electoral process agenda.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

The FIS was a religious fundamentalist political party that had metamorphosed into a terrorist group. In response, the government introduced constitutional amendments in 1996, prohibiting the creation of religiously based political parties,3 thus banning parties such as the FIS from running in elections. Those people who realised the danger of associating radical religious thought with politics welcomed the amendments. On the other hand, Islamists argued that the provision was only beneficiary to the ruling, often liberal party. This dilemma is now known as the ‘Algerian syndrome’. If excluding religious parties jeopardises democracy, including religious parties may also endanger democracy, as such parties often have little faith in democracy as a Western liberal concept. Besides the aforementioned change in the electoral procedure, the 1996 constitutional amendments allowed Algerians living abroad representation, and officially transformed the Algerian parliament into a bicameral system, constituted of the National People’s Assembly and the National Council. The latter provision came into force in November 1996.4 In 1998, during a speech on national television, Zeroual resigned, citing health reasons. Presidential elections followed in April 1999, which brought Abdelaziz Bouteflika into office. Bouteflika was a prominent political figure, who had acted as the head of the Algerian diplomacy under the Boumedien administration, and as Algeria’s representative as the chairman of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Bouteflika was re-elected on 8 April 2004 for a second, and final, five-year term in office.

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ELECTIONS 2004: PAVING THE WAY FOR DEMOCRATISATION? Since 1995, Algerians have voted far more frequently than their African counterparts; they have visited voting stations three times (including the 2004 elections) to elect a president, twice for legislative elections, and twice for local elections.5 They have also voted for several referendums, the latest being on the National Reconciliation Charter in September 2005. The 2004 race to the El Mouradia presidential house was contested by: r
r
r
r
r
r


the incumbent president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika his previous Prime Minister and main challenger, Ali Benflis the Muslim conservative candidate, Abdullah Djaballa the leader of a regionally and ethnically-based Kabyle party, Said Saadi the leader of the small leftist party Ahd 54, Fawzi Rebaine the first female candidate in the history of the country and in the Arab world, Louisa Hanoun of the Algerian Workers’ Party (PT).

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This section of the chapter will engage in an assessment of some key elements of the electoral process that took place in Algeria in 2004. The process is divided into three phases, namely the pre-electoral process, Election Day and post-election. Before discussing the Algerian electoral process, let us first highlight some issues plaguing the African political scene in general. It is essential to take into account the manipulation of the electoral process, not only by governments but also by opposition parties themselves. The immaturity of the African opposition, in general, has led a substantial number of opposition parties to seek strategies that are in themselves detrimental to the proper conduct of a democratic electoral process. As noted by Adar and Nkosi, opposition parties in Africa become platforms to address personal issues. Thus ‘a number of leaders who have had personal disagreement with the leaders of ruling political parties end up creating their own opposition parties or swapping parties … this highlights another problem in African politics, that of integrity and credibility’ (own emphasis).6 African opposition parties, in more than a few instances, lack ideological orientation. As confirmed by Adar and Nkosi,7 few African opposition parties differentiate their programmes from those of the governing party or coalition. Eventually, they not only provide a limited range of political choice to the electorate, but their political agenda constrains innovation. More worrisome is that they employ similar political ideologies to the ruling parties, and once elected, they fail to translate their promises into action, much as the overthrown regimes failed to do. Regime changes in a number of Southern African countries, notably Malawi and Zambia, reflect this failure. Therefore, successive undemocratic regimes in Africa become a vicious circle whereby apparently democratic parties replace undemocratic ones. Once victorious, the newly elected parties undergo an unfortunate metamorphosis. Furthermore, many opposition parties advise their constituencies to boycott elections, a strategy that may indeed be fruitful in some instances yet unconstructive in others. Many opposition parties calling for a boycott often assume that the electoral process is flawed and has already been tampered with by the government in place. Thus voting is useless. Is this constructive to the democratisation process? Would it not be more appropriate for the political opposition to become involved in the process first and find a strategy to ensure a democratic handling of the elections? Rather than initially engaging in an electoral process, and then declaring the process unfit after realising the poor prospects of winning, would it not be more constructive for opposition parties to deal with the root causes of a non-democratic electoral process, through electoral law, for example? The strategy can, indeed, be rethought in many African cases, although it is true that the electoral process remains flawed, and affords many opposition parties in a number of African countries little room for manoeuvre.

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Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

The support base of African opposition parties also reflects their weakness. Often, opposition groups are based on the divisive factors of ethnicity, religion or class. As a matter of fact, only a few newly emerging parties have succeeded in nurturing new support constituencies across social lines.8 Thus, opposition parties may be numerous, but they remain fragmented, their differences easily overcome for the benefit of a coalition. An alliance strategy whereby opposition parties unite to challenge a governing party may be beneficial where there are indications of democratic tolerance. Should a favourable environment exist, an opposition coalition would give more room for democratic practices to flourish, if the alliance survives. Indeed, the leading party may tamper with opposition alliances. However, it is the obligation of the opposition, if genuine, to undertake an internal reassessment to avoid leaving a gap for vicious manipulation by leading parties or coalitions.

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PREELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS The events that unfold in the run-up to an election often indicate the maturity of the democratic electoral process in a given country. The candidates’ selection process, media coverage and bias, electoral campaigns, and election-related violence are often used as benchmarks to assess the democratic nature of the electoral process. The 2004 pre-election phase in Algeria reflected both negative and positive developments. There were three major issues of concern. Firstly, violent incidents were registered in the country prior to the election, particularly in the Kabyle region, east of the capital Algiers. The region, an ethnically distinctive part of the country, has been a political hot spot since 2003 when security forces clashed with a group of youth. The Kabyles have since been negotiating with the government for more autonomy in the Kabyle region as well as recognition of the Berber tongue, Amazight, as an official language. The government has subsequently recognised Amazight as a national, but not an official, language. It has also agreed to remove, at the request of the Co-ordination of Arouch, Dairas and Communes (CADC)9, the elected mayors of the National Democratic Rally (RND) in the Kabyle region. This move sparked serious opposition by the concerned party, which argued that the mayors were elected by popular vote.10 The collapse of negotiations between the government of Ahmed Ouyahia and the CADC led to the pre-election clashes in the Kabyle region. The government had agreed on 15 demands as set out in El Ksour Platform, the basic negotiating policy of the CADC. The concern around the constitutionalisation of Amazight, however, remained contentious, with the government continuously proposing to refer the decision to all Algerians through a national referendum. The CADC rejected the proposal, maintaining that subjecting the matter to a referendum would lead

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CHAPTER 1 Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

18

to its rejection by the majority of Algerians11. This may well be the case but the need to involve all Algerians in this decision is critical, since the Berber language is a widely debated topic in all parts of the country. Taking a decision without general consultation of the Algerian population may indeed spark another challenge to the government. The failure to agree on the language issue thus led to the interruption of the negotiations, and a call for the boycott of the elections by the CADC. The president of the CADC, Belaid Abrika, then officially declared that all presidential candidates, including the Kabyle candidate Saadi, were persona non grata, and thus should not be supported through elections.12 The call for a boycott had its effect on the elections as will be noted later. Violence also erupted in the southern part of the country, notably in the cities Ouargla and Tougourt, when a group of young unemployed men clashed with security forces during and following a visit by Bouteflika.13 This violence was, however, not directly linked to the election itself, but rather to socio-economic protests. The violence stopped during the election week. Secondly, a major split within the long-ruling FLN party marked the preelection period. Tensions within the political party surfaced in December 2003, when a court decision ruled in favour of freezing FLN assets.14 This was followed by a contest between Ali Benflis, a former prime minister under Bouteflika, and Bouteflika himself. The FLN eventually opted for Benflis as its candidate while Bouteflika ran in the election as an RND candidate. The animosity between Bouteflika and Benflis led the latter to maintain, during the electoral campaign, that Bouteflika’s followers continuously harassed his supporters,15 a statement that could not be confirmed by independent observers. Despite the allegations, electoral campaigns were reportedly conducted à l’Américaine, with all candidates convening rallies around the country, using various media platforms. Thirdly, the selection of the candidates by the Constitutional Court raised eyebrows among the supporters of those who were rejected. Ahmed Taleb Al Ibrahimi, the leader of Wafaa, Sid-Ahmed Ghozali of the Democratic Front and Moussa Touati of the Algerian National Front were all rejected due to their failure to collect the required 75 000 signatures.16 The leaders of these parties, most notably Ibrahimi, have accused the Constitutional Court of purposefully obstructing their participation in the election. Ibrahimi and Ghozali subsequently announced their support for Benflis.17 Nonetheless, positive developments, as far as the pre-election phase is concerned, were also noted. Probably the most significant was the shift in the position of the Algerian army. The statement by the army, made through its Chief of Staff at the time, General Mohamed Alamari, that it would remain neutral during elections, was widely praised, both internally and externally. Many have criticised the role of the army in Algerian politics, especially due to its intervention in the cancellation of the 1992 elections, which would arguably have brought the FIS to victory. This criticism is questionable, however, as the cancellation may have

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THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

reflected the will of the Algerian people.18 Alamari has also rejected requests by opposition political parties who previously criticised the involvement of the army, but who were now calling for the military leaders to stop Bouteflika from manipulating the election.19 Attempts by the Algerian army to change its image in the international community were further illustrated by an electoral law amendment that abolished special voting stations in military bases. Previously, army, gendarmerie and police personnel were allowed to vote in special voting stations within their bases. The electoral law was amended in January 2004 in order to remove this provision. The amendment preserved, however, the itinerant polls used in the desert to allow the nomads in the south of the country to vote. This change in the electoral law, as well as the army’s neutrality during these elections, illustrates the willingness of the army to distance itself from the Algerian political scene. Many analysts have suggested that this move by the Algerian army is likely to be sustained as ‘the army’s current priority [is] its professionalisation and its integration into NATO’.20 Secondly, following premature allegations of fraud, Bouteflika called for the creation of an independent electoral commission, the National Political Commission to Oversee the Presidential Election (CPNSEP). The commission was headed by Said Bouchair and was composed of representatives of each presidential candidate. The commission had branches at the local level in order to guarantee more transparency.21 The role of the commission proved to be crucial in monitoring the situation, and notably violence in the period leading up to Election Day. The commission’s impartiality was proved when it officially called on the government to attempt to calm the security situation unfolding prior to the election.22 The role of the media in the election preparation process, as well as the subsequent phases, is particularly interesting to analyse. Political parties opposing the president maintained that the national/state media was supportive of the incumbent president, despite the fact that the national television channel also featured opposition leaders in political debate. Foreign observers and media reported that the ‘six candidates whiz across Africa’s second largest country and run television, radio and newspaper advertisements’.23 While criticism of the biased state media was widespread, very little was mentioned about the independent print media, and particularly the French-language publications, which were in favour of Bouteflika’s main competitor, Ali Benflis. The ‘war’ between Bouteflika and the private media continued to unfold in the headlines of the above-mentioned daily papers. The media division, however, played a positive role in the election process, serving as a crucial campaigning tool for all candidates in that it allowed the Algerian people balanced access to information. The problems of the pre-electoral phase were mostly addressed and order was re-established. The numerous clashes gave way to a generally calm Election Day. Nevertheless Election Day was seriously affected by the CADC-ordered boycotts in

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the Kabyle region where a group of youngsters wrecked ballot boxes, according to some reports.24 The disruptions were, however, limited to the Kabyle region.

ELECTION RESULTS Although pre-election opinion polls had granted Bouteflika the edge over Benflis, it remained unclear whether the elections would be limited to one round, as many expected a close result. However, Bouteflika was to win by a surprising margin. The voting turnout was also solid in comparison to other elections/referendums, as it approached the 60 per cent mark.25 A tripartite coalition between the FLN, RND and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) subsequently formed the new government. The official results were as follows: Candidate/ Party Abdelaziz Bouteflika: National Democratic Rally (RND)

85,0

Ali Benflis: National Liberation Front (FLN)

653 951

6,4

Abdallah Djaballah: Movement for National Reform (MRN)

511 526

5,1

Said Saadi: Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)

197 111

1,9

Louisa Hanoun: Workers’ Party (PT)

101 630

1,0

63 761

0,6

10 179 702

100,0

Total

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%

8 651 723

Fawzi Rabaine: (Ahd 54)

20

Number of votes

Bouteflika’s success may be attributed to two key factors. Firstly, unlike other prospective candidates who focused their campaign on particular groups, Bouteflika made a real attempt to be more inclusive. Said Saadi, for instance, enjoyed support from only a minority in the Kabyle region, specifically in the city of Tizi Ouzou. His focus on a specific ethnic group came at an expensive price due to the boycotts in the region. As a matter of fact, many analysts maintain that the abstention rate worked in favour of Bouteflika, as participation by Kabyles would have brought more support to Saadi and Benflis.26 Furthermore, Saadi was not the only candidate supported by the population of the region. He was challenged by Benflis. Abdullah Djaballa, the conservative Islamic leader of the MRN, also received meagre public support. Algerians remain distant from conservative parties as a result of the instability, wrought by FIS activism, that has plagued the country since 1992. The few followers of the ex-FIS also did not show support for Djaballah’s party, because he has a history of conflict and divergence with Abassi Madani, the leader of the FIS. As for Fawzi Rebaine, leader of the small leftist party Ahd 54, he was virtually unknown to Algerians. Generally, these

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THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

candidates demonstrated a limited support base, as we have noted is so often the case with African opposition parties. None of the aforementioned Algerian opposition parties, with the exception perhaps of Benflis, could have hoped for a ticket to El Mouradia House. Their support remained weak. A single broad opposition coalition might have had better results. Benflis of the FLN, who was believed to be a major contender for the presidency, also faced key obstacles. Benflis’s electoral campaign, according to some observers, arguably lacked a clear and coherent programme. In fact, the only opposition candidate who did have a well-structured programme was Louisa Hanoun. Benflis’s campaign was merely modelled on Bouteflika’s programme, thus focusing on countering key points in the FLN’s candidate manifesto. Furthermore, observers noted that Algerians remain skeptical of the unknown and their choice to opt for continuity also contributed to the favouring of the current president. A number of news reports emerging out of the country during the elections highlighted the continuity factors. Interviews with Algerians indicated that the population opted for Bouteflika to allow him to finalise the programmes launched in his first term.27 The second factor that worked in favour of Bouteflika is what has been referred to as the ‘triple comeback’ of Algeria: in terms of security, economy and the restoration of the country’s image in the international arena. According to several reports, most Algerians questioned on why they would vote for Bouteflika referred to these aspects as the leading reasons. Bouteflika has brought security and stability to the North African country since his appointment in 1999. This may be attributed, to a large extent, to the Concorde Civile, an amnesty law that came into force on 13 January 2000, following a national referendum. The amnesty law resulted in 6 000 terrorists laying down their arms. Bouteflika’s achievement, in terms of security, contributed to his growing support base throughout his first term in office. Indeed, the results of the polls demonstrate that the incumbent president received more support in those regions that suffered the most from terrorism. In Tissemsilt, southwest of the capital, Bouteflika prevailed with 95.47 per cent of the vote. In Tiaret, a city in the west of the country, where the arid and mountainous landscape facilitated terrorist activities, the president received 94.82 per cent of the vote. Not far from Tiaret, in Sidi Belabes, he was supported by 93.79 per cent of the vote. In Relizan, the same trend was recorded, with Bouteflika gaining 64.26 per cent of the vote. These are but a few examples of a recurring trend throughout the country.28 The economic performance of the country, which resulted from the stable security situation, also proved to be a selling point for Bouteflika. The Algerian economy has not been in better shape since 1989. GDP growth rate was estimated at almost 7 per cent in 2003, and almost 6 per cent in 2004 compared to the near zero of the early 1990s.29 Foreign exchange reserves are currently estimated at $33 billion.30 Investment (domestic and foreign) has also increased, passing the

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$15.5 billion bar, three times more than the decade spanning 1989–1998. The balance of payments is also in good shape, with an excess in external trade of $4.1 billion for the first semester of 2003. Furthermore, after a phase of deceleration, the agricultural sector has developed significantly. In 2003, agricultural growth was estimated at about 16 per cent.31 This has resulted in the creation of millions of jobs in rural areas. Moreover, some 50 000 microenterprises have generated 150 000 jobs. The 2004 finance law handled 200 000 projects, which are intended to benefit 550 000 job seekers under the age of 35 (this category constitutes one-third of the population affected by unemployment). Building projects alone have created 70 000 permanent jobs.32 The unemployment rate fell from more than 30 per cent to 23 per cent by the time of the 2004 elections, and to 17.7 per cent by December 2004.33 The last aspect of the so-called comeback is the repositioning of Algeria in the international arena. The country has remained isolated from the international community as a result of the internal crisis. Bouteflika understood his country’s seclusion when he stated, ‘Algeria was isolated, and no country, no brother, no friend nor any other dared to look at us, and this is why Algeria must rely only on itself.’34 Despite this feeling of betrayal, the country has revived its activism in the international community, and has imposed itself as a key player in African politics, as a founding member of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Within this context, the country has also ratified the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The re-election of Bouteflika is hence a mandate given to him by the population to finalise the reforms undertaken in the country. The most crucial aspects that he is expected to tackle before the end of his term are socio-economic reforms, notably the further reduction of the level of unemployment. Economic reforms will be monitored closely, as the country is again expected, according to the 2005 finance law, to achieve a GDP growth rate of 5.5 per cent, thus sustaining the pace of economic growth for the third year in a row. Social reforms are of major importance as well. Bouteflika’s social programme was based on three promises, namely housing, reform of the education system and reform of the family code and the status of women. The devastating consequences of the current family code, especially on women and children, prompted a call for swift amendments to the code. In its first term, the government undertook reforms in the education system and attempted to provide as much social housing as possible. The reform of the family code took place and was tabled by parliament in 2004.

POSTELECTION PHASE

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The main opposition factions, notably Benflis’s FLN, welcomed the election results with accusations. They claimed massive fraud and irregularities occurred during

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THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

the 8 April elections. Louisa Hanoun has, however, rejected such claims, arguing that she does not support claims by her fellow opposition leaders.35 The accusations started prior to the elections, when Benflis alleged that Bouteflika intended to rig the election results to gain a second term in office. Asked by the national electoral commission to provide concrete proof of fraud, opposition parties could not do so and eventually withdrew their accusations. International observers – more than 120 of them representing the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United States, the Arab League and the African Union (AU) – have all rejected the allegations, maintaining that they did not witness any signs of irregularities. To counter such claims, the head of the European Parliamentary observers’ team, Pasqualina Neapoletano, has indicated that ‘the fact that the (opposition) candidates are still there means that in the minds of the candidates, the elections are still worth contesting’.36 International observers have also invited the Algerian opposition to provide them with proof of fraud in order to support their claims. The opposition has thus far failed to respond to the request. The conclusions of Western diplomats, with regard to the outcome of the elections, were consistent, as all of them maintained that the elections were the most free and fair the country has experienced since its transition to multi-party politics in 1989.37 Bruce George, an observer from the OSCE noted that the election’s outcome clearly reflected the will of the Algerian people.38 Furthermore, Anne-Marie Lizin, the chairperson of the Belgian senate, maintained: ‘For us it is clear. What we have seen during this election is consistent, in terms of procedures, with European standards.’39 George added that the election proceedings amounted to ‘one of the best conducted elections, not just in Algeria, but in Africa and much of the Arab world’.40 It is believed that these elections will raise Algeria’s position in terms of democratisation in Africa, and it will, almost certainly, head the list in the Arab world.41

OVERALL OBSERVATIONS A number of general observations on the democratic development of Algeria can be made from reports flowing out of the country during the 2004 election process. There is a general sentiment among the population that the election was reflective of their will. A number of reports referred to Algerians commenting that for the first time in the democratic history of the country, they were not certain who the winner would be. Many remained unsure on whether it was Bouteflika or Benflis who would win the election and whether the country would have to go through a second round to determine the new president.42 The role of the electoral commission in guaranteeing the legitimacy of the

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elections was crucial in the April 2004 poll. The 2004 commission was particularly successful. It was composed of representatives from all participating political parties, which lent it a credibility that a government-appointed commission would have lacked. The role of the media should also be praised. Despite the various biases that characterised the elections, both in favour of the ruling coalition and opposition leaders, the media enabled the public access to information from different angles.

CONCLUSION

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Judging a democratic process in a country on the basis of few successful elections may well be inadequate, precisely because it is a process. What can be deduced from election analysis, however, is just how committed the political system, the elite, institutions, civil society and the population are to a democratic transition. What emerged from the Algerian case study is political and popular engagement in the electoral process. The observations noted above hint at positive progress in Algerian politics, namely: r
A positive development in Algerian politics is the genuine interest of the majority of the population in a political and electoral process that is perceived to be largely democratic. r
Although the country is still in the process of consolidating a recently launched democratisation process, the return of the population, with a degree of trust, to the political scene may point to an optimistic way forward. r
Despite the apparent success of the 2004 elections, Algeria cannot claim the consolidation of democracy in the country. However, it can comfortably claim a successful re-launch of the process, more than a decade after its official institutionalisation.

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Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ANNEXURE A: ALGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES Name

Political representative Status

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National Liberation Abdelaziz Front (FLN) Bouteflika

Description

Legal

Extension of the liberation movement. It is a rightist party and the longest-ruling party in the country.

National Democratic Rally (RND)

Ahmed Ouyahia Legal

An offshoot of the FNL created in 1997. It is moderate in orientation.

Movement of Society for Peace (MSP)

Bougherra Soultani

Legal

Moderate Islamist party.

El Islah

Abdallah Djaballah

Legal

Islamist party aiming at establishing a state based on Islamic laws.

Workers’ Party (PT) Louisa Hanoun

Legal

Calls for the establishment of a law-based democratic state, from which Islamist parties should not be excluded.

Ennahda

Lahbib Adami

Legal

Conservative party.

Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA)

Yacine Terkmane Legal

Minor leftist party.

Movement of National Understanding (MEN)

Ali Boukhazna

Legal

Minor moderate party.

Front of Socialist Forces (FFS)

Hocine Ait Ahmed

Legal

Ethnically based party (Kabyle).

Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)

Said Saadi

Legal

Ethnically based (Kabyle) leftist Party that calls for the opening up of the political scene to younger generations.

Movement for Democracy in Algeria (MDA)

Ahmed Ben Bella

Legal

A moderate Islamist party.

Ahd 54

Fawzi Rebaine

Legal

The name of the party refers to the Soummam Treaty in which Algerians decided to guarantee the total independence of the country from colonialism. It is leftist.

Wafaa (Loyalty)

Taleb Al Ibrahimi Not recognised

Extremist Islamist movement.

Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)

Abassi Madani

An extremist Islamist party that was banned following the elections of 1992. It is the key perpetrator of terrorist activities in Algeria.

Illegal

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CHAPTER 1

ENDNOTES 1

Volpi F. 2003. Islam and Democracy: The failure of dialogue in Algeria. London: Pluto Press. p. vii.

2

Middle East Report. 1993. ‘Algeria: Democratization, October 1988–11 January 1992’. http://www.kalabhavanshow.info/world_ref/Algeria/dz0122.htm.

3

European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. 2004. ‘Algeria: Elections and parliament’. http://www.medea.be/?page=2&lang=en&doc=13

4

ibid.

5

Cornish J.J. ‘Algeria pays toll for aborted poll’. Mail and Guardian (South Africa). 8–15 April 2004. p. 17.

6

Adar K. and Nkosi G. 2005. ‘Political Parties’. In Hugo P. and Maloka E. (eds). The State of Africa 2003/2004. Pretoria: The Africa Institute of South Africa. p. 18.

7

ibid p. 16.

8

ibid p. 17.

9

A representative Kabyle body constituted of traditional leaders, which is negotiating with the government on Berber-related issues.

10 ‘The Middle East and North Africa 2005’. Algeria. (51st ed.) London: Europa Publications. pp. 184–5. 11 ibid p. 185. 12 ibid. 13 ‘The Middle East and North Africa 2005’. op cit. p. 185. 14 ‘Tensions increase as Algeria approaches elections’. AfrolNews. 2 February 2004. www.afrol.com/printable_article/11168. 15 ibid.. 16 ‘The Middle East and North Africa 2005’. op cit. p. 186. 17 ibid. 18 Cornish J. J. op cit. Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

19 The Middle East and North Africa 2005. op cit. p. 185. 20 The Middle East and North Africa 2005. op cit. p. 185. 21 The Middle East and North Africa 2005. op cit. p. 185. 22 De Benden P. ‘Algeria poll body tells govt to stop violence’. Reuters. 3 March 2004. http://aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2004%20News%20archives/April/3%20n/ Algeria%20Poll%20Body%20Tells%20Govt%20to%20Stop%20Violence.htm. 23 ibid. 24 ‘Scattered violence marks presidential election in Algeria’. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 9 April 2004. http://aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2004%20News%20archives/ April/9n/Scattered%20Violence%20Marks%20Presidential%20Election%20in%20 Algeria.htm. 25 Algerian Constitutional Council. 2004. ‘Résultats Définitifs’. http://www.algeria-watch.de/ fr/article/pol/presidentielles/resultats_conseil.htm.

26

26 The Middle East and North Africa 2005. op cit. p. 186.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

watch.de/fr/article/pol/presidetielles/dominante_securitaire.htm. 29 Aggad F. 2003. Algeria: A country risk analysis. Africa Institute of South Africa. www.ai.org.za. 30 Doggett G. ‘Algerians ponder choice for president’. Mail and Guardian (South Africa). 6 April 2004. www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?ao=33765. 31 Ouazani C. 2003. ‘Bouteflika contre-attack.’ Jeune Afrique. www.jeuneafrique.com/ articlelmp.asp?art_cle=LIN02113bouteeuqatt0. 32 ibid.

THE ALGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

27 Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2004. op cit. 28 El Watan. 2004. ‘Les régions touches par le terrorisme ont voté Bouteflika’. www.algeria-

33 ‘Baisse de taux de chômage de 4 points en Septembre 2003’. El Moudjahid. 2004. www.80.88.0.236/stories.php?story=04/02/25/8138336 ‘Communication du Chef du gouvernement sur le bilan du développement économique et social Durant l’année 2004’. El Moudjahid. 2005. www.elmoudjahid.com/print.php?story=05/02/22/8810979. 34 Cornish J.J. op cit. 35 ‘Le partie des travailleurs n’adhère pas a la these de la fraude.’ Le Soir d’Algérie. 10 April 2004. www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/pol/presidetielles/pt_fraud.htm. 36 Doggett G. ‘Plot talk on eve of Algerian vote.’ Mail and Guardian (South Africa). 7 April 2004. www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?ao=33830. 37 BBC Correspondent. ‘Observers praise Algerian voting’. 2004. Newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/3613805.stm. 38 ibid. 39 ‘Présidentielles l’armè “n’entend ni gêner ni favoriser” les candidates’. Agence France Press. www.jeuneafrique.com/articlelmp.asp?art_cle=AFP33134prsidstadid0. 40 BBC Correspondent. op cit. 41 ibid. 42 De Benden P. op cit. 43 The political representative is not the party president, as the two might be different Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

individuals in Algeria. The political representative refers to the political figure that represents the party at the highest levels in national politics.

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27

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CHAPTER 2

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN CAMEROON Consolidating democracy, or foreshadowing decline?

John W. Forje

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INTRODUCTION: ELECTIONS AND NATIONBUILDING Elections entail the possibility of a political change. However, we often meet change with apprehension because of its unpredictability. The main function of an electoral system is to translate the votes cast in an election into seats won by each party in a Legislative Assembly.1 Elections are meant to give the people (the true custodians of power) the right to make their choices, elect and dismiss candidates as they see fit, and to put in place a government that is accountable, transparent and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. Elections are a key benchmark in any nation-building process, allowing failed states and divided societies to reconstitute and reconstruct sources of commonly accepted authority. Elections are also a source of polarisation, however, even in a society as secure and ordered as countries in the north. Too often, in societies emerging from civil war or in a process of transition (transformation), elections prove too high a hurdle to surmount, as the losers contest the results and the effects consequently perpetuate divisions in the society. Cameroon is not an exception to these hurdles, particularly after decades of authoritarian one-party rule. The aftermath of the 2004 presidential election in Cameroon resulted in draconian fiscal policies for 2005 that have exacerbated poverty. Multiparty electoral principles were lost in Cameroon when the 2004 election became personalised between President Biya and other presidential contenders. The real ideological issues faded into the background. Aristotle contends that in a democracy the people are king because they are in the majority, and because the will of the greatest number has the force of law. This is not true, however, in transitional societies where politics of the belly remain the order of the day.2

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With the return to multiparty political pluralism in the 1990s, Cameroon held its third presidential election on 11 October 2004 under what could be described in some quarters as free, fair and transparent conditions. The election was a milestone along the road to the return to democratic governance. The 1992 elections were conducted under the 1984 constitution, while the second and third elections were carried out under the auspices of the 1996 constitution with a seven-year term of office for the elected president. The concept of ‘free, fair and transparent’ elections within the Cameroon context needs further qualification. Yes, it was a free and fair election in relative terms, especially with regard to the casting of the ballot papers. In absolute terms, there have never been any free, fair and transparent elections in Cameroon; not since the reunification of the two Cameroons on 1 October 1961 and in particular, the institutionalisation of the unitary governance system in 1972. Indeed, neither in the heyday of the monolithic party system of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) nor under the current Cameroon People Democratic Movement (CPDM) has Cameroon conducted a clean election. A free, fair and transparent election begins with the establishment of a transparent electoral list and continues up to the publication of results, passing through the following steps:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Registration of voters and the issuing of electors’ cards Correct names appearing in the registry and voting station A voting process with indelible ink to avoid multiple voting Counting of the votes and pronouncement of the results A free and fair judicious contestation of any irregularities in the process, in a court of law assigned for such purposes.

The 2004 presidential election, like all other elections in Cameroon, was engulfed with wrangles around voter registration and non-issuing of registration cards. The opposition parties were prevented from campaigning. Even the media was prevented from providing proper coverage of the activities of the opposition parties. In a rare display of honesty, Paul Biya admitted that: [The] 11 October 2004 presidential elections, intended to serve as a true-life test of Cameroon’s march towards acquiring a democratic culture, was marred by irregularities. What we need to do in future – but this mostly the responsibility of political parties – is to ensure a larger voter turnout in order to broaden the base of our democratic governance system.3

30

Given this and other related discrepancies in the conduct of the elections, it is fairly safe to conclude that the election had been won long before the first ballot

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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THE BELEAGUERED COUNTRY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Cameroon is a country of complexities, and, if appropriate measures are not introduced to restrain the policies of exclusion and ethnic hegemonic politics, the country’s future is uncertain. These vices plague the political landscape of the country. To maintain power and ensure continuity of a spoils system that benefits only a few, elections are frequently rigged at all costs, with government operating on fundamental principles of divide and rule, exclusion, xenophobia, outright discrimination and the victimisation of those who share different ideological orientations. This explains why opposition parties were not allowed to campaign in areas of the ethnic origin of the leaders, particularly in the home province of the incumbent president. The regime also denied some of the electorate in some areas their democratic and constitutional right to register.5 Cameroon has a population of about 17 million with 230 ethnic groups, and is divided into 10 provinces covering an area of 475 000 square kilometres. English and French are the official languages, a legacy of its history as both a British and a French-administered United Nations Trust territory. The former British-administered territory became known as the Federal State of West Cameroon (FSWC) on 1 October 1961. The FSWC was divided into two provinces, namely the South West and North West. These transformations paved the way for a United Nations-administered plebiscite in 1961, in which the English-speaking territory voted overwhelmingly for the reunification of the two territories. The two United Nations Trust territories under British and French administration were reunified in October 1961 to form what became known as the Federal Republic of Cameroon. In September 1966, existing political parties were banned, leaving the Cameroon National Union (CNU) as the only legal political party. In 1972, a new political dispensation emerged with the abolition of the federal system and the introduction of a unitary governance system. Cameroon was now known as the United Republic of Cameroon and changed its official name to Republic of Cameroon in 1984. With the new political dispensation, especially following the formation of the New Deal Government in 1982, the minority English-speaking

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

was cast. But while the electoral process in all likelihood was flawed and chaotic, it was unlikely that the overall outcome would be disputed, unlike the 1992 elections that saw a presidential candidate placed under house arrest and a state of emergency declared in the province. In short, the 2004 elections suggest that democracy still has a long way to go before its entrenchment in the body politic of the country. Don McKinnon, the Commonwealth Secretary General, maintained that more should to be done to improve the democratic governance and human rights situations in Cameroon, focusing especially on the need for the National Elections Observatory (NEO) to be a more substantive and robust organisation.4

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population was now confronted with the politics of exclusion, more than ever before.6 The return to political pluralism in the 1990s opened new avenues for greater involvement by society in the body politic. The first opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was formed on 26 May 1990 in the Englishspeaking sector of northwest Cameroon. Over 175 registered political parties exist in Cameroon, though the activities of some do not extend beyond the bedroom of the leader. Nevertheless the political parties collectively play a major destabilising role during elections. Many scholars have analysed the political evolution of Cameroon.7 The political divide in Cameroon is based on the Anglophone – Francophone dichotomy. This ethno-geographic divide includes, among others: North West, West, Littoral and South West Provinces (Grand West) versus the rest of the country; South West, Centre, South, East, Adamawa, North and Extreme North Provinces (Grand North); Adamawa, North and Far North Provinces (Grand North Alliance) versus the rest; South, Centre, East and the Grand North Alliance; Northwest Provinces versus the rest of the country, and the Beti hegemony versus the rest of the country. These constellations play a large role in the body politic of the nation. It is no secret that France as well as French-speaking Cameroonians will not tolerate an Anglophone as head of state. This is the political situation in the country under which transparent, free and fair multiparty elections are supposed to take place.

PREELECTION CAMPAIGN

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ISSUES USED IN THE CAMPAIGNS

32

In some countries, the launching of party manifestos that spell out the political platform, precedes an election. In Cameroon, however, the issue of election manifestos is distant from the vocabulary of the country’s political mainstream. In Ghana, for example, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) launched its draft manifestos under the slogan of an ‘Agenda for positive change’. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) manifesto was titled ‘Spreading the benefits of development’. While the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) party conducted its election with the slogan ‘With Paul Biya: A Cameroon of greater ambitions’, the SDF focused its campaign on the general need for change to usher in new visions and a sense of direction for the country in the 21st century.8 The 2004 presidential election, it can be argued, was completely devoid of coherent electoral manifestos. The rhetoric that dominated the election, especially on the part of the major political parties, centered on two issues, namely: a computerised electoral register and an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). One of the responsibilities of the INEC was to oversee the entire electoral

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

r
the establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission r
a computerised voters register r
the need for an open and inclusive process of registration, including clear identification and location of polling stations as well as the right names of voters appearing at the right polling stations r
security of life and property r
the economy featured primarily in the campaign agendas of the opposition parties.

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

process from registration to pronouncement of the results. Secondly, in the absence of public opinion polls, politicians have to make the best of whatever opinions are expressed by the electorate. In all, there was constant wrangling on the variety of key issues that divided the contesting parties on the left–right political continuum. Electoral surveys can cloud rather than deepen public understanding of the political landscape. In the absence of party manifestos, the political debate would often fail to focus on the real burning issues of the day. In this case, debate was focused on:

The ruling CPDM’s successful campaign was based on:

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r
preserving the peace and stability prevailing in the country, as compared to the general instability in the Central African sub-region r
the experience of the incumbent r
gradual recovery of the economy, with the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline (CCOP) highlighted by the party as a major economic success r
their commitment to advancing the process of democratisation. Not surprisingly, an Independent Electoral Commission without the political will and determination of the people to change will make no progress. In addition, the issue of leadership remains crucial in the process, or else it will meander without a purpose or focus.9 Instead of spearheading the campaign process, President Paul Biya chose to sit in his private home in Mvodemeka, or was abroad on holidays. His public campaign appearances were limited to the following towns: Douala, (Littoral Province), Monatele, (Centre Province) and Maroua (Far North Province.) No visits were made to either of the two Anglophone provinces. This attitude indicated a foregone conclusion to the election results and a nonchalant attitude towards the Anglophone population by President Biya, which reached its height following the appointment of the new cabinet on 8 December 2004. Simultaneously, few other candidates personally campaigned extensively. Ni John Fru Ndi of the SDF remains the only candidate who has visited all ten provinces of the country

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more than ten times since the return to multiparty politics. Meeting the people in their environment is paramount to understanding their day-to-day living experiences. Some pertinent questions to ask in an attempt to understand the electoral outcome in Cameroon are: What progress has Cameroon made towards consolidating the democratisation process since the political transition from one-party state to the political pluralism of the 1990s? What are the contextual and explanatory factors behind the (low) level of electoral sophistication in the country? Does the current level present any hope or new ideals for better electoral practices in the country? Cameroon, like most transitional societies, has yet to arrive at the stage of politics based on ideological orientation, and not ethnicity. To a large extent, the 2004 presidential election was a contest between the advocates for change versus the status quo apologists, with the latter emerging victorious. There was a split in the opposition alliance, Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CNRR), and grumbling within the CPDM modernist faction against party leadership for not organising a congress to select the party’s candidate. Leading that faction was Mila Asoute, who broke ranks with the party and submitted his application as a presidential candidate. His candidature was rejected. Opposition hopes for a united front were consequently dashed when the modernist faction within the CPDM was left disillusioned. Of the 30 Cameroonians who filled their papers for the contest of the presidency, 16 were permitted to compete for the post. This worked in favour of the incumbent.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR CANDIDATES Despite the existence of 150 political parties, the contest for the presidency was narrowed down to a few competing candidates or parties. At the start, it looked like it was a contest between the ruling CPDM and the CNRR, an alliance of opposition parties, which in the end never materialised. Apart from government deficiencies in the organisation of the elections and the registration process, there were even greater weaknesses among the opposition parties. At the root of these failures was the ongoing and overwhelming political strength of the RDPC/ CPDM, consolidated through the use of the state bureaucracy and the dishing out of the spoils. The following box presents a list of the candidates running in the 2004 presidential elections. The three most serious contenders were Paul Biya, Ni John Fru Ndi and Adamu Ndam Njoya. This was Fru Ndi ‘s second attempt to win the presidency. Both Adamu Njoya and Fru Ndi boycotted the 1997 presidential elections. 34

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Paul Biya: Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) / Rassemblement démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) Ni John Fru Ndi: Social Democratic Front (SDF) Adamou Ndam Njoya: Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) / Union Democratique du Cameroun (UDC) Anicet Ekane: Movement Africain pour le Nouvelle Independence et la Democratie (MANIDEM) Boniface Forbin: Justice and Development Party (JDP) Djeukam Tchameni: Movement for Democracy and Interdependency (MDI) Garga Haman Adji: Alliance For Democracy and Development (ADD) Victorin Hameni Bieuleu: Union of Democratic Forces in Cameroon (UFDC) Hubert Kamgang: Union of African Populations (UPA)

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

Candidates for the 2004 presidential elections in Cameroon

Justin Mouaffo: Nationalism of Cameroonian Patriots (NPC) / Nationalisme des Pacifists du Cameroun pour lle Bienetre et l’Unit re’elle contre les Souffrances des Humains (NPS-BUSH) George Nymandi: Social Liberal Party (SLP) Fritz Pierre Ngo: Movement of Cameroon Ecologists (MCE)/Mouvement des ecologists camerounais (MEC) Jean-Michel Tekam: Party of Social Democracy (PDS) Yondo Mandengue Black: Social Movement for Democracy (MSD) / Mouvement Sociale pour la Nouvelle Democratic (MSDN) Gustave Essaka: Cameroon Integral Democracy (DIC) Jean-Jacques Ekindi: Progressive Movement (MP)

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Source: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization. 2004. Official List of Presidential Candidates. Yaounde: MTAD.

Since the introduction of multipartism in 1992, the ruling party has let the electoral system in Cameroon gradually take root. However, the CPDM still maintains exclusive control of state apparatus, including the electoral machinery. A privileged ruling elite at local, regional and national administration level controls the principal avenues of economic accumulation. The ruling party has even succeeded in extending its electoral base into regions hitherto considered beyond its natural core, such as the Beti-dominated Centre Province, if only through a politically-convenient alliance with the northbased National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP). This elite group is instrumental in promoting the agenda of the ruling party during elections.10 It came as no surprise that the opposition coalition, the CNRR, effectively disintegrated when it became clear the coalition partners could not possibly agree on a common candidate. Cameroon’s largest opposition party, the SDF, announced that it would field its own candidate after the CNRR selection committee rejected SDF leader Ni John Fru Ndi’s candidature and instead nominated Adamou Ndam Njoya of the Cameroon Democratic Union. Days after the SDF’s

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withdrawal, Antar Gassagay of the Union for the Republic (UPR) announced his party’s defection to the so-called ‘presidential majority’ bemoaning the ‘selfishness’ of opposition leaders.11 To a large extent, the failure of the opposition parties to rally forces around a common candidate pointed to a country grappling with myriad political squabbles, and parties that ended up paving the way for the most Machiavellian political backstabbing in recent history. Biya’s victory at the polls was as the result of the fragmentation among the opposition parties. Splits within the individual parties, and at the CNRR coalition level, increased the degree of apathy among their supporters, while the CPDM portrayed the opposition as a group that could not be trusted.

PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF ELECTION The preparation and conduct of the elections in many respects has remained almost the same. It is still the total prerogative of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MTAD). Major changes have included the introduction of a ceremonial body, the National Election Observatory (NEO), and recently, the use of transparent ballot boxes. Little has changed in the registration process. Suspicions of rigging will continue to persist until such time as the public can be persuaded that a genuine mechanism has been put in place to oversee free, transparent and fair elections within the country. Preparation for elections gets underway at the last minute. The powers of administrative officers have not diminished but intensified, as they can make or mar the process and outcome of election results in the country.

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ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES

36

The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation is the main electoral management body. Attempts by opposition parties to push for the creation of an Independent Electoral Commission failed. The NEO can only make observations, which may or may not be binding on the government. With the help of the British Council, an observers’ guide was published in 2002 outlining the modalities for election observers (British Council 2002). The official version of the NEO’s 2002 Parliamentary and Municipal Elections results has still not been made public. In addition, the NEO was appointed less than six months before the 2004 elections were held, giving the electoral body insufficient time to prepare. The extent to which civil society contributed to the appointments was minimal. Most of the appointees were in one way or another affiliated with the ruling party. Under the auspices of the National Episcopal Conference (NEC), the Catholic

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

On the face of it, everything looked ‘free and fair’ at many polling stations, as foreign observers, some hired, stood by to watch the trend of voting…Prior to establishing the voters’ lists, there was general apathy in the country, already accustomed to rigging mechanisms which have become more sophisticated with the passage of time…There was the blatant and criminal issue of distribution of envelopes of cash to tribal groups by Members of Parliament of the ruling CPDM.12

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

Church trained some 1 250 election monitors, who were thereafter accredited by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation. The national and international monitoring bodies covered polling stations. The former leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Mola Njoh Litumbe, disparaged election practice in these words:

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POLITICAL PARTIES The majority of Cameroon’s political parties exist only on paper. During the first multiparty parliamentary election in 1992, political parties converged into two camps, namely the presidential majority, made up of those parties that allied with the ruling party, and the opposition alliance. Subsequent elections pitted the two blocs against one another, but with more coherence existing within the ‘presidential majority’. The alliance of the ‘presidential majority’ presented a single candidate, Paul Biya, against a divided opposition alliance with 15 candidates. The opposition was better known for its divisions than any unity. They could not move beyond the limits of their weekly public demonstrations in Yaounde demanding transparent ballot boxes, computerised voters registration, and the need for establishing a level playing field for contesting parties. The opposition not only failed to mobilise their supporters but also did not succeed in the courts of law. For example, the Supreme Court rejected the six suits filed by the SDF and the CDU on the grounds that the candidates themselves did not sign the cases as stipulated by the electoral law. Fritz Ngo, a candidate for the Movement of Cameroon Ecologists, castigated his colleagues by arguing: ‘the opposition spent seven years dragging their militants into the streets instead of sensitising them into registering on the electoral lists. It has become normal for most politicians who lose elections to seek an honourable way out and some do so by filing frivolous law suits in court’.13

VOTER REGISTRATION By all standards, voter registration was neither transparent nor accessible, and particularly not to those considered strangers in an indigenous environment.

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Voter apathy was highly prevalent due to a number of inherent problems. These included secrecy in the registration process, administrative bottlenecks, and a long waiting period to obtain cards, corruption, and poor sensitisation of the electorates. Out of a population of about 17 million, with a voter capacity of around eight million, less than five million were registered. It should also be noted that multiple registration, which constituted part of the rigging agenda, was common. This helped inflate the actual number of registered voters. Table 1 depicts the number of registered voters per province:

Registered voters

Effective voters

Abstention

% Participation

Void ballots

Valid ballots

Table 1: Number of registered voters by province

Adamawa

225 292

187 908

37 384

83,40

5 235

182 673

East

260 791

210 984

36 300

80,70

3 750

207 214

Centre

747 040

609 395

137 645

86,03

7 595

601,806

Far North

966 575

834 366

132 2109

86,94

23 770

807,007

Littoral

628 277

336 294

291 983

71,84

6 562

329 732

North

365 625

333 431

62 194

85,11

11 123

292 308

North West

392 082

296 324

95 974

75,89

3 681

292 643

West

473 505

390 814

82 685

82,66

6 463

384 251

South

240 068

228 572

11 496

94,59

794

227 778

South West

358 493

287 374

45 895

80,43

3 078

284 296

Province

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Source: www.democraf.com and www.electionguide.org

The results at the national level, including the number of votes won by individual candidates, are illustrated in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. Political apathy is the result of a number of interrelated factors, ranging from gross disillusionment with the conduct of state affairs, and the role and attitude of politicians, to a general decline in living standards. Under these circumstances, democracy cannot be sustainable since economic growth and its benefits fail to trickle down to the people. The other reason for growing apathy within the body politic of the country is previous rigging and flawed election results. When the result is known long before, it does not motivate people to actively be part of the process. The general disillusionment with the approach of political parties to the political divide kept many eligible voters from the registration process. The kind of harassment the electorate were often subjected to acted as a deterrent in the registration process. 38

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Registered voters

4 657 748

Effective voters

3 830 272

Valid ballots

3 758 221

Abstention

827 476

Void ballots

72 051

% participation

82,23

Source: www.democraf.com and www.electionguide.org

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Table 3: Number of votes obtained by individual candidates nationwide Names and party

No. of ballots per candidate

% of ballots per candidate

Paul Biya (CPDM)

2 665 350

70,92

Ni John Fru Ndi (SDF)

654 066

17,40

Adamou Ndam Njoya (UDC)

168 318

4,47

Garga Haman Adji (ADD)

140 372

3,73

Justin Mouafa (NPC-Bush)

14 915

0,39

Yondo M. Black (MSD)

13 601

0,36

Anicet Ekane (MANIDEM)

13 290

0,35

Fritz Pierre Ngo (MEC)

13 122

0,34

Jean Michel Tekam (PDS)

12 785

0,34

Victorin Hameni Bieuleu (UFDC)

11 920

0,31

Boniface Forbin (JDP)

10 542

0,28

Djeukam Tchameni (MDI)

10 539

0,28

Jean-Jacques Ekindi (MP)

10 158

0,27

Hubert Kamgang (UPA)

7 508

0,19

George D. Nyamndi (SLC)

6 739

0,17

Gustave Essaka (DIC)

4 996

0,15

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

Table 2: Results at the national level including votes obtained by individual candidates

Source: www.democraf.com and www.electionguide.org

ELECTION RESULTS As already indicated, controversy clouded the 2004 presidential election. Firstly, there was a low turnout for registration by the eligible voters. Secondly, the results were given different interpretations. For example, opinions were divided between

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40

Cardinal Christian Tumi of the Catholic Church who saw the ‘election as a masquerade’, while the episcopal archbishop of Yaounde, Tonye Bakot, maintained, ‘the election reflected the will of the people’. No doubt, one of them painted an accurate picture. The co-ordinator of the Christian monitors, Professor Titi Nwell, in an interview with Radio France International (RFI), maintained that, ‘the election was a sham’. He condemned NEO, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, and government officials for failing to play their role objectively.14 Following pressure from top government circles, the chairperson of the Episcopal Conference, Archbishop Tonye Bakot of the Yaounde archdiocese, requested that Titi Nwell retract his statement to save the government from embarrassment. Professor Nwell acquiesced by retracting his statement.15 Following the reports of the Christian monitors who were accredited by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, in an interview granted to Radio France International on 20 October, Cardinal Christian Tumi maintained that ‘the election was neither free nor fair and far from transparent’, and that ‘Cameroon has never had a free and fair election’.16 This pronouncement angered the minister of communication, Jacques Fame Dongo, who castigated RFI for biased reporting. Dongo wondered why the RFI had ignored the letter of congratulations from President Chirac of France to Paul Biya as well as the interview by the President of the Federation of Protestant Churches in Cameroon (FPCC), the Right Reverend Pastor Joseph Mforchive, who maintained that the election was free and fair. In addition, the minister used Professor Nwell’s retraction to pick holes in Cardinal Tumi’s declaration. Embarrassed by such unfolding developments, Titi Nwell issued a rejoinder, which the state-owned Radio and Television Corporation (RTVC) refused to broadcast. Unable to stomach the minister’s half-truth, the secretary-general of the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church (ECCC), Reverend Father Patrick Lafon, and the co-ordinator of the Christian Monitor Team (CMT) gave interviews in defence of the cardinal and promised that their final report on the election would contain all the details. Again, the Presidency asked Archbishop Tonye Bakot to call his secretary-general to compel him to retract his declaration. This time, the archbishop met a stonewall as Reverend Father Lafon refused to budge. To save the battered image of the government, Archbishop Bakot issued a statement congratulating President Biya for his victory, and without consulting all the bishops, he read it over RTVC in both English and French.17 The battle about the conduct of individuals and the process of the election has yet to unfold. Just as the churches were divided over the conduct and results of the elections, so also were the different monitoring or observer teams. A most pressing question is whether Pastor Joseph Mforchive of the FPCC, and the chairperson of the Episcopal Conference of Cameroon Bishops (ECCB), Archbishop Tonye Bakot, is serving the church or the government. For the Catholic Church, it is a repeat of events in the 1990s. The same regime turned the late Archbishop

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THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

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Of the 4 657 748 registered voters, a total of 3 830 272 voted and 827 476 abstained. The turnout, according to the organisers, was placed at 82.23 per cent, which is extremely high under normal circumstances. In the North West Province, the stronghold of the SDF, the ruling CPDM improved its voting record from 9 per cent (32 348) of the votes cast for Paul Biya in 1992 to 30 per cent (87 827) in 2004. Opinions varied about the electoral results. Many supporters and sympathisers of the opposition parties felt cheated by the failure of the opposition to reach a compromise over a single presidential candidate. Freer voting and expression of ideas would help increase opportunities for some citizens to participate; perhaps it would also reduce those opportunities for others. There is no doubt that citizens can better sway government decisions when elections are competitive. Supporters of the various parties had conflicting interpretations of the elections, which ranged from free, fair and transparent to a rigged and flawed electoral process. Irrespective of the dominance and control of the state by the CPDM, Cameroon is gradually reinforcing its institutional capacity to conduct multiparty elections. However, much remains to be done in this area if democratic governance is to take root in the country. State control of the media and lack of well-established democratic procedures and rules governing elections are some of the difficulties that hamper free and fair electoral process. In addition, the parties do not sensitise their supporters. Above all, leaders of opposition parties are not very conversant with rules and regulations governing elections in the country.

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

Jean Zoa of Yaounde Archdiocese against Cardinal Christian Tumi. For how long and to what extent will these conflicts between the state machinery and influential forces within the various denominations continue?

TOO MANY POLITICAL PARTIES? One major question that needs to be seriously addressed, not only in Cameroon but throughout the continent, is the question of the number of political parties in a country. The multiplicity of political parties has negative implications for any democratic society, and generally works in favour of the ruling party. The return to political pluralism has failed to give Cameroon the kind of political direction it needs. As already indicated, the opposition’s fragmentation damaged its standing with the public. The opposition alliance, the Coalition for National Reconciliation and Reconstruction (CNRR) – established in August 2003 with the objective of fielding a single candidate for the 11 October 2004 presidential elections – fell by

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the wayside in September 2004 following the selection of Adamou Ndam Njoya in place of Ni John Fru Ndi as the coalition’s candidate. Attempts by Cardinal Christian Tumi, Archbishop of the Catholic Diocese of Douala, to reconcile the two leaders did not prove fruitful. Even though Ni John Fru Ndi offered the post of prime minister to Adamou Ndam Njoya in his future administration, Fru Ndi still failed to persuade the latter to withdraw his candidature in favour of Fru Ndi. During the campaigns, the two friends-in-arms traded insults and accused each other of treachery and betrayal. Immediately after his selection as the candidate for the opposition alliance, Adamou Ndam Njoya left for France. Was there a hidden hand behind the alliance’s failure to present a common candidate and why this visit to France by Adamou Ndam Njoya? After the rupture within the opposition parties, Antar Gassagay, a member of the coalition alliance, switched sides and called on his supporters to vote for Paul Biya. Generally, Cameroon’s opposition leaders are known for their disagreements and constantly shifting allegiances, but with this election their divisions may have permanently damaged their credibility. Apart from Ni John Fru Ndi, the majority of these opposition leaders have served Paul Biya as ministers or senior officials, and are well known for using the platform of opposition to negotiate a return to government. The opposition alliance collapsed as thoroughly during the first multiparty elections in 1992.

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CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS Civil society in Cameroon is passive, and has yet to exert any sizeable influence on politics, even during the era of monolithic party and governance systems. Of course, a few Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been active, especially in the field of human rights. Often the ruling party has used some of the CSOs to advance the CPDM agenda. In some cases, the CSOs undertook voter education exercises as part of their responsibility. One of the major problems faced by the CSOs has been dependency on foreign funding for the implementation of their activities. For example, the local chapter of the African Association for Public and Administrative Management (AAPAM), with the help of funding from the United States embassy in Cameroon, was involved in voter education exercises initiated by the embassy. Attempts by some political parties and members of civil society to get Cardinal Tumi as a candidate for the opposition party met with strong resistance from the cardinal and certain quarters of the ruling CPDM party.

42

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A number of national, regional and international monitoring and observing bodies appeared on the scene, most at the last minute, giving them very little time to observe the electoral process from the registration phase. To promote free, fair and transparent elections, observers should deploy their teams early and be well informed about the geopolitical dynamics of the country. The problem with the electoral monitors is not the lesson to take away from this election, however. It is the fact that Cameroonians have not yet learned to embrace democratic governance by genuinely practising it.

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FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTION

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AND OBSERVING ORGANISATIONS

By all standards, the 2004 election was not fair, free and transparent. There was no level playing field for the opposition candidates, compared to the advantages enjoyed by the incumbent. The election was monitored, however, by a number of local and international observers with considerably different assessments presented by each team. Vote rigging and vote buying were glaring irregularities. The conclusion by a team of former United States congress members was that the running of the election had been generally satisfactory, despite some shortcomings. The conclusion of the NEO put in place by the Cameroon government was no different. According to the Commonwealth observers, the election reflected the wishes of the people, but they criticised the fact that many people had been unable to exercise their right to vote. They recommended the establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to oversee the general organisation of future elections in the country. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, responsible for elections, could not be both prosecutor and judge at the same time and be expected to be fair, transparent and free. Less than half of those eligible to vote were registered. This suggests a number of inter-related causes: r
The high voter turnout among the registered voters notwithstanding, there was voter apathy regarding the political process, particularly because of the disintegration of the opposition parties. r
A number of people were denied registration simply because they were sympathetic to the opposition political parties. r
The refusal by community leaders to register ‘strangers’ disenfranchised voters originally from other areas.

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The International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) condemned the vote, accusing the government of vote rigging and vote buying. Local observers were generally critical of the way the election was conducted. Monitors from the Catholic Church alleged numerous irregularities. Cardinal Christian Tumi, a noted critic of the regime, was not indifferent in condemning the conduct of the elections, maintaining that only an independent electoral institution, not a government appointed and directed body, could guarantee democracy in Cameroon. The Presbyterian churches in Cameroon remained divided on the conduct and results of the elections. It should be noted that hardly any of the foreign observers were present in the country during the registration process, nor were they present at all the polling stations to give a fair assessment of the transparency of the process. The rigging process started at registration centres, where many voters were excluded from the process. The National Electoral Observatory, as appointed by the regime, could not be independent and lacked the authoritative powers of an Independent Election Commission (IEC). The view of one of the contesting candidates, George Nyamndi, leader of the Social Liberal Congress, is a case in point. He observed that: NEO to me is just one of those mechanisms put in place to create the impression that democracy is taken seriously in Cameroon. Its main mission has not been given to it. What Cameroon needs at the present stage of democratic evolution is not an observatory. Cameroon needs an election organising mechanism … NEO is like a hunter without a gun, he cannot shoot, much less kill. It should be given independence and the power to organise elections and control them, from the

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beginning to the end.18

44

According to the executive director of the Movement for Democracy Development and Transparency (MDDT), irregularities during the 11 October 2004 presidential election could be summarised as follows. Firstly, elections in Cameroon have attained a certain degree of maturity in conduct but are still marked by overzealous citizenry. The idea of winning at all costs has tended to stifle the democratic process in Cameroon. Some political parties are ready to kill in order to win elections and remain in power at all costs. Secondly, the NEO was composed of friends and friends of friends of the incumbent president. Thirdly, the signatures of the various representatives of participating political parties in the more than 2 000 polling stations across the country were not verifiable. This gave another opening for fraudulent signatures on the election results sheets.19 There was a deliberate policy on the part of government to restrict the widespread registration of voters. ‘Even the perceived pro-government National Elections Observatory, in its report on the 2002 twin parliamentary and municipal elections, curiously published only in 2004, recommended that government

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

took action to ensure that more Cameroonians were enlisted on voters’ registers’.20 Furthermore, the Cameroon Campaign Group (CCG), a London-based coalition led by a member of the British House of Lords, Lord Avebury, also called upon the international community to put pressure on the government of Cameroon to ensure that a majority of Cameroonians participated in the political process. In October 2003, the Commonwealth liaised with Cameroon’s international donors, who agreed to send a clear message to the government of Cameroon that they expected the 2004 presidential election to be transparent, free and fair.21 In addition, the opposition did not educate party supporters and sympathisers on the importance of registration, while the government placed numerous hurdles on the registration process. The fact that the government appointed members of the National Election Observatory only four months prior to the election is indicative that transparency and fair and free elections were not government’s top priority. What was important was remaining in power at all costs and by all means. It is interesting to observe that the Cameroon government refused a British government offer of 10 000 transparent ballot boxes. This British gesture was intended to shore up confidence in Cameroon’s electoral process, even though they had the candour to admit that they harboured no illusions about Cameroon’s electoral problems. The response from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization was simply to dismiss the gesture and state that Cameroon needed more than 20 000 ballot boxes. The Japanese rushed in with a donation of an extra 15 000 transparent ballot boxes.22 Similarly, the government rejected offers to computerise voter registration, calling into question whether the authorities desired a transparent, free and fair election.

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FUTURE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS The challenges and prospects for the country are many and varied. The elections only elevated the state of poverty in Cameroon. With poverty growing, the degree of corruption will intensify, as people will have to explore all means of survival. Bearing in mind that, since Biya’s ascendancy to the presidency, there has been no salary increases in the past 23 years, the living standards of the population has worsened over the years. There is a need to ensure that the country does not fall off the democratisation and good governance bandwagon. It is important that future elections are given extensive coverage and real efforts be devoted to fostering the transparency, integrity and legitimacy of the electoral process. Much has yet to be done to construct a culture of democracy. This requires taking adequate measures to ensure the institutionalisation of a code of conduct for elections. The role of civil society remains crucial in determining the future trend of the democratisation process. As of now, the country’s civil society organisations have remained passive actors in the political game. The ruling party has capitalised

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on the passivity of civil society. For how long, though, remains to be seen. For now, civil society has accepted all tax increases with a smile. The forgotten populations, especially the rural poor and other vulnerable groups, as well as the marginalised Anglophone community, could be the next time bomb awaiting the ruling elite and particularly the CPMD regime in the twenty-first century. Under the current constitution, the next presidential election is scheduled for October 2011. It is possible that the politics and policies of the envisaged ideals of ‘great ambition or achievement’ could influence the current political impasse and apathy in the country. If the ambition were realised, poverty, poor service delivery, and corruption would be a thing of the past. Only by realising such progressive developments can Cameroonians see the ongoing ideological orientation based on ‘great achievements’ as having any meaning for improving the living standards of the people. Is the funding of candidates and political parties by the state the right way of ensuring the entrenchment of democratic governance through a genuine representation reflecting the true votes of the people? Clearly a number of presidential candidates went in for the sake of money and not with a commitment to winning the highest office in the country. It was money first, and not the interest of the common people, which was in the minds of most of the aspirants to the presidency. The first multiparty elections were flawed on these grounds. There were a number of political parties and presidential candidates who contested elections with the objective of attracting money from Cameroonians and donors, which in many respects worked only to the advantage of the ruling party. There were others who were sponsored by the regime to divide the opposition votes. Funding of political parties leads to internal division within the parties. The SDF has been a victim of this trend, especially during the 2002 parliamentarian and municipal elections. A new formula for financial assistance to the political parties and candidates should be devised. The parties themselves must show greater accountability, transparency and good governance. It might be a good idea to suspend funding to the political parties. Politics has become a source of wealth in transitional societies. Accountability and transparency have been sacrificed, with a system of patronage in which state resources are allocated according to party allegiances. Even without physical obstruction from governments, splintered opposition parties cannot compete effectively. Democracy requires collective participation, and provides an environment for citizens to raise issues with the powers that be, which in turn may have an impact on decision-making. Accountability, transparency and other ethical and moral principles must be harnessed and enhanced within the body politic of the country. Striving for good governance as demanded in the manifesto of the ruling party is vital, but it requires translating words into actions.

46

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The 2004 election clearly highlighted the underlying monolithic governance system still prevailing in Cameroon. The return to political pluralism more than a decade ago has not changed the political status quo in the country. That many Cameroonians feel frustrated and now accuse Paul Biya of being obsessed with power comes as no surprise. Paul Biya marked his entry into the centre of political power with a political creed and promise of rigour, moralisation and democratisation that thus far has not been put into practice. Paul Biya and the ruling CPDM have entrenched themselves in the power matrix of Cameroon. Thus, the issue of leadership in the interest of the people and quality of management under Paul Biya’s regime remains questionable. Yet Paul Biya would like to be remembered as the one who brought democracy to Cameroon. What lessons can be drawn from the 2004 presidential election in Cameron? Firstly, a level playing field for all contestants in the political process was nonexistent. Secondly, it was inappropriate for the ruling regime to use the state bureaucracy as an extended bureau of the ruling party. Thirdly, civil servants are expected to remain impartial and not become campaign managers of the ruling party in their respective areas of origin, as was the case in Cameroon. Fourthly, the degree of disunity within the opposition parties does not make them credible alternatives to the ruling party. Furthermore, the double standard in reporting by foreign observers only plays into the agenda of the incumbent administration. Moreover, only through an impartial Independent Electoral Commission empowered with all the necessary legal, logistic, financial and human resources can one begin to hope for a transparent electoral process in the country. Once these ideals are attained, conflict over results should be reduced to the barest minimum. Finally, party leaders and their supporters must be exposed to political education on the electoral process and the constitution of the country. There is an increasing public demand for policies that foster democracy and development and for a budgetary planning process that is open, accountable, transparent and subject to public scrutiny. Though civil society is currently passive, one should not take for granted that it will continue to remain so. The regional trend is for an increasingly active citizenry to champion the call for representative government. The Cameroon opposition parties failed to learn from the concerted efforts of opposition parties in Kenya and other African countries to field only one presidential candidate during elections. This move brought changes to the bodies politic of those countries. A divided opposition cannot, given the context of geopolitics in Cameroon, effect meaningful change. The boundaries of mistrust must be overcome to usher in a united front and common platform for meaningful change. Supporters have to be convinced that their leaders will not dash their hopes during critical decision-making. The leaders of the CRRN acted more in

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THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

CONCLUSION: WHITHER DEMOCRACY IN CAMEROON?

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their own interests than in the common interest. Can Cameroon’s political leaders be trusted, given their attitude and behaviour leading up to and after the 2004 presidential elections? Building political trust and credibility is a major challenge that the leaders must address. Within the next two years, the Cameroon electorate will once again be called upon to choose their representatives to parliament and the municipal councils. What will the politicians tell the electorate? The country needs to earnestly and genuinely work towards a democratic national or domestic order. Existing tendencies in societal management have to be improved. The country needs collective democracy for the common good of all. It is only through this visionary approach that direct voting / direct democracy will eventually occur in the country. Opposition parties failed on 11 October 2004 to give hope to the people. Will the people recover from this burden placed on them by a disorganised and self-centred alliance of opposition parties? In other words, democracy in Cameroon needs to transcend the mere holding of periodic elections. There is a need, therefore, to avoid the pitfalls of the fallacy of divisive electioneering. Within a contextual framework, Cameroon has made some progress in the political transition from an authoritarian one-party system towards multiparty political pluralism. The process towards democracy has been more obvious with the holding of regular multiparty elections, although the conduct of these elections has yet to be free, fair and transparent. A level playing field is required to consolidate the progress made so far. However, it requires the total resolve and political will of the leaders to embrace the new principles and culture of democratic governance.

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1

Reynolds A.1999. Electoral Systems and Democratisation in Southern Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.

2

Bayart J. F. 1993. The State in Africa: the politics of the belly. London: Longman.

3

Tidings A. ‘New Year’s speech: Biya admits electoral, economic flaws, promises redress’. The Guardian Post (Cameroon) no. 0144. 10–16 January 2005. p. 2.

4

Akana D. ‘Cameroon’s democracy needs improvement–Commonwealth scribe’. The Post.

5

Nsom K. ‘Fru Ndi says Biya is foreigner’. The Post (Cameroon) no. 0643. 4 February 2005.

(Buea, Cameroon) no. 0637. 31 January 2005. p. 5. pp. 1–3 and generally, Nyamnjoh F. B. 2002. ‘Cameroon: Over twelve years of cosmetic democracy’. News from Nordic African Institute Newsletter. Uppsala, Sweden. 3 October. pp. 5–8. and Nyamnjoh F. B. 1999. ‘Cameroon: A country united by ethnic ambition and difference’. African Affairs. vol.98. no.390. pp.101–118. 6 7

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON

ENDNOTES

Biya P. 1987. Communal Liberalism. London: Macmillan. See, for example: Forje J. W. 1972. Unification And After: a political study of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Department of Political Science. University of Lund, Sweden. 2 vols. Joseph R. 1978. ‘Introduction and general framework’. In Joseph R. (ed). Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers. pp. 3–42. Ndiva K. K. 1998. Legislative Power in Cameroon’s Second Republic: its nature and limits. Douala, Cameroon. Ndiva K. K. 1986. ‘Ethnicity, regionalism and political power: A postmortem of Ahidjo’s Cameroon’. In Schatzberg M. and Zartman I. W. (eds). The Political Economy of Cameroon. New York: Praeger. Mbaku J. M. 2002.‘Cameroon’s stalled transition to democratic governance: Lessons for Africa’s new democrats’. Africa and Asian Studies. vol.1. no.3. pp. 125–163. Mbipgo N. C. ‘The rumour that killed a living Biya’. The Guardian Post (Cameroon) no. 0144. 10–15 January 2005. Mbuagbo O. T. 2002. ‘Cameroon: Exploiting Anglophone identity in state deconstruction’. Social Identities. vol.8. no. 3 pp. 431–438. Ndifontah N. F. 2004. Foreign interest in the British Cameroons

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plebiscites. Yaounde, Cameroon: DeScholar Press. Ngoh V. J. (ed). 2004. Cameroon: From a Federal to a Unitary State 1961–1972. Limbe: Design House. Ngoh V. J. 2001. Southern Cameroons 1972–1991: A constitutional history. Aldershot: Ashgate. 8

See Anoma C. ‘Grande ambitions and the politics of exclusion’, The Post (Cameroon)

9

See Akan D. ‘Cameroon’s democracy needs improvement–Commonwealth scribe’.

no. 0626. 13 December 2004. The Post (Cameroon) no. 0637. 31 January 2005. 10 See CDD Election Brief. 2004. Cameroon Presidential Election 2004. Yaounde: CDD. 11 ibid. Waindim J. ‘Coalition 2004: To run or not to run – Vectors of ego and time?’ The Witness (Cameroon) no. 005. 16 August 2004. pp. 1–4. British Council. ‘Observers’ guide – Cameroon election observation project – principles of observation’. May 2002. Yaounde, Cameroon: British Council. 12 Litumbe N. M. ‘The criminal face of the October 11 presidential election’. Weekly Post. vol. 13. no. 0264. 28 October–3 November 2004. p. 4.

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13 See Weekly Post. ‘Opposition bungling at the Supreme Court: Could people who exhibit such criminal ignorance have governed well?’ no. 0264. 28 October–3 November 2004. p. 4. 14 Presidential election: Cardinal versus archbishop – same house different rooms’. The Messenger. (Cameroon). no.015. 28 October 2004. pp.1–5. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 ibid. 18 ‘Interview – Is Dr. Nyamndi eyeing coalition single candidature?’ The Post. (Cameroon) no. 0598. 3 September 2004. 19 Akonteh A.‘Democracy in Cameroon’. The Post (Cameroon) no. 0626. 13 December 2004. 20 Mbipgo N. C. ‘The rumour that killed a living Biya’. The Guardian Post (Cameroon) no. 0144.10–15 January 2005. p. 6. Taku C. ‘Rumours of Biya’s death: Who intended to benefit from the rumours.’ The Post. (Cameroon) no. 0577. 14 June 2004. 21 ibid.

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

22 ibid. p. 7.

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CHAPTER 3

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GHANA A case for democratic consolidation

Beatrix Allah-Mensah

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION As the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain political independence on 6 March 1957, Ghana was seen as a model for the rest of Africa still under colonial subjugation at the time. Since then, the political and development terrain has not been smooth, and social disorientation and economic elusiveness have followed. The disillusion which affected the entire socio-economic and political landscape, led to political and economic experimentation with models expected to offer solutions. These economic changes also led to a string of military and civilian governments, with varying degrees of terms of governance. Thus, over a period of 47 years (1957–2004), Ghana has had 10 different regimes. The military ruled Ghana for a cumulative period of 20 years, while civilian elected governments headed the country for a total of 27 years. Noteworthy is the fact that, in the last twelve years, 1993–2005, power has been shared between two main, rival political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) from 1993–2000 and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) from 2001–2008.

BACKGROUND TO THE 2004 ELECTIONS The 2004 December general elections were the fourth successful elections conducted since the process of re-democratisation started in 1992. The 1992 elections were the first after military rule, which spanned a period of 10 years under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. The PNDC government rolled back its frontiers to allow for competitive

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multiparty democratic politics, an action attributed by some political analysts to a powerful combination of domestic and international pressure.1 While the process for the 1992 elections has been described as flawed on many fronts, it nevertheless launched Ghana on a path that was to give direction to the gradual but bold attempts to nurture democracy in the country. The challenge lies in finding the balance of acceptable national principles and broad global parameters. Consequently, there was the 1996, the 2000 and the 2004 elections, all of which catapulted Ghana onto the democratic stage and helped deepen democracy in the country. Against this background, the December 2004 election in Ghana is a demonstration of the forward march to consolidating democracy, the inherent challenges notwithstanding. In other words, in spite of the problems associated with the election, it is another step towards deepening democratic institutions and entrenching democratic values, both of which are conditio sine qua non for social and economic advancement. This chapter looks at the processes for the conduct of elections, including the voters registration exercise, the campaign of the various registered political parties, the election day proper, the declaration of the election results and matters arising, including gender and the dynamic role of the media.

THE ROAD TO ELECTIONS 2004

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REPLACEMENT OF VOTERS REGISTER

52

The administration of the 2004 elections started off with the creation of a new voters register, since there had been speculation about a bloated register in 2000.2 The process took a number of stages. First, the registration of eligible voters; second the taking of photographs; third, the display of the provisional register for checking and correcting problem spots; fourth, cleaning up and fifth, submission of the final register. For the government and the Electoral Commission (EC), there were other processes that either preceded the conspicuous process or superseded it, including the sourcing of funds (by government), procurement of electoral materials, training of registration officers and assistance, and the communication strategy roll out.3 The initial problems, disagreements and speculation on the release of funds and procurement processes, as usual attracted a lot of media attention and aroused intense public debate. According to the ruling party, due to concerns raised by sections of the donor community for the need for transparency, a Procurement Committee was proposed to oversee the bidding and the tendering processes. This was, however, construed by the opposition parties mainly to be a move to manipulate the process to the advantage of the ruling party. In order

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

to disassociate itself from any further accusations, the idea of a Procurement Committee died quietly with the EC mandated to oversee the procurement process.4 The registration exercise was duly launched nationwide almost 9 months ahead of Election Day, 7 December 2004. The process spanned a period of 14 days, from 16-29 March 2004.5 However, the registration process had problems. There were constitutional controversies surrounding the creation of 30 new constituencies, and the government’s alleged hidden agenda for the exercise. The regional distribution of the new constituencies also sparked debate as the two major parties, the NDC and NPP, have clear regional strongholds. The EC weathered this storm well, citing legal, demographic and democratic reasons for the new constituencies. The increase in the number of constituencies from 200 to 230 had implications for resource availability and adequacy, registration and polling stations, and other logistic requirements. The additional constituencies had implications too for the EC’s workload.6 The first day of the exercise recorded a number of problems. Inter alia, some registration officers (ROs) and registration assistants (RAs) refused to show up at the registration centres, protesting against inadequate allowances. The ROs were to receive 200 000 cedis and the RAs were to get 120 000 cedis for the two weeks. However, the registration officers were demanding 700 000 cedis and the registration assistants 420 000 cedis respectively. The ROs and RAs based their demands on the allowances and other ‘fringe benefits’ being enjoyed by their political party agent counterparts, who were receiving 30 000 cedis a day in addition to free meals and water, for doing virtually nothing.7 The strike action by the EC registration officers led to a situation where political party officers, who were at the registration centres as observers, took over the registration in those affected areas. This turn of events gave rise to two viewpoints. One group of critics thought the involvement of political party agents was unacceptable and may have given some political parties, especially those involved, an undue advantage. The second and more optimistic group thought that it was a show of nationalism that deserved commendation and not condemnation.8 Another challenge with the registration exercise was the refusal of some head teachers to release teachers who had registered as ROs due to the timing of the exercise, just before the final year examinations for Junior Secondary Schools (JSS), due to begin on 19 April nationwide. As many of the registration officers were teachers, this led to a reduction in their expected numbers. These issues all affected the timely commencement of the registration exercise, leading to anxiety on the part of eligible voters, some of whom had queued from as early as 5 a.m.9 Other shortcomings of the exercise included a shortage of registration materials. For instance, the NPP, which was the ruling party at the time, expressed its unhappiness at reports of a shortage of registration forms, indelible ink and other materials. The worst hit areas were the Greater Accra, Upper East and Upper West

53

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54

regions. In fact the last two regions had additional problems, because they were the only regions where the registration was done simultaneously with the photo taking. In these two regions there was a shortage of film and poor monitoring due to difficult communication and terrain, and the problem persisted for more than three days without any response. The apparent short period of time for the education and sensitisation aspects of the exercise made the process unnecessarily cumbersome and disenfranchised some people. It is also important to state that the registration was carried out on dates different from the photo-taking exercise due to inadequate cameras to cover every registration centre. This also added to the existing problems as some people had misplaced their registration form on which the pictures were to be placed, during the one-month interlude.10 These problems were however considered ‘non-threatening’ by the government. The EC in particular did not perceive the problems as serious enough to affect the expected outcome of the exercise. In fact, the president, recognising the problems and showing confidence in the EC stated: ‘I hope the teething problems encountered during the first day of the registration exercise will be overcome. We expect the EC to rise up to its duties to register all qualified citizens during the period.’11 These ‘teething problems’ were somewhat surmounted for the registration process but other issues surfaced during the photo-taking exercise. Some identity cards issued with the photograph had the national flag colours turned upside down, making them very similar to other African countries like Senegal or Mali. In a few cases clearly visible female photographs had the gender ‘M’ inscribed in the gender box and vice versa. There were also isolated cases of suspicious citizenship, which were largely resolved by the EC.12 Nonetheless, the voter registration process was largely successful. The problems were sometimes blown out of proportion and efforts were made by the EC to address most of them. Even though the opposition cried foul, the EC was firm and stated categorically at a national review meeting on the voters registration exercise that technically, the exercise was the best ever in the history of the EC. According to the chairman of the EC, three procedures made the 2004 exercise unique from previous ones. These were the registration form, the poll book, which was a handwritten copy of the registers, and an identity checklist. These features, according to the chairman, made it possible to trace each used form to the specific centre where it could be established who had or had not had their picture taken. These measures helped reduce the possibility of double registration, which was a feature of the 2000 registration. More importantly, the point was made that no election process is without some hitches and that election monitors do not look for ‘perfection but general trends, while ignoring isolated irregularities’.13 Such isolated irregularities are unavoidable but efforts can be made to reduce them, something the EC did and continued to do until the finalisation of the register. Thus, at the national front, the EC did their best. Once the successful

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Table 1: Number of registered voters by region Region

No. registered

% of national total

Greater Accra

2 098 780

20,26

Ashanti

1 893 527

18,28

Eastern

1 142 390

1,03

Western

1 007 816

9,73

Brong Ahafo

939 228

9,07

Northern

894 342

8,63

Central

857 287

8,27

Volta

819 466

7,91

Upper East

425 756

4,11

Upper West

276 378

2,66

10 354 970

99,95

Total

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

registration of eligible voters was over (see Table 1) the registered political parties, which had started their campaign in subtle ways, started gearing up for national campaigns.14

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Source: Electoral Commission Research Department. 2004

Interestingly, the population of registered voters showed some regional shifts. Both major political parties saw shifts in the areas of their support base. The NDC boasts of the Volta as its stronghold, while the NPP believes it has a firm grip over the Ashanti region. The Greater Accra region replaced Ashanti as the largest region of registered voters, while the Volta province dropped from sixth in the 2000 register to eighth place, ahead only of the Upper East and Upper West. However, what determined the winner of the elections could perhaps be analysed most critically by the direction of the economy and the expectations of the ordinary Ghanaian. The question to pose is did political party campaigns address the people’s concerns?

POLITICAL PARTIES’ CAMPAIGNS AND PEOPLE’S CONCERNS Electoral campaigns are structured competitions, which allow voters to listen to, examine and finally decide on which candidate or party to vote for, based on their messages. These communication strategies can impact on voters directly or indirectly. The purpose of campaigns, from the political parties’ perspective, is to win over the support of those who have an affection for their opponents, attract more floating voters and, at the same time, ensure that their own members remain

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steadfast and loyal to their party. Thus, competitive and credible campaigns pave the way for the electorate to make a choice based on information available to them. Simply put, campaigns do matter and none of the political parties, especially the NDC and the NPP, contesting the 2004 elections underestimated the power of their opponents’ political campaigns. A number of concerns had been raised about the misconduct of political parties during the campaign period because of the threat of political utterances and actions disrupting the peace and unity of the country. Fortunately, the 1992 to 2000 election experiences were taped to ensure that there was an improvement in the process and delivery of the election service by all stakeholders including groups from civil society. In light of the above apprehension and to ensure that decorum and the national interest influenced the campaigns of political parties, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), in collaboration with all eight contesting political parties, and supported by the EC, developed a code of conduct for the 2004 elections.

Preamble We, representatives of the registered political parties in Ghana: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

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7.

8.

9.

Determine to uphold and defend Ghana’s Fourth Republican Constitution Are committed to the maintenance of peaceful and stable political, economic and social conditions in Ghana Are desirous of transforming and sustaining our country as a beacon of hope and inspiration in our sub-region and the continent as a whole Are united in our common commitment to the growth and development of the multiparty system of governance in our country Aspire to build a lasting democracy for present and future generations of Ghana Have successfully formulated for ourselves a new political parties’ Code of Conduct 2004 to regulate the conduct of political parties during and between elections Have agreed that the formulation of the code should mark the beginning of a new era of partnership between the registered political parties of Ghana and the Institute of Economic Affairs to promote and deepen democracy in Ghana And acknowledge the contribution and support of the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NMD) and the Institute of Economic Affairs in facilitating and sponsoring the formulation of this code of conduct Held a two-day meeting at the Little Acre Hotel in Aburi, Ghana between Friday 7th and Sunday 8th May 2004 to review the Political Parties’ Code 2000, under the joint chairmanship of the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE).

Source: IEA. 2004. Political Parties Code of Conduct. pp. i–ii

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The key issues raised in the code of conduct were on democratic imperatives, campaigning, out-of-campaign activities, elections, enforcement and implementation. The code sought to ensure the commitment of political parties to

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

recognising and upholding the democratic values of the country. The code called for political parties to make sure their behaviour, party activities, utterances and interaction with other political parties were a reflection of the democratic values for which they had signed up. In addition, they were all expected to co-operate to ensure the code’s implementation and enforcement by educating their supporters and constituents on the content of the code. Interestingly, the code states that no political party can take legal action to release supporters who carry arms to campaign or election grounds. This is critical to ensure that the sanctity of the code is preserved and respected.15 In addition, political parties were to avoid plagiarising of campaign strategies, symbols, slogans, and songs. Interestingly, they were also to desist from using government vehicles, which was common in previous elections by incumbent political parties, and political parties were not to engage electoral officers in confrontation or open argument since there are proper mechanisms for addressing possible misunderstandings.16 In short, political parties contesting the 2004 elections, together with their supporters and sympathisers, were to behave and conduct themselves in the most politically acceptable, democratically acknowledged and morally respectable manner. However, the challenge was for the party leadership to ensure that their supporters adhered to these expressed ideals. This was indeed the crux of the matter, as almost all the major political parties fell foul of aspects of the code, leading to confrontation before, during and even after the elections. For instance, the NDC leadership accused the NPP of intimidating its supporters and using its incumbency to kick-start campaigns. Thus, the NDC claimed, the ruling party had undue advantage over the opposition parties and almost reduced to naught the so-called level playing field.17 The abuse of incumbency is a common practice and, since 1992, has been characteristic of Ghana’s elections. The NPP government, which had criticised the NDC for abuse of incumbency during the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections found itself in the same position – the accusers became the accused. A study conducted by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) on the abuse of incumbency confirmed the claims of the NDC. The study found that NPP leaders had used their platform to launch development programmes and attend civil functions as guests of honour, proclaiming the party’s manifesto, its achievements and its goals.18

MANIFESTOS AND CAMPAIGN MESSAGES Manifestos are significant because, not only are they the blueprints for political action, but they are also the baseline for the policy direction of a winning political party. The manifestos of the contesting political parties touched on key elements

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of the economy and issues critical to the development agenda of the country. Areas covered in the different manifestos included agriculture, fishing, minerals production, and tourism and labour issues. Other areas were social services such as water and sanitation, infrastructure and transportation, science, technology, information and communication technology (ICT). Specific groups like women, the aged and children also received attention in the various manifestos. All the political parties promised good governance, with a major focus on anti-corruption, reconciliation and the role of the media.19 Interestingly, the messages churned out by political parties during their campaigns were very narrow and could not capture what was stated in their manifestoes. The opposition parties dwelt primarily on the alleged ineffective and corrupt administration of the ruling party, seldom balancing this accusation with alternatives. The NDC, in particular, resorted to a comparative analysis of the cost of basic household items. The NPP countered this with a more critical comparative analysis, emphasising the daily minimum wage under the NDC (2000) and the NPP (2004) administration, and detailing how many specific items could be bought with the daily minimum wage under its administration. (See Table 2 and 3 for these market analyses.) In November 2000, the daily minimum wage was 2 900 cedis or 87 000 cedis a month. In November 2004, the daily minimum wage was 11 200 cedis or 336 000 cedis a month.20

Table 2: Market analysis by daily minimum wage

Price in 2000 (NDC)

How much you could buy with monthly wage

Gallon of petrol

6 500 cedis

13

20 000 cedis

Bag of cement

30 000 cedis

3

48 000 cedis

7

Tuber of yam

3 000 cedis

29

5 000 cedis

67

500 cedis

174

1 000 cedis

336

12 500 cedis

7

30 cedis

11

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Item

Ball of kenkey* Crate of eggs

How much you Price in 2004 could buy with (NPP) monthly wage 17

Source: The Statesman. vol.1. no.17. 10–11 November 2004. pp.1/6 * Kenkey is a staple food prepared from fermented corn and eaten with fried fish, any canned fish and/or sauce/gravy.

58

Such tactics reflect the level of competition with respect to the economy. This issue topped the campaigns of all political parties, but particularly the NDC and the NPP. This was consistent with results of a pre- and post-election survey conducted by the Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana, which gave a clear indication as to what the Ghanaian electorate considered most fundamental in the elections – the ability of the ordinary Ghanaian to survive on their earnings.

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In the pre-election survey, when respondents were asked to indicate what they considered to be the most important issue at the national level, they ranked the economy first (57 per cent), corruption (43 per cent) and a more liberal political environment (30 per cent), in that order. The other options available to them were employment, education, peace and stability, respect for human rights and chieftaincy issues.21 In the post-election survey, when asked to indicate the most important development issue at the national level, the respondents noted good education facility (23 per cent), good education (23 per cent) and good health care (15 per cent) in that order among 16 other options. Respondents contended that having good education facilities was not the same as a good education, although a well-equipped classroom could be a good booster.22 Respondents noted that the economy, anti-corruption and a more liberal political environment is needed at the national level to ensure the development of the education and health sectors. To most Ghanaians, good education and good health are the key to development. Indeed, the emphasis on education as crucial has been confirmed in several other surveys. In a survey conducted on women in politics and public life in Ghana, one of the strongest recommendations from respondents was for women to have better and higher levels of education.23 Thus, Ghanaians were looking for a political party that could deliver on these issues. The focus on the economy though tended to overshadow other important issues, like the environment and gender, which were only given cosmetic, sporadic and spontaneous attention by political parties. The sophistication, innovation and attention-grabbing campaign styles of the political parties, especially the NPP and the NDC, cannot be over-emphasised, in spite of the very narrow focus of the issues raised. One aspect of the campaign worth mentioning is the presidential debates, which started in the 2000 elections, organised by civil society. In the 2000 organised debate, presidential candidates of all registered political parties were invited to address the general public on pertinent political issues. Interestingly, the then ruling NDC party turned down the invitation. Before the 2004 election, two civil society groups, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), offered to hold the debates separately, creating an atmosphere of rivalry and rumours that each had its favourite political party. The ruling NPP candidate and the president of the Republic did not participate in the debate organised by the IEA.24

ECAMPAIGNING AND THE MEDIA In order to allow a level playing field through fair media coverage, the EC, together with the National Media Commission (NMC), Ghana Television and the national dailies (Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times), worked out a format to ensure fair

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coverage of all political parties contesting the elections, as had happened in the 2000 elections. Ayee (2001) notes, for instance, that the collaboration between the NMC and the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA) was an attempt to avoid the misunderstandings on fair media coverage that had characterised the 1992 and 1996 elections.25 The role of cellular phones in the campaign was tremendous. This was heightened 24 hours prior to Election Day when the ban on open campaigning was lifted. E-mails and text messaging took over from politicians. Some messages were craftily created with rhythmic attention, particularly those of the two most popular parties, the NPP and the NDC. This was a challenge the EC had not envisaged or, if it had, was unable to legislate. This advanced technological challenge could be a daunting one for the EC, especially with the ever-increasing popularity of cellular phones in Africa. There is even talk in some circles of using cellular phones for swifter and more convenient voting.26 Cell phone technology has also contributed somewhat to ensuring transparency in the declaration of results at the constituency level and transmission to other quarters. Another dimension of the campaign was the use of commercial buses and private taxis for displaying political parties’ messages. The NPP used this publicity method most prominently, leading to allegations of misappropriation of public funds for party purposes, although there was no proof from the accusers. The use of ordinary people to deliver campaign messages was well done and widely broadcast.27 From these slick adverts, it was clear that the NDC was not cash strapped after all – the source of the money notwithstanding.

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THE ELECTIONS, OBSERVERS AND RESULTS DECLARATION

60

The Electoral Commission is the body mandated to oversee all elections in Ghana. The 2004 elections presented the EC with some peculiar issues and challenges. Besides the new voters registration, which was carried out quite successfully, the EC had another chance to prove that it was politically neutral. The 2000 elections took place under the NDC government with the NPP winning. Thus, in the 2004 elections, the NPP were the ruling party. Though the opposition had been wary of the EC from the beginning of the registration process, the majority of Ghanaians felt that the EC has showcased maturity in handling elections and would rather improve than tarnish its positive record. The 2004 elections took place on 7 December. The presidential and parliamentary elections are traditionally held on the same day to avoid the outcome of one influencing the direction of the voting pattern of the other.28 The election results declaration took a different form this year. Cellular phone technology enabled the transmission of the certified results from the various collation centres

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

throughout the country. Operators of private radio stations could release the collated results for a particular constituency. While there were some discrepancies in figures released by these radio stations, the level of accuracy was still very high. This, in no mean way, contributed to the level of transparency, freeness and fairness in the results declaration at the constituency level, even before the EC made its own declarations of the certified results.29 This technological trend attracted criticism from certain quarters. Some critics felt that the media had arrogated to itself a mandate for which it has no legal basis by declaring results, an action exclusively preserved by the constitution for the EC. Those on the other side of the divide argued that announcing certified results did not mean that radio stations or the media had become the new face of the EC. The media was only contributing to a process expected to be beneficial to the electorate, thereby advancing the course of democracy in the country. Indeed, ensuring transparency of ‘good electoral governance’ is the responsibility of all individuals, civil society institutions (including political parties) and government. This should be part of the long journey from democratic inception to maturity. The consolidation of democracy comes with periodic elections, which sees positive improvement in the administration and management of the process. Elections, in theory, help transform the state into a democratic system, as the institutions in the polity become part of the management process, contributing to the effort of consolidating democratic values. Such institutionalisation is necessary for stable and economically vibrant economies, the vision and challenge for most countries on the African continent.

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ELECTION OBSERVERS Different groups of observers took it upon themselves to monitor the conduct of elections. Thus, besides the presence of international observers, there were domestic observers, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), drawn from both secular and religious bodies. Our focus will be on the domestic observers, since they have a direct stake in a consolidated democracy, and the potential to transform governance.

THE CODEO AND ELECTION MONITORING The CODEO was formed in May 2000 under the management of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD). Their presence in the 2004 elections was more robust. A press statement on Election 2004 by CODEO, noted that there were about 7 400 members who were deployed in all the 230 constituencies. Their presence in the constituencies was to ‘ensure and promote free, fair, transparent

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and peaceful elections in order to deter, prevent or detect fraud and conflict and instill confidence in the electoral process and in the ordinary voter’.30 CODEO was active prior to Election Day. For instance, the coalition’s pre-election monitoring and observation exercise ran from 1 June to 6 December 2004. The issues covered during this phase of the monitoring were: voter registration, political party primaries, party rallies/campaigns/public gatherings. Other concerns of interest to the coalition were inter-party conflicts, gender issues, the use or misuse of incumbency and civic education. Among the adverse findings of the coalition were the acrimonious party primaries, particularly within the ruling party. Defeated or disaffected candidates declared their intent to contest the election as independent candidates, after some of the primaries had been postponed several times.31 A running mate is an important consideration for the political parties because the identity of the running mate is also a determining factor for the presidential winner. The ‘northern factor’ has an influence on Ghanaian politics. The three northern regions (Upper East, Upper West and Northern) of Ghana are the poorest in the country. Thus, political parties have to ensure that their running mates come from these areas. This is considered strategic in order to attract northern votes, but also to satisfy, to some extent, the constitutional requirement of regional balance in public positions.32 In addition, the coalition noted that the problem of misuse of incumbency has not fizzled out with the change in the ruling party. For instance, it was reported that the NDC government used extensive state resources to fund political affiliate groups such as the 31 December Women’s Movement (DWM) and the Progressive Voluntary Organisations (PVO) to campaign for the ruling party.33 The coalition commented that under the NPP government, one could barely draw a crooked line between political party campaign tours and official/state visits. The only difference was the obvious absence of the party’s colours. For example, CODEO observed that the NPP used visits dubbed official to introduce the NPP’s candidates for a particular constituency. However, the use of government/state vehicles for political party functions had reduced drastically during the 2004 elections. This did not imply, however, that party supporters to these gatherings were party neutral in their appearances.34 Another form of incumbency abuse noted during the 2004 elections was the non-resignation of public officials who had declared their intentions to contest parliamentary seats. By and large, however, the coalition reported an improved atmosphere for the election boded well for a more transparent, free and fair environment. The Election Day itself recorded very few incidences. Among these was the late arrival of election materials at some polling stations.35

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Since 1992, women in political and decision-making representation at both local and national levels have been few and far between. In spite of the slow progress, women’s groups, from civil society particularly, have not relented in their efforts to get more women into key decision-making positions. Indeed, they see these achievements as steps towards the bigger expectations of achieving 30 per cent (or more) female representation. The 2004 elections come with some interesting gender dynamics. For instance, the increase in the number of constituencies from 200 to two hundred and thirty 230 seats, coupled with the increase in the number of women contestants over the years give some level of hope to gender enthusiasts. Table 4 illustrates the slow but steady and significant progress women have made into parliament since 1992.

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

GENDER ISSUES

Table 4: Women in parliament by year Year

No. of seats

Contestants

Winners

% of total seats won by women

1996

200

53

18

9.0%

2000

200

95

19

9.5%

2004

230

104

25

10.9%

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Source: Allah-Mensah B. 2005. Women in Politics and Public Life in Ghana. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. pp. 28-29 and Research Department, Electoral Commission. 2005. January.

Table 4 gives a clear picture of the increasing number of both female contestants and winners. In the 200-seat parliament of 1992, only 16 members of parliament (MPs) were women, mainly from the ruling NDC party. The year 1996 saw a mix of women from the two dominant parties, with the NDC having the majority. In 2000, the NDC and the NPP both had nine female MPs each, until a bye-election increased the NPP tally to ten. However, the 2004 elections demonstrated some dramatic shifts in female MPs from the two main political parties. Out of the 25 women who won parliamentary elections, 80 per cent were from the NPP, with the remaining 20 per cent being NDC candidates. This compares with the NPPs 56 per cent presence in the 230-seat legislature. The NDC hold 41 per cent of the seats with the remaining seats shared between the three MPs of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), the four MPs of the People’s National Convention (PNC), and one independent. It is significant to note that, none of the other political parties’ female candidates won seats, a reflection of the poor performance, in general, of independent candidates since 1996.36 In the 2004 elections, between the six other contesting political parties, there were 49 female contestants, which accounted for 47 per cent of the female contestants overall. Independent female candidates made up

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about 9 per cent of the total number of women running for office. In fact, none of the CPP’s 19 female contestants for the 2004 elections won any seat, although it was the party that recorded the second highest number of female contestants after the NPP’s 28. The NDC followed with 16 female contestants.37 The figures also showed that the number of women contestants and winners were highest in the Ashanti and Greater Accra regions, which had 16 contestants each, with 31per cent winning their seats. This perhaps can be explained by the fact that, by population, these two regions recorded the highest figures for women while at the same time being the hub of most gender-focused activities. Another significant success is the increase in the number of female winners from the predominantly Moslem Northern region – from one in 2000 to four in 2004. Another noteworthy shift is the drop in the number of male parliamentary contestants in the 2000 elections, compared to the 2004 elections. In 2000, 989 male and 95 female candidates contested the election. In 2004, while the number of female candidates increased to104, the number of men dropped to 849. What is significant is not the increase or decrease in the figures alone, as there was an increase in the number of available seats, but in what this trend could imply for gender relations in Ghanaian politics. For gender enthusiasts, this might be a positive indication that the incremental steps being taken by women are gaining momentum. The critical point, however, is women’s ability to influence policy making and the crafting of legislation for the benefit of their constituents in general, but also particularly to address the many challenges encountered by women and children.

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THE DECLARATION OF THE 2004 ELECTION RESULTS

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The declaration of the 2004 election results was not as straightforward as expected. In fact, the tension that accompanied the results declaration amplified the political anxiety between the NDC and the NPP. The NDC, realising the difficulties of being in opposition after leading the country’s democratic process since its re-launch in 1992, expected to win the elections. On the other hand, the NPP had been in opposition for two consecutive terms, that is; 1992, where the NPP boycotted the elections after accusing the NDC of rigging, and 1996, where the opposition party made some inroads into parliament. In 2000, the NPP won the presidential elections with little over half of the 200 seats in parliament, giving it an uncomfortably slim lead in parliament. If fairness of elections were to extend to equal chances for the different political parties, then the NPP would have relaxed, confident that success was a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, the party was anxious to know the final results. While delays in the declaration of the presidential results increased the tension, some private radio stations had already announced that the ruling NPP government was in the lead.38 Due to allegations

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTI0NS IN GHANA

by the NDC opposition party of irregularities in some constituencies, the EC accordingly waited for some crucial results from the newly created constituency of Weija in the Greater Accra region, the largest constituency in Ghana. The seat was won by a female parliamentary candidate on an NPP ticket. That was the deciding factor in announcing the results, which were based on 225 of the 230 constituency results.39 Before delivering his long-awaited speech, preceding the actual results declaration, the chairman of the EC took time to clear the air of any allegations mounted by the opposition NDC, in order to give credence to the results to be declared. The mature, professional and clearly non-partisan manner with which the chairman systematically, coherently and eloquently announced the figures with cogent explanations where necessary, complemented the EC’s acclaimed and accepted credentials in electoral administration. Knowing the consequences of over-celebration, the EC chair cautioned the winning party and its supporters and sympathisers to be modest in their celebration. This admonition, though mild, helped to reduce the tension.40 The results were as follows:

Table 5: Presidential results by political parties Party

Votes obtained

% of votes cast

NPP

4 463 731

52,75

NDC

3 750 830

44,32

PNC

163 648

1,93

CPP

84 501

1,00

8 615 306

100,00

Total

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Source: Ghana Electoral Commission

The results in Table 5 above indicate that the presidential contest was between the NPP and the NDC. However, the difference of 673 706 votes (7 per cent) between the two came as a surprise to both parties. The NPP had consistently believed it would win the elections but not by such a close margin.41 The close race showed that, irrespective of the damaging effects of the reconciliation process42 that implicated its former leader, ex-president Jerry John Rawlings, the NDC’s support base was still very strong. This fact shocked the NPP despite what the party believed it had achieved over the four-year period. The presidential candidate, John Agyekum Kufour of the NPP, was duly declared the winner of the 2004 December presidential elections.43

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION For observers of Ghana’s democracy, the 2004 elections sent a strong signal that no one political party is likely to have the absolute majority. The results also showed that parties would be judged on their performance, which must be evident to the electorate. This, at least, allays the fear of a one-party system emerging in the near future. Thus, the 2004 elections in Ghana have not only contributed to furthering democracy in Africa, but also show that multiparty elections offer the necessary platform for such nurturing, through democratic institutional development and the entrenchment of democratic values and principles. The strength and resilience shown by the political parties, especially the two main ones, attest to the readiness of any one of them to serve as a strong opposition and alternative to the other, an ingredient necessary for the growth and sustenance of democracy. The impressive voter turnout of more than 80 per cent indicated that Ghanaians were prepared to participate in a largely disciplined fashion. This seems to confirm Saul’s assertion (2005:5) that the key to the secret of democracy is the involvement of the people.44 Supporting this, the Division for International Co-operation (2000:4) notes that, ‘democracy is not achieved simply by holding elections at regular intervals. It requires the active participation of broad sections of the population’.45 Ayee (2001:33–34 ) also explains that the mass participation of people in the elections and other processes constitute one of the two main features of democratic consolidation46; the other being elite consensus. The importance of institutional guarantees, in addition to the above-espoused indicators, contributes to democratic consolidation. Dahl (2005:87), for instance, states that:

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citizens must have unimpaired opportunities to formulate their preferences, signify them and have them weighted equally. This requires institutional guarantees, which encompass the freedoms and rights, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.47

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Supporting this, Gasiorowski and Power, cited in Boafo-Arthur, categorically assert that democratic consolidation does not constitute a reach for inflexible predetermined status, but a qualitative improvement in the practices of democracy and its related institutions. Such changes and improvement flow from the procedures set in place, an incremental rather than a quantum leap. If the 1996 and 2000 December elections were largely perceived as the beginning of the democratic consolidation process for Ghana, then the 2004 election certainly sets Ghana on the next rung of consolidating its democracy, a process that is

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

CONCLUSION For Ghana, the democratic process is on course. As this paper has tried to illustrate, it is not a smooth process, but this admission does not imply a lack of vibrancy. Rather, it is the mechanisms put in place to address the rough edges that distinguish a stable process from a rugged one, each with its own levels of prospects for success. From 1992–2004, there has been tremendous improvement in the role of political and non-political actors, including the EC, political parties, civil society organisations and even governments, in ensuring the sustainability of the democratic process. Indeed, the participation of the electorate has tremendously improved in quality and quantity over the period. The road to democratic consolidation is a long, winding process and with every successful election, at least in the Ghanaian case, the unwieldy process leads to recognisable improvement. Whilst this is commendable, it is not a basis for complacency. There is a need for vigilance and commitment by all actors, especially political parties.

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being guarded nationalistically by all institutions, civic groups and even the ordinary citizen.

ENDNOTES 1

Dumor E. 2000. ‘Keynote Address: The 1996 elections and democratic consolidated’. In Ayee Joseph R. A. (ed). The 1996 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra: Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. pp. 21–22.

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2

The Statesman. 20 May 2004. p. 5.

3

Public Agenda. 12–18 July 2004. p. 11.

4

ibid.

5

Public Agenda. 22–28 March 2004. p. 3.

6

ibid.

7

ibid. p. 3.

8

ibid. These were discussions that went on for a while on radio stations in the capital.

9

ibid.

10 Public Agenda. 26 March–1 April 2004. p. 4. 11 Public Agenda. 22–28 March 2004. p. 3. 12 Public Agenda. 7–13 May 2004. p. 4. 13 The Statesman. 20 May 2004. p. 5. 14 Public Agenda. 7–13 May 2004. p. 4. 15 The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMP) and The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). 2004. Political Parties Code of Conduct 2004. Accra: NIMP, IEA

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16 ibid. pp. 2–6. 17 Public Agenda. 5–11 March 2004. p. 5. 18 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). 2004. ‘Abuse of incumbency, state administrative resources and political corruption in election 2004: Part III’. Briefing Paper. vol. 6 no. 6. December. 19 New Patriotic Party and The National Democratic Congress. 2004. Positive Change Chapter Two: Manifesto of the New Patriotic Party and A Better Ghana: The National Domocratic Congress 2004 Manifesto. NDC Research Department. 20 Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. Pre-election Survey. October– November 2004 and The Statesman, vol. 1. no. 17. 10–11 November 2004. p. 1. 21 Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. Post-Election Survey. December 2004. 22 Allah-Mensah B. 2005. Women in Politics and Public Life in Ghana. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. pp. 90–93. 23 The presidential debates, introduced in the 2000 elections, are very new in the political history of Ghana and are meant to refine the process and give the electorate a better choice. 24 This was to ensure fair media coverage for all political parties in the contest. The focus was on public-owned media. See: Ayee J. R. A. 2001. ‘The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-Off in Ghana: An overview’. In Ayee J.R.A. (ed). Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 elections. vol 1. Accra: Freedom Publications Ltd. pp. 33–34. 25 People capitalised on the liberal market of cell phones to text campaign messages. It is important to note that this was not a feature during the long period of campaigns but suddenly became a powerful tool to woo floating or undecided voters the night before Election Day. 26 Taxis and other commercial buses displayed posters of parliamentary and presidential candidates, becoming mobile campaign billboards of political parties. While some were individual efforts and did not cost anything, others were commercialised.

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27 Market women, mechanics, taxi drivers and students were among the people engaged by political parties to send messages to the electorates. 28 The 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections took place on different days and with it came a host of problems including the famous ‘Stolen Verdict’ by the strongest opposition party at the time, the NPP. 29 Two private radio stations in Accra, Joy FM and CITI FM, which had affiliate stations around the country, announced that the NPP presidential candidate had won the presidential slot. This was done in the interim when all Ghanaians were eagerly waiting for the Electoral Commission’s results. 30 Coalition of Domestic Election Observers: Ghana’s Election 2004 p. 57. 31 ibid. pp. 23–25. 32 ibid. pp. 19–32. 33 Ahiawordor S. K. M. 2001.‘Issues and Dilemmas in Ghana’s 2000 Elections’. In Ayee

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op cit. pp. 111–112.

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35 This had been criticised by the NPP when in opposition and so the party tried not to fall prey to the enticement. However, the party could not prescribe a dress code for its supporters at such national gatherings. They came in their party colours and conspicuously displayed party flags, symbols and other paraphernalia. 36 Coalition of Domestic Observers: Ghana’s Election 2004: What the observers say. A project by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD–Ghana) pp. 50–52. As much as there was reported improvement, there were still concerns raised by the coalition. See pp. 39–40 of this report. 37 Allah-Mensah B. ‘Political Parties, Gender and Representation’. In Ayee. op cit. p. 122. 38 The Convention People’s Party is noted for fielding a lot of women yet none have won.

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34 ibid. pp. 109–110.

This is why the statement is made strongly by Allah-Mensah (2001) op cit. that the calibre of a political party can contribute a lot to women’s winning possibilities. 39 The announcement, by Joy FM and CITI FM, of the winner of the presidential contests, before the Electoral Commission, was not taken kindly by the opposition NDC, who labelled the radio stations allies of the NPP. 40 Daily Graphic. 11 December 2004. 41 ibid. 42 The government set in place a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to address problems of human rights abuse by hearing those who have been offended by any regime, particularly military ones. The hearings were heavily weighted against the immediate past president of the republic, leading the ruling party and its sympathisers to believe that the NDC would be dealt a blow. However, the outcome of the results did not seem to indicate that the NDC party was affected in any dramatic fashion. 43 Supporters of the NPP kept vigil, and the entire country was in a state of jubilation, while the NDC presidential candidate refused to concede defeat amid threats of court action to challenge the results. 44 World Development Movement. 2005. Denying Democracy: How the IMF and World Bank Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

take power from people. London: World Development Movement. p. 5. 45 Division for International Cooperation. 2000. Peace, Democracy and Development. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 4. 46 Ayee J. R. A. ‘The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-off ’. p. 158. 47 P Burnell. 2005. ‘Democratization’. In Burnell P. and Randal V. Politics in the Developing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 187.

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CHAPTER 4

CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY An analysis of the 2004 Malawi general elections

Boniface Dulani

INTRODUCTION

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The first democratic elections of 1994 marked an important watershed in Malawi’s political history. After exactly thirty years under the dictatorial rule of former president for life, Hastings Banda, Malawians were able to choose a new multiparty parliament and a new president. A second round of general elections took place in 1999. In both the 1994 and 1999 elections, Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) won the post of president. Only three parties, namely the UDF, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), won seats in parliament. Ten years into the new democratic era, a third round of elections took place in May 2004.

BACKGROUND TO THE 2004 ELECTIONS Malawians went to the polls to elect a new president and parliament on 20 May 2004. These elections provided an opportunity to further consolidate Malawi’s democracy, a decade after the rejection of single-party authoritarian rule. As a way of cutting down on costs and improving participation in local government elections, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), proposed combining the 2004 general elections with local government elections. This proposal was, however, rejected by parliament. Opposition parties, in particular, argued that the electoral body had shown that it was not prepared to run three elections at the same time. The idea was also criticised for having a high likelihood of confusing voters and was therefore rejected.1

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The third general elections were initially set for 18 May 2004. However, a High Court order on 14 May forced the commission to postpone the elections by two days, to 20 May. The actual polling went smoothly and peacefully. The Electoral Commission announced the results on Sunday 23 May. In the presidential race, the ruling UDF candidate, Bingu wa Muntharika, emerged victorious and succeeded Muluzi to become only the third president of Malawi, after Banda and Muluzi. In the parliamentary race, the MCP emerged as the biggest party in parliament with a total of 58 seats. For the first time in Malawi’s democratic history, six new parties won representation in parliament to challenge the hitherto tripartite dominance of the UDF, MCP and AFORD.

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THIRD TERM DEBATE

72

The failed attempt by President Muluzi to run for a third term provided an opportunity for the Malawian electorate to choose a new president. However, this was only possible after Muluzi failed to have the constitution amended to extend his tenure of office. Under Section 83(3) of the constitution, a president is only allowed to serve for a maximum of two five-year terms. During the period 1999–2004, Muluzi unsuccessfully tried to have this provision changed so that he could contest the presidency for a third time. The calls for a constitutional amendment to extend Muluzi’s tenure of office were first heard at the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) party rallies, a few months before the elections of June 1999. Muluzi himself, during his swearing-in ceremony after the 1999 elections, made a passing reference to his desire for an extension to his tenure, when he said that he had ‘another 26 years to rule the country’.2 From then on, Muluzi’s supporters in the ruling UDF campaigned to remove the tenure limitation provision in the Constitution of Malawi. The UDF did not, however, have the necessary two-thirds majority that is required to amend the constitution. The party, therefore, embarked on what has been described as a ‘carefully orchestrated campaign to change the rules of the game to ensure the passage of the amendment’.3 The strategies that were adopted included attempts to weaken the opposition in and out of parliament. These tactics included expulsions of opposition legislators from parliament and the incorporation of a number of opposition MPs into UDF ranks by offering them a number of incentives, including money. Using the party’s youth wing, the Young Democrats, the UDF also unleashed a wave of terror against critics of the proposal to extend Muluzi’s tenure of office. The victims of this violence included, among others, members of parliament, journalists from independent media houses, civil society, university students and church leaders. There were two attempts to amend the constitutional provision guiding the presidential tenure of office. The first attempt, which was presented as a private

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CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

member’s bill, sought to completely abolish all limitations of tenure. The second bill proposed an increase to the maximum tenure of office from two to three fiveyear terms. The first bill, which was popularly referred to as the ‘Open Terms Bill’, was gazetted on 24 May 2002. The rationale for the bill was that the section that limits the presidential tenure of office ‘is considered to infringe upon [the] people’s power to elect into [the] office of the President the person of their choice, and to renew his mandate for as many times as they may wish him or her to serve them’.4 The Open Terms Bill was tabled for debate in parliament on 4 July 2002. However, the bill failed to attract the support of two-thirds of the MPs in order to pass into law. The bill had needed 128 votes from the 193 MPs. However, only 125 MPs, including all MPs from the UDF, and some from the opposition, voted in favour. 59 MPs, mainly from the opposition Malawi Congress Party, and a section of the Alliance for Democracy, voted against. A further three abstained while another five were absent. This meant that the bill fell short by three votes and was therefore defeated. Following the failure of the Open Terms bid, President Muluzi conceded defeat and called for conciliation between the bill’s supporters and opponents. This concession did not, however, put the issue of Muluzi’s candidacy to rest. At a meeting of UDF regional and district executives on 20 July 2002, delegates agreed that a modified version of the bill seeking an extension to Muluzi’s tenure be presented again in parliament, this time seeking a third term, rather than unlimited tenure.5 A new bill was subsequently gazetted on 8 September 2002, and proposed to extend to three terms the maximum presidential tenure of office. The main argument in favour of the proposal was that two terms was too little to realise all the development plans that President Muluzi and any other future president may have. However, as with the failed Open Terms bid, this bill also received widespread criticism from the opposition and civil society. Civil society organisations came together and formed the Forum for the Defence of the Constitution (FDC) with the specific aim of campaigning and lobbying MPs to vote against the third term. The new proposal also saw the emergence of cracks within the UDF party itself, as well as a loss of support from their former allies in the opposition MCP. Malawi’s major international donors also weighed in. The British Embassy, for example, pointed out that the third term ‘issue is diverting attention away from the real and immediate problems confronting the people of Malawi’.6 The way government had attempted to curtail debate on the subject was also criticised by donors. In an unusually blunt statement, the donors pointed out in a joint statement that: We would again strongly urge that such an important constitutional amendment be considered only after a consultation process that encourages free expression of

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views by all interested Malawians, without fear of intimidation or retribution, in accordance with democratic principles.7

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For a country that is highly donor dependent, such sentiments brought further pressure on the government to reconsider its position, while at the same time emboldening the bill’s opponents. Against such strong opposition, it soon became clear that the bill would not attract the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament. Sensing defeat, Muluzi, in a national address on the eve of the October 2002 parliamentary sitting, called upon the National Assembly not to treat the Third Term Bill as a priority. Instead, he called upon MPs to focus on ‘pressing issues of national concern … [like] food production and correcting the ills of the economy’.8 The shelving of the bill was, however, only temporary. The UDF was still working on securing the necessary majority in parliament. An emergency session of parliament was called for 27 January 2003, where the Third Term Bill was tabled. In the ensuing debate, it soon became clear that the bill would not garner the necessary two-thirds support. The government was subsequently forced to retreat by ‘referring’ the bill to the Legal Affairs Committee of parliament two days later.9 Two weeks after this second ‘shelving’ of the Third Term Bill, President Muluzi declared that he would not be standing for a third term of office, saying the constitution was ‘very clear on that and that nobody needed to ask him if he would stand again’.10 However, given that the bill had not been formerly withdrawn, and that Muluzi had made similar statements following the defeat of the Open Terms bid in July 2002, there was still uncertainty on whether the bill had been shelved for good. It was only in the second half of 2003, following Muluzi’s decision to choose Bingu wa Muntharika as the UDF’s candidate in the 2004 presidential elections that the Third Term Bill was formally withdrawn. The stage was thus set for the start of campaigning for the 2004 general elections, without Muluzi.

PREELECTION CAMPAIGNS

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The electoral process in Malawi is guided by the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (PPE) Act. Under this Act, the official campaign period is supposed to last a period of two months prior to a general election. The official campaign period for the 2004 general elections was from mid-March 2004 up until 48 hours before the start of polling. In reality, however, the campaign for the 2004 elections started long before the official campaign period. Immediately after the UDF picked Muntharika as the party’s candidate in the 2004 presidential race, the ruling party went into a full-time national campaign to promote their candidate. Similarly, hundreds of aspirants for parliament embarked on unofficial campaigns for the parliamentary race.

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CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

Candidates for the parliamentary elections were selected through primary elections at the party level. This process, however, had numerous problems. In a number of cases, there were allegations that the process was being manipulated in favour of certain candidates preferred by the individual party leaderships. As we show later on in this report, this resulted in a high number of candidates opting to contest on independent tickets after being dissatisfied with the primary elections. In the presidential race, the selection of candidates was done mainly through party conventions. However, it is also important to note the role of the church in this respect. The main Christian churches attempted to bring together the opposition parties so that they could improve their chances of victory in the polls by putting up a single presidential candidate. After much wrangling, seven parties came together under the banner of the Mgwirizano Coalition and agreed to field a single candidate in the presidential race.11 The ruling UDF also entered into an alliance with two other parties, namely AFORD and the New Congress for Democracy (NCD). These three parties agreed to put forward a common presidential candidate. All the major political parties released election manifestos, which contained their policy prescriptions for the country’s development problems. Given the nature of Malawian political parties, which have been described as lacking in distinctive ideological differences, there were no significant policy differences in the manifestos of the main parties.12 Most focused on tackling corruption and limiting unnecessary state expenditure. This included promises to reduce the size of cabinet and also to curtail presidential travel as a way of saving public resources. Another major issue in the manifestos was the revival of the agricultural sector in order to tackle Malawi’s rampant and widespread poverty.13 Nearly all the major parties promised to re-introduce subsidies on agricultural inputs, which had been removed in the early 1990s as part of structural adjustment programmes. Given that the agricultural sector in Malawi employs up to 80 per cent of the workforce, the potential appeal to voters of agricultural subsidies cannot be overemphasised. In its manifesto, the UDF also promised to introduce a revolving fund of half a billion Malawian kwacha. This would be used to offer loans to small-scale businesses as a way of reviving economic growth and tackling unemployment in the country. The campaigns themselves took various forms. The most common attempts to communicate with the voting public were through public rallies addressed by political leaders and aspiring candidates. Besides the campaign promises, the UDF’s campaign strategy also involved handouts of money and food to the general public. Largely as a result of the fact that most of the parties were promising the same things, the tone of the campaign messages tended not to focus on real issues, but rather on personalities, especially those of the party leadership. As the African

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Union Observer Mission point out in their interim statement on the elections, this resulted in the usage of language that was often ‘intimidating, provocative and insulting’.14 The media played a crucial role in disseminating information to the general public. There was widespread usage of advertising in both the print and electronic media. A majority of the media houses also produced special election supplements and programmes that offered the parties the opportunity to explain their policies to the general public. However, there was a discernible bias among the public media towards the ruling party. The depth and extent of this bias was highlighted by most of the election observer missions. The role of public radio in disseminating information to the general public is crucial, given that it is the only medium of communication that has a nationwide outreach. This bias, which saw the public media giving up to 90 per cent of airtime and positive coverage to the UDF, was also the subject of a number of high court challenges.15 The MEC, while acknowledging this bias, argued that it was powerless to take action and instead referred complaints to the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority. This body, however, took no action. Nearly all the parties relied on funding from well-wishers to finance their campaign. The ruling party however took advantage of its access to state resources, which were frequently used for campaign purposes. In a number of instances, the ruling party also used vehicles from parastatal bodies, notably: the Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation, and the Malawi Telecoms Limited, in their campaigns. Although the opposition complained to the MEC numerous times, the MEC refused to take action. Instead, they argued that the Office of the President and Cabinet would best handle this issue. This culminated in a court challenge by the Mgwirizano Coalition, requesting the courts to order the MEC to take action against the ruling party. In a decision delivered by the High Court and then subsequently upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court, the MEC was slated for abdicating its duties by not ordering the ruling party to stop using state resources in its campaign. The general consensus among the various election stakeholders is that the campaign playing field was not level. The ruling party, in particular, had a clear and distinct advantage over the opposition, especially with regard to campaign funding, as well as access to the media. The failure by most parties to distribute their manifestos widely also denied most voters an opportunity to assess the policies on offer by the major parties. As a result, party propaganda and the personal attributes of the party leaders were the major factors influencing voting decisions. Although the real impact of the handouts that were distributed in the elections themselves cannot be properly assessed, it is also clear that these overshadowed whatever attention was given to the policies that the parties were promoting.

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The 2004 elections saw a total of 1 267 candidates registering to contest the 193 parliamentary seats. Of this total, 154 were women. This translates to 12 per cent of the candidates. A further six candidates registered for the presidential race. However, one candidate withdrew, leaving five to battle it out. The 2004 general elections saw a record number of 15 political parties fielding a total of 895 candidates in the parliamentary elections. In terms of party participation, however, the levels tended to vary. Only the UDF, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Republican Party (RP), the MCP and the People’s Progressive Movement (PPM), fielded more than 100 candidates. The remaining parties fielded only a handful of candidates, ranging from 1 to 40 (See Table 1.) A unique feature of the 2004 elections was the record number of candidates standing on independent tickets. Of the 1 267 candidates, 372 (29 per cent) contested the election as independents. The high number of independent candidates was largely due to dissatisfaction with the conduct of the party primary elections. In the majority of cases, the major parties, especially the ruling UDF, adopted a strategy of imposing particular candidates in the primary elections. The candidates that were frustrated in these exercises therefore opted to stand as independents. The postponement of elections in six constituencies meant that not all the 1 267 registered candidates were able to take part in the 2004 parliamentary race. In the end, only 1 258 candidates took part. In one constituency elections were postponed after one of the contenders sued the Electoral Commission for refusing to register him. Elections were also postponed in one constituency after one of the candidates died a few days before polling. In the remaining four constituencies, elections were postponed at the eleventh hour after the names of some of the contenders did not appear on the ballot papers.

CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROCESS

THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE A total of five candidates contested the office of president. With Bakili Muluzi constitutionally barred from participating, Bingu wa Muntharika stood on the ticket of the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF). Muntharika was also representing the UDF’s alliance partners, the Alliance for Democracy and the New Congress for Democracy. John Tembo, a long-time cabinet minister during the Banda era, represented the Malawian Congress Party. Gwanda Chakuamba, who had succeeded Banda to the MCP presidency after 1994, and on whose ticket he had contested the 1999 elections before forming his own party in early 2004, was standing on the seven-party Mgwirizano Coalition ticket.

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Table 1: Parties and number of candidates: parliamentary elections 2004 Party

Number of candidates

United Democratic Front (UDF)

164

National Democratic Alliance (NDA)

187

National Unity Party (NUP)

9

People’s Transformation Party (PETRA)

18

Republican Party (RP)

110

Alliance for Democracy (AFORD)

40

Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE)

21

Movement for Genuine Democratic Change (MGODE)

22

National Congress for Democracy (NCD)

23

Malawi Congress Party (MCP)

174

People’s Progressive Movement (PPM)

112

Congress for National Unity (CONU)

2

Other parties

3

Independent candidates

372

Total

1 267

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission. 2004

Two former UDF stalwarts, Brown Mpinganjira, a founder member of the UDF, and Justin Malewezi, vice president to Muluzi between 1994 and 2004, were the other two contenders in the elections. Brown Mpinganjira, who left the UDF in 2001, stood on his National Democratic Alliance party ticket. Justin Malewezi, who quit the UDF in January 2004 after disagreements on the choice of the party’s presidential candidate, stood on an independent ticket. A sixth candidate, Hetherwick Ntaba of the NCD, withdrew his candidature to join the UDF/ AFORD/NCD alliance. A summary of the presidential candidates and their platforms is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Presidential contenders in the 2004 elections Name of candidate

Party

Bingu wa Muntharika

UDF/AFORD/NCD Alliance

Gwanda Chakuamba

Mgwirizano Coalition

John Tembo

MCP

Brown Mpinganjira

NDA

Justin Malewezi

Independent

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission

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Registration of voters for the 2004 general elections took place in January 2004. The exercise was meant to register new voters who had reached the voting age of 18, and also to allow those already registered to verify their names and details on the voters’ roll. The registration was initially scheduled to last for a period of two weeks. However, due to a number of logistical problems, the exercise had to be extended by another two weeks. The logistical problems that hampered the 2004 registration exercise mirrored those that had delayed the same exercise for the 1999 elections. Then, as in the 2004 elections, the exercise had also to be extended a number of times to allow more people to register.16 During the 2004 registration exercise, several centres reported critical shortages of registration materials such as film, camera batteries, registration and duplicate registration forms. This resulted in a number of people being turned away without registering in the first two weeks of the exercise. 17 Apart from the inadequate registration materials, there was also concern that fewer people than had been projected had registered. This was partly attributed to the problems cited above and also to poor civic education. At the end of registration, the Electoral Commission indicated that 6,7 million people had registered to vote in the 2004 elections. This represented an increase of nearly 2,7 million voters compared to the figure of 5 059 736 that had registered for the 1999 elections. Opposition parties, aided by civil society organisations, quickly disputed this new figure. They argued that it was unrealistic to assume that within a space of five years the number of registered voters could have gone up by such a high margin. Faced with accusations of inflating the figures, the MEC was compelled to undertake a ‘cleaning’ exercise of the voters’ roll. This resulted in the number of registered voters being reduced to 5 742 747. The registration exercise was also marred by accusations of attempts by the ruling party to manipulate the process. Several cases were reported of people being arrested for registering twice during the exercise.18 These accusations were compounded by the failure of the Electoral Commission to provide enough time for verification of the voters’ roll, as required by law. This eventually resulted in a court challenge by the Mgwirizano Coalition, which asked for the postponement of the elections to allow for more time for the verification of the voters’ roll. In a decision delivered by the High Court, and later upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court, the MEC was ordered to reopen the voters’ roll for verification from 14–19 May 2004. The ruling also criticised the commission for abdicating its duties by not taking action against public radio and television’s failure to grant equal access to all contenders. The MEC was also censured by the High Court for not stopping the ruling UDF from using state resources in its campaigns. The MEC responded by postponing the date of the elections from 18 May to 20 May.

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VOTER REGISTRATION

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ELECTORAL RESULTS Polling took place on 20 May 2004. With a few exceptions, all polling centres opened and closed on time. The general consensus among the political parties and other stakeholders (including the media, local and international observers) is that polling passed off peacefully and smoothly. The counting of votes was done at the polling centres. The results were then sent to the district headquarters where they were tabulated and correlated. In a number of cases, this process was fraught with logistical problems, which delayed the entire exercise. In districts such as Nkhatabay and Mzimba in the north; Kasungu, Lilongwe and Dowa in the central region; Zomba, Mangochi, Blantyre and Chikwawa in the south, it took more than 48 hours before all the results could be compiled at the district headquarters. This was due to the fact that a number of polling centres are in areas that are very difficult to access. After the compilation of district figures, the results were then submitted to the MEC National Tally Centre in Blantyre where the MEC are supposed to put all results received on public display. The tabulation and display of results at the Tally Centre was, however, chaotic and disorganised. In the first 24 hours after polling had closed, no results were released at the centre and only a handful of results were on display 48 hours after the close of polling. The commission blamed this on delays in receiving the results from the districts.19 The commission’s delay in releasing results created a lot of confusion and uncertainty. This situation contributed to a build-up of tension as rumours began to spread that the EC was deliberately withholding the results as a way of allowing the UDF to manipulate the results in their favour. This led to the eruption of violence in Blantyre on Saturday 22 May, with opposition supporters taking to the streets to protest the delays. The confusion was further compounded by one of the leading contenders in the presidential race, Gwanda Chakuamba, who proclaimed himself victor on the evening of 22 May. Chakuamba argued that he had won the elections, and accused the commission of deliberately withholding the announcement to allow the UDF to manipulate the results and have their candidate declared the victor instead. Under the PPE Act, the Electoral Commission is required to release results within 72 hours after polls close. However, section 96(4) of the Act states that the commission can only release results after they have been verified, and all queries and complaints have been addressed. Although the commission had failed to display most results at the Tally Centre, and despite the fact that the opposition had registered a number of complaints on irregularities, the commission went ahead and declared the results on the afternoon of Sunday 23 May 2004, three days after voting.

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The 2004 parliamentary elections saw a total of nine parties winning seats in the National Assembly. This represents a big change from the first two parliaments where only three parties, namely the UDF, MCP and AFORD, were represented in the house. The Malawi Congress Party emerged as the biggest party in parliament, winning a total of 58 seats. This was followed by the UDF, whose total number of legislators has been reduced by more than half, from 93 in the 1999 elections to 49 in 2004. The third biggest group of parliamentarians is that of the independent candidates, 38 of whom were elected into the National Assembly. The gender composition of the National Assembly has also marginally improved. Of the 188 MPs that were elected, 27, representing 14 per cent, are women. This represents an increase of 11 female MPs since the previous parliament. However, this is still far below the SADC requirement of a minimum of 30 per cent female representation in parliament.

CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

PARLIAMENTARY RESULTS

Table 3: Elected members of parliament by party and region – 2004

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

North

Centre

South

Total

% Share

UDF

3

7

39

49

26%

NDA

1

0

7

8

4%

NUP

0

0

0

0

0%

PETRA

1

0

0

1

0.5%

R.P

7

0

9

16

9%

AFORD

6

0

0

6

3%

MGODE

3

0

0

3

2%

MCP

0

58

0

58

31%

PPM

5

1

1

7

4%

CONU

0

0

1

1

0.5%

IND

6

4

28

38

20%

Total

32

70

85

187

100%

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission. General Elections: Members of Parliament per Party. 20 May 2004.

The results show that there was no clear dominant party in the new parliament. While the UDF had a small working majority in the two previous parliaments, the biggest party in the new parliament, the MCP, only has about 31 per cent of the seats. The UDF, whose presidential candidate emerged victorious in the presidential polls, only has 26 per cent of the seats in the house. Given that the government requires at least 50 per cent + 1 to transact business in the house, this means that the UDF would need to win the support of some of the other opposition parties

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and independent MPs to form a coalition government. It is even more difficult for the UDF when it comes to constitutional amendments. These require the support of at least two-thirds of MPs to pass in the house. The UDF would require the support of all the independent candidates, and some opposition MPs, in order to make any amendments to the constitution.

PRESIDENTIAL RESULTS Although the presidential poll was tipped to become a two-horse race between Gwanda Chakuamba of the Mgwirizano coalition and the UDF’s Muntharika, the final result was a close contest between these two plus MCP’s John Tembo. Table 4 presents the results of the presidential elections:

Table 4: Results of the 2004 presidential elections Share of vote No. of against no. districts with of registered majority voters (%) support

Votes polled

Share of presidential vote (%)

1 119 738

36

19

10

Chakuamba (Mgwirizano)

802 386

26

14

10

Tembo (MCP)

846 457

27

15

7

Mpinganjira (NDA)

272 172

9

5

1

78 892

2

1

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

3 119 645

100

54

28

Candidate Muntharika (UDF)

Malewezi (Independent) Null and void votes Total

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Source: Malawi Electoral Commission. Summary Results for Presidential General Elections. 2004.

82

The results of the presidential poll put the UDF candidate, Bingu wa Muntharika, in front of the other four contenders, with 36 per cent of the valid votes. John Tembo of the MCP came second overall, with 27 per cent, while the Mgwirizano candidate, Chakuamba, came in a close third with 26 per cent of the vote. Mpinganjira and Malewezi, between them, polled just over 10 per cent of the valid votes. The results of the presidential race have significant implications with regard to the popular legitimacy of the eventual victor, Bingu wa Muntharika. Overall, the votes shared among the opposition candidates represented a significant majority of about two-thirds (64 per cent). This suggests that Muntharika’s mandate is itself based on the minority of the electorate. This picture is also evident when the results are analysed by district. Of the country’s 28 districts, only the UDF’s Muntharika emerged as an outright victor in 10 districts, the same number as third placed Chakuamba of the coalition. The

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MCP’s Tembo, on the other hand, was victorious in seven districts. The same trend is also repeated at a regional level. In the northern region, Chakuamba was the preferred candidate in five of the six districts in the region. In the central region, Tembo was victorious in seven of the region’s nine districts. In the south, the UDF’s traditional stronghold, the picture was rather mixed. While Muntharika emerged a clear victor in 7 of the region’s 13 districts, Chakuamba followed very closely by winning in 5 districts. The NDA’s Brown Mpinganjira won the eleventh district in the region. Although the districts tend to vary in population size, Muntharika’s victory does not necessarily stem from winning in districts with larger populations. Rather, he owes his victory to the fact that he consistently came second, albeit a distant second, to John Tembo in the central region. The new president was sworn into office on Monday 24 January.

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CONTESTING THE RESULTS All participating parties accepted the majority of the results in the parliamentary race. However, in a few cases, the validity of the results was challenged. These challenges were mostly in constituencies where the winning margin was very small. All the losing contestants in the presidential race, however, alleged foul play and rejected the presidential election results. Immediately after the declaration of Muntharika as winner in the presidential race, supporters of the Mgwirizano candidate, Gwanda Chakuamba, took to the streets in Blantyre and Mzuzu to protest the result, accusing the UDF and the Electoral Commission of having rigged the results. In the ensuing fracas, the Malawi police shot to death at least three people in some of the more volatile areas of Blantyre.20 Meanwhile, the Mgwirizano opposition parties petitioned the High Court to nullify the presidential result, as declared by the MEC. The main argument in the court petition was that the elections were marked by numerous irregularities that ‘were never corrected by the MEC before and after the polls’.21 The petition also further argued that the Electoral Commission had erred in declaring Muntharika as winner on account of Section 80(2) of the constitution. Among other things, this section states that ‘the President shall be elected by a majority of the electorate …’22 Muntharika, according to the opposition, had failed to secure majority support of the electorate or of those who had voted. The MCP, whose presidential candidate John Tembo came second in the presidential race, also joined the Mgwirizano coalition in challenging the presidential results. Together, the parties cited electoral irregularities and discrepancies in figures collected by other stakeholders from the various polling centres. These included figures correlated by civil society organisations and the Malawi Human Rights Commission, which showed different figures and results from those of MEC.23 Before the High Court could make a determination on the opposition’s petition,

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however, the UDF signed a memorandum of understanding with two parties that were part of the Mgwirizano coalition. These parties, the Republican Party of Gwanda Chakuamba, and the Movement for Genuine Democracy, agreed to work together with the UDF to form a government of national unity. In return for a number of ministerial positions in the new government, Chakuamba agreed to drop his court challenge of the election results. Although some remnants of the Mgwirizano Coalition vowed to proceed with the case in court, the upheavals resulting from the new political developments slowed down the pace of the election case.24

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IMPLICATIONS FOR MALAWI

84

The chaos and disorganisation that marked the processing and declaration of results raises a lot of questions about the competency of the current MEC to run an efficient election. The situation, whereby the MEC was unable to publicise and announce results at its National Tally Centre, was largely to blame for the tension and uncertainty that led to rioting in Blantyre. The situation was further inflamed by fact that the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) was able to broadcast unofficial results on national radio when the commission itself had failed to release any results two days after polling. This also contributed to accusations that the commission had lost control and that agents of the ruling UDF party, using the national radio, had hijacked the process of correlating and declaring results. The impartiality and independence of the commission as a neutral referee in the electoral process was also brought into question by its failure to investigate all election irregularities before declaring the results. Although the opposition parties had presented numerous complaints to the commission, none of these were either investigated or taken into consideration before the results were declared. Consequently, a number of results were only queried after the commission had already made the official announcement. In a number of constituencies, for example, the results that were released by the commission on 23 May were overturned after investigations. The results released by the Electoral Commission show that just over 3 million voters took part in the 2004 elections. Although the final figures on the exact voter turnout are yet to be released, the turnout is estimated to have been around 56 per cent. This estimate is based on the number of valid votes in the presidential elections, which totalled 3 119 645 votes (54 per cent). Taking into account the fact that the number of spoilt ballots in the two presidential races of 1994 and 1999 averaged just less than 2 per cent, we therefore estimate a total voter turnout of around 56 per cent. This turnout is far lower than that in the first two elections of 1994 and 1999. As Table 5 shows, the voter turnout in 2004 fell sharply from a high of 92 per cent in 1999.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Year Turnout

1993 (referendum)

1994 (general elections)

1999 (general elections)

2004 (general elections)

69%

80%

92%

56%

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Source: Malawi Electoral Commission. Various years.

The sharp fall in voter turnout is a matter of concern for Malawi’s nascent democracy. It shows that 10 years after the introduction of democratic rule, enthusiasm for public participation in the electoral process is waning. This is largely due to greater public dissatisfaction and disquiet on the conduct of politicians over the last 10 years. In most instances, public office has been seen as a platform to self-enrichment. It has been pointed out that ‘political power and influence [in Malawi] are viewed merely as a means of access to comfort, wealth, self-aggrandisement and other egoistic pursuits ... Any benefits from politics that may accrue to the majority are merely incidental’.25 While the majority of Malawians, therefore, continue to languish in a life of poverty and misery, politicians, especially MPs, consistently vote for increases in their remuneration packages. The perception that the majority of Malawian politicians are self-seeking is supported by the fact that in the outgoing parliament, a number of opposition leaders were, at various times, enticed with monetary incentives to support the ruling party. This was particularly apparent during the debates on the third term extension. Although the proposed extensions were deeply unpopular with the general public, a number of political leaders ignored this and supported the proposals in return for ministerial positions and other financial rewards. The low turnout in the 2004 elections could also be a reflection of public disenchantment with the political process. In particular, the selection of candidates by parties to contest public office had the net effect of putting off a number of potential voters. As has already been alluded to earlier, the majority of the parties imposed particular candidates in the race for parliament. This resulted in a notable disillusionment among the general public, since a number of the more popular candidates were not allowed to contest. A major feature of the 2004 elections was the record number of MPs that were elected on an independent platform. Of the 38 MPs elected on an independent ticket, 28 came from the southern region. The high number of independent candidates in the southern region is largely as a result of ruling UDF party imposing particular candidates in their party primary elections. This resulted in a high number of independent candidates standing in predominant UDF strongholds. The fact that so many independent candidates won seats in parliament exhibits a greater level of maturity for Malawi’s democracy. It suggests that voters are able to look beyond parties to choose representatives they feel are better placed to

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Table 5: Voter turnout, 1993, 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections

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represent them. However, at the same time, the increase in the number of independent candidates, which represents more of a protest vote than issue-driven politics, does not bode well for the future of political parties. This may eventually result in the election of more single-issue candidates rather than candidates that represent a broader platform. The increase in party representation in parliament represents a growing discontent with the performance of the three parties that were represented in the first two parliaments since 1994. The UDF, AFORD and MCP all lost seats in the house, compared to the last parliament. As Table 6 shows, AFORD and the UDF were the biggest losers in terms of parliamentary representation, losing 79 per cent and 47 per cent of their MPs respectively between 1999 and 2004. The main winners from this loss of parliamentary representation by the main parties were the independents, whose representation in the National Assembly has gone up from 4 in 1999 to 38 in the 2004 elections. The new parties have also benefited by gaining 36 seats in the house for the first time.

Table 6: Changes in party representation in parliament between 1999 and 2004 UDF

MCP

AFORD

Independents

Other parties

1994

85

56

36

0

0

1999

93

66

29

4

0

2004

49

58

6

38

36

–47%

–12%

–79%

950%

Party Year

% change (1999 and 2004)

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Source: Malawi Electoral Commission.

86

The improved showing of the new parties is largely a result of the fragmentation of the three main parties, namely UDF, MCP and AFORD. During the period between the 1999 elections and 2004, the UDF has seen a number of senior members leaving to form their own parties. Prominent among these are NDA and PPM. The Alliance for Democracy has also seen a number of their members quitting over issues of party leadership and disagreements on the alliance with UDF. These formed the Movement for Genuine Democracy in early 2003. The MCP too has not been spared of the divisions. The party’s former president, Gwanda Chakuamba, decided to quit the party after losing the leadership contest to John Tembo in January 2004. Chakuamba then proceeded to form his own Republican Party. The net result of all these breakaways has been loss of support for the mainstream parties, which has gone to the newly formed parties. A major feature of voting patterns in the first two elections following the introduction of multiparty democracy in the mid 90s has been regionalism. In both the 1994 and 1999 elections, voting for the three parties that won seats in

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parliament was largely based on regional lines.26 The AFORD won most of their seats in the northern region, the MCP in the centre and UDF in the south. With the exception of the northern region, where support for the former dominant party, AFORD, has crumbled, the regional pattern of voting has been maintained in the central and southern regions. Whilst in the north a total of seven parties plus independent candidates won seats, the central regional voted predominantly for the MCP while the south voted largely for the UDF. The MCP won all their 58 seats in the central region, with the UDF winning another seven and PPM one. In the southern region, on the other hand, the UDF won 39 of their 49 seats from this region. Other parties to win seats in the south include PPM, NDA and Republican Party. NDA and RP did particularly well in Mulanje and the lower Shire districts of Chikwawa and Nsanje respectively. These also happen to be the districts of origin for the two respective party presidents. The regional patterns of voting can be attributed to the problem of distinct party identities already referred to earlier. Because the major political parties tend to offer similar and identical policies, most voters base their voting decisions on the region of origin of the individual party leaders.27 Thus AFORD has until now been regarded as the party for the north, MCP as the party for the centre and UDF as the party for the southern region. This pattern has consistently been blamed for having the potential to incite and inflame tribal and ethnic divisions.28 The lead taken by the northern region in the 2004 elections by breaking away from the regional voting patterns represents a cause for optimism for future elections. The declaration of Muntharika as victor in an election where he only managed to poll just over one third of the valid votes also raises a number of questions about the effectiveness and suitability of Malawi’s electoral system. The legitimacy of Muntharika’s victory is even more questionable when one considers that his share of the vote only translates to around 19 per cent of the total number of registered voters. By winning with such a small margin, there are implications for the popular legitimacy of the new president and also his ability to govern effectively.29 In order to give the president a more emphatic mandate to govern, the country could arguably be better served by adopting a system that allows for a run-off where no clear victor has emerged in the first poll. Muntharika’s ability to govern is further compounded by the fact that in parliament, his UDF party is not the biggest party. This also raises important questions about the ability of the new government to govern through parliament. The political system in Malawi is a cross-hybrid of the United States presidential system, with a legislature that has the powers of the British Westminster system. The 2004 election result has, however, exposed the weakness of adopting such a hybrid. Although the UDF has indicated that it will be the party of government in parliament, it clearly does not have the popular mandate to be such. Rather, the MCP, as the biggest party in parliament, might lay a more legitimate claim to

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this accolade. The confusion might necessitate the need to review the system of government in such a way that the president should get a working majority in parliament. Otherwise, a government might be incapacitated, if and when opposition parties decide to gang up against what is essentially a minority government.

CONCLUSION

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THE GOOD NEWS One of the major tests for democracy is that the opposition should have a chance of winning. Although the United Democratic Front has produced the winning president and been the party of government in all three elections in Malawi’s tenyear democratic history, there are signs that Malawi’s democracy is allowing the opposition an opportunity to win. The failure of the bids to amend the constitution, which would have allowed outgoing President Bakili Muluzi to stand again in the 2004 elections, clearly shows a new level of political maturity. Malawians have embraced democracy. The 2004 election results also show that the opposition actually had an opportunity of winning in both the presidential and parliamentary polls. However, it was only due to the fragmentation of the opposition vote that the UDF presidential candidate emerged victorious. This is against a background of the opposition winning a greater share of the parliamentary seats. The results, therefore, show that despite the UDF’s continuity, democracy in Malawi is very much alive. The 2004 elections results also show signs of improvement in voting patterns. Voters have shown that, rather than having a blind faith in parties, they are now willing to vote in individuals that have the potential to deliver. Hence, the record number of independent candidates winning seats in parliament, a challenge to the previous tripartite dominance of the UDF, MCP and AFORD. The regional voting pattern that characterised the 1994 and 1999 elections is also showing signs of disappearing, albeit slowly. This has been particularly notable in the northern region where there is no longer any single dominant party. Improvements have also been registered in the number of female MPs in the new parliament. Although a modest 14 per cent, the number of women has increased by 61 per cent since the last parliament. These positive gains notwithstanding, the 2004 elections have shown that Malawi’s democracy still faces significant challenges. These need to be properly addressed, lest the country regresses to the old days of authoritarian and single-party domination.

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Although polling for the 2004 general elections was generally peaceful, almost all observer missions, both local and international, failed to declare the elections free and fair.30 This failure has enormous implications on the country’s political and developmental future. The resumption of donor aid, withheld since 2001 due to poor economic and political governance, is dependent on a free and fair electoral process. Apart from the chaotic tabulation and announcement of results, observers have pointed to abuse of public resources by the ruling party in their campaign, and the failure of the public broadcasters to give equitable coverage to the contesting parties. The failure of the Electoral Commission to address problems raised by the opposition parties, both during the campaign period and before the announcements of results, led many to question the competency of the Electoral Commission to manage successful elections. A number of the local election observers have even gone as far as to call for the resignation of the chair of the commission for gross incompetence. Despite the fact that the Malawi Constitution empowers the Electoral Commission to ‘exercise its powers, functions and duties independent of any direction or interference by any section of society’, the 2004 elections have shown that this is far from the reality. Instead, the commission exhibited a high degree of bias towards the ruling party, which has led to the current political impasse. Malawi, therefore, needs a truly independent and impartial commission that is capable of running a successful election. The fairness of future elections in Malawi also requires the participation of an impartial and independent public media. Given the critical role that the public media, especially radio, plays in information dissemination, it is imperative that the actions of this medium be properly regulated to ensure a level playing field for all political players. The Electoral Commission also needs to use its constitutional and legal powers to introduce and enforce mechanisms that give all players in the political process equal opportunities. The low voter turnout in the 2004 elections is also another matter of great concern. Democracy thrives on the participation of an active citizenry. The fact that nearly half the registered voters never participated in the elections has important implications for the sustainability of Malawi’s democracy. The decision taken by some among the opposition to join hands with the UDF in return for ministerial and other unspecified favours might only lead to further public disenchantment with politics. It is, however, imperative that all stakeholders take stock of the factors that have contributed to the low turnout and correct them as a matter of urgency. The lingering regional pattern of voting in Malawian politics is also cause for

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CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

THE BAD NEWS

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concern as it has the potential to incite tribal and ethnic divisions in the country. It is therefore imperative that political parties come up with distinct identities and clear ideological positions. Rather than appeal to regional and tribal sentiments, this would enable voters to make real choices based on policies rather than the regional affiliation of party leaders. The fact that voters too base their decisions on regionalism also requires a change of mindset. Proper and adequate civic education needs to be carried out to enable voters to make decisions on the basis of real policy issues. The lead that has been taken in the northern region to break away from the regional voting pattern, welcome as it is, can only deliver meaningful results if it is emulated in the more populous central and southern regions. The results of the 2004 elections have also highlighted the weaknesses in Malawi’s electoral system. Specifically, the election of a president with minority support, and the creation of a government with a minority parliamentary representation, have shown that Malawi’s hybrid political system has the potential to create enormous problems of governance. This scenario echoes the warnings by one scholar emphasising, among other things, that ‘combining presidentialism with a legislature where no single party has a majority status is a kiss of death …’31 Therefore, in order to safeguard Malawi’s democracy and to avoid a repeat of the 2004 scenario, there is a need to make Malawi’s political system more representative. Despite the fact that women make up 51 per cent of the population, their participation in politics is very minimal. In the presidential race, for instance, there was no female candidate.32 In the parliamentary race, only a few women candidates contested the elections, a majority of whom contested on independent tickets. In the end, only 14 per cent of the new parliament is female. The SADC target is 30 per cent. Finally, the attempts to amend the constitution, which would have enabled the outgoing President Muluzi to extend his tenure of office, shows that individuals who mask themselves in the cloak of democrats also threaten democracy.

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1

‘Tripartite polls fail’. The Nation. 16 December 2003.

2

‘Muluzi goes into second term’. The Nation. 22 June 1999.

3

For a fuller discussion of the strategies used by the UDF in the quest to extend Muluzi’s tenure of office, see Dulani B. and van Donge J. 2004. ‘Parliament in Malawi: A bulwark against presidential usurpation of power – Ten years of multipartyism, ten years of struggle between president and parliament’. Paper presented at the Conference on African Parliaments and Governance, Nairobi Hilton, Kenya. 19–22 April. p. 7 and Chinsinga B. 2003. ‘Lack of alternative leadership in democratic Malawi: Some reflections ahead of the 2004 general elections. Nordic Journal of African Studies. vol. 12. no. 1.

4

See Malawi Government Gazette. 24 May 2002. Zomba: Government printer.

5

See ‘Third term refuses to die’. Daily Times. 22 July 2002. See also The Nation. 24 July

6

‘Probe bribes, says Britain’. Daily Times. 29 January 2003.

CONSOLIDATING MALAWI’S DEMOCRACY

ENDNOTES

2002. 7

‘Donors speak on third term’. The Nation. 11 September 2002.

8

‘Prioritise hunger, not third term bill’. The Nation. 1 October 2002.

9

See ‘Third term deferred’. Daily Times. 29 January 2003.

10 ‘Muluzi not to stand again’. Daily Times. 14 February 2003. 11 These included Republican Party (RP); People’s Progressive Movement (PPM); Movement for Genuine Democracy (MGODE); Malawi Democratic Party (MDP); People’s Transformation Party (PETRA); National Unity Party (NUP); and Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE). 12 Kings-Phiri M . 2000. ‘Reflections on Party Ideologies and Programmes’ In Ott M. et al. Malawi’s Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems and Prospects. Blantyre: CLAIM and Dulani B. 2003. ‘Democracy without political parties?’ Paper presented at the Workshop on Political Violence, Club Makokola, Mangochi, Malawi. 19 December. 13 According to an Integrated Household Survey by the Malawi National Statistics Office in Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

1998, 65 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line. 14 African Union. ‘Statement of the African Union Observer Team on the May 2004 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Malawi’. 23 May 2004. 15 Public Affairs Committee (PAC). ‘Statement on 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections’. 25 May 2004. 16 Kadzamira Z. ‘Management of the Electoral Process During the Second Multiparty Elections’ and Patel N. ‘The 1999 Elections: Challenges and Reforms’. In Ott M. et al. 2000. Malawi’s Second Democratic Elections: Process, problems and prospects. Blantyre: CLAIM. 17 See ‘Bungwe la EC Likukondera UDF–CHRR. Tamvani. 31 January – 1 February 2004 and ‘Voters fail to register in Mzimba centres’. The Nation. 9 January 2004. See also ‘Voter registration extended’. Daily Times. 20 January 2004. 18 See ‘3 Fined for registering twice’. The Nation. 9 January 2004. See also ‘Voter registration extended’. Daily Times. 20 January 2004.

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19 See ‘Blackout’. Weekend Nation. 22–23 May 2004. 20 See ‘Police kill two’. The Nation. 25 May 2004. 21 See ‘Gwanda calls for fresh polls’. Daily Times 26 May 2004. 22 Republic of Malawi. 1995. The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. Zomba: Government printer. 23 See ‘MHRC, EC figures differ’. The Nation. 26 May 2004. 24 See ‘New legal counsel for elections case’. Weekend Nation. 5–-6 June 2004. 25 Kamchedzera G. 1997. ‘Parliamentary strike and public trust’. The Lamp. no.9. July– September. Balaka: Montfort Media. 26 Chirwa W. ‘Democracy, Ethnicity and Regionalism: The Malawi experience, 1992–1996’. In Kings-Phiri M. and Ross K. 1998. Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking Blantyre: CLAIM and Kings-Phiri M. ‘Reflections on Party Ideologies and Programmes’. in Ott M.et al. 2000. Malawi’s Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems and Prospects. 27 Dulani B. 2003. ‘Democracy without political parties? op cit. 28 Chirwa W. 1998. ‘Democracy, Ethnicity and Regionalism: The Malawi Experience, 1992–1996’. In Kings-Phiri M. and Ross K. Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking. 29 See ‘Tough time for Bingu’. The Nation. 26 May 2004. 30 See, for example, the statements of AU. 2004. Statement of the African Union Observer Team on the May 2004 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Malawi. 23 May. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). Interim Statement on the 2004 Electoral Process. 8 June 2004. Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN). 2004. Republic of Malawi 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections, 20 May: Interim Statement. May and Public Affairs Committee (PAC). Statement on 2004 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. 25 May 2004. 31 Przeworski A. et al. 1996. ‘What makes democracies endure?’. In Journal of Democracy. vol. 7. no. 1. January. p. 46.

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32 The NDA, however, had a woman candidate as running mate.

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CHAPTER 5

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE An assessment

Iraê Baptista Lundin

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INTRODUCTION The Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and its presidential candidate were the declared winners of the general elections of 2004 in Mozambique. Though national and international observers, as well as the Constitutional Council, pointed to some irregularities in the electoral process, they concluded that the irregularities had not influenced the overall outcome. Mozambique is gradually consolidating its electoral democratic system, after entering the era of political pluralism with the 1990 constitution. The peace accord, signed in 1992 with the rebel movement that had destabilised the country since 1976, created a climate for reconciliation, and paved the way for participatory and inclusive democracy, where all political forces were made part of the process to construct democracy and encourage development. Since 1994, the country has had regular elections every fifth year. The number of political parties has increased dramatically, strengthening democratic pluralism, and the idea that power is gained via the ballot box. Since the end of the civil war and the beginning of a multiparty democratic system in Mozambique, the political landscape has been polarised. In spite of the more than 20 political parties registered at the Ministry of Justice, it is the two ex-belligerents that occupy the political stage – FRELIMO, who has been in power since independence, and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO). Since 1999, RENAMO has shown its political influence in the national elections by embracing a coalition block called RENAMO-Electoral Union (RENAMO–EU), a conglomeration of ten small parties, constituting a formidable opposition.1

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The results of the 2004 elections show that no third force has yet appeared to challenge the status quo. The implementation of democracy in Mozambique has not been free from conflict, especially because the electoral process is carried out by institutions created along party lines, according to party representation in parliament. One such institution, the Constitutional Council, is the last recourse for candidatures and electoral results’ appeals. Such a model creates a hierarchy, placing the winner above the loser at the National Electoral Commission (NEC), which uses the power of the vote to decide disputes instead of looking for consensus. RENAMO has contested the results of every election since 1994. Demonstrations marred the 1999 elections, and about a hundred people, who were members of opposition groups, died in jail in Montepuez (Cabo Delgado). Despite turbulence during each electoral process, the political environment is otherwise peaceful in Mozambique. However, at each election, old issues which recall past conflicts are brought up, such as the case of RENAMO’s armed men still confined in Sofala, long after the peace accord was signed in 1992. The problem persists due to a lack of understanding between RENAMO and the Interior Ministry. In 2004, civil society decided to be more pro-active by engaging the interested parties in the electoral process in conflict prevention. These forums engaged in dialogue with all political forces with the objective of conveying the importance of their participation as honest brokers. Civic organisations, united under observer forums, monitored the whole election process as closely as possible under the terms of the law. The objective was to lend more legitimacy to the results, validating them with their own counting of the official register sheets in selected representative pooling stations. To publicise its platform, one of the forums, the Electoral Observatory (EO), invited the political parties, the general public and private media to a round table in order to reflection the electoral process. One of the leaders observed that ‘elections should be seen as a feast we are all invited to construct’.2 The final objective, accepted by all the participants, was to ensure that the political parties and their supporters would do their best to contribute to free, fair and transparent elections, and to a peaceful electoral process.3

PREELECTION CAMPAIGN ISSUES

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The two major parties started the pre-campaign before the NEC announced the election dates. While FRELIMO later officially nominated Armando Guebuza to replace Joaquim Chissano, started campaigning as early as 2002, visiting the provinces and districts after his unofficial nomination as the presidential candidate. The major issue was to show his face to the population as the new leader of the ruling party.

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

The results of the local elections of November 2003 also became a pre-campaign issue, given that RENAMO gained 5 councils (MCs) (3 in Nampula and 2 in Sofala) and 4 municipal assemblies (MAs) (3 in Nampula and 1 in Sofala) out of 33. For the first time in Mozambique’s history, another force besides FRELIMO would be part of the government, if only at local level. The reaction to the results became the prelude for the campaign of 2004. FRELIMO went all out to turn the tide back in its favour, succeeding in Nampula, where it won the province for first time since 1994. The former secretary-general and second-in-command of RENAMO, Raul Domingos, created the Peace, Democracy and Development (PDD) party. Domingos had been expelled from RENAMO in 2000 for suspected links with FRELIMO. His new party became the third force during the 2004 elections. RENAMO accused the FRELIMO leadership of establishing the PDD to buy leaders to divide RENAMO’s constituency. The PDD ended up in third place, but fell short of the 5 per cent of votes required to enter parliament. The electoral census also became an issue in the pre-campaign period. It was alleged that registration officials had failed to reach the electoral strongholds of both FRELIMO (Nangade in Cabo Delgado) and RENAMO (Milange in Zambezia). RENAMO protested that it was particularly disadvantaged, arguing that it had been agreed by both FRELIMO and RENAMO that plans for placement of brigades would include districts and provincial election commissions. RENAMO insisted that the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (TSEA) was favouring FRELIMO, arguing that the TSEA manipulated supplies and the agreed plans on the census. The rural areas, where the vote in previous elections has traditionally favoured RENAMO over FRELIMO, were most affected by problems during the updating of the census.4 Another problem associated with the electoral census was the question of the number of brigades in the field. RENAMO complained that the TSEA had increased the number of brigades to about 1 300 – an increase of 29 per cent compared to 1999.5 However, in 8 provinces the increase was only 20 per cent, with the exceptions of Sofala, (a RENAMO stronghold, with a 40 per cent increase), and Maputo and Gaza provinces (FRELIMO strongholds, with a 60 and 50 per cent increase, respectively). The census became a hot topic during the elections, transforming the political environment into one of mutual distrust. RENAMO accused the TSEA of being controlled by FRELIMO, demanding that it should be able to nominate its own people to be included in the secretariat. The decision to grant the Mozambicans in the diaspora the right to vote was also contentious. The NEC decided that conditions were appropriate for Mozambicans in nine countries to register and vote. However, this was contested by RENAMO–EU. Registration took place in the Mozambican consulates in Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe in Africa, and Portugal

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and Germany in Europe. The NEC spokesperson announced that about 226 000 Mozambicans, a figure provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had registered to vote. The turnout was quite low, with only 46 000 and 1 101 voting in Africa and Europe respectively. The provisions in the electoral law also became an issue. One of the contentious questions was whether the observers would be allowed to observe the whole process, or only parts of it. The EU mission attempted to seal an agreement with the NEC on the issue, but failed to achieve its objective. The FRELIMO members of the NEC maintained that the electoral law did not provide for the observation of the electoral process, and therefore it was not allowed. .

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THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN The electoral campaign lasted from 17 October to 28 November 2004. FRELIMO, RENAMO–EU as well as other political parties and coalitions registered by the NEC received funds from the state budget, as provided for by law.6 During the 2004 elections, the international community did not provide extra funds. Mozambican Television (MTV) and Radio Mozambique (RM) provided space for campaigns for all the registered political parties and coalitions, as regulated by law.7 Some of the parties and coalitions seized the opportunity and presented well-elaborated messages to the electorate. Apart from minor incidents between members and activists of the two principal political parties, the campaign period was considered orderly and peaceful by national and international observers and civil society at large. The political parties, vying for votes, presented their competing programmes to the electorate. However, the manifestos and other programmes adopted by the competing political parties and coalitions were similar in many respects. For example, they contained issues relating to: the increase of services provided by the state in health care and sanitation; education; equality; gender; HIV/AIDS; de-bureaucratisation of the state institutions; less red tape; better security for citizens and properties; and the fight against corruption in the state apparatus and in the actions of its officials.8 The regional imbalances in development were also part of the platform of all the political parties.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR CANDIDATES

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A total of 25 political parties and coalitions submitted registration papers to the NEC to participate in the elections. However, only 20 finally took part in the elections, with only 5 presenting candidates for the presidency. The NEC rejected two political parties (one coalition and one group of citizens) because of irregularities

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

in the registration papers submitted by the parties. The law does not allow groups besides those organised in political parties or coalitions to participate in the electoral process. The two main parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, were more prepared for the 2004 presidential elections than they had ever been previously. The Central Committee of FRELIMO nominated Armando Guebuza, a veteran from the liberation war, as its presidential candidate. President Chissano had initially favoured a younger person from the new generation of technocrats, but conceded to the general appeal from the old guard and finally supported Guebuza. RENAMO, on the other hand, was more predictable, choosing Afonso Dhlakama, its leader since the war ended, as its presidential candidate. The small parties presented electoral lists encompassing members and non-members from civil society, of a diverse age and gender mix. Both parties’ parliamentary lists were discussed openly at the level of each electoral circle. In fact, the choice of candidates for the 13 electoral circles took place within the two major parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO–EU, under what looked like an open internal contest: an innovation in terms of internal democracy. Both parties introduced new blood as candidates in the lists. The fact that some of them have been elected to parliament will lend a new tempo to the performance of the national parliament. Another innovation in 2004 was the fact that all parties and coalitions taking part in the elections signed a code of conduct to guide their electoral behaviour during the campaign and after the elections. These codes of conduct were deposited at the Constitutional Council. Even though the political parties did not strictly adhere to the codes of conduct, the codes provided platforms of reference for the electoral process. The number of electoral circles increased from 11 to 13 in 2004 – one for each province, plus the city of Maputo, which, for administrative reasons, possesses the stature of a province, and one each for Mozambicans in Africa and the rest of the world. Even though the political opposition parties protested, for the first time, the Mozambicans in the diaspora cast their votes.

PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS The number of opposition political parties in Mozambique has multiplied since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1994. This has been a common trend in other African countries since the 1990s. Table 1 shows the political parties and coalitions that took part in the parliamentary elections of 2004.

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Table 1: Political parties and coalitions – parliamentary elections Party/coalition

Full name

Scope of participation

FRELIMO

Front for Liberation of Mozambique

All 13 electoral circles

Peace, Democracy and Development

All 13 electoral circles

RENAMO–EU

National Resistance of Mozambique – Electoral Union

All 13 electoral circles

PAREDE

Party of Democratic Reconciliation

All 11 circles within the national territory

PARENA

Party of Social Reconciliation of Mozambique

All 11 circles within the national territory

PASOMO

Party of Social Enlargement of Mozambique

All 11 circles within the national territory

PEC-MT

Party Ecologist, Earth Movement

All 11 circles within the national territory

PIMO

Independent Party of Mozambique

All 11 circles within the national territory

PGM

The Green Party of Mozambique

All 11 circles within the national territory

SLDP

Social Liberal and Democratic Party

All 11 circles within the national territory

PADELIMO

Liberal Democratic Party of Mozambique Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

PALMO

Liberal Party of Mozambique

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

PAZS

Party of Solidarity and Liberty

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

PDPM

Popular Democratic Party of Mozambique Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

PT

Labour Party

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

CDU

Congress of the United Democrats

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

USAMO

Union for the Salvation of Mozambique

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

EFO

Enlarged Front of the Opposition

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

PDD

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

98

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Party/coalition

Full name

Scope of participation

MBG

United Front for Change and Good Governance in Mozambique

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

UD

Democratic Union

Less than the 11 circles within the national territory

Table 2 indicates the political parties and coalitions that presented candidates who vied for the presidency during the elections. According to the law, the candidatures were presented to the Constitutional Council (CC), and had to have at least 10 000 signatures before they could qualify for the elections.10 Five candidates were approved, and three had their candidatures rejected for not fulfilling the terms of the law.

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

Table 1 Continued

Table 2: Candidates for the presidency Party/Coalition

Candidate

FRELIMO

Armando Guebuza

MBG

Carlos Reis

PDD

Raul Domingos

PIMO

Jacob Sibindy

RENAMO–UE

Afonso Dhlakama

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PREPARATIONS AND CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS The parliament voted in Electoral Law 7/2004 in June 2004 and the census was updated from 28 June to 15 July 2004.11 The NEC elaborated and approved the electoral programme. The updated census was somewhat chaotic, prompting some observers, such as the Carter Centre, to recommend an auditing of the whole process. The advice, endorsed by civil society organisations and the independent press was, in fact, structured along the ruling of the Constitutional Council after the end of the local election held in 2003, which was not taken into account by the NEC and the TSEA in preparation for 2004 elections.

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THE NEC AND THE ELECTORAL TIMETABLE The NEC provided the final electoral calendar in June 2004, scheduling dates, procedures and deadlines for civic education, presentation of candidatures, electoral campaigns, voting processes and counting exercises, among others. After updating the electoral census, the total number of registered voters announced by the NEC was 9 095 185. The first national electoral census had taken place before the 1994 national elections. Later, the 1999 register was amended and these changes were also revised in 2003 and 2004. However, problems occurred during all three census exercises, with a number of questions raised about regions and urban and rural areas covered in the registration exercise. The problems that were detected in the processes were never solved, bringing into question the validity and authenticity of the number of registered voters. The NEC could have asked the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) to prepare a template to adjust the results of the census as a means of solving the problems raised about real numbers. For example, the rate of death per year in the country could have been calculated per province.13 As Table 3 indicates, the figures from the Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), show a deduction of 1,5 per cent for deaths, making the number of voters since the 1999 elections lower than the actual figures provided by the NEC.14

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Table 3: Number of registered electorate to be adjusted to 1.5% deaths/year New registrations

Less than 1,5% deaths /year

1999

7 099 105

6 566 672

2003

1 308 592

1 288 963

2004

697 595

697 595

Total

9 105 292

8 553 230

Source: AWEPA. 2004. Mozambican Political Process Bulletin. no. 30. August

The new electoral law retained the 5 per cent threshold for parties to enter parliament, but showed some improvement with respect to problems that had caused electoral difficulties in previous elections. These include provisions which stipulate, for example, that:

100

r
polling station staff, police and journalists can vote at any polling station r
parties are banned from using goods and properties belonging to the state for campaign purposes r
parties have the right to check proofs of the ballot paper before printing r
party polling station agents must receive their credentials from the district election commission r
counting was to be published district by district

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In August 2004, the NEC published the procedures for the parliamentary and presidential candidates. In September 2004, presidential candidates registered for elections at the Constitutional Council while members of the legislative assembly registered at the NEC. Five candidates were approved and registered as presidential candidates. Twenty parties and coalitions registered for the legislative assembly elections. Civic education on elections started officially in September 2004, and lasted for about a month. The exercise was conducted by both the TSEA and by civic society organisations. The aim was to educate the electorate about the importance of exercising their civic responsibilities and participating in elections. However, insufficient materials to cover the whole country prevented some of the would-be voters from receiving the message. The NEC established 13 000 polling stations and 700 technicians were trained to monitor the electoral process. Voting took place during the first two days of December 2004. However, contrary to the expectations of many Mozambicans, the turnout was very low. Errors in the electoral register books and changes to the locations of the pooling stations were some of the reasons that led to low voter turnout.

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

r
the number of votes of each candidate must be written in the formal result sheets, compiled after the counts in figures and words r
in the event of other documents going missing, the copies of signed counts and the original official summary sheet, signed and stamped, were to be given to party polling station agents to resolve disputes.12

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ELECTION MONITORING AND OBSERVATION During the 2004 elections, 3 926 national and 458 international observers, as well as 520 national and international journalists, received credentials from the electoral organs to monitor and observe the Mozambican elections. In 2003, civil society established the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), the Centre of Studies for Development and Democracy (CSDD), the Muslim Council of Mozambique (MCM) and the Mozambican Association for Development of Democracy (MADD) to monitor and observe elections in Mozambique. For the national elections of 2004, five other organisations joined the Electoral Observatory, namely: the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique (ECM), the Mozambican League of Human Rights (MLHR), the Organisation for Conflict Resolution (OCR), Forum for Civic Education (FCE) and the Mozambican Forum for Electoral Observation (MFEO). The Observatory had about 1 550 observers in Mozambique during the elections. The EO did a sample count of the elections. Parallel vote tabulation involves selecting results from several hundred polling stations and polling centres in

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order to provide an accurate picture of the totality. The Observatory covered the results of 775 polling stations for the presidential poll and 767 polling stations for the national assembly elections.15 The Observatory delivered the results of the exercise to both FRELIMO and RENAMO–EU, and validated the announcement of the NEC of the winning party and presidential candidate. However, one of the major problems, as we have seen, was the number of voters in the register books, and national and international observers questioned the validity of the number of registered voters.

ELECTION RESULTS The final results were supposed to be announced by the NEC on 17 December 2004, that is, 15 days after the end of the elections, as provided for by the electoral laws. However, because of difficulties such as the lack of signatures appended

Table 4: Number of votes received by each party/coalition

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Party or coalition

102

Number of votes

% of national total

FRELIMO

1 889 054

62,03

RENAMO–EU

905 289

29,73

PDD

60 758

2,00

PARENA

18 220

0,60

SOL

13 915

0,46

PED–MT

12 285

0,40

PIMO

17 960

0,60

PASOMO

15 740

0,52

PVM

9 950

0,33

PAREDE

9 026

0,30

PT

14 242

0,47

PPD

448

0,01

FAO

7 591

0,25

MBG

11 059

0,36

PAZS

1 252

0,04

UD

10 310

0,34

PALMO

9 263

0,30

USAMO

8 661

0,29

PADELIMO

3 620

0,12

Source: The Carter Center, Observing the 2004 Mozambique elections. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, October 2005, p.54–55

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

to the polling stations summary sheets, the results were only announced on 21 December 2004 even though RENAMO-EU did not sign the final document. The turnout was very low. According to the NEC’s figures, the turnout was only 36.34 per cent, compared to 88 per cent and 60 per cent in 1994 and 1999, respectively. In some provinces, such as Nampula, the turnout was even lower, registering only 30 per cent. Of the 3 321 926 votes cast, 3 045 429 were validated (91,68 per cent). Only 166 540 were considered void (5,01 per cent) and 109 957 were nullified (3,31 per cent). As Table 4 indicates, FRELIMO and RENAMO–UE respectively, received 62 per cent and 30 per cent of the votes cast, clearly dominating the other political parties. The PDD achieved 2 per cent while the other political parties and coalitions garnered less than 1 per cent of the vote.16 As indicated in Table 5, it was only FRELIMO and RENAMO–EU, with 160 and 90 seats respectively, that reached the 5 per cent threshold for admission to parliament. FRELIMO took most of the seats in the 13 electoral circles while RENAMO–EU took most of the seats in Zambezia and Sofala. Table 6 provides an interesting comparison of parliamentary representation by FRELIMO and RENAMO since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1994. RENAMO’s national assembly representation has dwindled over time, with 112 and 117 seats in comparison to FRELIMO’s 129 and 133 in 1994 and 1999

Table 5: Legislative seats gained by each party/coalition – by electoral circle

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Electoral circle

FRELIMO

RENAMO

Total

Niassa

9

3

12

Cabo Delgado

18

4

22

Nampula

27

23

50

Zambezia

19

29

48

Tete

14

4

18

Manica

7

7

14

Sofala

6

16

22

Inhambane

15

1

16

Gaza

17

0

17

Maputo province

12

1

13

Maputo city

14

2

16

Africa

1

0

1

Rest of the world

1

0

1

160

90

250

Total

Source: The Carter Center, Observing the 2004 Mozambique elections. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, October 2005, p.54–55

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respectively. In the 2004 elections, RENAMO–EU received 70 seats fewer than the ruling party, FRELIMO.

Table 6: Distribution of total seats in parliament – 1994, 1999 and 2004 Party or Coalition

1994

1999

2004

FRELIMO

129

133

160

RENAMO–UE

112

117

90

9

0

0

250

250

250

UD Total

Sources: 1. Fauvet, Paul, 2004. ‘Mozambique: contested election results lead to bloodshed’ in Colin Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, vol 27, 1998–2000. New York: African Publishing Co., p.A766 2. Fauvet, Paul, 2001. “Mozambique: Frelimo wins power as war ends’ in Colin Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, vol 25, 1994–1996. New York: African Publishing Co., p.B620

In the presidential elections, 3 329 167 of the electorate cast their votes, representing only 36,42 per cent of the total registered voters. Of the votes cast in the presidential elections, 3 144 168 votes were validated, that is, 94.44 per cent of the votes. Table 7 indicates the results of the votes cast for the presidential candidates.

Table 7: Results of the presidential election Number of votes

% of national total

2 004 226

63,74%

998 059

31,74%

Raul Domingos (PDD)

85 815

2,73%

Jacob Sibindy (PIMO)

28 656

0,91%

Carlos Reis (MBG)

27 412

0,87%

Candidate Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO)

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Afonso Dhlakama (RENAMO)

Source: The Carter Center, Observing the 2004 Mozambique elections. Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, October 2005, p.54–55

After the NEC announced Armando Guebuza as the winner and the next president of Mozambique, the Constitutional Council validated the results within a maximum of 40 days, as provided for by the electoral laws.

REACTIONS TO THE RESULTS

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National and international electoral observers expressed mixed feelings with respect to the procedures and irregularities associated with the electoral process. Electoral monitors and observers such as the EU, SADC, the Carter Center

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

(CC), Portuguese Speaking Countries (PSC), the British Commonwealth, and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), among others, emphasised that the irregularities did not compromise the overall outcome in terms of the presidential elections, but raised doubts about the number of seats in the electoral circles for the parliament.19 The Constitutional Council ratified the final outcome on the basis that the irregularities would not change the overall results. Initially at least, the opposition rejected the results, accusing the electoral organs of fraud. Afonso Dhlakama stated that the elected members of RENAMO would not take their seats in the new parliament and that he would not take his seat at the Council of State (CS) as regulated by the new constitution. The Council of State is a new organ created by the Constitution of 2004 where, besides prominent personalities, all living ex-presidents and the leader of the opposition would have a seat.20 As was expected, RENAMO and other opposition parties reversed their decisions and took their seats when the national assembly and the Council of State were inaugurated.

FUTURE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Mozambique, like any other emerging democracy, still faces daunting challenges.21 These challenges are socio-cultural and eco-political in nature. As B. Mazula 1995 argues, any society develops its own democratic culture based on laws.22 The post-election scenarios are showing that the secret of true democracy lies in the opportunity to, as well as the capacity for the exercise of good will. The challenges are many. To list but a few: r
Transparency and accountability remain elusive concepts in many respects in Mozambique. r
The issue of unorganised electoral register books constitutes a challenge. r
Specific electoral dates and a calendar should clearly be inscribed in the electoral laws. r
The issue of electoral funds constitutes another challenge for a country highly dependent on foreign donors. Nearly 60 per cent of the national budget is financed by external funds in form of loans and aid. Electoral misconduct by all the political parties remains a major challenge. r
The multiplicity of opposition political parties is in itself a drawback to democracy, particularly because of the lack of a strong party to challenge government policies.

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CONCLUSION The results of the national elections announced by the NEC and validated by the Constitutional Council gave FRELIMO and its presidential candidate, Armando Guebuza, victory, regardless of the initial protests by RENAMO–EU. However, RENAMO–UE later decided to respect the state institutions and the law by accepting the outcome. The electoral process was punctuated with pockets of violence. Nonetheless, the code of conduct signed by all the political parties and coalitions constrained the behaviour of all parties contesting the elections. The issue of irregularities, the multiplicity of register books and the high voter abstentions are major concerns. The structure of the electoral organs, polarised along the two major party lines is an issue that will require further attention by the lawmakers. The electoral law should be amended to avoid problems of ad hoc and incidental deadlines, an issue that should involve all stakeholders. Mozambique is consolidating its multiparty democratic electoral system. On the normative side, democracy is being consolidated gradually with organs and institutions scrutinised regularly by national and international observers. Ultimately, the state is still too weak and not yet properly structured in terms of the separation of powers.

ENDNOTES 1

See, for example: AWEPA: Mozambique Political Process Bulletin. 2004. ‘On the impact of FRELIMO and RENAMO in the post conflict political development in Mozambique’. vol. 30. Lundin. B. I. 2001. Reflections on the Dynamics of a Nation Building Process under Stress: The case of Mozambique, 1993-1998. Goteborg: Handelshoskolan vid Gotebogs Universitet, Kulturgeografiska Institutionen. Lundin B. I. ‘Political parties: A reading

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of the ethnic and regional factor in the democratisation process’. In Mazula B. 1996. (ed). Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development. Maputo: Inter-Africa Group. pp. 407–454. Fauvet P. 2001. Mozambique: Frelimo wins power as war ends’. In Legum C. (ed). Africa Contemporary Record 1994–1996. New York: Africana Publishing Co. vol. 25. pp. B615–B634. 2

Bishop Dinis Sengulane, the President of the Christian Council of Churches during the meeting. On the issue of concept ethnicity and how it relates to democratisation trends see generally, Glickman, Harvey, (ed) 1995, Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa. Atlanta, GA: The African Studies Association Press.

3

The major political parties attended the round table and arrived at such a compromise.

4

See generally, Economist Intelligent Unit. Country Report December 2004 – Mozambique.

5

On the figures on brigades provided during the 1999 elections see, Mazula B. 2000 ‘Os

London: Economist Intelligence Unit.

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Africa: O Caso Mocambicano. Maputo: Sociedade Editorial Njira, Lda. pp. 42–54. 6

On the constitutional provisions governing the electoral process in Mozambique see: Governo de Mocambique. 1999/2004. Constituicao da Republica. Maputo: Boletin da Republica.

7

See TVM programme Terceiras Eleicoes GeraisI. 2004 and Economist Intelligence Unit.

8

Economist Intelligence Unit. op.cit.

9

Besides RENAMO, the parties in the coalition are: Independent Alliance of Mozambique

op.cit.

(ALIMO), Patriotic Action Front (FAP), Mozambique United Front (FUMO), Mozambique Nationalist Movement (MONAMO), National Convention Party (PCN), Ecological Party of Mozambique (PEMO), Mozambican People’s Progress Party (PPPM), Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), National Unity Party (PUN) and United Democratic Front (UDF).

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN MOZAMBIQUE

Desafios da Democracia Mocambicana’. In Mazula B. (ed). Construcao da Democracia em

The Mozambican National Union (UNAMO) left the coalition after 1999 and was replaced by PEMO. See Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration. 1999/2003. Mocambique Dados Estatisticos do Processo Eleitoral. Maputo: TSEA. 10 Governo de Mozambique. 2004. op. cit. 11 ibid. 12 See Governo de Mozambique. 2004. op. cit. 13 For details on the data see, Instituto Nacional de Estatistica. 2003. Statistical Yearbook 2003. Maputo: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica. 14 See AWEPA 2004 op. cit. 15 Economist Intelligence Unit. 2004. op. cit. 16 Economist Intelligence Unit. 2004. op. cit. 17 The list of the parties and coalitions in Table 4 follows the one used by the president of the NEC when announcing the results on 2 December 2004. 18 From 1999 RENAMO entered into a coalition of 11 other parties and established RENAMO–EU. Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

19 Communiques and reports produced by the NEC, observers from the Electoral Observatory, the Mission of Observers of the European Union, the Carter Centre, the Commonwealth and SADC. 20 For details, see Governo de Mozambique. 2004. op. cit. 21 Mazula B. 2000. op. cit. For a discussion on the impact of civil wars on emerging democracies see generally, Kaldor M. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organised violence in a global era. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 22 Mazula B. 1995. Educacao, Cultura e Ideologia em Mocambique, 1975–1985. Lisboa: Edicoes Afrontamento. See also Lundin B. I. Forthcoming. Comparative Studies between the System of Centralised Economy (1975–1986) and Democratic Pluralism (1987–Present). Goteborg: Handelshoskolan vid Gotebogs Universitet, Kulturgeografiska Institutionen.

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CHAPTER 6

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA Is the country’s democracy consolidating?

Khabele Matlosa

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INTRODUCTION The year 2004 was historically important for democratic South Africa as this was the year that marked a decade of democracy. It was, therefore, a year for both reflection and planning – reflection on the achievements and challenges since April 1994, and planning strategies for consolidating the country’s democratic transition. This was the third democratic multiparty election since the political transformation that ushered in majority rule in 1994. The second and third multiparty general election took place in 1999 and 2004. The fourth general election is due in 2009. South Africa has also held two local government elections, in 1995 and 1999. The third local government election is scheduled for 2006. The 2004 election was crucial in many respects. Firstly, the election presented an opportune moment for key political actors and democracy activists in South Africa to reflect on the progress made in the last decade, and the challenges remaining. The South African government undertook a ten-year review of the country’s democracy project, highlighting challenges, opportunities and constraints and, on the basis of this analysis, framed a strategy for addressing existing socio-economic and political bottlenecks. The review was made public in a publication entitled, Towards a Ten Year Review: Synthesis report on the implementation of government programmes – A discussion document, prepared by the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) in the Presidency in October 2003. Secondly, the 2004 election also formed part of the national celebration of ten years of democracy. The festivities, marked by pomp and ceremony, included

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CHAPTER 6 Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

the official second-term inauguration of President Thabo Mbeki on the 27 April 2004. During the year, various government departments showcased their successes over the past decade. Opposition parties complained that state resources were being used for politicking. The main opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), raised concerns that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was using democracy celebrations to gain political mileage in advance of the election. The ANC was tampering with the playing field, according to the opposition. Be that as it may, the 2004 election was held in a political environment conducive to a free and fair electoral contest, as was confirmed by various election observer reports. Thirdly, the 2004 election set the political scene for the key political actors to re-craft and re-frame South Africa’s future democratic governance, at least for the next decade. Thus, the PCAS undertook a significant exercise, culminating in a document entitled, Memories of the Future: South Africa Scenarios 2014. The document presents various scenarios for the country’s development and democratic trajectory up to 2014. The scenarios were drawn from the challenges and opportunities that had marked the democratisation project over the last ten years. Five scenarios were identified, with the best-case scenario entitled, ‘Shosholoza: on the fast track’, wherein a combination of economic development, social cohesion and democratic consolidation will be realised. It is worth noting that the policy thrust of the ANC’s 2004 election manifesto, ‘A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty’ was consistent with this best-case scenario. This chapter aims to review the 2004 general election in order to ascertain whether or not the election helped the country to consolidate its newly found democracy. One important indicator of the democratic quality of elections is electoral governance. Two questions must be answered here. First, to what extent were the electoral management, processes, procedures, regulations, systems and institutional/legal frameworks premised on ‘procedural/institutional certainty’, in other words, on predictable and well-known rules of the game? Second, to what extent was the election outcome ‘substantively uncertain’ or unknown prior to the electoral process, and announcement of results? It has been observed that: Political uncertainty is the essence of democracy, and it takes two distinct forms: institutional and substantive. Institutional uncertainty – the uncertainty about the rules of the game – implies the vulnerability of the democratic system to antidemocratic forces. Substantive uncertainty – uncertainty about the outcome of the game – is about the perception of the ruling political elite in a democratic system on whether they will return to office. The former – institutional uncertainty – is bad for democracy for it raises the prospect of the return to authoritarianism in the third wave of democracies. The latter – substantive uncertainty – is good for democracy for it keeps politicians on their toes and makes them responsive to their

110

citizenry.1

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

We will argue that South Africa’s 2004 election was, in large measure, marked by procedural/institutional certainty. The rules of the game were transparent and well known and accepted by the players, hence the code of conduct that all the parties signed prior to the election. We will further argue that while, to some degree, substantive uncertainty was assured, it tends to be limited largely by the overwhelming dominance of the ruling African National Congress. Feeble and fragmented opposition parties have helped to institutionalise the prevailing dominant party syndrome in the country. Be that as it may, we argue that the dominant party syndrome, in and of itself does not amount to a one-party state or authoritarian rule, as others have implied.2 If that were the case, countries like Botswana, which has been ruled by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) for over 30 years, would not be labelled stable and world-acclaimed liberal democracies.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK An election culminates in the creation of a government. Thus, both the election and how a government is formed are fundamentally constitutional matters. In particular, in democracies, an election is critical for the formation of the parliament (especially the national assembly). Chapter Four of the 1993 Constitution establishes South Africa’s parliament. It is a bicameral parliament comprising the National Assembly and the Senate. In this chapter, we are more interested in the National Assembly (NA) and this will be our main focus. The NA is constituted following a multiparty election. In terms of article 40 of the constitution, the National Assembly comprises ‘400 members elected in accordance with a system of proportional representation of voters’.3 The speaker, assisted by the deputy speaker, heads the NA. The life span of the NA is five years, and this is consistent with the electoral cycle. Thus, the constitution guarantees that the NA is one of the key organs of government and ensures that it is elected every five years through universal suffrage. The president of the republic is not directly elected by the voters, but rather by parliament. The president is mandated to form the national cabinet and the premiers form the provincial cabinets. Following its 2004 election victory, the ANC selected Thabo Mbeki as president, and this was subsequently endorsed by parliament. In all nine provinces, the premiers are members of the African National Congress. The main opposition party, at both the national level and in most provinces, is the Democratic Alliance, at that time led by Tony Leon (currently led by Helen Zille). To all intents and purposes, the South African Constitution has been hailed as the most liberal constitution in the world. There is no gainsaying that South Africa’s Constitution is the principal foundation for institutional certainty and some relative substantive uncertainty, especially in the arena of electoral

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CHAPTER 6 Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

governance. South Africa has institutionalised, through this constitution, a democratic political culture marked by constitutionalism, rule of law, respect for and protection of human rights, separation of powers with checks and balances, and the holding of regular multiparty elections. Since the political transformation of 1994, there is no gainsaying that South Africa’s democracy is slowly, but surely consolidating. If we use two main indicators of consolidation of democracy, namely: more than two successive and successful elections (1994, 1999 and 2004); and institutionalisation of governance (judiciary, legislature, the executive. bureaucracy, security establishment and the engagement of the non-state actors in governance), it is evident that South Africa’s democracy is taking root. Given the broadly inclusive nature of the 1994 political settlement and the electoral model in South Africa, it is evident that, in terms of political participation and representation in the governance process, democratic practice and culture is increasingly becoming entrenched. Furthermore, deliberate government policy towards economic empowerment of the historically marginalised has also gone a long way in redressing the economic imbalances of the apartheid era. In this area, however, much more still needs to be done if, for instance, widespread poverty and unemployment are to be reversed. Indeed, the major deficit of the South African democracy rotates around socio-economic justice.4 Early in 2005, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) produced an interesting volume entitled, Democracy in the Time of Mbeki, edited by Richard Calland and Paul Graham. This book presented IDASA’s democracy index on South Africa, similar to David Beetham’s Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom. South Africa’s democracy under Mbeki received the overall score of 63 per cent as indicated in Table 1. It is clear from Table 1 that, while South Africa performs well in most areas, it scored below 50 per cent in respect of socio-economic justice (47 per cent). This is, in part, why President Mbeki has often referred to South Africa as a country with ‘two nations and two economies; one rich and largely white and one poor and largely black.’5 These authors further observe that, ‘the richest 10 per cent of South Africans account for 45 per cent

Table 1: State of democracy in South Africa Index section

112

Score (%)

Participation and democracy

62

Elections and democracy

72

Accountability and democracy

57

Political freedom and democracy

69

Human dignity and democracy

47

Total

63

Source: Calland R. and Graham P. (eds). 2004. Democracy in the Time of Mbeki. Cape Town: IDASA.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN A DEMOCRACY AND POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION Elections are one of the most important ingredients of democratic governance and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. While elections on their own would not be adequate to ensure sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, democracy cannot prevail without regular multiparty elections. Additionally, peace cannot be sustained in post-conflict societies without the institutionalisation of democratic governance anchored upon regular multiparty elections. The key functions of elections in entrenching democratic governance are many and varied, but the most critical ones for the purpose of this discussion are:

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

of the national income while approximately 5 per cent of the national income is shared among the poorest 40 per cent. This disparity also has a racial basis, with white South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranked 45th in the world while black South Africa’s GDP is ranked 180th.6 The highest score is in elections and democracy (72 per cent). This is an indicator of the extent to which the country has been able to ensure the procedural certainty of elections and substantive uncertainty of its outcomes.

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

r
r
r
r
r


legitimisation of the political system and government providing for orderly succession of governments selection and recruitment of leaders linking political institutions with voters’ preferences mobilisation of the electorate for social values, political goals and programmes r
channelling of political conflicts into procedures for their peaceful settlement r
settling the competition for political power on the basis of alternative policy programmes. Democracy is a fairly complicated system of governance. It does not only denote broad representation of key political forces in the running of national affairs, and a sufficiently equitable distribution of national resources, but equally important is the management of conflicts. Democracy, by its nature, entails a multiplicity of different kinds of conflicts. The system opens up the political space for public demands, which are often not met through deliberate policy initiatives. However, democracy is also about managing societal conflicts in a constructive manner. If one accepts this premise, then it is helpful to conceive of conflicts not as destructive, but rather as a natural part of social development. The challenge then is not to wish conflicts away, but rather to devise effective institutional mechanisms for managing them more effectively.

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This section reviews election-related conflicts in South Africa ahead of the 2004 election and sheds some light on how to deal with these effectively. Elections provide the requisite legitimacy for the winning party to govern. They assist in institutionalising the democratic means to change governments. Elections link the leadership succession to the preference of the electorate. They provide a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of political conflicts. Since the 1994 political transition, all the elections in South Africa have performed these functions fairly adequately – but particularly the entrenchment of an electoral process as a conflict management process. This is where elections become crucial for democracy – for elections have a great potential to either detonate or defuse an existing conflict. You need not look far for evidence of this. In Angola, the 1992 abortive election entrenched a culture of political violence. Conversely, Mozambique’s elections since 1994 have helped entrench a political culture of the constructive management of conflicts much as the South African elections since 1994 have helped entrench political harmony and reconciliation in South Africa.

MANAGEMENT OF ELECTIONRELATED CONFLICT IN DEMOCRACY BUILDING Major conflicts in the south of Southern Africa, as elsewhere in the world, revolve mainly around four areas.

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Resource-based conflicts Control of territory Ideology Social identity

The common denominator in these structural conflicts is the pursuit of power, and especially state power. Given the nature of the contest and the high stakes, elections are, by their very nature, conflict-ridden phenomena. All forms of competition involve varying degrees of conflict. For a conflict to occur four conditions exist: 1. 2. 3. 4.

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Context (e.g. election) Actors (e.g. parties) Issues (e.g. registration) Incompatibility of interests (e.g. control of government).

A conflict situation, depending on how it is managed, either escalates into a violent encounter between belligerent forces, or de-escalates into a peaceful settlement.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

1. The pre-election phase 2. The election or polling phase 3. The post-election phase.

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The challenge is to ensure that appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place to manage election-related conflicts. In South Africa, the Code of Conduct for parties helps deal with election-related conflicts. Institutional arrangements for ensuring compliance with the Code include the IEC, conflict management panels, party liaison committees and the electoral court. Electoral commissions also need to have plans in place for managing conflicts throughout the entire electoral process. Anticipating or identifying critical ‘hot-spots’ can do this more effectively. Observers and monitors often tend to focus their election observation plans and strategies on the key areas that have greatest potential for generating conflict in the electoral process. An election process evolves over three stages:

What then are the key conflict areas in the pre-election phase? In the pre-election phase, the usual hot-spots in SADC elections are around: r
r
r
r
r
r
r


constituency delimitation voters registration registration of parties nominations and party lists political campaign independence of the IEC and election staff recruitment party funding.

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CONFLICT AROUND CONSTITUENCY DELIMITATION The issue of delimitation of election boundaries or constituencies does not arise in the the 2004 election in South Africa, given that the country uses the PR electoral model, which considers the whole country as one large single constituency. This becomes a major problem in almost all other SADC states, such as Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, that operate the British-style FPTP electoral model.

CONFLICT AROUND VOTER REGISTRATION No major conflicts were experienced around voter registration for the 2004 election and all parties applauded the IEC for a job well done. The voters’ register is open for inspection by the voters and parties to ensure the openness and transparency of the electoral process.

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CONFLICT AROUND REGISTRATION OF PARTIES Although the registration of parties was undertaken with minimum conflict, two parties contested their registration for election through the courts and won the case.

CONFLICT AROUND NOMINATIONS AND PARTY LISTS The nomination process may seem fairly straightforward given the electoral model in South Africa, but is inherently fraught with tension and conflict. Parties work out their lists based on their own internal arrangements. Depending on how much internal democracy has been institutionalised in each party, conflicts may or may not disrupt the party machinery. For instance, in some parties, such as the ruling African National Congress, the process is fairly open and allows inputs from the provinces for the development of party lists. The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, an independent organisation, facilitates and monitors the whole process.

CONFLICT DURING THE CAMPAIGN PROCESS

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Election-related conflicts during the campaign process are dealt with through the Code of Conduct for Parties (CCP), conflict management panels, party liaison committees and/or the electoral court. No violent conflicts on a national scale occurred during the run-up to the April 2004 election. A number of violent encounters between the ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters were reported in Kwazulu-Natal.

CONFLICT AROUND THE IEC The independence of the IEC, and the nature of election staff recruitment, have become heated issues around elections in a number of SADC states, including Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, the independence of the IEC and the recruitment of election staff did not trigger any major conflicts in South Africa’s third democratic election. This may suggest the effectiveness of the democratic institutions and the ongoing entrenchment of democratic culture and practice in the country.

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Although public funding for parties is well regulated, private donations to political parties are not regulated and this situation can, as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa has aptly argued, lend itself to political corruption and abuse of power. Political parties are divided on this matter; bigger parties do not seem to favour regulation and disclosure of private donations, while smaller parties prefer regulation and public disclosure. Democracy requires that a country hold regular multiparty elections. Elections are, therefore, an important ingredient of democracy. However, elections on their own, do not constitute democracy. Elections presuppose contestation over control of state power. Given the high stakes in the contestation, then elections tend to be conflict-ridden phenomena. Election-related conflicts are therefore part of the political game. They should be accepted as a reality of electoral politics. Having accepted that elections are conflict-ridden phenomena, political actors then need to strive to put in place institutional mechanisms for managing them effectively.

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

CONFLICT AROUND PARTY FUNDING

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THE ELECTORAL ACT AND THE ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODY EMB The 1998 Electoral Act regulates mundane electoral governance. The Act specifies exactly who votes, how the voting process takes place, and how votes cast are translated into parliamentary seats. The Act provides a detailed legal framework for the management of elections as well as a code of conduct for political parties during elections. One important aspect of the 2004 elections in South Africa was the manner in which the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) managed the process. Both the election process and its outcome are highly dependent on the manner in which the election is managed and administered throughout its three phases. The IEC was established in terms of the 1993 Constitution and through a 1996 Act of Parliament. Managing national elections is the sole responsibility of this autonomous and impartial body. Its vision is to ‘strengthen constitutional democracy through the delivery of free and fair elections in which every voter is able to record his or her informed choice.’7 The IEC, to a large measure, adhered to this vision throughout all three phases of the electoral process. The IEC managed the 2004 election with a diligence and professionalism that earned it more confidence from all stakeholders, including the political parties. In fact, the manner in which the IEC is established, and the professional conduct of the IEC in managing elections in South Africa, is increasingly becoming a model to emulate in many African countries, especially in the SADC region.8

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HOW THE IEC IS ESTABLISHED The IEC comprises five members, one of whom is a judge, appointed by the president to serve on the commission for a period of seven years. The Constitutional Court (CC) recruits commissioners through newspaper advertisements, and prepares a short-list of qualified candidates. Then, interviews of the qualified applicants are conducted by a panel consisting of: r
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the president of the Constitutional Court as chairperson a representative of the Human Rights Commission a representative of the Commission on Gender Equality the Public Protector.

After screening and public interviews, the panel then submits eight nominees to the Portfolio Committee for Home Affairs (PCHA) for a recommendation. Upon consideration by the PCHA, the full national assembly approves the names of five selected commissioners through a resolution. The resolution is then submitted to the Minister of Home Affairs who, in turn, submits the names to the president for official appointment. The current members of the Independent Electoral Commission are: r
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Dr Brigalia Bam Ms Thoko Mpumlwana Judge Herbert Qedusizi Msimang Mr Terry Tselane Mr Fanie van der Merwe

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

The commission is assisted by the secretariat, which is headed by the Chief Elections Officer (CEO).

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS WORKINGS The electoral model in use in South Africa since 1994 is the List Proportional Representation (PR) system. According to Nohlen, a pure PR electoral system is one ‘which, without natural or artificial hurdles, (the size of constituencies or thresholds) aims at attaining the highest possible degree of proportionality’.9 Some analysts posit that: South Africa used the British First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system of electing representatives for parliament for more than 80 years. Since its implementation at

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unification in 1910, this system remained essentially unchanged, until it was

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

1994. Towards the end of the 1980s, it became clear that South Africa was moving irrevocably towards political transition, and also a new electoral arrangement. The five years that preceded the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1993 was dominated by the debate on electoral options for the new South Africa.10

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

The 1996 Constitution prescribes that the electoral system must result in proportional representation. Thus ‘the system chosen to fulfil this mandate for national parliament was a highly proportional party list system, in which each party draws up closed and rank-ordered national and provincial lists of candidates for parliament.’11 Since 1994 therefore, South Africa has used List Proportional Representation, in which the entire country is considered one big electoral zone or constituency with various voting districts. However, the South African model is not as straightforward as it seems, because the PR model applies only in so far as elections for the national assembly are concerned. For local government elections, a hybrid system, which combines the constituency-based First-Past-The-Post electoral model and proportional representation, applies. The rationale for this was to ensure that, at the national level, there is a deliberate effort towards broadening representation in the national and provincial legislatures, and nurturing and deepening reconciliation and political stability, while emphasis is placed upon accessibility and accountability at the local government levels, even though the FPTP system does tend to be exclusionary. Parties contesting elections prepare lists of candidates for the 400 member national assembly as follows:

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replaced by the 1993 Interim Constitution and the subsequent election of April

r
A National Assembly list or national-to-national list, comprising 200 candidates r
A National Assembly list or province-to-national list, comprising 200 candidates r
Nine provincial lists or province-to-province lists, comprising candidates equivalent to the number of seats available in each provincial legislature.12 Having been duly constituted through an election, the national parliament ‘elects the president, who is the head of the executive branch of government, and who is responsible for governing in conjunction with the cabinet, which he appoints’.13 Thus, unlike in the FPTP system of the apartheid era, in the present PR electoral model, political parties prepare their party lists of candidates, who, in turn, contest elections, not as individuals chosen to the legislature to represent constituencies, but as party representatives that essentially represent parties in the legislature. The allocation of seats itself is a fairly technical process that uses the Droop quota. This is the threshold that is used in highest average List-PR systems and

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the quota ‘is ascertained by the following formula: total vote divided the number of seats plus one, then one is added to the product.’14 In terms of the seat allocation formula, the South Africa PR system provides for a fairly low threshold for parties’ access to parliament in the SADC region, compared to Mozambique’s five per cent. The main purpose of a threshold is to determine the inclusion and exclusion of parties in the legislature on the basis of votes cast. Thus, each party has to pass the test of implicit threshold first and foremost before gaining access to parliament. It is worth emphasising, though, that the South African Constitution does not prescribe a predetermined or explicit threshold. This was perceived as undemocratic, exclusionary and discriminatory. Thus, the quota in South Africa elections is determined primarily by voter turnout, and the calculation of seats won by each party.15

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM

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The PR electoral model that South Africa has used since 1994 has, by all indications, served the country fairly well. Firstly, it has certainly helped ensure broad representation of key political forces in the legislature. Secondly, and linked to the first point, the PR system has been a catalyst for increased gender balance with greater numbers of women participating in both parliament and the executive branch of government. Thirdly, the PR model has facilitated reconciliation and peace, following a protracted violent conflict, thereby acting not only as a conflict management instrument, but also a guarantor for political stability. Fourthly, proportional representation has enhanced the participation of the electorate in elections, by eliminating incidences of vote wastage. All valid votes cast count towards the calculation of election results, and parties thus earn their legislative seats in proportion to their electoral strength. All these positive attributes of the PR model notwithstanding, there has been a lot of debate around the PR model as applied in South Africa, especially since 1999 and the country’s second democratic election. One major critique levelled against the PR system is that, given the centralisation of power within the party, the system suffers from a severe lack of accountability of the MP to the electorate. The MP tends to think that s/he has been elected into parliament, not so much by the voters, but rather by the party leadership, which placed her/him on the party list. Consequently s/he is beholden to the party’s political top brass and hardly ever serves the interests of the voters. This mindset gives rise to faceless MPs without a distinctive constituency and without accountability to the voters. As some analysts put it, this shortcoming ‘is seen as the most serious in that it suppresses communication between voters and the representatives: the MPs are responsible to parties and not sufficiently responsive to the needs of voters’.16 However, the key question around this paradox is whether, in fact, lack of accountability of

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ELECTORAL TASK TEAM ETT

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

As part of the political settlement, South Africa adopted a provisional constitution in 1993. This constitution provided for, inter alia, the holding of elections on the basis of an electoral model that would ensure proportional representation. This is the model that was then adopted during the transitional election of 1994, and the constitutional amendments of 1996 did not change this model, thereby allowing the country to use the model for the 1999 election as well. But the 1996 Constitution anticipated refinements to, or a change of, the electoral system following the 1999 election, and before the 2004 election. The general debate that had ensued around the model, together with this constitutional provision, prompted President Thabo Mbeki’s government to appoint a task force on electoral reform to primarily advise on the best way forward for electoral system engineering in South Africa. Styled the Electoral Task Team (ETT), this commission was established on 20 March 2002 and was headed by Dr. van Zyl Slabbert. The ETT had a fairly broad mandate to: (a) draft the new electoral legislation required by the constitution and (b) formulate the parameters of new electoral legislation, and draft it in order to prepare for the scheduled national and provincial elections of 2004 or any earlier election, should the need arise.17 The terms of reference for the ETT were to:

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MPs is a factor of an electoral model alone, or is a wider political problem linked to the broader political culture of a country. In other words, we need to address accountability not solely as a factor of the model alone, but also as a factor of the wider political culture, including the manner in which political parties conduct the game of politics.

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identify the controlling constitutional parameters identify the salient and relevant aspects of the South African context identify the list of options available within the South African context canvass the preferences and views of relevant role players and stakeholders with special regard to political parties in respect of the list of identified options r
develop specific proposals identifying the preferable electoral system to be canvassed with aforesaid role players and stakeholders r
formulate a draft bill for submission to Minister M. Buthelezi.18 An international conference was organised jointly by the ETT, Konrad-adenauerStiftung and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) in Cape Town on 9–10 September 2002 to engage in this debate, and bring on board regional and

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international perspectives and experiences.19 Even at the conference, no consensus emerged regarding a preferred electoral model for South Africa. Some participants agued for a Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMPR), whereas others argued for the retention of the full List-PR system. What is interesting, though, is that public opinion on the electoral reform was overwhelmingly in favour of the present List-PR system and its retention. The public opinion survey was undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) covering a total sample of 2 760 South African citizens of voting age, randomly selected. It was undertaken by Southall and Mattes. the survey asked … respondents a series of questions about their opinions of the current electoral system. Looking across the questions, it is clear that a substantial majority feels that, overall, the present system is fair. About three-quarters say they are ‘satisfied’ with ‘the way we elect our government’ (74 per cent) and agree the system is ‘fair to all parties’ (72 per cent). Approximately two-thirds feel that ‘all voters were treated equally’ in the 1999 elections (68 per cent) and that ‘all

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

parties were treated equally’ in 1999 (63 per cent).20

The Slabbert Commission (SC) undertook its work with the diligence and professionalism worthy of such a high-powered task force. The commission conducted stakeholder workshops and interviewed political parties and other key stakeholders on the electoral system reform. The commission also engaged experts to undertake a survey on public opinion around the electoral system reform. However, in the end, members of the task force were divided, and two schools of thought informed the ultimate outcome of the whole process. First, a majority view emerged in favour of a Mixed Member Proportional Representation system, which would lead to the introduction of 69 multi-member constituencies, from which 300 MPs would be elected via FPTP and 100 members of parliament would be elected on the basis of a closed party list. Second, a minority view emerged arguing for the retention of the current system on the basis that its potential strengths outweigh its perceived weaknesses. As a result of the divergence of opinion within the commission two reports emerged, namely: the main report, which advocated for the change of the model, and a minority report, which called for the retention of the PR system. The ETT submitted both reports to the Minister of Home Affairs and the matter was subsequently presented to cabinet. According to some scholars ‘the government’s reaction to the ETT report was that the status quo would be maintained and that the newly elected government in 2004 would review the report and make a decision in preparation for the 2009 poll.’21 There were various factors that influenced government’s decision not to undertake electoral reforms in line with the majority position of the ETT. Some of these factors are as follows:22 122

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

The majority report emphasised the point that PR is deficient in so far as accountability is concerned, and hence the need for electoral system reform in South Africa. The main message carried by the minority report was simply that public opinion had revealed popular support for the PR, and political parties had indicated their preference for the retention of the model; hence there was no need to change the system. Furthermore, the minority report argued that the List-PR system in South Africa was good for the country as it was fair, inclusive and simple. It will come as no surprise if, up to the 2009 election and beyond, the South African government makes no further efforts towards reform measures.23

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The challenges posed by the introduction of a new model in respect of civic and voter education just in advance of the 2004 election. r
The perceived fairness and representivity of the PR; in particular its inherent virtues in a post-conflict South Africa. r
For voters, the system had become familiar and was simple to understand, not as complex as the proposed new MMPR model. r
The system had proved itself conducive to gender equality in government. r
The fact that the commission itself had not formed a solidified and unanimous opinion on the reform imperatives.

GENDER REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT Despite its perceived failings in accountability, the proportional representation system allows for broad representation of key political forces in the legislature. It is an inclusive political system, promoting reconciliation in post-conflict societies, and facilitating gender balance government as Table 2 demonstrates.

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Table 2: Gender balance in the South African National Assembly, 1994–2004 Year

Size of parliament

Number of women

% of women

1994

400

111

27,7%

1999

400

120

29,8%

2004

400

131

32,8%

Source: Morna C. 2004. ‘Ringing up the changes: Gender in Southern Africa politics’ Johannesburg: http://www.genderlinks.org.za/article.php?a_id=293

It is evident from Table 2 that women’s participation in the South Africa parliament has been progressively increasing since 1994. With a parliament of 400 seats, women occupied 111 seats, constituting 27.7 per cent of the total in 1994. This situation improved considerably in the country’s second democratic election of 1999 when the number of women in parliament reached 120 or 29.8

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per cent of the total parliamentary seats. South Africa made good on its commitment to the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development (DGD), signed by member states in Blantyre, Malawi. The signatories committed themselves to achieving equal gender representation in key organs of governance, aiming for at least 30 per cent female representation by the year 2005. Following the 2004 election, South Africa exceeded the 2005 target. The current female representation in parliament is 131 or 32.8 per cent. There is no doubt that the electoral system has had an important influence on this positive trend in South Africa’s evolving democracy. Added to this has been the commitment by political parties to inculcate a political culture that embraces gender equality in the governance process. However, PR on its own may not be an adequate catalyst for gender equality in the legislature; it needs additional impetus from political commitment and the institutionalisation of either voluntary or involuntary quotas.24

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM It is fascinating that South Africa, which was engulfed in a protracted violent conflict with little prospects for an amicable political settlement just three decades ago, has made such tremendous headway in both political transition and institutionalisation of democratic governance since 1994. To be sure, the political transition and institutionalisation of democratic governance has had a profound bearing on both the democracy project, broadly speaking, and specifically on the party systems and party organisation in the country, as is evident elsewhere in the SADC region. Today, more parties take part in the political activities of SADC countries than ever before, and are thus able to contest state power through regular elections. All these developments suggest that liberal democracy is increasingly becoming institutionalised in Southern Africa. However, what is striking about the form of liberal democracy underway in the region is the stark reality that almost all the regional states today are characterised by a ‘dominant party system’.25 In the following section, we present a critical review of South Africa’s party political configuration, and specifically tease out the country’s emergent dominant party system. We further explore the implications of the nature of the party system for the electoral contest, taking the 2004 poll and its aftermath as our guide.

DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM

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There is a fairly lively debate today on the extent to which democratic governance in Southern Africa is being consolidated. All keen observers of Southern Africa’s democracy project are concerned about the extent to which the process

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

… too much power concentrated far too long in the hands of one party is inimical

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is ephemeral and thus likely to experience reverse waves. Our best-case scenario is that the project is sustainable and irreversible. However, that sustainability and irreversibility is highly dependent upon the institutionalisation of the process. This calls for the entrenchment of institutional certainty and substantive uncertainty. Part of the current democracy discourse rotates around the value, or lack thereof, of the dominant party system to a working and vibrant democracy. South Africa’s successful democratic transition and the current democratic governance in this country is marked, in the main, by a strong dominant party system. The key question is whether this situation, in any fundamental way, denudes the country’s liberal democracy. According to one analyst, a dominant party system tends to diminish the inherent value of liberal democracy:

to democracy. Irrespective of whatever past benefits the party may have contributed to the nation. Power does not sanctify the holder of it, as Lord Action observed during the reign of Queen Victoria. On the contrary, ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.26

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

On the contrary, we provide an argument suggesting that the above observation may be overstated in South Africa’s complex political setting. There is no scientific evidence suggesting that a dominant party system is inherently undemocratic or authoritarian. Throughout the world there are basically four types of party systems: 1. The one-party system provides for a governance system in which only one party is in existence, either de jure or de facto, actively drives the political system, and is solely in control of state power. 2. In a two-party system, two main parties are dominant, drive the political system, and alternate state power through electoral contest. 3. In a multiparty system, more than two parties exist, and are politically active in directing the governance realm, and in so doing, alternate control over state power among themselves. 4. A dominant party system in which, despite the multiparty situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political system, and is firmly in control of state power over a fairly long duration of time, such that even opposition parties make little, if any, dent on the political hegemony of the dominant ruling party.27 By all indications, therefore, the political hegemony of the ruling African National Congress in South Africa suggests that the country is governed by a dominant party system. Some of the key features of a dominant party system, such as the one prevailing in South Africa, include:

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continuous electoral victories, by huge margins, of a dominant party over time, reducing oppositional contest to second fiddle r
political hegemony of the ruling party over state institutions, including control of the largest share of the legislature and local government authorities r
sole determination and direction of development policy trajectories by the ruling party with little challenge or credible policy alternatives from opposition parties over time. Axiomatically, all three conditions prevail in South Africa. The dominant party system in South Africa is similar to the one that has prevailed in Botswana’s widely celebrated and stable liberal democracy since the 1960s. This fact does not, in any fundamental way, denude the country’s democratic governance. Nor does it suggest, in any material way, that the country’s democracy is not consolidating. It is one thing for a ruling party to ensure its dominance through the bullet and authoritarian means, as was the situation during apartheid; it is quite another for a ruling party to ensure and sustain its political hegemony through the ballot, as has been the case since 1994. In any case, the dominant party system in South Africa, unlike in various other African states, has institutionalised various mechanisms, including the proportional representation electoral model, to ensure broad representation in the legislature, and wider inclusivity of the political system. Although some analysts tend to perceive the dominant party system in South Africa as an Achilles heel of its democratic governance, we argue that there is nothing inherently undemocratic about a dominant party system. A dominant party syndrome comes about, not because of coercive politics, which is the hallmark of authoritarianism, but as a result of competitive politics of consensus, and regular multiparty elections. Thus, a dominant party system may not be scientifically equated to an authoritarian mode of governance. It may well be that a dominant party system will be with South Africa for quite a while, given the degree of enfeeblement and fragmentation of opposition parties Overtures by the main opposition, the DA, to strive towards a two-party dominant system are likely to prove a distant mirage. Opposition parties realise the entrenched political hegemony of the ANC, and that the best they can do under the circumstances is to cut the ruling party down to size by reducing its parliamentary majority.

ELECTION 2004 POLITICAL PARTIES

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There are 37 registered political parties in South Africa. Ten of these parties contested all national and provincial elections in 2004.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

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Keep it Straight and Simple (KISS) The Employment Movement for South Africa (EMSA) The Organisation Party (TOP) United Front (UF).

Other parties contested the elections at the national level and in a few provinces, while some contested only in provinces. Those parties that contested all the national and provincial seats were: r
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African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) African National Congress (ANC) Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) Democratic Alliance (DA) Independent Democrats (ID) New National Party (NNP) Pan-African Congress of Azania (PAC) United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) United Democratic Movement (UDM) Vryheidfront Plus (VF Plus).

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Those parties that contested elections at the national level only were as follows:

Parties contesting national elections were required by law to pay a deposit of R150 000, and those contesting provincial elections R30 000.Thus, the parties that contested both the national and provincial elections each paid a total of R420 000

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Table 3: Party deposits for the 2004 election and reimbursements Party ACDP ANC AZAPO DA ID NNP PAC UCDP UDM VF Total

Deposit received (Rand) 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 420 000 4 200 000

Deposit reimbursed (Rand) 330 000 420 000 150 000 420 000 240 000 210 000 210 000 180 000 300 000 300 000 2 760 000

Source: IEC. 2004. p. 45

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to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). This money is reimbursed if a party is able to secure seats in the legislature. In Table 3, we indicate the amount that each party paid and the amount reimbursed by the IEC after the election. The parties that lost the national elections together with their R150 000 deposits included KISS, EMSA, TOP and UF.

PARTY FUNDING While private funding for political parties in South Africa still remains unregulated, public funding to parties is regulated through the 1997 Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act (PFRPPA). According to this act, parties represented in parliament are entitled to state funding which is proportionate to the parliamentary strength. This fund is managed and administered by the IEC and its financial year runs from 1 April of every year to 31 March of the following year. For the financial year 2004/05 parties were allocated state funds as illustrated in Table 4.

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Table 4: Allocation of public funds to parties represented in parliament Party

National Assembly Provincial (Rand) Legislature (Rand) Total

ACDP ANC AZAPO DA Freedom Front Plus ID Inkatha Freedom Party Minority Front NNP PAC UCDP UDM Total

1 152 289,02 44 785 633,22 76 819,27 7 758 746,06 691 373,41 998 650,48 4 609 156,08 307 277,07 1 075 469,75 384 096,34 460 915,61 1 459 566,09 63 759 922,40

893 106,70 1 453 272,01 n/a 1 453 272,01 656 958,58 348 043,89 370 011,15 219 672,67 197 705,40 409 826,82 135 922,46 946 651,91 7 084 443,60

2 045 395,72 46 238 905,22 76 819,27 9 212 018,07 1 348 331,99 1 346 694,37 4 979 167,23 526 949,74 1 273 175,15 793 923,16 596 838,07 2 406 218,00 70 844 436,00

Source: IEC. 2005. p.10

VOTER REGISTRATION AND VOTER TURNOUT

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Voter registration in South Africa is a continuous process in which voters are supposed to register or inspect the voters’ roll at the offices of Municipal Electoral

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Officers (MEO) within their localities. Over and above the continuous registration, the IEC organised targeted voter registration campaigns on 8–9 November 2003 and 24–25 January 2004. In both cases, the IEC established around 17 000 registration stations throughout the country to facilitate the registration process. The IEC recruited a total of 50 271 people to assist with both exercises. The IEC registration was boosted by President Mbeki’s visit to the registration stations. On one such visit, in Khutsong, Carletonville, the president had one simple message, ‘Go and register so that you can exercise your democratic right to vote’.28 Undoubtedly, targeted registration was successful and hence the IEC Chairperson, Brigalia Bam, proclaimed ‘ as we enter the 10th year of our democracy, there can be no greater satisfaction than that of seeing each and every one of those who qualify to vote registering and not waiting for 2009’.29 In fact, all the major political parties, including the ANC, the DA and the New National Party expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the targeted registration process.30

REGISTRATION STATISTICS South Africa has a total population of about 40 million people. It is estimated that there are 27 436 898 eligible voters. At the end of the registration period, a total of 20 674 926 voters countrywide registered. Of these 11 334 028 (about 56 per cent) were female voters, while 9 340 898 (about 44 per cent) were male voters. Table 5 depicts the provincial breakdown of the voter registration data, and compares the 1999 trend with the 2004 trend. It is evident that, in 2004,

Table 5: Voter registration trends: 1999/2004 Voter registration 2004

Voter registration 1999

Eastern Cape

2 849 486

2 454 543

394 943

Free State

1 321 195

1 225 730

95 465

Gauteng

4 650 594

4 154 087

496 507

Kwazulu-Natal

3 819 864

3 443 978

375 886

Mpumalanga

1 442 472

1 277 783

164 689

433 591

377 173

56 418

Limpopo

2 187 912

1 847 766

340 146

North West

1 749 529

1 527 672

221 857

Western Cape

2 220 283

1 864 019

356 264

20 674 926

18 172 751

2 502 175

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Province

Northern Cape

Total

Difference

Source: IEC. 2004

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the registration figures increased by 2 502 175 from the total figure of registered voters (18 172 751) in 1999. For the first time all prisoners, regardless of the nature of their crimes, were eligible to register and vote in the 2004 election. In previous elections, only awaiting trial prisoners, and those whose sentences allowed them an option of a fine, had a right to vote. All in all, 9 930 prisoners were registered. The outcome of the registration statistics of voters and voter turnout in the country’s three democratic elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) is reflected in Table 6.

Table 6: Voter registration and voter turnout, 1994–2002 Election Year

Voting age population (VAP)

Registered voters

% of VAP registered

1994

22 709 152

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

1999

22 589 369

18 172 751

80,4

89,3

71,6

2004

27 436 819

20 674 926

75,4

76,7

57,8

% Turnout registered % Turnout VAP

Source: Matlosa K. and Letsholo S. 2005. ‘South Africa’s third democratic election: Opportunities and challenges’. In Minnie J. (ed). Outside the Ballot Box: Preconditions for elections in Southern Africa 2004/5. Windhoek: MISA

Table 6 clearly shows the decline in both registration and turnout in South Africa’s three democratic elections (1994, 1999 and 2004). According to Piombo (2004 Again, no reference for this work in endnotes], participation in the national elections decreased by 30 per cent between 1999 and 2004 (evaluated as a percentage of voting age population, VAP).

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

VOTING AND VOTE COUNT

130

Table 7 indicates how many votes were cast in polling stations per province both in absolute numbers and in percentage terms. There was a total of 17 000 voting stations. As indicated in Table 7, the Eastern Cape Province had the largest number of polling stations (4 115) understandably, as this province had the largest number of registered voters (2 849 486). Interestingly, the Eastern Cape province also had the largest percentage of voter turnout (79.31 per cent). The province with the lowest number of polling stations was the Northern Cape (412), possibly because the province also had the lowest number of registered voters (433 591). Nationally, there were 16 966 voting stations and 15 863 554 voters cast their ballot. Unlike in some countries where ballot papers have to be transported from polling stations to counting centres for counting, vote counting in South Africa takes

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Province

Voting stations

Votes cast

% Poll

Eastern Cape

4 115

2 310 226

79,31

Kwazulu-Natal

3 556

2 807 885

72,84

Gauteng

2 098

3 553 098

74,23

Limpopo

2 000

1 686 757

74,80

Western Cape

1 348

1 621 835

71,27

North West

1 246

1 353 963

75,55

Mpumalanga

1 128

1 157 963

78,30

Free State

1 063

1 042 120

77,76

412

329 707

74,70

16 966

15 863 554

100,00

Northern Cape Total

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Table 7: Polling stations per province 2004

Source: Election Update South Africa, February–June 2004. 2004. Johannesburg: EISA. p.224

place at polling stations. It is now established that vote counting at polling stations is one of the best election practices. Election practitioners, observers and monitors have long established that transporting ballots from polling stations to counting centres poses a number of challenges and risks including the security of the ballot and the costliness of the election management process.

Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

THE ELECTION RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS The outcomes of the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections were derived using this calculation, culminating in the results as illustrated in Tables 8, 9 and 10. It interesting to note how the political opening brought about by the transition, and the low threshold of the electoral model triggered a phenomenal mushrooming of political parties as shown in Table 8. However, despite the proliferation of parties, the main players in the new South African politics of 1994 were the ANC (63 per cent), National Party (20 per cent), Inkatha Freedom Party (11 per cent), Freedom Front (2 per cent), Democratic Party (2 per cent), and the Pan-African Congress (1 per cent). It is evident that, despite the multiplicity of parties and broad representation in parliament, the ANC has remained a hegemonic force in South African politics. This situation was further demonstrated by the outcome of the 1999 election, illustrated in Table 9. As in the 1994 election, the ANC won the 1999 election, snatching 66 per cent of the total valid votes, while the main opposition – the Democratic Party – was only able to pocket 10 per cent. The ANC’s electoral hegemony is firmly entrenched in South Africa, and the election result of 2004 reinforces the dominant party system. As parties began to gear themselves up for the 2004 election,

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Table 8: 1994 South African election results Party

Total votes

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African National Congress 12 237 655 (ANC) 3 983 690 National Party (NP) 2 058 294 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 424 555 Freedom Front (FF) 338 426 Democratic Party (DP) Pan-African Congress of 243 478 Azania (PAC) African Christian Democratic 88 104 Party (ACDP) 10 575 SOOCER Keep it Straight and Simple 5 916 (KISS) Workers Rights Peace Party 6 434 (WRPP) 4 169 Workers List Party (WLP) Ximoko Progressive Party 6 320 (XPP) 34 466 African Muslim Party (AMP) African Democratic 9 886 Movement (ADM) Dikwankwetla Party of South 19 451 Africa (DPSA) 17 663 Federal Party (FP) 3 293 Luso–SA Party (LUSAP) 13 433 Minority Front (MF) 19 533 498 Total

% of votes

Parliamentary seats

% of seats

62,65

252

63,0

20,39 10,54 2,17 1,73 1,25

82 43 9 7 5

20,5 10,75 2,25 1,75 1,25

0,45

2

0,5

0,05 0,03

0 0

0,0 0,0

0,03

0

0,0

0,02 0,03

0 0

0,0 0,0

0,18 0,05

0 0

0,0 0,0

0,10

0

0,0

0,09 0,02 0,07 100,00

0 0 0 400

0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0

Source: IEC. 1994. EISA database. 2004. Electionsynopsis. vol.1. no. 4

132

the ANC’s primary strategy was to maintain its political hegemony, while the opposition parties aimed principally to put up a spirited fight in order to narrow the ANC’s margin of anticipated victory. What is obvious from Tables 8, 9 and 10 is that the PR allots parliamentary seats to parties almost in direct proportion to their electoral strength. For instance, the ruling ANC won 62.65 per cent of votes and a commensurate 63 per cent of seats in 1994. In 1999, this party won 66,35 per cent of votes and 66.5 per cent of parliamentary seats. In 2004, this party won 69.68 per cent of votes and a corresponding 69.75 per cent of seats. Direct correlation of votes won and seats won is a scarce political commodity under the FPTP system.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

Party

Votes won

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African National Congress 10 601 330 (ANC) 1 527 337 Democratic Party (DP) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 1 371 477 1 098 215 New National Party (NNP) United Democratic 546 790 Movement (UDM) African Christian Democratic 228 975 Party (ACDP) 127 217 Freedom Front (FF) United Christian Democratic 125 280 Party (UCDP) Pan-African Congress of 113 125 Azania (PAC) 86 704 Federal Alliance (FA) 48 227 Minority Front (MF) Afrikaner Eenheidsbewiging 46 292 (AEB) Azanian 27 257 Peoples’Organisation (AZAPO) Abolition of Income Tax and 10 611 Usury Party (AITUP) Government by the People 9 193 Green Party (GPGP) Socialist Party of Azania 9 062 (SOPA) 15 977 142 Total

% of votes

Parliamentary seats

% of seats

66,35

266

66,5

9,56 8,58 6,87 3,42

38 34 28 14

9,5 8,5 7,0 3,5

1,43

6

1,5

0,8 0,78

3 3

0,75 0,75

0,71

3

0,75

0,54 0,3 0,25

2 1 1

0,5 0,25 0,25

0,17

1

0,25

0,07

0

0,0

0,06

0

0,0

0,06

0

0,0

100

400

100,0

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Table 9: 1999 South African election results

Source: IEC.1999. EISA database. 2004. Electionsynopsis vol.1. no. 4

REACTION TO ELECTION RESULTS Political parties generally accepted the results of the election. The main opposition, the DA, accepted defeat. Only the Inkatha Freedom Party decided to contest the outcome, albeit to no avail. On 18 April 2004, the IFP announced publicly that it was contesting the IEC’s declaration of the elections as free and fair on two grounds. Firstly, the IFP claimed that 367 731 people voted, yet their names did not appear on the voters’ roll. Secondly, the party complained that the IEC had not responded to its 42 complaints of violence and intimidation, before announcing the poll as free and fair. Realising that these complaints would not bear any

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Table 10: 2004 South African election results Party

Total votes

% of votes

Parliamentary seats

% of seats

African National Congress (ANC)

10 878 251

69,68

279

69,75

New National Party (NNP)

257 824

1,65

7

1,75

1 088 664

6,97

28

Independent Democrats (ID)

269 765

1,73

7

1,75

Freedom Front (FF)

139 465

0,89

4

1,0

1 931 201

12,37

50

12,5

Pan-African Congress of Azania (PAC)

113 512

0,73

3

0,75

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)

250 272

1,6

6

1,5

41 776

0,27

2

0,5

United Democratic Movement (UDM)

355 717

2,28

9

2,25

United Front (UF)

11 889

0,08

0

0,0

Freedom Front+ (FF+)

139 465

0,89

4

1,0

United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP)

117 792

0,75

3

0,75

Minority Front (MF)

55 267

0,35

2

0,5

The Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA)

14 853

0,1

0

0,0

New Labour Party (NLP)

13 318

0,09

0

0,0

The Organisation Party (TOP)

7 531

0,05

0

0,0

Keep it Straight and Simple (KISS)

6 514

0,04

0

0,0

Nationale Aksie (NA)

15 804

0,1

0

0,0

Peace and Justice Congress (PJC)

15 187

0,1

0

0,0

The Employment Movement of South Africa (EMSA)

10 446

0,07

0

0,0

15 612 667

100,00

400

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Democratic Alliance (DA)

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Azania Peoples’ Organisation (AZAPO)

Total

Source: IEC. 2004. EISA database. 2004. Electionsynopsis. vol.1. no. 4

134

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7

100,00

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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

fruit, the IFP withdrew its legal challenge a day before Mbeki was to be sworn in as the President of South Africa.31 This fuelled comment that the IFP was not serious about allegations of election irregularities in the province, but was merely strengthening its position at the negotiating table as the national government was being formed.32 A matter of more serious concern was the question of the IFP’s participation in national government and in the Kwazulu-Natal provincial government.33 The exclusion of the leader of the IFP, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, from cabinet by the ANC, caused further tensions between the two parties. President Mbeki had earlier invited members of the IFP to fill two deputy ministerial posts. However, in light of the exclusion of their leader, the party’s National Council (NC) withdrew the names of the members earmarked for the portfolios. As a result of the IFP’s stance, President Mbeki on 7 May appointed two other deputies: Ntopile Kganyago (UDM) for Public Works and Gert Oosthuizen (ANC) for Sport and Recreation.34 The aftermath of the 2004 election also produced the total collapse of the New National Party, the remnant of the all-powerful party of apartheid. According to one analyst, the NNP’s downfall naturally precipitated further identity and leadership crises.35 It thus came as no surprise when the party was eventually coopted by the ANC. Predictably; the DA accused the NNP of betraying the trust of voters. As a reward for ‘co-operating’ with the ANC, Marthinus van Schalkwyk was made Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The floor crossing of September 2005 put the last nail in the coffin of the politically paralysed NNP. The party officially dissolved and was subsumed into the ruling ANC. The floor-crossing exercise itself has been a heated bone of contention among the political actors and analysts alike. There is a general consensus that floor crossing under the proportional representation system distorts the system and brings about enormous political conflict within parties. As one scholar observes, originally the constitution explicitly barred floor crossing on the basis of: the understandable logic that once voters had decided upon the representation of political parties in the legislative assemblies through the list-voting PR, politicians should not have the liberty to change it. However, politicians from diverse backgrounds were soon complaining that this arrangement was too inflexible to contain the fluidity of the party system.36

CONCLUSION So, is South Africa’s democracy consolidating, following the 2004 election? In order to answer that question, we have reviewed the constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks within which the election was held. We have looked at the key players in the electoral process and how they impacted on the process

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itself. In particular, we have extensively reviewed the nature of the electoral PR and dominant party systems. We unearthed their implication for the nurturing and consolidation of South Africa’s democracy. We unravelled how the electoral process unfolded at various stages. We further interrogated the gender dimensions of the electoral outcome, especially in respect of representation of women in parliament. Equally importantly, we provided an overview of election-related conflicts, and these were managed during the 2004 election. Having taken stock of all these issues, it is evident that while numerous challenges still remain, electoral governance in South Africa is predicated upon a fairly solid constitutional and institutional foundation. A fairly plausible argument can be advanced that South Africa’s electoral governance is marked by institutional certainty and relative substantive uncertainty. The rules of the game are known and accepted by all key actors. The electoral outcomes are not necessarily known, although they are easily predictable due to two main factors: a dominant party syndrome, and weak and fragmented opposition parties. There are, however, many challenges facing South Africa’s democracy today. Although a lot of progress has been made on the political front to institutionalise democratic governance in the country, on the socio-economic front enormous work still remains to be done by all key stakeholders, especially the government. Additionally, election observers and monitors have identified various challenges. The observer missions to the 2004 South African elections included the SADC Parliamentary Forum, EISA and the AU. European observers, particularly the European Union and the Commonwealth, made a deliberate decision not to observe the election, arguing that South Africa’s democracy has been progressively entrenched and thus requires less external oversight. The main recommendations by observers included the following: r
introducing translucent ballot boxes in order to enhance the transparency of the electoral process r
encouraging political parties to mobilise across social identities like race and ethnicity in order to consolidate peace, harmony and reconciliation r
increasing the involvement of civil society in the electoral process, especially in voter and civic education r
entrenching and fixing the date of elections in the constitution so that all political players are able to prepare for the contest well in advance r
ensuring that the date of elections does not coincide with a national holiday, as was the case in 2004 when the election coincided with Easter r
the enhanced involvement of domestic monitors during elections.

136

It is evident that the deficiencies of the 2004 elections are not of the magnitude that would have rendered the electoral process fraudulent. Hence, all the observers declared the election ‘free and fair’.

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

1

Habib A. and Schultz-Herzenberg. 2005. ‘Accountability and democracy: Is the ruling elite responsive to the citizenry?’ In Calland R. and Graham P. (eds). Laurence P. 2004. ‘A critical moment in our political history’. Focus. No. 33. First quarter.

2

Laurence P. 2004. ‘A critical moment in our political history’. Focus. No. 33. First

3

Government of South Africa. 1994. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act

4

Thipanyane T. 2005. ‘Human Dignity and democracy: Can socioeconomic rights be

quarter. 200, 1993. Cape Town: Government Printer. p. 10. realized without human rights?’ In Calland and Graham. 2005. op cit. 5

Landsberg C. and Mackay S. 2004. ‘South Africa’s decade of democracy: Inequality and improvement’. Electionsynopsis. vol. 1. no.1. p. 5.

6

ibid.

7

IEC. 2004. ‘Vision statement’. http://www.elections.org.za.

8

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

ENDNOTES

Matlosa K.and Letsholo S. 2005. ‘South Africa’s third democratic election: Opportunities and challenges’. In Minnie J. (ed). Outside the Ballot Box: Preconditions for elections in Southern Africa 2004/05, Windhoek: MISA.

9

de Ville J. 1996. ‘Proportional representation: Formulae for the translation of votes into seats’. In de Ville J. and Steytler N. (eds). Voting in 1999: Choosing an Electoral System. Durban: Butterworths. p. 19.

10 Faure M. and Venter A. 2003. ‘Electoral Reform in South Africa’. South Africa: University of South Africa/Rand Afrikaans University. p. 2. (mimeo). 11 Butler A. 2004. Contemporary South Africa. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 105. 12 Cherry J. 2004. ’Elections 2004: The party list and issues of identity.’ Electionsynopsis. vol. 1. no. 3. 13 Butler A. 2004. p. 105. op cit. 14 Reynolds A. and Reilly B. The International Idea Handbook of Electoral System Design. Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

Stockholm: International Idea 1997. p. 140. 15 Matlosa and Letsholo. 2005. In Minnie J. (ed). op cit. 16 Faure and Venter. 2003. p. 7 op cit. 17 Van Zyl Slabbert F. 2003. Report of the Electoral Task Team, 2002. Cape Town: Electoral Task Team. p. 3. 18 ibid. p. 4. 19 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 2003. ‘Electoral models for South Africa: Reflections and options’. Johannesburg. (mimeo). 20 Southall R. and Mattes B. 2002. ‘Popular attitudes towards the South African electoral system: Report to the Electoral Task Team’. HSRC Occasional Paper no. 1. p. 5. 21 Faure and Venter. 2003. p. 8. op cit. 22 Southall R. 2004. ‘Containing accountability’. Electionsynopsis. vol. 1 no. 1. 23 Matlosa and Letsholo. 2005. op cit. 24 Matlosa and Letsholo 2005.

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25 Brooks H. 2004. ‘The dominant party system: Challenges for South Africa’s second decade of democracy’. Journal of African Elections. vol. 3. no. 2. December. Giliomee H and Simkins C. (eds). 1999. The Awkward Embrace; One Party Domination and Democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers. Landsberg C. 2004. ‘Campaign 2004.’ EISA Election Update South Africa 2004. no. 6. Johannesburg. Matlosa K. and Karume S. 2004. ‘Ten years of democracy and the dominant party system in South Africa.’ EISA Election Update. no. 5. 26 Laurence. 2004. op cit. 27 Karume S. 2004. ‘Party systems in the SADC region: In defence of the dominant party system’. EISA Occasional Paper No.16. January. Brooks, Landsberg and Matlosa K. 2004. ‘Political parties and democratisation in the Southern African development community region: The weakest link?’. EISA Research Report. no. 16. 28 The Star (South Africa). 26 January 2004. 29 ibid. 30 ibid. 31 ibid. 32 Mottair S. 2004. ‘Campaigning in Kwazulu-Natal.’ In Election Update no. 6. Johannesburg. 33 Kotze D. 2004. ‘Election phase 2004’. In Election Update no. 27. Johannesburg. 34 Kotze 2004. p. 221. 35 Booysen S. ‘Ten years of democracy and the state of opposition politics in South Africa’. In Election Update South Africa, February–June 2004, Johannesburg: EISA p. 224.

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36 Southall R. 2004. p. 7. op cit.

138

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CONCLUSION

ELECTIONS IN AFRICA The way forward

Korwa G. Adar, Abdalla Hamdok and Joram Rukambe

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T

HE CHAPTER CONTRIBUTORS in this book have, from theoretical and practical perspectives, methodologically assessed and analysed the underlying characteristics of the selected African states’ electoral processes. Interrogating electoral processes in Africa is to leap into complex terrain where the internal centripetal and centrifugal political forces continue to undermine and overlook the very institutions and rules established to govern free and fair electoral processes. While some African presidents, for instance Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, successfully managed to change the constitutions of their countries to allow them to run for a ‘third term’ in office, others such as Fredrick Chiluba (Zambia) and Bakili Muluzi (Malawi) tried but failed due to campaigns against the moves within their respective parties, and among the citizenry in general. The same ideas about a ‘third term’ were being mooted in Nigeria and South Africa. Even though President Thabo Mbeki has come out in the open and rejected the move, the very fact that the idea is slowly being debated is an indication that there are people out there who are prepared to promote selfinterest against the general or public good. It is a common practice for recalcitrant African leaders, particularly the incumbent presidents in power and their agents, to use state resources during campaigns, thereby augmenting their advantage over the opposition political parties.1 In the case studies in this exploratory volume – in particular, Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi and Mozambique – the authors are generally in unison that there were consistent, deeply entrenched, and institutionalised webs of constraints, which threatened the legitimacy and institutional potency of liberal multiparty democratic electoral processes founded in the countries after decades of one-party rule.2

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CONCLUSION Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

140

Under these circumstances, the responsibilities of political parties as agents of voter education often become blurred with the other roles they play in the political domain. In dictatorial systems, or systems still experimenting with the multiparty electoral process, consolidation of political liberalism becomes a problem, with the role of political parties consistently undermined during elections. As one scholar has observed, ‘the functions of the political party’ are ‘collapsed into the state. Instead of the political party transforming the state, the practices and modalities of state functioning may have transformed the character of the political party’.3 It is also important to mention that in most instances in Africa, history has shown that the behaviour of members of the opposition parties and the so-called democracy and human rights advocates is not any different from the ruling parties, particularly when they take over the leadership of their countries. The reluctance of the Mwai Kibaki leadership in Kenya to change the constitution and eradicate corruption, and Presidents Bakili Muluzi’s and Fredrick Chiluba’s attempts to change the constitutions of their countries to suit their personal interests, all serve as good examples. As the authors of the chapters have demonstrated, the problems that face multiparty electoral processes are many, and will continue as Africans try to grapple with the impact of liberalisation couched within globalisation. The challenges include, among others: r
Ethnic-centred electoral patterns: Ethnicity is an important variable that will continue to influence electoral outcomes in Africa in a negative way.4 In most of the African countries, leaders tend to use ethnic constituencies as the central denominator for political power and influence, that is, a base on which they can lean if they are in trouble with the state or need to exert their power. r
Tampering with voter register, vote rigging and buying: Due to the level of poverty and illiteracy in the continent, the regimes in power, as well as the opposition political parties, are all victims of the temptations of vote rigging and buying prevalent in the continent. This practice encourages and institutionalises corruption. r
Control of the media by the ruling party and the state: State-controlled radio and television tend to give more coverage to the ruling parties. The strategies may include, among other things, propaganda programmes aimed at the opposition parties. r
Access to state resources by the ruling party: Specifically, multiparty elections have not eliminated the practice of personalisation of politics, or centralisation of power within the presidency, with a significant impact on electoral outcome. r
Violence: It is common to find both the ruling party and the opposition political parties establishing their own ‘militias’ or ‘bandits’ who operate at will

Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation : Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections of 2004, Africa Institute of

ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

and threaten the stability of the countries during elections. The ruling parties may also use state resources, particularly the police, to intimidate and harass members of opposition parties, and the electorate sympathetic to the opposition. r
Multiplicity of opposition political parties: The issue here is not that the multiplicity of the opposition parties is unacceptable per se. One of the problems is that these practices undermine prospects for the removal of dictatorial systems through a unified opposition front. Of great concern, however, is that it encourages political polarisation, with far reaching consequences for the stability of any country and democratic consolidation. In some cases, some of the opposition parties are established by the regimes in power to divide the opposition. r
Lack of respect for electoral laws by the stakeholders in the elections: This phenomenon is common on both sides of the political divide, that is, the ruling and the opposition political parties. r
Formation of ‘no-go areas or political zones’. This is a common feature in the case studies, particularly in Cameroon, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa, as well as in Africa in general. Political opponents are normally barred from venturing into such self-proclaimed zones. Even in South Africa, where the foundation of multiparty electoral process is taking positive root, there are certain areas which are still considered too risky to venture into by outsiders.

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THE WAY FORWARD The enduring systemic constraints prevailing in the domestic political environments identified by the case study contributors require a fresh approach by African leaders and the stakeholders. Specifically, for liberal multiparty electoral democracy to acquire its rightful place in the continent, and gain proper foundation, credence and legitimacy, a number of issues need to be considered. Firstly, it is imperative to stress that for democracy to take root in the continent, African leaders need to respect laws and institutions, which are established to govern electoral processes. In other words, the issue of principled leadership, or lack thereof, will continue to remain high on the agenda of African political discourse. African leaders need to govern, not rule. It is unacceptable, in our view, for African leaders to wait for the donors to impose econo-political conditionalities or, for that matter, to provide incentives, before they institute tangible participatory multiparty democracy. Second, comprehensive constitutions that address electoral questions and explicitly stipulate issues relating to change of leadership need to be established. Constitutions alone cannot change anything unless the leaders themselves are

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CONCLUSION Copyright © 2007. Africa Institute of South Africa. All rights reserved.

willing to respect and adhere to the provisions contained therein. In other words, African leaders should not be responsible for the collapse of their own societies solely because of their rejection of democratic transformation and consolidation. Leaders who vacate their offices at an opportune moment when they are still popular, as was the case with the former South African President, Nelson Mandela, carry with them a lot of dividends, especially respect at home and abroad. Thirdly, political systems in which civil and political rights, as well as freedoms, are recognised have the potential of accommodating divergent views and promoting democracy and good governance. Crucial to this proposition is the idea that such a system is managed by rational leaders, who take into consideration the right and liberties of individuals. Fourthly, democratisation of political parties is an important question, which, if pursued by party leaders, would promote the ingredients necessary for democracy consolidation in Africa. It would also limit inter-party violence, which is common during elections. It is unrealistic to assume that democracy can take root in a country governed by undemocratic political parties. Political openness has to originate with the ruling and opposition political parties. This is one of the major stumbling blocks to democracy consolidation in Africa. We also need to point out that it is a common practice for some influential and dominant political leaders to manipulate their own elections from the grassroots level or from the primaries, or by appointing their cronies to key positions, which in turn may spill over into national and regional governing practices.5 Fifthly, independent electoral commissions, with full statutory powers and legal guarantees, need to be established for the purposes of administering elections. The members of the commission must have security of tenure, adequate resources and the power to hire personnel. The issue of adequate resources is an important one in the sense that commissioners would be able to conduct their businesses in most parts of the country in question. Linked to this issue is reliance on donor funds to run elections. A number of African countries still rely heavily on donor funds to conduct their elections. However, South Africa deliberately depends primarily on state funds to conduct its elections. In 2003, when donor funds were not forthcoming for presidential elections, Rwanda managed its elections from state funds, and donations from its own citizens. These are some of the issues that require careful consideration and adoption by African countries if participatory democracy is to be achieved on the continent.

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1

On presidential recalcitrance in Africa see, for example: Adar K. G. 2000. ‘Democracy in Africa: The second liberation’. In Legum C. (ed). 1992–1994. Africa Contemporary Record. vol. 24. New York: Africana Publishing Co. pp. A1–A12. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges and Lee. Margaret C. 1997 (eds). The State and Democracy in Africa. Harare: African Association

ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

ENDNOTES

of Political Science. 2

On the meaning of founding elections, see: O’Donnell and Schmitter P. C. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

3

Suttner R. 2003. Transformation of Political Parties in Africa Today. Occasional Paper no. 9. Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 9. See also, generally: Olukoshi. A. O. 1998. (ed). The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

4

On the influence of ethnicity on elections in Kenya see, for example: Adar K. G. 1998. ‘Ethnicity and ethnic kings: The enduring dual constraints in Kenya’s multiparty democratic electoral experiment’. Journal of the Third World Spectrum. vol. 52. no. 2. Fall. pp. 71–96. Ndegwa S. N. 1997. ‘Citizenship and ethnicity: An examination of two transition movements in Kenyan politics’. American Political Science Review. vol. 91. no. 3. September. pp. 599–616.

5

On this debate in relation to the East African Community see, for example: Adar K. G. 2005. ‘New regionalism and regional reconstruction: The case of the East African community’. Politeia: Journal for Political Science and Administration. vol. 24. no. 1. pp. 28–48. Aywa F. A. 2004. Processes for Elections to the East African Legislative Assembly. Nairobi:

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Friedrich-Stiftung.

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143

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