Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak: Contesting Developmentalism and Rights 9789814762823

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
Glossary & Definitions
About the Contributors
Chapter 1. The 2016 Sarawak State Elections: Old Stories and New Punch Lines
Chapter 2. Tupong: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It!
Chapter 3. Stakan: Much Ado About Postal Votes?
Chapter 4. Repok and Meradong: Challenges in Courting Rural Votes
Chapter 5. Ba’ Kelalan: Sustaining the Crack in the BN’s Rural Dominance

Citation preview

Contents i

ELECTORAL DYNAMICS INSARAWAI

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (SIRD) is an independent publishing house founded in January 2000 in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. The SIRD list focuses on Malaysian and Southeast Asian studies, economics, gender studies, social sciences, politics and international relations. Our books address the scholarly community, students, the NGO and development communities, policymakers, activists and the wider public. SIRD also distributes titles (via its sister organisation, GB Gerakbudaya Enterprise Sdn Bhd) published by scholarly and institutional presses, NGOs and other independent publishers. We also organise seminars, forums and group discussions. All this, we believe, is conducive to the development and consolidation of the notions of civil liberty and democracy.

Contents iii

ELECTORAL DYNAMICS INSARAWAK CONTESTIG IVB.DPliNTAUSM AJID RIGHTS Edited by

Meredith L. Weiss and Arnold Puyok

SIRD Strategic Information and Research Development Centre Petaling Jaya, Malaysia

l5ER5

YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Copyright © 2017 Meredith L. Weiss and Arnold Puyok First published in 2017 by Strategic Information and Research Development Centre No. 2 Jalan Bukit 11/2, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia Email: [email protected] Website: www.gerakbudaya.com for exclusive distribution in Malaysia and non-exclusive distribution outside Malaysia and Singapore Co-published in Singapore in 2017 by ISEAS Publishing ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119614 Email: [email protected] Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg for exclusive distribution in Singapore and non-exclusive distribution outside Malaysia and Singapore. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia / Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak: Contesting Developmentalism and Rights / edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Arnold Puyok ISBN 978-967-0960-56-2 1. Elections–Sarawak. 2. Sarawak (Malaysia)–Politics and government. I. Weiss, Meredith L. (Meredith Leigh), 1972-. II. Arnold Puyok. 324.959522 ISEAS Library / Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak : Contesting Developmentalism and Rights / edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Arnold Puyok. 1. Elections—Malaysia—Sarawak. 2. Sarawak—Politics and government. I. Weiss, Meredith L. (Meredith Leigh), 1972- II. Puyok, Arnold. JQ1062 A953S3E37 2017 ISBN 978-981-47-6281-6 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-47-6282-3 (e-book PDF) Copy-editing by Kay Lyons Cover photograph by Meredith L. Weiss Cover design and layout by Janice Cheong Printed by Vinlin Press Sdn Bhd 2 Jalan Meranti Permai 1, Meranti Permai Industrial Park Batu 15, Jalan Puchong, 47100 Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia

Contents v

Contents

Acknowledgements vii Glossary & Acronyms ix About the Contributors xi Chapter 1 The 2016 Sarawak State Elections: Old Stories and New Punch Lines 1 Meredith L. Weiss & Arnold Puyok Chapter 2 Tupong: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It! Mohd. Shazani bin Masri

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Chapter 3 Stakan: Much Ado About Postal Votes? Noor’ain Aini

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Chapter 4 Repok and Meradong: Challenges in Courting Rural Votes Ngu Ik Tien

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Chapter 5 Ba’ Kelalan: Sustaining the Crack in the BN’s Rural Dominance Arnold Puyok

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Acknowledgements vii

Acknowledgements

This volume presents the findings of one prong of a multi-year, multi-country, many-person effort to examine the role of political networks and patronage flows as part of electoral cycles in Southeast Asia. In connection with that project, we have thus far deployed large teams across Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines to conduct ethnographic field research on the conduct of elections: Malaysia’s 13th general election in 2013, Indonesia’s legislative election in 2014, the Philippines’ general election in 2016, and now the Sarawak state election, also in 2016. (Plans to include the Thai general election of 2015 were disrupted by the coup and subsequent emergency rule.) Guided by a set of central research questions and concepts, the researchers, distributed among a reasonably representative set of electoral districts, track the conduct of the campaign there, as situated within local history, issues, and socioeconomic context. The approach allows subnational, national, and cross-national comparisons about the composition, function, penetration, and durability of political networks; the mix and relative prevalence of material, affective, and ideological factors shaping voting behaviour; and the balance among individual-level (particularistic), communitylevel (meso-particularistic), and non-contingent and non-exclusive (programmatic) policies elections are likely to produce. This effort is very much a collective endeavour, reliant on a large number of individuals and institutions. Our primary debt in this case is to the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS), including Dean Neilson Ilan Mersat. A team of researchers from UNIMAS (supplemented by one Sarawakian from Universiti Malaya) participated in the research; four from that group

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went on to contribute chapters to this volume, based on their findings. That team put tremendous effort into what is inherently challenging research and writing; the chapters here aim to present empirically rich and analytically trenchant, thought-provoking contributions to the study of politics in Sarawak and Malaysia generally. Credit is due also to the co-principal investigators of the overarching project, together with editor Weiss: Edward Aspinall (who participated also in the workshop to develop this volume), Allen Hicken, and Paul Hutchcroft. The support of all three has been invaluable. Furthermore, any project such as this requires material as well as moral support. Primary funding for the project as a whole, including this component, has been from the Australian Research Council, as part of a project on ‘Money Politics: Patronage, Political Networks and Electoral Dynamics in Southeast Asia’ (DP140103114) – although in-kind support from UNIMAS was equally critical to this research in Sarawak specifically. (A grant from Universiti Malaya generously funded previous research on the Malaysian general election, including in Sarawak, together with E. Terence Gomez and Surin Kaur.) Lastly, we thank our publishers, SIRD in Petaling Jaya, particularly Chong Ton Sin and Charles Brophy, and ISEAS Publishing in Singapore, especially Rahilah Yusuf and her colleagues Deputy Director, Ooi Kee Beng and Senior Fellow, Lee Hock Guan at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, for their support of the project and this volume.



Acronyms & Definitions

Glossary & Definitions

1MDB 1Malaysia Development Berhad ADMO Alliance Direct Membership Organisation Amanah Parti Amanah Negara, National Trust Party BN Barisan Nasional, National Front Bumiputera Malays and non-Malay indigenous peoples of Malaysia Ceramah Political rallies, usually centred around stumpspeeches DAP Democratic Action Party EC Election Commission (see SPR) Gotong-royong Cooperative community work effort JASA Jabatan Hal Ehwal Khas, Department of Special Affairs JKKK Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung, Village Security and Development Committee KEMAS Jabatan Kemajuan Masyarakat, Community Development Department NCR Native customary rights (particularly to land) PAS Parti Islam seMalaysia, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PBB Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu, United Bumiputera Heritage Party PBDSB Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak Baru, New Sarawak Dayak People’s Party Pembangkang Political opposition PKR Parti Keadilan Rakyat, People’s Justice Party

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PRS Parti Rakyat Sarawak, Sarawak People’s Party S4S Sarawak for Sarawakians SABERKAS Pertubuhan Belia Kebangsaan Bersatu Sarawak, Sarawak United National Youth Organisation SIB Sidang Injil Borneo, Borneo Evangelical Mission SNAP Sarawak National Action Party SPDP Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party SPR Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, Election Commission (see EC) SSE Sarawak state election STAR State Reform Party SUPP Sarawak United People’s Party TERAS Parti Tenaga Rakyat Sarawak, Sarawak People’s Energy Party Turun padang Going ‘down to the ground’ (walkabouts) Ubah Change UEC Unified Examination Certificate UMNO United Malays National Organisation UPP United People’s Party



About the Contributors

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About the Contributors

NGU Ik Tien was born and raised in Sibu, Sarawak. She is currently a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Chinese Studies, University of Malaya. She obtained her PhD in Political Science from Universiti Sains Malaysia in 2013. Her recent publications include a book chapter, ‘Loss of SUPP Bosses’, in Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots. Her work has also been published in the Asian Journal of Social Science, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMBRAS), and Southeast Asian Affairs (Nanyang wen ti yan jiu, China). NOOR’AIN Aini is a Senior Lecturer in International Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. She holds an MA in International Relations from Flinders University of South Australia. She has special interests in ASEAN politics and a wide range of contemporary issues in international relations, including territorial disputes, human rights and human security, food and environmental security, refugees, and child soldiers. Her research and publications have also addressed issues such as elections in Sarawak and Malaysia – including a forthcoming chapter in the volume, Electoral Change in Malaysia – as well as socioeconomic issues of local communities. Arnold PUYOK is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and Government Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. He earned his PhD in Political Science from Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. His works on contemporary Malaysian politics, especially Sabah and Sarawak,

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have been published in Asian Journal of Political Science, Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia, and Kajian Malaysia. He also regularly contributes to The Malaysian Insider, Malaysiakini, The Malay Mail Online, Daily Express, The Borneo Post, and East Asia Forum. He blogs at http://arnoldpuyokpoliticalinsights.blogspot.com/. Mohd. SHAZANI bin Masri is a Lecturer in Politics and Government Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. He attended the London School of Economics and Political Science for his MSc in political theory and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for his BA in Economics and Political Science. His areas of interest are political theory, including discourse between Western and nonWestern (especially Islamic) philosophical outlooks, and contemporary Islamic politics, particularly with reference to Malaysia. He also reads Malaysian politics, economics, and religion as his general interest areas. Meredith L. WEISS is Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She is the author of Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (2011) and Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (2006), and has edited a number of volumes, including the Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia (2015) and Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots (2014). Her research addresses political mobilisation and contention, the politics of identity and development, and electoral politics in Southeast Asia. Her PhD in Political Science is from Yale University.



The 2016 Sarawak State Election

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Chapter 1

The 2016 Sarawak State Election Old Stories and New Punch Lines Meredith L. Weiss & Arnold Puyok

Studies of Malaysian politics are all too often studies of West Malaysian politics: they give short shrift to the distinctly different patterns in Sabah and Sarawak. As a result, prevailing analytical frameworks for understanding Malaysian political dynamics tend to be premised on what happens on the peninsula. This book aims to complement relatively few other state-level studies (for instance, Faisal, 2011; Lim, 2008; Loh, 1997a; Chin, 1996) to help redress that bias, through a grassroots-based exploration of politics in Sarawak. In doing so, we aim both to add to closely contextualised knowledge of a distinctive state’s politics and to put wider theories of what drives electoral behaviour and shapes electoral outcomes to the test. Of Malaysia’s thirteen states and two federal territories, the only state that currently holds its state elections separately from the general election is Sarawak. Just as Malaysian political parties see in that timing an opportunity to test the waters in advance of their nationwide effort, it allows social scientists the chance for a focused study on a single state, isolating local issues and processes. Importantly, mainstream peninsular political discourse tends to frame the Sarawak state election (hereafter, SSE) as a bellwether for the general election; however, that equation is misleading. At the most basic level, Sarawak’s demographic

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profile makes clear how unrepresentative the state is, particularly given the overwhelmingly communal tinge to Malaysian politics and political economy (among many others, von Vorys, 1975; Lim, 1980; Cheah, 2002; Lian and Jayanath, 2011; Weiss, 2013; Segawa, 2015). Nationally, the Malaysian population is 61.5 per cent Bumiputera (Malay and indigenous), 21.0 per cent Chinese, 6.3 per cent Indian, 0.09 per cent ‘Others’, and 10.3 per cent non-citizens (Department of Statistics, 2016). For Sarawak, the comparable figures are 70.5 per cent Bumiputera, 22.5 per cent Chinese, 0.003 per cent each Indian and ‘Others’, and 6.5 per cent non-citizens. At least as important politically is the breakdown of the category, Bumiputera. (The Malaysian government glosses this distinction; official statistics focus on the catch-all term, aggressively promoted as of the 1970s with the launch of the New Economic Policy; c.f. Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981/82). In Sarawak, the Iban share of the population is the largest: approximately 30.3 per cent of citizens; on the peninsula, 63.1 per cent of citizens are Malay and only about 4 per cent other Bumiputera (Department of Statistics, 2011).1 Malays came to outnumber Chinese, to comprise Sarawak’s second-largest category, only in 2014; Bidayuh, Melanau, and the composite category Orang Ulu follow, in that order (Borneo Post, 2014). Discourse of Malay ‘sovereignty’ and ‘special position’ nationally makes this demographic difference politically salient, particularly amid speculation of restructuring the federal ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) as a ‘Malay-unity’ government through the reunion of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), perennial leader of the BN, and the usually opposition, Malay-based Parti Islam seMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS).2 It is not clear how the less ethnically structured, let alone Malay-led, Sarawak

1

Nationally, Orang Asli, indigenous peoples of the peninsula, comprise only 0.5 per cent, divided among eighteen ethno-linguistic subgroups (Gomes, 2004: 10). 2 See, for instance, Malay Mail (2016).



The 2016 Sarawak State Election

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BN – comprised of the Malay/Melanau-based (but inclusive of Iban and Bidayuh) Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Heritage Party, PBB), Chinese-based Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), largely Iban (but also Bidayuh and Orang Ulu) Parti Rakyat Sarawak (Sarawak People’s Party, PRS), and Chinese/Iban/Bidayuhbased Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP) – would fit that model (Lee, 2016: 2). At the same time, ethnic (and in some circumstances, essentially familial) ties remain important bases for political allegiance in Sarawak – not along the broad-brush Malay/ Chinese/Indian lines presumed on the peninsula, but at a lower level of aggregation, reflecting Sarawak’s more kaleidoscopic ethnic mix. Equally important politically is the development gap between West and East Malaysia. A recent UNDP Human Development Report is fairly damning: Development attainments across our range of indicators show East Malaysia trailing the Peninsular [sic]. Crucially, Sarawak lags behind the Peninsular by much greater margins than suggested by the state’s rather low official poverty rate. We also observe that rural areas of Sabah and Sarawak are, in capability terms, even further behind rural Peninsular Malaysia, compared to the corresponding urban-to-urban disparities (UNDP, 2014: xx).

Moreover, poverty rates, basic infrastructure, and social mobility, especially via civil service recruitment and promotion as well as educational opportunities, remain worse among Bumiputera communities of Sabah and Sarawak (as well as peninsular indigenous Orang Asli), particularly the rural majority, than among Malays (UNDP, 2014: 40–1, 147–51, 154–8, 220–8). Recognising the pressing need for development in the state, Sarawak’s then-chief minister Abdul Taib Mahmud announced in 1992 a ‘politics of development’ strategy: ‘a total commitment to development by using the power of politics to make sure that we achieve our development objectives’ (quoted in Aeria, 1997: 59). That strategy – combined with the Election Commission’s ability since the 1990s to pinpoint voting patterns down to the village, longhouse, or

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even bilik (household) level – has encouraged voters in Sarawak to see the BN as their only sure conduit to resources: experience in the state suggests that defectors may lose out on development projects and public services (Aeria, 1997: 63; Faisal, 2009). Each election, the BN reminds voters of what it has provided, launches various infrastructure and other projects mid-campaign, and promises substantial new investment, should they be returned to power; that the BN has always controlled the federal government at the time of a given SSE lends credibility to these promises, since many Sarawakians rely upon federal grants (for instance, Aeria, 1997: 67, 81–3; Welsh, 2006: 15–16). Urban voters less in need of infrastructural and other investment have shown themselves more willing to reject such ‘money politics’ (Loh, 1997b: 9–10; Mersat, 2009) – though the anti-cronyism stance of new chief minister Adenan Satem seemed to assuage at least some of these voters in 2016 (Mayuri, 2015). In short, while ‘developmental politics’ (Loh, 2003: 276–9) and reliance on patronage – especially, though not exclusively, on the part of the BN – remain prevalent nationally, these dimensions may be especially salient in under-developed Sarawak. Hence, the two dominant frames for understanding Malaysian politics generally – communalism and developmentalism – both hold significant sway in Sarawak. Nonetheless, that Sarawak looks so different from the peninsula in terms of both its communal make-up and its developmental status makes clear why a state election here cannot be envisioned a dry-run of an election elsewhere in Malaysia. Yet the Sarawak state polls remain of critical significance. On the one hand, BN dominance nationally hinges on Sarawak. Since the 2013 general election, PBB has been the second-largest party in the BN, after UMNO, with fourteen seats to UMNO’s eighty-eight; other Sarawak parties hold an additional eleven seats. On the other hand, the 2016 SSE reveals critical tensions; especially given Sarawak parties’ position within the BN, these tensions are meaningful for the future federal–state balance and Sarawak’s political way forward.



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To explore these dimensions, we first sketch the conduct and issues of the elections, then home in on two defining aspects: the states’ rights debate and nuances in money politics this time around.

The 2016 SSE: What happened? The Sarawak State Election was held against a backdrop of Adenan Satem’s strong and rising popularity as Sarawak’s new chief minister. Adenan came to power in 2014 to replace Malaysia’s longest-serving chief minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud. Adenan was quick to establish himself as a no-nonsense and strong ‘Sarawak for Sarawakians’ leader. On a number of occasions, Adenan openly criticised the federal government for its tendency to centralise decisions and strongly supported demands for more autonomy for the state. In less than two years after having taken over from Taib, Adenan boasted of having initiated fifty-three decisions ‘for the good of the state’ (Borneo Post, 2016). Among these decisions were a slew of populist policies, such as abolishing toll payments and quit rents, lowering electricity tariffs, and recognising the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC), a standard test adopted by independent Chinese schools in Malaysia.3 In a further attempt to win over Sarawakian Chinese voters, he also said the Chinese are not pendatang, or immigrants (FMT Reporters, 2015), as a prominent peninsular Malay-rights NGO has insisted they are (Yu, 2015), and praised them for their contributions to the state. The pace at which Adenan distinguished himself from his predecessor and the people’s positive reactions to his pro-rakyat (pro-people) decisions caught opposition parties by surprise. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), for instance, admitted that Adenan would be their ‘stumbling block’ in broadening their support in

3

The Malaysian government, however, does not recognise the UEC, claiming that it does not meet the country’s national educational objectives. Adenan called the government’s decision ‘stupid’ and said ‘he was prepared to stand up [to recognise the UEC]’ (Yu and Rahimy, 2015).

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Chinese areas (Goh, 2016). The BN looked set to win the Sarawak election easily, yet the question remained of whether Adenan would be able to translate his popularity into votes. Would the Chinese give their support back to the BN? Would Adenan be able to do better electorally than his predecessor? The Sarawak election was called for 7 May 2016 – almost two months before the term of the state assembly would otherwise end, on 20 June. Eighty-two seats were contested, eleven of which were newly created. The battle lines of the election were laid: the BN contested in all eighty-two seats (PBB in forty, SUPP in thirteen, PRS in eleven, SPDP in five, and BN ‘direct’ candidates in thirteen). Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) contested in forty seats, DAP in thirty-one, Parti Amanah Negara (the newly formed National Trust Party, Amanah) in thirteen, PAS in eleven, the State Reform Party (STAR) in eleven, Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak Baru (the also-freshly formed New Sarawak Dayak People’s Party, PBDSB) in five, and independent candidates in thirty-five. As for every election, the BN and opposition alike had to deal with the difficult issue of seat allocation. On the BN’s side, the SUPP and a splinter group, the United People’s Party (UPP), were at loggerheads, as the latter party was vying for seats traditionally allocated to the SUPP. The SPDP, on the other hand, refused to allow its splinter group, Parti Tenaga Rakyat Sarawak (Sarawak People’s Energy Party, TERAS), to contest in seats the SPDP formerly held. To escape this deadlock, Adenan came up with the solution of allowing candidates from the warring parties to contest as BN direct candidates. All BN direct candidates were required to resign from their respective parties and contest under one common BN symbol. If they won, they could return to their parties or join any other component party in the BN. Of the thirteen BN direct candidates, seven were former members of the UPP, three were from TERAS, and another three were from PBB. The arrangement did manage temporarily to quiet the squabbling over seats. Meanwhile, the opposition tried to address their own internal problems, but had little success, forcing the DAP and PKR to contest



The 2016 Sarawak State Election

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against each other in Batu Kitang, Mambong, Simanggang, Ngemah, Murum, and Mulu. ‘Team Adenan’, as the BN candidates were called collectively, was banking heavily on Adenan’s popularity and his record of ‘bold’ decisions. The BN’s reliance on the ‘Adenan factor’ could be seen in the ruling party’s campaign billboards, which featured Adenan’s glowing visage, conveying his larger-than-life personality. Adenan further accentuated the BN’s ‘presidential’ campaigning style – accentuating the executive at the helm – by reminding the voters ‘to think of him’ if they did not like the other BN candidates (Banji 2016). Apart from making promises of development aid, as they had previously, the BN promoted messages of peace, prosperity, and stability. The opposition – particularly PKR and the DAP – mainly campaigned around issues of the on-going 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, 4 which embroiled Prime Minister Najib and various others in allegations of money-laundering and misappropriation of public funds; a related mysterious RM2.6 billion payment into Najib’s personal accounts, purportedly a donation from Saudi royalty to support the BN’s campaign efforts; and state autonomy. Their campaign ceramah (political rallies, featuring campaign speeches and sometimes entertainment and/or food) presented allegations of misuse of power, mismanagement of public funds in 1MDB, and other alleged ‘scandals’ committed by BN leaders. The opposition also downplayed Adenan’s reformist image, reminding voters that a vote for Adenan was a vote for the ‘corrupt’ BN government. However, some opposition leaders conducted their campaigns in a more low-key manner, focusing instead on micro issues affecting their constituents at the local level. As widely expected, the BN returned to power with more than a

4

See the collected coverage at ‘Malaysia Controversy’, Wall Street Journal, ; and ‘1MDB’, Sarawak Report, ; both accessed 19 August 2016.

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two-thirds majority, winning seventy-two out of eighty-two seats (or 87.8 per cent of the seats in the state assembly). Out of these seventytwo seats, the PBB won forty, PRS eleven, SUPP seven, SPDP three, and BN direct candidates eleven. The PBB and PRS both posted 100 per cent wins, making them the best-performing BN parties (see Noor’ain and Shazani, this volume). The fact that the SUPP managed to increase its winning margin indicated a significant swing back to the BN among Chinese voters, many of whom had turned towards the DAP in recent years (see Ngu, this volume; Welsh, 2016). The SUPP’s decisive victories could be seen in Repok, Meradong, Dudong, Batu Kawah, and even Piasau, where the party’s former president, George Chan, had lost to the DAP in 2011. In contrast, the SPDP had mixed fortunes, failing to win in Ba’ Kelalan or Krian (see Puyok, this volume). The SPDP’s inability to make a clean sweep shows the party’s declining popularity. Lastly, Adenan’s BN-direct formula proved to be relatively successful, securing eleven out of thirteen seats. The opposition’s crushing defeat is reflected in the DAP’s loss in five urban areas and in all the rural areas it contested. The DAP only won in seven of thirty-one seats it contested. PKR managed to win all the three seats it had won previously (Ba’ Kelalan, Krian, and Batu Lintang) but failed to win any new seats. None of the other opposition parties – PAS, Amanah, PBDSB, and STAR – or any independent candidates won seats. What accounts for the BN’s convincing victory and the opposition’s dismal performance? The chapters to come suggest distinct nuances across different communities and contexts. However, we can identify four dimensions with overarching explanatory power. First, the Adenan factor did play a role (Ruban, 2016). Adenan managed to portray himself as a different kind of leader: peopleoriented, approachable, and non-elitist. The Sarawak BN’s strategy of highlighting Adenan as a reformist and strong regional leader proved to be crucial in securing support from Sarawakian voters. Second, the opposition went to the polls without a workable plan to counter Adenan’s popularity. The message of ubah (change), the



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opposition coalition’s national slogan for the 2013 general election, was widely seen as ‘recycled’ and did not resonate with voters, especially in rural areas. The opposition’s strong regional stance did not work in their favour, either, as Adenan had successfully ‘hijacked’ the Sarawak for Sarawakians movement (more on this issue below).5 This ‘clever move’, as one scholar noted, convinced the voters that a vote for Adenan was a vote for the restoration of Sarawak rights as per the Malaysia Agreement signed in 1963; Sarawak joined the Federation of Malaysia at that time upon the guarantee of eighteen points, concerning issues ranging from religion and language, to immigration control, to administrative structure.6 Third, as the persistent economic under-development sketched above might lead one to expect, emphasising the politics of development helped the ruling coalition to sustain its control, particularly in rural areas. The BN’s message that only the ruling party can bring development to rural areas was fairly convincing, particularly among voters who regard bread-and-butter issues as more important than 1MDB and governance matters. Moreover, the BN’s formidable election machinery helped ensure that this message got across effectively. Fourth, the opposition’s failure to form a united front to face the BN also contributed to their poor performance (Welsh, 2016). Infighting among opposition leaders and their inability to offer common alternative policies for Sarawak left the opposition parties in disarray. Furthermore, the fact that many key peninsular opposition leaders were prevented from coming to Sarawak – the state controls immigration, including from West Malaysia, and barred them from entering (for instance, Rajvinder, 2016) – made it harder for

5

James Chin, interviewed by Norman Goh, ‘James Chin: Adenan Satem quite clever’, KiniTV video, 30 April 2016, , accessed 26 August 2016. 6 Ibid. Sabah entered on condition of a similar twenty-point memorandum; calls for restoration of those guarantees have become increasingly heated there, too.

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opposition parties to demonstrate the relevance of national issues like 1MDB to Sarawakian voters.7 Had these parties’ leaders been allowed to enter Sarawak, the 1MDB scandal would likely have become a more prominent issue in their campaign. Overall, the conduct and outcome of the 2016 Sarawak state election suggests that long-standing tropes of communalism and developmentalism persist, but remain pitched in ways distinctive to the state. As the chapters to come will demonstrate, the election results show that, like their peninsular counterparts, Sarawakian voters still vote substantially along ethnic lines. However, communal voting in Sarawak is often blurred by issues of developmentalism, regionalism, and more narrowly gauged ethnicism. The opposition has yet to make its presence strongly felt across Sarawak, even if potent in certain areas; Sarawak is a large state, marked by unique political configurations. Nevertheless, BN dominance is not guaranteed: the main challenge that the chief minister and his ‘Team Adenan’ will face going forward is not only to deliver on their developmental promises, but to sustain and manage the push for more autonomy for Sarawak.

Dimensions to watch How the SSE campaign transpired, as much as the vote and seat tallies once it ended, suggests useful vantage points on Sarawak and Malaysian politics. Two that are especially salient are demands for autonomy – for some candidates and voters, stopping just short of calls for secession from what they deem an unjust federal system – and specific patterns to patronage and developmentalism, across parties and communities. States’ rights and the nature of Malaysian federalism A key theme in the 2016 SSE was states’ rights, embodied most clearly in the social movement and slogan, Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S).

7

James Chin, interviewed by Norman Goh, op. cit.



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While S4S itself was strongest among non-Malay/Melanau voters, who do not benefit from affiliation with the federally dominant ethnic group, even Chief Minister Adenan and his PBB touted a state-nationalist line. However much still marginalised economically within Malaysia, the state is now essential to the BN politically, and hence uniquely well-situated to make demands (Chin, 2016). Rhetoric dismissive of West Malaysian – ‘Malayan’ – parties and priorities, and insistent upon greater political and economic autonomy, resonated among voters. (See Ngu Ik Tien’s chapter here in particular.) Other states, too, demand increased autonomy, or at least a more favourable allocation of federal resources, particularly Sabah, and increasingly Johor and Terengganu. Both government and opposition actors, for instance, have pressed insistently for an increase in oil royalties paid to Sarawak. Under the Petroleum Development Act of 1974, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) remits 5 per cent of profits earned on petroleum from Sabah and Sarawak back to the state; the Sarawak State Legislature under Adenan resolved in 2014 to demand an increase to 20 per cent.8 Complementing more abstract calls for economic autonomy, a new goods and services tax (GST) the federal government introduced in 2015, coupled with evidence of substantial corruption entailing federal government officials (particularly the 1MDB fiasco), presented especially potent rallying points for the opposition in Sarawak, across economic classes. Not only did the opposition decry the local partners of that BN federal government in general terms, but they also protested more specifically the fact that income from Sarawakian voters flows into federal government coffers. (See, for instance, the chapters here by Noor’ain and Shazani.) The fact that UMNO is not in Sarawak – and only absent there – gives the Sarawak BN leverage. Indeed, Adenan urged Sarawakians to vote BN specifically to deny UMNO an excuse to take over. As noted 8

See Gale, 1981: 1131–3; and Malaysia Today’s more current coverage: , accessed 19 August 2016.

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

above, the special provisions related to governance, language, religion, and more under which Sabah and Sarawak entered the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 have steadily been whittled away. Along these lines, recent flare-ups over religion, and specifically, seeming encroachments on Christians’ rights to freedom of worship, are especially important in Sarawak: Christians comprise only 9.2 per cent of the Malaysian population overall, versus 61.3 per cent Muslims (Department of Statistics, 2011), but 44 per cent in Sarawak (versus 30 per cent Muslims), the highest level in Malaysia (Hector, 2016). (See especially Arnold Puyok’s chapter here, on the salience of church networks and Christian religious appeals.) How even the BN moved to co-opt and embrace calls for states’ rights, including resisting federal-led Islamisation, offers a model for Sabah especially, but also for other states demanding increased resource rents and more. Varieties of money politics The 2016 SSE also demonstrated both new forms and new intensity of money politics, in various guises. Perhaps most importantly, the conduct of this election highlights different strategies for voter mobilisation in urban, rural, and in-between areas (divisions that align fairly closely with relative wealth), as detailed in the chapters that follow. As Loh suggested over a decade ago (Loh, 2003), developmentalism may upstage communalism – except that communal politics, too, is a fairly new, peninsular-derived model in Sarawak (Loh, 1997b: 3–4). Ngu’s and Shazani’s chapters especially suggest how complex the interplay of communalism and developmentalism is in contemporary Sarawak. Money politics spans ‘retail’, or individual-level, strategies; the sort of bloc infrastructure grants or promises of development projects to come, pegged to elections, described above; and close relationships between government and business figures. All featured in the 2016 SSE, as the chapters that follow note. Conventional wisdom (and our colleagues’ and informants’ observations) suggest that retail vote-buying is relatively more



The 2016 Sarawak State Election

13

common in Sarawak than in peninsular Malaysia, particularly in rural areas. In early 1997, the Election Commission invalidated the result in one constituency due to rampant vote-buying in 1996’s SSE, yet most cases are unreported and unprosecuted, however well-known and often creative. Sarawak’s chief minister himself estimated that his campaign cost RM300,000–500,000 per constituency in 1987 (many times the legal limit); estimates for elections since then have been even higher, though lack the sort of evidence that enabled the 1997 court judgment (Faisal, 2011: 177–8). A related issue is the role of gambling syndicates backed by local tycoons with personal interests tied to the BN government – favoured access to contracts, concessions, and the like – that offer odds designed to encourage support for BN candidates (Aeria, 1997: 71–2). Yet these practices are hardly new in Sarawak. Two aspects that distinguished these polls (both elaborated upon in the chapters that follow) are the participation of BN direct candidates and opposition parties’ efforts to beat the BN at their own developmental game. BN direct candidates hark back to the short-lived Alliance Direct Membership Organisation (ADMO) of the 1970s, except that ADMO targeted individuals who did not fit standard communal-party pigeonholes, as the three-party Alliance was developing into today’s BN (Siti Nurbaiyah, 2008). This time, Adenan’s selection of a set of candidates to contest under the BN banner directly, even if they left their BN-component party to do so, did offer a workaround to seat-allocation disputes, yet also raised concerns: not only did these contests cause rifts in SUPP in particular, but they offered berths to wealthy tycoons (for one example, refer to Ngu’s discussion here of Repok), connected especially with the timber industry. Critics insisted the practice demonstrated the too-close ties between BN politics and corporate interests in the state (Malaysiakini, 2016). Meanwhile, perhaps the clearest indication of the entrenchment of developmentalism is efforts by the opposition DAP and PKR to win not through ideological appeals, but through demonstrating that they, too, can satisfy rural development needs. Issues of Native

14

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Customary Rights (NCR) land, for instance, have already been central to PKR efforts in Sarawak, though primarily since state party chief (and incumbent state legislator) Baru Bian has made these cases a cornerstone of his legal practice and popular appeal (Puyok, this volume). Recent efforts go farther. Through the DAP’s Impian Sarawak (in train also in Sabah, and echoed by PKR), opposition supporters fund and install basic infrastructure on a small-scale – roads, irrigation, hydro- and solar-power projects – although they ‘strive to educate the rural communities on their democratic rights’ at the same time.9 While these efforts seem not to have yielded immediate electoral payoffs (nor did either party expect them to), they represent a new strategy for making inroads among rural voters – typically a core BN constituency. It is worth noting, too, that even some BN candidates propose that less well-intentioned colleagues may prefer not to press too hard to fulfil their development promises; continued dependency is useful, so long as only one side seems at least potentially capable of making matters better. Competition on this score might not win the opposition enough votes to tip the scales, but still might press the BN to work harder, to the benefit of long-marginalised voters. How far this opposition strategy develops in future, and with what longer-term effects, matters for how both sides define and differentiate themselves, as well as for voters’ own calculations.

9

Impian Sarawak & Sabah homepage: , accessed 19 August 2016. The DAP keeps a notably low profile on the webpage (and party representatives note that they do not harp on their party brand). Much of the PKR effort has been through Baru Bian’s Barefoot Mercy NGO; through this vector, the party takes an even lower profile. See for instance the 22 August 2012 Barefoot Mercy press release on Baru’s webpage, regarding a micro-hydro project: , accessed 19 August 2016.



The 2016 Sarawak State Election

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Research design and overview This investigation into the 2016 SSE is part of a larger, four-country exploration of political networks and the relative salience of forms of ‘money politics’ in Southeast Asia. The present volume complements an earlier one, involving some of the same authors, on Malaysia’s 13th general election (Weiss, 2014), as well as a cognate volume on Indonesia’s 2014 legislative elections (Aspinall and Mada, 2016) and a forthcoming one on the Philippines’ 2016 elections. The chapters that follows are based upon ethnographic research throughout the course of the 2016 SSE campaign. Each of the authors (as well as several colleagues who focused on other constituencies) spent time in a specific area; state-wide, we aimed to maximise our variation in terms of degree of urbanisation and ethnic mix in particular. Researchers interviewed candidates and campaign workers, observed campaign events, followed media and other accounts, and otherwise aimed to discern what motivated voters in that area, how candidates appealed to voters (which usually differed by segment), what issues dominated the campaign cycle, and what forms money politics took in that constituency. (Some candidates or campaign teams were more accessible than others, and some aspects – for instance, the postal votes Noor’ain probes in her chapter – were more opaque than others.) The chapters here draw, too, on media accounts of the campaign, both state-wide and in that specific area, as well as secondary academic literature on Sarawak politics. This volume does not pretend to be comprehensive; however small the polity in question, its political stories to be told are manifold. However, we do aim to shed light on Sarawak’s complex and changing political scene and in doing so, add nuance to overly static and narrow conceptions of Malaysian politics broadly.

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

References Aeria, Andrew (1997) ‘The Politics of Development and the 1996 Sarawak State Elections’, Kajian Malaysia, XV(1/2): 57–83. Aspinall, Edward and Mada Sukmajati (2016) Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots, Singapore: NUS Press. Banji, Conny (2016) ‘If you don’t like the BN candidates, think of me’, Borneo Post Online, 23 April, , accessed 25 August 2016. Borneo Post (2014) ‘State statistics: Malays edge past Chinese in Sarawak’, Borneo Post Online, 8 February, , accessed 19 August 2016. ——— (2016) ‘Adenan attends gathering with 5,000 Ta Ann staff in Sibu’, Borneo Post Online, 20 April, , accessed 25 August 2016. Cheah Boon Kheng (2002) Malaysia: The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Chin, James (2016) ‘Sarawak’s Wayang Kulit’, New Mandala, 18 January, , accessed 19 August 2016. Chin Ung-Ho (1996) Chinese Politics in Sarawak: A Study of the Sarawak United People’s Party, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Department of Statistics Malaysia (2011) ‘Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report 2010’, updated 5 August, , accessed 19 August 2016. ——— (2016) ‘Population Quick Info’ (‘Ethnic’ data for Malaysia and Sarawak), , accessed 19 August 2016. Faisal Hazis (2009) ‘The Politics of Development in Sarawak’, Akademika, 77: 91–111. ——— (2011) Domination and Contestation: Muslim Bumiputera Politics in Sarawak, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. FMT Reporters (2015) ‘Perkasa: Chinese, Indians were “pendatang”’, Free Malaysia Today, 9 November, , accessed 25 August 2016. Gale, Bruce (1981) ‘Petronas: Malaysia’s National Oil Corporation’, Asian Survey, 21(11): 1129–44. Goh Pei Pei (2016) ‘Sarawak polls: DAP admits Adenan is popular, has won support of Chinese community’, New Straits Times Online, 21 April, , accessed 25 August 2016.



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Gomes, Alberto C. (2004) ‘The Orang Asli of Malaysia’, IIAS Newsletter, 35: 10. Hector, Charles (2016) ‘Sarawak – Christians (44%), Muslims (30%), Buddhism (*13.5)%? Gerrymandering’, 4 February, , accessed 19 August 2016. Lee Hock Guan (2016) ‘Impressive Results Await BN in Sarawak State Elections’, ISEAS Perspective, 20 (3 May). Lian Kwen Fee and Jayanath Appudurai (2011) ‘Race, Class and Politics in Peninsular Malaysia: The General Election of 2008’, Asian Studies Review, 35(1): 63–82. Lim Mah Hui (1980) ‘Ethnic and Class Relations in Malaysia’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 10(1/2): 130–54. Lim, Regina (2008) Federal–State Relations in Sabah, Malaysia: The Berjaya Administration, 1976–85, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Loh, Francis Kok Wah (1997a) ‘Special Issue on Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and Federalism’, Kajian Malaysia, 15(1/2). ——— (1997b) ‘Understanding Politics in Sabah and Sarawak: An Overview’, Kajian Malaysia, 15(1/2): 1–14. ——— (2003) ‘Towards a New Politics of Fragmentation and Contestation’, in Francis Loh Kok Wah and Johan Saravanamuttu (eds), New Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 253–82. Malay Mail (2016) ‘Umno can win next GE by forming pact with PAS for “Malay unity”, ex-minister says’, Malay Mail Online, 30 April, , accessed 19 August 2016. Malaysiakini (2016) ‘Why Adenan chooses business tycoons to contest polls’, Malaysiakini, 17 April, , accessed 19 August 2016. Mayuri Mei Lin (2015) ‘Ahead of polls, survey finds Adenan Satem winning over Sarawakians with tough act on graft’, Malay Mail Online, 27 July, , accessed 19 August 2016. Mersat, Neilson Ilan (2009) ‘“Blue Waves versus Political Tsunami”: Sarawak and the 2008 Malaysian General Election’, Akademika, 77: 113–32. Rajvinder Singh (2016) ‘Nurul Izzah latest opposition leader not allowed into Sarawak’, The Sun Daily, 2 May, , accessed 26 August 2016. Ruban, A. (2016) ‘After Sarawak win, Adenan hailed as “the man”, BN’s “X-factor”’, Malay Mail Online, 9 May, , accessed 25 August 2016.

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Segawa, Noriyuki (2015) ‘Ethnic Politics and Consociationalism in the 2013 Malaysian Election’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 16(2): 177–94. Siddique, Sharon and Suryadinata, Leo (1981/82) ‘Bumiputra and Pribumi: Economic Nationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia and Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs, 54(4): 662–87. Siti Nurbaiyah Nadzmi (2008) ‘An idea from the past to change the future’, Sunday Times, 2 November. von Vorys, Karl (1975) Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton: Princeton University Press. UNDP (2014) Malaysia Human Development Report 2013: Redesigning an Inclusive Future, Kuala Lumpur: United Nations Development Programme, Malaysia. Weiss, Meredith L. (2013) ‘The Consociational Model in Southeast Asia: Is It (Still) Relevant?’ Taiwan Journal of Democracy, May (special issue): 149–70. ——— (ed.) (2014) Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots, Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Welsh, Bridget (2006) ‘Malaysia’s Sarawak State Elections 2006: Understanding a Break in the BN Armor’; report prepared for the National Democratic Institute. Available at: , accessed 19 August 2016. ——— (2016) ‘Victory and Insecurity: Sarawak Results and Trajectories’, New Mandala, 13 May 2016, , accessed 25 August 2016. Yu Ji (2015) ‘CM: Chinese no longer pendatang’, The Star Online, 19 February, , accessed 6 September 2016. Yu Ji and Rahimy Rahim (2015) ‘Federal govt “stupid” not to recognise UEC, says Adenan’, The Star Online, 5 November, , accessed 25 August 2016.



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19

20

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Tupong 21

Tupong Malay/Melanau: 71.9%, Chinese: 16.9%, Iban: 6%, Bidayuh: 4%, Others: 1.3% Polling Results 2011 Candidates

Daud Abdul Rahman (BN/PBB) 8,304 Baharuddin @ Din Shah Mokhsen (PKR) 3,753

2016 Fazzrudin Abdul Rahman (BN/PBB) 10,942 Nurhanim Mokhsen (PKR) 2,887

Majority

4,551

8,055

Registered Voters

17,796

21,499

Votes Cast

12,192

13,982

Voter Turnout

68.5%

65.0%

135

153

Spoilt Votes Sources:

http://www.thestar.com.my/sarawakelection2016info/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn10/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn-sarawak/

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Tupong 23

Chapter 2

Tupong If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It! Mohd. Shazani bin Masri

The most recent, eleventh Sarawak State Election (SSE11) demonstrates yet again the domination of PBB (United Bumiputera Heritage Party), part of the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) coalition, in Malay-majority areas. Tupong is one such area. The election in Tupong saw a two-pronged contest between the incumbent government party, represented by Fazzrudin Abdul Rahman of PBB, and Nurhanim Hanna Mokhsen of the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People’s Justice Party). The former won with 79.1 per cent of the popular vote against 20.9 per cent; 8,055 votes set the candidates apart. This chapter examines Tupong as one of BN’s strongest urban bastions. Tupong is notable because it defies the assumption that election outcomes in the urban areas lean more toward the opposition – unlike in other Sarawak urban seats such as Padungan (a Chinesemajority seat) and Batu Kawa (a mixed seat). A possible explanation is that Tupong houses among the highest concentration of voters from Sarawak’s newly emergent, urban, Malay-Muslim middle class, who are among the prime beneficiaries of state and federal BN affirmative action. As a political community, the Malays also have a close historical and social affiliation with PBB, the state BN majority component party. The community’s mix of feelings of gratitude and

24

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

affinity with PBB translates into the mass of voters supporting BN in Tupong. In this chapter, I argue that Tupong is an example of the pull of patronage politics, based on a variant of the politics of development often associated with more rural areas in Sarawak, by looking at campaign strategies and issues raised by BN and PKR during the SSE11 campaign period. First, I outline the basic demography of Tupong, which is a rapidly developing, privileged, Malay-majority, urban area. Second, I discuss ‘the Adenan Factor’, which is a strong feel-good sentiment towards Sarawak’s newly elected chief minister, Adenan Satem. The extent to which Fazzrudin’s victory depended on Adenan’s popularity hints at the prevalence of personalised, clientelist politics in the area. Third, I discuss PKR’s ceramah (political speeches or rallies). Like Fazzrudin, Nurhanim also relied on her party seniors for boosting support, suggesting the pervasiveness of personality politics, whether rooted in charisma or in patron–client ties. This reliance on personal ‘pull’ was evident when PKR lost much of its audience for ceramah sessions due to the absence of PKR (and other opposition) national superstars. As a result, PKR was unable to effectively explain to local voters a number of key national issues it raised. But, PKR seems to be more creative than PBB, as it switched gears to emphasise the credibility of the candidate, as opposed to solely relying on the goodwill or popularity of the party or its leader. In the final section, I examine how BN and PKR still appeal to the politics of development for support, but with twists of their own. I demonstrate that it is unlikely that BN’s developmentalist model is broken for now. But this is by no means an indication that Tupong politics has no room for opposition, as its maturing urban Malay community may eventually call for more meaningful participation in economic and political decision-making.

Tupong demography The constituency of Tupong has among the highest concentrations of Malay-Muslim middle-class voters in Sarawak. Tupong constituency includes 21,999 registered voters and posted a turnout rate of 65.4

Tupong 25

per cent in SSE11. The population of Tupong is about 72 per cent Malay-Melanau, followed 17 per cent Chinese, 6 per cent Iban, 4 per cent Bidayuh, and 1 per cent Others. Tupong has excellent access to public roads, internet, and other utilities and infrastructure, as befits a middle-class, urban setting. Several important government buildings, such as the North Kuching City Hall, are located in Tupong, and the state Legislative Assembly Building and state courts are just next door, in Samariang constituency. Tupong consists largely of low-density residential areas with emerging commercial zones. The constituency comprises part of a ring of the most affluent Malay-majority areas in Sarawak, which are representative of Malay, middle-class, urban settings. There are also notable Malay kampong1 areas still present in the area, in the midst of fast-paced residential and commercial development, along with pockets of minority Chinese settlements, most notably in the Matang area. Tupong has pockets of poverty, such as Kampung Pinang Jawa, but these areas are the exception, amidst the one- and two-storey terrace homes and semi-detached housing estates throughout most of the constituency. We can infer by sight that urbanites living in the area have comfortable lives. There are considerable on-going development projects, including new commercial complexes such as MetroCity, and various housing projects, such as Taman Haziq. Basic amenities and infrastructure are excellent, compared with elsewhere in the state. Thus, Tupong residents cannot claim to be (relatively) economically left behind. The BN often boasts about the development it has

1

Kampong, or villages, are generally home to lower-income Malays in this area. These ‘traditional’ Malay residences have not (yet) been touched by government or commercial projects, other than small improvements to roads, electricity, water, and telecommunications infrastructure. In contrast to kampong-style residences are the taman perumahan (planned residential areas) that are mushrooming in the Petra Jaya area to cater to growing demand from an emergent Malay middle-income group. There have been instances in Petra Jaya, too, of relocating villagers to new taman perumahan as part of compensation for their land by government or private developers.

26

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

brought to the area, claiming it turned semi-rural Matang into robust, developing, urban and semi-urban Tupong in a span of twenty years; BN has held the constituency throughout that time. It can be said that Tupongites are among the main beneficiaries of both federal and state BN projects in Sarawak.

The Adenan factor Voters in Tupong usually distinguish little between federal and state seats as far candidate choices are concerned: as long as a candidate is PBB (or BN), they should be the right choice for continuance of development. Voters seem to put their trust in the party much more than in any specific candidate, although beyond the party brand, they understand PBB largely in terms of the calibre of its top leadership. As a result, BN posters for SSE11 focused on stoking ‘Adenan fever’. The popularity of new Sarawak Chief Minister Adenan Satem is a major cause of BN’s win in Tupong. His popularity derives from his vocal and firm rhetoric of ‘catching up’ with more developed states in peninsular Malaysia, while emphasising state-centric issues such as Sarawak autonomy and an increase in oil royalties. He also distances himself from what he sees as federal government problems such as the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST), which has resulted in increased costs of living for the general population. To prove – especially to more observant and informed citydwellers such as Tupongite voters – that his words are not empty rhetoric, Adenan abolished toll collections at the Tun Salahuddin bridge toll plaza, the only toll plaza in Kuching, on the bridge that connects Kuching North (where Tupong is located) with Kuching South. This decision was a politically and practically significant move by Adenan that boosted his image in city areas, especially in the Malay-majority Petra Jaya area (of which Tupong is a part). First, the action gave the benign impression that an Adenan-led state government at least provides a cushion against economically burdensome policies, including not just tolls, but also the GST. Second, the action implied that the Adenan-led state government had nothing

Tupong 27

to do with the implementation of the GST. Adenan seemed to draw a line distinguishing the state and federal governments, downplaying the fact that the GST had been introduced by the BN by emphasising the difference between the coalition at the state and federal levels. ‘Adenan fever’ revolves around fifty-three principles and proposals for substantive reform and development under Chief Minister Adenan Satem’s leadership. The credibility of the campaign also lay in the charismatic strength of Adenan Satem, who claims to have already made substantive changes in just twenty-four months since his appointment. The principles he touts focus on ensuring Sarawak’s development catches up to that of peninsular Malaysia, which still enjoys the lion’s share of development so many years after the formation of Malaysia. Chief Minister Adenan’s charismatic strength rests on two bases: personal and political. On a personal basis, he is referred to affectionately as Tok (Grandfather) Nan and is seen to possess a simple, down-to-earth persona that defies the ‘standard’ posh and distant attitude normally associated with government officials of his standing. Furthering this image – which appeals to the psyche of locals in Tupong – is the fact that Adenan and his wife frequent areas such as Kubah Ria and Pasar Tamu, eateries and markets for ordinary locals. Adenan is often contrasted with the previous chief minister, Taib Mahmud. Moreover, Adenan is not camera-shy – his face features prominently in everything from large-group photos to close-up ‘wefies’ – making him a political star in social media such as Facebook and Instagram. This personal basis for support is coupled with a political one: the fact that he is a no-nonsense, pro-state reformist who acts firmly, especially to re-orient the state and federal civil service toward ensuring Sarawak’s development reaches the level the state deserves as part of the federation of Malaysia. Although Adenan stated that his development agenda would focus on rural areas, that emphasis clearly did not reduce urban Malay support for him. This loyalty was probably due to his demanding more efficiency and productivity from federal

28

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

agencies, which in the eyes of especially Malay urban locals – many of whom are state and federal civil servants – is a brave action to take. Furthermore, Adenan’s efforts have raised political consciousness among the locals in how they perceive the civil service: they now distinguish between the state and federal levels.

PKR ceramah: An attempt to lay it all out briefly Lacking a state-level counterpart to Adenan of their own, and hamstrung by state immigration controls in their efforts to bring in key national party leaders (details below), PKR focused on building support on the ground. Their campaign in Tupong relied on friendly walkabouts in public areas, posters and flyers, and ceramah. Ceramah typically are the most anticipated events in opposition campaigns, and perhaps the most important of all campaign tactics employed by the opposition to get their messages across to voters. However, with the absence of major opposition figures such as Anwar Ibrahim, the effectiveness of ceramah seemed to have dwindled, judging by the number of attendees. I attended one of PKR’s main ceramah, held on 22 April 2016, and saw no more than about 200 attendees at its peak. Still, ceramah remained the most informative opposition medium, particularly since PKR is in much needier circumstances than the BN in terms of publicity. For previous elections, given the importance of ceramah to the campaign, the opposition’s biggest guns, such as de facto opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim and Azmin Ali, the present Selangor chief minister, had often flown from the peninsula to join ceramah and meet with Tupongites. Ceramah organised by PKR – the only viable opposition party in Tupong – used to be the highest-profile political events in the area: they were usually the only time to meet face-to-face with opposition superstars. Moreover, ceramah used to be among the few sources of alternative views and outlooks on the state and federal political landscape. It is during ceramah that PKR hopes to deliver its most valuable political messages. While information about PKR’s stands on political

Tupong 29

issues is readily available, the charisma and ability of the ceramahgiver to personally persuade voters and to contextualise certain issues make this traditionally a core strategy. Ceramah allow a chance to introduce the opposition candidates for Tupong and other nearby Malay-majority areas, particularly Satok. Satok, which is Tupong’s neighbouring constituency, is important for its similar characteristics – like Tupong, it has an urban Malay composition and is a BN stronghold – but it has established commercial areas. Perhaps by coupling Tupong and Satok, the opposition hoped to deliver a more complete outlook on urban Malay issues, hence highlighting matters that are similar among Malay voters in Tupong and Satok. More importantly, the ceramah is a venue for introducing key issues brought by the candidates: their personal aspirations for the locals in the constituency and their hoped-for effects on state politics at large. These key issues were contextualised in ceramah within the Tupong and Satok constituencies. For instance, at its 22 April ceramah, PKR raised concerns about exorbitant house prices for firsttime owners specific to the Satok–Tupong area. PKR also pointed to business practices that it related to cronyism and nepotism by the ruling party, which limit business opportunities for small-scale Malay businesspeople in urban areas. PKR also highlighted stark differences in terms of development within Malay urban areas such as Satok, where traditional Malay kampong stand side-by-side with modern commercial complexes, and the limits to economic benefits for kampong dwellers with regard to sharing in business and commercial property ownership. PKR questioned the low rate of participation in business among local Malay villagers, despite their residing just next to the bustling commercial complexes in the Satok area – a pattern emblematic of the increasing inequality between rich and poor in Malay urban areas. But the climax and crowd-drawer is typically the speeches by opposition top leaders. This time, the opposition was denied the chance to bring in its best people to explain opposition standpoints on national and local socio-political issues to Tupong voters. The Sarawak

30

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

state government denied certain national opposition figures entry into the state – a novel action done in the name of preventing ‘extreme views’ and racial disharmony from spreading in Sarawak.2 The absence of national opposition leaders who could accurately and convincingly explain urban Malay issues – such as Anwar Ibrahim, Nurul Izzah Anwar, and Rafizi Ramli – apparently blunted PKR’s attempt to effectively explain national issues. As a result, PKR was forced to rely upon lower-profile peninsular-based PKR state legislators and parliamentarians to explain issues such as the GST and its effect on cost of living and, more importantly, to contextualise these issues in relation to local problems. In terms of GST, PKR highlighted the economic hardship of the locals, particularly the urban poor. So strong was PKR’s stance on this issue that it hoisted yellow ‘No GST’ flags (which resembled the SUPP flag from afar) throughout the 22 April ceramah, along with candidate posters and party flags. PKR blamed Sarawak BN for at least implicitly endorsing the GST despite Adenan’s repeated denial that Sarawak BN had played any part in its implementation. PKR proved this point by highlighting the twenty-five Sarawak BN parliamentarians, all of whom supported the GST in Parliament. In addition, PKR emphasised that, despite Adenan’s insistence that the tax is a federal rather than state matter, the increased cost of living the GST has entailed for local Sarawakians indicates that the tax must be abolished. At the ceramah, PKR also brought up the related issue that local salary levels had not increased to match the rising cost of living. PKR presented this imbalance as a direct consequence of the GST and BN’s mismanagement of the economy, which had contributed to an increase in the prices of necessities such as houses and food, and the very limited availability of jobs in the market that match the

2

This action was, of course, rebuked by opposition leaders such as Azmin Ali; the head of the Sarawak opposition, Chong Chien Jen; and NGO figures such as Ambiga Sreenevasan: all claimed that this decision was an abuse of Sarawak immigration rules by Sarawak’s chief minister.

Tupong 31

academic qualifications of young graduates. Moreover, those graduates suffer both from burdensome student loans and, in many cases, underemployment (or worse, unemployment). With such discourse, PKR encouraged voters to think about these issues and allow the party to play a role in checking the BN’s development politics to ensure that the BN addresses challenges in managing the state’s economy and correcting its shortcomings. Interestingly, the selective (and politically strategic?) banning of national opposition leaders’ entry into Sarawak might have been a blessing in disguise for the opposition. The tactic highlighted a new discourse in Sarawak politics, raising questions about the extent to which Sarawak’s autonomy in immigration should apply: should it permit barring legitimate opposition politicians from entering the state? When speakers raised this issue at the 22 April ceramah, the attendees applauded. PKR pointed out that such bans embody the ungentlemanly politics of Adenan Satem and are antithetical to national unity. PKR also added that it will abolish such state immigration rules that limit movement of legitimate opposition politicians when it controls the government. This promise was significant to the development of local opposition politics because, for the first time, the Sarawak immigration autonomy issue was meaningfully raised, and in a state election campaign, for a local state audience.

Getting the grassroots touch: Turun padang Turun padang (going to the ground) refers to the activities through which prospective electorate candidates make themselves publicly visible, including paying visits to local neighbourhood houses and public places such as mosques and eateries. Turun padang efforts range from simple walkabouts involving meet-and-greet outreach, photo sessions, and handshaking, to grander affairs such as ceremonies to celebrate important community events. These efforts comprise an important part of both sides’ campaign strategies.

32

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

BN’s turun padang Fazzrudin was new to the PBB-BN scene in Tupong. He understood his expected role as a candidate in one of BN’s strongest urban safe seats in the state: to sing along with the tune of #TeamAdenan and to acknowledge the deeds of his predecessor in that seat, Daud Abdul Rahman. At 40 years old at the time of the election, Fazzrudin was the youngest among BN’s candidates, although not so young when compared to a good number of opposition candidates, including Aziz Isa, a Malay DAP candidate who is in his twenties. Yet, Fazzrudin presented the closest PBB-BN came to ‘youth’ and, therefore, was to be the BN’s go-to person for youth politics. Being new to electoral politics, Fazzrudin depended much on the solid reputations of PBB top leadership. Given the BN’s strong odds in SSE11, Fazzrudin could likely coast into office on the wave of ‘Adenan fever’, without having to do much to convince Tupong voters that Barisan Nasional was the right choice. His posters, some of which depicted him playing football, and speeches suggested that he would focus especially on educational opportunities and sports development. However, he did not elaborate in detail a viable policy direction for either of these issues should he win. Instead, in supporting Fazzrudin, the BN primarily highlighted his BN seniors such as Prime Minister Najib Razak; Adenan Satem, the PBB president and chief minister; Daud Abdul Rahman, the previous five-term BN representative for Tupong; and Federal Works Minister Fadillah Yusof. Fadillah is significant because he is the member of parliament for Petra Jaya constituency and PBB Youth chief. Moreover, until his candidacy, Fazzrudin served as Fadillah’s political secretary. To emphasise this junior–senior connection, Fadillah (and Daud Abdul Rahman) joined Fazzrudin for formal turun padang efforts. BN’s turun padang activities are usually grand, especially in its strongholds. In Tupong’s case, one of the most notable events was a three-day programme called Sejiwa Senada, held in a newly completed commercial complex in the Matang area. This programme

Tupong 33

was supposedly a state-sponsored programme designed to close the information and social gap between the civil service and the local population. However, it served more as a huge promotion for BN for the upcoming election. Sejiwa Senada in Tupong was in fact the final episode of a series of Sejiwa Senada programmes held throughout the state, starting months earlier. Adenan Satem himself graced this Sejiwa Senada Grand Finale with an elaborate opening ceremony in which he sang for the public. The event featured exhibitions from government, semi-government, and private agencies, promoting their roles within the state’s service sector. The event also included speeches from state ministers who described Sarawak achievements in economic development and social harmony. Booths selling handicrafts and hawker food enticed the public, as did lucky draws, featuring prizes – even cars – and an evening concert featuring big-name artists such as Dayang Nurfaizah, Akim, and Jay-Jay. No BN or PBB flag was publicly hoisted, but the speeches by Adenan and other ministers made clear that attendees should vote BN in the state election if they want the benefits enjoyed so far to continue – giving the impression that the BN is always and equal to the state government (and that its programmes are essentially patronage for loyal supporters). While the Sejiwa Senada event showcased Adenan rather than Fazzrudin, the programme’s effort to solidify a general pro-BN mood helped to pave the way for the local candidate. Fazzrudin himself appeared in more modest BN events, though these were still grander than their PKR counterparts. For instance, Fazzrudin attended a ground-breaking ceremony for a new bridge in one of the villages in Tupong. In these appearances, Fazzrudin focused on low-key issues such as traffic congestion and local youth development through sports and education. He seemed to subordinate himself to Daud Abdul Rahman by praising what Daud had done in developing the area and promising that he would continue to do the same, in accordance with Daud’s plans and policies. He asked the voters to judge for themselves the level of development PBB had brought to the community (Star, 2016). To prove this record, he cited

34

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

current road construction works in the effort to mitigate traffic in the area, including a new underpass at the Kipali roundabout (still under construction). Local villagers of Kampung Sinjan, a sizeable Malay kampong located in Tupong, dubbed Fazzrudin as pendekar muda Tupong (Tupong’s young master). A PBB branch leader (ketua ranting), Jamaludin Buji, guaranteed that Kampung Sinjan would remain a BN stronghold in SSE11. He said, ‘our hope is that the new Tupong candidate will continue the development agenda brought by Datuk Daud Abdul Rahman for the past 25 years’ (Sarawak Live, 2016).3 Fazzrudin replied by urging the villagers to maintain strong relationships with community leaders. He said, ‘I hope you will give me your confidence and a chance to prove my ability as your representative for Tupong. I also promise I will continue the development agenda brought by our former state legislator in Tupong’ (Sarawak Live, 2016).4 Turun padang seems a classic patronage strategy, with a twist. The idea is to highlight BN as the patron party that brings material benefits to locals who vote for the party, then to feature the specific BN candidate as the direct benefactor of the constituency. But in Tupong, at least in this election, material benefits manifested themselves more in the form of fulfilment of policy promises already planned for Tupong, than as immediate rewards. Hence, for instance, the BN’s launch of projects already planned in line with larger policy goals, such as to tackle traffic jams. This approach is evident with the building of the Kipali underpass, the most significant infrastructure project in Tupong, during the official campaign period. The BN’s approach to

3

‘Harapan kami, calon baharu Tupong akan meneruskan agenda pembangunan yang telah dibawa oleh Datuk Daud Abdul Rahman sepanjang 25 tahun ini.’ 4 ‘Saya berharap anda akan memberi keyakinan serta peluang untuk saya membuktikan kemampuan saya sebagai wakil anda di Tupong ini. Saya juga berjanji akan meneruskan pembangunan yang telah dibawa oleh bekas Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (ADUN) kita di Tupong ini.’

Tupong 35

the politics of development in Tupong, then, and the sort of patronage it proffered, were more subtle than the conventional wisdom suggests of less urbanised areas. Here, the party did not make a direct appeal for support because it built an underpass. Rather, the BN emphasised its long-term plans, of which this initiative was a part, to expand infrastructure to cater to a growing population density in the area. In Tupong, the BN candidate himself was secondary – he was to build a reputation by association with PBB in hopes that, in the future, he will have enough political mileage to influence party direction as much as his seniors in PBB do now. BN party loyalists vote for whomever PBB, as the patron party, entrusts with the candidacy. Adenan’s effort to lend all BN candidates a hand with popularity by declaring that a vote for any of them would be a vote for himself embodies how much local BN candidates ride on the coattails of their party leader. Indeed, in Tupong, posters and souvenirs for Adenan outnumbered those for Fazzrudin. Among the latter were hydrogen balloons featuring the slogan, ‘Undilah [Vote] Udin!’ and posters showing him playing football, presumably to remind voters of his promises regarding sports and youth development. Overall, it can be said that the BN’s turun padang efforts in Tupong very much depended on the fame and familiarity of major BN icons. The candidate himself largely depended on these factors, even as he still presented himself to voters personally and carved out a potential policy niche. PKR’s turun padang Similarly, Nurhanim Hanna, PKR’s Tupong candidate, also employed the turun padang strategy. But Nurhanim did not enjoy the same advantages as Fazzrudin – being in the opposition is difficult in Tupong. Nurhanim had been on the ground for many months before the election, then continued after the election, to establish a connection with Tupong denizens. She built rapport via social activities such as holding sports events for kids and conducting charitable activities. For instance, she handed out face-masks to

36

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

passers-by on the road to ward against haze, assisted a family when fire broke out in their house, distributed bubur lambuk (a specially made porridge) to the public during Ramadan, and conducted social activities to promote herself and her political ideals to the locals. These acts can be seen as intended to counter a widespread perception of ‘seasonal’ politicians – the general local impression that politicians (especially BN politicians) are seen roaming around the area and interacting with the general public only during election periods. To some extent, this strategy has increased PKR’s visibility in the area, giving the sense that the opposition is there to stay. Like Fazzrudin, Nurhanim also depended on her party seniors, but at the national level instead of local ones – Azmin Ali and Wan Azizah rather than Sarawak PKR chief Baru Bian, for instance. This seeming similarity in candidate strategy masks an important contrast: BN has grounded support locally and PKR relies much more on national-level support. Thus, with the use of immigration rules, Sarawak BN effectively crippled PKR’s national support by barring key non-Sarawakian opposition leaders from the state. Overall, despite assistance from Salleh Shawkatali, the PKR candidate from Satok constituency, Nurhanim’s campaign was far less effective than PKR likely hoped. Even so, Nurhanim appeared to be more directly engaged and visible on social media, such as Facebook, than Fazzrudin, in updating her constituents on her political activities. It seemed that she posted items herself on her personal Facebook page, giving the impression that she was more accessible than her BN counterpart. Also, her active updating of Facebook ensured easy public access to information about PKR activities such as walkabouts, ceramah, and other social activities happening in the area. Her social media posts included links to PKR materials, such as the party’s Demi Sarawak (For Sarawak) short video clip, a speech by Azmin Ali condemning Adenan Satem’s ban on peninsular politicians’ entry, and general PKR appeals for votes. These postings helped to compensate for the usual lack of general mass media coverage for opposition politics and activities. In other words,

Tupong 37

Nurhanim’s turun padang also involved a personalised, candidatecentred, online dimension in her attempt to inform voters – who were largely in the dark about opposition activities in the area, given lack of opposition access to the mainstream media – of what she had to offer. Nurhanim’s turun padang style was more direct than Fazzrudin’s and largely revolved around the candidate herself as a credible choice for Tupong. One PKR pamphlet, for instance, depicted Nurhanim as the people of Tupong’s hope for change. More so than in the last general election, PKR cast its identity in these campaign materials as more localised than national by focusing in on the candidate, Nurhanim, and her personal credibility. Nurhanim was not shy about promoting her personal background as a successful food-business owner, and as an overseas (Australian) graduate. These details appealed to the idea that the more able and talented a person, the more the person is qualified to lead, as opposed to the idea that one can lead just because he or she belongs to the ‘right’ party. While on the ground, Nurhanim wanted to prove that she was capable of representing the people of Tupong in line with the ideals and vision of her party. However, she presented her own slogan for Tupong – prihatin, konsisten, reformis (concerned, consistent, reformist) – in addition to PKR Sarawak’s more general ‘For Sarawak: Great Economy, Just Society’ and its set of five state-wide promises. (The five promises were: to reduce the cost of living by abolishing GST, develop Sarawak’s infrastructure, satisfy Sarawakians’ claims to native customary rights [NCR] land, restore state autonomy and increase petroleum royalties, and fight corruption and injustice in line with the model set by the opposition-led governments in Penang and Selangor (Ten, 2016).) Nurhanim seemed to focus in on the four of those elements most pertinent to Tupong: the cost of living and GST, infrastructure development, state autonomy, and combating corruption and striving for justice. This tailoring suggests Nurhanim had a greater degree of autonomy than Fazzrudin to act on her own initiative and be creative, so long as she represented her party’s vision on key policy goals.

38

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

In the past, supporting the pembangkang (political opposition) carried a negative connotation. This time, while still small, the opposition seemed less stigmatised when they turun padang. People from all walks of life seemed to extend them polite courtesies whenever they made their rounds. The fact of a small but consistent 20 per cent bloc of opposition votes throughout the years confirms that there are dissenting voices in Tupong. The conduct of the election campaign suggests, though, that the time is not yet ripe in Tupong for the kind of ‘new politics’ those voters presumably prefer, of voting based more on policy frameworks and ideology than on the basis of developmentalist inducements (or identity), and in which one’s vote depends more on whether a candidate possesses the ‘right’ characteristics, as evidenced by achievements or personal credentials, than on party credentials.

The politics of development: It’s not broken … yet From the way the campaign took shape for both sides in Tupong, it is clear that both the BN and PKR appealed to the idea that economic development is the way forward for Tupong. However, they differed in at least two marked areas. First, the BN attempted to prove that it is still the best party to serve the people of Tupong by convincing voters that their new, youthful candidate would further the already-existing development agenda set by the party. The BN also used Tupong indirectly as an example for the state’s Malay community (urban and rural alike) to affirm that BN is the party that will safeguard their interests by playing up their development track record in Tupong, which emerged from an economic backwater in the 1980s into a busy Malay-middle class residential and commercial hotspot in 2016. Moreover, Adenan Satem used his personal clout to convince urban Malay society to stand behind his government, notwithstanding any doubts they might have about the BN at the federal level. His efforts to delineate between federal and state government policies let the Sarawak BN evade responsibility for touchy issues such as

Tupong 39

GST – but in the process, might have helped to create a new political consciousness among urban Malays, who previously elided the state and federal BN and their development efforts. Second, on the opposition side, PKR took the reverse approach, tying Adenan and the Sarawak BN to their federal counterparts, and painting both as responsible for national issues such as the GST, which PKR promised to abolish. PKR also highlighted the negative effects of other BN policies, which the BN is wont to downplay, such as the low representation of the wider Malay community in high-stakes property ownership and businesses, even in Malay urban areas, which PKR tied to the prevalence of cronyism and nepotism. PKR also attempted to be both local and inclusively national in orientation at the same time, as opposed to the state BN, which attempted to distinguish clearly between the PBB-led Sarawak BN and the UMNO-led federal BN. PKR attempted to harmonise its ideal development narrative, based on a national agenda and under an inclusive national party (instead of an ethnic-based or regional party, as under BN), with state-specific priorities, as was apparent in the way the party dealt with issues of state immigration authority or the current state government’s effort to deflect responsibility for unpopular policies to the federal government. PKR’s candidate, Nurhanim Hanna, also had more autonomy to frame her party’s agenda to fit the local Tupong situation and to speak in her own voice. While the effect of this practice remains to be seen, the opposition is certainly more accommodating than BN of generating policy ideas from below, rather than just following the agenda set by a party or predecessor. But PKR has not yet been able to interrupt the BN’s long narrative of development in the Tupong area. Tupongites seem content with the BN, probably due to the absence of any specific jolt to their economic well-being: they are overall well-served by the BN. Indeed, a considerable number of PBB leaders from the higher ranks actually reside in Tupong, and all of Petra Jaya, including Tupong, has benefited from the booming development of residential projects catering to the growing mass of middle-class Malays, thanks to federal

40

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

and state government policies aimed at enhancing Malay-Bumiputera economic well-being. The combination of Adenan Satem’s popularity and widespread trust that the state BN (particularly PBB) will continue to deliver on its economic policy promises, based on its historical track record, keeps most Tupong voters complacently supportive. Yet, the presence of opposition in the area cannot be downplayed. First, PKR envisages a more inclusive development not based on ethnicity, race, or region, but based on norms of economic justice, political meritocracy, and national unity: an ideal of a united Malaysia built upon the idea that the wealth of a country should be properly managed by a transparent and accountable government that is sensitive to the needs of its citizens, particularly the underprivileged, regardless of ethnic, racial, religious, and regional background. Experience in peninsular Malaysia suggests that as the Malay urban community matures, they will likely demand more transparency in governance, especially with respect to dishing out more equitable shares of the economic pie. In other words, the newly economically empowered middle class will likely want more egalitarian economic participation in high-stakes sectors such as real-estate and largescale commercial development. Hence, PKR made the case for more egalitarian and merit-based criteria, as opposed to a patronage-based economic model that centres on a few political seniors or a party, and highlighted the negative impacts of urbanisation and the plight of the marginalised in the community, which the government party tends to downplay.

Conclusion Tupong remains a BN stronghold for now. The popular vote for the BN increased notably because of Adenan’s popularity and confidence that the state BN is capable of delivering on its development promises. This trend is unlikely to change soon, insofar as the urban Malay community remains the chief beneficiary of the BN’s development policies. However, the fact there is always a small but stable presence of opposition in the area signifies that critical sentiments are not

Tupong 41

absent. This opposition seems to draw on people’s silent, but likely still emerging, discontent over BN-style development, which they see as favouring the privileged few at the cost of others. The opposition also highlights national inclusiveness as opposed to being ethnically or regionally exclusive, and takes a different approach from the BN’s tone and rhetoric that seem to emphasise a state-centric view of development. Will the federal BN respond to increasingly fraught Sarawak-versus-federal sentiment by introducing an UMNO presence in the state to counter PBB dominance, most probably using Tupong as one of its urban gateways? Or will the opposition be able to localise its messages further, such that its reform agenda sounds more familiar and closer to the heart of the locals? These could be the main points to observe in Tupong in Malaysia’s next federal election.

References Faisal S. Hazis (2012) Domination and Contestation: Muslim Bumiputera Politics in Sarawak, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Goh Pei Pei (2016) ‘Development and Opportunity Is What Tupong Wants, Says BN Candidat’, NST Online, 26 April, , accessed 22 August 2016. Sarawak Live (2016) ‘Beri Saya Peluang Di Tupong: Fazzrudin’, Sarawak Live, n.d., , accessed 6 September 2016. Star (2016) ‘Candidate to Focus on Traffic Issues’. Star Online, 6 April 2016, , accessed 22 August 2016. Ten, Marilyn (2016) ‘PKR Declaration Lists Five Promises for the State’, Borneo Post Online. 26 April, , accessed 14 September 2016.

42

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Stakan 43

Stakan Malay/Melanau: 41.9%, Iban: 21.9%, Chinese: 18%, Bidayuh: 14.1%, Others: 3.1%, Orang Ulu: 1% Polling Results 2011

2016

Candidates

_

Mohammad Ali Mahmud (BN/PBB) 8,820 Leslie Ting Xiang Zhi (DAP) 1,778

Majority

–

7,042

Registered Voters

–

14,846

Votes Cast

–

10,784

Voter Turnout

–

72.9%

Spoilt Votes

–

186

Sources: http://www.thestar.com.my/sarawakelection2016info/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn10/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn-sarawak/ http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/05/07/2016-sarawakelection-results/

44

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Stakan 45

Chapter 3

Stakan Much Ado about Postal Votes? Noor’ain Aini

‘It’s not about winning, but winning with the biggest majority.’ Anonymous

Stakan is one of eleven new constituencies1 created in a 2015 redelineation of Sarawak’s legislative districts. It was carved out of Muara Tuang, which is under the Kota Samarahan parliamentary constituency and has always been a stronghold for the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front). Of the eleven new state constituencies, Stakan was especially controversial due to its huge number of postal votes – votes cast under special circumstances, particularly by members of the armed forces and police. Postal voters in Stakan account for 47.8 per cent of registered voters in Stakan and represent 28.1 per cent of total postal voters in Sarawak. As described below, it is generally presumed in Malaysia that postal votes will fall overwhelmingly to the BN. The demographics of 1

The eleven new state constituencies were Batu Kitang (N13), Stakan (N17), Serembu (N18), Bukit Semuja (N23), Gedong (N26), Kabong (N40), Telian (N57), Bukit Goram (N63), Murun (N66), Samalaju (N70 ), and Mulu (N78) (Election Commission, 2015).

46

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Stakan thus entailed huge odds against the opposition. Nevertheless, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) took a gamble and fielded a candidate to deny the BN a walkover victory. As predicted, the BN won, gaining 8,820 votes (59.4 per cent of eligible voters), for a 7,042 majority over the DAP, which secured only 1,778 votes. Voter turnout was 73 per cent. The election result in Stakan was most likely determined by postal votes, and the prevalence of these voters also shaped the campaign and its messages. This chapter attempts to determine the extent to which postal voters affected the electoral outcome in Stakan and, given the nature of the contest, whether the issues raised by the candidates in Stakan matched the issues of concern to local voters.

Background to the contest in Stakan Stakan (see Map 1) has a total of 14,846 registered voters, comprised of 7,788 ordinary voters and 7,050 postal voters. A semi-rural seat, Stakan has an ethnic composition of 41.9 per cent Malay/Melanau, 21 per cent Iban, 18 per cent Chinese, 14.1 per cent Bidayuh, 1 per cent Orang Ulu and 3.1 per cent Others. (These ‘Others’ include Javanese who reside in a few villages in the area, such as Kampung Jawa Batu 12 and Kampung Sri Arjuna.) The BN candidate, businessman Mohammad Ali Mahmud, was the two-term incumbent state assemblyman for Muara Tuang and is also the younger brother of former Sarawak chief minister Abdul Taib Mahmud. Ali’s previous victories in Muara Tuang were said to owe more to his kinship to his brother than to his own credibility as a candidate. Meanwhile, DAP’s Leslie Ting Xiang Zhi was a young and fresh candidate. Only twenty-five years old, he was a sales executive who was just beginning to participate actively in politics. However, Leslie is a member of the DAP’s Kota Sentosa branch and comes from a family that has been involved in politics for a long time. His mother was the Secretary of Women’s Affairs for the DAP Pending branch while his father had been a member of DAP Kota Sentosa for more than thirty years.

Stakan 47

Map 1: Sarawak election map

Source: Star (2016).2

The decision to choose Leslie to stand in Stakan was made at the last minute and caught him by surprise. Before the election was called, it was widely touted that a young, enthusiastic Malay would stand against BN in Stakan. This politician-in-the-making, Abdul Aziz Isa, aged twenty-six, had been well exposed to and integrated into the Sarawak political arena through his politically well-connected family. Aziz is the great-grandson of Rahman Yaakub, former Sarawak chief minister and governor. That relationship also made Aziz the grand-nephew of his BN competitor, since Ali Mahmud and Aziz’s

2

The Election Commission has not issued a detailed map of the eleven new constituencies.

48

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

grandmother were first cousins. Aziz dubbed his fight against Ali Mahmud as one of David against Goliath, not just because of the gap in their ages, but also for the difference in their experience and political power.

DAP’s campaign strategies Understandably, Leslie’s last-minute nomination affected his campaign preparations in Stakan. In fact, the DAP did not conduct much of a public campaign at all. Leslie avoided big political rallies altogether, believing he would be more visible if he adopted door-to-door and person-to-person approaches. He did walkabouts to introduce himself and the party manifesto, and to address issues of concerns to voters in selected villages and in public spaces in town areas. Visiting houses in villages led him primarily to elderly voters, who remained loyal to the BN. To garner the support of youth, Leslie scoured public premises in towns, looking for support from young people, who are assumed generally more inclined to support the opposition. (In fact, Welsh suggests that 2016 election results state-wide show the opposition has been losing support among youth (Welsh, 2016).) Notwithstanding their family members’ affiliations, the DAP worked hard to get these young people to register as voters. According to Leslie, unlike their elders, young people are both more open to accept the DAP as an alternative party and quite willing to consider giving the DAP their votes.3 Despite their lack of a structured campaign in Stakan, DAP was quite adept with technology and fully utilised social media to advance their campaign objectives. The party uploaded pictures from previous campaign events for public view and disseminated information regarding future events through social media. However, despite the DAP’s media-savvy campaign machinery, the lack of a concerted effort from the party to appeal for votes reflected its lack of confidence

3

Interview with Leslie Ting, Kota Samarahan, 23 July 2016.

Stakan 49

in winning, due to the large number of postal voters in Stakan. Julian Tan, member of Parliament for Stampin, explained the DAP’s approach, confirming that the party decided to contest the Stakan seat simply to deny BN a walkover victory, to make their presence felt, and to put pressure on the government to serve the people better (Borneo Post, 2016).

BN’s campaign strategies Echoing the BN’s approach in previous elections, Ali did not hold big political rallies. Rather, his popular modus operandi was conducting small-scale events known as ramah mesra bersama rakyat, referring to small gatherings of people in mosques, village halls, or community leaders’ homes. More comfortable as a businessman, Ali was not the typical politician who liked to give speeches at these ramah mesra bersama rakyat events. His face-to face interactions with, for instance, a mosque congregation during prayer time was deemed appropriate in a predominantly Malay area and seemed to work well for him. Adopting a similar strategy, in the 2006 elections he had won 80.1 per cent of total votes against an opponent from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) and an independent candidate, then in 2011, 77.6 per cent of the vote against a Parti Islam seMalaysia (PanMalaysian Islamic Party, PAS) challenger. Nonetheless, one could still detect a subtle change in Ali’s campaign style in the 2016 election. Although he still basically grounded his campaign on ramah mesra bersama rakyat events,4 Ali made significant efforts to speak at these events this time. Ali’s change in campaign style might have been part of his strategy to regain support among ordinary voters, whose support for the opposition – PAS, especially – had grown steadily in past elections (Table 1). 4

For instance, events at Kampung Merdang Gayam, Kampung Kuap Dayak, Kampung Sungai Empit, Kampung Pengkalan Kuap, Kampung Sri Arjuna, and Kampung Jawa Batu 12, and at the home of the penghulu (a local official) in Kampung Stakan.

50

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Table 1: Sarawak state election (SSE) and general election (GE) results (BN and PAS), Stakan (Kota Samarahan) SSE 2011

GE 2013

Polling centre

BN

PAS

BN

PAS

SMK Muara Tuang

293

178

213

413

73 (1) 95 (2) 116 (3)

114 (1) 200 (2) 20 (3)

106 (1) 93 (2) 63 (3)

133 (1) 173 (2) 201 (3)

Dewan Masyarakat Muara Tuang (per saluran, channel; voters in saluran 1 are the oldest)

Source: Unofficial results compiled by PAS during the 2013 GE.

The number of voters choosing the opposition (PAS) in the SMK Muara Tuang polling centre more than doubled, from 178 in the 2011 election to 413 in the 2013 general election, while votes for the BN decreased from 293 in 2011 to 213 in 2013. Similarly, the BN also lost votes in the Dewan Masyarakat Muara Tuang polling centre: total votes there for the BN decreased from 284 in 2011 to 262 in 2013, while PAS gained a significant increase in votes, from 334 in 2011 to 507 in 2013. This trend indicated that the BN was losing support from these areas and threatened BN long-time dominance in Kota Samarahan (the parliamentary district) and the Muara Tuang state constituency. The formation of Stakan, as a new, postal-voteheavy constituency, was thus seen as an attempt to maintain the BN’s dominance in Kota Samarahan. The most worrisome trend for the BN shown in Table 1, however, was the tendency of young voters to vote for the opposition. Among those casting votes at Dewan Masyarakat Muara Tuang, for instance, BN’s votes from youth (saluran 3) decreased by almost half, from 116 in 2011 to only 63 in 2013, while youth votes for PAS increased tenfold, from 20 in 2011 to 201 in 2013. Given this apparent trend, the BN was keen to drum up support among youth and get them registered as voters. This scramble for young voters was very obvious,

Stakan 51

with strategies like concerts 5 and motorcades of youths on big motorbikes accompanying the candidate, such as when Ali arrived for an event at Kampung Stakan. He also invoked youth in his speeches, addressing their importance and contribution to the development of the nation by equipping themselves with education and skills in order to be competitive, especially in attaining Vision 2020. One party worker confided that the BN had been making considerable efforts to indoctrinate youth.6 These efforts at strengthening political affiliation by active socialisation indicated that the BN now had to work hard to gain support from the youth, something that they had previously overlooked or taken for granted.

Mismatched campaign issues Overall, both parties carried out rather clean campaigns. The BN, for example, did not resort to character attacks, even though the opposition candidate was young and inexperienced. Most of the BN campaign targeted the DAP as a party, not the candidate. The DAP was portrayed as an ‘outside’ party that had little understanding of local issues and local people, and was therefore not suitable to represent the people of Sarawak. Ali also focused on rebutting issues raised by DAP, particularly the party’s critique of the 2015 constituency-delineation exercise in Sarawak and of the nature of postal votes, though Ali seemed to have deliberately misinterpreted the latter issue. While the DAP criticised the process of postal voting, Ali talked about the necessity of having an army and its role in protecting the country, rather than addressing the ways that postal votes could give an unfair advantage to a certain party.

5

Normally BN would organise concerts to lure youths to their campaigns. This time, the strategy re-appeared in the form of events such as the Sejiwa Senada festival (see Shazani, this volume), which was held across the state, starting in April and culminating in Matang in early May. 6 Interview with Sarkawi Suhaili, head of Barisan Nasional Youth for Asajaya and Deputy Director of Operations, Kota Samarahan, 30 April 2016.

52

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Ali naturally capitalised on Adenan’s regional rhetoric by highlighting all the changes the new chief minister had effected, including the contributions made and accomplishments achieved by Adenan in just two years in office. Ali also emphasised what the BN had done for the people, such as providing basic infrastructure, in particular, roads and village halls. His campaign raised, too, the harmony maintained among the various ethnic groups in Sarawak. Leslie, on the other hand, focused more on national issues, such as the goods and services tax (GST) enacted after the last general election, and state autonomy, including the need for checks and balances. Leslie did not address the biggest local issue, postal votes, himself; rather, that became a party issue. The DAP’s main concern with postal votes rested not only with the huge number of postal votes cast, but with their validity. The party argued that since most of the army personnel and their spouses casting these votes were not even locals, it was therefore unreasonable that they be allowed to determine the future of the people of Stakan.7 Overall, in the 2016 election, there seemed to be a mismatch between the issues highlighted by parties or candidates and the issues of concern to voters. While the candidates focused on (for the BN) Adenan’s popularity,8 the DAP’s flaws, and ethnic harmony, or (for the DAP) GST, autonomy, and postal votes, the grassroots were more concerned with ‘real’ survival issues like land titles, water supply, and schools. Land titles are a longstanding issue. Many villagers live in houses that they own and built on what is supposed to be their native land. But without land titles, these

7

Interviews with Abdul Aziz Isa, Kota Samarahan, 20 July 2016; and Leslie Ting, Kota Samarahan, 23 July 2016. 8 Adenan and his ‘team’ won the approval of Sarawakians, especially after they practically hijacked the ‘Sarawak for Sarawakians’ movement’s fight for greater state autonomy. A Merdeka Center poll in January 2016 found that Adenan’s popularity had increased to 81 per cent, from 74 per cent in April 2015. His approval rating was not even across ethnic categories, however, tallying 90 per cent among Muslim Bumiputera, 85 per cent among non-Muslim Bumiputera, and 71 per cent among Chinese (Lee, 2016: 4).

Stakan 53

lands are effectively owned by the government. Even though the government has made promises in the past to look into the issue of native land titles, the problem remains unsolved. Lack of water supply is another enduring issue, especially in the education hub of Kota Samarahan and in suburbs like Desa Ilmu and Samar Indah. Numerous new housing areas have been built (some still under construction at the time of the election) to accommodate the growing population, putting stress on the local water supply. Besides the new army camp at Kampung Bukit Berangan and Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS), which receives an average of 15,000 students each session, there are also two Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) campuses and a teachers’ training college located in Kota Samarahan. This growing population has also created more demand for primary and secondary schools. There are, ridiculously, only two secondary schools in Kota Samarahan, in Muara Tuang and Stakan. However, both parties failed to address and champion these local issues in their campaigns.

What is a postal vote? The defining issue for the election in Stakan, though, was the question of postal votes. The category includes two subtypes: absentee voters and early voters. Absentee voters are registered voters who are away from their constituency on polling day for reasons deemed acceptable to the Election Commission (EC) and thus entitled to vote by post. Per regulation 2(c) of the 2002 Election (Registration of Voters) Regulations,9 absentee voters in Malaysia comprise the following four categories: i. Military personnel; ii. Government personnel who are in service abroad; iii. Full-time government-sponsored students studying abroad; 9

Available at , accessed 20 September 2016.

54

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

iv. Spouses of the above. The 2003 Elections (Postal Voting) Regulations10 further defines postal voters as registered voters who are absent from their home constituency on polling day, EC officials on duty, and police and public service officials on duty or at work abroad. The EC also identifies 112 other categories of those eligible to vote through the post, such as media personnel, electricians, and producers (Amin, 2013). In practice, the list of those eligible to vote by post has been tightly limited until recently. Prior to the 2013 Malaysian general election, mounting public pressure compelled the Election Commission to come up with new guidelines that allowed a wider range of Malaysians living overseas the right to cast votes (Cochrane, 2013). The new regulations gazetted on 21 January 2013 set three conditions: that the individual in question be a registered voter who has been in Malaysia for not less than thirty days in the five years preceding the dissolution of Parliament and the state legislative assemblies, and be residing abroad.11 Previously, individuals who did not fit into any of the categories above were considered as normal voters, thus requiring them to return to Malaysia on polling day to cast their votes in the constituency in which they had registered (Election Commission, 2015). Absentee voters are known as postal voters because they are entitled to vote through the post. They are also termed early voters because they vote before the actual polling day. Overseas absentee voters (categories ii and iii above) cast their votes early and have their ballot papers sent to the constituencies in which they are registered voters to be counted. The situation is different for voters in category i: military personnel and their spouses. Instead of having their ballot

10

Available at , accessed 20 September 2016. 11 This rule does not apply to Malaysian voters living in southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and Kalimantan (in Indonesia).

Stakan 55

papers sent to their respective constituencies, military personnel and their spouses are counted as registered voters in whichever constituency they happen to serve at the time. It is this category of voters that proved so pivotal in Stakan.

Postal votes in Stakan The Sarawak electoral roll in 2016 included 1,113,522 ordinary voters and 25,022 postal voters. Voting for this latter category took place on 3 May 2016, four days in advance of polling day, with a total of 24,604 people casting votes. These early voters comprised members of the army and police, including the police General Operations Force, and their spouses, as well as 106 absentee voters (Bernama, 2016). By comparison, in the 2013 general election, Sarawak had a total of 1,063,740 ordinary voters and 20,375 postal voters, comprised of 12,242 military personnel and their spouses and 8,133 police personnel (MStar 2013). That difference tallies to an increase of 4,647 postal votes, or 0.4 per cent of total voters in the state since the last general election. This increase is due to the huge number of army personnel and their spouses occupying a newly completed army camp in the vicinity of Kampung Bukit Berangan, as well as the old army camp in Penrissen. As previously mentioned, postal voters in Stakan accounted for nearly half the constituency’s registered voters and over onequarter of all postal voters in Sarawak. Table 2 shows all Sarawak state constituencies for which at least five per cent of total registered voters are postal voters (including overseas, or absentee, voters). The percentage of postal votes in Stakan dwarfs that of the second-highest constituency, Nangka, with 16.4 per cent. This means that nowhere else in Sarawak did the election result depend so much on postal votes as in Stakan. Even when they represent a less dramatic share of the electorate, postal votes may take on substantial political significance. For instance, in the 2013 general election, more than a million Malaysian citizens were estimated to be eligible to vote through the post, potentially determining the results in a number of constituencies (Amin, 2013).

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Table 2: Sarawak state constituencies with at least 5 per cent postal voters, 2016 Constituency

Registered Early voters voters

Overseas voters

Percentage postal votes

N08 Satok

13,550

786

7

5.9

N12 Kota Sentosa

25,761

3,163

7

12.3

N14 Batu Kawah

16,991

1,241

8

7.4

N17 Stakan

14,846

7,050

0

47.8

N19 Mambong

17,467

996

1

5.7

N31 Bukit Begunan

9,389

1,075

0

11.5

N55 Nangka

18,605

3,043

1

16.4

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarawak_state_election,_2016

In Stakan, the high proportion of postal votes stems from the number of large military units based there. Table 3 lists those units in the constituency with 500 or more postal voters and the share of Stakan’s voters each represents. Table 3: Registered voters per military unit in Stakan, 4th quarter, 201512 Number of postal voters

Percentage of Stakan voters

1,422

9.6

Serian RD

1,029

6.9

Rejimen Renjer Diraja (RRD)

834

5.6

Markas Division 1 Kem Samarahan

702

4.7

Rejimen Semboyan Diraja

630

4.2

Kem 3 Brigade

581

3.9

Military unit Armor 10th–14th

Source: Courtesy of Abdul Aziz Isa

12

Stakan constituency houses several other military units, as well, each with 20–436 registered voters.

Stakan 57

Given the circumstances under which military and police personnel in particular cast their ballots (detailed below), this preponderance of postal voters gave the BN confidence and the DAP pause. With that backdrop in mind, we turn to the results.

Stakan 2016 explained The BN’s victory in Stakan was expected. Conventional wisdom presumes that the most significant factor contributing to the BN’s win was the huge number of postal votes, particularly given the increase from 4,391 postal votes in Muara Tuang in 2013 to 7,050 postal votes in newly created Stakan in 2016. However, one might question how much of the BN’s 7,042 majority actually came from ordinary votes and how much was from postal votes. Would the BN have won without the postal votes? Without data on how many postal votes each candidate obtained per voting district in the 2016 state election – such data are not available – we cannot say conclusively how much of the BN’s margin of victory came from postal votes. But based on trends from the 2013 general election, as depicted in Table 1, the BN had reason to worry that it was losing support from across nearly all age groups, especially the youth. The 2010 census reported that Sarawak had the fourth lowest level of urbanisation in Malaysia, at 53.8 per cent. More than half of state seats are thus located in rural areas. Traditionally, BN has always been able to maintain its stronghold in Sarawak’s rural seats, with the exception only of Krian and Ba’ Kelalan (see Puyok, this volume). Among rural Sarawakians, the older generation is the most dominant group and carries values and perspectives that have not seemed to change with heightened political consciousness. Characteristics typical of what Almond and Verba term a ‘parochial’ society, marked by low political awareness, low expectations of the political system, and low participation in politics, are quite prominent among older voters (Almond and Verba, 1963). The common assumption among observers of Sarawak politics is that voters in the rural areas have been saturated with BN messaging and are familiar with the BN, its dacing

58

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

(scales) symbol, and its accomplishments and jasa (good deeds) for the people. Rural voters have trust in the local component parties of the BN. These voters are more concerned, too, with local issues like paved roads, water supply, and electricity, than national issues like 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) or murky donations to the prime minister (see Weiss and Puyok, this volume). Mohd Faisal Syam et al. (2002) propose the ‘Sarawak Model’ to explain the strong influence of candidate and party among Sarawak voters. Still, they emphasise the power of weakly partisan and nonpartisan voters to significantly affect election results. Although relying on loyal partisans like older, rural voters has been advantageous to the BN, sooner or later this group will fade out (Sarkawi, 2016). We might therefore expect a serious, multi-pronged approach by BN in wooing support in Stakan, given likely shifting bases of support.

Value for votes In light of the 1MDB issue that plagued Malaysia’s political scene in the lead-up to the 2016 election, Sarawak’s polls became a focal point through which to gauge the popularity of the BN. Hence, the election turned out to be one of the most expensive elections in the state to date, with cash, hand-outs, and monetary promises offered in desperate attempts to win the hearts and minds of voters. However, all was peace and quiet in Stakan. Apart from distribution of food at some events, not many promises of projects were made, nor did cash appear to have been handed out during the campaign period. The only noticeable promise was made by Rubiah Wang, BN member of Parliament for Kota Samarahan, to solve the water problems in her constituency as she broke ground for a new water project. We might interpret this lack of promises in two ways. First, it indicated that the BN felt quite complacent about its position in Stakan, most probably due to confidence that they could rely on the huge percentage of postal votes to win the election. Second, to some

Stakan 59

extent, the lack of inducements suggests that the availability of a secure bloc of votes reduced the value of ordinary voters in Stakan: the BN could still win, without having to do, give, or promise much to Stakan’s ordinary voters. Stakan’s non-postal votes effectively carried a lesser value than those in Ba’ Kelalan, for instance, who (as Puyok describes, this volume) were promised millions of ringgit in cash and projects. And unlike their counterparts in Ba’ Kelalan, who were graced with the presence of the prime minister and chief minister during the campaign period, Stakan voters were not even worth a visit by prominent BN federal or state leaders. Ali was, instead, accompanied by not-so-prominent state figures like Member of Parliament Rubiah Wang, Deputy Speaker of the Sarawak State Assembly Datuk Gerawat Jala, or local community leaders like the head of BN Youth, Hamzah Ibrahim, or one of the political secretaries to the chief minister, Awangku Jamuddin Pengiran Kon, who also gave speeches and appealed for votes from the people. If postal votes were as secure as the BN assumed, that implies a huge political significance for postal votes as a determinant of the election outcome, given their large share of voters. But why were postal voters allowed to decide the future of Stakan when they were likely not even affected by either the local issues of concern to Stakan voters or the election outcome? The opposition often raised these questions about postal voters in their campaign.13

Patronage and clientelism Malaysia has long been considered to have a strong, patron–clientcentred political culture and to maintain only a thin line between the BN as a political party and the BN-led government. Moreover, the Malaysian military is under the control of the Minister of Defence, a civilian. As a result, Malaysia’s form of civilian control resembles

13

Interviews with Leslie Ting, Kota Samarahan, 23 July 2016; and Abdul Aziz Isa, Kota Samarahan, 20 July 2016.

60

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Nordlinger’s (1977) ‘penetration’ model more than his ‘liberal’ model.14 Hence the concerns about postal votes: Were military personnel intimidated when casting their votes? In what way were they intimidated and to what extent were they vulnerable? And ultimately, how did their position affect their voting choices? The issue of postal votes has gained prominence across Malaysia, especially since the 1999 general election when the ruling government was faced with a real threat of losing power due to the ‘reformation’ movement (Reformasi) led by what is now PKR.15 Postal votes have been a pressing and recurring issue in every Malaysian election since, for three main reasons. First, the general perception has been that postal votes give a tremendous and unfair advantage to the BN because military personnel are believed to be, if not coerced, at least intimidated to vote for the incumbent government. The nature of Malaysian civil–military relations – the ‘penetration’ model, as noted above – adds weight to such pressure. For instance, for an October 2014 by-election contest between PAS and BN, the constituency of Bagan Pinang had just over one-third postal votes, or 4,604 out of 13,664 registered voters (Loh, 2009). Observers assumed that most would vote for the BN due to fear or force and, in fact, military personnel admitted that they could not make their choice independently because they had to reveal their names and service numbers on a registration form attached to the 14

The ‘liberal model’ of civilian control differentiates between the functions of civilian and military elites, such that both must respect the other and not interfere in the other’s functions, whereas under the ‘penetration model’, civilian rulers penetrate the armed forces with civilian political ideas and personnel (Nordlinger, 1977). 15 Reformasi led to the establishment of a social movement, Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial (Adil), which failed in its efforts to register as a political party. Consequently, an existing political party, Ikatan Masyarakat Islam Malaysia was changed to Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN). After the 1999 general election, PKN and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, Malaysian People’s Party) merged to form Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) to fight injustice and abuse of power (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, n.d.).

Stakan 61

ballot paper. Many were scared to vote for the opposition out of fear that their votes would be known to their superiors (Zaid, 2009). If such claims are true, the opposition has little hope of making headway among postal voters. A second common debate on the postal vote issue relates to fairness and freedom in the Malaysian electoral system broadly. The EC has been criticised for denying postal voters their right to a legitimate election campaign as allowed in a democratic system: the EC denies opposition candidates access to military camps to meet with and advance their campaign manifesto among postal voters (see also Jagtiani, 2014: 84).16 The candidate might have an advantage if he or she happens to be a former member of the military and can rely on links and networks from that former career, but such instances are relatively rare.17 The EC has likewise been criticised for failing to introduce mechanisms that would allow military personnel to vote like ordinary voters, in a free and confidential manner, so as not to compromise the secrecy of their votes. Indeed, by right, postal ballots should only be cast by those who are away on duty (e.g., in the jungle, aboard a vessel at sea) on polling day, as specified in the Elections (Postal Voting) Regulations 2003. Confining postal votes to those on active duty on polling day would effectively reduce vote manipulation (Loh, 2009). However, without proof or eyewitness testimony to substantiate them, allegations of postal voting fraud remain as allegations. My own efforts to probe further by interviewing military personnel (both former and currently in service) met with little cooperation. Two respondents refused entirely to be interviewed; they claimed how they voted and for whom while they were in service was confidential, and insisted that, although both were now retired, they still could not

16

In Stakan, Leslie did not make any attempt to campaign among military personnel in army camps. 17 For instance, the case of Mohamad Imran Abd Hamid, a PKR candidate in the 2013 general election in Lumut; see Jagtiani (2014: 81–5).

62

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

reveal ‘government secrets’. A third respondent was still in service, and thus, under oath not to reveal any confidential information.18 Yet another respondent testified that they were free to vote and that no coercion took place on polling day. But since he had retired in 1986, at a time when the Malaysian political climate was still fairly amicable and there were practically no strong opposition parties, his testimony might not be relevant to the current political context. (He naturally voted for BN.) Deborah Loh (2009) as well as Siti Noranizah Hafizah Boyman and Jayum Jawan (2013) note the low level of public trust regarding postal votes and the need for the EC to tackle this issue in order to regain lost public confidence. Similarly, Amin Ahmad (2013) touches on the need to formally investigate postal-vote fraud in order to verify allegations against manipulations of postal votes, and to make those results public, even to the extent of setting up a Royal Commission of Inquiry if necessary (Amin, 2013). The third issue is that the BN has allegedly bussed in military personnel to serve as ‘phantom voters’. Amin Ahmad (2013) notes allegations in the 2013 general election that over 50,000 military personnel who voted early on 30 April could have voted again on 5 May, enabled by faulty indelible ink.19 He also touches on irregularities reported in the voter list gazetted in March 2013 of postal voters ‘who by definition, are engaged in national service, but with a national origin from Pakistan, Bangladesh or Indonesia’ (Amin, 2013) while Zaid Ibrahim (2009) mentions that retired military personnel who had already moved from their camps were still listed as postal voters (Zaid, 2009). Equally controversial has been the fact that the spouses of

18

Personally, I thought their responses and hesitation to be interviewed spoke volumes regarding what transpired on polling day in the military camps. 19 Indelible ink, dabbed on a voter’s finger, was used as a mechanism to prevent multiple voting. During the 2013 general election, inedible ink that was supposed to last between five to seven days was discovered to be quite easily removed shortly after it was applied.

Stakan 63

uniformed personnel living in the camps are also categorised as postal voters, even though they neither serve in the military nor are on duty. To reduce the political significance of postal votes, experts recommend that the number of postal voters be limited by redefining uniformed personnel and their spouses as ordinary voters and extending postal votes only to those on duty on polling day (Loh, 2009). Despite popular belief that postal votes give an unfair advantage to the BN, there have been several cases in which the bulk of postal votes, or at least a substantial share, have been won by the opposition. For example, in the 1999 general election, PKR’s candidate gained 730 postal votes against BN’s 1,874 in the Teluk Kemang parliamentary seat; PKR’s share increased in the 2000 by-election, when the party won 1,743 postal votes to the BN’s 1,625. Similarly, in the 2008 general election in Bagan Pinang, the PAS candidate obtained 1,189 postal votes, or 25 per cent. This pattern, however, could also lead to more election fraud, as ballot papers go unreturned – election regulations treat keeping a ballot paper as an offence. In 2008, MAFREL (Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections) discovered that nearly 5,000 ballot papers from the Lumut parliamentary and Pangkor state constituencies, where a naval base was located, were unreturned (Loh, 2009). All told, there is good reason for critics to worry about the probity of postal votes in Stakan. While we cannot say definitively who voted how, the fact that the BN stemmed an apparent tide of petering-out support, without substantial effort or promises, does imply that the coalition had other reasons to be confident. The case of Stakan would seem to lend support to assumptions of postal votes as overwhelmingly captured by the BN, for any or all of the reasons sketched here.

Conclusion The 2016 election results showed BN winning with a secure majority of 7,042 voters in Stakan. However, if it is assumed that the majority of postal votes (if not all) went to the BN, only around 1,770 BN

64

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

votes came from ‘ordinary’ voters. That number is more or less on par with the 1,778 votes secured by DAP, indicating a rather neatly divided ‘ordinary’ electorate and the high significance of postal votes in determining the BN’s victory in Stakan. Not only might the sheer number of concentrated postal voters skew an election outcome, but their presence – and the confidence or resignation that bloc of BN votes inspires – may discourage candidates from making a concerted effort to learn and promote issues of real concern to local voters. However predictable the results in Stakan, then, the conduct of the state election there has implications for constituencies across Malaysia.

References Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Amin Ahmad (2013) ‘Menuju PRU-13: Pengundi tidak hadir’, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), 30 January, , accessed 15 July 2016. Azeem Ibrahim (2013) ‘Election Fraud in Malaysia’, Huffington Post, 5 July, , accessed 12 August 2016. Bernama (2016) ‘Sarawak Election: 24,604 Early Voters To Cast Ballots On Tuesday’, Bernama, 1 May, , accessed 20 September 2016. Borneo Post (2016) ‘Leslie Ting from DAP springs 11th hour surprise in Stakan’, Borneo Post, 26 April, , accessed 27 April 2016. Cochrane, Liam (2013) ‘Overseas Malaysians Get Postal Voting Rights in Time for Elections’ (interview with Wan Ahmad Wan Omar), ABC Radio, , 23 January, accessed 9 May 2016. Department of Statistics Malaysia (2011) Sarawak Census 2010, , accessed 13 May 2016. Election Commission of Malaysia (2015) ‘Pendaftaran Pemilih’, 17 August, , accessed 9 May 2016.

Stakan 65

Jagtiani, Reema B. (2014) ‘Lumut, Perak: Patronage, Clientelism and the PostCoup Order’, in Meredith L. Weiss (ed.), Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots, Kuala Lumpur: SIRD and Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 81–94. Lee Hock Guan (2016) ‘Impressive Results Await BN in Sarawak State Elections’, ISEAS Perspective, 20 (3 May). Loh, Deborah (2009) ‘The Mystery of Postal Votes’, The Nut Graph, 1 October, , accessed 15 July 2016. Mohd Faisal Syam Abdol Hazis, Neilson Ilan Mersat, and Ahi Sarok (2002) Tingkahlaku Pengundian dalam Pilihanraya Parlimen Sarawak, Sarawak: UNIMAS. MStar (2013) ‘PRU13: Statistik Komposisi Pemilih Mengikut Negeri’, 3 April, , accessed 20 September 2016. Nordlinger, Eric (1977) Soldiers in Politics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Nut Graph (2013) ‘Malaysia’s Electoral System’, The Nut Graph, 11 February, , accessed 13 July 2016. Ong Kian Ming (2016) ‘Allow S’wakians outside state to vote through post’, Malaysiakini, 24 January, , accessed 29 April 2016. Parti Keadilan Rakyat (n.d.) ‘Sejarah Parti’, , accessed 11 August 2016. Siti Noranizah Hafizah Boyman and Jayum Jawan (2013) ‘Study on The Report on The Improvement of The Election Commission: A View’, Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategy, 40(1): 116–32. Star (2016) ‘2016 Sarawak State Election’, Star Online, n.d., , accessed 11 May 2016. Welsh, Bridget (2016) ‘Victory and Insecurity: Sarawak Results and Trajectories’, New Mandala, 13 May, , accessed 6 June 2016. Zaid Ibrahim (2009) ‘Undi Pos’, 5 October, , accessed 15 July 2016.

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67

Repok and Meradong

Repok Chinese: 75%, Iban: 17.8%, Malay/Melanau: 6.3%, Others: 0.9% Polling Results 2011

2016

David Teng Lung Chin (BN/SUPP) 5,221 Wong Hua Seh (DAP) 7,900

Huang Tiong Sii (BN/SUPP) 7,446 Yong Siew Wei (DAP) 6,503 Wong Chin King (Ind) 381

Majority

2,679

943

Registered Voters

18,481

20,263

Votes Cast

13,364

14,475

Voter Turnout

72.4%

71.4%

243

145

Candidates

Spoilt Votes

Meradong Chinese: 55%, Iban: 41%, Malay/Melanau: 3.2%, Others: 0.8% Polling Results 2011 Candidates

2016

Ling Kie King (BN/SUPP) Ding Kuong Hiing (BN/ 4,197 SUPP) 6,865 Ting Tze Fui (DAP) 6,884 Ting Tze Fui (DAP) 5,349

Majority

2,687

1,516

Registered Voters

15,337

16,882

Votes Cast

11,188

12,379

Voter Turnout

73.1%

73.3%

107

165

Spoilt Votes

Sources: http://www.thestar.com.my/sarawakelection2016info/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn10/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn-sarawak/

68

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak



Repok and Meradong

69

Chapter 4

Repok and Meradong Challenges in Courting Rural Votes Ngu Ik Tien1

The losses of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in five Chinesemajority seats in the 11th Sarawak state election shocked political observers who had been convinced the party had solid support in most Chinese-majority seats. These five seats share interesting characteristics – their ethnic composition, semi-urban character, agriculture-based economy, and political history as Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) or SUPP (Sarawak United People’s Party) strongholds for decades until recently. The instability of DAP’s electoral performance in those seats, in contrast to its persistent victory in urban Chinese-majority areas, gives some indication that degree of urbanisation or local context may take precedence over factors such as ethnicity and national politics when it comes to voting. This study uses a comparative examination of contests in two of those seats, Repok and Meradong, to explore an explanation for the BN’s victory, whether there might be a distinctive ‘rural Chinese’ voting pattern, and how political developments deviated from those of previous elections. Comparison of these two areas, selected for their 1

The author wishes to thank the Young Faculty Research Fund of Beijing Foreign Studies University (Project No: 2015JT001) for funding one of her field trips to Sarawak.

70

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

highly similar socio-economic characteristics, intends to measure the effects on voting of factors other than the choice of candidates. The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section gives a general description of each candidate and constituency, then the second part provides in-depth, descriptive accounts of the campaign issues raised and strategies used by both parties. The third explores the social and political implications of the campaigns and polling results. The last section offers concluding remarks.

Political profiles of Repok and Meradong The total population of Sarikei District is 56,228 (as of 2010), of which ethnic Chinese comprise about 40 per cent, followed by 33 per cent Iban, 16 per cent Malay, and 7 per cent Melanau. The economy of Sarikei is primarily agricultural. A sizeable proportion of Chinese in Sarikei are involved in farming and farming-related business. The local authority of Sarikei has yet to meet the criteria of a municipal council, which include covering an area with a population of over 150,000 and having an annual revenue of more than RM20 million. There are two state constituencies, Repok and Meradong, under the parliamentary seat of Sarikei. Both Repok and Meradong are Chinese-majority seats. Repok and Meradong had been considered SUPP strongholds until Meradong fell to the DAP in the 2006 state election. In 2006, Ting Tze Fui of DAP capitalised on internal fights within SUPP that resulted in a five-cornered fight, and garnered 5,990 votes. She secured the seat again in the 2011 state election with 6,884 votes, as opposed to 4,197 votes for her SUPP opponent. In Repok, DAP had not made headway until the 2011 state election, when SUPP veteran leader David Teng was defeated by a DAP majority of 2,679 votes. The election saw an incredible surge in voter turnout, from 63 per cent to 72.4 per cent, which partly explained the increase in DAP’s votes, from 4,926 in 2006 to 7,900 in 2011. However, the polling results also confirm that that SUPP managed to keep its supporter base in Repok intact, securing 5,221 votes in 2011, a slight loss of 281 votes from the 5,502 it won in 2006.



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In the 2016 state election, SUPP fielded former Member of Parliament for Sarikei Ding Kuong Hiing as the candidate for Meradong. He is in his early 60s and holds an engineering degree. Despite his loss in the 2013 general election, Ding remains influential in the area, partly due to his role as the BN constituency coordinator (pegawai penyelaras kawasan pilihanraya)2 for the Sarikei parliamentary seat. This role enables him to determine the allocation of government resources. Ding Kuong Hiing’s opponent was the DAP’s Ting Sze Fui, the incumbent State Assembly member for Meradong. She is a trained lawyer who first contested in the 2006 Sarawak state election at the age of 25 and, as noted above, has twice claimed victory. Ting’s father is a veteran DAP member and himself contested in the 1992 state election. The SUPP’s candidate for Repok was Huang Diong Sii, who was handpicked by the Chief Minister as a ‘BN direct’ candidate,3 but contested on an SUPP ticket. He is known as a timber tycoon who has contracted business with several logging corporations. His candidacy was announced about two months prior to the polling day. Though many local people had little knowledge about him except for his wealth and low educational achievement, the local Chinese newspapers described him as a young, successful, local-born entrepreneur. 2

The position of constituency coordinator was created after the 2008 general election. The Prime Minister’s Department appointed defeated BN candidates as constituency coordinators in areas won by the opposition. The Penang state government has complained that constituency coordinators demanded the state government work through them when applying for federal funds, as they are the legitimate federal officers (Sun Daily, 2010). The BN coordinator reportedly receives a monthly salary of RM5,860 for a parliamentary constituency and RM3,360 for a state constituency (Malaysiakini, 2013). 3 Another three business tycoons who contested as direct candidates were Tiong Thai King from Rimbunan Hijau Group (RH Group), Janet Lau from KTS Group, and Hii King Chiong from Kingwood Hotel Group. KTS, RH Group, Samling, Shin Yang, Ta Ann and WTK Holdings Berhad are known as the ‘big six’ timber companies in Sarawak.

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The SUPP’s main opponent in Repok was Yong Siew Wei from DAP. Yong, a 30-year-old lawyer, joined the DAP in 2010. She completed her degree in Law in 2010 at the University of London and obtained a second degree at the University of Queensland in Australia in 2012. Upon her graduation, she practised in Australia for nearly a year before returning to Sarawak. Currently she works at a Kuchingbased legal firm.

Election issues SUPP Adenan Satem announced BN’s election manifesto, with the theme, ‘Give Team Adenan a Chance’, on 26 April. Among the fifteen points included, the first three championed states’ rights and Sarawak’s social uniqueness, pledging to ‘uphold the rights of Sarawak and its people; safeguard the peace and harmony of our state; and preserve Sarawak culture, heritage and beliefs’. Indeed, safeguarding the state’s rights and autonomy, and Adenan’s leadership, were the primary issues exploited by the SUPP’s candidates in this electoral campaign. On my trips to the constituencies of Repok and Meradong, I came across BN posters, banners, and billboards with such slogans as: ‘To Defend Sarawak’s Immigration Autonomy’, ‘Full Education Autonomy to Sarawak – Enhancement of English Language’, ‘Heads of Federal Departments Are Sarawakians & 90% of Teachers are Sarawakians by 2018’, ‘The Adenan Way’, ‘Never Compromise Sarawak’s Autonomy’ (Sha zhou zhi zhu, jue bu tuo xie), ‘United We Can’ (Wan zhong yi xin wo men neng), ‘Five More Glorious Years’ (Wei lai wu nian gong chuang hui huan), and ‘Thank You CM for Developing Chinese Education’ (Ken ding shou zhang cheng uo fa yang hua jiao wei lai). In comparison to the previous state elections, when SUPP’s statements promoting regionalism were vague and hollow, in this election they spelled out the aspects of Sarawak’s autonomy that SUPP wanted to fight for and would leverage Adenan’s leadership to achieve. It was also easy to spot



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yellow SUPP t-shirts with the slogan of ‘Safeguard Sarawak’ printed on the front. At an SUPP political talk I attended, held at the Sarikei bus terminal, an SUPP speaker gave a fiery speech on Sarawak’s autonomy. He said, ‘To safeguard (han wei) Sarawak, we have to rely on our own. Other people would not help us to achieve this. Worse, they would hurt us, especially the West Malaysian political parties’ (Bu zhi bu hui bang, hai hui hai wo men, te bie shi xi ma zheng dang). He asserted that he doesn’t mind being criticised as an extremist and was prepared to be the most extreme Sarawakian (zui ji duan de sha la yue zi min), given that he would always stand up for the cause of Sarawak’s interests. To elaborate on the meaning of Sarawak’s autonomy, he used the example of opposition leaders’ being denied entry to Sarawak. He cried emotionally, ‘We are the owner of our house. It is our right to allow or disallow them to enter. That is our gate (tie meng), it belongs to neither Penang, Selangor nor the federal government. It’s our gate. It’s ours, that’s what it means to have self-determination (zi ji zuo zhu).’ He said he felt sorry for Penang because its state government had no say on the issue of immigration. In line with this rhetoric, Adenan Satem was portrayed as a symbol of states’ rights and a defender of Sarawak’s interests. The issue of Sarawak’s autonomy has gained influence among Sarawakian Chinese in particular in the past two years.4 Many see autonomy as a more feasible alternative to the opposition’s call for a change of government or institution of a two-party system, the most prominent campaign issue in the previous state and national elections. The opposition alliance is currently in a state of disarray, which has 4

A voter opinion survey conducted by the Merdeka Center in January 2016 indicated that a high percentage of Chinese are aware and supportive of the Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S) movement. Compared to 70 per cent of Muslim Bumiputera and 72 per cent of non-Muslim Bumiputera, 82 per cent of Chinese respondents claimed they had heard about the S4S movement. 62 per cent of Chinese, compared to 17 per cent of Muslim Bumiputera and 48 per cent of non-Muslim Bumiputera, indicated they supported the movement.

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made change of government a daunting goal. Sarawak autonomy offers a more viable channel to address the pre-eminent problem of keeping UMNO’s style of racism, corruption, and Islamisation at bay.5 The excitement about Sarawak’s autonomy was further provoked by the leadership of Adenan Satem and the state-wide movement of Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S). The S4S movement, which champions Sarawak independence and rights, has appealed largely to Chinese youth living in Sarawak. One of my informants, who was an active Sarikei-based member of S4S, said she believed in the cause of S4S, but decided to withdraw after discovering the movement was allegedly hijacked by the SUPP to counter DAP influence. Her initial dedication and subsequent retreat may signify that the underlying appeal of Sarawak regionalism for the Chinese is actually an anti-federal, or more precisely, anti-UMNO sentiment, rather than opposition to West Malaysia generally. This subtle nuance to Chinese Sarawak regionalism may also explain the lukewarm response of the Muslim community towards S4S. In fact, condemning outsiders and passionately calling for safeguarding Sarawak’s autonomy are not sufficient to lure Chinese votes. This is proved by the humiliating losses of STAR (East Malaysia-based State Reform Party) candidates in all contests: they actually made Sarawak’s autonomy their foremost appeal. All STAR’s candidates, including charismatic president Lin Soo, lost their deposits. Aside from Sarawak regionalism, other issues SUPP frequently raised included local development and ethnic Chinese representation in the state government. A Chinese letter (gao xuan min shu) issued by SUPP in Sarikei to Repok’s voters began by reminiscing about the cost to Sarikei of being under DAP leadership: ‘What we have lost in the past five years … Repok fell off from the political mainstream and resulted in its stagnant growth, lack of funds for social organisations, 5

The Merdeka Center’s survey also shows that 74 per cent of Chinese respondents, the highest level among the three groups, felt they were treated unfairly by Putrajaya.



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people’s issues were not being addressed.’ The second part of the manifesto was about the personality of candidate Huang and his ambition and plans for the people of Sarikei. The final part stressed Adenan’s leadership, especially his concern for all Sarawakians and his determination to advocate for Sarawak’s autonomy. Lastly, the letter reminded voters that access to ruling power was instrumental to the growth of Sarikei’s society and economy as a whole. In this vein, at a political talk in Repok on 5 May, Huang offered the audience promises of funds for Chinese schools and local development on the condition that he was elected. He lamented that every school that he visited complained to him about the lack of funds for infrastructure maintenance and development. ‘Some schools did not even have funds to install fans. All these happen because you do not have a representative to advocate your interests in the state legislative assembly’, he explained. While the role of people’s representatives in local development is not as prominent as portrayed by the candidates, they may still be instrumental in securing at least some funding for local community activities, schools, and other needs. Huang’s speech was mixed with Foochow dialect and his Mandarin carried a strong Foochow accent; that accent is usually diluted by the formal education system, which emphasises the common languages of Malay, Mandarin, and English. Moreover, as a dropout from secondary school and carrying the nickname ‘wild boar’ (ya du in Foochow) Huang’s image as an undereducated man was strengthened, posing a sharp contrast to his DAP opponent, a female overseas Law graduate. Huang used the analogy of milk to describe the division of resources between West Malaysia and Sarawak. He said, ‘Adenan has successfully brought back billions in allocations to Sarawak. He channels the “milk” from West Malaysia to Sarawak … If you send me into the state legislative assembly, I would transfer things out to Sarikei’s people … I would ask for subsidies and allocations.’ (The message that Adenan was a caring patron who had largely reduced the cost of living by abolishing tolls, and reducing rates for electricity, assessment fees, land quit rents, and so forth was repeated in political

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talks, newspapers, and SUPP propaganda materials.) At the end of Huang’s speech, he described himself as ‘the engine of a train’ (huo che tou), calling upon the audience to light up this engine so that he could shine upon them. On polling day, when Huang was standing right in front of the entrance of a polling station greeting voters, I approached him and asked what he would prioritise if he won the election. He said he would address three problems, as he had reiterated in speeches: the improvement of school facilities, which are mostly in very bad condition; subsidies for farmers and agriculture; and infrastructure in Sarikei. Overall, then, BN candidates appealed to Chinese voters in terms of the same three core dimensions as in previous elections: regionalism, developmental projects, and government allocations. DAP DAP Sarawak launched its election manifesto only on 27 April, two days after nomination day. This delay may indicate DAP’s indecision in pinning down the voters’ primary concerns. The main focal point of the manifesto was to advocate tangible socio-economic benefits for Sarawakians, whereas more ‘political’ issues were a secondary concern. The manifesto outlined ten points: free public bus services, equitable sharing of forest resources, sharing of land by all, job creation, enhancement of Internet coverage, improvement of security, transparency in governance, fostering a multi-racial civil service, and autonomy in taxation and education.6 The ten points showed an obvious inclination toward the needs and aspirations of the urban Chinese. Chong, DAP Sarawak’s chairman, described these points as ‘concise and concrete action plans’, but it did not appear that people were discussing them during my multiple visits to Repok and Meradong during the campaign. As did the BN, the DAP allowed its 6

DAP’s election manifesto was reported on 28 April 2016 in major newspapers, including the Borneo Post.



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candidates to launch their own election manifestos to address the specific needs of the local communities – for instance, electricity supply and customary land rights for rural Dayak communities – but the Repok and Meradong DAP did not do so. However, as reflected in the political speeches at most evening talks in Repok and Meradong, the main themes raised by DAP were corruption, abuse of power, and the economic well-being of Sarawakians. Among corruption cases, the main one exploited was the association of Prime Minister Najib Razak with the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal (see Weiss and Puyok, this volume), although an equally important topic was controversial land transactions approved by Adenan Satem. The 1MDB controversy appeared in local Chinese newspaper headlines for many days. DAP’s speakers spiced up the issue by explaining some details and urged voters to use the 11th state election as a referendum on Najib Razak’s leadership. As for Adenan Satem, he was both portrayed as a staunch supporter of Najib Razak and accused of cronyism in his own right due to several land transactions, such as the sale of 3,121 acres of land in Lundu and other prime areas of Kuching at far below market price. In a speech at Repok on 30 April 2016, incumbent Padungan Assemblyman Wong King Wei accused Adenan Satem of approving the sale of more than 30,000 acres of land during his two-year administration. He warned that Adenan Satem had shown an inclination to become Taib Mahmud II – a remake of the muchdisliked previous chief minister – and thus urged voters to take the 11th state election as a battle between ‘corporate politics’ (cai tuan zheng zhi) and ‘check and balance politics’ (zhi heng zheng zhi). While the DAP also spoke of state rights, with the backing of Adenan, BN seemed to play the autonomy card more skilfully in this election. To counter the BN’s vision of Sarawak autonomy, which was grounded in rhetoric opposing West Malaysian opposition parties and the desire to expand the state government’s administrative power, DAP strived to broaden voters’ imagination of what state autonomy might entail. For instance, Wong Shu Qi, a state assemblyperson from

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Johor, stressed the economic significance of Sarawak’s autonomy at a rally in Sarikei. She said, ‘We want to claim back Sarawak’s economic autonomy. Without economic autonomy, all talk is hot air.’ Thus, the DAP’s manifesto demanded the government return half the tax revenue collected from Sarawak to Sarawak. ‘If Adenan couldn’t deliver that, don’t talk about autonomy. Why do we need economic autonomy? With it, the government can take care of our everyday needs’, Wong continued. Moreover, addressing immigration restrictions on opposition leaders seeking to enter Sarawak,7 Wong presented Adenan’s use of power as opposing the wants of the people. She criticised what she termed ‘Adenan’s bullying campaign’, or ‘ABC’, which denied Sarawak’s people the opportunity to listen to talks by their favourite speakers. The audience standing before the stage appeared to be more responsive to Wong’s speech than the previous ones. Even a local reporter sitting next to me, taking notes on Wong’s speech, praised it as excellent and stopped to take photos with Wong. Overall, the personality, ideology and qualifications of SUPP’s candidates were not the focal points of DAP’s campaign, but the wrongdoings of those candidates’ ultimate patrons in Putrajaya and Kuching and the need for a long-term solution to systemic corruption. At a rally in Repok, for instance, DAP Sarawak chair Chong Chieng Jen ended his 40-minute speech with an example of a Hong Kong movie plot to explain the ‘consequences of corruption’ (referring to BN politics). He explained, In the 1960s, Hong Kong suffered from a very corrupted bureaucracy. There was one scene in the movie that when people went to lodge a police report, the police went to the backdoor to inform the gangs

7

Dozens of opposition leaders, including Azmin Ali, Chua Tian Chang, Liew Chin Tong, and Nga Khor Ming, were denied entry into Sarawak during the election campaign period; others, like Lim Guan Eng and Wong Shu Qi, were given restricted visas. The state government did not provide any explanation for these denials or restriction orders, but merely asserted that they were exercising their juridical power.



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(hei bang). The collusion between the police and the gangs, and between the officials and the gangs was so extensive that good people were oppressed and had no place to find justice. Finally the ICAC was set up to tackle corruption and that move eventually brought prosperity to Hong Kong. Thus, my dear fellows, money politics is terrifying … you may feel good when you receive money today, but money politics will have a damaging impact on our future generation … that’s why we present you with lawyer Yong … If you were bullied by gangs, or being rejected by police when you went to lodge a report, or other kinds of mistreatment, go to her … we need someone with legal knowledge to be our representative and who would speak for us. With her we would be able to counter the vicious forces (er shi li) and the BN.

Indeed, the problem of criminal gangs in Sarawak8 has persisted for decades and the general public believes there is collusion among police, gangs, and sometimes Chinese politicians or timber groups. Some gangs have even been active in forcing rural farmers to sell their farm produce and jungle commodities at prices the gangs fix. However, it is understandable that many voters may not believe that the problem could be reduced by voting for a young and inexperienced opposition candidate. The DAP discarded the most prominent election slogan of the last election – change of government – and, unlike then, did not mention either Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) or Pakatan Harapan (Coalition of Hope), in which DAP and PKR are partners. (A third partner, the PanMalaysian Islamic Party, PAS, had left the original Pakatan Rakyat, People’s Pact, since the last election, though a splinter party from PAS had taken its place in the reconstituted coalition.) In fact, DAP and PKR failed even to reach consensus on seat allocations, resulting in three-cornered fights in certain areas. This state election saw the 8

According to a Home Ministry report (Borneo Post Online, 2013), one-third of the gangs in Malaysia are based in Sarawak. However, a Home Ministry officer denied that they had links among themselves or with the triads in the Peninsula, describing them as ‘loosely organised thug groups’.

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DAP return to its old strategy of standing alone, and to its old appeal: for a stronger opposition that can play a more effective ‘check and balance’ role in the government, instead of a change of government. National DAP leader Lim Kit Siang even assured the Chinese voters that Adenan’s team would win the majority of seats and be elected as the next chief minister. Nevertheless, Lim Kit Siang did set a timeline for DAP Sarawak to capture the Sarawak state government: by the 2021 elections. He based his estimate on the perceived ‘success’ of the Impian Sarawak projects (discussed under ‘Campaign Strategies’, below) and Dayaks’ receptiveness to DAP. Nevertheless, this ambitious proposition did not seem to arouse much discussion among local voters. Perhaps people had yet to notice any significant changes in political views or growing support for the Chinese-led DAP among their Dayak friends. In fact, local DAP politicians admitted that most Impian project participants came from the peninsula. Local voters admired the noble intentions of the project, but were not quite convinced that the project would draw more electoral support to the DAP. Indeed, in the context of ‘developmental politics’, these efforts might only reveal how disadvantaged opposition parties are in terms of personnel and material resources.

Campaign strategies SUPP On the cover page of the Sarawak BN’s manifesto booklet, Adenan Satem stands above all the different ethnic groups of Sarawakians, giving a thumbs-up. The image conveys the message that a paternal figure like Adenan Satem would stand up to protect his people’s rights and needs. In Chinese-majority constituencies like Repok and Meradong, Adenan was represented as the ultimate patron of Sarawak, including for the Sarikei community, and a protector of Chinese interests, comparable to the benevolent figure of Najib Razak in the general elections of 2013. The SUPP’s Repok candidate called



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for Repok Chinese to support the Sarawak BN because he said they would not find anyone else as protective of the Chinese community as Adenan.9 While the SUPP candidate for Repok pledged his support for Adenan, he also presented himself as a patron of the community. Instead of elaborating on socio-economic policies, he made generous donations, especially to Chinese schools and local Chinese clan and social organisations. A local teacher revealed (personal communication, 6 May 2016) that his school had received a few thousand ringgit in donations from Huang. A secondary school Huang formerly attended allegedly received about RM100,000 and, as far as the teacher knew, all other Chinese schools received donations of at least RM3,000. He recalled a dinner invitation Huang sent out to all the Chinese primary school teachers in town. His principal and two other teachers attended the banquet, held at the Sarikei Civic Hall; Huang personally handed each a souvenir pen that cost about RM20– 30. Another school teacher, who was also an active church member, said that churches were also beneficiaries of Huang’s generosity. Most of these cheque-presentation ceremonies were reported in Chinese newspapers, and for most Chinese local politicians, appearing in the local editions10 of Chinese dailies in connection with such events is a major form of publicity. Social organisations seem to be instrumental in rallying and organising the Chinese in Repok and Meradong. Though Huang attempted to avoid the mass media during the campaign period, including refusing to be interviewed by Radio Television Malaysia (RTM), he publicised his private or personal activities with Chinese 9

For example, Adenan Satem had once criticised the federal policy of not recognising the Unified Examinations Certificate (UEC) of private Chinese schools as a ‘stupid policy’, as many foreign universities, including Oxford University, have accepted the qualification. He further announced that the state civil service will accept UEC graduates. 10 In addition to national news, the Sin Chew Daily, for example, has three different local editions (di fang ban) in Sarawak: in Kuching, Sibu, and Miri.

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organisations and neighbourhood communities, taking advantage of the interdependent relations among local Chinese leaders, local Chinese organisations, and Chinese dailies. A couple of months prior to the announcement of his candidacy, Huang began to sponsor and attend dinners held by local Chinese organisations in Sarikei. Though the local journalists and leaders of local societies that I spoke to barely knew him, they praised Huang for his philanthropic acts. As the main sponsor of dinners or events, he would usually give a speech and the hosts would compliment his acting as a communal patron. The cycle was completed with local Chinese newspapers’ coverage. At one dinner held by the Sarikei Foochow Association on 5 May, co-organised by the Sarikei Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the chairman of the Foochow Association openly expressed his gratitude to Huang for his generous sponsorship and stressed that Huang has been the association’s advisor since 2012 (Eunited 2016b). The guests present included the SUPP candidate for Meradong, Ding Kuong Hiing; the chairman of Sarikei’s district council, Chan Phan Chan, who is also the chair of the United People’s Party (UPP) Sarikei; and the People’s Progressive Party Repok’s chair, Wong Siew Hu. Similar dinners and programmes were organised by other clan associations, such as the Sarikei Chiang Chuan Association.11 Some weeks before polling day, Huang himself set up the Sarikei Young Entrepreneurs Association.12 One of its very first events was a dialogue themed, ‘A dialogue between the youth and Dato Sri Huang Tiong Sii, a successful entrepreneur’ (Eunited, 2016a).13 On the other hand, Ding, the candidate for Meradong, received 11

In other parts of Malaysia, Chiang Chuan associations are called Hokkien associations. Chiang and Chuan represent two districts in Fujian Province that are the ancestral homelands of most of the Hokkiens in Southeast Asia. 12 The English name is the author’s translation. The Chinese name is Si li jie qing nian qi ye jia xie hui. 13 The event was reported on 18 April 2016 in the United Daily, with the title, (Qing nian cai jun yu cheng gong qi ye jia na du si li fan chang xi jiao liu hui).



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considerable support from the church community. It was said that Ding regularly attends a local Methodist church and is highly regarded among church members. When churches in Sarikei District need funds for renovations, he often helps them apply for government funds. A local church member said that three churches in Sarikei were planning to renovate their buildings, so they needed Ding’s support. Among those of Ding’s campaign helpers whom I talked to, his driver and campaign manager were both church members. Unlike urban Sibu, where veteran SUPP candidates constantly exploited dialect identity to mobilise support, the party’s candidates did not emphasise dialect cleavages among Chinese in either Repok or Meradong. This is understandable, given that Sarikei has a relatively large Cantonese population, but the SUPP’s candidates were both Foochows. The use of dialect politics by SUPP would only alienate Cantonese voters. SUPP’s party machinery was candidate-based and candidates’ personal resources were their major source of campaign funds. This pattern partly explains why Chinese business tycoons have often been BN’s choice as candidates. As in the Sibu area, SUPP candidates here did not use SUPP offices as their electoral operations rooms. Huang’s operations centre was in a row of two-storey commercial buildings located on the outskirts of Sarikei town. People said Huang owned the entire building. I met several SUPP Sarikei leaders who were stationed there to assist with Huang’s election campaign, but his campaign manager was clueless about Huang’s daily campaign itinerary. She said Huang seldom came to the operations centre and relied on his people – especially those from his company – to help him. Perhaps Huang was cautious about potential sabotage by the party as he was not the SUPP’s nominee, whereas Ding, who was nominated by SUPP, was inclined to rely on party workers. Ding also set up his operations room outside the centre of Bintangor, the district centre of Meradong constituency. He was assisted by veteran SUPP branch leaders who generously shared with me Ding’s campaign itinerary. Ding and his campaign managers

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seemed to have established a long-time working rapport. However, Ding did not receive much funding from SUPP, and refused to reveal his major funding sources. Candidates did engage in vote-buying in Repok and Meradong, but the rates paid depended on the personal wealth of the candidate or the campaign funds each was able to raise. The amounts SUPP candidates allegedly offered in both Repok and Meradong appeared to be between RM400 and RM500 per vote, per the allegations of a local teacher (personal communication, 16 August 2016): several of his family members who registered as voters in Repok and Meradong received RM200 cash in advance and another RM200–300 after polling day. The rates for Iban voters in longhouses varied, too, depending on the number of families in the longhouse. As Repok and Meradong cover large rural areas, mass ceramah (political talks or rallies) were not a main mobilisation strategy except in Sarikei town. During my visits to Sarikei, SUPP held fewer and shorter talks than the DAP. At a BN/SUPP ceramah for Huang, for instance, there were fewer speakers and the highlights of the ceramah, as advertised in the local Chinese newspapers, were entertainment programmes. One event I visited, for example, featured a performance by the Kuala Lumpur-based M-Girls, four young female singers. West Malaysia-bashing did not seem to dampen the audience’s enjoyment: they gave the performers thunderous applause. The absence of SUPP big shots was evident, likely because the candidate was nominated by neither SUPP nor UPP, but handpicked by Adenan Satem, even though he stood as SUPP. The comfortably seated audience consisted of children, teenagers, adults, and the elderly; many seemed to be families rather than interested individuals. Most stayed until the end of the programme. It may be the case that – as I found in fieldwork in Sibu during the previous elections – the BN/SUPP facilitated attendance at their ceramah. Instead of mass ceramah, SUPP relied mainly on what they termed ‘dialogues’ with local communities to reach out. I shadowed SUPP candidate Ding, for instance, as he visited Muslim villages, Iban



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longhouses, and Chinese schools in more than five communities in one day, from 8:00 in the morning until evening. His visits were in conjunction with community events such as Majlis Bekalan Elektrik (the launch of electricity provision), Pertandingan Sepak Takraw (a sepak takraw competition), gotong-royong (a community work effort), etc. At each function, the candidate would be invited to give a speech. His speech was usually brief, reiterating a few issues, including the supply of tap water or electricity, his personal efforts to improve the village infrastructure, and the chief minister’s approval of a total of RM500 million in funds for rural development. He also expressed his wish to increase his share of Bumiputera votes from 80 per cent to 90 per cent in the coming election. At one of the longhouses, a local Protestant priest was invited to say a prayer for opening the event and to bless the candidate. Unlike at political rallies in town, the day’s events included no emotional or provocative speeches. Meals were served at most of these events. Each event may have cost the candidate RM2,000–3,000. At one luncheon with the candidate, village elders, and guests, the candidate signed a cheque for about RM2,000, which seemed to be reimbursement for expenses for the event. Speaking in a soft and polite tone, he explained to the village chief that he had to put 8 May, the day after the election, as the valid date; the village chief nodded and expressed his understanding. Government officials from the police force, Special Branch, and Department of Special Affairs (JASA)14 were present at that luncheon, as well as at the rest of the day’s events. A policewoman as well as a Special Branch officer told me that they came to ‘protect’ the candidate 14

Housed under the Ministry of Communications and Multimedia, JASA is a federal government agency for information-gathering as well as ‘enhancing people’s confidence in national leadership’. The Special Branch is another intelligence agency, under the Malaysian police. A Special Branch officer spoke with me about the role of JASA in Sarikei, complaining that their roles overlapped. The JASA division for Sarikei has a number of officers from different ethnic groups. A former SUPP candidate for Meradong, whom I met during the campaign period, was a JASA officer.

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and to make sure no one came to kacau (mess up) the event. None of the village chiefs or government officials seemed to deem this use of government machinery to be irregular or unacceptable. In this election, SUPP made efforts to attract youth; for instance, SUPP Repok organised a cycling event on Labour Day in Sarikei town. Also, they set up Facebook accounts for their constituencies, although those pages served more as bulletin boards than as interactive social media. Most postings hardly received any comments and my attempts to contact Huang, for instance, via the SUPP’s election Facebook account for Repok never received any response beyond the automatic reply, ‘Hi sir/ms, we will feedback soon. Thanks’. DAP Unlike their counterparts in Sibu and Kuching, but similar to their local SUPP opponents, DAP’s main avenue for outreach in Repok and Meradong seemed not to be political rallies. DAP Sarikei held only one rally on a daily basis at the town centre of Sarikei, targeting urban Chinese voters, whereas DAP Bintangor conducted small gatherings in neighbourhood areas. The rallies in Sarikei drew huge crowds on weekend evenings, but turnout in Meradong was usually small. On the eve of polling day, DAP Bintangor organised a rally and buffet dinner at a supporter’s house in a residential area that gathered about 200–300 people. Only about 100 stayed until the last speech, delivered by the candidate at around 10 pm. About half left after the third or fourth speeches. Other approaches including hand-shaking at public gathering spots and door-to-door visits, but these seemed to target known supporters rather than court new voters. For instance, DAP Sarikei organised a walkabout at the Central Market of Sarikei on 1 May 2016. It was a public holiday, so the market was packed with local shoppers. The walkabout team consisted of six people: the candidate, two local campaign workers, and three DAP volunteers from Penang. When the walkabout started, it was not very clear who should take the lead in introducing the candidate to the crowds. A Sarikei DAP committee



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member occasionally took the lead, but was often distracted by socialising with old friends he encountered. For a large part of the walkabout, the candidate herself led the team, contrary to common practice. Team members and the candidate appeared shy and to lack determination to shake every single hand and give out campaign flyers. They reached out mostly to people who had a friendly smile, but were uneasy with those who looked indifferent. They did not cover the entire market; a veteran member explained that they had been there several times in the past few weeks, so all the stall owners already knew who they were. However, the market was packed with weekend buyers rather than just stall keepers. Overall, the walkabout lacked the aggression and apparent efficacy of urban DAP walkabouts I have observed in the past. According to a party member, DAP Sarikei has a small membership of about 200. For this election campaign, they relied on a number of active members and volunteers from West Malaysia. Young members able to converse in English and Bahasa Malaysia were assigned to visit longhouses, whereas older folks campaigned in town, where there were high concentrations of Chinese. The party branch received local support in the form of volunteers and small donations. Their main financier was a beverage distributor who supplied local coffee-shops. He explained that the small size of the campaign effort was because many local people were employees of timber corporations and hence hesitant to come forward. Some also worried about harassment by local gangs if they were seen to support the opposition. Other episodes of political activism, such as Bersih (electoral reform) rallies or issue-based protests had never been held in either Sarikei or Bintangor. One of my informants admitted that she would join Bersih rallies held in Kuala Lumpur, but not in her hometown, Sarikei. We might surmise that the politics of fear has a stronger effect on small communities as individuals who act against authorities or social norms are easily identified. After the 2013 general election, DAP planned to venture into rural areas by taking seriously the development needs these communities

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faced. In particular, the central leadership of the national DAP launched the Impian Sarawak projects mentioned above as a way to engage with rural native communities. The DAP candidate for Meradong, Ting Tze Hui, told me that Meradong had held Impian medical or health camps, getting volunteer doctors from West Malaysia to service several longhouses. A couple of educational camps have also been held in rural areas. All received positive responses. Nonetheless, Ting had yet to see these efforts as an effective tool for securing votes. Instead, she looked at them more as ways of nurturing political awareness among the rural people, explaining, ‘the whole objective is to bring some awareness, to let the native people know that BN is not the only party that can be the government. Even when DAP is not the government of the day, we can still deliver.’ Yet, being in the government, the ruling coalition is in a better position to deliver development projects and personal patronage. In countering this challenge, Ting resorted to personal relations, service delivery (including offering minor financial support), and political education. Resisting the idea of trying to woo local councils, she insisted her role as opposition is to monitor, supervise, and offer checks and balances. Holding to such theoretically correct principles, however, may not please many of her supporters, as they are aware that the government is the major source of local development projects. Prior to polling day on 7 May, the general sentiment on the ground was that DAP did not have the upper hand in the contests for Repok and Meradong, unlike in the previous elections. DAP’s supporters complained that the party had not put forward a catchy slogan and persuasive plan or discourse that could effectively counter Adenan’s approach and promises. Many believed that the Adenan factor would surely sway votes to the BN. Overall, the DAP’s campaign revealed that they lacked a full grasp of current sentiment among Chinese voters. The opposition coalition’s electoral gains in 2008, coined a ‘political tsunami’ by opposition leaders, had failed to keep the same momentum after the 2013 general election. Their issues and strategies suggested DAP Sarawak was still dwelling on previous victories.



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For example, they continued to use old slogans and the rhinoceros hornbill (state bird of Sarawak) mascot named Ubah (the Malay word for ‘Change’) first introduced for the Sibu parliamentary by-election in 2010. Moreover, their choice of candidate suggested DAP Sarawak took Chinese support for granted. In Repok, the party reverted to an old strategy of fielding a ‘parachute’ candidate with an impressive academic résumé, but little political experience. A local potential candidate, Wong Ching King, was side-lined despite nearly a decade’s service. Most people I met felt sorry for Wong and believed DAP would have captured more votes if he were contesting.

DAP’s losses in Repok and Meradong: Implications for rural politics Sarawak DAP lost five semi-urban seats15 and did not fare too well in urban seats,16 all of which it retained with lower majorities. The DAP’s losses in Repok and Meradong were mainly due to its failure to keep the support of swing rather than core voters, who swung back to the BN/SUPP in this election. Polling results from Repok (see the table at the start of the chapter) show SUPP secured a total of 7,446 votes, an increase of 2,225 votes, defeating DAP by 943 votes. The votes cast for DAP plunged from 7,900 votes to 6,503, a decrease of 1,397. As for Meradong, SUPP won 6,865 votes, a surge of 2,668 votes from the 4,197 votes it won in 2011. DAP won only 5,349 votes, a drop of 1,353 votes from the 6,884 it won in 2011. Overall, the DAP lost around 18–20 per cent of its previous vote share in Repok and Meradong, a sharper percentage decline than it experienced in urban seats like Bukit Assek and Padungan.

15

This chapter classifies state constituencies covering areas mostly belonging to district councils (majlis daerah) as semi-urban. The conclusions I draw here may not apply to rural seats in more remote areas of Sarawak. 16 This chapter classifies state constituencies covering areas mostly within city and municipal councils (dewan bandaraya and majlis perbandaran) as urban seats.

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In urban seats like Bukit Assek and Bukit Sentosa, a slight swing in Chinese votes to the BN and lower voter turnout could be the underlying factors that led to the DAP’s reduced majorities. While turnout dropped in urban Chinese-majority seats, semi-urban Chinese-majority seats maintained an average voting rate of about 70 per cent. For example, Meradong had a voter turnout rate of 73.5 per cent, compared to 73.1 per cent in the 2011 state election. Similarly, Repok’s turnout rate stood at 72.6 per cent, comparable to the previous 72.4 per cent. On the other hand, voter turnout in urban constituencies dropped by 2.2 per cent, to 66.6 per cent, in Bukit Assek, which covers most of Sibu town; and by 4.7 per cent in Padungan and 6.6 per cent in Pending, both urban constituencies in Kuching. In the past few elections, a high voter turnout in urban seats has been perceived to indicate strong opposition support from outstation Chinese voters, who had left for greener pastures due to the lack of social and economic opportunities in their hometowns and who held the BN government responsible for Malaysia’s unbalanced development. Compared to their family members who still reside in Sarawak, they are more likely to vote against the local authority as they are less likely to be affected by the consequences. In other words, a lower voter turnout in Chinese majority urban areas could be read as a sign of reduced support for opposition parties. Unlike in urban seats, in Repok and Meradong, the DAP’s losses mainly reflect a change in local residents’ vote choices, given that voting rates in both seats remained unchanged. My observation of the campaign suggests that local context has more influence on rural than urban voters. In the case of Repok and Meradong, that context entails funds for local development, prospects for growth in villages or towns, and so forth. The government is the major source of funding for most local construction or development projects. With respect to class structure, the middle class is much thinner in semi-rural areas than in cities, and both Repok and Meradong have relatively smaller commercial classes than do their urban counterparts in Sibu and Kuching. The Chinese middle class in both areas consists of mostly



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agriculturalists who regularly receive agricultural subsidies from the government. The following discussion delves deeper into the voting patterns of a few selected polling areas in Repok and Meradong in order to show differences in political preferences among Chinese voters as well as to provide a clearer contrast between the political behaviour of urban and rural communities. Table 1: A comparison of polling results at Bandar in the 2011 and 2016 state elections Polling area: (total voters in 2016) Bandar (3,096)

SUPP

DAP

2011 2016 2011 417

767

2016

1,326 1,211

Total votes cast

Spoilt votes 2011

2016

3

7

2011

2016

1,746 1,985

Sources: Sin Chew Daily, 17 April 2011 and See Hua Daily, 8 May 2016

Table 1 presents the polling results of a polling area in Meradong called Bandar. Due to its location in the Bintangor town centre, it has the constituency’s highest number of voters, over 90 per cent of them Chinese (SPR, 2015). Overall, DAP won about 61 per cent of the total votes cast in the town and SUPP, 38.6 per cent. The DAP’s votes decreased by an average of 8.7 per cent, whereas SUPP support almost doubled for most age groups. Table 2: Comparison of polling results at Narasit and Tulai in the 2011 and 2016 state elections Polling area (total voters in 2016)

SUPP

DAP

Spoilt votes

Total votes cast

2011 2016 2011 2016 2011 2016

2011

2016

Narasit (608)

110

188

275

238

1

7

386

433

Tulai (883)

260

380

473

310

1

1

34

01

Total*

370

568

748

548

2

18

1,120 1,134

* My calculations Sources: Sin Chew Daily, 17 April 2011 and See Hua Daily, 8 May 2016.

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Table 2 presents the results of polling centres located in the rural areas of Narasit and Tulai in Meradong. These locations merit consideration for their rural location and overwhelmingly Chinese population, which minimises the impact of non-Chinese votes.17 SUPP fared much better in these places than in Bandar, garnering 50.1 per cent of the vote to DAP’s 48.3 per cent. We see similar voting patterns in town and rural polling centres in Repok, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. While DAP performed a little better – 52.4 per cent versus 44.4 per cent for SUPP – in town, at the polling centre at SK St. Anne, DAP clearly lost to SUPP in polling centres at SJK Bulat and SMK Tinggi, both on the outskirts of town and with high concentrations of rural Chinese.18 DAP polled 47.2 per cent of total votes in SJK Bulat and SMK Tinggi to SUPP’s 50.5 per cent. Table 3: Comparison of polling results at SK St. Anne in the 2011 and 2016 state elections Polling centre SK St. Anne

SUPP

DAP

Independent

2011 2016

2011

2016

2016

873

1,665

1,504

91

1,274

Spoilt votes

Total votes cast

2011 2016 2011 2016 14

12

2,552 2,869

Sources: Sin Chew Daily, 17 April 2011 and See Hua Daily, 8 May 2016

17

Chinese constituted 96.7 per cent of total voters in Narasit and 97.9 per cent in Tulai (SPR, 2015). 18 Telephone interview with Wong Ling Biu, DAP MP for Sarikei, 17 August 2016.



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Table 4: Comparison of polling results at SJK Bulat and SMK Tinggi in the 2011 and 2016 state elections Polling centres

SUPP

DAP

2011 2016 2011 2016

Independent 2016

Total votes cast

Spoilt votes

2011 2016 2011

2016

SJK Bulat

497

753

810

658

21

10

15

1,317

1,432

SMK Tinggi

254

687

540

688

42

7

9

801

1,417

Total*

751

1,440 1,350 1,346

63

17

24

2,118

2,849

* My calculations Sources: Sin Chew Daily, 17 April 2011 and See Hua Daily, 8 May 2016

Concluding remarks This study of two semi-urban, Chinese-majority constituencies suggests that urban or rural residence may have as much of an effect on vote as ethnicity, since differently located voters’ interests and priorities tend to be different. The DAP’s stumble in semi-urban areas is perhaps an indication of disparity between urban and rural Chinese voters. Hope of a change in the federal government, which had been sustained since the 2008 political tsunami, is waning among Chinese voters, giving room for a revival of regionalism and other factors, such as cultural affinity, candidates’ personalities, and local development projects. Lower turnout rates in urban constituencies indicate increased feelings of demoralisation or of political inefficacy (or indifference) among urban voters, as many outstation opposition supporters did not come back to vote. On the other hand, a sizable component of rural voters made a pragmatic move by swinging back to BN. The BN’s victories in Repok and Meradong also indicate that many rural voters could easily disentangle locality from nationality, especially in the state election. In this election, instead of national policies and national-level corruption, issues related to local physical development were of upmost concern among the majority. Apparently

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voters believed developmental goodies could be obtained more easily through state government patronage as well as a locally-based patron–client network than by participating in wider opposition politics. While the ruling party provides patronage, traditional Chinese institutions such as clan organisations, newspapers, and schools look also to local patrons for material support. In return, these social institutions render themselves powerful tools for political communication and mobilisation. Whereas the influence of these institutions is fiercely contested by new media, political parties, and issue-based organisations in larger urban areas, limited alternative sources of information and a greater need for material assistance have helped to keep the political perspectives and behaviour of rural people more in line with their patrons – and these voters thus more likely to swing back toward the BN.

References Malaysiakini (2013) ‘BN coordinators receive RM5,860 per month’, Malaysiakini, 28 November, , accessed 25 August 2016. Borneo Post Online (2013) ‘16 out of 49 in Sarawak’, Borneo Post Online, 30 August, , accessed 29 August 2016. ——— (2016) ‘State DAP launches 10-point manifesto’, Borneo Post Online, 28 April, , accessed 1 May 2016. Department of Statistics Malaysia (2011) Yearbook of Statistics Sarawak 2010, Kuching: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak. ——— (2012) Yearbook of Statistics Sarawak 2011. Kuching: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak. Eunited (2016a) ‘Fan chang xi: zhi de gu li, si qing nian shi ye jin qu xing qiang’ (Huang Tiong Sii: Aspiring young entrepreneurs of Sarikei), United Daily, 18 April, , accessed 20 April 2016. Eunited (2016b) ‘Liu xian men: dai dong si jing ji huan yin fan chang xi hui diang fa zhan’ (Liu Xian Men: Welcome Huang Tiong Sii to boost Sarikei’s economy), United Daily, 7 March, , accessed 8 March 2016.



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Sun Daily (2010) ‘State should refer to BN constituency coordinators’, Sun Daily, 30 August, , accessed 25 August 2016. Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya (SPR) (2015) Demography of polling centres in Meradong. SPR posters, labelled Data SPR Q4 2015.

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97

Ba’ Kelalan

Ba’ Kelalan Orang Ulu (Lun Bawang/Kelabit): 87.8%, Chinese: 4.4%, Malay/ Melanau: 3.9%, Iban: 2.6%, Others: 1.3% Polling Results 2011

2016

Willie Liau (BN/SPDP) 2,032 Baru Bian (PKR) 2,505

Willie Liau (BN/SPDP) 2,320 Baru Bian (PKR) 2,858

473

538

Registered Voters

6,958

7,375

Votes Cast

4,574

5,213

65.90%

70.68%

37

35

Candidates

Majority

Voter Turnout Spoilt Votes

Sources: http://www.thestar.com.my/sarawakelection2016info/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn10/ http://www.myundi.com.my/prn-sarawak/

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak



Ba’ Kelalan

99

Chapter 5

Ba’ Kelalan Sustaining the Crack in the BN’s Rural Dominance Arnold Puyok

Ba’ Kelalan is one of the most competitive seats contested in the Sarawak state election. The last three state elections – in 2006, 2011, and now 2016 – have seen either Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) or opposition candidates win the seat with only slight majorities (Table 1). This election was no different: Baru Bian, the incumbent candidate from the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People’s Justice Party) faced a stiff challenge from his opponent from 2011, Willie Liau of the BN-component Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP). How Baru retained his seat, despite the opposition’s poor performance overall in rural Sarawak, offers insight into how voters balance potentially conflicting priorities and ties in defining their interests. Ba’ Kelalan has 7,375 voters, 87.8 per cent of whom are Lun Bawang/Kelabit,1 followed by Chinese at 4.4 per cent, Malay/Melanau

1

Even though the Lun Bawang and Kelabit are two distinct ethnic groups in Sarawak, their cultural and linguistic traits are similar.

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at 3.9 per cent, Iban at 2.6 per cent, and 1.3 per cent Others.2 As is the case in many rural areas in Sarawak, Ba’ Kelalan still lags behind urban areas in terms of development of infrastructure such as a secondary school, electricity, piped water supply, clinics, and so on. The lack of proper electricity and water supply has left many Lun Bawang to rely on gravity-fed water and solar energy. Given the importance of development in Ba’ Kelalan, it is understandable that the BN once again resorted to the ‘politics of development’ (see Jitab and Ritchie, 1992; Weiss and Puyok, this volume), hoping to recapture Ba’ Kelalan from PKR’s Baru Bian, who has held the seat since 2011. The BN’s politics of development approach came with the announcement of millions of ringgit in allocations to fulfil Ba’ Kelalan’s development needs (more on this below) and reminders to Lun Bawang voters that it is only through the ruling coalition that Ba’ Kelalan can be developed. Despite the BN’s well-oiled campaign machinery and promotion of the politics of development, the ruling party failed for the second time to wrest Ba’ Kelalan from the opposition. That loss means the BN failed to make a clean sweep across Sarawak’s rural areas. This chapter is an attempt to understand the dynamics of electoral politics in Ba’ Kelalan by looking at salient issues affecting the Lun Bawang voters’ decisions. The chapter also explores the role of faith-based organisations, their networks, and their influence among Lun Bawang voters. The analysis turns, too, to the role of personality politics in contributing to the electoral results in Ba’ Kelalan. It is argued that given the nature of the close-knit, highly devout Lun Bawang community, the opposition was able to win by countering the BN’s developmental promises through appeals of faith, personal ties, and personality.

2

‘ 2 0 1 6 S ar aw a k s t at e e l e c t i on’, < http : / / w w w. t h e s t ar. c om . my / sarawakelection2016info/>, accessed 2 September 2016.



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Ba’ Kelalan: An electoral history Ba’ Kelalan was formerly part of Lawas, a small town located in the northern part of Sarawak. Ba’ Kelalan was created as a new seat following a redelineation exercise in 1995, making it a majority Lun Bawang constituency. Due to its size (63,198 km) and challenging geographical terrain, it is not easy to campaign in Ba’ Kelalan. The fastest way to reach the scattered villages in Ba’ Kelalan is via helicopter. Driving is difficult, as only people who are familiar with the Ba’ Kelalan–Lawas road can navigate the rough logging tracks. Ba’ Kelalan is traditionally a BN stronghold. The late Judson Tagal of the SPDP won the seat uncontested in 1996 and 2001. Judson was the first surgeon from the Lun Bawang community and the son of an influential Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB, Borneo Evangelical Mission) pastor in Ba’ Kelalan. Ever since Judson’s ascension in politics, no challenger had ever contested against him as he was considered a popular leader and an ‘icon’ by the Lun Bawang. The Lun Bawang faced a contested election for the first time in the 2004 by-election following Judson’s sudden demise in a helicopter crash (Puyok, 2005). In the by-election, Judson’s private secretary, Nelson Balang Rining, won narrowly against the then-independent candidate, Baru Bian. Nelson and Baru contested against each other for the second time in 2006. But with little financial and institutional support, Baru, who stood this time under the SNAP (Sarawak National Action Party) flag, again lost to Nelson, even though he managed to substantially increase his popular majority. In 2011, Baru contested once again, but this time under PKR (Puyok, 2006). His opponent this time was Willie Liau, the SPDP Youth chief and Ba’ Kelalan chair of SABERKAS (Pertubuhan Belia Kebangsaan Bersatu Sarawak, Sarawak United National Youth Organisation). As chair of Sarawak PKR, Baru received strong financial backing from PKR and personal support from PKR de facto leader Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar even travelled to Lawas to campaign alongside Baru. In one of his campaign speeches, Anwar called the

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Lun Bawang ‘heroes’ for turning up in droves to attend PKR ceramah (political speeches or rallies), even after some local community leaders warned them to stay away from the opposition gatherings. In his third attempt since 2004, Baru finally won in 2011, with a narrow majority of 473. Dissatisfaction towards the BN’s candidate, Baru’s personal charisma, his strong affiliation with SIB churches, and support from Anwar and PKR were among the factors that contributed to Baru’s win (Puyok, 2006). Table 1: Popular votes obtained by BN and opposition in Ba’ Kelalan Election Year

Popular Votes Obtained BN

Opposition

2004

2,843 (1,452)

1,391

2006

2,064 (475)

1,589

2011

2,032

2,505 (473)

2016

2,320

2,858 (538)

Source: Various newspaper reports Note: Numbers in parentheses represent the margin of victory

Ba’ Kelalan and the 11th Sarawak State Election The Lun Bawang went to the polls once again against the backdrop of Sarawak Chief Minister Adenan Satem’s rising popularity (See Weiss and Puyok, this volume). The BN was confident of recapturing Ba’ Kelalan by riding on Adenan’s populist policies. The Lun Bawang Member of Parliament for Lawas, Henry Sum Agong, was bullish about winning Ba’ Kelalan and urged the people to continue to support the government ‘to realise their aspirations and needs especially in the development of infrastructure’ (Sman, 2016). For BN, winning Ba’ Kelalan was important for the continuation of Adenan’s ‘going rural’ agenda (Neil Paul Sakai, personal communication, 6 May 2016). The BN also hoped to win in Ba’ Kelalan in order to weaken PKR’s presence in Sarawak. Baru is the chairman for Sarawak PKR and his defeat would discourage the



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opposition and give the BN a moral victory. Adenan also has a soft spot for the Lun Bawang community. He regarded Judson as his close friend and felt it would honour Judson’s memory if the BN won in Ba’ Kelalan (Neil Paul Sakai, personal communication, 6 May 2016). Adenan first tried to convince Baru – the ‘prodigal son’, as Adenan called him – to join the BN, reminding him that ‘only the BN government can deliver the goods needed by the people as opposed to the opposition’s token promises’ (Kiew, 2015). Baru declined the invitation, remaining with PKR. Despite the BN’s confidence that they could defeat Baru, finding a credible candidate was not easy and caused factional rifts among the BN leaders in Ba’ Kelalan. Initially, there were moves to field a BN ‘direct’ candidate for Ba’ Kelalan (see the chapters here by Weiss and Puyok; Ngu). At least eight potential candidates offered themselves for the contest. Except for Nelson (who had held the seat from 2004–11), Willie Liau (who lost to Baru in 2011) and Mutang Tagal (the former Member of Parliament for Bukit Mas), all the other aspirants were newbies (Kiew, 2016). One of the aspirants said Adenan called on them to support whoever was picked as candidate and not to sabotage the candidate (Martin Labo, personal communication, 31 July 2016). Adenan’s choice of Willie from the SPDP raised eyebrows as the latter had been defeated in the last election and was not a popular choice at the grassroots. Adenan seemed to have little choice but to select Willie due to strong pressure from the SPDP. A source said the SPDP threatened to leave the BN if Adenan did not choose an SPDP representative to stand in Ba’ Kelalan (BN leader, personal communication, 6 May 2016) because the Ba’ Kelalan constituency ‘belongs to’ the SPDP. A source advising Adenan on the selection of candidates for BN said Adenan needed to consider the SPDP’s position in Ba’ Kelalan, even though there were many potential candidates from other parties (Adenan’s political adviser, personal communication, 2 May 2016). Reactions to Willie’s selection were mixed. But overall, there was general unhappiness over the BN’s choice of candidate. The

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Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

dissatisfaction at the grassroots was so deep that some used the word temido (a Lun Bawang word which means in the state of mourning) to describe the feelings of the Lun Bawang about the BN’s choice of candidate (civil servant, personal communication, 6 May 2016). But now the battle lines had been drawn: it was a rematch between Baru and Willie. The odds were stacked in Baru’s favour as he had the power of incumbency, was a popular native customary rights (NCR) land lawyer, had personal charisma and was popular among SIB church members and pastors. Willie had the full backing of key BN state and federal leaders, had more established party election machinery, and received support (direct or indirect) from government agencies. He was also banking on his roles in SABERKAS and SPDP Youth, and in the Persatuan Lun Bawang Sarawak (Sarawak Lun Bawang Association), the only association representing the Lun Bawang in Sarawak. Speaking in his capacity as deputy president of the latter association to a group of Lun Bawang professionals in Kuching on 19 April 2016, Willie said the basis for his struggle was, ‘anun luk do ku bangsa ku, pupuh ku’ (I strive to bring all the good things for my race, for my people).3 But, before we look into how Baru and Willie mobilised support and their campaign strategies, it is important to understand the role of SIB churches and their networks in electoral politics.

The SIB church and Lun Bawang community Religion and electoral politics are intertwined in Malaysia. The largest party in Malaysia, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), for instance, has often used Islam as a tool to secure support from the Malays. The nexus between religion and the ballot box is also evident in the state of Kelantan, where Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS, the PanMalaysian Islamic Party) is in control largely because it has succeeded

3

‘Ba’ Kelalan BN candidate – Willie Liau’, YouTube video, posted by visiontechtv, 19 April 2016, .



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in portraying itself as an Islamist party that promotes and defends Islam. In the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, too, religion plays an important role in electoral politics. Sabah’s second chief minister, Mustapha Harun, believed that only through Islam could the people of Sabah be truly united and developed, leading him openly to support the Islamisation of the mainly animist indigenous people of Sabah (Luping, 1994: 251–73). In Sarawak, Abdul Rahman Yakub and Abdul Taib Mahmud likewise worked closely with the federal government to promote Islam as a strategy to remain at the helm of Sarawak politics (Faisal, 2012: 71–151). Despite the growing number of studies on the politicisation of Islam in the Malaysian polity, there has been little attempt to look into the role of other faith-based organisations in electoral politics, particularly in Sabah and Sarawak. In the post-2008 Malaysian political order, a growing number of Christian-based organisations have been involved in mobilising electoral support among Christians. Through the works of Christian volunteers and church leaders, many Christians have openly expressed their political opinions. Their responses to what they regard as attempts to undermine their religious practices can be strongly felt in Sabah and Sarawak, where Christianity is the largest and second-largest religion, respectively (Puyok, 2015). One of the fastest growing faith-based organisations in East Malaysia is the SIB. Unofficial records show that the SIB has more than half a million members and is still growing (Puyok, 2015: 69). The SIB is popular for its contemporary outlook and is quite aggressive in its ‘church-planting’ activities. Its main mission is to get as many members as possible and to make them ‘followers’ of Christ (Puyok, 2015). The social life of the Lun Bawang of Ba’ Kelalan revolves around the SIB. Almost all of the Lun Bawang are Christians, with a strong affiliation with the SIB. This pattern can be traced to the early 1930s, when Australian missionaries taught the Lun Bawang about Christian teachings and values (Lees, 1993: 186–7). Many Lun Bawang then became pastors and volunteered to work for the church. The typical

106

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak

Lun Bawang village has a church at its centre. The church not only serves to fulfil the spiritual needs of the people but is also a meeting place for the Lun Bawang to interact socially. A pastor is the head of the church, assisted by the influential Majlis Sidang (church council). Unlike in the olden days, when membership in the church council was limited to those with theological education, more Lun Bawang without theological training are now appointed as members. Members of the council are selected based on their piety and religious standing among the community. Leaders of the church are differentiated by their titles, i.e., pastor, penatua (elders), deacons, and so on. The hierarchical structure of the church points to the influential role of the pastor and council members. As a former church elder, Baru understands the psyche of the Lun Bawang people and their deep devotion to the Christian faith. One of his popular messages to the Lun Bawang people (and indirectly to other Sarawakian voters) has been: ‘For God did not give us the spirit of timidity but the spirit of power, of love and of self-discipline. So do not be ashamed to testify about our Lord or ashamed of me his prisoner. But join with me in suffering for the Gospel, by the power of God’ (2 Timothy 1: 7–8; see Puyok, 2005; 2006). For Baru, politics and faith are inseparable, and his joining politics is to become ‘the effective voice of the people’ (Baru Bian, personal communication, 29 April 2016). He has reminded the Lun Bawang that ‘faith and principles must influence our politics and not politics influencing [sic] our faith and principles’ (Puyok, 2006: 220). In reacting to the BN’s repeated plea for the Lun Bawang to support the BN, as only the BN can provide for the development needs of the Lun Bawang, Baru said: ‘We stand to defend our right to decide who we want, for all the good that God has taught us, for honesty and integrity. This is more important in our teaching than material wealth and possession. Our faith has taught us that man shall not live by bread alone’ (Baru Bian, 2014: 240; see also Puyok, 2005). Baru’s message, in short, is a plea for the Lun Bawang to look at development in ways beyond material terms.



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BN leaders in Ba’ Kelalan realise the importance of the churches and Christian values in Lun Bawang community life, too, but they were not as articulate as Baru in conveying the message of faith and its role in politics. They also failed to package their campaign messages for their Christian audience. Having the ability to preach is an added advantage for anyone contesting in the religiously devout Lun Bawang community. Baru has the ability to preach and to quote from the Bible when making statements, making him popular among SIB church followers and earning the respect of the pastors. Nevertheless, Willie tried to get closer to the churches by mobilising his SABERKAS members to organise gotong-royong (voluntary communal work) and church repairs, as described below. Not only are the Lun Bawang deeply religious, most are related. In the small town of Lawas, the people know each other and can trace their blood ties through their ancestry. The Lun Bawang community is emblematic of the close-knit and dense social networks among Sarawak’s indigenous societies. When Willie and Baru contest against each other, indirectly, the contest is between two extended families in Ba’ Kelalan. Willie is Baru’s nephew and both have extensive family networks. Also, the parents of both were pastors in the early days of the SIB. Lun Bawang voters were aware of Baru and Willie’s proximity to each other, and of both to the SIB church, yet still clearly differentiated between the two candidates in terms of their relative religious credentials and respective branches of the Lun Bawang family tree.

Campaign issues and strategies BN campaign On nomination day, 29 April 2016, Willie was accompanied by notable BN Ba’ Kelalan leaders Nelson Balang, Mutang Tagal, Martin Labo, Jerry Siran, Barry Baru, and Henry Sum Agong. Willie’s high-powered campaign entourage also involved key federal personalities, such as Home Minister Zahid Hamidi; federal Minister of Energy, Green

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Technology, and Water Maximus Ongkili; and Sabah Deputy Chief Minister Joseph Pairin Kitingan. The highlight of the BN’s campaign for Willie was Prime Minister Najib Razak’s ceramah in Lawas on 29 April 2016. Najib knew the importance of NCR land to the Lun Bawang and of Baru’s popularity as a leading Sarawak NCR lawyer. He downplayed Baru’s role as activist-cum-native land lawyer, however, and said that it was Chief Minister Adenan who had ‘championed’ NCR land issues in Sarawak by ordering the authorities to conduct perimeter surveys on all NCR lands. The event at Padang Awam Lawas (Lawas Public Field) was attended by more than 5,000 people. As in previous elections, the BN campaigned heavily with the theme of development. Its main message was that ‘only the BN government could bring development [to the people] and not the opposition’ (Mohamad, 2016). Zahid Hamidi, for instance, announced RM28.5 million for the development of Lawas district. He said the allocation was ‘[to repay] the people’s trust in the BN government and called for continued support for more development’ (ibid.). Zahid also said if BN won in Ba’ Kelalan, more would be done to develop the area (ibid.). The BN also announced an allocation of RM35 million for the construction of the much-awaited Long Semadoh secondary school. The BN knew that the church and the Lun Bawang community are indivisible. During the election campaign, it announced an allocation of RM5.5 million for the churches in Ba’ Kelalan. Maximus Ongkili, himself a former SIB church elder, said ‘these churches could not be assisted by the assemblyman who is from the Opposition … Only a caring party like Barisan Nasional can assist with the needs of the people, including facilities for worship in Sabah and Sarawak’ (Tan, 2016). Meanwhile, to get closer to the church community, Willie and his SABERKAS members organised a series of voluntary communal sessions to paint and repair churches in Long Tanid, Kg. Puru Sia, and other villages. In connection with these activities, which began long before the election, Willie also gave a personal donation of 8,000 ringgit to the First Theological School in Buduk Nur, Ba’ Kelalan.



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Apart from campaigning with key BN leaders, Willie was assisted by party workers and volunteers who resorted to the usual house-tohouse campaigning. For instance, the SPDP women’s wing went from house to house to ‘meet the people, get to know their problems and tell them to vote [for] our [BN] candidate, Willie Liau’ (Mohamad, 2016). The extent of Willie’s campaign machinery was reflected in the big entourage that followed him to campaign. Members of the entourage were mainly party workers or volunteers and Willie’s relatives. They usually came in four-wheel drive vehicles, donning BN/SPDP shirts and carrying BN flags. Knowing the importance of land issues to the Lun Bawang, Willie focused his campaign messages on the state government’s latest efforts to conduct perimeter surveys of all NCR land in Sarawak. He also promised to provide the people with land ownership titles once these perimeter surveys are complete. According to a source, the use of money to buy votes in Ba’ Kelalan was quite rampant, especially on the BN side (civil servant, personal communication, 18 August 2016). The source alleged that voters were given between 50–100 ringgit each, although the amount could have been higher – between 500–1,000 ringgit – for hard-core opposition supporters. These allegations of vote-buying seem to accord with Baru’s own accounts (Baru, 2014: 230). Other campaign spending was more public: the extent of the BN’s development pledges for Ba’ Kelalan is shown in Table 2.

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Table 2: Total value of BN infrastructure development pledges in Ba’ Kelalan and Lawas Infrastructure Project

Date Announced

Value (RM)

31 May 2015

3 million

1. Lawas–Long Sukang road and Trusan–Briwan road

31 May 2015

26.2 million

2. Mengkalap–Sinampuang road

29 February 2016

23.6 million

Kuala Lawas–Merapok pipe project

29 February 2016

2.2 million

PBR (housing assistance programme) Lawas project and repairs

29 February 2016

1.73 million

Jetty in Awat Awat

29 February 2016

1 million

Long Semadoh Secondary School

5 May 2016

35 million

Allocation for 110 churches in Ba’ Kelalan

5 May 2016

5.5 million

Long Tuan Service Centre Road Construction

Total

98.23 million

Source: various newspaper reports

Apart from direct campaigning by BN leaders, rank-and-file workers, and volunteers, government agencies such as Jabatan Kemajuan Masyarakat (KEMAS, Community Development Department), housed under the Ministry of Regional and Rural Development, and local Jawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan Kampung (JKKK, Village Security and Development Committees) were said to have been mobilised to do the ‘political bidding’ of the BN candidate, ‘directly’ and ‘openly’ (civil servant, personal communication, 18 August 2016). PKR campaign As in previous elections, Baru continued with his campaign messages of faith, religious freedom, and the right to NCR land. One of the opposition’s billboards effectively captured these emphases with the following message (in Lun Bawang language):



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Tuped ngaceku luk matu kuan amung: ngimet idi naan hak tana adat lun kuan bawang idi hak agama, ngelawan rasuah, luk napetulu idi luk neken lun melaya, lun nguyut luk namanu ku politik idi perintah rasuah. (I am standing to defend the truth for the sake of our people: to defend our right to [NCR] land and our right to religious freedom, and to fight against corruption, mismanagement of power and oppression of the powerless.)

Baru was clearly at a disadvantage as far as money and campaign machinery were concerned. Unlike Willie, who relied heavily on the presence of BN leaders and BN campaign machinery, Baru depended on the support of his loyal supporters and family members to spread his campaign messages. Baru also campaigned without the presence of key PKR leaders, either from Sarawak or peninsular Malaysia. Instead of adopting the BN’s style of campaigning from one village to another, Baru limited his movements by concentrating on a few villages, to ‘touch base’ with his supporters. Most of Baru’s campaign team members came from his family and loyal supporters, reflecting the same strategy he had employed in previous elections. But what was interesting was the involvement of the ‘second generation of Christian intellectuals’ in Baru’s campaign team (Baru Bian, personal communication, 31 August 2016). This group, comprised of retired teachers, headmasters, and pastors, spoke at Baru’s ceramah. Members of this special group of campaigners were influential and respected people in their own right. For instance, at his campaign ceramah in Pengalih, Baru roped in two former teachers, Johny Ating and Sia Sinawat, to speak about a whole range of issues, from the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, to mismanagement of public funds, alleged corruption in government, and Malaysia’s representative system. As noted, one of Baru’s advantages was his close association with SIB churches and pastors. The pastors, like his key family members and special campaign team members, acted as Baru’s ‘silent supporters’. Baru had cultivated a close association with these pastors long before

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he became the state assemblyman for Ba’ Kelalan. Prior to the election, Baru organised meetings with the pastors in which he shared with them his vision for Ba’ Kelalan and asked the pastors to engage the public and speak up on issues affecting churches and the Christian faith (Baru Bian, personal communication, 13 August 2016). Even though Baru did not try to persuade people to vote for him from the pulpit, his message of ‘change’, which pervaded his discourse in church, was quite ‘in tune’ with the opposition’s message of change. His preaching and messages to Lun Bawang congregations were laden with calls for SIB members and pastors to become agents of change, not only for the community, but for the country as a whole. Baru also established his own prayer groups that acted not only to ‘comfort’ him spiritually, but also to spread his plea for support. In responding to the BN’s financial allocation to churches, Baru stated, Barisan National has hit a new low with the latest promise of money for the churches in Ba’ Kelalan [two] days before polling day. They will stoop to the lowest level to get votes from the Christian Lun Bawang community. The Christian Minister who was sent in from Sabah [Maximus Ongkili] to perform this heinous act should be thoroughly ashamed for allowing himself to be used as a tool by the BN … The churches have been neglected by BN for decades and for them to suddenly be so generous with promises only shows their insincerity. I urge the Christians in Ba’ Kelalan to be steadfast and to hold on to their integrity and pride. Our votes are sacred and the BN must not be allowed to defile our churches by their cheap attempt at vote-buying (Baru, 2016).

To counter the BN’s politics of development, Baru reminded the people that even without the government’s assistance, the people could still initiate their own development programmes. Baru said he managed to raise more than two million ringgit in funds to buy pipes and supplies for gravity-fed water systems, as well as to buy water tanks for his priority groups, such as churches and widows (Baru Bian, personal communication, 29 April 2016). Funds for



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these projects came from his close contacts with non-governmental organisations and donations from supporters. Baru thus created his own ‘development message’ by promoting community-driven mini hydroelectric projects, as well as solar-powered electricity installations. In responding to the BN’s promises to develop Ba’ Kelalan, Baru accused the ruling party of failing to fulfil its previous pledges. He asked, ‘Did the BN provide proper schools, good roads, electricity, infrastructure, treated water, industries and economic development in those 48 years? Most Sarawakians have never heard of Ba’ Kelalan before 2011. This is how much attention the BN government has paid to this remote area’ (Chia, 2016). Baru also took a swipe at the government’s allocation of RM100 million to survey NCR land in Sarawak. He argued that doing perimeter surveys and issuing communal titles would not solve the issue of land ownership as the land would still not belong to individuals, but to the community as a whole. Baru claimed that the government was not serious in helping the people to resolve their land ownership issues, as his attempt to file a private member’s bill to amend the definition of NCR to include pemakai menoa (communal land) and pulau galau (reserved forest land) had been rejected outright. The NCR land issue stems from the centuries-old shifting cultivation method practised by the indigenous people. The issue of NCR land became contentious as a result of various laws introduced either by the indigenous people (adat, or customary law) or the state government (through provisions in the Land Ordinance and Land Code). The Sarawak government, in essence, recognises native customary claims to land but, at the same time, it also has substantial power to develop NCR land. For instance, Section 17 of the Sarawak Land Code gives power to the chief minister to acquire land for development purposes; some people argue that this provision is ‘draconian’ and ‘subject to manipulation’ (Ngidang, 1997; Mersat, 2001; Hooker, 1999). Baru has made assisting indigenous Sarawakians to press claims to NCR lands the focus of his legal practice; the

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reputation he has thus developed has helped to build his political base. To undermine the credibility of the BN’s candidate, Baru’s sympathisers highlighted Willie’s alleged close association with businessman Yong Kah Sing, who owns several shoplots and controls most of the businesses in Lawas. They distributed leaflets detailing Yong’s alleged ‘illegal’ activities, including selling drugs and smuggling contraband cigarettes. Yong was also alleged to have paid government officials to fabricate an intelligence report which enabled Willie’s selection as candidate in Ba’ Kelalan (senior civil servant and BN Ba’ Kelalan leader, personal communications, 6 May and 13 August 2016). Among the headlines of the leaflets and posters distributed to voters were: Skandal calon di Ba’ Kelalan: Willie Liau & Yong Kah Sing (Scandal involving the election candidate in Ba’ Kelalan: Willie Liau & Yong Kah Sing), Calon Barisan Nasional En Willie Liau bersama tuannya Yong Kah Sing (National Front candidate Mr Willie Liau with his master Yong Kah Sing), Pengedar No. 1 dadah dan syabu di Lawas adalah orang kanan Yong Kah Sing (Yong Kah Sing, the No. 1 drug and methamphetamine distributor in Lawas [is the BN’s] right-hand man). Even though Baru and his campaign team were not directly involved in the distribution of the leaflets and posters, these campaign materials were enough to damage Willie’s reputation.

Results The BN failed to recapture Ba’ Kelalan for the second time since 2011. The ruling party’s heavy reliance on the politics of development and the existence of government machinery at the grassroots level failed to convince Lun Bawang voters to support the BN candidate. Baru managed to defend Ba’ Kelalan and even increased his margin of victory, from 473 to 538. In terms of popular votes obtained, polling centre data confirms that Baru gathered most votes in the highlands – an area where the BN hoped to win based on the presence of notable BN leaders there, such as Mutang Tagal (Table 3). The fact that the opposition won the



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higher share of popular votes across all localities, though, shows the extent of its sustained popularity across Ba’ Kelalan. Support for the opposition also increased slightly in the lowlands – also traditionally a BN area – which is located near to the more developed Lawas town. In the midlands and highlands, where support from the churches and the role of family networks were crucial, it is perhaps less surprising that more popular votes went to Baru than to the BN candidate. Table 3: Percentage of popular vote and locality Party

Percentage of Popular Vote/Locality Lowland

Midland

Highland

Total

BN

13%

11%

21%

45

Opposition

14%

12%

29%

55

Source: Author’s own calculations, based on results from polling centres

Obviously, the BN failed to correctly read the sentiment of the Lun Bawang regarding the party’s choice of candidate. One Lun Bawang leader explained, ‘the Lun Bawang uphold [two] basic value[s] for a leader: man of God (70 per cent) and man of respected family (30 per cent). I blame our ketua masyarakat [community leaders] for not fighting for the right candidate. Money cannot buy our value. We vote for value. Value is reflected and [carried] by the candidate. We want to be proud of our leader’ (BN leader, personal communication, 10 May 2016). The numerous government agencies and grassroots programmes tasked with monitoring sentiment on the ground and raising the people’s confidence in the ruling party also failed to persuade voters to change their minds – especially Baru’s hard-core supporters. The Lun Bawang, as another leader put it, ‘are very independent people. Most are (now) educated and work on their own either as businessmen or small time traders. They made up their choice of candidate independently without the influence of outsiders’ (Mutang Tagal, personal communication, 19 August 2016). Moreover, workers

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in government agencies may ‘slack off ’ at work if they are not happy with the selection of the BN candidate. Instead of working hard to help the BN candidate to win, some hoped to see the ruling party punished at the polls (senior civil servant, personal communication, 18 August 2016). In fielding Willie Liau, the BN underestimated the role of the SIB churches in shaping the Lun Bawang political outlook and community values. Compared to Baru, Willie lacked religious credentials and was not close to the SIB church leaders. Explained one teacher and seasoned BN campaigner, ‘The real thing about Baru is that he used the churches and pastors. The community regarded him their kind of leader. His personality made him unbeatable’ (personal communication, 9 May 2016). A senior SIB pastor quipped, ‘pihak gereja dan pemimpin SIB lebih mengenali Baru. Beliau disenangi oleh pihak gereja dan pemimpin’ (the churches and SIB leaders know Baru very well. He is well liked by the churches and leaders; personal communication, 17 June 2016). So why were the SIB churches and pastors more inclined to support Baru than the BN candidate? Baru has what one observer called the ‘first mover’ factor (Neil Paul Sakai, personal communication, 17 August 2016). He established himself earlier among the SIB churches by forging friendships with the church community and pastors. For Baru, the ‘church market’ is important as the social life of the Lun Bawang revolves around the church. It is the churches that teach the Lun Bawang about Christian faith and the importance of living up to the Christian principles. Willie tried to penetrate the churches, but to no avail as he did not have any strong message to offer them. Compared to Baru, who had started to campaign among the churches and pastors with his foray into Lun Bawang politics in the early 2000s, the BN did not have a strong presence or influence among the Lun Bawang religious community. Still, Baru also knew the importance of development aid to the Lun Bawang to secure their future support. He has regularly given 300 ringgit for funeral expenses to those who have lost their loved



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ones and contributed between 500–1,500 ringgit to churches (Baru Bian, personal communication, 13 August 2016). Baru also has provided zinc roofing to widows or people in dire need of help, and has provided the Lun Bawang with water tanks, fresh water supply, mini hydroelectric projects, and solar energy – all done with the cooperation of, and funding from, his supporters and well-wishers. Baru’s main message to the Lun Bawang community was that even without the government’s assistance, they could still initiate their own infrastructure development projects, albeit on a smaller scale. According to Baru, all these development projects were done and offers made prior to the election (Baru Bian, personal communication, 13 August 2016).

Contesting the BN’s politics of development In electoral politics, it is argued that development is a ‘commodity’ used to gain the people’s support and a ‘tool’ to dominate them in the rural areas. This explains the BN’s dominance in Malaysian and especially Sarawak politics (Faisal, 2009). In Sarawak, for instance, the government led by the former chief minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud, heavily promoted the politics of development, arguing that only by supporting the BN-led government could the Sarawak people – rural voters especially – be fully developed. Rural constituents were also reminded to continue to support the ruling party, failing which the BN-led government would withdraw its development aid. Most scholars studying electoral politics in Sarawak have adopted the developmentalist model to explain the BN’s almost unbreakable rural dominance (Faisal, 2009; Aeria, 2013; Mersat, 1999). These scholars argue that rural people’s support for the BN is due to the party’s capability of distributing development goodies to them. They claim that rural people are highly dependent on the government to survive economically. This culture of dependency has cemented patron–client ties among BN leaders and their supporters. Such ties are also forged as a result of the constant threats from the BN leaders that they will cut ties with their supporters should they support

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the opposition. In the context of the BN’s rural dominance and its promotion of the politics of development, rural voters are seen as ‘materialistic’ – a ‘disease’ which explains why voters continue to support the BN despite a depressing economic outlook and the various scandals affecting BN leaders (Free Malaysia Today, 2016). The problem with this dominant view is that it fails to take into account another variation on a patron–client network, formed on the basis of the quality of the relationship and the role of intrinsic factors such as faith and community value (Scott, 1972). This chapter has shown that despite living deep in the interior of Sarawak, the Lun Bawang are not unduly influenced by the politics of development. The results from the 2016 state election suggest that they accept the idea that development may come in various forms, and not in the form of infrastructure alone. Local voters were also reminded that even without the government’s assistance, they can work independently to bring infrastructure projects to their area. This was the message that Baru tried to convey to his loyal supporters. The BN’s over-reliance on the politics of development worked less effectively in Ba’ Kelalan because the Lun Bawang were reminded persistently not to trade their votes for promises of development and monetary offers. If seen from the perspective of patron–client ties, the relationships established between Baru and his core supporters were based on nonmaterial appeals such as values, principles, and personality. Baru was also successful in using his personal pull as a charismatic former SIB church elder to gain the support of the church community and pastors. He did what the BN candidate failed to do: remind the Lun Bawang of their Christian roots and the importance of upholding their faith. It is not enough for the BN to win the hearts and minds of the Lun Bawang by promises of development and offers of material advantage. The key to understanding changes in the political outlook of the Lun Bawang community lies in how they view their relationships with their elected representatives and the significance to these voters of the values and principles that their elected representative upholds.



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Conclusion The developmentalist model and the politics of development alone cannot explain key changes in the voting patterns and behaviour of rural voters. Lun Bawang voters, for instance, have shown that material lures alone may not be sufficient to convince them to vote for the BN. The dynamics of rural politics in Ba’ Kelalan suggests that rural voters may be willing to look beyond the politics of development and materialism. The case of Ba’ Kelalan also brings to the fore factors such as faith, religious networks, community values, and personality politics as key elements shaping the political outlook of rural communities.

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