Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide [1st ed.] 9783030308360, 9783030308377

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xviii
Introduction (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 1-8
The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 9-24
The World’s Use of Electoral Districts (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 25-28
Unequal Voting Power (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 29-43
Equality in Electors or Persons (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 45-56
The Upper Chamber of a Bicameral National Legislature (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 57-63
Proportional Representation and Electing Nationwide (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 65-77
Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 79-97
Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 99-114
Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with Proportional Representation Elections (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 115-121
Protecting Access by Minorities and Women to the Political Process (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 123-133
Criteria for Determining District Boundaries (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 135-144
The Institution Responsible for Redistricting or Reallocating Seats in the National Legislature (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 145-156
The Role of Courts (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 157-176
Conclusion (Steve Bickerstaff)....Pages 177-181
Back Matter ....Pages 183-252

Citation preview

Studies in Choice and Welfare

Steve Bickerstaff

Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide

Studies in Choice and Welfare

Editors-in-Chief M. Fleurbaey, USA M. Salles, France

Series Editors B. Dutta, United Kingdom W. Gaertner, Germany C. Herrero Blanco, Spain B. Klaus, Switzerland P. K. Pattanaik, USA K. Suzumura, Japan W. Thomson, USA

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6869

Steve Bickerstaff

Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide

Steve Bickerstaff University of Texas Law School The University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX, USA

Some portions of this book previously appeared in Chap. 9, Redistricting from a Practitioner’s Viewpoint, by Steve Bickerstaff in the American Bar Association book International Election Remedies (2017). ISSN 1614-0311 ISSN 2197-8530 (electronic) Studies in Choice and Welfare ISBN 978-3-030-30836-0 ISBN 978-3-030-30837-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to my wife, Charlotte Carter. Her patience was phenomenal. I am retired so I had to research and write this book primarily from home. Charlotte withstood my grouchy impertinence and made my work environment comfortable and forgiving. Thank you—it could not have been easy.

Acknowledgement

I also wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Sherry McCall and Becky Vragel.

vii

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Origin of the Word “Gerrymander” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Why Gerrymander Electoral Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Gerrymandering Is Possible in Every Type of Election System . . . 2.4 The Reasons for Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Partisan Gerrymander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Incumbent Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Discrimination . . . . . . . 2.4.4 Incidental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Essential Tools of Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Gerrymandering the Allocation of Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Gerrymandering Single-Member or Multi-Member Districts . . . 2.8 A Gerrymander Is not Always Successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 The Tactics of Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.1 Cracking (Sometimes Called Fracturing) . . . . . . . . . 2.9.2 Packing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.3 Malapportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9.4 Maintaining the Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 10 11 12 12 13 14 17 17 18 19 20 21 21 21 22 22 23 23

3

The World’s Use of Electoral Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Use of Fixed or Special Multi-Member Districts . . . . . . . 3.2 Electing from Within Fixed or Multi-Member Districts . . . . . 3.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using of Electoral Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

25 25 26

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27 28

ix

x

4

5

6

Contents

Unequal Voting Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Different Measures of Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Calculating Voter Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Limits on Deviation Set by Law Vary by Nation . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Challenge of Limits Becoming the Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Inequality in a PR System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The Need for Requiring Periodic Redistricting and Reallocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Nations Fail to Comply with Their Own Requirements for Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 Is Voter Equality Important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 A Lax Standard for Voter Equality Encourages Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 A District’s Shape Is Not Necessarily Indicative of Whether It Is Gerrymandered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.12 Gerrymandering Hypothetical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

29 30 31 33 34 35

.

36

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36 37

.

38

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39 40 42

Equality in Electors or Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Using Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 The U.S. Experience: Using Census Population . . . 5.2 The Arguments for and Against Using Population . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Argument for and Against Using Electors, Citizen Population, Eligible Voters, or Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Defining Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Evenwel v. Abbott: Population or Eligible Voters . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 The Brewing Controversy in the United States Regarding Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 Increasing Importance for the Distinction Between Elector and Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Civil Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 Voters in the Last Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.10 Expediency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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45 47 47 48

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49 50 51

.

52

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53 53 55 55 55

The Upper Chamber of a Bicameral National Legislature . . . . . . . 6.1 Differences in How Members of an Upper Chamber Are Selected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Appointment by a Local Government (Indirect Election) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Appointment by Nation’s Executive or an Outside Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

57

.

58

.

58

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59 61

Contents

6.2 6.3 7

8

xi

Differences in How Upper Houses Are Empowered . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Proportional Representation and Electing Nationwide . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Countries Currently Using Only Nationwide PR Elections to Elect National Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Proportional Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Variations in a PR Election System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Winner Bonus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Double Simultaneous Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Block Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4 Choosing a Party’s Candidate: Open and Closed Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.5 PR Systems that Require Voting for Individual Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.6 Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 The Effect of Population Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 An Inadequacy in the Code of Good Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Legal Requirements for Periodic Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Triggers in Lieu of a Period Between Redistricting or Reallocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 The Guarantee of Seats to a Fixed District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.1 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4.2 The United Kingdom: Political Compromise among Kingdoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.5 Avoiding the Requirement for Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Untimely Action Is Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.1 India: A Moratorium on the Reallocation of Seats . . 8.6.2 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.3 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.4 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.5 The United States: Learning a Lesson . . . . . . . . . . 8.6.6 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7 Examples of Timely Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.1 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.2 New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.3 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62 62

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65

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65

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67 69 69 70 70

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71

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72 73 73 73 75 77

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79 80

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80

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81 82 82

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84

. . . . . . . . . . . .

85 87 87 89 90 91 91 93 93 93 94 95

xii

Contents

8.7.4 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.5 Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.6 Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7.7 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95 96 96 96 97

Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Treating the Fixed District as a Single-Member District . . . . . . 9.3 Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional Representation Within Special Multi-Member Districts . . . . . . 9.4 Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional Representation Within Each Fixed District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Electing Members of the National Legislature in Single-Member Districts Within Each Fixed District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.6 Preferential Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.7 Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.8 Block Voting (Blk) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9 Gerrymandering the Shape of Single-Member and Multi-Member Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.9.1 The American Experience: Bizarre Shapes . . . . . . . . 9.9.2 Gerrymandering District Shapes Worldwide . . . . . . . 9.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99 99 99

8.8 9

10

11

Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with Proportional Representation Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Parallel Election Systems (P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 The Percentage of SMD and PR Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Geographical Areas for the PR Component of MMP or Parallel Election Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 Gerrymandering the Mixed System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 Is the Goal A Fair Treatment of Persons (Voters) or Parties? . . . 10.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Protecting Access by Minorities and Women to the Political Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Methods of Aiding the Representation of Identified Minority Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.1 Consideration in Redistricting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.2 Guaranteed Seats for Minority Groups . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.3 Creation of Districts Designed to Elect Minority Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.4 Allowing Self Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.5 Exemptions in a PR System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1.6 The Upper Chamber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 Representation of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100 104 106 108 109 109 110 110 111 114 115 115 117 118 118 119 120 121

. 123 . 124 . 124 . 124 . . . . .

126 128 129 129 129

Contents

11.3 11.4 12

13

xiii

The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Criteria for Determining District Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1 Equality in Population or Electors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.2 Contiguity of Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 Compactness of Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.4 Recognition of State, Provincial, or Administrative Unit Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.5 Recognition of Communities of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6 Recognition of Remote or Sparsely Populated Areas . . . . . . . 12.7 Recognition of Natural Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8 Recognition of Existing or Historical Boundaries . . . . . . . . . 12.9 Diaspora, Out-of-Country, or Overseas Voting . . . . . . . . . . . 12.10 Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.11 Prohibiting Political Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.12 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

135 136 136 136

. . . . . . . . .

138 139 139 140 141 141 143 143 144

The Institution Responsible for Redistricting or Reallocating Seats in the National Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.1 Is Political Influence Desirable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 National Legislatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2.1 Plans Developed by States or Provinces . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.1 Legislative Control of Commission Action . . . . . . . . 13.3.2 The U.K. Boundary Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.3 The Size of Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.4 The Make-Up of Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3.5 Election Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.4 The Good Side of Political Influence on Reallocating Seats or Redistricting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5 The Bad Side of Political Influence on a Commission . . . . . . . 13.6 The U.S. Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7 Criteria for Independent Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7.1 Designing a Truly Fair and Apolitical Means of Choosing the Members of the Commission . . . . . . 13.7.2 Choosing the Right Commissioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7.3 Avoiding Political Influence on the Commission Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7.4 Achieving Racial, Ethnic, Geographic and Religious Diversity Among Members on the Commission . . . . 13.7.5 Encouraging Public Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.7.6 Imposing Requirements for How Electoral Districts Should Be Drawn, Such As . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

145 145 146 147 147 147 148 150 150 151 152 152 152 153 153 154 154 154 154 155

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Contents

13.7.7

13.8 14

15

Including Provisions for the Protection of Electoral Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 13.7.8 Mandating Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

The Role of Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1 Some Nations Bar Court Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1.1 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1.2 Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1.3 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.2 Court Deference to Legislative or Commission Decisions . . . . 14.3 Court Intervention Around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 Court Rejection of Absolute Voter Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4.1 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4.2 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4.3 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5 The Battle Over Voter Equality Between the Courts and the Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.1 Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.2 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.3 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.4 Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.5 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.6 Republic of Korea (South Korea) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.7 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.8 Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.9 Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.10 Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.11 Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.12 Lithuania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.13 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.5.14 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.6 The Limits of Court Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.7 America’s Failure: Partisan Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157 157 158 159 159 160 160 160 160 161 162

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1 Gerrymandering Is a Worldwide Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 How to Identify a Gerrymander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3 Equal Voting Power Is Denied Voters Worldwide . . . . . . . . . . 15.4 Many Nations Fail to Follow their Own Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.5 The Election Structure in Most Countries Is Biased toward Rural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.6 No Discretion in the Allocation of Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

177 177 178 179 179

162 162 164 164 166 167 167 168 169 169 169 170 171 171 172 173 173 175

180 180

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15.7 15.8 15.9

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Proportional Representation Is Only an Election System Option, Not an Answer to Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Redistricting Commissions Alone Are Not the Answer . . . . . . 181 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Appendix A: International Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.1.1 Equal Voting Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.2 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A.3 UN (Center for Human Rights): Human Rights and Elections: A Handbook on the Legal, Technical, and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, Annex II Para. V.b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

183 183 183

Appendix B: International Election Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1 Bicameral or Unicameral National Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.1 Bicameral Legislatures with Upper House Not Directly Elected (Usually Selected by States or Provinces [Indirectly Elected] or Appointed by Head of State or Monarch) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.2 Bicameral Legislatures with Some Members of Upper House Directly Elected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.1.3 Unicameral Legislatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.2 Method of Election of Members to Lower House or Unicameral National Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.2.1 Fixed Multi-Member Districts Generally with FPTP, TRS, or AV Elections (FPTP Unless Shown Otherwise) Within the District (Sometimes with Exceptions for Specific Areas or Groups) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.2.2 Fixed or Special Multi-Member Districts Generally with Proportional Representation Elections Within the District (Sometimes with Exceptions for Specific Areas or Groups, or Post-Election Distribution of Seats to Districts for Political Parties Based on National Vote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.2.3 Mixed System: Partly Single-Member Districts Within Fixed Districts and Partly PR with Parallel System [P] or Mixed Member Proportional [MMP]) Within Special Multi-Member Districts or Nationwide (Sometimes with Exceptions for Specific Areas or Groups, or Post-Election Distribution of Seats to Districts for Political Parties Based on National Vote) . . . . . . . . . B.2.4 The Nation as One District (Single Constituency) . . . B.2.5 Block Vote (BLK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3 Base for Drawing Districts and Determining Voting Equality Among Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

187 188

184

185

188 188 188 189

189

190

190 191 191 191

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B.3.1 B.3.2

B.4 B.5 B.6

B.7

Total Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eligible or Registered Voters (Electors) (Citizens of Voting Age; Some Nations Mandate Registration and Voting) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3.3 Citizen Population (All Citizens, Including those Too Young to Vote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.3.4 Voters in Previous Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Legal Standard Set by Law for Voter Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . Legal Prompts for Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats or Review of Deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Redistricting Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.6.1 Population Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.6.2 Compact or Contiguous Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.6.3 Districts that Respect Administrative Boundaries . . . . Final Authority for Approving or Reviewing Redistricting or Reallocation Plan for Election to National Legislature . . . . . B.7.1 National Legislature (in Many of these Countries the National Legislature Acts Through Legislation Requiring the Executive’s Approval) . . . . . . . . . . . . B.7.2 State Legislatures or Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.7.3 Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix C: Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.1 A Case Study of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.2 A Case Study of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.3 A Case Study of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.4 A Case Study of Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.5 A Case Study of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.6 A Case Study of Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.7 A Case Study of Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.8 A Case Study of Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.9 A Case Study of Texas 2003: An Example of Masterly Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

192

192 192 192 192 193 193 193 194 194 194

194 194 195 197 197 198 205 209 212 216 217 219 222

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

About the Author

Steve Bickerstaff is 73 and now retired. He is an attorney who initially was with the State of Texas as Parliamentarian of the State Senate, Director of the State Office of Constitutional Research, and Assistant Attorney General. In 1981 he left the state’s employ and founded the private law firm of Bickerstaff, Heath and Smiley. The firm grew to 50 attorneys. Steve left the law firm over a decade ago, but it continues to bear his name (Bickerstaff, Heath, Delgado, Acosta). Among Steve’s most prominent achievements as a private attorney were: a judgment for the largest monetary recovery ever awarded against the State of Texas ($204 million in an environmental suit); a multi-year, multi-forum fight to make telecommunications competitive in Texas and other states; a judgment holding the state financially responsible for convicted felons housed in county jails; 42 years representing public entities and officials in redistricting; and the fostering of an independent citizen commission to draw electoral districts in Austin, Texas. During much of this time, Steve was also an adjunct professor at the University of Texas Law School teaching constitutional law and voting rights. He also taught as a Fulbright scholar in Germany, was a Rockefeller Scholar in Residence at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy, was part of a Carter Commission study of elections in China, and lectured at 16 different universities in Europe, the U.K. and Scandinavia. xvii

xviii

About the Author

Steve was on the governing board of several non-profits, including The Trustees for Alaska, the Board of Visitors for McDonald Astronomical Observatory, and West Texas Public Radio. He remains on the National Council of the National Parks Conservation Association. Steve is the author or co-author of nine books and 26 law review articles. Virtually all of this writing is on legal issues, such as voting rights and telecommunications regulation.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The origin of this book lies in my belief that there is a dearth of readable works relating, comparing, and analyzing the use and gerrymandering of electoral districts in different election systems worldwide. Moreover, I resent the attitudes I found among many political scientists that gerrymandering to advantage or disadvantage certain candidates or political parties is a problem unique to the United States, and that systems with proportional representation largely escape this problem. As this book demonstrates the drawing of election districts or allocation of seats to states, provinces, administrative units, or multi-member districts, or the failure to do so, for the benefit of specific political officials or interests in the national legislature is common throughout the world and is a form of gerrymandering. I expected that some of the relatively new democracies would be having a difficult time wrestling with the inherently nuanced political tasks of reallocating seats in the national legislature and fairly redrawing electoral districts. Surprisingly, I also found that some of the fairest allocation schemes were among the newest democracies, while many of the long-established democracies have come to accept and even to institutionalize bias that favors certain political groups, politicians, or interests. Another reason for writing this book is to help fill the shameful gap in knowledge that exists for most persons, especially Americans, concerning election systems worldwide. Political scientists tend to pidgin-hole election systems into only a few categories without understanding, or at least acknowledging that virtually every country’s election system is unique. Many Americans believe that the U.S. provided a model democratic election system that other nations largely envied and some emulated, but, if so, this model, along with those of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, was merely a starting point from which many variations emerged. Sometimes a country found that the U.S. model poorly fit its needs and must be modified. In other instances, countries looked at U.S. democracy and concluded that it could be improved. For example, the Electoral College is a singularly unpopular element of the U.S. system; other countries have chosen various proportional representation systems rather than © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_1

1

2

1 Introduction

the plurality election system found in the U.S.; and the concept of equal suffrage (i.e. one person, one vote) that is pervasive in the U.S. has encountered mixed acceptance worldwide. It is wrong for Americans to think at this point that their country’s election system is necessarily the preferred democratic structure. Instead, Americans should appreciate the diversity among representative democracies worldwide and the many lessons that we can learn by observing different election systems. This diversity is beautiful. The most important reason for writing this book, however, is to help understand one of the great failings of representative democracy. The concept of a government controlled by the people it governs through their elected representatives is attractive. Most of the people in the world have come to assume that representative democracy is the preferred form of government. With only a few exceptions, such as North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and China, representative democracy is the claimed objective of nations worldwide. Representative democracy, however, is failing to meet its promises. Gerrymandering of electoral districts is a significant reason for this failure. Any pretense of representative democracy becomes a sham if politicians are allowed to gerrymander and manipulate electoral districts in their self-interest contrary to the public’s will. In recent months there has been an outcry in the United States against gerrymandering. These opponents of the practice charge: Voters should choose their politicians rather than allowing politicians to choose their voters. This aphorism is a general truth, but an over simplification of the complex processes and competing interests that affect the allocation of seats in a national legislature and the redrawing of election districts. Both the timely and fair reallocation of national legislative seats and redrawing of electoral districts to reflect population changes and shifts are critical for maintaining equal voting power for a nation’s inhabitants. A failure to perform either process in a fair, transparent, and lawful manner can deny people an equal opportunity to affect the policies of their government and raises questions as to whether the nation is truly a representative democracy. Nevertheless, many of the oldest and most established “democracies” in the world have abused these processes. Too often political scientists in Western countries fail to recognize the achievements of the non-English speaking world, overlook flaws in the longer established Western democracies, and espouse a Westminster or European Model for democracies without clearly understanding or acknowledging the weaknesses of those models or that other models exist. It is also important for voters to recognize that the presence of gerrymanders is partly their own fault. We have forgotten the meaning of representative democracy and allowed ourselves to accept gerrymanders as inevitable. We even applaud as though at a sporting match when a gerrymander is for “our side.” Gerrymanders are indeed inevitable so long as voters refuse to acknowledge that they merely substitute self-interest for democracy and refuse to take the steps necessary to minimize or to prevent them. I hope that a candid look at current systems and recommendations in

1 Introduction

3

the conclusion will help in understanding what is working and not working worldwide to preserve and advance representative democracy. This book achieves its purposes through thirteen chapters, a Conclusion, Appendices, and several Case Studies. Each chapter includes examples to illustrate a point in my text or which I think readers will find interesting. In addition I have given examples of how some nations have structured their election systems. I selected these examples to show the diversity that exists in the world and how the simple categorization of countries or scan of their laws tells very little about what is happening. Many of the footnotes are designed to furnish the reader with additional examples. Chapter 2 discusses the history, purposes, and characteristics of a gerrymander. Chapter 3 describes how electoral districts are used in virtually every nation and have certain advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 4 explains the difference in how we measure an individual’s equality in voting power worldwide, and how most nations reject the rigid “one person, one vote” standard found in the U.S. Chapter 5 discusses how nations use different bases for measuring equality among electoral districts and how in some nations this amounts to a form of gerrymandering. Chapter 6 explains the differences in how the members of the upper chamber are selected and empowered in nations with Bicameral Legislatures.1 Chapter 7 describes the proportional representation system in the few nations that exclusively use such a system nationwide and how such a nationwide system has recently been abandoned in two larger countries. Chapter 8 explains how the timing of redistricting or reallocation of seats can operate as a gerrymander. Chapter 9 explains how gerrymandering occurs after seats are allocated to states, provinces, special multi-member districts, or administrative units. Chapter 10 considers gerrymandering in mixed systems. Chapter 11 describes how various nations protect minority access to the political process. Chapter 12 provides the so-called “neutral criteria” in redistricting that are supposed to govern the shaping of electoral districts and explains how they can be manipulated for political reasons to produce almost any result. Chapter 13 discusses the use of redistricting commissions instead of the legislature for redistricting and reallocating seats and provides the essential aspects of a truly “independent” commission. Chapter 14 considers the role of the courts. The Conclusion provides my observations about election systems worldwide, including how to recognize a gerrymander and how some of the common claims regarding proportional representation election systems and boundary or redistricting commissions have been misleading. The Conclusion also provides my recommendations for preventing gerrymanders. At the end of the text of the book, I have included several appendices. Appendix A provides the applicable standards for redistricting issued by several international organizations. Appendix B contains lists of nations using various election systems and practices. Appendix C provides case studies of several nations as a sample of the

1

Lists of nations having bicameral or unicameral legislatures are provided in Appendix B.

4

1 Introduction

diversity that exists in democratic systems worldwide. I choose these particular countries for my case studies for various reasons: I selected Germany and France because they are internationally important and because their election practices need to be documented in English; The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey because they are often misunderstood in America; and Indonesia, Uruguay, and Lesotho to illustrate how each nation’s election system is unique and has its own story. Appendix C also contains two short items on the United States, including a case study of a redistricting of congressional districts in Texas that used gerrymanders in a “masterly” fashion to replace eight Democratic incumbents and to strengthen the Republican majority in Congress. The Bibliography directs the reader to various sources. In view of the unique nature of this book (i.e. looking at the realities rather than the official versions of what was happening in a nation) I was compelled to rely on many websites rather than on published books or articles. I found that such websites often reflected a more current and candid view of the nations.2 I have also included an Index at the end of this book. I caution, however, that neither this book nor the general websites shown in the Bibliography should be the sole source of information on any particular country. These websites are invaluable as a starting point, but I found the summary information on these websites sometimes conflicted or was too incomplete, outdated, or shallow to be reliable. For example, it is insufficient to say that a nation has a proportional representation (PR) or mixed election system without indicating whether the PR component of the system is nationwide, by fixed districts (e.g. states), or by special multi-member districts or constituencies, and whether the nation’s election system is open/closed, permits independent candidates, has a threshold that is so high that it curtails the benefits of a PR system, or has recently reallocated seats in its national legislature or redrawn its electoral districts. All of these nations have an agency responsible for elections and, surprisingly, these agencies often maintain a version of their website in English. Anyone looking at a particular country should access that country’s relevant website. Unfortunately, the quality of these agency websites varies, or at least in the English-language version. Sometimes they present only a rosy picture of a nation’s election system and avoid presenting any information that might allow any meaningful analysis. Nevertheless, they are valuable sources. It is important to use multiple sources as

2 I was especially aided by the reports of the OSCE/ODHIR (Organization for Security and Co-operation for Europe/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) assessing specific countries and elections. Its reports cover 57 (mostly European) countries—Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Uzbekistan.

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5

verification of the current election system in a country as some are constantly changing. Few scholarly articles exist that offer critical assessments in English of events or circumstances in some countries. Digging for specific information on redistricting or the allocation of seats in a country is especially difficult because these processes, or lack thereof, often escape attention and are seldom the subject of books, articles or websites—even among major democracies or the websites that pride themselves on reporting on election practices in nations worldwide. Therefore I often was left to examine the electoral districts myself to measure voting equality. Sometimes I found it necessary to separately locate information about the boundaries and number of representatives for individual electoral districts and, where available, the census population or number of electors (eligible voters) within each district. From this information I calculated the number of persons or electors per representative in fixed or multi-member districts and looked for anomalies. Similarly, I used such data to spot single-member districts and seat allocations that varied significantly from the ideal either in population or shape. Where possible I tried to determine the most recent allocation of seats and redistricting for the nations. It is necessary to clarify the scope of this book and the terminology used in it. My focus is on elections to the national legislature of a country. Rather than identifying each nation’s national legislative body by its unique name, I often used the term “national legislature” in reference to that body in all countries. Although my focus is on national legislative bodies, most of the observations about districts and gerrymandering are equally applicable to the gerrymandering of electoral districts for election to a state, provincial, or other local government legislative body. This footnote briefly describes the different types of election systems found worldwide and the initials by which they are generally recognized in the literature and within this book.3 In the United States the process of redrawing the boundaries of electoral districts is known as “redistricting.” Internationally, academics generally describe the fixing of electoral district boundaries as adjusting those boundaries, and the process as “demarking” or “delimitating” instead of “redistricting.” Since I have been involved

3

PR—proportional representation, voting with each political party entitled to representation according to its share of the vote; FPTP—first-past-the-post, plurality voting with a single winner; TRS—two round system, plurality or majority voting with two rounds of voting to provide a single winner; MMP—mixed member proportional, a mix of FPTP and PR elections with limits on a party’s share of seats, but no fixed number of seats in the national legislature; P—parallel system (also called Mixed Member Majoritarian [MMM]), with a mix of FPTP and PR elections and a fixed number of seats; STV—single transferable vote, with ranked or preferential voting designed to achieve proportional representation; AV—alternative vote (also called instant run-off voting) with ranked or preferential voting among multiple candidate designed to achieve a single winner; Blk— block voting (also called multiple non-transferable vote), for electing several representatives of the same party from a single multimember electoral district; SMD—single-member district; MMD— Multi-member district. A more extensive description of these election systems is available in the text of this book.

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1 Introduction

in “redistricting” electoral districts in the United States for over 40 years, I will stick with the American terminology. The process of assigning the number of seats for a state in the lower chamber (House of Representatives) of the U.S. national legislature (Congress) is called “apportionment.” A similar process exists in almost every country, with seats in the national legislature assigned to the nation’s states, provinces, administrative units, or predetermined multi-member districts. Most countries regard this process of reassigning the number of seats in a national legislature among these jurisdictions as “redistribution” or “reallocation”. In some systems with a PR component this reallocation among party lists and fixed or special multi-member districts occurs again after the election and is the result of a complicated process that often is unique to the nation. I most often use the words allocation or reallocation in this book except when referring specifically to the apportionment process in the United States. Nations differ as to whether voting equality should be defined in terms of “total population,” “citizen population” or “electors (registered voters).” I acknowledge that all of these measures are legitimate. Therefore, I refer to equality in terms of “persons or voters” rather than picking one measure or the other as the proper basis for allocating seats in a national legislature or drawing boundaries of an electoral district. However, a nation’s choice among these, and other, options may have a significant impact on the voting power and degree of representation of certain racial or ethnic groups. Therefore, I discuss the effects of these various options in Chap. 5 of this book. I do not spend much time rehashing the law of redistricting in the U.S. because I expect that most readers of this book are already generally familiar with U.S. practices and are more interested in practices worldwide. Moreover, there are numerous books, articles, and websites on redistricting in the United States. Nevertheless, I often use election cases and practices from the United States to illustrate an issue in the text because my 40 years of experience with redistricting has made me intimately familiar with the best and worst aspects of elections in this country. My mention of United States law or practices is not meant to suggest that election practices in this country are superior. In fact, some are demonstrably inferior to what can be found elsewhere. My references to U.S. law are primarily to little known aspects of that law, and as a means of illustrating election practices in the U.S. as compared to those in other countries. There are at least 192 nations that call themselves democracies. There are 195 sovereign nations according to the U.N., but another eleven nations are partial members or observer states of the U.N. or de facto sovereign countries.4 One source lists 240 countries worldwide, but this includes areas that are “part of” another nation, such as Scotland. Some of the areas that are commonly considered “nations”

4 See, www.un.org/undpa/en/members; Overseas Territories, Dependent Areas, and Disputed Territories, One World Online at www.nationsonline.org and www.worldonline (The Nations Online Project). How Many Countries Are There in the World in 2018? Political Geography Now (January 11, 2018).

1 Introduction

7

are actually self-governing territories or protectorates of other nations.5 Different sources vary in their count of countries because they use different definitions of what constitutes an independent nation as opposed to a “self-governing” territory. Not all of the nations that claim to be democracies are considered by other nations or international organizations to be democracies. Many of these are controlled by a single party or group and do not conduct elections at all or any free and fair elections. For example, according to The African Election Database, in sub-Saharan Africa alone there are 25 countries that conduct elections that are not free and fair, but there are also 18 countries in the region that are considered electoral democracies with governments elected through generally legitimate, free, and fair elections.6 A similar scenario can be found on almost every continent, with the number of “true” representative democracies and “restricted” democracies highly subjective and constantly in flux as local circumstances change. Even the United States has been criticized as not being a “true” representative democracy because two of its last three presidents have won election while losing the popular vote as a result of the Electoral College and its congressional districts are racked with bizarre gerrymanders that distort the popular vote. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran is generally denied status as a democracy even though it conducts elections and the outcome of those elections affects the country and the world.7 My research suggests that Iran has been unfairly characterized as a “terrorist state” by Western governments and media. More than 190 nations and self-governing territories have at least one chamber of the national legislature where most of the members are directly elected by the qualified voters of the country and where the equality of voting power is an announced objective. Each of these nations, however, is a little different in its use of electoral districts and its redistricting or reallocation processes. Also, the election systems are constantly changing. For example, while this book was being written the electoral circumstances changed in at least England, Lebanon, France, Italy, Fiji, and the Russian Federation. I have tried to address all changes through 2018. In many nations the reality is far different from the legal, sometimes constitutional, requirements that have often been the basis for prior studies. Even some of the 5 These include nations such as the United States (e.g. Puerto Rico, the American Virgin Islands, Guam, Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands), Great Britain (e.g. the Falkland Islands, Jamaica, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Saint Helena, Jersey, the Pitcairn Islands, Monserrat, the Turks and Cacaos Islands, and Gibraltar), France (e.g. New Caledonia [there are also many overseas départements of France as discussed in Chap. 12]), Tanzania (e.g. Zanzibar), Kingdom of the Netherlands (e.g. Aruba, Curacao, and Sint Maarten), Denmark (e.g. the Faroe Islands, Greenland), New Zealand (e.g. the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau) and China (Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan [disputed]). See, Overseas Territories, Dependent Areas, and Disputed Territories, One World Online @t www.nationsonline.org and www.worldonline (The Nations Online Project). 6 www.eisa.org.za; and http://africanelections.tripod.com 7 See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Iran. Most political scientists consider Iran a theocracy. Iran considers itself a democracy. Religion (Islam) is a critical element of Iranian government structure, but so are elections. Election outcomes affect both domestic and foreign policies.

8

1 Introduction

oldest and most established democracies have accepted some element of bias in their election systems or have, for various reasons, avoided or postponed compliance with their own laws regarding the frequency and standards for redistricting or reallocation of seats among districts. I have tried to record some of these transgressions. There are, however, means for minimizing the effect of political self-interest on the manner in which we elect our representatives. At a time when the institution of representative democracy is threatened for being inefficient at best or a sham at worst, it is critical that we not take democracy for granted. We need to understand what is working well and what is failing. Finally, I write as a practitioner, not a political scientist. Many of the opinions and observations expressed in this book are my own based on my experience aiding governments in redistricting, litigating dozens of redistricting lawsuits, working frankly with innumerable politicians and their staffs, and examining or crossexamining political scientists as “expert witnesses” in dozens of cases on the effects of specific redistricting plans. I think that this experience affords me a valuable tool for ferreting out and understanding the realities of gerrymandering. I realize, of course, that political scientists do not necessarily agree that practitioners have much to offer.8

8 See. Political Scientists and Electoral Reforms in Europe and Canada: What They Know, What They Do by Camille Bedock, Damian Bol, and Thomas Erhard, 16 Election Law Journal 445 (2017), published online (September 1, 2017). Actually the symposium was called “What Do Political Scientists Know About Electoral Reform That Practitioners Do Not (Emphasis added)?”.

Chapter 2

The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

Democracy is a form of government under the control of the people it governs. A representative democracy is one in which the people express their will and act through their elected representatives. There are many ways to manipulate the election process or rules to favor or disfavor certain groups, individuals, or political parties in a representative democracy.1 This book focuses on only one—the gerrymander. A gerrymander is a manipulation of electoral districts such that an incumbent or a political party (usually the dominant one) attempts to use the reallocation of seats or redrawing of electoral district boundaries, or the failure to do so, for their own advantage. Essentially a gerrymander occurs when self-interest is substituted for the public’s interest. The processes of reallocating seats in the national legislature and redistricting (i.e. redrawing electoral districts) are critical to representative democracy. They are the means of assuring that each member of the national legislature represents a roughly equal number of persons or voters and that each person or voter has an equal opportunity to affect the policies of his or her government through his or her representatives despite the inevitable changes and shifts of population that occur over time in every electoral district. This equality of opportunity is the essence of representative democracy. Gerrymandering is a means of

1 See, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE IN ELECTORAL MATTERS: GUIDELINES AND EXPLANATORY REPORT, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (2002); ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart in the Agathon series on representation (2003); ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: Election Laws in Democracies by Louis Massicotte, André Blais and Antoine Yoshinaka, Univ. of Toronto Press (2004); INTERNATIONAL ELECTION PRINCIPLES by Jack Young, ed., American Bar Assoc. (2015); INTERNATIONAL ELECTION REMEDIES by Jack Young, ed., American Bar Assoc. (2017).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_2

9

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2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

denying this equality of opportunity and is, therefore, a threat to representative democracy. Often the word gerrymander conjures up the image of a weirdly shaped electoral district, but, as I discuss later, a gerrymander can be bizarre in shape or compact and aesthetically attractive. The overriding issues are the purpose and intended effect of a redistricting or reallocation plan. It is fair to ask why I consider the discriminatory reallocation of seats and malapportionment, or the failure to timely reallocate seats or redistrict as forms of gerrymander. Many politicians and some political scientists see these offenses as distinct from gerrymandering. They aren’t! They are decisions that affect electoral districts, are harmful to the public, and are intended to serve a political party’s or politician’s self-interest. Even if elections in a particular malapportioned nation are not seen by some political scientists as causing outcomes that are “biased” toward a particular political party, the malapportionment, or failure to reallocate or redistrict, may have been intended to do so. Gerrymanders sometimes fail. Moreover, a gerrymander is not always about a party’s success; it may be designed to maintain the status quo and to reelect incumbents, sometimes from many different parties. All redistricting or reallocation of seats in a national legislature has political consequences. It is impossible to avoid or even diminish this effect, but it is crucial to the survival of representative democracy that we limit the act of purposefully drawing any electoral district or allocating any seats in a legislative body, or failing to act timely to advantage or to disadvantage a political party, group or individual rather than to meet neutral criteria that benefit the public.

2.1

The Origin of the Word “Gerrymander”

The practice of designing electoral districts for political advantage dates back to the earliest use of districts for elections. This practice was given a name (as Gerrymander) in the Boston Gazette (USA) on March 26, 1812 when the word was first used to describe a redrawing of Massachusetts state senate election districts by the Massachusetts Legislature during the term of Governor Elbridge Gerry. One of the districts was claimed to resemble the shape of a mythological salamander. The word “gerrymander” is a combination of the governor’s last name and the word salamander.

2.2 Why Gerrymander Electoral Districts

11

This original (now infamous) 1812 gerrymander cartoon depicts the Essex South state senatorial district for the legislature of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

The 1812 “Gerry-mander” was drawn to benefit Governor Gerry’s DemocraticRepublican Party. The precise purpose presents an enigma. If the district was drawn so that Gerry’s party could win it, the gerrymander failed. The opposing Federalist Party candidate won this district by over 15%. However, if the district was created to pack Federalist voters and drain them from the other senatorial districts, it was a success. The overall redistricting successfully reelected a Democratic-Republican majority in the Massachusetts’s state senate.2

2.2

Why Gerrymander Electoral Districts

Gerrymandering is usually about power. One group or party dominates governmental decision-making and wants to retain it by maintaining or enhancing its percentage of representatives in the national legislature. Gerrymandering is one means by which it may do so by controlling the allocation of seats or the shape of electoral districts to assure that the persons who have the best chance of winning are those who support the group or party in power. Gerrymandering is also about political survival—especially for individual politicians. A decision about how many seats to allocate to a fixed or multi-member district, how to shape a particular electoral district, choosing a proportional 2 See, Seeking to End Gerrymandering’s Enduring Legacy by Carl Hulse, New York Times at A17 (January 26, 2016).

12

2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

representation system to protect party leaders, or whether to make any changes at all may be perceived by a politician as crucial to his or her ability for winning reelection. Few politicians are willing to forego the opportunity to affect these decisions. Gerrymandering is also often about a clash of ideas. An incumbent or party in power feels that their ideas are best for the country and that gerrymandering is justified to assure that they remain in office or power to further those ideas. This is contrary to democracy. In a representative democracy, the ultimate judge of the merits of an idea is its acceptance or rejection by the voters through their elected representatives. Any effort to stifle, direct, or manipulate that voting through gerrymandering to bolster an idea or policy is not justified. Personal beliefs about what idea is “best” never justify a gerrymander. Any definition of gerrymandering is almost meaningless, however, when faced with the difficulties of proving the purpose behind district boundaries or reallocation decisions. As discussed in Chap. 12, almost any district configuration or allocation can be justified by ostensibly neutral factors or criteria even if the real purpose is political. This fact does not make gerrymandering satisfactory, or in the public interest. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of making certain that those persons entrusted with the authority to allocate seats or redraw electoral districts are qualified and free from self-serving or political motives.

2.3

Gerrymandering Is Possible in Every Type of Election System

We usually think of gerrymandering in terms of the process of shaping singlemember electoral districts, but it is also a characteristic of PR and mixed election systems. The failure to timely redistrict or reallocate seats in the national legislature in a fair manner or as populations change is possible in every election system, and is particularly beneficial to incumbents and to the political party or parties in power. Since mixed systems have a single-member district component, the issue of gerrymandering the shape of single-member or multi-member districts is similar to that of majoritarian or plurality election systems that are all single-member. However, gerrymandering also occurs for district or regional proportional representation and mixed systems in the allocation of seats among fixed districts (states, provinces, administrative units or multi-member electoral districts), or the failure to reallocate those seats when demographics change.

2.4

The Reasons for Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering occurs for several reasons:

2.4 The Reasons for Gerrymandering

2.4.1

13

Partisan Gerrymander

The theory behind the partisan gerrymander is to manipulate the processes of drawing electoral district boundaries or allocating national legislative seats in a plan such that, taken as a whole, the plan gives the dominant party or group the best chance of winning enough seats to continue to control the legislative process and to help party incumbents to win reelection without harming the party’s overall objectives. This is achieved through the shaping of electoral districts or allocating of seats in such a way that the probable votes for an opposing candidate or party are wasted. A political party wants to achieve a result that satisfies its members and guarantees the best chance for electing its candidates and thereby controlling the national legislature. This usually means avoiding any reallocation of seats if possible unless the reallocation furthers or protects the party’s interests and shaping electoral districts to increase the chances of its candidates. It is easier to achieve these results if the requirement for reallocating seats or for numerical equality among the districts is lax. Therefore, it is not surprising that the law of most nations allows considerable disparity in the number of persons or voters among the districts, or why the national legislature in many nations disregards even these legal limits. The U.S. strict population standard and enforcement of that standard by the courts leave no room for such disparities, but they have resulted in many bizarre and strange looking congressional districts. State legislatures and political parties have used technology to identify “friendly” and “unfriendly” areas and to gerrymander districts so that they meet the strict population standard and still include or exclude areas as needed to achieve their political objectives. The result is districts in the U.S. that are irregular and even bizarre in appearance. The U.S. has many oddly shaped districts. An example of a bizarre U.S. district caused by partisan and racial gerrymandering can be found in one of the most famous of America’s gerrymanders. In 1992, congressional district 12 in North Carolina stretched awkwardly across that state to pack Black voters (assumed by the Republican Legislature to be primarily Democrats) into the district, while leaving the surrounding districts to be dominated by white Republicans The top map shows the districts as enacted by the North Carolina Legislature including the infamous District 12 (yellow) into which a significant proportion of the state’s Black voters were packed (Fig. 2.1). Such shapes continue today as shown in Illinois’s congressional districts as they existed until 2013. The boundaries were gerrymandered in a bipartisan deal to protect incumbents in both parties. The oddly shaped District 17 was unofficially nicknamed “the rabbit on a skateboard” for its weird shape. The districts were redrawn in 2013, but continue to be somewhat oddly shaped (Fig. 2.2): Such weirdly shaped districts are common among congressional districts throughout the United States. In assessing the shape of these districts, however, remember that these districts were also drawn to comply with the requirement that all

14

2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

5 12 10

6

9

4

8

1992 North Carolina Plan 5

10 12

6

9 8

1997 North Carolina Plan

Fig. 2.1 The 1992 North Carolina Congressional Districts. The map is courtesy of Bickerstaff, Heath, Delgado, Acosta LLP @ www.bickerstaff.com

of the districts be essentially equal in population. Thus they reflect an attempt to achieve a particular political result while also achieving absolute equality in the number of persons in each district. Partisan gerrymandering may be used as an offensive weapon. Appendix C, Case Study of the 2003 Congressional Redistricting in Texas describes a Republican plan that replaced eight of ten targeted Democratic incumbents. In nations with PR elections, political parties may unite in support of a plan that fails to allocate the requisite number of seats to fixed or multi-member districts largely controlled by an opposing political party, or fail to reallocate seats when needed to equalize voting power.

2.4.2

Incumbent Protection

A gerrymander for an incumbent usually means maintaining the status quo as nearly as possible. In an election system with at least some PR elections it means avoiding any reallocation of seats that could affect the reelection of incumbents. In a system using single-member districts it means avoiding the reallocation of seats, if possible, and creating electoral district boundaries shaped for the benefit of incumbents seeking reelection.3 A single-member district will usually resemble or remain unchanged from the boundary of the district in which the incumbent was elected in the past. The 3

It is rare to gerrymander a district for someone who is not an incumbent.

2.4 The Reasons for Gerrymandering

15

Fig. 2.2 Illinois Congressional Districts in 2003–2013 and in 2013. The maps are courtesy of the Illinois Board of Elections

Illinois Congressional Districts 2003-2013

Illinois Congressional Districts 2013-current boundary may be changed to make the incumbent’s reelection more likely by the removal from the old district of areas in which most of the voters were expected to oppose the incumbent’s reelection or the addition of areas in which the voters are expected to support the incumbent. Each incumbent is usually eager to find “friendly” voters to help his or her reelection, but often incumbents from the same

16

2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

party have their eyes on the same areas or voters. The intra-party fight over these voters can become desperate, especially if the incumbents believe that their reelection depends on the outcome of the dispute. In a nation with lax requirements for equality in population or voters, resolving this intra-party dispute is easier. It is common to see an incumbent’s single-member district intentionally underpopulated or unchanged, especially if the incumbent is a member of the political party controlling the redistricting. An Incumbent Protection Gerrymander can receive the support of several political parties, even competing parties. In the United States the Republican and Democratic Parties sometimes unite behind a carefully negotiated redistricting plan that protects incumbents from both parties. So-called “bi-partisan commissions” that were once hailed in the U.S. as a reform of state redistricting have instead become vehicles for the development of “incumbent protection” plans that end up violating “neutral criteria” mandated by state law in order to satisfy incumbents from both parties. For example, after the 2010 census six of the ten plans adopted by such commissions were invalidated.4 Some nations accept incumbent protection as an unofficial, but acceptable, criterion for shaping districts or allocating seats. For example, even though not listed in law as one of the guidelines for delimiting constituencies, the protection of incumbents is generally recognized in Germany as an unwritten guideline because it provides “continuity.” As explained by one academic observer in Germany, As for redistricting boundaries within a state: Districts of an incumbent who has represented the district over the last twenty or so years (and who has worked his or her way to the upper echelons within parliament) are hard to touch. Losing a village from the district? Adjoining a new community? Most incumbents hate such an idea. If they are big shots, they occasionally succeed to prevent any changes until they retire.5

Many nations find merit in this idea, although few6 formally acknowledge incumbent protection in their law or among its guidelines for redistricting.7 Not all members of a national legislature start out with an intention to gerrymander the electoral district in which they were elected, or any other district. The idea of “gerrymandering” is abhorrent to them. Nevertheless, as the redistricting or reallocation processes proceed, these members often find that if they remain passive, they soon become victims. Some other members may have fewer scruples about gerrymandering or may have become desperate about their chances for reelection unless they find more “friendly voters,” a place to which they can jettison some

4

Independent Redistricting Commissions for American Cities by Steve Bickerstaff, 13 Election Law Journal 110 (2015). 5 This statement appears in an e-mail sent to the author by a professor in Germany. I have chosen not to reveal the professor. 6 Zimbabwe includes “continuity with previous district boundaries” as a criterion for redistricting. 7 Even U.S. courts have acknowledged the legitimate interest of a state in protecting incumbents with seniority in Congress, but have refused to allow such an interest to justify any deviation from absolute population. See, White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).

2.4 The Reasons for Gerrymandering

17

“unfriendly” ones, or have an underpopulated district. Any change to satisfy one member affects other districts and soon the changes ripple through any proffered plan. A passive member can find that his or her current district has been deprived of its “friendly” voters or has become the dumping ground for “unfriendly” ones to help another member. The passive member’s abhorrence of gerrymandering becomes a regrettable fight for survival. I have often seen members who at first profess that they “do not care” about the makeup of their districts become aggressive defenders of their current district’s boundaries. Redistricting may be divisive, even between members of the same political party. With this political infighting, it is easy to understand why maintaining the status quo has often become the easiest option for national legislatures. The same rationale applies to any possible reallocation of seats. Maintaining the status quo is made easier if the decision remains within the discretion of the national legislature and any legal requirements for periodic redistricting or reallocation are lax, absent, or ignored. Maintaining the status quo to prevent the defeat of incumbents is gerrymandering.

2.4.3

Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Discrimination

A gerrymander can be used to discriminate against a racial, ethnic, or religious group. Such a Racial, Ethnic, or Religous Gerrymander is unlawful in the U.S. under the Constitution and Sect. 2.2 of the Voting Rights Act if the minority group is large enough, politically cohesive, and has historically seen its candidates lose because of the voting of a polarized majority.8

2.4.4

Incidental

A gerrymander may not be the result of a Machiavellian conspiracy to affect an election outcome. I have seen candidates try to control the area in their district by gerrymandering a district’s boundary to exclude a possible opponent’s residence, to include the residence of a family member or important person, to include a prestigious institution, such as a university or medical facility, or to include or exclude areas for seemingly trivial or undisclosed reasons. However, virtually all of such mundane requests have the ultimate objective of creating some political benefit for 8 See, Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Ironically, some of the most bizarre congressional districts in the U.S. are ones drawn in an effort to overcome this historical discrimination by creating districts with enough minority voters to assure that they can elect the person of their choice. Unfortunately, the shaping of these remedial districts causes the nearby districts to be mostly white and Republican. Some state legislatures have used the Voting Rights Act as an excuse to pack minority voters in as few districts as possible to reduce their overall political significance.

18

2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

the incumbent, such as an opportunity for less competition, a less expensive campaign, greater prestige, or larger campaign contributions. These reasons overlap. For example, a political party that is in power is likely to want to protect its incumbents and therefore is interested in preventing any changes in the allocation of seats or shapes of single-member or multi-member districts that could adversely affect them. These options for gerrymandering must face the political realities of the legislative body. Sometimes the result desired by the dominant party cannot be achieved. For incumbents, sometimes it can be achieved only with the cooperation of other incumbents, even members of an opposing party. It is common in such circumstances for the incumbents from two or more parties to negotiate an agreed course of action that protects the parties’ incumbents. So also, a gerrymander that advantages a party or incumbent may have the effect of disadvantaging a racial, ethnic, or religious minority. As long as one result (partisan gerrymandering) is legal and the other (racial gerrymandering) is not, the observer and a court have difficulty determining the true purpose of the gerrymander.

2.5

The Essential Tools of Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering begins with the same data that is necessary for any redistricting or reallocation of seats—accurate maps of the affected areas and counts of the number of persons or electors in an area. This data should be available for the smallest geographical areas possible.9 Technology now plays a major role in redistricting. Computers with GIS software can calculate data and display proffered redistricting plans in seconds that only three decades ago took hours of work and reams of paper to construct. Special software exists specifically for redistricting and is being used at every level of government in the United States.10 This technology makes redistricting easier, faster, and more accurate for persons charged with the task, but it also has the same benefits for those persons wanting to gerrymander districts. An additional bit of information is needed for gerrymandering. Gerrymandering generally works only if the housing pattern in an area is politically segregated so that most persons living in an identified geographical area, such as possibly a whole state or fixed district, dependably vote for the same candidates or political party. A politically homogeneous area is less susceptible, although not immune, to gerrymandering. Therefore, reliable information about how persons have voted in the past and judgment about how they will likely vote in the future is essential.

9

In the United States, the census provides the number, age, race, etc. for persons in very small geographic areas (census blocks) that may have fewer than 50 total persons. 10 The basic system is the Geographical Information System (GIS), but much more sophisticated software is now available, including past election results, economic data, etc.

2.6 Gerrymandering the Allocation of Seats

19

Election patterns are often volatile. Therefore, it is crucial to select the right election or elections to serve as a benchmark for determining an area’s voting tendency. By using several elections to give a range of results it is possible to know the high and low of past support in an area for specific candidates or parties. Choosing the right past elections for comparison is key. Again, computers are available to analyze complex statistics and prior election results. Often, however, the conclusion of “friendly” and “unfriendly” areas for purposes of gerrymandering is not a result of any detailed or technical analysis, but is the result of a politician’s practical experience, such as an incumbent’s “feeling” that, “they love me there.” The final need is for the mechanical means necessary to achieve the objectives. Such means may be as basic as maps, pencils, official demographic data, and hand calculators, or as sophisticated as computers and specialized software. The adoption of a gerrymander is far more dependent on politics than technology, or as famously voiced about the constituencies in the United Kingdom, “a constituency is created, not found.”

2.6

Gerrymandering the Allocation of Seats

The only legitimate basis for allocating seats in a nation’s national legislature among its fixed or multi-member districts is equality in the relative number of persons or electors per representative in each such district. There are several acceptable formulas for determining how best to handle special circumstances, such as islands, or how to round a “remainder,” but the basic rule is that if a district has sufficient population or electors to warrant a representative, its voters are entitled to elect that representative.11 Some nations have discriminated among fixed or multi-member districts by allocating them greater or fewer representatives than the number to which they are entitled based solely on the district’s number of persons or electors or refraining from any reallocation at all. This causes the number of persons or electors per representative to vary among the districts. Such discrimination is never appropriate. The effect, and possibly the purpose, of giving a district too few representatives is to lessen the voting power of the residents of that district in the national legislature and to increase the relative voting power of residents in another district. The reason for this discrimination may lie in official policy, such as the allocation of a minimum number of seats to each fixed or multi-member district,12 incumbent 11

This statement assumes that the primary objective is equal treatment of voters. This statement changes if the primary objective is equal treatment of parties. Some existing formulas for the geographical dispersion of seats in a PR system (especially in the PR component of some mixed systems) place a higher priority on assuring that each party receives its share of seats than on whether each vote carries the same weight. 12 See, Chap. 9.

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2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

protection, preservation of the voting integrity of remote regions, or in an effort to advantage or disadvantage certain groups, political parties, or individuals, including certain racial, ethnic, or religious groups that are disproportionately located in the affected fixed or multi-member districts. Sometimes many purposes overlap. The allocation of seats is important to both individual candidates and political parties in all systems because the more seats allocated to a friendly fixed or multimember district, the greater a party or an individual candidate’s chances of winning. This effect is even greater when the number of seats in a particular fixed or multimember district is to be reduced through a proposed reallocation of one or more seats to another district. This reallocation may create a situation in which the number of incumbents in one or more fixed or special multi-member districts exceeds the number of seats remaining in that district—meaning that at least one incumbent must step aside or lose.13 Thus, the incumbents in this district have a personal, sometime desperate, interest in seeing that the proposed reallocation does not occur. There is no incumbent in the other fixed district with an equivalent personal interest since the seats of these incumbents are theoretically unaffected; therefore it is not surprising that the proposed reallocation is often stymied, especially if it requires approval by the national legislature, as has occurred in Germany. The reallocation of seats is also important to the affected fixed districts themselves, especially if they face the prospect of losing a vote or voice in the national legislature. These local government or party officials can be decisive in the legislative conflict over whether to reallocate seats.

2.7

Gerrymandering Single-Member or Multi-Member Districts

Even in shaping electoral districts, it is wrong to think of gerrymanders as necessarily strange or bizarre in appearance. Some of the most bizarre are benign in purpose. For example, a district that follows a city boundary may be irregular in appearance, but beneficial in its purpose. On the other hand, some of the most regular in shape hide a malign purpose. Later in this book I discuss a congressional redistricting in Texas that produced esthetically attractive districts, with the purpose of essentially fencing Black and Republican voters together in a single overpopulated district in order to advantage the reelection efforts of white Democratic incumbents in the surrounding districts.14 In nations using single-member electoral districts within a fixed district, a reallocation of seats among fixed districts which reduces the number of seats in a fixed district may result in one or more incumbents not seeking reelection or two, or more, incumbents seeking reelection in a single district, which is called “pairing.” 14 See, Bush v. Martin, 224 F Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff’d per curium, 376 U.S. 222 (1964), discussed in Chap. 9. 13

2.9 The Tactics of Gerrymandering

2.8

21

A Gerrymander Is not Always Successful

It is wrong to believe that a gerrymander is necessarily successful in achieving its ultimate goal. History is filled with examples of unsuccessful gerrymanders—beginning with the apparently failed attempt to elect a Republican-Democrat to the Essex South state senatorial district in 1812 and continuing through the victory of Emmanuel Macron’s supporters in France in 2017.

2.9

The Tactics of Gerrymandering

In nations that allocate seats to fixed or multi-member districts, the tactic for the party in power is simple—delay reallocation or minimize the number of seats allocated to unfriendly districts and maximize the number allocated to friendly ones. The three classic tactics of gerrymandering single-member or multi-member districts are known as “cracking,” “packing,” and maintaining the status quo.

2.9.1

Cracking (Sometimes Called Fracturing)

Cracking occurs when voters that historically vote dependably for opposition candidates or political parties are intentionally split among two or more districts in such a way that these voters are expected to be a minority submerged in a majority that is likely to vote for a competing candidate or political party. An example is in the Russian Federation, where it appears that in the recent districting politically problematic urban areas are split and combined with pro-government areas so that the urban vote is diluted and Putin’s Russia United Party can win.15 Opposition votes are essentially wasted because the candidates supported by a majority of pro-government voters always win. Cracking the opposition means, however, that the voters intended to be in the majority are also spread among the districts to create as many districts as needed in which the candidates or party favored by the government will win. It also requires reliable information about how persons have voted in the past and judgment about how they will likely vote in the future. If the “friendly” voters are spread too thin, an unexpected voting pattern that benefits the opposing candidates may cause the pro-government candidates to lose in some districts where they anticipated winning. Thus, it behooves the gerrymander drawer, who is usually pro-government, to search for the right balance—systematically spreading the voters among the districts so that the candidates or party favored by the government will win in as many districts as needed to control the national legislature without unnecessarily creating 15

See, Chap. 7.

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2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

the possibility of losing if the voting pattern changes. This strategy is made easier, with more room for error, if the districts are allowed to be unequal in the number of persons or voters per representative in the national legislature, and it is possible to systematically or selectively underpopulate the districts targeted for victory. Such purposeful overpopulation or underpopulation can be intended to advantage or disadvantage an individual candidate, or, if systematic, can advantage or disadvantage a political party or group. The objective from a party’s perspective is the total plan, not any single district.

2.9.2

Packing

The second method of wasting the votes for opposing candidates or political parties is known as packing.16 As the name suggests, this method is aimed at placing as many of the opposing candidate’s or party’s voters in as few districts as possible.17 A pro-government candidate will have little or no chance of winning in these districts because the voters are overwhelmingly likely to vote for the opposition, but the effect of packing the opposition’s voters in only a few districts is to allow the pro-government candidates to more easily dominate in the remaining districts and to win control of the legislative body. See the hypothetical at the end of this Chapter.

2.9.3

Malapportionment

The simplest and most effective tactic for achieving an electoral advantage in nations with lax voting equality standards is through malapportionment by overpopulating any single-member district likely to vote for the opposition, or allocating fewer seats than appropriate to a potentially unfriendly fixed or multi-member district. An example of this latter tactic can be seen in those nations that avoid reallocating seats to a growing area that may have a disproportionate percentage of voters likely to vote for an opposing party. This particular tactic is unavailable in the United States

16

See, Values and Validations: Proper Criteria for Comparing Standards for Packing Gerrymanders by Robin E. Best, Shawn J. Donahue, Jonathan Krasno, Daniel B. Magleby, and Michael D. McDonald, Election Law Journal (2017), published online (March 12,018) @ https://doi.org/ 10.1089/elj.2017.0471; and Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans by Wendy K. Tam Cho and Yan Y. Liu, Election Law Journal (2016), published online (Dec 12,016) @ https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2016.0384 17 Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymander Standard by Robin Boyd, Shawn Donahue, Daniel Magleby, and Michael McDonald, Election Law Journal (2016), published online @ https://doi.org (September 26, 2017). The various tests examined in the article were wasted votes, comparing wins, equal vote weight, and seat-dominated symmetry.

2.10

Conclusion

23

because of court enforcement of rigid requirements for population equality among congressional districts in a state.

2.9.4

Maintaining the Status Quo

The most common tactic of gerrymandering is to literarily do nothing. If a party’s incumbents prevailed in the latest election, why change the allocation of seats or redistrict even though required by law? The effect is to leave a significant inequality among voters in the districts and to benefit incumbent politicians. This tactic is evident in the oldest democracies, such as France and the United Kingdom, and the newest. These tactics of cracking or packing the opposition’s voters or allowing a person’s vote to be more or less important than the vote of another person can be identified worldwide. They often are manifested in elections that are biased for one party or another and a result in which the winner of the most votes nationwide does not necessarily win the most seats in the national legislature. In other circumstances the partisan bias is not obvious, but the gerrymandering is designed to benefit particular incumbents by making it easier to win reelection.

2.10

Conclusion

The easiest way for a political party in most democracies to achieve a political advantage over other parties in elections to the national legislature is to control the processes by which members of that body are elected. Gerrymandering electoral districts is an important means of achieving such an advantage. It is common to think that gerrymandering and malapportionment are distinct wrongs. Thus is incorrect. Controlling the population or the number of voters in a district for political advantage is gerrymandering. In a PR system this control allows fewer seats to be allocated to fixed or multimember districts likely to favor opposition candidates, or the systematic overpopulation of the electoral districts likely to be won by the opposition. Both techniques are forms of gerrymandering. In this scenario, the party drawing the redistricting or reallocation plan wins more seats because the opposition’s votes are wasted and the voter’s will is denied. Often leaving the status quo is a tactic used to benefit the party in power or all incumbents. It is amazing to me that a party not in power would find it convenient to support maintaining the status quo, but this is explainable if doing so benefits the party’s incumbents or if the party is more comfortable with a “known” role than with the uncertainties of change. A party’s leaders are the particular beneficiaries of a “status quo” policy.

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2 The Many Disguises of Gerrymandering

A search for gerrymanders on the basis that they are always strangely shaped is wrong. Sometimes they are oddly shaped; sometimes not. Some of the least effective gerrymanders have the most bizarre shape. Some of the most effective gerrymanders are uniform and aesthetically attractive in their appearance. Districts that are bizarre in appearance can become benign, nonpolitical, or even beneficial to a societal objective when explained by competent evidence. In some instances in the United States the most bizarre district boundaries are created for ostensibly positive reasons.18 However, even those districts can become vehicles for political gain. The practice of gerrymandering is generally reviled by voters. Therefore, it is popular for opposition candidates to promise to end it if elected. Few, if any, actually try to do so. I generally support Democratic candidates, but I cannot enthusiastically endorse the Party’s latest outcry about Republican gerrymandering and campaign to “end this travesty” because I think the Party’s objective is not so much to end gerrymandering as to replace gerrymanders favorable to Republicans with ones favorable to Democrats. We can do better. Gerrymandering electoral districts is contrary to the principles of representative democracy and is a threat to its survival.

18 See, e.g., the congressional districts created in Harris County (Houston) in 1991 [Chap. 9] ostensibly to benefit minority voters.

Chapter 3

The World’s Use of Electoral Districts

An electoral district is a geographically-defined area from which voting members of the national legislature are elected, usually by the resident voters of that electoral district. Virtually every nation uses electoral districts as part of its election system. Chapter 7 discusses those few nations that elect all members of the national legislature nationwide. Electoral districts can be an invaluable part of representative democracy, intended to assure fairness, voter equality, accountability, and geographical and political diversity in a legislative body. They also, however, can be a means for voter discrimination and entrenchment of the status quo through gerrymandering.

3.1

The Use of Fixed or Special Multi-Member Districts

All democracies, except those in Chap. 7, disperse or allocate at least some of the seats in the national legislature among the country’s fixed administrative districts, such as states, provinces, other administrative units, or special multi-member districts. Even in countries that rely only on PR elections those elections usually occur in fixed or special multi-member districts to which seats in the national legislature are allocated.1 In mixed systems, there are districts for the direct elections, such as single-member districts, but in many nations the PR component also incorporates special multi-member districts. In most countries these fixed districts are administrative units or governments such as states, provinces, or other administrative units. I refer to these units as “fixed districts.” A few countries, however, have defined a separate set of special multi-member electoral districts within the country. These “special multi-member districts” are

1

See, Chaps. 9 and 10.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_3

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3 The World’s Use of Electoral Districts

used for PR elections. Each such multi-member district usually has many governmental units in it, but has little or no governmental power itself. It is used only as a part of the election system. As a result, I use the term “special multi-member districts” to encompass these units. This allocation of seats is common for both upper and lower chambers in nations with bicameral national legislatures and in unicameral national legislatures. In the remainder of this book, however, I deal almost exclusively with districts as they are used in unicameral legislatures or the lower chamber of a bicameral legislature. The boundaries of these fixed or special multi-member districts seldom change. In some countries, these districts have remained unchanged since the nation was created or became a democracy and may even be specified in the nation’s constitution. It is possible to argue that even these states, provinces, administrative units, and special multi-member districts whose boundaries now are largely stable were originally drawn with some political goals in mind. Whatever those goals may have been, however, are far beyond the scope of this book. It is a mistake, however, to assume that these fixed districts never change. In some countries the number of units has increased, decreased or otherwise changed their boundaries over time as the nation has expanded or the units have been consolidated or divided. For example, the United States originally consisted of 13 states, but now consists of 50 states as a result of the nation’s expansion and the division of some states. Other nations, such as India, U.K., Japan, and France have seen similar changes. Turkey’s major cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara, have been split into two or three multi-member electoral districts as the population has grown. The same is true in many of the largest cities in nations like Iran.

3.2

Electing from Within Fixed or Multi-Member Districts

The manner of electing representatives within these fixed and special multi-member districts varies among nations. Some nations elect their representatives at-large in the fixed districts.2 In other instances, the fixed or special multi-member district functions as a multi-member electoral district. In some nations, this fixed district is sub-divided into individual districts. In most of these nations, such as France, India, United Kingdom, and the United States (House of Representatives), each of these individual districts elects a single representative to the national legislature using a First Past the Post (FPTP), Two Round System (TRS), or other plurality/majoritarian election scheme. In a few nations, however, these individual districts are at least partially multimember, and use a PR, Bloc voting, or other system. A few countries, such as Iran,

2 The United States Senate is an example. In the U.S. each state has two Senators elected by FPTP in staggered terms statewide.

3.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using of Electoral Districts

27

have both SMDs and MMDs and a unique TRS system. These various systems are discussed further in Chaps. 9 and 10. In other fixed districts, all of the seats allocated to the fixed district are elected by PR within the fixed district. The special multi-member districts are found primarily in nations that have PR elections or are used for the PR component of mixed systems.3

3.3

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using of Electoral Districts

All of the geography within each state, province, or administrative unit in the nation is usually included within some single-member district (SMD) or multi-member district (MMD) so that all qualified electors have a vote for at least one voting member or a political party in the national legislature.4 Using an election system with at least a component of districts has certain advantages. It allows voters in a constituency to hold a specific representative or group of representatives accountable—voting them out of office if a sufficient number of voters in the district are displeased. Therefore, each representative of a district has reason, whether a matter of loyalty or political survival, to act on behalf of his or her constituency rather than some more abstract interest such as national or political party needs. SMDs provide the most direct link between representative and constituents. This linkage is less in a MMD and lessens further as the number of representatives elected from a district increases and the role of the political party becomes paramount. On a policy plane, election from districts assures representation of more geographical areas in a country and, consequently, greater geographic diversity in the national legislature. Election from districts also has its disadvantages. Sometimes the interests of a constituency are clearly counter to the interests of the nation or the member’s political party. On these occasions, a district member’s conscience may be conflicted and his or her vote in the national legislature may be uncertain. Also, if a nation attempts some equality in voting power for its inhabitants, it must provide for the redrawing of the electoral districts at a regular interval or adjust the number of representatives in multimember districts to reflect changes in the relative population or number of voters within each district. Critics of SMDs also claim that such districts easily lead to gerrymandering and the creation of “electoral fiefdoms” in which a politician can win election and reelection at will. A nation’s use of single-member electoral districts is often criticized as resulting in a less politically diverse national legislature than PR

3

See, Chaps. 9 and 10. An exception exists in the United States, where residents of the District of Columbia (National Capitol) do not have a voting member of Congress. 4

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3 The World’s Use of Electoral Districts

elections. Support for this conclusion may be found in many countries, but particularly in the latest parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation.

3.4

Conclusion

For purposes of this book, I have divided the discussion of gerrymandering in the current use of electoral districts into: (1) Those countries that elect all members of the national legislature from the nation as a whole (Chap. 7); (2) Those countries which allocate seats to fixed districts, with the fixed district often sub-divided into singlemember or multi-member districts (Chap. 9); (3) Those countries which allocate seats to fixed districts or special multi-member districts, with PR elections held at-large in the district (Chap. 9); and (4) Those countries which have a mixed system that combines single-member districts with a proportional representation component (Chap. 10). Since my focus is on how electoral districts can be gerrymandered, my division is slightly different from the usual political science categorization into: • Plurality/majoritarian systems in which the candidate or parties with the most votes are considered the winners, such as first past the post (FPTP), party bloc vote (BV), alternative vote (AV), and two-round (TRS) electoral systems. • Proportional representation (PR) systems in which parties receive approximately the same share of the seats as they receive of the votes cast in the election. • Mixed systems in which plurality/majoritarian and proportional representation systems are combined in an attempt to have the best aspects of each system. In reality, both types of classification are useful in understanding the variety of election systems in the world. A basic tension exists in all election systems between the ability of voters to choose a specific candidate to hold accountable for the locale and the need for a political party to maintain discipline within the party by assuring that the elected candidates are committed to the party’s national vision. Each nation has balanced these conflicting interests in choosing its electoral system and modifying it. Districts are a vital tool for achieving that balance.

Chapter 4

Unequal Voting Power

The Code of Good Practice states that “seats (in the national parliament) must be evenly distributed between constituencies.”1 This principle, sometimes popularized as “one person, one vote” is perhaps the most widely acknowledged principle throughout representative democratic societies—i.e. that each person or voter should have an equal opportunity through his or her representative to determine national policy. This equality is measured by the relative number of persons or voters per representative. It is, however, a principle that has many different manifestations, and often seems more a matter of rhetoric than a reality of representative democracy. In some nations, this requirement has been loosened ostensibly to leave greater room for factors such as natural features, historical boundaries, and recognizing communities of interest and local government lines.2 These, as discussed in Chap. 12, are considered to be neutral factors and, if embodied in the law, are in the public interest. In some countries the courts have expressly disavowed the U.S. standard of voter parity in favor of community as the most effective means of guaranteeing representative democracy.3 In many countries, however, the exigencies of governance and politics simply have overcome this principle of equal voting power for all. Unequal voting power can be a result of gerrymandering: 1. When “unfriendly” fixed or special multi-member districts are allocated fewer seats than justified by population or number of electors to cause the opposition party to “waste” votes; 2. When “friendly” fixed or special multi-member districts are allocated more seats than justified; 1

Appendix A. See, Chap. 12. 3 See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1996); and Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, 183 (Can.). Excerpts from these cases appear in Chap. 14. 2

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3. When single-member (SMD) or multi-member (MMD) districts are drawn to “waste” an opposition party’s votes by overpopulating districts in which the opposition is likely to win; 4. When SMDs or MMDs are drawn to enhance the dominant party’s votes by underpopulating districts in which it is likely to win; 5. When SMDs or MMDs are drawn to help incumbents win reelection by underpopulating the district in which the incumbent will seek reelection; or 6. When the seats are not timely reallocated or the electoral districts not timely redrawn so that the dominant party or incumbents are advantaged by keeping the status quo. Each of these circumstances represents a deliberate act to advantage or disadvantage a party or individual by manipulating voting power through malapportionment. Therefore, if an imbalance in voting power exists, it justly raises a concern that it exists because of self-interest and is the result of gerrymandering. My research indicates that gerrymandering is a major, possibly the primary cause of significant malapportionment and voter inequality.

4.1

Different Measures of Equality

Measuring the comparative level of voter equality among nations is difficult because there is no uniform standard. Nations commonly speak of the relative equality of persons or electors among electoral districts in terms of a percentage, such as 10%. This can, however, be very misleading because the use of a percentage without further explanation can have many different meanings. For example, it is common to describe the standard for state legislatures and local governments in the United States as 10%.4 This percentage, however, is calculated by adding the numerical sum by which the most and least populous districts vary from this ideal. For example, if the total population of a jurisdiction is 10,000,000 and there are 10 single-member districts (SMDs), the ideal SMD size is 1,000,000 persons. If the most populous SMD is +7% from the ideal (i.e., 1,070,000 persons per representative), then a 10% deviation occurs only if the least populous SMD is
3% (i.e., 970,000) below the ideal. In this example, the total difference, or “total maximum deviation” between the two SMDs in the jurisdiction is 100,000 persons or 10% of the ideal.5 This measure gives the maximum difference between the value of votes in the jurisdiction. By contrast, most nations define the number of persons per representative by a percentage above or below the “norm,” “quota,” or “average” for the measured constituencies. This calculation tells an observer only about that single district, not 4 The “de minimis” or essentially no deviation standard in the U.S. applies only to congressional districts within a state. 5 This measure is used in a few nations, including the United States and Japan.

4.2 Calculating Voter Equality

31

about the plan as a whole. If one such district is 20% above the average number of persons or voters per representative within a jurisdiction, it is possible to achieve this measure of deviation only if this overpopulated district is offset by another district that is (or several districts that total) 20% below the average.6 Under this measure, a nation may claim that a particular district is only 20% above the average number of persons or voters per representative, but this means that a vote in the district is 50% less valuable than a vote in a district that is 20% below the average. For example, using the preceding example of a 10 district/1 million population electoral area, a district with population that is 20% above the average has 1,200,000 persons. Necessarily there must also be an off-setting district or districts in the jurisdiction that total 20% below the average (200,000 persons). If there are two off-setting 20% districts, the total maximum deviation between these two districts is 400,000 persons per representative, or 40% of the ideal. This difference of 400,000 persons is 50% of the least populous district, meaning that, assuming an equal percentage of voters to persons in the two districts, a vote in this district is more valuable than one in the more populous district. This is because there are fewer persons or voters per representative in his or her district than in the other (i.e., one out of 800,000 v. one out of 1,200,000) even though they have an equivalent vote in the national legislature. It also should be noted that although “norm,” “average, and “quota” are often used interchangeably among international standards, they have very different meanings. A quota in this context means the “proportional share” of persons or electors in a jurisdiction that a seat represents. It is easily calculated, and is essentially the same as “ideal.” It does not imply that any districts are at the ideal. The same is true of “average.” On the other hand, use of the word “norm” or normal suggests that although the particular district’s deviation from ideal is great, the other districts are at or near the ideal. This is very misleading. All of the districts could be significantly above or below the ideal.

4.2

Calculating Voter Equality

Any calculation of voter equality in a nation begins with a determination of the quota or ideal number of persons or electors per representative in the national legislature. This determination involves the simple division of the number of persons or electors in the country by the number of representatives in the national legislature. This calculation can be repeated for each fixed district (SMD) by dividing the district’s population or number of electors by the number of seats allocated to the fixed district to determine the quota or ideal number of persons or electors in each SMD within the fixed district. For multi-member districts (MMDs) the process is

6 For example, in a jurisdiction that has one district that is 20% above the ideal, there necessarily must be districts totaling a negative percentage of 20%, such as four districts each of minus 5%.

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4 Unequal Voting Power

similar. The number of persons or electors in each MMD, such as the fixed district as a whole if it is being used as a single MMD, is divided by the number of seats allocated to the multi-member district. These calculations indicate the ideal number of persons or electors per representative for each single-member or multi-member district. These simple calculations allow a comparison of the value of a vote (i.e. the person or voter per representative), in any SMD or MMD with the national ideal, the fixed district’s ideal, and voters elsewhere in the fixed district, special MMD, or nation. They also allow a comparison of the relative voting power of persons or electors in one fixed or multi-member district with those in another district. If the objective is to calculate the deviation as a percentage from the ideal, then subtract the number of people or electors per representative in the district from the ideal for the nation, if the objective is a comparison with voters nationwide, or the ideal for the fixed district, if the objective is a comparison within a fixed district, and divide the result by the appropriate ideal.7 This calculation will provide the percentage of deviation in persons or electors per representative for a district from the ideal in the country or fixed district. If the objective is to calculate the total maximum deviation among districts within a nation8 or a particular fixed district, add the largest deviation above the ideal to the largest deviation below the appropriate ideal while disregarding the plus or minus signs (e.g.
20% added to +20% ¼ 40%). This also can be obtained by determining the difference in the actual number of persons or electors between the two districts and dividing that number by the respective number of persons or electors in the ideal district. The significance of the difference to persons or voters in the two districts (or any two districts), divide the actual number of persons or electors in one of the districts by the difference in actual number of persons or electors between the two districts.9 Both areas elect a single representative to the national legislature. This means that in this example of 20% a person’s vote in the overpopulated district has only 2/3 of the weight as a person’s vote in the underpopulated dtrict. A similar calculation can be made by comparing the number of persons or voters per seat among different multi-member districts. Many other calculations are possible. One of these is to determine how many and by how much deviation is normal. This calculation may disclose that most of the districts are significantly above or below the ideal or average.

7

For example, if the ideal is 50,000 and the district has 40,000 persons or electors, the result is
10,000. If this result is divided by the ideal (50,000), the deviation is
20% from the ideal. 8 Although the U.S. requires essentially absolute equality in population among congressional districts within a state, there is no such requirement of equality among districts nationwide. However, both calculations are important. 9 E.g. if the difference is 400 persons or voters, and the number of persons or electors in the smaller of the two districts is 800 persons or electors then the difference is 50% of the smaller district. For the larger district with 1200 persons, the difference is 33.3% of the number of persons or electors in the district.

4.3 Limits on Deviation Set by Law Vary by Nation

33

Making these calculations is important for identifying gerrymanders. Any significant deviation from the ideal or average should be explained and justified by neutral criteria.10 If not, the odds are that politics is determining the boundaries of districts or the allocation of seats.

4.3

Limits on Deviation Set by Law Vary by Nation

The Code of Good Practice states that “The permissible departure from the norm should not be more than 10%, and certainly should not exceed 15% except in special circumstances (protection of a concentrated minority, sparsely populated administrative entity).”11 In other words, the Code of Good Practice accepts the principle of equality in voting power, but rejects the total maximum deviation standard for measuring equality. The maximum deviation allowed by laws in different countries varies from 3% above or below the quota in Macedonia to 25% above or below the quota in Germany (for existing districts), and Canada.12 The most common allowable legal deviation is 10% above or below the population quota. In many countries, however, the actual deviation among districts nationwide is higher than the limit set by law. Most often this degree of allowable deviation is given without explanation. It is usually interpreted to mean the percentage from the “average” or “quota” within the nation or a state or province, not as the difference between the highest deviations as occurs if using the total maximum deviation method. Many nations do not prescribe any objective or maximum deviation.13 Some mandate “as equal as possible,” but effectively leave the actual deviation to be determined by the national legislature or commission with authority to redraw districts or reallocate seats. The following chart shows the variable legal limit on deviation in a few of the major nations using SMDs (Table 4.1)14: 10

See, Chap. 12. Appendix B. Use of the word “norm” is unfortunate and misleading. 12 These nations include: Albania (5%), Armenia (15%), Australia (15% at creation), Belarus (10%), Canada (25%), Croatia (5%), Germany (25%), Hungary (20%), Italy (20%), Lithuania (25%), Macedonia (3%), New Zealand (5%), Papua New Guinea (20%), Singapore (30%), Ukraine (10%), United Kingdom (5% with exceptions; pending), United States (court imposed de Minimis), Yemen (5%), and Zimbabwe (20%). Most of these measurements are explicitly or implicitly from the quota. 13 These nations include: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, France, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Poland, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, and Uruguay. 14 These limits are lifted primarily from Toward Developing International Standards, Appendix C, ACE (2004). This invaluable compilation of election practices for 87 countries was headed by Lisa 11

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4 Unequal Voting Power

Table 4.1 Example deviation limits Country France Germany United Kingdom United States Japan India Australia Indonesia Russian Federation Canada

Limit under law None 15–25% Variable 0–1% None None 10% None None 25%

Notes 20% from quota—court imposed From quota. If 25%, a district must be redrawn Uniform limit of 5% postponed Total maximum deviation within each state Court has said 2–1 using total maximum deviation From quota

From quota

Some countries have a limit on the number of persons or electors among PR electoral districts. An example is Croatia at 5%, which elects an equal number of representatives from each domestic multi-member district, but has never changed the MMD boundaries.15

4.4

The Challenge of Limits Becoming the Norm

Unfortunately, in many nations this maximum of allowable deviation is more of an accepted and common result rather than an exception. Germany’s direct election constituencies are an example. The Bundestag regularly redraws districts that deviate from the Land quota by at least 25%, but leaves the deviation unchanged in the others. The inequality in these districts is left unaddressed until they too reach, or approach the 25% limit. This is gerrymandering! The Conseil Constitionnel in France16 is one of several authorities17 in Europe to recognize the problem that in its country, electoral districts tend to be drawn at the legal limits. The Conseil explained:

Handley, but is incomplete and was based in part on inaccurate surveys. The information contained in this chart is accurate for these countries. 15 See, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/ 2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010) 16 Decision no. 2008-573 DC, Conseil Constitutional (January 8, 2009). See Chap. 14. 17 See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X6472/2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010) and THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, ON THE COMPLIANCE OF ARTICLE 9, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA LAW ON THE ELECTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA (CONVENTION OF 6 NOVEMBER 2012) TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, No. KT27-N16 (October 20, 2015).

4.5 Inequality in a PR System

35

[T]he principle of equal electoral law will be violated or, in the interests of favorable election results, abusive by setting boundaries for constituencies. Therefore, the application of this maximum population deviation is possible only in exceptional cases, with proper justification.18 (Emphasis added).

A nation’s limit on deviation should not be an invitation for gerrymandering at or slightly beneath this limit. A legislator’s wish that his or her district be left unchanged simply because it is below the allowed extreme is a gerrymandering of district boundaries to benefit the self-interest of the incumbent and denial of the voters’ right to be treated fairly. Any significant19 deviation from equality should be justified by criteria that bear the public’s imprimatur. Each voter is entitled to be treated equally.

4.5

Inequality in a PR System

Gerrymandering through an inequality in an individual’s voting power may also occur in proportional election systems when fixed or multi-member districts are not allocated seats based solely on their population or voters. An example—two districts have an equal number of persons or qualified voters, but one is allocated five seats in the national legislature while the other has eight seats. Both may fall within the allowable deviation from the quota as prescribed by a nation’s law, but, in terms of representation in the national legislature, the effect is that a person’s vote in one province has less than 65% of the weight of a person’s vote in the second province. In a nation with a population of 20 million and a national legislature with 200 seats, each member ideally represents 100,000 persons. If two fixed or multimember districts each has a population of one million, but one is allocated five seats in the national legislature (each theoretically representing 200,000 persons) while another has ten seats (each theoretically representing 100,000 persons), it means that a voter in the latter district has twice as much ability to affect national policy as one in the first district.

18

Decision no. 2008-573 DC, Conseil Constitutional at paras 21 and 26 (January 8, 2009); See Decision No. 2008-24 ELEC of May 29, 2008, Observations of the Conseil Constitutionnel on the parliamentary elections of 10 and 17 June 2007. 19 I acknowledge that some minor deviations from the ideal occur because the legislature or commission finds it easier to draw districts in an allowable range than it is to try to meet an ideal. This is scant justification for any significant deviation.

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4.6

4 Unequal Voting Power

The Need for Requiring Periodic Redistricting and Reallocation

The issue of timely redistricting or reallocation is discussed in Chap. 8, but it is important at this point to realize that the presence in a nation of a limit on the allowable deviation from the average, which is discussed above, is different from a requirement to periodically redraw all districts in an effort to achieve equal voting power consistent with the applicable criteria. It is different in at least two ways. The first is that the limit on the degree of deviation may be applicable in most countries only when the districts are redrawn. Over time a district’s deviation may change, but there is no mandate to redistrict. The second difference is that in those nations, such as Germany, where there is a mandate to redraw a district if it exceeds a certain level of malapportionment, which in Germany is 25% from the quota, the particular district may be the only one purposefully redrawn, leaving the other districts unchanged20 even if their deviation from the average or ideal is significant but less than the maximum limit. The maximum allowable deviation becomes the usual deviation. Both a limit on acceptable deviation for when districts are redrawn and, where possible (i.e., in nations using an ongoing count or registration of persons or electors), a limit on existing malapportionment are appropriate. Whatever the limit on deviation, there must be a mandate after a clearly stated period of time to review and to redraw as necessary all districts to make them as equal “as possible” in persons or electors per representative. To provide otherwise is to invite gerrymandering. A similar requirement for the same number of persons or voters per seat in a PR system is necessary for voter equality.

4.7

Nations Fail to Comply with Their Own Requirements for Equality

Even among those nations that acknowledge the desirability of equal voting power and by law have set a numerical limit for deviations from equality, many have not lived up to those standards. The nation’s legislature or commission has found justifications in geography, history, communities of interest, historical boundaries, or expediency for not strictly adhering to the deviation limit set by law when redrawing a particular district. Almost any outcome can be rationalized, but few can really be explained when the whole plan is examined for consistency in application of a particular justification. Such an examination may reveal that the

20 Of course, it is impossible to redraw only one district. A change in the boundaries of one district necessarily affects the boundaries of one or more other districts.

4.8 Is Voter Equality Important?

37

proffered rationale for the underpopulation or overpopulation of one district is belied by the inconsistent treatment of other similarly situated districts. Other nations have given little or no justification for allowing the inequalities to persist. In many nations, this avoidance of prescribed deviation limits has its origin mostly in politics. It is made possible because: (1) there are few enforceable legal requirements that the districts must be redrawn or seats reallocated within a definite period; (2) courts are hesitant to compel timely redistricting in accordance with the nation’s legal limits; and (3) the political reluctance to redistrict or to reallocate electoral seats in most nations is not effectively offset by a public outcry against voter inequality.

4.8

Is Voter Equality Important?

Virtually all guidelines for democratic government claim population or voter equality as essential. It is wrong, however, to assume that this guideline enjoys unquestioning worldwide support. The relatively rigid standards set by courts in the U.S. for congressional districts are often criticized as being unjustified and the cause for widespread gerrymandering of electoral districts in this country. For many observers, there are good reasons for recognizing other criteria, such as geography, local government boundaries, etc. as considerations that serve a valid public interest and should be allowed to offset population or voter equality. Some critics of the “one person, one vote” doctrine suggest that it is more important that a voter be able to identify with a local community than that each person’s vote has absolutely equal weight and that equal suffrage may be best achieved through boundary assignment based on specific redistricting criteria. Courts in Canada and Australia have expressly rejected the rigid American standard in favor of “effective representation”.21 In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court considered this argument and concluded, “legislators represent people, not trees or acres” and “legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”22 The Court was reacting to the decades in which state legislatures, sometimes contrary to a state’s own constitution, had found some rationale for not redistricting at all or for not equalizing persons or voters among its electoral districts. I have always thought that the unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to accept neutral factors, such as the recognition of political subdivision boundaries, in the redistricting of congressional districts, was an indication of its basic distrust of state legislatures to draw the districts in good faith and without discriminatory influences.

21 See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1996); and Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask), 2 S.C.R. 158 (Can.) (1991). 22 Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).

38

4 Unequal Voting Power

The emphasis on absolute voter equality for congressional districts23 limits the discretion of state legislatures and their ability to gerrymander congressional districts behind the cloak furnished by redistricting criteria. As important as this legal notion of equality in voting power has remained for U.S. redistricting, it is clear that most other countries do not share this view. It is also clear, however, that some national legislatures simply avoid redistricting or reallocation of seats altogether unless there is judicial intervention. Some do so openly, such as India and France. Others achieve a similar result indirectly by delaying release of the census where obligated to redistrict after the census, such as Lesotho, or delaying the effective date of changes and thereby minimizing effects on existing office-holders, such as the U.K.

4.9

A Lax Standard for Voter Equality Encourages Gerrymandering

The presence of a lax limit on equality or the failure to enforce existing limits are invitations for the drawing of districts or allocating of seats for the purpose of advantaging or disadvantaging a political party or candidate—in other words a gerrymander. This effect can be significant. Assume a scenario in which a jurisdiction with ten million voters is to be divided into 100 single-member electoral districts. The ideal number of voters or quota in each district is 100,000. In this hypothetical, only 40% of the voters in the jurisdiction prefer Party A, while 50% prefer Party B. In an unbiased system it is reasonable to expect that the 100 representatives elected in the jurisdiction would roughly reflect this same 50/40 split,24 with party A winning a majority of the seats. In this scenario, however, Party B controls the redistricting and, within the hypothetical nation’s legally allowable limit of plus or minus 20% deviation from the quota, systematically overpopulates the districts likely to favor Party B and systematically underpopulates the districts likely to favor Party A. Given favorable demographics, Party B could actually win a majority of seats even though only favored by 40% of the voters. In some circumstances the highest deviations found worldwide are singular events caused by unusual geographical features, such as making an island a single district despite its underpopulation or overpopulation or occur because a state or province is guaranteed a certain number of seats regardless of its population, which 23 The Court has allowed state and local governments greater leeway in drawing their districts. The strict standard applies only to congressional districts within a state. I doubt that the Supreme Court foresaw how technology would allow legislatures the flexibility and means to meet this voter equality requirement, and by gerrymandering to still achieve most of their political goals. 24 In the hypothetical illustrated at the end of this chapter I added a third party C with 10% of the vote. The presence of this third party is intended to give the hypothetical a European flare, but is not necessary for the result that Party A can win a majority of the seats.

4.10

A District’s Shape Is Not Necessarily Indicative of Whether It Is Gerrymandered

39

is a regrettable relic of the past and causes some of the most extreme deviations. These are forms of legal manipulation of district boundaries, rather than gerrymandering. They have their basis in law; although they may become gerrymanders when they reflect an intentional bias toward one group of voters. The Constitutional Council of France has struck down that nation’s statutory guarantee of two seats for each département because it unfairly favored the rural areas. In many circumstances, however, this legal maximum for deviation has become a victim of politics with districts at or above the maximum becoming the rule rather than the exception.

4.10

A District’s Shape Is Not Necessarily Indicative of Whether It Is Gerrymandered

An example of how the shape of an electoral district is not necessarily an indication of gerrymandering and how a significant deviation in population can be an effective gerrymander is the 1958–1964 congressional redistricting in Texas. Situated in the upper center of the following Texas map is District 5 (yellow). It is compact, contiguous, regular in shape, and encompasses only one county, Dallas County. It seems the perfect non-gerrymandered district. It was, however, the most populous congressional district in the United States (951,527) in 1964. Next to it was the least populous congressional district in Texas, District 4 (Fig. 4.1). Why did this configuration exist? Democrats controlled the Texas Legislature, but more and more Texans were voting Republican, especially in Dallas County. The Legislature’s redistricting plan solved this political problem in part by making Dallas County a single, overpopulated district. The Legislature’s malign motive for its treatment of Dallas County was shown by comparison to how it had inconsistently split the state’s other populous county, Harris (the city of Houston), into two districts. By keeping all of Dallas County in one district, the legislature limited Dallas Republicans to only a single congressman, denied black voters in Dallas County an opportunity to elect a person of their choice to Congress, and kept a white Democrat in office in District 4. It was an effective gerrymander even though the district shape appeared benign. In 1964 U.S. Courts invalidated Texas’ redistricting plan because of its malapportionment and instituted a requirement of population equality among congressional districts in each state.25

25

Bush v. Martin, 224 F Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), aff’d per curium, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).

40

4 Unequal Voting Power

Dallas

Fig. 4.1 Gerrymandering by overpopulation, Texas in 1956–1964. This map was furnished by the Texas Legislative Council

In many other nations, however, a significant deviation in population or voters among electoral districts is common. Is such a deviation a form of gerrymandering? I believe the answer is “Yes!”26

4.11

Conclusion

This chapter points out six major problems that harm representative democracy. First, the practice of describing electoral districts in terms of their variance from the quota for a jurisdiction allows politicians to hide discrimination for or against a particular individual candidate or group because it tells nothing about the fairness of a redistricting or reallocation plan as a whole. To say that a district is only 10–20% above or below the quota hides the fact that there must be enough districts in the plan with the opposite sign to establish the quota. Also, use of the word “norm” to mean “ideal” is misleading. 26

Still, gerrymandering of equally populated districts in the United States is always a subject of interest worldwide. Appendix C describes another incident of congressional redistricting from Texas in 2003 that attracted worldwide attention.

4.11

Conclusion

41

Second, the allowable limit on the relative number of persons or electors per representative (the result of allowing deviation among the electoral districts) is far too high in most nations. A limit of 10–20% deviation from the quota for a fixed district may sound inconsequential when considered in isolation, but it may result in a difference of 20–40%, or higher, for voters within the same jurisdiction. For example, if the quota is 100,000 persons or electors with a potential allowable deviation of 20%, it means that one member of the national legislature represents 120,000 persons or electors while another represents only 80,000; yet both have an equal voice and vote in the national legislature. This same analysis applies to the allocation of seats. There are circumstances, such as an island, in which the presence of a significant deviation may be justified by neutral factors, but this should be the exception, not the rule. Third, some nations don’t have standards or even abide by their own laws or rules for the maximum allowable deviation because there is little or no means of enforcement of these laws or guidelines and no public outcry for violating them. These legislative actions seem to clearly be gerrymandering for the benefit of incumbents and the dominant party. Fourth, nations should have a requirement both for periodic review and redistricting of all districts and a limit on deviation of districts from an ideal or quota. Where possible (i.e. where current data is available) the limit should be applicable for when a district is redrawn and on an ongoing basis when the malapportionment meets a certain level. Germany has the right idea, but needs to add a requirement for periodic redistricting of all districts. Fifth, a lax requirement for equal voting power among voters encourages gerrymandering because it means that district shapes can be more easily adapted to advantage or disadvantage an individual, group, or political party without attracting attention as appearing bizarre or misshapen. The stricter the requirement for equality among voters, the more likely the gerrymandered districts will reveal themselves with bizarre shapes. Sixth, the calculation of voter equality should be made on a national basis. The fact that a single-member district varies only slightly from the ideal within a fixed district is not sufficient. The U.S. requirements for voter equality apply only within a state. History may be adequate justification for that country’s discrimination, but not as a model for other nations. Some nations have refused to follow the rigid system of equality found in the U.S. for legitimate reasons such as (1) they are appalled by what many see as the unnecessary and largely meaningless chaos in the U.S. after each decennial census; (2) they reject the U.S. notion of “voter parity” in favor of a more “pragmatic, pluralist, and group-based” concept that leaves room for community interests; and (3) they accept the reasoning that “effective representation is at the heart of the right to vote” not “equality of voting power per se.”27

27

See, McGinty v W Australia, 186 CLR 140 (1986).

42

4 Unequal Voting Power

I do not suggest that nations should adopt the rigid standards of the U.S., but the level of deviation that is permitted by most nations is far too high, especially if it serves as a standard for all districts instead of only extreme cases. It is above the recommended limits and encourages gerrymandering. A nation’s national legislature or courts may find the strict standards of the U.S. to be too extreme, but there is no bona fide reason for ignoring the international guidelines, its own laws, or the welfare of its inhabitants.

4.12

Gerrymandering Hypothetical

The following chart demonstrates the potential effects of gerrymandering. The hypothetical uses the gerrymandering tools of packing, fragmenting, and population variance to allow a party with 40% support to likely control elections in a jurisdiction of one million voters divided into ten single-member districts of unequal population or voters ranging between 20% (Table 4.2). Under this hypothetical, Party A, with only 40% of the voters in the jurisdiction, is likely to win as many as seven of the ten districts (Districts 1–7) based on past voting trends. Approximately 350,000 of Party A’s voters are spread among these seven districts, giving the Party with an outright majority in three districts (Districts 1–3) and a majority over Party B in four others (Districts 4–7). Of course, predicting future voting trends is never easy or guaranteed. Party B has 500,000 supporters, equaling ½ of the voters in the jurisdiction, but may win in only two or three districts, with 180,000 of its voters “packed” in two districts (Districts 8 and 9), where it has an outright majority, and the remaining 220,000 “fractured” among the others. Districts 6 and 10 present interesting cases. District 6 becomes a toss-up if the 15,000 Party C voters join with Party B’s voters to support the Party C candidate. In Table 4.2 Hypothetical gerrymandering District voters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total

Party A (400,000) 45,000 45,000 50,000 50,000 55,000 50,000 50,000 20,000 20,000 10,000 400,000

Party B (500,000) 35,000 35,000 40,000 35,000 40,000 35,000 45,000 90,000 90,000 55,000 500,000

Party C (100,000) – – – 5000 5000 15,000 15,000 – 10,000 50,000 100,000

Total voters (1,000,000) 80,000 80,000 90,000 90,000 100,000 100,000 110,000 110,000 120,000 120,000 1,000,000

Deviation (%)
20
20
10
10 0 0 +10 +10 +20 +20 0

4.12

Gerrymandering Hypothetical

43

District 10, Party A is very unlikely to win, but if its voters join with those of Party C, the Party C candidate will probably win and leave Party B winning only two districts. This possibility offers a bargaining tool for Party A to get Party C cooperation in District 6. A hypothetical gerrymandering of seats in a PR election can produce a similar result. Gerrymandering in the real world to produce a designed result is replete with uncertainties that are not evident in this hypothetical, including the quality of candidates, the mood of the voters, etc. The most thoughtful redistricting plan may become a sacrifice to reality.

Chapter 5

Equality in Electors or Persons

Assuming that the relative equality of voting power is a priority, there are several bases for measuring that equality. The Code of Good Practice states that: [Voting power] entails a clear and balanced distribution of seats among constituencies on the basis of one of the following allocation criteria: population, number of resident nationals (including minors), number of registered voters, and possibly the number of persons actually voting.1

In a homogeneous society, where age, citizenship, voter registration, and voter turnout are uniform among all regions and racial, religious, or ethnic group, these bases should produce roughly the same result. As we know, however, these factors are not always uniform. As a result, the choice of the base upon which to equalize districts can have a significant political effect, and overrepresent or underrepresent certain regions or groups in a national legislature. The three most commonly used bases for redistricting and reallocation of seats are the number of persons (total population), the number of citizens (including young), or the number of electors (eligible voters or citizens of voting age [CVAP]).2 In most cases the measures produce similar results, at least at the macro level and particularly if a nation’s standard of equality are lax. Pockets exist, however, in which an abnormally large number of noncitizens cluster together. These are common in many countries, but often are insignificant to the overall tasks of redistricting or reallocation. In some nations, however, a base that does not include non-citizens can produce very different outcomes.

1

Appendix A. It was difficult for me to find reliable data on whether a country uses population or electors for redistricting or reallocation because many countries simply have not engaged in these tasks recently or sources conflicted because they made assumptions without focusing specifically on the issue. As a result, Appendix B offers only a partial list of countries. Also, it should be noted that “citizen population” is a popular base in European Countries.

2

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_5

45

46

5

Equality in Electors or Persons

Districts equal in census population are not necessarily equal in the number of citizens or eligible or actual voters. For example, the current 36 congressional districts in Texas are absolutely equal in persons (698,488, according to the 2010 census),3 but vary widely in the number of eligible voters, registered voters, and actual voters in prior elections. The Texas Legislative Council reported that in the congressional districts enacted in 2011, one district (District 21) had 542,873 registered voters (requiring citizenship) while another (District 33) had only 261,615. The voter turnout figures for the two districts showed a similar disparity in the 2016 legislative election at 365,284 (District 21) compared to 130,923 (District 33).4 This disparity is attributed to the make-up of the districts. District 21 is 64% Anglo; while District 33 is 66% Hispanic, with a much larger percentage of noncitizens and persons under 18 years of age.5 In some countries, such as Germany, Finland, and many other European countries, the base is “citizen population.” Most of these countries also recognize citizenship as something that passes from one generation to another through “blood,” not necessarily place of birth. This distinction has at least two effects. First, it removes the ability of some persons to claim citizenship as a birth-right even though born and residing in a country. Second, it means that persons can also claim citizenship and vote even though their family now and possibly for generations has resided outside the country. As a result, some countries have created “constituencies” for this “diaspora” with separate candidates and separate seats in the national legislature.6 The issue of citizenship is discussed further later in this chapter. Provinces and territories in at least two nations, Canada and Australia, diverge. Seats are allocated from the national level on the basis of population, but singlemember districts in the provinces are drawn on the basis of electors. For the reasons set out below, some fear that states under Republican domination in the U.S. will begin using the number of electors as the basis for redistricting, especially if the census is changed to ask if a person is an American citizen. The bases for redistricting or reallocating seats among fixed or multi-member districts are:

3

Actually District 33 is one person short of this total at 698,487. www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist.html. Not all of this disparity is attributable to citizenship or age. Hispanics have a notoriously low rate of voter registration and turnout even among eligible voters. 5 For example, although the two districts are equal in population, District 33 has only 469,456 in voting age population (VAP), compared to 553,018 in District 21. www.tx.leg. Another district had only 471,352 VAP. Id. 6 See, New Borders and Anomalies in the Balkans: Croatia’s Diaspora Constituency by Tihana Bartulac-Blanc, National Endowment for Democracy (2007) available at www.ned.org. Other nations with separate constituencies for the diaspora include Spain, Greece, Hungary, and several other European countries. 4

5.1 Using Population

5.1

47

Using Population

The most popular base worldwide for drawing single-member districts and allocating seats is total population. At least 65 countries claim this base (see Appendix B), but my count is incomplete as I was unable to find the base for every nation. For most nations, using total population requires that the nation have a recent, dependable census or registration of all inhabitants. Such a census or registration often is unavailable. As a result, some nations that by law are supposed to use total population have used some substitute for drawing electoral districts. For example, in 2009, the Federal Supreme Court in Iraq required the use of food ration cards as the best proxy available to show the population of its 18 governorates serving as multimember electoral districts. The Court rejected the use of registered voter data because the nation’s constitution required equality in persons, not voters. On the other hand Liberia in 2005 suspended the legal requirement of using total population data since the last census occurred in 1984 and was believed to be outdated. The national legislature combined voting precincts to establish electoral districts. In 2008, the country completed a census, and seats in the national legislature were reallocated and constituency boundaries redrawn at that time according to the new census.7

5.1.1

The U.S. Experience: Using Census Population

The U.S. is known for using total population as the basis for redistricting. The U.S. Constitution8 explicitly requires that seats in the U.S. House of Representatives be apportioned among the states according to the number of “persons” within each state as determined by the decennial census.9 Redistricting and gerrymandering in the U.S. assumes the availability of a reliable, unbiased census.10

7

See, Delimiting Electoral Boundaries in Post-Conflict Settings by Lisa Handley at page 191 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 8 Article 1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 9 The Constitution does not specify, however, what basis should be used by states for drawing the congressional districts, or for drawing the electoral districts for the state legislatures or local governments. States might be able, like provinces and territories in Canada and Australia, to use the number of electors, or, as popularly known in the U.S., citizen voting age population (CVAP) or eligible voters. 10 State and local governments in the U.S. have overwhelmingly used population as the basis in the past (with minor modifications [e.g. removing the population of prisons in a jurisdiction where its inmates cannot vote) largely because the census data is an enumeration (an actual count of people instead of an estimate) and is considered the most comprehensive, uniform, accurate, and objective information available.

48

5

Equality in Electors or Persons

The U.S. Census is conducted every 10 years. It is conducted for one date (April 1 of the last year of a decade [e.g. 2020]) and is intended as a count of every inhabitant of every place, however remote, in the nation on that date. The census not only counts persons, but obtains a wide variety of information about conditions and people. This information is collected, organized, and then released in a series of reports (now largely computer tapes or data dumps) over several years. The first release of census data in the U.S. comes early in the year (e.g. 2011) following the census and relates demographic data, including race and voting age, for all geographic areas in the country and shows this data down to very small areas generally equivalent to a city block. This detail, combined with computer software designed specifically for redistricting, generally shows which electoral districts are overpopulated or underpopulated compared to the ideal under the new census and allows state legislatures, local government officials, redistricting commissions, and the general public to draw and proffer redistricting plans based on the new population data.11

5.2

The Arguments for and Against Using Population

Those in favor of requiring total population to be equalized among electoral districts emphasize that every inhabitant is entitled to equal representation and that non-citizens and the young have legitimate issues too. A favorite analogy is of two institutions, one an orphanage, the other a retirement center. Both seek government funding. Although, in the analogy, they are equal in population, all of the residents of the retirement center are electors, but none of the residents in the orphanage is old enough to qualify as a voter. Should only the retirement center have a right to representation in the contest for government funding? Similarly, areas inhabited primarily by non-citizens or the young have needs, such as health care and housing. Should these areas be entitled to equal representation in the national legislature? Opponents of using total population as the basis for drawing districts point to several drawbacks. Census data may be inaccurate. In 2010 it was estimated that the U.S. census undercount was about 1.6%, with a higher percentage for certain minorities.12 Census data also becomes obsolete. Districts drawn on the basis of a periodic census become malapportioned as the population changes or shifts during that period. It may be financially or practically infeasible to do a national census

Therefore, redistricting in the United States generally occurs during the first year of each decade when the results of the decennial census are first released and show that the electoral districts are malapportioned. The U.S. courts have usually required use of data from the last census even later in a decade rather than permit districts to be redrawn based on population estimates or projections that the courts fear could be manipulated for political gain. 12 See, www.census.gov/data 11

5.3 The Argument for and Against Using Electors, Citizen Population, Eligible. . .

49

more often than once per decade; therefore, a reliable census may be unavailable later in a decade.13

5.3

The Argument for and Against Using Electors, Citizen Population, Eligible Voters, or Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)

The claim that electors, eligible voters, or citizen voting age population are more appropriate measures of equality among districts appears on first blush to be sound since only citizens and persons over a certain age are allowed to vote. Many of my colleagues, especially those teaching at universities outside the U.S., advocate this view. Their argument is that it is nonsensical to allow noncitizens and the very young to affect who are representatives in a democracy in which they are ineligible to vote. Some of the same reasoning supports a base of “citizen population,” which includes citizens too young to vote. The use of eligible voters, citizen population, CVAP, or electors as a basis for redistricting is particularly widespread among European countries. An effect is that in some countries segments of society in a country not only may remain unable to vote but are underrepresented in the allocation of seats in the national legislature. For example, the United Kingdom uses the number of registered voters as its base, thereby leaving out a portion of its adult population. Also, Muslims, particularly from Turkey, have constituted a part of the population of Germany for most of the twentieth century, but many Muslim inhabitants have remained citizens of their country of origin and have declined or been unable to become German citizens.14 They have a limited ability to affect the allocation of seats in Germany’s complex PR election process or government policy.15 A similar effect exists in several other European countries. Whether it affects election outcomes or governmental policy is beyond the scope of this book.

France found a solution to the possibility that a census might show a need to redistrict —abolish the census. 14 An estimate made in 2015 calculated that there are 4.4 to 4.7 million Muslims in Germany (5.4–5.7% of the population). About 1.7 million are German citizens. 15 One of the issues of growing significance on which these Muslims might have a view is immigration. See, The Many Sides of Muslim Integration: A German-American Comparison by Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, Lily Gardner Feldman, Mathias Rohe, Raida Chbib, Rauf Ceylan, Tara Bahrampour, AICGS (2010); Immigration and Socio-Spatial Segregation—Opportunities and Risks of Ethnic Self-Organisation by Rauf Ceylan, 46 German Journal of Urban Studies (2007). 13

50

5.4

5

Equality in Electors or Persons

Defining Citizenship

In a general sense, there are essentially three ways in which countries define citizenship—by blood (Jus sanguineous), by birth (jus soli), or by naturalization. Countries, however, vary greatly in their specifics about who or how a person can become a citizen. Many countries provide citizenship on preferential terms to individuals with ethnic ties to these countries (so-called lieges sanguinis). The most common method of obtaining citizenship is by Jus Sanguinis (Latin: right of blood). It is a principle by which citizenship is not determined by place of birth or necessarily residence, but by having one or both parents who are citizens of the nation. Children at birth may automatically become citizens if their parents have citizenship, even if they are born abroad. Many nations16 have some form of birthright citizenship, or Jus Soli. In many cases, however, this right is limited by requiring that least one parent must be a citizen or long-term resident of the country. In a slightly different twist, Iran grants citizenship at birth to persons born in Iran of foreign parents if one or both of the parents were themselves born in Iran. The current U.S. President, Donald Trump, has questioned whether the U.S. should keep birthright citizenship because, in his view, the right is being abused by pregnant immigrants. At a time of greater international mobility and number of refugees, the application of these citizenship principles has become mixed and less susceptible to clear distinction. For example, Germany, long an example of Jus Sanguineous, loosened its policy in 2000, replacing the parent’s citizenship requirement with a requirement that children born to a parent who has had a German permanent resident permit for at least 3 years or has lived in Germany for at least 8 years can get German citizenship. On the other hand, the United Kingdom used to grant birthright citizenship, but with an increasingly international population coming to the country, the government removed unconditional citizenship by birth in the British Nationality Act of 1981. Children born in the UK today can get citizenship only if they have at least one parent who is a citizen, a “settled” resident of the country, or a resident of the British territories, or upon the tenth birthday of the child. Naturalization is the legal act or process by which a non-citizen may acquire citizenship or nationality in a country. It is available in most countries. The specifics vary greatly, including issues such as marriage to a citizen, continuous residence in the country,17 knowledge of the country and the government, and whether the country permits dual citizenship. Many nations also have a denaturalize process through which it deprives one of its citizens of citizenship. 16

These include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Ireland was the last country in Europe to abolish unrestricted birthright citizenship. 17 Some countries require lengthy residence. For example, most countries require at least 10 years of continuous residence.

5.5 Evenwel v. Abbott: Population or Eligible Voters

51

Historically, there are many instances of mass naturalization by law, such as when Greece in 1922 naturalized all the Greek refugees returning from Turkey. A second massive naturalization process occurred when Armenian refugees from Turkey went to Syria, Lebanon or other former Ottoman countries. Reciprocally, Turkey massively naturalized the returning refugees of Turkish descent. In the United States citizenship was extended in mass to citizens of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Native-Americans became citizens of the United States under the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.

5.5

Evenwel v. Abbott: Population or Eligible Voters

In 2016 a unanimous United States Supreme Court in Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. ___ (April 4, 2016) upheld the right of Texas to draw its state senate districts using total population numbers from the census, but did not foreclose the use of “eligible voters” (i.e. CVAP) in the future. Proponents of using population pointed to the history of the usage of total population for redistricting in the U.S. and the initial decision of the members of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 to use total population as the basis for apportioning seats in Congress. Writing for the Court in Evenwel, Justice Ginsburg explained: As the Framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment comprehended, representatives serve all residents, not just those eligible or registered to vote. . . . . Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy debates—children, their parents, even their grandparents, for example, have a stake in a strong public-education system—and in receiving constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits bureaucracies. By ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same number of constituents, total population apportionment promotes equitable and effective representation.18

The Court’s opinion allowed the Texas Legislature to use census population.19 In Evenwel two justices (J.J. Alito and Thomas) concurred with the judgment in opinions indicating that jurisdictions could use total population for redistricting, but also expressly indicated that it was permissible to use eligible voters. The Court left this issue unresolved in an apparent effort to reach a unanimous decision on a short-handed Court.

18

At page18 of the slip opinion.in Evenwel v Abbott. The Court opinion in Evenwel dealt only with state senate districts in one specific state (Texas), where the state’s constitution did not expressly require redistricting on the basis of persons (a previous version of the provision as adopted in 1876 invited use of the number of “qualified electors” for drawing the state’s senate districts). The Court in Evenwel did not address other instances where the applicable wording is different, such as language requiring the use of population. The opinion does not indicate that as a general matter equalizing eligible voters (i.e. CVAP) instead of persons is forbidden; nor does it approve such usage.

19

52

5.6

5

Equality in Electors or Persons

The Brewing Controversy in the United States Regarding Citizenship

The difference between redistricting on the basis of population or citizen voting age20 is great in parts of the United States. Recent U.S. censuses have not enumerated the number and specific location of citizens. As a result, the use of “eligible voters” as a basis for drawing districts currently has been possible only by extrapolation of census data and is less precise and reliable than the census enumeration of persons. As a result, courts have rejected the use of “eligible voters” or CVAP on the few occasions when it has been proposed. This may be changing. A current controversy in the U.S. is over whether the census should be changed in 2020 to ask if each person in a household is a citizen.21 Several lawsuits are pending, but the issue has reached the Supreme Court and it is expected to rule by late June, 2019. Critics of this change are concerned that it will cause an inaccurate census and a significant undercount of both noncitizen and citizen immigrants, such as noncitizen parents with citizen children in their household.22 A recent court decision has questioned whether the citizenship data from the census would be reliable because, even if the question on citizenship is included in the census, privacy concerns would require that the data be reported only for large census areas. For purposes of this book, the primary concern is that the inquiry on citizenship is the precursor for redistricting on the basis of “eligible voters” (CVAP) or electors instead of population. It is likely that this issue of which base will be used for redistricting will be vigorously litigated in many jurisdictions over the next decade, with the outcome varying according to the wording of applicable state laws or constitutions and the political offices at stake.23

20

Since the U.S. has a right of citizenship based on birth, many non-citizen families have one or more citizen children. Thus a potential way of reducing the count of immigrants for redistricting purposes is to count only citizens over 18 years of age – thus the critics of using total population urge using “citizen voting age population” (CVAP) rather than “citizen population.” 21 See, What to know about the citizenship question the Census Bureau is planning to ask in 2020 by D’Vera Cohn, Pew Institute (March 30 2018) @ www.pewresearch.org; Census deadline looms for public to comment on adding citizenship question by Deborah Barfield Berry, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2018) @ www.usatoday.com. If an inquiry on citizenship is added to the U.S. Census, the uncertainties of extrapolation disappear. The citizen number could become as reliable as the rest of the census. However, asking the “citizen” question in the census could reduce the number of census responses from Hispanic and Asian citizens and increase the undercount of language minorities that are citizens. Moreover, having an enumeration of citizens and non-citizens could undercut enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. 22 These critics suggest that many Hispanic and Asian persons will avoid answering the census questionnaire altogether because they fear a possibility that the government in the future will use this citizenship data to find and deport them even if they currently have a legal right to remain in the U.S. 23 This issue is of grave political importance in the U.S. because such a change in the base for redistricting would significantly reduce the number of districts with Democratic majorities, especially at the state and local levels (the U.S. Constitution’s use of “persons” for apportioning seats in

5.8 Civil Registry

53

The argument for using electors or CVAP in lieu of population has become politicized in the U.S. Many current electoral districts have significant and disproportionate percentages of Hispanic or Asian noncitizen inhabitants and citizens too young to vote. These heavily Hispanic or Asian districts have usually elected Democratic representatives to Congress, state legislatures and local governing boards. Some Republicans are prepared to push for redistricting on the basis of CVAP numbers to reduce the number of such districts24 and the number of Democrats elected to state legislatures, local governments, and Congress. Therefore, any decision by state or local governments to equalize citizen population or eligible voters among districts instead of population is seen by some Democrats as a partisan grab by Republicans for political power rather than a rational alternative basis for redistricting.

5.7

Increasing Importance for the Distinction Between Elector and Population

This distinction between total population and citizens, citizen population, electors, or eligible voters for redistricting and allocation of seats will take on increased importance in some countries, given the mass movement of refugees throughout the world. These immigrants are not citizens upon arrival; therefore they cannot vote and in many countries are not included in the basis for redistricting or allocating seats in the national legislature. Since these and other immigrants cluster together in their new nation, these areas can become underrepresented in the national legislature and in the nation’s law-making.

5.8

Civil Registry

Several nations have effectively replaced or supplemented their census with a requirement that all residents or citizens must periodically register at a certain age or in order to vote.25 Civil registration allows a national government to record the

Congress makes it difficult [but not impossible] to conclude that it is legally permissible for a state to use CVAP for drawing U.S. House of Representative districts). 24 A shift of the base for redistricting from total population to electors or citizen voting age population would cause minority persons (i.e. non-citizen or underage) to be a majority of voters in fewer districts, reduce the number of districts with significant Hispanic and Asian inhabitants and voters, and probably reduce the number of Democrats elected to congressional, state legislative and local government offices. 25 Among countries deriving the base to be used for the allocation of seats or redistricting from such registries are France, United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Namibia, South Africa, Romania, The Netherlands, Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, The Philippines, and Australia. Some countries use the registry to derive eligible voters; others use it to derive total population.

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vital events, such as births, marriages, deaths, etc., of its residents. As an incentive some of these nations tie benefits, such as public health care, to this registration. Depending on its nature, registration can be used to support redistricting or reallocation on the basis of population, some sub-set of population, or electors. Usually, however, a national registry is used to provide a base of registered voters. Using registrants as the base of equalization among electoral districts has the benefits of not requiring a census to know the number of persons or eligible voters and theoretically being updated periodically to allow redistricting more often than possible with a census. It is acknowledged, however, that any list of registrants is likely to be unreliable. For example, the U.K. Electoral Commission estimated on December 1, 2015 that between 7.6 and 8.3 million eligible people were not correctly registered to vote at their current address across Great Britain.26 Another source estimates that three million eligible voters are entirely left out of the current registration roll in the UK.27 Also, registration is often disproportionately deficient in registering specific groups, such as minorities, the young, or urban dwellers, thus resulting in an underrepresentation of these groups in the national legislature. In addition to requiring enrollment in the civil registry, Australia requires all eligible Australian citizens and British subjects living in Australia to enroll and to vote in federal elections, by-elections and referendums, but the modest fine ($180 Australian dollars maximum) and availability of exemptions mean that some eligible voters do not register or vote. Several other countries mandate that their citizens vote.28 The United States does not mandate registration or voting and is unlikely to ever use registered voters as a basis for redistricting.29

26 See, New registration system sees more accurate registers; but further action still needed to encourage electoral registration, The Electoral Commission of the United Kingdom (14 Jul 2016); Electoral statistics, UK: 2017, Office for National Statistics (2017). 27 See, PUTTING VOTERS IN THEIR PLACE by Ron Johnson & Charles Pattie, Oxford Univ. Press (2006). 28 In at least eleven countries in the world have laws that require mandatory voting. These countries include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Luxembourg, Nauru, North Korea, Peru, Singapore, and Uruguay. 29 The problem of using registered voters to determine the number and location of electors is great in the United States, where it is very unlikely that redistricting on the basis of registered voters will ever be legally acceptable. The U.S. has no national civil registry of citizens or inhabitants. Registration occurs only as a requirement for voting, is voluntary, and is the responsibility of each individual state. States actually vary in their definition of who is eligible to register (e.g. several states have limitations on the voting rights of convicted felons). The registration process may vary by state or local government—in some jurisdictions it may occur on the day of the election. Moreover, the accuracy of registered voter lists may vary by state and by jurisdictions within a state because it often relies on the vagaries of local officials and may include dead or ineligible persons in some jurisdictions whose names have not yet been purged from the list, while excluding eligible persons who do not register or register late.

5.11

5.9

Conclusion

55

Voters in the Last Election

Several countries30 have opted for measuring the equality of their electoral districts according to the number of persons who actually voted in the last election. Interestingly the Supreme Court of Croatia used this data to conclude that the PR multi-member districts in the country were malapportioned.31 This basis is administratively simple, but is subject to many variables, such as turnout, and can easily lead to districts that are badly malapportioned based on population or eligible voters. At least one nation, Uruguay, has recently discontinued allocating seats on the basis of a fixed district’s vote in the recent general election. It now uses population. Many nations not only allocate seats to fixed or special multi-member districts before an election, but have a formula for reallocating those seats after an election in PR systems or an election in the PR component of a mixed system. This formula is based on the actual vote for a party in a region, fixed district, or special multimember district. This issue adds a possibility of unequal voting power for individual voters and is discussed further in Chap. 10.

5.10

Expediency

There are several examples in which new or strife ridden nations lacked a reliable census or count of electors to use for drawing electoral districts and used other data temporarily as a rough equivalent. For example, as discussed above, elections in Iraq after the U.S. invasion used food ration cards to identify voters.

5.11

Conclusion

It is wrong to assume that the choice of the base for redistricting is a form of gerrymandering. The decision is complicated and there are legitimate reasons for the choice of using citizens, citizen population, eligible voters, or electors instead of population other than to advantage or disadvantage political parties or elements of society. Nevertheless, use of any base other than a reliable enumeration of all persons has the potential effect of advantaging or disadvantaging certain groups and candidates by underrepresenting certain areas and persons. To this extent, it has many of the effects of gerrymandering.

30

See, e.g., Belarus. See, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/ 2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010). Further discussion of this case may be found in Chap. 14. 31

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The question of whether to use population or another base for redistricting is largely unimportant today in most countries because these countries cannot get past the initial question of whether to redistrict or reallocate at all and because for most countries the differences of using one base or another would be small, at least on the national level. This question, however, is already important in some countries and will become more important worldwide as a political issue in the future as more and more persons immigrate and become non-citizen residents in their new country. The question is certain to generate disagreement in the United States.

Chapter 6

The Upper Chamber of a Bicameral National Legislature

Although this book deals primarily with unicameral national legislatures and the lower chamber of bicameral legislatures, it would be inappropriate to entirely ignore the upper chamber of bicameral legislatures.1 At least 48 nations have bicameral national legislatures in which the members of the upper chamber are appointed, including those in which these members are “indirectly elected” by state, provincial, or other local legislative bodies.2 Another 28 nations have bicameral national legislatures in which at least some in the upper chamber are directly elected.3 At least 128 have unicameral national legislatures.4 Appendix B provides a list of

1

See, Does Bicameralism Matter? by Michael Cutrone and Nolan McCarty (Princeton Univ. 2006) later printed by Oxford University as part of The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (2008). 2 The nations with bicameral national legislatures in which the upper chamber is appointed or “indirectly elected” include: Afghanistan, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bermuda, Bhutan (Monarch appoints 11 members), Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Grenada, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan (appointed by Monarch), Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Myanmar, Morocco (appointed by Monarch), Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Rwanda, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland (appointed by Monarch), Thailand (appointed ½ by lower chamber and ½ by government), Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Saint Lucia, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom (appointed mostly by Monarch), and Yemen. 3 These nations include Australia (STV), Belgium (PR), Bolivia (PR), Brazil (3 elected by majority for each of 26 states and Federal District), Chile (PR), Colombia (PR), Czech Republic (TRS), Dominican Republic (FPTP), Haiti (3 elected by majority [TRS] in each of 10 administrative départements), India (STV), Indonesia (SNTV), Italy (P), Japan (P), Kazakhstan (FPTP, with 9 appointed), Liberia [2 elected in FPTP from each of 15 counties for 9 year terms], Mexico (P), Nigeria (FPTP), Palau (In MMDs, there are no political Parties), Paraguay (PR), Philippines (nationwide through majority at-large voting), Poland (FPTP), Romania (PR), Spain (FPTP), Switzerland (FPTP), United States (FPTP), Uruguay (PR nationwide), and Zimbabwe (PR, with addition of eighteen selected by the tribal chiefs and two people with disabilities). 4 The nations with unicameral national legislatures include: Andorra, Anguilla, Albania, Algeria, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_6

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nations with bicameral and unicameral national legislatures. In most of the nations with bicameral legislatures, only the members of the “lower chamber” are directly elected. This possibility of a “second house” of a national legislature not based on equal representation of persons or voters is recognized in the Code of Good Practice, which provides that the principle of equal voting power among constituencies “must at least apply to elections to lower houses of parliament.”5 There is, however, considerable variation among bicameral nations in how the members of the upper chamber are selected and how they are empowered.

6.1

Differences in How Members of an Upper Chamber Are Selected

Among nations with a bicameral national legislature, there are apparently three general methods for deciding how members of the upper chamber are selected— by the legislature or council of a local government or province, by some other designated authority (usually the head of state or lower chamber of the national legislature), or by direct election. Many nations combine these methods in selecting their upper chamber.

6.1.1

Appointment by a Local Government (Indirect Election)

The most common method, which appears often in combination with other methods, is appointment by a local government, region, or province.

Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus (North), Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Estonia, Egypt, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Falkland Islands (Maldives), Finland, Fiji, Georgia, Guernsey, Ghana, Greenland, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jersey, Kenya, Kosovo, Republic of Korea, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Libya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Macau, Mali, Malta, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Monserrat, Micronesia, Republic of Moldova, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Niue, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Saint Helena, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Taiwan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Virgin Islands (British), Virgin Islands (U.S. territory), Wallis and Fortuna, Zambia, and Zanzibar. 5 Appendix B.

6.1 Differences in How Members of an Upper Chamber Are Selected

59

If the members of the upper chamber of a bicameral national legislature are selected by local legislatures or councils,6 it is often said that they are “indirectly” elected and represent persons within those provinces, administrative units, regions, states, or even tribes in the nation’s lawmaking. The nature of these local entities varies greatly based on the history of the country. For example, the Russian Federation has different “federal subjects”, including 22 republics, 46 oblasts, nine krais, three federal cities, four autonomous okrugs, and one autonomous oblast, each of which sends two “senators” to the country’s upper chamber. I treat those members as appointed because they are not directly elected by the voters and some, such as in Germany, serve at the will of the local government instead of for terms. Many countries use this indirect election method for determining the members of the upper chamber, but the procedure varies widely. In the Netherlands, for example, the upper chamber (Eerste Kamer) has 75 members selected for a 4-year term by the provincial councils on the basis of proportional representation at the provincial elections. In Germany, the members of the upper house are selected by the state (Lander) legislatures, but have no term and can be replaced with a change in the state government. In France the upper chamber is chosen primarily by local councils. In Namibia the upper chamber is selected by local councils, but is only advisory. The upper chamber in the Russian Federation has 170 members consisting of two representatives for each of its 85 “federal subjects.” One representative is selected by the local executive and one by the local legislative body.

6.1.2

Appointment by Nation’s Executive or an Outside Authority

There remain at least 24 nations with constitutional monarchies bound to exercise their powers and authorities within the limits prescribed by an established legal framework.7 The powers actually exercised by the monarch vary by country and are beyond the scope of this book. In most of these countries, the constitutional monarch appoints at least some members of the upper house. For example, in Bhutan the monarch appoints five of the 25 members of the upper chamber, while in Swaziland (now the Kingdom of

6

Initially the United States utilized such a scheme by which the legislature of each state was authorized to determine the manner of selecting the state’s United States senators. Most state legislatures initially decided to make the selection themselves and generally choose among their own members. Gradually more and more states changed to a system under which the U.S. senators were directly elected by a state’s voters. The United States Constitution was amended through the Seventh Amendment in 1911 to require direct election of U.S. senators in all states. 7 These include Andorra, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia (elective monarchy), Denmark, Japan, Jordan, Kingdom of Lesotho, Lichtenstein, Luxemburg, Kuwait, Malaysia (elective monarchy), Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Swaziland (now the Kingdom of Eswatini), Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Kingdom.

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Eswatini) the monarch appoints 20 of the 30 members of the upper chamber and ten members to the lower chamber. Interestingly, the other ten members of the upper chamber in Swaziland are appointed by the lower chamber. In many countries the appointment by the monarch is largely ceremonial, with the country’s Prime Minister deciding who to appoint. For example, although some members of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom are appointed by the monarch, it is on advice of the UK Prime Minister. In addition, there are 16 countries that are independent, but are part of the British Commonwealth and still recognize the UK queen or king as their monarch.8 The role of the UK monarch as head of the British Commonwealth is largely ceremonial. In these states, the UK monarch does not directly appoint the members of the upper chamber, but the country’s Governor General, representing the UK monarch, may make the appointment. For example, members of Canada’s Senate are appointed by the Governor General with the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada. In some nations, the selection of members in an upper chamber is made by some other authority, such as the head of the national government itself.9 In Myanmar the military appoints approximately 1/3 of the members of the upper chamber; with the remainder elected. The Myanmar military also appoints 1/3 of the members of the lower chamber. In Ireland the appointments are made by the president and the leader of the opposition party. In a few countries the appointment of members of the upper chamber is left to the members of the lower chamber. In others, the appointment is made by a trade association or other citizen group. In some nations, the seats in the upper chamber are hereditary. The House of Lords in the United Kingdom is an example of a legislative body in which some members hold hereditary titles. Another example is the Kingdom of Lesotho in which the Senate (upper chamber) has 33 members—22 hereditary chiefs and 11 individuals appointed by the King on the advice of the Council of State. It is common to see a mixed method of selection in an upper chamber, such as combining appointment of some members by the president or monarch and some elected.

8

These include Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Grenada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Papa New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Sudan, and Tuvalu. 9 These include Belarus, Rwanda, and Ireland.

6.1 Differences in How Members of an Upper Chamber Are Selected

6.1.3

61

Election

In some nations, the members of the upper chamber are directly elected by the voters of a state or province.10 In others the seats in the upper chamber are filled by a national election, such as in Uruguay. A common characteristic in many bicameral national legislatures is that each state or province is guaranteed one or more seats in the upper chamber regardless of its population or number of voters.11 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy of the requirement of two U.S. senators for each state, but it has specifically banned the states themselves from using this “Senate Model” to create a chamber of any state legislature based on anything but equal representation of voters. The Court described the U.S. Constitution’s “Senate Rule” as a unique and necessary compromise that made the union possible—for reasons that were not applicable to a state’s recognition of counties or parishes.12 The Court distinguished between the status of the states as separate sovereigns at the time the Constitution was ratified, and the status of counties and parishes as entities created by a state, and therefore subject to change. In theory, the Court’s reasoning would also apply in nations that have allowed unequal electoral systems recognizing administrative units, states, or provinces that the national legislature creates and can change. However, most of these nations also have a historical justification for this inequality. Nations vary greatly in their election methods for the upper chamber. Some countries elect nationwide using PR voting, such as Columbia, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Others, such as Poland and Switzerland, use the FPTP plurality method from single-member constituencies. Bolivia has four senators elected by a closed PR system for each of its nine administrative départements; Brazil elects three for each of 26 states. The list of differences goes on and on.

Nations electing members of the upper chamber from fixed districts include Argentina (Blk Vote), Australia (STV), Bolivia (PR), Brazil (Blk Vote), Cambodia (PR), Philippines (Blk Vote), and the United States (FPTP). 11 The U.S. Senate is an example. In the U.S. Senate, each of the 50 states has two senators, even though the states vary widely in the number of persons or voters. Wyoming is the least populated, with the state having only 563,626 inhabitants according to the 2010 census. California is the most populated state, with 37,254,956 inhabitants according to that census. Each state elects two senators and has the same number of votes in the U.S. Senate. In other words, there is no pretense of each person or voter within the states being equally represented in the U.S. Senate. In the United States, this is called the “Senate Model.” It was part of the political compromise between large and small states that made it possible to adopt a U.S. Constitution and to form a union in 1789. 12 See, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 733 (1964); Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 10

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6.2

6 The Upper Chamber of a Bicameral National Legislature

Differences in How Upper Houses Are Empowered

In most of these bicameral national legislatures, the upper house has only limited law-making powers compared to the popularly-elected lower house. For example, there are two chambers in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The members of the “House of Commons” are directly elected from districts (constituencies), while the members of the upper “House of Lords” hold their titles by hereditary right or appointment, but have only limited law-making authority. In Namibia the upper chamber is only advisory. The Netherlands’ upper chamber can only accept or reject legislation, not amend it. In a few nations, however, the upper chamber has law-making powers that are comparable to those of the lower chamber, even though the members of the upper chamber are appointed or elected from electoral districts with unequal numbers of persons or voters. The U.S. Senate (elected) and the French Senat (appointed) are examples. Italy’s upper chamber has law-making powers comparable to the country’s lower chamber and is elected from constituencies ostensibly roughly equal in population.

6.3

Conclusion

The method of choosing members of the upper chamber of a bicameral national legislature and the law-making authority of such chambers deserve more attention than is given in this book. Nevertheless, certain observations can be made. First, these upper chambers are difficult to categorize as elected or non-elected because many are composed partially of members chosen by election and partially of members who are appointed, particularly by local legislatures or councils or by the head-of-state. Second, there is no expectation that members of the upper chamber will be selected on a basis of equality among members of the public. In general, these upper chambers appear oriented toward assuring that each of a nation’s states, provinces, or administrative units is represented in the national legislature or giving the government an opportunity to control one chamber of that nation’s legislature. An effect of representing the local states, councils, or administrative units regardless of population is to bias these upper chambers toward rural interests. There are exceptions, such as those nations that elect members of the upper chamber nationwide. There are exceptions, such as those nations that elect members of the upper chamber nationwide. Third, the law-making powers of the upper chamber vary greatly among the nations that are bicameral; from being purely advisory to having authority comparable to the usually directly elected lower chamber. Fourth, the U.S. model of an equal number of senators directly elected from each state regardless of the state’s population has been a model that many nations have

6.3 Conclusion

63

followed, but with one big difference. In most of these countries, the upper chamber’s powers are limited in comparison to the lower chamber. The US model gives the Senate powers that are comparable to the House and thus puts disproportionate power in the hands of voters in smaller, often less populous states. Fifth, there are electoral districts in some countries that are susceptible to gerrymandering, but these are rare and of little legal consequence given the policy that the upper chamber is not expected to meet voter equality and the large number of nations that rely on appointments to fill seats in the upper chamber.

Chapter 7

Proportional Representation and Electing Nationwide

A handful of democracies conduct only nationwide elections for the unicameral or lower chamber of its national legislature. These include Kazakhstan (PR, some appointed), Kosovo (PR), Kyrgyzstan (PR), Moldova (PR), Monaco (FPTP and PR), the Netherlands (PR), Fiji (PR), Serbia (PR), Slovakia (PR), Namibia (PR), and Israel (PR). Sources differ on whether Rwanda elects a majority of its unicameral national legislature through a PR system or is operating under a post-conflict agreement that divides the seats between Hutus and Tutsis. This list does not include those few countries or territories whose existence is disputed and are not in the United Nations, such as Taiwan, Western Sahara, South Ossetia, Northern Cyprus or Abkhazia. It would seem natural for small countries to utilize only national elections instead of dividing the country into even smaller electoral districts, but a country’s size is only one factor. Many of the smallest countries in the world, such as Luxembourg, Nauru, Liechtenstein, and Lesotho, utilize electoral districts, while, as discussed below, at least two much larger nations, Italy and the Russian Federation, experimented with using a purely nationwide PR system before changing to a mixed system with both FPTP and PR elections.

7.1

Countries Currently Using Only Nationwide PR Elections to Elect National Legislature

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. The national legislature (StatenGeneral) is bicameral.1 The lower chamber (Tweede Kamer) has 150 members, directly elected nationwide for a 4-year term. The proportional representation

1 The upper chamber (Eerste Kamer) of the Netherland national legislature has 75 members chosen (appointed) for a 4-year term by councilors in each of the twelve provinces based on proportional representation in the provincial elections.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_7

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threshold is 1/150th of the nationwide vote (one seat), with the residual seats assigned to a party using the highest averages method. Moldova has a 101-member unicameral parliament that is elected for a 4-year term through proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency. One third of the registered voters must participate in an election for it to be valid. Political parties need to receive 6% of the valid votes to participate in the allocation of seats in the parliament. Out-of-country voters have an opportunity to vote without prior registration. To estimate their number and potential polling station locations, the government created a website for voters to declare their residency abroad. Slovakia has a unicameral national legislature (Narodná rada Slovenskej Republiky) consisting of 150 members directly elected nationwide for 4-year terms. Serbia has a unicameral national legislature (Narodna skupština Republike Srbije) with 250 members elected nationwide for 4-year terms. Both Slovakia and Serbia have a threshold of 5% of the national vote. Kazakhstan is bicameral, with the lower chamber (Mazhilis) having 107 seats, with >80% of the seats controlled by one party. The members are elected for 5-year terms. Most (98) are directly elected nationwide, but nine are chosen by the Assembly of Kazakhstani Nation, which is a presidentially appointed advisory body designed to represent the country's ethnic minorities. The threshold for party representation is 7% of the national vote. Kyrgyzstan is unicameral and also has a 7% threshold for a party’s membership in its 120 member national legislature, but actually has a “Double Threshold” because it limits parties to a maximum of 65 seats. Namibia is bicameral.2 The law-making power rests with the lower chamber, the National Assembly. The National Assembly has 102 members of which 96 are elected by direct popular vote nationwide for a 5-year term, and a maximum of 6 non-voting members are appointed by the president. A single party (SWAPO) has dominated elections since 1989. Israel has a unicameral national legislature (the Knesset) consisting of 120 members elected nationwide for 4-year terms based on a closed party list, with a threshold of 3.25% (up from 1%) of the national vote. Monaco is a constitutional monarchy. The Conseil National has 24 members, elected nationwide for a 5-year term. It is unique in having a mixed nationwide system. Sixteen of the members of the national legislature are elected by a winnertake-all plurality system and the other eight by proportional representation. Each voter may cast a ballot with up to 16 candidates' names. If two or more majoritarian candidates tie, the older candidate prevails.3 Fiji also presents an unusual case. In 2014 for the first time Fiji elected members of its lower chamber of a bicameral legislature through nationwide open list PR

2

The upper chamber consists of 26 representatives (2 selected [appointed] by each of 13 regional councils). 3 By contrast, if two or more candidates tie in an Italian FPTP constituency election the youngest candidate wins.

7.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Proportional Representation

67

elections. In the past, the nation’s system underwent many changes as a result of at least four coups. The nation has been torn by racial division and strife. In an effort to quell this conflict, its parliament at one time was elected according to race-based communal constituencies, with members elected using multiple voter rolls and multiple ballots to choose 25 members by universal suffrage (the voter and candidate could belong to any race or ethnicity); 23 by indigenous Fijians; 19 by Indo-Fijians; 3 by other “minority” groups; and one by Rotuman Islanders. The current nationwide PR election system (but including a separate seat for the island of Rotuman) used in 2014 was intended to treat all eligible voters alike as “Fijians.” The national threshold for representation under the new system is 5%. The Fiji Senate was abolished in 2013.4 Several nations have PR elections at the Fixed or special Multi-Member district level (see Chap. 8), but also have “adjustment” or “leveling” seats based on the party’s performance nationwide. These seats are awarded based on the difference between a party’s number of seats won in the multi-member districts and the number of seats that the party would have won in a proportional contest held in a single, nationwide constituency. These “adjustment” or “leveling” seats are intended as a compensatory measure to ensure proportional representation of parties at the national level. Since all of these nations use at least some PR elections, this is an opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of proportional representation (PR) elections.

7.2

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Proportional Representation

Most of these countries use a wholly proportional representation (PR) system.5 The system theoretically is very straightforward. An election is held to elect members of the national legislature. The vote is for a party not for an individual.6 Each party theoretically then is allocated the same proportion of seats in the national legislature

4 For a discussion of the election system history and changes in Fiji see, A New Electoral System for Fiji in 2014: Options for Legitimate Representation by Norm Miller, Pacific Islands Brief (No. 3, 2013, Pacific Islands Development Program); Top 10 things you need to know about Fiji’s new electoral system by Thomas Carnegie, Pacific Scoop (August 31, 2014). 5 For a discussion of proportional representation systems in general see APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (Second Edition 2018); Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation by Karsten Schuster, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Mathias Drton, and Norman Draper, 4 Electoral Studies 22 (2003); and How Proportional Representation Elections Work, FairVote @ www.FairVote.com 6 Some courts have found PR systems or the PR component of a mixed system unconstitutional on the basis that a vote for a party is not a “direct” election. See, Chap. 14.

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as it receives of the total valid votes in the national election. There are different formulas for how the allocation is made,7 but the most common is some form of the d'Hondt method.8 However, as so often occurs in electoral matters, there are other factors that affect the result. The law of most of these nations establishes a “threshold” of the national vote (up to 10%) that a party must receive of the vote in the national election to be entitled to a seat in the national legislature.9 The votes attributable to the parties that do not reach the applicable threshold are usually spread as a residual among the parties that meet the threshold and these parties receive additional seats. One result of a threshold in an election is that a proportion of the electorate may cast their votes for parties which are not represented in Parliament. The higher the threshold; the more of the electorate are left in this position. In a recent election in Turkey (with a 10% threshold) reportedly 45% of votes were “wasted” in this fashion. A high threshold defeats the purpose of proportional representation. In some nations the law allows political parties to form coalitions to increase their chances of meeting this threshold;10 in others not. Some with nationwide PR systems are closed list; some are open list. Many political scientists praise the PR system as being “fairer” than a majoritarian/plurality system, such as FPTP single-member districts, because it tends to encourage the creation of multiple small parties, which then leads to the inclusion in the national legislature of all significant groups with different ideologies and agenda. A PR system is seen as leading to greater voter participation, better access

7 There are several variables that affect how votes are allocated for parliamentary seats in a PR system. The two main formulas are the greatest remainder method and the highest averages method, although each type includes several variations in how the conversion takes place. The most common is the highest averages formula that divides the number of votes gathered by a party list in the electoral area (the nation for these countries or in a given district for most countries). The calculation is performed by means of a series of divisors. Variations in this method concern the divisors, for example, the simple 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. progression (d'Hondt formula); the odd-number 1, 3, 5, 7, etc. series (Saint-Lague formula); or its variant 1, 4, 3, 5, 7, etc. series (modified Saint-Lague formula). In each case, the mathematical operation results in an average, a quotient, with seats for party lists distributed successively according to the highest quotient, until all seats are filled. 8 The d’Hondt method of allocating seats among parties in a PR system is named after Netherland’s political scientist, Victor d’Hondt. It uses whole numbers and is generally considered fair. Some critics believe it slightly favors large parties and coalitions over scattered small parties. Most nations with PR elections use this method of allocation, or some variation, at a national or regional level. These nations include Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 9 There are several nations with PR voting that have no threshold or a threshold that is equivalent to one seat. An example is the Netherlands. 10 Usually the threshold is raised for party coalitions.

7.3 Variations in a PR Election System

69

for minorities and women, and avoidance of “regional fiefdoms” created by the dominance of a single party in a district. After a PR election the national legislature may be composed of members from many parties without any party having a ruling majority—thus resulting in the need to form coalition governments consisting of two or more parties. Critics of the PR election system urge that the creation of multiple small parties usually causes a fragmented party system, extremist parties, internal disputes, and coalition governments that are unstable. Much has been written about the relative benefits of both PR and plurality/ majority electoral systems. I cannot hope to resolve this dispute in this book by advocating for or against either system. Either can generate gerrymanders. These countries with nationwide PR elections are instructive, however, on some of the issues that arise under PR election systems.

7.3 7.3.1

Variations in a PR Election System Winner Bonus

In an apparent effort to address the issue of instability for a coalition government in a PR election system, several nations modified the system. In Europe, at least four nations (Italy, San Marino, Armenia, and Greece) adopted a “Majority Bonus” that awarded extra seats in the national legislature to the party that won the most votes in a legislative election to assure that the party would have a majority of seats.11 This modification of PR voting actually has a long history—first used in Italy by Benito Mussolini in 1924. It reemerged at the national level in Italy in 2006. The Constitutional Court of Italy struck down the bonus in 2013 as violating the Italian Constitution because it was an open-ended entitlement to the party with the most votes regardless of the percentage the party received of the total vote.12 It reappeared in the latest Italian election system, but with the requirement that to be eligible for the majority bonus, a party had to lead the voting and have at least 40% of the seats in the national legislature. It appears that Greece, Armenia, and San Marino still use the modification. In Greece, a fixed 1/6th of the seats in the national legislature are reserved as additional seats for the party that wins the most seats in the election. Greeks sometimes call their system “reinforced proportionality.” In San Marino, the winning party receives however many additional seats are necessary to give it a 35 seat majority in the 11

See, Electoral systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems by Camille Bedock and Nicolas Sauger, Project: Electoral systems and their consequences (2014) @ www. researchgate.net 12 Judgment No. 17, Italian Constitutional Court (2017). See, The Italian Constitutional Court Rules on Electoral System by Giacomo Delledonne and Giovanni Boggero in the Int’l J. Const. L. Blog (Feb. 8, 2017) @http://www.iconnectblog.com. See also, Chap. 14.

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nation’s 60 member unicameral national legislature. In Armenia, the size of the national legislature can vary. If no party wins a majority of seats in a general legislative election or no coalition government is formed within a few days after that election, a second round of voting is held matching the two parties with the highest number of seats. The seats won by other parties remain unchanged. The party that wins the second round of voting gets 54% of the total seats in the national legislature, with seats added to the national legislature until this percentage is reached. At least one nation, Kyrgyzstan, actually limits the size of the majority to a maximum of 65 seats in its 120 seat unicameral national legislature.

7.3.2

Double Simultaneous Vote

Some nations in Latin America, including Argentina,13 Uruguay, and Honduras,14 have used a different modification of the PR system. It is called the “double simultaneous vote” system, best known in Latin America as “Ley de Lemas.” The mechanism fuses national legislative elections with other elections, such as presidential elections. The parties are “Lemas.” Each Lema may have multiple “Sublemas,” containing a list of candidates for various offices. Different Sublemas within the same Lema may have different candidates for the same office. Each voter has a single ballot. The winning party is the one which receives the most votes after the votes won by each of its Sublemas have been added together. Within a Lema (i.e. party), the winning Sublema is the one which, individually, won the most votes. Once the number of votes received by each Lema and Sublema is counted, seats are allocated to each proportionally, typically using a system such as the d'Hondt method. This complex system is designed to allow persons to support a party, while also increasing the voter’s choice of candidates and avoiding a party’s selection of candidates in secret.

7.3.3

Block Voting

Several nations use a block voting system in which seats are allocated to the nation’s fixed districts or special multi-member districts as in a PR system. Parties put forth a list of candidates in each district to fill all of the seats allocated to the district. The party that wins the most votes in a district fills all of the district’s seats. 13

Only some of Argentina’s states continue to use the double simultaneous vote system. It is possible that by the time this book is published no Argentinian state will use the system any longer. 14 Honduras now uses an open list PR system in 18 multi-member constituencies based on the départements ranging in size from 1 to 23 seats.

7.3 Variations in a PR Election System

7.3.4

71

Choosing a Party’s Candidate: Open and Closed Lists

A common issue among all countries using a proportional representation system is the manner of choosing who among a party’s candidates is seated in the national legislature. In all nations using a PR election system, each political party prepares a pre-election list ranking at least some candidates in the order in which they will be chosen based on the number of representatives to which the party is entitled according to the party’s showing in the nationwide election. This list gives the party officials considerable control over who will represent the party in the national legislature. A PR system deemphasizes the importance of the individual candidate or officeholder while emphasizing the roles of the party and party leaders, thus prioritizing the goals of a party, but entrenching power within a sometimes obscure cabal of party loyalists, and making it more difficult for voters to hold any specific person accountable. In a twist, the parties in Guyana publish their list of candidates ordered alphabetically. This allows party leaders even more scope to reward party loyalty because seats are only allocated to individuals once the result of the vote is known. The pressure is great to modify the PR system in a country to allow some opportunity for regional representation and accountability. In response, several of the countries using a PR system allow an exception to the party list in an apparent effort to attract voters. This exception allows voters to express a “preference” for an individual candidate on a party list. Systems allowing a voter’s preference for a candidate on a party list are sometimes called “open lists”, but the specific rules vary among nations. For example, among the nations that rely exclusively on PR national elections, the Netherlands allows a party to use different lists in different electoral areas and a person to vote for a party and for a preferred representative from the party list. Theoretically a candidate who receives at least 25% of the electoral quota nationwide is deemed elected regardless of his or her place on the list. However, the effect of this exception has been limited because often the lists are the same in all of the areas or vary only near the bottom among candidates who are celebrities or known locally and are likely to attract voters to a party but are unlikely to serve. In Slovakia, there is a single nationwide list for each party, but also the ability for a voter to indicate a preference for a candidate on the list and an allowance for a candidate who receives a preferential vote equivalent to at least 10% of the party’s vote to move up the party list. In most of the nations with PR election systems that use open party lists,15 the vote for a candidate as well as a party is optional and, because most voters mark their ballots for parties only rather than candidates, the candidate-choice option often has limited effect. Sweden is an exception. Over 25% of the Swedish voters regularly 15 Among the countries using some variation of PR with an open list as part of their election structure are Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Iceland, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Japan, Norway, Poland, San Moreno, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

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choose a candidate as well as a party, and a number of individuals are elected who would not be if the list were closed. A “closed list” requires a voter to vote for only the party and does not allow a voter to express a preference for someone on the list. One effect of such a system is that it gives party leaders an advantage in winning seats in the national legislature. Israel uses a purely closed list and provides an example of how the manner for selecting candidates on a party’s list varies. In some parties, the party leadership determines the list. For example, the candidates of the Yesh Atid, Shas and Yisrael Beytenu parties are created in accordance with the desires of the respective leaders of those parties. In some parties, the list is determined by a small group of party elite, such as an “appointment committee” or “nomination committee” while in other parties the party list is established through a party congress or a council, with delegates chosen by the party members. Since 1992 several parties in Israel have adopted party primaries as a means of determining the names and ranking of candidates on the party’s list. In 2016 elections, three parties, the Habayit Hayehudi, the Likud, and the Labor Party, used primaries. Several nations use a closed list PR system.16 It should be noted, however, that many of these countries use the closed PR system for election to the national legislature from within local fixed or multi-member districts; not nationwide. Thus they retain a geographical element and, presumably, greater accountability in their election structure. In Italy, however, party leaders are allowed to appear on up to ten regional lists, thus almost assuring their election to the national legislature. In Kosovo, a switch from closed to open lists actually enhanced the presence of more extremist candidates. There are instances in which the use of an open list proved advantageous or disadvantageous for the representation of women.

7.3.5

PR Systems that Require Voting for Individual Candidates

By contrast, Brazil and Finland use PR list systems, but voters must vote for the individual candidates rather than a party: the number of seats received by each party within a jurisdiction is determined by the total number of votes gained by its candidates. The order in which the party’s candidates are elected to these seats is determined by the number of individual votes they receive. While this gives voters much greater freedom over their choice of candidate, it also has some less desirable side effects. Since candidates from within the same party are effectively competing with each other for votes, this form of open list can lead to

16

Among the nations using a PR or mixed system with a closed list are Albania, Angola, Andorra, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uruguay.

7.5 Italy

73

internal party conflict and fragmentation. It also means that the attempt of a party to feature a diverse slate of candidates can be ineffective because voters can skip the minority or female candidates and vote only for majority males instead.

7.3.6

Thresholds

The threshold for receiving a seat in the national legislature is important to parties striving to reach the threshold and the larger parties that stand to receive the additional seats if any party fails to meet the threshold. A high threshold (e.g., Turkey [10%], Kazakhstan [7%] and Russian Federation [7% in 2011, but 5% today]) helps the larger parties by increasing the percentage of additional seats that they obtain after the election. This threshold can operate as a barrier to some parties, especially those with primarily a regional base of support. An example is how the high 10% threshold in Turkey functioned for years to keep the pro-Kurdish parties from winning seats in that country’s national legislature.17 When parties are allowed to form coalitions, the threshold is generally higher.

7.4

The Effect of Population Centers

Another characteristic of electing by PR election from a nation as a whole or even a large multi-member district is that it allows population centers, if their inhabitants vote overwhelmingly for parties that have a greater local presence, to disproportionately influence an election outcome and increase the chance that candidates from those areas will defeat rural candidates in races for the national legislature. This effect in turn means that a party may achieve representation by focusing primarily on candidates from and turn-out in these urban areas and may find it unnecessary to try to compete nationwide. The 2011 election in the Russian Federation provides an example. The experience of Italy and the Russian Federation illustrate some of these aspects of a national PR system.

7.5

Italy

Italy is known for unstable coalition governments. The nation has changed its election system at least five times since WW II. In 2005 the Italian Parliament adopted a nationwide closed PR electoral system, with potentially different lists in

17

See Appendix C, A Case Study of Turkey.

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26 districts. The law also provided for an “unlimited majority bonus” of seats in the national legislature for the party that had won the most seats in the PR election, thus assuring a majority for that party in Parliament. This system was intended to benefit the ruling Democratic Party and to produce a stable national government to tackle the difficult problems, especially economic, confronting the nation, but was unpopular because it caused long party lists with no avenue for voters to show a preference for individuals.18 Efforts in Parliament to change the system failed. On December 4, 2013, the Italian Constitutional Court found the election system unconstitutional because, in part, it provided an unlimited majority bonus. The Court also struck down the “closed” nature of the PR election, explaining: [B]y not allowing the elector to express any preference for candidates, but only to choose a party list (the election was indirect). . . . [T]he Constitution presupposes the existence of a mandate given directly by the voters. . . . [B]y subtracting from the elector the right to choose the elected one, they would ensure that the vote is neither free nor personal.

.... Ultimately, it is the fact that, without exception, no Member of Parliament elected is supported by the individual votes cast by voters which violates the requirement of representativity enshrined in the Constitution. Due to these voting conditions which require voters to select a list and thereby choose en masse also the numerous candidates included in the list, whom they have not had the opportunity to know and assess and who, by virtue of their position in the list, are automatically destined to become Members of the Chamber of Deputies or Senators, the legislation under examination is not comparable either with other systems in which there are closed lists only for some seats, or with those comprised of geographically smaller electoral constituencies in which the number of candidates to be elected is sufficiently low that it is effectively possible to know them and correspondingly that the efficacy of the choice and freedom in voting are guaranteed (as occurs in singlemember constituencies).19

Although relying on specific wording in the Italian Constitution for its ruling, the court opinion can be also seen as general criticism of an electoral system that does not allow some means of voting for individuals or at least for voters to express a preference among names on a party list. To the Italian Constitutional Court, this was especially a problem in large jurisdictions like Italy. After several false starts (a TRS was proposed, but was struck down by the Court in 2017) the Italian Parliament in 2017 adopted a new mixed parallel (P) electoral system for both chambers that had both FPTP (36.8%) and PR (61.2%) components.20

18

See, Tricks and Treats: The 2005 Italian Electoral Law and Its Consequences by Gianfranco Pasquino, 12 South European Society and Politics 79–93 (2009). 19 The Italian Constitutional Court, (No. 1 of 2014) @ www.cortecostituzionale.it. Many constitutional or supreme courts provide English versions of some of their opinions. This is true of the Italian Constitutional Court. 20 See, The Italian Constitutional Court judgement on the ‘Italicum’ electoral law: another new reform for Italy? by Roberta Damiani, The Constitution Unit [UCL] (July 2018).

7.6 Russian Federation

75

The PR component for the upper chamber is based on PR in the regions. The PR component for the lower chamber is based on a party or coalition of parties meeting a national threshold, but seats are distributed among 63 regional districts, each with 3–9 seats, and 2 single member districts.21 The “majority bonus” survives in the lower chamber, but only for a winning party with at least 40% of the PR vote. This party is guaranteed 340 seats in the lower chamber. The party lists in the lower chamber are “blocked” at the top to guarantee a seat for party leaders, who can choose to be on as many as ten regional lists. Voters are entitled to one preference in the upper chamber and two (one male and one female) in the lower chamber. Italians abroad elect six members of the upper chamber and 12 members of the lower chamber, which is about 2% of each chamber. The first election under the new system occurred in March, 2018.

7.6

Russian Federation

The national legislature (Federalnoe Sobranie) of the Russian Federation is bicameral. The lower chamber (State Duma [Gosudarstvennaja Duma]) has 450 members elected for 5 year terms (previously 4 year terms). The upper chamber is discussed in Chap. 6. The country experimented with electing its lower chamber nationwide. In 2008, the country did away with single-member district elections and adopted a nationwide PR system in which all 450 members of the lower chamber of the national legislature were elected using nationwide elections and closed party lists. The threshold was set at 7% of the national vote and the ability of parties to form coalitions was restricted. These changes were adopted ostensibly for the purpose of strengthening Russia’s political parties and party system by reducing the number of competing parties. However, critics claimed that the main objective was to eliminate regionally based parties and to increase the dominance of one party nationwide, United Russia.22 The change did not go smoothly. The regional governors were reluctant to embrace the change because they feared becoming too dependent on United Russia and preferred to create their own alliances for the purpose of retaining control over regional assemblies. More importantly, the only parliamentary general election under the new system (2011) went poorly for United Russia, which won the election, but with only 49.32% of the vote (down from 64.30% in 2007), taking 238 seats or 52.88% (down from 70%) of the Duma seats. The outcome in 2011 demonstrated that more than one party could win substantial representation in the national legislature under a nationwide PR election system 21

These single-member districts are in Valle d’ Acosta and Tretino-Alto Ariga. See, Putin and the Russian Electoral System; Reforms to Prevent Regime Change by Darrell Slider and Paul Rodrick Gregory, Soviet and Post-Soviet Review (2012) reprinted as Putin Changes September Election Rules To Prop Up His 'United Russia' Party by Patrick Roderick Gregory, Forbes (Mar 14, 2016; The Electoral System of the Russian Federation, by Bill Bowring, The European Parliament (2011) available at www.europarl.europa.eu 22

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by focusing on campaigning primarily in the major cities. This election showed that such a system created the possibility of a second major party to challenge United Russia. This was especially true when the party’s opposition tended to be in urban, populous areas such as Moscow and St. Petersburg and could do well in parliamentary elections under a nationwide PR system. Protests followed the election, alleging that the United Russia party had relied on election fraud to hang onto power. The change in 2015, with the first election in 2016, to a mixed parallel (P) system of an equal number of single-member districts and proportional representation in a nationwide election (with change to a 5% threshold) is, according to Putin critics, a plan to maintain United Russia’s dominance, because that party is better positioned to win district elections. This proved to be the case in 2016 when the party ran candidates in 206 of the 225 single-member districts. The new mixed system had several characteristics that favored the United Russia Party. The single-member constituencies were decided by FPTP elections with only a single round of voting. There were 6–13 candidates in each constituency in 2016, allowing most candidates to win with far less than a majority of the votes. Turnout in the more liberal centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg was a low 28%. United Russia’s candidates in the single-member constituencies in these cities won with as little as 26% of the vote.23 Moreover, the new system created the opportunity for gerrymandering the single member districts in urban areas to dilute the opposition to United Russia by “packing” these voters into a few districts24 or combining opposition areas with those more friendly to United Russia in the traditional “cracking” tactic. United Russia supporters were spread among the districts giving United Russia an edge in the multi-district urban areas, such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The shapes of the resulting single-member legislative districts or constituencies in these cities suggest gerrymandering when compared to electoral districts for local elections in those cities.25 The population deviation among electoral districts is great, but this is largely caused by the allocation of at least one seat to each federal subject or administrative unit regardless of population. However, there was a pattern in 2016 of United Russia 23 Only one of United Russia’s candidates received over 50% of the vote in the 13 electoral districts in these 2 cities. 24 The fact that United Russia did not even field a candidate in 19 districts is suggestive of this result. However, since most of those seats were won by parties aligned with United Russia, the lack of a United Russia candidate may have been intended to prevent the parties from splitting the vote. These districts were primarily among Russia’s ethnic republics, however, there are districts in Moscow and Saint Petersburg that ssuggest this tactic.. Interestingly, the United Russia candidate in Sevastopol (disputed part of Ukraine) won with only 34.5% of the vote. 25 In 2018 municipal elections several parties other than United Russia won the largest percentage of the vote in areas near the center of these cities. An overlay of the boundaries of the 2016 legislative constituencies shows that these non-United Russia areas are carved up and submerged in areas that supported United Russia—a classic example of the gerrymandering tactic of fracturing the opposition’s areas of support. United Russia won several legislative constituencies in Moscow or St. Petersburg with as little as 22–35% of the vote.

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winning by large margins (up to 75–80% of the vote) in these underpopulated districts. Not surprisingly, the districts in Moscow and Saint Petersburg are among the most populous. The effect of the change in election systems was very positive for United Russia. Out of 206 constituencies in which United Russia ran a candidate, they won 203, losing 3 contests to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Out of 19 constituencies which did not have a United Russia candidate, seven were won by A Just Russia, five by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, four by the Communist Party, and one each by an independent candidate (allowed to run in the SMDs), the Civic Platform Party, and the Rodina Party. Most of United Russia’s losses or decisions not to run a candidate were in federal subjects or republics in the eastern or southwestern parts of the country. United Russia ended up with a super majority of 343 seats (>76% of the 450 seats) in the Duma, plus the reliable support of several other parties, including the Communist Party, Liberal Party, and A Just Russia Party. This was achieved with only 54.3% of the vote nationwide. These observations about the 2016 election are cursory. A more complete analysis is needed. It is possible to argue that Putin and United Russia have learned from the U.S. how to use gerrymandering to control election outcomes.

7.7

Conclusion

The nationwide PR systems do not use districts; therefore they are not subject to gerrymandering. Although only a few countries elect all members of its national legislature nationwide, many countries utilize PR voting within fixed districts or nationwide for the PR component within a mixed system. An example of a nationwide PR component in a mixed system is the current Russian Federation. Also, as described in Chap. 11, nationwide elections are sometimes used to fill seats reserved for minority voters and candidates, and for women. These are discussed in Chap. 11. The small number of nations using a solely nationwide PR system shows the importance of a geographical or district component in almost all election systems. Even some of those nations that elect all members of the national legislature in a nationwide PR election have opened their party lists to permit voters an opportunity to express a preference among candidates on the list. Although this opportunity has proven more theoretical than real in some nations, its mere existence acknowledges a public unwillingness to forego the possibility of voting for preferred candidates and to trust entirely in a party’s selection process. The experiences of Italy and the Russian Federation demonstrate that a solely nationwide PR system is ill-suited for large nations. The experience in the Russian Federation shows that in a mixed system gerrymandering single-member districts can become a political tool.

Chapter 8

Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats

A fixed or multi-member district has the advantage of not needing to be periodically redrawn like a single-member district. This advantage, however, does not avoid the task of accommodating demographic changes. As the Code of Good Practice states, “With multi-member constituencies, seats should be redistributed preferably without redefining constituency boundaries, which should, where possible, coincide with administrative boundaries.”1 Reallocating seats among fixed or multi-member districts is not always easy to achieve. Unless the number of seats in the national legislature increases, each addition of a seat to one fixed or multi-member district requires the elimination of a seat in another fixed or multi-member district. This elimination of a seat not only alters the voting power of constituencies, but may mean that an incumbent, party, state, or province will lose a seat in the national parliament. Therefore, it is not uncommon for this reallocation to become ensnarled in politics and to be delayed or avoided altogether. This dispersion or allocation of seats among fixed districts can become a vehicle for gerrymandering regardless of whether the ultimate election system is Plurality/ Majoritarian or PR. Periodic reallocation of seats among fixed districts or special multi-member districts is essential for maintaining a national equality of voting power for persons in the face of inevitable population changes and shifts that occur over time. Unfortunately, it sometimes does not occur.

For a good overview of the history of redistricting in certain subject countries see REDISTRICTING IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 1

Appendix B.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_8

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8.1

8 Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or. . .

An Inadequacy in the Code of Good Practice

A mandate for periodic review is consistent with the Code of Good Practice, which states, “In order to guarantee equal voting power, the distribution of seats must be reviewed at least every 10 years, preferably outside election periods.”2 Unfortunately, an obligation to review the distribution of seats is not a mandate to make that distribution more equal.3 Provision for periodic redistricting or reallocation of seats by law should mean that all districts will be reviewed and adjusted as necessary to reduce the existing inequality among districts nationwide. Perhaps the drafters of the Code believed that review would necessarily bring corrective action. It hasn’t. In most nations there is no reliable and effective mechanism for forcing the legislature to timely approve the needed changes.4 This is true even if the changes are recommended by a boundary commission or other commission. Often the national legislature has discretion to approve only some or none of the recommendations, or to postpone action. In the legislature, there are many pressures for avoiding change, such as protecting incumbents from having to seek reelection in a redrawn district or satisfying a state or province that is upset about possibly losing a seat in the national legislature. There are few, if any, for making it. Even if action is taken, it may be piecemeal.

8.2

Legal Requirements for Periodic Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats

Many nations with electoral districts have a time interval, or prescribed circumstance, such as a specified level of malapportionment, which by law should trigger at least the review of the need for reallocation or redistricting. This mandatory time varies between 3–12 years. The most popular period is 10 years with the law of at least 20 nations prescribing this timeframe.5 In some nations the law mandates review of the allocation of seats every 5 years, such as Albania, Bahamas, the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. In others, such as the U.K., the law permits 12 years or longer to pass between the redrawing of constituency boundaries, but allows the Parliament to postpone the review. France Appendix B. Please note that this guideline provides only for “review” at least every 10 years, not for action. 3 The Venice Commission should not be blamed for an expectation that if a review showed an imbalance, the national legislature would act to correct it. 4 See, Chap. 14, The Role of the Courts. 5 These include Botswana, Canada, India, Japan, Kenya Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, the United States, and Yemen. 2

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had a requirement for periodic redistricting (12 years), but is an example of a nation that has been too busy on other matters to meet its own laws about when reallocation and redistricting should occur. France’s ultimate solution—do away with the national census and the statutory requirement for periodic redrawing of districts and reallocation of seats.6 There is tension between a requirement for when a review occurs and whether it should occur more often as population changes. In the U.S. the courts have accepted the “fiction” that a decennial census remains valid for 10 years until after the next decennial census. This allows a reprieve from redistricting and makes sense in nations which use periodically determined census population rather than registration to measure equality. However, it provides no check on the inevitable climb in malapportionment that occurs during the interval between censuses. By providing for periodic redistricting or reallocation of seats, a nation effectively forestalls those processes from occurring earlier even though particular districts may exceed the prescribed limits during the interim period. In some instances this sets the stage for governments to overpopulate single-member districts or to allocate too few representatives to a fixed district even with the knowledge that the area in question is likely to experience disproportionately high population growth over the next period. This is a particularly pernicious form of gerrymandering that worsens the effects of an initial gerrymander. Some nations, such as Australia, have tried to combat this circumstance, requiring by law that population projections be considered in redistricting. By contrast, U.S. courts have distrusted redistricting on the basis of projected growth7 or estimated population, insisting instead on the use of decennial census figures even late in a decade.

8.3

Triggers in Lieu of a Period Between Redistricting or Reallocation

In many countries, there is no specific time interval prescribed by law. There is no provision at all for redistricting or redistribution of seats, or these are triggered in the law by other factors, such as prior to each national legislative election, a change in the number of seats apportioned to an area, changes in administrative boundaries, or when a prescribed level of malapportionment is reached. Two examples are useful at this point. Germany is an example of a nation that has on-going data about the number of voters and reviews it regularly before each new legislature, but distinguishes between the deviation permitted when a district is redrawn (15% from the quota)

6

It did so in 2002. Projections of growth are notoriously unreliable. Different experts may disagree about when, where, or even if such growth will happen. 7

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and the deviation that requires a district to be redrawn (25%). This has allowed piecemeal action aimed only at the districts that exceed the maximum deviation rather than a nationwide redistricting or reallocation of seats. Turkey8 is an example of a nation in which a reallocation of seats for PR elections occurs prior to each general legislative election (5 years) based on an ongoing count of registered voters. An independent judicial commission allocates the legislative seats among the provinces based on the number of electors. Neither the legislature nor the executive has a role in this reallocation.

8.4 8.4.1

The Guarantee of Seats to a Fixed District The United States

Most writers who discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote” principle focus on the requirement that congressional districts must be as equal in population as is “practicable” (i.e. de minimis).9 It is often overlooked, however, that this requirement for absolute equality among congressional districts applies only to those districts within a state, not among the states. The number of congressional districts apportioned to each state in the United States is adjusted each decade to reflect changes in population as shown by the decennial census. Since each state is apportioned seats based on its current population and must redraw its congressional districts to reflect any such change, the population of most of the nation’s congressional districts fall within a narrow range. According to the 2010 census, the average population of a congressional district is 710,767 persons. Nevertheless, the U.S. Constitution creates inequality because it guarantees that each state has at least one member in the U.S. House of Representatives. There are seven states that have only a single member of that chamber.10 The least populous of these is Wyoming, with 563,626 inhabitants according to the 2010 census. The least populous congressional districts, however, are in the state of Rhode Island. With a total population of 1,052,567, the state had enough population in 2010 for two districts, with approximately 526,283 people in each one. By contrast, the most populous congressional district in the U.S. is Montana with 994,416 persons according to the 2010 census. Unfortunately, Montana had more than enough inhabitants in 2011 for one congressional district and too few for two districts. This guarantee that the voters of each state elect at least one member to the

8

See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Turkey. U.S. courts have rejected congressional districting plans with less than a 1% deviation among congressional districts. 10 These are Wyoming, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Alaska. 9

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Fig. 8.1 United States 2016 single-member congressional districts. The map is courtesy of Bickerstaff, Heath, Delgado, Acosta LLP

U.S. House of Representatives was part of the compromise between large and small states in the U.S. Constitution in 1787 (Fig. 8.1). Many other nations operate under similar political compromises that have institutionalized inequality in population or voters among constituencies by guaranteeing a minimum number of seats to states, provinces or other administrative units. This guarantee, which generally has existed in nations for generations, has inevitably benefited rural areas because of the migration of people from rural to urban areas. The guarantee of seats in a unicameral legislature or the lower chamber of a bicameral legislature to fixed or multi-member districts is very common among nations. The highest number of guaranteed seats appears to be five for each province in Australia and Indonesia. Among the many nations having one or more guaranteed seats are Germany, France, Mexico, Brazil, and Japan. Canada handles the guarantee in a slightly different manner—guaranteeing no fewer than the number each of its ten provinces and three territories had in either 1976 or 1984.

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8.4.2

8 Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or. . .

The United Kingdom: Political Compromise among Kingdoms11

The United Kingdom provides an example of political compromise among entities that were at one time separate kingdoms. The House of Commons is made up of members elected from constituencies in the four regions of the United Kingdom— England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. For historical reasons, each region has had a fixed number of members in the House of Commons.12 The nation has Boundary Commissions for each of the four regions. In the past, these Commissions have strived to maintain a deviation of no more than 5% from the quota in each region, subject to exceptions caused by local conditions.13 The commissions are required by law to carry out reviews every eight to 12 years and to re-draw boundaries to reflect the changes in the electorate. The average number of voters in a constituency for the 2010 election was approximately 70,000 voters for England, 66,000 for Scotland, 64,500 for Northern Ireland and 56,000 for Wales.14 The current breakdown of members of Parliament representing the different entities of the UK is as follows: 533 from England, 59 from Scotland, 40 from Wales, and 18 from Northern Ireland. The breakdown as proposed for the Sixth Constituency Review is that there will be a total of 600 constituencies in the United Kingdom (and four protected island constituencies in Scotland and England). This total is to be distributed across the four parts of the United Kingdom in accordance with a formula which relates the number of seats in each part to its share of the national electorate. If the Sixth Constituency Review is finally implemented (see below) England will have 501 seats (down from 533), Scotland 53 (down from 59), Wales 29 (down from 40) and Northern Ireland 17 (down from 18).

11

See, PUTTING VOTERS IN THEIR PLACE by Ron Johnson & Charles Pattie, Oxford Univ. Press (2006); FIXING THE BOUNDARIES: DEFINING AND REDEFINING SINGLEMEMBER ELECTORAL DISTRICTS by Ian McLean & David Butler, eds., Dartmouth Pub. Co. (1996); Electoral Distortion Despite Redistricting by Independent Commissions: The British Case, 1950–2005 by Ron Johnston, Charles Puttie, and David Rossiter at page 205 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008); and DRAWING A NEW CONSTITUENCY MAP FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM: The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill 2010 by Michel Balinski, Ron Johnston, Iain McLean, Peyton Young, and Angela Cummine, a report prepared for the British Academy London (2010); and National Parliaments: United Kingdom, Library of Congress (accessed July, 2018). 12 The House of Commons Redistribution of Seats Act 1958 eliminated the previous common electoral quota for the whole United Kingdom and replaced it with four separate quotas. These first quotas were England 69,534, Northern Ireland 67,145, Wales 58,383 and in Scotland 54,741 electors. 13 Islands create a special case, see Chap. 12. The Parliamentary constituency with the smallest-sized electorate in 2017 was Na h-Eileanan an Iar in Scotland [21,200 electors] and the largest was the Isle of Wight [109,900 electors] in England. Both are islands with a single constituency. 14 In 2017, the median total parliamentary electorate across constituencies was about 72,200 in England, 56,000 in Wales, 68,300 in Northern Ireland, and 67,200 in Scotland.

8.5 Avoiding the Requirement for Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats

8.5

85

Avoiding the Requirement for Redistricting or Reallocation of Seats

Unfortunately, the mandatory time or circumstance prescribed by law in many nations for redistricting or reallocation is often ignored as political conflicts and gridlock forestall legislative action on the changes. These conflicts and gridlock are usually quarrels over gerrymandering. One means by which some nations have tried to avoid a political gridlock caused by an attempt to reallocate seats among fixed districts is to add new seats to the national legislature and to award those new seats to those fixed districts that have disproportionately increased in persons or electors. This action provides some shortlived political relief, but is imprecise and soon falters as the fight over the size of the legislature produces its own gridlock. Iran is an example—seats were added to the Tehran district as the population in that area of the country grew faster than in the more rural areas, but caused resentment among those officials who feared that Tehran would come to dominate the national legislature. A second way to avoid the need to reallocate or redistrict is to change the election system itself and grandfather the current incumbents in office until the next election as part of the transition. An example is Hungary which, along with Albania, has had at least seven different election systems in the past 40 years. One writer has observed that in some of Eastern Europe’s new democracies it was easier to change the system of government than to reallocate or redraw electoral districts.15 A third way is to limit remedial action to only the worst malapportioned districts instead of correcting any imbalances nationwide. Such action is especially present in nations that have only a trigger tied to a level of malapportionment. The important distinction between requirements for periodic redistricting and triggers for redrawing boundaries of a single district is discussed earlier in Chap. 8. A trigger, such as a certain level of malapportionment in a district, has the advantage if followed of preventing any district from exceeding the limit (usually high) during a period between general redistricting. The lack of a requirement for periodic general redistricting, however, can mean that other districts below the trigger level are left unchanged even if they significantly vary from the ideal number of persons or electors and can result in a significant and uncorrected imbalance among the overwhelming majority of districts. This imbalance can grow over time toward the higher trigger limit. A fourth approach is to draw most or all of the districts at the highest permissible limit rather than at or near the ideal. Constitutional courts or authorities in countries, such as France and Lithuania, have warned against this effect and cautioned that the

15

See, Districting and Redistricting in Eastern Europe: Regulations and Practices by Marina Popescu and Gabor Toka, at pages 251 and 260 in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).

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limits of deviation are for only the extreme or extraordinary circumstances where justified by the public interest.16 Another approach is to eliminate a legal requirement for periodic legislative action to redistrict or to reallocate seats. In 2002 the French Parliament repealed the statutory provision for a national census and, along with it, the requirement for periodic redistricting. In a similar move in 2002, Lithuania changed its law. The country’s election law initially required that the population of constituencies be within 10% of the national average. This was amended to allow for a deviation of 20%. According to the Lithuanian authorities, this amendment was adopted because demographic changes would have resulted in substantial changes to the boundaries of constituencies if the original limit of 10% had remained in place. According to the OSCE it was deemed more politically acceptable to increase the permissible deviation than to change constituency boundaries.17 As a result, there was a large disparity in the population size among constituencies. The nation’s Constitutional Court intervened18 and the districts were redrawn to meet a 10% limit. The sixth and most common way to avoid this responsibility is simply to find an excuse to ignore the legal requirements. Such a rationale was given in 2005 when the then President of France explained that, even though the nation had not redistricted or reallocated seats since 1986 (based on the 1982 census), the national legislature was “just too busy” to bother with the “highly time-consuming and politically fractious process” of redrawing the nation’s electoral districts even though the Conseil Constitutional prodded the House of Delegates for action.19 A muchcriticized redistricting and reallocation was finally adopted by the national legislature in 2010 after repeated court intervention. Other tactics for avoiding the immediate political repercussions of redistricting or reallocating seats include unnecessarily dragging out the review process, delaying or postponing approval of the changes, or approving the changes, but making them effective at some date in the future. The United Kingdom House of Commons is fond of using these tactics, with the result that redrawn constituencies, when implemented, are based on outdated data and are even less equal than when

16

Several of these courts and authorities are quoted in Chap. 14. See, REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2036, Final Report, at page 4, OSCE/ODIHR (October 9, 2016). 18 See, Chap. 14. 19 The quotations in this paragraph are from Redistricting in France under Changing Electoral Rules by Michel Balinski at pages 173 and 185 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008), citing Villepin enterre le redécoupage électoral, Le Figaro (June 17, 2005) and Le gouvernement renonce au redécoupage de la carte électorale, Le Monde (June 17, 2005. See, Decision No. 2008–24 ELEC of May 29, 2008, Observations of the Conseil Constitutionnel on the parliamentary elections of 10 and 17 June 2007; and Decision no. 2008–573 DC, Conseil Constitutionnel (January 8, 2009). The English version of the opinions have no page numbers. (@ https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ en). 17

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drawn. The latest review (Sixth Periodic Review of Westminster Constituencies) is discussed elsewhere in this Chapter.

8.6

Untimely Action Is Common

Many nations have found reasons for postponing redistricting or the reallocation of constituencies. Examples of this inaction can be found in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Politicians, but also voters, often see maintenance of the status quo as more attractive than change. The following are a few examples.

8.6.1

India: A Moratorium on the Reallocation of Seats

After redistricting in 1973, India20 placed a moratorium on the reallocation of seats among the states until 2000. This moratorium was later extended until after the first census (2031) following 2026. As a result, there is already a severe malapportionment among the states, which appears to favor the slower-growing Southern states.21 The situation is complicated as a policy matter because the Indian government had asked the nation’s states to get theie inhabitants to reduce population growth. This policy was followed unevenly around the country. Advocates for a moratorium on reallocating seats among the states argued in part that such a reallocation of seats in the national legislature would unfairly penalize those regions of the country that were the most successful in reducing population growth. Critics said that this argument was only “a smoke screen” for baser political objectives. It is clear that any reallocation of seats now would mean very major political changes. The task almost certainly will only become more difficult in the future and will exact even greater political changes later (e.g. an estimate is that by 2026, one state will have 12 too many seats in the national legislature and another will have 17 too few seats). A further extension of the moratorium seems likely. Supporters of the moratorium urge that any unfairness in the moratorium on the reallocation of seats is offset to some extent by the recognition of new states, dissolution of some constituencies, and the continued redrawing of some individual constituencies within the states on the basis of the existing allocation. However, this is very confused, is a slow process, and is piecemeal. One source says delimitation within a state occurs only with the President’s assent,. Some states have differed the redrawing of constituencies until after 2031. The last nationwide delimitation of

20

See, The Paradox of Political Representation (in India) by Yogendra Yadav (2008) available @ www.india-seminar.com 21 See, Delimitation in India by Alistair McMillan at page 75 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).

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Fig. 8.2 Single-member electoral districts in India. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http:// psephos.adam-carr.net

parliamentary constituencies occurred in the 1970s, but many constituencies were drawn on the basis of 2001 census and will continue to be used until after 2031. Critics dispute the value of such redistricting and claim that it too has been marred by confusion, delays, and extensive gerrymandering of the nation’s single-member districts (Fig. 8.2).

8.6 Untimely Action Is Common

8.6.2

89

The United Kingdom

For several decades, the redistricting process in the U.K. has been unnecessarily long and drawn-out and has utilized old data. Moreover, the Parliament has often delayed or postponed changes with the effect of leaving members of the House of Commons to run for reelection in the same constituency as the one in which they were elected even though the constituency’s demographics have changed. For example, the Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster Constituencies was based on the Roll of Electors for 2000. The new constituencies were first used for 2010 elections. Scotland implemented the changes for the election in 2005, but Parliament postponed the changes for the remainder of the U.K. These constituencies remain in effect today. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act of 2011 was originally scheduled to take effect after the completion of the Boundary Commissions’ next review of constituencies. The Boundary Commissions submitted new reviews to Parliament in 2013. However, only Parliament, with royal Assent, has authority to enact or repeal legislation, including implementation of the recommendations of these commissions. Implementation of the Act stalled, with the Boundary Commissions cancelling their review in the face of opposition in Parliament. Parliament voted to postpone these changes. This postponement was beneficial for the party in power and the incumbents of all parties. It was in effect a gerrymander for the benefit of incumbents and the Conservative Party. The Boundary Commissions restarted their review process in 2018, with the change in the number of constituencies postponed by Parliament until the 2020 election. In proposing the new constituencies, the Boundary Commissions are forbidden from considering any demographic information generated after January 1, 2015.22 England’s number of electors continues to grow faster than its sister entities so that the inequality among constituencies has worsened as the redrawing of constituencies has been delayed. After observing the 2015 elections, the OSCE concluded: Significant population changes have occurred since the last boundary review, consequently, the number of registered voters in each constituency for the 2015 general election varied widely. The Boundary Commission for England noted that the number of registered voters per constituency ranges from 53,877 to 107,572, with an average of 75,774 voters. Out of the 533 constituencies in England, 343 constituencies deviate by more than five per cent from the electoral quota. . . .The most recent constituency reviews were completed in 2007 (England and Northern Ireland), 2004 (Scotland) and 2003 (Wales).23

In the meantime, elections have continued to be held in the constituencies drawn by the Fifth Review based on the Roll of Electors for 2000. This delay has had added

22

This makes the data already at least 3 1/2 years old. It will be at least seven plus years before any new constituencies are used in U.K.-wide (Scotland may be an exception) Parliamentary election. 23 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, GENERAL ELECTION, Final Report, at pages 2–3, OSCE/ODHIR (May 7, 2015).

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importance because these are the members of Parliament dealing with the exit of U.K. from the E.U.

8.6.3

Germany

In Germany, an Electoral Districts Commission (EDC) (Wahlkreiskommission) is appointed at the beginning of each parliamentary session (approximately every 4 years) by the President, but it is not independent. It has 15 months to review and report on the need to reallocate seats among the states (Länders) and to redraw single-member districts in Germany’s mixed system. The commission’s report, however, is merely a recommendation to the German national legislature. The Bundestag receives the report and decides whether to approve any or all of the changes. Historically, the Bundestag has been reluctant to accept the changes recommended by the commission except when the malapportionment of a specific district exceeds legal limits. Ostensibly redistricting of an electoral district is required if malapportionment of the district is 25% or greater (previously 33%) than the national average or quota. In its assessment of German election practices, ACE in 2004 concluded, Länder governments – particularly if they are due to lose a seat – do not relish a change in constituency boundaries. Members of Parliament are also likely to object to changes in constituency lines: new constituency boundaries could make it more difficult for incumbent legislators to win and could lead to the loss of a party seat. Therefore, Parliament often simply accepts only those changes that are mandated by law, retaining the status quo as much as possible.24

The national legislature not only rejected reallocation recommendations in 1983, 1987, and 1990, but also rejected the EDC constituency delimitation plan for a united Germany in 1994. In 1995, the Bundestag voted to reduce its size, effective in 2002. This major reform reduced the number of single-member constituencies to the current 299 and caused several Länder to lose constituencies. A proposal in 2004 to reduce two states by one seat and to increase two others because of population changes was rejected. Amendments in 2005 reduced some of the deviation among Länders and redrew several direct constituencies, but left 53 districts over 15% from the national quota or average.25 These deviations worsened.

24

Annex, Case Study, Germany, Delimiting Districts in a Mixed Member Proportional System, at Conclusion, ACE available at https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/annex/bdy/bdy_de 25 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ELECTIONS TO THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT (BUNDESTAG), OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report (September 2009). Following 2005 ELECTION, the CEC prepared proposals for amending some boundaries. As a result of the review, Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg each gained one SSED seat and Anhalt and Sachsen each lost one seat. In addition, the boundaries of 31 single-member districts were redrawn prior to the 2009 federal elections. However, the finalized districting plan includes some 53 districts

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By 2012 the Bundestag had acted to overcome the worst disparities among the Länder, but significant disparities remain. In the view of one German political scientist (in a dig at their oft rivals), the necessary changes in Germany are “merely delayed,” not totally rejected “as happens with the French.”26

8.6.4

France

France redistricted and reallocated seats in 1986 based on the 1982 census. The Conseil Constitutionnel, the nation’s highest constitutional authority, reluctantly approved the legislation after earlier cautioning about its degree of population deviation.27 Over time the population deviation among districts and administrative units (départements) worsened. The Conseil prodded the national legislature to act to redistrict and reallocate seats.28 The French Parliament failed to do so. In 2002, the legislature even did away with the national census and statutory obligation to periodically redistrict and reallocate seats. The Conseil began to show its impatience and in 200829 explained: For more than twenty years, the Constitutional Council has recalled that the National Assembly, designated by direct universal suffrage, must be elected on essentially demographic bases. . . . It is now imperative to proceed with this division.

France’s Parliament finally acted in 2010,30 but concerns about malapportionment persisted. The Conseil allowed a deviation of 20%, but emphasized that this deviation was only for special circumstances.

8.6.5

The United States: Learning a Lesson

Although each member of the U.S. House of Representatives is ultimately elected from a single-member district drawn by each state’s legislature, each state may be

which deviate from the federal average by more than 15%, of which some 18 deviate by more than 20%. 26 This statement was made in jest by the renowned German Professor Friedrich Pukelsheim in an e-mail to the author on June 16, 2016. 27 See, Decision No. 86-208 DC, Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] (July 2, 1986); and Decision No. 86–218, Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] (Nov. 18, 1986). 28 Decision no. 2008–573 DC, 8 January 2009. The Conseil even declared the guarantee of two seats for each département unconstitutional. 29 OBSERVATIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL SUR LES ECHEANCES ELECTORALES DE 2007, Conseil Constitutionnel (July 7, 2008). See Chap. 14 for more of this opinion. 30 This redistricting was upheld, but claims of gerrymandering and population imbalance persisted.

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Fig. 8.3 2011 United States apportionment. The map is from Wikipedia

seen as a multi-member fixed district that every 10 years is apportioned seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. The critical apportionment of seats among the states is done by Congress. A state can create only as many districts as it has been apportioned. Every 10 years the U.S. Congress apportions the 435 seats in the House of Representatives anew among the states, according to the population of each state as determined by the new decennial census (conducted in the last year of the previous decade) and with the guarantee of a minimum of one seat for each state. This necessarily means that some states gain seats in the House of Representatives and that other states lose an equivalent number of seats in that body (Fig. 8.3).31 Previously, this decennial apportionment was left largely to Congress. In 1921, however, Congress was confronted by a political gridlock and failed to adopt an apportionment act. Congress ultimately addressed the reapportionment issue by removing its discretion and making the reapportionment essentially automatic based on the results of the decennial census. For slightly under 100 years, the apportionment process has been strictly controlled by a statutory formula32 and the calculation for each state made automatically by the Bureau of Census, a federal agency, based on the decennial census and the prescribed formula. The agency reports the results to the President and through him to Congress. Congress has never interfered with this apportionment since 1921. As for the states themselves, the courts have been the driving force. Many state legislatures in the United States for decades avoided redistricting congressional and state legislative districts even though required by their state constitution to do so. The failure of states to redistrict ended only when the federal courts intervened 31

For example in 2011, a total of 12 additional seats were apportioned to Texas (4), Florida (2), Arizona (1), Georgia (1), Nevada (1), South Carolina (1), Utah (1), and Washington (1). An equivalent number of seats were lost at the same time by New York (2), Ohio (2), Illinois (1), Iowa (1), Louisiana (1), Massachusetts (1), Michigan (1), Missouri (1), New Jersey (1), and Pennsylvania (1). 32 The United States apportions using the method of equal proportions.

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in 1963, 1964, and 1968 to require congressional, state, and local legislative districts within a state to be roughly equal in population. The standard for congressional districts was essentially absolute equality in population, but was less rigid for state and local districts. The release of the federal decennial census at the beginning of each decade provides the means for states to redraw their congressional and state legislative electoral districts, and the data by which a state’s redistricting, or failure to redistrict may be challenged in court.

8.6.6

Others

It appears from my research that many nations have never redrawn their singlemember electoral districts or reallocated their seats in the national legislature. Some, like Iran, with a combination of MMDs and SMDs, have enlarged the national legislature and added seats to existing districts to overcome the worst imbalances, but this tactic has proven to be an imprecise and ultimately unsuccessful effort. Other nations have simply ignored the need. Examples can be found throughout the world, but especially in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

8.7

Examples of Timely Action

There are a few nations, however, where the processes of redistricting and reallocation of seats seem to have proceeded in a timely manner in the past. English-language writers often identify the United States, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia as examples of systems in which the reallocation and redistricting processes occur regularly and are largely unaffected by political bias. They suggest that a major reason for this success is that three of these countries have independent redistricting commissions that act without legislative approval.

8.7.1

The United States

The United States is discussed above. The requirement for the decennial apportionment of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives to the states according to the number of persons in each state is in the U.S. Constitution. Congress has complied except in 1921 when congressional gridlock prevented passage of a reapportionment act. Since the 1930 census, reapportionment according to the decennial census has become an essentially automatic task. Federal law requires the Clerk of the House of Representatives to notify each state government no later than January 25 of the year

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immediately following the census of the number of seats to which it is entitled. The states are responsible for drawing the boundaries of these electoral districts. The federal courts make certain that promptly they do so. State laws generally require that the new districts be drawn in the same year that the census is released (i.e. the first year of the decade; the year after the census is taken), but some state laws allow until the following year.

8.7.2

New Zealand

New Zealand33 first adopted a requirement for an equal number of “votes” among electoral districts in 1852. It conducts a census every 5 years and some of its singlemember district lines are redrawn as necessary after each census on the basis of total population and are required to meet a standard of 5% deviation from the quota, subject to certain “neutral” considerations. Since 1994 the country has used a MMP voting system that combines these single-member districts with national PR voting. The South Island has a fixed number of single-member districts or constituencies (16). The number of such districts allocated to the North Island is determined by the number necessary to make the average number of persons in each district in the North equal to the average number of persons in the South Island constituencies. A separate set of districts nationwide is established for Māori inhabitants using the same formula. In 2007 there were 16 districts for the South Island; 47 for the North Island; and seven for the Māori. The remainder of the usually 120 member national legislature, including possible additional “overhang” members under the MMP system, is determined based on a national PR election. Each party receiving at least 5% of the national vote chooses these additional members from a closed party list. An independent commission, which was first created in 1887, is responsible for redistricting the single-member constituencies. Although there have been occasional claims of gerrymandering, the commission’s plans have generally been seen as lacking political bias. Interestingly, New Zealand law bars any legal challenge to the commission’s redistricting because such challenges are seen as usually having a political objective. New Zealand has the advantages of having a relatively small population to count and a rich history of relatively gerrymander-free redistricting.

33

See, An Independent Commission with Political Input: New Zealand’s Electoral Redistribution Practices by Alan McRobie at page 27 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).

8.7 Examples of Timely Action

8.7.3

95

Australia

Australia has an election system dependent on single-member districts allocated among the country’s eight states and territories. The Electoral Commissioner allocates the seats based on a statutory formula. Although total population is used for allocation of the seats, redistricting of the states and territories is based on eligible voters. Voting registration is mandatory in Australia for all qualified persons. Therefore, the number of registrants per district should equal the number of persons eligible to vote and, unlike nations dependent on a decennial census; Australia theoretically has an ongoing and current count of the number of eligible voters in each district. Australian law requires periodic redistricting (every 7 years), but also has several other triggers for when redistricting or reallocation of seats must occur. These include when more than 1/3 of the districts within a state vary by more than 10% from the ideal number of registrants. A Redistribution Commission is appointed for redrawing the districts. Australia is unique in requiring that districts be drawn utilizing projected numbers of registrants based on rates of fertility, mortality, and interstate migration. As a result, although districts may legally be as high as 10% from the ideal when drawn, the objective is that they will vary no more than 3.5% from the ideal number of registrants after 3 ½ years. Australia, however, guarantees each of its eight states and territories at least five representatives in its lower house regardless of population. As a result of this guarantee of seats, the average constituency in the least populated state, Tasmania, is over 20% smaller than the average constituency in the most populated state, New South Wales.

8.7.4

Canada

Canada is another nation where the reallocation and redistricting processes seem to be timely, but the limitations on voting equality are lax. The redistricting is done in each province by independent commissions.34 Following the 2011 census, however, constituencies ranged in population from 26,728 to 132,443, with an average of 99,043. Of the 338 constituencies, 156 deviated more than 10% from the national average and 91 deviated by more than 15%.

34

See, Understanding Electoral Reform: Electoral Reform and Direct Democracy in Canada: When Citizens Become Involved by Lawrence LeDuc, 34 West European Politics 551–567 (Issue 3, 2011), available online at www.tandfonline.co; and The Electoral Boundary Revolution in Canada by R. K. Carty, 15 American Review of Canadian Studies 273 (Issue 3, 1985), published online: November 10, 2009. These commissions consist of judges and politicians.

8 Gerrymandering by Untimely or Malapportioned Redistricting or. . .

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8.7.5

Turkey

A well-functioning process for reallocating seats among electoral districts may also be found outside the English-language nations. Turkey is an example. Representatives in the national legislature are elected by proportional representation from the nation’s 85 electoral districts, including two or more multi-member districts in three large cities, Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, situated in its 81 provinces. Before each legislative general election, an independent judicial commission reviews the number of registrants in each province and determines whether the number of representatives in the multi-member districts should be reallocated. The urban districts in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir have higher numbers of registered voters per representative than the smaller, rural districts (about 15% above the national average). However, given the continuing and sometimes violent dispute between the nation’s government and the Kurdish minority, I expected to find that the predominately Kurdish southeastern provinces would be overpopulated, but failed to find this imbalance. Moreover, I did not find an occasion on which the otherwise very vocal Kurdish activists criticized the allocation of seats among the provinces. My conclusion is that the seat reallocation process in Turkey has been timely and fair and that the judicial commission has done its job well.

8.7.6

Uruguay

Uruguay has a PR system in which the elections are at the fixed district level. The country has reallocated seats among those fixed districts every 5 years for at least 60 years.35

8.7.7

Others

Many nations refuse to reallocate seats, such as Croatia.36 Others are generally timely about reallocation or at least have reallocated seats in recent years, including Greece, Finland, Bolivia, and Iceland.

35 36

See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Uruguay. See, Chaps. 9 and 14.

8.8 Conclusion

8.8

97

Conclusion

A failure to timely and fairly reallocate seats in a national legislature among a country’s fixed or multi-member districts is a form of gerrymandering and is not remedied by the use of proportional representation. The same self-serving political forces of incumbency, party interest, and personal bias that affect the drawing of single-member districts also affect the decision of whether to reduce the number of seats allocated to one state or province in order to increase the number allocated to another state or province because of demographic changes, or to maintain the status quo. Some of the oldest and largest representative democracies in the world have avoided timely redistricting and reallocating seats in the national legislature. This inaction is at least partially based on the ostensible benefit of the status quo to incumbents and the government in power. This is gerrymandering. Sometimes it works; sometimes not. According to my research, a clear similarity among the nations that have regularly reallocated seats is that each nation is using an automatic method or an outside commission to make the reallocation. Allowing the reallocation decision to rest with the legislature is to subject it to the uncertainties of political self-interest, even if the reallocation plan has been proposed by an outside commission. The only legitimate basis for the allocation of seats in the national legislature is equality in total persons or electors. There should be a reallocation of seats on a periodic basis to fixed or special multi-member districts according to a fair formula. The reallocation should be automatic or through an independent commission of qualified persons. Triggers, such as the reallocation of seats before each general election or the redrawing of a district’s boundaries when it exceeds a specified deviation, are beneficial if the nation has reliable data on which to act. However, such triggers should supplement a requirement for periodic redistricting and reallocation of seats. Triggers for limits of deviation for individual districts must not be in lieu of a review of all districts in the nation as a whole and the requirement to equalize population or electors per representative, preferably nationwide.

Chapter 9

Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts

Once seats in the national legislature are allocated to a fixed or special multi-member district, the manner of electing persons to fill those seats can take many forms. In many countries, the fixed district is subdivided into single-member districts, or a PR system is used to elect representatives from the fixed district as a whole or in a special multi-member district. There are variations of these two systems and other election systems as well. Several states, such as Ireland and Australia, have singlemember districts, but use an alternate vote system (AV). Iran uses a modified TRS system in a mix of single-member and multi-member districts.1

9.1

Gerrymandering

Each system is susceptible to gerrymandering. As discussed in the previous chapter, gerrymandering in a nation using elections within fixed or special multi-member districts can be achieved by controlling the allocation of seats to these districts. Each district should have a roughly equal number of persons or electors per representative. The presence of a significant difference in this figure among districts probably indicates a failure to timely reallocate seats to reflect demographic changes or a purposeful effort to disadvantage a political party or group. This action or inaction is a gerrymander to benefit incumbents and the parties in power.

9.2

Treating the Fixed District as a Single-Member District

It is possible to elect some representatives from the fixed district as a whole. The U.S. Senate is an example of such districts using FPTP elections. Each of the 50 states elects 2 senators statewide. Several other countries elect members of their 1

See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Iran.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_9

99

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upper or lower chamber in fixed district wide elections (see below and Chap. 6). Although these elections are not themselves subject to gerrymandering, the decision to hold certain legislative elections in the fixed district as a whole can handicap voters and candidates from less populated areas or political minorities within the fixed district by allowing them to be submerged in and consistently outvoted by an opposing and polarized majority.

9.3

Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional Representation Within Special MultiMember Districts

A few nations allocate seats to special multi-member districts instead of traditional fixed districts.2 These special multi-member districts usually do not have general governmental powers, but instead are used primarily or wholly in the election system. The boundaries of these districts seldom change. For example, in Iceland the 63 members of the national legislature (Althing) are elected primarily using six closed list PR multi-member constituencies of 8–13 seats into which the nation’s 23 counties and independent cities are incorporated. Of the 63 seats, 54 are elected using constituency results. The remaining nine seats are awarded to parties that crossed the 5% national electoral threshold, but failed to win an equivalent number of constituency seats. In Finland, there are 15 multi-member constituencies, each electing from 1 to 35 representatives under a PR open list system that is based on pooling the votes for candidates of each party at the district level. The nation’s provinces were abolished in 2010. The national legislature (Eduskunta) has 200 members. The Finnish constituency boundaries have remained essentially unchanged since 1906, but the number of seats has been regularly reallocated about 6 months before each election (Fig. 9.1).3

2 Nations that use PR elections in fixed districts or special multi-member districts include Albania (changed to PR in 2008), Angola, Albania, Argentina (DSV in some states), Algeria, Aruba, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cambodia, Chile (changed to PR in 2017), Columbia, Costa Rica (DSV), Croatia, Cyprus (North and South), Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, Faroe Islands, Greece, Greenland, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia (some provinces divided into MMDs), Iraq, Ireland (STV), Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein (Two MMD constituencies), Luxembourg (Four MMD constituencies), Malta (STV), Mauritius (BV), Macedonia, Mongolia, Moldova, Morocco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Palestinian Territories (BV), Romania (changed to PR in 2015), Rwanda, San Marino, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay (DSV). 3 Electoral Systems in Context by Åsa von Schoultz (2016).

9.3 Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional. . .

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FINLAND ELECTION DISTRICTS 7

7

8 18

11

14

10

17

10 12

9

2 6

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18 3

10

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1. Ahvenanmaan vaalipiiri 2. Etelä-Savon vaalipiiri 3. Hämeen vaalipiiri 4. Helsingin vaalipiiri 5. Keski-Suomen vaalipiiri Number of members 6. Kymen vaalipiiri elected 7. Lapin vaalipiiri 8. Oulun vaalipiiri 9. Pirkanmaan vaalipiiri 10. Pohjois-Karjalan vaalipiiri 11. Pohjois-Savon vaalipiiri 4 21 12. Satakunnan vaalipiiri 13. Uudenmaan vaalipiiri 14. Vaasan vaalipiiri 15. Varsinais-Suomen vaalipiiri

14

15 17

12 6

1

13 34

1

Fig. 9.1 Special multi-member districts in Finland. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http:// psephos.adam-carr.net

Sweden has a somewhat unique approach. It has 29 special multi-member electoral districts, which generally follow county lines except in the major cities. Of the nation’s 349 members in its unicameral parliament, 310 are elected through a proportional system with open lists from these multi-member districts. The remaining 39 seats are “adjustment” seats. These seats are awarded based on the difference between a party’s number of seats won in the multi-member districts and the number of seats that the party would have won in a proportional contest held in a single, nationwide constituency. Voters can choose between three different ballots to indicate both party and candidate preference, including a blank ballot paper where a voter can write in the party and a candidate’s name. To be elected on a basis of personal votes, a candidate must receive at least 8% of the party votes in the respective constituency (Fig. 9.2). As mentioned above, Iceland reserves nine seats for parties that receive at least 5% of the vote nationwide, but fail to win an equivalent number of constituency seats. Norway has “leveling” seats based on the party’s performance nationwide. Some of the nations that use PR elections in these special multi-member districts make little attempt to equalize voting power for voters within these districts through reallocation as the population changes. For example, in Croatia, representatives are

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9 Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts

SWEDEN

VÄSTMANLAND UPPSALA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS 2014 ELECTION

ÖREBRO

12 NORBOTTEN

8 12

B

4

DALARNA

11

B. GÖTEBORG KOMMUN

11

11

15

3 GOTLAND

1

8 HALLAND

12

2

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10 VÄSTERNORRLAND

11 17

10

10

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32

39

8

11 7

9

13

10

A. STOCKHOLM KOMMUN

12

11

VÄSTERBOTTEN

JÄMTLAND

10

VÄRMLAND

11

6

C

5

6 KALMAR

4

13 1. JÖNKÖPING 2. KRONOBERG 3. ÖSTERGÖTLAND 4. SKÅNE NORRA OCH ÖSTRA 5. SKÅNE SÖDRA 6. SKÅNE VÄSTRA

2

BLEKINGE

5 7. SÖDERMANLAND 8. STOCKHOLM LÄN 9. VÄSTRA GÖTALAND NORRA 10. VÄSTRA GÖTALAND ÖSTRA 11. VÄSTRA GÖTALAND SÖDRA 12. VÄSTRA GÖTALAND VÄSTRA

Number of Riksdag members by District

C. MALMÖ KOMMUN

Fig. 9.2 Special multi-member electoral districts in Sweden. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos.adam-carr.net

elected to a single chamber of Parliament (Sabor) by PR in 12 multi-member constituencies. Ten of the constituencies elect 14 representatives apiece, while the diaspora constituency elects up to 14 representatives, and a constituency for national minorities elects eight nationwide. In December 2010, the Constitutional Court of Croatia4 ruled that an update to the layout of the ten primary electoral districts was necessary, as the differences in the number of voters per representative among the domestic districts, limited by law to a 5% deviation from the average, had grown to at least 25% (Fig. 9.3). The Court requested data on the number of eligible voters in each constituency, but was told by the government that such data was unavailable; so the Court used the number of votes cast in the last election to show the probable imbalance in the number of voters among the districts. In its opinion5 the Court noted:

4

THE CONSTITUTIONALCOURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010) available at https://www.usud.hr 5 THE CONSTITUTIONALCOURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA No. U-X-6472/2010 Zagreb (December 8, 2010) at para 5 available at https://www.usud.hr

9.3 Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional. . .

103

III A

II

VII

IV

VI V

VIII

A

I

IX

XI

CROATIA

X

Croatians abroad

2015 ELECTION Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB) Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) Bridge of Independent Lists (MNL) Forward Croatia! (NH) Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDPH) Labour and Solidarity Coalition (SRS) Human Blockade (ZZ)

Fig. 9.3 Special multi-member electoral districts in Croatia. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos.adam-carr.net

Thus both the legality and the general democratic character of the elections depend on the equal distribution of the voters in the general constituencies (the equality of votes directly depends on this distribution). . . . In other words, constituencies that are once determined undergo changes by the nature of things. It is especially important that the division into constituencies cannot be regulated once and for all. Migration processes demand that constituencies should be constantly adapted to changing relations, by geographically changing their boundaries or by changing their number of seats.

In April 2011 the parliament discussed a proposal to change the constituencies, but no change was made in time for the 2011 elections. These ten multi-member districts remain unequal today, with one constituency regularly having over 70% more voters than another. Croatia faces pressure from the EU to change its election

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system as a condition for joining that body. Despite these pressures, the inequalities among constituencies remain unaddressed.6 Some nations with special multi-member districts make an attempt to balance voting power among these multi-member constituencies. Greece is an example of a nation that has reallocated seats recently. Until 2012 Greece elected representatives using mostly single-member districts, but with 12 representatives (“state deputies”) elected nationwide and a majority bonus of 40 seats for the party receiving the largest share of the votes. The law was changed and now provides for PR elections in multi-member constituencies, but with a majority bonus of 50 seats. The country has 13 special multi-member constituencies, which generally following prefecture lines.7

9.4

Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional Representation Within Each Fixed District

The most popular system among nations worldwide is reliance on proportional representation (PR) within the fixed districts to determine their representatives to the national legislature.8 For example, Norway has 19 counties. Each county functions as a fixed multimember electoral district or constituency. Candidates for the national legislature are elected by proportional representation within the constituency. The number of seats in each constituency is to be adjusted every 8 years, but the allocation is based on a consideration of both a county’s population (one point) and geographic size (1.8 points per square kilometer). This has led to an imbalance in favor of the larger

6

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2015 OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT (September 2015); and HDZ wins election in six constituencies, EBL News (Croatia) (September 12, 2016). 7 For the 2015 election, seats were reallocated by the Interior Ministry. The seats in the national legislature were increased by three in the electoral constituency of Attica (from 12 to 15 seats), by two in Athens second electoral constituency (which is the country’s most populous, with a total of 1,428,759 voters), and by one in Piraeus first electoral constituency (from 5 to 6 seats), Thesprotia electoral constituency (from 1 to 2 seats), Magnesia electoral constituency (from 5 to 6 seats) and the Cyclades electoral constituency (from 3 to 4). At the same time, the parliamentary seats of Athens first electoral constituency were reduced by three (from 17 to 14 seats), while by one in Achaea electoral constituency (from 9 to 8 seats), Aetoloacarnania (from 8 to 7 seats), Boeotia electoral constituency (from 4 to 3), Karditsa electoral constituency (from 5 to 4), Serres electoral constituency (from 7 to 6) and Trikala electoral constituency (from 5 to 4). The Greek Parliamentary Seats and Preference Crosses per Constituency by Aggeios Skordas, at https://greece. greekreporter.com (January 16, 2015). 8 A list of countries using PR in fixed districts or special multi-member districts appears in a previous footnote and in Appendix B.

9.4 Electing Members of the National Legislature by Proportional. . .

105

NORWAY 2017 ELECTION

TROMS

FINNMARK

Labour Party (Ap) Progress Party (FrP) Conservative Party (H) Christian People’s Party (KrF) Green Party (MDG) Red (R) Centre Party (SP) Socialist Left Party (SV) Liberal Party (V)

NORDTRØNDELAG

MØRE OG ROMSDAL

SØR-TRØNDELAG

NORDLAND

NORTHERN NORWAY

SONG OG FJORDANE HEDMARK

A OPPLAND OSLO

HORDALAND

AKERSHUS

BUSKERUD ROGALAND

TELEMARK

ØSTFOLD VESTFOLD

AUST-AGDER

OSLO AREA VEST-AGDER

Fig. 9.4 Electoral districts in Norway. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos. adam-carr.net

northernmost counties. In an effort to even out discrepancies between the number of votes received and the number of seats in the parliament (Storting), each constituency was given an additional “seat at large.” Nevertheless, inequality has continued. For example, in recent elections, a vote in the northernmost county, Finnmark, has counted approximately twice as much as a vote in the capital Oslo or the surrounding county Akershus. Also, like Sweden and Iceland, Norway has “leveling” seats to reward parties that do not achieve representation through the constituency elections (Fig.9.4). Portugal elects the 230 members of its unicameral national legislature (Assembly of the Republic) from 20 multi-member districts using proportional representation. These districts correspond to the nation’s administrative units. An additional two districts are for Portuguese who live outside Portugal (the diaspora). Each one of Bulgaria’s 28 administrative regions is an electoral constituency, except for the city capital city of Sofia, which is split into three constituencies (Fig. 9.5). Similarly, in Switzerland, each canton is a fixed multi-member electoral district. The members of the 200 seat lower chamber (Federal Assembly) are elected by proportional representation from within each canton. Switzerland, however, adds a

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9 Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts

Fig. 9.5 Electoral districts in Bulgaria. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos. adam-carr.net

twist. Its upper house (the Council of States) elects its 46 members from a mixture of 20 multimember and 6 single-member districts that correspond to cantons and ½ cantons.

9.5

Electing Members of the National Legislature in Single-Member Districts Within Each Fixed District

After allocating seats to fixed districts, several nations elect all of their representatives to the lower house of the national legislature exclusively from single-member districts or constituencies drawn within those fixed districts. The most notable examples of countries using only single-member districts are the United Kingdom, Ghana, France, India, Australia, Canada, and the United States.9 Plurality elections, instead of PR elections, are also held in many other nations and are a component of mixed systems. In most nations these single-member districts within fixed districts are drawn by the national legislature. The exceptions include the United States and Canada,10

9

Although fewer countries use all single-member districts than use PR elections, there are more persons in these countries. 10 See, www.elections.ca; To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States by Anthony J. Gaughan, 41 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 999 (2013). Understanding Electoral Reform: Electoral Reform and Direct Democracy in Canada: When Citizens Become Involved by Lawrence LeDuc, 34 West

9.5 Electing Members of the National Legislature in Single-Member. . .

107

where the state, provincial, or territorial legislatures or commissions draw the districts. This adds a new dynamic in which the self-interest of local legislators wanting to run for the national legislature may conflict with the self-interest of incumbents in the national legislature wanting to remain in office. The manner of electing members varies within these districts. The two most common systems are FPTP and TRS. First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) In some nations (e.g. United States, India, Canada, and United Kingdom), each representative from a single-member district (i.e. constituency) is elected using a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, with a candidate needing only a plurality to win.11 India provides an example (Fig. 9.6). Two Round System (TRS) Some nations, such as France and Iran, require that the winning representative receive a specific minimal percentage, perhaps even a majority of the votes in a district, so there often is a second election between the top votegetters in the first election. This system is called a two round system (TRS).12 Maps of France and Iran are in Appendix C. In Iran, a form of the TRS is used in both single-member and multi-member elections. In Majlis (national legislative) elections, each elector has as many votes as there are seats at stake in the constituency (i.e. single or multi-member district) and may be voted as a block for a single candidate. After the first round of voting the candidates who have received the highest number of votes (at least 25%) are elected up to the number of seats at stake. If too few candidates meet the required minimum level of support, the unsuccessful candidates (up to twice as many as there are seats left to be filled) participate in a second round to fill the remaining seats. There are other election systems at use in the world.

European Politics 551–567 (Issue 3, 2011), published online (April 11, 2011).The Electoral Boundary Revolution in Canada by R. K. Carty, 15 American Review of Canadian Studies 273 (Issue 3, 1985), published online: (November 10, 2009); COMMISIONED RIDINGS DESIGNING CANADA’S ELECTION DISTRICTS by John C, Courtney, McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press (2001). 11 The nations that use FPTP elections include American Samoa, Anguilla, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, Canada, Cook Islands, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica (nine appointed), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, India, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya (12 appointed), Laos, Liberia, Maldives, Myanmar (25% appointed by military), Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Malawi, Monserrat, Mozambique, Micronesia, Nigeria, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Oman, Pakistan (with PR for seats set aside for women and non-Muslims), Samoa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (six appointed), Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore (nine appointed by parties), Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tanzania (with 75 seats set aside for women chosen by PR; and some members appointed), Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, British Virgin Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (some appointed). 12 The nations that use a TRS include: Bahrain, Belarus, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, France, French Polynesia, Gabon, Haiti, Iran, Kiribati, Mali, New Caledonia, Tokelau (protectorate of New Zealand), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Wallis and Fortuna, and Viet Nam. Many of these are former French colonies.

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9 Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts

REPUBLIC OF INDIA Legislative election of April-May 2014 Bharatiya Janata Party Indian National Congress All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Biju Janata Dal

Communist Party of India (Marxist) Telangana Rashtra Samithi YSR Congress Party Telugu Desam Party

All India Trinamool Congress

Shiromani Akali Dal

Nationalist Congress Party

Samajwadi Party Lok Janshakti Party

Shiv Sena Aam Aadmi Party

Fig. 9.6 Single-member electoral districts in India. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http:// psephos.adam-carr.net

9.6

Preferential Voting

There are several forms of preferential voting and different circumstances in which they are used. One form of preferential voting is the alternative vote (AV). This manner of election is sometimes called “rank voting” or “instant runoff voting”. It is a form of election that produces a single winner in a single-member district in a single election (i.e. no run-off), but allows the voter multiple choices. The voter receives a ballot with the names of all of the candidates for an office; Voters rank the candidates

9.8 Block Voting (Blk)

109

according to their preference. A formula is followed to allocate those votes among the candidates to produce a single winner. Australia has single-member districts in its lower chamber, but uses AV voting within those districts. Papua New Guinea uses a similar system. Another form of preferential voting is the Single Transferable Vote (STV). It is a voting system designed to achieve proportional representation through ranked voting in multi-member districts. Ireland, Nauru, and Malta are the only examples I could find of nations currently using this system for election to the lower chamber of the national legislature. Each has multi-member districts with three or more representatives. In a few nations, however, such as Northern Ireland, Australia, Scotland, New Zealand, and even the United States, STV or AV is used for a few state or local elections. In some countries it is also is used within a few state legislatures as the method of choosing the state’s representatives in the upper chamber of the national legislature. Variants of the AV and STV systems include the Borda Count, Dowdall, Nanson and Baldwin methods of counting preferential votes to choose a winner. It may be used in single-member or multi-member elections. The nation of Nauru uses the Borda Count method in multi-member districts.

9.7

Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV)

The Single non-transferable Vote (SNTV) method of selecting representatives in a national legislature is used in some nations with multi-member elections. Each voter casts only a single vote. The vote is cast for one candidate in a district in which there is more than one seat to be filled. Those candidates with the highest vote totals fill these positions. SNTV is used in at least: Afghanistan, Pitcairn Islands, Vanuatu, 90 of the 150 seats of Jordan’s Lower Chamber, the Senate elections in Indonesia, and in 6 of the 113 seats under the Parallel (P) system in Taiwan.

9.8

Block Voting (Blk)

Some sources classify the election systems in Singapore, the Palestine Authority, and Mauritius as having “block voting” systems, but this can be misleading. Each of these nations has several multi-member electoral districts. The political party obtaining the greatest number of votes in each multi-member district (usually 2–4 seats) takes all the seats allocated to the district. The block voting occurs only within individual multi-member districts, not nationwide. Parties compete in each multi-member district as if in a PR election, but the winning party in each district gets all of the seats allocated to the district. Block

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9 Gerrymandering Within Fixed Districts

Voting is thought to aid minorities within a multi-member district by allowing them to concentrate their votes and elect their candidates within a district. In Singapore, there are two types of districts. There must be no fewer than eight single-member constituencies. The remainder of the districts are Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) contested by groups instead of individuals. These are essentially multi-member districts in which each group must include at least one person belonging to the Malay, Indian, Eurasian, or some other minority community. The party receiving a plurality of votes in a multi-member district wins all seats in the district. In Mauritius, in addition to the 62 representatives elected from 21 multimember constituencies using block voting, there are a maximum of eight additional seats allocated to the “best losers.” These “best loser” seats are appointed by the Electoral Supervisory Commission and are apportioned among four constitutionally recognized ethnic or religious communities (Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and Creole) to ensure some representation for each of these minority groups. In the Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and Gaza Strip are divided into 16 multimember electoral districts. Six seats across four districts (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Gaza) are reserved for the Christian population and one seat (in the Nablus district) for the Samaritans. In both Mauritius and the Palestine Authority, the political party obtaining the greatest number of votes in each multimember district takes all the seats allocated to the district.

9.9

Gerrymandering the Shape of Single-Member and Multi-Member Districts

In every nation that draws these single-member districts there are two opportunities for gerrymandering. The first opportunity occurs in the allocation of seats to the fixed districts. This form of gerrymandering was discussed in the previous chapter. The second opportunity occurs in the shaping of each electoral district itself. The boundaries of single-member districts within a fixed district must be periodically redrawn to keep them equal in population or electors. The redrawing should occur long enough before an election to permit voters to be adequately informed of the changes and to avoid unnecessary confusion or instability.

9.9.1

The American Experience: Bizarre Shapes

Gerrymandering the shape of single-member electoral districts is often seen as a particularly American phenomenon because some of the U.S. congressional districts are bizarre in appearance. The U.S. redistricting process is usually and rightly criticized as being a haven for oddly shaped electoral districts drawn to favor or

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111

disfavor particular candidates or political parties. It is also appropriate, however, to observe that the shape of these districts is often bizarre in appearance because the drawer is simultaneously trying to create a politically advantageous districting plan and to comply with the nation’s strict requirements for equality in population among districts and for non-discrimination against certain minorities. These requirements are easily established by using census enumerations that are provided for each block or enumeration district in the country and are available to the government and every member of the general public. If the state legislature or commission does not use these tools to make certain its redistricting plan meets the strict court-imposed requirements for equality and legality, a dominant party’s politically favorable redistricting plan will be struck down and may be redrawn by the courts. The political advantages in the original plan may be lost. Therefore, the bizarre shapes of the districts are often the result of an attempt by a plan’s architects to use this census data to achieve certain political goals while insulating the plan from legal challenge. Sometimes they are successful, sometimes not.

9.9.2

Gerrymandering District Shapes Worldwide

If a nation permits districts to vary significantly in the number of persons, citizen population, or voters, the gerrymandered districts are less obvious and less bizarre in appearance than in the United States. Nevertheless, these districts can be drawn to favor or disfavor candidates or political parties by packing an unequal number of persons or voters among esthetically attractive districts that meet the historic neutral criteria for drawing districts, such as contiguous, compact, regular in shape, and respectful of political subdivision boundaries. The same may be achieved through “cracking” opposition strongholds. Both of these are gerrymanders regardless of their appearance. Therefore, although gerrymandering single-member electoral districts is often seen as a particularly American phenomenon, it actually exists worldwide and is facilitated by the lax standard of equality of persons or voters found in most countries and the lack of court enforcement of even those existing standards. Among the nations that have been explicitly accused of gerrymandering the shape or population of electoral districts are Australia, Canada, Chile (changed to PR in 2017), France, Germany, Greece (changed to PR in 2012), Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Nepal, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sudan, Turkey, United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland), United States, and Venezuela. It is unfair, however, to pick on these particular countries because virtually every nation that allocates seats among fixed districts or has single-member or multi-member constituencies, including mixed systems, has examples of districts redrawn or seats allocated to achieve a political purpose. A few of the most notorious examples of gerrymandering single-member districts include:

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Canada—In 2006, the provisional government of Prince Edward Island replaced an electoral map drawn by a commission with one that ensured every current member of the legislative assembly from the premier’s party with a district to run in for re-election.13 Despite this obvious attempt at gerrymandering, only 7 of 20 incumbent members of the Assembly were re-elected (seven did not run for re-election), and the government was defeated. France—Conservative governments took advantage of three opportunities to design favorable districts. These were in 1958, 1987, and 2010. The redistricting in 1987 was particularly effective, resulting in 80% of the seats going to conservatives with 58% of the vote in 1993. The Constitutional Council was asked twice to decide about gerrymandering, but, while it avoided the issue of partisan gerrymandering, it forced the national legislature to respect an 80–120% population ratio (20% from quota), ending a tradition in which départements, however small in population, would send at least two members to the national legislature. As the national census was done away with by the French Parliament in 2002, the Electoral Code no longer provides for fixed redistricting. Some OSCE/ ODIHR observers thought the process of redistricting in 2010 was politicized, leaving room for “gerrymandering” since the government controlled the process and the role of the Independent Commission was strictly advisory. This latest redistricting in 2010 is seen by critics as gerrymandered to continue to benefit conservatives, but supporters of Independent candidate Macron swept to a majority of the national legislature in 2016 despite the alleged gerrymandering. Malaysia—The practice of gerrymandering has been around in Malaysia since its independence in 1957. The ruling coalition (National Front or Barinas Nasional) has been accused of controlling the election commission by revising the boundaries of constituencies. Most recently, in 2013, Barinas Nasional won 60% of the seats in the Malaysian Parliament despite receiving only 47% of the popular vote. Malapportionment has also been used at least since 1974, when it was observed that in one state alone (Perak), the parliamentary constituency with the most voters had more than ten times as many voters as the one with the fewest voters. Philippines—The national legislature of the Philippines has never passed a national redistricting bill since the approval of the 1987 constitution. However, it has created 34 new districts, out of the 200 originally created in 1987. These new districts are carved from existing districts and allegedly gerrymandered to allow politicians from powerful families to avoid running against one another. Singapore—Critics of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) have accused it of unfair electoral practices to maintain significant majorities in the Parliament of Singapore. From Singapore’s independence in 1965–1981, the People’s Action Party won every single seat in every election, forming a parliament with no elected opposition for almost 2 decades. This dominance continues today. In

13

Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, 183 (Can.).

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2015, out of 89 seats, the People’s Action Party (PAP) contested all and won 83. The opposition attributes this PAP success to gerrymandering of the nation’s single-member districts. Sudan—In the election of 2010, there were numerous instances (according to a report from the Rift Valley Institute) in which constituencies were created that were well below and above the required limit of 15% greater or lesser than the average constituency size. Japan—The nation has a mixed (P) system, with 360 SMD and180 PR in regional multi-member districts. The single-member component is notorious for respecting local government boundaries more than voter equality, with the most populous district being >200% larger than the least populous district. The Supreme Court held this disparity unconstitutional, but the Court refrained from intruding in the legislature’s province and instead left the national legislature to fix the system. It did not do so.14 Russian Federation—The Russian Federation has a history of gerrymandering districts under different election systems.15 In Chap. 7 I discussed how the new mixed system used for 2016 elections allowed the shaping of single-member districts and the unequal allocation of constituencies to facilitate the continued control of the national legislature by the United Russia party, which in the 2016 election won 77% of the seats in the Duma with 54% of the vote. Northern Ireland—Gerrymandering was used after the establishment of Home Rule in Northern Ireland in 1921 to favor Unionists (who tended to be Protestant) over Nationalists (who were mostly Catholic).16 United Kingdom—Much has been written about how political parties in the U.K. try to influence the shaping of electoral constituencies to bias election results for Parliament.17 Moreover, each redistricting takes years to complete—meaning that

14

See, Chap. 14; and The Politics of Redistricting in Japan: A Contradiction between Equal Population and Respect for Local Government Boundaries by Tashimasha Moriwaki at page 107 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 15 See, The Electoral System of the Russian Federation by Bill Bowring, DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2011); Russian Parliamentary Election Report on Duma Elections in 2016, OSCE/ODIR (2016); and Putin Changes September Election Rules To Prop Up His ‘United Russia’ Party by Patrick Roderick Gregory, Forbes (Mar 14, 2016). 16 See, Electoral Redistricting in Ireland by John Coakley at page 155 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 17 Electoral Distortion Despite Redistricting by Independent Commissions: The British Case, 1950–2005 by Ron Johnston, Charles Puttie, and David Rossiter at page 205 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008); PUTTING VOTERS IN THEIR PLACE by Ron Johnson & Charles Pattie, Oxford Univ. Press (2006).

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the underlying data is outdated by the time it is used. For example, the last redrawing of constituencies in England began in 2001, but did not become effective until the 2010 election. In 2011, Parliament revised the redistricting criteria, reduced the number of constituencies (from 650 to 600), and directed the country’s four boundary commissions to review and to report on new constituencies before October 1, 2013. This entire review of constituencies stalled in 2013 as the Parliament was unable to muster votes for adoption of the new constituencies. This review of constituencies was postponed until 2018 and the reduction in the number of constituencies was delayed until after 2020. Southeast Asia—Several writers lament that Democracy is retreating in Southeast Asia.18 The issues go far beyond the gerrymandering of electoral districts. Latin America—Several countries are facing democratic regression. As in Southeast Asia, the issues go beyond the gerrymandering of electoral districts. Africa—According to The African Election Database, in sub-Saharan Africa alone there are five countries that conduct elections that are not free and fair. The gerrymandering of the shape of districts is also a factor when districts are drawn in mixed systems.

9.10

Conclusion

Gerrymandering is not solely an American phenomenon. It exists throughout the world and in every election system where decision-making about the allocation of seats or shape of electoral districts is susceptible to the influence of political selfinterest. Any effort to limit gerrymandering lies in a nation adopting an effective means of eliminating or at least minimizing the opportunities for that influence, not through the choice of the election system itself. Some nations have been successful in finding such means; others have not.

18 See, South-East Asia: lots of elections, not so much democracy by Banyan, Economist (May 26th 2018) Democracy in Southeast Asia: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, Electoral Integrity, a Kofi Annan Foundation Initiative (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia September 2–3, 2017); East Asia and the Receding Tide of the Third Wave of Democracy by Larry Diamond (Keynote Speech), International Conference on Democracy in East Asia and Taiwan, Global Perspective (2011) available at [email protected]

Chapter 10

Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with Proportional Representation Elections

Several nations combine single-member electoral districts with proportional representation in a dual system for the election of members of the lower chamber of its national legislature or for its unicameral national legislature.1 The two electoral systems function separately. Usually each voter may cast two votes—one for the direct election of his or her favored candidate in the singlemember district where the voter resides and one for a political party. These choices can appear on a single ballot, but usually appear on two separate ballots. The basic purpose of such a dual system is to combine the ostensible advantages of direct single-member elections (e.g. geographical representation) with the perceived fairness of proportional representation. The specifics of this dual system vary among nations.

10.1

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Elections

Germany is the leading example of a mixed system, but with a twist. The Bundestag has 299 members elected directly from single-member districts in each of Germany’s 16 states (Lander). The Länder are allocated these constituencies based on their

1

Nations that have mixed election systems include: Andorra (P), Armenia (P), Antigua and Barbados (P), Bolivia (MMP), Cameroon (P), Chad (P), Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) (P), Djibouti (P), Ecuador (P), Georgia (P), Germany (MMP), Guatemala (P), Guinea (P), Hungary (P, changed from MMP in 2012), Italy (P, changed in 2018), Japan (P), Jordan (P, with seats reserved for women, Christians, and Chechens/Circassians), Republic of Korea (P, South Korea), Lesotho (MMP), Lithuania (P), Libya (P), Madagascar (P), Mauritania (P), Mexico (P), Monaco (P), Nepal (P) (26 appointed), New Zealand (MMP), Niger (P), Panama (P), Pakistan (P), Philippines (P), Puerto Rico (P), Russian Federation (P beginning in 2016), Romania (MMP), Senegal (P), South Sudan (P),Taiwan (P), Tajikistan (P), Tanzania (P), Thailand (P), Ukraine (P), Venezuela (changed from MMP to P in 2010), and Zanzibar (MMP). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_10

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number of German citizen population in each Land and the number ostensibly changes as the seats are reallocated because of changes.2 A proportional representation system exists alongside the single-member election system. A map of the German single-member electoral districts is in Appendix C. After World War II, Germany attempted to engineer a system (Zweistimmensystem, or as known Internationally—Mixed Member Proportional [MMP]) in which there were a fixed number of single-member electoral constituencies, but a political party’s ultimate representation in the Bundestag was never greater than a party’s percentage of the national vote. The respective states and parties, however, resisted giving up the seats derived from the district direct elections (i.e. single-member) even if the total number of seats for the party was greater than the percentage earned in the national vote. This led to excess seats in the Bundestag unfairly favoring certain political parties and states. In 2008, the country’s Federal Constitutional Court held this system unconstitutional as violating the principles of equality and immediacy of choice.3 After two tries, the Bundestag in 2013 adopted a modified system intended to correct this failing. In the words of noted author Professor Freidrich Pukelsheim, the German System: serves three goals: to achieve proportionality between political parties across the whole country; to allocate the seats of a party among the party’s state-lists of nominees, and to combine the system’s proportionality component with plurality elections of individual candidates in single-seat constituencies.4

The new system continues to combine single-member district elections and proportional representation, but is designed to adjust representation in the Bundestag according to each party’s ratio of votes nationwide by increasing the number of members from other parties. The Constitutional Court approved the new system. As a result, the Bundestag is expected to grow in size. Several nations followed the German (MMP) model, including Bolivia, New Zealand (changed to MMP in 1993), Hungary (changed from MMP to parallel [P] in 2012), Lesotho, Venezuela (changed to Parallel in 2010), Zanzibar, and

2 As discussed in Chap. 8, Germany has been slow to reallocate seats. In 2012 the average singlemember constituency size nationwide was 268,293 persons, but Berlin with a population of 3.56 million had 12 constituencies (average 296,666); while Lower Saxony with a population of 7.79 million had 30 constituencies (average 259,666); and Thuringia with 2.181 million had 9 constituencies (average 242,333). 3 BVerfGE 121 (2009) 266–317, Judgment of 3 July 2008 (2 BvC 1/07, 2 BvC 7/07). One of the Court’s conclusions was that the “negative voting weights” characteristic of the system actually caused parties sometimes to win more seats by getting fewer votes—causing voters to speculate whether casting their vote for their favored party would help or harm it. On a personal note: while teaching in Germany in the early 2000s, I recall being startled by Chancellor Merkel’s plea that supporters of her CDU party actually vote for another party to prevent CDU from losing seats. 4 APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION at 247 (Second Edition 2018).

10.2

Parallel Election Systems (P)

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Romania (changed from MMP to FPTP in 2006 and then to PR in 2015). In some of these nations the election system is called “the Additional Member System,” but the idea is the same—a party is limited in the total of its representatives in the national legislature from SMD and PR elections to its proportion of the national PR vote. Italy in 2015 considered following the German lead, but settled instead for a Parallel system (P). Hungary had a MMP system for a while, but changed to a Parallel (P) system in 2011. Venezuela changed to a Parallel (P) system in 2010. Romania changed from MMP to a FPTP system in 2006, but went to a strictly PR system in constituencies in 2015. Bolivia modified the MMP system to avoid increasing its Chamber of Delegates by providing that if one party has more seats from the single-member districts alone than the proportion of list vote it received, the extra seats are taken from the last allocated list seats. The MMP system is used at below the national level in at least Scotland and London. International agencies, such as ACE and OSCE/ODIR, have concluded that the German Lander do not relish a loss of seats or a change in constituency boundaries and that members of the German Parliament are also likely to object to changes in constituency lines because new constituency boundaries could make it more difficult for incumbent legislators to win and could lead to the loss of a party seat. “Therefore, [the German] Parliament often simply accepts only those changes that are mandated by law, retaining the status quo as much as possible.”5

10.2

Parallel Election Systems (P)

Most of the 45 or more nations with a mixed system make no effort such as Germany’s to limit a party’s membership in the national legislature, including constituency victories, to the ratio of a party’s percentage of the vote nationwide or to increase the size of their national legislature for equality. In this second category of a mixed system the two components—single-member district elections and national proportional representation elections—are unconnected. This is called a Parallel System (P). In the nations using this parallel system, such as Japan, Mexico, Ecuador, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, The Russian Federation, Italy, and South Sudan, there are a fixed number of single-member and proportional representation seats. The seats won by a political party in the proportional representation election are merely added to the seats won by the party directly through the district single-member elections.

5

See, Appendix C, A Case Study of Germany.

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Mixed Election Systems Combining Electoral Districts with. . .

The Percentage of SMD and PR Seats

The relative number of seats that are decided in single-member or PR elections varies by country. The most common division is a roughly evenly split mix. Some countries, however, have a significantly uneven split. For example, in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) there are 253 members of the national legislature elected from single-member constituencies, while only 47 are elected through a national PR system. In MMP election systems, the number of single-member constituencies remains unchanged, but the number of PR seats fluctuates as necessary to equalize party representation in the national legislature.

10.4

Geographical Areas for the PR Component of MMP or Parallel Election Systems

The PR component of a mixed system election may be carried out on the basis of the nation as a whole, within specially designated multi-member districts, or within the country’s fixed districts. Nationwide The Russian Federation is an example of a nation that combines single-member districts with a nationwide PR election. Russia had experimented with a nationwide PR election for all members of its lower chamber, but recently changed to a Parallel System.6 In doing so, it kept nationwide elections for the PR component of the system. Other nations that use nationwide elections for the PR component of their mixed systems include the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Philippines, and Hungary. This is also true of some other countries, although many allow a party to submit a different list for each fixed district. Specially Designated Multi-Member Districts Several nations that use mixed systems conduct their PR elections using specially designated multi-member districts. In Mexico,7 both chambers of the national legislature use a Parallel election system. The PR component of the lower chamber (Cámara de Diputados) is based on the outcome in five super-sized multi-member, multi-state districts (Fig. 10.1). Each multi-member district in Mexico elects 40 members to the national legislature. The electoral regions may be modified by the National Electoral Institute to 6

See Chap. 7. Mexico: Final Report, Observing the 2000 Mexico Elections by Marcela Szymansic, Carter Center and ACE (2000); and From Politics to Technicalities: Mexican Redistricting in Historical Perspective by Alonso Lujambio and Horacio Vives Segi in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008).

7

10.5

Gerrymandering the Mixed System

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2006 legislative election leading party CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES PROPORTIONAL DEPUTIES

2 26

Circumscription 1

6

Circumscription 2 7

Circumscription 3

3 25

Circumscription 4

19

Circumscription 5

10 28 32

UNITED MEXICAN STATES 1. Aguascalientes, 2. Baja California, 3. Baja California Sur, 4. Campeche, 5. Chiapas, 6. Chihuahua, 7. Coahuila de Zaragoza, 8. Colima, 9. Distrito Federal, 10. Durango, 11. Guanajuato, 12. Guerrero, 13. Hidalgo, 14. Jalisco, 15. Mexico, 16. Michoacan de Ocampo, 17. Morelos, 18. Nayarit, 19. Nuevo Leon, 20. Oaxaca, 21. Puebla, 22. Queretaro de Arteaga, 23. Quintana Roo, 24. San Luis Potosi, 25. Sinaloa, 26. Sonora, 27. Tabasco, 28. Tamaulipas, 29. Tlaxcala, 30. Veracruz-Llave, 31. Yucatan, 32. Zacatecas

1

18

31

11 22 13

14 8

24

23 16

15 9 29 17 21

4

30 27

12 20

5

Fig. 10.1 The special multimember PR electoral districts in Mexico. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos.adam-carr.net. In this map, each of the five special multi-member PR (circumscription) districts is shown in a different color. The black lines show the states

maintain a roughly equal distribution of population among the regions. However, the current distribution has been in use since September 30, 2005. The PR component for the upper chamber (Cámara de Senadores) is decided on a nationwide basis. Among nations that use regional multi-member districts as part of the PR component in their mixed electoral system are Italy, Mexico, and Japan. Fixed Districts Several nations with mixed systems determine each party’s share of PR seats at the national level after an election, but then disburse those seats to party lists in its fixed districts. Such a dispersion allocation raises the issue of whether its goal is equality in the treatment of voters or political parties. This dilemma is discussed below.

10.5

Gerrymandering the Mixed System

A mixed system is susceptible to gerrymandering. While such a system enjoys the advantages of both single-member and PR systems, it also has the disadvantages of both systems. Some of the most famous examples of gerrymandered mixed systems

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are discussed elsewhere in this book, but include Germany, The Russian Federation, Mexico, and Japan. The single-member component can be gerrymandered through both the reallocation and redistricting processes. Any PR component that is based on fixed districts or regional multi-districts can be gerrymandered through the reallocation or district redrawing processes. Both components can be manipulated through the failure to timely make the adjustments that are necessitated by demographic changes. It is also meaningful that many of the nations that have mixed systems allow preferential voting and independent candidates in the PR component.8 These aspects of the system theoretically diminish the power of the parties to control who serves in the national legislature and increase the potential for accountability of candidates to voters. Whether these aspects of the system actually have these effects varies by country.

10.6

Is the Goal A Fair Treatment of Persons (Voters) or Parties?

An issue for nations with PR, MMP or P systems that after an election disburse PR seats to their fixed or special multi-member districts is whether the objective is equality for voters or fairness for political parties. In Germany, the Constitutional Court has endorsed the concept of “success value equality.” This concept is based on the premise that “all voters shall have the same influence on the result of the election from the vote they cast.”9 This concept is an endorsement of these Post-Election adjustments to assure that parties receive seats equivalent to their national showing. Formulas for the Post-Election dispersion of seats are complicated, but usually include the number of votes for a party in a fixed or special multi-member district as a factor. Using the number of votes instead of, or in addition to, the number of persons, citizen population, or electors in a fixed district for dispersion of seats in a PR component invariably adds some deviation from equality because of variations among fixed districts in turnout, invalid votes, and uncounted votes for parties that failed to meet the party threshold. This problem also exists in circumstances in which a nation uses “leveling seats” or “adjustment seats” after an election to reward parties that met the national threshold, but did now win sufficient votes to gain enough seats in the constituencies to equal its share of the vote nationwide. The underlying principle is that the number

8 For example, both Mexico and Japan allow a voter’s preference to affect the ranking of candidates on a party list. 9 APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION at 247 (Second Edition 2018).

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Conclusion

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of seats a party gets in the national legislature should be as close as possible to the relative number of votes that the party got in the election countrywide. These Post-Election adjustments in a PR system or in a mixed system almost make the pre-election distribution of seats on the basis of total population or the number of citizens or registered voters largely meaningless. They benefit the parties at the cost of voter equality. Whether this deviation works over time to provide significant unequal treatment for voters in certain countries is unclear to me.

10.7

Conclusion

Several nations, such as Italy, the Russian Federation, and Hungary, have changed to a mixed system within the past decade. Combining direct election and PR election systems is attractive, but it has advantages and disadvantages. Having a mixed system does not mean avoiding the opportunity for gerrymanders. Such a system has multiple ways in which it can be manipulated for political self-interest. The key to true representative government lies not in the choice of a specific election system, but in how the redistricting and seat allocation decisions are made. Are there clear criteria to identify the public interest? Are the decision processes insulated from political self-interest? These issues are addressed in the following chapters.

Chapter 11

Protecting Access by Minorities and Women to the Political Process

Many nations now provide by law for a means for advancing or protecting the interests of groups when those persons or voters might not otherwise be able to win election to the national legislature. These provisions are the result of the work of many organizations.1 International treaties and standards allow special measures for advancing ethnic minorities or groups that have suffered past discrimination, and such measures are not considered necessarily discriminatory themselves. Many organizations have pushed for greater representation of women on party lists or in the national legislature. Single-member districts can discriminate against minorities if drawn to crack or pack cohesive areas of predominately minority population. The districts may also effectively prevent minority success at the polls even when gerrymandering has not occurred, if voting in the district is polarized against the minority. Multi-member districts, such as used in PR elections, can present several impediments to minority access. If voters are polarized along racial, ethnic, religious or political lines, all seats in a district may consistently be won by the same electoral majority unless the election system overcomes such bloc voting. For some observers, this means that minority voters are “submerged” in the political majority and are unable to elect a person of their choice. There are many methods, however, that can be used to increase minority representation. At least 40 nations set aside seats in the national legislature for designated racial, ethnic, language, or religious groups, have power-sharing arrangements (e.g. Bosnia), or allow race conscious redistricting to assure minority representation

1 See, e.g. Statement of Gay J. McDougall, United Nations Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Hearing of the U.S. Helsinki Commission available @ www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission. Reports of the U. N. Independent Expert on minority issues based on her observations are available for many different countries.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 S. Bickerstaff, Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide, Studies in Choice and Welfare, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_11

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in the national legislature.2 The definition of the protected minority and the methods of achieving minority representation vary widely among countries.

11.1

Methods of Aiding the Representation of Identified Minority Groups

The following are the methods I identified that nations are using to aid minority representation in their national legislatures and a few examples of the nations using the method. It is not intended as listing of all nations that aid minority representation.

11.1.1 Consideration in Redistricting One method is to specify that minority communities are communities of interest to be considered in redistricting. In Panama concentrations of indigenous populations must be considered. Kazakhstan is bicameral, with the lower chamber (Mazhilis) having 107 seats. Most (98) are directly elected nationwide, but nine are chosen by the Assembly of Kazakhstani Nation, which is a presidentially appointed advisory body designed to represent the country’s ethnic minorities. In Italy’s mixed system, separate districts are formed where recognized linguistic minorities reside. In Ukraine, the density of national minority populations is to be taken into account. Criteria requiring due consideration of a minority population is often unlikely to have any significant effect on the election of minorities. On the other hand, in at least two countries, U.S. and Canada, the splitting of a minority community can be a basis for a court challenge to the redistricting plan.3

11.1.2 Guaranteed Seats for Minority Groups A surer method for guaranteeing that the views of named minorities are part of a nation’s law-making is to set aside a certain number of seats in the national legislature for designated minorities. The definition of a protected minority varies by nation and circumstance. In some cases it is a racial or ethnic group. In others it is

2

See, Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Comparative Approach by Andrew Reynolds at 115 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 3 See, e.g. Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask) [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, 183 (Can.); Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

11.1

Methods of Aiding the Representation of Identified Minority Groups

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a religious group. Some countries even reserve seats for certain occupations such as farmers, students, or laborers or for disabled persons. In the Middle East the emphasis is on religious groups. For example, Iran’s national legislature includes five seats reserved for non-Muslim minorities; specifically the nation’s Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Armenian Christian populations. Pakistan reserves categories of seats for women and non-Muslims. The State of Palestine reserves seats for religious minorities. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, but it too reserves seats in its national legislature for Christians, Chechens/Circassians and women. In addition, Jordanian law requires three multi-member districts drawn for the probable election of Bedouins. Lebanon divides the national legislature equally between Christians and Muslims, and further divides the nation into districts and sub-districts designed to elect representatives of different sects of these two religions. By contrast, the emphasis in Eastern Europe is on racial or ethnic groups and is largely the result of past conflict among these groups. In Croatia, for example, separate seats are reserved for the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak, Rumanian and Ukrainian, and Austrian and German minorities. In addition, Croatian law specifically reserves three seats in the national legislature for the Serbian minority. In Slovenia, two seats are reserved for the Hungarian and Italian minorities. Kosovo reserves 20 seats in its 120 member national legislature split between ten for Serbs, four for Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian, three for Bosnians, two for Turks and one for Goranis. Since 2014, Hungary has allowed each of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Rusyn, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian, and Ukrainian ethnic minorities to win one of the 93 PR seats in its parallel system if they register as a specific list and reach a lowered threshold. In Central and South America, the dominant issue is representation of indigenous persons. Columbia reserves a single seat for indigenous people. Venezuela reserves three. Panama requires that concentrations of indigenous people be considered in redistricting. In several nations the seats are filled by the “indigenous” persons using usos y costumbres practices, which are a less formal and more “community-based” method for resolving disputes selecting representatives. In Africa, many of the governments continue to face economic and political challenges, including the representation of minority groups. Guaranteed seats are primarily for tribal groups and women. In Burundi, approximately 60% of the seats in the national legislature are allocated to Hutu and 40% to Tutsi, with three 3 seats reserved for Twas. Women must occupy 30% of the total seats. Appointments are made to “co-opted” seats as required to assure that the quotas are met. In Rwanda, one authority says that there are 45 Hutu and 13 Tutsi seats in the lower house,4

4

See, Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Comparative Approach by Andrew Reynolds at page 115 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman, Eds. (Oxford Press 2008). Another authority says that the tribal distinctions between Hutus and Tutsi have been abandoned and all are Rwandans.

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but other sources disagree. Twenty-four women are elected by electoral colleges5 formed in the provinces and three members of the national legislature are appointed by mini-committees, two representing youth (selected by the National Youth Council) and one representing disabled people (selected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled). Niger sets aside eight seats for the Taurag, a nomadic people inhabiting the Sahara. At least one nation, Zimbabwe, once reserved 20 seats for “Whites” elected nationwide using preferential voting. Zimbabwe eliminated this reservation of seats in 1987. In Asia, the protected groups are more diverse. The Philippines reserves 20% of the seats in its national legislature for “marginalized groups or parties”, with a three seat cap for such groups or parties. Papua New Guinea has single-member constituencies with an Alternative Vote (AV) election system, but has separate sets of communal seats to guarantee representation of the major ethnic groups. Samoa has seats for non-Samoans. There are several methods by which these countries fulfill their guarantee in regard to minorities and women in the national legislature. One common method is by appointment. For example, in some nations, if elections fail to produce the desired result, someone (usually the president) is authorized to appoint as necessary to meet the prescribed membership.6 Another method is by the use of nationwide elections in which only certain minorities or women are eligible to become candidates or to vote. For example, Pakistan uses primarily single-member districts, but it uses PR elections to fill 60 additional seats for women (PR by province) and 10 seats for non-Muslims (PR nationwide). Specific examples include:

11.1.3 Creation of Districts Designed to Elect Minority Candidates In New Zealand,7 a separate set of Maori electoral districts exists alongside the general districts; with only Maoris allowed to vote or to seek election in these electorates.8 These Maori districts cover the entire country and exist as an overlay of the general electoral districts. Maoris have been represented in the New Zealand parliament in roughly the same proportion as their percentage in the population Encarta Dictionary defines a college in this context as “A group of people, usually of the same profession, who have agreed duties and rights.” 6 For example, in Mauritania so-called “best loser” seats are appointed by the Electoral Supervisory Commission and are apportioned among four constitutionally recognized ethnic or religious communities (Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, and Creole). 7 See, An Independent Commission with Political Input: New Zealand’s Electoral Redistribution Practices by Alan McRobie in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., Oxford Univ. Press (2008). 8 Maori voters and candidates are not prohibited from instead participating in the general election. 5

11.1

Methods of Aiding the Representation of Identified Minority Groups

127

TE TAI TOKERAU HAURAKI-WAIKATO WAIARIKI

TAMAKI-MAKAURAU TE TAI HAUAURU

IKAROA-RAWHITI

TE TAI TONGA

NEW ZEALAND 2017 ELECTION

MAORI SEATS New Zealand Labour Party

Fig. 11.1 New Zealand 2017 election: Maori seats. There have been seven Māori electorates in each of the 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2017 general elections. The map is courtesy of Dr. Adam Carr @ http://psephos.adam-carr.net

(Fig. 11.1). Registration on the Maori electoral roll is optional; Maoris can choose to register on the general roll instead. In Italy the new system calls for separate constituencies to be formed where recognized linguistic minorities reside. Lebanon probably carries the idea of creating districts to assure religious equality further than any other country.9 The 2008 Lebanon Constitution requires that the

9 See, The Lebanese Electoral System, IFES (2009) available at www.IFES.org; Lebanon’s Unique Democracy: 7 Things to Know About Today’s Elections, A complex new election law, sectarianism, Palestinian refugees, and the ‘selfie prime minister’: Your guide to Lebanon’s first general election in 9 years, The Associated Press (May 06, 2018).

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seats in the national legislature must be divided evenly between Christians and Muslims. The two religions are sub-divided into four Muslim and seven Christian sub-groups10 called “confessionals”.11 The nation’s legislature became gridlocked and elections were postponed three times for a total of nine years. A new election law was implemented in 2018. The Constitutional mandate for an even split between Muslims and Christians remains, but the new law implements a PR system that awards seats by the share of vote received, instead of the former winner-takes-all system in each district. It reduces the number of electoral districts from 23 to 15, but many districts are unchanged or are divided into sub-districts. Each district or sub-district is carefully drawn to give voting majorities to the various confessionals. The new law allows voters to choose both an electoral list and a preferred candidate from that list. A general election was held under the new law on May 6, 2018. The new election law is so complex that some say they would rather stay at home because they can’t figure out how their vote will be computed.12 In India, there are 79 parliamentary seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, and 41 seats for Scheduled Tribes.13 These reserved single-member districts are allocated to each state (fixed district) based on its proportion of the protected class in the national population. In reserved constituencies, only candidates from these communities can stand for election. These reserved constituencies shift among states from one election to the next.

11.1.4 Allowing Self Government Recently the President of the Philippines announced that he was recognizing the right of the Southern Philippines to limited self-government in an area to be known

10

Muslim sub-groups were Sunni, Shia, Alawite, and Druze. Under the previous law, the nation’s 128 parliamentary seats were allocated among 26 multimember districts (2–10 seats in a district), with seats in a district assigned to specific confessionals. Although candidates for a particular seat had to be from that confessional, all voters in the district could vote for each seat allocated to the district. 12 See, Lebanon’s Unique Democracy: Seven Things to Know About Today’s Elections, A complex new election law, sectarianism, Palestinian refugees, and the ‘selfie prime minister’: Your guide to Lebanon’s first general election in 9 years, The Associated Press (May 06, 2018); The Lebanese Elections and Their Consequences by Rayan El-Amine, Middle East Research and Information Project (June 14, 2018); Is Lebanon’s New Electoral System a Path Out of Sectarianism? By Elias Muhanna, The New Yorker (June 29, 2017); 7 Things to Know About Today’s Elections, A complex new election law, sectarianism, Palestinian refugees, and the ‘selfie prime minister’: Your guide to Lebanon’s first general election in 9 years, The Associated Press (May 06, 2018); The Lebanese Elections and Their Consequences by Rayan El-Amine, Middle East Research and Information Project (June 14, 2018); Is Lebanon’s New Electoral System a Path Out of Sectarianism? by Elias Muhanna, The New Yorker (June 29, 2017). 13 See, Delimitation in India by Alistair McMillan at page 75 in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective by Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, eds., (Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 11

11.2

Representation of Women

129

as Bangsamoro. The area is predominately Muslim, while the remainder of the Philippines is primarily Christian. The action followed many years of fighting by the Muslims for independence. A similar recognition of self-government applies in the relationship of Zanzibar to Tanzania and in a few other situations around the world.

11.1.5 Exemptions in a PR System An approach for aiding certain groups to become represented in the national legislature in a country using proportional representation elections is to waive the required threshold of votes that the group as a “racially or ethnically minority” party must receive nationwide. For example, Serbia, Germany, and Poland make an exception to their 5% proportional representation threshold for qualifying minority parties. These parties are only required to meet a threshold of .04% of the national vote in Serbia, the equivalent of a single member in the national legislature. Another approach is to require party lists to contain a certain percentage of identified minorities.

11.1.6 The Upper Chamber Many nations have similar measures to assist minorities in becoming members of the nation’s upper chamber. For example, Belgium reserves seats for French, Flemish, and German in its upper chamber.

11.2

Representation of Women

It has become increasingly common for countries to advance the election of women. In countries using PR elections, this may be accomplished by requiring parties to include women on their party list, or even to require them to alternate men and women on the list. In Burundi, the election in the lower chamber is PR in MMD, but there is a quota of 30% women. If the quota is not met in the election, the president appoints women to fill the gap. The PR component of the new mixed system in Italy is an example of how a PR system can be designed to assure female representation. Each party list is closed and must alternate male and female candidates. Some preferential voting exists, but is limited. This limit is intended to prevent voters from skipping over the female candidates. Also, no party list can have over 60% of same gender, nor can any party have over 50% of one gender among its leaders.

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In countries that rely on single-member elections, seats may be set aside for women. For example, in Pakistan, 272 members of the national parliament are elected from single-member districts, but an additional 60 seats are reserved for women and 10 for non-Muslims. The women candidates for these reserved seats are chosen from closed lists filed by the political parties and the seats are filled under a PR system based on the number of general seats won by each political party by province. The seats reserved for non-Muslims are filled under a PR system, but based on results in the country as a whole. Morocco has a similar system, with 30 seats reserved for women and filled by national PR elections. An alternative for increasing the number of women in the national legislature’s Upper Chamber is by requiring the appointment of women. In Afghanistan the President appoints 34 persons to the Upper Chamber, half of whom must be women. This same approach exists in Swaziland, where the King appoints ten Members of the Upper Chamber, half of whom must be women.

11.3

The United States

The United States makes no special provision for aiding women to secure seats Congress. After the 2018 mid-term elections, there are 25 female senators out of 100 members of the Senate and 102 women out of 435 members in the U.S. House of Representatives. Nor does the U.S. expressly set aside any seats for minorities or (contrary to some descriptions) require that districts be created for the election of minorities. Instead, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Constitution have been interpreted to prohibit districts that dilute minority voting strength by gerrymandering (i.e. packing or fracturing) large, cohesive minority communities in the presence of polarized voting by a majority.14 The Act has aided certain minorities to win election to Congress. After the 2018 mid-term elections, there were two Hispanic-American, three Asian-American, and three African-American members of the U.S. Senate, and 35 Hispanic-American, 12 Asian-American, and 52 African-American members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The biggest growth has been among Hispanic-Americans and Asian-Americans, both of whom have doubled their representation in the national legislature since 2001. Court decisions enforcing these Voting Rights Act prohibitions have had the general effect of creating districts in which the protected racial or language group (Black, Latino, Asian, or Native American) has the “opportunity to elect the person of their choice.” As a practical matter, this has meant the creation of electoral districts under the Voting Rights Act in which the minority voters are a majority of

14 Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The case also emphasizes the importance of the residual effects of past discrimination.

11.3

The United States

131

the qualified voters and thus have the ability to outvote any racially “polarized” opposition.15 In some such districts, the minority voters have elected white representatives. These districts are also often seen as form of gerrymander because designed to achieve a specific purpose and are some of the most bizarre in appearance of all districts as the map drawer searches by computer for election precincts or census blocks that have the desired demographics, while avoiding other precincts and staying within the strict one person, one vote requirement. I dislike the bizarre shapes of some of these districts and think that the desired result can be achieved without such contortions, but I disagree with the classification of these districts as gerrymanders because (if done correctly) they are created to meet a legally recognized public need or approved criteria, not the self-interest of politicians. The following congressional districts were created in the center of Harris County (Houston), Texas by a Democratically-controlled state legislature in 1991. They were designed to allow both Black and Hispanic voters in Harris County to elect a person of their choice to Congress. I applaud the goal, but deplore the largely unnecessary disregard of traditional redistricting criteria. The districts were drawn so that Black voters were a majority of the voters in the light blue district (Congressional District 18) and Hispanic voters were a majority of voters in the red district (Congressional District 29).16 The underlying assumption was that these minority groups could not be assured of the ability to elect the person of their choice as required under the then existing law unless they constituted a majority of the eligible voters in the districts. A majority of persons was thought insufficient because of the higher rate of non-citizens and underage persons within these groups, especially among Hispanics. The districts were created using census blocks (shown by the solid lines) which provided the population and racial composition of each block. These small census blocks, sometimes containing