This book presents the teaching of Evagrius of Pontus (345-399) about eight passionate thoughts (logismoi), i.e. glutton
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English Pages 400 [324] Year 2021
Table of contents :
Front Matter
Introduction
Chapter I. Protology and Eschatology
Chapter II. Anthropology
Chapter III. Spiritual Doctrine
Chapter IV. Logismoi of the Passionate Part of Souls
Chapter V. Acedia
Chapter VI. Logismoi of the Rational Part of the Soul
Conclusion
Bibliography, Indexes
STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE ExpLORATIONS IN EARLy AND MEDIEvAL THEOLOGy Theology continually engages with its past: the people, experience, Scriptures, liturgy, learning and customs of Christians. The past is preserved, rejected, modified; but the legacy steadily evolves as Christians are never indifferent to history. Even when engaging the future, theology looks backwards: the next generation’s training includes inheriting a canon of Scripture, doctrine, and controversy; while adapting the past is central in every confrontation with a modernity. This is the dynamic realm of tradition, and this series’ focus. Whether examining people, texts, or periods, its volumes are concerned with how the past evolved in the past, and the interplay of theology, culture, and tradition.
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STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE ExpLORATIONS IN EARLy AND MEDIEvAL THEOLOGy
44 Series Editor: Thomas O’Loughlin, Professor of Historical Theology in the University of Nottingham EDITORIAL BOARD Director Prof. Thomas O’Loughlin Board Members Dr Andreas Andreopoulos, Dr Nicholas Baker-Brian, Dr Augustine Casiday, Dr Mary B. Cunningham, Dr Juliette Day, Prof. Johannes Hoff, Prof. Paul Middleton, Prof. Simon Oliver, Prof. Andrew Prescott, Dr Patricia Rumsey, Prof. Jonathan Wooding, Dr Holger Zellentin
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Eight Logismoi in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus
Leszek Misiarczyk
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Cover illustration: Tabula Peutingeriana © ÖNB Vienna Cod. 324, Segm. VIII + IX. © 2021, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2021/0095/156 ISBN 978-2-503-59494-1 eISBN 978-2-503-59495-8 DOI 10.1484/M.STT-EB.5.123708 ISSN 2294–3617 eISSN 2566–0160 Printed in the EU on acid-free paper
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations Introduction
1 3
Part One Philosophical and Theological Fundamentals of the Evagrian System Chapter I. Protology and Eschatology 1. Protology of Evagrius 1.1. Creation of λογικοί 1.2. Original Fall of the νοῦς 1.2.1. “Movement” of Will and the Lack of Vigillance of the νοῦς 1.2.2. The Consequences of the Original Fall of the νοῦς 1.3. God’s Answer to the Fall of the νοῦς 1.3.1. Judgement, Providence and the Creation of a NoeticPsycho-Somatic Structure of λογικοί 1.3.2. The Variety of λογικοί after the Fall: Angels, Demons and Human Beings 2. Eschatology of Evagrius 2.1. Reversible Character of the λογικοί Condition 2.2. Transitional Character of the Contemporary World
15 15 15 21 21 25 31
Chapter II. Anthropology 1. Basic Elements of Origen’s Anthropology 2. The Tripartite Anthropology of Evagrius 2.1. Influence of Gregory Nazianzen 2.2. Double Trichotomy Of Evagrius
47 47 50 50 57
Chapter III. Spiritual Doctrine 1. The Ascetic Practice (πρακτική) 1.1. Πρακτική as the Struggle with λογισμοί 1.1.1. Origin and Meaning of the Term λογισμοί. 1.1.2. Πρακτική as the Struggle with λογισμοί Passionate Part of the Soul 1.1.3. Impassibility (ἀπάθεια)
65 66 69 70
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31 34 38 38 42
75 94
VI
tab l e of co nt e n t s
2. Spiritual Knowledge (γνωστική) 2.1. Contemplation of the Spiritual rationes of the Material World (φυσική) 2.2. Contemplation of God (θεολογική)
109 111 116
Part Two Eight Principal Logismoi, the Dynamics of Their Activity and the Strategies of the Struggle with Them Chapter IV. Logismoi of the Passionate Part of Souls 1. Λογισμοί of the Concupiscible Part of the Soul 1.1. “The beginning of passions gluttony” 1.1.1. Gluttony as the Fear against Starvation and Being Unhealthy 1.1.2. Gluttony as the Temptation for a Stricter Austerity and Ignoring of Brothers 1.1.3. Gluttony as Illusion of an Easy Way in Asceticism 1.1.4. Gluttony as the Obstacle for Prayer and the Cause of Bad Dreams 1.2. Impurity (Fornication) 1.2.1. “Gluttony – mother of fornication” 1.2.2. Seeking the Meetings with Women 1.2.3. Erotic Fantasies and Dreams 1.2.4. Lust – Vanity 1.3. “Avarice – The Root of all evils” 1.3.1. Avarice – “Love of Money” and the Desire of Wealth 1.3.2. Avarice as Flattery for Rich People and Pretence of Caring about the Poor 1.3.3. Avarice Caused by the Anxiety about the Future 1.3.4. Avarice as a Source of Vanity and Pride 2. Λογισμοί of the Irascible Part of the Soul 2.1. Sadness 2.1.1. Sadness as the Frustration Caused by Unfulfilled Desires 2.1.2. Sadness as the Result of Wrath 2.2. Anger – λογισμὸς of Demons 2.2.1. Anger as the Frustration of Concupiscences 2.2.2. Anger as the Will of Revenge for Real or Supposed Injuries 2.2.3. Anger as the Obstacle to Gain the State of the Pure Prayer 2.2.4. Anger Dims the νοῦς and Causes Lack of Spiritual Gnosis 2.2.5. Anger as the Cause of Nightmares
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123 127 129 132 136 141 145 149 152 154 158 162 167 169 174 176 178 179 183 186 194 196 201 204 210 213 217
table o f co nt e nt s
Chapter V. Acedia 1. Definition of Acedia 2. Nature of Acedia: Complex Thought 3. The Signs of Acedia and Preventive Means 3.1. Time – Daemonium meridianum 3.2. Hatred for All that is and the Desire for All that is Not 3.2.1. Hatred of Anchoritism and the Will to Return to the World 3.2.2. Hatred for One’s Own Cell and Work – The Desire for Another Cell and Work 3.2.3. Hatred of Brothers and the Will to Receive Support from Others 3.2.4. Hatred toward Oneself and the Will to be Praised by People
221 221 224 230 230 234 235
Chapter VI. Logismoi of the Rational Part of the Soul 1. Vainglory 1.1. Praktikos Vainglory 1.2. Gnostikos Vainglory 1.3. Vainglory as an Enemy of the Spiritual Gnosis and Contemplation 2. Pride 2.1. Pride as the Consequence of Vainglory 2.2. Pride as the Conviction of Being the Source of One’s Decent Deeds
251 253 256 261 265 269 272 274
Conclusion
279
Bibliography I. Edition of Evagrian Texts and their English Translation II. Other Ancient Authors (editions) III. The Holy Scriptures and the Documents of the Catholic Church IV. Studies V. Repertoria and Dictionaries
285 285 288 290 290 304
Indexes I. Index of Scriptures II. Index to the Writings of Evagrius III. Index of Authors IV. Index of Subjects
305 305 307 308 311
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237 241 244
V II
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Abbreviations
Apophtegmata Patrum, t. I–II, Systematic collection. Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse 1899–. Biblioteka Ojców Kościoła, Kraków 1992–. Collectanea Theologica, Warszawa 1949/50. Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément, Paris 1928–. Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, Paris 1936–. Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, Paris 1932–. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, Freiburg 1954–. Harvard Theological Review, New York 1926–. Journal of American Academy of Religion, Oxford 1966–. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Münster 1958–. Journal of Early Christian Studies, Baltimore 1934–. Jahrbuch der Österreischichen Byzantynistik, Wien 1932–. Orientalia Christiana Periodica, Roma 1935–. Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca, t. 1–161, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris 1857–1866. PL Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina, t. 1–217, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris 1841–1855. PSP Pisma Starochrześcjańskich Pisarzy, Warszawa 1969–. RAM Revue d’Ascétique et Mystique, Toulouse 1920–. RHR Revue d’Historie des Religions, Paris 1880–. RSPhTh Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, ROC Revue de l’Orient Chrétien, Paris 1896–. RSR Recherches de sciences religieuse, Paris 1910–. SCh Sources Chrétiennes, Paris 1941–. TU Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Leipzig 1882–1941, Berlin 1951–. VCh Vetera Christianorum, Bari 1964–. VigChr Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam – Leiden 1947–. VoxP Vox Patrum, Lublin 1981–. VSS La vie Spirituelle. Suplément, Paris 1947–. ZKTh Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, Innsbruck-Wien 1877–. ZACh Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentums ZAM Zeitschrift für Askese und Mystik, Berlin 1926–. ŹM Źródła Monastyczne, Kraków-Tyniec 1993–. ŹMT Źródła Myśli Teologicznej, Kraków 1996–. Apo BLE BOK CT DBS DS DSAM FZPhTh HTR JAAR JAC JECS JOB OCP PG
Abbreviations of the biblical books are those commonly used.
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Introduction
Biblical anthropology is the starting point of any Christian reflection on the human psycho-spiritual condition. According to the book of Genesis, two important elements played a decisively key role in affecting how we understand human nature. First, the human being was created in the image and likeness of God as very good in his essence, with the purpose of communion with Him. From this it follows clearly that man is good by nature, not by choice, and open to God. Spiritual likeness to God is a fundamental dimension of human life and cannot be eliminated without mutilating the person himself. Consequently, on the one hand, man finds righteous happiness and joy in satisfying his needs, and on the other hand he is drawn to transcend himself. The meaning and purpose of human life is outside of man, not inside. Second, at the beginning of his existence, man experienced a reality which is theologically termed original sin, and philosophically or psychologically could be called a state of breakdown of human nature or a state of permanent disharmony and conflict. Hence, A. Görres rightly states, “teaching about the sin of the first parents gives a satisfactory answer to the question of where the misery of human existence comes from, which is a fact that does not raise any doubts”.1 These two affirmations revealed by God in the Scriptures are crucial to understanding man’s essence: he is very good by nature, but at the same time broken, cracked, in a state of constant disharmony, and capable of moral evil. The correct interpretation of these truths also requires that in every anthropological reflection we should treat them together, because the exclusion of either one results in misunderstanding human nature. We know such attempts from the history of ancient Christianity, when on the one hand Gnosticism and Manicheism denied the natural goodness of the whole human nature or his corporeality, and on the other, Pelagianism, questioning the reality of original sin led to the recognition of man as capable of improving only on his own strength. These two basic misperceptions about people have returned in various forms over the last two thousand years, whether in strictly theological versions, or more philosophical forms of neo-Pelagianism or neo-Manicheism. Drawing equally from the two foundations of biblical anthropology presented above, Evagrius of Pontus (345–99), developed a theory of passions. During his many years of life in the desert as a monk and a spiritual director, and carefully observing the movements of his own soul or of the souls of his monastic disciples, he came to the conclusion that the human is attacked by eight major λογισμοί – a term that encompasses desires, dynamisms of the soul, passions, and demons – that bring a 1 Görres (1997), 9–28, here 11.
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person into conflict with himself/herself, other people, and God. They are gluttony, impurity, greed, sadness, anger, acedia, vain glory, and pride.2 Their action was particularly evident in the lives of anchorites who went to the desert, where through asceticism, supported by the grace of God, they tried to restore in their humanity the original harmony. P. Négrier rightly states that the theory of passionate thoughts developed by Evagrius, and later taken over by John Cassian and medieval authors, is not a “spontaneous creation of ancient Christian monastic thought”, because it is of biblical origin and is already in Gen. 3–4.3 That Biblical passage describes the spread of various sins after the fall of the first parents, but it does not itemize the passionate thoughts. Evagrius fleshed the Genesis account into one of eight λογισμοί a coherent system that would later become the basis of Christian teaching about the Seven Deadly Sins. Evagrius is convinced that man after the primordial fall of the spiritual mind is in a state of internal disruption and permanent disharmony, while the individual spheres of his or her person like the body, soul and mind – remain in a state of constant conflict. The Pontian monk also proposes ascetic practice as a spiritual method which, with the help of God’s grace, purifies the soul of these passions. The human soul attacked by passion remains in a state of illness, i.e. in an unnatural state, whereas after purification it achieves a state of impassibility – an experience of inner harmony similar to the state before the original fall of the mind. Evagrius repeatedly emphasizes that as long as man lives on earth, it is impossible to achieve a state of complete and perfect freedom from the attacks of these passions. However, he allowed the possibility that here on earth, thanks to the ascetic effort and help of God’s grace, one could reach a state of partial impassibility, internal harmony, and freedom from these basic conflicts, such that they no longer were an obstacle in a relationship with God. The taxonomy of eight λογισμοί played a key role in the history of the entire ascetic teaching of the Church. All the later Christian writers who dealt with the subject of asceticism based their teaching on Evagrius’s, so ultimately the category of eight λογισμοί, affecting the soul not only of the monk but of every man and woman, entered permanently into the canon of Christian ascetic teaching. In the East, authors such as John Climacus,4 Maximus the Confessor5 and John Damascene retain both the order and number of the eight principal passions and their explanation given by Evagrius. In the West, however, the Latin Church made some modifications to his theory. John Cassian, who visited the centers of anchoritic life in the East, such as Nitria and
2 Cf. Practicus 6; A. and C. Guillaumont (1971), 506–08; Sinkewicz, (2003), 97–98. See also De octo spiritibus malitiae, (PG 79,1145A–1164D); Sinkewicz (2003), 66–90. 3 Cf. Négrier (1994) 315–30. In the introduction to the French translation of Evagrian De octo spiritibus malitiae Négrier notices: “Ce thème des péchés capitaux […] n’est pas un création spontanée de la pensée monastique chrétienne primitive, car il est d’origine biblique: il se trouve déjà en Genèse 3–4, qui mentionne à la foi l’apparition des sept péchés mortels et leur condamnation par Dieu”. 4 Cf. John Climacus, Scala paradisi 22, (PG 88,624–1164). 5 Cf. Viller (1930) 156–84.239–68.331–36; Dalmais (1953), 17–39; Dalmais (1966), 356–62; Thunberg – Allchin (1995); Paša (2010); Konstantinovsky (2016).
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Cele, was acquainted with the monks’ lifestyle and the main ideas of monasticism,6 and transferred Evagrius’ teaching to the West.7 In De Institutis coenoborium et de octo principalium vitiorum remediis V–XII and in Collationes Patrum V he invokes the category of the eight main thoughts, and even keeps the same order. However, he translates the Greek term λογισμοί of Evagrius by the Latin vitia or spiritus, and makes small changes in meaning. The more philosophical and psychological reflection of Evagrius about the eight λογισμοί was reduced by Cassian to practical ethic-moral thinking about faults or sins, so characteristic of Latin Christianity. Needless to say, this presentation of the teaching of Evagrius set it on a path that led to serious impoverishment and limitations. The decisive role in the modification of the Evagrian category of eight λογισμοί and Cassian’s octo vitia was played by pope Gregory the Great († 604). He described them in his work Moralia sive expositio in librum Job, written partly during his stay in Constantinople in the form of conferences for monks, and finally completed probably around 595.8 Gregory, influenced by Augustine, sees pride as the source of all other vices (regina omnium vitiorum) and excludes it from the entire category, finally accepting only septem principalia vitia.9 Whereas Evagrius presented the eight λογισμοί particularly in the context of attacks on the anchorite, Cassian described them as threatening also the cenobitic monastic communities in the Western Christian world; Gregory followed Cassian’s lead and wrote about the seven main faults, applying them to all Christians.10 Evagrius and after him Cassian present for example acedia as one of the eight λογισμοί describing both its essence and ways of operation so ingeniously that the descriptions evoke admiration among modern psychologists or psychiatrists, whereas Gregory the Great completely ignores it, placing it outside the moral order.11 Acedia often attacks a human being without any participation of his consciousness and will, but Gregory unhelpfully places it outside the order of moral evaluation and substitutes it with jealousy (invidia).12 Thus with Gregory came a clear “moralisation” of the entire system of Evagrius. In the Middle Ages and the following centuries, the classification established by Gregory the Great became the foundation for the moral evaluation of human behavior for both monastic communities and lay Christians especially in Western Christianity.13 The subject of the seven deadly sins, so important not only historically but also in the practical life of the Church, has aroused the interest of researchers for a long time and nowadays is experiencing its renaissance.14 Yet if there are increasingly a greater 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Cf. Weber (1961); Stewart (1998) and also essays in: Badilta – Jakab (2003), 1–255. See Marsilli (1936); Jakab (2003), 1–14; Stewart (2003), 205–19. Cf. Gillet (1989), 7–19. Gregory the Great, Moralia 31 and 87. See Gillet (1989), 89–102. Evagrius in Capita cognoscitiva 41 presents his conviction that pride is the source of other thoughts but here he talks about so-called primordial pride identified with love of onself (Sinkewicz 2003, 214). Cf. Sraw (2003), 35–58. Cf. Gillet (1989), 91. See. Nault (2003), 37–59, especially 50–51. See Casagrande – Vecchio (2003). Cf. Zöckler (1893), 66-72; Bloomfield (1952); Wenzel (1968), 1–22; Lyman (1978); Fairlie (1978); Jehl (1982), 261–359; Solignac (1983), col. 853–62; Pynchon et al. (1993).
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number of general studies on the whole category, as well as on individual major sins in the Middle Ages,15 the state of research on this subject for the patristic period is very poor.16 However, if we want to understand more deeply the seven deadly sins, which have been present in Western Christianity for many centuries, it is necessary to refer to patristic literature, especially to the tradition of the Eastern Church. Even a superficial survey of the Christian literature of the East shows not only that the categorization was created there much earlier, but also that its presentation and description are deeper and more interesting than what is found in Christian Latin literature. The key role in the formation of the entire categories of eight λογισμοί, of course, is played by the texts of Evagrius Ponticus, who has in recent decades enjoyed increasing popularity not only in a narrow circle of specialists but also among those interested in psychological and spiritual topics. The new editions and translations of Evagrius’ writings, and studies on his doctrine enable us to deepen his theory of the eight λογισμοί.17 Although Evagrius wrote mainly for anchorites, his teaching can be very useful for all people interested in their own spiritual growth. For he perfectly captured the basic dynamics of human desires or passions that attack every human being and push him to act against God, other people, and himself. The conclusions he came to in the way of observing his own soul inspire modern human sciences,18 and the ways of dealing with them can be useful for anyone who wants to live in greater harmony with himself, others, and God. However, the subject of the eight passionate thoughts in Evagrius’ writings has not yet been fully elaborated. In recent decades there have been several studies on the general presentation of the category of eight passionate thoughts19 including also individual λογισμοί such as acedia, impurity, greed, or anger.20 However, there has been no analysis either of the eight passionate thoughts as a complete system or of the mutual cause-and-effect relations between different individual thoughts. The present study, with full awareness of imperfections and limitations, sets for itself the goal of filling this gap and is, at my knowledge, the first and unique in the world. In our study, the following research hypothesis is put forward: Evagrius of Pontus created a coherent set of categories of eight passionate thoughts, built upon a system of mutual cause-and-effect relations between individual thoughts. The aim of this work is to answer the following questions: Is Evagrius really the creator of the system of the eight passionate thoughts? What are its sources? How did the 15 See Casagrande – Vecchio (1994), 331–95; Casagrande – Vecchio (2000); Little (1971), 16–49; Newhauser (2000); Payer (1993); Nani (2002), 134–46; Wenzel (1967); Theunissen (1996); Vecchio (2005), 104–26; Newhauser (2005), 324–47; Barton (2005), 371–91; Diekstra (2005), 431–53. 16 Cf. Hausherr (1933), 164–75; Jehl (1982), 261–359; Straw (2005), 35–58; Peters (2005), 59–73. 17 The bibliography is immense – see http://evagriusponticus.net, edited by Joel Kalvesmaki. 18 Cf. Wucherer-Huldenfeld (1997), 338–63. 19 See Nieścior (1996), 203–30; C. et A. Guillaumont (1997), 63–84; Stockinger (1995); Stewart (2005), 3–34; Tilby (2005), 143–52. 20 Cf. Louf (1974), 113–17; Bunge (1989c); Rüdiger (1990); Filippo (1993), 51–61; Joest (1993), 7–53; Maier (1994), 230–49; Bürgler (1997); Grebaut (1913), 213–25; Driscoll (1999), 141–59; Driscoll (2001), 21–30; Bunge (1999a); Misiarczyk (2001), 147–65; Misiarczyk (2002), 83–96; Misiarczyk (2003), 27–38; Misiarczyk (2004), 63–84; Stewart (2000), 65–81.
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Pontian monk understand the nature of this categorization of the thoughts? Did he perceive it as a coherent system and how did he view relations between individual thoughts? What, in his opinion, is the nature of every passionate thought, what is the dynamic of its operation, and what are the remedies in the fight against it? Evagrius’ teaching on the eight passionate thoughts cannot be analyzed in isolation from his other ideas, both his spiritual teachings as well as his cosmology, eschatology and anthropology. It is not the purpose of this work, however, to reconstruct the entire cosmology, eschatology, or anthropology of Evagrius, but only that which is necessary for understanding his spiritual teaching. Similarly, we are not interested in the issue of Evagrius’ originality, the reasons for the condemnation of his teachings, and the discussion of his whole christology or soteriology. We omit also all general issues concerning anchorites’ in fourth-century Egypt, because they have already been sufficiently well-studied. Further, in our work we omit a detailed study of the influence of Evagrius’ category of eight passionate thoughts on later Christian authors, limiting ourselves to the short synthesis in the introduction, above. A full treatment would need to be very extensive and would require a separate monograph. Biographical data about Evagrius are sufficiently well-publicized, and there is no need to go beyond a basic summary.21 The most important stages in his life are attested in Historia Lausiaca 38 by Palladius, who spent nine years alone in the Cells as the disciple of Evagrius, and the Ecclesiastical History of Sozomenos (VI,30) and Socrates Scholasticus (IV,23).22 According to these sources, Evagrius was born around 345 in Ibora, in Pontus. He was probably educated in Caesarea of Cappadocia, where he obtained a philosophical and rhetorical education developing under the spiritual protection of the famous Basil the Great. After the death of Basil in 379, he moved to Constantinople where, in the city dominated by Arians, pastoral care over the community of Christians faithful to the Council of Nicea was held by Gregory Nazianzen.23 Ordained by Gregory as a deacon, he used all his education and rhetorical talent in the defense of the Nicene Creed, undertaking preaching activities and writing works in defense of orthodoxy. Evagrius owes to Gregory and Basil his introduction to philosophical and theological knowledge, especially to the teaching of Origen. After Gregory’s abdication, he remained in Constantinople for some time, assisting Gregory’s successor, bishop Nectarius. However, the wife of one of the prefects of Constantinople fell in love with him, and her jealous husband
21 See Ceillier (1860), 110–19; Levasti (1968), 24–264; Contreras (1976), 83–95; A. Guillaumont (1971), 23–37; Bunge (1986), 17–111; O’Laughlin (1987), 712-735.; Nieścior (1998), 15–23; Dysinger (2005), 7–28; Casiday (2013), 7–72. 22 According to Bunge – de Vogüé (1994); Palladius would have written in 390–99 the version of his work for Egyptian monks which later would became the basis for future Syriac and Coptic translations, but in 420 he himself would have shortened the text dedicating it to Lausos and this is the reason why the different versions differ between them. For the Coptic vesrion see Amélineau (1887), 73–124, the shortened version was published by J. J. Migne and later by Butler (1904); Bunge – de Vogüé (1991), 7–21; Draguet (1946), 321–64; (1947) 5–49. For the Armenian version of Vita Evagrii – see Blanchard – Griffin – Timbie (2000–2001), 25–37. 23 Cf. Lackner (1966), 17–29; Daley (2016), 14–48.
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intended to kill Evagrius, who, mysteriously warned in a dream, left the city in 382 heading for Jerusalem. While staying in the monastery on the Mount of Olives, led by Rufinus and Melania, he contracted a mysterious disease. When he confessed to Melania that he had not fulfilled his promise made to God in Constantinople to change his lifestyle, the Roman aristocrat encouraged him to fulfill his promise. The disease passed after a few days and Evagrius, probably in 383, received the monk’s habit from Rufinus. Then he went to the Nitrian desert, south of Alexandria, which was then a settlement of cenobitic life, a kind of vestibule to the real life of a hermit, in solitude and harsher conditions. In 385, he moved further into the desert, to a settlement of semianchorites in Kellia, where at that time about 600 hermits lived.24 There he made friends with many monks and found real spiritual masters in people like Macarius the Great from Sketis and Macarius of Alexandria.25 The Apophtegmata Patrum – the sayings of the Desert Fathers – confirm that Evagrius quickly gained fame as a spiritual master not only among uneducated monks but also outside, so that, as Palladius recalls, several people visited him every day seeking advice on spiritual life. The art of spiritual direction and Evagrius’ literary talent is also clearly visible in his writings.26 It is no coincidence that he is referred to as the “father of Christian spiritual literature”. He wrote over thirty treatises, some of which, devoted to ascetic and spiritual topics, survive in the original Greek. As a result of his condemnation as an Origenist at the Council of Constantinople in 553, only works on ascetic and spiritual topics survived in Greek, often under the names of other authors, such as Nilus of Ancyra (Tractatus ad Eulogium, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus, De oratione, De octo spiritibus malitiae, De malignis cogitationibus). But because of the controversies associated with Origenism, works in the fields of cosmology, eschatology, and anthropology have been irretrievably lost or have survived only in translation, primarily in Syriac, Coptic, Latin, and Armenian.27 The writings of the Pontian monk carry the traces of the milieus that shaped him, and the different settings present many seemingly contradictory elements in his writings. First is the milieu of the great Cappadocian Fathers, particularly Caesarea of Cappadocia and Constantinople, where Greek paideia, perfect knowledge of rhetoric, theological defense of the Nicene Creed, and the world of ecclesiastical politics and diplomacy dominated. Second is the milieu of educated people who led the monastic life, like Melania and Rufin. Third is the desert fathers’ milieu, marked by simple piety and severe asceticism. The fourth and final milieu is the world of educated monks in the desert of Egypt, who preceded Evagrius and were involved in the Origenistic controversies. Leading scholars of Evagrius’ writings, such as Claire and Antoine Guillaumont and Gabriel Bunge, are of the opinion that 24 Cf. Hausherr (1935), 114–38; Id. (1956), 5–40.247–85; A. Guillaumont (1968), 31–58; Id. (1977), 187–203; Id. (1975), 3–21; Id. (1979); Kesser (1976), 111–24; Miguel – de Vogüé et al. (1993); Regnault (1999). 25 Cf. Guy (1964), 126–47; Id. (1965), 237–49. 26 Cf. Bunge (1988); Gould (1997), 96–103. 27 Cf. Stewart (2016), 187–257.
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he drew the ascetic-spiritual teaching from the Desert Fathers tradition, especially through the two Macariuses, whereas the speculative doctrine would be the fruit of his own philosophical-theological reflection, shaped by the theology of Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers.28 Even a superficial analysis of Evagrius’ writings shows that both his literary corpus and his doctrine are of two types: the first – the works that survive in Greek – concern the practical part of monastic life and deal with the evil desires of the monk, the other explains the creation of the world and human beings, sin in the pre-existence, its consequential permanent breakdown of human nature, and the final restoration – the ultimate goal of human life. This second group of writings was addressed by Evagrius himself only to the perfect, spiritual gnostics who purified their souls through ascetic practice and had become capable of achieving spiritual knowledge. For this reason, works such as Kephalaia Gnostica, Gnosticus or Epistula ad Melaniam were written in esoteric, encrypted language, understood only by the chosen and initiated. However, when these texts fell into the hands of people unprepared to read them, they were misunderstood. It was these writings that caused the subsequent suspicions of Evagrius for heretical views and the final condemnation of him in the period of the so-called second Origenistic dispute in the sixth century at the Council of Constantinople in 553. We are not surprised by the fact that they survive only in Syriac or Armenian translations. Scholars studying Evagrian writings often confront the question about the internal coherence of these two styles of text, so different from each other.29 Some recognize him as a master of the spiritual life, a mystic and a theoretician of mysticism, while others consider him to be a heretic or compare his ascetic teaching with Hinduism or Buddhism.30 Bousset and Balthasar came to the conclusion that Evagrius was the spiritual pupil of Origen in his speculations, especially about the origin and end of the world, and the creation of rational beings and their corporeality, and that he went too far, radicalizing his master’s teaching.31 Antoine Guillaumont, after the publication of the second Syriac version (S2) of Kephalaia Gnostika, came to the conclusion that Evagrius’s teaching conforms with the doctrines that were condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 553.32 The opinion of Guillaumont, undoubtedly one of the world’s leading researchers in the writings of Evagrius, has become widely accepted among the scholars. Allegations of heterodox christology and soteriology against the monk of Pontus have been made by F. Refoulé and other scholars.33 However, the publication of the more doctrinal
28 A. Guillaumont (1972), 29–56, especially 43–44; Bunge (1983), 215–27.323–60. See also Bouyer (1963), 380–94. 29 Cf. Bamberger (1981). 30 Cf. Conio (1974), 49–62; Balthasar (1939b), 31–47, especially 39–40; Vasquez (2011). 31 Bousset (1923), 282–341; Balthasar (1939b), 31–47 calls him “more origenistic than Origen himself ” (32). 32 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1961), 219–26; Id. (1962). See also Kalvesmaki (2016), 257–87. 33 Cf. Refoulé (1961), 221–66; Refoulé (1963a), 453–72; Refoulé (1963b), 398–402; see also Dempf (1970), 297–319; Grillmeier (1982), 561–68; Crouzel (1985); Longosz (1985) 395–412.
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writings of Evagrius, like Epistula ad Melaniam and Epistula fidei, showed the depth of his cosmological and anthropological reflection. The whole of his literary output creates, despite apparent contradictions, a fairly coherent system of ideas in which certain elements, such as a double creation or apocatastasis, are clearly taken from Origen’s reflection, while others are original contributions by Evagrius himself.34 Thanks to specific terminology, the style of writing, and the conclusions Evagrius comes to, it is also easy to find his teachings in the writings of later Christian authors. According to O’Laughlin, the modern studies of Evagrius’ writings showed us very clearly the dual character of his doctrine. On one hand are his sophisticated and quite esoteric cosmology, eschatology, and anthropology with elements of metaphysics or even mythology, some of which may underlie the doctrines condemned in 553. On the other are moral, ascetic, and psychological teachings that were never condemned and, moreover, influenced the entire theology and spirituality of the patristic period and the Middle Ages, and today has experiencing a renaissance.35 Gabriel Bunge gave a new impulse to research on Evagrius, demanding that all the writings of the Pontian monk be studied.36 In his opinion, quite rightly, it is not only impossible to understand the spiritual teaching of Evagrius without considering his cosmological, anthropological, and eschatological reflections, but also the attempt to properly understand these quite esoteric doctrines about the creation of the world, man, and the original fall should be based on the study of all his works. Anyone who does otherwise will come to a skewed picture. An example of such one-sidedness, according to Bunge, is the fact that the doctrine condemned in 553 is not synonymous with the speculative doctrine of Evagrius.37 He rightly criticized Guillaumont for trying to reconstruct the cosmology and anthropology of Evagrius only on the basis of Kephalaia Gnostica, without considering related works, such as Epistula ad Melaniam or Epistula fidei. According to Bunge, Evagrius often defended the Nicene Creed, and fought against Arians, Eunomians, Apollinarians, and Gnostics. He was inspired by Origen, of course, when he speculated about the origins of the world and human beings, but apparently, he considered it doctrinally undefined by the Church at that time, and so an area open for theological reflection. So, interestingly, at the Councils of 543 and 553, Origenism and related doctrines were condemned, not naming Evagrius by name at all, but known only on the basis of Origenists monks without deep knowledge of the writings of Origen or Evagrius. Bunge, analyzing the letters of the monk of Pontus and his Epistula ad Melaniam and Epistula fidei, came to the conclusion that in defined matters (dogmata) he accepted the teaching of the Church, while in open questions he sought through biblical texts and philosophical speculations a convincing explanation of the state of human nature after original sin. Recent studies have convincingly shown that neither Refoulé nor 34 Cf. Murphy (1985), 253–69; A. Guillaumont (1980–1981), 407–11. 35 See O’Laughlin (1988), 357–73; O’Laughlin (1987); O’Laughlin (1992), 528–34. See also Gould (1992), 549–57; Clark (1990), 145–62; Clark (1992); Brakke (2011). 36 Cf. Casiday (2004). 37 Cf. Bunge (1986), 24–54; Id (1983), 215–27.323–60. See also Casiday (2004), 249–79; Stefaniw (2016), 96–127.
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Guillaumont are correct in attributing to Evagrius the doctrine condemned at the Council of Constantinople in 553.38 Evagrius in a very original way synthesized the ascetic experiences of the Desert Fathers with a profound description of the condition of human nature. For the Pontian monk, the exact determination of the causes and state of broken human nature after original sin is conditio sine qua non for determining which ascetic tools were necessary for its reintegration. He was also aware that it is impossible to return to a situation before original fall, i.e., to the state where human nature was naturally integrated with the divine. Original fall had caused an irrevocable and permanent breakdown of human nature, and now integration is possible thanks only to the help of God’s grace and one’s own ascetic effort. The discussion on the speculative doctrine of Evagrius, although limited to a narrow group of specialists, continues and brings more and more interesting fruits. However, in this study we are more interested in psychological and spiritual doctrines. I am, of course, aware that both aspects of the Pontian monk’s teachings are very closely connected, and one cannot properly understand his ascetic doctrine without reconstructing its cosmological and anthropological background. However, the speculative threads of his doctrine will be dealt with only so far as needed to understand the spiritual doctrine of Evagrius. I agree with the conclusions of Bunge and Casiday, who convincingly rejected the erroneous identification of the teaching of Evagrius with the Originist doctrine of the sixth century. It is rightly emphasized that disputes over the Origenism of Evagrius cannot diminish his achievements in the most important field of his literary activity, namely, in ascetic doctrine.39 It was the genius of his psychological and spiritual intuitions that have brought him the greatest fame and today help many people to rediscover him as a master of spiritual life.40 As I wrote earlier, one cannot properly understand Evagrius’ eight passionate thoughts without placing them on the wider background of his spiritual teaching. The latter cannot be understood without the reconstruction of the anthropology of the Pontian monk, which in turn is conditioned strictly by his cosmology and eschatology; hence it seemed necessary to divide the current study into two parts. The first part will be devoted to the synthetic reconstruction of the protology and eschatology of Evagrius (chapter I), anthropology (chapter II) and ascetic doctrine based on πρακτική and γνωστική (chapter III), which form the basis of his study of the eight passionate thoughts. In the second part, an analysis will be made of each passionate thought, its relations with the other thoughts, and the strategies to fight it. Chapter IV concerns the thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, that is, gluttony, impurity, greed; Chapter V is dedicated to the thoughts of the angering 38 Cf. Dysinger (2003); Casiday (2008) and (2013); Misiarczyk (2016), 441–59; Krausmüller (2016), 187–257. 39 Cf. Nieścior (1998), 13. 40 Bouyer (1963), 381 describes Evagrius as “one of the most important names in the history of spirituality, one of those that not only marked a decisive turning-point, but called forth a real spiritual mutation”. See also Collins (2016), 317–31.
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(irascible) part of the soul, that is, sadness and anger; chapter VI treats acedia; and chapter VII, the thoughts of the rational part of the soul, vanity and pride. In this study I use basically an analytical method, focused on the analysis of Evagrius’ texts published in English translation with some references, if necessary, to the original Greek words. The best critical editions will be cited, but for those texts with no critical edition, I will refer to other editions. In the case of texts that have been preserved only in the Syriac language, I have abandoned quoting entire parts of original Syriac in the footnotes, so as not to burden the apparatus. I hope that specialists will forgive me this decision, dictated by the desire to make Evagrius’ reflection on the subject of the eight passionate thoughts available to the widest range of readers. The monk of Pontus, after all, who rightly described the secrets of the human soul very aptly, is sometimes referred to as the psychologist of early Christian monasticism.
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Part One
Philosophical and Theological Fundamentals of the Evagrian System
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C ha pt er I
Protology and Eschatology
1.
Protology of Evagrius
As already mentioned, Evagrius in the presentation of both his cosmology and eschatology is clearly inspired by Origen,1 especially such elements of his doctrine as creating of λογικοί as purely spiritual beings, their original fall in “preexistence”; the diversity within each rank of angels, people, and demons; and the allowance that at least some of them, by creating a second world, could return to God. The Pontian monk, inspired by Origen, does not of course receive his master’s ideas mechanically, but creatively develops them, trying to present them as part of a coherent system.2 1.1.
Creation of λογικοί
Due to both content and formal reasons, it is not easy to reconstruct Evagrius’ views on the creation of the world and man. The author himself repeatedly insists that he had darkened his teaching on the subject, to protect it from people unprepared for such a reading.3 From a literary point of view the ideas of the Pontian monk on this subject are expressed in chapters (centuries), so that some sentences lack context and are very difficult to interpret.4 The best example here is the text of Kephalaia Gnostica, which consists of six such centuries in which Evagrius presents his doctrine.5 Like Origen, Evagrius, from his teaching about the final state of creatures, or return to the original unity with God, draws conclusions about the creation of rational beings, their fall, and their new mode of existence. He neither quotes Origen nor clearly reproduce his views, but he tacitly presupposes them and develops them, often with even more esoteric language.6 The protology of the world is presented by the Pontian monk mainly in his Epistula ad Melaniam, Epistula fidei, Kephalaia Gnostica, and several minor treatises. According to Evagrius, in the beginning, before the creation of all beings, only God’s knowledge existed: “The first of all kinds of knowledge is the knowledge of the 1 Cf. Crouzel (1961), 3–15.105–132. 2 Cf. Utheman (1999), 399–458; Balthasar (1939a), 86–106; Balthasar (1939b), 31–47. 3 Barsanuphius confirms (PG 86,892–924) that “gnostic” works of Evagrius provoked a lot of confusion among monks in V–VI centuries; Rivas (2013). 4 Cf. Hausherr (1932–1935), 416–18; Watt (1982), 1388–95. 5 See for example Ivanka (1954), 285–91. 6 Cf. Utheman (1999), 425–36.
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Monad and of Unity (Henad)”.7 This knowledge of God is not presented, however, in philosophical terms, but clearly in the Christian perspective: The Father, and only He, knows Christ, and the Son, and only He, the Father. The one qua unique in Unity (Henad), the other qua Monad and Unity (Henad).8 This knowledge of God is therefore absolutely primordial to all kinds of created beings, and exceeds them in the mode of existence: All beings have come into existence thanks to God’s knowledge. Now, everything that has come into being thanks to something else is inferior to the one thanks to which it has come to existence. This is why God’s knowledge is superior to all.9 Evagrius, writing about this primary knowledge (gnosis) of God as the source of existence of all rational beings, nowhere explains how to understand it thoroughly. One can only guess that he probably means the kind of knowledge God has about himself, and due to his clearly Christian perspective that, each of the divine persons of the Trinity has about their essence and each other about themselves. If, as we shall see further, this knowledge can be understood as a kind of spiritual, mystical or contemplative cognition, then Evagrius would mean a spiritual knowledge within each of the persons of the Holy Trinity, of their own essence and mutual contemplation. So, God existed from the beginning, beyond time, and individual divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit possessed perfect knowledge of, and contemplated, each other. From this primitive spiritual knowledge, the contemplation of the three-person God, the first λογικοί were created as the rational beings: “All that which has come into existence has come into existence thanks to God’s knowledge […]”.10 Evagrius sees the trinitarian dimension as a gift of the original spiritual gnosis with which these beings were endowed with their creation: “The primary knowledge that was found in rational creatures (λογικοί) is that of the Holy Trinity”.11 Such knowledge is not, as we shall see, the gift to creatures of a spiritual cognition or contemplation of the Holy Trinity identical to the one that individual persons of the Holy Trinity have, because the creature is not capable of it; Evagrius here emphasizes that λογικοί were created with the ability to imitate divine persons in the contemplation of their own being and mutual contemplation of persons. God called them to existence in His image and gave them the ability to know Him spiritually: 7 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,3; A. Guillaumont (1958), 61; Ramelli (2015), 88. Only small fragments (about 15%) have been preserved from the original version of the Greek, see: Muyldermans (1931), 52–59, Hausherr (1939), 229–33 and Géhin (1966), 59–85. The complete text survives only in the Syriac version. Frankenberg, (1912), 48–422 published a transcription of one manuscript representing the common Syriac version (S 1), with a retroversion in Greek; the later edition of the Syriac version (S 1 and S 2) along with the French translation of A. Guillaumont (1958), is better and it will be quoted here. There are also fragments of the Armenian version of this treatise – cf. also Young (1992), 535–41. 8 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,1; Guillaumont (1958), 99; Ramelli (2015), 141. 9 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,87; Guillaumont (1958), 57; Ramelli (2015), 78. 10 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,50; Guillaumont (1958), 41; Ramelli (2015), 54. 11 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI 75; Guillaumont (1958), 249; Ramelli (2015), 362.
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The image of God is not that which is susceptible of His wisdom, for corporeal nature would thus be the image of God. Rather that which has become susceptible of the Unity – this is the Image of God.12 So, the first λογικοί existed beyond time, in a noetic state, i.e. as a pure noes, spiritual beings, totally united with God, and they were fully involved in the original knowledge of God Himself. According to Evagrius, therefore, creatures exist because God thought them and wanted their existence. At this point, however, a fundamental question arises: do these original νόες really exist, or are they, on the model of Platonic ideas, only in the mind of God? Of course, we do not exclude the influence of Platonic teaching both on Origen and Evagrius, but we must remember that they use Platonism or Neoplatonism to interpret biblical revelation. The texts quoted above, as well as many others, seem to indicate clearly that Evagrius, speaking of λογικοί, meant rational beings created by God and truly existent, and not merely ideal beings with no existence outside the mind of God.13 As we shall see further, Evagrius does not understand the unity of the Creator with creation in such a way that abolishes the real existence of creature. For if λογικοί were understood by him as pure ideas, then the themes of their unity with the Creator would not raise so much controversy both in antiquity and among modern commentators of his writings. This “first” world of God’s unity with creation is the most primordial, and is the beginning and ultimate fulfillment of all other worlds: Not one of the worlds/aeons was more excellent than the first world/aeon. This, indeed, they say was made out of the principal [or “original”] mixture [or “quality”]. And that in it all the aeons will be perfected, a minister and gnostic taught us.14 So, the first λογικοί existed in a noetic state, completely united with God, and they fully participated in the original gnosis of God Himself. Participation in the knowledge of God Himself by contemplating Him was, in fact, the primary purpose of their existence. The basic category that Evagrius uses in his presentation of the protology of the created world, and also in eschatology, is the Unity of the first λογικοί with God through participation in His gnosis. This idea of God’s unity with primitive rational beings, which was misunderstood, became one of the reasons for the later condemnation of his teachings. Among modern scholars of his writings, it raises accusations of pantheism or monism, or a mysticism that is more philosophical than theological15 or even closer to
12 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,32; Guillaumont (1958), 111; Ramelli (2015), 159. The same idea we can find also in Epistula ad Melaniam 16; Frankenberg (1912), 616; Casiday (2006), 67. See also different studies on this subject – Bunge (1999a), 79–95; Gould (1992), 549–57; Florovsky (1958), 154–59. 13 Cf. Bunge (1989), 449–69; Dempf (1970), 297–319; Balthasar (1939b), 31–47. 14 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,45; Guillaumont (1958), 235; Ramelli (2015), 341–42. O’Laughlin (1987), 122 translates “from primary substance” which is better, while Guillaumont, 235 “qualité principale”. 15 Hausherr (1934), 117: “Néonmoins il faut bien dire que jamais Évagre n’a integré dans sa mystique la théologie trinitaire. Si fréquente que soi dans les Centuries l’expression ‘contemplation de la Sainte Trinité’ […] ne jouent un rôle appréciable dans la monteé de l’intelect. ‘Sainte Trinité’ n’est
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Buddhism or Hinduism than to Christianity.16 G. Bunge, in his excellent analysis, gives convincing arguments for a different understanding of the terms μονάς and ἑνάς and also proposes a different understanding of the Evagrian concept of the unity of God with λογικοί, with important consequences for understanding his protology and eschatology.17 All confusion in contemporary research has been caused, according to Bunge, by Frankenberg’s retroversion into Greek of the Syriac version of Kephalai Gnostica, based on the fifth and sixth centuries’ wrong understanding of the Greek terms μονάς and ἑνάς. Frankenberg usually translated the Syrian ihidaiutha with μονάς, which caused modern readers to suspect Evagrius’ cosmology of being monistic. Whereas Guillaumont, in 1958, edited both Syriac versions of Kephalaia Gnostica and translated the Syriac terms differently: ihidaiutha as “Unité”, while hidaiutha once as “unity” (III,31,33) another time as “union” (IV,57,89; VI,14), and three times as a “monad” (II,3; III,1; IV,21). As a result, the term “monad” is very rare in the translation of Guillaumont version S 2 and usually mean “unity”. It is not clear why he translated the “monad” of the Syriac hidaiutha and why the term “henad” does not appear in the translation, which occurs several times in 15 anathemas from 553 condemning Evagrius’ teaching without invoking his name. Bunge compared the sentences of Kephalaia Gnostica with preserved fragments of Evagrius Greek writings such as Epistula fidei or Maximus Confessor’s scholia to the books of the Heavenly hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite and 15 anathemas of the Council in 553 and came to a different understanding of the key terms in the Pontian monk’s protology. In the above mentioned texts, the term μονάς appears only once and that in the typical Evagrian sentence γνῶσις τῆς μονάδος. Well, the phrase ἑνάς καὶ μονάς in Epistula fidei 7,6,21 the text in which Evagrius expressed himself in a much clearer manner than in Kephalaia Gnostica and additionally preserved in Greek, means God in Himself, i.e., synonymus with the Holy Trinity (see KG I,27; II,3). The first term would accentuate the more absolute unity of the essence of God, the other the trinity of divine persons. The term μονάς would mean for Evagrius état d’être, the unity of all creation with God. This is clearly confirmed by the passage from Epistula fidei and the understanding of this term by Maximus the Confessor.18 Instead μονάς for him is the state of numerical unity (Bunge defines it as état d’unicité non-numérique) between the creatures themselves and between creatures and God rooted in the non-numerical unity of the three divine persons. In non-numerical unity it is about the unity of the essence of God, who does not eliminate personal differences between individuals in que l’apellation chrétienne de la Divinité, de la Monade […] Malgré la théologie qui en est le but suprême, la mystique évagrienne reste plus philosophique que proprement théologique”. 16 Balthasar (1939b), 39–40: “Es kann kein Zweifel bestehen, dass die Mystik des Evagrius in ihrer völlig konsequenten Geschlossenheit dem Buddhismus wesentlich näher steht als dem Christentum […] Gewiss kennt er die Schöpfung aus dem Nichts – aber sie wird praktisch überwunden in ein fast pantheistisches Verhältnis von Gott und Nus. Gewiss kennt er die Trinität – aber sie wird praktisch zu einer fast schrankenlosen Übermacht de Einheit über dei Dreiheit, mito deutlichen Spuren der Unterordnung der Personen […] Evagrius is ein echter Mystiker. Aber ist er deswegen schon ein christlicher Mystiker?”; Conio (1974), 49–62 compares the teaching of Evagrius with that of Upanishad. 17 Cf. Bunge (1989a), 69–91; Id. (1989b), 449–69. 18 Cf. Capita theologica II,1,8,16. (PG 90,1125A).
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the Holy Trinity, between divine persons and created creatures, and also between created beings themselves. The monk of Pontus sees the unity of creation as being rooted in the mystery of the three-person unity of God, and the term μονάς is for him a synonym for the Holy Trinity. Difficulties arise, however, in the face of a contradiction between Evagrian texts. In Kephalaia Gnostica, he in fact says: “But in the Unity there will be no leaders, nor (others) submitted to leaders, but all of them will be gods”,19 while in Scholia in Psalmos 144 (commenting on v. 10 “Let all your works, Lord, praise you”) he states, “Here ‘works’ mean rational natures. For these, by nature, praise God”.20 The passage from Kephalaia Gnostica can be understood as saying that there will be no leaders or subjects in the “Monad” (likely the underlying Greek term for the Syriac ihidaiutha), but all will be gods. In the first text, this unity can be understood pantheistically in the sense of eliminating the difference between God and creatures and as a kind of fusion of God with all creation, while the other would clearly emphasize the difference in the way of existence between God and creatures. There is, however, no contradiction between these texts, Bunge rightly emphasizes, if we understand the first as expressing the état d’union, and the second as referring to God in three persons who creates such a state of unity with Him. Thus, the source of all unity of creation itself and the unity of creation with God is the unity ad intra of God Himself with the preservation of the personal difference as well as ad extra between creatures and God and between the creatures themselves. This unity, however, should not be understood pantheistically, as the elimination of all differences between God and creatures, or as some fusion of God with all creatures, or monistically, as the equality of nature of creatures with the nature of God. The difficulty in the understanding of Evagrian protology increases when we realize that the term μονάς can refer to both the original state and the definitive existence of rational beings. Evagrius, however, is not self-contradictory, if we remember that his protology and eschatology are two aspects of the same process that begins with the creation of the world and will eventually be completed at the end of time, and everything takes place in God. By the term μονάς Evagrius understands both the protologic unity of God with λογικοί, as well as the eschatological return to the same unity, when God will be “all in all”. It is worth noting that the term ἑνάς does not appear alone in the Greek text of Epistula fidei but always occurs with μονάς, and it seems unlikely that it was the basis for the Syriac term hidaiutha in Kephalaia Gnostica. The term that Evagrius most likely used would be rather the Greek ἕνωσις in the sense of “unity” or “unification”.21 So ἑνάς
19 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,51; Guillaumont (1958), 159; Ramelli (2015), 227. 20 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 144,10; (PG 12,1673). English translation of the Scholia on Psalms are taken from a forthcoming translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus. I give thanks to Carl for the permission to use it before the printed edition. Scholia in Psalmos remained under the name of Origen Origenis Selecta in Psalmos in PG 12,1054–1686 edited also by Pitra (1884) 444–83. See also Rondeau (1960), 307–48 where we can find the key to search the scholia of Evagrius. 21 Bunge (1989a), 86 is probably right suspecting that in the Greek version of Kephalaia Gnostica III,31, A. Guillaumont (1958), 111 was rather ἑνότης and in Kephalaia Gnostica III,33, Guillaumont (1958), 111 – ταυτότης.
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is translated into Syriac always by hidaiutha and appears in Kephalaia Gnostica only three times (II,3; III,1; V,21) and never on its own, but always in the expression of ἑνάς καὶ μονάς translated into Syriac by hidaiutha weihidaiutha. The expression ἑνάς καὶ μονάς, which is much less common in Evagrius’ writings, was probably taken from Origen (cf. De principiis I,1,6). In the Syriac version of Kephalaia Gnostica is always translated by hidaiutha weihidaiutha and signifies non-numerical unity of the three divine persons in the Holy Trinity; whereas μονάς does not describe the essence of God, but the state of primary and ultimate (état protologique et eschatologique) non-numerical unity between rational beings created in the image of God and God himself. Evagrius distinguishes, therefore, acte d’union, which he expresses by the Greek ἕνωσις,22 from état d’unité, which he expresses by the term μονάς, because it better emphasizes the state of participation of λογικοί in unity with God. The term μονάς is then the key in Evagrian cosmology, but the encryption of its deeper meaning has become the cause of many misunderstandings already in the S2 Syriac translation of Kephalai Gnostica, where it was understood as a synonym for the essence of God, and in Frankenberg, who translated S1 in this light, even though that translation went to pains to avoid it. Bunge rightly points out that the mysticism of Evagrius is the mystique of union with God and it is not about unification with some “monad” of philosophers or the pantheistic dissolution of creation in God until the loss of its own existence, but, the union with the triune God.23 The precision of the exact meanings of key phrases in the reflection of Evagrius also obliges us to look at the famous 15 anathemas directed in 553 against the so-called Origenists, Palestinian monks referring to Kephalaia Gnostica. It is easy to notice that anathema 9, especially the expression γνῶσις τῆς μονάδος may have its counterparts in Kephalaia Gnostica I,77; II,5; III,72; IV,18,21,43,24 but it seems that it was not Evagrius who was the source of the condemned errors. The central term condemned by anathemas from 553 is ἑνάς, which appears in them 5 times and 6 times in Justinian’s letter, but μονάς occurs only once and even then, only in the expression γνῶσις τῆς μονάδος. The system condemned in 553 had as its central idea the “henad”, which would not be the system of Evagrius, for whom the “monad” was the basis of everything. The condemned mistakenly identified ἑνάς with the Holy Trinity, which led to the conclusion that it was ἑνάς that became that primitive and final unity in the system of Evagrius, and consequently to suspect him of monism or pantheism. Bunge supposes that Origen could have been the direct source of the teaching of the sixth-century Origenists, rather than Evagrius.25 It is also conceivable that the Origenists were indeed inspired by the teachings of Origen and Evagrius, but ultimately created their own doctrine which deviated from one and the other author.26 22 The Syriac expression in Kaphalaia Gnostica IV,89 translates probably the Greek ἕνωσις τῆς μονάδος. 23 See Lackner (1966), 24. 24 The text in Diekamp (1899), 94 and Hefele – Leclercq (1908), col. 1187–96; see also A. Guillaumont (1961), 219–26; Id. (1962). 25 Cf. Bunge (1989a), 90. Crouzel was convinced that during II Constantinople Council the doctrine of Evagrius was condemned not that of Origen. 26 Cf. Dechow (1987a), 112–22; Id. (1987b), 144–58; Id. (1988).
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1.2.
Original Fall of the νοῦς
According to Evagrius, as already mentioned above, at first the rational and noetic beings possessed a complete gnosis about the three-person God and lived in non-numeric unity with Him.27 This is confirmed very clearly by two chapters from Kephalaia Gnostica: “In the beginning the intellect (nous) had God, who is incorruptible, as teacher of immaterial intellections”.28 There was no evil at that time, and all creation that came out of God’s hands was ontically good and carried in itself indestructible seeds of virtue: There was a time when evil did not exist, and there will be a time when, likewise, it will no more exist; whereas there was no time when virtue did not exist, and there will be no time when it will not exist. For the germs of virtue are impossible to destroy.29 It is worth emphasizing that according to Evagrius, although after the original fall the nature of the existence of λογικοί had been modified, its natural, essential goodness was not destroyed, because it is indestructible according to God’s plan.30 1.2.1.
“Movement” of Will and the Lack of Vigillance of the νοῦς
This state of the original Monad has been destroyed by the fall of λογικοί, which the Pontian monk describes as “movement”: The primary knowledge that was found in rational creatures (logikoi) is that of the Holy Trinity; then, there occurred the movement of free will, and Providence, which rescues and never abandons anyone, and then the Judgment, and again the movement of free will, and Providence, and the Judgment, and so on up to the Holy Trinity.31 Of course, this does not mean that there was any imperfection or fallibility in God, but because this possibility existed from the very beginning in νοῦς, its decision broke that original unity of the λογικοί with the Holy Trinity: The Unity (Unification/Monad). This, by itself (acting in isolation), is not put into motion, but it is set in motion by the receptivity of the intellect, which, in its carelessness, turns its own face away from it and, due to the privation of it, gives birth to ignorance.32 The departure took place as a result of the νοῦς movement, which, although it was originally in unity with the Monad, also had the freedom to move away from 27 Cf. Tsirpanlis (1987), 173–98. 28 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,55; Guillaumont (1958), 119; Ramelli (2015), 72. 29 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,40; Ramelli (2015), 36. There are different Syriac and Greek versions of this text – Cf. A. Guillaumont (1958), 37. 30 Cf. Balthasar (1939b), 31–47; A. Guillaumont (1972), 29–56; Nieścior (1996), 115–36. 31 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,75; Guillaumont (1958), 249; Ramelli (2015), 362. 32 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,49; A. Guillaumont (1958), 41; Ramelli (2015), 51.
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it. Disassociating itself from this original oneness with his Creator, it fell into ignorance, lost its inner harmony and changed the status of its existence.33 When it remained in unity with God, the νοῦς continued in a state of perfect unity with Him and with itself, but after turning away from Him, it fell into a state of disintegration. Thus, the first beings lived in union with God, participating in his gnosis, but as a result of the moving of their will, they fell away from this original unity. According to the Pontian monk, the first who departed from the unity with Monad was a νοῦς later called the Devil, who brought other beings with him and thus became the perpetrator of all subsequent evil in the world. In Epistula fidei, we find the following: Nor will you dare to say his essence is changeable, once you consider the nature of the adverse power which fell, like lightning, from heaven [cf. Lk 10:18] and plunged from true life because it had holiness as an adjunct and its change resulted from its wicked will. Therefore, on this account, having fallen from the One and repudiated its angelic dignity, it was called the Devil from its character. With his primitive and blessed state extinguished, this adverse power was enkindled.34 In Scholia in Proverbia 2,17 Evagrius specifies that the will, the decision, is a certain movement of the νοῦς: If the will is a certain movement of the mind […] perhaps here by “evil will” it means the Devil. For he expressed an evil wish when he said “I will place my throne above the stars; I will be like the highest one” (Is 14:13). And he forgot divine knowledge when he left behind the “teaching of his youth”.35 The above text seems to indicate that Evagrius understands this movement, which caused the fall of νοῦς, to be an act of “self-righteousness”, a decision of free will. This is confirmed by another passage from the Kephalaia Gnostica: “The first movement of rational creatures (logikoi) is the separation of the intellect from the unity that is in it”.36 Although the Greek text of Kephalaia Gnostica has not been preserved, on the basis of the already mentioned Scholia in Proverbia 2,17 we can very probably assume that the Greek term for the description of this will was κίνησις.37 This “movement”, understood as the stirring of the will, is the cause of that original evil, that is, the departure of the first beings from oneness with God: “Movement is the cause of evil”.38 33 Cf. O’Laughlin (1987), 123-136; Nieścior (1997), 100–02; Nieścior (1999), 67–85. 34 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula fidei 31; Grimbont (1983), 106; Casiday (2006), 55. See also Origen, De principiis,I,V,5. 35 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 2,17; Géhin (1987), 116–17. English translations of the Scholia on Proverbs are taken from a forthcoming translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus. 36 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,22; A. Guillaumont (1958), 109; Ramelli (2015), 153. 37 Evagrius used the term kinesis in a double sense. The first in the sense of the impulse of the mind or emotions, which occurs only in Epistula ad Melaniam with [Syriac], the second in the sense of the movement that caused the fall of logikoi occurs in Epistula ad Melaniam and Kephalaia Gnostica, with the term methzaynutho. 38 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,51; A. Guillaumont (1958), 41; Ramelli (2015), 54.
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Satan, therefore, the original νοῦς, is according to Evagrius one who first crossed the “limits of evil” and departed from unity with God: The one who “was made to be the object of derision of the angels of God”, ( Job 40:19; 41:25) is it not he who initiated movement and in the beginning broke the boundaries of evilness? And because of this he was called “the principle [or ‘the first’] of the works of God”.39 The monk from Pontus in his interpretation of the original fall clearly follows Origen,40 and the latter after Job 40:19 he calls the devil “the beginning of the creation of the Lord” and observes precisely in his actions the cause of God’s creation of the material world.41 Thus, in the beginning there was a totally spiritual νοῦς, which became the soul only after the fall.42 Νοῦς did not experience any current human passions, because there was no concupiscible and irascible sphere in it, but was still free and could turn away from God. In biblical terms, we could identify that νοῦς with the image of God in created beings. This νοῦς was in a primary state, as it were, a pure center of decision making and had a free will. In an interesting way, Evagrius further defines the essence of the original fall by commenting on the verse from Prov. 20:23: A double scale is an abomination to the Lord; and crooked balance is unsightly before him. By crooked balance he means a mind whose nature it is to judge matters justly, but which tilts under the wight of free will.43 The essence of this sin is seen by Evagrius as the reverse of the natural order of creation. In his opinion, νοῦς naturally perceives reality in a proper way and draws the will behind him in the direction of what he knew as good, while in original sin without proper assessment, he thoughtlessly followed the decision of the will. Our monk, although he does not exhaustively explain the relationship between νοῦς and free will, very closely combines these two realities by using interchangeably the terms νοῦς and will (βουλή). In Scholia in Ecclesiasten 2,11 the will is defined as “a kind of movement of the mind” (ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις).44 Similarly in the previously quoted Scholia Proverbia 2,17, where “the will/decision” is called exactly the same ποιὰ νοῦ κίνησις. For Evagrius, this original fall is, therefore, a free decision of the rational being to depart from the original purpose of its existence appointed by the Creator. This departure, as we shall see later, will have various degrees, but their common denominator is the subordination of the judgment of reason to the desire of will and the decision of the latter against the will of God. In another passage from Kephalaia
Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,36; A. Guillaumont (1958), 231–32; Ramelli (2015), 336. See Origen, Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis XX,22; (1975, 182); See also Crouzel (1985), 284. Cf. Nieścior (1999a), 72. Evagrius differently than Origen clearly distinguishes these two states of existence: nous as completely spiritual, primitive, which became the soul only after the fall, obtaining a lower sphere of unreasonable part: concupiscible and irascible. 43 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 20,23; Géhin (1987), 312. 44 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Ecclesiasten 2,11; Géhin (1993), 75. 39 40 41 42
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Gnostica, the Pontian monk states that this “movement” was caused by the carelessness and lack of vigilance of the νοῦς: “A soul is an intellect that, in its carelessness, has fallen from Unity and, due to its lack of vigilance, has descended to the order of praktikē”.45 The νοῦς therefore fell through neglect and lack of vigilance on its part, which led it to go uncritically after the decision of the will, instead of pursuing its own nature by discerning the reality judging different things and guiding the will. The fact of having direct knowledge of God, freedom and rationability did not negate for λογικοί the necessity of own spiritual vigilance on their part. Lack of care and vigilance in judging the decision of the will caused the fall of νοῦς and the loss of this original status forever.46 Clear convergences between the teaching of Evagrius and Origen (De principiis I,3,1; 1,4,1–2) lead to finding inspiration for the theory of the Pontian monk in the doctrine of his master from Alexandria.47 There is always possible an indirect influence of Coptic texts, of course, but then one would have to show that Origen himself was inspired by Coptic sources, which is rather unlikely. Origen, referring to the reality of human life, emphasizes that neglect of a topic can lead to the loss of both acquired skills and knowledge about it. So too, in his opinion, in the case of the original fall, when νοῦς experienced a kind of exhaustion in the contemplation of God,48 a kind of weariness to what God created him to do, that is, to contemplate Him.49 Evagrius does not use the Origenian term κόρος (weariness), but he understands the fall as the movement of will, which appears less frequently in the terminology of the great Alexandrian.50 This clearly demonstrates that Evagrius was not only not a passive user of Origen’s doctrine, but that he creatively used the intuition of his master. The change in terminology is probably explained by the fact that Evagrius presented the teaching of the fall of the νοῦς mainly in his work of Kephalai Gnostica, where he consciously used a more esoteric and abstract language to encode his teaching, in order not to offend people unprepared for reflection on such matters. There is no doubt, however, that his teaching about the original fall in the essential elements is inspired by the doctrine of Origen. But in one of his typical ascetic treatises, De oratione, which was probably intended for a wider audience, the monk from Pontus places the reason for the fall of the νοῦς in vanity: Vainglory is the origin of the mind’s erring; when the mind is moved thereby, it makes attempts at circumscribing the divine in forms and figures.51
45 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,28; A. Guillaumont (1958) 109; Ramelli (2015), 156. 46 Cf. Gendle (1985), 378. 47 See also Kephalaia Gnostica I,49, A. Guillaumont (1958), 41 “The Unity (Unification). This, by itself (acting in isolation), is not put into motion, but it is set in motion by the receptivity of the intellect, which, in its carelessness, turns its own face away from it and, due to the privation of it, gives birth to ignorance” (Ramelli (2015), 51). 48 Origen, De principiis I,3,8. 49 Some scholars see the inspiration for Origen in Plato and stoics – see Harl (1966), 274–305; Ivánka (1990), 118 f. 50 See for example De principiis, II,9,2. 51 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 116; PG 79,1193; Sinkewicz (2003), 206.
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The very literary form of the De Oratione, a collection of aphorisms on the subject of prayer, devoid of a wider context and makes it difficult to answer the question of whether Evagrius meant the original fall of mind or some other fall, but some elements suggest the former. In this text, he expresses the conviction that it is vanity that moves the mind to describe divine things in a material way. So here we have a clear confirmation of the Kephalaia Gnostica, that the “movement” of the mind is the reason for its fall. In De Oratione 116, Evagrius merely states that the reason for this movement was the desire of νοῦς for vainglory. Hausherr rightly observes that this passage should not be understood as the fall of the mind that urged him to describe the deity through various forms, because the fall did not cause this error, but the reverse: vanity as a passion caused the fall of the νοῦς.52 Vanity, as we shall see in the second part of our study, is the temptation of a νοῦς purified from the thoughts of a passionate part of the soul or in a state from before the original fall. A lot of light on the proper understanding all of it is cast by other fragments of De oratione. In De oratione 72 Evagrius states that during the so-called pure prayer, that is, contemplation, when the mind does not succumb to the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul (Anthirreticus VII, De Mal. 15), the demons come from the right and suggest the illusions of God or the image of things pleasant to the senses, so that the prayers seem to have already fully reached the purpose of prayer. Meanwhile, the desire for vainglory opens the door to the temptations of imagining God and describing Him with the help of images. Evagrius develops this idea in De oratione 73, adding that the demon of vanity changes the light that falls on the mind and thus awakens the passion of vainglory, which pushes the mind to recklessly imagine divine and essential knowledge.53 According to Evagrius, the cause of the original fall of the mind was its vain desire to be equal to God, to have essential, divine knowledge of the Holy Trinity, and the desire to describe the divine with images. Creation, on the other hand, is not at all capable of knowing God essentially, as He himself knows His essence and persons and succumbs to the illusion of describing the deity in the form of an image. 1.2.2.
The Consequences of the Original Fall of the νοῦς
The mind, which in its vanity wanted to acquire knowledge equal to God himself, abused its freedom, and fell away from unity with Him. As a result of this original fall, it no longer existed in a purely noetic form, but became the soul and later was also connected with the body. In Epistula ad Melaniam, Evagrius presents this process as follows: As we said of the mind, it is one in nature, person and rank. Falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, it was called a soul. And it descended
52 Cf. Hausherr (1960), 149–50. 53 Cf. De oratione 72–73; Sinkewicz (2003), 200–01.
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again and was named a body. But at some point there will be a time when the body, soul and mind – because of differences of their wills – will [become] this. Since their differences of will and movement will at some point pass away, it will rise to its former creation: its nature and person and name will be one, which God knows.54 In the above text, the monk of Pontus teaches a double separation of νοῦς from God: after the first separation it went to a different state of existence and was called a soul, while after the second it separated itself from unity with God and received a bodily existence. Evagrius nowhere, however, specifies how he understands this double separation from Monad and never wrote about the second fall directly. Most probably he meant a two-stage act of the original fall: after the first separation, there was a transition from an only noetic state to the state of noetic-psychic existence (mind and irrational/passionate soul), and then to the noetic-psychic-physical state (minde-soul-body). Following Origen, Evagrius also predicts three stages of the mind’s return to its original state, which he calls the “resurrection”: this will be the resurrection of the body, soul, and mind.55 The monk of Pontus perceives this duality of states of existence in a different way in Kephalaia Gnostica: All that which has come into existence has come into existence thanks to God’s knowledge. But some of these existing beings are primary beings, and some of them are secondary. And (divine) knowledge is more ancient than the primary beings, and movement (is more ancient) than the secondary beings.56 The distinction between the “first” beings, that is, the rational creatures existing before the movement and the “second” ones, after the movement, shouldn’t be understood in the chronological sense. We can only talk about a temporal sequence with the rise of matter and time, which come after the scene envisioned by Evagrius. The first λογικοί existed beyond time, in a noetic state, i.e. spiritual, completely united with God, and they fully participated in the original gnosis of God Himself. But the “double” or “second” creatures, taken clearly from Origen, is understood differently by the scholars. According to A. Guillaumont, Evagrius’s two categories correspond to two different levels of real creatures: êtres premiers, who are rational creatures, are completely spiritual and created beyond time; and êtres second, who are fallen, are spiritual beings with a God-given spiritual-psycho-bodily constitution.57 It is strange that Guillaumont, such an expert researcher of Evagrius’ writings, does not see the need to appeal to Origen – so helpful in understanding the Pontian monk’s protology. For this reason, it seems that the intentions of Evagrius are better summarized by
54 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula ad Melaniam 26; Frankenberg (1912), 616; Casiday (2006), 69. Epistula ad Melaniam is extant only in a Syriac translation, the first part of which is at Frankenberg (1912), 616–19 with retroversion into Greek. The second part was published by Vitestam (1964). 55 Cf. Origen, De principiis II,8,3; Evargius, Scholia in Psalmos 114,7 and Kephalaia Gnostica V,19.22.25. 56 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,50; A. Guillaumont (1958), 41; Ramelli (2015), 54. 57 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 103–12.
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Bunge, who asserts that the term “first and second beings” does not really mean two distinct types of beings – the first purely spiritual, the second carnal-spiritual – but two ways for the same λογικοί to exist. As first beings they turned away from God through the movement of will and change in the way of existence of spiritual beings, becoming carnal-spiritual second beings.58 This original fall, referred to by Evagrius as “movement”, “carelessness”, or “lack of vigilance” was not just a transitory act without further consequences. Because the fall was rooted in the rejection of the fundamental goal of the existence of λογικοί assigned to them by God, the will redirected, speaking in more contemporary language, all the psycho-spiritual energies toward its own ego, permanently modifying the original orientation of the νοῦς and its way of existence. It does not live as before, in order to contemplate God, but it concentrates on contemplating itself, adoring its own ego, and tends mainly to fulfill its desires and needs. Nor is it able to return on its own strength to the path of that original purpose of its life. Evagrius, however, notices the possibility of this return and gives specific measures leading to it, which we will deal with later. Here, however, let us concentrate on the effects of this original fall. The specificity of this original fall of νοῦς is the fact that it has left permanent effects in its nature, transforming the λογικοί into a noetic-psycho-carnal being. Evagrius presents the main results of this fall of λογικοί from Monad using two terms: ignorance of νοῦς and anger of the will, or otherwise its inclination to what is worse. From these two permanent “cracks” in the nature of λογικοί, do all other problems of rational beings begin. Our author clearly presents this idea in Letter 18,2 and in Scholia in Proverbia. In the Letter 18,2 we read: Two bad thoughts oppose good thoughts: one comes from demons and the other is a negligence of our will, which inclines to the worse. So, evil does not originate from the nature of our creation, which comes from God! For we were not evil from the beginning, since the Sower, who is our Lord, sowed good grain on his part (see Matt. 13:27).59 This passage clearly confirms that Evagrius acknowledged the original goodness of all λογικοί, a notion that was alien to Gnostics or Manicheans, who treated created nature as evil from its very beginning.60
58 See Nieścior (1997a), 102. 59 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 18,2; Frankenberg (1912), 578–79. The majority the letters of Evagrius do not survive in Greek. Fragments have been published by C. Guillaumont (1987), 209–21 and Géhin (1994), 117–47; Géhin (1996), 59–85. The Syriac version with Greek retroversion was published by Frankenberg (1912), 565–611. 60 According to Nieścior (1996b), 115–36 the idea of the natural goodness of creatures Evagrius drew out from the Stoics. I think it is unnecessary to look for borrowings from Stoicism, because the idea is already present in the Book of Genesis, and Evagrius could only describe it with the help of terminology similar to the Stoics. Borrowing, if it actually happened, would apply to form rather than content.
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The reasons for the first fall of νοῦς were, as I mentioned earlier, in the negligence of will. The fall of νοῦς is linked with the decision of will in Scholia in Proverbia, commenting on the text Prov. 5:3–4: “Oil” signifies pleasure, from which is born impurity, whose offspring are vice and ignorance in, and nothing more bitter than these things can be discovered in the things that have come to be.61 A similar idea can be found in the commentary on Prov. 6:9: This “sleep” by nature befalls the rational soul alone, for, here, it signifies vice and ignorance, and wakefunl vigilance of these make one “as a lonely sparrow on a roof ” (Ps. 101:8).62 And also the commentary to Prov. 17:17: “For this purpouse they are begotten” by wisdom, in order that they may guide human beings from vice to virtue and from ignorance to knowledge of God, if indeed “every creation itself groans and in travail with us and was subject to futility unwillingly” (cf. Rom. 8:20–22).63 Initially, the νοῦς participated in the gnosis of the Holy Trinity; then, through the “movement” of the will, it departed from that original unity with God and participation in his knowledge. Bunge rightly observes that Evagrius, as confirmed by the Greek fragments of his Kephalaia Gnostica, understood this unity in two ways: as the unification of λογικοί with God the Creator, and on the other hand as the internal cohesion and integrity of νοῦς in cognition and desire.64 Not accidentally, our author states that “conversion is the ascent from movement and from evilness and from ignorance toward the knowledge of the Holy Trinity”.65 The Pontian monk does not explain clearly and explicitly the mutual dependence between will and reason, but he does so indirectly in Scholia in Proverbia 2,17, where he defines the will (decision) as a certain movement of νοῦς.66 This means that νοῦς, although it participated in God’s gnosis, still remained free and vulnerable to negligence and disturbance. This is emphasized by a fragment from Kephalaia Gnostica: The Unity (Unification/Monad). This, by itself (acting in isolation), is not put into motion, but it is set in motion by the receptivity of the intellect, which, in its carelessness, turns its own face away from it and, due to the privation of it, gives birth to ignorance.67 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 5,3–4; Géhin (1987), 148. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 6,9; Géhin (1987), 172. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 17,17; Géhin (1987), 260. G. Bunge (1989b), 449–69. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,19; A. Guillaumont (1958), 225; Ramelli (2015), 327. In the version S 1 of Kephalaia Gnostica the statement is even more clear “Conversion is a return of rational nature to the state from which it fell”. 66 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 2,17; Géhin (1987), 116. 67 Kephalaia Gnostica I,49; A. Guillaumont (1958), 41; Ramelli (2015), 51. 61 62 63 64 65
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Thus, by its own fault, the νοῦς falls away from unity with God and forgets its “knowledge of God” due to lack of care and vigilance.68 This oblivion or ignorance concerns not only God Himself, but also His activities in the present world, which Evagrius describes with the category of “judgment and providence”. The reasons for providence became dark for νοῦς, and those concerning the judgement, hidden: The various movements and the different passions of rational creatures (logikoi) have compelled by force the intellections (logoi) concerning Providence to be seen in an obscure way, whereas their different orders have made the intellections (logoi) concerning the Judgment concealed.69 These spiritual reasons for the existence of reality created earlier were available to rational beings as if in direct view, but now they discover them thanks only to so-called natural contemplation.70 The νοῦς also lost the direct knowledge of God and now, as we shall see further, through the process of purifying the passionate part of the soul, attains a state of impassibility and becomes capable of natural contemplation, and then finally may return to contemplation of God Himself. The second result of the departure from communion with God is, as I wrote above, the anger of the will, its inclination towards what is worse. The mere falling into ignorance, according to Evagrius, does not refer only to some theoretical cognitive error, but determines the loss of the personal relationship with God, the ability to directly know Him and contemplate. There is no doubt that this anger of the will has a very practical, ethical, and moral dimension. As a result of the reversal of νοῦς from unity with God, its will has weakened in the ethical dimension, i.e., it has become more willing to choose evil over good, or apparent good instead of real good. This internal inclination to evil, or at least to the worse, is described by Evagrius as passion (πάθος). In Scholia in Proverbia 24,9 he identifies passions with the term “impurity” (ἀκαθαρσία), and the again with κακία71 whereas, for example, in De malignis cogitationibus 2 with “thought” (λογισμός), “demonic thought” or more briefly, “demon”.72 The beginning, however, and the essence of passion is self-love (φιλαυτία): “First of all is the thought of self-love, after which come the eight”.73 In this text, just as in De octo spiritibus malitiae, our author under the term λογισμός
68 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 2,17; Géhin (1987), 116. 69 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,23; A. Guillaumont (1958), 187; Ramelli (2015), 265. 70 See Kephalaia Gnostica V,51, A. Guillaumont (1958), 199 “The person who, on the basis of the harmony of beings, sees the Creator, it is not God’s nature that she knows, but it is God’s Wisdom that she knows, that in which God created everything”. Now, with Wisdom I mean, not the essential one, but that which is manifested in the existent beings, that which those who are experts in these matters usually call “natural contemplation” (Ramelli (2015), 291). See also Epistula ad Melaniam 13; Frankenberg (1912), 614; Casiday (2006), 67. 71 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 24,9, Géhin (1987), 362. 72 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 2; C. et A. Gulluamont – Géhin (1998), 154–56; Sinkewicz (2003), 154. This treaty survived in Greek and was published in PG 79,1200D–1244B and in Philokalia I, Athenis 1957, 44–45. Muyldermans (1932), 47–55 published the fragments of recensio longior. This study will be based on a critical edition of the Greek text in SCh 438. 73 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 53; Muyldermans (1931), 38–44, here 43; Sinkewicz (2003), 215.
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understands a kind of passionate desire. And it is not about the fact that love itself is evil by nature, but that νοῦς turning away from the original purpose of its life, that is contemplating God, fell into a passionate love for itself. Let’s precise, not self-love, but passionate self-love is implied by the term φιλαυτία. The original orientation of spiritual energies to God was replaced by concentrating them on the ego. Passions, according to Evagrius, are the result of the abuse of the individual capacities of the soul. As I wrote above, according to the Pontian monk, in the beginning there was pure νοῦς in communion with God, but as a result of breaking this unity it has been transformed into a noetic-psycho-corporeal being. In the soul, the author distinguishes the rational part (also referred to as the principal) and irrational (otherwise called passionate consisting of two parts: concupiscible and irascible).74 “Rationality”, “concupiscibility”, or “irascibility” by themselves are not inherently evil, but rather are neutral. The moral evil after the original fall is not the appearance of these forces, thoughts, or passions, but rather the tendency of the nous to use them in an evil way, that is, against its original nature. This is what Evagrius remarks very clearly in Epistula 30,2: For if all evil arises through a rational, irascible or concupiscible part [of the soul], these powers can be used well or badly, so it is obvious that evil arises from [their] misuse. And if so, no fault of the soul was created by God!75 The improper use of the soul’s properties is their action under the influence of passion, which Evagrius did not understand in a contemporary sense, i.e., as an intense feeling, but rather as a very strong (psychologically, we would say compulsive) attachment to a thing or a person. Therefore, the essential goal of the life of a monk, as well as of every man and woman, should be the ascetic effort to purify the soul of various passions so that it can act in accordance with its nature. They do this when “its concupiscible part pursues the virtue, the irascible is fiercely fighting for the virtue, and the rational is committed to the contemplation of beings”.76 Historically, in medieval and modern Christian theology, the original fall has been closely associated with the notion of inheritance. But Evagrius never mentions the hereditary nature of the first fall. Although we find fragments of his works, such as Kephalaia Gnostica VI,3 in which he seems to treat Adam as the physical progenitor of the whole human race, he usually interprets Genesis allegorically.77 The bodily Adam, according to him, appeared only after the fall of the νοῦς, that is, during the so-called “second creation”. One could, however, try to interpret Evagrius understanding of the heredity of the first fall indirectly from the status of Adam after the fall. Since Adam was the first rational being who, after the original fall, received a human body, different from the angelic and demonic body, from that moment he became the progenitor of a particular way of existence for some λογικοί, and from generation to generation, the human body was marked by Adam’s fall and existence. However, these are only
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See Scholia in Psalmos 25,2; PG 12,1273; Scholia in Proverbia 11,17, Géhin (1987), 224. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 30,2; Frankenberg (1912), 586. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 86; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), here t. II, 676; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. Cf. Nieścior (1999a), 82–83.
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speculations that are ultimately extremely difficult to confirm. Let us then confine ourselves to the conclusion that we do not find in the fragments of Evagrius’s writings a clear statement on the inheritance of the original fall. 1.3.
God’s Answer to the Fall of the νοῦς
1.3.1.
Judgement, Providence and the Creation of a Noetic-Psycho-Somatic Structure of λογικοί
As we have seen, the νοῦς fell not only into ignorance of God’s affairs and into an inclination to evil, but also into a modification of its nature as a first being. God the Creator, after the fall of the λογικοί, did not turn away from them, nor did he deprive them of his love, but he accommodated their new condition by giving them a sensual body and initiating the history of salvation. A chapter in the Kephalaia Gnostica illustrates this idea very well: Before the movement God was good and powerful and wise, and creator of incorporeal beings, and father of rational creatures, and omnipotent. But after the movement God has become creator of bodies, and judge and ruler and physician and shepherd and teacher, and merciful and patient, and also door/gate, way, lamb, high priest, together with the other epithets that are said in modes.78 Although according to Evagrius, all the terms applied to God are used “in modes”, that is, in the analogical sense, because His essence cannot be described by any human words, yet he uses human language to present the relationship between God and λογικοί, both before and after the fall. This different relationship, of course, does not mean any change in the essence of God, but only his adaptation to the new state of existence of the λογικοί. After the fall, they are no longer able to relate to the hitherto noetic, that is, purely spiritual level. The change of relationship was not initiated by God, but by the λογικοί. God’s strategy is explained by Evagrius elsewhere: The primary knowledge that was found in rational creatures is that of the Holy Trinity; then, there occurred the movement of free will, and Providence, which rescues and never abandons anyone, and then the Judgment, and again the movement of free will, and Providence, and the Judgment, and so on up to the Holy Trinity. Thus, every judgment comes between the movement of free will and God’s providence.79 In the above text, Evagrius combines the idea of God’s judgment and providence as His response to the movement of freedom of rational beings. The fact that he puts them interchangeably, i.e., either the providence before the judgement, or after it, does not seem to matter much to him.80 However, it is difficult to say what exactly
78 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,20; A. Guillaumont (1958), 225; Ramelli (2015), 327–28. 79 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,75; A. Guillaumont (1958), 249; Ramelli (2015), 362. 80 Cf. Nieścior (1997a), 103.
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the monk from Pontus had in mind presenting the entire process in a cyclical way. In the quoted chapter, there are two movements of freedom of λογικοί which somehow initiate God’s judgment and providence, but it is not fully known whether these are two falls of these rational beings or certain periodic recurring failures and interventions of God in successive worlds. Since, as we have seen before, Evagrius interprets the biblical message of the fall of the first parents with the help of a fairly esoteric language. While Gen. 2 describes only one fall, one may think that he had in mind rather a cyclically repeated process, the ultimate of which will be a return to the original unity with the Holy Trinity. Jesus Christ plays a key role in this process of returning to unity: “Who will expound the grace of God? And who will investigate the logoi of Providence, and how Christ leads the rational nature through various aeons, toward union in the holy Unity?”81 As mentioned earlier, after the movement God became “the creator of the body, judge, ruler, doctor, shepherd, teacher, merciful and generous, and yet the gate, the road, the lamb, the great priest” and – one could add – the redeemer through the historic mission of his Son. The deepest spiritual dimension of this mission remains completely impregnable to human reason, but Evagrius has no doubt that Christ best fulfills the judgment and providence of God over the fallen world in order to bring all λογικοί to unity with the Holy Trinity again.82 After the fall of λογικοί, God, while establishing his providence, increases his concern for rational beings because their inner spiritual strength has been greatly weakened and they are no longer able to take care of themselves as they were before. By judgment, however, Evagrius understood the decision of God to confer upon λογικοί a material body and place in the world that correspond to the degree of their original fall. Both the judgment and the providence of God have the primary goal of bringing rational beings again to unity with God. The creation of new bodies and new worlds is an element of God’s pedagogy, whose goal is to help rational beings return. Evagrius accepts here, after Origen, the possibility of passing from one state of existence of rational being to another, not as a change of nature, i.e., from humans to angels, but as a moral and ethical change. Such understandings will also be clearly indicated in other texts. In Gnosticus 48, Evagrius, citing the opinion of Didymus the Blind († 398), states: Didymus, the great and knowing teacher, said, “Train yourself always in the logoi about providence and judgment, and try to remember their matters, for almost all stumble over these things. You will find the logoi about judgment in the difference between bodies and worlds, and those about providence in the ways that lead us up from evil and ignorance to virtue and knowledge”.83 Thus, the manifestation of God’s judgment is the creation of various material bodies and worlds for λογικοί, which, through the different degrees of the primary fall
81 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,89; A. Guillaumont (1958), 175; Ramelli (2015), 243. 82 Cf. Kline (1985), 155–83. 83 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 48; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 186; C. Stewart, Gnostikos, translation of Greek fragments forthcoming I want give thanks here to Columba for sharing the translation in advance.
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have departed from communion with Him to varying degrees. We clearly see that Evagrius understands the idea of God’s judgment as being much more than simply punishment for sin. In another passage from Kephalaia Gnostica he specifies that “A judgment of God is the coming into being of a world/aeon, to which he gives a mortal body, in accord with the degree (of development) of each one of the rational creatures (λογικοί)”,84 and in Scholia in Proverbia that “judgment is the creation of an age (eon) when bodies are assigned to rational beings (λογικοί) in accordance with their state”.85 Thus the judgment of God is a manifestation of the great love of God, which determines the degree of decline of individual rational beings and their departure from communion with the Holy Trinity and, depending on the degree of this fall, creates for them the bodies and worlds appropriate and necessary for living in new conditions. Providence, on the other hand, is the action of God intended to restore all rational beings to the original unity, and not just, as traditionally conceived, care of the world and men.86 Thus, Evagrius accepts the Origenian theory of apokatastasis and understands this action of divine providence as universal. That is, God wants all rational beings to return to unity with each other.87 The destruction of all sinners did not mean for him their eternal damnation, but the destruction of all evil in successive worlds and the hope of universal salvation for all rational beings at the end of time.88 Balthasar rightly defines the Evagrian view of providence as God’s act, which through suffering, asceticism, and contemplation leads the “second nature” anew to function as the “first nature” until the complete elimination of all evil.89 Thus, the judgment and providence according to Evagrius are two inseparable elements of the same salvation strategy undertaken by God as a result of the fall of λογικοί, in order to restore in them an original internal harmony and unity with Him.90 As I wrote above, the Pontian monk understands the judgment of God as an act of his love towards rational beings, which determines the degree of their fall and assigns them the appropriate body and world necessary for a new existence. It is not a form of punishment but a new stage in the Creator’s saving plans. Although the material world arose only as a result of God’s judgment after the fall of λογικοί, it is, however, not evil in nature. God, depending on the extent of the fall of rational beings and their ability to know Him in such a state, created for each one of them an appropriate noetic-psycho-corporeal structure. This new world, although not inherently evil, is worse than the first. “The first creation”, that pure νοῦς, was spiritual, had internal harmony and participated in perfect unity with God. But after the fall its internal unity was broken and the nous fell into a noetic-psycho-carnal structure.
84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,38; Guillaumont, 113; Ramelli (2015), 162. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 24,22, Géhin (1987), 370. Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 16,12; 72,17. See A. Guillaumont (1962), 116-124; Bunge (1986), 24–45. Cf. Nieścior (1997), 104. Cf. Balthasar (1939b), 35. Cf. Gambos (2013). Access: https://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1515&context=luc_diss.
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From now on, rational beings exist in other worlds and bodies and are able easier to do evil. In this sense, the secondary world, after the fall, is less perfect or worse for Evagrius because it is forever marked by sin and disintegration; it never existed before in such a form. Absolutely spiritual minds, turning into souls, needed bodies and a new material world in which they could live, because they were no longer able to live in a mostly spiritual world. And God, out of love for them, and not to punish them, assigned them, depending on the degree of fall, the appropriate type of corporality and world. 1.3.2.
The Variety of λογικοί after the Fall: Angels, Demons and Human Beings
As we have seen before, according to Origen, λογικοί, depending on the degree of fall from completely spiritual beings, became angels, demons, or people, and each of these was assigned a different world, a kind of mode of existence. Belonging to one of these three states and worlds depends on the degree of the fall of an individual being, that is, on the degree of its moral perfection, its gnosis, and the presence of material elements.91 There is no doubt that Evagrius’ nearly identical teaching has been taken from the great Alexandrian. Commenting on the description of the creation of the world in Scholia in Proverbia 3,19, our author states: All this things are symbols of reasonable natures that are assigned to worlds and bodies in accordance with their state.92 The state, which Evagrius calls κατάστασις, is in practice the state of spiritual gnosis. Another saying from the Kephalaia Gnostica emphasizes the decisive role played by gnosis in the alignment of beings to specific states of existence: Those who live in bodies that are alike are not in the same (degree/kind) of knowledge, but in the same world/aeon, whereas those who are in the same (degree/kind) of knowledge are in sameness of bodies and in the same world.93 We see here that Evagrius differentiates the level of spiritual gnosis from corporality and being in a particular world. For him, the world is a reality for common beings who have the same corporeality, albeit with different levels of spiritual gnosis, while the same degree of spiritual cognition determines equality both in corporality and in inhabiting the same world. Beings that exist in different worlds combine spiritual and material elements. The matter is composed of four elements: fire, water, earth and air.94 As Evagrius says in the Kephalaia Gnostica:
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Origen, De principiis, II,9,1. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 3,19; Géhin (1987), 126. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,14; A. Guillaumont (1958), 67; Ramelli (2015), 96. Evagrius in Kephalaia Gnostica I,68, talks about fire, earth and air, and about water in II,51 (“The carriage of gnosis is the fire and the air, and the carriage of ignorance is air and water”). The scholars of Pontian writings discuss the source of his views on the four elements of matter. The most natural inspiration seems to be Aristotle; Lackner (1966), 17–29, however, is of the opinion that it was rather
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There is in common that all the aeons are constituted by the four elements, whereas individually each of them has a different kind of mixture.95 By quality, our monk understands not only physical properties such as color or form different for each state,96 but also the level of spiritual gnosis.97 The theologian from Pontus, like Origen, strangely considers the stars to be rational beings,98 and in a mysterious chapter he seems to accept the existence of four kinds of corporeal beings: Those who possess light bodies are said to be on high, whereas those (who possess) heavy bodies (are said to be) below. And higher than the former are those who are lighter than they are, whereas below the latter there are those who are heavier than they are.99 However, when Evagrius tries to define the different states of λογικοί existence after the original fall, he mentions three basic categories: angels, people, and demons.100 It is worth remembering, however, that the names angels, people and demons define not so much their nature qua rational being, but rather their existence, and, in the case of angels, functions.101 In Scholia in Ecclesiasten 53, where Evagrius comments on chapter 6:10–12 he lists these three categories of λογικοί: For it is up to the free will either incline towards virtue and to be considered worthy of knowledge, which makes on an angel, archangel throne or dominion [cf. Col. 1:16]; or to incline towards vice and to be filled with ignorance, which makes on a demon, or Satan, or some other cosmic power of this darkness [cf. Eph. 6:12]. Whatever come to be, it says, at moment of the making of the world, received a name indicating its state, and the human being also received a name suitable for his state.102
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Basil the Great (Homiliae in Hexaemeron IV,4). Even if Evagrius really took over the theory from Basil, it is still known that the Cappadocian did not invent it himself, but he took it over from Greek philosophy. See also KG VI,26. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,23; A. Guillaumont (1958), 107; Ramelli (2015), 154. In Kephalaia Gnostica I,22; A. Guillaumont (1958), 25–27 he affirms that the color and shape of demonic bodies are unknowable to human senses, because the quality of their bodies is different from the quality of human bodies. For this reason, when demons want to appear to people, they must accept a body similar to human. Demons are therefore material, but their materiality is different from the materiality of human bodies. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,84; A. Guillaumont (1958), 173; Ramelli (2015), 241. Cf. Origen, De principiis I; VI; Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,88; A. Guillaumont (1958), 255. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,68; A. Guillaumont (1958), 87; Ramelli (2015), 129. Cf. P. Géhin (1987), 45–48. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 106–08. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Ecclesiasten 6,10–12 (passim); Géhin (1993), 148–51; English translation of the Scholia are taken from a forthcoming translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus. See also Labate (1978), 483–90; Labate (1984), 241–63; Labate (1992), 22–23; Bunge (1994), 135–46.
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So, when the free will of λογικοί strives for virtue and spiritual gnosis, it makes of them an angel (or archangel), but when it inclines to evil and becomes filled with spiritual ignorance, it makes them demons. The names that all rational beings received at the time of the so-called “second creation” after the fall also determine their state: the name “angel” – the state of virtue and spiritual knowledge, the name “demon” – the state of anger and spiritual ignorance, and the name “human being”, about whom our author only mentions, without explanation, that he received a name appropriate to his state. He reinforces this point in other texts such as the Kephalaia Gnostica: “Among the logikoi some have spiritual contemplation and praktike; others among them, on the other hand, have praktike and contemplation; and others among them have hindrance and discernment”.103 From other fragments of this work, we learn that contemplation is a condition that characterizes the existence of angels: The contemplation of angels is named heavenly Jerusalem and Mount Zion. Now, if those who have believed in Christ have gotten close to Mount Zion and to the City of the Living God, then those who have believed in Christ have been and will be in the contemplation of angels.104 For Evagrius Egypt is a symbol of the world of evil, which remains under the rule of demons; Jerusalem symbolizes the ability to natural contemplation, or in other words, the ability to see the spiritual reasons of created reality; while Mount Zion symbolizes the knowledge of the Holy Trinity itself (KG V,21).105 Therefore it is easy for us to understand that the world of rational beings who have “contemplation and praktike” is the world of angels. In another text, he defines their function more precisely: “An angel is a rational substance who has been entrusted with the logoi concerning Providence and the Judgment and concerning the worlds/aeons of human beings”.106 Evagrius assumes, with Origen, that although angels are the rational beings who, in the original fall have deviated least from God, nevertheless their state of existence has also changed. They no longer exist only in a purely noetic state, but in a noetic-psycho-corporeal state. According to Origen (and Evagrius is clearly inspired by his teaching here) all rational beings already had an ethereal body before the original fall, imperceptible to the human senses, whose properties after the fall changed. Only God is disembodied. The Pontian monk is of the opinion that in angels prevail νοῦς and fire (KG I,68), which could indicate that they have some kind of ethereal body, but he does not explain how it would differ from the one they had before the fall. Similarly, the acceptance of the necessity of πρακτική seems to indicate the attribution to the angels of the unreasonable part of the soul which, although subjected to its rational part more deeply than in the case of demons and people, would nevertheless demand some kind of ascetic practice. Angels after the original
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Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,13; A. Guillaumont (1958), 23; Ramelli (2015), 115. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,6; Guillaumont (1958), 179; Ramelli (2015), 251. Cf. Nieścior (1997a), 106. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,7; Guillaumont (1958), 179; Ramelli (2015), 251.
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fall became guides and helpers of people in the struggle to free themselves from evil and ignorance, to gain virtue, to know God, and to return to communion with God.107 The second category of beings have both πρακτική and contemplation, clearly indicating people. They are rational beings who have moved from the state of noetic existence to the level of a noetic-psycho-carnal existence. In the hierarchy of rational beings after the fall, people occupy an intermediate position between angels and demons: Just as infants are placed between the just and the unjust, so are all men placed between angels and demons, without either being demons or bearing the title of angels, until the consummation of the age.108 Humans are therefore neither completely good as angels, nor completely evil as demons, and they will become one or the other after the end of the world’s history. They received an unreasonable (passionate) part of the soul and a material body, perceptible by senses, and God also created a new, sensual world for them to live in their new condition. Of the λογικοί who became human, the first was biblical Adam. They are characterized by being dominated by the concupiscible part of the soul and by the element earth (KG I,68). Therefore, to return to their original state of contemplation of God, people must undertake ascetic practice, through which they will purify the passionate part of their soul and achieve a state of impassibility. In the treatise Practicus, Evagrius defines Christianity as the teaching of Christ, our Savior, which consists of πρακτική, φυσική and θεολογική.109 Although seemingly a series of three items, Prolog 9 to the Practicus clearly combines the last two disciplines as the two parts of a single activity: γνωστική. Hence the essence of man’s spiritual life is in πρακτική and γνωστική, that is, ascetic practice and contemplation. In other passages (e.g. Gnosticus 1) he describes πρακτική as an ascetic practice that serves to purify the passionate part of the human soul, whereas γνωστική is contemplation, which purifies the rational part of it, enabling it anew to contemplate God Himself. The third group of beings who have “bonds and judgment” undoubtedly refers to the rational beings who exist in the demonic state. They are led, as we have seen before, by Satan, Lucifer, who in his pride wanted to be equal to God Himself. As a consequence, he lost not only his previous state of existence, but also attracted those other rational beings who became demons. Demons are enemies and opponents of people, and they use all possible means to lead humans into evil and ignorance.110 They are the rational beings dominated by anger and by the element air (KG I,68).111 It follows that the demons also changed the state of their existence from purely noetic with an ethereal body, as Origen believed, to a state of noetic-psycho-carnal existence. In their case, however, the mind became subject to the domination of the irascible part of the soul, and the ethereal body from before the fall still remained unnoticed
107 108 109 110 111
Cf. Scholia in Proverbia, 1,27; 13,22; 22,10; 27,25; 28,22. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 1,32; Géhin (1987), 108. Cf. Practicus 1; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971) 498; Sinkewicz (2003), 97. Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 4,17; 5,9. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1957), 196–205.
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by material senses, but darkened. Because their bodily way of existence is in some sense more perfect than that of a human being, they do not need sleep or rest in their fight with him.112 During the day they stimulate passionate thoughts, which in turn arouse the passionate part of the soul, leading a person to sin by deed, while at night they awaken the soul through dreams (Scholia in Proverbia 36). In their temptations, however, they remain limited and do not know the inner thoughts of man, because only God fully knows his heart. Therefore, demons can deduce a person’s passions only by observing his/her deeds or words. However, they remain completely helpless in the face of the gnostic, that is, the man who frees himself from passionate thoughts and is entirely devoted to prayer and contemplation. Evagrius, following Origen, accepts also the possibility that λογικοί can change their state of existence, and go from one body to another, combining the heaviness of this body with the state of spiritual perfection of each being.113 Theoretically, if anger prevails in an angel or a man, that individual approaches the state of demonic existence, but if the mind begins to dominate a demon or a person, they approach the angelic state. There is, however, a certain problem when angels and demons approach the state of human existence. For this to happen, they would need to allow concupiscence to dominate their minds, and this is simply impossible because they do not have a sensual body, through whose mediation alone is lust aroused in man. Probably Evagrius, like Origen, did not mean a change in the way of existence of rational beings after the fall, transitioning to another state of noetic-psycho-bodily existence, but only a kind of moral and ethical change. The monk of Pontus, however, does not mention anything about this matter and it is very difficult to find any satisfactory answer to that question. On the other hand, many of his texts seem to assume the notion of successive worlds being followed by successive falls, where such changes in the state of existence would be possible. In any case, for Evagrius the state and place of existence of particular λογικοί after the original fall depends on the degree of their fall and the bodily elements they receive in the new condition. Angels, people, and demons are three basic categories, and belonging to any of them strictly depends on the degree of spiritual perfection, as well as the type of corporality and dominance of νοῦς, concupiscibility, or irascibility assigned to them.
2. 2.1.
Eschatology of Evagrius Reversible Character of the λογικοί Condition
We have seen earlier that, according to Evagrius, λογικοί were assigned different worlds after the original fall. However, a more thorough analysis of both the terms themselves and
112 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 4,16; 26,25. 113 See Origen, De principiis I,7,2; Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica, V,88; Guillaumont (1958), 255; Ramelli (2015), 314.
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the content they bring with them in the writings of our monk allows us to find the triple meaning of this idea.114 First of all, “world” (Greek: κόσμος; Latin mundus) is primarly a set of all reality – material and immaterial – created for a particular class of λογικοί after the original fall. Second, while before the original fall λογικοί lived in a homogeneous way, after the fall they became, depending on the degree of this fall, angels, people, or demons, and to each of them was assigned by God a different world. Hence “world” often refers to one of three different realities in which these three categories of λογικοί live. However, within any one of the three world of angels, people, or demons differences in the way of existence are possible, depending on the degree of an individual’s spiritual gnosis. For, according to Evagrius, those who live in equal bodies are not in the same gnosis, but in the same world. And those who are in the same gnosis, have equal bodies and are in the same world.115 Third, a “world” in the mind of our author can rise and fall, and the number of worlds, corresponding to successive stages of all created reality, is indefinite until the eschatological fulfillment. In this scenario, however, like Origen he does not use the term kosmos, but aion (Latin aevum, saeculum), which means “age, generation, period of time, period of life”.116 Whereas the first and second understanding of the “world” by Evagrius does not pose major problems and partly appeared on the occasion of the analysis of the original fall and its consequences, the third concept of the “world” presents much more difficulty, so let us now concentrate on it. From Kephalaia Gnostica VI,75, previously quoted, very interesting elements emerge to explain the multiplicity and diversity of worlds. According to the monk from Pontus, the first gnosis of λογικοί is about the Holy Trinity; then there was the movement of freedom, providence and fidelity, and then the judgment; and again the movement of freedom, providence, judgment; and so on until the return of all the creation to the Holy Trinity. The text seems to presuppose a cyclical conception of the time when the movement of freedom or will, as Evagrius said in another place, follows God’s providence and judgment, then the freedom movement is repeated again, followed by providence and judgment, and so on until the final return of all created reality to the Holy Trinity. This fragment is very difficult to interpret. If we assume that it refers to the description of the primary fall of νοῦς as I did above, then how to understand the repetition of the same process in the future? Does the text show that the original fall is repeated in another world, or is it a fall qualitatively different from the first one? If we remember that the emergence of material reality was a consequence of God’s judgment, are the next judgments to be understood as the formation of other materialities? Evagrius nowhere explains this in his texts, but seems to assume the teaching of Origen. On the other hand, the great Alexandrian, in a hypothetical way, allowed for the possibility of infinitely repeating new worlds and new falls, which would contradict his theory of apocatastasis assuming a linear concept of time and the history of the world.117 As we have seen, however, Evagrius’s
114 115 116 117
See Nieścior (1997a), 108–11; Stewart (2001); Casiday (2013), 234–50. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica II,14; A. Guillaumont (1958), 67; Ramelli (2015), 96. Liddell – Scott (199410), 45. Cf. Crouzel (1985), 254.
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clear distinction between kosmos and aion explains the apparent contradictions in his texts between the linear concept of time and the recurring new worlds and falls in the moral sense. In any case, Evagrius seems to understand the history of the created world as a series of consecutive stages in which the movement of freedom (apostasy) and the operation of providence and God’s judgment take place until the final return of all created reality to unity with the Holy Trinity. He explains this in another passage: As many accountable beings as the Judge has judged, so many aeons/worlds he has also made, and the one who knows the number of judgments also knows the number of aeons.118 The text clearly speaks of the multiplicity of judgments and worlds and emphasizes that knowing the first is a condition for knowing the other. The text is not about the so-called first judgment after the original fall when God, depending on the degree of the fall of λογικοί, assigned appropriate bodies and worlds, resulting in the states of existence of angels, people, and demons. So, the term “world” does not have as its original Greek kosmos, a material world or as a reality proper to each of the above-mentioned states, but rather aion, an age, a period of time. This is even more clearly confirmed by another gnome: All the transformations that have occurred before the world/aeon to come, some have been joined to excellent mortal bodies and others to bad ones, whereas those which will occur after the world/aeon to come will join all of them with gnostic instruments (organa).119 Evagrius understands the term “worlds” as the successive stages of transformation of created reality until reaching the final world, in which a qualitative change in the manner of the existence of rational beings will take place and they will possess transformed “gnostic bodies”. Although he usually mentions three categories of created beings, i.e., angels, demons, and people, who are subject to judgment (KG II,84), he does not mean any chronological periods and does not seem to limit the number of all worlds to only the three for these beings. Origen wrote about four worlds: the spiritual world of ideas, the world of pre-existing minds, the present world, and finally the future world of the resurrection. Evagrius similarly assumes the existence of a spiritual world of eternal ideas, then the prelapsarian state of λογικοί, which he calls the “first world” (KG VI,45), further mentions the present material world created after the fall, and then predicts that someday they will find “new worlds” (KG V,81). However, he also mentions the next world, which is Sheol (KG V,5), and we can see that his thought is far from being clear. It is possible that the confusion arose from the overlap of Origen’s two theories about the existence of the above-mentioned worlds and the acceptance of the existence of other rational beings (angels, demons, people) within the present world after the fall. Much could
118 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,75; A. Guillaumont (1958), 91; Ramelli (2015), 134. 119 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,51; A. Guillaumont (1958), 119; Ramelli (2015), 169.
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be explained here by the terminological distinction between kosmos and aion in Evagrius’ writings, but unfortunately Kephalaia Gnostica was written in aphoristic style and, in addition, the roughly fifteen percent that survives in Greek does not cover chapters relevant to this topic. Perhaps the question would become much clearer if we assume that aion does not mean for Evagrius a really new material world, but a new moral condition for a rational being allocated according to the degree of its dominance of νοῦς over concupiscence (in the case of humans) or anger (in the case of demons) and the degree of its spiritual knowledge. Understanding of “world” in the sense of new moral conditions of individual rational beings, new worlds become regularly possible, as do new falls. These new falls and new worlds, however, would have a character completely different from that primary fall that took place only once at the beginning of human history and affected all rational beings. New falls and new worlds would, therefore, concern the condition of the existence of individual λογικοί and not a global condition. Depending on the degree of purification of an irrational soul (ascetic practice) and perseverance or lack thereof in the achieved level of spiritual knowledge (gnosis), it would be possible to pass between the world of demons, angels, and people, as well as to change within the same world – depending on the degree of spiritual gnosis.120 Of course, it is not about the possibility of substantive change of the body from one existence to another, by angels or demons from invisible to the visible as human, and vice versa, from human to angelic or demonic, but only changes in the moral sense. For example, the human body does not disturb the νοῦς any more as in the case of angels in the contemplation of spiritual reality and God Himself. Man becomes a moral not actual demon when irascibility dominates in him and an angel when the νοῦς prevails. I admit that such a hypothesis attempts to bring coherence in the teaching of Evagrius, and also Origen, because it assumes that these authors were not schizophrenics and were not consciously trying to teach contradictory views. If so, then there are somehow coherent assumptions underlying their doctrine. We must uncover them, rather than impose our own, anachronistic beliefs. It seems that one essential point is to take the term aion not as an ontological but as a moral category, thanks to which it is possible to accept the existence of many worlds and subsequent falls and transitions between them, morally. Thus, Evagrius assumes a multitude of worlds until the final return of λογικοί to the original state of unity with the Holy Trinity.121 Such an understanding of his thoughts is also suggested by another chapter: Just as those who dwell in this aeon have quite a small vision of the world to come, in the same way those who are in the last aeon see some luminous beams of the Holy Trinity.122
120 Cf. Linge (2000), 537–68. 121 Cf. O’Laughlin (1987), 129. 122 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,3; A. Guillaumont (1958), 177; Ramelli (2015), 250 (with small changes).
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According to Evagrius “the world” in this sense is a dynamic reality, a stage of transformation of all created reality with various states of λογικοί (angel, people, demons). 2.2.
Transitional Character of the Contemporary World
In the Kephalaia Gnostica, our author clearly emphasizes the transient nature of the human body and the world in which people live: If the human mortal body is a part of this world/aeon, and if, on the other hand, “the form of this world will pass”, (1 Cor. 7:3) it is clear that the form of the mortal body also will pass.123 The Pontian monk, as well as St Paul, meant here not only the general transitoriness of the world but also the transitoriness of the present form of human life in the body. This is clearly indicated by another fragment: Just as the destruction of the last aeon will not be followed by a new creation, so also the creation of the first aeon was not preceded by a destruction.124 The first world, according to Evagrius, was not created as a result of the destruction of the previous one but as a result of the transformation of the spiritual world into the spiritual and material world.125 Important for our analysis is the statement of the Pontian monk that the transformation of successive worlds will not be cyclical or infinite, but rather finite. The last world will not change into yet another but will be destroyed. Yet another text confirms the opinion of Evagrius about the transitional nature of worlds, including the material form of the present world: The elimination of the aeons, the abolition of mortal bodies, and the vanishing of names will accompany the knowledge regarding rational creatures (logikoi), while there will be unanimity of knowledge, in accord with the unanimity of hypostases (individual substances).126 Here, the Pontian theologian combines the existence of bodies and names of rational beings with a specific form of the world. As we have seen before, the diversity of the names of rational beings, their bodies and the worlds in which they exist has appeared after the original fall of νοῦς. When this dichotomy is overcome and λογικοί return to their original unity with God, then again all spiritual beings will be equal, the multiplicity of worlds and bodies will disappear, and the names of individual beings will not be necessary. In the process of consecutive “movement” of the will of rational beings and “judgment” of God there will be the final judgment that “will not show the transformation of bodies, but their destruction” (KG II,77). Thus, the 123 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,26; A. Guillaumont (1958), 29; Ramelli (2015), 26. 124 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,89; A. Guillaumont (1958), 215; Ramelli (2015), 314. 125 The term “first world” is basically referred to by Evagrius as efers the completely spiritual world before the first fall (KG VI,45), but sometimes he also uses this term in the sense of the first material world, which was created after the fall. 126 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,17; A. Guillaumont (1958), 67; Ramelli (2015), 97.
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last act of God’s intervention after rational beings attempt to move away from Him will not lead to another transformation of their bodies and the creation of yet new worlds adapted to their new condition, but to the destruction of these material bodies. According to A. Guillaumont, Evagrius perceived the differences between the bodies of individual rational beings as dependent on the proportion of the four elements that make them.127 During the final resurrection of the bodies, however, a qualitative change will take place: “The resurrection of the mortal body is a passage from a bad quality to an excellent quality”.128 Therefore, the resurrected body will have a different quality, although it will still remain in some sense material having however another type of materiality, because it is composed of four elements but connected in different proportions: The spiritual body and that which is opposite to it will be made not of our limbs or our parts but of an (immortal) body. For it is not the case that death is a change from (given) limbs into (other) limbs, but that from a good or bad mixture to a good or bad transformation.129 Depending on whether the elements are light or spiritual, the body will become angelic, while in the case of the predominance of heavy elements, demonic. Change can take place both for better and for worse: “The transformation of the just (is) the passage from practicing and seeing bodies to seeing or greatly seeing bodies”,130 but “The transformation of sinners is the passage from practicing or demonic bodies to those that are even heavier and darker”.131 Because the difference between demons, angels and people depends on the quality of their bodies associated with a given gnosis, after the resurrection people receiving the bodies of angels or demons will actually become in some way demons or angels (KG II,7; III,65; IV,38; VI,24). The transformation of rational beings into one another is possible because there is no essential difference in nature between them, and there is only a difference in quality: From the order of angels come the order of archangels and that of the psychic; from that of the psychic, that of demons and that of human beings; from that of human beings, angels and demons will derive in turn, if it is true that a demon is the one who, because of an excess of thymos, has fallen from the praktikē and has been joined with a dark and extended (immortal) body.132
127 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 114–16. 128 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,19; A. Guillaumont (1958), 185; Ramelli (2015), 262. 129 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,25; A. Guillaumont (1958), 107; Ramelli (2015), 155. The version S 1 is even more eloquent: “The spiritual body that logikoi will receive on the last day will not be different from the present body that will leave; but even the present one, which is ‘immersed in mortality’, when it is refined and blessed, will become ‘immortal’”. 130 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,48; A. Guillaumont (1958), 117; Ramelli (2015), 167 (with changes). 131 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,50; A. Guillaumont (1958), 117; Ramelli (2015), 168 (with changes). 132 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,11; A. Guillaumont (1958), 181; Ramelli (2015), 254.
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The resurrection will not be a one-off act, but one of perhaps many changes that might make a rational being pass through various states: angelic, human, and demonic. Later anti-Origenists saw precisely in the teaching of Evagrius the sources for the views of the Origenists, according to which the resurrected body will continue to be destructible and subject to subsequent deaths.133 A sixth-century reader hostile to Evagrius might have found justification for this condemnation. He appears to state that innumerable changes will eventually lead to the formation of spiritual bodies, but during the last change they will also disappear and the total annihilation of all bodies will take place: “Just as the first trumpet revealed the coming into being of (spiritual) bodies, so also will the last trumpet reveal the vanishing of (spiritual) bodies”.134 On the eighth day after the end of the world’s history, when the worlds are destroyed, all bodies will be broken up and names will be abolished. Only pure minds will exist, as they did before fall. All who have been united with bodies will be necessarily freed from them (KG I,58). This destruction of bodies will be universal and will affect the bodies of demons, who also for this reason must cease to exist as demons. If, as the Scripture says, all will be submitted to the feet of Christ and all nations will pay homage to him, it means that all rational beings will learn about ascetic practice and experience true knowledge of God, and demons will one day be subjected to Christ. And when everything is submitted to Christ, then he will also be subjected to the Father (1 Cor. 15:28) and his kingdom will end. All rational beings who become heirs of Christ through natural contemplation will become his joint-heirs and will again gain the grace of the Monad. It seems, however, that Evagrius’ eschatology has been misunderstood both by the ancient and by modern readers of his writings. The Pontian monk does not affirm directly that the demons’ bodies will eventually be annihilated and they will cease to exist. Most of his texts concern the eschatology of λογικοί, which after the fall became human, not demons or angels, and many indicate that he meant the destruction of the present form of human body and world, not the annihilation of all corporeality. Further, many scholars of the writings of Evagrius, headed by A. Guillaumont, assume that he accepted the original existence of minds in a purely spiritual, disembodied state, which does not necessarily mean absolute incorporeality, but only the lack of the material body we now know. There is also the impression that the researchers of the Pontian’s doctrine understand “world” as a new ontological or metaphysical reality that would arise after each fall, and not as a change in the moral existence of individual rational beings. Evagrius did not affirm so clearly that once the existence of all material reality in its present form come to a definite end the λογικοί returned to a disembodied existence. In Great Letter to Melania 22–25 Evagrius seems to suggest that the separation of the human body, soul and mind will cease and the body and soul will become intellect and in such a way these passages are interpreted by Parmentier in his edition of Great Letter. But Augustine Casiday is right criticizing Parmentier’s interpretation because
133 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962); A. Guillaumont (1961), 219–26. 134 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,66; A. Guillaumont (1958), 125; Ramelli (2015), 179.
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according to him it is unlikely that this is what Evagrius really meant. In fact, “we have no reason to suppose that the final state will involve annihilation and abolition of any of the three constituent elements of the human being (body, soul and intellect)” rather then “reintegration of the features that are already present”.135 As I wrote above, Evagrius assumes here the reflection of Origen that only “ideas” or “reasons” are completely spiritual and co-eternal to God, whereas the minds (noes) are not pre-eternal and had ethereal or gnostic bodies before the first fall. After completing the process of transformation and succession of different worlds, the present bodies of the λογικοί, as well as material reality in its present form, will cease to exist, they will be destroyed. Such a form of continuity between the body and the present and future world seems to assume the following fragment: “Just as this body is called the seed of the future ear, so will also this world be called seed of the one that will come after it”.136 The future body of rational beings therefore grows out of their present body, thus guaranteeing the continuity of the existence of corporeal rational beings. This is confirmed by Kephalaia Gnostica III,25: The spiritual body and that which is opposite to it will be made not of our limbs or our parts but of an (immortal) body. For it is not the case that death is a change from (given) limbs into (other) limbs, but that from a good or bad mixture to a good or bad transformation.137 This text clearly indicates that Evagrius assumed continuity between the present sensual body and the future spiritual one. If so, when he wrote about total destruction, he meant the final and definitive transformation of the present form of the materiality of the world and the corporeality of rational beings into a qualitatively different kind of corporeality, and the term “destruction” referred not to the total destruction of all corporeality, but only to its present form. The technical Syriac term for “passing away” in Evagrian texts means rather “to be silenced/to fall silent” then “to be abolished” and in a surviving Greek texts the term ἀπώλεια means not the annihilation of things created by God but also rahter the reconfiguration and restoration of things as God intended.138 In Scholia in Proverbia 28,28 Evagrius himself defines ἀπώλεια as dissolution of impiety.139 The difference between the present sensual body and the future spiritual one, as in the case of Origen, would consist in a difference in quality, not essence. In the reflection of the Pontian monk, it seems that both the first transformation after the original fall of the λογικοί, as well as the last after the end of the present world, are understood as qualitative transformations, i.e., those that change the structure of the existence of λογικοί, while all others which take place as if within singular worlds, only quantitative, i.e., they do not change their very structure, but only the mode of existence. Only the last change will be qualitative: from a material to a spiritual
135 136 137 138 139
Casiday (2013), 234–35. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,25; A. Guillaumont (1958), 71; Ramelli (2015), 105. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,35; A. Guillaumont (1958), 107; Ramelli (2015), 155. Casiday (2013), 238. Gehin (1987).
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body. Augustine Casiday rightly points out for two features of this eschatological model of Evagrius.140 First is the fact, that Evagrius allows for ethical and spiritual instruction and progress so that final “eschatological non-differentation” should be understood strictly as the purgation of vices and elimination of every proud. If the final stage would consists with the elimination of differences, it would be nonsense to speak of progress in understanding. The second regards the communal aspect of restoration which is very important, even if it does not cancel personal restoration. In any case, an element sufficiently sure in the thought of Evagrius is the belief that the material world in its present form is temporary; it will cease to exist in the future and will be replaced by another world with a different materiality. Rational beings will return to their original unity with God – not to a purely noetic state but to a manner of a noetic-psycho-physical existence in which their irrational part of the soul will be cleansed of passion and the sensual body transformed into a spiritual body.141 If there is a predominance of irascibility in demons, it means that after the original fall they also had an irrational part of the soul that would demand spiritual purification. Evagrius does not deal directly with the question of the possibility of their final conversion to God. We can guess that he allowed such a possibility, given the universal nature of the original fall and the pervasive judgment and providence of God, which give hope to all rational beings of returning to their original unity with God. Since the original fall afflicted the angels, they, too, although least distant from God, will be restored to full communion with Him at the end of time.
140 Casiday (2013), 239. 141 Origen, in De principiis, II,10,3, assumed that in the world of noes there would be no place for animals or plants.
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C ha pt er II
Anthropology
In the past, scholars saw Evagrius as being dependent upon Origen not only in his cosmology and eschatology but also in his anthropology. It was emphasized that the differences between them showed that he did not just copy his master’s teachings uncritically, but he creatively adapted them for the needs of his spiritual doctrine. Studies of the last dozen or so years have shown, however, that the chief sources of Evagrius’ anthropology are not in the writings of Origen but in those of Gregory Nazianzen, or more precisely in the combination of the anthropology of Origen and Gregory. In order to better introduce the anthropology of the monk from Pontus, I will present it against the background of Origen’s theory, comparing both concepts and arguing for the more likely influence of Gregory.
1.
Basic Elements of Origen’s Anthropology
As earlier stated, according to Origen only ideas exist as co-eternal to God, whereas rational beings (νόες) were created by God at the same time in His image, equal to themselves and provided with ethereal bodies. The theologian of Alexandria, thanks to Plato’s understanding of the νοῦς, supplemented with the biblical description of man, explains in opposition to the Gnostics the equality of rational beings and their susceptibility to changes as creatures that have a beginning in time. In the treatise On Principles Origen discusses the origin of the soul, then much debated, in order to repel the attacks of Valentinians and Marcionites.1 The former excluded any individual human responsibility for the creation of the soul, because they held that the diversity of souls existed by the intent of the Creator himself. Spiritual people (pneumatics) would therefore, according to the Valentinians, have a spiritually perfect soul and would always have been destined for salvation, regardless of personal merit and faults, while material people (hylics) would have the worst soul and would have never saved, regardless of personal merits and faults. Origen, on the other hand, perceives diversity among rational beings as a result of the free decision of each to depart from communion with God, and he also champions their freedom to restore that communion, excluding any determinism. The Marcionites, on the other hand, from the observed spiritual inequality among people, argued against the goodness of the Creator and they claimed that one should accept the existence of two gods: good and evil. Origen responds to these doctrines with a theology of the creation 1 Cf. Crouzel (1985), 255–58.
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and the fall of νοῦς, which allows him to hold in tension doctrines – seemingly exclusive – about the equality and diversity of rational beings. All νόες were created by God at the same time and were equal to each other, while the current differences between them, including the state in which man is born on earth, depend on the degree of the fall of a νοῦς in pre-existence. In his anthropology Origen attempted to synthesize biblical anthropology and with the anthropology of Greek philosophy, especially the Platonic tradition.2 The starting point for early Christian authors in reflecting on man was the words of St Paul from 1 Thess. 5:23: “May the God of peace himself sanctify you entirely; and may your spirit (πνεῦμα) and soul (ψυχή) and body (σῶμα) be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ”. Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 135–c. 202) was one of the earliest Christian writers to attempt to systematize Christian anthropology, but Origen was the first to introduce it in a systematic way. It is worth remembering that the Christian anthropology of both Irenaeus and Origen crystallized to a large extent from the need to respond to Gnostic proposals for understanding man and his condition in the world. Quite rightly, Crouzel points out that, contrary to widespread belief, Origen’s anthropological trichotomy, that is human being composed by spirit, soul and body cannot be justifiably identified with Plato’s trichotomy. The difference is essential. The trichotomy of Origen concerns the whole person, whereas Plato’s trichotomy involves only the soul. Origen follows St Paul in accepting the existence of three elements in man: spirit (πνεῦμα), soul (ψυχή) and body (σῶμα); but Plato sees in the human soul three parts: “rational” (νοῦς), “concupiscible” (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and “irascible” (θυμητικόν).3 The theologian from Alexandria combines both Paul and Plato, sometimes introducing subtle modifications that often escape the careless reader of his writings. So, a man, according to him, has the three above-mentioned elements: πνεῦμα – “spirit” (Lat. spiritus), ψυχή – “soul” (Lat. anima) and σῶμα – “body” (Lat. corpus); with help of the Platonic theory, however, he specifies that the soul is bipartite, with upper and lower elements. The higher tendency is called by our author in Greek νοῦς (Lat. mens) “mind, reason” or using the Stoic term ἡγεμονικόν (Lat. principale cordis) “guiding tendency”. This upper faculty is, in short, the main, rational part of the human soul that organizes his life. After the original fall, νοῦς received a lower “irrational” or “passionate” tendency, which continuously tries to pull the whole soul from the spirit and subject it to the desires of the body. Origen held that the lower faculty or part of the soul is the passionate one. With Plato, he affirms that this lower tendency contains two parts: concupiscible (ἐπιθυμία) and irascible (θυμός). He makes some modifications, however. He considers this part of the soul to have both bad and good tendencies, and not just bad ones. This element in Origen’s theory is extremely important, because as we shall see later, Evagrius, following his master, also wrote about good lust and anger. The biblical language describes this passionate tendency of the soul “the carnal mind” (cf. Rom. 8:6–7) or “carnality” because it is more susceptible to be attracted by the body than by the
2 I follow here the studies of Crouzel (1955), 364–85; Crouzel (1985), 123–28 and Dupuis (1967). 3 Plato, Phaedon 246B. See also Fustigière (1930), 385–97.
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spirit. It should be remembered, however, that this passionate tendency of the soul or “the carnal mind” is not employed only to evil functions, i.e., pulling the soul to sin, but also contains naturally good functions. The division that a man experiences after the original fall, about which St Paul wrote in the Letter to the Romans, according to Origen and Evagrius consists precisely in the fact that man’s νοῦς strives for the spirit while the passionate part of the soul tends to the body and its desires, thus exacerbating a painful state of division. Man, however, is guided by πνεῦμα, which as a gift of God does not belong in a strict sense to his person, but is a divine element in man. Πνεῦμα remains in some sense independent of other parts of a person, directs the soul to know God and to act in accordance with His commandments, and is also the source of moral consciousness. Spirit constantly fights against the body for control over the soul, in which the rational tendency seeks a closer relationship with it, while the passionate part seeks to follow the urges of the sensual body. Πνεῦμα remains present in every human being, and although the sins of the soul or body have no direct influence on it and cannot destroy it, yet they can bring it into a state of numbness and infirmity. Πνεῦμα cannot naturally influence a soul dominated by evil tendencies. It returns to its mission of guiding the soul when cleansed of the evil tendencies that make it addicted to the body. The center of the human person, according to Origen, is a soul that has both spiritual senses as sight, hearing, taste, as well as free will capable of experiencing freedom and responsibility. Originally the soul was a νοῦς or as a rational tendency, created in the image of God. After the fall, it received this lower, passionate tendency (part) and started its existence in a sensual body. When it is able to be guided by the spirit, then also the passionate part becomes more spiritual, but if it succumbs to the desires of the body, it is taken over by the passionate tendency, which obscures rationality, separates it from the spirit, and subordinates it to the desires of the body. The spirit in man, never identified with the Holy Spirit, is therefore the master and teacher of the soul in relation to God, and when the soul follows it, the entire human grows in knowing God and the moral life. The third element in Origen’s anthropology, the body, was not presented in his writings in an unambiguous manner. Origen distinguished very clearly between corporeality and the body. Corporeality means a mode of existence for him, is identified with the passionate part of the soul and means the submission of the soul to the body. However, when it comes to the body, two different concepts are present in the treatise On Principles. On the one hand, the Alexandrian starts from the just assumption that only God as Trinity is eternal and has no body, while the characteristic of creation is precisely existence in the body. From this it would appear that the soul as created has also some kind of body. Immediately, however, he adds that the soul itself has no body but is connected with the body forever.4 When he concludes the treatise On Principles, he returns to the subject once again, distinguishing between absolute incorporeality, that is, the lack of any body and relative incorporeality, in 4 Cf. Origen, De principiis I,6,4; II,2,2; IV,3,15.
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which there is no sensual body but there nevertheless exists a more subtle body. Only the Holy Trinity is absolutely bodiless, devoid of any form of body, while all created beings have a body, but this can be understood in two ways: as an ethereal, immaterial body and a sensual, material body. All noes posseses subtle, ethereal, intangible or “glittering” bodies before the fall, but after the original fall, only angels and redeemed people can rise to eternal life. Demons, beings that were the most distant from God in the original fall, and condemned people have ethereal, immaterial but “dark” bodies. People, on the other hand, are noes in which the ethereal body after the original fall became the sensual and material body we now know. However, this body is not something completely new because its essence remained intact, but only took on a new, temporal and material quality, and will regain its former state after the resurrection. This sensual body is the link between man and the entire material world, and although created by God as a result of the original fall of those beings for whom existence in the ethereal body was no longer possible, it is good by nature, because everything that God created was good (Gen 1). However, the body attracts the soul to concentrate on it and its needs and makes it difficult to contemplate the mysteries of God, that is, to fulfill the natural function for which it was created.
2. 2.1.
The Tripartite Anthropology of Evagrius Influence of Gregory Nazianzen
Although Evagrius bases many of his reflection on the doctrine of Origen,5 in the case of anthropology he leaves the teachings of his master. While Origen accepted the existence of three elements in man: πνεῦμα, ψυχή and σῶμα, for Evagrius πνεῦμα is replaced by νοῦς, a term Origen had reserved for the reasonable part of the soul. Further, following Origen and the Platonic tradition, he accepts that the ψυχή consists of two parts: a rational tendency (μέρος λογιστικόν) – in the terms of the Stoics, the ruling or managing (ἡγεμονικόν) faculty – and the irrational part or tendency (μέρος ἄλογον) also called passionate (παθητικόν). In turn, the passionate, irrational tendency is divided between the concupiscible part/tendency (μέρος ἐπιθυμητικόν) and irascible (μέρος θυμητικόν). According to Crouzel, Evagrius’ confusing πνεῦμα with νοῦς would distort Origen’s concept by deleting the subtle dialectic that characterizes it.6 If that is the case, then such a change would have a whole range of very important consequences and would raise many questions: what is the relation between νοῦς and μέρος λογιστικόν of the soul in the Evagrian system? Does νοῦς belong to the sphere of spirit and the same for him as πνεῦμα for Origen, or does it belong to the soul and is identical to its rational part? For if we assume that νοῦς belongs to the sphere of the soul, then Evagrius would practically accept the Platonic trichotomy (νοῦς, ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμητικόν), abandoning the reflections of Origen and somewhere
5 Cf. Murphy (1981), 256. 6 Cf. Crouzel (1961), 3–15.105–13; Crouzel (1985), 124.
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πνεῦμα disappearing completely.7 The issue, however, is more complicated than it might seem at first glance. In some of his texts, our author clearly states that νοῦς was created as purely spiritual, disembodied, known only to God and superior to all other parts of human nature, i.e. ψυχή and σῶμα.8 In this sense νοῦς, like πνεῦμα in Origen, would be a divine element in man and would be different from the soul.9 The soul itself would be composed of three parts: Since the rational soul is tripartite according to our wise teacher, when virtue arises in the rational part is called prudence, understanding and wisdom; when it arises in the concupiscible part is called chastity, love, and abstinence; and when it arises in the irascible part is called courage and perseverance, but when it penetrates the entire soul it is called justice.10 In this text, Evagrius, citing the teaching of his master,11 clearly distinguishes three parts in the soul (ψυχὴ λογική): rational (λογιστικόν), concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν), and irascible (θυμητικόν). A similar idea can be found in Practicus 86, where the Pontian monk develops his reflection on the operation of a rational soul in accordance with nature: The rational soul acts according to nature when its concupiscible part (epithumetikon) longs for virtue, and the irascible part (thumetikon) struggles on its behalf, and the rational part perceives the contemplation of beings.12 Virtue, then, is the soul acting in harmony with nature – an idea taken over by Evagrius directly from Plato or through Christian communities, where it was widely known, clearly confirmed by Vita Antonii of Athanasius.13 It is also worth emphasizing that according to Evagrius ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμητικόν are not inherently evil and have a very important role to play in the spiritual struggle to achieve impassibility. In turn, at Scholia in Psalmos 25,2, the Pontian monk interprets the kidneys and the heart symbolizing tripartite man: Kidneys are a symbol of the passionate part of the soul, that is, of irascibility and desire; but the heart is a symbol of the rational part.14 According to these texts, man would consist of three basic elements: νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα, where soul would be divided into two parts or tendencies: μέρος ἐπιθυμητικόν and μέρος θυμητικόν. If this is the case then Crouzel would be right in saying that Evagrius in his anthropology would replace πνεῦμα by νοῦς, thus distorting the
7 8 9 10 11
Cf. Ware – Dempf (1985), 158–63. Cf. Practicus 47; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 606; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. Cf. Practicus 21; 23; 28; 82, where Evagrius seems to distinguish νοῦς and ψυχή. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 89; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 680–82; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. Although Evagrius credits “my master”, which normally means Gregory Nazianzen, we know that this chapter is a quotation from a first century Peripatetic philosopher. See SCh 171,682. 12 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 86; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 676; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. 13 Cf. Vita Antonii 20. 14 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 25,2; (PG 12,1273).
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anthropology of Origen and considering νοῦς as a kind of divine element in man which exists beyond the soul. However, the other texts of the monk from Pontus seem to indicate that he has identified νοῦς with μέρος λογιστικόν. The Guillaumonts, undoubtedly the world’s most recognized authorities among the scholars of Evagrius’ writings are of such an opinion.15 In Scholia in Psalmos 107:3, the monk from Pontus compares symbolically the harp (psalterium) to the mind, while the zither to the soul: The symbol of the mind is the “psalter”, and the symbol of the soul is the “cithara”. And the mind “arises” when it rejects ignorance, and the soul “arises” when it rejecting vice. By “soul” I mean the passionate part of the soul, that is the irascible and desiring.16 In this text, Evagrius seems to perceive a man as composed of νοῦς and ψυχή, and the latter as having a part that is irascible and concupiscible, from which it would appear that in some sense he identified νοῦς with the rational part of the soul. The Pontian monk also mentions the distinction of the passionate part of the soul and the mind in Gnosticus 18, but since it did not survive in Greek, it does not add much to the understanding of his anthropological terminology.17 In Scholia in Proverbia, commenting on Prov. 11:17, Evagrius symbolically refers the term body (σῶμα) to the soul and “light” to the mind, based on Matt. 6:22: Christ, also, in the Gospels refers to the soul under the name of “body”: “The lamp of your body is your eye”, in the first place saying that the mind is a “lamp” – for it is a recipient of knowledge – and in the second place that the “body” is the the irascible and concupiscible part of the soul, which some call “irrational” and others call the “passionate” part.18 We find a similar teaching in Scholia in Proverbia 23,22. Evagrius comments on the exhortation of the inspired author to listen to the father who gave birth to you and not to offend your mother because of her old age, and interprets it allegorically: I heard on of the elders say that the soul is the mother of the mind. For it, through the virtues of praktikē, leads the mind into light. And he used to say that the “soul” is the passionate part of the soul, which is divided into the irascibility and concupiscibility. Through courage and moderation, he said, we possess wisdom and the knowledge of God. And courage and self-control are the virtues of irascibility and concupiscibility.19
15 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1971), t. I,105 “le logisticon n’est autre chose que l’intellect νοῦς, c’est-à-dire l’essence même de l’être raisonnable, créé intellect pur, incorporel, puis déchu et revêtu d’un corps”; see also Id. (1962), 37–39 and Nieścior (1997a), 153–57. 16 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 107,3; Pitra (1883–4), 220. 17 Gnosticus 18; SCh 356, 116–17. 18 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 11,17 (127); Géhin (1987), 224. A similar statement we find also in Scholia in Proverbia 21,23; Géhin (1987), 324. 19 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 23,22 (258); Géhin (1987), 352–54.
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This view of the structure of man is confirmed also by Practicus and Kephalaia Gnostica. The latter reads: The devils who fight against the intellect are called “birds”; those who trouble the thymos, “animals”; and those who agitate the epithymia, “bestial”.20 In the treatise Practicus, which survives in Greek, the monk from Pontus distinguishes between νοῦς and the irrational part or the irascible part of the soul (c. 66) specifying elsewhere that it is about θυμός and ἐπιθυμία (c. 71): The demonic songs set our desire in motion and cast the soul into shameful fantasies, but psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs (Eph. 5:19) call the mind to the constant remembrance of virtue, cooling our boiling irascibility and extinguishing our desires.21 As evidenced by the above fragments, Evagrius would call the soul really only the passionate part of the soul, that is concupiscible and irascible, while νοῦς would remain outside the structure of the soul. Similar conclusions, as we shall see later, seem to indicate his teaching about acedia, which he defines as the disease of the whole soul, which consists in simultaneously stimulating lust and anger towards the same object without the participation of a part of the rational soul. It is worth noting, however, that our author nowhere clearly identifies νοῦς with the rational part of the soul (μέρος λογιστικόν) and an identification only deduced by the Guillaumonts. If indeed only the passionate part of the soul is the soul proper, then there is no basis for identifying νοῦς with μέρος λογιστικόν as did the Guillaumonts. P. Géhin is conscious of the problem, and more cautious, stating that Evagrius used the term ψυχή in a double sense: in the broad sense to describe all three parts of the soul: νοῦς, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, and in the narrow sense to refer only to parts of ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμητικόν. In his opinion, Evagrius would take over from Plato the three-part division of the soul into νοῦς, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, a system completely alien to the Bible and familiar to, but not embraced by, Origen. Of these three parts of the soul, νοῦς of course is the most noble, having been created disembodied at the first creation, and being joined after the fall by θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, all of which as a complete soul merged with the body. The νοῦς is in charge of guiding the soul and was called to contemplate spiritual things and God himself.22 On the other hand, the passionate or irrational part of the soul is the seat of passion (πάθη) and the cause of its troubles. Even if it was created during the so-called second creation, it is not evil by nature and has an important role to fulfill: θυμός should have its anger directed against evil and demons, and ἐπιθυμία its desire toward God’s gifts.23 If this is indeed the case, the concept of Evagrius’ soul 20 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,53; A. Guillaumont (1958), 43; Ramelli (2015), 55. See also Kaphalaia Gnostica IV,73. 21 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 71; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971) t. II, 658; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. 22 Cf. Corrigan (2009), 37–52. 23 Cf. Géhin (1987), 34–35 “Prise en un sens large, la ψυχή désigne l’ensamble des trois parties; mais, lorsqu’elle est asociée au nous, elle a une signification restreinte et elle ne recouvre plus que les deux parties inférieurs, le thumos et l’épithumia”.
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would be exactly the same as Plato and Origen (νοῦς, ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμητικόν) and Crouzel would not be right accusing the Pontian monk of identifying νοῦς with πνεῦμα. Such a trichotomy would therefore only concern the soul, because Evagrius mainly concentrated on it in his ascetic writings, not the entire human being, as in Origen’s thought. In the texts of Evagrius, like those of Origen, we would deal with two intersecting trichotomies: one concerning the whole man and the other only his soul. Some elements of Origen’s trichotomic anthropology Evagrius adopted without any doubt, as evidenced by the fact of God’s creation of the body with which the νοῦς connects after the original fall. However, he does not refer anywhere to the category πνεῦμα, so typical of the anthropologies of St Paul’s and Origen. One can, of course, try to explain all this by silently slipping Origen’s anthropology into Evagrius’s, but it justification must rest on an e silentio argument that explains nothing. Let us remember that Evagrius nowhere explicitly identifies the rational part of the soul with πνεῦμα, and that such an identification is largely the deduction of the modern interpreters of his writings. The monk from Pontus defines νοῦς as the soul only after its failure, never before (KG III,28), although he also adds that when the soul knows its own nature, then it will not be a soul anymore, but a mind.24 From this it could be understood that the difference between the soul and the mind is the difference in the degree of awareness of one’s own nature and does not mean the emergence of some new ontic structure after the original downfall. Mind and soul are not two separate ontic states, but two different states of self-awareness of the same subject as to the nature of their origin and activity. Let’s return to these texts of the Pontian monk, in which he clearly distinguishes the rational part of the soul from the mind. Interestingly, both Guillaumont and Géhin do not explain why Evagrius introduced the λογιστικόν category at all, nor does he use the triad’s description of the soul: νοῦς, ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμητικόν but always λογιστικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμητικόν.25 In the treatise Practicus 89 the Pontian theologian very clearly states that the “rational soul” (ψυχὴ λογική) consists of three parts: rational (λογιστικόν), concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and irascible (θυμητικόν), He differentiates between the reasonableness of the whole soul and the rationality of its higher part, and introduces a separate category λογιστικόν.26 The task of the λογιστικόν, according to its nature, is to contemplate beings (Pr. 86), a function similar to that of the νοῦς. From this one would suppose that he did not identify λογιστικόν with νοῦς, because it would not make sense to introduce a separate category λογιστικόν if it had already been identified with νοῦς. Unless we assume that these are two phases of the mind – the νοῦς before the fall, and after the fall the λογιστικόν. However, such an understanding of Evagrius’ teaching seems unlikely, since he applies the term νοῦς to man after the fall. In his teaching about three parts of the soul, Evagrius, as he admits himself (Pr. 89), took over from his “wise master”, who was Gregory Nazianzen. One can therefore hope that Gregory’s thoughts will help us understand better the anthropology of the Pontian monk. Such
24 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula ad Melaniam 29; Frankenberg (1912), 619; Casiday (2006), 69. 25 See my essay deepening this aspect Misiarczyk (2013) 149–54. 26 Also Practicus 84 and 86.
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a solution was proposed already in the eighties by O’Laughlin.27 In his opinion, fourth century Christian reflection on man functioned within two systems: dichotomic with body and soul on the one hand and spirit on the other, and trichotomic with body, soul, and spirit, but associating the first two elements with the earthly world and the νοῦς or πνεῦμα to the celestial. Irenaeus of Lyon and Origen used both systems, but they were closer to the dichotomic model, because they treated the soul as the center of human personality and saw the fundamental division of the human person between soul and spirit. Crouzel, as we remember, defines Origen’s anthropology as trichotomic and sees the center of personality in the νοῦς, the higher part of the soul, which would also be the center of free will. The other two elements, though belonging to the human person, are not central: the spirit is the element of God in man, and the sensual body was created only after the original fall. It is true that Origen, even in his Commentary on Romans 2,9,28 refers to three parts of man, but he has in mind the whole person, not the trichotomic structure of the soul. Crouzel himself admits this, saying that “spirit is the divine element present in man […] as God’s gift is not, strictly speaking, a component of the personality of man, as to it cannot be attributed responsibility for sins; nevertheless, sins bring the spirit into a state of numbness, preventing it from acting on the soul”.29 The Guillaumonts and P. Géhin interpret Evagrius’ anthropology through the prism of Origen’s anthropology, in which νοῦς belongs to the human soul, constituting its rational part. However, since in Origen’s anthropology the spirit does not belong to the structure of the human being, O’Laughlin proposes to name Origen’s system as dichotomic, not a trichotomic system in which the νοῦς is clearly separated from the soul. In his opinion, Didymus the Blind, a contemporary of Evagrius, would be another example of such dichotomic anthropology. In his writings, we have on the one hand the body and soul together with its highest part νοῦς, and on the other the divine element, πνεῦμα.30 But Didymus also used the trichotomic scheme in which νοῦς is clearly separated from the soul and called by different names, including πνεῦμα. The dichotomic scheme would be older then trichotomic and more precise, while the trichotomic one, having emerged, as it is supposed, due to the devaluation of the soul, was more widespread but also less precise. The trichotomic scheme, although it contained various elements, was widespread in the pre-Christian and early Christian world, in texts by Plato (λογισμός, ψυχή and σῶμα),31 Philo of Alexandria (νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα),32 Justin Martyr (λόγος, ψυχή and σῶμα),33 Plutarch (νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα),34 Marcus Aurelius (νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα),35 Clement of Alexandria
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Cf. O’Laughlin (1988), 357–73; Id. (1987). Crouzel (1955), 367 quotes also this text. Crouzel (1985), 124. Cf. Didimus the Blind, Commentarium in Zacchariam 12,1–3. Plato, Timaeus 30b; Phaedo 247c; Leges 961d-e. Philo of Alexandria, Legum allegoriae 1,32. Justin Martyr, 2 Apologia 10. Plutarch, Moralia, De facie in orbe lunae 943A. Mark Aurelius, Meditationes 2,2,1; 3,16,1; 7,16,1–4; 8,56,1; 12,3,1.
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(νοῦς/πνεῦμα/ἡγεμονικόν ψυχή and σῶμα),36 Plotinus (νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα),37 and the Gnostics. Evagrius places himself within such a context but, unlike Didymus, does not oscillate between the dichotomic and trichotomic systems and is clearly in favor of the trichotomic, in which νοῦς is treated as the center of human personality separate from the soul and body. Νοῦς would not be for him only an inclination or ability of the soul, as in Origen, but the real center of the personality, and the soul and body would be its inferior modifications after the original fall. Evagrius, as he recalls (Pr. 89), took over this teaching from his master, Gregory of Nazianzus.38 Gregory, as most theologians at this time, based his anthropology largely on Christology of the 370s. Before the Apollinarian controversy in, however, writers described the mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God according to the scheme of Logossarx, mirroring an anthropological scheme of pneuma-sarx. Such a dichotomy is present in Gregory’s texts, but apart from this we find clearly defined in his texts a trichotomic anthropology.39 In Epistula 101,38 he even lists four non-corporeal elements present in man: ψυχή, λόγος, νοῦς and the Holy Spirit, where he clearly distinguishes between ψυχή and νοῦς. Νοῦς guides the soul and body and is the center of the human personality (Epistula 101,43). Gregory mentions other elements like λόγος and πνεῦμα, but πνεῦμα, although it is an aspect of human existence, is not a constitutive element of a human being, at least not like νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα. According to O’Laughlin, Gregory was probably the source of the anthropology of Evagrius, who on the one hand rejected the dichotomic scheme of Origen, and on the other filtered Gregory’s teaching by preferring his trichotomic views about the existence of three basic elements in man: νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα. He would clarify this system by referring directly to Plato or the Egyptian monastic tradition of John from Lycopolis. It is a fact that Evagrius does not refer to some categories of Gregory such as λόγος or πνεῦμα in his anthropology and he understands the spiritual struggle differently from Origen. In his system, the fundamental spiritual struggle takes place in νοῦς and in the soul insofar as it prevents νοῦς from fulfilling its natural function of contemplating God. The soul does not disturb the mind when its individual inclinations act according to their nature and because after the original fall it is very easy for the soul to leave this natural action, generating passions, it is necessary to purify it through ascetic practice. At the end of time, when the νοῦς is completely cleansed, it will return to its state of existence from before the fall, not in a non-corporeal form as before, but with a changed, purified soul and body.40
36 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 3,68,5 (PG 8,1113). 37 Plotinus, Enneades 1,1,4. 38 Following the majority of scholars, I assume that this “wise master” was Gregory Nazianzen – cf. A. and C. Guillaumont (1971), 680–89; Simonetti (1988), 287; Sinkewicz (2003), XVII–XIX; Cataldo (2007), 22–23; Brakke (2009), 2–3; Konstantinovsky (2009), 11–26; Corrigan (2009), 2; Stewart (2010), 321–27; Kalvesmaki (2012), 113–39. Recently Ramelli (2013), 117–37 proposed to see in that “master” of Evagrius rather Gregory Nyssen then Nazianzen. The proposal sounds quite convincing, but it still requires further research to determine the relationship between the teaching of Evagrius and Gregory Nyssen. 39 Gregory of Nazianzen, Oratio 32,9 (PG 45,9–105). 40 Cf. Corrigan (2013); Tabon (2013).
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O’Laughlin proposes, therefore, to acknowledge in Evagrius’ anthropology νοῦς as the center of the human person, separated from the soul, rejecting in this way the proposition of both the Guillaumonts and Géhin to identify νοῦς with the rational part of the soul (λογιστικόν). On the other hand, it seems that according to O’Laugholin νοῦς would not be treated by the Pontian monk as an image of God in man, replacing πνεῦμα with Origen’s anthropology. Νοῦς in the anthropology of Evagrius would not be a part of the soul as in the anthropology of Plato or Origen, nor would it be God’s element in man, like πνεῦμα in both the Origenian and biblical system. However, relationship between νοῦς and πνεῦμα remains unclear in evagrian antropology as well as the question why he introduced the term μέρος λογιστικόν of the soul. In any case, although Evagrius’ teaching in this regard is far from clear and extremely difficult to interpret, it seems that O’Laughlin’s conclusions about the influence of Gregory Nazianzen’s anthropology and the need to clearly distinguish νοῦς from μέρος λογιστικόν are not without foundations and can become a good starting point for further research on the anthropology of the Pontian monk.41 2.2.
Double Trichotomy Of Evagrius
From what has been said above, an image of the anthropology of Evagrius emerges, in which, as in the case of Origen, two trichotomies form: the three elements in a man and the three parts (inclinations) of the soul. It is possible, therefore, that the anthropological scheme itself, even if it contains clearly different elements, was taken by our monk directly from his master from Alexandria or through the intermediation of the Cappadocian Fathers. Now, Origen saw the human as composed of three elements: πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα and the soul consisting of μέρος λογικόν (otherwise ἡγεμονικόν) which he identified with νοῦς and μέρος ἄλογον (otherwise παθητικόν) in which he also distinguished two parts (or inclinations) μέρος ἐπιθυμητικόν and μέρος θυμητικόν. The soul therefore has three basic parts/inclinations: rational (νοῦς), concupiscible (ἐπιθυμία) and irascible (θυμός). The center of the human person in such a concept is the soul, and in it the rational part/inclination of νοῦς. The Guillaumonts and Géhin understand the anthropology of Evagrius through the prism of Origen’s anthropology, identifying νοῦς with μέρος λογιστικόν. According to O’Laughlin, however, Evagrius perceived man as composed of three elements: νοῦς, ψυχή and σῶμα. The Pontian monk would not replace, however, Origenian πνεῦμα by νοῦς. For Origen, πνεῦμα is a divine element in man and does not belong to the center of his personal structure, whereas for Evagrius νοῦς is also the “body” of the Father and the center of man. This is not just a matter of different terminology, because the Pontian monk does not define νοῦς as the divine element in man as πνεῦμα is in Origen’s system, but he also understands the role of the mind in a different way. The center of the human personality in such a concept is not a soul, but just a νοῦς and in it the hardest spiritual battle takes place. 41 See my further research on this subject Misiarczyk (2013), 149–54.
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c h ap t er i i The scheme of Origen’s anthropology πνεῦμα
ψυχή
μέρος λογικόν (ἡγεμονικόν) = νοῦς
νοῦς
σῶμα
μέρος ἄλογον (παθητικόν)
μέρος ἐπιθυμητικόν
μέρος θυμητικόν
The scheme of Evagrius’ anthropology ψυχή
νοῦς
μέρος λογικόν (ἡγεμονικόν)
μέρος λογιστικόν
σῶμα
μέρος ἄλογον (παθητικόν)
μέρος ἐπιθυμητικόν
μέρος θυμητικόν
The monk from Pontus, referring to Gen. 1:26ff, defines νοῦς as “God’s likeness”, which he understands as a certain ability to have a personal relationship with one’s Creator. It is not an ordinary reason, but the seat of a personal being and the capacity for a personal relationship with God and other people. The nous is inherently open to God and capax Dei, i.e. capable of knowing God, understood not so much as rational knowledge but as contemplation.42 This scheme of Evagrius’ trichotomic anthropology could be further complemented by the trichotomic scheme of the soul, very clearly confirmed, as we have seen, in his texts. Hence man, according to the Pontian monk, would consist of νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα and his ψυχή also of the following three parts/inclinations: rational (λογιστικόν), concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and irascible (θυμητικόν). Schematically, both concepts could be presented as follows: In the state from before the fall, νοῦς existed in the form of a perfect, disembodied and spiritual being. It is not clear, however, how to interpret these terms. Does bodiless
42 Cf. Bunge (1987), 11.
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νοῦς mean for Evagrius absolute lack of any body? This seems unlikely, because then it would be somehow equal to the disembodied God. The disembodied refer to an absence of the present sensual body, thus allowing the existence of the body Origen described as ethereal. Our monk does not specify, but since he relies in many points of his teaching on Origen, we can presume that also here incorporeality means rather the lack of a sensual body. Commenting on the Book of Proverbs, Evagrius states: If the “works” of God are “righteous and holy” and if nous is also one of His works, it means that nous was created “righteous and holy” by the Lord.43 The basic purpose of its existence was the contemplation of God. This purely noetic world, as we saw earlier, had changed as a result of movement, the decision of νοῦς. When it separated itself from unity with the divine Monad, lost its true spiritual knowledge and fell into ignorance, and lost its inner unity and experienced breakdown, the state of its existence consequently changed. In Epistula ad Melaniam we find confirmation of this idea: As we said of the mind, it is one in nature, person and rank. Falling at some point from its former rank through its free will, it was called a soul. And it descended again and was named a body. But at some point there will be a time when the body, soul and mind – because of differences of their wills – will [become] this. Since their differences of will and movement will at some point pass away, it will rise to its former creation: its nature and person and name will be one, which God knows.44 By its own fault, the mind lost the original simplicity of existence and became a being composed of an element that was first psychic and then somatic. The above text seems to suggest a double separation of the mind from the original oneness with God. After the first fall, it was called a soul, and after the second it was called a body. Do these words suggest two falls? Evagrius seems to indicate that the fall of the mind had two steps. When the mind departed from oneness with the Monad through the desire for independent existence, it fell into the rank of psychic existence (it became a soul), but the soul cannot by its nature exist without a body, hence it was necessary to descend to an even lower degree of existence, namely somatic. It happened thanks to the intervention of God, who through the so-called second creation brought into existence the angelic, demonic and human realms, and created a material and sensual world for the mankind. When the mind fell out of its original state, according to Origen, it became cold and heavy (De principiis 2,8,3), but according to Evagrius it expanded (KG II,32).45 However, also in this state it remained a spiritual being, infinite and known only to God (Pr. 47). When the mind in its fall came to the rank of πρακτική then it expanded to the point that it also became a soul, but Evagrius
43 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 21,8; Géhin (1987), 318. 44 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula ad Melaniam 26; Frankenberg (1912), 616; Casiday (2006), 69. See also Kephalaia Gnostica III,42 and De principiis II,8,3 of Origen. 45 Cf. O’Laughlin (1988), 365.
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did not identify it with the rational part of the soul as Origen. This is confirmed by the treatise Kephalaia Gnostica: A soul is an intellect that, in its carelessness, has fallen from Unity and, due to its lack of vigilance, has descended to the order of praktikē.46 The rank of πρακτική is typical of the existence of the soul and is naturally alien to the mind, but such discipline becomes a necessity to the ensouled mind after the original fall. The soul “grows” out of the mind, it is its addition or enlargement, but, according to Evagrius, mind remains still separated from the soul. The soul is disembodied, but again this incorporeality should probably be related to the sensual body: “There is nothing among incorporeal realities that is in power in bodies; for our soul is incorporeal”.47 The soul, especially its passionate part, is, however, the subject of feelings, desires and passions, from which it should constantly purify itself to submit to the mind’s direction. In a full way this surrender will take place in the next world, when the mind and purified soul with it will return to God: Just as fire in its power pervades its body, so will also the intellect in its power pervade the soul, when the whole of it will be mingled with the light of the Holy Trinity.48 It is worth emphasizing here again the typically Christian perspective of the process of purification of mind and soul, which will take place in the light of the Holy Trinity and not in some Monad understood philosophically. In connection with this two-stage abandonment of the mind from unity with God, its return (or resurrection in another way) will concern not only the mind but also the new elements, that is, the body and the soul. Resurrection of the body will be a transition from an inferior quality to a higher quality of bodily existence (KG V,19), resurrection of the soul – a transition from the ascetic practice to a state of impassibility (KG V,22), and the resurrection of the mind – the transition from ignorance to true gnosis (KG V,25). What remains, however, is the discussed question of identifying the rational part of the soul with νοῦς proposed by Géhin and the Guillaumonts, which is also not without foundation. In fact, in Practicus 84, Evagrius says: The end of the practical life is love, of knowledge theology; they have their respective beginnings in faith and natural contemplation. Those demons that seize hold of the passionate part of the soul are said to be opposed to the practical life, in turn, those that cause great vexation to the rational part are called enemies of all truth and adversaries of contemplation.49 Similarly in the previously quoted Practicus 86 our monk emphasized that the rational part of the soul acts according to its nature when it engages in the contemplation of
46 47 48 49
Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,28; A. Guillaumont (1958), 109; Ramelli (2015), 156. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,45; A. Guillaumont (1958), 39; Ramelli (2015), 49. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,29; A. Guillaumont (1958), 73; Ramelli (2015), 108. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 84; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), t. II, 674; Sinkewicz (2003), 111.
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beings. Well, contemplation (θεωρία) or contemplation of beings (θεωρία τῶν γεγόντων) is the basic task of the mind as well, hence one could conclude that Evagrius identified νοῦς with the rational part of the soul. The only problem is that, as we have written before, Evagrius himself does not make such an identification anywhere and it remains still difficult to answer the question of why he introduced the category of λογιστικόν at all. The fact is that according to his spiritual teaching, as we shall further see, the demons attack essentially the passionate part of the soul, not the mind directly, which could indicate that Evagrius understood by the term “soul”, just the passionate part, whereas νοῦς would identify with its rational part. However, even this argument is not entirely convincing because passionate thoughts such as vanity and pride can directly attack the mind, as actually happened during its original fall, the cause of which, as we remember, was the vanity of the mind. As we shall see further, other passionate thoughts attack the mind through the passionate part of the soul, while others, like vanity and pride, attack its rational part directly, but it is difficult to deduce from this that this part of the soul should be identified with the mind. O’Laughlin’s suggestion to distinguish νοῦς from the whole soul also does not explain why Evagrius introduced the category μέρος λογιστικόν. It seems that his anthropology is most probably a combination of two systems of two double trichotomies: 1) the biblical and Origenian double trichotomy regarding the whole man with σῶμα, ψυχή and πνεῦμα in which according to Plato and Origen ψυχή has three parts (or inclinations): νοῦς, θυμητικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν; 2) the biblical and Origen’s double trichotomy regarding the whole man with σῶμα, ψυχή and πνεῦμα where ψυχή according to Gregory Nazianzen has three parts (or inclinations): λογιστικόν (rational), θυμητικόν (irascible) and ἐπιθυμητικόν (concupiscible). It seems that νοῦς in Evagrian anthropology cannot be identified either with the rational part of the soul (λογιστικόν) or treated as a replacement of πνεῦμα. At this moment it is very difficult to decide whether this is an effect of Evagrius’ unconscious use of the two above-mentioned double trichotomies or an intentional and badly masked adaptation of these old concepts to his vision of man and Christian ascetics. As a result we have in Evagrius’ anthropology the trichotomy of the whole man: σῶμα, ψυχή and νοῦς and the trichotomy of ψυχή: λογιστικόν (rational), θυμητικόν (irascible) and ἐπιθυμητικόν (concupiscible).50 The mind after the fall has expanded to the level of soul and bodily existence, yet it still retains its spiritual nature and a kind of independence. So, if it follows its spiritual nature, it enters the angelic world, and if it succumbs to the impulses of the body then it exposes itself to the attacks of demons: The intellect, if it goes straight along its own path, meets the holy powers, whereas if (it goes along the path) of the instrument of the soul, it will run into the demons.51 Thus, Evagrius encourages monks to undertake an ascetic practice that purifies the passionate part of the soul and enables the mind to return to the path of its natural action, that is, contemplation of the spiritual reality of the world and God Himself.
50 See Misiarczyk (2013), 149–54. 51 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,48; A. Guillaumont (1958), 81; Ramelli (2015), 119.
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The third element in Evagrian anthropology is the body created by God after the original fall. Our author describes it as ὄργανον of the soul and an element of God’s providential action towards λογικοί, who became human beings: Souls of sinners who cling to dust, consider what is earthly; but the souls of the righteous either stay in bodies or are attached to them because of the economy of God.52 The body, although created secondarily, i.e., as God’s answer to the fall of the mind during the so-called second creation, is not bad at all as Manichaeans or Gnostics belived.53 In Kephalaia Gnostica we find very clear anti-Manichean and anti-Gnostic statements: To those who blaspheme against the Creator and speak ill of this mortal body of our soul, who will show them the grace that they have received, while they are subject to passions, to have been joined to such an instrument? But to witness in favor of my words are those who in visions of dreams are scared by demons, and when they awake they take refuge as among angels, when the mortal body suddenly awakes.54 The bodily element in the human nature is not a curse, but a grace and a necessity for living in the sensual world. Were the soul deprived of the body, it would not see material and sensual things.55 In Epistula 29, he adds that the body reveals the soul of the carnal world and its rationes through its physical movements.56 The body is thus a tool enabling the soul to get to know the sensual world and to contemplate the spiritual reasons for its existence. Fighting with passions is not about wanting to leave or destroy the body, but overcoming them with its help. Evagrius is far from the Manicheans’ contempt for the body; rather he sees its value in the process of returning the mind to its original unity with God. A true Christian ascetic practice cannot, in his opinion, take place at the expense of the body or be motivated by contempt for it. Our monk mocks that type of attitude: The one who is liable to passions and prays that his departure may occur soon is similar to a man who is ill and asks the joiner to break up his bed soon.57 Through the body, bodily passions arise in the soul, and also through the body they should be overcome. In Practicus 15 it is clearly stated that burning lusts extinguish fasting, hardships and anchoritism, that is, typically physical practices, and in Practicus 49 he adds that “those things which heal the passionate part of the soul require also the body to put them into practice”.58 However, the body itself, although naturally
Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 118,25; (PG 12,1591). Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 112; Bunge (1986), 34; Nieścior (1996b), 115–36. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,60; A. Guillaumont (1958), 163; Ramelli (2015), 231. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,62; A. Guillaumont (1958), 163. See also Scholia in Proverbia 20,12; Géhin (1987), 310. 56 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 29,1; Frankenberg (1912), 586. 57 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,76; A. Guillaumont (1958), 269; Ramelli (2015), 238. 58 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 49; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 610–12; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. 52 53 54 55
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good, is not an image of God: “all fleshly beings are vanity, for bodiless nature has been created in the image of God”.59 The soul was “made”, and the body just “shaped” (Scholia in Psalmos 118,73), which from the beginning was subject to corruption and in its present form will be eventually destroyed (Ep. 48). Rational beings arose as spiritual beings and then were united with the body as a result of the judgment and providence of God, who after the fall gave them appropriate bodies and worlds depending on the degree of this fall. The bodies of rational beings differ in the proportion of the four material elements contained in them: earth, water, fire and air. The same is true in the structure of a man: in the mind there is the dominance of air, in the irascible part of the soul the dominance of fire, in the concupiscible part, that of water, while in the body, that of earth.60 However, Evagrius does not explain whether before the fall these rational beings had no body at all or did not have it in its present form. He probably assumes Origen’s theory of ethereal bodies, which we can discover from his description of the future state of existence of rational beings. After the resurrection, the present sensuous human bodies will become spiritual, “gnostic” bodies (KG III,25), similar to the bodies of angels, in which the four elements still remain, but with a predominance of fire and νοῦς, which will make them lighter than the present ones.61 The concept of this spiritual or “gnostic” body of Evagrius is very close, if not identical, to the idea of ethereal bodies which, according to Origen, all rational beings had at the beginning of creation. After the passing of the last world, the present sensual body will be destroyed and a qualitatively new spiritual body will arise, which will retain the nature of the body but contain in other proportions these four component factors. The fragments of Kephalaia Gnostica remain problematic in this context. Evagrius seems to suggest the complete destruction of all corporeality in the future world: “For all those who have been joined to a (mortal) body will also necessarily be liberated”,62 or in another fragment: “The final Judgment will not show the transformation of bodies, but it will reveal their elimination”.63 As we have seen earlier, however, everything indicates that he meant the destruction of the present form of the sensual body that rational beings were endowed with and not the body as such at all.64
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Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 38,6; (PG 12,1389). Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica I,22,68; II,51; III,68. See A. Guillaumont (1962), 114. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica I,58, A. Guillaumont (1958), 45; Ramelli (2015), 58. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,77, A. Guillaumont (1958), 91; Ramelli (2015), 135. Cf. Nieścior (1997b), 143.
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C ha pt er III
Spiritual Doctrine
Man’s life in the present world is thus marked by a constant tension as the mind is engaged in a constant spiritual struggle for domination over the soul and the body. It cannot get rid of them completely, but it can and should strive to purify them so that they do not interfere with the restoration of the basic purpose of its existence, i.e. contemplation of God. The internal harmony which a logikoi experienced as a stable state before the fall disappeared after the fall, leaving him in a state of permanent internal disintegration. The return to unity with God and inner human harmony is accomplished through the spiritual struggle and the hardships of asceticism, which Evagrius calls πρακτική and γνωστική.1 In the Letter to Anatolius 9, a prefatory letter to the Practicus treatise, Evagrius writes: And so concerning the holy habit and the teaching of the elders, let these things we have said [suffice]. But concerning the life of the ascetic and the knower I now propose to describe in detail not [merely] what I have heard or seen, but what I have also been taught by [the elders] to say to others. I have compactly divided ascetical matters into a hundred chapters, and matters of knowledge into fifty, plus six hundred. And some things I have concealed and shadowed over, so that “we do not throw holy things to dogs nor cast pearls before swine” (Matt. 7:6). But this will be clear to those who have embarked on the same quest.2 The Pontian theologian thus divides the spiritual life into two main parts: the ascetic practice (πρακτική) and the gnostic stage (γνωστική). The first is discussed in one hundred centuries, which corresponds to the Practicus, but spiritual knowledge in the fifty chapters of the Gnosticus and the six hundred of the Kephalaia Gnostica. The two treatises correspond to the two parts of γνωστική: φυσική and θεολογική: “Christianity is the teaching of our Savior Christ consisting of asctical practice, the contemplation of nature (fusikes), and theology (theologikes)”.3 We can find a similar idea in Epistula fidei 4: For he calls ‘flesh and blood’ everything to do with the holy secret of his dwelling [among us], and disclosed that teaching (consisting of ascetical, physical and
1 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 38–63; Bunge (1996b, 59–72; Nieścior (1997b), 105–13; Konstantinovsky (2016), 128–53. 2 Evagrius Ponticus Epistula ad Anatolum (Prologus) 9; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), t. II, 492–94; Sinkewicz (2003), 96. See also Young (2016), 128–53. 3 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 1; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), t. II, 498; Sinkewicz (2003), 97.
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theological elements) by which the soul is nourished and prepared for the contemplation of ultimate realities.4 The physics that Evagrius refers to is not empirical knowledge of the material world; rather, he means knowledge of the spiritual reasons of the created world. And theology is not rational reflection on the mysteries of God, but mystical knowledge of God. This terminology and its taxonomical division is not Evagrius’s invention; he takes it from the ancient philosophical tradition. The bipartite/tripartite division has already been seen in the previous chapter’s account of the soul. It was used in antiquity to describe other realities of human life. Plato used it to divide types of political thought,5 and Aristotle, like the Stoics, applied it to the division of philosophy.6 Although in Aristotle we also find a three-part division into θεωρητική, πρακτική and ποιητική.7 The echoes of these thoughts can be found in Theophrastus, Peripatetics, and Plutarch, who was convinced, citing the opinions of Aristotle, that a perfect man should be simultaneously θεωρητικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς τῶν ὄντων, although on the other hand he claimed that philosophy is divided into three parts: φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν.8 There are many indications that the three-part division came from the Stoics, as confirmed by one of Seneca’s letters.9 In the Christian world, where many treated Christianity as a kind of philosophy, there was a modification of both the meaning of the terms themselves and the context of their use. While in the pagan world these divisions were the classifications of the sciences of human life, with Origen, who also influenced Evagrius, they become the stages man in restoring his pre-lapsarian state.10
1.
The Ascetic Practice (πρακτική)
Evagrius defines πρακτική as a method of purifying the unreasonable, passionate part (inclination) of the soul, a process that is necessary to achieve a state of impassibility, which in turn is a necessary condition for the return to spiritual gnosis of the world and God.11 Although the monk from Pontus gives the term πρακτική
4 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula fidei 4; Petrucco (1983), 94; Casiday (2006), 50; Kalvesmaki (2012). 5 Cf. Plato, Politica 258e–259c. 6 Cf. Aristotle, De anima III,10. Although in Aristotle we also find a three-part division into θεωρητική, πρακτική and ποιητική. 7 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica e,1,1025b. 8 Cf. Diels (1929), 273. 9 Seneca, Epistula ad Lucillum 89,9 “Philosophiae tres partes esse dixerunt et maximi et plurimi auctores: moralem, naturalem et rationalem”. 10 Origen, Libri X Canticum Canticorum, Prologus; Bresard – Crouzel – Borret (1991), 75. The text has been preserved only in the Latin translation of Rufinus. Origen at the beginning quotes the three-part Greek division of teachings and applies it to Christian spiritual doctrine: “Generales disciplinae quibus ad rerum scientiam pervenitur tres sunt, quas Graeci ethicam, physicam, epopticen appellaverunt; has nos dicere possumus moralem, naturalem, inspectivam”. 11 See Brakke (2013).
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a specific meaning, it nevertheless fits a long history of usage helps us to better see what nuance it had for him. The oldest opinion is found in Plato, who divided political knowledge into πρακτική ἐπιστήμη and γνωστικὴ ἐπιστήμη. The first concerned manual activity (χειροτεχνική), for example a craftsman, the other a greater effort of thought and spirit which took place, for example, during governance (Politics 258e–259c). The great philosopher, therefore, distinguished between πρακτικοί dealing with art or manual processing of materials, and γνωστικοί or philosophers who seek and contemplate the truth.12 Aristotle replaces πρακτικός with θεωρητικός and distinguishes between νοῦς πρακτικός and νοῦς θεωρητικός, where the practical mind means practical human activity, and the theoretical mind, theoretical reflection. Applying this distinction to philosophy, he perceives the goal of practical philosophy in practical and effective action, and the theoretical in seeking the truth.13 Further, these two different ways of understanding philosophy also lead to two different styles of life: βίος πρακτικός refers to all activities including political, while βίος θεωρητικός concerns the contemplation of the truth. Keeping in mind that Aristotle also divided human acitivity into three spheres, let us note that the term πρακτικός had for him a broader meaning than it did for Plato, including as it did all human activity, including political. Aristotle’s understanding of the term was adopted by the Stoics, confirmed by Ammonius and Chrysippus. According to Ammonius, practical action (τὸ πρακτικόν) concerns human affairs and aims at the well-being of human life, and political action attempts to implement it, while theoretical action (τὸ θεωρητικόν) concerns divine matters.14 Chrysippus also combines the life of a virtuous man with social activity, otherwise known as practical (πρακτικός). The wise man, in his opinion should be at the same time capable of both active (πρακτικός) and contemplative θεωρητικός) life, in short the λογικός.15 A common feature of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics is the application of the term πρακτικός to non-religious activity. The first author to apply πρακτικός to a man’s religious life was Philo of Alexandria. He also knew, of course its pagan use when he distinguished between the arts of praktike such as architecture or manual art, and the arts of theoria such as geometry or astronomy.16 Apart from this, however, using the terminology of Aristotle, he is the first to take the life o praktikos into the ascetic life which, without neglecting human affairs, concentrates on seeking the truth and the experience of God.17 Christian authors adopted both the understanding of Aristotelian and Stoic πρακτική and Philo’s application of the term to the religious and moral life. Origen is the earliest attested Christian author to distinguish between πρακτικός, that is, one who leads a vita activa, and θεωρητικός, who leads a vita contemplativa. The symbols of these two ways of life are the evangelical Martha and Mary. For Origen, however, both stages are not complementary at the same level, 12 13 14 15 16 17
Cf. Plato, Respublika V,476, a-b. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica a,1. Cf. Arnim (1964), t. I, 19. Cf. Arnim (1964), t. III, 160. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, Legum Allegoriae I,57–58; Mondesert (1962), 70–71. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, De praemiis et poenis 51and De vita contemplativa 1.
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because πρακτικός has a more moral character, also called “righteousness of action”, and is a preliminary stage to θεωρητικός, contemplative life (θεωρία). Though he uses the terms θεωρητικός and γνωστικός (In Joh. VI,19), and the meaning he gives to πρακτικός is close to Evagrius’s, the Guillaumonts rightly emphasize that, contrary to what some scholars claim, in the writings of Origen lack the Evagrian scheme πρακτική, φυσική, θεολογική.18 Cappadocian Fathers, especially Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, inspired by Origen, as well as by Greek philosophers, distinguished between φιλοσοφία πρακτική and φιλοσοφία θεωρητική or θεωρία, but both groups of terms refer to the religious life.19 In the context of the intense development of the monastic life at that time, they reserve the terms vita activa (πρακτικός) for the activities of clergy, especially bishops directing the Church, and vita contemplativa (φιλόσοφος, θεωρητικός) for monastic, eremitic life. So πρακτικοί are those who in serving others accept various duties, such as presbyters and bishops exercising sacred ordinances, while θεωρητικοί are monks – hermits who seek hesychia and devote themselves to contemplation. In sum, for Plato πρακτική meant manual activity, for Aristotle effective action, for the Stoics social and political activity, for Philo moral and religious life oriented to the experience of God, for Origen “righteousness of action” as a prerequisite for the contemplation of God, and for Gregory Nazianzen the active life of clergy in the service of others, in contrast to the life of the contemplative monks. Evagrius on the other hand gives it a completely new meaning. First of all, the πρακτικός is for him a monk, a hermit who has departed not only from the world of current human affairs but also from active functions in the Church. Second, drawing from Philo and Origen the belief that πρακτική is the first stage of spiritual life, he applies the term to the anchorite’s ascetic life and clearly defines its goal, which is ἀπάθεια. Evagrius sees the entire spiritual life of the hermit monk as the following stages: πρακτική (ascetic practice), to achieve impassibility (ἀπάθεια), a necessary condition for the second stage, γνωστική, which is itself split into two: φυσική (natural contemplation) and θεολογική (contemplation of God). Our author very often combines both of these stages, πρακτική and γνωστική into one continuous process of spiritual growth: “A person accomplished in the gnostic life and one accomplished in the practical life met each other; between the two of them stood the Lord”.20 Ascetic practice with spiritual knowledge or spiritual contemplation of the created world and of God Himself is for Evagrius the essence of the ascetic and spiritual life of the anchorite, and in large sense also of every human being. The monk of Pontus most often uses the form ἡ πρακτική, less often he uses the phrase typical of Origen τὸ πρακτικόν,21 although there are also in his texts variants
18 Authors such as Bousset, Viller, Daniélou and Rahner referred to the excerpt from Selecta in Psalmos, which after more detailed research turned out to be the text of Evagrius – cf. C. et A. Guillaumont (1971), t. II, 45. 19 Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Elogium Bazylii 62,4–5; Boulenger (1936), 186–87; Gregory Nazianzen, De vita sua, (PG 37,1047–52). 20 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad Monachos 121; Greßmann (1939), 152–65, here 163; Sinkewicz (2003), 130. See also Capita Cognoscitiva 32–33; Muyldermans (1931), Evagriana 41; Sinkewicz (2003), 214. 21 Cf. Practicus 1; 60; 78; 81; 84; 87.
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such as ψυχή πρακτική, ἀνὴρ πρακτικός, and πρακτικαὶ ἀρεταί.22 Πρακτική and its cognates poses considerable translational difficulties because, translated colloquially as “active life”, it would basically deny the Evagrian idea of the lifestyle of monks aiming at contemplative life, not vita activa. Modern translators of Evagrius’ works reflect it through “ascetic practice”, while ancient Syriac translations adopted the term pulhana, a term that implied “practicing the commandments”,23 not too far from Evagrius’ intention. The Pontian theologian himself emphasized: Charity is the offspring of apatheia; apatheia is the flower of the ascetical life (praktike). The ascetical life is constituted by keeping the commandments, and these are watched over by the fear of God, which is begotten by right belief. Belief is an indwelling good which exists naturally even in those who have not yet believed in God.24 The whole path of spiritual growth is presented by Evagrius as a combination of keeping the commandments and practicing different virtues. The beginning of this process is faith hidden within the human being and present even in non-believers (Pr. 81), strengthened by the fear of God, and the temperance. Temperance makes perseverance and hope unshakable and from them gives birth to impassibility, whose daughter is love. Love is the gate to natural knowledge (φυσική) and knowledge of God (θεολογική), which gives ultimate happiness. If we remember that the goal of ascetic practice is to achieve impassibility, it is easy to see that it is identified with living the virtues of faith, fear of God, temperance, perseverance and hope. For the role of practicing the virtues in the spiritual life, the Pontian monk follows his predecessors, especially Clement of Alexandria, in whose works we find a similar terminology, and the Cappadocian Fathers.25 Evagrius, however, gives to the term πρακτική not only the new meanings already mentioned, but a new position in the spiritual journey. The practice of virtues, although extremely important in the life of the hermit, is only a preliminary stage to a deeper spiritual life, because it leads only to hesychia and not to impassibility, which is a condition for natural contemplation and contemplation of God. Only πρακτική, however, whose essence is the fight of anchorites against passionate thoughts (λογισμοί), leads to impassibility. 1.1.
Πρακτική as the Struggle with λογισμοί
Evagrius defines πρακτική as “a spiritual method purifying the passionate part of the soul”.26 The passionate part of the soul, brought upon the nous after the fall, causes the most difficulty in its return to know God. Its purification leads the passionate part of the soul to more easily submit to the rational part, and the entire soul back
22 23 24 25 26
Cf. Sententiae ad Monachos 31,64,70, 118, 132; Greßmann (1913), 155–64 passim. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica I,13; IV,40; V,8; VI,15,49. Cf. Practicus 1; 32; 66; 78; 84; 87. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 81; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 670; Sinkewicz (2003), 110. Cf. Stromateis, II,31,1. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 78; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 666; Sinkewicz (2003), 110.
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to the leadership of the νοῦς. Hence, Evagrius emphasizes that the practiced one is the one who has brought the passionate part of his soul to impassibility. In the present state of life man cannot completely get rid of this passionate part of his soul, but he can make it dispassionate through ascetic practice. The author of Practicus emphasizes that fighting with thoughts is a specific kind of spiritual fight reserved for anchorite monks: The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks they do so especially through thoughts (logismoi), for they are deprived of the objects because of the solitude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin in thought than in action, so is the warfare in thought more difficult than that which is conducted through objects.27 The monk who withdraws from the world and active life is less susceptible to being tempted by things or attitudes of people than do those who are living in a marriage or dealing with the affairs of the world. Thanks to the state of anchoritism, loneliness, and the practice of the virtues we described above, no doubt he experienced a greater state of internal peace (hesychia) than cenobites or people living in the world. However, it would be an illusion to think that he is completely free from spiritual warfare, because the state of hesychia does not yet mean a state of impassibility. According to Evagrius, passionate thoughts, which are often memories or rappresentation of things or people seen in their previous life, fight with the anchorite, and this fight is definitely more difficult than the one that struggles directly with worldly things. Cenobites lead the spiritual struggle in the field of things and people: The demons fight directly against anchorites; but in the case of those who practise virtue in monasteries or in communities they equip the most negligent among the brethren with their weapons. Now this second warfare is much lighter then the first.28 So according to our author πρακτική is a struggle with passionate thoughts or desires that are essentially proper to anchorites living alone, not to cenobites or lay people tempted more by things or other people. The fight with thoughts is definitely more difficult than the one in the field of things. It is in this context that Evagrius uses the category of λογισμοί, which deviates from the common understanding of this term before him. Let’s try to take a closer look at the meaning that our author gave it. 1.1.1.
Origin and Meaning of the Term λογισμοί.
Although the Pontian theologian accepts the existence of both good and bad thoughts in a human being,29 his usage of the term λογισμοί in the context of πρακτική, usually has a pejorative meaning as passionate thoughts, bad thoughts inspired by demons
27 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 48; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 608; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. 28 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 5; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 504; Sinkewicz (2003), 97. 29 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 7; Sinkewicz (2003), 157–58.
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or even identified with demons which the anchorite should fight in order to achieve a state of impassibility. In Kephalaia Gnostica he considers evil only those thoughts that attack the passionate part of the soul and are an obstacle to God’s gnosis: Not all thoughts hinder it from knowing God, but those that attack it from the irascible and the concupiscible/appetitive (parts of the soul), which assail it (going) against what properly belongs to (human) nature.30 In the treatise De malignis cogitationibus 7 he mentions three types of λογισμοί: angelic, human, and demonic, while in Practicus 80 he sees thoughts as being inspired by angels and thoughts being inspired by demons. And although in one of his texts the Pontian monk distinguishes between the thoughts and demons that inspire them, in others he identifies them directly with demons; in the case of the term λογισμοί, he often omits the precise term “demonic thought”, and uses the term “thought” interchangeably with “demon”.31 Such pejorative and quasi-personal (demons) understanding of the term λογισμοί will be widely accepted merely under the influence of Evagrius in all subsequent Greek Christian ascetic literature repalced in Latin tradition thanks to Cassian by vitum. In turn, in other fragments we find that the thoughts are only carriers of the demons’ actions: If one of the monks should wish to acquire experience with the cruel demons and become familiar with their skills, let him observe the thoughts and let him note their intensity and their relaxation, their interrelationships, their occasions, which of the demons do this or that particular thing, what sort of demon follows upon another and which does not follow another.32 The Pontian monk bases his views here on the two principles that will later become the inheritance of the spiritual doctrine of all Christianity: firstly, demons cannot directly influence the human soul as God does but only through the different “carriers” of which, in the case of the anchorite, the most important are passionate thoughts; secondly, man is not able to know this action of demons directly because their nature is completely different from his nature and he can do it only indirectly, just observing the appearance, enhancement or weakening and the mutual connection of passionate thoughts. Evagrius does not, of course, invent such an understanding of the term λογισμοί but takes it from his predecessors. There are many indications that our monk took up such an understanding of the term λογισμοί from the Vita Antonii written by St Athanasius, where we find the expression πονηροὶ λογισμοί, or more likely, from Origen. In the writings of the great Alexandrian, we find that the source of all sin are evil thoughts (διαλογισμοί)33 30 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,83; A. Guillaumont (1958), 253; Ramelli (2015), 368. 31 Both in the Practicus 7; 8; 12; 13; 14 and Antirrheticus Evagrius uses the terms “thought” and “demon” interchangeably. Only once, in De octo spiritibus malitiae 13 the term πνεῦμα appears in the recension B of the text published by Muldermans, whereas in the Migne edition we probably have the error of the copyist – ῥεῦμα, – “stream”. 32 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 50; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 614; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. 33 Cf. Origen, Commentarium in Evangelium Matthei 21.
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and that evil thoughts or desires are identified with demons or evil spirits (πνεῦμα; spiritus).34 In Origen’s text, we find that he learned the teaching on the subject from the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, from which he also developed the theory that any particular demon or evil spirit is in charge of every thought. So, it is probable that the sources of the term λογισμοί are in Hebrew יצר, whose pejorative meaning in the sense of evil thoughts directed against God is confirmed by Gen. 8:21 and Eccles. 15:14 (διαβούλιον). In the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Qumran texts, and subsequent rabbinic literature, the term takes on an even more personalized and pejorative meaning of the “evil spirit”. And although the Septuagint does not translate Hebrew יצרanywhere into the Greek λογισμός, the words λογισμὸν πονηρόν ( Jer. 11:19) or λογισμὸς ἄδικος (Prov. 15:26) appear in other texts of the Old Testament. In the New Testament, especially in 2 Cor. 10:4 (λογισμούς) and Matt. 15:19 (διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί), which was a direct inspiration for Origen, the term occurs with the meaning of “evil thoughts”35 and such meaning of λογισμοί Evagrius also accepts. However, what deeper meaning has the term λογισμοί in the spiritual doctrine of Evagrius? Although it is the most common term to describe evil thoughts or desires, we soon see it is by no means the only one. Reference to other terms will help us to define its meaning more precisely. Well, while in Greek the term λογισμός usually meant thinking or reasoning, our monk gave to it a definitely wider meaning in his texts.36 Λογισμός is not just a kind of intellectual idea that is born in the human mind, but a certain psycho-spiritual process which is characterized by a large emotional component. When he wrote about the thought of self-love (φιλαυτία) or the eight principal thoughts that each anchorite struggles with, he often called them thoughts that gave rise to passions or even identified them with passions (πάθη).37 However, he did not understand passion as it is understood today, i.e., as a very intense sexual desire, but as a slave, we would say in the language of modern psychology, a compulsive attachment to a person or thing.38 In the treatise De malignis cogitationibus, he adds that demons fight an anchorite by giving him imaginations (φαντασία) or memories (μνήμη).39 Thus, according to Evagrius, λογισμός is a passionate thought, strongly lined with various feelings (emotions), lust and often based on memories from the past. Such an incoming thought, even though it is morally neutral and is not yet a sin, becomes a temptation and a time of trial for every monk; and if he succumbs to it, it becomes the cause of sin, first in thoughts and then in deeds.40
Cf. Origen, In Cant. 3; Id., Homiliae in Numeros VI,3. Cf. C. et A. Guillaumont (1971), 63. Cf. Nieścior (1996a), 203–30; Id. (2005), 97–119; Corrigan (2016), 49–72. Cf. Practicus 7; C. et A. Guillaumont (1971), 508; Sinkewicz (2003), 98; Capita cognoscitiva 56; Sinkewicz (2003), 216. 38 Cf. Allen (1997), 297–316. 39 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 2 i 25; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 154–56.240–44; Sinkewicz (2003), 154.70–177. 40 In Scholia in Psalmos 68,2 (PG 12,1512) i 123,4 (PG 12,1636) Evagrius seems to identify the “thought” with “temptation”. 34 35 36 37
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The other technical term which Evagrius uses most often to describe the thoughts is νόημα. Our author relates it to two realities: an abstract thought devoid of an image41 and thought dominated by passionate imaginations.42 Writing about the pejorative character of νόημα the theologian from Pontus most often means the latter meaning and relates it clearly to the second stage of spiritual life (γνωστική). So, while Evagrius usually uses the term λογισμός in the context of πρακτική, with νόημα he rather refers to the stage of γνωστική to describe the state of getting rid of all imaginative thinking that interferes with the knowledge of God.43 Both categories are morally neutral. Λογισμός takes on a pejorative meaning when it stimulates passion in the soul, but νόημα when it becomes an obstacle in the way of knowing God. The Pontian monk repeatedly emphasized that all thoughts that appear in the human soul are inherently morally neutral: Opposed to the demonic thought are three thoughts which cut it off when it lingers in the intellect: the angelic thought, that which proceeds from our free choice when it leans towards the better, and that which is furnished by human nature according to which even pagans love their own children and honour their parents. Opposed to the good thought there are only two thoughts, the demonic thought and that which proceeds from our free choice when it inclines toward the worse. No evil thought derives from our own nature, for we were not created evil from the beginning, if indeed the Lord sowed a good seed in his field (cf. Matt. 13:24).44 Thoughts or desires that flow from a human being by nature are not evil; they are only evil thoughts when inspired by demons or by the free will of man. Evagrius did not fall into the trap of Gnosticism or Manichaeism, which judged as inherently evil not only the matter and corporeality of man but the whole sphere of passions.45 By its very nature the body is not the perpetrator of the bodily passions, but only creates the possibility of their occurrence. The nature of the body is good and morally neutral; it becomes the instrument of the free will of man from whose attitude the moral evaluation of the act depends. Evagrius repeatedly emphasized that it does not depend on a man whether passionate thoughts attack him or not, but it depends on him whether he will succumb to them or whether he will fight them. As I wrote earlier, the monk from Pontus using the terms λογισμός and νόημα defined all kinds of thoughts, and in using terms like φαντασία, εἴδωλον, μορφή, σχῆμα, μνήμη and ἔννοια defined specific context in which they appear, depending on whether they relate to the imagination or memory.46 Writing about thoughts, Evagrius, as we
41 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 24; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont 1998, 236–38; Sinkewicz (2003), 169–70; Capita cognoscitiva 17; Sinkewicz (2003), 212. 42 Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 145,8 (PG 12,1667); Epistula 41,2–3; Frankenberg (1912), 594–95. 43 Cf. Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont 1998, 11–23; Nieścior (1996a), 211–15. 44 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 31; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont 1998, 260; Sinkewicz (2003), 175. 45 See Nieścior (1995), 39–53. 46 The Pontian anchorite still uses the category of διαλογισμός and διανόημα, but the first one is derived from λογισμός and it means its prolonged duration, while the latter is closely connected with νόημα. For all these topics see Betancourt (2018).
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have seen, strongly emphasizes their imaginary character, which manifests itself in imagining the future or remembering the past. His understanding of thoughts is very close to what today we call in the humanities imagination or emotional memory. It is therefore about desires or memories combined with a large load of emotions. Φαντασία is a way of manifesting λογισμός, which arouses sexual needs, anger, or desire for fame.47 Needless to say, not all human imaginations come from demons or are caused by passions. While our author semantically connected λογισμός with φαντασία and placed them appearing at the stage of πρακτική, the terms referring to “imaginative thoughts” like εἴδωλον, μορφή, σχῆμα were associated with the topic of the so-called “pure prayer” characteristic of the γνωστική stage. The category of memories is another element of the human cognitive structure by which demons evoke passion in it. Memories, like other forms of imaginative thoughts, are neutral by nature but take on a pejorative character when they are colored with passion: When we have impassioned memories of certain things, it is because we previously entertained the objects with passion; and in turn, when we entertain objects with passion, we will have the impassioned memories associated with these.48 Therefore, impassibility does not mean that a person will not experience any passions, which is impossible here on earth, but that he will remain unmoved even in the face of their memories.49 Memory may be an obstacle at the stage of ascetic practice when, for example, it evokes a woman, pushing a monk into unclean thoughts; but freeing his mind by temperance enables him to remember the woman dispassionately. However, it remains an obstacle also at the level of cognition: “When you are praying the memory brings before you either fantasies of objects from the past, or recent concerns, or the face of one who has caused you hurt”.50 Scholars studying the writings of Evagrius are of a different opinion when it comes to assessing what he considered more difficult to master. Hausherr believed that according to Evagrius, the “imaginary memory” remains more difficult to control than dominance of the actual imagination that characterizes contemporary people,51 while Nieścior is of the opposite opinion.52 I think that both are right, only in different aspects. Images from the past are more difficult to be controlled then actual because they relate to experienced events combined with a specific emotional charge which easily recalls 47 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 2; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 154–56; Sinkewicz (2003), 154; Tractatus ad Eulogium 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 311–12.; Practicus 48; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 686; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. Tractatus ad Eulogium has a very complicted history of editions. In PG 79,1093D–1140A it has been edited so-called shorter recension (A), then Muyldermans (1932), 62–65 and (1941), 4–7.9 has published small fragments. Recensio longior (B) edited recently Sinkewicz (2003), 310–33 based on the Atos manuscript. In the absence of a critical edition in the citation of the Greek text I rely on the recensio longior. See also Gibbons (2015). 48 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 34; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 578; Sinkewicz (2003), 103. 49 Cf. Practicus 67; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 652; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. 50 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 45; Sinkewicz (2003), 197. 51 Hausherr (1960), 67. 52 Cf. Nieścior (1996a), 24.
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them, while images about the future are more difficult to control then actual and past because of their indefinite content. The past is more defined and remains deeper in a man because of the experiences he has lived, whereas the imaginary future is rather undefined and vague and not deep in the human soul. Although Evagrius assumed the inherent goodness of man, and thus also his thoughts appearing in a different form, nevertheless due to the ascetic context of many of his statements, he most often used the above-mentioned terms in a pejorative ethical or moral sense. As sources of temptation, thoughts were an obstacle to the ensouled nous, for its purification, its achieving impassibility, its natural contemplation, and its knowledge of God. 1.1.2.
Πρακτική as the Struggle with λογισμοί Passionate Part of the Soul
Ascetic practice is a struggle with the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul in order to achieve impassibility, which in turn is a sine qua non condition for achieving spiritual gnosis and finally, through degrees, the rise to “pure prayer”, the vision of God’s light, and the contemplation of the Holy Trinity.53 Because the reality of spiritual growth is dynamic, so too is impassibility. According to Evagrius, the anchorite who achieved it should proceed further along the path of fighting demons, because impassibility has various degrees and the level of spiritual gnosis depends upon achievement. A gnostic, that is, a monk already advanced in the way of fighting with thoughts, who frees himself from those attacking a passionate part of the soul, still fights with other demons, which are an obstacle in contemplation: Those demons that seize hold of the passionate part of the soul are said to be opposed to the practical life; in turn, those that cause great vexation to the rational part are called enemies of all truth and adversaries of contemplation.54 In this text Evagrius characterizes the thoughts contrary to truth and contemplation as struggling with the rational part of the soul, which comports with the trichotomic model of the soul, with those thoughts attacking the rational part of the soul, not the mind. In the treatise On Thoughts our monk presents even more clearly the division of attacking thoughts between the passionate kind and the rational: Among the impure demons some tempt the human person as a human being; others trouble the human person as an irrational animal. The first, when they visit us, instill within us mental representations of vainglory or pride or envy or censoriousness – these do not touch any irrational beings. When the second class of demons approaches us, they move our irascibility or concupiscibility in a manner contrary to nature.55
53 Cf. Driscoll (1993), 56-64; Driscoll (1994), 47–84. 54 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 84; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 674; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. 55 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 18; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 214; Sinkewicz (2003), 165.
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Therefore the passionate thoughts that attack man as man, i.e., rational animal, and therefore the rational part of his soul are vanity, pride, jealousy, and frequent accusation of other people, while those that attack the part of man shared with all other animals are thoughts that stimulate lust and anger. Both thoughts and desires by their very nature are not intrinsically passionate, but they become so when they act against nature. We have seen earlier that the soul acts according to its nature when its concupiscible part seeks virtue, the irascible fights for virtue, and the rational contemplates beings (Pr. 86). The thoughts of the passionate part of the soul attack the anchorite at the stage of πρακτική, against either the concupiscible or the irascible part of the soul. The first to enter the battle are concupiscible thoughts and the first demon that awakens them is that of gluttony. He tries to destroy the anchorite’s abstinence at all costs, tempting him with a rejection of the fast and a return to his previous lifestyle, or with unbearable harsh fasts, so that the monk will not be able to resist and leave the desert. Another demon, acting in an even more violent way, is a demon of impurity, which arouses in a monk lustful images of a woman or various types of fantasies and dreams in order to arouse in him natural sexual desires. However, according to Evagrius, concupiscible thoughts are not the most harmful nor do they last long, and they are relatively easly dominated through asceticism and intense prayer. Definitely more harmful to the spiritual contemplation of the anchorite and more difficult to overcome are the thoughts of the irascible part of the soul: If somone long to attain pure prayer and to bring to God a mind without thoughts, let him control his irascibility and let him watch for the thoughts begotten of it, I mean those that arise from suspicion, hatred and resentment, those which are especiallly blinding for the mind and which destroy its celestial state.56 The lifestyle of anchorites exclude any willingness to fight with loved ones about wealth or possessions, because the monk is looking for “pure prayer”. Whoever awakens wrath through riches and wants to satisfy it with the same riches, is similar to a man who pierces his eyes in order to introduce drugs to them.57 Thus πρακτική, according to the monk of Pontus, is the spiritual activity which includes keeping the commandments, practicing the virtues, fear of God, abstinence, perseverance and hope, devotion, asceticism, and above all a struggle with thoughts of the concupiscible and irascible part of the soul.58 The starting point of all spiritual activity is vigilance of the mind which enables it to have a minimum of insight into itself and to perceive thoughts or desires that arise.59 Evagrius wrote his works for anchorites, so he assumed that his readers had already moved away from the world into the desert and had cut off all stimuli that would needlessly distract the mind and keep it from experiencing hesychia, that is, the state of relative calm of the soul. Thoughts
56 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 32; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 262–64; Sinkewicz (2003), 175. 57 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 32; Sinkewicz (2003), 175–76. 58 Cf. Practicus 60; 66; 78; 81; 84; 87. 59 Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 11,34; Sinkewicz (2003), 316; Scholia in Proverbia, Géhin (1987), 340.
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or passionate desires are born in the human soul even from so-called natural images which, although they are morally neutral, can stay in the soul longer to arouse lust or anger in it. If this happens, the monk should counteract them by using measures such as fasting, watching, and prayer.60 The main source of thoughts, however, are the passions (πάθη), which in another place Evagrius describes as evil tendencies (αἱ κακίαι).61 Because passions are often aroused through the body and imagination, it is important to dominate the body through fasting, watching, and praying, and wisely meeting its needs. Evagrius advises: “Do not drink wine or enjoy meat, so that you do not feed your body, and ugly thoughts will leave you”.62 An effective weapon in the fight against passionate thoughts put forward by the demons is physical work in order to obtain funds for one’s own maintenance and to help those in need by practicing charity and hospitality.63 Physical effort helps to overcome laziness, which often becomes a gateway to passionate thoughts, especially concupiscible ones; fighting them requires a balance of work and rest.64 Another important means of fighting with the thoughts is prayer, both the personal prayer of the monk in the cell and common prayer: Out of fear become conversant with the divine scriptures on a daily basis, for by association with these you will drive away converse with thoughts. He who by meditation treasures the divine scriptures in his heart easily expels thoughts from it.65 Just as human nature cannot exist in a vacuum, so if there is no thought in the soul, then certainly the first to appear will be passionate thoughts. Thus, Evagrius encourages the monks already from the morning to introduce into the soul some biblical passage and to meditate on it throughout the day, and to include with it concentrated community prayer.66 As we shall see later, he developed a special technique to fight the thoughts, which consisted in directing against the specific thought an appropriate passage from the Holy Scriptures.67 He also strongly emphasized the role of the master or spiritual director. It is to him that the monk should reveal his innermost thoughts and desires, weakening their strength by saying them out loud. Both the monk and his spiritual director were to use the practice of discernment (διάκρισις) of thoughts, desires or spirits, which would later become one of the key elements of Christian ascetic practice.68 The memory of one’s own sins and God’s judgment is also an effective remedy for persistent passionate thoughts, because it leads to humility and an opening for God’s help. 60 Cf. Epistula 55,3; Frankenberg (1912), 602–03; De malignis cogitationibus 7; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 174–76; Sinkewicz (2003), 157–58. 61 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 25,20; Géhin (1987), 402 and also De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus, (PG 79,1140B–1144D). 62 Ad fratres, Greßmann (1913), 156; see also Epistula 6,4; Frankenberg (1912), 570–71. 63 Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 28; Sinkewicz (2003), 330; De malignis cogitationibus 27; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont 1998, 248–50; Sinkewicz (2003), 172. See also A. Guillaumont (1979), 118–26. 64 Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 9 i 12; Sinkewicz (2003), 314.16–317. 65 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 20; Sinkewicz (2003), 46. 66 Cf. De Vogue, (1984), 7–11. 67 Cf. Nieścior (1997c), 31–56. 68 Cf. Bamberger (1992), 185–98; Gould (1997), 96–103, see also Rapp (2016).
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The essence, then, of πρακτική is the struggle with passionate thoughts that begins with their discernment (διάκρισις). Evagrius advises, for every thought coming to our mind, to ask “from whom it comes” (Ep. 11.3) and then to treat it appropriately. If the incoming thought is bad, it should be counteracted by ascetic acts such as fasting, prayer, watching, and speaking against it an appropriate passage from the Holy Scriptures.69 And because every passionate thought can be reduced to categories, πρακτική is basically the struggle with these eight main thoughts. Strictly speaking, πρακτική is a fight with the first six passionate thoughts, while the fight against vanity and pride concerns the stage of γνωστική. Nevertheless, as I wrote earlier, the monk who has already reached the beginning of a state of impassibility is also still exposed to the dangers of those previous thoughts, and his impassibility admits several degrees and is a dynamic reality. Only after the monk overcomes all eight passionate thoughts does he begin to experience perfect impassibility, which introduces him more deeply into the spiritual knowledge and contemplation of God. In the treatise Practicus, which, as we know, is about the stage of ascetic practice, Evagrius says: All the generic types of thoughts (logismoi) fall into eight categories in which every sort of thoughts is included. First is that of gluttony, then fornication; third avarice, fourth sadness, fifth anger; sixth acedia, seventh vainglory, eighth pride. Whether or not all these trouble the soul is not within our power, but it is for us to decide if they are to linger within us or not and whether or not they stir up the passions.70 The theory of eight λογισμοί is undoubtedly the piéce maîtresse in the ascetic doctrine of Evagrius. It became the basis for what became known in the Church as the seven deadly sins.71 With the category of eight λογισμοί of Evagrius we are at the beginning of this doctrine in ascetic Christian literature. According to Jerome, Gennadius of Marseille credited Evagrius with the creation and elaboration of a list of eight main vices: Evagrius monachus […] scripsit […] adversus octo principalium vitiorum suggestiones, quas aut primus advertit aut inter primos didicit […].72 A more accurate analysis of ancient sources suggests that our monk did not invent the taxonomy, but rather systematized the teaching of earlier Jewish, Christian, and pagan authors. However, when we look for a concrete source from which he might have taken over the concept of the eight passionate thoughts wholesale, we cannot find any specific author or group of people. Scholars studying Evagrian texts have proposed several hypotheses, but none of them have been completely accepted. Some scholars recognize as a source of Evagrius’ teaching Origen with the ancient Christian (Shepherd of Hermas, Clement of Alexandria) and Jewish traditions (Philo, Qumran texts, Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs); others point to the monastic
69 The monk from Pontus collected for this purpose biblical texts which can be used as a help in the fight against passionate thoughts in the treaty Antirrheticus, Frankenberg (1912), 472–545. 70 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 6; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 506–08; Sinkewicz (2003), 97–98. 71 Cf. Stewart (2005), 3–34. 72 De viris illustribus 11.
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traditions of the Macarius of Egypt; others to pagan literature (Horace), especially the Stoics; still others to astral religiosity or to notions derived from the Platonic pattern of the tripartite soul. The Guillaumonts are convinced that Evagrius created his theory based on the teachings of Origen and lists of vices found in non-Christian literature, especially Stoic texts.73 Let’s now look at these hypotheses in detail. There has been a long discussion about the influence of the Stoic doctrine on the spiritual teaching of Evagrius. It is especially emphasized that among the writings of Evagrius there are Sixtus Sentences, incorrectly assigned in antiquity to Pope Sixtus I or Sixtus II, and in fact a work created by the Pythagoreans or Neopitagoreans in the second century and reworked by Christians later.74 The text is preserved in Greek, Armenian, Syrian and Georgian. The Greek tradition consists of three short collections, which appear under Evagrius’ name in a few Greek manuscripts. The first two collections, Capita paraenetica and Spirituales sententiae, are alphabetical collections, while the third collection does not follow any particular order.75 The Armenian corpus of Evagrius contains three selections of Pythagorean-like aphorisms, mostly from the Sentences. According to Conybeare, the fusion of the Armenian Sextus with the Evagrian corpus happened between the fifth and sixth century,76 while Muyldermans has proposed even an earlier date.77 Both the Armenian and the Greek contain aphorisms from the Sentences, but also from Sextus’ source material like Clitarchus and the Pythagorean Sentences. The three Greek collections of gnomes handed down under Evagrius’ name are probably excerpts from a larger Evagrian original. Recurrent references to a life of renunciation and liberation from passions in the three collections, suggest that the collection has been prepared in the monastic circles. The continuation of this appropriation of pagan gnomes in Evagrius’ time shows that at the end of the fourth century the christianisation of Sextus’ source material was still an on-going process. If Evagrius knew the Sentences, he received them probably from Origen78 or from earlier monastic tradition.79 Whether the Evagrian selections of Sextus are authentic or not, the presence of aphorisms of Sextus in the Evagrian corpus in Greek, in Armenian and Georgian translations shows that the Sentences and their source material by the end of the fourth century played a very important role in the monastic life of the IV century. However, even though the Sentences, if authentic, might prove the general influence of Stoicism on the spiritual teaching of Evagrius,80 it does not automatically mean that it was from them that he derived the category of eight passionate thoughts.
73 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 63–84; Hausherr (1933), 164–75; see also Wrzoł (1920), 14–22.203– 11.241–46.281–86; Solignac (1984), 853–62. 74 See editions of the original text: de Lagarde (1858); Gildemeister (1873); Elter (1892) and English translation of Conybeare (1910); Chadwick (1959); Edwards – Wild (1981); Sinkewicz (2003), 229–32. 75 Paverello (2013), 26–28. 76 Conybeare (1910), 131. 77 Muyldermans (1929), 183–201. 78 Muyldermans (1929), 199; Casiday (2006), 173. 79 Casiday (2006), 173 is even more radical affirming that Evagrius certainly knew the Sentences and personally redacted the collection. We have no proof of that and this opinion seems exaggerated. 80 Corrigan (2009), 73–101.
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In fact, we have no evidence of such an impact. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Zöckler put forth a hypothesis, also followed by other scholars, that the moral doctrine of the Stoics had influenced the catalog of the eight principle λογισμοί of Evagrius.81 According to this proposal, the eight passionate thoughts of Evagrius would have been taken from Stoic teaching regarding four πάθη and four κακίαι. The four main passions in the system of Stoic ethics are ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία, φόβος, λύπη; their four principal vices are ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία, which are opposed by four virtues: φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη. A comparison of these terms to Evagrius’s shows that only λύπη is shared. All others are completely different: Stoic system ἡδονή ἐπιθυμία φόβος λύπη ἀφροσύνη δειλία ἀκολασία ἀδικία
Evagrian list γαστριμαργία πορνεία φιλαργυρία λύπη ὀργή ἀκηδία κενοδοξία ὑπερηφανία
Some may claim that δειλία is to be identified with acedia, but that relies upon a connection made by Origen, not Evagrius. I. Hausherr and the Guillaumonts were right to reject the direct and exclusive influence of the Stoics on Evagrius albeit for different reasons.82 First, the Stoics call the passions πάθη and κακίαι, while the monk from Pontus, although he also used those terms, always used the term λογισμοί when talking about the eight passionate thoughts. Second, except for λύπη, no term of the Stoics has a counterpart in the catalog of the Pontian monk. We cannot claim the impact of Stoicism if almost all the terms in both lists are completely different.83 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Schiwietz84 proposed Epistula ad Maecenam I 33–40 of Horace to be the source of the Evagrian list of eight passionate thoughts. Six of them correspond to the terms used by Evagrius: Fervet avaritia miseroque cupidine pectus? Sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem
81 Zöckler (1893); also Wrzoł, (1923), 385–404 and (1924), 89–91; Stelzenberger (1993), 379-385. 82 Cf. Hausherr (1933), 164–65; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 73–75. 83 Augustine Casiday in his Review of this book before its edition suggested that I am “to hasty in disregarding Stoic influence” on Evagrius and uploads to “the Ring of Xystus (transmitted in some oriental version as an Evagrian text)”. If general influence of Stoics on Evagrius is admissible, in the case of eight passionate thoughts there is no such evidence. We cannot talk about direct Stoic influence on Evagrius when there is only one common term, λύπη, instead an indirect influence is very difficult to prove. 84 Schiwietz (1906), 268-272. To refer to the four cardinal virtues in the Stoic system here, as Hausherr correctly pointed out, is actually a return to the Zöckler proposal and adds nothing new to discussion about the sources of the Evagrian list.
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possis et magnam morbi deponere partem; Laudis amore tumes: sunt certa piacula, quae te Ter pure lecto poterunt recreare libello. Invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator, Nemo adeo ferus est ut non mitescere possit, Si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem.85 This letter is undoubtedly proof of the widespread reflection on the catalog of human faults in various circles, but one should doubt whether Horace inspired Evagrius. First of all, the text is in Latin, which Evagrius probably did not know. Second, even granting the six terms that agree with those of Evagrius (avaritia, cupidine, amor laudis, invidia, iracundia, inertia), it is still difficult to ascertain the correspondence of the meaning of these words, as they wrote in different languages, to different audiences. Third, it is difficult to imagine the monks in the Egyptian desert reading the works of Horace. It is always possible, of course, that Evagrius was familiar with Horace’s work in Constantinople or in Jerusalem, but it remains in the sphere of speculation very difficult to verify. We have no evidence of Evagrius quoting from or alluding to any Latin literature. Some scholars have proposed astral religion to be the source of the catalog of eight passionate thoughts in Evagrius.86 According to the Gnostic theory, when the demiourgoi wanted to create the material world, they first created seven evil spirits (archontoi), each of whom became a guardian of one of the spheres of the emerging world and symbolised a single defect in each sphere. When the soul after its fall was forced to merge with matter, it descended into the earthly world, and as it passed through each sphere, it took on that sphere’s characteristic defect. If it now wants to be free from the present state, it must rediscover its path, freeing itself from the power of the seven spirits responsible for the seven spheres and defects.87 The traces of similar beliefs about the existence of planets or spheres which are evil powers are found in the Commentary to the Aeneid VI,714 of Servius (late 4th–early 5th) and the Book of Enoch 18,13 (200 bce – 100 ce). In the first text the author emphasizes that Mathematici (= astrologers) fingunt quod (…) cum descendunt animae, trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, Veneris libidinem, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium. It is worth noting that five mentioned faults coincide with the catalog of Evagrius: acedia (torpor), anger (iracundia), impurity (libidine), greed (lucri cupiditas) and pride (regni desiderium), but have been expressed in peculiar Latin terms. The author of the Book of Enoch seems to identify seven planets with seven evil spirits that have turned away from God. Again, however, similarities are not sufficient to justify the influence on Evagrius of the mythological Gnostic theories. The fundamental difference regards the number of thoughts and technical terminology. In Evagrian texts we have eight spirits, but in the Gnostic theory only 85 Horace, Epistula I,33–40. 86 Cf. Reitzenstein (1904), 232-235; Zielinski (1905), 437–42; Gothein (1907), 416–48; Schiwietz (1906), 266–74; Wrzoł (1923), 385–404 and (1924), 84–91; Vögtle (1941), 217–37; Bloomfield (1952), 43–67. 87 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 79–82.
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seven. Proponents of the astral hypothesis have been less concerned with Evagrius than they with the later category of the Seven Deadly Sins used in the Catholic Church. Bloomfield proposed to add to the seven celestial spheres one more in order to have eight, which in the Gnostic theory would already be a kind of constant sky, but this is an unconvincing proposition.88 Next, we find neither in the Gnostic texts nor in the writings of the Church Fathers who had entered into polemics with them terminology close to the list of Evagrius. In short, the astral hypothesis as the origin of the list of principal thoughts of the Pontus monk is only a product of the fantasy of scholars. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Zarine suggested that the sources of the Evagrian list should be sought in the Egyptian monastic tradition.89 Thanks to the recent studies, especially those of Rubenson, it has been convincingly demonstrated that the Letters of Anthony the Great are of a marked Origenist character.90 This conclusion radically changed our understanding of the theological tendencies in early Egyptian monasticism showing that there was a strong inclination in early monastic circles towards philosophical and theological speculation. O’Laughlin even speculated that Evagrius was formed in the tradition of Anthony the Great, which was in turn an Origenist tradition transmitted through desert fathers who had themselves been in direct contact with Anthony.91 Other scholars, like Jeremy Driscoll,92 Columba Stewart93 and Luke Dysinger94 followed this path traying to show from one side the strong relationship between Evagrius and desert monasticism of IV century, and from another that if in Evagrian works there are some elements of his spiritual doctrine similar to Origen, it most probably has been taken over from ancient monasticism and not directly form Origen.95 Leaving aside the discussion of whether Evagrius 88 Cf. Bloomfield (1952). 89 Augustine Casiday in his Review of this book before being printed criticized me for not taking into account the recent conclusions of Rubenson’s researches on the presence of elements of the teachings of Origen in the Letters of Anthony the Great and his successors and their possible impact on Evagrius. I am not convinced of such necessity, but I included in this study a half page of analysis in order to show that if there is no doubt about the fact that Origen’s ideas are present among Desert Fathers, however there is nothing in their texts regarding eight principle thoughts as a whole concept. We should then clearly distinguish between the general influence of Desert Fathers on Evagrius, which is obvious and there is no need to repeat it here, and their influence on his teaching regarding eight passionate thoughts as a whole category intended as the cause-effect with relationship between all passionate thought which is completely absent in the texts of Desert Fathers including Anthony the Great. It is a creation of Evagrius under the influence of Origen. Desert Fathers sometimes analyze the action of one or the other passionate thought, but never of all eight together with their mutual relationship. This is also the opinion of Stewart (2011). Mariya Horaycha convincingly showed that the list of Psuedo-Macarius (c. 360–90 ce) is different from Evagrian eight principle thoughts. 90 See Rubenson (1986), (1989), (1990), (1993), (1999), (2006), (2011), (2012), (2013), (2018). 91 O’Laughlin (1999). 92 Driscoll (1989), (1990a), (1990b), (1991), (1993), (1994a), (1994b), (1997), (1999), (2000), (2001), (2003). 93 Stewart (2001). 94 Dysinger (2005). 95 Maybe Mark del Cogliano (2011) is right concluding that all these three authors are benedictine monks and they try to convince themselves and their readers that Evagrius was an orthodox and was inspired more by Desert Fathers then by Origen. I think that is not necessary, because the works of Evagrius defend him very well.
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took over some ideas about spiritual life directly from Origen or through the desert fathers which is the theme for another study, I am convinced that the answer to this question is impossible in general, but only in the case of concrete points. So, if we look for the entire category of eight passionate thoughts as presented by Evagrius in the Letters of Anthony the Great or other monastic texts, we certainly will not find it. Even more, in the Letters of Anthony the Great none of the technical terms of Evagrius appears, only in Vita Antonii 36 we find ἀκηδία, but it should be assigned rather to Athanasius then to Antony. It’s true, that the single Greek terms are present in different texts of the Desert Fathers, but never as whole category with cause-effect relationship like in Evagrius. So, if some scholars are talking about the influence of Antony the Great or some other Desert Fathers on Evagrius’ teaching about the eight passionate thoughts it might be true in the case of some single thought, but not as the whole category which is completely absent in their works and is the personal creation of Evagrius. Zarine, instead proposed that the monk of Pontus took over the category of eight passionate thoughts from Macarii of Egypt.96 It is true that in Macarius’ treatise Prayer among the passionate thoughts tormenting a monk are πορνεία and κενοδοξία, and in his Spiritual Homily 2, κενοδοξία, ὑπερηφανία and φιλαργυρία, but the others are note, and the full Evagrian list is absent in these texts. Moreover, some scholars still doubt that Macarius is the author of Spiritual Homilies.97 Hausherr sought the inspiration for Evagrius in monastic circles, especially in the text titled Life of Saint Syncletica. The work, however, which as he himself admits is contemporary to Evagrius or written shortly afterward, rather only confirms the existence in the monastic tradition of the teaching about passionate thoughts. Even then, it mentions only four of them from the list of the monk from Pontus: πορνεία, φιλαργυρία, λύπη, ὑπερηφανία.98 Other scholars in turn have proposed ancient and early Christian and Judaic texts as a source of Evagrian teaching on the eight thoughts. In the writings of Philo of Alexandria we find a very interesting fragment in De opificio mundi 79, in which appear some terms present in Evagrian texts: And this (life similiar to that of Paradise) would be the case if there were neither irrational pleasures to obtain mastery over the soul raising up a wall of gluttony (γαστριμαργία) and lasciviousness (λαγνεία), nor desires of glory (ἐπιθυμίαι δόξης), or power, or riches (χρημάτων), to assume dominion over life, nor pains to contract and warp the intellect, nor that evil counselor-fear (αἱ λῦπαι), to restrain the natural inclinations towards virtuous actions, nor folly and cowardice, and injustice, and the incalculable multitude of other evils to attack them.99 So here we have the present terms such as: “unreasonable lusts” (ἄλογοι ἡδοναί), gluttony (γαστριμαργία), lust (λαγνεία) – near impurity, although expressed by
96 97 98 99
Cf. Zarine (1907), 309–53. Cf. Hausherr (1933), 165. Cf. Hausherr (1933), 173–75. Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi 79; Arnaldez (1961), 184; Colson-Whitaker (1981), 65–66.
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means of another term, desire of glory (ἐπιθυμίαι δόξης) – close to the vainglory, the desire for wealth – similar to greed, and sorrows (αἱ λῦπαι). If indeed, as L. Wrzoł suggests, cowardice (δειλία) could be connected thematically with spiritual cowardice later defined as acedia, and injustice with anger, the use of which is confirmed by other Philo’s writings (f. ex. Leg. Alleg. II,3; Quod Deus. XV,7; De agricultura IV,17), the passionate thoughts presented by Evagrius (with the exception of pride), although described using a different terminology, are in Philo.100 Nevertheless, only two Evagrian terms, γαστριμαργία and plural αἱ λῦπαι, are present in Philo’s writings. The others are missing, so Philo’s influence is just as unlikely as the Stoics’. Among the Qumran texts, and specifically in the Rule of Community, we find a very interesting passage: However, to the spirit of deceit belong greed, frailty of hands in the service of justice, irreverence, deceit, pride and haughtiness of heart, dishonesty, trickery, cruelty, much insincerity, impatience, much insanity, impudent enthusiasm, appalling acts performed in a lustful passion, filthy paths for indecent purposes, blasphemous tongue, blindness of eyes, hardness of hearing in order to walk in all the paths of darkness and evil cunning.101 In the text we find six terms semantically similar to those on the list of Evagrius: greed, laziness close to acedia, pride and haughtiness (vainglory?), anger and the spirit of prostitution. Even the analysis of the Hebrew terms would not bring much insight here, for the six thoughts or spirits presented in the Rule of Community do not form a catalog of the eight passions as in the texts of Evagrius, but are mixed with many others. And of course, Evagrius certainly did not know the Hebrew language so it is impossible that he would have been inspired by a Qumran text like the Rule of the Community. In the Greek Testament of Reuben, which belongs to the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, we find a fragment about the seven spirits of error where the author puts them in the following order: With these spirits are mingled the spirits of error (ἑπτὰ τῶν πνευμάτων τῆς πλάνης). First, the spirit of fornication (τὸ τῆς πορνείας πνεῦμα) is seated in the nature and in the senses; the second, the spirit of insatiableness (ἀπληστεία γαστρός) in the belly; the third, the spirit of fighting (μάχη), in the liver and gall. The fourth is the spirit of obsequiousness and chicanery (ἀρεσκεία καὶ μαγγανεία), that through officious attention one may be fair in seeming. The fifth is the spirit of pride (ὑπερηφανία), that one may be boastful and arrogant. The sixth is the spirit of lying (ψεῦδος), to practice deceits and concealments from kindred and friends. The seventh is the spirit of injustice (ἀδικία) with which are thefts and acts of rapacity, that a man may fulfill the desire of his heart; for injustice worked
100 Cf. Wrzoł (1923), 19–22. 101 The Rule of Community 4,9–11; Gracia Martinez (1994), 7.
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together with other spirits by taking of gifts. [And with all these spirit of sleep (ὕπνος) is joined which is (that) of error and fantasy].102 It is very interesting to note that we have here a very similar list of eight spirits to Evagrius. However, only two Greek terms πορνεία and ὑπερηφανία are shared verbatim with Evagrius; a third, ἀπληστεία γαστρός, is close to γαστριμαργία. Some similarities of this list with Evagrius are obvious, but one can doubt whether the text of the Testaments of Twelve Patriarchs, written in a Jewish milieu about 150 ce, would have directly influenced Evagrius. As we know, the question of later interpolation both Judaic and Christian in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs remains still open and widely discussed among scholars, and for this reason it is difficult to date the quotation above. At best we can say that the testimony of the Testament of Reuben shows the existence and development within Judaism of the category of seven (or eight) evil spirits (or spirits of error); there is no sign of its influence on Evagrius. In the New Testament, we do not find, of course, the same list of eight passionate thoughts as in Evagrius or of seven deadly sins as in later Church moral teaching, but in the various texts there are three terms used by Evagrius: impurity (πορνεία), greed (φιλαργυρία) and pride (ὑπερηφανία). They occur in various configurations and with other terms in the following texts διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί, πορνεῖαι, (Matt. 15:19–20); ὑπερηφάνος (Rom. 1:18–32), πόρνοι, πλεονέκται 1 Cor. 6:9–10; πορνεία (Gal. 5,19–21); πορνεία, πλεονεξία (Eph. 5:3–5); πορνεία, πάθος, ἐπιθυμία κακή, πλεονεξία (Col. 3:5–8); πορνεία (1 Tim. 1:9–10), φίλαυτοι, φιλάργυροι, ὑπερήφανοι (2 Tim. 3:2–5). This fact deserves to be emphasized because, as we know, it was these three temptations which Satan presented to Christ while he was tempting Him in the desert, and, as we shall see later, Evagrius saw in them the source of the other five passionate thoughts. It is worth noting the slight difference between Evagrius and the New Testament: the monk of Pontus considered the third thought by which Christ was tempted to be vanity (κενοδοξία) and not pride (ὑπερηφανία). The New Testament was undoubtedly a direct inspiration for Evagrius for the three passions gluttony, greed, and vainglory, which became the foundation and basis for the entire category of eight passions. But the New Testament did not provide Evagrius with the whole system and its specific terminology. The first Christian text in which a similar catalog of spirits appears is Shepherd of Hermas.103 The text, as we know, was written between 140 and 155 in Rome and consists of 5 Visions, 12 Commandments and 10 Parables.104 In this work, the Fourth Commandment deals with impurity (πορνεία), the Fifth with anger (ὀξυχολία) and the Tenth with sadness (λύπη). Very interesting is a fragment of the Sixth Commandment (36:5), in which there is an invitation to discern the spirits, that is, to distinguish the action of the angel of righteousness from the angel of evil and to see in every sin the action of the demon. So, when the evil demon acts, it raises “anger” (ὀξυχολία), spends money on “various
102 Testament of Ruben II,1; Charles (1960), 5–6. See also Testament Rubena III,3–7. In Testament of Benjamin VII,2 there is another list of seven spirits, but the terminology is completely different. 103 Origen probably knew the work for he included it among the inspired writings – cf. In Rom. 10,31, PG 14,1282. 104 Hermas, Pastor; Joly (1968); Lightfoot-Harmer (1992), 329–527.
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utensils utterly superfluous” (gluttony!), incites “lust of women” (ἐπιθυμία γυναικῶν), “greed” (πλεονεξία), and “pride” (ὑπερηφανία). In the Eighth Commandment (38:3–5) we find yet another catalog of evil deeds: “impurity” (πορνεία), “gluttony” (ἐδέσματα πολλά), “greed” (πολυτέλεια πλούτου/πλεονεξία), “haughtiness” (ὑψηλοφροσύνη), “pride” (ὑπερηφανία) and “vanity” (κενοδοξία).105 As we can see, the Shepherd, with the exception of acedia, mentions all the other evil deeds: gluttony, impurity, greed, sadness, anger, vanity, and pride. And while its terminology differs from Evagrius’s, there are also four terms exactly the same as in his writings: πορνεία, λύπη, κενοδοξία, ὑπερηφανία. If we remember that in 2 Tim. 3:2 the greedy are called φιλάργυροι, then in the middle of the second century we would have the confirmation of technical terminology in the Christian texts for five of Evagrius’ eight thoughts, but not as a single list, from a single source. Of course, this does not prove the direct dependence of Evagrius on these texts, but it shows the development of this aspect of the ancient Christian tradition. Clement of Alexandria also described, though with different terminology, four passionate thoughts even if he never presented these four as a list: gluttony (ἡδονή τοῦ γαστρός/ἀσωτία), lust of women (ἐπιθυμία/φιλογυνία), vanity (φιλοδοξία) and pride (φιλαρχία), and also quoted a Stoic theory of four desires ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία, λύπη and φόβος.106 The terminology in this case, except for λύπη, is completely different from that present in the writings of Evagrius and so we can doubt any direct dependence. Now, in order to see better the whole pagan, Judaic and Christian tradition before Origen, let’s put together all above mentioned the sources.107 We exclude the hypothesis of the influence of astral religion because it is too vague, Epistula ad Maecenam because it was written in Latin, which Evagrius did not know and the texts of Qumran, because Evagrius did not know Hebrew: As we can see from this table, except for ὀργή and ἀκηδία all Greek terms used by Evagrius are already present in different pagan, Judaic and Christian texts before Origen. If we remember that in Epistula ad Maecenam appears the Latin term iracundia meaning “anger” and in Servian’s Commentary to Eneida VI,714 once again iracundia to describe anger, and torpor very close to acedia, even if those texts have not influenced Evagrius directly, they nevertheless confirm the existence of the widespread ancient tradition of many evil spirits or thoughts, out of which can be found all eight Evagrian passionate thoughts. There is no doubt that Origen was the first Christian author in whose texts all the Evagrian terms can be found. The great Alexandrian, however, has not presented yet a complete, succinct list of eight passionate thoughts in their mutual relation of cause-effect as Evagrius but only the single terms, found in a variety of his texts. The following table provides a synoptic overview of the most important places in his writings, ordered by the catalog of Evagrius.108
105 Cf. Lightfoot-Harmer (1992), 394–97. See also Parabole VI,5,5 (anger, impurity, greed) and Parabole IX,15,3 (impurity, sadness, anger, lust). 106 Cf. Stromata II,20; IV,6. 107 Cf. Misiarczyk (2018), 198. 108 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 69-73; Hausherr (1933), 168–69.
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κενοδοξία ὑπερηφανία
κενοδοξία
ὑπερηφανία
ἀκηδία
ὀργή
λύπη
φιλαργυρία
φιλαργυρία
Macarius of Egypt πορνεία
λύπη
Stoics
πορνεία
γαστριμαργία
Evagrius
ὑπερηφανία
λύπη
φιλαργυρία
πορνεία
Life of St Syncletica
αἱ λῦπαι
γαστριμαργία
Philo of Alexandria
ὑπερηφανία
πορνεία
Testament of Reuben
ὑπερηφανία
φιλαργυρία
πορνεία
New Testament
ὑπερηφανία
κενοδοξία
λύπη
πορνεία
Shepherd of Hermas
λύπη
Clement of Alexandria
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iactantia
superbia
ὑπερηφανία
iracundia
fornicatio avaritia
In Lib. Jesu Nave Hom.11,3
κενοδοξία
κενοδοξία
ἀκηδία
ὀργή
λύπη
πορνεία φιλαργυρία
γαστριμαργία
Evagrius
κενοδοξία ὑπερηφανία
ἀκηδία
inconstantia pusillanimitas
invidia
superbia
iactantia
tristitia
libido avaritia
libido
Et alia
iactantia
avaritia
superbia
ira
fornicatio avaritia
κενοδοξία
ὀργή
λύπη
ἐρώτες
In Lib. Jesu Nave Hom. In Ierem. Hom. 2,10 15,5
iactantia superbia
ira
avaritia
ὕπνος, ἀκηδία δειλία κενοδοξία
φιλαργυρία
πορνεία
γαστριμαργία
In Lucam Hom. 29
ὀργή
λύπη
ἐπιθυμία φιλαργυρία
γαστριμαργία
In Ierem. Hom. 5,12
In Num. Hom. 27,12 In Iudic. Hom. 2,5
vana gloria superbia
ira
avaritia
fornicatio
In Exodum Hom. 8,5
In Lib. Jesu Nave Hom.15,4
κενοδοξία
θυμός
ὀργή
ὀργή
λύπη
πορνεία
In Ezechielem Hom. 6,11
λύπη
ἐπιθυμία
φιλοπλουτία
πορνεία
In Matthaeum Hom. XV,18
φιλαργυρία
γαστριμαργία
Evagrius
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As can easily be seen from the above table, all the eight principal passions of Evagrius are present in Origen’s writings. In none of his texts is cited the whole list of eight passionate thoughts, but they are always scattered in different texts, which means that he did have Evagrius’s whole taxonomy. Origen did not care too much about the order of individual thoughts, as their order is different in various texts. It is also worth mentioning that single thoughts appear only in Origen’s homilies, that is, in the parenetic texts, not in any commentary or treatises. Hausherr is of the opinion that Evagrius built his eight passions upon Origen’s Commentary to the Book of Deuteronomy 7,1, in which he made an allegorical interpretation of the seven nations inhabiting the land of Canaan before the arrival of the Israelites, because this explanation is later given to us by Cassian. According to him the monk of Pontus would have taken over from Origen the names of the individual passions and given them their own order.109 On the other hand, the Guillaumonts are convinced that Cassian’s explanation sounds artificial and is intended rather to explain a list he himself had taken over from Evagrius, not to indicate the origin of the list of the monk of Pontus.110 As a consequence, they also doubt that Origen’s Commentary to the Book of Deuteronomy 7,1 was the sole direct inspiration for the Evagrian list of eight λογισμοί. In fact, Origen in his Commentary to the Book of Deuteronomy 7,1 presents seven pagan nations – the Hittites, the Girgashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites – as “incorrigible sinners who had filled up the measure of their iniquities” and practiced idolatry, but he never uses any Evagrian Greek terms in this text. Hausherr and the Guillaumonts are of the opinion that Evagrius created his theory based on the teachings of Origen and the list of faults present in non-Christian literature, especially the Stoics. I personally doubt the influence of the Stoics, for reasons explained earlier. It seems that the direct sources of the whole list would be the New Testament, early Christian tradition, and Origen. In fact, Evagrius himself underlines that three fundamental passions/demons are the same who attacked Jesus: gluttony, greed, and vainglory, and in the New Testament we find also three Greek terms presented in Evagrian writings: πορνεία, φιλαργυρία and ὑπερηφανία. In the Shepherd of Hermas are four terms: πορνεία, λύπη, κενοδοξία, ὑπερηφανία. So, in the middle of the second century five technical terms of Evagrius’s passionate thoughts are attested: πορνεία, φιλαργυρία, λύπη, κενοδοξία, ὑπερηφανία. The four terms, that is γαστριμαργία, φιλαργυρία, κενοδοξία and ὑπερηφανία are present in the texts written in the Christian monastic tradition, namely Pseudo-Macarius who live between 360–90 ce111 If we remember that Philo confirms the knowledge of the term γαστριμαργία, then in earlier pagan (Stoic), Judaic, and Christian tradition six of eight Evagrian passionate thougths, (γαστριμαργία, πορνεία, φιλαργυρία, λύπη, κενοδοξία, ὑπερηφανία) are confirmed. Origen adopted this earlier tradition and added the next two (ὀργή, ἀκηδία) presented in earlier Latin texts. As we can see there was no list of eight passionate thoughts before Evagrius. If he took over the names of eight passionate
109 Cf. Hausherr (1933), 170. 110 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 73. 111 Cf. Horaycha (2013).
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thoughts and the Greek terms to describe them from the earlier pagan, Judaic and Christian tradition, as well as Origen, he himself created the whole theory of eight passionate thoughts by precisely describing cause-effect relations between them, since he is the first author to present it in such a way,112 which later became the basis for the Church’s teaching about the seven deadly sins.113 The Pontian monk settled the list of eight passionate thoughts taking probably as a starting point the fragment from Matt 12:43–45 and Luke 11:24–26, where it is said that the impure spirit cast out of a man takes with him seven more evil spirits and attacks the man again. If the source of the number of evil spirits or thoughts can be the teaching of Christ from the Gospels, their Greek names were most probably taken from early Judaic and Christian tradition including Origen. Based on his own experience of fighting with passionate thoughts in the desert, Evagrius limited their number to the eight most important, which are the source of all other evil thoughts. Let us see now the reciprocal relationship between eight passionate thoughts which is a personal contribution of Evagrius. It is probably the description of Christ’s temptation in the Gospels which became the inspiration for Evagrius in accepting the basic three demonic passions that start the attack on man: gluttony, greed and seeking glory (vanity).114 The attack of gluttony gives birth to impurity and together with greed they become the cause of stimulating the soul to anger or sadness in the event of their later frustration in the event of their later frustration. When concupiscibility and irascibility are simultaneously stimulated, then acedia arises in the soul and embrace the whole part of the unreasonable soul, while vanity and pride begin to attack the rational part of the soul after overcoming all previous thoughts and reaching a state of impassibility. Schematically, it could be presented as follows: Based on these three main evangelical temptations by which Satan sought to deceive Christ, Evagrius, as it has been said earlier, extended the whole list to eight demons/thoughts with their specific names derived from early Judaic and Christian tradition. The study of the three main demonic temptations is already present in Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses and later Cassian’s Collationes.115 In the Byzantine writers like John Climacus, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory of Sinai, probably under the influence of Evagrius, the three main demonic temptations are considered to be the basis of all other passions.116 112 The proposal of Stelzenberger (1993), 398 to identify the beginning of such a list in one of Ephrem the Syrian’s writings failed when it was proved that it was written by John of Damascus. Similarly Vöglte (1941a), 217–37, Id. (1941b), col. 74–79 referring to Cassian, postulated a general Egyptian monastic environment, but he could not indicate specific texts, and his proposals to appeal to the oral monastic tradition were contradicted by the texts of Cassian, which clearly depended on Evagrius. 113 Cf. Tilby (2005), 143–52. 114 Evagrius himself talk about these three basic thoughts in De malignis cogitationibus 1. 115 The teaching about three main temptations finds its echo in the writings of Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses V,22,2 and John Cassian, Collationes Patrum V,6, who sees differences in their presentation in Matthew, where there is gluttony, vanity and pride, and in Luke, where three temptations are gluttony, greed and vanity. 116 Cf. John Climacus, Scala 26 (PG 88,1013A); Maximus the Confessor, Kephalaia de amore 56 (PG 90,1033BC); Gregory of Sinai, Kephalaia acrostica 91 (PG 150,1268BC). See also Steiner (1962).
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sp i ri t ual do ct ri n e γαστριμαργία
φιλαργυρία
κενοδοξία
πορνεία ὀργή λύπη
ἀκηδία
ὑπερηφανία
Evagrius presents a list of eight passionate thoughts almost always in the same order: from gluttony to pride: Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to the practical life, those ranged first in the battle are the ones entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those who make to us suggestions of avarice and those who entice us to seek human esteem.117 In the same text he adds that the devil suggested the same temptations to Christ, but he was defeated by Him: For this reason the devil introduced these three thoughts to the Savior: first, he exhorted him to turn Stones into bread; then he promised him the whole world if he would fall down and worship him; and thirdly, he said that if he would listen to him he would be glorified for having suffered no harm from such a fall (Luke 4:1–13) […] Through these things he teaches us too that it is impossible to drive away the devil, unless we have shunned these three thoughts.118 The anchorite therefore begins his struggle with passionate desires from gluttony, trying to work out the virtue of self-control, which is the first fruit of πρακτική. The ability to limit food and drink to what is necessary is, according to Evagrius, the sign of entering the path of real asceticism. There is a cause-and-effect relationship between the individual passionate thoughts, if one succumbs to the first, then he cannot fight any that follow. Gluttony is the mother of impurity (De octo spiritibus malitiae 4) and one cannot fall into the trap of impurity if he has not fallen earlier due to gluttony. If a monk wants to fight a demon of impurity, he should reduce the rations of bread and water because it contributes to abstinence (see Proverbs 17). The
117 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 148; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. 118 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 148; Sinkewicz (2003), 153–54. See also Epistula 38.
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desire for food, riches, or human glory, in turn, puts under the control of irascible demons, i.e. anger and sadness: Nor is it possible to trouble the irascible part, unless one is fighting for food or wealth or esteem. And it is not possible to escape the demon of sadness if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them.119 When a man struggles to satisfy one of these three main passions and there is a real danger that he will not achieve it, then he experiences anger. Sorrow, on the other hand, appears in a double form: as an experience of unsatisfied desires, or as a result of anger. This twofold kind of sadness explains why the Pontian monk places it before greed in one place (Pr. 6), and after anger in another place (Pr. 10). If on the one hand there is a kind of concupiscence attacking the soul, and on the other, an anger or sadness due to a lack of satisfaction of that desire, then the sixth passionate thought arises in it, namely acedia, which tears the soul in two opposite directions (Pr. 23). Evagrius sees acedia as a passionate thought that ends a demon’s attacks on the passionate part of the soul, because no other demon follows the demon of acedia (Pr. 12). Overcoming acedia therefore closes the whole process of acting passionate thoughts, which ends with the calming of the concupiscibility and irascibility of the human soul. The last two passionate thoughts, vanity and pride, according to the succession of individual thoughts, are born after overcoming all six previous ones. However, Evagrius does not directly describe causal relations between particular passionate thoughts, limiting himself to the general statement that a man cannot come across this last demon, that is, pride, if he is not first wounded by those standing in the first row (De mal. 1), that is gluttony, greed, and seeking human glory. On the one hand, he seems to claim that vanity and pride attack the monk after overcoming all previous thoughts, and on the other that they torment the anchorite that has fallen into one of the first three, that is, gluttony, greed and vanity. He says: “Nor will one escape pride, the first offspring of the devil, if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils (1 Tim. 6:10) (De mal. 1)”.120 This apparent contradiction can, however, be easily explained by referring to the distinction Evagrius makes between primary vanity and secondary pride. Primary vanity is born in the soul as a result of the original fall and belongs to the first series of thoughts, or arises as a result of succumbing to other thoughts, while secondary vanity, more subtle, is born after winning the first six passionate thoughts (Pr. 13). Similarly, primary pride is the result of succumbing to the previous demons, whereas the secondary arises after overcoming all previous ones, including vanity, when a person thinks that he himself is the source of his righteous deeds (Pr. 14). The temptation of pride to assign all victories over thoughts to oneself and put oneself in the place of God causes the deepest spiritual fall of a monk.
119 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 148; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. 120 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 148; Sinkewicz (2003), 153.
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sp i ri t ual do ct ri n e
Although the Guillaumonts define the Evagrian order of eight λογισμοί as largely conventionel, it seems that in our author’s description of the action of these thoughts we can find two orders: empirical experience and spiritual development. From the perspective of spiritual development, every next passionate thought appears when the previous one is overcome: The more the soul progresses, the greater are the antagonists that folllow it in succession, for I am not convinced that it is always the same demons that persist against it. They know this best who perceive the temptations with greater precision and who see the impassibility they have attained being dislodged by the successive demons.121 The anchorite begins, therefore, purifying his soul by the struggle with the thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, then with the thoughts of the irascible part, acedia, and finally with the fight against vanity and pride. So here we have the progression from the corporeal passionate thoughts to the spiritual. From the perspective of empirical experience succumbing to the previous thought opens the way for the next. Thus, Evagrius wrote that one cannot fall into the trap of the spirit of impurity if he has not fallen by the spirit of gluttony before. Further, in the empirical order it is possible to pass from the attack of more spiritual thoughts again to the lower ones. And so, the demon of vainglory, as we shall see, often gives way to the demon of impurity or sadness (Pr. 13), while the demon of pride, the last after which theoretically no other should appear, often stimulates the attacks of sadness and anger. However, there is no fundamental contradiction between these orders. If a monk follows the path of cleansing the passionate part of the soul, then conquering the first six passionate thoughts one after another brings him to a state of impassibility. In such a state, it is easy to seek human recognition for overcoming the hardships of asceticism, and if the monk succumbs to this temptation without receiving praise from people, he falls into sorrow or comforts himself with sins against purity. Similarly, one who succumbs to the demon of pride will sooner or later discover the truth that he alone is not the only source of his successes, and this can arouse in him anger or sadness. In the order of experience, thoughts do not always attack successively one after the other from gluttony to pride, but often in practice a man is tempted with three temptations at the same time on three different levels: gluttony in the concupiscible part, anger in the irascible part, and vanity in the rational part of the soul. There is, as I wrote above, a cause-and-effect relationship between individual thoughts, but it is not a simple relationship that results only from the sequence of individual thoughts. The basis of all eight thoughts are the three major ones: gluttony, greed, and seeking human glory (vanity). Gluttony gives birth to impurity, and all three, that is gluttony, impurity and greed, give rise to anger or sadness. When the passionate part of the soul is not yet purified enough to not give birth to one of these five thoughts, then it is attacked by acedia, a painful tearing of the human soul at the same time through concupiscibility and irascibility. Acedia does not concern only some part of the soul, 121 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 59; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 638–40; Sinkewicz (2003), 108.
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but attacks the entire passionate part of the soul. If the whole passionate part of the soul is purified, then man experiences a state of impassibility. Then vanity appears as a search for human glory for the one’s ascetic efforts, or pride, that is, the attribution to oneself of the victories over demons. Vanity, however, can also be born at a lower level, when the monk effectively resists gluttony and impurity or values himself based on the wealth he achieves. There is, in truth, a connection between the order of passionate thoughts in Evagrius’ catalog and parts of the soul, but not in the way that Schiwietz or Thunberg have proposed.122 The attribution of individual thoughts to the various parts of the soul is clearly confirmed by Cassian (Collationes XIV,15) and Maximus the Confessor (Kephalaia I,65–67), who developed the reflection of Evagrius in this regard. In the treatise of Practicus, the monk of Pontus clearly distinguishes between the thoughts of the concupiscible and irascible parts of the soul, though he does not assign specific thoughts to them.123 However, he does so in many other texts, he writes directly or indirectly writing about the opposite virtues; hence it is easy to see that γαστριμαργία, πορνεία and φιλαργυρία are perceived as being born in the concupiscible part of a soul, while λύπη and ὀργή are associated with the irascible part of the soul.124 Further, acedia is described as a thought that concerns the entire passionate part of the soul, while nowhere do we find the explicit statement that κενοδοξία and ὑπερηφανία attack the rational part of the soul.125 Even if we do not find a straightforward statement in the Pontian theologian’s text, it is easy to deduce it from the context of all his ascetic doctrine. We can conclude indirectly: since there are eight major passionate thoughts and the six previous ones concern the passionate part of the soul, logically the other two, vanity and pride will concern the rational part of it. This is also indirectly confirmed by the excerpt from the treatise On Thoughts, in which Evagrius, considering the subject of passionate dreams, states that when demons are unable to awaken the anchorites lust and anger at night, then they shape dreams of vain glory, i.e. dreams that appear after those previous ones. If dreams about vainglory take place after lustful and vicious dreams, then we can rightly assume that this is also the case with passionate thoughts, that is, vanity and pride would be the thoughts of the rational part of the soul. When the anchorite overcomes the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul, then he begins to experience the state of impassibility. Let us now see more clearly how Evagrius understood this state. 1.1.3.
Impassibility (ἀπάθεια)
Although the Greek term ἀπάθεια was used both in earlier pagan and Christian literature, we owe its basically new understanding to Evagrius.126 However, in order 122 123 124 125 126
Cf. Schiwietz (1906), 268; Thunberg (1965), 265. Cf. Practicus 54; Sinkewicz (2003), 107. Cf. Practicus 15; 16; 17; 23; 24; 35; 84; 86; 89. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 93–94, note 3. Cf. Rüther (1990); Brady (1932), col. 727–47; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 98–112; Joest (1993), 7–53; Nieścior (1996–1997), 105–33; Tabon (2010b).
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to accurately determine the meaning that the Pontian monk gave to the term ἀπάθεια and describe the essence of the concept of impassibility, we must briefly reconstruct the earlier use of this idea. We will do this by referring to the understanding of the category of πάθος both by Evagrius and his predecessors. There is widespread conviction by researchers on Christian antiquity that the understanding of the term πάθος in the ethical sense began with ancient Greek philosophy. Frohnhofen distinguishes four basic philosophical meanings of it:127 everything that happens to a human being, especially painful events; soul experience; sensations and sensory experiences caused by external factors that are painful and cause suffering; and an ethically negative movement of the soul beyond measure. In the philosophical reflection of the Stoics, the third and fourth understandings of πάθος – as sensory experiences induced by external factors and exaggerated, contrary to reason, movement of the soul – prevailed.128 Another understanding of it was presented by Ware. According to him we can see in ancient Greek philosophy two trends of understanding this term. Stoics perceived this state as a disorderly and exaggerated movement of the soul, while Plato and Aristotle as ethically neutral experiences of the irrational part of the soul such as joy, sadness, anger, etc. which, depending on the attitude of a person, take on a positive or negative character.129 Ware’s proposal does not really contribute much to the discussion of the sources of the patristic use of this idea, because it come back to two (the second and fourth) understandings out of the four proposed by Frohnhofen. Frohnhofen’s conclusions show us that the term πάθος or the idea itself was understood in pre-Christian antiquity in four different ways and the boundaries of each of these meanings were not always clearly defined. Although Ware claimed that in later patristic literature the negative, Stoic understanding of πάθος as a disorderly movement of the soul prevails,130 it is more true to say that in different forms there are all four meanings of the term distinguished by Frohnhofen.131 From the perspective of our analysis, the most important is the conclusion that the understanding of πάθος in ancient Greek philosophy can be reduced to essentially two: disordered desire which is the understanding that prevailed among the Stoics, and ethically neutral soul expericences in the Platonic-Aristotelian conception. In the New Testament, our term appears only three times in the Letters of Saint Paul (Rom. 1:26, Col. 3:5, 1 Thess. 4:5) and this in the sense of erotic passion. The Apostolic Fathers apply the third understanding of πάθος, as the unpleasant and painful sensations caused by external factors, to the Passion of Christ.132 The first Christian author who develops a broader reflection on the subject of understanding
127 Cf. Frohnhofen (1987), 25–45. 128 Even if they do not always equate such a condition with a disease of the soul, but, for example Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae III,7, “anxiety”. 129 Cf. Ware (1989), 315–22. 130 Such an understanding appears in his opinion already with Philo, Evagrius, Gregory of Nyssa and John Climacus, while a more positive understanding of Plato and Aristotle only in a few fathers, such as Abba Isaiah, Theodoret of Cyrus or Maximus the Confessor. 131 Cf. Nieścior (1998), 46. 132 Cf. Frohnhofen (1987), 39.
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πάθος was Clement of Alexandria, who made a synthesis between the biblical teaching and previous philosophical concepts, especially Stoic ones. Clement takes over three of the four meanings given to our term in pre-Christian literature:133 σωματικὰ πάθη, i.e., passions or otherwise corporal needs necessary for life, such as desire for food, drink, sleep, etc.; ψυχικὰ πάθη or movements of the soul like joy, sadness, anger, etc.; and such movements of desire that elude the control of reason.134 While the first two are, in some sense, an activity in accordance with the psycho-physical nature of a human being, the third meaning refers to an action contrary to the rational nature of a human being, where passion and not reason directs human life. Only the passion in this third sense, which is the movement of the soul contrary to the rational nature of man, is a disease of the soul. Clement explains its beginning with the original fall of man, when the desire for pleasure, ethically neutral in itself, transgressed a boundry by generating lust, a passion (ἐπιθυμία) opposed to the mind.135 From this original situation, a permanent illness of the human soul arose, the essence of which relies on an exaggerated, irrational desire or even a desire for something that is inherently good in nature. This initial split of a man into rational desires, that is, those in accordance with the nature of man and his passionate contradictions, weakened his psycho-spiritual construction so much that it now very easily produces similar divergences. Clement, although he knew the other meanings of the term πάθος in ancient Greek philosophy, nevertheless focused more on this very last understanding, or passion as a moral disease of the soul, which looks for pleasure in a crazy and exaggerated way and succumbs to impulses. We find a similar triple understanding of our term in the theology of Basil the Great, who perceived it as physical suffering, as a natural experience of the soul and finally as a disease of the soul, that is, a passion running against the spirit.136 As it is easy to imagine, the four ways of understanding the term πάθος indicate the possibility of a quadruple understanding of the same impassibility. For the Stoics, it meant the ideal of total freedom from the four main passions: fear, sadness, pleasure and desire.137 In ancient Christian literature, to the contrary, two understandings of impassibility prevail: as non-sensitivity to sensory experiences caused by external factors, and as freedom from the movements of the soul.138 Christian authors of the second century refer the term ἀπάθεια to the impassibility of God and the Logos incarnate. Justin perceived it as an attribute of God only and identified it with immortality, which would be available to man only after his resurrection. According to Frohnhofen, the ancient Greek philosophers were convinced that such non-susceptibility to external factors occurs in three cases: a divine being who does not have a soul experiencing such sensations; a being that has, indeed, a soul, but does not experience sensual movements that stir up passions; a being that has a soul and experiences sensual 133 134 135 136 137 138
Cf. Rüther (1949), 56. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II,13,59,6; VI,9,71–74. Cf. Stromata II,20,119,3; VI,11,66,2; Protraepticus XI,111. Cf. Dirking (1954), 202–12. Cf. Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae III,7; III,23. Cf. Nieścior (1998), 48.
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movements, but which do not affect the soul anymore.139 Only in the third case could one speak of a certain imperturbability to the disturbances caused by external factors. For Christian authors, it is obvious that total non-sensitivity to external sensations is only possible for God, and ἀπάθεια in this sense would remain the property of the divine mode of existence. It is obvious, then, that for a man such a condition is impossible to achieve here on earth, but only after resurrection in eternal life, while here on the earth he can at most fight for temperance (ἐγκράτεια).140 Because man has a soul, he might not experience sensory shifts or experience them so that they do not affect him directly. Many of the Church Fathers treated the term ἀπάθεια as a description of the proper condition for God, while the impassibility of man was expressed by the term ἀταραξία. This is confirmed even by Vita Antonii, where ἀπάθεια was treated as an attribute of God, and the ideal of monastic life was ἀταραξία. Basil the Great referred the term ἀπάθεια exclusively to God and identified it with the absence of any evil passions, and Cassian avoids the term itself by replacing it with the Latin tranquillitas or puritas cordis.141 In addition to referring to the perfect impassibility of God, ἀπάθεια in ancient Christianity it was also understood as the ideal of monastic life, an ideal that is also available to man in some measure. The first Christian author who presented impassibility in such a way was Clement of Alexandria. Before him, we find a similar understanding of impassibility in the writings of Philo, who made a kind of synthesis between philosophical understanding of the term and the biblical tradition, perceiving in it more generally the ideal of ascetic life.142 Clement transferred this understanding of impassibility into ancient Christianity, making it the ideal of ascetic and monastic life. He treated it as a characteristic of God, to which man can approach due to the ascetic effort and the help of God’s grace. Its essence was seen in the removal of or total lack of passion, such as concupiscibility (ἐπιθυμία) and irascibility (θυμός). God by nature does not have such passions, but man acquired them after original sin, and now he can get rid of them through the grace of God and his own ascetic efforts. Clement, being more inspired by the Stoic tradition, identified concupiscibility with sinful passions and impassibility with their total elimination. One could, however, rightly ask whether such total liberation is possible at all and how should it be understood? The Stoics, who described πάθος as disordered desire, understood by impassibility its complete extermination, whereas in the Platonic-Aristotelian conception, where πάθος was perceived as morally neutral, the ideal was self-control (μετριοπάθεια), proper use, and not total elimination. The difference between these concepts was in fact a moral assessment of desires: the Stoics regarded them as morally evil, whereas the Platonic-Aristotelian regarded them as morally neutral, considering only their use consistent incompatible with nature and subject to moral evaluation. Philo, however, oscillates between the understanding of impassibility as a total destruction
139 140 141 142
Cf. Frohnhofen (1987), 34-42. Cf. Dirking (1954), 206–10. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont, (1971) 103, note 5. Cf. Philo of Alexandria, Legum allegoriae II,100–02; III,129-132; Mondésert (1961–1968), 158–61.
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of passions and a limitation of their impact on human life (μετριοπάθεια).143 Clement of Alexandria, for his part, emphasized that limitation (μετριοπάθεια) is an ideal for philosophers, while the Christian ascetic should go further by striving for temperance (ἐγκράτεια), that is, not succumbing to passions at all, and even for impassibility, i.e., total freedom from them. In spite of the radicalism of his proposal, Clement allowed that the desire to consume food or drink and the sexual impulse, for example, remain in Christian gnostic,144 and he identified impassibility with the riddance of passions arising from disorderly pleasure.145 Contrary to the Gnostics he accepted that passions such as the desire for food, drink, or sexual needs are part of human nature and as such are good, since they remain even in the Christian gnostic and cannot be completely eradicated from human nature. On the other hand, the goal would be the riddance of the desire that arises from unordered passions, that is, those opposed to nature. Evagrius, like his predecessors also knew these various meanings of the term πάθος, such as suffering or bodily disease (De mal. 8), natural movements or soul experiences (De mal. 21); in other texts he described it as “illusory pleasure” (Ep. 60) or the passion of a carnal man (Ad Eulogium 23). The Guillaumonts rightly suggest that the many similarities in their understanding of impassibility clearly show that it was Clement, not Origen, who was a direct inspiration for the reflection of the Pontian monk. Origen described impassibility as a combination of the evangelical ideal of the perfection of Christian life understood as full of virtues, and the ideal of philosophical perfection, that is, freeing oneself from all passions, and he did not connect it directly with the ascetic and monastic life.146 There is no doubt that Evagrius was inspired by Clement’s reflection, not on the basis of pure imitation, but rather in a creative dialogue, and he clarified many specific issues concerning a deeper understanding of impassibility.147 From Clement, therefore, he accepted the ethical understanding of passion as a disease of the soul, which consists of an evil, that is, the use of the faculties of the soul against nature, which leads to sin by thought or deed. In the treatise On Thoughts, Evagrius himself gives a kind of definition of the passion that is “a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of free will and compelling the mind to make improper use of the creatures of God”.148 So passion is not, let us emphasize it firmly, the good use of God’s gifts or creatures. Passion, nevertheless, according to this text, has two very important features: it is a pleasure that is hostile to the true good of man, and it is born of his free will. Such a passion, which is, of course, pleasant and appears to be good, is in fact the enemy of the true good of man and is described by the Stoics, Clement and Evagrius as a disease of the soul. By submitting to it the soul of man acts against its true nature, that is against the
Like f. ex. Abraham – see Clement of Alexandria, De Abramo 170 n. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II,20,119,1–3; VI,9,71. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata III,7,57,1. Cf. In Matth. 15,17; PG 13,1304A; In Rom. 6,14; PG 14,1102B–C; In Jos. 15,3; SCh 71,342–43; In Joh. 20,28, PG 14,657D. 147 See Nieścior (1998), 52–66. 148 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 19; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 218; Sinkewicz (2003), 166. 143 144 145 146
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established natural moral order. In this sense, for example, sadness or greed are passions against the very nature of the irascible and concupiscible part of the soul (De mal. 2; Pr. 54). The very appearance of thoughts, feelings or passionate desires, as we wrote above, is not always dependent on the will of man, and therefore also does not fall under moral or ethical judgment. However, when the thought, feeling or passionate desire has a consent of human will, it can end in sinful action under their influence. Although they may be aroused by memory, senses, or demons (Capita cognoscitiva 59), it does not depend on us whether these thoughts bother the soul or not, but what depends on man is whether they persist or not, whether they arouse passions or not (Pr. 6). In the aforementioned Scholium to Proverbs 25,20, Evagrius also describes passion with the Greek term κακία which we translate into English as a “vice”. We must, however, remember that this is not about a bad, repetitive act, but an earlier stage, i.e., it is passion that is hostile to the true nature of man. Passions, although not yet a sin, can easily lead to sinful thoughts or actions and to loss of faith in the sense of the struggle for virtue (Scholia in Proverbia 19,5). So, passion in Evagrius’ writings is a certain disorderly attachment or attraction, incompatible with the will of God and the true good of man. It has a permanent state and can be called a spiritual illness that leads from sin in thoughts to sin in deeds. It separates man from God, blinds and enslaves the mind, and hands him over into the power of evil spirits. It results from the misuse of free will and reason and from improper management of the desires. In particular, human memory and the senses take part in its action. They are the mediation of improper thoughts, which when they last longer, transform into passion.149 The mind whose soul has not cleared itself from the thoughts of the passions is capable neither of loving God and neighbor nor of true gnosis about God and prayer, and is subjected to the power of demons. The decision to fight with the passions is really to stand for God and his kingdom, while to succumb to them means agreeing to remain in the power of demons. Passionate relationships with people or things later evoke passionate memories in the soul and push for passionate ideas about the future. The human soul is then torn apart by past passionate memories and future passionate hopes as well as detached from the present. If this situation persists longer, it leads to a specific habit of continuous passionate perception of the surrounding reality, which significantly modifies human perception, creating a fictitious world of precisely passionate memories and hopes. Passionate thoughts cause general confusion and enslave the mind so that it is not able to grow in the knowledge of God. Evagrius perfectly captures this state when some passionate thoughts, playing upon each other, in this way multiply the diseases of the soul (πολυπάθεια) and can lead the person to even confuse the senses (De mal. 22). In today’s language this state is defined as a mental illness or madness, when the passionate desires so to speak “suck” the human mind (heart) into an abyss (De mal. 28) leading to the total or partial disintegration of one’s personality. Modern psychiatrists and psychotherapists are well aware of this state of “possession” by passionate and compulsive thoughts. In the fourth century, Evagrius suggested that 149 Nieścior (1996–1997), 117–18.
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cleansing the soul of passionate thoughts leads to its health, that is, leads to acting in accordance with its original nature and, in modern language, to the reintegration of the human personality. Just as Evagrius is inspired by the Stoic and Clement’s understanding of passion, he also formulates his doctrine of impassibility on the basis of their teachings. However, he does not do this in a purely imitative way, but rather as an inspiration for his own search. The reflection of the Pontian monk on the topic of impassibility is complicated and far from clear. The terminology by which he describes this state is very rich and diverse, but as a common denominator he has the idea of removing passions that stimulate the soul against its nature. So, he writes about “killing”, “destroying”, “removing”, “extermination”, “wiping”, “extinguishing”, “relieving”, “cutting off ”, “moving away”, “rejection” of passion or “escape”, “salvation” from passion. Like Clement, he does not identify ἐγκράτεια with ἀπάθεια, seeing in as the self-control of the body, the basis of all other virtues and the necessary condition of impassibility.150 The goal of the life of Christian ascetic, a true gnostic, is, according to Clement, the knowledge and love of God, not identified with any theoretical knowledge of God or an undetermined sentimentality but with the spiritual knowledge of God. Knowledge and God’s love are mutually determinate in the sense that knowing God leads to loving Him, and love is at the same time the most perfect form of knowledge about Him.151 Similarly, Evagrius sees a close relationship between impassibility, love, and spiritual knowledge (gnosis): “impassibility of which love is the offspring; love is the door to natural knowledge” (Prologue 8 to Practicus). The beginning of spiritual life in man for both authors is faith, while the beginning of ascension is temperance, which is a necessary condition of impassibility, and the last are love and knowledge about God.152 In a few points, however, Evagrius’ teaching is clearly different from that of Clement. While Clement perceived impassibility as a characteristic of God, to which man can approach by ascetic effort and the help of God’s grace, Evagrius perceived it as the ideal of life for man alone.153 For if impassibility for him means healing a part of the passionate and rational part of the soul from its illness so that it is healthy and acts in accordance with its nature (Pr. 56,89), it cannot refer to God who not only does not have a passionate part of the soul, but does not have a soul at all. Clement, more inspired by the Stoic tradition, identified concupiscibility and irascibility with sinful passion, and identified impassibility with their total destruction, although, as we have seen, he allowed for the existence of certain desires and feelings that were naturally good in the spiritually advanced gnostic. Evagrius, to the contrary, with the PlatonicAristotelian tradition, understood by ἐπιθυμία and θυμός their impulses, that is, the neutral moral and natural forces of the soul, distinguishing them from the improper passions incompatible with the nature of their use. Desires are ontically good, an integral part of human nature given to man along with the body after the original fall.
150 151 152 153
Cf. Stromata IV,22,138,1 and Practicus 68. Cf. Stromata II,9,45,1; VI,78,4. Cf. Nieścior (1999b), 65–83. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 107.
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It would be absurd, therefore, to attribute them to God who does not have them at all. In the case of man, though, the aim of asceticism cannot be their destruction but their appropriate use compatible with nature, and speaking even more specifically, the removal of improper use of passions, not passions themselves, which would be an attempt to destroy what in a man is natural, good, and in some sense even necessary to live in the material world. Clement, as we have seen, allowed the existence, even in the Christian gnostic, of certain instincts or affections, which, it seems, he regarded as ontically good; but his teaching lacked the clear distinction between morally neutral impulses and their misuse present in Evagrus. Consequently, impassibility did not mean for the monk of Pontus that he would completely free himself from impulses, feelings, or sensations, but rather free himself from the use of passions that was incompatible with their nature. Clement understood impassibility as a complete deprivation of sinful desires, whereas for Evagrius it was “only” their sinful use because the needs are ontically good. The confusion that prevailed at that time in the assessment of the sphere of passions concerned the lack of distinction between the ontic evaluation related to their existence and the ethical one regarding action under their influence. According to Evagrius, the entire human nature, even if created after the original fall, and therefore with impulses and passions, is ontically good, but these needs may be disordered, i.e. contrary to their nature and used simply to evoke evil passions.154 Passion, however, acts according to its nature when it seeks virtue and when it fights for virtue (Pr. 86). Evagrius writes that the nature of irascibility is the struggle with demons that pulls towards worldly desires and forces fury, but, when it acts against human nature, it fights against the people (Pr. 24). Thus, impassibility will be a liberation from such passion, that is, from the use of passions and desires that is incompatible with nature, not their complete annihilation. So, impassibility is the spiritual state of a man in which he not only does not commit an act but also destroys passionate thoughts; our author often identified it with the purity of his heart. The Pontian monk in some of his texts did not understand this spiritual destruction as a complete removal of passions from human life, but rather as a limitation of their influence or a moderate use of the term (μετριοπάθεια).155 Evagrius, therefore, was not completely free from ambivalence in the presentation of impassibility, similar to that found in the writings of Philo from Alexandria. Scholars studying Evagrian texts very quickly discovered inconsistency in his views, because on the one hand he wrote of impassibility as the complete eradication or removal of all passions from the soul, and on the other hand as only limiting their influence. So they proposed a solomonic solution: that Evagrius, writing about impassibility as a removal of passions, would refer this ideal to monks at a higher level of spiritual perfection, while encouraging beginners or the less perfect to limit the influence of passion on their life.156 In the case of greater spiritual perfection he specified that “The soul possesses impassibility not by virtue of the fact that it
154 Cf. Nieścior (1995), 39–53. 155 Cf. Nieścior (1996–1997), 118–22; Tabon (2010a). 156 Cf. Géhin (1987), 93, note 3; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 679, note 87.
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experiences no passion with respect to objects, but because it remains untroubled even with regard to the memories of them”.157 So it is a more radical way of purification from the passions when the soul is unmoved not only by contact with things or persons, but even by their very memory. Such imperturbability to the thoughts arising from the meeting or even the mere memory of people or things during the day, and at night the lack of dreamlike imaginations is, in Evagrius’ opinion, a sign of health of soul and impassibility.158 And although he sometimes described impassibility as “lack of enemies” (Scholia in Psalmos 17,3), this should not be understood as a complete lack of passionate thoughts, but a state in which they become harmless to the spiritual life of a monk. So, impassibility would not mean an absolute lack of passionate thoughts, but a short and harmless time of being in the soul without any consent of will. This, however, clearly contradicts other Evagrian texts in which he defined impassibility as a total release from the passions. An apparent ambivalence can be explained by the category of moderation and gradation. Passion for Clement of Alexandria is immoderate, and for Evagrius simply incompatible with nature. So, the first degree of impassibility would be to free oneself from this immoderate and inconsistent use of them. This would be about the negative aspect of the whole process, i.e. liberation from the evil use of the ontically good sphere of passions, and this state could be described as imperfect impassibility. The second step, as postulated by Géhin, would be reserved for advanced people in the spiritual life and would mean a positive aspect of the process, that is, use of passions in a moderate way according to a measure determined by God’s ontic and moral order, as well as individual choices of man and in accordance with their nature, that is, the passion for virtue and the fight for it. There is no doubt, however, that it was thanks to the teaching of the Pontian monk that the ideal of impassibility became popular in later Christian ascetic literature and inspired the ascetic reflection in the monastic life of the East throughout the following centuries. In the West, impassibility was treated rather suspiciously as a result of criticism by Jerome, who mistakenly identified it with impassibilitias and impeccantia.159 However, we must remember that Jerome saw the sources of both Arianism and Pelagianism precisely in Origenism, and from the perspective of these assumptions, he was not quite right in his interpretation of Evagrius’ teaching on impassibility, as we shall see. He identified impassibility with impeccantia or impassibilitas, accusing Evagrius of wanting to make man an insensitive stone or sinless god (vel saxum vel
157 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 67; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 652; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. 158 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 16; Sinkewicz (2003), 163–64. 159 Jerome, Epistula 133; Hilberg (1910–1918), 246: Evagrius Ponticus Hiborita qui scribit ad virgines, scribit ad monachos, scribit ad eam, cuius nomen nigridinis testatur perfidiae tenebras, edidit librum et sententiae περὶ ἀπάθειαν quam nos impassibilitatem vel imperturbationem possumus dicere, quando numquam animus ulla cogitatione et vitio commovetur et, ut simpliciter dicam, vel saxum vel deus est. We can find a similar idea in Contra Pelagianos (PL 23,496 A) and Commentarius in Prophetae Ieremiae IV,1 (Reiter (1925), 220–21) […] Cum subito Phytagorae et Zenonis ἀπαθείας et ἁναμαρτίας id est impassibilitas et impeccantiae, quae olim in Origene et dudum in discipulis eius Grunnio Evagrioque Pontico et Ioviniano iugulata est, coepit reviviscere […].
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deus est).160 Evagrius, as we have seen, did not at all identify impassibility with the state of modern apathy, insensitivity, or – psychologically speaking – with the repression of feelings or emotions. If he claimed that love is the daughter of impassibility, he still assumed the existence of some emotional component in this state. Further, he clearly distinguished between lusts, desires and passions. The first ones, which were given to man only after the original fall at the moment God gave him a bodily structure, are ontically good and morally neutral, while the latter, although neutral in themselves, are the result of man’s decision to use lusts and desires in a wrong way, not according to their nature, and are subject to moral evaluation. Impassibility according to Evagrius consists in freeing oneself from the passions, because it is impossible to free oneself from the desires that in the present state belong to the nature of man. Jerome did not understand this subtle distinction, or Evagrius’ teaching reached him already in some distorted form, since he identified impassibility with the will to be freed of any lust and desire. While on the one hand the lack of distinction between lusts, desires, and passions led to the identification of impassibility with insensitivity or an attempt to make man a stone, on the other hand, the identification of passion itself with sin led to the understanding of impassibility as impeccantia, or a divine state. It is worth remembering that Jerome used the term impeccantia which, as Bunge notes, in his day referred to a Pelagian teaching about the possibility of reaching a state of sinlessness on one’s own strength without the help of God’s grace.161 He applied this Pelagian idea to the concept of Evagrian impassibility, seeing in it the influence of Origen and the sources of Pelagian heresy. The absurdity of this objection becomes obvious if we remember that Evagrius is inspired more by Clement of Alexandria, than by Origen, who used the Greek term ἀπάθεια very sporadically. Jerome, as L. Nieścior aptly points out, did not fully understood Evagrius’ teaching on this subject, mixing it with the Stoic ideal of dispassion with the Pelagian teaching of sinlessness. Pelagians themselves, by identifying ἀπάθεια with impeccantia did a disservice to the very idea and to the term itself, which would be avoided at any cost by later Christian authors such as John Cassian, replacing it with puritas cordis.162 In the spiritual doctrine of Evagrius, impassibility meant neither a Stoic lack of any desires (insensitivity) nor sinlessness understood in a Pelagian way, i.e. achieved solely by ascetic effort. There is no doubt that, according to the Pontian monk, ascetic practice, although a spiritual method of purifying the passionate part of the soul, still remains ineffective without the help of God’s grace. What is more important in this context is another question: can a monk even through the ascetic effort and the help of God’s grace be able to achieve a state of impassibility understood as sinlessness? It is true that Evagrius, distinguishing clearly between ἐγκράτεια and ἀπάθεια, emphasized that ἐγκράτεια means taking away sin by
160 I depeend this aspect presenting contribution Impassibilitas et impeccantia. Jerome’s misunderstanding of impassiblity and silnessness in Evagrius Ponticus during International Conference Heornymus noster in Ljubljana in October 2018 (forthcoming in Bogoslovny Vestnik). 161 Cf. Bunge (1986), 24–54. 162 Cf. Nieścior (1998), 59–61; Driscoll (1999), 141–59.
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deed, while ἀπάθεια “destroys spiritually passionate thoughts” (De mal. 35). Hence the conviction that ἐγκράτεια means taking away sin by deed, and ἀπάθεια letting go sin with thoughts.163 However, the question remains whether such a condition is at all possible to be achieved here on earth. In the reflection of our monk we see a certain ambivalence. On the one hand, he in fact defines impassibility as the destruction of passionate thoughts, treating it as possible to be achieved here on earth and as inviolable or difficult to change (see f. ex. In Proverbia 18,16); on the other hand, he evokes examples of biblical figures who achieved such a state, but then fell again (see In Psalmos 30,22). He also stressed that it is impossible to completely free oneself from the passions or attacks of demons, because “demons that govern spiritual passions persist stubbornly with a man until death” (Pr. 36). I think that a way to solve this issue will be found in the definition of impassibility as a spiritual destruction of passionate thoughts. What does this mean? If we remember that passions are born from our use of ontically good desires in a way contrary to nature, the spiritual destruction of passions would mean restoring their natural function to them, that is, striving for virtue and fighting for it. So one could talk about good passions, which would be a kind of passionate use of desires in pursuit of virtue and the fight for it, and evil passions, that is, using them contrary to their nature. What is important here is not the very term “passion” as a causative ability to use the natural movements of the soul, but whether these movements work in harmony or against their nature. Impassibility would be a liberation from the evil use of passions, that is, from the use of desires against their nature, and not the lack of any passion at all. Evagrius defines this state as “the health of the soul”,164 and if we would define sin as a use of desires against their nature, then impassibility would be a liberation from such sinful use. Such a condition is possible for man to achieve here on earth, but it is never permanent. The monk of Pontus thus seems to clearly distinguish between the possibility of reaching a state of impassibility, i.e. freeing oneself from the sinful use of desires incompatible with nature, and its durability. Then the apparent ambivalence in the teaching of Evagrius disappears: it is possible to achieve the state of sinlessness and it is relatively stable, but it is not inviolable in the absolute sense. As long as man lives on earth, everything is reversible in his life. And just as for the Stoics impassibility meant the ideal of total release from the four main passions: fear, sorrow, pleasure, and desire,165 so for Evagrius it is combined with overcoming the eight passionate thoughts.166 A monk reaches the state of impassibility after overcoming the first six passionate thoughts, and he completes it with the eradication of the last two, vanity and pride, because these eight thoughts are the basis for every other sin by thought or deed. The Pontian theologian, therefore, identifies the state of impassibility with the health of the soul, and it is the percondition is the gaining of all other virtues. The virtues born in the rational part are: prudence (φρόνησις), cleverness (σύνησις) and
163 164 165 166
Cf. Somos (1999), 365–73. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 56; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 630–32; Sinkewicz (2003), 107. Cf. Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae III,7; III,23. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 98–112; Joest (1993), 7–53; Nieścior (1996–1997), 130.
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wisdom (σοφία); in the irascible part: bravery (ἀνδρεία) and persistence (ὑπομονή), in the concupiscible: restraint (σωφροσύνη), love (ἀγάπη) and temperance (ἐγκράτεια); while in all three parts (inclinations) of the soul justice is born. Prudence leads the fight against demons, shields virtues, defies the flaws and disposes of what is morally indifferent; cleverness directs all harmoniously to the goal; wisdom contemplates bodily and non-corporeal beings. Further, restraint teaches us to look dispassionately at things that evoke bad images, and temperance rejects all the pleasures of the palate. Finally, the task of bravery is to be unafraid of enemies and to remain firm in face of dangers of love; to love all people of God; and justice, to lead all parts of the soul to harmony (Pr. 89). Thus, the state of impassibility does not mean getting rid of the passionate part of the soul or the body connected with it, because in the present life on earth it is impossible, but rather the restoration of their natural power of action. As we have seen before, although the body and soul were secondarily created by the original fall of the mind, they are a gift of God and are good by nature. Evagrius opposed the treatment of the body and passionate desires in the Manichean way, emphasizing that they are the tools that help the monk exercise asceticism to come to know God. It is through the mediation of the body that the impassibility of the soul is reached and contemplation of beings takes place. There is, therefore, no place for an exaggerated asceticism of the body which easily turns into subtle contempt for it (Pr. 53). Evagrius, therefore, distinguished between impassibility which was only possible in the case of corporeal creatures, cleansed of their passion from the material imperfection proper to God.167 The state of impassibility brings man closer to the way of angelic existence, but with the difference that he still remains in the human body. If, as we have seen before, the passions make themselves present with the help of thoughts, memories, or impressions, and although they are not yet sinful, can become the sources of sin, impassibility in the sense of not succumbing to the sources of sin would lead to sinlessness. This sinlessness cannot be understood as a complete lack of attack on the part of passionate thoughts or memories or as a short-lived and harmless arrival in the soul, but as a complete and conscious rejection of their remaining in the human soul that could lead to sin in thoughts and then in deeds. The key question for Evagrius is the decision of the human will that allows the passionate thoughts to enter into the souls and then remain in it. He underlines that what is needed is the same decision of the human will in words and in heart, because only such decision opens to God’s help and brings spiritual fruit. He warns against the difference between words and heart decision that many people do not realize. He also emphasizes that achieving a state of impassibility is impossible without God’s help, nor is it an absolutely permanent state, unchanging or irreversible, that it can easily be destroyed.168 Impassibility is not achieved by shortcuts or some kind of voluntarism, but slowly and gradually thanks to the fight with eight passionate thoughts. It is a state, or better, a process subjected to a certain gradation, which develops as
167 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 107. 168 Cf. Practicus 53 C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 620; Sinkewicz (2003), 107; Scholia in Ecclesiasten 6,1–6, Géhin (1993), 140–44.
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if in parallel with the practice of asceticism. The various grades of impassibility are thus achieved after victory over each individual demon, or one of the three parts (inclinations) of the soul. He wrote that the demons of the concupiscible part of the soul, that is, the carnal ones (gluttony, impurity and greed), leave earlier, while those who are responsible for spiritual passions (vanity and pride) persist to the end of human life. The universal, human experience teaches that it is very difficult to free man from vanity and pride. Writing about degrees of impassibility, Evagrius distinguishes between perfect and imperfect impassibility: Perfect impassibility emerges in the soul after the victory over all the demons that oppose the practical life. Imperfect impassibility refers to the relative strength of the demon still fighting against it.169 This text clearly implies that it is possible to achieve a state of perfect dispassion after victory over all eight demons. This state is rather rare and is achieved thanks to the grace of God and personal asceticism. So, impassibility is a state of being free from all passions, diseases of the soul that are born from use against the original nature of mind, will, senses, and body. It does not mean the absence of any attack on the part of thoughts, imaginations, or passionate memories, but an inner state of man’s will when he does not consciously and voluntarily give consent to the passions to stay any longer in the soul. It leads to release from sins committed not only in deeds but also in thoughts. And although according to Evagrius it is possible to achieve it on earth, it is never a permanent and irreversible state. On the psychological level, though, impassibility is a state of experiencing deep inner harmony and integration of the human personality. Let’s see now closer the signs of impassibility. In the second part of the Practicus, Evagrius also presents the hallmarks of the approach of impassibility. To this end, he first distinguishes two states of peace in soul: There are two peaceful states of the soul, one arising from natural seeds, the other resulting from the retreat of the demons. Accompanying the first you have humility and compunctions, tears, an Infinite longing for the divine and an immeasurable zeal for work; and accompanying the second you have vainglory and pride at the destruction of the other demons, and this in turn drags the monk down. Therefore, one who observes the limits of the former state will more quickly recognize the incursions of the demons.170 The Pontian monk allowed for the possibility of reaching a state of impassibility by practicing the natural virtues sown in the soul of every human being, which were not completely destroyed even by the original fall. The second state appears when the demons of the passionate part of the soul including acedia retreat, giving up the monk to the passionate thoughts of the rational part of the soul, or vanity and pride. To one such a state of peace of the soul, there easily erises a temptation to seek human
169 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 60; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 640; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. 170 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 57; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 634; Sinkewicz (2003), 107–08.
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recognition for one’s own ascetic hardships or even attribute to oneself and as a result to bypass the grace of God. Evagrius does not, however, call these two states impassibility, but understands them as an earlier stage, describing it as a κατάστασις. The one who approaches the boundaries of impassibility is also able “to knock out one nail with another” and his mind “found strength to annihilate the thoughts of the demons by means of human thoughts”.171 It requires, however, a perfect knowledge of the methods of action of individual demons and their mutual dependence. For example, because the demon of vanity opposes the demon of impurity and it is impossible for them to attack the soul at the same time, Evagrius encourages a monk to evoke the thoughts of the opposing demon (Pr. 58). Such a tactic of driving away demonic thoughts with the help of human thought does not mean impassibility, it only brings closer to it. The sign of a very deep impassibility is, however, the ability to repel passionate thoughts, for example, thoughts of vainglory by humbleness, and thoughts of impurity by self-control. Depending on how a person deals with passionate thoughts, he will discover whether he is at the beginning or in a state of deeper impassibility. Further, another sign of impassibility is that one does not experience passion related not only to the people or things that one encounters and is not even moved to mention them (Pr. 67). Speaking in a more contemporary language, it is about freeing oneself from compulsive desires for people and things. Moreover, it is not only about meeting people or using present things, but also about memories of them from the past. For if a man can no longer possess people or things as he did in the past, then he comforts himself with remembrance of past associations. So, impassibility would mean not only to free oneself from present thoughts or passionate desires, but also from passionate memories. Yet another hallmark of impassibility are dreams. Just as during the day the state of impassibility can be recognized thanks to our thoughts, so likewise during the night thanks to dreams.172 Not all dreams, however, specifies Evagrius, are a sign of the lack of impassibility: When the natural movements of the body during sleep are free of images, they reveal that the soul is healthy to a certain extent. The formation of images is an indication of ill health.173 So if the natural movements of the body, e.g., related to sexual needs, are not accompanied by erotic images, it is a sign of impassibility. The images that appears are a sign of the presence of passion, that is, the disease of the soul. We should, however, to distinguish between blurred images that do not necessarily exclude impassibility from explicit images that are a symptoms of a “fresh wound” (Pr. 55). All the above-mentioned elements are not so much indications of achieving a state of static impassibility, but rather of approaching it, which is a certain dynamic process. The symptoms of impassibility are most fully revealed in the human mind: “It
171 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 58; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 634; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. 172 Cf. Practicus 56; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 634; Sinkewicz (2003), 107. 173 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 55; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 628; Sinkewicz (2003), 107.
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is a proof of impassibility when the mind has begun to see its own light and remains still before the apparitions which occur during sleep and looks upon objects with serenity”.174 Plato’s idea of the mind’s perception of its own light during prayer was close to Evagrius’, for the monk of Pontus returns to it in his various works.175 For us at this moment, however, two other elements of this text are more important: the fact that the mind in the state of impassibility is calm both during sleep and while awake in view of the surrounding reality, i.e., in the dream experiences no more than blurred images, and in the meeting of people, things, or events the experience of peace.176 Of course, this is not about any state of amnesia caused by the repression or “hardening” of the feelings, but a state of dispassion in the sense of an evangelical view of the present and remembrance of the past. Then also the mind “begins to practise prayer without distraction” (Pr. 63) and “it imagines nothing of the things of this world during the time of prayer” (Pr. 65).177 When the passionate part of the soul is purified and the monk resists the temptation of vanity and pride, then his mind is able to realize its natural function, that is, to pray and grow in God’s knowledge.178 Evagrius’ idea of impassibility, as we have seen, is definitely more subtle than that of Jerome. The Pontian theologian wrote about imperfect impassibility or about reaching “the limits of impassibility” (Pr. 58) available to all who practice asceticism, and perfect dispassion (“eating the bread of angels” – KG I,23) available only to the few who approach the angelic rather than the divine state of existence and is the goal for which one aims throughout life.179 Although impassibility is the primary goal of ascetic practice, it does not end the whole process of spiritual growth in man, but only prepares him for an even more noble task – spiritual knowledge. In Prologue 8 to the Practicus treatise, Evagrius wrote that the daughter of impassibility is love and “love is the gate to the knowledge of nature”. Therefore, the ultimate goal of all ascetic practice is love, because it is the one that opens the gates of knowing the true nature of created beings and God Himself: The end of the practical life (praktike) is love, of knowledge theology; they have their respective beginnings in faith and natural contemplation.180
174 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 64; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 648; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. 175 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 2; Muyldermans (1931), 38 “If someone should want to behold the state of his mind, let him deprive himself of all mental representations, and then he shall behold himself resembling sapphire or the colour of heaven (cf. Ex 24:9–11). It is impossible to accomplish this without impassibility” (Sinkewicz (2003), 211); the longer version of Gnosticus 148 (the text survived in Socrates Historia Ecclesiastica IV,23 (PG 67,520) “This second type of knowledge (i.e. spiritual) is only able to be experienced by dispassionate people who, during prayer, contemplate the light of their own mind enlightening them”. 176 Cf. Hausherr (1933), 321–25; Beyer (1981), 473–512; Guillaumont (1984), 255–62; Guillaumont (1983), 591–95; Bertrand (1999), 355–63. Evagrius’ teaching on the mind which sees its own light in prayer, also influenced the later monastic reflection – cf. Alfeyev (1997), 229–38; Harmless – Fitzgerald (2001), 498–529; Misiarczyk (2016), 273–97. 177 Cf. Stewart (2001), 173–204. 178 Cf. McGinn (2003), 76. 179 C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 110; Linge, (2000) 537–68. 180 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 84; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 674; Sinkewicz (2003), 111.
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The act of love is “all the images of God, showing one another as much as the prototype […]” (Pr. 89). Christ-like love is a kind of “divine” way of treating other people. There is a kind of interaction between impassibility and love; on the one hand love is the daughter of impassibility while on the other love leads to it (Pr. 91). Evagrius, of course, does not set any rigid boundaries between impassibility and love, because there are no such boundaries. He clearly wrote that love also acts when a person has not yet reached full impassibility and is in the process of purifying the irascible part of the soul. Impassibility is the best remedy for anger and passions which are definitely more difficult to overcome than those of the concupiscible part of the soul like gluttony, impurity, and greed. Love is obviously not a closed stage of a monk’s life, but rather a lifelong task. No one is threatened with the excess of love of God and neighbor. It is expressed exteriorly in the attitude of gentleness (Ep. 56,5), which is the most perfect form of imitating Christ, “a silent and humble heart”. Gentleness, which is actually identified with love, is also the most powerful weapon to fight the demon of anger, which most obscures the human mind and makes it impossible to know God. Just as there is no rigid line between impassibility and love, neither is there a precise distinction as to when the ascetic practice ends and the gnostic stage begins. Both stages interpenetrate and overlap in some areas, so that the gnostic stage already begins when a person approaches the boundaries of impassibility or experiences it still incompletely, imperfectly, while the ascetic practice continues until perfect spiritual knowledge is achieved. For when an anchorite experiences the beginnings of impassibility, he also begins to experience, as we saw above, so-called pure prayer and the beginnings of spiritual gnosis, which are hallmarks of true impassibility. Spiritual knowledge and pure prayer complete the final purification of the soul, for the mere fulfillment of the commandments is not enough for perfect healing of the soul’s powers unless the appropriate thoughts appear in the mind.181 And although the health of the soul is impassibility, its food is knowledge (Pr. 56). Thus, the final stage of cleansing the soul in the ascetic practice is the beginning of spiritual gnosis, which refines and deepens impassibility and nourishes the soul of a human being, preparing it for natural contemplation and contemplation of God which are already some kind of mystical experience. In the following, we will briefly present the γνωστική stage.
2.
Spiritual Knowledge (γνωστική)
We have seen before that the γνωστική begins when the monk approaches the limits of impassibility, and spiritual gnosis perfects even more the purification of the soul, which cannot be fully accomplished by πρακτική. As we know, Evagrius understood spiritual life as an ordering not only of behavior, but also of thoughts, desires and ideas of a human being. This is done at the πρακτική level and extends also to γνωστική. At the stage of ascetic practice, this is done by keeping the commandments, physical 181 Cf. Practicus 79; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 666; Sinkewicz (2003), 110.
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work, individual and communal prayer, gaining virtues opposed to individual passions, reading the Holy Scriptures, and using the antirhetical method to fight demons, fasting, vigil, almsgiving, and guidance by the spiritual director. If the monk experiences this stage fruitfully, he comes to the limits of impassibility and love, entering the path of a deeper knowledge of both created reality and God himself. Conversely, at the stage of γνωστική, this ordering of thoughts, desires and imaginations takes place thanks to the knowledge of the spiritual reasons for the existence of the created world and the knowledge of God Himself. Evagrius wrote: The mind cannot see “the place of God” within itself, unless it has transcended all the mental representations associated with objects. Nor will it transcend them, if it has not put off the passions that bind it to sensible objects through mental representations. And it will lay aside the passions through the virtues, and simple thoughts through spiritual contemplation; and this in turn it will lay aside when there appears to it the light.182 In this text, Evagrius even emphasizes that ascetic practice, focused on the freeing of passionate thoughts and acquiring virtues, leads only to the freeing of the mind from imaginations and sensations related to sensual perception, while the final release from the thoughts only takes place thanks to spiritual knowledge. He also adds that the “praktikos is one who is concerned solely with the achievement of perfect freedom in the portion of the soul subject to compulsions” (Gn. 2), but the gnostic is someone who has also purified the rational part of the soul (Gn. 49).183 We have seen earlier that it is the achievement of impassibility and love that introduces a monk to the stage of spiritual gnosis which, in turn, according to what we read in Prologue 8 to the Practicus treatise, divides into “knowledge of nature” and “theology”: “Love is the door to natural knowledge, which is followed by theology and ultimate blessedness”.184 This knowledge of nature (γνῶσις φυσική), however, cannot be understood as modern physics, which studies the material world, nor can theology (θεολογία) be understood in the sense of modern theology as a methodical reflection on the mysteries of God. Evagrius, as we shall see soon, understood by “the knowledge of nature” the knowledge of the spiritual reasons of the material world, while by “theology” he understood the contemplation of God Himself. The monk presented these three steps in the Practicus treatise even more clearly: Christianity is the doctrine of Christ our Savior. It is comprised of the practical, the natural, and the theological.185 Thus, Evagrius describes these two stages of γνωστική as φυσική and θεολογική and defines their essential goals. So, while the goal of the ascetic practice is to purify the mind and achieve impassibility, the goal of physics is to “discover the truth hidden in
182 183 184 185
Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 23; Muyldermans (1931), 40–41; Sinkewicz (2003), 213. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1987), 195–201; Id. (1978–1980), 467–70; J. Konstatinovsky (2009). Evagrius Ponticus, Prologus 8 to Practicus; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 492; Sinkewicz (2003), 96. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 1; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 498; Sinkewicz (2003), 97.
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all beings”, and the goal of theology is “to distance the mind from matter and to turn it towards the First Cause”.186 In the next chapters I will analyze φυσική and θεολογική. 2.1.
Contemplation of the Spiritual rationes of the Material World (φυσική)
When the anchorite reaches a state of impassibility and love, the gate of natural knowledge opens up to him (φυσική). While the ascetic practice is dominated by the ascetic effort of a monk who, through specific ascetic practices, purifies his soul and seeks God, at the stage of knowledge the initiative is taken by God himself, making him contemplative (θεωρητικός, γνωστικός).187 According to Evagrius, man can only reach the gates of spiritual knowledge through asceticism, but only God can lead him further. While he was looking for God before, now he is sought by Him. So, it is not so much about total passivity on the part of man, but about passivity in the sense of permitting God’s lead. As Bunge rightly pointed out, while the teaching of Evagrius about ascetic practice gained admiration, especially in monastic circles, his reflection on natural contemplation aroused suspicion and distrust especially during the period of so-called Origenism in the fifth to sixth centuries, which found its expression in the judgments of the Council of 553.188 So the purpose of φυσική is to “discover the truth hidden in all beings”189 and to contemplate all created reality, that is “has been and is being brought into being by God” (In Psalmos 148:14), because it “favors our salvation” (Gn. 12) and is a prerequisite for the contemplation of God Himself (θεολογική). However, Evagrius does not understand physics in the modern sense as empirical knowledge, but as knowledge of a created reality, also known as natural contemplation (θεωρία τῆς φυσικῆς).190 This natural contemplation consists in knowing God indirectly through His wisdom contained in the work of creation: The person who, on the basis of the harmony of beings, sees the Creator, it is not God’s nature that he knows, but it is God’s Wisdom that he knows, that in which God created everything. Now, with Wisdom I mean, not the essential one, but that which is manifested in existent beings, that which those who are experts in these matters usually call “natural contemplation”.191 The harmony of existing beings is, according to Evagrius, the basis for knowledge of the wisdom of God hidden in creation. As rightly noted by Nieścior, such a term for
186 Cf. Gnosticus 49. The fragment did not survive in the Greek language – cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1989), 190. 187 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 6,8, Géhin (1987), 168 Evagrius compares the ascetic practice to the work of an ant, while the contemplation of creatures and of the Creator to the work bees. See also Bunge (1996b), 64–67. 188 Bunge (1996b), 64–65; see also A. Guillaumont (1962), 105-108; Konstatinovsky (2009), 47–77. 189 Cf. Gnosticus 49; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 190–91. 190 Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 29,1; Pitra (1883–1884), 3. 191 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica V,51; Guillaumont (1958), 199; Ramelli (2015), 291.
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natural contemplation refers to the famous biblical statements of the author of the Book of Wisdom (13:1–9) and of St Paul from Romans 1:18–20 about the possibility of coming to know God through the reality of the created world.192 Evagrius, however, specifies that it is in no way to know the essential wisdom of God, but only that which is contained in created beings. In other fragments of the Kephalaia Gnostica treatise, our author lists five kinds of contemplation, the first of which is contemplation of the Holy Trinity, the second and third – the contemplation of bodiless and bodily beings, and the fourth and fifth the contemplation of judgment and providence.193 If the first contemplation meant the stage of θεολογική or God himself in the trinity of persons, and the fourth and fifth would refer to the knowledge of the material world created after the original fall, judgment and providence, it can be rightly presumed that the second and third, which includes the disembodied and carnal beings (but with the body from before the original fall) would concern our natural contemplation. Natural contemplation is therefore contemplation of the real spiritual nature of bodiless and bodily beings. In the same work, Kephalaia Gnostica the monk from Pontus presents this knowledge about the nature of created beings as a two-stage distinction between “the first natural contemplation” and the “second natural contemplation”. It is easy to understand this distinction if we remember that the material reality perceived by the senses was, according to Evagrius, created secondarily by God as an answer to the initial fall of the mind and gave rise to the economy of salvation, that is, the action of God in history. Not all beings, however, were endowed with a sensual body, but like the angels largely retained their original, noetic state of existence. And thus, the knowledge of λόγοι or spiritual reasons for the existence of the “second” visible and sensual beings of the whole reality is obtained by this second natural contemplation, while the knowledge of the “first”, noetic and invisible beings is the first natural contemplation.194 We can only add that the second contemplation concerns the spiritual reasons for the existence of corporeal beings as well as the sensual and material world that God created after the fall. In describing these two types of knowledge, Evagrius also distinguishes between material and non-material contemplation, which depend on the object of cognition.195 The material contemplation takes place when an object simply falls under the senses, and the non-material when an object does not fall into material perception. In fact, according to the Pontian monk the only immaterial reality that man as a created being can contemplate is the Holy Trinity.196 Before the original fall, all rational beings that existed in a spiritual (noetic) state without a sensible body were also capable of such immaterial knowledge, but after the fall some of them, human being, were deprived of it as a natural gift and must now obtain it with ascetic 192 See Nieścior (1997a), 118–28. According to Nieścior Evagrius would have taken over this idea from Basil the Great, Homiliae in Hexaemeron I,11; Hayden (2015); Dysinger (2013). 193 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica I,27; A. Guillaumont (1958), 29. 194 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 38. 195 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,81; A. Guillaumont (1958), 171. 196 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,87; A. Guillaumont (1958), 175.
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efforts starting from secondary knowledge, that is, carnal beings and the sensual world. Evagrius deals mainly with the rational beings in a human state of existence, so for obvious reasons he also concentrates on this second natural contemplation: For now, our thick mind has been linked to the earth and mixed with clay and cannot fix itself upon naked contemplation. So, being directed by the beauty born with its body, it considers the works of its Maker and understands them in the meantime by their effects. Thus, having grown in strength little by little, it will be able even to approach the unconcealed divinity itself.197 Therefore, the mind’s return to contemplation of God leads through the second contemplation of created beings with a sensual body and their world. At the present stage of its existence, it is possible to know God only indirectly, through his power, action and wisdom hidden in the work of creation and impossible to know His essence. The Guillaumonts are convinced that the second natural contemplation would be appropriate for the imperfect impassibility experienced by many people who are on the level of ascetic practice, and its sign is to approach the “limits of impassibility” (Pr. 58), while the first natural contemplation, proper to perfect impassibility, would be characteristic of angels and experienced only by a few people here on the earth (KG I,23).198 Only a man purified of passions is able to perceive this spiritual, supernatural sense of created, material reality, and the only few are able “to eat the bread of angels”, that is, to contemplate what is invisible for senses and to know truly spiritual nature of the created beings. Therefore, this stage of spiritual knowledge must be preceded by the ascetic practice which, as we remember, is a spiritual method of purifying the passionate part of the soul. Contemplation or first knowledge is reserved only for a few, while the second, spiritual reasons for the existence of material beings, is limited. For even the man most purified of passions is not able to know the first principle of all creation, because only Christ, the Logos knows this. The other reasons for the existence of other beings have their source in the Logos, and their knowledge depends on the degree of purification of the knowing person. The nature of creation is most fully described in the Holy Scriptures, but in them we will find nothing about these spiritual reasons for the existence of beings. Thus, the incomplete understanding of created reality does not result from its imperfection, but from the weakness of the human mind. The temptation for the gnostic is false opinion, which presents to the mind the status of existence as something different than it is in reality, or cognition conditioned by some passion.199 Although the gnostic has already cleaned up the passionate part of the soul, it is not an absolutely permanent or immutable condition here on earth and the old passions can again easily invade his soul. He is also still subjected to the passions of its rational part like vanity and pride. And just as at the stage of ascetic practice it was
197 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula fidei 7; Grimbont (1983), 100; Casiday (2006), 52–53; see also A. Garzya (1988), 299–305 and the collecion of studies on Epistula fidei in: P. Bettiolo (2000). 198 C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 110. 199 Cf. Gnosticus 42–43; C. and A. Guillaumont (1989), 170–71.
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easy to make false opinions about the commandments, it is now easy to find similar false opinions at the φυσική stage. Such a temptation, according to Evagrius, dominated various heretics and pseudognostics when they said that God is not righteous in his judgments and does not act according to his wisdom.200 Knowledge at the φυσική stage, – adds our monk – is not only limited (In Ps. 1444,3b) and transient (Ep. 7.35), but also eventually disappears with the death of man (In Eccl. 1,2 6,10) and will find its complement in eschatology, where in a full and clear way we will know God’s plan hidden in the created world. Bunge in his researches presents two basic assumptions in the teaching of Evagrius about φυσική: one is the limitation of human knowledge of created beings and the exclusion of all contempt for the created world; the other is such fascination with these Mirabilia Dei, the “delight” of knowledge (Pr. 32; KG III,64) with wonder or contemplation of creation, that the advanced monk, the gnostic, forgets the basic purpose of his life, that is, the knowledge of the Holy Trinity (In Eccl. 1:2).201 In the treatise On Prayer 56–58, the Pontian monk warns against falling victim to the temptation of continuing reflection on the spiritual principles of the created world. Then we recognize God only as a Creator based on His creation, not through direct, mystical experience. The pursuit of contemplation of the Holy Trinity cannot, of course, be based on contempt for the created world, but on the recognition of it as good, and ultimately exceeding this level of knowing it. The created world reveals God to us, but it is not God Himself, and the knowledge of God as the Creator is really only a knowledge of some aspect of His action, not of His being. According to Evagrius, φυσική as contemplation of the spiritual reasons of the created world is an indirect knowledge of God, while the contemplation of the very being of God is the direct one. First, therefore, man knows the divine rationes or thoughts present in the creature (λόγοι), otherwise called letters (γράμματα), which reveal the Creator, and then he seeks and wants to know God Himself (Ep. ad Mel. 5). Otherwise he would prefer in a completely absurd way knowledge of what has been created, rather then knowledge of the Creator Himself (De or. 60). The φυσική stage, though indirect and imperfect, has great value because it allows the discovery of the truth hidden by God in the work of creation. In Epistula ad Melaniam, Evagrius develops in great detail a reflection on this subject, the essence of which could be summarized as follows: the work of creation reveals the fundamental truth about the ineffable love of the Creator for his creation.202 This love of God manifests itself in both the first creation of spiritual beings and in the second creation of the material world. God Himself invented the ways of returning fallen beings to Himself through the creatures that were called to exist by the Holy Trinity.203 That is also when the history of humanity began in its present form, and God adapted his action to a new state of noetic-sensual human life. This gave rise to the process which the Fathers of the Church, beginning with Justin and
200 Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 143,7; see also Rahner (1933), 21–38; Otto (1974), 65–81; Bunge (1996b), 67; Id. (1986), 24–54; Vasquez (1986), 271–306. 201 Bunge (1996b), 68. 202 Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 1; 14; 56; Casiday (2006), 64.67.75. 203 Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 5; Frankenberg (1912), 612; Casiday (2006), 65.
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Irenaeus, describe as the “economy of salvation”, i.e., God’s action towards man in history, which aims to bring man back to unity with Him. Evagrius wrote about the necessity of knowing these saving works of God in Epistula fidei: The Holy Spirit all the while protecting our understanding, so we do not fall from one idea while grasping for another; and despise the dispensation while focusing on theology (θεολογία); and our incompleteness become impiety.204 Our monk connects very closely the contemplation of God’s economy with the contemplation of God Himself, because the contemplation of God in His action and His very being are like two sides of the same process. From our perspective, it is important to emphasize that natural contemplation (φυσική) has two aspects and includes both the knowledge of the spiritual reasons of the created noetic or noetic-material world, as well as the knowledge of the spiritual reasons for God’s economy, that is, His actions in the history of mankind and the individual man. Just as the created material world carries in itself traces, “the letters” of God’s action, so too does the history of humanity and individual people contain such traces, by which we come to know the spiritual sense at the φυσική stage. Contemplation or natural knowledge for Evagrius is thus discovering the spiritual sense of the created material world, as well as discovering the spiritual meaning or otherwise the reason for God’s action in the history of all mankind, local communities and individual people. The Pontian monk arrives at the conclusion that the only spiritual reason for God’s action in all these areas of the human world is His love. Evagrian spiritual doctrine is often accused of lacking a clearly Christian perspective, and a greater concentration on the philosophical or even mystical elements in the Buddhist or Hindu sense, where the unity of creation and the Creator is often understood, so that their separate identity is lost. We see that Epistula ad Melaniam contradicts such assumptions. In this text, the monk from Pontus presents both the work of creation and the beginnings of God’s economy of salvation as the work of the entire Holy Trinity,205 as well as his teaching on the contemplation of God himself, which he clearly identifies with the contemplation of the Holy Trinity. The ultimate fulfillment of God’s love for the material world is the incarnation of His Son, so that fallen creation will be brought back to unity with God again. The knowledge of the created world both in its material dimension and in the sense of the spiritual reasons for its existence leads to the discovery that the basic reason, the principle of the existence of creatures is the love of God. Natural contemplation thus leads to the love of the Father who had the “intention” to create the world, his power, or the Son who is his “hand” and realizes his intention, and the wisdom of God, or the Holy Spirit who as a “finger” records this divine plan in creation.206 As we have seen before, the material world was created by God as an expression of His providence and care for man after the original fall, so it carries the traces of this
204 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula fidei 3; Grimbont (1983), 92–93; Casiday (2006), 49–50. 205 Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 8–9; Frankenberg (1912), 612–14; Casiday (2006), 66. 206 Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 11; Frankenberg (1912), 614; Casiday (2006), 66.
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love. In this way, we see the essential unity in the thought of Evagrius, who sees love as the first and the most important commandment of God (Ep. 56,3), the ultimate goal of ascetic practice (Pr. 84), “the gate to knowledge/the natural contemplation (Prol. 50)”, and is the essence of the φυσική itself, which consists in the discovery of the great love of God “hidden” in the work of creation. God’s love is expressed in His commandments, it is the goal of all asceticism and it also manifests itself in the work of creation. In this love, we can see the foundation of all authentic spiritual life. Its various stages, such as keeping God’s commandments, ascetism or the knowledge of the created world, cannot be motivated by fear, contempt for oneself or the created world or, on the other hand, by deification of it, but only by the desire to experience God’s love contained in His commandments and in the created world. Just as asceticism without love is “ashes left by fire” (Ep. 28), so also φυσική without love ends either in contempt for the created material world or in such a fascination with it (idolatry) that it stops man on the way to the contemplation of the essence of God. In his teaching about natural contemplation, Evagrius cautions against Gnostic or Manichean contempt for the created world which even accuses God of creating an unjust world and against such an idolatric admiration of it that hinders the knowledge of God Himself. Evagrius also reflects on the durability of this natural knowledge and concludes that the so-called second contemplation is limited in time and will disappear with the disappearance of the material world: When the intellects have received the contemplation concerning them, then also the whole nature of the bodies will be elevated, and thus contemplation concerning it will become immaterial.207 Because the subject of the present natural knowledge, that is, the material reality in its present form, will pass away, so also the knowledge itself will pass away undergoing modifications from the physical and material to non-material and spiritual. In this way, minds that will be deemed worthy of receiving proper contemplation will come back to the knowledge proper to them before the fall, which was characterized by a direct knowledge of all spiritual reality and of oneself as just a spiritual being. Therefore, material knowledge or secondary natural knowledge will one day become immaterial again or primary.208 This will happen not because of the change of nature of the secondary knowledge itself, because it will not change and disappear, but because of the change in the status of the existence of objects of this knowledge, which from the material will become spiritual again.209 2.2.
Contemplation of God (θεολογική)
The next, final stage is θεολογική, or knowing God Himself. This stage is closely connected with the previous two, because Evagrius perceived ascetic practice as
207 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica II,62; A. Guillaumont (1958), 85; Ramelli (2015), 126. 208 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica II,63. 209 Cf. Nieścior (1997a), 122–23.
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an ascetic effort that purifies the human soul and makes it possible to keep God’s commandments and discover His love, φυσική as contemplation of God’s works and His economy, and θεολογική as contemplation of the essence of God Himself.210 Although our author formally distinguished the three stages, he also saw the intrinsic relationship between them. The term θεολογική itself has a lot of meaning in Evagrius’ writings that we will try to present briefly. First, θεολογική, like the previous two stages, is based on faith in God’s revelation and the Christian Creed. Even more, theology understood in such a way is not only based on faith, but it is also equated with faith in the content revealed and given in the Creed.211 In the deepest dimension θεολογική is faith in the unity and three persons of God, but at the same time our monk observes that this unity cannot be understood numerically, proper to created beings, nor threefold in a heretical manner as three gods.212 In this understanding of theology, Evagrius’ concern for the orthodox interpretation of revelation is clearly evident. For although the Holy Scripture tells us both of the unity and trinity of God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it does not define the exact relationship between them, leaving this task to theology. Hence the theologian from Pontus derives the second understanding of θεολογική as precisely the interpretation of God’s revelation identified in that period practically with biblical exegesis. Such an understanding would be closest to our present understanding of theology as a rational reflection on revelation. Evagrius, as the disciple of Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers, was a supporter of the allegorical, mystical interpretation of the Scriptures: For not all arrive at the more mystical conception of Scripture. […] It is necessary to understand divine Scripture intelligibly and spiritually. For perceptible knowledge according to the historical sense is not true.213 There are not, of course, only some specific biblical passages that would have theological meaning, but the entire Holy Scripture, in which there are various meanings (ethical, physical, theological), the deepest being the theological and mystical meaning.214 The task of theology thus understood is, on the one hand to explore and explain the revealed teaching, and on the other hand, to defend the belief in the content of God’s revelation against the impulses of reason which, ignoring the boundaries of its cognition, distort the revealed truth and faith in it, inventing heresies. Evagrius often emphasizes that the categories of human reason are limited and incapable of describing God: Do not speak about God without consideration, and never define the divine. Definitions, after all, are for things that come into being and are composite.215
210 211 212 213
See Bunge (1996b), 68; Konstatinovsky (2009), 47–77. Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 24,6, Géhin (1993), 360. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica VI,10–13. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 23,1–3; Géhin (1993), 346. On the allegoric interpretation of the Scriptures see also Kephalaia Gnostica II,69; III,77; VI,44. 214 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 22,20; Géhin (1993), 342; Baán (2011). 215 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 27; C. and A. Guillaumont (1989), 170–71. See also Gnosticus 41.
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Our monk generally recommends rarely dealing with difficult theological questions, in order “lest we say something that is not to be said about God and fall from spiritual knowledge in our impiety” (In Prov. 25,17). Human reason tries to describe God based on His action, that is, through creation or His action in the history of salvation, defining Him as the Creator and Savior, but these are categories that do not fully reflect His being. Theology understood as the exegesis of the Holy Scriptures, although very necessary, only indirectly and to a very limited extent leads to the knowledge of the essence of God. The rational knowledge of God’s action is not the ultimate way of knowing Him. There is also a third meaning which Evagrius gives to the term θεολογική, namely, a mystical knowledge of God.216 Such “theological knowledge” of God is not based on theoretical, rational, or scientific reflection on the mysteries of God, but is a direct, personal, and supernatural experience of God.217 It is done through prayer, because it is the “vestibule of non-material and intangible knowledge” (De or. 85). If someone is a theologian in this sense, he will truly pray, and if one truly prays, he is the theologian.218 The subject of theology understood in this way is, on the one hand, contemplation or knowledge (θεωρία) of the unity of God (ἑνάς καὶ μονάς), which the Pontian theologian also describes as a kind of “essential knowledge” (γνῶσις οὐσιώδης),219 and on the other, “the knowledge of the unity” that joins the Creator with creation, or put in another way “the knowledge of unity” (γνῶσις τῆς μονάδος).220 In this sense, “theology” is the contemplation of both the essence of God himself and the state of His protological and eschatological spiritual unity with creation. At the same time, this knowledge of the essence of God does not mean experiencing the power of some undefined impersonal divine energy, but typically the Christian knowledge of the Father through the eternal Son and the Holy Spirit.221 Thus the aforementioned “essential knowledge” (γνῶσις οὐσιώδης) of God means the contemplation of the essential unity of the three Divine Persons. In Epistula 58,4 the monk from Pontus emphasizes that while the contemplation of created beings contains various information, the contemplation of the Holy Trinity is a one-dimensional knowledge, because it is this essential knowledge that manifests itself to the mind liberated from the passion and influence of the body.222 In the case of theology understood as a rational reflection on the created world or the action of God in history (oeconomia salutis), man comes to know God through his action, which is not the knowledge of His being. However, what is impossible in purely rational knowledge becomes available in contemplation or mystical experience. According to our monk, it is obvious that this kind of knowledge is a special grace available here on earth only to a few and depends on the degree of purification of the mind.223
216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223
Cf. Beyschlag 1(980), 169–96; Spiteris (1997), 365–426. Cf. Blum (1979), 41–60. Cf. De oratione 61 (60), PG 79,1165A–1200C. Cf. Bunge (2000), 7–26. Cf. Epistula fidei 7,6; 2,34. Cf. Bunge (1989), 69–91; Id. (1989), 449–69. Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 16; 19; Kephalaia Gnostica IV,34; VI,28. Cf. Epistula 58,4. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1976), 116–27; Bitton-Askhelony (2011).
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Needless to say, although the Pontian monk describes this kind of contemplation of God as “essential knowledge” (γνῶσις οὐσιώδης), it is definitely different from the mutual knowledge of the divine persons in the Holy Trinity. So, if at the stage of πρακτική the basic attitude is to believe in the preservation of God’s commandments as a precondition to purifying oneself from the main passions and for acquiring virtues, and at the φυσική stage, the hope for the final fulfillment of the history of salvation in the return of the whole creation to unity with God, then the θεολογική stage is the experience of God’s love for creatures and creatures for God. For Evagrius, love for God always means trinitarian love for the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit (Ep. ad Mel. 31) and love for His creatures.224 At the last stage, the monk therefore experiences in a mystical way here on earth the union with God (“essential knowledge”), which will become the part of all creation after the end of world history. This knowledge or experience of the essence of God completes the purification of the soul of man, expanding it even more to accepting God’s greater love and enabling greater love for himself and his neighbor. It is not a one-off act, but a process that continues uninterruptedly to the end of human life. It is easy to see that Evagrius speaks here like a true Christian mystic and most likely describes to a large extent his own experiences.
224 Cf. De oratione 31.
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Part Two
Eight Principal Logismoi, the Dynamics of Their Activity and the Strategies of the Struggle with Them
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C ha pt er IV
Logismoi of the Passionate Part of Souls
In this part of our study, we will deal directly with the analysis of the Evagrian teaching about the eight λογισμοί. We will do it on two levels, trying on the one hand to reconstruct the reflection of the Pontian monk on the whole category of the eight principal thoughts, hence the sequence of their succession and mutual dependencies, and to follow in detail the dynamics of each passionate thought. Evagrius, as I wrote earlier, is not only the initiator of the category of principal thoughts, but also an expert on the cause-and-effect relations between them, the ways each of them act and the tools to fight them. As we will see, the monk of Pontus did not limit himself to the descriptive aspect of the action of each of the passionate thoughts, but also set a practical goal, i.e., to help others overcome these passions.1 So later on in this study I will concentrate on the evagrian analysis of the dynamic of each of the eight passionate thought and the ways to combat them. All passionate thoughts, according to the Pontian monk, have their source in self-love (φιλαυτία), which is a foundation for the eight λογισμοί as well as for all others: “First of all is the thought of self-love, after which come the eight”.2 Self-love is the source passion, while the eight major passionate thoughts are instrumental passions, for the realization of this basic love of self, which is expressed mostly by implementing one’s will without omitting the will of God. Therefore, all the ascetic efforts of the monk and every man should aim at growing in the virtue of love of God and neighbor as opposed to a passionate love for oneself. True love, however, is the daughter of impassibility, and this is achieved after overcoming the eight thoughts and acquiring virtues that are opposed to them. As we have seen before, according to our author there are eight principal λογισμοί: gluttony (γαστριμαργία), impurity (πορνεία), greed (φιλαργυρία), sadness (λύπη), anger (ὀργή), acedia/sloth (ἀκηδία), vainglory (κενοδοξία), pride (ὑπερηφανία).3 Evagrius calls them the main/principal thoughts (γενικώτατοι λογισμοί), because all other thoughts are born of them, but he does not limit the number of all evil thoughts that are born in the monk’s soul to only eight. He also mentions the thought of remembering evil, jealousy, accusation and others.4 Although the mutual dependence of individual thoughts and their causality has not always been presented by our author in a clear and precise manner,
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Cf. De malignis cogitationibus; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 23. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 53; Muyldermans (1931), 43; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. Cf. Practicus 6; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 506–08; Sinkewicz (2003), 98. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 2 i 18; C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 154–56.214–16; Sinkewicz (2003), 154.65.
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the concept of eight passionate thoughts and the relations between them create a coherent doctrine, and apparent contradictions can be easily explained. However, while the number of eight passionate thoughts and the order in which they follow each other, with one exception, are evidently clear in the system of Evagrius, their connection to particular parts of the soul is less clear. It is difficult to conclude whether this lack of precision is the result of ambiguity in the reflection of Evagrius himself or his intentionally deliberate “darkening” of his own teaching so that it does not accidentally fall into the hands of beginners on the path of spiritual development. Although the Pontian monk does not explicitly attribute the individual thoughts to one of the three parts of the soul, there is no doubt that, as the Guillaumonts have shown, there is a connection in the anthropology of Evagrius between the order of thought and the three parts of the soul.5 Even if in the writings of the Pontian monk there is no direct assignment of individual λογισμοί, to some particular part or tendency of the soul, nevertheless indirect assignment is present in his writings and can be easily deduced without being accused of falsifying his reflections. Such indirect assignement also remains in line with the main themes of Evagrius’ reflection on the category of eight λογισμοί and the three-part division of the soul into a rational, irascible and concupiscible part. Thus, in the spiritual teaching of Evagrius gluttony (γαστριμαργία), impurity (πορνεία) and greed (φιλαργυρία) would relate to the concupiscible tendency of the soul, because these three thoughts are born in the soul through the body of man. In Practicus 35, Evagrius calls them bodily passions, because they take their origin only through the mediation of the body.6 In turn, the frustration of any of the three above mentioned desires leads to the thoughts of the irascible part of the soul (θυμικόν/ θυυμητικόν): sadness or anger (Pr. 10–11). Frustration associated with carnal desires – gluttony, sexual desire, or greed combined or individually, always gives rise to anger or sadness. The distinction between anger and sadness would only apply to forms of anger: anger would be an outword expression towards others, while sadness would be inward. Evagrius also emphasizes that the stimulation of the irascible part of the soul takes place both in the situation of submitting to the thoughts of the concupiscible part as well as in the case of resisting them. However, he does not explain how it happens. It is easy to imagine why the frustration of satiety, sexual desire or the desire to possess material security causes sadness and anger in the human soul, but it is more difficult to understand why, when these desires are satisfied, frustration also arises. We can only guess that satisfying the desires of the concupiscible part of the soul evokes anger in the monk just because he has succumbed to them thus undermining the meaning of anchorite life. In any case, according to Evagrius, both succumbing to the thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul and not succumbing cause the attacks of the thoughts of the irascible part of the soul. It also happens that anger is caused not only by frustration of the desire for gluttony and greed, but can also come from vainglory.7
5 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 93. 6 Cf. Practicus 35–36; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 580–83; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 7 Cf. Epistula 39; Antirrheticus V,30.
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Further, the prolonged and simultaneous action of concupiscibility and irascibility leads to the attack of the demon of acedia (Pr. 23), which does not attack only one part of the soul, like all other demons, but “the whole soul and suffocates the mind” (Pr. 36). It is not very clear how to combine it with the teaching regarding the three parts of the soul, since acedia appears after anger and sadness, and before vanity and pride. It seems that when writing about the acedia that attacks the whole soul, Evagrius really meant only a passionate part/tendency of it. However, there is more ambiguity. In the Practicus, our monk, describing the dynamics of acedia’s demon, states: “No other demon follows immediately after this one: a state of peace and ineffable joy ensues in the soul after this struggle”.8 How does one understand these words in the context of even Pr. 6, where the demon of acedia follows the demon of vainglory, which arouses false hopes, and then “it flies off abandoning him to be tempted either by the demon of pride or by that of sadness” (Pr. 13), the perpetrator of “the very worst sort of fall” (Pr. 14)? Evagrius also emphasizes that passionate thoughts of vain glory and pride attack the monk when all other demons have withdrawn (Pr. 31; 57). In other fragments, however, he adds that the demon of vainglory can leave the human soul not only to the demon of pride, but also to the demon of sadness or impurity (Pr. 13), while the demon of pride, to the demon of sadness or anger (Pr. 14). All these seeming contradictions can be easily explained, however, if we remember, as I wrote earlier, that in his description of the action of the eight passionate thoughts, Evagrius combines the empirical and experiential succession of individual λογισμοί with the order of progress in the development of spiritual life. According to the latter, encouraging the demons of the lower level, i.e., gluttony, impurity, or greed, exposes the monk to the next attacks of sadness and anger, while freeing oneself from the thought of a passionate part of the soul can lead to vanity and pride: The more the soul progresses, the greater are the antagonists that follow it in succession, for I am not convinced that it is always the same demons that persist against it.9 In the order of spiritual development, a monk can easily recognize that he is approaching impassibility if he is attacked by ever stronger demons. Evagrius adds that the gnostic must face new, unknown temptations, because he is the first to pass the next stages of spiritual development.10 Whereas in the empirical order, succumbing to the demons of the “lower” level leads to yielding to another, the “higher”, yet it also happens that the “higher” demons, such as the demon of vainglory, can again lead to the “lower” thoughts of passion, such as impurity or sadness, and the demon of pride to sadness and anger.11 So if we want to properly interpret Evagrius reflection on the eight principal λογισμοί, we must keep in mind these two overlapping orders that appear in various texts and contexts. Returning to acedia, it is easy to notice that
8 9 10 11
Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 12; SCh 171,526–27; Sinkewicz (2003), 99. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 59; SCh 171,638–39; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. Cf. Antirrheticus IV,3; Frankenberg, 502. Cf. also SCh 171,639–40, note 59. Cf. Practicus 13; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 528–31; Sinkewicz (2003), 100.
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in Scholia in Psalmos 118,28, Evagrius describes its essence as simultaneous arousal of concupiscibility and irascibility, that is two inclinations of the unreasonable, passionate part of the soul and not the whole soul along with its rational part. After overcoming the thoughts of the concupiscible and irascible part of the soul and both of these tendencies stimulated together in acedia, the monk begins to experience the beginning of a state of impassibility (Pr. 63). Then he is attacked by the last two thoughts of a rational part of the soul, vanity and pride. The first, as we shall see later, tries to persuade him to look for his own glory in the practice of asceticism, while the latter pushes the monk to assign to himself all victories and to place himself in the place of God. If the monk succumbs to even one of them, then it very quickly gives him up to the demon of impurity or sadness. Anchoritism and all the ascetic efforts of the monk were aimed at purifying the soul of these eight passionate thoughts and acquiring virtues. Eight virtues are opposed to eight passionate thoughts: gluttony – moderation, impurity – purity, greed – poverty, sorrow – joy, anger – forbearance, acedia – perseverance, vainglory – modesty and humbleness, pride – humility.12 From the Evagrian doctrine of virtues, we can also indirectly infer the assignment of each of the passionate thoughts to one of the three parts of the soul that our author attributed to each of the inclinations of the soul, even if he used a slightly different terminology. So, in the concupiscible part of the soul are born the virtues of restraint, love, and temperance, in the irascible part bravery and perseverance, and in the rational part prudence, rationality, and wisdom. On the other hand, justice is a virtue common to all three parts of the soul.13 Evagrius, as I have emphasized many times, did not let himself be seduced by the temptation of the Manichean duality, recognizing a part of human nature as good and another as evil. For the monk from Pontus, the whole man, with elements created after the original fall such as the emergence of a concupiscible and irascible part of the soul, is good. Hence, Evagrius defines vice as the evil use of the powers of the soul against its nature, while virtue is using those powers in accordance with its nature: If all evilness is generated by the intelligence, by thymos, and by epithymia, and of these faculties it is possible to make use in a good and in an evil way, then it is clear that it is by the use of these parts against nature that evils occur to us. And if this is so, there is nothing that has been created by God and is evil.14 Vice is therefore not the existence or functioning of these three parts of the soul, but their evil use by man. Evil in the world does not come from the naturally good tendencies of the soul, but from their use against nature. Thus, in another place Evagrius emphasizes that the soul acts according to nature, when its concupiscible part seeks virtue, its irascible part is fighting for virtue, and the rational is committed to the contemplation of beings. 12 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus, PG 79,1140B–1144D; Sinkewicz (2003), 61–65. 13 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 89; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 681. Evagrius is inspired here by the thought of peripatetics and Aristotle – cf. C. and A. Guillauomont (1971), 681–85, note to the chapter 89. 14 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,59; A. Guillaumont (1958), 121; Ramelli (2015), 174. See also A. Guillaumont (1962), 120–23.
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The natural feature of the concupiscible part of the soul is to desire, the irascible to fight for something, and the rational to contemplate existing beings. The concupiscible part of the soul acts according to its nature if it desires virtue, and its irascible part when it fights for it. Because these parts of the soul have been so “programmed” by God, the desire for anything other than virtue and the struggle for it forces the concupiscible and irascible part of the soul to act against each other and cause human suffering. The doctrine of virtue as a nature-compatible action (κατὰ φύσιν) is, as we know, of Platonic origin. Evagrius took it directly from Plato or, more likely, through an earlier Christian tradition, confirmed by Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen. The monk of Pontus, however, does not take up this teaching mechanically but adapts it for the use of his own spiritual doctrine. The acting of the soul in accordance with nature means to him the action of all three parts in accordance with nature, that is, the attainment of the state of natural impassibility of the soul, while the action incompatible with nature is action under the influence of passions. The human soul acts in harmony with nature when its “intellect is with the Lord all the time, and whose irascible part is full of humility thanks to its remembering God, and whose concupiscible/appetitive part is entirely oriented toward the Lord”.15 Therefore, the ascetic practice of a monk should always aim at discerning the ways of action of each of the eight passionate thoughts from the simple to the more subtle ones and fighting them in order to achieve a state of impassibility and to acquire the virtues opposite to them. The analysis of the action of the eight passionate thoughts is divided into three chapters. The first is a study of the thought of the passionate part of the soul, that is, its concupiscible tendency with thoughts of gluttony, impurity and greed, and then the thoughts of the irascible tendency where sadness and anger are born; in the second chapter acedia; and in the third thoughts of the rational part of the soul, or vanity and pride.
1.
Λογισμοί of the Concupiscible Part of the Soul
Evagrius, based on the three-part division of the soul, perceived its irascible part as connected with the rational part, while he perceived the concupiscible part as closely related to the body. This is confirmed by the fragment from Kephalaia Gnostica as well as Scholium to the Book of Ecclesiastes: The irascible part of the soul is joined with the heart, where its intelligence, too, is; its concupiscible/appetitive part, instead, is joined with the flesh and the blood, if it is true that we ought “to remove rage in the heart and evilness in the flesh” (Eccles. 11:10).16
15 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,73; A. Gillaumont (1958), 169; Ramelli (2015), 237. 16 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,84; A. Guillaumont (1958), 253; Ramelli (2015), 369. The same idea we can find in Scholia in Ecclesiasten, Géhin (1993), 176–77, where Evagrius comenting on the text of Eccl. 11:10,1–2 affirms: “From this we know that the irascible part is joined to the heart, and the concupiscible part to the flesh” (Casiday 2006, 149).
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The Pontian monk was not a Manichean who would consider the human body to be naturally bad, but nevertheless as a representative of the monastic circles, he clearly emphasized that sensual imaginations are an obstacle to God’s contemplation: “The mind possesses vigour when it imagines nothing of the things of this world during the time of prayer”.17 Although the body and senses are inherently good, they were created after the primary fall to enable people to live in the material world, yet their ability to perceive material reality distracts the mind from its natural spiritual function, or prayer and contemplation of God. This natural inclination of the body is used by demons to stimulate the passion of the concupiscible part of the soul precisely through the senses (Pr. 38). The anchorite, when he is in the desert, is no longer exposed to direct sensual input, but he is still living in the body and fighting with the demons for prayer. Evagrius in the treatise On Prayer presents it as follows: The demon is very jealous of the person at prayer and uses every trick to frustrate his purpose. Thus, he does not cease setting in motion mental representations of objects through the memory praising loose all the passions through the flesh, so that he can impede his excellent course and his setting out towards God.18 Anchoritism does not completely release the monk the use of memory and the body, which he seeks to include in the process of prayer and the demons use to prevent him in it. During prayer with the help of the body they awaken his passions, and if they are unable to do it, they act directly after it: When after many attempts the most wicked demon is unable to impede the prayer of the zealous person, he holds back a little and then takes his revenge on the individual after his prayers. Either he inflames him with anger and wipes out the excellent state formed within him through prayer or rouses him to some irrational pleasure and makes a mockery of the mind.19 Because the state of an anchorite’s life was closely connected with abstinence from fancy food and drink, abandonment of sexual relations with women and material security, it is not surprising that just the lack of satisfying needs in these three very important aspects of human life was used by demons to arouse these unreasonable pleasures and bring the monk’s mind to a fall. In fact, the struggle in these three areas of the life of a monk did not take place for one or another food or for having or lacking money for subsistence, but it touched the foundations of human existence: limiting food is a subjective (not necessarily real) threat to life, giving up using one’s own sexuality is a resignation from the prolongation of his life by having children, which gives a sense of security in old age and extends the line of the family, and material poverty deprives protection for the future. So, in the area of eating, procreating, and possessing material resources, the fierce struggle
17 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 65; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 650–51; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. 18 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 46; PG 79,1176; Sinkewicz (2003), 197. 19 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 48; PG 79,1176–77; Sinkewicz (2003), 197. Cf. Hausherr (1960), 70–71.
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for physical survival continued in the life of the monk. Even if there was no real threat to life, the concupiscible part of the soul, closely related to the body and its needs often gave birth to fear for one’s own life or health. It is understandable why, according to Evagrius these three demons gluttony, impurity and greed, began to attack the monk staying in the desert. On its deepest level, it was always a struggle to defend, speaking in the language of Saint Paul, this “old man” shaped after original sin. The anchorite, to the contrary, went to the desert precisely to “kill” this old man through asceticism and, with the help of the grace of Christ, to put on the new man on earth. A common feature of all three passionate thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul is to push the monk to more frequent contacts with people: When the concupiscible part becomes heated, then in turn they try to make us sociable, calling us austere and uncivil, so that out of desire for bodies we seek encounters with bodies. We must not obey them, but rather do the opposite.20 Demons, according to Evagrius, bring the monk to a fall, stimulating his naturally good lust and then directing him to act against nature. Signs of arousal of the concupiscible part of the soul in the anchorite are an exaggerated propensity to socialize under any pretext and to feel sorry for the hardness and severity of a lifestyle chosen in a free way. It is very easy then to fall prey to them, explaining that there is nothing wrong with dealing with other people that everyone needs. While in the case of other people social relationships are indispensable, in the case of an anchorite all contacts with people and material things quickly arouse in him thoughts of passionate gluttony, sexual desire, and greed. Evagrius therefore encourages monks not to listen to such promptings of demons, but rather to act against them, remaining alone. It is also understandable why the demons who act through the body are provoked by young monks beginning anchoritic life because in them the strength of corporal desires is still great. Older monks are attacked less because they have already weakened their bodily desire and are advanced on the path of spiritual development.21 The concupiscible part of the soul is healed by fasting, prayer and night vigilance, making it immune not only to the thoughts of this part of the soul, but also to anger and sadness.22 In the next part of our analysis, we will examine in detail the dynamics of action of each of the passionate thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, that is, gluttony, impurity, and greed. 1.1.
“The beginning of passions gluttony”
According to Evagrius, among the demons who oppose ascetic practice, the demon of gluttony begins to fight first. The Pontian monk emphasizes repeatedly that the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul, i.e., gluttony, because of the close relationship
20 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 22; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 552–53; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. 21 Cf. Gnosticus 31. 22 Cf. Epistula 6,4.
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with the body are born through the mediation of material reality, perceived by the senses or through the imagination. He wrote about it in one of his texts: He who controls the stomach diminishes the passions; he who is overcome by food gives increase to pleasures. […] and gluttony is the first of the passions. Wood is the matter used by fire, and food is the matter used by gluttony. A flame grows dim when matter is wanting; a lack of food extinguishes desire.23 Evagrius emphasizes that overabundant consummation of food leads to an increase in lust and vice versa, and that limiting one’s intake of food is the only way to reduce this passion. One cannot free oneself from the passion of the concupiscible part of the soul without fasting and abstinence. For this reason, the anchorites went to the desert to minimize the impact of external material stimuli and to purify their own soul faster. The demon of gluttony, however, did not give up, using the human imagination to fight with them, which he aroused through the memory of old feasts or culinary fantasies. The monk of Pontus often shows the interdependence between imaginations and passions, adding that one cannot free oneself from imaginations if a one is not released from passion first, and this is impossible if the thoughts of gluttony, greed, and vainglory are not removed earlier.24 Thus, the first among the passions or the beginning of all passions (ἀρχὴ παθῶν), which attacks every monk entering the path to purify his soul, is gluttony (γαστριμαργία).25 Evagrius clearly states this in another text: Whenever the demons attempt to dislodge one’s thinking with shameful pleasures, then they introduce the warfare of gluttony, so that once they have fired the stomach beforehand they can the more effortlessly cast the soul into the pit of lust.26 Succumbing to this demon opens the path of impurity, and with the desire for wealth and vain glory, it stimulates the man’s frenzy to act against nature, opening the way for other demons and ultimately leading to pride, the “first fetus of the devil”. In monastic circles, due to the specific living conditions of anchorites, the natural need to consume foods necessary for life became a place of the monk’s spiritual battle. Although on the one hand the anchoritism radically cut off all sensual stimuli about food, the monk was still alive in the body which demanded both food and the natural pleasure of eating. It was easy to escape into compensating images of past or future feasts.27 It is also worth remembering that in addition to the pleasure that it gives a person the consumption of various foods also attests to an often underestimated deeper psychic dimension, a factor that gives a sense of security resulting from sustaining physical life. Frustration and the need for security is particularly difficult and painful as can be seen by anyone who practices any form of fasting, regardless of 23 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 1; PG 79,1145A; Sinkewicz (2003), 73. 24 Cf. Epistula 39,3. 25 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 1; PG, 79,1145A; Sinkewicz (2003), 73–74. See also Capita cognoscitiva 42; Sinkewicz (2003), 214. 26 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 12; Sinkewicz (2003), 39. 27 Cf. Nieścior (1997a), 25-29.
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whether it is religious or purely motivated by health. Even if the body is concerned with the realization of a natural need, in its deepest dimension it is the struggle of the human “ego” with the fear of its own physical survival. The fight with such anxiety was intensified especially sharply in the life of anchorites who, such as Macarius of Egypt, the master of Evagrius, practiced not only a qualitative but also a quantitative fast. Therefore, they weighed the portions of daily bread to be eaten and measured the portions of drinking water, and slept only for a short time, leaning against the wall. They also recommended the same to their pupils.28 The monk went to the desert to purify himself of passions and to achieve a state of impassibility, which is a condition for spiritual knowledge of God. This purification began just from overcoming the temptation of gluttony by means of a quantitative and qualitative fast and a sense of mental safety of physical survival based on it. Evagrius quotes the dictum of one of the anchorites, which he probably used in his own ascetic life: “A rather dry and not regular diet joined to love quickly leads the monk to the harbor of impassibility”.29 Abstinence and love but also the determination by the anchorite of the proper measure of consumed foods, and in practice, the limitation to just dry bread and water brought him onto the road to quickly purify the soul of all passions. Before this, however, he had to face all temptations associated with gluttony because his human nature was relentlessly subjected to the practice of fasting. As we shall see below, the hostile strategies of this demon were different, much different, than gluttony as is commonly understood, that is, ordinary consumption of food in excess. The demon of gluttony, in Evagrius opinion, uses a double tactic to defeat a monk: he wants to lead him to abandon anchoritism and leave the desert, and if he fails, to mitigate fasting and temperance so that it is impossible to purify the soul, and the stay in the desert itself makes no sense. In short, the passionate thought of gluttony uses different fighting strategies to convince the monk to abandon asceticism or to modify the practice of fasting and abstinence so that it no longer serves any purpose. It arouses in him the fear of losing health or life caused by harsh fasting or abstinence, or pushes him to exaggerated austerity in their practice, so that he cannot stand it and abandons his life in the desert. However, if the monk still remains in it, it delights him with the possibility of achieving impassibility without harsh fasting and abstinence, or encourages him to soften these practices and alleviate them, thus depriving the senses of the same ascetic life. Evagrius does not describe the action of gluttony, nor of any of the other passionate thoughts, in a systematic manner in a single treatise, but presents them in the form of scattered sentences in many works; hence the difficulty in reconstructing his teaching on the subject. The exceptions are treatises De octo spiritibus malitiae30 and Antirrheticus,31 28 Cf. Practicus 94; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 698; Sinkewicz (2003), 112–13. 29 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 91; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 692–93; Sinkewicz (2003), 112. 30 The text has been preserved in Greek assigned to the Nile of Ancyra and was published in PG 79, 1145A–1164D; Muyldermans (1939), 235–74 has published a text with variants of the B reviews – cf. Sinkewicz (2003), 73–90. 31 This treaty was unfortunately preserved only in the Syriac version and it was retranslated into Greek by Frankenberg (1912), 472–545. English translation Brakke (2009); see also Dysinger (2016), 73–95.
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the first of which is a set of sentences on each of the passionate thoughts, the second a collection of biblical quotes that served to direct them against a particular demon in accordance with the principles of the antirhetical method. Preliminary analysis of all the fragments in which the subject matter of gluttony appears in the writings of the Pontian monk allows grouping them around the following topics:32 “gluttony as fear of hunger or loss of health”, “gluttony as temptation of harsher asceticism and disregard for brothers”, “gluttony as temptation of an easy path in ascetism” and finally “gluttony as an obstacle to prayer and the cause of bad dreams”. In the following part of our study, we will deal with a detailed analysis of these topics which, due to the small amount of studies on gluttony in Evagrius writings, will focus mainly on the interpretation of source texts.33 1.1.1.
Gluttony as the Fear against Starvation and Being Unhealthy
The attack of gluttony, according to Evagrius, does not aim at the monk eating too much, but at tempting him to ease the fast under the pretext of destroying his own health. It arouses in him fear of illness of the body exhausted by fasts or fear of hunger. The strategies of its operation in this context, as we shall see immediately, are various and clever. It attacks the anchorite from all possible sides to discourage him from the quantitative and qualitative fast. Thus, the thought of gluttony in monk who is practicing fasting predicts, that he will soon be hungry and undergo great suffering (Ant. I,21) or arouses in him the fear that he will run out of bread, fat or other necessary things (Ant. I,8,18,62). It also happens, wrote Evagrius, that the attack of the gluttony evokes some strange somatic symptoms in the body of a monk. The demon then “chills the stomach and all the sinews of the body, and casts great weakness into the body as if from hunger and prolonged illness”.34 He also tries to distract the monk from fasting with flatteries and oaths “You will no longer suffer any harm from food and drink because your body is weak and dry from prolonged fasting”.35 He also puts under his eyes “severe weakness from diseases that are about to arise in us from fasting, and that persuades us to eat a little cooked food”.36 Under the guise of a disease of the liver and kidneys, he tempts him to drink wine instead of regular water (Ant. I,22) or predicts pain of the stomach and other viscera due to abstinence (Ant. I,26). It arouses in a monk fear that his body will soon be destroyed (Ant. I,57) or in the imagination he puts in front of his eyes the pain of very specific parts of the body: stomach, liver, spleen, or even specific diseases such as water hemorrhage (Ant. I,56). It also foretells hunger and insufficiency for a monk and
32 Cf. Epistula 1,2; 4,2; 8,1; 16,2; 17,3; 27,3–5; 32,6; 34; 39,3; 52,7; 60,3; Practicus 7; 22; Gnosticus 10; 31; 47; De oratione 47–48; 51; 83; Sententiae ad monachos 6; 11; Rerum monachalium rationes 8; 10; De malignis cogitationibus 1; 2; 23; 24; 35; De octo spiritibus malitiae 1–3; De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 2; Tractatus ad Eulogium 1; 12; 25; Antirrheticus I; Capita cognoscitiva 42. 33 See Shaw (1998), 35 and my essays on this Misiarczyk (2001), 157–59. 34 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I,44; Frankenberg (1912), 481; Brakke (2009), 62. 35 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I,33; Frankenberg (1912), 479; Brakke (2009), 59. 36 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I,59; Frankenberg (1912), 484; Brakke (2009), 65.
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warns him that he will be forced to use the help and grace of other people (Ant. I,62). Evagrius perfectly captured and synthetically presented this action in the Practicus: The thought of gluttony suggests to the monk the rapid demise of his ascetism. It describes for him his stomach, his liver and spleen, dropsy and lengthy illness, the scarcity of necessities and the absence of doctors. Frequently it brings him to recall certain of the brethren who have fallen prey to these sufferings. Sometimes it even persuades those who have suffered such maladies to visit those who are practicing abstinence and to tell them of their misfortunes and how they come about as a result of their ascetism.37 Although the Greek verb ὑποβάλλει most often actually means in Evagrian texts “tempting by the demon”,38 the sense of the initial sentence can also be understood in a different way: “The thought of gluttony predicts to the monk a quick defeat (fall, failure) of his asceticism”.39 And this understanding of the entire phrase seems more appropriate here. The demon of gluttony in this case arouses anxiety in heart of the monk about his own health, threatening him that with the fasts he would destruct his own body or its concrete organs. Let us add, for accuracy, that in the case of a dry diet practiced by monks, that is, the consumption of dry bread and drinking ordinary water, such fears were partly justified. It is enough to recall the example of Evagrius himself who, according to the message of his pupil Palladius, at the end of his life suffered from various stomach complaints caused by eating raw foods.40 So if the reasons for fear for one’s health were somehow justified, the passionate thought of gluttony cleverly fed and exaggerated it. As we can see, the essence of its acting is not, as it seems to be, the desire for an excess of food or the usual “overeating”, but is just awakening in the monk an exaggerated fear for their own health.41 The essence of this temptation is exaggerated fear, different from the usual and necessary care for one’s own health. And because the difference between, according to modern terminology, hypochondrial fear and the necessary concern for one’s own health is very subjective, the demon of gluttony cleverly fuels this fear by presenting it to a monk’s consciousness as a real threat to his health. The conditions of life in the desert and the example of other monks did not diminish this fear; on the contrary, it intensified it. The thought of gluttony took advantage of this imagination and placed the sick internal organs in front of a monk’s eyes, convincing him that this is because he only eats dry bread and drinks water without the admixture of wine.
37 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 7; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 508–10; Sienkiewicz (2003) 98. 38 Cf. Practicus 9; 22 and De malignis cogitationibus 1. 39 Such an understanding of the phrase was proposed by the Guillaumonts in French translation in C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 509 “La pensée de la gourmandise suggère au moine l’échec rapide de son ascèse”. 40 Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 38. 41 In my previous study Misiarczyk (2001), 157–59 I wrote that the thought of gluttony scares a monk with hunger. After a closer analysis, however, it seems, that the central element of the text is more fear for one’s own health and life which, for understandable reasons, will always be stronger than the fear of hunger.
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The monk also remembered the disgusting look of sick person with dropsy. The state of medicine in the fourth century probably did not allow the dissemination of knowledge about the appearance of the internal organs of man, hence it should be assumed that the demon of gluttony has stimulated here more imagination than real knowledge about human anatomy. Therefore, without any doubt, we can say that the axis of gluttony is, according to Evagrius, fear and an essentially imaginative fear. Fear and imagination remain very strongly connected to each other and are mutually fueled. For this reason, the thought of gluttony suggested to a monk an offer to abandon the practice of fasting which ruined his health and showed this decision as the most rational. After all, the anchorite went to the desert to purify his own soul and not destroy his body or health. If we add to this the frequent accusations of Manicheism and asceticism motivated by contempt for the body, it is easy to imagine the difficult situation in which the single anchorite found himself. It was not easy, therefore, to make a discernment without the help of an experienced spiritual director in determining where the real and necessary care for one’s own health and life ends, and an exaggerated and imagined fear begins. Imagining the disease of specific organs stomach, liver, spleen, or kidney, was so vague that the imagination could freely create various images in this area. Eventually, the disease of particular organs led sooner or later to the disease and infirmity of the whole organism. It could have been the previously mentioned dropsy or other long-term illness, which in the absence of any medical help in the desert quickly turned into real threats to life. The elements mentioned above were probably more dependent on the actual living conditions of a monk than just an imagined one. Monks, even before leaving for the desert, as well as those already staying in it, encountered cases of those suffering from dropsy or another illness, and the appearance of such people would certainly leave a deep mark in their memory. These images revived now with redoubled strength when a real prospect of their own illness or death caused by raw fasting appeared. It is also easy to guess that any disease in the desert, where living conditions were very harsh, water saved, personal hygiene kept to a minimum, and no medical help, intensified the fear of a future life in the soul of the monk. Next, we must remember that the anchorites mainly maintained themselves thanks to the work of their own hands. They made, for example, straw mats or other things that they then sold on the market in the city to obtain the necessary means to live. Hence, we also understand their fear that in illness they would not be able to survive by the work of their own hands with a consequent lack of resources necessary for life and an experience of shame due to the use of others’ grace (Ant. I,62). The fear of being left without any means for life in the situation of a long-term illness was justified, and the demon of gluttony fueled the imagination to such an extent that the monk imagined that he would be in a state of slow agony and complete loneliness. The passionate thought, under the guise of protecting a monk from such future humiliations as the necessity of receiving help and being a burden to his fellowen, presented to his soul as a completely reasonable decision the abandonment of anchoritism easing of the raw fast, or its abandonment altogether. Needless to say, this meant in practice a monk’s defeat by the demon of gluttony. Evagrius therefore warned: “If you need
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food or clothing, do not be ashamed of accepting what others bring you, for this is a form of pride”.42 Rejecting all help from others is a manifestation of pride, the greatest enemy of monastic life, and accepting help is not a sign that he cannot survive in the desert and should leave it. In this way, Evagrius told anchorites how to use even the situation of deprivation and dependence on others to fight the demon of pride. The thought of passionate gluttony, however, goes further in its awakening of fear and suggests to a monk the memories of other anchorites who, practicing a similar asceticism, came to exactly such illness. Again, we are dealing here with the element of monastic life which the demon of gluttony used to arouse the imagination of the monks. It is possible that indeed one or the other ascetic suffered from an imprudent diet, but it was not a common experience nor did it necessarily have to be repeated in the case of this particular, tempted person. The passionate thought of gluttony, intensifying the fear for this health, closed a monk in the illusory conviction of his own “uniqueness”, so that he thought no one else would be able to suffer this type of disease, except him. The demon of gluttony finally encouraged sick ascetics to visit beginners and tell them about their diseases acquired through the practice of fasting. In his texts, Evagrius repeatedly warned not to tell everything about the hardships of the ascetic life, not to discourage beginners, but to save the fruit of one’s hardship for the Lord and not for human glory. The most radical temptation of gluttony threatened a monk by putting in front of his eyes the thought: “A miserable death results from austere fasting” (Ant. I,19). The demon of gluttony strengthened the general fear of death, which can be caused by raw fasting. If the internal organs of the body will be destroyed, such death will be far more cruel than others, because it will be a slow agony in solitude in the desert. It is not surprising, therefore, that such images even spoke to ascetically seasoned anchorites, arousing in their souls anxiety, and often also justified fear. In all these situations, Evagrius does not describe a real threat to the health of the monk but the temptation that greatly exaggerated them, awakening the imagination of the future unnecessarily. It is worth noting the strategies of the demon of gluttony’s activity, which tempt the monk by diverting him from the current practices of fasting by arousing fear of the future. The common denominator of his actions is exaggerated, arousing the imagination based on his own memory, the memory of others, or pure fantasy. In the action of a passionate thought of gluttony regarding the future, we clearly notice a certain evolution from the imagination of ill internal organs to meeting with brothers whose own illnesses were examples of the pernicious effect of asceticism. The defense against such thought focused essentially on mastering one’s imagination, because it was the demon of gluttony that used it to stir up fear in the monk for his own health and life. Evagrius encouraged them not to succumb to these imaginary fears: Do not pity a body that is debilitated and in mourning, nor fatten it up with rich foods, for if it gains strenght it will rebel against you and wage unrelenting war
42 Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 4; PG 40,1256B; Sinkewicz (2003), 6.
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upon you, until it takes your souls captive and delivers you a slave to the passion of fornication.43 A strong body easily takes the soul of a monk into slavery and quickly hands him over to the demon of impurity, while the weak one often arouses exaggerated fears and pushes him to self-pity. In this way he creates the mechanism of the vicious circle in the human soul: the strong body enslaves, the weak arouses exaggerated fear for one’s own life. However, there is no other way to free oneself from passion than to master the body: “The one who brings his flesh into subjection will be impassible; he who nurtures it will suffer with it”.44 The way of the anchorite’s liberation from the passionate thought began with the weakening of the body that mediates in its formation and persistence. The only help in breaking the mechanism of the vicious circle is to stick to the fixed, individual measure of fasting and not abandon it under any circumstances, and to meditate on the relevant texts of the Bible, collected by Evagrius in the work Antirrheticus, which encouraged ridding themselves of fear and having greater trust in God.45 Thanks to this, on the one hand the anchorite was able to sufficiently weaken his body, and on the other did not fall into the trap of imaginary fear for his own health or life. 1.1.2.
Gluttony as the Temptation for a Stricter Austerity and Ignoring of Brothers
If the demon of gluttony could not, by means of anxiety for health and life, lead the anchorite to leave the desert or dissuade him from the practice of fasting and temperance, then he encouraged him, paradoxically, to an even more severe asceticism. The goal that he sets for himself is still the same, that is, to dissuade a monk from the anchorite’s lifestyle, but the way he achieves it changes. So, if it is possible for the perverse temptation to seduce a monk into believing that he is indeed capable of sterner fasting, it may turn out that he does not survive the harshly imposed asceticism and withdraws from it altogether when it leaves the desert. In this case, the passionate thought of gluttony often appears in combination with subtle vanity and pride, tempting the ascetic to depart from the measure of fasting. Evagrius, as one of the first Christian ascetical authors, discovered that not every kind of ascetic radicalism is of evangelical origin, but that there is also demonic radicalism which destroys a man. So, the demon of gluttony: Persuades us to extend our discipline beyond what is appropriate by putting sackcloth on our loins, setting out for the desert, living continuously under the sky, and tending wild plants; and that advises us as well to flee from the sight of human beings who comfort us and who are comforted by us.46
43 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 1; PG 79,1148B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 75. 44 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 6; H. Greßmann (1913), 152; Sinkewicz (2003), 122. See also Driscoll (1990) 361–92 and (1991). 45 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I; Frankenberg (1912), 475–76; Brakke (2009), 60. 46 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I,37; Frankenberg (1912), 478–79; Brakke (2009), 53–68.
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This thought cleverly uses all elements of the anchorite’s life to lead a monk to radicalize the ascetic resolutions to such an extent that he will not be able to fulfill them. So, he gives him the desire to increase his responsibilities or reduce the resistance of his own body with the pain caused by wearing a skirt, regardless of the fact that he is already weakened by raw fasting. Next, he urges him to stay in the desert without access to shady places and water, and to feed only on desert roots. Limiting food to bread and water is already enough sacrifice, which leads to weakening of the body. The demon of gluttony perversely pushes the monk to resign from this and eat only the dried roots of the desert, knowing perfectly well that no man will be able to withstand such a draconian asceticism. Finally, he encourages the monk to avoid people asking for help, as well as depriving himself of the possibility of any help from them in the clear conviction that in such difficult conditions he will manage himself. Putting a fast over love of one’s neighbor, as we shall see further, was for Evagrius a clear sign of activity of the demon of gluttony and pride. He did not accidentally propose in Antirrheticus I,37, that according to the principles of the antirhretic method directed against the demon of gluttony which urges over-asceticism, the biblical text of Eccles. 7:17: “Do not be too just and do not consider yourself wise because you destroy yourself ”.47 The second text, in which Evagrius presents the action of the passionate thought of gluttony as a temptation to a stricter fast, we find in the treatise On thoughts: When a demon of gluttony, after numerous and frequent struggles, lacks the strength to destroy the abstinence well-formed within us, he throws the mind into a desire for an extreme ascetism. Subsequently, he brings forward the companions of Daniel, their poor life and the grains (Dan. 1:12,16), he evokes the memory of certain other anchorites who have always lived in this way or who began to, and he compels him to become their imitator so that in pursuing an immoderate abstinence he may fail to attain even a moderate one, the body not being strong enough because of its weakness. In reality this demon blesses with his mouth and curses in his heart (cf. Ps. 61:5).48 Evagrius emphasizes in this text that the demon of gluttony changes its tactics of struggle with the anchorite after it has had numerous and frequent battles with him, but has not been able to overcome him. It is worth remembering that the tactics of the demon of gluttony for a stricter fast do not apply to the monks beginning the path of asceticism, but to those already advanced in the fight against him who have not been deceived by other means. The kind of temptation in this case is also an indication of the higher state of the spiritual development of the monk and the new weapon he now uses is to stimulate the soul to the desire for harsher asceticism. As we can see, the spiritual battle is again played out at the level of the monk’s desires, which are then put into practice. As usual, through the imagination and memory, a passionate thought
47 In modern translation of the Bible it is 7,16: “Do not be too righteous, and do not act too wise; why should you destroy yourself?” (RSV). 48 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 35; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 272–74; Sinkewicz (2003), 177–78.
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awakens the desire for a harsher fast. He puts in front of the imagination an ascetic image of the biblical Daniel and his companions who, faithful to God’s law, decided not to defile themselves with royal dishes or wine, eating only vegetables, and their appearance was ultimately better than other young men (Dan. 1:8). Next, he reminds him of some anchorites who have lived this way and stuck to it, urging the monk to imitate them and assuring him that he will persevere. I wrote earlier that the demon of gluttony cooperates in this case with subtle vanity and pride. This is perfectly evident after the desire to imitate spiritual masters who lived a very harsh ascetic life as then experienced shame when the monk could not survive alone and was forced to use the help of others (Ant. I,62). A strict fast and lifestyle can actually be a sign of significant progress in the ascetic life or a kind of masochistic temptation, but it is difficult to discern without falling into the trap of illusions. The demon of gluttony which urges more severe asceticism, uses such an illusion, telling the monk that he has already matured to it and is as perfect as the great Desert Fathers. The purpose of his actions is to make the anchorite, by taking on an immoderate abstinence, lose even his moderate abstinence. At the same time, he brings him to a split desire: a monk, in the language of Evagrius, “blesses with his mouth and curses in his heart”. He blesses for show pretending that he is satisfied with the harsher lifestyle, which he has chosen himself, in order to be seen by people, but he curses in the spirit because he is ashamed to retreat and is no longer able to bear the burden of such harsh asceticism. In this situation, however, in the opinion of the Pontian ascetic, the monk should blame himself: Those who in their wickedness nourish the flesh and “make provision for it to gratify its desires” (Rom. 13:14) – let them blame themselves and not the flesh. For they know the grace of the Creator, those who have attained impassibility of the soul through this body and perceive to some degree the contemplation of beings.49 As we can see, the Pontian monk really mastered the action of the demon of gluttony, which easily impersonates ascetic radicalism, but motivated not by the desire for God’s greater glory and love but by seeking the monk’s own glory and admiration from the brothers. Such radicalism, paradoxically, instead of leading to the weakening of the action of the thought of gluttony, strengthens it even more, leading also to the growing contempt for one’s own body. In this way, the demon of gluttony manages to imprison the anchorite in a vicious circle of contempt for his body while increasing its needs. Even the most severe fasting and abstinence, according to the Pontian ascetic, cannot be motivated by contempt for the body, because it is God’s gift to man after the original fall. The body is the result of the grace of the Creator who gave it to the fallen minds as an aid to achieve salvation: To those who blaspheme against the Creator and speak ill of this mortal body of our soul, who will show them the grace that they have received, while they are subject to passions, to have been joined to such an instrument (organon)?50
49 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 53; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 620; Sinkewicz (2003), 107. 50 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,60; A. Guillaumont (1958), 163; Ramelli (2015), 231.
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It is thanks to the body that it is possible to practice ascetism and achieve the impassibility of the soul: The one who is liable to passions and prays that his departure may occur soon is similar to a man who is ill and asks the joiner to break up his bed soon.51 Further, through the mediation of the body, the fallen mind is capable of a general transition from sensual knowledge, which is at the same time the beginning of its path, up to spiritual gnosis (KG IV,70) and the soul can take refuge in the body from demons (KG IV,82).52 The anchorite fights on the one hand with the demon of gluttony, but on the other hand he should defend himself against treating his body with contempt. The best defense against this action of gluttony is to stick to the pre-determined measure of fasting or abstinence and not abandon it on any pretext. Evagrius ends the cited text with a very important remark: I think it is not right that one obey him nor abstain from bread, oil and water. For the brothers have determined by experience that this regimen is the very best, provided that it is not pursued to satiety and that it is limited to once a day.53 He encourages the monk not to listen to the promptings of the demon who promises to achieve perfection and admiration of the brothers quickly, but to consume bread, water and oil according to a fixed measure once a day. The ascetic from Pontus refers here to the practice of a diet tried by previous monks; and the custom of one incomplete meal a day, goes back, as we know, to the time of Anthony the Great.54 As we can see, the demon of gluttony, by incites one to exceed the measure of asceticism and attacks most often those people who are not able to set the right boundaries for themselves in eating food. It tempts them with an invitation to overeat or to severe fasts. Yet another manifestation of the demon of gluttony’s activity which encourages stricter fasting is the attitude of disregarding the brothers at the same time. The practice of fasting or abstinence becomes the most important for the monk instead of meeting the needs of his neighbors. This procedure quickly leads the ascetic to exaggerated concentration on himself at the expense of his relationships with others. The monk then does not place God at the center of his life, but rather self-improvement. It is easy to feel the instrumental treatment of asceticism in such an attitude as a tool for building one’s own “self ”, not as a means to purifying the mind or growing in the love of God and neighbor. Evagrius very strictly warns against the treatment of fasting and abstinence as a goal in itself, not at the center of monastic life, and sees in this approach the subtle action of the demon of gluttony. The clearest sign of
51 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,76; A. Guillaumont (1958), 169; Ramelli (2015), 238. 52 C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 621–23, note 53. 53 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 35; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 274; Sinkewicz (2003), 178. 54 Cf. Apophtegmata Patrum, Antoni 34.
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such action, again with vanity and pride, is to disregard the brothers. In the Treaty to Eulogius, he states: When a brother visits you during your intense fast and practice of stillness, do not accept the odiousness of thoughts that suggests disturbance of your stillness and interruption of your fast.55 The conviction that the visiting neighbor may disturb inner peace or break the fast shows that in reality ascetic practice and self-improvement are more important to the monk than the love of neighbor. This contradicts the main assumption of monastic life: not to strengthen, but rather to overcome the “ego” of the old man, and the visits of the brothers give a good opportunity for that. The Pontian monk in fact wrote: “Anachoresis in charity purifies the heart; anachoresis accompanied by hatred troubles it”.56 Whenever the opportunity arises of transcending or abandoning the realization of one’s own needs, even a need for self-improvement, and it is rejected, we are dealing with a fictitious asceticism and the illusion of spiritual development. Not incidentally, does Evagrius combine the temptation of harsher fast with disregard or even contempt for the brothers. Concentrating on the practice of stricter fast can easily be motivated by hatred and contempt for other people, and also mask the vanity and subtle sense of superiority over them. Disrespect and contempt for brothers is also often really revealing the hidden contempt for oneself. And if contempt for oneself and others is the central motivation for harsher fasting or abstinence, then the very nature of these practices is perverted and become devastatingly futile. Asceticism motivated by hatred towards oneself or others does not purify the heart, but introduces it to confusion. Evagrius already in the fourth century described these subtle strategies of the demon of gluttony, proposing remedies against him. He advised: “Let us not speak of the frequent visits of the brothers as disturbances, but rather let us trust their community as a helpful alliance against the phalanx of the adversary”.57 The monk from Pontus encouraged the anchorites to see the brothers as an opportunity for common prayer and support in the fight against demons in the desert. Hospitality as an expression of love and kindness to the brothers gives hope for participation in the love of Christ (Ad Eul. 25). Fasting, even the harshest, without the love of God and neighbor is not worth much. It is important, however, that this hospitality should not be feigned: Some people flatter themselves in a strange way with the role of the host, and whenever they invite a distinguished guest, they do not implore him at all, but they amplify the message of invitation with their pride, and when an invitee refuses the invitation, they censure him as they would one who had given insult. Great conceit is thus enkindled by this.58 55 56 57 58
Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 25; Sinkewicz (2003), 327.51. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 8; Greßmann (1913), 152; Sinkewicz (2003), 123. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 25; Sinkewicz (2003), 327, 51. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 25; Sinkewicz (2003), 327, 51.
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Some people who do not have the courage to refuse hospitality apply various treatments so that the visitor will be liable to not want to come. They would like offer an invitation, but they also let you know that it would be better not to visit them; and if the invitee, according to their hidden intentions, refuse to come, they try to arouse guilt in him, insisting that he offends them. According to Evagrius, only sincere hospitality is a sign of true love of neighbor, and the latter is a test of the authenticity of fasting and abstinence. The Pontian monk presented the general principle of wise flexibility which can stick to the designated measure, but can also give it up for the love of others or in case of a disease of the body. In the Foundations of Monastic Life he wrote: Fast as much as you are able before the Lord […]. Eating once a day, do not desire to eat a second meal lest you become extravagant and trouble your thinking. Thus, you will be able to accumulate an abundance for the purpose of works of beneficence, and you will be able to put to death the passions of the body. But if a visit from brothers should occur and there is need for you to eat a second and third time, do not be sullen or downcast; rejoice rather that you are obedient to necessity and, eating a second or third meal, give thanks to God that you have fulfilled the law of love and that you have God himself as the one who disposes for your life. There will be also the time when sickness of the body comes along and makes it necessary for you to eat a second and third time or even more often: so do not let your thoughts be saddened by this.59 Therefore, it is more important to carry out the will of God, who sends a monk to visit his brothers or sends him a physical weakness rather than a soulless adherence to established rules at the expense of loving one’s neighbor or one’s own health. Faithfulness to the set extent of fasting and abstinence is absolutely necessary in the fight against the demon of gluttony, but not as a goal in itself or as just a tool for self-improvement. The love of neighbor and the prudent care of one’s health is more important than the preservation of the measure. A wise and prudent anchorite keeps a harsh fast and abstinence to quickly reach the port of impassibility, but at the same time is able to give it up if that is God’s will. This principle testifies to the deep humanism of the desert ascetics who, with all the severity of life, always had a concrete human being in front of their eyes, and not just a soulless observance of the rules. 1.1.3.
Gluttony as Illusion of an Easy Way in Asceticism
If the demon of gluttony did not succeed in discouraging the monk from living in the desert, he tried to question his determination to stay in subsequent attacks. He tried to lead him in various ways to soften the harsh practices of fasting, deceiving him with the possibility of reaching a state of impassibility without these sacrifices; he tries to lead him to self-pity or to avoid his will. The purpose of such action was, of course, the desire to take the monk away from ascetic practice, and the tool most 59 Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 10, PG 40,1261D–1263A; Sinkewicz (2003), 10.
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often became the imagination stimulated by memory, because in the desert it was difficult to tempt the senses in the form of real sophisticated dishes. Most of his reflections on this subject were presented by Evagrius in Antirrheticus I, where he collected fragments of biblical texts useful for directing against this demon during the spiritual battle.60 Thus, passionate thoughts aroused the natural need for pleasure from eating sophisticated foods, at the same time convincing the monk about the senselessness of fasting and giving up God’s gifts or tempting him with the possibility of combining satiety with the anchoritic lifestyle. The demon of gluttony told him: “Do not torment your soul with a lot of fasting that gains you nothing and does not purify your intellect”.61 As we can see, this series of attacks of gluttony does not encourage the monk simply to overeating or to severe fasts, but it undermines the absolute necessity of fasting and abstinence as means to purify the mind. Further, the passionate thought slowly “softens” the soul of the monk, giving him the belief that nothing really bad for the soul will result from abundant food and drink (I,6), that the commandment of fasting is difficult (I,5) and yet that you can “follow the path of the saints while being full of bread and water” (I,9), and that the oath of fasting and sacrifice is in fact completely alien to the monastic way of life (I,27). The demon of gluttony weakens the anchorite’s vigilance, comforting him: “Do not live so severely; through fasting and constant labor you will wear out your weak body” (I,14); “Do not wear yourself out so unsparingly and afflict your soul by keeping vigil” (I,15); give “a little rest to the weak and miserable body” (I,20). The tactic of fighting is clearly directed at the monk’s being sorry for the hardships of his own life and departing from the previously adopted decisions. If it manages to sow doubts in his soul, then it quickly attacks him with guilt because of the fall and failure to fulfill his obligations. If the anchorite was not seduced by the demon of gluttony, which questioned the meaning of all sacrifices in food and drink, he was attacked by him with the awakening of memory and the recalling of memories, especially past feasts. He recalls to him: “delicacies of the past and remembers pleasant wines and the cups that we used to hold in our hands when we would recline at table and drink” (I,30) leading him so that he: “wants [to return to] this custom” (I,36), to submit to “pleasures and of a table that has been filled with all good things […] better than the monastic life” (I,41) or to show a sharp contrast between past pleasures and present or future hardships and sufferings (I,38). In this way, he encourages the monk to return to his former lifestyle filled with abundant and varied foods, and to abandon fasting and the hermitical life. Persistence in the soul was able, if not to discourage the monk completely from asceticism, at least to raise doubts in him and undermine his zeal in fulfilling his practices. Evagrius captures here undoubtedly a general mechanism of action of human imagination and memory. Even if in these memories some elements, such as drinking wine or supper, for obvious reasons are marked by the sign of the time, so the pattern of memories is the same for all people, and the cultural variable will
60 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus; Frankenberg (1912), 472–545; Brakke (2009), 53–68. 61 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus I,2; Brakke (2009), 53.
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be only their content. The fight, therefore, of the monk with the demon of gluttony in this area focuses on the continuous cleansing of memories from past images and developing his meditation on the mysteries of God. When the passionate thought of gluttony fails to ultimately dissuade the monk from the anchoritic lifestyle, he takes up a fight with him in the context of specific practices of fasting and abstinence. Such a thought, even if he remains in the desert, will encourage him to give: “a little care for […] body by eating and drinking” (I,52), and “gives no heed to the harm that springs from filling the belly” (I,4) or that he took care of acquiring the necessary food and drink (I,16,23). Since the anchorites were not only limited to consuming mainly dry bread and drinking ordinary water, but usually only did it once a day, the demon of gluttony also used this element to fight them. When “the soul that grows weary in the affliction that comes upon it from restriction of bread and water” (I,51) and “weeps over simple foods and dry bread” (I,24), then the passionate thought encourages the monk to fill the stomach with bread and water to fill him up (I,31.64) or at least to consume more of them to relieve the suffering and exhaustion of the soul (I,42). It stirs up dissatisfaction with eating bread and drinking water, making the monk look for vegetables (I,45), meat, wine or other foods at harvest time (I 54) under the guise that they are God’s gifts created for people (I,36). The temptation to desire a different food than dry bread and water intensified much more during the holidays or during the anchorite’s stay in the city, for example, to sell his hand-made products and obtain the necessary means to live. Passionate thoughts then urged “on a feast day to show a little mercy to our body by offering it a few delicacies” (I,25) or, in a more subtle way, suggested “on a feast day gently approach us and say to us that we might just once in a long stretch of time taste meat and wine” (I,29). Often the thought of gluttony from the feeling of shame in front of relatives encouraged the monk to give up fasting and eat some vegetables on Christmas (I,32) or “on feast days enumerates for me many people reclining at the finest table, exulting and rejoicing” (I,40) or also “to expect to receive what we need from others” (I,63). In a Mediterranean climate in which wine is a daily drink served with meals, the demon of gluttony used it as another element to fight desert ascetics. The anchorites used wine only in the case of stomach ache or severe illness, but the temptation to also drink it outside these situations (I,67) or even to dream about the abundance of wine in the holiday season quickly arose (I,60). Finally, the other way through which passionate thoughts of gluttony could easily seduce a monk was an apparent concern for needy brothers. It scolded the monk that “the provisions that we have gathered are not sufficient both for us and for the brothers who come to us” (I,10) or it reminded him of necessity: “even when there is no scarcity, gathers more bread than he needs, on the pretext of hospitality” (I,12). The passionate thought aroused fear for oneself, leading the monk to care for his abundance and not let his bread be given to the needy, explaining that the needy could go to someone else, but the anchorite did not knock on the foreign door (I,28). This fear has often been, we would say in today’s language, rationalized, not to share one’s own food and clothing with beggars because in fact they cannot exist both for a monk and a beggar, or maybe because someone else will need them more
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and they need to be stored for them (I,49). The monk was also tempted, like every human being, by a split of intention: on the one hand he supported beggars and the needy, and on the other he felt regret and loss after what he offered (I,58,66). The temptation of gluttony often urged the ascetic “to be anxious about food and clothing on the pretexts of hospitality, illnesses, and prolonged miseries of the body” (I,47). If the demon of gluttony could not persuade the anchorite as to the pointlessness of fasting, he tried to stimulate him to silent pity about his fate or to deprive him of purity of intention in practicing fasting so that he would think in one way but act in another. This was perfectly described by Evagrius in Epistle 16,2: The demon of gluttony observes the person who fasts or who in his depression does not complain for the lack, or whether in his words it is impossible to recognize such a thing, or if by chance his will of fasting is not divided so that he thinks one thing inside, and something else is shown people outside, and does not wait to hear a few words about how pale a face and what delicate skin he has.62 The demon of gluttony observes the attitude and appearance of the fasting monk, and watches whether he takes a depressed pose to show others his hardships, or practices fasting with joy. Next, he listens to the words of the monk, whether he feels sorry for the lack of food and beverages; for Evagrius has repeatedly emphasized that a humble monk should rather reveal his sins, not ascetic hardships and victories. If he does the opposite, hiding his failings and telling everyone about the hardships he has suffered, it means that he seeks human glory and is far from perfect. When the monk’s face shows no signs of depression and he has no complaints about himself, then the demon of gluttony cleverly tempts him with accepting the pharisaic attitude that he would think differently, and show something else outside. This split of will may work in two directions: when a monk is alone in a cell he takes a depressed attitude and complains about a shortage of food and drink, while outside, he pretends to be joyful with words and tries to confirm his satisfaction with the anchoritic lifestyle. Or vice versa, he experiences spiritual joy in loneliness from the practices he has undertaken, while outside he pretends to be depressed and complains. Evagrius rather thinks of the latter case, when the monk on the outside takes a depressed attitude and complains to others, seeking consolation from them and waiting for advice that he should ease his fast because “he has a pale face and delicate skin”. The demon of gluttony, leading the monk to divide the will, reaches the intended goal, thus depriving him of the purity of intention in practicing fasting only for God and for the purification of his own soul and making him also a hostage of human considerations. The monk’s struggle with such temptations of gluttony was to persevere at all costs in the adopted decisions of the practice of fasting and abstinence: “I would be amazed if someone who took his fill of bread and water were able to receive the crown of impassibility”.63 An experienced spiritual master quickly recognized the true nature
62 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 16,2; Frankenberg (1912), 577. 63 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 35; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 274–76; Sinkewicz (2003), 178.
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of these temptations by confirming, like Evagrius, from his own experience, that no one could purify the soul or attain a state of impassibility while submitting to gluttony. The most effective tool to fight against it is fasting and watching: “Hunger and thirst extinguish evil desires; a goodly vigil purifies the intellect”.64 This purification is impossible or is significantly prolonged over time in the case of mild or temporary fasting. Further, an important element of the struggle with the thought of passionate gluttony was to discover in the presence of the spiritual master the true intentions of his action, often mocked by concern for one’s fellow men. The root of the desire to gather food under the guise of charity was most often the fear of lack of livelihood. A good remedy for fear is trust in God, personal prayer, and meditation on the Word of God, especially the Book of Psalms.65 Evagrius himself, as already mentioned above, collected in his treatise, the Antirrheticus appropriate biblical verses helpful to fight this temptation. 1.1.4.
Gluttony as the Obstacle for Prayer and the Cause of Bad Dreams
The purpose of monastic life, according to Evagrius, is contemplation of God, which takes place most fully in a state of pure prayer, that is, prayer deprived of any image. The mind is healthy if it does not imagine anything in the world during prayer, but begins to see its own light, remains calm in the face of dream visions, and looks at things and events without any movement.66 But before it reaches this state of impassibility, it must overcome each of the eight demons, beginning with gluttony. A great help at every stage of this fight is prayer, which although not yet fully immaterial, significantly supports the process of purification. For this reason, demons do everything to prevent the monk from it: Why do the demons want to produce in us gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger and resentment, and other passions? So that the mind becomes thickened by them and unable to pray as it ought.67 Prayer is a specifically human activity whose demons envy people: The demon is very jealous of the person at prayer and uses every trick to frustrate his purpose. Thus, he does not cease setting in motion mental representations of objects through the memory and prising loose all the passions through flesh, so that he can impede his excellent course and his setting out towards God.68 For all the struggle between people and impure spirits is about spiritual prayer (De or. 50). So Evagrius advises: “When you experience temptation, do not pray before you have directed some words of anger against the one causing the 64 Evagrius Ponticus, Ad virginem 40; Greßmann (1913), 146–51; Sinkewicz (2003), 154; See also Elm (1990), 393–404 and Elm (1994). 65 Cf. Dysinger (1997), 176–82; Id. (1999); Id. (2005). 66 Cf. Practicus 64–65. 67 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 50; PG 79,1177B; Sinkewicz (2003), 198. 68 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 46; PG 79,1176D; Sinkewicz (2003), 197.
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affliction. For when your soul is affected by thoughts, it follows that your prayer is not pure”.69 This general principle can also be applied to the demon of gluttony, which is a great obstacle to the monk’s prayer. The Pontian monk claimed: “The body is subdued with hunger and vigil and does not jump when a thought mounts upon it, nor does it snort when it is moved by an impassioned impulse”.70 The anchorite of Pontus proposes, therefore, an effective tool to fight the demon of gluttony, which uses the natural needs of the human body; fasting and watching. In turn, the vigil is very closely connected with prayer and it is impossible for a man to overcome the desire for satiety without it. With a very dry diet, the mind of the monk retains sobriety and is able to watch, while the search for a comfortable life plunges him into the abyss of spiritual ignorance. In the treatise De octo spiritibus Evagrius excludes the possibility of attaining the state of prayer without vigil and abstinence. An unsatisfied stomach makes the soul stay watchful, while a full stomach makes it sleepy. The praying and fasting monk quickly rises up like a young eagle, while the glutton, burdened by satiety, falls down. Severe digestion of foods obscures the mind so that it releases “the stems of abominable thoughts”, and thinking based on a dull satiety does not accept the knowledge of God and is not able to contemplate.71 First, our author refers to common human experience. He says that in a state of fullness, man is heavy and drowsy, and vigilance is very difficult. We can easily understand these notes from the Pontian monk, remembering that the anchorites very often practiced the prayer vigil long at night, allowing only a few hours of sleep. For obvious reasons, satiety hindered or even prevented such vigil. However, this did not mean having to go to the opposite extreme. Neither an excessively full or completely empty stomach is conducive to prayer, so Evagrius encourages a state of insatiability which, in his opinion, best suits the soul to watch in prayer both day and night. The abstemious monk, wrote Evagrius, will quickly reach a state of peace and impassibility, and his prayer will be pleasing to God: You who long for pure prayer […] control your stomach; do not give your belly its fill of bread, and restrict its use of water, keep vigil in prayer and put resentment far from you.72 As we see, according to the ascetism of Ponticus, to achieve pure prayer it is necessary to fast together with the night watch. It is interesting that in his opinion victory over the corporeal demons allows the monk to experience deeper freedom during prayer than after the victory over the so-called spiritual demons: No temptation bestows on the soul such frankness at the time of prayer as that bestowed by the temptation that attacks the body! Nor does our Lord confer
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Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 42; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 596; Sinkewicz (2003), 105. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 3; PG 79,1148B; Sinkewicz (2003), 75. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 1–2 passim; Sinkewicz (2003), 73. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 43; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 298; Sinkewicz (2003), 182.
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such apatheia on anyone as on one who, patiently enduring what happens with thanksgiving, despises this “sack”.73 The text confirms Evagrius’ conviction that bodily passions are an obstacle to the spiritual prayer of the anchorite. A very subtle form of victory of gluttony can be the conviction of a monk that to practice spiritual prayer it is enough to free oneself only from the passionate thought of gluttony; this will stop him on the way of any further purification of the soul. Evagrius explicitly warns against staying in such an illusion: Let no one pray or cry, being in temperance alone. It is impossible to build a house with one stone or build a building with one brick […]. Temperance only tames the body, while the calmness makes the mind able to see! Nothing, however, extinguishes hot bullets of evil as much as knowledge of God.74 In this way it is clearly emphasized that gluttony is the gate that opens the way to all other passions, but even if the anchorite resists it, he can be attacked by passionate “spiritual” thoughts which do not always need to mediate the body: Mistrust those who love only fasting, who although unblinded by tempting thoughts of gluttony are oppressed by thoughts of avarice, envy, anger, vainglory, and pride. […] For the goal of the monk is not to free his nous from some thoughts while binding it to others, but rather to free his nous wholly from unclean thoughts and to “cast it down before Christ” (1 Cor. 11:2).75 Nothing seems to release the passionate thought of gluttony if the monk allows himself to be dominated by greed, vanity, or pride, because in this way he will never reach impassibility, thus making useless his stay in the desert. Evagrius himself warned the anchorites, especially those who defeated the demon of gluttony, against the temptation to seek in such conditions vain glory: For what good will come to us, that we will remove […] abdominal passions through self-control, but at the same time we will assume the passions of vainglory and murmuring […]?76 The monk of Pontus has perfectly captured here the state of the soul, which modern psychology describes as the transition from one addiction to another. However, in his opinion, the process of true purification of the soul cannot consist in freeing oneself from some passionate thoughts and binding with others, but in achieving a state of relatively permanent liberation from all of them and achieving impassibility.
73 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 1,2; L. Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). “Sack” is of course the human physical body. 74 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 27,3–4; Frankenberg (1912), 583. 75 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 52,6; Frankenberg (1912), 599–601; L. Dysinger, www.ldysinger.com/ Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 76 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 17,3; Frankenberg (1912), 577. Cf. F. Refoulé (1961), 470–516.
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Yet another manifestation of the activity of the demon of gluttony is tormenting the monk with passionate dreams.77 As we have seen before, temperance enables the mind to honestly pray and resist anger and lust, as well as release from nightmares: This happens, however, to the wrathful and the gluttonous who do not abstain by day, and who enjoy no respite from evil fantasies by night.78 Evagrius links here, admittedly, the attack of the demon of gluttony and anger, but it is clear from the text that those who succumb to gluttony during the day are tormented by various evil delusions at night. The close connection between gluttony and bad images in a dream is clearly confirmed in another text by our monk: Do not give an abundance of foods to your body, and you will not see evil fantasies in your sleep, for in the same way that a flame consumes brush so does hunger extinguish shameful fantasies.79 Our author, beyond describing them as bad and repugnant, nowhere specifies the content of these dreams. The cure for demonic attacks of gluttony during the night is moderation in food and the courage to confront the experience of one’s own hunger. Additional help in this fight comes by limiting the hours of sleep: “Do not give yourself to feeding your belly (Prov. 24:15) and take not your fill of nighty sleep, for in this way you will become pure and the Spirit of the Lord will come upon you”.80 Evagrius repeats here the conviction that fasting combined with the limitation of sleep and nocturnal vigil prayer quickly purifies the soul of the monk, opening it to receive the Spirit of God. As we have seen, the demon of gluttony temptes the anchorite in a variety of ways, arousing fear for his own health or life, arousing the desire for harsher asceticism, or deceiving him with the possibility of achieving impassibility without fasting and abstinence. As a tool to help him fight, Evagrius proposes to determine the right measure of fast for each one and not give it up under any circumstances, to limit the hours of sleep, and to use the antirrhetical method, i.e. to direct against the passionate thought the passage from the Scriptures. The key to success in the fight against the demon of gluttony is, in his opinion, the virtue of moderation in the consumption of food and drink as well as the limitation of time devoted to sleep and rest: Abstinence is a bridle for the stomach, a scourge of immoderation, a balance of due proportion, a muzzle for gourmandize, renunciation of rest, the undertaking of austerity, a place of chastisement for thoughts, an eye for vigilance, deliverance from lustful burning, pedagogue of the body, a tower of ascetic works and a wall for our ways, reserve in morals and repression of the passions, mortification of
77 Cf. Misiarczyk (2006), 121–38. 78 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 4,2; Frankenberg (1912), 569; Dysinger, www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/ 11_Letters/00a_start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 79 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 11; Greßmann (1913), 154; Sinkewicz (2003), 123. 80 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 97; Greßmann (1913), 161; Sinkewicz (2003), 128.
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one’s bodily members, revivification of souls, imitation of the resurrection, a life of sanctification.81 The essence of the activity of gluttony, as it has been repeatedly emphasized, is the exaggeration and lack of moderation in eating and drinking. 1.2.
Impurity (Fornication)
Before we begin a detailed analysis of the Evagrian understanding of impurity, it is worth emphasizing that even a superficial reading of his writings reveals the double meaning he gives to this term. In the general sense, it means all kinds of passionate thoughts (ἀκαθάροι λογισμοί) as an obstacle to knowing God, and are not necessarily connected with the erotic sphere of man. With this understanding, purity will then be identified with impassibility. In our analysis, however, we will not deal with this understanding of impurity, but are interested in a second, more specific meaning, usually expressed by the Greek term πορνεία, which Evagrius defines as the desire of bodies of the opposite sex.82 Sexual need is inherently good, and the Pontian monk has definitely cut himself off from any form of Manicheism that would recognize human sexuality as being ontically evil. If he described it as evil, he always meant the moral evil in the situation of the anchorite, who voluntarily chose to practice chastity and withdrew from it.83 The body and all its needs, including the need for sexual relations with a different gender, although created by God secondarily in the aftermath of the original fall, are inherently good. God, it seems, after the original sin, provided man with the sexual need as one of the central needs for several reasons: he wanted to give men and women the opportunity to create a community based on a deep physical and spiritual relationship for mutual help; he gave the gift of experiencing great pleasure compensating for daily hardships in the present state of life; further, he combined it with the gift of motherhood and fatherhood and the transmission of life to ensure the survival of mankind; and finally, he gave to individuals a form of “survival” in their offspring after their own physical death, and through sexual relations with the opposite sex, enabled persons to transcend themselves. Although every monk choosing a life of sexual abstinence and purity gave up the realization of all these needs, they nevertheless remained in his nature and let him know of their existence. Fighting in this situation is especially difficult because both the power of the sexual impulse that God has given to every human being as well as the frustration of resigning from emotional and exclusive closeness with a woman and some form of further life in one’s offspring is great. Evagrius himself experienced it when he was tempted by impurity: “he spent the whole night in prayer standing in a cistern with water, naked, in the middle of winter, until his body became as hard as stone”.84 The struggle with
81 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 2; PG 79,1140B–1144D; Sinkewicz, (2003), 62. 82 Cf. Practicus 8; Sinkewicz (2003), 98. 83 Cf. Palladius, Vita Evagrii 21. Evagrius confirmed that in his time, not only monks and nuns kept their purity, but also many lay people. 84 Palladius, Vita Evagrii 19.
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the demon of impurity takes place on two levels: physical and psycho-spiritual. The monk from Pontus wrote about it: Now consider that there are two types of fornication, coupled together yet distinct, that of the body and that of the spirit.85 Evagrius understands by impurity of the body the ordinary impure activities, while the impurity of thoughts and desires are those which sneak into the soul and urge it to associate with the images of woman’s figure. The phantom, though it does not have a body, urges the soul to sin by thought. At the physical level, the mediation of the body and senses leading to total dedication to another person in sexual relationship plays a key role. Evagrius repeatedly emphasized that impure thoughts are born through the visible world86 and are, as it can be said, the most capacious: Impure thoughts receive for their increase numerous materials and extend themselves to many objects. Indeed, they traverse in the intellect mighty seas, and they do not decline to undertake long journeys because of the great ardour of the passion.87 Even if the text refers in general to all the passionate thoughts that the anchorite of Pontus often used to describe as impure, among them is also fornication, the quickest like the demon of blasphemy against God.88 Sexual need therefore arouses by the senses, especially by sight and touch in the case of men, and the monks were men. Hence, the first step in the monk’s control of sexual desire was to move away into the desert and exclude all encounters with women which provoked the sense of sight. We know perfectly well, however, that human sexuality has a transcendental character by its nature, i.e. in relation to the other person; it forces us to go beyond an egocentric search for only pleasure at the expense of others and to seek the good of others, crossing the boundaries of our own self. Evagrius perceived human sexuality as a gift which God provided to man who was focused on himself after the original fall, to live in relation to another person in order to help him cross the boundaries of his own “ego”, which was and still remains its original vocation. The monk chose a different way to transcend his own “ego”, by sacrifice and asceticism; but the danger of experiencing his own sexuality now became the pleasure of erotic thoughts, and increased desires without a real relationship with a woman had to be confronted by celibate anchorite. The Pontian monk knew perfectly well that it is impossible here on earth to be completely free from sexual desires, nor is it at all necessary, but rather to purify them from the passion that often compels man, (in modern psychological language we would say 85 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 19; Sinkewicz (2003), 322. 45. 86 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 4,3; De malignis cogitationibus 23; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 236; Sinkewicz (2003), 169. 87 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 36; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 276–78; Sinkewicz (2003), 178. 88 Cf. Practicus 51; Sinkewicz (2003), 106.
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compulsiveness). Our author wrote that the demon of impurity “unless it should set the thoughts in motion with passion, poses us no hindrance to the knowledge of God”.89 The anchorite, attaining the state of impassibility with the help of God’s grace, returned to the original state from before the fall and anticipated the future life in God, where the mediation of the body in its present form in relationship between people will no longer be necessary, according to Christ’s words: “they will neither get married, not marry, but they will be like God’s angels in heaven” (Matt. 22:30). The second, the psycho-spiritual level of struggle with the demon of impurity is definitely more difficult to determine and eludes direct consciousness; for liberation from impure acts was only part of a monk’s ascetic work. The resignation from real sexual relations with women as well as looking at them or touching their bodies could easily be compensated by erotic imaginations and dreams. The eternal strategy of human nature is by means of imagination or dreams to achieve what is unattainable in reality. This strategy acts particularly strongly in the sexual sphere, where the sense of sight and imagination plays such an important role. The anchorite’s lifestyle of purity, however, as the Pontian monk pointed out many times, should lead not only to giving up impure actions, i.e., sexual relations with a woman, but also to the purification of thoughts, desires, and erotic dreams so that they no longer cause passion. So, it is not only about the purity of the body, but above all about the purity of the soul, which is achieved through the purification of memory and imagination. And because it is easy to go from erotic thoughts and ideas to sexual acts, Evagrius encouraged: “Therefore, do not bow down to an unsubstantial little figure lest you do the same also in the flesh”.90 He emphasized that this is about purification of the memory and imagination so hat they allow only natural erotic movements that are not an obstacle to spiritual prayer. Further, in the spiritual space, resignation from the use of eros automatically forced the anchorite to confront death (thanatos). It seems that in its deepest level, the ascetic work of a monk or any celibate over the control of one’s sexuality is largely an effort to control the fear of one’s physical annihilation. The renunciation of procreation, in addition to giving up the physical experience of fatherhood/motherhood, is a form of interrupting and stopping the “power of life” that is no longer passed on to the offspring. This means choosing the path of death for the present body and state of life without the possibility of further extending it. This anxiety often remains unconscious and easily stimulates the physical level of experiencing sexuality, which at the same time becomes a source of great consolation, creating a mechanism of the vicious circle very difficult to break: fear – consolation. This anxiety was additionally reinforced in the case of the monk’s repulsion of the demon’s attack by the practice of fasting and giving up the comfort of sophisticated foods, because then sexuality quickly became a source of self-comfort and numbness of this fear. Not incidentally, did Evagrius based on the Platonic tradition,91 Clement of Alexandria,92 and Gregory
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Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 51; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 616; Sinkewicz (2003), 106. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 19; Sinkewicz (2003), 322.44. Cf. Plato, Phedo 67c; Plotinus, Enneades I,9; III 6,5. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V 11,67,1.
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Nazianzen,93 describe anchoritism, and thus also the fight with passionate thoughts, as an exercise in dying: Separating body from soul belongs solely to the one who joined them together, but separating soul from body belongs also to one who longs for virtue. Our fathers call anachoresis a meditation on death and a flight from the body.94 The choice of chastity by living alone in the desert was undoubtedly such an exercise in dying. We also understand why the Pontian monk described impurity as the daughter of gluttony, because the common denominator of both passionate thoughts was the struggle for physical survival: in the case of gluttony, survival in general; with impurity, survival in the offspring. For this reason, the resistance of man against purification in the sexual sphere was and is definitely greater than in other areas of human life. As in the case of gluttony, Evagrius does not systematically describe the activity of the demon of impurity, but does so in the form of scattered sentences95 that can be gathered in the following subjects: “gluttony – mother of fornication”, “the meeting of a monk with women”; “erotic thoughts, images and dreams” and “impurity – vanity”. We will deal with these topics in the following paragraphs, analyzing the texts of the ascetic from Pontus.96 1.2.1.
“Gluttony – mother of fornication”
Evagrius repeatedly and on various occasions wrote about the close dependence of impurity on gluttony, based on the earlier traditional Christian and non-Christian teaching about this subject.97 In Scholia in Ecclesiasten, commenting on excerpt 10:1–2: “Keep away anger from your heart and wickedness from your body” he writes. By “wickedness” here he means “fornication (πορνεία) and gluttony (γαστριμαργία)”.98 Gluttony is the mother of impurity in a dual sense: on the one hand, it can easily be succumbed to by a monk who has lost the battle with the demon of gluttony; on the other hand, he who overcame the passionate thoughts of gluttony but now experiences the frustration of his sexual desire, easily can return to consoling himself with food and drink. A similar situation when passionate thoughts quickly turn to eating occurs “whenever the spirit of fornication, playing with them, gives 93 Gregory Nazianzen, Epistula 31. 94 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 52; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 618; Sinkewicz (2003), 106–07. 95 Cf. Vita Evagrii 9; 19; 21; Epistula 4,3; 6,4; 16,3; 27,3–4; 39,4; 56,2; Practicus 8; 22–23; 51; 58; Gnosticus 31; 47; De oratione 90; 146; Capita tria de oratione 3; Sententiae ad monachos 7; 44; 65; 96; 97; 102; Ad virginem 50; De malignis cogitationibus 1; 5; 8; 9; 12; 15; 16; 17; 21; 22; 23; 24; 27; 29; 30; 33; 36; De octo spiritibus malitiae 4–6; Tractatus ad Eulogium 12; 22–23; 33; Paraeneticus; Antirrheticus II; Institutio seu paraenesis ad monachos 1; 20; 23; Capita cognoscitiva 36; 42; 47; 49; 60; Scholia in Eccl. 72–72; Scholia in Prov. 92. 96 Cf. Shaw (1998), 56-58; Misiarczyk (2001), 159–61. 97 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi 158. 98 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Ecclesiasten 73; Géhin (1993), 176; C. Vennerstrom. See also Capita cognoscitiva 42; Sienkewicz (2003), 214.
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them a little respite and so they suppose that they have reached the frontier of chastity”.99 When the demon of impurity briefly stops his attacks, then the monk can very easily fall victim to the delusion that he has already achieved a constant abstinence, and concentrating so much on defending himself against impurity, he suddenly falls back into the trap of gluttony. Following impure thoughts, as Evagrius wrote, demons very quickly give thoughts full of concern for a monk’s own health and life, returning him again to embrace the demon of gluttony. And gluttony, as we shall immediately see, awakens impure thoughts again, and in this way the vicious circle closes, and both passionate thoughts propel one another. In any case, according to Evagrius, gluttony is directly or indirectly the main reason for the arousal of sexual desire. In the treatise De malignis cogitationibus, he states: “It is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has fallen under influence of gluttony”.100 The presence in the text of the term πνεῦμα instead of λογισμός can be easily explained by the fact that Evagrius used them interchangeably. Similarly, in the book De octo spiritibus malitiae he wrote: “Abstinence gives birth to chastity; gluttony is the mother of licentiousness”.101 And even if in the text a more general term ἀκολασία appears instead of πορνεία, there is no doubt that it is a matter of impurity, as confirmed by a passage from another fragment from the Pontian monk’s writings: “There is gluttony, the mother of fornication (πορνεία)”.102 The essence of the activity of impurity in this sense is to illude the anchorite with the possibility of achieving purity in the state of satiety. Evagrius warns against such an illusion, describing everything in his typical way: He who wars against the spirit of fornication will not bring along satiety as an ally, for satiety will leave him and stand with his adversaries and fight to the end with his enemies […]. The one who fills his stomach and then announces that he is chaste is like one who says he can hold in check the acion of fire in a reed […]. A pillar is erected on a base; the passion of fornication comes to rest on satiety.103 It is worth noting that according to our author, impure thoughts are born in the monk’s soul not only when eating some exquisite foods in excess, but also when eating bread and water to the full. Hence the basis for the fight, with both the demons of gluttony and impurity, is the qualitative and quantitative fast, that is, in practice, eating only bread and drinking water, and not enough of them. Therefore, he advises anchorites: Weigh your bread in a balance and drink your water by measure (cf. Ezek. 4:10–11); then the spirit of fornication will flee from you.104
99 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,10; Frankenberg (1912), 487; Brakke (2009), 71. 100 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 150; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. 101 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 4; PG 79,1148CD; Sinkewicz (2003), 76. 102 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 2; PG 79,1141; Sinkewicz (2003), 62. 103 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 4–5; PG 79,1148CD–1149C; Sinkewicz (2003), 76–77. 104 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 102; Greßmann (1913), 162; Sinkewicz (2003), 129.
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As in the case of gluttony, it is important to find the right measure for eating bread and drinking water in order to fight the demon of impurity. Restrictions in eating, drinking and sleeping accelerate the process of purification and achieving impassibility.105 Fasting, prayer, and nighttime vigils heal the concupiscible part of the soul, making it resistant both to impure thoughts and to anger.106 The demon of impurity flees from any anguish of the body: The demon of lust, after suddenly hurling its filth at the champion of ascesis, springs quickly away from the fiery torch of ascetic labours, unable to bear the heat.107 Evagrius himself experienced it. When asking Abba Macarius how he could defeat the impure spirit, he received the answer: “Do not eat anything in your time, neither fruit, nor anything cooked on the fire”.108 The Pontian monk tried to practice this principle, but because of this, as we know, he suffered from a disease of stomach failure. The constant memory of the death of the body and the imagination of God’s righteous judgment is an aid in restraining the fiery senses.109 In any case, the monk who despised food and burdened his own body was released quickly from the demon of impurity, as well as from anger and sadness, passionate thoughts usually arising from the frustration of sexual desire. 1.2.2.
Seeking the Meetings with Women
So-called carnal demons, to which also the demon of sexual lust belongs, affect the soul of man, as repeatedly pointed out by Evagrius, through material reality and the body.110 They arouse sexual desire in a man through meetings with women: “encounters with women ignite the fire of pleasure”.111 Anachoresis for the monk meant moving away from the material world, including any meetings with women in order to quickly master sexual desire and achieve the virtue of chastity. Although the influence of external stimuli declined significantly after leaving for the desert, nevertheless, the same sexual desire remained as such and was manifesting itself in the form of a masked search for meetings with women. This was especially the case when the anchorite was forced to go to the city to sell some of his products and buy things necessary for living or when women came to him seeking spiritual advice. This action of the demon of fornication fits perfectly into the general principle of the action of the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul given by Evagrius. The demons of the concupiscible part of the soul (gluttony, impurity, greed) “try to make us sociable, calling us austere and uncivil, so that out of desire for bodies we 105 106 107 108 109 110 111
Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 97; Greßmann (1913), 161; Sinkewicz (2003), 128. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 6,4; see also, Institutio seu paraenesis ad monachos 1. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 22; Sinkewicz (2003), 324.48. Cf. also Epistula 39,4. Palladius, Vita Evagrii 9. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Ad Eulogium 23; Sinkewicz (2003), 50. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 47; Muyldermans (1931), 43; Sienkiewicz (2003), 215. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 4; PG 79,1148D; Sienkiewicz (2003), 76.
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seek encounters with bodies”.112 The attack of demons of the irascible part of the soul closes a man in on himself making him a loner, while those associated with the concupiscible part of the soul drive him to frequent encounters with people. It is easy to imagine that the fight with them will be based on the opposite action: socializing in the case of a struggle with anger and sadness, or anchoritism (withdrawal) in the case of gluttony, fornication and greed. In this matter Evagrius makes his own the words of Serapion from Thmuis: Love heals the inflamed portions of the irascible part (thumos), and self-control stops the flow of evil desire (epithumia).113 Therefore, he encourages a monk to reject the temptation of a demon who “expels” him to the market or forces him to “hang around out of the market” (Ant. II,58). If the demon of impurity noticed any ambivalence in the attitude of the anchorite who on the one hand gave up sexual relations with women and any encounters with them, and on the other, looked for opportunities to at least meet them, he quickly used it against him. Evagrius masterfully grasped this ambivalence in the attitude of the monk to women in Epistula 16: And also the demon of fornication observes the subject of the monk’s concerns, or if he meets a woman, whether he meets her by accident or whether he planned in advance that he would meet her on a pretext. He also examines the words that the monk says, whether they excite people to laughter or whether they keep their modesty. He also observes the eyes of the monk, whether they are shameless, and his way of walking, if it is perhaps mannered, and whether by his effeminate sloth he does not reveal by accident a certain passion. He also examines his clothing, whether it is worn or nice because of a woman.114 In the text quoted, it is easy to see the concentration on various areas of the life of a monk who, as soon as he allowed his soul to desire to meet a woman, quickly became a victim of impurity. Evagrius refers here to the frequent attitude in the life of many people, i.e., the simultaneous desire for two things that are mutually exclusive, but in such a way that one of these desires, morally or socially incompatible with the other, is cleverly masked. Needless to say, such a duality of intention tears the human soul painfully apart, causing huge spiritual suffering. Officially, the anchorite sought the virtue of chastity, avoiding meetings with women, but under the guise of the necessary encounters with people he wanted to meet with them also. He wanted to achieve purity and at the same time to meet with women who aroused his erotic desires. This split in desires was revealed
112 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 22; SCh 171, 552; Sienkiewicz (2003), 101. 113 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 47; C. and A. Guillaumont (1989), 184. This fragment is not found in the writings of Serapion, Evagrius probably took it from oral tradition, and not from the very same author who died around 360. The same idea we can find in Kephalaia Gnostica III,35; Guillaumont (1958), 111: “Knowledge cures the intellect, whereas charity-love cures the irascible faculty (of the soul), and chastity the concupiscible/appetitive part. Now, the cause of the first is the second, and that of the second, the third” (Ramelli (2015), 160). 114 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 16,3; Frankenberg (1912), 577.
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in his external attitudes, which the demon of impurity closely observed and cleverly used against him, because he is not able to know directly the thoughts or desires of man. So, the demon of fornication observes what the monk really cares about in his life, and his real desires are revealed by his deeds and words: whether he meets a woman in fact by accident, or whether he wanted to meet her at any price and only looked for an excuse not to admit to himself and to others the desire to meet her. Next, this demon studies the words of the anchorite: if they provoke laughter to encourage a woman to stay with him for a long time or are modest and limited to saying the necessary things. Then he observes where and how the eyes of the monk look, i.e., whether he is looking at a woman or somewhere else, and how he looks at her. Other elements that show the monk’s passion are his “mannered walk” or “effeminate sloth”. Evagrius does not explain what he means by these concepts, so we have to guess. It is probably a way of walking, which shows the monk’s efforts for meeting with the woman, making him less secure at the end of the meeting. The demon is finally investigating whether the monk is dressed in his old, worn out clothes or meeting a woman dressed in a nice outfit. In Evagrius’ theory, the demon of fornication is unable to act directly on the soul of a monk, but in his encounter with a woman he uses the “tools” that the anchorite gives him in the form of glances, spoken words, and how he walks and dresses. If they reveal any passion, then he cleverly awakens his desire for the woman even more. Instead of concentrating on prayer and knowing God, the monk is forced to struggle with his own lust. The key element that this demon uses is the duality of the monk’s intentions. Hence, as a remedy in the fight against him in this case, Evagrius proposes the coherence of desires and their conformity with external attitudes, i.e., the desire for the virtue of chastity and showing it in concrete attitudes. Since the monk decided to be an anchorite, it means that he really wants to free himself from the influence of external stimuli, in this case of watching women, because “a passion has no strength when matter is not present” (De oct. 5). The soul of a tempered monk avoids watching women: The sight of a woman is a poisoned arrow; it wounds the soul and injects the poison, and for as long a time as it stays it causes an ever greater festering. The one who guards against these arrows does not frequent public festivals, nor will he go around agape on the feast day.115 As evidenced by Evagrius’ advice, some anchorites probably used various Christian or even pagan feasts to wander around the city and stare at women, which undoubtedly awakened anew the silenced sexual desire. However, they did not deepen the purification of their soul in this way, fluttering somewhat between the state of tranquility in the desert and the awakening in the cities. The spiritual master of Pontus encourages them rather to stay at home and devote themselves to prayer, than to expose themselves indolently to threats. On the one hand, a threat to the purity of the anchorite is the lack of coherence in his desires, so that at one and the same time he wants chastity but in hidden ways wants to meet women, on the other there are different seductive ways of women’s 115 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 4; PG 79,1148D–1149A; Sinkewicz (2003), 76.
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behavior. In one of his texts, Evagrius masterfully describes such attitudes of women, warning anchorites of them: Flee encounters with women if you want to be chaste, and never allow them the familiarity to be bold with you. For in the beginning they will have or pretend to have pious reverence, but later they will dare anything without shame. At the first encounter they keep the eyes lowered, they speak softly, cry emotionally, dress modestly, and moan bitterly; they inquire about chastity and listen earnestly. At the second meeting you notice her looking up a little bit. A third time, they look directly at you without shame, you smile, and they laugh heartily. Then they adorn themselves and make an open display of themselves for you; they look at you in a way that shows the promise of their passion. They raise their eyebrows and bat their eyelashes; they bare the neck and use the entire body in an enticing manner; they speak words that caress the passion and they practice a voice that is enchanting to hear, until they besiege the soul by every means. These are the hooks laid out to catch you in death and the entangling nets that drag you to destruction. May they not lead you astray with their nice words.116 Evagrius, as it seems, was not only a great expert on the soul of the male monk, but also, which the above text confirms, a great expert on the female psyche. If this text were anonymous, it would be difficult to guess that it was written by a monk in IV century ce. To properly understand this passage and not accuse our author of misogyny, we must read it in the context of the anchoritic lifestyle and its spiritual teaching on this subject. The Pontian monk did not see women and their seductive style of behavior as tool in the hands of Satan in general, but as a threat to a monk who lived in chastity. So, this is not an attempt to demonize women as such, but a sober reality of life, which suggests that encounters of a monk with women are often a threat to his chastity. Evagrius encourages then anchorites to avoid any such unnecessary encounters, because spiritual meetings may quickly lose this character due to a woman’s conscious or unconscious seductive behavior. He masterfully describes the different stages of the increasing boldness of women towards the monk. At the first meeting they have their eyes closed and do not look at the anchorite at all; they speak calmly and gently, trying to cry out for compassion and pity, or adopt a dignified attitude and sigh bitterly over their fate. They also show interest in the theme of chastity and ask a lot about it. According to the Pontian monk, it is the desire to arouse pity or compassion and to demonstrate interest in the lifestyle, and specifically the chastity of the monk, soften his soul. Who would not like to help and comfort of a weeping person or what kind of monk would not feel inner satisfaction when a woman is interested in the hardships of his asceticism, especially admiring his sexual temperance? Then a subtle vanity is born in his heart: someone needs his spiritual help and appreciates his life of purity. So moved, he agrees to the second meeting, where the woman is bolder and raises her head a bit higher, and to the third when she approaches him, and responds to the gentle smile of the monk with laughs. 116 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 4; PG 79,1149A–B; Sinkewicz (2003), 76–77.
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Then she comes to the next meeting, dressing up in various ornaments, raising her eyebrows and rolling her eyes, finally uncovering her neck and shoulders. Her body movements, words, and voice encircle his soul; she eventually hugs herself gently to his body. The description of the dynamics of individual meetings of a monk with a woman is realistic enough that either Evagrius personally experienced such a situation or saw it in the life of those anchorites who turned to him for help in discerning the nature of such meetings or who had already fallen victim to them. The ascetic of Pontus, therefore, advised that the spiritual guidance of women, especially the young, should be dealt with by older age and more spiritually experienced anchorites. He also encouraged the young monks to avoid any meeting with young women: Better you should approach a raging fire then a young woman, if you yourself are young. For when you have approached a fire and felt pain, you will quickly draw back; but if you have been weakend by a woman’s words, you will not easily withdraw.117 Evagrius was convinced that the monk who is looking for meetings with women under any pretext, would not free himself from the influence of the demon of impurity, because: “A plant flourishes when it stands near water; the passion of licentiousness flourishes in encounters with women”.118 The principal remedy for combating such tactics of the demon of impurity is to avoid any individual encounters with women, not motivated, however, by contempt for them, but by prudence and awareness that this promotes the growth of sexual desire. If meetings are necessary because of spiritual advice, the monk should keep far-reaching prudence and not prolong the conversation, especially with a married woman under the guise of often confiding in him because she is in need of spiritual advice (Ant. II,35). 1.2.3.
Erotic Fantasies and Dreams
When the demon of impurity did not manage to lead the monk to fall through his senses and body by looking at women and meeting them and the anchorite was bravely in the desert, then he changed the strategy of struggle, trying to awaken in him the images of such meetings and sexual desire without the mediation of the senses, by means of memory, imagination, or dreams.119 If the anchorite remained faithful to the main principle of monastic life, which was stabilitas loci, and he went to the city only briefly and in absolutely necessary matters, then the demons tempted him to travel in the imagination. Evagrius in his own specific way describes such a situation: There is a demon called the “vagabond” who presents himself to the brothers especially about the time of dawn; he leads the mind around from city to city, from village to village, and from house to house. The mind arranges so-called simple encounters, then meets with acquaintances, holds longer conversations, and corrupts its own state with these associations, distancing itself little by little from 117 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 5; PG79,1149C; Sinkewicz (2003), 77. 118 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 5; PG79,1149C; Sinkewicz (2003), 77. 119 Generally about dreams in Evagrius see Refoulé, (1961b); Rivas (2017).
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the knowledge of God and from virtue while it forgets even its profession […]. It is with the intention of destroying the anchorite’s state that he does this, so that the mind, inflamed by these things and intoxicated by these many encounters, immediately falls prey to the demon of fornication or anger or sadness.120 Let’s note that this is not yet a demon of impurity, but another that the monk of Pontus calls “vagabond”, and who by his action prepares the ground for impurity, anger, or sadness. In a situation where a monk retains the principle of stabilitas loci, going out only occasionally, this demon tempts him to travel in the imagination between cities, villages and homes, thus meeting people and talking to them. Through these thoughts, the monk flees from the desert, circulates among people, and loses κατάστασις (calmness, stability, fixed state) or stabilitas mentis, thus departing from the knowledge of God. Such an anchorite of hot and drunken imaginary meetings quickly hands himself over to the demon of impurity, to further imagine meeting with women, or to the demon of anger or sadness because of the fact that he cannot arrange these meetings. When, however, the anchorite maintains stabilitas loci and stabilitas mentis, the demon of impurity tempts him yet with images of women and tries to lead the monk to an impure sin at least in the imagination. The dynamics of his actions are described in detail in the Practicus: The demon of fornication compels one to desire various bodies. It attacks more violently those who practise abstinence in order that they give it up, convinced that they are accomplishing nothing. In defiling the soul, the demon inclines it to shameful deeds, has it speak and hear certain things, almost as if the object were visible and present.121 The Pontian monk right at the beginning emphasizes that this is not about mere natural movements of bodies that can be controlled, but about the demon of impurity who “forces” the desire of other bodies. It’s about arousing desire which is very strong, violent, and compelling.122 We are dealing here with the personification of a passionate thought and its identification with the demon itself, which forces the monk to lust for women.123 The demon of impurity, therefore, forces the monk to lust for women and tries to awaken anger against God, which is obviously hidden, showing Him as an unjust demanding from him such a great sacrifice as sexual temperance and emotional loneliness.124 He also suggests that “youth can never cease from the desires of fornication and offer to God thoughts purified of it” or “youth is neither guilty nor culpable if it fornicates or if it gladly receives unclean thoughts”.125 Further, he encourages him to “marry a woman and become the father of sons” (Ant. II,49) just
120 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 9; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 180–82; Sinkewicz (2003), 159. 121 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 8; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 510–12; Sinkewicz (2003), 98. 122 Cf. Misiarczyk (2001), 159–61. 123 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,15. 124 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 49; Muyldermans (1931), 43; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 125 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,4–5; Frankenberg (1912), 485; Brakke (2009), 70.
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like other married men instead of fighting against impure thoughts. In the first phase of the attack, the demon of impurity seeks to present sexual desire as naturally good and difficult to control in youth, to bring the anchorite to acquiescence of desire and then to lead him to sinful deeds. If this fails, then he wants to undermine the meaning of temperance among celibates; he encourages them to abandon it and to doubt the possibility of achieving anything through it. If we remember that the anchorite went to the desert in order to purify his own soul from passionate thoughts, starting from gluttony and impurity, we will quickly notice that such an attack hits the very essence of monastic life: temperance does not make any sense because through it nothing, especially the purification of the mind, can be reached and the one is only exposed to unnecessary anguish. Then the demon of impurity tried to lead the monk to such a state that he would imagine the presence of a woman beside him and sin with her in deed or wicked talk. In the text above, Evagrius does not specify what deeds and words he is talking about, but we can easily guess that it is about gestures and words related to the sexual sphere. Such an assumption is confirmed by other fragments of his writings, in which the author warned that the demon of impurity often takes on “the form of a beautiful, naked woman, luxurious in her gait, her entire body obscenely dissipated, [a woman] who seizes the intellect of many persons and makes them forget the better things” or shows in the imagination “the form of a beautiful woman and that wants to speak with her earnestly or to do something evil that would not be proper”.126 In short, the demon awakens the imagination of the anchorite so that he can see the naked woman, allow himself various gestures and sensual words, or even imagine intercourse with her. Even if all this happens only in the imagination of a monk, these images defile his soul and can easily lead to wicked deeds. As we have seen, in this case, the demon of impurity attacks the anchorite at the same time from two sides: it raises doubts about the sense of abstinence itself, and on the other it arouses desire through erotic imaginations. And if he can persuade the monk as to the senselessness of temperance, he also causes anger against himself and against God, or sadness about the frustration of not using his own sexuality. When both the anger or sadness and impurity are simultaneously excited, then the monk quickly falls into the trap of the demon of acedia, which will be discussed in more detail later in the present study.127 Obviously, the defense will be a belief in the sense of abstinence, based in fact on the practice of other anchorites, showing that overcoming the demon of impurity is possible and is a prerequisite to purifying the soul of other thoughts and achieving a state of impassibility. An important role is also played by skillful handling of one’s own imagination: One must try therefore in times of temptation to transfer the mind from an impure thought to another mental representation and from this to another, and so escape that evil taskmaster.128 126 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,32 and II,36; Frankeberg (1912), 489–91; Brakke (2009), 76–77. 127 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 23; Sinkewicz (2003), 101–02. 128 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 24; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 238; Sinkewicz (2003), 170.
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Ultimately, the goal is that real or imagined encounters with women not stimulate sexual desire in the anchorite. Evagrius gives also the criterion of mastery of the proper sexuality: When the memory of a woman arises without passion, then consider that you have arrived at the boundaries of chastity.129 At his boundary, however, one should not be overly confident, for even a silenced passion can very quickly be reawakened and carry the danger of sin in deed. It also happens that the demon of impurity fails to make monk a participant in the imagination of impure deeds or thoughts, tempting him then to be a viewer of abominable images. Evagrius wrote about his cunning tricks like this: When someone has attained impassibility of the concupiscible part [of the soul] and shameful thoughts have cooled off a little, this spirit at once introduces men and women fooling around with each other and makes the anchorite a voyeur of shameful acts and gestures […]. Sometimes it touches even flesh, inducing within it an irrational burning.130 The demon does all this to draw the monk to be a spectator in imagination of erotic games with women until he is brought to sin by deed. This temptation, however, as emphasized in the same passage by our author, does not last long in the soul. An ardent prayer, fasting, night vigils and spiritual contemplation drive it away like a cloud (De mal. 16). When the monk retains stabilitas loci, stabilitas mentis, and thanks to fasting and prayer watches over his own imagination, then the demon of impurity tries to awaken his lust through erotic dreams. Evagrius describes to his readers a rather frightening picture of the monk’s nocturnal battles with demons which take the form of birds, carnivores, or vipers encircling the ascetic or if they want to fall high mountains on him. From our present perspective – conditioned by a more rationalist mentality – Evagrius’ demonology may seem like an exaggeration or even an obsession with demons, but we know even from descriptions of mystics closer to our times that some mystical experiences also include a special type of struggle directly with demonic powers. Therefore, we have no reason not to believe that he himself experienced such things, even if he described them in the religious language of the age. Thus, it happens that the anchorites are awakened at night and surrounded by wild beasts; they see a cell that is fiery and smoky: “And when they do not give in to these fantasies nor fall into cowardice, they in turn see the demons immediately transform into women who conduct themselves with wanton indecency and wish to play shameful games”.131 Demons do this to awaken the anchorite’s lust even at night: The concupiscible part [of the soul] readily welcomes thoughts of fornication when it has been previously agitated in the fantasies of its sleep. They bring on these
129 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 6; PG 79,1152A; Sinkewicz (2003), 78. 130 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 16; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 206; Sinkewicz (2003), 163. 131 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 27; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 248; Sinkewicz (2003), 172.
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fantasies, as I said, by preparing the way for the following day or by purposing to humiliate as much as possible during the night those troubled on the preceding day.132 If the dream’s matter is one of the thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, in this case the impurity, it is clear, according to Evagrius, that this part of the soul is sick and the passion itself is still strong.133 As in the case of gluttony, there is also in impurity, a close relationship between thoughts that are passionate during the day and dreams of passion at night. When it was impossible during the day, the demon, tries to awaken the impurity in the monk through dreams and thus prepare the way for the next day. He allures him in the night through a dream of a disgusting act, and then makes fun of him and harasses him during the day.134 The monk from Pontus advises not to let them scare his own soul or make the mind too cowardly before taking up the fight the next day.135 He also encourages directing anger against the demon of impurity, as well as prudent contacts with women on the following day: If an anchorite should not be troubled during sleep fantasies by terrifying or lustful visions, but rather should exercise his anger against the imaginary women who tempt him in his dreams and should strike them, and in turn, if while touching women’s bodies for the sake of treating them – for the demons show this as well – if he should experience no warmth but rather should counsel some of them concerning chastity, truly blessed is this man for such a degree of impassibility!136 Evagrius sees as a sign of deep impassibility in the sexual sphere the courage of the anchorite in supporting night-time visions or impure dreams, prudence in dealing with women and no signs of excitement when he touches their bodies for healing. It is attained and sustained by watchfulness and prayer, which the demon of impurity seeks to tear down at all costs and “to distance the mind from God while it is standing before him with reverence and fear”.137 Most often attacked by erotic dreams are brothers who: “take their fill of bread and water” (De mal. 27). In addition to vigil and prayer, the remedy for such attacks is the fast that quickly suppresses lust. It takes a lot of prudence to fight the demon of impurity because he is very deceptive and full of jealousy.138 1.2.4.
Lust – Vanity
Although we will deal with the analysis of the passionate thought of vanity which is born in the heart of a monk after overcoming the thoughts of the passionate part 132 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 27; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 248; Sinkewicz (2003), 172. See also Antirrheticus II,19. 133 Cf. Practicus 54; Sinkewicz (2003), 107; see also Misiarczyk (2006), 121–38. 134 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,34; 60. 135 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 21; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. 136 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 29; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 254–56; Sinkewicz (2003), 174. 137 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 90; Sinkewicz (2003), 202; cf. I. Hausherr (1960), 123–25.179; Capita tria de oratione 3. 138 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus II,41; Frankenberg (1912), 491; Brakke (2009), 78.
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of the soul, it is worth stopping here at the mutual relationship that the monk from Pontus saw between the vanity which appears after overcoming only the passion of impurity. A passionate thought of vain glory is multiple and opens doors to all the other demons, destroying the prayer of the anchorite.139 According to Evagrius, vanity is very often a tool and help for other, already defeated demons, to redominate the mind of an anchorite. In our case, vanity becomes the gate through which the demon of impurity wants to break into the heart of the monk, because he did not manage to get there directly by arousing sexual desire. This means that such an attack strategy uses demons against an anchorite who bravely repulsed the attacks of these direct thoughts and practically defeated the demon of impurity, achieving a state of relative purity in this matter. The demon of impurity, however, does not give up and wants to continue to master the soul of the monk. However, he cannot do this by his typical actions through erotic thoughts or ideas because the anchorite watches and quickly recognizes his ambushes, so he tries to get through the gate of vanity. The monk has already surpassed the stage when the impure thoughts disturbed him in keeping the commandments of God, hence the demon of impurity does not advise him not to obey the commandments, but whispers to keep them to show himself to people, thus destroying the fruit of purity of his intentions.140 According to the ascetic of Pontus, the demon of impurity attempts to invade the monk’s soul through the mediation of the demon of vanity, but it is worth remembering that they never attack at the same time: The demon of vainglory is opposed to the demon of fornication, and it is impossible for them to attack the soul at the same time, since the former promises honours and the latter is the forerunner of dishonor.141 As we saw earlier, when the demon of impurity cannot get into the soul of the pure monk directly, he tries to enter through the gate opened by vanity. During that day the demon of vanity awakens vain thoughts and hopes in the monk, then he flies away, leaving the temptation to the demon of pride or sadness, or passes it to the demon of impurity.142 Likewise also at night, when he cannot awaken anxiety or lust, he shapes dreams of vainglory, leading his soul to fall.143 Evagrius perfectly described the mutual relationship between vanity and impurity in the treatise De malignis cogitationibus: Whenever the anchorite’s mind attains some small degree of impassibility, it then acquires the horse of vainglory and immediately rushes to the cities, getting its fill of the lavish praise accorded to its repute. By providential design the spirit
139 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 14; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 198–200; Sinkewicz (2003), 162–63. 140 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 30; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 256–58; Sinkewicz (2003), 174. 141 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 58; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 636; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. See also Ad Eulogium 22; Sinkewicz (2003), 49–50. 142 Cf. Practicus 13; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 528–30; Sinkewicz (2003), 100. 143 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 28; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 25; Sinkewicz (2003), 173.
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of fornication which came to meet him and shut him up in a pigsty, teaches him not to leave his bed until he is completely healthy and not to imitate those undisciplined sick people.144 This time, the demon of impurity comes out directly to meet the demon of vanity, which encourages the monk to seek human glory in the visited cities, and under the pretext of caring for his own health leads him to have pity on himself and give up mortification of the body. It is possible that Evagrius recalls here concrete monks from his own surroundings, like the one mentioned by Palladius, a certain Heron, who in such a state of vain self-confidence went to Alexandria and sinned there with local prostitutes.145 The monk from Pontus primarily encouraged anchorites to try to remain in their cell during the attack of vanity, devoting themselves to prayer and numerous reflections on godly matters. It is extremely important to prevent the once purified soul from being wounded again with impurity: For it is easier to purify an impure soul than it is to bring back to health one that has been purified and wounded again; the demon of sadness does not allow it, but constantly springs upon the pupils of the eyes and brings forward the image of the sin during the time of prayer.146 According to Evagrius, the first purification of the soul is much easier than any other, because the obstacle then becomes a demon of sadness which after subsequent falls more strongly humiliates the person, putting in front of his eyes, especially during prayer, images of his recent impure sins and fear as to wether God really has forgiven them. He does so also during the first purification, but his action finds in the soul less fertile ground than after the subsequent falls. Therefore, the struggle of the anchorite to not fall into the trap of impurity is so important and difficult. Evagrius also presents other ways to deal with the demons of vanity and impurity besides remaining in a cell and prayer. Further on in the already cited Practicus where the demon of vainglory opposes the demon of impurity, we read: Therefore, if one of these approaches and presses hard upon you, then fashion within yourself the thoughts of the opposing demon. And if you should be able, as the saying goes, to knock out one nail with another, know that you are near the frontiers of impassibility, for your mind found the strength to annihilate the thoughts of the demons by means of human thoughts. The ability to drive away the thought of vainglory by means of humility or the thought of fornication by means of chastity would be proof of the most profound impassibility. Try to put this first method into practice with all the demons opposed to one another, for at the same time you will come to know what sort of passion you are more affected
144 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 15; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 202; Sinkewicz (2003), 165. 145 Cf. Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 26. 146 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 36; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 278; Sinkewicz (2003), 178.
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by. But still, as best as you can, beseech God for the ability to defend yourself against your enemies with the second means.147 The text contains a number of interesting elements on which it is worth to stay longer. The first way to fight the demon of impurity is to remove this passionate thought from the soul with the help of human thought. Because vanity and impurity oppose each other, so that the first promises to the monk honors, and the second leads to shame, Evagrius advises that when the anchorite is visited by vanity and seeking human glory, he should evoke the attack of the impure thought; and vice versa, when a demon attacks it with impurities, he should evoke the attack of vanity. He calls this method knocking out one nail with another. This proverb was known in antiquity, for Aristotle148 and Cicero149 were already quoting it and in Christian literature, probably under the influence of Evagrius, it was recommended as a way of driving away demons by others, among others in Life of Saint Syncletics of Pseudo Anatase,150 Lausiac History of Palladius151 and the writings of John Cassian.152 We should constantly remember that vanity is often a gateway to the demon of impurity, which cannot otherwise sneak into the soul of a monk. Hence, when a monk enters the temptation to seek human glory or pride himself in his purity, he should not unwisely awaken his imagination by new erotic images but, as Evagrius encourages, should recall his previous sins of impurity. The memory of earlier falls tempers vanity and indirectly defends against further attacks of the demon of impurity. When, however, the demon of impurity attacks the monk trying to arouse fear in him, the monk of Pontus encourages him to remember moments of victory over him and to persevere in purity. Such a method of fighting passionate thoughts is based on the principle of opposing demons, in this case vanity and impurity. Thanks to it, wrote the Pontian anchorite, the monk will also be able to determine by which demon he is tormented the most. The second way of struggle is to overcome the passionate thought with the help of its opposing virtue, which the monk gets through the grace of God and his own ascetic effort. Therefore, if an anchorite in the face of vanity defends humility and against impurity, restraint, it means that he is in a state of deep impassibility. This second method of defense against demons is undoubtedly more perfect and it is necessary to seek it, calling always on God’s help. In the context of the current analysis, when impurity enters the soul through vanity, the virtue of humility plays a key role in its repulsion: Bring your resentment to bear against the spirit of fornication and vainglory, two bitter demons opposed to one another; for one flees from people, but the other rejoices in people […] If therefore one should wish to prevail over these (two 147 148 149 150 151 152
Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 58; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 636–38; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. Cf. Aristotle, Politica 5,11,3. Cf. Cicero, Disputationes Tusculanae IV,75 (tamquam clavo clavum eiciendum). PG 28,1505A. Cf. Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 6; Butler (ed.), 82. Cf. John Cassian, Collationes Patrum V,12; Pichery (1955), 202.
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demons) with God’s help, let him waste the flesh to counter fornication and let him humble the soul to counter vainglory.153 Evagrius proposes a memory of past sufferings as a method of struggle with both the demon of vanity and of impurity. He returns to this in his other texts, adding that vanity moves away from people and imagination of them, while impurity finds pleasure in being with others. Impurity overcomes the hardships of the flesh, and vanity overcomes humility and the awareness of one’s weakness in the fight against passions. And if a monk prides himself over others for his purity and treats it as the basis for building his own ego and seeking human glory or for exalting himself above others, sooner or later he will fall down: “One who has placed his trust in his own abstinence will fall; he who humbles himself will be exalted”.154 In the treatise To monk Eulogius, Evagrius describes the whole strategy of the demon of vanity and pride of already attacking a monks during the struggle with his own lust: He who engages in the training of bodily ascetic works with greater harshness, let him not engage in such work for reasons of praise nor let him put on airs for reasons of glory. For if the demons can make the soul conceited in these matters, they can fortify both the harshness and the ascesis of the body with glory and draw the soul on to the attainment of greater ascetic works with the result that it puts on even greater airs […]. Sometimes they deceptively put to sleep the burning of his flesh, hiding impure thoughts from his interior self, so that he might think that he has overcome the spirit of fornication by means of his austerity and sanctified his heart in the radiance of the saints and has ascended to the highest rank of holiness.155 Evagrius dedicates different texts to the vanity and pride, which relate to another stage of ascetic practice and are born in the soul of a monk after overcoming the passionate thoughts of the unreasonable part of the soul. It is about a different kind of thing here, namely the vanity and pride that arise after the repulsion of the impurity. The monk, dominated by such vanity and pride, tells others in detail about the struggles in which, as a matter of strength, he has won victory over impurity, not acknowledging God as a helper. He demands all the glory for himself, sinking in the blasphemous belief that he is able to keep himself pure. Vanity and pride undermine, according to Evagrius, the power of passions, to make it easier to deceive the monk by the conviction that he has achieved temperance, while it is only a change in the strategy of struggle with him. The hallmark of the anchorite’s mastery of such a kind of vanity is telling others about the hardships of struggles in dealing with temptations in order to arouse admiration and praise from other people. And even if he can actually
153 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 22; Sinkewicz (2003), 324.48. 154 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 96; Greßmann (1913), 161; Sinkewicz (2003), 128. Evagrius gave similar advice to virgins living in cenobitic communities – cf. Ad virginem 50, Sinkewicz (2003), 134: “Do not despise your sister when she eats, and do not grow haughty over your abstinence, for you do not know what the Lord has planned, or who shall stand before him”. 155 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 33; Sinkewicz (2003), 332.58.
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preserve purity, an egocentric intention, or a desire to seek human glory, destroys the spiritual fruits of such asceticism. Hence, Evagrius encourages the anchorite to act in the opposite direction, which all demons cannot stand: hide the hardships of his asceticism and tell the people about his possible temptations and falls. 1.3.
“Avarice – The Root of all evils”
Along with gluttony and sexual desire, according to Evagrius, greed (φιλαργυρία) is the third passionate thought of the concupiscible part of the soul. In the repeatedly cited text De malignis cogitationibus 1 he counts it with gluttony and vanity as the so-called source passions that first arise to fight. However, while gluttony stimulates the concupiscible part of the soul and is, as we have seen, the mother of impurity, greed does not give rise to any passionate thoughts in the sphere of concupiscibility, but is a tendency that directly provokes anger. One cannot be angry, Evagrius wrote, if he does not fight for one of these three things: food, wealth, or glory. The frustration and sense of deprivation in one of these areas of human life arouses anger or sadness in the soul and, succumbing to greed, becomes the cause of pride (De Mal. 1). Greed is for the Pontian monk along with gluttony and seeking human glory, one of the three source passions that are the cause of all others. It is for this reason that the devil proposed these three thoughts to Christ when he encouraged him to make bread from stones (gluttony), promised that he would receive the whole world if he fell down and worshiped him (greed) and tempted that if he jumped, he would be glorified and not will be hurt (seeking his own glory). In the attitude of the Savior, Evagrius sees that the devil cannot be repelled unless one refuses these three passionate thoughts.156 In the description of the temptation of Christ, we see that greed is not only a temptation that is satisfied with the mere possession of money, but it is really a tool for gaining power over the whole world. Bunge rightly emphasizes that greed, or the desire for money or possession of it, is really a tool for the greedy man to achieve his goal – that is, his own ambition and proud desires. Every power or any form of domination needs money, and money strives to gain power over other people, so that they are interconnected and one gives the other the power to drive a man into slavery. Christ, rejecting voluntarily the power that money gives chose poverty.157 Although Evagrius nowhere clearly states that succumbing to gluttony and impurity is the main cause of the attack of the demon of greed, there is no doubt that in his dynamic presentation of the succession of passionate thoughts there is a close relationship between all three passions of the concupiscible part of the soul: gluttony, impurity and greed. The element that is common in their arising is the mediation of material reality and human senses. Following Origen, he accepted that greed, just like vanity and pride, is not proper to the nature of the human body and should be
156 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 150; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. 157 Cf. Bunge (1999a), 37.
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purified through ascetic practice.158 For when the movements of the body are set in motion in accordance with nature and in an orderly way, this means the partial health of the soul (Ep. ad Mel. 47). However, when an anchorite has aroused his sensuality, succumbing to gluttony and impurity, he will surely quickly become the object of the attack of greed. In this sense, we can speak of gluttony and impurity as an indirect cause of greed. On the other hand, because the goal of the monk’s asceticism is to know God and achieve so-called pure prayer, demons do everything to prevent it, often evoking greed after repulsed impurity: If you try to pray, you may be tormented by the thought of impurity. If you resist it, it will arouse in you the greed or the thought of anger.159 It so happens that a monk who has resisted impurity can be attacked, especially during prayer, by the passionate thought of greed. However, Evagrius dedicated most of his reflections on greed to the direct attack of this thought as one of the three sources, which is born directly and has its share in the stimulation of anger. At the end of these preliminary analyses, it is worthwhile to stop briefly at the apparent contradiction in the teaching of Evagrius. In the beginning of the treatise De malignis cogitationibus, quoting the famous words from 1 Tim 6,10 that “the love of money is the root of all kinds of evil”, he tries to convince a monk that “nor will one escape pride, the first offspring of the evil, if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils”.160 How to understand this sentence in the context of other statements of our author? In the same passage, he states that the first to fight are actually three passions gluttony, greed, and vanity, and all the others that follow them in attacking monks (De mal. 1). So, all three would be in some sense the root of all other passions, not just greed itself. In turn, in the Reflections, he clearly emphasizes that the first of the evil thoughts is φιλαυτία, followed by eight others.161 Instead, in De octo spiritibus malitiae he states that “gluttony is the first of the passions” (ἀρχὴ παθῶν γαστριμαργία).162 So what is the beginning or the first passion: self-love, gluttony, greed, or the first three: gluttony, greed, and vanity? Are we dealing here with a lack of coherence in Evagrius’ teaching or are we reading his texts carelessly? There are many indications that it is more the latter. Φιλαυτία does not belong directly to the eight main thoughts but is a foundation, a base, for them. As for the priority of gluttony or greed, it concerns different areas. Evagrius distinguishes this clearly in the use of vocabulary, calling gluttony the beginning (ἀρχή) in the order of experiencing eight passionate thoughts and the first of the so-called sources of passion, while greed is defined as the root (ῥίζα) all evil. Greed, therefore, is located deeper in the human soul and is a doomed attempt to achieve a sense of security for a man controlled by self-love. In this sense, gluttony can also be understood as the greed of food. After the original fall when 158 Cf. Origen, De principiis III,4,2. 159 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita tria de oratione 3. 160 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 150; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. See also De octo spiritibus malitiae 7; Sinkewicz (2003), 78. 161 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 53; J. Muyldermans (1931), 43; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 162 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 1; PG 79,1145; Sinkewicz (2003), 73.
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man, instead of love of God, chose to love himself, greed as an instrument to grow in self-love and the desire to gain power over others became a universal experience. The growth of self-love or the conquest of power over the whole world, however, will not bring happiness to man because they are alien to the basic man-made human being created to love God and transcend himself. Hence, Evagrius proposes a return to this original, natural orientation of man towards the knowledge and love of God through ascetic practice and the purification of the soul from the eight passionate thoughts. Let us note that in addition to theological motivation (knowledge and love of God), the anthropological motivation plays a very important role here, i.e., the real happiness of man, which consists in the discovery of his original destiny. Evagrius reflection on greed, as in the case of gluttony and impurity, is found in various texts and contexts. In our study, we will focus on the analysis of fragments that interest us on topics such as “greed as love of money and a desire for wealth”, “Greed, the cause of flattering the rich and apparent concern for the poor”, “greed caused by fear of the future”, and “greed as the source of vanity and pride”. As in the case of gluttony and impurity, current analyses will be based on the interpretation of source texts.163 1.3.1.
Avarice – “Love of Money” and the Desire of Wealth
Evagrius, based on the text 1 Tm 6:10, defines greed as the root of all evil and understands it practically as the love of money, which perfectly reflects the etymology of the Greek term φιλαργυρία used by him. He also often describes it using other terms, such as “wealth”, “desire for possessions” or simply “greed”, but he is always referring to the desire for money, silver or gold, generally speaking, wealth. Immediately, however, he specifies that “The avaricious person is not the one who has money, but is the one who desires it”, for, after all, the say that “bursar is rational purse”.164 Evagrius refers to greed as a desire to have money based on the definition of Aristotle, according to which the greedy (φιλάργυρος) man is the one who covets money and for whom it is rather an object to gain rather than to use, depending on the circumstances.165 The Pontian monk following Aristotle contrasts a greedy man who wants to have money with a monk economist or a particular hermit who uses it if necessary, and jokingly calls him a “reasoning purse”.166 Therefore, greed is linked more with the disposition of the heart than with the actual state of possession and can touch both the poor and the rich. For “the demon of avarice is the most varied and ingenious in deceit”.167
163 See also some studies on this subject – Grebaut (1913), 213–25; Driscoll (2001), 21–30; Misiarczyk (2001), 161–62. 164 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 30; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 142. 165 Aristotle, Ethica magna, III,4,1232a. 166 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1989), 144, note 30. The existence of economists who dealt with the management of money in both cenobic monasteries and the hermit’s possessions is clearly confirmed by ancient monastic sources – cf. Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 10; Apophtegmata Patrum, Anoub 1; PG 65,129C; John Cassian (1965), 254–55. 167 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 21; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 226; Sinkewicz (2003), 167.
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In the case of monks who renounced having anything who lived in the desert and used only the necessary things, greed could manifest itself in the collection of goods or money beyond what was necessary. When an anchorite bravely practices poverty, then the demon tempts him with memories of the past or imaginations about future wealth. The demon of greed “persists in us and suggests to our intellect either the remembrance of money that we have renounced, or the effort that we are making to acquire things that at present cannot be seen, or the preservation and safekeeping of the things we have now”.168 In the first case, the demon of greed tried to divide the will of the anchorite, so that he officially renounced all wealth but in hiding accumulated it. Such an attitude was born not only of the desire to possess, but to a large extent from seeking material security, about which we will have the opportunity to mention elsewhere. However, trusting in money and not in God, or deluding oneself with the possibility of combining wealth with asceticism, was in fact contradicting the essence of anchoritic life.169 Therefore, Evagrius warned against such an attitude: A monk with many possessions is like a heavily laden boat that easily sinks in a sea storm: just as a very leaky ship is submerged by each wave, so the person with many possessions is awash with his concerns […]. A monk with many possessions has bound himself with the fetters of his worries, as a dog is tied to a leash, even when he is forced to move off elsewhere […]. The monk with many possessions rejoices over many profits […]. The avaricius monk works very hard […] fills storerooms with gold.170 The anchorite, who treats the life of a monk as an opportunity to raise money will very quickly become susceptible to other temptations and will fall, because his mind is enslaved by the care for money, not for prayer. He is happy and works very hard to multiply the money, neglecting the practice of poverty. The accumulation of riches is incompatible with the life of the anchorite whose aim is to know and love God: “The one who loves money will not see knowledge; and one who amasses it will know darkness”.171 The monk who gathers wealth not only does not attain to knowledge of God, but plunges his soul into darkness, tearing it apart with two contradictory desires: the knowledge and love of God for which the condition is poverty, and wealth. Evagrius expressed here the conviction which is also confirmed by the contemporary humanities: that human suffering is very often caused by the simultaneous desire of two mutually exclusive things. Hence the monk from Pontus warns: “If you desire riches you will have many worries; if you hold onto them you will experience bitter sorrows”.172 Instead of taking care of only one thing, that is, purifying his own soul, knowing and loving God, the greedy monk is overwhelmed by many concerns related
168 169 170 171 172
Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus III,24; Frankenberg (1912), 496–97; Brakke (2009), 90. Cf. Antirrheticus III,42; III,54; Brakke (2009), 97 and 99. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 7–8; PG 79,1151C–1153B; Sinkewicz (2003), 78–79. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 18; Greßmann (1913), 154; Sinkewicz (2003), 123. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 57; Greßmann (1913), 158; Sinkewicz (2003), 126.
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to earning, multiplying, and storing money. He is disappointed because he rejected the knowledge of God on the one hand, and on the other he did not experience peace of mind or a sense of security because having money was not able to provide it. The greedy man chases wealth all his life and finishes it only by his death: The sea is never filled up even though it takes in a multitude of rivers; the desire of the avaricious person cannot get its fill of riches. He doubled his wealth and wants to double it again, and he does not stop doubling it until death puts a stop to his endless zeal.173 Greed pushes a man to count his money or valuable goods, makes him feel his worth on the basis of possessions, elludes his prediction of a long life so that he can enjoy what he has accumulated, stimulates him like a magic spell to diligence and watchfulness, leads to avarice in the form of starving himself or buying cheap food. In a word, it is “insatiable madness” which raises many worries174 taking sometimes more subtle forms in monastic life, such as constant reflection on the matters of buying and selling salt, vinegar, oil or bread (Ep. 25,4). Another way in which the demon of greed fights with the anchorite is to stimulate his memory of riches. He supposedly agreed to poverty, he obeys it with deeds, but in his mind, he remains a slave to the past. Evagrius describes such a state in a masterly way as always: He carries around the memories of possessions as a heavy burden and a useless weight; he is stung with sadness and is mightily pained in his thoughts. He has abandoned his possessions and is lashed with sadness Even if death should approach, he is miserable in leaving behind present things and giving up his soul; he cannot take his eyes away from (material) things. He is dragged away unwillingly like a runaway slave: he is separated from the body but he is not separated from his possessions; the passion (for possessions) has a greater hold on him than those dragging him (towards death).175 The anchorite dominated by this form of greed, even if he moves to the desert, takes with him memories of riches that become a heavy burden to him and an unnecessary grief. He torments his soul masochistically with the simultaneous desire for poverty and the remembrance of wealth. Although he left behind riches, he has not yet achieved internal freedom, and suffers and is sad about it. He is drawn to poverty as if against his will, and at the same time he glances at the earthly goods he left behind with a lustful eye. A special form of such memories from the past are memories from the family home. The ascetic controlled by greed, although he voluntarily left all his riches, begins to carry a hidden grudge towards his parents; that when he left, they did not give him part of their possessions, he is saddened that he left his father’s paternity down; mentions and constantly compares a large family home with one
173 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 8; PG 79,1153A; Sinkewicz (2003), 79. 174 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtitibus 3; PG 79,1141; Sinkewicz (2003), 5. 175 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 7; PG 79,1152C–D; Sinkewicz (2003), 79.
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small cell in the desert; wonders whether to return to the riches he left behind. He is physically in the desert, but his thoughts are still left in the past. The prospect of death is a great trauma to him, because it means leaving with regret the world that he supposedly despised while moving away into the desert. As we can see, this is again an experience of the state of duality of desires. However, if the monk watches over his memory, constantly purifies it, and achieves the state of abandonment of riches not only in fact but also in memory, then the demon of greed tempts him with images of future riches. According to Evagrius: […] The image of wealth is maintained thanks to greed […] and the mind does not […] refuse to imagine if it does not free itself from passion first. […]. In turn, it cannot free itself from passions if he does not cut off gluttony, greed and vainglory.176 Although our author rightly perceives greed as the reason for the images of wealth, I think that there is a kind of feedback between passion and imagination. Greed generates images of wealth, and imaginations strengthen the passion itself. Evagrius has written about freeing oneself from the passionate thought of greed so deeply that even possessing or imagining riches or money does not stimulate it. For the true gnostic at the time of being taught should be free from all physical sufferings and worries (Gn. 10). The best remedy for demonic attacks of greed is consistency of will combined with the practice of poverty, alms, and the desire to know and love God.177 Therefore Evagrius encourages: “Do not shun poverty and affliction, for they are the material that produces unburdened prayer”.178 All kinds of distress, including poverty, should lead a monk to seek support from the Lord during prayer, not to avoid poverty or seek consolation by accumulating wealth when he experiences the hardships of life. Since the purpose of the anchoritic life is to know and love God, Evagrius repeatedly emphasizes that it is impossible to achieve this by coveting riches: As it is inadmissible for life and death to coexist in the same person at the same time, so is it impossible for charity to exist alongside riches in a given individual. For not only is charity destructive of riches, but also of our transitory life itself.179 There is no need to convince anyone too much about the incompatibility between love that opens oneself to God and neighbor, and greed which rather closes man in on himself. In the text, however, we are not only dealing with the simple opposition of love and wealth, but with the idea that love is the destroyer of riches and temporal life. Evagrius refers here to the concept of death present in Rom 6:8 and perceives it as a gate for God’s gnosis (KG IV,62).180 Love cannot guard food or money (Pr. 99) 176 177 178 179 180
Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 39,3–4; Frankenberg (1912), 591. Cf. Epistula 17,3. Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 131; PG 79,1195A; Sinkewicz (2003), 207. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 18; SCh 171,546; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont, (1971), 546–47, note 18. The Guillaumonts find here the Aristotelian vocabulary.
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and enjoys poverty, in contrast to hatred which finds pleasure in wealth (Ad monachos 16). He won love, who despised food, mammon and worldly fame (Ep. 60,3). The poverty accompanying spiritual knowledge is better than wealth combined with ignorance (Ad monachos 26). Evagrius draws a picture of a poor monk: The monk free of possessions is well prepared traveler who finds shelter in any place […]. This sort of person is above every temptation and scorns present realities, he rises above them, withdraws from earthly things and associates with the things above, for he is light on the wings, not weighed down by concerns. Affliction comes and with no sadness he leaves that place. Death approaches, he departs with a good heart, for he does not bind his soul with any earthly fetter.181 A poor monk who has freed himself not only from having wealth but also from thinking about it is internally free. He is always ready to go if necessary and feel at home everywhere. When he has what is necessary for life at the present time, he is not worried about the future.182 He is convinced that his own hands are enough to take care of the body and satisfy his daily needs. A wise anchorite considers the needs of his body and does not starve himself unnecessarily, guided by greed or miserliness (De octo 8). Evagrius describes poverty also in a somewhat poetic way: Freedom from possessions is the uprooting of avarice and the rooting of freedom from it, a fruit of love and a cross, a sun without distraction, immeasurable matter, incomprehensible wealth, a scythe for cares, the practice of the Gospels, the world readily abandoned, a fast-running contestant.183 As can be seen from the above text, the monk from Pontus understands by poverty a relatively constant state of uproar and consolidation of the lack of attachment to money. Such an attitude makes life free from the suffering caused by the constant pursuit of wealth and envy of what others possess. It also frees the anchorite from the cares of having to multiply his money and the threat of losing it. A poor monk always abounds in material goods and is rich when he has the necessary things for everyday life. Such a lifestyle conforms to the Gospel and quickly leads him to free himself from the other passions. Another method in the fight against the passionate thought of greed, according to Evagrius, is to dismantle it into four elements: the mind that allowed it, the image of gold, the gold itself, and the greedy passion. Then ask yourself which of these things is a sin. It is not a disembodied mind created in the image of God, or gold itself, which exists according to its being or its image, but the pleasure of man, born of free will and forcing the mind to misuse God’s creation.184 For a monk, having things necessary for life is not greed because it fits in with this good use
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Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 5–6; PG 79,1151C; Sinkewicz (2003), 78–79. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 6. Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3; PG 79,1141; Sinkewicz (2003), 63. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 19; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 218; Sinkewicz (2003), 163.
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of things created by God. Evil appears with a passionate desire to possess, which absorbs the entire life of the anchorite and pulls it away from the main purpose of life in the desert. A good test that allows him to distinguish the state of ordinary possession from the passionate possession of the things necessary for life is to meet the needy. So, if the monk closes his heart to the needy or to complex chronic illness (even during his own shortage), and puts away all the money and supplies, or falls into depression and sorrow because of spending money on the poor, or hides his food and clothes, it means a passionate attachment to possessing money or goods, or greed. 1.3.2.
Avarice as Flattery for Rich People and Pretence of Caring about the Poor
If the demon of greed fails to get the anchorite to split his will so that at the same time he wants asceticism and to accumulate money or lives in past memories or imaginations of future riches, then it changes the strategy of struggle. He tempts him under the guise of good, that is, seeking money among wealthy people in order to help the needy or give alms. This goal in itself is of course noble and glorious but inappropriate to the lifestyle of an anchorite, and may cover the desire of being close to money and material goods. Alms, as we have seen, is one of the elements helpful in the fight against the demon of greed, but for the Pontian monk it means sharing one’s own goods,185 not developing an organized charity in the desert. In concrete individual assistance to the poor the monks were often very radical, like the one evoked by Evagrius himself, who sold the book of the Gospel and gave money to the hungry, saying: “I have sold the word itself which said to me, ‘Go sell what you have and give to the poor’ (Matt 19:21)”.186 The thought about greed is clever in temptation and is easily hidden behind good deeds or attitudes, including the will to help the poor: Often constrained by the most severe renunciation, he immediately pretends to be the administrator and the friend of the poor; he generously receives guests who are not yet there; he sends assistance to others who are in need; he visits the city’s prisons and he buys those who are being sold; he associates himself with wealthy women and indicates to them who should be treated well; and those who have acquired an ample purse he advises to renounce it. And deceiving the soul little by little in this way, he encompasses it with the thoughts of avarice and hands it over to the demon of vainglory.187 As we can see, a demon of greed, not being able to tempt the monk with a direct desire to possess riches because of his staying in the desert, tempts him indirectly by
185 See J. Driscoll, Love of money in Evagrius Ponticus, 26-35. 186 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 97; Sinkewicz (2003), 113. 187 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 21; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 226; Sinkewicz (2003), 167.
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encouraging him to care for the poor, abandoned, and needy, pretends to be overly hospitable and constantly preparing for guests.188 Then he visited the imprisoned as Christ himself recommended, he dealt with the purchase of slaves being sold, he sought for the company of wealthy women allegedly to show them those who most needed their support, and encouraged other wealthy people to poverty. In this way the anchorite, under the guise of caring for others, thinks about money all the time and does not do what he should do. Evagrius has grasped here the mechanism which in modern times would be called a sham action. In the case of an anchorite, it is subjection to the greed of possessing money under the guise of helping the poor and the needy. What is important, however, is not so much helping as the fact of the visual enjoyment of constantly turning money, counting it and touching it. The monk no longer thinks about asceticism or knowing God, but about money, and that’s what the demon of greed wants. Evagrius rightly concludes that in this way the demon deceives the soul, surrounding it gradually with thoughts of greed and giving in to the dominion of vanity. The anchorite begins to glory in the fact that he is agile and can earn money (of course not for himself, only for others); he gains more and more self-confidence, thinks that he is irreplaceable in this, and the real anchoritic life is abandoned. The ascetic of Pontus therefore warned the monks: This should be your attitude towards almsgiving. Therefore, do not desire to possess riches in order to make donations to the poor, for this is a deception of the evil one that often leads to vainglory and casts the mind into occasions for idle preoccupations.189 Even the good purpose of helping the poor does not sanctify the tool, which is the desire for wealth. The monk withdrew to the desert to fight with passions, including greed. Thus, the imprudent ascetic quickly fell victim to this cunning tactic of greed, which disguised the desire for money under the cover of a fine goal. His mind was completely immersed in material reality and fell victim to vanity, moving away from spiritual gnosis.190 Another tactic of the demon of greed is to tempt the monk to look for the company of rich people. In one of his Letters, Evagrius wrote: The demon of greed evaluates our paths, how we approach rich people and what we say or do to receive something from them, and whether they do not feel sorry for us for our poverty, as if we were going to leave our place because of the poor crowd who are bothering us. And if we receive the rich with joy, while in the meantime we turn our faces away from the poor like the one who escapes.191 The demon of greed looks at the monk’s attitude towards rich people: whether he approaches them with full humiliation, flattering them in words and deeds in the
188 189 190 191
Cf. also Antirrheticus III,25; Brakke (2009), 91. Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 4; PG 40,1256A; Sinkewicz (2003), 6. Cf. Antirheticus III,20; Brakke (2009), 90. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 16,4; Frankenberg (1912), 577.
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hope of receiving some money from them, or in relations with them keeps his inner freedom without clinging to anyone. Of course, this is not about rejecting any help in the form of food or dress, because it would be a manifestation of pride, but a proper disposition of the heart in the practice of real poverty.192 The sign of being dominated by greed, according to Evagrius, is the monk’s self-pity in the presence of rich people over his own poverty, suggesting the necessity of leaving the desert because of alleged crowds of the poor and needy. Another sign of greed is the treatment of rich and poor people. If the monk welcomed the rich, hoping for material support from them, and escaped from the poor, who could not support him in anything (on the contrary, they themselves expected help), he was inevitably possessed by the demon of greed. The sign of freedom was the same treatment of both the rich and the poor. Evagrius stigmatizes such two-faced postures among monks and ordinary Christians: That is why you are merciful towards those who give, and you turn out to be unmerciful towards those who do not give or even ask. And you came to the fact that you look at the hands of everyone who comes carrying something under his arms, but nobody can look at your hands. Let greed disappear from people, and such a cunning attitude should not rule over a Christian!193 Reading this text from the fourth century, one gets the impression that indeed little has changed in the life of human society since then. Even today, Christians, both lay people and clergy, easily fall into the temptation of treating the rich and the poor differently. Evagrius calls “a cunning attitude” of mercy, gentleness or greater indulgence towards those who give money for any activity of the Church, while greater severity towards those who give nothing and often ask for help. A two-faced man dominated by greed still expects something from others, while he often does not feel obliged to help, or even more is angry when they expect something from him. Evagrius describes it perfectly: he looks at everyone’s hands, but does not allow himself to look at his own hands. A prudent and poor monk: “will not flatter the rich for the sake of the pleasure of his stomach, nor will he enslave his free mind to many masters”.194 The rich people are usually flattered by a monk who is afraid for his own life or health, while the one who knows that by working with his own hands he is able to satisfy the daily needs of his body, keeps his heart free. 1.3.3.
Avarice Caused by the Anxiety about the Future
Another way of tempting a monk by a demon of greed to abandon poverty, and consequently also anchoritic life, is to arouse anxiety about old age, the inability to sustain himself, remaining destitute and humiliating dependence on others. Evagrius described such an action in the Practicus:
192 Cf. Rerum monachalium rationes 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 6. 193 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 33,1; Frankenberg (1912), 589. 194 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 8; PG 79,1153A; Sinkewicz (2003), 79.
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Avarice suggests a lengthy old age, inability to perform manual labour, famines that will come along, diseases that will arise, the bitter realities of poverty and the shame there is in accepting goods from others to meet one’s needs.195 The text reflects in part the real worries of the anchorite regarding his life in the desert. The monk had to get the necessary means to live by his own hands, he did not count on the help of others, and to receive alms or any means necessary to live was a sign of embarrassment.196 All this made him susceptible to the fear that at the end of his life he would not be able to survive alone, and such thinking would create uncertainty and destroy the sense of security. All these real difficulties and threats were used by the demon of greed to fuel an ever-greater fear in the anchorite in order to force him to abandon his ascetic practice in the desert. This fear, as we will immediately see, was based largely on the awakened imagination about the future.197 The demon began his attack, breaking into the monk’s soul by turning his attention to the long-awaited old age. Already in this first moment we can see how such a thought is based on imagination. Nobody knows exactly how long his old age will be. However, if the demon of greed has already managed to convince an anchorite that his old age will be long, then he will build and feed on fears about other aspects of his life at that time. A long old age logically coincides with the inability to work, and this, as we know, was the basis for maintaining an anchorite.198 The inability to get the funds necessary to live sooner or later led to starvation. There was no social welfare system in the desert and everyone had to look out for himself. Whoever was not able to do this suffered from hunger and consequently fell ill with various diseases related to malnutrition. Such situations happened and a demon of greed cunningly summoned them, reinforcing these fears even more. Then the monk would begin to experience the bitterness of poverty and be forced with great shame to take the necessary means for life from others. Poverty, which was previously practiced by choice but now as a necessity, fills him with bitterness because it signifies the lack of basic means of life, like bread and water. Accepting the resources necessary for life means that the monk is not able to support the harshness of anchoritic life and should leave the desert. Let us remember that Evagrius describes a process that takes place only in the imagination of a monk physically fit enough to be able to survive everyday. The demon of greed fuels fears about the future to convince him to leave the desert now. Often the demon of greed goes further, showing the monk a long life of misery, the appearance of misfortune, the conviction that in his need he will not find the necessary help, and that a slow death awaits him.199 The struggle against such a strategy of the demon of greed was associated with mastering the imagination through prayer and meditation on the Word of God or the mysteries of faith. Since, as we have seen, the whole process of arousing in the soul of
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Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 9; SCh 171,512; Sinkewicz (2003), 98. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 513; Adnes (1969), col. 381–99. See Misiarczyk (2001), 161–62. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1979), 118–26. Cf. Antirrheticus III,2; III,27; Brakke (2009), 85.91.
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a monk fear for the future moved the logically connected different aspects of his life – long old age, inability to work, hunger, diseases due to hunger, humiliation related to dependence on others – it was important not to give up already at the first stage, i.e., the fear of a long old age. We know, however, that very often such irrational fear escapes the control of our reason and will. Then it helps to summon God’s help, read and meditate on the biblical texts that encourage greater confidence or refer to the passionate thoughts of a particular fragment of the biblical text within the so-called antirrhetic method. In the treatise Antirrheticus III, Evagrius gathered all the biblical texts useful to fight the demon of greed in this way.200 Placing hope in God also gave the anchorite a sense of security for the future, on which no human being has any influence. Evagrius encouraged: Having therefore what you need for the present time, do not worry about the future, whether that be a day, a week or some months. When tomorrow has arrived, that time will provide what is needed, as long as you are seeking above all for the kingdom of heaven and the righteousness of God. For the Lord says: “Seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be given to you as well’” (Mt 6:33).201 The monk of Pontus, paraphrasing Christ’s words from the Gospel of Matthew, encouraged anchorites to seek above all the kingdom of God. If any of them now have what is necessary for life, let them entrust their future, regardless of how distant the day, week, month or year, into the hands of God. The necessary precaution for everyday life is not a manifestation of greed. Masochistic torment, as we would say in today’s language or fear of the future over which we as humans have no influence, destroy human beings leading to neurosis and offend God, whom we should trust. In the case of anchorites, fear for the future often led them to abandon ascetic life. 1.3.4.
Avarice as a Source of Vanity and Pride
Another characteristic feature of greed is the inducement of vanity and pride. Let us add at once that this is not about vanity and pride which are born in the rational part of the soul after overcoming all previous passions. Here the Pontian monk talks about the vanity and pride which are the result of the domination of the demon of greed, who pushes for collecting money and various goods on which man builds his sense of security and values in accordance with the spirit of this world: the more money he has, the more valuable he is. We all know that this is not the case, but most people apply this criterion in the judgement of others. In addition, we must remember that money and wealth open the door to power understood as a prideful control over other people. In the case of the anchorite, the effects of greed in this regard were even more negative, for he accumulated money often under the guise of helping the poor, but sat in secret with the very desire to possess them. If by flattering wealthy people he was able to accumulate substantial goods, he quickly fell into the trap of
200 Cf. Antirrheticus III; Frankenberg (1912), 495–503; Brakke (2009), 85–98. 201 Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 4; PG 40,1255C; Sinkewicz (2003), 6.
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vanity, thinking of himself as a vigorous administrator, or the trap of pride, placing hope more in money and in people than in God. In addition to the general definition, as of St Paul, that greed is the mother of idolatry,202 Evagrius, warning his friend against greed, states: Recall how many shipwrecks avarice has caused and how many wars against people it has provoked, [together with] chains, imprisonment, and instruments of torture.203 Although the text deals directly with greed, it seems to combine with it vanity and pride. The desire of possession exposes people traveling by ship to break up when they embark on long journeys to get rich. It pushes them to start wars in order to acquire booty, but also leads to vanity and pride, that is, a sense of superiority over others and establishing themselves as rulers of human life by building prison and enclosing enemies there, or tormenting them with various types of torture. In this way vanity and pride based on greed arouses even more in man the desire to possess the vicious circle: greed generates vanity and pride, and they more and more strengthen greed itself. A vain and proud man is convinced that he has the right to have even more wealth and puts such a belief into practice. The same mechanism also works in the life of an anchorite, first dominated by greed and then by vanity and pride. He then abandons the basic purpose of life in the desert, that is, to achieve spiritual gnosis and love of God, because love cannot reside in the soul together with the desire for wealth and power. Love is won by one who has despised food, mammon and worldly fame. When one is overwhelmed by these passions, he will sue anyone who takes away his wealth or insults him.204 And even if Evagrius does not use here the technical term of φιλαργυρία, the whole triad indicates greed, because in his texts the three source passions gluttony, greed, and vanity appear together in most cases. The demon of greed, along with vanity and pride, urges the monk to fight for money and possessions because of the immediate profit. Needless to say, the spiritual struggle with this kind of vanity and pride must begin precisely with greed, because it is impossible to be greedy and humble at the same time. However, this is not always easy because, as we have seen, vanity and pride born of greed strengthen the greed itself by creating a mechanism of mutual fueling. They are interrupted by the practice of poverty, the submission to hope and trust in God, and the humble memory that even if someone flows in riches, his life does not depend on his property (see Luke 12:15).
2.
Λογισμοί of the Irascible Part of the Soul
The second part or inclination of the passionate part of the soul is the irascibility in which its passionate thoughts are born, i.e., sadness (λύπη) and anger (ὀργή). When
202 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 27,7; Frankenberg (1912), 583. 203 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 52,3; L. Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 204 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 60,3.
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analyzing the Evagrian understanding of irascibility, like in the case of concupiscibility, we must always have before us the fundamental distinction between their ontic and ethical level of functioning. Thus irascibility, although it appeared as a result of the original fall, as such is a gift of God himself and is ontically good. It was given to man along with concupiscibility and the body as an aid in returning to God and fighting with demons.205 In the ethical sense, the qualification of irascibility as good or bad strictly depends on its action according to its nature or against it. For the confusion in the passionate soul produces a demonic thought that awakens in it concupiscibility and irascibility against nature.206 In order to determine exactly when the irascibility works according to its nature and when against it, we must know how Evagrius understood the nature of the irascibility. The Pontian monk describes it in this way: The nature of the irascible part is to fight against the demons and to struggle over any sort of pleasure. And so the angels, on the one hand, suggest to us spiritual pleasure and the blessedness that will come from it, and they urge us to turn our irascibility against the demons These latter, on the other hand, drag us toward worldly desires and compel the irascible part, contrary to its nature, to fight with people, so that with the mind darkened and fallen from knowledge it may become the traitor of the virtues.207 In the text, the author distinguishes clearly between the action of irascibility in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and against nature (παρὰ φύσιν). The soul acts in accordance with its nature when its concupiscible part seeks virtue, the irascible fights for virtue, and the rational one contemplates beings.208 The passionate part of the soul acts against its nature when its concupiscibility does not aspire to the virtues of temperance, abstinence, and poverty, but to the passions of gluttony, impurity, and greed, and the irascible does not fight for the above virtues with joy and gentleness, but stimulates passions of sadness or anger. The irascible part of the soul, by its nature, fights with passionate thoughts, and also stands up for the protection of pleasure. The Guillaumonts explain very well the term “lutter en vue du plaisir, quel qu’il soi”.209 We find this idea in the following text: For this reason I do away with pleasures, namely, to cut off the pretext available to the irascible part. For I know that this always contends for pleasures, troubles my mind, and chases away knowledge.210 Angels draw a monk to spiritual pleasure (πνευματική ἡδονή) and the happiness that comes from it, and encourage him simultaneously to direct his irascibility to fight for it and against demons, who draw irascibility towards desiring world concupiscences (τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας) and stimulate fighting against the people. Irascibility, then, acts 205 206 207 208 209 210
Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 17; Sinkewicz (2003), 164; Ad Eulogium 10; Sinkewicz (2003), 37. Cf. Practicus 86; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 24; SCh 171,556; Sinkewicz (2003), 102. Cf. Epistula 39,4. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 557; Bunge (1999a), 53. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 99; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 708; Sinkewicz (2003), 113. Evagrius evokes the same idea in Apo 9 (952).
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according to its nature if it is directed against demons, not people, and when it fights for spiritual pleasure and does not seek sensual desires. Demons in spiritual combat with the anchorite want first of all to deprive him of spiritual knowledge;211 and anger, one of the passionate thoughts of irascibility, makes it most effective by blinding his mind: With those who approach obscure matters and want to describe them the demon of anger fights night and day, that [demon] which is accustomed to blind the thought and to deprive it of spiritual contemplation.212 Irascibility awakens through concupiscibility or meeting people and acts against nature when it wants to dissuade the anchorite from spiritual gnosis. According to Evagrius, the characteristic feature of irascibility contrary to concupiscibility is to push the monk to isolate himself from people and close himself in. And just as the medicine for concupiscibility is anchoritism, the cure for irascibility is to stay among people and to practice patience, forgiveness, alms, and above all, love of neighbor.213 This is clearly confirmed by the fragment from Kephalaia Gnostica: “Knowledge cures the intellect, whereas charity-love cures the irascible faculty (of the soul), and chastity the concupiscible/appetitive part”.214 Thanks to this fragment, it is easier for us to understand another text of Evagrius in which he distinguishes the passions of the flesh and passions of the soul The passions of the soul have their origin in human beings; those of the body have their origin in the body. Abstinence cuts away the passions of the body; spiritual love cuts away those of the soul.215 The Pontian man took from Aristotle the distinction between τὰ σωματικὰ πάθη and τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη,216 counting among former passionate thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, i.e., gluttony, impurity and greed, while the latter is anger and sadness arising from the relationship with people.217 Passions of the body are born on the basis of natural human needs, such as food, drink, or sexual needs, and can be healed relatively easily, mainly thanks to abstinence. Passions of the soul are not only vanity and pride, but also anger and sadness, as clearly indicated by the fact that the medicine for them is love. This is confirmed by the fragment from Tractatus ad Eulogium: The passions of the body take their origin from the natural appetites of the flesh, against which abstinence is effective; the passions of the soul have their conception from the appetites of the soul, against which charity is effective.218 211 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica III,41; A. Guillaumont (1958), 115; Ramelli (2015), 163. 212 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,47; A. Guillaumont (1958), 157; Ramelli (2015), 224. See also Kephalaia Gnostica III,90; VI,63; Scholia in Palmos 31,9. 213 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 2; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 154–56; Sinkewicz (2003), 154. 214 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,35; A. Guillaumont (1958), 111; Ramelli (2015), 160. 215 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 35; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 580; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 216 Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea X,2. 217 Cf. C. et A. Guillaumont, C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 580–81, note 35. 218 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 23; Sinkewicz (2003), 325.49.
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According to Evagrius, the passions of the soul, that is, irascible thoughts, are born in the soul, but are stimulated by meetings with people, through their words or attitudes. For the monk of Pontus the fact that the passions of the soul also mean the passionate thoughts of the irascible part of the soul is also demonstrated by the presentation of love as a remedy for them, because it heals anger and sadness. The Pontian monk wrote repeatedly that passionate thoughts are triggered by the senses and do not arise when temperance is opposed to concupiscibility and love counters irascibility. In the case of all thoughts of the passionate part of the soul, that is, concupiscible and irascible, we deal with the mediation of the senses, but the body inflames more lust, while the soul and contacts with people, anger. There is no need to convince anyone that young people struggle more with lust, but older with anger. The same applies to anchorites: Exhort the old men to conquer anger, and the young men [to conquer] the belly: for demons of the soul battle the former, while for the most part demons of the body [battle] the latter.219 Such a consequence is conditioned for understandable reasons by the age of the monk, but also by his spiritual growth, because “the more the soul progresses, the greater are the antagonists that follow it in succession” (Pr. 59). Evagrius, therefore, warns: A gentle young person bears many things; but who will bear the pettiness of an elder? I saw an irate elder exalted in his time; the young person however had more hope than he.220 As we have seen before, according to Evagrius, demons attacking the irascible part of the soul are more difficult to overcome: The irascible [part of the soul] requires more remedies than the concupiscible, and for this reason love is said to be great (1 Cor.13:13), for it is the bridle of anger.221 Concupiscibility is relieved by temperance and self-control, while irascibility by love, expressed in calmness, gentleness, patience.222 The virtue of gentleness (πραΰτης) in a perfect degree was possessed by Moses described in the Bible as a gentle and loving man whom Evagrius presents to anchorites as a model to follow.223 Passions of the soul are more difficult to dominate than passions of the body because they originate not only from the structure of the human personality, but are also born in relationships with other people.224 For this reason, to overcome them there is a need for love, a greater virtue than self-control, which is enough to overcome concupiscibility. The Pontian monk in fact claims: 219 220 221 222 223 224
Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 31; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 146. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad Monachos 112; Greßmann (1913), 162; Sinkewicz (2003), 129. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 38; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 586; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. Cf. Epistula 19,2; Casiday (2006), 62. Cf. Epistula 56. Cf. Practicus 35; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. See Bunge (1989c), 20.
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Those [demons] who preside over the passions of the soul hold out until death; those that preside over those of the body withdraw more quickly.225 The last fragment, apart from confirming the distinction between demons of the soul and demons of the body, also specifies the time of their attacks on the soul of the monk. Those demons who control the passions of the flesh retreat relatively early, while the spiritual attack the man throughout his whole life. Therefore, the struggle with them is definitely more difficult and more love is needed to overcome them, and it is expressed in meekness and gentleness. Although the passions of the soul arise in principle due to contacts with people, through their words, deeds or attitudes, it is often done, as in the case of carnal passions, by means of various material objects connected with people. This is because, according to the Evagrian structure of the soul, the irascible part of it is as in the middle: on the one hand it belongs to the passionate part of the soul, on the other hand it also connects with the rational part, influencing the mind which is the center of man. The aroused irascibility obscures the mind, preventing it from achieving spiritual gnosis, from contemplating beings and God. At the end of this part of our analysis, let us be mindful once again that in the Evagrian teaching about the eight passionate thoughts there overlap the two orders of reflection: empirical and spiritual. In the empirical order, the passionate thoughts of the irascible part of the soul, i.e., anger and sadness, attack the anchorite when he succumbs to one or all of the concupiscible thoughts, i.e., gluttony, impurity, and greed. On the other hand, the monk advanced in the spiritual life is attacked by stronger opponents (Pr. 59), hence the passionate thoughts of the irascible part of the soul are born after overcoming those three concupiscible thoughts. Spiritual and empirical order of sequence of passionate thoughts, for obvious reasons, overlap in the everyday life of a human being, from which one could conclude that both succumbing to the passionate thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul or resisting them and even overcoming them, exposes the monk to an attack of both sadness and anger. The Pontian monk also repeatedly emphasized the mutual dependence and causality between sadness and anger, which may lead in the same man to the situation that sadness is born of anger, or vice versa.226 In his presentation of the eight main thoughts of passion Evagrius presents as the fourth sadness and the fifth anger (Pr. 6), and we will analyze them in this order in the present study. 2.1.
Sadness
The first thought of the irascible part of the soul in the Evagrian catalog of the eight λογισμοί is sadness. The monk of Pontus in his teaching on this subject is based on St Paul, who distinguished two kinds of sadness: the godly sadness converting to
225 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 36; C and A. Guillaumont (1971), 582; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 226 Cf. Practicus 23; Sinkewicz (2003), 101–02.
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salvation, which later the person does not regret, and the sadness of this world that causes death.227 In the Ad Eulogium treatise, we find a very similar idea: There are two types of sadness arising from evil, which can be separated in each activity: one appears in the heart without any apparent cause for sadness, the other is forcefully begotten of unusual causes. Godly sadness calls the soul back with tears, refusing the joy and sadness of the opposit side, and it worries over approaching death and judgement; little by little it opens to accept this. Frustrated desires produce plantings of sadness.228 Evagrius is therefore of the opinion that two kinds of sorrows can be born in the human soul: one coming from God as a consequence of human iniquity, the other caused by passions as a result of unsatisfied lusts. The former is given as a grace from God for conversion, when man realizes that by committing a certain evil he has offended God and he reveals himself through tears and reflections on God’s death and judgment. It concentrates man more on God and His forgiveness, while the other is a consequence of unsatisfied desires, which closes man in on himself, is lived more egocentrically, and leads to “hardening” of emotions and feelings. In another place, our author adds: The sadness is blameworthy when it is a deprivation that is a result of corruptible pleasure; but sadness is praiseworthy when it is a deprivation that is a result of the virtues and knowledge of God.229 Monk’s awareness of committing sins and abandonment of the path of acquiring virtues and spiritual knowledge of God gives rise to sadness, that is good because it is connected to a sense of sorrow (πένθος) and repentance (κατάνυξις) and leads to tears and conversion.230 It was to the demon of sadness that S. Paul handed over the one who committed sin, encouraging the Corinthians to resolve this affair with love: “that this man should not fall into desperate sadness”.231 According to Evagrius, the symbol of this demon is a viper whose venom, in accordance with the principles of ancient medicine, dosed in small portions destroys the poisons of other animals and is useful for humans, but kills when taken in excess. A little sadness as a result of wickedness serves the conversion of man, while the immense sadness that comes from unfulfilled desires brings great suffering and kills the monk spiritually. The ascetic from Pontus, therefore, emphasizes: When this spirit afflicts people, it can also be for them an opportunity for a good repentance; for this reason St John the Baptist called those stung by this demon and who flee to God “Offspring of vipers”, and then said “Who
227 228 229 230
Cf. 2 Kor 7,10. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 7; Sinkewicz (2003), 314.34. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 25,20a; Géhin (1987), 404. Cf. Protrepticus; Frankeberg (1912), 563. Regarding sorrow and repentance in Evagrian writings and other Eastern authors, see an interesting study of I. Hausherr (1944). 231 2 Kor 2,7.
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warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bear fruit that befits repentance” (Matt. 3:7–9).232 For understandable reasons, Evagrius is more interested in this kind of sadness, which is caused by the failure to satisfy the desires of passionate or destructive pleasures. The essence of such sadness is seen in the fact that unlike other passionate thoughts which are usually accompanied by some pleasure, the immediate effect of sadness is the lack of any bodily or spiritual pleasure: All the demons teach the soul to love pleasure; only the demon of sadness refrains from doing so. Instead, he corrupts the thoughts of those in the place by cutting off and drying up every pleasure of the soul by means of sadness, if indeed “the bones of the person afflicted by sadness dry up” (Prov. 17:22).233 The demon of sadness isolates man from the world, other people, and from all pleasure, so that even when he experiences them, he does not have a taste for them: “Pleasure follows every thought except for thoughts of sadness”.234 For the thoughts of sadness destroy all other pleasant thoughts. When this condition lasts longer, it brings an anchorite to relinquish the asceticism and the desert, or even advises the soul secretly to leave the body, i.e., to commit suicide (De mal. 13). Evagrius sees in the action of demons, especially the demon of sadness and acedia, the source of suicidal thoughts and acts, which he condemns unequivocally. Even if the demon of sadness does not lead a man to such a drastic step, in the case of a monk he can force him to abandon anchoritic life. It happens, however, wrote Evagrius, that those who still remain in the wilderness, overcome by sadness or anger, fall into madness: Let no anchorite take up the anchoritic life with anger or pride or sadness, nor flee his brothers while troubled by such thoughts. For attacks of folly arise from such passions.235 We are, of course, interested here in sadness as an obstacle to ascetic practice. The monk, overcome by passionate sadness, either leaves the desert or, if he remains, will practice asceticism without inner joy and close in on himself in front of the brothers. This sooner or later will lead his soul to madness. To describe this state Evagrius uses the term ἔκστασις, which we find in Aristotle and in other ancient texts concerning medicine; in Philo Alexandrinus it had a sense of madness caused by rage.236 Already in this text Evagrius shows us the basic remedy to fight sadness and anger, which is to meet the brothers. Anchoritism becomes sweet after the removal of passionate
232 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 12; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 192; Sinkewicz (2003), 161–62. 233 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 12, Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 192; Sinkewicz (2003), 161. 234 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 51; Muyldermans, 43; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 235 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 23; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 232–34; Sinkewicz (2003), 169. 236 Cf. Philo of Alexandria, Quis rerum divinarum 249; Harls (1967), 290–91.
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thoughts (Pr. 36), but it is very dangerous for the soul overcome by sadness, when the demon whispers to the monk how beautiful it is to move away from the world, so that it will never free itself from it.237 I wrote earlier that sadness can be born in the soul of a monk, both when he succumbs to the three passions of the concupiscible part of the soul (the empirical order) and when he resists them (the order of spiritual development). The Pontian monk focuses his teaching much more on the second type of sadness that arises when the monk resists lust, gluttony, impurity, and greed. Analyzing his description of the dynamics of action of individual passionate thoughts, we must always keep in mind his basic assumption that so-called main thoughts are gluttony, greed, and vainglory. Gluttony is the source of impurity, in turn, gluttony, impurity and greed can give birth to the thoughts of irascible part of the soul, that is sadness or anger: “It is not possible to escape the demon of sadness, if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them”.238 We see, then, that this is clearly the prospect of spiritual development, according to which thoughts of the passionate part of the soul, that is, sadness and anger, attack anchorites already advanced on the path of ascetic practice who resisted bodily desires. Similarly, anger, as one of the possible causes of sadness, arises in the soul of someone who has despised food, riches, and vainglory.239 In spite of the concupiscible passions, the source of stimulating sadness or anger is often vanity or the desire to seek human glory. Evagrius, of course, is here referring to the so-called “source vanity” which is present at all stages of the ascetic practice. The analysis of the fragments in which we are interested in, scattered throughout all the works of the Pontian monk,240 will focus on the following themes: “sadness as a manifestation of frustration due to unfulfilled desires” and “sadness as a result of anger”. 2.1.1.
Sadness as the Frustration Caused by Unfulfilled Desires
We could say that Evagrius wrote a programatic text on the subject of sadness in his treatise the Practicus: Sadness sometimes occurs through the frustration of one’s desires, or sometimes it follows closely upon anger. When it is through the frustration of one’s desires, it occurs in this way. When certain thoughts gain the advantage, they bring the soul to remember home and parents and one’s former life. And when they observe that the soul does not resist but rather follows right along and disperses itself
237 Cf. Practicus 22; Ad Eulogium 5; Sententiae ad monachos 8. 238 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 1; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 145; Sinkewicz (2003), 153. 239 Cf. Epistula 39,4; Ant. V,30. 240 See Epistula 8,1; 39,4; Practicus 10; 13; 23; 25; Gnosticus 10; 47; De oratione 16; 20; 34; Sententiae ad monachos 55; 56; Ad virginem 39; 40; De malignis cogitationibus 1; 3; 8; 9; 13; 22; 28; 36; De octo spiritibus malitiae 7.11–12; De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3; Tractatus ad Eulogium 5; 7; Protrepticus; Paraeneticus; Antirrheticus IV; Capita cognoscitiva 19; 51; 60; 61; In Prov. 25,20a; 26,23.
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among thoughts of pleasures, then with a hold on it they plunge it into sadness with the realization that former things are no more and cannot be again because of the present way of life. And the miserable soul, the more it followed itself to be dispersed among the former thoughts, the more it has now become hemmed in and humiliated by these latter ones.241 The monk of Pontus, therefore, sees the double cause of sorrow: the non-fullfilment of desires and the consequence of anger. The second situation confirms that in his opinion there is a mutual causal relationship between sadness and anger, but we will deal with that later. In the latter part of the quoted text, our author focuses clearly on the first cause of sadness which is the frustration of desires. He masterfully describes the strategy of passionate thoughts which through the memory awaken the imagination and desire for pleasure.242 Thus, passionate thoughts evoke in a monk’s soul the memory of the family home, parents, brothers and sisters, colleagues and friends, his old life. The memory of a family home and parents is of course not bad in itself, but even these natural thoughts connected with caring for loved ones, experienced in a passionate way, can give rise to sadness. They put quickly “before our eyes our father’s old age, our mother’s lack of strength, and the sorrow of our relatives, who are not comforted”243 or “showing them a member of their families in sickness or in danger on land or at sea”.244 Worse is when this memory – and this is where the biggest trap begins – ends with a reminder of the old life; then the monk’s return to the memories of old feasts, wealth, and experienced relationships with people. If he does not resist them, he then begins not only to remember those experienced situations, but also to imagine good food and meetings with women, gathering wealth, and seeking human glory. Such immersion in unreal and only imagined pleasures leads to even greater frustration and plunges a monk into greater sadness, because desirable things will not come back and they cannot come back because of the chosen anchoritic lifestyle. The perverseness of such temptations consists in the fact that they evoke vain hopes impossible to implement at the present stage of monk’s life, in advance condemning him to the frustration that is the mother of sadness. However, this is not a frustration resulting from the lack of necessities for a monk, but rather imagined corporeal needs. The depth of experienced sadness depends on the degree of submission to such memories of the old life. In this state, man is attacked by two types of demons: those which induce lust and bind man to the world, and those which lead to anger and sadness.245 The more someone mentions his old desires and builds new ideas on these memories, associating with the things of this world, the more he experiences frustration and sadness. Although in this text Evagrius specifies the cause of sadness as a frustration
Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 10; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 514; Sinkewicz (2003), 98. Cf. Misiarczyk (2002), 84–91. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus IV,42; Frankenberg (1912), 508; Brakke (2009), 109. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 28; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 252; Sinkewicz (2003), 173. 245 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 516, note 10. 241 242 243 244
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of desires (στέρησιν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν) and specifies that it is mainly about remembered or imagined lusts, in other texts he clearly states that the cause of sadness is the frustration of present or expected pleasure: One who flees all worldly pleasures is a citadel inaccessible to the demon of sadness. For sadness involves the frustration of a pleasure, whether actually present or only hoped for. And so if we have an attachment to some earthly object, it is impossible to repel this enemy, for he sets his snare and produces sadness precisely where he sees we are particularly inclined.246 In this passage, the Pontian monk defines the cause of sadness as deprivation of pleasure (στέρησις ἡδονῆς), which in practice is identical with the previous term frustration of desire (στέρησιν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν), so that both phrases are used by him interchangeably. They are based on the conviction that: “Now desire is the source of every pleasure, and sensation gives birth to desire”.247 Desire concerns material reality: The person who is bound by sadness has been vanquished by the passions and he carries the fetters as a proof of his defeat, for sadness is constituted by the frustration of an appetite [of the flesh], and an appetite is joined to every passion. One who has overcome his appetites has overcome the passions; one who has overcome the passions will not be dominated by sadness. […] He who has gained control of the passions has gained control of sadness, but one who has been defeated by pleasure will not escape the fetters of this vice. One who is continuously afflicted by sadness but pretends to impassibility is like a sick person who feigns health. […] The person who loves the world will experience a lot of sadness […] but he who disdains riches will be free of sadness.248 Sadness is usually born from the want of bodily desire, that is, as we have seen gluttony, impurity and greed. If someone is overcome with sadness, according to Evagrius, it is a sure sign that he is still dominated by the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul: “One who is deprived of his desires is distressed”.249 Nothing will seem to be a victory over lusts or fake impassibility, for sadness reveals this inner attachment. Often the temptation of an anchorite does not begin with the immediate stimulation of bodily desire in him – gluttony, impurity, or greed – but in a more subtle and sophisticated way with the imaginations of ordinary encounters with people: There is a demon called the “vagabond” who presents himself to the brothers especially about the time of dawn; he leads the mind around from city to city, from village to village, and from house to house. The mind arranges so-called
246 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 19; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 546–48; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. 247 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 97. See also C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 547, note 19. 248 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 11–12 (passim); PG 79,1156D–1157B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 82–83. 249 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 8,1; Casiday (2006), 61.
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simple encounters, then meets with acquaintances, holds longer conversations, and corrupts its own state with these associations, distancing itself little by little from the knowledge of God and from virtue while it forgets even its profession. […] It is with intention of destroying the anchorite’s state that he does this, so that the mind, inflamed by these things and intoxicated by these many encounters, immediately falls prey to the demon of fornication or anger or sadness – these demons especially spoil the radiance of its state.250 The demon called seducer or homeless (πλάνος) begins the temptation of a monk by guiding his imagination to seen or only imagined cities, villages, or homes, and presents him with meetings with people. Already at this stage, the vigilant ascetic will quickly see the beginning of temptation which detaches him by imagination and thoughts from his monastic lifestyle after moving away into the desert in order to cut unnecessary stimuli for passionate thoughts. If, on the other hand, he allows it to lead, he will quickly begin to engage in new imaginations and long conversations with people he meets. It then destroys his inner peace and stabilitas mentis (κατάστασις) because his mind is already busy with imaginary encounters and gradually departs from practicing virtue and knowing God. It is only in this state, through contact, admittedly only in the imagination, that the old lusts are aroused in him again. And because he cannot satisfy them in any way, he experiences anger or sadness of frustration. Each of these passionate thoughts destroys the state of stabilitas and give rise to impurity through the arousal of the concupiscible part of the soul, and to sadness or anger from the irascible. All demons are concerned with destroying this state of a monk’s inner stability in practicing the opposing virtues which are a condition of impassibility and knowing God. Evagrius, masterfully as always, discovered the strategy of demonic action which does not start the fight with the anchorite by a direct attack on stability, but in a very distant and seemingly innocent way, from the imaginations of meetings with people. Then by stimulating lust, it brings frustration which becomes a source of sadness or anger and destroys stability. Hence the Pontian monk proposes as a way of fighting this demon thoroughly investigating the mode of temptation. Because the mind during the temptation gets confused and does not see exactly what is happening, he then recommends that after the demon leaves, the monk should sit down and remember the things that have happened, in what place the spirit of impurity, sadness or anger has seized him. Such a thorough analysis of this demon’s strategems enables the monk to recognize him at his next arrival and to scold him immediately.251 In the other fragment of the Practicus 10 the monk from Pontus does not limit the causes of sadness to the frustration of the passions of the flesh, but extends them to the world’s passions. The passions of the world are the eight major λογισμοί, which are also the basis of all the other passions and pleasures of this world (Pr. 6). All the impure thoughts “bind the mind either by concupiscibility or by irascibility or by 250 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 9; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 180; Sinkewicz (2003), 159. 251 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 9–10 passim.
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sadness”.252 In the treatise De octo spiritibus malitiae, Evagrius wrote that the cause of sadness may be the frustration of not only bodily desires, but also the frustration of anger and desire for revenge against others and the search for human glory.253 We will deal with the frustration of anger and desire for revenge in a separate section, but here it is worth pausing briefly on the frustration of the desire to seek human glory. Let us be mindful that it is not about vanity or seeking human glory, which is born after liberation from passionate thoughts of the concupiscible and irascible part of the soul towards the end of ascetic practice, but about vanity as one of the three source passions that accompanies the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul. It is worth noting that in this text, to describe the frustration of the desire for vainglory, Evagrius uses the phrase στερηθεὶς ἀνθρωπίνης τιμῆς, in exactly the same way as in the case of frustration of corporal desires στέρησιν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. The ascetic of Pontus, looking for sources of sadness in these five passionate desires – gluttony, impurity, greed, desire for revenge (anger), and vanity – combined their appearance with a specific anchorite’s state of life. This is a state of frustration of the bodily desires, when the monk freed himself from the passion of gluttony, impurity and greed, then because of this frustration easily fell into anger or vanity, seeking compensation in the form of human recognition and admiration for the fruit of his ascetic efforts. The dynamics of the operation of the human soul in such a state described by Evagrius is universal. In the monastic life, the cause of sadness could be the vain hopes of being a priest, for the clergy today, when the priesthood is universal, it would be hopes of promotion in the church hierarchy, and for lay people promotion in their work. Only the areas at play change depending on the desires of specific people or social groups, but the pattern of the operation of empty hopes remains the same. Evagrius wrote about the vain hopes of anchorites in such a way: The thought of vainglory is a most subtle one and readily insinuates itself within the virtuous person […] it even predicts to him (= monk) that he will eventually attain the priesthood; it has people come to seek him at his door, and if he should be unwilling he will be taken away in bonds. When this thought has thus raised him aloft on empty hopes, it flies off abandoning him to be tempted either by the demon of pride or by that of sadness, who brings upon him further thoughts opposed to his hopes.254 The demon of vainglory awakens in the anchorite the vain desires of the priesthood, and elevating him to the heights, abandons him, leaving the temptation to the demon of pride or sadness. This sadness would not have been born and would not have reached the monk if he had not been first seduced by vanity which overwhelmed him, because the frustration of the desire of the flesh made him experience a feeling of deprivation for which he wanted to compensate with the priesthood and admiration of other people. Sadness is born through the wakening of empty hopes
252 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 60; Muyldermans (1931), 44; Sinkewicz (2003), 216. 253 Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 11; Sinkewicz (2003), 82. 254 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 13; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 528–30; Sinkewicz (2003), 100.
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that are impossible to realize. However, the deceptive passionate nature of such desires shows their realization to the fullest extent. A man who passionately wants something and ultimately achieves it is joyful only for a short time because he wants more and soon falls into sadness again. The characteristic feature of passionate desires is that they will never be satisfied, but they push people to desire more and more. Evagrius in his description of this mechanism exposes the essence of its action and warns against the illusory treatment of vanity or seeking human glory as a method for healing one’s complexes and frustrations. Since human nature hates a vacuum, in a situation of frustration of passionate desires every person, including a monk, experiences profound deprivation and naturally wants to return to the same desire or to replace it with another passionate desire. The monk of Pontus, however, proposes a different method of dealing with passionate desires which also respects the basic principle that nature hates a vacuum, helping to withstand the frustration of not satisfying the desire of the flesh, while not escaping to compensate it with anger or seeking human glory. He encourages monks to live ascetic practice, which consists in freeing themselves from bodily and spiritual passions and in their place introducing the human soul to virtues opposing them. Thus, the fasting, pure, and poor monk cannot stop at these virtues alone, because the frustration of gluttony, impurity, and greed, will make him return to them sooner or later; or if he does not return, he will respond with sadness, anger, or vanity. He should fight for the opposite virtues, that is, joy, gentleness and humbleness. Evagrius wrote: An abstinent person does not experience sadness in the absence of food, nor does the chaste person experience sadness in the lack of a licentious pleasure; similarly, the person free of anger in not attaining vengeance, or humble person when deprived of human esteem, or the person free of avarice when he suffers a loss – for such people have decisively turned away from the appetite for these things. Just as one who wears armour is not affected by an arrow, so the person who has attained impassibility will not be wounded by sadness.255 Just as passionate thoughts connect closely to each other and condition each other, so too the virtues. Evagrius repeatedly warned in his texts about practicing only one or two virtues while neglecting the others. Therefore, the one who has truly despised the world, its passions, and pleasures, and more specifically gluttony, impurity, greed, and seeking for human glory, will be free of sadness and fight for the virtues of temperance, restraint, poverty, and humility. Then the anchorite will grow in opposition to sadness, that is in authentic inner joy which is strengthened more and more with the purification of the soul from successive thoughts of passion, that is, anger and acedia, and finally reach a state of impassibility. Because the dispassionate person does not hurt a demon of sadness, the demon cannot loot anything, if man has rejected everything, he is vigilant and he is not afraid.256 The demon of sadness cannot be repelled if one is passionately attached to one of those desires, but
255 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 11; PG 79,1156D–1157A; Sinkewicz (2003), 82. 256 Cf. Epistula 39,4.
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“Sadness will not lay hold of a pure heart, for it has banished corruptible pleasure from itself ”.257 Sorrow will remain a sign of continuous dominance in the soul of at least one of these passions, even if man denies and pretends to be liberated from them. He is “one who dwells over loss, who is familiar with frustrated acquisition, a forerunner of exile, remembrance of family, a deputy of want”.258 The gnostic who has indeed been freed from all these pleasures is similar to a tower inaccessible to the demon of sadness. His mind has drunk spiritual knowledge, experiences perfect purification by practicing love, and will teach others free from sadness.259 Evagrius also encourages vigilance in those anchorites who have already achieved or who are close to achieving impassibility, because sadness makes it difficult to heal a purified and re-wounded soul: Therefore, it is necessary to keep guard over the heart with all watchfulness […]. For it is easier to purify an impure soul than it is to bring back to health one that has been purified and wounded again; the demon of sadness does not allow it, but constantly springs upon the pupils of the eyes and brings the image of the sin during the time of prayer.260 The healing of the soul after being hurt again by some passion and sin is much more difficult than the first cleansing, the obstacle being the demon of sadness who puts under one’s eyes the constant memory of the sins committed. The memory of new wounds is always stronger and more difficult to heal than old ones. Hence as part of the struggle using the antirrhetic method, the Pontian ascetic suggests directing against the demon who is attacking the soul with the memories of sins and trying to plunge the monk in sorrow, f. ex. the biblical text of Mic 7.8: “Do not be merry over me, my enemy; though I have fallen, I will arise, though I am in darkness, the Lord is my light”. As a remedy for sadness of soul, Evagrius proposes to defend himself at any cost before falling into the trap of complete isolation from other people and the closure of himself. Any thoughts or desires that the monk in a state of sadness would go to the desert or choose any independent occupation without the need to cooperate with others is the temptation of the demon of sadness, because he wants to keep a man in this state. The monk frees himself from it by practicing the opposite virtues, that is, love of neighbor and joy, and this is possible only thanks to being among people. Magnanimity and forgiveness destroy anger, and love and joy destroy sadness.261 Real joy is: The destruction of sorrow and thanksgiving for misfortunes, a vision that comes from prayers and gladness that comes from ascetic works, happiness doing
Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Proverbia 26,23; Géhin (1987), 418. Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 4; PG 79,1141D; Sinkewicz (2003), 63. Cf. Gnosticus 10; 47. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 36; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 278; Sinkewicz (2003), 178. 261 Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 5; Sinkewicz (2003), 32–33. 257 258 259 260
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good, an ornament of renunciation, a receptacle of hospitality, a refuge of hopes, nourishment of ascetics, an encouragement for mourners, a consolation for tears, a help for affliction, a support of love, a partner in patience.262 The demon of sadness was particularly difficult to overcome for anchorites because they inhabited the desert, usually alone, just as today it affects mostly people living alone or experiencing emotional loneliness. The second way to deal with sadness, “the companion of acedia” (De vitiis 3), is perseverance and survival of its attack. As we have seen, because the demon of sadness does everything to discourage an anchorite from the ascetic life and force him to abandon the desert or, if he stays, leads his soul to madness, then to persevere in his place and fight to cleanse the soul of its influence is really fruitful.263 A great help in practicing perseverance for the monk is, of course, prayer, the third medicine in turn “for sadness and discouragement”.264 However, Evagrius encourages the monk not to be sad about if he does not immediately receive what he asks for, because if he perseveres in prayer the Lord will bestow on him greater goodness and communion with Himself.265 There is also a mutual relationship between sadness and spiritual prayer: prayer heals sadness, and the “spirit of sadness crushes prayer”.266 The Pontian monk warns: “Prayer is a defence against sadness and discouragement”.267 Prayer purifies the soul of sorrow, but expelling the demon of sadness is a condition for true, pure, and spiritual prayer. The sad monk will not stimulate his mind to contemplate, nor will he offer pure prayer, because sadness obscures the contemplating mind.268 Another way to fight against sorrow is to direct some fragment of Scripture against it, with faith in the power of the Word of God which is capable of expelling this demon from the human soul. Evagrius collected such biblical quotes in the Antirrheticus treatise for use by the anchorite in the spiritual battle with the demon of sadness.269 So the texts from the Old and New Testament against the demon of sadness who whispers to the anchorite that he is alone with his thoughts and God does not see his torment and leaves him alone and the demon threatens him with night visions, weakening his belief in the possibility of victory. Yet another method of fighting the demon of sadness is the gift of tears, always connected with a plea to God for direct help: “Sadness is burdensome and acedia is irresistible, but tears shed before God are stronger than both”.270 Sadness in its external manifestations is often similar to acedia and similarly leads to a bizarre blocking of feelings, so that a man has the impression that he really did not feel anything and his feelings do not surrender completely to the control of reason or will. Only the watchfulness of the 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270
Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3; PG 79,1144A; Sinkewicz (2003), 63. Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 55; Sinkewicz (2003), 125. Cf. De oratione 16; PG 79,1172A; Sinkewicz (2003), 194. Cf. De oratione 34; Sinkewicz (2003), 196. Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 56; Greßmann (1913), 157; Sinkewicz (2003), 125. Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 20; PG 79,1172B; Sinkewicz (2003), 194. Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 12; Sinkewicz (2003), 82. Cf. Antirrheticus IV; Brakke (2009), 99-123. Evagrius Ponticus, Ad virginem 39; Greßmann (1913), 149; Sinkewicz (2003), 134.
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mind and the tears poured out before the Lord are then able to soften the soul of man and restore his true “feeling”. 2.1.2.
Sadness as the Result of Wrath
The second cause of sorrow in the human soul is anger (Pr. 10), apart from the frustration of unfulfilled desires. Evagrius defines anger as a “boiling over of the irascible part and a movement directed against one who has done injury or is thought to have done so”.271 More on the subject of the nature of anger as a stirring of wrath will be described in the analysis of the dynamics of passionate thoughts of anger, but here it deserves to be emphasized, by the statement of our monk, that anger is directed against the one who actually or allegedly harmed us. Anger is born as a reaction to real, objective harm or subjective hurt. According to the monk of Pontus, as a response to such real or alleged harm, there is often born in man automatically, unconsciously, beyond the control of reason and will, the desire for revenge: Sadness is a dejection of the soul and is constituted from thoughts of anger, for irascibility is a longing for revenge, and the frustration of revenge produces sadness.272 Sorrow in this passage is defined by the “dejection of the soul” (κατήφεια ψυχῆς), which comes from anger. The essence of anger is the desire to take revenge on a person who has actually or allegedly hurt us. Most often it is about the desire to repay the wrongdoer the same, according to the Old Testament principle “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”, and when it is impossible, some other equivalent harm. The mere use of the term θυμός instead of the typical ὀργή is not very important here, since Evagrius used them interchangeably to describe anger. According to the Pontian monk, anger can be the cause of sadness in two ways: in a situation where, for various reasons, revenge cannot be put into practice, or when revenge has been taken, it later gives birth to sadness as a consequence of guilt. The first situation is when there is no opportunity to take revenge and sadness is born in the human soul from feelings of hurt and helplessness. The sense of real or alleged harm so humiliates the human ego that it almost automatically generates in him the desire for revenge and punishing the wrongdoer in the same way.273 Evil sometimes is obvious and then anger towards the wrongdoer, especially when the evil is really great, is understandable. Evagrius, however, distinguishes the category of the so-called wrongdoing we deal with when someone feels aggrieved only because he has not received what he expected from others. Such harm will not be objective, but rather a subjective and supposed sense of harm. The very sense of harm will be real in the sense that a person truly feels hurt and does not just pretends, but it is a subjective state of man, not an objective harm. In short, the subjective sense of hurt will be real, but not necessarily the harm itself. The magnitude of this alleged or apparent
271 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 11; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 516–18; Sinkewicz (2003), 99. 272 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 11; PG 79,1155B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 81. 273 Cf. Misiarczyk (2002), 91–93.
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harm will depend on the passionate expectations and desires of a particular person who has not been satisfied at that moment. Often, however, these expectations are so excessive that it is impossible to fulfil them. For if someone with low self-esteem is always looking for human admiration, then he will be disappointed whenever others do not show interest in his arguments or ideas and a subjective sense of such alleged harm will appear in him. However, it does not change the fact that even in such a situation his ego will boil over from anger at the alleged wrongdoers and seek vengeance. Failure to take revenge may have different reasons, but it always gives rise to sadness in the soul of a man. Some deviate from vengeful actions for moral reasons, recognizing the desire for revenge as a sin; others for purely humanistic motives because a well-educated person should not be vengeful; others out of fear or opportunism, out of a desire not to precipitate even greater suffering or consequences if revenge were to be directed towards someone on whom they depend professionally or socially. The inability to take revenge leads us to close ourselves in, “chewing” on hurt internally, generating sadness from such a sense of helplessness. Sometimes it also happens that there is no specific person who is the wrongdoer, and then the anger with the desire for revenge is vaguer because it is not aimed at a specific person but at some institution, organization, or even country for not meeting human expectations. The lack of a specific object of anger leads even faster to non-fulfillment of revenge and turns into sadness. Thus, Evagrius emphasizes that sadness comes from “a complaint of exasperation, a reminder of insult, and a darkening of the soul, dejections in morals, drunkenness of prudence, a soporific remedy, a cloud of form, a worm in flesh, sadness of thoughts, a people in captivity”.274 In addition to the failure to take revenge, Evagrius also mentions vengeance as the second source of sorrow. Again, in order to properly understand the universal mechanism of giving birth to sadness from the feeling of guilt that arises after completing the revenge, one must remember about the anchoritic context of his life. External conditions can always change, but the mechanism of action of human nature in certain mental states will be similar. In the context of monastic life, Evagrius described the subtle form of revenge carried out on the confrere by expelling him from the cell and angering him: Be attentive lest you ever provoke the departure of one of the brothers because you drove him to anger; as a result, you will not be able to escape in your lifetime the demon of sadness, which will always be an obstacle to you during the time of prayer.275 The monk from Pontus nowhere explains what caused the monk’s disturbance at the brother visiting him, perhaps some real or actual damage that was revealed only
274 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3; PG 79,1141D–1144A; Sinkewicz (2003), 63. 275 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 25; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 558; Sinkewicz (2003), 102. This fragment has been discovered in Vat. Gr. 2091 and published by R. Dragueta (1957), 267–306 as the fragment of Historia Lausiaca 7 regarding Pachomius. According to the Guillaumonts (1971) 559, note 25 this version is not the authentic Evagrian.
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now or the current sense of alleged harm caused, for example, by disturbing him in some activities. The fact is that the angry monk expelled him from his cell, arousing in him anger for such treatment. We are dealing here with a situation where our own anger born of a sense of alleged wrong and expressed revenge also stimulates others to anger. According to the Pontian monk, he who flared up with anger against his brother and took revenge on him by driving him away, will fall into a trap of sorrow and will never free himself from it in his life. Sorrow can control the monk’s soul as a corollary of his own anger, but also as guilt for unjustly provoking the wrath of others. The latter case, according to Evagrius, seems to be more difficult because it is up to us to free ourselves from our anger, and we have no power over others. Hence the real danger that the sadness caused by such a situation will remain with the monk until the end of his life and will constantly disturb him in spiritual prayer. It is difficult for him to be freed even when he requests forgiveness from the angry brother. Since in this case the source of sadness is frustration of the desire for revenge or its fullfilment, so that it provokes the anger of others, wanting to effectively fight with sadness it is necessary to purify the soul from the desire for revenge beforehand. Evagrius advises that anger and the desire to take revenge should be directed not against people, but against demons: Hatred against the demons contributes greatly to our salvation and is advantageous in the practice of virtue. But we do not have the strength to nourish this within ourselves like a sort of good offspring because the pleasure-loving spirits destroy it by inviting the soul to return to its habitual friendship.276 This hatred of demons, although salutary in itself, hardly becomes a stable attitude, for pleasure distracts man from hatred and pushes him to friendship with them. This does not mean, however, that it is completely impossible, but only that it must be acquired somehow. In the case of anger and the desire for revenge, the best natural way to get rid of it will be to direct anger against the demon. So, if we want to bring a demon to anger, it should be accused immediately as it starts attacking, revealing the first place it came to, then the second and third. Then he usually leaves because he cannot remain having been accused.277 Blockage of the anger, in modern language we would say its repression to the subconscious, or the impossibility of realizing the desire for revenge leads to sadness. Along with the expression of anger towards the attacking demon, Evagrius invites the anchorite to practice the opposite virtue, that is, patience and forbearance towards others. 2.2.
Anger – λογισμὸς of Demons
Although Evagrius, using the terms “passionate thought” and “demon” interchangeably, clearly emphasizes the demonic character of all the eight major passionate thoughts,
276 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 10; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 184–86; Sinkewicz (2003), 160. 277 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 9; Sinkewicz (2003), 159.
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there is no doubt that anger is in some sense the most demonic passion, contrary to the spiritual and monastic life. It is a passion that most closely resembles a human being to the demon: “For no evil makes the intellect into a ‘demon’ as much as anger through the troubling of wrath”.278 Vanity and pride, as rightly emphasized by Bunge, are the vices of spiritually mature people who attribute to themselves spiritual progress and appear at the end of this growth to destroy all the ascetic efforts of the monks.279 Evagrius states, however, that pride, in addition to spiritual madness, rage and watching the crowd of demons in the air is often accompanied by anger and sadness.280 One can rightly suppose that anger (ὀργή) in some way involves all stages of man’s spiritual life, from gluttony to pride. If we remember that for Evagrius a specific feature prevails in every rational being, angels, people and demons, anger is the dominant feature of demons: “A demon is a rational nature which, because of an excess of thymos, has fallen from the service of God”.281 Whosoever prevailed over irascibility and anger reigned over demons (De mal. 13). In the above texts, it is true that the technical term ὀργή does not appear but a more general θυμός, but based on other fragments of Evagrius’ writings we can assume that it is just anger, because our author uses these terms interchangeably: In those in whom anger (θυμός) is dominant, wrathfulness is also dominant. But if our enemies are wrathful, our enemies are therefore angry. For theis anger “according to the likeness of the snake” (Ps 57:5).282 Irascibility did not belong to the nature of demons from the beginning because God created them as spiritual beings, by nature good and full of love. They became so after the decision of their own free will, which turned them into beings full of anger. According to Evagrius, who agrees with Origen on this point, demons are beings created by God as ontically good, but succumb to evil through the decision of their free will. As in the case of a demon it is not nature but bad behavior that made him evil, so in the case of a man who succumbs to anger and becomes similar to a demon in life or after death: “And do not consider a demon to be anything other than a human being aroused by anger and deprived of perception!”.283 This happens when anger and hatred do not work according to their nature, i.e., they are not fighting for virtue but against people.284 The anger of the soul according to its nature is such anger, which rejects the passionate thoughts created in the mind as a result of any
278 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 56,4; Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 279 Cf. Bunge (1999a), 26; Grébaut (1913), 213–25. 280 Cf. Practicus 14; Sinkewicz (2003), 100. 281 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,34; A. Guillaumont (1958), 111; Ramelli (2015), 160; See also Scholia in Proverbia 5,9. 282 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 17,49; Pittra (1883–1884), 472. In such a way understands them Bunge (1999a) 26. 283 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 56,4; Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 284 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 6,22; Géhin (1987), 178.
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reflection.285 Anger, like all other passionate thoughts, is an action against the nature of a certain facultas which is good in itself. According to Evagrius, every created nature is susceptible to changes, hence man by his conduct (not by nature) becomes an angel or a demon.286 Anger is particularly harmful to monastic life and practically undermines the meaning of anchoritism: If someone is a slave of this passion (= irascibility), he is a complete foreigner to the monastic life and a stranger to the ways of our Savior, since the Lord himself is said to teach the gentle his ways (Ps 24:9LXX).287 The spiritual life of a monk living in anger dies away and he is not capable of true prayer. He only provokes God’s anger against himself and he enters on the path that will lead him to madness sooner or later (De or. 65). Anger is a passionate madness that quickly destroys the state of spiritual knowledge, makes the soul a wild animal and makes it retreat before all encounters with people. The violent monk is rattling his mind with unreasonable thoughts of vindictiveness, and behaving like an angry animal he can barely see anyone without gritting the teeth.288 And because each of the eight passionate thoughts is the basis for many other vices or sins, all other vices are born of anger, such as jealousy, criticism (De mal. 18), distrust (De mal. 32), hatred, persistence, slander, insult, etc. (Gn. 32). Evagrius, therefore, encourages anchorites to be vigilant: Our irascibility cooperates very much with the goal of the demons when it is moved contrary to nature, and it renders itself most useful to their every wicked design. Therefore, by night and by day not one of them refuses to trouble it; but when they see it bound to gentleness they immediately find just pretexts for setting it loose so that when it has become more impulsive it may serve their bestial thoughts. Thus, it is necessary not to provoke it over either just or unjust things, nor to give an evil sword to the authors suggestions. I know many people who often do so, and more than is necessary, when they get inflamed with anger over trivial pretexts.289 Often a demon of anger abandons the anchorite for an instant, leaving the soul free to act. And when there is no occasion for frustration in important matters that could awaken irascibility, he uses for this purpose any trivial pretext. The monk from Pontus encourages that one not stimulate the soul unnecessarily with anger, either in a right or wrong case, and he is surprised at the same time at how many people are inflamed very often without a serious reason.290
285 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 48. 286 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 20,1; Géhin (1987), 300. 287 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 13; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 196; Sinkewicz (2003), 162. 288 Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 9; Sinkewicz (2003), 162. 289 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 5; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 166; Sinkewicz (2003), 156. 290 Cf. Antirrheticus V,19; Brakke (2009) 123; Louth (2010).
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Bunge sees in the Evagrian teaching two causes of anger: primary and secondary;291 but I think that we would have to talk about four causes. The first cause is the frustration of the desires of the concupiscible part of the soul, that is gluttony, impurity, and greed. The second, which Bunge calls the first, is the experience of some people of some injustice, real or alleged (Pr. 11), undeserved insinuation or slander (Ant. V,4.11), unjust accusation (Ant. V,23) or even persecution (Ant. V,34) and beatings (Ant. V,36). The third cause of anger, secondary in Bunge’s terminology, is pride or the desire for omnipotence, a sense of superiority combined with the reluctance to adapt to others. Finally, the fourth cause is the natural thoughts of every human being, good and necessary, but used by demons to arouse anxiety in the soul. It is about general natural thoughts or concerns for our relatives, parents, brothers and sisters or in the case of people living in marriage, for husband, wife, or children. Evagrius wrote: It is certainly possible for thoughts which accord with nature to awaken anger and lust insofar as scattering the intellect through their many concerns, if he does not take care to employ corresponding remedies, namely hunger, thirst, keeping vigil and withdrawal from the world and prayer.292 Ordinary daily activities and thoughts, or even small things or events that are inconsistent with the original intentions, can very quickly arouse anger in someone who is permanently impulsive or is currently moved by something. In the second situation, the demons use natural thoughts related to caring for relatives to arouse anxiety through images of alleged harm that our loved ones experience: But the demon of anger imitates this demon (= fornication), and he too invents some parents or friends or relations being mistreated by worthless fellows, and he sets in motion the anchorite’s irascible part so that he says or does some wicked thing to those who appear in his intellect […]. Irascible people succumb in these temptations, and especially if they are easily inflamed with anger.293 Evagrius urges the anchorite to watch over his thoughts, and if he notices that demons, without reason, awaken images in which someone is seemingly threatening his relatives, it is necessary to calmly but firmly tear the mind away from such images, otherwise the state of pure prayer will be lost. Since we know the causes of anger presented by Evagrius, it is worth pausing now on its definition. Because anger is born in the irascible part of the soul and works in harmony with nature when it fights for virtue (Pr. 86), it means that anger by its very nature is somehow related to the struggle. Hence, the virtues that are born in the irascible part of the soul are characterized by courage and perseverance (Pr. 89), and love is manifested through meekness and patience (Gn. 47). Love of neighbor
291 G. Bunge (1999a), 47. 292 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 55,3; Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 293 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 16; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 208 Sinkewicz (2003), 164.
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plays an especially key role in the fight against anger, because its practice is imitation in the highest degree of God himself who loves a sinful man and hates sin. Demons, on the other hand, do everything to reverse this order: they incite anger against the sinner and love of the sin. Evagrius clearly states: There is absolutely no such thing as just anger against your neighbour. If you search you will find (cf. Matt. 7:7) that it is possible even without anger for the matter to be settled properly. Therefore, make use of every means to avoid an outburst of anger.294 Demons, by such a reversal of order, also change the action of anger against its nature. For it is the nature of anger to fight against demons and with the thoughts that are suggested by them.295 Evagrius probably took over his teaching about the action of anger in harmony with nature, or against it, from the Desert Fathers, and more specifically from Macarius of Egypt, because we find a trace of such inspiration in his writings. Well, when Evagrius once asked Macarius why mentioning the harms suffered from people destroys the faculties of our memory, and remembrance of the harms suffered from demons do not, he received the answer that the first situation is contrary to the nature of irascibility, the second is compatible with it.296 According to Macarius, and Evagrius will repeat it, anger towards the neighbor because of the harm one suffers is contrary to nature, while anger towards demons or sins remains consistent with it. Therefore, directing anger or aggression against demons and sins brings no harm to the soul. However, the fight against demons is just one aspect of the action of anger in accordance with its nature; the second is the fight for virtue. Evagrius in the previously quoted fragment of the Practicus 24 states that the nature of anger is not only the fight against demons, but also “to struggle over any sort of pleasure”. That is why angels encourage engaging irascibility and anger in a positive fight for spiritual pleasure, the fruit of which will be blessing and happiness. Conversely, demons pull man towards worldly pleasures and fighting with people. As a result, the mind becomes dark and devoid of spiritual discernment. Angels rejoice when evil is lessened because they are servants of love and mercy, while demons, on the contrary, strive to diminish virtue in man because they are subjects of anger and hatred. The first, approaching, fill spiritual knowledge with joy, while the second fill it with shameful imaginations.297 As we can see, Evagrius does not limit his teaching about anger to only the negative aspect, that is, fighting people and seeking worldly pleasures, but clearly emphasizes the necessity of including it in a positive fight for virtue in accordance with its nature, i.e., spiritual pleasure and the fight against demons. In this context, it becomes clearer to say that the most effective medicine for anger is, on the one hand, love of neighbor and seeking spiritual enjoyment, and on the other hand, anger directed towards demons and rejection of worldly lust. We find a good summary definition of anger in the treaty De vitiis:
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Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 24; PG 79,1171C; Sinkewicz (2003), 195. Cf. Practicus 24; Sinkewicz (2003), 102; De malignis cogitationibus 16; Sinkewicz (2003), 163–64. Cf. Practicus 93; Sinkewicz (2003), 36; Ad Eulogium 9; Sinkewicz (2003), 36. Cf. Practicus 76; Sinkewicz (2003), 110.
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Anger is a plundering of prudence, a destruction of one’s state, a confusion of nature, a form turned savage, a furnace for the heart, an eruption of flames, a law of irascibility, a wrath of insults, a mother of wild beasts, a silent battle, an impediment to prayer.298 Evagrius’ teachings on anger, as in the case of the other passionate thoughts, are found in various texts and contexts.299 In the current analysis of the fragments in which this issue occurs, we will focus on the following topics: “anger as a frustration of concupiscence”, “anger as the desire of revenge for real or alleged evil”, “anger as obstacle in achieving a state of pure prayer”, “anger blinds νοῦς and deprives it of spiritual knowledge” and “anger as the cause of nightmares”. As in the previous cases, current analyses will generally be based on the interpretation of source texts. 2.2.1.
Anger as the Frustration of Concupiscences
The first cause of anger in the soul of an anchorite is perseveringly resisting the passionate thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul, that is, gluttony, impurity, and greed. It attacks the anchorite, who is already more advanced on the path of spiritual development and has rejected those first three thoughts. The frustration of “natural” needs, sexual relations, the search for material protection in life, and the restriction of eating food in small amounts of dry bread and water, introduces him to a state of general irritability. This is because a part of his personality, in biblical language of the “old man”, still wants them and does not want to give them up. This state of irritability can quickly turn into anger directed at other people. It touches most often, as we would say in modern language, extroverts, that is people with a tendency to blame others for their own frustrations. In the anchorite who fought the demons of concupiscibility, frustrating the three needs of man mentioned above, there can also be born anger against himself for the fact that he chose such a radical form of life from which he cannot resign without being ridiculed, or there can appear anger towards others who inspired him. A man dominated by anger, however, changes its natural direction and instead of being angry with demons and seeking spiritual pleasures, he is angry with people and is chasing material lusts. Anger perverts the real state of things and confuses the soul.300 Evagrius quotes the dictum of one of the desert elders on this subject: For this reason I do away with pleasures, namely, to cut off the pretexts available to the irascible part. For I know that this always contends for pleasures, troubles my mind, and chases away knowledge.301
298 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 5; PG 79,1144; Sinkewicz (2003), 64. 299 Cf. Epistula 4,2; 6,4; 8,1; 15,1; 27,3; 32,2; 38,1; 39,4; 52,6; 55,3, 56,4–5; 60,3; Practicus 11; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24; 26; 35; 38; 42; 76; 100; Gnosticus 4; 5; 31; 47; De oratione 15; 21; 24; 26; 27; 48; 65; 145; Capita tria de oratione 3; Sententiae ad monachos 10; 12; 124; 30; 31; 35; 36; 52; 98; Ad virginem 8; 19; De malignis cogitationibus 1; 2; 3; 4; 8; 9; 14; 22; De octo spiritibus malitiae 9–10; De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3; Tractatus ad Eulogium 4–5; 6; 7; 9–10; 32; Antirrheticus V; Scholia in Proverbia 60,3; 78,6; 134,5–6; 206,3. 300 Cf. Epistula 38,1; 38,4. 301 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 99; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 708–10; Sinkewicz (2003), 113.
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Our author describes here the situation when the monk is overcome with anger because he still desires material pleasures, which could indicate that he has not yet fully liberated himself from the passion of the concupiscible part of the soul. He wrote: “What could cause fury in someone who has despised food, wealth, and vainglory?” Therefore, in the treatise Antirrheticus he proposes the text Qo 11:10 as an aid to the “soul that does not want to let go of pretexts for anger but desires food, clothing, riches, and the glory that passes away; anger that is stirred up on account of these things does not depart from the heart, but rather plunges the intellect into the paths of perdition”.302 However, the appearance of anger is not always a sign of being enslaved by lust. Often even for an anchorite freed from lust, an anger naturally fighting for pleasure, pushes back to the lust of the flesh if it is not direct it to spiritual pleasures. Freeing oneself from lust does not mean that it will never come back, but only that even when it returns, it will not do any harm to the monk. Evagrius, therefore, encourages vigilance so that anger will not again bring the ascetic into the desire of flesh, because there is interdependence between them: Armed against anger, you will never give in to desire, for desire provides material for anger, and the latter in turn troubles the intellectual eye, spoiling the state of prayer.303 Thus, on the one hand, to free oneself from anger it is necessary to free oneself from lust, while on the other hand one must also directly control the anger itself so as not to succumb to the lusts again. Just as there is a mutual dependence between the vices of the concupiscible and irascible part of the soul, so also this relationship exists between virtues. If, therefore, gentleness and meekness, the opposites of anger are not attained, one does not acquire self-control, purity, poverty and humility; and it is equally impossible to be self-controlled when gentleness is lacking. Evagrius discourages the anchoritic life for someone who has not sufficiently achieved gentleness: Do not be moderate if you lack gentleness. Anyone who refrains from food and drink causes unrestrained reason. It is similar to a ship sailing on the sea, which is controlled by a bad spirit.304 The monk from Pontus deprives any candidate and participant of monastic life of any illusions. Anchoritism aims to free oneself from the passionate desires that begin with fasting and abstinence in eating and drinking. Such renunciation, by its nature, arouses the turmoil of irascibility which is not subject to any control of reason. If a monk’s anger is already awakened and he lacks the virtue of gentleness, then in the desert where many sacrifices are required, it will be strengthened. Hence the advice of the Pontian monk not to be in continence without a minimum of gentleness. And it is not about achieving this virtue in a perfect way, but it is about the level that makes it possible to undertake an ascetic life.
302 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus V,30; Frankenberg (1912), 516–17; Brakke (2009), 125. 303 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 27; PG 79,1171D; Sinkewicz (2003), 195. 304 Evagrius Ponticus, Spiritales sententiae per alphabeticum dispositae 5 (74); Elter (1892) and PG 40,1267.
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Evagrius, however, goes further in his proposal, encouraging an anchorite to purify his own soul of anger, even when it does not lead to lust again. For continence alone is not enough to reach the state of spiritual prayer and gnosis: Let no one pray or cry, being in a state of abstinence. It is impossible to build a house with one stone or build a building with one brick […]. An angry man will not see the rising morning star (i.e. Christ), but will go where he will not come back – to the dark land.305 The mere abstinence of the monk, that is, the liberation of both the primary and secondary lusts, born under the influence of anger, is not enough to achieve a state of impassibility, and consequently neither pure prayer and spiritual knowledge, if it is controlled by anger. According to Evagrius, the purpose of the anchoritic life is not to be free from one passionate thought just to get attached to the next one. He observes his friend in one of the Letters: Mistrust those who love only fasting, who although unblinded by tempting thoughts of gluttony are oppressed by thoughts of avarice, envy, anger, vainglory, and pride. Therefore I beg you, do not lack discernment, nor imagine that only those who fast can receive the knowledge of God: for no ship is built with a single plank; nor is a building erected with a single stone. For the goal of the monk is not to free his nous from some thoughts while binding it to others, but rather to free his nous wholly from unclean thoughts and to “cast it down before Christ” (2 Cor. 11:2).306 It is possible that the Pontian theologian refers here to the real situation when some monks limit asceticism only to practicing fasts, even harsh ones, in the conviction that this is enough to achieve impassibility and spiritual knowledge. Evagrius rightly condemns such thinking as unreasonable, referring to the basic principle of spiritual life which is the harmonious growth of all virtues. If a person fast attains the virtue of abstinence even to a perfect degree, and at the same time succumbs to greed, anger, vengeance, vanity, or pride, he falls victim to spiritual illusion. For self-restraint alone is nothing, if gentleness is lacking. Evagrius compares a man who, in truth, abstains from food or drink but incites his fury, to a ship thrown into the open sea whose helmsman is a demon.307 Sooner or later, it will break up on the rocks or capsize. Just as it is impossible to build a ship from one beam or a house from one brick, so the spiritual life will not be built on one virtue. The purpose of the life of a monk is to achieve freedom of the mind in order to cling to Christ. So, it is important to give up the desires of the concupiscible part of the soul and at the same time not to fall into sadness or anger. Anger uses the inconvenient and distressing things that come to a man, creating a kind of bridgehead from which it later attacks his soul with anger or lust again.308
305 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 27,3. 306 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 52,6; Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_ start.htm (access 04.06.2018). 307 Cf. Epistula 56,5. See also the same fragment in De mal. 14. 308 Cf. Ad Eulogium 5; Sinkewicz (2003), 32–33.
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2.2.2.
Anger as the Will of Revenge for Real or Supposed Injuries
Another cause of anger in the monk’s soul is meeting people, experiencing some sort of injustice, real or alleged harm, such as undeserved insinuation or slander, unjust accusation or, finally, various kinds of persecution. Words or attitudes of other people can arouse anger in two ways: through objective and conscious harm, humiliation, or injury done or on the basis of subjective human feelings. In the second case we are dealing with the situation of alleged harm, when someone did not intend to hurt us consciously, but because of our complexes, old psychological wounds, or speaking in Evagrian terms, passions, we perceive such words or attitudes of others as harmful. In reality, however, other people are not hurting us but our own excessive and exaggerated expectations towards them. This can be clearly seen in the example of a man with the neurotic need for unconditional acceptance of himself and his actions on the part of others. Such a person, being refused unconditional acceptance of his words, deeds, or attitudes, will take it as a rejection of him as a personal and quickly get angry. This is precisely the psychic-spiritual state of the anchorite, but in part also of every human being, which concerns Evagrius’ statement that anger is the passion of the soul and arises from encountering people. However, meetings with people do not create anything new in the monk but only awaken what was already in his soul, namely complexes, psycho-spiritual wounds, and unrealistic expectations. It is enough, then, for the mere presence of others, their unpleasant word or attitude, to easily arouse anger in his soul. It is “passion that leads to madness and easily drives those who possess it out of their senses; it makes the soul wild and moves it to shun all (human) encounter”.309 So if meetings with other people incite a man to anger, causing this “boiling of the soul”, then he easily isolates himself and feels offended by others. Real or alleged wrongs humiliate a very human ego, giving rise to anger in the human soul and pushing it to revenge, that is, to pay back evil for the received evil (Ant. V,42.53.61). Evagrius describes this state in Scholia in Psalmos: “Cease from wrath and abandon evil”. “Wrath” is longing for revenge, and revenge is repayment for evil.310 There are many indications that our monk took over this element of his teaching from Clement of Alexandria, because in Stromata we find a very similar idea.311 If revenge is at least partially possible, it is directed to the perpetrator, if not then to someone else, often completely innocent person. An angry man returns to the Old Testament logic “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” and especially in the case of a subjective sense of wrong provokes a similar response from the other person who is completely unaware that his attitude has provoked such anger. A spiral of mutual accusations unfolds and each side looks for a way to take revenge. According to Evagrius, revenge is expressed, among others, in lies, false testimonies (Ant. V,3), insults (Ant. V,5),
309 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 9; PG 79,1153; Sinkewicz (2003), 80. 310 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 36,8; PG 12,1317. 311 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V,27,10.
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suspicions (Ant. V,10), writing abusive things (Ant. V,32), rejection of the proposal of reconciliation (Ant. V,28). Therefore, he advises such monks to maintain peace even in a situation of real harm: And you, when you are offended, do not give offence in return; rather, appease the person who takes vengeance on you. And if you act in this way, you block the irascibility of the beast; bear the offence, as your means of progress, and with your lips shut in the beast of irascibility. Give no reply at all to those who make threats, that by your silence you may stifle the fiery lips […]. For if you remain silent, you will not be eaten up by offence, but the other person is all the more bitten by your silence when you bear patiently with the insults of the arrogant man.312 Thus, Evagrius encourages us, even in the situation of insults, to remain calm and not to listen to the words of those who are putting us on the defense. The pity of others arouses anger even more, while the peaceful abolition of insults contributes to the growth of those who measure themselves with the smallest measure. Silence against various insults allows one to avoid the spiral of mutual accusations with the wrongdoer. If, however, we cannot remain calm and anger is aroused independently of our will, Evagrius encourages us not to allow it to remain in the soul for a long time, but to destroy it by staying among people and by the love of our neighbor who reveals himself with meekness, patience, gentleness, generosity, and mercy.313 Anger and hatred increase man’s irascibility, while gentleness and mercy reduce even that which is there already.314 Prayer with Psalms315 and the antirrhetic method, that is, directing against the demon of anger the right fragment of the Word of God, is a great help.316 However, when the persuing of revenge for various reasons is impossible or the person is introverted and experiences anger as a consequence of this unfulfilled desire for revenge or directs anger inward, then even greater frustration and sadness caused by helplessness arises (Pr. 10). It so happens that the monk responds to the experienced or alleged harm first with sadness or anger he feels in himself, and then indirectly with anger directed at others. Evagrius describes the dynamics of such anger in many of his works and we will begin to analyze the subject from the following excerpt from the Practicus treatise: Anger is a passion that arises very quickly. Indeed, it is referred to as a boiling over of the irascible part and a movement directed against one who has done injury or is thought to have done so. It renders the soul furious all day long, but especially during prayers it seizes the mind and represents to it the face of the one who has hurt it.317
312 313 314 315 316 317
Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 312. 32. Cf. Epistula 6,4; 32,2. Cf. Practicus 20; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. Cf. Dysinger (2005), 47–78. Cf. Antirrheticus V; Brakke (2009), 119-135. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 11; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 516–18; Sinkewicz (2003), 99.
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Let’s try to briefly analyze the important elements of this text.318 The Pontian monk describes anger as violent passion and proposes as a remedy “against the thought of rapidly emerging” anger which is “disturbing the mind for a trivial cause” the biblical texts from Prov. 12:27 and Eccles. 7:10.319 In his definition of such anger Evagrius, based on Aristotle, who defines anger as “a certain movement”, cites from his work De anima the definition of anger proposed by dialectics, for which anger is “the desire to hurt someone” and by physicians for which anger is “boiling (ζέσις) the blood that surrounds the heart”.320 We find a similar term in Gregory Nazianzen who as we know, is the master of Evagrius, but it seems unlikely that he was the one who inspired the Pontian monk directly, for the technical terms he used are closer to Aristotle than to Gregory. The monk of Pontus’ definition of anger as θυμοῦ ζέσις καὶ κίνησις is inspired by the Stagirite’s thought in a creative way, without mechanically copying the great philosopher, because he reverses the order of terms used by him: θυμοῦ κίνησις … ζέσις. Aristotle’s thought about the nature of anger was also taken up by the Stoics, because Seneca ascribes to them the definition of anger as θυμοῦ ζέσις.321 Further, referring to the Aristotelian definition of anger as a desire to harm someone, he makes it clear that anger is directed not only against those who have hurt us, but also against those who intend to do so.322 Seneca’s opinion is confirmed by texts, for example, of Chrysipus, in which we find exactly the same phrase as that used by Evagrius. So far as the expression of anger as “boiling and stirring” (θυμοῦ ζέσις καὶ κίνησις) comes clearly from the Aristotelian inspiration, the addition that it is directed against who did the alleged harm would be based on the Stoic doctrine. Personally, however, I doubt, that Evagrius would make such subtle distinctions and rather suppose that he cites here the definition of anger commonly functioning in his time based, of course, on the teaching of Aristotle and the Stoics. Further, the anger that overwhelms a man causes his soul to boil all day long, leading him to go mad, and depriving him of any domination of reason or will. Although it is born and works in the soul, anger also masters the mind to such an extent that it is unable to pray, because it still has the face of the wrongdoer in front of the eyes. Evagrius presents anger here as a consequence of sadness “showing the face of a person who has done me harmor dishonoured me” (Pr. 11).323 This understanding of the passage shows us better the cause-and-effect relationship between sadness and anger, and is also confirmed by other texts of Evagrius in which such a relationship is clearly stated (Pr. 22–23). Let’s look at another passage from the Practicus:
318 See C. and A. Guillaumont, C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 517–21, note 11; Cf. also my short analysis of this text – Misiarczyk (2002), 93–95. 319 Cf. Antirrheticus V,19; V,29; Brakke (2009), 123.24. 320 Aristotle, De anima I,1,403 a 26 and I,1,403 a 29 – b 1. 321 Seneca, De ira II,19; Haase (1853), t. I,45: “Volunt itaque quidam ex nostris iram in pectore moveri effervescente circa cor sanguine”. 322 Seneca, De ira I,3; Haase (1853), t. I,5: “Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest: ait enim esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi […] iis qui laesuri sunt”. 323 See the same idea in De malignis cogitationibus 2; Sinkewicz (2003), 154.
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When, having seized on a pretext, the irascible part of our soul is troubled, then at the same moment the demons suggest to us that anachoresis is a fine thing, lest we resolve the causes of our sadness and free ourselves from the disturbance.324 Although our author wrote generally about irascibility, in the latter part of the text he clearly suggests that it is more about anger and sadness. So, when the irascible part of the soul experiences a state of deep agitation because of some pretext which, as we saw in the previous passage, is meeting someone who has really or allegedly caused injustice, the trap for such a disturbed man becomes a move away from the world. This withdrawal from the world (ἀναχώρησις) can be understood in two ways: as the choice of anchoritic lifestyle and departure from the world to the desert or the withdrawal or the closing in on oneself hic et nunc after experiencing a sense of injustice. Both withdrawals of man from the world in this condition are dangerous. The choice of the anchoritic life cannot be motivated by an escape from the evil world or people who have hurt us, such as a single experience of real or alleged evils, because this is the best way, as Evagrius wrote, to never “free ourselves from this boilng”. According to the Pontian monk, the anchoritic life in anger leads sooner or later to madness: Let no anchorite take up the anchoritic life with anger or pride or sadness, nor flee his brothers while troubled by such thoughts. For attacks of folly arise from such passions, when the heart moves from one mental representation to another and from this to another and from that to still another, falling little by little into a pit of forgetfulness. We have known of many among the brothers who fell afoul of this shipwreck […]. When someone takes up the anchoritic life in such a state, he first sees the air of his cell all afire and lightning flashes at night shining round the walls, then there are voices of people pursuing and being pursued and chariots with horses figured in the air […] and from overwhelming cowardice he then falls victim to folly, becomes exalted, and out of fear he forgets his human state.325 In this rather dramatic text, Evagrius warns against the desire to practice anachoresis by someone possessed by passions, because its effects can be very negative. Aanchoresis becomes sweet after freeing oneself from the passions (Pr. 35), especially from anger. Otherwise, the monk can become mad or experience terrifying night visions. Similar results are evoked in the human soul’s attitude, which we could call a kind of “internal anachoresis”, in other words, closing oneself off in the state of the soul’s boiling. Freeing oneself from agitation with anger becomes possible when its actual cause or sadness is removed. The latter is born as a primary reaction to an experienced or alleged harm. Perhaps here is the actual harm to an innocent man, and then the experience of first sorrow and then anger is understandable. Evagrius encourages the monks to also free themselves from states of anger caused by the real injury, not 324 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 22; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 516–18; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. 325 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 23; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 232–34; Sinkewicz (2003), 169.
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allowing anger to be locked in and not becoming isolated from people. As it is easy to guess, such a danger was especially great in the case of anchorites living alone in the desert, because the possibilities of meeting with others that healed the soul of anger were limited. The temptation to escape into loneliness after experiencing real harm also often affected the cenobites: Whenever a violent dispute embitters the brothers in a community, then the thoughts suggest considering the solitary blessed in order to exhaust their patience and separate them from charity. He who overturns anger with patience and sadness with charity overturns by two forms of valour two evil beasts that fight with ferocity.326 The chilling of a monk in such a situation of loneliness as unique remedy for received injuries cuts him off from relationships with people and the possibility of practicing magnanimity and love, the first healing anger, the second – sadness. More often, however, as Evagrius explains, sadness is born of unfulfilled desires (Pr. 10). A man will be freed from such sadness, who knows his desires exactly and distances himself from them, especially those desires that cannot be realized. In many of his texts, Evagrius returns to the subject of sadness as the cause of anger: Sadness gets stirred up as an intermediary between angry persons. Therefore, if the first to regain sobriety recovers from the passion, he also gives his hand to the other in an apology, driving away the bitter sadness. Sadness is a disease of the soul and the flesh; it takes the former in captivity and it withers the latter on in spot. Sadness is begotten of opposing forces; from sadness comes wrath, and from these is born madness and insults.327 The monk’s correct response to anger born of sorrow is to forgive, because only forgivness really repels the sense of harm and bitterness of sadness. Everyone experiences adversities in his life and it is from them that anger is usually born. Therefore, the first step in dealing with anger is learning about our own desires and giving up those that are impossible to achieve; the second step, is found in practicing peace in the face of different adversities; and the third step is realized when we have experienced a sense of real or alleged harm, arriving at the offering of forgiveness and ultimately psalmody, patience, and mercy (Pr. 15). Then neither the outer anachoresis, that is, the departure into the desert, nor any experience of harm from people cut off the healing action of love of neighbor: “Anachoresis in charity purifies the heart; anachoresis accompanied by hatred troubles it”.328 The recognition of sadness as the cause of anger was probably one of the reasons for placing sorrow in the catalog of eight passionate thoughts (Pr. 6) as the fourth passion, followed by anger as the fifth. Such opinion of Evagrius is also confirmed by other of his texts:
326 Evagrius Ponticus, Ad Eulogium 5; Sinkewicz (2003), 313.33. 327 Evagrius Ponticus, Ad Eulogium 7; Sinkewicz (2003), 314.34. 328 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 8; Greßmann (1913), 153; Sinkewicz (2003), 123.
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Among the thoughts that follow the first, some lead and some follow: those of sadness lead and those of anger follow, according to the Proverb “A hurtful word rouses anger” (Prov. 15:1).329 The sense of the text is clear: “Thoughts of sorrow come first, then thoughts of anger, according to the proverb, the grieving word causes anger”.330 Other texts of our monk confirm his belief that anger shows in the mirror, literally “reflects”, the face of the wrongdoer: For example, if the face of a person who has done me harm or dishonoured me should arise in my mind, this will be proof of the approach of the thought of resentment.331 Although the term μνησικακία used by Evagrius is not a typical term for anger, there is no doubt that we remain in the same subject in that it involves imagining the face of someone who has hurt or insulted us. By recalling the face of a real wrongdoer, fury uses the memory of a man to arouse anger against him, but this is only possible on the basis of imagination. Then the passionate thought suggests in the imagination the image of a brother who in hate says something evil against us or listens to hateful things about us to arouse our anger towards him.332 If anger stimulated by sadness and a feeling of helplessness lasts long enough, it becomes a resentment, a state of constant stimulation of anger. In turn, the resentment, often hidden by man or even unaware of it (Ant. V,1), is manifested in nocturnal terror, body weakness, pallor and imaginary attacks of poisonous animals. We will deal with the night signs of anger and resentment in a later part of our analysis; here it is worth recalling the optimistic statement of Evagrius: It is not possible to love all the brothers equally, but it is possible to conduct our relationship with all without passion and free from resentment and hatred.333 The monk from Pontus speaks realistically, stressing that even if we are not able to love all people around us, let us at least try to deal with them without passion, especially grudges and hatred, which destroy interpersonal relations the most. In the fight against anger and resentment, Evagrius encourages, in accordance with the principle of agere contra, counteracting them by practicing hospitality: If your brother annoys you, invite him to your place or do not hesitate to go to him, but eat your portion with him, for in so doing you will save your soul and there will be no obstacle for you in the time of prayer.334
329 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 43; Muyldermans (1931), 42; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. See also Antirrheticus V,32. 330 Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont, (1971), 519, note 11. 331 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 2; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 154; Sinkewicz (2003), 154. 332 Cf. Antirrheticus V,6. 333 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 100; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 710; Sinkewicz (2003), 113. 334 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad Monachos 15; Greßmann (1913), 154; Sinkewicz (2003), 123.
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The flames of resentment and anger extinguish the gifts and attitude of kindness not only towards those who irritated us, but also towards those in need. A good medicine, therefore, is all the care shown to the poor: “One who shows mercy to the poor destroys irascibility; he who feeds them will have his fill of good things”.335 Whoever keeps the memory of the experience of evil for a long time and is against others “is like one who hides fire in chaff ” (Ad mon. 10). Sooner or later it will explode and destroy an angry man. Hence Evagrius advises all those who choose monastic life to distance themselves from the wrath, anger, and memory of the harm suffered. For God loves gentle people and hates those who are prone to anger.336 2.2.3.
Anger as the Obstacle to Gain the State of the Pure Prayer
In the previous paragraphs, we tried to take a closer look at the reasons for the awakening of anger in the soul of a monk; now we will pause to analyze the consequences to which it leads. In the next few paragraphs, we will see how anger destroys the state of prayer and spiritual knowledge, bringing the mind into darkness and causing nightmares during sleep. According to Evagrius, anger makes man an animal and a demon destroying his interior life, and if it lasts long is transformed into resentment and destroys spiritual prayer: Those who store up hurts and resentments in themselves and think they can pray are like people who draw water and put in into a jar full of holes.337 The text confirms that those who mourn and remember evil fall prey to the great illusion of prayer. Although they externally speak words, their prayer is to no avail. In the opinion of the monk from Pontus, authentic spiritual prayer is impossible when a person is possessed by some passionate thoughts, especially by anger.338 For all the struggle between people and demons is really about spiritual prayer which is unfriendly and very burdensome for unclean spirits, but highly salutary and encouraging for people.339 The state of demons’ lives and similarly human life in anger, however, excludes any spiritual prayer.340 Because demonic thoughts bring to the soul sensual images, thanks to which the mind carries the shapes of these things, in the case of anger it will be the image of the wrongdoer’s face and the remembrance of the evil, and this will prevent real spiritual prayer.341 If we remember that all material things, according to Evagrius, leave a mark on the human soul and that often our mind remains more in relation to this trace than with a real human being, then we understand why, after an angry reaction to someone, the image of this person remains in the mind.342 In this state, the mind is occupied with
335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342
Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad Monachos 30; Greßmann (1913), 155; Sinkewicz (2003), 124. Cf. Ad virginem 8.19; Sinkewicz (2003), 132. Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 22, PG 79,1172B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 195. Cf. Bunge (1987). Cf. De oratione 50; Sinkewicz (2003), 193. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 5; Sinkewicz (2003), 156. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 2; Sinkewicz (2003), 154. Cf. Bunge (1999a), 72–75.
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this image (εἴδωλον) and incapable of spiritual prayer which by its nature is deprived of any imagination. Our monk describes here a universal experience, connected not only with prayer, but applicable also to a different situation in which a person stops at the imagination of his wrongdoer and is not able to break away from such images by force of will. However, the image of a wrongdoer’s face is extremely lethal for prayer, especially if it is accompanied by a desire for revenge on him.343 Then there comes a particular perversion, when a man in prayer invents the ways of revenge on his neighbor. Evagrius therefore warns: Do not give yourself to the thought of anger, fighting in your intellect with the person who hurt you, nor to the thought of fornication by continually imagining the pleasure. The first brings darkness to the soul, the second invites it to experience the fires of passion: both leave your mind defiled. And when you entertain such images during the time of prayer and do not offer your prayer to God purely, you immediately fall prey to the demon of acedia.344 The angry reawakening of that which has saddened us and the internal struggle with the one who offends us can very quickly lead to comforting ourselves again with unclean thoughts or erotic images. Anger, as we have seen, pushes the soul into darkness and impurity into the fire of desire; both passions desecrate the mind of the monk. If anger and impurity are stimulated at the same time and the monk in prayer imagines different, contradictory things, then he quickly falls into the state of acedia. Where there is anger, sadness, impurity, and acedia, a state of peculiar numbness, weariness, and boredom appear very quickly. The gate, however, through which all subsequent thoughts enter into the soul, is the passionate thought of anger, the meditation of hurts suffered, and the internal struggle against the wrongdoer. Without freeing oneself of those thoughts, the attempt of true spiritual prayer becomes almost dangerous: Similarly, the imitation of the awesome and supernal practice of prayer in spirit and truth would do absolutely no good for the impure mind caught in the passions; but, quite contrary, it provokes against itself the displeasure of the divine.345 If the mind of the anchorite is dominated by impurity or anger, all attempts at spiritual prayer become ineffective; on the contrary, it stimulates God’s to anger against such a monk. At the basis of such a prayer, as rightly emphasized by Bunge, lies pride, that is, the conviction that one can be full of passions and at the same time desire spiritual prayer, which ends up with deluding oneself in prayer or the desire to “produce it” with human effort.346 The simultaneous desire for two mutually exclusive things ends with madness and acedia: “No one with love for true prayer who entertains
343 Cf. De oratione 13; Sinkewicz (2003), 194. 344 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 23; SCh 171,554; Sinkewicz (2003), 102. 345 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 146; PG 79,1180D; Sinkewicz (2003), 208. See also Hausherr (1960), 179. 346 Bunge (1999a), 77.
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anger or harbours resentment escapes madness, for that is like one who wants acuity of vision but does harm to his own eyes”.347 That is why Evagrius first recommends ascetic practice as a method of purifying the soul, not only from impurity or anger but the whole passionate part of the soul, to attain impassibility which is a condition sine qua non of pure spiritual prayer (καθαρὰ προσευχή).348 A man cannot pray with pure prayer as long as he is involved in material matters and is driven by ceaseless worries, for prayer is the abandoning of thoughts.349 A prayer that is pure is cleansed of all thoughts of passion, images or memories and any imagination of created things.350 Then the mind begins to pray without distraction, which is undoubtedly “the great thing” (Pr. 69) and “the most important activity of mind” (De or. 35). In accordance with the principle that as spiritual growth progresses, the fight against demons becomes sharper, Evagrius emphasizes that the mind in this state struggles more with demons of anger than of lust: “When the mind begins to practise prayer without distraction, then all the warfare is concentrated around the irascible part of the soul by night and by day”.351 Anger is the main temptation of the gnostic, that is, the one who is advanced in spiritual growth and has begun slowly experience a state of impassibility and taste spiritual contemplation. The demon of anger approaches him, to fight with him day and night, to blind his mind and deprive him of spiritual prayer.352 At night the demon of anger fights the monk through nightmares, and during the day: “through people that they (= demons) surround him with adverse circumstances, slanders and dangers” (De or. 139). So, Evagrius advises: “Remove thoughts of anger from your soul, and let not irascibility lodge in your heart, and you will not be troubled at the time of prayer”.353 The monk from Pontus, however, goes even further in his reflections on the nature of spiritual prayer. Even if someone has reached a state of impassibility, it does not mean that he is truly praying, because he can also have empty thoughts and by exploring them move very much away from God.354 We see how much his theory of prayer differs from all kinds of meditations, whose aim is to bring man to the state of emptiness of thoughts and images. The very state of lack of thoughts or imaginations is not yet a state of prayer. Therefore, all attempts to link the study of Evagrius’ prayer with meditation typical of Buddhism or Hinduism prove a deep misunderstanding of his teaching on the subject. In the Evagrian concept of pure prayer, it is not about freeing oneself from all thoughts or images only in order to experience emptiness, but to free oneself from all thoughts or images in order to contemplate God. He further clarifies that even when someone is no longer submerged in the thought of material things, it does not yet mean that he has reached a state of complete freedom of mind
347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354
Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 64; PG 79,1197; Sinkewicz (2003), 199. Cf. Hausherr (1960), 92–93. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1983), col. 591–95. Cf. De oratione 71; Sinkewicz (2003), 200. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 647, note 63; Bunge (1999a), 109–18. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 63; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 646; Sinkewicz (2003), 109. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,47; A. Guillaumont (1958), 157; Ramelli (2015), 224. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 10, PG 79,1156A; Sinkewicz (2003), 81. Cf. De oratione 56; Sinkewicz (2003), 198.
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from passion, since he can still continue to look at things and think about their inner principles, which even if they are only in words, form some image of things, affect the mind, and distract him from God. This second level of prayer, called the spiritual view of the material nature of things, very often can stop a person on the path to God. It also happens that the mind achieves a deeper, third level of spiritual prayer, rising even beyond the spiritual view of bodily nature, but here also a trap is waiting for him to remain only on this level of learning mental entities without seeing the “perfect place of God”.355 Evagrius, as we can see, distinguishes several degrees of prayer: the first is a state of impassibility and thought without the content of passionate images or imaginations; the second is a state of spiritual view of bodily nature or the spiritual reasons for the existence of the created world; the third is the state of spiritual gnosis, or cognition of noetic beings; and finally the fourth is seeing the place of God. All these states of prayer, especially the fourth, are impossible to achieve without the help of God’s grace because true spiritual prayer is the charism (χάρισμα) and gift (δῶρον) for which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are to be begged. The monk of Pontus encourages anyone who has not yet received the gift of prayer to ask for it faithfully and he will receive it (De or. 87). 2.2.4.
Anger Dims the νοῦς and Causes Lack of Spiritual Gnosis
Another effect of anger in the monk’s soul is to deprive the mind of inner light and spiritual knowledge. The gnostic, or one who is already experiencing a state of impassibility and spiritual contemplation, is in the state that helps to increase all virtues, and mainly the control of anger: For he who has touched knowledge but is easily moved to anger is akin to somone who gouges out his own eyes with an iron awl.356 Anger, according to Evagrius, is contrary to spiritual knowledge and can not be combined with it in any way. Speaking of the control of anger (ἀοργησία), he refers directly to the Aristotelian and Stoic vocabulary or derives it from Vita Antonii 17 of St Athanasius. In turn, the domination over anger is identified with the virtues of gentleness and love, virtues that characterize gnostics and are necessary to acquire spiritual knowledge.357 The gnostic monk, who on the one hand wants to contemplate the spiritual reasons of the material world and God Himself, and on the other hand succumbs to anger, is similar to someone who wants things that are contradictory, as if he would pop his eyes out of himself.358 Anger and the memory of evil not only destroy true prayer, but also blind the mind, making it incapable of spiritual knowledge of God. In any case, anger “spoils the state of prayer” and “obscures the
355 356 357 358
Cf. De oratione 57 i 58; Sinkewicz (2003), 198. Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 5; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 94. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont, C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 94–95, note 5. Cf. similar idea in De oratione 65 and Ad monachos 109.
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spiritual eye” (De or. 27), blinding the central part of the human personality. And his other texts confirm clearly that it is really about blindness of the mind: “In the same way as the smoke from chaff irritates the eyes, so does resentment irritate the mind in the time of prayer”.359 Although Evagrius seems to limit this blindness only to the time of prayer (ἐν καιρῷ προσευχῆς), remembering that the main occupation of the monk is to practice continuous spiritual prayer, we easily understand that it is really a permanent blind state of the anchorite’s mind. This idea is confirmed by Kephalaia Gnostica: Just as those whose sight is ill and gaze at the sun are impeded by their own tears, and in the air see ghosts, so also cannot the pure intellect (nous), when it is disturbed by anger, receive contemplation of spirit, but it sees a kind of fog lying on the objects.360 If the mind of a monk in a state of anger is blinded during spiritual prayer and must flee from it due to the pain of his inner, spiritual sight, further abandonment in the desert and the anchoritic life itself loses meaning. Anger not only blinds the mind of a monk, but also does it to a degree higher than other passionate thoughts: “Nothing blinds the mind as much as disturbed anger”.361 Evagrius, following Origen, accepted the existence of the spiritual senses of the soul and also spiritual sight, and if he wrote about the blindness of the mind, he, of course had in mind that spiritual sight. In the case of the eyes of the soul, each of them contemplates a different reality: Demonic thoughts blind the left eye of the soul, which perceives the contemplation of beings, the mental representations that leave an impress and a form on our ruling faculty cloud the right eye, which in time of prayer contemplates the blessed light of the Holy Trinity.362 Anger, blinding the spiritual left eye of the mind, obscures its ability to know created beings (θεωρία τῶν γεγόντων), and by blinding the right eye, it prevents the contemplation of the Holy Trinity. In this way, he becomes incapable of learning the spiritual reasons for the existence of created reality, that is, acting in accordance with his nature, and becomes spiritually blind. At the advanced stage of the spiritual life of the monk, the demons attack him mainly on the right, which in biblical language has always been connected with knowledge of God,363 hindering him in his contemplation by suggesting illusions of God or images of things pleasant to the senses.364
359 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 10; PG, 79,1156A; Sinkewicz (2003), 81. 360 Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica VI,63; A. Guillaumont (1958), 245; Ramelli (2015), 355; see also Kephalaia Gnostica IV,38; V,27. 361 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 6,8 d; PG 12,1176C. See also In Ps. 30,10; PG 12,1301A. 362 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 42; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 296; Sinkewicz (2003), 182. 363 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica II,12; IV,2. Cf. also C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 297, note 2. 364 Cf. De oratione 73; Sinkewicz (2003), 200–01.
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Further, the gnostic himself, already cleansed of passionate thoughts, naturally became a teacher of others, and it was in this pedagogical activity that he could easily be angry with low-minded students. So, Evagrius urged him not to be angry with the disciple who sinned, because it is not right to hurt him unless he is healed. After all, a doctor who heals a disease does not resent the one who has become ill against his will. If a doctor uses a knife without anger, the spiritual master should also try to rebuke others without anger. The Pontian master advises: “Let the knower understand that at the time when he interprets the Scriptures, be free from anger, hatred, sadness, bodily suffering and anxieties!”.365 This freedom is important not only in relation to people whom the gnostic teaches, but also in relation to knowledge itself. Evagrius, citing the views of Basil the Great, distinguished two types of knowledge: Attentive study and exercise strengthen the knowledge that comes from human beings, but righteousness, freedom from anger, and mercy [strengthen the knowledge] that comes from the grace of God. Even the impassioned can receive the first, but only those free from passion are capable of the second, they who also behold the light proper to the mind shining upon them at the time of prayer.366 The first knowledge is ordinary human knowledge, available to most people, gained by effort and systematic learning. It can also be achieved by those who are enslaved by all kinds of passionate thoughts. On the other hand, the second, spiritual contemplation comes from the grace of God, and only those who are free of passion can receive it, who have acquired the virtues of justice, freedom from anger and mercy. So, we see that for Evagrius, this freedom from anger (ἀοργησία) is one of the basic conditions for gaining spiritual knowledge. In another place of the treatise Gnosticus he describes it even more precisely: The knowledge that comes from outside tries to explain materials through their logoi. But the [knowledge] that comes from the grace of God presents matters directly to the mind, [so tha as] the mind looks at them, it receives their logoi. Erros is opposed to the first; rage, anger and the things that keep company with them [are opposed] to the second.367 Knowledge of the outside world tries to present some content through reasoning, while spiritual knowledge is as if poured into the heart of man through the grace of God and presented directly to his consciousness without mediation of any reasoning. An obstacle in achieving the first type of knowledge is an error in reasoning, i.e., the misuse of the tool, which is human reason, whereas for the other, the awakened irascibility, it is especially anger. In Evagrius’ time, human knowledge was acquired through a study and exercise in dialectics, to present the content of knowledge through thoughts, and moral qualities
365 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 10; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 102; English translation by C. Stuart, Gnosticus in Syriac versions. 366 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 45; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 178. 367 Evagrius Ponticus, Gnosticus 4; C. i A. Guillaumont (1989), 92.
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had little effect on the technical side of the cognitive process, whereas in spiritual cognition intellectual skills play a much smaller role than impassibility. Therefore, Evagrius opposed the attitude of dialectic to the attitude of the contemplative: The knowledge of God needs, not a dialectic soul, but (the faculty of spiritual) vision. For dialectic is usually found even by souls that are not pure, whereas vision is only in pure souls.368 It is possible that Evagrius was referring to the specific situation of monasticism in the fourth century, when people educated in pagan knowledge reached the desert and there they wanted to continue to delude themselves with the possibility of contemplation through philosophical disputes. The Pontian monk strongly opposes this practice, showing the way to purify oneself of passions as a condition for receiving spiritual knowledge that takes place without any mediation of reasoning. While all errors in external cognition from people can be quickly corrected through scientific research, the knowledge coming from God demands appropriate internal human disposal and this, as we know, is gained and corrected with far more difficulty.369 Therefore, the greatest sin of the gnostic is the false knowledge of the things themselves or reflection on them under the influence of some passion.370 An error in external cognition may or may not have a direct effect on a person’s life, while any error in knowing God, which Evagrius describes as “heresy”, in his opinion directly influences the attitude towards life and other people. Thus, at the stage of ascetic practice demons fight with the monk, arousing passions against virtues, while at the spiritual stage of gnosis they arouse erroneous knowledge of the spiritual reasons of the created world or of God as Triune.371 Heresy for Evagrius is therefore not just a “technical scientific error” easy to correct, but is very much dependent on the degree of domination of heretics by passionate thoughts. Therefore, heretics are most often people blinded by all sorts of passions. It is impossible to fall into a trap of error in spiritual knowledge if one has not fallen victim to the demon of anger that most obscures the mind of the cognizer. So, when the demon obscures the left spiritual eye of a gnostic, he falls victim to erroneous knowledge at the physics stage, i.e., he is unable to properly know the real nature of the created world and often accuses the Creator of injustice or even lack of wisdom.372 On the other hand, the errors of the theological stage concern not only God’s action, but also His essence. We are not surprised given examples of such errors, that the Pontian theologian refers to the heresies of his time whose supporters denied the coessence of the Son of God (Arians) or the Holy Spirit (pneumatomachoi, Macedonians). In later centuries, there will be of course different heresies, but the pattern described here is repeated. Thus, Evagrius encourages the monks not to disregard the “holy truths” (δόγματα) at the stage of gnosis, especially theology, which the Fathers established
368 369 370 371 372
Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica IV,90; A. Guillaumont (1958), 174–75; Ramelli (2015), 244. Cf. Bunge (1999a), 84. Cf. Gnosticus 42–43. Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 24,6; Scholia in Psalmos 141,4 a. Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 143,7 e.
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and remained faithful to the teaching of the Church. This keeping with the Church is the only way to free oneself from both erroneous subjectivism in knowledge and the influence of anger on cognition. An undoubted merit of Evagrius, as Bunge rightly states, is emphasis on the influence of personal moral defects on those, who learn about the theological process of cognition. And also a consideration of heresy not only in terms of theoretical intellectual error, but above all as a practical moral error and action under the influence of passions that previously blinded the mind by anger or the will to remember evil.373 Heresies and schisms in the Church, according to the Pontian monk, are a clear sign of demonic activity, especially anger: “Those who divide the Church of the Lord are far removed from pure prayer”.374 Whoever does not try to settle various doubts in faith or theological knowledge in humility and gentleness, but does so in anger, quickly falls prey to pride, and even if he led a very strict ascetic life he is far from true prayer and spiritual life. Only a gnostic, a contemplative free of anger, full of justice and mercy, will possess spiritual knowledge and be able to pass it on to others.375 In such a state the praying monk perceives the light of his own mind, and the mind’s perception of his own light is, as we remember, a sign of impassibility.376 2.2.5.
Anger as the Cause of Nightmares
The passionate thoughts of the irascible part of the soul are not limited to their attacks only during the day, but also at night through dreams. According to the general principle of Evagrian interpretation of dreams, the natural movements of the body or soul in a dream that is not accompanied by images indicate that the soul is healthy to some degree. However, if dreams are accompanied by images, it means a disease of the soul. From the kind of images that appear in a dream we can determine what part of the soul needs healing.377 If in a dream the demons show an image of an anchorite in an encounter with friends, a feast at their parents’s home, or a women’s choir, and he runs out to meet them, it is indicative of the disease of the concupiscible part of the soul. On the other hand, the signs of the disease of the irascible part of the soul are different: But when in turn they (= demons) trouble the irascible part, forcing us to travel on precipitous routes and leading forth armed men and poisonous, flesh-devouring beasts, and we are terrified by these roads and flee from the pursuit of the beasts and the men, then let us take care for the irascible part (of the soul).378 So, if nightmares occur to someone in which he dreams of various dangers, for example, if he climbs steep paths, meets armed people or poisonous or bloodthirsty 373 Cf. Bunge (1999a), 87. 374 Cf. Epistula 52,5; Dysinger, http://www.ldysinger.com/Evagrius/11_Letters/00a_start.htm (access 04/06.2018). 375 Cf. Bunge (1988), 95–109. 376 Cf. Practicus 24. See A. Guillaumont (1984), 255–62. 377 Cf. Practicus 55; Sinkewicz (2003), 107. See also Misiarczyk (2006), 121–38. 378 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 54; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 624; Sinkewicz (2003), 107.
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animals, and he feels enormous fear and runs away from the people or animals, it means that his soul is tormented by anger or sadness. Evagrius wrote that “those inclined to anger and irascibility among the brothers are more apt to fall victim to frightening visions”.379 Demons send such apparitions in order to lay the groundwork for an attack the following day or the nightmares themselves are the result of the experience of the previous day. For the irascibility awakened at night by various apparitions, during the day is very intensely agitated and quickly destroys the state of spiritual prayer. Such anchorites: In the night time during sleep they fight with winged asps, are encircled by carnivorous wild beasts, entwined by serpents, and cast down from high mountains. It sometimes happens that even after awakening they are againg encircled by the same wild beasts and see their cell all afire and filled with smoke.380 According to Evagrius, angry anchorites experience strange phenomena in their dreams: though they are not there, they think that they fight with winged vipers, are surrounded by various terrible animals, girded by snakes, and dropped from high mountains. Due to the sense of enormous fear, they also often lose the ability to distinguish sleep from waking, and after waking up they have the feeling that these animals were indeed present in a cell filled with fire and smoke. Such visions are sent by demons, and their purpose is to disturb the anchorite during sleep. Of the irascible thoughts it is anger that contributes most to the appearance of nightmares, which is why Evagrius, referring to Eph. 4:26, encourages us not to go to sleep with a soul full of anger: ‘Let the sun not go down upon our anger’ (Eph. 4:26), lest by night the demons come upon us to strike fear in our souls and render our minds more cowardly for the fight on the morrow. For frightful apparitions usually arise from the disturbance of the irascible part. Indeed, nothing else so inclines the mind to desertion like a disturbance in the irascible part.381 Nocturnal ghosts, as we saw earlier, bring fear into the soul, and the next day they make the mind cowardly, unwilling to fight. Anger that occurs during sleep and, speaking in a modern language, experienced by the subconscience of man, introduces fearfulness into the mind and strengthens his escape tendencies. Hence, Evagrius advises following St Paul: before sunset, free oneself from anger, and forgive the one who hurt us. Otherwise, the nightmares and imaginary attacks of wild animals will be repeated: “Anger […] provokes disturbances at night accompanied by wasting and pallor of the body, as well as the attacks of venomous wild beasts”.382 If anger lasts
379 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 27; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 250; Sinkewicz (2003), 173. 380 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 27; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 248; Sinkewicz (2003), 172. 381 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 21; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 550; Sinkewicz (2003), 101. 382 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 11; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 518; Sinkewicz (2003), 99.
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for a long time, it transforms into a resentment, often hidden or even imperceptible to man (Ant. V,1), which has more negative effects at night: The irascible person sees disturbing nightmares, and an angry person imagines attacks of wild beasts.383 Resentment experienced during the night out of the conscience of a man, like the anger arouses anxiety and fear as well as imaginary attacks of venomous animals; it also causes somatic symptoms in the form of general physical weakness and pallor. The most characteristic effect of anger and irascibility felt in the soul of a man at night, which appears in all of Evagrius’ texts, is the fear and imaginary attacks of wild animals. This “nocturnal fight” weakens the anchorite physically and the next day makes his mind unable to fight for true prayer.384 The main remedy for nightmares caused by agitated anger or irascibility is, of course, not to allow oneself to go to sleep in such a state. Evagrius, therefore, encourages forgiveness of those who have actually or allegedly hurt us, and calming the irascible part of the soul before going to bed. The aroused anger calms down by “singing the psalms, patience and mercy” (Pr. 15), “gentleness” (Pr. 20), “magnanimity” (Ant. V,12), and above all “love” of enemies (Pr. 38), expressed in the practice of charity and mercy towards others. If the mind remains calm with regard to dream visions, then this is a clear sign of the beginning of impassibility (Pr. 64).
383 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 10; PG 79,1156; Sinkewicz (2003), 81. See alsoe Ant. V,12. 384 Cf. Refoulé (1961), 470–516.
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Acedia
1.
Definition of Acedia
Acedia is the sixth among the eight passionate thoughts of the Evagrian catalog that attacks the anchorite.1 However, before we determine the meaning of this term in the texts of the Pontian monk, it is worth stopping at least for a short time on its previous use by classical and Christian authors.2 Plato described it as a lack of concern for someone,3 while in the Iliad and Odyssey this term meant abandoning the human body without a funeral.4 In classical Greek ἀκηδία or ἀκήδεια expressed states such as “indifference”, “weariness”, “apathy”, “exhaustion” or literally “lack of interest in anything”.5 Although without a broader context it is difficult to determine it, the probability of just such a use of the term appears in one of Cicero’s Letters: “ἀκηδία tua movet me, etsi scribis nihil esse”.6 In the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the so-called Septuagint, the noun ἀκηδία most often means “depression” or “sadness”, while the verb form ἀκηδιᾶν “be cowardly, sad, without hope”.7 Interestingly, the term ἀκηδία does not appear in the New Testament at all, and the first Christian text, where it appears is Shepherd of Hermas: For just as old people, no longer having any hope of renewing their youth, look forward to nothing except their falling asleep, so also you, being weakened by the cares of this life, gave yourselves over to indifference (εἰς τὰς ἀκηδίας) and are not casting your concerns on the Lord. Your spirit was broken and you were aged by your sorrows (ταῖς λύπαις).8 The text contains several valuable elements. First of all, the phrase itself is used in the plural here; second, acedia means discouragement in temporal struggles; third it results from the lack of transferring their own concerns to the Lord (Ps. 54:23; 1 Pet. 5:7); fourth, it leads to heartbreak, constant worrying and sadness, and faster old age. Such elements
1 2 3 4 5
Cf. Practicus 6; Sinkewicz (2003), 97–98. Cf. Nabert (2005), 15–25; Filippo (1993), 51–61. Cf. Plato, Leges 913. Cf. Homer, Ilias 25,554; Odysea 20,10. Cf. Liddel – Scott (199410), 49. See also Wenzel (1963), 173–76; A. Guillaumont, C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), t. I, 85; Joest (1993), 20. 6 Cicero, Epistula ad Atticum 12,45,1. 7 Cf. Ps 118,28; Iz 61,3; Syr 22,13; 29,5 and verbal forms in Ps 61 (60), 3; Ps 90,6; the title if Psalm 102 (101) and Ps 143 (142),4. 8 Hermas, Pastor, Visio III,11,3; Lightfoot – Harmer (1992), 364–66.
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as discouragement in everyday life struggles, lack of trust in God, and experiencing sadness will become for later Christian authors, including Evagrius, the characteristics of acedia. The Guillaumonts emphasize that the understanding of acedia as “breaking/ exhausting of the heart” was taken over by other Christian authors, translating the Greek term ἀκηδία into Coptic by pehloplep, and into Syriac by qûtâ 're'yânâ or sometimes also by ma'înûtâ (boredom).9 Origen, inspired by both classical thought and the Old Testament in the Homily to the Gospel of Luke 29 emphasizes that apart from gluttony, other temptations such as sleep, acedia (ἀκηδία) and anxiety (δειλία) are definitely more dangerous.10 The great Alexandrian places acedia between dreams, which also appear as the eighth on the list of vices given to us in the Testament of Reuben III,9 from the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, and cowardice, one of the vices in the Stoic system. Gregory of Nazianzus, although a disciple of Origen, in his definition of acedia, however, remained at the level of the intellectual meaning proper to classical literature, because acedia for him is laziness, sloth or cowardice in rational reflection.11 However, Evagrius was not the first Christian author who introduced the use of the term ἀκηδία to monastic literature because it appears for the first time in Vita Antonii of St Athanasius. Anthony describes the situation after a demon attack from which is immediately born anxiety of the soul (δειλία), disorder and confusion of thoughts, shame, hatred of the ascetic, acedia (ἀκηδία), sadness (λύπη), memories of loved ones, and fear of death, and then the desire for what is wrong, disregarding virtue and unsteadiness.12 This description, as in the case of Origen, combines the classic use of the term acedia with the biblical, which rather indicates that the fragment comes from Athanasius and is not a record of the thoughts of Anthony himself. Evagrius in his presentation of acedia was most probably inspired by Origen, describing it as a demon of the midday, which brings sleep, sloth, and tempts the monk to leave the cell and escape from the desert (Pr. 12). John Cassian translates the Greek term ἀκηδία descriptively using the Latin phrases taedium sive anxietatem cordis.13 Although the term taedium appears in many later texts of Latin authors, it was not really adopted, because both Cassian himself and other Latin authors after him will use the term acidia more often, which is a Latinization of the Greek form of ἀκηδία. Cassian and later Christian writers intuitively understood that the sense which Evagrius gave to this passionate thought remains untranslatable into Latin as well as the term itself. The Latin term acidia has thus reached most European languages, including English, and has been translated by acedia. According to Evagrius it expresses the state of “spiritual discouragement”, “weariness”, “dryness”, “boredom”, “cowardice”, “depression”, “inability to concentrate on one activity”, “disgust”, “inconvenience”, “atony of the soul” or even “paralysis of the soul”. Although all these meanings fit somehow in the understanding of the state of acedia by Evagrius, it has 9 Cf. SCh 170,85–86. Such a term we can find in Coptic version of Ascetion written by Abba Isaias or in Syriac translation of Evagrian Practicus. 10 Cf. SCh 87,502–03. 11 Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Poemata moralia 34,70; PG 37,950A. 12 Cf. Athanasius of Alexandria, Vita Antonii 36; PG 26,896B. See also Brague (1985), 197–228. 13 John Cassian, De Institutis caenobiorum X,1; Guy (1965), 384.
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been assumed that the best translation in English would be “atony”. Acedia means a man’s psycho-spiritual state similar to contemporary depression, which is often manifested by a sense of emptiness and meaninglessness of life, thoughts of suicide or even suicidal attempts, reluctance to any action, and also the senseless fear or even paralysis of the psycho-spiritual forces of man.14 Because Evagrius addressed his writings essentially to anchorites, he described acedia with terminology of the spiritual life as a temptation to leave a cell and that which destroys the state of hesychia; hence some scholars of his writings such as the Guillaumonts suggest that it concerns basically only the anchoritic state of life: “Acedia is therefore a temptation that goes against the basic principle of remaining in a cell, against hesychia itself, and that’s how the condition of a praktikos or an anchorite living alone is determined and characterized. Acedia, as it is defined by Evagrius, is basically related to the state of anchoritic life and reaches the person who chose this lifestyle”.15 Evagrius himself does not define expressis verbis anywhere that acedia is a disease of the soul that affects only anchorites; the Guillaumonts draw their conclusions based rather on the texts of John Climacus and John Cassian. Climacus actually states that “common life is opposed to acedia, because it is a companion of anchorite whom it does not leave until death”.16 Similarly, Cassian thinks that acedia attacks exclusively anchorites who live in the desert.17 According to the Guillaumonts, it was Cassian who adapted Evagrius’ teaching to the cenobitic life, combining it with idleness and laziness.18 If acedia survived in medieval catalogs of vices and sins both for monks living in communities and for lay people,19 it is just thanks to Cassian’s adaptation, but Evagrius linked it only with the anchoritic life. Bunge, another eminent researcher of the writings of Evagrius, is of the opinion that acedia is not the spiritual disease of only the anchorites. If this were the case, then the state of acedia should reach only monks living alone, but in fact it also affects monks living in communities as well as lay people. The state of acedia is a universal experience connected with the human condition of existence.20 As we have seen before, it was already known in classical and biblical literature long before the appearance of Christian anchorites. We can agree with the thesis of the Guillaumonts that acedia is the most destructive for the life of anchorites but it cannot be limited only to this state of life. If a monk goes to the desert to purify his own soul from passionate thoughts and deepen his relationship with God, there is no doubt that acedia destroys this 14 Cf. Louf (1974), 113–17; Rüdiger (1990); Maier (1994), 230–49; Misiarczyk (2004), 68; Vazquez (2015a) and (2015b); Peretó Rivas (2014) and (2015). 15 C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), t. I,89 “L’acédie est donc la tentation, qui va contre le précepte fondamental de la garde de la cellule, contre l’hésychia elle-même, c’est-à-dire ce par quoi se définit et se caractérise l’état de vie du practicos, dont nous avons vu qu’il est un anachorète et un solitaire. L’acédie, telle que la définit Évagre, est esentiellement liée à l’état de vie anachorétique et elle est propre à celui qui a embrassé cet état”. 16 John Climacus, Scala Paradisii 13; PG 88,860A. 17 John Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum X,1. 18 Cf. Weber (1961), 82-84. 19 On acedia in Medieval Ages see Wenzel (1967). 20 Cf. Bunge (1989c) 256-260.
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relationship as well as expels the monk from the desert. It is right, however, that Bunge emphasizes that the mere fact that a man is naturally in relation to God whether he wants it or not, also proves the universality of acedia as an obstacle in this relationship. This author describes acedia as a religious and metaphysical state of general suffering, which in a non-religious form is described by the contemporaries as ennui (Pascal), Schwermut (Guardini, Kierkegaard), melancholy (A. Kępiński), or depression.21 It’s about a state in which a man subjectively “suffers from himself and from other people” (Bunge). The difference in experiencing the pain of existence between an anchorite, a cenobite, and a man living in the world is a difference in degree, in the sense that people living in the world have more resources, even if not always effective, for anesthesia of this pain e.g. through alcohol, sex, drugs, or addictive relationships with other people, while the anchorite is alone in the desert and cannot escape this pain anywhere. Anchoritic life is a full experience for Evagrius, that is, a simultaneous physical separation from everyone and a harmonious spiritual union with everyone in God. This was the original state of the existence of rational beings, and to retrieve it from sins and passionate thoughts was encouraged by the Pontian monk. In this sense, the anchorite is the prototype of a new man who, with the grace of God and his own ascetic effort, returns to his original unity with God and all creation. Although acedia belongs to the eight passionate thoughts and in the process of purification of the soul it appears after the thought of a passionate (irrational) part, it has a very specific character and in its essence differs from the others. Therefore, its analysis in the current study will also be different from the previous one. First, we will try to present exactly the essence of acedia according to Evagrius, and then the symptoms of its manifestation in human life and the remedy proposed by him.
2.
Nature of Acedia: Complex Thought
According to Evagrius, since natural seeds of virtue remain indestructible in man,22 it follows that action according to nature is the action according to virtue, while giving in to passions is contrary to human nature. With such assumptions, it becomes clear that acedia, as well as all other passionate thoughts, for him, is an unnatural state of the soul: Acedia is a relaxation of the soul, and a relaxation of the soul that is not in accord with nature does not resist temptations nobly. For what is food for healthy body constitutes a temptation for the noble soul.23 Acedia destroys the resilience of the soul (De octo 16) and as such is weakness (ἀτονία) which is contrary to its natural state because it does not fight with temptations to which it is naturally called, but is weakened, slothful, and cowardly. For the natural state of the soul, according to Evagrius, is the struggle for virtue and struggle with temptations, which for a healthy and brave soul acting according to its nature, becomes food just 21 Cf. Vazquez (2016). 22 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 31; Sinkewicz (2003), 175. 23 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; PG 79,1157C–D; Sinkewicz (2003), 83.
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as is material food for a healthy body. It is about a state of man’s psycho-spiritual weakness in which he has no strength to take any action. This is not always solely related to the weakness of the will, as it is often mistakenly stated, but as we shall see is the result of the action of various passions that paralyze the free will of man. Although on the one hand acedia belongs to the eight major passionate thoughts that attack the monk’s soul, hindering his relationship with God, on the other hand it is passionate thought sui generis and has a very specific character that distinguishes it from the seven other thoughts. One of the fundamental differences is that while all other passionate thoughts attack only a part of the soul, acedia affects the entire soul: Whereas the other demons are like the sun which rises and sets, touching only one part of the soul, the noonday demon is accustomed to enveloping the entire soul and strangling the mind.24 All other demons, such as gluttony, impurity, and greed, attack only the concupiscible part of the soul or, as in the case of sadness and anger, its irascible part, while acedia, which Evagrius in other texts defines as the noonday demon (μεσημβρινός), touches the whole soul and obscures the mind. As we have seen before, concupiscible and irascible thoughts follow one another and are mutually conditioning: gluttony gives rise to impurity, and the frustration of these two and greed stimulates the irascible part of the soul in the form of anger or sadness. This is confirmed by our author, clearly commenting on Psalm 139.3: “Demons attack us through passionate thoughts, they move sometimes lust, other times anger”.25 In the case of acedia, Evagrius did not write about such causal order as in previous thoughts, only stressing that it is very closely connected with sadness: “Sadness […] is a kinsman of acedia […], acedia is […] a partaker in sorrow”.26 This text, as well as others that were recalled on the occasion of the analysis of sorrow, do not indicate that the Pontian monk perceived sorrow as the cause of acedia, but rather as its component and inseparable companion.27 Sorrow differs from acedia in that it arises out of unsatisfied lust (De octo 11) or as a result of anger, i.e., always after the frustration of one passionate thought, while acedia is a complex passion and is born from the simultaneous action of two or more passionate thoughts. Therefore, the scholars of the Evagrian writings are not right when they group acedia together with sadness and anger in the passionate thoughts of the irascible part of the soul (θυμικόν).28 The conviction that acedia is a complex passion is a central element in Evagrius’ teaching on this subject and one to which he returns in many of his texts. In the previously quoted Commentary on the Book of Psalms, we read: Demons attack us through passionate thoughts, sometimes stirring up our desires and other times stirring up our wrath. On still other occasions they stir up anger and desire in the same person, the combination of which is called “complex”. 24 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 36; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 582; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 25 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 139,3b; PG 12,1664. 26 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 3–6 (passim); PG 79,1141D–114C; Sinkewicz (2003), 63–64. 27 Cf. De oratione 56; Sinkewicz (2003), 198; Ad virginem 33; Sinkewicz (2003), 133. 28 Cf. Wucherer-Huldenfeld (1997), 346–50.
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And this only occurs in a time of acedia, whereas ojter thought succeed each other in turn. No other thought succeeds the thought of acedia for a whole day, first because it lingers for a long time, but also because it contains in itself all the other thoughts.29 Other passionate thoughts attack the monk intermittently, coming one after another in some period of time, whereas acedia is a complex passion and is born from the simultaneous arousal of the concupiscible and irascible parts of the soul. The demons of the concupiscible part of the soul use the passions of the flesh, while the irascible ones act through the passions of the soul.30 This is what the ascetic of Pontus means when he states that the demon of acedia grabs the whole soul and suffocates the mind. Writing about the whole soul, Evagrius really means only the unreasonable part composed of the concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and irascible (θυμικόν). He does not mention anything about what happens to the rational part of the soul. If, as some scholars of his writings say, the rational part of the soul is identical with the mind, he further explains that this simultaneous stimulation of the concupiscible and irascible parts of the soul obscures the mind and prevents it, more than any other passion, from acting in accordance with its nature, i.e., contemplating God. As we remember that in the concupiscible part of the soul gluttony, impurity, and greed may be born, whereas anger and sadness in the irascible, acedia will arise from any combination of simultaneous arousal of at least one thought from a part of a concupiscible and irascible soul. Just waking up the lust and frustration of one of these thoughts will only bring anger or sadness, while acedia will theoretically arise from the simultaneous arousal of anger or sadness in combination with each of these three desires: gluttony, impurity or greed. In practice, however, Evagrius specifies that acedia is born from the simultaneous stimulation of one of the three concupiscences and anger: Acedia is a long-lasting stimulation of irascibility and concupiscibility in the same person, in which is enraged at what is present, and desire for what is absent.31 Although our monk uses here the general term θυμός instead of the typical ὀργή for anger, he immediately clarifies in the further part that it is just anger or feeling angry. Acedia arises from the simultaneous arousal of anger towards what is and the desire for what is currently unavailable. In the text quoted above, there is another very important refinement. Acedia is not only simultaneous, but also long-lasting (πολυχρόνιος) stimulation of lust and anger. Evagrius wants to emphasize that acedia will not be born in the human soul when the two faculties of the human soul are simultaneously stimulated only for a short time. It is not just a temporary acedic episode but a long-term duration very similar to what the modern classification of mental disorders describes as depression or bipolar disorder. Acedia, as well as
29 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 139,3; PG 12,1664B. 30 Cf. Practicus 35; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 31 Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 118,28; PG 12,1593A–B.
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depression, is often accompanied by sadness, but it does not take a direct part in its creation, being born somehow secondary, as a result of anger. The essence of acedia is simultaneous and long-lasting stimulation of anger towards what is or what we possess and the desire for something that in the current state is unattainable. Man gets angry and hates what he has now: work, age, health, family, wife, children, salary, position, etc., and at the same time he desires another job, age, health, wife, children, salary, position, etc., impossible to achieve here and now. In the life of the anchorite, acedia was most often a simultaneous stimulation of anger and gluttony or fornication or avarice: Do not give yourself to the thought of anger, fighting in your intellect with the person who hurt you, nor to the thought of fornication by continually imagining pleasure. […] And when you entertain such images during the time of prayer and do not offer your prayer to God purely, you immediately fall prey to the demon of acedia, who leaps upon dispositions especially such as these and rips the soul apart as a dog kills a fown.32 Although the text can theoretically be understood as a warning against the passionate thoughts of anger and sexual desire separately, the further part of it explicitly indicates that Evagrius means simultaneously stimulating these passions, because only then does acedia arises. It is the demon of acedia that evokes in the human soul the feeling of being torn in two directions. As we shall further see, in the case of an anchorite anger with simultaneous desire may also apply to other areas of his life, e.g., the cell in which he lives, physical work or seeking consolation from others.33 The definition of acedia as a simultaneous stimulation of anger and lust requires, however, a certain refinement, because not every simultaneous stimulation of these passions in fact introduces a man into the state of acedia. We deal with acedia when hatred and desire are related to the same object of desires. Acedia will be prolonged in the human soul when the object of this simultaneous arousal of hatred and desire together will be one, while if there are two or more, the consequence will be anger or sadness. While anger or sadness drag the monk’s soul one way, acedia tears it apart and pulls it in two opposite directions. We can graphically represent this state in this way:34
Lust
human soul
Anger
32 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 23; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 554; Sinkewicz (2003), 101–02. 33 Cf. Antirrheticus VI,1. 34 Cf. Misiarczyk (2004), 70.
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Evagrius described this in the Letter to the Monks, answering their question about the nature of acedia: This temptation is composed of several thoughts, because it arises from hatred and lust. For anyone who succumbs to acedia hates what is there, and he desires what is not. And the more the lust pulls the monk down, the more hatred expels him from the cell; he then resembles an unreasonable animal, drawn by lust at the front, and beaten and pushed by hatred from behind.35 The Pontian monk once again repeats that acedia is a complex thought and is born of hatred for what is and for the desire of what is not. In the passage jus cited, we find a description and comparison of a monk to an unreasonable animal, which is pulled forward by lust, and on the back beaten and pushed by hatred. This comparison of a rational man in the state of acedia to an unreasonable animal represents very well its irrational character. Evagrius distinguishes among the passionate thoughts those that are common to people and animals, and others only appropriate to people: Those (= thoughts) that appear as human beings are all those that derive from sadness, vainglory and pride; those that derive from acedia are mixed, coming to us both as animals and as human beings.36 Human thoughts common to animals are all kinds of irrational movements that are born through sensual reality and belong to the sphere of instincts. In the Letter to Melania, Evagrius lists such animal motions: hunger, sleep, lust, anger, fear, sadness, hatred, sloth, haste, cunning, severity, haughtiness, distress, mourning, anger.37 These thoughts connect us with the sensual world, they are born in the passionate part of the soul and come from lust or wrath. From our category of the eight passionate thoughts there will be gluttony, impurity, greed and anger. However, passionate thoughts that happen to us as people are sadness, vanity and pride, as well as jealousy and accusations, that is, those belonging to the rational human sphere and distinguishing us from the animal world.38 It is interesting that Evagrius here added sorrow to the group of thoughts that happen to us as people together with vanity and pride, which, as we know, belong to the rational part of the soul. He treats sadness as a “human” passion as opposed to anger, which he passed to the “animal” passions. The last text of Evagrius also forces us to make some correction in our understanding of his teaching about acedia. In previous passages, he emphasized that acedia arises from simultaneous and long-lasting arousal of lust and wrath, or the tendency of a passionate (irrational) part of the soul. In that case, Bunge would indeed be right about to describe acedia as the most irrational and unreasonable phenomenon.39 And this is undoubtedly one of the aspects of the Pontian monk’s teachings on this subject, but not all of his teaching. 35 Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 27,6. 36 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 40; Muyldermans (1931), 42; Sinkewicz (2003), 214. See also De malignis cogitationibus 21. 37 Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 41; Casiday (2006), 72. 38 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 21; Sinkewicz (2003), 167–68. 39 Cf. Bunge (1989c), 218.
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In this context, complexity would mean that acedia consists of anger and lust for the flesh. In the last text, however, the Pontian monk seems to point to a different type this complexity, namely, it is a thought that has a mixed “animal” and “human” origin, that is, it comes from lust and wrath, but also from sadness, vanity and pride. Evagrius did not write about the simultaneous stimulation of anger and sadness or anger and pride, but he admitted, as we will see in later analyses, the possibility of acedia in the thought of vainglory and anger. Although he nowhere specifies whether it deals with vanity as a passionate thought of the rational part of the soul, which is born after overcoming the thoughts of the irrational part of the soul, or vanity as one of the three so-called source passions attacking monks at all stages of purifying the soul, it seems from the whole context of his teaching that it is the latter. One of the characteristics of acedia is also that, unlike the other thoughts that come and go, it basically ends and closes the whole process of temptation. After it, according to Evagrius, there is no other passionate thought, because of itself it lasts for quite a long time and by nature is a complex thought that also contains other thoughts. Bunge rightly perceives acedia as a state in which “the hatred to what is connected with the long-term desire of what is inaccessible paralyzes the natural functions of the soul to such an extent that no thought is able to control others”.40 Evagrius has collected all the manifestations of acedia in one of the fragments of his work De vitiis: Acedia is an ethereal friendship, one who leads our step astray, hatred of industriousness, a battle against stillness, stormy weather for psalmody, laziness in prayer, a slackening of ascesis, untimely drowsiness, revolving sleep, the oppresiveness of solitude, hatred of one’s cell, an adversary of ascetic works, an opponent of perseverance, a muzzling of meditation, ignorance of the scriptures, a partaker in sorrow, a clock for hunger.41 In the further part of the current study, we will examine the most important elements of the Pontian monk’s teaching about acedia. Before we do this, however, it is worthwhile to pause on the question of the possibility of freeing oneself from this state. If it is a thought composed of simultaneous and long-lasting arousal of concupiscibility and irascibility, that is irrational and the same as animal instincts, over which human reason has no power, does this not mean that a man will be condemned to remain in this condition forever? However, Evagrius also states, that although a passionate thought or a demon torments a man regardless of his will, it is ineffective without his consent to the “pleasure born of free will” (De mal. 19). The very fact of being tormented or tempted is not yet subjected to a moral evaluation, and it is only a decision of will which changes the qualitative qualification from temptation to sin (Pr. 75). It depends on the free will of man whether thoughts persist and inflame passions in him or are rejected (Pr. 6). Evagrius looks optimistically at the human being, emphasizing that original sin did not completely destroy the nature
40 Cf. Bunge (1989c), 219. 41 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 6; PG 79,1143B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 64.
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of the spiritual mind and in the deepest level of personal existence did not deprive him of reason and freedom. The image of God in man in his most inner being is indestructible, but by the decision of his free will can be obscured. Although defending man’s freedom and responsibility in the deepest levels of his personality, the Pontian monk does not diminish the fact that after the original sin there existed a constant and independent reality, a kind of virtual ego that arose through the reversal of the spiritual energy of the mind naturally directed at God, and turned it inward. The root of all evil, Evagrius wrote, is self-love, and since man is unable to love himself because love is always born in relation to someone else, then seeking love of himself will quickly turn into hatred and aggression. This state of permanent tearing and disintegration of personality experienced by all people after original sin most fully reveals itself in acedia. It manifests itself on two levels. The first is a basic conflict as a result of original sin that is born of the mind, the center of the human personality still equipped with free will and oriented from nature to God, and of the unreasonable part of the soul that is focused on self-love and gratification of all desires of this virtual ego. The second conflict is born from the simultaneous stimulation of lust and wrath in which the free will of man is largely paralyzed by irrational and instinctive passions. Evil, however, according to Evagrius, appeared in the world secondarily, and although it has a permanent component independent of man, it touches him only to the extent that he allows. The mind, once inherently God-oriented, now has to slowly return to this through the effort to purify the soul of the passions that interfere with it. Acedia is the passion that is the most dangerous because it captures the whole soul and obscures and suffocates the mind the most. However, it is not able to completely destroy this center of the personal existence of man because, though “strangled”, he is still free and can surrender or reject it. Evagrius looks at the man with hope, saying that “one can be completely freed from evil” (Ep. 43:1).42
3. 3.1.
The Signs of Acedia and Preventive Means Time – Daemonium meridianum
The first distinguishing mark of acedia is the time in which it appears and attacks the monk. While all other passionate thoughts can torment the human soul at any time of the day, acedia is called by Evagrius the demon of the noonday (δαιμόνιον μεσημβρινόν) because it attacks the monk just at noon of the day. In the Practicus he states: The demon of acedia, also called the noonday demon is the most oppresive of all the demons. He attacks the monk about the fourth hour (10 a. m.) and besieges his soul until the eighth hour (2 p. m.). First of all, he makes it appear that the sun
42 Cf. Bunge (1989c), 221–25.
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moves slowly or not at all, and that the day seems to be fifty hours long. Then he compels the monk to look constantly towards the windows, to jump out of the cell, to watch the sun to see how far it is from the ninth hour (3 p. m.), to look this way and that lest one of the brothers (do not come).43 Basil the Great used the term “demon of the midday” in his rules. He also encouraged the monks to recite Psalm 90 in order to overcome him44 and Evagrius certainly took over the earlier monastic tradition here. He is, however, the first author who identifies the demon of the midday from Psalm 91 (90):6 with acedia.45 The Hebrew text of Ps. 91:6 and the English based on it describes the situation of a man who, hoping in the Lord, will not be afraid of “the destruction that wastes at noonday”, while the Septuagint translates this part of verse 6 καὶ δαιμονίου μεσημβρινοῦ. Evagrius takes over the phrase “demon of the noonday” (δαιμόνιον μεσημβρινόν) from Septugaint, identifying it clearly in Scholia in Psalmos with the demon of acedia (τὸν μεσημβρινόν δαίμονα φασιν εἶναι τὸν τῆς ἀκηδίας).46 The translation of the Septuagint, which instead of “pestilence which destroys at noon”, sees the demon of the noonday, was probably based on the ancient Judaic interpretation confirmed by Midrash to the Book of Psalms, where it speaks of the demon of the noonday (qeteb) attacking man during the hottest months between the hours 4 and 9, both in the sun and in the shade.47 Based on the translation of the Septuagint, Jerome in his Vulgate translates δαιμόνιον μεσημβρινόν by daemonio meridiano, and other ancient translations of the Bible such as Peshitta and Targum to the Book of Psalms also see in Ps. 90:6 the demon (spirit) of the noonday. Evagrius describes the demon of the noonday (acedia) as the most dangerous (βαρύτατος) of all demons (Pr. 12; 28) because although it basically attacks the monk’s soul, it also causes physical effects in his body. And this is because of the fact that it torments the anchorite in the hottest hours of the day, that is from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m., when the heat itself in the Mediterranean climate in the summer months introduces man into a state of physical heaviness. It is probably because of this heaviness and drowsiness, that the Testament of Reuben III,9 of the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs identifies the demon of the noonday with the spirit of sleep, and Origen links acedia with dreams (In Lucam Hom. 29). The demon of acedia attacking the anchorite at this time of the day subjects his soul to the undoubtedly heaviest test (Pr. 28). In the state of acedia, the monk has the impression that time runs slower or even stops; in the desert in the fourth century, the only measure of time was the movement of the sun, hence the impression that the sun moved less or even stopped, and the day was
Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 12; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 520–22; Sinkewicz (2003), 99. Basil the Great, Regulae Magnae 37,4; PG 31,1013D–1016A. Cf. C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), t. I,86–87. Evagrius Ponticus, Scholia in Psalmos 90,6; PG 12,1552C. We find the same expression in Scholia in Psalmos 90,6; Pitta (1883), t. III,170. The interpretation has been ascribed to Athanasius, Scholia in Psalmos 90,6; PG 27,401B and in a more expanded version can be found in Cyril of Alexandria, Explanatio in Psalmos 90,6; PG 69,1220A–B. 47 Cf. Braude (1959), 102. 43 44 45 46
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as long as fifty hours. According to Evagrius, this physical heaviness and drowsiness at midday, however, does not prevent the demon of acedia from introducing the monk into a state of internal anxiety and tension. Wanting to free himself from such an unpleasant feeling, the monk experiences a different perception of time. This coincides with the general experience of another subjective perception of time associated with experiencing a difficult situation. Because it is not easy to withstand that inner tension and anxiety, the monk keeps looking out of the window or running out of the cell to stare at the sun as if he’s disbelieving his perception inside the cell that it’s moving so slowly. For he waits with a longing forthe ninth hour, which, according to our time is 3 o’clock p. m., because then he eats a meal.48 In the state of acedia, the monk would like the mealtime to come faster and be consoled at least with a bit of food or a meeting with the brothers, whose visits are also awaited with longing. Evagrius as always masterfully described this state in the treatise De octo spiritibus malitiae: The eye of the person afflicted with acedia stares at the doors continuously, and his intellect imagines people coming to visit. The door creaks and he jumps up; he hears a sound, and he leans out the window and does not leave it until he gets stiff from sitting there. When he reads, the one afflicted with acedia yawns a lot and readily drifts off into sleep; he rubs his eyes and stretches his arms; turning his eye away from the book; he stares at the wall and again goes back to reading for a while; leafing through the pages, he looks curiously for the end of the text, he counts the folios and calculates the number of gatherings. Later, he closes the book and puts it under his head and falls asleep, but not a very deep sleep, for hunger then rouses his soul and has him show concern for its needs.49 In the state of acute tension, the monk keeps looking at the window, expecting a visit of the brothers who, he thinks, would alleviate the pain of his inner anxiety. The anchorite is not always fully aware of his condition and this anxiety or tension which he often experiences, we would say in modern language, in his unconsciousness. Man’s automatic response to the unconscious pain of the soul is the desire to get rid of it at any cost by escaping to meet people or other forms of comfort, such as eating. The monk expects the visit of the brothers and becomes sensitive even to the smallest signals in this space, like the creaking door or any voice. If nobody visits him and he is forced to stay in the cell by himself, he wants to find some comfort in reading the Bible. However, in the state of deep acedia even reading the most interesting books is impossible. The anchorite dominated by acedia so often yawns and falls asleep, rubs his eyes, stretches, looks around, picks up the book, counts how many pages he has left to read, looks at the chapters, gets angry at the character of the scripture and the decoration of the manuscript. Finally, he decides to sleep a bit, deceiving himself again that he will get rid of his inner anxiety, but in the state of acedia even sleep is shallow and does not bring relief. Although Evagrius has described here the state of acedia which anchorites experience, I think that every adult person has
48 Cf. Apophtegmata Patrum, Macarius 33; PG 65,276C; Anthony 36; PG 65,85D–88A. 49 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 14; PG 79,1160A-B; Sinkewicz (2003), 84.
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experienced something similar at least once in his life. Both the external context as well as the strategies of freeing oneself from internal anxiety will of course always be individual, but the basic mechanism of the action of acedia is common to all people. At the end of this part of our analysis, it is worth stopping briefly on yet another aspect of understanding the phrase “the demon of midday” or “noonday temptation” referred to later as the so-called mid-life crisis. Jerome of Stridon describes the situation when after many years of monastic life (post multos annos) he was overwhelmed by a very strong discouragement of the ascetic life and a strong desire to abandon it, but with the help of a spiritual director he resisted this temptation.50 He does not specify exactly whether it was actually half his life or not. The issue of placing the experience of acedia in exactly half of one’s life in general or of anchoritic life is of course secondary, but there is no doubt that he experienced acedia in the form of hatred of monastic life and that he wanted to return to his homeland. Nevertheless, neither Evagrius nor Jerome refer to the “demon of the noonday” at the half of human or monastic life. It will be made by medieval authors like St Bonaventure or later ascetic authors who, though, do not use the very term daemonium meridianum, but describe the midpoint of life as a specific spiritual experience of anxiety and lack of sense, putting it symbolically at the age of 40.51 This idea is inspired by the contemporary depth psychology of C. G. Jung, describing this experience as the mid-life crisis or Krise der Lebensmittel.52 This mid-life crisis, which is more or less the middle (the symbolic midday) of human life, is a state in which a man or woman realizes that not all his/her plans have been implemented, is often dissatisfied with his/her life, and at the same time still wants to fulfill his/her hidden desires that, however, neither now nor probably in the future have any chance of implementation. Stimulating aggression and hatred for what is with the simultaneous desire for the impossible gives birth to acedia. Anger and aggression, as we have seen, may manifest themselves in the form of anger towards others or in sadness, i.e., feelings of helplessness and anger towards oneself. Contemporary psychological and psychiatric diagnostics determine such a state as a bipolar disorder with depressive and manic elements. The terminology, is of course, different here, but I think that we are in the schema of Evagrian acedia in which sadness and anger against oneself can be equated with the depressive element, and desire for what is impossible with a manic element. If acedia is born with simultaneous hatred of what is and the desire for what is unattainable, then its dimension will be much deeper in the case of a man who hates his whole life and would like to change everything in it. Such an experience affected precisely the monks, as in the case of Jerome, who after a dozen years of staying in the desert he was assaulted with hatred of a chosen lifestyle and the desire to return to the old
50 Jerome, Vita Malachi 3–4: “[…] post multos annos incidit mihi desiderium ut ad patriam pergerem […]. Coepit clamare abbas meus diaboli esse tentationem et sub honestae rei occasione later antiqui hostis insidias. Sic multos monachorum esse deceptos”. 51 Cf. Jehl (1984), 49. 52 Cf. Joest (1993), 24.
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way of life or to choose something else. However, the total or even partial change of life in the state of acedia usually does not bode well because it is motivated by an unconscious negative choice, that is, an escape from internal anxiety (against something), not a positive one, that is, an acceptance of some new value. Acedia explains many unreasonable human choices like marital divorce or crises of priestly or religious vocations. Thus, the scheme of the formation of acedia described by Evagrius may be repeated in relation to the “noon” of life, although it is rather its later application, because he placed its action only at the noon hours of the day in anchoritic life. 3.2.
Hatred for All that is and the Desire for All that is Not
If acedia is a passion composed of a simultaneous arousal of hatred for what is and desire of what is not, the individual groups of its symptoms will, for obvious reasons, combine the hatred of the present state of life of the monk with the desire for change. The hatred of what is, allows the demon of anger into the soul, which especially in troubles creates a kind of bridgehead: “and prepares the ground for the spirit of acedia so that they may (both) darken the soul and at the same time gather up its ascetic labors”.53 Since in acedia an anchorite experiences internal anxiety without knowing its source, he unconsciously associates its appearance with the current place and conditions of his life; hence hatred of the present situation is born in his heart, combined with the illusion that the change of these external conditions of life would end his inner suffering. This is a process of thinking that very often escapes human consciousness and connects very closely with what modern human sciences call rationalization and projection. Man then accuses the outside world (other people, conditions, etc.) of his own suffering and takes action to change other people and external conditions rather than himself, while presenting his own choice as the most reasonable action. The external symptoms of acedia as described by Evagrius are many and Bunge mentions in his study the following: “state of general discouragement”, “internal anxiety”, “concern for physical health”, “recognition of work and learned profession as a source of unhappiness”, “blaming fellowmen for our own suffering”, “escaping into entertainment and distraction”, “seeking companionship”, “appearance of virtue”, “prayer minimalism”, “maximalism”.54 In my earlier study on acedia, I followed Bunge in mentioning the symptoms such as “internal anxiety and the need for constant change”, “anxiety”, “exaggerated care for one’s own health”, “hatred for a learned profession combined with the desire to get another”, “accusing other people for our own psychological and spiritual unhappiness, misfortunes or failures”, “compulsive search for entertainment to distract internal pain and suffering”, “uncontrolled need of human company”, “appearances of virtue”, “a great difficulty in fulfilling everyday duties”, “maximalism, workaholis”, “aversion
53 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 6; PG 79,1101B; Sinkewicz (2003), 33. 54 Cf. Bunge (1989c), 229-238.
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to anchoretic life and to life in general”.55 To be sure, some of them are more an attempt to seek remedies and the symptoms are only indirect. Based on the treatise Antirrheticus VI,56 Joest mentions “loss of sense (Sinnlosigkeit)”, “loss of courage, bravery” (Mutlosigkeit), “hatred of confreres” (Haß auf die Mitbrüder), “thoughts of escape” (Fluchtgedanken) and “other” (Verschiedenes).57 They all boil down to hatred for the various expressions of the life of the anchorite and the simultaneous desire for its fruit. In the further part of these analyses, these symptoms will be presented in groups. 3.2.1.
Hatred of Anchoritism and the Will to Return to the World
The demon of acedia which attacks a monk aims primarily at discouraging him from the chosen anchoritic lifestyle. And because the essence of this life is prayer, asceticism, and manual work for one’s own maintenance, he hits directly in these areas of the monk’s life. He takes away his hope (Ant. VI,12) showing to his soul: “how very difficult the monastic life is and that a human being can scarcely endure its way of life”.58 The demon tries to convince a monk that there is no one who sees his afflictions (Ant. VI,34) and wanting to destroy the virtue of endurance shows him “a prolonged old age, severe poverty without consolation, and diseases that can kill the body” (Ant. VI,32). We are dealing here with a situation similar to gluttony, in which the demon similarly frightens the monk with old age, lack of strength, and diseases caused by harsh fasts. In the case of both gluttony and acedia, fear for the future, even if it actually has a partial justification in the conditions of life in the desert, is also largely stimulated by the imagination. Acedia manifests to the soul images of the monastic life, which the monk once voluntarily chose, as full of torments and many hardships (Ant. VI,40) in order to discourage him from this way of life and lead him to abandon “the holy path of the illustrious ones and its dwelling place”.59 Fort the monk, the path of good deeds is to practice asceticism and love of neighbor. In addition to the general hatred for anchoritic life, the demon of acedia also arouses hatred of all asceticism so that even if he fails to force him to leave the desert, he deprives him of the purpose of his further stay. He shows him “a long time and years of wretched life” (Ant. VI,25) living in ascesis, at the same time convincing him that it is too burdensome for him and devoid of any meaning (Pr. 12). In practice, in pushing the monk to the hatred of the anchoritic life and the hardships of asceticism, the demon of acedia illudes him also with the possibility of purifying the soul and achieving a state of impassibility without any hardship, pain or suffering (Ant. VI,51).
55 56 57 58 59
Cf. Misiarczyk (2004), 73–78. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI; Frankenberg (1912), 521–31; Brakke (2009), 133–46. Cf. Joest (1993), 25–26. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,14; Frankenberg (1912), 525; Brakke (2009), 136. Cf. Antirrheticus VI,52; Brakke (2009), 145.
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So, if, on the one hand, acedia is a hatred of anchoritism and the hardships of asceticism, on the other hand it is also an unattainable desire for its fruit without practicing it at all. Thus, an anchorite in such a state convinces himself that “a person can acquire purity and stability apart from the monastic life” (Ant. VI,41). The demon of acedia therefore tempts the monk back again to the world and his relatives. He tells him that he should once again incline towards the world and his affairs (Ant. VI,4), bless those who have dealings with the world (Ant. VI,35), (reminiscent of the relatives questioning the honesty of his intentions in leaving the world) and judge that he did it not for God but because of his own sins or weaknesses and inability to meet the affairs of the world (Ant. VI,46). Acedia convinces the monk that the world, however much it insulted and humiliated him in the past when he lived in it, is in fact not so bad, and that he may have chosen anchoritism for fear of secular life and therefore escaped to the desert in search of a more comfortable life. The purpose of such temptations is, of course, to encourage the ascetic to abandon the desert and return to secular life. This temptation is often strengthened by natural longing for the family home and relatives (Ant. VI,44). Thus, it brings to his mind some relative or brother who has achieved to an important and responsible position (Ant. VI,7,23), it encourages him to rest a bit and for a long time to take care of his family home and relatives (Ant. VI,39) or visit his own father (Ant. VI,44). An anchorite in the state of acedia does not accept the teachings of Christ who encouraged anyone who wants to follow him to “hate” his relatives (Ant. VI,45); nor does he refrain from visiting cities and relatives or friends living there (Ant. 53) or looking for other places in the desert, closer to their place of residence, to be able to go to them at any time (Ant. VI,57). Evagrius proposes as a remedy for this type of temptation perseverance in the chosen state of anchoritic life, which is clearly confirmed by the fragment of the Treaty to the monk Eulogius. The ascetic of Pontus describes the pilgrimage in Greek as ξενιτεία, meaning literally “staying alien”, as the first of fights that brings the monk fame when he decides to leave his home country, family, and property. The last part of the passage leaves no doubt that it is about leaving for the desert and leaving a family home and close relatives. Therefore, if anchoritism is among the greatest struggles, thanks to perseverance he will be faithful to the end to this choice and stay away from his dear places, and he will gain virtue and eternal salvation. The evil spirit, of course, does everything to dissuade him from this path, especially when he realizes that the monk’s soul has mastered the feeling of disgust with an anchoritism, and then surrounds it with darkness. The one who is persevering in constant thanksgiving shakes off his evil thoughts, but the more intense they are, the more they will force him to change the resolution of his heart. It is evil thoughts that bring temptations, flatter him, make him turn back from the path of asceticism, lie to him, and cause trouble in order to get him back from the chosen path of anchoritism and destroy his good resolutions and perseverance.60 Remaining in the desert and persevering, heals the soul dominated by acedia. 60 Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 2; Sinkewicz (2003), 29–30.
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Attacks of the demon of acedia do not stop, however, along with the monk’s decision to remain in the desert, but rather his tactics change. He deludes the anchorite, that it is possible to get the fruit of impassibility and spiritual knowledge without exercising the virtue of perseverance, (Ant. VI,3) fidelity in the practice of prayer, reading and meditation on the Holy Scriptures (Ant. VI,5,8). The monk, seized by acedia, does not fulfill God’s will for the zeal and perseverance which are proper to his way of life, that is, prayer and meditation on the Word of God (De oct. 14). Simultaneous hatred for the efforts of ascetic life and the desire for its fruits but without any difficulty, in some strange way paralyze the soul of the monk and cause it to “stumble”. Hence as a remedy for this symptom of acedia, Evagrius advises exercise in the virtue of perseverance and fidelity to the duties undertaken, and also prayer to beg God for these favors: Perseverance is the cure for acedia, along with the execution of all tasks with great attention [and the fear of God […]. Pray with understanding and intensity, and the spirit of acedia will flee from you.61 Fulfilling all personal duties with the same diligence and fear of God, and even more eagerly and with fervent prayer, cleanses the soul of this symptom of acedia. 3.2.2.
Hatred for One’s Own Cell and Work – The Desire for Another Cell and Work
The second group of symptoms concerning acedia is the monk’s hatred for specific manifestations of the anchoritic lifestyle, that is, his residential cell, learned profession, and manual work. So Evagrius wrote: One wife is not enough for a man given to pleasure; a single cell is not enough for the monk given to acedia.62 A married man in the state of acedia changes his wife and blames her for his suffering, and the monk wants to escape from his present cell. The demon of acedia therefore convinces the anchorite that “the first one (cell) that he had was very foul and full of moisture so that he got all kinds of diseases from it”.63 And as the delicate plant is easily disturbed by a bitter gust of wind, so is the idea of leaving the cell by a monk dominated by acedia.64 The hatred of the present cell and the desire to seek a new one is presented to the mind as reasonable because it depends on the subjectively negative assessment of the previous one as just disgusting, full of moisture and the source of all diseases. This is not always the case, but acedia convinces the monk to such reasoning, to master his heart with the temptation of constant change. The anchorite who finds reasons to reject the current cell will also find reasons to hate
61 62 63 64
Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 14; PG 79,1160C; Sinkewicz (2003), 85. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; PG 79,1160A; Sinkewicz (2003), 84. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,26; Frankenberg (1912), 525; Brakke (2009), 135. Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; Sinkewicz (2003), 84.
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other places and in this way fall into the trap of subsequent continuous changes. For a man overcome by acedia every place is bad and he wrongly thinks that anywhere else will be better. In the case of anchorites who inhabited the desert and practiced the principle of stabilitas loci as a condition for stabilitas mentis, the temptation of constant change definitely affected such a lifestyle more strongly than in the world and was noticed faster than by other people accustomed to life changes. Frequently changing the place of residence destroyed the constancy of a monk’s thoughts: “A wandering monk is like a dry twig in the desert; he is still for a little while and then is carried off unwillingly”.65 In this passage, Evagrius also emphasizes another aspect of this temptation of constant change, namely, that it is done somewhat unconsciously despite the will of the anchorite himself. The strength of inner tension and suffering is constantly driving people forward, to change. Of course, the supposedly rational pretexts for abandoning a cell by a monk were and are different from a Christian’s living in the world to abandon his wife or husband or workplace, etc., but the mechanism of action of acedia remains the same. So, the demon of acedia: Instills in him a dislike for the place and for his state of life itself, for manual labor […]. He leads him on to a desire for other places where he can easily find the wherewithal to meet his needs and pursue a trade that is easier and more productive; he adds that pleasing the Lord is not a question of being in a particular place: for scripture says that the divinity can be worshipped everywhere. He joins to these suggestions the memory of his close relations and of his former life; he depicts for him the long course of his lifetime, while bringing the burdens of ascetism before his eyes; and, as the saying has it, he deploys every device in order to have the monk leave his cell and flee [to] the stadium.66 The hatred of a monk in the state of acedia is not limited to the cell in which he lives, but also affects the very lifestyle of the anchorite and manual work for his own maintenance. Acedia therefore tempts him by encouraging changes in his chosen lifestyle, that is, changing the place for one less humid where it will be easier to find what is necessary for life. So, it shows him other places and advises him to get a new cell there, because then he will met rest of his needs and consolation from the arriving brothers without much difficulty.67 In practice, therefore, thoughts estemming from acedia encourage relaxation of severe asceticism; they “shake our endurance and provoke us to take a little break and make an extended visit to our home and kinfolk”.68 The submission to them is justified by the explanation that pleasing God is independent of the place and one can give Him the same service everywhere. The truth is, of course, that God can be worshiped in every place, but there are places like the desert which make it very easy. If there really was no difference between
65 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; PG 79,1160A; Sinkewicz (2003), 84. 66 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 12; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 522–26; Sinkewicz (2003), 99 (with some changes). 67 Cf. Antirrheticus VI,15,33; Brakke (2009), 137.40. 68 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,39; Frankenberg (1912), 527; Brakke (2009), 142.
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life in the world and in the desert, what sense would anchoritism itself have? We see, therefore, that acedia constantly strives to question the meaning of anchoritic life and encourages the monk to abandon it or at least tries to destroy his state of internal constancy. The ascetic mind is then jerked on the one hand by anger, which expels him from his place, and on the other hand he is attracted by the desire of other places (Ant. VI,57). Acedia draws him into the temptation of constant change and eternal dissatisfaction with the new cell, and finally gives him the idea that it would be better to abandon the anchoritic life and return to the world or to his relatives.69 The defense against attacks of acedia will be the struggle to maintain stabilitas loci. Evagrius has no illusions that the desire to change a cell to another one will not end in just one change, but will open the door to further changes. For a monk dominated by acedia, one cell is not enough as one wife is not enough for a lascivious husband. All passionate thoughts, and in a special way those from acedia try to make the monk unstable and deprive him of the fruit of anchoritism: When thoughts transport us to places which they have suggested we will like, then they in turn make us feel regret in order that they may render us completely unstable and unproductive. Therefore, let us not disperse ourselves from place to place, but rather let us bend ourselves to the practice of stillness (hesychia) and ascetic toils, because from our laziness the thoughts get power against us. He who knows the experience of warfare in the place where he was called remains there with God, but the person who does not know the experience proceeds as one still untried.70 Although the term acedia does not appear in this text, we have no doubt that it is the subject because it reveals the desire to change cells. Evagrius emphasizes, moreover, that coinciding with the common monastic experience of changing cells to a supposedly better and nicer one, is almost immediate occurrence of a feeling of regret. What he had longed for before he now regrets, not knowing what he really wants. In this way, he allows himself to enter into a state of emotional instability and loses the fruit of hesychia. Hence the ascetic of Pontus advises not moving from place to place, but fighting or turning to hesychia (silence) and hardships, remaining before God in the place where one found his calling. Succumbing to acedia by constantly changing the place of residence makes the soul cowardly, takes away its bravery, and weakens its perseverance. And perseverance is the only effective remedy for acedia: You must not abandon the cell in the time of temptations, fashioning excuses seemingly reasonable. Rather, you must remain seated inside, exercise perseverance, and valiantly welcome all attackers, especially the demon of acedia, who is the most oppresive of all but leaves the soul proven to the highest degree.71 Just as before, in the fight against acedia which pushed the monk to abandon the anchoritic life and asceticism, Evagrius advised using the weapon of perseverance
69 Cf. A. Guillaumont (1968), 31–58. 70 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 12; Sinkewicz (2003), 318.39. 71 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 28; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 564; Sinkewicz (2003), 102.
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(ὑπομονή) to remain in this state of life, he now also encourages perseverance as the best remedy to stay in the same cell. For the monk from Pontus ὑπομονή does not mean any general patience or perseverance in trials, but rather perseverance in the chosen lifestyle and in one’s own cell. This is because acedia is a temptation that strikes the basic principle of anchoritic life or hesychia conditioned by the permanence of lifestyle and place.72 In Practicus 89, Evagrius clearly links perseverance (ὑπομονή) with bravery (ἀνδρεία) emphasizing that these are virtues born in the irascible part of the soul. As we have seen, in acedia anger towards what actually is becomes an important component of it, hence perseverance and bravery can be regarded as virtues helpful in overcoming this passion as well. The monk should therefore cease inventing supposedly reasonable reasons for leaving, and sit in a cell and persevere. Evagrius, writing about sitting in a cell, refers here to the ancient monastic tradition confirmed even by St Anthony for whom, remaining in the cell was closely linked with the state of hesychia.73 Moving from place to place quickly led to the idlensess of thoughts and destroyed this state. Perseverance in many texts of our monk is presented as the only effective remedy for acedia.74 And the victory over it cleanses the soul the most: If the spirit of acedia comes over you, do not leave your dwelling or avoid the worthwhile contest at an opportune moment, for in the same way that one might polish silver, so will your heart be made to shine.75 Perseverance, not only in anchoritism, but also in the same cell, is a sign of the state of hesychia and best cleanses the heart of the monk from passionate thoughts: “The spirit of acedia drives the monk out of his cell, but the monk who possesses perseverance will ever cultivate stillness”.76 Evagrius, as a good spiritual master, of course allows a situation when leaving the cell becomes not only possible, but even necessary. It happens when the one in which he is staying has become a hindrance to him, and then he does not hesitate to order: Even if the cell in which you live is too easily accessible, flee and do not spare it; do not grow slack because you are attached to it. Do anything and everything so you can cultivate stillness and devote your time to diligent application to the will of God and to the struggle with the invisible ones.77 The Pontian monk introduces the anchorite to the practice of spiritual discernment, so that he can assess his decisions in the desert from this perspective.78 If, therefore, the cell is an obstacle to maintaining hesychia and inner freedom, he should leave it as soon as possible, for remaining and clinging to it would mean a search for human
72 Cf. De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 5; Sinkiwiecz, 64. 73 Cf. Apophtegmata Patrum, Antoni 11; PG 65,77C. 74 Cf. De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 62; Tractatus ad Eulogium 8; Sinkewicz (2003), 35. 75 Evagrius Ponticus, Sententiae ad monachos 55; Greßman (1913), 157; Sinkewicz (2003), 125. 76 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; PG 79,1157D; Sinkewicz (2003), 84. 77 Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 5; PG 40 1257A–B; Sinkewicz (2003), 7. 78 Cf. Linhard (1980), 502–29; Bamberger (1992), 185–98.
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glory.79 If, on the other hand, it helps to cleanse the soul, calms it down and frees it to abide with God and the courageous fight with the passions, then one has to stay in it. Acedia as a passionate thought composed of hatred and desire of the same object paralyzes subsequent spaces of a monk’s life. In addition to the hatred of anchoritism and asceticism and the desire to return to the world and loved ones, as well as hatred for a cell and desire for another more comfortable and with easier access to people, the anchorite dominated by it also has hatred of the present work along with a longing to find a new one that will be less tiring and will bring greater material benefits. Acedia thus removes the monk from all hardships (Ant. VI,29.52) and physical work,80 which was very often the case, for example, when weaving mats in a cell so that in a half-sitting position, leaning against the wall at noon, he took a nap (Ant. VI,28). It tempts him, therefore, to hate the physical work he knows and at the same time to want “to learn another skill by which it will be better supported and which will not be so arduous” (Ant. VI,1). It also happens that if the reluctance to present work and the desire of other work cannot be realized for various reasons, then acedia introduces a man into a state of laziness and general discouragement from any effort. Evagrius recommends that the monk should try to live thanks to the work of his own hands winning out, as once did St Anthony, over the demon of acedia: Give thought to working with your hands, if possible both night and day, so that you will not be a burden to anyone, and further that you may be able to offer donations […]. In this way you can overcome the demon of acedia and eliminate all the other desire inspired by the enemy. The demon of acedia lies in wait for laziness and ‘is full of desires’, as scripture says (Prov. 13:4).81 Manual work is also a necessity for the anchorite for two reasons: to earn his own livelihood and not to burden others but to support the needy themselves; secondly, it is an excellent therapeutic measure in the case of acedia and other lusts.82 As in previous areas of the monk’s life so also in this case, the only medicine is to persevere in this manual work which the monk performs best and which gives him enough support. 3.2.3.
Hatred of Brothers and the Will to Receive Support from Others
The state of internal tension and suffering that acedia causes in the soul of a monk pushes him to seek support and consolation in his confreres. Acedia, however, is not triggered by any specific and immediate cause or misfortune, in which the anchorites showed great understanding, supporting and comforting the confrere, but is a process of painful purification of the soul contaminated with original sin in which no one can support or comfort the person. Thus, as we saw in the earlier passages, the monk dominated by acedia, constantly looks around to see if any of the brothers are coming
79 80 81 82
Cf. Antirrheticus VII,21. Cf. Nieścior (1995), 81–108. Evagrius Ponticus, Rerum monachalium rationes 8; PG 40,1260C–D; Sinkewicz (2003), 9. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1979b), 118–26.
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to comfort him; he is also very sensitive to every creak of a door or human voice reaching him.83 When nobody visited him, we must remember that the anchoritic life was and is a lonely life by its nature so that monks usually visited rarely, and very quickly the thought of acedia convinced him that “love has disappeared from among the brothers and there is no one to console him”.84 Acedia stimulated an anchorite to wrongly blame his spiritual masters and confreres for his own suffering. The monk dominated by acedia was angry “about the brothers on the pretext that there is no love in them and they do not want to console those who are sad”.85 A man in such a state does not understand that other people have not changed their attitude towards him and that the sense of abandonment is associated with an increase in his desire to be comforted. That is why an anchorite accuses his spiritual director not supporting him and his other brothers in spirit, of being excessively demanding and severe towards them and of not supporting them in torment. It is interesting that these accusations are also presented by the monk in the name of other brothers, and not just his own, as if to avoid being accused of wanting to settle his personal matters. Accusations quickly turn into anger “with the holy fathers on the pretext that they are unfeeling and do not want to console the brothers”.86 In this text the generalization of experiences also appears as if all the anchorites need such consolation, and not only a monk in the state of acedia. The intense desire to be comforted by others with simultaneous anger towards the spiritual masters further deepens the acedia of an anchorite. Experienced masters of the spiritual life could indeed refrain from cheaply comforting a monk in the state of acedia, because it would not do much good and in addition would delay the entire process of purifying his soul. They knew perfectly well, just like Evagrius himself, that: “No other demon follows immediately after this one: A state of peace and ineffable joy ensues in the soul after this struggle”.87 To be precise, it must be emphasized that the Greek text adds that no demon follows “immediately” after acedia, which does not mean that the monk will no longer be tempted by any other demon in the future. It is important, however, to undertake a brave fight with acedia because after winning against it, the anchorite experiences a state of deep inner calm (εἰρηνικὴ κατάτασις) and inexpressible joy. In his other texts, the Pontian monk explains that the state of εἰρηνικὴ κατάτασις accompanies angelic thoughts (Pr. 80) and means a state similar to impassibility (Pr. 57). In this context, we understand better the attitude of spiritual masters of anchorites who avoided cheap consolation so as not to turn them off back from the path towards impassibility. However, the monk himself does not always understand it, but rather feels anger and dislike for his spiritual masters (Ant. VI,51). In addition to seeking consolation from the spiritual father, an anchorite in the state of acedia also asks for help from his fellow brothers (Ant. VI,24). When he does
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Cf. Practicus 12; De octo spiritibus malitiae 14. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 12; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 522–24; Sinkewicz (2003), 99. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,30; Frankenberg (1912), 523; Brakke (2009), 140. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,55; Frankenberg (1912), 531; Brakke (2009), 146. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 12; C. i A. Guillaumont (1971), 526; Sinkewicz (2003), 99.
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not receive it, he falls into a state of constant dissatisfaction and proverbial eternal murmur (Ant. VI,13,48) or also accuses them of saying: “there is no love in them having no love and they do not want to console those who are sad and weary”. The accusation presented here, as in Practicus 12, is quite serious because it touches the most important aspect of Christian life and the purpose of anchoritic life, which is love. The monk dominated by acedia accuses the confreres that they have betrayed the essence of their vocation, which is the struggle to achieve impassibility, the condition of spiritual knowledge and love. This accusation is obviously based on the subjective feeling of the monk left by the confreres in his suffering. Acedia, however, is a spiritual experience in which no human consolation will help much, but experience teaches that man in the state of pain and suffering of the soul awaits support from others and is deceived by their apparent therapeutic value. In the state of acedia, whole institutions or individuals are easily blamed for one’s own suffering, monks blame other monks, spouses blame husbands, children blame parents, subordinates blame superiors, etc., but as Bunge rightly wrote: “They do not understand that they are stuck in the very center of a particularly difficult fight with oneself and that their opponent is no institution, marriage or spouse, colleagues at work or anything else, but their own wounded ego, the result of falling in love with themselves, in which Evagrius sees the roots of all eight thoughts”.88 All consolations in this state, according to the spiritual masters of the desert, not only do not help but harm, delay or even prevent the purification of the soul from the root of all passions, that is, self-love. The only cure for acedia is to survive this condition. Of course, that is easy to say or write, but it is more difficult to survive such an experience. Thoughts resulting from acedia, on the other hand, stir up the anger of the monk against the brothers who are close to him, and together again drive him into sadness, pushing the brothers farther away from him.89 In a situation where the monk did not receive the consolation he expected from spiritual masters, superiors, or confreres, it was easy for him to be angry on one hand and wrongly accuse them of a lack of love, and on the other hand, to desire to change his cell in the hope that the new place would satisfy his needs and he would find consolation from the brothers coming to him (Ant. VI,33). Probably it is just a combination of these various motives, such as the desire to change the cell for a better and less humid one, to change the work for one that is lighter and better paid, to seek other people who provide comfort in suffering, that makes the temptation of acedia so difficult to overcome. The monk in acedia fled the desert, returning to the world convinced that the love of neighbor had died out among the anchorites (Ant. VI,4); or he changed his cell and work and looked for comforters in other places (Ant. VI,57). And because his desires for consolation were so much heightened by internal pain and suffering that no one was able to satisfy them, he accused the next monks of a lack of love in the new place and went to yet another place with the same hope of finding compassion. In this way, however, the circle closed, pushing him into a trap of eternal dissatisfaction
88 Bunge (1989c), 235. 89 Cf. Antirrheticus VI,9.
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and constant change. Whoever is not satisfied with what he has (cell, work, confreres, wife, husband, children, or close relatives), will probably not be satisfied by anything. 3.2.4.
Hatred toward Oneself and the Will to be Praised by People
In addition to the above-mentioned, another symptom of acedia is hatred of oneself and vain desire for human glory. The fact is that this last form of acedia may be born in the soul of a monk directly and independently or as a result of its appearance in previous areas. The first situation occurs when a person is angry at himself for choosing the anchoritic lifestyle in the hope of getting admiration from other people but did not get it and is experiencing frustration; and the anchoritism itself was associated with great suffering. The second is when there is no possibility of expressing anger towards others for anchoritism, cell, work, or lack of consolation, and it becomes internalized, with the inability to fulfill the desire to leave the desert or change the cell, work, and confreres for fear of being suspected of desertion. The anchorite must remain where he is but anger and lust are so strong that they still cause great pain and seem to tear his soul to shreds. When a monk cannot change the place, work, company of people, he tries to deal with the passions of anger and lust in a different way, applying the strategy that people of all ages used to do, namely, to cut himself off from them. A very simple and old method is telling oneself that there is no anger or lust. Contemporary psychological language defines this strategy as a defensive mechanism of repression of unpleasant feelings to the subconscious. The man then puts on a mask and pretends to be calm although inside of him everything is “boiling”. Evagrius does not use contemporary psychological terminology for obvious reasons, but he describes the same mechanism. Such a defensive strategy, in his opinion, makes the soul unfeeling. So, when acedia attacks the soul of an anchorite for a long time, the soul loses courage and hope of defeating it (Ant. VI,7,21,34), feels anxious (Ant. VI,27) and a sense of being crushed by life (Ant. VI,37). According to Evagrius, the soul then becomes so weak that it almost dies in its own bitterness, its power destroyed by great suffering and its perseverance close to depletion due to the demon’s violence (Ant. VI,38,42,47). A man in this state experiences a feeling of being completely overpowered and exhausted (Ant. VI,9), is afraid that his torments and tortures will not end (Ant. VI,34; 54), experiences profound sadness and depression (Ant. VI,20,31,49) and a sense of alienation from himself (Ant. VI,56). All this leads to a state of some strange “hardening” or paralysis of feelings, making the soul insensitive. Evagrius described such a state in the treatise On thoughts: As for the demon that renders the soul insensible, why is it necessary even to speak of him? For I am afraid even to write of him and of how the soul is drawn out of its proper state at the moment of his arrival and rejects the fear of God and piety; the soul figures that sin is not really sin and thinks transgression is not transgression; it holds the memory of judgement and eternal punishment as mere words […]. The soul does confess God, so to speak, but does not know what he has commanded; you beat your breast when it (the soul) is moved to sin and it
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shows no awareness of it; you argue from the scriptures, but it remains completely callous and does not listen; you expose to it its disgrace before the people and it takes no account of the shame it causes among the brothers; this soul shows no understanding at all, like a pig that closes its eyes and breaks through its pen. Prolonged dwelling on thoughts of vainglory brings on this demon.90 Although he does not use the term ἀκηδία in this text, nor does he directly mention it, the description of the demon’s activity that makes the soul unfeeling corresponds to what the Antirrheticus VI,10 attributes to acedia. The soul of a man in such a state is being separated from itself, losing the ability of spiritual prayer and of feeling anything in the spiritual space: the fear of God, the sense of sin, unrighteousness, punishment, and eternal judgment. A man still believes in God but he does not see His action in the world; he tries to repent of the sin he has committed, but the soul does not feel regret; contrary to what it has experienced before, it does not have any concentration when reading the Holy Scriptures. Evagrius defines such a state of the monk’s soul as hardened and deaf, but it is not a state of dejection by the decision of the will, but rather the paralysis of the soul through feelings. It does not fear people’s reproach and remains insensitive to any consolation or accusation. Such a state is born, according to the Pontian monk, from long-term thoughts of vainglory. Acedia, as we have seen before, is born essentially of anger and carnal desire, but in the above text Evagrius allows the possibility of its being born from anger and desire of human glory. It attacks the monk who chose the anchoritic lifestyle motivated in a hidden (unconscious) way by the desire to gain admiration and human glory. However, being about half way to purifying the soul, the price of this vainglory turns out to be too high, and he reacts with anger towards himself and others. The simultaneous and long-lasting arousal of anger towards oneself and the desire for vainglory brings to him the demon of acedia which makes the soul unfeeling. This demon, paradoxically, seldom visits other people besides monks because they usually experience various disasters, illnesses, misery, or other types of pain, and when the soul is gradually racked with pain, it slowly regains compassion and destroys the state of hardening. As a remedy for such a state of hardness and anesthesis of the soul, Evagrius offers several remedies. The first is asking the Lord for the gift of tears: For the shedding of tears is a great remedy for nocturnal visions that are born from acedia, and David the prophet wisely applied this remedy to his passions when he said; “I am wearied with my groaning; I will wash my bed every night with tears, I will water my couch” (Ps 6:7).91 Acedia, of course, tries to do everything to convince the anchorite that tears will be useless in the fight against it (Ant. VI,19) or to even “put away the tears” (Sentence 56), but such experienced ascetics like the Pontian monk cannot be 90 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 11; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 188–90; Sinkewicz (2003), 160. 91 Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VI,10; Frankenberg (1912), 523; Brakke (2009), 136.
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fooled: “Sadness is burdensome and acedia is irresistible, but tears shed before God are stronger than both”.92 A great help in combating such a symptom of acedia’s action is the antirrhetic method, that is, directing an appropriate fragment of the Word of God against it. Evagrius most often recommends in these situations the quoted Ps. 6:7, but also Ps. 42 (41): 4, “Tears became bread for me day and night when they tell me every day: Where is your God?” and Ps. 42 (41):6. This last fragment of the Psalm he proposed to use as an interesting strategy of dealing with the acedia demon: When we come up against the demon of acedia, then with tears let us divide the soul and have one part offer consolation and the other receive consolation. And showing within ourselves goodly hopes, let us chant with holy David this incantation: “Why are you saddened, O my soul, and why do you trouble me? Hope in God; for I shall confess him, the salvation of my face and my God” (Ps. 41:6).93 In the state of insensitivity and numbness of soul, the Pontian monk proposes to the mind the embodiment at one at the same time of once of a comforting part of the soul which, using the biblical text, calls to trust, and a comforted one that pities itself. In this way it deals with both the part of the soul that is oppressed and troubled, as well as the one that trusts God in spite of everything. Finally, another way to combat this thought is true prayer, which calms the mind away from the hustle and bustle, acedia, and carelessness.94 Often, however, the awareness that it is necessary to live in a state of constant internal or insensitive struggle for the rest of his life, combined with the conviction that he will not be able to defeat the strong demon of acedia, fills the anchorite with the proper fear which is also usually accompanied by somatic symptoms. This is also confirmed by the discoveries of modern human sciences that the repression of anger and various good desires becomes the cause of some somatic diseases. For obvious reasons Evagrius did not draw such far-fetched conclusions, but he did notice the connection between acedia and fear for one’s own health. This relationship acts as a cause-and-effect in two directions: minor bodily diseases cause acedia or the state of acedia scares the monk with somatic disease. In the state of acedia, anxiety intensifies in a man, because it shows “prolonged old age, severe poverty without consolation, and diseases that can kill the body” (Ant. VI,32). We have seen earlier in the analysis of gluttony that such fears in desert conditions were somehow justified, but acedia pushed for exaggerated concern, we would say in today’s language, hypochondriacal fear, for one’s own health, which forced the anchorite to depend on others and to exercise patience in bearing the will of God. We also saw in the case of sadness how often different states of anxiety were closely associated with somatic symptoms. On the other hand, the monk’s soul quickly fell into acedia when it suffered any minor
92 Evagrius Ponticus, Ad virginem 39; Greßmann (1913), 149; Sinkewicz (2003), 134. 93 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 27; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 562; Sinkewicz (2003), 102. See also Ant. VI,20. 94 Cf. De oratione 76; Sinkewicz (2003), 201. Cf. Hausherr (1960), 109.
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bodily disease (Ant. VI,6,36). As an aid in overcoming these exaggerated fears for one’s own health, Evagrius instructed the monks, still valid today, in the golden rule of conduct taken from Macarius of Egypt: The monk must ever hold himself ready as though he were to die tomorrow, and in turn must treat the body as though he would have to live with it for many years. The first practice, he would say, cuts off the thoughts of acedia and makes the monk zealous; the latter keeps the body healthy and always maintains its abstinence in balance.95 The principle of a monk’s life – to be ready as if one had to die tomorrow, the so-called exercise in dying – has proved to be very effective in overcoming acedia which focused the monk on himself and his own health. Not only Evagrius but also later monks like Cassian and Genadius mention it.96 Cassian refers to one of the letters of the previously mentioned Macarius who encourages monks to look after their bodies as if they were to live 100 years, and on the other hand should not unnecessarily stimulate the soul, should forgive injuries and reject sadness as if they had to die each day (tamquam cotidie moriturum).97 A. Guillaumont rightly emphasizes that the sense of the phrase of Cassian cotidie moriturus is closer to Macarius and Evagrius than to Seneca cotidie morimur (Epistula ad Lucillum 24) in the sense of “everyday we approach to death” or St Paul “I am put to death every day” (1 Cor. 15:3).98 It is about the sense conveyed in one of the sentences attributed to Macarius the Great, “to have the thought about death every day in front of one’s eyes”.99 This everyday meditatio mortis freed the monk from moments of absolutizing his own life and body, allowed him to gain a healthy distance and thus destroy acedia and grow at the same time in zeal.100 On the other hand, it kept the body in good health because it is a necessary tool in ascetic practice and in knowing the world and God.101 An anchorite dominated by acedia, in spite of escaping from it into states of somatic anxiety, often uses other strategies such as escape from prayer into apparent concern for those in need, or into work or other exaggerated activism. These escape strategies are usually motivated by anxiety and can easily be recognized after a tendency to exaggerate. The state of general sluggishness, weariness, and discouragement has particularly harmful consequences for the monk’s prayer which is his main duty in the desert. Evagrius then warns: The monk afflicted with acedia is lazy in prayer and will not even say the words of a prayer. As a sick person cannot carry about a heavy burden, so the person afflicted
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Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 29; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 566–68; Sinkewicz (2003), 103. Cf. De viris illustribus. 10. Cf. De institutis caenobiorum V,41; Guy (1965), 256–57. Cf. C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 567–68, note 29. Cf. PG 34,232D–233A. Cf. Vita Antonii 19; PG 26,872A. Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962), 110.
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by acedia will not perform a work of God [with dilligence]. The former has lost the strength of his body and the latter has dissipated the exertions of his soul.102 Acedia destroys the taste of true prayer and the anchorite dominated by it. Even if he actually utters the words, he is not really capable of true spiritual prayer. This unnatural state of the soul deprives it of all power and weakens its zeal in the service of God. The very purpose and meaning of the monk’s stay in the desert, that is, prayer, the continuous, uninterrupted, and direct dialogue of the mind with God (De or. 3), is questioned. Often during the Eucharist the demon of acedia tied to convince the monk that the singing of the psalms was too heavy and tiring for his soul, and gave him drowsiness and haste in prayer to relieve the weary body as quickly as possible.103 And because the monks in Egypt at the beginning and the end of the night were reciting two series of twelve Psalms, the demon of acedia detached them from reading and learning inspired words or tempted to shorten their singing only twelve Psalms, arguing that a holy old men did so and they were liked by God.104 The monk seized by acedia very often shortened or even completely abandoned prayer, justifying it with the need to care for needy people. Evagrius is however skeptical about the real motivation of such a practice: A person afflicted with acedia proposes visiting the sick, but fulfilling his own purpose. A monk given to acedia is quick to undertake a service, but considers his own satisfaction to be a precept.105 According to the monk of Pontus, the desire to visit the sick is really just an excuse for the monk to achieve his own goal of escaping from his cell. After all, he went to the desert to purify his soul and to pray, so if he is suddenly overwhelmed by great concern for his fellow men, it is right to see it as an egocentric goal rather than as true love of neighbor. The monk in the state of acedia is eager to serve others, but in fact he does so more for love of himself than for his fellow men. The internal anxiety accompanying acedia is thus intoxicated with the apparent love of neighbor and excessive activity. Evagrius speaks of gentleness as a simple criterion for distinguishing between apparent love of one’s neighbor and the true one. Bunge rightly wrote: “True love makes a person gentle, while the ‘activism’ born from acedia is bitter and incomprehensible”.106 Of course, the monks definitely have fewer ways to escape into such destructive activism, but in the secular life we often meet people who live in the illusion that a large amount of activity will allow them to escape the feeling of inner emptiness. And some even boast about their hard work, not distinguishing it from genuine diligence, never resting and experiencing even guilt when they do not have any. This destructive maximalism, especially among Christians, can easily be covered by appearances of virtue and often difficult to recognize. The decisive criterion is the actual and not the apparent intention with which we undertake or reject
102 103 104 105 106
Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 14; PG 79,1160C; Sinkewicz (2003), 85. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 8; Sinkewicz (2003), 35. Cf. Antirrheticus VI,5; Brakke (2009), 134. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 13; PG 79,1157D; Sinkewicz (2003), 84. Bunge (1989c), 238.
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any action. If one looks for himself and makes something out of love for himself, then even if he is tormented by severe asceticism or helping others, it remains without values before God. Evagrius insisted that all exaggeration comes from evil and has nothing to do with the real life of an anchorite. That’s why he warned the monks: The demon of acedia also imitates this demon, suggesting to the persevering (ascetic) an extreme withdrawal, inviting him to rival John the Baptist and Antony, the very first of the anchorites, so that, unable to bear the prolonged inhumane withdrawal, he flees with shame, abandoning the place, and the demon then makes his boast, ‘I prevailed over him’ (Ps. 12:5).107 Just as the demon of gluttony, when unable to conquer the anchorite by ordinary gluttony, encourages him to more severe asceticism in order to bring him down, so does the demon of acedia. He encourages the persevering monk to more severe asceticism and makes him compassionately compare himself to John the Baptist or St Anthony in order that he will not endure the inhuman asceticism and will leave his place with shame. Demons are often: […] hindering what can be done and forcing us to do what cannot be done. And so the prevent they sick from giving thanks for their suffering and acting patiently towards those who are looking after them; in turn, they encourage them to practice abstinence even while they are weak and to say the psalms standing even when they feel weighed down.108 Any measure in such a fight is allowed because the demon of acedia wants to achieve one goal, namely, that the monk should abandon “the holy path of the illustrious ones and its dwelling place”.109 The cure for attacks of the demon of acedia which pushes laziness on the one hand, and on the other destroys maximalism, is to determine the right measure for oneself. Adhering to the designated measure and not going away from it, either one way or the other, allows the anchorite to preserve the internal calm and the state of hesychia. As in all other symptoms of acedia, so also in this case the remedy par excellence is perseverance in the adopted decisions which the Pontian monk described as follows: Perseverance is the severing of acedia, the cutting down of thoughts, concern for death, meditation on the cross, fear firmly affixed, beaten gold, legislation for afflictions, a book of thanksgiving, a breastplate of stillness, an armor of ascetic works, a fervent work of excellence, an example of the virtues.110 True perseverance is the foundation and contains all other efforts and strategies in the fight against the demon of acedia.
107 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 35; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 276; Sinkewicz (2003), 178. 108 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 40; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 592; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. 109 Cf. Antirrheticus VI,52; Brakke (2009), 145. 110 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 4; PG 79,1143B–C; Sinkewicz (2003), 64.
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C ha pt er VI
Logismoi of the Rational Part of the Soul
In the reconstruction of the ascetic teaching of Evagrius on the subject of eight λογισμοί and thus also the passion of the rational part of the soul, we must constantly remember that he describes this issue from two different perspectives: spiritual growth and empirical. In the order of spiritual growth, thoughts of the rational part of the soul, that is, vanity and pride, attack the anchorite after overcoming the passion of the unreasonable (passionate) part of the soul. It is about this state when the monk successfully resisted both the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul, i.e., gluttony, impurity, and greed, as well as the irascible, i.e., anger and sadness, then acedia which simultaneously stimulates the concupiscibility and irascibility of the soul. In the empirical perspective, however, vanity, as we have seen before, along with gluttony and greed is one of the three so-called source passions and often attacks the anchorite together with the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul.1 The Pontian monk therefore seems to understand the temptations of vanity and pride in two senses: as passions of the rational part of the soul that embrace the soul of the monk in the final phase of the whole process of its purification and as passions that have already appeared at the stage of ascetic practice. In the empirical order, vanity and pride can arise when a monk struggles with one of his passionate thoughts. So, if the anchorite still succumbs to one of the passionate thoughts such as gluttony, impurity, greed, sadness or anger, then often he unknowingly falls into the trap of the demon of vanity which encourages him to seek human glory in other areas of his own life. In modern language, we would say that this is a typical form of compensation: to make up for gaps in one area of life one searches for success in other areas. Thus, the anchorite who undergoes, for example, gluttony or impurity, will look for human glory in diligence or a unique way of making the mats. This mechanism of compensating for low self-esteem that arises from the sense of inadequacy of one’s own conduct to the chosen ideal, of course, not only in the lives of monks but in every human being, though it takes other forms there. When the anchorite resists one or the other passionate thought, then the demon of vanity tries to take away the fruit of all the ascetic effort before God, pushing him to seek human glory. It arouses in him the conviction that he has already reached a state of perfection similar to the great Desert Fathers and should start practicing even more severe asceticism, so that ultimately he cannot endure it, he abandons monastic life or returns to his old passions. In this way, vanity and pride become easy ways to return to old lusts or wraths.
1 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 1; Sinkewicz (2003), 153.
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In the case of vanity and pride, the issue of a vague relationship in the anthropology and spiritual teaching of Evagrius between the mind and the rational part of the soul returns once again. On the one hand, the Pontian monk himself, as we have seen before, defines the soul as a fallen mind and, as a consequence, such great scholars as Guillaumont or Gehin are of the opinion that only its passionate (irrational) part is really the soul for Evagrius, while its rational part (λογιστικόν) is identical to νοῦς. Some of his texts, such as the description of acedia as the last passion after which no other thoughts follow, seem to confirm this understanding of his teaching. This is clearly indicated in the text from the Practicus: The end of the practical life is love, of knowledge theology; they have their respective beginnings in faith and natural contemplation. Those demons that seize hold of the passionate part of the soul are said to be opposed to the practical life; in turn, those that cause great vexation to the rational part are called enemies of all truth and adversaries of contemplation.2 According to this fragment, demons who attack the passionate (irrational) part of the soul (gluttony, impurity, greed, anger, sadness, and acedia) oppose ascetic practice, while those who attack the rational part of the soul (vanity and pride) oppose truth and contemplation.3 Faith is the beginning of love, and the purpose of love is to know God.4 In the previously quoted text from Practicus 78, Evagrius actually states that ascetic practice is a spiritual method that purifies only the passionate part of the soul. But impassibility is achieved in two ways: as an expression of the natural sowing of virtues which “is accompanied by humbleness with repentance, tears, God’s boundless desire and immense zeal for work”, and after the demons have withdrawn, “vainglory and pride at the destruction of the other demons”.5 Further, Evagrius emphasizes that the rational part of the soul acts according to its nature when it engages in the natural contemplation of beings (Pr. 84; 86), just like the mind that “has completed the work of the practical life with the help of God and has approached knowledge possesses little or no awareness at all of the irrational part of the soul, for knowledge has carried it off to the heights and separated it from sensible things”.6 On the other hand, the monk from Pontus defines demons and passions as not only the thoughts of the unreasonable (passionate) part of the soul, but also vanity (Pr. 59) and pride (Pr. 14), clearly counting them among the eight major λογισμοί (Pr. 6). Nowhere does Evagrius identify directly the rational part of the soul with the mind, always clearly differentiating terminologically between νοῦς and μέρος λογιστικόν, nor does he describe the human soul as composed of the mind and irrational part, but always as composed of rational and unreasonable (passionate) parts. According to Evagrius, when an anchorite has already freed himself from the thought of the passionate part of the soul and achieved impassibility with love, 2 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 84; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 674; Sinkewicz (2003), 111. 3 Cf. also Scholia in Psalmos 117,10; PG 12,1580D: “Some demons encircle him as praktikos, others encircle him as contemplative. And he rebuffs the former with justice and the latter with wisdom”. 4 Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 122. 5 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 57; Sinkewicz (2003), 108. 6 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 66; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 650; Sinkewicz (2003), 109.
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he begins to experience the natural contemplation of the φυσική stage, and he is attacked by the demons of vainglory and pride that are the enemies of truth and contemplation. Vanity and pride belong still to the eight main λογισμοί, however, they are not the thoughts of the passionate but the rational part of the soul. They are also not temptations of the πρακτική phase, when the monk struggles with the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul, but temptations of the γνωστική stage, when the anchorite fights against the temptations of its rational part and is called gnostic (γνωστικός) or contemplative (θεωρητικός). In the treatise On different types of evil thoughts, Evagrius says the same with different terminology, distinguishing between the thoughts of vainglory, pride, jealousy, and accusation, they tempt man as a rational being, and other thoughts that rouse man as a foolish animal, awakening his madness or lust against nature.7 At the gnostic stage the monk begins to experience spiritual knowledge, first seeing the spiritual causes (reasons) of the existence of the material world (φυσική) and then meeting in a spiritual way the Holy Trinity (θεολογική). In this sense, vanity and pride, the passions proper to the γνωστική stage, oppose both natural contemplation (φυσική), which is the beginning of the knowledge of the spiritual reality, as well as the contemplation of God (θεολογική), which is its end. One might even be tempted to say that vanity is a temptation against natural contemplation, and pride is a temptation against theology in the Evagrian sense of the term, or contemplation of God. On the one hand, vanity and pride are passionate thoughts that oppose natural contemplation and contemplation of God, while on the other hand, at the stage of ascetic practice, they try to destroy its fruits, stimulating the monk to seek human glory or the desire to assign all right deeds to himself, opening in this way access of the soul to the previous demons. Evagrius emphasizes that the action of some passionate thoughts is seen when they limit virtue, hindering the fulfillment of the commandments, while others are noticed only in the way of virtue when they whisper to keep the commandments for the sake of people, destroying the good intention of the monk.8 It is easy to see in these statements a distinction between the thoughts of a passionate part of the soul that fights with virtue and ascetic practice, and vanity and pride that destroy the good intention of asceticism. Further detailed analyses of vanity and pride will focus precisely on these two aspects of their action: seeking human glory for oneself in the practice of asceticism and as an obstacle to gaining spiritual gnosis.
1.
Vainglory
As we have seen earlier, Evagrius perceives vanity along with gluttony and greed as one of the three so-called source passions that are the reason for the appearance of all other temptations.9 Therefore, if the anchorite wants to deal effectively with other
7 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 21; Sinkewicz (2003), 167. 8 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 30; Sinkewicz (2003), 174. 9 Cf. Epistula 39,3; De malignis cogitationibus 1; 24.
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passionate thoughts, he should first try to overcome these source ones because it will not bring him any benefit to remove gluttony by fasting or greed with alms when he falls to the demon of vainglory.10 The monk of Pontus, therefore, proposes to the monks of the desert that they despise food and drink, and reject all greed from them, and flee from vainglory, for “all human glory is like a flower of the field” (Isa. 60:1:1; 1:24).11 He encourages them to imitate: Those who are at peril on the sea, who throw the cargo overboard because of the violence of the winds and the rising waves. But here we must pay careful attention, lest in throwing the cargo overbard we do so to be seen by people.12 In this text, Evagrius refers to the images proper to his time, when people travelled mainly by sea; but the idea of getting rid of unnecessary things during a storm clearly emphasizes the need to free oneself from the passions as a condition for reaching spiritual gnosis. Often, however, even the very struggle with passions can be carried out in the name of a subtle desire to seek human glory. It is not easy to discover all the machinations of the demon of vanity.13 The thought of vainglory embraces the whole spectrum of human life and is born in a situation of sin when someone seeks admiration and recognition from other people or arises with virtue after overcoming some passion. It is understandable that in the context of anchoritic life, Evagrius mainly refers to the latter situation when vanity is born with virtue, and in the further part of our analysis we will deal with this aspect of its operation. The Pontian monk affirms that “It is difficult to escape the thought of vainglory, for what you do to rid yourself of it becomes for you a new source of vainglory”.14 Vanity can very quickly and easily introduce every person, and in a special way the anchorite, into a vicious circle and spiritual “looping”. For if on one hand he tries to cleanse his soul of all passions in order to achieve dispassion and to enter the path of spiritual gnosis, then very quickly such a state may become a reason for new vanity. The first vanity is born at the stage of ascetic practice when the anchorite fights to free himself from the thought of the passionate part of the soul, then the demon of vanity tries to persuade him to do all this not for God but for human glory. The second kind of vanity appears only in the state of impassibility, after overcoming the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul, and cannot exist earlier because this kind of seeking human glory “is persuaded by almost all the demons”.15 For if the anchorite struggles with gluttony or greed and has not reached impassibility, for obvious reasons there is no place in his soul to seek human glory because of dispassion. Impassibility is, according to Evagrius, very important and at the same time a delicate moment for the further development of the ascetic life of a monk which, lived badly, can quickly 10 Cf. Epistula 17,3. 11 Cf. Epistula 27,5; De malignis cogitationibus 3. 12 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 3; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 158–60; Sinkewicz (2003), 154. 13 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 44; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 14 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 30; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 570; Sinkewicz (2003), 103. 15 Cf. Practicus 31; Sinkewicz (2003), 103.
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end up in the snares of vanity; and this in turn, as we shall see, results in a regression to previous passions, especially sadness or anger or falling into the trap of pride. Hence the Pontian monk observes: Alone among the thoughts, that of vainglory has an abundance of matter; embracing nearly the whole inhabited world, it opens the gates to all the demons, like some evil traitor of a city. That is why it greatly humiliates the mind of the anchorite, filling it with numerous words and objects, and ruining its prayers through which he endeavours to heal all the wounds of his soul. When all the demons have been defeated, together they augment this particular thought and thereby they all regain their entrance into souls, truly making ‘the last state worse than the first’ (Matt. 12:455; 2 Pet. 2:20). From this thought is born also that pride, which cast down from the heavens to earth ‘the Seal of Likeness and the Crown of Beauty’ (Ezek. 28:12).16 The demon of vanity feeds on manifold matter and opens the way to all other passionate thoughts, both those from which the monk has already released himself and those from the demon of pride. The thought of vainglory is like a thistle that pricks on all sides. It is served by both a sack and a princely robe, word and silence, satiety and hunger, anchoritism and meetings with people.17 This demon is driven away by perseverance in prayer and voluntarily refraining from speaking or doing something that would create a new vanity (De mal. 15). Evagrius left us a perfect synthetic description in his treatise De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus: Vainglory involves fantasizing about social encounters, a pretence of industriousness contrary to the truth, the author of heresies, desire for privilege, the ultimate title, slavery to praises, a spirit with many forms, a beast with many teeth; the mean of vainglory is entwined with pride and jealousy which are found within one another and which make war through one another, the three-strand chain of vices, the threefold poisonous mixture of passions, the threefold tongue of heretics.18 Vainglory as the main goal of life puts man in search of recognition, priority, and success, contrary to the truth. It makes a person dependent on success and desirous of praise, although he himself is unable to express them to other people. It envies the successes of other people, convincing its victim that he is all the more worthy of the same or even greater recognition. It humiliates the mind of the anchorite, making him incapable of true natural contemplation and even more so of the contemplation of God, and immerses him even more in reflection on the sensual world. Evagrius deals with vainglory in various texts;19 in the current study we will focus on the analysis of three aspects of this passion: “vanity as seeking human glory in 16 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 14; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 198–200; Sinkewicz (2003), 162–63. 17 Cf. Epistula 51. 18 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 4; PG 79,1144C–D; Sinkewicz (2003), 64. 19 Cf. Ep. 8,1; 9,1; 16,5; 17,3; 25,4; 27,5; 39,3; 51,2–3; 52,3–4.6; 60,3; Pr 13; 30–32; Or 73; 74; 116; 148; Sent. 61, Ad virginem 18; De mal. 1,3,11,15,17,21,2,24,28; De octo 15–16; De vitiis 4; Ep. Mel. 46; Eul 3,4,8,13,14,15,17,18 ,21,22,24,25,27,28,33,34; Ant. VII; Capita cognoscitiva 44, 49, 57.
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practicing asceticism”, “vanity of the gnostic”, and “vanity as an enemy of gnosis and contemplation”. 1.1.
Praktikos Vainglory
One of the aspects of the presence of vanity is, as we have seen, its activity already at the stage of ascetic practice when the anchorite fights to free himself from the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul. When one seeks human glory as a reward for overcoming one of passionate thoughts, we can talk in such a case about the so-called small vanity: When the anchorite’s mind attains some small degree of impassibility, it then acquires the horse of vainglory and immediately rushes to the cities, getting its fill of the lavish praise accorded to its repute. By providential design the spirit of fornication which came to meet him and shut him up in a pig-sty, teaches him not to leave his bed until he is completely healthy and not to imitate those undisciplined sick people who while still carrying about in themselves the last vestiges of sickness apply themselves to untimely walks and baths and fall back again into their illnesses.20 The small impassibility that the Pontian monk mentions in the above text means the same as imperfect impassibility in his other writings and concerns the overcoming of one of the passionate thoughts. Evagrius does not explicitly mention what passion is meant, but from the context and other fragments of his works, in which he opposes the action of demons of vanity and impurity, we can easily guess that it is a matter of impurity. So, when the anchorite has freed himself from the demon of impurity, he then leaves the desert with vainglory, finding no care for his abstinence and going to the cities and public baths. There a demon of impurity awaits him who, through contact with people, attacks him again, awakening his imagination with erotic thoughts. The price of such imprudent behavior is the return to impure sins or at least exposure to the attacks of impure thoughts along with the descent from the path of knowledge and return to the path of ascetic practice. This happens not only in the case of impurity, but any other passionate thoughts. The re-attack of the demon of impurity or some other, according to the monk of Pontus, reminds the anchorite that his soul has not yet been completely healed of the passions and he should not leave his cell under any circumstances until he has fully recovered. Otherwise, he will again fall into the disease of the soul and will be overcome by the old passions, and he will have to fight with them again instead of contemplating the spiritual reality. In the struggle with the demon of vanity it is necessary to know the principles of his actions, that is, he usually appears after liberation from some passion and often automatically, without the participation of human consciousness. Evagrius recommends that the monk or nun practice asceticism, purify his or her motivation, and not look for human glory:
20 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 15; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 202–04; Sinkewicz (2003), 163.
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Do all things for the Lord, and do not seek the glory of men, because the glory of men is like the flower of the grass, but the glory of the Lord abides forever (Isa. 40:6–7).21 Vanity wraps itself around virtue like bindweed and not only around the virtue of continence, but around every other one after overcoming its opposing passions. Searching for human glory reveals the honesty of the monk’s intentions in practicing asceticism, and man’s own love will use everything, even the most harsh asceticism, to strengthen his ego. For if the anchorite practicing asceticism fights with some passion, and after liberation from it runs immediately to people seeking their recognition, it can be assumed that all his efforts were motivated not by love for God but for himself and the search for human glory. Evagrius classifies the demon of vanity with those passionate thoughts that whisper to keep all commandments or to practice asceticism in order to show themselves to people (De mal. 30). In this way, the self-centered motivation destroys in fact all the value of the monk’s asceticism. Thus, the Pontian monk describes the effects of its operation in its own, almost ironic way: Vainglory is an irrational passion and it readily gets tangled up with any work of virtue. A bindweed vine entangles itself round a tree and when it reaches the uper part it dries out the roots; vainglory grows alongside the virtues and does not withdraw until it eradicates their power. A grape bunch that trails on the ground quickly goes rotten, and virtue is ruined when it leans on vainglory. The monk afflicted with vainglory is an unpaid workman; he undertakes the work but gets no pay. […] It (= vainglory) makes the older stronger than the younger, only if there are many witnesses present. Then fasting, vigils, and prayer are light matters, for the praise of the multitude rouses the enthusiasm.22 Although our author defines the search for human glory as an irrational passion, he is not in contradiction with himself, associating it in other texts with the thought of the rational part of the soul. In this text he means the rather irrational character of vanity in the sense that it destroys the values of the monk’s ascetic hardships and, in fact, turns against him alone. Just as the bindweed which entangles the tree and dries the root, similarly vanity cannot exist without the virtue around which it is climbing up, drying up the root of the noble intentions of man’s asceticism. If, therefore, virtue is built only on a subtle search for human glory, sooner or later it will be stripped of its fictitious character; and human glory itself becoming the payment for hardship deprives the monk of the right to any reward on the part of God. Praise and appreciation on the part of the people is able to give superhuman to the vain man efforts and enable him to cross the limits of human nature. Vanity destroys the value of abstinence and alms, and by advising prayer in public squares it destroys the essence of prayer, limiting it to the human level people and preventing it from
21 Evagrius Ponticus, Ad virginem 18; Greßmann (1913), 147; Sinkewicz (2003), 132. 22 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 15–16; PG 79,1160C–1161B; Sinkewicz (2003), 85–86 (passim).
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reaching God. Just as a wise man hides his treasure, so a wise monk should hide the hardships of his asceticism: Do not sell your labours for people’s esteem, nor hand over the future glory for the sake of paltry fame, for human esteem settles in the dust and its reputation is extinguished on earth, but the glory of virtue abides for eternity.23 Evagrius develops here the teaching of Christ himself according to which one who fasts or prays in public seeking the recognition of people has already received his reward. So, if the monk takes on the hardships of asceticism only because of human glory, he does not do it for God but for himself and wants to receive the reward from people, not from God. In the Ad Eulogium Evagrius develops his teaching on this subject. He states, therefore, that true virtue does not demand human worship nor does it rejoice in the honors which are the mother of all evil. The beginning of the desire for honors is the willingness to please people and their end is pride.24 Often, of course, this desire to seek human glory is carefully hidden by man behind the screen of an apparent search for the glory of God or the good of other people. A good test of the actual intentions of man will always be the way of experiencing the frustration of the need for recognition. So, if someone who does not receive admiration or recognition from other people quickly falls into anger or sadness, then there is no doubt that he was looking for recognition and is overcome by vanity, even if he said something completely different. Evagrius perfectly captured this idea in one of his Letters, when he underlines that praise causes vanity and to whom the object of his desires has been taken away falls into depression.25 Searching for human glory and recognition for our own actions becomes a trap from which there is not an easy way out: its achievement leads to pride, and its lack to sadness or anger.26 Another way of action for the demon of vanity at the stage of ascetic practice is to urge a man to look for the company of important people from his environment or various institutions, so that by the very fact of staying in such an environment he at least gains a little admiration from other people. Included in this desire is familiarity with well-known people, with whom people of all ages have sought acquaintance. Among the anchorites, however, wrote Evagrius, some become friends of God-fearing people not because of caring for their own soul but for fame, to gain respect for themselves without difficulty.27 Such “attaching” to the authority of anchorites famous for a holy life gives to the monk a sense of being more important than others and the illusory hope that through the very fact of being in their company he will be freed from all passions without any effort. However, life itself usually brutally verifies such illusions, showing that everyone has to struggle with his own passions for a long time and there is no shortcut here.
23 24 25 26 27
Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 16; PG 79,1161B; Sinkewicz (2003), 86. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 30–31. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Epistula 8,1. Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 61; Sinkewicz (2003), 126. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 21; Sinkewicz (2003), 47.
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The passionate thought of vainglory also emerges when one intensifies the severity of asceticism and multiplies physical exercises. If the payment for asceticism is the glory and admiration of people, a more severe asceticism becomes the source of greater recognition. Then the demon of vainglory makes the monk speak in a teacher’s tone, indicating that he occupies the first place among those who have great hardships and spiritual experience, and encourages him to compete and be jealous of those praised for their perfect deeds and actions or admirable behavior.28 The desire to leave the world in the wrong time or to teach brothers or lay people about the monastic life, when the monk himself did not achieve soul’s purity, is a sure sign of the demon of vanity.29 Another sign of this demon’s attack in the life of an anchorite is the temptation to speak a lot and of superfluous things when one should be silent, or silent when one has to speak, and to throw himself into the vortex of worldly affairs to meet with pleasure those who accuse each other before him.30 Talkativeness and the appearance of concern for the affairs of others and the desire to recognize his ability to solve the affairs of this world hide the joy of finding listeners after a long period of silence and isolation of the anchorite.31 As a remedy for such manifestations of vanity, Evagrius recommends humility, patiently enduring all insults, and hospitality. Humility, avoidance of haughtiness and the inclination to govern, increases hospitality,32 and the awareness of one’s smallness helps to free oneself from constant comparison with others: If you measure yourself by the lowest measure, you will not compare your measure to another.33 Anyone who constantly compares himself with others will always meet someone who will be better off than him and for this reason will suffer forever. For a man who demands signs of reverence exalts himself and cannot bear neglecting on the part of others: When those most practised in ascetic labours receive a wealth of human honours, then the demons devise and introduce dishonours, so that, distanced from honours, they cannot bear dishonours nor can tolerate the offences.34 For the one who loves his own glory, insults as slight as lack of admiration for him will be a very painful wound.35 For the vain man, whatever human lack of respect to himself is always perceived as an insult, and criticism of his views also as an insult, and he quickly falls into sadness or anger. Demons, on the other hand, often bring
28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 33; Sinkewicz (2003), 57–58. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,1,9,16. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,12,21. Cf. De oratione 148; Sinkewicz (2003), 208–09. Cf. Institutio seu paraenesis ad monachos 6. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 312.31. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 13; Sinkewicz (2003), 318.40. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 30–31.
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insults upon vain anchorites so that they abandon their efforts for humbleness not supporting disregard. So Evagrius advises: When you are offended, do not give offence in return; rather, appease the person who takes vengeance on you. And if you act in this way, you block the irascibility of the beast; bear the offence, as your means of progress, and with your lips shut in the beast of irascibility.36 Those visible enemies, people who were always less dangerous than demons for him, the Pontian monk calls benefactors and physicians because with their insults they curb and heal the vain soul of the monk with a contempt.37 The struggle against vanity is then endured by maintaining patience and perseverance in the face of all signs of disrespect from other people, in order to control the anger born in the soul which brings the soul back to madness. Hence, Evagrius rightly claims that whoever has a heart susceptible to vainglory given to him by thoughts and does not oppose them, will not be far from madness fluttering between sadness and anger.38 He instructs the anchorite to hide his hardships from people, just as they hide their sins.39 For whoever hides his own transgressions and carelessly reveals hardships of asceticism is doing something contrary to their nature.40 Evagrius describes the attitude of humbleness as opposing vanity as follows: Freedom from vainglory is the working of humility, a defection from obsequiousness, blindness to praises, contemplation of knowledge, a counter to the world, keen perception of the soul, a teaching of lowliness, a hiding place for ascetic works, hostility to fame, a hidden treasure in a corruptible body.41 Any attitude against the search for vainglory (ἀκενοδοξία) takes its origin from humility, which does not seek flattery or pay attention to praise. It also opposes the attitude of the world, where the desire to attract attention and for fame prevails. The humble anchorite experiences spiritual knowledge, looks at life differently, can stop at small things, and hides the hardships of his asceticism. The practice of hospitality is a great help in overcoming vanity. Evagrius encourages the monks not to receive the brothers in the conviction that one is being given a great grace, but to do so with sincerity of intention. It should be remembered, however, that the characteristic feature of vanity is the fact that even what we do to overcome it can give rise to new vanity. So, some people, although they appreciate the great value of hospitality, do not invite the guest spontaneously, but they extend an invitation with vain intentions, and when the invited person refuses, they accuse him of insulting them.42 The tool par excellence for fighting against passions, including vanity, is the 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 312.32. Cf. Epistula 52,4. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 34; Sinkewicz (2003), 58–59. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,20,32,38. Cf. Tractactus ad Eulogium 11; Sinkewicz (2003), 37. Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 4; PG 79,1144D; Sinkewicz (2003), 64. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 25; Sinkewicz (2003), 51.
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antirrhetic method, that is, referring the demon of vanity the relevant passage from Holy Scripture, which Evagrius collected in Antirrheticus VII.43 1.2.
Gnostikos Vainglory
In addition to the vanity that besets an anchorite after the attack of a single passionate thought, the vanity appears after the anchorite overcomes all thoughts of the passionate part of the soul. If after overcoming one passion the demon of vanity stimulates the monk to seek human glory, we can easily imagine that after repelling all the passionate thoughts he does so with much greater strength. Evagrius describes his acting as follows: I have noted that the demon of vainglory is pursued by almost all the demons and with the fall of its pursuers it shamelessly comes forward and displays for the monk the grandeur of his virtues.44 The Pontian monk speaks here as one who himself experienced the action of the demon of vanity (“I noticed”). He also emphasizes that there is a natural incompatibility between this kind of vanity and all other passionate thoughts. It does not appear at the stage of ascetic practice, when the monk still has to struggle with some passion. For obvious reasons, there can be no thought of vainglory where other passions appear and the monk has no reason to boast. The only exception is the thought of passionate pride, which can co-exist with vanity: “Alone among the thoughts, the thoughts of vainglory and pride arise after the defeat of remaining thoughts”.45 However, when demons which awaken other passions fall down, then the demon of vanity proceeds to attack, revealing to the monk the greatness of his virtues. The victory over previous passions is definitely strengthened by the thought of vainglory.46 The nature of his actions at the γνωστική stage is very similar to the earlier dynamics of action at the stage of ascetic practice. He can no longer bring forth passion for help, because the monk manfully rejected it, so he only needs to deprive him of the reward from God by seeking recognition from his people for his virtues. In spite of these similarities, the struggle against the demon of vanity at the γνωστική stage is definitely more difficult in many respects, because after overcoming all the passionate thoughts, the reasons for seeking human glory are definitely more than after overcoming only one of them. This vanity, which can be called a small vanity in opposition to a great vanity is characterized not only by a desire for recognition from people, but also by the awakening of vain hopes for the future. For obvious reasons, virtues for which an anchorite hopes to be recognized differ from those of a lay people, but mutatis mutandis, the mechanism of the activity of vanity remains the same. Evagrius as usual masterfully exposed this mechanism in one of his texts:
43 44 45 46
Cf. Antirrheticus VII; Frankenberg (1913), 531–37; Brakke (2009), 147–57. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 31; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 572; Sinkewicz (2003), 103. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 57; Muyldermans (1931), 380; Sinkewicz (2003), 216. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 15; Antirrheticus VII,5,38; Ad Eulogium 4,20,28.
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The thought of vainglory is a most subtle one and readily insinuates itself within the virtuous person with the intention of publishing his struggles and hunting after the esteem that comes from people (cf. 1 Thess. 2:6). It invents demons crying out, women being healed and a crowd touching his garments; (cf. Matt. 9:20–21; Mark 5:27); it even predicts to him that he will eventually attain the priesthood; it has people come to seek him at his door, and if he should be unwilling he will be taken away in bonds. When this thought has thus raised him aloft on empty hopes, it flies off abandoning him to be tempted either by the demon of pride or by that of sadness, which brings upon him further thoughts opposed to his hopes. Sometimes it delivers him over to the demon of fornication, he who a little earlier was a holy priest carried off in bonds.47 The thought of vainglory is, therefore, definitely more subtle and more difficult to discover because it arises in righteous people. The first element that characterizes it is the desire to publicize the ascetic struggle of the anchorite at the stage of ascetic practice and to seek recognition and fame for that reason. The demon of vanity is extremely treacherous, enjoys meeting people, haunts people who are zealous and covers them with darkness, trying to destroy the glory for which they fight.48 The second component of such vanity of anchorite is the hope of receiving the charism of power over evil spirits and of healing sick people. The demon of vanity stimulates the monk to imagine that at his command all evil demons come out screaming, withdrawing from possessed.49 Next the monk imagines healing sick women, and the crowd with respect and admiration touches his garments, noticing in him a holy monk who has become worthy of receiving such great gifts. The gesture of touching the anchorite’s vestments refers again to the event of the Gospel of Mark, when a woman suffering from a haemorrhage was healed just at the moment of touching the garments of Jesus (Mark 5:27). Similarly, the crowd gathering around him would resemble those people who came from distant parts to see the figure of the great hermit, St Anthony.50 The demon of vanity therefore encourages an anchorite to compare himself with St Anthony and imagine that he possesses the same healing power as Christ. The desire and the search for the charism of healing or jealousy of this gift to the brothers is according to Evagrius, a clear sign of the demon of vanity.51 For the intense desire for the gift of healing reveals the improper motives of the desire itself, which the monk wants in order to seek for his own glory rather than as a tool for revealing God’s power to people. According to the Pontian monk, inner freedom is always the best hallmark of the authenticity of the gift of healing. Further, in the context of monastic life in the fourth century, the greatest honor was the choice of a monk as a candidate for the priesthood. The demon of vanity soon foretold to him priestly dignity and made
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Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 13; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 528–30; Sinkewicz (2003), 100. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 22; Sinkewicz (2003), 48. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,34. Cf. Vita Antonii 70; PG 26,941C. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,2,35,42.
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him, through the eyes of the imagination, see messengers from afar who stand at the door of his house and diligently seek him; and when they meet, they beg him to accept the priesthood he has long deserved. He, though he is glad in his soul that he has finally been noticed, externally of course resists deploring pro forma that he is not worthy. The envoys of the hierarchy of the Church, however, do not give up and they bind him up and by force bring him with them. The desire of the priesthood by someone who chose the anchoritic lifestyle, according to Evagrius, is almost always a sign of the demon of vanity,52 all the more so if someone tried to obtain the office of priesthood for money.53 The Apophtegmata confirm that indeed many anchorites because of their great humbleness have refused to receive priestly or episcopal ordination.54 We also know examples of monks, such as Abba Isaac, who became a priest at Kellia only when he was led by force for ordination.55 A good example here is Evagrius himself, who fled when Teofil of Alexandria wanted to consecrate him as a bishop.56 By recalling such images in the monk’s soul, the demon of vanity tried in a subtle way to persuade him to compare himself with the great Fathers of the Desert. As I wrote elsewhere, today the demon of vanity does not foretell the priesthood, which among the male religious communities is almost universal, but foretells to a priest becoming a well-known scientist, superior, canon, prelate or bishop, and to the lay people predicts secular careers and managerial positions.57 The content of the temptation of vanity, for obvious reasons, depends on the environment and the historical context of the epoch, but the mechanism of its acting remains the same. Let us remember that this entire process takes place only in the imagination of a man who, dominated by vanity, allows that the demon awaken in him those vain hopes. The strategy of its operation consists in awakening hope that cannot be realized, so that the monk sinks even more into pride, experiences frustration, and succumbs to the demon of anger or sadness.58 The demon of vanity always precedes the demon of pride59 and together they convince the monk that he is indeed worthy of the gifts he imagines, whereas anger or sadness are a reaction to the frustration of unfulfilled expectations. Anger and frustration are usually directed against God or decision-makers among people who are blind enough not to appreciate the genius and perfection of a vain monk. Sadness, on the other hand, as we remember, is an auto-aggression which, in response to frustrations, in turn offers different thoughts opposing hope, so that the monk wavers between great vain hopes and hopelessness. The demon of vanity arouses empty hopes, leaving the monk to the temptation of pride or sadness, and it even happens that he hands over the monk to the demon of impurity. Thoughts or impure deeds in this way become not only a form of direct
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Cf. Epistula 16,5; Antirrheticus VII,3,8,40. Cf. Antirrheticus VII,36. Cf. Congar (1966), 169–97. Cf. PG 65,224B–C. See Socrates, Historia Ecclesiastica IV,23; PG 67,521A. Cf. Misiarczyk (2003), 27–33. See also Antirrheticus VII,25. Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 17; Sinkewicz (2003), 87.
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consolation for the frustration of empty unfulfilled hopes, but also a form of indirect consolation in sorrow. In this way, adds Evagrius, the one who until recently in his imagination was a saintly monk brought to the priesthood by force, becomes a victim of old passions again. Thus, we see that the purpose of vanity is actually to turn the monk away from the path of spiritual cognition and to reawaken of old anger and lust. If, on the other hand, the demon of vanity fails to awaken vain hopes through the imagination during the day, he does so through dream images during the night: When the demons have not been able to trouble the irascible or concupiscible part at night, the then fabricate dreams of vainglory and draw the soul down into a pit of thoughts. Generally speaking, these are the sorts of dreams they invent. Frequently one sees oneself rebuking demons, healing certain bodily conditions, or wearing the clothing of a shepherd and pasturing a little flock. And immediately upon waking one gets the fantasy of the priesthood and then spends the entire day thinking through the things that that involves; or as if the charism of healings were about to be granted, one sees in advance the miracles that happen and fantasizes about the people who will be healed, the honours coming from the brothers, and the gifts brought by outsiders, all those that come from Egypt and also from abroad, drawn by our renown.60 Dreams of vainglory cover virtually the same areas as daytime imagery, that is, rebuking and expelling demons, healing bodily diseases, and the priesthood. According to Evagrius, vain dream images are not as dangerous as the imaginations stimulated by them the next day. It is then that the anchorite, instead of praying, imagines himself as the one who heals countless numbers of ill people drawn by his fame, coming to him not only from Egypt, but also from other parts of the world. The healed give him many gifts for the favors he has received, and he gains great respect and admiration among the brothers. The hermit, aroused by the dream of the priesthood,61 considers and conceives all matters related to the priesthood throughout the following day, neglecting his ordinary duties. In the text quoted above, however, Evagrius does not develop the theme of dream images that refer to the power to cast out demons. As a remedy in the fight against the demon of vanity, in addition to the previously mentioned resources, Evagrius proposes a new one, that is watching over one’s own imagination. It is about keeping the mind occupied constantly by prayer and meditation on the Holy Scriptures or mysteries of faith, and the imagination by the memory of old sins. Recollecting old sins and weaknesses will not let the soul of the monk be dominated by vanity, which drives away all other demons. Even the dreamy imaginations of vainglory will not be able to harm the soul of a monk if, just after waking up, instead of letting himself be carried away by dream images during the day, he will occupy the mind with prayer and the imagination with the reflection of his own sins from the past. The anchorite of Pontus advises us to preserve the memory
60 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 28; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 252; Sinkewicz (2003), 173. 61 Cf. Antirrheticus VII,26.
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of the harm suffered from the spirit of impurity and vainglory that are opposed to each other.62 Our author seems to suggest that the demon of vanity is driven away most effectively by the memory of one’s own sins against purity. 1.3.
Vainglory as an Enemy of the Spiritual Gnosis and Contemplation
Vanity does its best to bring the anchorite back to the level of struggle with passions at the stage of ascetic practice, depriving him of the taste of spiritual cognition. Ascetic practice and spiritual contemplation are mutually exclusive. When he does not succeed, however, he tries by all means to interrupt his spiritual knowledge at the stage of γνωστική. The stage of spiritual knowledge, or in other words, contemplation, reminds us, as we have seen, of a state close to that of spiritual beings from before the original fall when their fundamental task was contemplation of God. Now, after freeing oneself from the conditioning of the passionate part of the soul created with the body just after this fall, the anchorite must face the temptation of vanity which, according to Evagrius, was the cause of the original fall.63 Hausherr in his commentary to the treatise De oratione emphasizes that this passage cannot be understood in the sense that the illusion of the mind is the cause of the fall, but just the vanity as the desire to describe the formless God.64 This is also one of the few Evagrian texts, in which he wrote about vanity as a passion that attacks the mind directly, not the rational part of the soul as it is usually explained.65 This is understandable, because only the mind existed before the fall and there was no soul as such, especially not a passionate part of the soul. The text would refer to the description of original fall of mind when there was no soul, and rational beings existed only in a noetic state. So, it would be about the so-called the original vanity of the νοῦς, which was the cause of its original fall. Now vanity appears as the temptation of the rational part of the soul after overcoming the thoughts of the passionate part of the soul. However, in the previously mentioned Gnom 13 he states that the disease of the soul is the mind’s desire for glory, which would indicate a direct attack of vanity on the mind as the cause of the disease of the soul, and not vice versa. In any case, according to the Pontian monk: “For the eye of the soul is blinded by the spirit of complancence at the moment when the mind is sprinkled with dust”.66 In the above text, Evagrius again ascribes the desire to please people to the mind and not to the rational part of the soul, as was the case in other texts. On the other hand, in Antirrheticus VII,24 he proposes that a fragment from Isaiah 40:6–8 should be directed “to the soul that loves glory from human beings more than the knowledge of Christ” as an element of the antirrhetic method.67 So it is not easy to conclude whether according to Evagrius the thought of vanity attacks the mind of a monk as it did before the original fall, 62 63 64 65 66 67
Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 22; Sinkewicz (2003), 48. Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 116; PG 79,1193; Sinkewicz (2003), 206. Cf. Hausherr (1960), 149–50. Cf. Spiritales sententiae per alphabeticum dispositae 13 (60). Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 19; Sinkewicz (2003), 322.45. Evagrius Ponticus, Antirrheticus VII,24; Frankenberg (1912), 535; Brakke (2009), 152.
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or the soul, as other texts seem to confirm. The difficulty disappears if we accept, as some scholars of his writing suggest, that he identifies the rational part of the soul with the mind. In any case, the difference between that vanity which caused the fall of the mind and the one that attacks after freeing oneself from a passionate thought is essential. The former attacked the mind because rational beings existed only in a noetic state, but now also have a soul. Evagrius emphasizes that it is difficult to escape the thought of vainglory, because what we do to destroy it is often a new reason for vanity. This may also happen in the case of spiritual knowledge itself, which, although it is the goal of all ascetic practice, can easily become a new subtle reason to seek human glory. Hence, he observes: As for the person experienced in the emigration of the practical life and the homecoming of the gnostic life (cf. 2 Cor. 5:8–9), who anoints the simple with the skills of the thoughts – let him watch out, let him not boast about the gnostic life to make a show for his own glory.68 According to Nieścior, being a monk in exile at the stage of ascetic practice meant renouncing one’s past life, family, and property, and experiencing the state of migration (πρακτική ἐκδημία) which resulted in entering the path of spiritual knowledge (γνωστική ἐκδημία) and becoming a citizen of a new reality.69 I think, however, that Evagrius’ reflection goes a little deeper here. The state of ascetic practice is for him a banishment of the monk from the spiritual existence of the mind from before the original fall to the level of the mind with the soul and body, and γνωστική ἐκδημία would mean just returning and staying in the homeland, i.e., in a state of spiritual existence with a changed soul and body. This return to the homeland of the spirit and experience of spiritual gnosis itself can become a reason to seek human glory. The Pontian monk encourages anchorites who have already entered on the path of spiritual perfection to watch over their own thoughts and not boast of spiritual knowledge before others. A good sign of such a vigil is silence about their own spiritual experiences, which in the entire Christian tradition was a sign of their authenticity. Whoever builds his value on the basis of spiritual experiences and searches glory for himself based on them, will sooner or later endure a demon of vanity and pride, which will destroy even the originally authentic grace of spiritual gnosis. Hence, Evagrius warns against the demon of vanity, especially anchorites who are only entering the path of spiritual knowledge, because whoever has really tasted it, will not be vanquished: The person who has attained knowledge and enjoys the pleasant fruit that derives from it will no longer be persuaded by the demon of vainglory, even if it should bring before him all the pleasures of the world. For what greater than spiritual contemplation could it promise? To the extent that we have not tasted knowledge let us work devotedly at the practical life, demonstrating to God our goal of doing all things for the sake of his knowledge.70 68 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 24; Sinkewicz (2003), 50. 69 Cf. Nieścior (1997a), 177. 70 Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 32; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 572–74; Sinkewicz (2003), 103.
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Vanity, which is born with the overcoming of subsequent passions and growth in virtue, is dismissed when the monk enters spiritual knowledge. The vanity called great, which arises after overcoming all six passions, is confirmed in the soul of the anchorite along with the experience of true cognition and the tasting of spiritual pleasures. Although the monk of Pontus uses in this text the general term “pleasure” (ἡδονή), in Practicus 24 we find an explanation that it is about “spiritual pleasure” (πνευματικὴ ἡδονή) in contrast to “pleasure/lust of the world”. According to Evagrius, the experience of spiritual pleasure is so great and leaves such a deep trace in the human soul that one who has experienced it once does not want to turn it into any pleasures of the sensual world. The superiority of spiritual pleasure, however, results not only from the depth of human experience, but above all from its very nature. While all the pleasures of the present sensual world pass with it, the pleasure that flows from spiritual gnosis is the only one that will survive in the next world.71 Thirdly, the superiority of spiritual gnosis results also from its subject, which is spiritual reality, and more specifically, in the language of Evagrius, the spiritual reasons for the existence of the material world and God. The material world can give the monk nothing more than that which spiritual contemplation (πνευματικὴ θεωρία) gives, which our author identifies with spiritual knowledge: If among the things that are eaten there is none that is sweeter than honey and than honeycomb, and if, on the other hand, the knowledge of God is said to be sweeter than these things, it is clear that there is nothing among all that is on earth that provides delight as the knowledge of God does.72 The Pontian monk refers here to the teachings of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who described the ideal of Christian life as tasting the reality of God and a kind of disgust of the present world.73 Thus, according to him, the most effective tool in combating vanity is spiritual cognition, while ascetic practice is effective insofar as it is not directed towards seeking glory from people, but directed to its natural goal, which is the spiritual knowledge of God. Whosoever turns his soul’s eyes back to the Lord, speaks and does all things in order to know God.74 The purpose of life not only for the anchorite, but also for every human being is to know God, and from him flows the greatest spiritual pleasure, which any pleasure of this world cannot exceed. But whoever is overcome by the passions, perceives as a great frustration the lack of realization of a sensual need. Passionate thoughts of impurity and vainglory, remaining in a mutual relationship with each other, present to the eyes of the imagination of a monk even God as unjust, who unjustly grants the grace of spiritual knowledge only after freeing onself from impurity and vanity.75 An anchorite, infested with unclean desires and seeking human glory will consider it unjust to treat chastity and humility as a condition for spiritual contemplation. Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica IV,49; Guillaumont (1958), 157; Ramelli (2015), 225. Evagrius Ponticus, Kephalaia Gnostica III,64; Guillaumont (1958), 125; Ramelli (2015), 178. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VI,9,75,1. Cf. Scholia in Psalmos 24,16; PG 12,1272C. Evagrius uses here the same expression we find in Practicus 32. 75 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 49; Sinkewicz (2003), 215.
71 72 73 74
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In addition to opposing the spiritual knowledge of God, vanity also destroys true spiritual prayer. The monk seized by it seeks recognition among people for his ascetic efforts and often unconsciously and in a camouflaged way thinks about it even during ordinary prayer. All the more so in the case of spiritual prayer, which consists in freeing oneself from all imagination and mediation of the sensual world, and thus in a state of vanity becomes simply impossible. A vain anchorite is constantly thinking with grace about people who praise him and with anger about those who do not praise or who criticize him. This attitude focuses him more on himself than on spiritual reality or God, making practically impossible any spiritual contemplation. Evagrius advises, therefore, not to enter into such a prayer before dismissing vanity: Show no fondness for verbosity nor for esteem; otherwise, the sinners will no longer hammer your back but your face (cf. Ps 128:3); and you will be their laughing stock (cf. Eccles. 6:4; 18:31) in the time of prayer, as you are dragged away and caught by them on the lure of alien thoughts.76 Although the word “sinners” appears in the text, the reference to Ps. 129 (128) suggests that it is really the enemies of the anchorite who hammer his back (Ps. 129:3) and these, as we know, are demons. The vain anchorite allows the demons to hammer not only his back, but also his face with various strange thoughts and passions. The back and the face are, of course, metaphorical expressions that could be applied to the body and mind on the basis of Ps. 129(128). Vanity, which often loves empty words (Ep. 62, Ant. VII,33), gives the enemy permission to bind not only the body, but also the mind (Or. 72) by pulling it away from true prayer.77 During such spiritual prayer of the monk, the demons no longer come from the left but from the right. For the left eye symbolizes, according to Evagrius, the contemplation of created beings, and the right contemplation of the Holy Trinity itself.78 Demons then give him the illusions of God and images of things that are nice to the senses to deceive him, convincing him that he has fully achieved the goal of prayer. This comes from a desire for vainglory and a demon that even touches a part of the brain, causing veins to pulse.79 The Pontian monk, in explaining this phenomenon, refers to the opinion of an “extraordinary and educated man” which according to Hausherr could be John of Tebaida.80 The demon of vainglory suggests to the monk sensory images to dissuade him from spiritual prayer or to urge him to describe God, seeking in this way human recognition for his spiritual insight and the grace he has received from God. It also happens, as Evagrius himself witnessed, that demons, unable to awaken various passions, including vanity, directly touch the body of a monk with heat or cold.81 76 Evagrius Ponticus, De oratione 148; PG 79,1199; Sinkewicz (2003), 208–09. 77 Cf. Hausherr (1960), 180. 78 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 42. See Bunge (1987), 191–98; Bunge (1999c), 211–27; Bunge (2000), 7–26. 79 Cf. De oratione 73(72) and Antirrheticus VII,31. 80 Cf. Hausherr (1960), 106. 81 Cf. Kephalaia Gnostica VI,25; Antirrheticus IV.
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2.
Pride
Pride is the last of the passionate thoughts in the Evagrian system of eight λογισμοί. In its case we can better see the overlapping of the two previously mentioned orders, spiritual and empirical development, which underlie the Evagrian category of eight passionate thoughts. We have seen earlier that the monk of Pontus distinguishes between passionate thoughts that happen to us as animals and appear as a result of concupiscibility or irascibility, and thoughts that happen to us as people and appear as a result of depression, vainglory and pride.82 Pride belongs to the category of passionate thoughts that attack people as people and is a spiritual not a carnal passion.83 Evagrius, clearly based on Origen’s teaching, emphasizes that vanity and pride are not proper to the natural condition of the body, but it is the soul which is dominated by these passions that gives them to it.84 In another part of the treaty entitled Capita cognoscitiva Evagrius affirms: Among the thoughts, there are some that lead and there are some that follow: those that derive from pride […] and those that derive from irascibility.85 Passionate thoughts that precede others, according to Evagrius, are caused by pride, while those that follow later by anger. This statement is so strange since pride is usually portrayed by him as a thought that somehow ends the temptation of the monk and appears as the last of the eight passionate thoughts. The ascetic of Pontus further specifies that among the thoughts that precede others, some of them occur earlier, others later; the ones that occur earlier are caused by gluttony, and the ones that follow them are caused by impurity.86 However, how do these words refer to other fragments of his work, where he clearly states that gluttony, greed, and vanity constitute three so-called source passions from which all others are born? Is he not contradicting himself, specifiying greed and vanity at one time, and impurity and pride at another as the beginning of the other passions? I think that if we distinguish different orders in the presentation of our author, then all these texts can be understood as consistent with each other. The three main passions, gluttony, avarice, and vanity, are the sources for all others. From among the passions, some appear earlier, and these take their origin from pride, while others later, and these take their origin from anger. However, within the thoughts that appear both earlier and later, Evagrius still sees a certain precedence and succession. Thus, among the preceding thoughts, the earlier ones are caused by gluttony, the first and one of the source of passionate thoughts, and the ones later by impurity, the second of the category of eight λογισμοί. On the other hand, among the later thoughts, the earlier ones come from depression and sadness, Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 40; Sinkewicz (2003), 214. Cf. Practicus 35; Sinkewicz (2003), 104. Cf. Epistula ad Melaniam 46; Casiday (2006), 73. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 41; Muyldermans (1931), 378 (42); Sinkewicz (2003), 214 (with changes). 86 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 42; Sinkewicz (2003), 214. 82 83 84 85
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and the later ones from anger. Because we are mainly interested in this first category of passionate thoughts, it is easy to notice that according to Evagrius, gluttony is the cause of impurity, and impurity is the cause of the next passion, or greed, while the frustration of one of them stimulates anger, which in turn becomes the cause of other passions. So far, the reasoning of Evagrius present in the work of Capita cognoscitiva turns out to be consistent with his other texts; the only problem is the recognition that pride is the cause of all these earlier thoughts, that is, gluttony, impurity, and greed. And this, nevertheless, can be explained if we remember the distinction that our monk introduces in Capita cognoscitiva 44. Considering the question of the binding of individual thoughts to matter, he states that passionate thoughts which originate from primary pride do not relate to matter; the ones that bind to small matter come from impurities, and the ones that bind to manifold matter come from vainglory.87 Evagrius nowhere explains how thoughts of primary passionate pride, which do not involve any matter, can become the cause of the above-mentioned thoughts preceding others like gluttony, impurity, and greed which by their very nature depend on matter. For us, however, the other information in this text is more important, namely the fact that Evagrius distinguishes between primary and secondary pride. This is clearly confirmed in another passage: Among impure thoughts, some show God to be unjust, some as being partial, some as powerless, and others as merciless: unjust, those proceeding from fornication and vainglory; partial, those deriving from secondary pride; powerless, those deriving from original pride; merciless, the rest.88 The monk of Pontus says that primary pride presents God to man as powerless, and secondary pride presents Him as having regard for the people. However, since we will search unsuccessfully in his texts for a description of the exact difference between one and the other kind of pride, we have to discover it from the indirect affirmations. It can be presumed that this “primary pride” (πρώτη ὑπερηφανία) by Evagrius is identified practically with love for oneself (φιλαυτία). In Capita cognoscitiva 53, he states that the first of all bad thoughts is self-love, followed by eight [others].89 The similarities are striking here: both πρώτη ὑπερηφανία and also φιλαυτία do not belong to the category of eight passionate thoughts, but they are, as it were, their foundation. Primary pride would thus be the kind of pride that became the cause of the original fall of the mind, and would be closely connected to the will of the independence of creatures from the Creator. It is that which is the “first fetus of the devil” (De mal. 1) and has destroyed the seal of God’s likeness in rational beings.90 However, secondary pride (δεύτερα ὑπερηφανία), although it also bears the characteristics of primary pride, among others the desire for independence from God and people or acting
87 Cf. Capita cognoscitiva 44; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 88 Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 49; Muyldermans (1931), 378–79 (42–43); Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 89 Cf. Evagrius Ponticus, Capita cognoscitiva 53; Muyldermans (1931), 379; Sinkewicz (2003), 215. 90 Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 15; Sinkewicz (2003), 163.
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directly on the rational part of the soul, differs from the primary one by appearing at the end of the process of liberation from the passions. Primordial pride was the cause of the fall of rational beings, whose status was modified from spiritual, noetic beings into noetic-psycho-corporeal ones. Along with the appearance of the unreasonable soul and the body, various soul passions appeared that operate from the psychical level or through the mediation of the body, while primary and secondary pride attack the mind directly from the spiritual, noetic level. This primordial pride, which is the cause of the original fall of the mind, would therefore be identical not only to self-love, but also to primary vanity. Among these various passions, the eight major constitute the basis and source of all others. If, therefore, a monk goes to the desert to free himself from these passions, then although he is unable to change his state of being from noetic-psycho-corporeal and return to the original spiritual-noetic, he may be freed from the passions so that they are not an obstacle in a spiritual way to life of the body and soul. In practice, therefore, it is about removing both the effects of this primary fall, or secondary pride, as well as its cause, or primary pride. The last accent in this struggle is the fight with this secondary pride, which this time tells the monk that he came to impassibility and spiritual cognition with only his own ascetic effort and without the help of God’s grace. If it manages to convince him of its reasons, then he returns again to the level of primitive pride and sooner or later falls into the old passions, destroying all the fruits of the current asceticism. Thus, Evagrius understood the words of Christ from Matt 12:45, that the later condition of such a man is worse than the previous one. In a further part of this study we will deal with secondary pride which Evagrius synthetically describes as follows: Pride is opposition to God, demonic fantasy, wicked jealousy, obscuring blindness, insolence in one’s attitude, conceit of the flesh, false love of esteem, servitude to wicked thoughts, friendship with the demons, an eminent soul, an obvious siege by the adversary, an admonition to destruction.91 Such a secondary pride puts man in the place of God and makes the monk assign all victories over passions to himself, not to His grace, just as the fallen demons zealously and boldly emphasize their independence from God, making the anchorite more similar to them. It makes man boastful of the deeds of the body, of which he should be ashamed, and makes him become a slave of bad thoughts. It fills him with bad zeal and solicitude for false love of fame. A man who considers himself a god becomes a demon sooner or later; he does not accept any critics or interprets it as hostility towards himself; his soul becomes vulnerable. The texts of Evagrius on this subject are scattered throughout all his works.92 Here we will focus on two elements of his teaching: “pride as the result of vanity” and “pride as ascribing to oneself righteous deeds”.
91 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 9; PG 79,1140B–114D; Sinkewicz (2003), 65. 92 Cf. Vita 21; Ep. 9,1; 52–5-6; Pr 14; 33; Sent. 19,53,61,62, Rerum 4; De mal. 1,15,21,23; De octo 17–19; De vitiis 4; Ep. Mel. 46; Eul 3,13,14,15,17,18,21,24,26,27,28,33; Ant. VIII; Inst. 6; Capita cognoscitiva 41, 44, 49, 57; In Prov. 39, 102, 157, 162, 181, 212, 299.
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2.1.
Pride as the Consequence of Vainglory
According to Evagrius, as we saw in the analysis of vanity, a monk dominated by the desire for human glory falls into sadness and depression if he does not receive it, and if he receives it, he falls into pride.93 Recognition from people for the ascetic efforts of the anchorite results in pride or seeking even greater glory among people and the conviction that one is the source of his righteous deeds without the help of God’s grace. The close relationship between vanity and pride or even their cause-and-effect relationship was described by Evagrius in many of his texts. We have seen earlier, on the occasion of the analysis of Practicus 13 on the subject of vainglory, that the demon of vanity raises the monk’s false hopes to the heights and then flies away, leaving the temptation to the demon of pride or sadness. Vanity therefore tells the monk that people bless him and treat him as a wise man, and that his good deeds and knowledge of God are necessary for other people’s souls.94 Sooner or later it gives birth and announces pride: “A flash of lightning foretells the sound of thunder; vainglory announces the presence of pride”.95 A passionate thought of vainglory announces that if its desire is satisfied, pride will quickly follow it.96 Pride is for Evagrius an ancient evil through which Lucifer was cast down by God97 and “the first fetus of the devil”.98 Pride “cast the archangel from heaven and made him fall to earth like lightning”.99 Pride was also the cause of the original fall of rational beings and more than all other passionate thoughts makes a man like a demon. From the vanity of created beings who wanted to describe what was divine in terms of shape and appearance (De or. 116), pride was born: “From this thought (= vainglory) is born also that of pride, which cast down from the heavens to earth ‘the Seal of the Likeness and the Crown of Beauty’” (Ezek. 28:12).100 Evagrius is convinced that the same old pride that was the cause of the devil’s downfall and the original fall of the mind, and at the same time caused the loss of his likeness to God, now returns in a changed form as a result of vainglory because of the achievement of impassibility. Of course, this new pride is different from the original one in that it does not cause another fall of the mind, which would modify once again the structure of rational beings, but it drives him into old passions and hinders the maintenance of a state of impassibility. Although vanity, as we have seen, is associated with multiple matter and takes various forms, in the case of anchorites the greatest temptation of vanity was to imagine receiving God’s gift of healing or priesthood. The demon of vainglory makes
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 61; Sinkewicz (2003), 126. Cf. Antirrheticus VIII.15,30; Brakke (2009), 162.66. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 17; PG 79,1161C; Sinkewicz (2003), 87. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 30–31. Cf. Practicus, Prologus 3; Sinkewicz (2003), 95–96. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 1; Sinkewicz (2003), 153–54. Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 18; PG 79,1163A; Sinkewicz (2003), 87. Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 14; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 200; Sinkewicz (2003), 162–63.
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the monks begin to talk among themselves about the priesthood; they foretell the immediate death of the current priest and the necessity to establish a new one, and add that it is impossible to escape from the ordination, as others did (De mal. 21). It also causes an inner struggle to begin in a person, and in those who give consent to such a thought it gives rise to pride: In this way, the wretched mind, now bound by these thoughts, attacks those people opposed (to his priesthood), but on those offering acceptance he readily lavishes them with gifts and approves their good sense; but those who are rivals he hands over to the magistrates and demands that they be expelled from the city. Then as these thoughts are present and churning around within, immediately the demon of pride appears, forming continual lightning flashes in the air of the cell and sending forth winged dragons, and finally provoking the loss of reason.101 The demon of vanity therefore arouses an inner struggle in those who have surrendered to its action and quickly gives them seeming gifts, praising their openness. In the face of those who resist his temptations, he makes that by some false accusation or other reason they are handed over to judges and removed from the city. If the thought of vainglory lasts longer, it gives rise to pride, and this in turn leads to different horrifying visions like lightning in a cell or the imagination of strange animals. Hence Evagrius advises: “Do not give your soul to pride, and you will not see terrifying fantasies”.102 For the soul of the proud is disturbed by the enemies from the air, is surrounded by darkness,103 and ultimately falls into madness.104 The fight against pride which is the fruit of vanity will largely rely on the control of vanity itself as its cause.105 Thus, the means of healing that Evagrius proposes in the fight against this kind of pride will be the same as in the case of vanity. The basic medicine for vanity and pride is humility and patient endurance of any insults or adversities of life: Humility is a thankful acknowledgement of God, a true recognition of one’s nature, a forceful confession of one’s weakness, a fortress for love, a refuge from hatred, an unfallen acropolis, a parting of the diabolic waves, a fight over the snares of the enemy, the natural overthrowing of Satan, a pleasing life, praise of enemies, a philosophy provided by God, and true friendship with wisdom. Knowledge of these things and their practical investigation purifies the heart.106 Evagrius combines humility with obedience to God, which results from a true knowledge of man’s own nature and recognition that, even if he does not know what he did or claimed, he is never able to become equal to God. Every human 101 Evagrius Ponticus, De malignis cogitationibus 21; Géhin – C. and A. Guillaumont (1998), 206; Sinkewicz (2003), 167–68. 102 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 17; PG 79,1163AD; Sinkewicz (2003), 87. 103 Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 62; Sinkewicz (2003), 126. 104 Cf. De octo spiritibus malitiae 19; Sinkewicz (2003), 88–89. 105 Cf. Antirrheticus VIII,15. 106 Evagrius Ponticus, De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus 9–10; Sinkewicz (2003), 65.
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being is and always will remain only a creation of God, weak and sinful, destined to dependence on Him, and any denial of it will not change anything here. Whoever has understood and accepted this fundamental truth about human nature bypasses the traps of enemies and eradicates everything that opposes God from his soul. He begins to accept his human life fully and experiences the true wisdom that allows him to reach God himself. The lack of glory, although it causes pain, nevertheless puts a significant end to troublesome attacks of vanity and pride.107 Further, Evagrius encourages vigilance so that the monk winning the struggle with passions will not allow his soul to be tricked into pride nor his the spirit with deceit and fall into madness.108 Still another way, as in the fight against vanity, is the memory of one’s sins: Do not forget that you have fallen, even if you have repented, but hold onto the memory of your sin as an occasion of compunction that leads to your humility, so that thus humbled you will by necessity disgorge your pride.109 Evagrius obviously encourages the memory of one’s own sins, not to unnecessarily torment oneself with the sense of guilt but to remember the wrongs suffered from the demons. Such a memory of the humiliation suffered is to protect the anchorite from becoming prideful. The classic method of fighting the demon of pride proposed by the Pontian monk is to direct against him an appropriate fragment of the Scriptures, which he himself collected in his treatise, the Antirrheticus.110 2.2.
Pride as the Conviction of Being the Source of One’s Decent Deeds
Evagrius perceives pride as a result of succumbing to passionate thoughts of vain glory, but describes its essence as not recognizing God as a help in the spiritual struggle with passions and the conviction that man himself is the source of good deeds. In one of his texts he puts it as follows: The demon of pride brings the soul to the very worst sort of fall. It induces the soul to refuse to acknowledge that God is its helper and to think that it is itself the cause of its good actions, and to take a haughty view of its brothers as being unintelligent because they do not all hold the same opinion of it. Anger and sadness follow closely upon this as well as the ultimate evil, derangement of mind, madness, and the vision of a multitude of demons in the air.111 In the context of the spiritual life which, although based, as we know it, on the personal effort of man but fundamentally dependent on the grace of God, the demon of pride is the perpetrator of the greatest fall of the monk. He convinces an anchorite, who has been mastered earlier by the desire to seek human glory, to recognize himself as
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Cf. Epistula 52,6; De octo spiritibus malitiae 19. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 13; Sinkewicz (2003), 40. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 14; Sinkewicz (2003), 319.40. Cf. Antirrheticus VIII; Frankenberg (1912), 537–45; Brakke (2009), 159–73. Evagrius Ponticus, Practicus 14; C. and A. Guillaumont (1971), 532–34; Sinkewicz (2003), 100.
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the only source of his righteous deeds and at the same time reject God’s help. More specifically, it is not so much the rejection of the help of God’s grace as such, but the monk’s conviction that it is only thanks to his own ascetic effort and not God’s help that he freed himself from his passions. The hypocrisy of such thinking, according to Evagrius, depends on the fact that man assigns to himself what is really God’s work, because nobody is able to free himself from his passions by his own power. The refusal to recognize God as a helper is not a rejection of any general belief, but is rather s denial of what he has already done in the life of an ascetic. The demon of pride is the perpetrator of the greatest fall of man because he puts him in the place of God.112 To determine the essence of pride, as ignoring the help of God, we turn to Evagrius other texts. In the Antirrheticus, he clearly defines the demon of pride as the one who denies help and victory coming from God, and attributes it to man’s own strength.113 Pride is a disease of the soul of a man who rejects God and trusts only in himself: “The one who has distanced himself from God suffers the disease of pride in ascribing his accomplishments to his own strength”.114 Evagrius reminds the monks that patiently enduring the hardships of anchoritism and all ascetism does not come only from man’s own strength, but from the grace of God: As for those who have received from grace the strength for ascetic labours let them not think that they possess this from their own power, for the word of the commandments is for us the cause of all good things, just as the Deceiver is for evil suggestions. For the good things you accomplish, therefore, offer thanksgiving to the cause of good things; as for the evil things that torment you, throw them back at their author.115 Humility, or truth about the status of every human being as a creature, unable to free himself from any passion and to cease to pretend to be almighty God, liberates the monk from the chains of pride. The Pontian monk therefore warns that the anchorite not let pride into his heart and say to the Lord, “I am strong”, so that the Lord will not leave his soul completely, and envious demons not humiliate it.116 As in the case of vanity, repentance, constant memory of one’s past life, sins, and passions, and the awareness that it is from the mercy of Christ that the monk came to impassibility, will keep him in constant alertness, give humbleness and prevent the demon of pride.117 And just as the humble Lord opposes proud people and exposes them to their own passions so that they fall, he also quickly raises those who humiliate themselves before Him.118 Humility is the virtue of angels, which is very feared by the evil spirit because it leads the mind to true knowledge and raises it up to God.119
112 Cf. Misiarczyk (2003), 34–37. 113 Cf. Antirrheticus VIII,22,25. 114 Evagrius Ponticus, De octo spiritibus malitiae 17; PG 79,1161C; Sinkewicz (2003), 87; See also Ant. VIII,6,12. 115 Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 15; Sinkewicz (2003), 319.41. 116 Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 62; Sinkewicz (2003), 126. 117 Cf. Practicus 33; Sinkewicz (2003), 103. See also Sententiae ad monachos 53; Sinkewicz (2003), 125. 118 Cf. Scholia in Proverbia 39,157,162,181; Géhin (1987), 132.254.260.274. 119 Cf. Vita Evagrii 21.
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The one who is overcome by pride and puts himself in the place of God consequently begins to exalt himself over other people and despises them. And because the other people do not always admit to him that he is better than they, or let themselves to submit to his contempt, the proud man considers everyone around him to be fools who do not understand his alleged greatness. The proud anchorite is convinced that he is a holy man of the Lord and a perfect monk (Ant. VIII,1,39,40), lives in a pure way and does not allow himself dirty thoughts (Ant. VIII,2), despises holy fathers as if they experienced smaller hardships than he (Ant. VIII,8), and believes that he has always had spiritual knowledge and understanding of the Holy Scriptures (Ant. VIII,26). He exalts himself because of his ancestry and the distinguished character of his family (Ant. VIII,37), he describes and willingly reveals the sins of others (Ant. VIII,38,42), he does not understand the weakness of others (Ant. VIII,52,54), and he despises his erring brothers (Ant. VIII,57). The demon of pride tries to increase the hardships of those who resist him and makes the monk speak in a teacher’s voice and teach others. However, Evagrius believes that this is just a clever tactic of pride120 to lull other passions and he advises: To those who commit faults pay no attention with an arrogant thought that holds you up as a judge, but attend to yourself with a watchful thought to scrutinize your actions.121 Whoever tries to condemn the sins, weaknesses, and falls of his brother, and wants to somehow show his superiority over him and subordinate him to himself, becomes, according to Evagrius, an ally of Satan (Ad Eul. 18). It is important, therefore, that the anchorite should weep over his own sins when he falls, not over others’ (Ant. VIII,42), and not be proud when he does good. A great help in the fight against pride may be to receive food or dress and other gifts donated to a monk because the need for these basic living goods makes him dependent on others and puts him in line with ordinary mortals.122 Another sign of humility will also be obedience to his spiritual director and visiting brothers who allegedly have less knowledge than he.123 When a monk infested by the demon of pride is abandoned by God, whom he himself has previously rejected, or does not receive from other people signs that would emphasize his superiority, then he falls back into old passions like anger or sadness and experiencing spiritual madness. He begins to see demons in his cell and his soul is dominated by the dark.124 Practicing anchoritism in anger, sadness or pride can even lead to confusion of the senses. In a state of such spiritual madness that Evagrius calls ἔξτασις φρενῶν, it happens that a monk sees a glowing of air in the cell, hears voices of people chasing each other, sees in the air harnessed carts and a cell filled with Ethiopians and a general uproar.125 Such spiritual insanity probably 120 121 122 123 124 125
Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 28; 33; Sinkewicz (2003), 53.58. Evagrius Ponticus, Tractatus ad Eulogium 17; Sinkewicz (2003), 321.43. Cf. Rerum monachalium rationes 4; Sinkewicz (2003), 6. Cf. Tractatus ad Eulogium 27; Ant. VIII,33. Cf. Sententiae ad monachos 62; Sinkewicz (2003), 126. Cf. De malignis cogitationibus 23; Sinkewicz (2003), 169.
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happened among monks as it is confirmed by Apophtemata Patrum. Evagrius defines this “losing of the senses” as the renewal of the tendency of the rational soul to evil after achieving virtue and knowing God.126 This is not ecstasy in the sense of such immense saturation with God until the loss of the senses, but the departure from the senses and the spiritual madness caused by the re-tearing of the soul which has already experienced spiritual gnosis and now is being pulled back by old passions such as anger or sadness. The remedy here will again be growth in humility because the Lord is in the hearts of humble people.
126 Cf. Capitula XXXIII,9; PG 40,1264B.
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Conclusion
The goal of this study is to demonstrate that Evagrius was the first Christian author who created the category of eight λογισμοί as well as presented it as a system of causeand-effect relationship among them giving in this way the basis for future Christian doctrine of the Seven Deadly Sins. For a good understanding of his teaching about the eight passionate thoughts, its basis had to be reconstructed, that is, the spiritual doctrine of the monk of Pontus influenced by both his anthropology and cosmology. Evagrius’ presentation of protology and eschatology depends completely on Origen. Consequently, he claims that originally there existed spiritual λογικοί, however they were not entirely bodiless but had bodies different from material one’s. He has a different idea than Origen as he sees the fall of λογικοί caused by the movement of the will and a lack of the mind’s vigilance, which resulted in the mind’s ignorance and the anger of the will. In response to the fall of λογικοί, God, in his judgement and providence gave them irrational (passionate) part of the soul and a material body. Depending upon the extent of their fall they became angels, demons, and people for whom God also created a material world. Evagrius, like Origen, presents the possibility of a change in the moral condition (not ontological) of the λογικοί in successive worlds till the final return of them all to God. In the study of the cosmology and eschatology of the Pontian monk, the opinion of the eminent French researcher of his writings, A. Guillaumont prevailed for many years, that his doctrine was identical to the teaching of the sixth-century Origenists rightly condemned by the Council of Constantinople in 553. In this study, I support the conclusions of G. Bunge, who convincingly claimed that Evagrius was a supporter of the Nicene Creed, and in areas where the fourth century Church did not specify its teaching he tried to describe the human condition after original sin. Nor can his teaching about the primary and final unity of rational beings with God be identified with the condemned doctrine of the Origenists. The basic category of the monk from Pontus is μονάς identified with the Holy Trinity, which meant for him the state of such primary and final unity between rational beings and God, not canceling the personal differences between God and λογικοί and between the created beings themselves. On the other hand, there are many indications that at the Council of Constantinople in 553 the doctrine based on the concept of Henada was condemned, that is, the acceptance of God’s unity with creatures eliminating personal differences. Bunge’s argument was also confirmed by the new study of A. Casiday. The original fall caused a change in the manner of existence of rational beings in the case of people from noetic to noetic-psycho-physical. The mind does not exist alone anymore, but with an irrational soul and a sensual body. Consequently, it seems that Evagrius accepted the existence of three elements in man: mind, soul, and body,
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but this matter is more complicated. H. Crouzel was of the opinion that the Pontian monk assumed the trichotomic structure of man following Origen: νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα, replacing πνεῦμα with νοῦς. Although Evagrius nowhere clearly identifies νοῦς with πνεῦμα in his texts, most researchers of his writings headed by Guillaumont and P. Géhin have assumed that man according to him is νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα while identifying νοῦς with a rational part of the soul (λογιστικόν). O’Laughlin has proposed Gregory Nazianzen’s anthropology as the source of the Evagrian concept of man, to which the monk of Pontus himself explicitly refers in his definition of the soul (Practicus 89). In the present study, we also supported this proposition by adopting two trichotomies as the basis of the anthropology of Evagrius. The first trichotomy concerns the whole man and contains νοῦς, ψυχή, σῶμα, whereas the second concerns only the soul which consists of the rational (λογιστικόν), concupiscible (ἐπιθυμητικόν), and irascible (θυμητικόν) part. As far as people are concerned, the return to unity with God can be accomplished, according to Evagrius, by purifying the passionate part of the soul consisting of the two parts, concupiscible and irascible, and by reaching apatheia and spiritual gnosis. The monk from Pontus defines his spiritual doctrine as πρακτική and γνωστική, giving a completely new meaning to the terms. The present study shows that Evagrius defines the essence of πρακτική in a completely new way – as the struggle to purify the passionate part of soul from eight principal λογισμοί. Similarly, Evagrius has a completely new view on the sense of the term λογισμοί, using it as an equivalent of the term “demon” to describe eight principal thoughts; and its meaning is very close to the contemporary idea of a compulsive desire. Further, it is also present in the study that it was Evagrius who created the whole category of eight λογισμοί and was the first to put them together in a concise system. Although some individual thoughts appear in the Stoics or in Horace, as well as in the New Testament and Christian or Judaic texts before Evagrius, he was the first author who juxtaposed them as a category in the following order: gluttony (γαστριμαργία), impurity (πορνεία), greed (φιλαργυρία), sadness (λύπη), anger (ὀργή), acedia (ἀκηδία), vanity (κενοδοξία), pride (ὑπερηφανία). The source of the doctrine was Jesus’ teaching from Matthew’s Gospel about eight evil spirits and Origen’s teaching, not the Stoic doctrine, astral religions, or Judaism, as many scholars proposed some years ago. We have also shown that in the Evagrian teaching about the eight passionate thoughts two orders of reflection overlap: spiritual and empirical development. In the first, each subsequent passionate thought attacks the anchorite when he resists the previous one, while in the empirical order, succumbing to one passionate thought opens the next door. Evagrius is not only the author of the whole category of the eight λογισμοί but also the first Christian author who presented a relationship among them. He sought the sources of the passionate thoughts in the three so called resourceful thoughts of gluttony, greed, and vanity, the ones by which Christ was tempted. Gluttony causes impurity and the frustration of these two passions together with greed or vanity leads to anger and sadness. The simultaneous incitement of the concupiscible part of the soul (gluttony, impurity, greed) and the irascible part of the soul (anger, sadness) leads to sloth (acedia). Seeking human praise in practicing asceticism (vanity) and boasting about the victory over the passions (pride) appear
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after the victory over all the previous thoughts. At that stage a monk achieves the state of apatheia. It is also shown in our study that the monk from Pontus did not see apatheia as impassibilitas or impeccantia as St Jerome interpreted it, seeing his teaching as the source of Pelagianism, but he perceived it as the immunity to attacks of passionate thoughts. Apatheia does not end the way of a monk’s spiritual development but opens him to a greater love of God and neighbour, and introduces him to the second stage of spiritual life, γνωστική, which consists of two other stages, φυσική and θεολογική. The aim of the former, also called natural contemplation (θεωρία τῆς φυσικῆς), is to get to know God through His wisdom (which is visible in the created world) while the aim of the latter is to get to know God himself through faith and His Revelation, the Church teaching in the Credo and through individual mystical experience of God complementing the purification of the human soul. The second part of our study shows that Evagrius, unlike later Christians except Cassian, not only noticed the cause-and effect relationship between individual λογισμοί but also discovered and, in a masterly manner described the nature as well as the dynamics of each of them and the strategies for fighting them. According to Evagrius, in the spiritual battle of the anchorite the first to reveal themselves are the three so-called source thoughts by which Christ himself was tempted: gluttony, greed, and vanity. Gluttony is the first passionate thought which attacks the anchorite and opens the door for all the others. Consuming food to the full, in addition to the usual natural pleasure of eating, gives every person a sense of security for sustaining their own physical life. The monk, practicing both quantitative and qualitative fast, gave up on the saturation of food, frustrating not only the natural need of the body, but above all the need for security, and had to face his own fear of physical survival. According to Evagrius, the essence of gluttony is not the encouragement of simple “overeating” but evoking – by means of imagination – the fear of illness and starvation to force a monk to stop asceticism. If the strategy fails, the demon of gluttony changes the strategy to use a monk’s subtle pride to tempt him to stricter fasting and to despise his brothers who do not practice it. When the first attack of gluttony failed and the monk continued his fasting in the desert, the demon of gluttony misled him with the possibility of purifying the soul without any fast. As a means of fighting against gluttony, Evagrius recommends vigil, asking God for greater confidence, setting an individual measure of fasting and non-compliance with it under any circumstance, and an antirrhetic method, that is, referring to it an appropriate passage from the Holy Scriptures. Impurity is the second passionate thought which attacks an anchorite. The study shows that for Evagrius impurity is the result of gluttony both when the monk yields to it and when he resists the temptation. The frustration of gluttony soon causes the temptation of finding comfort in sexual relationships with women, and yielding to it reinforces the sexual desire. In this case the struggle is particularly difficult as the frustration of a sexual need is not only the resignation from a certain pleasure but also from the need to establish a deep emotional relationship with a woman and the need to become a father and outlive oneself in one’s offspring. The renouncing of procreation and of physical fatherhood is putting a stop to the “impulse of life” and
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choosing the route of “death”. If the monk yields to gluttony, a stronger sexual desire is evoked and encourages him to seek a meeting with women in the cities where he goes pretending to look into important matters, or in the desert where he practices the spiritual leadership. When this fight tactic fails, the demon of impurity tempts the anchorite by causing him to imagine sexual relationships with women or by introducing erotic dreams. It also happened that sexual desire would increase without the mediation of gluttony as compensation for the frustration of gluttony which the anchorite rejected and as the effect of subtle pride as he was looking for praise for his fast. The remedy for impurity is fasting, living in accordance with the principle of stabilitas loci and avoiding unnecessary and prolonged meetings with women. Avarice is the third passionate thought of the soul and together with gluttony and vanity is one of the three so-called source passions. Evagrius does not perceive it as a consequence of gluttony and impurity, but as a separate and independent passion. The essence of greed is not the encouragement of an anchorite to possess a larger amount of money but treating wealth as the source of safety in life and the tool of power over other people. Poverty is always a painful frustration for those who trust financial resources more than God. The demon of greed incites a monk to fear the lack of financial resources necessary for living and encourages him to gather supplies and the money he needs. The other example of greed in an anchorite’s life is flattery of wealthy people, hoping to receive help from them or gathering money as the excuse of taking care of the poor. As a remedy for greed the monk of Pontus proposes the practice of poverty, alms and putting more trust in God than in money. Exaggerated fears and an awakened imagination are calmed down by the meditation on the Word of God. According to Evagrius, the thoughts of the irascible part of the soul can appear after fighting the thoughts of the concupiscible part of the soul (the order of spiritual progress) as well as after succumbing to them (the empirical order). The first passion of the irascible part of the soul is sadness, which appears as the reaction to the frustration of unfulfilled passions or the need of human praise, or as the result of anger. Wrath, the second passion of the irascible part of the soul, like sadness is incited by the frustration of concupiscence and pride meant as the feeling of being almighty but contrary to sadness, anger is the external feeling directed towards other people. It results in the desire of revenge for real or imaginary harm, plunging the human soul into darkness and depriving it of spiritual gnosis. A good remedy for such thoughts is to stay among people and to practice patience, forbearance, generosity, and love of one’s neighbor. Personal prayer and the antirrhetic method are also a great help. Acedia is the sixth passionate thought in the Evagrian catalog. According to the monk of Pontus it is a thought consisting of the simultaneous and long-lasting incitement of one of the thoughts of the concupiscible part of soul, namely gluttony, sexual desire, or greed, as well as one of the thoughts of the irascible part of the soul, namely wrath or sadness. The essence of its performance is the hatred of that which is and the desire of that which is unavailable. It is the painful tearing of the human soul by two passions that “pull” it in two opposite directions, causing great mental-spiritual pain and introducing the soul into a state of numbness. Since the sloth in the monastic life customarily appeared at noon, the monk from Pontus
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associates it with daemonium meridianum from Ps. 91 (90):6. In an anchorite’s life sloth appears as the hatred of anchoritism, the hatred of one’s own cell, manual work, brothers, and finally oneself, and the will to return to the world and people, a different cell, or a different work, the will to receive support from others, or to be praised by people. Sloth can be cured by being faithful to everyday duties, persistence in the chosen way of living, place, and job as well as resistance to the temptation of endless changes. A great help for the manifestation of acedia, which is the insensitivity of the soul, are the tears poured out before the Lord and a proper passage from the Holy Scriptures directed against it. Finally, two other passionate thoughts, vanity and pride, are born in the rational part of the soul after overcoming the six previous ones when the anchorite attains the beginnings of impassibility and spiritual knowledge. Evagrius wrote about two kinds of vanity: praktikos pride at the ascetic practice after fighting one of the passionate thoughts which deludes a monk by seeking human praise, and gnostic vanity which appears after fighting the six previous thoughts. The second kind of vain thought incites hopes which are vain and impossible to be fulfilled e.g., to be called to the priesthood, and leads him in this way to frustration and gives way to demons of wrath, sadness, or impurity. Such vanity is also an obstacle to further growth in the spiritual knowledge of God and the source of pride. Pride is the cause of the greatest fall of the monk as it assures him that only thanks to his own ascetic effort and without God’s mercy has he achieved apatheia and spiritual gnosis and that he himself is the source of his decent deeds. It is born as the result of human praise and admiration. As the remedy for attacks of vanity and pride Evagrius advises humility and remembrance of one’s own sins, patient bearing of the obstacles of life or offences from people, as well as meditatio mortis. Although for the most part Evagrius wrote his texts for the use of anchorites, a very specific group of people, he managed, nevertheless, to capture certain permanent mechanisms of the soul of every human being that remain unchanged in different cultures and living conditions. It is likely that life in solitude in the desert was the best place for them to reveal themselves to the fullest extent and where the means for their “relief ” were relatively small. It is amazing how many of his analyses, which arose in the distant fourth century, are still relevant in our time and in the life of not only monks or clerics, but also every human being. His conclusions about the dynamics of passionate thoughts coincide in many points with the conclusions of contemporary experimental psychology. Hence, let us hope that our study will become a starting point on the one hand for further comparative studies on the category of passionate thoughts or later seven deadly sins in other Christian authors of the Patristic and Middle Ages, and on the other hand as the basis for new comparative studies between the spiritual teaching of Evagrius and conclusions of modern psychology. On a practical level, we hope that the present study on the subject of eight passionate thoughts will help everyone who cares for his or her own spiritual development and for all those who try to help others in their different ways to greater self-maturity and fullness of life in their own humanity and deeper relationships with other people and God.
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Bibliography
I.
Edition of Evagrian Texts and their English Translation
Ad Virginem (1913) H. Greßmann (ed.), Nonnenspiegel und Mönchspiegel des Evagrios Pontikos, TU 39, Leipzig, 146–51. (1991) English translation S. Elm, “Evagrius Ponticus’ Sententiae ad Virginem”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 45, 97–120. Aliae sententiae (1892) A. Elter (ed.), Gnomica I, Sexti Pythagorici – Clitarchi, Evagrii Pontici sententiae, t. 53, Leipzig. Antirrheticus (1912) Syriac version: W. Frankenberg (ed.) Evagrius Ponticus, Berlin, 472–545 (with retranslation in Greek). (2009) English translation: D. Brakke Talking Back. Antirrheticos (Cistercian Liturgical Press), Minnesota. Apophtegmata PG 65, 173A–176A. (2005) English translation W. Harmless, The Apophthegmata Patrum: Text and Context, Oxford. Capita cognoscitiva (1931) Greek fragments: J. Muyldermans ‘Evagriana, Extrait de la revue’, augmenté de Nouveaux fragments grecs inédits, Muséon 42, 38–44. (1912) Syriac version: W. Frankenberg (ed.), Evagrius Ponticus, Berlin, 422–71. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, Reflections, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 210–16. Capita paraenetica (1892) A. Elter Gnomica I, Sexti Pythagorici – Clitarchi, Evagrii Pontici sententiae, t. 52, Lipsiae. Capitula XXXIII PG 40, 1264D–1268B. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 224–27. De malignis cogitationibus (1998) P. Géhin – C. Guillaumont – A. Guillaumont, Évagre le Pontique. Sur les pensées, SCh 438, Paris. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, On Thoughts, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 136–82.
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De octo spiritibus malitiae PG 79, 1145A–1164D. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, On the Eight Thoughts, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 66–90. De oratione PG 79, 1165A–1200C. Small changes in Filokalia I, ed. 3, Athenis 1957, 176–89. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, Chapters on Prayer, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 183–209. De vitiis quae opposita sunt virtutibus PG 79, 1140B–114D. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 60–65. Epistula ad Melaniam (1912) Syriac version: Part 1: W. Frankenberg, Evagrius Ponticus, 610–19. (1964) Syriac Version: Part 2: G. Vitestam, Seconde partie du traité qui passe sous le nom de “La grande lettre d’Évagre le Pontique à Mélanie l’Ancienne”, publieé et traduit d’après le manuscrite du British Museum Add. 17192, Lund. (2006) English trans. A. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, New York, 63–78. Epistulae LXII (1987) Greek fragments: C. Guillaumont, “Fragments grecs inédits d’Évagre le Pontique”, in: J. Dummer, Texte und Textkritik. Eine Aufsatzsammlung, TU 133, 209–21. (1994) P. Géhin, Nouveaux fragments grecs des Lettres d’Évagre, Revue d’Histoire des Textes 24, 117–47; Id., Evagriana d’un manuscrit basielien, 66–67. (1912) Syriac version: W. Frankenberg, Evagrius Ponticus, Berlin, 564–611. (2006) English translation of Lettres 7, 8, 19 and 20, A. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, New York, 59–62; other Lettres in L. Dysinger’s website. Gnomai Greek edition: (1873) L. Gildemeister, J. (ed.), Sexti Sententiarum Recensiones. Latinam, Graecam, Syriacas, Bonn. (1892) A. Elter A. (ed.), Gnomica I. Sexti Pythagorici, Clitarchi, Evagrii Pontici Sententiae, Leipzig. Syriac edition: (1952) J. Muyldermans, Evagriana Syriaca. Textes inédits du British Museum et de la Vaticane, Louvain, 33–34. (1958) P. de Legard (ed.), Analecta Syriaca, Leipzig. Armenian edition: G. Sarkissan, Sentenatiae Xysti, Venetaie 1907. English translation: (1910) F. C. Conybeare, The Ring of Pope Xystus. Together with the Prologue of Rufinus. Now First Rendered into English with an Historical and Critical Commentary, London. (1959) H. Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus. A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics, Cambridge 1959. (1981) R. A. Edwards – R. A. Wild, The Sentences of Sextus, Chico (Calif.).
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(2003) R. Sinkewicz, Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 229–32. Gnosticus (1989) C. i A. Guillaumont, Évagre le Pontique. “Le Gnostique ou a celui qui est devenue digne de la science”, SCh 356, Paris. English translation of C. Stewart, Gnostikos, translation of Greek fragments and Gnostikos from Syriac versions, both forthcoming. Institutio seu paraenesis ad monachos PG 79, 1235A–1240B. Kephalaia Gnostica (1931) Greek fragments: J. Muyldermans, “Evagriana, Extrait de la revue”, augmenté de Nouveaux fragments grecs inédits, Muséon 42, 52–55. (1932) J. Muyldermans, À travers la tradition manuscrite d’Évagre le Pontique. Essai sur le manuscrits grecs conservés a la Bibliotheque Natinale de Paris, Louvain, 73, 74, 85, 89, 93. (1939) I. Hausherr, “Nouveaux fragments grecs d’Évagre le Pontique”, OCP 5, 229–33. (1966) P. Géhin, “Evagriana d’un manuscrit basielien”, Meséon 109, 59–85. Syriac version: (1958) A. Guillaumont, Les six Centuries des “Kephalaia gnostica” d’Évagre le Pontique. Édition critique de la version syriaque commune et édition d’une nouvelle version syriaque intégrale avec une double traduction francaise, PO 28,1, Paris. (2015) I. Ramelli, Evagrius’ Kephalaia Gnostika. A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the Syriac (Society of Biblical Literature Press), Atlanta. Paraeneticus (1912) Syriac version: W. Frankenberg, Evagrius Ponticus, Berlin, 556–63. Practicus (1971) C. i A. Guillaumont, Évagre le Pontique. “Traité pratique ou le Moine”, t. I–II, SCh 170–71, Paris. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, The Monk: A Treatise on the Practical Life, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 91–114. Protrepticus Syriac version: (1912) W. Frankenberg, Evagrius Ponticus, Berlin, 554–57. Rerum monachalium rationes PG 40, 1252D–1264C. Small changes in Filokalia, 38–43. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, The Foundations of the Monastic Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 1–11. Scholia in Ecclesiasten (1993) P. Géhin, Évagre le Pontique. “Scholies à l’Ecclésiaste”, SCh 397, Paris. English translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus forthcoming. Scholia in Proverbia (1987) P. Géhin, Évagre le Pontique. “Scholies aux Proverbes”, SCh 340, Paris. English translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus forthcoming. Scholia in Psalmos In PG 12, 1054–1686 as a text of Origen and in PG 27, 60–545 as a text of Athanasius.
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(1883–1884) B. Pitra, Analecta Sacra, t. II, Frascati 444–83; t. III, Paris, 1–364; English translation: C. Vennerstrom, Evagrius of Pontus: The Scholiastic Corpus. Sententiae ad monachos (1913) H. Greßmann (ed.), Nonnenspiegel und Mönchspiegel des Evagrios Pontikos, TU 39, Leipzig, 152–65. (2003) R. Sinkewicz, To Monks in Monasteries and Communities and Exhortation to a Vergin, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 115–35. Sententiae sex (1932) J. Muyldermans, À travers la tradition manuscrite d’Évagre le Pontique. Essai sur le manuscrits grecs conservés a la Bibliotheque Natinale de Paris, Louvain, 74. Sermo sive dogmatica epistula de sanctissima Trinitate (Epistula fidei) (1957) Y. Courtonne, Saint Basile. Lettres I, Paris, 22–37. (1983) J. Grimbont in: M. Forlin Patrucco, Basilio di Cesarea. Le lettere, vol. I, Torino, 84–112. (2006) English translation by Augustine Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, London and New York: Routledge. Spiritales sententiae per alphabeticum dispositae (1892) A. Elter, Gnomica I, Sexti Pythagorici – Clitarchi, Evagrii Pontici sententiae, t. 53, Leipzig. Tractatus ad Eulogium PG 79, 1093D–1140A (recensio brevior). (2003) R. Sinkewicz, Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus; Appendix 2: Eulogios – Text of Lawra G 93, 310–33 (recensio longior). (2003) R. Sinkewicz, To Eulogius, in: Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 12–59.
II.
Other Ancient Authors (editions)
Apophtegmata patrum (Sayings of the Desert Fathers), Jean-Claude Guy (ed.), Les Apopthemes des Pères: Collection systématique, vol. I–II, SCH 387 and 474, Paris: Ėditions du Cerf, 1993 and 2003. Aristotle (1960–1961) Analytica posteriora, De generatione animalium, Ethica magna, Ethica nicomachea, Metaphysica, Protrepticus ad philosophiam, Rhetorica, in: Bekker – O. Gigon (ed.), Opera, I–V, Berlin. Athanasius of Alexandria, Vita Antonii (PG 26, 835–976). Augustin (1992) Confessiones ( J. J. O’Donnell, Oxford). ——— (1962) De vera religione (K. D. Daur, Wien, CCSL 32). ——— (1956) Enarrationes in Psalmos (E. Dekkers – J. Fraipont, Wien, CCSL 38). ——— De Genesi ad litteram (PL 34, 436). Basil the Great (1957) Epistulae, Y. Courtonne, Saint Basile. Lettres, vol. I, Paris. ——— (1962) Epistulae, Y. Courtonne, Saint Basile. Lettres, vol. II, Paris. ——— (1949) Homiliae in Hexaemeron (S. Giet, SCh 26). ——— Regulae Magnae (PG 31, 1080–1305).
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Clement of Alexandria (1960) Paedagogus I (H. I. Marrou – M. Harl, 1960, Paris, SCh 70). (1991) Paedagogus II (C. Mondesert – H. I. Marrou), Paris, SCh 108) (1970) Paedagogus III (C. Mondesert – Ch. Matray – H. I. Marrou, Paris, SCh 158). ——— (1976) Protraepticus (C. Monedesert, Paris, SCh 2). ——— (1960) Stromata I–VI (L. Fruchtel, Berlin, GCS 52). ——— (1970) Stromata VII (L. Fruchtel, Berlin, GCS 56). Didymus the Blind (1962) Commentarium in Zacchariam (L. Doutreleau, Paris, SCh 84–85). Epiphanius of Salamina (1933) Panarion (K. Holl, Berlin, GCS 25). Gregory the Great (1989) Moralia (R. Gillet, Paris, SCh 32bis). Gregory Nazianzen, Orationes (PG 35–36). ——— Epistulae (PG 37). ——— De vita sua (PG 37, 1047–52). ——— Poemata moralia (PG 37–38). Gregory of Sinai, Kephalaia acrostica (PG 150, 1268B–1276C). Hermas (1968) Pastor (R. Joly, 1968, Paris, SCh 53 bis). Jerome (1910–1918) Epistulae (I. Hilberg, Wien, CSEL 54–56). ——— (1925) Commentarium in Prophetae Ieremiae (W. Reiter, Wien, CSEL 59). Homer (1889–1907) Ilias, I, IV (A. Ludwich, Leipzig). ——— (1917–1919) Odysea (T. W. Allen, Leipzig). Justin Martyr (1994) 1 et 2 Apologia (M. Markovich, Berlin-New York, PTS 38). Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses (PG 7, 437–1224). John Cassian (1965) De Institutis ( J.-C. Guy, 1965, Paris, SCh 109). ——— (1955) Collationes (E. Pichery Paris, SCh 42). John Climacus, Scala paradisi 22 (PG 88, 624–1164). Marcus Aurelius (1968) Meditationes, vol. I–II (A. S. L. Farquahrson, Berlin). Marcus Tullius Cicero (1860–1869) Epistula ad Atticum; Disputationes Tusculanae, in: Opera Omnia, vol. I–XI ( J. G. Baiter – C. L. Kayser, Berlin). Maximus the Confessor, Kephalaia de amore (PG 90, 960–1080). The Midrash on Psalms (W. G. Braude, New Haven, 1959). Origen (1991) Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum (L. Brésard – H. Crouzel – M. Borret, Paris, SCh 375). ——— (1966) Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis (C. Blanc, Paris, SCh 120). ——— (1970) Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis (C. Blanc, Paris, SCh 157). ——— (1975) Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis (C. Blanc, Paris, SCh 222). ——— (1982) Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis (C. Blanc, Paris, SCh 290). ——— (1990) Commentarium in Evangelium Joannis (C. Blanc, Paris, SCh 385). ——— (1970) Commentarium in Evangelium Matthei (PG 13; books X–XI, R. Girod, Paris, SCh 162; books XII–XVII (E. Klostermann – E. Benz, 1935, Berlin, GCS 10). ——— (1967) Contra Celsum (M. Borret, Paris, SCh 132). ——— (1968) Contra Celsum (M. Borret, Paris, SCh 136). ——— (1969a) Contra Celsum (M. Borret, Paris, SCh 147). ——— (1969b) Contra Celsum (M. Borret, Paris, SCh 150). ——— (1978) De principiis (H. Crouzel – M. Simonetii, Paris, SCh 252). ——— (1980) De principiis (H. Crouzel – M. Simonetii, Paris, SCh 268).
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