Education System in Saudi Arabia: Of Change and Reforms [1st ed.] 9789811591723, 9789811591730

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xv
Introduction (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 1-11
Society and Social Change (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 13-35
Policy Approaches to Education (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 37-51
Development of the Education System (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 53-72
Imperatives for Reforms (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 73-102
Contemporary Saudi School Education (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 103-131
A Flourishing Higher Education (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 133-167
Women Claim Equality in Education (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 169-201
Changing Dynamics of Religion and Education (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 203-225
Conclusion (Md. Muddassir Quamar)....Pages 227-229
Back Matter ....Pages 231-266

Citation preview

Education System in Saudi Arabia Of Change and Reforms Md. Muddassir Quamar

Education System in Saudi Arabia

Md. Muddassir Quamar

Education System in Saudi Arabia Of Change and Reforms

Md. Muddassir Quamar New Delhi, Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-9172-3    ISBN 978-981-15-9173-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgment

October 5, 2020 It would not have been possible to complete the manuscript for this book without the support and encouragement I have received from Professor P.  R. Kumaraswamy at various stages of my academic career since I enrolled in the M.Phil/Ph.D. program in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 2009. He not only helped me in improving my research and writing skills but also supported me through various ups and downs of a budding researcher’s life in the confines of a university and beyond. At various times whenever he noticed my chips down, he made sure that it does not affect my motivation or confidence. He agreed to my idea to write a dissertation on this subject for my M.Phil degree and later encouraged me to rework on the subject to publish it as a book. I will remain indebted to him for the faith he has always reposed in me. In the process of my academic life and while writing this manuscript, I have come across numerous teachers and fellow students and colleagues who have in many ways contributed to my understanding of the subject as well as helped me improve my research skills. Though it is not possible to name all of them here, I must acknowledge Professor Gulshan Dietl, Professor Girijesh Pant, Professor A. K. Pasha, Professor A. K. Ramakrishnan, and Professor Bansidhar Pradhan for their support and encouragement. Classmates and fellow students including, but not confined to, Zubair, Raghib, Mari, Saif, Raj, Mushtaq, Alvite, Dipa, Manjari, Anjani, and others have at various stages inspired and encouraged me in my academic endeavors. Colleagues in MP-IDSA including DG Ambassador Sujan v

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

R.  Chinoy, former DG Ambassador Jayant Prasad, and former DDG Major General Alok Deb, colleagues in West Asia center Dr. Meena Singh Roy, Dr. Adil Rasheed, and Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan have been generous with their affection. Others including Dr. S. Kalyanraman, Col. Vivek Chadda and Dr. Ashok Behuria have inspired in different ways to focus on my academic pursuits. Conversations with Dr. Rajeesh Kumar in the MP-IDSA building corridor has been a source of reassurance and cheer. Lakshmi’s love, affection, and generosity toward me have never flinched since we met in JNU during those monsoon days of 2002. Without her confidence in me, I would never have been able to pursue the dream of a career in academics and research. The support of my family, especially the unconditional care, love, and affection of my mother, instilled in me the confidence in my abilities. Last, but not the least, I would like to acknowledge the influence my late father and his dedication, hard work, and kind words had on my early life, without which I would never have been able to even dream of pursuing higher education, set aside a career in research, and hence, I dedicate this book to his memory. Md. Muddassir Quamar

About the Book

This book is a comprehensive study on the education system of Saudi Arabia, placing the reforms and changes it has undergone in the past two decades within the context of the historical evolution of the education system. For a better appreciation of the subject, it has been studied within the context of the ongoing changes in the society, how they have facilitated or hindered the education reforms, and how the education reforms, in turn, have impacted the society. The book does not ignore the immediate trigger for the beginning of a comprehensive reforms process but goes beyond it to find much deeper sociopolitical and economic rationales that paved the way for the reforms. It provides a nuanced understanding of the interplays of various socioeconomic as well as political factors that have shaped the education system in Saudi Arabia.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 Society and Social Change 13 3 Policy Approaches to Education 37 4 Development of the Education System 53 5 Imperatives for Reforms 73 6 Contemporary Saudi School Education103 7 A Flourishing Higher Education133 8 Women Claim Equality in Education169 9 Changing Dynamics of Religion and Education203 10 Conclusion227 Bibliography231 Index253 ix

About the Author

Md. Muddassir Quamar  is fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He holds a Ph.D. in Middle East studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has focused his research on the social dynamics in Saudi Arabia within the context of the tensions emerging out of two seemingly non-harmonious trends: Islamization and modernization. He has published several research articles and book chapters on the subject. Dr. Quamar was a Visiting Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, in 2014–15. He has been associated with various research, outreach, and publication activities of the MEI@ND since 2010.

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Abbreviations

ARAMCO BoD CASOC CDLR CEDAW CRFHI CSU GDEA GDP HRW ICG IUM JCCI KACND KAPEDP KAU KAUST KFUPM KSU MIT SOCAL THE TVTC UNDP

Arabian American Oil Company Board of Directors California-Arabian Standard Oil Company Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Center for Religious Freedom of Hudson Institute Council of Senior Ulema General Directorate of Education Affairs Gross Domestic Product Human Rights Watch International Crisis Group Islamic University of Medina Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (Tatweer) King Abdulaziz University King Abdullah University of Science and Technology King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals King Saud University Massachusetts Institute of Technology Standard Oil of California Times Higher Education Technical and Vocational Training Corporation United Nations Development Program

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Abbreviations

WEF WFC WHO WTO

World Economic Forum Weighted Fractional Count World Health Organization World Trade Organization

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 8.1

Annual increase in number of schools, 1967–2000 60 Distribution of schools in the 13 provinces of Saudi Arabia, 2010 63 State Universities in Saudi Arabia 65 Native population in Saudi Arabia, 1932 and 2020 (in million) 76 Population growth rate, 1950–2020 77 Age structure in Saudi Arabia, 2020 (in percent) 78 Regional distribution of expatriate population in Saudi Arabia, 2010 82 Private universities in Saudi Arabia 138 Private colleges in Saudi Arabia 141 Top 20 Saudi Research Institutions 151 Distribution of students in higher education in Saudi Arabia, 2009180

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Education is an important aspect of human life. It plays a significant role in shaping an individual, state, and society at large. The quality and level of education are considered important measures for social progress and human development. Quality education thus is one of the 18 sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN). Despite its universal appeal and its significance in all cultures and societies, education is not universally available to all. The degree of attainment and quality of education varies widely among different regions and societies based on their socioeconomic and political conditions. This wide disparity in terms of education becomes visible in terms of knowledge production and scientific and technological advancement. In terms of the regional distribution, the Western societies of North America and Europe have attained far greater advancement in education compared to other parts of the world. This also shows in terms of the large number of top-ranked universities and institutions of higher learning located in the Western countries. In recent decades, however, other societies especially in Asia, and also in other parts of the developing world in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, have been working to develop their education systems and the UN’s adoption of quality and accessible education as one of its millennium development goals (MDGs), and SDGs has helped developing societies catch up on the time in terms of education. China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia have been among the countries who have © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_1

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performed extremely well in developing their education system and in knowledge production. On the other hand, societies in the Arab world and Africa have been struggling in developing their education systems. In the case of Africa, the lacuna due to conflicts and limited resources is being fast filled with local, regional, and international efforts, though the continent has a long way to go in terms of providing quality education for all. The Arab countries on the contrary do not necessarily lack resources and, until coming under colonial rule, were among leaders in knowledge production and scientific and technical learning. Many medieval cities including Baghdad, Basra, Damascus, Medina, Jerusalem, Timbuktu, Qurtuba, and Fez. were considered to be centres for education, learning and imparting of knowledge. Arab scholars are well regarded for transfer of the ancient knowledge from Indian and Chinese civilizations through their translation works into the modern world. Their works in sociology, astronomy, philosophy, medicine, mathematics, algebra, geometry, literature, language, and other fields are well regarded for inspiring modern philosophers, scientists, and scholars to take further plunges in oceans of knowledge. In modern times, however, the Arab societies have fallen behind not only the developed but also the developing societies in terms of knowledge production and education. There are few Arab universities that rank among the top in the world in any field today. Even countries like Egypt and Iraq that had in the twentieth century shown promises in terms of educational advancement have for a variety of socioeconomic and political reasons fallen off the track. Recognizing the problems facing the Arab societies, the second Arab Human Development Report published in 2003 focused on the need for building a knowledge-based society in the Arab world. Highlighting the problems facing the Arab societies in terms of knowledge production and dissemination, the report noted: “Key knowledge dissemination processes in Arab countries, (socialisation and upbringing, education, the media and translation), face deepseated social, institutional, economic and political impediments. Notable among these are the meagre resources available to individuals, families and institutions and the restrictions imposed upon them. As a result, these processes often falter and fall short of preparing the epistemological and societal environment necessary for knowledge production” (UNDP, 2003, p. 3). While little has changed in nearly two decades, some countries with ample resources and a more focused approach on reforming the education

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system have invested ample resources to not only achieve the MDGs and the SDGs but also change the sociopolitical attitude towards education. The Gulf countries with oil wealth have recognizingly done better in this regard. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are today among the leaders in the Arab world in terms of economic development as well as in terms of providing access to education to their nationals. They have invested heavily in improving their education system both for preparing better skilled manpower to be able to take part in the economic activities as well as for meeting the MDGs and SDGs. There is also a recognition on part of the ruling monarchies to improve the education system if they want to remain regional leaders as the oil wealth that brought prominence for them on the regional map is not infinite and only a gradual shift to a knowledge-based economy can keep them in the leadership position in terms of the regional geopolitics and geoeconomy. Simultaneously, there is a need to fight extremist and radical ideologies and this can be done only through developing an education system that promoted rational thinking and scientific temper among the youth. Because of its centrality in the Arab and Islamic world, its importance in the global oil market, and its significance in Middle East geopolitics, Saudi Arabia remains under the international spotlight. The kingdom’s unique historical evolution and the religious revivalist movement that was the harbinger of the formation of the kingdom, the Islamic legitimacy claimed by the Al-Saud monarchy, and the rapid modernization the society and economy underwent bring extraordinary focus on the Saudi society, politics, culture, and economy. Besides the reportage and coverage of internal developments in the international media, various issues pertaining to the kingdom are discussed and debated regularly in academia. Despite the abiding interest in the internal affairs of the kingdom, seldom does one finds the opinion emanating from a deeper and nuanced understanding  of the society and its people. Barring a few notable exceptions, a majority of academic refrains are shaped by superficial understandings based on widely held prejudices and presumptions based on research carried out with an “orientalist” prism. Within Saudi Arabia, the reactions to such international scrutiny and criticism have been varied. But predominantly, the domestic discourse tends to paint it in the binaries of West vs. Islam or Saudi vs. the world. Nonetheless, some have gone deeper into specific issues to research, explain, and reflect and this has led to greater debate and discussions on

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various socioeconomic issues in the Saudi public sphere including in the virtual space. Globally, some new research has tried to shed the prejudiced lens to develop new and innovative ways to research and understand the finer nuances of the society and culture in the kingdom without necessarily overlooking the problems facing it. Among the issues that have attracted widespread domestic and international attention, especially in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, is Saudi Arabia’s education system. One of the key incidents that prompted the heightened scrutiny of the education system was the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the United States. The idea that the education system was entrenched in radical teaching gained ground and put increased pressure on the monarchy to bring about reforms. The issues have since remained under the international spotlight. Some studies conducted subsequently have noted the objectionable aspects in the school curriculum, textbooks, and pedagogy. They also held the education system partly responsible for the home-grown radicalism. It was noted that some of the references to Jews, Christians, Shias, Sufis, and atheists were highly objectionable. As the world debated the issue, the monarchy acknowledged the problem and began a process of reforming the education system through extensive programs focused on various aspects of the school and university systems. As Saudi Arabia experimented with reforming the education system, a few studies were carried out to understand and explain the nature and impact of these measures on the textbooks, curriculum, classroom, pedagogy, and so on. There are also studies that highlight the rationality behind some of these measures or the limitations in terms of specific policies and programs. Critical studies have also been conducted within Saudi Arabia mostly supported by the system through university departments and specialized research centers as well as independently or in conjunction with international organizations. However, most of these studies have not undertaken a comprehensive study of the education system and how it has evolved or changed over time and what kind of impact it has on society. This book is a comprehensive study on the education system of Saudi Arabia, placing the reforms and changes it has undergone in the past two decades within the context of the historical evolution of the education system. For a better appreciation of the subject, it has been studied within the context of the changes going on in the society, how they have facilitated or hindered the education reforms, and how the education reforms, in turn, have impacted the society. The book does not ignore the

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immediate trigger for the beginning of a comprehensive reforms process but goes beyond it to find a much deeper sociopolitical and economic rationale that paved the way for the reforms. It provides a nuanced understanding of the interplays of various socioeconomic as well as political factors that have shaped the education system in Saudi Arabia. While there is no doubt that the international aspects played a significant role in shaping the education system over the decades, there are three important domestic aspects that have significantly contributed to the evolution of the society as well as to the education system. Firstly, it is important to shed some light on the nature of the society. During the course of the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia evolved from a scarcely populated desert with only a partially settled populace to a predominantly settled and urbanized demography. Undoubtedly, the political landscape too changed beyond recognition to become a unified and centralized monarchy. Furthermore, the oil revenues enabled a rapid development in terms of physical infrastructure, the availability of goods, and economic structures. This political, economic, and demographic evolution had a profound impact on society. Various aspects of life such as the question of identity (Weston 1987; Okruhlik 2004) or the structure of the houses and living spaces (Al-Hathloul 2003) or the household and the ways of socialization (Al-Khateeb 1993; Salam et  al. 2014; Almosaed 2008) underwent an unprecedented transformation. Social behavior, norms, and values too witnessed changes, including, for example, the conception of family or public sphere and so on. Despite the changes and evolution some of the basic characteristics of the society remain intact. The most defining among them are tribal and religious ways of life. There are several important studies that have explored these aspects, most notably Salwa al-Khateeb (1981), Ayman al-Yassini (1985), Z. H. Kour (1991), Joseph Kostiner (1993), Madawi Al-Rasheed (2006, 2010), Thomas Hegghammer (2010), Joseph Kéchichian (2013), and Nadav Samin (2015). What is notable and important to understand is that the sociopolitical and economic ways of life continue to be guided by and adhere to the values emanating from the tribal and Islamic customs. For example, the idea of not questioning authority emerges from religious and tribal convictions. In the Hanbali-Wahhabi tradition obedience to the ruler holds considerable importance. Ibrahim al-Awaji (1971, pp. 67–68) notes: Islam is the source of political legitimacy, the basis of the judicial system, and the moral code of society. Islam is the primary political and social frame of

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reference. On the one hand, it is the formal religion of the state and therefore its principles are the supreme authority. On the other hand, it is a social and cultural institution whose system of social conduct and spiritual force penetrates every aspect of Muslim life. (Cited in Al-Sarhan 2015, p. 191)

Similarly, in the tribal setup, the role of the head of the family, leader of the tribe, or the ruling chief becomes extremely important. While the consultation process is appreciated, disobedience is considered a sign of challenging authority and rebellion. In the Saudi political system, the tribal ethos of “kin-related social behavior, social solidarity and economic cooperation” (Kostiner 1990, p. 227) was ingrained at the outset and remains an important component of state–society relations. Moreover, in the sociopolitical setup, tribal lineage or tracing one’s genealogy to a prominent tribe or family holds importance. Nadav Samin (2015, p. 191) notes: “Lineal authentication became a core political function not only at the once-dominated margins but at the highest reaches of the Saudi state.” Islamic and tribal values remain dominant components of the individual’s social life and in various ways continue to define the nature of the society. In the education system, for example, religion played a significant role. Ayman al-Yassini (1985, p. 111) notes that the ulema were against modern-secular education as they “feared that it would damage the religious fabric of Saudi society”; therefore they were made responsible for the education affairs by the ruler. The education policy at that time tried to satisfy the apprehensions of Saudi religious leaders by incorporating theology into it to make it consistent with the “religious character of the society” (ibid). Similarly, in other social institutions and functions, such as family, marriage, divorce, birth, and death, tribal and religious customs remain extremely relevant. Secondly, it is important to understand the nature of the monarchy. Even here, despite decades of upheavals, changes, and evolution, the basic ethos remains intact. Most importantly, the family rule legitimized by its Islamic credentials and the phenomenon of monarchism as proposed by Michael Herb (1999) define the political system and governance structure in Saudi Arabia as well as other Gulf Arab monarchies. Herb notes that these monarchies are modernized or modernizing versions of traditional state or governing structures and despite the occasional struggles for power or internal challenges, they have survived because of their willingness to adapt to the social ethos and the aspirations of the population. This is also reflected in the way the issue of succession has been handled by

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these monarchies (Kéchichian 2001; Billingsley 2010; Stenslie 2012). Despite huge speculations on the emerging instabilities within the monarchies, in most cases the issues have been managed without large-­scale bloodshed, which cannot be said about the non-monarchical states in the region, and this is not a testimony of righteousness, but rather of the adaptability or adaptation of the preexisting political structures. Another important characteristic of the Gulf Arab monarchies is the process of consultation which is followed within the established sociopolitical structures. Undoubtedly, these are not democracies, but the process of consultation does provide a way for the populace to be part of the political process and give them the semblance of being heard by the authority. This does not mean that there are no issues of human rights violation or suppression of dissent, but what is notable is that these monarchies have an inherent and inbuilt characteristic of being consultative and responsive to the needs, demands, and aspirations of the people so far as these do not threaten the security of the monarchy or are not a challenge to its authority. This characteristic certainly emerges from the centuries of historical evolution of the politics in the tribe-dominated Arabian Peninsula and the kind of sociopolitical understanding that was informed by Islam since its advent in the seventh century. What this means is that despite being monarchies, and having no democratic credentials in the modern sense, these monarchies have successfully adapted the medieval sociopolitical structure to remain responsive to those under their rule. Thirdly, it is important to understand the economic factors that have shaped the state and society and, in turn, played a significant role in the evolution of various aspects of governance, public education and healthcare, gendering and regendering processes, as well as norms and values in the society. The literature on the economy and political economy focuses significantly on the rentier model prevalent in oil-based economies in the Persian Gulf. In many ways, rentierism defines the interactions between state, society, and economy in the region. Numerous studies have explored this aspect of the evolution of the Gulf Arab monarchies including Hazem Beblawi (1990) and Islam Y. Qasem (2010) but what stands out, especially in Saudi Arabia, are the studies by Steffen Hertog (2005, 2007, 2009, 2010). Hertog underlines the significance of the role of individual leadership in shaping and reshaping the sociopolitical and economic structure in the kingdom while highlights the limitations of the rentierism concept in explaining the evolution of the political economy in the kingdom.

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As far as the socioeconomic factor is concerned or the idea of how the oil wealth has shaped the society, there is no doubt that this has been elite-­ centric. This is significant because of the nature of the state and society and the way these have interacted over the years. Hertog (2010, p. 3) notes: The Saudi state apparatus has played a crushingly dominant role in national politics. Saudi politics has been highly centralized around the regime elite, whose patronage and largesse undermined the autonomy of the social groups. Yet the disjointed nature of the state growth and the hub-and-spoke structure of a system almost entirely centered around the royal family have led to great heterogeneity and indeed fragmentation of social groups and, crucially, state institutions at the lower levels of the polity.

Notably, this means that the oil wealth eventually percolates down to all sections of the society depending on where they stand on the patronage network revolving around the royal family. This is certainly mired in unevenness and corruption in the process, and has become one of the major points of action of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman in the process of him establishing his legitimacy among the populace and authority within the Al-Saud. Nonetheless, the economic structures and oil wealth have also meant prosperity and higher consumerism and ability for investment in public services including healthcare, education, and infrastructure, which has been a major factor in the evolution of the state–society–economy relations. The book navigates within the context of these three important aspects that have significantly contributed to the formations and evolution of the education system in Saudi Arabia. It was important to note them at the outset as in the following chapters these factors reverberate and shall help the reader to appreciate the content of this book. In addition to introduction and conclusion, the book comprises of eight chapters, each with an exclusive focus on various aspects of the evolution of the education system, except the second chapter, which provides a detailed background of the society and the process of social change it has undergone since the establishment of the kingdom in 1932. The chapter provides a detailed context for understanding the Saudi education system and how various important events in the course of Saudi history have nurtured society and impacted the education system. Chapter 3 discusses the Saudi policy approaches to education from the start and notes the important causal factors that have contributed to the

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evolution of the education policy and how that facilitated or hindered any reforms. In Chap. 4, the development of the education system has been noted in great detail right from the early years of the establishment of the kingdom. It describes how the education system evolved and developed during the time of various monarchs since the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud (Ibn Saud). The chapter notes the problems and challenges facing the education system at the time and how various kings navigated these issues or why the question of improvement in the quality of the public education system did not become a focus for the monarchy and remained ignored. Chapter 5 focuses on the imperatives for reforms that for the first time in the 1990s brought the focus on the need to reform the education system. It analyzes the relevant factors and how the monarchy responded to the growing demands for reforms. The chapter underlines in greater length the factors that brought about a change in the thought process of the monarchy so far as the question of education reforms was concerned. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the reforms in the school and higher education in the kingdom during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, respectively. They also discuss the challenges that the reforms have been able to address while noting the problems that remain despite the reform efforts. The final two chapters provide insights on  two very important aspects of the Saudi education system. In Chap. 8, the issue of women’s education has been discussed comprehensively: How did Saudi women over the years navigate the inherent and inbuilt disadvantages in the education system? To what extent have the education reforms focused on the need to bring parity in the quality and accessibility of education for men and women? To what extent have they succeeded and what are the challenges that remain? Chapter 9 focuses on the important subject of the relationship between education and religion and to what extent the two have informed each other, especially in the last two decades. The chapter also discusses how the greater focus on higher and modern education and exposure to the outside world has impacted the perception and understanding of religion in society, especially among the youth.

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References Al-Awaji, I. (1971). Bureaucracy and society in Saudi Arabia (Ph.D.  Thesis). University of Virginia. Al-Hathloul, S. (2003). “Riyadh Architecture in one hundred years”, lecture in Arabic presented by at Darat al-Funun, Amman on April 21, 2002, English text prepared by Majd Musa and Mohammad al-Asad. Center for the Study of the Built Environment, Amman. https://www.csbe.org/riyadh-­architecture-­in-­ one-­hundred-­years-­1. Accessed 15 Feb 2019. Al-Khateeb, S.  A. H.  A. (1981). Tawtin al-Badw fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-­ Saudiya: Dirasa Ijtima‘iya li Hijra al-Ghatghat; Nationalization of the Bedouins in Saudi Arabia: A sociological study of Ghatghat migration (Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Masters degree to the King Saud University). [Arabic]. Riyadh. Al-Khateeb, S. A. H. A. (1993). Asalib al-Tanshia al-Ijtimaia li al-Tifl al-Saudiya: Dirasa Muqarina bain jail al-Ummhat Wa al-Jaddat fi Madinat al-Riyadh; Trends in socialization of Saudi child: A comparative study between the generations of mothers and grand mothers in the City of Riyadh. Journal of King Abdulaziz University. [Arabic], 6, 37–75. Almosaed, N.  F. (2008). Money and power in Saudi family. Journal of King Abdulaziz University, 16(2), 61–87. Al-Rasheed, M. (2006). Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Rasheed, M. (2010). A history of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Sarhan, S. (2015). The struggle for authority: The Shaykhs of jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997–2003. In B. Haykal, T. Hegghammer, & S. Lacroix (Eds.), Saudi Arabia in transition: Insights on social, political, economic and religious change (pp. 181–206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Yassini, A. (1985). Religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Boulder: Westview Press. Beblawi, H. (1990). The rentier state in the Arab world. In G. Luciani (Ed.), The Arab state (pp. 85–98). Berkeley: University of California Press. Billingsley, A. (2010). Political succession in the Arab world: Constitutions, family loyalties and Islam. London: Routledge. Hegghammer, T. (2010). Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herb, M. (1999). All in the family: Absolutism, revolution, and democracy in the middle eastern monarchies. New York: State University of New York Press. Hertog, S. (2005). Building the body politic: Emerging corporatism in Saudi Arabia. Paper presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for

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Advanced Studies during 16–20 March 2005 at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme. Hertog, S. (2007). Shaping the Saudi state: Human agency’s role in Rentier-state formation. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39(4), 539–563. Hertog, S. (2009). A Rentier social contract: The Saudi political economy since 1979. In The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1979–2009: Evolution of a pivotal state (pp. 16–19). Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. Hertog, S. (2010). Princes, brokers, and bureaucrats: Oil and the state in Saudi Arabia. New York: Cornell University Press. Kéchichian, J. A. (2001). Succession in Saudi Arabia. New York: Palgrave. Kéchichian, J. A. (2013). Legal and political reforms in Saudi Arabia. London: Routledge. Kostiner, J. (1990). Transforming dualities: Tribe and state formation in Saudi Arabia. In P.  Khoury & J.  Kostiner (Eds.), Tribes and state formation in the Middle East (pp. 226–248). Berkeley: University of California Press. Kostiner, J. (1993). The making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From chieftaincy to monarchical state. New York: Oxford University Press. Kour, Z. H. (1991). The states of Arabia. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Okruhlik, G. (2004). Struggle over history and identity: ‘Opening the gates’ of the kingdom to tourism. In M.  Al-Rasheed & R.  Vitalis (Eds.), Counter-­ narratives: History, contemporary society, and politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (pp. 201–228). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Qasem, I. Y. (2010). Neo-Rentier theory: The case of Saudi Arabia (1950–2000) (Ph.D. Thesis). Leiden: University of Leiden. Salam, A. A., Elsegaey, I., Khraif, R., & Al-Mutairi, A. (2014). Population distribution and household conditions in Saudi Arabia: Reflections from the 2010 census. Springerplus, 3, 530. http://www.springerplus.com/content/ 3/1/530. Samin, N. (2015). Of sand or soil: Genealogy and tribal belonging in Saudi Arabia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stenslie, S. (2012). Regime stability in Saudi Arabia: The challenge of succession. London/New York: Routledge. Weston, F.  W., III. (1987). Political legitimacy and national identity in Saudi Arabia: Competing allegiances. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 11(1), 81–104.

CHAPTER 2

Society and Social Change

The transformation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from a fledgling rural, nomadic, and tribal state to a highly urbanized, modern, and technocratic regional heavyweight in a span of over nine decades had a profound impact on all aspects of its people’s life. Family, civil society, market, governance, and international relations were all affected by the choices made and decisions taken by the monarchy in consultation with other stakeholders, especially the tribal leaders, merchants, and Wahhabi ulema. These decisions emanated from the sociocultural mores of the society, with an emphasis on Islam and tribal values, but the monarchy was also responding to the demands from the people as well as regional and global geopolitical changes. In other words, economic changes, migration, and globalization were equally the drivers of the transformation as were tribal values, Arab identity, and Islamic ideals. In many ways, the interaction between these factors contributed to the evolution of the society and social policy, which significantly influenced the education, health, livelihood, and security of the people. Undoubtedly, Saudi social policy was shaped by a number of domestic, regional, and international developments, and these, in turn, shaped the life of the people. According to Lucinda Platt, professor of social policy at the London School of Economics, “[s]ocial policy analyses the different roles of national governments, the family, civil society, the market, and international organizations in providing services and support across the life course from childhood to old age” (Platt 2019). In the case of Saudi © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_2

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Arabia, the monarchy adopted the concept of social welfare right from the early days of the formation of the kingdom, even before the discovery of oil. Notably, the Saudi idea of social welfare did not emanate from the modern concept as it is understood in Europe or other parts of the world that adopted various hues of socialism. Rather, it was and is an idea rooted in the local culture and tribal political system followed in the Arabian Peninsula wherein the head of the family, tribe, and alliance of tribes is considered responsible for the welfare of all its members. Hence, soon after the formation of the kingdom in 1932, the founder, King Ibn Saud, started to think about measures to generate revenues for the newly found state to be able to provide for the people (Lipsky 1959; Lacey 2009). The government emerged as the sole agency providing services, such as child and family support, schooling and education, housing, healthcare, and unemployment support. In the early period, this process was based on traditional networks of transferring wealth through tribal leaders, rich merchants, and charitable organizations (Kostiner 1990; Kour 1991). Subsequently, as the kingdom adopted the path of modernization, it started to adopt the new tools of providing these services. However, this did not mean the dismantling of the traditional networks, as they were brought within the ambit of the expanding state bureaucracy (Al-Rasheed 1996a, b). Eventually, the monarchy started to shape the social policy within the context of the modern concept of social welfare, and this became evident in the post-oil boom period since the 1970s when a wide array of developmental work was carried out by the state even in the far-off areas (Hertog 2010; Stenslie 2012). The Saudi society, therefore, evolved through interactions between various forces including the family, civil society, market, international organization, and the state. The “social contract” between the monarchy and the citizens ensured that the government takes care of all aspects of individuals’ lives from birth to death including schooling and education (Hertog 2009, 2010; Jones 2010). This was significant in reducing the differences in terms of the availability of education as the education system was being run with a uniform education policy and state-built infrastructure. As discussed in subsequent chapters, it ensured that there is less disparity in terms of availability and accessibility, undoubtedly there were other issues pertaining to social policy impacting the education system (Prokop 2003). Therefore, there remained a certain degree of disparity in both accessibility and quality of education, especially when seen in terms

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of the urban/rural divide (more defined in the early stages of the foundation of the kingdom) and the sectarian and gender divides. From the point of view of understanding the Saudi education system and its evolution, it is important to understand how the society evolved and how it impacted the social policy and in turn the education system. As underlined by Platt, “[s]ocial policy aims to identify and find ways of reducing inequalities in access to services and support between social groups defined by socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, migration status, gender, sexual orientation, disability and age, and between countries” (Platt 2019). In the case of Saudi Arabia, the state policies have played a significant role in shaping the society and creating a unified sociopolitical identity despite the tribal, religious, and economic fault lines. Therefore, the study of social change and policies that have impacted it becomes more important as one tries to understand the education system, the reforms, and the changes it has undergone and how that has impacted the larger society and lives of the people.

State and Society Since the founding of the kingdom in 1932 until the current phase when Saudi Arabia is one of the leading regional countries and a member of G20, the state, society, and its people have progressed in a variety of ways. The country has witnessed phases of socioeconomic developments but at the same time faced hardships due to internal challenges, political turmoil, regional conflicts, as well as religious extremism. The state, society, and social policies have undergone significant changes and evolution and have impacted the education. In the process, the society has come a long way from a rudimentary understanding of the need for education to recognizing the need for scientific and technological education building some of the best education institutions of higher learning in the Arab world.1 The society and social policy have evolved from being solely driven by the

1  For example, in the Times Higher Education World University Ranking 2019, six Saudi universities—King Abdulaziz University (KAU), Alfaisal University (AU), King Saud University (KSU), King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences (KSAUHS), King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), and Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University (IAFU)—featured among the top 1000 universities in the world. More importantly, of the top five universities in the Arab world, Saudi universities—KAU and AU—held the top two positions (Times Higher Education, 2019).

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religious and tribal understanding and being rooted in customs to having incorporated the idea of creating a knowledge-based society. The progress in terms of how the society has evolved and how they have impacted the education system is significant but the evolution has not been smooth. It has gone through periods of disruptions and tensions, and at the same time, individual rulers and important incidents have left a strong stamp on shaping the society. This evolution can be divided into five broad phases: the early phase under the founder King Ibn Saud (1932–53); the middle phase that marked the beginning of the oil era (1953–70); the era of planned development that coincides with the oil boom period (1970–91); the post-Kuwait crisis phase (1991–2005); and the globalization phase (2005–20). Ibn Saud Era In the early days of the establishment of the kingdom, the focus of the monarchy was on consolidating the political accomplishments of the period between 1902, the year when the Al-Saud family regained the control of Riyadh, and 1932, when Ibn Saud declared the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Before his death in 1953, Ibn Saud was able to consolidate his rule and unify vast newly acquired territories under his family’s dominion, established diplomatic relations with international powers and regional countries, and most importantly entered into the oil-­for-­security agreement with the United States that not only brought security but unprecedented prosperity with sudden flow of cash or petro-dollars. The political culture adopted in the kingdom in these formative years shaped the future of the state and society. At the outset, the kingdom chose to become a unified tribal–political entity with a strong center supported by various sections including Wahhabi ulema and Hejazi merchants who were recognized as important agents in the extension of Al-Saud influence. The strong political interactions among various tribal groups in the Arabian Peninsula resulted in Ibn Saud relying upon traditional methods to secure and ensure legitimacy. In addition, he had to respond to challenges from within the family, particularly from his uncles and nephews, as well as other branches of the clan. He dealt with it by making them stakeholders in the state, co-opted them through marriages, and occasionally neutralized them by force (Al-Rasheed 2010, pp. 69–83). The decision on key social issues, such as education, infrastructure, and healthcare, like other political and economic decisions, were taken by the

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king, who was the absolute authority. Nonetheless, Ibn Saud preferred to work in consultation with his majlis and advisers (Lipsky 1959; Al-Rasheed 2010).2 Some of these advisers were of Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian origin and had become part of the king’s coterie for their specific skills in fields such as business and financial management, language, and interpretation skills or contacts with European and American businesses and leaders. He made sure that his allies are adequately compensated while allowing rehabilitation of former enemies and opponents, thus adding to his popularity and enigma. Emerging alliances with Britain and the United States came in handy at crucial junctures of state formation and ensured the inflow of technology and ideas which started to become an important factor in shaping the worldview of the newly formed state (Philby 1955; Lipsky 1959). While the king, his family, and close aides shaped much of the policy, the elite that started to develop around the newly formed state too contributed in limited but significant ways. In the formative years, the elites consisted of four components: the royal family that formed the core and provided the political leadership; the Wahhabi ulema who helmed the religious, cultural, and educational affairs; the Nejdi tribal leaders who acted as the bridge between the ruling family and tribes, and extended complete support to Al-Saud expecting financial largesse in return; and the Hejazi merchants who provided finances and helped manage the economic affairs. Besides the immediate kin of Ibn Saud, the royal family included members of lateral clans such as al-Jiluwi, al-Mishari, al-Thunayyan, and al-Sudairi (Lipsky 1959; Kostiner 1993). Intermarriages within these branches were common and served as an instrument to keep the clan intact. The king married multiple times including outside the immediate clan and tribe to win over allies and strengthen his rule.3 The imprint of Wahhabi ulema on decision-making in the realms of religious, cultural, and educational affairs, which continued to be significant even in later stages, is largely a legacy of this formative phase of the 2  A number of majlises were part of the daily schedule of the King for various purposes and duration, such as the al-Majlis al-Aam (public congregation), al-Majlis al-Khas (congregation with close associates), and Majlis al-Dars (congregation with ulema), which helped him in taking decisions. 3  It was mainly as a result of these multiple marriages and the large number of offspring he left behind that the composition of the royal family gradually changed to comprise only his sons and grandsons, while the lateral branches were pushed to the periphery (Khoury and Kostiner 1990).

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kingdom’s evolution. Wahhabi ulema were strongly allied with the royal family and had provided the religious legitimacy to the expansion of their rule in Nejd and beyond. At least in the early stages (before higher education became more accessible), they were predominantly descendants of the eighteenth-century revivalist religious scholar Mohammed Bin Abdul Wahhab whose descendants later came to be known as the Al-Shaikh family. The ties between the two families (Al-Saud and Al-Shaikh) had strengthened due to intermarriages (Bligh 1985; Commins 2006; Wynbrandt 2010). The ulema ensured the incorporation of Wahhabi ideas in public life and appropriated the decision-making and administration of education. Despite their opposition, however, Ibn Saud did not backtrack from introducing modern education, which he considered important for the development of the kingdom, but he did accede to their demand to put them in charge of the education system (Lipsky 1959). As a result of their influence on education affairs, once the organized education system took shape, an overwhelming proportion of educational curriculum from primary to higher education remained rooted in religious subjects with only incremental introduction of modern elements that were needed for the skilled workforce (Saleh 1986; Prokop 2003). The ulema were opposed to the introduction of English language teaching in schools, as well as any pictorial representation of humans or mammals in the textbooks (Prokop 2003). The textbooks that were introduced in this phase were full of Islamic references including, on many occasions, being hate-­ filled toward other religions and denominations. It was largely a legacy of Wahhabi ulema that came under serious international criticism after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States (Shea 2006). Early Impacts of Oil Signs of changes in the sociopolitical spheres first started to emerge in the 1950s and this was mainly a result of newfound prosperity with a substantial influx of oil revenues (Niblock 1982). The establishment of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO; now known as Saudi Aramco) and the introduction of a number of new technologies and influx of skilled workforce from outside made an impact on the society and underlined the need for a fresh approach toward education. In addition, regional political upheavals and factionalism within the royal family created new dynamics that profoundly impacted decision-making. In fact, it is important to underline that this was one of the most difficult phases in

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the evolution of the kingdom mainly because of the regional political upheavals and their impact on internal affairs. Since the late 1940s oil revenues had started affecting various aspects of the socioeconomic life and a new class of people started to emerge around the oil industry which in turn influenced the society and social structure (Lipsky 1959; Wenner 1975). The oil industry became the driving force behind the construction of new infrastructure, and besides direct employment for scores of Saudis, it created opportunities for small businesses in the petroleum-related services. This propelled the demand for a skilled and unskilled workforce that was not locally available; hence, the majority of the workforce came from outside. Nonetheless, newer economic opportunities generated a consciousness among some Saudis to acquire skills and many who could manage resources sought to acquire skilled-based education in neighboring Arab countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Most of these local citizens who could acquire skills from outside became gainfully employed in the fledgling oil industry. Eventually, a conscious effort was made to establish schools, vocational centers, and universities for skilling people. In the meanwhile, the government and administration were also expanding. Employment opportunities in the government and administration created consciousness among the people to acquire education for employment and adjust to the changing realities of social life. A large section of people were still living a nomadic or seminomadic life, but a growing number were willing to migrate to urban areas. To be able to lead a comfortable life and afford newly available housing, appliances, and modes of transport, people aspired to gain employment in the public sector that was lucrative in terms of remuneration and allowed them enough time to indulge in traditional chores. But to get such employment, school and higher education were necessary; thus a growing number began to seek education. The period witnessed tumultuous political changes in the region, especially following the rise of secular Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism, and socialism. The emergence of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt created ripples inside Saudi Arabia as labor unions and mobilization of workers in the petroleum industry led to a number of strikes in the mid-1950s causing panic among the Al-Saud leadership (Lipsky 1959). This had a profound impact on the state and its social policies as well as on its political choices and foreign policy. The other problem faced by the kingdom at the time was the internal squabbling among the siblings, especially King Saud and

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Crown Prince Faisal, for the direction in which the kingdom was to progress. King Saud briefly dabbled with the idea of aligning his policies with the socialist states but soon understood the trappings and started to distance Saudi Arabia from Nasser’s Egypt (Al-Rasheed 2010). Internally, he tried to consolidate power in his hands and promoted his sons at the expense of ambitious half-brothers, which pushed Crown Prince Faisal to effect a soft coup against him in 1964 and take over the leadership. Oil Boom Period King Faisal was not only inclusive when it came to managing the affairs of the royal family; he also distributed power among his half-brothers. The new king streamlined the process of power distribution within the royal family and created a system where in the half-brothers did not feel excluded and had a strong stake in the continuation of the monarchy (Kéchichian 2008). Once he was able to streamline the process of power distribution within the family, he started focusing on state-building. This was significant as the political, social, administrative legacy which his father had left a decade ago had been shaken by the policies adopted by his elder half-­ brother (Stenslie 2012). Some of the aspects required a fresh approach while others needed strengthening. King Faisal decided to streamline the political structures while he adopted a fresh approach as far as the society was concerned (Kéchichian 2008). Faisal understood that for the long-term survival of the kingdom, it is imminent that the state heralds a new era of social change without appearing disruptive. This was a task easier said than done. There were international, regional, and internal challenges. The raging Cold War between the United States and the USSR, with several proxy wars taking place within the Middle East, underlined that the kingdom needs to be cautious in making international alignments and alliances. Faisal chose to consolidate Saudi Arabia’s position within the Islamic world through moves such as the formation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC; later renamed Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in 1972 and the oil-­ embargo in 1973 (Cordesman 2003; Bronson 2006; Jones 2010). It was not only the foreign policy choices of King Faisal that had a profound impact on the future of Saudi Arabia but also the social policy choices which went a long way in changing the relations and interactions between the state and society (Kéchichian 2008). A key aspect of this was the beginning of planned development with the adoption of the first

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development plan in 1970 that streamlined the process of government expenditure and set priority areas for public investment. In this regard, two important decisions changed the face of the kingdom for the future generations. Firstly, the kingdom adopted the idea of market economy and rentierism, meaning that the state depended on rent received through the export of one commodity for most of its economic activities. This was made easier due to the oil boom in the aftermath of the oil embargo that had sky-rocketed the internal oil prices leading to a huge rise in state revenues. Secondly, the kingdom decided to adopt the idea of social welfare. This was a significant decision as the state was taking responsibility for all the welfare needs of its citizens including providing housing, necessary services, healthcare, and education.  The idea to adopt the social welfare model was rooted in the local Arabian tribal custom but the tool adopted for the implementation was modern and necessitated improved infrastructure and system of delivery of services. The growing oil revenues made it easier to invest in infrastructure development, in addition to investing in developing delivery systems, boosting economic activities, and establishing new urbanized townships and cities (Rugh 1973; Makki 2011). But the most important aspect as far as the implementation of these policies was concerned was the decision to adopt the planned development model. Planning was an important aspect of social policy; Faisal adopted the five-year plan model that was in use in many developing countries. The Central Planning Organization (CPO) was established in 1965 to prioritize expenses and formulate development plans for different sectors. The first five-year plan (1970–74) was drawn envisaging infrastructural development and proposed energizing economic growth, leading to improvement in transportation and communication systems. The second five-year plan (1975–80) focused on developing education and training infrastructures to enhance local manpower. The third plan (1980–85) focused on social services and health sector improvement while the fourth five-year plan (1985–90) was dedicated to economic growth and human resource development (MoEP 2010a, b). Earlier decades had witnessed growth but the lack of planning and haphazard and non-systematic expansion had led to wide-ranging disparities both in terms of demographic and geographical divisions (Birks and Sinclair 1982). With centralized planning, the monarchy was able to streamline and expedite economic growth while ensuring that the state takes care of the societal needs (Niblock 1982). As far as education was

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concerned, the second five-year plan (1975–80) focused on building infrastructure, streamlining curriculum, and providing accessible education. Economic diversification was part of planning efforts emanating from the idea to minimize dependence on unstable oil revenues and world market fluctuations. There was the pressure from the domestic constituency to expand the base of the modern economy to sustain the state structures and its welfare model (Birks and Sinclair 1982). Saudi Arabia “experimented with different forms of economic diversification in the industrial and agricultural sectors” (Zuhur 2011, p. 141). It helped in the overall growth of the economy and enhanced social services including education and healthcare and attention was given to improving agricultural production, which despite being on the agenda for some time had earlier attracted only feeble attention due to lack of resources (Jones 2010). With planned development and focus on social policy, the society witnessed an unprecedented transformation in the next two decades. A new middle class started to emerge in the wake of the influx of oil wealth and planned development and impacted various aspects of life including demography, social structure, as well as level of education (Ramady 2005; Niblock 2006; Niblock and Malik 2007). Post-Kuwait Crisis Phase The political disruption in the wake of the Kuwait crisis had a profound impact on Saudi politics and society. Thus far, the state had not seriously encountered public mobilization and direct demands from its citizens and had relied upon the elites to understand the social aspirations and devise social policy. The protests and petition politics in the early 1990s changed these dynamics and forced the monarchy to realign its functioning and prioritize issues that were important for the people and resonated among the newly emerging middle classes (Dekmejian 2003; Lacroix 2004). The key demand of the people was education reforms and, hence, human resource development became one of the keywords in the state policy. The ‘petition fever’ had begun in Kuwait and soon spread to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states. Between 1990 and 1991 two well-­ orchestrated petitions were submitted to King Fahd by liberals and Islamists (Al-Rasheed 1996a, b). The key political demands included reviewing ties with the United States, political opening, introduction of a constitution, and an ‘elected’ legislative council (Dekmejian 2003;

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Raphaeli 2005). Major socioeconomic demands in these petitions were improvement in the conditions of women, education reforms, creation of jobs, and religious and cultural rights for the marginalized including the Shias. King Fahd responded to some of the political demands by introducing the Basic Law (al-Nizam al-Asasi) in March 1992 and the formation of a nominated Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) in August 1993. The demands for social and education reforms were accommodated only after the coming to the fore of Crown Prince Abdullah as the de facto ruler after King Fahd was sidelined due to a debilitating stroke in November 1995. As a de facto ruler, Abdullah initiated reforms in areas such as education, judiciary, and political participation, and took measures for improving the condition of women and Shias. Initiatives such as the National Dialogue, interfaith dialogue, municipal elections, nomination of women in the Majlis al-Shura, and opening of new universities indicated his intent for meaningful change in social policy despite the constraints of internal politics within the royal family to undermine his position, mainly by the full-brothers of Fahd and the strife due to growing divisions in the country between the liberals and conservatives (Kéchichian 2013; Thompson 2014). King Abdullah handled the situation skillfully and adopted a carrot and stick policy towards those at the forefront of demanding reforms. He used force to dispel dissent and co-opted those who were ready to align their agenda with his. Hence, several important religious and social figures, especially from among the liberals and “Islamo-liberals” worked with the monarchy to focus on a more inclusive and responsive government (Lacroix 2004; Hegghammer 2010). As Abdullah was trying to stabilize the internal situation and focused on reforms to respond to internal demands, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States rocked the world. This was to date the most difficult tests for Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the United States as 15 out of the 19 attackers were of Saudi origin. After the initial dust settled, and Saudi Arabia managed to avoid an immediate American reprisal, the focus shifted to the Saudi education system that was accused of fomenting extremism. A number of studies subsequently found the textbooks and curriculum to be disseminating radical and hate-filled ideas based on sectarian and religious lines (ICG 2004; Shea 2006). Abdullah’s management skills and leadership proved significant as he was able to use international pressure to stonewall the opposition from conservatives, traditionalists, and radicals, especially among the ulema, to begin a complete overhaul of the education system and

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development of a new school curriculum including publication of new textbooks as discussed later in the book. Since the Kuwait crisis, Saudi society witnessed a gradual transition inter alia due to globalization, modern education, and manifestations of “reformist” leanings of the monarchy. The overlapping of religious beliefs, traditional practices, and modern understandings of life ushered in changes in individual behaviors, cultural practices, and religious understandings. A tribal society that was based on kinship and familial alliances witnessed rapid urbanization and demographic changes and a gradual sociocultural opening. Economic growth, religious revivalism, and changes in the political economy impacted society and created demands for reforms, which broadened due to continuous pressure for change from within. Era of Rapid Globalization The beginning of the globalization phase coincides with the post-Kuwait crisis phase. Toward the late 1980s and the early 1990s, as oil revenues started to drop due to price fall and slowdown in the world oil market and wars in the Gulf, the kingdom’s gross domestic product (GDP) also saw a downward spiral forcing Riyadh to start on the path of economic liberalization (Niblock 2006). It planned to reduce subsidies and encourage private investments as well as applied for membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which was granted in 2005. With this Saudi Arabia formally entered the phase of globalization. Upon the demise of King Fahd in August 2005, King Abdullah took over the reins and started to build an alliance with the reformist voices within the kingdom and though he preferred gradualism, he was able to introduce substantive social reforms, including education reforms, until his death in January 2015. This phase can be considered the most substantive for education reforms because of the enormity of changes that was introduced by the monarchy. Abdullah brought technocrats and professionals to devise new education policy and manage the education system and started gradual opening for women, and this process has intensified under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed. One of the key aspects of the Abdullah’s policy was to start a gradual process of privatization of services and cutting down on subsidies to manage the economic problems due to the demographic surge and lower oil prices. This was balanced with economic

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diversification and nationalization of jobs to deal with the problem of growing unemployment among the Saudis. For example, Saudi Arabia unveiled the Nitaqat (domains/ranges) program in 2011 to streamline the Saudization of the workforce. In the education sector, Saudi Arabia adopted the policy of human resource development, skill development, and knowledge-based society and started programs such as King Abdullah Public Education Development Program (also known as Tatweer), the Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project, and the King Abdullah Foreign Scholarship Program. Abdullah was keen to improve the accessibility and quality of education for all and focused on improving female enrollment in tertiary education and preventing chances of dropout among both boys and girls after school education. These proved to be important steps in creating the environment for a comprehensive change in the education system. As discussed in the subsequent chapters, the education reforms initiated by Abdullah are by far the most comprehensive in the kingdom’s history and proved to be a harbinger of the larger social change.

Drivers of Social Change The drivers of social change might not be the same in all societies. They can vary based on the political systems; for example, in more democratized societies, local groups and people can have more space to contribute to social change, while highly centralized systems can be extremely prone to a top-down approach. Likewise, in places that have witnessed a strong social current of public participation or democratization, the sources can be different from places that have a history of lower public participation. Saudi society has experienced change and reforms with some unique sources or drivers of the policy initiatives impacting the society. There are some key components including Islam, tribalism, demography, market, globalization, and international politics that need to be discussed. Islam It has been well articulated by a number of scholars that Islam is the main source of legitimacy not just for the state and the ruling family but also for seeking respect and social status for the common people (Dekmejian 1985; Delong-Bas 2004; Billingsley 2010; Alshamsi 2011). The society is deeply embedded in religion which is seen as the basis of inspiration for all

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aspects of life including politics and sociocultural changes (Yamani 2004; Al-Rasheed 2006). Islam is a predominant factor that has shaped the society and plays the most important role in the private lives of individuals and the collective life of the people, something the ruling family has repeatedly reiterated through various legislations and administrative structures (Aba-­Namay 1993; Nevo 1998). The process of Islamization of the society has strengthened from time to time either as part of the ideological leaning of the state or as a reaction to local, regional, and international events. Until the advent of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, who on several occasions underlined that they wish to change the course (BBC 2017), Islamization is considered as one of the driving factors for politics and government in the kingdom. Islam nonetheless remains the most important component of social, political, and cultural life in Saudi Arabia. In the words of Ghassan Salamé (1987), as part of an individual’s faith, cultural heritage, and political ideology, it “permeates the Saudis’ daily life.” Islam was not only critical to the establishment of the Saudi state but has been significant in its evolution and many of the sociopolitical spheres—be it education, judiciary, or cultural life. The kingdom has been dominated by the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, the root of which goes back to the preaching of the eighteenth-­century religious scholar Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab and the subsequent establishment and evolution of the Saudi state. The influence of Islam on the social and political life is not confined to Saudi Arabia as has been underlined in studies on Arab societies highlighting Islam as a cultural force, especially the concepts of adl (justice) and maslaha (public good), which have profoundly impacted the evolution of  the state and society social in the Arab–Muslim world (Ismael and Ismael 2008). Nonetheless, the extent to which Islam has influenced the society and politics in the kingdom is profound (Al-Yassini 1985; Salamé 1987). This was as much a product of the circumstances which led to the formation of the kingdom as the ideology that drove the Al-Saud and the society. This extraordinarily dominant role of Islam and ulema in the affairs of the state and society makes the Saudi case unique, especially since the ulema played a significant role as a functionary and stakeholder in the political system. It led to an exceptional emphasis on religion in all aspects of life which, many a times, has been regarded as the source of radicalism or conservatism in society (Dekmejian 1985; Delong-Bas 2004; Billingsley 2010; Alshamsi 2011). For example, the kingdom has witnessed the rise of radical religious movements from time to time such as the Ikhwan in

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the 1920s, Juhaiman al-Uthaibi’s siege of Kaaba in 1979, and the emergence of the Sahwa movement and jihadist groups in the late twentieth century. Notwithstanding the debate on extremist Islam, historically, the society and the education system were dominated by Islam. Religion has had a huge influence on the state and society including on the education system  (Prokop 2003). Moreover, the way the government and society evolved, education had for a long time remained under the influence of the ulema and it was not until the reform measures taken by Abdullah that the influence of the ulema started to wean (Al-Sumbul et al. 1998; Al-Aqil 2005a, b). The heavy emphasis on religious education had also raised questions about the lack of quality in terms of skill development and employability (Bahgat 1999; Rugh 2002). Tribalism At its heart, Saudi Arabia is a tribal society and the people take pride in their tribal origins. For centuries, the states and society in  the Arabian Peninsula have been organised on the basis of tribal affiliations and tribes are the most important mode of social organization. People organized on the basis of descent and it was the primary unit for political, economic, and social function (Kour 1991; Kostiner 1993). Among the innumerable tribes who were living in different parts of the peninsular desert, a few large tribes such as Anza, Mutayr, Qahtan, Utaiba, Murrah, Shammar, Harb, Dawasir, Ajman, Subay, and Suhul were dominant and influential. They wielded power, owned resources, and moved freely from one part to another in search of food, water, and grazing lands (Al-Harbi 2011; Samin 2015). As Joseph Kostiner states, “[i]n the early years of the twentieth century Saudi society was divided into large tribal groups that maintained a corporate life and inhabited different regions in the central and northern Arabian Peninsula” (Kostiner 1990, p. 226). Descent was an important marker of social differentiation and hierarchy and it continues to be so, thus, those belonging to the ‘original Arab’ (Arab al-Asl) tribes or those claiming descent from the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bait or Syed) formed the higher echelons in the society. On the other hand, those coming from a non-tribal origin and non-Arab descent and were Arabized (Arab al-Areba) in due course of time were regarded as lower (Taqoush 2009). The latter group mainly comprised artisans and tradesmen of Farsi (Persian), Hadrami (people from Southern Arabia), Hindi (Indian), Habshi (African), and Indunesi (Southeast Asian) origins.

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This division has become diluted in contemporary times but had resonated sharply until oil-induced economic and social transformation. Salwa al-Khateeb (2007) argues that before the advent of oil, Saudis could be categorized into four groups based on their hierarchy: the most respected were the tribal leaders or sheikhs who were rich and wealthy and wielded power; the second rung were Bedouins, who belonged to pure Arab tribes; the third category were those who traced non-Arab origins and were immigrants; and the fourth were slaves. The main difference between those who belonged to tribes and those who were immigrants rested on their occupation. The Bedouin people detested occupation such as carpentry, blacksmithing, and butchering; the rich tribes owned slaves for manual works such as herding animals and harvesting fruits. The contemporary patterns of Saudi society are remarkably different from those of the past. The population is predominantly urban, leading to the near disappearance of tribal and clan-based sustenance. Tribal networks have become less important but continue to play a role in the identity and social structure, particularly in matters of marriage. With 85–90 percent of the population living in urban areas and changing modes of consumption, the tribal setup has witnessed changes. Politically, however, the tribal association remains important, particularly in terms of leadership and negotiations with the state, but the political system has vastly changed due to the ‘unification’ (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). The tribal network remains important in terms of the decision to migrate, settle, choose an occupation, and in marital choices, and descent continues to be an important marker for identity. As Nadav Samin states, “[d]espite the erosion of kinship ties resulting from almost three centuries of religious conditioning, and despite the unprecedented material transformation of Saudi society in the oil age, genealogy remains a central facet of modern Saudi identity” (Samin 2015, p. 2). He further articulates that the emphasis on belonging to a tribe has been perpetuated because it “has become an important marker of authenticity” and “national belonging” (ibid). Despite the changes, tribalism remains an important component of individual and collective identity and a part of social life, urbanization, modernization, and globalization notwithstanding. Demography and Migration The demography and migration patterns have been an important aspect of social change. The monarchy has been responsive to the demographic

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changes both due to migration, and birth and has evolved policies accordingly. In fact, it would not be wrong to argue that the demographic changes have been one of the most important factors in the social change experienced in the kingdom. The rise in the national population and improvements in demographic indicators such as fertility and mortality are important markers of the changes in the society. The growth in middle classes and its impact on society created demands for change from within and the social and educational reforms which were introduced by the state were in response to these demands. The educated middle class and reformist intellectuals have been at the forefront of demanding reforms and the monarchy has responded by taking measures such as providing education, healthcare, and more recently the demands for better job opportunities for educated women. Furthermore, demographic changes, urbanization, and internal migration have created a section of urban poor who continue to remain at the margins despite some efforts to providing better educational, healthcare, and economic opportunities. The demographic changes and migration have also posed serious problems for policymakers, leading to the introduction of programs such as Nitaqat in 2011. Policy challenges notwithstanding, demography has been a major factor in the changing attitude and aspirations of people toward conventions and customs, and this has forced policymakers to take note. Debates around the role of the ulema and religion, sports, recreation, education, employment, the role and place of women, and many other aspects of social and political life, especially among the youth, have contributed to social change. Saudi scholar Tawfiq al-Saif (2014) suggests that this is evident from the growing popularity of those talking the language of social justice and civil rights among the citizens. The youth are leading this debate and art, literature, photography, films, painting, cartoons, music, sports, and other mediums of popular expression have found their way among Saudi youth and have become the tools of their expression to which the monarchy has responded through bringing change and reforms. According to the United Nations World Demographic Trends, as much as 50 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of 25. This generation does not shy away from debating politics and society, leading to a continuous churning of ideas. Studies suggest that the Saudi youths’ attitude and views on society and policymaking are different from the previous generations, forcing the monarchy to take notice and make amends accordingly in order to remain relevant and continue to enjoy legitimacy (Montagu 2010; Murphy 2013; Al-Ahmadi 2011).

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Market and Globalization Economic changes, market forces, and globalization (both in terms of communication revolution and economic liberalization) have had a profound impact on the society. Market and economy have been one of the most important drivers of change. As discussed earlier, in the formative phase of the kingdom, it was the economic imperatives that convinced the monarchy to allow the oil exploration and after the discovery of oil, the state and society started to revolve around the commercial aspect of oil production. In the 1970s and 1980s too, it was mainly with the objective of economic change that planned development was adopted and rentierism and social welfare emerged as the primary drivers of social policy and impacted the society. Likewise, toward the late twentieth century, as the world experienced massive change in terms of global order and economy, the kingdom was faced with internal demands for change. The monarchy adopted the policy of gradual social opening and started a comprehensive overhaul of the education system. The beginning of the twenty-first century brought its own set of challenges and opportunities and globalization and market-driven economy shaped the society and policymaking. The market-driven need for reforms was the driving force behind the steps taken by King Abdullah which profoundly affected the Saudi society, and education reforms had been a thrust area during his reign mainly driven by the problem of disparity between market requirements and lack of skills (Mellahi 2000; Al-Aqil 2005a, b; Al-Eisa 2009). Moreover, the Saudi Vision 2030 and the National Transformation Program 2020 that are the pet projects initiated under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed are another example of how the monarchy has reacted to the forces of market and globalization to undertake reforms. A significant aspect of the Vision 2030 program is to introduce wholesome changes in the social domain. This is intricately linked to the need for economic transformation and diversification of the oil-based economy as well as to the necessity to respond to regional and global changes. The Vision 2030 document notes: A vibrant society is vital to achieving the Vision and establishing a strong foundation for economic prosperity. Our goal is to create a society in which every citizen enjoys a happy, fulfilling lifestyle complemented by a standard of living that provides a safe and secure environment for families, and access

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to world-class health care and education. At the same time, we want our people to cherish their national identity and their ancient cultural heritage, and live by the Islamic principle of moderation. (KSA Vision 2020)

The Vision 2030 is a roadmap for the economic and social transformation of Saudi Arabia in the next decade. Impact on Education Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy and the state and society have been shaped by the religious and tribal identities as well as globalization, demography, and market-driven economy. There is no doubt that the education system and policy have been profoundly impacted by all of these factors. The formulation of education policy in Saudi Arabia has witnessed a shift in the past few decades. Earlier the policy used to focus exclusively on the preservation of religious heritage and the spread of religious education. However, newfound enthusiasm can be felt at policy level for bringing in quality education, including through steps such as private education. The establishment of co-educational institutions, despite opposition from the religious sections, is a product of the larger social change experienced in the kingdom. Similarly, the appointment of women officials including a woman deputy minister of education under Abdullah symbolized the changing trends in the higher echelons of Saudi policymaking and its impact on education. The trends in the formulation of education policy in Saudi Arabia are changing; new ideas are creeping in and making their impact felt. These changing trends at sociopolitical level are a major reason for the education reforms experienced in the kingdom over the past decades. The economic, demographic, and religious changes have added the need to devise policy that responds to the aspirations of the people, especially the youth, and this is most visible in education policymaking.

References Aba-Namay, R. (1993). The recent constitutional reforms in Saudi Arabia. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 42(2), 295–331. Al-Ahmadi, H. (2011). Challenges facing women leaders in Saudi Arabia. Human Resource Development International, 14(2), 149–166.

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Ramady, M.  A. (2005). The Saudi Arabian economy: Policies, achievements, and challenges. London: Springer. Raphaeli, N. (2005). Demands for reform in Saudi Arabia. Middle East Studies, 41(4), 517–532. Rugh, W. A. (1973). Emergence of a new middle class in Saudi Arabia. Middle East Journal, 27(1), 7–20. Rugh, W. A. (2002). Arab education: Tradition, growth and reform. Middle East Journal, 56(3), 396–414. Salamé, G. (1987). Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia. Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(3), 306–326. Saleh, M. A. (1986). Development of higher education in Saudi Arabia. Higher Education, 15(1/2), 17–23. Samin, N. (2015). Of sand or soil: Genealogy and tribal belonging in Saudi Arabia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shea, N. (2006, May 21). This is a Saudi text-book. The Washington Post. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­d yn/content/ar ticle/2006/05/19/ AR2006051901769.html. Accessed 22 Jan 2010. Stenslie, S. (2012). Regime stability in Saudi Arabia: The challenge of succession. London/New York: Routledge. Taqoush, M.  S. (2009). Tareekh al-Arab Qabl al-Islam; History of Arabs before Islam. [Arabic]. Beirut: Dar al-Nafaes. Thompson, M. (2014). Saudi Arabia and the path to political change: National dialogue and civil society. London: I. B. Tauris. Times Higher Education (THE). (2019). World University Ranking 2019. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-­university-­ rankings/2019/world-­ranking#!/page/0/length/-­1/sort_by/rank/sort_ order/asc/cols/stats. Accessed 7 May 2019. Wenner, M.  W. (1975). Saudi Arabia: Survival of traditional elite. In F.  Tachau (Ed.), Political elites and political development in the Middle East (pp. 157–191). Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing. Wynbrandt, J. (2010). A brief history of Saudi Arabia. New  York: Facts on File Infobase. Yamani, M. (2004). Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the quest for an Arabian identity. London: I. B. Tauris. Zuhur, S. (2011). Saudi Arabia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

CHAPTER 3

Policy Approaches to Education

For the greater part of Saudi Arabia’s history, the education policy laid an overbearing emphasis on religion along with some stress on the market-­driven need for human resource and skill development. The initial impulse for a strong religious consideration in education policy was partly a result of ideological foundations of the kingdom and partly a pragmatic decision by King Ibn Saud to give the responsibility of religious, cultural, and educational affairs to the ulema. The ulema had supported the Al-Saud bid for retaking the reigns of Nejd in 1902 and had actively participated in the expansion of the third Saudi state between 1902 and 1932. The ulema were, and continue to be, an ally of the royal family and had provided the religious legitimacy to the Al-Saud claim over the state. At least in the formative stages, the most powerful ulema belonged to the Al-Shaikh family who had maintained strong links with the ruling family. As the structure of the state and polity started to take shape, the ulema were made stakeholders in the system. The ulema enhanced the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the traditional and orthodox population, but they had a vested interest. They wanted complete control over religious and cultural affairs including social and education policy. Undoubtedly, this was the easiest and most effective way to spread the ideas of religious orthodoxy while emphasizing the need

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for shedding some of the conventional practices and beliefs.1 While Ibn Saud did not agree to all of their demands, he acceded to their desire for control over education. Studies on Saudi Arabia suggest that one of the most significant influences of Islam and the ulema is found in the education system (Prokop 2003; Alshamsi 2011). The ulema had a predominant stake and say in education at all levels including school and higher education as well as women’s education. Historically, they monopolized the education system; however, a number of changes have been witnessed during the past decades wherein their dominance on the education policy has declined. But due to the dependence of the monarchy on the ulema for legitimacy and their long-­standing commitment toward dawah (preaching of Islam), going back to the foundation of the first Saudi state in the mid-eighteenth century, the royal family tolerated sharing power with the ulema. On the other hand, the ulema opposed reforms fearing loss of dominance on the education system and society (Doran 2004; Al-Rasheed 2006). In the formative years, that is, in the 1930s and 1940s, the ulema opposed the introduction of any technology or ideas that were remotely linked to the West, including the railways, telegraph, motor vehicles, as well as modern education and the banking system. Indeed, the ulema had even opposed oil exploration by the “infidels” but Ibn Saud countered them through political maneuvers and theological arguments and prevailed upon them. The opposition to modern technology slowly diminished, particularly after an increase in oil wealth that also benefitted the religious leadership in the form of increased grants for religious, cultural, and educational affairs. Thus, rather than blindly opposing everything Western, the ulema became more selective in what to oppose (Yizraeli 2012, pp. 24–25). The development of public administration and the oil industry in the 1950s and 1960s and the economic boom and bureaucratic growth in the 1970s and 1980s generated the need for skill development and vocational training. This was necessary for preparing Saudi nationals to find employment in the burgeoning public administration and a booming economy. Nudged by King Faisal and later by King Fahd, the ulema conceded some 1  This is a key aspect of the teaching of Abdul Wahhab, who emphasized the need for maintaining the religious orthodoxy by returning to the fundamentals as emphasized in the Salafi School but at the same time shedding some of the commonly held beliefs among the Bedouin population in the Arabian Peninsula which had origins in Sufi and occult practices.

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space to the technocrats. This, however, did not mean that they stopped interfering in the  education  policymaking. They had a final say on the content and structure of all aspects of the education system including professional and vocational programs. In the post-Kuwait crisis period, the region was engulfed by “petition fever” and protests demanding reforms. The glass ceiling so far as the control of the ulema over education policy was concerned was pushed further during this period as one of the key demands in the petitions and protests was educational reforms (Dekmejian 2003; Lacroix 2004). Human resource development emerged as one of the most important components of education policy during this period. This created greater opportunity for the technocrat-driven Ministry of Higher Education, which had been established in 1985 (and  merged with the Ministry of Education in 2015) to take policy decisions with respect to higher education. Nonetheless, the overall control of the vast bureaucracy and decision-­ making in the education sector remained under the control of the ulema. With the changing political and social realities, some space was created for parallel education policymaking and when Crown Prince Abdullah began to rule as a regent in late 1995, he nudged the bureaucracy to devise a plan for a systemic change. Therefore, in 1996 the Comprehensive Educational Assessment Program was launched. Though some would argue that the program was largely a failure (Al-Eisa 2009), there is no doubt that this was the first time the king had nudged the bureaucracy to bring in systemic change into the education sector. Eventually, during his reign until 2015, numerous other reform measures were introduced that had a profound impact on the education system. Education policy in the kingdom has evolved over time and the progress made is well reflected in the overall change in the education system, including improvements in educational infrastructure, growth in literacy rate, primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment, and the number of higher education institutions that have gained international rankings. To be able to understand how the transformation happened and how the reform process unfolded, it is important to understand the role of the state and bureaucracy in shaping the education policy and its core characteristics and the challenges faced in the education policy formulation.

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State and Bureaucracy Public-funded schools, vocational institutions, and universities dominate the education landscape in the kingdom and are directly funded and managed by the state-appointed bureaucracy. The earliest manifestation of this was the formation of the General Directorate of Education in 1925 that formulated plans, allocated funds, and directed policy as far as education was concerned. The directorate remained in charge of overlooking the operation and establishment of schools until 1953 when, along with the reorganization of public administration, it was elevated to establish the Ministry of Education. Prince Fahd (later King) was the first Education Minister when the Ministry of Education was established in 1953 (Wahibi 1978). The Ministry remains in charge of all aspects of education policy and administration to date and has emerged as one of the most important ministries in the kingdom. The Ministry of Education has undergone many changes over the years. For example, for a period of three decades, between 1985 and 2015, a separate Ministry of Higher Education functioned to look at the affairs of universities and professional education. Likewise, until 2002 female education was managed by a separate General Directorate of Girl’s Education, which was merged with the Ministry of Education in 2002 after a fire incident at a girls’ school in Mecca led to deaths of several students when the mutawwa (religious police) prevented the firemen from entering the school as they suspected that the female teachers and students inside the building might not be wearing their hijab (Prokop 2003). Significantly, the majority of the ministers in the Ministry of Education, since its inception in 1953, have been members of the Al-Saud family, while the Ministry of Higher Education, during the 30 years of its existence, mostly saw technocrats as ministers from among prominent scholars and academicians. Hence the royal family had a strong influence but consultation with Hia’t al-Ulema al-Kibar al-Saudiyah, the Council of Senior Ulema (CSU), was common. Members of the Al-Shaikh family dominated the CSU. The ministry functions through various departments and agencies that look after specific aspects of education. In addition to the ministry, the state appoints the head of all the publicly funded universities and vocational and professional institutions. Similarly, all schools function through a principal who is eventually responsible for the overall welfare of the school. Between the school principal and ministry of education, there are various layers of bureaucracy to ensure the smooth functioning of the

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education system and proper implementation of policies and programs. In addition to the state-funded and administered education, Saudi Arabia has been encouraging private institutions, especially in higher education. A number of privately funded universities, including the co-educational King Abdullah University of Science & Technology (KAUST), have been founded during the first two decades of the twenty-first century but the education landscape remains dominated by the state. There is not much scope for an interface between private entities and educational institutions due to the highly centralized system. Foreign educational institutions have shied away from establishing branches due to the rules and regulations which lack flexibility. The education bureaucracy is one of the largest in the kingdom and provides employment for a significant number of people and has overall been effective in implementing policies and programs of the decision-makers but their contribution or role in policymaking is limited. As far as education policymaking is concerned it is the monarchy and the ulema that reign supreme. Education in relation to the state can have three purposes: growth of the nation, development of individuals, and training for better governance. But education policy of a state does not “wholly and completely” aim at any one of these purposes (Russell 2010, p. 15). Education policy is formulated keeping in mind all three of these objectives in varying degrees and Saudi Arabia is no exception. For example, the 2006 education policy document defined the purpose of education in the following words: The education policy is the guidelines that make the basis of the process of education and training to perform the duty of introducing an individual to God and religion, establishment of a system to follow his orders, to fulfill the societal needs and to achieve the objectives of the nation that include[] all stages of education, the plans, methods and means of education and its administration and the mechanism to organize [the] education system and its related aspects. (Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [MoE] 2006)

Likewise the Education Strategy, 2016–2020, underlines that the objective of education is to provide “excellent education to build a globally competitive knowledge-based society” (MoE 2016, p.  1). It further underlines that the objective of the education policy is “to provide education for all, raise the quality of educational outcomes, increase the

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effectiveness of scientific research, encourage innovation and creativity, develop community partnership and promote skills and capacity building” (ibid). The Vision 2030 program underlines in one of its themes that the goal is to achieve national development through community participation and by strengthening the roots of the society. It underlines that the aim of Vision 2030 is to instill positive moral beliefs in our children’s characters from an early age by reshaping our academic and educational system. Schools, working with families, will reinforce the fabric of society by providing students with the compassion, knowledge, and behaviors necessary for resilient and independent characters to emerge. We [the Kingdom] will also promote cultural, social, volunteering and athletic activities through empowering our educational, cultural and entertainment institutions. (KSA Vision 2020)

These statements underline that the state strives to build a national character rooted in tradition and culture and yet aims for scientific learning and knowledge. This is a definitive change in the education policy. When it comes to the relationship between state and the education policy formulation, there is not much change except in the departure from the overwhelming influence of the ulema and a greater centralization. The state remains the most important agency in the formulation of education policy. This had in the past led to a heavy dose of religious content in education, especially since the policy was formed by the ulema. The state did not participate much in planning and allocated part of the state revenues to the ulema, who had a monopoly over education. It is understood that the religious fervor in the education policy in Saudi Arabia (and other Arab Gulf states as well) was due to the lack of a well-articulated development plan. The state wanted to share the oil wealth with the citizens and hence, like other areas of social welfare, spent significantly on the development of the education system. It is argued that [u]nlike other countries, the expansion of the education system in the Gulf monarchies was not part of a slow and gradual process of social and economic development. Instead, it was part of a newly-created welfare state where most of the social services, including schools, were offered to the indigenous population either completely free or for a minimum charge. The goal was to share oil revenues among the local population. (Bahgat 1999, p. 129)

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Tribal and religious factors played a significant role in legitimizing the family-ruled states in the Arab Gulf. This entailed that the ruling families not only provided security but also ensured economic survival and equitable distribution of resources. After the huge influx of oil wealth, the rulers were conceived as corrupt sometimes if they did not distribute the wealth among those who sought patronization. Thus, the Arab Gulf monarchies started to adopt the modern state structures and concept of citizenship and created an infrastructure to provide civic amenities and services such as healthcare and education. This transformed them into a kind of welfare state without many structural changes in society and polity. This meant that despite growth in education, the traditional setup of the ulema being in charge of education policymaking remained even after the state adopted the practice of planned development. The expansion of the public education system was a means of gaining or strengthening the legitimacy of the state and the elite (Al-Rasheed 2010). To some extent, this aspect has not changed in the contemporary situation, with the state and the leadership trying to strengthen their legitimacy by incorporating the aspirations of the people vis-à-vis education and social policy. The political system in Saudi Arabia is such that one finds an overbearing influence of the state in all fields including education. However, the state does have a mechanism for consultations to be able to accommodate the aspirations and demands of the people. While political organization and activity are not accepted, conventional methods of consultation, such as through tribal leaders, ulema, business councils, chambers of commerce, as well as sports and cultural societies, provide the alternatives. The nominated Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and elected Majlis al-­ Baladiya (Municipal Council) are other important institutions that provide feedback to policymakers. So far as the shifts in the policy are concerned, a comparative look at the 2006 education policy and 2016 education strategy underlines various nuanced shifts in the state’s attitude toward education. While the earlier document emphasizes the fact that “Saudi Arabia’s education policy flows from Islam” (MoE 2006), the latter merely mentions Islam as one of the important drivers of the education policy (MoE 2016). Under King Abdullah, a number of comprehensive steps were taken to bring reforms into education; the definitive role of Islam was not challenged but the ulema were sidelined from both policy formulation and administration of education. Under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, the

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kingdom has gone a step further to assert the primacy of the civic state with the marginalization of the ulema. The state had a monopoly over education policy and system2; nonetheless, the ethos of the education flows from the society. The Saudi social structure played a significant role in the way the state sought to formulate education policy. This can be understood from the fact that with the changes in society, the education policy witnessed a transformation. From being rooted in Islam and mostly confined to the dissemination of religious studies and conventional knowledge during the formative years, the Saudi education system can today boast of some of the world-class universities disseminating modern education and catering to various demands from the society. In a way, the reforms in education are reflective of the social transformation Saudi Arabia has gone through over the past century. This in no way means that religion or Islam is no longer a source of education policy or has become irrelevant in the society. But there is a growing section, especially among the youth, which feels the need for embracing modernity in all its manifestations while remaining true to the Islamic faith and ideals, and they feel the best way to do that is through modern education (Moaddel 2006; Al-Atawaneh 2009). The policy documents are a good example of the ensuing change in the way the decision-­ makers have  tried to accommodate this seeming duality in policy formulation. For example, in the 2006 education policy document, the religious manifestation of the society is accommodated in these words: The life in this world is a phase for acting and cultivating, here the Muslim cultivates for the eternal life of hereafter through faith and good deed, so today it’s only action and no accountability while tomorrow it would be accountability and no action. (MoE 2006)

On the other hand, the 2016–20 education strategy emphasizes on developing skills and a scientific temperament. This is also a reflection of how the state manages with various factors while taking decisions and is influenced by society.

2  The private sector was allowed to enter the higher education sector through a royal decree in 1997 under the ambit of the sixth five-year plan (1996–2000). Despite, opening up of a number of private educational institutions, the state remains the predominant agency as far as the education policy and administration are concerned.

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According to Madawi Al-Rasheed, knowledge and history were conventionally a domain of tribal sheikhs (leaders of family and clans) and the ulema who had “a vested interest in the past as a source for explaining power relations, intertribal conflicts and alliances” (Al-Rasheed 2001, p. 28). Interpretation of the past was an exclusive domain of tribal chiefs, who manipulated this for maintaining their authority. With the changing social structure and value system, the monopoly of tribal sheikhs was gradually diluted and more or less started to wean off in contemporary times. Policymakers had to be keep this in mind while formulating education policy. Earlier the bureaucrats and administrators hesitated to challenge the authority of the sheikhs and ulema as the political leadership was accommodative of their assertions. However, the leadership has gradually chosen to ignore their assertions and communicate directly with the citizens and this has started to reflect in the policymaking as well. Historically, policy had reflected social moorings and religious influence that sometimes increased due to a specific internal or external development. For example, after the conquest of most of Arabia, Ibn Saud recognized the need to modernize the political and social structures to sustain his rule. His aspiration to modify the administrative institutions in the country to achieve his political objectives often clashed with the understanding of the state by the ulema, who insisted “that answers to contemporary situations be sought in the sharia [jurisprudence] and traditional Islamic institutions” (Al-Yassini 1985, p. 42). While Ibn Saud was willing to accommodate skill-based education, he did not wish to risk antagonizing the ulema at the time, who in June 1930 had held a meeting in Mecca to discuss education policies of the state and had issued a fatwa (religious edict) “protesting the inclusion of foreign languages, geography and drawing in the curricula of the newly founded directorate of education” (Al-Yassini 1985, p. 50). One of the concerns which the ulema cited as the reason for not learning a foreign language was that it will lead Muslims to “learn the religion of unbelievers.” They opposed the study of geography as it “proposed that the earth is round,” while according to them the Quran said otherwise, and drawing was opposed because painting was considered haram (prohibited) in Islam (ibid). This eventually led to some compromise and the education policy accommodated the concern of ulema.

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On the other hand, incidents such as the siege of Kabah,3 the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that all took place in 1979 led to reversals in modernization policy and Islamization of education policy (Prokop 2003). The act of rebellion led by Juhaiman al-­ Utaibi was perceived as a mark of discontent among the population with respect to the Islamic credentials of the state. On the other hand, the Islamic revolution and rhetoric about the export of the revolution created fears among the leaders and policymakers regarding their own Islamic credentials and, hence, they considered the need to reinforce Islam as the basis of the state. This was alluded to by Crown Prince Mohammed in October 2017 when, while announcing US$500 billion investment in the newly created NEOM city, he said that Saudis want to return to “moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe” and that Islamization was reinforced in the kingdom in the wake of the 1979 revolution in Iran (BBC 2017).

Characteristics Traditionally, religion played an important role in the education affairs and the religious orientation of education is obvious and visible. This is one of the key characteristics of the education policy. The religious nature of the education policy is clear from the missions and objectives underlined in the various policy documents. For example, one of the education policy documents states that “[s]eeking knowledge is obligatory for all according to Islamic doctrines and it is incumbent on the state to facilitate and spread education at different stages as much as it is capable of” (MoE 2006). It further explains that “the religious education is the basis for all years of education at the elementary, intermediate and secondary level and the Islamic culture is a basic subject for all years at the higher level” (ibid). Another clause says that the basis of education policy is to “benefit from all useful knowledge under the light of Islam” (ibid). The education policy

3  On November 20, 1979, a few hundred armed rebels led by Juhaiman al-Utaibi took over the Kabah, the holiest Islamic site in Mecca. They declared Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani, the brother-in-law of al- Utaibi, to be the Mahdi (redeemer of Islam whose coming at the end of certain periods is foretold in prophetic traditions). The siege finally came to an end after two weeks of military operation led by the Saudi army with the help of Pakistani commandoes and French paratroopers in which most of the rebels including al-Utaibi were killed (see Trofimov 2008).

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emanated from the “concern to preserve the religious foundation of the regime” (Prokop 2003, p. 78). Nonetheless, the sensitivities of the society too were a major factor for Islamization of the education system (Al-Aqil 2005a, b). One of the reasons was that Islamic scriptures, like other religious scriptures, emphasize on seeking knowledge. For example, the Holy Quran says: “Do they not contemplate the Kingdom of Heaven and the things which God has created?” (The Holy Quran, VII: 183). Likewise, numerous sayings (hadith) attributed to Prophet Mohammed underline the need for acquiring knowledge such as the one which says seeking knowledge is a duty incumbent on every Muslim, man and woman. Hence, as a state policy, Saudi Arabia followed “an Islamic philosophy of education and the seeds of its education system are founded in Islam” (Saleh 1986, p. 18). In addition to the religious component, the education policy is rooted in fulfilling the tasks of preparing individuals to seek employment and contribute to the economic growth and development of the society. The education policy thus strives to develop an ideal society that respects its values, reaffirms Saudi identity, and respects the political system. This has resulted in the policy orientation wherein one sees that there is more emphasis on education in the fields of science, medicine, engineering, management, technology, and theology and only a few schools or institutions offer a comprehensive program in liberal arts or social science stream. Although the changing trend has resulted in a new vigor in the education system, it still needs huge improvements in terms of its ability to skill the students. The policymakers had earlier been faced with the dilemma of balancing the rising demands for reforms from one section of the society and the resistance from another toward reform; however, in recent years, the balance has decisively shifted in favor of those demanding reforms (Al-Hamid 2002; Al-Eisa 2009). These changing trends at policy level are also indicative of the changing perception of the people toward education. Earlier, education had a narrow meaning and meant only religious education. The economic requirements added the need to learn skills. The new interactions of the Saudi people with the developed and developing world of Europe, the United States, and Asia further helped change the attitude of people toward education. Gradually, it has become a norm to achieve higher education in various fields.

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Challenges The key challenges as far as policymaking is concerned pertains to equitable and quality education. Disparity based on gender, sectarian identity, or the expatriate population has confronted policymakers for long. The Saudi education policy has been accused of being discriminatory toward minorities and women. Shias who constitute an estimated 10–15 percent of the total population and migrants who constitute nearly one-third of the population at times find it difficult to get an education. Shias who are predominantly concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province often complain about the education policy missing out on the need for their special educational requirements, as well as lack of accessibility to quality education (ICG 2005). The education policy does not take into consideration the concerns of the Shias for their need to have a specific syllabus, schools, and institutions. The Shias had to use study material prescribed by the state, whose contents at times were completely discriminatory against them (Prokop 2003). So far as the women’s education is concerned, the education policy prescribes special status to women and identifies that women are equal to men and have the right to education to attain a dignified life within the ambit of Islamic sharia (MoE 2016). Some of the discriminatory practices vis-à-vis women have been gradually discontinued and women now have equal access to education, though on some aspects the policy treats women differently. For example, the education policy recognizes that the educational needs of women are different from those of men and should suit their nature. In part, this is the result of cultural norms that see women as simply being child bearers. At the same time, it is the result of Traditional ideologies (that is motherhood and/or religious fundamentalist views) where women are considered primarily in charge of domestic chores and child-rearing and therefore literacy and certainly advance schooling do not appear as prerequisites for performing those traditional roles. (Morrow and Torres 1995, p. 390)

The education policy talks about suitable education for women; “suitability” here, linked to the stereotypical image of women, embedded in the sociocultural traditions, means that they should be educated so that the children can get a better upbringing.

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However, the practice regarding women’s education among the masses has changed significantly in recent times. Accordingly, the education policymakers have woken up to the fact that women should be treated at par with men and should be given liberty to choose their field of education and way of life. This changing trend has been observed is the acceptability among the masses for the rights of women to attain education and employment (Thompson 2019). Traditionally, it was difficult for women to achieve the desired level of education within the Saudi system. Women for long were given the window of opportunity in a very limited field of study. They traditionally found it easier to pursue the fields of medicine and teaching due to social acceptability. Thirdly, the challenge faced by the Saudi policymakers pertains to the question of lack of employability of the graduates or of creating enough jobs in the market to absorb the Saudi university graduates. This has been a major three-pronged problem: one, the economy has been largely dependent on the oil and petroleum sector; hence there were fewer jobs in non-oil sectors; two, a majority of the labor force in the private sector are expatriates who are available at lesser cost to the employer than a Saudi citizen; and three, even if the private sector was ready to employ Saudis at a higher cost, there were questions of them lacking skills or commitment to work. Given the growing local population or the youth bulge, the rising number of unemployed youth and increasing nationalist sentiments, the policymakers are forced to take the situation seriously and devise policies accordingly. In fact, it would not be wrong to argue, as would be explained in detail in the subsequent chapters, that this has been the most important driving force for the Saudi policymakers to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the education system.

References Al-Aqil, A.  B. A. (2005a). Siasat al-Ta’lim wa Nizamuhu fi al-Mamlakah al-­ Arabiyah al-Saudiyah; Education policy and system in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd. Al-Aqil, A.  B. A. (2005b). Siyasat al-T‘alim Wa Nizamuhu fi al-Mamlaka al-­ Arabia al-Saudiya; Education policy and system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Maktaba al-Rushd. Al-Atawaneh, M. (2009). Is Saudi Arabia a theocracy? Religion and governance in contemporary Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies, 45(5), 721–737.

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Al-Eisa, M. A. (2009). Islah al-Ta’lim fi al-Saudiyah: Bain Ghayab al-Ru’yah al-­ Siasiyah Wa Tawajjus al-Thaqafah al-Diniyah Wa Ajz al-Idara al-Tarbawiyyah; Educational reform in Saudi Arabia: Between lack of political vision, religious-­ cultural apprehensions and incompetence of educational administration. [Arabic]. Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. Al-Hamid, M. B. M. (2002). al-Ta’lim Fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyah al-Saudiyah: Ru’yah al-Hadhir wa Istishraq al-Mustaqbil; Education in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Present vision and future outlook. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Maktabah Al-Rushd. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. (2001). Political Legitimacy and the production of History: The Case of Saudi Arabia. In Lenore G. Martin (Ed.) New Frontiers in Middle East Security. New York: Palgrave. Al-Rasheed, M. (2006). Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Rasheed, M. (2010). A history of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alshamsi, M. J. (2011). Islam and political reform in Saudi Arabia: The quest for political change and reform. London/New York: Routledge. Al-Yassini, A. (1985). Religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Boulder: Westview Press. Bahgat, G. (1999). Education in gulf monarchies: Retrospect and prospect. International Review of Education, 45(2), 127–136. BBC. (2017, October 25). Crown prince says Saudis want return to moderate Islam. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­middle-­east-­41747476. Accessed 26 June 2019. Dekmejian, R.  H. (2003). The Liberal impulse in Saudi Arabia. Middle East Journal, 57(3), 400–413. Doran, M. S. (2004). The Saudi paradox. Foreign Affairs, 83(1), 35–51. International Crisis Group. (2005, September 19). The Shiite question in Saudi Arabia (ICG Middle East Report, No. 45). Brussels/Cairo. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 [KSA Vision]. (2020). The vision themes. https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/themes. Accessed 26 Apr 2019. Lacroix, S. (2004). Between Islamists and liberals: Saudi Arabia’s new “Islamo-­ Liberal” reformists. Middle East Journal, 58(3), 345–365. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2006). Siasat al-Talim li al-­ Mamlaka al-Arabiaya al-Saudiya; Education policy of kingdom Saudi Arabia. [Arabic]. http://www.moe.gov.sa/openshare/moe/Ministry/sub7/index. html. Accessed 02 July 2010. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2016). Strategy 2016–2020. https://www.moe.gov.sa/ar/about/Documents/Strategy_of_the_Ministry_ of_Education.pdf. Accessed 26 Apr 2019. Moaddel, M. (2006). The Saudi public speaks: Religion, gender and politics. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(1), 79–108.

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Morrow, R. A. and Carlos Alberto Torres. (1995). Social Theory and Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Cultural Reproduction. New York: State University of New York Press. Prokop, M. (2003). Saudi Arabia: The politics of education. International Affairs, 79(1), 77–89. Russell, B. (2010). Education and the Social Order. New York: Routledge Classics. Saleh, M. A. (1986). Development of higher education in Saudi Arabia. Higher Education, 15(1/2), 17–23. Thompson, M. (2019). Being young, male and Saudi: Identity and politics in a globalized kingdom. London: Cambridge University Press. Trofimov, Y. (2008). The siege of Mecca: The forgotten uprising in Islam’s holiest shrine and the birth of al Qaeda. New York: Anchor Books. Wahibi, A. (1978). “The Development of Education in Saudi Arabia”, Prism, General Department of Foreign Cultural Relations, Ministry of Culture, Egypt, pp. 39–48. Cited in Saleh, M. A. (1986). Development of Higher Education in Saudi Arabia. Higher Education, 15(1/2), 17–23. Yizraeli, S. (2012). Politics and society in Saudi Arabia: The crucial years of development, 1960–82. London: Hurst and Company.

CHAPTER 4

Development of the Education System

The development of the modern education system in Saudi Arabia started with the establishment of the General Directorate of Education Affairs (Wikalat as-Shi’uun at-Ta‘lim; GDEA) in 1925. Since then the education system underwent several changes. During the past century, the education system has evolved to adapt to the demands of the society and economy. A sincere effort has gone into making it amenable to the need for human resource development and scientific advancement of the society. It has witnessed a constant process of reforms to realize the goal of quality education and is reflective of the political, economic, social, and cultural developments in the kingdom. The education system in any given context is shaped by many variables such as history, society, culture and civilization, globalization, science and technology, and economy, and the Saudi education is no different. It is a curious mixture of traditional and modern ethos and ways of teaching and learning and has accepted both local and international influences. While it is organized within the framework of the modern education system, it has never been able to completely shed its traditional essence.

© The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_4

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Genesis Rudimentary Early System For centuries the most common form of education in the Arab world was the kuttab,1 where students were taught to recite the Quran and sometimes learned basic writing and arithmetical skills (Husen 1994). Education was not prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, except in the Hijaz region. The cities of Mecca and Medina were the only centers of any educational activities rooted in learning in Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence), tafsir (Quranic interpretation), hadith (Prophet’s saying), sunnah (Prophetic tradition), sirah (Prophet’s biography), and other related subjects. Some Ottoman-style secondary schools in Jeddah imparted education in nontheological subjects such as arithmetic, philosophy, ethics, history, and language. These Turkish-­ medium schools were known as madaris (sing. madrasa). These madaris were largely dedicated solely to the education of the town’s higher echelons that wanted to impart modern education to their children but could not afford to send them to faraway cities in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. Additionally, mosques used to organize religious gatherings (majlis-ad-­ dars) to impart religious education among adults but they were largely voluntary and did not have much written or established curricula. According to Saudi scholar Al-Aqil, the traditional education system before the establishment of Saudi Arabia can be classified into three types: kuttab, mosqueimparted religious education, and Ottoman-style madaris (Al-Aqil 2005). Before the formation of the GDEA, “there was no official institution to oversee the educational activities” (Al-Sumbul et  al. 1998, p.  64). Independent teachers used to organize classes for different subjects in mosques or homes. Hijaz had some schools, which were established only after the region came under the Ottoman influence. The first school in the city of Medina was established toward the end of the eighteenth century (Al-Aqil 2005). Some more Ottoman-style schools were later established under the patronage of the Hashemite family that ruled over Hijaz before being expelled in a military expedition by Al-Saud in 1925. By all accounts, before the foundation of Saudi Arabia, only the cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah had some traditional and Ottoman-style madaris, while other places followed the old system of kuttab. 1  Small centers for imparting basic religious and language education run by individual preachers with a group of students mostly within the premises of a mosque within the locality.

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As the kingdom was proclaimed in 1932, the need for organizing the education system and the introduction of modern education was felt by King Ibn Saud. The groundwork for the establishment of an education system was carried out during 1902–1932. In 1925 when Hijaz came under the Saudi rule, Ibn Saud held a meeting with the religious scholars of Mecca and emphasized the need to spread education (Al-Aqil 2005). The same year the GDEA was formed to overlook the establishment and operation of schools and eventually grew to become the Ministry of Education in 1953. Between 1925 and 1953, an extensive program to establish schools was started and a centralized education policy was entrusted to the GDEA. The schools were modeled on the Egyptian system, which in turn was heavily influenced by the French model. The 1930s and 1940s witnessed the establishment of some schools and colleges. As of 1951, there were 226 schools in Saudi Arabia spread across the country, but Hijaz had the highest concentration. Gradually other provinces also started to have more public-run schools (Al-Aqil 2005). Impact of Discovery of Oil When oil reserves were found in the 1930s and its economic potential was recognized, the kingdom also felt the need for skilled manpower. The monarchy, which had already started the modernization of education to aid necessary changes in the administrative structures and bureaucracy, set out to speed up the expansion of the education system to support economic development. The discovery of oil proved to be an important factor in pushing for the establishment of new educational and vocational institutions. Gradually, the monarchy recognised the need for a widespread and organized education infrastructure to cater to the needs of the oil-­ driven economic growth. It is worth noting that after the formation of the kingdom, Ibn Saud was facing immense financial difficulty in managing the affairs of the newly established state. The expectation of the ruler taking care of the needs of the population was burdening and, at the same time, the new state was facing problems from neighboring states that were alarmed by its rise. To manage these issues, the state required a constant source of revenue and the traditional economic structures were too weak to fulfill the requirement. Within the first decade, economic constraints due to deficient resources and fluctuating revenues had started to hurt the kingdom. The aftereffects of World War I and the involvement of the world powers in the local affairs had destabilized the traditional economic structures. Ibn Saud

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needed resources to secure the loyalty of the tribes; his resources were limited and the economy was in a precarious condition to sustain the demands. Despite a partial increase in the flow of revenues due to territorial expansion and British subsidy, the economy in the early 1930s was facing hardships. The newly proclaimed kingdom was under severe financial predicament; it had accumulated debt, creditors had refused further finances, and external loans had become nearly impossible due to the declining capability and interest of the British Empire (Wynbrandt 2010, p. 187). The state expenses had continued to rise, while revenues were stagnating and the great depression (1929–33) and later World War II had adversely affected Hajj, leading to a drastic drop in pilgrimage-driven revenues. After taking control of Hijaz, Ibn Saud had ensured security for the pilgrims, which had led to an increase in their numbers of overseas pilgrims (Foley 2011). According to estimates, Hajj and related income constituted 50–80 percent of the state revenues during the late 1920s and early 1930s. It had helped in lower internal taxation and provided a replacement for British subsidies but global disturbances had soon turned the situation upside down and the number of Hajj pilgrims witnessed a steep decline, leading to lower revenues (Bronson 2006; Wynbrandt 2010; Foley 2011). It was under these circumstances of financial stress, and despite opposition from religious sections, that Ibn Saud allowed oil exploration. Petroleum, which would change the fate of the Gulf region, had not yet become a priced commodity in the international market and its strategic importance had not yet become common knowledge. The agreement between Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) and the kingdom to allow petroleum exploration brought much-needed financial relief as Ibn Saud granted a concession to SOCAL on May 29, 1933, after it had discovered oil in Bahrain the previous year.2 According to the agreement, SOCAL paid an interest-free loan of British Pound (BP) 50,000 in two installments in addition to an annual payment of BP 5000 and was allowed to explore petroleum in the Eastern Province. In return, Ibn Saud “agreed to pay back the loan in future oil revenue if it ever materialized” (Bronson 2006, p. 17). SOCAL formed a subsidiary called California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) to explore oil. Oil was first discovered in 1935 but CASOC was facing difficulties on many fronts including investments and lack of avenues to sell the oil in the international market, thus it merged 2  Ibn Saud was reportedly working on the advice of his close confidante Ameen Raihani and a British officer St. John Philby (Lipsky 1959; Bronson 2006).

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with Texas Oil in 1936. Commercial production started in 1938 when large quantities of petroleum were drilled from Dammam-7 oil well located near Dhahran, producing more than 1500 barrels per day (Safran 1988; Bronson 2006). In 1944, the subsidiary was renamed Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and, as it turned out, this became the foundation stone for the US–Saudi relations, which continues until now despite the ups and downs (Cordesman 2003; Bronson 2006; Gause 2011). ARAMCO came under complete control of the Saudi government in 1976 and, in 1988, the current Saudi Arabian Oil Company or Saudi Aramco came into existence. In the words of Rachel Bronson, “[t]he 1938 oil discovery and subsequent finds shocked and delighted” Ibn Saud and the first royalty the kingdom received was US$1.5 million (Bronson 2006, p. 19). It boosted the faltering finances that started to look better with subsequent supplies but it was not enough to completely revamp the economic structures. Poverty and the hardships among the general populace continued as the traditional modes of production such as agriculture, farming, pastoralism, and handicrafts were facing difficulty due to conflicts and transition (Niblock 1982, p.  77). The task to improve the education system was daunting due to the pressure on limited resources and even government employees faced payment delays in the late 1930s (Sluglett and Farouk-­ Sluglett 1982). The problem was compounded by the beginning of World War II, which affected oil production and supplies. Economic problems continued despite increasing oil revenues, and the situation came to head due to family rivalry after the death of Ibn Saud in 1953 as economic conditions had begun to look precarious (Niblock 1982). The country had suffered due to external debts that were one of the reasons for tensions between the half-brothers King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal (Yizraeli 1997, 2012). The kingdom had remained in debt and faced budgetary problems despite a massive rise in revenues because of a lack of coordination between changing economic requirements of the state and society and the existing financial system. The situation became unmanageable during King Saud’s reign (1953–64) because of political problems, as well as his misplaced priorities that affected government finances to the extent that Saudi Riyal had to be devalued in 1958 (Zuhur 2011). The financial situation had become so bleak that when Faisal took over the responsibility of the government as prime minister in 1958 the treasury had only 317 Riyals available in cash and the banks had refused to provide credit due to earlier debts (Lipsky 1959). This was the time when Faisal started to counter Saud’s policies and eventually pushed him out in

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1964. By the late 1960s, the state treasury had started to show signs of recovery but the kingdom was facing several internal and external problems. Newer political challenges were emerging in the form of religious and secular groups (Niblock 1982; Buchan 1982) and regional problems, especially in neighboring Yemen and the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt, had started to affect the internal situation. By this time, however, the petroleum industry had started to make an impact on the Saudi socioeconomic condition. In the words of George Lipsky (1959), the Saudi economy immediately after oil production started can be explained in terms of the explosive impact of the oil wealth on an arid and impoverished country whose leaders did not have the fiscal and monetary techniques to handle an immense income nor plans for putting the income to uses which would offer material benefits to the largest number of people. The only philosophy of state control or welfare was expressed through the simple traditional obligations of the ruler, and the population initially did not expect of the king anything beyond these goals. (p. 150)

A significant aspect of the beginning of the commercial production of oil was the reducing dependence on Hajj revenues. Though these remained important, earnings from petroleum gradually became the mainstay of state revenues. In the late 1940s and early 1950s oil constituted as much as 85–90 percent of the government’s revenues (Lipsky 1959). It was during this period that a host of commercial activities around the oil industry began leading to declining dependence on agriculture and farming activities even though a large section of the population continued with traditional activities for sustenance. In fact “at-least three-fourth[s] of the population” continued to be engaged in traditional activities such as “farming and animal husbandry” (ibid, p. 149). The period also witnessed an expansion in the government administration and the beginning of infrastructural development including the education system. Oil income ensured the continuation of the policy to keep taxation to a minimum while giving impetus to trade activities (Bronson 2006). Despite the greater wealth and some recognition for the need to expand the education system, scant attention was given to develop educational infrastructure. One of the contributing factors could have been the preoccupation with stabilizing the economy and finding ways to build road, transport, and communication infrastructure that were deemed necessary for the nascent oil and aligned industries. Nonetheless, new public schools

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were opened and a few institutions of higher learning were established. The spending on education witnessed some increase. The first university, now known as King Saud University (KSU), was founded in Riyadh in 1957. The following year, the kingdom adopted a uniform educational policy in cooperation with other Arab states that provided for a six-year compulsory elementary education, a three-year optional intermediate education, and a three-year optional secondary education for men only. In 1961, education for women became mandatory, with the responsibility being given to the newly created General Directorate of Girl’s Education. There was considerable resistance to female education at the time, but due to the strong stand adopted by King Faisal, the ulema gave in (Kéchichian 2008).

Expansion The expansion of education system started to take an organized shape with the beginning of the streamlining and reorganization of the state structure and public policy. Faisal’s emphasis on planned development and the rapid rise in state revenues in the 1970s after the oil boom led to extraordinary increase in the public investment in building infrastructure and improving services, and education and health sectors were the first to benefit from the new-found wealth. The immediate beneficiary was the public school education system that witnessed a massive growth since the 1970s, higher education, on the other hand, had to wait another decade to receive the required attention. School Education School education in Saudi Arabia is divided into three phases: elementary, middle, and secondary. The elementary school comprises six years, where the child is eligible to get admission in first grade at the age of six after completing kindergarten. Once the economic situation started to stabilize and the focus shifted to planned development and building infrastructure, educational development too came to the fore. As a result of consistent efforts by King Faisal to promote education, the 1960s saw a huge rise in the number of schools and enrollment of students. Initially, the expansion was witnessed only in boys’ education as people were apprehensive about sending girls to school. It took a few decades to achieve a degree of parity in the number of schools for boys and girls (Table 4.1). Simultaneously, enrollment for girls in schools took a few decades to become at par with boys. The need for an educated and quality human resource was the driving force behind sustained investment in expanding the education system.

Kindergarten

26 37 45 49 46 65 85 91 103 104 123 150 169 195 244 324 377 436 492 551 534 500 551 646

Academic Year

1967–68 1968–69 1969–70 1970–71 1971–72 1972–73 1973–74 1974–75 1975–76 1976–77 1977–78 1978–79 1979–80 1980–81 1981–82 1982–83 1983–84 1984–85 1985–86 1986–87 1987–88 1988–89 1989–90 1990–91

266 320 378 390 488 587 721 881 1008 1147 1270 1471 1655 1877 2204 2515 2836 3200 3310 3370 3619 3754 3832 3930

1278 1365 1446 1518 1666 1880 1990 2147 2489 2731 3174 3512 3658 3867 4083 4277 4423 4517 4502 4642 4807 4877 4976 5167

22 22 22 27 69 95 98 117 136 164 198 273 350 430 515 604 710 819 875 899 1027 1103 1135 1194

241 300 333 371 418 465 490 532 584 660 792 937 1027 1109 1212 1318 1388 1502 1512 1557 1744 1843 1975 2095

Boys

Girls

Girls

Boys

Intermediate

Elementary

8 5 6 6 15 18 19 26 35 48 58 85 113 138 175 220 270 308 335 366 448 499 520 581

Girls 90 107 110 118 127 135 141 156 177 209 273 322 343 375 463 497 533 583 593 624 722 763 735 773

Boys

Secondary

Table 4.1  Annual increase in number of schools, 1967–2000

4 5 5 5 6 11 11 11 11 16 18 23 23 21 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 15

Girls

Special education

14 16 21 22 22 29 31 31 34 37 36 39 40 37 18 18 17 18 17 19 19 21 23 23

Boys 2 2 2 4 4 25 74 350 471 628 696 875 997 1078 1340 1427 1461 1699 1585 1462 1569 1588 1053 1014

Girls 554 606 611 613 628 743 852 1075 1272 1519 1819 2091 2360 1913 2567 1800 1553 1560 1433 1402 1325 1361 1290 1246

Boys

Adult education

2,502 2,782 2,976 3,120 3,486 4,050 4,509 5,414 6,317 7,260 8,454 9,775 10,732 11,037 12,827 13,007 13,576 14,651 14,663 14,902 15,824 16,320 16,101 16,683

Grand total

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727 680 751 795 837 894 936 962 992

1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000

4194 4674 5014 5164 5379 5576 5847 6086 6206

5296 5556 5697 5707 5838 5933 6011 6148 6209

1358 1600 1822 1955 2099 2223 2437 2637 2716

2224 2409 2609 2643 2799 2931 3071 3267 3391

Boys

Girls

Girls

Boys

Intermediate

Elementary

685 795 875 948 1064 1171 1361 1497 1571

Girls 852 937 1040 1054 1254 1347 1482 1622 1721

Boys

Secondary

16 17 13 18 20 21 25 25 24

Girls

Special education

30 37 44 48 50 69 95 118 180

Boys 1067 1264 1375 1451 1598 1749 1954 2107 2228

Girls 1288 1266 1288 1258 1238 1220 1197 1155 1107

Boys

Adult education

17,736 19,234 20,527 21,040 22,175 23,133 24,415 25,623 26,344

Grand total

Note: Schools include kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, secondary, special education, adult education, night schools, schools for Quran memorization, and schools for adult women

Source: Compiled from data available at Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Website (MoE 2010)

Kindergarten

Academic Year

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School education saw a huge rise in the decades after the establishment of the Ministry of Education. Earlier the expansion of schools was slow and until 1948 “there were only 182 primary schools, with an enrolment of 21,409 students” (Al-Yassini 1985, p. 111). However, with the change in focus and some effort, the number of schools rose to 301 in 1952 and the enrollment also increased to 39,920 students. Further, in the 1960s and 1970s, the education system began to witness a rapid expansion. “These changes were evident in increasing public expenditure; the number of schools, teachers, student enrolments and graduations; a new emphasis on technical training and higher education; and women’s education” (ibid). The educational infrastructure in the kingdom improved rapidly. The system was expanded to provide basic education to children under the age of 16  years. Besides, some efforts were made to improve the quality of teaching and learning. Accordingly, the number of schools for boys and girls grew and spread in different parts, including in the Eastern and Northern provinces. As noted, there were 226 schools in 1951 and 301 in 1952 and, with a huge increase in the next two decades, this number rose to almost 3000 in 1969–70 and to more than 5000 in 1974–75 (Ministry of Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [MoI] 1998). In the next ten years, a huge rise in the number of intermediate and secondary schools was recorded and, in 1984–85, almost 14,000 schools were functioning (ibid). This further increased to 27,229 schools during 2000–01 (MoE 2010). At the turn of the twenty-first century, the kingdom could boast of more than 27,000 schools (Table 4.2). Since then, the number has increased considerably and as of 2017–18, the number of schools has reached over 37,000 and nearly 55 percent of them are girls’ schools (MoE 2019). The number of enrollment for both boys and girls also grew consistently during the same period. Around 400,000 students were studying at various stages in schools during 1969–70, which saw a huge increase and grew to approximately 800,000 during 1979–80 (MoI 1998). Almost a twofold increase in enrollment was seen in one decade, mainly due to the rising awareness among the population about the importance of education. The remarkable increase in the number of teachers together with good infrastructure gave a boost to school education, which in turn saw the corresponding rise in the demand for vocational and higher education. According to the Ministry of Education, in 2005–06, there were 28,225 schools (13,386 for boys and 14,839 for girls) functioning in all the districts of Saudi Arabia. This was a huge increase as there were only 226 schools in 1951, most being concentrated in the Hijaz region. A total of

4  DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 

Table 4.2 Distribution of schools in the 13 provinces of Saudi Arabia, 2010

63

Province

Number of Schools

Al-Riyadh Makkah al-Mukarramah Al-Madinah Al-Munawwara Al-Qassim Ash-Sharqiyah Asir Tabuk Al-Bahah Al-Hudud Ash-Shumaliyah Al-Jawf Jazan Najran Ha’il Total

7081 6291 2438 2415 3376 3937 1039 1064 406 734 2619 781 1287 33,468

Source: Compiled from data available at the Ministry of Education Website (MoE 2010) Note: Schools include kindergarten, elementary, intermediate, secondary, special education, adult education, night schools, schools for Quran memorization, and schools for adult women

around 4.3 million students were studying in these schools during the academic year 2005–06 with an approximately identical number of boys and girls (MoE 2011). Vocational Education Vocational and technical education had not received much attention in the early phases of educational expansion. Only after the impact of oil discovery was felt on the economy, the demand for technically skilled manpower was recognized. In fact, until the 1960s, the focus of the government was on developing schools and building universities. Hence, most of the technical support staff were imported from outside, especially from neighboring Arab countries such as Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. The unskilled labor, on the other hand, was brought from South Asia and this created a large expatriate population in the kingdom. It was only after the oil boom in the 1970s that the government for the first time devised a plan for vocational training. The Technical and Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC) was established in 1980 to overlook the growing technical and vocational institutions (TVTC 2011). The vocational and technical colleges provided

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training at the secondary level in the fields of industries, agriculture and trade to train Saudi citizens looking for jobs in the expanding economy. In 2000–01 there were over 30 technical and vocational institutions in Saudi Arabia, which rose to 70 in 2008–09. Since then the technical and vocational training education sector has expanded significantly and the institutions run under the umbrella of the TVTC and various programs run by the TVTC train an average of 300,000 Saudi youths every year to become part of the job market (TVTC 2016). Higher Education From the 1960s as the public school education was expanding rapidly, the higher education system was still in early phase of development.  The authorities woke up to the need for rapid expansion of vocation and higher education only after the oil boom and many universities and professional colleges were established. Between 1957 and 1981 seven universities were established (Table 4.3). These universities grew rapidly and their enrollment increased mainly due to the rise in demand for higher education and the need for qualified manpower (Saleh 1986). The Ministry of Education was bifurcated in 1975 and a new Ministry of Higher Education was formed to focus exclusively on higher education requirements (Saleh 1986). During the reigns of King Faisal (1964–75) and King Khalid (1975–82), Saudi Arabia established two five-year plans with an emphasis on human resource development through education and training to provide Saudi manpower for the private sector of the economy. The education system was redesigned to accommodate an increasing number of elementary and intermediate school students in higher education. This helped in increasing the enrollment in higher educational institutions. According to the erstwhile Ministry of Higher Education, a total number of 63,563 students were studying in these universities, including girls’ colleges, during the academic year 1981–82. The 1970s saw an average annual rate of 21.3 percent increase in student enrollment every year (Saleh 1986, p. 23). Saudi Arabia made tremendous progress in higher education expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. The oil boom period saw an increase in oil revenues which translated into an infrastructural boom and demographic change. While a large expatriate workforce migrated to the kingdom from the outside, demand for jobs for Saudis were created due to the growing demography. A growing young population forced the authorities to invest in education, particularly in higher education. Educational programs to develop the quality of higher education and eradication of illiteracy among

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Table 4.3  State Universities in Saudi Arabia S. No Name of the University

City

Province

Region Year of Establishment

1. 2. 3.

Riyadh Medina Dhahran

Al-Riyadh Al-Madinah Al-Sharqiyah

Najd Hijaz East

1957 1961 1963

Jeddah

Makkah

Hijaz

1967

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

1974

Hasa Mecca

Al-Sharqiyah Makkah

East Hijaz

1975 1981

Abha

Asir

South

1999

Medina Taif Buraidah Ha’il Jouf Riyadh

Al-Madinah Makkah Al-Qasim Ha’il Al-Jouf Al-Riyadh

Hijaz Hijaz Najd Najd North Najd

2003 2003 2004 2005 2005 2005

Jazan Baha Tabuk Najran Arar

Jazan Al-Baha Al-Tabuk Al-Najran Al-Hudud Al-Shumaliyah Al-Riyadh

South Hijaz Hijaz South North

2006 2006 2006 2006 2007

Najd

2007

Dammam Al-Sharqiyah

East

Thuwal

Al-Riyadh

Najd

Carved out of King Faisal University in 2009 2009

Shaqra

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2010

4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

King Saud University Islamic University King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals King Abdul Aziz University Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University King Faisal University Umm Al-Qura University King Khalid University Taibah University Taif University Qassim University University of Ha’il Al Jouf University King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University of Health Sciences Jazan University Al Baha University University of Tabuk Najran University Northern Borders University Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman Universitya Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal Universityb King Abdullah University of Science & Technology Shaqrah University

Riyadh

(continued)

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Table 4.3  (continued) S. No Name of the University

City

Province

Region Year of Establishment

24.

Majmaah

Riyadh

Najd

2010

Kharj

Riyadh

Najd

2010

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2011

Jeddah Bisha Riyadh

Makkah Asir Al-Riyadh

Hijaz Asir Najd

2014 2014 1978

Hafr al-Batin

Al-Sharqiyah

East

2014

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Al Majmaah University Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz Universityc Saudi Electronic University University of Jeddah University of Bisha Naif Arab University of Security Sciences Hafr Al Batin University

Source: Compiled from information available on the Ministry of Higher Education Website (MoHE 2010) a The university was established in 2007 by adjoining several colleges spread over Al-Riyadh province. Its new residential campus in Riyadh with a capacity of 50,000 students was inaugurated on May 15, 2011

Formerly known as Dammam University, renamed in 2016. Until 2009 it was part of King Faisal University b

c The university was earlier known as Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz University and was renamed on March 1, 2015

adults were introduced during this period. In the 1990s, the kingdom witnessed protests and demands for education reforms through petitions, which further pushed the monarchy to invest in the development of educational infrastructure. As shown in Table 4.3, until 2000, there were only eight universities, but in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 23 new universities were established.

Important Aspects of the Education System One of the key issues that came to the fore in the debate on Saudi education system, both internally and internationally, was the  problems and challenges facing the system, especially the inadequacies or incompetencies of Saudi school courses, curriculum, and textbooks, the problems related to science and technology and professional education and the issues pertaining to religious education. After September 11, the kingdom was criticized for the extremist or hateful content being taught in its public schools. Within the kingdom, there were increasing debates about the curriculum, courses, textbooks, and teaching methods that did not

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prepare the students for the job market (Abu Taleb 2005). Based on the internal debate and external criticism, the kingdom charted out a course for reforming these aspects, as also discussed in the subsequent chapters. Curriculum and Courses The courses and curriculum emphasized on religious education at the school level but most of the religious subjects were also offered at the university level. As noted by Al-Sumbul et al. (1998) the school curriculum at the elementary and intermediate levels were heavily titled in favour of religious subjects. In elementary schools, 21 out of 28 hours per week were devoted to Arabic and Islamic studies for first-grade students whereas 17 out of 31 weekly hours were dedicated to religious courses in sixth grade (ibid. p. 152). Similarly, at intermediate level, 14 out of 33 weekly hours were dedicated to Arabic and Islamic studies for students of all three grades (ibid. p. 198). About 35 percent of weekly hours were dedicated to religious subjects at the secondary level for students in the Sharia and Arabic language branch, while 14 percent were allotted for those in the technical and basic sciences (physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, and mathematics) branch (Prokop 2003). At the secondary level, students had the option of choosing an area of study. They could take admission in one of the six areas of specialization from among Sharia (Islamic Law), al-Lugha al-Arabia (Arabic Language), al-Tijara (Business Administration), al-Ulum al-­ Ijtimaia (Social Sciences), al-Ulum al-Tabiyia (Sciences), and al-­ Riyadhiya (Mathematics and Statistics). However, students who chose to specialize in sciences, social sciences, business, and mathematics also had to compulsorily study religious subjects. The religious subjects taught at school level included the Quran, Tawhid (declaration of the oneness of God), Tajwid (recitation), Tafsir (interpretation, commentary on Quran), Hadith (record of the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad and his companions), and Fiqh (jurisprudence). At the university level as well, religious subjects were taught not only to students of theology and in religious universities but also to science, engineering, and business students. Nearly 40–45 percent of teaching hours were dedicated to religious subjects in departments such as art, history, and administration (Prokop 2003). Graduate students even at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), a university dedicated to technical subjects with English as the medium of instruction, had to take 14 credit hours each semester in Islamic and Arab Studies, and this accounted for approximately 10–15 percent of the curriculum.

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The old-school textbooks had a high degree of religious content. Reports suggesting the problem of hate speech against Shias, Jews, and Christians in Saudi textbooks came to light in the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States. Since 2001, the Saudi school textbooks and school curriculum came under intense scrutiny of the Western media, academia, and think tanks (Rugh 2002; Shea 2006; Wurm 2008). This propelled debate on the subject and the issue of religious content in school textbooks became one of the most discussed topics in the media, particularly in online forums. Scores of articles and write-ups both in favor of keeping the content intact and against it were published on various websites (Abu Taleb 2005; Al-Rasheed 2006; Al-Salmi 2010). This was one of the catalysts for the monarchy to initiate programs for reforms in school education. Science and Technology Education The issue of  an  inadequate focus on science and technology education both at the school and higher education levels also came to the fore in the debate on the problem facing the Saudi education system. In the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia had only seven universities and among them three— Islamic University, Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University, and Umm Al-Qura University—were dedicated to religious studies. Only four—King Saud University (KSU), KFUPM, King Abdulaziz University (KAU), and King Faisal University—offered courses in science and technology subjects. KSU in Riyadh, the oldest university in the kingdom, had colleges of administrative sciences, agriculture, arts, dentistry, education, engineering, medical sciences, medicine, pharmacy, and science. The university offered postgraduate studies in 61 specializations and doctorates in Arabic, geography, and history. The university catered to a small population; for example, in 1984 there were 479 graduate students, including 151 women, and this number had grown to 38,109 students during 2008–09 (KSU 2010). The KFUPM in Dhahran, founded in 1963, offered undergraduate and graduate degree programs in engineering and science, with most programs of study being offered in English. Dhahran has another university, King Faisal University, founded in 1976, with colleges of agricultural sciences and foods, architecture, education, medicine, and veterinary medicine. In 1984 some 40 percent of its 2600 students were women. The King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, founded in 1968, consisted of nine colleges, including arts and sciences, environmental studies, marine sciences, medicine, and meteorology. As the pressure on improving the higher education

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infrastructure increased due to the petition movement that gripped the kingdom after the Kuwait crisis, the monarchy started to pay more attention to investing in higher education. This led to increase in the budget for the higher education and due to a consistent increase, the infrastructure for modern education got a boost since the 1990s. Hence, as of 1995, Saudi Arabia had an education system with more than 14,000 institutions, including seven universities and 11 teachers’ training colleges, besides schools for vocational and technical training, special needs, and adult literacy (MoI 1998). Investments in individual universities began to  increase, leading to exponential growth to accommodate a large number of students graduating from school. During the 1980s and 1990s, the number of university students increased from approximately 58,000 to about 113,000, an increase of 95 percent (MHE 2009). The enrollment for women increased dramatically at the university level during the same period. In 1989, an almost identical number of men and women graduated from all the colleges and universities. The year 2008–09 saw a huge rise of 400 percent in the number of students passing out of university and higher educational institutions (MHE 2009). Religious Education Religious education witnessed growth along with the development of modern education. The emphasis on religious education received an extraordinary boost after the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution and the siege of Kaaba a few months later as has been discussed in the introduction. The establishment and growth of faculties of arts and sciences, medicine, and technology were accompanied by the growth in religious institutions. The Islamic University of Medina, founded in 1961, received significant attention and funding from the monarchy and emerged as one of the premier centres for higher leaning in Islamic theology not only in the kingdom but the entire Islamic world attracting students and researcher from across the globe. The university was founded and designed to play an important role at the global level in imparting Islamic religious education  and  has five faculties—Faculty of Islamic Law, Faculty of Islamic Preaching and Theology, Faculty of Holy Quran and Islamic Studies, Faculty of Prophetic Tradition and Islamic Studies, and Faculty of Arabic Language—which offer courses on different Islamic theological subjects like fiqh (jurisprudence), Islamic politics, Islamic history, creed, Dawah (preaching), Quran, Hadith (Prophet’s tradition), and Arabic language

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(IUM 2009). The University also offers a scholarship for international students from Muslim countries. In 1985 the University had 2798 students including several hundred graduate students, which rose to 6500 students in 2008–09 (MHE 2010). Moreover, the Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University at Riyadh that was established in 1974 and Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca established in 1981 began to cater to the growing demand for religious education within the kingdom. These universities catered to the need for research and higher education in theological subjects, and provided the human resource for the vast network of ever-increasing religious bureaucracy that was appointed in important positions in the ministries and agencies working in the public sector. At the same time, the religious universities helped Saudi Arabia enhance its soft power in the Islamic world as bright Muslims from around the world were provided with handsome scholarships to join and study in these universities. Upon their return these Islamic universities’ graduates acquired prominent religious and social positions in their home countries advancing Saudi soft power in them. This further served the purpose of Al-Saud’s commitment for the propagation of Wahhabi Islam in Muslim countries and helped the monarchy in enhancing its leadership position in the Islamic world. Before the start of the reforms in the education system in the early twenty-first century, the kingdom had developed a vast network of education infrastructure that was spread across the geographical space inside its boundaries and catered to the demand for the free and accessible education for all. However, the system suffered from several inadequacies and challenges as has been highlighted here. This created the imperatives for bringing comprehensive reforms in the education system and the demands for it were already rising within the kingdom since the 1990s, and the September 11 terrorist attacks provided the immediate reason, creating international pressure, thus helping expedite the reform process.

References Abu Taleb, S. (2005, May 3). Changing the national curriculum of Saudi Arabia. Asharq Al-awsat, London. http://aawsat.com/english/news. asp?section=7&id=1524. Accessed 12 Oct 2010. Al-Aqil, A.  B. A. (2005). Siasat al-Ta’lim wa Nizamuhu fi al-Mamlakah al-­ Arabiyah al-Saudiyah; Education policy and system in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd. Al-Rasheed, M. (2006). Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Al-Salmi, M. B. F. M. (2010, June 10). Al-Malik Abdullah: Khamsu Sanawat min al-Ata’ al-Mutajaddid; King Abdullah: Five years of bestowed novelty. [Arabic]. Dar al-Hayat, Riyadh. http://ksa.daralhayat.com/ksaarticle/150873. Accessed 10 June 2010. Al-Sumbul, A. B. A., et al. (1998). Nizam al-Ta’lim fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiayah al-Saudiyah; Education system of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Dar al-Khariji Publishers and Distributors. Al-Yassini, A. (1985). Religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Boulder: Westview Press. Bronson, R. (2006). Thicker than oil: America’s uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press. Buchan, J. (1982). Secular and religious opposition in Saudi Arabia. In T. Niblock (Ed.), State, society and economy in Saudi Arabia (pp.  106–124). London: Croom Helm. Cordesman, A. H. (2003). Saudi Arabia enters the twenty-first century: The military and international security dimensions. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. Foley, S. (2011). The gulf Arab states: Beyond oil and Islam. New Delhi: Viva Books. Gause, F. G., III. (2011). Saudi Arabia in the new Middle East. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Husen, T. (Ed.). (1994). The International encyclopedia of education. New York: Pergamon, Cited in Bahgat, G. (1999). Education in gulf monarchies: Retrospect and prospect. International Review of Education, 45(2), 127–136. Islamic University in Madinah. (2009). al-Jamiah al-Islamiah bi al-Madinah al-­ Munawwarah: Nabzat An al-Jamiah; Islamic University in Madinah: About the University. [Arabic]. http://iu.edu.sa/web/default.aspx. Accessed 9 Mar 2011. Kéchichian, J. A. (2008). Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s king for all seasons. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. King Saud University. (2010). Facts and statistics. Riyadh. http://ksu.edu.sa/ AboutKSU/Pages/Factsandstatistics.aspx. Accessed 28 Dec 2010. Lipsky, G. A. (1959). Saudi Arabia: Its people its society its culture. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010). al-Barnamij al-Sanawi li A‘maal al-Ihsa’; Annual statistical work program. [Arabic]. Published by Information Department, http://www.moe.gov.sa/Pages/Default.aspx. Accessed 23 Apr 2011. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2011). Ma’lumat wa Ihsayiat; al-Aam Al-Dirasi: 1431–1432; Information and statistics; academic year: 1431–1432 Hij. http://info.moe.gov.sa/. Accessed 15 Feb 2011. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2019). Bylaws: Private colleges. https://www.moe.gov.sa/en/HigherEducation/PrivateHigherEducation/ RulesAndRegulations/Pages/Bylaws-­PrivateColleges.aspx. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2009). al-Taqrir al-­ Watani; National report. [Arabic]. Available online: www.mohe.gov.sa.

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Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010). Nahwa Bina’Mujtama al-Ma’lumat fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyah al-Saudiyah: Musairah wa Injazat; Towards formation of information society in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Way forward and achievements. [Arabic]. Riyadh: General Department of Planning and Statistics, Deputy for Planning and Information Affairs. Ministry of Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (1998). al-Tawthiq al-­ Tarbawi; Educational documentation. [Arabic]. Available online www. moi.gov.sa. Niblock, T. (1982). State, society and economy in Saudi Arabia. London: Croom Helm. Prokop, M. (2003). Saudi Arabia: The politics of education. International Affairs, 79(1), 77–89. Rugh, W. A. (2002). Arab education: Tradition, growth and reform. Middle East Journal, 56(3), 396–414. Safran, N. (1988). Saudi Arabia: The ceaseless quest for security. New York: Cornell University Press. Saleh, M. A. (1986). Development of higher education in Saudi Arabia. Higher Education, 15(1/2), 17–23. Shea, N. (2006, May 21). This is a Saudi text-book. The Washington Post. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­d yn/content/ar ticle/2006/05/19/ AR2006051901769.html. Accessed 22 Jan 2010. Sluglett, P., & Farouk-Sluglett, M. (1982). The precarious monarchy: Britain, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud and the establishment of the kingdom of Hijaz, Najd and its dependencies, 1925–1932. In T. Niblock (Ed.), State, society and economy in Saudi Arabia (pp. 36–57). London: Croom Helm. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2011). Nash’at al-Muassasa’ wa Tatawwurha; Establishment and development of the corporation. [Arabic]. http://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 8 Feb 2011. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2016). Annual Report, 2015. https://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ InformationCenter/Documents/1437.pdf. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. Wurm, I. (2008). PRIF Report: In doubt for the monarchy: Autocratic modernization in Saudi-Arabia (G.  Shkalikov, Trans.). Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute. Wynbrandt, J. (2010). A brief history of Saudi Arabia. New  York: Facts on File Infobase. Yizraeli, S. (1997). The remaking of Saudi Arabia: The struggle between king Sa’ud and crown prince Faysal, 1953–1962. Tel Aviv: Dayan Center. Yizraeli, S. (2012). Politics and society in Saudi Arabia: The crucial years of development, 1960–82. London: Hurst and Company. Zuhur, S. (2011). Saudi Arabia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

CHAPTER 5

Imperatives for Reforms

The story of education reforms in Saudi Arabia cannot be seen in isolation of the modernization project that started in the wake of the discovery and production of oil. The oil wealth not only laid the foundations for economic and social transformations but also created imperatives for the reorganization of the education system. However, the process of change in the education sector, unlike the economic transformation, was painfully slow. The most important reasons for this tardiness were the grip of the ulema on education administration and a lack of demand for higher education and skill development among the population (Niblock 1982; Prokop 2003). People preferred self-employment or public sector jobs as the private sector had lesser incentives and required high skills or involved field work or menial labor (Bahgat 1999). This meant that a majority of jobs in the private sector were filled by expatriate workers of American, European, Arab and Asian origin. While the white-collar jobs were manned by Western expatriates, the blue-collar jobs were largely occupied by workers of Arab and Asian nationalities. Gradually, as sedentary and urban lifestyle became common, the kingdom witnessed a rapid population growth. The demographic changes intensified in the oil boom era and were accompanied by several new challenges that were hitherto unknown or marginal. One of the key problems was the rising number of young Saudis looking for employment. As the population increased and lifestyle started to change, more people sought education as it was seen as a means toward better economic opportunities. © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_5

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It meant that the demand for education and skill development began to grow. Saudis still preferred public sector employment and despised menial labor but started to enroll themselves in higher education institutions, leading to a growth in demand (Rugh 2002). This forced the government to respond in the form of investments in expanding the network of schools, colleges, and universities. Enrollment in these institutions rapidly increased and, in a few years, the numbers of Saudi graduates seeking jobs in the market witnessed a rise. However, the demand for private jobs remained low and the natives continued to prefer public sector employment. Private companies too were skeptical of employing Saudi graduates for two reasons: higher cost and lower outcome (Bosbait and Wilson 2005). The latter brought the question of quality of education imparted in schools, colleges, and universities into focus. As a result, one witnessed a growing demand among the population for education reforms in the 1990s and also the beginning of the policy of nationalization of jobs. The September 11 attacks in the United States brought another facet of the education system—fomenting of extremism and radicalism—to the fore, and built international pressure on the monarchy to take corrective steps. Broadly, three important imperatives became the catalysts for initiating and expediting education reforms: (1) the growing demand for education and employment; (2) rising calls for quality education to prepare the Saudi youth for the job market; and (3) concerns about the education system fomenting extremism. Historically, these three imperatives were internalized in the policymaking during three different stages. The oil boom period and the subsequent demographic changes came to the fore in the 1980s and brought the issue of the growing demand for education to the fore. The “petition fever” in the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis underlined the increasing problem of poor-quality education and the government responded with some policy initiatives. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the issue of the Saudi education system fomenting extremist came to the fore and the kingdom faced immense American and international pressure for reforming its education system.

Oil Boom and Demography The transformation of Saudi Arabia from a desert kingdom lacking basic infrastructure and amenities to a modernized oil-based economy by the 1990s had irreversible impacts on the society, most importantly on the demography. At the core of the demographic change was the transition of

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the largely nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary one followed with rapid urbanization. When Ibn Saud was seeking to restore the Al-Saud rule in the early twentieth century, the Arabian Peninsula consisted mostly of the nomadic tribal population with a small rural–sedentary population in some parts. The urban population was largely confined only to the Hijaz region (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). Hijaz had an urban lifestyle as it was the center of trade, pilgrimage, and education bringing Muslims from across the world who settled in Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina (Baker 1979). The rest of the peninsular population largely maintained a nomadic or seminomadic lifestyle and had only limited interaction with the outside world (Kour 1991). The unification of the peninsula under Ibn Saud did not have an immediate impact on the demography as the majority of the population continued to lead a nomadic or seminomadic lifestyle (Lipsky 1959; Niblock 1982; Kostiner 1990). The population at the time could be divided into two types, namely, settled (hadar) and nomadic (badu). This division, however, was fluid as the distinction between the two groups was always blurred. In the words of historian Z. H. Kour (1991), the difference “was not always clearly defined since there were stages of nomadism and sedentarism. Now and then some nomads gave up their nomadism for a settled way of life, and occasionally elements in the sedentary population opted for the desert” (p. 186). Nonetheless, both had only limited contacts and they not only mistrusted each other but also had a sense of superiority over the other (Al-Harbi 2011). The demographic change was a post-oil phenomenon mainly because economic opportunities propelled internal migration and the monarchy started discouraging nomadic Bedouin lifestyle as it obstructed the idea of political integration and centralization. The settled population began to grow around townships such as Dammam, Dhahran, Khobar, and Hasa surrounding the oil industry in the Eastern Province (Parssinen and Talib 1982), as well as Riyadh and Jeddah due to their political and economic significance. The formalization of state structures gained momentum during the 1960s and this affected the demography (Fabietti 1982). Many nomadic tribes particularly in the Najd region either started to live in settlements to reap the benefits of state largesse or were forced to settle down to avoid tribal skirmishes (Al Hathloul and Edadan 1991; Kour 1991). This change in the demographic characteristics of the population profoundly impacted the society. Settled life in an urban setup resulted in

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people belonging to different tribes, ethnicities, and regions living together in the same locality or vicinity. Sometimes they worked in the same workplace or had trade and commercial relations (Lipsky 1959). Rapid changes were noticeable during the 1970s as economic modernization in the wake of the oil boom led to a strong wave of urbanization. The introduction of road transport, telecommunication and postal services, radio and television broadcast, modern education, and healthcare services profoundly affected the demography. Industrialization and exposure to the outside world were other important factors for demographic change. One of the most significant consequences of the demographic change was population growth and this trend strengthened further in the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s. Population Growth Since the 1950s, Saudi Arabia witnessed a massive rise in its national population due to economic prosperity, a better quality of life, and improved healthcare. There was a noticeable population explosion in the 1950s (Moghadam 2004; Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005), but the oil boom of the early 1970s resulted in the “baby boom” and “youth bulge” in the subsequent years and decades. Consequently, the national population grew by 66 percent in the 1970s, 45 percent in the 1980s, 35 percent in the 1990s, and 26 percent in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Between 1960 and 1980, the population more than doubled from 4.08 million to 9.7 million and has reached an estimated 23 million in 2020 (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1  Native population in Saudi Arabia, 1932 and 2020 (in million) Year

1932

1950

1960

1970

1980

1992

2004

2010

2015

2020

Men Women Sex ratioa Total

NA NA NA 2.5

1.58 1.53 968 3.11

2.05 2.03 990 4.08

2.97 2.86 962 5.83

5.20 4.50 865 9.70

6.21 6.09 980 12.31

8.28 8.24 995 16.52

9.52 9.18 964 18.70

10.78 10.92 1012 21.70

11.52 11.78 1022 23.30

Source: Adopted from (Lahmeyer 2003; MoEP 1992, 2010a, b) Note: Figures for 1992, 2004, and 2010 are from Saudi census data; 2015 and 2020 figures are UN projections Females per 1000 males

a

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Table 5.2 Population growth rate, 1950–2020

Period

Growth rate (in percent)

1950–55 1956–60 1960–65 1966–70 1970–75 1976–80 1980–85 1986–90 1990–95 1996–2000 2000–05 2006–10 2010–15 2016–20

2.62 2.77 3.40 3.73 4.82 5.77 5.97 4.05 2.84 2.53 2.91 1.98 1.85 1.57

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An interesting picture emerges as one looks at the demographic change in terms of population growth rate.1 A slow rise is noticeable since the 1950s commensurate with the early period of development of the oil industry. This gives way to a sudden burst in population since the oil boom era in the 1970s with the population growth rate touching nearly 6 percent between 1980 and 1985 (Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.1). One then witnesses a decline in the 1990s and this trend has continued to strengthen subsequently. In other words, while there is a huge increase in the national population since the late 1980s, Saudi population growth rate has been declining. According to Saudi sources, between the censuses in 1974 and 1992, the native population grew at 3.7 percent annually (MoEP 1992) and between the 1992 and 2010 censuses, it grew at 2.6 percent annually (MoEP 2010a, b). Notwithstanding the declining growth rate, the gross national population has significantly increased. Given the rising national population and the growth rate, a key trend is a large number of the young population. Saudi Arabia is a young country and as per United Nations estimates, 50 percent of the Saudi national population was below the age of 25 years in 1  The United Nations defines population growth rate as “average annual rate (in percentage) of change of population size during a specified period” (United Nations 2007, p. 57).

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7 6 5 4 3 2 1

0

5

-2 16

0

-1

20

10

-1

20

5

06

-0

20

0 00

20

-2

00

5 -9 19

96

0 -9

19

90

5

86 19

-8

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80

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-8

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76

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-7

19

70

-7

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66 19

-6

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60

-6

19

56

50 19

19

-5

5

0

Population Growth Rate

Fig. 5.1  Population growth rate, 1950–2020 Table 5.3  Age structure in Saudi Arabia, 2020 (in percent)

Saudi Arabia West Asia World

0–14 years

15–24 years

25–64 years

65 years and older

24.7 28.1 25.4

13.1 16.4 15.5

58.7 49.7 49.7

3.5 5.8 9.3

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019

2010, with children comprising 32 percent and youth 18 percent. A mere 5 percent of the population is above the age of 60. In 2020, the trend has only marginally changed; about 37.8 percent of the total native population is below 25 years of age, while children below 14 years comprise 24.7 percent of the population. The youth of 15–24 years make up 13.1 percent while a whopping 58.7 percent of the population is in the workingage group of 25–64  years and only a small 3.5 percent is above the working-age group of 65 years and older (Table 5.3). The “baby boom” and “youth bulge” were a result of rapid economic growth and associated demographic and structural changes in the society“. Improved healthcare facilities, a decline in child mortality, and high

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fertility among women led to a huge rise in the young population. Hence, as per estimates in 2020, nearly 72 percent of the national population is in the working-age group of 25–64 years. The high ratio of youth has been a major feature of the demographic transition and nearly 65 percent of the Saudi population was in the 15–59 age group and those in the 15–40 age group comprised nearly 30 percent (Table 5.3). The population trend created an interesting scenario in the 1980s with a sudden rise in the young and adolescent population. Demand for Education and Employment The demographic transition created new dynamics in the society and posed a serious challenge for the monarchy as with the growing young population the demand for education and employment grew exponentially. It was an interesting scenario because a young population is regarded as an engine of economic growth and social progress (United Nations 2011). The kingdom in the 1980s was at a crucial stage of development whereby the population was relatively young and the oil resources had enabled the monarchy to invest in training and human resource development. The challenge was to expand the education infrastructure to make it accessible to all. Moreover, as a greater number of people started to seek education and began to graduate from colleges and universities, the number of Saudis in the job market increased. Hence, as a direct result of demographic change, the demand for education and employment increased significantly. The most important demographic challenges facing Saudi Arabia in the 1980s was the need to provide universal education and the problem of unemployment. Hence, one witnessed significant attention on the part of the monarchy to expand the education system. As a result, the number of schools grew to 27,000  in 2000, and nearly 150 vocational institutions and professional colleges were opened (TVTC 2011). Furthermore, more than 50 public and private universities were opened (MHE 2010a). The massive expansion in education infrastructure meant that the total number of students enrolled in these schools, colleges, and universities witnessed a huge rise. As of the early 2000s, the kingdom achieved nearly a 95 percent net enrollment rate at primary school and the total literacy rate rose to over 85 percent. Further, it started recording nearly 100 percent enrollment at the secondary level and the number of students graduating from colleges and

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universities witnessed a 400 percent rise by the late 2000s in comparison to a decade earlier (MHE 2009). The expenditure on education consistently increased, and nearly 4–5 percent of the GDP was spent on the education sector since the 1980s (MoE 2014). A thrust on improving female access to education in this period resulted in nearly an equal number of female enrollments in schools though at the college and university levels it was still lower. Nonetheless, the number of women seeking higher education grew in comparison to the past. Despite the expansion in the educational infrastructure, the quality of human resources in terms of education and training continued to be poor (Looney 1991; Prokop 2003). The number of Saudi graduates seeking jobs in the market increased but they were faced with a serious dilemma. The market was producing employment opportunities at the lower levels but the Saudi graduates were not seeking menial work. Hence, the demand for highly skilled positions or menial jobs was being filled by expatriate labor. The managerial and supervisory positions which the Saudi graduates were suitable for were not well paid, especially in comparison to the public sector. The problem of disparity between market requirements and skill sets of Saudi university graduates created an unusual situation of large-scale educated unemployment (Mellahi 2000; Al-Aqil 2005; Al-Eisa 2009). The number of Saudis in the private sector workforce remained low. One of the reasons for the lack of skills was the recent nature of economic growth and lower consciousness among the population for acquiring skills. The changes spurred by economic growth were the result of top-down initiatives that created a client–patron relationship between the ruler and the population. The population was yet to become a stakeholder in the development process and was rather a consumer of the fruits of development (Hertog 2010; Thompson 2014). The idea that skills are needed to drive socioeconomic growth and progress was yet to percolate among the masses. The economic growth that started in the 1950s and witnessed a massive expansion in the 1970s started to create consciousness regarding the need to sustain this growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and even though the government took measures to improve infrastructure, the consciousness about the need for skill development for a sustainable economic growth was yet to take deep social roots (Algosaibi 1995).

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The Influx of Expatriate Workforce The oil boom and economic modernization not only changed the Saudi demographic characteristic from a nomadic to a settled life but also brought a large pool of expatriate workers to engage in the oil and oil-­ driven industries. Saudi Arabia lacked expertise and human resource to steer economic growth despite having massive oil wealth, which forced it to bring expatriate human resources from Western, Arab, Asian, and African countries. Scholars observe that international migration was the most significant contributing factor to the growth in urban demography in the GCC countries since the 1970s (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005). It led to a sudden increase in the resident population; in the 1970s the number of expatriates living and working in the kingdom was less than 100,000 and by the late 1980s more than 4 million expatriates were working in Saudi Arabia. As per the 1992 census, the population was 16.94 million, of which 72.6 percent, that is, 12.31 million, were Saudi nationals while 4.63 million were expatriates, comprising 27.4 percent of the total resident population (MoEP 1992). The expatriate population further grew since the early 1990s and, as of 2015, an estimated 10 million expatriates lived in the kingdom, making up nearly one-third of the resident population (MoEP 2015). Expatriates were and continue to be concentrated in urban and industrial cities including Riyadh, Mecca, Medina, and the Eastern Province, while less industrialized provinces such as Baha, Tabuk, and the Northern Border Province attracted only a fraction of expatriates. As per the 2010 census, the four more urbanized provinces housed nearly 7 million out of the total 8.4 million expatriates while the three less urbanized provinces only had 250,000 expatriates (Table  5.4). Riyadh and Mecca, the most populous provinces, had 2.48 million and 2.79 million expatriates respectively, and the Northern Border Province had only around 50,000. Women constituted a small fraction of the expatriate population, and the sex ratio among expatriates as per the 2010 census was 420 women to 1000 men. This highlights the fact that, largely, the expatriate workers were either not allowed to or could not afford to bring families because of the high cost of living. It also affected the sex ratio of the total population (Mirkin 2010). For example, over the years, the sex ratio among the national population has largely hovered around 970 women for every 1000 men but the sex ratio among the resident population is much lower and in 2010 it recorded 695 women for every 1000 men (MoEP 2010a, b).

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Table 5.4  Regional distribution of expatriate population in Saudi Arabia, 2010 Provinces

Total

Male

Female

Sex ratio (females per 1000 males)

Riyadh Mecca Medina Qaseem Eastern Province Asir Tabuk Hail Northern Borders Jazan Najran Baha Jouf Total

2,480,401 2,798,941 515,421 287,367 1,214,665 322,545 130,382 109,940 52,347 260,015 103,228 63,252 90,897 8,429,401

1,762,631 1,828,412 350,488 223,403 924,771 248,055 99,091 84,161 39,550 176,990 75,339 48,852 71,231 5,932,974

717,770 970,529 164,933 63,964 289,894 74,490 31,291 25,779 12,797 83,025 27,889 14,400 19,666 2,496,427

407 530 470 286 313 300 315 306 323 469 370 294 276 420

Source: MoEP (2010a, b)

The expatriate population has been instrumental in the economic growth and infrastructure development, and the role of the expatriate population in the economic development of the GCC countries including Saudi Arabia is well documented (El Azhary 1984; Winckler 1997; Naufal and Genc 2012). However, the phenomenon is also considered as one of the most important contributing factors for the rising unemployment among the local population. The problem had just started to appear in the 1970s and 1980s as many expatriates arrived in the wake of the oil boom as the proportion of educated and skilled Saudis was lower. Nonetheless, the influx of expatriates contributed to a rise in the unemployment rate among educated Saudis to reach 5 percent in the 1970s (World Bank 2015). The monarchy tried to satisfy the growing demands for education through investments in education. The situation did not attract much attention until unemployment among educated Saudis rose to more than 25 percent as of 1991, which, as discussed later in the chapter, forced the monarchy to take measures such as nationalization of jobs.

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Kuwait Crisis and Demands for Reforms The early 1990s were a tumultuous time for the Gulf region. In many ways, one still sees the repercussions of the developments during this period among the GCC countries. This is true for Saudi Arabia as well, especially in the context of the sociopolitical mobilization that happened during this time, with the focal point being the question of bringing about reforms. While demands for sociopolitical reforms did not materialize or were realized in a limited fashion (like the appointment of a Majlis al-­ Shura), the developments during these times became a major catalyst for economic and education reforms. The impact of the Kuwait crisis upon Saudi Arabia surpassed any other contemporary event. The end of the Iraqi aggression and the liberation of Kuwait were possible because of the international coalition led by the United States and Operation Desert Storm. Within hours after the Iraqi invasion, King Fahd after consultations with senior princes and the ulema acceded (Lacey 2009) to the US offer to help and agreed to the stationing of the American forces to protect oil fields from a possible Kuwait-like situation in Saudi Arabia (Pollack 2002). The Saudi response, however, created an internal political storm. The severest criticism of the Saudi handling of the situation came from the Islamists. It gave the newly formed Qaedatul Jihad (The Base for Jihad or Al-Qaeda), formed in 1988 under the leadership of Osama bin Laden comprising Afghan-Arabs, an opportunity to attack the Saudi monarchy as being inept in handling the security and other affairs of the state. Bin Laden had reportedly offered the services of Al-Qaeda fighters to fight against the Iraqi army but was rejected by King Fahd (Jehl 2001), who preferred to depend on the United States and allowed the stationing of US forces in the kingdom. This enraged Bin Laden, who articulated the need to liberate the “holy lands” from the “infidel” forces (Hegghammer 2010). The stationing of US forces was unacceptable to the Islamists and Jihadists primarily due to religious implications, and for them, it was tantamount to “occupation” of the holy places. In one of his open letters written in 1994 and addressed to the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz bin Baz, Bin Laden articulated Al-Qaeda’s commitments to Islam, the Muslim ummah, and the Islamic holy lands including in Palestine and criticized him for his fatawa (sing. fatwa) justifying the stationing of “infidel” American forces. He admonished him for justifying all the actions of the Al-Saud including violating the sanctity of the holy places and his fatwa against Sahwa leaders such as Salman al-­ Awdah and Safar al-Hawali who criticized the Saudi response to the

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Kuwait crisis (Bin Laden 1994). For Al-Qaeda, the stationing of American forces on Saudi soil was unacceptable as it “compromised” the sovereignty of Muslim territory and was economically exploitative as it enforced “expensive arm deals on the Saudi state” (Hegghammer 2010, p. 104). Other Islamists including neo-Wahhabis and Sahwis were also critical of the Saudi response as they saw it as compromising the sanctity of the Holy land and the Holy mosques and raised doubts over the ability of the monarchy to defend them. They questioned the legitimacy of the Al-Saud, who could not defend its people, resources, and territory without the help of “infidel” forces. While they questioned the legitimacy of the move to allow stationing of the US forces in Saudi Arabia, unlike the jihadists, they did not call for an overthrow of the monarchy and settled for calling on the ruler to rectify the mistakes by immediately expelling the US forces and bringing reforms in social, political, and security structures (Al-Rasheed 1996; Lacroix 2004). This was an unprecedented challenge for the Al-Saud; the only other time voices from within had called for such drastic changes was when the “Free Princes” demanded the abolition of the monarchy in the 1960s.2 Their support base was thin and hence could be easily dismissed. This time the critics had wider support manifested by the popularity of the opposition figures (Ehteshami 2003) because the critics were resting their argument on the same Islamic principles that accorded legitimacy to the monarchy. Public perception was not entirely in favor of the monarchy, particularly because it was a question of fighting another Muslim ruler and the invitation to foreign troops was seen as a weakness. If the status quo could not have been maintained, reforming the political system was not possible as it meant power-sharing and loss of authority. Petition Fever The “petition fever” began in Kuwait and soon spread to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf States. Between 1990 and 1991 two well-orchestrated petitions were submitted to King Fahd by liberals and Islamists (Dekmejian 1994; Al-Rasheed 1996). Key political demands included reviewing ties 2  Free Princes led by Prince Talal fled to Egypt in 1964–65 and started raising voices against the Saudi monarchy with backing from Nasser of Egypt. They later abandoned their campaign and returned to Saudi Arabia and were given official pardon (see Kéchichian 2008, pp. 107–108).

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with the United States, political opening, the introduction of the constitution, and an elected legislative council (Dekmejian 2003; Raphaeli 2005). Major socioeconomic demands of these petitions were improvement in the conditions of women, education reforms, creation of jobs, and religious and cultural rights for Shias. The first signs of protests could be noticed in September when about 70 women defied the prevailing driving ban and drove their cars pressing for lifting the ban. This rebellious action was partly the result of them noticing the presence of American women soldiers in combat uniform and them driving, “a symbolic act prompted by the heady atmosphere of liberalization and the presence of Western media and military personnel” (Dekmejian 2003, p. 403). The protest, however, enraged the conservative constituency who were already perturbed by the presence of American forces on Saudi soil (Hegghammer 2010). One of the earliest petitions signed by 43 liberal-reformist intellectuals was submitted to King Fahd in December 1990, weeks before Operation Desert Storm and demanded “codification of Islamic law that would provide for fundamental reforms,” and a consultative council and judicial reforms (Dekmejian 2003, p. 403). The pace of such moves increased after the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 and a few more petitions were submitted to the King. This demand for political participation was mainly led by two conflicting groups: the religious clergy and the Islamo-liberal intellectuals. Another petition was sent in the form of an open letter to King Fahd on April 12, 1991 (Nehme  1995, p.  162). Titled Petition for Change this demanded the formation of a Consultative Council, implementation of the Law of Provinces, investigation of the Judicial system, enforcement of the rule of law, freedom of expression and press, equal rights for women, and curbing the role of the notorious religious police (that is, Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vices or mutawwa). One of the key demands of these petitions was a comprehensive reform of the education system and limiting the involvement of the ulema in education policy formulation and the education system. It was argued that the education system should be secular and free from intervention by the ulema; the number of religious instructions in classes should be reduced and religious subjects should be limited to religious schools. These liberal signatories, however, were “careful not to be perceived as opposing the regime or deviating considerably from Islamic tenets of the state” and, thus, throughout the text they tried to emphasize their Islamic credentials and justified their demands based on Islamic law (Al-Rasheed 1996,

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p. 362). Their main aim was to reduce the influence of religious authority on education and society. The petition succinctly articulated the demand for the introduction of a written constitution. According to Rashed Aba-Namay, [a]ccording to these liberal views, the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet are too general to apply precisely to the sophistication of modern government and failing to yield to the irresistible force of social and economic change will produce acute tensions. Pragmatism and a flexible approach will produce more satisfactory results for both religion and the state. A written constitution clarifying and detailing the function of the government is appropriate. It will prevent the government from going beyond the limits prescribed by the written law and regulate the working of the government to overcome its deficiencies. (Aba-Namay 1993, p. 302)

A  third  petition titled Memorandum of Advice was submitted on 18 May 1991, after reversal of the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait, by a group of about 500 religious scholars led by Grand Mufti Bin Baz, Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Sheikh Salman al-Oudah (Pasha 1999, p. 33). This was nevertheless, a reaction to the earlier petition, but in the words of Michel G.  Nehme, was a “daring step by Saudi standards” (Nehme 1995, p. 161). The petition was published and circulated in mosques in advance, which was not liked by the monarchy and King Fahd expressed his astonishment for the way it was pursued, which later led to disapproval by the CSU that ironically included the Grand Mufti Bin Baz (Aba-Namay 1993, p. 302). The petition reflected the fear among the religious establishment of their marginalization and, thus, it focused on “reiteration of the tenet that Shari’a (Islamic law) was the guiding principle of government in Saudi Arabia” (Al-Rasheed 1996, p. 363). Besides, they demanded an overhaul of the system, restriction on the power of monarchy, and creation of Majlis al-­Shura (Consultative Council), with its member chosen from among the most competent candidates without any exception and distinction and empowered to debate and decide on all matters of domestic and foreign affairs. The demands included further Islamization of social, economic, administrative, and educational systems, as well as the creation of a strong Islamic army. The petition called for the introduction of a comprehensive social justice based on Islamic laws, curbing of corrupt elements within the system, equitable distribution of wealth, reform of media to ensure a

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“strong, independent Islamic press,” dismantling of all non-Islamic pacts and treaties, reorientation of the kingdom’s embassies abroad on Islamic credentials, and Judicial reforms (Aba-Namay 1993, p. 301). The interesting aspect of this petition was that the petitioners demanded the Islamization of the education system as against the demand from the earlier petition, which asked for reduction of religious intervention. These petitions resulted in the introduction of three statutes by King Fahd on March 1, 1992: al-Nidam al-Asasi (the Basic System), Nidam Majlis al-Shura (System for Consultative Council), and Nidam al-­ Manatiq (System for Provinces). These three statutes were “meant to re-­ establish the basis for government and regulate political participation through the establishment of a consultative council and regional government” (Al-Rasheed 1996, p. 363). These were modest reforms initiated to accommodate the growing demands. In March 1992, King Fahd had remarked that the prevailing democratic system in the world is not compatible with the kingdom and that Islam favors the consultative system between the ruler and the subject.3 The announcement of these reforms was welcomed, but apprehensions remained regarding implementation as no steps were taken for their realization for almost a year when finally the Majlis al-Shura was inaugurated in September 1993, with one speaker and 60 members. The kingdom was going through a volatile political situation during this period; measures were being taken to curb dissent and to co-­ opt the opposition. In the backdrop of such conditions and the regime facing internal and external challenges, another petition was presented to the king in September 1992. The petition was signed by over a hundred leading figures from the kingdom’s three main Islamic groups, namely the extremely conservative Salafis, the moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wahhabi scholars. This was a 45-page document termed as Nasiha (advice) that covered most areas of the country’s political life, including foreign relations, monetary policies, social services, and high oil production rates. It was critical of the Al-Saud and demanded an annual audit of government expenses accusing it of rampant corruption in the rank and file of the ruling family (Pasha 1999, p.  42). A key demand in the petition was for education reforms to deal with the growing problem of rising unemployment among the youth. 3  King Fahd’s interview to Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasa on March 28, 1992 (cited in Pasha 1999, p. 42).

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Quality of Education and Unemployment As noted earlier, one of the key demands in the petitions presented before the monarchy was for education reforms. In the oil boom phase, a greater number of educational institutions were established, and a large number of Saudis enrolled in these institutions. However, as Saudi graduates entered the job market, the issue of quality of education and poor human resource came to the fore. One of the key challenges facing Saudi graduates was their lack of preparedness for taking up jobs in the competitive private sector. Poor quality of education was the most important reason and it was alleged that Saudi education was not preparing the youth for the job market. Despite a growing number of educated youth entering the job market every year, their ratio in the workforce remained low. On the other hand, the rate of unemployment starting to increase and was significantly high among educated youth and women. In 1991, the employment rate was 4.4 percent; it increased to 4.5 percent in 1992, 4.8 percent in 1993, reached 5 percent in 1994, and grew to a high of 5.6 percent in 1999 (World Bank 2019). The unemployment among the youth was higher and even more so among the educated youth. Despite the enormous increase in education infrastructure, the problem of quality of education had become a major issue. This forced the monarchy to focus on introducing programs for quality education and human resource development. The Ministry of Higher Education that oversaw the higher education sector made plans to improve the quality of higher education and human resource through programs such as tie-ups with universities and higher education institutions abroad. Teacher’s training programs were introduced to address the problem at the school level, as it was recognized that without a strong foundation, the Saudi school graduates would find it difficult to cope with the rigors of higher education. In 2010, the Ministry of Higher Education came out with an “Observatory on Higher Education,” which endeavored to provide a guideline to the existing universities and professional institutions for improvement in the quality of education and research (MHE 2010c, p. 8). A strategic plan was developed to improve the quality of higher education. The plan aimed at capacity building, harmonizing university education with the developmental needs of the kingdom, developing scientific research, establishing strategic partnership with international higher education institutions of repute, facilitating modern administration, and

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expanding the financial resources for higher educational institutions (MHE 2009, p. 2). However, these measures were not sufficient and the problem persisted, and growing unemployment among Saudi nationals became a political issue. Consequently, the feeling of alienation and hatred toward the growing expatriate population who were seen as taking up the jobs in the private sector started to take root, and this demanded immediate remedial steps. Nationalization of Workforce A program for nationalization of the workforce was introduced in the 1990s toward mitigating the problem of unemployment among the educated youth (Bahgat 1999; Bosbait and Wilson 2005). Though this was an important step, which continues to resonate among the policymakers until now, in the early phase of the introduction of the nationalization program, it could only achieve limited success. A variety of factors including lack of skills, lacunas in the education system, and unwillingness of the Saudis to take up menial jobs resulted in continued and excessive reliance on the expatriate workforce (Karoly 2010; Peck 2014). For example, in 2014, expatriates made up 78 percent of the total Saudi workforce (Naffee 2015). The rate of unemployment among nationals was 11.2 percent in 2010 but was much higher among youth (20–25 years of age) at 15 percent in 2000, rose to 30 percent in 2009–10, and increased to a staggering 45 percent as of 2015 (International Labour Organisation 2011; Chabaan 2009; MoEP 2015). Unemployment among educated women was even higher, at 30.6 percent as of 2010 (MoEP 2010a, b). As of 2015, the national rate of unemployment stood at 11.6 percent but was 32.8 percent for women (MoEP 2015). Female participation in the workforce was marginal and in 2005 they accounted for 7.6 percent of the national labor force and this slightly increased to 20 percent (17.5 percent Saudis) in 2015 (MHE 2010b). This growth is not commensurate with the increase in the number of educated women (Chabaan 2009). For example, the number of women graduates from universities increased to 60 percent in 2013 from less than 40 percent in the 1980s (MHE 2013). Their enrollment in nontraditional courses and training and technical institutions also increased since 2005; however, Saudi female participation in the labor force remained low (17.5 percent) than in other GCC countries (43 percent) (MoEP 2015).

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Efforts at Saudization of the labor force and reducing the number of expatriates met with limited success. A program was launched in the mid-­1990s toward improving the job prospects of Saudis in the private sector but it largely failed due to the lack of quality local human resources (Bahgat 1999; Rugh 2002; Bosbait and Wilson 2005). In 2011, the government relaunched the nationalization of the labor force program and called it Nitaqat (ranges), which helped in improving the proportion of Saudis in the private sector and, as a result in 2012–13, nearly 11 percent of employees in private-owned local and multinational companies were Saudi nationals (MoL 2013; Peck 2014). Unemployment among the youth, a huge population of expatriate workers, and a lack of skilled human resource were linked to the poor quality of education. To achieve the twin objective of human resource development and nationalization of the job market, the monarchy took some measures including the expansion of the education system, curriculum development, and investment in improving the quality of education. The monarchy also invested in the expansion of existing universities and established new institutions of learning and education, and vocational training centers, to cater to the needs of the people and to provide them with an opportunity to be a part of the market. It also developed a plan for creating a knowledge-based economy to attain this goal. The rentier nature of the economy, problems of youth unemployment, and failure to meet the market demands for skilled human resources created pressure for reforms manifested in demands for opening up of the economy and the demand for greater employment opportunities for fresh graduates (MHE 2010b; Murphy 2011).

September 11 and International Pressure At the turn of the century, Saudi Arabia woke up to a hitherto ignored problem—growing extremism. A key aspect of the problem was its linkages with the education system. While earlier, especially during the petition fever, some had identified the extraordinary role of the ulema and religion in school and university education as problematic, it had not led to a serious debate on the issue and the problem had become lost in the haze of bureaucratic procedures and opposition from the ulema. The September 11 attacks in the United States led the monarchy to take note of the issue. It forced Saudi Arabia and the world to recognize the dangers posed by Islamist extremism and compelled the monarchy to review some

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of its domestic religious and education policies. The kingdom was hard-­ pressed to preserve its ties with the United States without inviting a backlash from the conservative elements at home. In terms of the domestic political situation, the incident rekindled political activities akin to the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis. Several petitions were submitted to the monarchy amidst encouraging response by Crown Prince Abdullah. In January 2003, 104 academics and prominent intellectuals signed the Strategic Vision for the Present and the Future demanding constitutional reforms and elections for the legislative council (Kéchichian 2013). It was followed by another petition titled In Defence of the Nation that was sent to the Crown Prince in September 2003 which, among others, was signed by 51 prominent Saudi women (In Defense of the Nation 2003; Raphaeli 2005). In April 2003, a Shia delegation met Crown Prince Abdullah, submitted a petition titled Partners in One Nation, and asked for a degree of autonomy in religious practices and education (Dekmejian 2003). Subsequently, Shias were allowed to organize a public ceremony for Ashura and were granted permission to introduce religious textbooks in primary schools (Kéchichian 2013). In the meantime, the kingdom faced a slew of terror attacks orchestrated by Al-Qaeda that opposed the regime and its domestic and foreign policies. Increased political activity together with the dangers posed by radical Islamists forced the monarchy to initiate measures to accommodate demands for better education and job opportunities. So far as demands for political reforms were concerned, Abdullah preferred gradualism, an approach that received the support of the reformist elements. In the words of Saudi academic Abdualaziz O. Sager (2004), [a] gradual, step-by-step approach is the best option to avert and appease apprehensions. Jump-starting the reform program will strengthen the credibility of the government and preclude any propensities towards violence, as reforms will already be concretely and resolutely underway. Gradual execution of reforms will also allow for more options to choose from and will preclude unpredictable developments from taking root. (p. 34)

The liberal-reformists found a strong ally in Abdullah, who was acting as regent since late 1995 following a debilitating stroke suffered by King Fahd. As a de facto ruler, Abdullah initiated reforms in areas such as education and other fields and took measures for improving the condition of women and Shias. Initiatives such as the National Dialogue, interfaith

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dialogue, municipal elections, nomination of women in the Majlis alShura, and opening of new universities indicated his intent for meaningful reforms though the pace was slow (Kéchichian 2013; Thompson 2014). Extremism and Radicalism There is a consensus among scholars that religion and the religious establishment play an important role in the lives of Saudis (Lipsky 1959; Nevo 1998; Hamza 2002; Bradley 2005; Al-Rasheed 2006; Niblock 2006; Alshamsi 2011; House 2012). Joseph Nevo (1998) suggests that the individual and collective lives of people in Saudi Arabia are molded by religion, particularly the Wahhabi version, and it plays a major  role in the formation of the Saudi national identity. Anne Rathbone Bradley (2006) argues that the Saudi social arena is largely controlled by the state and religion, that is, people’s lives and the interactions between various social institutions are influenced and directed by them. She contends that the monarchy plays the role of an interfering state and the ulema keep the cultural realm under control within a specific set of rules based on faith and its Wahhabi interpretations (Bradley 2006). The political evolution of the kingdom has played an important role in determining the overwhelming presence of religion in public life. Saudi Arabia came into being due to an alliance between a local tribal chief and a religious preacher, and it is on this basis that the ideological legitimacy of the Saudi state is derived. According to Tim Niblock (2006, p. 8), “[i]n [the] Saudi case, the ideology takes the form of a religious-based perception of how the society should be organized. The monarchy has always projected itself as protector of the Islamic faith, promoting the implementation of Islamic practices in the Kingdom.” The state not just identifies and acquires legitimacy from religion but promotes its implementation. For example, the preface in the 1992 Basic Law, which was the codification of the existing order, identifies the promotion of the Wahhabi mission as the state principle: “The reform mission (that is Wahhabism), upon which the Saudi state was founded, represents the main core of the government. This mission is based on the realization of Islamic rules, implementation of Islamic law (shari’a), and enjoining good and forbidding evil” (Basic Law 1992). At many junctures, however, the ideological legitimacy associated with Wahhabi Islam has been challenged by even more radical individuals and groups who have questioned the commitment of the monarchy to its

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founding ideals. For example, the Ikhwan revolt in the 1920s, the Kaaba siege in 1979, the Sahwa challenge in the wake of the Kuwait crisis, and the rise of Al-Qaeda were all internal challenges from extremist or radical Islamist groups. The September 11 attacks, as was confirmed by the involvement of Saudi nationals in the planning and execution, was a result of a new wave of the radical challenge facing the kingdom which not only posed an internal threat but also became a threat for the outside world. The political implications apart, the involvement of Saudis in the planning and execution of the September 11 attacks brought to the fore the issue of the education system fomenting extremism and radicalism. Both traditional education and modern education were found to emphasize on religion and perpetuating radical ideas among students. The initiation of the pupil into these ideas began at the schools and some of the teachers were found to be causing radicalization. As discussed earlier, school curricula and textbooks were full of heavy dose on Islam, and unpleasant and hateful remarks about “others” including Christians, Jews, Shias, and Sufi Muslims (Shea 2006). This forced the monarchy to introduce measures to reduce the control of the ulema in education but the school system was largely managed by those graduating from Islamic universities and committed to exclusionary Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, thus undermining the effectiveness of reforms and continued questions over the poor quality of school education (Bahgat 1999; Bosbait and Wilson 2005). The education system produced a large number of religious graduates who were found to be prone to radical ideals and were key in imparting such ideas to their students in schools, colleges, and universities. Internal Debate The internal debate was divided into the lines of Islamist and liberal demands for change within an Islamic framework and was highlighted through manifestos and petitions (Lacroix 2004, p. 345). The September 11 attacks had a profound impact on the political reform debate. It pushed the Islamists on the back foot who had earlier wrested the position of main opposition from the liberals. The government then loosened control over public discourse, which led to the demand for the implementation of political, economic, and social reforms from intellectuals and leaders from various spectrums of ideological leanings (Dekmejian 2003, p.  404).

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These demands were not just for sociopolitical reforms but also for religious ones. As Madawi Al-Rasheed (2006) notes, [t]he ongoing public debate in the twenty-first century is no longer the one that dominated the second half of the twentieth century. Previously Saudis discussed how to modernize while remaining faithful to the authentic Islamic tradition. Today, the debate moves on to more complex and focused questions relating to increasing political participation, social justice, the rights of women and minorities, freedom of speech, an independent judiciary and other urgent issues which many Saudis feel are neither properly addressed nor fully applied by the current regime. These concerns have emerged from the bottom up rather than as a result of royal patronage or outside pressure. (p. 15)

Domestic demands for large-scale sociopolitical reforms and Abdullah’s willingness to take reform initiatives also played an important role in bringing the question of educational reform to the fore. The January 2003 petition signed by intellectuals including writers, academicians, and journalists demanded the development of constitutional institutions and separation of power structure into independent legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. Women’s rights, equitable distribution of wealth, freedom of speech, and human rights were highlighted in the document (Dekmejian 2003, p. 404; Raphaeli 2005, p. 522). The petition got a favorable reaction from Abdullah. At the same time, it invited criticism from Interior Minister Naif, which showed a sharp difference within the ruling family over the question of reforms (Doran 2004). This petition was followed by another submitted  three months later. The petition was unique in the sense that it was submitted by the Shias, who had remained  largely  marginalized in the social, political, and economic discourse in Saudi Arabia. In April 2003, 450 Shias, including 27 women, presented a petition titled Partners in One Nation to Crown Prince Abdullah. The acceptance of the Shia petition can itself be termed as an achievement and the willingness of Abdullah to take the difficult path of reforms. The petition highlighted the condition of Saudi Shias and the discrimination they faced in every walk of life. It urged the government to take immediate measures to stop discrimination against Shias and allow them to participate in the nation-building process. The right to practice Shia festivals, lifting the ban on Shia publications, and allowing

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them to have their religious education were some of the demands made through this petition (Dekmejian 2003, p. 411). Another petition, In Defence of the Nation, was submitted to the Crown Prince by a group of 300 intellectuals and businessmen, including 51 women, in September 2003. The petition reminded the regime of its promises of political reform and asked them to take affirmative action in this regard. The petition highlighted the need for popular participation in the decision-making process and argued that any further delay in introducing political reform would lead to more unrest in the Saudi society, which was already going through a crisis-like situation. It criticized the government for handing over a huge chunk of power to religious clerics and accused them of not being open to dialogue. The petition also urged the government saying that “confronting terrorism cannot only be done through security means and security solutions but by a thorough diagnosis of political, social, economic and cultural factors that have led to it” (Raphaeli 2005, p.  525). The petition further pointed out the need to develop “a pluralistic intellectual environment” by allowing, in addition to other things, “cultural and educational diversity” (In Defence of Nation 2003). The petition demanded educational reform by allowing diversity in the field of education, which meant making it free from religious influence. International Pressure A major challenge Saudi Arabia faced in the wake of the September 11 attacks was straining of ties with the United States due to the involvement of Saudi citizens in the attacks. The United States and the kingdom share a strategic partnership based on oil and security. In the beginning, this was a two-way flow, with Saudi Arabia providing the United States and the Western markets with oil and, in return, the United States ensuring the security of the monarchy. The partnership goes back to the first time that oil exploration began in the Arabian deserts with the leasing of the land in the Eastern Province to SOCAL and the eventual formation of ARAMCO. With the advent of World War II and later the growing need for Saudi oil for the American economy the relationship between the two evolved into a strategic partnership with the meeting between King Ibn Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in the Red Sea on February 14, 1945 (Cordesman 1997; Riedel 2017). Since the meeting, the United States and Saudi Arabia generally agreed and found themselves on the same page on important regional political

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and economic issues. For example, Saudi Arabia allowed the stationing of US forces on its soil during the Kuwait crisis. However, the Saudi–US relations have not remained completely free from problems. There have been instances when Saudi Arabia acted in defiance of American interest or had to go overboard in pacifying the US administration against taking harsh measures against Saudi citizens. During the October 1973 War, for example, the Arab oil-producing countries, led by Saudi Arabia, waged an oil embargo on the developed economies for their military support to Israel. The relations between the two hit the bottom after the September 11 attacks as it came to light that the majority of the attackers were Saudi nationals. It took a lot of maneuvering on the part of Saudi Arabia to avoid any immediate repercussions from the United States (Rabasa et al. 2004; Lacey 2009). Later, it agreed to co-operate with President Bush’s “war on terror” and to bring reforms mainly in the school curriculum, which was accused of fomenting extremist thoughts. The monarchy faced immense pressure from the United States and the international community to overhaul the education system of the country in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Studies such as the International Crisis Group Middle East Report (2004) and the Center of Religious Freedom Report (2006) highlighted the problems facing the Saudi education system. These reports, even though they were termed as propaganda by some, highlighted the fact that the Saudi school curriculum and textbooks contained substantial reference of hatred toward “infidels” and “idolaters.” It was also argued that Saudi textbooks have contents that arouse hatred toward Jews, Christians, Shias, and Sufi Muslims. Saudi Arabia faced enormous pressure from the United States to bring about reforms in the education system and to remove hateful references toward other religious and sectarian groups from the curriculum. Abdullah took initiatives to tide over the external pressure, to bring reforms in the system, and to make changes in the school curriculum. He ordered the review of the school curriculum and textbooks and a committee headed by the then defense minister Sultan was formed to cleanse the textbooks of negative references (Khashoggi 2006). Subsequently, the monarchy launched a comprehensive program for overhauling the school textbooks and curriculum not only to cleanse it of extremist tendencies but also to create an environment of scientific learning at the school level and to improve the overall quality of education. The Saudi education system witnessed significant reforms since the early twenty-first century and the factors that compelled the monarchy to

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introduce reforms in the education system included compulsions due to change in demography and rise in national population that created greater demand for education and employment. Subsequently, the issue of quality education was raised within the context of the complaints among the citizens that the Saudi education system does not adequately prepare them to find jobs in the private sector. Finally, the reforms were brought in the context of growing domestic debate and international pressure on the issue of the education system fomenting extremism. The primary target of reforming the system was the school education in the early phase, though gradually the higher education sector too witnessed rapid reforms.

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Naufal, G., & Genc, I. (2012). Expats and the labor force: The story of the gulf cooperation council countries. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nehme, Michel G. (1995). Political Development in Saudi Arabia: Empty Reforms from Above. International Sociology, 10(2), 155–171. Nevo, J. (1998). Religion and national identity in Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(3), 34–53. Niblock, T. (1982). State, society and economy in Saudi Arabia. London: Croom Helm. Niblock, T. (2006). Saudi Arabia: Power, legitimacy and survival. London: Routledge. Parssinen, J., & Talib, K. (1982). A traditional community and modernization: Saudi camp, Dhahran. Journal of Architectural Education, 35(3), 14–17. Pasha, A. K. (1999). Aspects of political participation in Saudi Arabia. In A. K. Pasha (Ed.), Contemporary gulf: State, society, economy and foreign policy (pp. 126–159). New Delhi: Detente Publications. Peck, Jennifer R. (2014). “Can Hiring Quotas Work?: The Effect of the Nitaqat Program on the Saudi Private Sector”, Unpublished paper of Labor Market Decision Support System project at the Center for Complex Engineering Systems, King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, Saudi Arabia and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://economics.mit.edu/ files/9417 (accessed on 15 March 2015). Petition “In Defence of the Nation (IDN), (2003), Translated by Nada Abdelnour and Khalid Al-Dakhil, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https:// carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/SaudiPetitionTranslation.pdf Pollack, J. (2002). Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931–2002. The Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6(3). http://www.rubincenter. org/2002/09/pollack-­2002-­09-­07/ Prokop, M. (2003). Saudi Arabia: The politics of education. International Affairs, 79(1), 77–89. Raphaeli, N. (2005). Demands for reform in Saudi Arabia. Middle East Studies, 41(4), 517–532. Riedel, B. (2017). Kings and presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR. Washington, DC: Brookings. Rugh, W. A. (2002). Arab education: Tradition, growth and reform. Middle East Journal, 56(3), 396–414. Sager, A. O. (2004). Reform in Saudi Arabia: Current challenges and feasible solutions. Dubai: Gulf Research Center. Shea, N. (2006, May 21). This is a Saudi text-book. The Washington Post. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­d yn/content/ar ticle/2006/05/19/ AR2006051901769.html. Accessed 22 Jan 2010.

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Tabutin, D., & Schoumaker, B. (2005). The demography of the Arab world and the Middle East from the 1950s to the 2000s: A survey of changes and a statistical assessment. Translated by Godfrey Rogers, Jonathan Mandelbaum and Catriona Dutreuilh. Population (English edition), 60(5–6), 505–616. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2011). Nash’at al-Muassasa’ wa Tatawwurha; Establishment and development of the corporation. [Arabic]. http://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 8 Feb 2011. The World Bank. (2015). World development indicators. http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/. Accessed 15 Mar 2015. Thompson, M. (2014). Saudi Arabia and the path to political change: National dialogue and civil society. London: I. B. Tauris. United Nations. (2007). Indicators of sustainable development: Guidelines and methodologies. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Available online. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/guidelines.pdf United Nations (2011). “Population Matters for Sustainable Development”, Inter-Agency Consultation on Population and Sustainable Development, 4 August 2011, http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Rio+20%20 Concept%20Note,%20Population%20Dynamics%20and%20Sustainable%20 Development.pdf (accessed on 15 August 2015). Winckler, O. (1997). The immigration policy of the gulf cooperation (GCC) states. Middle Eastern Studies, 33(3), 480–493. World Bank (2019). “World Development Indicators”, http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/ (accessed on 15 March 2019).

CHAPTER 6

Contemporary Saudi School Education

Saudi Arabia has a strong and effective public school system that caters to the needs of the national population. The network of public schools, funded completely by the government, is spread across the length and breadth of the kingdom. The government through various agencies of the Ministry of Education controls all aspects of the public school system, including preparation of the curriculum and textbooks, appointment of teachers and decisions regarding the system to be followed in schools. Hence, in terms of the quality of education imparted in schools, there is less scope for disparity as the entire public school network is controlled by the Ministry of Education and follows the same guidelines, curriculum, and textbooks. At the same time, this means there is a lack of autonomy and a limited scope for independent policy and plans at the level of individual schools. The debate on reforming the school education is not new, and it has always resonated among the intellectuals, academics, journalists, members of civil society,1 and the larger population. For a majority of Saudis, school education takes precedence over higher education and the kingdom has 1  One might argue that Saudi Arabia does not have an independent civil society. However, this assumption is based on the standards of a democratic political system. Studies have found that, within the limits of a monarchy, Saudi Arabia has a functional civil society and public sphere based on traditional practices of organization and largely adheres to the local ethos. For further reading, see Montague (2010, 2015).

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nearly a 95–98 percent enrollment rate in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of schools. During the oil boom era, the debate revolved around expanding the network of schools to make education accessible to all. Subsequently, the issue of quality of schools and school graduates became a point of discussion when more Saudi graduates started entering the job market and found it extremely competitive. Hence, the petition movement in the 1990s highlighted the issue of imparting accessible and quality education. Since then the school education remained at the core of the larger reform discourse. To alleviate the growing criticism from civil society, the monarchy took measures to reform schools. One of the earliest programs to be launched to reform the school system was the Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project in 1996 (Al-Eisa 2009, p. 60). This was the first time that the monarchy accepted the need to take complete stock of the public school system and agreed to prioritize reforms. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the project could not produce any immediate results, but was instrumental in identifying the core problem areas that were subsequently addressed through other initiatives. The debate on education reforms intensified in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Domestic demands from Islamist and liberal civil society groups and challenges from the extremists and radicals who, among other things, were questioning Al-Saud’s legitimacy had put the monarchy on the defensive. One of the allegations of the Islamists, extremists, and radicals was that the monarchy has failed in their task of imparting “Islamic” education to the pupils and the government is planning to introduce “Western” education, which will compromise the traditional ethos of the Saudi society (Dekmejian 2003). On the other side of the spectrum were the reformists and “Islamo-liberals” who were advocating making the school education in tune with the needs of the students to prepare them for higher education and to train them for the tough and competitive job market (Lacroix 2005). Crown Prince Abdullah who was handling the affairs of the state, as regent to King Fahd since December 1995, was finding it difficult to balance the situation as any action could have further fueled the domestic detractors. On top of the domestic debates, the pressure from the United States and the international community after September 11 was increasing. Besides, a series of terrorist attacks inside the kingdom had created an alarming situation, but it contributed to finally settling the debate in favor of comprehensive reforms. Abdullah first started to pave the way for

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reforms by engaging the civil society and the detractors, and bringing them on a common ground to accept the need for comprehensive reform in the education sector. He took time to engage with the moderate Islamists, Islamo-liberals and reformist intellectuals who had emphasized on education reforms to tackle the sociopolitical problems facing the kingdom. Abdullah further took action against the radicals and extremists to prevent the spread of such ideas and charged the interior ministry to root out the problem of home-borne terrorism. Nonetheless, the challenge from the state-backed ulema, especially the members of the CSU, remained a major stumbling block in the education reforms. The ulema were insisting that the religious curriculum in the schools be left intact. To counter the opposition from the ulema, Abdullah underlined problems such as the quality of school graduates and the need for preparing Saudi youth for the market demands, and empowered those who were advocating reforms by accepting their petitions. He met and discussed the need for reforms with the conservative ulema and was able to convince them to allow for comprehensive reform, especially given the growing problem of radicalization. This paved the way for introducing reform steps; however, some of the contentions of the ulema could not be rejected because of their stronghold on the society.

Challenges The challenges facing the school education were numerous and, given the polarized debate on the need for reforms, the question of reforms had acquired political overtones. Despite the intent on part of the monarchy, it was difficult to introduce a wholesome reform because of the opposition from the ulema who provided religious legitimacy to the monarchy. In 2003, 150 scholars led by Sheikh Abdullah bin Jibreen petitioned the government against changing the school curriculum (Abu Taleb 2005).2 The ulema held sway over a large section of the population, and Abdullah was not prepared to take the risk of antagonizing the ulema. While this was the limiting factor, the reformist advocates were offering compelling arguments in favor of reforms. For one, the problem of the quality of 2  Sheikh Abdullah bin Jibreen (d. 2009) was a prominent independent religious scholar. He belonged to the Al-Rashid clan of Bani Zaid Tribe of Najd. He was a member of al-lajna al-Daa’imah li al-Buhuth al-Ilmiyah wa al-ifta’ (Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatwa). He had authored many books on Islamic jurisprudence and religious edicts.

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school graduates and their inability to excel in higher education and compete with the expatriate job-seekers was considered a major issue. Furthermore, the marginalization of some  sections of the  society, especially the poor, women, and Shias, was termed as a major problem for the growing division and social stratification. The argument that Saudi youth were finding it difficult to be absorbed in the private sector jobs due to poor education was more compelling. The problem of creating employment opportunities for Saudi youth was intertwined with the issue of the poor quality of school education that was failing to prepare the Saudi youth for the market. This had led to growing unemployment among the youth. As far as external factors were concerned, the challenge was to balance the demands for religious education within the country while withstanding the growing international pressure to reform and curb hateful references to the “others.” When it comes to extremist tendencies, it posed a threat not only to the outside world, but also to the monarchy itself. The challenge of handling external criticism was delicate because allies such as the United States were exerting pressure to curb extremism, but the opposition at home, both secular and religious, was accusing the monarchy of succumbing to external pressure. Religious Curriculum In the debate surrounding the education reforms, the most contentious issue was the degree of religious content in the curriculum, and continues to remain so to a lesser degree after a series of reform measures. This was also the most difficult challenge so far as education  reforms were concerned. Before the reforms started, the degree of religious content was so high that nearly 30–50 percent of classes every week in the public school system was dedicated to religious subjects (Al-Sumbul et al. 1998, p. 152). At the elementary level, the focus was on children’s development through Islamic and Arabic language education in addition to personality development through cultural and moral studies (Al-Aqil 2005, p. 81). The target of primary education was to instill good conduct, improve linguistic capabilities, and give the students a strong base for further stages of studies. Major subjects taught at this stage were the Quran, reading and memorization, and arithmetic. There were seven classes every week for the Quran from grades one to four, while for grades five and six there were three classes. Children of 6–12 years had to study theology even if they did not want to specialize in religious studies.

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In the three years of middle school, the focus was on preparing the student for secondary education and an Islamic upbringing to reaffirm the faith and character (Mutawalli 2004, p. 108). The middle school aimed at improving cognitive and physical abilities and at developing an understanding of the society. English language education was introduced at this level to acquaint the students with a broader understanding of the world (Al-Aqil 2005, p. 91).3 The degree of religious education was again high; students of the 12–15-year age group were mandated to take eight classes per week on religious subjects. The Quran, Hadith (Prophet’s Tradition), Tawhid (Oneness of God), Tafsir (Interpretation of Text), and Fiqh (Jurisprudence) were the main religious subjects. At the same time, Arabic language classes at six hours a week too had a high degree of religious content. In the three years of secondary school, students could choose a specialization in any of four branches: Arabic and Sharia, Social Sciences and Administration, Natural Sciences, and Technical Education. For girls, the option for specialization was limited to two: Arts and Science (Mutawalli 2004, p.  117). Despite choosing a nonreligious specialization students had to take some mandatory hours in religious subjects. In the boys’ section, a total of 33–35 weekly school hours were mandatory. Of this, 12  hours were dedicated only for religious subjects in the Arabic and Sharia branch while the rest were focused on language, grammar and history. Nonetheless, students from other branches were to dedicate 5–6 hours to religious subjects. In the girls’ section, the curriculum was slightly different. Girl students could choose specializations only in Science or Arts and needed to take mandatory classes in theology and home economics. The students could choose to enroll in professional courses at the secondary level in technical schools in a variety of fields, like teachers’ training, business and trade, and health education. In addition to the public school system, there were exclusive religious schools for children to learn and memorize the Quran at every stage except in nursery classes and these are known as Madaris li Tahfeez Quran al-Karim (Schools for Memorization of Quran) (Al-Aqil 2005, p.  90). These schools catered to the need of the people who dedicated their children to memorization of the Quran. In the post–September 11 scenario, this became one of the most contentious issues as far as the kingdom’s education system was concerned. The debate on the education curriculum became more intense after US 3  In September 2020, the Saudi education minister announced introduction of English language classes for primary school students from the academic year 2021–22.

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and international criticism called it backward and underlined that the Saudi education system foments extremism. Though a majority of domestic public opinions rejected such allegations, the issue of a strong focus on religious subjects became a highlight of the debate. The ulema came out strongly in support of the education system and any proposed move to change the orientation of the school curriculum was opposed by them. Sheikh Jibreen, who submitted a petition opposing any diluting of the religious character of school education, stated in the petition that any deleting or distorting of books written by Islamic scholars is against the faith and will undermine the religious character of the society. He further felt that schools should follow the old curriculum and theological subjects should continue to be taught at all levels of education and subjects like algebra, physics, and foreign languages should not be mandatory (Abu Taleb 2005). Quality of Schools The second most important problem facing the Saudi school system was the quality of education. At the higher education level, the dropout rate was high due to the inability of the school graduates to cope with the specialized subjects. The schools were failing to prepare the students to sustain and excel in higher education. The major problem pertained to the quality of textbooks and poor pedagogy followed in the schools. Rote learning was encouraged by the teachers who themselves were a product of the system and did not have enough pedagogical training to be able to prepare the students for higher education and the job market. The curriculum and textbooks promoted mediocrity and rote learning. The textbooks had numerous hateful references toward non-Muslims and the focus was mostly on teaching history and traditional subjects. The textbooks focused on building Arab, Islamic, and Saudi character and identity among the students and promoted the “idea of cleansing Muslim countries from Western cultural influences” (Alsharif 2009, p. 1). The history textbooks in schools focused mostly on Saudi-Wahhabi history and did not take into account the history of non-Najdi regions, such as of Hijaz, Asir, and the Shias (Prokop 2003, p. 80). History textbooks contained no mention of contemporary and recent international developments, even in the Arab world, and had a strong tilt toward the Wahhabi narrative dividing the world in a binary ‘us’ vs. ‘other’ narrative (Prokop 2003, pp. 80–81). It was recognized by the monarchy that the school textbooks are a major cause of extremist tendencies. For example, writing in USA Today

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in June 2006, Saudi Arabia’s then Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, observed: Saudi Arabia is a nation undergoing dramatic self-examination. Every aspect of Saudi Arabia’s society and culture is being openly debated. We have recognized that a comprehensive, modern and open educational system – with new and revised textbooks – is fundamental to the growth and prosperity of our country. A thoughtful revision of this system is necessary and indeed well underway. (Al-Faisal 2006)

Teachers’ training and monitoring of classes were other areas of concern. One of the major problems facing school education was the quality of teaching due to the lack of trained teachers. The philosophy of teaching inculcated “passivity and dependence” and there was too little emphasis on developing creative and analytical skills (Prokop 2003, p.  80). The teaching methodology and the interaction in the class between teachers and students was focused on memorization and exams and did not foster any ability to think and analyze. In such an environment, innovation and creativity became a casualty, and at the higher level, students found it difficult to think beyond what was stated in the lectures and reference books. Some of the teachers themselves held extremist views and imparted the same to their students. The school system did not promote interaction either among teachers and students or among peers and the idea of interaction of teachers with parents and guardians was nearly nonexistent. One of the key concerns about the quality of education was that the school education with its emphasis on religion and methods of imparting knowledge ill-equipped the students to face the challenges of the market economy in a globalized world. Lack of skills in modern subjects including STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) subjects, as well as economics, accounts, and administration, was an added disadvantage. Furthermore, a lack of knowledge about the larger history of nations and a narrowed-down approach toward life due to exposure to only one dominant philosophy was found to be a major cause for the poor quality of school education. Globalization and modern means of communication kept people informed about the happenings all over the world, but lack of a broader understanding of the world, due to the constraints mentioned earlier, prevented them from venturing into innovative ideas and creative fields.

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It has been noted in previous chapters that the education policy and education system had remained the domain of the ulema, and the Al-Shaikh family played a significant role in devising education policy since the establishment of the kingdom in 1932. However, gradually various kings had tried to curb their influence through the creation of vast education administration and bureaucracy. King Faisal was most successful in that respect but at the time he could not completely alienate the ulema and their influence had remained strong. Abdullah used the same policy by appointing reformist technocrats at key positions in the Ministry of Education and the erstwhile Ministry of Higher Education to bring education under reformist leaders. He took a keen interest in the education and appointed his son-in-law Prince Faisal bin Abdullah al-Saud (husband of Princess Adela) as Minister of Education in 2009 to expedite the reform process.

Reform Initiatives In Saudi Arabia, education reforms have been one of the most sensitive domestic political and social issues. However, because of the keen interest among the top echelons of the monarchy, including the kings, queens, crown princes, and influential princes and princesses, several reform measures have taken place over the years. For example, during Faisal’s rule, it was Queen Iffat’s keen interest in female education that led to the introduction of modern education for girls (Kéchichian 2008). Similarly, during the reign of King Abdullah, his daughter Adelah was considered to be a major influence in pushing toward education reforms, especially in the arena of female education (Dickey 2009). Education reforms emerged as one of the most important priorities of the monarchy in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Changes were incorporated through the evolution of a national school curriculum for a more inclusive, modern, and tolerant educational system. School textbooks were revised to remove hateful references about “others” and make it attuned to the need for developing a scientific temperament among the students. Monitoring of schools and teachers’ training programs were introduced to make the teaching process effective, by improving the teachers’ capabilities and the learning process for students, and to improve the pedagogy prevalent in the schools. Reform projects, such as the Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project (1996), the Ten Year Strategic Plan, 2004–2014 (2003), and the King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (Tatweer) (2005) were launched for

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improving school education. These projects along with greater budget allocation were able to improve the quality of education, including in the field of science and technology. Steps for a more inclusive education system were also taken and some of the challenges posed by the ulema were neutralized through a combination of the use of force and mobilization of public opinion in favor of reforms. Comprehensive Assessment Project One of the earliest reform projects was the Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project (Assessment Project), which was launched in 1996 soon after Crown Prince Abdullah took over as the regent following the debilitating stroke suffered by King Fahd in 1995. The main objective of this project was to make a comprehensive assessment of the education system in all its aspects and at all levels and to prepare a report recommending reform measures. A committee of 27 academicians, technocrats, bureaucrats, and experts from various fields was constituted to carry out the assessment work. The committee took three years to come out with a report titled Educational Reform in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and submitted it to the Ministry of Education (Al-Eisa 2009, p. 61). However, the committee’s recommendations were never made public and no action could be taken due to differences among the authorities and lack of coordination among the different levels of bureaucracy. The project did not bring any significant change in the system. The basic reason was the lack of clear vision among the committee members about what aspects and what areas had to be assessed (Al-Aqil 2005; Al-Eisa 2009). There were reports of differences among the committee members as well as the authorities who refused to act on the recommendations. Mainly the differences pertained to how to go forward in the assessment and suggest recommendations for change. One opinion was to conduct surveys on the ground and take the opinion of common people, students, teachers, parents, and school and college administrators and come up with a comprehensive assessment outlining the deficiency in the education system. Others believed that the need of the hour is to think about the future and give recommendations about evolving a new system that would replace the old system (Al-Eisa 2009). The Assessment Project entered into turbulent waters right from the beginning and could not make much impact at the policy or system level. Its recommendations could not be implemented and it failed to achieve much success in

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bringing the required change in the thinking pattern of the education policymakers and faded away without much impact. Nonetheless, the program was not a complete failure in the sense that it paved the way for the launching of several pilot projects, which subsequently helped bring about other plans that were more successful in effecting reforms. One such pilot project was the Saudi leading schools project, which was derived from the education system followed in Victoria province in Australia. This was launched in select Saudi schools in 2002 with the purpose of assuaging the deficiencies in public schools’ response to the specific needs of individual students (Al Sadaawi 2010). The project accorded a degree of autonomy to the school administration to devise specific ways for it to deal with specific situations and needs of the students. The program, however, remained a pilot project and was not implemented in all schools as many were found unequipped to autonomously deal with such peculiar issues. Democracy and Partnership Initiative Another program that could not make much headway was launched in association with the US Department of State. The Democracy and Partnership Initiative launched by the then US Secretary of State Collin Powell in 2005 included initiatives for development and modernization of education that suffered from a lack of state support corresponding to population growth and cultural ideas affecting girl education (Abu Taleb 2005). Through this initiative the US administration wanted to push the kingdom toward a change in school curriculum; however, this was not received kindly by all sections of the population. Many perceived this as interference in internal matters and a futile exercise of blaming the problem of radicalization and extremism entirely on Saudi Arabia. A report published by the Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf States argued against the claim that the Arab education system is responsible for producing terrorism. Ten-Year Strategic Plan In 2003, the Ministry of Education developed a Ten Year Strategic Plan, 2004–2014, aimed at making a difference in the field of education by incorporating effective changes in the curriculum (MoE 2003). The idea was to make the ministry responsible for developing the national

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curriculum to “prepare the students to fulfil the goal of achieving knowledge and scientific thinking and lifelong expertise” in the respective subjects (MoE 2003, p. 14). The strategic plan laid down 15 general goals, with each goal aimed at achieving specified objectives in the ten years. One of the first objectives was to attain universal primary enrollment in concurrence with the UN millennium development goals (MDGs) first promulgated in 2000. As part of this goal, the idea was to have accessible kindergarten schools in all areas of the kingdom for parents to be able to send their children to these schools before admitting them in primary schools at the age of six years. The second important aspect of the strategic plan was to achieve 100 percent enrollment among Saudi children from 6 to 18 years at all levels of school education. As a result of the strategic plan and further efforts on the part of the government, Saudi Arabia achieved 98 percent enrollment at the primary level and 94 percent at the secondary level as of 2017 (United Nations 2018). Further, the kingdom has incorporated these goals in its Saudi Vision 2030 to ensure that all the sustainable development goals (SDGs) are met by 2030. The other goals in the strategic plan pertained to improving the quality and standard of education at all levels, developing a program for imparting technical education for girl students, and training and pedagogical development of officers and inspectors in the ministry who were involved in engaging the schools. Furthermore, the plan wished to improve the internal and external performance of schools in the coming decade (MoE 2003). Improvement in overall human resource engaged in the education sector, expansion of educational infrastructure, eradication of illiteracy through programs for older people, involvement of the society in improving the educational outcomes of the schools, and evolution of a comprehensive assessment mechanism for monitoring the performances of the schools were among the other goals as part of the strategic plan. The plan was successful in achieving many of its goals as the kingdom coordinated these initiatives within the framework of the MDGs and SDGs. Hence, in 2018, the kingdom was among the leading performers among developing countries in achieving the education-related goals incorporated in the SDGs. According to the first voluntary national review of the SDGs published in 2018, Saudi Arabia had not only achieved 98 percent primary enrollment as of 2017 but had  also had a 97 percent retention rate at the primary education level (United Nations 2018). Similarly, it was able to achieve 94 percent enrollment at the secondary

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school level, which was among the highest compared to the participating nations. It had also gained a 97 percent net registration rate at the high school level and 1.02 percent gender parity. It has a 1:11 teacher/student ratio in schools and the total enrollment rate at the higher education level was 69 percent. Saudi Arabia hence emerged as one of the best performing among the developing countries in terms of expenditure on the public education system with the 2018 budget allocating US$51.2 billion for education. One of the key aspects of the Saudi education system was that Article 30 of the Basics Law of Governance stipulates that “[t]he state shall provide general education and shall be committed to fighting […] illiteracy” (Basic Law 1992). As a result, the public education system has witnessed exponential growth, with 38,368 schools attended by 6.2 million students and a total number of 537,147 teachers who are all appointed and paid by the government (United Nations 2018). Tatweer Project The King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (Tatweer Project) was launched in 2005. The Tatweer Project was a pet project of King Abdullah and was close to his heart. It aimed at changing the face of public education in the kingdom with all students having an opportunity to acquire world-class school education. King Abdullah repeatedly emphasized the need for education reforms and better educational opportunities for all. The project was launched with much fanfare with a budget of US$2.4 billion, promising to overhaul teaching methods, emphasizing science education and providing training to 500,000 teachers to improve the quality of education. The project was launched in two phases of five years each: the first phase in 2007–12 and the second phase 2012–17. In the first phase, a total of 50 schools were chosen (25 girls and 25 boys) as a pilot program. King Abdullah, since taking over the reign in August 2005, had repeatedly said that giving young people a better education is at the heart of his plan to build a modern state and fight religious extremism. “Humanity has been the target of vicious attacks from extremists, who speak the language of hatred, fear dialogue and pursue destruction,” said Abdullah in 2009 while inaugurating the country’s first co-educational university, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) (quoted in Laessing and Alsharif 2011).

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The highest regulatory body which looks after the school education is the Ministry of Education. The curriculum followed in schools is devised by the ministry through its various departments. The ministry, in trying to modernize the curriculum, had started plans to develop a uniform curriculum for the country to be followed by all schools. One of the objectives of the Tatweer Project was to develop a national curriculum for school education through consultations and discussions as part of the “community partnership” program. In this endeavor, in December 2010, the ministry received the final report of the discussion panels and workshops on the future vision of the development of education and promised to “formulate a future vision for education and to identify future directions” for the project (Tatweer 2010c). Among the aims of the project was to develop standards of the school education system and quality of education imparted in public schools. The project also aimed at a comprehensive change in the school curriculum of science subjects as well as developing a curriculum for technical and professional courses. Capacity-building among teachers was another area that was prioritized as part of the Tatweer Project. The endeavor was to improve the overall educational environment in the kingdom, making it one of the best educational destinations in the Arab world (Tatweer 2010b). One important objective of the project was to replace the old science and mathematics textbooks in schools and introduce new books, developed and prepared with the help of international subject matter experts. The new books were introduced in 2010, and compared to the old books, these were more interactive and were designed to increase the interest of the students in the subject (MoE 2011a; b). The Ministry of Education also developed a dedicated portal for science and mathematics education for school students at secondary and high school levels (MoE 2011a, b). The portal contained the curriculum, teaching methodology, and content of science and mathematics subjects taught at schools from primary to high school level. It was made interactive and had dedicated sections for teachers, students, as well as parents to make them familiar with the subject and to make the material on the subject accessible for all (MoE 2011a, b). These were positive steps in making science and mathematics more attractive for school students with the potential to change the way science and mathematics are taught at the public schools. Significantly, the new books in the STEM subjects avoided extraordinary emphasis on religious arguments and justifications. But other subjects including social sciences,

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languages, and moral education still followed a traditional approach. Nonetheless, the question of pedagogy and lack of teachers’ training remained intact. The question was whether the teachers who have been teaching science through religious justifications would be able to teach science with a modern approach. For this, a comprehensive teachers’ training program was devised by the Ministry of Education in partnership with some of the best teachers’ training schools and experts in the world. The project further endeavored to develop a practice of involvement in extracurricular activities among school students for their overall personality development. To achieve this objective the project recommended teachers and schools to inculcate activities such as debates, discussions, science and technology games, as well as health and hygiene awareness programs (Tatweer 2010b). Tatweer was an ambitious project that had the potential to change the way teaching and learning activity were carried out in Saudi public schools. Its impact on the overall public education was felt significantly since the launch of the program. The project had generous funding and was well received by the school teachers and students who wanted to see a change in the system (Al-Eisa 2009). The project though had some limitations as well and fell short on many aspects for an overall improvement of the public school education. Social sciences and languages subjects were largely ignored by the project, and no mention of the need to develop the curricula and teaching methodologies in these fields were found in the project’s aims and objectives. It failed to recognize that these subjects were equally important for the overall development of students and for bringing the required change in the school environment. It also fell short in giving a clear guideline for the schools in their approach toward religious education, thus failing to limit the number of religious subjects taught in schools. Apart from that, there were serious concerns about the proper implementation of guidelines and recommendations of the project. It was feared that this project, like earlier ones, might fail in its objectives due to lack of proper implementation (Al-Eisa 2009, p. 66). The project faced delays in implementation and ran into trouble due to lack of serious interest on the part of middle-level officials in the Ministry of Education. A key issue was that the limited approach of changing the curriculum of science and mathematics subjects and the inclusion of Islamic teaching in the name of moral education had not satisfied those opposing reforms and hence they resisted the change  (Tatweer 2010b). Furthermore, some Saudi scholars

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have  noted serious differences regarding the project even  among the authorities at the highest level (Al-Eisa 2009; Alsharif 2009). Despite some limitations, the overall impact of the Tatweer Project on the public education system has been positive. For one, the number of schools witnessed exponential growth: the number of schools catering to primary and secondary education in 2005–06 was approximately 30,000, they  crossed 32,000  in 2010, and reached over 38,000  in 2017 (MEP 2010a, b; MoE 2011a; United Nations 2018). The greater investment in education and emphasis on improving the quality of education had also improved the enrollment rate in primary schools and helped decrease the dropout rates at the primary level. For example, the dropout rate at the primary level in 2003 was 7 percent (World Bank 2008) and came down to nearly 3 percent as of 2017. Similarly, the enrollment rate in secondary and tertiary education also improved over the years to cross 90 percent. The Tatweer Project was initially launched only in select schools and 25 boys’ and 25 girls’ schools in the kingdom were chosen in phase one of the project. During phase two of the project, it was expanded further to include more schools but could not cover the whole public school system. Some of the studies on the impact of the project found it to be effective in encouraging scientific thinking among teachers and students and in helping creative activities (Alyami 2014). Other studies, however, noted the neoliberal agenda that was the driving factor for the launch of the project and underlined how it failed to achieve any significant reforms in areas where the Saudi public education was facing challenges (Tayan 2017). One of the comprehensive studies on the impact of Tatweer was submitted in the form of a doctoral thesis in a university in the United Kingdom. The study found that the key objective of the first phase of the Tatweer Project (2007–12) was to change the impression of education from a simplistic imparting of basic learning skills to centers of innovation and comprehensive learning (Alghamdi 2018). This was to a large extent successful as the Tatweer schools were found to be more proactive in science and mathematics learning (Alyami 2014). But the study found lacunas including the lack of training among the stakeholders and implementers to tackle the demand for such a large-scale reform project (Alghamdi 2018).

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Curriculum Revision and New Textbooks The curriculum development and textbook revision programs focused on removing derogatory and hateful references toward others as well as improving the overall quality of education imparted in schools. The program focused on developing a skill-oriented curriculum for better human resource development. This emphasis on skilled manpower was mainly aimed at addressing the need for the Saudization of human resources necessary for the economy. The oil boom of the 1970s was followed by a baby boom and Saudi Arabia had faced a population bulge at the turn of the twenty-first century (Marcel and Mitchell 2006, p.  107). The lack of expertise in required fields gave rise to unemployment among youth and the Saudization plan had to be complemented with curriculum development in schools to improve the quality of the human resource. The curriculum development program is a continuous process and has not been planned merely as a response to external pressure. Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with the United States, invested in curriculum design and development in the 1980s (Shaker 1980). But this had more to do with human resource development and improvement in the quality of education. The major objective that compelled the authorities to speed up the curriculum development program after 2001 was to devise a curriculum that remains free of extremist influences. This phenomenon came into the debate after the September 11 attacks and the involvement of Saudi citizens, which forced the monarchy to start radical changes in the religious curriculum of schools and universities. Subsequently, school textbooks were revised and the Saudi authorities claimed that they had completely removed any objectionable reference to ‘others’ and had made it free from contents that may cause any kind of hatred toward other religious, sectarian dominations and schools of thought (Abu Taleb 2005). A royal study group constituted in 2004 recognized the need for revision of Saudi school textbooks, and later Prince Turki al-Faisal, on his appointment as ambassador to the United States, said that “the Kingdom has reviewed all of its education practices and materials and has removed any element that is inconsistent with the needs of modern education” (Shea 2006). Earlier, it had been stated by the authorities that the government recognized the need to review the education system saying that “[i]t has recently done an audit, which determined that about five percent of school textbooks and curriculum guides

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contained possibly offensive language. A program is now in place to eliminate such material from schools” (RESA 2003). The quality of education improved over time as a result of consistent effort for improvement of the school curriculum. Science and technology education in schools has particularly improved in comparison to what it was earlier. Curriculum development has focused more on the development of science education, but progress was slow. A 2007 study by the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) put Saudi students third from bottom in eighth-grade mathematics and in the science category the kingdom was fifth from the bottom among 58 countries that were surveyed (Gonzales 2009). Saudi Arabia ranked 93rd out of 129 countries in UNESCO’s 2008 index assessing the quality of education (UNESCO 2008). However, the situation has started to improve and in 2019–20, some  Saudi students were among the top scorers in international mathematics and science education assessment tests. Though overall Saudi Arabia still fell short in comparison to developed countries. Likewise, the improvement in the quality of education and curriculum has not spread to the fields of humanities and social sciences. The existing school system continues to follow the traditional method of education when it comes to social science and humanities subjects, while the task of  curriculum development in these subjects have been largely ignored. Most of the social sciences and humanities class hours are still focused on the study of theology, religion, and Islamic and Arab history. The importance of education in these areas is largely ignored due to the apathy of the education administration (Al-Eisa 2009). The reform measures for curriculum development, therefore, have achieved only partial success because certain areas such as the science curriculum have witnessed improvement while social science and humanities subjects were ignored (CRFHI 2008). This raises obvious questions regarding the limitations of the reform measures which have prevented these from achieving the desired objectives. This is mainly because of administrative deficiencies in implementation, and discrepancies at the policy level. For example, curriculum development plans did not care for the need of people and the demands of a modern education system. Education in public schools cannot be improved unless the programs devised for curriculum development are implemented across all schools throughout the kingdom. Unlike the curriculum development program, the textbook revision program was a direct result of external pressure after September 11. As discussed earlier, this brought to the fore the objectionable contents of school textbooks, which were found to have negative and inciting references about Jews, Christians, atheists, Shias, and Sufis. This narrowing

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down of the interpretation of the Islamic scriptures and religious texts based on Aqidah (faith), which is a matter of intense theological debate, was found to be mentioned in school textbooks of children as young as 6–7 years (Prokop 2003, p. 80; Doumato 2003; CRFHI 2008). In the early phase, the new textbooks did not bring about as wholesome a change as was demanded. A study by Nina Shea in 2006 found that the textbooks for Islamic studies for the academic year 2006–07 revealed “despite the Saudi government’s statements to the contrary, an ideology of hatred toward Christians and Jews and Muslims who do not follow Wahhabi doctrine remains in this area of the public school system” (Shea 2006). She further pointed out that the textbooks taught a dualistic vision, dividing the world into true believers of Islam (Muslims) and unbelievers (kuffar sing. Kafir meaning infidel). Other studies too found certain problematic references. Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed by Saudi government agents in Turkey in October 2018, had observed in one of his writings in 2006 that until and unless schools stopped giving lessons in theology and jurisprudence to children, the problem of inciting and intolerant references to others would continue. He had added that if Catholic theology would be taught to children in schools in Europe, it would invoke similar sentiments in those children against non-Christians and non-Catholics (Khashoggi 2006). In the same vein, it has been noted that “high school literature, history and even science textbooks regularly quote Koranic verses” (Laessing and Alsharif 2011). The education reforms had a limited impact on overhauling the school textbooks as the “government has started to cut comments that urged Saudis to kill ‘infidel’ Christians and Jews,” but the “books still say Saudis should avoid non-Muslims.” This was, however, only a reference to the new textbooks for religious studies and not about the new textbooks that were introduced for other subjects. The new religious textbook also mentioned that the Prophet Mohammed had “cursed Jews and Christians because they built places of worship around their prophets’ tombs” (Laessing and Alsharif 2011)  underlining the limitations of the reforms in handling the religious content in the textbooks. All the steps taken for the revision of school textbooks have not addressed the root of the problem: teaching theology to schoolchildren. Theology and jurisprudence are subjects for specialization that need training not just in religion but also in modern subjects to make it more relevant for a modernizing society. Another problem is traditional and

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dogmatic references in school textbooks of social science subjects. This brings up the issue of religious influence on the education system. Moreover, there are problems of implementation of these measures because most of the officials and subordinate workers in the education ministry, departments, and agencies are taken from religious schools, and hence the implementation of these measures is hindered due to lack of interest and understanding of the modern education system. Nonetheless, some of the problems in history and social science textbooks were addressed in the new textbooks. For example, negative references to pre-Islamic Arabia was removed. Similarly, romanticized and exaggerated references toward pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism was removed and the focus shifted to studying the history of the Arabian Peninsula and to instill a sense of Saudi national identity (Alhussein 2019). These books also tried to instill ideas of loyalty to the nation, family, and against extremism and terrorism among the students. Ideas of honesty, trustworthiness, and citizenship have been incorporated in the textbooks. However, a survey of 2017–18 Saudi middle and high school textbooks conducted by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom and published in November 2018 underlined several problems in these textbooks. While it noted that progress has been made compared to the past, the issue of “intolerant content” remains. The report remarked that the “intolerant content is scattered throughout many of the books” and “is reflected in the commentary and interpretations offered by the textbooks” (USCIR 2018, p. 3). It further found that though “the middle school curriculum and books generally dwell on developing ‘right’ belief, the high school books focus on inculcating appropriate responses by society and the individual to those with ‘wrong’ beliefs” (ibid). While this had been done with the understanding that extremist preachers need to be identified as ‘wrong,’ the problem is that it painted everyone other than the “state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam” as “polytheists who will go to hell regardless of their good deeds.” Furthermore, the report found that the textbooks continue to demonize the “Shi’a and Sufi veneration of the gravesites of prophets” and they are dismissed as “heresy.” The books continue to have serious problems when it comes to the idea of “criticism of Islam,” considered as “apostasy,” and this is punishable by “death penalty.” The problem of gender

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discrimination and homophobia remained and this was promoted in the moral sections of the textbooks (ibid). It can be said that the educational reform measures taken to address curriculum development and textbook revision achieved only partial success. The changes brought about by these reform measures are not enough. These steps, at best, have achieved limited success in their objectives and can only have limited impact. The major question which the curriculum development and textbook revision intended to answer, that of religious intervention, remains an issue. Teachers’ Training and School Environment An important component of Saudi school education reforms were steps for improvement in the school environment and capacity-building and skill development of teachers through training. A number of teachers’ training programs have been promulgated by the Ministry of Education since 2001 along with the programs for improvement of the environment in schools and these were aimed at making the teaching and learning process interactive, friendlier, and attractive for students (MoE 2011a, b). The Ministry of Education  adopted a variety of training methods and courses, including those provided by its supervisors, courses laid out at its training centers, and training provided at private centers (Sidiya 2009). Workshops and in-house training on school premises undertaken by visiting experienced teachers is another method. The main objective of these programs was to make the learning process enjoyable for students and improve the quality of education. Saudi Arabia has a large number of teachers’ training colleges from where most of the schoolteachers are recruited. However, the teaching methodology is based on rote learning, which does not inculcate critical thinking abilities among the students (Prokop 2003, p. 87). This along with the poor environment of learning in schools necessitated the improvement in teaching and learning processes. The programs intended to address problems such as lack of knowledge and specialization in concerned subjects among teachers, lack of expertise among primary schoolteachers, tendency among teachers to trivialize critical understanding, lack of interest among teachers to develop the personality of students, lack of debate and discussion in classes, lack of interest and understanding of the subject, as well as disciplinary issues among teachers (Al-Eisa 2009, pp.  64–65). These problems needed to be addressed through measures such as improvement in the quality of

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existing teachers’ training colleges and supplementary workshops and training programs run by the Ministry of Education. Some degree of success were achieved through these dedicated programs. For example, the UNESCO Teachers’ Training Report 2007 underlined that some changes in the school environment could be noted. The teaching methodology improved though the problem of traditional approach and lack of creativity and innovation persisted. However, one of the key issues noted was the problem concerning the receptiveness among the teachers, who feel singled out as the source of all the problems afflicting the public education system. Teachers, in general, were found to be lacking enthusiasm about improving their capabilities. Teachers who were in the profession for the several years saw the training programs as additional work and an unnecessary burden (Sidiya 2009). That apart, attending workshops and training programs at times incurred extra costs in the form of course materials, conveyance, and so on, discouraging the teachers from attending these workshops. A proposal for a centralized system for a teaching license that was first discussed in the Majlis al-Shura in mid-2007 could not be implemented due to differences among the policymakers (Sidiya 2009). According to the proposed program, only qualified people having a potential for teaching would be selected and trained and certified for teaching in schools. It was further underlined that more is needed to be done to make the teaching and learning process more effective and to achieve international teaching standards, p. 260). Another program that was launched in 2004 was the school evaluation program in partnership with the Saudi Ministry of Education and the British Office for Standard in Education. The program intended to be a “continuing and comprehensive evaluation process for all aspects of school, including environment, administration, teachers, and students” (Al Sadaawi 2010, p. 2). Other similar programs such as Schools Personnel Evaluation Project (2001) and Thinking Skills Development Project (2002) were similarly intended for improving the quality of the teaching and learning process by the Ministry of Education. The latter was “implemented to assist students to move from rote learning habits to developing problem-solving skills and seeking creative solutions” (Ibid, p. 3), and did make some impact in changing the overall attitude of the administration and the teachers in public schools. This, however, was too small to be able to bring about a comprehensive change. In the same vein, the kingdom adopted the “Education for All Week” program, scheduled by UNESCO each year in its commitment not to

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neglect the role of the teachers in improving the education system. In 2006, the occasion was organized with the theme of Every Child Needs a Teacher “in affirmation of the role of the teacher and importance of the teacher being suitably qualified pedagogically to implement the educational process and achieve its goals” (Al Shaer 2007, p. 1). Similarly, the strategic plan, launched in 2004, incorporated the idea of improving teachers’ support to promote the involvement of citizens in the field of education (MoE 2003, p.  15). The strategic plan further envisaged the development of the teaching methodology adopted in the schools (MoE 2003, p. 15). Further, the Tatweer Project that was launched in 2005 designed a program for improvement of teaching in schools, which would assess and develop the teaching capabilities of schoolteachers (Al-Eisa 2009, p. 63). The endeavor of the “Qualification and Training Program” is [a]ttaining an effective professional system of qualification and development that makes educational cadres able to embody educational values and possess efficiency at educational work. The system should depend on skillful human efficiency that embodies the internal sufficiency and it should be based on international standards and takes part in apprenticing the education process and improving its outcomes. (Tatweer 2010a)

This program was instituted to generate a professional human resource to fulfill the needs of Saudi schools. Through this program, the Ministry of Education not only wanted to provide schools with qualified professional teachers but also wished for a continuous assessment of the education system and regular monitoring of classes which should eventually lead to the improvement of the teaching methodology in schools. Nonetheless, several problem areas persisted. The measures proposed for the capacity-building of teachers could be implemented sparingly, and wherever they were implemented they did not evoke enthusiasm from the teachers and the administration. The program ran into many roadblocks such as less participation among schoolteachers as the training program was not compulsory (Sidiya 2009). Lack of awareness among teachers about the need to improve their capabilities and lack of acceptability that the system needed change and improvement were other problems. It was reported that the teachers found the training program useless and did not want to attend these expensive training workshops, which, according to them, hardly added anything as far as their growth prospects were

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concerned (Al Sadaawi 2010). They did not feel that attending these programs enhanced their teaching skills. Apart from this, there were issues such as the qualification of schoolteachers. Usually, teachers are inducted into the school system after passing high school and earning a diploma in teaching, which leaves a lot more to be desired in a teacher. Some have argued that the only way one can expect some improvement is if the eligibility criterion is set higher, with a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree in the concerned subject in order to be eligible for teachers’ training colleges (Al-Aqil 2005, p. 260). More such suggestions for improving the teachers’ training program were advocated by the reformist elements but the authorities were slow to incorporate these suggestions and work out a comprehensive plan to achieve the objective of well-trained teachers and a good learning and academic atmosphere in schools (Al-Eisa 2009, p. 65). The kingdom faced serious problems concerning the improvement of the overall teaching environment in schools. The Ministry of Education devised plans for improvement of schools and their teaching environment. But it was found that the “ministry’s stand-alone projects were not focused on the country’s education goals, they lacked integration or communication” (Al Sadaawi 2010, p. 3). The ministry’s plan to create a mechanism wherein teachers and school administration can have regular interaction with parents ran into trouble (Tatweer 2010a; Al-Eisa 2009). Most of the teachers, as already discussed, lack expertise in the subject and are poorly trained, teaching methodology lacks innovation, and students are not groomed to face the complex demands of life. These problems affect future job prospects. It can be argued that the teachers’ training and improvement in school environment programs have had only limited impact. The problem of poor quality is likely to continue to hamper education reform efforts until and unless the issue of teachers’ training and improvement in the school environment are given more importance and addressed with urgency. Administrative Changes Several administrative measures were taken to streamline the public education system. After ascending to lead the monarchy in August 2005, King Abdullah stepped up efforts toward school education reforms (Alsharif 2009). Among the measures taken were administrative changes, including

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the appointments of Prince Faisal as Minister of Education and Norah Al-Fayez as Deputy Minister of Education in charge of female education. Abdullah tried to rein in the CSU from interference in education and limited their powers. The power of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Dawah, and Guidance was curtailed by the King, and they were asked to focus on religious and endowment affairs and leave the education for the specialized technocrats (Maroun et al. 2008). Seen in this wider context, the appointment of his son-in-law as Minister of Education by King Abdullah was a step to take control of the education policy and implement education reforms. On taking over, the new minister had remarked that “current and future national educational efforts are characterized by focusing on the quality through developing what will be provided to our children at school and continue improving it” (MoE 2010a, b). Further, he observed that “the country needs to adjust its education system in accordance with the changing requirement of the world we live in today” (Ibid). More changes have been brought about after King Salman ascended to the leadership following the passing away of his half-brother King Abdullah. In the government reorganization announced in 2015, the Ministry of Higher Education was merged with the Ministry of Education and Azzam al-­Dakhil was appointed the minister. Dakhil was relieved of his position in 2018 and Hamad bin Mohammed al-Shaikh, who had served as deputy minister of education between 2011 and 2015, was appointed as new Minister of Education. Several other deputies and secretaries, including women, have been appointed to take charge of various administrative tasks in the ministry. This was done to bring centralization and effectiveness in the implementation of policies and programs as it was felt that a dispersed system of administration was not effective. The curtailment of the powers of the ulema under the initiatives taken by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are likely to have significant impact in further limiting their influence in administration of public education and pave way for further reforms in the education sector.

Vision 2030 and School Education Under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, Saudi Arabia has started an extensive policy for the socioeconomic transformation of the kingdom  through the Saudi Vision 2030. While the program is partly aimed at countering the negative media coverage of the kingdom in the international press, there is no doubt that it is a comprehensive blueprint for bringing about a social and economic transformation. It underlines the evolution of Saudi Arabia into “a vibrant society,” “a thriving economy,”

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and “an ambitious nation” (KSA Vision 2019). The vision document elaborates that to realize these ambitions, the kingdom will depend on three pillars: (A) Islam, that is, Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the faith and the ruler is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques; (B) the potential for the kingdom to become a global investment hub; and (C) the unique strategic location of the kingdom providing connectivity to Asia, Europe, and Africa building connectivity through land and waterways. Within the theme of creating “a vibrant society,” the vision intends to achieve three important long-term objectives, namely a society with strong roots, with fulfilling lives, and built on strong foundations. For creating strong foundations in the society, the vision envisages building a strong character in children through education. It underlines that education and learning should aim to instill “positive moral belief … from an early age” (KSA Vision 2019). It underlines the need for cooperation and coordination between schools and parents to “reinforce the fabric of society by providing students with the compassion, knowledge, and behaviors necessary for resilient and independent characters” (Ibid). As part of the latter, the vision commits to increased engagement of parents and families in the school education. It argues that the “engagement of parents in their children’s education is a key measure of success” and that Vision 2030 aims that 80 percent of “parents engage in school activities and the learning process of their children” (KSA Vision 2019). To achieve this, it envisages “[l]aunching the ‘Irtiqaa’ [progress] program to measure a school’s effectiveness in engaging parents in their children’s education”; “[e]stablishing parent-led boards in schools to open discussion forums and further engage with parents”; “[t]raining teachers to raise their awareness of the importance of communicating with parents and equip them with effective methods to do so successfully”; and “[c]ollaborating with private and non-profit sectors to offer innovative educational programs and events that can improve this academic partnership” (KSA Vision 2019). Vision 2030 is an ambitious blueprint for social and economic transformation, and addresses the challenges posed by demographic changes, the market economy, globalization, and international relations. The fact that the program envisages a transformation of the education system, especially the public school education system, underlines the level of importance the monarchy attaches to education reforms. It is a long-term program that cannot, in realistic terms, achieve all its goals, but the proof that the monarchy is committed to achieving maximum success emerges from the fact

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that it has started periodic reviews of specific goals and for taking corrective measures where necessary. The vision program accords the highest priority to education. A key component of the vision is that it intertwines the education development program of the kingdom with the SDGs to be achieved by 2030. King Salman in one of his remarks said that “[e]ducation in Saudi Arabia is the cornerstone through which we can achieve our nation’s aspirations towards progress and advancement in sciences and knowledge” (United Nations 2018). As part of the vision objective, the government plans to promote public–private partnership in the management of schools and an initiative for independent schools have been adopted. Accordingly, “[t]he first part of this initiative will involve the transfer of 25 public schools for operation by the private sector. The move is expected to contribute to a better quality of the education sector’s input and output” (Ibid). Furthermore, the initiative intends to involve the private sector in developing and upgrading educational facilities, transportation, and introduce vocational skills programs “to meet labor market needs and innovate new instructional techniques.”

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King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Public Education Development Project (Tatweer). (2010a). Qualification and training program. Riyadh. http://www.tatweer. edu.sa/En/AboutUs/programs/TrainingProgram/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 22 Jan 2011. King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Public Education Development Project (Tatweer). (2010b). Ahdaf Mashru’ Tatweer; Objectives of Tatweer Project, Riyadh. [Arabic]. http://www.tatweer.edu.sa/Ar/AboutUs/Pages/ProjectObjectives. aspx. Accessed 12 Feb 2011. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 [KSA Vision]. (2019). The vision themes. https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/vision/themes. Accessed 26 Apr 2019. Lacroix, S. (2005). Islamo-Liberal politics in Saudi Arabia. In P.  Aarts & G.  Nonneman (Eds.), Saudi Arabia in the balance: Political economy, society, foreign affairs (pp. 35–56). London: Hurst and Company. Laessing, U., & Alsharif, A. (2011, February 10). Special report: In Saudi Arabia, a clamour for education. Reuters, Jeddah. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/10/us-­saudi-­education-­idUSTRE7190MJ20110210. Accessed 11 Feb 2011. Marcel, V., & Mitchell, J.  V. (2006). Oil titans: National oil companies in the middle east. London: Chatman House. Maroun, N., et al. (2008). How to succeed at education reform: The case for Saudi Arabia and the broader GCC countries. Dubai: Ideation Center, Booz Allen Hamilton. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010a). Khuttat al-Tanmia’ al-Tasia’, 2010–2014; Ninth development plan, 2010–2014. [Arabic]. http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=BF88A9FFF439434 EB0EB266DC7C7CC7C.alfa?event=ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=79. Accessed 8 Oct 2010. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010b). Statistical yearbook, 2010. Riyadh: Central Department of Statistics and Information. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2003). Mulakkhas al-Khutta al-Istiratijiya; The executive summary of the Ministry of Education ten-year plan, 2004–2014. [Arabic]. Riyadh. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010a). al-Barnamij al-Sanawi li A‘maal al-Ihsa’; Annual statistical work program. [Arabic]. Published by Information Department, http://www.moe.gov.sa/Pages/Default.aspx. Accessed 23 Apr 2011. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010b). Kalimat al-Wazir: Ru’yat al-Ta’lim Mustaqbil al-Watan; The Minister speaks: Education vision future of the nation. [Arabic]. http://www.moe.gov.sa/Pages/MinisterSpeech. aspx. Accessed 21 Jan 2011. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2011a). Ma’lumat wa Ihsayiat; al-Aam Al-Dirasi: 1431–1432; Information and statistics; academic year: 1431–1432 Hij. http://info.moe.gov.sa/. Accessed 15 Feb 2011.

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Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2011b). Bawwabat al-­ Riyadhiyat wa al-Ulum al-Tabiyiat’; Mathematics and science portal. [Arabic]. http://ksa.obeikaneducation.com/node/129. Accessed 13 Feb 2011. Mutawalli, N.  A. (2004). Al-Ta’lim al-Aam; Basic education. In M.  B. M.’j. Al-Hamid et  al. (Eds.), al-Ta’lim fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyah al-Saudiyah: Ru’yah al-Hadhir wa Istishraq al-Mustaqbil; Education in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Present vision and future outlook. [Arabic]. Riyadh: Maktabah Al-Rushd. Prokop, M. (2003). Saudi Arabia: The politics of education. International Affairs, 79(1), 77–89. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC. (2003, April 2). Press release: Statement regarding Saudi education system. http://www.saudiembassy.net/ archive/2003/press/page80.aspx. Accessed 22 Jan 2011. Shaker, P. (1980). Curriculum change in the developing country: The case of Saudi Arabia. The Educational Resources Information Center, Paper presented at the ‘Annual Meeting’ of American Educational Research Association, Boston, 7–11 April, 1980. Shea, N. (2006, May 21). This is a Saudi text-book. The Washington Post. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­d yn/content/ar ticle/2006/05/19/ AR2006051901769.html. Accessed 22 Jan 2010. Sidiya, F. (2009, April 7). Saudi Arabia: Teacher’s training raises intense debate. Arab News, Riyadh. http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=9§ion=0&articl e=121303&d=7&m=4&y=2009. Accessed 12 Feb 2011. Tayan, B. M. (2017). The Saudi Tatweer education reforms: Implications of neoliberal thought to Saudi education policy. International Education Studies, 10(5), 61–71. The World Bank. (2008). MENA development report: The road not travelled: Education reform in Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC. United Nations. (2018). Sustainable development goals: First voluntary national review, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New York: UN High-Level Political Forum. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2008). Education for all global monitoring report: Education for all by 2015 – Will we make it? Oxford: Oxford University Press. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2018, November). A survey of 2017–2018 Saudi middle and high school textbooks. https://www.uscir f.gov/sites/default/files/SaudiTextbook_inside_ FINAL112818wlinks.pdf. Last accessed 7 Feb 2020.

CHAPTER 7

A Flourishing Higher Education

Saudi Arabia has a vast network of higher education institutions that cater to the education and training needs of the young Saudis. It is one of the largest networks of institutions in the region, and some of the universities and institutions have done well in recent global higher education rankings. For example, seven Saudi universities featured in the World University Ranking 2020, two—King Abdulaziz University (KAU), Jeddah, and Alfaisal University, Riyadh—are among the top 201–250 and 251–300 bracket respectively (THE 2020). This is a significant improvement from the past when the kingdom had only a few universities, and none of them featured in the top 500 in the global ranking. In many ways, the higher education sector in the kingdom has witnessed a revolutionary turnaround in the past two decades considering the fact that there were only eight universities until 2000, and one of them was established in 1999. Three of them were dedicated to Islamic studies, that is, only five catered to the broader higher education needs. With focus on education reforms and expansion, the number of universities increased rapidly and, as of 2020, Saudi Arabia has over 50 higher education institutions, including state and private universities and specialized institutions of research and training. In addition, several colleges and vocational institutions cater to the growing need for a professionally trained workforce. While some expansion in higher education infrastructure had taken place in the 1980s in the aftermath of the oil boom, the problem of meeting the growing requirement for trained human resources could not be © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_7

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matched, mainly due to slow policy initiatives and lackluster implementation. Furthermore, the problem of quality higher education institutions remained a major concern as the private sector continued to prefer expatriate workers over Saudi graduates, both because it was cost-effective and because educated Saudis were seen as lacking proficiency and unwilling to undertake menial work. The problem had become acute in the 1990s, and this manifested in the form of rising demands for education reforms through protests and petitions. This forced the monarchy to take note of the situation and take action. The Ministry of Higher Education that was formed in 1975 was tasked with planning for higher education reforms, and the monarchy decided to significantly enhance its education and human resource development budget. What is notable is that the plan for higher education reforms was driven by political and economic considerations. The demographic pressure and labor market difficulties along with rising public demands necessitated reforms, and the monarchy used these to neutralize any opposition to reforms by the conservative ulema. The public demands for reforms were concentrated in the need to review the whole education system; in higher education, the question was both about lack of accessibility and poor quality. The growing unemployment and underemployment among Saudi graduates, youth bulge, and large-scale unemployment among the educated youth were among the major issues raised by the petitioners and protestors. For example, one of the petitions in the early 1990s noted the following: We believe that the education system of our country is in need of comprehensive and fundamental reform to enable it to graduate faithful generations that are qualified to contribute positively and effectively in building the present and the future of the country and to face the challenges of the age, enabling us to catch up with the caravan of nations that have vastly surpassed us in every field. (HRW 1992, p. 50)

One of the immediate measures that were mooted in the 1990s to deal with the growing unemployment among Saudis was the nationalization of the job market. The idea was to force the private sector to give priority to Saudis while hiring, especially in cases where educated and trained Saudi human resource was available. Saudization of the workforce was considered a quick-fix solution to the problem of spiraling unemployment among the native population. However, the nationalization plan did not yield the

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desired result because of the huge gap between the output of the education system and the requirements of the market economy. Hence, the lack of skilled Saudi human resources and limited success in the Saudization plan were attributed to the inefficient higher education system. For the Ministry of Higher Education, tasked with devising a comprehensive reform plan, the challenge was twofold. On the one hand, there were fewer universities and specialized training and research centers, and on the other hand, there were questions about the quality of education. Therefore, the plan that was devised to deal with the situation was also two-pronged. The idea was to simultaneously work on expanding the higher education infrastructure to make it accessible to all and to help universities and institutions in capacity-building to improve quality. The plan aimed to improve the quality of higher education and human resource through development programs in existing universities and by founding new colleges, universities, and training centers (MHE 2010c, p. 3). Crown Prince Abdullah was at the forefront of encouraging and prioritizing the need for higher education reforms. Under his guidance, a number of plans such as the Overseas Scholarship Program (2005), Strategic Plan (2009), and Observatory on Higher Education (2010) were devised to expand the higher education infrastructure and improve the quality of the human resource. These plans endeavored to provide a guideline for the existing universities and professional institutions toward improvement in education and research (MHE 2010c, p. 8), and simultaneously increase the number of higher education institutions. Resultantly, the kingdom witnessed a large increase in the number of universities, colleges, training and research centers, and professional institutions (MHE 2009, p. 1). The expansion of the network of higher education institutions and efforts at improving their quality to bring them at par with the top global institutions have continued after King Abdullah under the leadership of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed.

Infrastructure Development and Expansion The strategic plan launched in 2009 aimed to improve the condition of higher education and  endeavored to build capacity in higher education institutions, harmonize the university education with the developmental needs of the country, improve the quality of education, develop scientific research, establish a strategic partnership with international higher education institutions of repute, facilitate modern administration, and expand the financial resources of higher educational institutions (MHE 2009,

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p.  2). Infrastructure development in emerging and new fields to make quality higher education accessible to all was an important goal but it took some time before this could be achieved. Furthermore, the reform agenda focused on improving the quality of higher education and human resource to complement the Saudization plan and support economic and social development. Reform measures to develop better infrastructure and to expand the education system for providing opportunities to the growing population have been one of the focus areas since the mid-1990s. The plan was to provide all school graduates with access to higher education and increase the enrollment ratio in tertiary education. As a result of persistent efforts, the kingdom as of 2020 built more than 50 institutions for higher learning, in addition to a large network of community and private colleges, training and research centers, and vocational institutions. Older universities such as KSU, KAU, King Khalid University, and KFUPM have witnessed a vast expansion in the last 20 years by introducing new courses and accommodating more students. New, highly specialized universities, such as King Saud Bin Abdulaziz University of Health Sciences (KSAUHS) (2005), Princess Nora Bint Abdulrahman University for Women (2007), KAUST (2009), and Institute of Nanotechnology (2011) among others, have also been inaugurated (Khan 2011; Al-Harithy 2011). Saudi Arabia has taken significant strides in expanding its educational infrastructure, and a number of new universities, colleges, and vocational institutions have been established. Infrastructure for science and technology education has improved. Existing universities have established new centers for emerging fields of study and have tied up with international institutions for providing quality education. KSU, for example, signed a Memorandum of Understandings with universities in France, the United States, Britain, India, China and Germany for the exchange of teachers and students to help improve the quality of education. Similarly, KAU has entered into understandings with universities abroad. The university has further expanded with an investment of US$2 billion and has established new colleges of education, environmental design, pharmacy and planning and technology in addition to the existing ones. The university can accommodate more than 25,000 students, with a medical complex to include a hospital, a health services center, and a medical research facility. Similarly, KFUPM, which is a premier science and technology university, has catered to the need for education and training for complementing the oil industry. The university has an understanding and partnership with premier international institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of

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Technology (MIT) in the United States. It is one of the best universities in the region and has emerged as a hub for quality education and research in the Arab world. It attracts students from Arab and Muslim countries particularly in the field of scientific research. Similarly, KAUST has a huge infrastructure and has been founded to improve the quality of science and technology education and to provide more opportunities for citizens to go for higher education and research in scientific fields. Many new institutions in emerging areas of science have been opened to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency in science education. In 2001, in its ambition to improve the quality of higher education and to provide equal opportunities for the pursuance of higher education, Saudi Arabia allowed the establishment of private universities and institutions of higher education (MHE 2009, p.  15). These institutions were given ample autonomy in matters of financing and curriculum but were regulated by the government laws and bylaws. As a result, there are a huge number of students, male and female, studying in these institutions. In 2008–09, 76 districts of Saudi Arabia had higher education institutions in comparison to only 16 districts in 1998–99 (MHE 2009, p. 13). The main objective for improved infrastructure and better accessibility is to provide higher education to all school graduates and, despite it being slow, the kingdom has achieved significant progress. For example, the enrollment ratio in tertiary and higher education has reached 67 percent, and the dropout rate in tertiary education is on the decline (United Nations 2018). According to the erstwhile Ministry of Higher Education, the “education system in Saudi Arabia has undergone tremendous growth over the last five decades” (MHE 2010c, p. 3). As of 2010, Saudi Arabia had more than 50 government and private universities; around 150 professional colleges and institutions including teacher’s training colleges; and more than 30,000 boys’ and girls’ schools that cater to the need of the Saudi population for elementary, intermediate, secondary, higher, and professional education. This huge infrastructure is a testimony to the success of Saudi authorities in providing educational opportunities to the Saudi populace in all parts of the country. Universities Universities are the most important centers of learning, teaching, and imparting knowledge. Saudi Arabia has come a long way in expanding the

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network of universities. As per the records of the Ministry of Education, the kingdom has 43 universities in 2020. While 30 public universities (Table 4.3) are completely funded by the government, there are 13 private universities which are regulated by the ministry but are funded privately (Table  7.1). The Ministry of Education provides guidelines and regulations for the establishment and functioning of the universities, but they also enjoy a degree of administrative and academic autonomy. These Table 7.1  Private universities in Saudi Arabia S. No. Name of the University

City

Province

Region Year of Establishment

1.

Prince Sultan University

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2.

Effat University (for women)

Jeddah

Makkah

Hijaz

3.

Arab Open University Al-Yamamah University University of Business and Technology Fahd Bin Sultan University Prince Mohammed bin Fahd University Alfaisal University Dar al-Uloom University Dar Al Hekma University

–

–

–

Founded as a college in 1999; upgraded into university in 2003 Founded as a college in 1999; upgraded into university in 2009 2002

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2001

Jeddah

Makkah

Hijaz

2000

Tabuk

Al-Tabuk

Hijaz

2003

University of Prince Mugrin Riyadh Elm University Al Maarefa University

4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

Al-Khobar Al-Sharqiyah East

2006

Riyadh Riyadh

Al-Riyadh Al-Riyadh

Najd Najd

2002 2005

Jeddah

Makkah

Hijaz

Medina

Al-Madina

Hijaz

Founded as a college in 1999; upgraded into university in 2014 2017

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2008

Riyadh

Al-Riyadh

Najd

2009

Source: Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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universities are spread across the length and breadth of the kingdom and cater to the young population. As of 2017–18, the total enrollment in the higher education institutions was 1.6 million and an average of 250,000 graduates pass out of Saudi universities annually. While most of the government universities offer courses in wide-­ ranging subjects including basic sciences, mathematics, social sciences, law, education, accounts, business, medicine, engineering, language, and literature, the private universities largely focus on subjects such as business administration, engineering, medicine, information technology, law, and other professional courses that are career-oriented. Barring a few, most universities have now opened their doors for both genders, even though they have separate buildings or campuses for men and women. Seven of these universities are among the top 1000 global universities as per the World University Ranking 2020 (THE 2020).1 Among the 63 best universities in the Arab world, 6 Saudi universities feature among the top 15 and the top two positions are held by two Saudi universities, KAU and Alfaisal University. Saudi universities have also started to attract students from neighboring Arab and South Asian countries and, in 2017–18, over 12,500 non-Saudi students graduated from Saudi universities (Ministry of Education [MoE] 2019). Undoubtedly, it is not only the number of universities that have increased but the overall quality of education in these universities has witnessed improvement. This has led to a large number of Saudi graduates opting to go abroad for further specialization after completing higher education in the kingdom. The number grew significantly since 2005 when King Abdullah launched a scholarship program for Saudi students to study abroad and the number of Saudi students abroad reached a peak of 200,000 in 2012–13 (Ahmed 2015). Since then the number has gradually come down, and as of 2017–18, around 114,000 are reported to be studying in 22 countries, and among these, about 74,000 are funded by government scholarship (Toumi 2018).

1  They are King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah; Alfaisal University, Riyadh; King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran; King Saud University, Riyadh; King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Riyadh; King Khalid University, Abha; and Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal University, Dammam.

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Community and Private Colleges In addition to the universities, Saudi Arabia has a vast network of community colleges  and private colleges that offer undergraduate degrees. While the community colleges are affiliated with universities, private colleges run independently and are funded through private capital. According to the bylaws for the establishment of private colleges, they can issue degrees in accordance with the guidelines, rules, and regulations issued by the Ministry of Education. The colleges have autonomy for administrative, financial, and academic purposes, but they have to follow the bylaws made by the ministry in establishing the college and overall functioning (MoE 2019). These colleges are mandated with the task of providing education and training for school graduates to “raise the level of education and academic research, and to provide related academic specializations as per [the] kingdom’s educational policy” (ibid). As of 2019, there were 42 private colleges in the kingdom that offer undergraduate studies mainly in professional and vocational courses (Table 7.2). These colleges are spread across the kingdom and offer courses in medicine, nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, law, accounting, design, and so on. The private colleges cater to the larger needs of the population and train students in professional courses and subjects for which practitioners are needed in the kingdom. These colleges are run by the College Council and Board of Trustees. The council is chaired by the rector of the college, who is appointed by the board in conjunction with the Ministry of Education. Most of the faculties in these colleges are Saudis who have been trained abroad in the best international institutions in respective subjects. The colleges are open to the recruitment of foreign faculty in case the need arises but, unlike in the past, an overwhelming majority of the faculty members in these colleges are Saudis. Another important feature, different from the past, is that most of these colleges offer courses for both men and women and though classes are held separately, there is no restriction on women in terms of what courses they can choose. These are in many ways revolutionary steps for the kingdom where until 2000 women did not even have separate identity cards and until the mid-2000s could not enroll in most of the professional courses,2 either because it was 2  Saudi families preferred their girl-children not to study beyond school; those who allowed girls to pursue higher education preferred them to choose humanities and arts courses. The question of women pursuing an independent career was seen as an affront to faith and tradition. Those who allowed women to go for higher learning and pursue a career preferred

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Table 7.2  Private colleges in Saudi Arabia No. College

Location

Specializations and degrees

1.

Al Baha Private College

Al Baha

2.

Fakeeh College of Medical Sciences Riyadh College of Dentistry (Men and Women) Riyadh College of Pharmacy (Men)

Jeddah

Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Business Information Systems, Accounting, Interior Design, Information Management Systems (Admissions for Computer Engineering and Information Management Systems were stopped from January 2018 until further notice) Nursing, Medical Laboratories, Master of Nursing in Mental and Psychiatric Health Dental Surgery, Dental Hygiene, Dental Technology, Master of Science in Dentistry

Riyadh College of Pharmacy (Women)

Riyadh

3.

4.

5.

6.

Riyadh

Riyadh

Buraydah

Pharmaceutical Science, Medical Laboratories, Ph.D. Program in Pharmacy, Nursing, MSc. in Clinical Pharmacy Pharmaceutical Science, Medical Laboratories, Ph.D. Program in Pharmacy, Nursing, MSc. in Clinical Pharmacy Medicine, Clinical Pharmacy, Dentistry, Nursing English Language, Law

Buraydah

Computer Science, Computer Engineering

Buraydah

Dentistry

Jeddah

General Medicine, Nursing, Physical Therapy, Health Administration, Dentistry, Imaging and Radiology, Pharmacy Nursing, Health Sciences Management and Technology (Admissions for Health Sciences Management and Technology Admissions were stopped from January 2018 until further notice) Nursing

Ibn Sina College for Medical Studies 7. Qassim Private College for Language Studies 8. Qassim Private College for Computer 9. Qassim Private College for Dentistry 10. Batterjee Medical College

Jeddah

11. Saad College of Nursing and Allied Health Sciences

Al Khobar

12. Al Riyada College for Health Sciences

Jeddah

(continued)

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Table 7.2  (continued) No. College

Location

Specializations and degrees

13. Al Maarefa College of Medicine 14. Al Maarefa College of Pharmacy 15. Al Maarefa College of Applied Sciences

Riyadh

MBBS

Riyadh

BSc. in Pharmacy

Riyadh

16. Buraydah College of Engineering and Information Technology 17. Buraydah College of Administrative Sciences and Humanities

Buraydah

18. Buraydah College of Dentistry and Pharmacy

Buraydah

19. Buraydah College for Applied Medical Sciences

Buraydah

BSc. in Nursing, BSc. in Respiratory Care, BSc. in Emergency Medical Services, BSc. in Computer Science, BSc. in Information Systems, Bachelor of Industrial Engineering Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Electrical Engineering (Electric Power, Electronics and Communication Systems, Information Technology) for girls Special Education, Language and Translation, Accounting, Marketing, Human Resources Management, Law (Admissions for Law were stopped from January 2018 until further notice) Clinical Pharmacy, Dentistry, Pharmacy Science (Admissions for Pharmacy Science and Dentistry were stopped from January 2018 until further notice) Nursing, Medical Laboratories, Physical Therapy, Environmental Health Sciences, Dental Care, Radiology, Clinical Nutrition, Medical Records Management (Admissions for Nursing, Medical Records Management, and Physical Therapy were stopped from January 2018 until further notice) Pharmacy, Nursing, Medical Laboratories

Buraydah

20. Mohammad Al Mani Al Khobar College for Medical Sciences

(continued)

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Table 7.2 (continued) No. College

Location

Specializations and degrees

21. Al Farabi College of Medicine, Dentistry And Nursing

Riyadh

22. Al Farabi College of Dentistry and Nursing

Jeddah

23. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges

Riyadh

24. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges 25. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges

Jeddah

Bachelor of Dental Surgery (Admissions into dental surgery program were suspended starting from the second semester of the academic year 2016 (G), MBBS, Nursing (Admissions and transfers into MBBS and nursing programs were suspended starting from the first semester of the academic year 2015–16 (G) Dentistry (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification). Bachelor of Dental Surgery, Nursing (Admissions and transfers into Dentistry and Nursing Programs were suspended starting from the first semester of the academic year 2015–16 (G) Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories Medical Laboratories (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories

26. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges

Abha

27. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges

Qassim

Dammam

Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories Emergency Medicine (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories Radiology (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Emergency Medicine (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories Nursing (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notice) (continued)

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Table 7.2  (continued) No. College

Location

Specializations and degrees

28. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges

Tabuk

29. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges 30. Al Ghad International Medical Science Colleges 31. Al Rayyan Colleges College of Medicine, College of Health Sciences and Nursing 32. Sulaiman Al Rajhi College 33. Arab East Colleges

Najran

Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories Medical Laboratories (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Emergency Medicine (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories

Al Madinah Al Nursing, Health Management, Emergency Monawwarah Medicine, Radiology, Medical Laboratories

Al Madinah Al Medicine, Medical Laboratory, Radiology, Monawwarah Anesthesiology, Clinical Pharmacy

Al Bukayriyah

Medicine, Medical Laboratories

Riyadh

Educational Management and Supervision, Accounting, Law, Business Administration, Special Education, Early Childhood Education, Educational Technology, Executive Master of Business Administration, Master of Computer Applications and Systems Management (continued)

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Table 7.2  (continued) No. College

Location

34. Inaya Medical College

Riyadh

35. Ibn Rushd College for Management Sciences 36. Al Bayan College of Engineering

37. Al Bayan College of Business Administration 38. Al Bayan College of Information Technology

Specializations and degrees

Laboratory Sciences, Dental Health Care, Medical Emergency and Intensive Care, Nuclear Medicine Technology, Nursing Science, Radiology Science, Respiratory Therapy, Biomedical Technology Radiology Science (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nursing (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification). Laboratory Sciences (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notice) Dental Health Care (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Nuclear Medicine Technology (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Biomedical Technology (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Abha Management Information Systems, Business Administration, Hospitality Management, Master of Business Administration (Men and Women) Al Madinah Al Architecture Engineering, Civil Engineering, Monawwarah Electrical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Interior Design (Men and Women) Al Madinah Al Accounting, Business Information Systems, Monawwarah Economics, Finance, Business Administration, Marketing (Men and Women) Al Madinah Al Computer Science, Information Technology Monawwarah (Men and Women) (continued)

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Table 7.2  (continued) No. College

Location

39. Jeddah International Jeddah College

40. Al Asala Colleges

Dammam

41. Gulf Colleges

Hafr Al Batin

42. Onaizah Colleges

Onaizah

Specializations and degrees Information Systems, Marketing and Business Administration, Interior Design, Fashion Design, Graphics Design, Accounting and Finance, Real Estate and Insurance (Men and Women) Fashion Design (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Interior Design (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Graphics Design (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) Accounting and Finance (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification) College of Architecture and Design (Architecture and Interior Design), College of Business (Human Resources, Marketing, Finance), College of Law (Law), College of Engineering (Architecture Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering) (Men and Women) Business Administration, English Language, Information Technology Engineering and Information Technology (Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Design Engineering, Architecture, Computer Engineering) Humanities and Administrative Science (Business Administration, Accounting, Law, English Language, Psychology) English Language (Admissions were stopped from 22-01-2018 (G) until further notification)

Source: Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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considered taboo or because there was no separate infrastructure for women in the institutions of higher learning. Vocational Institutions Vocational training did not receive much attention in the kingdom until the 1970s when in the wake of the oil boom the need was felt to train Saudis to find employment in the new sectors of the economy. As a result, some vocational training institutions were founded. As they catered to only a limited number of people and offered only a few courses, a significant majority of middle-level skilled workers to be employed in the booming Saudi market in the 1980s and 1990s continued to be imported from the outside. However, as the need for better vocational training of Saudis arose and the demands from the citizens for vocational training grew, the TVTC was established in 1980 to overlook the growth of technical and vocational education (TVTC 2011). Before the formation of the TVTC, three different agencies were responsible for technical and vocational education, including the Ministry of Education, which was responsible for secondary training schools that had courses in industrial, agricultural, and commercial streams; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which looked after Vocational Training Centers; and the Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs, which was responsible for assistant institutes in rural areas (TVTC 2011). After the foundation of the TVTC, all these institutions came under one umbrella, and the TVTC was tasked with the work of harmonizing the output of technical colleges and their training programs and the needs of the labor market. According to the TVTC, as of 2001, the kingdom had around 30 institutions imparting technical and vocational training and the number rose to around 75 in 2010. In 2008, the TVTC devised a general plan to overhaul the vocational education under the guidelines provided by the government to restructure the technical and vocational education. The generic plan had short-­ term, medium-term, and long-term objectives under which it was mandated to develop several programs. Based on this, the TVTC them to choose courses in education and medicine, which were considered “suitable” for women. These were also seen as vocations that women professionals were required to adhere to in order to prevent intermixing of non-mahram men and women. For further reading, see Vidyasagar and Rea (2004).

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succeeded in the “unification of the technical and vocational training system” (TVTC 2016, p. 7). The TVTC has divided the training programs at different levels, including industrial vocational levels and technical training. It has also succeeded in expanding the relations with the labor market, and had hence narrowed the gap between the training programs and the actual need of the market. Further, the TVTC has taken steps to rationalize the “curriculum, qualification level and the requirements of the training programs” (ibid). The TVTC devised a number of programs to enhance its output. These include joint training programs with government departments and agencies and cooperation with the private sector for education and training. With the government, the TVTC participates in carrying out training programs and “assumes the duty of supervising, delivering the vocational and technical training programs, securing the requirements of the human resources, setting up facilities and provisions as well as preparing plans and the training package” (TVTC 2016, p. 1). These include the Vocational Military Training Institute, which operates under the umbrella of the vocational military training program and collaborates with the TVTC “for the purpose of delivering professional training” to be able to serve in professional and technical positions in the Saudi security forces. The other institutes that run in partnership with the government are Inmate (Prison) Vocational and Industrial Training Institutes. These institutes are established by the TVTC in “collaboration with the Directorate General of Prisons for the purpose of training male/female inmates by delivering specialized vocational programs and training courses” for them to be able to lead a better life and earn a livelihood after serving their prison term (ibid). In collaboration with the private sector, the TVTC has developed a number of specialized institutions to advance the objective of developing a professionally trained local workforce. Under this plan, the TVTC “participates in carrying out or granting license and supervising programs with the private sector” (ibid). These include the following: 1. Strategic Partnership Institutes: These “are non-profit advanced technical institutes where TVTC is responsible for establishing and operating them in collaboration with the private sector.” 2. Colleges of Excellence: These are run by the government but “operated by highly qualified international training providers as well as employee trainers who have industrial experience” for male and

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3.

4.

5.

6.

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female graduate trainees who are trained with international-standard skills. National System for Joint Training: This “is a training program where TVTC collaborates with the Ministry of Labor, Human Resources Fund and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the purpose of supporting the concept of ‘training ended by employment’ at the private sector.” On-the-Job Training Program: According to this the TVTC carries out on-the-job training “for the purpose of promoting and developing the skills of workers who are specialized in technical and vocational professions at both the public and private sectors.” Private Training Centers and Institutes: These are for-profit nongovernment “training institutes and centers established by the private sector for delivering technical and vocational training.” While funded and operated fully by the private sector, these institutions have to seek a license from the TVTC and have to follow the course and curriculum structure authorized by the TVTC. Riyadh Institute for Entrepreneurship: This is a national not-for-­ profit institute “which aims at assisting those nationals who intend to run their own business as well as those (males/females) who have small and medium sized [business] projects.” The institute trains citizens, “delivers training, provides consultations and guidance, sponsors projects, assists in getting funds,” and facilitates in fulfilling the procedures laid down by the government.

The technical and vocational training institutions that run under the umbrella of the TVTC have emerged as one of the most important contributors in fulfilling the objective of nationalization of jobs and for industrial growth in the kingdom. One of the key issues as part of the Saudi Vision 2030 program is to diversify the economy beyond the oil sector and to create a pool of young Saudi graduates who will lead and operate the market in the direction of growth and development. On average, the TVTC annually trains over 300,000 Saudi graduates, both men and women, through its various training and vocational education programs (TVTC 2019). For example, in 2018, a total of 345,884 Saudi men and women benefitted from all the vocational and training programs run by the TVTC, and 316,622 Saudi men and women earned diplomas and degrees through the vocational and training institutes run either by the TVTC or in partnership with it (ibid).

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Specialized Centers for Research In addition to the universities, colleges, and vocational institutions, the kingdom has a network of highly specialized research centers that contribute to the higher education sector. As part of the increasing consciousness for acquiring and developing expertise, and the government’s push to encourage scientific and technological fields, the kingdom has witnessed a rapid increase in specialized research centers that carry out scientific and technological research. Though the number of such institutions is small compared to that in developed countries, and even countries with advanced educational infrastructure in the developing world, the number has increased significantly in recent years (Table 7.3). These centers are largely focused on research in niche fields such as petroleum and petrochemicals, renewable and nuclear energy, engineering, and medicine. In fact, Saudi Arabia is among the top 30 countries in the world in terms of scientific research output and the best in the Arab world. According to the Nature Index 2017, “Saudi Arabia leads the way in scientific research in the Arab world, but its position at the top of the pile is reliant on relatively few institutions” (Hodson 2017). The most important areas of scientific research in are chemistry and physical sciences, and “Chemistry is Saudi Arabia’s forte, and the main driver of its rise up the Nature Index rankings since 2012” (Ibid). Saudi Arabia has, to a large extent, achieved the goal of infrastructure development and expansion of the higher education system. It has done so through the expansion of the education system, private investment, and partnerships and cooperation with international universities and education centers of repute. The education system has grown rapidly due to the efforts of authorities and the educational reform measures aimed at providing education for all citizens. The idea of education for all has also been incorporated in the Saudi Vision 2030 program, which has contributed to expedite the process of infrastructure development and harmonization of existing resources for education and training purposes. Though its impact on the economy is arguably much less, it is expected to become more visible with time.

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Table 7.3  Top 20 Saudi Research Institutions Rank 2016

Institution

WFCa 2012

WFC 2016

Change (percent)

Article count 2016

1.

King Abdullah University of 40.51 Science and Technology King Abdulaziz University 5.24 King Saud University 1.63 King Faisal Specialist Hospital 0.62 and Research Center King Fahd University of 0.63 Petroleum and Minerals King Abdulaziz City for Science 1.29 and Technology Saudi Basic Industries 0.42 Corporation King Faisal University 0.33 Majmaah University 0.00 Saudi Aramco 0.00 King Abdulaziz Medical City 0.06 King Saudi Bin Abdulaziz 0.04 University of Health Sciences Alfaisal University 0.05 Qassim University 0.00 Prince Mohammed Bin Fahd 0.00 University Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health 0.00 Imam Abdulrahman Bin Faisal 0.00 University University of Tabuk 0.21 Umm Al-Qura University 0.20 Taibah University 0.00 King Fahd Medical City 0.00

71.88

77.4

168

10.90 3.89 2.19

107.9 139.0 253.7

164 32 18

1.76

177.6

11

1.46

13.4

22

0.66

–

3

0.53 0.50 0.48 0.37 0.36

– – – – –

4 1 3 3 3

0.34 0.33 0.33

– – –

7 1 1

0.29 0.29

– –

2 2

0.20 0.17 0.15 0.12

– – – –

9 2 2 2

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Source: Nature 2017 a Weighted fractional count (WFC) is an indicator used by Nature Index to assess an institution’s research output as a proportion of total output in the natural sciences. For details, see Nature (2017)

Quality Education and Human Resource Human resource development is a key component of higher education reforms in Saudi Arabia. In fact, it would not be wrong to argue that it is the driving force behind education reforms. The kingdom first recognized the need for better human resources in the 1970s and took steps to focus

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on this area for the first time in the 1980s. The fourth development plan (1985–90) prioritized human resource development as a key area for Saudi Arabia’s future. However, poor planning, bureaucratic inefficiency, and lack of expertise affected implementation and by the 1990s the issue of poor human resource management became an acute problem leading to protests and public demands for reforms. Despite some steps and new programs, the situation did not improve and Saudi Arabia again witnessed petitions demanding education reforms and better human resource management in the early 2000s. As the kingdom faced an acute problem of rising unemployment and underemployment among educated youth, and this started fueling resentment among the population, both against the authorities who were seen as not being bothered about the welfare of the people and against expatriates who were seen as stealing the jobs of Saudis and therefore a burden on limited local resources (Crane et al. 2011). It forced the monarchy to take immediate measures; one of the key measures was to gradually expand the higher education infrastructure and make quality higher education accessible to all. Undoubtedly, economic considerations played an important role in convincing the monarchy of the urgent need for education reforms. Education plays an important role in economic growth, helping nations to deal with the issues related to poverty, social mobility, and improving the quality of life. Saudi oil-based economy is grappling with problems such as unemployment, lack of skilled human resources, and uneven distribution of jobs, which are directly linked to education and training (World Bank 2008, p.  7). The problems of unemployment and lack of skilled labor, therefore, have been a main concern of the government while devising education reforms policy. Human resource development and Saudization of the workforce have been the twin objectives of education reforms. The vital role of education in economic progress is propelled by the rapid pace of technological advancement and changes in the global economy, which demand a human resource with a capacity for leadership, problem-solving skills, and collaboration and communication in a wide range of economic sectors. Lynn A.  Karoly (2010), a senior economist with the RAND Corporation, observed that in the twenty-first century, the countries of the world have been experiencing a transition from production-­based economies to ones based on knowledge and information.

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Just as the shift from agrarian to industrial economies required a new mix of skills for the workforce, so too has this most recent transition changed the nature of jobs and the skills required to be successful. Education, from the earliest ages until the transition to adulthood and even beyond, plays a role, as it has in the past, in advancing the productive capacities of the workforce, known as human capital. (p. 5)

For Saudi Arabia, the main objective for human resource development is to utilize its youthful population in nation-building and training a quality human resource to drive the economy forward. Unemployment among the youth, huge population of expatriate workers, and lack of skilled human resource was partly a product of poor education, and to achieve the objective of human resource development and Saudization, expansion of the education system, curriculum development, and investment in improving the quality of education were needed. As discussed earlier, many new universities and colleges were established and investments in the expansion and building of technical and vocational education were increased significantly. An important step was to develop a new curriculum, both in schools and universities, especially in STEM subjects. The curriculum development plan was devised and has had a significant impact on improving the quality of education, both at school and at higher education levels. The quality of science education in universities has improved, with Saudi Arabia emerging as the Arab leader in scientific research (Nature 2017). This has brought tremendous change in the way higher education is imparted. Though concerns about poor standards in humanities and social science subjects remain as they are not on the priority list of broader education reforms, the core areas of science and technology and vocational education have benefitted significantly from reform measures. The education system has gained from the plan to improve the human resource; however, some of the problems persist. A major concern has been the high dropout rate at the secondary and tertiary levels which is more among boys than girls. In 2005, the dropout rate among boys at secondary to tertiary level was as high as 45–50 percent while it was 35–40 percent among girls (UNESCO 2008, p. 316). Gradually, overall enrollment in tertiary and higher education has improved and some reduction in dropout has been noted. In 2017–18, for example, a significant 67 percent of the total school graduates were reported to have enrolled in one form of tertiary or higher education (United Nations 2018). The

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number of those seeking higher education has witnessed a gradual but notable improvement. For example, in 2001, only 12 percent of the total Saudi population enrolled in any bachelor’s program; this increased to 14.9 percent in 2004, 19.2 percent in 2013, and 23.5 percent in 2017 (UNESCO 2019). Among those seeking higher education, the rate was higher among women at 25.2 percent compared to men at 22.4 percent in 2017. Saudi Arabia also has a healthy teacher/student ratio at the higher education level and nearly 100 percent of university teachers are trained and qualified (ibid). Despite the huge expansion, increased enrollment, and better investment, the improvement in the quality of education was notably slow (Gonzales 2009). In order to deal with the situation, the Ministry of Higher Education decided to have an Observatory on Higher Education for harmonizing the market needs and quality of education. This “supports, monitors and guides the comprehensive and sustainable process of development of the higher education sector in the kingdom” (MHE 2010c, p.  5). This step proved to be vital in improving the quality of higher education and has started to show results, with a growing number of Saudi youth finding jobs in the private sector. A number of industrialized countries including the United Kingdom, Holland, Belgium, Canada, and some Arab countries, including Morocco, Lebanon, and Algeria, have also adopted the idea of an observatory, which has helped them in harmonizing and regulating the higher education system. Further, this has helped more Saudi graduates travel abroad for higher education. In 2014–15, for example, Saudis consisted of the third-largest number of students enrolled in foreign higher education institutions after Chinese and Indians (Ahmed 2015). Besides the overall measure and programs to improve the quality of education and human resource, a number of key initiatives have been taken. Overseas Scholarship Program A key initiative toward improving the quality of education and human resource has been the overseas scholarship program. The plan was mooted as King Abdullah Overseas Scholarship Program and first launched in 2005; it was later rechristened as The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program. Three phases of the program have been completed: Phase I—2005–09, Phase II—2010–14, and Phase III—2015–19. The program aimed at facilitating quality higher education to deserving

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students in specialized areas of study. Accordingly, in 2005, nearly 2800 Saudi students were provided with financial aid to study abroad and the number reached 50,000  in 2008 (MHE 2009, p.  15). The number of students going abroad with the help of this program increased significantly during the second phase, and in 2013, nearly 150,000 Saudi students were studying in various international universities on this scholarship. The number reached 200,000 in 2015. However, during the third phase, with some restrictions, the number has come down slightly, and as of 2018, about 114,000 Saudi students were availing the scholarship program, with the largest number of nearly 50 percent enrolled in American universities and colleges (Toumi 2018; MoE 2019). The overseas scholarship program has been one of the most successful steps as far as higher education reforms in Saudi Arabia are concerned. Given the quality of life, higher remuneration in both private and public sectors, and because of familial bonds, a majority of those studying abroad on the scholarship program prefer to return home to serve in the kingdom after completion of the course. This has prevented brain drain and has led to a vast pool of highly educated and trained Saudi youth gainfully employed inside the kingdom. A large number of them have taken employment in research, training, and teaching, and this has helped in the overall quality of higher education and research. Amro Kandil (2019), a Saudi human resource professional, notes that the overseas scholarship program “has changed the Saudi job market and tipped the scales in favor of Saudi candidates.” He further observes that “there is strong evidence of the direct impact of overseas scholarships on the Saudi economy” and that the program has enabled a growing number of “students with scientific and technical qualifications” to enter the job market and contribute to the economic advancement of the kingdom. Saudization Saudi Arabia, like other GCC countries, took initiatives for nationalization of jobs first in the 1990s. However, the lack of quality education was a major hindrance to the realization of the program. Initially, when higher education reforms were launched, only a horizontal expansion of infrastructure took place, while the vertical progress in terms of improvement in quality of education lagged behind. Hence, the program failed to yield the desired result, and only a limited improvement in terms of participation of the local workforce in the economy could be noticed. With

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growing demands, the number of the expatriate workforce continued to rise. While youth unemployment was high, unemployment among educated youth was even higher, and this was attributed to the lack of requisite skills among Saudi graduates, which made them less attractive for prospective employers compared to expatriate workers who brought higher skills on a relatively lower cost (Karoly 2010). For example, the unemployment rate in 2009 was 10.5 percent, but the unemployment among the youth of 20–24 years of age was as high as 30.2 percent during the same year (ILO 2010). More than 50 percent of the total labor force working in various sectors of the economy were expatriates. A total of 3.83 million male and female Saudi nationals as against a total of 4.31 million expatriates were engaged in the economy (ibid). Though the nationalization did not succeed, it helped increase the percentage of Saudi citizens in the total workforce. As a result of consistent inflow of funds and efforts to improve the quality of education and Saudization of the workforce, the number of the native workforce employed in the government and private sectors increased from 3.3 million in 2004 to 3.9 million in 2009 (MEP 2010b, p. 15). Hence, the total proportion of Saudi workforce including the public sector has increased from an estimated 30 percent in 2003 to nearly 40 percent in 2009. One reason that hindered the Saudization plan is the lack of participation of women in the economy. Apart from social problems, there are certain lacunas in the policy and the system that result in a huge gap between the numbers of male and female workforce. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of university graduates in 2008 were women, but only 15–18 percent of the total Saudi workforce comprised women (MHE 2010a). The reason was that women were encouraged to take up higher education in limited fields that were deemed suitable for the ‘female gender’ like medicine and teaching. This resulted in a large proportion of the population remaining outside the organized economic activity despite having achieved higher education. As is discussed in the chapter on female education, the situation has changed significantly in the last 20 years, and the pace of change has increase manifold under the leadership of King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed. Toward nationalization of labor market a new program called Nitaqat (ranges) was launched in 2011 with the objective of incentivizing the employment of Saudi nationals in the private sector. The program helped improve the share of Saudis in the private sector and as a result in

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2012–13, nearly 11 percent of employees in private-owned local and multinational businesses were Saudi nationals (MoL 2013; Peck 2017). The intention behind Nitaqat was not only to improve the ratio of Saudi labor in the job market but also to create job opportunities for educated Saudi youths in the private sector by restricting the number of expatriate workers a company could hire. Studies suggest that to a large extent the Nitaqat program helped in curbing the attitude of the private sector in hiring with preference for expatriates (Peck 2017). However, the problem of the high rate of unemployment among Saudis, especially among the youth and women, has persisted. Hence, the Saudization program has been incorporated in the Saudi Vision 2030 initiative launched by Crown Prince Mohammed. While it does not envision expelling the expatriates, it provides a roadmap for diversification of the economy beyond the petroleum sector and wishes to create opportunities for the private sector in newer areas of the economy that had remained untapped, including tourism, sports, entertainment, and archeology. The monarchy intends to harmonize the requirement of the job market with easing social restrictions. Quality education and training and investment in the identified new areas is expected to make it possible for the young Saudis to join the job market and reduce unemployment. As challenging as it appears, the coordinated effort on part of the leadership through the Vision program has been an important step in the right direction and is expected to make a difference in the short-to-medium term in the job market. Budget Allocation and Investment Budget allocation and funding of educational institutions is one of the major areas of higher education reform. Despite the opening of the higher education sector for private investment, an overwhelming section of the population depends on the government-funded institutions for education and training, both at school and higher education levels. Thus, government financing continues to play a significant role in the education sector. Budget allocation for education thus becomes an important tool of educational reforms. A consistent increase in the educational budget has been witnessed during the past two decades. Attempts have been made to foray into emerging and new areas of education particularly in the field of science and technology. The budget allocation for improving the quality and infrastructure of educational institutions and the establishment of new universities,

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professional colleges, and specialized institutions have been one of the cornerstones of reforms in higher education. Through the consistent increase in budgetary allocation, the monarchy has achieved considerable success in eradicating illiteracy and reducing unemployment, and some degree of success in Saudization of the workforce. The government allocated nearly 20 percent of its educational budget or US$36.3 billion to human resources under the Fourth Development Plan between 1985 and 1990 (MEP 2010a). During the Fifth Development Plan (1990–95) the total expenditure on human resource development was US$37.6 billion (MEP 2010a). Since then, the budget allocation for education has continuously increased; for example, the education budget for 2002 was SR 53 billion (US$14 billion), and rose to SR 61.7 billion (US$16.5 billion) in 2004, SR 69.9 billion (US$18.6) in 2005, SR 104.6 billion (US$28 billion) in 2008, and SR 122 billion (US$32.5 billion) in 2009 (MEP 2010a, p. 361). According to a World Bank report, during 1965–74 Saudi Arabia spent 3.6 percent of its GDP on education, which increased to 6.7 percent during 1975–84. It further increased to 7.2 percent during 1985–94 but decreased to 6.3 percent during 1995–2003 (World Bank 2008). In 2006, Saudi Arabia spent 6.2 percent of its GDP on education. During the Eighth Development Plan (2004–09) human resource development was one of the focus areas. Likewise, the Ninth Development Plan (2010–14) envisaged developing the human resource and underlined the need for a consistent increase in budgetary allocation for education. Accordingly, the planned allocation for education and human resource development was estimated at a whopping SR 498.4 billion (US$132 billion) for basic education SR 200.2 billion (US$53 billion) for higher education (MEP 2010a, pp.  361–390). Human resource development received the highest share of 50.6 percent of the total allocation for welfare during the Ninth Development Plan (Ghafour and Hanware 2010). The government, in its education reform initiatives, does not wish to lag behind due to budgetary constraints. It gives high priority to budget allocation for education and human resource development. To achieve the national objective of academic excellence and improvement of universities, the government is extending full support through budget allocation (Fatany 2007). It also plans to enhance the share of the local workforce in the public and private sectors to over 50 percent. Similarly, it plans to open more schools, universities, and professional institutions to cater to the

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needs of the growing population and the requirements of the market economy. With such huge investments in higher education, the kingdom now has a large network of higher educational institutions, including universities, vocational and technical colleges, and specialized centers of research and training. This could be made possible only through consistent public expenditure in the field of education. In addition to increased budgetary allocation for improving the condition of education, efforts have been made to foray into emerging new areas of study. In 2011, the Institute of Nanotechnology was launched that functions under the Riyadh-based KSU (Al-Harithy 2011). Pharmacy, adult education, biotechnology, renewable energy, bioinformatics, Artificial Intelligence and information technology are areas in which the government intends to invest for further expansion. Apart from the improvement in existing areas through consistent investment, the government is pumping funds into the development of infrastructure for new and emerging areas of study. The kingdom has done well as far as budgetary allocation in education is concerned. It has led to exponential growth in the network of education institutions, while some improvement in the quality of education is also noticeable and is reflected in the increase in research output of Saudi public universities as well as research institutions. The expected socioeconomic development with the budgetary input in the education system is being slowly realized and this can be witnessed in the growing number of Saudis going abroad for professional education and training and gaining employment in the private sector. These achievements are extraordinary if contextualized in terms of the fact that the kingdom embarked upon the path of modern education just six decades back. Though Saudi Arabia has a long way to go, compared to developed societies, it has been working on the path of achieving accessible and quality education for all. The strides in improving the quality of education can be attributed to the determination of the monarchy to channelize the financial gains of the oil-based economy into the field of education, especially science and technology. Science and Technology Education Science and technology education in Saudi Arabia has improved over time due to persistent efforts. Notably, science education in schools has improved and participation of students in science subjects at the intermediate level has increased. The quality of science and technology education

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at the higher level has also improved. One of the objectives of the emphasis on science and technology education was to develop a scientific temperament among the population and to encourage innovations that can help the kingdom to grow and develop. A lot of effort, on the part of the policymakers, is concentrated on improving the quality of science education and on enhancing the interest of students in science subjects. One of the key components of generating more interest among students to undertake higher education is to promote interest in STEM subjects at the school level. Toward this end, the Ministry of Education introduced new textbooks for science and mathematics in 2009–10 (MoE 2011). These books have been made available online for easy access to all students and teachers, and this helped make science education more interactive. Guidelines for students and teachers, for using the book, activities, and exercises have been made available online. These books make a conscious effort to create scientific interest and thinking among the students. A lot of emphasis has been put on activities and interactive lessons to create analytical skills among the students (MoE 2011). Another aspect of improvement in science and technology education is encouraging more scientists and researchers to engage in different fields of science and emerging areas of technology that can benefit the society. This can only be realized through consistent and long-term effort to improve the quality of science education at all levels. Attracting students to science subjects at the school level, encouraging them to take up science education at a higher level, and then providing opportunities and infrastructure to opt for scientific research requires a kind of atmosphere where scientific thinking is encouraged at all levels of education, and the reforms measures are aimed in this direction. The effort to improve science and technology education has been harmonized vis-à-vis policy and system levels. These efforts have yielded results and, comparatively, Saudi Arabia has improved the standard and quality of education in the field of science and technology. This is evident from the fact that new universities and institutions of higher learning have been established during the past decade. The number of scientific publications per million population has increased from 61 in 2002 to 71 in 2008 (UNESCO 2010, p. 265). KSU, which was established in 1957, won a UN award in recognition of its e-services in 2010 (KSU 2010). Likewise, the number of scientific articles published by Saudi higher education institutions has increased from 1321 in 2000 to 1745 in 2008; and the number of patents achieved by Saudi citizens also recorded an increase from 19 in 2003 to 30 in 2008 (UNESCO 2010, p. 266).

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According to Nature Index (Hodson 2017), Saudi Arabia is the leader among the Arab countries in scientific research despite being reliant on a few institutions that are producing high-quality research (Table  7.3). Saudi Arabia is ranked 29th in the 2018–19 scientific research output in the world. The only country in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region placed higher than Saudi Arabia is Israel; the next Arab country, the UAE, is placed 17 places below at 46th rank (Nature 2019). Among the subjects where Saudi institutions have done well are chemistry followed by physical sciences and life sciences. KAUST is the top-performing Saudi institution in terms of high-quality scientific research publication. It is ranked first in the region in chemistry, second in the earth and environmental sciences, seventh in life sciences, and third in physical sciences among the institutions in the MENA region (Nature 2017). Furthermore, “Saudi Arabia ranks 44th in the world for gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)” (Hodson 2017). Steps for Inclusive Education One of the focus areas of education reforms is in providing equal educational opportunities to all sections of society. Many sections of society based on gender, sect, ethnicity, and tribal affiliations faced systematic discrimination in the past. For example, Shias have for long complained of systemic discrimination in various fields including education (HRW 2009, p. 1). Women have also been subjected to systematic discrimination due to societal constraints. A number of reform steps have been taken to change the system, put an end to organized discrimination, and provide equal educational opportunities to all sections of the society. The Shias, who are mainly concentrated in the Eastern Province and Najran, and comprise about 10– to 15 percent of total population (ICG 2005), have long complained of discrimination and demanded religious and educational freedom. The Ismaili population of Najran has long complained of deprivation in terms of educational opportunities, which in turn also affects their prospects to gain employment both in public and private sectors (HRW 2008, p. 59). The issue of discrimination against Shias is not new. In 1979, after Juhaiman al-Utaibi’s siege of Kabah, and inspired by the events of the fall of Shah in Iran, the Shias in Eastern Province began protests. The security forces responded with a crackdown on the demonstrators which led to days of rioting resulting in scores of deaths. Likewise, during a pilgrimage

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in 2009, scores of Shias were killed and injured as a result of clashes between the Shia pilgrims and the notorious religious police, who tried to stop them from performing some religious ritual, not in accordance with Wahhabi Islam (Yamani 2009). The developments in the wake of the Arab Spring protests did not help the matter, and despite the years of steps for inclusive policy, especially in education, a feeling of unrest among the Shias was noted in 2011–12. Announcements and calls for protest demonstrations led to several arrests of Shia youths, which spiraled into more protests by the families demanding the release of arrested youths. A noted Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, who was accused of inciting the youth from the town of Awamiyah in Eastern Province to protest, was arrested by the security forces in July 2012. In January 2016, after a hasty trial and rejection of appeals, Saudi Arabia executed him as he was sentenced to the death penalty by the court. This led to a huge internal and external uproar and contributed to festering feeling of suppression among the Shias. The monarchy looks at Shias with suspicion and as a security threat vis-­ à-­vis Iran, and the rise of Shias in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein has alarmed the Saudi government. The Saudi Shias though do not have direct linkages  with Iran, they sometimes identify themselves with the theological fusion the Iranian revolution has given birth to and  feel inspired by the empowerment of Shias in Lebanon, Iraq and the larger Middle East (Yamani 2009). The system is such that there is a lack of trust between the authorities and the Shia population. The monarchy fears that the Shia identity might be overpowering the national identity among the Shias in Eastern province. It is also feared that complete freedom of the Shias may encourage the secessionist elements among them which could lead to the loss of oil-rich areas, populated mostly by Shias. The Shias too suffer from serious insecurities and feel discriminated. King Abdullah tried to address the Shia complaints of government apathy and discrimination in religious and cultural fields as well as in terms of education and employment. Accordingly, a number of new universities and colleges were opened in Shia-dominated Eastern Province (MHE 2010d). Changes have been witnessed in the attitude of Saudi policymakers regarding Shias that reflect on the education system. A number of steps have been taken in this regard to make the education system more inclusive and sensitive toward the needs of the Shia population. “The authorities have taken some measures to promote respect for the Shia religious minority,” particularly after the increased unrest among Shias due to regional circumstances since 2006 (HRW 2009, p. 7).

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In 2003, Abdullah had met a Shia delegation and accepted their petition. The same year, he initiated a series of National Dialogues, which for the first time brought together leading Saudi Shia and Sunni religious figures. Furthermore, since 2005 the authorities eased the prohibition on festivities surrounding Ashura,3 allowing more public processions in Qatif. Between February and April 2005 the authorities conducted elections for half the seats of municipal councils, the first elections in most parts of the kingdom, and did not interfere when Shias won all six contested seats in Qatif and five out of six in Hasa (HRW 2009, pp. 7–8). Moreover, steps have been taken to promote respect for Shias by removing derogatory and hateful references for Shias in the school textbooks. Similarly, the number of schools in the Shia majority areas grew while new universities and colleges were opened in Shia-populated Eastern Province and Najran (MEP 2009; MHE 2010b). In addition, Shias have been allowed some degree of autonomy in cultural and educational matters; for example, primary schools run by Shia religious organizations have been allowed to publish their own textbooks (Kéchichian 2013). In 2013, for the first time, Shia representatives were nominated in the 150-member Majlis al-Shura. This meant that the authorities were trying to do away with the official educational discrimination against Shias. However, these small steps may not be able to bridge the gap between Sunnis and Shias. The long-held complaint of the Saudi Shias that the government is discriminatory toward them is a result of their sociopolitical marginalization. The Shias claim that the government denies them religious and cultural space and discriminates against them in education, administration of justice, and employment. These steps and efforts have made partial changes, but more needs to be done to completely end the discrimination of Shias. Though the minority Shia and the large expatriate community continue to complain of discrimination, the case of women is entirely different. Saudi women have taken significant strides in claiming their rights and achieving leadership positions in various fields and the most significant area in which women have made progress is education.

3  The tenth day of the first month of the Islamic calendar, which is commemorated by Shia Muslims across the world as a day of mourning for the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of Prophet Muhammad, who was killed in the battle of Karbala in 680 (or 61 according to the Islamic calendar).

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References Ahmed, M.  A. (2015). Outward mobility of Saudi students: An overview. International Higher Education, 83, 19–20. Al-Harithy, A.  M. (2011, February 15). 1st Nanotechnology Institute to be launched on 11-11-11. Saudi Gazette, Riyadh. http://www.saudigazette.com. sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010121389178. Accessed 15 Feb 2011. Fatany, S. (2007, October 2). Education reform is the pathway to future. Arab News, Riyadh. http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&articl e=101957&d=2&m=10&y=2007. Accessed 28 May 2010. Ghafour, P. K. A., & Hanware, K. (2010, August 9). Kingdom to spend SR 1.44 Trillion in 9th Plan. Arab News, Riyadh. http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/ article98636.ece. Accessed 9 Aug 2010. Gonzales, P. (2009). Highlights from the TIMSS 2007: Mathematics and science achievement of US fourth and eighth-grade students in an international context. Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences. Hodson, R. (2017). Leader of the pack. Nature Index, 549(7673), 62–63. Human Rights Watch. (1992). Saudi Arabia: Empty reforms: Saudi Arabia’s new basic laws. New York. Human Rights Watch. (2008). Saudi Arabia: The Ismailis of Najran: Second class Saudi citizens. New York. Human Rights Watch. (2009). Denied dignity: Systematic discrimination and hostility towards Saudi Shia citizens. New York. International Crisis Group. (2005, September 19). The Shiite question in Saudi Arabia (ICG Middle East Report, No. 45). Brussels/Cairo. International Labor Organization. (2010, April 20–21). Saudi Arabia: Economic weakness led to unemployment rate hike. In G20 statistical updates, G20 Meeting of Labour and Employment Ministries. Washington, DC. http:// www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/jobcrisis/download/g20_saudiarabia_statistical. pdf. Accessed 11 Feb 2011. Kandil, A. (2019, February 17). Best time for Saudi youths to enter the job market. Arab News.https://www.arabnews.com/node/1453746. Last accessed 7 Feb 2020. Karoly, L.  A. (2010). The role of education in preparing graduates for the labor market in the GCC countries (RAND Labor and Population working paper series, WR-742). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Kéchichian, J. A. (2013). Legal and political reforms in Saudi Arabia. London: Routledge.

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Khan, G. A. (2011, May 16). World’s largest university for women opened. Arab News. http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article406075.ece. Accessed 16 May 2011. King Saud University. (2010, June 25). King Saud University wins UN award. Arab News, Riyadh. http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article73449. ece?service=print. Accessed 26 June 2010. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2009). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: National millennium development goals report. Riyadh. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010a). Khuttat al-Tanmia’ al-Tasia’, 2010–2014; Ninth development plan, 2010–2014. [Arabic]. http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=BF88A9FFF439434 EB0EB266DC7C7CC7C.alfa?event=ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=79. Accessed 8 Oct 2010. Ministry of Economy and Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010b). Statistical yearbook, 2010. Riyadh: Central Department of Statistics and Information. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2011). Bawwabat al-­Riyadhiyat wa al-Ulum al-Tabiyiat’; Mathematics and science portal. [Arabic]. http://ksa. obeikaneducation.com/node/129. Accessed 13 Feb 2011. Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2019). Bylaws: Private colleges. https://www.moe.gov.sa/en/HigherEducation/PrivateHigherEducation/ RulesAndRegulations/Pages/Bylaws-­PrivateColleges.aspx. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2009). al-Taqrir al-­ Watani; National report. [Arabic]. Available online: www.mohe.gov.sa. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010a). Observatory on higher education. Riyadh: Deputyship of Planning and Information. http:// www.mohe.gov.sa. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010b). Al-Ta’lim al-­ Aa’li wa Bina’ al-Mujtama’ al-Ma’rifah; Higher education and formation of knowledge society. [Arabic]. Riyadh. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010c). Al-Ta’lim al-­ Aa’li bi al-Arqam; Higher education in numbers. [Arabic]. Riyadh: General Department of Planning and Statistics, Deputy for Planning and Information Affairs. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2010d). Nahwa Bina’Mujtama al-Ma’lumat fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiyah al-Saudiyah: Musairah wa Injazat; Towards formation of information society in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Way forward and achievements. [Arabic]. Riyadh: General Department of Planning and Statistics, Deputy for Planning and Information Affairs.

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Ministry of Labor, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (2013). Statistical year book 2013. [Arabic]. http://portal.mol.gov.sa/Sites/default.aspx. Accessed 18 Aug 2015. Nature. (2017). Saudi Arabia. 549 (7673): S-61–S-81. Nature. (2019). Country/territory outputs. https://www.natureindex.com/ country-­outputs/generate/All/global/All/score. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. Peck, J. R. (2017). Can hiring quotas work? The effect of the Nitaqat program on the Saudi private sector. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy., 8(1), 316–347. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2011). Nash’at al-Muassasa’ wa Tatawwurha; Establishment and development of the corporation. [Arabic]. http://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 8 Feb 2011. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2016). Annual Report, 2015. https://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ InformationCenter/Documents/1437.pdf. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. Technical and Vocational Training Corporation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (TVTC). (2019). Annual Report, 2018. https://www.tvtc.gov.sa/Arabic/ Documents/TVTC2018Report.pdf. Accessed 7 Feb 2020. The World Bank. (2008). MENA development report: The road not travelled: Education reform in Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC. Times Higher Education (THE). (2020). World University Ranking 2020. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-­university-­ rankings/2020/world-­ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_ order/asc/cols/stats. Accessed 13 Feb 2020. Toumi, H. (2018, March 29). Saudi students abroad to be given bonus. Gulf News. https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/saudi-­students-­abroad-­to-­ be-­given-­bonus-­1.2196434. Last accessed 7 Feb 2020. United Nations. (2018). Sustainable development goals: First voluntary national review, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New York: UN High-Level Political Forum. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2008). Education for all global monitoring report: Education for all by 2015 – Will we make it? Oxford: Oxford University Press. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2010). World social science report: Knowledge divides. Paris: UNESCO and ISSC. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2019). Share of population by educational attainment, population 25 years and older. http://data.uis.unesco.org/. Accessed 7 Feb 2020.

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Vidyasagar, G., & Rea, D. M. (2004). Saudi women doctors: Gender and careers within Wahhabic Islam and a ‘Westernised’ work culture. Women Studies International Forum, 27, 261–280. Yamani, M. (2009). From fragility to stability: A survival strategy for the Saudi monarchy. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2(1), 90–105.

CHAPTER 8

Women Claim Equality in Education

One of the key challenges Saudi Arabia has faced over the years is the status of women. The kingdom has been vehemently criticized for the treatment of its women, who face structural discrimination on a daily basis (Mtango 2004; Pharaon 2004; Le Renard 2008; Buys and Macuiba 2012). It faces serious international backlash for perpetuating discriminatory norms and laws against women in the name of following the sharia or adhering to local customs. A majority of these criticisms are not unfounded as Saudi women have faced structural and systemic problems in the social, political, and economic domains. Nonetheless, this inherent structural gender discrimination is not entirely different from similar problems women face in any other society. Women everywhere, including in developed countries, have had to struggle to be able to claim equal status to men, and, in most cases, this struggle is an ongoing process. Saudi women have been struggling to be able to break the restrictions imposed on them either by the society or the state and have achieved varying degrees of successes in different domains. A combination of customary laws, social conventions, economic practices, and legal systems, drawn from patriarchal tribal traditions and Islamic sharia, and interpreted by the Wahhabi ulema, make the situation more difficult  for Saudi women. Accordingly, women are considered minors, and hence dependent on a male guardians. As dependents, they had to seek the consent of their legal guardians for all decisions, including admission in a university, travelling abroad, consulting a hospital and © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_8

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undergoing surgery, as well as in seeking employment. Saudi custom did not approve of women going out of their homes alone for education, employment, or other social activities. The daily struggle of women runs deeper within the history and social milieu (Doumato 1992, 1999; Moghadam 2003; Nashat and Tucker 1999; Al-Rasheed 2013). Representation of women in all aspects of public life, including the judiciary, media, sports, economy and business, and even in education, has been traditionally low. Saudi Arabia was the last country in the world to grant women the right to vote in 2011. Female participation in civil society and public affairs is negligible as the closed system does not allow much scope for a completely independent civil society (Montagu 2010). The society is patriarchal, and problems of misogyny, sexual exploitation, domestic violence, abuse, child marriage, and polygamy were widespread. Despite facing serious social restrictions and historical discrimination, Saudi women have made serious strides to push the boundaries set by the society to improve their condition. Notwithstanding the odds, numerous women have achieved remarkable success in various fields, and have contributed to public life. Their contribution to healthcare and education has been remarkable, and slowly the status of women within the family and society is improving. Gradually, women have pushed the taboos to engage in economic activities, and have made their mark by reaching leadership positions in businesses and corporations, while many have become successful entrepreneurs. They have joined government services, bureaucracy, and education administration, as well as are  contributing to scientific research in universities and institutions of higher learning. Economic imperatives have gradually opened the labor market and, in recent times, media and civil society have been debating the condition and status of women, thereby creating awareness about their rights and plights. Economic modernization and globalization contributed to the changing attitudes and facilitated greater female participation in public life. But above all, the reform initiatives by the monarchy have been instrumental in improving the condition of women. The role of leadership in opening the public sphere to women and promoting the ideas of women empowerment is notable. Since coming to power, King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed have lifted or eased a number of restrictions on women, including the prohibition on driving, public segregation, strict dress code, and on attending sports or entertainment events. A combination of these factors has contributed to easing some of the discriminations faced by Saudi women in their daily lives.

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In the field of education, Saudi women have made remarkable progress. Modern education has helped them push the glass ceiling imposed by tradition and customs, and accessibility to education has had a profound impact upon women (Bahry 1982; Jamal 1988; Al Rawaf and Simmons 1991; Zaidan 2000; Hamdan 2005; AlMunajjed 2009; Quamar 2013). This has led to the opening of new fields, such as science, technology, engineering, law, business, and sports, that were hitherto closed to them and facilitated the participation of women in the labor market. Educated and financially independent women have become vocal about their rights within the family and society. This is reflected in the increasing visibility of women in media and public spheres and in the articulation of their needs and rights by themselves (Sakr 2008; Al Sadiq and Hausheer 2014; Baki 2004). The public education system has become more amenable to women and the practice of a separate curriculum has been discontinued. Though most of the education institutions continue to follow the idea of segregation, a few have discontinued the practices and adopted the coeducation model prevalent elsewhere.

Early Reforms It has been argued that the sudden bout of modernization in the aftermath of the discovery of oil deeply affected the social lives of women, and put immense restrictions on them. Traditionally, women had more freedom than generally understood, particularly in private domains such as marriage. In the nomadic or seminomadic lifestyle, women did not face restrictions, especially in terms of their movements outside the household. They participated in the traditional modes of economic activities, had an active involvement in family farms, reared camels, goats, and chicken, helped in fishing (in coastal areas), participated in social life for leisure and recreation, and were at the forefront during festivities and mourning (Katakura 1977; Altorki and Cole 1989). They were an integral part of the caravan that moved in search of pastoral lands, rode camels, were responsible for many aspects of tribal life such as tendering for the elderly and children, and even practiced traditional forms of medicine (Al-Khateeb 1981, 2007). Even under patriarchy, they were responsible for family and children when men were away for trade or for other purposes. At least within the context of their family, clan, and tribal environment, women had considerable leeway, space, and freedom of action. The discovery of oil and its influence on the market and

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society led to the confinement of women as they were no longer required to participate in economic activities, and modern education was considered unsuitable for them as it required learning foreign ways. The only education that remained available to them was traditional religious education. The debate over the need for women’s education began in the late 1950s and gained momentum during the reign of King Faisal (1964–75). For the first time, King Faisal mandated girls’ education in 1961 and the first girls’ school in the kingdom was opened in 1962 (Kéchichian 2008, p. 117). King Faisal’s reign was significant at the beginning of women’s education. Queen Iffat had a profound impact on the nascent debate on the role and place of women in the traditional tribal Saudi society. She was instrumental in promoting and founding numerous institutions and organizations that continue to work toward empowering women through skill development, education, and leadership training programs. Till the formal beginning of public education for girls, only a few elite families ensured education for their girls either by employing lady tutors at home or sending their girls to boarding schools in Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus (Altorki 1986). These girls “belonged to the first generation of Saudi bureaucrats and merchants.” They were the first generation of Saudi women to acquire modern education because of their fathers’ occupation, to live abroad for “extended periods,” and to “benefit from the opportunity to acquire formal education” (Al-Rasheed 2013, p. 86). The introduction of education for girls took more than four decades since modern education for boys was introduced and nearly three decades from the establishment of the kingdom. Still, when King Faisal notified a policy for girls’ education, the monarchy faced vociferous resistance from the ulema (Ramazani 1985, p. 259). The strongest opposition erupted in the Qassim region, where a school was forced to shut down, and one religious scholar warned the people saying: You Muslims, beware of the dangers. Get united to go to the government and scholars to show them the truth and ask them to close these schools that teach modern material. The outside of these schools appears to be good but inside there is corruption and chaos. The schools will end up promoting unveiling and debauchery. If you do not act now before it is too late, you will regret it. (Cited in Al-Rasheed 2013)

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In the new education policy the monarchy was forced to underline that the need for educating women is within the Islamic framework, to counter opposition from the ulema (Al-Aqil 2005; Al-Eisa 2009). King Faisal articulated that the “purpose of educating a girl is to bring her up in a proper Islamic way so as to perform her duty in life, be an ideal and successful housewife and a good mother, ready to do jobs suitable to her nature such as teaching, nursing and medical treatment” (cited in Al-Rasheed 2013, p. 90). Despite modern education becoming available, only a few chose to go for higher education after completing school education as social norms mandated early marriage. Those who were allowed to join higher education because of supporting parent/s or spouse confined themselves to the fields of religious studies, pedagogy, and medicine as other fields were considered too masculine. The key factor for the restrictions on women was the influence of the ulema on the monarchy and society. Even after allowing the opening of modern education for women, systemic discrimination remained as the ulema had control over education policy and system. They devised a separate curriculum for women at all levels and prohibited female participation in many courses and activities including physical education, industrial training, and so on. With a change in time, the general education came under the control of technocrats, but female education remained the exclusive domain of the ulema. Moreover, under the influence of religious and tribal leaders, the society discouraged women from taking employment, and those who did take up a job did so mainly due to economic imperatives to support the family and had to seek the permission of their male guardians (Al-Khateeb 2007). Though gradually the opposition to girls’ education subsided, the pace of reforms was slow. The efforts by the monarchy, advocacy by the members of the royal family, and constant articulation by intellectuals made a difference and resulted in the opening of schools and colleges for women in different provinces. The people gradually started to allow their daughters and spouses to acquire modern education. The oil boom paved the way for massive improvements in the educational facilities and infrastructure, and the Ministry of Higher Education was formed in 1975 to deal with filling the deficiencies in higher education, particularly in the science and technology fields. With an abundance of resources, Saudi Arabia was able to hire talents from abroad, including consultants from Europe and the United States, teachers from the neighboring Arab countries, and staff from countries in South and Southeast Asia, who laid the foundation for

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higher education. It was during this post–oil boom period that one could notice a significant expansion in girls’ education. Nonetheless, it was not until the 1990s that girls’ education reached a degree of parity with boys. For example, in 1967–68, the ratio of girls’ schools and enrollment was one-fifth of boys’ schools; it reached the half-way mark in 1980–81 and reached parity in 1999–2000 (Table 4.1). The early 1990s witnessed a new phenomenon; for the first time, the kingdom was facing demonstrations, debates, and petitions articulating the need for political, economic, social and educational reforms. This period is crucial because those demanding reforms included prominent women, and their demands included improvements in the condition of women and better education and employment opportunities for them (Dekmejian 2003; Raphaeli 2005). Unemployment among the native population, lack of specialized skills and inadequate quality training became major roadblocks and forced the monarchy to look for corrective steps and improve the quality of education with an emphasis on human resource development. It was the time when the authorities recognized that the kingdom cannot embark on economic growth without the active participation of one half of the population, that is, women. Therefore, measures were taken to improve access for women at all levels of education, and it was deemed necessary to open higher education, particularly professional courses and programs, for women (Al-Aqil 2005; Al-Eisa 2009; Al-Rasheed 2013). One of the most significant developments in the 1990s was the opening of female sections in religious institutions. Earlier, only a few religious institutions, such as the Umm al-Qura University (1971) and Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University (1984), were open to women. As demands for better education opportunities resonated, more religious educational institutions opened female sections leading to an increase in the number of female religious graduates. It provided more women with educational opportunities, and at times an escape from the restricted “domestic space, filled as it is with sometimes suffocating obligations” (Le Renard 2008, p.  623). Further, it created the public sphere as women religious scholars and preachers gained access to uncharted public spaces, such as university departments, charitable organizations and mosques, which were not available to them earlier. Though these were segregated spaces and focused on issues of women, they allowed women to “achieve, to some extent, emancipation from domestic duties” (ibid).

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The issue of joblessness and unemployment among the Saudis was another important agenda that was raised by those demanding reforms. The idea of nationalization of the labor force led advocates of women’s rights to argue that more women should be allowed in the workforce; the monarchy, despite considerable resistance from the conservative ulema, agreed with the demand but mandated following of dress codes and gender segregation in public spaces. Thus, many private sector companies started to hire Saudi female employees as it was a business incentive to attract female clientele. For example, private banks came with the idea of female-only branches to attract female patrons (AlMunajjed 1997). Furthermore, hiring Saudi women became cost-effective due to the nationalization initiative (Niblock and Malik 2007). As the job market opened up, demands for female education in the nonconventional course increased, leading to an expansion of the education infrastructure to accommodate the growing demands.

Contemporary Reforms In the post–September 11 debates inside the kingdom, women were allowed more space to voice their concerns on issues of their rights and need for better education and job opportunities. Prominent women in various fields took the lead to express their views and were occasionally encouraged and rewarded by the monarchy (Al-Ahmadi 2011). Female members of the ruling family and women with liberal, modernist, and reformist leanings took an active interest in promoting women’s rights and freedom. Princess Adela bint Abdullah became one of the most vocal and visible advocates of women’s rights, and while taking active part in public life spoke about the need for improvement in the condition of women on several occasions. She reportedly had a profound impact on her father in moving him to take reform initiatives to improve the condition of women, especially in the field of education (Dickey 2009). Other royal women, such as Luluwah al-Faisal (daughter of King Faisal), Basmah al-Saud (daughter of King Saud), Reema al-Bandar (granddaughter of Crown Prince Sultan) and Hussa al-Salman (daughter of King Salman), took the lead in raising concerns about the condition of Saudi women. It helped create some space for other women from prominent families to voice their concerns (Syeed and Zafar 2014). They worked toward creating opportunities for women in different sectors including education and business and were considered leading voices advocating

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reforms (Fatany 2013). Their family status enabled them to be vocal, and being independent and intellectual, they sought to create social awareness regarding the status of Saudi women. In the last two decades, the reform steps taken by the monarchy have played a significant role in paving better education opportunities for women. The reign of King Abdullah, both as de facto ruler (1995–2005) and as king (2005–15), stands out in this regard (Fatany 2013; Murphy 2015; Al-Haidari 2015; Al-Jarousha 2015). Leaning toward reforms and modernization and endorsement of the rights and role of women, he encouraged intellectuals to take interest in promoting the cause of tamkin al-mara’ (women empowerment). His personal interest in improving facilities and accessibility for women’s education and creating economic opportunities for them created a conducive environment for reforms and inspired various government ministries, departments, and agencies to take measures for improving opportunities for women. On numerous occasions, he invited and personally received women in the Royal Court and was seen shaking hands with them, which under normal circumstances was considered taboo. Abdullah received female delegations, accepted their petitions, gave assurances for improvement in their social conditions, conferred awards to women scientists, doctors, journalists, and academics, and appointed them in leadership positions (Fatany 2013). This period witnessed increasing participation of women in public debates through traditional and new media on a variety of issues, most importantly on problems faced by women. At the same time, advocacy groups and organizations aimed at promoting women’s rights became part of the civil society and were supported by powerful princesses and influential elites (Al-Rasheed 2013). Female participation in the labor force increased, especially in banking, retail, hospitality, real estate, and IT sectors, which were not open to them until a few years ago (AlMunajjed 2010). Likewise, women’s engagement in civil society through voluntary work, charity organizations, women’s associations, and professional guilds increased (Montagu 2010). The efforts of King Abdullah toward reducing the marginalization of women is recognized in the kingdom and some of the obituaries upon his death even termed his reign as a “golden era” for Saudi women (Muhammad 2015; Al-Haidari 2015; Ja‘afery 2015).

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Progress in Women’s Education In the last two decades, female enrollment in school and higher education has witnessed a massive boost, with women eventually outnumbering men in university enrollment. In 2009, for example, 56.6 percent of university students were women (MHE 2010a). Women outperformed men in higher education in many fields. The ratio of literate women to men increased from 83.8 percent in 1995 to 97.9 percent in 2008 (MEP 2009, p. 31). Similarly, the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and higher education increased considerably. Their participation in the labor force improved, and in 2008–09, women comprised 15 percent of the total workforce and 20 percent of those going abroad for higher education (MHE 2010a). The number of women students’ enrollment in graduate programs in universities increased to 450,000 between 2005 and 2010 (MHE 2010a). A number of steps taken by the monarchy directly or indirectly helped in the progress of female education. For example, in 2001 Saudi women were for the first time issued identity cards, and in 2006, it was made mandatory for women to have their own identity cards (Fatany 2013).1 The kingdom ratified the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in September 2000, which meant that, among other things, the government had to take initiatives for equal education opportunities for women (AlMunajjed 2010). An unprecedented move was a women’s delegation meeting the crown prince in January 2003 and submitting a petition advocating improvements in educational and economic opportunities for women (Fatany 2013). Furthermore, one of the key themes during the third national dialogue held in Mecca in June 2004 by the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (Markaz Malik Abdulaziz li al-Hiwar al-Watani, KACND) was the condition of women in Saudi Arabia, and the gathering included 35 women (Asharq Al-Awsat 2005). In March 2002, the monarchy decided to merge the Directorate for Girls’ Education with the Ministry of Education (Hamdan 2005, p. 44). The decision was taken after a fire incident in a primary girls’ school in Makkah Province led to a public uproar on the role of the mutawwa (Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice or religious police) in preventing the firemen from entering the schools, as it 1

 Until then, women were listed in their legal guardian’s identity cards.

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would have violated the modesty of the women teachers stuck inside, resulting in the death of 15 young girls, that steps were taken to oust the ulema from the control over women’s education (Prokop 2003, p.  78). This was the first step in bringing women’s education to the mainstream and limiting the interference of the ulema. Subsequently, a new education policy and fresh school curriculum were implemented with the objective of improving the quality of school education as well as reducing gender discrimination (MoE 2006). In 2005, women were allowed to enroll in fields which were earlier not open to them, including in the field of law. In 2007, a new women’s university, Princess Norah Bint Abdulrahman University,2 was founded and its state-of-the-art campus with a capacity of 50,000 students, faculty, and staff was inaugurated in Riyadh in May 2011 (Thompson 2014). The first coeducational university, KAUST, was opened in 2009. In the same year, for the first time, a woman Norah al-Fayez, who was a seasoned educationist, was appointed as Deputy Minister of Education and put in charge of girls’ education. The monarchy also rewarded some of the leading women achievers in the field of science and technology for encouraging women to take higher education in these areas. For example, Khawla bint Sami al-Kuraya, a cancer research scientist at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital, Riyadh, was awarded the King Abdulaziz medal for her contribution to medical research in 2010 (Arab News 2010). This was the first time that the scientific accomplishment of a Saudi woman was formally recognized by the monarchy. More reform initiatives were taken in other areas that underlined the changing attitude of the monarchy as well as of the society on the condition of women. A key development was the appointment of 30 women to the Majlis al-Shura in January 2013, and the granting of rights to the franchise to women (Khan 2014a, b). Women for the first time participated in the municipal elections held in December 2015, both as voters and as candidates (Quamar 2016). A number of noted women who had achieved excellence in their fields were recognized by the monarchy for their services to the kingdom. These included Mody al-Khalaf, who was appointed as assistant attaché for cultural and social affairs in the Saudi 2  The university is named after Princess Norah, the favorite sister of the founder king of Saudi Arabia. She was considered close to Ibn Saud, and reportedly had a profound influence on political decisions. In fact, she is identified as one of the closest confidantes of the king, his main adviser, and even took to managing the affairs of the state when the king was unable to do so because of illness or travel. It is reported that on many occasions, the king identified himself in public as “the brother of Norah” (Stenslie 2011, pp. 72–73).

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embassy in the United States in September 2012, and Malak al-Nory, who in the same month was conferred the Ibn Khaldun Fellowship, supported by the KFUPM and Saudi Aramco, to pursue research at the MIT in the United States (Al-Rashid 2012; Fatany 2013). In 2013, the monarchy for the first time granted license for the establishment of a women’s sports center. The same year women were allowed to practice law in Saudi family courts. Bayan Mahmoud al-Zahran became the first female lawyer in the kingdom to receive a license for practicing law. The monarchy also appointed 60 women legal researchers in the Courts of Appeal across the kingdom. In August 2013, the Council of Ministers passed a law against domestic violence and child abuse. Hanadi al-Hindi became the first Saudi woman to be issued professional license to fly planes in 2014, and in December 2014, Fatimah Al-Rashoud was appointed head of the Women Guidance Committee in the General Presidency of the Two Holy Mosques, the committee that looks after the administration of Kaaba in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. These initiatives created a conducive environment for the promotion of female participation in public life and gave the message to the society that women, if allowed to pursue education and career, can achieve equal success to men, and that this does not violate their faith and customs. Resultantly, Saudi women have made significant gains in the field of education in the past two decades. While the ulema lost control of boys’ education in the 1960s, they continued to wield influence over girls’ education until the reign of King Fahd. Thus, the curriculum and contents of girls’ education were determined by the ulema and hence were largely regressive and full of religious instructions (Prokop 2003). For over four decades, a separate General Directorate for Girls’ Education looked after girls’ schools, and only after the merging of the directorate with the education ministry was the situation reversed. As was the case during King Faisal’s effort to start education for girls, King Abdullah too faced resistance from the conservative ulema for initiatives to improve women’s education. For example, Sheikh Saad al-Shithri, a member of CSU, criticized the foundation of KAUST as it was a coeducational university, arguing that it will ruin the moral fabric of the society (Al-Mufadhali 2009). This opposition did not prevent the monarchy from continuing to expand the education system to make it more inclusive for the female population. The monarchy was, however, cautious to tread a fine line and not entirely ignore the resistance from the ulema, and hence the idea of segregation of women in the educational institutions, except in the case of

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KAUST, was maintained. Considerable resources were invested in improving infrastructure for female education, leading to an increase in the number of schools, colleges, vocational institutions, and university branches offering specialized courses for women. For example, in 1967–68 there were only 100 girls’ schools across the kingdom, but they reached nearly 1600 by 1975–76, and crossed 6500 by 1990–91. In 2000–01, there were more girls’ schools than boys’; that is, 13,726 schools for girls as against 13,437 for boys (Table 4.1). This led to a considerable improvement in female literacy rate, the ratio of literate women to men too increased considerably, and a degree of parity in male and female literacy was achieved (MEP 2009, p. 31). Nonetheless, women faced problems in the form of differential curriculum and lesser enrollment in science and technology education. For example, in 2008–09 women made up only 2 percent of students in engineering colleges, while their representation in professional courses was nil. Their proportion was higher in education (87 percent) and medicine (48 percent) fields (Table  8.1). In 2004, the monarchy introduced a new school curriculum that addressed some of the disparity between male and female education (Al-Eisa 2009). The following year a new education policy was introduced that envisaged equal educational opportunities for both men and women. These measures addressed the problem of disparity in the curriculum and differences in the quality of education available to girls and boys. The new education policy sought to increase the participation of women in general and in professional Table 8.1  Distribution of students in higher education in Saudi Arabia, 2009 Area of study Education Arts and Humanities Social Sciences, Economics, and Law Natural Sciences Engineering Agriculture Health and Medicine Other professional courses

The ratio of Men (percent)

The ratio of Women (percent)

13 47 53

87 53 47

52 98 67 52 100

48 2 33 48 0

Source: Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2010

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education (MoE 2006). It stated that “female education […] facilitates all necessary means for girls to seek education and provide opportunities for them to acquire any type of education that suits their nature and fits the national interest” (ibid). Notably, the policy document emphasized the importance of preserving local culture and tradition and underlined the need to preserve the Islamic framework of education. This was done not to antagonize the ulema, who were already unhappy over losing control over girls’ education. The idea was to not hamper infrastructure development for female education while keeping the conservatives under check. Through sustained and considerable efforts, women’s education, which was taboo until the 1960s, became acceptable and widespread in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Resultantly, women outnumbered men at all levels of education. For example, in 2013–14, girls outnumbered boys in school, college, and university enrollment, and their dropout ratio was lower across all levels. Since 2000, the number of schools for girls surpassed the number of schools for boys. According to the Ministry of Education, in 2013 Saudi Arabia had a total of 35,397 schools of which 18,729 were girls’ schools while 16,668 were boys’ schools (MoE 2013). As of 2017–18, the total number of schools in the kingdom had increased to 37,500 and nearly 55 percent were girls’ schools. Similarly, the enrollment rate for girls at 52.5 percent is higher than for boys at 47.5 percent. During 2012–13, of the total number of students enrolled in Saudi public schools, 2.6 million were boys while 2.7 million were girls. In 2017–18, the total enrollment had increased to 5.5 million, and girl students outnumbered boys by nearly 4–5 percent. The dropout rate among boys at secondary to tertiary level is as high as 45–50 percent while it is 35–40 percent among girls. Special emphasis on improving educational opportunities and accessibility both at school and higher levels has resulted in improvement in women’s education. As of 2013–14, nearly all universities had opened women’s branches, either within the same campus or on a separate campus, and almost all courses offered in these universities including engineering, business administration, aeronautics, and nanotechnology were opened to women (MoE 2014). Moreover, women account for over 60 percent of students enrolled in universities and colleges and 20 percent of the students going abroad (MHE 2010b). One of the major factors that forced the monarchy to invest in female education was the need to increase their participation in the workforce and

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decrease dependency on expatriate labor (Hamdan 2005, p.  58). This opened up new avenues for women to step up their representation in the job market, and since the late 1990s “women have been moving steadily into new areas of employment which were unacceptable a generation ago, such as advertising, broadcasting and journalism” (Doumato 1999, p.  569). The need for nationalization of the workforce and productive participation of the other half of the population in the economy opened new doors for women. Along with the improvement in the education infrastructure within the kingdom, the number of women going abroad for higher education has increased. Nearly 25 percent of students benefitting from the overseas scholarship program were women (Molavi 2015). The budget allocation for female education has also witnessed significant increase; it had reached parity with allocation for male education in 1999–2000 and had surpassed it by 2005–06. As of 2009–10, nearly 52 percent of the education budget was earmarked for female education and this trend has continued well into the next decade. As a result, education and training facilities for women improved and professional and vocational institutions started to admit girls in different courses including nursing, pharmacy, and design. In 2019, there were more than 375 private and public vocational training institutions for girls with an enrollment of more than 40,000 students in as diverse fields as information technology, business management, photography, textile and design, food and hygiene, electrical maintenance, jewelry design, and beauty care (TVTC 2019).

Saudi Vision 2030 and Women’s Education The process of reforms in women’s education that gained momentum during Abdullah’s reign has continued under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed within the broader framework of economic and social reforms. The Saudi Vision 2030 provides a framework for comprehensive socioeconomic changes, and education including women’s education features prominently in the vision document. As part of the vision, Saudi Arabia has launched the human capital development program, which aims to improve the “outputs of the education and training system at all stages from early education to continuous education and provide training to reach the international levels through education” (KSA Vision 2019). The vision document underlines the need for continuous investment in education and training to equip young men and women with better

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training and skills for the job market. It underlines that the government will make an effort to provide quality education to “Saudi children, wherever they live, to enjoy the higher quality, multi-faceted education.” It further emphasizes the need for investment “particularly in developing early childhood education, refining … national curriculum and training … teachers and educational leaders” (ibid). Furthermore, the vision aims to “redouble efforts to ensure that the outcomes of our education system are in line with market needs.” The idea is to “expand vocational training in order to drive forward economic development,” and provide scholarships to deserving students to be able to enroll in “prestigious international universities and be awarded in the fields that serve … national priorities.” In 2019, Saudi Arabia was among the top five improved countries in the world to fill the gender gap in education, and in 2020 it has improved its ranking to 92 and score to 0.983 in terms of female education (WEF 2020). Women’s participation in higher education and research, including in the science subjects, has improved significantly, and 34 percent of doctoral students in Saudi universities are women while about 23 percent of researchers are women (Nature 2017). There are a number of Saudi women who have taken up leadership positions in research institutions in science subjects and some of them have been doing excellent work in terms of research and training in highly specialized subjects including medicine, nanotechnology, bioinformatics, and chemical sciences.

Impact on Condition of Women Women’s education has had a profound impact on the condition and status of women in various fields. Their economic participation has increased significantly, while more women are now visible in the media and civil society as well as in other fields. At the same time, their participation in fields such as politics, judiciary, sports, and entertainment has witnessed only partial improvement. Economy Women are increasingly marking their presence in the economy, and their participation, which was only 14 percent in 1990, increased to 21 percent in 2015. Though this is less than the average 43 percent participation of women in economic activity for the GCC countries, considering the fact

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that the kingdom embarked on women’s education and economic participation late, the statistics are remarkable. After embarking on the path toward the economic participation of women, the monarchy had to face considerable opposition from the ulema. For example, when the government issued a notification allowing employment of women in occupations other than those of teachers and doctors, Abdulaziz bin Baz—a popular and influential preacher who was later appointed the Grand Mufti—issued a fatwa rejecting the idea of female participation in labor force, and termed it a great sin that would open the doors of evil in the society (Bin Baz 1979). In the twenty-first century, Saudi women have come a long way in actively involving themselves in the economy and can now pursue education and a career in the fields of their choice. The ratio of women in the labor market has gradually increased; for example, in 1992 women constituted only 5.4 percent of the native workforce, which improved to 14.4 percent in 2010 (AlMunajjed 2010). The World Bank data on labor force reveals a similar picture; in 1990 women constituted nearly 14 percent of the total workforce (including expatriates) in the Saudi job market, and their share increased to 21 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2015). In the past, while the economic participation of women had remained low, the comparative participation of Saudi women was even lower; in the early 1990s nearly 14 percent of the total workforce were women but only a small 5.4 percent were Saudis. In 2013–14, this had changed substantially: if women made up 20 percent, Saudi women made up 17.6 percent of the total workforce, and this further improved to 19 percent in 2016–17. Thus, the share of Saudi women active in the economy has tripled, though the proportion of women in the economy (including expatriates) has increased only marginally. Saudi women have breached traditional barriers to join professions that were earlier not available to them. Previously, women were confined to jobs in fields like education and medicine that were acceptable socially and were sanctioned by the ulema, but with changing circumstances they are getting education as well as employment in newer fields. They are taking up jobs as cashiers and saleswomen in supermarkets and departmental stores; security personnel at airports, banks, and government offices; receptionists and personal assistants in the hospitality sector; and as advisers and consultants in various sectors. In October 2019, Saudi Arabia announced that women will be allowed to join the armed forces (Jaffari 2019).

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Furthermore, the opening of science, engineering, and legal studies for women has led to an increased number of female professionals in these fields. Saudi women scientists such as Hayat Sindi and Samera Ibrahim Islam have made a mark internationally through their work and were included in the top 20 Muslim women scientists by a UK-based online science magazine (Arab News 2014). Others such as Dalal Alezi, Ranad Shaheen, and Jasmeen Merzaban have made their mark in science education and research in recent times (Nature 2017). Female representation in the business sector has witnessed a sharp rise since 2008 when women were allowed to register their own commercial firms. For example, as of 2013, 54,231 commercially registered businesses were owned by women as against 44,047 in 2012 (MCI 2013). According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the proportion of women’s ownership in private sector enterprises reached 4.3 percent in 2013 while their investment in the Saudi market has seen a rise since 2008. The Ministry has taken several measures to encourage and enhance women’s participation in the commercial and business fields, such as opening women service centers in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dammam, and allowing women to be members of the board of directors (BoD) of private firms. Amélie Le Renard notes that “the young generation of women, among whom a large proportion are educated and want to have their own activities beyond their families – whether they are informal activities, informal business, writing, shopping, or work” (Le Renard 2008, p. 629). Saudi sociologist Mona AlMunajjed notes that the “rising education level is a major factor in the increase of female participation in the labor force.” She elucidates further that “[t]his is not to say that simply getting a degree enables Saudi Arabia’s females to join the labor market –unfortunately, it does not” (AlMunajjed 2010, p. 3). This highlights the dichotomy of the economic system that poses a challenge to Saudi women who aspire to become financially independent and contribute to the family’s welfare and national progress, and the reform initiatives by the monarchy have contributed to bridging the gap. However, in terms of global ranking, Saudi Arabia remains at the bottom with the 148th rank and a score of 0.375 in the global gender gap index (WEF 2020). Many individual women have made their mark in their professions and have reached a leadership position in their fields. Reema al-Bandar, a member of the royal family, who has worked in various public and private sectors in Saudi Arabia and abroad, was appointed the Saudi ambassador to the United States in February 2019. She is the first woman Saudi envoy

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sent to any country. In the Ministry of Education, there are three women secretaries who are in charge of various departments and agencies, including Leena al-Twaimi, who is responsible for the scholarship department, Hanan al-Amir, who is responsible for private education, and Tahani al-­ Bayz, who is in charge of education programming. Furthermore, there are numerous other women who have made their mark in public life. Some of the other prominent names include Norah al-Fayez (educational administration), Samia al-Amoudi (medicine), Lubna al-Olayan (finance), Sarah Al Ayed (business), Hatoon al-Fassi (academics and social work), Samar Fatany (journalism), and Suhaila Zain al-Abideen (human rights). These prominent women have contributed to changing the perception of Saudi women and their condition. These women have challenged the social norms and customs, and have widened the scope for their public role. In their limited ways, they have acted as agents of change, and have acted as role models for the younger generations. The monarchy has contributed to promoting female professionals. It has encouraged government-sponsored and independent organizations, such as chambers of commerce, the national dialogue center, as well as colleges and universities, to appoint women in leadership positions (Al-Ahmadi 2011; Thompson 2014). Women have also contested and were elected in professional guilds. For example, in 2005 two women—Lama al-Suleiman and Nashwa Taher—were elected as members of the BoD in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI). This was the first time women had contested any elections in Saudi Arabia. At the time, the JCCI had 3880 members out of which 100 were women, and the board comprised of 12 members. In the buildup to the elections, nobody expected the women to win as it was the first time that women were allowed to contest, and 17 women were in the fray (Asharq Al-Awsat 2005). Subsequently, women contested for the board in Mecca and Riyadh chambers, though they could not meet the success of JCCI (Mohammed 2013). The context of a development model or a development-oriented growth has provided space for women to excel in a variety of fields. Saudi Political Scientist Hanan al-Ahmadi (2011) argues that “Saudi Arabia is embracing a new strategic direction to recruit qualified women into positions of leadership at the top of the hierarchy in public and private sectors” (p. 150). This has created a situation where “Saudi women are slowly but definitely assuming high positions that include deputy minister, university president, Shura Council consultants, board members of chambers of commerce and

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many other new and exciting positions” (Al-Ahmadi 2011). Nonetheless, women even in leadership positions continue to face challenges due to the patriarchal nature of the society. Some of the problems emanate from the idea of compulsory segregation of sexes and deep-rooted social customs that give women a subordinate status to men. Sometimes, “despite their high qualification, job experience and full readiness to assume leadership roles in their organizations, women leaders in Saudi Arabia face several challenges that limit their effectiveness as leaders and prevent them from achieving their potential” (Al-Ahmadi 2011, p. 165). Family and Health The increasing economic participation of Saudi women has significantly transformed the way they are treated in society. It has made an impact in the sociopolitical sphere and has led to improvements in their status both within the household and outside (Doumato 1999; Hamdan 2005; Al-Rasheed 2013). Though the kingdom is yet to abolish the guardianship law, steps have been taken to ease restrictions on travel, education and seeking medical help. In practice, this has helped improve the women’s status within the family, and more women are now able to assert their rights and follow their aspirations. Improvement in their educational status and financial independence has enabled Saudi women to wield more power within the family. Demographic changes, particularly urbanization and prevalence of nuclear families, too have contributed to the greater say of women. An urban, independent, educated, and working woman is more likely to deal with a man in her family on equal terms than those who internalize the patriarchal norms due to lack of exposure to education, employment, and freedom (UNDP 2006). Studies by Saudi scholars suggest a shift in the husband–wife relationship moving away from a subordinate status to, if not equal then, one of mutual interdependence (Al-Ghamdi 1996; Almosaed 2008). Scholars argue that in traditional family systems women in the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed some freedom, but the spread of post-oil modernization made them subservient to men (Altorki 1977; Altorki and Cole 1989; Katakura 1977). The situation started to change due to demographic and structural transitions, economic compulsions, forces of globalization, and women’s education. Greater space for women within the family in terms of decision-­ making is manifested in their marital choices, divorce trends, and increased wealth owned by women. According to Saudi sociologist Nora Almosaed (2008), “the social and economic circumstances are shaping the value

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system especially those values surrounding power relations and household division of labor” (p.  63). She further elucidates that “[m]odern Saudi women are seeking education as a means to finding employment, financial independence and decision making. Women’s employment has been almost as important as women’s education in changing the position and self-perception of women, and in altering the patriarchal gender contract” (ibid). This changing gender norm has led to a noticeable increase in the number of divorces in the kingdom in recent decades. According to one study, Saudi Arabia witnessed more than 30,000 divorces during 2012, which stood at 27,000 in 2011 and 18,000 in 2010 (Al-Eqtisadiah 2013). The number according to the Saudi Ministry of Justice reached nearly 35,000 in 2017. This meant that one in five marriages ended in a divorce, which is one of the highest rates in the Gulf countries. Reasons for the dissolution of marriage filed by girls include not being allowed to continue their education or being forced into marriage. Saudi sociologist Salwa al-Khateeb (2007) argues that traditionally a marital relationship was based on the authority of men and subservience of women. Wives were expected to unconditionally ‘obey’ and ‘respect’ their husbands, and take care of children and home. Khateeb observes that “[i]n traditional Saudi society relationships between men and women were essentially unequal. Men were dominant, their supremacy unquestioned, while women were subordinate and were expected to show great respect to their husbands” (p. 93). Furthermore, “[f]emale education and employment have improved the status of women within the family and given them more power in family decision-making, particularly in upper-­ middle and upper classes” (p. 98). Together with their status in the family, the healthcare facilities for women have tremendously improved. They received early attention from the state and given the resources at disposal in the wake of the oil boom, these improved significantly. Earlier, most of the medical practitioners in female healthcare were expatriate women from Western and other Arab and Muslim countries. With an expansion in female education a large cadre of native female medical practitioners was trained and now contributes to the overall healthcare facilities. AlMunajjed (2010) notes that the advancement in women’s healthcare can be attributed to their increased awareness due to education and economic participation. Families even in smaller cities and towns have started to understand the significance of female health, and the government has provided an excellent healthcare

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infrastructure even in remote and far-off locations. Resultantly, women’s healthcare has improved significantly. Hence, over 98 percent of Saudi women receive maternal healthcare while a similar percentage of births are attended to by skilled health personnel, thereby contributing to a decline in mortality rates (WHO 2019). Media The media in Saudi Arabia is largely state-owned or is patronized by powerful princes; nonetheless, with growing, education women have made a mark in this field. The number of women media professionals has increased, and many work as reporters, newsreaders, photojournalists, and anchors. The Al-Ekhbariya news channel that was launched in 2004 was the first to appoint women as presenters and readers, while Rotana, a prominent name in Saudi broadcast media, appointed a woman as editorin-chief of its newly launched magazine in 2006. In February 2014, Somayya Jabarti became the first female to become the editor-in-chief of a Saudi daily, Saudi Gazette (Fatany 2013). Some of the women presenters on Saudi television can now be seen without a hijab, which would have been unthinkable before 2015. Women’s participation in traditional media notwithstanding, social media has provided a platform for them to voice their concerns. Their participation in social media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Pinterest is substantial, and according to a survey conducted in 2014 nearly 13 percent of the social media users in Saudi Arabia were women (Perlov and Guzansky 2014). The number has increased further. While 90 percent of Saudis use the internet, nearly 70 percent use social media, and according to estimates, as of 2019, nearly 30–35 percent internet and social media users were women. Noted Saudi journalist Maha Akeel (2010) underlines that social media has provided a tool for Saudi women to participate in public debates and that they not only discuss issues concerning women but are involved in a variety of issues including politics, economy, literature, and religion. She elaborates that due to restrictions and censorship in traditional media women have increasingly embraced social media and used blogs and microblogging sites to “express their opinion more freely,” despite the fact that they continue to “face social restrictions and hurdles” (Akeel 2010, pp. 69–70).

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Educated women have been questioning discriminatory laws such as the guardianship law. This has generated debate in the media and academia for the abolition of the law. Activists such as Wajeha al-Huwaider have articulated the need to abolish the guardianship system as it is discriminatory and violates human rights (Jawhar 2009). In 2014, a petition signed by 25 Saudi women was submitted to the Majlis al-Shura calling for an end to “absolute male guardianship” (Harbi 2014). There were counter voices where some women came out in support of the existing guardianship arrangement; for example, in August 2009 Rowdha Yusuf along with 15 other Saudi women launched a campaign “My Guardian Knows What’s Best for Me” and within two months they gathered more than 5000 signatures in support (Zoepf 2010). This move generated some media debate and many women bloggers came out with scathing criticism of the campaign; Eman al-Nafjan (2009) said in her blog: “The aim of the campaign is to stand against women who are demanding to be treated as adults.” Of late, the guardianship law has become a seriously debated issue, and after the lifting of the ban on women driving, this has become one of the most important issues pertaining to Saudi women that is discussed in local and international media. Arts and Fashion Women have made their mark in the fields of arts, design, and fashion. This could be due to the traditional nature of the society, and an opening available to women in these professions as they are considered ‘feminine.’ The Saudi art scene has evolved from nearly negligible to what some commentators define as ‘thriving’ (Otterbeck 2012), and many private art galleries in Jeddah, Riyadh, and other cities have displayed works by women artists. One of the most prominent names in the contemporary Saudi art scene is Manal AlDowayan, who did groundbreaking work and exhibited it all over the world (Bouaissa 2013). Haifa Mansour is a renowned film director whose work Wajda received critical acclaim the world over and became the first official Saudi entry in the Academy Awards (better known as the Oscars) in the foreign language category (Lapin 2013). Many artists and galleries have made efforts to explore and underline the contribution of Saudi women artists across generations. Art historian Samia Khashoggi—cofounder of Jeddah-based Saudiaat established in 2005—promotes Saudi female artists and has been a major force in discovering anonymous works by women from the previous generation. In early

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2015, she was the source behind an exhibition hosted by Hafez Gallery in Jeddah titled Anonymous: Was a Woman that focuses on the representation of Saudi women in art (Manjal 2015; Rao 2015). In an interview shedding light on the concept, she said “Women empowerment in our society is a subject I am passionate about” and the exhibition “explores the diversity in mediums and see[s] how female artists have represented women in our society” (Manjal 2015). There are many others, such as Noura Bouzo, Sarah Abu Abdallah, Maha Malluh, and Sarah Mohannah al-Abdali, who have become prominent through their artworks (Milner 2012). Politics, Civil Society, and Judiciary Despite huge achievements in education and improvements in economic participation, female representation in politics is negligible. In fact, until September 2013, when for the first time King Abdullah nominated 30 members, women’s representation in the Majlis al-Shura was nil. Since 2009 a few women have been appointed as advisers in various committees of the Majlis al-Shura but full membership had to wait until the sixth council in 2013 (Trenwith 2013), although lack of political participation is not exclusive to women. Saudi Arabia is a closed monarchy, and there is little scope for political participation. Though the political system has some inbuilt consultative mechanisms, politics remains the domain of the ruling family that controls the state and government. Any political organization is prohibited. There have been instances when prominent women, such as Princess Norah (sister of founder King Ibn Saud), Queen Iffat (wife of King Faisal), and Princess Adela (daughter of King Abdullah), have influenced policies, but these were exceptional circumstances. Despite the closed political system and nearly nonexistent civil society, some women have articulated political opinion from time to time, and have faced a backlash from the state and the ulema. One of the most significant political actions by women was the defiance of the driving ban by 70 prominent women in September 1990. The protest enraged the conservative sections which were already perturbed by the presence of ‘infidel’ American forces on the Saudi soil (Hegghammer 2010). In the crackdown that ensued, those who participated in the protest were dismissed from their jobs and cussed in public, and big billboards with their names depicting them as ‘deviant’ were up in Riyadh.

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The issue of women driving again became the center of women’s activism in 2007 when a group of women led by Wajeha al-Huwaider unsuccessfully petitioned King Abdullah to lift the ban. In the wake of the Arab Spring, an online petition was started by activist Manal al-Sharif to revive the demand for lifting the driving ban. The ban was eventually lifted in 2018, but not before a number of women activists who had been previously involved in the women driving campaigns, including Lujain al-­ Hathloul and Eman al-Nafjan, were incarcerated on charges of defaming the kingdom and for contacting the foreign media (HRW 2020). Driving rights are not the only focus of women activism; many have participated and achieved a breakthrough in various areas including contesting elections for professional guilds and participating in the petitions movement. In 2003, for example, a number of women signed the petition “In Defence of the Nation” that demanded reforms. During the run-up to the second municipal elections held in September 2011, activist Naila Attar campaigned for women’s political rights and demanded that they should be allowed to participate in the municipal elections. She launched a campaign Baladi and was joined by other prominent women. They campaigned and showed up at voters’ registration centers and argued that if the government did not allow them to vote, they would conduct a parallel “women’s municipal elections” (Jadaliyya 2011). Saudi civil society functions differently and has only a limited space in terms of shaping policy decisions (Montagu 2010; Montagu 2015). Within this limited space, some prominent women, especially from the higher echelons of the society, have been able to create a niche for themselves. Nonetheless, civil society activists, both men and women, are always at risk of a backlash from the government. It is common for civil society activists, human rights advocates, and journalists to be targeted by authorities for speaking up. For example, in 2013 two human rights activists— Abdullah al-Hamid and Mohammad al-Qahtani—were convicted on charges of providing inaccurate information to foreign media and founding a human rights organization without authorization (Amnesty International 2014). In October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who had become critical of the government and was living in self-exile in the United States, was killed by Saudi intelligence agents in Istanbul for being too vocal in his criticism of the working style of the crown prince. Women’s representation in the judiciary is nearly negligible (Buys and Macuiba 2012). The only instance of a woman coming close to being a judge was when Sadiq al-Jibran was appointed as an arbiter for a commercial

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dispute case in the administrative appeals court in Eastern Province. In 2018, the Majlis al-Shura discussed a proposal for the appointment of legally and religiously qualified women as judges but no further development has taken place in this direction. Nonetheless, since 2005 the number of women legal professionals has increased significantly, and since 2013 they have been allowed to argue cases in family courts. However, the system remains inadequate and discriminatory toward women who are regarded as minors by law. “Women are struggling to fight discrimination in the courts because many judges and senior members of the Ulama are either unaware or indifferent to their suffering. Women have no voice in the council of senior scholars or as advisors to the grand mufti to address their needs and grievances” (Fatany 2013, pp. 38–39). Sports Women have remained lesser mortals in the world of sports despite all efforts to end discriminatory practices (Lomasney 2007). Girls in Saudi Arabia were not allowed to join physical education classes until 2017 because of the opposition of the ulema and were barred from attending sports events until 2018. In 2014, a 20-year-old college girl was arrested for entering a stadium to watch a football match disguised as a man, and this had led to international uproar (The Guardian 2014). In June 2013, the government allowed some private schools to have physical education for girls on the condition that they have proper sporting facilities. In May 2014, a proposal for introducing physical education in girls’ schools attracted protests, and in December local media reported that the School Sports Union—a government body in charge of developing sports in public schools—would not allow sports in girls’ public schools (Saudi Gazette 2014). The situation under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, who have been taking social reform initiatives, has changed rapidly. With increasing education and better exposure to the outside world, many women have undertaken a career in sports. Yoga, an Indian traditional meditation art form, has a significant following among Saudi women. During the London Olympics in 2012, the kingdom had two female athletes—800 meter runner Sarah Attar and Judoka Wojdan Shaherkani—in its contingent. In the 2012 Summer Olympics held in Singapore, a Saudi woman, Dalma Rushdi Malhas, participated in the equestrian event. Similarly, in June 2013, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare granted license to a women sports center, a far cry from 2006

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when a women basketball club based in Jeddah had to be registered as a commercial enterprise because the youth presidency refused to grant it license as a sports club (Toumi 2013). With better education, growing awareness, and supportive leadership, more Saudi women are able to undertake sports as a hobby and a career; this is expected to further change in the coming times.

Debate on Women’s Rights In many ways, the Saudi society is going through a transition and is at a stage when tensions between the old and new ideas, lifestyles, and social structures have become glaring. This is visible in many areas—in the way people dress, penetration of technology in their lives and socializing norms of the youth. It is apparent in the contrast between the number of students enrolled in higher educational institutions, going abroad for education, or joining universities. While some long for the return to traditional ways of life and wish things can be reversed, others demand greater changes to keep pace with other parts of the world. In many ways, the existing values remain strong while newer norms are becoming prevalent. The question of equality between sexes evokes strong emotions from different sections of opinion makers. On the one hand, there are the ‘liberals’ who demand more freedom for women, and an end to public segregation of men and women, allowing women to drive and move along without any male mahram accompanying them, as well as allowing them to go abroad alone. On the other hand, there are Islamists who have a contradictory view on all these issues and demand a limited role for women as homemakers, mothers, and wives. It is not just the debates around issues that are sharply divided but the contestations among ideas and ideologies that provide the basis for these intense debates are equally polarized. Social changes with respect to women’s rights are small compared to the notions of gender equality as understood in liberal and modernist perspectives. Even minimal changes are largely driven by economic compulsions and advancement in education but the political subtext of struggle and tension between the old and the new and the reformist-modernists and the conservative remains relevant. The pace of change in terms of women’s rights and debates on gender discrimination has increased significantly since 2015 when King Salman took over the reins after the demise of King Abdullah. This has led to the lifting of several conventional restrictions on women that had curbed their movement outside of private

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spaces. Education has played a significant role in making these changes possible. Nonetheless, when it comes to debates on women’s rights, widely contrasting ideas and ideals coexist in the kingdom, and at times give an impression of tension between the old and the new and largely the debates revolve around religion. These debates have become more nuanced with the rise of Crown Prince Mohammed who has publicly acknowledged the challenges facing the kingdom due to the policy of Islamization and has committed himself to rid the kingdom of the extremist tendencies and toward social opening.

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CHAPTER 9

Changing Dynamics of Religion and Education

Religion plays an important role in all aspects of life in Saudi Arabia, and education is no different. The society emphasizes on observation and promotion of the faith, and the monarchy derives legitimacy from the state’s foundation in and observation of the faith. On the surface, it gives an impression of a typical religious society where life revolves around dogmas and faith. As the Lebanese-French social scientist Ghassan Salamé (1987) notes, Islam “permeates the Saudis’ daily life” (p. 306). Before the issue of the Saudi education system fomenting radicalism became a global issue in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the monarchy undertook corrective steps, the education system, especially school education, was heavily entrenched in dogmatic religious ideas. Not only were the religious subjects and injunctions taught in moral and ethics classes, they overwhelmingly comprised the curriculum in other subjects including history, social sciences, and even sciences. This was in addition to the wide network of education institutions for the dissemination of religious education. In fact, at one point nearly one-third of public education was focused on religious studies (Bahgat 1999; Ochsenwald 2001; Prokop 2003). This overwhelming emphasis on Islam in the education system was the product of the broader trend of Islamization of the state and society based on historical developments. The political evolution of the kingdom had contributed to the inherent Islamizing tendency, and the internal and regional developments in the mid-twentieth century further strengthened the phenomenon. William Rugh (2002) argues that “the persistence of © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_9

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Islamic education is [was] a reaction to the growth of secular education by conservatives who want[ed] to foster Arab and Muslim civil society in the face of Westernization” (p. 404). The Islamic content of the curriculum saw a rise particularly during the 1960s, which was a reaction to the threats emanating from the secular pan-Arabism, and the Saudi anchoring of its politics and foreign policy in pan-Islamism (Cordesman 2003; Bronson 2006; Jones 2010; Chauvin 2010). Subsequent developments, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran and Juhayman al-Utaibi’s siege of Kaaba, both in 1979, intensified the Islamizing tendency. As discussed earlier, the issue of education reforms became a topic of public debate in the wake of the Kuwait crisis in the 1990s, and one of the most contested issues within the debate was the overwhelming religious content of the public education system. The religious orthodox and conservatives were justifying the idea based on the commitment of the Saudi kingdom and monarchy to Islam, while the reformists, liberals, and Islamo-liberals were arguing for the need to reform to deal with the problems facing the society of growing unemployed youth and rising radicalism. While the debate was yet to settle, the monarchy faced the challenge of dealing with the international repercussions of the involvement of its nationals in the September 11 attacks. Some studies and reports published afterward underlined the hateful references made in the Saudi school textbooks against people of other faiths and sects, including Christians, Jews, Shias, and Sufis (ICG 2004; Shea 2006). These studies found the school curriculum and textbooks highly offensive and alleged that they were one of the causal factors for radicalization among the Saudi youths. The monarchy responded to these criticisms by bringing about large-scale changes in the school curriculum and textbooks, and invested significantly in teachers’ training programs to make them sensitive toward others. The new Saudi education policy, while emphasizing the importance of Islam, underlined the need for providing education to all in a moderate environment. On numerous occasions the Saudi leadership articulated the view that the monarchy now wishes to promote moderation in the society through education. The overall education reforms have considerably reduced the religious content in public education. While religious education remains prevalent, the overpowering influence of the ulema and religion on the education system has significantly come down. In the last two decades, due to reform measures taken by the monarchy, significant changes can be witnessed in the education system as well as the attitude of the people toward religion,

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especially among the youth. This process of change in the attitude toward religion can be understood from the viewpoint of the broader social reforms the kingdom was undergoing. Islam remains an important factor in Saudi social life, but some shifts are visible in terms of the changing perception of religion and decline in the influence of the ulema.

Importance of Religion and the Ulema There is a consensus among scholars that religion and the ulema play an important role in the public and private lives of Saudis (Lipsky 1959; Nevo 1998; Hamza 2002; Bradley 2005; Al-Rasheed 2006; Niblock 2006; Alshamsi 2011; House 2012). Joseph Nevo (1998) suggests that the individual and collective lives of people in Saudi Arabia are molded by religion, particularly the official version of Islam adhered to by the monarchy. Anne Rathbone Bradley (2005) argues that the Saudi social arena is largely controlled by the state and religion, that is, people’s lives and the interactions between various social institutions are influenced and directed by them. She further contends that the monarchy plays the role of an interfering state and the ulema keep the cultural realm under control within a specific set of rules based on faith and its interpretations. This significance of Islam is best explained by the history of the geographical landmass that constitutes modern-day Saudi Arabia and the political evolution of the Saudi state. Firstly, Islam originated in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century A.D. and the region remained under Islamic rule since. It houses Islam’s holiest sites—Mecca and Medina—and is the seat of the faith. Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of the faith, has continued uninterrupted since the advent of Islam and sees a huge congregation of Muslims from all over the world. The city remained the center of the Islamic world despite not being the political headquarter of Muslim empires at any point in time and continues to be so (Sardar 2014). It is not only the cities of Mecca and Medina but the entire Peninsula that is considered the birthplace of Islam, and this makes the society overtly conscious of its Islamic identity. Islam as a combination of faith and culture has been followed in everyday life and individual and collective interactions. It has molded the traditions and customs and become part of social values and norms. This has created a situation whereby individuals express themselves in terms of

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Islam, and this has become one of the mainstays of the society.1 The overt identification with Islam can be understood in terms of the political evolution of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia came into being due to an alliance between a local tribal chief and a religious preacher, and it is on this basis that the ideological legitimacy of the Saudi state is derived. According to Tim Niblock (2006), “[i]n the Saudi case, the ideology takes the form of a religious-based perception of how the society should be organized. The monarchy has always projected itself as protector of the Islamic faith, promoting the implementation of Islamic practices in the kingdom” (p. 8). The state not only identifies and acquires legitimacy from religion but also promotes its implementation. For example, the preface in the 1992 Basic Law states that “[t]he [Islamic] reform mission, upon which the Saudi state was founded, represents the main core of the government. This mission is based on the realization of Islamic rules, implementation of Islamic law, and enjoining good and forbidding evil” (Basic Law, 1992). Social customs, practices, and institutions, such as mosques and ifta, strengthen the role of Islam. Mosques are central to the Islamic faith; they not only provide an opportunity for daily congregation but also contribute to the formation of a religious public sphere (Zaman 2013). In the Saudi case, this public sphere has remained largely apolitical because of the overpowering reach of the state, which effectively uses it to extend political authority. Nonetheless, mosques as central spaces have exerted strong social influence. Importantly, local preachers used mosques as spaces to spread their views and perpetuate their social influence. With bureaucratization of the religious affairs, this phenomenon has disappeared from contemporary Saudi Arabia, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 regularization of religious preachers (MoIA 2001). Ifta, the practice of seeking and issuing religious advice on issues about everyday life, assigns the Saudi ulema a strong say in the social life (Alhargan 2012). There are many intricacies attached to issuing a fatwa, but the institutionalization of the process of ifta enhanced the role of the state and the ulema as it was necessary to follow the opinion of religious leaders who were part of the state structure.

 Other important factors including local customs and traditions pre-dating Islam, and interactions with the outside world, have impacted the cultural milieu. Interactions with the outside world have significantly contributed to shaping the local culture even before the advent of globalization mainly because of Hajj and trade links (Alhujelan 2008; Umar 1985; Shahin 1997). 1

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Broadly the Saudi ulema can be classified into two categories: those who are aligned with the state and predominantly adhere to the teachings of Abdul Wahhab, and those who are independent or are not holding any official position and are not necessarily followers of Abdul Wahhab. While the prior can be categorized as establishment ulema, the latter can be categorized as independent ulema. Nonetheless, it is never easy to draw a clear line between ‘establishment’ and ‘independent’ because individuals at times have been co-opted by the state and rehabilitated as part of the state structure, and thus become a part of the establishment ulema, and on other occasions, religious leaders fall out of favor of the state and are sidelined, and thus become a part of independent ulema. This reflects the nature of the relationship between the monarchy and the religious leaders that has been termed as “symbiotic, yet asymmetric” (Stenslie 2012). However, the ulema as an institution has a role in the political system as an ally of the ruling family as well as a counterbalance. Establishment ulema have been allowed to have their power base within the framework of the political system and they advise the king and the government and help shape the public opinion. Individual kings and the crown prince, however, have adopted distinct policies and attitudes toward the ulema. For example, Abdullah cracked down on several independent ulema, but at the same time reduced the powers of establishment ulema by reducing their interference in everyday life, including in education policy and administration. King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed have adopted a much stronger policy of sidelining the establishment ulema and cracking down on the independent ulema to be able to implement their policy of economic diversification and social opening. This has changed the contemporary dynamics of the state– ulema relations and has wider implications for the present and the future of the kingdom. This does not mean that the ulema have lost their influence, but their stronghold on the society and on decision-making has been significantly reduced. Historically, the establishment ulema, including the Grand Mufti (al-­ Mufti al-Aam), the members of the CSU (often referred to as Hai’a) headed by the Grand Mufti, and the Imams (prayer leaders) in the al-­ Masjid al-Haram that houses the Kaaba in Mecca and the al-Masjid an-­ Nabawi (the Prophet’s Mosque) in Medina, were the most influential. The views of these ulema are implemented through a vast religious bureaucracy including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawah and Guidance (often referred to as Awqaf ), and the

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mutawwa or religious police. While the justice ministry manages the entire judicial system, the Awqaf ministry manages the mosques, organizes Quran study circles, appoints preachers, undertakes missionary and philanthropic works, and takes care of religious endowments. The mutawwa were extremely powerful and had the task of regulating the public morality, but gradually, they have lost their influence as consecutive kings and crown princes have clipped their wings because of their abrasive public behavior, and at times their abuse of power. The kingdom witnessed the phenomenon of a growing number of religious preachers taking strong anti-establishment views on various matters in the 1990s, and the issue acquired a serious proportion with the rise of the Sahwa movement that was opposed to the stationing of the US troops in the kingdom. Though independent ulema existed earlier, they never posed a threat to the monarchy because of their small numbers and lack of organization. The al-Sahwa al-Islamiya (Islamic Awakening) was a movement that was inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) and took strong anti-establishment views in the immediate aftermath of the Kuwait crisis (Zuhur 2005; Lacroix 2011). Scholars such as Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, and Saad al-Faqih were some of the prominent figures of the Sahwa movement and were associated with the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (Lajnat al-Difa an al-Huquq al-Sharia; CDLR) founded in 1993  in Riyadh. The movement was critical of the Saudi regime and accused it of having lost the religious legitimacy to rule. The CDLR was seen as the first religious opposition group to have openly challenged the monarchy. The monarchy responded with force, and the CDLR was banned while a number of its leaders were imprisoned. Some of them were later released; they were either allowed to go into exile or were co-opted and rehabilitated as part of the establishment (Fandy 1998; Lacroix 2011; Al-Saif 2013). In addition to the Sahwis, the more radical among the independent ulema eventually turned into jihadi scholars and provided the ideological justification for the rise and spread of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The group challenged the monarchy by taking up arms against it and engaged in terrorist acts inside the kingdom with a series of bombings and attacks on security establishment between 2004 and 2006. The Saudi counter-terrorism initiative developed in association with the US military helped dismantle al-Qaeda’s cells in the kingdom, and led to the arrest of a large number of radicalized youths (Cordesman and Obaid 2005). While those who were found guilty of direct involvement in the bombings and

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attacks were executed, a majority were imprisoned and put through the de-radicalization program and eventually released (Hegghammer 2010). In the post–September 11 scenario, the kingdom witnessed the emergence of some independent and reformist ulema who opposed religious orthodoxy and articulated the need for reforms. These were independent scholars who had on several occasions petitioned the King to introduce reforms within an Islamic framework. The group was not monolithic and included many hues of religious affiliations including Shias. The spectrum of incidents and emerging situations led to the prominence of these “Islamo-liberal” ulema (Dekmejian 2003; Lacroix 2004). They formulated “a common democratic, nationalist, and anti-Wahhabi political platform, thereby giving birth to a new trend within Saudi political-intellectual field” (Lacroix 2004, p. 346). Their main agenda was to reform, with an emphasis on issues such as respect for human rights, ending discrimination, addressing unemployment, improvement in education, and according women their due rights (Dekmejian 2003). The education sector is an important component of creating and retaining the influence of the ulema. Islamic universities employ a large number of ulema who undertake research and training in various religious subjects and become influential if they belong to prominent families or build connections with influential members of the royal family. These universities, in a way, are the nursery for the production of both establishment and independent ulema. The Islamic universities received generous public funds and flourished since the 1980s when the regime enhanced funding and infrastructure development for religious studies after the Kaaba siege incident (Al-Saif 2013). The most influential among the Islamic universities is the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh. Other prominent Islamic universities include the Islamic University in Medina and Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. Graduates from these universities largely provide the kingdom with its religious bureaucracy and are principally employed as judges, teachers, preachers, Imams, and mutawwa (Taheri 2004). An overwhelming number of the independent ulema are also graduates of Islamic universities, but largely, they remain dependent on the government for employment. Those who eschew government largesse find it difficult to sustain in an environment where social prestige and respect come easily with government position and affluence. Even if one manages to remain disinterested in the regime’s religious agenda and finds an alternative source of sustenance, it is difficult to gain social acceptability as an independent preacher.

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Changes in Religious Education The Saudi society has undergone numerous changes reflected in the demography, structure, family life, as well as the condition of women. At the same time, reform initiatives by the monarchy have impacted people’s lives in various sociocultural domains including religious affairs. In religious affairs, some of these reforms were aimed at streamlining the functioning of the system while others were intended to reduce the influence of the ulema. Partly, this was in response to the growing internal demands, especially among the youth, for curbs on religious establishment, and better education, employment, and recreational avenues. A major initiative that impacted the religious establishment was the beginning of the national and interfaith dialogues. While the interfaith dialogue was aimed at the international audience, the national dialogue was intended to develop and encourage a culture of debate and create a collective response to rising extremism. The national dialogue was introduced in 2003 with the foundation of the Markaz al-Malik Abdulaziz li al-Hiwar al-Watani (KACND) to promote a culture of internal debate on important social issues. A key component was to regain the political ground lost to the extremist elements. This was an important step because of the lack of a closed political culture in the kingdom, where public expression of contradictory views is considered an affront. Abdullah, as crown prince, had taken a keen interest in launching the national dialogue as he understood that fighting and eradicating extremism required a comprehensive approach, and could not happen without the participation of the larger population in promoting moderate views. This was in a way a response to demands for political opening raised by some through petitions. Nonetheless, the central objective was the fighting extremist ideologies. The crown prince in his inaugural speech on the foundation of the center stated: “I have no doubt that the establishment of the center and the continuation of the dialogue will turn out to be a historic achievement, which would go a long way toward creating a new channel for responsible self-expression” (Abdullah 2003). He further added that “[i]n the long run, this will be very effective in fighting extremism and fanaticism and can create a healthy and clean environment which promotes enlightened attitude and rejects terrorism and terrorist ideologies” (ibid). The national dialogues sought to bring together leading intellectuals, ulema, academics, writers, and journalists to debate about important

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social, religious, and cultural issues. Madawi al-Rasheed, an ardent critic of the Saudi monarchy, acknowledged the significance of the initiative and articulated that “[t]he fact that Saudis were brought from all sectors and intellectual backgrounds to debate important topics long considered taboo, and only discussed behind closed doors, is an achievement in itself in a country where top-down policy has been a feature of governance for many decades” (Al-Rasheed 2009, p.  590). The public response to the initiative was enthusiastic and many prominent intellectuals, reformist activists, and citizens participated in the dialogue revolving around religious extremism, terrorism, religious moderation, tolerance toward other faiths, and condition of women (Kéchichian 2013; Thompson 2014). Notably, the national dialogue was not helmed by religious leaders and, for the first time, a major sociopolitical initiative was being led by academics and intellectuals including Shias and women. The themes reflected in the reduced involvement of the conservative establishment ulema; for example, the first national dialogue in July 2003 held in Riyadh was focused on “Reinforcing National Unity”; the second in December the same year held in Mecca was on the theme “Extremism and Moderation, a Comprehensive Methodological Perspective.” In the next two installments of the dialogue held in 2004 in Medina and Dhahran, the themes were “Women: Rights, Duties and Their Relationship to Education” and “Issues of Youth: Reality and Aspirations” respectively. The most important component of reforms in religious affairs was measures taken toward changes in religious education. The education reforms have been at the forefront of the reform debate in the kingdom since the 1990s and, as discussed in the earlier chapters, the education system has gone through a remarkable transformation over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Earlier school and higher education were largely controlled by the ulema, as part of the understanding with the monarchy. When the kingdom embarked on modern education, there was considerable opposition from the ulema who had argued that it leads to Western influence and moral decay (Lipsky 1959). To placate them the monarchy had allowed significant religious content in the curriculum, and the ulema were given a stake in the administration and policy formulation (Al-Eisa 2009). This helped in the establishment of a modern education system but the ulema remained in the driver’s seat, making it a unique amalgamation with modern infrastructure but with a largely traditional-religious content. In the beginning, this worked fine as the ulema retained their say while the population, which largely used the monarchy’s largesse for its

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economic needs, did not need to compete in an open job market. Moreover, this served the domestic and foreign policy objectives of the monarchy to establish its Islamic credentials. Whenever the monarchy faced problems due to religious radicals, the monarchy further reinforced its Islamic credentials. For example, in the aftermath of the Kaaba siege and Iranian revolution in 1979, the monarchy decided to increase the financial support to religious education with generous grants for Islamic universities (Prokop 2003). This approach, however, came back to haunt the monarchy in the form of the September 11 attacks, in which 15 of the 19 attackers were found to be Saudi nationals. Economic compulsions and growing religious fanaticism forced the monarchy to bring wholesome changes in the approach to education, including religious education, with the focus shifting from religious curricula to vocational and skill-based education (Prokop 2003; Bosbait and Wilson 2005). Religious education is an important arena where reform initiatives have made an impact. At the school level, some schools are dedicated to memorization of the Quran, known as madrasa tahfiz al-Quran. These run parallel to primary and middle schools where students mainly study and memorize the Quran. A majority of these students join religious studies in secondary and tertiary education and go on to join Islamic universities for higher studies. These schools continue to function, but they have also been brought under the administration of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, at the school level, the curricula for religious studies too are being prepared within the guidelines of the Ministry of Education. In the past, religious studies were the domain of the ulema alone, but gradually all affairs of public school education have been brought under the Ministry. At the higher education level, religious education remains the domain of the ulema. The religious universities are led and guided by the ulema and educationists appointed directly by the king. As noted earlier, these are the backbone of the vast religious bureaucracy in the kingdom. The most important among them is the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, which was established in the 1950s. “The university included higher education institutes, faculties and academic institutes. The university has been continuously expanding since its establishment. It currently includes 11 faculties, including 5 faculties in Riyadh and 6 faculties in Qassim, Al Ahsa, the Southern region and Al Madinah” (MoE 2019). The other important university is the Islamic University in Medina, which was established in the early 1960s. It is one of the most prominent

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Islamic universities that attracts students from all over the world. It was during the early days of the success of pan-Islamism that the university was founded, and for a long time served as the center for the dissemination of Saudi Islam in various parts of the world through its alumni. With a change in the attitude of the monarchy toward Islamic preaching, which has attracted global criticism, the significance of the university has considerably reduced. Nonetheless, it continues to attract a large number of international students, mainly from poorer Muslims countries in Africa and Asia. The university has broadened its horizon to offer higher education in engineering, computer science, and other subjects. The third most important Islamic university is the Umm al-Qura University, which is located in Mecca. The university began as a Sharia College in the 1950s and eventually developed into a university in 1981. With time the university has evolved into one of the most dynamic universities and has opened centers and colleges in various subjects including medicine, science, engineering, as well as humanities and social sciences. The university offers specializations in Sharia, Arabic language, applied sciences, education, medicine, and engineering, and has more than 30,000 students studying in its three campuses over 12 colleges. According to the university website, although the university “has recently been restructured,” it “maintain[s] its status as one of the most distinguished universities due to its location and noble origin.” Furthermore, “it has acquired a superior status as an academic institution that has a great reputation with regard to Shari’ah sciences, education, and Islamic studies, as well as modern scientific and applied specializations.” Notably, the Islamic education institutions have broadened the scope of courses they offer and this has allowed the graduates of these institutions to find employment in various sectors. This is a key development as the kingdom was struggling with problems of youth unemployment and rising radicalism. The ability of religious institutions to adapt to the demands of modern education bodes well for the future and can help the kingdom overcome some of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic challenges facing it.

Changing Perception of Religion As discussed earlier, religion continues to play an important role in the society and remains entrenched in various aspects of life but due to the impact of changes in other spheres including education and economic

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developments, people’s perception of and attitude toward religion have witnessed changes. This is manifested in several areas such as popular culture, the behavior of the youth, the attitude of the younger ulema, the spread of liberal views, as well as women’s participation in public life. According to Saudi social scientist and activist Tawfiq al-Saif (2014), the changing attitude toward religion and religious movements is evident as the transformations in the society have gradually started to alter “the balance of power in the Saudi social context in a profound manner, and forces calling for social justice and civil rights are earning increasing social popularity. In other words, society is witnessing the decline of the religious political movement” (p. 418). Given the problem of rising extremist tendencies, the monarchy was forced to take a comprehensive view of the situation, and take measures in dismantling “social circles” aiding extremist elements (Taheri 2004). With the changing attitude of the monarchy and religious establishment, the people have started to explore and engage with alternative ideas. Mai Yamani (2009) suggests that the emerging middle classes understand the need for reforms and no longer overthink the need for preservation and protection of Islam. Madawi al-Rasheed (2006) argues that unlike the largely accepted narrative of a complete observance of the religious and political authority, the Saudi situation has created both ‘consenting’ and ‘contesting’ intellectual debates. In other words, the perception of religion and religious authority is not uniform and the younger generation feels there is a need to reinterpret and debate religion according to the changing circumstances. The youth in their twenties and thirties are leading the debate on the role of religion in the society, and the debates are increasingly held in an open atmosphere due to the opening of various public spheres as a result of the steps taken by the monarchy. Furthermore, the youth find creative ways to express their views through various newer means of expression, including the internet and social media. This is most visible in the spread of popular culture. Art, literature, photography, films, painting, cartoons, music, sports, and other mediums of popular expression have found their ways among Saudi youth, and have become an integral part of their lives. While the internet has proved to be an important medium of artistic expression, local art studios have come up, especially in cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah, showcasing works that explore social issues from different vantage points. Islam remains an important aspect, though these mediums may wish to challenge the established norms and values and

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explore new ideas. Jonas Otterbeck (2012) observes that “Pop culture lifestyles are making their entrance into public arenas in Saudi Arabia … short amateur films from inside homes put on the Web and Saudi death metal bands using the Internet to spread their home recordings” are certainly an indication toward increasing prevalence of popular culture that was hitherto confined to private lives (pp. 341–342). Earlier modern and Western music was abhorred and discouraged, and only a certain type of local folk music that uses sounds created by the human voice, clapping, and some traditional musical instruments such as drums was allowed (Shaheen 2010). However, with changing times musical concerts are being allowed and this has attracted huge participation from local youths. Women have been allowed to participate in these music festivals and this was unimaginable a few years ago. Traditionally, some folk music was part of social life and was played during local festivities and celebrations around marriages, births, and so on. Festivals such as the Janadiriya organized by the Saudi Arabian National Guards (SANG) that celebrates the Bedouin culture and heritage provided a platform for such folk dances and music.2 In the 1970s and 1980s, some of the Saudi singers, such as Tareq Abd al-Hakim, Talal Maddah, and even Etab, a female singer, had become popular, but they were based outside. Since the early 2000s, the situation has changed with the youth finding ways to defy the religious police. Western music has gained a degree of popularity and local radio stations broadcast Hollywood numbers. Stereos in vehicles can be heard constantly playing loud Arabic or English music, and while earlier they were penalized if they attracted the attention of the mutawwa, nobody raises eyebrows any longer. Many local artists produce music, such as Aala Wardi, Muhammad Abdu, Abdul Majid Abdullah, and Rabeh Sager, and have gained popularity. The change in the music scene has been termed as a ‘quiet revolution’ (Robertson 2008; Otterbeck 2012). Most of the Saudi Western music bands are underground, but some groups have performed in public. One of the first pop videos was premiered in a shopping mall in Jeddah in August 2007 which was directed by Kaswara al-Khatib (Otterbeck 2012). 2  The Janadiriya festival (Meharjan Janadiriya) was started in 1985 to celebrate Saudi Bedouin culture and heritage against a modern canvas. It was also an attempt to forge the Arab-Islamic heritage with a Saudi national identity. For more, see the official web page of Janadiriya: www.janadria.org.sa (in Arabic). The Saudi national dance, Ardha, a traditional dance form symbolizing preparation for war that involves performance by men carrying a sword amid drumbeats and poetry expressing the tribal pride is performed during the festival.

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According to some estimates, in 2008 there were around 60 rock and metal bands operating in the kingdom mainly run by the youth which created youth-oriented music comprising mainly heavy metal, hip-hop, jazz, and traditional rock (Alosaimi 2008). Some of the popular bands such as Wasted Lands (Jeddah), Deathless Anguish (Dammam), Death Adder (Riyadh), AlNamrood (Qatif), and others have used the internet as a medium. With the social opening undertaken by Crown Prince Mohammed, many of the musicians wish to perform and play in public. Saudi rock bands, however, have made a mark on foreign, mainly Arab, platforms. Many young Saudi musicians have used “cyberspace to express themselves” and have been able to “travel and perform abroad when they are invited to perform at festivals” in many countries in the Arab world as well as in the United States and Europe (Freemuse 2008). The new trend can be seen as an expression of political dissatisfaction among Saudi youth who aspire for a free society. Aiman (known only by his first name), a guitarist with Jeddah-based Wasted Land, told a local daily that “[t]he songs make us speak up and express our feelings,” and the feelings of the dissatisfied Saudi youth (Alosaimi 2008; Freemuse 2008). Though the music scene remains nominal and confined to private, underground, and internet platforms, local concern for the bleak scene espouses hope for a turnaround (Saeed 2012). Photography and painting are other arenas where the old barriers are breaking down and being questioned and challenged—be it in terms of variety, the number of people engaged in these activities, or the participation of women. In recent years, some art galleries in Riyadh and Jeddah have witnessed the participation of young artists and photographers, indicating an increase in the number of people engaged in artistic activities. Jeddah can be seen as the art and culture capital of Saudi Arabia and has many art galleries such as Al Alamia, Ayyam, Dama Art, Nesma Art, Athr, and Arabian Wings that are owned by individual art connoisseurs and hold regular events displaying works by local, Arab, and international artists. The city witnessed the establishment of Jeddah Art Week (JAW; pronounced as jaou, which means fun in Arabic) in 2013 to encourage and give expression to the increasing local art scene (JAW 2014). During the first two art weeks in 2013 and 2014, JAW had seen the participation of a large number of young Saudi artists who displayed their paintings, sculptures, films, and photographs. Similarly, there are individual and private art galleries in Riyadh such as Alaan Artspace, Areej Art Cafe, Gallery

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Design, Lahd Gallery, Naila Art Gallery and others that provide opportunities for established and upcoming local artists to exhibit their work, as well as organizing workshops and educational activities. Besides, there are public institutions such as the National Museum which have done their bit in promoting art and culture. Several individual Saudi artists have contributed to promoting art. One such artist is Reem Nazir, who has exhibited her works in Jeddah as well as in international cities such as London, Buenos Aires, and Dubai. Born in Jeddah, she mostly acquired her education in the West and honed her skills under Freddie Dean at the Chelsea Art Club of London (One Fine Art, n.d.). A well-known name in Jeddah’s art circle, Nazir joined hands with other Saudi women artists in 2005 to establish a group called Saudi Women and holds regular exhibitions (Mubarak 2005). Significantly, the number of women who have taken to art and photography for creative expression or as a carrier is increasing. Tasneem al-Sultan, for example, is a professional photographer who has taken to wedding photography, which has become a popular trend. Based in Dubai, Sultan was the first Saudi female to take up professional photography and says that the changing Saudi society has made it possible for women like her to pursue their passion and choose their profession (Ahmed 2014). Many young men and women are involved in artistic activities to express their views on problems facing the society and use creative ways to avoid censorship. Haifaa al-Mansour, for example, has gained international fame for her feature film Wadjda that was premiered at the 2012 Venice Film Festival and gained critical acclaim. The first film to be shot entirely in Saudi Arabia by a woman director, Wadjda became the first official Saudi entry for the Academy Awards (Oscar) in the Best Foreign Language Film Category in 2014 (Brooks 2013). Many upcoming and young women have been noticed for their work such as Hatoon Kadi, who runs her own YouTube stand-up comedy channel known as Noon al-Niswa (female beauty represented in Arabic alphabet ‘noun’) (Al-Mukhtar 2013).

Spread of Liberal Ideas Liberal views and ideas that were unknown or were abhorred by the earlier generations have become points of discussion and debate, especially among the educated youth. It would be an exaggeration to argue that liberal values have become commonplace but not be incorrect to say that sociocultural changes have affected the value system, influencing people’s

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attitudes toward various issues including religion. The phenomenon is more pronounced among those exposed to the outside world or who were educated abroad. The kingdom sends a large number of students to universities in the United States and Europe for higher education, which works as a catalyst for knowing and even imbibing Western views on social and political issues, but the phenomenon is not confined to only those who have studied abroad, rather many younger ulema, products of Saudi religious universities, are getting exposed to ‘modern’ ideas through Arabic and other literature. Their views on issues such as gender-mixing, coeducation, use of contraceptives, and art and music are different from the views held by the earlier generation. The prevalence of mass media, the internet, and social media has made it easier to interact with the outside world, further leading to the spread of liberal social views. The initial signs of change began in the early 1990s when the petition fever gripped the kingdom, and several memorandums and petitions were published in local newspapers and journals outlining the need for reforms, curbing extremist tendencies and limiting the role of religion and the ulema in the social sphere (Abir 1993). In response, many religious leaders petitioned the government to continue to work within the Islamic framework and to not forget their duty of ruling according to sharia (Dekmejian 1998). This was the first instance when liberals had mustered enough courage to speak in public in a strong voice, and certainly contributed toward measures such as the codification of the Basic Law and establishing of the Majlis al-Shura. Though the trend subsided toward the late 1990s, it led to increased discussion about religion and its role in public life (Abir 1993; Aba-Namay 1993; Dekmejian 1998). The trend again resurfaced after the September 11 attacks and led to a major debate within Saudi civil society on important issues including the role of religion, traditional values, and liberal interpretations of Islam. Some of the petitions during this period articulated the need for religious reforms, and numerous intellectuals, academics, and citizens, particularly those coming from a religious background, articulated and expressed views that marked a shift in the sociopolitical debate (Lacroix 2004). Though the liberal voices became somewhat subdued due to lack of substantial reforms, the advent of protest movements in the Arab world in 2010–11 reenergized some of these voices. With the advent of social opening under King Salman, and public articulation of the need for moderation in public life, the situation has further changed.

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The desire among Saudis to see ‘progressive’ changes in the society is manifested in growing space for engaging in debate and discussions. Although civil society as it is understood in Western political structures may not be visible in Saudi Arabia, the traditional voluntary sectors are functional and provide alternative forms of civil society. Caroline Montagu (2010) argues that “[i]f the voluntary sector is traditionally seen as a key part of civil society, then Saudi Arabia has a thriving civil society” and as part of the political system it “is an important driver for social reform and modernization” (p. 68). Saudi scholars suggest that traditional voluntary organizations and civil society go hand in hand, thus blurring the lines between them (Bargawi 2008; Al-Shahrani 2008). Muhammad Ibrahim al-Helwa, a former member of the Majlis al-Shura, argues that the nature and characteristics of Saudi civil society are different from those of other countries, particularly in the West, and are strengthened due to the formation of professional guilds, sports clubs, and women’s rights groups (Al-Helwa 2003). Even if the character and nature of the civil society differ, their functions are similar to what a civil society provides in democratic political systems. The nature of this function is different in the Saudi case and there is cooperation between the ruler and the civil society. What is interesting is that civil society, which includes traditional charitable societies, nongovernment organizations, professional guilds, and women’s clubs, has broadened the scope of public debate and discourse on important issues including religion. Furthermore, it is argued that the “civil society in Saudi Arabia is everywhere. Social and political discussion abounds, not within the political parties, but identifiable within groups of broad, informal structures and relationships. The social debate is widespread, as is the discussion of Islam and its traditions, and of what constitutes liberal, conservative, or essentialist Islam” (Montagu 2010, p. 69). If one goes by the ways and extent of the spread of liberal and Islamo-­ liberal views, particularly when compared to the earlier situation, it can be argued that a small but increasingly growing section of the population is becoming receptive toward new ideas and views. Though it is confined to a small proportion of the population, its reach is continuously increasing due to advancing educational standards, exposure to the outside world, increasing penetration of internet and social media, as well as a supportive monarchy.

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Youth and Religion Another significant area that goes parallel with and at times overlaps the changing popular culture scenario and spread of liberal views is the relationship between youth and religion. According to the United Nations World Demographic Trends, as much as 50 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of 25. This generation does not shy away from debating religion and politics, leading to a continuous churning up of ideas and the emergence of new discourses. “Rather than being paralyzed by impotence, the Saudis have produced a complex intellectual tapestry, woven by debating subjects, some of whom consent while others confront” (Al-Rasheed 2006, p. 1). According to Caryle Murphy (2013), the Saudi youths’ attitudes and views on religion are changing and they have become tolerant of differences and pluralism in terms of religious interpretations. She further elucidates that although they are not looking for revolutionary political change, their understanding of religion and politics has transformed. With the advent of satellite television and the internet, Saudi youth were exposed to new cultures and ideas and became aware of the plurality within Islam and the plurality of views on matters of faith and religion, leading to changes in the understanding of Islam and other religions and world views espoused in them. The younger generations of Saudis are looking for a more appropriate application of Islam in tune with the changing times. Their engagement with new ideas, professions, and ways of life is affecting their thinking and attitude. At times it creates confusion and many find themselves “struggling to choose between conservative ideology at home and the world outside. They are torn between tradition and modernity in a society that has made it difficult for them to form identities uniquely their own” (Faruqui 2010). The attitude of younger ulema on myriad issues of sociopolitical importance is changing. Young religious scholars, such as Abdullah al-Maliki and Muhammad Abd al-Karim, are receptive toward concepts of justice, freedom of choice, sovereignty, and dignity, indicating increasing acceptability of reconciliation of Islam and modernity within the Saudi framework. Many young ulema have publicly articulated the idea that the application of sharia should be by choice. Articulation for peaceful struggle in the form of civil society activism, demonstrations, and civil disobedience have found voice among many young Saudis, including those passing out of religious universities. In March 2012, a document—Statement of Saudi Youth Regarding the Guarantee of Freedoms and Ethics of

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Diversity—by young Saudis was published online which gave an insight into the spread of liberal ideas among them. The statement carrying more than 2500 signatures of people in their twenties and thirties underscored the religious ferment brewing in the kingdom, especially among the young people, and that underlines the fact that religious attitude is becoming ‘fluid and diverse’ (Murphy 2013). The youth do not challenge the Islamic bases of the society but do not wish to accept everything passed on to them by the older generation in the name of religion.

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CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

The education system of Saudi Arabia has come a long way from what it was in the early days of the establishment of the kingdom. Through the process of reform and changes informed by the aspirations of the changing society, catalyzed by the reform measures taken by the monarchy, and facilitated through the oil wealth, in 2020, the Saudi education system has changed beyond recognition not only from the early years of the kingdom but also from what it was toward the end of the twentieth century. Saudi Arabia now houses some of the best universities in the Middle East offering advanced courses in science and technology fields and producing cutting-­edge research in some of these fields. It also has one of the most elaborate networks of public schools that offer universal primary education and education up to higher secondary to nearly 95 percent of the children. The reform process has also addressed some of the inherent and inbuilt weaknesses in the system, including the heavy dose of religious curriculum, gender discrimination, as well as poor quality of education in terms of the needs of the market for trained and skilled manpower. A varying degree of successes have been achieved toward different goals. The school education has witnessed a significant transformation through a comprehensive change in the curriculum, introduction of new textbooks, improvement in the classroom environment, and teachers’ training programs that have made it more inclusive and tolerant toward others. To a certain degree, hate-filled references to ‘others’ have been removed from textbooks. The teachers’ training program has been © The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0_10

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initiated with the aim of making the learning process effective and improving the quality of schools. Programs such as Tatweer, Comprehensive Assessment, and monitoring of schools have achieved a varying degree of success. Higher education has become more accessible to the population and more youths can enroll in vocational training and undergraduate and graduate courses of their choice. The number of universities, colleges, and vocational training institutions has increased significantly. Steps have been taken to improve the quality of higher education and human resource to be able to effectively implement the labor market nationalization program. A greater number of Saudi students have gone abroad to enroll in higher education courses and a majority of them have availed government scholarships. Reforms in the higher education system have made it accessible and at the same time improved the quality of the programs offered. The higher education aims to synchronize the economic requirement for diversification beyond the oil industry and the growing aspiring young population to help develop a knowledge economy and a knowledge-based society. Resultantly, steps have been taken to reduce unemployment and develop skill-based courses. New universities have been opened, old universities are being expanded, and more vocational colleges are being established to cater to the needs of the population. Budget allocation for education and human resource has seen a consistent and considerable increase. Efforts are ongoing to improve the quality of science education in which the kingdom had a poor record. But with increased investments and consistent efforts, some movement has been noticed in this regard. However, given that the kingdom aspires to be recognized as a regional hub for education and knowledge, it is still in the early stages of evolution. Concerning women’s education, several measures have been taken to provide equal opportunities to them at both school and higher education levels. This goes hand in hand with the larger ongoing reforms to change the discriminatory laws and customs that have been the major obstacle in achieving gender parity in education and other fields. Women’s education, which was earlier the exclusive domain of the ulema, has been brought into the mainstream and educational facilities for women are being improved. Steps have been taken to make educational institutions more inclusive toward women and, while keeping the Saudi-Islamic customs of “modesty” and no “intermingling,” the gender segregation rules are being gradually eased. In today’s Saudi Arabia, women have greater rights and choices in terms of attaining education or choosing a career than it

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was at any time in the past. Besides the reform efforts undertaken by the monarchy, this is also a reflection of the larger change taking place in the society wherein, a few decades back, not only was the sight of an unveiled woman in public frowned upon but hijab was also enforced by the “notorious” religious police. The impact of the education reforms on the relationship between the ulema and the educational institutions is also witnessed. Seen within the larger context of the religious influence in the society, the reform process has significantly altered the power dynamics in terms of the control of the ulema on the education system. In fact, the ulema now have become confined to regulations and administration of only religious institutions while their control over the public education has reduced significantly. One of the key characteristics of the reforms is that the state ulema have more or less lost their control over the education policy and system though their opinion on various issues of sociopolitical importance, including education, has not become entirely irrelevant. The reforms in education are also reflected in the way the society is changing and how the aspirations of the youth have become more globalized. In that sense, one can certainly notice the impacts of globalization and economic modernization on the education system. The changes and reforms in the education system are also reflected in the way that perception about religion and its role in the society has evolved. While Islam remains the primary cultural force, the focus has shifted from “conservatism” to “moderation” and this has had a profound impact on, among other things, the education policy and system. The education system in Saudi Arabia has witnessed a sea change since 2001 when the kingdom came under international pressure to introduce education reforms as it was accused of fomenting extremism. The reforms initiatives rooted in Saudi social milieu and economic requirement have helped confront the challenges without a serious rupture in the education system. The challenges included making the education accessible to all and improving the quality of education at all levels. It also faced challenges because of the lesser educational opportunities for women and other marginalized sections. Even bigger problem was to make the education system attuned to the need for training the youth for the job market and fostering a new generation of Saudis toward a knowledge-based society. But the biggest challenge was confronting the influential ulema who for long resisted change and hindered education reforms. In varying degrees, the reforms have addressed these issues and though it will require a continuous and sustained effort to emerge completely from the dark shadows of the past, the comprehensive reforms are an encouraging sign for the future of the kingdom.

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Index1

A Abdullah, Adela bint, 23, 39, 91, 94, 96, 104, 105, 111, 135, 175, 191 Abdullah, King, 23–25, 27, 30, 31, 43, 110, 114, 125, 126, 139, 162, 163, 176, 179, 182, 191, 192, 194, 207, 210 Adl (justice), 26 Adult literacy, 69 Age structure, in Saudi Arabia, 78 Apostasy, 121 Aqidah (faith), 120 Arab American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 18, 57, 95 Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf States, 112 Arab Gulf monarchies, 43 Arabian Peninsula, 7, 14, 16, 27, 38n1, 54, 75, 121, 187, 205, 208 Arab identity, 13 Arab nationalism, rise of, 19 Arab Spring, 162, 192

Artistic activities, among Saudi youths, 216, 217 Arts and fashion, women involvement in, 190–191 al-Awdah, Salman, 83, 208 Awqaf, 207, 208 B Baby boom, 76, 78, 118 Baladi campaign, 192 Balance of power, 214 al-Bandar, Reema, 175, 185 Basic Law (al-Nizam al-Asasi), 23, 92, 114, 206, 218 Baz, Abdulaziz bin, 83, 184 Beblawi, Hazem, 7 Bedouin culture and heritage, 215, 215n2 Bedouins, 28, 38n1, 75, 215, 215n2 Bin Laden, Osama, 83, 84 Blue-collar jobs, 73

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2021 M. M. Quamar, Education System in Saudi Arabia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9173-0

253

254 

INDEX

Budget allocation for education, 157, 158, 182, 228 for human resource, 158, 228 Bush, George W., 96 C California-Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), 56 Center of Religious Freedom, 96 Central Planning Organization (CPO), 21 Challenges, in education policy making, 39 Characteristics, of education policy, 39, 46 Child mortality, decline in, 78 Citizenship, concept of, 43 Civil disobedience, 220 Civil society activism, 192, 220 groups, 104 Cold War, between the US and USSR, 20 Colleges of excellence, 148 Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), 208 Communication revolution, 30 Community and private colleges, 136, 140–147 “Community partnership” program, 115 Comprehensive Educational Assessment Program (1996), 39 Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), 23, 43, 85–87 formation of, 85 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 177 Corruption, 8, 87, 172 Curriculum and courses, in education system

development of, 9, 23, 42, 53–65, 115, 116, 119 of elementary school, 59, 67 for female education, 40, 59, 110, 126, 156, 173, 175, 177, 180–183, 188 of intermediate school, 64, 67 religious curriculum, 105–108, 118, 227 revision of, 109, 118, 120 skill-oriented, 118 Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Overseas Scholarship Program, The, 154 D al-Dakhil, Azzam, 126 Death penalty, 121, 162 Decision-making, process of, 95 Demand, for education and employment, 74, 79–80 Demography and migration, patterns of, 28 De-radicalization program, 209 Distribution of schools, 63 Dress codes, in public spaces, 175 Driving rights, for women, 192 E Economic boom, 38 Economic diversification, 22, 24 policy of, 207 Economic growth and development, 47 Economic liberalization, 24, 30 Economic modernization and globalization, 170 Economic transformation, of Saudi Arabia, 30, 73, 126, 127 Economy, impact of female education on, 171

 INDEX 

Educated youth, unemployment among, 82, 87–90, 106, 118, 134, 153, 156, 157 Educational infrastructure, in Saudi Arabia, 39, 58, 62, 66, 80, 113, 136, 150 development of, 58, 66 Educational needs of women, 48 Educational Reform in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 111 Education bureaucracy, 41 “Education for All Week” program, 123 Education policymaking, 31, 39, 41, 43 role of Al-Shaikh family in, 110 Education reforms, in Saudi Arabia administrative changes for, 125–126 after September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, 66, 104, 119 Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project (1996), 25, 104, 110, 111 debate on, 103–105 demands for, 9, 23, 24, 47, 66, 83–84, 134, 174, 175 during Faisal’s rule, 110 Educational Reform in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 111 for female education, 110 initiatives for (see Initiatives for education reforms) King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (Tatweer), 110 King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (Tatweer) (2005), 114 Kuwait crisis and, 83 role of Al-Shaikh family in, 110 Ten Year Strategic Plan, 2004-2014 (2003), 110, 112 US pressure to implement, 24, 96

255

Education–religion relationship changes in religious education, 210–213 on changing perception of religion, 205, 213–217 youth and religion, 220 Education Strategy, 2016-2020, 41 Education system, in Saudi Arabia domestic aspects of, 5 female education, 40, 59, 110, 126, 156, 173, 175, 177, 180–183, 188 formation of, 8 higher education, 38, 150 historical evolution of, 4 impact on state and society, 7, 15 influence of ulema on, 73, 173 international aspects of, 5 new school curriculum, 23, 180 opposition to English language teaching, 18 political factors shaping, 5 public education system, 9, 43, 114, 117, 123, 125, 171, 204 quality of, 9, 14, 25, 41, 88–90, 96, 103, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 135, 136, 139, 153–156, 159, 160, 174, 178, 180, 227, 228 radicalisation of, 203 reforms in, 4, 43, 44, 73, 74, 88, 96, 151, 155, 158, 229 school and university system, 4 scientific and technological education, 15 skilled-based, 19 under second-five year plan (1975–80), 21, 22 Wahhabi influence in, 18 Women’s education, 9, 38, 48, 49, 62, 172, 176–184, 187, 188, 228 Al-Ekhbariya news channel, 189

256 

INDEX

Employment demand for, 79–80 education for, 19 in government and administration services, 19 in private sector, 49, 161 Enrolment of students, 62 Every Child Needs a Teacher, 124 Expansion of education system higher education, 64–66, 133, 150 school education, 59–63 vocational and technical education, 63, 69, 148, 159 Expatriate population, in Saudi Arabia, 48, 63, 81, 82, 89 Expatriate workforce, influx of, 64, 81–82, 89, 156 Extracurricular activities, 116 F Fahd, King, 22–24, 38, 40, 83–87, 87n3, 91, 104, 111, 179 Faisal, King, 20, 21, 38, 57, 59, 64, 109, 110, 126, 172, 173, 175, 178, 191 five-year plan model, 21 foreign policy of, 20 social policy of, 21 al-Faisal, Turki, 109, 118, 126 Family and health, impact of female education on, 188 al-Faqih, Saad, 208 Fatwa, 45, 83, 184 Al-Fayez, Norah, 126, 178, 186 Female education, 9, 38, 48, 49, 62, 172, 176–184, 187, 188, 228 contemporary reforms in, 175–176 debate over the need for, 172 during reign of King Faisal, 179 early reforms in, 171–175 education reforms, 110

enrolment in school and higher education, 177 enrolment in tertiary education, 25 General Directorate of Girl’s Education, 40, 59 impact on condition of women; arts, design and fashion, 190–191; economy, 183–187; family and health, 187–189; media, 189–190; politics, civil society and judiciary, 191–193; sports, 193–194 key factor for the restrictions on, 173 in nonconventional course, 175 process of reforms in, 182 progress in, 177–182 ratio of literate women to men, 177, 180 Saudi Vision 2030 and, 182–183 school curriculum for, 180 ulema opposition to, 173, 184 Female literacy rate, 180 Female representation in business sector, 185 in civil society and public affairs, 170 in judiciary, 170, 192 in politics, 191 in sports, 170 Fire incident, at girls’ school in Mecca, 40 First five-year plan (1970–74), 21 Foreign educational institutions, 41 Fourth five-year plan (1985–90), 21 G Gender discrimination, problem of, 121 Gender segregation in public spaces, 175 rules for, 228 General Directorate of Education, 40

 INDEX 

General Directorate of Girl’s Education, 40, 59 Genesis of education system impact of discovery of oil, 55–59 rudimentary early system, 54–55 Global gender gap index, 185 Globalization, era of challenges and opportunities, 30 market-driven economy and, 30 “Golden era” for Saudi women, 176 Grand Mufti (al-Mufti al-Aam), 83, 184, 193, 207 Great depression (1929–33), 56 Gross domestic product (GDP), 24, 80, 158, 161 Guardianship system abolishment of, 190 absolute male guardianship, 190 Gulf Arab monarchies characteristic of, 7 evolution of, 7 human rights violation, 7 suppression of dissent, 7 H Hadith (Prophet’s saying), 54 Hajj revenues, 58 al-Hamid, Abdullah, 47, 192 Hanbali-Wahhabi tradition, 5 al-Hawali, Safar, 83, 86, 208 Health and hygiene awareness programs, 116 Hejazi merchants, 16, 17 Hia’t al-Ulema al-Kibar al-Saudiyah, 40 Higher education budget allocation and investment, 157–159 community and private colleges, 140–147 deficiencies in, 173 demand for, 64, 73

257

distribution of students in, 180 female enrolment in, 177 foundation for, 173 and human resource, 88, 135, 136, 228 inclusive education, steps for, 161–138 infrastructure development and expansion, 135–137, 150 Ministry of Higher Education, 39, 40, 64, 88, 110, 126, 134, 135, 137, 154, 173 Observatory on Higher Education (2010), 88, 154 Overseas Scholarship Program (2005), 135 quality of, 64, 88, 134, 136, 137, 154, 155, 228 reforms in, 158 Saudization, 135, 155–157 science and technology education, 68, 159–161 specialized centers for research, 150 Strategic Plan (2009), 135 universities, 64, 69, 88 vocational institutions, 147–149 Home-borne terrorism, problem of, 105 Homophobia, 122 Houses and living spaces, 5 Human resources budget allocation for, 158, 228 development of, 21, 22, 25, 39, 53, 64, 79, 88, 90, 118, 134, 151–153, 158, 174 fourth development plan (1985–90) on, 152, 158 problem of unemployment and underemployment, 152 quality education and, 88, 151 quality of, 80 Saudization of, 118 Human rights violation, 7

258 

INDEX

Husband–wife relationship, 187 Hussein, Saddam, 162 al-Huwaider, Wajeha, 190, 192 I Ibn Baz, Abdulaziz, 83 Ibn Khaldun Fellowship, 179 Ibn Saud, King, 9, 14, 16–18, 37, 38, 45, 55–57, 56n2, 75, 95, 178n2, 191 control of Riyadh, 16 death of, 57 era of, 16–18 influence of, 16, 178n2 leadership of, 204 majlis and advisors of, 17 relation with Al-Shaikh family, 18 on skill-based education, 45 Iffat, Queen (wife of King Faisal), 110, 172, 191 Ifta, practice of, 206 Ikhwan movement, 26 Ikhwan revolt of 1920s, 93 Illiteracy, eradication of, 64, 113 Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, 68, 70, 174, 209 Inclusive education, steps for, 161–138 In Defence of the Nation (2003), 91, 95, 192 Individual’s social life, components of, 6 Infrastructural development, 21, 58 Initiatives for education reforms Comprehensive Educational Assessment Project (1996), 104, 110–112 curriculum development, 122 curriculum revision and new textbooks, 118–122 Democracy and Partnership Initiative (2005), 112

during Faisal’s rule, 110 for equal education opportunities for women, 177 on modern education for girls, 110 recommendations for change, 111 Tatweer Project (2005), 114–117 Ten Year Strategic Plan, 2004–2014, 110, 112–114 textbook revision programs, 119 Inmate (Prison) Vocational and Industrial Training Institutes, 148 Intermarriages, in Saudi society, 17, 18 International Crisis Group Middle East Report (2004), 96 Internet, advent of, 220 Investment in education, 117, 182 Islam as driver of social change, 25–31 as formal religion of Saudi Arabia, 6 idea of “criticism of Islam,” 121 influence in social and political life, 26 need for preservation and protection of, 214 political legitimacy of, 5 role in affairs of state and society, 26 state-sanctioned interpretation of, 121 “Islamic” education, 104, 204, 213 Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence), 54, 67, 69, 107 Islamic law, 67, 85, 86, 92, 206 codification of, 85 Islamic revolution, in Iran, 46, 204 Islamic scriptures and religious texts, 120 Islamic University of Medina (IUM), 69 Islamist extremism, 90 Islamization of education policy, 46 of society, 26, 203

 INDEX 

Islamo-liberals, 23, 85, 104, 105, 204, 209, 219 J Janadiriya festival (Meharjan Janadiriya), 215n2 Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI), 186 Jibreen, Abdullah bin, 105, 105n2, 108 Jihadist group, emergence of, 26 Joblessness, issues of, 175 Job market, 64, 67, 74, 79, 88, 104, 108, 155, 157, 175, 182, 183, 212 nationalization of, 90, 134 Job opportunities for educated women, 29 in private sector, 157 Jobs, nationalization of, 24, 82, 149, 155 Judiciary, women’s representation in, 170, 192 K Kabah, siege of (1979), 46, 161 al-Karim, Muhammad Abd, 220 Khalid, King, 64 Khashoggi, Jamal, 96, 120, 192 Khashoggi, Samia, 190 King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (KACND), 177, 210 King Abdulaziz University (KAU), 15n1, 68, 133, 136, 139, 139n1 King Abdullah Overseas Scholarship Program (2005), 154 King Abdullah Public Education Development Project (2005), see Tatweer Project (2005) King Abdullah University of Science & Technology (KAUST), 41, 114, 136, 137, 161, 178–180

259

King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), 15n1, 67, 68, 136, 139n1, 179 King Saud University (KSU), 15n1, 59, 68, 136, 139n1, 159, 160 Kinship ties, erosion of, 28 Knowledge-based economy, 25, 90 society, 16, 41, 228 Kuttab, 54 L Labor force, nationalization of, see Saudization of labor force Labor market nationalization of, 156 Nitaqat (ranges) program, 25, 29, 90, 156, 157 Labor unions, 19 Law of Provinces, 85 Liberal views and ideas, spread of, 214, 217–221 M Madaris li Tahfeez Quran al-Karim (Schools for Memorization of Quran), 107 Madrasa, 54 Madrasa tahfiz al-Quran, 212 Majlis al-Baladiya (Municipal Council), 43 Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), 23, 43, 85–87, 92, 123, 163, 178, 190, 191, 193, 218, 219 women representation in, 191 Male and female education, disparity in, 180 Male guardianship/guardianship law, 187, 190 al-Maliki, Abdullah, 220 al-Mansour, Haifaa, 190, 217

260 

INDEX

Markaz al-Malik Abdulaziz li al-Hiwar al-Watani, 210 Market-driven economy, 30, 31 Market economy and rentierism, idea of, 21 al-Masjid al-Haram, 207 al-Masjid an-Nabawi, 207 Maslaha (public good), concept of, 26 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 137, 179 Media, impact of female education on, 170 Memorandum of Advice, 86 Memorandum of Understandings, 136 Middle East North Africa (MENA), 161 Millennium development goals (MDGs), 113 Ministry of Education Directorate for Girl’s Education, 177 plan for improvement of schools, 125 Ministry of Higher Education, 39, 40, 64, 88, 110, 126, 134, 135, 137, 154, 173 Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 126, 207 Ministry of Justice, 188, 207 Modern education system development of, 53 expansion of, 55 genesis of, 54–59 important aspects of, 66–60 Modesty, Saudi-Islamic custom of, 228 Mohammed, Crown Prince, 24, 26, 30, 43, 46, 156, 157, 170, 182, 186, 193, 207, 216 Mohammed, Prophet, 47, 120 Monarchism, phenomenon of, 6 Monopoly, over education policy and system of state, 44

of tribal sheikhs, 45 Muslim Brotherhood, 87, 208 Mutawwa (religious police) abuse of power, 208 role of, 177 task of regulating the public morality, 208 N Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 19, 20, 58, 84n2 Nationalization of jobs, policy of, 74 National labor force, 89 National system, for joint training, 149 National Transformation Program 2020, 30 Native population, in Saudi Arabia, 76–78, 134, 174 Nature Index 2017, 150, 151, 161 Nidam al-Manatiq (System for Provinces), 87 Nidam Majlis al-Shura (System for Consultative Council), 87 al-Nimr, Nimr, 162 Nitaqat (domains/ranges) program, 25, 29, 90, 156, 157 No “intermingling,” Saudi-Islamic custom of, 228 Noon al-Niswa (YouTube comedy channel), 217 O Observatory on Higher Education, 88, 135, 154 “Occupation” of the holy places, 83 October 1973 War, 96 Oil-based economies, 30, 74, 152, 159 in Persian Gulf, 7 Oil boom period (1970–91)

 INDEX 

261

and demography, 64, 74–90 population growth, 76–79 Oil, discovery of, 14, 30, 55–59, 171 impact on education, 55, 171 Oil embargo, in 1973, 20, 96 Oil era (1953–70), 16 Oil exploration, 30, 38, 56, 95 Oil-for-security agreement, 16 Oil income, 58 Oil industry, 19, 38, 58, 75, 77, 136, 228 Oil production, commercial aspect of, 30 Oil revenues, 5, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 42, 56, 57, 64 impact on socioeconomic life, 19 Oil wealth, 8, 22, 38, 42, 43, 58, 73, 81 On-the-job training program, 149 Operation Desert Storm, 83, 85 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), see Organization of Islamic Cooperation Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 20 ‘Original Arab’ (Arab al-Asl) tribes, 27 Ottoman influence on education, 54 Overseas Scholarship Program (2005), 135, 154

Planned development model, 21 Political culture, in Saudi Arabia, 16, 210 Political dissatisfaction, among Saudi youth, 216 Political economy, evolution of, 5, 7 Political rights, of women, 192 Political system, in Saudi Arabia, 6, 14, 25, 26, 28, 43, 47, 84, 103n1, 191, 207, 219 Post-Kuwait crisis phase (1991–2005), 16, 22–24 impact on Saudi Arabia, 22 Powell, Collin, 112 Private colleges, in Saudi Arabia, 136, 140–147 Private education, 31, 44n2, 186 Private training centers and institutes, 149 Problem-solving skills, 123, 152 Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bait or Syed), 27 Public administration, development of, 38 Public education system, quality of, 9 Public-funded schools, 40 Public investment, 21 Public school system, 103, 104, 106, 107, 120

P pan-Arabism, rise of, 19 Patronage network, in royal family, 8 Petition fever, 22, 39, 74, 84–87, 90, 218 Petro-dollars, 16 Petroleum-related services, 19 Photography and painting, 216 Physical education, for girls, 193 Pilgrimage-driven revenues, 56

Q Al-Qaeda, 83 bombings and attacks on security establishment, 208 rise and spread of, 208 Saudi counter-terrorism initiative against, 208 Qaedatul Jihad, see Al-Qaeda al-Qahtani, Mohammad, 46n3, 192 Qasem, Islam Y., 7

262 

INDEX

Quality of education, 14, 25, 74, 88–90, 96, 103, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 135, 136, 139, 153–156, 159, 160, 174, 180, 227 improvement in, 118, 119, 154, 155, 159 Quality of life, 76, 152, 155 Quran, memorization of, 61, 63, 106, 107, 212 R Radical religious movements, 26 RAND Corporation, 152 Religion changing perception of, 205, 213–217 people’s perception of and attitude towards, 214 role in; education affairs, 46; society, 229 youth and, 220–221 Religious affairs, bureaucratization of, 206 Religious curriculum, 105–108, 118, 227 Religious education changes in, 210–213 education institutions for, 203 reforms initiatives in, 212 role of ulema in, 204, 212 Religious gatherings (majlis-ad-­ dars), 54 Religious leadership, 38 Religious legitimacy, 18, 37, 105, 208 Religious orthodoxy, ideas of, 37 Religious preachers, regularization of, 206 Religious schools, for children, 107 Religious scriptures, 47 Religious ways of life, 5

Rising extremist tendencies, problem of, 214 Riyadh Institute for Entrepreneurship, 149 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 95 Royal family factionalism within, 18 power distribution within, 20 S al-Sahwa al-Islamiya (Islamic Awakening), 208 Sahwa movement, 26, 208 Salman, Mohammed bin, see Mohammed, Crown Prince Satellite television, advent of, 220 Al-Saud, Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman, see Ibn Saud, King Al-Saud monarchy, 3 Saudi Arabia alliance with the United States, 23 formation of, 16 founding of, 15 gross domestic product (GDP), 158, 161 security threat vis-à-vis Iran, 162 socio-economic developments, 15 Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), 57, 179 Saudi civil society, 192, 218, 219 Saudi Council of Senior Ulema (CSU), 40, 86, 105, 126, 179, 207 Saudi research institutions, 151, 183 Saudi Riyal, devaluation of, 57 Saudi rock bands, 216 Saudi–US relations, 96 impact of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on, 96 Saudi Vision 2030, see Vision 2030 program

 INDEX 

Saudi women, 9, 91, 163, 169–172, 175–177, 179, 183–191, 193, 194, 217 Saudization of labor force, 90, 175 School education, in Saudi Arabia, 15, 16, 93, 109, 118, 178, 181, 204, 212, 227 challenges facing, 79, 88 distribution of schools, 63 dropout ratio among boys and girls, 181 eligibility of, 125 engagement of parents in, 127 enrolment of students, 62 expansion of schools, 62 ‘Irtiqaa’ (progress) program, 127 “Islamic” education, 104, 213 phases of, 59 quality of, 106 religious curriculum, 105–108, 118, 227 Saudi-Wahhabi history, 108 subject-wise study plan for; elementary schools, 59, 67; middle schools, 107, 121; secondary schools, 54, 62, 107, 114 teachers’ training and monitoring of classes, 109 teaching and learning, quality of, 62 Vision 2030 program, 149, 150 Western cultural influences on, 108 “western” education, 104 Schools Personnel Evaluation Project (2001), 123 Schools, quality of, 93, 104–106, 108–110, 178, 228 Science and technology education, 68–69, 119, 136, 137, 159–161, 180 Science education development of, 119

263

quality of, 153, 160, 228 Secondary education, 59, 107, 117 Second five-year plan (1975–80), 21, 22 focus on education system, 21, 22 September 11, 2001 terror attacks extremism and radicalism, 66, 74, 90, 92–93, 104 impact on; education system, 4, 74, 90, 93, 96, 203; Saudi–US relationship, 23, 68, 90, 95 internal debate on, 93–95 and international pressure, 74, 90, 95 involvement of Saudi nationals in, 93, 212 Al-Shaikh family, 18, 37, 40, 110 Shari’a (Islamic law), 86, 92 Sharia College, 213 al-Sharif, Manal, 192 Sheikhs (leaders of family and clans), 28, 45 Shias, discrimination against, 161, 163 Sirah (Prophet’s biography), 54 Skill development, 25, 27, 37, 38, 73, 74, 80, 122, 172 Skilled-based education, 19 Social and education reforms, demand for, 23 Social change, drivers of demography and migration, 25, 28–29 impact on education, 31 Islam, 25–27 market and globalization, 25, 30–31 tribalism, 25, 27–28 Social differentiation, 27 Social hierarchy, 27 Socialism, rise of, 19 Social justice, 29, 86, 94, 214 Social policy, in Saudi Arabia, 15, 20, 26 evolution of, 15, 26

264 

INDEX

Social transformation, 27, 31, 44, 73 of Saudi Arabia, 31, 44 Social welfare concept of, 14 Saudi idea of, 21 Soviet invasion, of Afghanistan, 46 Specialized centers for research, 150, 159 Sports, female representation in, 29, 170 Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), 56, 95 State and bureaucracy, attitude toward education, 43 Statement of Saudi Youth Regarding the Guarantee of Freedoms and Ethics of Diversity, 220–221 State–society–economy relations, 8 State–society relations during oil boom period, 16, 20–22 early impacts of oil on, 18–20 in era of rapid globalization, 24–25 in post-Kuwait crisis phase, 16, 22–24 State structures, formalization of, 75 State-ulema relations, 207 State universities, in Saudi Arabia, 65–66, 138 Strategic partnership institutes, 148 Strategic Vision for the Present and the Future (2003), 91 Sunnah (Prophetic tradition), 46n3, 54 Sustainable development goals (SDGs), 113, 128 T Tafsir (Quranic interpretation), 54, 67, 107 Tamkin al-mara’ (women empowerment), 176

Tatweer Project (2005), 110, 114–117, 124 Teachers appointment of, 103 development of teaching methodology, 109, 116, 122–125 interaction with students, 109 monitoring of classes, 109, 124 qualification for, 125, 148 training and school environment, 122–125 training program, 88, 110, 116, 122–125, 204, 227 UNESCO Teacher’s Training Report 2007, 123 Teacher training colleges, 69, 122, 123, 125, 137 Teaching and learning, quality of, 62, 123 Technical and Vocational Training Corporation (TVTC), 63, 64, 79, 147–149, 182 Technical education, 63, 113 for girl students, 113 Ten Year Strategic Plan, 2004-2014 (2003), 110, 112–114 Textbook revision programs, 118, 119 Thinking Skills Development Project (2002), 123 Third five-year plan (1980–85), 21 Training ended by employment, concept of, 149 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 119 Tribal life, in Saudi Arabia ethos of, 6 kinship ties, 28 lineage of, 6 ‘original Arab’ (Arab al-Asl) tribes, 27

 INDEX 

as primary unit for political, economic and social function, 27 role in affairs of state and society, 15–25, 31 social hierarchy of, 27 tribal networks, 28 tribal-political entity, 16 U Ulema categories of, 207 interference in education, 178, 207 in Islamic universities, 93, 209 Islamo-liberal, 209 opposition to banking system, 38 relation with state, 41, 42 role in affairs of state and society, 26 support to Al-Saud, 16, 17 Wahhabi, 13, 16–18, 92, 169 Ummah, 83 Umm al-Qura University, 68, 70, 174, 209, 213 Underemployment, problem of, 152 Unemployment among educated women, 29, 89 among educated youth, 88, 134, 152, 156 among Saudi nationals, 89 due to poor human resource, 88 issues of, 88, 89, 134, 175, 209 national rate of, 89 rate of, 82, 88, 89, 156, 157 UNESCO Teacher’s Training Report 2007, 123 Uniform educational policy, 59 United Nations World Demographic Trends, 29, 220 Universities, in Saudi Arabia, 4, 64–66, 68, 69, 133, 136–138, 140, 153, 178n2, 227

265

Urban lifestyle, 73, 75 Urban/rural divide, 15 al-Uthaibi, Juhaiman, 26 Kaaba, siege of (1979), 26, 93, 179, 204, 207, 209, 212 V Venice Film Festival (2012), 217 Vibrant society, theme of creating, 127 Vision 2030 program, 113, 149, 150, 182–183 school education and, 126–128 and women’s education, 182–183 Vocational education demand for, 63 impact of oil discovery on, 63 Vocational institutions, 40, 55, 63, 64, 79, 133, 136, 147–150, 180, 182 Vocational Military Training Institute, 148 Vocational training, 38, 63, 64, 90, 147–149, 183, 228 W Wadjda (film), 217 Wahhab, Mohammed Bin Abdul, 18, 26, 38n1, 207 Wahhabi Islam, ideological legitimacy associated with, 92 Wahhabi mission, 92 Wahhabi ulema influence in education affairs, 17 opposition to English language teaching in schools, 18 role in decision making, 17, 18 War on terror, 96 “Western” education, 104 White-collar jobs, 73 Women driving, issue of, 190, 192 Women empowerment, 170, 176, 191

266 

INDEX

Women’s education, see Female education Women’s municipal elections, 178, 192 Women sports centers, establishment of, 194 Women’s rights contemporary reforms, 175–176 debate on, 194–195 to enrolment in school and higher education, 194 on equality in education, 169–195 Workforce nationalization of, 89–90, 175, 182 Saudization of, 25, 90, 134, 152, 156, 158

World Trade Organization (WTO), 24 World University Ranking 2020, 133, 139 World War II, 56, 57, 95 Y Youth bulge, 49, 76, 78, 134 Youth–religion relationship, 9, 29, 31, 214, 220–221 Z al-Zahran, Bayan Mahmoud, 179