Education for responsibility 9781786303660, 1786303663

Table of contents :
Content: Foreword ixIntroduction xviiChapter 1. The World as a Reflection of the Mind 11.1. Definitions of the terms 11.1.1. Notions of world 11.1.2. Notions of mind 51.1.3. Gnoseological hypothesis, notions of consciousness and the model of the mind 61.2. The objective world as an epistemological and societal reflection of the collective mind: an example of science 171.2.1. Paradigms and projections in science 181.2.2. Examples of projection by a collective mind onto the objective world 201.2.3. Overview: the scientific world, a reflection of scientists' minds 241.3. The subjective world as a psychological and phenomenological reflection of the individual mind 251.3.1. The basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship 251.3.2. The four horsemen of the individual relative mind 381.4. Integrating the model of the relationship between the relative world and the mind 831.4.1. Metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet 841.4.2. The ego, mediator of the reflection of the subjective world through the individual relative mind 891.4.3. An example: stereotypes, prejudices and violent radicalizations 94Chapter 2. Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 1032.1. Introduction: an overview of the tone of current research on responsibility 1032.2. Responsibility as a dialogical relationship between the outer and inner worlds: ethical perspectives 1052.2.1. Problem of responsibility in the field of ethics 1052.2.2. Responsibility approaches in the field of ethics 1082.3. Responsibility as a consciousness connected to oneself, others and the non-human environment (NHE): psychological and phenomenological points of view 1102.3.1. Cognition and responsibility 1102.3.2. Orientation and responsibility 1172.3.3. Emotions, relationships and responsibility 1232.4. Assessment: criteria for guiding towards responsibility 1272.4.1. Coherence 1282.4.2. The motivation for innovation 1302.4.3. Harmony 1342.4.4. Horizon of an education for responsibility 147Chapter 3. Education for Responsibility Guidelines 1613.1. Reflexivities 1613.1.1. Cognitive reflexivity 1623.1.2. Dialogical reflexivity 1643.1.3. Phenomenological reflexivity 1663.1.4. Objectives and material for the implementation of these reflexivities 1693.2. Meditation 1743.2.1. Meditation and its phenomenological effects 1743.2.2. Clinical protocols and practices including meditation 1803.2.3. Techniques related to meditation 1833.2.4. Psychobiological effects of meditation 1843.2.5. Effects of meditation in school and university contexts 1913.3. General principle: reflexivities, meditation and responsibility 1933.3.1. Meditation and dialogical reflexivity would synergistically promote phenomenological reflexivity 1933.3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity promotes empathy and relatedness by instantiating harmony 1973.4. Summary of the competences targeted in responsibility education 2033.4.1. Notion of competence 2043.4.2. Emotional competences 2063.4.3. Epistemic competences 2093.4.4. Attentional competences 2113.4.5. Relational competences 2133.4.6. Axiological competences 2143.4.7. Summary of the progress within the five types of competences 2193.5. Integrating model of psychospiritual competences targeted in education for responsibility 224Chapter 4. Discussion 2294.1. Education for responsibility, ethics and spirituality 2304.2. Limitations of this approach 2324.2.1. Obstacles in the French context 2324.2.2. Some limitations of the proposed model 2354.3. Education for responsibility and happiness 2374.3.1. Stopping the illusion of ego and lasting happiness 2384.3.2. Connections between education for responsibility and positive psychology 2414.4. Building knowledge and practical implementation in education for responsibility 2454.4.1. Summary of the present argumentation 2454.4.2. Epistemological, pedagogical and research perspectives 2484.4.3. Afterword 254Postface 257References 261Index 289

Citation preview

Education for Responsibility

To all beings, for a harmonious life

Education Set coordinated by Angela Barthes and Gérard Boudesseul

Volume 4

Education for Responsibility

Hélène Hagège

First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address: ISTE Ltd 27-37 St George’s Road London SW19 4EU UK

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street Hoboken, NJ 07030 USA

www.iste.co.uk

www.wiley.com

© ISTE Ltd 2019 The rights of Hélène Hagège to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Library of Congress Control Number: 2019935737 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-78630-366-0

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvii

Chapter 1. The World as a Reflection of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1. Definitions of the terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1. Notions of world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2. Notions of mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.3. Gnoseological hypothesis, notions of consciousness and the model of the mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. The objective world as an epistemological and societal reflection of the collective mind: an example of science . . . . . 1.2.1. Paradigms and projections in science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2. Examples of projection by a collective mind onto the objective world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3. Overview: the scientific world, a reflection of scientists’ minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. The subjective world as a psychological and phenomenological reflection of the individual mind . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1. The basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship . . . . . . 1.3.2. The four horsemen of the individual relative mind . . . . . . . . 1.4. Integrating the model of the relationship between the relative world and the mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.1. Metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4.2. The ego, mediator of the reflection of the subjective world through the individual relative mind . . . . . . 1.4.3. An example: stereotypes, prejudices and violent radicalizations

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Chapter 2. Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Introduction: an overview of the tone of current research on responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. Responsibility as a dialogical relationship between the outer and inner worlds: ethical perspectives . . 2.2.1. Problem of responsibility in the field of ethics. . . . 2.2.2. Responsibility approaches in the field of ethics . . . 2.3. Responsibility as a consciousness connected to oneself, others and the non-human environment (NHE): psychological and phenomenological points of view . . . . . 2.3.1. Cognition and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2. Orientation and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3. Emotions, relationships and responsibility . . . . . . 2.4. Assessment: criteria for guiding towards responsibility . 2.4.1. Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2. The motivation for innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3. Harmony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.4. Horizon of an education for responsibility . . . . . .

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105 105 108

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110 110 117 123 127 128 130 134 147

Chapter 3. Education for Responsibility Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . .

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3.1. Reflexivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1. Cognitive reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2. Dialogical reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3. Phenomenological reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4. Objectives and material for the implementation of these reflexivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1. Meditation and its phenomenological effects . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2. Clinical protocols and practices including meditation . . . . . 3.2.3. Techniques related to meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4. Psychobiological effects of meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5. Effects of meditation in school and university contexts . . . . 3.3. General principle: reflexivities, meditation and responsibility . . . 3.3.1. Meditation and dialogical reflexivity would synergistically promote phenomenological reflexivity . . . . 3.3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity promotes empathy and relatedness by instantiating harmony . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. Summary of the competences targeted in responsibility education 3.4.1. Notion of competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2. Emotional competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3. Epistemic competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.4. Attentional competences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

3.4.5. Relational competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.6. Axiological competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.7. Summary of the progress within the five types of competences 3.5. Integrating model of psychospiritual competences targeted in education for responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . .

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213 214 219

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Chapter 4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

229

4.1. Education for responsibility, ethics and spirituality . . . . . . 4.2. Limitations of this approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1. Obstacles in the French context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2. Some limitations of the proposed model . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. Education for responsibility and happiness . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1. Stopping the illusion of ego and lasting happiness . . . . 4.3.2. Connections between education for responsibility and positive psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. Building knowledge and practical implementation in education for responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1. Summary of the present argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2. Epistemological, pedagogical and research perspectives . 4.4.3. Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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230 232 232 235 237 238

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245 245 248 254

Postface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

257

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Foreword

Why is there such an urgent need for education for responsibility? ‘Because the world is mad,’ answers Hélène Hagège, hence this ambitious as well as modest proposal: we must change the world and, to do so, change our minds. The book takes an old philosophical problem and presents it in a new way, by bringing together cognitive sciences, psychosociology, phenomenology and ethics in order to develop a new modeling approach, a tool that allows us both to organize the field of research and to act in the world. For someone like me, unfamiliar with the advances of the cognitive sciences, the theory is not self-evident. So I have had to rebuild it step by step to understand its coherence. You said “responsibility”? As Hans Jonas and others have clearly shown, modern humanity holds the future of the planet in its hands. For the first time in history, the threat of degradation of life on Earth comes not only from natural disasters, but from human action and the reactions it causes in turn to natural processes. The coupling of humanity and its environment has never been stronger, to the point that the dualism of nature and culture seems to be fading in favor of hybrid objects: is the hole in the ozone layer natural or “cultural”? The survival of humanity implies a change in the functional norms of Western societies. In other words, we must transform the way we live, produce, consume, circulate, etc. And we must probably also redirect our values more towards being rather than towards having and still much more than that. We must somehow re-educate ourselves and our children accordingly. The School is a stakeholder in this case, as evidenced in recent years by the

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proliferation of “education for” (the environment, health, etc.) that challenge the traditional dualisms of education and training, knowledge and values, science and ethics or politics. Education for responsibility comes into play here, not as a new “education for”, but rather as a transversal dimension. This education has two dimensions: first of all, the internal congruence in the subject, or rather the “coherence” to use the author’s lexicon: it refers to a subject who is lucid about themselves, their desires and thoughts, and who acts in accordance with the values faithfully chosen. Second, responsibility implies the choice of certain moral objectives: caring about others, taking care of them and the environment, although there is no consensus in moral psychology research on the spectrum of values implied by this second element (Hagège 2014). In reality, one may wonder whether the idea of coherence is not, in itself, a carrier of these positive values, as some pragmatists, such as John Dewey, believe, or close to this current, such as Jean-Marie Guyau. For this philosophical optimism, evil is first and foremost a disease of the self or the ego. Metaphysics and the strawberry tartlet Such ethics requires an epistemological and even metaphysical detour. Hélène Hagège is not afraid of this term that professional philosophers nowadays use with caution, even if she mitigates the intimidating potential of this term by pleasantly proposing this expression of “metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet” (section 1.4.1). We must change the world or change our world, we said. But what does the world mean? The history of philosophy here offers a whole range of theories of knowledge. For Kant, who accepts the realistic hypothesis, there is a world independent of the subject, which is the same for all, supports phenomena, but is unknowable. We do not have access to this world in itself (to the noumena), but only to an interpretation of it, to what appears to us: phenomena. Our intellectual equipment structures our experience: we perceive things in time and space and according to the categories of our understanding. Hegel challenges this distinction of phenomena and noumenon by assimilating reality to the collective experience of humanity (the Mind) and the ultimate reality to absolute knowledge, which today tends

Foreword

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to be interpreted as the horizon of experience. It is in this perspective that the phenomenological (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre) or pragmatist (Peirce, Dewey, James) currents are situated. In relation to all these currents, Hélène Hagège claims to have a “gnoseological” hypothesis, which attempts to reconcile the ontological hypothesis (the belief in a more or less knowable outer world) with the phenomenological hypothesis (the world is our representation or experience, whether individual or collective). However, the author offers a warning. Individual or collective subjects are often tempted to believe that their worldview reaches the ultimate reality while even scientific research is always carried out within a given economic and social cultural context and therefore presents, in this sense, a certain relativity; hence the phenomenological theory that the world is a reflection of the mind. This logically implies that it would be “futile to change the world without seeking to change the mind” and therefore without changing oneself (section 1.2.3). Thus, to say that ecological threats force us to live differently is to say that we must change our relationship with the world, our vision of the world and select new values-in-action. The necessary political, economic and ecological changes will only be made if we are aware of the relativity of our vision of the world and the possible alternatives to this vision. Illusions of the ego If the world is mad, it is because we are mad, or almost all of us are. But where does our madness come from? From the ego, this illusion takes itself for reality, this tendency of the self that forces us to seek our own interests before anything else, to the point of confusing its relative reality with the ultimate reality. Let us successfully distinguish the individual, the subject and the ego. The individual is our biological entity, which both links us to a species and makes us unique. The subject is not a fixed entity; it is, according to Gilbert Simondon, a psychobiological and sociocultural process of individuation (Hagège 2014). In short, it is society that provides this primitive “soup” of sensations, emotions and volitions, the unity of a permanent self in time and the ability to say “I”. As for ego, it is a way of being for the subject, an attitude which is lived as separate and absolute: both as a social atom and as the center of the world. By separating from the world, projecting preferences and closing off from others, the ego takes its perspective on the world as the ultimate reality.

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But how can we evaluate the gap between the perception of the ego and the ultimate reality? Let us say that the ego is an illusion machine. This produces a number of discrepancies between saying and doing, such as when a smoker or heavy drinker makes moral speeches about the importance of health. Being convinced that it is right, the ego can freeze in its prejudices, even in dogmatism. Escaping the madness means above all becoming aware of the relativity of one’s point of view, striving to be coherent in regards to oneself, engaging in dialogue with others and learning from experience. Education for responsibility is only possible if the ego accepts a dialectic of emancipation and limitation by which self-realization renounces the desire of all power, which implies recognition of the point of view of others and social norms. But Hélène Hagège goes further: some subjects would be able to approach the ultimate reality which, on the one hand, would allow us to measure the gap produced by the crazy perspectives and, on the other hand, recall the Bergsonian or Nietzschean notions of intuition or the Schopenhauerian will, capable of tearing the veil of Maya, of representation, in order to achieve something of becoming or being. Our hypothesis is confirmed. What Hélène Hagège is looking for are the psychological, or rather ethical, conditions of an education for responsibility. Furthermore, we are of course reminded of Spinoza’s or Dewey’s ethics (Fabre 2015): to eliminate sad passions, those that diminish the power to act, to be in harmony with oneself, to harmonize one’s self, to open oneself to others and to connect with the universe. There is no radical evil, or rather, evil is a disease of the self that must be healed rather than punished. In short, education for responsibility would involve bringing about “awareness that relative reality is not the ultimate reality, to train the mind to perceive this, to function in an increasingly coherent way, to promote empathy and affiliation” (Box 2.2). All this supports the critical and especially self-critical mind. Changing: yes, but how? “Change yourself and the world changes with you” (section 1.5). The maxim is Stoic in appearance and seems to refer to voluntarism. Certainly, a researcher who comes from a molecular biology background probably knows how to appreciate what depends on us and what does not (heredity, social determinisms). But as the neurosciences show, this dualist division does not resist analysis for long if we consider the subject as a process of

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psychobiological individuation. This is in other ways in line with the Sartrean intuition that a human is how they react to situations that condition them without determining them. Humanity is therefore responsible for itself and others as well (especially as educators). The maxim is not Stoic, for another reason that is due to the impotence of the will in the change of self. The classic representation of the voluntary act, as the result of a rational deliberation, has already been challenged by Bergson and pragmatism: free will is probably only an illusion, even if, paradoxically, it is better to believe in free will, because this belief has performative values. In reality, everything seems more or less decided in advance, before consciousness, in an unconscious state, which, in order not to be representative of Freud’s, is no less effective. If this is the case, there is no point in fighting head-on against the trends from which we would like to free ourselves, which would only reinforce them. Rather, we are invited to participate in self-knowledge, to have a non-judgmental awareness of our entire subjective life: “being present to what is, without seeking to fight against” (Hagège 2014, author's translation). Hence the call to meditation in a secular spirituality associated with reflexivity. “Education for”, between emancipation and indoctrination The education for responsibility defended here therefore relies on “the values of harmonious coherence”. On several occasions, Hélène Hagège insists on the ethical imperative of giving subjects the freedom to choose their own values. In addition, she mentions the performative effect of explaining to subjects the possibility of choosing the values they can have (otherwise they risk acting unconsciously according to the values of their environment without ever questioning them). Admittedly, she emphasizes the educator’s “committed impartiality”, and the educator must not repress their own values (which would amount to letting them influence it unconsciously), but must endeavor to present them as choices, among others. We understand the educator’s concern – a concern I fully share – not to embrace it. One of the dangers of “educating for” would be to update the ideal of the education plans belonging to Robespierre’s friends: to regenerate a population through education; this is what frightened Condorcet. Hannah Arendt and John Dewey, each in their own way, also denounced the danger of making youth education the lever of a revolution whose goals would have been thought of in advance by the adult generation. On the contrary, the authentic meaning of education is undoubtedly to equip young people

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intellectually, emotionally and morally so that they are able to change the world according to their own objectives. However, it must be recognized that “education for” puts the educator, and especially the teacher, in an uncomfortable position and makes them subject to all kinds of excess. Indeed, teachers must encourage their students to become more reflective and critical of the madness existing in our world (in terms of development, health, etc.). They must be encouraged to change their outlook, but to change it in a certain direction, one that democratically decided public policies indicate: sustainable development rather than productivism, for example. We are probably over analyzing when we consider that taking responsibility is more in line with Nicolas Hulot’s proposals than with Donald Trump’s denial of reality. Plato called education as such, a “conversion” to designate turning away from the shadows of the cave towards the true reality. In addition, Durkheim, analyzing the beginnings of the modern school of thought, used the term to designate the educational goals of Carolingian Christianity, goals which, once secularized, he believed should support school education to this day (Durkheim 1990). The question posed to an ethics of responsibility that emphasizes the coherence of the subject is how to solve tensions between metamorphosis (change that allows the subject to determine his or her own values) and conversion (pre-directed change in a given direction) (Moreau 2014). It is not easy, indeed, to reconcile the vital need to change the world in a given sense if we want to survive, with the educational imperative to equip the freedom of young people who will have to invent their own world. Perhaps the articulation is to be sought in an ethics of prudence, as I propose (Fabre 2014). Certainly “education for” is driven by predetermined goals. But it is in the case studies (should we or should we not have an airport or a dam here or there? Should we or should we not ban a particular drug, such as weedkiller?) that we exercise caution. To problematize these cases is to carefully go around the problem, to elucidate the multiple stakes, to analyze the unavoidable opposition of values and interests that inevitably overdetermine it and finally to prioritize the decision-making criteria for a solution. In the absence of such an education for responsibility, practised concretely in the analysis of cases, as the author suggests, “educating for” risks either being brought back into the fold of academic disciplines, at the risk of being reduced to their scientific aspect, which is considered in a positivist way, or of giving rise, with the best intentions of the world, to a pedagogy of inculcation, by indoctrination or conditioning.

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To guide learners and education professionals in an ethical direction, Hélène Hagège uses five psychospiritual competencies (emotional, epistemic, relational, attentional and axiological), which could serve as a curriculum reference for education for responsibility. Thus, these professionals would be equipped to support learners in moving between two forms of ethos (“dialogism between ηθοξ and εθοξ ” in the book), that is, to invite them to emancipate themselves in a certain direction, without indoctrinating them, strictly speaking. “Happy is he who resembles Ulysses...” We must not be discouraged by the scientific erudition of this work. The gathered literature, with the rigor required in the exercise of the right to supervise research, is always at the service of meaning. Regardless of their original discipline or scientific, ethical or political interests, the reader will find his or her way around, as he or she will easily recognize many of the contemporary concerns of any citizen with any degree of insight. Personally, by reading this text, dense through erudition, but with a fluid and humorous writing style, I experienced “intellectual hygiene”, something that Bachelard recommended when he advised their reader to know how to leave their world to expose themself to other scientific or cultural worlds. However, by taking me on a trip to unknown countries, Hélène Hagège allowed me to approach islands of knowledge, familiar lands that I was able to revisit with a different perspective, to finally return to Ithaca, to my own questions, especially on “education for”, which have thus been enriched by this reading journey. I wish the same experience unto the readers of this book. Michel FABRE Professor emeritus, University of Nantes Centre de recherche de l’université de Nantes (CREN) President of the Société francophone de philosophie de l’éducation (Sofphied)

Introduction

I.1. Education for responsibility in today’s context “The world is mad!” This is the overused phrase that came to my mind when I tried to describe the context in which we live. How can we present the supporters of this madness in a few words at most? Let’s see... Let’s take a few examples on the go. I will start with the last one I learned about, not bad in its kind and quite characteristic. It has been known for 40 years – as published in the most prestigious scientific journal Science – that flame retardants pass from clothing or fabrics into the blood and then urine (Blum et al. 1978) and that they are mutagenic (Gold et al. 1978), and therefore potentially carcinogenic (Blum and Ames 1977). Moreover, it seems clear that these compounds are neurotoxic (Hendriks and Westerink 2015) and cause developmental problems – in particular intellectual disabilities (Roze et al. 2009). These volatile products added to certain fabrics, foams or other materials to prevent the spread of a possible fire (particularly domestic) are therefore absorbed into the body by simple contact or physical proximity (a vector would be dust) and are dangerous for children’s development and health. The worst part is that they do not even seem to be effective in reducing flames (Lyon et al. 2007), so even firefighters are fighting against their use (Cordner et al. 2015). Despite all this, one must be careful, as they are still widely available today in a variety of products, including baby supplies (Stapleton et al. 2011), for example, nursing clothes or pillows). In other words, our society tolerates that we harm babies without our knowledge, so that chemical industries can become richer – whereas a decrease of one point of IQ per

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individual would cost the society a decline in productivity of around 1 million euros. In other words, even according to the financial logic of economic growth, this choice is probably absurd. Anyway, this is only the beginning. Primary forests are destroyed by napalm in Tasmania and the paper trade is then enriched by the planting of eucalyptus trees, or for example, in Brazil, bulldozers extract aluminum from the soil to make individual coffee capsules. It is estimated that every hour in Borneo, the equivalent of 200 soccer fields of primary forests are sold or burned. Thus, more than 80% of the island’s primary forest has disappeared, mainly for the production of palm oil (Bryan et al. 2013). A continent of waste floats in the ocean. The water is contaminated by radioactivity, heavy metals, pesticides and so on. Animals are poisoned by waste produced several thousand kilometers away. The seed trade, based on the patenting of genes, leads to the servitude of farmers, their poisoning and the reduction of biodiversity. Let’s not even talk about the hole in the ozone layer; it is so much a part of the landscape now that we almost forget about it. There have never been so many rich people, and never before have there been so many inequalities on Earth in the material possessions of human beings. That is to say, 1% of individuals hold half of the material wealth. Louis 14th, beside this, had an extremely ridiculous fortune compared to the poorest French people at the time. Our garbage cans are full of waste that we have a hard time handling. I remember that during my studies I attended a conference given by an engineer who was proud to show the latest system for burying the most permanent radioactive waste: it was predicted to last about 10,000 years... while the half-life of this waste exceeded a hundred million years! Thus, he predicted that this storage would only be effective for a second compared to the life of this waste – and he seemed proud of it. I was shocked. In short, consumption and waste seem to be the law. Our “economy of hyperextraction” leads to an irreversible depletion of the planet’s natural resources1. Many thinkers have already made observations and short-term forecasts that should logically prompt us to change our lifestyles and

1 Available at: http://www.enviscope.com/environnement/thematiques/ioan-negrutiu-biologist-inthe-lens-of-lyon-humanity-should-ask-the-resource-question/9952.

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economic systems immediately2. On a global scale, we have the material means to feed and care for all of humanity, yet the logic of being an individual and looking out for ourselves and the now globalized market economy seems to take precedence over everything else, which leaves behind millions of human beings3. A symptom of this logic has just been elected President of the United States. Why is the world mad? The answer seems simple: because we are mad. Yes, including you and me, dear reader. The purpose of this book is to analyze the supporters of this madness, and to suggest ways to become more sane. Or even, for the bravest, more saintly. We could go so far as to talk about “wisdom”. Certainly, critics who experienced post-war misery could contradict this notion of a mad world: “Yes, but today, on the whole, there is still a sense of comfort, there is health, to which the middle class did not have access to before: there is still progress! Drat, we’re not going back to the Stone Age anyway! And then Man has always known how to find solutions to problems... we are so scientifically and technically developed that we will find a way out”. And they could even go so far as to say: “At worse, we’ll ruin another planet”. I would reply: “Indeed, as Morin explains, destruction goes hand in hand with construction; opposites are inseparable. Technosciences create at least as many problems as they solve. But scientism4 is philosophically and historically untenable. Of course, the world is not black or white, it is gray. Nevertheless, its color is becoming increasingly black, since it is nevertheless increasingly deteriorated and polluted, by processes that are largely irreversible and probably much faster than our scientific-technical progress! There is every reason to believe that drastic changes are hanging over our heads and that, without preparing our minds for them, we risk undergoing them with great violence”. So why do we persevere in our madness, even those of us who feel alert to these questions? And why do the majority of us seem to be burying our heads in the sand? 2 See for example the resources made available on the website of the Institut Michel Serre de l’ENS Lyon (http://institutmichelserres.ens-lyon.fr/). 3 According to the World Bank, it is estimated that 10% of the planet lives below the poverty line, i.e. on less than $2 a day, but this figure is controversial. Available at: https://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/ actualite-economique/ce-que-cache-le-recul-historique-de-la-pauvrete-dans-le-monde_17224 37.html. 4 Scientism is a belief (or an obsolete philosophical position) that science is inherently good and capable of solving all of society’s problems.

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I.2. Relationship with money Touiavii5, a Polynesian tribal leader who had visited Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century, that is, before the globalization of information and the economy, had, in his probably very wise ways, provided to my opinion a relevant answer to these questions, raising points that I consider essential. I share with you here his ethnological and very poetic views. In addressing his peers, he wrote: “Sensible brothers, heed my words and be happy that you don’t know the misery and terror of the white man. […] Because the round metal and the heavy paper, which they call ‘money’, that is the true god of the white man. Talk to a European of the God of love: he will think and then a smile comes over his face – he is smiling about the simplicity of your thought. But hand him a blank round piece of metal or a large heavy paper and immediately his eyes will light up and his lips will moisten. […] There are many who have sacrificed their friends for money, their laughter, their honor, their conscience, their happiness, their woman and their children. Almost everyone loses their health to it, to the round metal and the heavy paper. […] However, it is not possible in these countries of the white man to be without money only once, from sunrise to sunset. Without any money you could not satisfy your hunger or still your thirst, nor could you find a sleeping mat at night. […] When you have money, you can get tobacco, rings or beautiful cloth for it. You can have as much tobacco, as many rings or as many cloths as you can pay for. […] 5 It should be noted that the following text quoted from Erich Scheurmann’s 1920 book The Papalagi, which purports to be a genuine transcription of the speeches of a native Samoan chief, has, since its publication, come under some scrutiny from anthropologists who have queried its authenticity. See Senft (1999).

Introduction

Where does the money come from? How do you get much money? Oh, in many ways, some easy and some difficult. [...] You need to do a thing which the Europeans call ‘work’. ‘Work and you have money,’ is a rule of behaviour in Europe. Yet there is a great injustice with all this, about which the Papalagi [the European] doesn’t think and doesn’t want to think, because then he would have to admit this injustice. Not everyone who has a lot of money also works a lot. Actually everyone wants to have a lot of money without working much. This is how this comes about: when a white man earns so much money that he has food, a hut and a sleeping mat and beyond that a bit more, he immediately uses the money he has to spare to make his brother work. For himself! He gives him the work which before made his own hands dirty and hard. He lets him carry away the dirt, which he made. […] Then the people say: ‘He is rich’. They envy him, flatter him and say beautiful words to him. For the worth of a man in the white world lies not in his honor or in his courage or in the splendour of this reasoning, but in the amount of his money, how much money he can make each day and how much he keeps in his thick iron trunk, which not even an earthquake can destroy. There are many whites who save up money made for them by others, then bring it to a place which is well guarded. They keep bringing it more until one day they will no longer need workers for themselves, because now the money works for them all by itself. How this is possible without magic I have never learned: but it is the truth that money constantly grows, like leaves on a tree and that the man who has it gets richer, even as he sleeps. Now, if a person has a lot of money, much more than other people, so much that a hundred, even a thousand others could make their work lighter for themselves – he still gives them nothing. He lays his hands on the round metal and sits on top of his heavy paper with greed and self-satisfaction gleaming in his eyes. And if you ask him: ‘What do you want to do with your money? What more can you do on earth than to clothe yourself, eat and still your thirst?’ he knows not what to say or he replies:

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‘I want to make even more money. Always more. And more again’. And you soon realize that the money made him so sick, that all his senses are possessed by money. He cannot reason like this: ‘I want to leave this world without complaint or injustice, just as I came here, because the Great Spirit sent me to earth without the round metal and the heavy paper’. Only very few consider this. Most stay with their sickness, and never regain the health of their heart. They rejoice in the power which gives them all their money. They swell in their conceit like rotten fruits in the rain. They feel gratified to leave their brothers to their raw, hard work, so that they can grow far in their body and prosper. They don’t think of giving others a part of their money or to make their work easier for them. From this teaching he takes the right to be cruel, for the sake of money. His heart is bitter and his blood is cold; he is insincere, he lies and he is always dishonest and dangerous when his hand grasps for money. How often a Papalagi slays another for the sake of money. Or he murders him with the venom of his words; he uses his words to intoxicate him, in order to rob him. That is why no one trusts the next person, because all know of each others’ weakness. That is why you can never tell whether or not a man who has a lot of money is good in his heart; what is certain is that he can be very evil. You never know how and from where he has taken his treasures. But then, the rich man never knows whether the honors, which are offered to him, are because of him or his money. Mostly, they are because of his money. […] My enlightened brothers, we are all poor. [...] We don’t have enough round metal and heavy paper to fill but one trunk. We are impoverished beggars in the thoughts of the Papalagi. And yet! When I look at your eyes and compare them with those of the alii, I find theirs pale, wilted and tired, but yours are alive like the great light, gleaming with joy, strength, life and health! Only with the children of the Papalagi did I see eyes like yours, before they could speak, when they still knew nothing of money […] Let us praise our custom which does not tolerate that one

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man has a lot more than the other, or that one man has a lot and another nothing. This way our hearts will not become like that of the Papalagi, who can be happy and cheerful, even when his brother next to him is saddened and despondent” (Scheurmann, 1997, pp. 70–83, emphasis added). In his great wisdom, Chief Touiavii clearly perceived that the problem lay in our minds. We will come back to this later in the book. We can already note in brackets that there is a problem of blindness to our madness, which will be thematized in terms of the unconscious. That is to say, we, the Papalagi, do not always realize that we are “sick of thinking”, even if we are alerted to the contemporary problems inherent in the globalization of the market economy. Now, let us try to model rationally, and simplify, the role of money in our world. Let us first consider the three sectors of the economy and what we call “material reality6” which refers to the raw materials (organic, mineral, etc. used in trade), and the terrain where they are found (Figure I.1). The primary sector of the economy is therefore concerned by the exploitation of this material reality (e.g. agriculture, material extraction, etc.). However, this reality also has an energy dimension. For example, food corresponds to kilojoules, and this is rather the affairs of the economy’s secondary sector, which developed with industrialization: it consists of the transformation of matter into energy (transport, production, etc., for example the use of coal or uranium to produce heat or electricity) and the transformation of energy into matter (e.g. electricity consumption by production machines). Here, we include in this energy dimension any human labor that causes economic gain (whatever the sector). The tertiary sector corresponds to services and the management of intangible assets, which we refer to here as “informational”: their value is more in the information they mean than in their correspondence with a defined matter. It should be noted that there is always a material support for the information (examples include paper, computers, computer servers, etc.). Money has an informational dimension. Previously, it was directly coupled with material reality, via a gold equivalent stored in banks: the banknotes were the avatars of portions of gold (or goods). So there was a link with the primary sector of the economy (gold mining in particular). However, since this coupling has been broken, that is, since the 6 Dear philosophers, please do not be offended yet by the blatant use of the term “reality” here! We will justify this later in the introduction.

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autonomy of the banknote printing plate, the quantitative value of money has become virtually disconnected from the raw material. That is to say, today’s banknote production essentially depends on the willingness of governments to use inflation to buy back their public debt: the physical anchoring of money corresponds only to banknotes and information stored in servers (those of financial transactions). The economy is thus moving away from interaction, i.e. dialogism between money and raw material (Figure I.1A). It is as if the energy of human thought was somehow delocalized in money (and therefore in information), instead of being oriented towards and connected to matter. Thus, money in financial terms evolves according to its own logic, almost disconnected from material reality. The 2007–2008 American subprime mortgage crisis is a good example: on the basis of no change in the matter, financiers made wagers, speculated, etc., which led to people losing their homes and ending up on the street.

Figure I.1. An attempt to explain the “magic” that is the disconnection of money from material and energetic realities . For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE I.1.- A) Progressive distance from the economy in regards to the material reality (rising arrow), from the first to the third sector of the economy. B) Environmental consequences of the delocalization of human thought energy at the financial level (arrows 1 to 6): what is economically valued (downward curved arrows) is exploited, which leads to collateral ecological deterioration and a decrease in the initial intrinsic value of the raw material or its depletion (downward straight arrows). C)

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Financial information (economic value of money) is no longer regulated in a reciprocal way with material information. D) The intrinsic value only provides a little information about economic value, which follows its own logic, depending in particular on inflation and speculation. This is a fundamental problem of our society, not just a one-off problem. Economic crises are only the tip of the iceberg... the underwater part is much more worrying and consequential. So let’s talk about it: icebergs, yes, they melt and here we are, in their immerged part! I will indeed specify here some elements concerning the environmental consequences of this financialization of the economy. According to some psycho-sociological theories, we could consider that nature, of which raw materials are a part, has an intrinsic value, independent of the human being. It would then be a so-called ecocentric vision (versus anthropocentric or utilitarian7 ; see references in Hagège, Bogner and Caussidier 2009). For example, 1 kg of gold, 1 kg of salt or 1 kg of tomatoes would have an intrinsic value for what they are (value independent of their economic value, linked in part to inflation for example). This value would therefore be independent of the socio-historical context. However, there are two important points that gives nuance to this assertion. Firstly, the collateral effects of firms of the first sector of economy imply a scarcity or even a disappearance of certain nutritious raw materials (certain varieties of cultivated plants for example). Also, probably because of the abundant use of insecticides and herbicides in intensive agriculture (and particularly GMOs), the total biomass of flying insects has fallen by nearly 80% in Germany over the past 27 years (Hallmann et al. 2017). Beekeepers have been sounding the alarm for a number of years now. However, about half of all edible plant species apparently reproduce only through bees. This suggests that the intrinsic value of some commodities may be destroyed as a result of their human-induced disappearance. Secondly, by dint of exploiting raw materials through energy (and also by producing this energy or providing transport), and speculating on these

7 An anthropocentric vision of nature considers that human beings have a superior value and a utilitarian vision that nature only has value to the extent that it can be used by humans for their own purposes.

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commodities, the search at all costs for productivity and yields has led, for example via the use of chemicals, to soil depletion and pollution (Bourguignon and Bourguignon 2015)8, for vegetables to grow faster and out of season. Today, 1 kg of standard vegetables therefore has a lower nutritional value and complexity on average than 1 kg of vegetables grown in the last century (Halweil 2007). Because of the same type of process, 1 kg of sea salt no longer has the same nutritional quality as before, because it is contaminated by pollutants, particularly heavy metals (Figure I.1B). Of course, the secondary sector of the economy, particularly the chemical industry, benefits from this. And we know that these industries, which are also sometimes seed producers (such as the Monsanto Company, a spin-off of the chemical industry, which now produces GMOs), are lobbying governments to influence economic policies in their favor. Their profits seem to be their only motivation9. Thus, what might be called “the intrinsic value of raw materials” varies due to human activity. In addition, because of speculative bubbles (see numbers 3 to 6 at the money level in Figure I.1B), the monetary value of a financial entity may change without this change being in direct reference to material or energy (see the subprime crisis). As a result, by ricochet effect, even for 1 kg of tomatoes of a given nutritional value, the price can vary, without any variation in intrinsic nutritional value. It is the feedback effect of evaluation by money, which generates a vicious circle of hyperextraction: that which is valued by money (see the utilitarian economic value in Figure I.1D) is more exploited, and therefore linked to more deterioration. Money is a bit like the wind (autonomous information) compared to food (material that has an equivalent in material information). In other words, it is like injecting air into liquid cream to make whipped cream: at the end, there is more volume, and you may be under the impression that there is more material. But no, there is just more air, and the initial material no longer has the same texture or the same properties. If humanity evaluates a production energy or raw material positively with money, especially if there are financial and shareholder stakes involved, if people who do not leave an office earn money from there, then ecological deterioration is almost assured. This is an almost mechanical feedback effect, due to the relocation of human energy to the financial level. 8 See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPi3wKOyvHI. 9 See Pierre-Henri Gouyon’s comments on GMOs in the series “éthique et biotechnologies”. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XsMgOOLmz0.

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“When the last tree is cut down, the last river poisoned, the last fish caught, so only then will you realize that money cannot be eaten.” (Quote attributed to Alanis Obomsawin 1972) In my opinion, this happens in a way that is quite similar to the tumorization of tissue, that is, the formation of cancer. Initially, before forming a tumor, the cells contribute to the proper functioning of the tissue, adhere to their environment and the environment regulates their growth. The latter also feeds them and the information contained in the cell is thus consistent with the information present in the tissue. Problems occur when the cell's information becomes autonomous from that of its environment: it acquires the ability to move and reproduce independently of the environment’s needs. In other words, it only serves its own logic of growth, to the detriment of the entire organization. This leads to the counterproductive effect of exhausting, sometimes to the point of killing, the environment that allows life (in this case the human body in which it evolves)... as we are doing with our habitat, the Earth. Initially, money was at the service of humanity; it was a very practical communication and transaction tool. However, monetary information has become largely disconnected from the physical environment from which it originated, and from the corresponding physical information (crossed out arrow in Figure I.1C). Thus, it functions as information in a group of cancer cells that lose informational contact with its tissue environment. With the financialization of the economy, we are collectively becoming like a group of cells that become gangrenous, that metastasizes and will kill our environment and thus our own possibilities for life. Thus, economic value is no longer linked to intrinsic values, for example ecological values (crossed out arrow in Figure I.1D); it leads to their deterioration (Figure I.1B). Even human values have little influence on global economic functioning10. I find in this pathological economic logic many parallels with the functioning of totalitarianism according to Arendt (1951): an autonomous logic where the human being has no place, a process fed by the desolation of

10 Indeed, authentic alternative solidarity economies remain in the ultra-minority.

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a mass society, like a “mad” machine that leads to the destruction of politics, Man, and the world with... the same causes that produce the same effects! “Time for outrage”, Stéphane Hessel said... “Time to wake ourselves up”, I want to write! At this point, we have identified the center of the problem. But that’s not all. Our societies have undergone significant changes since the beginning of the last century. Some people refer to a problematic world marked by the decline of absolutes (Fabre 2016). Legitimate authorities have been partially replaced by abstract and impersonal dominations (Éraly 2015). These dominances are exercised, moreover, through the instruments and institutions of a globalized liberal economy – here it is again! They are exercised to the detriment of the authority of traditional institutions, such as the nation, the family or the school, and even to the detriment of the structure or sustainability of these institutions. This results in a dissolution of cultural specificities in global values. Thus, for example, our dependence on the central European power leads to the standardization of cultural or traditional practices (cheese making, university curricula, etc.). I.3. Media relations Above all, the omnipresence of mass media and screens contributes to general “sleepiness”, by diverting subjects from spiritual and relational values, and maintaining them in the illusion that happiness is synonymous with consumption and immediate satisfaction of pleasure (Favre 2007). Indeed, the psychosociology of happiness and materialism has shown that beyond the satisfaction of vital or elementary needs, material possessions do not bring happiness (Myers 2009). Their search, like that for other extrinsic goals (popularity, beauty, etc.), can generate more stress and other negative conditions than the search for intrinsic goals (contributing to the community, personal development, etc.; ibid.). While materialism does not increase a person’s quality of life, these numerous studies show that, on the contrary, close and caring relationships, community ties and positive thinking habits contribute to it (ibid.). In other words, “the best things in life are not things” (ibid. p. 603). Decades of scientific research have therefore been necessary to formulate an idea that has been formulated over thousands of years by most spiritual traditions: happiness does not come from the outside or from possessions; it comes from the inside or from relationships! Yet values seem

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to have reversed in the population in recent decades, newly favoring extrinsic goals. With regard to the problem of the mass media, I will focus here mainly on the example of television. I will not go into detail on the impact of social networks, Internet sales platforms and other virtual systems, which are economically dependent on market hegemony, advertising sales or consumer databases, and which are nevertheless becoming more and more important in our society. The French watch television on average 3 hours and 40 minutes a day, almost two months a year on a full-time basis (Desmurget 2013). And this is only on average! Programs are made to prepare brains to be conditioned by advertising, as a famous French television boss once said. Indeed, our CroMagnon human cognitive system is pre-wired to detect movement in an immobile group, movement that could indicate, initially, predator or prey. This attentional orientation is therefore linked to a primitive survival system. Compare the television shots of the 1960s to those of today: from American shots stable for several minutes, we are faced today with shots lasting only a few seconds at most. In addition, the effect of television on the brain is also specific, in that the light comes from the device, which increases the sense of reality (this is not the case with reflected light from the cinema for example). Thus, this screen that emits light and movement – in our living room, or now anywhere, thanks to our “smart” phone – maintains our attention, captivates it and puts our consciousness to sleep, diverting it from immediate reality11. When we are connected to the television, we are less present to what is around us (ourselves or others for example). So advertisements, which play on symbolic systems, insidiously condition us with often misleading ideas, and thus guide our consumer behavior in a way that is not necessarily compatible with our own good, that of others or the planet. Whether on the Internet, on the streets, in magazines, on television... advertising is omnipresent. It is a vehicle for the venal use of our cognitive functions, without our knowledge, hence the importance for us to understand this functioning, as this book intends to contribute to it. Let us get back to the power of television. The film Le Jeu de la mort (2009) presents the 11 Citton (2014) has analyzed different types of attention that coincide with this attentional capitalism. In particular, he evokes that meta-attention can make it possible not to let oneself be totally taken in by the object being viewed. We will examine this under more general circumstances, not only in relation to television (chapters 2 and 3).

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hypothesis and results of an extraordinary experiment carried out by a team of researchers led by Professor Beauvois. They wanted to replicate Milgram’s experiences in relation to the television system. EXPERIENCE.– In an attempt to understand the submission of the German people to Nazi authority, Milgram studied how subjects submit to an authority that was supposed to be legitimate but gave unjust orders. In his experiment, this authority was the scientific authority, embodied by a man in a lab coat. Under the watchful eye and non-violent incitement of the latter, the studied subject had to torture a student, by administering increasing electric shocks, so that the scientist could supposedly study the student’s learning. The final shocks could be potentially lethal. This torture was not real (the student was an actor who was complicit with the scientists), but the subject believed it was. It was not the learning that was studied, but the submission of the subject to authority. The scientist’s only instrument to force the subject to obey and administer electric shocks was the order (“do it”, “we’ll take responsibility”, etc.). The subject was considered disobedient when he persisted in refusing after five injunctions to continue. About 37% of the subjects disobeyed: all the others went so far as to (virtually) administer lethal shocks to the student. This allowed Milgram and his collaborators to understand how an entire population could obey unjust orders while being psychologically healthy. It was easier for the subjects to take responsibility for themselves and place themselves in a psychological state of servership, than to face their inner conflicts and the authority embodied by the scientist. In the experiment led by Professor Beauvois, the authority was embodied by a publicly known TV presenter and the context of the science lab was replaced by a TV board game. The principle of electric shock was similar. Their results showed only an 18% disobedience level. In other words, this experience tends to prove that 4 out of 5 people are able to kill another person in public who has done nothing to them, just because a host – legitimized by the media system they are a part of – asks them to do so. This led Beauvois to assimilate the mass media to a totalitarian system, having the same attributes of formatting minds and behaviors, and submission to an authority. It has also been analyzed how mass media annihilate democracy (Stiegler 2008), fabricate opinion (Chomsky et al. 2008), and entertain us in order to enslave us more successfully (Offensive 2010). We find here exactly the same parallels with the functioning of totalitarianism according to Arendt (1951), as those mentioned earlier about money.

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We could also mention here reality TV, series, blogs or Internet channels, some of which play on a human being’s most vile aspects (lies, judgment, betrayal, vulgarity, the reduction of a human being to appear as plastic or as a figure, competition, comparison, slander, etc.) and insidiously feed these tendencies into the minds of the people who watch them. Whether we like it or not, we are in fact in tune with what we let our attention be drawn to. These mass media are, of course, also a great source of information – for a reflective subject. However, studies on the new generations of students (“generation Y”) show the birth and dissemination of a new relationship with information: what is the point of memorizing, since I can find all the information I need on the Internet? What is the point of thinking or criticizing, since if I do not have an opinion, and I will find several readymade ones on the Internet? Finally, to conclude on television, studies have shown the disastrous effects of television and tablets on children’s psycho-affective and cognitive development and health (Desmurget 2013; Lurçat 2004). This loss of vitality seems to me to be perceptible in their eyes, all the more dull as these children are stupefied in front of screens. There are now even TV shows made for (lobotomizing) babies! Unfortunately, I have a feeling that Chief Touiavii would not see as much vitality today in the eyes of our children as he did at the beginning of the last century. In line with the illusions created by this attentional capitalism12, the number of single people in France seems to be constantly increasing in recent years (INSEE 2016), and yet, they have never had so many means of communication to meet a partner (for example, dating sites). The consumer society feeds the illusion that happiness is synonymous with the immediate satisfaction of pleasure, which has the effect of reducing tolerance to frustration: more than ever before, a partner is thrown away as a single-use product, families are reconstituted according to the wishes of parents and some of our elders die isolated from their families, as objects deemed useless in regards to pleasure or to the consumer society. Society tends to make people less responsible for the acceleration of ecological deterioration, a “collateral” damage of the liberal economy (Figure I.1b). It is in fact in society’s interest to keep the subjects in a psychological state similar to that of a child or adolescent. 12 This notion refers to the idea that an entire part of the market economy is focused on how to capture the attention of consumers (Citton 2014).

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I.4. The center of the problem French schools, which are supposed to transmit the values of the Republic (freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and secularism), are a champion of discrimination and social inequality among all the countries of the OECD! (Ministère de l’Education nationale 2013; Hagège 2017d). Without its knowledge, it reproduces the norms and values of the market economy: individualism, competition, exclusion of the weakest, etc. (Favre 2007). It thus contributes to the ambient incoherence of “do as I say, and not as I do” (Hagège 2017c). And we will keep silent here about politicians’ contributions to such inconsistencies, as the press is so full of examples. In this plural, multicultural, multireligious society, where values and families tend to be fragmented, where values are vague, contradictory and disseminated, where the collective is no longer a community (Éraly 2015), some young people seek their bearings in dematerialized communities, those of virtual social networks or in groups offering clear and solid roots. When the community (“us” or “ingroup”) contradicts the rest of the collective (“them” or “outgroup”), this can lead to radicalization, which can become violent under certain conditions, as we have seen with the recruitment of young French people into jihadist groups, a theme we will return to in this book (section 1.4.3). If we look again here at the results of the Beauvois experiment and recall the good words of Chief Touiavii, we can understand that stigmatizing “money” or “the system” misses the origin of all the centers of the problem: the functioning of our minds. The agentic state that the subjects who reach the end of torture in Milgram’s or Beauvois’ experiments find themselves in is similar to that of a machine that automatically and unconsciously obeys, like a sleepwalker to whom orders are given. This functioning is one of the manifestations of what we call “madness” in this book. It is important to note that the subjects of this experiment are not special: they are no less intelligent or compassionate than the average member of the public. They are simply normal humans. Indeed, our normal functioning often consists in behaving like unconscious automatons, even if we are also alerted to social problems. Our normal behavior therefore has characteristics of madness. Thus, to let ourselves be “normal”, we let such devitalizing logics persist around us, and even actively contribute to it, more or less without our own knowledge. There is no need to feel guilty about that. But it is useful to be aware of this, with patience and a desire for change. This is what we are

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trying to understand in this book. We are trying to analyze the mechanisms of this “madness”, which has its origin in what we will call here the “illusion of the ego”13, and we aim to propose educational solutions. This normal state which is notably characterized by a kind of transient sleepiness, we invite to awaken. PROBLEMATIC OF THE BOOK.– In summary, we would like to propose some answers to the following questions. In this context, how can schools, and more generally education, promote values compatible with responsibility and a sustainable future? What are these values? In other words, how can education for responsibility contribute to a healthier (i.e. less mad) world? Note: what we are dealing with here concerns both education (of young people) and training (of adults), that is, teachers and their trainers. To simplify the book, we will mainly use the terms “education” and “teachers”. As a starting point, it will be a question of understanding the driving forces and the manifestation of our own madness, and then grasping the means to transcend it. In this respect, the scope of this book could go beyond educational issues; it could also constitute a more general contribution to ethical and even spiritual approaches. I.5. The “education for” research field Fortunately for us, a mostly committed French-speaking field of research14, “education for”, has been working on these questions for some 20 years. Faced with the environmental, health, social and financial crises mentioned, many authors claim the urgency of changing our world, and, within it, more particularly the functioning of our societies (e.g. Capron 2003; Morin 2014a; Viveret 2005). Undoubtedly motivated by these observations, the injunction to all elementary and secondary school teachers to contribute to education for sustainable development (ESD), health, safety, etc. was first mentioned in the official texts of the French Ministry of 13 In this book, “ego” is not synonymous with its common sense, which almost means “pride”. This first term covers much more complex dynamics, which include pride and also its opposite (self-deprecation), as well as other subjective tendencies (desire, competition, etc.). We are not developing all these tendencies here; this will be the object of a future book. 14 There is of course a lot of English-language research on these questions of “education for” (health, citizenship, etc.), but it does not seem to be structured in a common field of research that regularly exchanges its knowledge and methods.

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Education several decades ago. These educational programs, called “education for” (health, safety, media, citizenship, etc.), contrast with the “teaching of” (biology, mathematics, French, etc. i.e. school content) and require different teaching methods (Lebeaume 2012). Indeed, research on “education for” has shown that, for example, health education cannot be limited to teaching informative content on the biological hazards of certain practices, which would probably be ineffective in encouraging subjects to take active and committed responsibility (called “empowerment” in the literature of this domain; Arboix Calas 2013). Indeed, we know that it is not enough to recognize the potential dangers of tobacco to stop smoking... Still, it is necessary to be motivated to do so, and sometimes this motivation is not yet sufficient. Thus, one aspect that will distinguish “education for” from the teaching of school matter is that they require the implementation of processes that engage subjects, including teachers, in particular by inviting them to question their values, beliefs and relationships with the world (Berger et al. 2009). So this partly affects what some people consider to be the private sphere and we will see that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot change the world and mentalities by remaining “politically correct”, by confining ourselves to transmitting knowledge, by not being “invasive in private”. What I am going to show here is that if we want to change the world, then we have to change the mind! Thus, we will dare to go beyond the sphere of private life: we will go to the sphere of the spiritual (which etymologically in French means “of the mind”). Because we want to call a spade a spade. But we will define what a spade is later. A spade is very down to earth. The conception of spirituality that is advanced here, too; so this conception is also very secular. Some authors propose that “education for” should be autonomous with regard to school matters (or, in other words, “non-disciplinary” ones; ibid.), be oriented towards participatory and deliberative democracy, favor action over knowledge (Lange and Martinand 2010), and explicitly address values, interdependence, interdisciplinarity and the complexity of the world (Fabre 2014; Pellaud et al. 2007). Consequently, the relationship of this education with traditional school norms and contents is problematic (Berger et al. 2009; Hagège 2013; Lange and Victor 2006). These studies have indeed unraveled many obstacles to the implementation or effectiveness of “education for” (Hagège 2015b, 2017d). Teachers are generally not at all or poorly trained to do this. The criteria for their recruitment do not include the necessary skills for “education for” (or for teaching in general). To my knowledge, France is the only European country where there is no

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compulsory training in psychology, as if teaching were a matter of knowing before a matter of human relationships! Anyway, we were talking about the obstacles. Teachers often feel uncomfortable and illegitimate in addressing the socially challenging issues that these themes raise (Berger et al. 2009). “Education for” is mentioned in official texts (e.g. Ministère de l’Éducation nationale 2007), apart from disciplinary programs. However, pedagogical inspectors essentially verify the application of these programs, and rarely (or not at all), to my knowledge, the implementation of “education for”. A recent exception to the latter point is the “moral and civic ‘teaching’” which officially appears in the elementary and secondary school curricula as a new teaching content – even if teachers are not trained to teach it, and it remains to be seen whether (and how) inspectors will monitor its implementation. Obviously, this research has also identified effective pedagogical and didactic mechanisms – locally and with motivated actors – to serve “education for”, which in general contrast with the masterful schooling form (for example, debates, Panissal et al. 2010). These studies envisage that changes in the world and society, useful to solving the multiple crises that take place in it, require a transformation of subjects and their relationship with the world (see Pellaud et al. 2007; Berger et al. 2009). This perspective may lead educators and trainers to want students or professionals to change. However, for these first (educators and trainers), the latter are part of the world: it would therefore amount to the fact that they first wish to change the world, by changing the others. Indeed, our context does not seem to favor the idea that it is important for the former to change themselves first, especially before having the ambition to change others or the world (Hagège 2015b). Another way of expressing this is that change (like happiness, see above) comes first from within, then from the outside: “Change yourself, and the world changes with you”. And we are sure of this, since you are part of the world... To scientifically argue this proposal, however, it is useful to have a model of “what is inside” the mind, how it works, its relationship with the world, and, knowing this, how its function could change. This is the first ambition of this book. Thus, we will detail the psychological and phenomenological mechanisms responsible for attentional spells, indoctrination and other functioning that can explain, at the individual level, the social phenomena mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. This book also aims to show the relevance of educational approaches, including meditation in particular, to promote the responsibility of the subjects. Thus, this reflection falls within

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the scope of “education for”, by founding a new discipline: that of education for responsibility. I.6. A constructivist epistemology to think about education for responsibility “The human being is nothing more than what they do. It is therefore appropriate to make them bear full responsibility for their existence. And when we say that the human being is responsible for themselves, we do not mean [that everyone] is responsible for their strict individuality, but that they are responsible for all human beings. [...] There is not one of our acts which, by creating the human being we want to be, does not at the same time create an image of the human being... To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose. Thus, I am responsible for myself and for everyone, and I create a certain image of the human being that I choose; by choosing me, I choose the human being” (Sartre 1970, pp. 22–27; author’s translation. We have replaced “man” with “human being” to reduce the androcentric nature of the text). Although we are not specifically situated in any existentialism, this quotation from Sartre eloquently expresses the notion that each of our gestures, internal or external (i.e. a movement of the mind or body), conscious or unconscious, contributes to making us what we are, and therefore humanity and the world what they are. Our approach is part of a complex vision, and therefore part of a constructivist epistemology (Le Moigne 1995), according to which interdependence prevails over any form of dualism. “Epistemology” means etymologically “knowledge discourse”. Interdependence corresponds to the idea that at a metaphysical level, every “element” in the universe is fundamentally connected, directly or indirectly, to any other, and is therefore dependent on it15. Chaos theory is a 15 Morin (1986) expresses this in his hologrammatic principle: the part contains information about the whole, as well as the whole information about the part. For example, a French subject contains information – even if it is partial – on the whole of French culture (language, music, etc.), because they are a vector of this culture, and they are also a constituent part of French society. Morin completes this idea with the dialogical principle. We will not mention here its third principle of recursivity, to which we nevertheless adhere.

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rationalized expression of this idea, with particular reference to sensitivity to initial conditions (“it has been said that something as small as the flutter of a butterfly’s wing can ultimately cause a typhoon halfway around the world”). “Constructivist epistemology” therefore means that our way of thinking about concepts and our relationship with them always takes into account, at least implicitly, the role of the human condition in this knowledge, and more specifically our own context, the one from which we speak. On the contrary, a dualistic posture would involve claiming, for the sake of simplicity, that opposites are disjointed (subject/object, interior/exterior, black/white, etc.) and that the elements of the universe are fundamentally separable from each other. However, according to the dialogical (constructivist) principle proposed by Morin, opposites are not disjointed: it is light that gives meaning to darkness, and Yin to Yang. In other words, the thesis-antithesis conflict is not resolved in a synthesis, but the tension between two notions that must exclude each other, inseparable from the same reality, is assumed (Le Moigne 1995). Here, the adjective “dialogical” is used in a dual sense, referring to this constructivist principle on the one hand, and etymologically designating that which consists of a “dual discourse” on the other hand. The notion of interdependence coincides with the notion of impermanence: an “element” only exists because it is in a state of permanent change (because of its relationship16 with what surrounds it; Hagège 2014). It is closely linked to the notion of responsibility17: the latter contains at its heart that of the solidarity of a subject with regard to actions and their consequences. It is therefore necessary to make everyone responsible for what they are, not out of principle, nor to burden them, but out of pragmatic efficiency: it is performative to think that I am responsible for my actions and their consequences, that is to say, by thinking so, I am actually assuming this 16 Reliance refers to the act of linking what is otherwise disjointed (e.g. knowledge from different scientific disciplines). For Morin (2014b), ethics implies the subject’s relationship with themself, others, the environment and the human species. And religion, which shares the same etymology as “reliance”, implies in particular a connection with cosmic dimensions that go beyond or transcend human nature. 17 Thus, inevitably, constructivist theories end up with ethical consideration, like the last volume of Morin’s method (2014b). This is where Western societies have a modern tendency to think the separability of the scientific subject with the described object – which would absolve the author of the theory of nuclear fission from any responsibility for the manufacturing of the atomic bomb – the constructivist vision forces us to consider the non-neutrality of the knowledge produced and the solidarity of the acts and knowledge produced along with their authors (see also Fourez 2002; Hagège 2013). This vision is in step with current research in the epistemology of sciences, which emphasizes the “fundamental human nature” of science that is “involved” and “impartial”, hence non-neutral. This thus creates “epistemic responsibility” (Coutellec 2015).

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responsibility. That being said, be careful not to confuse responsibility with culpability! Just because I take on this responsibility does not mean that I have to psychologically self-flagellate every time I make a mistake... It only means that my intentions are guided by including attention to myself, certainly, and also to others and the non-human environment, because I am aware that each of my actions impacts the world (see chapters 1 and 2). Even if many factors we are not directly responsible for contribute to making us what we are, it will be argued here that it is by fully accepting responsibility for our functioning and by becoming aware of it that we can change it... and thus contribute to changing the world. Each of our actions, internal or external, conscious or unconscious, has an impact on the world, and on others, because it creates or reinforces tendencies in us, and because humans are social beings and function physiologically by imitation. Thus, we are each a living model for others; we influence or affect them in one way or another. It therefore seems useful for each subject to strive to become a consciously chosen living model. To do so, everyone could become aware of the values served by their actions, words and thoughts, and their consequences, and could strive to act, speak and think in coherence with consciously chosen values (Sauvé 2000). In any case, we will argue that any education for responsibility should create conditions that favor such processes. Before arguing our point further, it seems important to specify the position of this book, which could be called “engaged impartiality” (Kelly 1986): “impartiality” insofar as we consider all points of view contradictory to ours as deserving of being heard and debated – which is not the case with “exclusive partiality” – and “engaged” insofar as values, particularly in relation to responsibility, are explicitly defended, and this is assumed – unlike a “neutral impartiality” according to what the author claims, fallaciously, to present a descriptive discourse of reality that has no axiological connotation18. Approaching educational purposes involves defending or proposing an ideal oriented towards the development of a human world (Legault et al. 2002). This orientation and these choices are underpinned – explicitly or not – by values. It is likely that these values and choices are not suitable for everyone from the outset.

18 “Axiological” means “relative to the values”, relating to the axis according to which we orient our actions.

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Moreover, promoting their universality, the idea that they would be good for all, wanting to impose them, would pose two types of problems: on the one hand, this would amount to an attempt at a forced, and therefore violent, “evangelization”, colored by a scientism19, unfortunately the founder of our Cartesian-institutional positivist epistemology (Hagège 2013). Moreover, in our pluralist context, where several conceptions of the good coexist, the public space, including schools, should refer to an ethics of fairness (and not of the good; according in particular to Rawls’ analysis, cited by Prairat 2016). Thus, a republican posture would imply the choice of values that preserve the coexistence of freedoms without imposing other normative values (Prairat 2016). On the other hand, this would be contradictory to the very purpose that is defended here: as we will see, responsibility coincides on the contrary with an openness to otherness. Thus, like the complex vision of this book, the knowledge produced in it is considered as useful tools for achieving certain goals (Fourez 2002), in this case: educating for responsibility, and producing and communicating scientific knowledge on this education. Therefore, we do not advocate a kind of absolute or transcultural superiority of the values put forward here, but we affirm, on the basis of scientific argumentation, that they are more effective than others in achieving these goals20. This analysis is based on a consistent literature review. Associated with a personal experience of meditation, shared notably via a module called “Introduction to meditation in an ethical approach” opened at the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Montpellier in 2012, it highlights the validity and effectiveness of what is presented here. It is therefore not a question of preaching these ideas as a new catechism, of giving them a priori a normative value, but of putting them forward so that they can be considered by the community as a relevant possibility, undoubtedly complementary to other approaches, and so that they can undergo criticism and be open to debate. We are currently working to assess them in light of experiments, in order to provide additional empirical evidence to that which is presented here. To rephrase, the fundamental issues of this book can therefore be expressed as follows: how can we change the world? What changes should 19 See footnote 4 of this Introduction. 20 Value conflicts are often due to divergent goals. If we agree on the goal, then we would be able to adopt the same values quicker.

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be made to promote responsibility? How can responsibility education contribute to this efficiently?  To begin, we will try to propose some answers to the question: what is the relationship between the world and the mind? Thus, in Chapter 1, we will propose an explanatory model defending the idea that the world is the reflection of the mind. The reasoning is based on science studies. We will deduce from this the proposal that changing the world means changing the mind. Then we will develop an explanatory model of the mind and its functioning. In this way, to “dissect” this interiority, we will use disciplines that study it, including cognitive sciences and psychosociology, then phenomenology. Then, we will have a model that highlights the illusory basis of most of our actions, synthetically called “ego” and relying on a duality (existing from a relative point of view, but not absolute). In Chapter 2, we will first present different complementary meanings of responsibility (drawing on ethics, phenomenology, education and psychology), which will make it possible to identify different indicators. It will appear that the ego tends to oppose responsibility, which implies, in particular, a reliance, a feeling of unity, with oneself, others and the non-human environment. We can then consider which modalities of the functioning of the mind would, on the contrary, be compatible with responsibility: essentially a mind freed from ego, in other words a phenomenological instantiation of interdependence and impermanence. We will consider the links between responsibility and harmony, arguing via a mathematical analogy, the possibilities of transforming the mind. In Chapter 3, we will draw educational conclusions from this. First, we will highlight the importance of reflexivity – while distinguishing between different types of reflexivity. We will argue about the relevance of learning to meditate in order to become more reflexive. We will present different types of meditation practices and their effects, and argue how they can lead to the liberation of the ego and thus constitute relevant practices for education for responsibility. Then, the changes in mind required for responsibility will be formulated in terms of emotional, epistemic, attentional, relational and axiological competences. Finally, in Chapter 4, we will justify why we call these competences psychospiritual. After discussing the scope and limits of this approach, we will propose to identify the specific features of education for responsibility among all research in the social sciences and humanities and the similarities with positive psychology, particularly through the proximity between the notions of responsibility and happiness. Finally, we will conclude by discussing the pedagogical applications of what we are proposing.

1 The World as a Reflection of the Mind

1.1. Definitions of the terms 1.1.1. Notions of world A clarification of these topics, at first, requires us to consider what we can mean by the term “world”. The word “world” has 28 different definitions in the Littré dictionary (for the word “monde” in French; Littré 2015a). Of these, those that most closely resemble its use in this book to date are as follows: “1. All that we see of space, bodies and beings, so called because of the arrangement and regularity that prevails there.”  “3. The physical world, the world considered in its sensitivity. The moral or intellectual world, or the intelligent world, the world considered in relation to moral or intellectual things.” “7. The world, this low world, the earth that men inhabit, as opposed to heaven, the heavenly kingdom.” The term “monde” (world) is also used to designate the vastness, specificity and multitude of a space (meaning 9 from Littré 2015a) or a domain, as in the expression “it is a world apart”, and also synonymous with “universe” in the figurative sense. Moreover, the French term “monde” derives from the Latin mundus, which strictly means “what is methodical, well-placed” and mundus was translated from the ancient Greek κόσμος, cosmos (ibid.). Like its Greek equivalent, it has two meanings: that of “good layout”, “decoration” on the one

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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hand, and that of “world” on the other hand (ibid.). In line with this first meaning, cosmos has given us the word “cosmetic” for example. This refers to external qualities, perceptible on the surface of things. As can be seen in definitions 1 and 3 from Littré, the notion of “world” is related to what is perceived by the senses, and this in a given context. This specification is found in von Uexküll’s Umwelt concept, which literally means “surrounding world” in German and would be more advantageously translated into French as “own world” (Kull 2010). This concept reflects the idea that animals living in the same environment, for example a snail and a spider, perceive it in a specific way because of the specific features of their sensory organs and modes of locomotion. So they each have their own Umwelt; one could say that they do not live in the same world. Their world corresponds to a separate universe of meaning (Salvador 2009), and these worlds are immeasurable (T.S. Kuhn 2008). In a similar vein, a person with attitudes considered crazy or inappropriate can be asked the question “What world do you come from?”: the meaning of their attitudes is foreign or unsuitable for the interrogator’s universe. Also, it can be said that people living in different social classes or contexts (e.g. rural versus urban) do not live in the same world: environmental objects do not have the same meaning for them (e.g. a 20 euro note, an industrial strawberry tartlet, a fallow field, a social housing project, a luxury car, etc.). Dedicated to the human world(s) this time, the Kantian term Weltanschauung, (literally “look on the world”) refers to the notion of a general view of life and the world, and has been translated into English by “worldview” (Wolters 1983). The term worldview has been defined as “a way of describing the universe and life within it, both in terms of what is and what ought to be” (Koltko-Rivera 2004, p. 4). This includes descriptive, normative and evaluative aspects, that is beliefs and values “regarding what exists and what does not (either in actuality, or in principle), what objects or experiences are good or bad, and what objectives, behaviors, and relationships are desirable or undesirable” (ibid.). This detour through the concepts of Umwelt and worldview only serves me here to highlight that an individual1 perceives the world in a particular 1 For a distinction between “individual” and “subject”, see Hagège (2014). Briefly, “individual” refers to a biological being who is a constituent element of the group (or society) and who is etymologically indivisible, while “subject” refers to a psychological and phenomenological

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way, depending on their biological condition, culture and personal history, and therefore that they live, in a way, in a world of their own that is in their world. “Why, then, was there a need to invent these concepts of Umwelt and worldview? Why not just name these phenomena “perceptions of the world?” I attribute this reason to the polysemy of the term “world”. In my previous sentence, “an individual perceives the world” implicitly implies the idea of an “objective” world shared by all: this corresponds to meanings 6 and 7 from Littré (2015a), which refer to the planet Earth or to the idea of a common physical reality in which individuals evolve. This is the ambivalence of the term “world”. In the penultimate sentence, the term “objective” has been taken for its common meaning and refers to what is specific to worldly objects, regardless of the human spirit (Petit Robert 1996). This definition contains an oxymoron characteristic of our culture: how can we talk about something objective, regardless of the human mind? To say that “something” is objective means situating this “something” in a common universe of perception and communication, in a conventional universe, instituted by a culture (Fourez 2002), therefore dependent on a human spirit. Objectivity can thus be considered as conformity to a socially accepted rule and as the result of intersubjective construction, negotiation or standardization (ibid.). In this more elaborate sense, it appears as a medium term between the world, ideally objective in the common sense, and one’s own worlds, purely subjective. This analysis therefore makes it possible to identify three meanings for the term “world”, relevant to our object of interest: – an objective world in the ordinary sense, which would refer to a realistic metaphysical position and the ontological hypothesis that corresponds to it (Hagège et al. 2010). This hypothesis postulates the existence of a reality independent of the one who describes it, even if their descriptions are not independent of them. The fact that this reality is considered to be eternally veiled and therefore unknowable in its ultimate perfection, does not affect the hypothesis that ‘assumes’ “the existence of [the essence of reality]”, independent of the observer’s existence and observer-modeler’s experience” (Le Moigne 1995, p. 22, author’s translation). It should be noted that any subject is nevertheless a constituent part of this objective world (see the gnoseological hypothesis on page 6). This conception of the world is universalist: the world being unique is considered to be the same for all; individuation process, which emerges from the interaction between the individual and the environment (see also Table 1.2).

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– an objective world in an elaborate sense, which seems to me to refer to the commonly accepted position in the human sciences today and to the notion of the social construction of reality. According to this idea, what is accessible to our mind is always filtered by the cultural prism through which we perceive it (Fourez 2002), if only through the language with which we think it (and by our biological condition). This world would therefore be a cultural one, such as when we speak of the “Western world” for example (meaning 10 from Littré 2015a). This meaning thus suffers from the same limitations and difficulties as the term “culture” and should therefore rather be considered in a plural form. There are several cultures in humanity, and the definition of their boundaries overlaps and possible interlocking can be arbitrary and raise ethical issues (Hagège 2013). In other words, this notion of the world necessarily refers to a context, and rigour would require that it be clarified;  – a subjective world, which corresponds to the individual perception of reality. Can a subject perceive anything other than such a subjective world? We answer temporarily by “no”, which we will qualify later. The consideration of this world inevitably refers to the phenomenological dimension of human experience, on which we will discuss later. Thus, the objective world in the common sense corresponds to an absolute pole, the subjective world to a relative pole, and the objective world in the elaborate sense, to a medium term between these two poles. Here the objective world in the ordinary sense is called “ultimate reality”, or sometimes “the real”. Then, simply, “objective world” and “subjective world” will designate respectively the two other meanings. It is important to note here a semantic break between ultimate reality and the world – whether objective or subjective. The ultimate reality, possibly inaccessible, is as it appears, and if we were to talk about it, we would then be talking about a world. An objective or subjective world refers to a universe of meanings, respectively cultural or personal. So instead of an “objective world” or “subjective world”, the term “relative reality”, or that of “world” itself, will sometimes simply be used. We will show in this book that the discrimination between ultimate reality, on the one hand, and relative reality, on the other, constitutes the founding epistemological breakthrough (“rupture épistémologique” in French) of an education for responsibility. As Fourez (2002) explains, at the basis of any scientific discipline, there is a disconnection, a human action that separates and prohibits confusion, always according to a project. And the project here is to

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create and validate knowledge (1) heuristics for research in education for responsibility, and (2) promoters of effective pedagogical approaches in this field. This knowledge also offers innovative ways of experiencing ethics or spirituality in a non-dualistic way. 1.1.2. Notions of mind In this book, we will argue that to change the world, we must change the mind. That is why we must also lay down in this introduction some basic principles of what we mean by this. In French, there is only one term for both spirit and mind: “esprit”. From the Latin spiritus, which literally means “breath”, from spirare (“breathe, inhale”), the term “esprit” has 29 meanings in Littré (Littré 2015b). It includes Cartesian dualism according to which the mind is exclusive to the body and refers to what is immaterial (meaning 3: “an intangible and intellectual substance”, meaning 5: “spirits, intangible substances, such as angels and demons”, where it appears, such as in meanings 7, 9 and 16, as an equivalent to the notion of the soul; ibid.), as a theological principle corresponding to a god (meanings 1 and 4) or metaphysical principle synonymous with life (meanings 3, 6 and 7). This theological principle could be seen as the immaterial counterpart of ultimate reality: like intelligence or information corresponding to this reality. It will be called here “principled mind”. This ultimate, absolute mind corresponds to information that is not distorted by a personal or cultural view, and therefore to a type of direct knowledge, beyond language. It is always phenomenologically experienced, so it slightly differs from what have been called, in famous thought experiments, “omniscient mind” by de Laplace or “demon” by Maxwell. The transition from an ordinary state of consciousness to this one is called “awakening”. Some definitions can be seen as an immaterial counterpart of the objective world: in the sense 14, “the human spirit, the spirit of man in general”, and the meaning 21, “opinions, feelings common to a number of people and to institutions; the family spirit; the republican spirit”. And finally, we also find the counterpart of the subjective world: in meanings 13, 23, 24 and 25, where it corresponds to intellectual faculties, tendencies, aptitudes or individual dispositions.

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In the latter two cases, we will refer to the “relative mind” (collective or individual), since this immaterial principle is linked to the perception of a relative world. In addition, the word “mind” is frequently interchanged with “thinking” or “thoughts” (for example, in Daniel 2016), and sometimes with “consciousness” or “knowledge/knowing” (e.g. being aware of something, having it in mind or knowing it are almost synonymous). However, it is essential in the reflection presented here to clearly distinguish these four notions. Below, we focus on defining more specifically what we mean by “consciousness” and “mind” (“thought” and “knowledge” being defined in particular in section 1.3.1.1.2). 1.1.3. Gnoseological hypothesis, notions of consciousness and the model of the mind “The truth is that there is no truth, including this one” (author’s translation; Shadoks’ motto). Consciousness is studied in particular in phenomenology, of which it is the main object. Phenomenology is the “science of the conscious experience” (Greisch 2015b). Its criterion is intuitive, rather than exegetical. That is, the meaning identified in the experience is identified as internal evidence to the subject, more so than as an objectification inferred on the basis of external coherence (Depraz 2012). Thus, this discipline aims in particular to report on the experience of knowing and perceiving the subject. “Consciousness” comes from Latin conscius, cum (“with”) and scire (“to know”) and “suggests not only the subject’s knowledge of the object, but that this object always refers to the subject itself ” (Ey 2015; author’s translation). The etymology of this term therefore seems to include the idea of the phenomenological hypothesis of constructivist epistemologies, which postulates “the inseparability between the act of knowing an ‘object’ and the act of ‘knowing oneself’ that the knowing subject exercises” (Piaget quoted by Le Moigne 1995, p. 75; author’s translation). According to this hypothesis, the “subject does not know ‘things in itself’ (ontological hypothesis), but knows the act by which they perceive the interaction between the things” (Le Moigne 1995, p. 76; author’s translation). Thus, speaking of consciousness as an object of the world, which could be studied from the outside, or even by trying to define it, are all acts of consciousness... thus self-contradictory (Bitbol 2014). And coincidentally, as explained by the

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phenomenological hypothesis, the same applies to the existence of an ultimate reality external to the subject (ontological hypothesis). Here, we propose a hypothesis that we call “gnoseological hypothesis” (from the Greek gnôsis, meaning knowledge). It is within this gnoseological hypothesis that this book is located. DEFINITION.– The gnoseological hypothesis reconciles the pragmatic aspect – particularly in order to be able to communicate and exist together – of the ontological hypothesis (realistic position to consider the existence of an ultimate reality), with the phenomenological hypothesis, which seems more relevant to us. First, the ultimate reality, whose character is unutterable, is considered inseparable from a relative reality and vice versa. This point therefore distinguishes our hypothesis from the ontological hypothesis. In other words, these two realities are two inseparable parts of reality, like the two sides of a coin, mutually constituent of a unit (from an ultimate point of view) and mutually exclusive (from a relative point of view). Indeed, on the one hand, the different relative realities and the corresponding different relative minds are part of what the ontological hypothesis calls “the real”. On the other hand, these different relative realities exist through the real, which constitutes their basic reference, so to speak, their foundation2. Thus, one is in the other as well as the opposite. Secondly, both these two areas are potentially recognizable, but not in the same phenomenological modalities – approaching the knowledge of the ultimate reality requires an optimally conscious mind. The idea of this gnoseological hypothesis is therefore to keep in mind the intertwined between these two coincident parts, which are in a dialogical relationship, while we will speak without complex about ultimate reality and relative reality. Thus, for example, here, it is a question of creating a world – the world of education for responsibility – with its universe of meanings, in particular for the purpose of communicating about it. We will argue in section 2.4 on relevance, for the intelligibility of this world, of this gnoseological hypothesis on the one hand, and of this distinction between ultimate and relative realities on the other. 2 Thus, a mind is usually described as crazy if it is too out of step with the way most other minds perceive this reality. Here, we have extended the use of this term, qualifying all our ordinary minds as “insane”, insofar as they are all out of step with reality. This is what we will discuss in section 1.3.

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When we talk about “consciousness” in this book, we are talking about a phenomenological point of view, which is essentially subjective. Thus, if this book defended a philosophical position, it would undoubtedly be that of phenomenology. Indeed, everyone can only know about their own experience. If they know one of the others, it is only through their experience of it... This notion corresponds to a phenomenological hypothesis. However, our point is not of a philosophical nature: it claims to be part of the educational sciences, in which we are required not only to discuss a supposed reality that exists outside our own individual consciousness, but also to propose effective ways to change it. We must therefore act as if there is a real recognizable outside to our personal consciousness. This is where the ontological hypothesis comes in, which postulates the existence of such a reality. The common person probably communicates and perceives things on the implicit basis of such a hypothesis, often set up as postulate. In other words, most people seem to act as if there is an existing, shared and recognizable reality outside of us. Here, we bring together these two hypotheses, which are a priori mutually exclusive within the gnoseological hypothesis, by assuming their tensions in the form of a dialogism borrowed from Morin (1986). When an “objective point of view” is mentioned in the book, it suggests that we are then placed under the ontological hypothesis. All “subjective points of view” refer to the phenomenological hypothesis. When we refer to an “ultimate point of view”, it is inevitably an abuse of language (assumed and done consciously). Indeed, by putting in words and inscribing our object in a universe of meaning, the point of view could only be objective at best. However, we need to express the notion of a state of mind that transcends the relative limits of the personal or the cultural. So we use it. And in this respect our proposals might seem similar to those of Bergson or Schopenhaueur... whereas we only wish to communicate in the most effective way to serve our educational and research purpose (would we not also be a little pragmatic in this sense?). Box 1.1. Gnoseological hypothesis and philosophical perspectives

“If the known disappeared, knowledge would appear” (quote attributed to Ibn Arabi). Despite the previous reservations expressed following the etymological apprehension of the term “consciousness”, the literature on consciousness is abundant in philosophical and cognitive sciences, and the authors generally refer to consciousness as if it were an object of knowledge that is part of their external world, and more particularly from the objective world.

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They rarely take into account the impact of their subjective world on their choice of words and description of the objective world. And perhaps even more rarely, the time to observe their own consciousness in order to draw direct knowledge from it (a method used in phenomenology). Thus, faced with the proliferation of theories and corresponding underlying metaphysics and variations in the use of words relating to consciousness, Block (1995) proposed a distinction that now seems to constitute a major reference in philosophical or scientific approaches to consciousness. He distinguished four types of consciousness, according to usage. We will discuss them after having explained them below3: – phenomenal consciousness is more precisely the one mentioned above, and cannot be defined in a non-circular way. It refers to the subject’s experience of their perceptions, sensations, emotions, inner states, etc., their immediate and direct knowledge of these phenomena. It could only be approached scientifically by collecting data in the first person, where the subject is invited to share this experience (Depraz 2012). It implies quality, intensity, color, etc. with which a phenomenon is perceived. Some authors call “qualia” the assumed atoms of unique subjective knowing experience (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1997)4. This consciousness thus refers to the irreducibility of subjective experience, to how it is to feel, to see, to breathe... to live. For example, if I eat a strawberry tartlet, my phenomenal consciousness refers to how it is for me to eat it, how I experience with my senses and eventually how it feels to think about what I think when I eat that tartlet (if I think about something at that time);   – self-consciousness refers to having a concept of the self and being able to use it about oneself in a situation. For example, if a mark is placed on the foreheads of some mammals (including humans over two years of age), while they are under anesthesia, and then they are positioned in front of a mirror, these mammals try to remove it – so they pass what is called the mirror test. This implies that they are aware that the image they see is the image of themselves. Self-consciousness makes it possible to know (we would rather say here “to have an implicit idea”) in an action that “I” am

3 This description is based on Block’s article (1995), unless otherwise indicated. 4 They are often part of a biological theory of consciousness (Block 2009), which is not our case, because this type of theory seems too reductionist to us.

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completing the action5. This consciousness seems to be essentially constructed through interactions with others (Clément 2007; Marraffa 2014);  – access-consciousness refers to the representation of the informative content of the phenomenon, or its form. And this representation emerges from contact with the persistence of the phenomenon, as a deduction that is made by promiscuity with this phenomenon. Such a representation would typically be the premise of reasoning, control of action or discourse. An access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness would be a bit like a zombie or a computer that could recognize the informative content of a perception without experiencing the perception itself, in its quality (i.e. without the knowledge of the quale6 itself). A phenomenal consciousness without access-consciousness would be like when a subject is sitting on a terrace with friends and there is a noise below: they experience this noise without realizing it. If suddenly, at midnight, they realize that there is this noise (and that they can even identify it from then on), that it was there before, and that at this moment as in the previous moments, they are hearing this noise7, then access-consciousness is added to the phenomenal consciousness at this moment in time. Access-consciousness is the most empirically studied, thanks to the reportability criterion: the subject is considered to have been aware of a phenomenon if they are able to say a posteriori that they have perceived it. This is not the case for subliminal stimuli, for example, where it is therefore considered that the subject does not have and will never have access-consciousness (Dehaene and Changeux 2011). Global workspace theories consider that phenomenal consciousness corresponds to information that is globally processed by the brain, especially by distant areas (Block 2009), yet experimental arguments seem hardly available except for access-consciousness (reviewed by Dehaene and Changeux 2011);  – monitoring-consciousness can take several forms: internal perception, review of internal states or higher order thinking. These would be 5 Given the cultural (and probably also interpersonal) variation in the concept of self (Kitayama and Park 2010), this definition seems somewhat problematic: it suffers from confusion between the relative world and ultimate reality. In our view, Block’s definition does not correspond to a consciousness, but rather to what we would call a representation of the basic level of cognition (see section 1.3.2.3.1). 6 “Quale” is the singular of “qualia”, these supposed atoms of phenomenal experience. 7 This latter knowledge would be a higher order thought.

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introspective thoughts. The mental operations targeted here are rather slow and require a high level of self-reflexivity (Clément 2007). Other authors have called this consciousness “metaconsciousness” (Winkielman and Schooler 2011). However, despite these distinctions, consciousness can only be phenomenal: these last two types of consciousness refer much more or less explicitly to the subject’s experience of (1) their perceptions or the recollection of them, that is, mental phenomena that concern a previous experience (access-consciousness; since we are talking about human beings and not computers or zombies), (2) thoughts about themselves (reflexive consciousness). As for the definition of self-consciousness proposed by Block (1995), it implies a conceptual level, concerning the self, which is in our opinion often unconscious. In this respect, the term “consciousness” seems inappropriate here. Other authors have proposed two components of private self-consciousness: (1) internal state awareness, i.e. of emotions, feelings and thoughts, what we would call here “phenomenal consciousness of the inner world”8 and 2) selfreflectiveness, which corresponds to thoughts about oneself (Wheeler et al. 2008). This second meaning thus refers to an explicit and conceptual consciousness whose purpose is to focus attention on the contents of lower order consciousness9 and therefore also corresponds to a reflective consciousness according to Block’s (1995) categorization. In our vocabulary, we will say that these are mental phenomena (see section 1.3.1.1.2) concerning memorized phenomena or events concerning the self. In other words, we will say that these are verbal thoughts (not necessarily conscious), which take as their objects previous thoughts or the memory of past perceptions or sensations about the self. At least a third notion of selfconsciousness has been identified in the literature: pre-reflective selfconsciousness, in connection with “for-me-ness”. For-me-ness refers to the notion that by acting or perceiving, the subject “knows” that it is they who are acting or perceiving (Legrand 200710). In other words, it refers to an

8 The terminology of “inner world” and “outer world” was borrowed from Jung (1933/1986). 9 For some supporters of “higher order theories”, these higher order mental states are the only ones which are phenomenally conscious (Block 2009). 10 In this regard, Ey (2015) distinguishes two structures of the conscious being: the synchronic structure that corresponds to the phenomenological field of consciousness (the presence of the here

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Education for Responsibility

implicit sense of self that leads to experiences at the phenomenal level (phenomelogical self-consciousness; Gallagher and Zahavi 2005). It therefore appears that Block’s categories (1995) partially overlap. In addition, it is problematic to reduce consciousness to a representation or thought11, as Block does in several definitions, because (1) a thought or representation can be and often is unconscious, (2) consciousness can exist without thought (Lutz et al. 2007; see also; sections 3.2 and 3.4.7) and (3) a subject absorbed in their own thoughts is all the less conscious (see example of daydreaming below). Regarding Block’s example of access-consciousness (the subject who heard a noise below and did not realize it), we would rather say that the subject is little or not conscious of this noise and that they become so. And we propose that, on the other hand, before midnight, while their consciousness was absorbed in the conversation, their mind perceived and knew the noise below. In other words, in our opinion, it seems more accurate to postulate (1) that it is the quantity of consciousness that changes in this case, and not its “access” quality that appears12 and (2) that the subject had access to initially unconscious content (or slightly conscious; the noise below the terrace). EXAMPLE.– We explain here with another example, why it is problematic not to distinguish different “quantities of consciousness”13. When a subject dreams and now) and the diachronic structure that is supported by the “for-me-ness” (the notion of a self that lasts in time and that is the author of thoughts and actions). 11 This erroneous conception, which reduces consciousness to thoughts, seems quite typical of the Western world, commonly assimilating intelligence and intellect, thoughts and mind, consciousness and the brain. Consciousness is often mistakenly considered as a simple epiphenomenon of brain activity (Bitbol 2014). In most Eastern traditions, the place of the mind is the heart (Kabat-Zinn 2003), not the brain, and thoughts are considered an epiphenomenon of consciousness (and not consciousness, identified with thoughts, as an epiphenomenon of the brain). In fact, the electromagnetic field of the heart is about 100 times stronger than that of the brain. In the West, theories broadening intelligence (Gardner 2011; Masciotra et al. 2008), consciousness and the mind (Bishop et al. 2004) consider them as incorporated and therefore as having to do with both emotions and the body as well as thoughts and the brain. These theories have only been popularized relatively recently. 12 In section 1.3.2.1.1, we will clarify this, in particular by linking the notion of variation in the quantity of consciousness with that of the field of consciousness and attention. Indeed, in the example of the noise heard from the terrace, at midnight attention is now focused on this noise and the field of consciousness coincidentally directed towards it (whereas this was not the case before). 13 This concept will be further developed in relation to the notions of attention and field of consciousness, defined in section 1.3.2.1.1.

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while sleeping, it is customary to consider them as unconscious, because they are not aware that they are dreaming (except in the case of a lucid dream; Voss et al. 2012) and that their five senses and interoception are largely unconscious to them. However, if they remember their dream when they wake up, it is because they were able to recognize it and memorize it... To take up distinctions made by Block, we can imagine that the dreaming subject is phenomenally conscious of the dream, but not conscious of themselves, and that they then have no conscious access to the dream (in case they cannot remember their dream when they wake up). That said, to a lesser degree, when a waking subject is absorbed in their thoughts, they can somehow dream without sleeping (“daydreaming”), without realizing at that time that these are only mental thoughts or images in which their consciousness is absorbed – whether these thoughts are “of a higher order” and in connection with a reflective selfawareness, or whether they concern the material planning of the next making of strawberry tartlets. However, the more the subject is absorbed in their daydreaming, the less they will be aware that they are daydreaming when they do so... Is it then better to say that they are conscious, or that they are unconscious, as if they were sleeping, at the moment when their consciousness is absorbed in their thoughts? In any case, they are not self-conscious or aware of the other phenomena at the moment in time, as if these phenomena were in the background (or even absent) of their phenomenological reality (like the subject mentioned earlier, who does not hear the noise below the terrace, while they are absorbed in conversation). Thus, as consciousness decreases correlatively with its “absorption”14 into a phenomenon (be it mental or something else), such as a thought of first- or higher order, it seems semantically problematic to assimilate these two terms: consciousness and thoughts. To sum up, the assimilation between consciousness and mind15 (or thought) is problematic – so not all of the categories proposed by Block seem accurate – and the boundary between conscious and unconscious is sometimes blurred. In this book, we propose solutions to each of these problems16.

14 We call this absorption “phenomenological grasping” later in the text. 15 “Mental activity” includes all mental thoughts and phenomena. 16 We will detail the proposed solutions to the first problem (section 1.3.1.1 for the distinction between mental phenomena, thoughts, consciousness, knowledge and mind) and to the second (section 1.3.2.1.1), and here we discuss only part of the solution to the second problem.

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Thuss, we proposse an operatiional definitio on of conscioousness as a dynamic of the mind, m as thee latter grouups the dynaamics of connsciousness and the unconsccious (Figuree 1.1). To thee left of the figure, f the suubject is aliennated by the factt they do nott have conscciousness; th hey are the object o of pheenomena that apppear in theirr inner or outer o world, that capturee their attenttion and conditioon their life in relation to the past, to t the expecttations of the future, and theerefore to thhe fears annd hopes geenerated by the situatioons they encountter (as in a dream or in i an agentiic state17). It is a persoonal (i.e. egocenttric) mind thaat is largely unconscious u . On the righht, instead off reacting to the past, p the subbject respondds in the preesent in a way w that is frree from conditiooning, and thherefore free of fears and d hopes: theree is a creativve aspect and an impersonal consciousness, which taakes into acccount both “tthe self” and otheers (see section 2.4), andd information n from their inner world and that of their outer world.. These two types t of info ormation are no longer seeparated: ween their mind and realiity, which is no longer pperceived there is a unity betw between in a disttorted way. There T is no more m madnesss, no more discrepancy d their miind and the real; their prinncipled mind d perceives the t ultimate rreality in perfect coherence annd unity. Thhe ultimate and a subjectivve points of vview are the sam (literally me. The subjject, transpaarent to itsellf, is fully responsible r response-able). Thee subject ansswers insteaad of reactinng. They aree awake. m subjectss oscillate duuring their liv ves between these two poles, but Thus, most closer too the left polle on average. We will elaborate e on these t aspectss later in the bookk.

Figure 1.1. Gradient G of spiiritual qualitiess

17 State in which the obedient subjeects in Milgram m’s experiment can be foundd (see the eponymouus box in sectioon I.3).

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COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.1.– The mind is defined here as the union of the unconscious and consciousness, which are in a dialogical relationship (relationship symbolized by double arrows). The boundary between these two compartments is sometimes thin (which is symbolized by dotted lines). The unconscious is considered as a set of psychological dynamics, both as described in psychoanalysis (Jung 1933/1986), and also in its more modern sense, as it is studied in cognitive sciences (Bargh and Morsella 2008 ; for more details, see Hagège 2014, 2015b, in connection with system 1; Evans 2008). These dynamics mobilize emotional engrams, attitudinal tendencies, thought-action repertoires... From left to right, the field of consciousness widens, and in the process, the latter changes in quality, as we will see later (sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3). Consciousness includes system 2 (Evans 2008) and is broader than this latter; it exists without thoughts and corresponds to phenomenal consciousness (Ey 2015). The more the field is reduced, the more attention is focused. So from left to right, it is more and more diffuse (and shared); vigilant attention is being developed (see section 2.3.2). This modeling of a mind composed of consciousness and the unconscious echoes the theories widely used in cognitive science, called “dual systems or process theories”. These studies have highlighted functions of the mind based on at least two biological information processing systems18: a primitive, unconscious, implicit, fast, automatic system 1, and a more evolved, conscious, explicit, slow, controlled19 system 2 (reviewed by Evans 2008; Gawronski and Creighton 2013). We provide here only a quick example, because we have addressed this issue elsewhere (Hagège 2014, 2017d). EXAMPLE.– Although most subjects nowadays declare themselves egalitarian (not racist), strong discrimination still persists in the United States (e.g. against Afro-Americans; Pearson et al. 2009). In an attempt to explain this paradox, researchers have uncovered implicit attitudes that correspond to

18 Some authors point out that systems 1 and 2 function as two minds in a single brain (Evans 2003). We prefer to evoke these two systems as two interdependent and dialogical parts of the same mind, therefore of a subject (i.e. not only in relation to the brain, but to the individual’s entire body). 19 We will not detail this here because we have already done so previously (Hagège 2014), why the distinction between the conscious and unconscious appears to be more operational than than of automatism and control.

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unconscious preferences20 and are believed to be due to the unconscious endorsement of cultural stereotypes (reviewed by Pearson et al. 2009). Some implicit attitude assessment tests are available online21. This research on racial attitudes and prejudices has shown that although most subjects declare themselves – and probably believe they are – not racist (explicit attitude), most of them nevertheless behave in a way that is biased in the racist sense (reviewed by Pearson et al. 2009). In other words, most subjects who have egalitarian declarative values would in fact discriminate without even being aware of it. In this sense, preliminary work carried out in the laboratory has shown that even activists in anti-racism associations have a majority of implicit racist attitudes, preferring subjects from the cultural group they come from. This implicit preference for an in-group has also been widely studied (see the references in Hagège 2017d). Dual attitudes obviously pose problems in terms of responsibility (Faucher 2012): how can we be responsible for behaviors and attitudes of which we are not aware? Indeed, the consideration of implicit attitudes has recently given rise to reflections in moral philosophy, inviting us to reconsider the notion of responsibility (Faucher 2012; Levy 2014). It seems to me that our responsibility would involve becoming aware of our implicit attitudes in order to be able to free ourselves from them (Hagège 2014) – otherwise we are only the object of these social stereotypes endorsed without our knowledge, and no longer a subject. We will come back to the role of education at this level later. To conclude, we retain here a model of the mind as it has a conscious component (understood as phenomenal) and an unconscious component. We therefore propose the following operational definition of the mind: the informational dimension of the conscious and unconscious dynamics of a subject 22. The mind can perceive seven kinds of phenomena, including thoughts (section 1.3.1.1). The latter may or may not be conscious, and are

20 The unconscious state of implicit attitudes has been discussed in literature (Gawronski et al. 2006; Hahn et al. 2014). We have argued on the relevance of considering, as most researchers in the field of dual systems seem to do, an equivalence between the unconscious and the implicit (Hagège 2014). 21 See for example: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html. 22 For more details on the term “subject”, see Hagège (2014), and on the term “information”, see also section 1.4.1.

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therefore not similar to the mind, much less to consciousness: they are to the mind what waves are to the ocean... they do not exist without it, but it can exist without them (Chapters 2 and 3). 1.2. The objective world as an epistemological23 and societal reflection of the collective mind: an example of science “The miracle is that the universe created a part of itself to study the rest of it, and that this part, in studying itself, finds the rest of the universe in its own inner realities” (citation attributed to John Lilly 1972). “Knowledge is a representation of the world that exists only in and for a human mind” (Perrenoud 1998, p. 493, author’s translation, emphasis original). Science studies (Harding 1991; Pestre 2006) have provided ample evidence that science co-evolves with society and produces knowledge about an objective world, depending on the subjects and their context of activity. This objective world is thus seen here as a reflection of their collective mind. It will also be argued in the following chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) that one of the major obstacles to responsibility is the following: subjects have the implicit impression of perceiving the ultimate reality, when in fact they perceive a relative reality. Here, the proposed analysis leads us to consider that this gap is omnipresent in science, including within the so-called “hard” sciences. In the latter, concepts seem to be disconnected from human concerns and values (Fourez 2002). In this way, these disciplines can commonly give the illusion of access to knowledge that would relate to the ultimate reality of phenomena (ibid.). A central objective of an education for responsibility, ethics or spirituality will therefore appear, in the context of our reflection, as being the reduction of the gap between the ultimate reality and what the subject perceives of it, a reduction that can be achieved by a change in the functioning of the mind (Chapters 2 and 3).

23 “Epistemology” means etymologically “knowledge discourse”. It is a discipline that studies knowledge, its status, origin and scope.

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1.2.1. Paradigms and projections in science The notion of paradigm makes it possible to understand this notion of discrepancy: T.S. Kuhn (2008/1962) compares a paradigm to a pair of glasses that a scientist would wear, without being aware that he is wearing them (Box 1.2). Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1994) is an essential figure in the epistemology of sciences: some epistemologists consider that there is a pre-Kuhnian and a postKuhnian era in this field. Based on a socio-historical analysis of the physical sciences, he proposed the notion of normal science: under such a regime, researchers adhere to norms and rules of scientific practice, and it is in this way that this practice differs from pseudoscience. Indeed, their research is framed by a paradigm, which provides a mold for interpreting reality and the legitimate methods and questions that guide the research. The paradigm is also based on metaphysical imperatives; it is not based solely on refutable proposals. Scientists have the illusion of knowing how the world is made up. The paradigm is a disciplinary matrix comprising knowledge, values, implicit features, norms, a common language... in short, it has the attributes of a culture. Thus, the expected results generally belong to a limited range of possibilities (predictable given the paradigm’s constraints) and the work of the researcher – rather an engineer than an inventor – consists mainly in knowing how to achieve them. If a result does not belong to the range of what is expected, it is often ignored because it is not comprehended. In normal science, publications are short, comprehensive and addressed to specialists. They start where the textbooks stop. Before the first period of normal science, the prescientific period is characterized by the absence of common achievements. This is the case of physics before Newton, chemistry before Lavoisier or biology before cell theory. Theories are then drawn from metaphysics and publications are general books addressed to all. During a period of normal science, the paradigm grows, gradually accumulating knowledge, but also anomalies. These anomalies are facts that either contradict the paradigm or whose explanation resists the paradigmatic methodology. They are put aside, but at some point, when they become too significant, a crisis period (which is opposed to normal science) can arise. Here, the foundations of the paradigm are challenged. The crisis can be resolved with the adherence to a new paradigm, which is a sign of a scientific revolution. This is what would have happened when the Newtonian paradigm changed to the Einsteinian paradigm. This vision contrasts with the conception of linear scientific progress: the greatest advances would be made by breaking with previous ways of seeing reality, not by adding new knowledge to the knowledge already acquired. Also, the other novelty of Kuhn’s theory was the emphasis on the fact that the reasons

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for changing paradigms (and therefore cultures) cannot be entirely rational. Indeed, on the one hand, at a time when the first adherents to this new culture were emerging, the new paradigm had not yet provided solid evidence of its effectiveness. On the other hand, since any instrument of proof or measurement necessarily refers to a frame and is therefore part of a paradigm, there is no extraparadigmatic measuring instrument (i.e. outside any paradigm). Consequently, the choice of one paradigm over another cannot be rationally assessed, nor can the two paradigms measured in relation to another; in other words, the latter two are immeasurable. Box 1.2. Paradigms, normality, revolutions and incommensurability in science

Normal science therefore leads to projections within a paradigm, projections as unconscious as the paradigm. These projections are languagemediated. Thus, when new concepts emerge, they are often named by borrowing terminology from everyday life notions. For example, the concept of work in physics (W, for work) was derived from the analogy between (human) work and the changes made by a machine. What initially consists of explicit and conscious metaphors is then erased and hardened; this gives the illusion of apparent autonomy (Fourez 2002). Here, as if in nature there were a W force, instead of considering that humans have constructed an interpretation of reality according to which a magnitude, which they called W, makes it possible to understand certain phenomena. Another example, in biology this time24, concerns genetics. The term “gene” comes from the ancient Greek γένος, genos, which means “generation, birth, origin”. The same root can be found in the terms “generate”, “genius”, “genesis” or even “Genesis”, which refers to the first book of the Bible, in which it is reported that God created the world. Thus, one of the semantic connotations attributed to hereditary particles is that of intelligent entities that create (we could almost add ex nihilo) an entire organism. This connotation, which does not correspond to biologists’ conscious thinking, has nevertheless implicitly impacted biology for a long time (Hagège 2004) and probably still does today. Indeed, although dualism and genetic determinism are now being challenged by scientists, it seems that we cannot detach a term from its cultural semantic connotations, because language is our primary tool to think 24 We will detail the epistemology of biology, particularly molecular biology, in a forthcoming book.

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(Vygotsky 1962/2003). Thus, although there has been a hardening (Fourez 2002) of the gene concept, this connotation probably still resonates today in the unconscious25. We have also analyzed that it even gives rise to logical contradictions and the recommendation of empirical means that are sometimes inappropriate to the research questions (Hagège 2004). We can see in this term “genes” a projection. DEFINITION.– “Projection” means the “action of throwing forward, launching” and in psychology, it means the “outside location of felt impressions that then acquire an appearance of independent reality” (Kipman 2005; author’s translation). Projection is an automatic mechanism that is mainly unconscious and causes us to project (in the geometric sense) a vision of ourselves or a feeling we have on an external object (or others). This results in seeing the object or person as we see ourselves unconsciously or attributing an emotion to it that we have unconsciously, so that we have the impression that the vision or feeling is part of the object or person and is independent from ourselves. EXAMPLE.– Finalism, that is attributing intentions to objects, for example by saying “bacteria wants to enter the cell”, is a typical projection mechanism. It is frequently observed among biology students. Jacob (1920–2013), winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1965, spoke of finalism as a mistress whom we cannot do without, but whose existence we cannot admit in public either. The same could almost be said of projections. 1.2.2. Examples of projection by a collective mind onto the objective world This reasoning could probably be generalized to all worlds. We will consider here some other examples, still taken from our field, that of science, to further illustrate this point. The field of science has the advantage of serving as a basis for a perhaps more eloquent demonstration. Indeed, in our Western societies, it seems more renowned than other fields of human knowledge, to produce knowledge supposed to relate to the ultimate reality of phenomena.

25 Because the etymological origin of the term inevitably contributes to its meaning.

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1.2.2.1. In physical sciences A frequent anthropomorphic projection involves projecting permanent entities separated from their environment, as human subjects tend to consider themselves at least implicitly (we will detail this in Chapter 2). This is the case with the notion of genes mentioned above. By following in particular the momentum of the analytical method formalized by Descartes, particle physics has sought to isolate what could be the ultimate atom of matter – in the sense of the individual, that is indivisible. Atoms, electrons, quarks, bosons, etc. the material still seems to be able to be cut into smaller units. This attempt to catch what would reassure us in our individuality has so far failed – and perhaps contributes to slowing down our individuation. Today, all these hopes are falling back on hypothetical unbreakable energy entities (string theory)... scientists seem to have lost hope in the existence of such material entities. 1.2.2.2. In biology Another example is Darwin (1809–1882), who constructed his theory of natural selection by borrowing from the economist Malthus (1766–1834) a vision of the world according to which resources being limited, it was normal that only the best endowed individuals survive. This economic theory aimed to justify the social inequalities of the time, particularly famines. According to this theory, it would be quite normal for the poor to die since they are the worst off and, in any case, there is not enough for everyone to eat. Thus, despite his humanist values, and probably because of an implicit belief in an illusory neutrality of scientific theories – as if science faithfully described the ultimate reality – Darwin gave us a vision of the living, which has become paradigmatic, according to which living beings undergo competition and struggle for their survival, in such a way that a merciless selection takes place on them. Being blind to his own projections, he seemed to believe that these processes, far from being a cultural interpretation, were intrinsic to nature. However, there are cultures, for example among the Touiavii of Samoa Island (or the Bochimans of the Kalahari Desert), where these notions, imbued with values typical of 19th Century liberal England, have no equivalent. These human beings think and live without any notion similar to competition or property... Their world is very different from ours – and probably warmer too. Since language is always culturally situated, and axiologically tinged, these objective worlds are never neutral in value26.

26 This idea resonates with W.V. Quine’s ontological relativity theory.

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Thus, it is not surprising to see that, on the basis of Darwin’s theory, Social Darwinism developed, which legitimized the establishment of eugenics (science) and eugenism (its social application) in the United States and Northern Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century. This science advocated the good intention of helping nature select the best individuals, leading to the forced sterilization of tens of thousands of people deemed unfit for reproduction, usually the poor (first sterilization law in 1907 in Indiana). It was this momentum that Hitler (1889–1945) drew inspiration from, with Social Darwinist theories developing his promulgation of the Aryan race. In our opinion, these abuses were potentially contained in Darwinian theory: it is not neutral to say that living is competition and selection. Undoubtedly aware that the objective world depends on the collective mind that builds it, today some scientists are developing models of biological evolution based on notions such as cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund 1998), and these models seem to be effective. The notion of cooperation is no more neutral than that of competition, but the values it underlies, and their potential drifts, are more peaceful and more humanistic. 1.2.2.3. In social psychology Finally, we will briefly present a final field, which concerns closely the scientific study of responsibility, and whose evolution seems quite eloquent: that of moral psychosociology. One of the pioneering researchers in this field was Kohlberg (1927–1987), who put forward a developmentalcognitive approach forged between the 1950s to 1980s (reviewed by Kohlberg and Hersh 1977)27. He proposed moral dilemmas to subjects of different ages and focused on the types of justification for their judgments. Thus he highlighted six developmental stages, each corresponding to a type of justification and a level of responsibility (or morality): (1) obedience and punishment orientation, (2) self-interest orientation, (3) interpersonal accord and conformity (the “good boy/good girl” attitude), (4) authority and socialorder maintaining orientation, (5) social contract orientation, and (6) the use of universal ethical principles (including justice), like Kant. Kohlberg advocated the universality of his model (ibid.). But he was himself inspired by Kant... the snake bites its own tail. Subsequent studies revealed that the sixth stage was so rare that it was eventually removed, that its model was not universal, and that stages 4 and 5 seemed essentially limited to the middle and upper classes of Western or Westernized urban adolescents and adults in the 27 Situations with two morally problematic outcomes.

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United States (Jensen 2008). It happened to be with such an audience that Kolhberg had conducted his studies and that the samples were mainly composed of male subjects (in short, subjects that resembled him). Considering this androcentrism, Gilligan (1936–) turned to a female audience. Through her interviews, she concluded that care was a female orientation (and not amoral!) while justice was a more typically male orientation. Her model, like that of Kohlberg, suffers from cultural limitations. Thus, researchers who turned to African-American subjects, or Eastern cultures, revealed dimensions that were almost absent from the first studies (e.g. spiritual justifications, ibid.). In the social sciences and humanities, the researcher or experimenter has come to project their own culture on the object under study, hence the need to contextualize the research (Haste and Abrahams 2008; reviewed by Sachdeva et al. 2011). Obviously, this book is also concerned with this assertion, although we try to be vigilant about this kind of bias by contextualizing our proposals culturally and to minimize them by referring to an epistemology of complexity. 1.2.2.4. Influences of androcentrism in science In the history and epistemology of science, it was highlighted that science and its dominant historical reading had been shaped by a Eurocentric male perspective. Thus, in biology, we can find mechanistic models and concepts colored by the male gender (example: the notion of master gene28), under the influence of an institutionalized and standardized, andro- and Eurocentric policy (Harding 1995). In addition, male historical reading has tended to minimize or obscure female contribution to the history of science (see, for example, the late recognition of Rosalind Franklin’s work 1920–1958, to the DNA double helix model proposed by Watson 1928–, and Crick 1916– 2004). The feminist argument is one of many: every minority is affected. Since human thought is necessarily biased, and colored by the sociohistorical contingency of the subject who produces it, standpoint theorists propose, in order to open up thought and maximize objectivity, to start by considering minorities and marginal lives.

28 Nota bene: this notion of master gene, which appeared at the end of the 20th Century and which today tends to be abandoned, echoes the Cartesian idea of “making masters and owners of nature” (Descartes 1637, p. 78, author’s translation).

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In short, the problem does not lie in the biases inherent in scientific activity, but in the absence of their recognition and consideration when the image of neutral knowledge is promulgated (Coutellec 2015). 1.2.3. Overview: the scientific world, a reflection of scientists’ minds Thus, we can propose some initial answers to the question about the relationship between the world and the mind. Subjects (in this case the researchers who contributed to the construction of this field) who are considered as being the emergence of the interaction between the individual and the environment, that as an individuation (Hagège 2014) have had innovative ideas and actions. Some of these ideas can be interpreted as psychological projection mechanisms that give the outside world meanings similar to those concerning the individual’s function in their environment. We can therefore consider that the origin of these evolutions is in the creativity of the subjects’ minds. And, in molecular biology, projection involves seeing in the living a creative mind (see the “gene”). In summary, the proposed answer to the initial question is that the world is a reflection of the mind. We do not stipulate here that this world would be a pure invention, disconnected from the real; as Fourez (2002) expresses it, this world is the result of a negotiation between researchers and the real, and we cannot say which part of it comes from the one or the other. If we are talking, it is about a world, because the real is inexpressible... The meanings that make the world what it is cannot, in our opinion, be changed if those that make the mind what it is are not. Consequently, one may wonder whether it would not be futile to hope to change the world without seeking to change the mind. In summary, in a so-called “hard” science, objects are studied within a shared paradigm, which collectively constrains norms, experimental procedures considered as valid, language, etc. In contrast, in a human science, each researcher must clarify their theoretical framework, by borrowing it from another or creating it, defining the terms they use, etc., even if certain procedures can also be standardized. It is, in particular, in this explanation of the theory, in its internal coherence, and possibly in its empirical operational character that the scientificity of the approach lies. Thus, in the “hard” sciences, we will speak more of the projection of a collective mind on an objective world, while in the human sciences, we will be able to see individual projections more frequently.

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In any case, researchers project meanings, which can be problematic when authors assert the universal significance of the knowledge they produce (Hagège 2013; Jensen 2008). Also, brought back to the question of how to educate for responsibility, this reasoning invites us to formulate the following question: what meanings and functions of the mind favor responsibility? We will propose answers as to the meanings and functioning of the mind, respectively in the second and third chapters. Beforehand, it is necessary to propose a model of the functioning of the individual mind and its relationship with the subjective world. This is what we will do in the next section. 1.3. The subjective world as a psychological and phenomenological reflection of the individual mind “Usually, we are trying to take advantage of our world – to milk our world or to slaughter it. We have precisely the same attitude toward our world that we have toward cows. […] And if they don’t produce anything, or even if it only looks like they won’t produce anything, we slaughter them and eat them up. This is an expression of aggression […] if your mind is preoccupied with aggression, you cannot function properly.” (Trungpa 1996, p. 15) In section 1.2, we illustrated that the objective world is constituted by reflecting the relative mind on a collective scale. At the individual level, how is the subjective world shaped? On what basis is it oriented? To answer these questions, we will first consider the subjectivity of perception. Being the spiritual or mental counterpart of the notion of subjective world, the notion of individual relative mind (or more briefly of “mind” in this section) refers to a subjective perception of the world. So what are the reasons for the subjectivity of the individual perception of the world? 1.3.1. The basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship 1.3.1.1. Modalities of perception 1.3.1.1.1. Sensory perception of physical phenomena A first reason for this subjectivity is that the five senses (which allow us to perceive visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory objects respectively) are specific. As mentioned above with the notion of Umwelt, the organs of the human senses are different from those of a bumblebee, an

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oyster or a crocodile, and allow us to perceive only a part of the real. For example, unlike bees, our visual photoreceptors do not detect ultraviolet rays. Beyond these interspecific differences, there are interindividual differences. For example, a color blind individual does not see colors in the same way as a person with normal vision. A 5'1'' tall individual does not see the same things as a 6 ft tall individual. The five senses allow us to perceive phenomena external to the organism and we speak of exteroception here (Beaumont et al. 2004). From the subjective point of view, we will thus evoke the first five types of perception objects (corresponding to the phenomena detected by these five senses). Each one depends on a type of particular receptor (respectively photo-, chemo-, mechano-, and chemoreceptors) concentrated in a sensory organ (respectively eyes, nose, skin, ears and tongue) and detecting a particular form of energy: respectively electromagnetic (photons of light), chemical (volatile molecules), mechanical (pressure on the skin), mechanical (sound vibration) and chemical (soluble molecules), called “stimuli”29. At the basis of perception, there is therefore a contact between a form of energy external to the individual and a sensory receptor, which generates information at the nerve level. This is called the “sensation”. This nerve impulse is transformed into perception at the level of the brain. Perception depends on the area of the cerebral cortex involved (and not on the nature of the stimulus; Campbell 1995). Thus, by pressing on closed eyes a light is perceived at this level; the mechanical pressure causes a nervous impulse “interpreted” like light through the areas of the visual cortex. Biologically, other phenomena can be perceived, although different types of neural receptors are mobilized, and these are not concentrated in an organ. They concern the sensations within the organism, generating processes called “proprioception” or “interoception” (Beaumont et al. 200430): for example, the perception of back pain, inner pulse, muscle contraction,

29 This schema is a bit simplistic: the skin also contains thermoreceptors and nociceptors in particular (detecting heat and pain respectively). 30 Some biologists distinguish between “proprioception” and “interoception”, the first referring to everything that makes it possible to recognize the body's position in space (vestibular perception, muscle contraction, etc.) and the second to other sensations internal to the body (pain or visceral sensations for example). In this book, we group these two terms together under the term “interoception”, which has the advantage of etymologically completing the “exteroception” (see perception of the inside of the body versus the outside of the body).

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gastric reflux, balance, etc. These sensations may involve nociceptors31 or mechanoreceptors, in particular. We will talk here about a sixth type of perception object, the corresponding phenomena being internal to the organism (i.e. to the individual). These first six types of perception objects therefore involve a physical object or phenomenon, present in the subject’s immediate reality, in the individual’s external or internal environment. They refer to a biological conception of perception and sensory functions (ibid.), and to what we call here “the first perceptual modality”. 1.3.1.1.2. Perception of mental phenomena A second important reason for the subjectivity of individual perceptions is the fact that reality is interpreted or imagined through mental phenomena. We also detail this in the next section. The point we are concerned about here is that we can perceive them. What are these phenomena? Internally, a subject can experience and perceive the first six objects of perception, in a way that is disconnected from the real. That is, in the absence of the corresponding physical stimulus. Try, if you will, to do the following internally, without it being visible to others from the outside (you can choose the easiest option for you, out of the two done for each case, and take your time): visualize your room or the face of a loved one, imagine the smell of garbage cans or hot chocolate, getting a back massage or a pinch in your right ear, hear the beloved ballad ‘If You Go Away’ or your own voice that says “I love you”, eat a strawberry tartlet or a quarter lemon, perceive the feeling of lumbago or gastric acidity due to hunger. There, we tried to provoke them. However, this kind of phenomena can occur spontaneously in the mind. In both cases, visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory, gustatory and interoceptive objects can be mentally perceived (from the Latin mens, “mind”), without this involving sensory receptors, or objects actually present in your immediate environment. We propose to call all these six types of mental objects “mental phenomena”, and to group them together to constitute the seventh type of perception object, perceived according to a second perceptive modality. Here the perception is therefore extrasensory. As you can see, some mental phenomena correspond to words you hear “in your head” (we would rather say “in your mind”), with a voice similar to

31 See note 29 in this chapter.

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yours, as you hear it when you speak aloud (since others hear your voice in a different way than you). This may be the case right now, as you read these words... Do you hear them internally with your own voice? Sometimes another person’s voice can also be recreated internally. This is the case, for example, if you imagine or remember a discussion between this person and yourself. It is then an inner dialogue, imagined or recalled. This is what we call here the “mental verbal”. The mental verbal is a type of thought which consists of (purely) mental verbal sound phenomena. With this verbal mind, there is another type of mental phenomena that are probably predominant in the ordinary mind, which we will call here “mental images”. They appear as inner visions, which can be associated with physical sensations, possibly tastes, smells, etc. For example, I can ask you to imagine yourself lying on a deckchair by the beach in an idyllic setting... You hear the sound of waves... the ebb and flow from the sea... The sun at its zenith heats your skin and dazzles you... You smell the sea spray... You let yourself be rocked by this frame and by the blue sky... The mental phenomena can be caused as here by reading. It is the virtue of a good novel to make us experience inner scenes disconnected from our actual perception of the first six objects of the senses. For example provoking in us a dream in the waking state in short, which is often accompanied by mental images. However, most of the time, mental phenomena are born spontaneously without being directly “controlled” by the environment – as I have just done and above – even if they are often born in reaction to it. Mental images thus correspond to what we perceive when we dream during sleep, or in the waking state, for example, when we recall a past situation or when we imagine a future situation: scenes or situations are seen internally in the form of images, sometimes felt through other non-verbal mental sensations. These mental images are another form of thoughts. In summary, mental phenomena can involve the purely mental experience of six types of objects, including verbal mental phenomena (verbal sound mental objects) and mental images (visual mental objects). They have a meaning for the subject, a meaning derived from a symbolic language, respectively verbal or pictorial, in both cases highlighted. This meaning has cultural and personal dimensions; thus these phenomena are linked to the collective and individual worlds. Indeed, perceptions are different and do not function in the brain in the same way in different cultures (Kitayama et al. 2003).

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Mental phenomena are most of the time out of step with the present moment. We propose here three levels of mismatch with the real, in descending order: – mental phenomena are completely disconnected from the present moment. Interestingly, authors here distinguish between “thoughts oriented towards objectives” (e.g. task planning), “spontaneous thoughts” (e.g. dreams or thoughts considered “drifting”, that is without a tail or head; Christoff et al. 2016, p. 71932). Rather, we will distinguish between reactive and creative thoughts, the latter being in one way or another in connection with the real (see section 1.3.2.4.3); – mental phenomena are linked to the present moment. These are usually verbal phenomena, for example when a thought comments or describes a present situation. In this case, on the one hand, there is a time lag, because what has been named has already changed, at least at the subatomic level between the time when it is perceived by one of the first five senses and the time when it is named internally. On the other hand, the words “lock up” suggest reality in a universe of cultural significance. The use of the verb therefore fundamentally implies a cultural cognitive distortion; – mental phenomena correspond to mental and unconscious infraverbal processes, intimately related to perception (see sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.2.1.1). Here we speak of unconscious thoughts. These thoughts contain an interpretation of what is experienced, which is culturally and personally biased, and thus they color and distort perceptions. In social psychology, it has indeed been shown, particularly with priming techniques, that by modifying the subject’s preconceptions, they perceive and interpret information in a biased, priming-oriented manner (Myers 2009). These mental phenomena therefore contribute to the subjectivity of individual perceptions. 1.3.1.1.3. The extrasensory perception of physical phenomena Finally, it is important to note that there is likely to be another type of extrasensory perception, distinct from the first and second perceptual 32 We also include (unlike these authors) compulsive thoughts such as mental ruminations. We also do not agree with all the criteria of their classification or terminology. For example, from the ultimate point of view, all mental phenomena are spontaneous.

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modalities. We will call it “direct knowledge”. This perception concerns a priori (but not exclusively) phenomena rather external to the organism, and its modality differs from the second perceptual modality in that it does not seem to be mediated by representations, nor a language (verbal or pictorial) that is consciously accessible33. These seem to be directly perceived meanings. Thus, it is a third type of perceptual modality. This seems to be the case, for example: – with blindsight, where individuals unconsciously detect and identify visual stimuli in the total absence of perceptual awareness, following lesions in the V1 area of the visual cortex (Overgaard 2011). For example, they may discriminate between shapes (by “guessing”) or grasp objects appropriately, which they do not see (Block 1995). In our opinion, this is unconscious knowledge34; – in “excorporations” (out of body experiences), frequent in near-death experiences. The latter are increasingly being studied scientifically (Sleutjes et al. 2014). Unconscious and sometimes blindfolded subjects describe elements of their then objective environment a posteriori, as if they had seen them with their own eyes (which is certainly not the case; Blackmore 2012) ; – in intuitive experiences, where subjects may become aware of phenomena or situations that are beyond the reach of their five senses (Petitmengin 2003). In this case of intuition, this is what is commonly called the “sixth sense”. These experiences seem to have a generic structure, made up of inner microgestures (ibid.), partly characterized by a transmodality where the “for-me-ness35” disappears. That is to say, what is perceived does not correspond to a given meaning, but to “movements, intensities, rhythms, 33 Classical phenomenology, with its solipsistic tendency, seems to ignore these knowing possibilities of consciousness (which have only recently) been mediated and scientifically studied: in Husserl’s work, the subject can only know through their flesh, through representation and perception, while in Heidegger’s work, the ultimate reality its subject, the Dasein, in his singular link with death, is fundamentally isolated from any external reality in regards to the subject (Courtine-Denamy 2015). 34 Block (1995) discusses the case of blindsight, which is phenomenologically problematic: it is clear that subjects have no access-consciousness to what they have seen (because they cannot say anything about it), but have they had a phenomenal, ephemeral and not memorized consciousness, or in any case not accessible a posteriori (a bit like in the case of dreams during sleep)? Rather, we propose that the mind recognizes characteristics of this environment and that this knowledge is unconscious. 35 Term defined in section 1.3.3.

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i.e. transmodal qualities, transposable from one modality to the other” (Petitmengin 2006, p. 89 author’s translation). These cases, and in particular the latter, seem to indicate the existence of infraverbal thoughts, such that a meaning appears in the mind, without it being, at the moment it appears, in the form of words, images or any other precise form. Sometimes, the formalization of this thought in language can take a long time. When Poincaré (1854–1912), an illustrious mathematician, had an intuition for the problem of the three bodies, as he described in Science et méthode (1908), he explained that this idea suddenly appeared to him while he was putting his foot on the step of a bus on holiday. This is not the mathematical sequence of reasoning that he saw, but rather a kind of undifferentiated summary of the result of this demonstration, which he later wrote. ANECDOTE.– In a similar way, one day, I was in front of a Buddhist temple in Auvergne (France). I contemplated the beauty of the extensive landscape of this quiet countryside. From memory, I was in conversation with someone. Suddenly the meaning of the world appeared in my mind as a reflection of the mind, as a concentrated understanding: all of a sudden, I saw, I understood, I knew, and this, without verbal thought. Like a flash, fast and illuminating. In a way, as I see it today, this book is a formalization, an explanation and a justification of this intuition. Even if other insights appeared to me during the writing of this book, about some aspects of the reasoning, the formatting of this book will have taken much longer than the immediate and condensed flash where this meaning appeared to me. To conclude, there may be direct knowledge, little or no conscious (in the case of blindsight) or conscious (as in intuition), and seemingly without thought either. To further detail what was mentioned in the introduction, it should also be pointed out that in the theoretical framework proposed here, mental phenomena are considered to be of the same nature as the mind, that is of an informational nature36. This refers to their representational and semantic dimension. The mind can perceive or recognize mental phenomena (like other objects of knowledge), consciously or unconsciously (Figure 1.1). 36 This remains valid even if neural correlates have been involved: some areas of the brain seem to be activated synchronously with the emergence of mental phenomena (Christoff et al. 2016). Rather subject-specific than individual-specific (Hagège 2014), it is not surprising that these phenomena have a physical medium, but it is only one of their dimensions (see section 1.4.1).

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Verbal thoughts are considered here as one of the possible objects of knowledge (taste, etc). We postulate that they are dependent on the mind, but when the reciprocal is wrong (e.g. in meditative absorption) there is a knowing mind in the absence of verbal thought. This is what is called “mental calm” in some traditions (Lutz et al. 2007). Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between consciousness, mind, thoughts and knowledge – and this is even imperative for us here. 1.3.1.2. Projection, phenomenological (distortion of perceptions)

grasp

and

identification

“There are only two places in the world where we can live happy: in our home and in Paris.” (citation attributed to Ernest Hemingway) Let us return to our question about the processes that generate subjectivity. When I work on the notion of observation in science with my students, many of them think automatically that observation and interpretation are clearly dissociable by most subjects: thus biologists would make neutral observations, independent of any cultural significance. We have argued in section 1.2 against this idea. And cognitively, it also seems clear that such dissociation is not carried out by the majority of subjects (see below). At this explanatory level, we find a concept mentioned in section 1.2: that of projection. The subject projects interpretations and meanings that they “take for truth”. To what extent are these projections “taken as truth”? To the extent that there is what we call a “phenomenological grasp”, sometimes simply called “grasp” in this text. DEFINITION.– Phenomenological grasping – which might have been also called phenomenological intake or seizure (as a translation from the French word “saisie”) – is a dynamic of the mind that causes subjective consciousness to be absorbed in a perceived phenomenon37 (physical like a 37 “Phenomenon” and “object” both refer to everything that the mind can perceive (see the seven types of perceptible objects): a tangible or intangible object, a person, a situation, etc., but they do not refer to the same reference frame. “Phenomenon” reflects the impermanent and interdependent nature of what is perceived and expresses the phenomenological dimension of perception. It refers to the ultimate dimension of the object. “Object” is related to something (object of identification, object of perception, etc.) and expresses a psychological dimension, in connection with the relative reality.

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strawberry tartlet, or immaterial like a thought; see below for more details). Thus, in the moment, consciousness is reduced to this phenomenon, while the other phenomena simultaneously present in the mind are obliterated, displaced from the field of consciousness or put at its background. In the moment, the subject unconsciously self-identifies with the phenomenon in which their consciousness is absorbed. That is, the phenomenon is unconsciously and subtly considered as “me” or “mine”. If the phenomenon is appraised as undesirable, then the identification automatically changes to its opposite-alter-ego, rejection. This means that the phenomenon is then considered as “other”. In both cases, it is a grasp. Note: for simplicity, we refer below mainly to identification, as rejection emerges from more complex dynamics (see below). This notion of grasp is therefore linked to that of identification. The latter is considered here as an unconscious dynamic, which makes the subject feel alive through phenomena, which then become objects of identification. Paradoxically, it is because the subject feels separated from a phenomenon that they identify with it. In this respect, identification, like rejection, objectively corresponds to a dual functioning (even if only rejection is subjectively experienced as a duality). Duality is based on three terms: subject, object and the relative38 separation between the two. Two types of identification can be distinguished: – on the phenomenological level (see the definition of phenomenal consciousness, section 1.1.3), in connection with phenomenological grasping, when consciousness is absorbed in a perceived phenomenon, the subject unconsciously takes themselves for the phenomenon at the time; they feel themselves unconsciously exist through this phenomenon. If the phenomenon is rejected, it is the way of experiencing one’s own existence through the phenomenon that changes, but the process is similar. This identification may be fleeting. Thus, there can be identification with a thought, an emotion, a person, a strawberry tartlet, etc.; EXAMPLES.– As I stand in the line at the bakery, I look at the last strawberry tartlet that remains in the window. I do “one” with this phenomenon. My consciousness is absorbed by this vision and I am already salivating from it. Unconsciously, “me = strawberry tartlet”: at this moment, nothing else is 38 This separation, and therefore duality itself, does not ultimately exist, because of the principles of interdependence and impermanence which characterize vacuity (see end of 1.4.3).

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part of my subjective reality. This is an identification. Also, it’s as if I was sure I was going to eat this tartlet, since I can already see myself eating it (projection). Identification is therefore linked to desire. Now, damn it, the person in front of me is buying it. The perception of this situation is instantly rejected or denied in a way: “a situation where there is no longer in the window the strawberry tartlet I wanted to eat = other.” In other words, “me = not this situation”. This rejection therefore consists of the counterimpression of an identification: instead of embracing the reality that presents itself to my consciousness, I do “two” with it. It is a duality, manifesting from a subjective point of view. Note: the rejection of an unwanted situation can lead to complete amnesia of the situation if it is too painful for the subject’s consciousness (purely psychological coma or traumatic amnesia). – on the psychosociological level, the subject has the impression of living, of existing through phenomena. This identification is more diffuse and persistent. Thus, the subject frequently self-identifies with their name, body, social role, etc. It is because of identification that some subjects experience the end of a social role very badly, which can even lead some people to commit suicide. For example: “If I no longer have my role as a mother (because I lost my child), my job (because I was fired) or such a belief, I no longer feel I exist, so I would prefer to die.” Moreover, experiments have shown that when circumstances show a subject that their beliefs about the world are wrong, this creates dissonance (a state of uncomfortable tension), which will often lead the subject to reinterpret their own actions in light of new beliefs, with the feeling that they were already there before (cognitive dissonance theory from Festinger; Myers 2009). It is therefore as if the subject needs to believe that they have not changed their own beliefs and that these beliefs are, and have always been, congruent with the world (or, as the subject believes, with the ultimate reality): as, through phenomenological grasp, they feel they exist through these beliefs, explicitly challenging them would be tantamount to questioning their own existence. Obviously, identifying with persons, situations, endogroups, etc. implicitly means identifying oneself as not being (or rejecting) other persons, situations, exogroups, etc. “Me” is defined in relation to the other, in a duality of identity/otherness. Doing “one” with something implies doing “two” with others39.

39 And even, as explained above, this is underpinned by a duality with the desired object.

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On the phenomenological level, when a subject’s mind is “absorbed” in their thoughts, the physical phenomena simultaneously present with these thoughts, and which could be perceived (e.g. auditory phenomena) are in the background of consciousness. They will then react less to these stimuli; for example they will not hear when called (“You-hoo! Can you hear me? I’m talking to you.” “Excuse me, I was absorbed in my thoughts.”) or in a movie, conversation, etc. This grasp thus makes the perception of the phenomena incomplete and partial, and it is unconscious at the moment. At the moment when there is grasping, the subject is not conscious of the reduction of their consciousness. An analogy can be made here with the method of capturing monkeys in Indonesia: a bottle is attached to a solid holder and in the bottle a peanut is placed. The monkey grabs the peanut and can no longer remove its hand from the bottom; it is thus captured. The relative mind works in a similar way with perception objects: the monkey allows itself to be captured (or captivated) by them, without realizing that it would be free “by simply dropping the peanut”. It is a bit like a dream, where we take our way of living things as true, whereas this way is a “fantasy” created by our mind (Box 1.3): “As soon as we identify with a role or an image, it becomes a limitation. It’s like placing yourself in a mold and then wondering why you feel cramped.” (Goldstein 2017, p. 186, author’s translation) It should be noted that projection, phenomenological grasp and duality (identification – rejection) are like the three heads of a Cerberus called “ego”: the three inseparable facets of the same process. If you hold three matches vertically by pressing them together, and remove one, the other two collapse (this is the principle of a beam). Well, it is the same here. Cutting a single head is enough here to kill this three-headed dog. When the term “mind” is mentioned, we place ourselves from an objective point of view, since our definition of the mind not only includes consciousness, but also the unconscious. We hypothesize that the dream is a conscious subjective experience and that it is only a matter of degree as compared to ordinary life (the content of its experience is only more disconnected from the real than usual). To understand this, we need to distinguish between subjective and objective points of view: from the subjective point of view, the dream (dreamed at night or dreamed during the day) is the phenomenological experience of the subject, and from the

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objective point of view, this experience corresponds to a reduction of the subject’s field of consciousness compared to what their mind embraces (and, for example, everything they perceive unconsciously). So in the dream, it would be the consciousness that would be absorbed, but the subject is not aware of this: it is the paradox of the phenomenological grasp. That is, the subject would be aware of their dream, but not that they are dreaming (if they are not a lucid dreamer). As we will see, it is when there is, at the subjective level, a transition from the subjective point of view to the objective point of view, or the integration into the field of consciousness of something that was not (which was only in the objective point of view – e.g. becoming aware of an implicit attitude) that there is a gain in responsibility. Box 1.3. The mind, dream and phenomenological grasp

In cognitive psychology, the cognitive dimension of the first steps of phenomenological grasping is called “information processing”. This last notion makes it possible to link the first and second perceptual modalities (thus the senses and mental phenomena – in this case the mental phenomena that are less out of step with the real). It is described as a multi-step process that includes, according to Launay (2004): – sensory coding, which encodes the formal properties of sensory signals (at the level of the five senses and interoception); – the synthesis of sensory characteristics into a perceptual representation, which is without semantic value for the subject. This representation is part of peripheral, modular and automatic processing, and is not controlled by attentional  processes; – the semantic processing of perception. “The effectiveness of sensory detection depends not only on the ratio of signal strength to ambient background noise, but also on a subject-specific decision criterion that reflects the subject’s motivation to identify or neglect relevant signals. Attention acts as an active filter that only lets through information that is important […] as far as the subject’s attitudes and motivations are concerned. […] One of the most essential aspects of the perceptual stage itself [is] the recognition and identification of objects. Perception [...] corresponds to the first level of semantic processing. Still largely automatic, these processes rely on several mechanisms such as feature extraction and

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stimulus-signal detection, shape recognition, object identification and categorization.” (ibid., p. 109–110, emphasis orginial author’s translation). “Perceptual identification allows [...] the recognition of objects from the concepts to which they refer: if, in a first step, the recognition of a shape results from a comparison between what is perceived and a prototype stored in memory [...], the recognition of the object is carried out in a second step on the basis of the characteristics of the class to which the object belongs.” (ibid., p. 111, author’s translation) This explanation indicates that phenomenological grasp and coincidental deformation are carried out in a way that is intertwined with perception: a mental activity – conscious or not – of labelling perceived phenomena brings this interdependent and impermanent reality into molds preconstructed by culture (by gluing concepts on them). This is what we have called above “infraverbal mental and unconscious processes” (section 1.3.1.1.2). Thus, psychological experiments have shown that a subject has difficulty seeing what they are not culturally prepared to see (Kuhn 1962/2008). In other words, the process of transforming a sensory reception of ultimate reality into the perception of a relative world is explained and integrated into the process of information processing: ultimate reality has no meaning for the subject, but semantic processing that mobilizes memory, connects, compares perceptions to the known, to the signifier, favors perception according to personal experience and cultural meaning (Brouillet 2008). This categorization consists of the implicit affixing of a name to an object. Like dreams, these subconscious phenomena seem more analogous to the image than to the verb, although the possibility of naming them could be a condition of their relative existence40. It seems that a human being learns to perceive things at the same time as they learn to name them (ibid.). In his explanation, Launay does not consider the case of the seventh object of perception, when the mind is absorbed by a mental phenomenon that is not directly related to simultaneous sensory perceptions, which is often the case. See, dear reader, how your own mind can easily be caught up 40 Thus, for example, the Lapons distinguish and are able to recognize and name five kinds of white and some Amazonian Indians, several hundred shades of green, where a European would not see any difference between these shades of color.

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in verbal thoughts that repeat the past, imagine or plan the future for example (section 1.3.1.1.2). Thus, the phenomenon of phenomenological grasp applies here again to the second perceptual modality, because the mind can be absorbed into the perception of a physical phenomenon, as well as a mental one. This extension is an originality of the present theory. What determines which phenomena are grasped or not grasped? What processes can lead, for example, to emotional fusion with a strawberry tartlet? Individuals perceive the environment and interact with it according to preferences that are culturally and personally conditioned. About the grasping process, Launey (2004) attributed subjective preferences (processed information) to the subject’s attention, attitudes and motivations. These preferences and dislikes have been theorized and explained in psychology or psychosociology through various concepts, which are the (not exhaustive) object of section 1.3.2. 1.3.2. The four horsemen of the individual relative mind I use this nomenclature of the four horsemen mainly as a tribute to Bargh, one of the leading researchers working on the cognitive unconscious, in reference to one of his famous articles on automaticity (Bargh 1994). Moreover, it so happens that the use we make of it here is partially consistent with the biblical source: in the New Testament, the Four Horsemen (conquest, war, famine and death) sow the Apocalypse. We will see in this book that our riders can generate disharmony or harmony (section 2.4.3), depending on their operation and orientation. In this section, we focus mainly on their ego functions, which rather sow disharmony. 1.3.2.1. Process of orientation (and deformation) of perception 1.3.2.1.1. Attention, a modulator of the mind The word “attention” has only two meanings in the Littré and we are interested in its first meaning here: “action to fix the mind on, to beware of.” In cognitive sciences, the concept refers to a group of processes called “attentional processes”41. They occupy a central position in the processes of 41 Indeed, here, attention is considered in its cognitive sense. It is located at the bottom of Citton’s attentional “milles feuilles” analogy (2014), with the dispositional factors (which we mention only briefly in this book). In the upper layers of his “milles feuilles”, above what he calls “individual attention”, he distinguishes other types of attention. Instead, we would rather

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“control”, because they ensure “both the selection of relevant information, the orientation of processing operations and the management of the resources necessary for this processing” (Launay 2004, p. 180; author’s translation). “Attention ‘supervises’ all cognitive activities from the processing of sensory information to the decision-making processes that trigger behaviors. It[...] mainly concerns the control of the flow of representations” (ibid.). It can be assimilated to a more or less selective filter42 that selects the relevant assessed environmental stimuli. As information processing capacities are limited, the main role of attention is to selectively allocate resources and control access to the central system of processed information. It therefore conditions the perception process mentioned in section 1.3.1.2. Semantic characteristics of information would be more important in this role than perceptual characteristics (Launay 2004). Thus, the subject’s cultural and personal background would be more important in directing attention than the components of the environment. In other words, attention depends more on the relative world than on the ultimate reality. And at the same time, it contributes to the relativity of this world. “The selectivity of attentional filtering processes is based on a number of mechanisms that translate into phenomena of orientation of the attention” (ibid., p. 185, author’s translation). Attention can be exogenous when attracted by an unexpected stimulus, and endogenous when it results from an intention (ibid.). For the latter, there are two modes: shared attention, when stimuli perceived by different sensory channels are simultaneous, and focused attention, when only one channel is used, in which case the processing of information is much better (ibid.) – and this corresponds to different experimental paradigms (not really physiological as far as shared attention is concerned). Diffuse attention is also distinguished when it covers a relatively large part of the perceptual field and concentrated attention when it is focused at a particular point (Launay 2004). This attentional orientation brings “about an internal representation of the perceptual field, not on the visual scene itself” (ibid., p. 187):

talk about “situational factors”, and “socio-cultural conditioning” (and their impact on the subject’s attention). 42 This notion of filter, which refers to Broadbent’s theory, is commonly accepted, although slightly debated (Maquestiaux 2013).

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“Particular cognitive processes are then responsible for the analysis of relevant stimuli. The main function of magnification (amplification) processes is to increase the salience of the information sought or expected.” (ibid., author’s translation) They correspond to signal amplification and more intense nerve activity when the information being processed is of interest to the subject. An opposite process is that of inhibition, which leads to attenuation or even suppression of the signal, also of central origin (Launay 2004). Thus the perception of the real is distorted. Also, attention conditions consciousness43. Indeed, any phenomenon that is not the object of attention cannot be in the foreground of consciousness – it is therefore subconscious or unconscious. For example, if I drive while my mind is absorbed in thoughts – objects of my attention – the road is perceived visually in a subconscious way. Have you ever been surprised by “suddenly coming back to the objective reality” while your mind wandered elsewhere, in a very subjective reality disconnected from the real? The exogenous attention, grasped by a phenomenon that appears, leads to “absorption” of the consciousness in this phenomenon (thus to a phenomenological grasp). For example, I am reading (endogenous attention with grasping) and suddenly the phone rings or a verbal thought is born; this verbal thought could comment internally on the passage by just reading or linking it to another event. These two phenomena (telephone or verbal thinking) can capture my attention and instantly divert it from reading; consciousness is then no longer present to reading, but only to the captivating phenomenon (exogenous attention). In both cases, the field of consciousness is limited to the perceived phenomenon. In the example of the person on the terrace who hears a noise at midnight (see section 1.1.3), there may be two scenarios. Either their attention is grasped at midnight by the noise, in a way similar to the previous example of the phone ringing during reading. Or, their attention and field of consciousness is amplified at midnight, so that they become simultaneously aware of the conversation at the table and the noise below (less likely if the subject has not trained their attention to be diffused).

43 This consideration of the concepts of attention and field of consciousness in the modeling of consciousness is a solution to the second problem of Block’s theory (1995) discussed in section 1.1.3.

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Thesse consideraations enjoinn us to purrsue the moodeling of thhe mind outlinedd in the introductionn by categ gorizing connsciousness (always phenom menal) accordding to the attentional a modality m invoolved and thee type of object to t which it iss present, that is, which it knows (Figure 1.2). A Attention can be considered as a a modulaator of conscciousness (D Depraz 2014), which t quality, nature n and qu uantity of peerceived infoormation. modifiees or directs the By “quuantity” of consciousneess, we im mply the nootion of a field of consciouusness. DEFINIT TION.– The field f of conssciousness iss the space (physical or mental) occupieed by consciiousness. “T The subject conscious c off something fills the present moment of their t time wiith this thing g (ideas, repreesentations, feelings, p etc.). […] What W is experienced theree is only memoriies, images, perceptions, experiennced in its pllace, […] thaat is, in the category c of reeality assigneed to it.” (Ey 20115, author’s translation)). Thus, the more attenntion is focuused, the narroweer the field of conscioousness is and a the smaaller the am mount of informaation involveed.

Figure 1.2. Quality of co onsciousness gradients g as a function of the attentiona al modality and d type of objecct

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 1.2.– In the t middle, atttention is diff ffuse and shaared (it is attentionn-vigilance; see section 2.3.2), and d there is a phenomennological dialogissm between the inner world w (sixth and a seventh types of peerception objects) and the oute ter world (firrst five types of perceptionn objects), w which are perceiveed on an equaal footing annd simultaneo ously (dialogiism symbolizeed by the

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double arrows). This refers to the concept of equanimity (Desbordes et al. 2015), which will be developed later in the text. The other positions along the horizontal axis correspond to a more concentrated attention, which coincides with a narrower field of consciousness (and often a stronger phenomenological grasp): consciousness is then essentially restricted to a phenomenon. Attention can be focused either on an inner world phenomenon (e.g. a thought, as in A), or on an outer world phenomenon (e.g. a phenomenon perceived audibly, or a seen strawberry tartlet, as in B). Positions A and B are probably the most frequent in the waking state of ordinary subjects. Attention grasping studies have shown that salient events that suddenly occur in the environment immediately grasp attention (Maquestiaux 2013). Studies on thoughts have also shown that they are automatic and uncontrollable (Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000). Thus, thoughts arise in the mind automatically. They can therefore be considered as an event occurring in the subject’s world. The attention “jumps” therefore in general from one perception object (a thought, noise, visual object considered positive or negative, bodily sensation considered unpleasant, etc.) to another, being automatically grasped, and therefore exogenous. It is sometimes endogenous (for example, when the subject knowingly pursues a reflection on a point they are trying to elucidate, as long as this research does not resemble mental rumination, an unproductive process that “goes around on a loop”). Here, we will essentially consider two attentional modalities: concentrated attention and diffuse attention. In concentrated attention, consciousness is absorbed into a phenomenon (a thought, an object of perception, an emotion, etc.) and, at the given moment, is therefore absent from all other phenomena, which can however be perceived subconsciously (Braboszcz et al. 2010; Figure 1.2). In diffuse attention, several phenomena can be perceived simultaneously, that is the subject can be aware, for example, simultaneously of their breathing, of a bird and a thought that rises in their mind. In this last example, as different sensory channels are mobilized, attention is also called “shared”. Having retained as a definition of the mind that it is the union of consciousness and the unconscious, can attention also modulate the unconscious processes? A great deal of research in the cognitive sciences seems to attest to this. Indeed, for example, implicit learning, evaluative conditioning or unconscious thoughts are goal dependent and require attention (Dijksterhuis and Aarts 2010). Thus, it seems relevant to consider attention as a modulator of conscious and unconscious processes, and therefore of the mind as a whole.

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What determines a subject’s interest in a signal and therefore the magnification or attentional inhibition processes? An answer to this question can be found in appraisal theories. 1.3.2.1.2. Appraisal “For me, heroin, well, I turn my nose up at it. Kids who inject themselves all become accustomed to happiness and happiness is not forgiving, since happiness is known for its cravings. To jab yourself with a needle, you really have to try to be looking for happiness and only the kings of idiots have such ideas. But I don’t really want to be happy, I still prefer life” (Gary 1975, author’s translation). “The desire to take is related to the memory of ‘pleasure’. Refusal is linked to the fear of suffering” (Patanjali 1991, p. 74, author’s translation). The appraisal process (Scherer 1999) consists of subjective evaluation (often automatic and unconscious, but sometimes deliberate) of a situation, therefore of a conjunction of phenomena from the outer world (perceived according to the first perceptive modality), as desirable, undesirable or neutral. Here we have a broader understanding of it, because we also include the phenomena of the inner world, in particular thoughts (see the second perceptual modality) and emotions, but also the sixth type of objects (see interoception, including physical pain). In other words, the latter phenomena are appraised, as well as external situations. Indeed, as we will detail below, they can be the object of a phenomenological grasp. Then the mind is absorbed in it, and perception distorted. Appraisal determines the nature and intensity of the emotional response to the situation or phenomenon – although some authors suggest that, on the contrary, it is emotion that determines appraisal (discussed in Brouillet 2008). Linked to attention, appraisal is therefore a key process in the perception-action articulation (with an important place for emotions and mental phenomena in the hyphen between perception and action). Lazarus et al. initially distinguished three types of appraisal: primary (in terms of well-being for the individual), secondary (which follow them up and appraise the resources available to deal with the situation) and reappraisal (of primary assessments in the light of secondary ones). With regard to primary appraisals:

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“three fundamental appraisals are possible: (a) the situation is irrelevant because it has no personal meaning, it can then be ignored [(‘I don’t care’)], (b) the situation is considered positive, the event can be considered beneficial or desirable [ (‘I want’)], and (c) the situation is considered negative44: the event can be considered stressful, painful, threatening, [or unpleasant (‘I do not want’)]” (Brouillet 2008, p. 31, author’s translation). Thus the appraisal of the situation (or phenomenon) depends on the appraisal of the emotion that this situation arouses: the “I want” corresponds to sensations considered desirable, because they are assimilated to pleasure, unlike the “I do not want” (see a nuance of this assertion in Box 1.4). For example, if a greedy, or even gluttonous, subject finds themselves in front of a buffet dinner, they will immediately identify the dishes they prefer (“I want”) – randomly, strawberry tartlets – those they hate (“I do not want”), and this corresponds to attention magnification (accompanied by a grasp). Some of the dishes to which they are indifferent (“I do not care”) will go unnoticed by them, and this corresponds to an attentional inhibition (which therefore unconsciously amounts to an “I do not see”). In the same way, in general, a subject arriving in a room filled with strangers will immediately identify people who are attractive to them (whom they find well dressed or who seem nice and approachable, for example, according to the criteria to which they are sensitive; “I want”), others whom they would a priori tend to avoid (“I do not want”), while they will not pay attention to all the others (“I do not care” therefore “I do not see”). You can try to see for yourself how your mind reacts in such cases. These two examples illustrate that this focus of attention is based on personal, culturally colored tastes, criteria, dispositions or judgments. This operation is typical of what is called here the “ego” (see definition in section 1.4.2). The ego leads the subject to interact with their world essentially according to the “I want”, “I do not want”, and “I do not care” (Figure 1.3).

44 For Lazarus, in case of stress, the appraisal can interpret the situation either as a threat (loss of love or self-esteem for example), or as a challenge (gain of autonomy or possibility of renewal by example; Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). The first modality would generate negative stress, inhibiting action, unlike the second.

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Figure 1.3. Steps in structuring subjective ego trends. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.3.– This theoretical case considers different visual (v1 to vn), auditory (a1 to n), olfactory (o1 to n), etc. stimuli of equal importance in the individual’s environment (in terms of amount of information). For example, the different visual stimuli would correspond to the same number of pixels on a photo taken in the individual’s visual field. The contact between these perceptual objects and sensory receptors (or the mind if these objects are mental phenomena) triggers step 1. In an ordinary subject, the attentional magnification process increases the importance of a significant stimulus for the individual (here v1 and v2) in their subjective reality, while attentional inhibition decreases the perception of all the other stimuli simultaneously present (step 2). The latter are therefore hardly part of its relative reality. This distortion is unconscious. Perception confers a first-rate meaning by answering “what is it?” (step 3). Note 1: for Koreans, silkworms are a festive dish, so why not a silkworm pie? Note 2: instead of such an exotic tart, we could have written “disappearance of the last strawberry tartlet in front of us in the boulangerie”. The appraisal produces a second-order meaning that responds to “do I want this?” (step 4). The reification of the ego that follows (step 5) generally leads to the emergence of mental phenomena and emotions (step 7) which are in turn phenomenologically grasped, because they are, at the moment they emerge, in place of blue dots at the top. Approach or avoidance behaviors may also emerge in this process. They also correspond to objects of perception. Trends are thus amplified. In this way, step 6 engrams

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trends (mental, emotional, behavioral) by generating or reinforcing neural circuits and perception-action schemes (step 7 returns to level 0, adding another “layer” of phenomenological grasping). Such a reinforcement is based on what is called “long-term potentiation” in neuroscience. DEFINITION.– The term “engram” is a common term of German origin, invented in neurology at the beginning of the 20th Century to designate the memory trace left in the brain as a result of experience. It gave rise to the verb “to engram”, which refers to the process by which this memory is inscribed in neural circuits. Here, the word “engram”, sometimes referred to as emotional, is used in a similar but broader sense. On the one hand, we consider that it is potentially the whole body, and not just the brain, that constitutes the place of engramming. On the other hand, the information corresponding to this memorized experience is stored in the form of energy and contains data concerning emotion, the attitudinal tendency and the corresponding thoughtaction repertoire (see examples 1 and 2, section 1.3.2.4.2). In the example in Figure 1.3, a pleasant object for the subject (a strawberry tartlet), is associated with pleasure and thus appraised as “I want” and an unpleasant object for them (a silkworm pie) as “I do not want”. However, it is not always that simple. Sometimes, a subject may have approaching behavior, and automatically appraise as desirable a situation or object that appears objectively unpleasant or uncomfortable. This typically corresponds to a resonance with old wounds (see section 1.3.2.4.2), that is, to known and addictive phenomena (see section 2.4.2). Thus, for example, depression or a toxic relationship of submission (example: a woman who is a victim of domestic abuse) can be considered as an addiction to certain behaviors and thoughts. The latter, which generally involves identification as a victim, may correspond for the subject a “comfort zone”... even if this area has sides that may otherwise seem uncomfortable. That is to say, unconsciously, the subject’s psyche finds something reassuring, a feeling of existence, and would thus be afraid of losing something if they dropped this known situation for an unknown situation of which they eventually ignores the ins and outs. Mental phenomena generally find coherent justifications in the eyes of the subject to remain in this dynamic, which aim to maintain the status quo (and are effective in this regard). So, like when you try to stop taking a drug, the “I want” and “I do not want” get tangled up. So it may be that “I will stay” or “I smoke”, if “I am too scared” to be confronted with emotions and a state of lacking. The case of masochism, which we believe is part of the previous description, does, however, present some particularities that deserve clarification. Indeed, it has been proven that an important psychological component modulates the intensity of

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pain. However, there are objectively painful stimuli, because they are perceived via specific neural receptors (called “nociceptors”) present in the skin, bones, muscles, joints, etc. These receptors have structural features that distinguish them from receptors of general sensitivity. In particular, their terminations are free (not encapsulated in connective tissue). They have a vital biological function, that of preventing human beings from harming their physical integrity (even if, in the case of chronic pain, the related signal may be unnecessarily amplified). Thus, the few subjects (with congenital analgesia) who are insensitive to physical pain have a shorter life expectancy because it is very difficult for them to learn which morbid behaviors to avoid. The subjects known as “masochists” find some pleasure in physical pain (which is only caused under certain conditions, usually those of a sexual game of humiliation or infantilization). Finally, we will end here with another special case, that of sugar consumption. Refined sugar and its substitute saccharin are highly addictive, much more so than a hard drug such as cocaine (Ahmed et al. 2013). There are also specialized receptors of “sugar”, in the mouth and intestinal tract, that trigger neural signals and hormonal reactions (Lee and Owyang 2017). We are biologically wired to seek out and love sugar, because it is calorific, and these systems have been selected in a nutrient-poor environment. Our current environment in Western societies is far from that – France wastes 10 million tons of food per year45. Food industries frequently take advantage of this biological condition by sweetening their products, which increases their palatability. However, excess sugar appears to be variously pathogenic (Khan and Sievenpiper 2016), in particular by being converted into fat in the body (Sadler et al. 2015). Thus, unlike the case of physical pain, where it is often beneficial to the physical integrity to rely on this biological signal and avoid it, in the case of sugar, it is on average more beneficial to health not to consume it every time our bodies are close to it. Never following such signals can also be, at the other extreme, very pathological, even morbid; this is what happens with anorexia for example. In conclusion, biological bases, linked to our ancestral condition as CroMagnon men (Raymond 2008), guide us, with some genetic (e.g. analgesia) or psychopathological (e.g. anorexia) exceptions, towards “objectively” unpleasant or pleasant stimuli in a similar way on average. However, on this common basis, psychological and cultural constructions and phenomena of addiction condition our individual tendencies in terms of preference and aversion, making appraisal a largely subjective process, and the categories of pleasure and pain not always mutually exclusive. Box 1.4. About the complexity of the “ I want” and the “I do not want” (Hagège 2017a) 45 Assessment available at: https://www.planetoscope.com/fruits-legumes/1257-le-gaspillagealimentaire-en-france.html.

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In conclusion, the appraisal processes mean that we do not attribute the same value to different objects, people, situations, thoughts and emotions, depending on the conscious or unconscious meaning they have for us. This notion of appraisal, especially developed in cognitive psychology46, therefore theoretically refers to a concept worked on in psychosociology: that of value47. 1.3.2.1.3. From values to behaviors, and the status of the error “You who invented sin, forgot to invent forgiveness” (Chico Buarque; personal translation of a verse from his song Apesar de Você). The notion of value has been defined as a belief that synthesizes the emotional and cognitive elements48 that guide subjects in their world (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). It corresponds to a criterion or standard of preference, and is supposed to be strongly linked to decision-making processes (influencing actions; ibid.). The notion of value was defined in educational sciences as a “representation or [a] statement that is highly emotionally invested and, as such, can play a psychological supporting role by designating what is good, good, beautiful or true more or less explicitly” (Reynaud 2008, p. 94, authors’ translation). In these two definitions appears the cognitive and affective entanglement of values. The concept of value is also linked to the notion of conation, distinguished from cognition and emotions in social psychology. Thus, in a subject’s relationship with an object (or a situation, a person, etc.), the affective corresponds to the energy of the relationship (“I feel”), the cognitive to the mental representation of the object (“I think”), and the conative to the orientation towards the object (“I tend to act”). A basic premise of this approach is that if the emotion (energy) 46 The field of emotions (i.e. affects) had initially been distinguished from that of cognition (i.e. thought, representation, reflection, etc.). However, cognitive psychology studies these two domains equally well, and they are now considered to be intertwined, including neurologically. Affectivity corresponds to the bivalent domain of emotions: schematically, pleasure and pain. The term “affectivity” is more commonly used in psychoanalysis and social psychology, while the term “emotion” seems to be predominant in cognitive psychology. 47 We have seen the link between attention and appraisal (Figure 1.3). Citton refers to an “incestuous  circle between valorization and attention”, explaining “I give my attention to what I value and I value what I pay attention to” (Citton 2014, p. 202, authors’ translation). 48 See note 46 in this chapter.

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is negative, the tendency (conative) will be to avoid the object, while if it is positive, it will lead to approaching it. However, the meaning of the causal link between emotion and action is discussed. It would be the value, in association with the underlying emotion, that would guide the behavior (approach if emotion and value are positive, avoidance if they are negative). However, as suggested earlier about appraisal, this simplistic schema needs to be made more complex. First, one reason is that emotions and values do not always head in the same direction. This is the case when the pleasures provided by certain behaviors run counter to consciously endorsed values. For example: I smoke or drink with my friends, even though I value health and freedom; I am fickle, even if my ideal is stability and sustainability; my passion is gokarting, even if I vote for the green party; I eat a strawberry tartlet every day, even if I want a colon free from gluten; I frequently buy leather clothes and I eat industrial-sized steaks, even if I feel concerned about animal welfare, etc. These examples suggest that the problem of incoherence (i.e. internal contradictions) of a subject is more complex than this (see in particular the example of implicit attitudes in section 1.1.3). Such a finding was made in the laboratory about an epistemic object49. We used questionnaires in which subjects were asked to qualify objects (science, teaching, learning, error, proof, etc.) by choosing a position in a continuum between two pairs of antagonistic adjectives, from different semantic registers: affective (e.g. “enjoyable/ painful”), axiological (e.g. “good/bad”) and cognitive (e.g. “relative/absolute”) (Dang 2013). In the population study (French science students, from the first year of bachelor’s to doctoral studies), for all objects (science, teaching, learning, etc.), values were positive and positively correlated with affects, except for the object “error”. For the majority of these subjects, error was positively valued (as useful, interesting, positive, etc.), while it caused negative affects. This highlights an obstacle to learning: it is necessary to make mistakes to learn, however subjects were afraid of them because they are painful. Why on earth be afraid of mistakes and hurt, if they can be useful and interesting? And again, here the public concerned is probably rather close to the learning process. What about such barriers among struggling students? Where does this obstacle come from?

49 The Greek word “épistémè” has been translated as “knowledge” in English. The term “epistemic” seems more appropriate here than the term “epistemological”, because the latter is more restricted: the epistemological corresponds to a meta-type knowledge: on academic knowledge or on personal knowledge, whereas the epistemic refers to knowledge (whether first or meta) and therefore includes the epistemological (Kitchener 2002).

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It could be due to the implicit contamination of the error through fault, in other words, of the epistemic domain by the moral domain (Favre 2007). Indeed, the error evaluates a difference between the result of an action and an instituted (or personal) standard; I made an error in my calculation (or in relation to the drawing I wanted to make). Let us consider the academic case of the established norm: this norm defines the true, the correct. There are socially instituted norms about mathematical calculation. Thus, the error is supposed to have a logical, or more generally representational, dimension related to form. This deviation from the norm should have nothing to do with the field of morality. However, the opposite of “true” is “false”, it is not “erroneous”. In French schools, the term “fault” (“faute” in French) is much more common than “error” (“erreur” in French, while there is no equivalent of “mistake”). We are talking about spelling “faults”, calculation “faults”, etc. In one assignment, the “faults” are counted and a score is assigned, which is qualified as “good” or “bad” (instead of “low” or “high” for example). A student who accumulates “bad” scores is often referred to in terms of being a “bad” student (“mauvais” in French). What are the semantic connotations of these terms? “False” come from the Latin falsus, from fallere (to deceive, to fail). Fault is defined as a more or less serious breach of a duty, a law, a custom, a rule, decency. “Bad” in French etymologically refers precisely to sin, to the Devil. Semantically, a “bad” student is therefore a student who has sinned, while one bad score, a bad action, might send them to hell! It is the entire Jewish-Christian universe sin found in this semantic field. However, this universe can cause guilt or shame. You can have fun counting how many times a day you think “I must do that” (the verb is “falloir” in French, with the same etymological root as “fault”). Then try to perceive the emotional coloration of this thought. It is likely that the individual will be tinged with guilt or shame. This is unnecessary, because in addition to evoking a sensation that is considered unpleasant, these emotions often inhibit action50. On the contrary, thinking for example “I will do that” or “I want to do this to achieve this goal, or because it corresponds to this value” puts the subject in a more positive energy, considered more pleasant and which encourages action51. Obviously, the use of the terms “bad score”, “bad student” and the corresponding implicit attitudes of teachers are probably not foreign to the exclusive logic of French schools (Hagège 2017d), which leads more than 100,000 pupils to leave the school system each year without any qualifications (Favre 2007). In addition, studies have shown that fear of error is related to learning difficulties, dogmatic thinking and violent behavior (ibid.). We will detail this later, especially when we discuss the problem of violent religious radicalization (section 1.4.3). Box 1.5. Error status, values and emotions

50 See Favre (2007) for more empirical data. 51 If you think “I must stop thinking ‘I must do that’”, it means that something has escaped you.

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Secondly, another reason for the necessary complexification of the initial schema is that there are explicit and implicit values, often contradictory to each other (Hagège 2017d). Also implicit values are present in the semantic connotation of words, in resonance with their emotional effect. ANECDOTE.– To illustrate this point, here is an anecdote that was told to us by a secondary mathematics teacher in a priority education area. The teacher had found a way to motivate her students: in each class, she gave them a very easy little exercise, which she noted. Put together, all these scores gave a score – generally quite high – that counted as an average. The students collected their precious notes with motivation. However, each year, the course that went the worst was the one on fractions. She could not understand why, until one day when a student who was very reluctant to attend the class also had an arm in a plaster cast. She then suspected that there might be an emotional language barrier. As a result, she asked them what the term “fraction” meant to them – she brainstormed. The words that emerged were: “fracture”, “to shatter”, “divorce”, “break”, etc. The students were right in a way, since the word “fraction” comes from the Latin fracio, which means “breaking action”. Thus, the students unconsciously put these painful notions behind the term “fraction”, because they were the only ones their cognitive system had at their disposal to interpret the sentence52. Since then, the teacher has been doing this brainstorming each time before the lesson about fractions, then clarifying that they are right to think that and that what she was going to talk about does not hurt. Since then, her course on fractions has gone as well as the others! We could have thought that since the students were in a mathematics class, they would know that what is taught there is mathematics, and that mathematics is emotionally neutral, it does not hurt. But such a belief neglects that science is a human construct (section 1.2.1), and that unconscious processes drive our behavior and emotions (section 1.3.2.4.2). In summary, values are not only representations, they also consist of implicit semantic connotations contained in words (see other examples in section 1.2.1 and point 2 of section 2.3.1). The notion of value refers to the idea that there are preferences, implicit or explicit (Reynaud 2008), based on judgments (“good-looking true, good, etc.”) in the subjects’ inner world and that these preferences, in connection with congruent emotional reactions, guide the subjects’ actions. In the example of error, it is obvious that it is the 52 Research in science didactics has indeed clearly shown that we always learn with an already conceptual approach (a preconception) that can act as an obstacle to learning. This example illustrates that the emotional dimension of such an initial conception can be massive.

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implicit negative value that is related to the emotional reaction, and not the explicit positive value. It should also be noted that different values can guide actions in a similar way. Thus, it has been theorized in environmental psychosociology that individuals can be motivated to behave respectfully towards the environment, because they value either the biosphere or others or themselves, which refers respectively to biospheric, altruistic or egoistic values (Stern & Dietz 1994). Values can therefore be considered as the psychosocial expression of subjective preferences, which are related to the subject’s emotions and beliefs. The notion of values is also related to that of attitude, which was mentioned by Launay (2004) as a decisive factor of attention. 1.3.2.2. Modalities of relationship with the world (psycho-affective attitudes) Like the concept of value, the concept of attitude is one of the central concepts of psychosociology. It was initially defined as referring to “a mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related” (Allport 1935, cited by Dang 2013, p. 69). According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), an attitude is “a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object”53 (quoted by Dang 2013, p. 70). “Current researchers agree that appraisal is the critical feature of attitudes in that they express good-bad, like-dislike, and pleasant-unpleasant associations with the object, on the base of the tracks of past experiences that are stocked in memory” (Dang 2013, p. 70). The link between this concept and those of appraisal, values and the notion of “I want” and “I do not want”, and therefore of attentional magnification, are evident here. Attitudes are traditionally considered to have three components: cognitive, affective and conative (see previous section on values, 1.3.2.1.3). Thus, a subject is supposed to have a positive or negative attitude towards an object, a phenomenon (a situation, a person, etc.). Other authors consider attitudes to have only two components, emotional and cognitive (reviewed

53 The link between attitudes and behavior, as well as its experimental appraisal, has been problematic in recent decades (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977).

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by Dang 2013). This is our case. Thus, we consider attitudes as a model of the relationship between a subject and an object. In our work, we have justified the conceptual division of an individual’s outer world into a human and a non-human environment (NHE): (1) psychology tends to overvalue the influence of human relationality in psychological development compared to that of interaction with the nonhuman, which is nevertheless just as structuring on this level (Searles 1986), (2) we also integrate into the NHE its non-natural elements (which is rarely the case in environmental psychosociology), (3) it would seem that there is a complementarity and antagonism between the two types of relationship (Hagège et al. 2009). That is, our model integrates the different ways in which a subject may be related to others or to the NHE, depending on whether this relationship is more or less dominated by cognition or affects (Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. Composition, characteristics of attitudes towards others and the non-human environment (NHE), and the relationships between these different attitudes. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.4.– The model is based on the assumption of a limited amount of affects. The latter are more or less destined for an “object”:

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others (top) or the non-human environment (NHE, bottom). The more affects there are, the less the distance with the object (low importance of cognition; lower left and upper right). Affects and cognition are in a dialogical relationship (double vertical arrows). The subject’s attitude can vary along a horizontal continuum, described below from left to right for the three remarkable attitudes: (1) their relationship with others is more dominated by cognition (they are splitting with emotions towards others, above), while their relationship with the non-human is mostly emotional in nature at this moment in time (fusion with the NHE, below)  (2) when their relationship with the environment (human and non-human) is balanced in terms of being emotional and cognitive, the subject is conscious, in empathy with others (top) and feels related to the NHE (bottom) ; (3) if they are in emotional contagion with others (top), at this moment they are emotionally disconnected from the NHE (bottom). The two extreme attitudes (splitting and fusion, green stripes) are those where the subject is least conscious (of themselves and the “object”). DEFINITIONS.– On the basis of work carried out by our previous research team (Favre et al. 2005), we distinguish three characteristic attitudes towards humans: – splitting with emotions involves being cut off from one’s own emotions and those of others. Thus, the relationship with others and with oneself is only cognitive in appearance. That is, the projection ignores the emotional components of the situation. This attitude can generate violent behavior and corresponds to psychological protection from what is perceived as a threat. It is difficult to imagine a torturer who is not cut off from the emotions of their victim and their own... The splitting corresponds to a subjective “I do not care”: an attentional inhibition of the perception of their emotions and those of others. Emotional inhibition coincides with strong identification with thoughts (see section 1.3.2.3). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that splitting with emotions and dogmatism go hand in hand (Favre 2007; unpublished personal work). We emotionally cut off when we see someone expressing suffering, anger, joy, etc., and we do not feel affected by their emotion. This is called “remaining unmoved”. We can have internal comments like “poor them, so unlucky”, have the impression of being compassionate, but on a phenomenological level, this compassion is purely intellectual. The disconnect can be useful in some cases, to “keep cool”, when there is a panic in a crowd for example;

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– emotional contagion (or fusion) is on the contrary the impression of feeling exactly the same emotions as others. This is what happens when we identify with a character in a film or novel, or when we are sad seeing a close one who is sad. At that moment, it is as if there were no distance between oneself and the other: the subject identifies with the emotion of the other, which takes, in that moment, all the space of their subjective reality. This generally corresponds to an “I want” if the emotion is positive and a “I do not want” if it is negative: there is an attentional magnification of the emotion and the projection hypertrophies the emotional component of the situation. In fact, it is our own emotions that are projected onto the other. Here the cognitive component of the relationship is weak or non-existent. These first two attitudes are those in which the projection, and therefore the deformation and phenomenological grasp are the most intense (and the field of consciousness the most biased and partial);   – the third attitude is that of empathy: the subject is affected by the other’s emotion and at the same time they are aware that it is the other’s emotions and not their own. They feel connected to the other, while having a sufficient cognitive distance to be able to act in the right way, by being welcoming and caring. This attitude corresponds to a neutral term between “I want”/”I do not want” and “I do not care”, and yet is qualitatively different. Thus, we are empathetic with someone who is sad when we feel their sadness as their own, when we can simultaneously mentally represent what they are going through, and when all this does not alter in any way the emotions that are specific to us (for example joy). Empathy is therefore accompanied, on a phenomenological level, by diffuse and shared attention, such that consciousness simultaneously perceives what is happening within ourselves and in the other. Our work led us to distinguish three mirror attitudes towards the nonhuman environment (NHE). These mirror attitudes (Figure 1.4) are: – splitting, when the subject feels indifferent to what is affecting the NHE. This is the case, for example, when a subject experiences environmental destruction or animal cruelty without consciously experiencing any emotion. Like the splitting with emotions towards humans, it is a form of psychological protection; – fusion, when the subject self-projects what happens in the NHE. By a mirror effect, they anthropomorphize the NHE. This seems to be the case for some environmental activists who are willing to sacrifice their lives for a

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forest. There is an identification with NHE’s object. For example, we might feel cut up inside to see a century-old tree being cut down. Some people – such as a famous 1960s French star whose name we will not mention – take refuge with animals and consider that they are “more human than humans themselves”. So this attitude is accompanied often simultaneously with a splitting with emotions towards humans. If we are witnessing the implosion of the housing project in which we have lived for 30 years, we could momentarily have the impression that our lives are being destroyed. We would then be in fusion with this element of the NHE at that moment. If we were emotionally affected (for example, sad), while being aware that our life is independent of the tower’s destiny, then we would rather have an attitude of relatedness;   – relatedness with the NHE, when the subject is aware of their material contiguity with the NHE: all their molecular components come from it (the atoms of the human body are renewed regularly), at the atomic level, they are identical with the composition of the stars, and, phylogenetically, humans are derived from animals. In this attitude, the subject feels part of the NHE structurally and functionally and, at the same time, feels different as a human being. They are also aware of their individual singularity. Thus, they feel emotionally affected by what is happening to the NHE while maintaining a cognitive distance. This allows them to have a representation of what happens to this environment, without assimilating it to their own destiny. The model proposed here is based on the hypothesis of the existence of a given quantity of affects per individual and per moment: the affects placed in the NHE are not placed in the human and vice versa, hence the idea of an antagonism between the affects placed in the human and those placed in the NHE. In other words, fusion with objects from one type of environment (human or not) goes hand in hand with splitting from the other environment (Figure 1.4). We have taken some extreme examples (particularly concerning fusion with the NHE): this illustrates that relational tendencies can be found in some subjects, with a pair of attitudes more frequent than the other two. However, each subject is expected to adopt at each moment an attitude along the way between the two pairs of extreme attitudes, such that this attitude may vary from one moment to another. As we have seen, the concepts of value and attitude are both intimately linked to the concept of beliefs. Obviously, beliefs, which are related to

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mental activity, significantly affect the relationship between the mind and the world. It is also a central concept in psychosociology. 1.3.2.3. Modalities of cognition: epistemic dimension of the worldmind relationship “We must always reserve the right to laugh the day after about our ideas of the day before” (quotation attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, authors’ translation). “It is harder to crack prejudice than an atom” (quote attributed to Albert Einstein). “We get angry because we identify with the fear we feel when others do not agree with our point of view” (Finley 2003, p. 169, authors’ translation). Beliefs concern the epistemic dimension of the world-mind relationship. In general, this dimension is related to formal knowledge, or form (cognition). We distinguish three aspects: two levels and a relational modality. 1.3.2.3.1. Three aspects of cognition 1) The first level of cognition is a basic level, and concerns the form itself. It is any content of a representational nature, and mediated by a language, even if it is imagery and symbolism (as in dreams): verbal or imagery mental phenomena (1.3.1.1), beliefs, ideas... Beliefs were initially defined as statements about reality that the individual accepts as true or factual (Bruvold 1973). Today, this concept seems very similar in semantics to that of “conception” in science didactics, although they each refer to different research methodologies. Thus, like values and attitudes (see above), beliefs can be implicit or explicit, context-dependent and influenced by the human environment or not, as evidenced by priming experiments (Myers 2009). We have defined thoughts above as a category of mental phenomena, corresponding to the emergence of verbal language forms in the mind (1.3.1). Through phenomenological grasping, beliefs and thoughts constitute an interpretative filter of reality, which makes up our world. Indeed, thoughts and beliefs, directed towards oneself or towards the outer world, seem intended to analyze, interpret, imagine (projection towards the future), judge, dwell (when it comes to the past), etc. All these cases are projections

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(of a given vision on the real). This language-mediated filter necessarily contains cultural and personal biases, but the grasping prevents the subject from being aware of these biases at the time. This is one of the central processes in the genesis of subjective confusion between relative reality (world) and ultimate reality (the real). We will come back to this later (see also the following example with dogmatism). In fact, the different thought contents are not equivalent in terms of impact on the world. For example, critical thinking includes the testing of information. It can proceed according to the rules of formal logic, justifying, arguing, conceptualizing (Daniel 2016). It is called “constructive” when it is open to a perspective of change, innovation and is part of a dynamic that takes into account oneself, others and the environment (ibid.). On the contrary, negative critical thinking manifests itself with a reluctance to change, a withdrawal into oneself and an instinctive rejection of others (ibid.). It tends to focus on the other’s flaws without examining its own flaws. On the contrary, constructive critical thinking is reflective: taking itself as its object, it aims at self-correction. In this, it also includes forms of the second epistemic level (see subpart 2 below; Forges et al. 2011 ; Slade 2002). Also, thoughts can have a performative character, that is, they can function as self-fulfilling prophecies. EXAMPLE: THE PYGMALION EFFECT.– When these thoughts concern others, this is called the interpersonal expectancy effect in English and more particularly the “Pygmalion effect54” in educational sciences (reviewed by Trouilloud and Sarrazin 2003). Thus, when teachers wrongly believe, following experimental manipulation, that some of their students are gifted and unaware of it, then their results increase (ibid.). A teacher’s attitude towards a student is in fact conditioned by their beliefs about them (Hagège 2017d). So, for example, if a teacher thinks, even secretly, that a student is bad, they will probably behave in a way that will not help the student to progress – despite any goodwill expressed to help them. The student in question, unconsciously feeling the energies of this thought (see section 2.4.3.2.3), may inadvertently internalize it. This “I am rubbish” may discourage them 54 In Greek mythology, Aphrodite gave life to the statue sculpted by Pygmalion, thus allowing him to concretize his love with this form issued from his own mind.

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from making efforts, which will contribute to maintaining their poor performance in school. All situations potentially congruent with this thought (e.g. they fall off their bike, they are scolded) can thus be attentionally magnified, reactivating this thought, which will give the individual the illusion that they were right to think that, since they have just received new proof. Attention is automatically focused on any phenomenon that reinforces a pre-existing belief, which then generates a thought in relation to that belief. Because of the grasping and identification, subjects tend to confuse their belief with reality, as if, in this case, the character of “foolishness” was inherent in their person. They do not always realize that it is somehow their belief that affects their performance, and that by changing this former, they would probably improve this latter. On the other hand, a subject who believes in themselves and does not let themselves become contaminated by the judgments of others may remain “watertight” to them. They will also probably dare to try more new things than a subject who thinks they are a failure. Beliefs therefore shape the subject’s thought-action repertoires. Thus, thoughts guide the shaping of the world (oneself and the environment), even when their verbalization does not leave the psychic intimacy of the thinker. A fortiori, in the case where thoughts are communicated aloud, exchanged or even argued, their impact on the world would be all the greater. We will also note the generalizing, and therefore highly distorting, nature of a thought such as “I am rubbish”. Indeed, we can also consider the modality of information formulation (idea, thought, belief, speech, etc.), more or less dogmatic (Favre and Joly 2001). The most dogmatic is to state general and universal truths, instead of nuancing and contextualizing the assertion (Favre 1998; see more details in the third part of the present section). EXAMPLES.– The same idea expressed: – in a dogmatic way: “Dolilo is rubbish”; – in a less dogmatic way, which explains the awareness of one’s own subjectivity, therefore the relative nature of the idea: “I think that Dolilo is rubbish”;

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– in a more objective way, because it is less projective, less generalizing: “Dolilo did not pass last Tuesday’s test as well as I would have expected from a 4th grade student.” 2) The second level is included in the previous one, and at the same time it is above it: it concerns the thought on form, in other words the metarepresentational. This concerns, for instance, personal epistemology (beliefs about knowledge) and metacognition (understanding one’s own cognitive functioning). Personal epistemology has been defined as “a field of research that focuses on beliefs and theories that individuals develop about knowledge and their acquisition” (Crahay and Fagnant 2007, p. 80, author’s translation). In the laboratory, we have particularly studied epistemic beliefs, that is, beliefs (of science students) about science, teaching and learning. We have been able to demonstrate that students move on average from a naïve, dualist conception where knowledge is either true or false, and held by authoritative figures, to a more sophisticated conception where the validity of knowledge is contextual and where learners can themselves, accompanied by experts, construct their knowledge (Dang 2013). For such a sophisticated epistemology, we will speak here of a contextualist epistemology55, which is opposed to a dualist vision of knowledge56. A constructivist epistemology, based on a theory of complexity (see introduction), is an elaborate form of contextualist epistemology. According to researchers in this field, proponents of development theories, before moving from a dualistic (absolutist) vision to a contextualist epistemology, subjects would go through a multiplicist position, according to which, since there is no absolute, all representations would be equal. After such relativism, they would be more inclined to adopt a contextualist epistemology, that is, to consider that knowledge is constructed, validated and used in a certain context, where it is then more operational than competing knowledge (reviewed in Crahay and Fagnant 2007). Metacognition also refers to an active understanding and regulation of one’s own cognitive processes (Fagnant and Crahay 2010). Like constructive 55 Also called contextual relativism (reviewed in Swaner 2005). 56 The binary conception of a continuum along which a personal epistemology can evolve (e.g. from a naϊve to a sophisticated epistemology) is no longer fashionable in this discipline, but we adopt it here to simplify the topic. Today, the personal epistemology of a subject is rather considered complex, made up of potentially contradictory systems, which emerge according to the context.

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critical thinking, it involves an awareness of the thought and processes used to reason (ibid.; Daniel 2016), as well as a sophistication of personal epistemology (Slade 2002). 3) Finally, let us consider the type of relationship the subject has with these forms (1) or (2): by being more or less attached to or identifying with them. Here, we will distinguish two orthogonal axes: that of dogmatism to cognitive flexibility on the one hand and that of a strong phenomenological grasping to the absence of grasping on the other hand (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5. Modalities of relationships with thoughts and beliefs

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.5.– On the abscissa, is the axis of the phenomenological grasping of thoughts and beliefs, and on the ordinate, the tendency more (dogmatism) or less (cognitive flexibility) of the subject to strongly adhere to an idea, a representation and to identify with it. A, B, C and D refer to four remarkable attitudes. An ordinary subject alternates between A and B (depending on the situations, the fields of knowledge, etc.), while being more or less close to the vertical axis (therefore less or more in grasping) and may have a greater tendency to function in A or B depending on their temperament or the period of their life. Dogmatism and cognitive flexibility refer to two opposing ways in which a subject may relate to their own beliefs, ideas or opinions. Dogmatism was initially defined as a closed cognitive style, associated with the tendency to

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seek robust, true knowledge and to rely on authority (Rokeach 1960). This understanding of dogmatism is close to the notion of the need for closure, which refers to an intolerance to ambiguity or uncertainty (see a desire for predictability), associated with the compulsion to seek and adopt an idea – any idea rather than leaving a question unanswered – and the preference for organization (order, structure; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). This variable is empirically correlated with dogmatism (Brandt and Reyna 2010). On the contrary, cognitive flexibility has been defined as the awareness that in each situation, there are options and alternatives, and the tendency and effectiveness to be flexible and adapt to the situation (Martin et al. 2011). It therefore refers to the ability to easily change one’s mind or representation. It corresponds to a more open cognitive style (or “open thinking” ; Favre 2007, p. 167). Constructive critical thinking requires a certain cognitive flexibility and thus seems antagonistic to dogmatism: inherently dynamic, it easily alternates between closing on one form and opening to another. Moreover, in line with this, we have shown that a naϊve personal epistemology was positively and significantly correlated with dogmatism, while sophisticated vision was, to a lesser extent, correlated with cognitive flexibility (Dang 2013). Thus, if we consider the case of a subject in B (Figure 1.5), they can quickly change their thoughts or beliefs, but each time believe them quite strongly at the moment, because they have a strong grasp of them. It is possible that each time the thought or idea is formulated in a dogmatic or generalizing way. Thoughts and words often take such a form because it is faster to express oneself in a dogmatic way than to contextualize and relativize one’s speech. At the scale of a short period of time, this can be observed within a single train of thought, where contradictory thoughts can follow one another, being formulated as general truths and grasped each time in the moment. For example: “Dolilo is a traitor for not helping me. Oh no, that’s right, I forgot, he had lower back pain. Oh, yes. No, basically, Dolilo is really a nice person...” Thus, it is possible that a subject with high cognitive flexibility may produce dogmatic turns of phrases, while being ready to change the sentence or idea (i.e. without taking the idea for an unchanging truth). This could be the case, for example, for a subject who doubts themselves, their ability to understand and reason, with regard to the ideas they adopt about a given field (but probably not with regard to their ideas about their own disability). In such a case, it is likely that an interlocutor will feel a difference in the energy, in the non-verbal characteristics of expression, between this assertion and the assertion of a

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subject who is more attached to what they say. Thus, whether thoughts and beliefs are long (case A) or short (case B) in terms of time, it would seem that the phenomenological grasp57 of thoughts and beliefs would favor a dogmatic way of thinking or expression. So, dogmatism and the phenomenological grasping of thoughts and conceptions go hand in hand with an identification with mental phenomena, and particularly with verbal thoughts. This is the case where the grasp operates on thoughts, knowing that it can also, on the other hand, concern emotions or perceptions. This attitude functions as the implicit and erroneous belief that the subject’s world is the ultimate reality. A subject may be more or less dogmatic depending on the moment, the situation, their cultural dispositions and conditioning. A coarser dogmatism leads the subject to feel that they exist through their system of thoughts, such that anything that challenges this system can be implicitly perceived and appraised as a personal threat. This corresponds to a generalized feature of a subject in A in Figure 1.5: the subject strongly adheres to an idea, assimilates it to reality and is not ready to change it or relativize it. This is sometimes accompanied by a paranoid tendency. In this case, if such a questioning were to become acute, it would, in principle, generate anger within the subject. Depending on the subject’s temperament, a dogmatic attitude can therefore easily lead to misunderstanding, intolerance or even violence against individuals who do not share the same system of thoughts or beliefs: as the news reported in 2015 and 2016, with the attacks claimed by jihadists, subjects who are probably dogmatic, who murdered individuals in the name of their beliefs. On the contrary, cognitive flexibility indicates a lower potential grasp, or, at a minimum, an increased ability to remove thoughts or beliefs (“to let go of the peanut”, to use the monkey metaphor mentioned in section 1.3.1.2): the potentially lower identification with the mind and beliefs would make the subject more willing to evolve, welcome and tolerate the difference around them. SUMMARY.– Two types of cognitive content are distinguished here: first beliefs, ideas or thoughts that concern the outer or inner world, and reflections, ideas or thoughts aimed at knowledge, learning or beliefs (see metacognition 57 Earlier we mentioned phenomenological grasping in general (i.e. with regard to the seven types of perceptual objects). Here, we therefore focus on the particular case of the grasping of the seven types of perceptual objects, mental phenomena – and, from a psychosociological point of view, on the case of beliefs and ideas.

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and personal epistemology). Secondly, two antagonistic modalities of cognition, dogmatism and cognitive flexibility, are considered. They are generally accompanied by a certain amount of phenomenological grasp, and can sometimes translate into a form of content, respectively corresponding to a more closed and abusively generalizing expression for dogmatism or more open and possibly constructively critical for cognitive flexibility. 1.3.2.3.2. Thought grasping, time inconsistencies and performativity Most of the time, the term “dogmatism” is used when the thoughts and beliefs in question concern the outer world. When thoughts are frequently and strongly grasped by the subject, and when they concern them, two types of cases can be distinguished: – if these thoughts are pejorative, it usually coincides with a psychopathological state. It has been shown that depressed subjects, or those with obsessive-compulsive disorder, have an increased grasp of such thoughts (reviewed by Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000). In addition, they try to remove them, which is counterproductive (ibid.). It is “the ironic effect” of thought suppression, which could be observed in most subjects, including healthy subjects (ibid.); – if the thoughts are laudatory, it may correspond to a euphoric, even maniacal state. This phenomenon is exacerbated in bipolar disorder where subjects present depressive and manic episodes, often alternating: they may sometimes really believe that they and their lives are rubbish, and that they should commit suicide, and sometimes overestimate themselves, believing they have superpowers, or even take themselves, as some do, for Jesus Christ. Far from being anecdotal, this psychiatric disorder of bipolarity is, according to one estimate, the most frequent psychiatric disorder, and thus represents the sixth most frequent cause of disability worldwide, affecting 1.2% of the general population (Mirabel-Sarron et al. 2006). These examples show the pathological and deleterious aspect of the phenomenological grasping of thoughts and beliefs, as well as their prevalence. It is remarkable to note that a subject can believe very strongly in contradictory beliefs alternatively, and take them for true each time. This is made possible by the division of consciousness into stages that are impervious to each other (Figure 1.6).

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Figure 1.6. Discontinuity of subjective consciousness. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.6.– The time scale can be seen fractally: a buffer zone can represent night and the adjacent zone day, or the schema as a whole can be at the scale of a life, a year, a day, a microsecond. A buffer zone is a shadow zone that is completely opaque to consciousness. The principle of this phenomenological model is that the level of consciousness varies. The higher it is, the higher the quantity and quality of perceived information (i.e. the wider the field of consciousness and the lower deformation due to phenomenological grasp), in other words, the more simultaneously the subject is conscious of their inner and outer worlds. This pattern provides an explanation for the subjective impression that “time goes quickly” under certain circumstances (see righthand side of the diagram): the more consciousness is absorbed in a task or distraction (e.g. watching a movie), the lower the level of consciousness (because the field is reduced), therefore, correlatively, the more unconscious there is (b). The archetype is sleep: when you sleep, the night goes by very quickly! On the contrary, when the subject is more conscious (wider and less absorbed consciousness), time seems to pass more slowly (a). This diagram also provides an explanation for the adoption of contradictory behaviors or ideas by a subject in good faith. Because of the illusion of continuity, the subject has the impression of a certain coherence. It is proposed here that periods of consciousness are partitioned in a relatively tight way: being in a period, the subject is no longer aware of the previous ones. Falling short of pathological cases, each subject may encounter this, especially with regard to judgments about oneself, others or life.

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Contradictory thoughts that one believes – that is, those that are grasped – in the moment, can even occur in a single train of thought, a few seconds apart, as mentioned above. The same applies to dogmatism and paranoid tendencies. The extreme cases of psychopathological cases, mentioned here, therefore present in our opinion markedly features that exist to varying degrees in healthy subjects. It seems important to specify that, on the one hand, it is not the fact of having beliefs that is problematic, but it is the importance that is given to them, through phenomenological grasping, identification and their status (possibly of absolute truth). We have all had the idea of hurting someone who hurt us, or killing them (well, haven’t you?). The difference with a murderer is that most subjects do not identify sufficiently with these kinds of thoughts to act. So the problem is the phenomenological grasping. And the stronger it is about laudative thoughts, the stronger it will also be on pejorative thoughts (see bipolarity): it is a matter of functional habit of the mind. On the other hand, for an equal phenomenological grasp, not all beliefs (or thoughts) have the same consequences on the world, as mentioned above. Thus, for example, the belief “I suck and no one else loves me” is probably effective in being depressed and “I am better than everyone else” in being arrogant or condescending. We have just given a partial overview of concepts used to describe the relationship of the relative mind with the world (outer or inner), concepts that characterize what is called here “its inner world”, and that explain subjective preferences and biased perceptions. Now, we need to focus on a notion that has already appeared several times, and which seems central to understanding these processes: the notion of emotions. 1.3.2.4. And the emotions in all this: a driving force of the subjective shaping of the world by the individual mind 1.3.2.4.1. Emotions, body and energy What are emotions? Although everyone may feel they know what they are, there does not seem to be an agreed definition (Brouillet 2008). They have been defined, for example, as “biologically-based processes that facilitate rapid decision-making and adaptive behavior by influencing (among other things) cognitive processes, and at times even by-passing them” (Chambers et al. 2009, p. 565) or as “a set of interrelated changes in the body in response to a real or imagined situation or stimulus” (Braboszcz et al. 2010, p. 1917). They “are experienced as feelings and may interrupt

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ongoing behavior or mental processes in the form of an urge to engage in action (e.g. flight for fear, outburst for anger, depending on the emotion felt” (ibid.). They mobilize subcortical brain areas, especially when information processing is automatic, and also sometimes cortical (Vermeulen 2013). They clearly have a somatic component, partly unconscious (visceral, muscular and hormonal)58 and their neuro-vegetative manifestations are very varied (Fraisse 2015). They correspond to particular facial expressions, stereotyped according to cultures (ibid.). For example, contempt is associated with literate cultures (Cottraux 2007a). However, there would be an innate neurological wiring for the “basic emotions” (joy, fear, sadness, anger and disgust), or “primary emotions”, which seem transcultural (ibid., p. 10). Many agree that they have adaptive and communicative functions (Brouillet 2008), although others define them as a behavioral adaptation disorder (Fraisse 2015). Some authors suggest that they have a role in motivation, in coordinating response systems, in reasoning and decisionmaking (Bechara et al. 1997; Brouillet 2008; Chambers et al. 2009). It is important to note that emotions correspond to bodily sensations (sixth type of perception objects, see interoception, section 1.3.1.1.1). As far as the process is concerned, there appear to be bi-directional links between perceptual and motor systems, where emotional appraisal would be an automatic and unconscious intermediary (Brouillet 2008). Body reactions and appraisals can trigger emotional processes (ibid.). “Emotion appears when the demands of the situation are disproportionate to the subject’s possibilities, i.e. when there is a gap between their perceptual and cognitive expectations and their repertoire of available responses. Everything then happens as if unused energy was diffused throughout the body, disturbing both organic regulations and the ideation as well as the life of relation” (Fraisse 2015, author’s translation). Thus emotion can be considered as an energy that “needs” to unfold through the body. For example, anger is often accompanied by the need to move one’s limbs abruptly (by hitting something, for example), fear by tightness in the limbs, and sadness the release of tears and facial movements. To paraphrase the beginning of Fraisse’s last quotation, we would say in our vocabulary that emotion appears when there is a significant gap for the subject between the immediate real and their projections (or expectations). In general, emotion is assessed positively 58 It is interesting to note that in Chinese psychoenergetics and Tibetan medicine, each basic emotion is linked to an endocrine gland (whose physiological function is to secrete hormones) and an organ.

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if this lag is appraised as beneficial by the subject and negative in the opposite case. Also, most of the time, the subject does not perceive this discrepancy, because it is not significant for them, but at certain moments it does become so. We will link this later to the feeling of separation. 1.3.2.4.2. Emotions, mind and action “People will say they ‘devour’ newspapers and stick their ears to the radio [...] in order to keep up with what is happening in the world, but that is pure illusion. The truth is that as soon as these poor people are not active, busy, they become aware of [what] is inside them. No matter, to tell the truth, from which breast they are suckling, the most important thing for them is to avoid coming face to face with themselves” (Miller 2006, p. 11, author’s translation). Are emotions related to our behaviors? If so, how? It seems that very often, attention is exogenous (attracted by an unexpected stimulus; see the caption of Figure 1.2) and instantiates itself in “attentional gestures”59 often driven by a search for distraction, occupation of the mind (Depraz 2014): fleeing boredom, we would constantly be busy. Once the attention is focused on a phenomenon, the lived experience is compared to the expected or desired experience (the purpose, well-being, comfort, pleasure, etc.), the gap between these two experiences is appraised, which makes it possible to classify the phenomenon as “I want” or “I do not want” (appraisal process) and co-generates more or less conscious thoughts and emotions, which leads to action. In case of “I do not want”, this action aims to reduce the gap (close the window if there is a noise outside assessed as annoying or eat a cookie in case of a craving sensation; see below for coping strategies). In the case of “I want”, the aim of the action is to try to preserve the status quo (for example, to continue to watch a phenomenon considered pleasant, or to eat more than necessary if you are greedy, sitting at a table convivially before good food, and if there are strawberry tartlets for dessert). This action is underpinned by an intention and is therefore based on endogenous attention. After that (and often during60), attention automatically 59 This terminology refers to a concept of attention such as “the tangible and relational body lived” (Depraz 2014, p. 78, author’s translation). 60 Even when attention is initially endogenous, it is often grasped in some other object along the way (usually a train of thought, called a “mind wandering episode”; Braboszcz et al.

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turns to another phenomenon. This mode of functioning is called here “unconcious mental”, because it involves mental phenomena (comparison with the past, with an imagined or implicitly expected situation, etc.), usually unconsciously. This is probably the most common mode of operation in the West (Hagège 2013). The subject’s attention is often tossed around by circumstances and most subjects are not aware of these fluctuations in attention at the time (Braboszcz et al. 2010). What determines the intensity and nature of the emotion? “The memory of emotional experiences is at stake in the specification of emotions felt, but also the cognitive appraisal of the possible consequences of the present situation” (Brouillet 2008, p. 29, author’s translation). Thus, in ordinary functioning (i.e. the individual relative mind), there is a loop between thoughts and emotions in the face of an emotion-generating situation, and a coloration of the present experience according to past experiences. Yet, in general, the subject attributes an external cause to the emotion, a cause that would be part of their outer world. This outsourcing allocation is the very principle of projection. EXAMPLE.– If anger rises following a punctured tire, the subject, in the moment, absorbed by anger (see the phenomenological grasp and magnification of attention; “I do not want”) attributes their anger to the puncture of the tire, a situation they appraise as negative for them. However, another subject, sat in the very same place, would perhaps laugh at the situation, or be saddened by it. Thus, unlike ordinary subjective perception, emotion, in its nature and intensity, is not inherent in the situation. The situation is only a trigger, an elicitor of an already present trend (dispositional factor). When a situation is perceived as aversive, the subject uses a coping strategy (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013), consciously or not. There are many types of them, and a synthesis of the work of the last two decades in this field has made it possible to establish a typology (ibid.). These different strategies are not all exclusive. Emotions appraised as negative often evoke strategies of avoidance or unproductive reaction (reviewed by Chambers et al. 2009). The 2010). That’s how you get up to get something and when you get there you forget what you came for, or eat a cookie without realizing and then you can't remember if you ate it or not. The awareness of this attention grabbing only comes after the fact; it is what is called “metaconsciousness” (ibid.).

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latter are forms of escape or struggle with emotion (Box 1.6; Table 1.1). In the event of an escape (i.e. avoidance) of the emotion, attention is automatically focused on something other than the emotion itself. This has the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the emotion (ibid.), which will then reappear later, being strongly grasped. Let us compare emotion to a wild animal in a cage, that is, to an energy that needs to be released. Most subjects let their attention be grasped, especially by their reactive thoughts. This prevents the emotions from being felt (Figure 1.7). Thus, most distractions or escapes, among others social networks, reality TV, tobacco, outings, etc., particularly pervasive in our society overwhelmed by new communication technologies (Citton 2014)61, can be considered as emotion avoidance strategies (Table 1.1). It is as if, when in front of a wild animal in a cage asking to leave (similar to the emotion considered negative), a common reaction was to move away from the cage to do something else and distract oneself (escape) from that emotion unconsciously labelled as unpleasant – just pretend it was not there. Note that another common reaction is to hit the animal on the head to knock it out (struggle). The animal stays there and may become more aggressive; it will roar again as soon as it has the opportunity.

Type of coping strategy

Attitude towards the situation

Cognitive confrontation

+/- Consideration, reception, regulation*

Attitude towards emotion

Box 1.6. Metaphor illustrating the common attitude of fight or flight with regard to emotions that are assessed as negative

Type of strategy

Description of the strategy

Mental planning

Consideration and appraisal of possible alternatives to deal with the situation, setting intermediate goals, setting priorities, planning actions to be taken.

Mental rehearsal

Detailed anticipation of the course of the event (e.g. imagining what I would say to my boss to explain my mistake).

61 Moreover, in my opinion, subjects’ knowledge of their own functioning also requires media education, which raises awareness of the way in which most mass media (particularly through advertising) condition certain behaviors, manipulate and create dependencies.

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Seeking information by recalling similar events Search for and how you/others have dealt with them in the information past, to choose the best strategy. Attempt to reduce negative effects through (1) Cognitive focusing on the positive aspects and/or potential reinterpretation gains inherent in the situation, (2) reassessing (reappraisal) one’s ability to cope with them, and/or (3) relativizing the importance of the problem.

Behavioral avoidance (flight) Unproductive cognitive reaction (fight)

Rejection (“I do not want”)

Ignorance (“I do not care”   and “ I do not see”)

Cognitive avoidance (escape)

Behavioral confrontation

Acceptance

Accommodation of cognitive structures to the reality of the situation.

Attempt to act on the NHE (to neutralize the Actions in stressor if they are non-human) or the HE regards to the (negotiation to resolve a conflict) to modify the environment situation. Search for help

Search for material help (jack to change a wheel), informational help (on the procedure to change the wheel) or emotional help (comfort).

Mental distraction

Grasping of attention in mental phenomena unrelated to the stressful situation.

Denial

Attempts to ignore the existence of the stressor, its severity and/or potential consequences.

Avoidance

Avoid or delay physical confrontation with the stressor (not going to an exam or postponing it).

Physical distraction

Engagement in an alternative hedonistic activity that distracts from the stressor (watching television, going out, sleeping, eating, smoking, etc.)

Behaviors aimed at emotional avoidance

Consumption or even abuse of substances that alter consciousness (psychotropic drugs, alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, etc.).

Rumination Letting one’s own attention be grasped by (example 1: obsessive negative thoughts that focus on the “It’s always negative aspects of the situation or emotions. me”)

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Catastrophizing (example 2: Attention captured by thoughts that envisage the “I’ll never worst possible outcome to the situation. make it”)

Unproductive behavioral reaction (fight)

Guilt-tripping Capturing attention with thoughts that blame the (example 3: subject for the occurrence of the problem or for “I am their inability to cope with it. rubbish...”) Rigidity

Persistence in trying to implement a solution despite its chronic ineffectiveness in the situation.

Assignment of Thoughts or behaviors that blame others for the responsibility problem and/or their inability to solve it. to others Physical aggression

Actions aimed at solving a problem through violence and/or self-harm.

*Strategies for confronting the situation can go hand in hand with conscious reception and regulation of emotions, but also with their avoidance... this depends in particular on the subject’s functional habits and their knowledge of these processes. Table 1.1. Typology of coping strategies with stressful situations

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.1.– This table is reproduced from Table 5.3 by Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013, pp. 159–160, author’s translation), with slight adaptations and the addition of the first column (attitude towards emotions). The acceptance strategy (cognitive confrontation) is particularly well adapted to situations where stressors are not controllable by the subject (ibid.). Confrontational strategies mobilize energy at the time, but often prove to be functional in the short, medium and long term (ibid.). Most of them are probably conscious. Avoidance strategies may appear effective in the short term because they relay emotion to the unconscious level, but they can be very harmful in the medium and long term (ibid.; see text). Unproductive reaction strategies are dysfunctional in the short and long term (ibid.). With regard to the two latter types of strategy, and despite the usual term “strategy”, the subject is not necessarily aware that (1) they feel an emotion considered negative, (2) they are implementing this “strategy” and (3) they are doing so in response to the emotion evaluated as negative. Note: unproductive cognitive reactions are characterized by high cognitive distortion (examples 1, 2, 3).

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Figure 1.7. Negative effect of the chain reaction involving appraisal, thoughts and emotions in response to a situation

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.7.– A) Depending on whether the object of attention corresponds to physical phenomena present in the individual’s external environment, to interoceptive sensations or to mental phenomena, the subject’s field of consciousness is occupied by a reality that is increasingly distant from reality “exterior” to the individual, but also from the objective outer world (rising arrow). In a way, they are therefore increasingly cut off from “shared” reality (and therefore from others in particular). B) When the subject encounters a significant situation for them (according to their past, their personality, their culture, etc.), reactive thoughts and emotions arise, and this all the more intensely if the situation is significant. This generates a loop (1-2-3) that amplifies this cognitive-emotional reaction. C) When emotion is assessed as positive, the reaction generally tends to want to maintain the status quo (e.g. stay as long as possible in a place or with the person we like). There is a form of attachment to the situation, mentally and implicitly labelled as positive. Thoughts generally revolve around strategies to prolong the situation or the apprehension of its future end, which can generate emotions felt as negative. The short-term harmful effect corresponds to the tensions generated in the body and mind by these closures (see testimony in section 1.4.1). The long-term effect consists of reinforcing the habit, the tendency of the mind towards grasping phenomena. D) When emotions considered unpleasant elicit negative reactive thoughts (rising arrow) and attention is focused more on the latter than on the emotional experience, an attempt to avoid thoughts and emotions can have perverse effects. There may be mental rumination, such that the mind strongly grasps thoughts, while the

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consciousness is not present at the bodily feelings of emotions. We can therefore explain what we have mentioned above about the grasping of thoughts (and dogmatism): it seems mainly due to the unconscious refusal to live an underlying emotional experience (examples below). If the subject avoids negative emotion (by engaging in hedonistic activity, for example), then this type of system will only be postponed (Figure 1.8). “YOGURT” EXAMPLE.– Let’s consider a fictional situation: a child, while eating a yogurt, sees a dispute break out between his parents. He tries to communicate with his parents about one of his needs, but they send him to his room so he doesn’t have to watch the argument. He experiences this internally as rejection. But he unconsciously appraises this emotion as too painful for him, so instead of bursting into tears, for example, he plays a video game, which distracts him from his emotion. It is an automatic “protection” mechanism that buries the energy associated with emotion in the subject’s body. It thus constituted an emotional engram. At the phenomenological level, what happens at that moment is a reduction in the field of consciousness: attention is automatically focused on some form of distraction object (in this case, the video game). So, as soon as he was born, the wild animal was imprisoned within the child, and the child does not know about it: for “protection”, here is a new chain at his feet. He grows up with that caged animal inside him. As an adult, he happens not to like yogurts and is addicted to video games. Subtle phenomena can occur in the mind such as: the subject in question walks down the street, sees a billboard with a photo of yogurt on it, then he subconsciously feels a little sad without knowing why and will think reactively “Oh no, I don’t want to go out, I would prefer to go home and finish my video game”, which he will do that night instead of meeting friends. The emotional engram was reactivated by the billboard. The subject will have the impression of acting on the basis of free will, whereas his choice is only the automatic consequence of the unconscious repression of his emotion. This example highlights how our “I want” and “I do not want” have been structured to avoid experiencing emotions and continue to do so. “SWIMMING POOL” EXAMPLE.– This second example is the testimony of a student following the MBER module62, following a session aimed at 62 MBER stands for Meditation-Based Ego Reduction. I created this module based on the MBSR program (see section 3.2.2). It was first taught as an option in general culture at the University of Montpellier (from 2012 to 2018). It consists of an application of the principles of education for responsibility presented here. More than 300 students have been trained there. Its content will be presented in my next book, to be published by ISTE.

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integrating the emotion of a lived situation (of his choice, but “slightly unpleasant”): “For my part, I chose my feeling of laziness when it comes to going to the swimming pool [...]. From there, I explored this feeling by focusing on the sensations of water on my skin, the freshness of the water, the bubbles tickling my skin, but the more I concentrated, the more I saw memories related to swimming reappearing from my past, from the simple inconvenience of cold water, to the fact that in my childhood I could not have had friends in swimming because I was outclassed among the older ones, and, while those of my age were playing, I had to train very hard. Then came the even stronger memory of my near drowning five years ago when, because of an asthma attack, I found myself unable to breathe and to get out of the water, gently flowing into the cold of this icy water. Then, after that experience, I saw something much longer ago, when I was three or four years old, when I was first swimming, when I was thrown into the water, and the times that followed, when I was afraid of that big blue pool that looked so cold. So, after this meditation, I understood that this laziness came rather from a childhood trauma, but that, to protect myself, I had buried all this, whereas swimming is something that, despite everything, I like. As a result, after this experience, I felt lighter, as if a chain had been removed from me that passed through my insides. It was a hard and intense experience, but it was extremely beneficial for me, and to understand things about me that I didn’t suspect.” Thus, giving credit – magnified attention – to the thought “I feel too lazy to go to the pool” led this subject to remain unconscious of the underlying emotional engrams and not to confront himself with the emotion in trying to avoid the pool, although this activity corresponds to his values. His testimony also shows the often “multi-layered” character of emotional engrams: their vibrations attract us in similar situations which, lived unconsciously, add layers to the pre-existing engram. The grasping of emotion results in a narrowing of the field of consciousness, and of the “thought-action repertoire”: the tendencies to act in a certain way are created or reinforced (Chambers et al. 2009; Figure 1.3). Influenced by a limited attentional focus, and altered cognitive performance, the subject identifies with the disruptive emotion and then reinforces it (ibid.). Indeed, pushing back or fighting an emotion is similar to pushing a balloon underwater: the harder you push it away, the more vigorously it will reappear out of the water (Box 1.6). The same is true for a repressed thought (Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000). Avoiding emotion through thoughts is therefore a vicious circle (Figure 1.7). This inhibition of emotional expression (escape or struggle), which is generally automatic and

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unconscious, therefore has many negative effects: attention focused on thoughts, to the detriment of the conscious experience of emotion, is characteristic of pathologies such as depression (ibid.). Some authors even believe that these processes are the primary cause of psychopathology (ibid.). On the other hand, the more courageous confrontation strategies (Table 1.1) allow a distance to be taken from the situation and therefore potentially a lesser grasp of the emotion. They thus decrease the intensity of the emotional experience, while giving meaning to the present experience, according to values and goals, and are therefore generally beneficial (except when they generate inflexible or unrealistic reassessments; Chambers et al. 2009). Such a decrease is called “regulation” of emotion for the purposes of this book (Figure 1.8, see testimonies below). TESTIMONIALS.– Two students from the MBER module testify to their use of an emotion regulation technique (called “three breaths”): “Sometimes I felt anxious or stressed and practiced all three breaths, I immediately felt a soothing, relieving and even energizing effect. It is as if all negative thoughts have been transformed into energy.” “When I was stressed, I decided to apply the ‘three breaths’ method and focus on the unpleasant sensation caused by stress [(confrontation); author’s italicization]. I felt my heartbeat slowing down, that I was calming down.”

*When emotion is integrated, attention is more diffuse, so there is no distance from the real (the third perceptual modality is at stake here). Figure 1.8. Attitudes towards the emotions assessed as negative and their effects. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

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COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.8.– The same diagrams can be made for emotions that are usually appraised positively (except that in B it would not be a question of struggle, but of identification). A) The trigger of emotion (below) can be among the seven types of objects: for example, a significant situation for the subject, physical pain or the recollection of an event, perceived respectively by the five senses, the interoception or mental phenomena. The birth of emotion will manifest itself through bodily sensations (6th type of perceptual object) then give birth to reactive thoughts in cases B and C, and to direct knowledge in D. Notes for B, C and D: (1) the t0, t1, etc. only indicate a chronology, not a relative duration (i.e. all the phenomena in B is not necessarily longer than the sequence of D) and the numbers refer to those present on the arrows; (2) the size of the red ball represents the quantity of energy related to the emotion, and when it is “grayed out”, at the bottom, this shows its unconscious, metastable (dormant) character. B) In the case of combatting a negative emotion, grasping contributes to engraming (step 6 in Figure 1.3), which reinforces the size of the emotional memory trace (at t6). Emotional avoidance almost has the same effect (direct change from t0 to t6). Also, a completely unconscious emotion similarly generates reactive thoughts, except that the latter do not explicitly take into account the underlying emotion. C) Emotional regulation consists of defusing the cognitive-emotional loops that amplify emotion (example of a method: welcoming emotion, focusing on one’s bodyily sensations, on one’s breathing, etc.). It does not act at the source of the emotion, so an engram of reactive emotion remains in the body. However, repeated regulation of a given type of emotional engram can reduce its volume. D) The integration of emotion implies letting the energy of emotion flow through your body without intervention (without evaluating, grasping, fighting...) and being in a conscious sensory mode (see section 2.3.2 and the “swimming pool” example). Then its energy is transformed, without leaving any residual trace as a reactive emotion. If we take the typology of the different offset levels of mental phenomena with the real (section 1.3.1.1.2), we can compare the phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1.7 with that of inflammation. During an infection, the body normally reacts with a chain reaction that quickly activates the immune system locally – this is inflammation. On the basis of perceived phenomena and the corresponding infraverbal mental phenomena, thoughts are generated to supposedly cope with the situation. It is a kind of inflammation that has a protective purpose. However, if it generates significant stress or ruminations, then it becomes like an autoimmune reaction: fierce thoughts that reinforce

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emotions that are unpleasant. These thoughts, disconnected from the real, constitute a kind of speculative bubble that takes up all the space in the mind. If this phenomenon is very strong in intensity or very long in duration, it can cause an acute delirium or depression respectively. It is like a gangrene of the mind; it has a morbid character, which depends on the grasping of thoughts. This tendency of thoughts to form gangrene can be explained: among all phenomena, attention generally tends to focus on those who confirm thoughts or beliefs. Now, since thoughts are often performative (see section 1.3.2.3.1), this further reinforces the snowball effect. The psychopathological model on which acceptance and engagement therapies are based postulates that most of our difficulties come from our grasp of thoughts and the resulting avoidance of emotion and situation strategy, sometimes moving us away from goals that correspond to our conscious values (Blackledge and Hayes 2001; “swimming pool” example). On the contrary, living the emotion without identifying with it, without grasping it (Figure 1.8C), or even evaluating it (Figure 1.8D) respectively blurs or stops the vicious circles linked to this emotion. This decrease in the grasping of emotion may require a change in its appraisal: following appropriate learning, it will be considered tolerable instead of negative (or unbearable) so it will still be appraised, but less negatively. Here are the testimonies of two students following the MBER module who illustrate this. TESTIMONY 1.– “I would say that I feel good, I recognize my suffering, I don’t try to make it disappear”. “I realized that some events are neither happy nor sad, they are just there, you have to accept them. I find that no longer judging life events has also helped me to stop judging others. My relationship with humans has evolved and I find it better to listen to a person without judging or cutting them off”. More generally, learning cognitive defusion, that is, stopping the grasp of thoughts, is one of the foundations of acceptance and engagement therapies (Blackledge and Hayes 2001). This method is used in various potentially psychopathological disorders (such as phobias or addictions) precisely to regulate emotions (ibid.). This notion of cognitive defusion is included in the notion of decentering, which concerns not only thoughts, but also emotions. Decentering consists of looking at these phenomena (thoughts and emotions) as transitional and objective events, accepting them as they are, without judging them (Fresco et al. 2007), grasping them, rejecting them, or being unconscious of them – that is, without being in the “I want”, “I do not want”

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or “I do not see” in regards to them. It is a question of not identifying with them and not taking them for reality in some way: of living them without “for-me-ness”, that is, without the implicit notion of “It is me who thinks that, who feels that”, without innuendo of the type “I am this thought, this emotion”. Training to function in conscious sensory mode allows us to learn to cultivate cognitive defusion and decentering (Shapiro et al. 2006) and, ultimately, to reduce the amount of reactive thinking (through the integration of emotions; Figure 1.8D; Box 1.7). Below, two MBER students testify to such training, involving performing a daily activity in a conscious sensory mode. TESTIMONIES 2.– “At first [...] I couldn’t sustain my action (brushing my teeth, walking the dog, [...]) [in conscious sensory mode]. Indeed, my thoughts were constantly putting me back on autopilot and at the end of the exercise I didn’t remember how exactly I had completed the action. Then, as the practices progressed, I first identified the thoughts that made me go on autopilot, but also those that came back most often. Currently, I manage to remain conscious of my actions during the exercises and experience new aspects (tastes, sensations, textures, smells, etc.)”. “My exercise [in conscious sensory mode] was to walk in the street: each time I moved, I tried to focus on myself, how I walked, how fast I moved, but also the smells, sounds, and finally even the other people I met on the street. I very quickly noticed that the people I met were, like me before, ‘absent’, [...] and in the end, during this exercise, I understood the importance of being present during our activities, I understood the strength of the autopilot that makes us walk [...] without seeing anyone while every day I meet hundreds of people”. At first, there was a visceral fear of being eaten alive by emotion… as if it were “her or me”. As if I would disappear, be swallowed up by the twists and turns of suffering from beyond the grave. As if she were morbidity incarnate. And then, with the welcoming, with the abandonment of the ego to life, the consciousness can embrace the being in its every nook and cranny. She can let herself be penetrated by everything that emanates from the being, without labelling the experience as happiness or suffering. And then emotion is transformed into orgasm. A kind of cosmic climax where the mind vibrates in unison with what there is. And there, in the here and now, the individual’s atoms find themselves connected, tuned to the cosmos, while the “I” opens up to the entire universe. Box 1.7. Integration of emotions

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In conclusion, the role of thoughts in avoidance or unproductive reaction strategies is to prevent the mind from being consciously present to emotions (its own and others), especially since most of the time, due to phenomenological grasping, emotions, thoughts and the implementation of coping strategies are not fully conscious. This is therefore part of splitting with emotions (section 1.3.2.2). Where do these emotions come from, all these caged animals? From emotional wounds from the past63 that were not consciously experienced or integrated: they were each like a wild animal encapsulated by our unconscious immediately after birth to “protect” our consciousness. Such a reflex presents the biological relevance of an evolutionary advantage: it favored the psychological survival of our Cro-magnon ancestors, allowing them to better devote themselves to their physical survival in a hostile environment. Nevertheless, this mechanism is counterproductive in terms of ethics and happiness (see section 4.3). Indeed, at the time the cage was formed, it was necessary for the subject insofar as they had not learned to experience their emotions consciously and without a grasp: the consciousness was thus protected from emotions that would then have been too disturbing for them. However, then the child has grown up, and once they are an adult, they may have acquired the psychological means to cope with these emotions: they then carry cages inside them that will limit their scope of possible actions and are no longer necessary. Instead of protecting them, they hinder them. It’s time for the individual to free these animals that only ask for that! (see examples “yogurt” and “swimming pool”, above). Because each event that unconsciously revives a feeling of past separation automatically triggers the implementation of a thought-action repertoire that distracts the subject from their inner world and focuses their attention on the outer world, through the mobilization of their reactive thoughts. Thus, ordinary subjects carry within them multitudes of caged animals and act in their world to avoid being confronted with these emotions. They thus reproduce inappropriate patterns and reinforce egotistical engrams without their knowledge (Figures 1.3 and 1.8B; examples “yogurt” and “swimming pool”).

63 According to Bourbeau (2013), the childhood wounds that structure us are of five types: betrayal, abandonment, injustice, humiliation and rejection. They all correspond to a specific way of experiencing a separation (from a person, a situation, an idea, etc.).

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Let us consider the very frequent case of an ordinary subject perceiving an emotion that they label as unpleasant. As long as there is this labelling and the corresponding sensations are therefore assimilated to suffering, the subject is generally reluctant to experience these emotions consciously. The subject would have the impression that they were delivering their own conscience with food for emotions, as if these latter would be devouring, making the subject disappear. A great fear is there: it is easier to run away, to bury your head in the sand. Let us compare this emotion, these feelings, to a child in distress knocking on the door. Our ordinary attitude is to look through the peephole and not open the door. If you have not been vigilant (if you are tired, for example), then you open the door without looking first (you start to feel sad, for example, without knowing why). Our reflex is usually to slam the door in the child’s face... “I’m not having that in my house!... I’m going to watch TV [or smoke a cigarette or something] instead”. Imagine how the poor child feels after the door is slammed door in their face. Their condition will get worse and they will come knocking on the door again as soon as they have the opportunity, because they are only waiting for one thing. Releasing the animal in a cage (the emotional engram) consists of letting the child go home, spending time with them, the necessary time and taking them in your arms. By practicing this, we will realize that the initial labelling of emotion as negative and undesirable is purely subjective and optional (testimonies above). And we will thus be more and more capable of welcoming the child in an adequate way, that is without identifying with them (the “none of that in my house” being in fact “I do not want to be like that”), without appraisal (i.e. without saying “it is negative”, “I do not want that”): in a purely sensory conscious mode. Therefore, if we manage to take the child in our arms in an adequate way (with equanimity, without a phenomenological grasp – therefore with decentration64), then they are instantly transformed into a free child and will never come knocking on the door again: their energy will have been transformed into joy and wisdom. It would therefore be useful to understand that it is in fact the emotion that is delivered as food to the consciousness, and not the other way around: the suffering aspect of the emotion (linked to the ego) is instantly dissolved in the consciousness of the present moment (Figure 1.8D). The art of this integration of emotions is within everyone’s reach, and methods of learning it are a topic of my next book65. Box 1.8. Delivering emotions to feed your consciousness

64 The ego would like to grasp only what it appraises positively and not what it appraises negatively... However, such a thing is not possible (and it is even by making us believe that it is possible that it is holding us by the nose). Grasping is a functional habit of the mind: if it occurs with what is positively assessed, it will automatically occur with what is negatively assessed. That’s why the required training involves not grasping anything. 65 See note 62 in this chapter.

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1.3.2.4.3. Distinction between emotion or reactive thoughts on the one hand and harmonious emotions or creative thoughts on the other This idea of the “imprisoned” emotions in the body, and which limit us in this way, is the foundation of different types of therapies, which have given rise to different bodily techniques. To release old emotions, these techniques generally involve movement: (1) uncontrolled, like in the regenerative movement (Katsugen Undo), (2) caused by a third party, like in therapeutic massages, or (3) autonomous, like in the cuirasses/breastplates release method© (Côté 2005). This consideration leads us to make a qualitative distinction between two types of emotions and thoughts. Indeed, the purpose of these therapies is not to become apathetic, insensitive like a robot, to free oneself from all forms of emotion, but only from the old repressed emotions of the past: those that hinder us and generate thought-action repertoires that are often ill-adapted to present situations. It is these emotions that we have mainly discussed so far. They also include what is commonly referred to as “neuroses”, concerned with the discrepancies between appraisal and behavior (see steps 5 to 7 in Figure 1.3). All these imprints, these engrams, linked to thought-action repertoires, are part of the unconscious next to system 1 (Figure 1.1). The associated thoughts (verbal or pictorial undertones) have the function of escaping these emotions. As argued above, they correspond to the reminiscence of old patterns in reaction to a present that resonates in a more or less distant way with this undigested past. We will therefore call these emotions and thoughts “reactive”. These thoughts, often verbal, are like a horde of capricious children (“I’m hungry”; “I want that”), rebels (“what an idiot, I want to hit them”), the police (“my work must be impeccable” ; “you must succeed”), judges (“it’s wrong to do that”; “Hmm! You should be ashamed of doing that”), etc. who sometimes converse together. Theoretical practitioners have translated them into different psychoanalytical categories, for example into different types of parents, adults and children in the theory of transactional analysis (De Lassus 2013). These voices want to command and dictate the conduct of the body, control the mind, frighten, help, etc. when they are like wind whose only function is to prevent the subject from hearing the emotion of their inner child knocking at the door at that moment. In other words, we find here Orthos, Cerberus’ brother: he is a two-headed dog, one is the reactive mind and the other the reactive emotions... this dog always walks around with his two heads! On the other hand, if you let one wither, then the other will follow.

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On the contrary, some emotions have nothing to do with the past, nor with the ego, and everything to do with the present, whether it is inside or outside: when, for example, we are touched by the beauty of a landscape. A subject may be moved towards others or the environment in what we would call a harmonious way, or they may be moved by it in a reactive way. In the latter case, the present emotion actually resonates with a past emotion, and is marked by identification with the phenomenon. This corresponds to the distinction made above (section 1.3.2.2) between empathy or relatedness (mobilizing harmonious emotion) and fusion or splitting with emotions (involving reactive emotion felt or repressed respectively). If the emotion is harmonious, then it leaves no memory trace, because there is no grasping or engramming (Figure 1.3). It is somehow directly integrated (rather than being pushed back, grasped or regulated; Figure 1.8). In addition, thoughts (verbal or not) that are not related to the subject’s past or neuroses are referred to here as “creative”. More clearly, we will say that these thoughts are not related to the subject’s ego. They do not necessarily accompany a harmonious emotion. When they emerge in the mind, they do not necessarily concern either a physical data of reality perceptible by the subject’s five senses. They may be verbal or non-verbal: they use the second or third perceptual modality (section 1.3.1.1). They too have the property of being harmonious (section 2.4.3). If they contain a great idea, this idea will be beneficial to people. On the other hand, if an idea seems brilliant and “creative” and it turns out to have harmful applications (such as the idea of nuclear fission for example), this disharmonious aspect indicates in this model that it was tainted by engramings of the subject’s ego who had it. Probably because the subject’s intentions to undertake their activity were themselves marked by egotistical motivations. In short, freeing oneself from reactive emotions and thoughts, the pillars of the illusion of the ego, does not imply becoming insensitive. On the contrary, without these distorting filters, phenomena are perceived with greater intensity – harmonious emotions too – and are further shared. 1.4. Integrating the model of the relationship between the relative world and the mind In the previous section, after having laid down the basic mechanisms (perception, projection, phenomenological grasping and identification;

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section 1.3.1), we presented the four horsemen with which the mind shapes the world (section 1.3.2): orientation (attention, appraisal, values), relationship, cognition and emotions. Before integrating all these elements into a global model, we would like to set some metaphysical milestones. 1.4.1. Metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet “Metaphysical” etymologically means “what is above matter”. You may have already heard about metaphysical systems in other cultures. For example, according to Aristotle or Tibetan Buddhism, the world is composed of five elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether or space, respectively). It is the same according to Taoist thought too, but the elements are earth, water, fire, wood and metal. These elements have a symbolic dimension, such that combined in certain proportions in each phenomenon, they determine their physical (and even emotional) properties with regard to the human being in Tibetan Buddhism and Taoism. Thus, in a ceramic pot, the earth element dominates, even if the other four are present: water gives form, fire gives cooking and therefore the change of the state of the earth, air provides the movement that has changed the shape and space the tangibility. Similarly, in what we call water, the water element dominates, even if the other four are present. So, what are our own Western metaphysics? Has science lifted our heads out of this dimension? This is what many scientists seem to think, advocating a materialism that is in fact... metaphysics! To say that everything is in fine reducible to matter (a posture called “reductionist physicalism”) is indeed a metaphysical posture. It is to affirm that the metaphysical nature of reality is matter. To deduce that metaphysics has no right of citizenship would therefore be blindness (or worse, bad faith). As Miquel (2011) expresses it, postulating the causal closure of the physical world requires positioning oneself outside the physical system... in other words, in a metaphysical dimension. Any symbolic or knowledge-based system is necessarily based on metaphysics, implicit or explicit. What I argue elsewhere (in a forthcoming book) is that the metaphysics of biology is based on the notions of matter, energy and information. In other words, these three categories play the same role in our countries as the five elements in Chinese, Aristotelian or Tibetan thought, even if the term “element” is less appropriate for the former. It means that our Western

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contemporary metaphysics would incline us to explain that in a ceramic pot, there is matter (clay, made of atoms), energy (that which is present in the bonds between the clay atoms and which partly comes from the heat of the oven used to cook the pot) and information (macroscopically the specific nature of the clay and the general shape of the pot and microscopically the nature of the atoms and their relative spatial positions). And I also postulate that this metaphysics is widely shared in our society, mostly unconsciously. In other words, there is a confusion between the objective world and the ultimate reality, an illusion that the relative view is absolute: most biologists probably have the impression that “in life, there is matter, energy and information”. Instead of perceiving this way of thinking as a partially culturally-biased metaphysics, there is a real lack of awareness that these categories do not constitute the real. Such a process of blindness towards the hardening of notions has been described in the epistemological literature. In this regard, T.-S. Kuhn (1962/2008) referred to the formatting of a paradigm to express this adherence to a worldview in scientific studies, while Fourez (2002) shows the similarities of this process with that of brainwashing. That is, in particular, that it would be part of the scientific training to adhere to the vision provided by the paradigm by taking it for absolute truth and not distorting... as if the world seen through this scientific look was the ultimate reality66. In this section, we therefore strive to make explicit what seems to us to be the metaphysical characteristic of our culture. And we will see, in the next two sections, that the aim of responsibility implies making the implicit explicit. According to my epistemological positioning, I consider scientific concepts and models as tools for acting in the world and communicating about it (Hagège et al. 2010; Hagège 2013). Thus, the modelling proposed below (Table 1.2) does not claim to correspond to the ultimate reality, but to the biological world, in which the understanding of emotions and other phenomena studied by the cognitive sciences is rooted. The objective is therefore to better anchor the theory proposed here in a universe of meanings 66 We are talking here about the conceptual and metaphysical foundations mentioned, and not about new or marginal knowledge, which scientific formations generally explicitly present as unstable (and therefore not to be considered as permanent truths). Indeed, it should be recalled that according to T.-S. Kuhn (1962/2008), a general questioning of these foundations constitutes a crisis, and changing them would require a scientific revolution (see Box 1.2).

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that is familiar to us – without any claim to its universality or supremacy over other cultures or other metaphysical systems. It seems to me that it has the quality, quite infrequent in the West, of explaining the metaphysical system on which it is based. I consider the status of the statements contained in this book to be that of effective knowledge in promoting education for responsibility67, in structuring research in this field, and in communicating these themes. As explained in the caption of Table 1.2, it is not at all a question of highlighting a separation between body and mind, but only of showing how these three meanings of the subject’s world (body, emotions, mind) resonate with the significant metaphysical categories in biology, which I believe also shape our Western objective world. Phenomena

Dimension of the subject

Level

Metaphysical category

Part of the tartlet

Mental and direct knowledge

mind

phenomenological / spiritual

information

strawberries

Emotional

emotions

psychological

energy

cream

Extero- and interoceptive

body

biological

matter

shortcrust pastry

Table 1.2. Typology of the phenomena considered in correspondence with the underlying metaphysical category

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.2.– As I have argued elsewhere, the underlying metaphysical categories are in a dialogical relationship (Figure 3 of Hagège 2014). Thus, it is clear that the three types of phenomena (first column of the table) can be perceived by consciousness, therefore by the mind, just as matter and energy correspond to information. Here, information is defined in a way similar to that in biology (see genetic information): an immaterial dimension that requires a material support and can be transmitted from one support to another (Hagège 2004). Thus, we consider that a real individual looks like a strawberry tartlet passed through a blender: a homogeneous pinkish flowing paste68. That is, body, emotion and mind are in reality neither the same nor different. On the other hand, here, for the purposes of discourse and modeling, 67 As well as ethics and spirituality. 68 At least I guess it looks like this, because I would never have made such a mess!

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we distinguish strawberries, cream and pastry (mind, emotions and body). We could speak of an isomorphism, at least partial, between the three levels. This typology highlights the pivotal place of emotions between the body and the sensations that pass through it, on the one hand, and between the mind and perception of phenomena that do not directly involve the first six modes of perception (seventh type of perceptual object), on the other hand. Indeed, emotions are rooted in interoception (bodily sensations linked to hormonal variations, microbiota, muscle contractions, etc.) and generally generate an inflammation of the mental phenomena, a kind of speculative bubble that is increasingly disconnected from reality (Figure 1.7). Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Tibetan word nyeunmong, often translated as “disturbing emotions” in English, literally means “madness and blindness”: the distorting madness of attentional magnification (“I want” and “I do not want”) and the blindness of attentional inhibition (“I do not see”; Figure 1.3)69. Thus, we can say in a way that emotions catalyze the passage from body to mind, from matter to information, in order to generate a subjective world. Obviously, the subject’s tendency to identify with their thoughts reinforces the subjective character of their perception and, coincidentally, their discrepancy with the ultimate reality. We find in the incriminated process a blatant analogy with the disconnection of money from material and energetic realities (Figure I.1, to be compared with Figure 1.7). This is simply because it seems to us that money corresponds to incarnation in the outer world (i.e. the result of the projection) of individual minds (Table 1.3) and their functioning in the majority of subjects. This is why the relationship between matter and energy, with reactive thoughts on the one hand and money on the other, seems to us to be quite similar, even homologous: they seem to be part of the same process of emotional avoidance. Indeed, being focused on saving money prevents us from landing on “what is not going well”, from letting old wounds rise and integrating them. It is the ego, influenced by society, that pushes us to amass in this way to the detriment of others. In the same way that the financialization of the economy deteriorates the planet, in a very concrete sense, and through more or less direct consequences (see introduction), the reactive mind generates tensions and deteriorates the body,

69 This Tibetan term seems to me to refer as much to the three modalities of the ego (Figure 1.3) as to the emotional engrams and their particular way of remaining in reactive emotion.

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through more or less direct consequences (example: muscle tensions linked to stress or thoughts that lead to suicide). Here is a testimony to this effect. TESTIMONY.– “My meditation experience allowed me to understand the influence of my thoughts on myself, focusing on my breathing showed me that there were many ‘secondary’ thoughts I had never really paid attention to [...]. The observation of these threads of thoughts showed me how much all these thoughts were much more than a kind of secondary disturbance, but that they really prevented me from being present and that they had a very negative influence on my behavior and moods. [Sleep] yoga also showed me that there was much more than these thoughts in my reactive mind, but also a lot of wounds [emotional engrams] that have an important influence on my moods and thoughts (and my life in general) that I am not yet truly aware of. I realized that I had to value all these thoughts and observe them rather than try to silence them in order to be aware of them and to better understand the dynamics of my motivations, thoughts, actions in order to live a healthier life” (MBER student). Metaphysical category

Individual relative mind

Objective world

Information

thoughts (reactive mind)

money

Energy

emotions

transformative forces of raw materials

Matter

perceived body and context (situation)

raw materials and their environment (planet Earth)

Table 1.3. Isomorphism between the objective world and individual relative minds

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.3.– Compare Figures I.1 and 1.7 for more details. The relative mind directly impacts the objective world; an analogy between the two right-hand columns shows money as an avatar of the mind, the drying up of energy sources as the resonance of our difficulties in regulating (“ managing”) our emotions and earthly deterioration as the image of the abuse of our body by the reactive mind. These harmful effects are mediated by an abnormal, disharmonious mobilization of energy: on the one hand, emotional energy is often either repressed or grasped and delocalized in terms of mental phenomena (instead of being experienced, consciously welcomed without grasping, and thus

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evacuated), and on the other hand, energy is abnormally70 located in the financial sphere instead of being in its right place. Finance is a system created from scratch by the human mind. This economic system consists of a reflection of human ego, and more specifically of its reactive mind. This is what Pierre Weil calls “the route of destruction”, which originates in the “fantasy of separativity”: human beings do not realize the causal link between their “inner disorder” and external disharmony (Pasquier 2018). 1.4.2. The ego, mediator of the reflection of the subjective world through the individual relative mind We will now clarify this notion of ego, which has been mentioned several times. Here, the inner world refers to the sixth and seventh types of perceptual objects, and to emotions, while the outer world refers to the perception of phenomena external to the individual (see the five usual senses and the third modality of perception; section 1.3.1.1), that is that of the human (HE) and non-human (NHE) environment. 1.4.2.1. The illusion of the ego As we have seen, the subject usually operates on the basis of preferences (attentional orientation, appraisal, values, attitudes and beliefs), which help them to situate themselves in relation to, or rather in, their outer world. They are identified with certain external (situations, social role, etc.) or internal (mental, emotional, etc.) phenomena, through which they feel they exist. These are essentially phenomena perceived with magnified attention, therefore of positive or negative valence for them. Phenomena that are the object of an inhibited attention are not significantly included in their world. The more attention71 is focused, the narrower the field of consciousness is and the smaller the amount of corresponding information. By “quality” of consciousness, we refer to the more or less great deformation operated by the phenomenological grasp. The more there is grasping, projection and perception through the filter of the ego, the more there is a gap between the ultimate reality and the relative reality, and therefore the more subjectively biased the information is. However, emotion appears when there is a 70 Not in the statistical sense, but in the Canguilhemian sense of “pathologically”. 71 As a reminder, this attention is mostly exogenous (section 1.3.2.1.1).

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significant gap for the subject between the immediate real and their projections. In other words, most of the time, the subject does not perceive this discrepancy, because it is not significant for them, but at certain moments it becomes so. This is a comical observation to say the least when you think about it: when a subject feels an emotion, fundamentally, it is because reality is not shaped according to their subjective world. They find that they are in duality with the real, and the vicious circle of the ego leads the subject to take refuge in their subjective world (often their reactive thoughts), to which they implicitly give more credit to than the real. Therefore, they are more like two with what is present. Thus, subjective functioning distorts reality through selfish prejudices (Trautwein et al. 2014). These mechanisms are linked to a feeling of separation: erroneously identified with an individual (Hagège 2014), the subject feels separated from their environment. According to Damasio’s (2002) model, the fundamental self, which precedes and serves as a basis for the conceptual self, involves four aspects: a specific spatial point of view anchored to the body, a sense of internal unity and duality with regard to others and the environment, a sense of possession, and primordial physical sensations (Trautwein et al. 2014). There is therefore a feeling of separation, a duality between what they identify with and what they do not identify with. They basically self-identify with their body and then the duality corresponds to that between the inside (individual) and the outside (environment). But as we have mentioned, they can identify with an external object (e.g. a strawberry tartlet, the character of a film, etc.) and in doing so they lose themselves. They do not identify with what is not part of their subjective reality (“I do no see”) and what they reject (“I do not want”). This too has a changing character (they can repel a thought, sensation, etc.). Duality can therefore also be experienced within a world. For example, in a dream, which is a strongly grasped manifestation of the inner world, the subject identifies only with a part of the dream (the self in the dream) and not with what is around them (for example, a strawberry tartlet that they cannot reach in the dream). However, it is the whole dream that unfolds in their mind, and not only the form they are identified with in the dream. Thus, the subject feels separated from the shape of the strawberry tartlet, while it is coemerging with the shape of the self in the individuation of the dream: it is also part of their mind. In the same way, in the event of physical pain, the subject will be able to identify with all their proprioceptive sensations, with the exception of the painful sensation implicitly considered as foreign, as not being part of their body (which is obviously a misinterpretation). These

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different examples illustrate that the feeling of separation supporting the tangibility of the ego on the one hand depends on the circumstances and on the other hand is spatially changing. This tangibility of the ego – that is, the feeling of a permanent self separated from the rest – is therefore illusory and only based on the ignorance of the subject of their own functioning (see blindness; Figure 1.3). Indeed, from an objective point of view (which would approach that of ultimate reality), the subject can rather be considered as a phenomenon emerging from the interactions between the individual and their environment, these two parts themselves emerging from a process of individuation (Hagège 2014). This vision implies that the ego (or self) is an illusion, which has been argued elsewhere (ibid.), on neuroscientific, sociological, psychological or philosophical grounds (Hood 2011). Neuroscientifical studies on the self have shown that the self is a sociocultural construct whose brain bases vary from one culture to another (Kitayama and Park 2010). Hood (2011) shows, for example, how the illusion of self emerges from a combination of external influences. Based on experimental results, he argues that education is not only about learning from others, but also about becoming like others and becoming a self – a narrative that memory constructs to weave different experiences together into a coherent story. As adults, the history of the self is constantly updated by changing circumstances (ibid.). Thus, the self would be a story – a kind of matrix in the mind that produces the illusion of a coherent individual – in the same way that a trompe-l’œil can give the illusion of a real-life scene. In a dynamic opposite to that of perceiving this illusory character, the functioning of the ego consists of generating a relative world to feel existance through it – and, in a way, confusing this world with the real (hence our madness, which is also blindness). This relative outer world is essentially based on past assumptions or conditioning (Figure 1.9). Here, we propose to define the ego as the illusory source of ordinary functioning, which makes the subject implicitly as permanent, separated from the rest, identify sees themself with their body (and with other objects of identification) and implicitly confusing their subjective reality with the ultimate reality. Conditionings (social, cultural, due to personal history, etc.) make us perceive reality through a filter that categorizes, judges and names the perceived phenomena and give them meaning according to these conditionings. Thus, our consciousness, in addition to being incomplete, is

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partial (Hagège 2017d): our attention selects information according to egotistical biases (cultural and personal).

Figure 1.9. Outcome diagram of the functioning of the individual relative mind. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.9.– Among the fields of possibilities, the projector of the subject-who-takes-themselves-for-an-individual, guided by their “I want” /“I do not want”, and ignoring the objects of “I do not care”, makes them perceive a subjective world: a world restricted and distorted as compared to the ultimate reality. This projector carries in the present meanings and reactions that come from the subject’s past, and thus prevents them from having a new, unprejudiced look. This impasto over time includes the belief in a self that is constant through change and separated from the environment and from what the ego does not identify with. This belief is fueled by the “for-meness”. This functioning leads some traditions to consider ordinary life as a dream (Ruiz 2016), qualitatively little different from nightime dreams72.

72 With the idea that the qualitative difference between these two states is much smaller than between what we call “the waking state” of a relative mind and functioning of a principled mind.

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1.4.2.2. The outer world as a reflection of the inner world This bias in phenomenology implies that the world in which the subject lives is only a reflection of the preferences of their inner world. Here, the notion of the inner world refers to that of the relative mind, and that of the outer world to that of the relative world. Indeed, the four horsemen of the mind (orientation, relationship, cognition and emotions) determine the substrates of basic mechanisms (perception, identification, projection): given what the mind turns towards and given how it interacts with these phenomena, what is perceived, grasped, projected and how it is perceived, grasped and projected is determined. As already argued above, the outer world can therefore be considered as a reflection of the inner world (Figure 1.10).

Figure 1.10. The outer world as a reflection of the inner world, therefore of the mind. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.10.– The labeling of forms, which is part of the semantic processing of perceptions, makes the phenomena (or objects) of the environment appear to be separate from their environment. In this perception, the phenomenological grasp and the subtle coinciding identification implicitly induce the subject to perceive themselves as they perceive an object: as an individual separated from their environment. This mirror effect thus reinforces

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the illusion of the ego. This dual basis of ego functioning seems all the more accentuated in Western societies, referred to as “individualist”. Since the mental division of the world (labeling of forms, beliefs, etc.) is intimately linked to the language and phenomenological grasping of thoughts by the subject, this division, culturally (ibid.) and personally significant, provides a kind of fascination for the subject to recognize themselves in the world they perceive; they unconsciously and illusively seek a feeling of existence there. The ego feels it exists through identification objects (thoughts, emotions, etc.) and external phenomena (the gaze of others, situations considered favorable or unfavorable, etc.). Note again that this distinction between the inner and outer world seems useful for communication in our opinion. However, it is not intended to refer to a dualist conception. Moreover, the model of the world-mind relationship that we propose, including phenomenological considerations consistent with an epistemology of complexity, leads to the overcoming of this dichotomy between the inner and outer. The meaning of “outer world” and “inner world” is intertwined with that of feelings of separation; it is all three terms that must be considered, which makes it possible to highlight the artificial nature of duality. 1.4.3. An example: radicalizations

stereotypes,

prejudices

and

violent

The ego is what makes us pull the covers overs ourselves: it is the source of our relative world(s) and of all the evils caused by human beings. Moreover, we will mention it later on, it is what generates our own suffering – by making us think exactly the opposite...73 what betrayal! In short, we could consider any conflict or societal problem, and show how the processes underlying the functioning of the ego have an explanatory role in it. We will do so with a topical example, that of violent radicalization. To do this, let us consider one of the basic mechanisms of the ego: appraisal and its link with attention. We have seen that it depends on situational factors (the situation) and dispositional factors (the individual’s 73 In other words, it makes us believe that if we follow it, if for example we seek pleasures and try to avoid displeasure, then we will be happier. However, as detailed in this book, this is precisely the source of our dissatisfaction and suffering. Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 2, this causes ethical problems.

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tendencies, in relation to their reactive, especially emotional, automatisms). It also depends on social conditions, such as implicitly or explicitly endorsed stereotypes. Stereotypes have been defined as beliefs about the criteria that characterize a group (Myers 2009). With regard to explicit relationships with outgroups (groups considered as foreign to our own), studies have shown, for example, that on average a football supporter has a stronger empathy for a distressed supporter of their own team than when they see a distressed supporter of the opposing team, a situation where on average they may even experience pleasure. With regard to implicit stereotypes, social identity theory incorporates the social dimension of appraisal. According to this theory (reviewed by Myers 2009): – we categorize: labeling someone as a Muslim, a Jew, a Mexican, a politician or a bad student, is a way to implicitly appeal to prejudiced things about them; – we identify ourselves: we associate ourselves with membership groups and gain self-esteem by doing so; – we compare: we appraise by contrast our membership group (ingroup) against other groups (outgroups), with a favorable bias for our own. Many experiments support the underlying cognitive mechanisms. EXAMPLE.– A test instructs subjects to press a button as quickly as possible: “shoot at the target”, when in the picture shown, the person is carrying a gun, and a button “do not shoot” when carrying a lure (e.g. a drink can). These authors have highlighted a bias among Australians to shoot more and faster at characters wearing a turban on their heads, whatever they hold in their hands, and whatever their gender or skin color – what has been dubbed the “turban effect” (Unkelbach et al. 2008). Other tests consist of measuring empathic reactions (physiological for example) to photos of ingroup or outgroup citizens. Thus, it has been shown that empathy towards citizens in the ingroup is greater than that towards those of an outgroup when the subjects in the photos are deemed to be in a negative situation, whereas there is no effect when they are in a positive situation (Neumann et al. 2013). In one study, with films depicting citizens from different groups, emotional reactivity shows a bias in favor of the ingroup (for some ethnic groups; Roberts and Levenson, 2006). Also, it has been shown that implicit racist attitudes are positively correlated with the

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speed of detection, and therefore attentional orientation and magnification, of African American faces (Hugenberg et al. 2003). In short, it is clear from these few examples that appraisal and attention orientation are cognitive bases for discrimination (Hagège 2017d). Discrimination is the foundation of violent radicalization. It can be defined as negative behavior towards an outgroup or its members, implicitly or explicitly justified by stereotypes. Violent radicalization74, on the other hand, has been defined as a process of engaging in activities that an outgroup considers a violation of important social norms (for example, the murder of civilians). It covers multifactorial and complex processes (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010), some of whose common features include identification with an ingroup and rejection of outgroups (Borum 2011), or, more concisely, an “identity withdrawal”. It is a kind of increased tension of the ego, which reinforces the intensity of identification with a social group and a grasp of the supposed division with the outgroups, particularly on the basis of a divergence of beliefs. Violence has been defined as the acquired need to harm others in order to feel alive, strong or secure (Favre 2007). In this brief explanation, it appears that relationships with otherness are structuring: relationships with epistemic otherness (with one’s own beliefs versus those of the Other) and relationships with social otherness (with one’s social identity versus that of the Other)75. We therefore conclude that two variables potentially characterize violent radicalization: dogmatism and discrimination. We have already mentioned dogmatism (section 1.3.2.3.1). It should be noted that its emotional component encourages the subject to remain in the known and pertains to an addiction to certainty (Favre 2016). Fabre (2016) refers in this regard to fundamentalism, which he defines as the “solidification of the questioning by inflation of the off question” (p. 20, author’s translation). That is, what is not addressed in the problem becomes frozen, and then reifies the problem and the solution considered with it. The latter is then set up as absolute truth. Dogmatism has been empirically correlated with violent behavior (Favre 2007). 74 It should be noted that radicalism – any movement that claims to promote the “root”, the essence of an ideology or practice – is not necessarily violent. 75 These two other factors may be linked with what has respectively been called “epistemological  otherness” and “external otherness” (Briançon 2019).

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Also, violent radicalization has been explained in particular by a “need for closure”, a notion related to dogmatism. Its correlation or link with religious fundamentalism (Saroglou 2002), racism (Van Hiel et al. 2004), rejection of outgroups and prejudice (Brandt and Reyna 2010) has been empirically supported. In addition, numerous studies have highlighted prejudice as a source of discrimination (ibid., Pearson et al. 2009). Prejudice is thus considered as the attitude that underpins discriminatory behavior (ibid.). On the one hand, the separation and distinction between “us” (ingroup) and “them” (outgroup) by a radicalized subject is at the heart of the process justifying violence in radical ideology. On the other hand, radical actions generate a vicious circle, as if discrimination and radicalization were self-sustaining. For example, with regard to violent Islamic radicalization76: (1) it has been shown that after September 11, 2001 prejudices against Muslims (more stereotyped as violent) have increased, as have stereotypes against Westerners (more seen as “sinners” and “immorals” by some citizens of Middle Eastern countries);  (2) discrimination against Muslims seems to reinforce the phenomenon of radicalization, giving rise to indoctrinating speeches by jihadists (Myers 2009). French sociological studies aimed at explaining violent Islamic radicalization place particular emphasis on the subject’s search for identity in a world perceived as hostile and confusing (reviewed by Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). We find here the role of projections and the subjective perception of reality (involving in particular the performativity of thoughts) as a causal factor. In our context, where a relativism of values is palpable (Prairat 2016) and where individualism seems to be authentic and lawful, some subjects experience a loss of meaning and reference points. In other words, the appraisal of their environment may become mostly negative. If they suffer from discrimination, this can lead to an increased sense of exclusion. Some Muslims descended from immigrants do not find themselves as part of the 76 Here, we use the term “Islamic” only because jihadists from the “Islamic State” claim to be Muslims. In the Koran, the major jihâd (jihâd al-nafs, meaning “combat against oneself”) refers to the effort that the practitioner must make to overcome their ego and thus, embody religious precepts, including respect for others (Larcher 2012). Thus, in violent jihadist radicalization, the spiritual dimension of the Koranic notion of jihad has been diverted to an identity dimension, giving the radicalized sense of belonging (rather than a spiritual aspiration). We consider this usurpation as a return to the archaic human sacrifice (according to the Girardian theory: social jugulation of violence through the sacrifice of an innocent alter-ego), whereas a spiritual approach invites us to sacrifice the source of violence within us, namely the ego.

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“us” among French society, nor part of that of their ancestors, but rather in an in-between without a clearly identified ingroup. At the level of the ego, the subject does not feel they sufficiently exist thanks to the phenomena they perceive, which generate a form of uneasiness (a lack of pleasure in appraising a situation as positive). However, this “identification deficit” could also be an opportunity to free oneself from existing conditioning. Such a change in dynamics would require a shift from a predominantly projective to a predominantly reflective attitude, which could perhaps take place if it were accompanied (Favre 2016), preferably by a caring and warm environment. Indeed, this destabilization implies having to face our dark sides, our reactive emotions which are deemed as negative, our old wounds (looking inside rather than outside, see chapters 2 and 3). And our attention, if placed in a context that allows it77, will automatically turn to an external phenomenon with which we will identify (rather than to our unintegrated emotions). This allows us to escape our negatively appraised emotional states, which are deemed as negative (Figure 1.7). Among these objects of identification are for some subjects dogmatic discourses, which give them a sense of belonging. Now, jihadists argue by demonizing the West (“corrupt” and “decadent”) and by offering a solid value system. They invoke the ummah, a virtual global community of all Muslims. Thus, the feeling of exclusion among these subjects in need of reference points would no longer be perceived as being due to personal failure, but due to a hostile environment where there is no place for Muslims. From then on, the subject will be able to start the radicalization process, finding meaning in their life, a community of belonging, an “us”. Finding these kinds of reference points seems to correspond to a basic psychological need in any subject who has not learned to function otherwise (other than by projection, identification, etc.) and who is unaware of their own functioning – which is probably the case for many of us.

77 In this case, there seems to be an important role of emotional ties and pressures in small social groups: today, the underground recruitment of jihadists seems more horizontal (by “activists” who are already part of the subject’s social environment) than vertical (by imams) (according to the filtering of social movement theories; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). And this proximal recruitment seems to be a decisive factor (contrary to the myth of the major role of virtual social networks and the Internet ; ibid.). It should also be noted that in detail, the psychological mechanisms involved vary according to the subject’s temperament. Thus, different psychological profiles of radicalized subjects have been updated (leader, protégé, misfit or drifter), and in these cases, the objects of identification are different (rather, the political aim for the first two, the new chance of meaning for the two latter; ibid.).

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In support of this understanding, it has been shown that the evocation of religious values (Kaplan et al. 2016a) or political opinions (Kaplan et al. 2016b), on the one hand, mobilizes areas of the brain involved in identity, appraisal, mental phenomena and self-centered cognition (we would summarize as “the ego”), called the “default mode network”. On the other hand, these opinions, relating to identity, seem much less subject to change than opinions that are less structuring for identity. In addition, the areas of the brain involved in responding to threats also seem to be involved in resisting a change of opinion. It can therefore be assumed that a subject in need of identity will first seek to find one, in this case through adherence to religious values or political opinions, and will therefore be potentially vulnerable to such an ideology that arises in their close circle78. It should be noted that the idea of a vicious circle between fundamentalism (dogmatism) and social isolation has been put forward by the social movement theory or network theory (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Indeed, during radicalization, the subject would avoid contact and confrontations of opinions with subjects who explicitly disagree with them79: in particular members of their family or houses of worship, from whom/ which they are often excluded. The subject who becomes radicalized in this way will thus find reference points that further dissociate them from the different forms of otherness (see also the vicious circle of discriminationradicalization mentioned above). This illustrates the link between violence and projection, namely how the world in which they live reflects their own mind. Indeed, the subject projects the vision of a hostile world. When they express this vision, they feel rejected by the majority of those around them who do not share it. This reinforces their vision of a hostile world. In fact, violence and projection include attributing to the outer world, here to the outgroup (the West, i.e. “the Great Satan”), the origin of their problems (instead of seeing it in their own mind). This distortion makes it logical that jihadists take responsibility for changing this exterior, for solving the problem at what they believe to be the source (ibid.). In short, the violent radicalization of the subject seems to arise from a subject’s closure: of their thoughts (dogmatism), emotions (ignored or rejected) and towards others (discrimination, prejudices, avoidance of 78 See note 77 in this chapter. 79 This explains why sometimes a terrorist’s close family circle is surprised at the way their life has turned out.

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otherness), such as attentional orientation, appraisal... the different mechanisms of the ego explain the cognitive and emotional bases80 of this process. This example is an additional illustration that the world (where terrorism, discrimination, etc.) is a reflection of the mind (borrowing dogmatism, stereotypes, etc.). As long as the illusion of the ego persists in some way there are different stereotypes and forms of dogmatism (section 1.3.2.3), to varying degrees and towards different groups, subjects or objects. We invite the reader here not to highlight their own differences in functioning with that of a person in the process of radicalization (do not “feel different from” or “make two” with). That would be counterproductive. It has indeed been described in the literature that our identification with an ingroup is accompanied by a sense of superior morality, which thus contributes to reinforcing stereotypes and discrimination against outgroups (Brambilla et al. 2013) and thus the vicious circles mentioned above. On the contrary, the purpose is to be able to identify common functions (which, placed in one context or another, will mature in a specific way). As Hofstadter (2008) expresses it, the uniqueness of the mechanisms related to self-perception in human beings results in “the rich diversity of our methods of internalizing facts [... and constitutes] finally one of the main forces of differentiation between individuals” (p. 784, author’s translation). As we will see, responsibility implies looking at what is inside, that which is in one’s own mind, and if it is likely to generate this type of effect, instead of focusing on incriminating or denouncing these causes (stereotypes, discrimination, dogmatism, phenomenological grasping, identification, etc.) in others. Let us first look, if you agree, at how our own beliefs mislead us and cut us off from parts of the real... What germs in our own minds, if they developed further and in an appropriate context, could lead to behaviors similar to those of jihadists81? Here, the examples taken relate more particularly to violent religious radicalization (in this case jihadism), but such radicalization can also be political, and we have recently observed that despite the tragedies and

80 We have focused here only on these two concepts of attention and appraisal, however they are intertwined with the other horsemen and the basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship. As for dogmatism, we have already mentioned its cognitive foundations. 81 This would be a very concrete way of applying Morin’s (1986) hologrammic principle and taking it into account in our own lives.

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genocides of the last century, violent political radicalization seems to be on the rise in Europe in recent decades. In any case, this example leads us to raise an interesting point for responsibility issues, which is part of what we will call the “taxonomic domain” – that is, the way in which we constitute groups and territories of belonging (and outgroups). Indeed, for example, we mentioned empathy as a relational attitude without raising the question of who it was addressed to: preferably those in one’s own ingroup? Or of a potentially equal intensity towards all human beings? As for relatedness, can it also be felt beyond what is identified as the subject’s own territory, or beyond the ego’s “I want” and “I do no want”? The implicit values are not the same in each case, nor are the consequences the same with regard to responsibility. We will discuss this point in more detail in the following chapters. In short, whether this results in violent radicalization or in strawberry tartlet addiction, the basic psycho-phenomenological mechanisms involved are similar. They are the ones which explain our madness, mentioned in the introduction. Why is the world mad? Because we are mad. Where does our madness come from? The mismatch between our vision and the ultimate reality and the coincident lack of awareness of this mismatch. Of course, being drugged with strawberry tartlets and being jihadist is not the same thing: the consequences are not of the same kind. In fact, these behaviors do not have the same ethical consequences. It is the purpose of our next chapter to consider benchmarks to guide our madness towards more responsibility, and even to transform it into wisdom. Thus, to conclude this first chapter, let us remember that we express ourselves under the gnoseological hypothesis. We first argued that, from an ultimate point of view, the world is the reflection of the mind, co-constructed with reality. In this respect, from an objective point of view, dialogism is intrinsic to the relationship between the inner and outer worlds. However, the subjective point of view, that of the ego, is that of a relative reality, precisely nourishing the (objectively illusory) separation between these worlds: it favors a dualist relationship to the detriment of a dialogism. As mentioned with the example of violent radicalization, such a gap can generate, justify violence and a set of other problems that we will describe later on as “disharmonious”. Thus, as we argue in Chapter 2, responsibility will, in our view, consist of a process of aligning relative reality with the real, that is, from the relative point of view with the ultimate point of view. In other words, it will be a question of realizing the illusory character of the

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ego, that is, of being aware at every moment of the dialogism inherent in the relationship between the outer and inner worlds, and beyond, of the emptiness of these worlds and their separation. DEFINITION.– “Vacuity” or emptiness is not synonymous with “nonexistence” and does not imply a nihilistic position. From a relative point of view, the ordinary subject tends to understand the self and phenomena as sustainable and separate from the rest, that is, to understand them in a dual way, based on an interior, an exterior and a separation between the two. However, from an objective point of view, the characteristics of a self or a phenomenon are only relative grasps, inherent in the egotistical processing of information. The notion of emptiness therefore refers to the ultimate, asemantic point of view that phenomena and the self are constantly changing and are interdependent on everything else.

2 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind

We have considered the notion of relative mind, proposed a model of its function and considered its relationship with the world as a reflection of the latter. The idea is that subjects perceive the world and act within it through biases, of cultural1 and personal origins, which can be understood using various concepts of psychosociology and cognitive science. Do these biases pose responsibility issues, and how? Before answering this question, we must first try to define what this notion of responsibility means, or at least give an operational definition. 2.1. Introduction: an overview of the tone of current research on responsibility In contemporary research, and according to my probably partial review of the literature, the notion of responsibility is specifically theorized mainly in the following French- or English-speaking fields: moral philosophy, business ethics (corporate social responsability, consumer responsibility, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, therapeutic education (patient responsibility), criminal law, environmental psychosociology (environmental responsibility), moral responsibility or psychology (responsibility attitude in certain psychological disorders, or attribution of responsibility). The other disciplines that mobilize the notion of responsibility, such as professional ethics, moral education or

1 Each culture, immeasurable to any other, generates its own biases. See Hagège (2013) for a discussion of the notion of culture.

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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“educating for…”, draw on these first fields, but especially on traditional philosophy, ethics or phenomenology to explain it. Basically, responsibility is the subject’s ability to “respond (so that they are response-able) by themselves, of their own accord and instead of reacting” (Hagège 2017b, p. 186, author’s translation). The concept refers to the conditions of imputability for an individual’s acts and omissions. It involves considering the subject’s action in relation to time (they will be able to answer for their act after having committed it) and to others (they answer to others; Henriot 2015). It is therefore at a transition of scale, between the individual and the social. The relationship between the subject’s intention to act and the action itself is crucial in assigning responsibility: a subject is all the more responsible when their action is premeditated2 (King and Carruthers 2012). In other words, the question of the causal link between mental phenomena and action is central. Beforehand, it is therefore important to decide on the freedom to think, to act, and therefore on the existence or not of free will (Knobe and Doris 2010). However, this question and these statuses are increasingly being researched in cognitive sciences (Baumeister 2008) and social psychology (Myers 2009). To cite just one example, neural signals predict an action “freely chosen” several seconds before the subject is aware of making the decision (reviewed by Bode et al. 2014). These results are disturbing, because they call into question the foundations commonly assumed for the experience of being a subject (Hagège 2014): on the one hand, the existence of free will – questioning which is nevertheless debated (Sie and Wouters 2010) – and, on the other hand, the correlative notion of responsibility (ibid.). Indeed, if free will is, like ego, objectively an illusion, can I be held responsible for my actions? Thus, today, philosophers tend to integrate these results, particularly those of the cognitive (neuro)sciences, into their arguments (Brownstein 2016), without which the latter could, as before, sometimes be whimsical or far removed from the biopsychophysical reality of individuals. In short, this research is more oriented either towards a normative and therefore pragmatic aim (education, professional ethics, etc.) or towards a 2 In the case of the conduct of an engagement, the subject may even claim responsibility for a situation they inherit, which they did not cause (Ladrière, Lecarme and Moatti 2015). That said, what we call “control” results from largely unconscious processes; the situation inherited by the subject is never entirely the result of their own conscious will (Figure 4 from Hagège 2014).

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descriptive and therefore theoretical aim (cognitive sciences, psychosociology, etc.). In the first case, it seems essential to safeguard the notion of responsibility, as do compatibilist moral philosophers, who decree compatible moral responsibility and determinism (reviewed in Knobe and Doris 2010), even if some argue that this assertion is only conventional and simply allows society and the judicial system to function (Kozakai 2008). In the second case, many say that free will is an illusion (Wegner 2003), but without going into the underlying metaphysical considerations that could relativize these statements (Árnason 2011; Hagège 2014). Thus, research on responsibility finds itself in tension between these two objectives: changing the world and trying to describe the subject’s ultimate reality. One of the ambitions of this book is to propose a selection of relevant references and an operational notion of responsibility for the field of “educating for...”, and more generally for the educational sciences, in the new discipline of education for responsibility, drawing inspiration from the cognitive sciences, psychosociology, phenomenology, philosophy and epistemology. We assume that these reflections could also be of interest in the fields of ethics and spirituality. Before that, we will briefly review conceptions of responsibility and disciplinary anchors, with regard to which we consider it important to situate the approach of the object that concerns us. We will begin by noting that the notion of responsibility is at the heart of the intelligibility of education and ethics. Indeed, on the one hand, educating a child consists of raising them to have a sense of responsibility, so that they can become responsible for themselves – where previously guardians assumed the function. On the other hand, the ethical approach aims at responsibility in the choice of actions and values. 2.2. Responsibility as a dialogical relationship between the outer and inner worlds: ethical perspectives 2.2.1. Problem of responsibility in the field of ethics With regard to ethics, two opposing meanings of responsibility can be classically distinguished (Hagège 2017c). According to a Platonist conception of ethics, responsibility corresponds to choices and actions that engage the

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subject’s specific character, calling for the surpassing of oneself and the norm. This is an ηθοξ (ethos with an “η”, Paturet 2003). This meaning differs fundamentally from a responsibility that is obedience to the rules, in congruence with the εθοξ (ethos with an “ε”; ibid.). Thus, where ηθοξ loosens, unravels habits, breaks moulds and models, the εθοξ links, channels and structures. This second meaning, which refers to morals, conformity with social practices, codifications and habitus, broadly corresponds to the common, that is, socially widespread, notion of responsibility (Such and Walker 2004). In a more contemporary sense, the attitude of responsibility implies on the one hand the presence of a subject who responds and on the other hand the presence and recognition as legitimate by the subject of other’s to whom respond; “in the syntax of ethics, responsibility and exercise of the subject function only as one” (Henriot 2015, editor’s translation). The idea of responsibility therefore implies holding together the two ends of ethics constituted by ηθοξ and εθοξ: “on the one hand, the establishment of a purely objective pseudo-responsibility, applying from the outside, alienates the individual-object, rendering it unfit to exercise an authentic right of reply. On the other hand, the exaltation of a pseudoresponsibility that is entirely subjective, manifesting the freedom of a will that unfolds in a vacuum, proclaims both the omnipotence and solitude of the Unique. [...] Weighing on a being who is reduced to nothing, the group becomes everything; the wild impulse of a will for whom everything seems permissible: these are the two extreme theoretical figures of irresponsibility, below and beyond. Of the two antithetical poles, but complementary to the field, neither can be privileged, nor sacrificed. The destruction of the subjective pole degrades the situation into a form of unilateral coercion. In the absence of the objective pole, we are only witnessing the take-off of a will denying any jurisdiction and whose subject takes itself as a measure of all things. The field of ethics coincides with that of responsibility” (ibid.). In terms of ethics, responsibility therefore implies a dialogical relationship between the subject’s inner and outer worlds. Thus, an education for responsibility should be led to make the two ethos coexist within the educational process, in a “dialectic of emancipation and limitation” (Fabre 2016, p. 20): self-realization through taking into account societal norms and

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the differences of others. This theoretical meaning poses a practical problem: how can we know, individually, what is the right direction to take? Let us consider the historical example of the Shoah. Those who, following one εθοξ, submitted to the authority of Vichy, contributed to the Shoah, mostly indirectly and without their knowledge. Sociological studies such as Milgram’s have shown how most subjects can indeed easily submit to an authority, even if the latter is clearly unjust (reviewed by Myers 2009; see also Experience in section I.3). The resistance fighters, following one ηθοξ, rebelled and history considered a posteriori that it was their way that was right. However, do jihadists not occupy an analogous position to the resistance fighters, following an ηθοξ brandishing values that go against the established order, and being ready to use violence to see them generalized? This provocative comparison is of course limited, as the societal contexts and the relationship of the subjects concerned with these contexts are not equivalent. In particular, it seems to us that the resistance fighters wanted to restore values prior to the German occupation, in a context where implicit and explicit values, rather intrinsic, were relatively shared. Jihadists would probably prefer to impose values in a context where they are not characteristic. Indeed, even if the values of our society are plural (“reasonable pluralism” according to Rawls, quoted by Prairat 2016), it seems to me that the majority of its implicit values are rather extrinsic (consumerist), and its explicit values are rather humanist. The strangeness of jihadist values in relation to our context makes the cultural violence of the process all the greater. There is therefore a lack of εθοξ, (while Pétain’s fighters neglected the ηθοξ). Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the resistance fighters and jihadists shared a form of conviction to act for the good. Indeed, as mentioned above, belonging to an ingroup is generally accompanied by a higher sense of morality (Brambilla et al. 2013). These examples make it possible to raise the question that concerns us here: when we are there, immersed in a History that is still only the present, before posterity has made its judgment, what can we do? How can we know what to do, whether what we think is good is really good beyond our own judgement? How can we identify a direction that is compatible with an ethical aim? It is the question of the criteria for guiding action that is at stake here: what benchmarks should we rely on to guide and orient our actions? For example, today, how can we know what to do in a neoliberal world where natural resources are wasted, inequalities are reinforced, and overconsumption and “possession of mind” by the media are favored?

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Two Jewish philosophers, marked by the Shoah, and disciples of the pioneering phenomenologists Husserl and Heidegger, were therefore precisely interested in the question of responsibility from two complementary angles according to our approach: responsibility towards the NHE and towards the HE. We will see that their proposals are not always congruent with the approach proposed here. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable to us to address them here. 2.2.2. Responsibility approaches in the field of ethics First, Jonas (1903–1993), through his famous book The Imperative of Responsibility, popularized the question of responsibility towards the environment (understood as non-human). More than ethics, which corresponds to a project, an intention, a dynamic (Ricœur 2015), Jonas aims to rebuild morals (Trémolières 2015), which refer rather to imperatives to be followed in the order of the good, which is however “situated on the path to carrying out the ethical intention” (Ricœur 2015). Faced with the potential danger to the nature of scientific and technical progress, and the fact that it will constitute a legacy left to future generations, Jonas proposes to recognize nature as vulnerable and to defend a heuristic of fear, not a fear for oneself, but for the future thus becoming fragile for future generations (Trémolières 2015). It thus gives an important part to the question of forecasting, of anticipating harmful consequences. Although this approach could perhaps usefully motivate political decisions, it seems to us that it could raise some obstacles in education. Its purely normative aspect – it is based on an imperative – makes it contradict the notion of dialogism mentioned above3. As we will see, it is a completely different approach that is advocated here, based more on creativity and a certain quality of being, than on the rationalization of a possible future and fear. For the moment, let us just note that the approach is part of an anthropocentric and utilitarian vision of nature, which is not considered to be the most relevant from a psychosociological point of view (Hagège et al. 2009). In other words, nature is considered in terms of its usefulness for

3 For Ricœur, the imperative (criterion of unquestioned judgment) is one of the moments of this dialogical relationship, completed by ethics: in particular deliberation (practical wisdom that questions these criteria; Fabre 2016).

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humanity, whose well-being is the purpose of the approach, instead of being considered as having an intrinsic value (ecocentric vision). Secondly, Levinas (1905–1995) founded an ethics of responsibility “centrered on the epiphany of the face of others [coming] in alliance with the metaphysical desire of the whole other” (Greisch 2015a, author’s translation). For him, philosophy must be “widsom of love for love” (ibid.). Thus, the infinite responsibility towards others involves letting oneself be taken hostage by them, as they are also a subject, but above all they are other, different, irreducible in their singularity; it is “the Other-in-the-Same” (Simon 1993, p. 131). According to the ordinary meaning, responsibility derives from the subject’s freedom, whereas for Levinas, responsibility comes from the face of others, and it is coincidental with their condition as a subject: it tears them away from themselves “in the relationship of One for the Other” (ibid.): “Levinas suggests the presence of otherness within the very heart of ipseity4. In this way, he gives a new meaning to Rimbaud’s formula: ‘I is another’, which would no longer mean so much alienation, self-betrayal as the experience of humility that the person who puts themselves in the other’s shoes, blaming themselves for the evil or suffering they experience, each person being able to become a ‘Messiah’” (Courtine-Denamy 2015, author’s translation). It seems important here to mention Ricœur’s approach, which was partly developed in criticism of Levinas’s. Ricœur proposes a real “dialectic of the self and other”: “the enjoined-being as a structure of ipseity, such that [otherness] can be reconciled with self-esteem and testified to in a reciprocity that would no longer have anything to do with asymmetry” (whereas it was asymmetrical in Levinas’s approach; ibid. italics added by the author). Thus, for him, as expressed in the title of his famous book Oneself as Another, otherness is constitutive of ipseity itself (ibid.), which expresses the dialogical principle mentioned above5. The evolution between these two thoughts seems analogous 4 The notion of ipseity corresponds to the identity itself, to what makes a person unique, but not in the sense of “idem” of a core personality or “self” that would remain constant through change; rather in that of a singular presence (Depraz 2014). 5 See also the notion of inner otherness developed alongside those of epistemological and outer otherness (Briançon 2019).

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to what is put forward in Gilligan’s approach to care6 ethics (discussed in section 1.2.2.3). According to her female developmental model, the first stage is oriented towards individual survival, the second towards self-sacrifice (considered as good), and the third towards non-violence. Thus, in the second stage, the acceptance of others and the connection with them would be a primary goal, even to the detriment of the needs of the self (Swaner 2005; as in the Levinasian vision). In the third and final level, dualism between oneself and others disappears (ibid.). Thus, we can see in the latter and Ricœur’s thought the proposal of an ethics of responsibility towards others as a dialogism between the phenomena of the inner world with which the subject identifies more or less (the “self”) and the human beings of the outer world (others). As will be developed further below, one of the objectives of an education for responsibility would therefore be to bring the subject’s mind to be present in their inner world, as well as in their outer world, on an equal footing. Therefore, what more precisely can the dialogical relationship between the inner and outer worlds correspond to on the phenomenological and psychological level? 2.3. Responsibility as a consciousness connected to oneself, others and the non-human environment (NHE): psychological and phenomenological points of view We will hereafter specify how to translate the dialogism characteristic of responsibility into the functioning of the four horsemen of the mind. 2.3.1. Cognition and responsibility We repeat here the three modes of cognition that were considered in section 1.3.2.3.1.

6 Moreover, care is sometimes seen as “solicitude”, and Ricœur “baptizes solicitude the impulse from self towards the other which constitutes the answer to this interpellation and which does not consist exclusively in obeying a duty” (Courtine-Denamy 2015).

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2.3.1.1. Basic level of cognition and responsibility At the level of the basic modality, that which concerns form, the dialogical relationship between exterior and interior is difficult to instantiate, because thinking, dualistic in essence, tends to take up a lot of attention: this is what we have called “phenomenological grasp”. Despite this grasp, different thoughts or beliefs are not equivalent in terms of responsibility. Thus, for example, the thought “I am responsible for my thoughts, actions and emotions” is much more effective (i.e. performative) in terms of responsibility than a victim’s thought such as “I undergo my emotions and what happens to me; and I have nothing to do with the future of the world or my own, I have no control over it”. Thus, all thoughts that reinforce the projective character of the ego, by assigning responsibilities to the environment, contribute to the disempowerment of the subject (another example: “it is because of this person or this situation that I am down”). And it seems that spontaneously, that is without targeted learning, thoughts tend to be more projective in this way. As we have explained, taking full responsibility for your emotions is an opening to yourself and promotes openness to others. So, “thinking about what we feel”7, for example naming our emotions, promotes their regulation (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). Also, “feeling what we think”8 allows us to contact the emotion underlying the reactive thoughts, thus promoting the fact of being aware of our emotions (legend of Figure 1.8B). Focusing attention on emotion bursts the speculative mental bubble (section 1.3.2.4) and thus thwarts projective automatism. Also, all the thoughts by which the subject consciously endorses goals or values that are consistent with responsibility, can contribute to this. For example: “I wish to develop a dialogical relationship between my inner world and my outer world; and to become more open to myself and others, less dogmatic and more tolerant.” Indeed, these wishes constitute a kind of self-programming, or, to use a term from the cognitive sciences, a conscious self-priming: when the opportunity arises, such seeding will spontaneously encourage actions and orientations of attention towards phenomena that go in this direction (Custers and Aarts 2010), and will thus feed a virtuous

7 According to Favre’s formula (2007). 8 See footnote 7 above.

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circle. This aspect is related to what we have called the “orientation” (first horseman of the mind, section 1.3.2.1). In addition, it should be noted that thoughts about the self and its extension (probably most of the thoughts of an ordinary subject in fact; e.g. “I must do that”, “where is my car”, “I am hungry”, “I do not like it when he talks to me like that”, etc.) reinforce the “for-me-ness” and therefore the ego. And this is all the more so since they are grasped. Thus, on the contrary, training one’s mind to be filled with altruistic thoughts instead generates an opposite attitude of openness and dialogism. For example, if the thought “I do not like it when he talks to me like that” is born in the mind, then we can voluntarily generate an open thought such as “I want us to have a fluid and benevolent communication together”. Such an automatism of “replacement of thought” would be facilitated if I am aware that if he speaks to me in an inappropriate way, it may be that he has problems, and that if I take it wrong, it is that it has triggered a reactive emotion in me (see section 1.3.2.4). Finally, constructive critical thinking, which aims to question, with kind curiosity, one’s own representations and those of others (Daniel 2016), will foster detachment from thoughts and representations, and thus a dialogical relationship between the inner and outer worlds. EXAMPLES.– The following thought emerges in the mind: “Dolilo is obtuse” or “that is what you need to do”. Constructive critical thinking could follow: “and if I was wrong about Dolilo? What is my share of responsibility in the conflict I had with him, instead of judging?” or “and if that was not the right thing to do... maybe it is good for me and the situation I expect, and I will feel, later, the time to act in the right way”. In the case of negative critical thinking, after the first thought has arisen, a speculative bubble will rather reinforce it. For example: “yes, it’s true, Dolilo is really stupid; besides, he did this to me the other day, it proves it well. If I could, I’d break his neck, etc.” (thoughts underpinned by anger) or “Gosh ! I didn’t do it, I have to do it! What will others think of me if I don’t?” (thoughts underpinned by guilt, and possibly shame, etc.; see the comments on Figure 1.8B). On the contrary, a negative critical thought, closed on itself, formulated in a dogmatic way, will maintain the illusion of separation between these two worlds. It widens the gap between oneself and the other, or between oneself and the situation: the subject feels implicitly alone, deprived, and

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their relationship with the world at this moment is dominated by a feeling of isolation, a fear of aggression, the need to defend, to feel existance through external phenomena such as the gaze of others... there is the illusion that they are separated from the world and that they must protect their territory (see the ego). So much tension in such a mind... In addition, as mentioned above (section 1.3.2.3.1), when a thought is explicitly shared with others, its impact is enhanced. Thus, activities that may seem trivial at first glance, such as exchanging gossip or mud-slinging, have a negative impact from an ethical point of view and therefore engage the responsibility of the subject who utters them. 2.3.1.2. Meta level of cognition and responsibility In the same vein, dualism is an obstacle to responsibility. It tends to be preponderant in our culture, and is accompanied by individualism. However, according to the social theories of learning (Vygotsky 1962/2003), Morin’s hologrammatic principle (1986) and the previous argument on the intertwining of the inner and outer worlds, such an institutional epistemology is linked to personal epistemologies. The first two stages of Perry’s (1999) intellectual and ethical development describe this psychosociological dualism (reviewed by Swaner 2005). It corresponds to the notion that knowledge is either true or false, and therefore somehow independent of human activity. It is thus linked to the implicit belief that knowledge is autonomous from action (Hagège 2013, 2015b; Perrenoud 1998). However, we have mentioned that responsibility implies feeling connected to own’s actions: “Being responsible for a situation or action is to be held accountable, that is, to appear as the cause and even to claim this quality. The person who is responsible for an initiative thereby declares that they are ready to present themselves as the principle, as the origin, to explain about it, to give their reasons, and to suffer all the consequences that will result from it” (Ladrière et al. 2015). However, Rousseau (1712–1778), one of the greatest French thinkers on education, did not educate his own children; they were educated through public assistance. American research has also shown that ethicists do not behave more ethically than other professors and that they sometimes even

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behave worse (Schwitzgebel 2009). Thus, a personal epistemology implicitly or explicitly marked by dualism can lead to the development of thoughts at the expense of actions, and implicitly rehabiliate a subject if they do not act in coherence with its values, “as long as they display beautiful ideas”. The increased attention given to thoughts relative to emotions and the body, which we have explained above, reinforces this phenomenon. This is especially since we think with words (Vygotsky 1962/2003) and since the more intense the phenomenological grasp of mental phenomena is, the more likely it is that dualism will be reinforced. Indeed, dualism and individualism are both intertwined in our Western languages, in which a sentence without a subject is rare, and the distinction between subject and object is grammatically marked. This is not the case in Chinese, where sentences, expressing processes more than (separate) entities, do not have such a structure, and where sentences can be made without subjects, like in Korean or Japanese. Thus, while we say “I think” in English, we can say “think” in Korean, such that the interlocutor understands that the subject who states the sentence refers to the activity of their own mind. In addition, the values are built into the language. EXAMPLE.– In Korea, a collectivist culture, the equivalent of “our” is used to refer to institutions valued by Confucian culture: family, companies, homeland or school. From then on, a child, even an only child, will say “our mother”. On the contrary, in our Western languages, marked by individualism and dualism, even a child from a big family will mention “his mother”. Thus, while a Western subject may have the impression of describing a fact in a neutral way by talking about his mother or his country, he expresses there without his knowledge the individualistic values embedded in the language. The thoughts we grasp, because of the very structure of our language, naturally reinforce dualism. As a result, the importance of the latter is equal to the intensity with which thoughts are grasped. On the other hand, a contextualist epistemology has the potential to promote responsibility. Thus, most constructivist theories (example: Morin 2014) logically include ethical considerations, because these ways of thinking logically link worldview and knowledge to the human actions and values that contribute to their production (Hagège et al. 2010; Fourez 2002;

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Le Moigne 1995). As we find in Sartre’s work (1970; see quotation in section I.6), it highlights the inseparability of all human action and responsibility, in other words the relationship between the inner and outer worlds. Translated into psychosocial and sociological terms, they correspond to a contextualist personal epistemology, where knowledge is considered neither as an absolute and universal truth, nor as relative or even subjective, but as having validity and utility in a given context. Perry’s (1999) work proposes that the ultimate stage of intellectual and ethical development corresponds to such a personal epistemology, coinciding in this stage with commitment: the subject being aware of the intertwined nature of their visions, their actions and the world, consciously choosing to engage in certain actions and defend certain visions of the world, in accordance with their values (reviewed by Swaner 2005). Responsibility is indeed a component of the conduct of commitment: “That which is remarkable in the conduct of commitment is that it concerns a state of affairs largely beyond the control of the actor, both in terms of the past and the future. The actor only inherits the situation they assume, which has in fact been generated by other wills, by other actions. It is therefore involvement that makes responsibility possible: it is because an existence can assume others that it can be responsible for what, in the strictest terms, does not depend on it” (Ladrière et al. 2015). Obviously, as we have discussed with Schwitzgebel’s work, a person with a personal contextualist epistemology is not necessarily committed; they could think dogmatically about such a vision, without seeking to apply it to themselves or to draw ethical conclusions for themselves. They would not be attentive to act in a manner consistent with their beliefs, particularly because of the phenomenological grasp of thoughts and the tendency of the mind to project, thus to be more attentive to the outer world than to the inner world. However, such epistemology potentially favors responsibility, unlike a dualistic epistemology more likely to counter it, as we have mentioned. To summarize sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2, thoughts and beliefs that foster a dialogue between the inner and outer worlds, and are conducive to the conscious perception of their dialogical relationship, are likely to favor responsibility to the detriment of the ego’s separation characteristic.

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2.3.1.3. Modality of cognition and responsibility Finally, with regard to the third aspect of cognition, cognitive flexibility favors distancing from one’s thoughts and representations, and therefore responsibility, while dogmatism and the grasping of thoughts are opposed. Indeed, when the phenomenological grasp of beliefs about the outer world is high9, the awareness of subjective functioning (especially of phenomenological grasping itself) tends to be correlatively low or non-existent. We have detailed enough above how such an attitude tends to cut off from others, to make the subject less tolerant, even violent. On the ethical level, it is clear that responsibility nevertheless implies establishing a dialogical and open relationship with the other, which allows the ethical process to have a transcultural focus (Haste and Abrahams 2008). On the contrary, the awareness of the cultural and personal biases inherent in the language that mediates the representations consists of a reflexivity, which is essentially antagonistic to the projective aspect of the ego (Favre 2007). Such awareness requires cognitive flexibility, a quality that could logically be coincidental with a personal contextualist epistemology. Indeed, as mentioned above, cognitive flexibility tends to foster a weaker grasp of thoughts and beliefs – a grasp that psychically treats this knowledge implicitly as absolute and universal. It is therefore more consistent with the belief in the contextual nature of knowledge. Neurological studies have shown that cognitive flexibility involves higher brain areas required for conscious processes (Kim et al. 2011). Other studies with subjects performing tasks have shown that cognitive flexibility is lower in subjects with behavioral addictions (Tchanturia et al. 2011), which are symptomatic of greater confinement in inappropriate and persistent past functioning (i.e. confined in thought-action repertoires that restrict the ego). Cognitive flexibility coincides with greater creativity – because it makes the subject more open to the new things which manifest through themselves – and requires attention (Ashby et al. 1999). These studies are therefore consistent with the idea that psycho-affective maturity and cognitive flexibility go hand in hand and that the latter makes it more suitable for

9 I would like to point out here that the problem seems to me to be much less the ideas we have, than the force of truth we give them (which sometimes leads to wanting to impose them on others), the intensity with which we identify with them: if identification with intolerant thoughts is weak, then the subject will be less willing to act accordingly.

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accepting novelty and diversity in oneself. It therefore potentially promotes responsibility. 2.3.2. Orientation and responsibility 2.3.2.1. Attention, relatedness and responsibility “Each instant is new, and what is new is always immediate. The immediate is constantly stripping itself of the old. The new one dies at what is even more new [...]” (Finley 2003, p. 161, author’s translation). “If we think of a lemon, we know that the idea of the lemon is not the lemon itself. However, if we think clearly enough about this lemon, we salivate.[...] That doesn’t mean that the idea of a lemon is a lemon. Simply, the idea of the lemon has awakened unconscious memories, and [...] imagining it gives rise to very clear sensations associated with something yellow and acidic. [...] It is therefore a question here of what it means to identify yourself. It’s easy to understand when what we’re talking about doesn’t really concern us. But when it comes to ‘I’ or ‘me’, our brains get confused. When you think of yourself, when you say ‘I’, the same inner phenomena surround and support this ‘I’ as was the case earlier with the word ‘lemon’. But when you think of this ‘I’, this ‘me’, the accumulated experiences and memories are even more numerous to come to the surface, they form a wall of thoughts and almost palpable emotions. When you think of your ‘self’, you have a sense of reality, because as these waves of accumulated past pass through you, they give you the impression of being you. But this is only a temporary state. No matter how often or how strong it is, that ‘I’ feeling is not you. You’re not your past. You simply unconsciously identified with it at that moment. Identifying with these impressions is what gives you a convincing, but fleeting feeling of existence” (ibid., pp. 164–166, author’s translation, italics added). We explained that the functioning of the ego causes a biased interaction with the environment. It is based on identifications that generate duality: a distinction between “me” and that which is not. The “for-me-ness” mentioned above is partly due to the grasping of mental phenomena whose

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content can be, for example, past situations which are “performed” (such as a film that goes through the head10), where attention is focused on what was perceived in the scene, what nourished the subject’s psyche (for example, the way others looked at yourself, their approval, which is appraised as a “I want”) or, on the contrary, what caused a conscious or unconscious emotional injury (for example, the disapproval of others, which falls into the “I do not want” category). The grasp of this type of thought implicitly supports the “for-meness”: “It was me who did this, it was me who experienced it, I was perceived as such, I felt it, etc.” So, when attention is grasped by this type of thought – as by all other thoughts moreover – it maintains duality and ego (Lutz et al. 2007). This carries the past into the present and makes the subject get stuck in the quicksand of time: it gives the subject the wrong impression of a continuity of what they take for their very essence (the ego), whereas it is simply a narrative agent that changes with the cognitive context (ibid.; Hood 2011). This is the subject’s diachronic structure (Ey 2015). The functioning of the relative mind, including unconscious dynamics such as implicit attitudes, is problematic in terms of responsibility (see details in Hagège 2014): some of them generate discrimination, because the subject has unwittingly endorsed such cultural stereotypes (based on a distinction between the characteristics of the self and the characteristics of others; section 1.4.3; Hagège 2015d). All this can be related to the problem of concentrated and exogenous attention, tossed from perception to action, without the subject being aware of it. Indeed, the frequent, almost omnipresent grasping of attention on phenomena that arise in their mind or outside, prevents the subject from being present in their inner world, and thus from perceiving their implicit attitudes. Thus, too, we may not really be “present”, moment after moment, in a large part of our lives: we can sometimes be “a hundred leagues” from the present moment, without being aware of it. At that moment, the immediate physical reality is in the background of our consciousness... EXAMPLE.– Sometimes we can drive for miles on “autopilot”, that is, without really being aware of what we are doing. In general, it is because we get lost in thought (related to our ego), rumination or inner images for 10 This type of phenomenological grasp refers to the autonotic consciousness, defined as “the ‘phenomenological’ characteristic of episodic memory: it is this consciousness that allows me to relive recalled experiences and to travel mentally through time” (Eustache 2013, p. 54, author’s translation).

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example. Have you ever come to a place wondering where you’ve been? We can indeed be that much absent... It may otherwise be that on the way an event suddenly brings us back to the present moment and to ourselves (e.g. a motorist breaking ahead). At that moment, we realize that we were absent. In “autopilot”, the events around us, as well as our thoughts, emotions and sensations (of which we are more or less aware) can trigger old habits of thought – which are often useless, create minor or major suffering, prevent us from being perfectly open to what exists and therefore pose ethical problems. The functioning based on this essentially exogenous attention which is mainly focused on the reactive mind is called here the unconscious mental mode (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Principle of unconscious mental and conscious sensory modes. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 2.1.– The direction of the red and green arrows shows the objects on which attention is focused: unconsciously on the reactive mind (red arrow; exogenous and concentrated attention) or consciously on the sensations (green arrow; endogenous attention; Shapiro et al. 2006). The unconscious and conscious sensory mental modes are also illustrated in Figures 1.7 and 1.8B on the one hand and 1.8C and 1.8D on the other hand, respectively (and also in testimonies 2 of section 1.3.2.4.2, which clearly express the antagonism between these two modes). In the open conscious sensory mode, diffuse and shared attention can also be implemented (e.g. the mind simultaneously perceives all perceptible physical stimuli, that is, objects from the exteroception and interoception). If attention is rather focused on one point, it can also be focalized (see testimony below).

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TESTIMONY.– “I chose to wash my hands in [conscious sensory mode with shared attention...]. There is the sight of water running on my hands, the smell when I used soap, the sound when the water comes out of the tap and the feel of the water and soap running on my hands. It was a difficult exercise because I had to pay attention to all these senses at the same time, and this on both hands. After a few days, I decided to focus on touching only one specific place on my hand [conscious sensory mode with concentrated and focused attention]”(MBER student). In unconscious mental mode, far from our inner reality, we are not in a position to recognize our implicit attitudes. It has thus been argued elsewhere how responsibility therefore requires an extension of the field of consciousness to the inner world, particularly to the unconscious dynamics of the mind (Hagège 2014). Phenomenologically, another way of evoking this ethical solution is to switch from exogenous concentrated attention to vigilant attention. Depraz (2014) highlights her approach in relation to phenomenologists (notably Husserl, Levinas and Ricœur). She therefore conceptualizes it only in terms of relationships with others (and not with the NHE): “(1) Vigilance rhymes with presence (versus the closed individual); (2) in vigilance, there is the time for waiting open to the unknown (versus the memory of the past closed on the subject); (3) vigilance is like hope, this emotional experience of the future (versus the control of the known); (4) in vigilance, there is a precarious relationship with others where risk is a guarantee of authenticity (versus security of possession). [...] It is no longer just a question of enhancing my subjective individual quality of consciousness through the parameters of observing the duration or awakening the senses, but of opening it to the demands of others” (Depraz 2014, pp. 456–457, author’s translation). Vigilant attention is therefore more intense, sustained, diffuse and shared. It corresponds to an increase in the quality and quantity of information perceived in an instant. The last three points of Depraz’s (2014) definition of vigilant attention are illustrated in Figure 1.2: they correspond to the right-hand side of the figure, where the field of consciousness is enlarged and the perception less distorted by the projections and attentional orientations of the ego. Indeed, as illustrated by Finley’s quotations at the

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beginning of this section, it is mainly the unconscious mental mode that maintains the notion of a self (diachronic structure), the “for-me-ness” of the ego. So, being out of this mode relaxes these functional habits related to assessments and beliefs. In other words, instead of the unconscious mental mode, the open conscious sensory mode is mobilized (Figure 2.1). DEFINITION.– In our model, the open conscious sensory mode involves being present both in the inner world and in the outer world (human and non-human), in a dialogical relationship. In other words, this mode is such that the subject’s attention embraces the first six types of perception objects to the detriment of the seventh (mental phenomena). However, it is not a matter of being unconscious to your thoughts; this mode is therefore only fully operational in the spontaneous absence of a reactive mind (called “mental calm”; Lutz et al. 2007). We will detail this further below (see the notion of equanimity in section 2.3.3 and testimony 1 in section 1.3.2.4.2): this conscious sensory mode correlatively allows us to develop a way of being free of appraisals (by definition, ego-centered). 2.3.2.2. Values and responsibility According to the first chapter of this book, the other factor that is considered typical of orientation – alongside the attention and appraisal just mentioned – is values (section 1.3.2.1.3). On the one hand, we could try to promote universal presupposed values. With this in mind, Anselme (1989) proposed an “anthropological  morality capable of accommodating the diversity of opinions and the whole of evolutive humanity” (p. 15, author’s translation). According to him, respect for the five “essential values” (freedom, equity, truth, biological solidarity and socio-cultural solidarity) “only allows the survival of humanity and the preservation of the characteristics that constitute Humanity”. However, it seems obvious to us that his conception of Humanity is culturally conditioned; his proposal is not free of cultural bias. It seems to us that this universalist posture is ethically untenable for two reasons. First, if we consider a culture as a paradigm (Kuhn 1962/2008), that is a matrix through which we perceive and understand the world (see the individual role of the ego), then logic tends to postulate the incommensurability of cultures (Box 1.2): since any value is necessarily expressed in a language, and therefore dependent on a culture, there is no extracultural value, which could

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legitimately impose itself on all cultures. Second, when values are established as universal principles, they can sooner or later be instrumentalized to oppress cultural minorities who do not share them. Such a form of extremism has indeed led to deadly violence on several occasions in the past (e.g. the inquisition; see Hagège 2013). Thus, according to Ricœur, only a dialogue of cultures could potentially identify universalizable values (Fabre 2016). However, this assertion raises practical questions that I believe are unsolvable: how can we ensure that all human cultures are equitably represented in such dialogue? And how can we designate and delimit these different cultures? Indeed, the very designation of a culture raises ethical problems, in particular by masking inequalities and world views of “intracultural” minorities (which has led some anthropologists to refuse to use the term “culture”; Hagège 2013). At the other extreme, we could argue that all values are equal: those of jihadism as well as french republican values, for example. However, on the one hand, from a logical point of view, such an assertion is based on the implicit claim to speak from a place outside of any value system, in other words extracultural. Indeed, it presupposes being able to observe all these values in an overshadowing way and to gauge, to evaluate from the outside that they have the same value. We therefore find the same flaw as mentioned above: any assertion is always formulated from a context, a culture. On the other hand, it is clear that different values do not have the same consequences if they are applied: in terms of life, suffering, etc. (and of course the application context is also to be taken into account here). Thus, the middle way proposed here consists of a reflexive proposal, which includes explicit references to the context from which we are speaking and the limit of our words (in this case our present context). Using homology, with the three personal epistemological positions previously mentioned (dualist-universalist, multiplicist, and contextualist; see section 1.3.2.3.1), the positioning we will adopt here is therefore contextualism: which values seem most appropriate in our context? And “adapted”, for whom and for what? Given the “reasonable pluralism” (Rawls, cited by Prairat 2016), which means that our societies, without common absolutes, admit several conceptions of good life, a republican position is supposed to promote values corresponding to a morality of the just (and not the good), values that allow the different freedoms to coexist in the public space (ibid.). Then we would be tempted to simply brandish French republican values, since they are, a priori, adapted for everyone, and

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for everything, in France. However, it does not seem that simple to me, for two reasons. On the one hand, the conception of responsibility that we are talking about always implies a dialogical relationship between the inner and outer worlds. In this respect, we consider that each individual has a responsibility to question their own values and those of their environment, and to problematize with caution (Fabre 2016) their own path. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, the explicit values of the French Republic (freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and secularism) often seem antagonistic to its implicit values, which are those of the market economy. And, in the same way as for dual attitudes, effective actions are often more consistent with implicit values. Thus, we will later propose axiological principles referring to values (section 2.4). They will make it possible to overcome these two difficulties, and could serve as a reference in the context considered. In short, we will retain values that favor a mind based on an open functioning (Dambrun and Ricard 2011), not involving the ego (therefore a principled mind, not a dual one). The corresponding values (e.g. respect, solidarity, love, etc.) must therefore be compatible with relatedness and empathy. For the sake of coherence, here we specify this context: that of research on “education for” in the academic world, its application in educational and training environments and perhaps also in other intellectual or spiritual fields. All this certainly in France, and potentially in other Western countries or more culturally distant countries. We therefore postulate that this context could include that of the implementation of an education for responsibility at the French Public School, which could thus concern different actors such as training subjects, teachers or students. Obviously, the broader the context, the more likely the proposals will not be adapted to the “local variations” of the context. We will therefore try to generalize with caution. 2.3.3. Emotions, relationships and responsibility Before presenting these principles, we still have to briefly mention the application of the last two horsemen of the mind in terms of responsibility. We have detailed the strong propensity of minds to grasp thoughts and the obstacle this presents to their own emotions (Figures 1.7 and 1.8). However, the presence to one’s own or others’ emotions is important for the instantiation of the dialogical character of responsibility. It is made possible by the implementation of an open conscious sensory mode, instead of the

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unconscious mental mode that mobilizes the personal and cultural filter of projections. As a reminder (see the comment on Figure 2.1), it consists of consciously focusing on all present sensory perceptions (i.e. the first six types of perception objects), and accepting them without judgment. If this mode also includes the seventh type of perception objects (i.e. a conscious mind; see section 3.2.1.2), then attention is relatively disengaged from reactive thoughts insofar as they are present on an equal footing with the other simultaneous phenomena: in this case, there is in principle no phenomenological grasp11. In other words, attention is focused on the objects that usually screen the dialogical relationship between the inner and outer worlds (thoughts and emotions), and in doing so, this illusory barrier dissolves: the subject can better feel themselves and their environment. In this way, they experience an equanimous consciousness. Here is for example the experience reported by a subject in the process of learning about equanimity, where objective dialogism becomes conscious: TESTIMONY (1/2).– “Observing [my] thoughts also made me realize that my interactions with others are really important. That my words, my actions and my way of communicating with others are not insignificant, that they have an influence on my surroundings in a much more profound way than I thought. I realized this by trying to be more present to others and more attentive to the exchange with the other, to things that seemed very harmless to me before such as body language, chosen words, voice intonation, eyes, etc. That a single word could cause discomfort in the other, that an anecdote could make the other sad or nervous and that, on the contrary, some words, some actions as simple as a pat on the shoulder or a smile to a stranger can have very positive responses. I have observed all these influences in myself as well. I was able to see how others influence my approach to events for the rest of the day, my moods and my energy in general” (MBER student, author’s italics). DEFINITION.– Equanimity is a state of calm and stable consciousness where the mind perceives all phenomena and experiences, whatever their emotional valence (“I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”) or their source (Desbordes et al. 2015). It includes impartiality in dealing with phenomena, including (1) mental phenomena or emotions that are usually considered unpleasant because they are not repressed, denied or appraised, and 11 This case typically corresponds to vipasyana training (Lutz et al. 2007), in a subject where mental calm has not yet been achieved: this subject is still the object of their reactive mind (unconscious mental mode) when they are not in sensory or conscious perceptual mode.

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(2) experiences that are usually considered pleasant because they do not create over-excitement, a desire to prolong them, or the temptation to become attached to or dependent on them (ibid.)12. Applied to the attitudes developed above, this state corresponds to the quintessence of relatedness and empathy: the subject is present to their own emotions and perceives those of others, with an equanimous presence, such that fusion and disconnection are impossible. Thus, the subject has an identical attitude towards their own emotions and those of others: not being in phenomenological grasp or in identification, their consciousness perceives their emotions “as if they were those of another”, being touched, but not identified... they are thus in empathy with themselves. Therefore, the subject literally perceives “themselves as another” (according to Ricœur’s formula, 1990). On the other hand, splitting with emotions and emotional contagion attitudes (with others or with NHE) restrict the field of consciousness, because they coincide with concentrated attention (on cognitive and emotional aspects respectively, such that these aspects exclusively concern the self or the environment). Thus, the establishment of a dialogical relationship between oneself and one’s environment corresponds, from a psychosociological point of view, to an affective (synonymous here with “emotional”) link with this environment, coupled with an epistemic distance that makes it possible not to feel confounded with this environment: it is empathy and relatedness (Hagège et al. 2009). As we will develop below, the most advanced equanimity is a state of consciousness where perceived information is not biased by the past, or by personal or cultural preferences: this state of consciousness is therefore close 12 It seems to me that we can actually distinguish two levels of equanimity. The first corresponds to the inhibition of the passage from step 4 to 5 in Figure 1.3: there is appraisal without further grasping (i.e. without identification or rejection): the subject makes neither one nor two with the appraisal of perceived phenomena. Training in this corresponds to the regulation of emotions (Figure 1.8C; Desbordes et al. 2015). This makes it possible to gradually achieve the vacuity of the ego: engrammation (step 6 of Figure 1.3) does not take place, which consequently reduces behavioral trends (via a weakening of the neural network mobilized by the implementation of this perception-reaction scheme). The second, more advanced level of equanimity refers to a functioning in which perception, undistorted, is operated without conceptual or phenomenological grasp (the perceived reality is similar to the blue line, step 0, at the top of Figure 1.3); there is neither attentional inhibition, nor magnification, nor ignorance. If a subject perceives this environment in a neutral, undistorted way, then their principled mind embraces the ultimate reality (this corresponds to the realization of the vacuity of phenomena).

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to a perception of ultimate reality by the principled mind. It is a peaceful attitude towards what is perceived, such that there is no appraisal and therefore no desire to avoid or prolong sensations (not as in Figure 1.7). Perceptions are not ignored either. When I talk about equanimity in class, a common reaction from students is: “Ah, but then it means that you don’t feel anything anymore, that you don’t have any emotion? It’s not something you want...” This reaction is normal. A fear of the ego manifests itself. However, an equanimous consciousness has nothing to do with a robot or a zombie; it is exactly the opposite. Everything is perceived much more intensely, with greater acuity and vivacity. Since the subject is not in the fog perpetuated by the filters of an ego – whose illusory character has been revealed – then the colors are more vivid, their own emotions (harmonious) and those of others felt more intensely. This is because there is no longer a feeling of separation. There is no longer any labeling, appraisal, attempt to escape or avoid the present experience. There is experience and sensations in the raw state and the subject’s cognition still works. They have a memory. Their body knows what has been learned. However, they no longer act in the present according to their past or their personal projects. They act according to the cosmos. That is the difference. Moreover, some subjects experience this kind of experience brutally and spontaneously13, sometimes transiently. They then recognize its extraordinary knowledgeable character. This sudden awakening is then often interpreted by the subject according to their beliefs (Vivekananda 2007). Box 2.1. Notable differences between an equanimous conscient subject and a robot or zombie

Thus, as the student in the previous testimony expresses it: TESTIMONY (2/2).– “In general, I feel like I wake up a little more every day and I’m just more alive since I started practicing [meditation]. I have the impression that I have spent a large part of my life asleep and I think that meditation is now necessary to my life insofar as it is a practice that makes me feel truly alive because I truly experience every sensation, every thought; 13 It seems interesting to me to note that several subjects describe having had this kind of experience of awakening, of liberation from ego conditioning, just or shortly after emotional episodes resembling depression, in which they have abandoned any personal desire or personal needs (e.g. Quirion 2013; Tolle 2000). I interpret this common point as the fact that they let their emotions pass through them without grasping or identifying them: the latter would then have been integrated, which would have allowed their minds to definitively let go of the illusion of the ego.

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meditation allows me to observe, it makes me focus on ‘what is happening’ now rather than on ancillary thoughts from the past or worries which I simply have no way to control”. The development of this vigilant attention, being phenomenologically present with regards to the self, to others and to the NHE, corresponds to the development of the synchronic structure of conscious being, to the detriment of its diachronic structure (Ey 2015). This requires a decrease in phenomenological grasp, especially of reactive thoughts and emotions, and an increase in consciousness – which allows the mind not to be driven by (or “glued” in) unconscious processes such as “for-me-ness” and implicit attitudes. When attention covers the entire perceptual field, without preferential orientation (i.e. without attentional magnification or inhibition), the subject is fully aware of themselves and their environment (Desbordes et al. 2015). On the contrary, when exogenous attention leads to reducing consciousness to a phenomenon, the subject neglects at that moment a part of themselves and their environment in their subjective reality (everything that is not consciously perceived as cognitively processed by system 1). They are no longer, at that time, in a dialogical relationship with their environment. 2.4. Assessment: criteria for guiding towards responsibility In summary, we have just seen that an ideal of responsibility, as far as the four horsemen of the mind are concerned, presupposes basic mechanisms such as an undistorted perception, an absence of identification, of phenomenological grasp, of appraisal and therefore of ego... We will specify this model later on, through the notion of harmony (section 2.4.3). The reader could conceive this ideal as a pure theoretical invention, unattainable in practice. That is why we would like to point out that this does not seem to be the case. Although these are a limited number of subjects a priori, some have reported a phenomenological experience that could be formulated with our words as a liberation from the ego (or rather an exit from the illusion of the ego). Thus, authors have described, in their own words, that they began their lives with an ego, that their minds once saw the illusion of it, and that they now live without the distorting prism of the ego, the mind perfectly aware of the present moment. This transformation has been exclusive of any religious affiliation. They explain in their own way the proponents of this transformation of the mind (e.g. Finley 2003; Quirion 2013; Tolle 2000).

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However, “spiritual” in French, for example, literally means “relative to the mind”. So, such a transformation can be described as “spiritual” and it is probably not utopian. Moreover, it has been described in some traditions, particularly in the East (Gampopa 1999; Patanjali 1991; Vivekananda 2007), and we assume that it has occurred in most people described as holy, just or prophetic, depending on the monotheistic religion concerned. 2.4.1. Coherence We have asked above the question of how to proceed, when immersed in a situation, to know the ethical choice, in other words, on the basis of which criteria can action be directed responsibly? Criteria such as the correspondence between action and values compatible with relatedness and empathy (e.g. tolerance, respect, solidarity, love, etc.) could be used. This correspondence is called coherence (or integrity; Sauvé 2000; Hagège 2015b). However, it is not easy to establish, because as we have largely detailed, the subject is confused by their projections: they act in an egocentered way because of the phenomenological grasp and identification with a self and phenomena (see “I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”; reviewed by Chambers et al. 2009), and they are not aware of all its functioning (Hagège 2014). Thus, for example, the subject may believe that they are tolerant, but may not be aware of unconscious functioning such as intolerant judgments (mental phenomena) or discrimination (actions). In other words, from their relative point of view, they believe they are doing one thing, but in fact, from the ultimate point of view, they are doing something else. Such inconsistency implies implicit attitudes and seems to be widespread among ordinary people (Hagège 2014, 2015b). This example illustrates the gap between the subjective world and the ultimate reality14, that is, between the subject’s mind and the principled mind: this noncorrespondence is due to the subject’s unconscious. It is problematic in

14 Here, it would also be correct to write: “between the subjective world and the objective world”, because, for example, actions can be appraised objectively by scientists or by a court. However, I prefer the term “ultimate reality” here for two reasons. First, one of the aspirations of objective descriptions is to tend towards those of ultimate reality. Second, my phenomenological modeling does not include a spiritual counterpart to the objective world. Indeed, I do not see to which phenomenological experience a collective relative mind could correspond. That is why, in my opinion, the relevant line of a semantic breakthrough for these arguments is between the relative and the absolute (i.e. the ultimate).

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terms of responsibility and it explains the illusory nature of the ego. This leads us to formulate two consequences. First, coherence is based on the clarity of the mind which first allows the subject to realize their own inconsistencies. Then, it requires an expansion of consciousness (Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4). Thus, the educational solution proposed here would be that the subject clarifies their mind, that they free space to perceive directly, that is, to feel, the most harmonious solution (see section 2.4.3 for an explanation of the link between harmony and mind), in a way that is not dictated by the ego and therefore not based on a dual functioning. This criterion seems to us to be fundamental. For this reason, we postulate that the subject should be in an equanimous consciousness. A broader formulation of this educational goal would be, for example: “develop vigilant attention, cognitive flexibility, empathy and relatedness, freeing oneself from the functioning of the ego, and thus learning to perceive the ultimate reality, developing one’s consciousness towards a principled functioning of one’s mind”. We will see that the means proposed here to clarify the mind is the association of reflexivities with meditation. Second, coherence can also be defined as a perfect correspondence between relative reality and ultimate reality (Hagège 2014). Consequently, the gnoseological hypothesis (see section 2.3.1), which pragmatically postulates the existence of ultimate reality and relative reality, seems necessary to think about the notion of coherence, and therefore that of responsibility (Hagège 2014). This distinction between, on the one hand, relative reality and (relative) mind, and, on the other hand, ultimate reality and principled mind, allows us to think heuristically about education for responsibility: this is what we propose here as the epistemological breakthrough that supports this field of research (Box 2.2). Once again, our argument supports that a major obstacle to thinking about responsibility, on the one hand, and embodying it, on the other, is the confusion, respectively at the theoretical (scientific) and phenomenological levels, between relative reality and ultimate reality (as reflected in the polysemies of the terms “world” and “mind”). The purpose of education for responsibility could therefore also be summarized as follows: “Awareness that relative reality is not the ultimate reality, to train the mind to perceive this, to function in an increasingly coherent way, to promote empathy and affiliation”. Box 2.2. Formulation of the purpose of an education for responsibility

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In this sense, it has already been pointed out that responsibility implies the awareness of the self that acts, of the other (the HE), of the object (the NHE), and of “the possible impact of one’s action or non-action” (Sauvé 2000, p. 82, author’s translation). This coincides with our model involving empathy and relatedness. These proposals have a significant impact on research methods and pedagogical practices in education for responsibility. Indeed, a researcher will only be able to produce knowledge at the level of the development of their consciousness: if we theoretically learn about the ego, the two realities, etc., and we do not train to see how they function in our own way of experiencing things, then we would be like pastry chefs specializing in strawberry tartlets without ever tasting one, or even, perhaps, without having seen a strawberry in our lives (only reading descriptions in books); we would produce a disembodied and probably, therefore, more limited knowledge. We could therefore learn to distinguish these two types of realities and gain clarity of mind, which would allow our texts to be less confused by our own projections15. Moreover, the efficiency of “education for” seems to depend on the educator’s questioning of their functioning and values, in order to gain coherence (Berger et al. 2009). In this way, an educator or trainer would gain effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy in embodying what they are aiming for, by committing to transforming himself or herself in this way. In summary, it seems fundamental to us that a researcher or actor in education for responsibility should also commit to developing their responsibility... to really know what they are talking about and to be a living model of it (Hagège 2013). These developments therefore lead us to ask an essential question for education for responsibility and research in this field: how can we know and change our own mind? We will propose some answers in Chapter 3 of this book. 2.4.2. The motivation for innovation In summary of the previous section, responsibility invites the subject to choose explicit values derived from a reflexive dialogism, and also to give 15 Observing your consciousness seems more practical than observing a strawberry tartlet, because you always have the first one with you, while the second one doesn’t necessarily last long!

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themselves the means to act in coherence with these values. Potential obstacles to this consist of ego reflexes, which make us believe via the reactive mind that we are not concerned by these changes: “oh well, I am fine, I act in a coherent way with my values, therefore this story of implicit attitudes does not concern me too much”, in other words, implicitly, “I am someone that is good anyway”, and perhaps even “it is quite possible that I am better than others”. Such a comparative judgment denotes a lack of equanimity; an ego game. Such thoughts seem to be widespread, according to psychosociological studies (Myers 2009). The logical conclusion is that each person cannot be better than another (ibid.). We refer here too to the incommensurability of cultures (the “best” being contextual and dependent on values). In short, we can reasonably assume that we are no better than others and no worse either. We may be affected by these changes. So, it is not a question of self-congratulation or self-flagellation, but of actively seeking, with tenderness and kindness towards oneself, our own flaws: to see where we are not coherent, to become aware of these insufficiencies and accept them gently. It is difficult to see, because the ego is full of resources to hide these flaws from us; it survives thanks to our unconscious functioning. We may wish to change this. If we are attentive, if we are sharp, we will see that behind these buffer zones (Figure 1.6), there is suffering. EXAMPLE.– I have a personal anecdote to share about this. I was on a meditation retreat and probably more self-conscious than usual. I wanted to talk to someone I noticed, because I thought it would serve some of my explicit values. So, one day, in the canteen, I found myself next to her in the queue and we started talking. We walked side by side once our trays were full and the logical next step would have been for us to sit down together to eat the meal and talk more, as I had hoped. However, at that moment, I changed direction without saying a word and went to sit in a place where there was only room for one person. Once seated, thoughts came up: “What am I doing here? Why did I leave? What happened?” I didn’t understand what had happened. I then spoke with a psychologist friend who was participating in the retreat to help me understand. And then after a while, everything became clear: my body, in that moment, had behaved like an automaton, reacting to old fears buried in my psyche. I suddenly understood a whole part of my existence, a whole set of past situations in which I had been sorry for not having any luck, for not having access to this type of person, because they did not come to me. I now clearly saw that I had reproduced this pattern of unconscious flight many times without being an ounce conscious. It was out of fear of rejection. This is the ironic aspect of

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the functioning of the ego: to avoid experiencing a feeling of rejection, an automatism had been set up in which, precisely, I felt rejected. I recreated and projected my own wound on the world, attributing purely internal causes to the outer world. And all this was absolutely unconscious until now and this realization was almost overwhelming for me. This personal example thus aims to illustrate that one can live for years in total incoherence (here, the desire to create links with a certain type of person and the action incompatible with such creation) without being aware of it. You have probably already had the impression that a type of situation that you perceive as unpleasant is repeated “particularly at home” (perhaps more than at your neighbor’s house). This can generate thoughts such as: “Again! Why me? Do I have bad luck or what? What have I done wrong?” You can be pretty sure that this is a repetition of a pattern shaped by buried wounds. And the ego is such that it prevents us from seeing our share of responsibility in the situation. One could even say that this is its ultimate purpose, because it maintains its power. It is not pleasant or comfortable to see this at home. This breaks our image of ourselves, which allows our ego to justify its own existence – which is no less illusory, because it is all relative. Also, in a similar way, when the memory of a past event manifests itself in thought, this is the symptom that the underlying emotion is not integrated. The more we think about it, the more it is a sign that the memory engram corresponding to the memorized event is intense and “ready to escape”. If instead of a thought, it is a situation that repeats itself (as mentioned above), then it indicates the presence of an even deeper wound. Thus, courageous is the one who looks at and accepts their own suffering without projecting it onto others or letting the ego pretend to avoid it – by absorbing consciousness into the reactive mind for example. Courage is indeed linked to responsibility (Sauvé 2000). Such a change of object (from a projective mode, which looks outside – see the first five objects of perception – to a reflexive mode, which looks inside – see the sixth and seventh objects of perception – then to a dialogical mode, which looks at the interaction between inside and outside), requires a change in motivation: the transition from a known functioning, which secures us, to an unknown functioning, in which we innovate. This passage, commonly referred to as “letting go” (Finley 2003), involves, among other things, the release of fears.

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TESTIMONY.– “The observation of [my functionings] has allowed me to get to know myself better, without judging myself, but simply by observing myself with kindness and realizing how much all these things repeat themselves and prevent me from living in the present moment with awareness and healthy living. Mediation allows me to see better these dynamics and to not be overwhelmed by cognitive distortions in situations that awaken one of these tendencies. It simply allows me to take these dynamics into account to lead a healthier and more conscious life. These few months of practice [of meditation] have been the source of many life lessons for me. The way I want to live now has changed” (MBER module student). We do not suggest that a subject works on only one type of motivation, and then can move on to another. Indeed, according to a model developed in our previous home laboratory (Favre 2007), three motivation systems (MS) coexist in ordinary adults. Briefly, at birth, the baby essentially uses the safety motivation system (SM1); they function with external references (their pleasure and relief of frustrations are brought from the outside, for example: when they are brought food). Naturally and quickly, an innovation motivation system (SM2) is set up where the child takes pleasure in internal reference, in gaining autonomy, overcoming difficulties, etc. (e.g. when they crawl to explore the environment, even if it means putting their fingers in the plug socket!). In this system, which is typical of learning, the subject leaves their comfort zone – and this is not always assessed as pleasant – and will only be able to experience pleasure later, after having adapted to the new conditions. SM1 is the basis of SM2: it seems that the subject needs to feel safe in the known in order to dare to go towards the unknown. Thus, paradoxically, people in an uncomfortable situation (e.g. violent environment) sometimes prefer to stay there rather than attempt change (see Box 1.4). A third motivation system, the parasitic safety system (SM1p), can be set up at the same time. It corresponds to the internalization of “foreign programs” (by analogy with a computer virus) that parasitize its SM2 and create addictive phenomena (to substances, thoughts, situations, etc.). The path towards responsibility that is proposed here implies “let loose” a known functioning, motivated by the SM1 or the SM1p: that of the ego, where there are strong phenomenological grasps, attempts to suppress emotions – and we have mentioned above that they could be related to certain addictions – and a concentrated and exogenous attention. This letting go therefore implies cognitive defusion and decentering (see these concepts in section 1.3.2.4.2). This new functioning to be learned is motivated by SM2: the mind, freed from the illusion of the ego, and thus from past personal and cultural

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conditioning, leaves room for the new, for harmony, for creativity and for connection. We believe that there is a form of addiction to the ego, a parasitic security to operate according to this known pattern, even when it is hindering and obsolete for us. It would notably result in an addiction to grasping and to escape strategies from emotions assessed as negative. These emotional avoidances would lead to an illusory form of pleasure (not permanent; Dambrun and Ricard 2011) to avoid consciously experiencing what is considered as a negative emotion. In this regard, one of my students in the meditation module (MBER) had observed their tendency to experience an “I want”, a grasping for the mechanisms of the ego, a tendency they had compared to Stockholm syndrome: the ego would be like a prison guard with whom the subject identifies, in whom they trust and whose existence they justify, while this prison guard imprisons the subject. The latter thus ignores the origin of their suffering, of which they perceived only a part of. I found the picture particularly accurate. In short, responsibility implies daring to test new subjective functioning oneself, which requires a motivation for innovation. It involves opening one’s mind to the creative, to the new, more than to the reactive. 2.4.3. Harmony Now, we will consider a third benchmark for responsibility. Given the ordinary subjective functioning based on ego, given the fact that we are not transparent to ourselves and that, on the contrary, part of what we do and think is unknown to us, an obstacle to responsibility is that we may feel that we are moving towards chosen goals, or acting in coherence with our values, although this is not the case (see example section 2.4.2). Our consciousness, wandered too much and restricted by frequently exogenous attention, then does not sufficiently perceive what is happening in us and perceives our outer world in a distorted, biased way. This narrow perception of the interaction between the outer world and oneself causes disharmonies. The opposite of disharmony obviously corresponds to harmony. Is a mind out of the illusion of the ego harmonious? But what is harmony, would it be a notion that is only qualitative and subjective? We propose below some reasoned answers (which can be summarized with a yes and a no, respectively for each question).

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2.4.3.1. Qualitative approaches to harmony From a qualitative point of view, two aspects of harmony can be identified. First, meaning 2 from Littré refers to an “arrangement between the parties of a whole, so that they compete for the same end goal” and the 4th refers to the notion of several parties that agree (Littré 2015c). In Rousseau’s (Richir 2015) and Leibniz’s work (De Gaudemar 2015), we come across the idea of an intrinsically harmonious nature with which humanity must resonate (or resonates de facto in their own nature; see section 2.4.3.2, the physical nature of resonance). Second, meanings 3, 5 and 6 refer to the pleasant nature of an object, discourse or sound (Littré 2015c). From an intrapsychic point of view, obnubilant emotions, where there is a strong phenomenological grasp (often called “passions”), lock consciousness inside and are perceived as disharmonious. Thus, in ancient Greek philosophy, they were associated with psychological pathologies (Richir 2015). Harmony therefore refers qualitatively to a healthy mind and a sense of connection that generates emotions that are considered pleasant, moderate – implied without grasping – and open to others and the world. In other words, empathy and relatedness are essentially harmonious. We will come back to this later (section 2.4.3.2). Esthetically, beauty has been defined as harmony, based on “a certain reasonable respectability maintainted in all parts [...], so that nothing can be added, diminished or changed, without surprisingly damaging work” (Alberti cited by Charles 2015). This is in line with the notions of empathy and relatedness in that there is a presence, an affective relationship (not as in the splitting with emotions), but which is not too abundant, not overloaded (as in affective fusion): “Basic goodness is concerned with generosity and a sense of trust in oneself. When that sense of trust comes through, we develop what is known as harmony. […] Harmony has to be related to some sense of lusciousness or richness. That is one aspect of harmony. The other aspect is a sense of spaciousness and openness. The lusciousness almost has the qualities of a Jewish mother: it is plentiful, rich and there is lots of stuff on the table,

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so to speak. The openness and spaciousness are like a Japanese home, where things are very sparse. There is no big furniture, no Victorian stuffed sofa, just mats. [...] So true harmony is the Jewish home and the Japanese home put together quite conventiently. When such harmony takes place properly and fully, there is also joy – for the very reason that you are not struggling to create the harmony” (Trungpa 1979, pp. 17–18). We find in the description of this “primordial goodness”, a characteristic of the principled mind according to Tibetan tradition, the same idea of a harmony that results from an intermediate attitude (or the right marriage) between on the one hand the overabundance of a quality of mind or a feeling, and on the other hand the absence of this quality or the emotional deprivation. There is a warm, abundant presence, which at the same time leaves all the space for forms and others to exist: it is not invasive (and therefore unsuitable), nor cold or empty. Obviously, the functioning of the relative mind, because of the ego, does not allow it to function in the same finality as others and in resonance with them. For example, reactive pejorative thoughts can generate physiological disorders (e.g. stress), have judgments or reject others. In this regard, we have referred to the case of violent radicalization. By definition, the ego is illusorily structured in relation to what it believes itself to be distinct, separate, or even in opposition of: what is “me”, oneself (identity), by definition, is no other (otherness). Moreover, the phenomenological grasp of emotions and other phenomena generates a duality that is accompanied by fundamental dissatisfaction (Dambrun and Ricard 2011): the ego is disharmonious and generates disharmony. On the other hand, responsibility, which is based on unity, reliance, equanimous consciousness, empathy and relatedness, goes hand in hand with harmonious functioning: the latter does not create suffering in others, nor does it destroy the non-human environment. Moreover, the reconciliation of the Western concept of corporate social responsibility with Chinese culture implies, according to L. Wang and Juslin (2009), to consider harmony, which refers to the idea of respecting nature (harmony between humans and nature according to Taoism) and to love others (interpersonal harmony according to Confucius). This conception of responsibility includes – as harmony – the relationship with others (see empathy) and the relationship with

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the non-human (see relatedness). In Taoism, the notion of harmony, conceived as a transformation that integrates the dialogical relationship between the outer and inner worlds, is also linked to that of unity (Cheng 2009). 2.4.3.2. Quantitative approaches to harmony From a quantitative point of view, in the physical and mathematical sciences, harmony refers to a certain type of regularity. For Pythagoras, the universe was governed by the proportionality and harmony of numbers (Detienne and Saintillan 2015). For Kepler too, there is harmony in the universe, via five planes (geometry, arithmetic, music, astrology and astronomy), as he believes the regularity of the movement of the planets testifies to this (Durand 2015). The mathematics of harmony is based on five basic geometric relationships found in different Eastern traditions, as well as in Greek traditions (for example, five Platonic solids; Stakhov 2006). 2.4.3.2.1. Self-referentiality One of the five basic relationships is given by the number Phi [ϕ = (1 + √5)/2 ~1.618], also called the “golden number”. The golden number can be expressed in self-referential forms [ϕ = √(ϕ + 1) = 1 + 1/ϕ]16, i.e. it is defined by referring to itself. When the proportion between two geometric elements is of Phi size, as in ancient constructions or fractal structures found in nature, a harmonious esthetic impression emerges (ibid.). The mathematics of harmony is related to the mathematics of fractals. For example, the Fibonacci sequence [Fn+2 = Fn+1 + Fn] is such that the quotients between two consecutive terms are the best approximations of the golden number. The Fibonacci sequence can be used as a basis for the construction of invariant (fractal) scale geometries and, then, these are focused on their center (such as the winding shell of a snail or galaxy). Fractals are constructed, like the Fibonacci sequence, by recursion (one term from the previous one). The mathematics of harmony therefore concerns objects that have a remarkable structure and properties. 2.4.3.2.2. Resonance The geometric proportions that respect the golden number materialize harmony in a static way. From a dynamic point of view, music is all the more harmonious, in the mathematical sense of the word, if it respects these regularities. For example, Johann Sebastian Bach would have been inspired 16 The golden number is the only positive solution to these equations.

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by plans of cathedrals built according to the golden number to compose pieces. Another dynamic way, which we have mentioned above with regard to the qualitative side of harmony, corresponds to the phenomenon of resonance. DEFINITION.– Resonance refers to the case where a system is able to easily store and dissipate energy in another mode, under the effect of periodic stress. If the load is applied at a frequency equal to the natural frequency of the system, the total energy increases and the amplitude of the oscillations of the system increases regularly. EXAMPLES.– – By pushing a swing with the correct periodicity, the amplitude of oscillations increases with each push (i.e. the swing resonates with the pushes). – Buildings can resonate with earthquake frequencies and dissipate energy through collapsing. So do bridges, with the frequency of steps or wind gusts. That is why it is forbidden to march on a bridge. The latter could start vibrating like a rubber band before breaking. This is one reason why modern bridges have many overhead cables rising above the bridge (clearly visible on the Millau bridge for example): these “decorations” complicate the natural frequencies, to the point of making it unlikely that a wave will enter in resonance with the bridge. – The tidal phenomenon, due to the variation of gravitational forces (higher when the moon, earth and sun are aligned), actually affects the entire surface of the globe, including the earth’s crust. The amplitude and frequency of the tide varies according to various parameters, including the texture (rheology) and the surface’s geometry. For example, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean do not have the same shape, so waves, due to the comings and goings of water (due to the variation of the gravitational force), do not propagate in the same way. These waves resonate more or less with the regional basins (depending on their layout): the greater the resonance, the greater the amplitude of the tide. So now, if we take the example of a musical instrument, we can see that it can resonate several notes, not just one. Similarly, a professional singer learns to send each note, according to its pitch, into the appropriate resonator. Each resonator can amplify a set of vibration frequencies. In the

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latter case, resonators are bones of the body. For example, those of the rib cage for low-pitched sounds, those of the face for median sounds, and the upper part of the skull for high-pitched sounds (that’s why sopranos often sing with the chin retracted: to better send sound waves upwards). If you have already heard live opera, you have been able to appreciate how much sound can be amplified in this way! We speak of a resonance spectrum, to designate all the frequencies that can be amplified by a resonator. Moreover, in this respect, we call harmonics the frequencies of higher orders. Have you ever listened to the sound of a Tibetan singing bowl? I recommend it to you. The appropriate stimulation of a metal alloy bowl with a stick, known as a striker, simultaneously produces sounds of different pitches, producing a harmonious accord (in the qualitative and quantitative sense of the term). 2.4.3.2.3. Electromagnetic phenomena in humans Let us now turn to what is of most concern to us in this book. A human body also has a complex natural frequency (just like the Millau Bridge). Verbal thinking, which can be assumed to correlate at the cerebral level with some internal communication (i.e. with transmissions of an electrochemical nature), also corresponds to a vibration, materialized in the form of a small electromagnetic field. An emotion also vibrates at a certain frequency. It seems clear that the frequency of joy is higher than that of sadness, for example. In terms of thoughts and emotions, a depressed person and a happy person do not vibrate in the same way. Moreover, when you know a person, you can sometimes feel their inner state, even though they do not let it appear outwardly (though this can also happen when you don’t know them). This psychic state can also be seen in the pitch of their voice, often lower in the case of sadness and higher in the case of joy. In the same vein, it is probably thanks to these vibratory frequencies that an animal can feel instantly if you are afraid, for example – those who practice horseback riding know it well. It therefore seems likely that the Pygmalion effect (see section 1.3.2.3.1) proceeds from this type of process, involving a vector that is in part physical (which is therefore matter, energy and information). Experimental evidence of this type of process, with regard to intercellular communication, has been provided over the decades. These involve electromagnetic radiation (in the ultraviolet, visible or near-infrared wavelengths), sound (reviewed by Scholkmann et al. 2013) and/or biophotons (Fels 2009). In other words, a cell seems to be able to perceive the vibrations of a distant cell by this type of wave.

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The extrasensory perception of physical phenomena mentioned in section 1.3.1.1.3 (referring to what we have called “direct knowledge”) probably has these electromagnetic vibrations as its physical support. We thus postulate that a subject can feel, at least unconsciously, by these kind of waves, what another person thinks, even if this thought is not expressed aloud. Add to this the fact that our thoughts also have an impact on ourselves, because of the trends, beliefs, judgments, etc. that they reinforce in us, and therefore indirectly on our environment (human and nonhuman). Such an indirect effect has been clearly demonstrated in the psychotherapeutic field (Cottraux 2007a) and in experimental psychology (Myers 2009). Thus, our responsibility also clearly includes that of our own thoughts (“even if no one else hears them”... consciously). With experience, I was able to appreciate the inherently morbid and confining nature of my reactive mind. It makes us automatons, and makes us suffer in a very direct, very immediate way. It generates tensions in the body and mind. It is a bit like walking with heavy chains on your feet: every reactive thought produces in the mind – at least unconsciously – a similar effect as that of the sensation of heavy metal on an already bruised ankle. Cultivating inner calm means taking care of yourself in a very basic, and very fundamental way. It means being softer, more loving towards yourself. Indeed, there is ample experimental evidence of the impact of a person’s state of mind (calm or agitated) on mental and physiological health (see section 3.2.4). TESTIMONY.– “I also realized during this module that there was a profound lack of kindness towards myself, a profound lack of gentleness. That the judgments I had of myself were much harsher than those I would have of an outsider. I am now trying to show more acceptance, less judgment about myself. I find that this process makes my thoughts much healthier, much more positive than before and makes me less prone to panic attacks” (MBER module student). We have just argued in favor of the idea that mental phenomena have ethical consequences, because they have a physical dimension, therefore an impact on the human (or living) environment, including the subject who is the place of their emission. Now we will more precisely consider that not all human beings have the same vibratory frequency according to their thoughts and state of consciousness in particular, and that their natural frequency

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therefore evolves. This premise may seem innovative from the point of view of Western science, but it is quite trivial and basic in traditional Eastern medicines (ayurveda, Chinese medicine, etc.). It is even, from a certain point of view, a founder of these traditions. It seems clear to me that the strength of the direct effect mentioned, for example, in the Pygmalion effect, depends on at least three factors: the natural frequency of the emitting individual, that of the receiving individual, and the quality of the emitted vibration (more or less harmonious). In other words, the premise implies that the observed effects of mind on matter would be more intense with a subject freed from the illusion of the ego, than with an ordinary subject, hence their greater responsibility. This is another way of considering that responsibility increases with consciousness. It also seems that on average (with a differential effect according to individuals) anything that reduces the state of consciousness (psychotropic drugs, alcohol, television, phenomenological understandings in general, etc.) also tends to decrease the vibratory rate. There are apparently some physical means to objectify this vibratory rate, in relation to what is called the “aura” (Prakash et al. 2015), and which can indeed, in accordance with the vision advanced here, be interpreted in a purely physical way (Duerden 2004). Also, techniques are available to evaluate biophoton flows (Korotkov et al. 2010). In other words, the state of consciousness would correspond to certain electromagnetic vibrations that can be detected by physical instruments. The “placebo effect” refers to the fact that a lump of sugar can cure an infection, as long as the subject believes they are ingesting a drug that cures their condition (instead of sugar). This effect can affect up to two thirds of participants with a wide range of conditions (reviewed by Price et al. 2008). The reason why some subjects respond to the placebo effect and others do not is scientifically unknown (ibid.). Some authors suggest that the difference lies in the meaning that the subject attributes to their experience: the more significant the latter, the more effective the placebo effect would be (Moerman and Jonas 2002). Also, it seems that the verbal suggestion (by the experimenter who mentions the presence of an active molecule) and the subject’s previous experience (confronted beforehand with an effective or ineffective drug) determine the magnitude of the placebo effect (reviewed by Price et al. 2008). It would seem that this effect involves brain structures that are also mobilized in the regulation of emotions and in reward/aversion

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systems (ibid.). Some of the placebo effects would be mediated by prediction, desire of change and emotions, while another is the result of less conscious processes, similar to classical conditioning (ibid.). In any case, this process seems similar to the Pygmalion effect mentioned above: except that here the result does not take place in others (a student), but in the subject’s own body. In terms of mechanism, scientific knowledge and assumptions seem weak. HYPOTHESES.– The belief that one has ingested a healing drug would resonate physically (via thoughts and emotions associated with it) with the body in a way that promotes healing and that, literally, informs the body. The placebo effect would therefore be related to the performativity of thoughts (see section 1.3.2.3.1). It would simply be a partly electromagnetic phenomenon. Also, a story, an emotion, a film, a situation can resonate within us. It is an expression: “what you say resonates with me”. Such resonance can be reactive (disharmonious) or creative (harmonious), depending on whether it lowers the vibratory rate by reinforcing an aspect of separation (and causing more grasping, feeding the ego) or whether it increases it by intensifying the feeling of reliance and helping to let go. In this vein, feelings towards strangers can be explained. I have often been surprised to see that in an assembly of such people, a very fast connection can be established with a person who shares many interests with me. Some remained close friends for another twenty years after such a “fortuitous” meeting. In a similar way, I was sometimes able to feel a kind of immediate aversion towards some people, without even knowing them. “I’m not feeling this person”, as the popular expression goes. You may also have had this kind of experience. Obviously, in an assembly of people, there are also some people who are hardly noticed, if at all. This includes the “I want”, “I do not want” and “I do not see” resulting from automatic appraisal on the basis of personal preferences. These phenomena can also be interpreted through the notion of resonance. The “I want” and the “I do not want” resonate with my vibrations, my engrams, my memory, while the “I do not see”, does not. A final example, among other possible examples, concerns recurring thoughts or situations (whether they are interpreted as disturbing, unpleasant, painful, etc. or, on the contrary, pleasant). Let us consider on the one hand each non-integrated (and therefore potentially reactive) emotion as an energetic engram vibrating according to a specific complex frequency,

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embedded in the body, and on the other hand each individual as being interdependent with their environment (and more broadly with the cosmos). The frequency of this engram depends on the past situation in which it was memorized, and on the specific subjective way of experiencing this separation event (e.g. abandonment, rejection, humiliation, etc.). Thus, as soon as there is a close situation in the individual’s environment, which corresponds at least partially to the engram, there is a resonance phenomenon between the two: the vibratory amplitude of the emotion increases, the engram is no longer embedded, especially since the frequency of the situation is similar to that of the emotion. This resonance simply makes us feel the emotion, more or less consciously; it manifests itself through the body in the form of physiological changes. If there is no corresponding situation in the environment, or if a situation only vaguely corresponds, then vibration will generally manifest itself as reactive thoughts, associated with a corresponding repertoire of actions (see examples 1 and 2 in section 1.3.2.4.2). In this way, all our reactive thoughts are the symptom of the vibration of an emotional engram. We could express in a final way that emotion awaits only that: a corresponding situation to vibrate to the maximum, and be evacuated, to leave the body, being integrated (like an animal in a cage waiting to be freed; Figure 1.8D). Instead of promoting this process, the ego focuses our attention on the reactive mind (unconscious mental mode). This leads us to avoid emotion, fight against it, or grasp it, which has the effect of re-embedding the emotional engram in the body (Figure 1.8B). In the last two cases, the content of thoughts generally focuses on the external event that triggered the resonance: this projection makes us believe that the origin of our emotion is external to us, which prevents us from taking responsibility for it. In conclusion to this section, the scientific study of the role of resonances and electromagnetic phenomena in human functioning (biological and psychological) and interpersonal relationships is still in its infancy and it should be developed. This may be prevented for the time being by the prevailing reductionist physicalism (see section 1.4.1), which seems to imply the implicit belief that explaining the phenomena mentioned above would amount to attributing some magical quality to the mind or matter. We have argued that they can instead be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the sciences, particularly the physical sciences. Moreover, at the fringe of the scientific “purely theoretical” field, beyond the dichotomy between

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allopathic medicine and alternative medicines17, an integrative medicine is now developing, which aims to take full advantage of the former and the second18. This is particularly true in the United States, which, with its pragmatic epistemology, is generally more concerned about the fact that “rather works” it than about basing the process on solid theoretical foundations – as we are more so in France, with our rationalist epistemology (Dutant and Engel 2005). In short, when we refer here to harmony or disharmony, it does not refer to a vague qualitative, or even subjective, notion, but on the contrary to a physical phenomenon, partly electromagnetic, potentially objectifiable and mathematicizable, and having material, energetic and informational dimensions. 2.4.3.2.4. Hofstadter and Gödel’s theorems These foundations have been laid, so let us go a little further, in a more “ultimate” point of view of understanding the relationship between resonance and harmony. One property of thought that Hofstadter (1979/2008)19 emphasizes is selfreferentiality: the subject can refer to themself by saying “I”. To describe self-referential systems, Hofstadter refers to “strange loops”. He calls “tangled hierarchy” a system where a strange loop occurs. In such a system, when you change scale (whether it is lower or higher than the initial level), you are in the same place. This kind of strange path is perfectly illustrated in 17 Experimental research on alternative medicines is generally published in scientific journals dedicated to them. To my knowledge, few of their results are reported in generalist journals, which would encourage dialogue between the different forms of knowledge. 18 Instrumental frequency therapies are a possible example. 19 In his book, Gödel, Escher, Bach (originally published in 1979), which received the Pulitzer Prize, we implicitly find a way to reconcile the qualitative and quantitative aspects of harmony. This book has been the object of a full module at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 2007. The author, Douglas Hofstadter, initially a physicist, then a professor of cognitive sciences, computer science, history and philosophy of science, philosophy, comparative literature and psychology, presents a unified theory of cognition, fractal mathematics and the esthetic aspect of harmony. One purpose of the book is to offer an explanation of how thought emerges from unconscious components (atoms, molecules, etc.). We do not agree with this formulation, which seems to be marked by reductionist physicalism (and we do not share all of Hofstadter’s assertions about the mind, despite the richness and scope of the book).

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Escher’s paintings and in the reasoning on paradoxes – such as Russell’s paradox, which says that the barber must shave all those who do not shave (should he shave himself?) or the phrase “I’m lying” (impossible to decide if it is true). According to Hofstadter, the prototypical example of the strange loop example is the self-referential structure at the heart of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. It seems relevant to me to note that Gödel would have chosen the numbers to code his functions based on Kabbalah, the esoteric text of the Jewish religion20. His first theorem, of indecidability, demonstrates that “all axiomatic formulations consistent with number theory include indecipherable proposals”, such as the one we will call “G” (Hofstadter 1979/2008, p. 19, author’s translation). As it happens, G is a selfreferential function. At a high level, we can see that G is true. But at a low level (by deriving G), we can’t say anything: we can’t decide if G is true or false. An explanation is still possible at the higher level; “this explanation is about understanding not just one level at a time, but how a given level reflects its meta level [...]” (Hofstadter 1979/2008, p. 799). Thus, if G is true, it cannot be demonstrated in the system in which it makes sense (I will say “in its reference paradigm”, in which it has a meaning), so we can say that the paradigm (“axiomatic system” in mathematical terms) is incomplete. Hence the second theorem of incompleteness: a consistent (coherent) system cannot lead to the demonstration of its own consistency, without its results being inconsistent. It is impossible to prove intraparadigmically a “positive” truth about the paradigm, with regard to consistency and completeness21 of the paradigm. It is also impossible for such evidence to be external to the system it is evaluating: there is no extraparadigmatic measuring instrument (Kuhn 1962/2008; Box 1.2). Let us return to G: it is a proposal – intraparadigmatic at the beginning, necessarily – which rises extraparadigmatically to some level; it allows us to say something about the whole system (in terms of incompleteness). It sheds light on a shadowy area (by allowing it to be precisely identified and pointed at). And how does it do 20 In fact, there seem to me to be some very material and concrete truths about the world in some religious texts, quite simply because in general they speak of the mind (in a direct or pictorial way), and this latter, not only is a part of the world, but is the virtual image, as argued throughout this book. 21 “So that the consistency of a formal system is the property that ‘any assertion generated by the system is true’, completeness is the opposite: ‘The system generates any true assertion.’” (Hofstadter 2008, p. 114, author’s translation).

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that? By talking about nothing but itself, because of its self-referential nature. In a similar way, the consciousness placed on the ego enlightens unconscious functions. In other words, any mathematical proof instrument is internal to the system in which the evidence is held (one could say that it is “intraparadigmatic”) and there is therefore a self-referential nature of the evidence. As a result, it is not possible to prove the completeness, full coherence, or full truth of arithmetic (or any other mathematical system). Yet another way of understanding this is to say that the symbols used to prove are part of a universe of meanings: one cannot prove something about this universe in an “absolute” or asemantic way, that is, by placing oneself outside any universe of meanings (see the incommensurability of paradigms). Thus, the paradox generated by these mathematical properties is that the asemantic level (one could say extraparadigmatic) of knowledge corresponds precisely to the formal system of these strange loops (including self-referential functions). Let us return to the link between harmony and resonance. Hofstadter takes the example of a phonograph (vinyl disc player) on which a disc is played whose grooves correspond to the phonograph’s natural frequency. It is a self-referential system in a way, since the sound emitted is characteristic of the device. Then a resonance phenomenon occurs that causes the phonograph to burst. We will see in the following section that the simple, precise and integral self-observation of the ego leads mechanically, by an analogous phenomenon of resonance, to its bursting. It is as if the disc pointed out the structural weaknesses of the record player and revealed them out in the open, making them obvious. Hofstadter (1979/2008, p. 95, author’s translation) paraphrases Gödel as follows: “for all record players, there are discs that cannot be played on this one, because they will lead to its indirect self-destruction”. In the example, the record player represents the axiomatic system (the paradigm) and the disc represents a chain of the system (theorem or non-theorem, i.e. G). We have seen that the mathematics of harmony concerns precisely self-referential forms. We continue this explanation in section 2.4.4, because distinguishing two functions of the mind will allow us to see more clearly the link between Gödel, the ego, resonance and responsibility... and to loop together the qualitative and quantitative notions of harmony towards this model.

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2.4.4. Horizon of an education for responsibility “Whenever there is the word ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘I am’, there is a sense of thisness, which is extremely strong. Therefore, our sense of thatness has to be conditioned by whatever is experienced by this. So we begin to have problems with that. We try to reject it, which is an expression of aggression; we try to magnetize it or suck it in, which is an expression of passion; or we ignore the whole thing, which is an expression of ignorance. Since expectations relate with passion, aggression, and ignorance, if you could see through their particular games, then the expectations themselves would be transparent. It’s a question of clarity, as well as self-confidence” (Trungpa 1996, p. 46). I hope you didn’t get tangled up in a hierarchy, or stuck on the border of a strange loop... in short, that I didn’t lose you in a small Hofstadterian harmonic labyrinth! Especially since I haven’t finished... 2.4.4.1. At the beginning, a relative mind Let’s go back to the start. There is the individual relative mind, with its four horsemen. From an objective point of view, its relationship with the world, which is biased, is rather an individuation: this relative mind and the world are cogenerated. Thus, for an ordinary subject, the interaction between the inner and outer worlds is based on cognitive mechanisms (projection, phenomenological grasping, attention, appraisal, etc.) and psychosocial mechanisms (values, attitudes, beliefs, etc.), summarized in the term “ego”, which guide the subject in their world – and at the same time generate it – in a subjective, biased way, conditioned by the past and the subject’s culture; the subject does not perceive ultimate reality because of these biases. One of these biases is when there is a phenomenological grasp of thoughts, in other words, when waves are mistaken for the ocean (frequent confusion in the literature in philosophy of consciousness, and in our Western culture; Hagège 2013, 2015b). It is important to note that because of the unconscious, by definition, our minds ignore their biases and blindness when they manifest; it seems that we therefore generally have the implicit impression of perceiving the ultimate reality directly, and tend to think and act as if we are transparent to ourselves – whereas this is not the case (Hagège 2014, 2015b). This confusion is

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evident in the polysemy of the terms “world” and “mind” (see introduction), which refer to either an ultimate entity or a relative entity. The ego therefore functions a little like an epistemological obstacle that prevents us from accessing a true, undistorted knowledge of the ultimate reality. For this to happen, a phenomenological revolution, internal to the mind, would be necessary. We have seen that ego is one of the major obstacles to responsibility (this chapter), hence the relevance of considering the gnoseological hypothesis as the foundation of education for responsibility. It should be remembered that this hypothesis considers, distinguishes and links relative and ultimate realities. We mentioned in the previous section that this functioning of the ego, based on separation, was fundamentally disharmonious. The ego is expressed in relation to emotions and the reactive state of mind. This functioning, in terms of vibrations, only adds false notes to the symphony or the ambient cacophony. It projects its own restricted and distorted vision on the world and thus cannot harmoniously take into account itself and the environment (human and non-human). For example, when there is a phenomenological grasp of reactive thoughts, most of which probably concern “me” or “I”, the field of consciousness is reduced to this (attention is grasped by these phenomena): at this moment, the mind resonates with this ego-centric content, with which the subject vibrates. At this moment, the subject is not vibrating with the environment, nor with their whole being (especially not with the reactive emotions that underlie these thoughts, and as we have seen, it represses them like this). As these thoughts revolve around the fears and desires of the individual, they subtly condition actions, motivated above all by security, therefore. Let us recall the parallel between Figures I.1 and 1.7 (money and thought): we are billions of individuals whose ego seeks to draw cover over itself. And as argued in the introduction, the result seems on average to be more of a disharmony. Of course, those in positions of economic or political power have the potential to have negative impacts on a larger part of the population or the planet. Nevertheless, “charity begins at home” and the hummingbird policy invites everyone to do what is within their power to make their minds more harmonious... which will make the world the same. We have argued in favor of the notion that, from an ultimate point of view, ego is an illusion. Hofstadter (1979/2008) proposes in this sense that our impression of having or being a self comes from the abstract pattern generated by strange loops.

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2.4.4.2. A harmonious transformation On the other hand, as we have discussed with responsibility, the four horsemen of the mind can function differently – and, fortunately, this sometimes happens spontaneously, even in ordinary subjects. In this case, creative thoughts or harmonious emotions vibrate in tune with oneself and the environment: the functioning of the subject adds “musical notes” which will contribute to an objectively more harmonious sound. Empathy and relatedness thus involve resonating with our environment, vibrating with it, via our consciousness. In such a case, the object of our attention, and therefore our field of consciousness, includes in a unified way the individual, their environment and the interaction between the two. This type of relationship with the environment is closer to the ultimate reality, because it is not (or is at a less ordinary level) distorted by the prism of the ego (especially by the reactive mind); there is simply a form of communion with what is. The reality at this moment is not imprisoned in concepts, labels of the reactive mind, interpreted (unconscious mental mode); it is felt, lived, perceived directly (conscious sensory mode). If we refer to the cognitive process of grasping (section 1.3.1.2), this amounts to a perception that is free of semantic processing. The subject is not experiencing life at this moment as if they are encased in an “I-thou”, that is, through the illusion of an ego. In short, the subject’s model highlighting the basics of a functioning compatible with responsibility is the one that has also been called the “decentered-self” (opening, overcoming the ego), in opposition to “self-centered functioning” (based on ego; Dambrun and Ricard 2011). Such a supposedly selfdecentered functioning, in addition to being more ethically relevant, would have the merit of being the source of authentic happiness, in the sense of being independent of external circumstances (ibid.). We can easily understand it: while the ego feels itself existing through phenomena (thoughts, reactive emotions, situations, people, social roles, etc.), by identifying with them (and therefore by cutting itself off from the environment), consciousness is sufficient to have a proper feeling of existence, when the subject perceives without the deforming prism of the ego. The subject in the latter case is not identified. The harmonious emotion (e.g. joy, gratitude, compassion) is due to the connection with the environment; not a personal past. Of course, neuroses, reactive thoughts and emotions are human. It’s perfectly normal to have them and it is quite normal that the ego is afraid of losing this, since, because it feeds on it, it feels it is existing through it. It

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feels that if it doesn’t have that anymore, it will disappear. And it’s not wrong. On the other hand, it exists when we are absent; it lives through our unconscious. It is when our mind is absorbed into a phenomenon (thought, emotion, external phenomenon, etc.) that the ego is here, when we are not present to everything that is in the moment, including ourselves. So it doesn’t make us what we are. It’s the opposite. We are precisely not what it identifies with. We are the consciousness that we have of phenomena. We are not these phenomena. But our ego frequently makes us believe that if we become more conscious, if we are present, we will disappear... when it is actually the ego that will disappear! And we, on the other hand, will never have been so alive in our lives. We will always have a personality, (harmonious) emotions, memories and skills. We are not going to turn into some kind of insipid vegetable. Quite the opposite, we and life will never have had so much taste; everything will be brighter, more vivid, more colorful, more existing... more conscious than before (Box 2.1). We can see that we are not free vis-à-vis our neuroses, reactive thoughts and emotions: carrying our existence at arm’s length, we act as if we are more important than others. It’s nerve-wracking; it drains energy unnecessarily. Ethically, this is what prevents us from taking into account in a just way of the self, of others and the non-human environment, and, moreover, it is what makes us suffer (Dambrun and Ricard 2011). In particular, paradoxically, by making us flee, grasping our emotions, or fighting them (section 1.3.2.4.2). A principled mind, on the contrary, enjoys the freedom and joy of being a singular human among others, regardless of past or cultural conditioning. In awake functioning, the ocean knows that it is ocean, and no wave disturbs its tranquility. The motivation for innovation is required, and the subject welcomes all phenomena as they arise, without resistance manifesting in their mind (which does not imply that they let everything happen or that they do not solve a problem... only in this case, they will calmly put in place appropriate responses). Here, the subject is fully aware of the inner and outer worlds... the mind embraces the ultimate reality of phenomena, without bias, without ego. It is a fuller, happier, lighter and more ethical way of life. Indeed, as mentioned, all ordinary beings can live this kind of functioning episodically, but such a state can be perpetuated as some living examples seem to show (see above) – and I therefore hypothesize that their level of consciousness is higher than that of an ordinary subject who only temporarily knows such a state. There is a small paradox: on the one hand, the capacities of these beings are dependent on their past and their culture (for example, the language they speak, what they know how to do, etc.), on

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the other hand, their way of being and understanding their lives is not a priori dependent on this, insofar as there is no ego and therefore no identification or projection. Moreover, leaving the illusion of the ego should, in our opinion, be a purpose for all authentic spiritual development – which would therefore include no longer being identified with a religion, even if it provided, along the way, tools to achieve this goal (e.g. prayer, meditation, etc.). And as argued throughout this book, this can be a relevant horizon for an education for responsibility. Precisely, the advantage of problematization in terms of education is that it invites us to think about change. These two modalities of the functioning of the mind, ordinary and principled, are described in traditional oriental literatures, where different stages of spiritual realizations, that is awakening, are distinguished (Gampopa 1999; Patanjali 1991; Vivekananda 2007). Here, we do not go into the details of these considerations and we will endeavour to model, by analogy with mathematical processes, such a transition from a relative mind to a principled mind, in other words from the ego to responsibility. In the next chapter, I will also present other theoretical and empirical arguments, which tend to show that at the very least it is possible to instantiate in one’s mind a functioning similar to that of a principled mind. 2.4.4.3. The dissolution of the ego by consciousness I mentioned above the notion that an awakened being can interact with their environment beyond social conventions, in relation to the modality of direct knowledge. A bit like G, which reaches an asemantic level thanks to its self-referentiality, Hofstadter (1979/2008) seems to eliminate the possibility of leaving the system, from “transcending the self” as he writes, in other words to have a direct, extraparadigmatic knowledge. For him, it is more a matter of self-knowledge than self-transcendence. However, like most Westerners, he does not distinguish between different modes of functioning of the mind, or between different levels of consciousness. He just refers to a “self”. The point of view defended here is as follows: the “self” could be considered as the mind, or the ego. Here, in the aim of responsibility, it is not a question of transcending the mind, but the ego. So, the mind does not go out from itself, it leaves a subsystem (the ego) – existing from a relative point of view, and illusory from an ultimate point of view22. Gödel helps us to understand why 22 In this, I agree with Hofstadter that this corresponds to a better knowledge of oneself, considering the self as the mind.

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such ann exit is harm monious: it is when con nsciousness is truly a puure selfreferential function, no longer conscious c of unconsciouss processes related to B), but conscious of itseelf (Figure 2..2C). Let us mention the ego (Figure 2.2B here aggain the anaalogy with the t phonogrraph and thhe disc, reprresenting respectivvely the egoo and the conscious c fun nction of coonsciousness. At the beginninng of the prrocess, it is the t ego that observes thee ego, then, little by little, a kind k of consciousness thaat witnesses the subjectivve experiencee (Figure 2.2B), thhat observes the phenomeena (first sev ven types of objects o of perrception, includinng emotions;; simultaneoously mentall and sensorry consciouss mode). Phenom mena and the conscious suubject are theerefore perceeived in a dirrect way, closer too the ultimatte reality (whhere the ego is an illusioon). I call thee process that leadds to this “pphenomenological reflexiv vity”. It is fuurther detaileed in the next chaapter (sectionn 3.1.3). Theen, if consciousness conttinues to obsserve the ego, it will w see that it i and the lattter are of the same naturee (vacuity); itt will see the illusory nature of the duallity on whicch it is baseed. Thereforre, when alignmeent – the phhenomenon of o resonancee of conscioousness withh itself – occurs, the subjecttive aligns with the ulltimate and thus experiiences a burstingg23 of the egoo. Indeed, thhe vision of the t subject thhen becomess in tune with thee ultimate reality, whereaas the ego manifests m itsellf by essencee only in the relattive subjectivve (Figure 2.22C).

Figure 2.2. Harmo onious transforrmation of the e mind through h phenomenollogical w k/hagege/educcation.zip reflexivitty. For a color version of thiss figure, see www.iste.co.uk 23 Or a dissolving, d subliimation, disappearance, etc.

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COMMENT ON FIGURE 2.2.– Subject (x) projects an interpretation of their inner world without being aware of it. They perceive the object (y) as separate and independent from them, but this is objectively an illusion. A2) Indeed, their consciousness reaches the object for perceiving; the perceived object (y) is a function of the subject (x), because of the processes of projection, attentional magnification, etc. (Figures 1.3 and 1.9). This function (⨍i) is unconscious, because the subject is not aware of these cognitive biases; they live in the illusion of perceiving the ultimate reality and being separated from the object. B) They observe more and more the functioning of their mind, the ego game and the “I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”, etc. At first, it is the ego that observes itself and remains within the subsystem. But by dint of being seen, unmasked, the disharmonious functions lose strength and shrink: the subject begins to realize the illusory character, that is, the vacuity, of the ego. This corresponds to the development of a conscious function (⨍c or “witness consciousness”), which takes as its purpose the detailed functioning in A2 (the unconscious function ⨍i). C) Progressing in the level of consciousness, the latter takes itself as an object (as in some meditative practices; Lutz et al. 2007; section 3.2.1); the mind instantiates the selfreferential quality of consciousness (⨍c on ⨍c) and thus realizes the vacuity of the self and phenomena (see the asemantic level of knowledge corresponding to the consciousness of the strange loop). If this state is stabilized, the subject perceives everything from a non-subjective point of view, truly perceiving themself as someone else. They have a direct knowledge of the phenomena (also involving the third modality of perception), undistorted by any personal or cultural bias. In other words, they perceive everything out of any reference, out of any semantic system: their principled mind perceives the ultimate reality. They are awake. The dotted lines indicate that they directly perceive the impermanent and interdependent characters (i.e. vacuity) of the phenomena and of their own existence. 2.4.4.4. Evolution of responsibility to awakening Thus, we can explain in a pictorial way what happens when a relative mind is transformed into a principled mind (Box 2.3). This transformation could be called “spiritual development” and is completed by awakening, which leads to total responsibility from an objective point of view: the relationship and dialogism with the environment are at the maximum (see Figure 3.1).

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Imagine that the wave of the real, of vacuity, corresponds to the frequency of the A major musical note and is of very low intensity. Also, the relative mind would function like a transistor that picks up waves automatically. The orientation of its sensor (its antenna) corresponds to the attention beam (the field of consciousness). All forms emit a specific and complex wave that characterizes them. The transistor feels strongly committed to the mission of capturing waves from the outside. But not just any waves; it has a roadmap (established by the ego) concerning the waves it should pick up (those of “I want”). However, it has a module (the unconscious) that emits waves itself, corresponding to thoughts, words, actions, etc. and emotional engrams. The latter emit a tenuous wave for the moment, as if they were muted. But they contribute well to the vibratory landscape emanating from the transistor. This landscape constitutes a “background noise”, which scrambles signals received from the outside. At first, this noise is simply a huge disharmonious noise. Since it can’t see very clearly, because of the cacophony, all the transistor is able to do is recognize on the outside the waves that correspond to certain emanations of its own background noise. It believes that the interesting information is there because it is the only kind that seems to emerge. What it recognizes in this way could be, for example, a phenomenon that it labels mentally or a situation resembling déjà vu... something that fits into the mold of a “I want” or a “I do not want”. So in doing so, it has the impression of capturing the outer world (which it assimilates to the real, because it ignores the “I do not see” and its projections), while it almost only captures waves that resonate with those it already emits. And as soon as it picks one up, it automatically compares it with its roadmap to see if it matches or not. When something on the outside resonates with an emotional engram, the latter is no longer embedded and the vibration becomes very sonorous. It’s the emotion felt. If this does not fit into its roadmap, then the transistor will try to reduce this signal by all means (fight or flight in general). Indeed, several fears emerge at that time. Panicked that it would further confuse all signals, it fears being no longer able to pick up signals that are in line with its roadmap as a result. Also, it is afraid to burst if it resonates too much with it. This reaction has the effect of maintaining or even increasing the background noise level. After many failures, the transistor realizes that its system does not work: that, apart from a few details, its roadmap is impossible to achieve, and that in addition, by trying to follow it, it damages itself and others. In short, it realizes that it is of no use to it except to lose energy, to be generally disappointed by the signals received and to live in a hellish hubbub. Let’s suppose that it then changes its roadmap and now tries instead to capture the waves it emits itself (phenomenological reflexivity). At first glance, it doesn’t seem to be of much use either. But useless for useless, let’s say it is a player and experiences it. Then when it picks up a strong vibration, such as that of an engram that is no longer embedded (i.e. an emotion felt), it can remain connected to it, it is no longer afraid of this intense sound: therefore, this vibration will no longer resonate poorly with poorlyadapted external waves (partially corresponding), before returning to where it

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comes from (Figures 1.8B and C), but it will fully resonate with the sensor, which will be perfectly adjusted to it. As a result, this wave will burst (this is the integration of emotion; Figure 1.8D). Why isn’t it the sensor that’s bursting? Because by capturing the wave, it absorbs the wave’s energy, thus increasing its vibratory rate. In other words, its properties change the moment it picks it up: its performance increases because it picks up this vibration. As a result, on the one hand, the engram has disappeared, so the background noise is less intense and less complex. On the other hand, the sensor is able to detect a greater variety of waves more accurately. Engrams that obstruct consciousness have disappeared. There is therefore less parasitic information (background noise): the sensor has a higher energy, capable of perceiving noise better as well as external information too24. The transistor is therefore beginning to perceive benefits from its situation. On its way, it therefore continues and, even if it has kept old automatisms consisting of capturing waves coming from the outside, it is no longer on its roadmap, so it redirects its antenna more and more easily towards the internal signals. And then the notion of a roadmap is also crumbling. It loses meaning because the transistor can see that in reality it has no control over everything that happens. It also perceives the sensor trying to pick up the internal or external signals; it is as if it was splitting (witness consciousness) and the new antenna was picking up the signals of the first one. The two sensors together also resonate. As a result of this duplication, the first sensor itself becomes a received signal... and is in the process of bursting. So, the second sensor starts to realize that being a sensor and being a received signal is fundamentally the same thing. It notices the artifactual character of 1) the distinction between a sensor and a signal and thus of 2) the assignment of characteristics to the sensor and signal. It therefore realizes that in fact what is important is not what we perceive, but that we perceive (it is not the phenomena, but the consciousness that perceives them). And it realizes that what is essential to receive, what makes it possible to receive, is neither the sensor nor the signal, it is that there is a vibration common to the sensors and received signals, whatever they are: the A major (the fundamental nature of phenomena and consciousness, vacuity), which had until then gone unnoticed because of the too intense background noise (reactive mental state and ego). It realizes that it is not a transistor, but that it is nothing more than this vibration. That this vibration is the fundamental principle of the existence of all phenomena... and that it characterizes them much more than all the differential properties they previously seemed to have... then there is no truth other than that. Thus, it can no longer perceive a sensor or signal as such. And it no longer has any interest in any personal roadmap – which is the same as a sensor or signal.

24 It is a paradox: the less background noise there is, the better the transistor picks up this noise (at home and in others’). In other words, the clearer our mind is, the better it perceives its own confusion.

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Nevertheless, its life and actions are consistent with the harmonious orientations it would have had on its previous roadmaps. It thus remains in tune with this main note that constitutes the cosmos. Then it picks up everything simultaneously, being in unison with the real, without duality between exterior and interior, sensor and signal, background noise and signal... Box 2.3. Metaphor expressing awakening as the completing of a vibratory transformation from a relative mind to a principled mind

Now, we are considering in particular the evolution of the notion of responsibility with regard to this spiritual development. Initially, in the ordinary functioning related to the ego, we take partial responsibility for our life and functioning. Because of projections, we tend to attribute the causes of our emotions and situations to the outside (to situations, to people, etc.). Thus, in psychosociology, there has been described a “fundamental  attribution error” or “correspondance bias”: most subjects tend to underestimate in others the influence of these external factors and overestimate it in themselves (Myers 2009). In other words, it is easier to attribute responsibility for our functioning to others than it is to take responsibility for our actions ourselves. We feel alienated from our own emotional engrams (we tend to slam the door in the face of the child who knocks on it or ignore it). In short, from a subjective point of view, we do not feel responsible for all our operations and we live on the basis of a duality with the environment. We are therefore not responsible from an objective point of view either, because we do not consciously perceive in real time the dialogism at work with the environment. In order to develop, we first need to consciously and more largely endorse the responsibility for our own subjective functioning, which implies a reduction in projection mechanisms. Two prerequisites could be to feel emotionally secure (see SM1 as necessary for the development of SM2; section 2.4.2) and to have some form of basic mental health. Well-being therefore intervenes here as a means to serve the ethical purpose. Indeed, it is often difficult to direct one’s mind towards a fair consideration of oneself, others and the non-human environment if, on the one hand, one is in a form of precariousness: dissatisfaction with basic needs (eating enough, having a roof over one’s head, having access to care), stress, anxiety or serious illness, for example;

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or on the other hand, a mental pathology (depression25, obsessivecompulsive disorder, schizophrenia, manic depression, etc.) can also prevent people from being motivated for the ethical aim or from understanding it in a fair way. If we perceive the outer world as being full of danger, it can be too destabilizing to look at our own projections: we would risk evaluating engrams and emotions as other dangers, which would increase the feeling of insecurity and could slow down the evolution, or reinforce the pathology. Indeed, seeing consciousness or the idea of the vacuity of the self can be frightening. At the elementary level, we need to rely on something... so if we can’t rely on the certainty of our own existence (as Descartes proposed), everything shakes! This can cause more anxiety. Emotional security will also help us to take responsibility for our functioning without feeling guilty. That is, to acknowledge our mistakes, in order to be motivated to change, without despising what led us to them, and without judging ourselves for it. It is a matter of feeling tenderness towards this “small-mindedness” or our limitations. Indeed, guilt only generates reactive emotions and thoughts (e.g. “it’s bad; I am a bad person; I acted wrongly, I should have acted differently”) that come from our ego and maintain it (see Box 1.5). This tenderness refers to the benevolent attitude towards oneself advocated in the practices known as “mindfulness” (Shapiro et al. 2006). To achieve these conditions, psychotherapeutic support can sometimes help: to acquire elementary well-being and mental health, to be more aware of one’s subjective functioning, to take responsibility for it, without feeling guilty (Welwood, 2000). Indeed, this type of work generally allows us to know more precisely our thought-action repertoires, and therefore indirectly our emotional engrams, and could in this way facilitate a cognitive defusion and a decentration when these engrams appear (ibid.). Such facilitation requires that the subject does not mentally grasp their functioning by identifying more with it (this is one of the risks of these therapies). If we progress in this direction, then subjective responsibility increases. And from an objective point of view too, consciousness will be a little more aligned with the real, including more clearly the subject’s own functioning. Then, a total subjective responsibility can follow, coupled with a recognition of one’s own powerlessness.

25 This should be qualified, as there appear to be exceptions (see note 13 in this chapter).

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On the one hand, the observation of our own functioning will allow us to see that situations are only the resonance of our emotional engrams. At this stage, it is not important whether this is ultimately and systematically the case or not: the subject will see that the important, relevant information lies in the remanence of an emotional engram (i.e. in their emotional reactivity), and not in the situation that awoke it (or un-embedded it). Each of these situations will therefore be an opportunity for the subject to integrate an emotion, and they will be aware that this is what counts. They may even be happy about it. They will no longer see what is commonly referred to as “suffering” as such. They will see this as an opportunity to be free. The ego, on the contrary, will seek to know whether, in the absolute “I am responsible”, or not, for this emotion – and will often either refuse to accept responsibility or take it on as guilt. However, this question is irrelevant. Here, the only function of believing in total responsibility is to promote the integration of engrammed emotions, by thwarting projections and ordinary duality. It is a question of efficiency (belief as a tool): if belief and the associated attitude allow the integration of the engram, then it is performative. Indeed, believing oneself responsible for something is giving oneself power over the evolution of things; it is responding instead of reacting. Similarly, in ordinary reactive thinking, the belief that its content is not important and is only worthwhile to the extent that it is a bridge to reveal the underlying emotion and that only the latter is important and worthwhile, allows liberation. On the other hand, certainly there may be power over the subsequent evolution of the process and over the subjective way of experiencing it in the moment, but the more the subject consciously opens up to any present experience, the more they realize that they have no power over what manifests in that moment, that their only power is to be aware of it or not. They come out of the illusion of control or power (of free choice, of free will) generated by the ego and thus realize the illusory nature of the feeling of control or the belief of control that they had before. The subject then finds themself in a double bind: on the one hand responsible for everything that happens to them, on the other hand they can do nothing about it. So at this stage, their subjective responsibility is at the maximum, but objectively the four horsemen of the mind still sometimes work in a disharmonious way. The only possible way out of this double bind is by letting go: focusing on the present experience, stopping the projection of one’s own mind on phenomena and dissolving engrams in one’s consciousness of the present

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moment as they emerge. A devolution of will, life and responsibility then takes place. Devolution consists of relying totally on someone or something other than oneself, or here, than the ego (on God for believers or life in a secular spirituality, for example). This devolution is called – paradoxically for us Westerners – a mastering in martial arts: the body perfectly conducts energies other than those of its own subjectivity (those of the Earth and Heaven in Chinese symbolism), because it does not hinder them with its engrams and its grasp. Indeed, it is this devolution that allows harmony. Here, devolution takes place with regard to one’s own consciousness. That is, “I stop trying to influence things; I rely on this awareness of the phenomena I experiment with” (see Box 3.2). This devolution and the dissolution of the engrams that accompany it can be experienced as a form of mourning: with each integration of the emotional engram, the ego sees in it the loss of a piece of self, of a functioning the subject identified with and which they will never see again. Like flakes of skin that are removed (de Souzenelle 1991), causing a tear similar to that caused by the loss of a loved one. Confidence in the meaning of the process, however, allows these successive removals to be welcomed with open arms, without struggle or avoidance. NOTE.– It is fundamental to note that this subjective devolution of responsibility, in order to be compatible with an ethical path, can only occur after the experience of a total and sincere subjective endorsement of one’s responsibility (free of guilt). Without it, indeed, cognitive defusion and decentration could be experienced as an irresponsible omnipotence: “since I don’t really exist and neither do others from an ultimate point of view, then everything is allowed!” (everything is equal, nothing is serious). This would mean considering the ultimate reality at the expense of relative reality: to move from the latter to the former by denying relative reality. This is why it is necessary to have touched as closely as possible one’s own subjective suffering to always keep this in mind: in oneself and in others, suffering is all the more significant because it is grasped and appraised as such. An authentic experience of non-duality (free of ego) would therefore not induce a subject to treat someone any worse than they would like to be treated themself (see the spontaneous harmonious character of the principled mind). This remark highlights the indispensable nature of the gnoseological hypothesis, which includes the unfailing solidarity of the ultimate and relative points of view (i.e. ontological and phenomenological hypotheses). Thus, when the ultimate and relative reality are perfectly aligned at home, the consideration of a gap in others between these two realities and the

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awareness that they subjectively live through a relative reality will only be the reasons for even more harmonious actions towards them. Finally, after a sufficient iteration of this process, having led to the disappearance of the reactive phenomena (thoughts and emotions) and any trace of disharmonious functioning in the subject’s mind (from any grasp, ‘for-me-ness ”, projection, etc.), the subject no longer lives as a separate individual. This is awakening. In unison with vacuity, in unity with the cosmos, the subject’s point of view is no longer relative. There is no longer any lived duality between the self and the non-self. Their subjective point of view is fully in tune with the objective point of view of a dialogism, of the interdependance between inside and outside. With regard to responsibility, we therefore arrive at a paradox: the perfect alignment of the subjective and ultimate points of view, and therefore the advent of objective responsibility, which coincides with the irrelevance of this notion from a subjective point of view. Indeed, we have mentioned that, philosophically, this notion presupposes a subject that responds and an otherness to which one can respond to. However, at this stage, from a subjective point of view, there is no longer any lived duality between oneself and others. Awakening therefore corresponds, after a devolution of responsibility, to its sublimation. In conclusion, according to the conceptualization here advanced, the development of responsibility implies engaging in a process to become more coherent, harmonious and conscious (including of one’s own inconsistencies). So now the question arises: more concretely, how can such a process be promoted? This is the subject of our next chapter.

3 Education for Responsibility Guidelines

It seems important, from an ethical point of view, that everyone should be able to understand their actual operating methods, their potential ways of functioning, and the different types of consequences of these and those, in order to be able to make a conscious and deliberate choice about their own lives. This would offer a possibility of questioning and re-assessment to which this book intends to contribute. Without this, the subject would be analogous to a pinball ball, tossed around by circumstances, having endorsed the goals and values of their environment without questioning their validity, undergoing the turpitudes of the ego without being aware of it. In this chapter, we make well-argued proposals, submitted to community criticism, which, according to this analysis, could serve as a guide for educational curricula or training for responsibility. If we really want to contribute to training citizens, responsible subjects, then we will have to give ourselves the means to do so. Using only surface methods may not change much... It is impossible to change the world without changing the mind, as argued in this book. 3.1. Reflexivities Let’s start by considering this question of means with the notion of reflexivity. In the field of physics, reflection refers to the phenomenon “which occurs when a body endowed with a certain speed meets another body that obstructs it, and which forces it to follow another direction” (Littré 2017). As Favre (2007) pointed out, this is the opposite of projection, which, according to the geometric meaning of the term,

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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corresponds to the transfer of a shape from one space to another (meaning without obstacle). In the psychological sense, reflexivity would therefore correspond to the process by which thought encounters an obstacle and incidentally changes direction. This transfer can be considered as a return of thought on itself (Legault 2004), insofar as its initial content is called into question and potentially becomes the object of an evolution. At the phenomenological level, this intra-individual psychological process thus implies a mental phenomenon (seventh type of perceptual object). 3.1.1. Cognitive reflexivity It is in this sense of “reflexive thought” that we refer to “cognitive reflexivity” (or “epistemic reflexivity”). The notion of obstacle has been extensively studied in the didactics of scientific disciplines, and has been associated with the notion of (socio-)cognitive conflict. These studies led to the conclusion that if these obstacles remain unconscious, they prevent the evolution of the subject’s thinking, and then the subject may remain stuck in their learning process. On the contrary, if this thought consciously encounters an obstacle, then it becomes reflective and the subject experiences a cognitive conflict, a conflict favored by social interactions (Doise and Mugny 1981). This last point corresponds to the dialogical aspect of reflexivity that we discuss in section 3.1.2. Other authors have emphasized the notions of problem and problematization, as tools to bring about thinking to explicitly confront and overcome the obstacle (Orange 2005). But in these studies, if the notion of reflexivity was mobilized, it was only marginally or implicitly so. In general, when it was done centrally, it was more in line with data from English literature. For Dewey (1933), reflexive thinking can only emerge in the face of a problematic situation that formal logic alone is not sufficiant to solve. He defined it as a thought conscious of its causes and consequences. This notion of reflexive thinking appears very close to those of critical and creative thinking1. Indeed, Lipman and Dewey sometimes use “critical thinking” and “reflexive thinking” as interchangeable synonyms (King and Kitchener 1994), while 1 And these three notions are interconnected with those of metacognition and personal epistemology (discussed in section 1.3.2.3.1; Baffrey-Dumont 2002; see in particular the notion of the development of reflexive judgment; King and Kitchener 1994).

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critical and creative thinking would not be differentiable in quality, but only in degree (Slade 2002). When the authors distinguish these three notions, they do not subordinate them to each other in a similar way (sometimes critical thinking is an attribute of reflective thinking, sometimes the opposite, for example). In France, in connection with the teaching of philosophy and the work of Lipman (1995), the term “reflexive thinking” would be preferably used. The latter then refers to “an entry into reflection through questioning, clarification of opinions, awareness of their origin, questioning them as prejudices, formulation of relevant questions, openness to a plurality of possible solutions, attempts to answer them with arguments...”  (Tozzi 2012, p. 261, author’s translation). The notion of constructive critical thinking has been theorized in Quebec, based in particular on a broad perspective of Ennis’ work. The latter proposed a somewhat logical understanding of critical thinking (and, in my opinion, even scientist-positivist). According to him, critical thinking corresponds to a set of skills and dispositions, for example. In reasonably and reflectively going about deciding what do believe or do, a person characteristically needs to do most of these things (and do them interdependently): 1) Judge the credibility of sources. 2) Identify conclusions, reasons, and assumptions. 3) Judge the quality of an argument, including the acceptability of its reasons, assumptions, and evidence. 4) Develop and defend a position on an issue. 5) Ask appropriate clarifying questions. 6) Plan experiments and judge experimental designs. 7) Define terms in a way appropriate for the context. 8) Be open-minded. 9) Try to be well-informed. 10) Draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution. (Ennis 1993, p. 180) Daniel (2016) has taken over the role of the above-mentioned logical operations, also drawing inspiration from Lipman’s work and placing greater emphasis on the return of the reflexion on oneself. She defined constructive critical thinking as “a thoughtful and logical act that aims to evaluate principles and facts before making a judgement of appreciation of these

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principles and facts [...and that] underlies and mobilizes a creative mind, a willingness to innovate and advance” (Daniel 2016, p. 3, author’s translation). In this respect, this thinking is opposed to the impulse of an unreflected negative critical thinking, driven by the fear of the new (see also section 1.3.2.3.1). Cognitive reflexivity (ethical implication) and constructive critical thinking share the same modalities. Their differences consist of their objects and purposes: while constructive critical thinking could a priori serve, any type of knowledge or purpose (e.g. to be cultivated in a scientific field, to improve academic performance, etc.), cognitive reflexivity has the following specificities: – three basic objects: the inner world, the outer world, their interactions; – two related objects: the causes and consequences of these functioning and interactions, at the level of oneself, others and the NHE; – an ethical purpose: to act (words, thoughts and actions) in a coherent way with harmonious values and goals resulting from a conscious choice;  – a phenomenological purpose: phenomenological reflexivity (section 3.1.3). 3.1.2. Dialogical reflexivity Studying philosophical exchanges in elementary school, Daniel et al. developed more precisely the notion of dialogical (also constructive) critical thinking and distinguished four ways of thinking that would underlie it: “Logical thinking implies the ability to be coherent and articulated; creative thinking refers to the ability to create new relationships and ask unexpected questions that will trigger reflection; responsible thinking implies a balance between the right to express oneself and the responsibility to do so in respect of others and with a concern for improving experience; and finally metacognitive thinking refers to the ability to deliberate internally and have retrospection for improvement” (Daniel 2016, p. 4, author’s translation). This thinking is called “dialogical” because it emerges from the dialogues between students. Indeed, in discussions with a democratic and philosophical

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focus, it seems clear that students develop both cognitive and psychosocial skills related to socialization and citizenship (Connac 2012b). This is a clear recognition of the Greek tradition of the love of wisdom, which is constructed in argumentation and debate within the city. The sense in which we use the term “dialogical” includes these aspects of social interactions. However, we refer in particular to the theoretical framework of responsibility as a dialogical relationship (sections 2.2 and 2.3). In this respect, the aim is not so much to know what to think or do about a given problem, but above all to get to know oneself better and, in general, to learn to guide one’s life and actions consciously (see the specific objects and purposes of cognitive reflexivity; section 3.1.1). The recommended means include (1) awareness of one’s initial or implicit values, beliefs, personal norms and (2) their confrontation with those of others, in order to foster this dialogue between the two forms of ethos (section 2.2). This meaning therefore includes the notion of a dialogue with oneself (1). The difference with cognitive reflexivity is that the latter refers to the epistemic dimension of the mental content involved. Here, dialogical reflexivity emphasizes the “round trip” process of this thought, and the role of “surface” on which the thought “bounces back and forth”. We can therefore consider cognitive and dialogical reflexivities as two sides of the same process. In the rest of the text, “dialogical reflexivity” will therefore also include the cognitive aspect presented in section 3.1.1. In a dialogue with oneself (1), the surface that allows one to step back from one’s own functioning can be a written medium. It can typically be a diary (Hess 1998) or a logbook (Hagège 2015b), in which the subject records thoughts, opinions, emotions, etc. In a dialogue with several people (2), it is the other who plays the role of reflector (Jorro 2005). The other can be a peer: we have discussed the role of debates, for which researchers have proposed ground rules for encouraging constructive critical thinking (at the expense of negative critical thinking; Connac 2012a ; Reynaud 2008). The other may also be a teacher (or trainer or educator). In the case of problematic knowledge (Fabre 2014) or socially vivid knowledge (Simonneaux 2011), to facilitate the learner’s openness to the implementation of reflexivity, the teacher’s posture would preferably be that of committed impartiality (Kelly 1986). That is, the teacher or trainer expresses what he or she thinks by presenting it as one of several possible points of view.

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They contextualizes it and encourages the consideration and analysis of opposing positions. If, on the contrary, they sought to hide or impose their point of view, they would risk being counterproductive. In the first case, they would probably still implicitly guide the discussions on the basis of their point of view. In the second case, they could cut short the learner’s dialogical process by suggesting that only one point of view is correct. Box 3.1. The teacher’s (or trainer’s) committed impartiality

Also, whether they like it or not, the teacher is a living model for the learner. They therefore have a responsibility to cultivate their own responsibility. This implies everything we are talking about here and also to choose your language, consciously. For example, the teacher would practice banning guilt words from their lexicon (“bad student”, “bad score”) (Hagège 2017d). Using an authority-autonomization model, they would seek to distinguish the person from their actions or skills, assigning the former an unconditional value, and the latter a contextual value, sometimes requiring reframing (Favre 2007). They could also ensure that they are aware of the prejudices that emerge in their mind, concerning the subjects to which they address, and would try to cultivate prejudices that are favorable to all (Hagège 2017d). In a debate, a learning subject can change their point of view by listening to others debate. However, it is likely that they could then more easily retain implicit opinions without even being aware of them. Whatever the reflector, the subject comes into contact with this surface through the favored means of expression (verbal or written). The latter has the virtue of making it possible to make latent and implicit thoughts conscious, and then possibly maintaining them at a distance. 3.1.3. Phenomenological reflexivity Since the crux of the problem comes from the gap between relative and absolute realities, an education for responsibility aims to align them. However, consciousness of an absolute reality would necessarily be beyond language and cultures. It is therefore unspeakable. Such reflexivity cannot therefore occur at the cognitive level, in the sense that it would involve verbal or mental phenomena. The process here at stake involves concentrating on observing “in all its glory” the relativity of the reality experienced at the individual and collective level, which may allow us to

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detach ourselves from it. It is a question of implementing a reflexivity free of a reflector: that of a self-reflective consciousness. Pay. Attention. To the present. Experience. Make a list of everything that’s important to you, everything you want, on all levels: personal, professional, spiritual, other, your goals, your values, etc. Phenomenological reflexivity is when you have crossed everything off this list except one line. Not because you have achieved these goals, but because they no longer matter to you. This line is as follows: “Pay attention to my present experience.” If nothing else matters to you, if your only goal, your only ambition from moment to moment is to see yourself, to be aware of your own experience, if your reactive mind has let go of everything else – so on everything in fact – then harmony can begin to develop. Then the ego can be observed for what it is: an illusion that creates disharmony. Then it will start to shrink and then disappear. Basically, there is nothing else to do to make it disappear: be aware of it. For the ego is an illusion: consciousness is without ego, and the ego feeds on your unconscious. For example, you’re a little agitated, a little stressed. You become aware of this state. Simply observe it, without trying to change it. Let the following thoughts eventually arise in your mind: “What do I feel?” Do not answer it with another thought. Feel the sensations in your body. Absorb the emotions in your consciousness. “Look at yourself.” Just observe that there is a human being here who is experiencing stress. As if you were looking at it from the outside. Don’t even try to ease these tensions. You’ll see that this state will fade away as if it doesn’t really exist. Because it doesn’t really exist. Like everything else, it’s evanescent. Only its reification by the ego gives it consistency. On the contrary, consciousness, closer to the ultimate reality, dissolves the illusions of relative realities. Because the ego is full of inconsistencies, illusions, clumsiness and lies. It’s like a movie made by a bunch of incompetent people. If you look at it distractedly, you can let yourself be taken by the story it tells and believe in it. But if you look carefully, you will see that it is a fabrication: the boom of the sound recorder visible in the camera field, the actor’s costume which is not connected, the incongruities of the scenario... And then, when we can observe the lack of unity and beauty of what we take for a self, of what we identify with, then there is a decrease, even a fall, of the motivation to identify with it. There is not much left to do except to observe this poor distracted sound recorder, this visually impaired director, this amnesiac stage manager who has not updated his files. All this little world struggling clumsily to make a film exist in which you are the main character, that your mind projects on the real, thus cutting your consciousness of this unique truth, of life. When the absurd and artefactual character of these dynamics is fully perceived, then naturally a compassion towards this small world arises. And from this, a compassion towards others, which we understand, from then on, that they are the unconscious objects of a similar functioning. Box 3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity reveals the deceit of the ego

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However, in dialogical reflexivity, it is a question of setting goals, values, seeking to consciously endorse them, question them, etc.; it is therefore a question of maintaining a certain form of mental activity, and not simply passively observing our functioning. Does this reflexivity contradict phenomenological reflexivity? Yes and no. In “cognitive dialogical reflexivity”, there may be an impression of willingness. That is, the illusion that it is “me-ness” that decides to do this. It’s not a problem. The point to identify is the effective attitude to do this, to choose, to discuss these goals and values: the one with which you throw a message into a bottle in the sea. A sensible person who sends a message like this does not hope to find a decent recipient, that he or she understands the language in which the word is written, that he or she responds to it, etc. We’re doing this for fun. Almost with humor. Or rather totally with humor. A humor rather in selfmockery. Like a wide smile open to the cosmos. Once you have thrown the bottle into the sea, you stay focused on the current experience. After that, it’s like forgetting that we threw that bottle away. We let the sea do its work. Maybe the bottle will be swallowed by a shark, maybe it will float endlessly and get caught in the seventh continent (continent of waste), or maybe it will find a recipient. Anyway, we don’t have to know. This is none of our business! This does not concern us. Nor do we have to hold the elements accountable. “So, sea, and the wind, it’s now been three years, three months, and three days since I threw this bottle... Where is it? Where is my return on investment? I’m waiting!” No, a sensible person doesn’t do that. The ego does that. In their madness, they spend a lot of time holding life and the universe accountable... reproaching them even! ‘Why is my life is like this? Why don’t I have a job / a friend / a father / a child / a mobile phone / a pair of pants /... as I would like? This is not what I ordered from Santa Claus; he must have misread my letter.” Like a capricious child and so far from the reality of life. So in this case, in phenomenological reflexivity, we don’t do that. Or if we do, we see that it’s being done. We observe with curiosity and benevolence the twisted game of the ego that demands accountability from the universe. But we’re not playing with it. A bit like a referee: you look where the ball goes, but you don’t touch it. Or rather as a witness, because we don’t judge what’s going on. We observe. Quietly. The noise of the ego. The reactive mind. At this stage of the text, this idea of a witness may seem abstract. However, phenomenologically, it can become very concrete (see section 2.4.4.2). Thanks to this practice of phenomenological reflexivity. By dint of everything, it’s going to happen on its own. There is no need to seek to do so. You are not required for that to happen. A consciousness is enough. That’s good, everyone is gifted! An awareness and intention to observe oneself, to see oneself, in connection with goals, as chosen in a dialogical reflexivity. Box 3.3. Articulation between dialogical and phenomenological reflexivities

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So dialogical reflexivity is rather like an educational premise that will allow us to understand the interest of all this, that can motivate us to engage in such a process and that is useful as long as a reactive mind lasts. It allows us to reframe these mental phenomena in a way. And phenomenological reflexivity is the targeted process in fact (like a horizon that is not necessarily reached). The two are complementary. The first involves verbal phenomena: mental for the cognitive dimension and expressed for the dialogical dimension. But what, more precisely, about the material of this dialogical reflexivity, likely to motivate the implementation of phenomenological reflexivity? 3.1.4. Objectives and material for the implementation of these reflexivities 3.1.4.1. An aim for dialogue and conscious endorsement of values and objectives As we understand it, a dialogical (cognitive) reflexivity has as its main aim to encourage the orientation of the subject’s functioning towards more responsibility. Such an orientation requires the conscious choice of values and goals that are congruent with responsibility as we have defined it here. An essential aspect of such a development is that the subject’s intentions are consciously oriented towards that; that they wish to develop empathy, relatedness and coherence. Thus, the fact that they set goals with an ethical motivation, or more generally that they have the goal of becoming responsible, also appears to be required (Hagège 2014). Berger et al. (2009) have highlighted the importance of implementing reflexivity to promote coherence at this level. Thus, for example, the subject could consciously set the goal of becoming responsible and conscious of their functioning and ego in order to act harmoniously towards themselves and the environment. As previously argued, the subject’s attention, values and norms (their orientation) depend on the other three horsemen of the mind (cognition, emotion and relationships). By habit and cultural bias (Hagège 2013, 2015b), it is likely that the subject is more aware of their beliefs and values, than of their emotions and relational modalities. And yet, they are not fully aware of them. When I ask second- or third-year undergraduate students each year what their values are (to name them, list them, rank them in order of importance), and why they do these studies (reasons and goals), most discover with surprise that they have never asked themselves these

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questions. As a result, it is for the most part difficult, at least at first, to put words to their values. Thus, the implementation of cognitive and dialogical reflexivity should aim to make the implicit explicit, in other words the unconscious. In this way, subjects will be able to become aware of possible inconsistencies between their lifestyles, actions and values, for example. Thus, in various modules, I make students list their regular activities (daily, weekly, etc.) and invite them to identify the corresponding values, then compare them with the list initially established (of priority values). This also implies an active comparison with the norms and values of the environment. In this regard, the reflexive attention has been “defined by the fact that the individual can pay attention to the dynamics, constraints, devices, and especially to the developments, which condition their attention. [...] Asking […] questions about objects or mechanisms that attract, stimulate, awaken, orient, captivate or alienate our attention necessarily means asking questions about the value of these objects or mechanisms” (Citton 2014, p. 201, author’s translation). Such work, at the cognitive level, certainly seems necessary. However, given our ability to be blind to ourselves, it is limited. It is not enough to know intellectually that such-and-such an incoherence exists in our lives, for example. It is also important to be aware of it at the moment it occurs: to observe it in a neutral way so that it can then be domesticated and then lose strength. As mentioned earlier, responsibility implies, for example, looking at how each of us are “aspiring jihadists”, how the same mechanisms are at work in our own mind. It is about seeing how we project our vision of the world, closing our minds, sometimes being violent towards others or to ourselves (in one way or another), grasping our thoughts, seeing that they are formulated in a language that induces culturally biased meaning, etc., rather than pointing the finger at the problem from the outside. This cannot be done only at the mental level. This implies looking directly at our own subjectivity and its relative character, by implementing phenomenological reflexivity. 3.1.4.2. Reference knowledge for dialogical reflexivity, likely to motivate phenomenological reflexivity As Sauvé (2000) expressed it, responsibility implies awareness and knowledge of the possible choices, of the consequences of acting, and thus of being informed, while critically processing information. This implies, as we have mentioned, making the implicit explicit (or the conscious). What implicit are we talking about more precisely? Well, the implicit existing in the three co-emerging phenomena at stake, namely: the inner world, the

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outer world and their interactions. So far, we have talked extensively about the inner world and its interactions with the outer world. To use a metaphor used by Quirion (personal communication), it is a question of understanding intellectually (and then seeing phenomenologically) that the projective attitude of the ego is as if I was scratching in the mirror to remove a stain on my face. If I understand and see this, then, naturally, I will try to work on my face instead. Such a process of looking inside, instead of outside can obviously be facilitated by being accompanied by someone who knows the path, who has already been there, can reassure and help the subject to identify the many traps of the ego. To encourage this observation of the discrepancy between relative reality and ultimate reality, internal inconsistencies in the subject and their regrettable ethical consequences, much knowledge – in particular psychological knowledge such as that presented in this book – can serve as a reference. The subject will thus be able to have models concerning their own functioning (e.g. the four horsemen of the mind) and try to compare their direct observation with these models – thus already entering into a reflexivity. This type of knowledge is also important to foster critical thinking and the possibility of choice in our societies: on the whole, salespeople, advertisers, media professionals know the techniques of manipulation and individual’s cognitive functioning. They use them to format opinions, infuse emotions and shape behavior. People are the objects of these processes. In order for them to regain their status as subjects in the face of these control systems, it seems necessary to teach them how these human processes work so that they can become aware of them and learn to detect their effects on themselves. This will allow them to have more control over their choices and behaviors. NOTE.– It does not surprise me that the political authorities do not put energy into this: if citizens were aware of the processes of manipulation and influence to which they are subjected, if they all became subjects responsible for their lives, it would undoubtedly do a lot of damage to the market economy. However, the latter seems to have much more influence in government decisions than the emancipation of the citizen and the future of the planet. There are clear economic interests in maintaining “sleeping people” and the beautiful momentum of the Enlightenment stipulating that it is important that the people be enlightened seems to have fallen back like bellows. “Knowledge is liberating”, however, it is not just maths, English, the arts and other school subjects that allow this freedom; it would be

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especially those that encourage a critical look at the functioning of our inner and outer worlds. As far as knowledge about the outer world is concerned, descriptions can be found in the other “educations for”, of which it is often a major topic. This knowledge concerns the complexity of the outer world and its different dimensions. We cite, as examples, the knowledge concerning: – epistemology (notions of paradigm, epistemological obstacle, etc.); – economic functioning (financialization and globalization of the economy, unequal distribution of wealth, role of money, stock markets, etc.); – human resource use (quantitative aspects, waste production, ecological and health consequences, economic links, etc.); – the functioning of political institutions (inter-state links, roles and responsibilities of lobbies, time scales and reasons for political actions, etc.); – evolution of food (link with pollution, production methods, holders of means of production, animal treatment, health, etc.); – the functioning of the media (see below); – some academic knowledge useful for a critical understanding of the world in which we live (e.g. historical, geographical, scientific, etc.). In these different processes, by coupling with knowledge about the inner world, we can also understand where and how the ego2 of Humanity comes into play. The testimonies of two students in the MBER module illustrate this. TESTIMONIALS.– “This approach [...] allowed me to see things [...] from a point of view that I had never explored before without meditation and learning this ethical approach. I have always taken care of my physical appearance by paying attention to every detail of clothing and other things, and before that, it was what I used to call ‘taking care of myself’. I understood that I was off topic and I was able to adopt a different way of working, because this need to always have the latest watch of such a brand or the latest trendy jeans is, I realize, far from being a vital need.”

2 Or the ratio of reactive thoughts-emotion to creative thoughts and harmonious emotions.

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“Detaching myself from the ego helps me to understand the world better, I act less subjectively. I am less self-centered, which gives me a broader view of the world. I pay more attention and thus give more importance to others, but also to the non-human environment, which, like us, deserves respect and recognition. ... I have made progress in my relationships and this really makes me happier, because... I now feel freer to act, connected with the outside world.” Thus, this knowledge about the external and internal worlds will allow us to reflect on values, their meanings and consequences, in particular by learning to distinguish those that nourish the ego (consumerism, competition, etc.) from those that promote harmony (solidarity, fraternity, etc.). To conclude, whether it is the inner world, the outer world or their relationship, the central objectives of an education for responsibility are that the subject has an explanatory model of the object of interest, sets goals in terms of action and correspondence of these actions with responsible values, and trains to become more aware of their functions at the moment they manifest themselves (beware of their thoughts, emotions, modalities of relations with the environment, power plays etc.). EXAMPLE.– These could include, with regard to the media: (1) recognizing their historical evolution, their modes of action and psychological and biological consequences, the roles and functioning of advertising, social networks, economic issues, modes of governance, their links with the political sphere, the use of resources, etc.; (2) taking a critical look at these data; (3) setting themselves a goal, for example (if the subject finds it relevant), stop watching reality TV shows and buying products seen in advertising; and (4) training oneself to be aware of desires or impulses when they arise, such as to ‘lose oneself’ when watching TV or buy a product because one remembers seeing it elsewhere. Without this awareness, the subject continues to act contrary to their own choices, and this, without even being aware of it. And, as illustrated by the previous testimony, to motivate the subject concerning points (3) and (4), they would (5) learn models concerning the functioning of the ego to (6) identify it as such at the moment it manifests itself, and thus coincidentally be able to disidentify from it. Thus, the same student specifies: “Personally, the meditation and lessons received during this module allowed me in part to ignore this behavior dictated by mental phenomena and to learn to better control the ego.”

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Points (1) and (2), and even (3), of the above example, already seem to be proposed in the other “educations for” – each one focusing on one of its themes (in the example, the media, if not health, the environment, etc.). The originality of our approach therefore concerns points (4), (5) and (6). And we have argued that these seem to us essential to an education for responsibility. Points (4) and (6), specific to phenomenological reflexivity, involve being aware of a phenomenon (external or internal) at the very moment it manifests itself, without the attention being accompanied by a phenomenological grasp – that is, without being unconscious of oneself or one’s environment at this moment in time. However, because of system 1 and unconscious processes in general, it is not easy to look at yourself or to perceive your inconsistencies. However, the subject can practice different techniques dedicated to learning the skills required for phenomenological reflexivity, techniques that we group under the generic name of “meditation”. 3.2. Meditation 3.2.1. Meditation and its phenomenological effects The term “meditation” refers to a disparate set of practices consisting of body and mind training (Lutz et al. 2007 ; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). These practices constitute a “family of complex emotional and attention regulatory strategies developed for various ends, including the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance” (Lutz et. al. 2008b, p. 163). Based mainly on Buddhist practices, from which most of the meditations practiced in the West are probably derived, three main types of meditation can be distinguished (Lutz et al. 2007; unless otherwise indicated, it is on this publication that I base myself for the following three points). They all aim at the development of endogenous attention, to the detriment of exogenous attention (see definitions in section 1.3.2.1.1). 3.2.1.1. Training for focused attention3 Focused attention refers to a state where the mind is consciously focused on an object for an indefinite time: with clarity, determination and

3 Via a single perceptual channel and also concentrated on one point.

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constancy. The object can be perceptive (sound, visual object, etc.), sensorimotor (breathing) or mental (image visualized and previously chosen). That is, it falls under one of the seven types of collection object (section 1.3.1.1). The physical posture is important, and generally implies that the spine is straight and vertical, while the rest of the body is neither too relaxed nor too tense. This training cultivates the ability to perceive whether attention is always focused on the object or whether it has been distracted from it – in other words, whether it has been grasped by some phenomenon and has therefore become exogenous. The latter faculty, which can be called “metaawareness”, is not awareness of the object of focus, but awareness of the inner world. Indeed, in the process of learning this meditative technique, when the novice tries to focus their attention on the object, they are frequently distracted (often grasped by a mental phenomenon or a phenomenon arising in their environment such as a noise). At first, it takes them a long time to realize that the attention has been distracted from the intended objective. Thus, they must develop three skills (Lutz et al. 2008b): (1) the faculty of vigilance that allows them to remain vigilant to distractions without being diverted from the chosen object. If this first one is not implemented, the subject needs to mobilize, (2) the ability to disengage their attention from a phenomenon by which it has been grasped, that is to escape from the phenomenological grasp of that phenomenon and, (3) the ability to then quickly redirect their attention to the chosen object. Novices, who have more frequent distractions, must frequently develop and then mobilize these last two skills. On the contrary, advanced practitioners can focus their attention on the chosen object longer without being distracted; they therefore have much less need to mobilize these two skills (ibid.). They have transformed the way their minds work, much more frequently based on endogenous attention than when they were novices. This has the effect, on the one hand, of reducing the frequency and intensity of phenomenological grasping, and on the other hand calming the mind (ibid.). In the long run, an inner silence can take place, so that reactive verbal mental phenomena disappear: the subject becomes fully present to what is within (inner world) and what surrounds (outer world). Their perception is then much less conditioned by the distorting effects of the ego.

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3.2.1.2. Training for open presence Focused attention skills are required for the development of open presence, the latter requiring a calm and a no more than slightly distracted mind (ibid.). Open presence is a state of vigilance in which attention detects at all times any phenomenon perceptible by the mind, without there being any phenomenological grasp or focus on an object: the field of consciousness remains broadened, and makes it possible to perceive all the phenomena of the inner world and the outer world that can be. NOTE.– Open presence corresponds to the simultaneous implementation of conscious sensory and mental modes, such that any phenomenon emerging in the subject’s mind, whether it comes from their inner or outer world, is consciously perceived within the widest possible field of consciousness. The training to ensure that this diffused attention is equanimous corresponds to the notion of perceiving all these phenomena on an equal footing: without ignoring some (of them) (“I do not see”), obviously, nor preferring the others (“I want”) or rejecting (“I do not want”). In fact, as long as there is a reactive mind in the subject, there is a dose of unconscious and grasping in the perception of these phenomena. That said, the subject can train to perceive them consciously without appraisal, as is done in meditations called Vipasyana in Sanskrit (Vipassanā) or Laktong in Tibetan. When the spiritual realization of the subject has made their mind free of reactive phenomena, then their diffused attention is equivalent (with the exception of a few creative thoughts) to the conscious sensory mode. This attention is therefore ideally also equanimous: then it would involve vigilant attention characterized by an openness to all phenomena, in which there is neither magnification nor attentional inhibition, and where everything that manifests itself is perceived with equal interest (section 3.3.2). Thus, it implies a dissociation of attention and phenomenological grasp, in other words, of perceptions and their semantic processing: it corresponds to a direct phenomenological experience, unbiased by personal or cultural preferences, and thus approaches the perception of ultimate reality by a principled mind (thus awakening; Hölzel et al. 2011; Lutz et al. 2007). It is indeed a question of having a phenomenological experience consistent with the actual experience (Hagège 2014). Experiments in neurophenomenology have shown that the metaconsciousness developed in open monitoring meditation allows better

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access to the richness of each phenomenal experience, particularly to the intensity of this experience, to the emotional tone and to mental phenomena (Lutz et al. 2008b). Nevertheless, it is as if these components of experience remained in the second plane of consciousness, without there being any particular foreground, other than the presence at the knowing experience (ibid.). Thus, the subject’s inner and outer worlds (relative realities) seem to be able to be perceived on an equal footing, in the background, such as consciousness (the principled mind then united with the ultimate reality) is perceived in the foreground. It would be the consciousness that begins to perceive itself (Figures 2.2B and 3.1B), in a phenomenological reflexivity. At first, the novice is prey to the phenomenological grasp of phenomena that appear. Their learning requires the skills that allow them to disengage their attention from these phenomena and to keep their mind out of any phenomenological grasp, without any point of focus. Before that, being able to focus their attention on an object, they disengage their attention from that object to take as an object their own subjectivity. The practice contains a discursive aspect: the practitioner contemplates questions such as: “Is the perceived object inside or outside consciousness?”, “Where does it come from?”, etc. As they progress, they become able to disengage their attention from their own subjectivity to observe what is invariant in any phenomenal experience: what makes possible the experience of the subject-object relationship, namely their awareness of phenomena. This last state of consciousness is probably stabilized only in a limited number of practitioners. Even at a lower level, this training has the effect of transforming cognitive and emotional habits: to be less emotionally reactive (i.e. to grasp emotions less and therefore not assess the situation and then act on them), to have a more sensitive and flexible mind, to finely perceive the functioning of the ego (projections, grasp, “for-me-ness”, etc.; Lutz et al. 2008b). It is then easier to develop certain qualities such as compassion. Practitioners at the highest level can even free themselves from the ego. NOTE.– Phenomenological reflexivity corresponds to a training for open presence practiced in an informal way (i.e. in one’s daily life, by doing other activities, instead of sitting on a meditation cushion “to do only that” for example), without containing an especially discursive aspect. It involves the development of a witness consciousness – one that observes in a neutral and

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detached way the subjective experience that is unfolding. Such awareness has been thematized in mindfulness practices with the term reperceiving (Shapiro et al. 2006). 3.2.1.3. Training for non-referential compassion This training aims to produce a particular emotional state: an intense feeling of Lovingkindness, which involves the dual aspiration that all beings are happy (love) and that they are free from suffering (compassion). This state is centered on others, but it is impersonal, because in its purpose it has no specific object or focus, such as a particular person or group of people. It therefore promotes equanimous empathy. And also, ideally, the subject meditates from a non-personal “It’s me who is giving to others”. It contains two aspects: that of impersonal compassion and that of open presence, which are mobilized alternately in practice. The latter uses several techniques in sequence, such as discursive strategy, a set of visualizations, and sometimes some recitations. Advanced practitioners can do without such sequences and instantly generate a state of compassionate love, directly within diffused and equanimous attention. This practice of Lovingkindness meditation generates an general well-being antagonistic with anger or irritation, which is communicative to the people around. 3.2.1.4. Outcome of meditative practices Meditation differs from traditional approaches to change (e.g. psychotherapeutic), which generally involve cognitive control based on re-evaluation (see section 1.3.2.1.2). Instead, it involves observing what is happening, without intervening (except in the particular case of meditation on compassion), which constitutes attentional regulation (Chambers et al. 2009 ; Braboszcz et al. 2010). Also it differs in this respect from the ordinary functioning of the relative mind, because it leads to not grasping emotions and thoughts, not identifying with them, and not reacting according to these phenomena. Contrary to the perception of emotions as ‘negative’, they can for example, lead to a flight or fight reflex and the implementation of a particular and egocentric thought-action repertoire (Chambers et al. 2009; section 1.3.2.4.2). We can compare these emotions with ‘caged animals’. Subjects have the option to confront and ‘knock them out’ (fight) or withdraw from them to consciously forget their existence (flight). The attitude developed by meditation makes it possible to learn to stay next to the cage, to observe, and, for more advanced practitioners, to open the cage to let the emotional wave surge (or roll in) while remaining calm internally – without

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moving, without being afraid of the animal and without identifying with it (Figure 1.8D). And the objective is to develop the same attitude, whatever the value of the emotion (or thought: considered pleasant or not), because the process to be thwarted by meditation is that of grasping (ibid.). However, if this grasp is operational with emotions considered pleasant, it will also be operational with emotions considered unpleasant (ibid.): it is impossible to identify only with emotions judged as pleasant (as the ego would like). It is about generating other functional habits of the mind and learning to stop judging phenomena. In short, meditative practices make it possible to train the mind to move from a mode where attention is exogenous, absorbed by phenomena (perceptions, thoughts, emotions, etc.), where the mind is prey to phenomenological grasping, and to interaction with a relative world, to a mode where attention is endogenous. In the latter mode, the field of consciousness and the orientation of attention can be customized. The relaxation of the mind thus generated, by reducing the phenomenological grasp, creates a space that allows the subject to observe themselves and to better perceive their own functioning (Hagège 2014). A thorough training for open presence makes it possible to pass from a dual phenomenology to a non-dual phenomenology, freed from the ego, where the mind experiences the unity of consciousness with phenomena: in other words the unity of the (principled) mind with the (ultimate) reality (see section 3.3). Meditative practices also make unconscious information more accessible (Strick et al. 2012), and develop the ability to detect initially subconscious mental phenomena – to make unconscious content conscious (Welwood 1977 ; Hagège 2014). In particular, unconscious emotions and thoughts would initiate the appraisal processes mentioned above and meditative practices would make it possible to become conscious of them (Cottraux 2007a). The states of consciousness thus generated have been characterized as “modified” and not ordinary (Braboszcz et al. 2010). They are considered to be “psychologically induced”, as well as relaxation and hypnosis. Other modified states of consciousness induced by other biases, include those corresponding to sleep, dreams, near-death experiences, fasting, sexual orgasm, or psychotropic effects (reviewed by Vaitl et al. 2005).

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3.2.2. Clinical protocols and practices including meditation One meditation protocol that has been widely popularized in the West is the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) protocol. Its inventor, Kabat-Zinn (2003) formalized it in 1979 by secularizing Buddhist practices to help patients with various disorders where drug approaches are limited, such as depression and chronic pain. It defines mindfulness as “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (ibid., p. 145). The term mindfulness is defined in different ways in literature. A consortium of researchers proposed an operational definition with two components: (1) attentional self-regulation, which allows attention to be maintained on the immediate experience, with an increased awareness of mental phenomena in the present moment, (2) this according to a particular state of mind, characterized by curiosity, openness and acceptance (Bishop et al. 2004). Then this first component was split into the component of attention (here and now) and intention (sometimes defined either as the purpose of the practice or as the endogenous character of attention) (Shapiro et al. 2006). Other researchers focus more on the result than on the process, defining it as a higher order awareness of the phenomenal experience of the seven types of perceptual objects in the present moment (Desbordes et al. 2015), which refers to diffused attention. Mindfulness can also be defined rather in terms of capacity: that of “maintaining the object of attention in working memory, whether this object corresponds to an external sensory stimulus, an interoceptive sensation from inside the body, a chain of discursive thoughts going through the mind, or even a memory from the past” (ibid.). One reason for the polysemy of the term mindfulness is that it was originally used as the English translation of different Sanskrit terms: smrti and samatha, which refer to the ability to focus the attention of consciousness, and also vipasyana, which expresses the notion of diffused and equanimous attention (Lutz et al. 2007). It is rather the latter sense that seems to prevail today, although in the MBSR protocol there are more samatha techniques than Vipassanā ones. Box 3.4. Polysemy of the term “mindfulness”

NOTE.– The definition of mindfulness, in its sense of open presence, may seem close to the notion of phenomenological reflexivity as we have defined it above. We prefer to keep the distinction for several reasons:

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– the polysemy of the term mindfulness mentioned in the box above, which refers, in the practices taught in the MBSR protocol and other related protocols (Mindfulness Based Interventions), to different techniques and therefore to different phenomenological experiences. In this respect, this term can be a barrier to a subject’s detailed understanding of their own experience; – phenomenological reflexivity refers to the process of self-observation by which such consciousness could emerge (not to consciousness or its state); – the notion of mindfulness semantically suggests the notion of an initially partially empty container that would become filled by consciousness, while, as we will detail in section 3.3, phenomenological reflexivity causes a change in the information perceived in quantity, but also in quality (the information being less distorted by the ego);  – the term “mindfulness” also evokes that the container would be full to the brim, as if the subject were then free of any form of unconscious. However, we assume that, even in an awakened being, certain physiological processes and some information (e.g. subliminal) is not available to the consciousness; – this term refers, in common use and sometimes in research, sometimes to techniques, sometimes to their supposed outcome. Thus, I have heard beginners in meditation make statements such as: “I crossed the street with mindfulness.” They probably expressed the idea that by crossing the street, they trained their attention to be present at emerging phenomena perceived by their minds, and that they therefore perceived them more than usual. However, this could be understood as the fact that they experienced a transient awakening when crossing the street; – in addition, mindfulness-based techniques have been developed to satisfy relatively personal goals (well-being, performance, physical health), while we understand phenomenological reflexivity from an ethical perspective. Despite these distinctions, we do not seek to oppose these aims and consider them more as complementary: taking care of- and being gentle with oneself seems to be a prerequisite for caring for others and the non-human environment. In short, the notion of mindfulness is polysemic, ambiguous and suggests misconceptions. It has the advantage of being widely publicized. The notion

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of phenomenological reflexivity, on the other hand, emphasizes the process of first observing one’s own functioning and then one’s consciousness, from an ethical perspective. To facilitate this process, the techniques used are dialogical reflexivity and meditation (including the development of impersonal compassion, and therefore equanimous empathy). In any case, the use of this term is quite popular among the general public and in research, thanks in particular to the success and growing study of MBSR. This protocol takes place over six to eight weeks, with a weekly face-to-face session and practices to be done at home. The sessions include training in different meditation techniques, mainly focused on attention and open presence, as well as some explanations on the functioning of the mind – particularly on the link between thoughts-emotions-actions (ibid.). Cognitive and behavioral therapies (CBTs) have also integrated mindfulness-based approaches into what is called “the third wave of CBTs” (Cottraux 2007a). The general goal of such therapies is unconditional selfacceptance (ibid.). The ordinary mode of operation is considered as an “autopilot” mode, given the exogenous attention, the phenomenological grasp of reactive thoughts, and the automatic orientation of appraisals and actions according to the “I want” and the “I do no want” (Philippot 2007): “[It is then] a question of becoming as fully aware as possible of all the facets of our current state, whether positive or negative, [...] not to let ourselves be carried away by these judgments, to not to let them govern our attention, [... therefore] learning to ‘disengage’ from the judgments of our experiences that occur spontaneously.” (ibid., p. 69, author’s translation) This distance – that is the space thus generated in the mind – makes it possible not to act automatically according to the appraisals, and thus, for example, for depressed people, to change their relationship to their thoughts and emotions in a way that is positive for their well-being (meta-analyzed by Hofmann et al. 2010; Gauchet et al. 2012), or for those with obsessivecompulsive disorders to stop repeating compulsive actions (Fairfax 2008). Robust evidence of the effectiveness of meditation-based therapeutic approaches has been provided, particularly for the regulation of anxiety, depression and pain (reviewed by Goyal et al. 2014). Various professional ethics programs are based on meditation approaches (Udayashankar 2015). This is the case, for example, of continued

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professional development for mental health professionals, often focused on impersonal compassion training (Cheng and Tse 2015). 3.2.3. Techniques related to meditation A technique related to meditation, which has recently developed, is cardiac coherence. It is more generally part of biofeedback techniques (Gauchet et al. 2012). These techniques involve voluntarily controlling physiological parameters to regulate thoughts and emotions (ibid.). In the case of cardiac coherence, it is a matter of setting your breathing for a certain time on six breathing cycles per minute. This requires attention to be focused on a stopwatch, breathing cycles and their synchronization, and therefore has features inherent in meditation based on focusing attention. Heart rate is directly related to the functioning of the autonomic nervous system and cardiac variability seems to be a good indicator of the ability to regulate emotions (Servant et al. 2008). Meditation also modulates heart rate and its combination with biofeedback techniques seems to be optimal (ibid.). Used in therapy, cardiac coherence “supports the development of patients’ cognitive and emotional resources, allowing them to better cope with stress and maintain a healthy optimal state” (Gauchet et al. 2012, p. 131, author’s translation). Sophrology (Etchelecou et al. 2012) and yoga (Duraiswamy et al. 2007) also involve training to control breathing and to pay endogenous attention to the inner world (mental phenomena, emotions, bodily feelings) in the present moment, and thus to emerge from the phenomenological grasp. Both techniques also have therapeutic applications (ibid.). Note that yoga, in its original sense, includes a set of disciplines, including meditation itself (Patanjali 1991). It has been defined as “stopping the automatic activity of the mind [...] which reveals our Center, established in it-itself” (ibid., p. 20, author’s translation). Thus, certain very specialized esoteric techniques, generally combining work involving the body and mind, make it possible to actualize extraordinary modified states of consciousness far beyond (or below) the functioning of the ego (Namgyal 2011). Finally, although this list does not claim to be exhaustive, I mention martial arts to finish this section. More specifically, Masciotra, Roth and Morel (2008) describe with specific concepts, derived from enaction theory, the effectiveness of a karate master (‘sensei’). This description is semantically very similar to what is described here about open presence: the

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master is in a “relationship of interiority”, as he or she is in “unity with nature”, “entirely available”, with “a panoramic vision that embraces the whole situation and transcends it”, to the detriment of a biased and restricted vision, which would have made the subject act on the basis of “a predetermined answer” (ibid., p. 123–124, author’s translation). In fact, knowledge of martial arts implies that the mind is fully in the present moment, with an expanded field of consciousness that encompasses the present reality, with the freshness in terms of its renewal, without subjective preference. 3.2.4. Psychobiological effects of meditation The disparity of meditation techniques makes it imprecise to state generalities about the effects of “the” meditation. In addition, the growing number of studies of these effects can compare expert meditators (who accumulate tens of thousands of hours of practice) with novice meditators, as well as groups that have followed a few weeks of training – typically an MBSR program – with groups that have not followed one. Study subjects may be healthy or have pathologies (such as depression), and measurements may be made during or outside meditation practice. Worse, sometimes it is a question of evaluating the impact of a practice on “mindfulness”, while the study only measures the self-reported “mindfulness”4 (without considering the subject’s meditation experience). Finally, as suggested above, most meditative training contains not only meditative practices, but also teachings and reflections about mind functioning and emotional regulation. Thus, it is often the combined effect of these two aspects that is actually appraised, and not only that of meditation (Hagège 2014). Moreover, the “trainer” effect is generally ignored: it can reasonably be assumed that the vibratory quality of the teacher, and their adequacy with that of the subjects following the training, influences the effectiveness of learning. Subjectively, we can indeed see that we do not learn as easily from different people (depending on affinity, the manner of explaining, etc.). Empirical publications on meditation are growing exponentially (Braboszcz et al. 2010). Among these,

4 That is, the subject answers a questionnaire on their ability to be conscious. We know that this type of questionnaire has many biases, including the subject’s limited ability to recognize themselves (because of unconscious processes) and their tendency to want to give a socially acceptable answer (called the “social desirability bias”).

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studies of the meta-analytical statistical type5 seem to identify the most statistically significant effects of these meditation-based approaches. 3.2.4.1. Concerning the mind Cognitive abilities are mainly measured by the success of tasks that involve them. A set of studies has shown effects of expert meditation practice on perception, attention (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014 and by Van der Velden et al. 2015), reactive thoughts and their regulation, self-understanding, mental intelligence, learning and memory (ibid.). The effects are more or less contrasted according to the type of practice implemented (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014). The effects are of moderate magnitude for attention, and of smaller magnitude for more cognitive measures (mental intelligence, etc.; meta-analyzed by Sedlmeier et al. 2012). For mindfulness-based interventions (MBSR type), a strong effect on cognitive reactivity, a moderate but consistent effect on mindfulness (self-reported6), rumination and concern were measured, in line with what is expected by the theory (meta-analyzed by Gu et al. 2015). Expert practitioners in focused attention, and those in open presence may perceive conflicting stimuli (e.g. a different stimulus in front of each eye; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010 and by Lippelt et al. 2014). This shows increased capacities of their consciousness. In addition, meditation increases attention to perceptions, detection of perceptual stimuli (Lutz et al. 2008a) and decreases perceptual habituation (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). EXAMPLE.– (1) Meditators notice more changes in flickering scenes, and more quickly, (2) they identify more perspectives in multiple perspective images and (3) they are less distracted by irrelevant elements suddenly arising in a task of selective visual attention than non-meditators (Hodgins and Adair 2010). They also perform better in cognitive flexibility (Grant et al. 2013; Fan et al. 2014). Even short (four-day) meditative training can improve visual

5 These studies calculate statistical effects by combining a set of empirical studies that have already been published. Their statistical power is therefore increased. 6 See note 4 in this chapter.

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spatial information processing, working memory and executive functions (Zeidan et al. 2010b). Also some studies have focused on the impact on creativity, for which we can distinguish: convergent thinking allowing us to pertinently select elements in a set to find an original solution, and divergent thinking which allows us to imagine different suitable possibilities. It would seem that focused attention meditation increases convergent thinking, while open monitoring meditation would more specifically promote divergent thinking (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014). Also, the cognitive decline associated with aging can be offset by meditation that develops attention, memory, executive function, speed of information processing and cognition in general (reviewed by Gard et al. 2014). As expected, meditation seemingly reduces the grasping of thoughts (mind wandering or mental ruminations; Kemeny et al. 2012; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010 ; and by Van der Velden et al. 2015), increases metaawareness (reviewed by Van der Velden et al. 2015) and mindfulness (ibid.; meta-analyzed by Galante et al. 2014). In addition, studies suggest that meditation reduces cognitive biases: those that manifest themselves in the appraisal of situations (Hafenbrack et al. 2014; Kiken and Shook 2011) and individuals (Lueke and Gibson 2015) – in other words, meditation would reduce implicit attitudes towards exogroups. It has also been shown (in line with the positive impact of meditation on well-being, see below) that meditative practice reduces attentional bias towards emotions that are considered unpleasant (Pavlov et al. 2014). Last, but not least, a body of evidence suggests that meditation allows a more objective knowledge of oneself (reviewed by Carlson 2013). In short, these results suggest that meditation tends to promote the development of a finer perception, vigilant attention (therefore diffused and equanimous), and the widening of the field of consciousness. All this allowing us to better perceive stimuli, in a way less hindered by the grasp of thoughts and less biased by the functioning of the ego, its habits and blindness. 3.2.4.2. Concerning emotions It is at the level of emotions and changes in the relationship with the other that the results are statistically the strongest (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010; meta-analyzed by Sedlmeier et al. 2012). Corresponding variables

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include interpersonal relationships, anxiety, emotions considered unpleasant, stress, emotions considered pleasant, empathy, well-being and emotion regulation (ibid.). The empathic response (and its neural correlates) is higher in meditators who are experts in non-referential compassion than in novices (Lutz et al. 2008; Mascaro et al. 2012). Also, this type of meditation causes a decrease in depressive symptoms, an increase in compassion towards oneself and in emotions considered pleasant (meta-analyzed by Galante et al. 2014). Even in novices, there is an increase in well-being, a feeling of connection to others (Hutcherson et al. 2008) – the strongest effect – and a decrease in self-centered considerations (Seppala et al. 2014). In contrast the effect on empathic response seems to be little noticeable after a short MBSR-type training, while an increase in compassion towards oneself is significant after this training (Birnie et al. 2010), as is the reduction of emotions considered unpleasant, depression, hostile reactions, the increase in emotions considered pleasant and the recognition of others’ emotions (Kemeny et al. 2012). However, for mindfulness-based interventions (MBSR type), the effect on compassion towards oneself is to be confirmed, in contrast with the decrease in emotional reactivity, the effect of which seems strong and robust (meta-analyzed by Gu et al. 2015). Finally, meditation seems to improve resilience in abused children (Waechter and Wekerle 2014) and medical staff (Seppala et al. 2014). Finally, we include in this section the impact of meditation on pain, because it is in particular the emotional component of pain that it influences, probably altering the negative appraisal of nociception7. Mindfulness-based approaches appear to have a non-specific effect on the reduction of chronic pain (meta-analyzed by Chiesa 2010). Such interventions, even very short ones, could be remarkably effective on acute pain (Zeidan et al. 2010a) and more effective than morphine-type analgesics (reviewed by Zeidan and Vago 2016). They would involve in particular the anterior cingulate cortex, the insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (reviewed by Bilevicius et al. 2016). Also, it seems clear that meditation expertise allows a decrease in the subjective feeling of experimentally induced acute pain, and this effect could be mediated by different brain structures, depending on the type of meditation (reviewed by Nakata et al. 2014). Finally, the analgesic effects of 7 Three non-exclusive causes of physical pain are traditionally considered: excess nociception (of a painful stimulus), neuropathic aspect (due to a problem in nerve transmission) and psychological dimension (due to reactive emotions and thoughts). However, this effect could also imply a feedback on the neuropathic component.

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meditation would be more specific to open monitoring meditation, while attention focusing techniques would have few or no similar effects (reviewed by Grant 2014). Thus, in general, meditation brings about various positive psychological effects, such as an increase in subjective well-being and compassion, a reduction in psychopathological symptoms and emotional reactivity (reviewed by Guendelman et al. 2017; Keng et al. 2011 and by Van der Velden et al. 2015). 3.2.4.3. About the body With regard to physiological changes, meditation causes a decrease in respiratory and cardiac rhythms, blood pressure and increased activity of the parasympathetic autonomic nervous system, sensitivity of baroreceptors, and synchronization of cardiac and respiratory rhythms (like in cardiac coherence; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). In addition, the emerging field of research in psychosocial genomics has studied changes in gene expression associated with yoga and meditative practices. It has thus been shown that circulating immune cells have a genetic expression profile suggesting an enhancement of immune function (reviewed by Saatcioglu 2013). In this sense, it has been shown that humoral and cellular immune responses are respectively faster and more intense in non-referential compassion practitioners, or after an MBSR program, than in control subjects (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). Also, a day of intensive meditation causes among expert meditators an epigenetic regulation of gene expression8 and a decrease of the expression of proinflammatory genes (Kaliman et al. 2014). In the same vein, various other studies have confirmed that meditation affects gene expression in favor of a reduction in the inflammatory response9 (reviewed by Buric et al. 2017). In line with these observations, meditation improves remission in various cardiovascular, neurological, autoimmune and renal diseases, including changes in the cerebral cortex, prefrontal areas, neurotransmitters, white matter, autonomic nervous system, limbic system and various circulating 8 Through reduced expression of histone deacetylase genes and changes in the acetyl and methyl groups of histones. 9 In particular the NFκB pathway, also involving interleukins. N.B: a decrease in this response, exacerbated in pathologies, is potentially beneficial to health.

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molecules such as cytokines, endorphins and hormones (reviewed by Jindal et al. 2013). At the cerebral level, eight regions were found to be systematically modified specifically in meditators, including key regions in metaawareness, external and interoceptive body conciousness, memory consolidation and reconsolidation, emotion and self-regulation, and intraand interhemispheric communication (reviewed by Fox et al. 2014). In addition, meditative practice seems to increase connectivity between the attentional brain network and other distant brain areas supervising attention, plus self-reference and emotional processes (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014). In line with what has been mentioned above, cortical thickness (gray matter) is greater in expert meditators (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010; Grant et al. 2013) and the latter have a lower atrophy of grey matter as they age than non-practitioners (Luders et al. 2015). Also, in meditators, the electroencephalographic signatures are comparable to those that seem specific to the emotions considered pleasant (reviewed by Vaitl et al. 2005). In particular, lateralized activation (left) of anterior brain regions, related to emotions considered pleasant and grouporiented behaviors, is found in meditators (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). Also, in those who practice non-referential compassion, brain networks involved in empathy and in the representation of the state of mind of the self and others are modified in response to emotional stimuli compared to control group subjects (Lutz et al. 2008a). Moreover, in the latter, the default mode network of the brain is that which corresponds to mind-wandering, which correlates with the absence of joy (Brewer et al. 2011) and with the processing of information in reference to oneself (self-referential processing; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). In resting meditators, these areas are deactivated, while functional connectivity between other brain areas involved in cognitive and selfregulation is stronger at rest, and during meditation than in control subjects (Brewer et al. 2011; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010; and by Tang et al. 2015). In addition, meditation recruits brain areas involved in attention more intensely in intermediate meditators than in expert meditators, suggesting that the latter, accustomed to endogenous attention, mobilize fewer brain resources to implement it effectively (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010 and Lutz et al. 2008b). Indeed, as explained above, novices require more attention skills than experts, for whom endogenous attention has become

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common. However, brain responses to sensory distractions suggest that expert meditators perceive stimuli more sensitively and finely, even when they focus their attention on another stimulus (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010): their attentional resources, instead of being allocated to the phenomenological grasp of mental phenomena, are more available for sensory information processing. This data, therefore, makes it possible to explain the neuro-atomic support of the decrease in grasping (especially of mental phenomena), the widening of the field of consciousness and a more diffused and equanimous attention, and tend to empirically validate these supposed effects of meditation. With regard to behavior regulation, there are fewer studies, but meditation seems to improve it in general (reviewed by Keng et al. 2011). For example, mindfulness-based sexual therapies reduce sexual desire and activity disorders (reviewed by Mize 2015); mindfulness-based approaches have a small but positive effect on the remission of pathological gamblers (metaanalyzed by Labuzienski 2015); improves sleep quality in seniors (Black et al. 2015) and appears potentially effective in helping weight loss and regulating eating behaviors (reviewed by Mantzios and Wilson 2015  and by Olson and Emery 2015). In short, meditation leads us not to grasp phenomena (even if they concern our personal history), by bypassing basic automatic cognitive mechanisms, such as the semantic processing of perception, via, among other things, changes in functional brain organisation. This new habit allows, for example, to feel an emotion without its meaning or cause being interpreted by the reactive mind, or to perceive a “recognized” external phenomenon without mentally associating it with a name. Meditation thus leads us to recognize things as they are (what is sometimes called “thusness”), and not as our personal past or our culture has conditioned us to conceive them. In this respect, we can say that knowing (the ultimate reality) and phenomenological grasping are antagonistic. SUMMARY.– With regard to the empirically-proven effects of meditation on the mind, emotions and body, first, meditation improves mind flexibility as well as cognitive (learning, memory, concentration, etc.) and perceptual performance, while counteracting brain aging. Fostering equanimity, it induces a reduction of attentional biases, therefore of the ego. Second, its most pronounced effects concern emotions and mental health, with an increase in well-being in particular. Finally, for the body, impacts are

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measured at the physiological (better blood circulation, strengthening of the immune system and reduction of inflammation) and cerebral (change in functionality and connectivity of certain areas) levels. Finally, meditation also allows the regulation of pathological behavior involving, for example, addictions. Note that the idea that emotion and thoughts on the one hand, and mind and body on the other, are separated is part of a traditionally typically Western dualistic epistemology, and that neuroscientific and physiological data suggest instead an interdependence between emotions and thoughts, and between body and mind (Chambers et al. 2009). This brief literature review clearly shows that meditation affects three levels of being, distinguished for the purposes of this presentation (mind, emotions and body; tables 1.2 and 1.3) and reveals their indissociated nature. As mentioned above, attention, emotions and behaviors are at the heart of the world-mind relationship. In conclusion, the empirical data10 available, briefly reviewed here, support the supposed impact of meditation on responsibility (Hagège 2014): meditative practices have the potential to foster the development of vigilant attention, empathy (and relatedness) and a better self-knowledge conducive to the coherence of the subject, by acting at the level of the four horsemen of the mind, such that the latter generate more harmony. Now, we will present a much smaller number of studies focusing on the impact of meditation in a school or university context. 3.2.5. Effects of meditation in school and university contexts 3.2.5.1. On cognition In middle school students, training to practice “mindfulness” in everyday situations would increase awareness and acceptance of what is (Viafora et al. 2015). Also, a decrease in mental ruminations and the reactive verbal mind has been measured following various meditation programs at school (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015) or university (Mrazek et al. 2013). In the latter context, a two-week focused attention training led to a significant increase in working memory (ibid.). According to a qualitative study, 10 We could also have reviewed the theoretical psychological mechanisms of the mode of action of meditation (Chambers et al. 2009; Hölzel et al. 2011).

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meditation seems to promote thought awareness and better sleep quality among specialized educators and guidance counsellors in initial training (Tarrasch 2015). Also, according to a meta-analysis compiling studies conducted on thousands of children, overall very significant effects of these approaches on cognitive performance were measured (Zenner et al. 2014). Finally, adolescents who have completed a seven-month meditation program in an alternative school report better self-knowledge and self-regulation11 (Wisner and Starzec 2016). 3.2.5.2. On emotions and well-being Overall, various meditation programs implemented at schools show a moderate improvement in well-being and emotion regulation, in terms of reduction of: violent ideas towards oneself (Britton et al. 2014), stress, anxiety, emotional excitement and emotions considered unpleasant, which reflects a more peaceful state in general (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). A meta-analysis showed a particularly strong effect of various interventions on stress resilience (Zenner et al. 2014). Effects are measurable even on short interventions, although they are stronger with longer programs and where young people meditate more frequently (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). These effects would also be stronger in older students and when a teacher teaches meditation, rather than an external intervener (ibid.). The impact on emotions considered pleasant (absent or weakly positive) is not clear at this time (ibid.). In addition, a quasi-experimental study of homeless high school students found that they experienced an increase in well-being and emotional regulation (Viafora et al. 2015). Also, according to qualitative studies, meditation seems to promote awareness of emotions and behaviors, reduce stress among specialized educators and pre-service guidance counsellors (Tarrasch 2015) and make students more aware and compassionate (Crowley and Munk 2017). Consistent with all these results, self-reported measures of mindfulness among students showed a significant positive correlation with measures of well-being12 and negative correlation with perceived stress (Singh et al. 2016) and reported harassing behavior (Abid et al. 2017). In addition, it has been shown in elementary schools that students who have followed a meditation program do indeed see their self-reported scores increase in mindfulness and well-being (Devcich et al. 2017; Dove and Costello 2017). 11 Emotionally, cognitively and behaviorally. 12 But an absence of correlation with life satisfaction (Agarwal and Dixit 2017).

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3.2.5.3. On behaviors Studies that have assessed relational behaviors have shown that different meditation programs promote prosocial behaviors and social skills in general, to the detriment of antisocial behaviors (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). The qualitative appraisal of a seven-month program in an alternative school showed an improvement in interpersonal relationships among adolescents – with their families and in their ability to trust (Wisner and Starzec 2016). The impact of meditative training on academic performance (measured by standard tests) has been little studied so far. After meditation training, high school students improved their results in language (especially vocabulary and reading skills) and mathematics significantly compared to control group students (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). In line with this, a study among undergraduate students showed that a two-week training session for focused attention significantly improves the performance of a reading and comprehension task (Mrazek et al. 2013). One of the common barriers to academic success is attention deficit and hyperactivity disorders. Although research still needs to be supported (Evans et al. 2017), several studies have shown that meditative practice can reduce these disorders in adolescents (reviewed by Meppelink et al. 2016; and by Mitchell et al. 2015), and even more clearly in adults (reviewed by Mitchell et al. 2015). In summary, these first studies, to be completed, have shown the feasibility, acceptability and potential effectiveness of meditation programs among different age groups and cultural contexts (Burke 2010; Waters et al. 2015). 3.3. General principle: reflexivities, meditation and responsibility 3.3.1. Meditation and dialogical reflexivity would synergistically promote phenomenological reflexivity 3.3.1.1. “Negative” effects of meditation We have mentioned above many observed beneficial effects of mediation. However, like any active practice (e.g. taking medication, sports,

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etc.), “undesirable” effects seem likely to occur in some cases. A few rare publications are devoted to these effects. Among the notable effects, depersonalization-derealization (Castillo 1990), anxiety and recollection of traumatic experiences have been identified (Cebolla et al. 2017; Lindahl et al. 2017), the majority of these effects being transient and benign (Cebolla et al. 2017) and their specificity is likely to depend on other factors (Lindahl et al. 2017). Depersonalization consists of feeling separated in two, as if there were a self that does, feels, etc. and a second self that observes this first self – that is, a witness consciousness (Castillo 1990). It is often accompanied by derealization: the subject has the impression of living as if in a dream, as if their world were no longer real (ibid.). More than two-thirds of adults would experience such a phenomenon in their lives, even if only temporarily, but subjects may find it disruptive in their professional and social lives, to the extent that it triggers anxiety in them (ibid.). Given the spiritual changes induced by meditation (see above), it seems normal that meditation causes depersonalization and derealization (the appearance of this witness consciousness is even a desired effect), that it brings back experiences considered traumatic (emotional engrams becoming conscious13) or anxiety (the anxiety that the ego would have to disappear, in particular) – see the following anecdote. However, the fact that these phenomena are experienced – in very rare cases, in a pathological way – is typical of people meditating without a particular purpose, for an inappropriate (egocentric) purpose and/or not having correctly understood the changes they were experiencing: the mind not being oriented in a meaningful direction for the subject, their detachment from the ego is experienced as a regrettable loss. Moreover, derealization is generally treated using symbols, which will essentially allow them to give a positive meaning to what happens to them (ibid.). Also, without going as far as pathology, if respondents to these surveys (Cebolla et al. 2017; Lindahl et al. 2017) have reported such effects as undesirable, this seems to be symptomatic of a misunderstanding or self-centered purpose. 13 In particular, focused attention meditation voluntarily reduces the field of consciousness and thus places it in a state close to that in which past wounds or emotions have been internalized, which has the effect of bringing them to the surface of consciousness (by resonance). Thus, its regular practice encourages confrontation with these “caged animals” and thus multiplies the opportunities to free them.

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ANECDOTE.– At the beginning of my meditative practice, I was intrigued by the experience of practitioners who followed long-term retreats: they spend three years, three months and three days locked in groups meditating up to 16 hours a day, without external distraction (tobacco, music, TV, etc.) and with only one day off per year. Every time I asked them if it wasn’t too hard to be locked up and not see outside for so long, the answer was similar and consisted of saying: “Being locked up is nothing; the hardest part is the emotions.” Obviously, subjects experiencing these phenomena and feeling detached from themselves and the world could probably also, more easily than other subjects, according to their values, commit misdeeds incompatible with an ethical aim (as many subjects commit virtually by playing video games for example): greater clarity of mind without orientation towards altruistic goals can reinforce egocentrism, as long as there is ego. Like any practice that brings about change in body and mind, its impact depends on the goals14 (and values) in which it is embedded: meditation is a tool. As such, its use depends on the goals served: U.S. Army snipers are trained in meditative techniques to reach their target better. A kitchen knife can be used to kill or cut strawberries to decorate a tartlet. This section therefore highlights the effects of a practice that becomes negative, if it is either too distorted from its original use (aimed at liberation from the ego) or not properly understood. In Buddhism, for example, it is all study, reflection and meditation that is considered effective for awakening: these techniques can contribute to well-being, but they were invented to free us from our dark areas, by confronting us with them. However, studies of the adverse effects of meditation have so far focused on the type and modalities (frequency, duration, etc.) of meditative practices. It would therefore now be useful to also investigate what accompanies the practice, in particular the goals sought by practitioners, their motivations and their level of understanding or study of the action mechanisms linked to these practices.

14 It is interesting to note that in moral philosophy, responsibility and adjustment to goals are close concepts. Indeed, responsibility is delimited by the so-called “volitionist” researchers, as belonging to what the subject can control (Knobe and Doris 2010). Control is also defined as the adjustment of functions to a goal (Suhler and Churchland 2009; Hagège 2014). So the notion of responsibility, like that of feedback, refers to the idea of adjusting one's actions to a goal (idea expressing an aspect of coherence; Hagège 2014, 2015b).

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3.3.1.2. Importance of the meaning and understanding of the process This is why, on the one hand, the meaning given to the practice, the understanding of its potential effects and what is learned from the models that gives meaning to the change in phenomenology brought about by meditation. On the other hand, reflection on oneself and on one’s values seem essential so that this practice can help to develop responsibility. The fact of directing one’s mind towards goals and practicing meditation allows the action to be automatically oriented towards these goals (argued in Hagège 2014). Among these goals, a central goal concerns liberation from the illusion of the ego, because the latter directs our functioning in a dual way, contrary to responsibility. The following is a summary of the central aspects to which, according to this analysis, responsibility education should encourage subjects: – understanding of the functioning mechanisms of the inner and outer worlds and their consequences, in particular through the appropriation of models that explain the functioning of the relative mind, the principled mind, the outer world and their interactions: to understand intellectually one’s own functioning, one’s relationship with the world, one’s possibilities for change, one’s possibilities for awakening, and thus be motivated to change in this sense;  – reflection on values, choice of values, and wishes to be consistent with them (dialogical cognitive reflexivity): freely and consciously setting goals (e.g. to feel relatedness, empathy, to be fair, coherent, free from the illusion of the ego, to develop love and compassion, etc.), learn to direct your intention towards what you deliberately have chosen; – training for endogenous attention (meditation): reduction phenomenological grasping and development of open presence;

of

– in situ comparison of the models learned in the first stage with one’s own experience, thanks to direct observation of how they work at the moment they manifest themselves (phenomenological reflexivity);  – metacognition on one’s own functioning as object; – readjustment of values, goals, etc. These aspects, which can be considered as relatively synchronous stages of the educational and are intended to be repeated in such a way expansion and transformation of consciousness,

more or less separate and process, are interdependent as to create the path of an marked by questioning. As

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it is a work on one’s own mind as we have defined it here, and which aims among other things to increase the share and quality of consciousness, we can call this journey “spiritual”. Thus, if the subject experiences a phenomenology similar to the depersonalization and derealization described above, understands them as beneficial phenomena of detachment from the ego, cultivates the desire to be useful to others, to their harmonious development, and, for example, practices meditations of non-referential compassion, their experience will be quite significant for them. Their phenomenological reflexivity will be consciously appraised as positive (and not as a loss). More detached from their ego, they will be much better able to help others and develop their responsibility. In conclusion, in the sense presented here, responsibility would involve clarifying goals that promote connectedness (empathy and relatedness), deliberately choosing them and giving oneself the means to achieve them. As we have already argued, these goals can be expressed in terms of harmony. We have argued (section 2.4.3.2.4) how phenomenological reflexivity would de facto allow the subject to function harmoniously. In the following section, we will consider how the transition from an effective dialogism (from the objective point of view)15, but largely unconscious – therefore associated with the illusion of dualism – to a conscious dialogism (from the subjective point of view), proceeds, and how the latter allows us to act more according to ourselves, others and the NHE than according to the ego (favoring ipseity over identity). In other words, we will propose an answer to the question: what is the link between phenomenological reflexivity, harmony, relatedness and empathy? 3.3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity promotes empathy and relatedness by instantiating harmony We considered reflexivity as a conscious self-reference. As in open monitoring meditation, consciousness takes itself as its object and this makes it possible to free oneself, with training, from any subjective filter of perception of reality (Figure 2.2). Such a release is called the realization of “emptiness” in Buddhism (Epstein 1989). In other words, it would seem that 15 Since the subject emerges from an effective dialogism between the inner and outer worlds, dialogism refers to an is “individuation” (a process that jointly modifies the individual and the environment; Hagège 2014).

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consciousness can recognize the ultimate reality. In a way analogous to the role of self-referential functions in Gödel’s theorems, phenomenological reflexivity, in which the mind (in this case its conscious part) takes itself as an object, allows a clearer perception of the world-mind relationship, such as the shadow areas (the ego, projections, the unconscious, etc.; Figures 1.6 and 1.9), illuminated by light, then disappear. We have already argued this point in section 2.4.4.3 using the example of Hofstadter’s phonograph16 (2008). We use it here in a slightly different way using the notion of isomorphism, defined as a “transformation preserving information” (Hofstadter 2008, p. 57, author’s translation). This is when “we can establish associations between two complex structures in such a way that each part of one structure corresponds to a part of the other. (This correspondence must be in line with the roles played by these parties in their respective structures)” (ibid.). Hofstadter (2008) notes that isomorphisms induce meanings. The meaning is explicit when you don’t see isomorphism, because it is so obvious. We can then speak of an implicit isomorphism. When, on the contrary, we must seek isomorphism, we must make it explicit, and then it is the meaning that is implicit. Let us illustrate this. In the ordinary ego-driven functioning (Figure 2.2A), the implicit isomorphisms corresponding to the projections (by definition unconscious) provide the explicit meanings of our relative worlds (in this case, subjective at the individual level). Thus, the subject recognizes themself in the world they see. They feel they exist through these meanings emanating from their own mind – explicit meanings for them – which they wrongly believe to be intrinsic to the outer world (which they implicitly attribute to the real in fact). It is as if, in terms of the phonograph, discs of variable frequencies had passed (corresponding to the different meanings that the ego projects): the ego remains there and the subject has a distorted vision of reality (since the frequency of the disc does not correspond well to either the inner world or the outer world; there is a partial isomorphism at the relative level, but no isomorphism at the ultimate level). Then the subject seeks to observe their own subjectivity (Figure 2.2B). At first, they try to 16 The latter also reflected on the brain-thought-consciousness link with these entangled hierarchies. He seems convinced that consciousness (and free will) is based on a kind of strange loop, and would perhaps correspond, like G, to a high level mode (an emergence), undecipherable at lower levels. He evokes the idea that “me” is born from the moment it can be reflected. He then speaks of a resonance that reinforces itself. However, Hofstadter probably considers consciousness and thought as processes of a given quality. He does not attempt to explain a change in their quality, as we do. In any case, the models and analogies he sets out in his book are nevertheless appropriate for our purpose.

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look at themselves, they try to explain isomorphism, but because of unconscious psychological defence mechanisms, they do not immediately perceive their implicit attitudes, inconsistencies and shadows: it is as if they are playing the right disc, but that the phonograph uses a program (defending the ego) that leads the phonograph to rearrange its structure so that it does not resonate with the disc. And then, by dint of perseverance and letting go, developing their phenomenological reflexivity, the phonograph’s defense programs are exhausted and the phonograph ends up reading a disc that resonates fully with the machine: the isomorphism is completely explicit and the phonograph explodes (the illusion of the ego is fully perceived, because the subject is no longer mentally disturbed by the phenomenological grasp of phenomena and projections). Then consciousness perceives reality without subjective distortion. It embraces the real: consciousness and the real are isomorphic, while this isomorphism is undifferentiated, because without reference (Table 3.1). Figures 2.2A and 3.1A 2.2B and 3.1B 2.2C and 3.1C

Process

Meaning of the word

Isomorphism

Structure 1

Structure 2

Projection

Explicit

Implicit

Ego

Outer world

Phenom. reflexivity

Implicit

Explicit

Ego → consciousness

Inner/out er worlds

Perceptual emptiness

Asemantic

Undifferentiated

Consciousness

the real

Table 3.1. Evolution of isomorphism between the mind and the world

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.1.– In the first column are indicated the figures to which the lines of the table refer. Isomorphism refers to that between structure 1 and structure 2 (last three columns of the table). In the case of projection, the relative, subjective point of view leads to seeing explicit meanings projected on the outer world by the functioning of the ego. In the case of phenomenological (“phenom.”) reflexivity, a consciousness develops beyond the ego, which perceives the inner world and its interaction with the outer world (in particular, the implicit isomorphism of the projection becomes explicit). When the implicit meaning of the search for a sense of existence through phenomena is perfectly updated, the latter loses its meaning (last line). The emptiness of the ego and the thusness of the

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consciousness are perceived. The awakened being17 perceives reality with a principled mind (ultimate point of view). We have mentioned above the notion of a witness who develops on their own, that there is nothing to do and that simply by observing the disharmony in us, harmony will develop on its own. Let us recall that the orientation of the mind towards a goal (formulated in terms of harmony, responsibility, empathy, relatedness, etc. for example), through the exercise of dialogical reflexivity, seems useful. In short, it may be necessary to have thrown a bottle into the sea anyway. We can even throw one away every day, or every two minutes, if it helps. The same bottle eventually helps. The message could be for example: “I wish a mind free from the illusion of the ego for a more harmonious life.” This adds some nuance to the terms “on their own” and “on its own”. Applied to the relationship with the human or non-human environment, with an appropriate orientation of the mind, such a process can foster the development of a harmonious relationship that includes empathy and relatedness (Figure 3.1). Indeed, at the formal level, the principled mind corresponds to a consciousness embracing the individual and their environment (co-emerging phenomena) as illustrated in Figures 2.1C and 3.1C. At an ordinary level, in this sense, it has been shown that the development of consciousness promotes well-being, empathy and clarification of values, which can contribute to sustainable development, in a harmonious relationship with the non-human environment (reviewed by Ericson et al. 2014). With regard to the process of transforming a relative mind into a principled mind (i.e. spiritual development), Trautwein et al. (2014) explain how the relationship with oneself and the relationship between oneself and others evolves through meditation. The ordinary functioning (Figures 2.1A and 3.1A) is divided between self-centeredness and the connection between the self and others. It is self-centeredness or connection that takes precedence depending on the situation and the subject’s dispositions (ibid.). As explained above, it also depends on the culture, the world in which the subject has evolved, etc. For example, Chinese subjects have higher median prefrontal cortex activity during self-judgment or other judgments, whereas in Western subjects, this area is activated only for self-judgment (Trautwein et al. 2014). Of course, even in ordinary functioning, subjects are 17 The term “subject” seems less appropriate here because the perceived reality is no longer subjective.

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capable of empathy, but they can also experien nce emotiona contagion orr splitting motions, depeending on thhe moment in time (Figgure 1.4). W When the with em phenom menological grrasp decreasees and the sub bject begins to t see and unnderstand how theey function (Figures ( 2.1B B and 3.1B), instead of perceiving p thhe self as somethinng permanennt and sepaarate from th he rest, the self is incrreasingly perceiveed as a channging, ephem meral, environ nment-dependdent element,, without real consistency (Trauutwein et al. 2014).

Figure 3.1. Developmen nt of empathy and relatedne essthanks to phenom menological re eflexivity. For a color versio on of this figu ure, see www.iiste.co.uk/hag gege/education n.zip

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 3.1.– The e clearer thee backgroundd of the draw wing, the more thhe subject’s consciousneess penetratees it. HE = human h envirronment; NHE = non-human environment. A1) When W the suubject dream ms, their consciousness illum minates onlyy a part off their inneer world, annd their A When ann ordinary suubject is attention is totally caught by thhe dream. A2) f on tthe outer awake, their attentiion is mainlyy exogenous and either focused (d orr grasped byy inner pheno omena (thouughts, emotioons, etc.; world (diagram) not reppresented). As A a result of the grasp sp, even in the latter ccase, the inner world w is relattively not ligghted by con nsciousness, as the subjeect is not aware that t there is a phenomennological grrasp (see fi, Figure 2.2A) A). B) By meditatiing, the subjject returns their t attentio on to their innner world aand their field off consciousnness widenss: they can n then moree easily expperience

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relatedness and empathy, because they are more conscious of themselves (inner world) and of what is around them (outer world). They can establish a more enduring and profound dialogical relationship between their inner and outer worlds. C) Rare expert meditators realize the emptiness of the self and phenomena (Lutz et al. 2007). In this case, attention is diffused and equanimous, and the subject perceives both their interiority and exteriority, themselves, others and the non-human: the field of consciousness is mingled with space, there is no longer any personal preference. The subject, of great wisdom, “ never ceases to have everything constantly in mind, never forgets the world, thinks and acts in relation to cosmos” (Groethuysen cited by Morin 1999, p. 33, author’s translation). The coherence of the subject (between saying and doing) is then presumed to be perfect (Hagège 2013). This change would be made possible in particular by focused attention meditation, which causes disidentification with regard to mental phenomena, and, coincidentally, a decrease in self-centered functioning (ibid.). Lovingkindness meditation would more specifically allow an increase in empathy towards oneself (which involves entering into an “ I-you” relationship with oneself) and connectivity with others, which is much more corporeal than conceptual (ibid.). Open monitoring meditation would promote the development of an external point, capable of apprehending oneself and the other on an equal footing (Figures 2.1C and 3.1C). In other words, in such a state of consciousness, Ricœur’s “oneself as another” corresponds to a phenomenological experience, not just an ideal. Indeed, four types of perception modification are encountered in expert meditators: an increase in the quality of perception (i.e. the quantity and accuracy of perceived information), an understanding of the interdependencies at work in the perception process itself, a cessation of perception based on subject/object duality (i.e. self/other), and a non-conceptual perception (i.e. where the semantic processing of perception disappears; Full et al. 2012). To conclude this chapter, we propose that the synergy between meditation and reflection on values and goals (dialogical reflexivity) allows us to change our mind, our relationship with the world, and therefore our relative world, through a process of phenomenological reflexivity. As the subject is part of the world, it changes it in this way18. In this case, this process promotes empathy and relatedness through a broadening of the field of consciousness and a liberation from the conditioning of the ego. An 18 QED: How can we change the world? By changing the mind.

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important aspect in these changes is the relationship with thoughts and emotions, which clears space in the mind to better perceive oneself, others and the NHE. It is not a question of suppressing these mental and emotional phenomena, but of no longer apprehending them in an egocentric manner (partly by evaluating them). Basically, what prevents us from being responsible (and therefore fair and connected to ourselves, others and the environment) is the dual and unconscious functioning of the ego. The process of adjustment with the self, the other and the NHE coincide with the development of responsibility, and is therefore accompanied by a change in mind that becomes more conscious through vigilant attention (Figure 1.6). Thus the subject’s world changes, and becomes “more ultimate”: the subject can become more self-transparent and act more consistently with their values. 3.4. Summary of the competences targeted in responsibility education In summary, to gain in emotional maturity and ethical action, and therefore in responsibility, subjects should probably learn to take into account (1) their inner world, by understanding and seeing in situ their own functioning (Hagège 2014), and (2) their outer world, in a less biased way, and to better perceive the interactions between these worlds. Paradoxically, it is the passive acceptance of these observations, and the coincident gain of consciousness, that will change these two worlds. The mind, the subject, seeing themself more clearly, is thus fundamentally changed; their reflexivity opens the barriers of their consciousness and reduces the influence of their ego (Figures 2.1 and 3.1): “The important thing, in essence, is to work first on your own development before engaging in anything else. We can’t do much more than that” (Trungpa 1979, p. 37). In order to formulate in an even more precise way the targeted transformations in the form of educational objectives, we will mobilize a notion that is now authoritative, without getting into the debates on the relevance of its use. This is the notion of competence. The major advantage we see here is that the current trend of curriculum development in France is based on this notion. It thus seems appropriate to us to propose foundations for a curriculum of education for responsibility, especially since, according

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to Le Boterf (cited by Sauvé 2000, p. 83, author’s translation), “responsibility characterizes competence”. I think you will have understood the general principle. As we have argued above, the four horsemen of the mind select the composition and coloration of the relative worlds. To use the biblical metaphor, they can be at the service of apocalypse or harmony. So, to change the world, it is these four horsemen that will be targeted in an education for responsibility. And one of them (orientation) will be divided into two competences (attentional and axiological). 3.4.1. Notion of competence The notion of competence is defined in official texts as “the ability to mobilize resources (knowledge, skills, attitudes) to perform a task or deal with a complex or unprecedented situation” (Ministère de l’Éducation nationale 2015, author’s translation). Historically, it has gained in importance in the educational sciences and especially in didactic sciences in response to the following observation: memorizing information (or “possessing knowledge”) is not enough to make this knowledge operational, that is, capable of solving problems (Giordan and DeVecchi 1994). In fact, programs seem to increasingly integrate the notion of competence alongside that of knowledge. Initially, in the field of didactic research, the notion of competence was thought out to consider the transposition of expert reference practices from the professional context to the school context (Perrenoud 1998). It is the reference to the effective performance of tasks in a professional context that has motivated more complex definitions than those of the French Ministry of National Education, including for example the sense of duty (Le Boterf 1994) or the originality of the response to situations (Bosman et al. 2000). These expert reference practices are never free of knowledge, but this knowledge is often implicit, poorly reflected or not constituted as a corpus, in contrast with academic knowledge (Perrenoud 1998). According to this pioneering reflection by Perrenoud (1998) on the link between didactic transposition and competences, a competence is made up of “mobilized cognitive  resources ([...] theories, [...] methods, [...] skills, attitudes)” and “operational  schema that allow, in real time, the effective mobilization of cognitive resources” (Perrenoud 1998, p. 505, author’s translation). The different disciplines that mobilize the notion of competence approach it in various ways (Jonnaert et al. 2009). A review of the literature in the

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educational sciences suggests that the notion of competence refers to the successful processing of a situation (ibid.). The abstraction of the notion of competence therefore implies considering the following frameworks (ibid.): – a situational framework in which the competence is valid, that is, a family of situations in which this processing is efficient; – a framework for action to clarify what constitutes or may constitute effective processing for this family of situations;  – an appraisal framework to determine whether or not the situation has been effectively addressed and why; – a framework of resources (external or internal) mobilized by the subject to address the situation. Any competence would therefore have a contextual aspect, and would be constrained by past experiences and previous knowledge of the subject, which will be more or less adapted to the situation (ibid.). As I expressed above with the quotation from Sartre (1970; see section I.6), the frameworks of action and situation concerned by responsibility are all the actions and situations of life, because it is a question of training the mind to change functional habits and because, in accordance with our epistemology of complexity, every action, word or thought contributes to building a certain world. Here, responsibility is not a matter of domain, but it is a matter of state of mind. Therefore, one could say that the context, if any, is that of spirituality or ethical reflection on our daily experiences and actions. In sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.6, we will outline five types of competences that can be used as benchmarks for education and training, on the one hand, and as criteria for research to assess, for example, the impact of educational (school or other) dispositives on responsibility, on the other. According to enaction theory, a competence corresponds to the implementation of positional enactive intelligence, which concerns the controlling of situations (Masciotra et al. 2008). This enactive intelligence is distinguished from two other intelligences: dispositional intelligence which corresponds to self-realization and concerns self-control, and gestural intelligence which corresponds to performance and concerns dexterity (ibid.). Thus, in this sense, the notion of competence refers more to adaptation to situations than to individuals’ dispositions.

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The operational definition of competences adopted here is broader than the previous one and overlaps quite well with the one proposed by the French Ministry of National Education. Also, it is more limited than the definitions resulting from the issues of didactic transposition of professional practices, because this is not such an issue here. It has been proposed for emotional competences which, according to Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013), include three levels: – implicit and explicit knowledge, which refers to the richness and complexity of the conceptual network concerned by the phenomenon (e.g. emotional);   – abilities that refer to maximum performance, to being able to apply your knowledge in situations sometimes when you try; – traits, or dispositions, that correspond to an ability so well incorporated that it constitutes a propensity to behave in a certain way. It therefore refers to a typical performance, integrated into the subject’s habits. In this model, the three levels interact, but are not necessarily correlated, as shown by empirical studies: a subject may exhibit certain abilities, without being able to mobilize them in each relevant situation, that is, without it being a trait or disposition (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). I will now present five competences, which summarize what has been covered in this book so far. For each, I will present only two aspects: the knowledge required and the abilities or dispositions, the latter two referring to a performance respectively being acquired or already acquired. And I will clarify each one’s relationship with the other four. Indeed, these five competences are considered as interdependent to promote education for responsibility. 3.4.2. Emotional competences “What is not thoroughly understood will repeat itself” (quote attributed to Krishnamurti) Emotions strongly influence, in positive or negative terms, depending on the case, the chances of survival, decision-making and social interactions (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). It is from an attempt to reconcile these

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two valences that the notion of emotional competence has been developed (ibid.). It originates from the notion of emotional intelligence, which has “evidenced that the ability to identify, understand, manage and use one’s emotions and those of others are at least as important for success as so-called cognitive or intellectual abilities” (ibid., p. 133, author’s translation; Box 3.5). An important idea of this work on intrapersonal and interpersonal emotional intelligences is that it can be learned. These same authors propose, based on a literature review and their work, five basic emotional competences, from which we draw inspiration (Table 3.2), and which we can relate to others (Box 3.6). The term “manage” (or “control” emotions, stress, etc.) seems inappropriate to us. Indeed, this term used in economics in particular suggests that it is enough to decide, to want to modify or do something about one’s emotion for change to take place. But you can’t manage an emotion like you manage capital or an institution... As we mentioned, it doesn’t work that way. Thus, the word “regulation” would be more appropriate to refer to the way in which emotions (or subjective functioning in general) can be modulated, than the words “control” (Hagège 2014) or “management”. This regulation operates on its own by consciously choosing goals for change, being aware of its current functioning and welcoming it as it is, in the moment, without grasping the phenomena. The effectiveness of this process has been understood, described and studied in the third wave of the behavioral and cognitive therapies (Cottraux 2007b). That said, as long as there is a dose of identification of the subject with their functioning (and an illusory ego), we will talk about “regulation”. Indeed, some regulation techniques (for example, distracting attention by focusing on breathing) do not allow the emotional engram, which will manifest itself later, to be evacuated. Thus, at a more advanced level, emotions can be integrated. That is, their energy is transformed into an open-mindedness and the corresponding engram (see step 6 of Figure 1.3) is definitively released from the body (Figure 1.8D). This process and the methods that allow it will be the subject of a future book. Box 3.5. From “management” to the integration of emotions

Identification Understanding Expression

Self Being able to identify one’s own emotions Understanding their functioning and consequences Being able to express emotions in a benevolent way

Others Being able to identify those of others Understanding their functioning and consequences Allowing others to express their own emotions and welcome them with benevolence

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Regulation Use

Being able to regulate stress and emotions that are inappropriate to the context Using emotions to facilitate harmonious thoughts and actions

Being able to help others to regulate their stress and inappropriate emotions Using others’ emotions with kindness to promote harmony

Table 3.2. Five basic emotional competences

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.2.– This table has been adapted from Mikolajczak and Bausseron’s work (2013, Table 5.1, p. 135, author’s translation). References to benevolence and harmony have been added because of our focus on responsibility here19. It is understandable that these authors have not done so, because, as they explain, there is a debate in this field of research at the moment around work that tends to show that subjects with strong emotional competences can misuse them (i.e. to satisfy their ego’s needs), by manipulating others to their detriment for example (ibid.). We can note that the regulation and use of emotions is achieved by distancing oneself from them and thus reducing the phenomenological grasp of emotions. Thus, these emotional competences require attentional competences (see below). Also, we characterized empathy and relatedness as relational attitudes, not emotions (section 1.3.2.2). Indeed, they have an emotional (affective) and also a cognitive component (see Figure 1.4), the latter involving an understanding of the other’s emotion (or the situation of the non-human element) and a distinction between oneself and another (or non-human self phenomenon; Grynberg 2013). They also involve emotional regulatory competence, which helps to maintain the subject’s emotion at a conscious but not too high level, and thus avoid splitting from emotions and fusion (ibid.). Also, these emotional competences are linked to epistemic and axiological competences, in that, for example, regulating emotions facilitates debate, critical thinking and the adoption of extrinsic goals. Box 3.6. Linking emotional competences with the other competences

Of the five competences proposed by these authors, emotional regulation is a pivotal one: the first three (identification, understanding and expression) help to regulate, while the last one links emotion regulation to action. In the

19 In the common base of knowledge, skills and culture framed by the French Ministry of National Education, there is a formulation of these competences (with the exception of the “comprehension” competence) (Ministère de l’Education nationale 2015). They are clearly formulated in the sense of responsibility.

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present theory, beyond the regulation of emotions – which seems to us to have a social function – it is the integration of emotions that is targeted, because it allows us to free ourselves from inappropriate and egocentric thought-action repertoires. Indeed, as already seen, becoming responsible for one’s own subjectivity requires releasing our caged animals (emotional engrams), which make us act on the basis of the ego (by generating “I want” and “I do not want”, and by being blind to “I do not care”). Thus freed from past conditioning, the mind becomes more conscious of itself and the environment. To conclude, I will complete Table 3.2 by specifying the knowledge and abilities/dispositions required (Table 3.3). Emotional competences – Coping strategies (Table 1.1) – Emotional/ego/responsibility link (appraisal mechanisms, engrams, wounds and reactive thoughts, etc.) Knowledge

– Welcoming, regulation and integration techniques – Distinction of error and fault; own relationship with mistake, error or fault – Complexity of the subject (different motivation systems) – Experiencing your emotions without avoidance, phenomenological grasp, or struggle – or failing that, being aware of it – Applying the techniques learned

Abilities/ dispositions

– Mastering techniques for regulating and integrating emotions – Accepting the risk of making mistakes without feeling guilty – Recognizing the different types of motivation at home when they occur – Fostering the motivation for innovation, coinciding with letting go

Table 3.3. Other emotional competences that promote responsibility

3.4.3. Epistemic competences Epistemic competences refer to what we have discussed about the three modalities of cognition (sections 1.3.2.3 and 2.3.1). We prefer the term “epistemic” to “cognitive” in order to avoid semantic ambiguity. Indeed, as far as the noun is concerned, the distinction between cognition and emotion

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seems clear. However, since the rise of cognitive sciences, which also include the study of emotions, conation, decision-making, etc., the adjective “cognitive” can be confusing. Also, the term “epistemic” is more appropriate here than the term “epistemological”20. Epistemic competences therefore involve considering beliefs and thoughts (their content, cultural biases), including those related to knowledge (see personal epistemology) and also the relationship with them (see dogmatism or cognitive flexibility). In literature, personal epistemology is mainly studied in its relationship with academic learning (Fagnant and Crahay 2010). Here, we are more interested in its relationship with acting (coherence) and feeling (reliance; see relational competences). Epistemic competences are related to other competences basically, insofar as the latter involve reference knowledge. Also, responsibility implies a connection with others. However, we have explained how cognitive flexibility, in contrast with dogmatism, makes it possible to open up to others, and that it is facilitated by a weak, if not nonexistent, phenomenological grasp of thoughts. These epistemic competences are therefore linked to attentional and relational competences. Epistemic and emotional competences are also dependent; for example, cognitive flexibility facilitates the acceptance of emotions. Finally, as argued by a pioneering researcher in the field of personal epistemology, a contextualist epistemology should induce the subject to choose their activities and life according to their values, which naturally leads to ethical considerations (Perry 1999). In this respect, epistemic competences are related to axiological ones. Indeed, according to a contextualist epistemology, knowledge is recognized as having validity in a given context (linked to values in particular) and the choice to value this knowledge rather than another engages the subject’s responsibility. This choice would come, in an education for responsibility, from cognitive and dialogical reflexivity – the cognitive component of which is purely epistemic competences – and from constructive critical thinking. Box 3.7. Linking epistemic competences with other competences

To conclude, a summary of the knowledge and abilities/dispositions of epistemic competences that promote responsibility is proposed in Table 3.4, based on everything that is argued about it in the book. 20 See Chapter 1, footnote 49.

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Epistemic competences – In epistemology (reflection on knowledge, reality and human activity, and the link between the three). For example, distinguishing epistemology of simplification from epistemology of complexity – Beliefs / phenomenological grasp / ego / responsibility links Knowledge

– Distinction between dogmatic and non-dogmatic modes of expression – Distinction between negative and constructive critical thinking – Dimension of self-knowledge of metacognition: knowing one’s own implicit attitudes, the functioning of the ego and the unconscious, the processes of phenomenological grasp – Link between mind/world/action – Contextualist personal epistemology

Abilities/dispositions

– Knowing how to consciously implement an epistemology of simplification or complexity, a more or less dogmatic expression, or a more or less constructive critical thinking – Observation, identification and relativization of mental content (decrease in phenomenological grasp) – Cognitive flexibility – Recognizing different types of own thoughts

Table 3.4. Epistemic competences that promote responsibility

3.4.4. Attentional competences As mentioned in the common foundation of knowledge, skills and culture, attention seems necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and abilities/dispositions (Ministère de l’Éducation nationale 2015). I have discussed the question of attention at length in this book, so I will just remind you, before summarizing the content of attentional competences (Table 3.5), that the grasping of phenomena, especially mental phenomena (see the unconscious mental mode), prevents presence to oneself and to the environment, and that in this it is opposed to relatedness and empathy, and also that the only likely function of the reactive mind is to preserve the ego by preventing the subject from feeling their reactive emotions (and therefore from integrating them). This grasp is therefore linked to epistemic, emotional and relational competences.

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In summary, these attentional competences consist of moving from exogenous and concentrated attention to vigilant attention (by definition endogenous, diffuse, shared and equanimous). Focused endogenous attention is an intermediary in this transition. Attentional competences – Different meditation techniques – The different modalities of attention (section 1.3.2.1.1)

Knowledge

– Principle of the difference between a subjective and an ultimate perception – Link between phenomenological grasp / capturing of attention / ego / the other four horsemen – Principle of phenomenological reflexivity and its articulation with dialogical reflexivity – Formal focused attention meditation: (1) remaining vigilant to distractions without being diverted from the chosen object, or (2) disengaging from a phenomenon by which attention has been captured and (3) then promptly redirecting attention to the object – Formal open monitoring meditation: remaining without phenomenological grasp – Lovingkindness meditation

Abilities/dispositions

Phenomenological reflexivity

– Daily informal application (identifying the instant state of mind, e.g. grasping of thoughts, emotional contagion, etc., and bringing it back to the present moment; being conscious and attentive-vigilant; feeling compassion for others in your daily life; etc.) – Observing in situ the automatic appraisals (i.e. being concious of “I want”, “I do not want” and “I do not care” when they appear) and comparing them to declarative values – Being concious of the seven types of perceptual objects at the time they appear (develop equanimity)

Table 3.5. Attentional competences that promote responsibility

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3.4.5. Relational competences Having just mentioned the links between these relational competences and the other three types of competences presented above, the “residual” recap is presented in Table 3.6. Relational competences – The fundamental error of attribution – Concept of projection – Different relational modalities (Figure 1.4) – Empathy/relatedness/responsibility link Knowledge

– Social identity theory – Cultural stereotypes, link with prejudice and discrimination – One’s own subjective criteria for judgment – Beliefs about the human being, the people in one’s environment, society, one’s environment itself, etc. – Identifying and seeing in action one’s own prejudices (discriminating behaviors and example of a technique developed by Katie 2016), welcoming them and aiming for equanimity

Abilities/dispositions

– Equanimous empathy – Equanimous relatedness – Otherwise, locating the splitting or fusion with emotions at the moment in time

Table 3.6. Relational competences that promote responsibility

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.6.– They are as much emotional as they are epistemic in nature. These competences are to be completed with those in Table 3.2, which relate to others (right-hand column). At the crossroads of epistemic and relational competences, there is their taxonomic dimension, that is, the way in which a subject identifies with an ingroup (“us”), and thus defines outgroups (“them”). In other words, it concerns the relationship with otherness and the corresponding subject’s values. Through the example of violent radicalization, we have discussed the role of this dimension in responsibility. It should be noted that the way we consciously or unconsciously form groups is evolving and contextual: a

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child may perceive their parents as part of an “us” when on a family trip, and a “them” when playing with peers. If we feel we are rather empathetic, we can ask ourselves the following questions: is this empathy only experienced with my loved ones, those with whom I identify? Am I able to be empathetic towards someone unknown? With someone whom I consider a stranger? Or even whom I consider to be an enemy? (and on what basis do I consider them as a friend or an enemy?) Also, in an equivalent way towards the non-human environment: am I only in tune with what I identify as my territory, or am I able to be in any environment (which would be an indicator of equanimity)? These reflections lead to notions of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. We can also make the link, via the projection mechanisms, with the notion of judgment towards oneself and towards others. These judgments are related to attentional biases (personal and cultural) and appraisal. They inhibit empathy to the extent that they foster a closed mind and a sense of separation from others. 3.4.6. Axiological competences We have just discussed the types of competences, each of which is inherent to a horseman of the mind. At present, there remain the competences dedicated to guiding these horsemen towards a more harmonious functioning, through the aim of dialogical reflexivity. It is about making choices and generating commitment. As mentioned in relation to dialogical reflexivity, the questioning of where we are heading, the link between these aims and our actions, and commitment, is indeed essential in an education for responsibility, particularly to stimulate motivation. Thus, these axiological competences could have been called “axio-teleo-logical and pragmatic”: “axio” referring to value – a principle that should guide action – “teleo” to purpose, to finality, and “pragmatic” to concrete action. Indeed, it is not a question here of conducting a theoretical reflection on values in a way that is disconnected from everyday life, but on the contrary of observing which values and goals, unconscious or conscious, are serving our effective actions, and which values and goals, implicit or explicit, are at work in our environment, of consciously choosing which values and goals we would like to act upon, of setting this as a goal, and of giving ourselves the means to implement it (this last point is thanks to the four other types of competences).

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It is these competences that link the first four to the idea of a future. For example, it may be a conscious choice to promote harmony and solidarity, to learn to integrate emotions, to develop cognitive flexibility, empathy or endogenous attention, to understand which values and which type of world serves an ego-based or non-ego-based functioning. With regard to this reflection on values, Fabre (2016, p. 27) recommends an “education for caution” at school, insofar as republican and secular values would be “out of the question”. This education would involve an “ethical reflexivity” and the search for a “fair environment” following problematization (ibid.). However, as mentioned above and empirically illustrated elsewhere (Hagège 2017c), the French public school, in its operation, unfortunately presents many contradictions with these values. How, then, can we encourage a subject to be coherent in a context which is exempt from coherence? A responsible, self-reflective school would require the training of reflective practitioners, who would also be reflective on their personal and societal context. Even if the values of the Republic can be considered out of the question in such a context, it would therefore be important for the practitioner to be concious of the inconsistencies between these declarative values of the school and its dominant practices, and for discussions on this topic to be welcome in the classroom. And, moreover, we believe that students whose explicit values are in conflict with these official values should be encouraged to express their point of view and actively confront it with that of others. This, as already argued, is a probable condition for their possible evolution of values. In conclusion, the first step would be to explain the (personal and social) implicit values, their links with the effective functioning (of the subject and the institution, or more generally of society), and then to promote a dialogical reflexivity between these four types of values: (1) personal conscious, (2) personal unconscious, (3) explicit social (republican values) and (4) implicit social (market economy values), and also to compare these values with regard to the ego, harmony and their respective consequences. Thus, each subject in an education for responsibility could try to become conscious of these four types of values, and challenge them in a dynamic and evolving way, through dialogical reflexivity. NOTE.– It therefore seems essential that an education for responsibility leads subjects to become responsible for their own lives. Otherwise, they may well endorse goals (often extrinsic nowadays; Myers 2009) without really

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knowing why these goals exist rather than others – in the sense of (1) knowing what values they serve, and (2) knowing what unconscious processes or environmental determinants led them to endorse them. Finally, a particular point of axiological competence concerns the notion of free will. From an ultimate point of view, if the ego is an illusion and the subject is only a phenomenon emerging from individual/environmental interactions (interactions considered as a process of individuation; Hagège 2014), then free will is nonsense. If there is freedom, it is that of consciousness with regard to the illusion of the ego. From a relative point of view, that is, as long as there is an illusion of an ego, the subject can be considered as having a free will if they see it as such. Belief in free will is indeed performative (see experience below). A subject who considers themself as a victim who is experiencing their emotions, the situations they encounter, etc. will have no choice but to suffer them. In this alienation, the grasp of reactive thoughts plays an essential role. On the other hand, awareness of the possibility of choice makes free will effective. Without this, the subject is a kind of automaton (on this topic we mentioned the agentic state and the pin ball). In other words, free will, or more precisely, belief in free will, is a tool for responsibility. Regardless of the notion of whether or not it exists in the absolute (Knobe and Doris 2010), what matters to us here is what changes if we believe in it or not. EXPERIENCE.– Vohs and Schooler (2008) conducted two experiments. In the first, the subjects either read a neutral text or a text defending determinism, advocating that behavior is only the product of interactions between genetics and the environment, and that free will therefore does not exist. Those who have read the second text then cheated more afterwards (in a task where they were asked to solve a problem on the computer on their own, when they could also find it thanks to a security flaw in the program). Those who believed less in free will were those who cheated the most. This suggests that they were shirking responsibility for their actions. In the second experiment, these researchers observed that subjects who had read deterministic proposals cheated by awarding themselves supernumerary points after a cognitive task, while subjects who had read assertions advocating free will did not cheat. We could see a paradox in highlighting an aim of harmonious values (Table 3.7), while at the same time advocating a free choice of values. However, the fact of recording this aim makes it possible to bring it into the

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discussion. In addition, “putting forward”, at the pedagogical level, will consist of presenting the ins and outs of the functioning of the ego and responsibility. Then the subject will be invited to identify the values related to the ego and those that, on the contrary, serve harmony. An intimate understanding of these processes, including the limitations and sufferings induced by the ego, should logically lead them to consciously privilege harmonious values. In other words, the practitioner (educator or trainer for example) will be able to present such harmonious values as possible, even desirable, alternatives in our context, consider their consequences and confront them with other contradictory values (for example, consumerist or why not jihadist, if a student subject brought them into the discussion). This choice, submitted to the subject whom the practitioner would consider as having free will, will give the subject an opportunity to evolve towards such values. Indeed, suggesting to a subject that they have free will lead them to act in a more ethical way than if it is suggested that they do not (see experience above). Also, because of the major importance of unconscious learning by imitation, the more the practitioner embodies harmonious values, the more they breathe them into their being, speaking and acting, the greater their influence will be in this sense. Indeed, unconsciously, a subject feels how others are. By the way, there is no better way to calm a class than to be yourself in a state of mental calm. On the other hand, achieving such a result while being internally agitated will probably require some coercion! If you want to be surrounded by serene and loving people, the best thing to do is to be serene and loving yourself (see section 2.4.3.2.3). Axiological competences

Knowledge

– Own values and goals, implicit and explicit, and those of the human environment (e.g. values of relatives, the government, jihadists, the economy, etc.) – Links between ego/disharmony/dual systems (notion of implicit attitudes) on the one hand, and responsibility/harmony/coherence on the other hand – Link between actions, values and goals – Concepts of choice and free will – Concept of performative thinking – Intertwining of language and values → cultural bias of language and therefore of thoughts and knowledge

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Abilities/ dispositions

Dialogical reflexivity

– Challenge one’s own values and goals, and those of the human environment, in a dialogical relationship21 – Distinguish values that serve the ego from those that are beneficial to oneself and the environment – Consciously choose and endorse harmonious values and goals that serve them – Engage, take responsibility, acting in a coherent way to achieve these explicit goals and values (e.g. to train one’s mind for reflexivity) – Reflective distance from on thoughts and their axiological connotations; consciously choosing mental content that promotes harmony – Act on the basis of the belief in the existence of one’s own free will, on the basis of possibilities of choice of actions and life (versus victim behavior in the face of life, others and situations)

Table 3.7. Axiological competences that promote responsibility

Axiological competences involve the other four types of competences. For example, for humanistic values, the taxonomy is broad and the “we” is the entirety of human beings: if this value is as implicit as it is explicit, then the subject, equanimous, can empathize with every human being in their presence (relational competence). In addition, identifying our implicit values requires attentional competences. What do we bring into our subjective reality? Does this correspond to our values and goals or not? We can enter into a dialogical reflexivity concerning what we let our attention focus on moment after moment: it corresponds to our values and goals, often unconscious (and sometimes therefore to social stereotypes endorsed without our knowledge), or to their opposites: what is appraised positively (therefore implicitly valued, “I want”) or negatively (“I do not want”). In this respect, this journey also implies the emotional competence to face emotion, to become responsible for it. For example, making a conscious choice as to whether or not to maintain an addiction (SM1p ; section 2.4.2). Obviously, questioning goals and values also involves epistemic competences: distancing oneself from thoughts and beliefs, metacognition and thought formulation, such as those that include the conscious choice of goals. It can be like this: do my thoughts and my relationship with knowledge serve the values that are close to my heart or do they on the contrary run counter to these values (cf. their performativity)? Box 3.8. Linking axiological competences with other competences 21 Moreover, according to Dubreucq (2016), it is the nature of secularism to appraise values, in a way “that claims to judge them without refuting them, and to recognize them without adhering to them” (p. 211, author’s translation), and thus to consist of “the establishment of a critical relationship with these values” (p. 212).

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In short, axiological competences aim to consciously choose harmonious values through dialogical reflexivity. The other competences will provide the means to act in accordance with these values, in particular through phenomenological reflexivity. Thus, responsibility education is conceived here as the implementation of conditions prompting the subjects to participate in a process of questioning, explicitation and attentional training, which makes it possible to become more conscious of oneself, others and the non-human environment, to act harmoniously – towards all three. 3.4.7. Summary of the progress within the five types of competences To summarize the competences and progression targeted in an education for responsibility, a set of benchmarks and indicators can be gathered, based on the theory presented here (Table 3.8), and represented in a diagram (Figure 3.2).

Emotional

Competences

Criteria

Attitude to reactive emotions22

Motivation26

Mind on the way to achieving openness (towards awakening)

Open, principled, alert mind (responsibility)

flight (avoidance, “I do recognition, letting not care”), fight go, caring24 = (“I do not regulation want”), grasping 23 (“I want”)

awareness, lack of identification, appraisal and grasping = integration25

Closed, ordinary mind (ego)

parasitized (extrinsic) security

security or innovation

innovation (intrinsic)

22 Review of instruments in Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013). 23 “Submerged” subject, impulsive. Lack of knowledge, fear (negative appraisal), disconnection or strong grasping. Measurement tool, see Favre et al. (2009). 24 Neutral appraisal or non-grasping of emotion (expressed with kindness). 25 All emotions are harmonious, not linked to the illusion of an ego. 26 Theory in Favre (2007).

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Attentional

Epistemic

Emotional

220

Source of emotional security

phenomena (external or internal27)

phenomena and consciousness

own consciousness

Trust in “self”, tolerance to uncertainty

weak

on the rise

unconditional

Information processing

dogmatic28

scientific

impersonal and without grasping

Critical thinking

negative

constructive

non-dualistic

Thinking29

simplifying

deliberate

complex

Reactive thoughts

pushed back, grasped or unconscious

regulated

absent

Beliefs

very structuring of the personality, understood as truths

considered as temporary tools for evolution

absent (perception of the real not distorted)

Personal epistemology30

dualist

multiplicist

contextualist

Metacognition

absent

high (verbal mental)

neither verbal nor mental

Cognitive flexibility

weak

average or domain dependent

high in different fields

Attention

mostly exogenous and concentrated

increasingly endogenous and broad

diffused and equanimous

Inhibition, magnification based on ego

ubiquitous

common

absent

27 Thoughts, people, products, behaviors, etc. 28 Measurement scale: Shearman and Levine (2006). 29 Tool developed in Arboix Calas (2013). 30 Review of instruments in Dang (2013).

Axiological

Relational

Attentional

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Phenomenological grasp of emotions and thoughts31

strong and unconscious

less frequent and/or conscious

absent

Field of consciousness

reduced

broader

potentially cosmic

Relationships with others32

through splitting or cutting with emotions, or unconscious

empathy

equanimous empathy33

Relationships with the NHE34

through splitting or cutting with emotions, or unconscious

relatedness

equanimous relatedness

Preference towards ingroups or own territory, aversion towards outgroups or foreign territories

unconscious35, claimed or reified; projections, identification, stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination36

conscious and unwanted, residual tendency to protect one’s ego

absent; harmonious “discrimination”37

Explicit38 values

serving the ego and closure to otherness, poorly thought out

thought out, serving harmony

conscious and dialogical, serving harmony

31 Instruments for measuring grasping of thoughts: Dionne et al. (2016); emotions: Fresco et al. (2007); and perceptions: no instruments found, except eye-tracking for sight. 32 For the tool, see Favre et al. (2009). 33 Perception of the suffering and limitations inherent in the different manifestations of ego in others (non-judgmental, benevolent perception). 34 Tools, see Hagège et al. (2009). 35 Many tools, for example: Eberhardt et al. (2003); Lai et al. (2014). 36 In this book, “discrimination” has been used mainly in its frequent meaning in psychosociology; it is discrimination based on ego. A principled mind discriminates against others, to better take into account their particularities and needs, perceived without judgment or duality. 37 See footnote 36 above. 38 See for example Schwartz’s (2006) theory on the different individual values.

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Transversal indicators

Axiological

222

Implicit values

many, unknown, unreflected

endangered, conscious

absent

Adequacy of values/ behavior (coherence39)

low if values are harmonious, high if values serve the ego

in the process of improvement (awareness of inconsistencies)

perfect

Awareness of the axiological connotation of thoughts, goals, actions, etc.

weak

high

total

Behaviors

social roles (e.g. victim, executioner or savior40)

more and more authentic

authentic, equitably beneficial for oneself, others and the NHE

Violence (towards oneself, others or the NHE)

frequent

rare and conscious

absent

low (depression, addictions, etc.) or superficial (assimilated with the immediate satisfaction of extrinsic goals)

more authentic (linked to intrinsic goals) and a heightened awareness of discomfort and its causes

irrelevant notion (being beyond the duality of well-being/unease)

Need for closure42

strong

weak

absent

Knowledge of internal states and functions

weak

high

total and omnipresent

Reflexivity

uncommon

dialogical

phenomenological

41

Well-being

Table 3.8. Model of change enhanced through education for responsibility

39 Grid to measure the occurrences in a text or a verbatim record in Hagège (2017c). 40 See the theory of the dramatic triangle in Petitcollin (2011). 41 See tools in Shankland (2014). 42 Scale in Webster and Kruglanski (1994).

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COMME ENT ON TAB BLE 3.8.– This T table presents p a modular m theeoretical framewoork that can be used in reesearch on “education “ fo and parrticularly for”, on educcation for responsibility r y. Most of the t notes inn this table refer to psychom metric toolss that makee it possible to meassure the im mpact of educatioonal measuures on thee different competencees associateed with responssibility, in other o wordss on open-m mindedness. Not all inndicators necessaarily coincidee in a subjecct. That is to o say: this table does nott suggest the exisstence of carricatured subbjects corresp sponding perf rfectly to thee column “closedd mind”. Thiss table is dessigned to eva aluate a channge from onee extreme to anoth ther. It couldd also be used u pedagog gically for a self-assesssment of competeences. The dootted blue arrrow (first lin ne) means that any charaacteristic in the column c “clossed mind” will w switch to o the next column c as sooon as it becomess conscious (if it was not previously)). For exampple, being aw ware that we are avoiding ann emotion iss more a cha aracteristic of an open mind (a m The dotted d arrow means tthat the reflexiviity) than a closed mind. charactteristics on the right inndicate morre open-minndedness thaan those precedinng them, butt that, howevver, they are not specific to a principlled mind (they caan also be fouund in a mind in the proccess of openiing up).

Figurre 3.2. Symbo olic representa ation of the inte ended path in an education e for responsibility r

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 3.2.2.– The box corrresponds to o the ego, itss relative and duaal relationshhip with the world (separrate entity: closed c box) where a durationn is graspedd (permanennt entity: vaalidity periodd). The lotus flower symbolizzes the mindd’s ultimate qualities: q equ uanimity andd emptiness oof which one cann become conncious througgh reflexivityy practices (aand one can be more in the prresent momennt: lemniscatte).

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The reason why we have placed particular emphasis on attentional competences is that they are rarely considered in “education for” (and education in general), despite their crucial importance. Emphasis at a pedagogic level can therefore be placed. Their development will facilitate the development of all other competences. On the other hand, their low level will limit the development of other competences (in particular, because they are necessary to achieve the characteristics typical of the principled mind; see Table 3.8). 3.5. Integrating model of psychospiritual competences targeted in education for responsibility The initial question of this book was “how can we change the world?” and the proposed answer here is “by changing the way our mind functions”. The principles of education for responsibility proposed here consist of working to change one’s mind and the distortion of one’s perception induced by the ego, to bring it closer to a principled mind, transparent to itself, perceiving the ultimate reality and allowing harmonious functioning (see section 2.4.3). Such a change would require a conscious choice of mental content (including the endorsement of harmonious goals), the absence of grasping and action consistent with the chosen goals. This coherence requires first of all an awareness and acceptance of one’s own inconsistencies, mobilizing increasingly endogenous, diffused and equanimous attention (open presence). To further detail the process at stake, we have broken down the changes into the four horsemen of the mind (emotions, cognition, orientation and relationships) and five corresponding competences (respectively emotional, epistemic, attentional-axiological and relational). In the initial presentation, values, attention and appraisal were all considered as an aspect of orientation (section 1.3.2.1), while here we have distinguished between axiological and attentional competences. Indeed, initially, it was a question of presenting the ordinary functioning of the individual relative mind, frequently guided by a set of processes of which the subject is unaware. In particular, attention, often exogenous, is thus correlated with implicit values, so that even lifestyle is not always the object of a conscious choice, even when there is a possible freedom of action. The subject’s actions are sometimes unknowingly the result of emotional avoidance strategies, for example. Since responsibility implies becoming aware of these functions (via phenomenological reflexivity), dissociating values from other aspects of the “orientation” horseman seems more

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operatioonal to consiider the educational aim m. Indeed, whhen attentionn directs the funcctioning of the ordinaryy subject, it is often by being graspped by a phenom menon (exogeenous attentiion). During the developpment of enddogenous attentionn, attention itself becom mes an objeect of attentiion, which aallows a “testimoony consciouusness” to develop. d Sincce it is a queestion of leaarning to developp diffused annd endogenouus attention on o the one hand, h and to question and connsciously chooose one’s values v and goals g on the other hand, then, as the minnd transform ms, attentionn becomes “meta” “ overr other comppetences (Figure 3.3): it makkes it possible to detach oneself o from m emotions, tthoughts, even vaalues (in thee sense that the latter arre no longerr the object of an “I want” or o a graspinng) and it is then no longer – when w it is pperfectly equanim mous – a guiding facctor as succh. Attentionn, through witness consciousness, allow ws us to transscend all inittial identificaation objects.

Fig gure 3.3. Psycchospiritual competences fo or an education n in responsib bility. Forr a color versio on of this figurre, see www.is ste.co.uk/hage ege/education n.zip

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 3.3.– Em motional com mpetences are the founddation of work onn the mind:: they are perhaps p the greatest diffficulty for ordinary Westernn subjects andd changing the t relationsh hip with theirr emotions caan allow a changge in beliefs fs, thoughts and relation nships (see Box 3.9). E Epistemic competeences can “push” towardds a goal in th he extent to which w the subj bject who still idenntifies with thoughts t andd beliefs willl be attractedd to situationns where make it they seee themself (via (v their proojections). Axiological A c competences possiblee to “pull”, too orient the functioning f of the subject in a certain direction (e.g. thaat of harmonnious functioning). Relatiional compettences superrvise this change to the extennt that, throough interactions with others o and thhe NHE, med, and belliefs and valuues can be deeveloped, emotionns can be provvoked or calm clarifiedd and challennged. Finallyy, the develop pment of atteentional comp mpetences

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allows the subject to witness their own subjectivity, their own individuation and to adopt a perspective that, in the long run, can transcend the subjectivity of ther own experience. Note: creativity refers to a symptom of innovation motivation. Here we find our wise leader Touiavii, who eloquently expresses what seems to be particularly exacerbated among Westerners on average: “But the Papalagi [the European] thinks so much that he has to think, needs to think, is even forced to think. He must think at all times […] The thinking and the fruits of his thinking – his thoughts – hold him captive. It is as if he were intoxicated by his own thoughts. When the sun shines beautifully, he thinks at once: ‘How nicely it shines!’. He constantly thinks ‘How beautifully it shines!’. This is wrong. Totally wrong. Foolish. For it is better not to think, when the sun shines. A clever Samoan stretches his limbs in the warm light and thinks nothing. He takes the sun not only into his head, but takes it also with both his hands, his feet, his thighs, his belly and all his body. He lets his skin and his limbs think for themselves. And surely they think also, even if in a different way than the head [..] He may think cheerful thoughts, but he doesn’t smile; he may think sad thoughts, but he doesn’t cry [..] He is a human being, whose senses live as enemies within his spirit– a human being who is split into two parts. “The life of the Papalagi often resembles that of a man who takes a canoe ride to Savaii and who thinks, as soon as he has pushed off the shore: ‘I wonder how long I will take to get to Savaii?. He thinks, but doesn’t see the appealing landscape along his way. Soon there is a hillside on the left. When he sees it, he cannot take his eyes from it. What could be behind the mountain? Could it be a deep bay, or a narrow one? His thoughts make him forget to chant along with the other youngsters, and he barely hears the teasing of the maidens. Hardly have the bay and the hillside passed, another thought torments him – whether there could be a storm before evening. […] But the storm does not come and he reaches Savaii by nightfall unharmed. Yet to him it seems as though he had not made this journey, because all day long his thoughts were far away from his body and outside of the boat. [...] “But the Papalagi loves and worhips his mind and feeds it with thoughts from his head. He never lets it go hungry and yet it doesn’t distress him if the thoughts eat each other. He makes much noise with his thoughts and he lets them be loud like impolite children. He acts as though his thoughts are priceless like blossoms, mountains and forests! [...] “The serious sickness of thinking has befallen them. This thinking is supposed to make the head great and high. When someone thinks much and fast, then they say in Europe he is a great head. Instead of being pitied, these great heads are especially honoured. The villages make them chiefs, and wherever a

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great head goes, he has to think ahead of others, which gives everyone much pleasure and is much admired. When a great head dies, the whole land is in mourning and people wail about what has been lost. An image of the dead head is made of a rock and it is put in the market place for all to see. Yes, these stone heads are made even much larger than their true size in life, so that the people will admire them properly and will feel humbled by their own small head. “Ask the educated one a question and he shoots back an answer before you have closed your mouth. His head is always charged with ammunition; it is always ready to shoot. Every European gives the most beautiful time of his life to make his head into a fast firestick […] Most carry such a heavy load in their head, so that their body is tired from this burden and in time becomes frail and wilted. “Should we now, beloved brothers, after everything that I have reported here in steadfast truth, imitate the Papalagi and learn to think like he does? I say no! Because we should not and must not do anything which does not make us stronger in body and happier and better in our spirit. We must guard against anything which may rob us of our joy of life; especially that which may darken our spirit and take away its bright light; especially that which may bring enmity between our head and our body. The Papalagi proves with his own example that thinking is a serious sickness, which makes the value of a human much smaller” (Scheurmann 1997, pp. 171–185). This text describes well the differences in functioning and effects between the conscious sensory mode of Samoan people and the unconscious mental mode of the Papalagi (section 2.3.3). The particular prevalence of the reactive mind in us would therefore make all the greater our splitting with our emotions and the reluctance to regulate or integrate them. However, mental phenomena can also be a formidable tool in the service of ethics. Thus the models proposed in this book could allow the reactive mind to feed itself in a way that is conducive to the development of responsibility. Box 3.9. Reactive thoughts... an illness?

We refer to these five competences as “psychospiritual”, in a nod to skills that are referenced in the field of health education: the psychosocial skills of the World Health Organization (Division of Mental Health 1993). There is a partial overlap between these two types of psychosocial skills/competences (psychosocial and psychospiritual), in which we find for example critical thinking, emotion regulation and empathy. Only here, we particularly insist on the transformation of the state of consciousness inherent in responsibility, in particular through attentional competences. As it is a transformation of the mind (esprit in French), these competences deserve the title “spiritual”. On

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the other hand, although relatively focused on the individual (see the prefix “psycho” of psychospiritual), our approach also takes into account social and, more generally, environmental interactions. In this respect, they are not only psychosocial, but rather psycho-socio-environmental, and thus also touch on the problems of environmental or sustainable development education43. This expansion also helps to justify the term “spiritual”, which refers to individuality as part of a whole that goes beyond the human condition.

43 There is a lack by the WHO of consideration for relationships with the NHE in their psychosocial skills, because many studies show the importance of the relationship with nature for well-being and mental health (Kellert et al. 2011).

4 Discussion

“In the Indian tradition, apart from the arsenal of respiratory and gymnastic techniques of yoga (the Greeks of Alexander the Great’s time called yogis the gymgoers, gymnasts of wisdom), what seems to me most interesting is this true ‘metapsychology’ that the practice of meditation allowed to develop over the ages. Hindu sages perfectly understood that the root of all our evils resides first in us and that ‘knowing yourself’, which was later dear to Socrates and then to Montaigne, could give rise to a true science of being and the psyche. Shri Aurobindo expresses it perfectly when, in a lapidary way, he says: ‘Each mind puts its own ideas in the place of truth”. And we could add: ‘instead of reality’. Indeed, we know that our listening to others, our gaze on others and on our immediate environment are constantly polluted by our thoughts, fantasies, emotions and mental conceptions. We must therefore, unceasingly, cleanse our mental phenomena to find a clear conscience and a true presence in the world. We have not been taught that in the West. And here is perhaps the most beautiful message, inherited from this multi-millennial India, that we can share today. Without having to become in any way Hindu, we can use India’s eternal wisdom to learn how to become better, more tolerant, more open, more lucid”. (de Smedt 1997, author’s translation, pp. 8–9)

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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4.1. Education for responsibility, ethics and spirituality As mentioned above, the notion of responsibility is at the heart of the intelligibility of education. Throughout this book we have argued about the interests of addressing the issues of “education for” from the theoretical perspective of the notion of responsibility. In any case, from a basic point of view, to “educate for responsibility” could be considered a pleonasm. Educating consists of encouraging the child to be responsible, by finding the right balance between a total absence of responsibility and a responsibility that is too heavy and overwhelming (therefore guilt-inducing; Vieillard-Baron 1994). The expected result is that adults can therefore live in society without parents. Despite this, it must be noted that “humanity in its most significant part is still, psychologically speaking, in a state of infancy” (Jung 1933/1986, p. 256, italics in original text author’s translation), since a significant proportion of “adults” cannot do without symbolic and operational substitutes for parents: to frame their behavior (laws, police, justice system, etc.) and to provide – at least in appearance – for their emotional needs (spouses, sources of distractions that allow them to forget themselves and escape their reality such as television, drugs, etc.). Thus, most adults could probably be more responsible, in the sense of having a psycho-emotional maturity that allows them to behave ethically in a spontaneous manner and to find their own emotional resources within themselves. These would therefore be two goals of education for responsibility. These two aspects of “immaturity” are generally based on the functioning of the ego, and this is probably even more so in our society, which tends to encourage capricious childish behavior in us, with low tolerance for frustration and emotional dependence (see Introduction). Why are we acting in a harmful way to others, to the environment, or to ourselves, and looking for emotional nourishment from the outside? Because we perceive the world in large part through the prism of “I want, I do not want, I do not see”; we seek to bring to ourselves what we consider desirable for us, to avoid what we evaluate as undesirable, and do not take the rest into consideration (see section 1.3.2.1), and this is based on a feeling of separation with these three types of objects. We have a partial, biased, self-centered and distorted vision of reality that prevents us from taking into account ourselves, others and the NHE equitably. The ego therefore obstructs the ethical aim. There is a lack of connection, a lack of unity with what is. This lack of unity makes the ego seek objects with which to unite. As we have explained, this quest is in vain, because it is based on a subjective duality (whereas objectively there is a

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dialogical relationship) and maintains it. In fact, it cannot bring lasting happiness and only feeds the feeling of separation that makes us suffer (Dambrun and Ricard 2011). We have mentioned that one of the important determinants of this functioning is the tendency of the mind to take refuge in our thoughts to escape emotions (section 1.3.2.4.2 and Figure 1.7): the attention thus paid to mental phenomena does not make the consciousness available to what is happening more deeply within itself. On the other hand, it is in its own consciousness that a principled mind finds its only source of emotional security, its only refuge. Thus, ethics is based on a psychospiritual development, involving that of responsibility: “Spirituality is simply the attention, respect and humility given to the life of the mind, perceived as an echo chamber of the world, visible or invisible. Not to control it, this spirit, not to enslave it, nor to make it a tool at the service of our ambitions, but to observe, submit, collect, contemplate, turn to the mysteries of life without the certainty of clear answers. I once read this remark attributed to the Dalai Lama: ‘We can do without tea, but not water. Just as we can do without religion, but not spiritual life’. Spirituality can be lived perfectly in a secular way. And also to lead to an increased quality of our faith if we are believers”. (André 2015, author’s translation) One day, a student returned to the meditation module in a joyful mood. She was a Muslim and told me, excitedly, something like: “I listened to an imam’s teaching this weekend... he was saying exactly the same thing as you! He was talking about the ego and how it takes us away from God, distorting our vision of life and the world!” I reassure you: I am not talking about God in class. However, this testimony is in line with one of my intuitions mentioned in the introduction: that the essence of any authentic ethical or spiritual approach (whether theistic or atheistic, secular or religious) is to go beyond one’s ego in order to have a life beneficial to beings through an expanded and impersonal consciousness. And this implies looking at one’s own subjectivity and relative character (phenomenological reflexivity), instead of spending one’s energy in judging or wanting to change others: this is also, it seems to me, the core substance of ethics and responsibility. When religions lead to violence, it is my opinion that these

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toolboxes of spiritual development (religions) have been instrumentalized by the egos of those who have seen in them objects of identification and reasons for grasping power (and the ego can do this also through other institutions, such as the State or the family, for example). I sometimes tell students that if I had to choose a mandatory class bible for all at the Public School, it would be Myers’ Social Psychology (2009) reference book. Indeed, this book teaches many scientific aspects that I believe are fundamental to understanding how a human being works, how they can be manipulated or happy, for example. In short, basic conceptual tools which can help one be a little reflexive and a little more free from the various mental manipulations. To describe our Western societies, Myers paints a picture of material abundance and spiritual poverty, emphasizing the ethical importance of personal and spiritual development. He mentions that this involves a change of consciousness and feeling responsible for something greater than oneself, each assuming by default that they are themself part of the global problem. This last point illustrates in particular Morin’s hologrammatic principle. This is entirely consistent with our approach and with the constructivist epistemology in which it is embedded. So we affirm here, perhaps in a bold way, that an education for responsibility must invite us to follow an ethical journey, through spiritual development, understood in a completely secular way. 4.2. Limitations of this approach 4.2.1. Obstacles in the French context Indeed, this may seem bold in our culture recently institutionalized on the principle of the separation of church and state. The first few times I mentioned the words “meditation” or “spiritual” in congresses, it did not fail to evoke a reaction or a question suggesting something inappropriate to our secular context. Incidentally, it is ironic to note that our word for “secular” (laϊque in French) originally came from Catholicism, referring – even today – to those who practise but who are neither ordained nor clerical (i.e. founding a family life in general). But this religious origin of the term seems to have been forgotten (Lefebvre 1998). In our dualist culture, sometimes turning to scientism1 (Hagège 2013), secularism often seems implicitly associated with 1 See Introduction, note 4.

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atheism or a-reliogisity, and spirituality assimilated to religion. Thus a badly considered conceptual shortcut, based on mistaken amalgams, would lead to the conclusion that spirituality has no place in the Public School. However, the difference between spirituality and religion is, in my opinion, the difference between a thing and a word that designates it: the thusness of a particular thing (e.g. a given tree) cannot be enclosed in a word (“tree”). In my opinion, each religion is like the word “tree” pronounced in a different language: it has a meaning, connotations – in relation to the tree species present in the places where this language is spoken, to the artistic works representing or mobilizing trees, to the cultural values associated with nature and the forest, etc. – and a particular shape, sound and vibration. Despite these contextual differences, spirituality refers to the objective reality of a transformation of consciousness. More generally, after abstractions such as the one made here, it refers to the intellectually extractable invariants of the transformations of the mind, inherent in the potentialities of a human being. And we have argued here that these potentials correspond to physico-psychic properties, which can even be scientifically supported. In this respect, a secular (non-religious) language can be invented to say the word “tree” at the French Public School, with the aim of promoting the development of responsibility. This is what I intend to contribute to with this book. Moreover, many spiritual movements, non-religious and sometimes atheist, have emerged or become popular in recent decades in the West. Also, many meditation techniques derive from Buddhism, and although some have been secularized (Kabat-Zinn 2003) and widely scientifically studied (Braboszcz et al. 2010) for nearly 40 years, some members of society seem reluctant in principle (via critical negative thinking) to accept this type of approach. In fact, such practices are not immune to aberrations (sectarian, dogmatic or proselytizing), but no less than any other vision or practice. Hard sciences are often taught in this way, that is in a dogmatic and “proselytizing” way (Favre 2016). Fourez (2002) even argues that the process of scientific studies includes all the attributes of brainwashing and we have shown in the laboratory that the level of dogmatism tends to increase with the level of scientific studies (Dang 2013). However, this is considered safe and even welcome in France, whereas history has repeatedly shown that the implicit epistemology at work involves serious ethical risks (Hagège 2013). In fact, there is always resistance to novelty in a society. Sex education was unthinkable a few decades ago in France and it is still unthinkable in many countries today. Thus, in the latter, women marry without knowing what it is all about, sometimes discover it in a violent way,

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and venereal diseases spread when this could be avoided. On the other hand, one could easily imagine that sex education also provides an opportunity for some adults to abuse their position. And yet, our society has recognized its importance, particularly in terms of health. And we will see that the approach proposed here is also of health importance (section 4.3). Beyond these obstacles linked to a misunderstanding of spirituality and secularism, there are still obstacles that may be more significant because they are older historically. They are probably related to the disease of constant thinking that seems to characterize us (Box 3.9). I have detailed them in several articles (Hagège 2013, 2015b, 2017c) and will therefore only briefly recall their overarching principle here. Institutional epistemology tends to make us believe that we are rational beings transparent to ourselves who generate our actions by conscious choice. Even in scientific articles on psychology, this seems to be the implicitly mobilized model, despite all the scientific knowledge – partly cited in this book – that now invalidates this model. It tends to promote a dualism, according to which body and mind, reason and emotion are separable. It implicitly suggests that it is the knowledge (reason, thoughts, etc.) of a subject that determines actions and that takes precedence over everything else. As a result, academic knowledge focuses mainly on understanding the outer world and teachers or other practitioners do not always make the effort to be consistent with their discourse (see (2) in section 2.3.1.2). They do not always (not often?) realize these inconsistencies. In correlation, action in situations, the body and the relationship with the body are largely neglected in curricular learning for the benefit of theoretical knowledge (Masciotra et al. 2008). Thus, for example, sport and art are considered as ancillary topics, and manual vocationalization courses are considered as ways back-up options students who have failed in general courses. And it seems that the system continues to make teachers believe that the mind and body are separable and that only the first one would be necessary for theoretical learning, which is of course scientifically contested (ibid.). In conclusion, the low consideration of emotions, the body and action in situation in school practices, the virtual absence of theoretical knowledge to understand them, of practices to regulate them in curricula2 and the 2 In the 2015 programs (common foundation and moral and civic education), a consistent place was given to emotions and learning how to regulate them (Hagège 2017a). It remains to be seen whether and how this will actually be taught, given that teachers are generally not trained to do so.

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erroneous doxa that makes us act as if all this were dispensable to the transformation of the person and the citizen are obstacles to education for responsibility. To provide a caricature, it is the implicit and erroneous belief that education consists mainly of the training of super-intellectuals, whose knowledge (e.g. ethical) is not relevant to their actions. 4.2.2. Some limitations of the proposed model It is perhaps under this cultural influence that I have still given insufficient space to the body in this book. The body has been mentioned with regard to perceptions and their role, emotions, resonance, body-mind indentification in the metaphysical model, and, of course, attentional training. However, on the one hand, we could have further developed the mechanisms of action of physical facilitators (circulation of cerebrospinal fluid, vertebral alignment, properties of cranial bones, etc.) on changes in states of consciousness. On the other hand, pedagogical applications involving the body should be further explored and analyzed in relation to education for responsibility. I am thinking in particular of singing, dancing and certain physical disciplines. In some cultures, dancing and singing together are almost weekly activities that bring families and communities together in a moment of sharing, joy and awareness of the reactive mind: implicitly, such activities teach us to be aware of our body sensations and to connect with others in a harmonious, simple and joyful way (to resonate physically with them). These kinds of traditions have become rare nowadays in Western societies, especially in urban areas. If you sing, it’s rather alone in front of your computer – maybe hoping one day to expose your talents on TV – in a karaoke session or with a group dedicated exclusively to that (so not necessarily with people with whom a community bond will be developed). Dancing is mostly done in a class or in a nightclub (alone, in a couple, rarely in a group with physical contact). There are also often issues here that are at least implicit in the order of appearance, image or personal pleasure (except perhaps in ballet, traditional dance balls, where the notion of sharing would be more significant?). The physical impact of singing on the body and on the transformation of the mind is understood and instrumentalized in ancient traditions such as yoga. Yoga refers, among other things, to an Indian philosophical system, with physical practices in which breathing and movement are carried out conciously (i.e. phenomenologically thought out). The essence of yoga would lead to inner silence, in other words, to the disappearance of the

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reactive mind (Papin 1990) – which we have seen is only the expression of the ego used to avoid the phenomenological experience of reactive emotions. Thus, the emission of particular sounds, possibly mobilizing mantras, and sometimes called “harmonic chanting”, aims to cleanse the body and therefore the mind of its egotistical engrams. These sounds correspond to harmonics in the mathematical (musical) sense of the term, that is, the body produces at the same time sounds of different pitches whose relationships are harmonic (like a singing bowl). Such practices are also found in Tibetan Buddhism and Sufism. In the Taoist tradition, the role of martial disciplines such as archery or combat is one of the foundations of spiritual practice3 and some Qi Gong movements are accompanied by sounds. To speak in a dualist way, these different traditions contain an elaborate science of the interactions between body and mind. Although meditation involves working on the body, a third term alongside “meditation” and “reflexivities” (“corporality”?) would probably be welcome to further support the recommended methods of education for responsiblity. Finally, the proposed model, as such, has inherent limitations in the simplifications it inevitably contains. These limits are partly dependent on my own limitations in understanding and explaining the phenomena concerned. In addition, this model could be more complex. I am thinking in particular of the following point, which could be a topic of future theorization. It would be a question of integrating the modalities of interaction of the four horsemen with interindividual differences, for example the dispositions, temperaments, personality, different types of intelligence, etc. that we group here under the generic term “trait” (without referring to a particular theory). There are theories developed in different traditions, for example: the enneagram, temperaments according to Tibetan Buddhism, according to Taoism (the wonderful vessels), wounds (Bourbeau 2013)... The latter two even mention a correspondence between physical and psychological traits. On the scientific side, the best known are probably the three personality traits (Eysenck 1991) and the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992). Such analyses would perhaps make it possible to develop a science and also, surely, finer tools to help everyone to know themselves better and understand how they work. For such a journey, the subject will probably first 3 And this has been taken up in Confucianism, rather for the “control” of the mind (and the people).

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identify with one or more traits, which will help them to better develop their phenomenological reflexivity and to see the automatic nature of their traits. Then they will be able to disidentify from these traits: to see that they are not the ego and their automatisms, but the consciousness that can perceive them. We discuss such personality traits in the MBER module. TESTIMONIALS.– “I am now aware in these situations that it is the ego that arises and I have the impression that simply having awareness that it is the ego allows me to leave it less space, less importance, less control over me”. (Student A). “I think that I have found myself to be [anger-related trait addressed in the module] very stubborn and clinging to this habit of assimilating everything and putting it together in the form of a puzzle to understand. I have the feeling that I am getting better and better at locating the boundary that separates the ego from the consciousness”. (Student B) “The [trait related to the desire discussed in the module] is the one that worried me the most in terms of my relationship with my love life [...]. What particularly alarmed me was my tendency to be blind, for example, to let someone hurt me without paying attention to it, because I constantly ‘replay’ these moments of grasping, which leads to particularly unhealthy relationships. I realized that in reality I didn’t know myself well enough and that I needed to spend more time exploring who I am, what I want, the values that are important to me in order to identify who I really am without freezing this conception of myself, because it is constantly changing”. (Student C) In the same vein, situational factors have only been discussed very briefly here (“factors of risk and protection”; Shankland 2014) as to their influence on the ego, responsibility and their particular variations. These include, for example, family, social, environmental and other environments. 4.3. Education for responsibility and happiness It would undoubtedly be possible to have, even after our presentation, a vision of responsibility as something unattainable, too serious or, worse, painful. In our Judeo-Christian culture, responsibility can go hand in hand with guilt. The latter works like a small blow of a self-assembled psychic whip: “assume your responsabilities!”, “take on your responsabilities!”.

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These are injunctions that may seem daunting, linked to heavy and unpleasant obligations, or even leading to personal sacrifice, as if we were forced to lose something in this process. Rest assured, since from an ultimate point of view the ego does not exist, there is no one who possesses it and there is nothing to lose! Even if from a relative point of view the ego exists, as soon as its illusion is revealed, it is not a feeling of loss, but a joyful feeling of openness that takes place. 4.3.1. Stopping the illusion of ego and lasting happiness To show the inappropriateness of the negative connotations associated with the notion of responsibility, we will consider how it relates to happiness. The link between secular spirituality and happiness has already been approached by many thinkers (Ferry 2011)4 and I will not come back to this here, even if it would add an argument in favor of our theory. Firstly, we have seen that the ego, through projections and identifications, makes us look outside for problems and solutions. It even insidiously leads us to believe that permanent solutions to our problems could be found there – hence the eagerness to seek them. However, since the outer world is impermanent – just as much as we are, as well as our changing desires – this process only generates more dissatisfaction in the long term. It only maintains an addiction and pleasure-pain cycles5. It is a bit like drinking salt water to quench your thirst (see sections I.2 and 2.4.3); it is insatiable (Count-Sponville 2003; see the box in section 4.1). At the individual level6, this search for extrinsic goals is partly due to the orientation of attention towards these goals, an attentional magnification of the corresponding external objects of desire, the phenomenological grasp of thoughts imagining a better life7 and erroneous beliefs such as, for example, the idea that more 4 Like Comte-Sponville (2006), Ferry (2011) associates secular spirituality with atheism. As previously argued, in our understanding, such a spirituality is not reserved for atheists; it is compatible with an obedience and/or belief (theist, atheist or other). 5 The media and advertisers play on appraisal by arousing desire (“I want”) and fear (“I do not want”) to reinforce in subjects the false illusion that they will be happier by having this or doing that. This dual approach therefore typically leads to the search for extrinsic goals; it promotes consumption and actually makes people unhappy (Myers 2009). 6 Citton (2014) analyzed the role of the media in these processes at the social level. 7 This is described in psychosociology by the adaptation-level phenomenon and relative deprivation, in which a subject assesses their present situation in relation to an imagined future

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material possessions will increase happiness (“I want”). In other words, the field of consciousness is reduced and the latter is absorbed into mental phenomena. This illusory search for happiness outside oneself – in unconscious mental mode – thus coincides with an absence from oneself (at least in the bodily and emotional dimensions), from what is in the present moment, and it increases emotional dependencies (see the flight coping strategies; Table 1.1); it constitutes a kind of escape of the mind from the outer world (Hagège 2015a), as in the optimal experience (see Box 4.1). In positive psychology, the optimal experience, also called flow, is considered as one of the determinants of well-being (Shankland 2014). It has been defined as a state “of total absorption of the individual in a task that is characterized by a commitment of the whole person with intense concentration that can lead to a loss of consciousness of self, of their environment, of their difficulties, and is accompanied by the feeling of being in full possession of their means, of perfectly mastering the activity” (ibid., p. 98, author’s translation). It is characterized by a specific goal to be achieved. It is noted that in such an experience, time does not pass and there is a good balance between the subject’s skills and the challenge represented by the objective – such that the situation is free of anxiety, but also of boredom. These experiences would be more frequently encountered at work. However, to affirm that this type of experience is beneficial for the subject and their health seems to constitute an abusive legitimization of activities that are often harmful to health, including addiction to video games or work. Thus, recent studies have shown the dark side of the flow, that is, the potentially addictive dimension, and therefore associated it with more discomfort. It has been empirically shown, as defined above, that in the optimal experience, the subject’s absorption of consciousness into the task is antagonistic to self-awareness and vigilant attention (thus to mindfulness, Sheldon et al. 2015). Attention may be endogenous at first (because the task is oriented towards a predefined goal), but it is likely that it will then become exogenous, being automatically grasped by the sequence of actions or their consequences: the subject is not there, they lose themself in the task – as when they are absorbed by a phenomenon unrelated to their conscious goals. Moreover, automaticity is mentioned as a characteristic of the optimal experience (Shankland 2014). And we can also understand it using Figure 1.6: when our field of consciousness is reduced and there is a strong phenomenological grasp, time seems to pass faster. Therefore, such an experience is an excellent way to avoid emotions. Thus, the subject can indeed report feeling good about such an experience. Despite this, situation or a possible situation (sight by others or on television), so that the recent satisfaction of having increased their standard of living, for example, is quickly replaced by the frustration of not having an even higher one, leading to a sense of dissatisfaction and a desire to increase their standard of living again (Myers 2009).

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the problem is only postponed: it seems to me that these experiences make it possible to increase subjective happiness in the short term, but to decrease happiness in the medium or long term. In recent years, work on harmonious and obsessive passions has led to a better understanding of how the experience of flow can be associated with happiness or its polar opposite (Vallerand 2015). Indeed, in the case of harmonious passion, the person can be absorbed into an activity, while maintaining an interest and maintaining attention to the environment and the people around. For example, a study was conducted among runners who raced on Reunion Island and showed that those with a higher degree of mindfulness had a more harmonious passion, that is, they appreciated both nature and sporting achievement (Junot and Paquet 2016). Conversely, those with a lower degree of mindfulness were more concerned with obsessive passion, which led to more risky behaviors, less resilience following accidents and a higher degree of uneasiness. Thus, more recent work in positive psychology provides a better understanding of the specific determinants of lasting happiness and emphasizes the importance of mindfulness (and therefore diffuse attention) to enable this. Subjects who are addicted to work can frequently experience optimal experiences, especially since it is generally socially valued to devote a lot of time to work that we are passionate about. This is often accompanied by a strong identification by the subject with the activity being carried out. Wouldn’t these same people who are over-experiencing optimal work experiences also be the most statistically prone to burnout, if the work persists, or depression in the event of being forced to stop working (due to illness, dismissal or retirement)? This is the assumption made here. It would indeed seem logical that, in the case of burnout, they should in fact neglect their own health in favor of this activity that has become a drug (N.B. drugs and optimal experience share at least three common attributes: modification of the state of consciousness, self-forgetfulness and immediate pleasure). In the case of stopping work, if subjects are no longer in a position to exercise this rewarding source of emotional avoidance, they would more easily find themselves confronted with their emotions and would have difficulty feeling alive without this activity. Recent research in psychology thus confirms the importance of open presence (see diffuse attention), allowing us to take care of ourselves, others and the environment. This is the purpose of the CARE program (from the French Cohérence, Attention, Relations, Engagement8), for example, which was developed by Rebecca Shankland, Ilios Kotsou, Jean-Paul Durand and Christophe André, with a view to cultivating the determinants of sustainable well-being by avoiding falling into the traps of the pursuit of happiness (see for example, Marais et al. 2018). Box 4.1. Optimal experience, happiness and mindfulness 8 Coherence, attention, relationships and engagement.

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Through this example, we see how the body (attention, action), emotion and mind (thoughts, beliefs, unconscious) trio functions in a biased way that keeps it away from the ethical aim and coincidentally from happiness. As long as a feeling or happiness is dependent on external circumstances, it is dedicated to temporality. On the other hand, by finding a source of satisfaction and happiness within oneself, one can achieve more sustainable happiness (Dambrun and Ricard 2011). And this is what the education proposed here invites us to do. Instead of taking refuge in phenomena (always impermanent), if our mind rests in what we really are, namely the consciousness that we have of phenomena, then it is freed both from the ego and from the major and recurring source of suffering and dissatisfaction. Indeed, our mind is still there and only its state of consciousness and its identification objects (i.e. its exogenous attention) vary. Thus, the only thing potentially stable in us, which can be actualized with the combination of reflexivity and meditation, is our awareness of phenomena. The latter simply gives us the joy to be alive, independently of circumstances and authenticity, to perceive and interact (without our mind grasping difficulties, or clinging to circumstances considered favorable in order to make them last): we find a feeling of existence within ourselves and not through objects or situations occurring in the world. In this sense, experiments show that engagement in activities that allow the subject to acquire skills increase the level of wellbeing much more than passive hedonic activities that provide only shortterm pleasure (Shankland 2014). In addition, the link between responsibility and happiness has been indirectly addressed in the literature. Various authors thus highlight the link between sustainable development and individual well-being (e.g. Ericson et al. 2014 ; Wolsko and Lindberg 2013). However, these studies are not very numerous so far. Below, we will present some points concerning the implicit link between responsibility and health (as discussed in positive psychology), for which there are many more studies. 4.3.2. Connections between education for responsibility and positive psychology Before that, we would like to highlight an epistemological similarity between “education for” and positive psychology. Positive psychology is not strictly speaking a discipline, but brings together work from different

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branches concerning human development and its optimal physical and mental functioning (Shankland 2014). It is not only a question of studying the condition “of absence of illness”. In this way, it differs from the biomedical approach and thus joins the health promotion approaches highlighted in health education (Fischer and Tarquinio 2006). Traditionally, the educational sciences and psychology have rather focused on “how to resolve problems”: by studying (1) the pathological (respectively learning difficulties and mental pathologies, for example), (2) the normal (respectively normal learning mechanisms and cognitive functioning) (Canguilhem 1943/2013) and (3) processes for “treating” the pathological (respectively effectiveness of educational or didactic techniques and therapies). In this epistemology, it is as if the standard is implicitly static and we are interested in it and in these “inferior” anomalies (i.e. the abnormal; Figure 4.1A). However, “education for” and positive psychology further study the anomalies “superior” to the standard (i.e. optimal; Figure 4.1A). In this way of thinking, these disciplines do not focus on the standard and above all do not think of it as static; they focus more on an orthogonal reference to the standard, which the latter could be similar to (Figure 4.1B). And such a comparison would consist of an elevation. In other words, implicitly, the standard is thought of as evolutionary by default and the anomalies studied are those evoking this axial reference through vertical and “phototropic” growth, in other words “upwards” (towards the light; Figure 4.2B). And it is also this reference from which these disciplines try to draw the outlines.

Figure 4.1. Epistemological particularities of “education for” and positive psychology. For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

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COMMENT ON FIGURE 4.1.– A) According to Canguilhem (1943/2013), “the anomalous” corresponds to a statistical deviation from the standard, without any pejorative connotation. It may therefore be above or below the standard. The “abnormal” corresponds to the pathological (below the norm). To qualify what is above the standard, the term “optimal functioning” is used in positive psychology (Shankland 2014), whereas there is not really a dedicated term in the field of “education for”. B) In “education for” and positive psychology, we are interested in a vertical axis of human growth, its characteristics and ways of approaching it. By analogy with the botanical nomenclature, a “pathological” functioning can be described as “abaxial” (or “disharmonious” for the purposes of this book) and “adaxial” (or “harmonious” here), with reference not to the standard, but to this growth axis9. Indeed, the ideal optimal functioning (“adaxial”, Figure 4.1B) of a human being includes happiness and responsibility. Positive psychology is about well-being, positive dispositions, what allows a person to be happy and at the best of their abilities. A particularly mobilized concept is that of positive mental health, which describes the phototropic reference axis for mental health (Figure 4.1B). The attributes of this concept clearly have points in common with the notion of responsibility. They are, for example: “the ability to develop”, “the ability to maintain a balance between different intrapsychic tendencies (impulses, social norms, etc.)”, “positive self-awareness, the ability to care for others and the natural environment, openness to new ideas and other individuals [and] creativity” (Shankland 2014, p. 29, author's translation). This is what we have called respectively the development of consciousness and coherence, dialogism, letting go of the reactive mind, harmonious functioning based on empathy and relatedness, cognitive flexibility, openness to external otherness and innovation. In addition, the personal forces that promote optimal functioning of the subject include “critical thinking”, “spirituality, the search for the meaning of life”, “opening of the mind”, “perceptiveness”, “distance”, “joy and humor”, “equity”, “integrity and authenticity”, “social intelligence”, and ”self-regulation” (Peterson and 9 Indeed, most plants have a stem that grows upwards and is phototropic, that is, oriented towards light. The side of the leaf opposite the plant's growth axis is referred to as “abaxial” (“ab” as in “absence”, contrary to “presence”) and the one on the axis side is called “adaxial” (“ad” meaning “near to” as in “adrenal” meaning “near the kidney”).

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Seligman 2004, cited by Shankland 2014, p. 62, author's translation), many aspects that we have mentioned more or less explicitly here. More specifically, the “sense of coherence [...] appears [...] as a fundamental element of good mental health: the individual perceives their existence as meaningful through a coherent articulation of values and actions” (Shankland 2014, p. 30, author's translation). In addition, the sense of coherence correlates positively not only with subjective well-being, but also with the reduction of mental disorders and circulatory diseases (Shankland 2014). Now, the coherence between values, thoughts and emotions on the one hand and actions on the other hand is central to the conception of responsibility that we put forward here. Numerous empirical studies have shown that empathy and altruism (prosocial behaviors such as protecting or developing the well-being of others, helping a person, volunteering or giving to charity) promote well-being and mental health, and vice versa (ibid.). This is clearly related to responsibility as presented here. Helping behaviors even lead to improved physical health. According to a cohort follow-up, “altruism identified during teenage years would have a positive impact on physical and mental health that can still be observed up to fifty years later” (Shankland 2014, p. 140, author's translation). Logically, well-being is inversely correlated with antisocial behaviors (including violence and delinquence (Shankland 2014)). The Public Health Agency of Canada’s five component positive mental health model emphasizes spiritual values and well-being as one of its components. This spiritual well-being “corresponds to the feeling of belonging to a reality greater than oneself and finding meaning in one’s own life; [it] constitutes a central element of psychological well-being” (Shankland 2014, p. 54, author's translation). And indeed, as mentioned above, mindfulness (and therefore phenomenological reflexivity) improves wellbeing on both a mental and physical health level (Shankland 2014). The common attributes between responsibility and positive mental health are therefore numerous, including in the involvement of spiritual development. Finally, with regard to education more specifically, health promotion programs seem to be the most effective means of health education (ibid.). Thus, for example, the Penn Resiliency Program in the United States, based on social and emotional learning of self-awareness and awareness of others, also involves recognizing reactive thoughts as automatisms (as in MBSR;

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ibid.). More than 17 studies have shown the effectiveness of this program on well-being (including a 50% reduction in anxiety and depression) and the reduction of antisocial behaviors (ibid.). Various studies have also provided empirical evidence that new educational theories, when applied (as “alternative educations”) tend to promote autonomy, creativity, interpersonal skills and well-being (ibid.) In conclusion, learning to be responsible for the four horsemen in your mind is not only implementable at school, but also encourages better health. Learning to be responsible is therefore not boring, it also means learning to be authentically happy! An education for responsibility could therefore contribute to restoring radiance in the eyes of children, a radiance of joy, life and health (which, as we mentioned in the introduction, is a feeling that it seems to us today is generally in the process of being tarnished). TESTIMONIALS.– “I am really grateful, [...] for all this questioning about the ego, but also the relationship with others, I feel much more benevolent towards others but also towards myself, and much more at peace”. (MBER student); “During the two months in which I took the module, I noticed a real change in my way of being and seeing things, [...] I am calmer, and I no longer seek confrontation at all costs. I feel happier [...]. I left my political group because I realized that my vision of a better world could not be achieved through violence. I think we must set an example, act with others as we would like them to act with us”. (MBER student) 4.4. Building knowledge and practical implementation in education for responsibility 4.4.1. Summary of the present argumentation Given that “education for” aims at changes in the world, I asked the following questions in the introduction, and I have answered them, in substance, throughout the text, as follows. 4.4.1.1. How can we change the world ? After having noticed some supporters of the madness of the world encountered in the introduction, I put forward some definitions (section 1.1), modelling the mind as being composed of consciousness and the

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unconscious (section 1.1.3) and distinguishing between ultimate reality and relative worlds (section 1.1.1) on the one hand and relative and principled minds (section 1.1.2) on the other hand. This last distinction, combined with a dialogism between the relative and the ultimate, is at the heart of the gnoseological hypothesis. A difference between relative and principled minds is that the latter’s consciousness (“augmented” in quality and quantity) allows the individual to perceive the real (i.e. the ultimate reality). It was therefore necessary for us to understand the supporters of the functioning of the relative mind, in order to understand that of the world. I considered the example of relative worlds (objectives) in science (section 1.2). The meanings that have been attributed to these worlds, and which therefore constitute them, appear as projected from the way in which the subjects perceive themselves. This analysis led to the suggestion that the world is the reflection of the mind. Thus, changing the world would mean changing the mind. I have detailed a model of the functioning of the individual relative mind (section 1.3) which highlights the oriented, biased and egotistical aspect of this relationship with the world, through the disharmonious functioning of the four horsemen. These functions also involve the body10. Thus, the non-exhaustive components of the ego (phenomenological grasp, projections, identification, attention, appraisal, values, attitudes, etc.) are avenues of what could be changed in the mind, to be able to change the world. And this modeling makes it possible to explain, for example, the supporters of the violent radicalization of a mind (section 1.4.3). 4.4.1.2. What changes foster responsibility? Responsibility, which is the object of research in disparate fields (section 2.1), implies, from an ethical point of view, a dialogical relationship between the subject’s inner and outer worlds (section 2.2). Translated into psycho(socio)logical terms, this relationship corresponds to empathy with others and relatedness with the non-human environment (NHE; section 2.3.3). In phenomenological terms, it is based on an expanded field of consciousness, and vigilant attention that allows one to be present to oneself, to others and to the NHE (section 2.3.2). On a cognitive level, it seems to be

10 As explained in section 1.4.1: (1) the three levels (mind, emotions, and body) are theoretically distinguished for modeling purposes, (2) they are considered to be non-dissociated and in a dialogical relationship, and (3) they overlap the metaphysical categories of biology (respectively information, energy, and matter; Table 1.2).

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favored by constructive critical thinking, contextualist epistemology and cognitive flexibility (section 2.3.1). These different aspects have been summarized and grouped into five types of psychospiritual competences (section 3.4), contributing to essential qualities of responsibility: coherence (section 2.4.1), motivation for innovation (section 2.4.2) and harmony (section 2.4.3). Phenomenologically, this harmony corresponds to a principled mind, freed from the ego and the unconscious (section 2.4.4). The inherently disharmonious ego is a particular obstacle to responsibility (section 2.4) when it manifests itself through: the grasping of reactive thoughts and emotions (section 2.3.2), dogmatism, a dualistic personal epistemology (section 2.3.1) or a splitting or fusion with emotions (section 2.3.3). 4.4.1.3. How can education for responsibility contribute to this efficiently? It is therefore more precisely these barriers that education for responsibility could attempt to remove, by targeting the development of the five identified competences: emotional (section 3.4.2), epistemic (section 3.4.3), relational (section 3.4.5), attentional (section 3.4.4) and axiological (section 3.4.6). Here, we focus on two main types of synergistic means by which education for responsibility could help to develop these competences (Figure 4.3): cognitive (section 3.1.1), dialogical (section 3.1.2) and phenomenological (section 3.1.3) reflexivity. The latter can be developed in particular through meditation, which consists of training for endogenous attention, and possibly also for certain attitudes, such as compassion (section 3.2.1). Numerous empirical studies suggest that the meditation/dialogical reflexivity duo could indeed promote responsibility (section 3.2.4), if the subject’s orientation and understanding of the processes involved are adequate (section 3.3.1). A key aspect of such effectiveness seems to be that the educator or trainer is in a similar responsibility process (section 3.4.6). Obstacles to this essential aspect (and also some facilitating elements) can be identified in the French institutional context (sections 3.1.4.2 and 4.2.1). Limitations can be considered for this model (section 4.2.2) which share similarities with positive psychology research (section 4.3). These outlines are summarized in Figure 4.2.

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Figure e 4.2. Partial graphic g summa ary of the principle of educa ation for respo onsibility

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 4.2.– In italics is ind dicated what correspondds to the subjectiive point of view (whichh became ulltimate on thhe right). Th The other words inn black referr to psycholoogical indica ators that cann be used to measure the effecctiveness of a dispositivee in terms of the responsibbility of subjjects and thereforre of their oppen-mindedness. 4.4.2. Epistemolo E ogical, ped dagogical and researc ch perspectives 4.4.2.1. Place and d originalityy of educattion for resp ponsibility ttowards others in “educatio on for” graphical expploration of different This book is parttly the resultt of a bibliog o research, scarcely s or not n at all prresent in thee field of “education fields of for”. It mobilizes diifferent objeccts (in italicss below), witthin various research o being ass follows: fields annd subfields (in brackets)), the main ones – coggnitive flexiibility (cognnitive psych hology), pers rsonal episteemology, dogmatiism (psychoosociology), critical thin nking (educaational sciencces) and epistem mology of scieence for episstemic compeetences; – em motional comppetences (coggnitive sciencces includingg psychologyy);  – rellatedness (environmentaal psychoso ociology) annd empathy (moral psychossociology and psychologyy) for relatio onal competeences (ethics)); – meeditation, atttention, uncconscious, dual d systemss, implicit aattitudes, consciouusness (cognnitive sciencces includin ng psychologgy, phenom menology, philosopphy) and phennomenologiccal reflexivity y for attentionnal competencces; – vallues (psychhosociology) and diallogical refleexivity (eduucational sciencess) for axiologgical compettences.

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These objects are gathered in an original way in order to study and promote education for responsibility. On the one hand, this work has made it possible to lay epistemological, metaphysical and theoretical foundations leading to a better framing of the objects and purposes of the research. In particular, the emphasis on the coherence and transformation of the mind (the development of consciousness) makes the gnoseological hypothesis necessary: researchers themselves are subjected to the distorting prism of the ego, and it is important, for the clarity of their purpose, that they specify the status of the processes studied or concepts used (subjective, objective or ultimate point of view). Therefore, from a theoretical and practical point of view (section 2.4.1), it seems important to consider this hypothesis, which includes an explicit distinction between relative reality and ultimate reality. I propose that this epistemological breakthrough should form the basis of research in the field of education for responsibility. Indeed, it seems futile to understand the intended transformation without this hypothesis: (1) initially, from an objective point of view, the relative mind (subjective point of view imbued with ego) obstructs responsibility because of its discrepancy with reality (i.e. with the ultimate point of view); (2) however, from an ultimate point of view, this relativity of mind is an illusion, because the relative mind has basically the same nature of emptiness as the ultimate mind; (3) a properly implemented transformation process (phenomenological reflexivity) allows the relative mind to realize this in its own consciousness and thus become undifferentiated from the principled mind (from the “subjective” point of view, which then became ultimate and therefore perfectly in line with the real). On the other hand, the study of the subject’s cognitive and psycho-affective processes is under-represented in “education for” (or even absent, to my knowledge, for example with regard to the consideration of dual processes, the unconscious or attention modalities). Indeed, because of the obstacles inherent in our institutional epistemology, which tends to overvalue rationality, the subject tends to be implicitly considered as transparent to itself (section 4.2.1). A particularity thus highlighted in education for responsibility is the introduction of phenomenological reflexivity (and its necessity). Also, except in the field of health education (Cardot 2011), emotional aspects are often neglected, or considered at the margins in “education for”. Health education has the particularity of being marked by the WHO’s 10

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psychosocial skills statement (Arboix Calas 2013). Thus, research in this area places particular emphasis on what I might call the knowledge of one’s inner world and the regulation of one’s relationships with others (although, as I have just mentioned, it does not seem to detail this inner world as much as that done in this book). However, according to the model developed here, others are only one of two components of the subject’s environment (the human component). On the other hand, EDD11 seems to focus mainly on the non-human component of the outer world (NHE: climate, biodiversity, etc.), probably because of its curricular relatedness with environmental education. EDD research generally leaves the inner world in the shadows. Education for responsibility has attributes of humanist and social dialectic approaches (Fortin 2004) in that it focuses respectively on the subject and on their interactions with the environment. On the other hand, it goes beyond the biopsychosocial paradigm, because it aims not only for a change in practices, conceptions or relationships (not just empowerment), but also, and above all, at a functional change in the subject, particularly in their relationship with emotions and thoughts (see Box 3.5). Therefore, the theory here supported would make it possible to unite these two trends in a coherent vision, by integrating (1) the inner world, (2) the two components of the outer world, namely the NHE and the human environment, and (3) the intertwining of these two worlds. This original perspective, through a reflection on education for responsibility, highlights, for “education for”, the important aims of the subject’s awareness of their own functioning, and the change in their relationship with their emotions, and with the human and non-human environments: a change in the properties of their consciousness through psychospiritual development. The next testimony from a student of the MBER module expresses this. TESTIMONY.– “I can understand better the care and recognition that we must give to nature and all that it provides us with, the vital energy necessary for our well-being. I also think that on some points I am aware of my actions and thoughts and I am now trying to be more open-minded and to have values that reflect what I value most. I think I have become more sociable and perhaps even happier through the practice of regular meditation and questioning my thoughts and choices.” 11 Education au développement durable, a French education concept which can be translated as “education for sustainable development” in English.

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However, responsibility is, it seems to me, a common objective of “education for” (Hagège 2014, 2015b): the aim is to create the conditions that encourage the subject to take responsibility for the environment, sustainable development, health, media relations, citizenship, etc., according to the theme of “education for” concerned. I have presented here arguments supporting the idea that meditation, combined with appropriate dialogical reflexivity, would allow the development of responsibility. Thus, the emphasis on this approach at the pedagogical level, and the scientific study of its effects, seem innovative and promising for the field of “education for”. 4.4.2.2. Pedagogical and research perspectives for education for responsibility Many associations, on a more or less national scale, already implement this type of approach in French schools. Thus, the international associations SEVE12 and Mind With Heart13 promote objectives such as “living together” and seem to propose methods for working, at least in part, with the five types of competences we have defined. A new program, “ATtentif à l’écOLE” (ATOLE), based on INSERM research in cognitive neuroscience, has just been developed and focuses on attentional skills, particularly in relation to academic success14. It contains some attributes of dialogical and phenomenological reflexivities. Also, several associations are drawing inspiration from the MBSR program, in particular to improve cognitive capacities (memory, concentration, performance) and emotional capacities (stress regulation). The associations Méditation dans l’Enseignement (AME)15, Cogito’Z16, Enfance et Attention17, Pleine Conscience Provence18, Mindfulness19 and Ateliers Ressources20, offer work on the body, thoughts and reactive emotions. The latter three associations use the now popular method of

12 Available at: http://www.fondationseve.org/pages/qui-sommes-nous?locale=en. 13 Available at: http://www.mindwithheart.org/fr/qui-sommes-nous/qui-sommes-nous. 14 Available at: http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/Projet-ANR-13-APPR-0011. 15 Available at: http://meditation-enseignement.com/. 16 Available at: http://www.cogitoz.com/images/formations/2017-2018/mindful_up_session_6. pdf. 17Available at: http://www.pleine-conscience-provence.com/pleine-conscience-ateliers-enfants. php. 18 Available at: http://www.pleine-conscience-provence.com/pleine-conscience-ateliers-enfants. php. 19 Available at: https://www.elinesnel.com/fr/formation-amt/. 20 Available at: http://www.ateliers-ressources.com/la-pleine-conscience.

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meditation for children, “Sitting Still Like a Frog” (Snel 2012). Two modes of action can be distinguished according to the associations: directly involving the association’s staff in schools, or training teachers to set up a program. In addition, the French Ministry of National Education reports on the Eduscol website that following four trials, each in a different department, programs at high school and elementary school have been implemented that include meditation exercises, with the support of the Ministry. Today, such initiatives can be part of moral and civic education programs (Hagège 2017d). Initiatives, both individual and institution-wide, are multiplying nowadays. It could be useful to draw up a list of them, identify and categorize their practices according to a shared nomenclature. Also, it is possible to scientifically study the impact of these programs, the levers and obstacles to their implementation and possible safeguards according to contexts or practices. This would include the need to expand experimentation in different contexts, including public schools. We hope that, as a result, appropriate programs, including teacher training programs, can be generalized in a supervised manner, because it seems to us that they are sorely lacking in our society where attentional distraction is excessively high. Recognized child psychologists make the same claim21, 22. It could also involve studying the external and internal transposition of the competences identified here, in particular so that the knowledge thus generated can guide the organization of curricula, and thus have a concrete impact on the functioning of institutions. At a methodological level, the theory argued for suggests here possible psychometric indicators of the five psychospiritual competences (e.g. empathy, relatedness, etc.; see the notes in Table 3.8). They could be measured by comparing educational conditions that have combined meditation and dialogical reflexivity (“MR”), with control conditions (“CN’). For this purpose, self-report questionnaires are often used. In other words, the subject positions themselves in relation to verbal proposals, for example by indicating their degree of agreement with certain sentences 21 Available at: http://lemonde-educ.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/06/15/la-meditation-comme-remedeau-mal-de-lapprentissage/. 22 Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/vous/article/2012/04/02/la-meditation-calme-aussi-lesenfants_1678652_3238.html.

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(Likert scale principle). However, this type of process has many biases, including social desirability, that direct responses according to what one thinks is socially accepted. Also, even if the subject were not sensitive to this kind of bias, given the unconscious processes of which they are the object and the distorting nature of their perception, their answers can only present a subjective vision. They are valid, but limited. Thus, to assess these approaches more objectively, they should be complemented by implicit attitude measures23 (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2014) or physiological measures, for example. With regard to the latter, some emotions can be detected, for example, by variations in the conductance of the skin (Bechara et al. 1997). Since one of the crucial aspects of responsibility is coherence, it could be appraised through a protocol comparing, as much as possible, indicators of explicit (declarative) functioning, indicators of implicit (unconscious) functioning, and actions. Also, by using first-person methodologies (Vermersch 1994), and although this appears clearly in the texts of students who have completed the meditation module, we could rigorously test the hypothesis of whether the “MR” condition leads to better self-knowledge and clarity of mind that conditions “CN” – thus a comparison with the principled mind – by allowing the subject to become aware of initially unconscious functions. In addition, the effects of meditation on implicit attitudes on the one hand, and on responsibility on the other, have been poorly researched or not studied al all. Thus, the approaches proposed here also seem potentially promising in the field of cognitive sciences and fields that study responsibility, such as moral philosophy. Finally, it would be relevant to study more precisely the link between responsibility and creativity, the latter being the subject of a number of educational studies. The implementation of this research would make it possible to validate responsibility indicators to assess the impact of educational actions, useful for research, and for which institutions are requesting. The new open field of education for responsiblity will thus encourage the importation of techniques from other research fields, and the development of new research protocols to assess responsibility and, coincidentally, to test the empirical scope and coherence of the entire model proposed here.

23 See for example: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/france/takeatest.html.

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With regard to the use of meditation for educational purposes (in a school or university context), there is limited literature, primarily in English and mainly concerning American experiments (section 3.2.5). However, the French context has particularities (in particular its rationalist epistemology and secularism), certainly containing specific obstacles (Hagège 2017c). Studies focus mainly on its effects on health (stress reduction) and cognitive performance (including academic performance). As (1) numerous empirical studies show the beneficial effects of meditation on health (section 3.2.4), (2) meditation has been popularized by the MBSR protocol (which aims to reduce stress and places particular emphasis on changing the relationship with thoughts and emotions), and (3) health education is particularly concerned with emotional skills, the contribution of meditation to health education seems already marked. This is not the case for other areas of “education for”24. Here too, the field is open, especially since, as we have mentioned, the French context will require specific studies, such as the study of social representations of meditation by educational actors (parents, teachers, etc.). 4.4.3. Afterword In conclusion, I would like to remind you that we started from this question: how can we change the world ? And I argued that this required a change in minds, justifying which ones, why and how. My aspiration is to contribute to the development of harmony in people’s minds, and therefore in the world, through my research, teaching and other activities, through the Ariadne’s thread of education for responsibility. And to do this, as I stated in the introduction, I am first working on creating harmony in my own mind. To be consistent, I end this book with an appeal to everyone: to acquire the means to be themselves what they want to see in the world. Caminante, son tus huellas el camino, y nada mas; caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar. Al andar se hace camino, y al volver la vista atras se ve la senda que nunca 24 I only found one university degree thesis on the contribution of meditation to EDD (Bouillon Claveau 2014).

Discussion

se ha de volver a pisar. Caminante, no hay camino, sino estelas en la mar. (Machado 1917) Walker, your footsteps are the road and nothing more. Walker, there is no road, the road is made by walking. Walking you make the road, and turning to look behind, you see the path you never again will step upon. Walker, there is no road, only foam trails on the sea. (Translation by Willis Barnstone)

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Postface

In reading this book I was struck by the author’s dazzling erudition, as well as Hélène Hagège’s outstanding ability to synthesize and integrate a large range of information. The critical approach developed in this book offers good prospects for social and societal improvement. Without trying to paraphrase or overemphasize certain aspects of her work, I propose rather to extend the links to the fields of application of this education for responsibility, particularly in the field of education, and more generally in relation to mindfulness-based interventions, which are currently undergoing significant development. The orientation and ambition of the book echoes the book Se changer, changer le monde by Christophe André, Jon Kabat-Zinn, Pierre Rabhi, Matthieu Ricard, Caroline Lesire and Ilios Kotsou, which has already sown many seeds for a transformation of everyone at their own level, with a view to better social development. The author’s orientations in terms of education for responsibility and the improvement of sustainable and shared well-being are in line with the latest reform proposals planned for French national education. These are aimed at developing greater autonomy and empowerment on the students’ part, particularly in the context of philosophical reflections and possible choices at the school level. The government is also questioning the obligation of solidarity practices led by young people in order to promote the development of this social and societal responsibility. Such schemes already exist in the United States. In high school, for example, every student is encouraged to get involved in associations such as hot meals for those in need or helping deprived people by working with religious associations. The aim is to develop feelings of solidarity and responsibility, while reducing the tendency towards social discrimination.

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Numerous studies have shown the beneficial effects of this type of engagement, particularly because it enhances the meaning of life, which contributes to maintaining a satisfactory level of well-being, which in turn generates more altruism (Shankland 2012). However, it is important to stress the importance of self-determined motivation in the implementation of solidarity actions, otherwise the effects are much less beneficial for both the individual and the beneficiary. As Hélène Hagège points out, well-being as targeted by mindfulness and positive psychology interventions is not a form of perpetual euphoria or maximization of pleasure; rather, it is about developing a calmer relationship with oneself and others, which results in a deconstruction of the ego and a better ability to take care of oneself, others and the environment (Shankland 2014). The new role that could be given to the question of responsibility and values is particularly useful at high school level where the drop in motivation and involvement is marked and is accompanied by an increase in the dissatisfaction felt among young people and the teachers who work with them. According to the amount of psychological work based on the theory of self-determination (Deci and Ryan 2002), this sense of self-determination is a fundamental factor in motivation and sustainable well-being. Self-determination refers to the perception of being at the origin of one’s choices, rather than being a passive observer who should follow instructions without having input. Self-determination theory is based on the premise that there are three basic psychological needs that must be addressed in order to foster engagement in action, as well as a sense of personal fulfillment. The first need is autonomy or self-determination, the second is the need to feel competent in what one is undertaking and the third is the need for social proximity. Educating for responsibility as recommended by Hélène Hagège meets these needs. Indeed, it places the individual in a position of choice and committing to actions that are linked to pro-social values. These actions will help to generate a positive social bond with other individuals. Education for responsibility could thus constitute the basis for individual and collective well-being. This responsible engagement can also be linked to a second model of the determinants of well-being used in the field of positive psychology: the PERMA model (Positive emotions, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning in life, Accomplishment; Seligman 2011). This model summarizes the main determinants of well-being studied over the past 40 years. The determinants

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most strongly associated with sustainable well-being are the quality of relationships and engagement in actions related to values, particularly prosocial values. Thus, education for responsibility would be a breeding ground for this individual and collective well-being. Education for responsibility cannot be decreed. It is not a question of transmitting information. As Hélène Hagège’s book methodically demonstrates, like the rest of the field of “education for”, it is, rather a question of developing skills. The World Health Organization (2003) has identified ten skills called “psychosocial competences” that promote better physical and mental health and contribute to the development of constructive relationships. These skills are presented in pairs: problem-solving skills/knowledge of decisions; creative thinking skills/critical thinking skills; effective communication skills/interpersonal relationship skills; self-awareness skills/empathy skills and emotion regulation skills/stress management skills. Mindfulness-based practices help to develop these skills, if they are accompanied by an education for responsibility. Here we find the combination of meditation and reflexivity highlighted by the author. Two recent overviews bringing together all the research evaluating the effectiveness of mindfulness interventions offered to young people (in total close to 1,800 young people; Waters et al. 2015 ; and 2,000 in the second overview; Zoogman et al. 2014) have shown effects on cognitive, emotional and relational skills. These mindfulness-based interventions proved all the more useful as the young people found themselves in difficulty. However, practices are essential in prevention and health promotion (Lamboy et al. 2016), because as Jon Kabat-Zinn points out in his mindfulness training, it is not when you jump out of the plane that you build your parachute! Mindfulness-based practices allow such effects to be achieved through real attentional training: bringing attention back to the object of focus while learning to welcome thoughts and emotions, without trying to catalogue them or attach to them. This allows a step back, a decentration and an ability to accept what happens, without feeling the urgency of having to react immediately. Decisions and actions can thus be made without the pressure of a presupposed urgency. They are more appropriate to the situation and more constructive (for an overview, see Peillod-Book and Shankland 2016).

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Coming from a background in clinical psychology, I was first particularly interested in the many effects of mindfulness, and in the potential of a combination of positive psychology and mindfulness-based interventions to improve the quality of relationships with oneself, others and the wider environment (Shankland and André 2014). Then, gradually, the community of researchers interested in these practices turned their attention to the ethical issue (Grossman 2015). Certain researchers or Buddhists have called for more caution in mindfulness-based interventions, indicating that the simple practice of attentional training through meditation without explicit work on ethics could lead to suboptimal or even counterproductive effects. This is why the question today is refocusing on education for responsibility in mindfulness programs. Hélène Hagège, having taken the opposite pathway, from education for responsibility to the means to ensure it, naturally developed a mindfulness-based program grounded with a specific focus on education for responsibility, that is, including a psycho-educational dimension from the beginning, oriented towards the ethics of practices and not towards the personal benefits of practices on health or well-being. This program therefore responds to a social and scientific need. It is therefore particularly promising today, as are all the approaches proposed in this book. The author’s ambitious objective (changing the mind to change the world) seems more realistic and concrete after reading this manuscript, thanks to the thorough and thoughtful work proposed. This text encourages us to move in this direction and to embody as much as possible the change we want to see around us, by providing us the appropriate conceptual tools and concrete pathways for implementation. Rebecca SHANKLAND Associate Professor of Psychology at the Université of Grenoble Alpes Director of the Positive Psychology Diploma

References

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Index

A affect, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 96, 116, 118, 124, 125, 135, 156, 157, 203, 208, 220, 230 appraisal, see also evaluation, 43–49, 52, 67–71, 73, 78, 81, 82, 84, 89, 95–96, 97, 99, 100, 121, 125–127, 147, 176, 179, 182, 186, 187, 193, 205, 209, 212, 214, 219, 224, 238, 246 attention, 11, 12, 14, 15, 36, 38–44, 48, 52, 55, 59, 68–76, 78, 80, 84, 88, 89, 92, 94, 98, 100, 111, 114, 116–121, 125, 127, 134, 143, 147–149, 154, 169, 172–186, 189, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 201–203, 207, 211, 212, 215, 218, 220, 224, 231, 237, 239, 240, 241, 246, 247, 248, 251, 259 diffused, 39, 55, 119, 180, 225 endogenous, 40, 119, 175, 183, 189, 196 exogenous, 119, 127, 174, 212 focalized, 174, 176, 191, 193 inhibition, 44, 45, 54, 87 magnification, 44, 45, 55, 87, 238 vigilant, 15, 120, 176, 186, 203, 212, 246

attitude, 103, 106, 112, 116, 118, 120, 123, 125–127, 128, 131, 136, 147, 157, 158, 168, 171, 178, 186, 204, 208, 211, 217, 219, 246–248, 253 implicit, 15, 16, 49, 50, 95, 118, 120, 127, 128, 131, 186, 199, 211, 217, 248, 253 automaton (automatism, automatic), 15, 20, 42, 43, 67, 74, 75, 111, 112, 131, 142, 183, 216, 236 awakening, 5, 14, 120, 126, 150, 151, 153, 156, 160, 176, 181, 195, 196, 219 awareness, see also consciousness, 11, 13, 30, 59, 61, 62, 69, 70, 85, 101, 116, 130, 133, 159, 163, 165, 168, 170, 175, 177, 178, 180, 186, 189, 191, 192, 216, 219, 222, 224, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 244, 250, 259 B belief, 21, 34, 48, 51, 56, 59, 62, 63, 66, 92, 113, 116, 142, 143, 158, 216, 218, 235, 238 bias, 23, 24, 29, 58, 85, 89, 92, 95, 103, 116, 117, 121, 134, 147, 150, 153, 156, 169, 170, 176, 179, 184,

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège. © ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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186, 190, 203, 210, 214, 217, 241, 253 biology, 2–4, 9, 18–24, 27, 47, 80, 84–86, 121, 143, 246 C cognition (cognitive), 10, 22, 32, 34, 36, 38, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54–57, 60, 61, 63, 69–72, 78, 84, 93, 99, 110, 111, 113, 116, 118, 126, 144, 149, 162, 164–166, 169–171, 178, 185, 186, 189, 191, 192, 208–210, 216, 224, 242, 246, 248 cognitive defusion, 78, 133, 157, 159 flexibility, 61, 63, 64, 116, 129, 185, 210, 211, 215, 220, 243, 247, 248 coherence (coherent), 6, 14, 24, 38, 65, 91, 114, 115, 123, 128–131, 134, 145, 146, 160, 164, 169, 183, 189, 191, 195, 196, 202, 203, 210, 215, 217, 222, 224, 240, 243, 244, 247, 249, 253, 254 conditioning, 42, 142 conscience, 81, 229, consciousness, see also awareness, 5–15, 17, 30, 32–36, 40–42, 55, 64, 65, 69, 71, 73–75, 79–81, 89, 91, 110, 118, 120, 124–127, 129, 130, 132, 134–136, 140, 141, 146–151, 153–155, 157–159, 167, 168, 176, 177, 179–186, 190, 194, 196–200, 202, 203, 216, 220, 221, 227, 231–233, 235, 237, 239–241, 243, 245, 246, 249, 250 phenomenal, 9, 10, 11, 15, 30, 33 contextualist, 60, 114 creativity (creative), 14, 134, 142, 149, 162, 164, 186, 243, 245, 253 critique, 112 culture, 3, 18, 19, 23, 37, 73, 74, 85, 91, 103, 113, 114, 121, 122, 136, 150, 190, 200, 208, 211, 232, 237

D decentration, 81, 133, 157, 159, 259 devolution, 158, 159, 160 dialogism, 8, 41, 101, 102, 108, 110, 112, 124, 130, 153, 156, 160, 197, 243, 246, 260 discrimination, 4, 96, 97, 99, 221, 257 disharmony (disharmonious), 38, 83, 88, 134, 136, 142, 144, 148, 153, 154, 158, 160, 167, 200, 217, 243, 246, 247 dogmatism (dogmatic), 50, 54, 58, 59, 61–64, 66, 74, 96, 97, 99, 100, 111, 112, 115, 116, 210, 211, 220, 233, 247, 248 dualism (dualist), 19, 60, 94, 101, 110, 111, 113–115, 122, 197, 220, 232, 234, 236, 247 E ego, 38, 44, 45, 74, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96–101, 104, 111–113, 115–118, 120, 121, 123, 125–134, 136, 141–143, 146, 148–151, 153–159, 161, 167–169, 171–173, 175, 177, 179, 183, 186, 190, 194–200, 202, 203, 207–209, 211, 215–224, 230, 231, 235, 237, 238, 241, 245–247, 249, 258 emotion, 9, 11, 12, 20, 33, 42–46, 48–52, 54, 55, 63, 66–89, 93, 94, 98, 99, 111, 112, 114, 117, 119, 123, 124–127, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 148, 149, 152, 154, 156–158, 165, 167, 169, 171–173, 177–179, 182, 183, 186, 187, 189–192, 194, 195, 201, 203, 206–211, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221, 223–225, 227, 229, 231, 234–236, 239–241, 244, 246, 247, 250, 253, 254, 258, 259

Index

empathy (empathetic), 54, 55, 83, 95, 101, 123, 125, 128–130, 135, 136, 149, 169, 178, 182, 187, 189, 191, 197, 200–202, 208, 211, 213–215, 218, 221, 227, 243, 244, 246, 248, 252, 259 energy, 26, 46, 48, 50, 66, 67, 70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 81, 84, 86–88, 124, 138, 139, 150, 154, 171, 207, 231, 246, 250 engram, 132, 142, 154, 158, 159, 207 emotional, 74, 77, 143, 158 environment, 108, 110, 111, 117, 123–125, 127, 133, 140, 143, 148, 149, 151, 156, 161, 169, 173, 174, 175, 181, 197, 200, 203, 209, 211, 213, 214, 216–219, 228–230, 239, 240, 243, 246, 250, 251, 258, 260 human, 217, 218, 250 non-human (NHE), 53, 54, 156, 173, 181, 200, 214, 219, 246 epistemic, 125, 165, 213 epistemology (epistemological), 17–19, 23, 60–62, 64, 85, 94, 105, 109, 113–116, 144, 148, 162, 172, 191, 205, 210, 211, 232, 233, 241, 242, 247–249, 254 breakthrough, 4, 129, 249 contextualist, 210, 247 personal, 162, 210, 211, 247, 248 equanimity (equanimous), 81, 124, 125, 129, 131, 136, 176, 178, 180, 182, 186, 190, 202, 212, 213, 218, 220, 221, 224 ethics (ethical), 5, 17, 80, 86, 104–110, 113, 115, 116, 120, 128, 150, 156, 159, 161, 164, 169, 172, 181, 182, 195, 203, 205, 215, 217, 227, 230–232, 241, 246, 248, 260 evaluation, see also appraisal, 43, 178

291

F, G, H field of consciousness, 11, 12, 15, 33, 36, 40–42, 55, 65, 73, 75, 120, 125, 148, 149, 154, 176, 179, 184, 186, 190, 194, 201, 202, 221, 239, 246 gnoseological hypothesis, 3, 6–8, 101, 129, 148, 159, 246, 249 grasp (phenomenological), 32–40, 42–44, 46, 55, 57, 59, 61–66, 69, 70, 73, 76–78, 80, 81, 83, 88, 89, 93, 96, 100, 114–117, 124, 125–128, 134–136, 141, 142, 147–149, 159, 160, 174–177, 179, 182, 183, 186, 190, 196, 199, 201, 208–212, 216, 219–221, 223, 237–239, 246, 247 happiness, 43, 79, 80, 94, 149, 178, 227, 230,232, 237–241, 243, 245, 251 harmony (harmonious), 38, 83, 127, 129, 134–137, 141, 142, 144, 146, 148, 149, 152, 159, 160, 164, 167, 173, 191, 197, 200, 204, 208, 214, 215, 217–219, 221, 224, 225, 235, 240, 243, 247, 254 human, 53, 57, 89, 140 I identification (identified), 12, 32, 33–36, 46, 54, 59, 61, 63, 66, 77, 83, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100, 116, 125, 126–128, 149, 151, 207, 208, 211, 219, 221, 225, 231, 240, 241, 246 identity, 34, 99, 136, 197, 213 incommensurability (incommensurable), 19, 103, 121, 131, 146 information, 5, 10, 14, 15, 26, 29, 37, 39, 40, 46, 59, 67, 86, 89, 120, 154, 155, 158, 170, 181, 186, 220 ipseity, 109

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K, M knowledge, 144, 146, 148, 151, 153, 170, 186, 191, 192, 211, 222, 250, 253 direct, 5, 31, 77, 86, 140, 151, 153 matter, 21, 43, 69, 84, 86–88, 111, 139, 141, 143, 188, 189, 246 media, 171–174, 238, 251 mass, 70 meditation, 75, 88, 126, 129, 131, 133, 134, 151, 172–174, 177, 178, 180–196, 200, 202, 212, 229, 231, 232, 236, 241, 247, 248, 251–254, 259, 260 Meditation-Based Ego Reduction (MBER), 74, 76, 78, 79, 120, 133, 134, 140, 172, 237, 245, 250 mental phenomena, 11, 13, 27–29, 31, 36, 37, 45, 57, 71, 73, 77, 99, 104, 114, 117, 124, 128, 140, 162, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 190, 202, 203, 231, 239 metaphysics, 3, 5, 18, 84, 85, 86, 88, 109, 235 mind, 103, 110, 112–115, 118–120, 124–130, 133–136, 140, 141, 144, 146–156, 158–161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 174–185, 189–191, 194–200, 202–205, 207, 209, 211, 212, 214, 218, 219, 221, 223–227, 231, 233–236, 239, 241, 243, 245–250, 253, 254, 260 principled, 176, 177, 196, 200, 221, 224, 231, 249 relative, 178, 196, 200, 224, 246, 249 mindfulness, 157, 178, 180–182, 184–187, 190, 191, 192, 239, 240, 244, 251, 257–260 mode, 119–121, 123, 124, 132, 138, 143, 149, 150, 152, 170, 176, 179,

182, 189, 191, 198, 211, 224, 227, 239 conscious sensory, 77, 79, 176, 119, 120, 121, 123, 149, 227 open, 119, 121, 123 mental conscious, 119, 120, 123, 239 unconscious, 119–121, 123, 227, 239 money, 87, 88, 148, 238 motivation, 36, 51, 67, 130, 132, 133, 134, 150, 167, 169, 209, 214, 219, 226, 247, 258 N, P need for closure, 62, 222 paradigm, 18, 19, 24, 85, 121, 145, 146, 172, 250 personal, 60–62, 64, 114–116 phenomenology, 6, 8, 9, 93, 104, 105, 179, 196, 197, 248 prejudice, 16, 90, 94, 97, 99, 163, 166, 213, 214, 221 projection, 20, 21, 24, 32, 34, 35, 54, 55, 57, 60, 69, 83, 87, 89, 93, 98, 99, 115, 132, 143, 147, 151, 153, 156, 158, 160, 161, 171, 199, 213, 214 purpose, 7, 8, 68, 82, 110, 129, 132, 144, 151, 164, 180, 182, 194–196, 214 reductionist physicalism, 143, 144 R radicalization, 50, 96, 97, 99–101, 136, 213, 246 reality, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 35–37, 40, 41, 57, 59, 63, 67, 73, 76, 77, 83–87, 90, 91, 100, 101, 117, 118, 125, 149, 154– 157, 167, 194, 197, 199, 200, 204, 211, 220, 229, 230, 246, 249

Index

relative, 4, 7, 17, 32, 45, 58, 89, 101, 129, 159, 171, 249 ultimate, 5, 7, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21, 30, 34, 37, 39, 58, 63, 85, 87, 89, 91, 92, 101, 105, 125, 126, 128, 129, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 159, 167, 171, 176, 177, 198, 224, 246, 249 reflexivity, 161, 165, 171, 218, 222, 223 cognitive, 162, 164, 165, 168, 170, 196, 210, 247 dialogical, 164, 165, 168–170, 182, 193, 200, 202, 212, 214, 215, 218, 219, 247, 248, 251, 252 phenomenological, 152, 154, 164, 166–170, 174, 177, 180–182, 193, 196–199, 201, 202, 212, 219, 224, 231, 236, 244, 247–249 relatedness, 56, 83, 101, 125, 128–130, 135, 136, 149, 169, 191, 197, 200–202, 208, 211, 213, 221, 243, 246, 248, 252 relative, 6, 25, 35, 38, 66, 69, 88, 92, 93, 103, 118, 128, 129, 136, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156, 129, 159 religion (religious), 97, 128, 145, 151, 231, 232 thought-action repertoire, 15, 46, 59, 75, 80, 82, 116, 157, 178 resonate (resonance), 135, 138, 142, 149, 154, 194, 199, 235 responsibility (responsible), 4, 14, 17, 22, 25, 36, 86, 101, 103, 105, 110, 111, 113–117, 121, 123, 127–130, 134, 136, 141, 143, 146, 147, 149, 151, 157–161, 164, 169, 174, 193, 196, 197, 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211–219, 222–225, 227, 230–233, 235, 236, 238, 243, 245, 246, 248–251, 254, 257–259 S schema, 125 scientism, 232

293

secularism (secular), 123, 159, 180, 215, 218, 231–234, 238, 254 spirituality (spiritual), 25, 86, 105, 128, 151, 153, 156, 200, 230, 231, 232, 243, 244 structure, 106, 109, 114, 118, 121, 127, 136, 137, 145, 198, 199 diachronic, 12, 118, 121, 127 synchronic, 11, 127 system, 1, 2, 15, 82, 127, 174 T, U, V thought, 109, 111–119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131–133, 136, 140, 142, 144, 147–149, 154, 158, 162, 163–167, 172, 173, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185–187, 191, 201, 203, 205, 208, 210, 211, 216–218, 220–222, 225–227, 229, 233, 234, 238, 241, 244, 247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 259 creative, 29, 82, 149, 163, 164, 172, 176, 259 critical, 58, 61, 62, 112, 163, 164, 165, 208, 210, 211, 220, 227, 233, 247, 248, 259 reactive, 29, 70, 73, 77, 79, 82, 83, 87, 90, 124, 136, 140, 143, 148, 157, 158, 182, 185, 187, 216, 220, 227, 244 verbal, 11, 31, 32, 38, 40, 63, 139 unconscious, 11–16, 19, 20, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 65, 67, 69, 72, 74–78, 80, 85, 118, 119–121, 124, 128, 131, 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 167, 170, 174, 176, 179, 181, 197, 198, 203, 211, 215, 217, 220, 221, 241, 246–249 strawberry tartlet, 2, 9, 27, 33, 38, 45, 46, 49, 84, 86, 90, 130 vacuity, 102, 152–155, 160, 199 value(s), 2, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, 48–52, 56, 57, 75, 76, 78, 84, 89,

294

Education for Responsibility

97–99, 101, 105, 107, 109, 111, 114, 121–123, 128, 130, 131, 134, 147, 161, 164–169, 173, 195, 196, 200, 202, 210, 212–219, 222, 224, 225, 227, 233, 237, 244, 246, 248, 250, 258, 259 W well-being, 43, 68, 109, 156, 157, 174, 178, 181, 182, 186–188, 190, 192, 195, 200, 222, 228, 239–241, 243–245, 257, 258, 260 world, 103, 105–107, 110, 111, 113–116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 128, 132, 134, 135, 137, 145, 147, 148, 153, 157, 161, 164, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 179, 183, 191, 194, 195, 196, 198–205, 211, 215, 223,

229, 230, 231, 234, 239, 241, 245, 250, 254, 257, 260 inner, 14, 41, 51, 65, 80, 89, 93, 94, 101, 105, 106, 110, 111, 113, 121, 153, 171, 176, 183, 198, 199, 201, 250 objective, see also reality, ultimate reality, 3, 4, 5, 8, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 85, 86, 88, 128 outer, 24, 41, 43, 53, 63, 73, 87, 89, 93, 94, 105, 106, 110, 115, 116, 121, 134, 137, 157, 171, 172, 173, 176, 196, 198, 199, 201, 234, 239, 250 relative, 6, 10, 37, 39, 91, 93, 179, 202 subjective, 4, 5, 9, 25, 87, 89, 90, 92, 128

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