Education for Decline: Soviet Vocational and Technical Schooling from Khrushchev to Gorbachev 9781487573973

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EDUCATION FOR DECLINE: Soviet Vocational and Technical Schooling from Khrushchev to Gorbachev

Perestroika - economic and political reform - is what the world associated with Mikhail Gorbachev when he led the USSR. There were, however, some political scientists in the West who saw Gorbachevism as a time of conservatism, not of radical change. Dennis Soltys confirms the latter view in this study of educational policy and institutions in the former Soviet Union. Focusing on vocational and technical schooling, Soltys reveals very strong continuity from Khrushchev to Brezhnev to Gorbachev. In 1991, schools still functioned on the principles of vocational education and applied science inherited from the Khrushchev era, instead of embracing a more forward-looking model based on technical education and basic science. Soltys examines the role of ideas, institutions, and societal actors in the development of educational policy, with emphasis on the period from 1981 to 1991. He demonstrates how poor conceptual design and institutional fragmentation damaged Soviet education at all levels. Education for Decline offers more than a lesson in educational and public policy making. It provides an important baseline for understanding stateand society-building in Soviet successor countries. Commercial entrepreneurs, diplomats, and development agencies should give this book serious consideration. DENNIS SOLTYS is an associate of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Ukrainian Academy of State Administration, Kyiv.

DENNIS SOLTYS

Education for Decline: Soviet Vocational and Technical Schooling from Khrushchev to Gorbachev

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1997 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada Reprinted in 2018 ISBN

0-8020-4176-0 (cloth)

ISBN 978-0-8020-8034-9 (paper)

Printed on acid-free paper

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Soltys, Dennis, 1950Education for decline Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8020-4176-0 (bound) ISBN 978-0-8020-8034-9 (paper)

l . Vocational education - Government policy - Soviet Union. 2. Technical education Government policy - Soviet Union. I. Title. LCl047.S68S65 1997

373 .246'0947'09045

C97-930764-3

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Contents

LIST OF TABLES

VII

viii

NOTE ON TRANSLATION PREFACE

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1 Introduction

xi

3

Part I: Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

2 The Vocational Paradigm: The Khrushchev Legacy and the Challenge of the Brezhnev Era 15 3 The Extensive Economic Model: The Union-Level Terrain of General, Secondary Vocational, and Higher Education 24

Part II: Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

4 The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform 45 5 The Design and Substance of the 1984 School Reform

Part III: Implementation, 1984-1988

6 The Central Government's Implementational Measures 7 Implementation at the Micro Level 90

59

77

Part IV: Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991 8 The 1988 Educational Debates: Paradigmatic Change and Institutional Continuity 109

vi

Contents

9 Institutional and Societal Realignments in Vocational Education, 1989-1991 124 IO Conclusion

NOTES

147

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

137

211

185

Tables

3.1 Number of Students and Instructional Institutions by Type of School, 1987-8 25 3.2 Dynamics of Worker Training in Vocational Education Institutions 28 3.3 Numbers Employed in the National Economy of the USSR 31 3.4 Qualificational Structure of Specialists with Secondary Specialized Education Employed in the National Economy 32 3.5 Expenditures on Education 36 7. I Percentage of Third-Level Students by Field of Study I 03 9.1 Number of Students by Level of Study 126 9.2 Enrolments in Secondary Specialized Instructional Institutions by Category of Institution 127

Note on Translation

English-language equivalents are used for all Russian terms except the following:

professional'no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche, or vocational-technical school SSUZ srednee spetsial'noe uchebnoe zavedenie, or secondary specialized instructional institution VUZ vysshee uchebnoe zavedenie, or institution of higher education

PfU

Preface

The overarching question this book seeks to answer is whether an important area of Soviet domestic politics was characterized by stasis or adaptation during the final decades of 'mature socialism,' from the Khrushchev to the close of the Gorbachev era. The narrative covers both the policy and institutional levels. The thematic focus is the adjacent segments of vocational and technical education. These segments were connected to different spheres of industry and had different implications for economic modernization and institutional capacity. The first of four parts is historical and contextual, while the next three parts comprising the years 1981-4, 1984-8, and 1988-91- deal respectively with the role of ideas, institutions, and societal actors in the development of educational policy. Concurrently, these three parts cover the substance, implementation, and realignments within vocational-technical education. The main finding is that there was very strong policy and institutional continuity from Nikita Khrushchev's educational reform of 1958 to the Brezhnevite reform of 1984. This continuity carried into Mikhail Gorbachev's reform of 1988, and even beyond. Intellectual ferment under Gorbachevism and (weak) growth of autonomous, societal-level policy participation did not lead to significant changes in educational policy and implementation. Soviet schools remained to 1991 within a vocational-education/applied-science paradigm inherited from the Khrushchev era, instead of moving to a more forward-looking technical-education/basic-science model. The main argument of this book is that educational policy and administrative practice, characterized by poor conceptual design and institutional fragmentation, badly damaged all levels of Soviet education. This book should be of interest primarily to analysts of Soviet education and public administration in the last decade of the USSR 's existence. It illustrates both the reluctance and the inability of the Gorbachev government to change

x

Preface

fundamentally directions in educational policy. It supports the view of those Western political scientists who saw Gorbachevism as a time not of radical change, but of conservatism. This study also supports the thesis of the 'unreformability' of the USSR, even under new leadership, for fragmentation and continuity across a wide institutional spectrum worked against reform efforts in particular areas. This book should also be of interest to those scholars of institutional politics who might wish to analyse state- and society-building in the post-Soviet successor countries. It provides a baseline for an understanding of the Soviet inheritance of these countries. It therefore concludes by suggesting general directions for further research not only in education, but also for scholars from the state-society, institutional politics, and centre-periphery traditions of political science.

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the good fortune of having Dr Peter Solomon, of the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, as supervisor for the dissertation on which this book is based. His intellectual guidance, and ready enthusiasm and support, saw me through the long march to the conclusion of my academic program. Sincere thanks are owed to Dr Ronald Manzer and Dr Donald Schwartz for their always sound advice, as well as to the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their care and thoughtful comments. I extend my appreciation to Dr Nikolai Fedorkin, head of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of Political Processes of the Sociology Department of Moscow State University, for a warm welcome to his department and for his help in setting up my research agenda while in Moscow. This portion of my research was funded by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, under the auspices of the Canada/CIS Academic Exchanges Agreement. I wish to acknowledge fellowship assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, which covered the general phase of my academic program, and to thank the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada for a grant in aid of publication. My warmest regards go to Dr Iryna Radionova, head of the Department for Economic and Social Policy of the Ukrainian Pedagogical University in Kyiv. Dr Radionova very lucidly explained the subtleties of Soviet education. She was a close and stalwart friend during the writing portion of my dissertation in Kyiv. Finally, but not least, I wish to express thanks for the interest and support of my brothers and sisters. This book is dedicated to the memory of my mother and father.

EDUCATION FOR DECLINE

1

Introduction

The subject of this book is the politics of secondary vocational and technical education in the USSR from 1958 to 1991. The emphasis is on the last decade of the USSR 's existence. This extraordinary decade began with the continuation of the traditional Brezhnevite polity; it then shifted to a period of liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev. The decade ended with the collapse of central economic management and the loss of the Communist Party's political hegemony. Vocational education was a special area of policy in that it represented the last major reform effort started before the era of perestroika. The story of the difficulties in conception and implementation of this reform illustrates larger problems that infected Soviet policy-making and public administration in the last years of Soviet power. These included limited vision on the part of the top leadership; an attachment to old ideas and procedures at the bureaucratic level; and the inability to coordinate and fund new programs. The result was 'stagnation' (zastoi) in the working of Soviet government, a stagnation that persisted until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The subject of vocational education has a larger significance than might be apparent at first glance; this significance is found on both the policy and institutional levels. By the 1980s the Soviet Union had two principal types of schools for preparing young people to enter the workforce; each was connected to a different sphere of industry. It follows that an emphasis on one or the other segment of vocational education corresponded to different strategies of industrial policy and had different implications for institutional capacity. The first type of vocational school comprises the simple and mass trades (called 'professions' in Russian). The prototype is the professiona/'notekhnicheskoe uchilishche (PTU), or vocational-technical school. Its programs are usually based on an incomplete general secondary education. The second segment of vocational education comprises the more complex trades, repre-

4

Education for Decline

sented by the srednee spetsial'noe uchebnoe zavedenie (SSUZ), or secondary specialized instructional institution. It is also called a technicum and can be based on either a complete or incomplete general secondary education. These two segments of education were rapidly expanded from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. They grew more quickly than the labour force as a whole, or other parts of the educational system; and their graduates accounted for twothirds of all entrants to the labour force by the close of the 1980s. Moreover, these two segments represented two different emphases or strategies in the Soviet Union's industrial policy: (1) the extensive development of resource and commodities industries, requiring a correspondingly lower-trained, mass vocational labour force, or (2) a more sophisticated technical-trades-and-servicesbased economy, requiring the identification and development of newer technologies and industries. In this connection, one of the most serious domestic problems faced by Soviet governments of the 1980s was the need to shift the USSR's industrial and labour force profile from an orientation towards an extensive, resource- and commodities-based economy to an economy that was more services- and knowledge-oriented. The economy needed to be made consonant with twentyfirst-century requirements. Accordingly one aim of this study is to evaluate, using hard data where possible, the Soviet Union's ability to achieve this reorientation in the area of vocational education. The analytical perspective is macroscopic. The broadest, overarching, question posed is whether an important area of Soviet domestic policy was characterized in its last decades primarily by continuity of old structures and procedures of governance or by adaptation to new requirements of socio-economic development. It should be noted that this inquiry deliberately moves the spotlight away from the more dramatic politics at the summit level to the mundane, but perhaps more profound, changes at the level of administrative structures and policy implementation. To use the jargonistic term, this is a description of 'tectonic shifts' in Soviet industrial and vocational policy on the one hand and of changes within state institutions and Soviet society on the other. In this vein, justifying a study of Soviet education more than three decades ago, Nicholas De Witt made the still-relevant point that there is an inseparable interrelationship between any system of education and its host society: 'Thus education, its foundation, its strength and weakness, ought to be judged in relation to the society which it is called upon to serve.' Furthermore, 'the supply of professional personnel and, to a great extent, its qualitative characteristics depend upon the ability of an educational system to adjust to the changing needs of a society and upon its ability to train a sufficient number of persons for a variety of specialized tasks. ' 1

Introduction

5

In line with De Witt's approach, the attempt here is to locate vocational education within the social and economic context of the Soviet Union's mature phase. Consequently, some insight into institutional workings, requiring empirical analysis not only of macro but also of intermediate and micro-level actors, is essential. This insight will help in evaluating the Brezhnev legacy and in deciding whether the Gorbachev era represented a fundamental change in the methods of Soviet educational governance. Did old habits of Soviet administration defeat Gorbachev's desires, if any, for educational adaptation? Were there changes within society that worked for policy innovation? To paraphrase these points, was adaptation to new socio-economic requirements led by the governmental bureaucracy or by lower-level institutional or societal actors or, perhaps, did no adaptation occur at all? The answers to these questions will allow the reader to reflect on the current legacies and politics of the Soviet successor states. That is, if the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by political modernization and administrative institution-building, or society-building, this would have put the successor states/societies in a relatively good position for yet further adaptation under conditions of independence and movement towards free markets. Conversely, if these years were characterized by conservatism and stasis, this would have left public sector institutions and societal groupings poorly prepared for further socio-economic development either within separate countries or within some common political structure. All this is to say that if we wish to understand more fully the place of vocational education as one important aspect of the domestic policies of the Soviet successor countries during the present, we need to retrace the Soviet Union's recent past. While contributing to Western literature on Soviet politics and public administration, the major present task is to extend the literature on the more narrowly defined area of Soviet education. The most comprehensive and informative Western monographs on educational topics, from a public policy standpoint, are those of Nicholas De Witt, 2 David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, Mervyn Matthews, Frank Sorrentino and Frances Curcio, J.J. Tomiak, John Dunstan, and James Muckle. 3 A number of fine articles have been published by such authors as Nigel Grant, Philip Stewart, Joel Schwartz and William Keech, Oscar Anweiler, David Williams, George Avis, Vadim Medish, Blair Ruble, J.L. Black, and James Muckle. 4 For all their valuable contributions, the main Western works on Soviet education and educational administration have two shortcomings. The main criticism of the monographic literature is that much of it was dated, even before the Gorbachev era. A shortcoming of the periodical literature is that it was, perforce, narrowly focused and mostly descriptive. The school system was not analyti-

6

Education for Decline

cally well situated within the broader context of Soviet society and the economy. The political and societal forces acting on the school, and the interests, resources, and capacities of the various actors within the school system, were treated in passing, if at all. Three of the monographic works cited above are particularly significant. The first is De Witt's pioneering study in which he mapped out the contours of the Soviet educational system of the late 1950s and described its components. He did this in an attempt to determine the patterns of utilization of Soviet specialized manpower and to understand the relationship between the centralized planning effort and the educational system. Given the problems of labour supply, prediction of supply requirements, and coordination of educational policy, De Witt was perspicacious enough to question whether the supply of specialized labour was really planned. He also concluded that the Soviet educational system was designed to serve not the individual, but the collectivist state. It was only within the confines of choice offered by the state that the individual was allowed to develop his or her personal abilities. The educational system was intended to 'mould' the individual into preconceived labour force and civic requirements. De Witt's massive work was a necessary precursor to a sociological study on education and the evolution of the Soviet working class written by David Lane and Felicity O'Dell in the mid-1970s. Lane and O'Dell's main concern was to find how well newly trained workers were integrated into Soviet society and the industrial enterprise. Lane and O'Dell also estimated the workers' technical competence, their political reliability, and the stratification of occupational positions as a factor in workers' future life-chances. The two authors found that the 'pyramid' of industry's requirements for skilled labour differed somewhat from the pyramid of youths' educational and labour training preferences. Students' demand for education became increasingly oriented towards academic rather than instrumental interests, even though available instructional programs were geared towards the needs of the economy. Still, Lane and O'Dell concluded that the educational system, which they called 'a leading part of the ideological state apparatus,' was generally successful in 'incorporating' young workers into the authority structure of industry. The third particularly useful monograph on Soviet education was one covering the years 1953 to 1979, written by Mervyn Matthews. In his comprehensive overview Matthews was especially interested in the degree to which a facility was available, the manner in which education was administered with reference to central control, the day-to-day practice within schools, educational content, and the problem of graduates' passage to places of employment. Like earlier authors, Matthews used a 'leadership-based' approach. He noted,

Introduction

7

correctly, that 'the Soviet educational system [had] been matured and moulded to support the regime in every way possible. ' 5 He also asserted that education had for a long time been one of the most positive facts of Soviet reality, that higher education had expanded at a sufficient rate to meet the needs of the economy, and that the growth of opportunity was one of the most impressive aspects of Soviet education. However, newer work, notably by Walter Connor, 6 shows that social mobility declined markedly from the mid-1970s onward. Evidence given in the present book also indicates that Matthews overestimated the academic attainment and economic yield of Soviet education. Educational practice retarded technological modernization, while the system of public administration placed many obstacles in the way of educational reform. Periodical works by the authors cited above provide useful descriptive detail on various aspects of Soviet education. Two notable articles, however, are conceptual. Philip Stewart (in 1969) and Joel Schwartz and William Keech (in 1971) argued that professional interest groups (or less definable 'groupings') shared power and were incorporated within an overall institutional framework provided by the Communist Party and state bureaucracies. Both articles were sympathetic to the 'conflict school' view of Soviet bureaucratic politics, which suggested that bureaucratic conflict was conducive to the emergence of what could be called interest groupings. This raises the possibility that if bureaucratic structures were excessively fragmented, as seemed to be the case by the 1980s and early 1990s, this might have actually reduced effective participation within official structures of professional interests or, more recently, of autonomous societal actors. That is, excessive bureaucratic fragmentation may have led to a picture of a 'weak state/weak society.' The evidence indicates that the issue of state and societal capacities of the 1980s and 1990s is indeed an open question a question that calls for further research. This case study attempts a textured treatment of education within the context of Soviet domestic policy-making. The methodology is closely empirical, in line with Jerry Hough's contention that older theories of Soviet politics are no longer adequate and that the discipline of (post-) Soviet studies needs to be rebuilt on the basis of empirical works. 7 In addition, a study of policy-making may be done 'to discover how, when, and why major changes in politics take place. ' 8 Regarding this point, a paradigmatic shift occurred in Soviet industrial/ vocational policy during the 1980s. The government recognized the need to integrate the USSR into the world economy, and in so doing to shift the economy from an extensive to an intensive basis. 9 It is of interest for the Western observer to review this change, simply on the policy level, and to follow the fate of vocational education reform during the period in question.

8

Education for Decline

Further, education is a topic with theoretical promise because, though the training and reproduction of a skilled labour force to serve the requirements of economic expansion is one of the modern state's major tasks, educational policy is also particularly interesting and accessible to society. Parents and students are much more directly concerned with education than, say, military and foreign affairs or high science - areas more readily conceded to the government. Education is an important matter both to government and society. The struggle over its structure and content can be highly political, and many of a country's values are crystallized in educational policy. Thus a study of education can illuminate more profound continuities or changes within governing institutions and society itself. Background material on education could, further still, be linked to the literature on state-society relations in the USSR/CIS, on institutional politics, and on centre-periphery relations. This might be done in several ways. For example, state-society relations and institutional politics could be studied from both a comparative and centre-periphery standpoint. Comparisons of institution- or society-building could be made between the new centre (Russia) and each of the newly independent republics on Russia's borders, or among the republics themselves. Finally, centre-periphery studies, with the accent on institutional politics, could be done within each of the independent republics. Presumably, those republics best able to adapt their internal politics to new requirements will negotiate the most favourable political and economic terms within the postSoviet geographical space. As noted above, most of the Western literature on Soviet industrial and educational policy is dated. Furthermore, this literature does not explain how educational practice depended on industrial policy and on the nature of domestic politics; and it does not show how educational policies and structures after the 1988 reform differed from or remained the same as those in 1984. That is, in not explaining either policy or institutional changes and continuities in education, the Western literature does not shed as much light as it could have on the dynamics of Soviet domestic policy-making of the 1980s. During the 1980s both the Brezhnevite and Gorbachev governments began to question the long-standing industrial policies of the USSR and, as a consequence, the educational practices that were to serve the economy. Pivotal to a new industrial policy under Gorbachev's regime of reconstruction (perestroika) was a reform of vocational and other levels of education. In order to evaluate the successes and failures of the Soviet leadership's initiatives in educational policy, a layered approach, also lacking in the Western literature, is employed in this narrative. The formulation of educational policy is described according to the preferences and constraints of the major actors, from the macro to the intermediate and societal levels.

Introduction

9

Uncertainties in jurisdiction and diffusion of authority characterized Soviet educational delivery of the 1980s. These uncertainties were increased within a managerial system already notorious for fragmentation and for the truncated vision and low capacity of each of its component units. The deficiencies of educational policy design, the fragmentation and inertia of institutions, and the tendency for ideological precepts to limit policy choices resulted in stasis right until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Here it should be noted that although industrial and vocational policy came from on high, it was micro-level actors - enterprises, municipal governments, and teachers - who had practical control over day-to-day implementation of national policy. Yet these actors had little incentive for change and received few new resources. The vacuum left by incapable state institutions allowed for the tentative emergence of an autonomous educational policy community on the societal level at the close of the 1980s. There are four parts to this book. The first is contextual, while the next three deal, respectively, with the role of ideas, institutions, and societal actors in the development of vocational education policy. Concurrently these three parts cover the substance, implementation, and realignments within vocational education. The first part follows an introductory chapter and contains two chapters on historical and policy background. Chapter 2 constitutes a review of the Western literature on relevant Soviet public policy. It outlines Nikita Khrushchev's operative paradigm in education and shows the continuity in economic policy from the time of Khrushchev to that of Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev. It also outlines some of the constraints on the economy of the 1980s. Chapter 3, based on Soviet sources, further substantiates the main features of Soviet education and economy as portrayed in the Western literature reviewed earlier. This chapter also introduces the main actors in educational policy at the union level. Giving some enrolment and budget statistics, it outlines educational and economic development strategies chosen by Soviet policy-makers of the 1970s and 1980s and completes the background for the more substantive parts of this study. The second part begins in 1981, with the eleventh five-year plan, and treats the close of the Brezhnev regime. This era represented the apogee of the command-administrative or rationalist paradigm of governance. As such, this era was characterized by the dominance of common policy assumptions. Policy-making was the preserve of the political summit (the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The educational system at all levels was bent according to economic and labour force requirements as perceived by this political elite.

10

Education for Decline

This part of the book outlines the making and substance of the 1984 educational reform. Accordingly, Chapter 4 seeks to answer the question of which political or institutional interests were behind the reform. What was its genealogy? What socio-economic priorities did policy-makers have in mind for the country? The intention in this chapter is to show that the impulse for educational reform came from a modernizing central government, but that this impulse was not deeply shared by lower-level state-sector interests or by ·the public. Chapter 5 poses the question of the guiding conceptions behind the reform measures themselves and whether these conceptions were coherent. How were these conceptions reflected in legislation? What purpose was the reform legislation intended to achieve? In short, what was the design and intent of the 1984 reform? Here it may be said that intellectual ferment and policy criticism were virtually absent during the Brezhnev era. A smug governing elite conceived what was, in this author's view, a backward-looking educational policy encapsulated in the 1984 reform. The third part treats the implementation of the 1984 educational reform up to 1988. Educational policy was now passed over to state institutions for implementation. This part of the book covers Gorbachev's accession to the general secretaryship in 1985 and ends on the eve of the introduction, during his tenure, of the 1988 educational reform discussions. This chronological division is marked by a significant shift in political and economic sovereignty from the union state-as-government to institutions below the union level. That is, there was a broadening of participants in educational policy formulation and implementation; participants included not only central state organs, but other public sector bodies as well. Chapter 6 asks what steps were taken by the centre in order to implement the 1984 reform. Here the measures of first resort were the activization of the ideological apparatus and administrative pressure on lower organs. These were accompanied by adjustments to the administrative jurisdictions of central and industrial ministries, and of territorial governments. Laws on enterprise rights were liberalized, while directives to educational and industrial ministries were revised. Chapter 7 asks whether coordination of central policy was achieved at the intermediate (ministerial and provincial government) and micro (enterprise and municipal) levels. It further asks whether policy penetration was achieved within the schools; and whether schools, enterprises, and local governments worked well together. The 1984 reform failed for a large number of reasons, but mainly because of poor design and lack of coordination. This period witnessed some policy criticism, but this criticism was overcome by strong ideological and institutional continuity.

Introduction

11

The fourth part begins with the educational reform discussions of 1988. This period comprises Gorbachev's loss of control over the political agenda as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate economically and politically. The system of planned economic allocation no longer functioned effectively, and new economic and social groupings were emerging independently of both the central and republican governments. Now not only governmental agencies, but autonomous or private institutional actors shaped the policy context. This period was marked by the emergence of autonomous, societal-level interests: enterprises cut loose from a foundering state, local governments undergoing further institution-building, and a new pedagogical community. This section ends with the formal dissolution of the USSR at the close of 1991. Chapter 8 asks, 'What was the impetus to the 1988 reform discussions?' How did the 1988 reform proposals differ from those of 1984? Was there a change in policy initiators and implementational measures? Was there a broadening of participants below the state-institutional level? What were the changes in policy substance? Chapter 9 asks about the results of educational policies, and about realignments within the Soviet administrative and societal context. Were new institutions evolving in order to offer new kinds of instruction? Were these institutions supported mainly by the public sector or by private individuals? Was there a shift from state to societal prerogatives? Was there significant social demand for new types of schools and instructional programs; and was this demand reflected in shifting enrolment patterns? The demise of old state structures and common assumptions allowed new societal interests to enter the policy arena as active participants. However, consensus about educational policy was now absent, while new public and private sector institutions were not yet strong enough to assume the role formerly discharged by the central government. Chapter 10 closes with a short summary of major findings. This chapter judges whether the educational measures of 1984 and 1988 could be called successes or failures, in the broader sense of socio-economic modernization. Being concerned with both the policy and institutional levels, it addresses the question of whether or not the reforms favourably placed the Soviet successor states/ societies for further socio-economic development in the post-colonial era. The conclusion ends by suggesting several general directions for future research. A wide spectrum of informational sources was used for this book. Western documentation includes monographic and periodical literature on Soviet education, economics, and public policy. Soviet sources comprise monographic, periodical, and statistical works on the same topics. Soviet pedagogical newspapers, notably Uchitel'skaia gazeta (Teachers' Gazette), and the pedagogical journals Professional 'no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie (Vocational-Technical

12

Education for Decline

Education) and Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie (Secondary Specialized Education) were the main primary sources. Also included were Soviet Education and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, translated compendiums of pedagogical and public policy literature from popular sources. A number of reports, conference proceedings, speeches by authoritative figures, and interviews round out the bibliography.

2 The Vocational Paradigm: The Khrushchev Legacy and the Challenge of the Brezhnev Era

A guiding concept or set of common assumptions is the first prerequisite for a rationalist social policy. 1 An analytical approach emphasizing the role of ideas seems especially appropriate within a state socialist setting, in which all governmental policies ostensibly accord with some overall plan. Since the Khrushchevian paradigm of general and vocational education in direct service of an extensively based economy prevailed from 1958 until the close of the 1980s, this paradigm should be outlined and its origins explained. Until Khrushchev's time the mainstay of the Soviet educational system had been the comprehensive and unstreamed general school, which did not contain a major break between primary and secondary education. 2 General course content dominated the curricula at these levels, for vocational education had not yet been strongly integrated into the general system. A parallel system of factoryproduction schools, or fabrichno-zavodskie uchilishcha (FZUs), for peasant and working-class youths trained vocational personnel for the unsophisticated industry of that era.3 However, the general school had always contained a substantial element of at least simple vocational education. The Soviet Union had a long tradition of education on the job and of increasing the proportion of vocational instruction within the general secondary system. Economic requirements for skilled manpower and the prerequisite educational foundations have always been closely interwoven.4 Further, the 1950s were an era of rapid industrial expansion in the USSR. The need to find new sources of labour was one of the most important reasons for Khrushchev's reform of general education in 1958. In line with labour requirements, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) model curricular reforms of 1959 allowed for a large increase in the time devoted to manual training within general schools. The call of the day was for 'polytechnization' (parallel teaching of general and vocational subjects) within educa-

16

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

tion. 5 Meanwhile, an excess of students in the humanities had been noticed by as early as the end of the 1930s.6 By the mid-1950s the system of higher education could absorb only one-fifth of the general secondary school leavers wanting to continue their studies. 7 That is, between 1954 and 1957, 2.5 million graduates of secondary schools were unable to find spaces in institutions of higher learning (vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia or VUZs) and technicums; indeed, only 450,000 were accepted. 8 Concerns about the growing imbalance between those wanting to pursue higher education and the absorptive capacity of the economy were enunciated by Khrushchev in a major programmatic statement in 1958. In Khrushchev's view there was too much copying of the prerevolutionary gymnasium, with its emphasis on abstract knowledge. Instead, knowledge would be more closely linked to the needs of production, and there would be more attention to secondary school graduates' prospects for employment and integration into society. There was also a strong moralistic aspect to Khrushchev's remonstrations: the student cohort's increasingly widespread disdain for physical labour was 'insulting to workers of the socialist community.' Furthermore, Khrushchev cared for social justice: VUZs accepted disproportionately few candidates from worker and collective farm families. An expanded system of vocational education would offer these candidates a springboard for further advancement. 9 The First Secretary was also concerned with the managerial and implementational aspects of educational policy. Students entering higher education made uninformed career choices; they had a strong propensity to change jobs after graduation, or to re-enter VUZs in areas entirely different from their first professions. Further, he said, VUZ graduates had poor practical knowledge something that became obvious when they took up their first employment assignments. All of these problems of maladaptation could be alleviated by a stronger dosage of vocational training within the general schools. In the Khrushchevian view there was no room for Western-style liberal or humanitarian education - no room for parental preferences or student self-exploration. Instead, Khrushchev's operative paradigm was unabashedly economic serviceoriented and managerial: 'Our entire system of secondary and higher education should be constructed so as to ensure well-trained cadres - engineering-technical, agricultural, medical, scientific, pedagogical, worker cadres, agricultural workers - all cadres necessary for our state.' 10 At this point, given an outsider's perspective, it may be said that Khrushchev's criticisms must have seemed reasonable in his time and place. As in the West, the economy's ability to provide employment opportunities is certainly of import to graduates of higher education. However, market economies, being more sciencebased and dynamic, are better able to exploit new technologies and can therefore

The Vocational Paradigm

17

absorb a greater proportion of higher-education graduates within new industries.11 Market-led or market-indicated economies are better able to pick 'winning' from ' losing' industries. In socialist economies, of course, where many possible directions of economic development can be made to appear equally profitable given politically set prices, the 'intellectual problem' of picking winners from losers is much greater.12 Concurrently, Soviet policy-makers received much weaker market signals that certain types of products or industries should be discontinued and replaced by new ones. Like Western political leaders, who emphasize the importance of increasing (macro) economic growth for full employment, Soviet politicians called for rapid economic growth to satisfy· national and societal needs. However, these politicians' public policy actions entailed an important difference. Soviet leaders became preoccupied with 'perfecting the economic mechanism' - that is, with the task of policy coordination at the micro level. They therefore operated within a paradigm of a 'finite universe,' in which a concern with perfecting the mechanisms of the economy subtly displaced the concern for making the economy bigger. As Gertrude Schroeder has noted in this regard, the more planners sought micro-efficiency, the more bureaucratic and unresponsive the economic system became as a whole. 13 This paradigmatic limitation at the governmental level was reinforced by the economy's practical difficulties in achieving technological innovation at the micro level. There is a substantial Western literature on the 'innovation avoidance ' of Soviet industry. 14 Schroeder attests that the Soviet economy achieved 'innovation by administration,' while another economist states that in Soviettype economies, 'innovation is the exception rather than the rule.' 15 The result is that the USSR was very slow in adopting new technologies and shifting labour out of traditional industries into newer ones. Silvanna Malle, a specialist on Soviet labour resources, points out that there had been no intersectoral redistribution of labour since the end of the 1970s. 16 There was no shift to the service professions, while intrasectoral shifts were to the less-skilled vocations. Labour-short factory managers induced white-collar and clerical workers into accepting blue-collar jobs. 17 In the same vein Thomas Remington observes that the decline in the number of auxiliary and unskilled jobs declined only painfully slowly. VUZ graduates were underutilized and undervalued, while VUZ and technicum graduates tended to be pulled into manual jobs once performed by PfU graduates. Technicums increasingly became regarded simply as a pool of skilled manual labour. Remington notes somewhat acerbically that the old ideological notion that Soviet society was losing its class divisions, becoming more 'homogeneous' through the 'intellectualization' of physical labour, seems to

18

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

express a perverse kernel of truth. For the trend has been toward a de-differentiation of the workforce brought about by a combination of technological stagnation and the overproduction of specialists with tertiary degrees. 18 Furthermore, easy grades in PTUs and high (state-set) pay for blue-collar vocations disinclined youths from higher education. The deflection of students into the vocational and technical occupations reduced the competition for entry into VUZs, lowering the VUZs' academic standards. 19 At the same time VUZs were badly underfunded and poorly managed during the Brezhnev era. Indeed, serious underfunding was characteristic for the educational system as a whole. 20 All this resulted in the decreased growth in the quantity and quality of scientific manpower, a decrease that was eventually noted in 1986 by Egor Ligachev, the Communist Party secretary for ideology. 21 But if summit-level leaders operated within an erroneous educational paradigm, then educational planners and administrators operated within none at all. There is in this connection the inherent intellectual dilemma of knowing how much to spend on education versus other socio-economic needs. There are no testable theories on how education contributes to economic development. 22 Nor is there much theoretical guidance on how much to invest on different branches within education. Writing in 1967, Harold Noah averred that Soviet policymakers were not trying to calculate the optimum allocation of resources within education. For all their talk of foresight and cost-consciousness, the work of Soviet educational planners in practice was characterized by a 'well-nigh breathtaking spirit of "voluntarism," improvisation, and wastefulness.' Thus, for example, while it was not too difficult for Soviet educational managers, using uniform salaries, to ensure equilibrium between teaching supply and demand in the aggregate, it was very difficult to achieve a balance within the important submarkets of the teaching profession. 23 Soviet scholars themselves later admitted the lack of any well-founded studies of educational economics. 24 In practice, Soviet economists planned 'from the achieved level' or 'through trial and error. ' 25 However, such an incremental approach, attempting to extrapolate future educational needs on the basis of past history, is inappropriate during a time of rapid technological change. 26 The more rapidly an economy changes, the greater also is the need for generalized training that gives people better ability to learn and relearn, including the development of verbal along with mathematical or manipulative competence. 27 Thus Soviet education, with its emphasis on direct service to the economy, preoccupation with micromanagement, and narrowly specialized knowledge in the natural sciences, was ill-suited to the requirements of the contemporary era. To be sure, Khrushchev's reforms were implemented only partially, for by

The Vocational Paradigm

19

the mid-1970s two-thirds of secondary school students were still in general schools, and only one-third in vocational. 28 This was the reverse of the desired proportions. Mervyn Matthews explains that Khrushchev's reforms failed because they were administratively impracticable, socially unacceptable to students aspiring to white-collar professions and to their parents, and because the reforms were inadequately financed. 29 It was left to successive leaders to continue attempts at educational reform. But they too operated without the benefit of well-founded studies of educational economics. At the close of the Brezhnev era the Soviet economy's difficulties only increased, for the growth in national income fell sharply. A major social change was the shrinking of the peasantry; between 1970 and 1975, 6 million villagers migrated to the cities, where youths tended to enter the lower ranks of the proletariat. Since the country as a whole was perennially short of skilled workers, the government's policy was to expand the system of PTUs. 30 No doubt the need to adjust village job-seekers to urban life played a large role in this decision. In the meantime there began an intensified search for additional sources of labour. The labour crunch was indeed serious; for whereas during the ninth and tenth five-year plans (1971-5, 1976-80) the labour force increased by 12 and 11.2 million workers respectively, between 1981 and 1985 the increase was only 3.3 million. 31 Furthermore, Soviet macro industrial and investment policy from the tenth to the eleventh five-year plan was 'more of the same,' with this policy's emphasis on the traditional labour-intensive sectors of steelmaking, energy production, and transportation. 32 In 1979 legislation was passed giving preferential treatment in entrance to higher education for those who agreed to work in labour-short heavy industries or regions of the country. 33 The government also attempted in 1979 and 1983 to restrict juridically the freedom of workers to change jobs 'excessively' and to use administrative sanctions against workers cited for labour violations. But there was no policy to conserve labour until the mid-1980s. The focus was on finding unused labour reserves, that is, inducing marginal workers such as pensioners, mothers, and adolescents into the labour force. 34 In the Soviet context labour policy drove educational policy. However, Joel Moses observed that, for all the attention that Brezhnev and Andropov paid to the former, there was only superficial consensus. Labour policy was stalemated between a conservative paradigm, emphasizing administrative regulation and coercion of the labour force, and a reformist orientation, calling for better working conditions and health care as components of employees' better adjustment to the world of employment. Gorbachev was mainly silent on labour issues; consequently labour policy drifted during his early incumbency. 35 Instead, there was already in place another model for labour and vocational policy.

20

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

As long ago as the 1940s, according to Blair Ruble, Leningrad party officials and factory managers began to set in place a system of education that would give the Leningrad region self-sufficiency in skilled personnel. It was here that the system of enterprise 'mentorship' over local general and vocational schools had been the most highly developed. The key to the success of this program lay in tying urban PfUs to future employment sites. At the same time, students were systematically discouraged from pursuing academic educational goals. By the early 1980s the Leningrad party organization had come to view the vocational school as the city's central institution for secondary-level education. Even prior to the 1984 all-union school reform, approximately 40 per cent of Leningrad secondary school students completing eight-year general school programs entered vocational-technical schools. This was a rate of entry that remained unsurpassed elsewhere in the USSR. 36 Ruble noted that the central leadership openly and extensively drew on Leningrad's experience during the preparation of the all-union 1984 draft reform. The vocational thrust of the 1984 reform, its attempt to reduce academic education and to integrate general and vocational schools more directly with the needs of economic enterprises, was to complete the reform process begun by Khrushchev in 1958.37 Other authors also saw continuity between Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's social policy. 38 A factor that reinforced the vocational thrust of the 1984 reform was the twelfth five-year plan (1986-90), now bearing Gorbachev's imprimatur. This plan continued to emphasize extractive and heavy industry, having a low budget for the 'non-production' (services) sector. 39 Consequently there would be no clear need to shift instructional programs away from the blue-collar-oriented PfUs towards the service professions taught in a portion of the SSUZ/technicums. Instead, as Walter Connor observed, the blue-collar-oriented PfUs would simply be somewhat upgraded to SPfUs (secondary vocational-technical schools). The SPfUs would absorb the majority of seventeen-year-olds, providing them with a 'comprehensive' education resulting in both vocational training and a secondary-education diploma. This meant that only a minority of teenagers would have the option of completing an academic secondary education (the 'main route' to higher education). The 1984 legislation thus addressed the same problems as the Khrushchev reforms: an 'excess' of teenagers electing to complete a secondary academic education, a 'shortage' of job-relevant vocational training, and the unreadiness of those completing academic secondary education to enter the working class.40 At this point some observations are due regarding the economy of the mid1980s. Soviet leaders had recognized a growing technological lag behind the West at least as early as 1969, when a major theme of a plenum of the Commu-

The Vocational Paradigm

21

nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the need to generate more rapid technological advance. 41 However, as outlined above, later governments continued to pursue a traditional economic development policy.. Accordingly the Gorbachev leadership considered machine-building as the key to the reinvigoration of the economy. Investment in this sector was to increase in the twelfth five-year plan (198~90) by 80 per cent over the rate for 1981-5.42 But the machine-building sector could not efficiently absorb such a large increase in investment, partly because there were already nearly 20 million unfilled job vacancies in industry. There was a general decrease in the rate of industrial output, while the economy's share of consumer goods production dropped to its lowest level yet - from 39 per cent in 1940 to 25.2 per cent in 1985. Meanwhile the value of unfinished capital construction was 8.2 billion rubles in 1987, rose to 13.3 billion rubles in 1988, and leaped to 39 billion rubles in 1989. This latter figure equalled four-fifths of the increase in the national income of that year.43 Thus technical change was not labour-saving, because the sectors designated to receive new capital investments kept expanding. 44 This was the more so as the Soviets had a marked reluctance to scrap obsolete, labour-intensive machinery. 45 An overgrown industrial sector created self-perpetuating pressure for additional capital investment. 46 Further economic inefficiency was caused by the lack of intersectoral mobility in the labour force, as mentioned earlier. This inefficiency was exacerbated by the vertical fragmentation of the Soviet economy among three major bureaucracies: party, state, and province. 47 Inefficiency in labour force adaptation was also caused at the enterprise level, for as Ruble pointed out, training in vocational schools was oriented to the needs of local labour markets, not the national. 48 It was enterprise and ministerial power, as the consumer of educational products, that appeared to be the main catalyst to the economy. But enterprises pursued selfish policies in attracting labour, causing unevenness in the distribution of this labour. 49 However, in contrast to the enterprises' short-run interests, the application of labour-saving and increased efficiency of labour utilization required greater, not lesser, labour force mobility. In this connection Malle argued that the biggest barrier to improved labour utilization was the interventionist system of planned labour allocation itself; for the thrust of such a system was, naturally, to fix personnel to specific workplaces. Since the growth in the workforce had sharply declined, the main way economic growth could have been improved was through interbranch shifts of labour. 50 There was, however, a paradox regarding the Soviet labour market - for it was indeed just that, a market. Several Western authors point out that the USSR has had a mostly free market in labour since at least the 1950s. Hiring 'at the factory gate' has always been substantial; indeed, these authors estimated that

22

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

by the mid-1980s about 85 per cent of all hires occurred without any form of state allocation. 51 A contributor to the authoritative journal Kommunist acknowledged that two-thirds of all urban employees were hired on the open market. 52 These figures suggest that if the Soviet labour market functioned as well as it did, this owed not to the successful penetration of state policy, but to workers' spontaneous actions, job shifts, at the societal level. These figures also suggest the importance for the present study of some regard for societal preferences and dynamics. This review of the Khrushchev reforms and their legacy for the 1980s closes with some final notes on the economy. There is consensus in the Western literature that the technological gap between the USSR and the West did not narrow during Brezhnev's tenure, or that this gap increased. 53 Indeed, even newly industrializing countries outperformed the Soviet Union, though not so much for cost reasons as for their faster technological modernization.54 In this latter regard Jan Winiecki noted that the trend in the world economy during the 1970s and 1980s had been for industries in which economies of scale and vertical relations predominated (steel, cement, bulk chemicals) to be replaced as an engine of growth by industries in which enterprises were typically linked horizontally, where flexibility and rapid innovation were the keys to success. These industries depended much more for their performance upon features that were the antithesis of central planning. The neglect of the service sector had further impeded the Soviettype economies,55 something that several Soviet commentators recognized by the early 1980s.56 And though the USSR led the world, in at least one Western author's view, on research and development spending, this did not forestall the Soviet economy's continuing trend towards extensive, not high value-added, industry during the 1980s. Because of central planning, Soviet basic research tended to become weaker the further one moved from the abstract to the experimental. 57 The Soviet Union remained a technological follower, not a leader, with a decline even in the sensitive area of military electronics. 58 Be high science as it may, the condition of the labour force and vocational education, to return to the main focus, was dismal. In the mid-1980s still 30 per cent of the employees in industry and 70 per cent in agriculture were doing manual or low-skilled work. 59 Agriculture still absorbed 19.1 per cent of the labour force; but, as noted earlier, emigration from the villages had dried up by the late 1970s. By January 1989 there were 1.4 million employed in the new cooperative sector, but inefficient agriculture absorbed more new labour than the cooperatives released.6(} In 1987 'full cost-accounting' (polnyi khozraschet) became required of enterprises, which received the ostensible right of 'possession, use, and disposal' of their physical assets. 61 However, cost-accounting disinclined enterprises even further from supporting vocational schools. Enter-

The Vocational Paradigm

23

prises also reduced in-house training by a fifth between 1985 and 1989, finding it easier to poach needed labour on the open market than to train young workers.62 As for education, there had been a flattening of the status-occupational gradient. The pay and prestige of intellectual occupations had declined continuously since the postwar era.63 In sum, this overview of Soviet education and economy shows the following: (1) Both the Khrushchev educational reform of 1958 and the Brezhnev/ Gorbachev reform of 1984 were firmly rooted in a vocational (simple or mass trades) paradigm for technical education, and an economic service/applied science paradigm for higher. (2) The economy continued to be based on the extensive development of traditional manufacturing and commodities sectors throughout the 1980s. (3) There were no significant intersectoral movements of labour, while intrasectoral movements, if any, were downward into the blue-collar vocations in order to make up labour shortages in the traditional industries. (4) The entire Brezhnev/Gorbachev era was marked by economic decline, with a concomitant - or preceding - decline in educational spending, infrastructure, and achievement. These preliminary findings are more firmly demonstrated in the next chapter, based on Soviet sources, which outlines the major actors in educational policy.

3

The Extensive Economic Model: The Union-Level Terrain of General, Secondary Vocational, and Higher Education The General School The present educational system began to take shape during the early 1930s.1 In the campaign of this era to eradicate illiteracy, the major emphasis was, of necessity, on general education. Offering an ' academic' program, the general school constituted the main link within the overall educational system until the late 1950s. 2 It retained its pre-eminence in a numerical sense to the close of the 1980s, as can be seen in Table 3.1. But the general schools had always provided vocational guidance and study, whose component increased over time. The general schools taught courses on the world of work and industry, organized excursions to enterprises and vocational schools, and sent students to interschool workshops.3 There was a notable increase in the vocational component as a result of the 1958 reform, when Nikita Khrushchev sought to have the general schools ' more closely tied to life.' 4 By 1978, 74 per cent of full-time general schools were providing instruction in manual skills. Though only 38 per cent of pupils in all possible classes throughout the USSR were covered,5 this was nonetheless a considerable number. However, the 1958 policy thrust towards greater vocational content had mostly not been implemented. Another quantitative increase in the vocational component occurred in 1984, when schools were formally grouped into general, vocational-technical, and intermediate (secondary) categories (the analytical categories used for this account). As Oscar Anweiler points out, the general school in 1984 was given the double function of preparing students both for vocational and higher education studies. He astutely observes that this was not a harmonious pedagogical concept; indeed, it was contradictory. Furthermore, the reform failed to achieve a distinct functional delegation of responsibility among

The Extensive Economic Model

25

TABLE 3.1 Number of Students and Instructional Institutions by Type of School, 1987--8 Type of School Preschool General Vocational-technical (PTU) Secondary specialized (SSUZ) (incl. 1st level higher educ.) Higher

No. of Instructional Institutions

No. of Students

145,000 135,000 8,000

16,900,000 43,800,000 4,200,000

4,500

4,500,000 5,000,000

900

Source: V.A. Raiangu, Planirovanie, finansirovanie i upravlenie obrazovaniia v SSSR (Tallinn: Gosudarstvennyi komitet Estonskoi SSA po narodnom obrazovaniiu, 1989), p. 85.

the various types of secondary schools.6 Given this unclarity of goals, the secondary school system was marked in the 1980s by a high degree of differentiation; the general school alone offered twenty to twenty-five vocational profiles, which were to lead to forty 'mass occupations' and some 257 narrower specialities. But the vocationalized general school no longer held centre stage by the mid-1980s for, in a normative sense, the secondary vocational-technical school (SPTIJ) emerged as the prototype of the future. 7 The place of ideology will be treated in later chapters. Still one can further agree with Anweiler that, to the Soviet regime, the school was first and foremost a place where ideological knowledge was transmitted in the interests of providing 'a well-trained workforce of broad general culture. ' 8 Little flexibility was allowed teachers and students; basic requirements regarding subject matter, methodology, and tests were the same across the USSR. A complete general secondary education, either within the general school proper or within generalvocational schools, was said to have been attained for virtually all (98 per cent) secondary school leavers by the late 1970s.9 Primary and general secondary education was supervised by the Ministry of Education of the USSR (Minpros). The main newspaper covering general education was Uchitel'skaia gazeta (Teachers' Gazette). Founded in 1924, it was the organ of the RSFSR Ministry of Education until 1958. It then became a newspaper of the USSR Ministry of Education jointly with the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Workers in Education, Higher Schools, and Scientific Institutions. On 1 January 1989 it passed directly to the control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU). It is now the main general education newspaper of the Russian Federation.

26

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

Vocational-Technical Schools One of the two foci of this book is the simple vocational-technical school, the professional'no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche or PfU. Its main function was to provide junior personnel for the mass trades. The PfU was an outgrowth of the State Labour Reserves system established in 1940 for the recruitment of labouring personnel for difficult jobs in remote areas. It always had low prestige among youth and parents, being viewed as a dumping-ground for underachievers and the marginally delinquent. 10 Entry into a PfU virtually ruled out the possibility of advancement to higher education; consequently the PfU was always plagued by an inability to attract sufficient entrants. 11 Until 1990 the PfU offered instruction in 1,600 vocations, or one-fifth of the total for all worker vocations. In absolute terms, however, the PfU trained 70 per cent of the category of 'qualified workers' (blue-collar workers with a trade certificate) and 50 per cent of all workers for the national economy. One hundred and two vocations accounted for three-quarters of all PfU graduates. Some of the main categories were as follows: tractor-machinists, manual and machine welders, lathe operators, painters and plasterers, radio and electronic repair personnel, lathe setters, cooks, and sewing machine operators. 12 The output of PfU graduates was particularly important for certain branches of the economy, comprising during 197~0, for example, 96 per cent of qualified workers in construction, 67 per cent in communications, and 58 per cent in railway transport. 13 Other industries that relied on the PfU cohort were machine-building, metal-working, energy, bulk chemicals, and agriculture. The list above indicates that PfUs were mainly the province of blue-collar, male vocations, with males making up 69.4 per cent of the cohort in 1979.14 Catering to the traditional blue-collar trades, the PfUs remained underdeveloped in the service sphere. 15 In an effort to raise their prestige, PfUs were promoted from the late 1970s as providing, besides a basic trade, a complete general education giving possible access to higher educational institutions. Combined general and vocational instruction was also offered in part-time or evening programs. However, in practice, few students enrolled in these programs, and many soon dropped out. 16 PfU programs were based on an incomplete nine-year (previously eightyear) secondary education and offered an additional two, two and a half, or sometimes three years of combined general and vocational education. Though a general education received in a PfU was widely considered to be inferior to that in a regular general school, a graduate with a grade of 'excellent' had preference over an ordinary general school leaver when applying for higher education. This was especially the case if the graduate's course background fitted the profile of the institution applied to. 17

The Extensive Economic Model

27

A more advanced variant of the PTU is the SPTU or secondary vocationaltechnical school. This was a relatively recent innovation, dating from 1969, and was rapidly expanded. By the mid-1980s the conversion of PTUs to SPTUs (PTUs providing a strengthened general education component) was said to be almost fully implemented. The basic options within the SPTU were: (1) nine years of general education combined with three years of additional general and vocational instruction, and (2) eleven years (a complete secondary education according to the new definition dating from the mid-1980s) and one or two years of vocational training.18 As noted in Chapter 1, there had been a steady growth in the PTU system. In the early 1960s one-third of all youths obtained a speciality within this system, but during the tenth five-year plan (1976-80), two-thirds of all entrants to the labour force (12.5 million) did so. Within this quantitative shift, there was also a qualitative increase in the level of general education and vocational training offered in the direction of the SPTU.19 The shift of students came mainly from the ordinary PTU system. (Here it should be said that for statistical purposes and in current usage, the terms PTU and SPTU were combined under the name 'PTU,' which Soviet authors understood as the vocational school offering the strengthened general component. This is the meaning of PTU to be used henceforth. )20 Regarding the development of the PTU system, the first row in Table 3.2 indicates that labour force growth declined between 1980 and 1985. Yet the third row indicates that the annual number of workers trained in PTUs grew steadily in absolute terms - from 1,638,000 in 1970 to a peak of 2,576,000 in 1985 - and remained at a substantial 2,537,000 in 1988. That is, the number of entrants to the labour force in 1985 grew to 111 per cent of the 1970 figure, while the number of PTU graduates increased to 157 per cent (from rows 2 and 4). Notwithstanding the rapid growth in vocational schools, from 5,351 in 1970 to 7,783 in 1985 (row 6), yet another 810 schools to comprise 800,000 new spaces were called for in the twelfth five-year plan (1986-90). The government's aim was to put in place a system of vocational schools uniformly distributed across the industrial regions of the country, with each enterprise of 2,000 employees or more having its ' own' school. 21 The interest of the base enterprise, which provided equipment for the PTU or training facilities at the factory, was that vocational trainees were ostensibly required to work at that enterprise for two years after graduating. That is, the PTU was to train a captive labour force for the enterprise.22 (One Russian interviewee described this as a system of 'moderate serfdom' (miagkoe krepostnichestvo).)23 The local PTU usually offered only one major field of study for its registrees, namely the field that fitted the profile of the base enterprise or

28

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

TABLE 3.2 Dynamics of Worker Training in Vocational Education Institutions

(1) All workers trained for new vocations (2) % 1970 (3) All workers trained in PTU (millions) (4) % 1970 (5) % PTU graduates of all graduates (6) Number of vocational schools (7) Cohort of trainees (millions) (8) Admittance, trainees (millions)

1970

1980

1985

6.4m 100

7.8m *122

7.1m *111

1.638 100

2.430 *148

2.576 *157

26

31

36

5,351

7,242

1989

1990

2.527

2.537 2.285

2.171

7,783

8,047

7,959 7,538

7,849

2.380 3.659

3.978

4.252

4.048 3.648

3.389

1.837

2.862

2.867

2.624 2.314

2.139

2.665

1987

1988

*Author's calculations. Source: V.A. Sidorov, Obrazovanie i podgotovka kadrov v us/oviiakh novoi tekhnicheskoi rekonstruktsii (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 149.

industrial region. 24 There were about ten to fifteen base enterprises designated for each secondary vocational school in the country, but it appears that only the major enterprise of a region cast its imprimatur on the local school. 25 Managers of the main enterprises often resented other industrial 'free riders' that tried to entice labour away from 'their' vocational schools and used this as a pretext to reduce their own assistance to the PfUs.26 Theoretically, each vocational school was responsible for placing its graduates into employment positions, with the base enterprise having first call. However, supply and demand of local industries determined vocational employment outcomes to a large extent. 27 As noted in Chapter 2, the Soviet Union had always had a mostly free market in blue-collar labour. Thus the placement of PI1J graduates was more informal than was the case with graduates of higher education. Base enterprises were not juridically guaranteed the output of the PTUs, yet another factor that made enterprises unwilling to provide the PfUs with more than grudging support. 28 By the close of the 1980s there were between 350,000 to 400,000 teachers of general, general-technical, and special disciplines within the PI1J system. In 1988, 94.6 per cent of the PTUs' regular staff had a higher education, though within the category of ' teaching masters' (experienced workers seconded from enterprises) only 18.8 per cent had the same. During the 1980s the number of

The Extensive Economic Model

29

teachers more than doubled, again attesting to the rapid growth of the PTU system. Here Soviet critics felt a disconsonance; for the mass of PTU teachers were either engineers without pedagogical training, or else were secondary teachers without an engineering education.29 The sex profile of PTU teachers was considered to be more favourable than that of teachers in the 'feminized' general schools. Accordingly males comprised 53.6 per cent of the overall teaching staff, and 61 per cent of teaching masters. Females comprised 78.3 per cent of teachers of general subjects within the PTUs.30 The PTUs were under the jurisdiction of the State Committee for VocationalTechnical Education (Gosprofobr) of the USSR Council of Ministers and corresponding entities at the republican and local levels. The Committee worked closely with about fifty of the largest industrial ministries and corresponding enterprises in developing curricula geared to industry's requirements. 31 The main trade journal for this level of vocational education was Professional'notekhnicheskoe obrazovanie (Vocational-Technical Education). It is now called Professional (The Professional).

SSUZ/fechnicums The second generic type of vocational school is the srednee spetsial'noe uchebnoe zavedenie (SSUZ), or secondary specialized instructional institution. The popular name for it is 'technicum,' though it is also confusingly sometimes called an uchilishche (vocational training school) by Soviet authors. It is increasingly now also being called a college. Though the better of these may be equivalent to American junior colleges, this is by no means the case with most. In 1980 only 62.9 per cent of technicum entrants had a complete general secondary education of ten years, while the remainder still entered with an eightyear general preparation. 32 Accordingly it is probably more accurate to say that the SSUZs are equivalent to American industrial colleges. The status of the SSUZs is the more confusing because they came under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education; and statistics on the SSUZs were often conflated in Soviet sources with those for higher education. Both SSUZ/technicum and higher education (VUZ) graduates are designated as 'specialists.' 33 The tenn 'SSUZ' usually refers to a larger establishment having about 500 students, and teaching a range of subdivisions of a particular discipline. 34 There are three main variants of the SSUZ: the first is based (now) on nine years of general education, and offers four additional years of combined general and vocational education; the second and third types are based on the eleven-year general school and provide either two or three years of further vocational train-

30

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

ing. 35 Here the point is made that if the roughly 4.6 million students in two-year programs of American junior colleges are classified by Unesco as within higher education, then Soviet SSUZ students should also be included. 36 This point seems justified only in part. The third type, based on eleven years of general education and three of technical, formally would seem to compare with the American junior college, based on twelve years of general preparation and two years of technical. The first, junior, category of SSUZs is being phased out. If one makes the generous assumption that half of all SSUZ students were enrolled in the more advanced stream in 1989, then out of a total of 4.5 million SSUZ students (see Table 3.1), 2.25 million could be said to be enrolled in programs equivalent to American junior colleges. Nonetheless, such a numerical approach ignores the pedagogical viewpoint that SSUZs provide weaker theoretical backgrounds than do American junior colleges. 37 The SSUZ provides specialized training for paraprofessionals in fields such as engineering, agriculture, low-level management, primary teaching and library sciences, and office work, and for support staff in the arts. Other fields are communications, navigation, and transport. Females constituted 61 per cent of employees in these categories, further comprising such fields as trade, public catering, health care, credit and insurance services,• and science (laboratory technicians).38 The SSUZ's trade journal was Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie (Secondary Specialized Education). It is now called Spetsialist (The Specialist). The list of vocations above shows that SSUZs in most cases provide personnel for the services. As such, one may agree with Mervyn Matthews that SSUZs are an extremely important element within an educational system otherwise heavily oriented towards specific functions within material production.39 If the members of the CIS are to achieve a significant modernization of their labour force profiles, the SSUZs would be expected to play an increased role. Table 3.3 indicates that the largest category of employed specialists was those with a secondary specialized education, numbering over 20.2 million since 1987. This number comprised 15.4 per cent of all personnel employed in the national economy. Thus the SSUZ, combined with the PTU (see note 12) trained about two-thirds of all personnel - including both qualified and unqualified - in the country. From the third and fourth rows of the table one may see that the categories of employed personnel with higher or secondary specialized education quadrupled between 1960 and 1980, roughly doubling in each decade. The rate of increase slowed somewhat for both categories from 1980 to 1987. Though the SSUZ system grew rapidly in the last three decades in absolute tenns, its internal structure was remarkably (indeed detrimentally) stable. This

The Extensive Economic Model

31

TABLE 3.3 Numbers Employed in the National Economy of the USSR

(1) No. employed in national economy (millions) (2) No. specialists (millions) (3) Of these: With higher education (4) With secondary spec. education (5) Specialists in no. employed% (6) Of these: With higher education (7) With secondary spec. education

1960

1970

1980

1985

1987

83.8

106.8

125.7

130.3

131 .3

8.7

16.8

28.6

33.6

3.5

6.8

12.1

5.2

10.0

10.4%

1989

1990

35.7

36.5

37.0

14.5

15.5

15.9

16.0

16.5

19.1

20.2

20.6

21.0

15.7%

22.7%

25.8%

27.1%

4.2%

6.4%

9.6%

11 .1%

11 .8%

6.2%

9.3%

13.1%

14.5%

15.4%

Source: V.M. Zuev, Roi', mesto i funktsii kadrov so srednim spetsia/'nym obrazovaniem v narodnom khoziaistve (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), p. 5. can be inferred from Table 3.4, which shows the occupational distribution of personnel within the category of secondary specialized education. The first thing to note (from row 3) is that the category of (industrially oriented) technicians, at 46.1 per cent of the total in 1987, was much the largest. Further, this category tended to increase, if only modestly. More striking is the converse: stability or even decline in the white-collar and service categories. Thus row 6 indicates that the category of planners and statisticians was stable since 1980 and actually declined somewhat, in percentage terms, between 1985 and 1987. The category for trade-goods handlers (row 8) increased by only half a percentage point between 1980 and 1987, reflecting continued poor service to the Soviet consumer. The figures for jurists (row 11) were small and stable, while there was a significant percentage decline in medical personnel between 1970 and 1985, followed by only a very modest increase in 1987 (row 13). The category of cultural/educational workers (row 15) also declined significantly since 1970, with this decline continuing right up to 1987. Therefore, in view of the large size of the 'technician' category (some of whose workers would admittedly fit under the rubric of service vocations) one should not overestimate the orientation of the SSUZ towards the service fields. In the remaining categories given, corresponding to the definition of service professions as understood in the West, there was percentage stability or even

32

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

TABLE 3.4 Qualificational Structure of Specialists with Secondary Specialized Education Employed in the National Economy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)

Employed in national economy: by specialization Technicians Percentage Agronomists, zoologists, veterinarians, vet. assistants Percentage Planners, statisticians Percentage Trade-goods handlers Percentage Jurists Percentage Medical workers Percentage Pedagogues, librarians, cult./edl. workers Percentage

1985

1987

1970

1980

9,988,100 4,333,100 43.4%

16,538,000 19,106,800 20,161 ,600 7,730,700 8,950,400 9,303,500 46.7% 46.8% 46.1%

597,000 6.0% 950,500 9.5% 396,300 4.0% 21,000 0.2% 1,862,100 18.6%

938,000 5.7% 1,984,700 12.0% 832,600 5.0% 40,000 0.2% 2,615,300 15.8%

1,042,800 5.5% 2,422,800 12.7% 1,006,900 5.3% 51 ,000 0.3% 2,917,600 15.3%

1,058,600 5.3% 2,479,000 12.3% 1,102,200 5.5% 55,400 0.3% 3,131,200 15.5%

1,458,900 14.6%

1,823,200 11 .0%

2,074,400 10.9%

2,134,400 10.6%

T = 95.6% of all occupations. Source: V.M. Zuev, Roi', mesto i funktsii kadrov so srednim spetsial'nym obrazovaniem v narodnom Khoziaistve (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), p. 6. decline. The findings of the Western authors cited in the previous chapter, who detected no significant inter- or intrabranch shifts towards the service trades, are confirmed to the close of the 1980s.

Higher Education While the system of higher educational institutions, vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia or VUZs, is beyond the immediate scope of this book, some knowledge of the structure and functions of Soviet higher education is essential for a contextual understanding of secondary vocational training. The latter was intended to complement higher education; conversely, it was intended that VUZ specialists 'would form the leading link in the system of vocational education.' 40 That is, VUZ education itself fell within a rather narrow applied science/economic service paradigm. As explained earlier, Soviet education historically had the unique attribute of being exclusively oriented towards professional employment; it did not offer programs not geared towards employment specializations.

The Extensive Economic Model

33

This attribute of servicing the economy directly prevailed to the end of the Soviet era, with the VUZ structure replicating the structure of the economy. 41 Consequently the VUZ system was characterized by fragmentation, both in its organization and curricular content. 42 As Matthews observed, the list of VUZ specializations contained mostly what was culturally, economically, or politically useful to the state. Courses, he said, were both highly standardized, in the Soviet manner, and complex, as befitted a modern economy. 43 The Soviet educational system had no provisions for academic freedom and tenure, to protect faculty from political pressures. In view of ideological constraints, the VUZ was isolated from global academic currents. Fewer than 500 students studied abroad annually. 44 Of these, only 100 to 300 travelled to capitalist countries, usually for short visits. This compared with from 12,000 to 22,000 students from the major West European countries and North America who studied for extended terms in other technologically advanced states.45 The USSR Academy of Sciences and the universities were formally granted independent status and control over their own resources in 1990.46 Like everything else in Soviet society, access to higher education was planned, with only a small minority of secondary-level students advancing further. Planning was aided by the fact that the government was both the main provider and consumer of education. 47 This again highlights the importance of the government's rationalist paradigm of socio-economic policy and the common assumptions of the educational elite. Here one may note that historically it was the all-union Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education that was responsible for top-level planning and policy coordination in the area of upper education. 48 VUZ graduates were required to accept a three-year employment placement upon completion of their studies. There was also in place a mechanism whereby enterprises could sponsor employees to study in VUZs by paying their stipends and reserving job openings for them pending completion of their studies. About 5 per cent of VUZ students were supported in this manner. 49 As with other levels of education, responsibility for graduate placement was shared by various institutions. The major ones were the all-union Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, union industrial ministries and departments, the Councils of Ministers of the union republics, regional and provincial (ob/ast') Councils of People's Deputies, and enterprise directors, along with the institutions of higher education themselves. 50 Universities always had a small place in Soviet higher education, for institutes were the main source of professional graduates. Institutes usually pertained to one of seventy industrial ministries or departments; they were separate from the universities, which were supported by the state directly. Usually offer-

34

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

ing a limited choice of closely related majors, institutes enrolled more than 75 per cent of all students in higher education,51 while the universities enrolled an estimated 11.5 per cent. 52 The seventy universities and about 400 pedagogical, medical, and social science institutes, together with academies in the fine arts, were collectively known as VUZs. Another 400 college-level establishments comprised polytechnical institutes (about 60) and specialized engineering and natural science institutes. These were called VTUZs - institutions of higher technical education. Degrees from a VUZ or VTUZ are similar to BA and BSc degrees in the United States. An additional component of higher attainment is the Academy of Sciences, having 62,000 staff members of various academic levels in 1988.53 The Academy did not offer instruction, but was purely a research body, separate from both the universities and institutes. The Academy of Sciences is analogous to the American and Canadian National Research Councils; it conducted about 5 per cent of all VUZ research. 54 In all, there were about 16 million employees with a university or institute education in the economy of the USSR at the close of the 1980s.55 Here it is time to correct the stereotype, shared by Matthews and Vadim Medish, of the large size of the Soviet university and institute systems. A typical Soviet phrase had it that, 'in 1981, 833 out of every 1,000 persons employed in the national economy had a higher or secondary (complete or incomplete) education. ' 56 All this phrase means, of course, is that the stated number of people had an education of at least grade eight. Likewise conflating higher and secondary categories, the USSR minister of higher and secondary specialized education boasted that the USSR had the world's most educated population.57 Yet another source claimed that the country had one-quarter of the world's scientific workers. 58 But the term 'scientific worker' was a slippery one. The term included members of the USSR Academy of Sciences with Candidate (Master's) degrees, as well as the category of 'junior scientific associate' without Candidate degrees. The term also included junior scientific associates within the system of industrial institutes. Finally, the term included people with Candidate degrees employed in the production sphere, but who did no scientific work. 59 Unesco data for 1988 show that in the United States there were 12,398,000 full and part-time students in all third-level (that is, post-secondary) institutions, compared to 5,097,000 for the USSR, with its larger population and this population's identical age structure. 60 The American figure for universities and equivalent institutions only was 7,754,000. Subtracting this number from the total for all third-level institutions leaves 4,644,000 in the junior (two-year) colleges. In comparison, ignoring the fact that Unesco does not count Soviet SSUZs as equivalent to American junior colleges, the number of Soviet stu-

The Extensive Economic Model

35

dents was probably not more than 2.25 million in the most advanced SSUZs (see note 36). As just mentioned above, the number of students in Soviet universities and equivalent institutions was 5,097,000. Of these 60 per cent, or 3 million, attended full-time. 61 The number of university students only was 585,097 in 1988,62 leaving 4,511,903 in the institute system. This compared, for example, with the Canadian number of 499,431 full-time and 306,192 part-time university students the same year. 63 Furthermore, the Soviet gross enrolment ratio (the percentage of high school graduates who advance to higher education within five years of high school matriculation) for students in university and equivalent institutions declined between 1980 and 1988 from 21.4 per cent to 20.7 per cent. This compared with gross enrolment ratios of 67.3 per cent for Canada and 63 per cent for the United States in 1988.64 Canadian university enrolment was nearly two-fifths greater in absolute terms than that of the entire former Soviet Union! The figures and estimates above show that the USSR had only about a third to a half of the North American attainment in higher education - in purely quantitative terms. All this speaks of the dominant vocational education/applied science paradigm in Soviet secondary and higher education. Policy-makers' preference for vocational and secondary technical education, and the dynamics within these, can be further deduced from budget statistics given in Table 3.5. Row 1 indicates that the rate of increase in global spending for education declined from the mid-1960s, though there was a moderate increase in the latter 1980s. These percentages show that the adjusted increase between 1985 and 1988 brought spending back approximately to the level prior to 1975. Spending on VUZs (row 4) was on par with that of cadre (labour force) training and SSUZs (rows 3 and 5) until 1970. Henceforth VUZ spending declined relative to other categories, falling in 1985 to 108.4 per cent of the 1980 figure - only slightly higher than spending on SSUZs that same year. The most favoured category was the PI1J (row 6), which consistently enjoyed the highest rates of spending increase from 1965 to 1988. Whereas spending on PTIJs was on par with SSUZs in 1965, by 1988 the PTIJs were enjoying nearly double the amount of global funding. Indeed, the big loser was the SSUZ, registering an absolute decline in 1988. The column for 1988 shows that the categories of cadre training and PI1J received large increases. The VUZ under Gorbachev received a belated increase to bring it back (only) to par with cadre training and the PTIJ. The increase for VUZs came not at the expense of vocational education at the PI1J level, but at the expense of the more service and paraprofessionally oriented SSUZ/technicums. A further discussion of these and related dynamics will be given in later

TABLE 3.5 Expenditures on Education (millions of rubles)

(1) Education & science, all categories (2) Education & cadre training (3) Cadre training (4) Higher education (5) Technicums, SSUZs (6) Vocational-technical (7) Expenditure on educalion & cadre training as % national income

1965

1970

17,510

24,769

11,510 3,251 1,483 829 840

15,603 4,854 2,188 1,221 1,313

6.0%

5.4%

1988/ 1985

1975

1975/ 1970

1980

1980/ 1975

1985

1985/ 1980

1986

1987

1988

141 .4%

32,788

132.3%

39,988

121.9%

49,602

124.0%

52,4TT

54,814

59,814 *133.6%

134.9% 149.3% 147.5% 147.3% 156.3%

20,874 7,020 2,972 1,790 2,092

133.3% 144.6% 135.8% 146.6% 159.3%

8,673 3,751 2,028 2,686

123.5% 126.2% 113.3% 128.3%

9,550 4,066 2,183 2,980

110. 1% 108.4% 107.6% 110.9%

9,994 4,063 2,239 3,360

10,288 4,169 2,107 3,656

11,316 *149.3% 4,793 *147.7% 2,120 *95.2% 3,829 *147.5%

1970/ 1965

-

5.8%

*Author's calculation, adjusted for three years. Source: N.E. Kolesnikov and A.I. Rabitskii, eds., Ekonomika professiona/'no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia: problemy effektivnosti (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola 1982), p. 73; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1991 g. (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1991), pp. 405, 556.

The Extensive Economic Model

37

chapters. Still, it appears that it was an increasingly vocationally oriented, bluecollar working population that was called upon to support politically and finance higher education at the close of the 1980s. This may well have caused some resentment and class jealousy at a time when Gorbachev attempted to change the terms of the regime's 'social contract' with workers.65 In any event a situation of declining popular support for higher education would not be viable over the long run. Regarding this point Jan Sadlak, an analyst of East European education, observed that despite a general decline in student enrolment 'it is not unusual to encounter the view that higher education is overdeveloped in relation to the [East European] countries' ability to provide adequate employment and existing budgetary resources. Low demand for new technologies from a greatly antiquated industry undermines even further public support for more generous financing of research activities in higher education. ' 66 A decline in public (or elite) political support and the economy's ability to pay for higher education appears to be what occurred in the USSR. 67 The Soviet pedagogical press from the late 1980s onward contained numerous ' advocacy ' statistics purporting to show the decline in spending on education as a percentage of national income. For example, V.A. Sidorov complained that because of spending cuts, the proportion of the USSR 's population having a higher education fell from third place in the world in 1953, behind only the United States and Canada, to 42nd place at the close of the 1980s.68 Another author recently stated that the USSR stood in 25th place,69 though the Russian Federation's Ministry of Higher Education insists that the Soviet Union stood firmly within the world's top ten. 70 The world ranking of the USSR is not a major concern here. However, it may be asserted that the USSR failed or (more precisely) chose not to achieve a higher ranking in upper education than could have been attained. The reason for this failure cannot be only budgetary constraints, as more generous funding was found for other levels of education and for labour force training. Instead, the reason appears to be primarily strategic in nature. The finding of the USSR's comparatively modest attainment in higher education is one of the most important, if somewhat incidental, findings of this book. 71 This low attainment resulted from a deliberate emphasis on secondarylevel vocational education. Union-Level Governing Structures

The constellation of institutional reference points for vocational education at the union level, to return to the main focus of this inquiry, was simple. Vocational education was by definition a variable dependent on demands from the economy and industry. In the socialist economy of the USSR these demands

38

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

were mediated by several governing actors. Legislative control over all branches of education was exercised by the CC CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. The Ministry of Education (Minpros) oversaw primary and general secondary education, while the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, under which, it will be recalled, the system of SSUZ/technicums fell, was responsible for higher learning. In June 1983 a Politburo commission to oversee the upcoming educational reform of 1984 was set up by lurii Andropov. The commission was chaired by Konstantin Chernenko; when the latter acceded to the general secretaryship, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed chairmanship. 72 Vocational education was supervised by the State Committee for VocationalTechnical Education (Gosprofobr). This was a full-fledged ministry, organizationally distinct from the other educational ministries. It was chaired by the General Secretary of the CPSU. 73 The progenitor in 1959 of the Committee was the Main Administration of Labour Reserves. At that time all of the schools under the Committee's jurisdiction were transferred to the (nominal) jurisdiction of the republican governments. 74 In 1966 it was made into a union-republican body and given a mandate to develop a single national policy in vocational education. It comprised nineteen sections, whose members included specialists in vocational education and directors of industrial ministries and departments. Its membership included over 200 methodologists and engineering-pedagogical workers. By 1969 a further 600 research personnel were working within more than twenty industrial ministries in order to answer a critical need for instructional programs in vocationally oriented economics, pedagogy, and psychology. 75 A number of institutions gathered data or did research on more narrowly labour-oriented problems. Some of these were: the Scientific Research Institute for Labour (NII Truda), the Institute of International Labour Movements (IMRD), the Institute for Sociological Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ISi), and the Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (ISEP). 76 The coordination of Jabour research had always been a problem in the USSR. Accordingly a Scientific Council for Problems in Vocational-Technical Education of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created in 1969; sections on pedagogy and psychology were added in 1977. 77 Notwithstanding all of these structures, each industrial ministry had its own career orientation programs. 78 The larger union republics also had their own parallel or subordinate research and governing structures. Traditionally the RSFSR Ministry of Education provided intellectual or program leadership for the other republics. 79 Over time, the Russian Soviet Federation's structures were transformed into all-union organs. Thus much the greatest concentration of institutions of higher learning - universities and institutes -

The Extensive Economic Model

39

was in Moscow (about 80) and Leningrad (50). Ukraine was the only nonRussian republic with significant academic potential, having about thirty institutions of higher learning. 80 This concentration also applied to higher pedagogical institutions, of which 200 of 390 were in Moscow as of the mid-1980s. 81 Thus it was the centre in Moscow that determined the curricula for all educational agencies, though these curricula were diffused through a complex and fragmented governing structure. Once worked out, curricula were distributed to Local Committees on Education for implementation at the local level. These committees were divided into four sections: vocational-technical, secondary, secondary specialized, and higher educational. 82 Aside from the government's top-level leadership, which seems to have been indirect under Brezhnev and sporadic during Gorbachev's tenure, 83 ongoing policy direction in vocational education was provided by a 'big three' group of central government bodies. The first of these was the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), which set the overall goals for the economy. The Ministry of Finance (Minfin) and the Ministry of Supply (Gossnab) can be conflated with the State Planning Committee; these had the task of finding financial and material resources for educational programs decided upon. The second major reference point for vocational education was the State Committee for Labour (Goskomtrud). This Committee acted as an order-taker from its industrial clients (ministries and enterprises) and also as a provider of labour for these bodies. The Planning and Labour committees had a close working relationship and shared policy leadership in vocational education. 84 However, the Planning Committee was formally the main player. 85 The third reference point was, of course, the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education. It was the junior of the three reference points, working closely with the other two in developing and implementing vocational programs. 86 In the summer of 1988 the three traditional educational ministries were united into one super-ministry called the State Committee for Public Education (Gosobrazovanie). Under its aegis the three line educational ministries continue to develop curricula and career orientation programs within the Russian educational system. Other Educational Actors

At the close of the 1980s there were nearly 5 million teachers of all types in the USSR. 87 Pedagogical training could be obtained in 60 universites and 200 pedagogical institutions of higher learning, in which 850,000 people were receiving instruction. In addition there were 400 pedagogical junior colleges (pedagogicheskie uchilishcha), which trained 420,000 registrees to teach at the primary level. The main source of teaching masters for PfUs were the industrial-

40

Historical Context and Actors in Soviet Education

pedagogical technicums, of which there were 70 at the beginning of the 1980s.88 The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (APS) was the highest scholarly pedagogical institution, being attached to the USSR Ministry of Education. 89 However, it was a small body, with spaces for only 160 members; half of the spaces, including that of the president, were unfilled in the latter 1980s.90 Many of its members do not appear to have had pedagogical or other professional qualifications giving them direct interest or competence in education. The APS's budget was small, at 12 million rubles annually, and its powers mainly recommendational.91 Reflecting its preoccupation with ideological orthodoxy, the Academy had three main programs at the close of the Brezhnev era: (1) to provide better instructional methods and technology, (2) to improve socialist upbringing (vospitanie) and ideological course content, and (3) to optimize the upbringing process within education.92 During the glasnost' era the Academy was criticized for being mostly an executive organ, not a scientific institution as such, 93 and especially for its failure to develop interesting and up-to-date textbooks on all subjects. In 1974 the system of instructional-production combines (IPCs) or uchebnoproizvodstvennye kombinaty was established within the general schools. 94 About two hours a week of shopwork within IPCs were obligatory for all seniors; 95 but in practice it seems that the combines were meant primarily for weaker students as a halfway house between the general schools and industrial enterprises. 96 The combines were intended to achieve economies of scale in vocational instruction. At the close of the 1980s there were about 3,000 of these at the district level in the country, each supported by several enterprises and taking in students from several general schools. IPCs were characterized by variability and informality in structure; they were financed mainly by enterprises or by the sale of their products and services to enterprises. The February 1988 CPSU plenum on education called for the further expansion of this system. 97 In closing, it may be pointed out that actually more industrial workers were trained in factories than in the formal vocational school system. 98 However, the factories offered only short programs of several weeks, either for breaking in new employees or for training workers to use newly installed equipment. 99 As such, the system of in-factory training is outside the present focus. Other actors in vocational education will be introduced later where pertinent. The main points to be gleaned from this chapter are the following: (1) The general school was continuously vocationalized over its entire history. (2) The PTU system, oriented towards traditional blue-collar industries, expanded · greatly from the 1960s onward. It retained its priority to the close of the 1980s. (3) The more service and higher technology-oriented SSUZ system increased

The Extensive Economic Model

41

since the 1960s in absolute tenns, but declined relative to that of the PTU. The internal SSUZ structure was detrimentally stable, while enrolments within this system declined in absolute numerical tenns between 1985 and 1988. (4) Enrolment in higher education was modest, while academic standards appear to have declined during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. Soviet education was well developed only to the secondary level. (5) The entire educational system was highly fragmented. The ground has been set for a deeper analysis of vocational policy of the 1980s.

4

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

The Central Government as Modernizer

The main goals of the 1984 reform of general and vocational secondary education were straightforward. They were to shift a portion of secondary school students away from the general 'academic' to the vocational stream; increase labour instruction in all secondary schools; increase the number and quality of vocational schools; and strengthen the integration of general and vocational schools with local sponsoring enterprises. Socialist upbringing and labour socialization within all categories of primary and secondary education were also to be improved. Here it is essential for a clear understanding of the 1984 school refonn to know who was behind it, for this issue, naturally, impinged upon the refonn's· ultimate fate. It is also useful to know how the people behind the reform viewed the policy requirements of the day, and to understand their motivations for change. Such a direction of inquiry is in keeping with the earlier observation that Soviet educational policy-making of the 1980s was idea-driven and fell within a rationalist paradigm. Unfortunately the question of the reform's backers can be answered only approximately - or negatively. It appears that the central government and heads of industrial ministries favoured reform, while neither enterprise directors nor the general public supported change. A Western authority points out that, aside from members of the Politburo, it is difficult to detennine precisely who were the motivators of the refonn.1 This question sets somewhat aback even CIS interviewees close to education. The reason for this is that there was a common belief among the governmental, industrial, and educational elites as a whole that changes were necessary. Thus, to one Moscow author of a doctoral dissertation on educational reform, it seemed that industrial ministries were the initiators. But the policy-initiation

46

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

process was amorphous; there were people both in industry and in government who wanted innovation.2 Aleksei Osipov, a twenty-five-year member of the steering panel of the USSR State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, testified that it was 'the public' (narod) that wanted reform. The public did so out of a general desire to see the economy and country progress. But Osipov probably understood 'the public' to mean the governmental and industrial elites within whose circles he had long worked, for he also said that the reform initiative in general came from the Communist Party leadership. It was officials from the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, and the Ministry of Education (prosveshchenie, or enlightenment) who actually worked out the concrete proposals of the 1984 reform. 3 Yet another vocational education official asserted that the reform was required by 'life'; no one concrete was behind the reform, though the government (Politburo and ministerial heads) was the main interest. The government, however, took a very ideological approach to the issues of school reform, seeing these issues through the prism of old dogmas. 4 The genesis of the 1984 reform can be traced back to a series of correctives all through the 1960s and 1970s to Khrushchev's earlier educational policies. But the more direct foundation was laid by Leonid Brezhnev at the 25th Party Congress in 1976, when he cited labour problems as a major domestic policy concern.5 His admonitions resulted in legislative 'Measures to improve further the training and raising of workers' qualifications in production' in 1979.6 This legislation was followed by Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Party Congress in 1981, in which he again called for much better labour use and conservation. During the upcoming five-year plan, 90 per cent of the increase in national income was to result from greater labour productivity in industry, and only 10 per cent from a larger working population. 7 Revealing an interventionist bent, Brezhnev called for the closer linking of economic and social policy. Mechanisms that would calibrate the provision of housing and other social benefits more directly to job performance were to be set in place.8 Upon his accession to the general secretaryship, lurii Andropov also proclaimed inadequate labour productivity as the major problem of the economy, a point on which there was consensus within the upper governmental ranks. 9 Here the Soviet leadership's ideological frame of reference (a topic for Chapter 6) was very important to the shape of educational reform. It may be noted that the early 1980s were a time of sharpened Cold War tensions; and with the accession of the former KGB head, Andropov, to the Party leadership there was a noticeable chill in the Soviet climate of public discourse. In a broadly publicized speech, delivered at the same time that his administration introduced the topic of educational reform, Andropov assigned top priority to ideological

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

47

work. Political-ideological issues, and those of the upbringing and education of Party cadres, had precedence even over economic and organizational matters. 10 In an alarmist tone Andropov stated that 'the future of mankind' depended to a large degree on the outcome of the ideological struggle between the socialist and bourgeois camps. Of cardinal importance for this struggle was an increase in Soviet labour productivity, along with a consistent scientific and technological policy. It was time to reform the general and vocational schools. Less than a year later, Konstantin Chernenko, by then the new General Secretary, in turn advised a plenary session of the Central Committee of the need for the 'class tempering' of youth, and of the importance of the educational system as a whole for the country's defence capability. 11 In sum, the 1984 educational reform had something of a Cold War air about it. At any rate, it was born in an atmosphere not conducive to a more balanced policy discussion and fell into the common Soviet practice of policy-making by 'campaign' rather than by program. Regarding the genealogy of educational reform, it is important to note that there were no sharp ideological or implementational disjunctures in educational policy from the time of Brezhnev to the close of the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev did not innovate in the area of ideology, while Brezhnev did undertake some experiments in economic administration. It was the Brezhnev-era leadership that recognized deficiencies in economic management and labour force training. The slogans of economic 'acceleration,' 'intensification,' and 'reconstruction' (perestroika) can be traced in Brezhnev's rhetoric at least as far back as 1981 .12 The continuity of old policies and the gradual introduction of new measures is corroborated by the overlapping tenures of several Politburo members who can be identified with educational reform during the 1980s. With Brezhnev's passing it was the more energetic Andropov who initiated educational change. A draft of reform guidelines was produced by January 1984. After widespread '_public discussions,' in which 120 million people attending 1.3 million meetings were said to have participated, a slightly revised text was ratified by the Central Committee in April 1984. In order to oversee this massive mobilizational effort, the disciplinarian Andropov named Brezhnev's close associate and new secretary of ideology, Chernenko, to head a special Politburo Commission for the Reform of the General and Vocational School. When Chernenko advanced to the post of General Secretary, his place as head of this commission was taken by Gorbachev - who prior to this was a member of the commission. When Gorbachev became party leader his own secretary for ideology, Egor Ligachev, became the top Party adviser on educational reform. 13 Though much was made in some Western quarters of the rivalry and policy differences between Gorbachev and Ligachev as the 1980s wore on, this

48

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

viewpoint was overblown. There were no differences of principle between Gorbachev's and Ligachev's educational policy pronouncements.14 The final (full) Politburo member who took a major interest in educational matters was Gaidar Aliev, who, however, said little on ideology. Sharing the vocational orientation of his colleagues, he was an advocate of a larger general education component within vocational instruction. 15 Educational reform not only had common Politburo backers, but also sprang from the ideological institutions of government. This is evident from the formal governing structure, for there were two departments of the Party's Central Committee apparatus that supervised different aspects of education and upbringing: the Department for Science and Educational Institutions, and the Department for Propaganda. 16 The three ministries of education also had inhouse ideological departments. But while educational policy derived from the ideological institutions of government, it also showed the rationalist or managerial perspective of the Soviet leaders themselves. Aside from ideological goals, the leadership sought economic modernization. If economic growth was to occur, workers would have to be made to go where government officials directed them. Noting that the CC CPSU assigned a prominent place in its activity to control socio-economic processes in the country, V.P. Eliutin, the USSR minister of higher and secondary specialized education, also stated that 'the new demands on the teaching and upbringing of specialists at the secondary level essentially consist of orienting education toward vocational activity under the conditions of production that develop dynamically under the influence of scientific and technical progress.' 17 Thus educational policy depended on the variable of economic needs as perceived by the governing political elite. The Andropov entourage wanted the earliest possible, and permanent, career choice of the Soviet pupil; this pupil was to make his or her choice by the age of fourteen or fifteen .18 For his part Chernenko later pointed out that 'the more we reduce the distance between the school and the production sector, the greater the yield will be from the reform.' 19 The problem here, in Chernenko's view, was that 'immature' youths did not wish to work where they were the most useful to 'the community.' 20 And forgetting that people's labour made up the state budget, an important author on education thought it justifiable that the economy's and society's needs should come before those of the individual, since it was the state that paid for education. 21 Consequently not only the vocational but also the general school was given the official task of providing training for mass occupations. Indeed, the main reason the general school was not even more extensively vocationalized than it ultimately was - that is, made to provide training for specific professions as well as mass ones - was that it lacked the technical means for this. 22

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

49

Political leaders in the Soviet Union had entrenched views about which branches of the economy and labour force should be developed on behalf of 'the community.' These were the traditional branches of heavy industry, metallurgy and machine-building, energy, and agriculture. The leadership gradually recognized that more attention should also be paid to light industry, especially for food production. 23 Such a developmental strategy was logical in a country not able to feed itself and needing to improve infrastructure and to find new sources of energy. However, in the preoccupation with finding new sources of raw materials and labour for essential industries, the Politburo and Central Committee lost sight of the need for technological change led by higher education. The State Planning Committee as Policy Developer

The government's right-hand organization for working out economic policy was, of course, the State Planning Committee - the legal superior of about one hundred industrial departments and ministries. 24 It was the senior partner of the State Committee for Labour, the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, and the other educational ministries. The State Planning Committee decided on investment and branch production growth, while estimates of labour resources were done by the State Committee for Labour and its local organs. 25 The republican Planning Committees were subordinated to the all-union planning structure and do not seem to have had any significant powers of their own. 26 Planning officials were well aware of the deteriorating demographic situation. Labour was no longer cheap and abundant, and its rapid turnover of between 20 and 30 per cent annually created large problems in conditions of a command economy. For their part, PTUs had always had the vexing problem of attracting enough students. 27 Accordingly a noted demographer, V.I. Perevedentsev, had long argued for linking school reforms and pronatalist measures to manpower needs. 28 But this approach still emphasized the quantity of labour instead of its efficient use, and by the late 1970s little more could be expected from such a policy. Further growth in national income would have to occur through improved labour education and productivity.29 The State Planning Committee thus proceeded with a two-track policy. On the one hand, it still sought to find new labour reserves, and to shift students from general education to vocational programs in order to improve their labour preparation. On the other hand, it sought the better allocation and use of this trained labour. Regarding the first of these policy directions, PTUs were supposed soon to increase the number of 'qualified workers' (those having a trade certificate)

50

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

within the category of all blue-collar workers from a current 69 per cent to an ambitious 90 per cent. 30 As for the issue of misallocation, this was a huge planning and administrative muddle. The principle of planning from the achieved level had caused growing distortions. Labour-short enterprises received only small proportional increases of new personnel; conversely, those enterprises already well supplied with labour were assigned even more by the State Planning Committee. There were two additional, concurrent tendencies within the allocation of working personnel: overqualification and underqualification for functions discharged. 31 Consequently in the RSFSR 50 per cent of engineers' places in industry and construction were taken by SSUZ graduates. On the other hand, 18 per cent of blue-collar workers' places were also taken by these same graduates, even though these jobs did not require secondary specialized education. 32 In the USSR as a whole there were five engineers to one technician, precisely the opposite of the proportion desired. 33 By the close of the 1980s, 4 million specialists (out of 37 million) were working in jobs not requiring specialist training; this figure included 1 million people with higher education who performed workers' jobs.34 These growing distortions in cadre allocation were not merely the result of low coordinative capacity, but were inherent to the planning process itself. Enterprises either submitted inflated demands for labour, or else failed to submit estimates at all. Industrial ministries did not receive data on future graduates coming from the schools, while local organs had no information on cadre requirements since the ministries did not supply it. 35 Furthermore, interregional labour balances were not considered at the preliminary stage of planning, but were only a subsidiary instrument used after the demand for labour had already been estimated by the enterprises and ministries. 36 This often resulted in lastminute scrambles to attract labour from other provinces. The outcome lost all semblance of rationality, for regional governments did all they could to retain labour within their own jurisdictions. The result was one in which all institutional actors, especially enterprises, had a short-run and selfish mentality. 37 As far as educational economics went the problem was even more elemental. As the USSR minister for higher and secondary specialized education admitted, the State Planning Committee had no criteria for measuring the economic gains from education. 38 Lack of criteria for the economics of education was, in turn, only a part of a broader phenomenon: the 'intellectual problem' of determining which branches of industry should be given priority within a context where market indicators were absent. Though the 26th Party Congress had recorded the need for new technologies and the need to integrate science with production, the place of science in leading economic growth was not discussed. Instead, industrial policy

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

51

was set on an incremental basis, in which the emphasis was on improving already existing technologies and the partial modernization of machinery. 39 The 'winners' in this industrial-policy-by-default were the working class as a whole - which had increased to two-thirds of the employed population - and heavy industry, hydrocarbon energy, metals, and transport. 40 This list was supplemented by agro-industries necessary for the Food Program, ratified as a key part of the CPSU's economic strategy in 1982. 41 As the country's economic problems continued to increase, the list was shortened to the absolutely most essential industries. These were the industries servicing the energy sector and food production.42 The State Planning Committee seems to have been rather passive, vis-a-vis the government, in working out the strategic directions for the country. Probably sharing the Politburo's and Central Committee's view on the 'objective need' for the traditional machine-building sector as a prerequisite part of the development of all other sectors, the vice-chairman of a State Planning Committee division testified that the Planning Committee set out its priorities for the economy with deference to the CPSU and Party Congresses. Experience had shown that the country had always made the right choices in socio-economic policy, for public (that is, Party) discussion at the early stages of plan formulation ensured the correctness and feasibility of the resulting plans' directions. The vice-chairman did, however, notice a tendency towards inertia. This called for special planning and administrative measures (governmental pressure) in order to ensure that new technologies were incorporated into industry.43 In this connection the emphasis on the metallurgical sector accorded with the existing industrial profile of the country. But, as noted in Chapter 2, this sector was overdeveloped relative to others and tended to absorb ever more resources. The later (mostly rhetorical) emphasis on electronics and information processing derived, one suspects, from a copying of the West. It is odd that no serious study of industrial strategy seems ever to have been done in the USSR. At any rate there were no references to cost-benefit studies within the broad categories of industry, or within education, in the Soviet literature reviewed for this monograph. Soviet directions in industrial development therefore appear to have been products of tradition, immediate need, and inertia. Concerning labour planning, a 1984 State Planning Committee conference noted that the Committee was currently developing a new methodology for determining the labour content within production (thereby admitting that the previous method had been invalid). The conference also admitted, in effect, that the centre was overloaded. Planning, to be made more effective, needed to be opened up to broader (institutional) participation. The conference further revealed that most of the increase in economic productivity resulted not from

52

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

better labour productivity and organization, but from technological progress. Nonetheless, the main role in economic progress was played by the human factor.44 In other words, organizational means to raise labour productivity had not worked or had been exhausted; it would be necessary to increase the level of the workforce's training.

The State Labour/Vocational-Technical Education Bureaucracy: Servant of Industry Whereas the planning and evaluation mechanisms of the State Planning Committee were chaotic, the issues of labour allocation and use had been much more thoroughly examined by the State Committee for Labour. Labour allocation was amenable to straightforward quantitative analysis. Thus at the initiative of the USSR Council of Ministers, the State Committee for Labour, and the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, massive employment studies were completed in 1979. In just one series of studies the placement of nearly 60,000 PTU graduates at 4,500 union enterprises and organizations was analysed, while the same was done of 194,000 trainees within the Russian vocational education system. In expressing pro forma satisfaction with the qualifications of vocational graduates and with their employment conditions, these studies noted the high turnover of trainees. Forty per cent of the trainees who had graduated between 1977 and 1979 had already left their first postings. (Of these in turn, one-quarter had left because of call-up for military service - from which trainees rarely returned to their original jobs. )45 Vocational graduates were often placed in jobs for which they had not been trained, or in jobs with very old equipment. The studies further found that PTU education was mainly the preserve of students from rural areas, though not necessarily from farm families. The first and sharpest need of this rural contingent upon its migration to the cities, where it made up 46 per cent of all vocational and secondary instructional school students, was housing. Problems with housing and dissatisfaction with working conditions were the main causes of employee turnover. Nonetheless, enterprises and industrial ministries were often not interested in trainees' social adaptation. The government attempted to compel better care of new employees by enterprises with legislation in 1980. At the same time there were calls for the better communist upbringing of youth and the harnessing of the mass media to the task of raising the prestige of working occupations. 46 But such ideological pressure was pointless, since it did not address what were really structural problems. Instead, it was the Plan that determined the interests of enterprises and vocational schools. Enterprise directors were always more interested in labour nee-

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

53

essary for plan fulfilment than in education for technological change. 47 These directors usually had to be cajoled into supporting vocational schools. There was throughout the economy a strong impulse to keep producing the same old produ.cts, while for its part the State Planning Committee was only sporadically interested in innovation. 48 In sum, the impulse for educational reform came not from industry, or even from the State Planning Committee, but from a modernizing political leadership. This narrow base for reform would later be one of the causes of the reform 's failure. But though factory managers were not usually interested in innovation, they nonetheless could not ignore the demographic transformation of their workforces as easily as could planners or politicians. They, and the PTU system, were the first to feel the requirement for more and better vocational labour. 49 Therefore, factory managers 'played the numbers game.' As an insurance measure for plan fulfilment they submitted inflated estimates of their vocational graduate requirements. Contrary to the State Planning Committee's desire for rational labour allocation, graduates with specialized or higher education were not infrequently stockpiled in manual jobs or in jobs not related to their specialist training.so This was easy to do because enterprises did not have to pay for vocational graduates and did not suffer penalties for the occupational misallocation of vocational or special school graduates. There was no central statistical accounting of trainee placement.s 1 Enterprise managers felt a shortage of labour not only because of this labour's misallocation and poor organization of the work routine, but also because the low qualifications of personnel combined with rapid capital investment required a larger number of workers. In the ministries for agricultural machine-building and automobile production, for example, the number of workplaces resulting from new investment increased by 6 to 7 per cent yearly, while the labour force grew by only 1.5 per cent.s 2 As noted in Chapter 2, there was only a very slow termination of old workplaces, resulting in the paradox that the number of manual jobs in the economy increased with greater capital investment. This caused a growing disconsonance between the skill levels of employees and the actual work they performed.s3 In the instrument-making industry, for example, almost a third of employees discharged only the simplest of functions. But here a forward-looking industrial official observed that the technical complexity of new jobs was nonetheless increasing more rapidly than workers' qualifications.s4 Overall, at the dawn of the 1980s almost 33 per cent of work in industry still consisted of physical labour, as did 42 per cent in construction,ss and two-thirds in agriculture.s6 Because of the diversion of trained personnel into manual jobs and the inefficient use of labour, one-quarter to one-third of factory capacity in Russia was

54

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

not utilized, while in the USSR as a whole 45 per cent of the spaces in the machine-building ministries were unfilled. 57 In view of such a picture, industrialists simultaneously supported two different orientations. On the one hand, they agreed with the State Planning Committee's strategy of increasing the global supply of vocationally trained labour;58 on the other hand, they perceived that a large labour reserve could be freed through the reduction of manual labour and through the raising of the qualifications of this labour. 59 But this second aspect would have required a solution (never found) to the structural tendency for labour use to increase with capital investment. Still, all industrialists could agree that the PfU system should be enlarged. This eventually became governmental policy. Throughout all this it should be noted that there were no initiatives for labour-saving from the regions. 60 Labour-saving was, again, the centre's idea. The muddle in labour allocation and use pointed out the need for a single plan for cadre training and a single agency to coordinate all aspects of labour training. The political leadership foresaw that the State Committee for Labour through its 'in-house' educational ministry, the State Committee for VocationalTechnical Education - would rationalize the system of attracting youth into the economy. Responsibility for career orientation was gradually shifted from the Ministry of Education to the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education,61 until the latter was itself subsumed under the new educational superministry, the State Committee for Public Education (Gosobrazovanie), in 1988. However, vocational education and career orientation answered not only to the government's key ministries, the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for LabourNocational-Technical Education, but also to a series of lesser bureaucracies. J .L. Black has noted that towering over the school was a five-storey administrative pyramid: the municipal, city, and provincial departments of public education, the pertinent republican ministry of education, and the USSR ministry (ministries) of education. The 1984 reform did not disturb this many-stage administrative structure under which schools were subject to these five masters. 62 The communication of industry's requirements to the vocational education system was intended to be mediated by the bureaucracy of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education. This Committee was to coordinate the personnel placement activity of industrial ministries, and to control the content and quality of instruction in vocational schools and factories. 63 The political leadership and state ministry elites hoped that such central direction would achieve an optimal balance between the labour needs of territories and industrial branches. But almost all republican Committees for Vocational-Technical Education had established their own interdepartmental councils for vocational education,

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

55

while each province also had a standing committee for the career development and direction of youth. 64 In the end the all-union Committee for Vocational-Technical Education was unable to govern the content of over one thousand professions across the five levels of bureaucracy noted above. Being overloaded, the central VocationalTechnical Committee had to share instructional development and career orientation programs with republican instructional-methodological working groups, local governments, and the 'better forces' within the vocational schools themselves. 65 Still, the several bureaucratic layers did not leave much room for initiative from teachers, parents, and students.

Teachers and Family as Objects of Administrative Manipulation The implementation of any rationalist, government-led educational policy must eventually penetrate to the lowest level of the state/society hierarchy - teachers, and the family and its members. Later chapters will show how the weight of government and bureaucracy set about implementing educational policy. The purpose of this section is only to portray the family (parents and students) as the object of manipulation by superior bodies. In 1984 the public was indifferent to educational reform, but the public itself was seen by governmental functionaries as a resource to be managed. In a clear example of the managerial elite's thinking, M.A. Prokofiev, the USSR minister of education, noted in 1980 that the school was a state institution (gosudarstvennoe uchrezhdenie), which was responsible for the preparation of youths for labour and for orienting them towards pertinent branches of the economy and culture. 66 Furthermore, instructional programs within these schools were considered to be state documents, which had to be implemented. Similarly, even to the close of the 1980s, the more liberally inclined new minister of public education declared that the teacher should not forget that he or she was a state official, whose primary responsibility was to execute the Ministries' of Education instructional programs.67 Prokofiev wished to harmonize students' and families' wishes with the needs of the economy, and noted with satisfaction that the school's (or state's) role in upbringing had increased greatly in recent years. The school had changed from being merely a teaching to a teachingupbringing institution. 68 Not mincing words, Prokofiev announced that 'before the Soviet system of public education there always stood and still stands a double task: the provision of community production with ever more qualified labour power, and simultaneously the upbringing of a [well] developed personality, [one that is] self-reliant, active, and responsible for all the tasks of socialist construction. ' 69

56

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

Likewise, the Uchite/'skaia gazeta (Teachers' Gazette) reminded its readers that the Soviet Constitution enjoined parents to take proper care of their children and to prepare them for socially useful labour. 70 In the unity of home and school, the school was superior. Accordingly the pedagogical press was replete throughout the 1980s with calls for the family to help the school in eliminating the 'immaturity' or 'infantilism' of youth - by which was meant that parents should direct their children towards vocational education rather than to higher. 71 Similarly, the elite's much-vaunted concern for 'culture' was also baldly instrumental; for to the extent that culture influenced the economy, it was necessary to improve culture. 72 There was, further, the idealization of family 'labour dynasties'; this in tum was bound up with the Brezhnev generation's nostalgia for the PfU. 73 To members of this generation, themselves not far removed from the working class, and brought up on the revolutionary idealization of this class, the PfU had represented real professional attainment. A Moscow-city conference of vocational education workers, enterprise directors, and Party and trade union officials therefore both described and prescribed a situation where the proportional weight of the working class within society was continuously increasing.74 But problems in the blue-collarization of society remained. One difficulty was that the family did not properly 'understand' the PfU, and that student peer groups continued to influence individual students' career choices inordinately. 75 Many efforts were made to cajole or co-opt parents into directing pupils to vocational schools. For example, parents were obliged to attend monthly (!) parent-teacher meetings, in which they were browbeaten and often publicly criticized for the shortcomings of their children. 76 In this regard official policy towards the family could be benign, motivated by a desire to strengthen the family unit in the face of common social problems such as divorce, alcoholism, or poverty. But the state could also be very intrusive. Teaching collectives were encouraged to track the progress not only of their students, but also to draw up sociological profiles ('social passports') of the students' parents as well.77 The manipulative side of Soviet education could be seen in yet another related practice - that of keeping a dossier, or kharakteristika, on each student, as he or she advanced through various levels of education. This dossier was the school's basic control document. It contained not only pedagogical information, but also remarked on the student's community or political activism, membership and participation in approved student organizations, or 'voluntary' community work or seasonal work at enterprises and collective farms.78 This was an analogue of the labour book (trudovaia kniga) retained by all employers for their employees, and without which individuals could not obtain new employment.

The Interests behind the 1984 School Reform

57

It was rarely acknowledged in the early 1980s that there could be intrinsic reasons for the low prestige of PfUs. Only in the Gorbachev era was it admitted that the PfU system had been given a virtual monopoly over other forms of secondary education. In a frank appraisal A.P. Dumachev, chairman of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, said that it had been the policy to 'force through' the PfU system virtually all secondary students not destined for higher or specialized education. This had been done without regard for proper training facilities and materials, or availability of suitably trained teachers. Since PfUs were evaluated according to the numbers of graduates they produced, regardless of the graduates' quality, there had been a 'race for big numbers.' Reports were widely falsified to this end. 79 It was also later acknowledged that trainees often had good reason to be dissatisfied with their poor training, low pay, and frequent placement into jobs to which they had not aspired. In short, the PfU system had done much to discredit itself. 80 It was against this background that the unprecedentedly broad 'public discussions' of the 1984 educational draft reform occurred. But as noted earlier, a revised draft was officially accepted only four months after the first version had been introduced. Such a short time could not have allowed for a serious discussion of the large number of public submissions put forward. Indeed, the revised text hardly differed from the first. Clearly the public discussions were mobilizational in character, intended to overcome both bureaucratic and societal indifference.81 Educational reforms of the decade were therefore named by one Soviet author as 'revolution from above. ' 82 In this latter connection, an issue that probably deserves a fuller treatment than will be given here is that of public demand for education and science. On the basis of several public opinion studies, some reform proponents claimed in the early 1980s that up to 95 per cent of the public agreed with the fundamental idea of linking study to socially useful labour and to vocational training for young people. 83 However, results were much different when the question moved from abstract wishes to the sphere of personal interests, for only about 14 per cent of both students and parents approved of attendance at vocational schools for themselves or for their family members. 84 The suppressed public desire for higher and specialized education would become apparent at the close of the decade, when quotas for PfUs were removed. In 1988 there was a surge of 'hundreds of thousands' of students away from the vocational stream into general schools and SSUZs. 85 Overall the picture was one in which parents or students had a high desire for personal advancement, but were unconcerned about the place of education within the country as a whole. It should be noted that the thrust of educational policy had long been to 'cool out' students' ambition for VUZ education86

58

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

rather than to encourage greater entrance into, and demands on, higher schools. Instead, educational officials simply assumed that the public would be mobilized, as needed, around the goals they had decided upon and that the state would extract the resources necessary. As the decade continued, some, more perceptive, educational officials began to call for greater educational spending. But the public, never having been treated as a policy partner, was indifferent to education's needs. Accordingly preparations for a union-wide strike in 1992 by teachers, who attempted to draw attention to underfunding of education, were called off owing to lack of public support. 87 The public was likely satisfied with the standard assertions that the Soviet population was one of the most educated in the world, and that educational matters were generally well in hand. 88 Sharing the view of Jan Sadlak, 89 the vice-chainnan of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences lamented that there was no social demand for science, and added only somewhat hyperbolically that virtually all industrial goods currently produced by the USSR were first developed over fifty years ago. 90 In a similar vein an economist portrayed the working class as lazy and conservative, as a class for which real professionalism was not in its interests. Echoing a critique of the Soviet working class by Peter Hauslohner, this economist opined that workers actively feared professionalization, for this would require qualificational upgrading and much better work perfonnance. 91 The traveller to the former Soviet Union may share these views of the region as a low-technology, blue-collar one, with a much-outdated civilian economy. The criticism of the low professionalism and motivation of the working class was probably accurate, but misplaced. The working class was simply made into the image prescribed for it by its leaders in labour and educational policy. Thus in one example of rare plan successes, the 1981 quota for qualified workers was fulfilled by 103.2 per cent, and for PfU entrants by 102.1 per cent. 92 But this was the 'success' of a policy elite in the service of an outdated vocational paradigm, and in the face of an unenthusiastic public.

5

The Design and Substance of the 1984 School Reform

Design Conceptions

After the extensive contour map of Soviet labour and educational policymaking provided earlier, it is now time to begin focusing on narrower issues of educational policy development, and in still later chapters, on implementation. Accordingly this chapter seeks to answer three questions: What were the conceptual motifs behind the 1984 reform, and were they coherent? How were these motifs reflected in legislation? What were the ultimate goals of the new changes? In other words, what was the design and substance of the refonn? A preliminary answer to these questions can already be given: the most essential points of the refonn were intended to increase the number of secondary school students within the vocational stream, and to bring both the vocational and general schools nearer to the factory. Since the 1984 reform set educational policy direction to the close of the decade, its design and substance deserve to be illustrated with some care. As was shown in the previous chapter, the 1984 measures had a cohesive, but shallow, set of sponsors. The impulse for change came from the Politburo and Central Committee, from the ideological institutions of government generally, and from the heads of industrial ministries. The consensus for change also extended to the heads of the State Planning and Labour Committees, and to the educational ministry elites. Lower down the hierarchical structure, those multiple institutions charged with actual policy implementation were mostly uninvolved. The elite-level policy-makers noted above sensed in the late 1970s and 1980s that the Soviet Union should move more closely towards the world market, and that technological change required new approaches to economic management and manufacture. This view prevailed, to be sure, within the traditional para-

60

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

digm for industry and education outlined in earlier chapters. But there was only superficial consensus regarding the practical questions of adjustment to the requirements of the new age. The conceptions behind the reform were never systematized within one coherent and well-grounded literary work or within one body of pedagogical literature. Like any normal body of professionals, teachers and lower functionaries argued, if circumspectly, for a wide range of propositions. Thus, below the elite level, there was never agreement over narrower questions of pedagogical content or implementation of educational policy. The main questions concerned the types of personnel that would be required for the future, what the content of their education should be, and what forms labour mobility should take. All these impinged, perforce, on issues of social justice and reward, though this latter category of issues was never placed on any explicit agenda. The conceptual complexity of policy design is sketched out by the following - abbreviated and simplified - list of policy choices, each of which could be combined with others in a large number of ways.

I • • • •

Questions of Personnel Quantity vs. quality of graduates to be produced Labour (PfU) vs. technical (SSUZ) training Flexible vs. static technologies characteristic of the future Discipline vs. incentive regarding labour performance

2 • • • •

Questions of Content Broad vs. narrow education Natural science vs. social science emphasis Traditional vs. new subjects Knowledge vs. socialization as main purpose of education

3 • • • •

Questions of Mobility Early vs. later career choice Horizontal mobility vs. workplace affixation Vertical mobility vs. workplace affixation Rural vs. urban labour supply

4 • • •

Implications for Social Justice Efficiency vs. social justice Equalization vs. differentiation (streaming) Reward for activism vs. professionalism In the end, the outcome from this 'menu' was simpler than the range of possi-

The Design and Substance of the 1984 School Reform

61

ble choices would suggest at first glance; for the Brezhnevite industrial inheritance and the ideological emphasis of Andropov/Chernenko shortened the list of plausible alternatives considerably. The conceptions and choices in policy design noted above can be briefly explained as follows:

Questions of Personnel The first issue in labour resource management was that of quantity versus quality of trained vocational graduates. Though there were numerous calls for raising the quality of vocational instruction at all levels, these were only pro forma. The most striking feature of the reform was its intention to double the number of fifteen-year-olds entering PfUs as opposed to general secondary education. The shares of youths entering general schools, at 60 per cent, and PfUs, at 30 per cent, were to be reversed. In addition to a qualitative and quantitative upgrading of the vocational schools, 'vocationalization' of the general school represented the real innovation of the reform concept. Accordingly a major goal of the reform was to have the general school become more deeply involved in vocational training, and to have its graduates receive a vocational qualification alongside their school certificates. 1 The core of educational strategy was 'vocational training for all,' having the aim of providing all young people with a skill before they entered employment. 2 Thus whatever may have been said about the need to raise the quality of vocational instruction, the thrust of the reform was to increase the quantity of vocationally trained manpower. The vocationalization of general secondary education was held to be the natural outcome of a historical evolutionary process, for inasmuch as a complete general secondary education had become universal by the close of the 1970s, the next stage of development was to vocationalize the general school. Soviet labour and educational theory also discovered the 'human factor' by the early 1980s. A conference of vocational educators and factory directors noted that the weight of the working class within society was increasing. 3 Considering this fact and the growing importance of the human factor, it was natural to assume that the main engine of the economy's growth would be both a quantitative and qualitative increase in the PfU system. 4 One may note that there was no conceptual contradiction between quantity and quality; but the rapid increase in the number of vocational schools during the 1980s strained the PfU system's ability to offer quality instruction. The second question of personnel was that of emphasis on vocational as opposed to technical training. Here the emphasis on expanding the PfU system displaced the earlier concern of some economists for SSUZs. Thus the SSUZ system was not a subject of the 1984 reform proposals, even though these pro-

62

Educational Policy from 1981 to 1984

posals formally grouped schools into general secondary, vocational-technical, and secondary specialized categories.5 It was not until November 1984, after the educational reform had already been drafted and ratified, that a State Planning Committee conference addressed the question of emphasis on the vocational school versus the technicum. A third personnel issue that needed to be decided was the future place of flexible as against stable technologies. 6 This question was important, for if the trend was towards flexible technologies, characterized by short production runs but high intellectual value-added, this would speak of the need for a stronger base of general and theoretical education, a longer education, and a delay in the prospective employee's career choice. Conversely, if the economy was to be characterized mainly by stable-technology or assembly-line production, students would be encouraged to make earlier career choices and could be trained for narrower functions. They would also be more amenable to discipline in such a setting. Thus it was crucial to find an optimal balance between general versus vocational training, and between general and specialized technologies. But these rarefied academic debates were decided more prosaically by Andropov and Chernenko, and by the tendency for the PfU to displace the SSUZ from the policy agenda. High Planning Committee and other officials advocated Taylorist methods of production; that is, administrative organization and control of the work process, and the disciplining of the workforce. Such 'scientific' views coincided nicely with the predilections of the governmental and ministerial elite, which saw large potential economies in stronger labour discipline. Labour violations were to be treated as violations of the Constitution. These views also coincided with Andropov's preference for workers who were not only technically well qualified, but also 'active builder[s] of communism.' 7 In sum, as far as personnel requirements could be predicted, or could be moulded by the state's coercive apparatus, the government's preference was for the following choices in personnel policy: to train for labour (PfU) instead of for technology (SSUZ); to emphasize the expansion of the PfU system rather than its quality; and to rely on administrative regulation and discipline over incentives or the self-direction of employees. Although much was said by economists about the need to train personnel for flexible and increasingly complex technologies of the future, the worker trained according to the criteria given above would actually be more suited for stable conditions of employment in material production. Questions of Content Closely related to prognostications of personnel requirements were, of course, questions of instructional content. The first issue that emerged was whether

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education of the future should be narrow or broad. A large number of educators, especially contributors to the more forward-looking Teachers' Gazette, began to argue in the early to mid-1980s for a broader general education. A broad education, they believed, was necessary for the individual's better social adaptation and for the student's later choice of professional specialization. This category of advocates also believed that rapid technological change required a common standard of education for all. 8 These points of view found a supporter in the minister of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education; for inasmuch as the tendency in the economy was towards brigade labour (a panacea of the early 1980s), the emphasis should be on training workers with wide profiles who would be able to work well in complex groups. On this view there was a place for greater theoretical education and 'an objective need to develop the workforce through developing the individual personality.' 9 In the event, however, a different view won out. While most policy-makers agreed that a broader general education was desirable, these policy-makers wished to subordinate the general school to the vocational. 'Life' had shown that the most effective form of general education was that which had been acquired in combination with PTU training. 10 Accordingly a compromise emerged, namely the old idea of 'polytechnical' education. Polytechnization would allow the linking of the general and vocational school. Polytechnization would seemingly enable the easy transferability of the worker of the future, and allow for future professional growth. Polytechnization was, however, a slippery concept. It was held to be consistent with the timehonoured Marxist-Leninist principle that instruction should be combined with labour. It was thus an 'integral component of communist education,' and was identified both with general knowledge and practical skills. 11 Both generalists and vocationalizers could see something desirable in the concept. The ambiguity in the definition of polytechnical education, and still more in its actual implementation, would also allow policy-makers to avoid conclusively deciding the difficult issue of emphasis on general versus vocational education. Here it should be pointed out, however, that if to some educators the concept of polytechnization was a cover for a greater general education component, the political leadership more unambiguously understood polytechnization as paving the way for greater vocational and labour content in all school instruction. 12 Still if there was a decision (or non-decision) in favour of polytechnical education, this did not resolve the question of its content. Here the choices involved old versus new subjects, natural versus social sciences, and, not least, the question of teaching for knowledge as opposed to socialization. The answer to these questions would indicate whether 'polytechnical' education really would be, in the end, what it was named.

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Regarding instructional content, S. Batyshev, the USSR secretary of the pedagogical and psychological department for vocational-technical education of the Soviet Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, argued that the overemphasis on the natural sciences had harmed the learning and social adjustment of youths. 13 Similarly, an all-union scientific-practical conference of educators recommended an improvement in the teaching of social disciplines, as the core of all ideological work of technical schools. 14 In other words, policy-makers believed that the teaching of social sciences should be increased; but these sciences would be understood as the classics of Marxism-Leninism and other community-political subjects that would benefit the moral upbringing of youth. These policy-makers perceived a greater need for such social sciences as aesthetics, Soviet law, and socializational methodology. Meanwhile the chairman of the Belorussian Committee for VocationalTechnical Education complained that social science teachers often avoided 'sharp issues' and did not properly link Marxist-Leninist theory with the political and socio-economic problems of the day. These teachers also used instructional methods that were too removed from the life of vocational schools and base enterprises. Nonetheless, as the USSR minister of education noted, a key element of the educational reform was the labour socialization of pupils. 15 All this accorded with Andropov's admonition that the Soviet worker should not be just a hollow carrier of a certain amount of technical knowledge, but that qualitative (that is, moral/ideological) indicators as well as quantitative ones should be used in evaluating labour. 16 The content of education was a point of universal criticism throughout the entire decade (first for not being sufficiently orthodox, and later for being too ideologically hidebound). Though on the rhetorical level there appeared to be a shift towards polytechnicism and better quality of labour preparation, none of the controversies over content were ever resolved. There was a fundamental contradiction between educating for concrete technical knowledge as opposed to civic functions. The elite's preference was for the second. But to the extent that the emphasis on socialization drew teachers' and students' time, and the country's resources, away from real knowledge, this lowered trainees' capacity for labour. This perhaps highly socialized but undertrained labour would be more poorly placed to meet the needs of advanced and non-standardized technologies of the future. Overall, the debate over content could be said to have resulted in 'polytechnicism plus ideology.' Questions of Mobility

Most policy-makers believed that a worker of broader background would be

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needed for the future. A minority also argued not only for greater professional or social mobility, but for greater interregional mobility as well. However, these arguments usually pertained to mobility of a specific sort. More labour was needed for a one-time shift to the Far East (a low-technology, natural resourceproducing area), and out of overpopulated Central Asia.17 But horizontal and ongoing mobility of qualified labour within the developed regions of the European USSR ran against the interests both of industrial ministries and enterprises, which feared the erosion of their labour forces, and against the interests of regional governments, which always tried to retain labour locally. Rhetoric aside, also the union government desired less horizontal mobility, that is, labour turnover. The Party leadership wanted the earliest possible career choice for youths, whose initial career directions were to be chosen at the age of fourteen or fifteen. 18 Thus the call of the day was for orienting ever-younger pupils towards socially useful labour, and for affixing them to specific workplaces, as suggested by the Belorussian minister of education and many others. 19 The policy of directing secondary students into the vocational stream after grade eight, and then into enterprises, had been the key to the success of the Leningrad model of vocational education. 20 The all-union minister of agriculture called for the even earlier streaming of village youths into vocational education - not from grade seven, as currently, but from grade five. The legal agelimit for certain types of adolescent labour in both urban and rural areas was lowered, 21 and a new point system gave preference in VUZ entry to vocational school students, provided they chose specialities in line with their earlier vocational profiles. Similarly, preference in VUZ entry was also given to rural students, provided they would agree to return to their home regions. 22 In other words, the intent was to narrow the student's world to the vocational school and local enterprise or collective farm. All this required closer integration between enterprises and 'their' client schools, and the more careful career orientation of youth towards the needs of the schools' base enterprises. That is, the schools' responsibility for career orientation increased; and the schools would have to strengthen their capacities for the streaming of youths. Here it was commonly believed that the state of pedagogical art allowed for the reliable prediction of vocational abilities, although the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences had not yet developed suitable guidance programs. Thus yet another 'social science,' psychology, was put in the service of the government's managerial project. The director of the Moscow City Executive Committee, for example, neatly conflated the concepts of economic need, vocational education, streaming, and psychology: A state system of psychology is needed: planning procedures and methods, plus the ere-

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ation of city and borough consultation offices and their staffs - including psychologists and doctors - and the specification of the range of their duties. In general the time has come when [economic] life is insistently demanding the creation of a psychological service in schools, districts and cities. 23

To be sure, the government 's policy of early streaming had its circumspect critics within the pedagogical community;24 and even at the Politburo level Aliev had reservations. Though Aliev seemed enthusiastic about the idea that the number of vocational stream entrants should be doubled, he believed that a stronger general education should be the basis for better vocational training. He recommended that pupils should have a broader career choice, and that they should not be required to make a definitive career choice too early. The career decision should come only after the ninth grade. 25 Though the question of social justice was never raised, it can be seen that the government opted for efficiency (in a narrow sense of the term) over social justice. Rural youths would be encouraged to stay in their villages, so as not to endanger the Food Program, and children from blue-collar families would be encouraged to remain within 'labour dynasties.' In contrast to Khrushchev's earlier intent, higher education would remain predominantly the preserve of the better-placed urban classes, and would decline in competitiveness. 26 Differentiation in schools would be emphasized over equalization, and 'activism' (here including the selection of a career as desired by educational policy-makers) would be rewarded over professionalism. The overt intent of the reform legislation was clearly to make labour less horizontally mobile, while the reform's latent consequences would make this labour less upwardly (professionally) mobile as well. To summarize the concepts behind personnel policy, labour training was favoured over technical; quantity of labour supply was preferred over quality; and discipline came before incentive. The result was that these factors taken together favoured assembly-line or traditional (commodities and construction) industries over flexible technologies, or those with high intellectual valueadded. Regarding the content of instruction, there was some movement towards broader and newer subjects over narrow and traditional ones. The social sciences were given relative preference over the natural; but the actual definition of 'social science' was mostly synonymous with ideology. Relatedly, socialization was valued over knowledge. Concerning questions of mobility and the non-question of social justice, the official preference was for an early career choice over a later one; employment stability was preferred over mobility. Though vertical mobility (professional growth) for working personnel of the future was viewed, pro forma, as a good, rural youths were encouraged to

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remain in their villages. The upward mobility of urban blue-collar children also would be rather limited. The fragmented, ideological content of education, and the emphasis on socialization and activism over knowledge and professionalism, would make vocational graduates poorly suited for upward mobility except on political grounds. One Soviet commentator, later free to speak openly, noted of this period: Never was there earlier in the country such a quantity of upbringers, as in the 70s and 80s. It appeared as if economic problems necessarily required ideological satisfaction ... Never in earlier times did we so often and so boringly teach one another how to live in the new manner. The number of specialists in the area of communist upbringing increased like a snowball. Only the lazy did not occupy themselves with the formation of the new man.27 The direction of the 1984 reform of secondary education was unfortunate, for the chance to reinvigorate the economy via cadre policy was lost. A truncated understanding of efficiency prevailed over social mobility and equality of opportunity, factors that could have opened up careers to the creative talents. The design concepts behind the reform were internally contradictory and, for the most part, regressive. The 1984 Reform Legislation There was smooth continuity in vocational policy from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and to the 1984 reform. AJready by 1977 there had been, Brezhnev reported, a significant increase in the number of secondary school graduates going into production; and three-quarters of general school upper graders were receiving strengthened labour preparation. But the greatest perceived faults in education were that many general school •seniors had insufficient practical knowledge, and that there was a lack of unity among the various parts of the educational system - especially between the general schools and the PfUs. These complaints resulted in 1979 in new decrees intended to achieve the unified, polytechnical school system necessary for current requirements. 28 That same year an all-union conference organized by the USSR Ministry of Education and the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences proposed a supplementary agenda for the 1980s. The main problems that needed to be resolved, in the view of the conference participants, were those of the social upbringing and education of young children; improvement in course content; the optimal relationship between the vocational and general schools; the tasks of ideological, political, labour, and moral education; and the interaction of the school, family,

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community, and labour collectives. Solving these problems was necessary if public education was to be properly integrated into the upcoming five-year plan for social and economic development. 29 Further foreshadowing the 1984 reform, the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU had already decided, in principle, that a broader polytechnical training for labour should be implemented. The plenum also gave greater emphasis to the social sciences, and called for the closer linkage between socio-political and psychological-pedagogical instruction. 30 The 1984 legislation thus fell within long-established parameters, and there was within it a strong vocational momentum. Whereas in 1976 fewer than one-fifth of grade eight general school students entered PTUs, already by 1981 nearly one-third did so. Aliev reported that in line with 26th Party Congress directives, three-quarters of new entrants to the labour force as a whole were to pass through the Vocational-Technical Education system, while 90 per cent of entrants to the blue-collar trades were projected to receive a PTU training. Nonetheless almost a million grade ten graduates, 34 per cent of grade ten general school leavers, still annually entered the economy with no vocational training at all. 31 Holding to the long-developing vocational labour thrust within educational policy, Aliev again reported on behalf of the Politburo that the overall goals of the educational reform were the improvement of labour education and socialization, and of communist upbringing. The emphasis would be on the (S)PTU as the centre of the reform, and as the single type of secondary vocational education institution. Concomitantly, general school leavers would have a trade even before graduating. 32 The new curriculum was therefore to double to 2,000 hours the amount of labour education received by pupils and students, from the beginning of primary school to the end of the secondary level, within general schools. Strengthened mechanisms for labour orientation were to enable pupils to make more rational career choices.33 The flavour of the reform legislation is best conveyed by excerpts regarding different aspects of education. Blending social values and economics, the preamble stated that ' labour upbringing should be regarded as a crucial agent of personality formation and as a means of satisfying the national economy's manpower needs.' Assuming a finite universe, that is, vocationally pushed not science-led economic growth, it was further proposed that 'the ratios among the streams available for the further education of ninth grade graduates [would) be adjusted in accordance with the requirements of the national economy.' Concerning more concrete measures of structural reform, 'the absolute and relative numbers of ninth grade graduates enrolling in secondary vocational-technical training [would), in time, be approximately doubled.' In line with the vocational impulse of the reform, it was noted that elementary school pupils (grades

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1-4) would 'master the basic methods of manual work [that were] essential in life, by working with various materials, [and by] taking care of plants [that were] grown as farm crops.' Incomplete secondary school pupils (grades 5-9) would be given a 'more thorough general labour training, acquire knowledge and practical skills in metal and woodworking, become acquainted with basic electronics, metallurgy, and technical drawing, and be introduced to the national economy's major branches.' These pupils would make 'simple items to fill orders placed by enterprises and for delivery to schools.' Within secondary general education schools (grades 10 and 11), 'labour training in the most widespread mass-based occupations, with due consideration for local requirements, [would] continue along the same lines, and [would] also be given directly at the work site. ' 34 The reform legislation allowed fifteen-year-olds, now to have nine years of schooling as the basis of an incomplete general secondary education, a choice of three ways of continuing their studies: in a PflJ; in a SSUZ (usually with a four-year term of instruction); or proceeding directly to the tenth and eleventh grades of the general school. In the first two cases the teenager, in selecting an educational institution, would also select his or her occupation within one of three areas. These were: physics and mathematics; chemistry and biology; or the social sciences and humanities. If the student was in the third stream (the general school or 'main route' to higher education), three more choices would be open: admission to a one-year division of a vocational-technical school or so-called 'technical school' (PflJ or TU respectively); admission to a SSUZ/ technicum with the prospect of completing studies in two years; and entry to a VUZ. 35 In terms of actual proportions, this would mean that about 40 per cent of all youths would be streamed into the PflJ after the ninth grade of the general school. Of the remaining 60 per cent, roughly one-third would go to oneyear job training programs in technical schools (TUs); another third would enter SSUZs or VUZs; and the remaining third would still go directly to work without any further vocational training. 36 The reform also contained a substantial list of ancillary goals. One of these was to raise the social prestige of teachers. The improvement of teacher training was held to be integral to more comprehensive educational refonn; this necessitated the prior improvement of pedagogical science. Second, inasmuch as the tasks of general and vocational education were seen to be converging, administrative organs were asked to hew to a single governmental policy for the education and upbringing of the new generation. New interdepartmental commissions were to be created at the centre (subordinated to the USSR Council of Ministers) and in the localities (subordinated to the executive committees of urban and municipal Soviets of People's Deputies), in order to coordinate edu-

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cational planning and enrolment policies at the macro and local levels respectively. Finally, in a measure that could have much significance for the future, the potential of state and cooperative enterprises for supporting education was to be tapped more extensively. The legislation therefore suggested that enterprises be given greater rights to set aside funds and material resources for the construction, repair, and supply of academic buildings and dormitories. 37 In sum, Ruble listed six concrete and immediate measures that stood out in the reform legislation: 1 Nine years of education would be compulsory for all. 2 A complete primary and secondary school program would require eleven years instead of ten. 3 All educational programs were to offer vocational orientation curricula. 4 Classroom hours devoted to academic instruction would be reduced. 5 The school day would be extended through day-care and supervised study programs, reducing the need for parents to leave work early. 6 Vocational programs would be devoted to the needs of local industries and not to those of the national economy, a relationship to be strengthened by direct linkages between vocational-technical schools and local factories. 38 The third, fourth, and sixth of these measures are of particular interest to this narrative, inasmuch as these comprised a substantial part of the vocationally centred industrial policy for the USSR. The Goal - Integration of School and Enterprise

The centre's overarching goal within the reform design and legislation was to bring the vocationalized general school and strengthened PTU closer to the enterprise. That is, it was necessary to achieve policy penetration down to the local level and to get local institutions to act in concert in a way desired by the centre. A fuller treatment of this complex implementational problem, involving a hierarchy of intermediate institutions, will be the task of later chapters. The purpose here is only to foreshadow the later discussion of this topic. One urgent task in bringing more and better-trained labour to the enterprise was to raise the prestige of the PllJs, as the leading link in the vocationaltechnical education system. In order to upgrade their popular image, the 1984 reform was to make PllJs into mass schools offering general education. Large incentives were offered to students who completed a course of labour training in PllJs, or at interschool instructional-production combines (IPCs). Vocational graduates who received excellent grades would have preference either in the

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geographical location of their obligatory work assignments, or in entry to SSUZs or VUZs. 39 However, the quality and popularity of the general education received in PfUs still lagged, for PfUs devoted only about a third of their instructional time to general education and about 60 per cent to production training and vocational subjects. This gave students knowledge roughly equivalent in content, though not in volume, to the general education program.40 The juncture between the general school and the PfU was regarded as crucial, for it was at this point that the student chose his or her subsequent career. It was also at this juncture that industrial ministries, provincial and municipal governments, and enterprises were called on by the central government to play a role. They were to provide career guidance to students and open training stations in local enterprises, where these students could be gradually adjusted to the world of employment. 41 The mechanism for this industrial intervention and participation was, in part, the IPC. The ideal sequence in the student's advancement was considered to be a complete or incomplete education in a general school, further vocational instruction and career orientation in an IPC, entrance to a PTU, and then a rational employment assignment. The chief advantage of the IPC was its multi-profile character. It could bring together several general education schools and base enterprises, thus providing economies of scale in simple vocational instruction. Again showing the government's strong provocational momentum long prior to the drafting of the 1984 reform, the number of IPCs had been expanded tenfold between 1977 and 1981-2, when it comprised 2,259 units. 42 (By 1988 the number was over 3,000.)43 However, the IPC did not train as competently as the PfU and was criticized by some for wasting materials and for being occupied only with busywork. In the factory portions of their training, students were often used by management simply as supplementary labour; students performed rote tasks instead of receiving proper vocational instruction. In fact it was admitted by some brave critics of the mid-1980s that IPCs (and PfUs) did not so much orient as disorient youth. Dull, repetitive 'industrial training' actually alienated youth from vocational programs. 44 Nonetheless, from a socializational-ideological point of view, IPCs were attractive to the USSR minister of education, for example, who forecast the IPC system's continued rapid growth. 45 Other observers held that the educational value of labour training should not be underestimated, even if its material results were modest. Finally, to people of this self-satisfied line of thought, it also seemed that general school administrators or teachers were not always well aware of factory conditions. Since the IPC was either financed or equipped by base enterprises, this gave industry more voice over instructional content and made this content more relevant to industry's needs.46 The reform 's payoff was to be, to repeat, more and better labour for enter-

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prises. In order to obtain this, the government's policy was both to require enterprises to provide more assistance to their client schools and to encourage enterprises to obtain greater control over these schools and over their own Jabour forces. The first measure the government wished to achieve as a component of this policy was an optimally distributed network of base enterprises across the entire territory of the USSR. Accordingly it was projected for the eleventh five-year plan that each municipality would have at least one PTU, plus another PfU for each enterprise of more than 2,000 employees. 47 To this end the government urged large enterprises to treat the construction of PTUs and provision of equipment to local general schools or IPCs as integral parts of their economic plans. The trade unions were to ensure that enterprise managers actually implemented the centre's wishes. In this way each school would have its own base enterprise. Generally, funds for the construction of school buildings and for the teaching staff came out of the central state budget, while enterprises were expected to provide equipment, to maintain the schools, and to second seasoned workers to act as teaching masters. Supplementing the school reform legislation, the government reaffirmed in August 1984 the enterprises' right (or duty) to provide schools with equipment and teachers directly, out of above-plan profits. Later that year the Ministry of Finance extended this measure by giving enterprises the right to support schools regardless of the hierarchy or territory to which these enterprises nominally pertained. 48 In those cases where, for reasons of their own, enterprises provided support to their client schools willingly, this legislation appears to have improved the material base of the PTUs. Enterprises had already Jong had the right to sponsor students in either general, vocational, technical, or higher education, who would be necessary to those enterprises in the non-Black Earth Zone, Siberia and the Far East, and in industries within which there was an acute need - manufacturing, construction, transport, state and collective farms. 49 Such devolution to enterprises was certainly desirable on functional grounds, for an overloaded centre could not possibly manage vocational education effectively at the micro level. Nonetheless, such a stance ran against the grain of the government's rationalizing tendencies. Here central officials probably thought that enterprises could be allowed greater discretion in local spending, but that trade unions and local Party organizations could maintain control over the enterprises. This way the state plan could still remain coherent. In the event, however, the problem was not so much one of needing to expand enterprises' rights over the schools, but of inducing enterprises to take more interest in these schools. The biggest complaint of the governmental and educational elites was that enterprises did not provide the schools with suffi-

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cient resources, and that local governments did not make active use of the formal rights that they already possessed. Thus enterprises' concern for PTIJs was more the exception than the rule. The pedagogical press was full of criticisms that enterprises took only a 'consumerist' approach to vocational trainees, and that even the largest firms in each province did not seem concerned about developing local labour resources.so Under the constraints of the Plan, enterprises often tried to avoid spending on non-production-related infrastructure. Typically they employed youths in uninteresting rote jobs that did not provide real training, or in jobs not related to the occupations which these youths had studied. Enterprises also sometimes lacked skilled personnel who could be seconded to vocational schools as teaching masters. Enterprises were called upon to support both general and vocational schools. But inasmuch as the vocational training received in general schools was of much lower quality, and since general school leavers were not automatically assigned to these enterprises upon graduation, as were PTIJ graduates, enterprises were less interested in supporting the general schools in their localities.st In those cases where enterprises might have had some assurance that they would be able to 'capture' and retain trainees - perhaps because these enterprises could offer good housing or other social services through the effective coordinative work of their in-house trade unions - enterprises tended to favour lower legal age limits for work. They also favoured more education and training right on the job, in those cases where they had the facilities for this. There was, finally, one major design flaw inherent to the PTU system as a whole. This was the problem that PTIJs could usually offer one or only a very narrow range of programs, while the interests and abilities of students were much more varied. It was therefore very difficult to 'tie' such disengaged students to local enterprises.s 2 Furthermore, to the extent that this was actually possible, it was enormously wasteful of potential talent. Certain youths could have had abilities of great value to society, but these abilities would remain misallocated and undeveloped if they were irrelevant to the sponsoring enterprises.s3 The reform conceptions and legislation left many problems of policy design, implementation, and slippage that would have to be worked out in practice. A tall hierarchy of state, industrial, and educational ministries, regional and local governments, enterprises, and general and vocational schools would have to be made to act in concert. Coordination would have to occur in the face of teachers, parents, and students who had preferences quite different from those of the policy-making elites. The interplay among some of the most important of these actors in educational policy and implementation will be the subject of the balance of this book.

6

The Central Government's Implementational Measures

The Ideological Reflex In surveying the central government's main policy implementation measures, one is forced, in the first instance, to recognize the role of official Party doctrine and public ideology within Soviet administration. Rather than dismissing these two elements as rhetorical window-dressing, one must understand that Party doctrine still served as a guide for elite policy-making and that ideology was still meant to be carried to the public. Doctrine and ideology were important not only regarding policy-makers' world-views or common assumptions about what needed to be done in the areas of economic and social policy, a topic illustrated earlier, but had direct relevance to concrete questions of administration. Thus, for example, if youths were not moving into the vocations as desired by the central government, or if enterprises were not giving sufficient assistance to vocational schools, this was considered not as a deficiency in administrative structures, but as a deficiency in institutional commitment to doctrine and as a shortcoming in ideological agitation among the public. The government pursued a definite sequence in policy implementation. The instrument of first resort was the ideological apparatus. This apparatus was activated even when, as shown in Chapter 5, the ultimate educational goals and their underlying intellectual conceptions were not entirely clear. The second implementational measure, in keeping with the managerial habits of the policymaking elite, was to intensify the search for administrative rationality. There was a desire for the 'one best adjustment' of institutional jurisdictions or bureaucratic controls. That is, the accent was on the search for better administrative mechanics. It was only after the first two instruments were applied that the central government then attempted more radical measures: the devolution of functions, vertically, to subordinate organs of the state apparatus (industrial and

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educational ministries), or horizontally, to territorially based governments or administrative bodies. Accordingly the latter two parts of this chapter are concerned with the devolution of certain central government functions to institutions, along both the vertical and horizontal axes. In all of this one should realize not only that the ideological impulse was very powerful, but also that this impulse worked to delay substantive institutional reform. That is, ideology and common elite assumptions worked for strong institutional continuity. For as long as policy-makers could hope that ideological campaignism or administrative tinkering might bear fruit, this delayed the devolution of substantive powers to lower-level state institutions or to evolving societal interests. Summit-level formulas for political democratization evolved only slowly during the 1980s, while changes introduced by state structures moved even more slowly. Nonetheless some seeds of substantive democratization in education were sown in the mid-1980s. As noted in the previous chapter, the overall implementational problems were to induce youths to enter the vocational and technical trades marked for expansion by the government, and to get all ancillary institutions, especially enterprises and local governments, to support students and their schools in this shift. 1 But education, at all levels and times, was a matter highly important to governmental officials concerned with social values. Thus in 1981 the USSR minister of education, M.A. Prokofiev, declared that the school was, first of all, 'an ideological institution.' A year later a Russian republic conference of trade unions stated that public education was part of the ' ideological front,' while the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU emphasized that communist upbringing was a precondition for any successful educational reform. 2 The first seven recommendations produced by a conference of SSUZ directors in 1984 dealt directly with questions of political and ideological upbringing. 3 Somewhat later, in 1986, Gorbachev noted that perestroika depended on the activization of ideotheoretical activity within education, while Egor Ligachev added that the school was the most important factor within the process of socio-economic acceleration of the country. 4 Perhaps no other area of domestic policy received as much attention to ideology from a transformational government as did education. As already intimated, in official Soviet understanding 'ideology' was not a term only narrowly concerning a certain world-view. Understood more broadly, it impinged on all aspects of vocational policy. It did so on the economic side through the formation and reproduction of the labour force, and on the social side through conditions that affected the activism (performance) of workers. In this regard critics complained that the PfUs and SSUZs did not bear practically any responsibility (really a structural problem) for how their graduates would conduct themselves at the workplace.5 Thus vocational graduates' failure to

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report to assigned jobs was taken by state officials first as a sign of poor discipline and upbringing, a fact that required moral-ideological countermeasures, rather than as a problem of bureaucratic control. 6 Officials believed also that boring lessons, the 'appearance of formalism in upbringing,' could be done away with if only teachers would 'firmly conduct the line of the Communist Party.' 7 That is to say, elite policy-makers had a pronounced tendency to see failures of vocational school structures or of instructional content in terms of failures of ideological upbringing. The government was willing to divert substantial human and material resources to ideological ends, even at a time of financial stringency. Already. prior to the 1984 reform each industrial-pedagogical SSUZ, which trained teachers for PTIJs, was to work out a perspective plan for the communist upbringing of its registrees for the entire length of their programs. One of the main goals was to achieve the ideologization (ideologizatsiia) of all subjects in the instructional plan, and the perfection of 'social science' disciplines. 8 With the 1984 reform between thirty and forty hours on the history of the CPSU, political economy, philosophy, and the works of the founders of MarxismLeninism were added to the teaching time of industrial and agricultural SSUZs. State examinations on the social sciences for all specialities and types of SSUZ programs were introduced,9 while the Collegium of the RSFSR Committee for Vocational-Technical Education set a further goal that every teacher of social sciences should receive a higher political education within universities of Marxism-Leninism. 10 Ideology also drew resources away from the material side of education. With legendary housing shortages in Ukraine, for example, 730 SSUZs reserved 930 Lenin rooms and museums of military and labour glory, and accommodated an additional 650 clubs of international friendship. This occurred at a time when in some areas 30 per cent of VUZ and SSUZ students were without dormitory accommodations. 11 The emphasis on ideological upbringing and social mobilization did not lessen appreciably with Gorbachev, even if he introduced some modifications to official rhetoric. Gorbachev's main ideological innovation was to appeal for the 'rebirth of Leninism.' 12 Whether in economics or education, control from above was supposed to be matched by democracy from below. Consequently the main link in the 'socialist self-government of the people' was to be the Soviets of People's Deputies, which had ostensibly created the foundations of the USSR. 13 In other words, self-government was old government. And if Gorbachev might have had some idealized conception in his own mind of how his formulas were to work, lower-level officials would interpret these formulas according to their particular liking. The 19th Party Conference of 1988 affirmed that the initiative for democratizing society would still come from the Party itself. 14

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Implementation, 1984-1988

In the Soviet policy context a high degree of political-ideological mobilization was necessary at every step or program if educational administration was to function properly. In just one managerial project, for example, all teachers and school administrators were to have their employment positions and functions re-examined, rationalized if necessary, and then confirmed within an overall process called attestation (attestatsiia). There was also a need to assign responsibility among local Party and pedagogical committees for different aspects of educational reform. But these bureaucratic control projects soon broke down owing to common pathologies such as favouritism, mutual protectionism, and lack of resources. Another weak point in educational administration was intraschool instructional program control. School directors, it was believed by policy-makers, were not sufficiently concerned with the socializational process and too preoccupied with meeting only quantitative enrolment and output targets. 15 All this is to say that micro-level actors had little enthusiasm for the government's mobilizational methods of administration; they responded only to concrete administrative pressure. However, Gorbachev, and others, put the blame for shortcomings in administration not on poor bureaucratic mechanics, but on failed 'democracy' or control from below.16 Concerning students themselves, the lowest rank along the state-society hierarchy, the chairman of the RSFSR Committee for Vocational-Technical Education complained that nearly half of all PTU graduates received a grade of only 'satisfactory' in political-ideological subjects. This ostensibly owed to the low qualifications of social science teachers. 17 Similarly the secretary of the central committee of the Communist Youth League noted in 1987 that despite being highly informed and self-reliant, young people were apolitical and ideologically immature. She also admitted that the overorganization of youths drove them into informal groupings outside the bounds of any kind of state control. 18 For their part teachers lamented that the reality of Soviet life appeared to contradict the everyday experiences of youth, something that required better explanations by teachers. But the transmission of ' authentic' social science knowledge was said to be hampered by rigid instructional programs that did not allow any departures from ideological convention.19 Summarizing all the points above, one sees that ideology was to serve as a lubricant for administrative mechanisms and to provide a motivation for activism within micro-level institutions. However, ideology as a motivator of societal-level action, as opposed to a formulator of elite-level world-views, no longer functioned effectively by the 1980s. Ideological lessons were not 'sticking' in the minds of youth, while teachers and low-level functionaries did not care about ideology.

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81

Administrative Rationalization The government's second impulse was to try more rationally to adjust the juris~ dictions of subordinate administrative organs. However, this process had internal contradictions; for though the Gorbachev entourage's preference was for centralization of many areas of economic and social management, the reality was that the centre was overloaded. Wanting to square the circle, Gorbachev called at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 for improvements in the central management of the economy. This was to occur at the same time that the independence of lower-level institutions, such as production associations and enterprises, was to be increased. The means for greater enterprise independence, and simultaneously for greater responsibility for 'final results,' were to be self-financing and economic accountability (khozraschet). The role of labour collectives within 'democratized' enterprise management was to be increased, while self-financing would somehow bring administrative structures at all levels up to date. Further, there was to be optimization of branch and territorial administration. The main themes in Gorbachev's statements on administrative reform were thus the twin desires to increase central control and to enhance initiative and responsibility at lower levels. 20 These problems of administrative optimization within the economy were, of course, also felt by the educational community. With respect to labour education the government's major thrust at the Party Congress was to recentralize vocational training and employment through a strengthened all-union State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education. But the task of rationalizing education was a gigantic one, inasmuch as educational delivery at all levels was fragmented along industry-affiliated lines. Hundreds of union and more than 800 republican industrial ministries and departments influenced particular aspects of educational policy implementation, though only about fifty of these comprised the commanding heights of the economy. 21 The formal educational system itself was split among 74 USSR and republican ministries and state committees of education and more than 200 governmental departments that supervised secondary special schools. 22 Such a situation caused much duplication; policy-makers therefore tried to clarify the jurisdictions of educational and industrial bodies. There were concurrent attempts on both the industrial and educational sides to create new institutions that would cut across ministerial lines and improve horizontal coordination at each level. The Gorbachev entourage believed that many deeply rooted economic problems could be solved by reorganizing administrative structures. Accordingly some superficial 'territorialization' of planning was announced, while most industrial ministries were grouped into a smaller num-

82

Implementation, 1984-1988

ber of superministries. 23 Lower down the hierarchy, some enterprises were consolidated into State Production Associations, which were supposed to carry out the entire research, production, and sales cycle within their own spheres. Organized similarly to Western corporations, it was hoped that these associations would respond more quickly to domestic and international market demands. 24 Policy-makers' desire to rationalize extended to social and housing-related services, for departmental fragmentation reduced spending efficiency in the sociocultural sphere and caused capital investments to be frittered away. Only one institution, some advocates felt, should be responsible for housing and social services, 25 although it was not yet decided in the mid-1980s at what level this consolidation should occur. Given the confusion in both industrial and educational management, the Russian Ministry of Education complained of a general breakdown in many aspects of the nurturing of young talents, and of a situation where the economy was not being supplied with enough new specialists. Much blame for this was placed by the Ministry and many other commentators on the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (APS) for its failure to provide suitable and interesting instructional programs. One of the main reasons for this situation, in tum, was that the APS had lost its leading role in determining the content of education in general and vocational schools as professionals in various fields acquired voice over program content. The Ministry suggested that the school reform should have begun with the reform of pedagogical (teacher) education itself.26 This breakdown in pedagogical science and APS control provided a yet bigger opening for the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education in filling the educational vacuum. 27 Thus alongside the government's other rationalizing tendencies in economic and social policy, the all-union Committee was to take increased responsibility for vocational education, career guidance, and employment placement. From the centre's perspective there was a need for a single, national labour policy in order to balance demographic shifts, and for a single system of 'continuous education' so that the labour force would be constantly upgraded as technologies became more complex.28 Many industrialists and vocational school directors shared the government 's view that instructional institutions locked themselves into shells, and that planning organs catered too much to branch interests. This allowed too many small specialities to be created. It would be better, they said, if the reception of students into vocational education were done centrally, with ' due account' of branch and regional interests. 29 An accretion of powers by the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education no doubt seemed logical, inasmuch as the Committee's bureaucracy already had the function of providing methodological and auditing assistance to vocational education within factories and among

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83

industrial ministries. Thus in 1984 a number of Russian republic vocational schools were transferred from the jurisdiction of industrial ministries to the allunion State Committee for Labour/State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education. 30 A year later it was confirmed that the Committee for VocationalTechnical Education, not the USSR Ministry of Education, would be given jurisdiction over a new system of career orientation centres (tsentry proforientatsii). The transfer of departmental PTIJs to the USSR Committee for Vocational-Technical Education was formally completed in 1986. As a whole, the central government was much concerned with rationalization and consolidation at all levels of industrial and educational management. Regarding vocational education specifically, the main innovation was to shift it further away from the USSR Ministry of Education and nearer to the State Committee for Labour/State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education. This was consistent with the vocationalizing of education in general. Policymakers also sought the holy grail of the clearer definition of jurisdictions among other institutional actors, notably between vocational schools and base enterprises.

Hierarchical Devolution - Expanding the Rights of Enterprises Beyond the administrative adjustments described above, there was some devolution of the centre's economic prerogatives to enterprises. It was enterprise power, of course, that drove the system of vocational education. 31 Accordingly the base enterprises, at least formally, had enjoyed considerable legal rights over the general and vocational schools under their stewardship. There was long in place a pattern within which an overloaded centre sought to devolve certain administrative functions to lower-level hierarchical or territorial units. At least as early as 1973 enterprises, collective farms, and executive committees of local soviets had the formal right to join in the construction of schools, dormitories, and accommodations for teachers. 32 Subsequently Andropov encouraged greater contracting among enterprises and brigades, thereby trying to relieve the centre of the trouble of labour micro-management. 33 Frequent calls by educational administrators that enterprises should allocate more resources for labour education and upbringing resulted in further legislation in 1984. This gave enterprises the right to provide schools with equipment, recreation facilities, and teachers directly - out of above-plan funds - rather than having to channel this support through prevailing state planning and administrative institutions. Meanwhile trade unions and local Party officials were encouraged to 'make more active use of their broad rights' in assisting enterprises by disbursing social security benefits, municipal services and hous-

84

Implementation, 1984-1988

ing, and recreational facilities for the enterprises' workers. They were also to exercise control over housing and working conditions for teachers.34 Here vertical integration between the base enterprises and local general, vocational, or technical schools was much sought by the central government. Through the mechanism of their trade unions, the base enterprises were supposed to support not only local labour forces, but local schools as well. Concern for the school meant, in the end, concern for the working family. Enterprises sometimes provided extra financial assistance to poor families, and labour guidance and employment spaces for the upbringing of the family's new working members.35 Accordingly local communities - schools and worker families - felt the strong paternal hand of the base enterprises and their 'in-house' trade unions at every turn. 36 For the moment, these enterprises still answered in at least gross tenns to superior ministerial or state organs. To the extent that it could control individual ministries and enterprises, the central government could still influence the implementation of vocational and labour policy at the local level. This situation would change by the end of the decade, once the centre lost control over management of the national economy. The order of the mid to late 1980s was, as earlier, to induce enterprises to take more interest in the schools and labour resources under their nominal care. The problem was not that industrial ministries and enterprises lacked the fonnal right to do this, but that they were often 'criminally indifferent' towards the schools under their jurisdiction. The government tried to encourage face-to-face contracting for labour resources between schools and base enterprises. However, as long as enterprises could obtain new employees elsewhere, they generally avoided contracting for labour and taking on the task of providing trainingspaces for recent graduates.37 Concurrently there was a growing recognition as the decade wore on that command-administrative methods of economic management were inadequate to economic development, and that ways should be found to make enterprises and workers more interested in each others' welfare. The failure in command administration was formally recognized in the summer of 1988 by the 19th Party Conference, which approved of a change in principle from primarily administrative to economic methods of management, and of increasing worker and producer-groups' interest in production. 38 But even prior to the conference and the Law on State Enterprises, which took effect in January 1988, there had been a movement towards greater local self-management. In addition to the old labour brigades the organization of cooperatives in various production and service sectors was introduced, as was an ambiguous formula of 'planning on the basis of direct contracts' between

The Central Government's Implementational Measures

85

vocational schools and enterprises. 39 Furthermore, enterprises or cooperatives were encouraged to acquire firmer stewardship over socialist property, which was currently 'ownerless' and therefore often misused. Enterprises were given the right of 'possession, use, and disposal' of physical assets (which nonetheless remained under formal state ownership).40 Many economists and factory managers advocated horizontally negotiated supplier-purchaser relationships. They also recommended that appropriate territorial organs should be brought into these relationships, and that there should be more emphasis on regional or local-level planning.41 The various legislation on cost-accounting measures contained the language of free markets. Though the state set delivery quotas for goods, this did not mean, in at least one economist's view, that these quotas any longer had the force of law. Wages were to be tied to firms' performance, and enterprises, not planning organs, were to determine their labour force requirements. In their daily activities enterprises were to be guided by the exigencies of production and the 'market,' not by hierarchical commands. The enterprises were, in effect, to carry out functions of economic governance formerly executed by the state machinery; while the government was to be interested only in 'final results.' Enterprises acquired the status of juridical persons. For their part, workers were to have a greater role in the running of their enterprises, and were even to elect their managers at enterprises. Nonetheless, the old institution of one-man management (edinonachalie) was retained. That is, the factory director would still harmonize the interests of both the state and the labour collectives. 42 All these changes in enterprise and local government rights - leaving aside for the moment the question of their substance - were matched by greater autonomy for educational bodies. Institutions of higher education, and all educational institutions generally, increased their participation in policy-making. VUZs were no longer to be passive suppliers of cadres to enterprises, but were to be paid for each graduate. 43 To match the enlarged prerogatives of industry and VUZs, divisions of the Academy of Sciences were given the right to manage their own material and financial resources. Gorbachev gave his blessing to the organizational innovations conducted in Ukraine by Boris Paton, the president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, who had developed hybrid scientific research/industrial engineering centres. These were akin to Western 'centres of excellence.' Following Paton, Gorbachev's wish was to exploit the research potential of the higher educational system by more closely orienting it to the needs of the economy. 44 All this indicates that the trend of the mid to late 1980s was one of institution-building, if not yet of autonomy, at the local level. Similar increases of institutional autonomy were recommended for SSUZs and vocational schools. Like the VUZs, SSUZs were encouraged to integrate

86

Implementation, 1984-1988

more closely with enterprises on a contractual basis. Accordingly there would be partial payment after 1987 by enterprises for SSUZ graduates. Contract relations were later to be established between enterprises and PTUs. 45 Further in keeping with this process of decentralization and micro-level institutionbuilding, voc~tional schools received the ostensible right to retain economized resources for other school purposes. Nonetheless, their earnings from commercial production continued to revert to the state budget; this naturally created disincentive for the production and sale of items produced by vocational schools.46 For their part, being encouraged to contract with schools for labour resources, enterprises were given greater financial means to shape their own labour forces and more discretion over funding for social infrastructure within their host localities. Thus in 1988 enterprises were to receive one hundred billion rubles for the 'self-financing' of production and social development. Total spending on social and cultural needs, part of which was to be disbursed by enterprises, was to rise by 9.1 per cent - twice the growth rate of national income. In the realm of ' public education, science, and culture' there was to be an 11 .2 per cent increase over the 1987 figure.47 Without a more careful analysis it is difficult to say how much real independence the enterprises gained under self-financing, and how this affected their relationships with local higher and vocational schools. Writing in 1987, Gertrude Schroeder noted that Gorbachev's economic reforms left the pillars of the traditional economic system - state ownership, central planning, numerous administrative agencies, rationing of materials and investment goods, and state control over prices - prominently in place. Enterprise incentives were still oriented towards plans and output targets.48 However, Gorbachev's measures obviously did have an impact (if perverse) on labour education. Enterprises cut their funding for in-house labour training by 20 per cent between 1985 and 1989, finding it easier to poach needed workers on the market rather than to train them. 49 The impact of change was also felt in the school system, for teachers often lamented that enterprises provided assistance to schools attended by children of their own employees, but neglected all others. Children were unjustly divided into categories of 'ours' and 'theirs.' 5 Cut loose from their earlier sources of supplemental funding from the vertical hierarchy of industrial ministries and enterprises, these schools would have to seek maintenance from territorial governments, or to try to obtain these funds from a now weakened central government. Overall the mid to late 1980s constituted a picture of central overload, and devolution (or abandonment) of many central prerogatives to industrial enterprises and educational institutions. These in tum underwent a process of institution-building and gained at least limited administrative autonomy.

°

The Central Government's Implementational Measures

87

Devolution to Territorial Governments

By the mid-1980s there was broad agreement among economists (especially Ukrainians and Baits) that more management of labour resources should be done on a regional basis. The 1984 school reform text itself called for the strengthening of provincial-level educational administration. 51 This orientation found sympathy within those overloaded central state ministries most closely linked to labour resource development. Thus at an all-union conference on labour problems and vocational training, the first vice-chairman of the USSR State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education asked for the expansion of territorial centres for career orientation.52 Politburo member V. Grishin proposed a larger component of regional-level planning within allunion direction of the economy, as did experts from the All-Union ScientificMethodological Centre for Labour Organization and Industrial Management. Regional organs should also be charged, the latter said, with coordinating the career orientation work of all industrial ministries and their subordinate organizations involved in career orientation in their territories. 53 The State Committee for Labour began to organize regional career orientation centres at least as early as 1984.54 In this regard the question of how much power republican governments and their educational ministries had is unclear. Most republics controlled only a small fraction of their own economic wealth. Ukraine had probably the lowest level of autonomy, controlling only about 5 or 10 per cent of the economic activity on its territory. 55 The practical significance of these figures is ambiguous, however; for despite Ukraine's low level of control over its own finances, this did not prevent Boris Paton from bending ministerial structures in order to create the engineering centres of excellence mentioned earlier. A somewhat vague description of union versus republican jurisdictions in higher education given by V.P. Eliutin, the USSR minister for higher and secondary specialized education, indicates that the central government decided on questions of general state interest and on strategic directions in education. Republican ministries of education retained only day-to-day administrative functions and were charged with implementing central policies. Specialized and vocational schools were usually the preserve of all-union industrial ministries.56 Nonetheless, almost all republics had their own Committees for VocationalTechnical Education, which in turn had established their own interdepartmental councils for the coordination of vocational instruction.57 An analogous situation prevailed with the union and republican Academies of Science. In 1985 the USSR Academy of Sciences and the all-union Committee for VocationalTechnical Education agreed that the Academy would help with vocational edu-

88

Implementation, 1984-1988

cation, mainly by researching urgent questions in this area. The republican Academies and Committees for Vocational-Technical Education signed parallel documents. 58 In this connection Gorbachev complained that economic and educational administration was even more fragmented at the republican level than at the union one. This fragmentation at the republican and lower levels was fatal for policy implementation, for it was precisely with these levels, and with school councils and teachers, that responsibility for the 1984 educational reform was left. 59 As Soviet society and the economy had grown more complex during the 1970s and 1980s, domestic politics were marked by a greater degree of institution-building below the union level. The role of local soviets had been formally increased under the 1977 Constitution; and it was these branches of government that had acquired a greater functional role in territorial labour management during the early 1980s.60 For example, time-frames and procedures for labour practicums performed by school students were to be determined by the executive committees of city and municipal Soviets of People's Deputies, as prompted by local conditions. Further, in 1986, an order of the CC CPSU emphasized the need for local soviets to act as 'single clients' (edinye zakazchiki) in the construction of housing and social infrastructure, and in supervising 'all other undertakings within the socio-cultural sphere.' 61 The 'restoration in full of the role and authority of the Soviets of People's Deputies as sovereign bodies of popular representation' was further legitimized by Gorbachev in May 1988, during his address to a plenary session of the CC CPSU. 62 The increase in local soviets' rights was not confined only to formal legislation and official rhetoric. In admitting in 1986 that the Party was doing badly in implementing the reform, especially at the provincial level, Egor Ligachev revealed that it was nonetheless at this level where 'the fate of the effort was (being] decided. ' 63 Another well-placed authority noted that there was much educational management expertise at the provincial level or lower. Thus Moscow city had a Committee for Vocational-Technical Education that was in fact larger than the all-union structure of 310 members; for its part, Leningrad had about 300 staff members. The RSFSR Committee for Vocational-Technical Education had a staff of 500, and the Ukrainian one 270. 64 Each province had its own parallel committee for the career orientation and ' affixation' of youth, and it appears that analogous committees were established at the municipal level. 65 Overall it may be said that the accretion of powers at lower levels had a structural or technological imperative, for departmental fragmentation reduced spending efficiency in the sociocultural sphere. It was therefore necessary in an increasingly complex social economy to transfer many departmental funds and

The Central Government's Implementational Measures

89

resources to institutions at the local level. 66 For this reason it was the overloaded centre itself that encouraged executive committees of local governments to rationalize spending on social and material infrastructure, and in so doing to strengthen their control over local labour. In a careful study of Soviet local government, Cameron Ross noted that there was a marked degree of centralization at the provincial level. At the same time, however, industrial ministries and large enterprises still tended to dominate all levels of local government. Regarding the crucial issue of control over financing, Ross found that the industrial base of a region was the major determinant of that region's local budget and social infrastructure. 67 Similarly, another author observed that for the most part, 'territorial planning' amounted just to the sum of industrial ministries' plans. Real 'municipalization' had yet to occur by the late 1980s.68 Following these arguments, it appears that provincial and municipal governments remained creatures of the largest industrial interests within their territories. A sharper picture of the power balance among local organs and enterprises will be given in the following chapter. It is sufficient for the present purposes to note only that some devolution of powers from the centre to the provinces and municipalities did occur during the mid to late 1980s. This is also evident from simple hindsight. Indeed several Western observers of centre-periphery relations had observed Moscow's weakening grip over territorial governments well before the formal dissolution of the USSR. Mark Beissinger points out that a feature of Brezhnev's practice of 'trust in cadres' was the growth of localism and regionalism. Patronage grew increasingly centralized at the republican level.69 Similarly Paul Shoup notes that the 'leadership drift' of the 1980s resulted in the growth of regional political machines, 'apparatus pluralism,' and the 'privatization of daily life.' By the late 1980s central governance could be described in terms of outright fragmentation and immobilism. 7° In conclusion, a large number of new nodes of industrial interest and educational competence, along both the hierarchical and territorial axes, had developed during the 1980s. This was especially so after the accession of Gorbachev. However, the 1984 educational reform had been drawn up by the Brezhnevite leadership of which Gorbachev was, to be sure, a member. This cohort still saw the world through the prism of old dogmas and familiar operating procedures. Market-type reforms were half-hearted, and educational policy was accordingly conventional.

7

Implementation at the Micro Level

Enterprise Interest in Local Vocational Education

The overall implementational problem of the 1984 educational reform was to bring the enterprise and the vocational school more closely together. It was the provincial, municipal, and city governments that were crucial to the solution of this problem, though these governments took their cues from the centre regarding social science and ideological content. (Republican governments appear to have been marginal to vocational policy implementation.) In order to evaluate the yield from the 1984 reform, one needs to see how the reform appeared from the micro-level perspective. One needs to place the vocational school within the inter-institutional context of local enterprises and governments, and to examine some of the interests and dynamics within the school itself. Since vocational education was driven in the first instance by enterprise (or ministerial) power, it should be noted that the enterprises' overall interest was to have stable in-house labour forces with the requisite mix of skills. One category of enterprises preferred, in a manner of speaking, to obtain labour on the open or national market. This category usually ignored local vocational education and labour resource development. Another group of enterprises, a group that could benefit more directly from the local labour pool, was more willing to intervene within the educational system. It devolved upon these particular enterprises and their parent ministries to take the initiative in implementing educational and labour force reform. The Politburo Commission for Reform of General-Education and Vocational-Technical Schools, chaired at the time by Gorbachev, stated that it was branch ministries and agencies that had 'the necessary capabilities, material resources, equipment and personnel' to provide schoolchildren with sound labour education and upbringing. 1 Regarding enterprise sponsorship of general schools, the enterprises' hope

Implementation at the Micro Level

91

had always been that general school students who had trained at enterprises would remain with them upon graduation. This sectoral principle applied even more to PTUs, which as a rule trained cadres only for the largest base enterprises within each locality. This latter situation resulted in cases where many medium-sized and smaller enterprises, not having their own training schools, were forced to train their new employees on the job or else to open their own small training schools. These smaller enterprises did so even though they often lacked the facilities and resources for proper labour instruction. In such cases, these vocational schools had very little autonomy or 'corporate identity' of their own; they were especially prone to the whims of enterprise management. A common complaint of teachers and students was that enterprises viewed their 'in-house' schools as places not so much for vocational training per se, as for captive labour necessary for Plan fulfilment. For their part, collective farm managers would often merely 'set a student on a tractor' rather than provide substantive agronomics or mechanics training. That is, there was conflict between the production goals of enterprises and the instructional needs of trainees. 2 The central government had long sought to clarify the role of enterprises vis-a-vis vocational schools through legislation, but legislative measures had no effect on the enterprise-school relationship. 3 Those enterprises most interested in local labour force development tried to control the social environment of their workforces through their factory methodological soviets (zavodskie metodicheskie sovety), through their in-house trade unions, and with the help of the Communist Youth League. Partly upon the recommendation of the latter two, the methodological soviets would reward favoured workers through bonuses, vacation vouchers, and more substantially, through accelerated access to housing and kindergartens for the workers' children. The enterprises could also look further upstream within society. Out of their funds for social development they could provide local schools with recreational and instructional facilities, holiday camps, special equipment - and in general help coordinate the work of all schools within their localities. 4 The coal industry was one that took care to assure itself of cadres. It maintained fiftyeight SSUZs in which there were 73,000 students. It kept spaces open for army returnees, hired media coverage to raise the prestige of the mining profession, and, through greater attention to career orientation work, reached into the general school system for prospective employees.5 Local government's management of labour resources occurred within a context of industrial dominance. This dominance was achieved through a gamut of 'civic organizations' that helped with various aspects of upbringing and educational policy. One of these, as noted, was the trade unions, which in turn operated closely with the 'labour collectives' of enterprises. The worker mem-

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Implementation, 1984-1988

bership of these two sets of organizations overlapped, inasmuch as leading trade union members were also members of the labour collectives. However, the 'labour collectives' contained majority contingents from the management staffs of the given enterprises. These collectives 'discussed questions of state, economic, and social-cultural development' placed before them by the union-level Soviet of People's Deputies. The collectives then passed along their own suggestions concerning 'complex economic and social development' to local soviets located within their territories. 6 The leading enterprises of each locality therefore constituted, in effect, an addititional level of local government. But since the bulk of social services was disbursed by the central government, enterprise managers requested more power to calibrate the provision of these services according to worker performance.7 With the beginning of self-financing and cost-accounting in 1987, however, another problem arose; but this time it was a problem not for enterprise managers, but for the school-age public. Enterprises wanted to train only part of the vocational school cohort, but not 'free riders.' Which part this turned out to be depended on the specific needs of enterprises and the types of specialities offered by local vocational schools. Those students who did not fit into enterprise plans were left socially unprotected. Traditionally, the bulk of funding for general and vocational schools came out of the central state budget. The state paid for initial capital construction and paid the salaries of the teaching staffs on an ongoing basis. Enterprises were to provide laboratory or other instructional equipment and to arrange for routine maintenance. Base enterprises were also to pay the salaries of teaching masters seconded by these enterprises to teach in the vocational schools. The central government covered about 80 per cent of the total cost of general and vocational education, while the remainder came from enterprises or other local sources. 8 Under the terms of the school reform, assistance in reinforcing the schools' material bases and in the organization of socially useful labour was to be stipulated in the enterprises' plans for economic and social development. 9 Thus enterprises were to set up training sections or workshops - either on their own premises, at schools, or within instructional-production combines. For their part, general and vocational schools were charged with formal responsibility for the labour training and upbringing of their students, and with vocational guidance 'with due regard for the area of work of the sponsoring enterprise[s] and [the enterprises'] needs for personnel in common occupations.' 10 Still, enterprise ·managers were usually reluctant to do more than the minimum for schools under their care, because of their own constraints. They did not like, for example, to second the enterprises' best workers to be teaching

Implementation at the Micro Level

93

masters within vocational schools, because these workers were needed at the enterprises themselves. The effectiveness of these teaching masters was further reduced because they usually had no pedagogical or psychological training, something that was considered to be a serious drawback by Soviet commentators. Much misallocation (or outright waste) of talent was caused by the fact that it was not possible for enterprises to train all types of students at the workplace. It was possible to teach only the main occupations of the firm. 11 Several factors frustrated the efforts of enterprises to assure themselves of adequate labour resources from the vocational education system. One factor was the obsolescence of the vocational schools' and factories' physical plant. Trainees usually worked with badly outdated - even junked - equipment, often of a type that was no longer used in modern production. This made it difficult for students to make rational career choices, for they lacked exposure to modern methods of production. The 'playing at labour' caused morale loss, as it lowered the prestige of labour and of vocational training. 12 Indeed, it actively frightened away prospective trainees; for if they once worked in discouraging conditions on badly outdated equipment, they could not later be 'pulled into the factory with a rope.' 13 In this connection some commentators astutely observed that there was an important difference between labour training (a narrower concept) and labour upbringing. Vocational education had become confused with narrow, utilitarian notions of the discharging of rote production processes, as opposed to the development of a genuine labour culture within which workers took a more active approach to labour. 14 Some problems of reform began at the ministerial level, and concerned simple administrative mechanics. The industrial ministries were supposed to designate base enterprises for schools, but most ministries had not yet done this two years after the reform. Many sponsoring enterprises therefore existed only on paper. Egor Ligachev criticized the ministries for not opening sufficient training spaces for students, and many general and vocational schools for their 'timidity' and mentality of waiting for instructions from above. 15 Within this bureaucracydriven context, in which no consideration was given to young people's interests and abilities, or to the national economy's needs as a whole, the yield from all levels of vocational education was very low. In 1986, of 4.4 million secondary school seniors, only an insignificant 28,000 were able to work at enterprises in industry, 15,000 in transport and communications, and 4,000 in construction. 16 Boris El'tsin complained that one-third of all municipal Party executive committees did not even once consider the reform during 1986. 17 Similarly, the RSFSR minister of education noted that as of January 1987 a quarter of all enterprises in his republic had not created a single trainee space. 18 On the other hand, some critics believed that there was an unwarranted bur-

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Implementation, 1984-1988

geoning of new specialities, a phenomenon that inevitably led to departmentalism and duplication. One observer lamented that of 500 official types of SSUZs, for example, 300 accounted for only 10 per cent of all graduates. Branch interests tended to create new specialities 'on the spur of the moment.' 19 Such complaints were typical of officials with a managerial mind-set, who tended to perceive fragmentation - a negative phenomenon - instead of something more positive: articulation and adaptability to new needs within a growing and increasingly complex economy. They no doubt were correct in pointing out cases of needless duplication. But in the absence of an efficient national market in specialists and easy lateral movement of vocational personnel, ministries and groups of major enterprises were compelled to create new specialities and vocational schools in order to meet their specific requirements. For their part, SSUZs faced increasing problems in supplying their industrial patrons with personnel. Between 1977 and 1987, the number of applicants for each SSUZ space declined significantly from 2.3 to 1.5. Given these personnel shortages, entrance examination standards were loosened, while SSUZ managers (organy po rukovodstvu) received the right themselves to designate certain professions as ones 'hard to fill' (trudnokomplektuemi). Thus almost all specialities in agriculture, many construction specialities, transport, and those of geological exploration were designated as hard to fill. Here it should be noted that discretion over designation lay with SSUZs, as micro-level institutions, and not with the central government. Senior SSUZ administrators in these branches also acquired the right to waive entrance examinations for PfU or general school graduates who had documented grades of '4' or '5.' 20 Given all these difficulties in enterprise/vocational and technical school relations at the best of times, the PTUs and SSUZs started to leave the base enterprises' 'zone of influence' with the advent of cost-accounting. The main reason for this delinking was that enterprises now often had quantitatively lower requirements for personnel of a specific profile than the schools had the capacity to turn out. As the general level of technology rose, enterprises needed fewer cadres from the mass trades and only a small number of specialists in the technical fields. In the latter case, SSUZ graduates sometimes did not have the desired theoretical or practical backgrounds. 21 Accordingly some enterprises tended to bypass both the PTUs and SSUZs; they preferred to take on general school students, who had a broader base of knowledge, and to train these students on their own premises. 22 An opposite reason that vocational and technical schools were leaving enterprise control was that some enterprises preferred to seek labour on the open market rather than to go to the trouble of training new workers. That is, structural changes within industry were gradually making PTUs and even some SSUZs maladapted to modern needs.

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Local Government

Local governments and institutional actors played an important role, if perhaps subsidiary to that of enterprises, in the coordination of general and vocational education. As noted in the previous chapter, there was much educational management expertise below the republican level. Most provinces, municipalities, and cities had their own career orientation councils under the auspices of provincial departments of public education. These councils were staffed by representatives of base enterprises, trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and general and vocational schools. One Soviet author protested, perhaps too selfrighteously, that the joint work of all these local actors amounted to more than just ' propagandizing a given occupation.' Still, their work was meant to provide a gamut of leisure, socio-political, and career orientation activities that would draw trainees into productive labour at local enterprises. 23 It is not clear which level of local government was the most important to general and vocational education. Cameron Ross painted a picture in which industrial ministries and enterprises dominated local governments; at the same time he noted considerable centralization at the provincial level. It was at the provincial level that branch plans merged with territorial ones, and to which the centre delegated the major tasks of policy coordination for inferior levels.24 From Ross's account it appears that only provincial-level territorial governments could offer any serious counterweight to enterprise power. On the other hand, municipal and city executive committees were closest to the day-to-day needs of schools. Consequently a number of Soviet commentators have noted that the Municipal Council for Public Education (Raionnoe Obedenenie Narodnogo Obrazovaniia) was the most important to the daily administration of schools. At the dawn of the 1970s the MCPE had been severely understaffed. However, considerable institutional capacity seems to have been added at the municipal level; for whereas earlier the MCPE usually had about three staff members, by the late 1980s there were several times as many.25 Still, municipal school officials appeared to be incapable of directing vocational schools, partly because of their insufficient qualifications for management. 26 It seems logical that larger schools, such as PTUs and SSUZs, designed to serve the industrial enterprises and ministries more directly, would be relatively more influenced by the Provincial Council for Public Education. Indeed, SSUZ directors worked under the aegis of provincial executive committees. 27 Soviet sources are vague on the definition of 'local soviets,' for they conflate under this term provincial, municipal, and city governments. At any rate, the CC CPSU legitimized a larger role for these soviets in the area of vocational education reform, and as 'single clients' in the building of housing and provision of

96

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other social infrastructure. 28 Accordingly the role of local soviets would be crucial for educational reform, not only for educational administration per se, but for the provision of one essential input - housing. Vocational students could not make satisfactory or rational career choices if these choices were guided not so much by their personal preferences, or the country's labour needs, as by the prospect of obtaining suitable living quarters - first within educational residences, and then in the regions of their employment assignments. The problem of housing applied even more to teachers, for if there was to be free lateral movement of teachers to regions where they were needed, this presupposed a free market in housing.29 The 1984 reform anticipated that local soviets would provide secondary and vocational school teachers with housing on a priority basis, for the problems of teaching cadres at all levels and housing were closely linked. 30 However, enterprises and public organizations often did not reserve enough housing for students and teachers, for this would have constituted greater spending on the 'non-production' sphere. There was a bias towards giving housing priority to workers in traditional industry. Republics, provinces, and even villages could ignore state directives on construction. 31 Consequently this was one major area where the central government's educational reform broke down; for if the reform goals were set by the centre, the provision of housing, communal services, and on-site policy coordination was decided locally. An important point of local policy implementation was the general or vocational school director, who mediated the needs of industry and the local community. The director, however, was powerless vis-a-vis the Municipal Council for Public Education. The director had no voice in the selection of the school's staff and could not discipline teachers even for gross misconduct. 32 Nor did he or she have control over the school budget, not being able to spend school funds for routine maintenance even though this power was formally within the director's job description.33 The lack of director's powers seems to have been tied to the lack of powers on the part of the school councils themselves. In an expression of trust in teachers, and in an attempt to raise their social status, a CC CPSU plenum of 1983 yet further deprived the director of many of his or her previously existing powers. This situation of both director and school council powerlessness tended to drive out of the school those directors who were not content with passive roles in school administration and those teachers who wished to have more professional independence.34 A further set of unreliable instititutional actors at the local level was the Primary Party Organizations (PPOs) within general and vocational schools. Ligachev lamented that educational institutions at the local level were working too much in isolation from the Communist Party. The members of these PPOs were aging, and their numbers were becoming 'catastrophically small.' He

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complained further that there was a 'residual principle' at work regarding the staffing of PPOs: workers, collective farmers, and military personnel were given preference in Party membership. Teachers came last. 35 From Ligachev's account it appears that there were not enough memberships to go around at the teacher level, and that Party membership within a profession as large as the teaching one did not connote exclusivity or any privileges for teachers. Overall, to this point, the picture of policy implementation at the local level was one in which there was a large number of fragmented interests and capacities. No one institution or level of government had both responsibility for policy as well as the requisite discretion over resources to discharge this responsibility. The general and vocational school thus became 'nobody's' (nicheinaia). 36 All this occurred against a backdrop of decline in popular ideological commitment. The confusion over jurisdictions and responsibilities at the local level was also mirrored by confusion in financing of physical plant. Formally the general school was a charge of the local soviets; it did not juridically belong to the base enterprises. 37 Every school was assigned a particular administrative district and tried to accommodate all students living in that district, whether or not they were children of base enterprise employees. The secondary school was financed from the central budget, with supplementary funding for factory training spaces or special equipment to be provided by base enterprises. 38 But local governments could not compel the industrial ministries and base enterprises to spend money on social infrastructure or schools. From this emerged the 'residual principle' of financing; that is, school funding came after industrial development. 39 Such a situation in tum led to great variability in the material bases and levels of upkeep of both general and vocational schools. It could be the case that a particular enterprise was unprofitable, or its management simply neglectful of education. 40 All of these contingencies in funding led to great variability of preparedness for further advancement among students from different regions, and to the unevenness of life-chances. 41 This delinking of life-chances from students' merit tended to undermine further the prestige of education, for a pervasive feature of Soviet education was that career success was only loosely related to students' inherent talents or personal efforts. 42 The arbitrariness of student evaluations was also aggravated by the fact that in the vertically fragmented educational system it was very difficult to implement uniform standards of evaluation. Formalism, ' percentomania,' the receipt of unearned grades, created cynicism towards the general and vocational school, and later towards labour. 43 As enterprises gradually withdrew from supporting general and vocational education, with the introduction of cost-accounting, critics began to call for more territorially based or standardized educational spending. It was usually

98

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teachers and lower-level school functionaries who first perceived a need for a stronger central government presence in the financing of schools. Inasmuch as local organs believed themselves better able to adjust to local conditions, they wished to have greater control over spending (but from a central fund). Alternatively, if funds were to be raised mainly from local sources, they nonetheless wished to have spending set according to some standard formula enforced by a sufficiently powerful level of government. 44 With the weakening of the central government by the late 1980s, however, the prospect that educational spending could be standardized across the country receded.45 In summary, the general, vocational, and technical schools operated within a context of great unevenness, both according to levels of funding and of academic standards. Local-level institutions had decided many aspects of educational policy implementation even in the heyday of the commandadministrative model. With the expansion of popular political participation in the Gorbachev period, a rational, centrally mandated educational policy would not be possible. Schools between Enterprises and Local Governments The first place in which jurisdictional confusion and low public or enterprise support for schools made itself felt was in the material base of general (and vocational) schools. Ligachev reported to the CC CPSU in 1988 that, nationwide, 21 per cent of all students attended primary and secondary schools without central heating, 30 per cent without plumbing, and 40 per cent without a sewer system.46 Nine out of ten rural schools, attended by 16 million pupils, did not have a sewage system, while 4,000 village schools did not have electricity. As of the early 1980s, 1.25 million students (3.3 per cent of the total) attended schools that should have been demolished, while 8.4 million (22 per cent) attended schools that required major repairs. Poor hygienic conditions caused high rates of illness for pupils and teachers alike; indeed, 53 per cent of all schoolchildren had health problems. Furthermore, there was much statistical padding regarding school infrastructure. The USSR Central Statistical Administration discovered that from one-ninth to one-quarter of the schools in several European and Asian republics did not in fact exist. 47 As with general schools, construction of vocational and technical schools also lagged badly during the 1980s. In 1981 and 1982, construction plans for 1711Js were fulfilled by 64 per cent and 63 per cent respectively, though they allegedly improved to 83 per cent, 86 per cent, and 79 per cent over the next three years. These higher figures, however, were disputed by Ligachev.48 Because of underfunding, SSUZ construction for 1985 was less than 64 per cent

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of the level planned. Partly owing to this lag in construction, the system of vocational and technical training had the capacity to upgrade annually only 3 of 33 million specialists employed in the economy.49 Throughout the 1980s the number of student entrants, as earlier, grew much more quickly than the pedagogical institutes', PTUs', and SSUZs' material bases. During the first thirty postwar years the number of SSUZs, for example, grew from 3,169 to 4,279, while the trainee cohort increased from 1 million to 4.4 million. That is, the number of students grew about three times more quickly than the material base. This naturally caused a running-down of the level and condition of equipment within the SSUZ system, with the result that only an insignificant number of SSUZs had a modern infrastructure. 50 A similar situation of prolonged decline in the material base obtained within the PTU system as well, where industrial ministries did not build enough new facilities. Indeed, twenty-six ministries, including some of the largest ones, had done nothing to implement the educational reform by 1986.51 For all the effort and resources that the central government invested in vocational education, the quality of students remained low. The reason for this was to a large extent the social background of vocational students. Soviet sociologists found that the career aspirations of youths varied directly with the educational attainment of their parents. Parents from the better-situated urban intelligentsia actively discouraged their children from entering the vocational trades.52 Concurrently students were 'tracked' for further education on the basis of general school performance. But as is well known, students from rural areas were at a special disadvantage in this regard, owing to the poor condition and weaker teaching staffs of rural schools. Accordingly PTUs became the repository for those weaker or difficult students whom general secondary school staff members did not wish to have in their classes. Many general school principals supported the government's vocational thrust, and the development of PTUs and instructional-production combines, because this relieved the general schools of having to offer labour training programs of their own. That is, PTUs and combines were a convenient 'dumping ground ' for mediocre or difficult students whom the secondary general schools did not wish to instruct.53 These students were carried along until the end of the eighth grade, for the practice of failing students had been practically eliminated by the early 1980s. Once they were in PTUs or technical instructional schools, the pass rates of these students remained absurdly high. In the 1980-1 academic year, for example, over 99 per cent of all students in industrial, special, and general courses received passing grades. Indeed, vocational and technical schools were not allowed to fail their charges, for these schools were required to meet planned targets for their human output. 54

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Naturally such high pass rates disguised many cases of low academic standards. One critic stated that 70 per cent of general school entrants to PfUs did not deserve a grade of '3' (that is, 3 out of 5, or an average grade). Many of these students did not know the units of measurement or multiplication tables. Another critic, the deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Education, asserted that the real pass rate of general secondary schools was about 70 to 80 per cent, and in some cases as low as 50 or 40 per cent.55 Furthermore, a large survey showed that one-quarter of the general school and PfU entrants into VU Zs, and almost one-half entering SSUZs, failed control examinations. 56 In addition to problems of underfunding and low academic standards, there were problems of curricular content and program structure. Students at all levels tended to be overloaded with too much detailed and poorly connected material. 57 There was little direct return on the investment in PfU workshops, mainly because of the structural reason that the PfU offered only one specialization; for its part the SSUZ offered only a narrow range of subjects. It was difficult to find and produce for industrial use or commercial sale an article which could link all the skills and knowledge required by students - that is, which would have instructional value for everyone. 58 This situation did not improve with the implementation of cost-accounting, for the commercial activities of technical schools fitted awkwardly into what still remained essentially an administered economy. The poor matching of students' preferences to programs available caused disillusionment and increased drop-out rates. This led to a situation in which the working class was said to be the decisive class within the community, but within which youths had a low desire to enter the working trades. 59 Recent Western analyses of curricular content disagree somewhat over whether financial hurdles or the conservatism of teachers were greater impediments to curricular change. One author observes that teachers were slow to accept the idea that they could create the content of education, either individually or at the level of the school. Furthermore, there was a general inability even well into the post-Soviet era to deal with local budgeting, to negotiate with teacher unions, and to define the roles of city and district education heads.60 Relatedly, not enough attention was given to the task of preparing teachers to carry out educational and curricular reform; teacher-education reform should have been placed before that of general and vocational education. 61 The lack of attention to instructional content was an oversight not just of the teaching establishment, but even of the teacher-reformers. The radical nature of their curriculum proposals did not disguise the fact that the reformers lacked specific advice on new activity-centred curricula. 62 At this point it is worth noting the peculiar role played by rural schools

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within the career paths of vocational students and young teachers. Despite a large agricultural labour force, the USSR continued to have difficulty feeding its population. Rural depopulation caused a serious loss of agricultural production. The rural school was therefore supposed to perform the social function of retaining personnel in rural areas. Meanwhile, these personnel were to discharge the economic tasks of the Food Program announced in 1982. Along with large spending increases on rural infrastructure called for in the Food Program, the government tried to consolidate rural schools. However, it was found that when small rural schools were closed, or when villages were amalgamated, young people would migrate directly to the cities. At the same time, maintaining a large network of small schools was very costly, and only a narrow range of subjects could be offered to pupils in these schools. This lowered pedagogical effectiveness and caused further resentment on the part of teachers who were often required to teach subjects in which they had not been trained.63 Rural teachers suffered from low social prestige and were pressed by local authorities to perform many extracurricular activities or even to do farm work.64 Yet rural schools helped shape the environment of urban ones. They made a substantial claim on resources, for by the mid- l 980s three-quarters of all schools and 40 per cent of the student body were in rural areas. 65 The 1984 reform foresaw that 48 per cent of all new school spaces would be created for village schools,66 while three-quarters of all newly trained teachers were given their first obligatory three-year postings in the villages. 67 The proportion of village youths entering urban f'fl.Js represented nearly half of the enrolment. This spoke not only of the underdevelopment of f'fl.Js in rural areas, but also of the low social status and preparation of f'fU trainees. 68 Similarly, one-quarter of all teacher trainees came from rural areas, where they had acquired weaker educational backgrounds. At the same time one-quarter of all candidates for entry into the teaching profes~ion as a whole were allowed into this profession, usually in rural areas, without entrance examinations. Thus rural schools were, in effect, the first staging points both for students, who would enter urban vocational and technical schools, and for teachers, who would later try their luck in institutions of specialized or higher education in an attempt to gain membership in the urban intelligentsia. Upon completion of their initial postings in rural areas, young teachers would start moving into the lower ranks of the teaching profession, or of other professions, in the cities.69 In sum, the rural school absorbed large national resources and depressed the quality of vocational and pedagogical job-seekers in the cities. Notwithstanding her or his dubious quality, the key figure in implementing the 1984 and 1988 reforms was held to be the teacher. This was not only a pious

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cliche, but in a perverse sense was also true in fact. For the picture of Soviet education that has been drawn so far is one of unclarity in the conceptions and aims of educational reform, and of endemic institutional fragmentation. The teacher was left, isolated, to make sense of the various instructions and demands directed towards her or him. However, the teacher functioned without effective institutional guidelines or supports - as will be seen below. Two peculiarities of the teaching profession (comprising all categories) were the 'flatness' of its status/professional structure, and the disproportion, in comparison with leading Western countries, of its academic profile. In fifteen years, between 1972 and 1987, the number of teacher trainees in educational day institutions increased by 30 per cent, while the number of entrants into pedagogical colleges (uchilishcha) almost doubled. 70 The teaching profession was bloated with junior-level, poorly paid personnel,71 while there was no incentive mechanism for better teaching or mechanism for discipline in case of poor performance. The academic profile of Soviet students at the third level is shown by Unesco data in Table 7.1. There was a much larger number of students in education (and engineering/natural sciences) in proportion to other categories of thirdlevel students than there were in several major Western countries. The table therefore indicates a peculiar type of social/industrial policy: a large number of teachers would instruct a large number of students in engineering and the natural sciences. These third-level teaching candidates, however, later taught mostly at the intermediary level. Unesco data show that whereas 33.3 per cent, 18.7 per cent, and 48.5 per cent of North American (American and Canadian) education students contemplated careers at the first, second, and third levels respectively, the corresponding figures for the 'USSR and Europe' were 18.1 per cent, 61.4 per cent, and 20.5 per cent. As for the relative proportions of teacher graduates actually employed in education, 42.4 per cent, 34.4 per cent, and 23.1 per cent of North American teachers worked at the primary, secondary, and higher levels; while 37.6 per cent, 49.8 per cent, and 12.6 per cent did so in the USSR and Europe.72 Furthermore, in conflating Soviet, East, and West European data, Unesco's figures overstate the percentage of Soviet teachers employed in upper education. Thus while 12.6 per cent of the teachers in the 'USSR and Europe' worked in higher education, the Soviet figure only is 11.5 per cent. This figure comprises 6.9 per cent for teachers in VUZs and 4.6 per cent in SSUZs - though one should remember that only part of the latter meet the Western definition of higher education. 73 It may be noted, incidentally, that North America and the Soviet Union had a virtually identical population agestructure. 74 The third peculiarity of the Soviet teaching profession was its large but poorly compensated membership. There were 3.37 million North American and

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TABLE 7.1 Percentage of Third-Level Students by Field of Study and Social Sciences

Natural Sciences, Engineering, Agriculture

29 39 38

36 27 23

Law

Germany Italy Japan Britain USSR

Education

Humanities

4 3 9 8 19

15 15 19 13 14

29

7

29

52

Medical Sciences 13 14 6 14 7

Source: Unesco, World Education Report, 1991, Paris, pp. 138-41. 5 million Soviet teachers respectively, 75 with the greater number of Soviet teachers being partly the result of a large number of small rural schools. 76 For all the size of the Soviet teaching staff, however, there were many authoritative complaints of a shortage of teachers and high turnover, especially in rural areas and Central Asia. Shortages were aggravated by high rates of teacher absenteeism (7.75 teacher-days per year), owing mainly to illness and responsibility for teachers' own children. 77 Teachers complained of the lack of leisure time for self-improvement, inadequate housing, and the long-term decline of their social status. 78 Teachers at all levels were poorly paid, with their salaries being only three-quarters of the industrial average. The 1984 reform provided for a onetime 30 to 35 per cent pay increase, which, however, brought teachers' salaries only to parity with the average industrial wage. 79 Notwithstanding the large and growing size of the teaching profession, the percentage of gross national product spent on education declined continuously during the postwar decades. To be sure, a percentage decline in educational funding was a secular trend in most developed countries. Soviet figures on educational spending vary considerably, but all indicate a significant decline in spending both as a percentage of GNP and in relation to Western countries.80 Unesco figures for the 'USSR and Europe' indicate stable spending on education as a percentage of GNP, but at a lower level than among the major Western countries. 81 In synthesizing all the points above, one sees an image of a bloated and demoralized teaching profession, whose members worked in difficult conditions. Some had entered the teaching profession with suspect qualifications, and most had low social status and salaries. Membership in this profession was not a privilege; consequently the threat of membership loss owing to performance review was not a credible one.

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Local-Level Rationalization of Vocational Education If educational administration was characterized by fragmentation and slippage at the macro level, as seen in earlier chapters, this was also true at the micro level within educational institutions themselves. Therefore, in addition to coordinating committees within various ministerial levels or territories, educational administration was supplemented by both a ministerial and an all-union system of general and vocational-technical school inspection. These two systems were to ensure program control and rationality within schools at the micro level. Perhaps the major irrationality was in funding. Each industrial ministry had its own department for personnel development and instructional institutions, and controlled a very broad spectrum of educational structures and functions. In such a context levels of financing, the material base of schools and residences, and academic standards were highly conjunctural. 82 Financial support was not at all related to the number and profile of the students instructed. Furthermore, industrial ministries controlled their own data on labour resources and training.83 This meant that there was no effective, centrally mandated formula for basic per-head funding that could ensure parity in the quality of education across institutions and professions. Since the quality of education varied widely, there was also little standardization of documentation and diplomas. 84 Industrial ministries audited their own vocational and technical schools. In such cases, 'self-auditing' of schools pertaining to industrial ministries was usually not objective; and even if auditors were brought in from neighbouring institutions, there tended to be much 'softness' and mutual protectionism among officials.85 Soviet critics agree that there were in fact no clear criteria for the auditing and inspection of instructional institutions, or the rating of teachers. 86 As a result auditing in the mid-1980s had less to do with technocratic substance than ideology, for the first aim of attestation (performance review and staff rationalization) was to raise the level of teachers' ideological-political grounding. Not surprisingly a union-wide attestation of SSUZ directors and teachers conducted in 1984 gave these staff members a clean bill of ideological and professional health. 87 The unclarity of criteria and phenomenon of mutual protectionism caused the RSFSR minister of education, however, to suspect the rigour of an attestation program in which only 102 teachers out of nearly 800,000 failed to be confirmed in their positions within the Russian republic. 88 State inspectors were poorly qualified and rewarded. They were paid even less than teachers and often had no formal training in inspection and auditing. 89 Gosinspektsiia, the State Inspection Agency covering education, had only forty SSUZ inspectors, for example, while there were over 500 different types of these schools. Given the tendency for all types of Soviet education to be narrow,

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this meant that these inspectors were ill-qualified to work outside their immediate professional areas.90 But in any event the State Inspection Agency's broad formal powers were only advisory, for the implementation of suggestions depended upon the local school administration. Inspectors seemed to confine themselves more to problems of housing and social services than of program content and delivery.91 As noted earlier, the general or vocational teacher was considered by all to be the key figure within the educational reform. Here the reform called upon the teacher, in effect, 'to teach better,' but without providing any guidance as to how.92 The old intellectual controversy over whether teaching should be primarily socializational or instructional was never resolved. Surprisingly, given the centrality of 'upbringing' within Soviet education, this concept had never in fact been thought through. This point was admitted by S. Batyshev, a leading member of the Soviet Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. Adequate research on the complete learning-labouring life cycle had not been done, said Batyshev, while accusing the APS of having worked in isolation from industry and labour collectives. 93 Similar criticisms had it that there was a basic policy confusion between 'socially useful labour' and 'productive labour' (the latter being a more utilitarian concept), or that psychological research had been subordinated to the service of a pedagogy of superficial values. 94 And though there were many calls for the need to diffuse pedagogical ' leading knowledge,' again there was no understanding of what this term meant or of criteria for it. All of these conceptual difficulties caused Ligachev himself to call for a 'reform of the reform' at a pedagogical conference in 1987.95 Given this conceptual confusion and lack of institutional support, many teachers understood the reform as a directive simply to put greater pressure on students to learn existing curricula. They did not see a need to change their own teaching methods or to improve their qualifications. 96 Because of the demands of the administrative system (rigid adherence to ideology and curricular content, mandatory pass-rates, overloading), and the lack of criteria and incentive for good teaching, many teachers fell into a standard 'rut.' The teachers worked within a context in which they could not develop their potential. These problems were partly the reason why one-quarter of pedagogical trainees dropped out of their programs, and why high out-migration from the teaching profession was typical among those who did complete their pedagogical training. 97 Such was the institutional context into which programs for the attestation of teachers and a salary increase were introduced. But teachers resented attestation. Partly they saw attestation, conducted by the schools' administrative staffs, as intrusive and controlling. Partly it missed its mark, for it tended to be simply a review of the teacher's past career path - with attention to political

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pedigree - rather than a more forward-looking document in which the teacher's future development would be mapped out and rewarded accordingly. Since the school director and administration had no discretion over salary levels, the teacher's salary was not linked to the attestation verdict. Thus attestation, where it occurred, satisfied almost no one. It was too imprecise to be of much use to school management, 98 and did not increase teacher effort or change work procedures. 99 Overall, one sees that the number of teachers was very large and that the instruments of teacher administration were unwieldy. The high turnover of underpaid teachers with low social status created a relative shortage of teachers, notwithstanding their large number. 100 Membership in the teaching profession was not a privilege; conversely, the threat of exclusion from this profession for poor performance was not a real one. The shortage of teachers defeated the process of attestation, 101 as could be easily surmised from the absurdly high approval rates cited above. The most noteworthy result of the 1984 reform was the increase in teachers' salaries. Though this increase did not improve teacher performance, it was nonetheless badly needed by underpaid personnel and stabilized the outflow of cadres from the teaching profession.102 In conclusion, the 1984 reform did not penetrate to the micro level. Microlevel coordination of educational policy was not achieved. Institutional processes at this level tended to confound the central government's educational policy; and the yield from the reform was very low. Not surprisingly the school system still failed to produce enough good workers; and the VUZs had to complete the education of secondary school graduates.103 The lack of success in school reform was admitted at the highest level in 1987, when Pravda stated that 'only "first-echelon" measures [had begun] to be implemented: pay raises for teachers, a shift to 11 years of schooling, more hours devoted to instruction in labor skills, partial review of curricula and textbooks. [But] the functional principles of the educational system were left untouched.' 104 That the 1984 measures had hardly gone anywhere was also admitted by Ligachev at the February 1988 central committee plenum devoted to educational problems. 105 It would be necessary to attempt another educational reform.

8 The 1988 Educational Debates: Paradigmatic Change and Institutional Continuity

Shifts in the Policy Elite's Perception of Problems in Education By the mid to late 1980s there was much questioning in the Soviet economic and pedagogical press of old assumptions. The extensive model of economic development and command-administrative methods of governance were, at least on the rhetorical level, deemed to be outdated. Labour was to be regarded less as a passive 'resource' for management, and more as an autonomous and active 'human factor' in all spheres of economic and social life. 1 Accordingly pedagogical science was called upon to abolish rote training of personnel for slots in the industrial economy. It was asked to nurture active students who could adapt themselves to changing technological and social conditions of the modern era. Nonetheless, the motor behind the 1988 reform was the same as four years earlier: a modernizing government that perceived broad socio-economic malaise. Industrial interests were also the same, though enterprises' interest in supporting general and vocational education declined with the advent of cost-accounting. The retention of the traditional industrial policy, lingering mental habits of managerialism, and ideological dogmas caused the policy substance of 1984 to be closely duplicated in 1988. The continuity of old interests and assumptions prevailed over professional policy criticism and societal ferment. But whereas state administrative and educational ministries were by this time in a condition of paralysis, 'societal' actors - functionally independent enterprises, municipal governments, teachers' associations, parents and students began to find their voices. They began to advance their own interests and to search for ways to provide for education where central state institutions had failed. The topic of non-governmental civic and pedagogical groups' entrance

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into the policy arena, broached in the closing pages of this chapter, will be continued in Chapter 9. By the mid-1980s Soviet economists generally realized that natural resources were no substitute for technological progress. The main reason for economic stagnation was perceived to be the extensive model of the economy, that is, the emphasis on the commodities and basic manufacturing sectors. 2 The technological lag behind the West had not narrowed during the Brezhnev era, and labour productivity was well short of world levels. 3 For his part, Ligachev noted a decrease in the rate of growth of scientific manpower, which began during the 1970s and slowed almost to a standstill in the early 1980s. The average age of the USSR Academy of Science's personnel had increased markedly. 4 In describing the country's high losses owing to an undereducated population, the first vice-chairman of the new USSR State Committee for Public Education (Gosobrazovanie) advocated a decisive shift towards the 'humanization' of education. There was, he said further, increasing functional illiteracy and professional incompetence. The old motto of 'education for all one's life' was no longer valid; instead, a system of continuous education was necessary. Narrowly qualified workers with outdated training were at a loss in non-standard production situations; this caused much damage to production. The vicechairman also acknowledged the intellectual isolation of the USSR, and wished to imitate the educational experience of foreign countries. Finally, he claimed, whereas in 1986 the Soviet Union spent 6.6 per cent of national income on education, including 1 per cent on higher education, the United States spent 12 per cent, including 4.3 per cent on higher. 5 Given all these and other problems, a party plenum devoted to education was convened in February 1988. But the more immediate impetus to the 1988 discussions of general secondary and vocational education was the refonn of higher and secondary specialized education in March 1987. This in turn had resulted from the Central Committee's new emphasis on speeding up scientific and technological progress shortly after Gorbachev's accession to the general secretaryship in March 1985. Gorbachev's objective was to apply the work of higher education and science more directly to the needs of the economy. Personnel exchanges were therefore to take place between the staffs of higher educational institutions and industrial enterprises, and instructional content was to be made more practical. 6 Students were encouraged to be more self-reliant in their studies - though these studies themselves were supposed to become more responsive to the practical needs of the economy. Thus, notwithstanding some limited gains to the autonomy of higher educational institutions and their students, higher education retreated from a relative orientation on basic science in favour of a more applied-science/economic-

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service paradigm. The Party leadership continued to regard the higher school as an important part of the entire system of labour cadre policy. 7 But higher education could not be reformed without attention to the lower educational levels that fed it, directly or indirectly. Anticipating this problem at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev advocated a unified system of continuing education. 8 Instead of 'an education for a lifetime,' the routinization of educational upgrading was to mark the modern era. Here a chorus of authoritative critics acknowledged the shortcomings of the 1984 reform of general secondary and vocational education. Echoing Pravda of 1987,9 Ligachev noted that the 1984 reform had ' bogged down ' and that 'a trend toward a slowing of development in the sphere of education in comparison with the world level has become evident. If it is not broken soon, in time we will sink into a lag that will be very dangerous for society and it will take decades to get out of it.' 10 Similarly, a high Ministry of Education official noted that the 1984 reform had accomplished almost nothing in the area of labourvocational education. 11 The reasons for the reform's failure were analysed somewhat differently by Gorbachev and Ligachev. In tacitly admitting that support for educational reform had been narrowly confined to the political summit, Gorbachev averred that the reform failed because it had not been backed up by measures to democratize education. Educators, parents, broad segments of society, and labour collectives had not been truly involved in implementing the reform. 12 Equally validly seeing the institutional fragmentation behind implementational failure, Ligachev allowed that 'the absence of a single center for the management of the reform [had) had its [harmful) effect.' 13 An academic further noted that 'the school remained essentially a closed institution without any kind of economic or administrative independence whatsoever.' 14 In other words, though the school had been closely subjected to the Party-state leadership, it remained unresponsive to this leadership or to the economy's needs. The 27th Party Congress had also endorsed a call by educational critics for much better quality of education at all levels, for better quality was necessary if the country was to move away from an extensive to an intensive economic orientation. There had been too much studying of a large volume of fragmented material, the criticism went, and not enough emphasis on individual work that would breed a culture of self-reliance and inquiry among students. Consequently the VUZs had long experienced the poor preparation of incoming secondary school graduates. 15 The earlier emphasis on the quantity of trained cadres, said Ligachev, had resulted in a 'paradoxical situation' whereby at the turn of the 1970s/1980s the Soviet Union had reached its highest attainment in history, leading the world in the number of scientists, technicians, and scientific

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workers. Nonetheless, the country had begun to relinquish its positions in the world economy. 16 The new concern with the quality of education coincided with the new emphasis on the 'human factor.' This emphasis was in turn closely related to the need, perceived most acutely by economists, to pay more attention to consumer welfare, public health, and social investment. To be sure, the new concern for the human factor was driven as much by economic reality as by benevolence towards Soviet society. In noting the increased role of this factor, one academic stated that since economic planning had not taken into account workers' social needs, planning itself was harmed. 17 Similarly the January 1987 plenum on cadre policy declared that the success of perestroika depended on skilled workers, just as the 27th Party Congress had earlier noted that one of the major aims of increased spending on the social sphere had as its further goal the formation of a suitable cohort of workers for the economy. 18 That is, for a better economy it was necessary to have better people. 19 At bottom, the new catchword of the 'human factor' disguised a large element of managerialism. The slogans concerning the human factor and social investment fitted comfortably into the tradition of social mobilization. But notwithstanding old mental habits, there was yet at least one other shift in thinking. The old command-administrative methods of economic governance were said to be no longer valid. Gorbachev explicitly repudiated the command paradigm in favour of a controlled market system in the summer of 1987, as did the 19th Party Conference of June 1988.2 Furthermore, the Conference employed the uncharacteristic language of civil rights, noting that the state had the ' responsibility before its citizens' for the creation of a law-based socialist order. 21 In sum, many traditional formulas were now questioned even at the highest level. A freer climate of political discourse and a greater opening for both 'incorporated' and autonomous societal participation had been created.

°

Political, Economic, and Institutional Continuities in Vocational Policy

In spite of the political elite's rhetorical rejection of the extensive economic model and command administration, the political and industrial interests behind the 1988 educational policy were very much the same as earlier. It was confirmed at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 that priority still belonged to the basic branches of machine-building, electronics, instrument-making, and the machine tool industry. 22 The success of perestroika was to come mainly through machine-building, however, for this sector produced one-quarter of the USSR 's industrial output and employed 16 million workers. During 1986-90

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the machine-building sector was to receive an investment increase of 80 per cent over the previous five years. Machine-building output would exceed that of industry as a whole by 1.9 times, while the production increases in lathebuilding, computational equipment, instrument-making, and electrotechnical industry would rise 1.3 to 1.6 times more quickly than in machine-building itself. There would be a much smaller increase in consumer welfare. Overall agricultural production was to rise by 14 to 16 per cent, while the output of foodstuffs, meat, and dairy products was to increase by 18 to 20 per cent and the production of non-food consumer goods by 1.3 times. 23 Along with the reinforcement of the traditional sectors of the economy, now with added attention to electronics, there was a retreat from the broad-scale development of basic science. The 27th Party Congress listed three main goals of science policy. First, there was to be a concentration of resources on the main sciences currently being developed. Second, there was to be rnassive use of reliable, tested technologies. And, only third, there would be an accelerated development of new technologies. 24 In a like economic-service/applied science vein, one economist, echoing the views of others in his profession, advocated a quick payoff using already developed technologies as opposed to the search for new ones. 25 Soviet experts recommended a retrenchment to narrower and more realistic goals in science and economic policy. Concurrently the Gorbachev leadership decided that education, including polytechnical labour education, was to be the 'motor' of production. This term became part of the public policy jargon of the mid-1980s. Education's centrality to economic modernization was confirmed at the highest level by Gorbachev and Ligachev at the February 1988 CPSU plenum on educational reform. 26 There was much continuity not only of economic policy, but also of institutional processes within the economy. Boris Rumer found that capital investment in the USSR was actually not well controlled, and that investment was characterized by much inertia_and its own dynamics. The construction of canals, hydroelectric stations, oil and gas pipelines, railways, and the extraction of ores took up the lion's share of investment resources. These were the sectors, Rumer said, in which it was easiest to spend funds: 'The simpler a project is, technologically speaking, and the larger it is in terms of cost, the greater the enthusiasm with which the government bureaucracy will greet and carry it out. ' 27 Furthermore, he noted, the big industrial policy 'winner,' the machine-building sector, could not efficiently absorb all the investment funds it was suddenly given. Conversely, spending on consumer welfare and social investment reached a postwar historical low, in relative terms. The share of investment in the consumer sector and construction of housing, schools, and hospitals had dropped continuously from 41 per cent of all capital investment in 1951-5 to 34

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per cent in 1981-5. Investment remained oriented on extensive development and, as Rumer put it, on moving earth and rock.28 Since the macro economy was oriented towards the traditional industries, it was difficult to reorient the labour force towards 'post-industrial' professions. The director of the Economics Research Institute, attached to the State Planning Committee, estimated that about 16 million workers would need to be shifted from production to services if national income were to be doubled by the year 2000. Yet the problem here was the historically low and declining prestige of intellectual professions, and the low pay of tertiary-sector workers.29 There was little incentive for students to shift to newer service or intellectual professions. The shifting of workers out of material production was further hampered by a law that required enterprises to find new employment for released workers. 30 Moreover, there was a deep conservatism in actual public administration. The leadership's managerial habits of thinking remained mostly intact. Thus Gorbachev implied that there was little wrong with managerialism per se, but that the Soviet Union had merely made a wrong choice of technologies as opposed to the West. 31 Characterizing the 27th Party Congress of 1986 as 'still a high mass of the old communism, ' John Gooding averred that perestroika began in earnest only at the January 1987 plenum. Despite Gorbachev's democratizing thrust, said Gooding, Gorbachev continued to defend the Communist Party's monopolistic position. 32 Other Western commentators agree, in this vein, that notwithstanding some bows to local soviets, the intent of Gorbachev's measures was to strengthen the branch basis of economic management. Though local soviets were given some increased powers, this could not be seen as a wholesale attack on the branch system. The latter remained intact. 33 Consonant with the Gorbachev leadership's centralizing and rationalizing proclivities, labour and educational policy-makers called for the development of both a coherent system of labour upgrading and placement and an orderly system of continuing education. Summarizing the managerial mood of the day, S. Batyshev, a high official from the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, promised that responsible bodies would henceforth do a better job of labour forecasting.34 He thus forgot his colleagues' rhetoric of greater student choice in study and careers. Given the strong elements of elite conservatism, the new ferment within the pedagogical community probably came too late to affect the Party leadership's proposals regarding general and secondary specialized education the following year. The overarching goals of the Gorbachev regime from 1985 to its practical demise in the late 198Os were rationalization and centralization on the administrative level, and greater discipline (disguised as democratization) at the societal level. Echoing Ligachev's view on the need for institutional rationalization,

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the first vice-chairman of the CPSU Ideological Department further blamed the limited nature of the 1984 reform measures, their faulty extensive orientation, and the sluggishness of the administrative framework for the reform 's failure. Educational reform received its 'second wind,' he said, only at the February 1988 plenum on education, after which a unitary administrative organ was created. This organ was the USSR State Committee for Public Education. This superministry was meant to have a broader view of education than the three line educational ministries that comprised it. 35 But if on the educational side of administration the trend was towards centralization, on the labour side the trend was the opposite. The June 1987 plenum had encouraged enterprises to plan their own labour needs and to participate in regional planning. A greater role in allocating economized labour, and in the building of new instructional institutions, was also foreseen for local governments. 36 Regarding the second broad aspect of Gorbachev's social policy, the managerial desire was to use the educational system in order to increase the social discipline of society. Thus by means of the union-wide attestation program (described in Chapter 7) the old Ministry of Education sought to increase school directors' and teachers' personal responsibility for 'final results' (the quantity of graduates produced and placed in employment slots).37 The same disciplinarianism applied to parents' legal responsibility for their childrens' adjustment to the school. Concurrently, parents were to be co-opted into the school system by being given more rights to participate 'as full members' of school collectives and pedagogical councils. 38 Adhering to the tradition of the mobilization of parents and students, a prominent member of the new State Committee for Public Education reminded his audience in the wake of the February 1988 educational plenum of the need to improve upbringing work and to combat enemy ideology. Perestroika should retain sufficient space for patriotic and international education. Another academic noted, similarly, that resources for ideological upbringing remained a component of better vocational training.39 As shown earlier, there was a strong pro-vocational momentum to industrial and educational policy prior to - and following - the 1987 plenum. Planning officials anticipated that the proportion of secondary students receiving a vocational education on the basis of an incomplete general program would increase from 33.7 per cent in 1985 to 41.7 per cent in 1990.40 Noting in the same vein that knowledge soon became dated and 'useless,' a well-known sociologist advocated not a longer, but a shorter, university education devoted to theoretical subjects. The majority of university students should receive a more applied education; only a minority needed a stronger theoretical grounding. 41 Officially, however; the principle of broader vocational education on the basis of a complete general program seemed to have won a qualified victory at the February

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1988 plenum. Thus the general school would now be the main link within the educational system. The general school was formally relieved of the task of training cadres for the mass trades, though young people would still have the option of obtaining a vocational training on the basis of an incomplete secondary education. 42 Still, there was much vagueness in the new formula. In a keynote address on education, carried in Pravda and lzvestiia, Ligachev stated that 'there is no doubt that Soviet [general) schools are labour oriented, and they are increasingly called on to be so.' At the same time he recommended greater diversity for secondary education: Everyone agrees with the principles of ... unified, labour-oriented and polytechnical school(s]. But in fact we have rigidified and overforrnalized them ... The schools should not be uniform in the primitive sense of standardization that still defines the activity of entire teaching collectives and has a strong effect on the management of school affairs ... It is from positions of recognizing behind socialism a wealth of colors and a broad field for exploration, experimentation, and the fruitful manifestation of diversity that we must approach the tasks of the present and future of all our public education. 43

In making his recommendation for greater diversity, Ligachev admitted that there was little to be gained from offering labour instruction in general schools. Most general schools did not have the facilities, personnel, or the time to give young people instruction in complicated occupations. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of vocational instruction from general schools did not mean, he emphasized, that this implied the weakening of the labour principle in these schools. Holding to their traditional mind-set, Gorbachev, Ligachev, and others wanted greater and more 'demo.cratic' social science content, more self-directed learning by students, and a 'properly structured' use of students' free time. 44 In effect, elite policy-makers still desired the voluntary mobilization of society (students and parents) behind ministry-led and ideologically coloured programs. Attesting to the continued importance of ideology, preference in the selection of candidates for SSUZs, for example, was still being given to 'activists' over 'practicals' on the eve of the 1988 plenum. The former were considered to have a better professional grounding, knew how to work with people, and 'were not afraid of taking responsibility' in the course of implementingperestroika.45 The 1988 Reform Proposals Notwithstanding the new criticisms and doubts surrounding educational policy,

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the actual proposals coming out of the 1988 educational reform discussions were much the same as in 1984. Though there were significant changes (as well as continuities) in rhetoric, the new reform proposals were very ambiguous, and changes were not implemented. The proposals and measures growing out of the 1988 discussions were less than met the eye. One shift that did occur was in the government's view of general and labour education: there was to be a change-over to training broadly qualified professionals.46 Relatedly, the concept of upbringing would have a new meaning: it would emphasize independence, creative initiative, social responsibility, and personal development. 47 Upbringing in some active sense of the term was to be valued over plain instruction, and student Jabour was to be 'real' labour. Accordingly the 1988 plenum decided that democratization, humanization, and orientation towards the student should be the main features of perestroika. Still there was no agreement as to what 'democratization' and 'humanization' actually meant. In the absence of conceptual clarity, local pedagogical collectives were unable to take advantage of their new rights to shape curricula.48 The formally operative documents in general and vocational education remained the legislation of 1984 and the 'Rules (Ustav) of the Secondary General Education School,' published in early 1987. The Rules stated that 'the secondary general education school [was] a single, Jabour-oriented, polytechnical school that provide[d] children and young people with a general secondary education and communist upbringing.' As earlier, Jabour upbringing within the general school was to lead to an 'informed choice' of career. The vocational thrust of the general school provisions was clearly indicated by the fact that the school year was lengthened substantially in order to allow for more labour content. The school term for grades five to seven was increased by ten days; for grades eight and nine by sixteen days; and for grade ten by twenty. 49 The legal age limit for certain types of adolescent labour was reduced. 50 It was projected for the twelfth five-year plan that PTU construction would remain at a high level (810,000 new spaces),51 and that there would be continued expansion of the instructional-production combines. 52 The February 1988 plenum listed a further set of principles and goals for general and vocational education; these were similar to the earlier Rules. The plenum repeated that vocational students would be given a broader academic grounding. To this end, as noted, comprehensive general secondary education would serve as the basis for further vocational and technical training. Other provisions had a more pro forma - or wishful - air about them. Accordingly there was to be a broad-scale upgrading of equipment in general, vocational, and higher schools during the thirteenth five-year plan. Departmental barriers in administration were somehow to be eliminated in the course of implementing a

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unified state policy on education. At the same time stronger links among all types of instructional, research, and production collectives would be established. There would be the 'all-encompassing democratization' of public education, and the raising of the 'independence and responsibility' of instructional collectives. Additionally, the system of teaching and upgrading of pedagogical cadres would be transformed, and a ' deep-rooted improvement' in academic/ research work would occur within public education. 53 Regarding more concrete measures, the old idea of further polytechnizing the general school was retained. Also retained was the managerial goal of a broad state system of vocational guidance for youth, a major link within which would still be the general school. There was, finally, to be closer integration between base enterprises and vocational schools, or between enterprises and interbranch special instructional schools. The plenum's instructions were permeated with contradictory centralizing and decentralizing language in related policy areas. In higher education, for example, VUZs were encouraged to attune themselves more closely to the needs of industry. On the other hand, they were to be given greater opportunity to participate at the policy-setting stage within the USSR State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the Ministry of Higher Education, and the Academy of Sciences. 'Leninist principles' in the settling of school affairs were also to be extended to local governments. Accordingly statecommunity organs of educational administration were to be established and attached to the Soviets of People's Deputies at the municipal and city levels, and to councils of public education chosen at professional conferences. The 'role and responsibility' of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was to be increased; and the Academy was to be given an interdepartmental character. This would enable the Academy to concentrate on the 'comprehensive working out of urgent problems of individual personality development, continuous education, [and] communist upbringing.' 54 As in prior formulations, the plenum assumed that the decisive figure in all of education was the teacher, who in turn was to be relieved of 'petty regulation.' There were the usual bows to communist ideals and morals. Therefore, the aesthetic upbringing of young people was to be improved, providing them with 'strong immunity from spiritual emptiness, [and] the influence of bourgeois "mass culture."' Party and community organs at all levels were asked to aid the development of a morally strong family unit. These organs would also 'flexibly intervene in the working content of instructional institutions.' The role of Primary Party Organizations within these institutions was to be strengthened to this end. 55 The listing of general principles above shows that the 1988 instructions were

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fully within the tradition of Party dominance of education, and that the vocational paradigm remained mostly intact. Despite some liberalizing language, there was a strong desire to retain old aims and methods of educational governance. In any event, the plenum's instructions were so wishful and vague that they provided practically no workable guidelines for educational personnel. There were, however, some significant new features that emerged from the plenum discussions. It was now broadly accepted that educational spending was too low. Ligachev proposed greater expenditures on education, and stated that there would be a 1.7-time increase in capital expenditures on schools during the twelfth five-year plan over the eleventh.56 Another landmark change proposed at the plenum was the abolition of grades for student discipline and behaviour. 57 This represented a major step away from the traditional compulsion of students. It now became common for teachers to call for the 'unchaining' or 'de-enserfment' (raskreposhchenie) of education. This term was used at the highest level by Gennadii Iagodin, the chairman of the new State Committee for Public Education, at the 19th Party Conference of June 1988.58 But here it should be emphasized that no comprehensive reform document on education emerged from the 1988 plenum or the 19th Party Conference. These meetings provided only criticisms and suggestions, some wishes for the future, and a new climate of discourse that permitted franker discussion of education's problems. As earlier, the government initiated policy discussion and then either walked away from further involvement, or lacked the means to provide ongoing direction. Educational policy continued to drift. The difference now, however, was that autonomous civic actors in education were starting to form and move into the policy vacuum left by state institutions. A non-governmental pedagogical community had emerged by 1988. In his New Year's message the editor of the Teachers' Gazette stated that the newspaper should in the first instance struggle for the interests of teachers.59 That is, the newspaper should no longer be merely a mobilizational instrument of the government, but an organ for professional advocacy. Soon following the 19th Party Conference, two draft documents representing rival bids for educational leadership appeared. One bid was from the more 'incorporated' Academy of Pedagogical Sciences; the other came from a voluntary and autonomous working group of educators called the Provisional Scientific-Research Collective (Vremennyi nauchno-issledovatel 'skii kollektiv). w There was little difference of principle between the two, general, programs. The APS pronounced that current labour education was too narrowly utilitarian. It also suggested that the central government continue to provide base funding and set overall strategies for education. Local organs, being better able to adjust

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to local conditions, should guide educational subsystems. Accordingly the APS suggested the decentralization of educational spending.61 The Research Collective's program was similar, further agreeing with the APS that the general school should be the basic one within the educational system. However, the Collective's bid seemed to be more infused with a spirit of criticism and change than the one from the discredited APS. In any event, the Collective was supported by the State Committee for Public Education. It intended to develop a new strategic program and to present its proposals to the first all-union Congress of Workers in Public Education upcoming in December 1988.62 Gennadii Iagodin, the minister of the State Committee for Public Education, and who later chaired the congress, had realized in the wake of the February plenum that there was still no coherent educational policy in place. Only now was there developing a fundamental debate on the school's mission. 63 An Ambiguous Balance between Change and Continuity

In his keynote address to the Congress of Workers in Public Education, Iagodin stated that the congress's mandate was to review the work of the prior CPSU plenum on school reform. 64 Notably, the congress executive was independent of the government, for it was elected by the general (dues-paying) membership. 65 A definite signal that times had changed was sent to the congress in the form of the CC CPSU's greetings to the participants. The Central Committee recognized that education had experienced 'serious damage during the years of stagnation' - that education had been characterized by a wholesale, 'extensive' approach, and that formalism, levelling, and uniformity in the teaching process had impeded the development of young talents. The country had paid dearly for these mistakes, the message continued, with the lowered authority of knowledge, a lag in science, and the spiritual impoverishment of daily life. 66 Iagodin enlarged on some of these themes in his address to the congress, 'Through Humanization and Democratization to a New Quality of Education.' He presented a long and eclectic list of criticisms. Some of these have already been given in general terms; others may be listed in order to convey the spirit of the congress. The general school was overloaded, said Iagodin. Whereas during the 1950s and 1960s fourteen courses were offered, currently twenty-two subjects were taught in too little depth. 67 He recommended more flexibility in core courses, and that republics and provinces should be able to determine 50 per cent of the course content. Instead of having textbooks ordered by the ministries of education, textbook writing should be done on the basis of free competition among any writers who wished to take on this task. Further, since technology now

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advanced more rapidly than people's ability to keep up, it was necessary to develop the integrated knowledge of students. Regarding the latter, he said, without a doubt the main orientation should be to develop individuality (lichnost'), or qualities of inquiry and independence. It should be admitted that people had differing abilities and that a corresponding variety of instructional institutions was necessary in order to realize the potential of all students. 68 But there was a note of foreboding in Iagodin 's address. Though the problems of education had finally caught the attention of the government, education's brief 'golden age,' highlighted by the February plenum, had already ended. That is, more pressing problems of the political and economic decay of the Soviet state were drawing the summit leadership's attention elsewhere. For their part, though the congress delegates_ laid bare the dilemmas faced by educators, they produced a wide divergence of opinion concerning possible solutions. 69 The congress therefore produced a curious Resolution, which presumed to advise the government on educational policy, but also deferred to the government's educational arms. There was consensus at the congress that no deep reconstruction of general and vocational education had been achieved. To blame were extreme centralization, the insufficient initiative of republican organs, conservatism, the indifference of some teachers, and interference in school affairs by incompetent individuals and organizations. Alluding to low public support for education, the Resolution stated that the key to the reconstruction of education was the raising of its social and economic value. 70 In calling at the congress for greater educational spending, Iagodin noted that whereas the Soviet Union spent 58 rubles (about $100) annually on each general school student, the Swedish figure was $1,000. And whereas the Soviet Union spent 2,400 rubles per VUZ student, the figure for major Western countries was $80,000. 71 Further advising the government, the congress called on the latter to share power with societal actors through a 'state-community' system of instructional institutions. Deferring to the government(s), the congress asked the State Committee for Public Education and the republican organs of education themselves to refine the documents and recommendations of the February plenum. Likewise, the Resolution asked the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to play a principally new and larger role in educational development. In keeping with earlier tradition, the congress also emphasized that the upbringing of young citizens in the spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism remained the great calling of the Soviet school. The Resolution recommended improvement in the upbringing and career orientation of youths on the vague basis of the 'organic linking of productive labour with instruction and

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polytechnical education within the secondary and higher school.' All possible means, the Resolution said, should be used in developing the mutual activity of general and vocational schools with production and science.72 Overall the congress both led and followed in educational policy. Though the appearance of an independent congress of teachers was a significant event in the development of an educational policy community, it should not be surprising that its participants were bounded to a large degree by traditional worldviews. In any event, the congress's resolutions were vague. The congress declined to play a more active role in educational leadership. Instead it called upon the government itself, through its educational ministry and APS arms, to flesh out the decisions of the February plenum. Institutional and policy leadership was left suspended midway between an incapable government and a not yet fully formed and confident pedagogical community. The latter continued to find expression within given governmental structures. Yet if a non-governmental ' pedagogical society' was still maturing and gaining self-esteem, there was also occurring the emancipation, so to speak, of 'economic society' brought about by the collapse of central planning. Unfinished capital construction totalled 8.2 billion rubles in 1987, 13.3 billion in 1988, and leaped to 39 billion in 1989 - absorbing four-fifths of the increase in national income of that year. The year 1988 witnessed an explosion of new construction projects - 40 per cent over the previous year. 73 In 1989 the government cancelled 24,000 projects, but initiated 146,000 new ones.74 The government's loss of control over investment was the result of two main factors: (1) under the new Law on State Enterprises, enterprises had gained the right to invest substantial resources outside the control of governmental agencies, and (2) those ministries that had not yet lost investment funds became more eager to invest than before. That is, both enterprises, which had switched to self-financing, and ministries were in a hurry to stake out their investment projects.75 Given the central government's loss of direction over the economy, enterprises were becoming the main protagonists in economic development. Henceforth both industrial policy and vocational education would be increasingly driven - or neglected - by enterprise power. In summary, the 1988 policy year began with the February CPSU plenum on education. This plenum represented an overall victory of the old conservatism, of traditional slogans, and failed to produce a clear and viable blueprint for the future . Speaking of the intractable problems of Soviet bureaucratic policymaking, Mark Beissinger has aptly noted that ' one of the striking patterns in Soviet politics has been the way in which the Soviets constantly rediscover the same troubles and then resort to the same solutions, resolutions, prescriptions, and decrees for dealing with these problems.' 76 Similarly one may agree with

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Jan Winiecki that the low learning capacity of Soviet administrative structures was often not appreciated by outside observers. 77 But 'societal' actors, though weak and tentative, were seeking alternative solutions to the educational bureaucracy's problems. Accordingly 1988 ended with the all-union Congress of Workers in Public Education. Its major accomplishment was to shake, if not yet to overturn, the old assumptions of February. However, the congress, too, failed to produce concrete and workable measures for the future . Given this policy vacuum, while taking into account the new requirements of the era, the best that the State Committee for Public Education could do the following year was to draft four statutes: for secondary and vocational schools, for secondary specialized schools, and for higher education. All of these anticipated greater choices and participatory rights for societal actors. Thus the statutes: (1) accepted differentiation and choice in the types of schools students would attend and the curricula they would study, (2) envisioned more freedom for individuals, schools, regions, and republics, (3) noted that schools would receive money from the state, but could raise additional sums on their own, and (4) said that there would be elections to the school councils, whose membership would comprise teachers, students, parents, and outside interests. 78 All this represented the democratization and maturation of Soviet society in general. It also represented the further decentralization of educational policymaking. Educational policy formulation would henceforth be, much as in the West, the outcome of the interplay of interests - governmental, economic, professional, and parental.

9 Institutional and Societal Realignments in Vocational Education, 1989-1991

Policy Outcomes in Vocational-Technical Education

A large array of conceptual and implementational problems resulted in a very low yield from the 1984 educational reform and the 1988 debates. Accordingly autonomous civic participation within official institutional frameworks would be necessary in order to help rectify misconceived and uncoordinated state policies. The present chapter identifies sources of dynamism within the newly autonomous industrial and educational communities and illustrates the flux and adaptation in educational policy from 1989 to the close of 1991. Here it is time to return to a theme broached in the introduction to this book that is, PfUs and SSUZs as proxies, respectively, for a blue-collar-based, traditional economy, or for more technology and services-led economic development. In other words, was there an effective shift in emphasis away from the simpler vocational school and towards the SSUZ? Was there a de-blue-collarization of the workforce? If not, what particular difficulties stood in the way of change? Growing out of the June 1987 plenum was the perception that SSUZ education should be expanded. 1 The authoritative journal Kommunist later spoke of the frighteningly low intellectual attainment of Soviet youth, and noted that the population's level of education placed the USSR 'somewhere at the tail-end of the developed countries of the world. ' Kommunist suggested that not even SSUZs, but universities, should play the leading role within the educational system. 2 It was now generally admitted that the quality of SSUZ and engineering graduates was low. Though the USSR had 6.5 million engineers as opposed to 2.4 million in the United States, Soviet engineers' greater numbers did not reflect greater output. Soviet engineers worked inefficiently, in part, because there were only 1.4 technicians assisting each Soviet engineer, in contrast to five or ten technicians for each American one. 3 This low ratio of technicians to

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engineers owed partly to the fact that SSUZs had come to train more for the blue-collar professions than for proper specialities.4 Furthermore, the SSUZ curriculum was said to have changed only six times in forty-two years, a rate that was too slow to keep up with changing technologies.5 This slow rate of curriculum modernization was probably related to the slow introduction of new technologies themselves. As noted in Chapter 3, the occupational profile of the Soviet population had not noticeably changed over recent years. To the close of the 1980s almost 70 per cent of all employed in the economy were workers in 'physical labour,' of which about half performed manual labour. 6 That is, while the population became better educated over time, the modernization of actual job content proceeded much more slowly. Mental labour was underutilized and undervalued. The State Planning Committee calculated that approximately 50 per cent of people with higher and secondary education did not work according to their chosen professions.7 Many SSUZ graduates probably shifted into manual occupations voluntarily, for they received only 91 per cent of the salary of qualified workers. 8 But even within the service and white-collar categories, professional qualifications appear to have been low. Thus, in addition to the example of poorly qualified engineers given above, only 1.4 of 5.5 million Soviet economists had a higher education. 9 Further, belying the stereotype of a highly bureaucratized society, the Soviet Union was actually much undergoverned. 10 Though the USSR had an administrative apparatus of 18 million employed at all levels of economic administration, a number that comprised 14 per cent of the country's labour force, the American figure for economic administrators (that is, workers in commerce, financial services, and law) was plausibly put by one Soviet academic at 27 per cent. 11 The USSR lacked a broad layer of middle and upper-category service and white-collar expertise for economic management. Accordingly, on the related topic of curricular reform in technical and higher schools, one Russian writer noted of the close of the Soviet era that 'the need to introduce new content, methods, and structures into the former USSR systems of education was not met by the system itself, by professors and teachers, but penetrated it via the badly damaged social environment, i.e., as a side effect of the failure of communist ideology, the crisis of the centrally planned economy, and the political dismantlement of the USSR.' He added that the failure of Soviet pedagogical theory and practice created a high demand for foreign curricula and teaching methods, especially in business courses. A Western diploma would therefore be considered the best possible for employment or further education, and would serve as an official indicator of the quality of education. 12 Notwithstanding the greater amount of rhetoric devoted to SSUZs from the mid to late 1980s, recent data show that a realignment in favour of SSUZs had

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Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991

TABLE 9.1 Number of Students by Level of Study (in thousands)

PTU

ssuz vuz *

1980/1

1985/6

1987/8

1988/9

1989/90

1990/1

1990/1 1980/1

3,971 4,612 5,236 42,108

4,174 4,498 5,147 50,383

4,340 4,448 5,026 53,120

4,135 4,372 4,999 47,619

3,891 4,231 5,178 43,500

3,614 4,097 5,162 35,958

91 .0% 88.8% 98.6% 85.3%

*Learning new occupations and raising qualifications at enterprises, institutions, organizations, and collective farms, and those learning a second profession. Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 213.

not occurred by 1990/1. Table 9.1 indicates that between the 1980/1 and 1990/1 academic years, the number of students within institutions of higher learning was stable, with the 1990/1 figure being 98.6 per cent of the 1980/1 total. There was a more marked loss of students from the PTUs, with the 1990/1 number being 91.0 per cent of that a decade earlier. The SSUZs trailed the other two categories, with the 1990/1 number of students being 88.8 per cent of the earlier level. Likewise, the number of students learning new occupations and raising their qualifications fell to 85.3 per cent of the level ten years prior. The significant decline in retraining and upgrading, as noted in Chapter 3, owed to the introduction of cost-accounting at enterprises. More cost-conscious enterprises reduced their expenditures on labour force upgrading, while the state, evidently, did not make up the financial outlays for upgrading. The reduction in PTU and SSUZ gross enrolment was not to be unexpected, as the percentage of youths within the total population declined. Within this decline, to repeat, the SSUZ fared slightly worse than the PTU. VUZ enrolments held their own, perhaps because of steady social demand. However, the decline in the number of youths entering education had probably not yet been reflected in gross enrolment statistics at the VUZ level. The above figures indicate both a shrinking of the industrial labour contingent (forced on the USSR by a declining birthrate), as well as the at least temporary stabilization of higher education for reasons that are not yet clear. The dynamics of SSUZ entrants according to academic profile are no less interesting. Table 9.2 indicates that the number of SSUZ entrants for all categories in 1990 was 93.0 per cent of the 1980 figure. One notes an across-the-board decline of entrants into the traditional occupations of industry and construction (to 83.7 per cent), agriculture (to 78.6 per cent), and transport and communications (to 91.4 per cent). More significant is the shared decline in 1990 of the category of 'economics and law' to 87.5 per cent of the 1980 figure. That is, to

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TABLE 9.2 Enrolments in Secondary Specialized Instructional Institutions by Category of Institution (in thousands) 1990 1980 Enrolled in SSUZs 1,457.0 Industry and construction 547.3 Agriculture 245.9 Transport and communications 115.0 Economics and law 199.7 Health, physical culture, and sport 169.4 Education 148.1 Art and cinematography 31 .6

1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

1,513.0

1,525.9

1,459.6

1,372.5

1,355.9

*93.0%

550.7 242.8

544.4 236.3

511 .7 216.0

476.6 201.6

458.1 193.5

*83.7% *78.6%

113.4 193.3

114.2 192.8

105.3 183.6

89.3 174.3

93.7 174.9

*91 .4% *87.5%

191.4 193.8

208.1 203.6

213.3 203.3

212.7 191 .5

221 .5 *130.7% 187.1 *126.3%

27.6

26.5

26.4

26.5

27.1

1980

*85.7%

*Author's calculations. Source: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSR v 1990g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 225.

1990 there had not been any shift into the social sciences, even according to the truncated definition of these sciences. Economics and law-related branches of expertise remained static right to the close of the 1980s. Also noteworthy is the rapid increase in the category of public education or 'enlightenment.' The figure for this category peaked in 1987, while the 1990 figure was still 126.3 per cent of the one a decade earlier. These statistics indicate the success of governmental policy in increasing and maintaining the overall number of teachers in the country. But here, to digress for a moment, this figure represents an increase of teacher trainees who would later teach in the same style as earlier. As was argued in Chapter 8, the February 1988 CPSU plenum on education and the teachers' congress later that year did not produce a workable agreement on new methods and content of instruction. This meant that large numbers of new teaching graduates were released onto the teaching market, but that they continued to teach in the same manner as before. The 1984 and 1988 educational measures had a momentum that carried mostly unaltered into the 1990s. As Eduard Dneprov, later to become the Russian minister of education, noted: The school refonn of 1984 [read also 1988) not only did not eliminate the crisis of the school, but in fact deepened it.

It cannot actually be called a refonn, inasmuch as it was

not preceded by a sober, critical analysis of school affairs in the country, by the working

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Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991

out of a mechanism for the necessary transformations, or by the [necessary] economic, legal, pedagogical, and organizational bases.13

Similarly, another critic complained that large numbers of teachers were not, as they were called on to be, in the vanguard of perestroika. Instead they constituted an inert and conservative force against educational change. 14 But if, to return to the theme of enrolments, the SSUZ system remained underdeveloped to the close of the 1980s this did not mean that the PTU was any longer favoured. With the rolling of the three traditional educational ministries into the State Committee for Public Education, the PTU appears to have lost some of its identity vis-a-vis the general school. Since the general school had been nominally relieved of its task of servicing the labouring trades, vocational instruction was now in the shadow of general education. The USSR later Russian - Ministry of Education began to hire considerably more personnel to administer the general rather than vocational education system. By the close of 1991, only 100 staff members of the RSFSR Ministry of Education worked in the vocational branch, while 440 were employed in the general education stream. State resources for the PTU began to decline. 15 A decline in support for the PTU had also occurred because of costaccounting in 1988. At that time the view was popular among some elite educational officials that the PTU should become legally part of the base enterprise. However, PTU teachers and directors feared that the transfer of PTUs to the base enterprises would lead to the loss of financial support, and that vocational education would be forgotten by the new superministry. 16 Nonetheless, PTUs were transferred in the fall of 1988 to the jurisdiction of the base enterprises. As the PTU teachers and directors had foreseen, the PTU system was not saved by this measure. Where this did not lead to a decline in financial support, it led to the utilitarianization of vocational education. The PTU and SSUZ would henceforth have to compete more for the support of industry and rely less on the support of government. 17 The transfer of PTUs to industrial jurisdiction created another problem that soon became apparent: the need for the (now bankrupt) state to provide social support for those PTU students and schools not wanted by the base enterprises. The government was accused of failing to pay for youths' adjustment just at the crucial time of the PTUs' orientation to an emerging market. Here the delicate problem was to create a new system of vocational schools sensitive to the needs of the market, but still supported by the rapidly weakening state. 18 Instead, the government decided to let the PTU system fend for itself. There was occurring a shift in policy emphasis from vocational education to general; and a shift in support for vocational schools from the public sector to industry.

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The implications of these shifts need deeper analysis. But it may be surmised that (1) enterprises were gaining a greater voice in vocational education, both over its content and its upkeep, and (2) the state's role would now be one not so much of initiation in socio-economic policy, but of helping in the adjustment of emerging market and societal forces. In this connection a crucial area of educational policy was that of financing. Obviously, any proactive governmental policy should be backed up with sufficient financial resources. But here, though Soviet calculations on global educational spending vary significantly, all agree that spending declined over time. Thus, for example, one author of a recent appraisal of educational and cadre policy stated that from 1965 to 1985 spending fell from 7.3 per cent to 5.2 per cent of national income, and from 11.4 per cent to 7.7 per cent of the state budget. 19 For his part, the first deputy director of the Central ·Committee Ideological Department admitted that the USSR was practically the only country where state budget expenditures on education had been frozen: 5.6 per cent of the budget in 1980 and 5.5 per cent in 1988 was spent on education. 20 State budget expenditures in 1983 accounted for 80.2 per cent of global expenditures on education, while expenditures by 'enterprises and organizations' increased fourfold between 1960 and 1983, to 6.3 per cent. 21 The remainder of educational funding, presumably, came from various governments below the union level. In belated recognition of the underfunding of education, the central government began in the late 1980s to increase its appropriations for this area. Thus Gorbachev reported that for the 1989 budget year an additional 6 billion rubles were found for education, the same as for public health. Thirty-seven per cent more schools were being commissioned during the twelfth five-year plan than were commissioned during the prior five-year period, and the salaries of teachers were increased. 22 A large part of these salary increases, however, seems to have been lost to inflation as the USSR's domestic deficit mounted to 100 billion rubles. 23 Teachers' salaries in 1988 were still only 78 per cent of the national average, whereas they had been 87 per cent in 1960. 24 This was said to have resulted in a situation where youths were quitting the teaching profession, leaving behind older teachers. 25 This picture is anomalous, however, for census data in Table 9.2 above show that the number of entrants into pedagogical institutions continued to increase. This indicates that teachers' salaries, or other job benefits, were attractive enough to bring considerable numbers of new entrants into the teaching profession, especially for the peak years of 1987 and 1988. It also seems to indicate a subsequent increase in the number of young transient teachers, that is, of teachers who used their profession as a stepping-stone to better careers in other fields as a perception of low salaries and benefits took over.

130 Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991 Institutional Shifts in the Delivery of Vocational and Technical Education

If on the policy level the emphasis began gradually to shift away from vocational education to general, and from the I7fU towards the SSUZ, the inertia of earlier measures continued to retard adjustment to the 1990s. As the tables above indicated, the relative numbers of I7fl.Js, SSUZs, and VUZs, and the profile of their students, had not changed appreciably to 1990/1. On the institutional level, however, changes were suddenly much more noticeable, if not yet clear in their direction. The most obvious and significant institutional change was the financial collapse of the central government. This collapse set in train a number of other, sometimes contradictory, realignments lower down the educational hierarchy. By 1989 it was universally acknowledged that the central government no longer had the capacity to finance education as earlier. Schools of all types would have to seek funds from other sources, in the first instance from enterprises. 26 A tendency, documented earlier, for power to shift to various types of local institutions such as municipal governments and enterprises was reinforced by a January 1988 governmental resolution 'On Ensuring Efficient Employment of the Population, Improving the Job Placement System, and Strengthening Social Guarantees for the Working People.' This resolution shifted responsibility for the placement of dismissed workers from their employing enterprises to - not yet well established - state labour bureaus. The resolution called, again, on local governments and trade unions to cooperate in the transfer and placement of released workers. 27 The balance of functions was clearly moving towards the enterprises and away from various state committees and industrial ministries. Shortly thereafter, the central economic bureaucracy was significantly downsized, with a 30 per cent average reduction in the staffs of Moscow bureaucratic organizations.28 On the industrial side there seems to have been a two-step shift in prerogatives: from the central bureaucracies to the industrial ministries, and from the ministries to enterprises. It appears that enterprises were now evolving as the most significant node of dynamism at the local level and, indeed, within the country as a whole. The earlier pattern of enterprise dominance of local environments remained in place. Regarding this point Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll argued that factory managers increased their discretion markedly during 1989 and 1990. They found no coherent pattern of changes in management and ownership within the enterprises themselves. These changes did not derive from any coherent governmental policy, nor did they unambiguously serve the interests of any level of

Institutional and Societal Realignments

131

bureaucracy - union, republican, or local. Johnson and Kroll suggested that the situation resembled the development of property rights in capitalist countries. 29 This view was corroborated by Donald Filtzer, who noted that the June 1990 Law on Enterprises in the USSR replaced the State Enterprise Law of 1987. The new law abolished limited experiments in enterprise collective self-management embodied in Councils of Labour Collectives and the competitive election of enterprise managers. The overall picture, on reading Filtzer, was one of increasingly powerful and insular enterprise managers who declined to share power with labour or other interests at the local level. Under cost-accounting these enterprises usually pursued their narrow economic interests in labour (and educational) restructuring. It was usually preferable for enterprise managers to poach skilled workers on the open market than to train them.30 In all of this, yet another Western observer agreed that local soviets lacked the power to obtain tax revenues, workers' protection, and social services and supplies from the enterprises. The latter were the 'real bosses' in the soviets' territories. It was now local corporations, many themselves in financial difficulty, that were the protagonists of economic processes. Party committees had ceased functioning at the local level by 1990, while local (state) soviets were incapable of assuming governing functions. 31 The institutional realignments at the level of local government were similarly in flux and ambiguous. With the collapse at the centre, local governments, like enterprises, received greater powers by default. The question here, however, was whether local governments could acquire sufficient new resources in order to step into the void left by the central government. Local governments fought a three-front war for resources. These governments wished to have the central government assign them larger funds, to acquire greater power to tax on their own, and to have local enterprises pay taxes into local budgets. In the latter case local governments asked the central government to compel compliance on the part of enterprises. The established pattern had been for the central government to 'force' local industries to pay for educational support to local bodies. With the decline of the central government's powers to extract resources and to manage them efficiently, local governments would have a more difficult time in maintaining educational infrastructure. 32 Given the central (or now republican) governments' ineffectiveness in educational administration, there appeared to be two basic choices in educational maintenance: (1) to give over all school properties to base enterprises, or (2) to deduct taxes from each enterprise of a particular locality and have these taxes paid into the budgets of local soviets, with funds marked for education. 33 It is easy to see that as a result of the first scenario there would be a great unevenness in access to and the quality of general and vocational education.

132

Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991

Outcomes would depend on the attitudes of enterprise managers, and on the profitability of their enterprises. This prospect of enterprise domination, and neglect, of education led a number of critics to call for the strengthening of the central government's role and for the recentralization of educational administration. Insofar as local organs were poor and weak, a meeting of Belgorod teachers, for example, favoured centralized funding from the Russian government. 34 The second scenario is also problematic in that it would require still weak local organs to develop new capacities in the construction of schools, coordination of programs, and supervision of teachers. Many of these functions continued to be discharged by enterprises to the close of the 1980s.35 One notices that there is currently a struggle for control over education on at least two levels. In the first instance there is a struggle between the private (or privatizing) sector and the public one - that is, between industrialists and educational bureaucrats. In the second case, there is an intrapublic-sector struggle among the republican, provincial, and municipal levels of government. No doubt the further fate of education hinges on the outcome of what Jeffrey Hahn has termed the vertical and horizontal struggle for power occurring over the (post) USSR. One may agree with Hahn that the most important struggle for power continues primarily at the local level. 36 Regarding this struggle as it concerns financing, the so-called 'Stolypin model ' of school maintenance began to be implemented in the RSFSR. Under this scheme, the Russian republican government allowed firms to deduct from their share of taxes owed to the government those funds that they disbursed for local education. 37 In June 1991 the El'tsin government offered wide tax exemptions to private and public organizations paying towards education within the RSFSR. 38 Broad tax exemptions were also offered to academic and scientific research institutions in Ukraine. Evidently the Soviet central government and republican governments did not have the machinery to extract taxes and/or supervise the financing of education themselves, but simply left tax room for enterprises. It is significant that these governments did not do the opposite: extract resources from enterprises· and provide for education directly. The further problem here, as Iagodin complained, was that enterprises did not always spend their tax exemptions on education.39 But if the central or republican governments were unable or unwilling to administer education down to the local level, the prospect that local governments could supervise education effectively also seems unlikely over the short term. As noted earlier, local governments were historically unable to compel financial compliance from enterprises. Though local governments have been strengthened over recent years, they continue to lack sufficient qualified personnel to administer education. Still there were at least some cases where

Institutional and Societal Realignments

133

municipal governments took advantage of the new Russian tax law on education. These municipalities, evidently for some reason being able to raise taxes locally, found it more convenient to finance education out of their own budgets directly, rather than paying full taxes to the central government and then waiting for financing to arrive from the central treasury. 40 Yet here again, if, alongside enterprises, local governments are to be a new point of support for education, this raises the question of their interest. In general it appears difficult to interest local organs in their schools. Local governments usually support their schools only if these governments can capture and use student labour within their own jurisdictions. 41 Local government interest under emerging marketization remained linked to the capture of student labour, as it had under the previous administered regime. Changes within Schools and the Pedagogical Community The inability of the central government adequately to finance and supervise education naturally put a great deal of stress on the pedagogical community. Here the new rule of thumb was 'everyone for himself' ('spasaisia, kak mozhesh '). This rule applied not only to schools, but also within schools to administrators and teachers. Thus yet another rule of thumb became operative: 'fire or be fired.' There was much local tension over jobs. The poor financial position of both general and vocational schools obliged them by the late 1980s to introduce the idea of 'fees for services' and to search for new patrons. 42 The central government had formally cleared the way (yet again) for the financial activity of vocational schools at the February 1988 plenum by suggesting the development of profit-making school cooperatives. Students could earn money within these cooperatives while receiving on-the-job training at local enterprises.43 General schools also entered commercial activity. Once general school administrators got over their qualms of mixing 'schools and money,' they could hope to free themselves from humiliating financial dependence on government and attain autonomy. 44 However, hopes that cost-accounting and contracting could provide new forms of support and increased autonomy do not seem to have been borne out. By the close of 1991 almost all SSUZs, for example, were said to have entered commercial activity, with some of them earning as much as half of their own funds. However, the SSUZs were not given legal control by the government of their assets. This legal uncertainty in turn aggravated their financial insecurity. Half of the teaching staff have had to seek extra income, usually in tutoring.45 The fate of the SSUZs appears to be one of internal disintegration, for though they gained in independence, they generally did not meet this independence

134

Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988-1991

with sufficient new resources for successful adaptation to the new environment. Thus the condition of the SSUZs was said by one observer 'to have little to do with the market.' A study of 152 SSUZs in the Russian Federation showed a decline in standards, declining teacher morale and student interest in learning, and further erosion of these schools' material bases. The main goal of each SSUZ was merely to survive; democratization and changes to the instructional process were forgotten. 46 Didacticism in teaching and the poor motivation of teachers prolonged the old isolation from production and the economy. The SSUZ therefore did not overcome its traditional problems of fragmentation of program content, which in turn still limited graduates' professional mobility. 47 By the end of 1991 there had, however, been some rationalization of the Russian SSUZ system. With the liquidation of the union ministries, which previously had jurisdiction over the SSUZs, over 800 of these schools were left without security within the Russian Federation. There were three basic choices in maintenance: (1) transfer to the Ministry of Education, (2) transfer to municipalities, and (3) retention within the industrial ministries' structures. Yet one other outcome was possible, for some of the better SSUZs could be made into private or semi-private colleges. 48 The problems of the PfUs were similar to those of the SSUZs. Like the latter, PfUs were ostensibly freed to merge with any public or private sector institutions. But they, too, received institutional autonomy just as the traditional sources of funding dried up.49 Given the central government's inability to deliver educational programs, independent pedagogical and civic groups, as noted earlier, began to spring up within the USSR in order to fill in the void. Interesting in this regard was the example of the so-called Moscow Academy for the Development of Education (Moskovskaia Akademiia Razvitiia Obrazovaniia). This group of educators noted within the USSR 'the continuing disintegration of the educational system [and the] practical lack of any staff level in any branch of government which would take any interest in the subjects of education in the regions.' In view of this disintegration, the Academy members believed that they should take upon themselves the role of the 'consolidating centre' for the educational community in Moscow, and then in the regions of Russia. 50 The Academy had any number of analogues. Already mentioned was the AllUnion Congress of Workers in Education, an early example of an autonomous association of teachers, whose first meeting had been held in December 1988. In October 1989, a constituent conference of the Union of Pedagogical Societies of the USSR was also convened in Moscow. Like the Academy, the Union emphasized the importance of consolidating the forces of the pedagogical community and increasing its role at all levels of education. 51 Yet another new grouping was the conference of Non-state Educational Institutions (Negosudarstvennykh

Institutional and Societal Realignments

135

Obrazovatel'nykh Uchrezhdenii). This particular group sought to develop a network of private schools across the USSR. 52 The establishmment of new pedagogical associations was perhaps more rapid in Ukraine - where the urgency for reform seemed to be motivated to a considerable extent by a desire to rehabilitate national and minority-group schools. (Ukraine was the first of the independent republics to pass a new comprehensive law on education.)53 All this is to point out, again, that non-governmental actors were moving in to help the state with the delivery of public and vocational-technical education. These actors should be distinguished from groupings that operated within the old structures of the 1960s and 1970s. Since the broader institutional context within which these new actors worked was less stable than in earlier decades, it is probable that the efficaciousness of these actors, themselves fragmented, was low. By 1990 a modest number of new types of schools appeared in the USSR. Seven alternative general schools were opened in Moscow on the initiative of teaching collectives and parents.54 About fifty new colleges were established across the USSR on the basis of PfUs and SSUZs; in 1991 the number increased by a further one hundred and fifty.55 The actual course content and instructional methods within these new schools are a topic for further study, however. One should be cautious in interpreting shifts in types of schools as shifts in program content. There appeared, finally, to have been one other shift: that of elite-level and ·societal values or, in a broad sense, of ideology. After the criticisms of the traditional system of education in 1988 there seems to have been little resistance, especially in the pedagogical press, to the phenomenon of private schools or tuition fees. Surprisingly, within a country so long dominated by a collectivist ideology, the need for at least some privatization of education was taken for granted among broad sectors of the policy-making elite, the public, and teaching profession. 56 At the elite level this probably stemmed from the recognition that the state simply could not adequately provide for education. The RSFSR deputy minister for public education, for example, much favoured an increase in the number of private schools. In his view, they produced healthy competition for public schools.57 At the public (student and parental) level, the ills of traditional education were probably long much more apparent than to the complacent ideological/educational elite. The public probably had little attachment to ideologized and standardized Soviet education. But while there seems to have been little resistance to the idea of private schools per se, there was more societal aversion to social stratification and the inequality of life-chances that private education would imply. Thus both the general and vocational-technical streams of education were asked, as in Western countries, to function as compensating mechanisms for social stratification. 58

136

Continuities and Changes in Vocational Education, 1988--1991

In conclusion, the many changes to education in the last years of the USSR required new roles for government - as a regulator of access to education and integrator of societal participation. It remains an open question how well governments in each of the Soviet successor countries will play these new roles, while attempting to meet the new challenges of economic development.

10

Conclusion

Summary of Findings The main argument of this book, on the policy level, is that Soviet education in the 1980s continued to be deeply rooted in a vocational education/applied science paradigm. Despite this paradigm's obsolescence, neither the design nor the implementation of the major educational reform attempted in 1984 went beyond that paradigm. Even recognition in 1988 by political, economic, and educational leaders of its limitations did not lead to new policies. The main inference on the institutional level is that the Soviet successor countries and societies within these were poorly placed for the further adaptation of educational policy under new conditions of national independence and transition to market economies. This arose from the fragmentation both of official structures and of still-nascent pedagogical communities autonomous from the old Soviet state. The initiative for educational policy-making was narrowly confined to the governmental (Politburo/Central Committee) elite to 1984, and even to 1988. High officials from the State Planning Committee and the State Committee for Labour appear to have shared the Politburo's view that labour force and educational reforms were necessary. However, the fragmentation of institutional interests started right at the ministerial level; for whereas the State Planning Committee sought all-union economic optimality and the geographical mobility of labour, the State Labour Committee was more concerned to assign labour to particular regional and industrial clients. There was less interest in the reform of vocational education further down the industrial and educational hierarchies. The government's educational policy was idea-driven and managerial. However, the conceptual design of the 1984 reform was developed within a context of the ideological self-isolation of the Soviet elite and of the USSR as a whole.

138

Education for Decline

As Walter Connor notes, 'The state [leadership], for all its resources, knew little about the society.' 1 Ideas for educational reform tended to originate within what could be called the ideological institutions of government. The family unit was unabashedly subject to social mobilization prior to and after the 1984 legislation. Teachers and school supervisory personnel were subject to administrative pressure, which, however, was unsystematic. The lack of frank criticism from teachers and the public contributed to the 1984 reform's being poorly conceived. There was confusion surrounding even the most basic conceptual building-blocks of reform . Terms such as 'polytechnical education' or ' labour education' meant different things to different people. In practice, policy-makers placed teaching for labour and civic socialization ahead of teaching for technical knowledge within the vocational and technical schools. By the late 1980s there was some shift towards a greater social sciences component within these schools. But these new subjects were mostly ideological in content and contributed nothing either to students' civic commitment or to their practical training. The two major goals of the 1984 reform had been to increase the proportion of vocational/technical students at the secondary level, and to strengthen the integration of school and factory. The central government wished to have local bodies (enterprises, municipal governments, and schools) themselves coordinate their actions to this end. But enterprises were usually indifferent towards the schools in their localities; local governments lacked the organizational and material resources to provide for the schools; and demoralized school staffs received no institutional supports for innovation. The three bodies noted above had different purposes and interests; they do not appear to have worked well together. At any rate, no single one of them had both the discretion over policy and command over the resources necessary to implement changes at the local level. Local institutions tended to impede the geographical and professional mobility of vocational students and, concomitantly, the optimal functioning of a national market for labour. Overall, the 1980s witnessed the gradual accretion of local-level control over material resources and a process of local institution-building. The fact that implementation of reform depended so greatly on local-level processes was fatal for central policy. With the advent of Gorbachev there was a freer climate of policy discourse. However, most criticisms centred not around basic assumptions and strategies in education, but around narrower topics of institutional fragmentation and implementational slippage. Gorbachev's preoccupation was with contradictory experiments in centralization and democratization; this compounded administrative confusion. Discourse on educational policy was still confined mostly to

Conclusion

139

high officials within state institutions and ministries, and concerned the optimization of administrative jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a substantial number of critics, both within government and the teaching profession, began to realize that the educational system needed fundamental reworking. A CPSU plenum convened in February 1988 underscored the government's concern for education. But aside from admitting to deep problems, the plenum endorsed no specific new measures. The plenum's pronouncements fell into a standard pattern whereby the centre would raise a certain issue, produce a 'wish list ' of policy measures, and then abandon the field to ministerial actors. In this case official institutional actors (state, educational, and industrial ministries) were hopelessly fragmented . Even if the February plenum had produced clear instructions, lack of coordination would have blocked the implementation of reform. Administrative structures at all levels had little capacity for implementing central directives; this prolonged the drift of educational policy and practice. There was much policy and institutional continuity between the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. Occasional rhetoric aside, both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev leaderships adhered to an 'extensive' model of economic development, emphasizing traditional commodity industries and, especially, machinebuilding. Both the 1984 educational reform and the 1988 discussions were initiated by governmental leaders anxious to assure the main branches of industry a sufficient supply of blue-collar labour. Though by 1988 there was considerable criticism of the vocational paradigm, and the basic link in secondary education was no longer to be the vocational school but the general, continuities of elite world-views and concrete economic interest kept the 1984 assumptions mostly intact. The government did not achieve a shift towards greater social investment, nor towards secondary specialized or higher education. The Soviet Union remained very much a blue-collar country to the close of the 1980s. During the 1970s and 1980s the government did achieve some overall successes. The number of PTU students registered annually expanded from 2.38 million in 1970 to a peak of 4.34 million in 1987, while the number of SSUZ graduates employed in the economy doubled from 10 to 20.2 million over the same period. There also seems to have been a moderate decrease in the proportion of students in the 'academic' stream within general schools, and a corresponding shift towards the vocational stream. Another notable success was an increase in the annual registrations of junior teachers' college trainees from 148,100 in 1980 to a peak of 203,600 in 1987, and a still substantial 187,100 in 1990. This was accomplished in spite of poor working conditions and low pay. But the success in maintaining and increasing

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the teaching cohort was not matched by an improvement in its quality. The new teachers suffered from low social status and material want, and became demoralized and conservative. Moreover, they often had suspect qualifications. The new cohort was characterized by a flat status-occupational 'pyramid.' That is, it comprised a large group of transient young teachers who regarded a teaching position as only a temporary step to a better career in some other field. The quality of Soviet education at all levels was probably overrated, in the popular Western and Soviet view, in comparison to Western countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the USSR trailed the leading Western countries in the proportion of secondary school graduates entering higher education, in the proportion of teachers working in higher education, and in global funding. Soviet practice favoured vocational education over technical, and secondary over higher. The failures of Soviet education were, in this writer's view, enormous. The policy 'successes' noted above were achieved in the service of an outdated vocational education and applied science-led economic policy. Because policymakers did not appreciate the role of higher education and basic science in economic growth, the intellectual potential of youths was tragically underutilized in low-technology occupations. This contributed to a decline in domestic economic growth and to a loss of international competitiveness. Furthermore, the country 's labour force profile was not modernized. There was no shift of students from the low-technology PTUs to the more advanced SSUZs; and there was no reprofiling within the SSUZs from traditional to service or new-technology sectors. The labour force remained remarkably stable in its occupational composition, though the labour force as a whole became significantly better-educated over the 1970s and 1980s. Owing to structural limitations local SSUZs, and especially PTUs, offered a choice of programs much narrower than the occupational interests of their charges. Since other aspects of educational and labour practice discouraged the mobility of youths to regions where more appropriate programs could have been offered, many students were forced into unwanted programs. They later entered unsatisfying types of employment and caused high labour turnover. The economy itself was characterized by a high proportion of manual labour and by great misallocation of trained personnel. In spite of its size and expense, therefore, the Soviet system of vocational education was mostly irrelevant to the USSR's labour force needs and economic development. The yield from educational policies was, accordingly, very low. The failure of command methods in educational delivery, and the loss of central control over core functions of economic planning and allocation, provided an opening for the creation of an autonomous pedagogical community. Indeed, the overloaded central government of the late 1980s encouraged and legiti-

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mized new forms of professional or societal participation. Clearly the government could no longer function adequately without popular input. In the event, however, an all-union teachers' congress convened at the end of 1988 also failed to produce consensus on educational reform. As tumultuous processes of the economic and political disintegration of the USSR took hold, education's brief presence in the policy spotlight ended. Education continued to drift at the policy level, while becoming increasingly influenced or captured by new interests at the societal level. The sudden collapse of the centre's leadership in education meant that still-weak local institutions would be charged with a major burden in educational delivery. The centre's collapse had several important implications for the near future. The government lacked the means to assist PTUs and SSUZs in the impending transition to a market economy. Vocational and technical schools, like institutions of higher learning, received greater autonomy just as central funding was constricted. Many youths not fitting into narrowly utilitarian enterprise plans were left socially unsecured. Access to funding and the quality of education would become yet more uneven and subject to contingent local factors. Social competition for good education and jobs would probably become sharper. Implications for Post-Soviet Politics and Directions for Further Study

The evidence illustrates the great difficulty that the Soviet leadership had in achieving policy coordination under the command-administrative model. It also illustrates both the reluctance and inability of the Gorbachev government to change fundamentally directions in educational policy and implementation once many earlier assumptions were deemed to be erroneous. It further shows the very strong tendency of the policy-making elite to impose its own values on an unwilling public. Indeed, it is striking that the elite adhered to manifestly unworkable policies for so long. This resulted from a lack of political imagination, and also from a lack of institutional capacity to do otherwise. These general findings support the views of those sovietologists who saw Gorbachev not as a radical reformer, but as a conservative. These findings also support the thesis of the 'unreformability' of the Soviet political system, even under Gorbachevism, for fragmentation and continuity across a wide institutional spectrum worked against reform efforts in particular areas. Even if the 1984 and 1988 educational reform conceptions had been less internally contradictory, bureaucratic processes would not have allowed the implementation of reform. The potential for policy change occurred only when the central state apparatus had practically collapsed, and nascent societal actors were able - indeed were

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Education for Decline

required by circumstances - to play a greater role in educational support and policy development. However, emerging societal interests controlled only modest resources and were still too weak to fill in the breaches of the educational system at the dawn of the 1990s. Like the bankrupt Soviet government, nowindependent republican governments have insufficient resources for the optimal adjustment of vocational schools to a free market economy. This adjustment will likely be slow and uneven within each of the successor countries. The dominance, until very late, of an outdated paradigm in industrial policy and education will compound the difficulties in each case. This is the more so since the material bases of education had been run down because of chronic underfunding. Administrative dependence on ideology and elite socialization suggests that with the demise of the old regime and its assumptions, it will be difficult for the successor countries to build cohesive new bureaucracies that are rule-governed, not ideology-oriented. Russia, inheriting the former Soviet structures, is probably better placed than most other republics for the consolidation of a new bureaucracy around traditional ideas of state-building and nationalism. In spite of reduced career rewards, Russia will likely be able to elicit sacrifice from bureaucrats in the name of Russian patriotism. Conversely, Ukraine, for example, lacking traditions of nationalism and statehood, and having neither an ethnically nor ideologically cohesive population, will face a critical institutional vacuum over the near term. This line of reasoning suggests that processes of decentralization will go further in Ukraine and other republics than within Russia. Regionally or functionally based societal-level actors will probably be more influential within the non-Russian republics. Moscow will negotiate with internally decentralized and weak republics on its peripheries. It was still to be decided which levels of government would play the leading role in educational delivery at the dawn of the 1990s, and how societal input would be integrated with state administration. A number of questions of direct relevance to the future of participatory democracy and to the integrity of the successor states arise here. Perhaps the main question (both in education and other areas) is that of the new balance of functions and resources between professional and private interest groups on the one hand and the successor governments on the other. That is, what prerogatives will these societies and states have in the future? What paths are democratization and state-building likely to take in the independent republics? The evidence corroborates the view of those Western authors who argued that Soviet state institutions were always highly fragmented, especially vertically, and that local bodies had long held 'vetoes' over the implementation of central policies. The successor countries will probably be even more decentralized. Here one can imagine outcomes in state-building along a relatively centralized

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to highly decentralized continuum. The first set of outcomes might presuppose egalitarian, but perhaps less dynamic, systems of vocational-technical education and other branches of public policy; while the second set might yield the opposite. Will resystematization emerge from the top down or the bottom up in each of the successor countries? In each case administrative systems will closely reflect the new balance of state-society relations growing out of the Soviet inheritance. Further, how successful will each country be in reshaping its educational system and labour force in order to meet the requirements of its domestic economy or the challenges of international competition? This is, of course, the old problem that Soviet governments never solved. The ability of the successor countries to face economic challenges will affect their domestic politics, their new relationships with the international community, as well as their ongoing relationships with each other. As just noted above, Russia seems the best placed for future advance. Ukraine will have more difficulty in developing its educational system, while the remaining republics are the most poorly placed and will probably continue to rely for some time on the functional leadership of Russia. This likely applies to other public policy areas as well. A comparison of institutionbuilding and 'society-building' in each of the decolonized successor countries, comprising a centre-periphery component (Russian/republican and intrarepublican ), would seem to be a particularly rich area of research for scholars interested in the evolution of the post-USSR geographical space. Analytical models might be found in the literature on other regions of decolonization, notably Africa and some Asian countries. These questions of new institutional capacities and power balances within and among the successor countries should be amenable to empirical analysis, where suitable statistical and other data can be obtained. The new formal arrangements within each country will be reflected in new legislation, and could be operationalized and measured in terms of the flow of resources. Outcomes in education could be measured by shifts or continuities in funding and student enrolments. Which disciplines are losing or gaining funds and students? A more difficult question, perhaps better left to professional pedagogues, is that of changes in the actual content of new instructional programs. (Outcomes in state bureaucracy-building could likewise be measured empirically.) Societal values and sociological processes are important in regard to new outcomes. Evidence given here, like the work of David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, and Walter Connor,2 implies the existence of an alienated category of workers within the former Soviet Union and of a substantial cohort of socially unsecured youths under current regimes. Will these youths, disaffected by their former blue-collar occupations and unfettered by ideas of social equality from

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Education for Decline

the Soviet era, constitute the core of a mobile class ready to step into new positions within commerce? Conversely, will social jealousy of former 'ne'er-dowells' from the vocational schools retard popular support for market reform? This, finally, leads the researcher to re-examine the ostensible 'social contract' between workers and industry/government in the Brezhnev-Gorbachev eras. Taking a class approach, Connor argues that 'never have social forces, developing over a long time and now unleashed, counted for so much.' 3 He makes a persuasive case that broad worker discontent and activism were instrumental in toppling the Soviet Union. He implies that workers could again be influential in shaping the (post-) Soviet geographical space. Similarly, Linda Cook suggests that how the social contract will be seen - or disposed of - by labour and factory management is an important topic for the future. Organized labour and organized management, she says, are the two main constituencies that emerged out of the old social contract. 'They are the most coherent and resource-rich interests in a slowly and tentatively emerging civil society, mainly because of their positions in the economy.' 4 Yet for all the attractiveness of class and social contract theories, this book, like Stephen Whitefield's work on Soviet industrial ministries, offers a simpler explanation for the failure and ultimate collapse of Soviet state and economic administration. This was the inability of state administrative structures to achieve policy coordination and to meet political and technological challenges. In his work on the role of industrial ministries, which he considers to have been the main players in the Soviet political system, Whitefield argues that the stability of the Soviet regime did not arise on the basis of any of the usual explanations. It was not based on force, a relationship between official and mass culture, a social contract, the success of the socialization programme, or a normative commitment to the legitimacy of the ideology; rather, it was organized by the manner in which ministerial power structured [or fragmented) social interests, power, and rationality. On the other hand, ministerial [or enterprise] power was also the greatest source of instability in Soviet politics, because of the conflict it generated with the weak and constrained politicians. 5

This was a picture of a gridlocked political-administrative system. If fundamental political instability and failure to meet technological challenges were the main factors that brought down the Soviet state, this indicates that the successor countries will have to discover and follow those steps that do make for political stability and ease technological adaptation. This will need to be done along a broad spectrum of societal and institutional actors.

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Focusing on both of these actors is a research strategy introduced by Loren Graham. He takes a middle position between the class/social contract and institutional approaches. Graham asserts that both 'cultural' and 'organizationalmanagerial' factors made the Soviet Union particularly poor at adapting to new technologies. 6 Cultural impediments to change, Graham says, were lack of broad social support for technological upgrading and demand for education, the traditional phenomena of class conflict and fear of unemployment, decline in student interest in the engineering professions, and societal ambiguity or even hostility towards machine technology. Organizational-managerial impediments were ingrained preferences of Soviet industrial managers for 'closed systems' instead of 'open systems' approaches to production and labour management, shortages of particular types of workers, and the dominance of the industrial economy by largescale industries marked by inflexible assembly-line or capital-intensive technologies that were difficult to reorient to other purposes. Graham argues that changes in technologies cannot be divorced from changes to the culturalsocietal environment into which these technological changes are to be introduced. Accordingly, he would say, a variety of cultural assumptions and habits, administrative institutions, and concrete technologies will need to be changed within each of the successor countries if they are to cope with both the political and technological demands of the future . This book indicates that research along the lines suggested by Graham would be promising. In closing, it is hoped that this book helps provide a baseline for understanding of one important aspect of public policy in the Soviet Union on the eve of this state's dissolution. Given the present inventory of the Soviet inheritance, future researchers might be in a better position to pursue some further questions along the several lines suggested above. Perhaps not only students of Soviet education, but also those from the state-society, centre-periphery, and institutional politics traditions could develop certain themes growing out of the evidence presented here.

Notes

Chapter 1 1 Nicholas De Witt, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), pp. 3 and xxxix. 2 Ibid. 3 David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, The Soviet Industrial Worker-Social Class, Education, and Control (Oxford: Martin Robinson and Co., 1978); Mervyn Matthews, Education in the Soviet Union (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); Frank M. Sorrentino and Frances R. Curcio, eds., Soviet Politics and Education (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986); J .J. Tomiak, ed., Western Perspectives on Soviet Education in the 1980s (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986); John Dunstan, Soviet Education under Scrutiny (Glasgow: Jordanhill College Publications, 1987); John Dunstan, Paths to Excellence and the Soviet School (Windsor, Berks.: NFER Publishing Co., 1977); James Muckle, Portrait of a Soviet School under Glasnost' (London: Macmillan Press, 1990). 4 Nigel Grant, 'Recent Changes in Soviet Secondary Schools,' International Review of Education 11 (1965), 129-43; Philip D. Stewart, 'Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education,' World Politics 1 (1969), 2950; Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, 'Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union,' in Roger J. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 151-86; Oscar Anweiler, 'The Education System: Potential for Crisis or Stability?' in Hans-Joachim Veen, ed., From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1984), pp. 20~17; David L. Williams, 'Preparing Future Generations: Recent Changes in Soviet Educational Policy,' in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 105-38; G. Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Educational Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12; Vadim

148

5 6 7 8 9

Notes to pages 7-16

Medish, 'The Educational System,' in his The Soviet Union (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990), pp. 219-44; Blair Ruble, ' Educating a New Workforce,' in his Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 141-54; J.L. Black, 'Perestroika and the Soviet General School. The CPSU Loses Control of the Ideological Dimension of "Vospitanie," ' Canadian Slavonic Papers 1 (1991), 1-18; James Muckle, 'Education: Restructuring the Education System,' in D.W. Spring, ed., The Impact of Gorbachev: The First Phase, J985-90(London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp. 49-67. Matthews, p. 204. Walter Connor, The Accidental Proletariat (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1991. Jerry Hough, Second Annual Workshop on Soviet Domestic Politics, University of Toronto, June 1989. Peter Solomon, 'The Study of Soviet Policy-Making: Research Agenda ' (unpublished manuscript), Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto, 1980. A number of authoritative statements by Soviet leaders were made to this effect. See, for example, ' Speech by Yu.V. Andropov at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee,' Current Digest of the Soviet Press 35, No. 25 (1983), 2; 'Communique on the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,' CDSP 36, No. 15 {1984), 5; and the 'Address by M.S. Gorbachev to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,' CDSP 38, No. 8 (1986), 6. See also E.K. Ligachev, 'On Progress in the Restructuring of the Secondary and Higher Schools and the Party 's Tasks in Its Implementation,' CDSP 40, No. 8 (1988), 8.

Chapter2 1 John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 2 Nigel Grant, 'Recent Changes in Soviet Secondary Schools,' International Review of Education 11 (1965), 129-43; John Dunstan, Paths to Excellence and the Soviet School (Windsor, Berks.: NFER Publishing Co., 1977). 3 See N.I. Glazunova, Podgotovka rabochei smeny (Kiev: Vyshcha shkola, 1987), pp. 1-50, for a history of Soviet vocational education. 4 Nathan Kravetz, ' Education of Ethnic and National Minorities in the USSR: A Report on Current Developments,' Comparative Education 1 (1980), 13-23. See also Mervyn Matthews, Education in the Soviet Union (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), ch, 1, on attempts to coordinate instruction in schools with production practice in factories. 5 Matthews, ch. 1.

Notes to pages 16-18

149

6 AV. Kuraev, Predposylki i sushchnost' reformy sistemy narodnogo obrazovaniia SSSR v 1985 g. (Saratov: Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1989), p. 20. 7 Norton Dodge, 'Soviet Education - Four Studies,' (review article) Problems of Communism 2 (1958), 42-7. Very good analyses of the Khrushchevian educational reforms are given by Philip Stewart, 'Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education,' World Politics 1 (1969), 29-50; and by Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, 'Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union,' in Roger Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 151-86. 8 N.S. Khrushchev, Ob ukreplenii sviazi shkoly s zhizn 'iu i o dal'neishem razvitii v strane (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel 'stvo politicheskoi literatury USSR, 1958), 20pp. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 I have argued this point elsewhere. See Dennis Soltys, 'Upravlinnia osvitoiu: dosvid Kanady i problemy Ukrainy,' Ekonomika Ukrainy, Kyiv, No. 7 (1994), 74-80. See also Thomas Remington, 'Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case,' Soviet Economy 2 (1990), 160--90. L.F. Kolesnikov, V.N. Turchenko, and L.G. Borisova acknowledged that capitalist economies were more effective than socialist ones in introducing technological changes in Effektivnost' obrazovaniia (Moscow: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia RSFSR, 1991), p. 38. 12 On the 'intellectual problem,' see Zysman and Hall. 13 Gertrude Schroeder, 'Soviet Technology: System vs. Progress,' Problems of Communism 5 (1970), 19-30. 14 Classics of this genre are Joseph Berliner's Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and David Granick's Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 15 Schroeder, 'Soviet Tech_nology'; Jan Winiecki, 'Are Soviet-Type Economies Entering an Era of Long-Term Decline?' Soviet Studies 3 (1986), 325~8. 16 Silvanna Malle, Employment Planning in the Soviet Union (London: Basingstoke and Macmillan, 1990), p. 50. 17 Silvanna Malle, 'Planned and Unplanned Mobility in the Soviet Union under the Threat of Labour Shortage,' Soviet Studies 3 (1987), 357-87. 18 Remington. See also Malle, 1987, on intellectual underemployment. 19 Remington. 20 George Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Education Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12; James Muckle, Portrait of a Soviet School under Glasnost' (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 42. Estimates of funding for education vary considerably; this subject will be broached in Chapters 7 and 9.

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Notes to pages 18-20

21 Peter Kneen, 'Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev,' Soviet Studies 1 (1989), 67-87. 22 Mary Jean Bowman,' An Economist's Approach to Education,' International Review of Education 16 (1970), 160-77. 23 Harold Noah, 'The Economics of Education, ' Problems of Communism 4 (1967), 42-52. 24 See, for example, N.E. Kolesnikov and V.S. Kalmychenko, Metodicheskie aspekty issledovaniia izmenenii soderzhaniia truda rabochykh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi effektivnosti ikh podgotovki (Leningrad: Vsesoiuznyi nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut professional'no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia, 1979), p. 85; S.T. Kosenko, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia effektivnost' zatrat na professional'no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie (Leningrad: Leningradskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1982) [precis], p. 2; V.A. Sidorov, Obrazovanie i podgotovka kadrov v usloviiakh novoi tekhnicheskoi rekonstruktsii (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 80; and L.F. Kolesnikov, V.N. Turchenko, and L.G. Borisova, Effektivnost ' obrazovaniia (Moscow: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia RSFSR, 1991), p. 30. 25 V.1. Glukhova, Finansovoe planirovanie v sisteme proftekhobrazovaniia (Kiev: Kievskii institut narodnogo khoziaistva, 1986), p. 13; N.E. Kolesnikov and A.I. Rabitskii, eds., Ekonomika professional'no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia: problemy effektivnosti (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1982), p. 100; Sidorov, p. 177; John Howard Wilhelm, 'The Soviet Union Has an Administered, Not a Planned Economy,' Soviet Studies 1 (1985), 118--30. 26 Richard L. Cummings, 'Approaches to Manpower Planning,' International Review of Education 16 (1970), 178--91. 27 Bowman. 28 Dunstan, 1977, p. 32. 29 Matthews, p. 32. 30 Joseph Zajda, 'Education and Social Stratification in the Soviet Union,' Comparative Education 1 (1980), 3-11. 31 Malle, 1990, pp. 27-33. 32 Gertrude Schroeder, 'The Slowdown in Soviet Industry, 1976-1982,' Soviet Economy 1 (1985), 42-74. See also Sheila Marnie, ' Employment and the Reallocation of Labour in the USSR,' in Anders Aslund, ed., Market Socialism or the Restoration of Capitalism? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 142. 33 Sergei Voronitsyn, 'Soviet Educational Policy in the Brezhnev Era,' Radio Free Europe-Radio liberty, 19 November 1982, 1-5. 34 Joel C. Moses, 'Consensus and Conflict in Soviet Labor Policy - The Reformist Alternative,' Soviet Union 3 (1986), 301-47. 35 Ibid. 36 Blair Ruble, 'Educating a New Workforce,' in his Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (Los Angeles: University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990), pp. 141-54.

Notes to pages 20-2

151

37 Ibid. 38 For example, Kuraev; Voronitsyn; and Walter D. Connor, 'Social Policy under Gorbachev,' Problems of Communism 4 (1986), 31-46. 39 Connor. 40 Ibid. Refer also to James Muckle, 'Education: Restructuring the Education System,' in D.W. Spring, ed., The Impact of Gorbachev: The First Phase, 1985-90 (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), p. 269, on the excess of aspirants to higher education. 41 Schroeder, 'Soviet Technology.' 42 Report by M.S. Gorbachev, 'The Fundamental Question of the Party's Economic Policy,' Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) 37, No. 23 (1985), 4. See also Andrew J. and Bonnie K. Matosich, 'Machine Building: Perestroyka's Sputtering Engine,' Soviet Economy 2 (1988), 144-76. 43 The above statistics are given by Boris Rumer, ' Investment in the 12th Five-Year Plan,' Soviet Studies 3 (1991), 451-72. 44 Malle, 1987. 45 Marnie, 1992, p. 152. For reviews of investment policies of the 1980s, see Philip Hanson, 'Soviet Technology Policy - Status and Prospects,' in Christopher Donnelly, ed., Gorbachev '.s Revolution (Surrey: Jane 's Information Group, 1989), pp. 49-65; Jurgen Notzold, ' Industrial Development and Technology,' in Hans-Joachim Veen, ed., From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1987), pp. 69-75. 46 Winiecki, 'Are Soviet.' 47 Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 4-5. 48 Ruble, 1990; Dunstan, 1987, p. 28, observes that vocational training courses are determined at random according to local situations. 49 Ross, p. 113. 50 Malle, 1987; Malle, 1990, pp. 25 and 54. 51 Mamie, p. 146; Malle, 1987; David Lane, Labour and Employment in the USSR (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), quoted by Wolfgang Teckenburg, 'Review of "Labour and Employment in the USSR,"' Soviet Studies 2 (1987), 328-9. 52 L. Kunel'skii, 'Trudovoi potentsial strany i povshenie effektivnosti ego ispol ' zovaniia,' Kommunist 14 (1984), 27-38. 53 Peter Kneen, ' Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev,' Soviet Studies 1 (1989), 67-S7. 54 Hanson, 1989. 55 Jan Winiecki, 'Are Soviet,' and 'Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the Future,' Soviet Studies 4 (1986), 54~1. 56 Kolesnikov and Kalmychenko, p. 46; Kosenko, pp. 7-S; V. Kostakov, 'One Person Must Work Like Seven,' CDSP 38, No. 3 (1986), 2-3.

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Notes to pages 22-5

57 Notzold; Harley D. Balzer, 'The Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligentsia,' Problems of Communism, May-June 1982, 6&-72; Winiecki, 'Are Soviet.' 58 Hanson. 59 Dunstan, 1987, pp. 72-3. 60 Malle, 1990, pp. 50 and 59. 61 Schroeder, 1987. 62 Donald A. Filtzer, 'The Contradictions of the Marketless Market: Self-Financing in the Soviet Industrial Enterprise, 1986-90,' Soviet Studies 6 (1991), 989-1009. 63 Joseph Zajda, ' Education and Social Stratification in the Soviet Union,' Comparative Education 1 (1980), 3-11; Vladimir Kostakov, with Abram Bergson and Jerry Hough, 'Labor Problems in Light of Perestroyka,' Soviet Economy 1 (1988), 95-101.

Cbapter3 1 Mervyn Matthews, Education in the Soviet Union (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 1; Vadim Medish, 'The Educational System,' in his The Soviet Union (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 222. 2 Nicholas De Witt, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), p. 23. 3 N.E. Kolesnikov and A.I. Rabitskii, eds., Ekonomika professional'no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia: problemy effekivnosti (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1982), p. 107. 4 J.J. Tomiak, The Soviet Union (Devon: David and Charles Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 23. Khrushchev's views on education are contained in N.S. Khrushchev, Ob ukreplenii sviazi shkoly s zhizn 'iu i o dal'neishem razvitii v strane (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury USSR, 1958). Excellent summaries of the 1958 reforms are provided by Philip D. Stewart, 'Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education,' World Politics l (1969), 29-50; and by Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, 'Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union,' in Roger J. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 151-86. 5 Matthews, p. 56. 6 Oscar Anweiler, 'The Educational System: Potential for Crisis or Stability?' in HansJoachim Veen, ed., From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1984), pp. 208-17. 7 John Dunstan, Soviet Education under Scrutiny (Glasgow: Jordanhill College Publications, 1987), pp. 28 and 60-1; A.I. Prokhorov, Problemy attestatsii upravlen-

cheskikh i pedagogicheskikh kadrov (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut upravleniia i ekonomiki narodnogo obrazovaniia, 1989), p. 38. 8 Anweiler; James Muckle, Portrait of a Soviet School under Glasnost' (London:

Notes to pages 25-8

9 10

11

12

13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

153

Macmillan Press, 1990), pp. 57-8. On the role of ideology, see J.L. Black, 'Perestroika and the Soviet General School. The CPSU Loses Control of the Ideological Dimension of "Vospitanie,"' Canadian Slavonic Papers 1 (1991 ), 1-18. A.A. Kondrashenkov, Rukovodstvo KPSS razvitiem obshcheobrazovatel'noi shkoly na sovremennom etape (Moscow: Znanie, 1986), p. 14. Beatrice Beach Szekely, 'Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, December 1980, 3-6; Vadim Medish, 'The Educational System,' in his The Soviet Union (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1990), p. 228. James Muckle, 'Education: Restructuring the Education System,' in D.W. Spring, ed., The Impact of Gorbachev: The First Phase, 1985-90 (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), pp. 49-67; Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, in their Industrial Labor in the USSR (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 27. V.A. Sidorov, Obrazovanie i podgotovka kadrov v usloviiakh novoi tekhnicheskoi rekonstruktsii (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 152; N.I. Glazunova, Podgotovka rabochei smeny (Kiev: Vyshcha shkola, 1987), pp. 39 and 157. Glazunova, p. 38. Glazunova, pp. 38 and 98; Sidorov, p. 149. Raiangu, p. 36. Felicity O'Dell and David Lane, 'Labour Specialization and Occupational Placement in Soviet Education,' Soviet Studies 3 (1976), 418-29. On effons to raise the prestige of PTUs, see also Joseph Zajda, 'Education and Social Stratification in the Soviet Union,' Comparative Education 1 (1980), 3-11. A. V. Kuraev, Predposylki i sushchnost' reformy sistemy narodnogo obrazovaniia SSSR v 1985 g. (Saratov: Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1989), p. 40. L.I. Kataeva, Aktual'nye problemy narodnogo obrazovaniia i pedagogicheskoi nauki v svete resheniiXXVI/ s'ezda KPSS (Moscow: Znanie, 1986), p. 43. Glazunova, p. 36. There is also a TU (tekhnicheskoe uchilishche), yet another variant of the PTU; it is not to be confused with a technicum. Glazunova, p. 114; Professional'no tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie (hencefonh Pto), 'V tsentral ' nom komitete KPSS i sovete ministrov SSSR,' 6 (1984), 2-5. Blair Ruble, 'Educating a New Workforce,' in his Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 141-54. Aleksandr Plugatar, interview, Moscow, 1 April 1993. Judith A. Morehouse and Jerry L. Atkinson, 'The Role of Leningrad's Vocational System in Russia's Changing Social and Economic Conditions,' Journal of Vocational and Technical Education 2 (1991), 26-35. Sidorov, p. 176. V. Dobin, 'Simptom,' Pto 3 (1987), 6-9. Morehouse.

154

Notes to pages 28-33

28 Philip Grossman, 'The Soviet Government's Role in Allocating Industrial Labor,' in Kahan and Ruble, pp. 42-58. 29 On the figures above, see Sidorov, p. 160. 30 A.A. Kostin, Byt' khoziainom; sotsial'nyi mekhanizm stanovleniia rabochego novogo tipa v usloviiakh rynochnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk TsK KPSS, 1991), pp. 42-3. 31 Michael Swafford, 'The Socialization and Training of the Soviet Industrial Labor Force,' in Kahan and Ruble, pp. 19~1; George C. Weickhardt, 'The Soviet MilitaryIndustrial Complex and Economic Reform,' Soviet Economy 3 (1986), 193-220; Detlef Glowka, 'The Unfinished Soviet Education System,' in Dunstan, 1987, pp. 11-31. 32 A.S. Shuruev, 'Razvitie srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia na sovremennom etape,' Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie (henceforth Sso) 6 (1982), 6-11. 33 Grossman. 34 Medish, p. 234; Tomiak, p. 74. 35 Iryna Radionova, interview, Kyiv, 10 December 1993. 36 For a comparison of Soviet and American definitions of higher educational institutions, see Richard Dobson, 'Introduction: Objectives of the Current Restructuring of Soviet Higher Education and Specialized Higher Education,' Soviet Education 11-12 (1987), 5-25 and note 6. The SSUZs are excluded from the Unesco definition of higher education, as all education after high school. This exclusion is disputed by the Russian Ministry of Higher Education. See \,ysshee obrazovanie v rossiiskoi federatsii: vremia peremen (Moscow: Komitet po vysshei shkole ministerstva nauki, vysshei shkoly i tekhnicheskoi politiki rossiiskoi federatsii, 1992),

p.4. 37 Radionova. 38 V.M. Zuev, Obrazovanie v usloviiakh perekhoda k reguliruemoi rynochnoi ekonomike (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel 'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1991), p. 32. 39 Matthews, p. 88. 40 Kostin, p. 47. 41 Stanislav Merkuriev, 'Soviet Higher Education in a Changing Political, Social and Economic Context,' Prospects 3 (1991), 413-20; G. Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Education Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12. 42 Avis; Philip Hanson, 'Soviet Technology Policy - Status and Prospects,' in Christopher Donnelly, ed., Gorbachev's Revolution (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1989), pp. 49--65; Jan Winiecki, 'Are Soviet-Type Economies Entering an Era of Long-Term Decline?' Soviet Studies 3 (1986), 325~8, and his 'Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the Future,' Soviet Studies 4 (1986), 54~1. 43 Matthews, 1982, pp. 116-18. 44 Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR po narodnomu obrazovaniiu, Vsesoiuznyi s'ezd

Notes to pages 33-5

45

46

47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64

155

rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), pp. 129-30. VJ. Il'chenko and V.V. Sokol, Kontseptsiia i mekhanizm perestroiki mezhdunarodnykh sviazei SSSR v oblasti obrazovaniia (Kiev: Kievskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1989), pp. 12 and 17. J.L. Black, 'Perestroika and the Soviet General School. The CPSU Loses Control of the Ideological Dimension of "Vospitanie,"' Canadian Slavonic Papers 1 (1991 ), 1-18. Matthews, 1982, p. 153; Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, 'Public Influence and Educational Policy in the Soviet Union,' in Roger J. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 151-86; Philip D. Stewart, 'Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education,' World Politics 1 (1969), 29-50; Kostin, p. 22. De Witt, p. 40; Great Soviet Encyclopedia, s.v. 'Higher Education.' B.A. Zel'sterman et al., Problemy razvitiia obrazovaniia i podgotovki kadrov v soiuznykh respublikakh (Riga: Latviiskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1986), p. 116. B.M. Ramzin, ed., Osnovnye napravleniia perestroiki vysshego i srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia v strane (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1987), p. 46. Medish, pp. 231-2. Dennis Soltys, 'Upravlinnia osvitoiu: dosvid Kanady i problemy Ukrainy,' Ekonomika Ukrainy, Kyiv, 7 (1994), 74-80. Finansy i statistika, Narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1988 g. (Moscow, 1989), p. 276. L.V. Tauson, ' Fundamental'nye issledovaniia i prikladnye razrabotki,' Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody (henceforth Eko) 10 (1989), 15-28. Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1989), p. 12. N.P. Kuzio, 'Foreword,' in M.N. Kolmakova and N.P. Kuzio, eds., The Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU and the Development of Public Education in the USSR (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1982). Translated in Soviet Education 3 (1984), ~7. A. Vladislavlev quotes a figure of 858/1000 in 'Sistema nepreryvnogo obrazovaniia sostoianie i perspektivy,' Kommunist 2 (1984), 5 ~. V.P. Eliutin, 'Gotovias' k s'ezdu partii,' Sso 2 (1981), 2-8. 'Umnozhat' vklad vysshei i srednei spetsial'noi shkoly v nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress,' Sso 2 (1984), 18-21. Radionova. Unesco, World Education Report, 1991 (Paris, 1992), pp. 134-7. Regarding age structures, refer to United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 37th issue, 198~9 (New York), pp. 67-70. Medish. Narodnoe obrazovanie, pp. 214-24. Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book 1992 (Ottawa, 1991), p. 135. World Education Report, pp. 134-7. The definition of gross enrolment ratio allows

156

65 66 67 68

69

10 71

72

73 74 75 76

77 78 . 79 80 81 82 83

Notes to pages 37-9

for the inclusion of older persons in the high school cohort, as if they were part of the cohort. That is, the definition includes the sizeable North American phenomenon of mature students, which has no counterpart in the former Soviet Union. On this topic, see Peter Hauslohner, 'Gorbachev 's Social Contract,' Soviet Economy 3 (1987), 54-89. Jan Sadlak, 'The Development of Higher Education in Eastern and Central Europe in the Aftermath of Recent Changes,' Prospects 3 (1991), 401-12. See Chapter 4, note 87, and Chapter 9 on finance . Sidorov, p. 235 . Sidorov used what seem to have been improperly compiled Unesco statistics, which recorded an implausibly high educational level for the Soviet population in 1953. E.A. Iakuba, Narodnoe obrazovanie v usloviiakh perestroiki: sotsiologicheskie ocherki (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), p. 77. lurii Zhuk puts the USSR in 70th place. See 'Chyiu svobodu zakhyshchatymesh, tovaryshu Savin?' Osvita, Kyiv, 5 January 1994, 11. \,ysshee obrazovanie, pp. 4-5. A comparison of North American/West European and Soviet educational systems is given in Soltys. The Soviet gross enrolment ratio for entry into higher education was about half those of the major West European countries and about a third of those in Canada and the United States. David L. Williams, ' Preparing Future Generations: Recent Changes in Soviet Educational Policy,' in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation (New York: Paragon House, 1990), pp. 105-38. Grossman. Ibid. Glazunova, pp. 29-31. S.P. Aksenov, ed., Ekonomicheskie problemy proftekhobrazovaniia (Leningrad: Vsesoiuznyi nauchno-issledovatel 'skii institut professional' no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia, 1980), p. 31. Glazunova, p. 31. V.I. Kostenko and S.G. Proshcharuk, Sovershenstvovanie sistemy upravleniia trudorymi resursami v Ukrainskoi SSR (Kiev: Gosudarstvennyi planovyi komitet USSR, 1985), p. 10. See Muckle, 1990, on central control of the curriculum. Medish. G.A. Iagodin, 'Following the Course Set by the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Congress,' Soviet Education 9-10 (1987), 26-48. Morehouse; J.L. Black, 'Education' (unpublished manuscript), Carleton University, Ottawa, 1990. See notes 77 and 78; Aleksei Osipov, interview, Moscow, 30 March 1993.

Notes to pages 3~6 157 84 Osipov. 85 K.G. Nozhko, lu. Babanskii, and S.L. Kostanian, Aktual'nye sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy narodnogo obrazovaniia: Tezisy dokladov vsesoiuznoi nauchnoprakticheskoi konferentsii, chast' /, 14-16 noiabria 1979 goda (Moscow: Ministerstvo prosveshcheniia SSSR, 1979), p. 26. 86 Osipov. 87 Gennadii Iagodin, 'Cherez gumanizatsiiu i demokratiiu k novomu kachestvu obrazovaniia,' (keynote address) in Vsesoiuznyi s'ezd rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 24. 88 Aksenov, p. 50. 89 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1974, s.v. 'Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.' 90 Vsesoiuznyi s" ezd, p. 202. 91 L.A. Ruvinsky, Za demokratiiu narodnogo,obrazovaniia (Moscow: Sovetskaia assotsiatsiia pedagogov-issledovatelei, 1989), pp. 13 and 38. 92 Nozhko, pp. 35-50. 93 Vsesoiuznyi s" ezd, p. 202. 94 For a description of the IPCs, see John Dunstan, 'Equalisation and Differentiation in the Soviet School, 1958-1985: A Curriculum Approach,' in his Soviet Education under Scrutiny (Glasgow: Jordanhill College Publications, 1987), p. 46. 95 Radionova. 96 N.N. Lukin, K voprosam o roli kooperatsii obshcheobrazovatel'noi i professional'noi shkoly v podgotovke molodogo spetsialista (Krasnoiarsk: Krasnoiarskii sel'skokhoziaistvennyi institut, 1988), pp. 15-17. 97 A.G. Filipenok, Finansy i finansovoe planirovanie mezhshkol'nykh uchebno-proizvodstvennykh kombinatov (Vilnius: Leningradskii finansovo-ekonomicheskii universitet, 1989), pp, 1-3. 98 Swafford, p. 30. 99 Osipov.

Cbapter4 1 Editor's Introduction, 'The Adoption of New Soviet School Reforms,' Soviet Education, March 1985, iii-ix. 2 V.I. Nechaev, interview, Moscow, 11 January 1993. 3 Aleksei Osipov, interview, Moscow, 30 March 1993. 4 A.S. Plugatar', interview, Moscow, 1 April 1993. 5 Joel C. Moses, ' Consensus and Conflict in Soviet Labor Policy - The Reformist Alternative,' Soviet Union 3 (1980), 301-47. 6 L. Kostin, 'Reservy professional'nogo obucheniia rabochikh -v deistvie,' Pto 12 (1981), 6-8.

158

Notes to.pages 46--8

7 L. Kunel'skii, 'Trudovoi potensial strany i povyshenie effektivnosti ego ispol'zovaniia,' Kommunist 14 (1984), 27-38. 8 V. Markov, A. Topilin, 'Aktual'nye zadachi planirovaniia sotsial'nogo razvitiia po territorii strany,' Planovoe khoziaistvo (henceforth Pich) 3 (1984), 97-102. 9 Moses. 10 'Speech by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on June 15, 1983,' CDSP 35, No. 25 (1983), 1-8. 11 'Speech by Comrade K.U. Chernenko at the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee on April 10, 1984,' CDSP 36, No. 15 (1984), 1-5, 11. The 'visceral importance' that the CPSU attached to general and vocational education was communicated to the teaching profession in Teachers ' gazette on 12 April 1984. See the ' Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum (10 April, 1984) Concerning the Fundamental Directions of General Education and Vocational School Reform,' Soviet Education, April-May (1985), 114-20. 12 'O proektakh Gosudarstvennogo plana ekonomicheskogo i sotsial'nogo razvitiia SSSR na 1981-1985 gody, Gosudarstvennogo plana ekonomicheskogo i sotsial ' nogo razvitiia SSSR na 1982 god i Gosudarstvennogo biudzheta SSSR na 1982 god,' Ug, 15 November 1981, 1. The same terms were used by Chernenko in 'Rech' general'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Chernenko,' Sso 3 (1984), 2--6. 13 David L. Williams, 'Preparing Future Generations: Recent Changes in Soviet Educational Policy,' in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 105-38. For another description of the Politburo commission see note 1. See also Beatrice Beach Szekely, 'Mobilization for Implementation of the New School Reform. Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, November 1985, 3-7. 14 An analysis of Gorbachev's and Ligachev's policy orientations is given by Jeffrey Surovell in 'Ligachev and Soviet Politics,' Soviet Studies 2 (1991), 355-74; on their educational stances, see Dennis Sowtis (Soltys], 'Soviet Industrial Strategy and Reforms in Vocational Education: Policy Implications and Implementation,' Comparative Education 3 (1991), 23-33. 15 A major statement on educational policy is given by Aliev in 'Ob osnovnykh napravleniiakh reformy obshcheobrazovatel'noi i professional ' noi shkoly,' Ug, 13 April 1984, 2. 16 Williams. 17 V.P. Eliutin, 'Carrying Out the Decree of the Party and Government,' Soviet Education, July-August 1981, 69-86. The Soviets' desire was to plan up to twenty years in advance! See V. Fokin, 'Forrnirovanie kompleksnykh nauchno-tekhnicheskikh programm v respublike,' Pkh 6 (1982), 61--6. 18 P. Mazur, 'Videt' perspektivu,' Ug, 19 July 1983, 1.

Notes to pages 48-50

159

19 'Speech Given by Comrade K. U. Chernenko to the 10 April 1984 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee,' Soviet Education, April-May 1985, 109-13. 20 E. Gassel', N. Pakhomov, V. Severtsev, 'Refonna shkoly: nekotorye voprosy pedagogicheskoi teorii,' Kommunist 4 (1984), 75-8. 21 V.P. Tomin, Standards of Public Education in the USSR, reprinted in Soviet Education, May-June 1984, 59. 22 John Dunstan, Soviet Education under Scrutiny (Glasgow: Jordanhill College Publishers, 1987), p. 22. See also 'The Adoption of New Soviet School Refonns. Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, March 1985, iii-ix; an outline of the new educational streams is given by B.B. Szekely, 'Editor's Introduction: Mobilization for Implementation of the New School Refonns, Part III,' Soviet Education, January 1986, 3-6. 23 'Rech' General'nogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS Iu. V. Andropova na plenume TsK KPSS 22 noiabria 1982 goda,' Ug, 23 November 1982, 1-2; 'Rech' tovarishcha K.U. Chernenko,' Ug, 3 March 1984, 1-2. Gorbachev's industrial priorities were summarized later in 'Report by M.S. Gorbachev: The Fundamental Question of the Party's Economic Policy,' CDSP 37, No. 23 (1985), 4; 'Address by M.S. Gorbachev to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress,' CDSP, 38, No. 8 (1986), 12. 24 E. Ivanov, 'Problema prioritetov v sotsialisticheskom planirovanii,' Pkh 11 (1987), 41-50; Alice C. Gorlin, 'The Power of Soviet Industrial Ministries in the 1980s,' Soviet Studies 3 (1985), 353-70. 25 Silvana Malle, Employment Planning in the Soviet Union (London: Basingstoke and Macmillan, 1990), p. 89. 26 A.P. Egorov, 'O raspredelenii molodykh spetsialistov,' Sso 6 (1981), 414; A.S. Shuruev, 'Razvitie srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia na sovremennom etape,' Sso 6 (1982), 6-11. 27 Murray Feshbach, 'The Structure and Composition of the Industrial Labor Force,' in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, eds., Industrial Labor in the USSR, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 421. 28 B.B. Szekely, 'Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, December 1986, 3-7. 29 A concise review of labour reserves and demographics is given in 'Trudovye resursy SSSR,' Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody (henceforth Eko) 3 (1982), 13746. 30 lu. Demin, 'Rabochie popolnenie,' Kommunist 15 (1982), 72-83. 31 'Gotovnost' k budushchemu,' Pto 8 (1985), 24. 32 V.P. Usachev, 'Tekhnikumy rossiiskoi federatsii i reforma shkoly,' Sso 10 (1985), 6-17; V.E. Iatsenko, 'Problemy planirovaniia podgotovki spetsialistov,' Sso 11 (1985), 3~1. 33 G.A. Iagodin, 'Vremia reshitel'nogo pereloma,' Sso 5 (1986), 2-8. 34 V. Sychev, V. Kulakov, A. Milovidov, 'Ekonomiko-demograficheskoe razvitie strany i zadachi sotsial'nogo planirovaniia,' Pkh 4 (1989), 81-7.

160 Notes to pages 50-3 35 36 37 38

39

40

41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51

Demin. Malle, p. 15. Vadim S. Zaitsev, interview, Moscow, 15 March 1993. V.P. Eliutin, 'Carrying Out the Decree of the Party and Government,' Soviet Education, July-August 1981, 83. Refer also to N.E. Kolesnikov and V.S. Kalmychenko, Metodicheskie aspekty issledovaniia izmenenii soderzhaniia truda rabochykh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi effektivnosti ikh podgotovki (Leningrad: Vsesoiuznyi nauchno-issledovatel 'skii institut professional ' no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia, 1979), p. 74; B. Breev, ' Otsenka ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov,' Voprosy ekonomiki 4 (1986), 56--65. 'Gotovnost' k budushchemu,' Pto 8 (1985), 2-4; ' Report by M.S. Gorbachev: The Fundamental Question of the Party 's Economic Policy,' CDSP 37, No. 23 (1985), 4. A.S. Dubinin, 'XXVI s" ezd kpss - znamenatel ' nyi rubezh v razvitii SSSR,' Sso 5 (1981), 26-9. On 'winners,' see also N.F. Krasnov, 'Aktual ' nye problemy sovershenstvovaniia podgotovki spetsialistov v usloviiakh nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa,' Sso 1 (1981), 2-8. 'Aktivno uchastvovat' v vypolnenii prodovol'stvennoi programmy,' Sso 7 (1982), 2-4. N.F. Krasnov, 'Zadachi sovetov direktorov po sovershenstvovaniiu srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia,' Sso 1 (1984), 2-8. Ivanov. 'Konferentsiia v Gosplane SSSR: puti uskoreniia rosta proizvoditel'nosti truda,' Pkh 2 (1985), 57-64. N.E. Kolesnikov and A.I. Rabitskii, eds., Ekonomika professional'no-tekhnicheskogo obrazovaniia: problemy effektivnosti (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1982), pp. 109-11. A.P. Dumachev noted that two-thirds of male PTU graduates entered the army, where they subsequently lost their vocational skills. See 'PTO v zerkale ntr,' Pto 6 (1986), 2-8; and V. Matusiak, ' Krepka stroika kadrami,' Pto 1 (1981), 56-9. Dumachev; Matusiak. Ju. Gorodkov, 'Al 'ternativa,' Pto 9 (1988), 55-8; V.I. Kozhanov, interview, Moscow, 17 March 1993. D. L'vov, 'Novaia kontseptsiia razvitiia mashinostroeniia,' Voprosy ekonomiki 11 (1988), 18-27; Plugatar' . Blair Ruble, 'Educating a New Workforce,' in his Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 143; Osipov. George Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Education Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12. R.N. Tikidzhiev, 'Robochie mesta, trudovye resursy i kapital'nye vlozheniia,' Eko 4 (1986), 112-20.

Notes to pages 53-5

161

52 I. Malmygin, 'Struktura i ispol'zovanie rabochikh mest v mashinostroenii,' Pich 12 (1985), 101-5. 53 L. Chizova, 'Sbalansirovannost' resursov truda s potrebnostiami ekonomiki,' Voprosy ekonomiki 5 (1983), 35-46. 54 A. Zvontsov, ' Kompas eksperimenta,' Pto 8 (1985), 56-58. 55 B. Rakitskii, 'Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i preobrazovaniia v sfere truda,' Kommunist 5 (1983), 35~6. 56 T. lugai, ' Struktura zaniatosti v usloviiakh intensifikatsii,' Voprosy ekonomiki 11 (1986), 74-83. 57 R. Tikidzhiev, 'Voprosy sbalansirovannosti vosproizvodstva osnovnykh fondov i trudovykh resursov,' Pich 12 (1981), 44--53. 58 This was the position, for example, of the minister of forest industry. See A. Orleanskaia, 'Shiroka programma deistvii,' Ug, 21 August 1984, 2. 59 E.G. Antosenkov, M.I. Vol'shanskaia, and V.D. Dimitriev, eds., Osnovnye napravleniia ratsional'nogo raspredeleniia i ispol'zovaniia trudovylch resursov (Moscow: Vsesoiuznyi nauchno-metodicheskii tsentr po organizatsii truda i upravleniia proizvodstvom, 1982), p. 17; S. Karastelin, 'Iz opyta planirovaniia sokrashcheniia ruchnogo truda, Pkh 7 (1984), 104-9. 60 Karastelin. Gertrude Schroeder, in 'The Slowdown in Soviet industry, 1976-1982,' Soviet Economy 1 (1985), 42-74, observes that in the early 1980s the government began to put pressure on enterprise managers to limit labour use. 61 On the enhancement of the State Labour and Vocational-Technical Education Committees' roles, see Antosenkov et al., pp. 19-20; L.I. Kataeva, Aktual'nye problemy narodnogo obrazovaniia i pedagogicheskoi nauki v svete reshenii XXVII s" ezda kpss (Moscow: Znanie, 1986), pp. 25-7; V.I. Glukhova, Finansovoe planirovanie v sisteme proftelchobrazovaniia (Kiev: Kievskii institut narodnogo khoziaistva, 1986), pp. 5-12. 62 J.L. Black, ' Education' (unpublished manuscript), Carleton University, Ottawa, 1990, 38pp. 63 V. Chlaidze, 'Pomogaem predpriiatiiam,' Pto 6 (1981), 60; N. Shelar, 'Nasha pomoshch predpriiatiiam,' Pto 11 ( 1981 ), 58-9; Glukhova. 64 F. Ulitin, ' Podvodia nekotorye itogi,' Pto 11 (1982), 62-3; G. Kamaev, ' Opiraias' na postoiannuiu pomoshch' i zabotuiu partii,' Pto 8 (1981), 2-3. 65 'Dopusk v zavtrashnii den ',' Pto 9 (1987), 2- 5. 66 'Tvorcheskii trud kazhdogo - osnova obshchikh uspekhov,' Ug, 15 November 1980, 1 and 3. 67 A. Novikov, 'Sovershenstvovaniia uchebno-programmnuiu dokumentatsiiu,' Pto 8 (1983), 6-7; V. Nikiforova, 'Obrazovanie prioritetno,' Ug, No. 43 (October 1990), 8. 68 'Tvorcheskii trud,' Ug. 69 M. Prokofiev, 'Krepit' sodruzhestvo,' Pto 9 (1981), 4-7.

162

Notes to pages 56-7

70 'Roditel'skii komitet,' Ug, 15 October 1981, 1; ' Sem'ia i shkola,' Ug, 25 January 1983, 1. 71 See, for example, 'Chto mozhet byt' pochetnee,' Ug, 15 January 1984, 1. 72 I. Diskin, ' Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy razvitiia infrastruktury kul'tury,' Voprosy ekonomiki 12 (1982), 117- 28. 73 For nostalgic reviews of vocational education, see, for example, S.F. Gladkii, 'Na tom zhe zavode,' Ug, 6 February 1982, 1; V.A. Petrov, 'Ne otkladyvaia na potom,' Ug, 22 March 1984, 1; A. Karpekin, ' Shkol'naia niva,' Ug, 27 June 1981, 1. 74 'Povyshat' prestizh professional'no-tekhnicheskikh uchilishch,' Pto 6 (1983), 7. 75 I. Borshevich, 'Kto stanet studentom?' Ug, 5 February 1980, 1; V. Ponomarev and G. Gaiduk, 'Shkola i PTU - vzaimoponimanie, edinstvo, preemstvennost' ,' Pto 3 (1981), 6-7; L. Zorina and V. Ignat'ev, ' Soiuz sem'i i pedagogov,' Pto 4 (1981), 44-5; 'Trudit 'sia otvetstvenno, tvorcheski,' Ug, 11 January 1983, 1. 76 'Nash soiuznik-roditeli,' Pto 11 (1981), 36-7, describes a case where one innovative teaching collective treated parents with respect. 77 'S samykh rannikh let,' Ug, 23 August 1983, 1; M. losenkin, 'Esli sprosit' direktora,' Ug, 21 May 1987, 1. 78 V.M. Zuev, Roi', mesto i funktsii kadrov so srednim spetsial'nym obrazovaniem v narodnom khoziaistve (Moscow: nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), pp. 109-10; L.I. Kataeva, Aktual 'nye problemy narodnogo obrazovaniia i pedagogicheskoi nauki v svete reshenii XXVII s 'ezda KPSS (Moscow: Znanie, 1986), p. 47; Kolesnikov and Rabitskii, pp. 24-5. 79 ' PfO v zerkale NTR,' Pto 6 (1986), 2-8. 80 V.P. Perevertsev, 'Obuchenie i proizvodstvo: nereshenye problemy,' Sso 9 (1988), 34; Dumachev. 81 A good description of the public discussions is given by David Williams. 82 E.A. lakuba, Narodnoe obrazovanie v usloviiakh perestroiki: sotsiologicheskie ocherki (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), p. 41. 83 'Discussion of School Reform Concludes,' CDSP 36, No. 14 (1984), 13. Liliana Gutauskene, in ' Professional'naia orientatsiia i sotsial'naia politika,' Kommunist 10 (1986), 54-8, notes that in 1980 over half of general school students wished to enter VUZs, constituting a ratio of 4.2 aspirants to each available space. 84 'Public Found Lukewarm to Vocational Emphasis,' CDSP 36, No. 9 (1984), 15. 85 'Prognoz na segodnia,' Pto 12 (1988), 2-5 . For the 1989 academic year it was expected that enrolment into PTUs would decline from the 1988 level by 365,000 or 12.5 per cent of total intake. 86 David Lane and Felicity O' Dell, 'Cooling Out Ambition and the Alternative Route,' in their The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education, and Control (Oxford: Martin Robinson and Co., 1978), pp. 92-107.

Notes to pages 58-63

163

'Ministr zanial vyzhidatel'nuiu pozitsiiu,' Ug, 13 October 1992, 4. This stereotype is evident from conversations with CIS citizens. See Chapter 3, note 66. L. Shcherbakova, 'Nauka i kommertsiia,' Eko 4 (1991), 97-104. V.I. Gerchikov, 'Novye sotsial'nye problemy predpriiatii,' Eko 5 (1991), 109-17. Gerchikov's analysis is usefully read alongside Peter Hauslohner's view of the working class in 'Gorbachev's Social Contract,' Soviet Economy 3 (1987), 54-89. 92 'Plany napriazhennye no real'nye - s rasshirennogo zasedaniia kollegii Gosprofobra RSFSR,' Pto 4 (1982), 58.

87 88 89 90 91

Chapters 1 John Dunstan, ed., Soviet Education under Scrutiny (Glasgow: Jordanhill College Publications, 1987), p. 47; Fredrich Kuebart, 'School Refonn, Technological Modernization of the Economy, and Vocational Training in the Soviet Union,' in Dunstan, p. 72; Beatrice Beach Szekely, 'Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, January 1986, 3-7. 2 Kuebart, p. 73. 3 Regarding the human factor, see T. Zaslavskaia, 'Ot kazhdogo - po sposobnostiam,' Ug, 17 December 1985, 2; 'PTO v zerkale NTR,' Pto 6 (1986), 2-8. On the role of the working class, see 'Povyshat' prestizh professional'no-tekhnicheskikh uchilishch,' Pto 6 (1983), 7. 4 Arguing in favour of higher-quality secondary education and vocational training were I.F. Obraztsov, the RSFSR minister of higher and secondary specialized education, in 'Osnovnoi put' sovershenstvovaniia vysshei shkoly,' Eko 5 (1981), 104-7; and 'Trudovye resursy SSSR,' Eko 3 (1982), 137-46. 5 Oskar Anweiler, 'The Educational System: Potential for Crisis or Stability?' in Hans-Joachim Veen, ed., From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, U.K., 1984), pp. 208-17. 6 On flexible technologies, see B. Bal'mont, 'Rabochaia programma otrasli,' Pto l (1986), 6-8; S. Batyshev, 'Podgotovka rabochikh vysokoi kvalifikatsii, shirokogo profilia. Prakticheskie vyvody,' Pto 3 (1981), 15-16. 7 'Voskhozhdenie k idealu,' Ug, 13 December 1983, 2. 8 A. Tkachenko, 'K edinoi Iseli,' Ug, 20 January 1983, l; D. Epshtein, 'Uchim vsekh? Znachit-kazhdogo,' Ug, 28 February 1984, 3; 'Prizvanie stat' rabochim,' Ug, 31 January 1985, l; 'Refonna shkoly - refonna VUZa,' Ug, 7 February 1985, 1. 9 'The Development of Vocational and Technical Education,' Soviet Education, MayJune 1984, 48 and 65. 10 A. Ivanov, 'Konferentsiia po obshcheobrazovatel'noi podgotovke,' Pto 3 (1981), 57.

164

Notes to pages 63-7

11 'The Polytechnical Principles of Vocational and Technical Education,' Soviet Education, December 198~January 1981, 11~13, and 137. 12 'V tsentral'nom komitete KPSS i sovete ministrov SSSR,' Ug, 5 May 1984, 1. 13 S. Batyshev, 'Videt' perspektivy,' Ug, 11 June 1981, 3. 14 'Rekomendatsii vsesoiuznoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii,' Sso 3 (1981), 3~9. 15 V. Verkhovets, 'Vperedi-bol'shie dela,' Pto 9 (1984), 2-4; M. Prokofiev, 'Nastupilo vremia deistvovat' ,' Ug, 28 April 1984, 2; see also 'V tsentral'nom komitete,' Ug. 16 'Speech by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov'; 'Rabochemu klassu - dostoinoe molodoe popolnenie,' Pto 9 (1983), 2-7. 17 V. Markov and A Topilin, 'Aktual'nye zadachi planirovaniia sotsial'nogo razvitiia po territorii strany,' Pkh 3 (1984), 97-102; L. Kostin, 'Zakon sotsial'nogo progressa,' Ug, 4 August 1984, 2. 18 P. Mazur, 'Videt' perspektivu,' Ug, 19 July 1983, 1. 19 M. Minkevich, 'Shkola - UPK - proizvodstvo,' Ug, 22 March 1984, 2. See also 0 . Chelpanova, 'Sotsial'nyi zakaz obshchestva,' Ug, 5 January 1984, 1; 'Zasedanie Komissii Politburo Tsk KPSS po reforme obshcheobrazovatel'noi i professional'noi shkoly,' Ug, 4 August 1984, 1; 'Ne otkladivaia na zavtra,' Ug, 24 March 1984, 1. 20 See Chapter 2, note 43; V. Bianki, 'Zabota vsekh Leningradtsev,' Ug, 26 July 1983, 1. 21 V. Bianki, 'Zabota vsekh Leningradtsev,' Ug, 26 July 1983, 1; 'The CPSU Central Committee's Draft Basic Guidelines for Reform in the General-Education and Vocational Schools,' CDSP 36, No. 1 (1984), 6. 22 'New Rules for Higher Admissions,' CDSP 39, No. 8 (1987), 20. See also 'Timely Interview: A Choice for a Lifetime,' CDSP 38, No. 12 (1986), 21. 23 On these points, see G. Aseyev, 'Urgent Problems of the School and Life: The Moulder of Personality,' CDSP 35, No. 40 (1983), 4. 24 See 'We discuss the CPSU Central Committee's Draft Basic Guidelines for Reform in the General-Education and Vocational Schools,' CDSP 36, No. 3 (1984), 7-9, 12; 'The School Reform in Action: The Vocational-Technical School Changes Its Look,' CDSP 39, No. 38 (1987), 18-20. 25 G.A. Aliev, 'Ob osnovnykh napravleniiakh reformy obshcheobrazovatel'noi i professional'noi shkoly,' Ug, 13 April 1984, 1-2. Aliev's view was later reiterated by Egor Ligachev. See 'On Progress in the Restructuring of the Secondary and Higher Schools,' CDSP 40, No. 8 (1988), 9. 26 For the Central Asian aspect of this policy, see Gregory Gleason, 'Educating for Underdevelopment: The Soviet Vocational Education System and Its Central Asian Critics,' Central Asian Survey 1 (1985), 59-81. Regarding 'hereditization' refer also to Walter D. Connor, 'Social Policy under Gorbachev,' Problems of Communism 4 (1986), 31-46. 27 V.T. Lisovskii, 'Sotsial'nye problemy iunosti,' Sso 4 (1991), 15-17. 28 'Strategiia i taktika prosveshcheniia,' Ug, 22 December 1979, 1; on the history of

Notes to pages 68-71

29 30 31

32 33 34

35 36

37

38 39 40

41 42 43 44

45

165

educational legislation, see also 'Nash sovetskii zakon - o shkole,' Ug, 5 December 1985, 1. 'Socioeconomic Problems of Public Education,' Soviet Education, March 1981, 18. V. Buravikin, 'Kakim byt' uchiteliu,' Ug, 4 October 1983, 3. For these figures, see Iu. Demin, 'Rabochee popolnenie,' Kommunist 15 (1982), 7283; 'Rabochemu klassu,' Pto; F.R. Filippov and V.A. Malova, 'Some Ways of Increasing Educational Efficiency,' Soviet Education, February 1986, 87-105; see especially pp. 92-3. Aliev. 'V meste s proizvodstvom,' Ug, 8 June 1985, 3. 'The Fundamental Directions of General Education and Vocational School Reform Endorsed by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 10 April and by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 April (1984),' Soviet Education, April-May 1985, 158-91. G. Gnedenko, 'What Should the 10th and 11th Grades Be Like?' CDSP 36, No. 3 (1984), 7. 'The Adoption of New Soviet School Reforms: Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, March 1985, iii-ix. See also 8.8. Szekely, 'Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, November 1986, ~ ; 8.8. Szekely, 'The New Soviet Secondary School Science Curricula: Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, March-April 1987, 3-8. 'The Fundamental Directions,' Soviet Education, A listing of ancillary goals is also given in 'V tsentral'nom komitete KPSS i sovete ministrov SSSR,' Ug, 15 May 1984, 1; 'Sovetskaia shkola na novom etape,' Ug, 7 January 1984, 1. Blair Ruble, 'Educating a New Workforce,' in his Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 141-54. 'lz pravil priema v tekhnicheskie uchilishcha,' Pto 4 (1982), 54; 'Timely Interview: A Choice for a Lifetime,' CDSP 38, No. 12 (1986), 21. 8.8. Szekely, 'Foundations of Vocational Pedagogy - Editor's Introduction,' Soviet Education, December 1980-January 1981, ~ ; S.lu. Batyshev, 'Vocational-Technical Education,' Soviet Education, March 1984, 44-57. •Shkola - PfU: grani sodruzhestva,' Ug, 26 January 1982, 1; 'Commission Meets,' CDSP 37, No. 5 (1985), 22. N. Sinitsyna, 'Pridut na zavod rebiata,' Ug, 1 December 1981, 3; 'Uchebnoproizvodstvennye kombinaty,' Ug, 27 February 1982, 1. 'Need One Be in a Hurry to Choose a Vocation?' CDSP 39, No. 52 (1988), 29. Iu. Demin, 'Rabochee popolnenie,' Kommunist 15 (1982), 72-83; 'Reforma. God vtoroi,' Ug, 3 August 1985, 2; N. Anisin, 'Prodolzhenie budet uspeshnym,' Ug, 17 December 1985, 3; P. Liubovskii, 'Kto v rabochie poidet?' Ug, 8 May 1986, 1. M.A. Prokofiev, 'Strategiia i taktika prosveshcheniia,' Ug, 1 September 1981, 2. For a short description of IPCs, see P.R. Atutov, 'Polytechnical Education, Labor Train-

166

46 47 48 49 50

51

52

53

Notes to pages 71-9

ing, and the Vocational Guidance of Pupils,' Soviet Education, February 1984, 4057; 'Schools' Sponsoring Enterprises,' CDSP 36, No. 42 (1984), 29. For a further reference to the IPCs' career orientation work, see V. Ponomarev and G. Gaiduk, 'Shkola i PfU - Vzaimoponimaniia, edinstvo, preemstvennost',' Pto 3 (1981), fr 7. A. Bol'shakov, ' Kto zavtra vstanet za stanok? ' Ug, 6 December 1984, 1. 'V riadu uzlovykh problemm,' Pto 11 (1981), 2-3. 'Bazovoe predpriiatie imeet pravo ... ,' Ug, 2 April 1985, 2. 'Higher Education Admissions,' Soviet Education, June 1985, ~3. See, for example, 'Povyshat' prestizh professional ' no-tekhnicheskikh uchilishchakh,' Pto 6 (1983), 7; M. Prokofiev, ' Nastupilo vremia deistvovat' ,' Ug, 28 April 1984, 2; A. Orleanskaia, 'Shirokaia programma deistvii,' Ug, 2 August 1984, 2. 'Socioeconomic Problems of Public Education,' Soviet Education, March 1981, 38; 'Vocational-Technical Education and the Trade Unions,' Soviet Education, December 1983, 47. V. Kurmaev, ' Zhivoi otklik,' Ug, 23 February 1984, 1. On the trade unions' role in 'affixing' trainees to their employment places, see ' f)rofessional'no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie i profsoiuzy, ' Pto 3 (1982), 2-3. V.I. Perevedentsev, 'The School and Labor Training,' Soviet Education, December 1986, 50.

Chapter6 1 On these points see, for example, 'Professional' no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie i profsoiuzy,' Pto 3 (1982), 2-3; 'Shkola i proizvodstvo: osnovy sotrudnichestva,' Ug, 15 December 1984, 1. 2 ' Strategiia i taktika prosveshcheniia,' Ug, 1 September 1981, 2; I. Kolesnikova and A. Astakhov, ' Rubezhi rossii: ot piatiletki k piatiletki,' Ug, 19 January 1982, 1; V. Punskii, 'Osnova - mirovozrenie,' Ug, 21 February 1984, 2. 3 'Rekommendatsii soveshchaniia predsedatelei sovetov direktorov,' Sso 2 (1984), 15-17. 4 'Uchit ' po-novomu myslit' i deistvovat',' Ug, 2 October 1986, 1-2; ' Shkol'noi refonne - glubinu i dinamiku deistvii,' Ug, 3 July 1986, 1-3. 5 V.N. Shamardin, 'Ukrepit' partiinoe vliianie v kollektivakh tekhnikumov i uchilishch,' Sso 3 (1984), 17-22. 6 See, for example, A.P. Egorov, 'Piatiletku vypolnim,' Sso 2 (1987), 2-5; I.E. Ermishin, 'Neotlozhnye zadachi prepodavatelei obshchestvennykh distsiplin,' Sso 8 (1984), 10-13; N.M. Ogarkov, 'Uluchshat' pravovoe vospitanie uchashchikhsia,' Sso 9 (1982), 10-13. 7 'Prevratit' idei plenuma v tverdye ubezhdeniia kazhdogo uchashchegosia,' Sso 8 (1983), 2-5.

Notes to pages 79-82

167

8 B. Lavreniuk, ' Osnovnye napravleniia uluchsheniia raboty tekhnikumov,' Pto 1 (1981), 48-9. 9 Ermishin. 10 G. Kamaev, 'V otvet na zabotu partii,' Pto 9 (1983), 13-14. 11 V.D. Parkhomenko, 'Sredniaia spetsial'naia shkola Ukrainy v odinatsatoi piatiletke,' Sso 11 (1985), 2-5; 'S pozitsii vysokoi trebovatel'nosti,' Ug, 16 February 1982, 2. 12 Gluboko izuchit' i osmyslit' resheniia ianvarskogo (1987g.) Plenuma TsK KPSS,' Sso 4 (1987), 8-20; N.V. Kuznetsov, 'XIX Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia konferentsiia vazhnyi etap v deiatel ' nosti KPSS,' Sso 9 (1988), 14-17. 13 N.V. Kuznetsov, 'XXVII s'ezd KPSS o dal'neishei demokratizatsii obshchestva,' Sso 10 (1986), 15-17. 14 'Vremia revoliutsionnykh peremen,' Sso 8 (1988), 2-5. 15 'Doklad predsedatelia gosudarstvennogo komiteta SSSR po professional'no-tekhnicheskom obrazovaniiu tovarishcha N.A. Petrovicheva,' Pto 9 (1983), 8-13. 16 On these points, see 'Kadry perestroiki,' Sso 3 (1987), 2-5 ; 'Uspekh nado gotovit' ,' Ug, 16 May 1987, 1; 'Vzyskatel'nyi smotr,' Ug, 12 September 1985, 1. 17 Kamaev. 18 L. Shvetsova, ' Po mandatu vremeni,' Pto 4 (1987), 5-7. 19 See, for example, A. Lubenskii, 'V ideate iv zhizni,' Pto 4 (1988), 61-2. 20 See CDSP 'Gorbachev Opens 27th Party Congress,' 38, No. 8 (1986), 15-16; Ed A. Hewett, 'Gorbachev's Economic Strategy: A Preliminary Assessment,' Soviet Economy 4 (1985), 285-305. 21 Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut truda gosudarstvennogo komiteta SSSR po trudu i sotsial'nym voprosam, Voprosy truda, zarabotnoi platy i sotsial 'nogo razvitiia v materialakh XIX vsesoiuznoi konferentsii KPSS (28 iunia-1 iulia) 1988 g., Moscow, (1988), 49; George Weickhardt, 'The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex and Economic Reform,' Soviet Economy, 3 (1986), 193-220. 22 David L. Williams, 'Preparing Future Generations: Recent Changes in Soviet Educational Policy,' in Jane Shapiro Zacek, ed., The Gorbachev Generation (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 105-38. 23 See Gertrude Schroeder, 'Gorbachev: "Radically" Implementing Brezhnev 's Reforms,' Soviet Economy 4 (1986), 313-26; regarding Gorbachev's reorganizational measures, see Philip Hanson, 'The Shape of Gorbachev 's Economic Reform, ' Soviet Economy 4 (1986), 313-26. 24 Andrew Matosich and Bonnie Matosich, 'Machine-Building: Perestroyka's Sputtering Engine,' Soviet Economy 2 (1988), 144-76; Gertrude Schroeder, 'Anatomy of Gorbachev's Reform,' Soviet Economy 3 (1987), 219-41. 25 V. Markov and A. Topilin, 'Aktual'nye zadachi planirovaniia sotsial'nogo razvitiia po territorii strany,' Pkh 3 (1984), 97-102; L. Svirina, ' Investitsionnaia politika v sotsial'no-kul' tumoi sfere,' Pkh 8 (1988), 94--8.

168

Notes to pages 82-5

26 'Place School Restructuring on the Level of Today 's Requirements,' Soviet Education, March 1989, 24-49. 27 F.R. Filippov and V.A. Malova, 'Some Ways oflncreasing Educational Efficiency,' Soviet Education, February 1986, 87-105. 28 B.A. Zel 'Iserman et al., Problemy razvitiia sistemy obrazovaniia i podgotovki kadrov v soiuznykh respublikakh (Riga: Latviiksii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1986), pp. 7-9. 29 On these points, see 'Obsuzhdaem proekt tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS,' Sso 1 (1986), 2-5; V.G. Shipunov, ' Uzlovye zadachi perestroiki srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia,' Sso 8 (1987), 2-7; lu. I. Molotkov, 'Problemy, trebuiushchie resheniia,' Sso 2 (1986), 13-14. 30 'S rasshirennogo zasedaniia kollegii i uchenogo soveta goskomiteta SSSR po proftekhobrazovaniiu,' Pto 1 (1984), 5-7. 31 George Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Education Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12. 32 L. Borisova and N. Nonkin, ' Zaboty sel'skoi shkoly,' Ug, l0January 1981, 2. 33 'Tekst vystupleniia General'nogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha Iu.V. Andropova,' Ug, 27 December 1983, 1-2. 34 'Sovetskie profsoiuzy v 80-e gody: glavnye orientiry,' Ug, 2 October 1982, 2; 'Shirokie prava, vysokaia otvetstvenost' ,' Ug, 18 April 1981, 3. 35 For a description of social welfare functions of base enterprises, see 'Shefy i shkola,' Ug, 13 January 1983, 1; A. Orleanskaia, ' Shirokaia programma deistvii,' Ug, 21 August 1984, 2. 36 Cameron Ross, in Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 213-15, paints a picture of enterprise domination of local governments. On enterprise domination, see also Steven Fortescu, 'The Restructuring of Soviet Industrial Ministries since 1985,' in Anders Aslund, ed., Market Socialism or the Restoration of Capitalism? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 121~1; Steven Fortescu, 'The Regional Party Apparatus in the "Sectoral Society,"' Studies in Comparative Communism 1 (1988), 11-23. 37 B.N. El'tsin, 'School Reform: Ways to Accelerate It,' Soviet Education, February 1989, 7~90. 38 'Party Approves Theses of 19th Conference,' CDSP 40, No. 21 (1988), 1-10. 39 'Vocational Education: Rethinking the System,' CDSP 39, No. 38 (1987), 18-20. 40 'Gorbachev Addresses Party on Change -1,' CDSP 39, No. 4 (1987), 1-7, 31-2; Gertrude Schroeder, ' Anatomy of Gorbachev's Reform,' Soviet Economy 3 (1987), 219~1. 41 See, for example, L. Voronin, 'O perestroike material'nogo-tekhnicheskogo obespecheniia narodnogo khoziaistva,' Pkh 5 (1988), 3-13; L. Kostin, 'Zakon

Notes to pages 85-7

42

43 44

45 46

47 48 49

50 51 52 53

54 55

169

sotsial'nogo progressa,' Ug, 4 August 1984, 2. On local government financing of schools, refer to 'Novaia shkola: ekonomicheskoe obespechenie,' Ug, 17 December 1988, 4. For summaries of enterprise rights under self-financing, see Vopro.sy ekonomiki 4 (1987), 54-62; A. Miliukov, 'Osnovnoe khoziaistvennoe zveno v sisteme upravleniia ekonomikoi,' Vopro.sy ekonomiki 5 ( 1987), 50-60; V. Senchagov, ' Nov ye cherty predpriiatiia v sovremennoi ekonomike,' Vopro.sy ekonomiki 5 (1987), 60-9. 'PTO: voprosy otkrytye i zakrytye,' Pto 4 (1988), 2-9. Peter Kneen, ' Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev,' Soviet Studies 1 (1989), 67-87. On proposals for contractual relations between industry and higher educational institutions, see also ' Speech by Comrade Ye.K. Ligachev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,' CDSP 38, No. 10 (1986), 8-10; CDSP 39, No. 1 (1987), 17-18. V.G. Dumev and A.G. Pankov, 'Perspektivy perestroiki deiatel'nosti tekhnikumov,' Sso 4 (1987), 6-8; ' PTO: Voprosy otkrytye,' Pto. 'Ob izmenenii poriadka finansirovaniia sptu i ispol'zovanii sekonomlennykh imi sredstv,' Pto 5 (1988), 42; P. Novikov, V. Kurbatov, and V. Selez'ko, 'Pedagogika khozrascheta,' Pto 11 (1987), 40-1. 'The USSR State Budget for 1988 and the Fulfillment of the State Budget for 1986,' CDSP 39, No. 44 (1987), 20-3. Schroeder. Donald Filtzer, 'The Contradictions of the Marketless Market: Self-Financing in the Soviet Industrial Enterprise, 1986-90,' Soviet Studies 6 (1991), 989-1009. Regarding self-financing of enterprises, refer also to Linda Cook, 'The Politics of Enterprise Insolvency,' Soviet Union 3 (1990), 235-58. See, for example, 'Speech by Comrade S.A. Fedotova, Teacher at School No. 130 in the City of Perm,' CDSP 40, No. 28 (1988), 10-28. 'The Basic Guidelines for Reform in the General Education and Vocational Schools,' CDSP 36, No. 18 (1984), 19-20. 'Trud- uchitel', trud-vospitatel',' Ug, 8 June 1985, 3. V. Grishin, 'Na peredovye rubezhi nauki i tekhniki,' Kommunist 3 (1985), 2~37; F. Bestem'ianov, 'Edinaia gosudarstvennaia,' Pto 9 (1986), 46-8. For a description of the all-union State Committee for Labour structure of the early 1980s, see E.G. Antosenkov, M.I. Vol'shanskaia, and V.D. Dmitriev, eds., Osnovnye napravleniia ratsional'nogo raspredeleniia i ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov (Moscow: Vsesoiuznyi naucho-metodicheskii tsentr po organizatsii truda i upravleniia proizvodstvom, 1982), pp. 5-20. L. Kostin, 'Zakon sotsial'nogo progressa,' Ug, 4 August 1984, 2; 'V TsK KPSS, Sovete Ministrov SSSR i VTsSPS,' Ug, 9 August 1983, 1. John P. Willerton puts the figure at 5 per cent. See his 'Reform, the Elite, and Soviet

170

56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68

Notes to pages 87-9

Centre-Periphery Relations,' in Soviet Union, Nos. 1-2 (1990), 55-94. The former Ukrainian prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, in 'Karaius', muchus', ale ne kaius',' Ukraina moloda, Kyiv, 14 May 1993, 4, gave a figure of 10 per cent. For a discussion of union versus republican shares of economic activity, see Donna Bahry, 'The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform,' Soviet Economy 3 (1991), 215-55. V.P. Eliutin, 'Administration, Organization, and Control in Higher Education,' Soviet Education, September-October 1985, 3-70. F. Ulitin, 'Podvodia nekotorye itogi,' Pto 11 (1982), 62-3. S. Kotov, 'Akademicheskaia nauka: soiuz s professional'noi shkoloi,' Pto 12 (1985), 24-5. 'Korennoi vopros ekonomicheskoi politike partii: Doklad tovarishcha M.S. Gorbacheva,' Ug, 13 June 1985, 1-2; Oskar Anweiler, 'The Educational System: Potential for Crisis or Stability?' in Hans-Joachim Veen, ed., From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Leamington Spa Berg Publishers, 1984), pp. 208-17. L.A. Revenko, Mestnye sovety narodnykh deputatov (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 25-32. 'Mestnye sovety i shkola,' Ug, 29 November 1986, 1. 'Communique on the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,' CDSP 40, No. 21 (1988), 1-10. 'For Depth and Dynamic Action in School Reform,' Soviet Education, February 1989, 53-75. Aleksei Osipov, interview, Moscow, 30 March 1993. G. Kamaev, 'Opiraias' na postoianuiu pomoshch' i zabotu partii,' Pto 8 (1981), 2-3. For a picture of attempts at regional self-sufficiency in labour resources, see V.V. Onikienko and M.V. Shalenko, Sovershenstvovanie territorial'noi organizatsii trudovykh resursov (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1989), especially pp. 7-18. On these points refer to 'O dal'neishem ukreplenii trudovoi distsipliny i sokrashchenii tekuchisti kadrov v narodnom khoziaistve,' Ug, 12 January 1980, 1; V. Markov and A. Topilin, 'Aktual'nye zadachi planirovaniia sotsial'nogo razvitiia po territorii strany,' Pkh 3 (1984), 97-102; L. Svirina, 'Investitsionnaia politika v sotsial'nokul'turnoi sfere,' Pkh 8 (1988), 94-8; 'Novaia shkola: ekonomicheskoe obespechenie,' Ug, 17 December 1988, 4. See also G. Plekhov, 'Samoupravlenie i samofinansirovanie oblastei, kraev i respublik,' Pkh 3 (1990), 4fr..56, on self-financing on a territorial basis. Ross, 211-15. V. Ispravnikov, 'Mestnye sovety kak sub'ekty prisvoeniia i khoziaistvovaniia,' Vospro.sy ekonomiki 3 (1989), 1~9. On ministerial dominance, see also Steven Fortescu, 'The Restructuring'; and Steven Fortescu, 'The Regional Party.'

Notes to pages 89-93

171

69 Mark Beissinger, 'Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-Imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared,' Studies in Comparative Communism 1 (1988), 71-85. 70 Paul Shoup, 'Leadership Drift in the Communist Systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,' Studies in Comparative Communism 22, No. 1 (1989), 5-9; Paul Shoup, 'Leadership Drift in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,' ibid., 43-55; John Willerton in 'Reform, the Elite, and Soviet Centre-Periphery Relations,' Soviet Union, Nos. 1-2 (1990), 55-94.

Cbapter7 1 'Commission Meets,' CDSP 37, No. 5 (1985), 22-3. 2 L. Gordin, 'Soiuz s proizvodstvom,' Ug, 27 August 1983, 3; V.P. Pereverzev, 'Obuchenie i proizvodstvo: nereshennye problemy,' Sso 9 (1988), 34. 3 For a brief discussion of this problem, see N. Lobanov, 'Vstrechnoe dvizhenie,' Pto 6 (1985), 12-13. 4 For an account of an enterprise's success in shaping its workforce through selective rewards, see V. Shevchenko, 'lntellektual'nyi potentsial trudovogo kollektiva,' Ug, 23 September 1980, 1. See also 'Shefy i shkola,' Ug, 13 January 1983, 1. 5 E.I. Iulov, 'Proforientatsiia dlia otrasli: opyt i problemy,' Sso 1 (1984), 9-11. 6 'Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik: o trudovykh kollektivakh i povyshenii ikh roli v upravlenii predpriiatiiami, uchrezhdeniiami, organizatsiiami,' Ug, 21 June 1983, 2. On legislation increasing the role of labour collectives in communist upbringing, see 'Zavodskie universitety,' Pto 7 (1985), 2-3. 7 For proponents of this view, see V. Radaev, 'Mera truda i glavnyi faktor ee razvitiia,' Pkh 6 (1983), 102-7; lu. Grafskii, 'Sotsial'noe upravlenie: chelovek i proizvodstvo,' Pich (1989), 104-9. 8 N.I. Subbotina, Finansirovanie narodnogo obrazovaniia, (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1985), pp. 10-11; see also I.P. Antropova, Ekonomika i finansy sistemy proftekhobrazovaniia (Sverdlovsk: Sverdovlskii inzhenemo-pedagogicheskii institut, 1988), pp. 66-9. On the forms of enterprise cooperation with SSUZs, see A.K. Gavrilov, 'Bazovye predpriiatiia i professional'naia orientatsiia,' Sso 2 (1982), 36-7; I.N. Sharapov, 'Opyt raboty otrasli v povyshenii effektivnosti sviazi obucheniia s proizvodstvom,' Sso 2 (1985), 6-10; Z.M. Guseinov and B. Avizov, 'Organicheskaia sviaz' zavoda s tekhnikumom,' Sso 12 (1986), 36. 9 'Speech by Deputy E.J. Kupca, Stuchka, E.D., Latvian Republic,' CDSP 37, No. 53 (1985), 16. 10 'Schools' Sponsoring Enterprises,' CDSP 36, No. 42 (1984), 29. 11 'Trud - uchitel', trud - vospitatel' ,' Ug, 8 June 1985, 3.

172

Notes to pages 9 ~

12 'Kak my vospitaem,' Ug, 5 February 1983, 1. 13 P. Liubovskii, 'Kto v rabochee poidet?' Ug, 8 May 1986, 1; 'lnitsiativno, delovito, energichno,' Ug, 17 December 1985, 1. 14 'Kontseptsiia obshchego srednego obrazovaniia,' Ug, 23 August 1988, 2-3. 15 'Make the School Reform Thoroughgoing and Dynamic in Its Effect,' CDSP 38, No. 27 {1986), 1-5. 16 'Cadre Instruction and Retraining,' Soviet Education, July-August 1987, 49-54. 17 B.N. El'tsin, 'Reforma shkoly: puti uskoreniia,' Ug, 25 September 1986, 1. 18 ' Shkol ' noi reforme - glubinu i dinamiku deistvii: soveshchanie v TsK KPSS,' Ug, 3 July 1986, 1-3; G.P. Veselov, 'Zadachi uchitel'stva rossii,' Ug, 4June 1987, 1-2. 19 V.G. Shipunov, 'Pervoocherednye voprosy sovershenstvovaniia soderzhaniia srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia,' Sso 9 {1986), 6-11; G.A. Iagodin, ' Following the Course Set by the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Congress,' Soviet Education, July-August 1987, 26-48; D.I. Chuprunov, 'Zadanie rodiny vypolnim,' Sso 2 (1982), 2-5. 20 'O pravakh priema uchashchikhsia,' Sso 9 {1988), 28. 21 Regarding PTI.Js, see M. Pliner, 'Printsip- territorial'nyi,' Pto 10 (1986), 2-3; on SSUZs, see A.I. Tikunov, 'Chto meshaet perestroike,' Sso 7 (1987), 2-5. 22 L. Gordin, 'Soiuz s proizvodstvom,' Ug, 27 August 1983, 3; V. Kurmaev, ' Zhivoi otklik,' Ug, 23 February 1984, 1; M. Minkevich, ' Shkola - UPK- Proizvodstvo,' Ug, 27 March 1984, 2; Pliner. 23 P.R. Atutov, ' Polytechnical Education, Labor Training, and the Vocational Guidance of Pupils,' Soviet Education, February I 984, 40-57. 24 Cameron Ross, Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 213-15 . 25 Ibid. 26 L. Soboleva, 'Poka grom ne grianet,' Ug, 21 March 1989, 2. 27 ' Vsesoiuznaia konferentsiia,' Sso 3 (1981 ), 6-35. 28 L.A. Revenko notes that provincial governments acquired greater voice over industrial management during the early 1980s. See Mestnye sovety narodnykh deputatov (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 23-5. V.N. Shamardin mentions that provincial councils of SSUZ directors had acquired a greater role in technicum management by the early 1980s. See ' Ukrepliat ' partiinoe vlianie v kollektivakh tekhnikumov i uchilishch, ' Sso 3 (1984), 17-22. 29 I. Afanasev, ' Shkola v usloviiakh rynka,' Ug, no. 48 {1990), 5. See also V.E. Iatsenko, 'Podgotovka spetsialistov v usloviiakh napriazhennogo balansa molodezhnykh resursov,' Sso 1 (1981), 43-6, regarding students' problems with housing. 30 'Kvartiry dlia uchitelia,' Ug, 10 December 1985, 1; I. Kolesnikova and A. Astakhov, 'Rubezhi rossii: ot piatiletki k piatiletke,' Ug, 19 January 1982, 1. 31 Iatsenko; 'Krysha doma tvoego,' Ug, 3 September 1986, 1. 32 A.I. Tikunov, ' Chto meshaet perestroike?' Sso 7 (1987), 2-5.

Notes to pages 96-9

173

33 For good descriptions of the general school director's role, see Olga Chelpanova, 'Shkol'naia reforma: upravlencheskii mekhanizm,' Ug, 5 June 1986, 2; M. Iosenkin, 'Esli sprosit' direktora,' Ug, 21 May 1987, 1; F. Dnestranskii, 'Doverie k liudiam, iii pochemu ne k.hvataet umelyk.h rukovoditelei,' Ug, 20 June 1987, 1; M. Korniiaka, 'Zaboty-popolam,' Ug, 2 April 1985, 3. 34 M. Postol, 'Nu, a direktor?' Ug, 27 October 1983, 3; Olga Chelpanova, 'Shkol'naia reforma: upravlenchiskii mekhanizm,' Ug, 5 June 1986, 2. 35 'Partiinyi komitet i shkola,' Ug, 9 April 1988, 1. For other accounts of the aging and demoralization of PPOs, see V. Nikiforova, 'Grany sodruzhestva,' Ug, 16 April 1988, l ; M. Slobnikova, 'Vzyskatel'nyi smotr,' Ug, 12 September 1985, 1. 36 lu. Gorbunov, 'Kak shkola stala nicheinaia,' Ug, 19 July 1988, 1. 37 ' S tochki zreniia k.hosrascheta,' Ug, 12 January 1988, 1. 38 'Rules of the Secondary General Education School,' Soviet Education, February 1989, 91-112. 39 V. Ispravnikov, 'Mestnye sovety kak sub 'ekty prisvoeniia i khoziaistvovaniia,' Voprosy ekonomiki 3 (1989), 100-9. 40 The general and vocational school's dependence on the attitude of enterprise officials is noted in 'Trud - vospitatel ',' Ug, 6 December 1983, 1. 41 On the unevenness of school financing, see, for example, V. Zheliba, 'Temp uskoreniia,' Ug, 7 December 1985, l; 'Shtab i ego strategiia,' Ug, 7 June 1988, 2; 'S tochki zreniia k.hozrascheta,' Ug, 12 June 1988, 1. 42 This is a common complaint of CIS citizens. On graft in the educational system, see R. Papilov, 'Vremia trebuet deistvii,' Ug, 20 January 1987, 1-2. 43 L. Fedotova, 'Vozmozhnye varianty,' Pto 1 (1986), 2~1; A. Khalamaizer, 'Podskazyvaet praktika,' Ug, 18 February 1984, 3. 44 'Kontseptsiia obshchego srednego obrazovaniia,' Ug, 23 August 1988, 2-3; E. Saburov, 'Shkol'naia ekonomika,' Ug, 15 December 1988, 3. 45 A. Sachkov, chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Committee of the Union of Educational Workers, wished to see authority for school construction and housing for teachers consolidated at the republican level. Refer to 'Vremia novyk.h podkhodov,' Ug, 26 January 1988, 1. A. Orlov discusses the difficulty that the central government had in standardizing local-level funding for education in 'Territorial'noe samoupravlenie,' Voprosy ekonomiki 4 (1989), 67-72. 46 'On the Course of Restructuring the Secondary and Higher Education System and the Party's Tasks in Carrying It Out,' Soviet Education, April 1989, 6-67. 47 On these points, see L. Denisova, 'Let Us Not Sin against the Truth,' Soviet Education, May 1990, 7-31. The illness rate of schooldchildren is noted by G. Iagodin, 'Shkolu-raskrepostit',' Ug, 5 June 1988, 3. 48 'Proftek.hobrazovanie: piatiletka dvenadtsiataia,' Pto 2 (1986), 2-7. 49 'Zadachi srednei spetsial'noi shkoly v svete reshenii oktiabr'skogo (1985g.)

174

50

51 52 53

54

55 56 57 58 59 60

61

62

63

64

Notes to pages 99-101

Plenuma TsK KPSS,' Sso l (1986), 2-7; V.A. Raiangu, Planirovanie, finansirovanie i upravlenie obrazovaniia v SSSR (Tallinn: Gosudarstvennyi komitet estonskoi SSSR po narodnom obrazovaniiu, 1989), p. 86. T.V. Polikarpova, 'Iz istorii srednei spetsial'noi shkoly (1974-1988g.),' Sso 9 (1988), 35-8; V.G. Shipunov, 'Perestroika srednei spetsial'noi shkoly: problemy i perspektivy sovershenstvovaniia,' Sso 5 (1988), 2-7. 'For Depth and Dynamic Action in School Reform,' Soviet Education, February 1989, 53-75; see especially p. 62. E.V. Belkin, 'Vocational and Technical Education in the Career Plans of Youth,' Soviet Education, January-February-March 1982, 195-204. M. Rutkevich, 'Inertia vs. Quality: A Sociologist's Notes on Restructuring Secondary and Higher Schools,' CDSP 38, No. 47 (1986), 1-3; V. Bianki, 'Zabota vsekh Leningradtsev,' Ug, 26 July 1983, l; V.A. Petrov, 'Ne otkladivaia na potom,' Ug, 22 March 1984, 1. M.A. Prokofiev, 'Strategiia i taktika prosveshcheniia,' Ug, 1 September 1981, 2; I. Trukhanov, 'Sovershenstvovat' proizvodstvennoe obuchenie uchashchikhsia,' Pto l (1982), 26-8; A.P. Dumachev, 'PTO v zerkale NTR,' Pto 6 (1986), 2-8. M. Shanygina, 'Srednee? Polusrednee? Realnoe?' Pto 1 (1988), 6-11; 'Obnovlenie shkoly: trebuiutsia idei!' Ug, 22 August 1987, 1-2. Denisova. 'The Fundamental Guidelines for the Restructuring of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Country,' Soviet Education, July-August 1987, 118-64. Ju. Barinov, 'Vokrug plana,' Pto 5 (1986), 13-15; I. Bogachev, 'Dorogie igry,' Pto 6 (1987), 39-40. I. Nazimov, 'Na dal'nikh podstupakh,' Pto 8 (1985), 54-6; 'Posle vos'miletki,' Ug, 26 June 1986, 1. Stephen T. Kerr, 'Diversification in Russian Education,' in Anthony Jones, ed., Education and Society in the New Russia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 47-74. On curricular reforms, see also John Dunstan, 'The Progress of Differentiation in Soviet and Russian State Scholarship,' ibid., pp. 75-101. Stephen Webber and Tatiana Webber, 'Issues in Teacher Education,' in Anthony Jones, ed., Education and Society in the New Russia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 231-59. See 'Soviet Curriculum: Pedagogical Issues,' in Brian Holmes, Gerald H. Read, and Natalya Voskresenskaya, Russian Education (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), pp. 175-99. On the role of the school in the rural economy, see A. Stoppe, 'Sud'ba sela v poriadke ocherednosti,' Ug, no. 29 (1990), 1; V. Smirnov, 'Gde rodilsia - tam prigodil'sia?' Ug, 26 March 1987, 1. A. Tsirul'nikov and E. Komarova, 'Sel'skaia shkola: problemy i perspektivy raz-

Notes to pages 101-4

65

66 67 68

69 70 71

72 73

74

75 76 77

78

79 80 81

82

175

vitiia,' Ug, 15 December 1988, 4; P. Pidkasistyi, 'Bo!' selskoi shkoly,' Ug, June 1989, 20. Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR po narodnomu obrazovaniiu, Vsesoiuznyi s" ezd rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 21. 'V interessakh naroda: vtoraia sessiia Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR odinatsatogo sozyva,' Ug, 29 November 1984, 1-2. ' Sel'skoi shkole - kvalifitsirovanye kadry,' Ug, 6 July 1982, 1. E. Davydov, in 'Trevogi direktora PfU,' Ug, 17 April 1986, 3, notes that in Riazan province, for example, PfU programs were often interrupted so that students could be used as farm labour. One school year out of three was used for farm labour. 'Tochka otcheta,' Ug, 25 July 1985, 1. 'Perestroika shkoly - na uroven' sovremennykh trebovanii,' Ug, 14 July 1987, 1-2. A World Bank report raises the issue of overstaffing. See Ukraina: Zainiatist', sotsial'nyi zakhyst ta sotsial'ni vytraty v protsesi perekhodu do rynkovoi ekonomiky (Washington: World Bank, 1992), November. World Education Report, pp. 35 and 95. The figures for VUZs and SSUZs are calculated by the author from data in Narodnoe obrazovanie i kul'tura v SSSR (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1989), pp. 42, 137, 151, 186, and 237. A comparison of North American/West European and Soviet educational systems is given in Dennis Soltys, 'Upravlinnia osvitoiu: dosvid Kanady i problemy Ukrainy,' Ekonomika Ukrainy, Kyiv, No. 7 (1994), 74--80. World Education Report, p. 95; lagodin, keynote address, Vsesoiuznyi s'ezd. World Bank, Ukraina. The figures above were given by the USSR Minister of Enlightenment in 'Perestroiku shkoly - na uroven' sovremennykh treboyanii,' Ug, 14 July 1987, 1-2. L.F. Kolesnikov, V.N. Turchenko, and L.G. Borisova, in Effektivnost' obrazovaniia (Moscow: Ministerstvo obrazovaniia RSFSR, 1991), p. 169, noted an accelerating outflow of personnel from the teaching profession over the 1980s. S. Boguslavskii, 'Naiti svoi oblik,' Ug, 28 February 1985, 2; A. Orlov and L. Radzikhovskii, 'Pedagogika sotrudnichestva - istoki, printsipi, perspektivy,' Ug, 16 February 1988, 3-4. A. Bulkin and V. Lebedev, 'Shkole -po trudu,' Ug, 13 August 1988, 1; Vsesoiuznyi s" ezd, p. 23; 'Delo partii - delo vsego naroda,' Pto 5 (1984), 2-4. See Chapter 9 on finance . Educational spending as a percentage of GNP in 1988 was given as 6.8 per cent in North America and 5.4 per cent in the USSR/Europe. See World Education Report, p. 36. A.A. Dement' ev, 'Provedenie vnutritekhnikumovskogo kontrolia, ' Sso 9 ( 1984), 23-5.

176

Notes to pages 104--6

83 G.P. Zykin, 'Professional'nye znaniia kak prodlikt proizvodstva,' Eko 1 (1987), 11420; A Shcheglov, 'Nauka i khozraschet,' Kommunist 12 (1990), 90-4. 84 The lack of a scientific basis for state funding of schools is noted by V. Iakovlev, 'Vse eshche pasynki,' Ug, 17 October 1989, 1. 85 'Konechnyi rezul'tat - sud'ba cheloveka i strany,' Ug, 11 February 1988, 1; E.F. Pedenko, 'Uluchshat' organizatsiiu kontrolia,' Sso 9 (1984), 1-8; M. Sdobnikova, 'Vzyskatel'nyi smotr,' Ug, 12 September 1985, 1. 86 See, for example, T. Leichnekov, 'Delo gigantskoe,' Ug, 9 April 1985, 2; V. Zimin, 'Kuda smotrel inspektor?' Pto 4 (1987), 49-51. 87 'Ob attestatsii prepodavatelei i rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov,' Sso 2 (1985), 19-20; V.P. Usachev, 'Tekhnikumy rossiiskoi federatsii i reforma shkoly,' Sso 10 (1985), 6-17. 88 G.P. Veselov, Uchrezhdeniia prosveshcheniia RSFSR na etape uskoreniia sotsial'noekonomicheskogo razvitiia strany (Moscow: Ministerstvo prosveshcheniia RSFSR, 1986), p. 39. A similar figure is cited in 'Stimul deistviia, poiska, rosta,' Ug, 9 January 1986, 1. 89 'Konechnyi rezul'tat,' Ug. 90 E.F. Pedenko, 'Uluchshat' organizatsiiu kontrolia,' Sso 9 (1984), 6-8; V. Zimin, 'Kuda smotrel inspektor?' Pto 4 (1987), 49-51. 91 I. Bogachev, 'Nadezhdy pod voprosom,' Pto 2 (1988), 26-9; E. Likhatskaia and E. Mozhaeva, 'Trebuetsia inspektor,' Ug, 12 December 1985, 2. 92 On the lack of institutional supports for teachers and regression to old instructional methods, see 'Chlo my dumaem o shkole,' Ug, no. 29 (1990), 10; N. Anis in, 'Glukhaia zashchita,' Ug, 6 January 1987, l; 'Shkola smotrit' v budushchee,' Ug, 5 July 1986, 1. 93 S. Batyshev, 'Soiuz shkoly i proizvodstva,' Ug, 10 October 1987, l; G. Legenskii, 'Strategiia peremen,' Ug, 19 January 1988, 2. 94 L. Novikova, ' A sushchnost' -to konservativnaia,' Ug, 21 March 1987, 2; 'Novoe mishlenie protiv naviazannykh formul,' Ug, 5 January 1988, 1. 95 Legenskii. 96 'Shkola smotrit' v budushchee,' Ug, 5 July 1986, l; Anisin; M. Sagdiev, ' Uspekh nado gotovit',' Ug, 16 May 1987, 1. 97 On the lack of institutional support for teachers and problems of workplace and domestic stress see, for example, Sh. Amonashvili, 'Uchitel ', shkola, nauka v zerkale perestroiki,' Ug, 29 September 1987, l; R.Kh. Shakurov, 'The Activity of Teaching Engineer Cadres,' Soviet Education, February 1991, 44-57; V. Nikiforova, 'Ochishchenie delom,' Ug, 11 April 1987, 1. 98 On attestation, see V.I. Il'chenko and V.V. Sokol, Konseptsiia i mekhanizm mezhdunarodnykh sviazei SSSR v ob/asti obrazovaniia (Kiev: Kievskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1989), pp. 5-12 and 35-7; V.M. Zuev, Roi', mesto i funkstii kadrov so srednym spetsial'nym obrazovaniem v narodnom khoziaistve (Moscow: Nauchno-

Notes to pages 106-11

99 100 101 102 103 104 105

177

issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), pp. 109-10; E.A. Iakuba, Narodnoe obrazovanie v usloviiakh perestroiki: sotsiologicheskie ocherki (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut vysshego obrazovaniia, 1990), p. 36. A. Bulkin and V. Lebedev, 'Shkole -po trudu,' Ug, 13 August (1988), 1; T. Zaslavskaia, 'Ot kazhdogo - po sposobnostiam,' Ug, 11 December I 985, 2. Kolesnikov, pp. 169-70. A. Kargin, 'Reforma krasna uchiteliam,' Kommunist 11 (1988), 72-4. 'K novomu chitateliu v novom godu,' Ug, 1 January 1988, 1; Kargin. A. Vartanian, 'Dengi na veter,' Ug, 2 February 1988, 1; V. Bogoliubov, 'Uskorenie nachinaetsia so shkoly,' Ug, 26 November 1985, I. ' According to the Old Schedule,' CDSP 39, No. 34 (1987), 11-12. 'The Country's Public Education on the Eve of Radical Changes,' Soviet Education, July 1989, 35-43.

Chapters

I T. Zaslavskaia, 'Chelovecheskii faktor,' Ug, 13 May 1986, 2. 2 See, for example, V. Kulikov, ' Uskorenie sotsial ' no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiia strany - strategicheskaia liniia KPSS,' Voprosy ekonomiki 10 (I 987), 106--16; D. Palterovich, 'Tekhnicheskaia rekonstruktsiia narodnogo khoziaistva,' Voprosy ekonomiki 1 (1988), 117-26; George Avis, 'The Soviet Higher Education Reform: Proposals and Reactions,' Comparative Education 1 (1990), 5-12. 3 V. Urchukin, 'Povyshenie effektivnosti otraslevoi nauki,' Voprosy ekonomiki 9 (1986), 45-51; Peter Kneen, 'Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev,' Soviet Studies, 1 (1989), 67-S7; G.A. Iagodin, 'The Restructuring of the Educational System and Continuing Education,' Soviet Education, July-August 1987, 94-117. 4 Kneen. 5 'Obrazovanie - cherez vsiu zhizn,' Ug, 11 December 1988, I. 6 Avis; Kneen. 7 'The Fundamental Guidelines for the Restructuring of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Country,' Soviet Education, July-August 1987, 118-64. 8 Iagodin, 'The Restructuring .. .' 9 See Chapter 7, note IOI. IO 'On Progress in the Restructuring of the Secondary and Higher Schools and the Party's Tasks in Its Implementation,' CDSP 40, No. 8 (1988), 8--13. 11 'Obnovlenie shkoly: trebuiutsia idei!' Ug, 22 August 1987, 1-2. 12 'Decree of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of February 18, 1988, "On CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's Speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum,"' Soviet Education, April 1989, 68--84. 13 'On Progress .. .' CDSP.

178

Notes to pages 111-14

14 A.V. Kuraev, Predposylki i sushchnost' reformy sistemy narodnogo obrazovaniia SSSR v 1958 g. (Saratov: Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1989), p. 24. 15 P. K.irpichnikov, 'Na uroki - v institut,' Ug, 24 January 1989, 1; E. Tkachenko, 'Vgliad iz zala,' Pto 10 (1988), 2-5. 16 'Prioritet obrazovaniia,' Sso 4 (1988), 2-5. 17 Ju.A. Andukinov, Problemy upravleniia trudom v usloviiakh korennoi perestroiki khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma (Kalinin: Kalininskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1988), p. 20. 18 N.V. Kuznetsov, 'XIX Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia konferentsiia - vazhnyi etap v deiatel 'nosti KPSS,' Sso 9 ( 1988), 14-17; Liliana Gutauskene, 'Professional' naia orientatsiia i sotsial'naia politika,' Kommunist 10 (1986), 54-8. 19 D. Karpukhin and I. Maslova, 'Formirovanie i effektivnoe ispol'zovanie trudovogo potensiala,' Vopro.ry ekonomiki 6 (1988), 93-103. For other critiques of the human factor and social investment see, for example, V. Orlov, A. Pero, and A. Bokov, 'Sotsial'noe razvitie: Iseli i perspektivy,' Pkh 2 (1986), 95-102; 'O cheloveke i chelovecheskom faktore: novye podkhody i resheniia,' Kommunist 1 (1986), 50-9; P. Krylov, 'Sotsial'naia pereorientatsiia ekonomiki v 198fr1988 gg.,' Pkh 3 (1989), 53-62. 20 Steven Rosefielde, 'State-Directed Market Socialism: The Enigma of Gorbachev's Radical Industrial Reforms,' Soviet Studies 4 (1991), 597-611. 21 Politizdat, Tezi.ry tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS k XIX Vsesoiuznoi partiinoi konferentsii: Odobrenyi plenumom TsK KPSS 23 maia 1988 g. (Moscow, 1988), p. 24. 22 'Communique on the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,' CDSP 40, No. 21 (1988), 1-10. 23 Andrew J. and Bonnie Matosich, 'Machine Building: Perestroyka's Sputtering Engine,' Soviet Economy 2 (1988), 144-76; T. lugai, 'Struktura zaniatosti v usloviiakh intensifikatsii,' Vopro.ry ekonomiki 11 (1986), 74-83. On industrial policy, see also G. Ivanov and A. Simonian, 'Planirovanie nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa: materially konferentsii v gosplane SSSR,' Pkh 9 (1986), 6fr78. 24 V. Simakov and lu. Iakovets, 'Novye pokoleniia tekhniki: problemy planirovaniia,' Pkh 6 (1986), 42-9. 25 V. Fal'tsman, 'Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress v SSSR: smena prioritetov,' Vopro.ry ekonomiki 11 (1988), 28-37. 26 'Decree of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of February 18, 1988, "On the Course of Restructuring of Secondary and Higher Education and the Party's Tasks in Carrying It Out," Soviet Education, April 1989, 69-84; 'Prioritet obrazovaniia,' Sso 4 (1988), 2-5. 27 Boris Rumer, 'Investment in the 12th Five-Year Plan,' Soviet Studies 3 (1991), 45172. 28 Ibid.

Notes to pages 114-17

179

29 Vladimir Kostakov, ' Labor Problems in the Light of Perestroika,' Soviet Economy 1 (1988), 95-101. 30 Kostakov. 31 M.S. Gorbachev, Energiiu molodezhi - delu perestroiki (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), p. 11. 32 John Gooding, 'The XXVIII Congress of the CPSU in Perspective,' Soviet Studies 2 (1991), 237-53. 33 Stephen Fortescu, 'The Regional Party Apparatus in the "Sectional Society,"' Studies in Comparative Communism 21, No. 1 (1988), 11-23; Bohdan Harasymiw, 'Gorbachev's Reorganization and the Gorkom,' Studies in Comparative Communism 1 (1988), 61-70; Rosefielde. 34 'Kogda-to, potom iii seichas? ' Ug, 2 August 1988, 2. 35 Riabov; V. Korol ', 'Stabil'naia nestabil'nost',' Pto 8 (1988), 8-11 . 36 V. V. Onikienko and M.V. Shalenko, Sovershenstvovanie territorial'noi organizatsii trudovykh resursov (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1989), pp. 159-60. 37 'V Ministerstve prosveshcheniia SSSR,' Ug, 12 November 1987, 1. 38 'Perestroika shkoly - na uroven' sovremennykh trebovanii: Tezisy Ministerstva prosveshcheniia SSSR,' Ug, 14 July 1987, 1-2; Narodnoe obrazovanie - v tsentr vnimaniia,' Ug, 15 December 1987, 1. 39 V.G. Shipunov, ' Perestroika srednei spetsial'noi shkoly: problemy i perspektivy sovershenstvovaniia,' Sso 5 (1988), 35-8; T.V. Polikarpova, 'lz istorii srednei spetsial ' noi shkoly (1974-1988gg.),' Sso 9 (1988), 35-8. 40 'Skhema napolnennaia zhizn'iu,' Pto 2 (1987), 2-4. 41 I.V. Bestuzhev-Lada, ' The Prospective Social Problems of Public Education,' Soviet Education, July 1988, 5-29. 42 'Decree of the CPSU ...,' Soviet Education, April 1989, 69-84; 'Prioritet obrazovaniia,' Sso 4 (1988), 2-5; S. Batyshev, 'An Occupation - for a Lifetime?' Soviet Education, September 1991, 5-22. 43 'On Progress in the Restructuring of the Secondary and Higher Schools and the Party's Tasks in Its Implementation,' CDSP 40, No. 8 (1988), 8-13. 44 'Priblizhat' refonnu srednei i vysshei shkoly k politike perestroiki,' Ug, 9 January 1988, 1. 45 V.A. Portnykh, 'Samoupravlenie -v praktiku uchebnykh zavedenii,' Sso 12 (1987), 22-4. 46 'In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,' CDSP 39, No. 1 (1987), 17-18. 47 'Perestroika professional' nogo obrazovaniia,' Sso 6 (1987), 7-9; A. Gorchev, 'Pust' vedit' vse vmeste? ' Ug, 16 January 1988, 1. 48 E. Kobyleva et al., 'Kakoe u nas obrazovanie?' Ug, 14 November 1989, 2. 49 'Ustav srednei obshcheobrazovatel ' noi shkoly,' Ug, 31 January 1987, 2-3; see also 'On the New Experimental Syllabus,' Soviet Education, March 1989, 62-71.

180 Notes to pages 117-21 50 'The CPSU Central Committee's Draft Basic Guidelines for Reform in the GeneralEducation and Vocational Schools,' CDSP 36, No. 1 (1984), 2. See also 'In the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers,' CDSP 35, No. 32 (1983), 6. 51 V. Orlov, A. Pero, and A. Bokov, 'Sotsial'noe razvitie: tseli i perspektivy,' Pkh 2 (1986), 95-102. 52 A.G. Filipenok, Finansy i ftnansovoe planirovanie mezhshkol'nykh uchebno-proizvodstvennykh kombinatov (Vilnius: Leningradskii finansovo-ekonomicheskii universitet, 1989), p. 3. 53 'O khode perestroiki srednei i vysshei shkoly i zadachi partii po ee osushchestvleniiu,' Ug, 23 February 1988, 1-2. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 'Decree of the CPSU ..., ' Soviet Education, April 1989, 69414. 57 E. Kobyleva et al.; G. lagodin, 'Cherez gumanizatsiiu i demokratiiu k novomu kachestvu obrazovaniia,' Ug, 22 December 1988, 1-4. 58 'Shkolu - raskrepostit' ,' Ug, 5 July 1988, 3. These calls should not be viewed in isolation from the cancellation of Soviet history examinations in institutions of higher learning in 1990. See J.L. Black, ' Perestroika and the Soviet General School: The CPSU Loses Control of the Ideological Dimension of"Vospitanie,"' Canadian Slavonic Papers 1 (1991), 1-18. 59 'K novomu chitateliu v novom godu,' Ug, 1 January 1988, I. 60 Muckle, pp. 76-81. 61 'Kontseptsiia obshchego srednego obrazovaniia,' Ug, 23 August 1988, 2-3. 62 'Shkola na segodnia, zavtra i poslezavtra,' Ug, 14 June 1988, 2. 63 'Shkolu - raskrepostit',' Ug, 5 June 1988, 3. 64 Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR po narodnomu obrazovaniiu, Vsesoiuznyi s" ezd rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 13. 65 'Ustav vsesoiuznoi federatsii profsoiuzov rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia i nauki,' Ug, No. 31 (July 1990), 9. 66 'Vsesoiuznomu s"ezdu rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia,' Ug, 22 December 1988, I. 67 G. Iagodin, ' Shkola dlia vsekh,' Ug, 11 April 1989, l; Gennadii lagodin, 'Cherez gumanizatsiiu i demokratiiu k novomu kachestvu obrazovaniia' (keynote address), Vsesoiuznyi s"ezd rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), pp. 19-20. 68 lagodin, 'Cherez gumanizatsiiu.' 69 Black. 70 ' Resoliutsiia vsesoiuznogo s"ezda rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia,' Ug, 29 December 1988, 1.

Notes to pages 121-5

181

71 72 73 74 75 76

Ibid. 'Resolutsiia,' Ug . Kostakov. Rumer. Kostakov. Mark Beissinger, Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 287. 77 Jan Winiecki, 'Soviet-Type Economies: Considerations for the Future,' Soviet Studies 4 (1986), 543-61. 78 Muckle, p. 82.

Chapter 9

1 'Kadry perestroiki,' Sso 3 (1987), 2-5; B.M. Ramzin, ed., Osnovnye napravleniia perestroiki vysshego i srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniia v strane (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1987), p. 18; T.V. Polikarpova, 'Iz istorii srednei spetsial'noi shkoly (1974-1988 gg.),' Sso 9 (1988), 35--S; V.G. Shipunov, 'Tekhnikumy i rynochnaia ekonomika,' Sso 9 (1990), 2-4. 2 Anatolii Zotov and VladimirTykheev, 'Obrazovanie v epokhu peremen,' Kommunist 11 (1990), 52--60. 3 M. Ivanov and G. Margolit, 'Effektivnost' inzhenernogo truda,' Pkh 11 (1989), 1235. For complaints of the low quality of Soviet engineers, see also F.I. Peregudov, 'Perestroika vysshego obrazovaniia: sostoianiia i politika preobrazovanii,' Sso 7 (1990), 2--S. 4 V.G. Shipunov, 'Perestroika srednei spetsial'noi shkoly: problemy i perspektivy sovershenstvovaniia,' Sso 5 (1988), 2-7. 5 'Nashi interv'iu,' Sso 9 (1989), ~14. 6 L. Chizova, 'Regulirovanie zaniatosti naseleniia,' Pkh 8 (1988), 88-93. 7 Ibid. 8 'S veroi v budushchee;' Sso 5 (1989), 2-5. 9 'Rabotat' po-novomu,' Sso 9 (1989), 2-5. 10 Regarding under-institutionalization in Ukraine, Marc Lalonde notes that Ukraine had only about 6,000 staff members in its central bureaucracy at the time of its declaration of independence in I 991. See 'Potribni pravyla,' Svit pro Ukrainu, 4 August 1993. Bohdan Krawchenko states that the Ukrainian central bureaucracy still comprised only 12,000 members as of 1993, in ' From Communism to Democracy: The Challenge of Public Service Reform in Ukraine,' Ukraine-Canada Policy and Trade Monitor 2, No. 1, Winter (1993-4), 33-41. 11 Chizova. 12 Igor V. Kitaev, 'The Labor Market and Education in the Post-Soviet Era,' in Anthony

182

13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20

21 22 23

24

25 26 27 28 29

Notes to pages 128-31

Jones, ed., Education and Society in the New Russia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 311-32. E. Dneprov, 'Chetvertaia reforma,' Ug, No. 25 (June 1990), 3. 'Ne lomat' -stroit',' Ug, No. 34 (August 1990), 3. I. Bogachev, 'Komu nuzhno protivostoianie?' Ug, 3 March 1992, 9. Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR po narodnomu obrazovaniiu, Vsesoiuznyi s"ezd rabotnikov narodnogo obrazovaniia: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 225; L. Zhiltsova and lu. Boiarov, 'la -reshitel'no protiv! Ia kategoricheski za!' Pto 9 (1988), 2-4. 'Prognoz na segodnia,' Pto 12 (1988), 2-5; 'Sto dnei i vsiu zhizn' ,' Ug, No. 34 (August 1990), 3. I. Bogachev, 'Komu nuzhno protivostoianie?' Ug, 3 March 1992, 9; I. Smirnov, 'Proftekh bez utekh,' Ug, 2-9 October 1990, 4. V.A. Sidorov, Obrazovanie i podgotovka kadrov v usloviiakh novoi tekhnicheskoi rekonstruktsii (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1990), p. 70. V. Riabov, 'The Restructuring of Education,' Soviet Education, July 1991, 3-25. Similar figures are given by the editor of Uchitel'skaia gazeta. See 'Chto my dumaem o shkole,' No. 24 (June 1990), 9-10. Unesco figures put spending in 1988 at 6.8 per cent of GNP in North America and 5.4 per cent in the USSR/Europe. See Unesco, World Education Report, 1991 (Paris, 1991), p. 36. K.I. Subottina, Finansirovanie narodnogo obrazovaniia (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1985), pp. 10-11. 'On the Basic Guidelines of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy,' CDSP 41, No. 25 (1989), 1-10. 'Report by N.I. Ryzhkov, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,' CDSP 42, No. 28 (1990), 1-4; I. Bogachev, 'Ne pugaites' - apparat prezidenta oshibilsia,' Ug, 26 November3 December 1991, I. 'Ne Iomit' -stroit',' Ug, No. 34 (August 1990), 3. For references to continued low teachers' salaries, see also 'Novaia zarplata: ot 240 do 350,' Ug, 5-12 March 1991, 1-2; V. Prushitskii, 'Ukhodit uchitel' -ukhodit budushchee,' Ug, 13 October 1992, 5. Prushitskii. For a reference to the outflow of teachers, see G. Seleznev, 'S nadezhdoi i veroi,' Ug, No. 52 (December 1990), I. V. lakovlev, 'Vse eshche pasynki,' Ug, 17 October 1989, I. Linda J. Cook, 'Brezhnev's "Social Contract" and Gorbachev's Reforms,' Soviet Studies 5 (1991), 37-56. Paul R. Gregory, 'The Impact of Perestroika on the Soviet Planned Economy: Results of a Survey of Moscow Economic Officials,' Soviet Studies 5 (1991), 859-73. Simon Johnson and Heidi Kroll, ' Managerial Strategies for Spontaneous Privatization,' Soviet Economy 4 (1991), 281-316.

Notes to pages 131-5

183

30 Donald A. Filtzer, 'The Contradictions of the Marketless Market: Self-Financing in the Soviet Industrial Enterprise, 1986-90,' Soviet Studies 6 (1991), 989-1009. 31 Rita Di Leo, 'The Soviet Union, 1985-1990: After Communist Rule the Deluge?' Soviet Studies 3 (1991), 429-49. 32 A. Orlov, 'Territorial ' noe samoupravlenie,' Voprosy ekonomiki 4 (1989), 67-72. 33 T. Skorobogat'ko, 'Ne Stroit' novoi "piramidy",' Ug, 8 August 1989, 1. 34 'Ostavliaem za soboi pravo,' Ug, 29 October-5 November 1991, 7. 35 Skorobogat'ko. 36 Jeffrey W. Hahn, 'Local Politics and Political Power in Russia: The Case of Yaroslavl,' Soviet Economy 4 (1991), 322-41. 37 I. Afanasev, 'Shkola v usloviiakh rynka,' Ug, No. 48 (November 1990), 5. 38 'Zakon Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki ob Obrazovanii,' Ug, 16-23 July 1991, 2. 39 G. Iagodin, 'Cherez gumanizatsiiu i demokratiiu k novomu kachestvu obrazovaniia,' Ug, 22 December 1988, 1-4. 40 Liubov' Artamanova, 'Pomogat' -sil'nomu, podavat' - bogatomu,' Ug, 18 February 1992, 10. 41 I. Smirnov, ' Svobodnyi diplom -ne v radost',' Ug, 9-16 July 1991, 7. 42 'Chto my dumaem o shkole,' Ug, No. 29, (July 1990), 10; B.F. Reva, 'Tekhnikumpredpriiatie: novaia model' vzaimodeistviia,' Sso 11 (1989), 33-4; Afanasii Gladkii, ' Obrechennye na eksperimenty,' Ug, 31 March 1992, 6. 43 Judith A. Morehouse and Jerry L. Atkinson, 'The Role of Leningrad 's Vocational System in Russia's Changing Social and Economic Conditions,' Journal of Vocational and Technical Education 2 (1991), 26-35. 44 A. Riabchenko, 'Cost Accounting: Dictatorship or Freedom?' Soviet Education, July 1991, 54-62. 45 V.N. Belkin, 'Put' tekhnikuma v rynochnuiu ekonomiku,' Spetsialist 4-6 ( 1992), 2-3. 46 R.Kh. Shakurov, 'Chto diktuet usloviia: razval iii rynok?' Spetsialist 7-9 (1992), 30-1. 47 V.A. Brezhnev, 'Srednaia spetsial'naia shkola ne ischerpala svoikh vosmozhnostei,' Spetsialist 4-6 (1992), 4-5. 48 'Seminar-soveshchenie direktorov tekhnikumov,' Spetsialist, 1-9 (1992), 22-4. 49 'Zakon SSSR o professional'no-tekhnicheskom obrazovanii,' Ug, 4-11 June 1991, 5; Afanasii Gladkii, 'Obrechennye na eksperimenty,' Ug, 31 March 1992, 6. 50 Sergei Medvedev, 'Kogda kritikuiut ministra-eto ser'ezno,' Ug, 13 October 1992, 23. 51 N.D. larmachenko, 'The Union of Pedagogical Societies of the USSR,' Soviet Education, February 1991, 6-21. 52 For a reference to this group, see 'Resoliutsiia II Vsesoiuznoi vstrechi (konferentsii) organizatorov chastnykh shkol,' Ug, 15-22 October 1991, 1.

184 Notes to pages 135-45 53 Ministry of Education of Ukraine, Development of Education in Ukraine, ( 19901991 ). Report of the 43rd session of the International Conference on Educational Issues, Geneva, 1992 (Kyiv, 1992), p. 54. 54 G. Aminev, 'Al'temativa-1,' Ug, No. 36 (September 1990), 3. 55 I. Smimov, 'Svobodnyi diplom-ne v radost' ,' Ug, 9-16 July 1991, 7; 'Tekhnikum i rynochnaia ekonomika: sposobna Ii srednaia spetsial'naia shkola ne tol'ko vyzhit', no i razvivat'sia?' Sso, 9 (1991), 16--18. 56 I. Bogachev, 'Kak privatizirovat' shkolu,' Ug, 6 May 1992, 8. 57 V. Novikov, 'Shkola v zerkale zakona,' Ug, No. 26 (June 1991), 11. 58 Novikov; Gregorii Frish in Olga Karmaeva and Gregorii Frish, 'Dolzhno Ii obrazovanie byt' platnym?' Ug, 14 January 1992, 3. The All-Union Council for Public Education asked that the school be shielded from commercialization. See 'Politika bez litsemeriia,' Ug, 1-8 January 1991, I.

Chapter 10 I Walter D. Connor, The Accidental Proletariat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 9. 2 David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, The Soviet Industrial Worker - Social Class, Education, and Control (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1978), especially pp. 92-107; Connor. 3 Connor, p. 4. 4 Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 212. 5 Stephen Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993),p.17. 6 Loren Graham, 'Adapting to New Technologies,' in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, and David E. Powell, eds., Soviet Social Problems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 296--318.

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Soviet Educational Journals and Newspapers Professional'no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie I Professional, 1981-92. Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie I Spetsialist, 1981-92. Uchitel'skaia gazeta, 1980--92.

Soviet Sources in English Translation Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1980-92. Soviet Education, 1980--92.

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Index

absorptive capacity, of higher-education system, in 1950s, 16 academic freedom, 33 academic instruction, 24, 70; standards, 41, 98, 100; -. vuz, 18 academic profile of teachers, 102 academic stream, 139; see also streaming Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 64-5,82,85, 118-2l;budget,40; 1979 conference with Ministry of Education, 67 Academy of Sciences, 34, 87-8; personnel, llO; of republics, 87-8 activism, 56, 66, ll 6 administration, 10, 62, 77, 81, 86, 125 adolescent labour, 65 agriculture, employees in manual labour, 22; production, 113 Aliev, Gaidar, 48, 66; at 26th Party Congress, 68 All-Union Congress of Workers in Education, 134 All-Union Scientific-Methodological Centre for Labour Organization and Industrial Management, 87 alternative schools, 135 Andropov, lurii: labour policy, 19; Polit-

buro Commission for Education, 38; public discourse, 46 Anweiler, Oscar, 5, 24 apparatus pluralism, 89 applied science, 113, 140; applied science paradigm, 23, 110-11 assembly-line industries, 66; technology, 145 attestation, 80, 105-6; 115; statistics, 104 autonomy, in higher education, 110 Avis, George, 16 base enterprise, 27-8, 45, 65, 93 basic science, 113 Batyshev, S., 64, 105, 114 Beissinger, Mark, 89, 122 Black, J.L., 5, 54 blue-collarization, 56 blue-collar trades, 17, 26; labour, 139 branch administration, 81 Brezhnev, Leonid, 3, 9-10, 19, 56; at 25th CPSU Congress, 46 bureaucratic control, 79-80 business courses, 125 cadres: policy, 67; training, 35 Candidate degree, 34

212

Index

capital construction, 21 capital-intensive technology, 145 capital investment, 53, 113 captive labour, 27, 91 career choice, 48, 65; guidance, 70 career orientation centres, 83, 87; councils, 95 Central Asia, 66 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 9,25,88,96, 120 Central Committee of the Trade Union of Workers in Education, Higher Schools and Scientific Institutions, 25 centralization, 81, 114, 138; provincial, 89,95 central overload, 51 , 72, 81 , 83, 86, 89 central planning, 6, 22, 122 centre-periphery relations, 8, 89, 143, 145 Chernenko, Konstantin: on career choice, 48; on class tempering, 47; Politburo Commission for Education, 38 choice of study, 69 civic actors, 119; groups, 134; organizations, 91 civil rights, 112 'closed system,' approach to labour management, 145 collective farm managers, 91 colleges, 135 command-administrative governance, 9; methods, 84, 109, 112; model, 141 commercial activities of schools, 100, 133 Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, 55, 88; ofrepublics, 54, 87 commodity industries, 139; sectors, 23 Communist Party of the Soviet Union. SeeCPSU

communist upbringing, 52, 79, 117-18 Communist Youth League, 80, 95 'complete general secondary education,' 61 comprehensive education, 20, 117 Conference of Non-State Educational Institutions, 134 'conflict school,' view of Soviet politics, 7 Congress of Workers in Public Education, Resolution, 12~1. 123 Connor, Walter, 7, 20, 138, 143-4 Constitution, 56, 62, 88 consumer goods production, 21 consumer welfare, 113 content of education, 60, 62-4, 67, 82, 100, 120, 134-5, 143; ideological, 67; see also curricula continuing education, 110, 114; see also continuous education continuity: ideological, 10; institutional, 10, 139, 141; policy, 139; vocational policy, 67 'continuous education,' 82 contracting out of administrative functions in educational management, 83-4 Cook, Linda, 144 cooperative sector, 22 coordination of educational policy and implementation, 73, 139, 141, 144; micro-level, l 06 cost-accounting, 22, 85, 92, 97, 100, 109, 128, 131 cost-benefit studies, 51 Council of Ministers, union and republic, 33 Councils of Labour Collectives, 131 Councils of People's Deputies, 33 CPSU, 3, 7, 9, 25, 38, 51, 77, 79, 88; cadres, 47; Department for Propa-

Index ganda, 48; Department for Science and Educational Institutions, 48; dominance of, 119; Food Program, 51, 66, 101 ; Ideological Department, 115; membership, 97; see also Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union CPSU Conferences: 19th (1988), 79, 84, 112, 119 CPSU Congresses: 25th (1976), 46; 26th (1981), 46, 50, 68; 27th (1986), 81 , lll-14 CPSU plenums: (1969), on technology, 20-1; (1983), 78; - , on polytechnical training, 68; (1988), on education, 40, 113, 116-17, 122,127, 139;-,on stagnation, 120 cultural impediments to technological change, 145 Curcio, Frances, 5 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 12 curricula, 39, 105; foreign, 125; labour curriculum, 68; primary and secondary, 15; vocational, 70; see also content of education curricular reforms, 15, 125, 159 decentralization, 123 democracy and democratization, 79-80, 114, 123, 138 demography, 49 design of 1984 and 1988 reforms, 59-67, 137 devolution of central government functions to institutions and enterprises, 77-8,83-6, 130,142 De Witt, Nicholas, 4-6 didacticism in teaching, 134 differentiation in types of schools and programs, 25, 66, 123

213

discipline, 66, 102, 114; of labour, 62; of teachers, 96 discretion, policy of, 138 diversity, Ligachev's recommendation for, in secondary education, 116 Dneprov, Eduard, 127 drop-out rates, I 00 Dumachev, A.P., 57 Dunstan, John, 5 economic bureaucracy, downsizing of central, 130 economic policy and management, 46, 48,84, 122 'economic society' (after collapse of central planning), 122 education: administration, 54, 13 I ; broad vs. narrow, 63 ; bureaucracy, 52-5, 132; economics of, 18, 50; elite, 33, 59; maintenance, 131; as 'motor' of production, 113; on the job, 15; personnel, 60, 61-2; planning, 33; ranking of USSR, 37; reform, Khrushchev (1958), 24; reform (1984), IO, 45, 67-73; - , backers, 45; - , design, 10,59-67, 137;-,draft,20, 47;-, genesis of, 45; - , goals of, 45, 57, 59, 70-3; reform (1988), 11, 109, 116-20; reforms, yield from, 93, 124-9, 140; - , as 'revolution from above,' 57; system, fragmentation of, 41 ; see also content of education; educational paradigm; educational policy; funding of education; spending educational paradigm, 18 educational policy: continuity of, from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, 20; coordination and penetration of, I 0, 70; as dependent variable, 48; design of, 9, 59-67, 73; development of, 59; and

214

Index

industrial policy, 4, 8; literature on, 8; outcomes, 124-9 efficiency over social justice in education policy, 66-7 elections, of school councils, 123 electronics, 51, 113 elementary school students, 68-9 Eliutin, V.P., 48, 87 El'tsin, Boris, 93, 132 engineering: centres, 87; graduates, numbers of, 124; pedagogical workers, 38; professional qualifications of engineers, 125 enrolments: PTU, SSUZ, VUZ, 34, 69, 127; gross enrolment ratios, 35, 126; patterns of, 11 ; statistics, 139 enterprise consumerism, 73 enterprises: dominance, 72, 85, 132; and local vocational education, 90-4, 98-103; managers, 131 ; power of, 26, 90, 122, 144; rights of, 10, 70, 83-6; sponsorship of students by, 72 entrance examinations, 101 essential industries, 49 extensive model, of economic development, 2, 7, 22-3, 24-41, 109, 139 factory capacity, 53 'factory methodological soviets,' 91 factory-production schools, 15 factory training, 40 family, 55, 67, 84, 118,· 138 Far East, 65 fees for services, in general and vocational schools, 133 females, in service and technical employment, 30; as PTU teachers, 29 Filtzer, Donald, 131 finance. See funding of education; spending

'finite universe' economic paradigm, 17, 68 five-year plans: ninth ( 1971-5), 19; tenth (1976-80), 19; eleventh (1981-5), 9, 19, 72, 119; twelfth (1986-90), 20-1, 27, 117, 119; thirteenth, 117 flexible technologies, 62, 66 Food Program. See CPSU: Food Program formalism, 79 fragmentation, 82, 94, 111; of institutions, 102, 141 ; of interests, 97; at republican level, 88 free market, 143 free riders, 28, 92 functional illiteracy, 110 funding of education, 97-8, 104, 129, 132, 142, 143; and financial collapse of central government, 130; irrationality in, 104; 'residual principle' of, 97 ; state, 92; see also spending general education, 24, 63 general schools, 15, 24-6, 116; as main link, 118; vocationalization of, 40 glasnost', 40 Gooding, John, 114 Gorbachev, Mikhail: economic policy, 9; educational policy, 141; on ideology, 78-9; liberalization, 3; machinebuilding investment, 21; policy discourse, 138; Politburo Commission for Education, 38; political agenda, 11; social policy, 115; on technological progress, I 10 Gorbachev era, educational governance,

5 governing structures, union-level, 37-9 government, new roles of in education, 136

Index grades for student discipline, abolition of, 119 Graham, Loren, 145 Grant, Nigel, 5 Grishin, V., 87 Hahn, Jeffrey, 132 Hauslohner, Peter, 58 health issues, 98 heavy industry, 20, 51 higher education, 24-5, 32-7; institutions of, seeVVZs higher technical education, institutions of. See VTUZs horizontal integration, 22 Hough, Jerry, 7 housing, 52, 83-4, 91, 96 'human factor' in economic progress, 52, 61, 109, 112 humanitarian education, 16 humanization of education, 110, 117 lagodin, Gennadii, 119, 120-1, 132 ideas, role of in education policy, 9, 15 Ideological Department of CPSU, 115 ideology, 25, 46-8, 66, 77-81, 104, 116, 135; apparatus, 10, 77; commitment to, 97; and course content, 40, 79; education in, 67; ideological front, 78; ideological upbringing, 79, 115; ideological work of schools, 64; institutions dedicated to, 48, 59, 138; orthodoxy of,40; pressure to conform, 52; see also communist upbringing; socialist upbringing illiteracy, general, 24 immobilism, 89 implementation of educational reforms, 55, 73, 77,97, 137, 141-2;atlocal level, 84

215

incentives, for enterprises, 86; for teachers, 102 'incomplete secondary schools,' 3, 69 incrementalism in educational planning, 18 individualism, 63, 121 industrial colleges, American and Soviet, 29-30 industrial policy, 4, 7, 51, 102; under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, 8; incrementalism in, 50-1; 'winners' in, 51, 113 industry: dominance of, 91; interests of, 71, 112, 132; ministries related to, 10, 33, 45-6, 59, 71, 81; output, 21 information processing, 51 infrastructure, statistics on, 98 Institute for Socio-Economic Problems of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 38 Institute for Sociological Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 38 Institute of International Labour Movements, 38 'institutes,' 33-4; see also VUZs institutional actors, 11, 139, 144 institutional politics, 8, 145 institution-building, 8, 85-6, 138, 143 institutions: autonomy of, 85, 141; capacity of, 141, 143; continuity of, 78; fragmentation of, 137; interests of, 10, 137; realignments in, local, 13 l; supports for, 102 institutions of higher education. See VUZs instructional-production combines, 40, 70-2,92 integration, of general and vocational schools, 45; of school and enterprise, 65; of school and factory, 138 intellectual aspects of education: 17, 62, 110,124,140

216

Index

intellectualization of labour, 17 intellectual occupations, 23 intelligentsia, 10 I 'intensification,' economic, 7, 47 interdepartmental commissions, 69 interest groups, 7; local government interests, 133 interests influencing education, 123, 141 interregional labour balances, 50 interschool workshops, 24 investment, economic, 122; policy, 19 lsvestiia, speech by Ligachev on school diversity, 116 jobs: content, modernization of, 125; performance in, 46; vacancies, 21 Johnson, Simon, 130-1 junior college, American, 34 junior scientific worker, 34 junior teachers' colleges, enrolments in, 139 juridical persons, 85 Keech, William, 5, 7 Khrushchev, Nikita, 9; educational paradigm, 15-16, 19; educational reform (1958), 18-19 kindergartens, 91 Kommunist, on labour market, 22, 124 Kroll, Heidi, 130-1 labour: administrative sanctions, 19; allocation, 49-50, 53; book, 56; brigades, 84; collectives, 81, 91-2; conservation, 19; content, 117; dynasties, 56, 66; education, 138; - , resources for, 83; instruction, 45; intersectoral mobility, 21; intersectoral shifts, 23; management, 145; market, 28, 90; markets, local and national, 21; micro-manage-

ment, 83; mobility, 21, 64-7;-, forms of, 60; organized, as main constituency in current society, 144; orientation of students, 68; prestige, 93; redistribution, 17; regional management, 87; reserves, 49; resource development, 90; saving, 54; supply, 6; training, 66; turnover, 49, 65, 140; violations, 62 labour force: entrants, 1970s and 1980s, 27; forecasting, 114; growth, 4; modernization, in CIS, 30; profile, 140; upbringing, 68, 126 Lane, David, 5, 6, 143 Law on Enterprises in the USSR (1990), 131 Law on State Enterprises, 122 leadership, 6, 89; Central Committee, 137-8; institutional, 122; 'leadership drift' of 1980s, 89; Party, 65; policy, 122; Politburo, 137 legislative control, by CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers, 38 Leningrad, vocational model, 20, 65 Lenin rooms, 79 life-chances, 97 Ligachev, Egor, 96-7, 105; criticisms by, 111; as educational adviser, 47; report to CC CPSU (1988), 98, 106; on secondary schools, 116; secretary for ideology, 18 Local Committees on Education, 39 local government, 95-103, 130, 132 Jocalism, 89 local Party organizations, 72; see also Primary Party Organizations local soviets, 95-6, 131 machine-building, 112-13, 139 macro economy, 114

Index Main Administration of Labour Reserves, 38

Malle, Silvanna, 17 management: enterprise, 130; expertise, 95; organized, as main constituency in current society, 144 managerialism, 112, 114 managerial paradigm, 16 manual labour, 17, 24, 53, 125, 140 marginal workers, 19 market: labour, 131 ; reforms, 89; system, 112; transition, 141 market-led economies, 17 Marxism-Leninism, 79; theory, 64 mass media, 52 Matthews, Mervyn, 5-7, 19, 30, 34 'Measures to improve further the training and raising of workers' qualifications in production' (1979), 46 Medish, Vadim, 5, 34 mental labour, 125 mentorship, 20 methodologists, 38 military electronics, 22 military_service, 52 ministerial power, 144 Ministry of Education, RSFSR, 38 Ministry of Education of the USSR, 25, 38, 100, 115; 1979 conference with Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 67 Ministry of Finance, 39 Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, 29, 33, 38 Ministry of Supply, 39 mobility, 7, 60, 64-7, 138, 140; see also labour: mobility mobilization, 47, 115-16, 138 modernization, of government, IO, 109; of leadership, 53; socio-economic, 11

217

moral education, 67 moral indicators, 64 Moscow Academy for the Development of Education, 134 Moscow City Executive Committee, 65--6

Moses, Joel, 19 Muckle, James, 5 Municipal Council for Public Education, 95--6

municipalities: budgets, 133; executive committees, 93, 95; services, 83 municipalization, 89 national income, 19, 21; link to labour productivity, 49 National Research Councils, Canadian and American, 34 natural sciences, 63, 66 Noah, Harold, 18 non-governmental educational actors, 135; see also civic actors, societal actors non-production sectors, 20, 96 obsolescence of equipment in schools, 93

occupational profile of Soviet population, 30-2, 125

O'Dell, Felicity, 5, 6, 143 'On Ensuring Efficient Employment of the Population, Improving the Job Placement System and Strengthening Social Guarantees for the Working People,' 130 'open system,' approach to labour management, 145 Osipov, Aleksel, 46 overqualification, 50 ownership, of enterprises, 130

218

Index

paradigmatic shift in Soviet industrial/ vocational policy, 7 paraprofessionals, 30 parental preferences, 16 parents' responsibility, 115 parent-teacher meetings, 56 Party Congresses. See CPSU Congresses pass rates, 99-100, 105 Paton, Boris, 85, 87 patriotic education, 115 patronage, 89 peasantry, 19 pedagogical junior colleges, 39 pedagogy: associations, Ukraine, 135; cadres, 118; education in, 82; literature, 60; pedagogical community, 133; - , autonomy of, 140; 'pedagogical society,' 122; science of, 69; training in, 39 'percentomania,' 97 perestroika, 3, 8, 112, 114, 115-16 Perevedentsev, V.I., 49 personal development, 117 physical labour, industry and agriculture, 53 policy. See educational policy; industrial policy Politburo, 9, 45-6, 59; backing for reform, 48; continuity, 47; educational goals, 68 Politburo Commission for the Reform of the General and Vocational School, 47, 90 political support for education, 37 polytechnical education, 15, 63-4, 122, 138; schools, 67, 117 polytechnization, 15, 63 post-industrial professions, 114 power balances, 143 power struggle, horizontal and vertical, 132

practicals, 116

Pravda: on reform implementation, 106, 111; speech by Ligachev on school diversity, 116 primary education, 15 Primary Party Organizations, 96-7, 118 private schools, 135 privatization of daily life, 89 production: associations, 81; collectives, 118 productive labour, 105 Professional (The Professional). See Pro-

fessional' no-tekhnicheskoe obrawvanie Professional 'no-tekhnicheskoe obrazovanie (Vocational-Technical Educa-

tion), 29 Prokofiev, M.A., 55, 78 pronatalist measures, 49 property rights, 131 Provincial Council for Public Education, 95 provincial departments of education, 95 Provisional Scientific-Research Collective, 119-20 psychology, 65-6 PTI.Js (vocational-technical schools), 3, 24, 26-9, 35-6, 56, 61-2; and base enterprises, 94; - , transfer to, 128; blue-collar orientation, 20; construction-plan fulfilment, 98-9; construction, twelfth five-year plan, 117; design flaw, 73; as 'dumping ground' for mediocre students, 99; and employment sites, 20; enrolment, 61, 68, 139; expansion, 19, 27, 40, 54; falsification of reports, 57; grades in ideological subjects, 80; graduate placement, 28; low prestige of, 57, 70; material base, 72; plan fulfilment, 58; quality, 71; quality of students, 99; rural, 52;

Index teachers, 28; - , sex of, 29; and traditional economy, 124; types of vocations, 26 public demands, 11, 57-8 public discussions (1984), 47, 57

219

rural schools, I~ I Russia, development, 144 Sadlak, Jan, 37, 58 salaries, teachers', 92, 129; increase in, 105-6

qualified workers, 49 quality of education, 111, 140; of students, 99 rational career choice, 96 rational employment, 71 rationalist paradigm, 9, 33, 45 rationalist social policy, 15 rationality, 50 rationalization of vocational education, 114; at the local level, 104-6 realignments: policy and institutional, 9; policy and societal, 11 reconstruction, 47; see also perestroika regional planning, 87, 115 Remington, Thomas, 17 republican governments, 142 republican jurisdictions, 87 research, directions for, 11 research and development spending, 22 research-industrial centres, Ukraine, 85 resources, local, 88-9 Ross, Cameron, 89, 95 rote jobs, 73 RSFSR Ministry of Education, 128 Ruble, Blair, 5, 2~1. 70 Rules of the Secondary General Education School, 117 Rumer, Boris, 113-14 rural background of students and teachers, 66, 99-101 rural claim on resources, JOI rural depopulation, IO 1 rural infrastructure, JOI

schools: as state institutions, 55; collectives, I 15; construction of, 72, 92, 98-9, 129; directors of, 80, 95, 106; inspectors, I04 Schroeder, Gertrude, 17, 86 Schwartz, Joel, 5, 7 Scientific Council for Problems in Vocational-Technical Education of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 38 scientific manpower, decline in, 110 Scientific Research Institute for Labour, 38

scientific worker, 34; see also junior scientific worker secondary education, 15, 24-5; academic, as 'main route' to higher education, 20, 69; incomplete, 69 'secondary general education schools,' 69, 117 'secondary specialized instructional institutions.' See SSUZs 'secondary vocational-technical schools.• See SPfUs self-directed learning, 116 self-financing, 81, 86, 92; see also costaccounting self-management, 84; of enterprises, 131 service economy, 2 service professions, 17 service sector, neglect of, 22 service workers, 125; see also whitecollar jobs and workers Shoup, Paul, 89 Sidorov, V.A., 37 social contract, 37, 144

220

Index

social development funds, 91 social infrastructure, 86, 89, 96; services, 63,92 social investment, 112-13, 139 socialist internationalism, 121 socialist upbringing, 40, 45 socialization, 64, 66, 138; of elite, 142; teaching for, 63 socially useful labour, 92, l 05 social mobility, 7, 65 social sciences, 66, 79-80, 116, 127 social security benefits, 83 social support for education, 128 societal actors, 9, 109, 123, 144 societal interests and values, 68, 142, 143 society-building, 8, 143 socio-economic priorities, 10 sociological profiles, 56 Sorrentino, Frank, 5 Soviet Education, 12 Soviet of People's Deputies, 69, 88, 92 soviets, local, 88 specialists, 29; employed in economy, 30-2 spending, 23, 35-7, 58, 82, 97, 119, 121, 128; decentralization, 120; local budgets, 89, 100; per cent of GNP, 103; state budget, 72, 86; see also funding of education Spetsialist (The Specialist). See Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie SPI1Js (secondary vocational-technical schools), 20, 25, 27 Srednee spetsial'noe obrazovanie (Secondary Specialized Education), 12, 30 SSUZs (secondary specialized instructional institutions), 4, 29-32, 35-6, 85-6; applicants, 94; and base enterprises, 94; cohort, 99; curriculum, 124; directors' conference (1984), 78; entrants, 29; - , by speciality, 126;

expansion, 40-1, 99; graduates of, 17; - , numbers employed, 139; - , payment for, 86; in the Russian Federation, 134; and service economy, 124; specialities, 94; structure, 41; training teachers for PI1Js, 39-40, 79 'stagnation' (zastoi), 3 standardization among schools, of documentation and diplomas, 104 state apparatus, collapse of, 141 State Committee for Labour, 49, 59, 137; labour studies by, 52 State Committee for Public Education, 39, 54,110,115, 119-20; draft statutes, 123; rationalization of labour supply, 54 State Committee for Science and Technology, 118 State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education, 29, 38-9, 49 State Enterprise Law (1987), 13 l State Inspection Agency, 104-5 state labour bureaus, 130 State Labour Reserves, 26 State Planning Committee, 39, 49-52, 59, 118, 137; on innovation, 53; labour misallocation, 125; labour planning, 51; labour policy, 49; labour strategy, 54; role of, 49, 51 State Production Associations, 82 state-society relations, 8, 145 status-occupational gradient, 23 Stewart, Philip, 5, 7 Stolypin model, 132 streaming, 65-6; academic and vocational, 45 students in higher education: abroad, numbers, 33; in Canada, U.S., USSR, 34-5; evaluation of, 97, 99, 119; profile of PfU, SSUZ, and VUZ students, 130 successor states, 5, 11, 142

Index supenninistries, 82 taxation, 131-3; RSFSR and Ukraine, 132 Taylorism, 62 teachers, 55; absenteeism, 103; conservatism of, 128; employment, 102-3; numbers of, 39; prestige, 69; role of, 101-2; role of in refonn, 118; salaries, 106; shortages, 103; social status of, 103, 140; strike (1992), 58; transient, 129, 140; turnover, 106 teachers' congress (1988), 127, 141 Teachers' Gazette. See Uchitel'skaia gazeta teaching masters, 28, 39, 92-3 technical training, 61 technicians, 124; numbers employed, 31-2 technicums. See SSUZs technological change, 49; adaptation to, 144; education for, 53; and stagnation, 18, 22; technological imperative, 88 technologies, 16; choice of, 114 tenure, 33 territorial administration, 81 territorial governments, 10, 87-9; see also local government territorial planning, 81, 89 textbooks, 120 theoretical subjects, 115 Tomiak, J.J., 5 tracking, 99; see also streaming trade unions, 72, 84 trainee placement, 53 training: for labour, 62; for mass occupations, 48; for technology, 62; workshops, 92 transfonnational government, 78; see also modernization, of government

221

trust: in cadres, 89; in teachers, 96 tuition, 135 Uchitel'skaia gazeta (Teachers' Gazette), 11, 25, 56, 63, 119 Ukraine: autonomy, 87; development, 143; institutions, 143; numbers of institutions of higher education, 39 underqualification, 50 unemployment, 145 Union of Pedagogical Societies of the USSR, 134 universities, 33, 115, 124; as distinct from 'institutes,' 33-4; enrolments, 34 upbringing, 47, 105, 107, 117; see also communist upbringing; ideology; socialist upbringing utilitarianization, 128 vertical fragmentation, 21 vertical integration, 22, 84 vocational curriculum, 24; see also content of education vocational education, 3; Brezhnev's legacy, 5; system of, 140; Western literature on, 5 vocational graduates, labour performance of, 78-9 vocational guidance, 24 vocationalization, of general schools, 61, 83 vocational paradigm, 15-23, 35, 137, 139 vocational-technical schools. See PfUs vocational training, 6 I ; schools for, 29 vocations, 26 voluntarism, 18 VTUZs (institutions of higher technical education), 34. See also VUZs VUZs (institutions of higher education),

222

Index

9, 16, 18, 32-7, 38-9; education, employees with, 34; entry points-system, 65; geographical concentration of, 38-9; graduates' underutilization, 17; 'institutes,' as distinct from universities, 33--4; orientation to industry, 118; payment for graduates, 85; role in planning, 118; specializations, 33; structure, 32

white-collar jobs and workers, 17, 19, 31 Whitefield, Stephen, 144 Williams, David, 5 Winiecki, Jan, 22, 123 'winning' vs. 'losing' industries, 17 working class, 51, 56, 58, 61 youth: immaturity, 56; socially unsecured, 141 , 143