Education and Solidarity in the European Union: Europe’s Lost Spirit 3030630412, 9783030630416

Table of contents :
Contents
1 Introduction
Structure of the Book
Bibliography
Part I Education in the European Union
2 Education and the European “Idea” (1945–1956)
The Impetus to Uniting Europe
European Spirit and Consciousness: Building Solid Foundations
Appealing to the Educators: Developing European Spirit Through Education
Youth Engagement
Teaching the Teachers
Exchange of People and of Knowledge
Creating Educational Institutions
Vocational Education for Skills Training and Adult Education
Education in the Western European Union
Bibliography
3 The Road to a European Community Education Policy (1957–1970)
The Rome Treaties
The Common Agricultural Policy
Vocational Educational Training
The Treaty of Rome and Education
Recognising Qualifications and Diplomas
University Exchanges
Developing Deeper Cooperation in Education
Research Cooperation
University Cooperation
Bibliography
4 Developing a Community Level Education Policy, 1971–Present
The 1970s: Facing Challenges
Facing Economic Crisis
Migration
Education Becoming a Player in Facilitating the European Project
Free Movement
Educational Mobility
Increased Academic Collaboration
The “Janne Report”
A Formal Place for Education in the European Commission: The 1970s
The Action Programmes
The 1980s: Overcoming Recession
Legal Cases that Changed the Course of Education at European Level
The Erasmus Programme
Launching New Education and Training Action Programmes
Resolutions on the European Dimension in Education (24 May 1988)
The 1990s: Maastricht Treaty and a European Dimension in Education
The 1995 White Paper on Education and Training; Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society
The 2000–2010; the Lisbon Strategy
The 2010–2020; Europe 2020 Strategy
Bibliography
5 An Intellectual Hub for Europe: The College of Europe and the European University
A European University: The Birth of an Idea to Create a European People
Setting Up the College of Europe
Defining a Mission for the College of Europe
Studying at the College of Europe
European Training at the College of Europe
Governance and Funding of the College of Europe
The European University: A Relaunch in the Community Sphere
National Interests and Contrasting Opinions on the European University Project
Drawing Up Concrete Proposals for a European University
A Shift in Orientation: From Community-Led to Intergovernmental
The Establishment of the European University Institute
The European University Project’s Main Obstacles
Room for Two? The Coexistence of the College of Europe and the European University
Final Thoughts
Bibliography
6 Education: A Complicated Policy Field
Neofunctionalism and Education
Intergovernmentalism and Education
Statism
States and the Distinctive Nature of Education Policy
Diversity Between States
Diversity Within States
Diverse Reactions Towards European-Level Education
Re-establishing Reputation
The Temporal Nature of Policy Development
The Importance of Context
Final Thoughts
Bibliography
Part II Solidarity: Between Theory and Practice
7 Understanding European Solidarity, Spirit and Identity: Theory
Introduction to European Solidarity
(Social) Theories of Solidarity
Calling on Hegel to Understand the Role of Spirit
Habermas’s Approach to Identity
The Transformation of the Public Sphere
Communicative Action
Learning Processes
Democracy and Citizenship
Habermas’s European Focus
Unpacking European Solidarity in Practice
Common Values and Goals
Risk Sharing
Equality
Trust
Bibliography
8 An Introduction to Europe’s Decade of Crises: Solidarity in Practice
Introduction
Crisis After Crisis
Financial Crises
The EU’s Economic and Monetary Union
The Global Financial Crisis
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Consequences
The European Migrant Crisis
Origins of the Migrant Crisis
Migration Routes and Figures
Impact on Member States and EU Responses
Public Attitudes Towards the European Migrant Crisis
Democracy and Legitimacy
Democratic Dissatisfaction
Populism
The EU as a Scapegoat
Disintegration
Defining Disintegration
Brexit
Case Studies
Case Study One: The UK’s exit from the European Union
The Road to the Referendum
British Public Attitudes Towards the European Union and European Affairs
Identity and Immigration
Trust, Democracy and Education
Political Alienation and Populism
Concluding Thoughts: Case Study One
Case Study Two: Refugee arrivals in Italy
Lampedusa, the Gateway to Europe
Citizens and Immigrants: An Uneasy Coexistence
When Lampedusa, and the Country, Turned Against the System
Concluding Thoughts: Case Study Two
Bibliography
Part III The Entwinement of Solidarity and Education in the European Union
9 Past and Present Challenges, and Future Opportunities, for Engaging Education to Address the Solidarity Crisis
Introduction: Why Does the EU Really Need Solidarity?
What Are the Barriers to Building European Solidarity and the Implications of Education as a Tool?
Nationalism
Identity
Domestic Interest
Shifts in the Composition of National Societies
Trust
Knowledge
Interdependence
Distinguishing “Real” Solidarity from “Artificial” Solidarity
Solidarity at the Individual Level
Solidarity at the Member State Level
Reframing the Problem of Achieving “Real” Solidarity with Education
The Core of the Problem
Re-transforming the Public Sphere: Individualism and Interdependence
Education Reframed
Vocational Education and Training (VET) and Higher Education
Citizenship Education
Non-formal and Informal Education
Final Thoughts and Policy Recommendations
Bibliography
10 Concluding Thoughts: Covid-19 Providing Yet Another Case Study or Impetus for EU Solidarity?
Index

Citation preview

Education and Solidarity in the European Union Europe’s Lost Spirit Sarah K. St. John

Education and Solidarity in the European Union

Sarah K. St. John

Education and Solidarity in the European Union Europe’s Lost Spirit

Sarah K. St. John European University Institute Florence, Italy

ISBN 978-3-030-63041-6 ISBN 978-3-030-63042-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my family: Guido, Lavinia, Giacomo and Giovanni. And for anyone who needs to have more faith in themselves. The sky is the limit, so find your wings.

Contents

1

Introduction Structure of the Book Bibliography

Part I 2

1 3 10

Education in the European Union

Education and the European “Idea” (1945–1956) The Impetus to Uniting Europe European Spirit and Consciousness: Building Solid Foundations Appealing to the Educators: Developing European Spirit Through Education Youth Engagement Teaching the Teachers Exchange of People and of Knowledge Creating Educational Institutions Vocational Education for Skills Training and Adult Education Education in the Western European Union Bibliography

15 15 18 21 23 25 26 31 36 38 41

vii

viii

CONTENTS

3

The Road to a European Community Education Policy (1957–1970) The Rome Treaties The Common Agricultural Policy Vocational Educational Training The Treaty of Rome and Education Recognising Qualifications and Diplomas University Exchanges Developing Deeper Cooperation in Education Research Cooperation University Cooperation Bibliography

4

Developing a Community Level Education Policy, 1971–Present The 1970s: Facing Challenges Facing Economic Crisis Migration Education Becoming a Player in Facilitating the European Project Free Movement Educational Mobility Increased Academic Collaboration The “Janne Report” A Formal Place for Education in the European Commission: The 1970s The Action Programmes The 1980s: Overcoming Recession Legal Cases that Changed the Course of Education at European Level The Erasmus Programme Launching New Education and Training Action Programmes Resolutions on the European Dimension in Education (24 May 1988) The 1990s: Maastricht Treaty and a European Dimension in Education The 1995 White Paper on Education and Training; Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society

43 43 44 45 47 48 54 56 60 67 69

71 71 71 72 75 75 77 78 79 83 85 89 90 91 92 95 96 98

CONTENTS

The 2000–2010; the Lisbon Strategy The 2010–2020; Europe 2020 Strategy Bibliography 5

6

An Intellectual Hub for Europe: The College of Europe and the European University A European University: The Birth of an Idea to Create a European People Setting Up the College of Europe Defining a Mission for the College of Europe Studying at the College of Europe European Training at the College of Europe Governance and Funding of the College of Europe The European University: A Relaunch in the Community Sphere National Interests and Contrasting Opinions on the European University Project Drawing Up Concrete Proposals for a European University A Shift in Orientation: From Community-Led to Intergovernmental The Establishment of the European University Institute The European University Project’s Main Obstacles Room for Two? The Coexistence of the College of Europe and the European University Final Thoughts Bibliography Education: A Complicated Policy Field Neofunctionalism and Education Intergovernmentalism and Education Statism States and the Distinctive Nature of Education Policy Diversity Between States Diversity Within States

ix

99 102 105

107 107 108 110 111 113 113 115 117 124 128 132 133 135 138 139 141 141 143 144 147 152 153

x

CONTENTS

Diverse Reactions Towards European-Level Education The Temporal Nature of Policy Development The Importance of Context Final Thoughts Bibliography

154 158 162 167 169

Part II Solidarity: Between Theory and Practice 7

8

Understanding European Solidarity, Spirit and Identity: Theory Introduction to European Solidarity (Social) Theories of Solidarity Calling on Hegel to Understand the Role of Spirit Habermas’s Approach to Identity The Transformation of the Public Sphere Communicative Action Learning Processes Democracy and Citizenship Habermas’s European Focus Unpacking European Solidarity in Practice Common Values and Goals Risk Sharing Equality Trust Bibliography

175 175 177 181 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 192 193 194

An Introduction to Europe’s Decade of Crises: Solidarity in Practice Introduction Crisis After Crisis Financial Crises The European Migrant Crisis Democracy and Legitimacy

197 197 198 199 204 208

CONTENTS

Disintegration Case Studies Case Study One: The UK’s exit from the European Union Case Study Two: Refugee arrivals in Italy Bibliography

Part III

9

xi

212 216 216 226 236

The Entwinement of Solidarity and Education in the European Union

Past and Present Challenges, and Future Opportunities, for Engaging Education to Address the Solidarity Crisis Introduction: Why Does the EU Really Need Solidarity? What Are the Barriers to Building European Solidarity and the Implications of Education as a Tool? Nationalism Trust Knowledge Interdependence Distinguishing “Real” Solidarity from “Artificial” Solidarity Solidarity at the Individual Level Solidarity at the Member State Level Reframing the Problem of Achieving “Real” Solidarity with Education The Core of the Problem Re-transforming the Public Sphere: Individualism and Interdependence Education Reframed Vocational Education and Training (VET) and Higher Education Citizenship Education Non-formal and Informal Education Final Thoughts and Policy Recommendations Bibliography

241 241 242 242 249 251 252 253 253 254 255 255 257 259 261 264 266 267 269

xii

CONTENTS

10

Concluding Thoughts: Covid-19 Providing Yet Another Case Study or Impetus for EU Solidarity?

Index

273 279

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Solidarity has become a question of survival for the European Union (EU) as it recovers from a decade of crises, only to start the new decade amid a global pandemic. Global and European challenges, alongside a rise in populism, have left the establishment of strong EU solidarity struggling, despite initiatives from within the EU calling to connect with citizens to strengthen the community. The need to bolster the European project with deep-rooted solidarity is not a new concept of our times. It was in fact highlighted as early as the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague as a fundamental necessity for the project’s success. The subsequent European Cultural Conference of 1949 proposed education as a means to diffuse the notion of a united Europe. This book tells that story of the European Movement’s mission to create through education a European spirit to secure the success of European integration, and how much of that mission reflected in the Europe of today. In tracing the development of an EU education policy, which never managed to be established as a fully fledged area of European competence, the book draws links between the crisis of solidarity experienced by the EU today and the difficulties faced throughout European integration to foster spirit through education. European symbols have been created, including a European flag, a European patrimony of historic towns and sites, and a Europe Day, but has it been enough to foster a European

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_1

1

2

S. K. ST. JOHN

spirit and solidarity? Economic, financial, military, demographic and environmental crises at global level have put European solidarity to the test and have the capacity to strengthen the European Union or shatter it. Was a European spirit created and lost or did it ever really exist at all? What role did education play in fostering spirit, to what extent did it succeed and what were the obstacles in relying on education? The book makes the case that education has not been a stable mechanism for fostering spirit due to its national attachment to identity and nation-building. However, without education, it has been a challenge to foster the spirit needed to establish a strong sense of European solidarity to overcome the crises the EU faces today. The book’s primary objective is to explore the linkage between education and European solidarity to suggest that today’s crisis of solidarity in the EU can be connected to the development of (or lack thereof) an education policy at European level. Specifically, it analyses the role assigned to education (secondary, further and higher education, as well as adult and vocational education) in early discussions on European integration to foster the European spirit needed to create a cohesive union of states with a common outlook and mission. It goes on to draw on the current political landscape to highlight the consequences of weak or nonexistent European spirit—what the European founders had feared. At the same time, rather than concluding that education should be dismissed as a means to foster solidarity, the book looks ahead to propose how, through lessons learnt, the EU can navigate education policy in such a way that it still has an important role to play in the processes of civic participation and solidarity-building. The pursuit of this argument follows two theoretical and analytical routes, structured in the book in three parts and outlined in this introductory chapter. The first part of the book, Education in the European Union, is dedicated to the origins and evolution of education as an area of European Community policy. To trace competence expansion and analyse the nature of its development, the study is framed within the debate between the opposing integration theories of neofunctionalism (policy development is automatic and is facilitated by the concept of spillover) and intergovernmentalism (member states play a central role in the policydevelopment process which is therefore driven by converging national interests). The part concludes by illuminating the notion that education has developed according to—and continues to develop along the lines

1

INTRODUCTION

3

of—intergovernmentalism due to its close attachment to national-identity formation, nation-building and national solidarity. The book’s second part focuses on the notion of solidarity between theory and practice, while the final part, The entwinement of education and solidarity in the European Union, unpacks the challenges and possibilities for fostering European spirit and solidarity through education, as advocated by the European Movement, triangulating the theoretical concepts of Durkheim to understand solidarity, Hegel for input on how individuals relate to their society, and Habermas on citizens’ participation in the public sphere and the role of learning processes. It elaborates this linkage between education and nation-building to seek answers to what it implies for the EU today in the face of the crises, when a demand for European solidarity is in short supply. Exploring through the notion of spirit the intertwine between education and solidarity, the book presents an interdisciplinary study that avoids the compartmentalisation of education studies, philosophy and political science to bring ideas together that shed fresh light on contemporary debates currently under the spotlight. The study does not limit its appeal and benefit to educationalists, but also opens up the field of education to a wider audience in European policymaking, with attention made to attracting practitioners looking beyond the confines of their policy area to understand how education might impact hot policy topics, as well as to academics seeking to make more sense of education’s scope across European studies.

Structure of the Book The first of the content chapters Education and the European “Idea” (1945–1956) addresses the initial concrete steps towards constructing Europe and the already embedded role of education in this process. Discussions on the uniting of Europe took place in the framework of the pressure group the European Movement and specifically at the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948. In addition to the political specificities of bringing the nations of Europe closer together, representatives proposed the cultural unification of Europe, stating that if the European project were to succeed, it could not just be a political union, it had to exist in the hearts of its citizens. A European spirit was a fundamental component. The congress considered education to be a mechanism for fostering European spirit and put forward a series of initiatives for the

4

S. K. ST. JOHN

implementation of this mission. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the work of the European Movement, and to outline the discussions that took place in the context of the Congress of Europe and the subsequent European Cultural Conference (1949) on fostering a European spirit through initiatives in the field of education. The timeframe reflects the initial discussions on uniting Europe until the Treaty of Rome establishing a European Community and evidence is provided by documentation on the European Movement, consulted at the Historical Archives of the European Union. Chapter 3 The road to a European Community education policy (1957 – 1970) outlines the emergence of a formal place for education in European integration. Emphasis was placed on the development of activities in education at European level with a cultural attachment in order to foster European spirit. However, tracing the development of an education policy at European level reveals a shift in the nature and missions of activities. Despite marked attention during early discussions on uniting Europe, education was not included in the 1957 Treaty of Rome setting up the European Community. Closely related was a provision for vocational educational training, and although it left a door open for education, it meant that activities with an economic attachment drove forward policy development. The chapter aims to summarise the development of a European Community education policy from 1957 until 1976, when education took shape as a formal competence of the European Community. It aims to reveal how member states and the European Community have approached cooperation in the field of education and the establishment of a formal policy field, namely that its association with the economic and political missions of the European Community facilitated its path and shaped its purpose at European level. Evidence is drawn from European Community documentation at the Historical Archives of the European Union as well as European Community communications and policy documents. Chapter 4 Developing a Community level education policy (1971– present) continues the historical account of EU education policy from the point when the European Community began to hold a recognised competence in the area of education, in particular the “Janne Report” of 1973, which was completed by the Belgian Minister for Education to pinpoint the basic elements of an education policy at Community level. Two action programmes, the Social Action Programme and the Education Action Programme, followed swiftly, helping to cement Community activities in

1

INTRODUCTION

5

the fields of education and training. The 1980s were peak years for education policy, which saw the creation of the Erasmus Programme and new Education and Training Action Programmes, and the 1990s saw further restructuring and reforms in Teaching and Learning as steps towards the learning society. The Lisbon Strategy of the 2000s threw focus onto lifelong learning and the Open Method of Communication. Finally, the last decade has witnessed ever intensifying activities, especially through the Europe 2020 Strategy, which has placed education high on the agenda to reinforce a knowledge economy in Europe. Research has been carried out through the study of policy papers and EU documentation. Chapter 5 An intellectual hub for Europe: The College of Europe and the European University presents the complex creation of these institutions, the latter of which took almost three decades to establish due to conflicting interests and the implications of cooperating in education at European level. The creation of these institutions acts as an informative case study for demonstrating how European cooperation of the field of education translates into practice. This chapter traces the European University project from its roots within the European Movement discussions to the establishment of the European University Institute in Florence and the College of Europe in Bruges. The chapter is based on archival research at the Historical Archives of the European Union, where documentation from the European Movement as well as the European University Institute was consulted. The timeframe reflects the first discussions on the European University in the framework of the European Movement until the European University Institute was established. Such a significant role for education in the early stages of European integration should have implied an impetus to the development of a European Community education policy, but this did not turn out to be the case and education continues to struggle to find its place as a fullfledged EU competence. Chapter 6 Education: A complicated policy field unpacks the complexities that surround European-level cooperation in education. Europe’s founders had underestimated what emerged to be an area of national sensitivity in which the European Community found itself negotiating statism to develop initiatives in the field of education. Tracing the evolution of education as an area of European Community competence reveals that there are numerous opportunities for spillover to occur, leaning towards neofunctionalist theory, but policy development appears resisted. What emerges is that member states appear reluctant to upload power in matters relating to education when initiatives lean

6

S. K. ST. JOHN

towards a cultural orientation, while they appear more willing when a clear economic benefit can be identified. This suggestion that member states have been able to influence the direction and scope of policy development is in line with an intergovernmentalist view of how integration occurs, in particular Moravcsik (1998). To explain this reluctance to engage in European policymaking in matters relating to education, this chapter explores the notion that education is entwined and embedded in nation-building, which forms the foundation’s national sovereignty, identity and solidarity (Neave 2001). This analysis begins by clarifying the terms nation, nation-states, nationality and national identity, before exploring the connection with education at national level. The significant role that education has to play in the building of nation-states mirrors the necessity for education to be involved in the building of a united Europe at European level. This is precisely what nation-states are uneasy about because it implies the risk of diluting national identity with European identity. A patent tension that emerges between fostering European identity, solidarity and spirit with that of preserving national identity, solidarity and spirit, which provides a tangible explanation for member states’ reluctance for the EU to meddle in its educational affairs. In Chapter 7 Understanding European solidarity, spirit and identity: Theory the book shifts to Part II. The part’s first chapter has a twofold aim of introducing non-specialist readers to the concepts of solidarity, identity and spirit; and exploring the current debates surrounding these concepts. The chapter draws on the work of scholars such as Karagiannis (2007) to map a theoretical understanding of solidarity, including the work of Offe, Baldwin and Durkheim, and leading to Habermas’s “Justice and Solidarity” (1989). Habermas, who brings Hegel into the discussion having been influenced by Hegelian insights to reciprocal recognition relating also to spirit, proves an effective theoretical basis upon which to discuss the link between solidarity, identity and spirit, and the crises of the European Union. In his publications “The Postnational Constellation” (2001b), “Europe: The Faltering Project” (2004) and “The Crisis of the European Union: A Response” (2012), Habermas argued that national identity acts as a barrier to ever closer union and what he sees as the holy grail of transnational democracy and cosmopolitan community (Murphy and St. John 2019). The chapter highlights the calls for greater solidarity within Europe, exploring what European solidarity implies in pragmatic terms, including the different versions of solidarity that emerge when facing different types

1

INTRODUCTION

7

of crises in the European context. This includes how public support for European solidarity varies according to the issue involved—financial, immigration, natural disasters, terrorism or the environment—and the instruments used for risk and burden sharing (Genschel and Hemerijck 2018). Created with non-specialists in mind, Chapter 8 An Introduction to Europe’s Decade of Crises: Solidarity in Practice outlines the challenges and crises facing the EU in the last decade. In particular, the chapter presents two cases in point to demonstrate scenarios in which the supply for European spirit and solidarity has not met the demand: disintegration in the case of the UK and the rise to power of populism in Italy. Solidarity breaks down when individuals are not informed about how European integration works, how they can make sense of it and therefore stand together in times of crisis. On the other hand, it also breaks down when they feel the European Union is not delivering. Both case studies imply a need for greater transparency between the EU institutions and the people, in accordance with Habermas’s ideas on mutual understanding. The case of the UK voting to leave the bloc, with questions from the people like “what has the EU ever done for us?” or “why should they tell us what to do?” suggest a strong indication that a key aspect leading to voters’ decisions is the fact that the European Union is simply not understood. In the British context, deeper discussions take place on a long-standing resistance to European integration due to a distinctive nationalist English identity (Risse 2005). In fact, considering national political elites’ influence on fostering European identity (Göncz and Lengyel 2016), it can be said that an almost complete lack of European sentiment portrayed by the British government to its citizens has resulted in the worst possible case: a decision to leave the EU. Italy, however, is historically pro-European, but it has been a principal receiver of migrants during the migrant crisis. The feeling in Italy is that the country has been left to fend for itself in the face of hundreds of thousands of arrivals, which has led to the popularity of the Lega (former Northern League) party advocating hard anti-immigration policies. Lega became a governing party in a coalition with the populist Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), which indicates Italians’ dissatisfaction with the immigration issue and what is felt to be a lack of support from the European Union on the matter. Shifting to the third part, Chapter 9 Past and present challenges, and future opportunities, for engaging education to address the solidarity crisis

8

S. K. ST. JOHN

provides the core of the book’s analysis. The European Union has been facing crises for over a decade, beginning with the economic crisis of 2007 and continuing tough challenges, stemming in particular from migration, which is at the centre of the European Union’s very raison d’être: free movement. The political landscape is overwhelmed with a wave of populism that is increasingly taking more nationalistic stances towards issues to defend against what are perceived to be influxes of migrants. Although not limited to Europe, this is questioning the legitimacy of the European Union. The chapter draws links between the current political climate, dwindling solidarity and the struggles for achieving fully fledged competence in education at European level. Deepening Habermas’s link discussed earlier by between identity, solidarity and facing the current crises, Habermas provides further theoretical enlightenment in his discourse on learning processes. He suggests that it is possible to learn our way out of nationalism and nation-state-bounded public policies. He makes continuous reference across his publications to the kind of “learning processes” on which the European Movement placed considerable emphasis in generating a form of supranational citizenship, culture and identity. In particular, Habermas develops the concept of communicative action in a process of renewing cultural knowledge to achieve mutual understanding, coordinating action towards social integration and solidarity through the public sphere. Crises of the last decade have seemingly led the European Community to recognise that education can be adopted as a vehicle to help overcome the challenges it faces. The 2017 European Commission communication “Strengthening European Identity through Education and Culture” (COM(2017) 673) includes points on language learning, mobility, teacher training and the creation of institutions, and the European Parliament published a report on “Learning EU in Schools” (2015/2138(INI)). This latter document reflects a response to the ever-increasing realisation that throughout its existence, the European Union has not been fully understood. Leaning again on Habermas’s communicative action, it becomes evident that mutual understanding between individuals and the European Union will be imperative if European solidarity is to be created. If not, citizens become prey to the populist movements that do provide—often discrediting—information about the European Union, or to fake news on policy issues that affect its relationship with people.

1

INTRODUCTION

9

Unfortunately, it appears that the European Community has completed a full circle when it comes to using education for fostering solidarity. The points outlined in the 2017 Communication hark back to the points already put forward by the European Movement in 1949. Sixty years of European integration has not fully mobilised education as an instrument for European solidarity. While initiatives such as the Erasmus programme have contributed to awakening a sense of being European among a slither of society, it has not formed an inclusive European solidarity that stands strong against the challenges and crises facing the European Union today. While, as Habermas advocates, “the supranational expansion of civic solidarity depends on learning processes” (2012), the development of education at European level will inherently be loyal to intergovernmental policy development, which is controlled at national level and which will protect national identity and nation-building. The book’s final chapter Concluding thoughts: Covid-19 providing yet another case study or impetus for EU solidarity? ties together the argument that the architects of a united Europe aimed to foster a European spirit through education, which was required for the success of the European project. However, the current state of the Union suggests that solidarity is in great demand but the supply is not sufficient and the reactions during this last crisis in the form of the Covid-19 pandemic are putting EU solidarity to the test. It can be argued that Europe has not existed enough, never existed or no longer exists in people’s hearts, which is what the founding fathers had feared. Education has proven a flimsy mechanism for fostering European spirit due to its complex intertwinement with nationbuilding, and therefore national identity and solidarity. A fully fledged European Union education policy could have gone a long way in securing a certain level of solidarity. It is recognised, however, that blame cannot be solely placed on a lack of European Union competence in education. Solidarity levels have also dropped due to the European Union not fulfilling individuals’ expectations. The current challenges facing the European Union therefore present a critical moment in which a re-evaluation should perhaps be considered of how education policy can be better developed to resuscitate European spirit, but it is also an opportunity for the European Union to rethink and push forward reforms in areas where it is falling short. Nevertheless, it can be said that while Brexit appears the ultimate demonstration of a lack of EU solidarity, the other face of Brexit has forced pockets of strong pro-Europeanness to emerge in a country that

10

S. K. ST. JOHN

historically lacks attachment to Europe, where remain voters feel they are being robbed of their European identity. This suggests that a certain degree of European spirit is out there, and going forward, especially in the current time of the Covid-19 crisis when solidarity is needed more than ever, the European Union can count on the support of those who do hold it in their heart.

Bibliography Amaral, A., Neave, G., Musselin, C., & Maasen, P. (2009). European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research. London: Springer. Banks, J. (1982). European Co-operation in Education. European Journal of Education, 17 (1), 9–16. Brock, C., & Tulasiewicz, W. (2000). Education in a Single Europe. London: Routledge. Corner, T. (2015). Education in the European Union: Pre-2003 Member States. London: Bloomsbury. European Commission. (2017, November 14). Communication on European Identity Through Education and Culture (COM/2017/673). European Commission. (2018, May 22). Communication on Building a Stronger Europe: The Role of Youth, Education and Culture Policies (COM/2018/268). Field, J. (1998). European Dimensions: Education, Training and the European Union. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Fogg, K., & Jones, H. (1985). Educating the European Community: Ten Years On. European Journal of Education, 20(2-3), 293–300. Genschel, P., & Hemerijck, A. (2018), Solidarity in Europe (STG Policy Briefs, 2018/01). Florence: European University Institute. Göncz, B., & Lengyel, G. (2016). Changing Attitudes of Hungarian Political Elites Towards the EU (2007–2014). Historical Social Research, 41(4), 106– 128. Gornitza, A. (2009). Networking Administration in Areas of National Sensitivity: The Commission and Higher Education. In A. Amaral, G. Neave, C. Musselin, & P. Maasen (Eds.), European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research. London: Springer. Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2001a). Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review, N. 11. Habermas, J. (2001b). The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Boston: Polity Press.

1

INTRODUCTION

11

Habermas, J. (2004). Europe: The Faltering Project. Boston: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2012). The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Boston: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2015). The Lure of Technology. Boston: Polity Press. Karagiannis, N. (2007). European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Khan, A. (1994). European Common Market and Education. Journal of Law and Education, 4(1), 29–42. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Murphy, M., & St. John, S. K. (2019). Conclusion. In S. K. St. John & M. Murphy, Educations and Public Policy in the European Union: Crossing Boundaries. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Neave, G. (2001). The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues. In J. Huisman, P. Maassen, & G. Neave (Eds.), Higher Education and the Nation State: The International Dimension of Higher Education. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. Nóvoa, A., & Lawn, M. (2002). Fabricating Europe: The Formation of an Education Space. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European Identity and the Puzzles of European Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291–309. St. John, S. K., & Murphy, M. (2019). Educations and Public Policy in the European Union: Crossing Boundaries. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Sultana, R. (1995). A Uniting Europe, a Dividing Education? Eurocentrism and the Curriculum. International Studies in Sociology of Education, 5(2), 115– 144.

PART I

Education in the European Union

CHAPTER 2

Education and the European “Idea” (1945–1956)

The Impetus to Uniting Europe The idea of unifying Europe did not spring as a consequence of the Second World War. Rather it gave impetus to a concept that had been simmering since as early as the 1700s. Not least, Kant alluded to a United States of Europe in his 1795 writings on perpetual peace (To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch). Victor Hugo suggested in 1849 “a day will come when we shall see […] the United States of America and the United States of Europe face to face, reaching out for each other across the seas”.1 In 1929, the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand proposed to the Assembly of the League of Nations the idea of a federation of European nations based on solidarity and in 1930 presented a “Memorandum on the organisation of a system of European Federal Union”. The Italian anti-Fascists Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi encouraged a federation of European States in their 1941 Ventotene Manifesto. They stated that “the question which must first be resolved, and if it is not then any other progress made up to that point is mere appearance, is that of the abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states”. Furthermore, “a free and united Europe is the necessary premise to the strengthening of modern civilization, for which the totalitarian era represented a standstill” (Spinelli and Rossi 1941). Spinelli and Rossi also 1 At the Congrès de la Paix in Paris.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_2

15

16

S. K. ST. JOHN

stated that “the general spirit today is already far more disposed than it was in the past to a federal reorganization of Europe. The hard experience of the last decades has opened the eyes even of those who would not see, and has matured many circumstances favourable to our ideal”. This mirrored the thinking of Winston Churchill, who already in 1930 in the Saturday Evening Post, had also suggested that a “European Union” was possible between continental states. At the end of the war, Churchill then revived the idea of a “United States of Europe” in a speech at the University of Zurich in 1946 (Mautell 1998). Thereafter, Churchill continued to champion European unity through the Anglo-French United European Movement (UEM), which formed the origins of the pressure group, the European Movement. The UEM provided a platform for the coordination of organisations that were created in the wake of the Second World. It derived from the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity (ICMEU), under which structure it organised a meeting that took at The Hague in the Netherlands on 7–11 May 1948, commonly known as the “Congress of Europe”. The objectives of the Congress of Europe were threefold: to demonstrate the widespread support that existed for unifying Europe; to secure an exchange of views and establish agreed recommendations for action and to provide a new and powerful impetus to the campaign.2 The Congress wanted to demonstrate that public opinion in support of European unity existed in the free countries of Europe and to discuss the challenges facing European unity as well as to propose practical solutions to governments. Lasting three and a half days (or 60 hours), there was a determination to bridge differences and find a basis on which to join forces under a common objective in which they all ardently believed. Presided by Winston Churchill as honorary president, the Congress of Europe gathered representatives of European as well as international countries to exchange ideas on the development of a European Union and discuss the construction of a united Europe. The Congress profoundly influenced the shaping of the European Movement, which was formally established soon afterwards on 25 October 1948. The European Movement’s objective was to transform relations between the European States and its citizens by always placing the citizen at the heart of Community 2 Verbatim Report, Plenary Session I, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

17

construction. The European Movement is still in existence, represented in 39 national European offices and regroups 36 international Associations.3 Following the Congress of Europe, the European Movement created the Council of Europe in May 1949 and, in a further stage, it organised the European Conference on Culture, which took place in Lausanne, Switzerland, in December 1949. In a “Message to the Europeans” during the final plenary session of the Congress of Europe, chaired by former Prime Minister of Belgium Mr. van Zeeland, delegates pledged their dedication to working towards a united Europe: Europe is in danger, Europe is divided, and the greatest danger comes from her divisions. Impoverished, overladen with barriers that prevent the circulation of her goods but are no longer able to afford her protection, our dis-united Europe marches towards her end. Alone, no one of our countries can hope seriously to defend its independence. Alone, no one of our countries can solve the economic problems of today.4

Delegates at the Congress of Europe focused their minds on the question of European unity and a federation of Europe. The Second World War had put pressure on national economies and a national financial policy was no longer a viable solution to overcome and reach the root of a state’s economic difficulty. The problems they faced demanded worldwide solutions, and such solutions could not be founded on a divided Europe. Delegates sought to define how a united Europe could be more than just cooperation between governments. They thought in terms of creating federal European institutions with full power, capable of bringing into existence a new league of free people. Under the pressure of grave events, a number of governments accepted that it was necessary to foster cooperation in the economic and military spheres in order to confront the dangers that had arisen during and after the war. They were aware that a united Europe could provide benefits across its member states, but that such benefits could not be achieved without some temporary interference in certain national and sectional interests. There would be resistance from governments towards any meddling in 3 http://europeanmovement.eu/who-we-are/history/. 4 Message to the Europeans adopted at the close of The Hague Congress, 1948 (ME421, HAEU).

18

S. K. ST. JOHN

their affairs and so, according to delegates at The Hague, the real problem in uniting Europe lay in creating a European organisation of supranational nature. But to talk of a united Europe without conceiving a European government and a European parliament was far from realistic.5 A vigorous opposition was thus expected from those whose interests would be adversely affected, and who would therefore seek to mobilise and misuse patriotic sentiment with the objective of holding back their governments. In this case, it was considered that if a state were able to withstand such potential pressures, it would have the solid foundations of an informed and convinced public opinion that would be ready to face the challenge of uniting Europe.6

European Spirit and Consciousness: Building Solid Foundations To create those foundations, delegates attached an organic meaning to the concept of European federalism. The Europe they envisaged meant a way of life for groups and individuals, and a world that was heading towards conflict put European people, divided and powerless, in danger of being the first victims. While a united Europe would cause upheaval because every national-level policy issue would be seen in a new light, it would be fundamental in allowing citizens to rediscover their true spirit, a European spirit, and to devise new social orders in harmony with this spirit.7 This line of thought continued at the European Cultural Conference, which took place a year later in Lausanne. The General Rapporteur stated that the problem was simple: “Europe or war”. Europe could not be saved if nations continued to believe in their separate salvation. It would not be possible to choose between individual freedom and social justice because “liberty without justice is disintegration”, and Europe would only be able

5 The Vital Question, proceedings from the Congress of Europe at The Hague, 1948 (ME-421, HAEU). 6 Verbatim Report, Plenary Session I, Congress of Europe at The Hague, 1948 (ME2945, HAEU). 7 The Vital Question, proceedings from the Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME421, HAEU (1948).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

19

to safeguard its own interests by safeguarding the dignity of man.8 In this sense, the European Cultural Conference appealed to intellectuals to shoulder their responsibilities by vigilantly watching over governments and experts, proclaiming the principle of the dignity of man, the foundation of all European civilisations. The conference appealed to national governments to abolish all barriers that paralyse rather than protect the cultural life of Europe, and to realise that expenditure on education confers on nations a more durable power of resistance in the long-term than expenditure on armaments. Finally, the conference appealed to the European Assembly to do everything its power to support European cultural institutions, without which a common awareness among Europeans could not be developed, and to all Europeans to refuse to believe in the inevitability of war.9 The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alcide De Gasperi, declared in a message to conference delegates that the main principle of uniting Europe is in the conscience of the spiritual and cultural community rather than the political, legislative, economic and social coordination.10 This need to address culture within the process of European unification was also reiterated in a message to the conference from Paul van Zeeland, in which he suggested that Europe’s battle would be waged not only in economics and politics, but also in the cultural field, and that European conscience was becoming ever more a living reality: Beneath the cross-currents of our interests, there is a common bed, constituted by traditions and hopes […] and to reveal or to affirm cultural affinities may become one of the essential factors making for European unity.11

In his opening address at the Congress of Europe, Dr. Henri Brugmans, President of the Bureau of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), declared the need to stimulate European political consciousness, and a 8 Rapport sur la conférence de Lausanne - présenté par le Rapporteur Générale, ME531, HAEU (1949). 9 Rapport sur la conférence de Lausanne - présenté par le Rapporteur Générale, ME531, HAEU (1949). 10 Message de M. De Gasperi, European Cultural Conference, ME534, HAEU (1949). 11 Message from M. Paul Van Zeeland, European Cultural Conference, ME534, HAEU

(1949).

20

S. K. ST. JOHN

bold and far-seeing European public opinion. European public opinion would not be the sum of individual national public opinions, but something sui generis that would be new in history: a common European citizenship.12 He did not deny that the task would be complicated and obstacles would need to be faced, but he affirmed that: If Europe discovers how to regenerate itself in unity, it will at the same time be able to reassert its independence in the world. It will be both moral and social independence, since among the great powers it will have brought forth its own peculiar type of society, born from free association and from stimulating cooperation13

Mr. Carandini, delegate for Italy, added in his speech in The Hague that the aim was to create new common rapports between people who share Europe as their geographical and spiritual base, adhering to a European citizenship.14 The General Report of the European Cultural Conference later highlighted that it was necessary to outline a new political framework for Europe that was inspired by spiritual and cultural considerations in addition to its more obvious political considerations. The European Cultural Conference aimed to provide this definition and to show that culture cannot only be of practical assistance to initiatives in other fields that seek to achieve European unification, but that European unification itself is also essential for the survival of European culture in all its rich diversity.15 However, conference delegates had to consider a balance between respecting the freedom of the mind, and recognising the responsibilities that go with it. The notion of “culture in the service of European unity”, which underlines responsibilities, is different to “a united Europe in defence of culture”, which indicates the way freedom of the mind can be safeguarded from the dangers that threaten it. The conference could at least begin by taking stock of the status quo of culture in Europe, the difficulties hampering its development and

12 Speech of Dr. Henri Brugmans, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME421, HAEU (1948). 13 Speech of Dr. Henri Brugmans, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME421, HAEU (1948). 14 Speech of M. Carandini for the Congress of Europe at The Hague, plenary session II. ME421, HAEU (1948). 15 General Report of the European Cultural Conference, ME531, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

21

the dangers threatening to destroy it. Accordingly, the two main questions forming the basis of the discussions were on “the material and moral conditions of cultural life in Europe” and secondly, a consideration for “institutions and reforms”, with a view to developing a European outlook.16 The initiators of the Congress considered culture to be something other than an “ornament, an elegant mask, a pretext for some phrases”. They realised that perhaps the average person believed the only serious reasons for wanting the union of Europe might be for its political, economic and purely material elements, and that the European notion of man, of his culture, and sense of life could be addressed later. However, as De Rougement proclaimed during the Congress, culture expresses the human sense of political and economic life, and whatever the commission achieves, it should be the awakening of a European conscience.17 The delegates of the Congress of Europe were aware that Europe’s cultural unification would be complex and would need to be a progressive process. Through the cultural optic, unification would be hindered by the different dictatorships and totalitarian regimes, against which the European spirit had to be defended, and which had tried to act on culture. There was a danger that cultural activities would be seen to support political ideas and act as political propaganda.18 The question was how cooperation could be possible between sets of people whose cultural views differ so sharply. De Madariaga pointed out that political and economic attributes were not missing from Europe, but if the Europe they envisaged were to exist and such diversity were to be overcome, Europe had to exist in the hearts of the citizens.19

Appealing to the Educators: Developing European Spirit Through Education At the European Cultural Conference in Lausanne, the delegate Prof. Anne Seimen gave a speech in which she provided a solution for creating European consciousness. She suggested that “no political and social 16 General Report of the European Cultural Conference, ME531, HAEU (1949). 17 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee,

ME2945, HAEU (1948). 18 Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 19 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1948).

22

S. K. ST. JOHN

reorganisation would be able to rest on secure foundations unless it is accompanied by a thorough reorganisation of education, special and general, which is the dominant factor in the upbringing of the youth of all European countries”.20 The European Cultural Conference therefore extended to social matters to include education and culture’s connection with schools and universities; education could facilitate the development of judgement and knowledge across all social classes for the dissemination and promotion of the European idea.21 As the Rapporteur of the Cultural Committee Denis de Rougement stated in his general report: The need is apparent, everywhere. Everyone is perfectly well aware that the creation of a European Union depends in the first place on the creation, through education, of a responsible elite of young people trained in a supranational spirit.22

And To take the mission seriously, calls for a vigilance which the intellectuals of free countries must, more than ever, feel incumbent on them. They must never cease to remind governments, politicians, social legislators and experts that there are spiritual principles which must not be overlooked in practice if Europe is to maintain its right to exist and its autonomy.23

Accomplishing the task, through the means of education, of creating a responsible elite of young people trained in a supranational spirit would require the cooperation of more than one generation, but it also had to be driven by energy and clear-sightedness.24 A solution had already surfaced 20 Congrès de Lausanne, Préparation à la conférence Européenne de la culture, Proposals for a European Education by Prof. Anne Siemen, Hamburg, ME540, HAEU (1949). 21 Congrès de Lausanne, Préparation à la conférence Européenne de la culture, Lausanne, Proposals for a European Education by Prof. Anne Siemen, Hamburg, ME540, HAEU (1949). 22 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1949). 23 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1949). 24 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

23

at the Congress of Europe in the speech of Claire Saunier, President of the French National Commission for Education: to create a sentiment of a united Europe, it was necessary to appeal to educators.25 Discussions within the framework of the European Movement on how to mobilise education as a means to fostering European spirit fleshed out a series of initiatives and proposals that can be organised across five broad themes: Youth engagement; teaching the teachers; the exchange of people and of knowledge; creating educational institutions and vocational education and skills training and adult education. Youth Engagement A key to the success of a united Europe was seen in the engagement of young people. It was discussed prior to the creation of the European Youth Campaign by the European Movement within the framework of a series of initiatives involving the youth. According to Gerold Meyer,26 appealing to the European Movement in a proposal for Strasbourg to become the “City of European Youth”, Europe had to be an attractive prospect for young people, who should collaborate on and drive forward the construction of a new Europe that would develop with them and for them. He suggested that young people had to rid themselves of their indecisiveness and favour collaboration between nations.27 With the aim of creating a form of true European solidarity in the youth generation, a proposal for the organisation of an international meeting between leaders of youth movements and organisations had the aim of discussing the theses of the construction of Europe, including the trend of new education in Europe: European university training.28

25 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 26 A teacher, also involved in children’s theatre, who was an advocate for Strasbourg as the City of European Youth. 27 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au Mouvement Européen avant la création de la Campagne Européenne de Jeunesse, Cité de la jeunesse à Strasbourg, ME162, HAEU (1949). 28 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au Mouvement Européen avant la création de la Campagne Européenne de Jeunesse, Note rélatif à l’organisation d’une rencontre internationale de dirigeants de mouvements et d’organisations de jeunesse, ME162, HAEU (1949).

24

S. K. ST. JOHN

Similarly, with the aim of gaining the interest of large masses of European students in the development of ideas since the Liberation, the French National Union of Students intended to invite the national student organisations of European countries to meet in Nancy on 15–20 December 1951. For the Union, students were seen as the most active in the area of international cultural exchanges, and they would provide a means through which to diffuse the European idea, but in turn, the European idea itself would strengthen cross-border cultural relations between youth movements. In order to provoke European conscience among university students, harmonising—where possible—the study and living conditions in European universities seemed indispensable. The Union proposed to research what European culture could and should expect from universities, and it would define the objectives and methods of a true European intellectual youth education. Bringing together students across Europe, the proposed meeting in Nancy—already a European university centre—would provide the fertile ground for such discussions and reveal a mutual understanding of culture across different nations.29 When the European Youth Campaign was established, it stated its aim as “promoting and defending the cultural and moral values of Europe, which for the majority have gone beyond borders, becoming common to nations of the free world”.30 The campaign would develop the following themes: the necessary deepening of knowledge on European realities; essential European values; Europe’s chances—human qualities, potential demography, resources and equipment; spiritual, historical, geographic, economic and artistic discoveries of other countries and other European trends; the situation of Europe in the world. According to the campaign, European conscience and being European would: overcome old and recent antagonisms; study the problems that are not resolvable at the national level; establish solidarity and organic unity. And the principles of a demographic Europe included: Freedom (diversity, tolerance and respect for one another); solidarity; responsibility (civil, sociological

29 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au ME avant la création de la CEJ. Note sur la conférence de l’étudiante Européenne, ME162, HAEU (1951). 30 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au ME avant la création de la CEJ, Rapport de la commission des thèmes et d’activités, ME162, HAEU (1951).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

25

and political education); social justice (the needs of man) and cooperation would result in future trust.31 The European Youth Campaign wanted to organise a demonstration so that young people could gain a conscience of the European reality and attract the attention of European opinion on the questions of youth. A demonstration would create a kind of humanitarian solidarity among young people, in which they could find European harmony between people, groups and countries with a common European reality, in the balancing of varying ideologies. Moreover, the organisation of a European Youth Conference in June 1951 and a “Summer of Youth” in 1952, aimed to make young people conscious of their common responsibility, especially at the European level.32 Teaching the Teachers The European Cultural Conference entertained the idea that, in order to fully instil the European idea in citizens, it would be necessary to teach the teachers on the European idea. The President of the Swiss University Rectors, Florian Casandey, highlighted that: There are too many intellectuals and scholars who do not pass on what they learn and the educators, teachers, whatever the degree of their teaching, they have a task. Those who have the mission of teaching should not be content with only explaining what is in the books, he should have spirit, moral dignity and the conscience of man, marked deeply with what prepares him for life.33

Affirming the European idea would therefore become a key element in the training of teaching staff because the main purpose of compulsory schooling is to develop in children the necessary qualities that make it possible for individuals to live together in society. Delegates identified that secondary education had the task of forming and imprinting “Europeanness”, and that schools established on a 31 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au ME avant la création de la CEJ, Rapport de la commission des thèmes et d’activités, ME162, HAEU (1951). 32 Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au ME avant la création de la CEJ, Rassemblement de la jeunesse Européenne, ME162, HAEU (1951). 33 Speech of F. Casandey, ME538 (1949).

26

S. K. ST. JOHN

national basis should henceforth have a European scope. Seimen proposed that adopting education as an instrument to disseminate the European idea would entail a restructure from within of official schools, and this was also interpreted as a revision of the secondary level curriculum. The theme of the European Union could be integrated into the curricula of history and of modern foreign languages (English and French in particular), which both lent themselves well to a European outlook. But revising curricula was touching upon sensitive ground. A general questionnaire was circulated before the European Cultural Conference took place to question the countries’ subjectivity to political influences in education, which found a link between history curriculum and political views. The questionnaire revealed traces of what was noted as “totalitarian feeling”, found in textbooks used in the teaching of history or the statutes governing the constitution of universities. Seimen was aware that governments would display resistance towards interference in education and suggested it would be necessary to provide existing schools in each country with teaching material about Europe, thus throwing a basis upon which to build further.34 Teaching and research on the history of Europe was deemed important at the European Cultural Conference by Prof. Falco of the Italian delegation as it provided a united Europe with cultural foundations. He advised that research on the past should be encouraged as history should be a strong component to the creation of a new Europe. For Falco, it was not about replacing one historiography with another, but about stimulating a European conscience deriving from scholars taking Europe as the object of research and proving its convictions. If money and scholars’ willingness were no object, Falco proposed the creation of a centre for studies on the history of Europe with a specialised library, regular teaching courses and cultural exchanges themselves.35 Exchange of People and of Knowledge Scholarly mobility had been in existence since medieval times, and the liberty of exchanges was already common, but further developments 34 Suggestions brought to the European Cultural Conference by the French Cultural Committee for a United Europe, ME540 (1949). 35 Pour une histoire de l’Europe par le Prof. Falco de la délégation italienne, Congrès de Lausanne, ME540, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

27

could be made. For example, the Verbatim Report of the Congress of Europe outlined the idea that, if it were possible to obtain one student from each European university who prepares an exam for three years, he/she could spend six months in a university of his/her choice with the same curriculum conditions as his/her own institution. The exams undertaken in the foreign institution would count as if they were done in the home institution. Such initiatives were realisable immediately at low cost, but they depended on the willingness of countries to collaborate.36 At the Congress of Europe it was also highlighted that there should be exchanges between institutions of culture, colleges and high schools, adult education, reading circles of workers—not just universities—to penetrate further into all angles of society.37 At Lausanne, delegates reiterated that cultural exchanges should not be a reserved privilege for intellectuals and members of the liberal professions, but extended to that of adult education.38 The concept of exchanges was pertinent in the area of Franco-German relations and, after 1949, particular effort was made by the French occupying authority in Germany as well as in the French youth movements to develop exchange activities. In the school year of 1949–1950, there were exchanges that were notable for their diversity and adaptation to varying places and interested social groups. For example, an international exchange centre organised individual exchanges and bursaries; movements such as the French Youth Catholic Association, the scouts, the Paris Youth Council organised study days and weeks with German movements; the French association of international meetings organised three pedagogical meetings, three sports meetings and eight youth meetings and the French league of teaching participated in adult-education work experience. However, none were able to meet the German demand, and the French and German organisations were not always balanced. The development of Franco-German exchanges at youth level confirmed the necessity

36 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 37 Congress of Europe at The Hague, Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 38 Resolutions—Committee on Exchanges, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949).

28

S. K. ST. JOHN

for a new form of cultural relations that were more in line with the new social and economic conditions.39 In other areas across Europe, activities included a Summer School on European Studies established in 1939 at the University of Zurich. It drew on faculty from across Europe and addressed contemporary European culture and its relations with that of other continents.40 In addition, an enquiry into existing cultural cooperation in Europe highlighted that within Holland’s ten university institutions, cultural conventions had been concluded with Great Britain, France and Belgium. At the time, conventions were also being prepared with Luxembourg, South Africa and Italy. The equivalence of degrees was also being discussed with Belgium and France, with concrete results yielded with the former.41 Luxembourg had no university institution and was therefore forced to seek cooperation in this field from outside its borders. Students who wanted to follow an academic career took a one-year advanced course at an institution in Luxembourg, which was equivalent to one year at university. There were 60 students and twelve professors on the course, and students then attended a foreign university if they wished to continue an academic career. Luxembourg developed cultural agreements with Belgium, France and the US and preparations were underway for agreements with Holland and Great Britain.42 Delegates at the European Cultural Conference identified a need to supervise and direct the exchanges taking place to ensure that partners were fully respecting their obligations, thus guaranteeing parity between the universities and schools that participated in the network. It was proposed that a European Commission for University and Study Exchanges might be instituted for this purpose.43 When established, this commission would be responsible for studying the status quo of existing cultural exchanges, of the restrictions that paralyse such exchanges and 39 Rapport sur les rencontres Franco-Allemandes, Initiatives concernant la jeunesse proposées au Mouvement Européen avant la création de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse, ME162, HAEU (1949). 40 Note sur les institutions européennes, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949). 41 Holland, Notes concernants les relations interuniversitaires européen, ME819, HAEU

(undated). 42 Luxembourg, Notes concernants les relations interuniversitaires européen, ME819, HAEU (undated). 43 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

29

of the appropriate reforms to propose in the framework of the European plan.44 In this context, the recognition of equivalent levels of qualifications would also need to be evaluated in order for such exchanges to be successful.45 It was recognised that cultural exchanges were hampered by questions of passports, visas and currency.46 According to the commission for exchanges, there were more restrictions and more obstacles in the freer movement of persons and of cultural material than in 1939. It stated that European culture could only exist if active communications between nations were established and called for European governments, especially those who were members of the Council of Europe, to do so. People should be free to travel, meet, confer and generally act as free agents, without government sponsorship. In response, in its proposals at the European Cultural Conference, the French Cultural Committee suggested that the movement of people could be facilitated by issuing European passports to avoid travellers having to obtain visas, which would increase exchanges of professors, students and pupils from secondary schools, and promote language learning.47 Similarly, the Education Committee also put forward the idea that a European stamp on passports would facilitate academic mobility as well as the mobility of people in youth movements, and the system of travelling scholarships.48 In a bid to rescue cultural cooperation from any such obstacles, the conference recommended that the task of promoting a greater degree of cooperation in the cultural field should be decentralised, and that the churches, the universities, youth associations, trade unions and organisations concerned with adult education should be invited to consult

44 Note sur les échanges culturels européens, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949). 45 Préparation à la conférence Européenne de la culture, Proposals for a European Education by Prof. Anne Siemen, European Cultural Conference, ME540, HAEU (1949). 46 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949). 47 Suggestions brought to the European Cultural Conference by the French Cultural

Committee for a United Europe, ME540 (1949). 48 Resolutions prise par le comité sur l’éducation: Educational Committee Resolution, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949).

30

S. K. ST. JOHN

together, and themselves to accept the responsibility of taking the necessary action in their respective fields. All the universities and other institutions of higher learning, official or not, should be invited to state what measures facilitate educational cooperation between the various European cultural agreements.49 An additional barrier came in the varying forms of a country’s universities: state universities and “free” universities, the latter often being denominational, dependent on private funds of financed by the local authority. This lack of uniformity diminished the opportunity for potential connections between institutions. Professors, however, were still often recruited by the local authorities, meaning that partisan interests came into play, which was seen as a possible source of danger if the party in power became totalitarian.50 The European Cultural Conference also urged the European Movement to put pressure on the various European governments to take immediate steps to remove all obstacles to the free flow of books and therefore of knowledge.51 Before the war, no country except the US taxed books and therefore their flow between countries was easy. However, in post-war Europe, tax on the flow of books was introduced and governments treated books with little respect, as if they were merely an ordinary, commodity of commerce without cultural value or importance.52 During the Conference, the British publisher Stanley Unwin claimed: No government finds it easy to defend the taxation or obstruction of knowledge when once it is publicly challenged, or likes to be held up to ridicule by an announcement that they are treating books like potatoes and taxing them by weight.53

49 Resolutions—Committee on exchanges, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949). 50 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949). 51 Resolutions—Committee on exchanges, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU

(1949). 52 Obstacles to the free flow of books, by Stanley Unwin, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949). 53 Obstacles to the free flow of books, by Stanley Unwin, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

31

He proposed that the solution was “ruthless publicity” in the form of praise for countries that allowed books to flow freely and ridicule those that do not.54 Creating Educational Institutions However, exchanges were not considered to be enough. There was a need to create institutions that guaranteed and showed unity among cultures and in diversity. As De Rougement expressed in the General Report of the European Cultural Conference, there was a need to equip Europe with instruments at the continental level that would train the young people carrying the federal idea, without which technical and material reforms would be lost. The proposed institutions to create were a Bureau d’Etudes; a European Cultural Centre; a College of Europe; a European Institute of Political and Social Sciences and a European Fund for Scientific Research. De Rougement realised that these projects asked for non-existent funds, but proposed that they could be created with a European title with a fraction of the Education budget in each country. He questioned the extent to which European countries wanted the education of a common European culture, which can be interpreted to suggest that if they wanted to achieve such a task, each country would have to make their contribution.55 Although the European Movement had planned five large-scale conferences to take place during 1948, there was no organisation or institution that could speak to the masses of people. European public opinion needed to be created among people who had differences in language, creed and political traditions. There was a need to appeal to universities and educational institutes to help to create a common civilisation because no political institution would be capable of such a task. Young people would be the ones to make a great sacrifice for what the delegates of the Congress of Europe were calling the “unity of Europe”, but it had to

54 Obstacles to the free flow of books, by Stanley Unwin, Congrès de Lausanne, ME537, HAEU (1949). 55 Présentation du Rapport Générale par Denis de Rougement, Congrès de Lausanne, ME538, HAEU (1949).

32

S. K. ST. JOHN

be translated into concrete language rather than the empty words young people had been hearing until then.56 With this in mind, in February 1949, the European Movement opened a “Bureau d’Études” (Bureau of Studies), which would consolidate the scattered initiatives to develop European awareness by creating small working groups.57 The delegates of the Congress of Europe in The Hague had proposed the creation of a European Cultural Centre58 (which eventually replaced the Bureau of Studies) with the aim of: collecting information on cultural forces in Europe; coordinating the scattered efforts in the field of culture and taking all initiatives that aimed to develop a European awareness among the people, to express it and to illustrate it.59 The European Cultural Centre, as described at the Congress of Europe, aimed to encourage the awakening of a European conscience at a time when no other institution had the means to. It would give a voice to European conscience and maintain the network of Western culture, promoting the sentiment of the European community through institutes of education. Established independently of all governmental supervision, it would promote the free circulation of ideas and facilitate the coordination of research, support the efforts of the federation of European universities and guarantee their independence with respect to their states and political pressures. It was also suggested that a Centre could be the means to a future international university.60 Some believed a European Cultural Centre would create a kind of European supranationalism, blocking out the voices of the nations, but the Congress of Europe advised that it would not. Neither would it compete with the universities that believed they were the cultural centres. In fact, it was proposed that the creation of the Centre could begin with the setting up of European sections in existing universities, followed 56 Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 57 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949). 58 Verbatim Report, I Plenary Session, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945,

HAEU (1948). 59 Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949). 60 Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

33

by sections in workers’ institutions. It was recognised that a European Cultural Centre could become a centre of conflicts between the four types of Europe: catholic, protestant, liberal and socialist, and it would be more effective to have committees that recognised the diversity between the four types of Europe in the way that a centre could not.61 According to the Verbatim Report of the Congress of Europe, divisions in the world creating blocs become dangerous for civilisation, so there was a need to create a common intellectual base. There was “a need for special education, an international education, an education that indicates an international spirit”.62 In May 1947, the international association of universities during its congress at Brussels created an international committee of studies for the creation of an international university, composed of representatives from different countries. It was felt that the international university was justified from a scientific point of view because national universities were becoming more like professional schools. However, it was recognised that it was necessary to start, not by an international university, but an institute of social studies which could develop into a true international university. A “College of Europe” in Bruges was championed at the Congress of Europe in The Hague. The original idea floated by the Congress of Europe and taken to the European Cultural Congress was that of a European University. De Madariaga stated in his speech at the Conference that European solidarity was lagging far behind and Europe needed to become aware of herself. He suggested that the idea of a European University was being mooted, but it was an idea that should be pursued. De Madariaga’s point was that when one thought of “France-University”, the Sorbonne came to mind, if “England-University”, it was Oxford, but if one thought of “Europe-University”, nothing emerged. He suggested that “a university is both the nursery of the leaders of a nation and the alma mater of its patriotism”, so if European leaders and European patriotism were desired, a European University had to be created.63 However, he also pointed out the complications of such a project. Even if all geographic, financial and academic obstacles had been overcome, a 61 Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 62 Verbatim Report, IV Cultural Committee, Congress of Europe at The Hague, ME2945, HAEU (1948). 63 Speech of Salvador de Madariaga, Congrès de Lausanne, ME538, HAEU (1949).

34

S. K. ST. JOHN

problem still lay in the recruitment of faculty. If one hundred professors were appointed, each from varying nationalities and rabid nationalists, it would not necessarily be a European University that was created, but rather a “Babel Tower”. Even if one hundred professors of only French and Swedish nationality were appointed, but who were all European at heart, a European University will have been created.64 Therefore, the key to a successful European University lay in the balance of competent academic ability and a truly European outlook. This, according to De Madariaga, was the aim when establishing a plan for the College of Europe,65 which would be a more limited, but more feasible, version of the European University. Establishing a university would be far more costly and slow process, even if an existing national university was to be converted into the European University. It would then also be too big an institution for students to live together and form a new European community. The College of Europe would be a smaller, more realisable project in the short term, but one that would not overshadow the European University project. It would train European experts and form a new generation of administrators for the European institutions, who possessed personal experiences of Europe and a general European culture. Acting as a School for Higher Education, the College would admit 50 students, from different countries and who would be educated to university level, to foster a community. The College would not compete with national institutions of higher education and would not create an obstacle for the creation of a European University. It would in fact act as a kind of pilot institution for the European University, which would foster the main intellectual hub of Europe. The College of Europe would be created in Bruges, where a national university did not already exist, and it could initiate the creation of other “European Colleges of Higher Education” across Europe, each with unique specialisations. These colleges would form a network that came together annually for a conference.66

64 Speech of Salvador de Madariaga, Congrès de Lausanne, ME538, HAEU (1949). 65 Speech of Salvador de Madariaga, Congrès de Lausanne, ME538, HAEU (1949). 66 Commission des institutions - Projet sur l’institution permanente du Collège

d’Europe, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

35

The College of Europe’s immediate aim would be to undertake a scientific study of the European situation in all its historical and sociological implications. It would keep in active touch with America, the Commonwealth and overseas territories associated with Europe, and it would try to create a confident spirit of initiative, supranational in its scope, without which it was thought that a real union of the European countries would be unimaginable. Thanks to the quality and spirit of the education, the diplomas granted would acquire European value.67 The European Cultural Conference recorded with satisfaction the success of the preparatory session of the “European College” at Bruges. It appealed to the European Assembly and national governments to provide, without delay, the necessary credits to ensure that the European College would be a success and recommended that the first regular session should open before the end of November 1950.68 The European Cultural Conference also proposed the creation of European Institutes, particularly of nuclear physics, to coordinate scientific research. It was felt that “the cooperation of the European nations in research in the natural and moral sciences profoundly would influence the spiritual community and the development of the European conscience”.69 The Institutes would collaborate closely with national organisations in similar fields and those of UNESCO. They would aim to train students, professors, teachers and pupils on the European plan and would be coordinated with the European Cultural Centre. Several suggestions were submitted, including a scheme for a mobile European University, a plan for European Chairs in existing national institutions and study scholarships.70 In the context of research on European issues, provisions were suggested in the Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, for exiled

67 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531, HAEU (1949). 68 Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU

(1949). 69 Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949). 70 General Report, Congrès de Lausanne, ME531. HAEU (1949).

36

S. K. ST. JOHN

or emigrant intellectuals and students from European countries with totalitarian regimes should be enabled to continue their work on European lines, with European funds available for this.71 Vocational Education for Skills Training and Adult Education Activities in the field of Vocational Educational Training (VET) were proposed to promote the free movement of workers for educational purposes, and to establish best practices in VET across Europe. In view of creating a European spirit, a European Bureau of Adult Education (EBAE) was founded, upon the initiative of the European Cultural Centre, as an autonomous institution in Geneva, which provided a platform for collaboration between associations of Adult Education. Its governing bodies were the general conference and the executive committee (elected by the general conference). Acting as a “technical office”,72 the Bureau aimed to develop among European people a sense of their belonging to a common civilisation; to offer Europeans a place to meet where they could study European cultural issues and to supply the necessary documentation to do so; to inform and advise interested organisations on Adult Education; and to encourage contacts to establish liaisons with non-EU institutions.73 It provided Europeans with all the necessary means possible to facilitate the exchange of people and ideas, to deal with intellectual confrontation and the understanding of the current problems, and the development of European solidarity.74 The Bureau suggested organising courses that ran parallel to university education. It was intended for candidates nominated by trade and labour organisations, who, though not university graduates, had the requisite

71 Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949). 72 Bureau européen de l’éducation populaire, Créations et activités du Bureau Européen de l’éducation populaire, ME1371, HAEU (1954). 73 Projet du statuts, Créations et activités du Bureau Européen de l’éducation populaire, ME1371, HAEU (1954). 74 Bureau européen de l’éducation populaire, Créations et activités du Bureau Européen de l’éducation populaire, ME1371, HAEU (1954).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

37

training and intellectual capacity to also access the College of Europe in Bruges and similar institutions.75 The EBAE produced a series of documentary publications known as “Notes et Etudes”, which were published on a trimestral basis in French, English and German. “Notes and Etudes” was a way of disseminating this information and ideas, and it was considered to be the first means for such information to cross national borders, where exchanges between countries had become a cultural need.76 A Scholars Corps, known as the European Academy of Sciences and of the Arts, would also be created, symbolising European unity in culture at the same level as the Council of Europe for politics. By existence, it would contribute to shaping a European patriotism and it would form the summit of a “Society of Spirits” of the new Europe. It would be the centre of personal relationships between the creators of spirits of the different countries and of diverse disciplines.77 Notable members of the Academy included T. S. Eliot, André Gide, Le Courbusier, Salvador de Madariaga and José Ortega y Gasset.78 The Academy of Literature and Philosophy would form the first branch of an Institute of Europe, which would be created progressively to include a European Academy of Sciences, a European Academy of Medicine, a European Academy of Fine Arts and a European Academy of History and of Economy. The first meeting would group twelve people, of equal representation of the diverse nations, chosen on the basis of their European reputation. These would include writers, philosophers and musicians, also of younger generations to attract younger people.79

75 Resolutions of the Committee of Institutions, Congrès de Lausanne, ME536, HAEU (1949). 76 Bureau européen de l’éducation populaire, Créations et activités du Bureau Européen de l’éducation populaire, ME1371, HAEU (1954). 77 Avant-projet de communiqué pour l’académie, Académie d’Europe Note 1, ME456, HAEU (1949). 78 Liste provisoire de membres de l’académie européenne, Académie d’Europe Note 1, ME456, HAEU (1949). 79 Projet de création d’une académie d’Europe, Académie d’Europe Note 1, ME456, HAEU (1949).

38

S. K. ST. JOHN

Education in the Western European Union Despite a distinctly military mission, significant activity in the field of higher education also took place under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU). On 17 March 1948, five states signed the Brussels Treaty, creating the Brussels Treaty Organisation, and thus took the responsibility to: promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their citizens; to make every effort to lead their citizens towards a better understanding of the principles that form the basis of their common civilisation; and to promote cultural exchanges. The implementation of this cooperation was then entrusted to four committees: the Social Committee, the Public Health Committee, the War Pensions Committee and the Cultural Committee. They were instructed to prepare recommendations for submission to the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation and subsequently to member governments. In 1954, Italy and Germany joined the Treaty through the Paris Agreements, establishing the WEU, whose member states represented 80 per cent of the Council of Europe. The Cultural Committee was composed of heads of cultural relations departments in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Secretaries-General in the Ministries of Education and met twice a year. The work of the Committees was then often carried out by subcommittees composed of national officials.80 In particular, its European Universities Committee was given the task of organising conferences with the Rectors and Vice-Chancellors of key European universities. The first took place in Cambridge in 1955, and the second in Dijon, which took place on 9–15 September 1959, bringing together 200 Rectors and Vice-Chancellors from fifteen European countries. In Cambridge, the discussion predominantly surrounded problems affecting universities in the post-war world.81 In Dijon, the discussion surrounded the shortage of research workers in the scientific field, which constituted one of the most pressing problems faced by Western Europe. To maintain its position in the world, Europe had to train scientists in both quality and quantity because Europe’s 80 Transfer of Cultural and Social Activities of Western European Union to the Council of Europe, Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf, Rapporteur, doc. 149, 12 November 1959 (WEU-8, HAEU). 81 Fifth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council’s activity for the period 1 January–31 December 1959, Assembly of Western European Union, doc. 159 (WEU-9, HAEU).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

39

technical and economic advancement would be thanks to its scientists. Universities had a special responsibility in training new researchers and adapting to new techniques. The second issue addressed at the Dijon conference was that of European studies in universities, given the importance of training university youth to European unity. Preparing university programmes of European studies would bring life and clarity to a subject that had only been addressed empirically, and moreover, would train minds towards a conception of Europe and an ability to understand the problems surrounding European unity. By developing European studies in universities, Europe would be formed in the hearts and minds of people as well as in the institutions.82 Five courses in Italy, the UK, Luxembourg, Belgium and France, were organised in 1958 on specific subjects of immediate importance that would foster a reparation in young people for their responsibilities as Europeans. In addition, a fortnight of meetings for 125 young people was organised in Brussels on 6–21 August 1958 under the general heading of “International Understanding”.83 The issue of the European University project was also discussed during the Dijon meeting, with much resistance to the project being demonstrated by the Rectors and Vice-Chancellors to the point that they considered drawing up a resolution to block its progression. Nevertheless, they understood and appreciated the need to Europeanise existing universities.84 The Cultural Committee of the WEU also studied the question of university cooperation and the possibilities that may lead to exchanges. The Assembly of the WEU asked for a general catalogue of theses completed at European universities to be published by the WEU by 1962, for which it was noted that the Federalist Inter-University Union had already completed part of the task by publishing a catalogue of university theses on themes of European interest. However, the Federalist Inter-University Union had no intention of extending its catalogue

82 Reply to chapters VI and VII of the Fourth Annual Report of the Council, Western European Union, 1958 (WEU-7, HAEU) and Activities of Western European Union in the Cultural Field, Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf—Rapporteur, Assembly of the Western European Union, Fourth Ordinary Session, doc. 96, 5 July 1958 (WEU-6, HAEU). 83 Activities in the Cultural Field, Western European Union, doc. 119, 1959 (WEU-7, HAEU). 84 Procès-verbal de la réunion constitutive du 25 septembre 1959, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne (CEAB/12-2416, HAEU).

40

S. K. ST. JOHN

beyond theses of European interest, so the WEU’s European University Committee would expand the catalogue to include all theses. The Cultural Committee also considered publishing a European Universities’ Journal,85 which was then prepared by an Editorial Board in 1958 to coincide with the Dijon conference. It was devoted to facts and ideas providing a regular exchange of information between European universities.86 The first two of a series of monographs by the European Universities Committee were published in 1960 on “The Universities and the State” and “The Universities and technological education”.87 Following the Paris Agreements in 1954, the WEU began making arrangements to transfer its activities in cultural matters, along with those of public administration, to the Council of Europe.88 Examples of the initiatives transferred to the Council of Europe include the cultural identity card, and the equivalence of secondary school and university diplomas. On 24 April 1959, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe communicated to the Consultative Assembly of its 24th session that the activities of the WEU in the social and cultural field would be transferred to the Council of Europe.89 It was felt that the fifteen member states of the Council of Europe provided a more solid base to make a combined effort in the area of cultural affairs, and there was a strong link between the work already carried out by the Council of Europe and the work of the WEU. The overall responsibility for activity in the field should be assigned to the body with most member states. However, the issue of the weakened existence of the WEU without activities in the cultural field was also raised, given that cultural activities had been part of the Brussels 85 Activities of Western European Union in the Cultural Field, Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf—Rapporteur, Assembly of the Western European Union, Fourth Ordinary Session, doc. 96, 5 July 1958 (WEU-6, HAEU). 86 Activities in the Cultural Field, Western European Union, doc. 119, 1959 (WEU-7, HAEU). 87 Activities in the Cultural Field, Western European Union, doc. 119, 1959 (WEU-7, HAEU). 88 Activities of Western European Union in the Cultural Field, Replies to the Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf—Rapporteur, Assembly of the Western European Union, 28 April 1959 (WEU-7, HAEU). 89 Transfer of Cultural and Social Activities of Western European Union to the Council of Europe, Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf, Rapporteur, doc. 149, 12 November 1959 (WEU-8, HAEU).

2

EDUCATION AND THE EUROPEAN “IDEA” (1945–1956)

41

Treaty Organisation from the outset. During the Assembly of the WEU, many speakers stressed that the WEU was not merely a defence organisation, but that it formed a closer link between its seven member states and that a community attitude could also be found in the joint consideration of social and cultural problems.90

Bibliography Corbett, A. (2005). Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy, 1955–2005. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Field, J. (1998). European Dimensions: Education, Training and the European Union. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Frazier, C. (1995). L’Education et la Communauté Européenne. Paris: CNRS Droit. Hitchcock, W. I. (2003). The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945–2002. New York: Doubleday Random House. Mautell, W. (1998). Churchill and the Unification of Europe. The Historian, 61(1), 67–84. Neave, G. (1984). The EEC and Education. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books. Neave, G. (2001). The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues. In J. Huisman, P. Maassen, & G. Neave (Eds.), Higher Education and the Nation State: The International Dimension of Higher Education. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. Pépin, L. (2006). The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe in the Making—An Example. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Pépin, L. (2007). The History of EU Cooperation in the Field of Education and Training: How Lifelong Learning Became a Strategic Objective. European Journal of Education, 42(1), 121–132. Shaw, J. (1992). Education and the Law in the European Community. Journal of Law and Education, 21(3), 415–442. Spinelli, A., & Rossi, E. (1941). The Ventotene Manifesto. In Ventotene: The Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies (pp. 75–96).

90 Transfer of Cultural and Social Activities of Western European Union to the Council of Europe, Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Kopf, Rapporteur, doc. 149, 12 November 1959 (WEU-8, HAEU).

CHAPTER 3

The Road to a European Community Education Policy (1957–1970)

The Rome Treaties The European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed by the six founding member states: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Simultaneously, the member states signed a second Treaty of Rome, commonly known as the Euratom Treaty, which set up the European Atomic Energy Community. Therefore, together they are often referred to as the “Rome Treaties”, but in time, the Euratom Treaty was the lesser considered as the EEC took a firmer position as the supranational entity of the European Community. The fundamental aim of the EEC was to create a common market1 in which its activities included “the abolition, as between member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital”.2 The free movement of people across the boundaries of the member states was fundamental to the concept of the European Community, and the Treaty of Rome contained explicit provisions for the movement of those in employment and self-employed. However, the concept of free movement was not so easily applied to the field of education as students did not fall within the category described, and teachers were employed by the public service, and so therefore did not benefit 1 Treaty of Rome, article 2. 2 Treaty of Rome, article 3c.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_3

43

44

S. K. ST. JOHN

from the Treaty provisions.3 Education remained a taboo area for cooperation at Community level and it was clear that, for the member states, education was fundamentally an area of national concern. However, the Treaty of Rome brought about a new phenomenon in Europe that had substantial impact on matters relating to education.

The Common Agricultural Policy The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community (EEC) can be considered one of the most important common policies of the European Union and the most integrated project for the first four of European integration’s five decades (Patel 2009). It also provided the first link to Community activities in the field of education. The CAP, established within the framework of the Treaty of Rome, constitutes one of the EEC’s first EU policies. The motivation for its establishment derives from excess production following the first and second world wars, which was a great challenge for international agricultural policy and this, coupled with national agricultural protection stimulating production, swayed the EEC towards the creation of a common policy (v. Graevenitz 2009). Since the EEC’s beginnings in 1958 to 1965, around 90% of all community legislation related to the CAP. In the 1970s, 80% of the EU budget was dedicated to it. The majority of the EEC’s financial, political, administrative and even intellectual capacities were linked to the CAP and it has been highly regarded as the core of the European Economic Community. Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome made provisions to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture, which marked a step beyond economic objectives into matters pertaining to people. Moreover, article 41(a) stated that in order for the objectives laid out in article 39 to be successfully fulfilled, provisions needed to be made for “an effective coordination of efforts in the spheres of vocational training, of research and of the dissemination of agricultural knowledge; this may include joint financing of projects or institutions”. In its section dedicated to workers, the Treaty of Rome states that “the freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the community by the end of transitional period 3 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

45

at the latest”4 and that member states shall “encourage the exchange of young workers”.5 Article 117 highlights an agreement made by member states on the need to promote improved working conditions and standard of living for workers, which will positively impact the common market. Making further reference to vocational training, article 118 stipulates that the Community “shall have the task of promoting close cooperation between Member States in the social field, particularly in matters relating to […] basic and advanced vocational training”. Of fundamental relevance was its commitment to establishing a European Social Fund to raise the standard of living,6 and article 125 states that on application by a member state, the Fund would meet 50% of the expenses incurred by the State, or by a body governed by public law, for the purposes of vocational retraining. More concretely, article 128 then lays down “the general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of the national economies and of the common market”.7

Vocational Educational Training On 2 April 1963, a Council Decision followed, which lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy. By 1963, the common market was being rapidly implemented, regional policies were being coordinated and the common agricultural policy was being developed. The Council recognised that structural changes were taking place in economic sectors, which raised problems of vocational training and retraining that required attention. The decision stated that an effective common vocational training would assist in fostering the movement of workers, and recognised that the freedom of occupation, place of training and place of work was the fundamental right of every person. The decision laid down ten principles, in which the key points included the notion that a common vocational training policy meant a coherent and progressive common action with programmes drawn up by member states, and the guarantee that every person should

4 Treaty of Rome, article 48. 5 Treaty of Rome, article 50. 6 Treaty of Rome, article 123. 7 Treaty of Rome, article 128.

46

S. K. ST. JOHN

receive adequate training—young people and adults—with due regard for freedom of choice in occupation, place of training and place of work. In this context, every person would have access to the technical knowledge and skills necessary to pursue a given occupation and reach the highest possible level of training. Suitable training facilities would be created to supply the labour forces required in different sectors, and vocational training would be broadened on the basis of general education. Once implemented, the common vocational training policy would forecast and estimate, both at national and Community level, the quantitative and qualitative requirements of workers in the various productive activities, and would give importance to a permanent system of information and guidance or vocational advice for young people and adults alike. Particular attention was paid to the training of teachers and training instructors. The Commission would take suitable steps to collect, distribute and exchange any useful information, literature and teaching material among the member states. The decision stated that suitable training for teachers and instructors should be a basic factor of any effective vocational training policy, and the numbers of such persons should be increased as well as their technical and teaching skills developed. The harmonisation of instructor training would be sought and special measures would be taken in the member states to promote the basic and advanced training of teachers and instructors for work in the less favoured regions of the Community, as well as in third countries, particularly those associated with the Community.8 In December 1963, a vocational training advisory committee was subsequently set up, which presented its opinion on questions surrounding vocational training both when requested by the Commission and upon its own initiative. It was composed of representatives of the member state governments, of employers and of employers’ organisations, and met three times a year with a two-year renewable mandate. In the Commission, vocational training was under the responsibility of the Directorate General V for Social Affairs between 1963 and 1976 (Neave 1984).

8 Council Decision of 2 April 1963 laying down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1338/63 (63/266/EEC), 20 April 1963.

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

47

The Treaty of Rome and Education The education sector itself was granted new opportunities as education staff and scholars were free to move between institutions around Europe with the same rights as they possessed in their home country. Free movement between universities and research institutes facilitated cross-border collaboration in the field of research, paving the way for a European research space, and students and staff could experience academic—as well as cultural—life in a European country other than their own. Mobility and inter-institution collaboration fostered an intensified exchange of people and knowledge, which sowed the seeds for what is now commonly referred to as the European knowledge economy, as well as a European research area. However, the new phenomenon did not come without its challenges and, for the free circulation of people to be the success that the architects of a united Europe had envisaged, it faced numerous obstacles. These came in the context of integrating individuals into the working and daily life of the host country. If workers, especially in the professional sectors, were to be able to move freely between member states with the same rights, it was important for their qualifications to be recognised. Equally, students wishing to spend time in another European institution had to be guaranteed recognition of their studies back home and recognition of their academic qualifications if they wished to continue their studies or participate in research projects in another member state. Greater attention to developing language learning within the European Community was also required if students, workers and scholars were to successfully integrate, whether on a temporary or permanent basis, into the host country. Academic mobility can be traced back to medieval times, when scholars sought new knowledge by travelling to other universities and places of learning. Over the centuries, although political and religious conflict caused more stagnant periods for academic mobility than others, it can be said that initiatives that took place against the backdrop of European integration gave impetus to the historically rooted concept. In post-war Europe, the economic and political climate that followed the devastation of the war created significant limitations to academic mobility. It was further hindered by the evolution of numerous and greatly diverse higher education systems, which caused difficulties in transferring grants, loans and scholarships between countries; the lack

48

S. K. ST. JOHN

of linguistic knowledge; the recognition of qualifications; and a lack of information about opportunities in other education systems.

Recognising Qualifications and Diplomas During the first decade of the European Community and the years leading up to it, the Council of Europe, as with much of the activities in the field of education, was the principal driver of academic-mobility initiatives at European level. One of the tasks assumed by the Council of Europe has been to work in favour of cooperation that is as close as possible between the universities. This includes the free circulation of university members, forcing the Council of Europe to stimulate their mobility.9 The Council of Europe was the first European organisation to address the problem of the equivalence of diplomas and wrote it into the programme of the Commission for Scientific Education. A first meeting of experts on the subject of the equivalences took place in July 1953, when they formulated a series of recommendations with the following principles: the organisation of periodic meetings with the experts in the Commission for Scientific Education; the creation of a centre or service in countries that do not already have such centres, to give information on foreign education systems, the exact value of foreign qualifications and the existing rules in the area of equivalences; support to governments in the creation of a European Centre for Information for issues concerning the mobility of people dedicated to research; the opening of an enquiry into the feasibility of a “European Student Record Book”. The Council of Europe set up three conventions on the equivalence of diplomas in the 1950s. The first in 1953 was the European convention on the equivalence of diplomas giving access to university institutions, which was ratified by all of the six member states of the European Community.10 The second came on 12 December 1956 on the equivalence of periods of university study, which, of the Six, was ratified by Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The third convention was signed on 12 December 1959 on the academic recognition of university qualifications, which, of the Six, was signed by Italy and the Netherlands. 9 Les échanges universitaires et l’Université Européenne, Rapport à l’Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, doc.2831, 18 septembre 1970 (EUI 8, HAEU). 10 European Convention on the equivalence of diplomas leading to admission to universities, 11 December 1953, Documents of Henri Cartan (HC-64, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

49

Finally, an additional protocol on the equivalence of diplomas giving access to university institutions was ratified on 3 June 1964 by France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (of the Six).11 In 1960, a European Council of Higher Education and Research (ECHER) was created, which adopted two recommendations in 1965 in favour of the free circulation of university personnel, and for the mobility of students. In the latter recommendation, the Community asked that countries encouraged undergraduate students to carry out study abroad, and that national bursaries continue to be paid to current study-abroad students and adapted to the living costs in the host country. An agreement on the continuation of payment of national bursaries was later signed in 1969, but only with signatures from Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg.12 Although member states signed the aforementioned conventions, there was no assurance that the qualifications were an official comparison to the study programmes they sanctioned, so the ECHER carried out a series of studies on the programmes of different disciplines taught in European universities. It identified a clear problem in the inexistence of common school and university programmes, which had a direct impact on the recognition of diplomas and on the mobility of university members.13 In 1960, the issue of academic exchanges appeared in the Report of the Interim Committee to the European Economic Community and Euratom within the framework of the creation of a European University.14 The Committee identified the need to establish a new situation of equivalence of diplomas and the ECHER would work in close contact with interested international organisations on the subject. The Committee highlighted that the question of harmonisation of programmes was directly linked to establishing a system of equivalence of diplomas and suggested there 11 Response à la question écrite No.293/68 posée par M. Couste, 1969, Assemblée parlementaire européenne et Parlement européen avant l’élection directe (PEO-9671, HAEU). 12 Les échanges universitaires et l’Université Européenne, Rapport à l’Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, doc.2831, 18 septembre 1970 (EUI 8, HAEU). 13 Les échanges universitaires et l’Université Européenne, Rapport à l’Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, doc.2831, 18 septembre 1970 (EUI 8, HAEU). 14 Rapport du Comité Intérimaire aux Conseils de la Communauté Economique Européenne et de la Communauté Européenne de l’Énergie Atomique, Comité Intérimaire pour l’Université Européenne, Florence, 27 April 1960, Doc.EUR/C/1408/60f, C.I.U. 86/60 (CEAB12-631, HAEU).

50

S. K. ST. JOHN

was interest in harmonising study programmes due to the differences between them which rendered the free circulation of students difficult and near impossible. However, harmonising study programmes was seen as an aim in itself, and in actual fact, diversity across the higher education systems would bring about more possibilities and advantages for university life than a uniformed study programme. It was therefore suggested that the Council should favourise bilateral contacts in this respect. The report stated that the ECHER would take the necessary initiatives to: establish a system of equivalence of diplomas to allow every member state student to complete part of their studies in another member state; encourage the competent authorities to implement the system effectively in all interested university with the maximum of guarantee for the student; and expand the system progressively with the first being established within a year. In addition to a system of equivalence of diplomas, the Committee addressed the issue of academic mobility with two proposals. The first was the introduction of a “Livret Universitaire Européen” (European Student Record Book/European Academic Passport), which would be given to the student by their home institution upon request. It would take the form of a conventional passport, including personal details such as name, surname, date and place of birth, address, photo and signature, as well as a faculty and university stamp. Within the pages, there would be details on the student’s studies, including registrations, exams passed, equivalences and references from professors. It would replace the various university student cards that students would otherwise collect from the various universities they studied at, and would grant access to university facilities, as well as reduced-rate museum access, across Europe. The second proposal was that of a “Guide Européen de l’Étudiant Universitaire” (European Guide for the University Student), which would advise students in possession of the academic passport on the opportunities abroad. The guide would be divided into two parts. The first would be published separately for each country, giving information on universities and Higher Education institutions, the courses they offer and their respective professors, registration fees and other expenses, the facilities available, eligibility and admission process and living conditions. The second part of the guide would be dedicated to each discipline, covering all member states. It would be published in four languages (and more if necessary) by the Orientation and Documentation Centre of the European Council for Higher Education and Research, and made available in all the member states.

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

51

The Orientation and Documentation Centre would also be responsible for registering the equivalence of diplomas and generally for keeping all documentation relevant to Higher Education and research. Attention was also dedicated to the exchange of professors, especially due to the limited forms of mobility, which were outlined as short visits for either one cycle of lectures or one to three weeks each, professors giving one or two lectures during a short visit to the host university, and one or several professors acting as visiting faculty for a single term. It was proposed that the latter of these forms, which were largely based on bilateral agreements, was the most effective and therefore required further promotion. To do so, the introduction of an informative document circulated within the European academic community specifying professors’ specialisations, languages and publications would facilitate such exchange initiatives. In addition, existing university twinning also developed such exchanges so further twinning was encouraged by the Committee, and the ECHER would examine the feasibility of a multilateral Convention between the member states to resolve the issues surrounding professorial exchanges, especially in the budgetary field. The results would be presented to the Council of Ministers. During a restricted meeting of the Council to the European Economic Community that took place two months later, Pierre Wigny15 indicated that the considerations made by the Interim Committee confirmed the political willingness of the Six to bring together national universities to intensify exchanges.16 In 1967, under the auspices of the Conference of the West German Rectors on the one hand, and the College of Dutch Rectors on the other, there were conversations regarding the establishment of bilateral regulations between the Netherlands17 and West Germany on the mutual 15 Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 16 Extrait du process-verbal de la réunion restreinte du Conseil de la Communauté

Économique Européenne, tenue à Bruxelles 20–21 juin 1960, apprové le 27 septembre 1960, doc. 629/60 (CEAB12-631, HAEU). 17 The Netherlands had already established a system of the recognition of diplomas obtained in other countries, having applied the Treaty of the Council of Europe (Treaty of Paris, 11 December 1953) (Annex III—Équivalences reconnues aux Pays-Bas et etudes en cours en vue to parvenir à une reconnaissance des diplômes et certificats étrangers, contribution de la délegation néerlandaise, Project note: Reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, doc. R/985/71, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 24 mai 1971 (CEAB12-2422, HAEU).

52

S. K. ST. JOHN

recognition of exams passed and studies carried out in other countries. A Dutch and a German expert were assigned to each subject area included in the regulations: philology, classic philology, sociology, economics, chemistry, physics, electronics and mathematics. It was hoped that similar initiatives would take place in other countries.18 In fact, the International Association of Universities had been dedicating attention to the equivalence of diplomas. The Association was founded by representatives of 167 universities and higher education institutions from 52 countries at the International Conference of Universities held in Nice in December 1950, which the Rector of the University of Paris presided. The first stages of its formation had taken place at a preparatory conference of university representatives held in Utrecht in 1948 under the auspices of UNESCO in collaboration with the Dutch government. The second general conference took place in Istanbul in 1955, and the third in Mexico City in 1960. The association’s aim was to provide a centre of cooperation at the international level among universities and higher education institutions. Among the organs of the Association was the International Universities Bureau, which, with the cooperation of the universities, could respond to requests for information on matters relating to higher education such as the equivalence of degrees, university organisation and technical assistance. During the Nice conference, it was decided that the tasks of the Bureau should be to carry out a long-term study of the equivalence of diplomas. The conference recognised that there were many complications involved in such a task, including the fact that qualifications obtained from different countries had political and economic implications, some falling within the competence of the government. Therefore, it was felt that a sustained effort to gain clarity on the issue should be exerted by a competent international organisation with university status, such as the Bureau. Its task was to compile documentation from a large number of countries, containing full details on the academic aspect of university degrees and the studies leading to them. Among this documentation was a list of bilateral agreements that had already been established. Focusing on the Six, numerous bilateral agreements on the equivalence of diplomas can

18 Reconnaissances des diplomes et certificats érangers: distribution de la delegation néerlandaise, doc. 1957/70 (BAC 9/1973-50, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

53

be noted, many being signed with the first decade after the end of the Second World War and some before the war.19 On 18 August 1969, the European Parliament produced a report on the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other titles.20 With a proposal for a resolution, the European Parliament requested the Commission of the Communities to develop a harmonisation programme for diplomas and study programmes, in view of favouring the mobility of students, teachers and researchers in higher education, and to avoid that the ongoing reforms led to greater disparities between examination and teaching systems. The Parliament requested that the mutual recognition of diplomas was automatically applied to salaried activities. The Parliament acknowledged the presence of the mutual recognition of diplomas in article 57 of the Treaty of Rome, for non-salaried activities, and that, founded on a judicial basis after long studies by groups of experts, the Commission proposed a directive on the mutual recognition of diplomas

19 Italy signed cultural conventions with Belgium (29 November 1948) and France (4 November 1949), cultural agreements with Turkey (17 July 1951), the UK (28 November 1951) and Japan (31 July 1954), and general agreements with Equator (7 March 1952), Austria (14 March 1952) and Switzerland (for engineers and architects on 5 May 1934). Belgium signed agreements with the Netherlands (14 January 1946), France (22 February 1946), the UK (17 April 1946), Norway (20 February 1948), Luxembourg (27 March 1948), Italy (29 November 1948), Egypt (28 November 1949), Austria (17 October 1952) and Greece (9 December 1954). France signed agreements with Iran (a general cultural agreement on 25 April 1929), Denmark (14 January 1930), Sweden (specifically on the equivalence of exams and qualifications on 3 June 1936), Greece (on intellectual and artistic relations on 19 December 1938), Belgium (22 February 1946), the Netherlands (19 November 1946), Austria (15 March 1947), Turkey (17 June 1952), Brazil (6 December 1948), Sarre (15 December 1948), the UK (2 March 1948), Italy (4 November 1949), Colombia (a convention for cultural exchanges on 31 July 1952), Japan (12 May 1953), Norway (4 December 1953), Luxembourg (8 February 1954), Germany (23 October 1954), Canada (an interuniversity agreement between the Universities of Paris and Montreal on 10 June 1952 in Montreal and 26 June 1925 in Paris), and the UK (an inter-university agreement between the University of Paris and fifteen UK universities on 23 March 1925). Germany signed agreements with Spain (10 December 1954) and France (23 October 1954). The Netherlands signed cultural agreements with France (19 November 1946) and the UK (7 July 1948), and cultural agreements with Belgium (14 January 1946), Luxembourg (26 April 1946) and Norway (18 May 1955). Documents concerning the equivalence of university qualifications, International Association of Universities (CM2/1958-949, HAEU). 20 Rapporteur: M. Hougardy, Assemblée parlementaire européenne et Parlement européen avant l’élection directe (PEO-1021, HAEU).

54

S. K. ST. JOHN

for architects. This was followed by proposed directives for doctors, dental practitioners, pharmacists, lawyers and engineers.

University Exchanges In its 1969 report, the Parliament also made aware that it was conscious of the obstacles opposing exchanges between European universities. Indicating a report authored by M. Schuijt for the European Parliament (3 October 1969) on the Europeanisation of universities, it committed to analysing the causes of the compartmentalisation. It pointed out that politicians must be aware that it is not only a problem of organisation, but that removing obstacles to exchanges between universities is an element of the whole cultural policy to be established in Europe. The Parliament proposed that the Commission could make certain proposals to highlight the existing concordances within study and examination programmes and to lay down certain principles for the harmonisation of programmes. It admitted that this would be a difficult task, given diversity within national education systems, such as the case of Germany in which education systems differ between each Länder. It would not be a question of creating a uniform programme, but trying to bring about a certain unity in which diversity, which is necessary, is safeguarded. Finally, the Parliament proposed that, without exerting authority over the different organisations involved in exchanges, the Commission could create a European Office for Exchanges. The Office could grant bursaries, establish a European student passport and be a centre for documentation and information, working in strict collaboration with the Council of Europe, the OECD and UNESCO.21 During the second meeting of the Ministers of Education of the countries of the European Community in Luxembourg on 6 June 1974, key points discussed were the European University Institute in Florence; the problem of the mutual recognition of diplomas, which was noted to affect the free movement in Europe of members of liberal professions, and to that of students; and the overall question of cooperation in educational matters. The meeting was described as productive, and remarkable for

21 Rapport sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, certificats et autres titres, 18 août 1969, document 87, Assemblée parlementaire européenne et Parlement européen avant l’élection directe (PEO-1021, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

55

its atmosphere of mutual confidence and realistic attitudes to the problems being discussed.22 On the mutual recognition of diplomas, by July 1974, in accordance with article 57 of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission of the European Communities presented the Council with 40 draft directives concerning freedom of establishment, and mutual recognition of diplomas in twelve categories of non-salaried activities. The Council pointed out that it was not simply a case of recognising qualifications, but of providing people with the possibility of practising their chosen profession in another European member state. Guidelines drawn up by the Council included proposals for greater flexibility in reviewing the training that leads to the qualification, and it was admitted during the meeting that despite different lengths of study and different methods, the “final product” does not differ greatly between member states. In addition, the Council planned to establish a list of certificates and titles that would immediately be recognised as equivalent, which would facilitate student exchanges.23 The French Minister for Education, René Haby, stated that he wanted to “see the solidarity between national educational systems encouraged by greater exchanges and the development of corresponding points of interest”. However, since the diversity of education systems is part of Europe’s culture, he did not intend the development of total uniformity in systems but that the national systems open towards each other. Mr. Malfatti, the Italian Minister of Education, felt the Council had worked well in the meeting, and felt convinced that the solution to educational problems lies outside the national educational framework, and to speak of European unity solely in economic terms would be a serious error.24 In 1970, in a report to the consultative assembly of the Council of Europe,25 it was highlighted that although universities were still as 22 75 European University News, July 1974, Division Information Universitaire, Direction Générale Presse, Informations de la Commission des Communautés Européennes (EUI-8, HAEU). 23 ‘Reconnaissances Mutuelles des Diplômes’, 75 European University News, July 1974, Division Information Universitaire, Direction Générale Presse, Informations de la Commission des Communautés Européennes (EUI-8, HAEU). 24 75 European University News, July 1974, Division Information Universitaire, Direction Générale Presse, Informations de la Commission des Communautés Européennes (EUI-8, HAEU). 25 Les échanges universitaires et l’Université Européenne, Rapport à l’Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de l’Europe, doc.2831, 18 septembre 1970 (EUI 8, HAEU).

56

S. K. ST. JOHN

“open” as they used to be in medieval times, they had evolved within national histories and had become divided behind barriers of a nationalism that constitute a serious obstacle to academic mobility, and in fact to the spread of a European spirit itself. While economic and social integration was developing, the development of cultural integration, and especially the creation of a European academic community, was seriously lagging behind. The report points out that already in 1948, the Council of Europe and the Six were conscious of the need to facilitate academic exchanges alongside the need to create a European University. The report advised the need to Europeanise national universities, independently of the development and form of the European University, as the important factor was the creation of a European-spirited community, which can be fostered through academic mobility to enrich professors’ and students’ experiences. It makes reference to the report presented by Mr. Shuijt on behalf of the policy commission on the Europeanisation of universities (3 October 1969), stating the need to stimulate university exchanges by adopting common study programmes in all countries. However, the rapporteur recognised the obstacles to university exchanges and the Europeanisation of universities: the equivalence of diplomas and difference in teaching systems; legislation, meaning that national laws were hardly ever flexible and professors and assistants were often considered as state officials causing problems with the eligibility of nationality; a lack of linguistic knowledge as foreign language teaching was insufficient and therefore created practical problems outside national borders, which was aggravated by the lack of initiatives in universities to improve the linguistic situation of teachers and learners; insufficient funds foreseen in national budgets for bursaries to maintain mobility; a lack of information on offer to inform students of the opportunities in member states; the priority given to national problems in university programmes, so programmes are nationally oriented with little relevance to other member states; an imbalance in the exchanges; and the absence of a European policy on exchanges, which would better coordinate exchanges and avoid the aforementioned imbalance.

Developing Deeper Cooperation in Education Following decisions made during the 565th meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (22–24 July 1970) for the Council of the European Communities, an ad hoc group of high functionaries competent

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

57

in the field of national education met several times in Brussels to prepare a Council session with the participation of the national Education Ministers of the member states. The group agreed that in order for Community economic cooperation to be a success, it largely depended on the situation in the education field. Certain objectives laid out in the Treaties of Rome touched upon this domain, and the delegations believed that cooperation crossing with the field of education would accelerate these dispositions in the treaties. For several delegations, the need for cooperation in the field of education went beyond the requirements of the process of economic integration alone. They considered that the Community of Europe must find its own cultural and educational dimension and that, therefore, a common reflection was necessary on the modalities of increasing cooperation in the field of education going beyond the strict framework of the Treaties. The first problem to resolve was that, if the ministers responsible were to be favourable to cooperation in the field of education, whether such cooperation should be limited to the framework of the Treaties or whether a type of cooperation could be envisaged that indeed went beyond the confines of the Treaties. However, the group was only responsible for identifying themes to be discussed in the context of European cooperation in education and not whether they fell under the Treaties or not. The themes to discuss were based on documents submitted by the different delegations. The ad hoc group agreed, however, that any Community cooperation in the field of education had to take into consideration the efforts already made by other entities and multilateral organisations, especially UNESCO, the OECD and the Council of Europe. A complete inventory of such activities would take place. In the ad hoc group’s report, three key areas were outlined: information and cooperation in the field of education; university cooperation; and the mobility of people. The first regarded the systematic collection of information concerning the education of the six member states, including documentation on the economy of education, education system structures, comparative studies of university courses, research in the field of education, technology and education, and statistics on education. In the context of mobility, the report proposed the creation of European diplomas, which would be valid in all six member states and would sanction a newly created cycle of studies and organised on a common basis within the member states. Such diplomas would be conferred by existing institutions as well as newly created institutions such as the European

58

S. K. ST. JOHN

University in Florence. It was noted that the German delegation was not in favour of this initiative. In the meantime, it was suggested that an examination should take place of the possibility of applying a “European validation” to certain existing national diplomas.26 Within the context of the Committee of Permanent Representatives meeting within the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Belgian delegation expressed its view that it considered the mutual recognition of diplomas as an essential issue linked to the success of the Community, and it hoped that the discussions between the national Ministers of Education could provide impetus to the work within the political plan of the Community framework. The French delegation considered that it would be important to ensure that decisions were made in full knowledge of the way in which educational systems work and how they might evolve. In addition, it believed there should be a systematic review of the implications of such decisions for the future of education in the countries where they will take effect. The German delegation believed that the mutual recognition of diplomas should essentially be based on the idea that in the highly developed industrial countries, including member states of the Community, the situation can be considered to be more or less the same, so the same values for assessing the recognition of diplomas are applied. Therefore, there should be a general mutual recognition without the need to lay down uniform minimum requirements too formally.27 In a separate annex, the German delegation expressed its view that growing economic integration within the European communities was making increasingly clear the need to extend cooperation between member states to areas closely linked to economic development. For the German delegation, the type of progress that had taken place in the field of science and technology, as well as in the field of industrial and monetary policy, was as equally valid in the field of national education. An individual’s training, as well as the improvement of the conditions necessary for his/her freedom and opportunities for further development in the Community, would be increasingly decisive for the social and economic development of the Community itself. It was for this reason that the 26 Projet: Rapport du Groupe ad hoc des hauts fonctionnaires compétent en matière d’éducation nationale, doc. T/742 f/70, 1970 (BAC 9/1973-50, HAEU). 27 Project note: Reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, doc. R/985/71, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 24 mai 1971 (CEAB12-2422, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

59

German delegation welcomed the suggestion from the Belgian delegation to hold a session of the Council of Ministers in the field of national education, and believed that closer cooperation between the member states was desired and necessary. In the German view, closer cooperation at Community level could provide new impulsion to the work already carried out in the past. The German delegation reiterated the need for periods of study spent in other member states to be recognised across the Community, to improve not only university mobility for professors but also for students, which provide the opportunity to experience the cultural, sociological, economic and political offerings of other member states. Furthermore, bringing teachers closer together—not necessarily leading to uniformisation—would facilitate study abroad and would naturally bring about the mutual recognition of qualifications.28 Within the discussion on the equivalence of diplomas in 1970, the European Community dedicated attention to specific professions that fell within the framework of work corresponding to article 57 of the Treaty of Rome. These were: architects, for which two propositions for directives had been studied since March 1969; engineers, for which discussions on propositions for a directive had been taking place since May 1969; geometers and agronomists, for which discussions were yet to take place; judicial professions, for which nothing had been discussed for lawyers and industrial property and fiscal advisors, but for compatible experts the Commission had presented a directive in July 1970; doctors, and medical and dental practitioners, for which a proposal for a directive had been sent to the Council in March 1969; pharmacists, for which a proposal for a directive was being discussed since November 1969; nurses and midwives, for which proposals for directives were sent in November 1969 and January 1970; and opticians and veterinaries, with two proposals for directives being sent in November 1969 and June 1970.29

28 Annex I—Extrait – Mémorandum de la République fédérale d’Allemagne concernant la coopération européenne en matière d’éducation nationale, Project note: Reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, doc. R/985/71, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 24 mai 1971 (CEAB12-2422, HAEU). 29 Annex II—Etat des travaux concernant la mise en oeuvre de l’article 57 du Traité de Rome, Project note: Reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes, doc. R/985/71, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, 24 mai 1971 (CEAB12-2422, HAEU).

60

S. K. ST. JOHN

Research Cooperation In July 1958, a report was produced within the framework of the European Communities on proposals for the creation of a European Scientific Community (the EEC and Euratom). It stated that the promoters of the Treaties of Paris and Rome had expressed their concern to ensure an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe. They considered that Europe can only be achieved by concrete actions and by the establishment of common bases for economic development, expressing their desire to seek, on the one hand, the expansion of the productions of the six countries of the European Community, and on the other hand, to ensure the raising of the standard of living of the populations. In this respect, scientific and technical research was one of the factors that could make a significant contribution to maintaining and bettering the standard of living. Each member country was lagging behind in the field of research compared to the US, the UK and Russia, and this delay was not be measured solely by the relative importance of the amounts spent on research, but also by the increase in the use of foreign degrees and qualifications. By creating a common research area, coordination of research at the centre of the six member states of the European Community would enable a growth in contacts between researchers and thus lead to an increase in the value of the research. A common research organisation would provide Europe with the possibility of re-establishing its position in the area of science and technology.30 The issue of scientific research was laid out in a note of the European Communities on 6 November 1959 entitled “La recherche scientifique: organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale” (Scientific research: organisation, financial efforts and international cooperation).31 The note provided a first overview of the regulations on scientific research and the efforts made in this respect in the Common Market countries in relation to the US, the Soviet Union and the UK. It points out that the note could not be exhaustive due to the complex structure, diversity and continual development of scientific research. It was stated that the European Community could be accused of lagging behind the US and 30 Propositions visant à la création d’une Communauté Scientifique Européenne, juillet 1958 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU). 31 La recherche scientifique: organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, doc. AE/8/59, Council of Europe, 6 novembre 1959 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

61

the Soviet Union. In the research areas of medicine, biology, aeronautics and astronautics, for example, the voice of the European Community had hardly been heard. An explanation could lie in the low funding that research in the Community receives, but also due to the lack of coordination of efforts across the Community. Since there did not appear to be any fundamental differences in the structure of research across the member states, it was felt that coordination should be relatively easy. The European Parliamentary Assembly, during its session in June 1958 adopted a resolution underlining the particular importance of research and interest in strong collaboration within the European Community. This position was reaffirmed by the Commission for Scientific and Technical Research in their meeting on 1 June 1959. The state of scientific research cooperation within the Six in the public sector was hardly advanced, except in the fields of nuclear energy, and coal and steel, in which the Treaties had paved the way for common research. In the private sector, however, the establishment of the Common Market has resulted in a number of private initiatives of closer collaboration in the industries of member countries within almost every industrial sector of the six countries.32 At the time of the report, scientific research in Belgium was carried out by recognised institutions of public use, and in particular the “Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique” (National Foundation for Scientific Research)33 and the “Institut pour l’Encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique dans l’Industrie et l’Agriculture” (Institute for the Encouragement of Scientific Research in Industry and in Agriculture),34 as well as in universities, government laboratories and institutes or laboratories in the private sector (in industry and agriculture). Other public-use institutions working in the field of research were the “Fondation Universitaire” (University Foundation), the Francqui Foundation, 32 La recherche scientifique: organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, doc. AE/8/59, Council of Europe, 6 novembre 1959 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU). 33 The “Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique” was an institution for public use created on 2 June 1928. It is independent of the State and is subsidised by the private sector and State subsidies (CM2/1960-756, HAEU). 34 The ‘Institut pour l’Encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique dans l’Industrie et l’Agriculture’ is a public institution that is dependent on the Ministries of Economic Affairs and of Agriculture, created on 27 December 1944 and is responsible for encouraging applied research in industry and agriculture. Its resources are provided by the government (CM2/1959-873, HAEU).

62

S. K. ST. JOHN

the “Institut Interuniversitaire des Sciences Nucléaires” (Interuniversity Institute of Nuclear Sciences), the “Fondation Industrie-Université” (Industry-University Foundation), the Belgian office for the growth of productivity, the Nuclear Foundation and the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique Médicale (Fonds of Scientific Medical Research). Belgian university research was carried out in more than six hundred laboratories or research services, divided between the two state universities of Gand and Liège, as well as the two free universities of Brussels and Leuven and seven other important university institutions. The resources of the university institutions depended on the state, deriving from government subsidies. The free universities had their own resources and received ministerial subsidies. The private sector maintained numerous laboratories ranging from small installations for analyses to laboratories carrying out applied research. The Belgian industrial sector also created laboratories, founded by professional groups. These research centres, known as “De Groote Centres”, were in virtue of a legal decree of 30 January 1947, financed by a single government subsidy, compulsory annual fees from all companies in the jurisdiction, and subsidies from the “Institut pour l’Encouragement de la Recherche Scientifique dans l’Industrie et l’Agriculture” or others. The Belgian coal industry also possessed the following research institutions: the National Institute of Mines; the National Institute of the Coal Industry; and the Institute of Mining Hygiene.35 At the end of the Second World War, Germany had seen a halt in industrial production and research was based in universities and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, created in 1907 and dissolved in 1945. The German physicist Max Planck, shortly before his death in 1949, wanted to create a similar institution and on 26 February 1949 the “Max Planck Gesellschaft sur Förderung der Wissenschaften” was created with the help of the allied military government. The Max Planck research institutes carried out work in the field of pure as well as applied research. However, neither the government nor industry intervenes in the research taking place. The institutes are principally financed by official funds on the basis of an agreement with all the Länder. They also receive donations from an association founded to encourage the sciences (Stifterverband für die

35 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

63

Deutsche Wissenschaft).36 The German Research Association englobes all universities and technical colleges, and entrusts its work to the researchers it subsidises. The resources derive from the Länder, from the Federal Government, the “Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft” and private sources. In addition, the Fraunhofer Society for the Advancement of Applied Research was founded in Munich on 16 March 1949, with the aim of providing the means and possibilities to develop industry interest in research in the natural and physical sciences. Certain industries created their own laboratories or institutes that were more or less attached to the universities or technical colleges. As for measures taken by public authorities, the Federal Republic did not have a Ministry of Cultural Affairs, and the universities and polytechnics were under the remit of the Länder. However, these different ministries of the “Bund” support the research that they are affected by.37 By decree on 29 November 1958, the French government reorganised the administration of its scientific research, by creating the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Scientific and Technical Research, which enabled an executive power to intervene with the utmost vigour in an area where the role of researchers and scholars was obviously fundamental. As the financial and material resources of the nation were limited, it was necessary that the French government could seek scientific advice to establish its options. The Committee constituted the Prime Minister, the President, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Public Health and qualified representatives from the French community. Its tasks were: to ensure the right balance between the volume of credits devoted to various forms of research; to ensure the efficiency of the nation’s research, which lead to studying the researcher’s profession and the structures in which they work; and to sense new research themes that would be of national importance. Research in France was carried out in laboratories, which included: state laboratories with personnel directly linked to the Ministries; research 36 The Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft was created in September 1949 in Frankfurt by the German economic circles, with the aim of collecting funds for the development of science and research (CM2/1960-756, HAEU). 37 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU).

64

S. K. ST. JOHN

organisations dependant on the Ministry of Education, including the College of France, the universities and their institutes (Institut Henry Poincaré, for example), in which research was directed by the professors; the National Centre for Scientific Research, created by a merger of two research centres in 1939 and directly linked to the Ministry of Education. Its mission was revised in 1945 and 1948 to develop research with universities, especially through subsidies and ensuring the working order of the laboratories. In 1957, the Centre’s laboratories had around 3000 researchers, 1300 contractual workers and 1500 technical collaborators. As in other countries, certain areas of industry that were of particular importance had their own research laboratories, which frequently carried out fundamental research. Elsewhere, certain branches of industry or groups of societies created professional centres of research, which were officially recognised by ministerial decree.38 In Italy, research was encouraged and financed mainly by the state, industry, academies and certain foundations. Research was carried out in universities, national centres of research and laboratories in the private sector. As regards state activity, the main organisation is the National Council of Research, which was founded in 1923. It coordinates national activities in different branches of science, founds scientific laboratories and contributes to their financing, elaborates research programmes of general interest, finances research centres, organises the diffusion of scientific publications, publishes bibliographical bulletins and scientific journals, organises subsidies for meetings and scientific congresses of national and international interest, and it represents Italy in international scientific relations. The state possesses numerous research organisations that depend on the technical Ministries of Defense, Agriculture, Interior, Transport and Industry. The universities and polytechnics depended on the state, namely the Ministry of Education, for their resources. They were dedicated mostly to pure research, but also applied research. Industry maintained a close rapport with the universities, in which professors were also advisors elsewhere in the private sector. University professors had the freedom to undertake the work they wished to in the university laboratories and they were able to directly contact sectors of industry that could be interested in their projects. Often, industry staff would be sent to work with the professor on a determined project, or industry funds would be paid 38 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

65

to cover the salary of university researchers. There were also academies (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei), knowledge societies (Italian Association for the Advancement of Sciences, the Italian Society for Chemistry, the Italian Society for Physics) and associations (the Electro-technical Association, the Technical Automobile Association and the Society of Engineers), which provided subsidies for research or the exchange of information and technical procedures.39 In the Netherlands, pure research was carried out by the organisation “Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek” (ZWO) and the universities, while applied research was carried out by a national centre “Nederlandse Centrale Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek” (TNO), and the laboratories of the industrial sector. Created in 1950 by the government, the ZWO’s role is to grant study bursaries and subsidies to university professors and research specialists. It works in collaboration with the TNO, on occasions providing joint subsidies. Pure research dominates in universities, but the TNO maintains contact with university researchers for collaborations in applied research. The TNO was created by a law on 1 May 1932, and is responsible for awakening the understanding of applied research for public interest. The institution has no official character and its personnel do not constitute government officials, but the state exerts an influence on its activity. As for the private sector, the large industrial enterprises such as Philips in Eindhoven, the Royal Dutch in Amsterdam, and Unilever in Vlaardingen, have created important private research centres, with which the TNO maintains relations.40 At European level, attention to research is evident from the European Coal and Steel Community, where in article 55 of the Treaty of Paris, the Community is requested to take up appropriate contacts between the existing research organisations, to provoke the financing of common research.41 Furthermore, during the meeting of the European Parliamentary Assembly on 20 March 1958, the Assembly decided to create 39 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération

internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU). 40 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU). 41 Article 55: (1) The High Authority shall encourage technical and economic research concerning the production and the development of consumption of coal and steel, as well as labour safety in these industries. To this end, it shall establish all appropriate

66

S. K. ST. JOHN

a Commission for Scientific and Technical Research. It believed that scientific and technical research constituted an urgent necessity, which should not be limited to pure science, but should also include economic and social sciences. The coordination and rationalisation of the research efforts called for a programme of common research within the three Communities, and it felt that in this field, coordinated action should be taken immediately in the field of energy supply. On 27 June 1958, the European Parliamentary Assembly published a Resolution, stating that it was convinced that scientific and technical research constituted, in both the applied sciences and economics, a powerful means to continued improvement in technology, the increase in productivity, consummation of new products, as well as the reinforcement of security, of sanitary protection and of the population. The Resolution requested that all responsible authorities take the necessary measures to facilitate the work of researchers, especially making detailed documentation available to them on the results acquired in the countries where the publishing languages are difficult to access.42 On 16 November 1959, a note was circulated on “scientific research: a plan of concerted action by the member countries of the European Community” in the framework of the European Economic Community and Euratom.43 The note proposed the creation of a central organisation for documentation and coordination responsible for collecting and distributing information relating to scientific and technical research, and the creation of organisations responsible for scientific policy, which contacts among existing research organisations. (2) After consultation with the Consultative Committee, the High Authority may initiate and facilitate the development of such research work: (a) by encouraging joint financing by the interested enterprises; or (b) by earmarking for that purpose any grants it may receive; or (c) with the concurrence of the Council by earmarking for that purpose funds derived from the levies provided for in Article 50, without, however, going beyond the ceiling defined in section 2 of that article. The results of the research financed under the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (c) above shall be placed at the disposal of all interested parties in the Community. (3) The High Authority shall make all useful suggestions for the dissemination of technical improvements, particularly with regard to the exchange of patents and the granting of licenses. (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951, www.cvce.eu.) 42 Note: La recherche scientifique: Organisation, efforts financiers et coopération internationale, Bruxelles, 6 novembre 1959, doc. AE/8/59 (CM2/1959-873, HAEU). 43 Note: La recherché scientifique: plan d’une action concertée des pays membres de la Communauté Européenne, Bruxelles, 16 novembre 1959 (CM2/1960-873).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

67

included formulating proposals and making decisions in the field. Furthermore, in a meeting on 26 January 1960, the President of the Euratom Executive stated that Euratom would create a common research centre and foster agreements on cooperation, including contracts for research with specialist institutions. It would establish four institutions in the framework of a common nuclear research centre: Ispra (Italy), Petten (Netherlands), Karlsbruns (Germany) and Mol (Belgium).44

University Cooperation On 29–31 October 1970, a meeting on university cooperation was organised by the European University Association and the University of Grenoble.45 The meeting aimed to bring about the study of what a system of cooperation between European universities could look like, and three commissions were established to answer the following questions: which essential elements condition the universities’ aptitude in cooperation? What will be the useful content of this cooperation? What would the strategy put in place be to carry out this cooperation? The first commission concentrated on: the aptitude for cooperation; judicial possibilities to cooperate; sociological conditions for cooperation; and the operational character of universities. The second commission focused on: the content of the cooperation; scientific research and university cooperation; mobility; and information systems. The last commission was responsible for discussing: a cooperation strategy; the technical means for cooperation; institutions of cooperation; and financial incitation. The delegates identified four structural models of university cooperation: supranational centralisation, in which all individual universities report to a centralised body; several national centralisations, in which national/regional universities report to a centralised national body and the national bodies cooperate bilaterally with each other; a decentralised system made up solely of bilateral cooperation; and central mediation with direct interactions, where universities cooperate bilaterally but also liaise with a centralised body. Meeting delegates highlighted that certain systems tend to follow supranational centralisation, although some states without

44 Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Commission de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, 1960 (CEAB-12-631, HAEU). 45 Documents sur colloque de Grenoble, 29–31 octobre 1970 (CIFE-367, HAEU).

68

S. K. ST. JOHN

centralised power in education, such as federal or free states, follow a decentralised system. It was believed that central mediation with direct interaction was the ideal model. Delegates felt that the mutual assimilation of scientific languages and the level of information of the participants was a necessary condition for the successful coordination of research. This implied that the mobility of students, researchers and teachers needed to be involved, and this would require the coordination of programmes and the mutual recognition of qualifications. Without a series of structural reforms to the universities, international cooperation could not take place, and thus it would be an ideal moment to implement such reform. Discussing university research’s place in scientific politics, Gilbert Caty and Henry Lesguillons of the University of Grenoble advised that it required the development of basic research programmes in response to the technical problems that social groups other than academia may have to solve. This broader perspective leads to the study of how university research can interact with the scientific arena in order to determine the measure in which it could be used as an instrument of politics.46 Within the context of the meeting’s first commission, discussing the aptitude for cooperation and the judicial possibilities for cooperation, the meeting highlighted certain national studies on the way research is organised. German universities have a long tradition of academic freedom, which is guaranteed by German Federal law, stating that art and science, and research and teaching, are free. This principle of academic freedom is applied to all university laws of the Länder, as well as in that statutes if each university. It should be noted that this principle of freedom extends beyond teaching and research to encompass the administrative organisation and governance of the university. In this field, the German universities already possessed the type of autonomy that the law of Edgar Faure later provided to French universities in 1968. Governance of the German universities fall within the remit of the eleven Länder, which explains the absence of a Federal Ministry of Education, and therefore a higher education situation that is vastly different from other member states. The near absolute majority of programmes of cooperation are left to the free initiative of the universities themselves, and this situation explains why the majority of international activities take place internally 46 Document de travail introductif élaboré par Gilbert Caty et Henry Lesguillons (Université de Grenoble, 29–31 octobre 1970) (CIFE-367, HAEU).

3

THE ROAD TO A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY …

69

within universities or university-managed organisations, and not within governmental institutions. In Dutch universities, both scientific teaching and research receive the same attention, and an interdisciplinary approach is encouraged in each sector. Moreover, the universities are free to carry out their work as they wish and independent from the State, and they are free to establish their own bilateral agreements for cooperation.47 The commission considered that international cooperation was an important contribution to the internationalisation of university training, to the effect that university degrees are thought of in European terms and in an international spirit. The universities are required to be very open to international perspectives if they want to play a role at the forefront of contemporary society, which was of capital importance for the integration of Europe and for world peace. Cooperation focuses on teaching and research, and in this domain, exchanges between professors and students are of utmost importance when forming European inter-university working groups, which can carry out common scientific research that goes beyond the capacity and competence of a single university.48

Bibliography Neave, G. (1984). The EEC and Education. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books. Patel, K. (2009). Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy Since 1945. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Pépin, L. (2006). The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe in the Making—An Example. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Pépin, L. (2007). The History of EU Cooperation in the Field of Education and Training: How Lifelong Learning became a Strategic Objective. European Journal of Education, 42(1), 121–132. v. Graevenitz, F. G. (2009). From Kaleidoscope to Architecture: Interdependence and Integration in Wheat Policies, 1927–1957. In K. Patel, Fertile Ground for Europe? The History of European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy Since 1945. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

47 Commission I—Rapport présenté par M. H. Schulte (Directeur de l’Office Allemand d’Echanges Universitaires à Paris), Université de Grenoble, 29–31 octobre 1970 (CIFE367, HAEU). 48 Commission I—Rapport présenté par M. H. Schulte (Directeur de l’Office Allemand d’Echanges Universitaires à Paris), Université de Grenoble, 29–31 octobre 1970 (CIFE367, HAEU).

CHAPTER 4

Developing a Community Level Education Policy, 1971–Present

The 1970s: Facing Challenges By the 1970s, the European Community had experienced a decade of political integration. It was also beginning to face the challenges emerging from developing integration that came to affect its education policy: economic crisis and migration. Facing Economic Crisis The development of European integration lasted a decade before it started to experience turbulence. Member state governments were dealing with energy shortages, monetary instability and stagflation brought on by a turbulent global economy (Wood and Yesilada 1996). A key contributor to these circumstances were the oil crises of 1973–1974 and later 1977–1978 (Aldcroft 2001). The first oil crisis, together with the tail end of the dollar crisis in 1971, triggered western European economies to plunge into recession. Looking to protectionist measures, member state politics dominated the decade and the policymaking system paralysed due to key actors’ inability to develop the momentum to launch new initiatives. Consequently, the decade was coined the period of “Eurosclerosis” (Stabb 2011). The European Community entered a phase of declining investment, productivity and international competitiveness, with rising inflation. Low © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_4

71

72

S. K. ST. JOHN

growth and high unemployment led to a period of re-nationalisation as member states invested in protecting domestic industries. By the end of the second oil crisis of 1977–1978, European member state economies had lost the ability to rebound from the crisis in the way they had been able to before (Aldcroft 2001). They began to review their economic policy and found benefits in greater convergence between member states. In 1978, the European Monetary System was launched, but the European Community was still feeling the effects of the double economic crisis, and by 1979 fell into a deep recession. Unemployment doubled in five years and Europe was losing its international competitiveness. Rising unemployment, particularly among youth, raised the profile of the European Community’s economic and social action (European Communities 2006). Consequently, a strategic response was sought, based on shortterm and localised measures that focused on training (Field 1998). This propelled education and training up the European agenda. Migration At the time of establishing the European Community, the concept of migration was not a new phenomenon in Europe; military invasion was a primary cause of displacement in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. However, when in 1957 the Treaty of Rome introduced the free movement of people between the member states of the European Community, it brought dramatic changes to the extent and nature of migration taking place in the Community. Migration within and to Europe had greatly increased as a consequence of the economic boom during the 1960s. By 1974, there were more than six million migrant workers in the Community,1 and if the dependents of these migrants are also to be taken into consideration, the number rises to around ten million, accounting for some 45% of the population. The numbers of migrant workers varied between member states, and industrialised areas were notably more concentrated.2 The Commission

1 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU). 2 Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families, COM (74) 2250, 14 December 1974 (European Communities).

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

73

recognised the great difficulties emerging and believed that the European Community had a responsibility to contribute to resolving the problems.3 This escalation of migrant numbers put pressure on member states’ economies, which had to absorb more rapid economic growth as a result. Migrants led to greater flexibility in the system as they meant workers were available in large numbers and often on short-term contracts, but over-concentration in industrialised areas also overloaded the social infrastructure. The majority of migrants were from third countries,4 but as national workers of the member states were able to move around the Community with the same rights as they possessed in their own country, it led to an even greater need to foresee provisions in relation to the obstacles created by the free movement of people. In order for the concept to be successful, there was a need to address economic, regional, industrial and development policies, linked to migration and to not merely focus on the social problems that migration causes for the migrants themselves. To achieve this, it would be necessary to coordinate at Community level national policies linked to migration in order to address especially social and educational measures to improve the conditions of migrants and their families. Workers from member states moving inside the European Community have the right, through Community legislation, to free movement and the equality of treatment regarding employment, social security, living and working conditions, the exercise of trade union rights, the education of children and the right to the accompanied by their families.5 The Council Regulation 16126 of 1968 had already provided for the abolition of discrimination based on nationality with regard to employment, remuneration and other working conditions, which was also stated in article 48(2) of the Treaty of Rome.7 3 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU). 4 Not within the European Community. 5 Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families, COM (74) 2250,

14 December 1974 (European Communities) Migrants of third countries have restricted rights and require work permits and visas from the host country, which are usually on the basis of secured employment. 6 OJ L257 (19 October1968) and L295 (7 December 1968). 7 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities,

doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

74

S. K. ST. JOHN

However, more was to be done if the full equality of treatment between national and Community migrant workers was to be achieved, and if free movement was therefore to be a thriving concept. If workers were to succeed in finding work in other Community member states, it was imperative to accelerate the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other national qualifications, since without it, the free movement of workers would be impeded. Another obstacle faced by migrant workers was access to basic vocational and linguistic training, both before their departure and during their stay in the host country. A lack of such training negatively affects the workers’ ability to find worthwhile employment and to professionally advance once in established employment. Migrant workers needed to have the opportunity to follow adequate language and vocational training programmes during the working day, as well as to have more training opportunities before departure in the country of origin. Vocational training centres needed to be sufficiently equipped to provide migrants with the necessary resources to improve their qualifications, and pilot schemes introduced for the training and exchange of training specialists. Migrant workers also needed sufficient training and support for returning to employment in their home countries, and an increased use of mass media in the cultural, language and vocational training of migrants could be adopted.8 The dependents of working migrants increased the overall number of migrants by at least a third, all of whom also required assistance. Migrants’ children in particular are vulnerable. They are threatened by socio-psychological problems fostered by family disruption following the family’s migration and by the necessity to rapidly adapt to new and different surroundings. They face language barriers in their integration into school and society, which cannot always be improved with help from the parents. Friction arises between native and host cultures, where there is a need to integrate into a new culture without losing touch with the native culture, and the loss of the latter causes family tension. It was necessary to facilitate integration into the life and culture of the host country, while maintaining a hold on the life and culture of the home country. National education legislations made no provision for the children of migrant workers and neither had they made adequate attempts to recruit 8 Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families, COM (74) 2250, 14 December 1974 (European Communities).

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

75

teachers from the countries of origin of migrant children, or organised teacher exchanges to gain knowledge of the home countries, including its culture, language and education system. As a direct consequence of this lack of provision, migrant children seldom furthered their education to secondary or university level, and if the Community were to address this issue, it had to begin in the schools. Efforts were needed to develop the reception of migrant children in member state schools; accelerate training to help them integrate into the new linguistic and educational environment; provide education in school time to preserve the native language and culture; recruit teachers from countries of origin; exchange information and instructional aids; develop assistance extracurricular activities; and treat migrant children equally in the awarding of study grants and similar assistance.9

Education Becoming a Player in Facilitating the European Project Free Movement The Commission of the European Communities highlighted the important role that education had to play in the success of a united Europe. It identified that the success of the European Union would depend upon the enhancement of public understanding and the stimulation of an active interest in developing Europe. This could be achieved by incorporating a European dimension into education across the member states, in particular by developing language learning, knowledge of the other member states and peoples, as well as of the process of European integration. With regard to language learning, the Community stated its special interest in encouraging the exchange of ideas and information between the populations of the Community, which required the diminishment of linguistic barriers. While respecting the diversity of language and cultural traditions of the member states, the Commission believed that all citizens should be granted the opportunity to learn at least one—preferably two—languages other than their mother tongue during their time in

9 Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families, COM (74) 2250, 14 December 1974 (European Communities).

76

S. K. ST. JOHN

education.10 The objective would be for as many people as possible to have the linguistic ability to communicate in one language other than their mother tongue, and to be able to understand a second language. In this respect, the Commission would begin by collecting data on language provision in the member states, stimulating surveys and enquiries where obvious gaps exist in order to develop a Community-wide plan for intensified cooperation and development. It would also sponsor pilot surveys of the languages on offer in the various education systems and the use to which these are put in post-school experience and careers. The Commission would also review the provision of language-learning programmes for television and radio.11 To develop the study of Europe, the Commission had developed a series of activities designed to provide information on the European Community and to encourage teaching and research on the subject. These included the financing of a register for university theses on European integration, the establishment of documentation centres within higher education institutions, awarding prizes and scholarships for theses on aspects of European integration, subscriptions to relevant organisations and the organisation of visits to the European institutions for student and teacher groups.12 Such initiatives required further elaboration from the point of view of scale and scope, including the Commission’s support for initiatives in which the study of Europe and its international relations, are integrated into the curricula. According to the Commission, the educational approach to Europe had to be broadly based, reflecting an awareness of how the European Community fits in the world context, and providing young people with the ability to understand its development and assess its achievements.13 Learning about Europe took various approaches when put into practice. Some were based on language studies and others in different disciplines. The emergence of “European Studies” as a new element to 10 Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on the Education of the European Community, Economic and Social Committee, dossier 71/SOC, doc. CES367/75 fin pk, Brussels, 17 April 1975 (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU). 11 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU). 12 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU). 13 Ibid. (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

77

curricula could be seen, which provided fertile ground for the exchange of ideas and experiences on the alternative curriculum approaches. The Commission proposed that it had a responsibility to stimulate and support the development of such programmes, and would begin by carrying out an analysis on the places where the study of Europe took place within the curricula of member states. It would support the creation of groups of teachers to design and develop experimental curricula projects in the field, and encourage the exchange of ideas and experiences between teachers of different member states. In the long term, it could establish a European network of educational units to focus on discussion, curriculum development and teacher training in the field of European studies. It would also review its publications designed as resource material for teachers. To encourage the exchange of ideas and experience, the Commission also proposed the creation of a pool of fellowships for teachers in secondary and post-secondary schools for the teaching of European Studies as well as languages. It would also support and develop training programmes for teachers in the study field of contemporary Europe.14 Educational Mobility The movement of teachers and students between member states was encouraged by the Commission on two grounds: as an effective way to enlarge the vision and broadening the experience of those who move; and for the acquisition of skills, notably in foreign languages. It viewed teacher and student mobility as not just desirable but essential, and central to the idea that the people of Europe should be increasingly able to consider themselves more as Europeans thanks to a better understanding of the different cultures and customs in other member states. The opportunities for student and staff mobility were greatest in the higher education context, which, in the case of teaching and research, is due to the increased availability of funding and the arrangements made by the higher education institutions for periods of leave. There was already reasonable provision for students and staff within the field of language learning to spend time abroad as part of their programme, but in general

14 Ibid. (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

78

S. K. ST. JOHN

further efforts were required at the level of secondary education as well as exchange programmes for young workers.15 In addition to a lack of linguistic knowledge, the absence of academic recognition of qualifications constituted one of the main barriers to mobility. Other barriers included legal barriers linked to the recruitment of foreign staff, administrative barriers, especially regarding quotas for foreign students at universities, and financial barriers. Article 57 of the Treaty of Rome provided for the mutual recognition of qualifications in order to facilitate the movement of the self-employed. However, there was a necessity to distinguish between the “professional” recognition and “academic” recognition of qualifications. A lack of recognition of the latter created problems for the mobility of students and educational staff, both to travel to another country and to return with a new qualification gained elsewhere.16 Increased Academic Collaboration Recognising the important social role held by universities and higher education institutions in the building of a European Community, the Commission proposed increased collaboration between these institutions. By definition they are international institutions and networks of contacts that are already present in the European Community, which have been intensified by collaborative programmes of study and research. The Commission proposed further examination of how information could be better disseminated and the exchange of experience could be further developed, the best direction for further collaboration and how the Commission can provide the most assistance in this respect. There was also widespread interest in the Community for developing new learning systems, including the Open University development for students who wish to combine part-time study and employment, and would support pilot schemes that aimed to develop non-traditional learning systems.17

15 Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on the Education of the European Community, Economic and Social Committee, dossier 71/SOC, doc. CES367/75 fin pk, Brussels, 17 April 1975 (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU). 16 Ibid. (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU). 17 Ibid. (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

79

In addition to cooperation among institutions of higher education, the Commission also laid emphasis on cooperation between the education systems of the member states, taking into account the diversity of the systems. It was considered that educational standards in the member states could be improved by means of a more systematic exchange of ideas through the mobility of students, staff and administrators. More could be learnt from other educational systems, in particular from the point of view of experimentation and innovation. Cooperation needed to take place with the support of all stakeholders, not just rectors, and be based on common interests and needs.18 The “Janne Report” The provision for vocational training foreseen in the Treaty of Rome opened up the question of education at Community level, but the first Council meeting of the Education Ministers of the six member states did not come until 16 November 1971. Altiero Spinelli was the representative of the Commission.19 In the meeting, the Ministers of Education highlighted the fact that elements of the Treaty of Rome pointed to matters relating to education, paving the way for closer community-level cooperation in the field. The Ministers were unanimous in support for cooperative action to encourage the mobility of teachers, students and research staffs within the Community, as well as to abolish the administrative, social and linguistic barriers. The Commission welcomed the fostering of a greater European consciousness to which such movement of people would contribute.20 On 26 July of the same year, the Council of Ministers adopted a series of general guidelines for vocational training activities at community level, and in July 1972 the Commission also invited the former Belgian Minister

18 Ibid. (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU). 19 Janne, H. (1973). For a Community Policy on Education, Bulletin of the European

Communities, Supplement 10/73. 20 Education in the European Community, Commission of the European Communities, doc. COM(74) 253 final/2, Brussels, 14 March 1974 (CES/1974-20.63.01, HAEU).

80

S. K. ST. JOHN

of Education, Prof. Henri Janne, to complete a report that pinpointed the basic elements of an education policy at Community level.21 To fulfil his task, Prof. Janne coordinated 30 talks with leading figures in a position to give their opinion on the matter. The interviews took place in twelve European cities in eight countries, and Prof. Janne submitted his report in February 1973. The report was not a formal Community policy in itself, but “only one stage in a process which sooner or later must take the form of a Community policy – more or less broad and active – in the field of education”.22 The report began with a brief outline of the activities that had already been executed in the field of education, namely: the setting up of the European University Institute in Florence on 19 April 1972, though with modest beginnings of 40–50 students; a fresh approach attempted by ministers regarding the equivalence of degrees and diplomas, but which was in deadlock; a study by a committee of senior officials on the proposal made by French Minister Guichard regarding the creation of a European Centre for the Development of Education, but which was abandoned; the creation of the European Schools, but which were admitting national and foreign pupils who did not belong to the category of children for whom they were created (children of officials and technicians of European institutions); the creation of a European Community Institute for University Studies under Community patronage with the aid of an international foundation, which was limited in size but had produced some useful studies on the problems of higher education and the exercise of professional activities at university level; and the establishment of the College of Europe in Bruges, but which did not have organic links with the European Community. The report noted that a great step forward had been made, but pragmatically, the developments had little importance, they were slow and were generally developed under intergovernmental conditions. Nevertheless, Janne maintained the belief that there was an “irreversible recognition of an educational dimension of Europe” and an “irreversible initial movement towards an education policy at European Community

21 Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on the Education of the European Community, Economic and Social Committee, dossier 71/SOC, doc. CES367/75 fin pk, Brussels, 17 April 1975 (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU). 22 Janne, H. (1973). For a Community Policy on Education, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 10/73.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

81

level”.23 The report outlined areas it considered to be inseparable from an education policy, namely cultural policy and scientific policy. In the context of the former, it stated that “education cannot be conceived of without fundamental values which alone confer a meaning upon it and define its ultimate aims” and “the system of values, whether it be grasped from the national angle (features of cultural diversity) or from the European angle (features of cultural homogeneity), constitutes the very substance of cultural policy”. For example, with so many intraEuropean exchanges already in existence, it was deemed paradoxical that the Community did not take on their promotion and coordination. As for scientific policy, which began at Community level with nuclear physics in the framework of Euratom, the report highlighted a need for “appropriate bodies to work out and implement a Community research and development policy is making itself felt”. Scientific policy is linked to education policy where it concerns university teaching, specifically the training of research workers and advanced technicians, and in permanent education in the form of refresher courses for supervisory staff, research workers and technicians of industry and the public services.24 The particular aims of a Community education put forward in the report were: the knowledge of languages, where it defined the need for language study, identified the nature of the Community response and the choice of languages to be learnt, considered the optimum age for the study of a second language, and considered a formula for language teaching; mobility, exchanges and cooperation; permanent education; and new educational technologies. Finally, the report explored the possibility of creating a study group on educational affairs. The conclusion emphasised the need to respect national education structures and traditions, but at the same time to promote harmonisation through permanent concerted action at all levels and though increased educational exchanges. It recommended associating non-member European countries with Community initiatives, and concerting member countries’ participation with other international organisations. It advised the creation of an “Educational and Cultural Committee” based on a model of the Economic and Social Committee, and suggested that 23 Janne, H. (1973). For a Community Policy on Education, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 10/73. 24 Janne, H. (1973). For a Community Policy on Education, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 10/73.

82

S. K. ST. JOHN

if member states found common objectives, the idea of a “European Charter of Education” should be considered. In a concluding section on the European dimension to be introduced into education, outlining limits and opportunities, the report powerfully stated: The Europeans’ feeling of political, social and cultural belonging can no longer be exclusively national if a part of the attributes of the nation-state has been tested in the Community: the territory in as far as the frontiers disappear, the transfers of powers of decisions to supranational bodies, the supranational jurisdictions, the right of establishment of foreigners, etc. This being so, is it possible to escape from the idea that education should compromise a European dimension wherever this is possible?25

In response, it added what it described as “two dampening factors”: States’ traditional attachment to the historic nations; and the fear of creating a European nationalism or a new power. With this in mind, an education policy could not be artificial, but based on practices and the organisation of exchanges that are freely developed. Education would be a means to allowing European people to get to know each other better by eradicating prejudices and stereotypes. Broadly speaking, the actions proposed at Community level were to increase knowledge of Europe through teaching practices; to correct history textbooks and cleansing them of national bias; to revise the history curriculum; to use geography to transcend national frontiers and mark diversity in human groups; to develop language teaching and European “civics”; and to examine the creation of an “agency” at Community level to produce didactic equipment. With the aim of developing the knowledge of languages, it was recommended that the Community took stock of the situation and regularly assessed its development; established through research the best age for learning a second language and the most effective methods for training young people, adults and their teachers; stimulated the creation of centres that were well-equipped for language teaching; intensified exchanges between teachers and between the taught, and refresher training courses for teachers; and abolished the nationality criterion for language-teacher recruitment.

25 Janne, H. (1973). For a Community Policy on Education, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 10/73.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

83

In the realm of exchanges, mobility and cooperation, the report recommended: agreements rather than general consortia to coordinate action; that the fields of teaching and research should be linked, with a view of setting up “centres of excellence” and enabling the European University to benefit from the “scale” factor; and the setting up of a University cooperation and exchange service to promote the conclusion of consortia. In permanent education, it proposed systematic stock-taking on the situation of adult education; the generalisation and harmonisation of legislation relating to study holidays and financing; the inclusion of permanent education in cultural agreements; assistance to universities so they can broaden their teaching methods in adult training; the study of European Open University; the progressive internationalisation of retraining methods; and experimentation in creating multinational border districts for adult training.

A Formal Place for Education in the European Commission: The 1970s In January 1973, a month before Janne’s report was presented, a formal decision called for education to be included within the Commission. Education was placed under the responsibility of the Directorate General XII for Research and Science Policy, coordinated by Commissioner Prof. Ralph Dahrendorf. In May 1973, the Commission considered proposals for work in science, research and education, and a scientific and technological programme was adopted on 14 January 1974. In March 1974, the Commission published the communication “Education in the European Community” for the Council.26 The communication devoted attention to a European dimension in education, including the learning of foreign languages the study of Europe, collaboration between institutions of higher education and development of the European schools. It also paid particular attention to mobility in education, namely the free movement of pupils, students, teachers, young research workers, academic staff, and educational and youth administrators, to visit other countries within the

26 Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on the Education of the European Community, Economic and Social Committee, dossier 71/SOC, doc. CES367/75 fin pk, Brussels, 17 April 1975 (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU).

84

S. K. ST. JOHN

European Community, as well as the education of migrant workers’ children.27 This resulted in the publication of the Resolution of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, of 6 June 1974 on cooperation in the field of education, which highlighted the principle that a programme of cooperation in education, while reflecting the progressive harmonisation of economic and social policies, should be adapted to the specific objectives and requirements of education. A further principle reiterated that education could not be regarded only as a component of economic life, that cooperation in education had to accommodate national traditions and diversity among education systems and that harmonisation of education systems or policies cannot be an end in itself. With these principles in mind, the resolution stated the following priority actions: the promotion of closer relations between education systems in Europe; the compilation of up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; increased cooperation between institutions of higher education; improved possibilities for academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; encouragement of the free movement of teachers, students and research workers and the improved teaching of foreign languages; equal opportunity for free access to all forms of education; and better facilities for the education and training of national and the children of nationals of other member states and of non-member countries.28 Already at a conference in Paris in October 1972, Heads of State affirmed that economic expansion was not an end in itself and should also result in the quality of life and standard of living. They attached as much importance to action in the social field as to the achievement of Economic and Monetary Union, and with the wave of transnational migration, the European Community faced a new situation in its working community. Member states began to host increasing numbers of people whose culture, values and languages differed from those of the host member state. The migrant-worker situation in the EU stretched beyond social policy to encompass education as teaching the host country’s language became a priority, since an inadequate good command of the host country’s language created a disadvantage for many migrant workers and their 27 Ibid. (CES/1974-60.23.04, HAEU). 28 Resolution of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, of 6 June 1974

on cooperation in the field of education, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C 98/2, 20 August 1974.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

85

children, hindering their integration. This situation called into question the location of responsibility for ensuring that the children and young people of these migrant families did not lose grip on their own cultures, but also integrated as best possible into the host member state. The question was: did it rest with the host or origin member state, or should it be controlled at supranational level? The Action Programmes In response to the new circumstances faced by member states, the European Community adopted two action programmes covering all migrant workers, both from member states and third countries: The Social Action Programme set out in the Council Resolution of 21 January 1974; and the Education Action Programme endorsed by the Ministers of Education at their meeting on 9 February 1976. Of course, aspects such as the freedom of access to employment and social security were limited to migrant workers of EU member states. Considering that social objectives should be a constant concern of all Community policies, the Social Action Programme’s main objectives were the attainment of full and better employment in the Community, the improvement of living and working conditions, and the increased involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of the Community and of workers in companies.29 It strengthened the role of the European Social Fund, through which the Commission was authorised to provide assistance to set additional expenditures incurred by member states, particularly in the provision of teaching for the children of migrant workers. It also provided financial assistance for the training of those personnel, teachers and social workers engaged in teaching migrant workers’ children. In the Social Action Programme, two key elements can be identified: provision for the improvement of employment for all workers; and provision of an action programme for migrant workers. Within the context of the former, the resolution stated that appropriate consultation between member states on their employment policies would be established and a common vocational training policy would be implemented, with a view to approximating training standards. In particular, a European Vocational Training Centre would be created. There would 29 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C 13/1, 12 February 1974.

86

S. K. ST. JOHN

be a reform of the organisation of work, giving workers wider opportunities to obtain higher qualifications, and greater equality between male and female workers in relation to access to employment and vocational training and advancement and as regards working conditions, including pay.30 As regards the action programme for migrant workers, provision extended to their families. The action programme would improve the conditions of free movement within the Community of workers from the member states, which would include social security and the social infrastructure of the member states to resolve problems of the training of migrant workers and the education of their children. The Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, of 9 February 1976 comprising an action programme in the field of education31 refers to a meeting within the Council on 6 June 1974 on cooperation in the field of education. It recalls the Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning the social action programme and the proposals in favour of migrant workers and their families submitted to the European Commission and on the education of the children of migrant workers. It states that the European Parliament stressed the importance of the Community’s activity in the field of education and that in 1974, the Economic and Social Committee recalled that “education is central to the full and healthy development of the Community”. It reaffirmed the desire to achieve European cooperation in education, understanding the contribution that such cooperation could make to the development of the Community.32 The Resolution provided for the setting up of an Education Committee consisting of representatives of the member states and the Commission. The Chairman of the Education Committee would come from the country holding the office of the President of the Council, and the Committee would be responsible for the implementation of the social action programme, as well as for preparing the proceedings of the Council and of the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council. 30 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a Social Action Programme, Official Journal C 013, 12 February 1974, pp. 0001–0004. 31 Official Journal C 038, 19 February 1976, pp. 0001–0005. 32 Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council

of 9 February 1976 comprising an action programme in the field of education, Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C 38/1, 19 February 1976.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

87

The action programme comprised six main sections: better facilities for the education and training of nationals and the children of nationals of other member states of the Communities and of non-member countries; the promotion of closer relations between educational systems in Europe; the compilation of the up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; cooperation in the field of higher education; the teaching of foreign languages; and the achievement of equal opportunities for free access to all forms of education. The Council and the Ministers of Education stressed the educational dimension of the social action programme. In the first section, they expressed the willingness of the member states to pursue and develop suitable measures to improve reception facilities for the children of migrant workers and to enable them to adapt to the host country’s school system and way of life. A reception system would include intensive study of the language or languages of the host country; provide more opportunities for teaching these children their mother tongue and culture, ideally in collaboration with the country of origin; and provide more information to families on the training and educational opportunities available to them. The Community would foster the exchange of information and experience concerning teaching methods by setting up pilot schemes to compare and assess methods, and foster cooperation in the training of teachers in this context. The Community would carry out educational studies and research on adapted language-teaching methods; the place and importance of the mother tongue and culture in school curricula; existing conditions and provisions for access to education at all levels; language-teaching programmes on radio and television; and the need for the setting up of schools teaching in more than one language. As for the promotion of closer relations between educational systems in Europe, the resolution highlighted a need to improve the mutual understanding of the different education systems in the Community and to ensure the continuous comparison of policies, experiences and ideas. At Community level, regular meetings would be arranged between the people responsible for education policies, and at national level, study visits to other member states would be arranged for local, regional and national administrators of schools and higher education institutions. To strengthen a European dimension in schools, the Community would provide the opportunity for teachers and pupils to participate in short study visits and exchanges and in general, facilitate the mobility of pupils from one educational system to another. There would also be contacts between

88

S. K. ST. JOHN

the authorities of establishments concerned with teacher training, and the development of educational activities with European content. The European Community would study the extension of the practice of recognising periods of study abroad; the possibility of enabling teachers to practise their profession in another member state; and the setting up of European or international-type establishments following specific curricula and using several teaching languages. It also proposed that a standard school-record card could be introduced to facilitate the mobility of pupils the educational system of one member state to another. In the context of providing up-to-date documentation and statistics on teaching, the Community’s role would be set up an information network. It would provide support and advice by promoting a mutual understanding of the educational systems of the Community and information handbooks for pupils and students would be drawn up. In the field of higher education, the resolution proposed the promotion of cooperation in higher education, and while respecting the autonomy of higher education institutions the Community would seek to facilitate better contacts between higher education institutions, to encourage short study visits and joint programmes. It would promote the free movement of teaching staff, students and researchers, and would establish whether periods spent abroad could be taken into account when calculating teaching and research staff’s seniority. It would also draw up a report to establish whether national schemes for scholarships, fellowships and studentships could be extended to increase mobility within the European Community. The Community would promote discussion on the possibility of a common admissions policy as well as for the academic recognition of diplomas and study periods carried out. In this context, it would draw up a report to analyse the status quo of academic qualification recognition and make proposals for improvement, developing a network of agreements if necessary, and it would organise consultations between those responsible for education policy and cooperation between higher education institutions to facilitate the recognition of periods of study carried out. As regards the teaching of foreign languages, the aim was to ensure that the greatest possible number of students learn the languages of the Community by offering all pupils the opportunity to learn at least one other Community language. The Resolution proposed the principle that foreign-language teachers practising within the European Community should have spent a period in a country or region where the language

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

89

they teach is spoken. It also proposed the promotion of language teaching outside of the school system, such as on the radio and television. In particular, this would be implemented to meet the vocational training requirements of adults. In the field of language learning, the Community would organise consultations between those responsible for language teaching and specialised researchers in the field, and examine the results of research into language-teaching methodology. The member states would organise regular extended periods abroad for teachers and encourage the exchange system for foreign language assistants, and encourage exchanges of individual pupils or groups of pupils. Finally, an aim of the educational policies of all member states would be to achieve equal opportunity for free access to all forms of education, and its importance in conjunction with other economic and social policies. Priority matters laid out at Community level were measures to be taken in the field of education to prepare young people for work, to facilitate their transition from study to working life and to increase their chances of finding employment, and the provision of further education to enable young workers and young unemployed persons to improve their chances of finding employment. In March 1975, a joint working party was set up between the Directorate Generals XII (research, science and education) and V (social affairs), in order to explore the possibilities of closer cooperation between education and vocational training. The working party met three times— in Copenhagen in October 1975, in London in December 1975 and in Dublin in May 1976—and agreed that guidance in vocational training should be provided throughout a worker’s entire professional life and not only at the beginning. There was a clear link between education and vocational training, in particular under the Education Action Programme, with teacher and pupil exchanges and the mobility of workers.

The 1980s: Overcoming Recession The recession of the 1970s led to a review of the plan to develop the common market into a true internal market (European Commission 1990), which resulted in the Single Market project outlined in the European Commission’s White Paper, championed by Jacques Delors (European Commission 1985). Revitalising the objectives of the Treaty of Rome, the White Paper outlined 270 precise measures to achieve a true common internal market, which once implemented would guarantee

90

S. K. ST. JOHN

the four freedoms of goods, services, capital and persons (Staab 2011). In order to increase productivity and growth, the single market aimed to remove the “physical technical monetary barriers”, which “thus expected to boost trade and financial integration among participant countries and to generate a virtuous cycle of one market-one money-one market” (Buti et al. 2010). The beginning of the 1980s witnessed a slow-moving labour market, but rapid technological development, which required a well-trained dynamic workforce. This, coupled with pressure for the common internal market, especially the promotion of the movement of persons and services, provided fertile ground for increased activities in the area of education. It can be said that the development of the ERASMUS programme, which is perhaps the Community’s greatest success story in education, benefitted from such circumstances. However, two legal cases also provided pivotal moments in increasing the Community’s influence in education: Casagrande 33 and Gavier.34 Legal Cases that Changed the Course of Education at European Level The case brought forward in 1974 by Donato Casagrande against the Landeshauptstadt München had already placed education issues in the European Court of Justice. Linked to provisions outlined in the Social Action Programme, the court ruled that “children of a national of a member state who is or has been employed in the territory of another member state shall be admitted to educational courses under the same conditions as the nationals of the host state”. This refers “not only to rules relating to admission, but also to general measures intended to facilitate educational attendance”. This provided a precedence in the court for the next case: Gravier.

33 Judgment of the Court of 3 July 1974. Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Verwaltungsgericht München - Germany. Case 9-74. European Court Reports 1974-00773. 34 Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1985. Françoise Gravier v City of Liège. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de première instance de Liège - Belgium. Non-discrimination - Access to vocational training. Case 293/83. European Court Reports 1985-00593.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

91

In 1985, the French student François Gravier wanted to study cartoon animation at a non-university institution in Liège, Belgium. The institution recognised Gravier as a foreign student and thus applied foreign student fees and rules. Based on discrimination, Gravier put forward his case and requested exemption. This was refused and the case went to court, then to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), where it was ruled that all students should be able to undertake vocational training in other member states under the same rules as nationals (European Communities 2006). The court had widely interpreted the concept of the common policy on vocational training in the European Community, which also later included higher education. In 1988, the ECJ decided to include Higher Education in the term vocational training after the Blaizot case35 in which Blaizot had requested his enrolment fees, paid in 1985, were reimbursed by the university following the ruling of the Gravier case. The Erasmus Programme Linking free movement with vocational training and higher education, as later ruled in Blaizot, the Gravier case can be recognised as the first stepping-stone to the creation of the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, commonly known as the Erasmus programme. In January 1985, Delors took office as President of the European Commission. Peter Sutherland was appointed as Commissioner for competition, and he wanted to ensure that education was in line with Delors’s new Community strategy for the single market (Corbett 2006). When the Gravier case came up in February 1985, it gave impetus to Sutherland’s work on the Erasmus programme, especially after a period of stagnation in education activities in the early 1980s. By June 1985, the political climate was much more favourable to measures close to the citizens. In particular, the European Council of Milan had in March approved the Adonnino Report on the “People’s Europe”, which highlighted the role of Education and Culture in general, 35 Judgment of the Court of 2 February 1988. Vincent Blaizot v University of Liège and others. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de première instance de Liège - Belgium. Non-discrimination—Access to university education—Repayment of fees improperly charged. Case 24/86. European Court Reports 1988-00379.

92

S. K. ST. JOHN

and notably in a second report in June 1985 it highlighted cooperation between universities and student exchange programmes. The Commission’s proposal for the Erasmus programme was hence developed, but discussions on the proposal ran into difficulties on the specificities of student mobility for fears of influxes of students and in the practicalities of integrating foreign students into university life on an unprecedented scale. The European Commission eventually withdrew the proposal at the end of 1986. Eighteen months of negotiations followed to reach an agreement on basis of Treaty articles 128 and 235. While this allowed the programme to go ahead, it did not obtain the budget it had originally hoped for to facilitate the mobility of 10% of students (European Communities 2006). The aims of the Erasmus programme were to promote greater mobility among students and staff, to support inter-university curriculum projects and encourage the wider mutual recognition of academic qualifications. Despite a lower budget than planned, it was by far the European Community’s largest action programme, representing one of the most important steps in the development of the Community’s competence in education and training (Field 1998). In addition, the programme activated initiatives in connecting areas that were necessary for Erasmus’s success, including the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) to ensure recognition for studies completed abroad. The Erasmus Programme formed a flagship programme, both from a financial perspective and for the attention it attracted, becoming a model for further programmes for promoting education and training (Field 1998).

Launching New Education and Training Action Programmes During the period 1986–1991, the European Commission launched a series of other action programmes in addition to the Erasmus programme. These were: Comett (a university-enterprise cooperation for Technology); FORCE and Eurotecnet (for continuing vocational training); Lingua (for languages in Europe); PETRA and “Youth for Europe” (Initial training for young people and youth exchanges); Tempus (university cooperation with the countries of central and eastern Europe). The programmes focused on education and training, mainly higher education and mobility, and aimed to “change the scale of cooperation and its potential penetration in the different member states” (European Commission 1988). They were built with an economic purpose to provide the necessary human

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

93

resources to ensure the potential of the internal market was exploited, and a sociocultural purpose to bring Europe closer to its citizens and give the Community the human face it lacked (European Communities 2006). Comett is the Community Programme in Education and Training for Technologies and was adopted on 24 July 1986. It was the first education programme and emerged from the Commission’s communication of January 1984 on technological and social change. It brought together universities and industry, particularly SMEs, to train students on new technologies to develop highly qualified human resources, mainly through work placements, thus maintaining a high level of competitiveness in European industry. A second programme was later adopted on 16 December 1988. The PETRA programme aimed to prioritise initial training for young people and was adopted on 1 December 1987 and implemented from 1988–1992. In a bid to battle youth unemployment, the programme addressed the transition from school to work, which is an important milestone in a young person’s life and thus requires active policies (European Communities 2006). Promoting mobility in other member states, it provided young people with the opportunity to carry out one to two years of vocational training in addition to their compulsory schooling. In 1995, PETRA was incorporated into a new vocational training programme: the Leonardo Da Vinci Programme. Recognising that if increased mobility was to take place it had to be accompanied by language skills, Lingua was created to promote the teaching of foreign languages. In 1984, education ministers agreed that while linguistic pluralism was needed for preserving European culture, “knowledge of foreign languages is a key element of European construction”.36 The Lingua programme was adopted on 28 July 1989, but it was not smooth due to the sensitivity surrounding the connection between language and national identity, so some member states opposed, particularly if it was to be extended to secondary education. In the end, the programme was opened for young people in vocational training, linked to articles 128 and 235 of the treaty, and it was not integrated into compulsory schooling (European Communities 2006). FORCE and Eurotecnet promoted continuing vocational training. In the context of the need to upskill the European workforce, these two 36 Conclusions of the Council and of the education ministers meeting within the Council of 4 June 1984 on the teaching of languages in European Communities (2006).

94

S. K. ST. JOHN

programmes aimed to encourage investment in continuing vocational training, especially in SMEs. Eurotecnet was created on 18 December 1989 to promote innovation in vocational training, and FORCE was adopted on 29 May 1990 and set about to renew qualifications and targeted in particular areas in which continuing training was difficult to obtain. In addition, the programme IRIS, which was the European network of projects of vocational training for women, ran from 1988 to 1993. Tempus was adopted on 7 May 1990 to support the process of reforming higher education in the European Union’s partner countries. The programme was developed against a backdrop of the Commission’s Phare Programme Action plan for coordinated aid to Poland and Hungary,37 a response to major political changes following the fall of the Berlin Wall, which included the training and development of human resources. The Strasbourg European Council of December 1989 had made provisions for education and training programmes to be accessible to nationals of the new countries, as well as the creation of a European Foundational for Vocational Training (European Communities 2006). The Tempus programme started as a tailored programme for the needs of these countries and sought to reform higher education systems. It aimed to develop joint curricula in priority subjects and encourage structured cooperation, such as cooperation within the framework of joint European projects, and with individual mobility grants for academic and administrative staff (Absalom 1993). Finally, “Youth for Europe” was adopted on 16 June 1988 as an ambitious youth exchange programme that aimed to develop a sense of European awareness and solidarity,38 and later in a second phase, it intensified cooperation between youth structures and transnational cooperation on the training of youth workers.

37 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the Republic of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic (OJ L 375, 23 December 1989). 38 Council decision of 16 June 1988 adopting an action programme for the promotion of youth exchanges in the Community—“Youth for Europe” (OJ 158, 25 June 1988).

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

95

Resolutions on the European Dimension in Education (24 May 1988) The “People’s Europe” (Adonnino) report of 1985 stated that teaching about the European dimension is part and parcel of the education of future citizens, and thus outlined the importance of initiatives in foreign languages, study visits and class exchanges, school curricula and teacher training and cooperation between teacher training institutions. In the framework of the European Union’s “Europe Day” on 9 May in recognition of the Schuman declaration, “Europe Days” were promoted in schools to raise awareness of the European Union. The Adonnino report led to a resolution of the European Parliament on the European dimension at school, adopted on 20 November 1987, and then to a resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council on 24 May 1988.39 The resolution considered the “enhanced treatment of the European dimension in education to be an element contributing to the development of the Community and achievement of the objective of creating a unified internal market by 1992”. It therefore stated the objective to “strengthen the European dimension in education by launching a series of concerted measures for the period 1988-1992”. This would strengthen a sense of European identity in young people, and an understanding of the value of European civilisation as well as safeguard the principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights, as outlined in the Copenhagen Declaration of 1978. Realising the objective would prepare young people to participate in the economic and social development of the Community, and raise awareness around the advantages of the European Community as well as its challenges in opening up an enlarged economic area. Finally, it would improve young people’s knowledge of the historical, cultural, economic and social aspects of the European Union in order to understand the significance of cooperation between its member states and with the world. To realise the objective, the resolution set out nineteen actions. At the level of the member states, these were in the areas of: incorporation of the European dimension in educational systems; school programmes and teaching; teacher training; measures to boost contacts between pupils 39 Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council of 24 May 1988—The European dimension in education (OJ C 177, 6 July 1988).

96

S. K. ST. JOHN

and teachers from different countries; and complementary measures by organising particular events to strengthen the image of Europe, such as “Europe Day” in schools. At Community level, actions were stated in the areas of: information exchange; preparation of teaching material; teacher training, including teacher mobility and specialist training; and additional measures to encourage cooperation and exchange of views among national bodies responsible for exchanges of pupils and teachers, the participation of NGOs, cooperation between educational research institutes, and the role of sport. Finally, a working party would be created to implement these tasks. The resolution provided a springboard for a series of pilot actions, and two reports on the implementation of the resolution were produced in 1991 and 1993.

The 1990s: Maastricht Treaty and a European Dimension in Education The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) shaped a legal context for education within the European Community, enshrined in article 126, which states that “The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between member states…” and that: Community action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the member states; encouraging the mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; promoting cooperation between educational establishments; developing exchanges of information and of experience on issues common to the education systems of member states; encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors; and encouraging the development of distance learning. (European Communities 1992)

The Treaty introduced the new context of a single market, which brought about changes in the need for human resources in the light of social and technological changes. Education aimed to prepare young people to exercise their responsibilities in a wider social and economic area. It was seen as an important factor in the adjustment of the educational process to the

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

97

new economic, social and cultural environment (European Community 1993). The 1993 Green Paper on the European dimension of education aimed to stimulate discussions on the possibilities offered by article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty. Given education’s new place in the Treaty, the paper provided a basis considering the possible future directions of action at Community level in the field of education. For the first time, a legal framework existed for cooperative actions in education, and in particular at school level. It also included contributions to education in the form of sandwich courses and company-based training, with an emphasis on enabling young people to be better equipped to participate as both citizens and as workers. General objectives for schools included a contribution towards equal opportunities, giving young people a sense of responsibility in society, and to act autonomously with a sense of judgement and to adapt to innovation. Young people would be enabled to achieve their full potential in their working lives and personal development, especially through lifelong learning, and they would be given the training needed to facilitate a smooth transition to working life. In addition, the Green Paper identified the added value of Community action in the sphere of education as the contribution to a European citizenship based on the shared values of interdependence, democracy, equality of opportunity and mutual respect. Contributing to a European citizenship also meant respecting different cultural and ethnic identities, which could be achieved through language learning and working on transnational projects that acquire knowledge of other countries, through socialisation in the European context, and encouraging a better understanding of Europe. To offer opportunities for improving the quality of education, the Green Paper outlines Community actions for developing transnational partnerships involving closer relationships between schools and the worlds of business, local authorities and non-governmental organisations. It promoted transnational cooperation networks for a better relationship between general education and initial vocational training. Partnership initiatives include mobility and exchanges, teacher training, language teaching, distance learning through multimedia systems, innovation in teaching, information and experience exchange and using the experience of the European Schools.

98

S. K. ST. JOHN

The 1995 White Paper on Education and Training; Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society In November 1995, the European Commission issued a White Paper addressing teaching and learning in the European Community. It took as a starting point Delors’s 1992 White Paper on growth, competitive and employment, which had stressed the Community’s investment in education and research for more employment-intensive growth. The 1995 White Paper was designed to put forward guidelines for action in education and training, and intended to launch in 1996 the European Year of Lifelong Learning. The Paper recognised the need to build on the progress made as a consequence of closer economic ties by investing more substantially in knowledge and skills. The internationalisation of trade, the global context of technology, and the arrival of the information society have all increased citizens’ access to information and knowledge. At the same time, they have changed the way that citizens’ carry out their jobs and the kinds of skills they require to do so. This latter consideration has increased unemployment where individuals no longer have the skills they require, and it has created social exclusion where individuals do not have access to opportunities for upgrading or acquiring those skills. If Europe is to continue to be a reference point in the world, it would depend on its ability to manage the transitional phase towards this new society beyond short-term forecasts. The first step was to create a broad knowledge base, by stimulating its citizens across all areas of society to want to constantly learn and renew their skills, and by ensuring their constant access to the tools that will allow them to do so. Secondly, it would build up abilities for employment and economic life. The Paper is careful to point out that its guidelines aim to support and supplement the education and training policies of the member states, and not to impose rules but rather a broad basis to identify points of convergence to face the abovementioned challenges. It recognises that education and training has always maintained a purpose for developing individuals on a personal level, and in the context of European integration, to foster a set of common values, pass on cultural heritage and teach self-resilience. However, this social integration function for education is under treat if it is not accompanied by a prospect of employment. It states that “the very foundations of any European society purporting to teach its children the

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

99

principles of citizenship would be undermined if this teaching were to fail to provide for job prospects”. The main lines of action at Community level to begin in 1996 were the objectives to: encourage the acquisition of new knowledge; bring school and the business sector closer together; combat exclusion; develop proficiency in three European languages; and to treat capital investment and investment in training on an equal basis. The Paper proposes the acquisition of new knowledge with actions in the areas of recognising and identifying key skills, by creating a European system to compare and disseminate the skills definitions, methods and practices. It proposes developments to student mobility and working on the legal, administrative and social protection implications, and the development of a multimedia educational software. To bring schools and the business sector closer together, the Paper proposes measures in the areas of apprenticeships and trainee schemes, and vocational training. To address exclusion, it indicated that measures will be taken to allow young people excluded from the system a second chance at education, and the creation of a European voluntary service for young people to be able to engage in an activity to serve the common good. On proficiency in three community languages, the Paper outlines aims to promote the learning of at least two Community languages by all young people, to encourage innovative MFL-teaching methods, to spread the daily use of languages in schools across all levels, and to foster a language awareness in early learning. Finally, to treat capital investment and investment in training on an equal basis, proposals are made in the areas of promoting training as an investment rather than as operating expenditure, encouraging individuals to invest in their own training along “training fund” lines, fostering cooperation between national systems from an accounting and fiscal approach to training expenditure, and bringing fiscal and accounting approaches to intangible investment closer together.

The 2000–2010; the Lisbon Strategy At the turn of the new decade, the Portuguese Presidency of the Union held the European Council of March 2000 in Lisbon, where it designed a new economic, social and environmental strategy for the Union. It aimed to reactivate Community cooperation in employment, economic reform and social solidarity to face the challenges brought about by globalisation and by a new knowledge-based economy (European Communities

100

S. K. ST. JOHN

2006). The European Council set the objective for 2010 “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000). To achieve this objective, it was recognised in Lisbon that great expectations were placed on the education and training systems, especially in terms of modernisation. In the field of education and training, the Lisbon Treaty aimed to develop schools and training centres into multipurpose local learning centres accessible to all, operating in partnership with firms and research facilities; to adopt a European framework for Lifelong Learning; to introduce a European diploma for basic ICT skills; and to devise a common format for CVs. Its overarching aims in education and training were to prepare the transition into a knowledge-based economy, and to modernise the European social model by investing in people and building an active welfare state. The Lisbon Treaty had three strategic goals and thirteen common concrete objectives. To make education systems more effective and improve their quality, the Union intended to: improve teacher training; develop key competences; provide access to ICT for all; increase the number of graduates in science and technology; and to make best use of resources. To make education systems more accessible, it intended to: create an open learning environment; make education and training more attractive; and foster active citizenship, equal opportunities and social cohesion. Finally, the Union aimed to make systems more open by: strengthening links with the world of work, research and society; developing the spirit of enterprise; improving foreign language learning; increasing mobility and exchanges; and strengthening European cooperation. As greater coherence in education and training policy cooperation began to develop, the European Council of February 2002 introduced the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC was designed to assist member states in formulating their own policies, based on jointly identifying and defining shared objectives at European level for measuring and comparing cooperation with the aim of contributing to the mutual improvement of systems through good practice, peer review and pilot projects (European Commission 2006). The difference between the OMC and previous means of advancing policy in education is considered to be down to the fact that progress towards shared objectives is monitored (European Communities 2006). The element of peer review is also

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

101

an advantage over former means of collaboration. In fact, in 2005, the Commission implemented a “peer learning activities” programme in 2005 to provide more assistance to member states in their search for common priorities. These priorities included teacher training, adult participation in lifelong learning, information and communication technologies and more efficient investment. Based on these priorities, the Commission set up nine working groups in 2001, including a standing group on indicators and benchmarks (SGIB) to advise on how to use and develop reliable and relevant indicators. The recommendations of the working groups led to a communication from the Commission of November 2003 entitled “Education and Training 2010: The success of the Lisbon strategy hinges on urgent reforms”, which encouraged member states to speed up reform and intensify their commitment towards shared objectives. The communication highlighted some key areas in which reform was an absolute necessity if the European Union were to achieve its objectives in Education and Training. The reforms required included: higher participation of and more strategic promotion for adults in lifelong learning; greater investment in European higher education; increasing the attractiveness of vocational education and training; increasing mobility in education; reducing the number of early school leavers; increasing the level of reading literacy; addressing the shortage of qualified teachers and trainers; and closing the gap between human resource investment in other countries such as the US and in the EU. The communication provided a basis for the first joint Council and Commission interim report on the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in Education and Training, requested by the Barcelona European Council in February 2004 for the Brussels spring European Council in March (European Communities 2006). It set out a schedule for action on the various reforms and outlined a more structured and systematic monitoring of progress, which included a yearly submission by member states on their action in education and training. The report highlighted the need for greater commitment at the national level as an implementation deficit, the gap between the strategy designed at Community level and the implementation at national level, was hampering progress in education and training. In response, and following the arrival of the Commission’s new President José Manuel Barroso who added impetus to the strategy, the spring European Council asked the Commission to set up a high-level group

102

S. K. ST. JOHN

of independent experts (known as the “Kok Group” after its chairman Wim Kok) to prepare for the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy. The report stressed important challenges that were still being faced by the Union, such as international competition from outside the EU (US and Asia), an ageing population, and the potential for EU enlargement. Even though the report suggested that the Lisbon Strategy was the best response to such challenges, a lack of political commitment was jeopardising its success. It called for strengthened OMC, in particular the peer pressure element to coordination, noting that “peer pressure and benchmarking are clear incentives for member states to deliver on their commitments”.

The 2010–2020; Europe 2020 Strategy Since widespread access to quality education and training is considered to be a driver of economic growth, social cohesion, research and innovation, and of citizens’ personal development, education and training is declared to be of paramount importance to the EU (European Commission website) and features prominently in the EU’s last ten-year strategy, the Europe 2020 Strategy, as well as the European Semester for the coordination of the EU’s economic policies. However, even in this most recent decade, responsibility for education and training systems within the EU still lies with the member states, and the role of the EU is to “support and supplement their action”. The EU currently foresees this support through the “Education and Training 2020 (ET2020)” framework, which provides a platform for policy cooperation and funding the field of education and training, for example through the Erasmus+ Programme and the European Structural and Investment Funds. Based on the lifelong learning approach covering early childhood education to adult vocational education and higher education—formal, non-formal and informal—the ET2020 seeks to provide opportunities to build best practices in education policy, to gather and disseminate knowledge and to advance educational policy reforms at the national and regional levels (European Commission, ET2020). The ET2020 supports four common objectives: to make lifelong learning and mobility a reality; to improve the quality and efficiency of education and training; to promote equality, social cohesion and active citizenship; and to enhance creativity and innovation, including

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

103

entrepreneurship at all levels of education and training.40 It also provides a series of benchmarks, suggesting that by 2020, 95% of children should participate in early childhood education, and no more than 15% of fifteenyear olds should be under-skilled in reading, maths and science. It aims for early leavers from education and training, aged 18–24, to be below 10% and at least 40% of 30–34 year olds should have completed some form of higher education. At least 15% of adults should participate in learning, and at least 20% of higher education graduates should have spent a period of study or of their life abroad, as well as 6% of 18–34 year olds with an initial vocational training qualification. Finally, employed graduates aged 20–34 with at least upper secondary education and having left between one and three years ago should be at least 82%. The ET2020 objectives are implemented in several ways. Working groups have been established, composed of experts that are nominated by the member states and stakeholders, and which have assisted in producing common reference tools and approaches. There are also a series of peer initiatives. Peer Learning Activities (PLA) are hosted by member states to present cases of good practice, and a group of member states can also provide guidance to another on a specific national challenge in a peer review or through peer counselling. The Education and Training Monitor has also been created to ensure that member states are supported in attaining the objectives and benchmarks by a comprehensive annual evaluation of member states’ education and training systems. The evaluation then contributes to the wider evaluation of member states’ socio-economic progress in the framework of the European Semester. Finally, there are consultation and cooperation activities with stakeholders, such as the European Education Summit and the Education, Training and Youth Forum, as well as funding for policy support initiatives through the Erasmus+ Programme. More formalised areas of policy have developed in recent years to now include early childhood education, schools, and innovation in education, alongside the long-standing areas of interest for the Community: vocational education and training; adult learning; higher education; international cooperation; and multilingualism. In schools policy, the Erasmus+ Programme provides for the mobility of teachers and pupils and promotes actions to improve the quality and inclusiveness of school 40 ET 2020 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ae f0016. E&T website: https://ec.europa.eu/education/node_en.

104

S. K. ST. JOHN

education, teacher and school leader competencies and school governance. In the area of innovation in education, there is an emphasis on university and business cooperation and the work of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT). EU higher education policy has intensified to emphasise further mobility and cooperation, and an endeavour to develop effective and efficient higher education that is inclusive and connected, with particular attention to European higher education systems’ positioning in the global context. Most notably, the EU launched a European Universities Initiative following the 2017 Gothenburg Summit, where it identified that the education landscape across Europe is changing and the EU had to therefore adapt accordingly. In the Summit’s conclusions in December 2017, the European Council called on member states, the Council and the Commission to advance with a number of initiatives including: Strengthening strategic partnerships across the EU between HEIs and encouraging the emergence by 2024 of some 20 ‘European Universities’, consisting in bottom-up networks of universities across the EU which will enable students to obtain a degree by combining studies in several EU countries and contribute to the international competitiveness of European Universities.41

The European Universities envisaged are transnational alliances that the EU anticipates will become the universities of the future by promoting European values and identity, and by revolutionising the quality and competitiveness of European higher education. The Commission launched two calls for proposal in 2019 and 2020 under the Erasmus+ Programme, outlining that the alliances proposed should include all types of higher education institutions broadly spanning the EU, and be based on a long-term strategy focused on sustainability, excellence and European values. They should offer student-centred curricula that is jointly delivered across inter-university campuses, and adopt a challenge-based approach whereby students, academics and external partners cooperate in interdisciplinary teams to find solutions to Europe’s current challenges. The first call yielded 54 applications, of which seventeen were chosen involving 114 HEIs from 24 member states. These first seventeen 41 European Council meeting (14 December 2017)—Conclusions.

4

DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY LEVEL …

105

alliances42 will test different models for the concept of European Universities and examine its potential to transform higher education. The Initiative will be fully implemented and developed further under the Erasmus+ Programme of 2021–2027.

Bibliography Absalom, R. (1993). The TEMPUS Scheme: Mobilizing Higher Education for Change in Central and Eastern Europe. Innovations in Education and Training International, 30(2), 122–128. Aldcroft, D. H. (2001). The European Economy 1914–2000 (4th ed.). London: Routledge. Buti, M., Deroose, S., Gaspar, V., & Nogueira Martins, J. (2010). The Euro: The First Decade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cairns, D. (2017). The Erasmus Undergraduate Exchange Programme: A Highly Qualified Success Story? Children’s Geographies, 15(6), 728–740. Corbett, A. (2006). Higher Education as a form of European Integration: How Novel Is the Bologna Process? (ARENA Centre for European Studies, Working Paper No. 15/2006). University of Olso. de Ruiter, R. (2010). Variations on a Theme: Governing the Knowledge-Based Society in the EU Through Methods of Open Coordination in Education and R&D. Journal of European Integration, 32(2), 157–173. European Commission. (1985, June 28–29). Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan) (COM(85) 310). European Commission. (1988, May 18). Education and Training in the European Community—Medium-Term Perspectives: 1989–92 (COM(88) 280).

42 (1) ECIU—pan-European University; (2) CIVIS—a European Civic University; (3) ARQUIS—longstanding comprehensive research universities; (4) CHARM-EU— promoting common European values in their diversity of the European tradition; (5) EPICUR—A Europe for the future: mobile students; (6) UNA Europa—creating a truly European inter-university environment; (7) EU-CONEXUS—a European University for Smart Urban Coastal Sustainability; (8) FORTHEM—multidisciplinary public research universities situated outside capital regions; (9) UNITE!—University Network for Innovation, Technology and Engineering; (10) EU4ART—devoted to fine arts; (11) YUFE—Young universities for the Future of Europe; (12) CIVICA—the European University of Social Sciences; (13) 4EUPLUS—public institutions embedded in their local territories and share European values; (14) EUTOPIA—challenge-led, studentcentred, place-based inclusive alliance of entrepreneurial, change-focused universities; (15) SEA_EU—European Universities of the Seas; (16) EUGLOH—Global Health; (17) EDUC—European Digital Universities.

106

S. K. ST. JOHN

European Commission. (1990). European Unification: The Origins and Growth of the European Community (3rd ed.). Luxembourg: Office of the Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission. (1993, November 17). Green Paper on European Social Policy Options for the Union (COM(93) 551). European Commission. (1995, November 29). White Paper on Education and Training; Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society (COM(95) 590). European Commission. (2003, November 11). Education and Training 2010: The Success of the Lisbon Strategy Hinges on Urgent Reforms (COM(2003) 685). European Communities. (1992, July 29). Treaty of European Union. Official Journal of the European Communities (C 191/1), Brussels. European Communities. (2006). The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe in the Making—An Example. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Council. (2000, March 23–24). Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council. Field, J. (1998). European Dimensions: Education, Training and the European Union. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Jacobone, V. (2015). Evaluating the Impact of the Erasmus Programme: Skills and European Identity. Edizioni Accademiche Italiane (Italy). Pépin, L. (2006). The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe in the Making—An Example. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Pépin, L. (2007). The History of EU Cooperation in the Field of Education and Training: How Lifelong Learning Became a Strategic Objective. European Journal of Education, 42(1), 121–132. Souto-Ortero, M., Fleckenstein, T., & Dacombe, R. (2008). Filling the Gaps: European Governance, the Open Method of Coordination and the European Commission. Journal of Education Policy, 23(3), 231–249. Stabb, A. (2011). European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact. Indiana University Press. Wielemans, R. (1991). Erasmus assessing ERASMUS. Comparative Education, 27 (2), 165–180. Wood, D., & Yesilada, B. (1996). The Emerging European Union. New York: Longman.

CHAPTER 5

An Intellectual Hub for Europe: The College of Europe and the European University

A European University: The Birth of an Idea to Create a European People In 1927, Salvador De Madariaga1 had stated that Europe would fail if it did not succeed in creating European nationalism. For him, it would be the task of the elite to foster such nationalism, not through their thought, but by making their souls European. Two decades and another World War later, De Madariaga kept this idea in mind when he became President of the Cultural Section of the European Movement and advocated for the creation of a European University. The seed of the idea for a European University was sown at The Hague Congress in 1948. At this point, the project was only touched upon, but it was presented more concretely at the meeting of the cultural section of the European Movement in London on 4–5 January 1949. The original proposal came from Jean-Paul de Dadelsen,2 who suggested teaching universal disciplines in a European context, rather than creating nonexistent disciplines such as “European physics”. de Dadelsen’s idea was for teaching to take place initially as a series of lectures, which could then 1 A Spanish diplomat and minister who left Spain when General Franco came to power and lived in Oxford as a writer and professor of history. In 1948, he became President of the Cultural Section of the European Movement. 2 Jean-Paul de Dadelsen (1913–1957) was a French poet and journalist.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_5

107

108

S. K. ST. JOHN

be developed into a fully functioning university campus. The possibility of creating specialised European universities in several cities was discussed, but left for a later date. Opinions were divided on the idea of an established university. The minority Federalists supported the single European university, while others saw the European University project as a slow and costly process. Focusing on the promotion of European education in existing institutions, an alternative proposal at the meeting recommended the creation of Chairs in national universities in Europe, and the possibility for students to spend a period of study at university elsewhere in Europe. A further step was made at the Inter-University Federalist Union congress in April 1949, which called for the creation of a European University conferring diplomas that would be recognised across Europe. A year later, the French delegation to the Council of Europe presented a European University project that aimed to provide additional training to graduates of existing European universities on the questions surrounding the European idea, as well as knowledge of European services and organisations. Unfortunately, the proposal was not pursued. As the European institutions required sufficiently trained staff for combined research that went beyond the capabilities of a single state, an agreement was reached to establish a specialist centre or university institute for European education. This would also satisfy the requirement for new positions in the European institutions, and specific scientific analysis on the process of European integration itself. De Madariaga had originally proposed the creation of a European University in Bruges. But realising the extent of the project, the Executive Committee of the Cultural Section of the European Movement settled for the more realistic and feasible project in the form of a College of Europe (Bekemans et al. 1999), for which De Madariaga became the first President of the Administrative Council. The institution was established with the idea that it could act as a pilot institution for a more comprehensive European university in the future.

Setting Up the College of Europe The city of Bruges, which in 1948 had proposed its candidacy to host the European Cultural Centre, had agreed to offer financial assistance to the College as well as to make buildings available. During the London meeting in January 1949, Bruges was already mentioned as a possible

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

109

location for a European University (Bekemans et al. 1999). On 19 January 1949, De Madariaga visited the city with Julius Hoste3 to meet with the mayor, Victor van Hoestenberghe (Vermuelen 2000) as well as with the Governor of the West Flanders province, P. van Outryre d’Ydewalle. Bruges was a small city without a university, but which was at the time considered to be typically European and thus provided a suitable setting for the College. Bruges’s administrative language was Dutch, which was not a dominant language on the European scene, and this avoided the risk of it dominating the life of the College. In addition, Bruges’s lack of university tradition paved the way for innovative enterprise in the university domain. Therefore, for De Madariaga, the city offered an appropriate place for students of different nationalities, languages and backgrounds to unite and develop a spirit of European solidarity (Bekemans et al. 1999). There were other candidate cities to host an institute of postgraduate study, so the authorities in Bruges realised the need to move quickly if the city was to be secured as the location of the College of Europe. In this regard, De Madariaga’s veneration for Bruges was positive for the city’s candidacy. In an initial stage of the College’s creation, a three-week preparatory session was organised from 20 September until 10 October 1949, acting as a pilot programme to define the direction the future programme would adopt. It aimed to host 25 postgraduate students from all countries of Europe.4 A report concluded the preparatory session and the first official academic year at the College of Europe began on 12 October 1950 with Prof. Henri Brugmans5 appointed as its first Rector. It was the first occasion in which students from across the globe came together to study the common interest of European affairs (Vermuelen 2000). Furthermore, the best specialists from across Europe would come to Bruges to manage a study programme in their field, orienting students

3 Julius Hoste Jr. was the Liberal Senator for Brussels from 1949–1954. In 1936, he became Minister of Education in Belgium and during the Second World War he was under-secretary for education (in exile, based in Great Britain). 4 Fondation d’un Collège d’Europe, Mouvement Européen, doc. EN/P/88, (ME-801, HAEU). 5 Prof. Henri Brugmans was a Dutch professor of French literature at the University of Utrecht. He was President of the Union of European Federalists and a co-founder of the College of Europe.

110

S. K. ST. JOHN

towards individual study as well as group projects. At the end of the programme, a certificate was awarded, which did not initially have a formal status, but could in the future if supranational institutions were to be established that required their officials to have training with a specifically European orientation.6 Prof. Brugmans remained Rector until his retirement in 1972, when he was succeeded by Jerzy Lukaszewski. The College of Europe was considered to be like no other academic institution in continental Europe. It can be distinguished from others due to four factors: human, in the multinational composition of the student and professorial body, which live together in halls of residence fostering a European intellectual community; programmatic, in its multidisciplinary programme of postgraduate studies; organisational, in its freedom as an independent institution rather than a national institution tied to regulations; and social, in its creation by the European Movement as an intention to contribute to the construction of a united Europe (Bekemans et al. 1999). Defining a Mission for the College of Europe The mission of the College developed during its initial years of establishment. Its founders recognised that Europe required a specialist team of workers and it would be the responsibility of the new generation to assign to Europe’s helm responsible individuals with a capacity to think with a perspective and conviction of a united Europe. To formulate the College’s mission, the kinds of questions the founders asked were: What are the continent’s limits? What have all European nations experienced in common? How are the various nationalities formed and what were the resulting institutions? Can Europe be united simply and solely by creating institutions and if so, what would be their competence and how would they be controlled? By what means would a united Europe be more capable than national states in coping with the current problems, such as a common defence system and the dollar gap? (Bekemans et al. 1999). The final mission devised and stated in Belgium’s official journal, the Moniteur Belge, in article 2 on 22 July 1950 was the creation and governance of an institution of postgraduate scientific teaching, for the training of students in the field of human sciences, envisaged in terms of the substitution of 6 ‘Pas d’Europe sans civisme Européen’, brochure of the College of Europe (ME-801, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

111

a political, economic, social and intellectual entity for the present fragmentation of the European states (Bekemans et al. 1999). In summary, for Brugmans, the precise mission was to forge indispensable intellectual instruments for future managers of Europe.7 By 1952, the mission was further defined as a twofold aim on the one hand to study, by impartial methods, the economic, social, political, judicial, social and cultural problems of European union, and on the other hand, to train young Europeans, who intended to embark on careers at international and European level, in areas such as diplomacy, internal institutions, public life and journalism. In Brugman’s early years as Rector, he gave thought to the College’s orientation, clarifying that the College was not an international university, a European school of administration or an academy for European militants. Then in May 1958, the mission was redefined by the Teaching Council as an institution giving “a European outlook to its students, and consequently, to being something other and something more than a technical School of International Administration” (Bekemans et al. 1999). Studying at the College of Europe The criteria for admission included a university degree after four years of study, and knowledge of the two official languages of the College: French and English. In addition, students had to possess a sufficient level of general culture, a desire to follow a career either directly or indirectly in the European field, and demonstrate a readiness to share common life with students of different nationalities.8 In the first academic year of 1950–1951, the College welcomed 35 students from 16 different nationalities,9 which grew to 57 in 1970. Seminars and lectures were held at the Brangwyn museum building, which had been made available by the city of Bruges. All the students, except married couples, along with the Rector and professors, were hosted at the Hotel Saint-Georges at the Place du 7 Note sur le programme et les professeurs, Henri Brugmans, Cabinet du Recteur,

College d’Europe (ME-801, HAEU). 8 From the Direction of the College to the National Committees for the selection of students, College of Europe (ME-801, HAEU). 9 UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Egypt and US. Bilan de la première année academique 1950–51 (5 July 1951), College of Europe (ME-1872, HAEU).

112

S. K. ST. JOHN

Bourg, and later at the Grand Hôtel du Commerce in Sint-Jakobstraat. Living under the same roof with a family atmosphere provided the desired environment to foster the European intellectual Community envisaged by the College’s founders. In particular, it offered the opportunity for frequent and informal exchanges between students, as well as with the professors and Rector. In fact, alumni recall that the most memorable discussions and exchanges of ideas were those that took place outside the classroom. By 1974, student numbers had exceeded 100, so they were hosted across several halls of residence. The subject fields covered in the College’s first programme were divided into three sections: history, sociology, human geography and political theory; international economics; and constitutional law and administrative sciences, comparative law and international law. However, two years later the general subject offering was reduced to only courses of a European orientation, such as the history of European civilisation, the geographic realities of Europe, and current political affairs and trends. These were taught at a high academic level in three major subject strands: history and sociology; political economy; and law. In addition to following seminars, students were required to submit a thesis at the end of the academic year. A year later, the programme was revised once again in light of the developing European institutions, and subjects were divided into two strands: international economy, law and comparative government; and history, political science, human geography and sociology. In this new system, students were required to choose three subjects from the two strands, but they were obliged to follow a “European Studies” programme consisting of a historical overview of the development of European cooperation and integration, a presentation of the main European organisations, and an inventory of current issues. This programme continued to be adopted until the 1960s, when in 1964–1965 it was further sharpened into the three strands of political science, law and economics, with three compulsory courses comprising the contemporary history of Europe, the European idea and realisation and European institutions. In response to a growth in student numbers across universities in Europe and to the development of the European institutions and of European integration, Brugman’s successor, Jerzy Lukaszewski, called for a revised programme of fewer basic courses and a greater offering of optional courses, which was implemented in the academic year 1973–1974 (Bekemans et al. 1999).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

113

European Training at the College of Europe In addition to the core programme, the College provided training in European affairs to professionals and other students. In 1963, a seminar for European railway personnel was held, which developed into a European training centre for national railways, and in 1968, a programme of European Studies for American undergraduate students was established for the spring term. The programme gave several hundred American students the opportunity to familiarise themselves with developments taking place in Europe, and with the city of Bruges, as an experience of European culture. The programme ran into difficulties, however, due to the young age of the students compared the College’s core student body, so it was restructured as a programme for professors of American universities. In 1973, the College also developed a training programme for young civil servants of the European Community. Governance and Funding of the College of Europe From the beginning, the College was governed by a Board of Governors that acted as the supreme body of the College. The board comprised the Presidents of the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and its Cultural Committee; the Presidents of the European Movement and its Executive and Cultural Committees; and of around 20 other individual members nominated by governors. An Administrative Council was established that included the aforementioned Presidents and five other members of the European Movement, as well as the director of the European Cultural Centre in Geneva and the Governor of West Flanders. The Administrative Council nominated the members of the Executive Bureau, which governed the practical organisation of the College, while a Financial Committee was responsible for financial matters under the guidance of the Administrative Council. The College faced great challenges regarding the matter of funding. Thanks to Hoste’s connections with the Belgian Prime Minister and the Minister for Education, the College was able to secure three million Belgian Francs for its first academic year from the Belgian government.10 It later provided another 500,000 for preparatory costs accrued in

10 Note sur le Collège d’Europe à Bruges (ME-801, HAEU).

114

S. K. ST. JOHN

February 1950 (Bekemans et al. 1999). By 1951, the College was considered well-established enough to begin requesting funding from other European countries of the Council of Europe. It subsequently requested 450,000 Belgian Francs towards the budget and 50,000 Belgian Francs in bursaries.11 In doing so, it carried out intense lobbying, but only received positive responses from West Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. West Germany had advised that its contribution of 460,000 Belgian Francs was a single subvention and could not be renewed annually. Norway provided a study bursary for a Norwegian student to attend in 1952, the Netherlands provided 100,000 Belgian Francs plus two bursaries, and Luxembourg provided 55,000 Belgian Francs. Denmark, Turkey, Iceland, Greece, Italy, Great Britain, Sweden, France and Ireland did not appear favourable to contributing.12 Conscious of the educational value of French culture, the College has largely demonstrated a “favoured nation” policy towards France. The French language was the most commonly adopted language and a predominant place had been reserved for French professors. However, France did not react positively to the invitation to provide the College with funding for the academic year of 1952/1953 and the five bursaries it had previously given were not reinstated.13 In 1955, however, France changed its mind, donating 500,000 French Francs, which was later reduced in 1959. Italy provided an exceptional contribution of 39,235 Belgian Francs for the academic year 1953–1954, but Great Britain remained unconvinced by the project. Nevertheless, the European Coal and Steel Community assisted with 500,000 Belgian Francs for the academic year 1953–1954 by providing for a Schuman Chair for the study of the economic problems of European integration.14 Funding was also provided by the US, which was generous in covering the expenses for an American professor of political and administrative science to spend a sabbatical year in Bruges, as well as for conferences organised by the College. In 1955, the Rector was sent a gift of $11,500 (577,384 Belgian Francs) from the Ford Foundation to spend on developing the library. By 1963, the budget exceeded seven million Belgian

11 Note sur le Collège d’Europe à Bruges (ME-801, HAEU). 12 Note sur le Collège d’Europe à Bruges (ME-801, HAEU). 13 Note sur le Collège d’Europe à Bruges (ME-801, HAEU). 14 Collège d’Europe, doc. BE/P/76 (ME-2198, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

115

Francs with a contribution of 350,000 Belgian Francs that finally came from Great Britain (Bekemans et al. 1999). The growth of the European Communities and the College’s nurtured connections with them were fundamental in the College’s ability to survive its implementation period and develop as an institution. In addition to challenging fundraising matters, several moments of instability occurred within the first decade of the College’s existence. The first was the collapse of the European Defence Community in the French National Assembly in 1954, and the second was the development of the idea to create a European University, which came to a head in 1960.

The European University: A Relaunch in the Community Sphere The idea of the European University was relaunched during the first stage of developing the Treaties of Rome at the Messina conference in 1955, in the more restricted political context of setting up European institutions rather than the immediate post-war European ideology. Ahead of the meeting in Messina, the Federal Republic of Germany— represented by Prof. Walter Hallstein,15 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—presented a memorandum on the advancement of integration. Recognising that integration should not be limited to economics, but extended just as much to culture, Hallstein included the proposal for a European University within the German proposal for the creation of a common market. Hallstein’s role in the advancement of the European University project is considered an important one. He believed that Europe was falling behind in education and research, and Germany had limited higher education provision. He maintained his belief that a fully fledged university was required, as opposed to the other various initiatives suggested that built on existing universities. He also rejected the idea of a postgraduate centre because such a model did not exist in Germany. Hallstein envisaged a single university with a genuine European spirit. He realised that the creation of the University of Europe would not be foreseeable in the short term; its mission would have to be clearly defined and its

15 Walter Hallstein was Professor and close collaborator of Chancellor Adenauer.

116

S. K. ST. JOHN

atmosphere carefully pieced together. As regards the disciplines, Hallstein gave precedence to technology to conform to the Euratom Treaty, then to mining research and metallurgy in line with the European Coal and Steel Community, followed by the political sciences, comparative law and economics. While such disciplines would respond to a political need by benefitting the European integration project, Hallstein also emphasised the importance of human sciences including philosophy, history, languages, literature and sociology. Hallstein received little support for his proposal, but at the same time no opposition, which by some was considered a bad sign for the project’s support in general (Brugmans 1969). Unfortunately, a discussion on the proposal was not opened at the meeting in Messina. Instead, it was passed to an expert-assisted intergovernmental committee and only reappeared again in the report from the heads of the delegation to the Foreign Ministers on 21 April 1956. In response to a lack of specialists in the field of nuclear research, the Euratom Commission proposed the creation of a joint atomic research centre and schools to train specialists, which could form the basis for a European University where scientists from all over Europe would work together. The report was approved in Venice on 29–30 May 1956. When it came to creating the joint nuclear research centre, the German delegate Haedrich announced that his government would provide a note on the European University project. Calling for the nuclear research centre to consist of a European Institute of Advanced Studies with traditional faculties of science, arts, medicine and law, this changed the orientation of the European University project. The type of proposal caused surprise and despite the conviction of other delegations that there was a need for a different model from the university Haedrich envisaged, Haedrich maintained his proposal. Unfortunately, other priorities pushed the European University project aside, but since delegations were still interested, they recommended its inclusion in the treaty creating the European Community of Economic Energy (Euratom).16 Indeed, it

16 The European Community of Economic Energy (EURATOM) is an international

organisation that was set up in 1957 by the six member states creating the European Community. EURATOM’s mission is to provide a specialist market for European nuclear power in Europe and acts as a separate entity from the European Union, though governed by the EU institutions. The EURATOM Treaty was signed alongside the Treaty setting up the European Community (the Treaty of Rome) on 25 March 1957.

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

117

featured in the Euratom Treaty, signed on 25 March 1957, in articles 9(2) and 216: An institution at university level shall be set up; the particulars of its operation shall be settled by the Council acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission.17 The commission proposals on the way in which the institution of university status referred to in article 9 is to function shall be submitted to the council within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty.18

Due to the ambiguity of the wording, contrasting interpretations of the articles became apparent. Therefore, a working group was established to prepare commission proposals for the creation of a European University, which was presided over by Gaetano Martino, former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The working group held four meetings in the months from June to October 1958 and presented its results on 18 December of the same year. During this process, the states of the Six collaborated closely to institute these proposals for the structure, function and setting of the European University. The European Community showed clear support for the project. In a speech in Milan on 13 December 1958 on the occasion of the second congress of the Cultural Foundation, the President of the European Economic Community Walter Hallstein, declared that the European university institution was not only desirable, but also necessary. This necessity was political, in the process of forming a European spirit, because the idea of unification of Europe had not yet penetrated intellectual circles.19 However, member states each had their independent interests and ambitions for such an institution, causing clashes in national viewpoints, and allies and oppositions to emerge. National Interests and Contrasting Opinions on the European University Project The German delegation declared its profound conviction that the six member states needed to seize the opportunity to fulfil the task of creating a European University, which it proved when it put forward the proposal 17 Euratom Treaty, article 9 (2). 18 Euratom Treaty, article 216. 19 Procès-verbal de la reunion constitutive du 27 janvier 1959, Assemblée Parlementaire

Européenne (CEAB/12-2416, HAEU).

118

S. K. ST. JOHN

at the Messina conference.20 The Germans envisioned a spiritual, scientific and technical centre that responded to the rich culture of Europe; it needed to be “a great school for a great idea”. Recognising the need to foster cultural as well as economic integration, they agreed to found a European University as an autonomous and permanent institute aimed at teaching and research, and at unifying professors and students from across the countries of the European Community; a university at the heart of the Community. While the German delegation supported a plan to establish a complete university, it also advised that it was not necessarily important to create a university with a comprehensive set of faculties. It saw the university as important stage in the construction of Europe, but realised national universities in Germany would not be able to dedicate resources to studying European problems. Therefore, a European University could function alongside existing national universities, and the German delegation was even prepared to contribute up to 15 million Deutschmarks to the project.21 However, the fact that education and universities in Germany were managed at the local level (Länder) brought about delays in the working group of the European University project as the Länder were not in agreement with the federal government. The federal government had provided its backing for the project without the support of the Länder ministries of culture or the university rectors. The Länder ministries believed the project did not sufficiently address the aim of integrating the teaching body at European level or of creating a university of the European Communities. The rectors felt the project, as a supranational university, would pose a threat to national institutions.22 The French delegation stood firm in its belief that article 9 of the Euratom Treaty did not necessarily imply the creation of a complete university such as the one other delegations envisaged. The French interpreted the European University project within the framework of the nuclear-power mission of Euratom, lobbying for the creation of a nuclear sciences centre.23 The delegation opposed the creation of a supranational 20 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants permanent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU). 21 German position on the European University (EUI-792, HAEU). 22 German position on the European University (EUI-792, HAEU). 23 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants perma-

nent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

119

university, afraid that it would gain too much importance as an institution. Instead, the delegation favoured a system of reinforced cooperation with existing national universities, with the exchange of people and ideas. In this context, the French proposed the introduction of a “Livret Universitaire Européen” (a European Higher Education passport) to facilitate the movement of people for academic purposes. Furthermore, they proposed the creation of specialist institutes within the national higher education institutions that were most qualified, as well as councils of administration within these institutes, composed of representatives from the European Communities. The French believed that the European University project was not a complete lost cause, but many of its complicated aspects, such as the languages to adopt, the equivalence of degrees and the recruitment of professors, required further evaluation. Setting up a European University without sufficient preparation would run the risk of compromising the future of European Higher Education cooperation. Therefore, the French delegation also showed concerns over its contribution to the budget of such an institution, but supported the creation of a specialist working group for the European University in order to iron out some of these concerns. Despite France’s hesitations, Gaston Berger24 convinced his colleague Roger Seydoux25 that France would benefit from taking a more flexible approach to the European University project. He argued that France would stand a better chance of having its viewpoint heard if it were to propose a realistic and attractive counter-project rather than continue to bombard other proposals with negative arguments. Berger, focusing exclusively on French scientific research and Higher Education, believed that the specialised institutes that were being created or were indeed already established, would only be capable of competing at the international level if they also drew on professors from other states. Such enlargement would come naturally from an attachment to a European University. Contrary to the Italian idea, the university would be set up in France and would use French as its operating language to complement the languages spoken in the Community. Berger’s colleagues supported his proposal as long as the university remained limited in size and

24 A French industrialist who retrained as a Professor of Philosophy (1896–1960). 25 A French academic and diplomat (1908–1985).

120

S. K. ST. JOHN

complemented teaching in national universities rather than threatening it (Palayret 1995). The French move has been described as a political one, which featured in the overall French policy to avoid any supranational communities in favour of intergovernmental cooperation. In this context, the European University project became one element in the much bigger dispute concerning the forms of political cooperation or integration among the Six (Lambert 1962). The Dutch delegation provided its full availability to collaborate on the creation of an institution of university level, despite the difficulties in which it found itself with limited resources for its own higher education.26 However, the Dutch did not agree to the establishment of a complete university and expressed a strong desire, like the French delegation, to create an institution dedicated to nuclear energy. According to the Dutch preference, the institution should work in close collaboration with the European Community as an important aspect of the cultural mission with a main objective to promote the European plan in higher teaching and scientific research in the area of atomic energy, and areas in which national universities were lacking in teaching and research provision. A secondary objective would be to promote collaboration on the European plan, but more generally, by means of conferences on European integration, from a historical, cultural, economic, social and legal perspective. Like the French delegation, the Dutch supported the creation of a Working Group on the European University project in order to keep proceedings moving. The Dutch in particular thought the conventions setting up the European University should be completely detached from the initiative of the Six and that other states should be welcome to participate. The Dutch felt that a university of the Six would be too narrow, and it would be more appropriate if the project were handled by the Council of Europe’s Cultural Committee or the European Universities Committee of the Western European Union, especially regarding the financial aspects. The Dutch, along with the Belgians, were most fearful of increased expenditure that went above states’ financial obligations in teaching and research laid down in the Euratom Treaty. The Dutch delegation highlighted that it would find it difficult to justify funding

26 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants permanent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

121

a university of a more general nature because of the restrictions imposed on national universities in the Netherlands.27 The Belgian delegation expressed a general agreement for the creation of a university institution, with a preference for a postgraduate institution. The Belgians felt it would be too premature to create a complete university, which should be created progressively.28 It believed, however, that in the creation of a university institution, the European Community should keep in mind the provision of this type that is already available in European countries. In this regard, the Belgians could conceive the idea of establishing a network of high-level institutions with an administrative headquarters in Florence. The Belgian delegation expressed serious concerns with the institution proposed by the Italian delegation, claiming it would conflict with the College of Europe, already established in Bruges. According to the Belgian delegation, the Italians’ institution had an almost identical structure to that of the College of Europe, with a focus on human sciences, and historical, political, legal and economic sciences. The Belgians therefore proposed the creation of a centre of research and postgraduate teaching based on four departments: history and civilization, political sciences, law, and economics, even though similar centres already existed. They proposed that the institution in Florence had a unique character emphasising theoretical physics, and pure and applied mathematics, while the College of Europe would focus on its original disciplines of legal and administrative sciences, economic sciences and political and social sciences.29 Similar to Italy and Germany, the Luxembourgian delegation was profoundly convinced of the need to create a European university to complement the European community.30 It considered the project’s objective to be the establishment of a complete university with traditional faculties, from higher teaching to postgraduate training. According

27 Exposé présenté par les experts néerlandais du Groupe de Travail sur l’Université Européene (CM2/1958-953, HAEU). 28 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants permanent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU). 29 The Belgian position on the European University (EUI-791, HAEU). 30 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants perma-

nent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU).

122

S. K. ST. JOHN

to the Luxembourgian delegation, the institution should focus European issues and the problems facing the Community; it should be a functional institution oriented towards the economic and political objectives of the European Community. The Luxembourgian representative, Pierre Pescatore,31 chaired the working group on the European University project.32 It should be added that since 1949, Luxembourg already had similar experiences to the European University project, which came in the form of an attempt to set up an “Institut Luxembourgeois Universitaire”. Luxembourg did not have its own university, so it pursued plans to create a university institute during the post-war period. Unfortunately, the project failed to come to fruition, but the issue was raised again in 1978.33 From the outset, the Italians maintained a strong conviction for the European University project and were perhaps its greatest advocates. Along the same vein as the Luxembourgian and German delegations, the Italian delegation whole-heartedly believed in the need to create a European University alongside the European Community.34 They were pleased with the proposal that the German delegation had submitted at the Messina conference, which promoted the establishment of a “European University presenting the characteristics of an autonomous institute to supply the necessary means of research, and allow access to profound and new knowledge”, as well as to promote European cooperation and to offer general European culture. The Italians did not want to dismiss completely the importance of nuclear sciences, but they favoured a complete university over a specialised centre. In order for such an institution to be true to its mission of promoting European integration and European culture, the Italian delegation believed that it had to be created progressively to avoid a soul-less institution that did not have the ability to address the needs of the future.

31 Pierre Pescatore (1919–2010) was a professor and a judge at the European Court of Justice. He worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1946–1967, during the establishment of the European Community. 32 Aide-memoire du Gouvernement Luxembourgois relative au projet d’une Université Européenne (CM2/1958-952, HAEU). 33 Letter from Henri Koch Kent to Prof. Walter Lipgens (EUI-794, 1978, HAEU). 34 Extrait du procès-verbal de la reunion restreinte du comitédes répresentants perma-

nent, tenue à Bruxelles le 21 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959-917, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

123

If it were to complement truly the European Community, it was imperative that it had the means to contribute concretely to the scientific and technical needs of tomorrow’s Europe. In this context, it would also prepare functionaries for the European institutions, as well as diplomats and professors of history and languages. The Italians deepened their proposal with practical details on the logistical orientation of a European University. They suggested it could host between three and six thousand students from university to doctoral level, which Germany supported since it was against the creation of a purely postgraduate university because such institutions did not exist in Germany. Although the proposal submitted by Italy was for a complete university, all programmes and students would have a research focus that linked to European integration. With such a specific European focus, the European University would therefore not compete with national universities, being a research area in which national universities had limited resources. The University’s faculty would therefore also be oriented strongly towards themes surrounding European integration, and professors would come from across the world. The Italians advocated the setting up of faculties comprising chemistry, physics, mathematics, biology, agronomy, political and legal sciences, economics and commerce, civil engineering, literature and philosophy (Palayret 1995). The Italian delegation proposed that the six member states would supply the budget for the University, and towards the finalisation of the project, Italy reserved state-owned buildings in Florence to host the institution.35 In 1958, the Association of the Universities of Europe also highlighted its objections to a centralised university. It questioned the very definition of a “European University”, suggesting that all the universities across Europe were in fact European because they were born and developed in Europe. If the recruitment of academic staff from different nationalities would be what makes it European, it is not enough; national universities also welcomed academic staff and students that were not of the nationality of the university. Neither would it be necessary to create a European University to intensify exchanges. In response to the suggestion that the European University would focus on European studies, the Association

35 Memoire presente par le Gouvernement Italien sur le projet de création d’une Université Européenne (CM2/1958-952, HAEU).

124

S. K. ST. JOHN

suggested that it risks becoming too political, a training centre for militants and officials, which may not be compatible with a scientific mission. If the envisaged university was to be a success, the Association suggested that it could not be mediocre, but at the same time, it could not overshadow existing universities or create a threat. Moreover, the Association pointed to a risk of cultural centralisation. According to the Association, a European University could not repeat the work of the existing universities, and it could not take on a political character. Neither could it favour a Europe limited to the Six, nor could it become an artificial creation without a soul. It should be a decentralised university that is not monopolised by one country or organisation, and it should be a new concept that favours the birth of a united Europe.36

Drawing Up Concrete Proposals for a European University In December 1959, under the guidance of Etienne Hirsch, President of the Euratom Commission, the Euratom Commission eventually proposed the creation of a “university with general competences” to be the “the university of Europe”. Of all the proposed projects, it was closest to that of Italy and Germany. In a meeting in January 1960, the members of Euratom’s Commission for Scientific and Technical Research insisted on: the need for the other two European Communities (the European Economic Community and European Coal and Steel Community) to participate in the creation of the European University; the importance of the linguistic problem and the need to contribute to language learning across Europe at the level of secondary education; the need to revise the teaching of human sciences with a European perspective; the importance of such teaching for the future of European youth; the importance of not establishing student quotas that are too rigid towards nationality and the percentage of non-member nationalities; the need for a liberal policy on the nationality of professors; the need to establish the university progressively to ensure its status; and the importance of universities in producing

36 Association des Universités d’Europe, Difficultés souvlées par la création d’une Université Européenne Centralisée, Examen des objections que susciterait un tel projet, par le Professeur Guy Michaud, Juillet 1958 (HC-64, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

125

the professors of the next generation.37 It was highlighted that the European Commission needed to avoid creating a “supranational” university that would compete with national universities, but to create an academic community devoted to assisting national universities on the European plan in the teaching and training of young people. It was therefore important to take action in the short term to assure public opinion, as well as that of universities and scientific environments, on the creation of a European University. The Commission gave M. Geiger the task of completing an “Interim Report on the Creation of a European University”.38 The European University was defined though as forming only a part of a more complex plan for increasing cultural and scientific cooperation under a European Council for Higher Learning and Research (Lambert 1962). The Interim Report, also known more colloquially as the “Geiger Report” was submitted to the Commission and discussed on 27 April 1960 in Florence by the Interim Committee for the European University. The report made three main proposals in this regard: on the European University, on European Higher Education and research institutes, and on exchanges at university level. On the question of the European University, it was noted that the university’s structure would be different to that of conventional universities, and would only teach disciplines grouped in six departments (Law, Economics, Social and Political Science, History, Pure Mathematics and Theoretical Physics) and not faculties. It would welcome students that had already received three or four years of university education, and would confer the diploma of “Doctor of the European University”. It would host around 250 students in the first year and then 500 students per year during the first five years of its establishment, and students would not be limited to those of the member states. It would develop a system of bursaries with support from states, the Community, and public and private organisations. The professorial body would be composed of permanent professors with a Chair of the European University, professors with a temporary Chair, professors assigned only to courses, and academic assistants (two for each professor). The role of 37 Ibid. (CEAB/12-631, HAEU). 38 Meeting of 26 January 1960 including exposé of M. Hirsch on the state of advance-

ment of the work on the creation of a European University and on a common centre for nuclear research at Ispra, and on a centre of nuclear research at Petten, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Commission de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (CEAB/12-631, HAEU).

126

S. K. ST. JOHN

the University would be to contribute to the spiritual development of Europe, and would therefore not compete with national universities. On the contrary, the insufficient student places in national institutions led to a necessity for the new European University.39 As the Interim Report stated that the Community would create the European University, it was suggested that the University indicated towards a political mission. However, Geiger denied any intrusion of political motives into the academic sphere, suggesting—in the words of the German Philosopher Karl Jaspers—that universities are seen as public establishments and the patrimony of the nation as an expression of a people. It was suggested that the idea of the economic integration process requiring output in the cultural field was undoubtedly at the root of the Council of Ministers of the EEC and Euratom decisions in July 1959, setting up the Interim Committee for the European University (Lambert 1962). The Committee considered the preservation of the freedom enjoyed by traditional universities and advised that the European University would therefore be an autonomous institution. Collaboration with existing universities and scientific institutions was emphasised, however, making the European University a centre of high specialisation and of European cooperation at the highest level.40 The mission of the European University would be to reinforce the cultural and scientific potential of Europe by contributing with research and teaching, especially in fields that are of high priority to the construction of Europe, and the close collaboration between member states. In particular, its role would be to: facilitate solutions to problems that such construction and collaboration poses; contribute to training individuals who will then work in the public services of their own countries, in the European institutions and in the intellectual and economic life of Europe; and study the problems that require a concentration of efforts for the European plan.

39 Extrait du process-verbale des activités de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, No. 4/1961, Analyse du rapport intérimaire de M. Geiger (Commission de la Recherche et de la Culture), doc. 1299/60 (CEAB/12-847, HAEU). 40 Rapport du Comité Intérimaire aux Conseils de la Communauté Economique Européenne et de la Communauté Européenne de l’Énergie Atomique, Comité Intérimaire pour l’Université Européenne, c.i.u.86/60, doc. EUR/C/1408/60f, Florence, 27 avril 1960 (CEAB/12-631, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

127

As for the European Institutes of Higher Education and Research mentioned in the Geiger Report, the idea had been created as a counterproposal to the European University project by Gaston Berger. However, it became an additional proposal in the report, supported by the academics. With assistance from the Community, the idea was to provide a European label to deserving institutions according to the importance and relevance of their academic output. The report also proposed the creation of advanced research centres, which aimed to address the areas of most relevance to the six states of the European Community. Lastly, the report encouraged the expansion of university exchanges and, overall, identified four sectors that deserved sustained effort: the equivalence of degrees, the harmonisation of study programmes, increased exchanges and the setting up of a reciprocal information system.41 Despite discussions taking place on the university’s governance structure regarding its governing body and the appointment of a rector and a secretary, discussions stalled at the Council meetings in June and July 1960 due to reservations from member states over the title of the institution and the source of its funding. On 20 June 1960, it was nevertheless decided that the European University would be hosted in Florence, Italy. The location of the European University brought about more disagreement among the member states. The Germans, along with the Belgians, preferred Luxembourg as the location, acting as a natural extension of the European schools. Since German universities were particularly decentralised and fell under the powers of the Länder, hosting a European University in Germany that depended on the national authorities would have been complex. Bearing in mind that a decision on the location of the European institutions had not yet been made, the location of the European University began to be used as a bargaining tool with Luxembourg (with unanimous voting, Luxembourg could have vetoed the idea of hosting the Communities in Brussels). When Luxembourg refused to bargain, the Italians seized the opportunity to make their proposal of spreading the European institutions across Europe to avoid Brussels becoming the capital of Europe. Of course, Italy wanted a bite of the apple and hoped that a part of the Community—the European University—could be hosted in Italy. Despite rejection from the Benelux countries and thanks to the agreement of France, Italy was allowed to proceed with diplomatic action to secure the European University in Florence.

41 Ibid. (CEAB/12-631, HAEU).

128

S. K. ST. JOHN

A Shift in Orientation: From Community-Led to Intergovernmental Unfortunately, the Italians were unable to pursue the project further because, in October 1960, the French representative suggested the question of the European University were tackled in the framework of a European cultural cooperation agency if it were to be set up. This proposal threw into question the Community-led orientation of the European University. Previously, the Italian delegation, with support from the Belgian and German delegations, had declared its conviction for institutional links with the European Community, though the German delegation pointed out the difficulty in navigating around three Communities.42 Charles de Gaulle sought to reduce supranational tendencies in general, claiming that the Commission could not constitute a political power and that intergovernmental cooperation should form the basis of Europe’s governance. Furthermore, even though other delegations approved the title of European “University” for the institution, the French opposed it.43 For the French, the European University project fell into a French political plan that emphasised university exchanges and the equivalence of degrees, and such questions would be discussed in regular meetings between Education ministers. This was the first time the project was truly reconsidered in a framework of intergovernmental cultural cooperation, away from the involvement of the Commission. The Italians used this to relaunch the project in the framework of the countries of the Council of Europe, where Britain and Denmark in particular showed an interest. On 18 July 1961, a meeting in Bonn with the Heads of State set up a Council of Ministers responsible for education and international cultural relations. The Council focused on university cooperation and exchanges, the European mission that could be assigned to national universities and research institutes, and the creation of a European University in Florence with an intellectual and

42 Extrait du procès-verbal de la 112ème réunion tenue à Bruxelles le 13–15 juin 1960, approuvé le 20 septembre 1960, doc. 387/60, Conseil de la CEE et Conseil de la CEEA (CEAB/12-631, HAEU). 43 Procès-verbal de la 121ème réunion, 5 septembre 1960, approuvé le 3 octobre 1960, doc. 546/60 (CEAB/12-631, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

129

financial contribution from the Six.44 Responsibility for implementing the European University project was assigned to the Italians, as the Germans, who had initially relaunched the question of the European University with a proposal at the Messina Conference, were unable to proceed due to constitutional obstacles that do not allow the government to interfere with matters of the Länder, of which higher education was a part.45 Greater emphasis on cooperation among national universities and their European vocation brought about a shift in Europe’s higher education policy, which also changed the programme for setting up the European University. No further reference was made to the Community’s involvement in the creation of the European University. The European Commission and the European Parliament had shown strong support for the European University project since 1959 and were therefore disappointed by the Bonn decisions, claiming that they ignored the proposals developed by the Euratom Commission, the Interim Committee and the European Parliament. The European Parliament stated clearly that the European University in Florence was not the university wished for by the Parliament; the Commission was still waiting for the creation of that University and would not cease to fight for its realisation.46 Developments continued on an intergovernmental basis, but questions were raised over whether the Six were legally able to create a university. The Six did not constitute a state and only a state could create a university. It would need to be an institute conferring degrees recognised in the six member states. It was suggested that the university should be set up as an Italian national university, specialising in European studies and supported by the Six. As De Gaulle did not want a university created under European law, he granted his agreement, and Germany gave Italy a mandate to create the university under national law with a European label on it. The other states would provide intellectual and financial support. The Italians were not keen, however. They knew

44 Bonn Communiqué, 19 juillet 1961, Bruxelles, doc. EUR/C/2606/61f (EUI-8, HAEU). 45 ‘L’Università Europea, Oggi’, Introduzione ad un dibattito sull’Università Europea promosso dalla unione Fiorentina, il 22 febbraio 1970, nella sede di Palazzo Strozzi a Firenze (EUI-8, HAEU). 46 Extrait du procès-verbale des activités de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, No. 4/1961, Analyse du rapport intérimaire de M. Geiger (Commission de la Recherche et de la Culture), doc. 1299/60 (CEAB/12-847, HAEU).

130

S. K. ST. JOHN

they had been loaded with a project riddled with well-known difficulties. They found themselves coordinating a project they were deeply attached to, but with the responsibility of relaunching it on different terms than their own. Nevertheless, in 1963, they proceeded to adopt a draft Italian law on setting up the European University in Florence and to intensify negotiations to flesh out the directives of the Bonn meeting. Italy set up an organising committee on which sat representatives of the Six as well as the three communities, demonstrating a keenness on their part to involve the communities. The Committee created the founding act for the University, and visited and approved a construction project at Villa Tolomei in Florence. More discussions on finance arose; considering the responsibility Italy had assumed in the European University initiative and particularly the construction project, France proposed that Italy bore the construction costs. The fact was that France did not want the “University” to become a real university and could only use financial power to hinder its development. France also called for the involvement of the European Communities to be ceased. Unfortunately, the project encountered further delays throughout 1962 and 1963. The other states doubted Italy’s ability to see through the Florence Project, particularly given Italy’s lack of preparation on the financial questions. Differences within the Italian government were also blamed for the delays; while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was happy to settle for a specialised institute for advanced studies, the Ministry of Education wanted a fully fledged university, which, in order to satisfy Giorgio La Pira (Mayor of Florence), would welcome students from underdeveloped countries, including Africa and South America. When a new government was formed, the Education Minister Giacinto Bosco was asked to draft the statutes for the European University. However, considering himself at liberty to draft his own proposal given the Italian control over the project, his proposal was for a fully fledged university and, of course, not accepted. The other states took advantage of the delays to request that the project be withdrawn; a request particularly driven by the German rectors. They would accept, however, a high-level institute created by many European states to avoid political interference, focusing on aspects of Europe that were studied poorly in national universities. Finally, the project was resumed in July 1963 when the new Italian Education Minister Luigi Guire launched it at a colloquium, at which point the draft Italian law was accepted by the Council of Ministers.

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

131

Two intergovernmental conferences took place in November 1963 and May 1964, and the project started to move forward again. However, the timing clashed with the Elysée Treaty and the “empty chair crisis”, causing further setbacks for the Florence project. Talks resumed in mid1965, but were troubled until 1969. The Italians then drew up another proposal for an institute composed of four departments (economics, law, political and social sciences, and history and civilisation), which would also provide training for business leaders and involve the participation of Britain. In February 1969, the Italian diplomat Cattani visited all the capitals of the Six, plus London, to sound out reactions. The resignation of Charles de Gaulle in April 1969 facilitated European enlargement, considerably helping the Italians’ plans for the European University project in this regard. There was seemingly little interest from other Council of Europe states in joining the European University, with the exception of Denmark, which stated its interest in August 1960. Once it had been decided whether such countries could become full or associate members of the Common Market, a solution would be found to the problem of cultural cooperation more generally. It would then be inconceivable that the Six would object to enlarging the membership to the University’s convention; the British, for example, could make an important contribution and play a significant role in such a project (Lambert 1962). The Hague Summit of December 1969 provided much more favourable circumstances than the Six had previously experienced. The new French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou needed European success for domestic purposes and the new German Chancellor Willy Brandt was freer to move. The heads of state noted that the European initiatives could only really succeed if they included the involvement of the youth, which reconfirmed an interest in the European University. In 1969, the University Commission of the European Movement reiterated the importance of a European University for Europe. It would be essential for shaping Europe; thus far, the privileged tools of intelligence and culture had been abandoned. It was time to change the mentality towards the direction of a European civilisation, and this would be the soul of the European University. In an established unified Europe, citizens would not remain in their own countries; they would organise cultural exchange and allow the “intellectual workers” to discover Europe, and in order to avoid remaining at the artisanal stage, it was necessary to build the European University. A true European civilisation was considered the only valid

132

S. K. ST. JOHN

interlocutor with the foreign civilisations, and this element alone should prompt the establishment of the university at the earliest opportunity. The European University would be able to create the “Europe of brains” that was so reclaimed.47 The Establishment of the European University Institute The Italians sought to reach an initial understanding with the French and, in meetings in October 1970 and February 1971, the Six agreed the European University would be linked to the Communities and called the European University Institute.48 It would be a postgraduate institution, governed by a High Council made up of member state representatives and an Academic Council of teaching staff and students. Its four departments of economics, law, political and social sciences, and history and civilisation would confer a doctoral degree, and it would be funded by the member states (at least until 1977, when a review would take place). The official languages would be German, English, French, Italian and Dutch, with French and English as the official working languages.49 Not more than one-third of the student body should be of one nationality, and the departments would provide teaching presented in a European context. The final agreement took place on 16 November 1971 at a meeting of Education Ministers when France (Olivier Guichard) pledged that it would accept the European University project if Italy accepted France’s Centre of Educational Development. Italy’s Riccardo Misasi agreed. The signing of the Convention setting up the European University Institute (EUI) therefore took place in Florence on 19 April 1972, and it welcomed its first students in the autumn of 1976 at the Badia Fiesolana in San Domenico di Fiesole, which was initially a temporary location until works at Villa Tolomei in central Florence had been completed.50

47 Commission Universitaire du Mouvement Européen, Rapport introductive par M. Philippe Dubief, Organisation Française du Mouvement Européen, 1969 (HC-30, HAEU). 48 Rapport Conclusif, Conférence Intergouvernmentale pour l’Université Européenne, Rome, 1–3 février 1971 (EUI-8, HAEU). 49 Ibid. (EUI-8, HAEU). 50 Note à l’attention de M. Dahrendorf, Commission des Communautés Européennes,

Groupe d’Enseignement et Éducation, 22 janvier 1973, Bruxelles (EUI-8, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

133

Today, with around 500–600 postgraduate students, the European University Institute is a smaller institution compared to the original plan to create a complete university. The Institute specialises in doctoral degrees across four faculties: History and Civilization; Economics; Law; and Political and Social Science. The governance of the EUI is intergovernmental, with member states sitting on a High Council and a Budget Committee, which both meet twice a year. Member states of the EUI must be member states of the EU, though not all member states of the EU have joined the EUI convention. Member states of the EUI provide the institution’s structural funding, as well as bursaries to students from its own countries. Some member states also sponsor students from nonEuropean countries. The EU does not hold a voting role in the EUI’s governance, though it is consulted and has representatives on the High Council. The EUI now attracts extensive external funding, a considerable portion of which is from the EU, but the EUI does not depend on the EU from a governance perspective, but rather as a reference point. The majority of its externally funded projects are hosted by the EUI’s research centre, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, which was founded in 1992 in a second phase of the EUI’s development. A further phase of development has recently taken place with the establishment of a School of Transnational Governance in June 2017, offering Executive Training, a Master’s programme in Transnational Governance and Young Policy Leader Fellowship programmes.

The European University Project’s Main Obstacles The European University project experienced a long, slow development that was not without obstacles. Differing opinions among member states applied the heaviest brakes to the project, but several practical considerations also arose. First, there was a question of equivalence of degrees. With students from different European countries with different qualifications, it was necessary to find a solution to recognise equally the diplomas from across the member states. A lack of a common system of degreeequivalence created obstacles for admissions to the University. Similarly, it was important to ensure that the degrees conferred at the European University were recognised in the European member states. Languages posed the second significant obstacle, especially because they were yet to be defined for the European Community. The official languages of the University needed to be decided, which would be

134

S. K. ST. JOHN

adopted for theses, courses, administration and official communication, and whether the University would impose criteria for applicants to be able to speak certain languages. There was potential for languages to play a significant role in the European University. For example, during discussions on the “Geiger Report”, it was suggested that the European University could play an emerging intermediary role between European languages by bringing together and making accessible the important scientific sources in European languages.51 The University Commission of the European Movement proposed the creation of a European linguistic diploma alongside other university qualifications.52 Third, the recruitment of professors posed a series of problems. Tenured professors would not necessarily be willing to leave their national universities for a fixedterm position, and at the time, it was uncertain whether there was even interest to move to a different country for another permanent position. It had been suggested in plans for the European University that professors should not be permanent in order to ensure fresh ideas and knowledge entered the institution, but at the same time, faculty solely based on sabbatical professors from other institutions could cause instability for the institution. In addition, it was noted that the creation of a library presented great difficulties. The war had destroyed a large number of documents, and American universities had bought up large volumes of stock in recent years.53 Finally, there was a general wariness among several member states towards a supranational institution and its potential threat to national higher education institutions if it gained too much importance. In a similar vein, there was fear that creating a European higher education institution could lead to the European Commission meddling in the affairs of national universities.

51 Note concernant la création d’une université Européenne par les Communautés

Européennes par M. Geiger, 22 octobre 1959 (CEAB/12-2416, HAEU). 52 Commission Universitaire du Mouvement Européen, Rapport introductive par M. Philippe Dubief, Organisation Française du Mouvement Européen, 1969 (HC-30, HAEU). 53 Procès-verbal de la reunion constitutive du 25 septembre 1959, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne (CEAB/12-2416, HAEU).

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

135

Room for Two? The Coexistence of the College of Europe and the European University Discussions within the European Council of Ministers on how to implement article 9 of the Euratom Treaty, for the creation of an institution of university status, began in 1960, sending shock waves through the already established College of Europe. The first reaction came from the College’s alumni. They met for a study weekend in Bruges on 6–7 December 1958 to discuss their concerns over the creation of a European University or a postgraduate university institution. The Alumni Association sent letters to the Presidents of the European Economic Community and Euratom, as well as to the members of the European Parliament’s Research Committee, highlighting that institutes of European studies were already available to the European communities and should therefore be considered within the framework of the European University. In particular, they called for the College of Europe to be integrated into the new postgraduate institution.54 Rector Brugmans was convinced of the threat that the European University posed on the College of Europe, due to its much larger dimension and similar academic focus. For him, since first appearing in the press in 1955, the European University initiative only intensified an already fundamental problem (Vermuelen 2000). The College’s Administrative Council held lengthy debates in 1960 on the subject of the European University, but it was decided that the College should take advantage of interest in the University to gain recognition for the College as a postgraduate institution and appeal for funding. The uncertainty had a pragmatic impact on the developments of the library building work, since the Mayor of Bruges was not convinced about continuing the project until the College’s future had been secured. Relief came with the news that the idea of a supranational university had been blocked by the French at the Bonn meeting in 1961, and the Alumni Association took advantage of the circumstances to adopt two resolutions in 1962. The first recommended the recognition of the College as an institute of advanced European studies with similar status to the European University, and the second recommended the increase in student numbers

54 Déclaration de la Commission de la recherche scientifique et technique, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, doc. APE/1362, Luxembourg, 22 janvier 1959 (CM2/1959917, HAEU).

136

S. K. ST. JOHN

to at least 100, in the permanent academic body with two further professors, and the introduction of a two-year course leading to a doctorate. Only the expansion of the College was successful. More uncertainty came when the EUI was established in 1972, and information on its funding was made available. Its budget was far greater than that of the College of Europe, and EUI member states were obliged by convention to contribute to the budget. It raised the question whether the College of Europe had missed an opportunity to become an integral part of the European system of institutes of advanced European studies, and it had to rethink its mission. Lukaszewski approached the issue headon in his first statement as College of Europe Rector in 1972, stating that the College of Europe should be expanded and comparable to the EUI. He noted that the EUI would have the same characteristics as the College of Europe, but for several hundreds of students and several dozens of professors, and in particular, with more financial resources and a more solid legal basis. These circumstances raise the question of whether the two institutions could coexist. Defending the College’s position, Lukaszewski highlighted that it was the first “European” academic institution and is thus well known. It has always placed the process of European integration at the centre of its teaching and research, and had always loyally reflected the national diversity of Europe. In general, Lukaszewski identified the College’s added value compared to the EUI as its ability to foster a European community, owing to the fact that students and professors were hosted together in halls of residence and could acquaint themselves with different cultures and intellectual approaches. In addition, it was able to foster good connections with the European institutions thanks to its close proximity to Brussels and easy access to The Hague, Paris, Bonn, Luxembourg and London.55 Despite concern over the creation of European University, the Rector of the College of Europe Brugmans believed, in general terms, that the European University project was a good idea (Brugmans 1969). He supported his argument by making reference to the Abigenses war and the creation of the University of Toulouse, the 1572 siege in Leiden and the first Calvinist University, and the rebirth of the Prussian State and the creation of the University of Berlin, to suggest that it is normal for a 55 Note sur l’état et les perspectives du Collège d’Europe par Jerzy Lukaszewski, 07/07/1972, ME-2084, HAEU.

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

137

new political entity to want to express its ideals culturally in the form of an intellectual institution. In the case of the construction of Europe, he suggests it would have been perfectly understandable that the European Movement would have wanted to do the same. While the European University in Florence would never singlehandedly Europeanise higher education since it would see only a small percentage of European students (Brugmans 1969; Palayret 1995), it does have the potential to act as a pioneer institution for experimenting new types of teaching and research. Depending on the success of the new forms of teaching and research, they could subsequently be diffused across the national institutions in Europe. He highlights that the overall aim should be to minimise any strong “nationalistic thinking” in Europe’s universities. In this regard, there were three proposals. The first was that of Gaston Berger, who proposed the creation of a “European label” for specialist institutes, which was included in the Interim Committee report but buried shortly after. The second proposal was made during a symposium organised by the College of Europe in 1960, suggesting the organisation of precise research projects to be carried out jointly by a group of universities. The final proposal, described as the most radical, involved a compulsory term at a foreign university, which the Association des Instituts d’Études Européennes already discussed. This would restore an old tradition seen in Germany in which students were expected to attend different universities within Germany, only the tradition would be adopted in broader terms. In addition to questioning the role of the European University, Brugmans also cast a shadow over the decision to host the European University in Florence. He believed it reasonable to ask whether Florence, being so far from Brussels, was the appropriate location for the study of European integration. He agreed that it could be a suitable location for the study of European cultural history, for instance, but he dismissed the problem given that—at the time—the proposal was no longer to study European integration in a single European University. Brugmans suggested that what Europe really needed were institutions like Harvard Business School or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which would be closer to the vision of Gaston Berger (Brugmans 1969). With this suggestion, Brugmans was trying to put forth the principle of pooling European resources in precise fields where there is a gap in the provisions available at national level. He proposed that initially a reason why academics of national universities were reluctant to renounce

138

S. K. ST. JOHN

their national careers was due to the fact that it was unclear what exactly the Florence European University could offer them. If they were able to leave their national universities for an institution that provided “American” possibilities in “European” surroundings that filled a gap in their national system, perhaps they would be more inclined to embark on such an initiative. Brugmans continued with his proposal by adding that such a European institution did not have to limit itself to its original specialist areas, but once established it could develop into a centre for higher learning. With this, Brugmans envisaged the European University being established where the need was greatest and developing into a pioneer institution, innovating methods and questioning programmes. In the same way that a united Europe can only be attractive if it is a new Europe, Brugman concluded that however large or small the European University becomes, it should be a “nucleus of fresh thinking, an experimental enterprise, a ferment in the world of learning” and that it should not be limited to students of the Community. By 1988, a fruitful collaboration agreement between the institutions, and with the European Institute of Public administration later created in Maastricht, was established and the three institutions enjoy strong synergies, complementing each other’s activities and expertise.

Final Thoughts Great expectations were placed on the European University project and some saw the EUI as only the beginning of a bigger project. In 1962, Lambert opens the question of a possible replica university in another state. He suggests that if the University in Florence were to prove successful, attracting large numbers of students spending part of their study at the University as well as international students, it may become too small. Therefore, it may occur to another state to create another European University in their country. For example, if Belgium decided to create another European University, it might consider developing its already existing College of Europe to create a counterpart to the Florence University. Looking now at the situation over forty years later, although it was a very valuable consideration, it has not been feasible. In its current form, the European University’s development has not advanced as it was perhaps hoped in the 1960s. Given the complexities of its development,

5

AN INTELLECTUAL HUB FOR EUROPE …

139

in the form of diverging domestic opinions and legitimate obstacles to its creation, we can see how a smaller institution than originally foreseen was created. When placed within the broader context of European integration and the construction of Europe, the creation of an academic institution of a European nature encounters obstacles linked to the coexistence of different nationalities, the recognition of diplomas and the mobility of academic staff. Furthermore, the existence of two European academic institutions posed problems for the project. The European University and the College of Europe were living in the other’s shadow, creating a difficult dynamic that to a certain extent conditioned the development of each institution. Time has smoothed out the differences and in a quickly changing Europe, the need and role of the two institutions shall be as pertinent as they were at the beginning of European integration.

Bibliography Bekemans, L., Mahncke, D., & Picht, R. (Eds.). (1999). The College of Europe: Fifty Years of Service to Europe. Bruges: College of Europe. Brugmans, H. (1969). The ‘European University’—Where to Go? Comparative Education, 5(1), 17–23. Lambert, J. R. (1962). The European University: A European Communities Project. The World Today, 18(2), 77–88. Palayret, J.-M. (1995). A University for Europe: A Pre-history of the European University Institute in Florence (1948–1967). Rome: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Department of Information and Publishing. Vermuelen, C. (2000). Le Collège d’Europe à l’ère des pionniers (1950–1960). Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

CHAPTER 6

Education: A Complicated Policy Field

Neofunctionalism and Education The notion of spillover in matters relating to education is apparent. From the beginning of European integration spillover from other policy areas into education can be identified: The movement of people, which led to a need to address the recognition of qualifications and periods of study abroad, the teaching of foreign languages, provisions and specialist training for teaching the children of migrant children; a common agricultural policy, which led to vocational training of agricultural workers; a common vocational training programme, which required the training of teachers; and scientific cooperation, which called upon strengthened connections between higher education institutions and the mobility and exchange of research staff. Member states are confronted with a variety of problems relating to education, which cannot always be managed at the national level. Introducing free movement of people brought about increased pressure to provide greater and more varied educational opportunities, and the organisational and financial implications became a common interest at a higher level than the nation-state. Policies in other sectors such as industry and social affairs spilled over into education with potential spill from future regional policies, where educational opportunities and infrastructure would necessarily come into play. It can be said that education was

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_6

141

142

S. K. ST. JOHN

proving to emerge as the nuts and bolts of numerous areas of European Community policy in the way that neofunctionalism had predicted. According to neofunctionalist theory, nation-states would not be able to determine the direction, extent and pace of change once a certain degree of loyalty had already been transferred to the supranational level. Supranational institutions would become actors in their own right with the deliberate entrepreneurial action by European authorities, and not necessarily based on the spontaneous emergence of new functional agencies. In the supranational context, it can be proposed that the basic actors are also autonomous individuals, acting in representation of the supranational institution and its interests. Policy entrepreneurship is a theory that has already been proposed by Corbett (2005) to explain the advancement of education and higher education policy, but it focuses largely on actors within the supranational institutions. While the proposal put forward in this framework is plausible in many respects, with too much focus on supranational actors it risks sympathising with neofunctionalist theory, implying that individual states were not involved in the process and their interests not considered. Furthermore, although the theory of policy entrepreneurship identifies key actors to suggest the successful advancement of education and higher education policy at European level, it lacks a profound analysis and explanation for their motives. Neither does it flesh out the notion of spillover, which played an important role in the development of education at the European level. The European University project provides a palpable demonstration of the type of spillover that can occur within the field of education at European level. The European University can be perceived as a “product” of the Europeanisation of higher education. In this sense, the European University had the potential to become the hub of European higher education and the centre of coordination for European research and ability; a beacon for other European higher education institutions. However, the attempt to create a university in which no nationality dominates and which is governed by all member states brought together numerous issues, namely for the harmonisation of higher education more generally, including the mutual recognition of qualifications, mobility, research cooperation, and the learning and use of languages. The European University represented to a certain extent a physical example of Europe with people from different nationalities coming together to live, work and study in the same physical location, putting into practice within an educational setting the core principles of a united Europe. It showed

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

143

that uploading education to the European level had repercussions stemming from the mobility of people, and the mobility of their academic lives. The University was confronted with the need to establish a system of recognition of qualifications in order to admit its students fairly from the member states and beyond. Moreover, it had to consider the qualification that it would confer to ensure it would be recognised within the member states. Furthermore, the University needed to accommodate the different languages that would be spoken, and identify the formal working languages and the linguistic skills that it would require from its students, professors and staff. In this regard, it would need to promote language learning to offer its members the opportunity to maintain and improve their language skills. It would also need to develop ways to cooperate on a European level with other university institutions, especially if it were to function alongside and together with existing national universities. As it can be seen, collaborating in one area of education or a matter close to education opens a Pandora’s Box of other issues to confront.

Intergovernmentalism and Education Throwing into question the plausibility of neofunctionalism, it is observed that since the European idea much of the most dynamic discussion and activity in the area of education have taken place within an intergovernmental context. This is also the case when looking at the most successful more recent collaborations in the field of education at European level, namely the Bologna Process and—although underpinned by the European Commission—the inter-institution collaboration that takes place through the Erasmus+ Programme. According to intergovernmental theory, what Moravcsik (1998) calls “two-level games” take place, which deems to explain that actors work in the “national” and “international” arenas simultaneously and rather than being separated from each other, they are intertwined. What is brought to the negotiation table at international level will depend on what is important at national level, and national governments take policy positions that are shaped by national preferences. Therefore, European integration is the result of strategic calculations by national governments to promote their main economic interests. Once national interests have been established, the two-level game theory takes place as bargaining at international level begins, which is the driving force behind international or European

144

S. K. ST. JOHN

cooperation, as opposed to the driving force being civil servants acting within the European institutions. Intergovernmentalism places states at the centre of the process. The theories of Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have been borrowed for this study from the political scientists, as a basis upon which to seek to explain the competence expansion of education across the landscape of European integration. However, it transpires that borrowing theories from other disciplines is not always compatible with studies in education and there are a number of specific issues that have been illuminated by the research to demonstrate that neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism hold water in an education-policy context.

Statism The previous chapters have shown that supranational influence was present in the field of education at European level, and spillover from developments in other policy areas occurred to some extent. However, the evidence also suggests that the spillover process faced resistance, and national dynamics, fuelled by domestic interests, weighed heavily on the extent of implementation and policy-development in education. In early European integration, through the neofunctionalist lens, the role of the state was questioned and upward policy development towards the supranational level was deemed automatic. Bartolini (2006) suggests that the process of European integration resulted from “problem pressures” after the two world wars, leading to the inadequacy of the state, and that Europeanisation can therefore be interpreted as a response to the weakening of the state system, as well as to new pressure of capitalist world development. However, several pivotal moments emerge from the evidence to demonstrate that the power and the influence of the state remained present, which is resonant with the work of Alan Milward (1992), who argues within an intergovernmentalist framework that European integration in fact rescued the nation-state. The case study chapter on the European University project highlights the behaviour of Charles De Gaulle vis-à-vis the European University project. Together with evidence in Chapter 3 outlining his reaction to the common agricultural policy they are indicators of member states’ ability to influence the direction and scope of spillover and policy development. The European University project maintained its supranational component until 1960 when the French representative suggested the project should

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

145

be tackled in the framework of the European cultural cooperation agency. Despite the conviction of the Italian, Belgian and German delegations that the University should have institutional links with the Community, the project was reconsidered in a framework of intergovernmental cultural cooperation. The Commission was no longer involved and the University would be governed and funded by member states of the Council of Europe on an intergovernmental basis, led by the Italians. Five years later, in 1965, De Gaulle sparked a period of “Eurosclerosis” and the “Empty Chair Crisis” after behaving in a similar fashion regarding voting in the European Council. De Gaulle sought to reduce supranational tendencies, claiming that the European Commission could not constitute a political power and that Europe should be governed on an intergovernmental basis. His two actions in 1960 and 1965 can support this opinion. This example of applying brakes to a supranational project in favour of intergovernmental cooperation provides a tangible demonstration of the importance of the nation-state in the governance process. The case of the European University may be on a smaller scale than European integration, but nevertheless it demonstrates nation-states’ capabilities to halt supranational activities in the field of education, and not by chance a similar dynamic took place at the heart of the integration process in the form of the “Empty Chair Crisis”. Most importantly, it provides evidence that nation-states are able to control the direction and scope of competence at European level. Challenging the viability of neofunctionalist theory, these examples led nefunctionalist thinkers to reconsider the theory in its traditional form. One such scholar was Philippe Schmitter (2005) who coined the notion of “spill-back” within his revised version of neofunctionalism (neoneofunctionalism) to address the fact that states could exert power in the spillover process. The evidence suggests that spillover triggers for further integration in the field were present and paved the way for policy expansion according to neofunctionalist theory. However, the fact that today the European Community still does not possess fully fledged competence in the field of education indicates the problematics of education at European level. It suggests that member states had some degree of control over the direction and scope of competence and to some extent the (lack of) development of activities towards the field of education further enroots Schmitter’s notion of “spillback”, that even if policy development begins along the lines of traditional neofunctionalism, competence can fall back into the hands of the nation-state. The fact that the European University

146

S. K. ST. JOHN

project shifted from the supranational to the intergovernmental context, hence with more control to the individual states, can also be considered an example of spill-back in the area of education. For the nation-state, there was a seemingly evident attraction to uploading competence in educational matters to the European level. As indicated in Chapter 5, the educational sector in all member states had been under pressure in post-war Europe; education systems and teacher training had been reviewed. Revised systems brought about new opportunities for teaching and learning in Europe, but also new problems, particularly in the increasingly globalised world. Member states would therefore benefit from tackling these global questions within a European context, if not supranational, at least at a level that went beyond the national. In general, since most member states were experiencing changes in one way or another within their education systems, at the very least, knowledge sharing would be beneficial for all. The introduction of free movement, explained in Chapter 3, had put further pressures still on the social infrastructures of the member states, including and especially education in the form of the recognition of qualifications, the learning of languages and the integration into society and communities of migrants and their children. In order to ensure the success of the European project, citizens required a comprehensive understanding of Europe through educational activities. However, this renouncing of competence for supranational control did not take place and in the cases in which it did, member states were able to control the direction and scope. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of activities detailed in Chapter 2, which took place during the early stages of European integration, did so within the intergovernmental setting of the Council of Europe, where they also appeared to have the most success. The Conventions of the Council of Europe on the recognition of qualifications can be taken as an example. It was expected at the European level that the ratifications would be applied by the member states, but the reality showed that they did not go beyond a quick “patch-up” of the issue. This may have been due to the member states’ political resources to implement the ratifications, but it is likely also due to a lack of will to fully adopt them. The member states were able to engineer Conventions that lacked concrete detail, which reduced the Council of Europe’s capacity to enforce the Conventions. It could be argued that there would have been less signatories if the Convention had been written rigidly

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

147

with a legally binding component. Member states would have been keen to protect the value and reputation of their qualifications and therefore willing to collaborate at the European level, only if they could do so on their terms. The Council of Europe had to rely on a “top-down” approach, based on intergovernmental agreements and the cooperation of member states. Although this approach was not often successful, the significance of state power became evident, and therefore provided a valuable learning curve for future Community-level activity in education, in which the “top-down” approach was consequently avoided. It seemed evident from the outset that European Community involvement in all aspects of education was never going to be feasible, perhaps only in the long-term. Why? This section has placed the nation-state at the centre of the policy-development process, echoing intergovernmentalist theory, but assigning the role of principal actor to the nation-state is not enough to explain why cooperation in education at European and supranational level was so problematic. Two important interlinked notions of diversity are brought to light, which help to explain why intergovernmentalism alone does not work for education policy. The first is diversity among policy areas, and the second is diversity among nation-states.

States and the Distinctive Nature of Education Policy Policy areas are different in the themes they address, the type of actions carried out within their frameworks, their sensitivities, and the people, services or objects they impact. To this end, presuming that there is a “one size fits all” solution to explaining the development of policy areas can be challenged. At the core of education policy, there are people instead of money or commodities; education policy directly and immediately impacts upon citizens and the way they develop as individuals. Already this provides a reason why it cannot be placed in the same box as energy policy or transport policy for example, but this line of thought can be developed further to suggest that education is a complex policy area due to its intricate webbing with nationalism, national identity, and subsequently nation-building. The concept of nation-state is a debated area that has been addressed by Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, but according to Chernilo, with no clear concept of what it is (Chernilo 2008, 2006). Indeed, it is a complex notion that goes beyond the structural make-up

148

S. K. ST. JOHN

to encompass the people within the state and the bonds between them, and the “nation” and the “state” should not be confused as the same entity. While states are composed of institutions, a nation is described as “a shared belief that its members belong together, and a shared wish to continue their life in common”, and “in asserting national identity, one assumes that beliefs and commitments are mirrored by those whom one takes to share that identity” (Miller 2000). It is also described as “not simply the product of macro-structural forces; it is simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in routine activities” (Fox and Miller Idriss 2008) and “a human population sharing historical territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991). Anderson defines nationalism as “an expression of certain straightforward ideas which provide a framework for political life” (Anderson 2000). Ultimately, a nation is a community of people, which is determined by a common nationality and national identity, that distinguishes one state from another. Beneath the surface of the nation, we find nationality. In its direct sense, nationality can be described as belonging to the country from which you possess a passport, implying that nationality is assigned at birth and it is a condition imposed on the individual. However, despite being imposed on individuals, it is considered to be a means to maintaining solidarity among states that are large and anonymous where the individuals are unable to foster solidarity through face-to-face interaction (Miller 2000). This notion indicates that nationality is much more profoundly embedded in individuals than simply the passport they hold. Scratching deeper below the surface of a nation, and beyond nationality, national identity can be found. National identity is closely linked to personal identity; the first elements used to describe one’s personal identity is often nationality. One’s country of origin forms a marked part of who they are, but it is necessary to determine what it means for personal identity to constitute that nationality beyond the passport they carry, and hence how one’s national identity shapes their personal identity. People of the same national identity believe they share similar traits that distinguish them from people from other nations. These can be of a cultural nature, consisting of shared values, tastes and sensibilities, which go beyond the simple sharing of institutions (Miller 2000). Another thread to add to Miller’s list is the use of a common language (Laffan 1996), though it is also possible to feel a

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

149

sense of belonging to a nation in which more than one official language is spoken, such as in Belgium and Switzerland. While the nation relies on nationality to maintain its solidarity, individuals are equally reliant on national identity to provide them with a purpose that goes beyond what they are able to generate themselves. Whether they choose to recognise their national identity or not, there is a mutual need between the individual and the state: Individuals need national identity to function as social beings, and the nation—even the state—needs individuals to identify with the nation-state through its symbols and institutions (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). The consequences when this mutual need breaks down can be seen in events in Catalonia—without forgetting other similar referenda such as that of Scotland in 2014, as well as consultative referenda in Northern Italy in the autumn of 2017 for increased regional autonomy—where sub-state nationalisms have proven stronger than state nationalisms and individuals identify with a regional identity more than national identity. If individuals are unable to identify with their nationality, they seek replacements for national identities, which challenges the legitimacy of existing states. To avoid such cases requires effective nation-building, but nation-building is a delicate process that is not as simple as instilling a common national identity on individuals. It is not possible to simply “adopt a national ideology” (Miller 2000) or to change national identity. National identities are embedded in a nation’s past and individuals carry an obligation to bring them forward into the present and future. New nationals inherit the past in which fellow nationals fought and spilt blood in defence of the nation, making nationality an ethical community because it stretches across generations and it is nonrenouncing for the present generation. This temporal element constitutes a type of national community that cannot be shared by other forms of association (Miller 2000). Nation-building can be considered in the first instance as the establishment of a new state as a political entity, but it is also described as “the process whereby the inhabitants of a state’s territory come to be loyal citizens of that state” (Bloom 1990). Moreover, nation-building is the fostering of national identities, which, apart from characterising a nation’s traits, myths and shared values, unite individuals to achieve the solidarity mentioned earlier. It is suggested that nation-building is successful when the nation-state has not only achieved solidarity among its people, but

150

S. K. ST. JOHN

when it can also claim its people’s loyalty, especially in cases of competition with external actors, for example in international conflict or where symbols of national identity are threatened. In this context, national sentiment is an important source of power for a state when it comes to acting within the foreign policy arena (Bloom 1990). In order for nation-building to be successful, it is necessary for the individual to feel connected to the nation-state and to feel the benefits of such connection. Bloom (1990) suggests that when individuals connect with the nation-state though symbols of the state, identity and psychological security are enhanced. Once an identification of the nation-state has been fostered by the mass of the people, then the same identification is passed on to new generations by family and social groupings. Nation-building is therefore not a requirement for developing countries seeking to establish nations for the first time, but it is an ongoing process for developed states to ensure the solidarity and loyalty of the nation to confront national challenges when they arise. Thanks to effective nation-building, citizens not only stand together in times of terrorist attacks or national disasters, but two great wars have shown that citizens will go as far as fighting and even dying for their country. When nation-building fails, citizens look elsewhere for identifications and loyalties and the nation-state effectively risks falling apart. If nation-building is fundamental for the survival of the nation-state, what then are the building blocks? Education provides a proposal for a mechanism in the nation-building process. Varying forms of education, whether within the framework of the formal education system or not, repeatedly prove to be important for the development and transmission of nationhood. Education is embedded in the nation-state, so much so that it is considered to have been a founding factor in its establishment, adopting education as an instrument for transferring national history to their societies and for promoting national language and culture (Neave 2001). The link between education and national-identity formation presents itself as a fairly understudied area, yet strong links to nation-building can be drawn from areas of educational research such as the teaching of history, the teaching of language and culture and in more recent curriculum, the inclusion of teaching on citizenship. However, nation-building through the education system does not only regard teaching subjects that specifically relate to elements of national identity like national history and language, but it is also the mentality and the approach with which education is delivered to its citizens that

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

151

contributes to the values and morals they develop. In this sense, educational settings can be considered as the closest context to the family setting regarding the trans-generational diffusion of elements forming national identities. If education forms a fundamental means to nation-building and the development and transmission of national identities, it can be understood why nation-states are adamant to keep a tight grip on their education systems. For the nation-state there is too much at stake to allow any interference in the functioning of education systems and the content of curricula. As Walkenhorst (2008) suggests, education is too closely interwoven into the national fabric of a state in terms of identity, culture, heritage and solidarity. As we know from Beukel (1993, 2000), Walkenhorst (2008) and Garben (2011), from the point of view of supranational involvement in education, education has always been and remains an area of national sensitivity. Taking into account the considerations detailed above, nation-states will be hostile towards any meddling in a policy that has the potential to weaken its nation-building and to dilute its national identity. This is because, as suggested earlier, unsuccessful nation-building reduces national solidarity, placing the nation-state in a precarious position. It risks breaking the mutual need that exists between the citizen and the state, causing citizens to lose their sense of belonging and potentially look towards other forms of self-determination, and causing states to lose the loyalty that constitutes their strengths in times of challenge and conflict. At this stage, it is possible to weave into this discussion the impact of globalisation on national identity to raise a point that despite an increasingly globalised world, national identities are maintained. Globalisation, which as Bartolini (2006) seeks to explain should not be confused with Europeanisation, is limiting “states’ capacity to determine the cultural make-up of its citizens”. Citizens across the globe are reading the same news, watching the same television programmes and the same films, following the same fashion trends and purchasing the same commodities, but the fact remains that national identities are still evident. Therefore, if factors external to education are becoming more globalised, while education systems are maintaining their national focus, this fact that national curricula and education have so far resisted globalisation, can be used to suggest that education is an important driver in the development and maintenance of national identity. In this regard, it is true that Ball (2012)

152

S. K. ST. JOHN

advocates, within the question of private education as a means to problems of state education, that state education is diminishing in its welfare form. However, the point is that education in the strict sense of the state system, has maintained its national domination. Diversity Between States While Moravcsik’s insistence on placing states at the centre of the process is valid, it is also valid to insist that states are not necessarily equal or function in the same way. What is therefore not apparent in intergovernmentalist theory is the acknowledgement of the diversity between states. As the Six entered into the process of European integration, every state had suffered the effects of the Second World War, which characterised the post-war period in all states as a moment of desperation. However, the scale of desperation varied from state to state in nature and extent, from a battle for basic provisions (Germany) to the regeneration of a slumped economy (France), and to social struggles in the form of unemployment and inflation (Italy). Even once recovered from the effects of war, the diversity between states remains—some states are larger and more powerful than others—which affects their ability to influence affairs at European level. However, it is the differences that foster interest when assessing the national interests of each state as they enter into European integration and began to collaborate on activities at the European level. While Benelux was in the spirit of reconstruction that it had already demonstrated with the Benelux union, Germany and Italy were attempting to rebuild their societies and disassociate themselves from their totalitarian pasts, and France focused on concrete plans to regenerate the economy. It can be suggested that each state entered into the construction of Europe and cooperation in activities at the European level with its own agenda, but at the same time recognising a number of similarities and the common experience of a war-torn country that required protection from Communism. Some states were more willing than others to transfer loyalty to the European level for the sake of greater integration, while others dragged their heels.

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

153

Diversity Within States In addition to diversity between the founding states of the European Community, diversity also emerges from within the individual states. As Chernilo points out, in the creation of nation-states, they have been divided so that disputes and struggles have been more common than not (Chernilo 2008). In a federal state, such as that of Germany, control in certain areas of policy, can be found at both the national (government) and the local (Länder) level. Such distribution of power can have an impact on policy development towards the European and supranational level, especially education, which is controlled at local level. Italy too delegates a certain degree of control to its provinces at local level, though not to the same extent as Germany. Diversity within France was political and affected the state’s approach to European integration. Perhaps the most influential components in France’s position at European level were its leaders: Charles De Gaulle, President from 1944–1946 and from 1959–1969; and Robert Schuman, Prime Minister from 1947–1948 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1948–1952. The two individuals were ferocious opposites, De Gaulle being a strong nationalist and Schuman a strong advocate of European integration, who proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and is known to be one of the architects of European integration. The circumstances suggest a country torn in two directions. At the birth of the European idea, Robert Schuman steered the country to a key position in the discussions on uniting Europe. Between 1948 and 1958, there was a period on instability with a different Prime Minister each year before De Gaulle took office again at the beginning of 1959, which was at the crucial early stages of established integration. The ideologies of a Federal Europe were heard with difficulty under De Gaulle and on several occasions the weight of his opinion was heard, notably in the “empty-chair crisis” of 1965 when he withdrew French participation from the Community in an act of protest against the proposal to move towards majority voting in the European Council. This led to the period of “Eurosclerosis” and the stalling of the European integration process until De Gaulle returned when unanimous voting was reinstated. Diversity within states can also emerge in cultural terms, which can be seen in the case of Belgium, divided culturally and linguistically between the “Flamands” and the Walloons. In the context of education, this

154

S. K. ST. JOHN

suggests that the Belgians were all too aware of the implications for education, including higher education, policy as they could only impose a broad set of principles at national level to maintain a certain level of consistency across the nation. However, it meant that the Belgians had a certain vision of feasibility for a European-level education policy that accommodated different languages, identities and cultures, which would be more difficult to grasp for other nations. Belgium realised though that it was necessary to achieve such common policy if the country was to compete at a higher economic and cultural level. Diverse Reactions Towards European-Level Education The intertwinement of education and nation-building detailed above highlights the complexities of education policy, and indeed reactions towards meddling in education from external actors differed across the member states of the European Community. Incorporating into the analysis the notion that states are different can serve to explain the difference in reactions. The type of national-level control over education varied among the states; some states’ systems were centralised and hierarchical (Italy and France), while others gave more autonomy, even complete control, to the local level (Germany and Belgium). Tensions between the state and the church were present in education across the majority of the Six. The majority of universities were state-run and state-funded, or run by the Catholic Church, and overcrowding and inadequate facilities affected higher education in all states at some point between 1945 and 1975, with the exception of Luxembourg, which did not create a university until 2003. Such conditions led to student protests across the states towards the end of the 1960s. As Chapter 5 has revealed, differences emerged especially during the discussions on the European University. West Germany had already experienced external meddling in its education system from the occupying Allies, who sought to restructure the system and revise curricula in an attempt to denazify the country. As a country with a history of nurturing communism, post-war West Germany was not in a position to protect its education system. Nevertheless, such re-education programmes were resisted by the local (Länder) governments, which controlled education and ultimately, the education system returned to the system adopted before Nazism.

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

155

France can be considered to be among the most nationalistic of the founding states and, drawing on the links made above between nationalism and education, it can be determined that the education of its citizens was therefore important. The evidence outlined earlier in Chapter 5 has suggested that French citizens were encouraged to obtain the highest qualification they were capable of achieving and therefore, a university degree was highly significant for the French people and graduation from one of the “Grandes Écoles” was considered to be a key to success. This national attachment to education created implications for their support towards the European University project. France feared that a supranational university would gain too much importance as an academic institution, and it favoured a system of reinforced cooperation among existing national universities. Vocational training and adult education were given attention in postwar France and were developed within universities as a means of facilitating economic growth. The centralisation of universities led to the increased prestige of the University of Paris as the city became the intellectual hub of France. Against this backdrop, it can thus be suggested that France could have exerted resistance towards a situation that may jeopardise or undermine the prestige of its institutions. This was demonstrated in the French delegation’s opposition to the term “University” for the institution, and in fact, “University Institute” was the term eventually adopted. Italy was unified in 1861, less than 100 years earlier than the beginning of European integration, so the Italians were more accustomed to the concept of integration than other founding states, such as France. In fact, the Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi was considered to be one of the most prominent figures in the European project and cemented Italy’s place within it. This consideration comes into play when reflecting upon education: before unification, education was governed across the Italian states by the Catholic Church on a supranational basis. Neither then was the concept of supranationalism alien to the Italians. After unification, a new system was implemented with centralised governance at the regional level, though religion remained a strong element of the system. Notable was Italy’s long history of universities, with the world’s oldest university being established in Bologna in 1088 hence inventing the very concept of a university. Similar to other European states, the university system was oversubscribed by the 1960s, when an economic boom was also experienced.

156

S. K. ST. JOHN

The Belgians expressed a general agreement to create a university institution with a preference for a postgraduate institution. However, Belgium’s principle concern with a European University was the competition with the already established College of Europe, in which Belgium had heavily invested. Even if the Belgian government agreed with the creation of the European University, it had a vested interest in recognising internal opinions deriving from the College of Europe. On the other hand, Luxembourg was profoundly convinced by the creation of a European University, advocating a complete university. The Luxembourgian representative, Pierre Pescatore, was the Chairman of the project’s working group, which, given Luxembourg’s previous experience in mediation between France and Germany and the diverse opinions over the European University project, appears to be a thought-out choice. Luxembourg did not possess a university and thus escaped threats to a national higher education sector, and had even attempted to create an “Institut Luxembourgeois Universitaire” (Luxembourgian University Institute) in 1949. The project did not come to fruition and it could be suggested that the Luxembourg delegation saw the European University as an opportunity to, at least to a certain extent, realise their project. It can be noted that the institution eventually created was called the “European University Institute”. The Dutch delegation agreed with the creation of a European University, but like the French delegation, believed it should be established within an intergovernmental context, which would also allow the participation of countries outside the Six. It appears that such considerations derive from concerns over the financial burden that such a project would carry if restricted to the Six, and are in line with the fact that Dutch universities were facing limited financial resources. The Netherlands would find it difficult to justify hefty expenses for a European University when it was cutting expenses for national higher education. Re-establishing Reputation Differing circumstances affected states’ motivations for allowing control to be passed to the European level. Evidence from previous chapters suggests that Germany and Italy were the greatest supporters of activities at European level in the field of education, in particular the European University project, and they shared similar motivations for doing so. In both cases, the desire to re-establish a reputation emerges as a prominent driver for developing policy at European level. Germany was eager

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

157

to rebuild its reputation in general and find its footing in the European arena by making a contribution where it could, which can provide an explanation for its advocacy towards the European integration process and the projects within it, including the European University. The case of Germany shows, on the one hand, a federal government that suggested a willingness to make sacrifices to regain its reputation and gain freedom from the totalitarian regime, even at the expense of education. The German universities had been destroyed due to the presence of Communist authorities and were being re-established with the financial assistance from the US. By 1949, in the height of talks on the European idea, American funding from the Marshall Plan had boosted the economic recovery of West Germany and subsequently, it can be said, boosted the country’s confidence to rediscover its place as a leader on the European scene. However, on the other hand, there was strong resistance from local governments, over the meddling—to a certain extent even from the national level, let alone supranational level—in the affairs of education. These tensions emerged in the case study on the European University project, in which there was conviction at the national level to pursue the project, but there was strong opposition at the local level. The Länder governments had not been consulted on the matter of collaboration on the European University and the German university rectors felt a supranational university was a threat to national universities. This opposition from the local level affected the German delegation’s ability to act at European level on the matter of the European University; without the support of the Länder the German delegation could not advocate the project at European level. Post-war Italy was in a similar place to Germany from the point of view that it was recovering from a long period of authoritarian regime: Fascism, which lasted from October 1922 until April 1945. The country was in a vulnerable state. There were questions over its governance as the result of a referendum over the monarch in 1946, in which the population voted in favour of a republic, and the country owed $360 million in reparations to other states. In 1948, Italy received Marshall funding from the US, which allowed for the creation of bridges, schools and hospitals. Italy was reliant on US funding for its recovery and economic development, which was made well known among the population and American influence had a notable effect on Italy. By 1949, Italy was considered to be America’s most faithful ally and even issues that had major implications for Italian sovereignty were not debated heavily.

158

S. K. ST. JOHN

As one of the principle actors in the European integration process while also feeling disadvantaged among the other members of the Six, the Italian government was keen to lay European foundations in its country and establish its reputation in the European Community. Having produced the first university in the world and with a long history of universities and a rich cultural heritage, Italy saw an opportunity in the European University project to regain a position on the cultural level. The Italians were therefore enthusiastic about the European University project and were willing to make compromises by accommodating the diverse opinions to see it succeed. Political instability did not escape the post-war Benelux countries, and to a certain extent, the Benelux countries also sought to establish their reputation in the Economic Community by working together. Belgium experienced questioning over its governance when, in 1950, a referendum saved its monarch who later abdicated leaving the throne to his twenty-year old son. The Netherlands was dealing with the aftermath of Nazi occupation and decolonialisation in Indonesia, which was weighing heavily on manpower and funding. However, an important aspect to the Benelux countries was their union, which, after treaties were drawn up between the three countries in 1948, was being formed at the same time as the European institutions. Together, they were able to take advantage for Marshall Plan funding and generally, they were able to recognise the benefits of political and economic union. Unfortunately, integration at the European level overshadowed the significance of the Benelux union, but it does shed light on the positive approach of these countries towards integration. Luxembourg had been a notable player as an intermediary in the reconciliation between France and Germany, and involvement in European integration was rarely questioned by Luxembourg’s population and politicians.

The Temporal Nature of Policy Development Temporality brings another dimension to the study by highlighting how factors and circumstances affecting policy development change over time. Instead of examining a series of single moments in time, looking at the temporal unfolding of processes reveals connections, raises questions and finds answers that may have otherwise been omitted. While the role of temporality has been addressed in areas such as the sociology of education (Lingard and Thompson 2017; Leaton Gray 2017), little attention has been paid to specifically temporal dimensions of social

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

159

and political processes (Pierson 2004). For a start, the notion of time is absent from neofunctionalist theory. The clearest explanation is that the theory was developed at the beginning of European integration when experience of time passing during the integration process had not yet occurred and was therefore not considered. In fact, in opposition to neofunctionalism, Moravcsik’s work, as a historical study testing a series of standardised hypotheses across five critical stages in the European integration process, takes temporality into consideration. Compared to neofunctionalist theory, which can be seen more as a prediction of how the integration process would develop, Moravcsik had the privilege of being able to test the theory within a temporal framework, looking back in time to seek explanations for how the integration process had taken place. However, what still cannot be found in intergovernmentalism is an unpacking of what the temporal dimension means to the analysis. History is often used as a source of empirical material, rather than to explain how politics unfolds over time (Pierson 2004). Events can be studied with a historical approach to seek causal accounts to explain certain outcomes, which provide a widened understanding of particular events. However, it does not necessarily explain how the events fit into a broader research programme. Other scholars use history to search for illustrative material to serve as an explanation for a model being used in the present, but this does not shed light on the temporal dimension of a process (Pierson 2004). Temporal sequencing demonstrates how factors and circumstances for development change over time. If the analysis focuses on the role of a particular actor, or hones in on a particular element in policy development, it is easy to lose sight of what is happening around that main actor, and this changes the overall scope, direction and speed of development. Complex dynamics can be fleshed out of a temporal sequence of events or processes that are linked together and laid out over time, highlighting previously overlooked outcomes and explanations to the way in which policy develops. Taking into consideration not only the “what” in a process, but also the “when”, the temporal ordering of events can cast light on why certain results appear. It is therefore not to say that the outcome would be the same if the same event occurred at a different moment in time because surrounding variables causing the outcome may not be the same. As Tilly puts it, “when things happen in a sequence affects how they happen” (Tilly 1984). Over time, individual actors change and a member state’s economic circumstances improve or

160

S. K. ST. JOHN

worsen, which affects decisions taken at that time. If the same decision is to be taken ten years later, those variables may be different and may favour the decision. This process can be identified in the development of education policy when events that led to formal activities in education at European level are placed in a sequence spanning a period of three decades, and the European University project in particular provides a tangible example of how decisions made at different times can impact the result. The European University project was initiated and re-initiated on several occasions, highlighting a series of significant dates in the development of the European University project. The first being 1949, when at a meeting of the cultural section of the European Movement the proposal of a European University was first discussed, but opinions were divided on the type of institution to be created and ultimately the College of Europe was created in 1950. The next date is 1956, when a proposal was presented again at the Messina conference in 1956 by the German delegation. However, it was not discussed and passed to an intergovernmental committee. In 1957, within the framework of Euratom, the Commission then proposed the creation of a joint atomic research centre to form the basis of a European University and appeared as article 9 in the Euratom Treaty. The project continued to develop within this framework, but in 1960 it returned to an intergovernmental context after its supranational orientation was contested by the French delegation, De Gaulle in particular. In 1961, the project was assigned to the Italians who managed the project until the creation of the European University Institute in Florence (Italy) in 1972. The decade-long gap in the project’s development was caused by a conflict of ideas on the orientation of the institution, as well as temporal clashes with the Elysée Treaty and the “empty-chair crisis”. The resignation of De Gaulle in 1969 facilitated the development of the project as he had caused a significant obstacle to its progression. Taking into consideration the temporal sequencing of these events causes questions to emerge as to whether the outcomes would have been the same if the dates were different. If the proposals had been presented at a time when De Gaulle was not in power, it could be argued that the project would have developed more smoothly or perhaps continued to unfold within a supranational context. The fact that the project was proposed again in 1956 when nuclear energy was a hot topic in the Community meant it was shoehorned into that context, but had it been

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

161

pursued at a different time, would it had taken on a different orientation? This example demonstrates that temporal sequencing highlights the importance of background variables in the development of processes. Furthermore, from this example it is possible to see that time is a common link between a process in which multiple events and microprocesses overlap and interconnect. Each event or process can be considered individually, but exploring the broader sequence of events leading towards a common outcome highlights intersections in distinctive paths of different, though linked, long-term processes. This notion can be combined with intergovernmentalist theory, focusing on national interests, to explain how policies develop when national interests converge. Each member state follows its individual path based on domestic interests, causing a web of overlapping processes under the umbrella of education, but an outcome will not occur until several of the paths meet an intersection. Similarly, the notion of multiple events and micro-processes overlapping and interconnecting lends itself to the concept of spillover. Individual processes take place in other policy areas, which encounter an intersection with education causing an outcome in the development of education policy. For example, by following the process of the free movement of people, an intersection is found at the recognition of diplomas and qualifications or the teaching of languages. Alternatively, the process of developing scientific research intersects with cross-border university collaboration and exchanges. Another consideration is that each individual process takes place at a different speed. Some member states may be eager to develop activities in education while others are hesitant, causing the lining up of national interests to be a slow-moving process, and the significance of that happening only being understood over time. Member state interests change as their circumstances change and shifts in motivations can be seen, which cause a stop-start development in each path and delays in their intersection. A temporal study exposes a shift from a cultural to an economic motivation to develop common activities in education at European level. A temporal study shows this shift over time, as circumstances change, and therefore the context in which education is used as a tool also changes over time. It can be said that the context in which education is proposed to be used provided a juncture for triggering an outcome: when collaboration in education incurred an economic benefit, national interests converged, leading to an outcome.

162

S. K. ST. JOHN

Pépin had highlighted the need to avoid the assumption that activities in education had not taken place before the 1970s and that the evolving process of establishing a European education policy had been long. Indeed, political outcomes may therefore be a slow-moving, cumulative process (Pierson 2004). There is a need to reflect upon what Ferdinand Braudel coined the longue durée; education demonstrates that developing policy can take a long time to develop and establish. The convergence of national interests may require considerable time to pass before it takes place, and only a temporal sequence can highlight such an aspect in the history of policy establishment. Moreover, limiting the study of causes and outcomes to the confines of individual paths of member states can lead to overlooking the significance of the junctures between them. When the element of persistence is present in a process, it also causes it to be slow-moving. Pressures accumulate over time without an effect until a threshold is reached, causing actors’ reassessment of options which leads to a rapid outcome (Pierson 2004). The process in which the field of education becomes an area of competency at European level in the broad sense is an example in itself of how persistence over time can generate an outcome. Discussions at European level on education emerged as early as 1948, but these did not transfer into formal activities within the European Community when it was established. Sixteen years passed before education was formally recognised as an area of competence of the European Commission. Nevertheless, in that time, the subject persisted with discussions taking place within an intergovernmental context and the importance of a role for education in the European integration process became evermore evident as the consequences of uniting Europe touched upon educational matters accumulated. It can be said that the threshold was reached in 1973 after the Janne Report called for member states to reassess their options regarding collaboration in the field of education. Once through the threshold, indeed activities began to develop at a faster pace. If events during the development of European education policy had been considered independently from each other, this element of persistence may have been overlooked.

The Importance of Context If a study focuses heavily on a determined set of variables to identify an outcome to a process, it is easy to dismiss context as external details. However, strong background variables may condition other factors to

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

163

affect the ultimate outcome. Considering the context of a process brings to light the relationships involved in a process; how certain factors are related to one another in a certain setting. Actors are shaped partly by the relationship with their setting and, in the same way that a moment in time is part of a broader temporal process, events take place within the setting of other events. How they sit within that setting can determine their significance (Pierson 2004). In this case, thinking about context means thinking about how activities and initiatives in the field of education relate to the broader process of uniting Europe and how the latter may have impacted those activities. Two contextual settings that affected the development of European education policy can be identified: political climate and governance. The first contextual setting is the political climate. The significance of the role of education in European integration was perhaps most apparent in the work of the European Movement, as outlined in Chapter 2, which saw it as a tool to foster a European identity, European culture, a European spirit, and secure European solidarity for the future. All these elements were needed if European unity were to be a success. States’ readiness to discuss and implement activities in education seemingly fell upon a backdrop of desperation. The Second World War had caused largescale destruction across the continent; the consequences of Communism had starkly come to light and its threat continued to loom. Of course, this was not the first time that nations of Europe faced the pressures of rebuilding their societies after war, for the First World War had already profoundly damaged them so that the second hit arriving in 1939 rocked them to their core. It was imperative that the European nations avoided any such reoccurrences and that its main objective had to be the creation and sustainability of peace. Uniting the countries of Western Europe was presented by the European Movement as the most feasible means to reaching such an achievement. Advocates of a united Europe fiercely maintained that if Europe were to hold war at bay, it could only do so if it were to create a close union between its six key states, namely France, Italy, West Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. There was a need to join forces to rebuild economies, as well as to face problems that could not be contained and managed within national borders. European nations had to agree to the creation of a supra-nation, which would inevitably come to impact on national affairs and interests even if it were based on cooperation between nations rather than the introduction of purely supranational

164

S. K. ST. JOHN

power. European solidarity existed when faced with the wake of a war, and solidarity fosters a genuine willingness to identify common solutions to problems that affect all parties. This proposes an explanation for the strong conviction of the role that education could play at European level, which sits starkly in contrariety to the role that education took—or not—a decade later upon the establishment of the European Community. Indeed, a decade had passed and the level of European solidarity that existed immediately after the war, and that had given impetus to collaboration in education, had withered. The establishment of the European Community brought about a new context—the movement of people—which called for collaboration in education in regard to university exchanges, the recognition of diplomas, the teaching of languages, cross-border research collaboration, etc. Here, the point on globalisation mentioned above can be called back into the discussion to demonstrate a second political climate that gave impetus to European education policy. As global pressures began to affect national education systems and states sought to increase their competitiveness towards a global knowledge economy, emphasis was placed once again on education. The governance of activities through intergovernmentalism and supranationalism provide a second context that impacts the development of education policy. Despite an apparent need to move to some degree towards Community competence in education with the introduction of free movement, competence during early European integration was maintained in an intergovernmental context; the Council of Europe carried out the majority of activity relating to the education sector. The discussions during this period that referred concretely to cooperation in higher education took place within intergovernmental contexts and collaborations, namely the meeting organised by the European University Association and the University of Grenoble, detailed in Chapter 7. This can be confirmed by the Janne Report, which even as far into the European integration process as 1972, stated that existing initiatives in education since the uniting of Europe had been slow and developed within intergovernmental contexts. It has been said that the Treaty of Rome itself provided ambiguous circumstances of creating both intergovernmental and supranational contexts (Keohane and Hoffman 1991). There were institutions such as the European Parliament, European Commission and the European Court of Justice which acted as supranational institutions, but the Council

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

165

of Ministers and the European Council functioned within an intergovernmental context. This difference in the type of institutions created tensions. If member states did decide to upload competence to the European level, they could still control the scope and direction of its development by carefully choosing the institution and therefore context in which it was dealt. It is therefore not surprising that much of the activities and initiatives in the field of education took place within the framework of the Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental context. Whether activities and initiatives in education are pursued, and at what pace, is closely linked to the governance setting in which they are situated. This is shown by the fact that the majority of activities with concrete outcomes have taken place within the intergovernmental setting of the Council of Europe. These include: the work of the Cultural Committee set up at the Hague Congress (1948) and the consequent discussions within the European Cultural Conference (1949); the creation of the College of Europe (1950), the activities in the framework of the Western European Union, including inter-university cooperation (1954) and the creation of a specialist committee for university rectors (1955), which resulted in the European Rectors Conference (1959); the activities throughout the 1950s and 1960s in the framework of the Council of Europe in the field of vocational training, Higher Education and Language and Adult Education, including the recognition of qualifications and exchanges; and the Report of the Interim Committee to the European Economic Community and Euratom within the framework of the creation of a European University (1960), addressing also European Higher Education Institutes and exchanges at university level including the harmonisation of study programmes. The most concrete outputs came in the form of institutions, which were not integrated into the European institutions that were later established in 1957.1

1 The European Cultural Centre was established in the Italian city of Venice, where it continues to exist as a centre operated by the European Cultural Foundation and registered in the Netherlands. The EBAE was established in 1953 by representatives from European states and now exists as a non-governmental organisation. The College of Europe remains one of the most successful initiatives since its creation in 1949 as it continues to be a thriving institution carrying out teaching, training and research on European Union issues and although it works closely with the European Union, it is not subjected to supranational governance. The European University project later materialised in 1976 in the form of an intergovernmental institution, the European University Institute in Florence, for doctoral students and research on areas of a European nature.

166

S. K. ST. JOHN

The European University project is also a valuable demonstration of how collaboration in an educational field depends on the governance setting. Although the idea of the European University was born within the context of the European Movement, on an intergovernmental basis, it developed within the creation of the European institutions and was eventually included as an article in the Euratom Treaty when the European Community was established, and hence it gained a supranational component. However, this placement of the European University within a supranational context sparked resistance from some member states, namely France, and the project returned to an intergovernmental context, in which it has since remained. Member states are watchful of the extent to which they cooperate and they respond to intergovernmental cooperation because it provides a more stable grounding to ensure control over the scope and extent of competence. This notion has been highlighted by Garben (2011) in the context of the Bologna Process—she states that, by opting for the intergovernmental context to develop the Bologna Process, member states have signalled their rejection of the European institutions as drivers of European integration in higher education. Member states sought to avoid the influence of the European institutions. Garben describes a “renationalisation” process in higher education through the adoption of the Bologna Process, in which member states seek to take back control. The intergovernmental context therefore also provides more fertile soil for discussions to drive forward policy development, while in a supranational context, as seen in the European University project, brakes are applied and an increased protectionist approach is adopted. In fact, feeling the member states’ resistance and protectiveness in regard to education, which could potentially stall policy development, the European Commission adopted the term “cooperation” in the context of activities and initiatives in education, as explained in Chapter 4. It was a means to reassuring education ministers that they could collaborate at European level without legal intervention. Cooperation would be based upon Resolutions and Conclusions rather than legally binding regulations and decisions. In fact, after the creation of the term “cooperation” for activities in the educational field, the education ministers were more inclined to collaborate on European-level activities and met within the Council in November 1971. This shift towards a willingness to take on a forward-thinking approach came from the secure environment in which to collaborate without losing

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

167

control over matters relating to education, and it opened education ministers up to the fact that there was benefit in cooperating in education, especially in the wider social dimension, because European integration was not only meant in economic terms. In this sense, it helped allay fears that collaborating in education meant jeopardising national sovereignty, culture and identity.

Final Thoughts The implication of carrying out an interdisciplinary study lies in confronting its complexity when adopting a theoretical framework. While it may appear advantageous to be able to call upon more than one discipline to provide a model in which to situate a study, having a greater choice does not always mean the right solution is available. What has been highlighted by this study is the need to remain cautious when borrowing theories from other disciplines. In this section, education has been used as a test case for assessing policy development and it can be seen that it is a unique policy area that requires a hybrid of more than one theoretical framework in order to comprehensively explain its development at European level. The value of neofunctionalism can be found in its notion of spillover. Education does not act alone; it is part of a complex interweaving of areas such as migration, employment, training in specific fields including agriculture, law and health, multilingualism, and scientific research (see Murphy and St. John 2019). Therefore, restricting research to the single policy area of education will not provide a full account of the vastness of the field. Equally, one cannot reject the notion of spillover when analysing activities within the field of education because the extensive overlap into other policy areas demonstrates that spillover is an integral component to the nature of education. However, the limits of neofunctionalism can be seen in its lack of consideration for nationalism and the role of states in the integration process. Giving space to the role of states has been important for the study in this section of the book. This falls most closely in line with an intergovernmentalist outlook on the development of education and higher education policy at European level and challenges the work of Corbett, who suggests that policy development in education was largely thanks to the entrepreneurial action of individuals at European level. Emphasis is placed on the voices of the member states, which were heard in the

168

S. K. ST. JOHN

process; the majority of initiatives took place within an intergovernmental context and when activities took on a truly supranational component—as in the case of the European University project—it was reverted back to an intergovernmental setting by the member states. Although intergovernmentalism provides a more feasible basis for explaining development in education policy, it is still not a perfect fit. Intergovernmentalism takes a macro perspective on policymaking, as opposed to considering a single policy area, and since education is so unique, there are some aspects in which intergovernmentalism falls short. Each state is different and can exert different amounts of influence in the policy development process, depending on their background circumstances, and this power to influence can change over time as circumstances change. With authoritarianism still looming over their shoulders, Germany and Italy began life in the integration process with less influential power and a need to prove their worth in the face of a democratic Europe, but later gained their position and even took the lead in certain initiatives (European University project). Therefore, while intergovernmentalism pays more attention to member-state interests, further consideration can be made to temporality and context. Exploration of the significance of temporal and contextual components in the development of European education policy has not been done justice in this study due to the scope permitted in the timescale provided. The work of Paul Pierson can be consulted in this regard (Howlett and Goetz 2014; Goetz 2014). Pierson goes against the grain of taking a “snap shot” view of the social world, and coined the notion that “history matters” by placing events into a temporal sequence to establish their meaning, which is often lost when events are stripped of their context. According to Pierson, complex social dynamics can be better understood by constructing “moving pictures” as opposed to a “snap shot”. Finally, education and the nation-state are closely linked. Since education is highly specific to nation-building and in the formation of national citizenship, member states have taken an exceptionally protectionist approach towards education at European level. If neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism ultimately work by the assumption that member states are willing to conduct activities and upload a certain level of competence to the European level, albeit on their terms in intergovernmentalism’s case, it must also be considered that there are particular areas—namely education—in which member states simply do not want to collaborate at European level. They can be convinced if there is

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

169

clear benefit to be gained, usually economic in the ways that Weymann (2010) explains through the fostering of a knowledge-based economy to improve competition for power and wealth. But ultimately, education will predominantly remain a matter of national governance.

Bibliography Anderson, M. (2000). States and Nationalism in Europe Since 1945. New York: Routledge. Ball, S. J. (2012). Global Education Inc: New Policy Networks and the Neo-Liberal Imaginary. Oxon: Routledge. Bartolini, S. (2005). Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring Between the Nation-State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bartolini, S. (2006). A Comparative Political Approach to the EU Formation (ARENA Centre for European Studies Working Papers, No. 4). University of Oslo. Beukel, E. (1993). Education. In S. Andersen & K. Eliassen (Eds.), Making Policy in Europe: The Europeification of National Policy Making. London: Sage. Beukel, E. (2000). Educational Policy: Institutionalisation and Multi-Level Governance. In S. Andersen & K. Eliassen (Eds.), Making Policy in Europe. London: Sage. Bloom, W. (1990). Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Börzel, T. A. (2005). Mind the Gap! European Integration Between Level and Scope. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 217–236. Chernilo, D. (2006). Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism. European Journal of Social Theory, 9(1), 9–22. Chernilo, D. (2008). Classic Sociology and the Nation-State. Journal of Classic Sociology, 8(1), 27–43. Corbett, A. (2005). Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy, 1955–2005. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Dale, R. (1989). The State and Education Policy. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. de Burca, G. (2005). Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 310–326. Flora, P., Kuhnle, S., & Urwin, D. (1999). State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan. Oxford University Press.

170

S. K. ST. JOHN

Fox, J., & Miller Idriss, C. (2008). Everyday Nationhood. Ethnicities, 8(4), 536– 576. Garben, S. (2011). EU Higher Education Law: The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International BV. Goetz, K. H. (2014). Time and Power in the European Commission. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 80(3), 577–596. Sage Publications. Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957 . Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hackl, E. (2001). The Intrusion and Expansion of Community Policies in Higher Education. Higher Education Management (OECD), 13(3), 99–119. Hoffmann, S. (1995). The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964–1994. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Howlett, M., & Goetz, K. H. (2014). Time, Temporality and Timescapes in Administration and Policy. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 80(3), 477–492. Huismann, J., Maassen, P., & Neave, G. (2001). Higher Education and the Nation State: The International Dimension of Higher Education. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. Huismann, J., & Van der Wende, M. (2004). The European Union and Bologna: Are Supra- and International Initiatives Threatening Domestic Agendas? European Journal of Education, 39(3), 349–357. Keohane, R. O., & Hoffmann, S. (1991). The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change. New York: Avalon Publishing. Kupfer, A. (2008). Dimished States? National Power in European Education Policy. British Journal of Education Studies, 56(3), 286–303. Laffan, B. (1996). The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), 81–102. Lawn, M. (2003). The ‘Usefulness’ of Learning: The Struggle over Governance, Meaning and the European Education Space. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 24(3), 325–336. Leaton Gray, S. (2017). The Social Construction of Time in Contemporary Education: Implications for Technology, Equality and Bernstein’s ‘Conditions for Democracy’. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 38(1), 60–71. Lingard, B., & Thompson, G. (2017). Doing Time in the Sociology of Education. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 38(1), 1–12. Martens, K., Nagek, A.-K., Windzio, M., & Weymann, A. (Eds.). (2010). Transformation of Education Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Martens, K., & Wolf, K. D. (2009). Boomerangs and Trojan Horses: The Unintended Consequences of Internationalising Education Policy Through the EU and the OECD. In A. Amaral, G. Neave, C. Musselin, & P. Maasen, European Integration and the Governance of Higher Education and Research. London: Springer.

6

EDUCATION: A COMPLICATED POLICY FIELD

171

McCrone, D., & Bechhofer, F. (2015). Understanding National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miller, D. (2000). Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Milward, A. (1992). The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routledge. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Murphy, M. (2003). Covert Action? Education, Social Policy and Law in the European Union. Journal of Education Policy, 18(5), 551–562. Mutimer, D. (1989). 1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism Reconsidered. Journal of European Integration, 13(4), 75–101. Neave, G. (2001). The European Dimension in Higher Education: An Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues. In J. Huisman, P. Maassen, & G. Neave (Eds.), Higher Education and the Nation State: The International Dimension of Higher Education. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. Pépin, L. (2006). The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe in the Making—An Example. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Pépin, L. (2007). The History of EU Cooperation in the Field of Education and Training: How Lifelong Learning Became a Strategic Objective. European Journal of Education, 42(1), 121–132. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pollack, M. A. (1994). Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community. Journal of Public Policy, 14(2), 95–145. Pollack, M. A. (2000). The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making Since Maastricht. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(3), 519–538. Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European Integration. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Rosamond, B. (2005). The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 237–254. Salter, B., & Tapper, T. (1994). The State and Higher Education. London: Woburn Press. Saurugger, S. (2014). Theoretical Approaches to European Integration. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Schmitter, P. C. (2005). Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 255–272. Smith, A. D. (1991). The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed? Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20(3), 353–368. Tilly, C. (1984). Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

172

S. K. ST. JOHN

Walkenhorst, H. (2005, March 31–April 2). The Changing Role of EU Education Policy—A Critical Assessment. Paper for the EUSA Ninth Biennial Conference in Austin, Texas (USA) (Unpublished Conference Material). Walkenhorst, H. (2008). Explaining Change in EU Education Policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(4), 567–587. Weymann, A. (2010). The Educating State—Historical Developments and Current Trends. In K. Martens, A.-K. Nagek, M. Windzio, & A. Weymann, Transformation of Education Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

PART II

Solidarity: Between Theory and Practice

CHAPTER 7

Understanding European Solidarity, Spirit and Identity: Theory

Introduction to European Solidarity Solidarity is a fundamental value upon which the European Union has been built. We have read in previous chapters how back in 1948 the Congress of Europe emphasised the need for people to feel a sense of belonging to the project, and solidarity has continued to feature in the EU treaties. From the preamble, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 communicates that member states “desiring solidarity between their people while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions […] have decided to establish a European Union”. Article 3 states that “[The Union] shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among member states”, “promote solidarity among generations”, and “shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples […]”. Article 24 states: Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ actions. (European Union 2012a)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_7

175

176

S. K. ST. JOHN

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) includes a “Solidarity Clause” outlined in article 222, stating that: The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States […]. (European Union 2012b)

Article 67 of the TFEU states that: [The Union] shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) ratified in 2000 states that “the peoples of Europe, in creating an evercloser union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values”. More specifically, the Charter continues: Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. (European Union 2012c)

Furthermore, the Charter dedicates chapter IV to solidarity, covering: workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking; workers’ right of collective bargaining and action; right of access to placement services; protection in the event of unjustified dismissal; fair and just working conditions; prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work; family and professional life; social security and social assistance; health care; access to services of general economic interest; environmental protection; and consumer protection. Calls for solidarity in Europe are ever-increasingly heard as the European Union continues to experience varying crises at the national, European and global level. So frequently referred to in some form as a natural first response to crises, solidarity has become a hot topic. But do we—the

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

177

general public, policymakers, academics—truly understand what solidarity entails and what we are striving to create? In general terms, dictionaries define solidarity as the “agreement between and support for the members of a group, especially political group”, a “unity (as of a group or class) that produces or based on community interests, objectives and standards”, a “unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with a common interest” and “a group of people showing support for each other or for another group, especially in political or international affairs”. Each of these definitions has different nuances, but none are necessarily more correct than another. It is more the case that solidarity encompasses all of the elements included in the varying definitions, which already provides a taster of the complexities surrounding solidarity and, greater still, of European solidarity. This chapter aims to provide an introduction to the concept of solidarity to non-specialist readers, including political theory on solidarity. It unpacks those complexities involved in understanding and fostering European solidarity, and how solidarity is entwined with spirit and identity.

(Social) Theories of Solidarity As Sangiovanni points out, although we see an increasing use of the term “solidarity” in EU policymaking and while we understand that solidarity boils down to “a value binding together Member States and as a value binding together the citizens of each and every Member State” (Sangiovanni 2012, 2013), it is not fully clear what the nature of solidarity truly is. Social theorists have tackled the notion of solidarity, dating back to Aristotle who identified a political dimension to human beings due to the fact that they have reason, which indicates a connection in the form of social cohesion between the individual and society (Beutler 2017). Offe (2007) identifies four types of solidarity. He takes as a starting point what he calls “type 0 solidarity”, which constitutes solidary actions in the form of spontaneous compassion. For example, if a man falls in the street, a passer-by will likely help them thanks to a conscious intention, seeing it as a “normal” reaction. Type 1 solidarity emerges with the civilised conduct of affairs between private individuals who have the mutual respect for rights and the rule of law. Type 2 includes the respect for state authority, which is dependent on citizens’ fulfilment of civic duties. This implies the state’s expectation that individuals are ready to

178

S. K. ST. JOHN

make sacrifices, whether their lives to defend the country, through taxation, or by following curriculum in a schooling system for the protection of freedom. Finally, type 3 solidarity occurs with redistribution mandated and enforced by a democratic state, which is recognised by voters and collective civil society actors. Hechter (2001) outlines three approaches to understanding the nature of solidarity: normative, structuralist and rational choice. For normative theorists, solidarity is unlikely to come from the interaction of rational, self-interested individuals, but through socialisation emerging in socially homogenous communities. Structural theorists consider solidarity to be the result of individually rational action in the spirit of sharing common material interests, discovering common interests through mutual interaction occurring repeatedly, which develops sentiment and strengthens compliance to collective obligation. A rational choice perspective suggests that rational actors will not join a group if they can already reap the benefit of others activity (i.e. they are not dependent on the group), and that rational actors therefore “free ride” and behave individualistically, fostering only minimal solidarity despite extensive common interest. However, if an individual’s dependence on the group increases, they are more likely to comply with common obligations, thus increasing solidarity. Individualism is a reoccurring concept in the thinking on solidarity, and a concept widely explored by Emile Durkheim in his 1893 thesis The Division of Labour, in which he argues that we see the emergence of a new social order from the rise of ideals of individualism.1 Durkheim’s basic premise was the distinction between what he called “mechanical” solidarity and “organic” solidarity. Durkheim highlighted the need to study empirically moral codes within different societies to understand how they are grounded in social conditions of existence, and how moral codes that are acceptable for one society may not be for another (Durkheim 1997). Durkheim noticed general conditions of social existence within the different codes of moral conduct in varying societies, and all acts concern two classes of objects: the individual self (ego); and beings other than self. Questioning whether acts involving only the individual self can truly have 1 This is similar to Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between Germeinschaft and Gesellschaft, in which social order is no longer dependent on the importance of tightknit communities but rather has transformed into an order based on collections of self-interested individuals.

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

179

moral character, he concludes that they cannot, separating self-interest from moral conduct. In this thread, he also includes acts of self-interest towards others that will still benefit the individual. In The Division of Labour, Durkheim suggests that solidarity is produced automatically through individuals’ pursuit of their own interests in economic exchange with others, and that for social solidarity to be created requires the existence of a strong universal moral consensus. However, this is only the case in simpler societies where development is rudimentary, and Durkheim called this automatic quality of solidarity “mechanical”, resting on common values, internalised norms and mutual awareness. “Mechanical” solidarity is the basis of social cohesion, in which social conduct is controlled by shared beliefs and values, and individual self-consciousness is only developed at a basic level (Giddens 1978). As modern societies become increasingly complex, the concept of “mechanical” solidarity is threatened by the rise of industry and the expansion of market economies, providing individuals with greater options (Hechter 2001). This fosters a rise in individualism, and a transition towards what Durkheim coins “organic” solidarity, which is a form of cohesion based on exchanges within a differentiated division of labour. Therefore, solidarity was no longer the result of self-interest as per “mechanical” solidarity, and Durkheim set out to document this progression from mechanical to organic solidarity through the development of systems of laws and legal codes (Giddens 1978). He described societies in their simplest form as an aggregate, like a mass of cells forming a simple organism, in which solidarity emerges from common sentiment and in which individuals are not connected by reciprocal ties. In this form, society, like an organism, can shed part of itself without losing unity because the parts are connected “mechanically” rather than connected forming an “organic” unit. “Organic” solidarity therefore occurs when individuals are connected interdependently, involving systematic exchanges between them. In terms of the division of labour, this concept is increasingly evident as specialisations of function develop and individuals have different roles in society. Consequently, restitutive law develops to regulate the areas of social conduct that emerge in developed societies. Durkheim considers that class struggles and tensions emerging from the development of nineteenth century central European societies did not imply the emergence of a new class society (capitalism), but from the incomplete transition from “mechanical” to “organic” solidarity in the new industrial order (Giddens 1978).

180

S. K. ST. JOHN

For Durkheim, the level of solidarity is also affected by the relationship between the state and citizens. In socialist theory, the scope of the state is extended, particularly in economic control, and in which there is increased blurring between state and society. In this sense, Durkheim highlighted that the state has a responsibility to realise the ideals of moral individualism in the form of democracy. The state is considered to be composed of officials representing the higher governmental authority in a political society as a decision-making body that coordinates policies in line with citizens’ needs. Echoing Offe’s type 3 solidarity, a democracy is the political means by which society can manifest its consciousness, and the nation is more democratic the more it has the ability to do manifest this consciousness. In close communication with its citizens, a democratic state must understand and respond accurately to the wishes of the majority of the population, but at the same time, have the autonomous capacity to articulate those wishes into transparent and rational responses forming appropriate and pragmatic policies. A lack of social associations providing a buffer between the state and citizens is what gives rise to authoritarianism. It is in fact this balancing act between state power and individuals’ influence that is crucial for how authority and state legitimacy are recognised, and the fostering of “organic” solidarity around the “organ of consciousness” that is the state. Durkheim revealed that a variable in determining the general conditions of social existence in different codes of moral conducts in varying societies was education (Durkheim 2003). For him, education being an influence exercised by adult generations on those being prepared for social life, varied between the different strata of society. Different education systems reflect different ideals depending on those strata of society in which they are located and class commonly determined the level and character of formal education received. Moreover, education becomes a key component in “organic” solidarity in terms of the development of occupational specialisations, which are a factor contributing to the rise of individualism within society. The state holds an important role, however, in administering the general direction of school curriculum to ensure individuals’ ideals are accurately reflected and that children possess sufficient education for the occupational specialisations they occupy in the division of labour. In addition, the state must maintain a shared core educational experience across all strata of society, and in this regard, Durkheim’s education lectures on moral education highlight the responsibility of the teacher in modern

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

181

schooling. He explains that children’s behaviour is influenced by unstable impulses of egoism, displaying fluctuations of attention and emotion, and education serves to moderate such desires in preparation for social life. He believed that children’s behaviour is similar to that of the adult members of simpler societies, acting in self-interest. Therefore, education in advanced society resonates with the development of civilisation as a whole, where the teacher acts as a moral exemplar. He carried out a historical analysis of education systems’ evolution to determine the educational trends that should be promoted or eliminated, with the aim of understanding how to meet modern demands on education for systems that promote sympathy and understanding for others, a capacity to accept change, and an awareness of the potentialities of mankind (Durkheim 1973).

Calling on Hegel to Understand the Role of Spirit Taking Durkheim’s notion that democracy is the political means by which society can manifest its consciousness, we can bring Hegel into the conversation. Spirit is commonly known in dictionary form as the principle of conscious life that animates the body, mediating between body and soul or the immaterial intelligent or sentient part of a person. In Passions of the Soul, Descartes talked of animal spirits produced in the blood and responsible for animating physical and emotive responses of man. Where the soul is considered to be the seat of the senses, desires, affections and appetites, spirit is what connects the individual (or not) to God or the higher entity. Could we then consider people to be the font of spirit in the soul of the democratic state? In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), the post-Kantian idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was concerned with the contradictions and tensions that riddled modern philosophy, culture and society. For Hegel, history must be fiercely protected as it is a means to understanding ourselves. It is a historian’s task to rescue precious information that has become lost in the past and that can serve to make sense of the challenges of modern society. Believing in learning from one’s intellectual enemies and opposing views, Hegel suggested that truth can be found in negative scenarios by approaching threatening or unknown phenomena by questioning what element of sense it might contain that could inform solutions for future development. Taking the example of nationalism,

182

S. K. ST. JOHN

Hegel questioned what could be learned from the negative consequences and proposed that a rise in nationalism was the result of actors’ need to feel pride for their origins and to identify with a higher entity, grounding their identities in a place that surpasses their own achievements and egos. History derives from conscious beings and culture, so for Hegel, history is driven by the idea. Subconsciously, the idea is at work, over time influencing and directing the conscious beings, progressing Understanding into a unified knowledge and ultimately therefore also creating history. In the context of spirit, Hegel’s objective was to achieve the Absolute Idea or Absolute Knowledge, which he proposed could occur by unifying the tensions and contradictions into a comprehensive whole. In order to create unity, the mind is forced onward from one thought to another thought that is necessary for the completion of the former, building up a single integrated totality through a dialectic process that is always initiated by the Understanding. Contradiction found in all areas of reality, including consciousness, history, philosophy, art, nature and society, is elevated to form a higher unity, which is processed and understood by the mind in the progress of knowledge as its own process of comprehension until a state of self-consciousness is reached. However, this whole cannot exist alone, and instead must be embodied by nature. Hegel maintains that nature is the concrete expression of the idea, so the idea is confronted by its own work, and the situation is right for it to start to understand itself. From all this, what Hegel calls “Geist ” is born, which can be interpreted as spirit, consciousness and awareness that is common to all, though not in the sense that everyone has the same mind, because views, thoughts and ideas differ among people, which is where the acknowledgement of conflicts and contradiction comes into play. Human minds constitute its vehicle, but what is really happening in them is that the idea is gradually moving towards full self-understanding or self-actualisation. Hegel argues that it is not enough for individuals to simply know “ideas”, nor to create new “ideas”. It is necessary to take what is already known— the good, helpful and important intentions—and harbour them within minds. Hegel considered the Mind (Spirit), hosted in the soul, to foster the awakening of consciousness (Kybceck 2015). He explores this concept in particular in Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, in a process by which the subjective spirit passes into that of the objective spirit, which concerns the patterns of social interaction and the cultural institutions within which

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

183

spirit is objectified (Hegel 2007). He divides his reasoning into five sections: soul; sensibility; rapport; consciousness; and spirit. Determined in and for itself, Hegel considers consciousness to be “the reflected or relational level of the spirit, the level of its appearance”. Spirit is “the unity of the soul and consciousness” (Hegel 2007), where the soul is the immediate totality and the consciousness is knowledge. Spirit comes from within the self, only relates to and is determined by the self, composing individuality. The soul is the substance of the “absolute” basis of all that individualises the mind and the basis on which the mind is shaped. Partaking in life on Earth, the soul possesses physical qualities that allow it to feel differences, such as the seasons, climates and time of day. Strong contrasts between each of the Earth’s poles create diversity across continents, transcending into specialities that Hegel terms “local minds”, shown in ways of life, occupations, physical build, as well as their inner tendency, moral character and intellectual capacity. For Hegel, this is how since the beginning of history, nations are seen to possess a certain “type” of their own, which is to say, identity. Moreover, Hegel viewed the State as objectified spirit, arguing that the State is the highest embodiment of the Devine Idea and the highest form of social existence. It is the ultimate development of mankind, from family to civil society to lower forms of political groupings. For Hegel, individuals are grouped into local communities with no meaning except in relation to the state, forming identity in relation to that state. Sensibility (feeling) is “the form of all dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality” (Hegel 2007). Hegel maintained that it is not enough for principles and religion to be in the head, which is merely in general form as consciousness; they should also be in the form of feeling in the heart. In feeling, it then becomes a mode of individuality and treated as one’s own, which forms the unity of the soul with its underlying self. An appeal can also be made towards feelings of moral conduct, which determine benevolent dispositions. Hegel also goes on to discuss the tensions between different feelings of the heart and intelligent rationality. Rapport is individuals’ concrete existence connected to the aggregate of their fundamental interests, which in turns connects them to each other. Hegel considers this totality to form individuals’ actuality. With sound senses and intellect, an individual is able to recognise the feelings making up his individuality, awake to it in the form of an interconnection

184

S. K. ST. JOHN

between himself and the external world. He also understands that this external reality is riddled with complex interconnections of its own. With a similar interpretation as Durkeheim’s “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity, Hegel proposes that the external world has threads woven into him to such a degree that they are part of the fabric making who he truly is. Should those external threads disappear, he would become extinct unless he is to a remarkable degree self-supporting and independent of them. In this sense, a person loses their identity. If intellect or personality is missing from sensibility, Hegel considers the individual to be in a state of passivity, like a child in the womb. The individual is dependent on and subject to the power of another individual to the point when the original person is self-less because his consciousness is that of another who supplies him with a train of ideas. These ideas are internalised to such a degree that he is aware of them as if they were his own, showing the substantial identity of the soul is capable of holding ideas of another, thus defying individuality. A kind of individuality exists, but it is empty, with the self-deriving ideas and sensations from the ideas of another. He possesses two sets of ideas, his own and that of his “magnetiser”, in a scenario in which it is no longer possible to distinguish which ideas, sensations and visions are being brought to his knowledge from his own inward self, and which are from the individual with whom he is under rapport. Hegel considers that such uncertainty may be the cause of deceptions and accounts of diversity that occur in individuals from different countries and under rapport with from different education. Contrarily, when an individual has the capacity to distinguish oneself in oneself, Hegel calls it “particular feeling” or “sensitive totality”, which is the awakening of judgement in oneself and giving feelings a place of their own in the self (self-feeling). Real individuality is therefore a reflection of the soul in itself.

Habermas’s Approach to Identity In Habermas’s publications “The Postnational Constellation” (2001b), “Europe: The Faltering Project” (2009), “The Crisis of the European Union: A Response” (2012) and “The Lure of Technology” (2015), he argued that national identity acts as a barrier to ever closer union and what he sees as the holy grail of transnational democracy and cosmopolitan community (Murphy and St. John 2019). Much of Habermas’s work

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

185

finds its way towards questions surrounding identity, which is why his work proves a precious source of theoretical underpinning. The Transformation of the Public Sphere Jürgen Habermas’s commentary on modern society began in 1962 with his work on the Theory of the Public Sphere: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. His starting block is the emergence of a public sphere in late eighteenth century Paris that resulted reserved for the bourgeoisie, whose members had the economic or intellectual means to contribute and thus this public sphere excluded the low socio-economic sectors of society and made political debate an elitist concept (Habermas 1989). The period also saw the rise of the publishing house, allowing anyone of any worth or with a political mind to establish a journal or a club, in turn giving rise to free speech. Habermas analysed the structural transformation of this public sphere that had come to creation, and noted that as trade expanded, there was a need for wider communication across borders in order for actors to keep abreast of trade developments in other areas. This broke down the vertical feudal structure in the relationship between noblemen and commoners, replacing it with a horizontal structure of interactions between people across the classes and social statuses. This transformation of the public sphere was considered to be a positive one, creating a space in which all citizens could debate freely in a realm that was separate from the state and economy, and generating healthy public opinion and attitudes that could influence and challenge state decisions. Rather than the former model of class binding the public sphere, the glue became citizens’ mutual willingness to debate issues of common interest. A further transformation was experienced, led by the industrial revolution and the rise of consumerism. In particular, the media sector began to steer towards profit-focused outputs and an emphasis on advertising, which together with other profit-generating corporations, began to blur the lines between the public and private sectors. For Habermas, economic and private interest, and the flow of capital became the heaviest influence in questions of politics and morality, resulting in a Hegelian dialectic response with government intervention to regulate business and the formation of the welfare state. This process saw the re-feudalisation of power and public debate became dictated by public relations with

186

S. K. ST. JOHN

governments, businesses and advertising adopted psychological concepts to influence citizens in emotive campaigning. Habermas observed that the public sphere was losing its horizontal structure as individuals were being replaced by organisations exerting their power over public debate, weakening the bonds between citizens and the nurturing capacity for rational ideas. In this sense, the media can be taken as an example of a one-way structure, for Habermas considers that it lacks interaction between readers and editors in a scenario in which media is commodified and which has considerably affected discourse in the public sphere (Benchimol and Maley 2007). Habermas advocates that the public sphere is a fundamental mechanism of democracy as is the basis of democratic rational debate. Unfortunately, the renewed vertical structure is an obstacle to the success of a public sphere in which individuals are able to engage and express their views. Commercial power facilitates leaders’ influence over the public in a way that contains more leverage than any individual or collective public action ever will. For the public sphere to be successful, Habermas believes that it depends on robust rational-critical debate in which every angle of society can participate with equal opportunity to convince others of the strength of their argument. Communicative Action Within the context of the individuals’ capacity to debate in the public sphere, Habermas then turns to the concept of “communicative action” in his 1981 Theory of Communicative Action. In communicative action, individuals coordinate action based on mutual deliberation and argumentation, supported by rationality. In a process where individuals exchange reasons, criticisms and justificatory obligations, Habermas observes that utterances can be contested because a listener rejects a statement due to the argument’s lack of validity (they are not right), because the speaker does not mean what (s)he is saying (they are not expressing themselves correctly), or because the speaker is raising an illegitimate assertion (they are not speaking in truth) (Strecker 2018). In communicative action, individuals learn from each other and themselves as part of a self-reflexive dialogue in which they are open to the views of others, and challenge notions that are not normally questioned. Identifying the tension between the ideal and reality, Habermas is aware of the need to adjust the ideal to fall in line with the reality, and

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

187

the reality to fall in line with the ideal (Habermas 1990). He outlines the notion of an “ideal communicative community” that functions in such a way that it can regulate and critique concrete speech situations. In this ideal scenario, individuals can accept, reject or contrast the claims of others on the basis of a stronger argument, with the ultimate aim of all participants being to obtain mutual understanding (Strecker 2018). However, reality dictates that economic and bureaucratic forces are at play in institutions that should have communicative character, such as family, politics and education. This results in the direction of such institutions being led by administrative power and economic efficiency rather than mutual understanding, thus leading Habermas to consider morality in his 1983 work Moral Conscious and Communicative Action, developing a theory of discourse ethics concerning the ethical assumptions of an ideal communicative community (Forst 2018). Learning Processes If Habermas’s communicative community is to reach realisation, there is a need for individuals to learn how to communicate in such a way and develop structures of judgement, which is why learning processes has been a prominent theme in his work. For Habermas, learning processes go beyond the acquisition of developed motor skills and the psychoanalytical or behaviourist approaches to understanding passive patterns of behaviour, extending to the formation of the cognitive and moral capacity of judgement through consciously accessible mental constructions (Nunner-Winkler 2018). For Habermas, learning processes occur through experience and the development of their understanding of morality to bring about societal change based on actors identifying new realities that are more suitable than old ones. He observes that learning processes in this sense occur at individual and collective levels. At the individual level, they begin in childhood as children develop cognitive and sociocognitive abilities by engaging in the physical world. Children start out in life considering the reality of the world is exactly as they see it. Moving through childhood, they come into conflict with others and face dilemmas, triggering an understanding that others may see that reality differently, thus learning that there are different perspectives and diversity among individuals. By adulthood, the highest form of moral understanding occurs through critical reflection on norms. Habermas considered that such a

188

S. K. ST. JOHN

learning process occurs in complex societies, which would be leaning back on Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity” that increased social development in society brings about more complex scenarios. In complex societies, and in the division of labour, individuals have greater access to formal systems of education and specialist education, which facilitates greater reflection on the adequacy of norms, based on knowledge of contradicting norms. There is a point in which individual learning processes become collective and lead to social evolution, driven by conscious action and systematic progression. Habermas takes the institutionalisation of legal order as an example of how individual learning processes, in which an understanding of morality is developed and the questioning of norms takes place, convert to a collective learning process, leading to social evolution. In the past, punishment and the administration of justice was dictated by traditions. As societies became more complex and citizens were granted increased rights, individual learning processes took place and morality was implicated in the challenging of norms, seeing the implementation of the universally accepted rule of law. As the concept of democracy evolves, what Habermas calls the “cosmopolitan law as law of individuals” can be established in a circular learning process through open and inclusive exchanges that are disconnected from external and internal constraints (Nunner-Winkler 2018). Democracy and Citizenship If the aforementioned learning processes transform communicative action into administrative power, then communicative power can indeed be considered to be a valuable mechanism for democracy. A democratic public sphere can only manifest if there exists this communicative action that Habermas describes, particularly in the concept of civil society (Möllers 2018). Within this deliberative concept of democracy exist a set of procedures and conditions to facilitate collective decision-making that is considered legitimate and valid (Baynes 2016). Habermas believes citizens share a drive to find the common good, rather than focusing solely on individual self-interest. This takes place in a “rationalised lifeworld” with compromises between a liberal political culture and civic virtues in a way that is deemed fair (Habermas 1996).

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

189

The notion of consensus is significant for Habermas in his commentary on deliberative democracy. Rather than aggregating personal or prepolitical preferences, he considers that the aim of reaching consensus should provide a platform for rational debate among free and equal people. This argument has received criticism, however, highlighting the “fact of pluralism”, which risks the manifestation of a false consensus that excludes certain brackets of society (Baynes 2016). However, Habermas highlights the need for compromise thus not claiming that all conflict can be accommodated in consensus by majority rule. This pluralism in fact becomes central to part of Habermas’s argument. If a state is democratic and constitutional, it will respect the citizens who have democratically endorsed the constitution to represent them. Since identities can be subject to transformation causing shifts in society’s civic composition, this consideration led Habermas to re-evaluate the civic composition of society and therefore citizenship (Habermas 1996). He observes that the democratic state must be an inclusive one along with its spaces for communication, so a democratic community cannot exclude on the basis of tradition and cultural identity those citizens requesting civil rights. The idea of democratic equality must be taken into consideration, ensuring that all participants in the democratic process of legal order have equal status. Habermas therefore considers the significance of traditional notions of national identity to be declining (Habermas 2001a). As society becomes more complex, the former notions of national identity in nation-state formation, based on tradition, ethnic belonging, shared culture, are replaced by a “constitutional patriotism”. Borrowed from Dolf Sternberger—who developed the notion that civic pride does not relate to national identity, but to the constitutional order (Möllers 2018)—“constitutional patriotism” refers to a collective identity that shares political commitment following common principles and procedures that facilitate public discourse and self-determination. Habermas’s European Focus In the 2000s, Habermas turned his attention to the case of Europe, applying his thinking on constitutional patriotism, particularly in the context of identity and European citizenship (Müller 2007). Given the transformative nature of identities within a democracy, Habermas deemed public spheres in democracy capable of transcending national borders

190

S. K. ST. JOHN

(Habermas 2001a). Going beyond a model of identity politics based on nation-building, his international public sphere is a transnational space of discourse within which policymaking can occur at European level, but given Europe’s pluralistic nature, it is not formed on the basis of specific conditions or identities. In fact, for Habermas, Europe’s pluralism has the capacity to condition its social evolution and improve the social bases of European democracy (Habermas 2001a). Where the “nation of the state” has tended to predominate, Habermas considered it to be necessary for the “nation of the people” to re-emerge in a turn towards republicanisation (Joerges 2018). Habermas is all too aware that constituting democracy beyond borders proves problematic. If a “nation of the state” has developed, it has occurred after a long process in which national loyalties have infiltrated the self-consciousness of democratic citizens as belonging to one and the same nation. Such a process produces only an artificial solidarity that was not pre-existing and should not be granted its own normative value (Joerges 2018). Recognising that Europe’s unity lies in its diversity, Habermas’s deliberative democracy does not transform that diversity into homogeneity, rather it embraces it through reciprocal recognition. Quashing the notion that the danger of Europeanisation lies in the weakening of statehood, Habermas maintains that developing freedom for private transnational interests at international level poses a greater threat for which the solution can be found in “expanding Europe’s political capacity for action […] simultaneously with the expansion of the basis of legitimisation of European institutions” (Habermas 2001a). Habermas’s call for greater political capacity for action translates into the further democratisation of the European public sphere and one in which individuals, based on constitutional patriotism that is disconnected from functional notions of identity, identify themselves as the authors of the law through representation by legitimately recognised institutions.

Unpacking European Solidarity in Practice In pragmatic terms, European solidarity is a bond in which individual actors (people) and collective actors (member states) reason in the collective as “we” rather than “I” in political decision-making or when presented with challenges facing the European bloc. Knodt and Tews

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

191

(2017) identify four types of EU solidarity: individual actors with transnational solidarity (horizontal); individual actors with supranational solidarity (vertical); collective actors with international solidarity (horizontal); and collective actors with intergovernmental solidarity (vertical). Transnational solidarity is based on common ideas and values that transcend national boundaries, where individual actors with similar living conditions cooperate together with a common aim. Supranational solidarity among individual actors is based not on association to a pre-existing community but to a political community, with the aim of creating converging living conditions between people through distributive and redistributive policies. Such is the case when EU law supersedes national law or in areas of deeper integration. Intergovernmental solidarity is demonstrated when collective actors work within the EU’s multilateral system without considering individuals, and international solidarity shows collective actors in a horizontal dimension because solidarity transcends European borders into the international arena. When we talk about EU solidarity, the most commonly encountered type is supranational, in a concept comprising four key components: common values and goals; risk sharing; equality; and trust. Common Values and Goals Building on a platform of common values, the first fundamental dimension to solidarity is the recognition for and desire to achieve similar goals, a notion that relates to the individual level as well as the EU level. In the former, we can as an example the concept of protests, whereby a group of individuals realise that their actions alone will not suffice to create impact and initiate changes, but collective action in which individuals all strive for a common goal according to common values and acting in solidarity is more likely to achieve the desired response. In the latter, the concept of European Union is centred upon a set of common goals, which provide the basis for solidarity, as outlined in the CFREU: The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development

192

S. K. ST. JOHN

and ensures free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the freedom of establishment. (CFREU 2000)

Risk Sharing Risk sharing is a necessary component to achieve common goals and a cohesive community. As collective actors, member states are expected to take joint responsibility for actions and offer aid in emergencies regardless of whether they contributed to the emergency (Steinvorth 2017). Individual actors, as part of the collective actor, indirectly take responsibility for actions through the risk-sharing process carried out by collective actor. The advantage of risk sharing is the ability to pursue more ambitious objectives as solidarity provides group members with an insurance, but it is also costly, implying the sharing of physical, financial, human or organisational resources for the common good (Genschel and Hemerijck 2018). When individual or collective actors decide whether to show solidarity, they calculate short-term costs and benefits (Knodt and Tews 2017). Equality Risk sharing cannot take place, however, unless all parties, whether individual or collective actors, feel they are equal. As Steinvorth (2017) reminds us, in a Freudian sense,2 this idea resonates with the French term Fratenité, implying that individuals act more like brothers than father and son. Not by chance, the French national motto Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité groups equality and fraternity. At the individual level, we can indeed identify a problem with the dimension of equality, given the evident inequalities across society, but also in the economic fortune of member states. Adopting the example of socio-economic inequality at the individual level, it is intended that citizens act with the mentality that inequalities can be reversed. While solidarity is uneven involving a transfer from the more fortune to the less fortunate with no immediate return, those who are wealthy realise that they could one day find themselves in the same situation as someone requesting their help. Likewise, if the socio-economic scales are tipped for the person asking for help,

2 The example in which the sons kill their authoritarian father, giving a model of people who are equally free, pursuing similar goals and acting in solidarity (Steinvorth 2017).

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

193

they remember the time when they relied on aid from others and should therefore feel compelled to offer aid when they are able to. Trust In order to provide support, however, it is important that collective and individual actors trust that those of other member states are also acting in good faith by providing an equivalent level of support and complying with the same concept of solidarity. This is also known as ethical reciprocity (Offe 2007), and a notion that applies to the connection between each individual or collective actor, but also the connection between the individual and authority. The latter consideration implies that individuals trust that states exercise fairness in the legal distribution of burdens and obligations. Offe’s commentary on solidarity proposes that a “horizontal” phenomenon of trust and solidarity, linking individual people to each other, is a precondition for the “vertical” phenomenon of respecting state authority. That is to say, people must recognise each other before they can recognise authority (Offe 2000). In addition, the solidarity that individual people feel towards each other, or that is fostered in them through the institutions that represent them, is also the basis of the “welfare state”, meaning both democracy and the welfare state depend on pre-existing binding motives (Karagiannis 2007a). To understand ethical reciprocity between individuals, we can lean on the example of tax evasion. Would it not be true that some are more likely to agree to their tax obligations if they trust that all other citizens are also satisfying their obligations? For solidarity to be successful, group members need conviction that other members will not exploit support offered. Offe suggests citizens feel that for the less fortunate to qualify in redistribution as legitimate receivers of solidary offerings, they must be “loyally resident, worthy and humble”. If they have demonstrated to have created a dependence on solidary offerings, or shown a lack of effort and responsibility to ameliorate their situation, then net payers will feel exempt from their obligations (Offe 2007). Trust in the group can be increased if risk is spread across a larger number of members, meaning that the request for support does not always fall to the same members. However, the risk pool should be small and homogenous as members tend to trust members with whom they can draw commonalities. Borders are an important mechanism for facilitating a small and homogenous group, and have facilitated at the national level

194

S. K. ST. JOHN

the rise of welfare states and national communities of solidarity, which in the EU context should mutually reinforce each other (Genschel and Hemerijck 2018). As the treaties and the Charter reveal, solidarity is a core value of the EU because it can be seen as a component to every area of EU policy. Unfortunately, there is no blanket solidarity across all issues, and level of public support for solidarity in the EU can be seen to vary depending on the issue, the instrument and the group member.3 Actors are not necessarily willing to show the same level of solidarity for other member states experiencing a debt burden as they would if they were suffering a natural disaster. Levels also vary on issues of high unemployment, large refugee flows and military attacks. On instruments, support can vary for an emergency fund, case-by-case assistance and investment aid, as well as on aid that is collected in view of a need and aid that is provided after the need is apparent (Genschel and Hemerijck 2018).

Bibliography Baynes, K. (2016). Habermas. Abingdon: Routledge. Benchimol, A., & Maley, W. (2007). Spheres of Influence: Intellectual and Cultural Publics from Shakespeare to Habermas. Bern: Peter Lang. Beutler, B. (2017). Solidarity in the EU: A Critique of Solidarity and of the EU. In A. Grimmel & S. My Giang, Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Brunkhorst, H., Kreide, R., & Lafont, C. (2018). The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia University Press. Durkheim, E. (1973). Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education. New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing. Durkheim, E. (1997). The Division of Labour in Society. Hampshire: Macmillan Education. Durkheim, E. (2003). Moral Education. New York: Dover Publications. European Union. (2012a, October 26). Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union (C/326/13), Brussels. European Union. (2012b, October 26). Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union (C/326/47).

3 YouGov survey, April 2018 in P. Genschel and A. Hemerijck (2018).

7

UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY …

195

European Union. (2012c, October 26). Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union (C326/391), Brussels. Forst, R. (2018). The Discourse Theory of Morality: Discourse Ethics—Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification (1983). In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, & C. Lafont (Eds.), The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia University Press. Genschel, P., & Hemerijck, A. (2018). Solidarity in Europe (School of Transnational Governance Policy Briefs, 2018/01). Florence: European University Institute. Giddens, A. (1978). Durkheim. Glasgow: Harvester Press. Habermas, J. (1962). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1998). The Inclusion of the Other. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2001a). Why Europe Needs a Constitution (New Left Review, N. 11). Habermas, J. (2001b). The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Boston: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2004). Europe: The Faltering Project. Polity Press: Boston. Habermas, J. (2012). The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Boston: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (2015). The Lure of Technology. Boston: Polity Press. Hechter, M. (2001). Sociology of Solidarity. In N. Smelser & P. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Studies. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Ltd. Hegel, G. (2007). Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (edition translated by R. Williams). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joerges, C. (2018). European Citizenship. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, & C. Lafont (Eds.), The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia University Press. Karagiannis, N. (2007a). Introduction: Solidarity in Europe: Politics, Religion and Knowledge. In N. Karagiannis (Ed.), European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Karagiannis, N. (2007b). European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

196

S. K. ST. JOHN

Knodt, M., & Tews, A. (2017). European Solidarity and Its Limits: Insights from Current Political Challenges. In A. Grimmel & S. My Giang, Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Kybceck, E. (2015). Geist (Spirit): History of the Concept. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier. Möllers, C. (2018). Democracy, Law, and Society: Between Facts and Norms (1992): Points of Reference: The Emergence of Political Philosophy from Theoretical Philosophy. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, & C. Lafont (Eds.), The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia University Press. Müller, J.-W. (2007). Constitutional Patriotism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Murphy, M., & St. John, S. K. (2019). Conclusion. In S. K. St. John & M. Murphy, Educations and Public Policy in the European Union: Crossing Boundaries. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Nunner-Winkler, G. (2018). Learning Processes. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, & C. Lafont (Eds.), The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia University Press. Offe, C. (2000). Democracy and Trust. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 47 (96), 1–13. Offe, C. (2007). Obligations Versus Costs: Types and Contexts of Solidary Action. In N. Karagiannis (Ed.), European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Outhwaite, W. (2007). Who Needs Solidarity? In N. Karagiannis (Ed.), European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Pickering, W. S. (1995). Durkheim and Moral Education for Children: A Recently Discovered Lecture. Journal of Moral Education, 24(1), 19–36. Sangiovanni, A. (2012). Solidarity in the European Union: Problems and Prospects. In J. Dickson & P. Eleftheriadis (Eds.), Philosophical Foundations of European Law. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online. Sangiovanni, A. (2013). Solidarity in the European Union. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33(2), 213–241. St. John, S. K., & Murphy, M. (2019). Educations and Public Policy in the European Union: Crossing Boundaries. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Steinvorth, U. (2017). Applying the Idea of Solidarity to Europe. In A. Grimmel & S. My Giang, Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Strecker, D. (2018). The Theory of Communicative Action (1981): A Classic of Social Theory. In H. Brunkhorst, R. Kreide, & C. Lafont (Eds.), The Habermas Handbook. New York: Columbia Univerity Press.

CHAPTER 8

An Introduction to Europe’s Decade of Crises: Solidarity in Practice

Introduction Crisis can be defined as a condition of instability or danger that leads to decisive change. At the individual level, it is circumstantial upheaval in one’s life. In Legitimisation Crisis , Habermas recalls that Aristotle and Hegel observed the significance of crisis as “the turning point in a fateful process that, despite all objectivity, does not simply impose itself from the outside and does not remain external to the identity of the persons caught up in it” (Habermas 1975). It is suggested that an external force becomes a crisis when it “deprives a subject of some part of his normal sovereignty” (Habermas 1975), and therefore, when it starts to cause modifications to one’s self. The European Union (EU) is facing the most turbulent and trying times in its history. For over a decade, the EU has been hopscotching from one crisis to another, not least to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is described as a multi-dimensional crisis, beginning with the Eurozone crisis in 2008 and swiftly followed by the migration crisis of 2015, in which the EU’s handling of these crises prompted criticism. Accusations of inadequate decision-making, uneven burden sharing and fraying solidarity began to bring into question the EU’s credibility and democratic legitimacy, reinforcing Euroscepticism and fracturing membership arrangements (Dinan et al. 2017).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_8

197

198

S. K. ST. JOHN

Indeed, solidarity is intrinsically linked to crises, which is why we should explore the crises encountered by the EU in recent years if we are to unpack EU solidarity. As we recall from the previous chapter, solidary responses and support for solidarity differ with the type of crisis and the instrument proposed to carry out solidary action. Keeping in mind the interdisciplinary nature of this book and thus its accessibility to readers from several disciplines, this chapter aims to provide an introduction to the key crises experienced by the EU and Europeans in recent years. The chapter is structured into two sections. The first provides an overview of the four crises, beginning with the financial crisis of 2008 to the disintegration ensuing the UK’s call to leave the EU in 2019, which have given rise to populist movements and led to Habermas’s term, a “legitimisation crisis”. The second section presents a more in-depth account of two case studies that act as examples of scenarios in which EU solidarity fell short and failed the Union: Brexit, and the refugee crisis in Italy.

Crisis After Crisis The EU faces two types of crisis-related phenomena: those external and those internal. External phenomena are far-reaching and affect the entire international community as a result of the increasingly globalised world, such as the impact of rising Chinese and Asian economic and industrial power, and fast-paced digital and technological innovation, or artificial intelligence development. The Covid-19 crisis emerging at the end of 2019 is the most recent example of these external phenomena, whose challenges, while not initiated within Europe, are not disconnected from the EU either. They have shaken the EU just as much as they have shaken other parts of the world, and no EU state can take any more responsibility than any other state across the globe. Phenomena that pose existential threat to the EU are those that have emerged from within the EU or that have a greater effect on the EU compared to other parts of the world. They are those that have determined fracture lines across the European integration project and led to questioned legitimacy, which in turn has increased Europhobia and exacerbated Euroscepticism. The crises we will explore in this chapter are: the financial crisis; the refugee and migration crisis; the crisis of democracy and legitimacy; and disintegration.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

199

Financial Crises The EU’s Economic and Monetary Union The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 marked a pivotal moment in European history. The EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was created, which then introduced the single currency. While functionalist thinkers may have imagined the EMU working as a kind of irreversible glue that would lead to shared sovereignty, member state influence and domestic interest proved strong and prevented any decisive leap to a federalist model. The EMU, supposedly an “economic” and “monetary” union, emerged as a predominantly “monetary” union of well-structured federal management of the single currency. The “economic” union on the other hand emerged as a straightforward system of economic coordination. The two aspects of the EMU were ultimately running at different speeds and with different scopes, resulting in an imbalanced system that left the EU in a precarious position when it came to establishing coherent action. For example, the reunified German Federal Republic held the upper hand in setting an exchange rate, which was equal to the West Mark and the East Mark; one that seriously affected the entire European economy, leading to a long season of high interest rates, the burden of public debt, and reduced growth. The EU Constitutional Treaty, drafted in 2003, aimed to overcome contradictions in the monetary-versus-economic union. It proposed that members of the European Economic Area (EEA) would be granted increased decision-making power, including on the adoption of recommendations made to EEA member states, the approval of measures related to excessive deficits and the accession of new states to the EMU. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Treaty was left unratified in 2004, principally due to a lack of consensus on the provision for amending voting rights to majority voting. Overall, the unbalanced economic-monetary model remained fragile and ill-prepared for the external force of financial instability that swept the Western world. The Global Financial Crisis Despite some periods of instability in the 1960s and 1970s, the Western world had witnessed a period of prosperity until the 2000s. Governments had shed the cautious approaches they adopted to stabilise economies and to boost unemployment in the post-war period. They began to focus on

200

S. K. ST. JOHN

creating economic dynamism through inflation and more relaxed regulations. Interest rates had begun to decline and new technologies were revolutionising the labour market, providing fresh opportunities, and social spending was reduced. As risky investments were increasingly tolerated in the lax financial environment, middle-class households began to dip into easily accessible home equity and other lines of credit, fuelling overinvestment in unproductive sectors, such as property. However, as private debt crept to historical highs, governments hit the brakes and switched to austerity with the hardest blows to those relying on social welfare. The debt build-up quickly became debt overhang, and firms, households and banks sought to reduce debt levels. The result was less private investment, less household consumption and less credit from banks. The collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank in 2008 initiated a chain reaction with panic and a lack of trust within the markets, which froze lending and caused the markets to crash (Szczepanski 2019). Governments across the world went into deep deficit and by the time the Bush administration collapsed in 2009, Europe was grappling with a deep financial crisis. While the US economy began to recover, the Greek debt crisis of 2008 unfortunately contributed to further recession in Europe. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis When Greece adopted the Euro in 2001, it had finally succeeded in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria for the single currency, or so it had seemed. In 2004, it was discovered that Greece had not in fact satisfied the criteria, but the EU did not pose sanctions for a series of political reasons, namely because expelling Greece from the EEA would weaken the young currency. The status quo therefore continued until the system broke in 2008 under the strain of the global financial crisis, and the incomplete institutional framework for fiscal union became more apparent than ever. While Greece’s particularly weak situation disadvantaged the EU’s ability to face the challenges of global recession, the European sovereign debt crisis also emerged from several other member states, namely Spain, Cyrus and Portugal. The root causes across these countries were composed of weak actual and potential GDP; a lack of competitiveness in the markets; the liquidation of banks and sovereigns; large pre-existing debt-to-GDP ratios; and considerable liability stocks, including government, private and non-private sector stocks (Petrakis et al. 2013).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

201

Without a robust fiscal framework in place, it can be said that the EU was responding in an improvised, emergency mode. Mario Draghi himself outlined that, in hindsight, a logical sequence of events should have been followed. Unfortunately, almost the reverse took place as an agreement in October 2010 on private sector involvement and the Greek debt restructuring of July 2011 were announced while an effective backstop for solvent governments was still under construction. In addition, initial stress-testing of banks in 2011 and the capital-raising exercise were conducted without any clear backstop for solvent banks, which caused many banks and some governments to come close to losing market access. Due to a lack of consolidated deep cross-country financial integration and, instead integration based on short-term interbank debt, the system unravelled under stress. Moreover, as there was no enforced fiscal framework, a number of governments did not have the fiscal space to absorb the initial shocks of the crisis, nor could they maintain market trust. It is understood that the European institutions faced unprecedented circumstances and were making decisions as events took place, but the EU’s approach to addressing the crisis was carried out through questionable quick-fix methods. Once granted the ability to legislate in the area of the economy, the EU imposed rigorous budgetary discipline and a system of deflationary measures. It set fiscal policies that limited government debt and deficit, requiring balanced budgets from all member states. This aimed to help to determine economic desertification and breakdowns in the cohesion of the social structure in some member states. In 2010, as it became evident that Greece was no longer able to borrow from the markets, the country was the first to receive a sovereignstate bailout. Standards and Poor’s downgraded Greece’s debt rating for fear of default, causing stock markets and the Euro to decline. Greece’s biggest lenders were Germany and its bankers, who together with the EU, required Greece to improve its public financial management, which forced the government to cut spending, increase taxes and reform its pension system. Greece was bound to a scheduled debt-payment programme beyond 2060 and a set of austerity measures that aimed to strengthen the government and financial structures towards long-term recovery. This was achieved, but austerity threw Greece into a recession lasting until 2017, triggering the Eurozone debt crisis. As support for anti-austerity politics grew and because of the difficulties in forming a new government after the elections, by May 2012 the plausibility of Greece leaving the Eurozone became apparent. However, the eventuality was suppressed by the

202

S. K. ST. JOHN

centre-right win in June. In September 2012, the European Central Bank announced free unlimited support for all Eurozone states involved in a sovereign state bailout from the European Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism, which settled the financial markets. Various reports of the EU presidents prefigured a minimal form of mutualising the debt, the creation of an EEA budget that was separated from the general EU budget, and a universal guarantee of bank deposits. These rules, however, allow some member states—such as Germany—to use the fact that they have low interest rates and inflation, and therefore a good level of performance in the industrial sector and a strong ability to export extensively outside of Europe, to compensate the lack of internal financial investment. Others had to cut internal investment and social benefits. The measures only addressed problems of budget deficit and only through a system of fiscal discipline, which led to member states being unable to invest internally. There was only risk reduction and the economic union was not able to offer any concrete element of risk sharing. Consequences The consequential effects of the combined global recession and European sovereign debt crisis were felt acutely by the EU economy and labour market. Unemployment rates soared, especially in Greece and Spain, and economic growth was stagnant across the entire bloc not just in the EEA. Investment suffered along with the fiscal position of many member states. The EU began to show signs of recovery by 2014, but the challenges of the dual crisis continue to persist. The EMU continues to lack a clear vision for the future, perennial macroeconomic imbalances are still present, as well as high public deficits in a number of member states. Limited employment opportunities for the youth continue to fester, and rising inequalities remain, along with high in-work poverty risk levels (Szczepanski 2019). According to Soros (2012), solutions to the financial crisis itself are theoretically straightforward, but not easily achieved. He argues that solving the Euro crisis requires the creation of a common treasury, claiming that the relevant instruments1 are not suitable for responding quickly to a crisis as it has to await instructions from member states before

1 European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

203

spending any funds. However, as yet, the political will of the sovereign states needed to fulfil the political process of creating such an authority has been lacking. He highlights that the increased deterioration of political cohesion within the Union makes the solution even less viable. Soros does not directly mention solidarity, but the argument points clearly to the notion that European solidarity has been lacking in the battle to resolve the Euro crisis. He claims that rather than committing political will (i.e. solidary action towards resolving the Euro crisis), member states have been buying time, allowing problems to fester and politics to intoxicate. In fact, he indicates that the seeds of the next crisis have been sown by the inadequate response witnessed to the last financial crisis. In an aim to explore the connections between financial crisis and migratory crisis, Bevelander and Petersson (2014b) support proposals that international labour migration appears the only viable solution to long-term economic sustainability. Such proposals take into consideration the aging EU population and the fewer workers available to cater to the needs of the retired while younger generations are not yet in the workforce. However, Bevelander and Petersson also highlight the tensions at play between securing economic sustainability through immigration in the long-term, and political cohesion in the short term, due to the risks for European cohesion that are associated with large-scale immigration. As we will uncover in the next sections, migration emerges as a vulnerable issue, used by politicians and the public in a way that works against increasing solidarity. The issue of migration is easily hijacked to reinforce the nationalist sentiment that commonly surfaces in a post-crisis environment as it emphasises the cultural differences present in society. At a time when a population yearns for stability and familiarity, a high presence of migrants appears more as a threat than a potential solution. In fact, Hatton (2014) suggests that historically a recession can be seen as the trigger converting increasing anti-immigrant sentiment into restrictive policies on immigration, especially following long periods of high immigration. This is noticed in Europe in the 1970s when high levels of international migration occurring throughout the 1950s in the framework of guest-worker programmes, was suddenly stalled when oil crises hit and economic growth slumped. Aggravated or not by the financial crisis, a migration crisis began to emerge in Europe in the aftermath of economic instability. Kullving

204

S. K. ST. JOHN

(2014) describes a “crisis nexus” in which financial crisis becomes assimilated to migration crisis in a sameness of risks and threats facing the EU. The European Migrant Crisis The European migrant2 crisis, also commonly known as the refugee3 crisis, is a period of increased migration to Europe between 2015 and 2019. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as poverty in the West Balkans and parts of West Africa, caused higher than normal numbers of civilians to attempt to reach Europe by sea, or over land via Turkey, until the situation reached a point of crisis in 2015. Origins of the Migrant Crisis According to UNHCR data, the majority of people arriving in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 were seeking refuge from war and persecution. These people are known as refugees. In Syria, socio-political unrest had been building up since 2011 under the presidency of Bashar al-Assad until civil war broke out between pro- and anti-government groups. Similarly, the conflicts in Afghanistan that began in 2001, and those of Iraq beginning in 2003, continued to threaten the wellbeing and lives of civilians in those countries. However, there were also large numbers of migrants arriving from the West Balkans (Kosovo, Albania and Serbia) and parts of West Africa, who were more likely fleeing poverty and unemployment in search of better quality of life and work. These are known as economic migrants. Whether economic migrants are

2 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines the term “migrant” as

referring to individuals who move away from their home country or place of habitual residence. Note that the term “immigrant” is only used from the perspective of the country of arrival. 3 The IOM, in accordance with the 1951 Convention, defines the term “refugee” as “a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who not having nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Convention relating to the status of refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137, Art. 1A(2)).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

205

seeking stability in EU member states with generous social welfare provisions or with more tolerant communities and stronger economies that can offer better employment opportunities, they do not hold justifications for claiming refugee status. There are therefore two different types of migrants attempting to reach Europe during the migrant crisis, but combined, their numbers reached unprecedented levels since the Second World War. Managing their arrivals put the EU and its member states under pressure. Migration Routes and Figures In 2015, more than 1,011,700 migrants arrived by sea, and almost 34,900 by land (compared to a total of 280,000 for land and sea arrivals combined in 2014).4 The EU’s external border force Frontex, which monitors migrant routes into Europe, estimated the total number of arrivals in 2015 to be as many as 1,800,000. They arrive via three main routes: The Central Mediterranean Route (sea) from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and Malta; the Western Balkan Route (land) to northern Europe (Hungary) via Turkey and Greece; the Eastern Mediterranean Route (sea) from the Middle East to Greece via Turkey. Additional routes include: The Western Mediterranean Route from North Africa (Morocco) to Spain; the Western African Route from North Africa (Morocco) to the Canary Islands; the land-based Eastern Borders Route; the Black Sea Route; the Circular Route from Albania to Greece; and the Apulia and Calabria Route.5 The top ten origin countries of migrants applying for asylum6 in the EU at the beginning of the crisis were Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran and Ukraine.7 Many take the short route to Greece (Kos, Chios, Lesvos and Samos) via Turkey using inflatable dingys and small rickety wooden boats,8 but the deadliest route is the Central Mediterranean. A major wake-up call for action was felt in Europe when on 18 April 2015 an overcrowded boat

4 Source: IOM. 5 Source: Eurostat. 6 The IOM defines the term “asylum seeker” as an individual who is seeking international protection. An individual whose claim has not yet been fully decided upon by the country in which it has been submitted. 7 Source: Eurostat. 8 BBC (4 March 2016).

206

S. K. ST. JOHN

carrying around 850 migrants, including several children aged between ten and eleven, capsized in the Mediterranean Sea, seventeen miles from the coast of Libya on its way to Lampedusa in Italy. The UNHCR called it the deadliest incident on record, as only 28 people were known to have survived.9 That April, a total of five boats carrying almost 2000 migrants sank in the Mediterranean Sea with a combined death toll of 1200.10 A total of 4041 migrants making the precarious journey across the sea in poorly maintained and overcrowded boats were reported to have died in 2015, mainly on the Central Mediterranean Route. The number increased to 5141 in 2016 before reducing to 3139 in 2017, 2299 in 2018 and half as many in 2019, with an average of 3.4% of total crossings ending in fatality.11 Arrivals have been steadily decreasing since 2016, from over a million in 2015, to 390,456 in 2016, 186,788 in 2017, 144,282 in 2018 and 123,920 in 2019.12 However, by the end of 2018, there was still a backlog of 878,600 pending asylum requests across the EU.13 Although arrivals are decreasing, the consequences of the migrant crisis will be felt by member states for some years to come. Impact on Member States and EU Responses The consequences of the European migrant crisis on EU member states and their citizens have generated tension. Of the 1,321,560 total asylum requests in the EU in 2015, Germany received around 476,000, but Hungary had the highest number of applications compared to the population. For every 100,000 members of the Hungarian population, nearly 1800 refugees claimed asylum. Similarly, Sweden received 1687 requests per 100,000 of the local population, while in Germany the figure was 587, and 60 in the UK. The EU average was 260 per 100,000.14 Member states have felt the burden of hosting and receiving the incoming migrants, in numbers which they deem disproportionate, particularly for the arrival countries: Italy, Greece and Hungary. In a bid to 9 The Guardian, 20 April 2015; UNHCR, 21 April 2015. 10 UNHCR, 1 July 2015. 11 Source: UNHCR. 12 IOM, 30 December 2019. 13 Source: Eurostat. 14 BBC, 2 March 2016.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

207

spread the burden across all member states, in September 2015, EU ministers voted to implement a migrant quota system, which aimed to relocate across the entire EU the 160,000 refugees arriving from Greece and Italy. The quota system was met with resistance from several member states and, as Tackle (2018) argues, conflicting ideas of solidarity emerged between the member states and the EU, and even between member states. Some shared the EU’s collective orientation of solidarity that is forward-looking beyond borders, while others held nationally oriented ideas of solidarity that firmly maintained borders. The UK had initially opted out of receiving any migrants, but Prime Minister David Cameron later pledged the UK would receive up to 20,000 refugees from Syria over the next five years.15 The Visegrád countries, namely Slovakia and Hungary, took the issue to the European Court of Justice, but they lost the case with the Court ruling that the quota system is “necessary to respond effectively and swiftly to an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of displaced persons”.16 The EU sought to reduce the numbers of migrants seeking to reach Europe. First it engaged with Niger, being central to the migration routes to the Mediterranean, pushing the Nigerien government to adopt a law that criminalises smuggling. However, implementation of the law resulted in removing smugglers’ livelihoods, and they were not provided alternative solutions to earn a living, which led to poverty and drove migrants to more dangerous routes across the Mediterranean via Algeria and Libya.17 In Libya, there are 30 official detention centres with 700,000 migrants, including 50,000 asylum seekers. Smugglers shifted their activity away from human trafficking towards profiting from the detention centres.18 Therefore, while the EU response may have been effective in the short term to reduce the number of migrant arrivals, the measures were not sustainable, and exacerbated the already complicated dynamics of the Libyan conflict. In the long term, prolonged conflict would produce increased numbers of migrants fleeing the country. Nevertheless, the EU did take step to address the root causes of the migration crisis. At the

15 BBC, 2 March 2016. 16 New York Times, 6 September 2017. 17 “Migration though the Mediterranean: Mapping the EU response”, European

Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (http://ecfr.eu). 18 Source: ECFR.

208

S. K. ST. JOHN

2015 Valletta Summit, it created an EU Trust Fund for Africa, which aimed to fund initiatives that establish the origins of migration from Africa. Public Attitudes Towards the European Migrant Crisis Public opinion towards migrants appears divided. An increasing number of citizens are not comfortable with migrants escaping poverty and violence in search of a better life in Europe. These feelings emerge as fear of unfair competition on the labour market, with migrants perceived to undercut residents’ salaries, and reduced access to social services. European progressive parties are divided between protecting their core values of solidarity and respect for human rights, and a mission to stand for workers’ rights (Funk et al. 2019). However, despite the hostile media coverage on the European migrant crisis and immigration’s central place in populist discourse, public attitudes do not necessarily oppose migrants as much as one would expect. During the period of the crisis, people tended to be more favourable to accepting migrants and only in Italy and Hungary were citizens opposed to closing borders to refugees, even when advised of a risk that these refugees could be infiltrated by potential terrorists. Public opinion is negative, however, towards the handling of the crisis by the EU and by national governments (Dennison and Geddes 2017). A lack of coordination was perceived to be a lack of control and sovereignty, where immigration is an area in which states either demonstrate their ability or inability to exercise sovereignty (Torres 2019). Democracy and Legitimacy Democratic Dissatisfaction Citizens believe it is extremely important to live in democracy,19 but they tend to be aware if they feel democracy is failing them (Kriesi 2020). Crises breed democratic dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction initiates a search for someone or something to blame, which has put the EU in a precarious position. Dissatisfaction has called into question the very idea of European democracy that has long been taken for granted since the democratisation after the Second World War and the Cold War (Rensmann 2019). According to Kriesi (2020), democratic dissatisfaction results from a crisis

19 Source: European Social Survey N. 16 (2012) in Kriesi (2020).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

209

of representation, which has two causes: the political system’s unresponsiveness to new demands from citizens; and its failure to perform. In the cases of the financial and migrant crises, citizens’ dissatisfaction has stemmed from criticism towards the ways in which the crises were dealt with by political institutions and from the way they perceive their lives have been affected by the crises. In addition to dissatisfaction directly linked to the handling of crises, citizens are increasingly concerned that their needs and demands in the context of a changing world are not being represented. Change is perceived by many as a threat, and globalisation is bringing about fastpaced, profound changes to citizens’ everyday lives. As Habermas (2001) described, “economic globalisation is a rapid structural change that redistributes social costs more unequally and opens up the gap in social status between the winners and the losers”. Habermas also explains that the benefits of globalisation will manifest in the long-term with burdens in the short term, which does not sit well with the general public as they challenge political systems to provide credible, immediate responses and solutions to the problems imposed by quickly developing technologies or larger, more competitive markets. As citizens start to observe shortcomings in the political system or a lack of adequate responsiveness in the face of these demanding challenges, trust in institutions begins to wane. Political institutions, and the EU in particular, are led towards a crisis of legitimacy in which they become increasingly required to justify their actions and existence. With citizens in search of alternative solutions for making their voices heard, populist parties have swooped into fill the void, instigating the rise of populism. Populism Populist parties can be seen as winners in the changing and challengeridden world, honing in on democratic underrepresentation and offering people a seemingly credible alternative to apparently failed traditional political systems. Populist parties capitalise on crises and the effects of globalisation, disregarding the opportunities that emerge from change and focusing instead on threats or forecasted short-term socio-economic degradation. In this sense, populism speaks to those in society who feel left behind by fast-paced change. As such concerns commonly emerge from the older generations, this notion is also reflected in the statistics stating that older generations have less faith in institutions and are more likely to vote for populist parties (Dustmann et al. 2017).

210

S. K. ST. JOHN

Bolstered by protectionist nationalism against an increasingly open society, populist parties exploit popular fears and a momentary sense of lost identity. They question the democratic constitution, democratically tested procedures, fundamental rights and values, and people’s recognition and trust in the constitutional order (Kotroyannos and Mavrozacharakis 2018). A lack of trust in institutions is a defining aspect of populism, as shown in voting patterns where populist party voters prove to be less trusting in national and European institutions (Dustmann et al. 2017), but it is not the only dimension to the phenomenon. Kotroyannos and Mavrozacharakis (2018) outline populism’s technical, content, leadership and media dimensions, which are key to its success. From a technical perspective, populist parties adopt an oversimplified political style that rivals the perceived highbrow rhetoric of traditional politicians and experts. Such an oversimplification, especially when combined with imagery, fosters a familiarity for the public that facilitates connectedness to the party. On content, populism gathers a homogenous group, mobilising it based on single-issue politics that attack social differences in an area that seemingly affects people’s everyday lives directly, such immigration, class and security, Euroscepticism and globalisation. Successful populist parties have charismatic leaders at their helms, who are relatable, likeable and approachable, fostering an immediate and uninterrupted relationship with the people and mobilising the masses into a cohesive collective (Kotroyannos and Mavrozacharakis 2018). The leaders themselves become a symbol of an alternative political system, providing the expected responses on targeted issues that fill that void of representation, and thus translate into votes at the ballot box. The media plays an equally important role in mobilising followers towards specific issues. Populist politics rely heavily on social media and tabloid media outlets to promote their purpose. In particular, leaders themselves reinforce their relatability to the people through personal social media accounts. While the media facilitates a new kind of public sphere, “filter bubbles” in online media work in populist parties’ favour by building up algorithms based on the user’s previous “likes” and activity, which omits opposing points of view on issues. With no opposition to their opinion, certain views are cemented due to the increased availability of content with which they agree (Fossum 2016). With new populist parties springing up in the political system, combined with heightening support for previously minor parties such as the Greens, the electoral base has become diluted and parties struggle

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

211

to obtain a clear majority in the system. Democratic systems become unstable because elected parties encounter obstacles in pushing issues through their parliaments. Countering the alleged objectives of populist parties to be more effective respondents to people’s needs and demands, such political polarisation results in hindering the smooth functioning of a system that is already failing in their eyes, further feeding support for populist parties who deepen their arguments against confidence in established political elites. The EU as a Scapegoat The EU already suffers from a democratic deficit and, as the European Parliament elections are increasingly being used as a platform by Eurosceptic parties to gain influence, political polarisation is also high in the European system. Populism therefore threatens both national and European political institutions, where the EU provides an easy scapegoat in populist rhetoric. Already, with growing external forces from the US, Russia and China, the effectiveness of the EU as a global player is forced into the spotlight, but at the same time, internal nationalism through populist parties weakens its influence on the global stage. In such a scenario, populist parties are able to pick holes in a lack of influence, to which—unbeknown to their followers—they themselves are contributing. The EU is also an easy scapegoat for the challenges of the globalised world. Surveys show that the older generations are less pro-European than the younger generations, which is counterintuitive given that the older generation is more likely to feel a connection to the founding aims of the EU to establish lasting peace after the Second World War than the younger generation. What surfaces is that the younger generation is less afraid of the technological and innovative developments of the changing society. Therefore, they do not gravitate towards the EU as a scapegoat and tend to possess an open-mindedness that is in harmony with the concept of European integration, which at least paints an encouraging future for the European project. Adding to the EU’s disadvantage in the face of globalisation is the ambiguity that separates Europeans from the European institutions. Populism is successful because the movement manages to speak to and connect with the people in a way that the EU has not yet been able to achieve. We can argue that this is due to the communicative and strategic techniques adopted by populist parties compared to those adopted by the European institutions, and although the EU institutions are among the

212

S. K. ST. JOHN

most transparent regarding the accessibility of information, the problem is systemic. In the eyes of the European public, the operation and systemic organisation of EU institutions and decision-making is often confusing, laying it bare for populists to blame the EU when something goes wrong at the domestic level that they cannot or do not want to explain to their followers. If citizens are not familiar with the EU’s modus operandi, they will unlikely contest the blame assigned to the EU. As regards democracy, there is nothing to suggest that a supranational system of governance cannot be democratic (Fossum 2016), but the system has to satisfy people’s desire to feel represented. Currently, only members of the European Parliament are democratically elected. While the Spitzenkandidaten has helped in raising the elections’ visibility among the general public, the EU is exposed to criticism for carrying out decision-making by “unelected technocrats”; while EU decisions are made by representatives of the member state governments—and therefore directly but sometimes indirectly elected—there may be two or three steps in distance between an EU decision-making commissioner and a citizen’s vote (Fossum 2016). Given the populist backlash surrounding expertise and representative democracy, such a system feeds straight into the hands of the Eurosceptic populist leader challenging the EU’s legitimacy. Disintegration The concept of disintegration has been thoroughly analysed by Webber (2019) in his study of the consequences of European crises. The European Union has historically shown resistance in facing crises throughout its lifespan, including the European Defence Community crisis (1950– 1954), the Empty Chair crisis (1965–1966), the British Budgetary Crisis (1979–1984), the crisis of the European Monetary System (1992–1993) and the Constitutional Treaty crisis (2005–2009). Rightly so, Webber (2019) questions what is different about contemporary crises. Why only now has the concept of disintegration come to the fore? With reference to the beginning of this chapter, we can notice first of all that contemporary crises tend to be external; both the financial crisis and the migration crisis did not evolve from within the Union. Webber adds that they are also multidimensional, involving a period of overlapping, multifaceted crises where no crisis ever exists in its own vacuum. Indeed, as we will see in the following section, Brexit may have evolved from within the Union, but arguments for leaving the Union have also emancipated from external

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

213

crises, namely immigration. The Covid-19 epidemiological crisis is the last to prove that point, as it almost dwarfs the Brexit crisis, leaving the EU dealing with a double crisis, both of significant magnitude, one internal and one external. Webber also suggests the duration of contemporary crises are more difficult to identify and that mass politicisation of the process has caused increased complexity in overcoming them. Crises had previously been addressed by the political elite, but the way to address salient issues is being debated on the public stage. European integration develops along three main paths: it can be deepened in a particular policy field; the range of integration can be broadened to include new policy fields; or integration can be widened through enlargement. Until recent scholarship, European integration has tended to be considered as a unidirectional concept, but as more cases of integration are being observed, the concept of disintegration has been brought under the magnifying glass. A perceived lack of steadfast leadership at EU level is considered an origin of the legitimacy crisis that has reinforced a trend towards intergovernmentalism and divergence from supranationalism. This can be seen in the diminishing autonomy levels of supranational institutions, while intergovernmental institutions such as the European Council were strengthened, demonstrated the increased power of the member state (Grosse 2017). In contemporary EU policymaking, national interest more often than not trumps common interest, and support for nationalist, populist and anti-EU parties has become widespread across most countries (Dinan et al. 2017). Such a scenario unfortunately leaves the EU navigating ways to satisfy a number of wavering national actors in the integration process. Defining Disintegration Since disintegration is considered to be the opposite concept of integration, a definition is that European disintegration involves the reverse process of one of these integration paths, i.e. deepening, broadening or widening (Schramm 2019). The three paths of (dis)integration in the EU identify a distinction between an internal and an external concept. In the internal sense, member states backtrack on integration in a particular policy field while operating on the inside of the EU, whereas disintegration in the external sense implies a member state exits the EU entirely and ceases to be a member state. Internal examples of disintegration can be found during the crises described above. The Eurozone crisis brought some member states,

214

S. K. ST. JOHN

namely Greece, to the point of questioning their membership of the Eurozone in 2015. However, since the fight against the crisis was bolstered by the supranational European Central Bank, which could facilitate bailouts to the major national banks, disintegration was avoided. The refugee crisis brought about modifications to the Schengen area, by a reintroduction of border controls in some member states, and the disintegration of the Common European Asylum System, which determines that the member state receiving the refugee should process the asylum application. It was claimed that some of the receiving countries (Greece, Italy and Hungary) were not abiding by the system and sent refugees on to other member states without processing their applications first. In addition to the cases made to the European Court of Justice contesting the refugee relocation programme, this all resulted in a move towards the renationalisation, and thus disintegration, of EU policies relating to asylum and internal security. The most prominent example of disintegration in the context of the EU, and falling into the category of disintegration in the external sense, is the exiting of the UK from the EU. The UK’s decision to leave the EU was not one that fell from the sky; the history of the UK’s relationship with the EU highlights the near inevitability of such a scenario. Nevertheless, “Brexit” has been one of the hardest blows absorbed by the EU since its existence. It is the first concrete case of external disintegration, which has the potential to harbour grave consequences for the future of the European project. Brexit On 23 June 2016, the UK held a referendum on whether or not to remain a member state of the European Union. The only possible options were “leave” or “remain”, and the result fell in favour of “leave” by 52% of the votes. The Prime Minister David Cameron, who had campaigned to remain in the EU, resigned and Theresa May took over as Prime Minister with the task of implementing the UK’s exit. In March 2017, May invoked article 50, setting the timer for the two-year countdown to the UK’s exit and in which time the UK was required to negotiate and have a deal ratified on the terms of the exit. She attempted to pass her deal through Parliament on 15 January 2019, but lost in the greatest defeat in history for a British Prime Minister since its modern democracy. The main bone of contention was the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, which came to be known as the “Irish Backstop”. It

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

215

jeopardised the Good Friday Agreement, a peace deal that ended decades of conflict in Northern Ireland, and Brexit supporters were unable to compromise on the issue, seeing any concession as a surrender to the EU.20 May made a second attempt to pass her deal on 12 March 2019, only weeks before the deadline of 29 March 2019, and lost once again, forcing her to seek an extension on the exit date from the EU to avoid leaving without a deal. The EU granted an extension until 12 April 2019. This allowed May to make a final attempt at renegotiating a deal with the EU and gain Parliament’s support, but she failed and was forced to request a further extension from the EU until the end of June 2019. The EU granted her an extension until 31 October 2019 in the hope of avoiding any further extension requests, stating that it would be flexible in the case the UK was ready to leave earlier than 31 October 2019. May made a final attempt to pass her deal on 12 May 2019, but failed again, leading to her resignation and the Conservative Party appointment of Boris Johnson as the new Prime Minister. Johnson pledged to pull the UK out of the EU with or without a deal on 21 October 2019, making varying attempts to do so. He renegotiated May’s original deal, particularly regarding the Irish border, and closed parliament to avoid it influencing the deal, but the prorogation led to backlash from antiBrexit opposition who feared the consequences of a no-deal scenario. The backlash resulted in a law forcing Johnson to seek an extension from the EU in the case that a deal was not achieved, and since it was not, he reluctantly requested a new extension, which brought the new exit date to 31 January 2020. In return, he requested an election. Despite the vociferous calls from the people for a second referendum on whether to leave the EU at all, Johnson was aware that he would not manage to pass a deal with the current composition of the Parliament. The only solution to resolve the impasse, with the exception of a second referendum, was to gamble his position and hold a general election. He campaigned to “get Brexit done” and with the Labour Party unable to get off the fence regarding the Brexit issue, Johnson’s gamble paid off and he managed to obtain a majority victory that provided him with the necessary seats in the House of Commons to pass his deal. The antiBrexit opposition and people’s cries for a second referendum slunk back

20 Vox, 31 January 2020.

216

S. K. ST. JOHN

in defeat and the UK left the EU at midnight (CET) on 31 January 2020. The one-year transition period is now up and, at the time of writing, it is touch and go as to whether the UK can escape the situation with a deal. The deed is now done and if the UK wishes to return to the EU in the future, it must re-apply alongside other candidate countries. For the EU, the risks of further disintegration are contested. There appear to be two potential routes as a result of Brexit: the triggering of further disintegration, which would jeopardise the entire European project; or deeper integration by the remaining 27 member states. The UK’s exit from the EU has triggered a period of reflection on the future of European integration, and for now a preventative solution to further disintegration appears to emerge in the form of differentiated integration, a term increasingly brought under the spotlight describing a scenario in which not all member states participate in integration. Horizontal differentiation implies that member states integrate and others do not in a particular policy field, while vertical differentiation implies that member states integrate in a particular policy field to different degrees of centralisation (Schramm 2019).

Case Studies Case Study One: The UK’s exit from the European Union The Road to the Referendum The UK’s relationship with the EU has never been plain sailing. Both Macshane (2015) and Evans and Menon (2017) highlight that, even in 1948 before the creation of the European Community, Churchill stated in his Zurich speech that the UK was “With Europe, but not of it”. Indeed, the UK has consistently proved to be the least European of the member states, both in politics and public opinion (Evans and Manon 2017). The UK joined the European Economic Community in 1973. Even then, the public and politicians appeared divided on the move, declaring that “a large part of the country is not ecstatic about the score” and that “the journey into Europe will be bumpy and discordant”.21 The UK’s first application to join the EEC in 1961 was rejected due to decisive influence from the French President Charles De Gaulle. It is said that the UK’s accession to the EU was facilitated when De Gaulle left power, 21 The Guardian, 17 January 1973.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

217

leading the UK to join in 1973. A referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EEC took place in 1975, with 67% of the population voting to remain and securing the UK’s membership in the Community. While the UK did eventually join the European Community, Britons have lacked an emotional attachment to the EU from the beginning, as Oliver (2018) points out, and since then, the UK’s commitment to European integration has been forever overshadowed by hesitancy. It can be said that real trouble emerged in 1992 with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which called for deeper integration and at which point the EMU was created, leading to the single currency. The UK began to distance itself, rejecting the Euro and later the Schengen Agreement in 1994. The pivotal moment, however, developed from the negotiations on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004, which—it can be said—have been a decisive factor in the UK’s journey towards its exit from the EU on 31 January 2020. After the general election in the autumn of 2005, the British people were due a vote on whether they wished to accept the EU’s proposed Constitutional Treaty (Westlake 2017). However, the French and Dutch rejected the Constitutional Treaty through referenda held earlier in 2004, which meant the Treaty was no longer viable with or without the UK’s vote. The UK population therefore never voted on the Constitutional Treaty and the EU spent the next decade redrafting elements of its content to substitute it with the Lisbon Treaty. On 5 March 2008, a Conservative proposal for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was defeated with 311 votes to 248, with the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown claiming that it was fundamentally different to the Constitutional Treaty. He argued that a people’s vote was therefore not required (Westlake 2017). In 2010, Brown signed the Treaty in Lisbon alone and the people did not get their vote on that Treaty either. The Liberal Democrats supported Labour’s position, but at the same time, they rallied for a referendum on EU membership to end the ambiguity surrounding the EU–UK relationship. David Cameron, the opposition leader, jumped on the Labour government’s broken promises and betrayal to the people for preventing them from having a voice on matters of EU governance, creating resentment towards the establishment. In 2013, he promised that if elected in the 2015 general election, he would avoid such a scenario in the future by passing a law requiring government to seek the people’s approval through a referendum on any further power uploaded to the EU. While the Lisbon Treaty had by then been ratified, so no vote could be held on that Treaty,

218

S. K. ST. JOHN

the law would apply to any such future treaties or future proposals for accession to the single currency. If you have read carefully the previous section on populism and dissatisfaction, you will know where we are going with this. Indeed, by 2014 one populist party in particular pounced: the UK Independence Party (UKIP) led by Nigel Farage. Following the Constitutional Treaty incident, UKIP had been simmering in the background along with several pro-referendum parties, but it came to the fore as discontent over denied voting on EU matters started to culminate in the 2015 general election. Westlake (2017) provides us a quote from 2014 that sums up Farage’s strategy: The fact that we have not yet had a referendum on this has made people very angry because we keep being promised one, don’t we? Dave even gave us a cast iron guarantee that if he became Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, there will be a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, and then of course we were let down like a cheap pair of braces. So, we are becoming cheesed off because time and time again we are promised a referendum and it has not been delivered.

Thinking back to the dimensions of populism discussed earlier, it ticks all the boxes. Farage is discrediting trust in traditional politics (i.e. Cameron and the Labour Party) on a single issue (for denying the people their vote), as a relatable, charismatic leader (with colloquial phasing such as “cheesed off” relatable to the general public) using clear and simple language to relay his message. However, in addition, Farage’s own lack of truth is problematic, insofar as Cameron did not promise a vote on the Lisbon Treaty as it had already been ratified. Cameron had promised referenda on future EU issues, and accused untruthfulness by the “leave” campaign was a notion that frequently riddled the referendum campaign. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, UKIP was able to secure seats and gain national-level political recognition, thanks to the proportional representation structure in the European Parliament. Farage pushed his issue of the vote denied to the people, and he even said himself that he imagined voters would use the European elections as an opportunity to finally have their say on this issue by voting UKIP in the face of traditional politics (Westlake 2017). The rise of UKIP left Cameron uneasy, and together with the fact that he knew Treaty reforms would be urgently required in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, he pledged

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

219

in the Conservative manifesto to hold and in/out referendum on the UK’s EU membership by 2017 if he were elected. In doing so, he hoped to recuperate Conservative voters straying to UKIP, but perhaps envisaged a coalition with the Liberal Democrats who would block any such referenda. His outright victory meant he was obliged to see through his promise of an in/out referendum, or risk a catastrophic demise of his reputation and absolute glory for Farage. Temporality was an important dimension to the 2016 EU referendum. As we know from earlier discussions on crises and democratic dissatisfaction, crises bring discontent, which leads to searches for a scapegoat. Cameron’s promise for a referendum, and the consequent vote on 23 June 2016, took place in the wake of the series of crises we discussed earlier: the financial and sovereign debt crises, and the migrant crisis. Some were still feeling the sting of the financial crisis, or at least the taste was still bitter, and the migrant crisis was at its peak. With the EU’s prominent role in both crises, for the likes of Farage and other Leave campaigners, the EU made an obvious target as the creator of all ills relating to these crises. Together with Farage’s single-issue political strategy on the denied Treaty referenda, it now perhaps seems obvious that the EU hardly stood a chance of keeping the UK in its pack. British Public Attitudes Towards the European Union and European Affairs Indeed, the UK people were most sceptical about Europe at the time of the referendum. Throughout the last two decades, it is suggested that no more than 20% of the population wished to leave the EU. Correlation between crisis aftermath and an increase in Eurosceptism, as well as the impact of the referendum, is apparent. In 1992 at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, only 10% wanted to leave the EU, increasing to 11% in 1994 for the Schengen Agreement. It spiked to 19% in 1996 when the EU banned the export of British beef, but reduced again to 12% by the time the Euro was introduced in 1999. Enlargement in 2004 caused another spike to 18%, and there was a jump from 20% in 2008 to 30% in 2012 following the Eurozone crisis. The figures gradually dropped back down to 26% in 2013, 24% in 2014 and 22% in 2015, before doubling to 41% in 2016. In fact, until only six months before the 2016 EU referendum, it was suggested that as little as 1% of the UK population rated Europe as an

220

S. K. ST. JOHN

important issue facing the country.22 At that time, important issues for people consisted of education, health care, defence, the economy and immigration. While no one was fighting for the EU, no one was fighting it either, with the exception of the minority long-standing Eurosceptics. The vast majority of the UK population appeared rather indifferent towards the status quo. Even in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the figures remained under 10% between 2007 and 2015, with the first spike over 10% only appearing in 2015. Even at the time of the referendum, it did not exceed 20%. The sharp increase in the proportion of the population believing that Europe was an important issue for the UK only came after 2016 once Theresa May invoked article 50. Only then did it become a paramount issue for the population, i.e. the newly imposed Brexit needed to be resolved so that the country could move on. Between 1992 and 2016, the largest proportion of public opinion dictated that the UK should stay in the EU with reduced EU power. The figures were consistently between 30 and 40% with the exception of 1999 when it increased to 43% and 2015 when it increased to 43% (against the 22% wanting to leave altogether). The number dropped again to 35% at the time of the referendum.23 These figures suggest that the British people were never strongly opposed to being a member of the EU, and suggest that the UK public would have been open to voting on the type of relationship that UK should have with the EU rather than leaving the bloc altogether. However, faced with an in/out vote to cast, it was the motivation that in the end swayed many voters towards “leave” rather than “remain”. According to a YouGov survey carried out the day before the referendum, the balance between Britain’s right to act independently and the appropriate level of cooperation with other countries, was the second greatest motivation for voting to leave (30%). For the marginal majority at 33%, it was jobs, investment and the economy that drove them to a “leave” vote, while 18% of the respondents voted on the basis of immigration, 4% on maximising Britain’s influence in the world, 9% on something else and 7% on none of the above. When questioned further about their perception of the EU, the public’s responses continue to lack clarity, despite a survey suggesting

22 Source: Ipsos Mori Issues Index. 23 Source: NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the

EU).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

221

that over half the population consider they either know a great deal or a fair amount about the advantages (58%) and disadvantages (60%) of EU membership. Roughly 30% admit to not knowing very much.24 However, on certain issues, responses are contradictory, even on the perceived consequences of Brexit. While figures suggest that 41% of people believe that the UK’s economy will improve in the long term after Brexit (31% believe it will worsen and 12% do not know), 44% believe that the strength of the union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will worsen (21% believe it will improve and 15% do not know).25 One can question how a weaker union can have a stronger economy than that of its pre-Brexit existence within the EU system. Similarly, it is suggested that almost half (47%) of Britons believe the EU would be less secure if Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey were to accede the Union (37% thought the level of security would not change, 14% felt it would be more secure and 2% did not know).26 And it is suggested that 47% of people were neutral or did not know whether there were too many member states in the EU (38% agreed, and 20% disagreed).27 However, it is also suggested that a large proportion of people (33%) believe that the more member states in the EU, the more influential it would be on the world stage (21% disagreed and 28% were neutral). A substantial 17% did not know.28 Similarly, 33% did not know whether they opposed the potential accession of Turkey, while 50% opposed and 18% supported.29 Identity and Immigration We notice that the issues British people considered to be a priority for the UK before the referendum, and those that were far higher on the agenda than the issue of Europe itself (such as the economy and immigration), were emerging as issues connected to the EU–UK relationship. Consequently, this influenced how people voted. For example, figures indicate that shortly before the referendum, 60% of Londoners—a notable 24 Source: Ipsos Mori, 5 May 2016. 25 Source: BMG Research, 7 February 2020. 26 Source: ComRes, 17 May 2016. 27 Source: Kantar, 14 April 2016. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

222

S. K. ST. JOHN

“remain” area—believed that immigration from the EU to London was “much too high” or “slightly too high”, and 50% believed that there would be less immigration in general to London if the UK left the EU.30 Therefore, there is a clear indication that leaving the EU was seen as a solution to the issue of immigration in London. In fact, it is suggested that 73% of people concerned about immigration as a single policy issue voted to leave the EU.31 Hostility towards immigration is rooted in the perceived social consequences, and how it may affect people’s daily lives and the composition of the environment around them. British citizens may have concerns about the level of welfare support immigrants should receive, but concerns about immigration cut deeper into questions of nationalism and identity. Given the low numbers of migrants in the UK compared to other EU member states (as you will see in the next case study), British hostility to immigration concentrates on a perceived image of how their community may change if immigration continues. In this sense, society is divided into two groups: those who seek to protect and maintain a homogeneous community; and those who advocate freedom of moral and cultural values, seeing benefits to a diverse community. Not surprisingly, 72% of those in the first category appeared to vote “leave”, compared to only 21% from the second category. Those on middle ground leaned towards “leave” with 53%.32 Given the embedded nationalism present in the UK, we can expect a high proportion of the population to associate with the first category preferring a homogenous community. Identity is an important part of UK citizenship, with a system that defines identities at the regional and national levels, i.e. English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish, in addition to British. When placed in the context of the European question, identities become even further polarised. In the first instance, European citizenship adds another layer to identity, which can be considered a step too far for some. In a YouGov survey carried out in London—the most cosmopolitan area of the UK—62% of respondents did not consider (either not very much or not at all) themselves to be strongly European,

30 Source: YouGov, London area, 6 June 2016. 31 NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the EU). 32 Source: NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the

EU).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

223

compared to 29% who felt fairly or very strongly European.33 Secondly, different regional identities vary in their support for the EU. Those who consider themselves as only English (and not even British) were more likely to vote to leave the EU (54% compared to 45% of those who considered themselves to be British as well34 ). However, this is a stark contrast to the overwhelming support for EU membership demonstrated by the Scottish people in the referendum results and consequent renewed calls for a Scottish independence referendum, indicating a preference over EU membership to UK membership. The situation is similar in Northern Ireland, where more survey respondents felt less British after the referendum than those who felt more British, and more felt more Irish than those who felt less Irish after the referendum. In fact, it suggested that 48% of people in Northern Ireland would be in favour of Irish unity as a pathway back to EU membership (against 45% who oppose and 7% who do not know).35 Overall, we can therefore consider that British identities are polarised between support for diverse communities, as indicated by Scottish and Irish attitudes, and protection for homogeneous communities, as indicated by English attitudes. Immigration becomes tied up in the latter, where British (or English) individuals become threatened by changes they experience in their community and in society. While many changes will have come about through globalisation and the development of technologies and innovation, the arrival of immigrants to that community are most immediately identifiable as a cause of such changes. This is perhaps why we see correlations between the older generations—who are more averse to change—voting “leave”36 and people with concerns about immigration also voting “leave”.

33 Source: YouGov, 6 June 2016 (British nationals, London area). 34 Source: NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the

EU). 35 Source: Lucid Talk, 2 February 2020. 36 Statistics suggest that the older generation were more likely to be “leave” voters,

while the younger generation were more likely to be “remain” voters. The division between the “younger” and “older generation” appears in the age group 45–54 years old, in which 53 per cent voted to remain, while in the next age bracket of 55–64, the figure reduces to 45 per cent. The highest group to vote remain were 18–24 year olds with 72 per cent and 63 per cent of groups 22–34 and 35–44 year olds voted to remain (NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the EU).

224

S. K. ST. JOHN

Trust, Democracy and Education When questioned about political institutions in an operational and democratic sense, by 2016, figures suggest that 67% thought there was too much red tape in the EU, with only 9% disagreeing and 25% either neutral or not knowing. 54% felt the EU interferes too much in domestic British politics, with only 9% disagreeing, and 37% either neutral or not knowing.37 While 50% consider they can influence domestic policy and 56% believe they can vote to change domestic policy if they are dissatisfied, only 22% consider that they can influence policy at EU level (47% believe they cannot and 30% are neutral or do not know) and only 29% believe they can vote to change EU policy if they are dissatisfied (39% believe they cannot and 32% are neutral or do not know). It is indicated that, at the time of the referendum, 39% of Britons thought the EU was undemocratic. 21% thought it was democratic, while 40% were neutral or did not know.38 Shortly before the referendum, figures indicated that only 26% of Britons trusted the European Parliament (59% did not trust it and 15% did not know) and only 24% trusted the European Commission (53% did not trust it and 23% did not know).39 We can consider that there is also a blurring of lines between a lack of trust and belief in democracy, and a lack of understanding about the EU. While survey results showing whether citizens agree/disagree/support/oppose are important indicators for assessing public attitudes, the percentages of people who are unable to comment (the don’t knows) merit consideration. The large proportions of people who remained indifferent on issues or did not know how to answer, suggests an overall high lack of knowledge among Britons on the EU, its operation, its democratic system, and the advantages and disadvantages of membership. If voters were unsure about how the EU works, but they have greater knowledge on domestic politics, their vote will likely be influenced by the way they perceive domestic politics working for them, believing the two are one and the same.40 There was less democratic deficit in the EU referendum than the 2015 general election. 43% of people claiming to have no interest in politics

37 Source: Kantar, 14 April 2016. 38 Source: Ipsos Mori, 15 May 2016. 39 Source: Kantar, 17 November 2015. 40 NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The vote to leave the EU).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

225

voted in the referendum, compared to 30% having no interest in politics voting in the 2015 general election.41 Figures suggest that a few days before the referendum, however, roughly only half of Britons felt they knew more about the EU than they did before the referendum was proposed, while the other half did not believe they learnt anything new about the EU before voting.42 Understanding about how the EU works links us to the concept of learning, and hence to education. Those with a higher level of education were more likely to prefer to stay in the EU, and figures present consistent correlation between the level of education and voting tendencies. 78% with graduate-level education tended to vote to remain, decreasing gradually to 59% of people with A-levels, 38% with GCSEs grades A-C, 31% with GCSEs grades D-G and 28% of those with no qualifications at all. This notion transferred to voters’ level of occupation, with 64% of people in managerial or professional occupations (positions typically requiring a higher level of education) voting to remain, compared to 30% of those in routine or semi-routine jobs.43 Political Alienation and Populism The EU referendum is commonly interpreted as a process that alienated a proportion of the population, who felt left behind in the changing world and distrusting of traditional politics (Fox 2020). It became a vote that rejected the political elite and experts, by which populist party UKIP exploited the unrest that had been simmering since a promised Constitutional Treaty vote to push through a vote to leave the EU. To reinforce their cause, it became clear that UKIP and the “leave” campaigners adopted an EU-scapegoat tactic, propelling the EU membership issue to the fore by tacking it on to issues closer to voters’ hearts, such as migration, healthcare, democracy and governance. They joined these dots for voters to prop up ideologies of a better country without the EU. As political discontent widened in general, UKIP saw an open window to attract support from those who felt disconnected from mainstream politics. Fox (2020) outlines this concept as political alienation, meaning a

41 Ibid. 42 ComRes Survey, 13 June 16. 43 Based on statistics from NatCen Social Research. British Social Attitudes 34 (The

vote to leave the EU).

226

S. K. ST. JOHN

“lasting form of estrangement from some aspect of one’s political system, community or environment”. It is a state in which the political system becomes alien to the individual, conditioned by social interactions and experiences during early life. Their understanding of politics is developed during adolescence from parents’ influence, from political experiences at that time in life, and from exposure to institutions including the media. Fox suggests that most British people could be seen as politically alienated in some way, with 60% believing political elites are unresponsive, 66% not trusting politicians and 42% struggling to digest the complexities of political processes and lacking confidence in their understanding of the system. This combination of the politically lost enabled populism to herd in the bulk of its followers, especially with the help of the media. Concluding Thoughts: Case Study One For the UK, Brexit has been and remains a highly polarising issue that has in many respects brought more divisions than unity to the nation. The issue of EU membership has been tightly knit to nationalism and identity at the regional, national and postnational level. Identity has been the cause of protecting against Europeanisation, but also for protecting against nationalism in favour of Europeanisation. In this respect, Scotland has renewed its pledge for a referendum on Scottish independence to favour a chance of maintaining EU membership and in response to claims that London holds too much influence over Scottish politics, given that the majority of Scotland did not want to leave the EU. In this case, the UK’s disintegration from the EU has the potential to trigger further disintegration of its own nation-state. The legitimacy of political institutions, trust in politicians and an understanding of the political system, causing political alienation and vulnerable citizens in the democratic system, brought about circumstances that populist party politics could exploit. UKIP took the chance to push its single-policy agenda of taking the UK out of the EU. And it succeeded. Case Study Two: Refugee arrivals in Italy Lampedusa, the Gateway to Europe Italy has been at the heart of the European migrant crisis, facing first-hand and through its veins the political, humanitarian, social and economic challenges it brings. At the height of Italy’s struggle with the migrant crisis, the country had witnessed 181,436 sea arrivals in 2016 through

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

227

the Central Mediterranean Route, with 4,578 dead or missing. By 2017, the numbers decreased to 119,369 arrivals in Italy, but it was still a sharp comparison to the 29,718 arriving in Greece and 27,253 arriving in Spain.44 The main points of arrival from North Africa are found in Sicily and its surrounding islands, most notably the small island of Lampedusa. 280 kilometres from Agrigento in Sicily and 225 kilometres to Sfax in Tunisia, Lampedusa is closer to North Africa than to Italy. It is considered to be the closest European territory to North Africa,45 seen as the gateway to Europe and the epicentre of the migrant tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea (D’Alessandro 2019). Lampedusa has a limited sea area of Italian territorial water extending only thirteen miles, and a small land mass of 20.2 square kilometres that is inhabited by a population of no more than 6000. Although its exterior may seem a quaint and secluded Italian paradise, the island leads a double life. On the one hand, as a popular tourist destination, it boasts crystal waters and unspoiled idyllic beaches, and on the other, a dark world of suffering with secluded reclusion sites for migrants (Wright 2014). Boats of irregular migrants began landing at the small pier in Lampedusa’s fishing port in the early 2000s, and numbers began to rise in 2006 when people smugglers started operating in Libya to facilitate migrants’ journeys to Europe and specifically to Lampedusa. Upon arrival, migrants were (and continue to be) taken to a first aid centre run by the Italian state-run emergency services, the Misericordia, and then to the island’s only reception centre, from where Italian authorities transferred them to other reception centres on the mainland. The Misericordia’s first aid centre had a maximum capacity of 381, but even before the peak of the migrant crisis, at times it far exceeded the limit by almost two hundred (Nembri 2015). The story was similar at the island’s reception centre that is hidden out sight in the middle of the island. It has maximum capacity of 850, but actual figures suggest more than double the number have been hosted. With no space in the prefabricated dormitories, migrants

44 Source: UNHCR. 45 The closest point between North Africa and Italy is actually 180 kilometres from

the Tunisian peninsula close to Ben Arous to the coast of Marsala and Mazara del Vallo in Sicily. However, the peninsula in Tunisia is for the most part rural coastline without any ports, making the organisations of crossings difficult. Moreover, with the majority of migrants coming from Niger and Libya, the journey would include a substantially longer land-based section for the sake of an additional 45 kilometres by sea for these migrants.

228

S. K. ST. JOHN

were sleeping outside on plastic sheeting, and conditions were reportedly abysmal.46 On occasions during the period of the crisis, migrants even set alight to it in protest and initiated riots out of despair. In 2011, migrant crossings intensified as a result of the Arab Springs occurring in North Africa.47 The pro-democracy uprisings were forcing more migrants than ever into boats across the Mediterranean to Italy. By May 2011 through to 2013, more than 35,000 migrants were arriving each year in Lampedusa alone from Tunisia and Libya, which was an increase of 75% compared to 2007.48 Throughout the following years of the European migrant crisis, with continuing conflicts in Libya and Syria and instability across the MENA region, the number of sea arrivals continued to be high in Lampedusa. In the midst of the crisis, 21,692 migrants were recorded to have arrived in 2015 via 168 successful crossings, which was already a 10% decrease on 2014 numbers.49 While these numbers are slightly lower than the arrivals for the same year in the Sicilian port of Augusta (22,391 arrivals), the significant difference is that Sicily has a land mass of 25,711 kilometres squared and a population of five million, and therefore more than one thousand times larger than the size of Lampedusa. Citizens and Immigrants: An Uneasy Coexistence With migrant arrivals outnumbering Italian residents, the impact of immigration on the island’s daily life was stark. When larger numbers of migrants began to arrive during the Arab Spring, authorities hosted them in the island’s reception facility while they waited for their papers to be processed for transfer to other reception centres in Italy. During that waiting game, migrants would venture into the island’s only town and mix with its residents. In the beginning, residents were welcoming and

46 Source: United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 23 September 2016. 47 Initiated on 17 December 2010, street protests began in Tunisia after a vegetable stall owner set alight to himself outside a local government building in protest after being arrested for not holding a permit. The incident sparked widespread protests, known as uprisings, elsewhere in Tunisia and across a number of other largely Muslim countries including Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Syria and Bahrain, against oppressive regimes and low living standards. 48 Source: Reuters, 14 May 11 and UNHCR in Wright (2014). 49 Source: UNHCR.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

229

showed great lengths of solidarity by offering the migrants clothes, food, money, cigarettes when they could. They even devised creative solidary initiatives, such as the “caffè sospeso” (coffee on hold), by which they would leave a euro behind the bar so a migrant could pick up a coffee when they were next passing (Wright 2014). Residents had always recognised their home as a transitional place between the two continents. However, as migrant numbers continued to increase and the reality of their arrivals on the island started to hit, residents’ hearts began to harden (Giuffrida 2017). Migrants were increasingly arriving in poor health due to dehydration and exhaustion during the journey, as well as burns from the engines, all requiring immediate medical assistance. Even though residents were willing to maintain their welcoming attitude towards the migrants, they began to notice the phenomenon weighing on the welfare system, and as tourism slowed down jeopardising their livelihood, they considered their quality of life to be in deep decline. For example, there was a lack of drinkable water, improvements needed to be made to waste management and, most importantly, health. Residents were required to travel to Sicily for healthcare, including pregnant women, who had to fly to Sicily a month before their due date. Similarly, a high unemployment rate was driving young people away from the island as they searched for better opportunities on the mainland, which did not pose a promising future for the island. There was an urgent need to invest in the island’s growth and development, which it could not pursue all the time that migrant arrivals were draining its resources. The majority of residents felt abandoned by the state (Gauriat 2019). Residents also felt a sense of abandonment due to the way that Lampedusa was being perceived by the rest of the world as a safe haven for migrants, where seemingly its population was relentlessly demonstrating solidarity and humanitarianism. Promotion by the then Mayor Giusi Nicolini did not help the cause, as she won the Olaf Palme Prize in 2016, dining at the White House, and then went on to win the Unesco Felix Houphouët-Boigny peace prize in 2017 for the great humanity and consistent commitment during the migrant crisis (Giuffrida 2017). Meanwhile, the cauldron of discontent was about to boil over as residents’ calls for assistance and solidarity appeared to fall on deaf ears.

230

S. K. ST. JOHN

When Lampedusa, and the Country, Turned Against the System To the Lampedusans, the Italian and international authorities were not acting adequately. They appeared incapable of providing a clear course of action to resolve the increasingly incontrollable situation. In the first instance, they were criticised for ignoring the challenges faced by Lampedusa, and in the second instance, given the reports of poor treatment, criticised for attacking and persecuting the migrants they were expected to help (Wright 2014). The geographical distance from mainland Italy and the secluded nature of the island made it difficult for outsiders to keep abreast of the reality of life on Lampedusa, as well as for Lampedusa’s messages to reach those with the power to change their situation. Wright (2019) highlights how this distance translated into socio-economic marginality, and how it was easily exploitable by national authorities in a politically calculated scenario that satisfied Italy’s official responsibilities vis-à-vis EU immigration law, while at the same time protecting the majority of Italian citizens elsewhere from the reality of the immigration situation in Italy. Unfortunately, it came at the price of the minority Lampedusans’ quality of life, who can be seen as carrying the burden of the entire country’s immigration obligations. The time for residents to raise their collective voice came with local elections in June 2017. Voting was driven by improving residents’ basic needs and many turned to the far-right populist party, Lega. A restaurant owner, who was also a Lega Senator, sums up their feeling: I joined Lega because of the problems that have affected my island daily for so many years. The problems are health, education, transport and waste management, for instance. We have been welcoming migrants for free. And now we’ve had enough. Now we will ask the national government and the European Parliament to give us something in return. We want to live serenely on our island. We’ll welcome those who need it, but we will fight against this phenomenon. Because behind that, there is delinquency, there are mafias. So, doors open for cruise ships, for fishermen, for tourists. But closed ports for those who traffic human flesh. Those we will always fight against… Always. (Gauriat 2019)

The Mayor Giusi Nicolini was voted out, criticised for not putting residents first, which left her arriving third in the polls with only 908 votes. A local fisherman lamented that:

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

231

Nicolini put herself first. Yes, it was right to help migrants, but millions have been spent on that and not on our basic needs – if you want to have a tooth out, you have to fly to Palermo. Even if you just want to leave on holiday, there are hardly any flights. (Giuffrida 2017)

Even though boat arrivals had begun to decrease by 2017 and their lives had slightly improved, voters elected Salvatore Martello, a local fisherman and hotel owner who had run independently of the mainstream parties and who was finally seen to prioritise citizens’ needs over those of migrants. However, even before the Lampedusans found their voice, word had spread throughout Italy about the conditions in Lampedusa, despite the remoteness and general disconnection from the mainland. The intertwine of two factors greatly influenced the diffusion of the crisis occurring in Lampedusa: right-wing populism and the media. During the period of the migration crisis, the media often reported incidents occurring in Lampedusa with alarmist rhetoric that promoted anti-immigration sentiment. A steady stream of updates informed Italians of the impact of the migrant crisis on their country, with a series of incidents that shook the country, and the world: the shipwreck of 3 October 2013 taking the lives of 368 people50 ; the shipwreck of 18 April 2015 in Libyan waters, taking the lives of no less than 700 people51 ; the death of the migrant child Alan Kurdi, washed up on a beach in Bodrum on 2 September 2015; and three shipwrecks near Sicily within a single week in May 2016 taking the lives of 700–900 people. The first major shipwreck, occurring on 2 October 2013, was the event that not only rocked Lampedusans to the core, but also opened Italians’ eyes to what was taking place in their country and pushed immigration to the top of the political agenda. With such emotional attachment, it became the symbol of the crisis. Likely due to an engine fire, headlines called it “the greatest tragedy of all time”52 and “a sea of bodies”.53 Two

50 Source: UNHCR. 51 Ibid. 52 “La più grande tragedia di sempre”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 October 2013. 53 “Un mare di cadaveri”, Il Secolo XIX, 4 October 2013.

232

S. K. ST. JOHN

weeks later, Italian authorities implemented the state-run migrant surveillance and rescue operation “Mare Nostrum” in the Mediterranean Sea. There followed a steady flow of reports highlighting increasing numbers of sea incidents throughout 2014 (Romana Genoviva 2016) with headlines such as “a flurry of departures, one dinghy after another”54 , and criticism on the efficacy of Mare Nostrum (“The blood balance of Mare Nostrum. Never as many dead in the sea”55 ). Assimilations between the Mediterranean Sea and a cemetery, opened calls for solidarity that were more than a visit from UNHCR Ambassador Angelina Jolie and the Higher Commissioner Antonio Guterres to Lampedusa in 2011. Although this and the visit of Pope Francis in 2013 raised the profile of the issue, pragmatic solidary action was required. However, to the Italians, it felt the EU and member states were dragging their heels and their country was being left to face the emergency alone with its own resources. As the Minister of Interior Alfano was quoted, “while we save human lives, we are alone”.56 The discontent felt for so many years by Lampedusans, was crawling up to a national scale. As with any populist party ambition to climb the ranks of the political system though the misfortune of others and criticism of the political system, the Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, emerged as a key player in Italian politics. Originally a regional party known as the Lega Nord with a policy agenda to liberate the profit-generating North from the poorer South, the Lega took on a national presence and turned their main policy orientation to anti-immigration. Jumping on the bandwagon that was criticising the state’s efforts to manage the crisis via Mare Nostrum, he declared that “[the victims of the shipwrecks] are the dead that weigh on the conscience of the crazy people at Mare Nostrum” and “[the migrants] have understood that just a quick call on the phone is enough for the Italian port to respond as a taxi service”.57 By 1 November 2014, Mare Nostrum was eventually replaced by the European Agency run operation “Triton”, but it suffered similar criticism 54 “Partenze a raffica, un gommone dietro l’altro”, La Repubblica, 13 May 2014. 55 “Il bilancio di sangue di Mare Nostrum. Mai così tanti morti in mare”, Il Giornale,

25 August 2014. 56 “Mentre salviamo le vite umane, siamo soli”, La Repubblica, 13 May 2014. 57 “Sono morti che pesano sulla conscienza dei folli a Mare Nostrum. Hanno capito

che basta un colpo di telefono e la marina Italian ava a fare il servizio taxi”, Matteo Salvini, 12 May 2014 in Romana Genoviva (2016).

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

233

on its watch too. On 18 April 2015, a fishing boat capsized in Libyan waters on its way to Italy, leaving no less than 700 victims. One headline reports a survivor’s perspective: “women and children closed in the hold; there were 950 of us, the sea swallowed us”.58 The newspapers attacked Triton and the EU, claiming they betrayed the fundamental values of solidarity, and Triton was an illusion and a police operation (Romana Genoviva 2016). This reactivated the dramatic media rhetoric, fuelling the Lega’s case. The next year did not bring any decline, as the migrant child Alan Kurdi was photographed dead on a beach in Bodrum, Turkey, on 2 September 2015 after another shipwreck. The child became another symbol of the crisis as the boy who escaped conflict only to end his life on a beach after a horrific journey. The media pulled on heart strings making it relatable for citizens with headlines such as “No nursery”59 and media turned its focus to child migrants in the context of boat crossings. By the time three shipwrecks in May 2016 took the lives of 700–900 people off the Libyan coast of Sabratha, enough was enough. Support for Matteo Salvini and the Lega grew as he responded to the country’s unrest. He was pushing a policy programme with a primary objective to reduce illegal immigration, as well as increase the number of repatriation centres and of deportations of those not qualifying for asylum, and finally the closure of Italian ports to migrant boats. His promises were heard both in the South, which contains a significant element of irony given the party’s roots, and the North. To the South, he offered a light at the end of a dark tunnel for those in migrantarrival destinations such as Lampedusa, finally allowing them to see a future that caters to their needs. In the North, they saw a solution to the thousands of migrants that were being moved to reception centres in the Lombardy region, which has—through the historical, steady presence of the Lega Nord—demonstrated to the most averse to immigration. In 2015, there were 12,499 migrants (of a total of 77,683 present nationwide)60 in temporary structures, which indicates that Italian citizens in

58 “Donne e bimbi chiusi nella stiva. Eravamo in 950, il mare ci ha inghiottiti”, La Repubblica, 20 April 2015. 59 “Niente asilo”, Il Manifesto, 3 September 2015. 60 La Repubblica, 7 January 2016.

234

S. K. ST. JOHN

the North were also perceived to be feeling the strain. Thanks to the negative narratives on immigration in the media throughout the crisis, and all the traits required for populist success, Salvini was able to secure his place in the government at the 2018 election. On 5 June, Italian citizens voted him into the government in a coalition with the other populist party for direct democracy, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) led by Luigi Di Maio. The leaders chose for their government to be led by the Law professor, Giuseppe Conte, with Salvini as Minister of Interior and Deputy Prime Minister. Once in government, Salvini was bound to maintaining his promises to the people and set out to implement vigorous measures to reduce illegal immigration. The most prominent was the closure of Italian ports to boats carrying illegal migrants. To the delight of his supporters, the numbers of migrant sea arrivals plummeted from 119,247 in 2017 to just 23,370 in 2018 and 11,471 in 2019.61 It should be noted, however, that while the number of arrivals declined, there was not a proportionate decline in the number of migrant deaths. For 11,471 arrivals in 2019, there were 1,244 dead or missing. If we consider that in 2017 there were 119,369 arrivals and 2,873 dead or missing, the number for 2019 should be around 280. Indeed, the closure of the ports reached a head in a humanitarian and political crisis in 2019 when migrant ships were found to be stranded at sea for weeks without basic necessities on board to ensure the welfare of its passengers (D’Alessandro 2019). One very public incident was that of the ship Sea Watch 3, which defied Italian officials’ orders to leave Italian waters and instead harboured in Lampedusa to save the lives of those trapped on board, which led the arrest of the German captain Carola Rackete. The incident caused Italy to become unpopular on the European scene for not implementing its EU immigration obligations and for going as far as to arrest the national of a fellow member state. Italy did not only become unpopular for such a move, for the reduced numbers of sea arrivals to Italy was having a strong effect on immigration to the other EU member states, namely Greece and Spain. While in 2017, Greece’s arrivals had fallen to 29,718 and Spain’s to 27,253, they rose again in 2018 to 50,215 and 65,325, respectively, and in 2019 to 71,386 and 32,531, respectively.62 Thus, Italy may have found a solution to its national crisis,

61 Source: International Organization for Migration. 62 Source: International Organization for Migration.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

235

but it had not contributed to a lasting solution to resolve the migrant crisis across the EU. It may have been pay back for the lack of support that it felt the country had experienced during its hour of need from the EU and its member states, especially with perceived draconian measures from France and Austria to keep migrants on Italian territory. However, shifting the crisis on to other member states only damaged any potential for EU solidarity on immigration. Concluding Thoughts: Case Study Two When riots broke out in the reception centre in 2011, they were described as the consequence of “a political system that treats foreigners like criminals” and “beasts”, which is “shameful for a country that wants to define itself as civilised”. It was added that “one hopes Italian citizens have the rationality and humanity that so far the government has lacked, the humanity that makes us understand that the ‘foreigners’, the ‘clandestine migrants’, the ‘seasonal migrants’ are before anything else ‘people’, human beings. And must be treated as such”.63 Unfortunately, it was not to be and a large enough proportion of the country was able to right-wing populism into power thanks to a hard, anti-immigration policy stance. Salvini found a short-term solution that shifted the burden to other member states, implying that the problem of migration in Europe has not disappeared. Solutions will only be found through collective EU cooperation that address the root causes of migration, while at the same time providing adequate support mechanisms for those facing the challenges first hand. Now that Salvini is no longer in government, the future of immigration to Lampedusa and to Italy is no longer clear (D’Alessandro 2019). If the ports are reopened and numbers begin to increase once again, but still in the absence of EU solidarity and concrete solidary action to assist Italy, it is possible that the anti-immigration rhetoric will be further instilled causing Italian citizens to fight back even harder placing Salvini back in government with a majority. Such a scenario will unlikely benefit any collective initiative to resolve and face the challenges together. However, the Lega’s defeats in the September 2020 regional elections indicate continued resistance for its take-over in some left-wing strongholds, notably Tuscany.

63 La Repubblica, 21 September 2011.

236

S. K. ST. JOHN

Bibliography Bevelander, P., & Peterson, B. (2014a). Crisis and Migration: Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Perceptions, Politics and Policies of Migration. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. Bevelander, P., & Peterson, B. (2014b). Crisis, oh That Crisis! The Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Migration in Europe. In P. Bevelander & B. Peterson, Crisis and Migration: Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Perceptions, Politics and Policies of Migration. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. D’Alessandro, M. M. (2019, September 11). Inside Lampedusa, the Frontline of Europe’s Migration Crisis. The Globe Post. Dennison, J., & Geddes, A. (2017, November 17). Are Europeans Turning Against Asylum Seekers and Refugees? European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson, W. E. (2017). The European Union in Crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dustmann, C., Eichengreen, B., Otten, S., Sapir, A., Tabellini, G., & Zoega, G. (2017, August 23). Populism and trust in Europe. Vox CEPR Policy Portal. Evans, G., & Manon, A. (2017). Brexit and British Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fossum, J. E. (2016). Democracy and Legitimacy in the EU: Challenges and Options (ARENA Working Paper 1/2016). University of Oslo. Fox, S. (2020, February 20). Political Alienation and Referenda: How Political Alienation Was Related to Support on Brexit. British Politics: Springer online resource. Funk, M., Giusto, H., Rinke, T., & Bruns, O. (Eds.). (2019). European Public Opinion and Migration: Achieving Common Progressive Narratives (Report by FEPS, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Fondazione Pietro Nenni and Fondation Jean Jaurès). Brussels. Gauriat, V. (2019, July 8). Lampedusa divided over migrants. Euronews. Giuffrida, A. (2017, July 8). Do-gooders No More: Lampedusans Turn Against Refugee Tide as Patience Wears Thin. The Guardian. Grimmel, A. (2018). The Crisis of the European Union: Challenges, Analyses, Solutions,. Abingdon: Routledge. Grosse, T. G. (2017). European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis. Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House. Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press. Habermas, J. (2001). Why Europe Needs a Constitution (New Left Review, N. 11). Hatton, T. J. (2014). The Slump and Migration Policy in Europe. In P. Bevelander & B. Peterson, Crisis and Migration: Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Perceptions, Politics and Policies of Migration. Lund: Nordic Academic Press.

8

AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE’S DECADE …

237

Kotroyannos, D., & Mavrozacharakis, E. (2018). Far-Right Populism and the Role of Democracy in Europe. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 7 (3), 10–25. Kriesi, H.-P. (2020, March 16). Is There a Crisis of Democracy in Europe? Polit Vierteljahresscht, Sage online resource. Kullving, L. (2014). A Crisis Nexus: The European Union, Security and Articulations of Irregular Migration Post-Arab Spring. In P. Bevelander & B. Peterson (Eds.), Crisis and Migration: Implications of the Eurozone Crisis for Perceptions, Politics and Policies of Migration. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. Macshane, D. (2015), Brexit: How Britain Left Europe. London: I. B. Tauris. Nembri, A. (2015, February 19). Lampedusa: due giorni senza sbarchi. Il centro è pieno. Vita. Olivier, T. (2018). A Europe of Drop Outs? Brexit and the Questions of European Solidarity. In A. Grimmel (Ed.), The Crisis of the European Union: Challenges, Analyses, Solutions. Routledge: Abingdon. Outhwaite, W. (2017). Brexit: Sociological Responses. New York: Anthem Press. Petrakis, P. E., Kostis, P. C., & Valsamis, D. (2013). European Economics and Politics in the Midst of the Crisis: From the Outbreak of the Crisis to the Fragmented European Federation. New York: Springer. Rensmann, L. (2019). Rethinking European Democracy After Its Legitimacy Crisis: On Hannah Arendt and the European Union. Journal of European Studies, 49, N.3–4. Romana Genoviva, F. (2016). Il molo dei media nella diffusione di una narativa della tragedia: titoli e trategie. UNHCR Fact Checking. Schramm, L. (2019, May). European Disintegration: A New Feature of EU Politics (College of Europe Policy Brief No. 3.19). Bruges: College of Europe. Soros, G. (2012). Does the Euro Have a Future? In W. R. Cline & G. B. Wolff (Eds.), Special Report 21: Resolving the European Debt Crisis, Peterson Institute for International Economic. Washington, DC: Breugel. Szczepanski, M. (2019, October). A Decade on from the Crisis: Main Responses and Remaining Challenges (European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 642.253). Tackle, M. (2018). Is the Migration Crisis a Solidarity Crisis? In A. Grimmel, The Crisis of the European Union: Challenges, Analyses, Solutions. Abingdon: Routledge. Torres, M. J. (2019). Public Opinion Toward Immigration, Refugees, and Identity in Europe: A Closer Look at What Europeans Think and How Immigration Debates Have Become So Relevant. Migrations in the Mediterranean. Rome: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2019. Webber, D. (2019). European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union. London: Red Globe Press.

238

S. K. ST. JOHN

Westlake, M. (2017). The Increasing Inevitability of That Referendum. In W. Outhwaite, Brexit: Sociological Responses. New York: Anthem Press. Wright, S. (2014). Lampedusa’s Gaze: Messages from the Outpost of Europe. Italica, 19(4), 775–802.

PART III

The Entwinement of Solidarity and Education in the European Union

CHAPTER 9

Past and Present Challenges, and Future Opportunities, for Engaging Education to Address the Solidarity Crisis

Introduction: Why Does the EU Really Need Solidarity? The European project was founded in the aftermath of a crisis, and hence the concept of solidarity was embedded in its existence from the outset as a core value of the European Union. Solidarity has since appeared as a given for European unity, but if we are to understand how to foster solidarity in the European Union, we must first unpack why the EU needs solidarity through a strategic optic that looks back to the root. In order to achieve European solidarity, it must be truly believed that it is the right response to the problem. The EU’s highest priority is to build a strong and sustainable position to act as a global player in the face of crises that are increasingly threatening the world as a whole rather than single nations. If it is to achieve such a goal, the EU is required to operate as a cohesive unit that works together to provide unified responses to global questions. To be a unified whole, the EU needs to be composed of member states, and therefore the people they represent, that strive for common goals and hold common values, that operate on an equal footing, that bear the burden of risk sharing and that trust each other. This is the essence of solidarity and why Salvador Madariaga told the 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague and reiterated at the 1949 European Cultural Conference in Lausanne, that it was necessary to awaken a European conscience; that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_9

241

242

S. K. ST. JOHN

Europe had to exist in the hearts of its citizens. Hence, solidarity implies survival and strength. However, whether solidarity has been achieved to the degree the founders envisaged is unfortunately easily contestable. During the seven decades of its existence, the European project has seen extensive development, but also experienced periods of profound challenge and instability, especially during the last decade. Such periods of difficulty have put the founders’ quest for postnational solidarity to the test, and it has been falling at the hurdles. It is not by chance that a crisis of solidarity coincides with the EU’s current period of crisis, and that is why finding effective solutions to the EU’s low levels of solidarity is imperative for the EU’s survival. This analytical chapter aims to bring together the contents of the previous chapters to explore the long-standing entwinement of solidarity and education in the context of the European Union by seeking to understand the factors that should be considered when approaching education as an effective tool to foster solidarity.

What Are the Barriers to Building European Solidarity and the Implications of Education as a Tool? By unpacking the theoretical concept of solidarity in Chapter 7, placing it within the practical context of the challenges facing the EU, and combining this knowledge with an understanding of EU education policy, it has been possible to identify barriers to building European solidarity and the implications of adopting education as a tool. The first is nationalism, in terms of identity, domestic interest, shifts in the composition of national societies, followed by trust, knowledge and interdependence. Nationalism Identity If the concept of a supra-nation was to be credible and appeal to the individual nations, it had to have its own culture and identity, and foster a sense of belonging and a consciousness among its people: a European citizenship. It entailed the creation of common rapports between people who are geographically and spiritually attached to Europe, which meant establishing a strong cultural component to underpin the political mission of a

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

243

European union. The people of Europe would have a common European outlook and therefore share a common sense of European solidarity. As Habermas (1998) suggests, the solidarity previously reserved for the nation-state needs to be extended to all EU citizens. In the same way that nations foster and maintain national identities for nation-building, the founders of Europe—and still the Eurocrats of today—realise that a postnational version of nation-building needs to take place if the people of the member states are to connect with the European Union. The European Community has remained aware that if European solidarity and loyalty to the European Community is to be created, it must succeed in creating a European identity,1 which entails a kind of “supranation-building”. However, “supranation-building” is more problematic than nation-building due to the fact that it about cultivating a secondary, higher “nationality” than the original nationality. National attachment is much stronger than European attachment, but in many cases individuals identify with both. However, many also identify only with their own nationality and exclusive European attachment is rare (Westle and Buchheim 2016). Bartolini (2005) explains that the difficulty in people’s recognition of a postnational identity lies in the “strong resilience of national identities” and that national identities cannot be “Europeanised in the sense that they cannot be denationalised” in the same way that nations were able to make way for a language and culture commonly adopted at Community level. It is therefore contended that the cultural thickness of nationhood hampers European identity (Segatti and Guglielmi 2016). Despite the European Community’s conviction and attempts to create a European identity from above, it should be considered that the process needs to be bottom-up. Especially if the creation of identities among individuals can be generated through education, which is an area of national competence, the fostering of self-determination with the European Community will largely depend on the member states. It will be the individual member states’ view of Europe that will predominantly diffuse through their nations, rather than a top-down approach, conveying the Community’s view of itself. Perception of what Europeanness is and what Europe means may differ among member states, which may derive from varying national historical characteristics and models of nation-building 1 European Governance: A White Paper, Commission of the European Communities, COM(2001) 428, Brussels, 25 July 2001.

244

S. K. ST. JOHN

(Göncz and Lengyel 2016). Göncz and Lengyel go on to explain that as national political elites are influential in national-identity formation and nation-building, they are also influential in the way they portray Europeanness among their nations. This notion of how Europeanness is portrayed within a nation can be extended to include the way it is transmitted through education. Different education systems have different approaches and different curricula, which affect the way “Europe” is taught and the extent to which it is included in the curriculum. Without formal competency in education policy, the European Community will have little say in this. Member states participate in European integration bearing their own histories, traditions and identities, which cannot always be accommodated in European governance structures. If the notion of a European identity is to succeed, it will need to be formed not as a homogenous identity, but one that accommodates and is comprised of the different national identities (Laffan 1996). This notion harks back to the consideration in Chapter 6 regarding diversity among states dealt with in the context of statism. Hence, the EU can be seen as a threat to national identity because of the fact that individual member states wish to pursue their own interests and those that are different to other member states (Beutler 2017). Domestic interest is therefore a significant factor in determining the level of solidarity that can be achieved at European level. Domestic Interest As we discussed in Chapter 7, whether member states decide to demonstrate solidarity at European level depends on the calculations they make between the short-term burden at the national level and the mediumto long-term reciprocity from other states. Solidarity tends to stop at national borders (Habermas 2012), suggesting that the burden to the member state in the short term outweighs the potential for reciprocity and national interest therefore prevails over the contribution that that member state can make to the European problem. If the member state recognises a more immediate gain from an act of solidarity, it is more likely to show solidarity. The same concept can be applied to policy development, and can be seen in the case of education. As Moravcsik (1998) explains, member states are influenced by their national contexts in two-level game theory, where they cooperate at European level while at the same time keep in mind their own national interests. Moravcsik (1998) suggests there are two opposing notions of

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

245

national preference formation. The first type of national preference is political and diplomatic, which is guided by potential threats to national sovereignty or to ideological, territorial or military integrity. In this case, cooperation can occur when member states’ ideological and geopolitical visions are in line with each other. The second type of national preference is economic, in which cooperation takes place when policies benefit all parties by improving competiveness and new opportunities in the markets. This distinction between national interests exerted to protect national sovereignty and those exerted for economic motivations provides an explanation for how education policy has developed at European level and why it was stalled as a tool to foster European solidarity. As detailed in Chapter 2, education at European level began with a cultural mission, which over time shifted towards an economic orientation, as outlined in Chapter 4. It is seen that indeed states were willing to cooperate in areas of education when initiatives implied an economic return, but were reluctant if national sovereignty was threatened. Evidence in Chapter 3 indicates that when the European Community was eventually established in 1957, education was omitted from the Treaty of Rome, despite such enthusiasm within the European Movement’s discussions. This can be explained in part by the fact that, at supranational level, a political and economic mission prevailed during the early years of European integration as the Community addressed the more pressing issues at hand, such as industry, customs, trade, transport and the common market (Shaw 1992) in which education did not seemingly require involvement. It can be noted that the explicit issue of education’s role in the construction of Europe was not raised at supranational level, avoided even, suggesting there was a hesitance for it be involved. This idea echoes what Field (1998) describes an evident taboo surrounding education within the corridors of the European Community, which can be ascertained to the notions of identity outlined above. Eventually, the free circulation of people, which had brought about unprecedented circumstances for the member states, began to put pressure on welfare systems and the labour market, causing a political and economic attachment to education to emerge. Chapter 3 tells us that, as the European Community unfolded, education was associated to several areas of European Community competence and the success of certain missions, causing the political and economic attachment to strengthen and interference with education appeared

246

S. K. ST. JOHN

inevitable and unavoidable; for the free movement of workers, qualifications and study abroad required recognition, and the free movement of workers also implied the movement of “workers” in the education sector, particularly higher education. With free circulation fully implemented and the movement of workers encouraged, dramatic changes occurred in the extent and nature of migration within the Community. As workers from other member states had the right to equal treatment as nationals with regard to employment, social security, living and working conditions, trade union rights, the education of children and the right to be accompanied by their families, increased migration had an impact on member state economies and their social infrastructures. A significant consideration was the integration of migrants into the societies of the new member states, for which it was necessary to develop vocational and linguistic training provisions. The integration of migrants’ children into society and into the new education systems faced challenges, namely in increasing the provision of linguistic training and teachers’ knowledge and experience of migrants’ children home cultures, languages and education systems. It was equally important to develop the study of Europe in order to facilitate migrants’ integration into the member states of Europe. Intensification of the need for a certain degree of competence in educational matters reached a critical point, provoking a more involved role in educational matters for the European Community, which led to concrete actions from the Community.2 In this case, education was integrated—though still in a limited manner—into the areas of Community competence when it had an economic and political attachment. In this case, member states could gain from cooperation in education at European level to alleviate the impact of immigration to their societies.

2 A Resolution of the Ministers of Education, meeting within the Council, followed in June 1974 on cooperation in the field of education. The member states also adopted two action programmes: The Social Action Programme in 1974 and the Education Action Programme in 1976. The latter action programme set up an Education Committee and addressed: better facilities for the education and training of nationals and the children of nationals of other member and non-member states; the promotion of closer relations between educational systems in Europe; the compilation of up-to-date documentation and statistics on education; cooperation in higher education; the teaching of foreign languages; and equal opportunities for free access to all forms of education.

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

247

Shifts in the Composition of National Societies However, as this mobility across Europe continues and intensifies, migration has become a sensitive issue in the context of solidarity. Chapter 7 has shown that solidarity emerges from homogenous groups in which individuals can relate to each other and pursue common goals. This concept is problematic for European solidarity from two angles. The first is in the establishment of postnational solidarity from the point of view that people from one member state should show solidarity to those of another. Such a demonstration of requires individuals to feel connections to those of other nationalities and cultures due to the heterogeneous make-up of European society. Therefore, overcoming the perceived need for a homogenous group to foster solidarity is required to achieve European solidarity per sé. The second point of view is in people’s solidarity with the EU. As they witness shifts in the composition of their society, which they associate with the free movement of people around the EU, and which threatens the identity of that society, the EU is increasingly used as a scapegoat, where opposing the EU would lead to stalling free movement and a return to former society compositions. Enlargement has aggravated such sentiments, leading to ever-growing fear and resentment towards the EU. According to a Eurobarometer Survey after the enlargement of 2003, nearly 43% feared enlargement from the social and spatial identity of state and society (Mau 2007). This is because enlargement provokes potential further shifts and more intense diversification within societies, which scares parts of society, particularly the older generations who are less adaptable to changing societies. Moreover, it is not necessarily the actual changes to their society that causes concern, but rather the uncertainty over what their society may become in the future and how far removed it will be from society as they know it today. Ultimately, their national identity is perceived to be threatened. Not by chance, the extreme right has a pronounced presence in areas whose social models have been challenged by cultural transformations as Euroscepticism becomes the consequence of generalised hostility towards the expansion of the political community (Mau 2007). Similarly, the EU is called in as the scapegoat for societal changes caused by the ever-increasingly globalised world. While access for all to the global market is positive for traders selling across a larger area and for consumers looking for greater choice and competitive pricing, globalisation is seen to dilute national identities, traditions and cultures, causing

248

S. K. ST. JOHN

shifts in national societies. While some embrace the change for the opportunities the global world brings, others feel alienated and left behind in the same way they feel towards the increasingly digitalised world, which can explain the return to the protectionist attitudes demonstrated by member states such as the UK. For the future of EU solidarity, globalisation could therefore be seen as an obstacle, all the time that populism exploits the phenomenon as a vehicle to criticise EU approaches. On the other hand, embracing globalisation and the creation of a global world has the potential to strengthen the EU’s position as a global actor and thus establish its position in the eyes of the people. Globalisation is a phenomenon that touches upon many aspects of the modern world, education included. As Field (1998) suggests, no education system has ever been completely isolated from external influences. The new circumstances during early European integration have since provided leverage for the European Community to continue and develop activities in fields connected to education, especially in line with increasing global competitiveness on the labour market. Even when, within the framework of the European Community, member states did not include education in the Treaty of Rome, external factors linked to free movement continued to lean heavily on national systems. Even today, this notion continues as globalisation continues to exert pressures on national education systems. This is in line with Field’s view that, in the context of globalisation, nation-states become less capable of containing an increasingly international economy, where they are required to be more competitive and therefore intensify activities relating to higher education in order to foster a knowledge economy (Field 1998). Similarly, as Lawn and Grek (2012) had said, states and economies change in speed and scale, which also affects national education systems and their relationships with the state, to the point when education can no longer be contained within natural borders. Globalisation challenges the national orientation of education, which has especially affected higher education systems in their new roles to contribute to the fostering of a global knowledge society (Hartmann 2011). Globalisation challenges education’s role in nation-building, but at the same time creates, as Hartmann describes, its own imagined community, which is linked to the global knowledge society. The ways that education is delivered is changing in response to global pressures, which is not least evident in the Covid-19 crisis. Globalisation has brought about the massification of higher education participation, increased information sharing through the internet,

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

249

and increased cross-border learning and partnership collaborations (Streitweiser 2014). Moreover, there are shifts and developments in the way that education is provided, which challenges traditional public education. This includes the growing investment in education and training by private investors, as well as the swelling numbers of massive open online courses (MOOCS) and other more recent forms of online education and training. Furthermore, there is an increasing role of business, social enterprise and philanthropy in education provision, which have a national and global impact on education policy. Before the Covid-19 crises, these services were predominantly provided in areas where the state provision falls short (Ball 2012). Such investment suggests a clear aim to contributing to upskilling the population to foster greater competitiveness in the global world. It is also student mobility that experiences developments caused by the changing context of the global knowledge economy. Push-pull variables are having a substantial impact on the pace, directions and outcomes of student mobility, which include mutual understanding, revenue earning, skill migration and capacity building (Choudaha and De Wit 2014). Mutual understanding is considered to be a political, social and cultural factor, while capacity building is educational. However, it is notable that the final two variables, revenue earning and skill migration, are both economic factors. This highlights the significance of economy in student mobility in today’s world. Trust Trust is essential for solidarity, which is why a lack of trust is considered a barrier. This study suggests that European solidarity is complex because it runs on two tracks, one of solidarity among people and one of solidarity among member states, with scenarios in which the two overlap. Therefore, varying but intrinsically connected forms of trust are required for European solidarity: trust between individuals; individuals’ trust in the EU institutions; trust between member states; and member states’ trust in the EU institutions. In terms of solidarity among member states, solidary action is granted by member states to other member states first when they believe that the receiver would be prepared and in a position to provide such support in return if and when required. Second, when the giver is convinced that the receiver is in need of solidarity through no fault of their own. This system of trust therefore breaks down if member

250

S. K. ST. JOHN

states cannot trust that other member states are acting conscientiously and avoiding irresponsible actions, which would lead them into a precarious position that may require solidary action in the future. Such a scenario was witnessed during the financial crisis when the richer states accused those states needing a bailout of misusing solidarity because their own bad management was responsible for the difficulties they were encountering. At the same time, those in need accused the richer states of lacking solidarity (Grimmel and My Giang 2017). Trust broke down because the member states requiring solidarity were not perceived by the wealthier member states to be acting appropriately within the group. On the other hand, it was deemed that Italy, Greece and Spain were justified to call for solidary action during the refugee crisis because they faced such challenges due to their proximity to the MENA, which was therefore not their fault. In this case, solidarity broke down because these member states and their people trusted that the EU support network would assist them in their time of need, but it was not perceived to do so. Therefore, the chain of trust between member states deteriorated, triggering deteriorated member state trust in the EU institutions, and then—aggravated by populist rhetoric—individuals’ trust in EU institutions. However, individuals’ trust in the EU institutions can also be linked to a lack of clarity in terms of how they function and how the EU benefits (or not) national societies. This was demonstrated in the Brexit case where the less the British public knew about the EU institutions, the less they were likely to trust them. The process is logical and can be seen in everyday life: we are more likely to trust a person we know well than a stranger whom we know very little about. Trust has also constituted a bone of contention in education policy; essentially, member states have been wary of trusting the EU with their education systems. A case in point is the European University project outlined in Chapter 5, which was withdrawn from European Community coordination in favour of an intergovernmental system where member states maintained control over its development and implementation. In the context of education, as described at the beginning of this chapter, member states have been systematically resistant to relaxing their grip on education to facilitate a European education system, unless they receive a clear return which has more often than not been economic. Member states’ resistance to developing education policy stems from a fear of jeopardising nation-building, specifically national identity and national

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

251

solidarity. The same has been said above for European solidarity. Developing European education and European solidarity can therefore be seen as member states’ inability to trust the EU with preserving nationalism in the European integration process, which is how both trust and nationalism turn into barriers against European solidarity and closer cooperation in education. Knowledge Without the EU infiltrating education systems as part of national curriculum, a further barrier to European solidarity is found in a lack of knowledge about the EU institutions and European integration. This also extends to knowledge about the world around us to be able to distinguish between challenges that are out of political and economic control and those that are linked to inefficient policymaking. Knowledge deficiency promotes uncertainty, stimulating protectionist attitudes and therefore divergence from European solidarity. National solidarity rests on an institutional framework that requires citizens’ conformity to legal obligations, such as tax. In return, the state guarantees support to citizens when they are in need, maintaining a system of interdependence between the citizen and the state in which the citizen trusts that the state is managing appropriately the taxes paid and the state trusts that the citizen is paying the taxes. This trust can break down when there is a lack of transparency on how the state is using public money, leading to citizens’ sense of political alienation and dissatisfaction with the political system. However, a lack of transparency can also be misinterpreted when the true cause of alienation is a limited knowledge of how the political system works or where to find information that will provide the explanations they require. The latter is a notable challenge for the EU institutions, which do not have the privilege of predefined interdependence with European people through legal obligations. As Popanuscu recalls (2017), EU institutions are too far removed from the day-to-day challenges that people face, resulting in a lack of emotional attachment. Europeans are therefore not tied to the EU in the same way that they are tied to the nation-state, leaving the EU reliant on individuals’ initiative to understand the EU system and the benefits of EU membership.

252

S. K. ST. JOHN

Interdependence The European Union is not merely a collection of states joining together in a system of cooperation. Rather there is a long history of interconnectedness among its member states and the EU represents the first “macro-society” based on the nation-state model (Mau 2007). It aims to foster a shared identity and common goals, and moreover, a system of mutual reinforcement with the EU institutions at its core. Hence, the concept of interdependence has been far from absent in European integration narratives. In economic terms, unification based on a common production base and market has aimed to foster economic dependence. As the UK case—as well as others—shows, it has been possible to opt out of the Eurozone and Schengen in a system of differentiated integration. However, differentiated integration and moreover disintegration in certain areas, lowers the overall level of a member state’s interdependence. The UK has been less dependent on the EU than those member states who are also members of the Eurozone, so leaving the bloc was a viable option. In this sense, we are witnessing an example of Durkheim’s concepts of “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity. In the context of the UK’s membership, the EU has been able to shed a part of itself without leading to the dissolution or the malfunction of the remaining part because the part lost was not dependent on the rest and vice versa.3 Witnessing such an example leads us to understand that European solidarity has remained at the state of “mechanical” solidarity normally found in societies of simple construction and is yet to develop into “organic” solidarity. However, to make such a suggestion may appear contradictory given that evident manifestations of solidarity across Europe have been noted during recent crises and not least during this time of the coronavirus crisis. Borrowed from Durkheim’s concepts, my suggestion is rather that we can speak of a kind of “artificial” solidarity being experienced in Europe instead of the “real” solidarity that its founders strove to create. Europe’s

3 In this argument, the author recognises that the negotiations towards the UK’s exit

from the EU have required the unravelling of a complex web of national and EU policies and legislation that indicates a certain extent of interdependence between the UK and the EU. However, negotiations have been complex in order to obtain an adequate deal between the two parties and if such a deal is not achieved, the UK will still be able to leave the EU without a deal.

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

253

challenge in its crisis of solidarity therefore lies in transforming “artificial” solidarity into “real” solidarity.

Distinguishing “Real” Solidarity from “Artificial” Solidarity Solidarity at the Individual Level Based on the notion of deriving from man-made, “artificial” solidarity can refer to a level and type of solidarity that has been deliberately cultivated and influenced in a top-down approach. European integration is susceptible to this kind of solidarity due to the fact that the European Union itself is a “man-made” community and, as the EU founders proposed, the project’s success depends on EU actors’ ability to instil European spirit and a sense of belonging in European people. Especially in the period of the Covid-19 crisis, calls for solidarity are being heard, so individuals are aware that solidarity is what they should be demonstrating in times of difficulty. However, it will be unlikely that supranational solidarity can be assimilated to national solidarity as it cannot rely on the embeddedness of nationalism, grounded in centuries of cultural identity. Yet, neither is it true that no solidarity has been achieved between the member states of the EU and between its people. A key difference is that postnational solidarity is primarily event driven (Offe 2007). Indeed, during the horrific, large-scale terrorist attacks in Paris and elsewhere, individuals demonstrated a closeness to each other across borders. Facebook profile pictures turned red, white and blue as a sign of respect and support for fellow Europeans in France as the country faced the attacks. The most recent example of event-driven solidarity is of course the Covid-19 crisis. However, the point is that while using a Facebook profile filter and updating a status with words of support is deemed to be a demonstration of solidarity—and it is certainly a start—it is not the type of solidarity that necessarily cuts to the heart and contains authentic emotion. Often, it stops at the profile picture or status update as an external manifestation of solidarity while the person’s actual state and life continues unchanged and untouched. This recalls Hegel’s notion of the “Idea” in Chapter 7, in which he insists that it is not enough for individuals to simply know “ideas”, but take what is already known—the good, helpful and important issues—and harbour them within our minds to achieve a state of

254

S. K. ST. JOHN

self-actualisation. In this case, we recognise that the attacks in Paris were negative and caused a deterioration in people’s lives, and we therefore demonstrate our understanding of that. However, can it be said that the consciousness of this “Idea” is converted to feeling (Hegel’s sensibility) breathing through the self, leading one to carry out benevolent action where possible? Similarly, the concept relates to Offe’s “type 0 solidarity” constituting spontaneous compassion. In the context of solidarity among individuals, the challenge lies in converting this spontaneous compassion to a higher level of solidarity and solidary action, which is to say “real” solidarity, where in Hegel’s terms, the outside world (nature) which is the European Union, has threads woven into the individual to such a degree that they are part of the fabric making who s/he truly is. Solidarity at the Member State Level It can be observed that member state solidarity has also been limited in its depth. When the EU founders called for solidarity in the Union, individuals were replaced with member states. However, the two eventually functioned in different ways and emerged to have different needs. We have discussed that nationalism, especially in the form of domestic interest, acts as barrier to solidarity. In terms of member state solidarity, domestic interest can constitute the limitation placed on “artificial” solidarity because member states are seen to be demonstrating solidarity when it is convenient and when there is a return, while “real” solidarity would be unconditional with a willingness to cooperate on equal footing and without forgetting that they too may find themselves in need of solidarity in the future. “Real” solidarity is based on actions that supersede cooperation that is based on self-interest claiming sovereignty (Beutler 2017). As indicated in Chapter 7, “real” solidarity is composed of unequivocal common values, risk sharing, equality and trust. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 refers to “real” solidarity, stating that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create real solidarity” and that “Europe can be built only by concrete actions which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic development”. Nevertheless, the lack of full consensus on refugee quota systems and on sovereign debt bailouts highlights the loopholes in the current state of solidarity in the EU, allowing member states to opt out

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

255

of solidary action, hence preventing the EU from reaching what Hegel might call a self-actualised version of itself. We can also return to the idea that the state of solidarity in the EU can be applied to Durkheim’s notion of “mechanical” solidarity, in which solidarity is produced automatically through the pursuit of personal (domestic) interest in economic exchange, and for social solidarity to be created requires the existence of a strong universal moral consensus across the group. For “organic” solidarity to be embedded in the community, the levels of reciprocal ties would need to be intensified. In this case, “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity represents another facet to “artificial” and “real” solidarity, respectively, from the point of view that “organic” and “real” solidarity is manifested in a deeper, more complex form. It can also be said that the creation of “real” solidarity is a bottomup process, deriving from the stimulation of people’s emotion, while “artificial” solidarity can be perceived as a result of a top-down approach, through the notion of instilling a sense of belonging upon the people.

Reframing the Problem of Achieving “Real” Solidarity with Education The first section of this book has detailed the complexities of policy development in education at European level. Throughout its life as an emerging and then eventually recognised field of EU policy, education has remained an area of sensitivity due to its attachment to national identity and nation-building. This makes education a seemingly problematic vehicle for bolstering solidarity-building initiatives and consequently easy to dismiss, especially when building postnational solidarity encounters similar obstacles relating to nationalism. However, given the tight weave between education and solidarity that emerges from this book, we should not be ready to turn our back on education as an important contributor to ameliorating the EU’s state of solidarity. Rather it is about viewing the solidarity crisis through a strategic optic, reframing the problem and the way that education can be beneficial for building solidarity. The Core of the Problem We note that solidarity is not absent in the EU, but it does not reach the depths that were envisaged by its founders nor the depth of solidarity that is being called for in the present day to combat the existential

256

S. K. ST. JOHN

threat from populism and elements of globalisation. The question subsequently becomes, not how the EU can increase postnational solidarity, but also—and even instead—how it can deepen the level of solidarity and improve the authenticity of solidarity in the EU. This entails a series of transformations: from Durkheim’s “mechanical” solidarity to “organic” solidarity; from Offe’s type “0” solidarity to type “4” solidarity” from solidarity between individuals to solidarity between member states; and from national solidarity to postnational solidarity. The condition of solidarity in Europe today is therefore incomplete. In Hegelian terms, individuals need to possess a European spirit or consciousness that stimulates emotion, which is the translating component for real European solidarity and the connecting component for individuals’ attachment to the EU. Without European spirit, there is no real solidarity and Europe remains essentially an incomplete version of itself. Therefore, fostering spirit starts with individuals, with people. There is a difference between solidarity among member states and among people, which lies in the presence of spirit, manifested through emotion. There is greater disposition for people to have an unconditional love affair with the EU than for member states. For member states, solidarity is carried out in a board room as a business agreement. Member states do not necessarily get emotionally involved in the EU. They calculate what can be gained from reaching out with solidarity: if they agree to refugee quotas, how will it affect their welfare systems, or voting tendencies for their upcoming election? What is their bargaining leverage? People on the other hand, who are proprietors of their own feelings, have the capacity to generate spirit and feel emotional attachment. This has been seen in case study two, in which Lampedusans’ initial reaction to the desperate incoming migrants was to show welcoming solidary action, compared to the lack of solidary action from other EU member states. While the EU founders could be criticised for implying that member states would replace individuals in the fostering solidarity because of their diverging approaches to solidarity, it can be argued that the EU founders were not completely wrong. If Hegel teaches us that the soul is the organ or seat of consciousness, then the democratic state should be seen as the soul of the people. This is also in line with Hegel’s ideas on the state as objectified spirit. Viewed from a different angle, the people are the spirit of the state. Therefore, especially where in democratic societies the member state is designed to be a representation and the voice of its people, this is why it is so important for the EU to start courting the

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

257

European people if it is to reach a state of “real” solidarity in the long term. We Europeans know that solidarity is needed in the world, if not specifically in the EU, and the majority of us will likely have solidary thoughts when they are called for. The challenge lies in the transformation from these solidary thoughts that we call “artificial” solidarity—when we know it is right to demonstrate solidarity, so at the basic level, we may share a post on social media or add a profile picture filter to show we care—to “real” solidarity demonstrated through solidary actions that also transcend to member state action. Re-transforming the Public Sphere: Individualism and Interdependence In order to realise such a transformation compels the identification of the core components of solidarity that require development and investment. Durkheim’s theoretical model based on the notion that mechanical solidarity shifts to organic through the presence of individualism and interdependence, informs the suggestion that solidarity-building efforts should gravitate towards the reinforcement of the public sphere. An effective public sphere in which individuals have the knowledge and tools to freely and competently participate in public political debate, gives rise to individualism. In particular, there is a need to return to the horizontally structured public sphere, witnessed prior to the re-feudalisation process described by Habermas (1962), in which public debate is driven by individuals instead of organisations. It can be said that Habermas’s transformation of the public sphere has been further aggravated by globalisation, assigning increased influence over public debate to the private sector. Globalisation causes distant solidarity to emerge due to the increasing distance between interdependencies in an international order that continues to evolve and in which the public has a greater choice in commodity acquisition (Beutler 2017). Moreover, we are seeing the manipulation of the public sphere by populist influence. As Chapter 8 explains, populist parties have grasped the support of those who feel detached from mainstream politics and the changing world. Relying heavily on mass media as their communicative vehicle, populist leaders have conditioned large proportions of public debate and hence the public sphere. In this scenario, citizens who lack the knowledge capacity to accept, reject, or contrast others’ claims on the basis of

258

S. K. ST. JOHN

a stronger argument, as Habermas’s communicative action dictates, fall vulnerable to Hegel’s process of “rapport”. The individual is in a state of passivity and becomes dependent on and subject to the power of another individual, supplying him with ideas that materialise in the public sphere as if they were his own. To escape from Hegel’s rapport entails the rise of individualism, which means empowering individuals to speak freely based on informed argumentation. According to Durkheim, increased individualism leads to greater interdependencies as varied profiles across society each have a role to play to keep the community machine running. The essence of this process ultimately lies in facilitating learning processes. Habermas suggests the barriers of nationalism and nation-bound forms of identity can be overcome by effectively learning our way out of nationalism to reach postnational identity (Murphy and St. John 2019). Similarly, we can effectively learn our way out of populism and media manipulation, and into postnational solidarity. Illuminated by Hegel, knowledge is a necessity to reach the state of self-consciousness or what he calls the absolute idea and self-actualisation. Consciousness is therefore knowledge, so if individualism is to be securely restored to foster “real” solidarity, it must be fuelled by knowledge acquisition and development. In the context of crises, Hegel teaches us that there is truth in negative scenarios, that we can learn from one’s enemies and others’ opposing views. However, this can only truly occur for the latter if others are on the same footing in a horizontally structured public sphere, absent from mass media manipulation. On the former, it is fundamental for the public to be able to fully make sense of the world around them, including historical context and dynamics at play for a wider understanding of international relations and the political webbing of the globalised world, through learning that builds on and goes beyond the current provision in citizenship education. This is why it is necessary to empower people with knowledge to be able to contextualise, critically analyse information and counter it on the basis of a stronger argument, especially in times of crisis when political discourse tends to attack opposition vulnerabilities or elaborate the truth in attempts to gain civic support. Durkheim’s Division of Labour highlights how greater specialisations within society leads to increased interdependence, which is a requisite for “real” or “organic” solidarity. Learning is also important for this process whereby individuals become trained in specialised areas and therefore each

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

259

hold a specific role to play in their community. The community is cohesive because it cannot advance if any component is missing. As crises continue to provoke changes to society, bringing about more complex scenarios in social development, the need to challenge norms and re-evaluate divisions of labour and specialisation intensifies. Emphasis should therefore be maintained at the European level on the role of training in European integration, whether through formal channels of compulsory, further and higher education, as well as through informal routes for the upskilling and re-skilling of workers in adult and vocational training. However, the difference compared to current missions for education and training at European level is seen in shifting imperatives from economic back to sociocultural for the emergence of greater interdependence as part of the wider objective to reinforce European solidarity. Holding a role to play in a community and understanding one’s role in society is another form of empowering people, which complements knowledge acquisition required for the re-transformation of the public sphere described above.

Education Reframed Education has been politicised; it is not purely a process of learning. As Ward and Eden (2009) state, “a nation defines itself and sustains its cultural existence, transmitting beliefs, ideas and knowledge from generation to generation”, in a process in which education is identified as a means to fostering the European identity. As highlighted by Green (2013), education systems and state formation are tightly woven, and it is plausible that education can play a part in “supra-state” formation. The evidence in Chapter 2 indicates that this notion of education—as a tool to foster a postnational identity—was identified during the European Cultural Conference of 1949. The conference pinpointed education as a means to creating European citizenship, to encompass European consciousness, belonging, outlook and solidarity. The success of a united Europe would depend on the next generation, leading to a greater significance being attached to training responsible young people with a supranational spirit. The European Cultural Conference highlighted the need to teach the teachers in order to infiltrate a European outlook into European populations. As highlighted by Bottery and Wright (2000) and Green (2013), teachers are required to engage with and convey to their students matters beyond the classroom, namely citizenship education, which can extend

260

S. K. ST. JOHN

to European citizenship. In the context of teacher agency (Barber and Mourshed 2007; Donaldson 2010; Priestley et al. 2016), it can be said that teachers have role to play in bringing about a greater association with Europe in the classroom. Training teachers in the affirmation of the European idea was emphasised in Chapter 2, which included teaching on the European idea within the framework of history and foreign language curricula, but the initiative’s vision forecasted a European presence across all areas of the national curricula. The European Movement not only wanted to adopt education as an instrument to reach school-age learners, but to also reach those in further education, higher education and adult education. In these contexts, it proposed the intensification of cultural exchanges between the learning institutions of the European nations, rather than reserving the privilege of exchanges to an intellectual elite and those in liberal professions. Exchanges within educational and cultural contexts would promote language learning, which would foster common connections between the peoples of Europe. The European Movement set out to create a series of cultural and educational institutions to assist in its mission to foster European consciousness for a united Europe, including the College of Europe and the European University. In the beginning, the two institutions fell under a common initiative to foster a European nationalism and European intellectual community. Initially, the original plan was to create a fully fledged European University, but after coming to terms with the extent of the project, the European Movement settled for the more feasible and realistic project of the College of Europe. It was suggested that this smaller project could in effect act as a pilot programme for the larger European University and the individual mission of the College of Europe became the forging of indispensable intellectual instruments for future managers of Europe. The European University became a postgraduate institution for doctoral students working on issues relating to European integration, to provide the European integration process with an intellectual underpinning. Other educational and cultural institutions created by the European Movement were the Studies Bureau, the European Cultural Centre, a European Institute of Political and Social Sciences, a European Bureau of Adult Education and a European Foundation for Scientific Research. In addition, the Western European Union (WEU) made a notable contribution to initiatives in the field of education. In particular, its European Universities Association brought together Rectors and ViceChancellors to discuss contemporary issues facing higher education across

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

261

Europe and the ways in which education could play a role in a united Europe. For example, it proposed the creation of European Studies courses in European universities to create a conscience in young people of the issues surrounding European unity and to foster a sense of Europe in the hearts and minds of young people. The WEU also contributed to the promotion of cultural exchanges and university cooperation, including the exchange of information between European higher education institutions. These original initiatives dating back to the construction of Europe were not wrong, but they faced challenges in their implantation. As Chapter 6 outlines, they stepped on member states’ toes, and the European Community struggled to realise the European University project within the framework of the community. It is necessary to accept that a common European framework for primary, secondary and tertiary education into which learning about Europe can be formally integrated will not be feasible because member states are highly protective of their education systems. So, how can the EU navigate the attachment to nation-building in order for it to benefit from education as a means to fostering solidarity? This study is able to pinpoint four areas of education policy in which the EU still has space to manoeuvre effectively to foster EU solidarity: Vocational Education and Training; Higher Education; citizenship education; and non-formal and informal education. Vocational Education and Training (VET) and Higher Education Chapters 3 and 4 on the development of education policy until the present day show that willingness to cooperate in education has emerged and driven policy development when it acts as a component to economic missions. Education found its place as a European Community competence through the development of VET, which has remained a prominent feature of the last ten-year strategies towards the reinforcement of a knowledge economy, especially following the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, we understand that VET as the first area of manoeuvre for the EU in education policy. VET and the fostering of a knowledge economy are dealt with in economic terms, but not in the context of solidarity when in fact in Durkheimian terms, it constitutes an integral part of fostering solidarity within a community as a means to increasing interdependence through specialisation.

262

S. K. ST. JOHN

The success of the Erasmus programme demonstrates member states’ openness for greater cooperation in formal higher education initiatives across the European Union. Moreover, it can be suggested, based on the arguments put forward in this analysis, that the Erasmus Programme has indeed stimulated a connection and an emotional attachment to the EU, leading to its success as a method for fostering solidarity. However, the Bologna Process also demonstrates that member states prefer to maintain control when cooperation for streamlining approaches and systems is under discussion. Higher education institutions (HEIs) lend themselves well to multilateralism, and the most recent European Universities initiative is a case in point, because they tend to already be international in their outlook and organic composition. Therefore, they provide naturally fertile ground for developing educational initiatives involving several member states and with cultural rather than economic objectives. In addition, higher education’s role in producing brilliant scholars and cutting-edge research to answer the challenges facing contemporary Europe and its society remains paramount for the EU’s future. However, there are two problematic aspects to further investment in mainstream higher education as a vehicle to foster solidarity in the Union. There may be a tendency for the EU to focus investment in higher education as it is an area that provides results. Nevertheless, it is precisely due to the success of the Erasmus programme and the higher education sector for instilling a sense of Europeanness in its students and staff that it does not effectively require increased or more focused investment to help the cause for solidarity among graduates. Higher education is already succeeding in that task. In this respect, it is noted that in the Brexit referendum outlined in Chapter 8, those with higher academic qualifications were more likely to vote to remain in the EU. This leads to the second problematic aspect, which is the fact that higher education is inherently selective and it does not reach the strata of society that need to be convinced on the European project. It would be impossible to ensure that all individuals partake in the Programme because, for numerous reasons, will not have access to higher education, the main platform upon which the initiative is built. While it could be expanded to all levels of education, this would be no small endeavour. Therefore, higher education’s inability to ensure widespread inclusiveness and extensive outreach, thus largely speaking to a privileged slice of society despite a drive for inclusive opportunities, means its influence in fostering widespread solidarity across an entire community remains

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

263

relatively low. Moreover, if as a consequence the EU becomes seemingly reserved for an intellectual elite, it only exacerbates the pre-existing reputation as an elitist construction that has surfaced in populist rhetoric. The EU founders were on the right path when they advised that the European project needed to extend to all corners of society, and with this in mind, higher education still has a fundamental role to play in bolstering informal education initiatives via pathways such as VET, adult education, online learning and teacher education that do achieve the level of impact that is required. From this point of view, higher education institutions will need to focus their attention to their outreach at all levels of society, refining the way that knowledge is disseminated to train individuals, resulting in the interdependence that Durkheim suggests derives from the division of labour through specialisation. This also involves a role for the EU and for HEIs in the wide dissemination of information on the VET-related opportunities, such as the Leonardo da Vinci Programme as well as courses and opportunities coordinated directly by HEIs. Investing in the knowledge economy also brings about benefits to further challenges facing society. By stimulating the work force with upskilling and reskilling that respond to the needs of the labour market, citizens stand a better chance of maintaining employment and the economy stands a better chance of resisting recession. Pushing for the knowledge economy is of course nothing new, but reframing investment in the knowledge economy for the long-term objective of developing interdependency to improve the state of European solidarity, rather than focusing on training purely for the sake of the economy, is more original, but vital for the future of European solidarity. It has become evident that as employment levels waver, political discontent rises, leading to increased support for populist parties, which play into the hands of disgruntled citizens. We see here economic objectives aligning with cultural objectives for solidarity among the community of European people, and the role that HEIs can play in this endeavour is integral. The fact that the higher education sector has been forced into the digital space in response to the Covid-19 crisis, has provided HEIs with a vehicle for greater outreach and widespread knowledge dissemination. From this perspective, it would be in the European Union’s interest to concentrate investment in digital tools for reinforcing the knowledge economy, in collaboration with and implemented by HEIs. Note that this endeavour would also require heightened investment in training for scholars on how to communicate their research and knowledge to

264

S. K. ST. JOHN

the wider society in civic engagement initiatives. Furthermore, this latter point has an important role to play in addressing the rising crisis of expert knowledge and the public’s waning trust in experts. Citizenship Education As civic engagement becomes a cornerstone of European solidarity building, it is impossible to omit consideration for citizenship education. If citizenship education prepares youth for their participation in society and how to interact with others within communities, nations and the global world, then its role is paramount for fostering solidarity. With the aim of establishing the mutually beneficial development of citizens and their society, citizenship education is taught in schools “to develop students in becoming active, informed and responsible citizens, who are willing and able to take responsibility for themselves and for their communities at the local, regional, national and international level” (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice 2017). Citizenship education is seen to be integrated into existing curricula through cross-disciplinary learning, or taught as a standalone subject. Through both methods, students are stimulated to develop knowledge skills, attitudes and values in: interacting effectively and constructively with others; thinking critically; acting in a socially responsible manner; and acting democratically (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice 2017). It is recognised that individuals share different views and ideas on participatory roles in society, and therefore, while citizenship education instils citizens’ legal rights and obligations, it also seeks to develop students’ identity (Veugelers 2019). Along this thread, citizenship education fosters individualism and an ability to formulate and defend views and arguments, while also respecting those of others. Developing these capacities in citizens falls in line with Durkheim’s individualism requisite for organic solidarity, as well as the skills required for participating in Habermas’s public sphere. It is for this reason that the benefits of investing in citizenship education for fostering solidarity are revealed. However, while citizenship education is present in national curricula, member states are not required to integrate European citizenship education, which puts the European project at a disadvantage. Citizenship education suffers the same fate as education policy at European level, exacerbated further by its even tighter weave into nation, identity and community-building. The EU is able to advise and benchmark on matters

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

265

of citizenship education, but it does not have the capacity to implement a common citizenship education across the Union, nor to impose the integration of European citizenship education into national curriculum. Even the presence of national citizenship education is found to be weak. The European Commission’s Eurydice report in 2017 indicates that all member states include citizenship education in their national curricula, but in a broad scope covering in some form socially responsible action, critical thinking and inter-personal interactions. Most member states also provide teachers with guidance materials and resources. However, almost half of member states still do not have regulations or recommendations on the development of citizenship education competences in the framework of initial teacher education (ITE) and there are no regulations for assessing the teaching and learning of citizenship education. At European level, cooperation initiatives in education have focused on promoting citizenship education in schools, especially in the context of the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training and in the Paris Declaration, with a focus on citizenship, fundamental values and non-discrimination in the different sectors of education (European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice 2017). However, it has been noted that there is a gap between policy and practice as well as within policy between general ideas and concrete measures. The challenge therefore lies in translating policies and reforms in citizenship education into successful practice on the ground (Veugelers 2019). National education systems prove to be a flimsy platform upon which the EU can rely to promote a European citizenship education, which has led the EU to develop its own initiatives in forms of continued citizenship education such as its “citizens’ dialogues” and more recently, in the European Commission and Parliament’s current “Conference on the Future of Europe” initiative. While these initiatives are indeed fundamental for attempts to increase solidarity-building in the EU, attention should be dedicated to the methodology adopted to ensure the effectiveness and true impact levels of such initiatives. Nevertheless, since the potential for citizenship education to play a fundamental and effective role in improving and increasing the participatory levels of citizens in democratic societies, the EU would benefit from intensified investment in this area, particularly in ITE where a gap has emerged and where a more surgically inserted methodology could be implemented. While some initiatives can already be identified, such as an education programme for schools

266

S. K. ST. JOHN

at the Historical Archives of the European Union,4 there is a need to invest in widespread and cross-border ITE that succeeds in achieving high levels of outreach, where knowledge on the EU and citizenship obtained through ITE is diffused into society through teaching once teachers in training become qualified. Non-formal and Informal Education Given this narrow scope for developing European citizenship education within the frameworks of formal education,5 the impact on fostering attachment to the European project and postnational identity learning through non-formal6 and informal7 education becomes most notable. The EU initiatives mentioned above fall into the category of non-formal education because the organising committees purposefully bring together groups of citizens with the aim of raising awareness about the EU. If non-formal education is learning that takes place outside the institutions of formal education systems, then the EU is indeed well placed to develop and coordinate a European citizenship education programme, preferably in collaboration with higher education institutions. Moreover, the Commission’s European Universities Initiative, as well as the broader scope of the activities within the Erasmus plus programme, already provides a credible platform for such an endeavour. Informal education, seen as learning that takes place spontaneously through individuals’ social interactions and surrounding environment, is seen as the vehicle leading towards a re-transformation of Habermas’s public sphere that is required to foster attachment to the European Union and intensified civic participation more generally. Put in other words, intensifying the quality of informal and non-formal education will bring the retransformation of the public sphere and provides a vehicle through

4 https://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/Education/For-Schools. 5 Taking place within the framework of education systems from primary school through

to university, including technical and professional training. 6 Educational activities organised outside the formal education system that have clear learning outcomes and objectives. 7 The lifelong learning process by which individuals acquire knowledge, skills and experience through social interactions and from the individual’s surrounding environment and community.

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

267

which to improve the connection between people and the EU, especially through digital channels.

Final Thoughts and Policy Recommendations This chapter has unpacked the connections between education and solidarity, and while education is a seemingly limited in is capacity to accommodate EU policymaking, the far-reaching connections between the two indicate that education as a means to fostering solidarity is not lost. The chapter has highlighted areas of education policy that remain accessible as arenas in which EU policymaking can be reinforced. It can be noted in this context that development in education policy at EU level propels when it is addressed in an intergovernmental setting. As Grosse (2017) identifies, the strength of the nation-state and of intergovernmental institutions has emerged in the current period of crisis, and in general terms, there is a tendency to opt for intergovernmental policymaking. As such, if there is an optimum time to promote education through intergovernmental means, it is now while we can take advantage of this tendency. The study’s key finding boils down to a need for people to not only be aware of the EU, its functioning, its context in the international order and the challenges faced at the European and global level, but also to be able to internalise and reflect upon these concepts. This entails individuals’ skills development to reinforce Durkheim’s division of labour, along with critical thinking skills via citizenship education to create positive shifts in Habermas’s public sphere. In doing so, there is a potential for society to learn its way out of populism by avoiding the scenario of Hegel’s notion of Rapport, which lowers democratic deficit as citizens are less politically alienated and more confident to manifest opinion through voting and participating in the public sphere. At member state level, increasing interdependence points to ever closer union. However, before such interdependence can be established, people’s belief in the European project has to come first so they reach the level of autonomous participation in the public sphere to quash the populist support that threaten the EU the deeper they embed themselves in the system. As the common thread running through the areas of education policy in which the EU can manoeuvre, it has emerged that the role of higher education institutions (HEIs) will be paramount in the implementation of

268

S. K. ST. JOHN

this endeavour. The European University project is witness to the important role of academic institutions in European integration. The European Universities Initiative demonstrates the European Commission’s awareness of HEIs influence, and it is now time to deepen expectations on the kind of activity HEIs should pursue, together with support and investment from the European Union. The most effective solutions to mention in this regard as suggestions include two for the short to medium term, and one for the long term. The former is the development of online education, in both formal and informal settings, aimed at the participation of all angles of society to upskill and build knowledge. With the recent drastic shifts in the education landscape caused by the Covid-19 crisis, which have aligned more closely education with the digital age, have opened doors in the facilitation of education that is accessible for all, despite geographical location, or employment and family commitments.8 An increased provision in online courses may also force down high tuition fees. Powerfully illustrated by Andrew Rossi in his 2014 Sundance Film Festival Award-winning documentary “Ivory Tower”,9 the rising cost of higher education was already at breaking point. It may be that the Covid-19 crisis causes the final snap that provokes a shift back towards the principles of higher education as a basic right and common good, and away from the commodification of education that responds to students as consumers. As the education landscape transforms to incorporate digital offerings, institutions will lose the on-campus perks—the state-of-the-art sports centre or trendy eateries—that are exploited to justify sky-high fees. In such a scenario, the cost of education is calibrated with the true value of quality educational training and the transfer of knowledge, and education is made increasingly accessible and inclusive. A second short- to medium-term approach involves the creation of digital content that is promoted through informal and non-formal education channels with the aim of raising awareness and developing knowledge on the functioning and role of the European institutions. 8 In this context, it is not however omitted that citizens from lower socio-economic backgrounds are seen to be disadvantaged in the accessibility of ICT equipment to participate in online learning. In this respect, there is a risk of increasing inequalities, unless these aspects are addressed and ICT equipment and internet becomes accessible to all. 9 Ivory Tower: Crumbling or Tumbling? An interview with Andrew Rossi by Dennis West, Cineaste, XXXIX (4), 2014.

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

269

Such an approach provides a means for individuals to connect with the EU by understanding how it affects issues that they are passionate about, creating the emotional attachment required for “real” solidarity to manifest because they feel true sense of belonging to the European community of people. Along the same thread as digital content, lies an important role for EU institutions and HEIs to play in promoting media literacy that combats the increasing formation of individual consciences through online media (Grosse 2017). Contrarily to traditional media, online media is interactive, thus exposing users to heightened influence over them. Furthermore, promoting digital literacy is fundamental in training individuals to be able to take advantage of digital developments for more inclusive participation in society, rather than seeing technological advancement as a threat. For the long-term, a focus on ITE should not go underexploited. The creation of a specialised European Teacher Training Programme that instils European culture and politics into those training to be teachers, has the outreach capacity to make a widespread impact on the diffusion of the European idea across the Union. The implementation of such an initiative requires careful navigation of the barriers and sensitivities in EU education policy, thus likely taking a path focused primarily on the components of citizenship education, but one that has the primary goal of provoking a Union-wide shift in citizens’ participation in the public sphere.

Bibliography Ball, S. J. (2012). Global Education Inc: New Policy Networks and the Neo-Liberal Imaginary. Oxon: Routledge. Barber, M., & Mourshed, M. (2007), How the World’s Best-Performing School Systems come Out on Top. McKinsey & Company. Bartolini, S. (2005), Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring Between the Nation-State and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beutler, B. (2017). Solidarity in the EU: A Critique of Solidarity and of the EU. In A. Grimmel & S. My Giang, Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Bottery, M., & Wright, N. (2000). Teachers and the State: Towards a Directed Profession. London: Routledge. Choudaha, R., & De Wit, H. (2014). Challenges and Opportunities for Global Student Mobility in the Future: A Comparative, Critical Analysis. In B.

270

S. K. ST. JOHN

Streitweiser, Internationalisation of Higher Education and Global Mobility. Oxford, UK: Symposium Books. Donaldson, G. (2010), Teaching Scotland’s Future: Report of a review of teacher education in Scotland. Scottish Government. European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice. (2017). Citizenship Education at School in Europe—2017. Eurydice Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Field, J. (1998). European Dimensions: Education, Training and the European Union. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Göncz, B., & Lengyel, G. (2016). Changing Attitudes of Hungarian Political Elites Towards the EU (2007–2014). Historical Social Research, 41(4), 106– 128. Green, A. (2013). Education and State Formation: Europe, East Asia and the USA. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Grimmel, A., & My Giang, S. (2017). Solidarity in the European Union: A Fundamental Value in Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Grosse, T. G. (2017). European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis. Warsaw: Scholar Publishing House. Habermas, J. (1962). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1998). The Inclusion of the Other. Boston: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2012). The Crisis of the European Union. A Response. Boston: Polity Press. Hartmann, E. (2011). The Internationalisation of Higher Education: Towards a New Research Agenda Om Critical Higher Education Studies. Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Routledge. Hegel, G. (2007), Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (edition translated by R. Williams). Oxford: Oxford University Press Laffan, B. (1996). The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), 81–102. Lawn & Grek. (2012). Europeanizing Education: Governing a New Policy Space. Providence: Symposium Books. Lazetic, P. (2010). Managing the Bologna Process at the European Level: Institution and Actor Dynamics. European Journal of Education, 45(4), 549–562. Mau, S. (2007). Forms and Prospects of European Solidarity. In N. Karagiannis, European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

9

PAST AND PRESENT CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE …

271

Murphy, M., & St. John, S. K. (2019). Conclusion. In S. K. St. John & M. Murphy, Education and Public Policy in the European Union: Crossing Boundaries. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Springer Nature. Offe, C. (2007). Obligations Versus Costs: Types and Contexts of Solidary Action. In N. Karagiannis, European Solidarity. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Piro, J. (2016). Revolutionising Global Higher Education Policy: Innovation and the Bologna Process. Oxon: Routledge. Popescu, B. M. (2017). Europe: Between the Crisis of Legitimacy and Brexit. In D. Dungaciu & R. Iordache, The Perfect Storm of the European Crisis. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Priestly, M., Biesta, G., & Robinson, S. (2016). Teacher Agency: An Ecological Approach. London: Bloomsbury. Segatti, P., & Guglielmi, S. (2016). Unpacking the Components of National Identity and Their Effects on Identification with Europe. In P. Segatti & B. Westle, European Identity in the Context of National Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shaw, J. (1992). Education and the Law in the European Community. Journal of Law and Education, 21(3), 415–442. Streitweiser, B. (2014). Internationalisation of Higher Education and Global Mobility. Oxford: Symposium Books. Van Dijk, J. A. G. M., & Van Deursen, A. J. A. M. (2014). Digital Skills: Unlocking the Information Society. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Veugelers, W. (2019). Education for Democratic Intercultural Citizenship. Brill | Sense: Leiden Veugelers, W., & de Groot, I. (2019). Theory and Practice of Citizenship Education. In Education for Democratic Intercultural Citizenship (pp. 14–41). Brill Sense. Ward, S., & Eden, C. (2009). Key Issues in Education Policy. London: Sage Publications Ltd. Westle, B., & Buchheim, R. G. (2016). National and European Identification: Their Relationship and Its Determinants. In B. Westle & P. Segatti, European Identity in the Context of National Identity: Questions of Identity in Sixteen European Countries in the Wake of the Financial Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 10

Concluding Thoughts: Covid-19 Providing Yet Another Case Study or Impetus for EU Solidarity?

This manuscript has been completed during the 2020 Covid-19 lockdown in Italy, which makes for timely circumstances to write a conclusion on solidarity in the European Union. The true extent of solidarity emerges in times of great tragedy; the creation of the European Union itself following the Great Wars being a case in point. With a decade of crises still weighing on its shoulders, and the next decade beginning with the worst crisis since its creation, the EU faces trying times. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has described the current Covid-19 crisis as “a war against an invisible enemy that is putting the future of the European project to the test” and calls for unwavering solidarity or face the failure of the Union.1 Moreover, Jacques Delors has spoken out to warn that a lack of solidarity is a “mortal danger to the European Union”.2 Indeed, it is among the times when real solidarity is at its highest demand, confronted not only with a health crisis, but also an economic and social crisis. As President of the European Central Bank Christine Lagarde has

1 Pedro Sánchez, Europe’s Future Is at Stake in This War Against Coronavirus, The Guardian, 5 April 2020. 2 Coronavirus Could Be Final Straw for EU, European Experts Warn, The Guardian, 1 April 2020.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3_10

273

274

S. K. ST. JOHN

highlighted, “unlike in 2008-9, the shock we are facing is universal: it is common both across countries and across all sections of society”.3 On the surface, Covid-19 appears to have provoked high levels of solidarity. In Italy, we set the trend early on in Europe for collective manifestations of solidarity; playing musical instruments across the balconies of neighbourhoods at set times, in addition demonstrating the power of social media in this digital era in coordinating solidary actions. Windows and balconies across the country held home-made rainbow flags, flying the slogan “andrà tutto bene” (it will all be fine). The rainbow soon became a global symbol for solidarity during Covid-19 and we saw similar demonstrations in other parts of the world, such as the 8 pm Thursday clap for the NHS in the UK, and collective musical manifestations in European cities. However, we also notice a stark contradiction. On the one hand, solidary-action methods and a symbol of solidarity have transcended national boundaries, highlighting the influence of the globalised world. On the other, solidarity throughout the Covid-19 crisis has so far remained predominantly at the national level. At the beginning of the crisis in Europe, while calls of solidarity with Italy, for example, were heard from the people of other member states when the government ordered a national lockdown, at member state level, it was felt that Italy’s calls for assistance fell on deaf ears in Europe, heard only by Russia and China. When the crisis subsequently swept across other member states—and beyond—countries from both an individual and member state perspective tended to turn inwards, concentrating on the domestic situation rather than calling on collaboration for collective responses. There were export bans on vital medical kits and independent national decision-making on borders controls, for example. The status of solidarity improved as the pandemic took hold. Germany, Austria and Luxembourg took in patients from areas worse affected across the borders, and European leaders reached consensus on revising the EU crisis management system, funding for research to develop a vaccine and joint procurement of medical supplies.4

3 Christine Lagarde, Our Response to the Coronavirus Emergency, The ECB Blog, European Central Bank, 19 March 2020. 4 Coronavirus Could Be Final Straw for EU, European Experts Warn, The Guardian, 1 April 2020.

10

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: COVID-19 PROVIDING …

275

Yet the financial component remains a bone of contention in crisis response at EU level, despite experiences from the 2008 financial crisis. Financial solidarity is still lacking, as some member states advocated for a new model for mutualising debt, instead of individual requests for loans via the European Stability Mechanism, while others continued to resist the idea of common debt. The European Union has confirmed a series of financial measures to support member states as they face shocks to their economies. The European Central Bank set up a new instrument, a temporary emergency purchase programme, making up to three trillion euros available to assist individuals facing hardship.5 The European Commission, stating that the depth and breadth of the Covid-19 crisis requires a response that is unprecedented in scale, speed and solidarity, has launched its SURE plan, a 100-billion-euro solidarity instrument that supports workers in maintaining their incomes and business in staying afloat.6 The EU’s overall Recovery Plan for Covid-19 was finally fully established at the end of July 2020. Two factors can be drawn from the history and analysis outlined in this book that will play a significant role in support for the EU and the reinforcement of EU solidarity moving into the future: trust and interdependence. Whether the two emerge will depend on the effectiveness and conviction of EU’s response in the aftermath of the crisis to mobilise resources and facing challenges as a unified bloc. It has been noted that, for example, when Italy felt its calls for help at the beginning of the pandemic were falling on deaf ears across the continent, a poll on 12–13 March suggested that 88% of Italians felt the EU was failing to support Italy and 67% felt that EU membership was a disadvantage.7 It can be said that the perceived lack of response was rubbing salt into the wounds from previous crises, namely the refugee crisis, but suffice it to say that the reaction is troubling coming from a founding member state that has historically been a key supporter of the European project, as the historical sections of this book have detailed.

5 Christine Lagarde, Our Response to the Coronavirus Emergency, The ECB Blog, European Central Bank, 19 March 2020. 6 Coronavirus: The Commission Mobilises All of Its Resources to Protect Lives and Livelihoods, European Commission press release, 2 April 2020. 7 Coronavirus Could Be Final Straw for EU, European Experts Warn, The Guardian, 1 April 2020.

276

S. K. ST. JOHN

While the EU’s response to the immediate challenges of the Covid19 crisis are important, it will be what it does next that counts towards its survival. Previous crises have demonstrated that the aftershocks significantly affect the levels of solidarity achieved due to the level of people’s trust in the EU, determining how likely they are to turn their support to other leaders, namely populist. In the case of the Covid-19, which is having an unprecedented impact on global economies, the EU will leave a gaping space open for the revival of strong populist support if it does not take a powerful, convincing stance in addressing the challenges of financial hardship and unemployment. The moment that the immediateresponse horrors of the pandemic have passed and people are left counting the coins that remain in their pockets, will be the moment for populist leaders to swoop in like an eagle over its unprotected prey. It can be hoped that societies follow path dependency towards a “retour à l’ordre” seen in post-war periods, in which they seek strength and safety, which has already been demonstrated in Italy by growing support for Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, who has been reassuringly consistent, clear and rational in his approach to confronting the challenges of the crisis. Contrarily, farright populist leader Matteo Salvini’s support has sharply dropped as his single-policy agenda to reduce immigration has lost relevance, suggesting also that neither is his leadership potential perceived to be rock-solid reliable. Nevertheless, the circumstances will be ripe for the populist support recipe outlined in chapter eight, meaning that the EU response will be imperative if “real” EU solidarity is to be secured, based on trust and interdependence. The current Covid-19 crisis therefore already provides the next test case for exercising an ability to learn our way out of populism and into “real” EU solidarity. The revival of Europe’s lost spirit from the times of its construction is therefore far from impossible. Ultimately, it will depend on a convincing step forward by the new EU leadership to regain trust, followed by reinforcement from HEIs as a vehicle for steering and fuelling initiatives that prepare the people of Europe for the way ahead and for overcoming the challenges of the current crisis. This may be directly through the diffusion of knowledge in post-secondary academic and vocational programmes that embrace the rapidly advancing digital learning society, preparing youth for the changing labour market. It may be by fostering flexibility in the labour market to provide VET opportunities for those wishing to change career paths, or executive training to retain those who wish to remain in their sector, but with the security that they are keeping abreast

10

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: COVID-19 PROVIDING …

277

of the changes occurring and therefore ready for challenges they may face in the future. These initiatives foster the interdependence required for solidarity in communities, while also heightening people’s confidence in the EU through the provision of opportunities. Fostering European spirit may occur indirectly through structured initial teacher training and European citizenship education programmes that reach further into all angles of society, alongside awareness-raising initiatives within HEIs—as well as in the European institutions themselves and non-profit, non-governmental organisations. Relying on the power of the digital space for learning about the EU, its challenges and responses in ways that are accessible and relevant to all sections of society, will provide the necessary tools to reactivate horizontal participation in the public sphere to foster greater cohesiveness between the EU and its people.

Index

A Adonnino Report, 91, 95 Adult education, 23, 27, 29, 36, 83, 155, 165, 260, 263

B Blaizot case, 91 Bologna Process, 143, 166, 262 Brexit, 9, 198, 212–216, 220, 221, 226, 250, 262 Bureau d’Etudes, 31

C Casagrande case, 90 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), 176, 191, 192 Citizenship education, 258, 259, 261, 264–267, 269, 277 College of Europe, 5, 31, 33–35, 37, 80, 108–111, 113, 121, 135–139, 156, 160, 165, 260 Comett, 92, 93

Committee of the Movements for European Unity (ICMEU), 16 Common agricultural policy (CAP), 44, 45, 141, 144 Communicative action, 8, 186, 188, 258 Congress of Europe, 1, 3, 4, 16–23, 27, 31–33, 175, 241 Constitutional Treaty, 199, 212, 217, 218, 225 Council of Europe, 17, 29, 37, 38, 40, 41, 48, 51, 54–57, 60, 61, 108, 113, 114, 128, 131, 145–147, 164, 165 Council of the European Communities, 56 Covid-19, 9, 10, 197, 198, 213, 248, 249, 253, 263, 268, 273–276

D De Gaulle, Charles, 128, 129, 131, 144, 145, 153, 160, 216

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. K. St. John, Education and Solidarity in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63042-3

279

280

INDEX

Democracy, 6, 95, 97, 176, 180, 181, 184, 186, 188–190, 193, 198, 208, 212, 214, 224, 225, 234 Democratic dissatisfaction, 208, 219 Disintegration, 7, 18, 198, 212–214, 216, 226, 252 Diversity, 20, 21, 24, 27, 31, 33, 50, 54, 55, 60, 75, 79, 81, 82, 84, 105, 136, 147, 152, 153, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 244 domestic interest, 144, 161, 199, 242, 244, 254 Durkheim, Emile, 3, 6, 147, 178–181, 188, 252, 255–258, 263, 264, 267

E Education Action Programme, 4, 85, 89, 246 Educational/student mobility, 4, 6, 23, 30, 31, 36, 54, 55, 57, 58, 73, 75–81, 83, 87–90, 92, 95, 96, 99, 102, 114, 141, 142, 146, 150, 151, 162, 166, 180, 181, 246, 249, 260, 262, 268 Education and Training 2020 (ET2020), 102, 103 Empty Chair Crisis, 131, 145, 212 Equality, 73, 74, 86, 97, 102, 176, 189, 191, 192, 254 Erasmus programme, 5, 9, 90–92, 262 Euratom Treaty, 43, 116–118, 120, 135, 160, 166 EU Recovery Plan, 275 Europe 2020 Strategy, 5, 102 European Atomic Energy Community, 43 European Coal and Steel Community, 58, 65, 114, 116, 124, 153

European Council of Higher Education and Research (ECHER), 49–51 European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), 92 European Cultural Centre, 31–33, 35, 36, 108, 113, 260 European Cultural Conference, 1, 4, 18–22, 25, 26, 28–31, 35, 165, 241, 259 European Economic Area (EEA), 199, 200, 202 European Economic Community (EEC), 43, 44, 49, 51, 66, 117, 124, 135, 165, 216 European Fund for Scientific Research, 31 European Guide for the University Student, 50 European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), 104 European Institute of Political and Social Sciences, 31, 260 European Monetary System, 72, 212 European Movement, 1, 3–5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 23, 30–32, 107, 108, 110, 113, 131, 134, 137, 160, 163, 166, 245, 260 European Scientific Community, 60 European Student Record Book, 48, 50 European Universities Initiative, 104, 262, 266, 268 European University Institute (EUI), 5, 54, 80, 132, 133, 136, 138, 156, 160 European University project, 5, 34, 39, 108, 115, 116, 118–120, 122, 127–129, 131–133, 136, 138, 142, 144, 155–158, 160, 166, 168, 250, 261, 268 European Youth Campaign, 23–25

INDEX

Eurosclerosis, 71, 145, 153 Eurotecnet, 92–94 Eurozone crisis, 197, 213, 218–220 Exchange of knowledge, 23, 26, 75 Exchange of people, 23, 26, 36, 47, 119

F Federalism, 18 Financial crisis, 198, 200, 202–204, 212, 219, 250, 261, 275 FORCE, 92–94 Free movement, 8, 36, 43, 47, 54, 72–74, 83, 84, 86, 88, 91, 141, 146, 161, 164, 192, 246–248

G Geiger Report, 125, 127, 134 Globalisation, 99, 151, 164, 209–211, 223, 247, 248, 256, 257 Gravier case, 91 Green Paper, 97

H Habermas, 3, 6–9, 184–190, 197, 198, 209, 243, 244, 257, 258, 264, 266, 267 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 3, 6, 181–184, 197, 253–256, 258, 267

I Immigration, 7, 176, 203, 208, 210, 213, 220–223, 228, 230–235, 246, 276 Intergovernmentalism, 2, 3, 144, 147, 159, 164, 168, 213

281

J Janne Report, 4, 79, 162, 164

L Lampedusa, 206, 227–235 Language learning, 8, 29, 47, 75, 77, 89, 97, 100, 124, 143, 260 Learning processes, 3, 8, 9, 187, 188, 258 Legitimacy, 8, 149, 180, 197, 198, 209, 212, 213, 226 Legitimisation crisis, 197, 198 Lingua, 92, 93 Lisbon Strategy, 5, 99, 101, 102

M Maastricht Treaty, 96, 97, 199, 217, 219 Messina conference, 115, 118, 122, 129, 160 Migrant children, 75, 141 Migrant crisis, 7, 204–206, 208, 219, 226–229, 231, 235 Migrant flows, 232 MOOCS, 249

N National identity, 6, 9, 93, 147–151, 184, 189, 243, 244, 247, 250, 255, 258 Nationalism, 8, 56, 82, 107, 147–149, 155, 167, 181, 182, 210, 211, 222, 226, 242, 251, 253–255, 258, 260 Nation-building, 2, 6, 9, 147, 149–151, 154, 168, 190, 243, 244, 248, 250, 255, 261 Neofunctionalism, 2, 141–145, 159, 167, 168

282

INDEX

O Offe, 6, 177, 193, 253, 254, 256 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 100, 102 Orientation and Documentation Centre, 50, 51

P PETRA, 92, 93 political alienation, 225, 226, 251 Populism, 1, 7, 8, 209–211, 218, 226, 231, 235, 248, 256, 258, 267, 276 Public attitudes, 208, 219, 224 Public sphere, 3, 8, 185, 186, 188–190, 210, 257–259, 264, 266, 267, 269, 277

Q Qualifications, 29, 47–49, 52, 53, 55, 59, 60, 68, 74, 78, 86, 88, 92, 94, 103, 133, 134, 141–143, 146, 147, 155, 161, 165, 225, 246, 262

R Referendum, 157, 158, 214, 215, 217–221, 223–226, 262 Research cooperation, 60, 61, 142 Risk sharing, 191, 192, 254

S Single market, 89–91, 96 Social Action Programme, 4, 85–87, 90 Spillover, 2, 5, 141, 142, 144, 145, 161, 167 Statism, 5, 144, 244

T Teacher training, 8, 77, 88, 95–97, 100, 101, 146, 277 Temporality, 158, 159, 168, 219 Tempus, 92, 94 Treaty of Rome, 4, 43–45, 47, 53, 55, 59, 72, 73, 78, 79, 89, 116, 164, 245, 248 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 175 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 176 Trust, 25, 191, 193, 200, 201, 209, 210, 218, 224, 226, 241, 242, 249–251, 254, 264, 275, 276 U UK Independence Party (UKIP), 218, 219, 225, 226 United European Movement (UEM), 16 United States of Europe, 15, 16 University cooperation, 39, 57, 67, 83, 92, 128, 165, 261 V Verbatim Report, 16, 18, 21–23, 27, 32, 33 Vocational Educational Training (VET), 36, 45, 261, 263, 276 W Western European Union (WEU), 38–41, 120, 165, 260, 261 White Paper, 89, 98, 243 Y Youth engagement, 23 Youth for Europe, 92, 94