Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State: Missouri, 1820–1860 [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674600225

Table of contents :
PREFACE
CONTENTS
I. LEGISLATIVE RELIEF IN THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCY OF THE 1820’S
II. THE BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI
III. STATE POLICY TOWARD CORPORATIONS, 1820–1847
IV. STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848–1860
V. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820–1846
VI. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847–1860
VII. AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY
VIII. CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION IN MISSOURI
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

ECONOMIC POLICY IN T H E D E V E L O P M E N T OF A WESTERN STATE

MISSOURI 1820-1860

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC

HISTORY

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION

WITH

T H E C O M M I T T E E ON R E S E A R C H IN E C O N O M I C

HISTORY

ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WESTERN STATE

MISSOURI 1820-1860

BY JAMES NEAL PRIMM Assistant Director Western Historical Manuscripts Collection University of Missouri

HARVARD UNIVERSITY Cambridge, Massachusetts 1954

PRESS

COPYRIGHT,

1954

B Y T H E P R E S I D E N T AND F E L L O W S O F H A R V A R D

COLLEGE

Distributed in Great Britain by GEOFFREY

CUMBERLEGE

OXFORD UNIVERSITY

PRESS

LONDON

L I B R A R Y OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD N U M B E R P R I N T E D IN THE UNITED S T A T E S OF

54-5997

AMERICA

PREFACE HIS study is an attempt to discern the relationship of the state government to the economic life of the people of Missouri from statehood to the Civil War. Of primary importance in the determination of state policy was the attitude of the people toward government participation in economic activity. Did Missourians feel that government was to be used as an instrument for the common good, or did they regard the state as a necessary evil, to be tolerated only as the protector of property and a deterrent to crime? Students of the subject of economic policy, basing their conclusions chiefly on their observations of the role of the national government in the economic order, have generally depicted the period between the American Revolution and the Civil War as one dominated by the laissez-faire ideas of Adam Smith and the Manchester school. Despite the pervasiveness of generalizations about economic individualism, and the knowledge that federal domination of economic affairs has been comparatively recent, little attention has usually been paid by historians to the economic policies of state governments during the ante-bellum period. In an effort to meet the obvious need for information in this important area, the Committee on Research in Economic History recently sponsored a group of studies in four states considered to be examples of typical economic development in the period under consideration. Two of the series have been completed, by Oscar and Mary Handlin in Commonwealth: Massachusetts 17741861, and Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860. A study dealing with a southern state — Georgia — is ready for the press, but that which was to examine developments in a midwestern area — Illinois — has failed of fruition. Possibly the present volume may serve as a substitute for the latter.

vi

PREFACE

In both the completed works, the authors have emphasized the positive nature of state economic activity, and have branded laissez faire as a myth, so far as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were concerned. In the present work, the writer has limited the investigation largely to state economic policy, though upon occasion the activities of the federal, county and municipal governments have been considered pertinent. In so limiting the subject, it has been necessary to exclude from the discussion those activities not having a direct bearing upon economic developments. Thus the educational and eleemosynary functions of the state government are not within the purview of this study. While most of the major economic developments in Missouri during the period covered by this study were affected by state policy, and were discussed as pertinent to the central theme, the writer has not attempted to portray the ante-bellum economic history of Missouri in its entirety. Thus discussion of the fur trade and those engaged in it is omitted, though that trade undoubtedly contributed to the wealth and growth of St. Louis and the state. It will be noted that the topical arrangement of material falls into a pattern that is to some extent chronological. Aid in cyclical depressions is significant primarily in the 1820's, state banking becomes important during the 1830's, and internal improvement sentiment is translated into state action in the late 1840's and in the 1850's. As the details of the development of state policy unfold, it will also be noted that the story occasionally dips back into territorial days, and that particular developments were necessarily influenced by conditions existing prior to statehood. These conditions were similar to those prevailing in other western or frontier communities, modified to some extent by the presence of Negro slavery. In a social and economic sense, territorial Missouri resembled Kentucky and Tennessee at an earlier period. At the time of her admission to the Union, most of Missouri's population of slightly more than 56,000 white settlers and some 10,200 Negro slaves was distributed along the Mississippi River

PREFACE

vii

and in the Booneslick country in the central part of the state. The greater part of the immigration to this latter area during the territorial period had come from Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Appalachian back country. Though a majority of Missourians in 1820 were pioneer small farmers, there was a considerable admixture of other elements. In southeast Missouri were a number of Americans who had arrived before the Louisiana Purchase, and who had made large profits from the sale of land acquired under the Spanish rule. In St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve French landowners and merchants were important groups in the population. In the Booneslick area and elsewhere lived a number of Kentuckians and Tennesseeans who had sold their lands in those states at good profits and had moved to Missouri with money and slaves. The metropolis of Missouri in 1820 was St. Louis, center of the river and fur trade, with a population of about 4000. The fur market of this city and the primitive lead mining industry of the counties south and west of it supplemented the state's major occupation of farming. As frontier conditions retreated under the impact of a flood of immigration and technological advances during the four decades preceding the Civil War, demands were made upon the state government to stimulate the expanding economy and, in times of economic stress, to relieve the depressed condition of the citizens. As the optimism of the mid-thirties was replaced by the gloom and despair following the crisis of 1837, critics of state policy grew more vociferous in their complaints. With the return of prosperity, advocates of promotional activity by the state were once again predominant. Whatever the state of the business cycle, however, citizens were characteristically inclined to favor state action deemed beneficial to their immediate personal or sectional economic interests. As this characteristic remained a constant factor within the framework of a developing economy, the writer has not thought it necessary to explain occupational economic biases in detail at every instance of pressure-group support of or opposition to proposed state measures. I have had the benefit of excellent advice and criticism from

viii

PREFACE

Professors Anne Bezanson, Arthur H. Cole, Oscar Handlin and Herbert Heaton in revising and completing this book. I am indebted principally, however, to Professor Lewis Atherton, who gave freely of encouragement and guidance throughout the period of its preparation. Professor Elmer Ellis also read the original draft and made valuable suggestions for its improvement. JAMES NEAL PRIMM

Columbia, Missouri June, 1953

CONTENTS I

LEGISLATIVE RELIEF IN THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCY OF THE 1820's

II

THE BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

III

STATE POLICY TOWARD CORPORATIONS,

1 18

1820-1847

32

IV

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

53

V

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

73

VI

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

92

VII

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

114

VIII

CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION IN MISSOURI

124

NOTES

129

BIBLIOGRAPHY

159

INDEX

165

ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WESTERN STATE

MISSOURI 1820-1860

I

LEGISLATIVE RELIEF IN T H E ECONOMIC EMERGENCY OF T H E 1820'S

N July 19, 1820, after thirty-eight days of deliberation, the delegates to Missouri's first constitutional convention adopted the body of organic law that was to serve as a guide to the development of the state for the succeeding forty-five years.1 The Constitution of 1820 created a strong government, with broad powers of sovereignty. The limitations placed upon the authority of the General Assembly by the state constitution were the usual guarantees of liberty contained in the bill of rights and in restraining sections on slavery and banking.2 There was no check upon the taxing power except the provision that all property subject to taxation should be taxed in proportion to its value. The rate of taxation was left entirely to the discretion of the legislature. Equally important was the wide discretionary power given the General Assembly in the disposal of funds, the only restriction being that public funds or credit might not be used to establish or support a religion.3 Shortly after the new government came into being, extraordinary demands were made upon it to exercise some of its broad powers for the welfare of its citizens. The nation-wide financial stringency following the panic of 1819 was ruinous to the large debtor class in Missouri. Town boomers and speculators in agricultural lands were hard hit by the decline of immigration into the state. Missouri farmers, who were not primarily speculators, had bought more land than they actually needed, with the expectation of selling it to future immigrants.4

O

2

MISSOURI,

1820-1860

One correspondent of the Missouri Intelligencer thought that the cessation of immigration had made legislative interposition necessary. Money previously brought into the state had been spent at the land office or had "crept into the hands of the merchants," bringing about an acute shortage of cash. That the General Assembly could and should relieve the situation was not doubted.5 The currency shortage was further aggravated by the deterioration of the Bank of Missouri, the only functioning bank in the state after the failure of the Bank of St. Louis in 1819. A select committee of the House of Representatives, appointed to investigate the condition of the bank's affairs, reported on June 15 that the amount of specie and notes of other banks held by the Bank of Missouri had diminished from over $700,000 in 1819 to $125,000 at the time of the issuance of the report in 1821. The committee observed that the embarrassment would be much greater by the first of October, when large sums of specie would have to be paid for public lands.6 The bank suspended specie payments on August 4, 1821, and its directors decided to liquidate the business, leaving the state without banking facilities except for a few private agencies. These organizations performed the dubious service of keeping notes of doubtful value in circulation.7 Various solutions for the state's financial ills were presented in the newspapers during the spring and early summer of 1821, but a majority of the writers agreed that some kind of legislation for the public good was necessary. Seldom was the expediency of state action in the crisis of the moment questioned, and there was little opposition to intervention on theoretical grounds. "An Old Farmer" observed that: Never was there in this country a time of so much pecuniary distress as the present; . . . stop law, property law and state bank are the constant and general topic of conversation; and though people differ in opinion on the subject, all agree that something must be done to save us from final ruin. But whatever is to be done must not be delayed any longer, in less than nine months, half a million of property will be sacrificed to pay, perhaps, not a twentieth part; the honest and indus-

L E G I S L A T I V E R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

3

trious will be turned out on the country, and the creditor little better for the sacrifice — our country will be ruined, and it will take an age to bring it back to its pristine state.8 As the relief agitation crystallized into specific demands for stop laws and cheap currency, opinion over the state divided into bitterly contending relief and antirelief factions. Farmers, speculators, and landholders generally condemned the government for its inaction, and demanded immediate remedial legislation, while lawyers, merchants, and the creditor class denounced the panaceas resorted to by other western states as dishonest schemes for escaping the payment of just debts.9 In presenting their case against legislative relief, antirelief partisans cited the disastrous effects of stop laws in ancient Rome and modern Kentucky, deplored the tyranny of the majority in popular government, supported the principle of sanctity of contracts, and urged the superiority of industry over legislation as an agent of relief. "Rusticus," a correspondent of the Missouri Intelligencer, scourged the leaders of the relief movement as profligate and imprudent men who had long been flourishing in apparent wealth without owning much property. Forcing them to pay their debts would disclose their real pecuniary worth, and do the community a service. The writer asserted sarcastically, "The situation of such excites my commisseration and calls forth the strongest sympathies of my heart." 10 As the stop law was the most vulnerable type of relief measure, opponents tended to concentrate their fire upon it. "A Farmer of St. Louis County," writing in the St. Louis Enquirer of May 5,1821, felt that a state bank "would be the most desirable plan, and a valuation law would be next best." 11 The debt moratorium, or stop law controversy, he contended, was simply a scheme to discredit the general plan of relief. Opposition by the creditor and conservative interest was not sufficient to stem the tide that was running for legislative action. According to the St. Charles Missourian, of May 2, 1821, ninetenths of the people were demanding economic relief. Meetings were called in rural areas to further the cause. A group of citizens of Howard and Chariton counties met at a schoolhouse on the

4

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

farm of Thomas Conway during the last week in May for the purpose of urging state action. A series of resolutions was adopted by this assemblage, the first of which attributed the current hardships of the farmers to the lack of markets for Missouri produce, the operations of the Bank of the United States, the drain of specie from the state owing to its unfavorable balance of trade, the departure of specie paid for public lands, the replevin and stay laws of adjoining states, and the lack of money for paying taxes. These factors, the resolution concluded, made legislative assistance imperative. A second resolution outlined a suggested course of action for the General Assembly. It was the opinion of a majority of those assembled that a specie-paying bank could not be successfully established, and that the charter of the Bank of Missouri should be so amended as to enable the state to subscribe for at least five hundred thousand dollars' worth of stock. The directors should suspend specie payments, and the legislature should make the notes of the bank payable for all debts. 12 The general resolution urging legislative action was approved unanimously by the gathering, but there was some opposition to the second resolve, though it passed by a large majority. General Duff Green, land and town speculator, spoke in favor of the bank plan, and it was opposed by Nicholas S. Burckhartt, acting sheriff of Howard County, Thomas Conway, chairman of the meeting, and others. Opposition arguments were based upon distrust of banks, rather than hostility to the principle of legislative relief. 13 During the month of April a petition had been circulated through the central part of the state by the relief faction, requesting Governor Alexander McNair to call a special session of the legislature. 14 As a result of this petition and other considerations, the governor issued a proclamation on April 20, calling a special session of the General Assembly to meet at St. Charles on June 4, 1821, "to consult and determine on such measures as in their wisdom may be deemed meet for the welfare of the state." 16 In his message delivered at the opening of the special session, the governor suggested that two important subjects should engage

LEGISLATIVE R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

5

the attention of the Assembly. First, it should take action to meet the requirements of Congress regarding the admission of Missouri to the United States, and second, it should consider the adoption of measures to relieve the financial difficulties of the citizens of the state. He made no suggestions as to the type of relief laws to be passed. 18 Actually the subjects for consideration were very closely related. It was widely felt that the admission of Missouri to the Union would be of considerable effect in relieving the depression. If potential settlers were assured of the status of Missouri, renewed immigration might restore prosperity to the state. 17 The special session was not long in producing results favorable to the advocates of relief. Duff Green, the "farmer's friend," introduced a bill in the lower house providing for the establishment of a loan office, which was approved on June 27. The loan offices, as stated in the preamble to the act, were to be "of great utility as well to the state, as to the citizens thereof." 18 This service to the people was to be accomplished by issuing certificates to a maximum of $200,000, ranging in value from fifty cents to ten dollars. To insure fair distribution of the benefits of the law, the state was divided into five districts, with loan offices at St. Louis, St. Charles, Chariton in Chariton County, Boonville in Cooper County, and Jackson in Cape Girardeau County. Loans were to be made in the various counties, in proportion to their population, in amounts not exceeding one thousand dollars to any one person if secured by real estate, or two hundred dollars if secured by personal property. The certificates were receivable by the state treasury, and by tax gatherers and other public officers for any money due to the state or to any county or town. All civil and military officers were required to accept them in payment of salaries and fees, and lessees of the state-owned salt springs were obliged to receive them in payment for salt.19 Thus the loan office act was calculated to serve the interest's of the people in two ways: it was to provide needy property owners with loans, and it was to furnish a circulating medium that would benefit everyone.

6

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

A second triumph of the relief party at the special session was the passage of a modified stay law, which permitted debtors to redeem their land within two and one-half years by remitting the purchase money plus 10 per cent per annum. 20 Though this law did not afford relief to persons who did not own real estate, it was felt that since a majority of the people were landowners, the interests of the greatest number would be served. 21 Duff Green, who voted for the stay law in its final form, criticized it as being ". . . partial in its operations on society, inasmuch as it leaves the cows and horses of the poor man to the mercy of the sheriff and constable." 22 Green had proposed to extend the right of redemption to all property, and had also introduced a valuation (minimum price) land bill, but both proposals had failed to pass.23 Passage of the loan office and stay laws did not bring about a cessation of hostilities. The rival factions continued to compete in holding meetings, passing resolutions of approbation or contempt, and engaging in direct action calculated to strengthen or destroy the program. Antirelief partisans issued a declaration of principles in the form of a series of toasts offered at a dinner given at Franklin on July 14 for the representatives who had voted against the loan office bill. They charged supporters of the relief program with immorality and political dishonesty, and characterized relief laws as "useful only to procrastinate the downfall of the idle and extravagant, at the expense of the industrious and economical." 24 Other toasts attacked the legislative majority as "rag barons," who could now "sail through Missouri with impunity." Hamilton R. Gamble struck a revealing note when he placed his reliance on the judiciary, who would "never shrink from the duty imposed upon them by the establishment of the loan office — declaring it unconstitutional." 25 Opposition to the relief measures soon took more tangible form, as shown by an advertisement appearing in the Missouri Intelligencer of August 7, 1821, announcing that Robert S. Barr, Augustus Kerr, William Lamme, Robert Hood, and John Gaw, all merchants of Franklin, had determined not to receive the

L E G I S L A T I V E R E L I E F IN T H E 1820'S

7

paper of the loan office in payment for any article in their stores, at any rate of discount whatever. Thomas Willis, barber, proclaimed in the same issue of the Intelligencer that loan office money would damage his profession, and that he would not " . . . shave it, or the holder of it, on any terms whatever." Much of the criticism was directed against the loan office as a bank which would oppress the populace and drive gold and silver out of the state. Duff Green answered these arguments from critical constituents in the following manner: . . . with me it was not a question of silver or paper — but shall the sheriff take paper, or axes, ploughs and hoes in payment of taxes? It was not a question of good or bad currency — but currency or no currency. It is admitted by all that our gold and silver is daily leaving us, and I believe that paper is the best substitute. The loan office is very simple in its operations. Very different from a bank — no one man can swallow up the whole — it is to be divided among the people — they are now in distress, and the state as a kind friend proffers her credit to her citizens, until by the produce of their farms they can pay their taxes and their debts.26 Support of Green's faith in the efficacy of state action and the expediency of the laws passed at the special session was in evidence at a "large and respectable concourse" which gathered at the Franklin hotel on July 28 to honor those voting for the relief bills. The loan office was toasted as "the legitimate daughter of the Constitution," who would bless those who cursed her, relieve the oppressed, and block the avenues of ruin. Her virtues, it was asserted, would force her credit even among her enemies. One man hoped that the merchants who had drained Missouri of specie would soon be drained out of the state themselves. Another saluted the farmers who understood their interests too well to be governed by a faction of merchants. Relief was declared to be destructive only to those who profited by general distress.27 The controversy continued in the same vein for the duration of the relief experiment. Those who felt their economic interests to be furthered by the relief measures lauded the legislature for giving expression to the changing will of the majority, and saw it as the protector of the people against predatory interests.

δ

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Lawyers, merchants, courts, and men of wealth were portrayed as oppressors and enemies of the public welfare. The opposition accepted the gage of battle as it was handed to them, placing their reliance on the right of judicial review, the sanctity of contracts, and the disinterested fairness of judges. They attacked members of the relief party as speculators, demagogues, and men of no property who had subverted the legislature to their own evil ends. "A Mechanic" of Franklin informed the public through the Missouri Intelligencer that he did not care if loan office money would not buy fine broadcloth imported from England. He believed that mechanics and farmers could use it, and that the two groups combined could put down the merchants. He had never been employed as a carpenter by the Franklin merchants, and he cared not whether they stayed in the country. State paper would serve for taxes, and if it would buy the necessaries of life within the state, simple farmers and mechanics could do without imported "gewgaws." 28 A farmer correspondent of the Intelligencer was indignant about merchants who advertised in newspapers that they would not take state paper for goods. Their learned arguments about constitutionality were impressive, but he believed that the constitution they were most familiar with was self-interest. He had been nearly ruined every year because Franklin merchants would not buy his produce, insisting instead that he take it to New Orleans. Once arrived at that place he would find the bells ringing every night, announcing deaths from fever, plague, and smallpox, and the shores lined with produce from Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas, as well as Missouri. On one occasion, afraid of dying and worried about his young wife and small children at home, he had found a Franklin merchant who "as a matter of great favor" agreed to buy his load of pork and tobacco for less than it had cost to take it down the river, and he had been obliged to take the merchant's word in lieu of payment. Thus it was no wonder that the Missouri merchant would not accept loan office paper; he preferred to keep the farmer at his mercy.29

LEGISLATIVE R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

9

"G" defended the loan office certificates against rag money charges, asserting that unlike the notes of specie-paying banks, they did not depend upon a sum of silver dollars " . . . liable to be stolen by bank directors or thieves," or upon the punctuality of large debtors like the notes of the Bank of the United States, but depended upon real estate of the value of twice the amount borrowed. 30 Another "Farmer" charged that those in the legislature who had opposed the relief measures adopted had favored instead a specie-paying bank at St. Louis, operating on $500,000 borrowed by the state. If this plan had succeeded, they could have appointed some St. Louis gentlemen as directors, who would then have borrowed all the money and ruined the bank. 31 The writer wondered why the legislature was so abused, when they had come to the rescue of the people with a paper currency that could be used to pay judges, lawyers, and taxes. The loan office would do no harm, even if it failed of its purpose. It was no bank; belonging to the directors, it belonged to the people, "to the poor man who ploughs his field, as well as to the fine pert lawyer in his ruffle shirt." 32 Opponents of the relief program continued to heap scorn upon its supporters. "A Friend to Justice" of Franklin admitted that there were citizens whose situation proclaimed the want of relief, but there was no reason why the solid part of the community, "on which the support of government, the improvement of the country, and the existence of the body politic essentially depend" should consent to accept trash merely to support "the tottering bankrupt, or the idle and extravagant rake." 33 Further he cited the melancholy examples of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio, whose legislatures had been so generous in supplying the country with rags through the chartering of independent banks. Was not the legislature of Missouri pursuing the same path? He was afraid that the spirit of relief, "that tender regard for the peace and comfort of the citizen, that willingness to supply every man with the means of discharging his debts," was too conspicuous. The deplorable effect of interfering with the legal obligations of contracts would be individual and political bankruptcy. 34

10

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

The first electoral test of the relief question in the state occurred in Howard County, where an election was held in October, 1821, to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. Other issues remained in the background as the candidates and their supporters belabored the loan office question. Philip Trammell was the prorelief candidate, and George Tompkins, a Franklin lawyer, his principal opponent. A third aspirant for the office, a Colonel Campbell, relied upon ambiguity, and played a negligible role in the canvass. As this test of sentiment was held in the bailiwick of the bellwether of the relief flock, Duff Green, it was to be expected that he would play a prominent part in the campaign. As Trammell's most articulate supporter, Green carried off all the honors in the war of words with Tompkins, with considerable assistance from the latter, who foolishly proclaimed himself the champion of respectability and talents. 30 Green, thinly disguised as "A Voter," asked the readers of the Intelligencer to regard the folly of a man who abused the common people while at the same time asking for their votes. He was sure that Mr. Tompkins would be happier in England, where wealth, talents, and influence were all-important. 36 "A Friend to Truth" countered Green's thrusts by remarking that certain "plain Republicans" and "Farmer's friends" had formerly taken no notice of the farmer, except to bid up prices against him at land sales. But now that the drama was over, and their dreams of riches fading, they had suddenly turned "mighty dear friends" of the plain farmer. 37 "Ploughman" was grateful that the General Assembly, as guardians of the community, had determined to use the credit of the state for the relief of the individuals composing the community, though he feared that the maximum of $200,000 in loan office certificates was insufficient.38 Another prorelief correspondent of the Franklin newspaper charged that candidate Tompkins was " . . . an illiberal person — who would put the weak and unfortunate at the mercy of the wide world . . . [to] become wandering mendicants." 39 Under the lash of this type of criticism, Tompkins answered

L E G I S L A T I V E R E L I E F IN T H E

1820'S

11

that he was "pinched with the hard hand of poverty" himself, though he had no towns to make, nor debts to shift to the public. 4 0 A bit of execrable, though probably effective, verse was published to sum up the arguments of the Trammell-Green forces in the final days before the election. To be sung to the tune of "Yankee Doodle," it ridiculed the opposition as follows: What glorious privilege we have To chuse the men to rule us; What dolts and blockheads we should be To let the lawyers fool us. Chorus: Sing Yankee Doodle, that good tune Republicans delight in; It suits to rally honest men In voting or in fighting. When lawyers and tape sellers join To raise a mighty pother Their interest they most likely join To trample down some other. I am a farmer firm and free Who ne'er read Coke or Chitty; Nor, simpering made a counter bow To lure the young and pretty. I have To I have To

no hundreds in my trunk brag or make a boast of; no goods on credit bought deal and make the most of.

What then — a man may honest be Tho' poverty ensnare him; A man may take a neighbour's part Yet have no da-d to spare him. Those bloated 'ristocrats of wealth Who pride themselves on money, Do little for the publick good As drones in making honey. Some few will vote for great Sir George, And some for Colonel Campbell; But I, and all the Farmers round, Will vote for FARMER T R A M M E L L . «

12

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

The result of the special election was a substantial victory for the relief forces, Trammell receiving five hundred forty-eight votes, or 46.2 per cent of the total cast, as against four hundred forty-nine for Tompkins, 37.9 per cent of the total. Ninety-three of Colonel Campbell's one hundred sixty-nine votes were obtained in his home town of Chariton, otherwise strong loan office territory, so it seems likely that his candidacy damaged Trammell more than it did the antirelief candidate. The town of Franklin, stronghold of the "lawyers and tape-sellers," gave Tompkins two hundred eight votes, Trammell one hundred twelve, and Campbell none. 42 With this victory to encourage them, the legislative majority continued their efforts to improve the Missouri economy. Governor McNair urged the Assembly to act vigorously in the face of the continuing financial emergency. He felt that the loan office plan had not been in operation long enough for a judgment of its efficacy, but he was certain that something needed to be done to increase public confidence in the certificates.43 There was considerable public agreement with McNair's point of view as the work of the second session of the General Assembly began. Newspaper editorials and citizens' petitions from various sections of the state urged increased amounts of loan office certificates and a new stay law of more general application and a minimum valuation provision.44 Despite this wide popular support, the relief forces were not successful in obtaining an increase in the amount of state paper authorized. Several measures were passed, however, to encourage maximum use of the $200,000 already provided for. One law directed that $50,000 in loan office paper should be deposited in the Treasury for the redemption of Auditor's Warrants. 45 Until December, 1821, the loan office plan had been designed to promote the general welfare through small loans to a large number of individuals, thus furnishing direct relief to borrowers and aiding the entire community by an increased circulation of currency. It was hoped that the increased flow of money would stimulate enterprise and pump life into the ailing economy. A new principle was introduced when the legislature author-

LEGISLATIVE R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

13

ized a loan of $50,000 in loan office certificates to Neziah Bliss for the establishment of an iron works. This large loan to a single individual was justified by the legislators as a means of promoting the welfare and prosperity of the state through the encouragement of individual enterprise. 46 Missourians had long been galled by the necessity of importing iron at high prices when the state abounded with it. If Bliss could produce an adequate supply of cheap iron, one of the elements of Missouri's unfavorable trade balance would be removed. In addition, the iron works would employ labor, circulate loan office paper, and stimulate industry generally. The various restrictive and regulatory provisions of the act made it clear that the public rather than Neziah Bliss was regarded as the chief beneficiary. Other individuals were granted loans in excess of $1000 at the same session of the legislature, always with the promotion of public welfare as the stated object. 47 The climax of the relief program was reached with the passage of a stay law with a minimum valuation proviso. Under the terms of this act, which nearly satisfied the most radical relief men, the creditor was given the option of accepting property at two thirds of its appraised value or being faced with a stay of execution for two and one-half years. Three property valuers for each township were to be appointed by the county courts.48 This assured the debtor that his property would not be sacrificed at ruinous prices at sheriff's sales as had so often been the case before. 49 With the passage of this legislation at the session of 1821-22, the high-water mark of the relief party was reached. The battle was fought largely in the courts after that time, and was a losing one for the farmer-debtor group. The destruction of the program, begun by some merchants who had refused to accept state paper for goods, was completed by the judges. An early and famous decision affecting the loan office was rendered by Judge Nathaniel Beverley Tucker in the St. Louis Circuit Court, February 18, 1822. In the case of Missouri v. William Carr Lane, Judge Tucker declared the loan office act unconstitutional on the grounds that the certificates were bills of

14

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

credit in contravention of the Federal Constitution. In a long and partisan summary of the course of relief legislation, he attacked the doctrine of the supremacy of the changing will of the majority as a fraud perpetrated by persons who did not believe it themselves, but hoped to be believed by weaker men. Judge Tucker considered the loan office law to be " . . . factional, mischievous, subversive of property rights, and unconstitutional in letter and spirit." 60 A similar decision was handed down by Judge Rufus Pettibone in the circuit court of St. Charles County during the July term of 1822. In this case, Fulkerson v. Devore, the sheriff of St. Charles County had refused to accept loan office certificates in payment of costs connected with the collection of a debt. Pettibone's opinion was largely an elaborate denial of the widely current charges of judicial usurpation. 51 The relief party was naturally bitter about these adverse decisions. One correspondent of the Missouri Intelligencer could not comprehend Judge Tucker's quoting from Alexander Hamilton in preference to any other "authority." He felt that if Hamilton's "acknowledged anti-Republican principles [were] to be the guide of our judiciary, it had been better that Burr had never killed him." The writer considered it high treason for an officer acting for the majority to declare hostility to its acts, for it was a maxim in all free countries that the majority could never do wrong. 52 Other correspondents took up the cudgels for the courts. "A Friend to Order" asserted that the representative form of government was not constituted to give expression to the will of the majority, but for the purpose of avoiding "those fits of frenzy and madness." "A Voter" hoped that the next legislature would be composed of men of "property and connexions." 53 The unfavorable court decisions in some sections of the state had the effect of accelerating the depreciation of loan office certificates that had begun shortly after their first emission. Friends of the loan office contended that certain merchants had forced the certificates down originally for the purpose of speculation, since paper acquired at large discounts could be cashed at

LEGISLATIVE R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

15

par at maturity. 54 After the adverse decisions of the various circuit courts, the possibility of eventual repudiation by the state became a factor, and the resulting general loss of confidence tended to discredit the entire relief program, even with those who had originally supported it. The confused state of affairs was remarked upon by Governor McNair in his message delivered at the opening of the second General Assembly on November 4, 1822. Since some judges had declared them unconstitutional and others had not, the relief laws were treated as nullities in parts of the state and enforced elsewhere. The governor had noted the beginnings of economic revival during the past year, and felt that the worst was over for Missouri. He hoped that legislative interference would soon be extended to the subject in such a way as to produce a uniformity of judicial decisions.55 This ambiguous statement was actually a call for the repeal of the relief program, and was so understood by the legislature, which repealed the stay law and acted to suppress the further emission of loan office certificates within three weeks.56 This action of the legislature marked the practical end of the relief experiment in Missouri, though the attempts of borrowers of loan office certificates to avoid repayment caused considerable litigation for several years and afforded opportunities for the judiciary to record its stern opposition to such heretical and dangerous follies. In the case of Mansker, Graves, and Simpkins v. the State, the Missouri supreme court ruled unanimously in 1824 that the loan office act was unconstitutional, but decided by a vote of two to one that debtors to the state under the act were liable for the full amounts borrowed. 57 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Matthias McGirk argued that permitting the state to recover would enable her thereafter to flood the country with bills of credit and to impose upon the people, from time to time, a system of "jobbing and shaving" which would tend to the creation of " . . . a sort of money nobility without the pain of useful toil at the expense of the unprotected multitude." 58 As the chief justice saw it, his colleagues were endorsing a mercantile philosophy which would

16

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

not discourage future experimentation with the currency. McGirk's viewpoint, while it was supported by a professed concern for the general welfare, was probably more popular with those who owed the state than with the "unprotected multitude." The majority position on this question was reasserted in 1826, when in the case of Loper v. the State, the court ruled that borrowers of loan office certificates were liable to pay, despite the unconstitutionality of the loan office law. Justice George Tompkins delivered the majority opinion, Chief Justice McGirk again dissenting. Tompkins refuted the idea that a ruling against the state would discourage future legislative adventures, arguing that it would instead leave the way open for powerful parties in the legislature to emit loan certificates to be borrowed by themselves and friends, secure in the knowledge that they would never be forced to repay them. Let the borrowers pay, and they would be more cautious of borrowing in the future.59 Whether one regards the relief program as primarily a scheme of speculators and large landholders to further their private interests, or as a sincere experiment in the interest of the general welfare, it is clear that there was considerable popular sentiment for state action to relieve the distress of the times, and that much of the opposition was directed at the particular measures adopted, rather than at the principle of legislative relief. Like their kinsmen and neighbors in other western and southern states, Missourians regarded the nearly complete absence of a circulating medium as an occasion for action by the state government.60 Kentucky, for example, the native state of so many Missourians, created the Bank of the Commonwealth in 1820 to deal with the crisis in the economy. This organization, operating on a grand scale and without specie reserves, issued $2,300,000 in notes and loaned $2,400,000 during its first year.81 It is obvious that these westerners had little respect for the workings of "immutable" economic forces. For the duration of the relief controversy in Missouri, the opposing groups waged a sort of class warfare which appears to be significantly related to the rise of Jacksonian Democracy. As has been shown, prorelief arguments were directed at farmers,

LEGISLATIVE R E L I E F IN THE 1820'S

17

debtors, and "poor men" generally. Their opponents were portrayed as enemies of the people who desired to control public affairs for the benefit of a privileged class. Antirelief writers and orators defended respectability, knowledge and property rights, and inveighed against the thieving conspiracy of profligates, wastrels, and dregs of society. Neither group feared government per se, but merely desired that it should operate to their advantage. Farmers distrusted lawyers, merchants, and judges. The last were particularly suspect, as they were usually men of superior education and wealth who were protected in their favored positions by life tenure. 62 It is probable that a majority of those favoring the relief measures were later identified with the Jackson group in Missouri.63 Supporters of the loan office plan did not necessarily favor banks generally. The loan office was not the kind of bank the ordinary farmer hated, because he regarded it as his own.64 As property of the state it was the property of the people, and there seemed to be no way that it could be manipulated to the advantage of a few wealthy directors. It is not the purpose of this writer to pass judgment upon the wisdom or constitutionality of the action of the state in the crisis of 1821. But it is necessary to say that a majority of the legislature, at the behest of their constituents, saw fit to use the powers of government to intervene in the economic affairs of the community to promote the general welfare. Officeholders, merchants, and creditors, believing that their financial security was threatened, and following the common tendency to identify their personal interests with those of the public, stubbornly defied the action of the majority, and from their strategic positions destroyed any chance that the relief program might improve the situation. This resistance, backed by court decisions and accompanied by the beginnings of economic revival, reduced the supporters of relief to a minority. So effective was the opposition, and so lasting was the memory of the loan office "rags," that no similar relief propositions ever received serious consideration during subsequent depressions in Missouri.

II T H E BANK OF T H E STATE OF MISSOURI HOUGH the framers of Missouri's first constitution granted generally broad powers to the legislature, their liberality did not extend to the subject of banking. An unhappy experience with the Bank of St. Louis, chartered during the territorial period, had made Missourians wary of privately controlled banking corporations.1 Thus the constitution provided that the General Assembly might incorporate one banking company, and no more, to be in operation at one time. The bank might have not more than five branches, only one of which could be established at any single session of the legislature. At least one half of the capital stock was to be owned by the state, and the issue was limited to $5,000,000.2 In limiting Missouri to a single bank with a large degree of state operation and control, the constitutional convention wished to check not banks, but irresponsible banking associations. It was desired also to obtain for the public a share of the profits to be made by any bank that the legislature might create.3 The banking article may seem somewhat paradoxical if one believes that limitations on the chartering power of the legislature were always evidence of a fear of too much government. Though the legislature could create only one bank, the state, through its ownership of stock, would always be in a position to direct bank policy in the public interest. It was not the General Assembly that was to be feared, but banking corporations not subject to the controlling hand of the state. When the Bank of Missouri, a private corporation operating

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

19

under a territorial charter, was forced to close in 1821, there was considerable sentiment in St. Louis and elsewhere for the chartering of a bank as a means of relieving the depression.4 This movement was overcome by the broader appeal of the loan office plan, and little was heard of state banks in Missouri for the next decade.5 St. Louis and the state had to depend upon forwarding houses and private banks until the Branch Bank of the United States opened in St. Louis in 1829. There was no demand for state legislation until President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill for renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States in the summer of 1832.® After the veto, the state bank question became entangled with national politics. Governor John Miller, a Jackson supporter, in his message to the General Assembly in November, 1832, rather cautiously advocated the establishment of a state bank. He felt that such an institution would be ideal for the investment of state funds, because the legislature could exercise direct control over it. In contrast, the immense money power of the Bank of the United States was destructive of the sovereignty of the states, and its charter took from Congress the power to create competing institutions. In the event of an emergency, it was not bound to aid, or lend to, the government. Governor Miller thought that a bank should be an instrument of public policy.7 There was considerable confusion and complexity in the attitudes of Missourians toward the establishment of a state bank during the hectic days of Jackson's second administration. There were many shades of opinion, often reflecting the influence of related political issues rather than a clearcut advocacy of or opposition to a moneyed institution established by the state. The Missouri Intelligencer, one of the outstanding country newspapers in the state, and an ardent friend of the Bank of the United States, attacked the state bank idea as a fraud being pressed on the people by the "collar-presses" of the state.8 William Jewell, a candidate for the state senate from Boone County in 1834, favored a protective tariff, internal improvements by the general government, recharter of the United States Bank, and

20

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

opposed the establishment of a state bank. 9 "Alpha Beota," in a letter to the Intelligencer, supported the Bank of the United States warmly, and was irked by the inconsistency of men who, "holding to the principles of the god-father," had maintained that the government was intended to be a hard money government, but who were now so enthusiastic for a state bank. 10 These opponents of state banking were not hostile to governmental intervention in the economy, as their positions on other issues makes clear. They feared the state bank idea because it appeared to be a factor in the destruction of the Bank of the United States. Another type of opposition was represented by Governor Daniel Dunklin, a staunch supporter of Andrew Jackson, who stated his position in his first biennial address to the General Assembly in 1834. He was opposed to the entire system of paper money as inexpedient and destructive to the permanent interests of the community, and regarded bank notes, whether issued by banks directly under the management and control of the state, or by chartered banks not managed by the state, as bills of credit and therefore unconstitutional. 11 In an open letter to a newspaper, Dunklin admitted, rather inconsistently, that safe banking was possible in wealthy, populous states, and that such states might find banks desirable. This, of course, eliminated Missouri.12 Dunklin's essentially hard money views were shared by a large number of the people of rural Missouri at this time. A correspondent of the Missouri Republican wrote that country people had been taught to believe that all banks were aristocratic monopolies created for the purpose of making the rich richer and the poor poorer. It was known that the most influential men in the state had fostered the hard money sentiment. 13 Conspicuous for their advocacy of state bank legislation were most of the merchants of St. Louis. A division of opinion existed within this group upon the question of supporting the Bank of the United States, with a majority favoring it, but they were united in their recognition of the need for an adequate circulating medium. As a result of their stand, rural distrust of the merchants, so evident in the relief agitation of 1821, played a prominent role

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

21

in the discussion of the bank question in the thirties. The Republican found it necessary to defend state bank proposals against charges by the Fayette Western Monitor that they were schemes to enrich St. Louis merchants and oppress the rest of the state.14 State bank advocates made a strong bid to get favorable legislation through the General Assembly in the session of 1834— 35. In the Senate, the ideas of Governor Dunklin and his rural supporters prevailed, and a bill was passed providing for a bank without note issue rights, to be exclusively owned and controlled by the state. 15 Bank supporters in the lower house, being unable to agree upon a single type of institution, engaged in wrangling in the special committee to consider a bank bill, with the result that the committee reported against the establishment of a bank. The Senate bill was rejected summarily by the House, and the legislature adjourned without a bank having been created. 16 According to the Missouri Intelligencer, there were three distinct parties in the legislature on the bank question. One party opposed any bank whatever; a second favored a bank in which the state should own one half of the stock; and a third favored a bank owned and controlled by the state entirely. The third group insisted that the great profits to be derived from banking should go entirely to the state rather than to a few rich and favored individuals. The Intelligencer remarked that the second party opposed the third because individuals would not be benefited, and that the first group opposed both. 17 James H. Birch, senator from Howard County, reported that the select committee studying the question considered that since bank profits were in the nature of a tax on the people they should accrue to the state. An institution owned entirely by the state would command more respect and popular support than one belonging even partially to individuals. Birch pointed out that the notes of the latter type of bank had often been depreciated purposely by directors who had then gone into the market privately and bought them at a large discount. 18 It was evident even before the legislature adjourned in 1835 that support for a state bank was increasing throughout the

22

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

state. Nathaniel Patten, the pro-United States Bank editor of the Missouri Intelligencer, remarked that he had always opposed state banks, beginning with the loan office, and still believed them to be attended with great evils, but he was beginning to realize that an inadequate currency would be a greater evil. He was afraid many of Missouri's best citizens would remove to states where industry was encouraged by a profuse circulation of money. The state was already in such distress that men of considerable property could not pay the most trifling debts. 19 The Boonville Herald urged voters to meet at their regular polling places for the purpose of petitioning the governor to convene the legislature. Public sentiment, according to the Herald, had undergone a radical change since the regular session. Representatives from Cooper County, who had voted against a state bank, would now support one with the approbation of their constituents. An "appalling cloud of COMMERCIAL VASSALAGE" was fast closing in and the state must act or commit economic suicide.20 Newspaper concern with the bank issue continued and increased through 1835 and 1836. In August, 1836, the Democratic Missouri Argus reported that every Democratic paper in the state except the Jeffersonian Republican favored a state bank. According to the Argus, such Democratic opposition as existed was based largely on fear that Whigs might gain economic and political advantage through its operations. 21 Despite'indications that Whigs had shown an illiberal inclination to favor a type of bank which would be particularly beneficial to Whigs, the Argus felt that it was still the patriotic duty of Democrats to support the creation of a bank in the interests of the whole people. Without a bank, St. Louis merchants, rural tobacco growers and general farmers were certain to fail. The editor contended that "Government was instituted to benefit, not ruin communities, . . . the very object of the social compact is the good, the prosperity, of the governed." 22 Another editor, noting that prejudice in Missouri against banking was passing away, ascribed the state's "nearly stationary" economic condition to the absence of a state bank. How could

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

23

the "great work of Internal Improvement" be carried forward without capital? 23 The Democratic candidate for governor in 1836, Lilburn W. Boggs, announced that "after much anxious reflection" he had concluded that "a well restricted, and well organized specie paying state bank — with sufficient capital — issuing no note under the denomination of Twenty Dollars" was necessary to enterprise of every description. The state must have a voice in the management at least in proportion to the amount of its stock. Boggs admitted that monopolies in general were not in accord with the spirit of republicanism, but he felt that the interests of the people had become so intermingled with the banking system that to persist without a state bank would be ruinous. 24 The rather apologetic arguments of most probank Democrats show an awareness of considerable lingering antibank feeling in the state. It is noteworthy that the method used to reassure the reluctant was to emphasize state ownership of stock, state control, restrictions on note issue, and other arguments calculated to demonstrate that the state, as the friend and protector of the people, would always keep a guiding hand on the helm. When the ninth General Assembly convened on November 22, 1836, Governor Boggs again urged the creation of a "sound, well-restricted, and specie paying" state bank. He knew there was a great prejudice among many well-informed citizens against "any and every species of paper money," which made it desirable that the bank charter should be so framed as to conciliate all classes of society. The proper kind of bank would insure to farmers and mechanics just rewards for their labor, and "infuse a healthful vigor into all the larger operations of the commercial community." Boggs thought there should be a provision in the charter requiring the bank to lend up to $5,000,000 to the state, for the purpose of " . . . enabling the state to aid her citizens in the prosecution of such objects of internal improvement as may be calculated to promote the general welfare." 25 As at the previous session of the legislature, there were three principal contending parties on the bank question. One group, composed generally of Democratic friends of the bank, favored

24

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

an equal division of stock between the state and individual stockholders, reserving to the state a majority of the directors. Most of the Whig members, in deference to the constitutional limitation, supported equal division of the stock with a preponderance in the directory given to private stockholders. A third group, which opposed a state bank on any terms, was composed largely of Democrats supported by a few die-hard Whig friends of the Bank of the United States.26 The bank bill that was finally reported out of committee was the result of agreement between the first two groups. Just as it seemed that the bill would be wrecked on the same rock that had broken it at the previous legislative session, the Whigs yielded on the question of control in the directory. A charter was then drawn up which provided that stock should be owned equally by the state and individuals, the state to have a majority in the directory.27 The principal architect of the bank charter, Democrat James B. Bowlin of St. Louis, was hard pressed to defend the measure against his party colleagues after it reached the floor of the House. Representative William Monroe of Morgan County introduced an amendment providing that three fifths of the stock should be reserved to the state. According to the editor of the Argus, Monroe preferred an "entire State Bank," but believed that his amendment was the nearest approach to the ideal that had a chance of passing. Before there was time for discussion of Monroe's amendment, John C. Edwards of Cole County moved that four fifths be substituted for three fifths in the Monroe amendment. 28 Bowlin was dismayed at these proposals. It was obvious that he had obtained Whig support for the bill by promising that no concessions would be made on the question of stock ownership. He argued that the amendments, intended to placate the "nobank" party, would accomplish nothing except the alienation of the "large and respectable minority" whose support he had been at such pains to obtain. The charter as it stood was the best possible, because a majority of the directory was to be chosen by the immediate representatives of the people. Such a bank would inspire general confidence and respect. It was also necessary to

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

25

the success of the institution that it command the friendship of the mercantile community. Bowlin believed that this friendship was contingent upon the even division of ownership between the state and individuals.29 Many of the legislators who eventually supported the Bowlin position were reluctant to relinquish their stand for maximum state ownership and control. Abel R. Corbin, editor of the Missouri Argus, though not a member of the General Assembly was in Jefferson City for most of the session, and used the columns of his newspaper to disseminate the ideas of this group. As Corbin saw it, bank profits were taken from the people and should be returned to them. Why should one half be turned over to stock-jobbers to support them in idleness? He scorned the feeble argument that private stockholders managed better than persons less interested. The interest that good men had in commercial prosperity and the general welfare was sufficient guarantee of their diligence. Nonstockholding managers should be even more responsible since they would not be tempted to manipulate the money market by sudden expansions and contractions of loans for the purpose of embarrassing business men and compelling them to pay high rates of exchange. Directors appointed by the state, who were also merchants, would be interested only in a safe bank and a stable money market.30 Corbin wanted to make certain that a majority of the directors were appointed by the legislature, for it was obvious that "a majority of directors should agree with a majority of the people." The "federalists" (Whigs), comprising the wealthiest classes in the community, would undoubtedly subscribe for most of the stock available, and would thus control the private directors. Hence, no Whigs should be appointed by the state. The Democratic editor agreed that these views might seem illiberal to some, but how else could the currency be kept out of the hands of the aristocracy? 31 At the time of the final defeat of the Monroe, or three-fifths, amendment Representative Jameson of Callaway County, who had originally favored a "pure" state bank, announced that he was reconciled to a mixed bank as proposed by the Bowlin Com-

26

MISSOURI, 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 6 0

mittee. State preponderance in the directory was enough. He now believed that most of the arguments against individual stock ownership applied to the Bank of the United States, rather than to a properly controlled state bank.32 The capitulation of such men as Jameson marked the end of effective opposition to the Bowlin charter, which was then passed by both houses and approved by Governor Boggs on February 2, 1837.33 This long and detailed document reflected the desire of the legislature to guarantee that the state would always keep firm control of the bank and its policies. The authorized capital was $5,000,000, to be divided into one-hundred-dollar shares. One half of the stock was reserved to the state, and one half was to be sold to individuals. The seminary, saline, and 3 per cent funds held by the state treasury, amounting to about $150,000, were to be invested in the bank, to be supplemented when necessary by the sale of state bonds. Thus it was apparent that state credit was to be the principal bulwark of the bank.34 Management of the institution was placed in the hands of a president and twelve directors. The president and six board members representing the state were to be elected for two-year terms at joint sessions of the General Assembly. Directors representing the private stockholders were to be elected at St. Louis for one-year terms, each stockholder being entitled to one vote for each share owned. Bank officers and board members could not be officers of the state or of the United States, nor could they hold an official position in any other banking institution. Directors must be citizens of Missouri and the United States.35 Powers granted to the bank included the right to issue notes, deal in bills of exchange, checks, and drafts, and receive public and private deposits. Notes of the bank were payable on demand in gold or silver. As long as specie payments were maintained, state funds were to be kept on deposit, and the notes were to be accepted for all payments due to the state. For the first five years circulation was not to exceed the amount of capital stock; thereafter, the directors were authorized to double the note issue if they thought it expedient. Subject to the provision that notes

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

27

smaller than ten dollars could not be issued, the directors were empowered to determine the proportion of the various denominations to be put into circulation.36 The bank was expected to render service to the state in many ways. It was to act as fiscal agent for the state, negotiate all state loans without charge, and transfer state funds upon request to any of its branches. It was not required, however, to lend money to the state, as Governor Boggs had recommended. 37 Interest rates were strictly regulated in the charter. The maximum rate on one-hundred-twenty-day commercial paper was limited to 6 per cent per annum, on four-to-six-months paper to 7 per cent, and on commercial loans for over six months to 8 per cent. These rates were not subject to revision by the directors, and any director, officer, or agent of the bank who loaned private funds at higher rates than those prescribed for the bank was to be dismissed immediately. 38 Farm and other real estate loans were virtually proscribed by the charter. The interest rate was 8 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, with 20 per cent of the principal to be repaid each year. 39 Farmers were to derive their principal advantage from the stable currency created by the bank, as the loan function was to be of chief service to the commercial community. Farmers were also reminded that bank profits accruing to the state would mean lower taxes on real estate. 40 In framing the charter, the legislators had taken care to provide that the affairs of the bank would come frequently under the close scrutiny of the elected officers of the state and that the people would be kept informed. Twice each year a detailed expense account was to be submitted to the governor, and a descriptive list of all accounts except those of private individuals was to be published in at least two Missouri newspapers. Either house of the legislature might demand an investigation of the bank at any time, and a committee appointed by the governor was to audit the books and submit a report to the General Assembly at the beginning of each session. In addition, condensed statements had to be submitted to the state auditor each quarter. 41 With these provisions for careful supervision by the legislative

28

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

and executive branches of the government, it was expected that any violations of the charter would be detected immediately. If a violation occurred, the legislature was to institute proceedings in a circuit court for revocation of the charter. To bring home the advisability of conservatism to the directors personally, the legislature provided that they were to be responsible to the extent of their financial resources if the bank failed as a result of an excessive issue of currency which they had approved. If for any reason the bank suspended specie payments, the governor was authorized to declare the charter forfeited. If not revoked for cause, the charter was to continue in effect for the next twenty years.42 Missouri's venture into mixed-enterprise banking was well received at first, especially in St. Louis. The Missouri Argus reported that the public was well pleased with the new bank, remarking that " . . . even the most rigid of the old-school bank men, and the most uncompromising of the anti-bank men, alike, see and appreciate the spirit of compromise that pervades the charter." 43 Certainly great care had been taken to allay the suspicions of the hard money group. Senator Thomas Hart Benton, "Old Bullion" himself, leading hard money advocate in Missouri and in the nation, was apparently satisfied with the charter of the Bank of the State of Missouri.44 Several of its provisions were consistent with his ideas, especially the clause forbidding the issuance of notes in denominations smaller than ten dollars.45 How could Benton, Bowlin, Corbin, and other leaders of the dominant Missouri Democracy reconcile their often-expressed antimonopoly views with the creation of a banking monopoly in which state control was paramount? There was actually no real paradox. Hard money, antimonopoly, no exclusive privileges to artificial beings, and other Democratic catchphrases were primarily expressions of opposition to economic domination by special interest minorities to the disadvantage of the majority. Their opposition to granting special privileges to the few was no bar to active state participation in economic affairs. Since banking was apparently necessary to the welfare of Missouri, they pre-

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

29

ferred it to be an instrument of state policy, controlled in the interests of all the people.46 If antimonopoly convictions did not preclude a state banking monopoly, neither did hard money views. If the state bank could create more currency, thereby raising prices and stimulating commerce, there could be no objection as long as the currency was safe, not subject to fluctuation, and could not be shaved. The state controlled directory would prevent shavers from taking charge. Hard money men did not believe in dear money; they objected primarily to the depreciation of paper money while in their possession. "Have you, gentlemen, ever been shaved?" asked a rural legislator during the debate on the bank bill. "If so, my word for it, you will never forget it the longest day you live. The first operation can be borne with, sir, but when they come to go over the old sore, Oh! ! sir, — I have been shaved and shaved and shaved." 47 Missouri's legislators, in debating the advisability of various proposed amendments to the bank charter, showed considerable acquaintance with the views of current and past authorities on money and banking. Representative John Jameson, in supporting an amendment limiting individual shareholders to a maximum of thirty votes for directors regardless of the number of shares owned, cited as his authority a report made to Congress by Alexander Hamilton in 1790. In opposing the Jameson proposal, Austin King remarked that Hamilton had been "overlaid by modern improvements" as the details of state bank charters recently granted abundantly proved.48 The charters of the Bank of South Carolina and the Bank of Tennessee were cited as precedents for paying salaries to the directors representing the state.49 Representative Martin Thomas of St. Louis read extracts from books by William Gouge and Albert Gallatin to support his advocacy of heavy investment by the bank in real-estate mortgages as a means of preventing currency fluctuation. In answer to Thomas, A. B. Chambers, a Whig who later became editor of the Missouri Republican, quoted Gouge as saying that real estate was more likely to fluctuate than other forms of property. Chambers thought it extremely odd that

30

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Thomas, a probank Democrat, should seek the assistance of a well-known enemy of state banks. 50 Thomas replied that he did not consider Gouge's writings to be fundamentally opposed to properly regulated banks. 51 Another opponent of investment in real estate, Representative Wright of Marion County, enlisted the aid of the Wealth of Nations, quoting Adam Smith as having said therein that every bank that had ever lent money on the security of fixed capital had eventually regretted the action.52 These and similar arguments advanced during the bank debates indicate that Missouri's lawmakers were familiar with and at times subscribed to the opinions of laissez-faire philosophers, but there appears to have been no consistent opposition to state action on theoretical grounds. Not only William Gouge and Adam Smith, but Nicholas Biddle and Alexander Hamilton were tailored to suit the occasion with equal facility and without apology by the contending factions. 53 The absence of an adequate currency and the widespread realization that a banking system was necessary to the economic development of the state were important factors in bringing about the creation of the Bank of the State of Missouri. Observation of unsuccessful experiences in other states, combined with the distasteful memory of her own previous banking ventures, contributed to making Missouri's state bank a sound, conservative institution. 54 The farmers of the state, comprising most of the population, unacquainted with the intricacies of private finance and distrustful of eastern commercial and financial interests, insisted upon state operation of the banking system.55 It is significant that state-owned institutions were popular in southern and western states at a time when decentralized free banking was becoming the rule elsewhere.58 This lends support to the conclusion that the people of comparatively undeveloped agricultural areas located at considerable distances from the financial centers of the country were especially inclined to rely upon their state governments to safeguard their economic interests against outside manipulation. In sanctioning and supporting statecontrolled financial institutions, they hoped to expand and stabi-

BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

31

lize their currency without having to make grants of financial and political power to great interests considered inimical to their own. If state investments proved profitable, resulting in decreased taxes upon land, farmers were twice fortunate.

III STATE POLICY TOWARD CORPORATIONS, 1820-1847

HE creation of the Bank of the State of Missouri as a chartered company in which the state entered into partnership with private investors was a prominent example of the use of the legislature's chartering power as an instrument of public policy. Though the state bank was the single instance in which the state invested its funds in a mixed-enterprise venture during the first forty years of statehood, the legislature was active in passing special acts of incorporation throughout the period. As was usual in the original constitutions of American states, Missouri's first body of organic law contained no reference to the process of incorporation, except for a restrictive article on banking. As it was generally recognized in America that the power to grant corporate privileges belonged to the lawmaking body, there was little need for an explicit provision on the subject.1 The absence of articles on incorporation in the basic laws of the older states undoubtedly influenced the Missouri convention, as its members drew heavily on earlier constitutions in writing the constitution of 1820.2 It is notable that the only constitutional limitation on the chartering power was the clause providing that one bank, and no more, could be incorporated by the General Assembly.3 The Bank of St. Louis, which had failed in a flurry of scandal and litigation, and the Bank of Missouri, still functioning but under heavy fire in 1820,4 had been the only corporations chartered by the territorial legislature that had not been strictly public in

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

33

nature. Of a total of twenty-five acts of incorporation from 1812 through 1819, twenty-two had created political units, and one a school.6 Thus, from the beginning, the incorporating function of the legislature was regarded in Missouri as a means of serving the public interest. Corporations, as agencies of government, existed for the furtherance of community purposes. The constitution definitely restricted the chartering power in the only area where experience showed that danger to society existed, when it provided that banking was to be a monopoly operated by an agency of the state. From 1820 until the great railroad and banking session of 1836-37, the General Assembly concentrated chiefly on the chartering of corporations of an obviously public nature, such as academies, schools, counties, and towns. Of the one hundred nineteen charters granted during this period, eighty-one were given to counties and towns, seventeen to academies and schools, six to manufacturing concerns, five to charitable and fraternal institutions, three to transportation companies, three to insurance firms, and four to miscellaneous organizations.6 Whatever the type of corporation, the charters granted give evidence of the state's intent to further community interests by incorporation for objects of definite advantage to the people.7 The preamble of an act incorporating John Mullanphy and others as the managers of the St. Louis Public Hospital in 1831 reveals that the legislature considered the charter a contribution to the relief of suffering humanity. The position of St. Louis was "such as to concentrate many of the good citizens of Missouri and strangers from other states," and as many of the strangers were likely to become sick and perhaps die, "an hospital for [their] gratuitous reception and accommodation" was desirable. Boatmen, raftsmen, and other river workers were to receive special consideration, presumably because of their importance to the commerce of St. Louis.8 In addition to private contributions to the public hospital, the state was to give money for its support, and the city of St. Louis was authorized to use all fines, forfeitures, and penalties from

34

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

gambling and bawdy houses for its maintenance. The charter further provided that the hospital, its premises, and its personal property should be permanently exempt from the payment of state, county, corporation, road, or poor taxes.9 Charters granted to manufacturing corporations in the early years of statehood give further evidence of the desire of the legislature to serve the public interest through special acts of incorporation. The first corporation of this nature was the Cape Girardeau Mill Company, created in December, 1826. This company was granted the usual corporate rights to sue and be sued, to purchase and retain lands and property, and to have and use a common seal. The interests of creditors and the public generally were protected by a provision that the stockholders were liable in their individual capacities for all debts of the corporation. Chief justification for the existence of the company was the provision that it should erect a mill at Cape Girardeau "on the point of rocks in the Mississippi River, commonly called the upper point, to manufacture good merchantable flour."10 Even more explicit was the seventh General Assembly, which demonstrated its belief in the social function of manufacturing companies when it incorporated the Clarksville Steam Mill Company and the Marion Steam Mill Company. The charter of the first could be altered or amended "as the good of the public, or the interests of the community" required, and whenever the company abused its privileges or failed to perform the objects for which the charter was granted, the legislature could repeal the act of incorporation. 11 The charter of the Marion Company was to continue as long as it "faithfully and beneficially fulfilled the objects of its creation." Failure to conform to those objects would result in alteration or repeal. 12 Similar social objectives were expressed in the acts creating insurance companies. First of these organizations in Missouri was the Missouri Insurance Company, chartered in 1831. The incorporation was declared to be a public act which was to be " . . . construed liberally for the beneficial purposes herein intended," and the corporation was to continue for as long as it should fulfil the objects of its creation. 13 The Marine Insurance Company,

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

35

chartered in 1835, received the state's blessing under similar terms.14 Corporations organized to facilitate transportation were likewise required to meet strict terms laid down by the state if they were to retain their charters. The Washington County Turnpike Company was created to build a road at least thirty-six feet wide, twenty-four feet of which was to be " . . . an artificial road, of that description known and called by the name of McAdamized road." At no place was the road to rise or fall more than five degrees from the horizontal. In the event that it was not completed from Caledonia in Washington County to the Mississippi River within ten years, all rights granted to the company were to revert to the state. 15 The process of incorporation by the General Assembly was apparently taken as a matter of course by the public prior to 1836. Newspapers generally noted the passage of acts of incorporation without editorial comment. In the legislature no attempt was made to classify corporations according to type. The public act provision included in the charters of the St. Louis and Marine insurance companies was also a prominent feature of the act creating the Flouring Mill Company of Hannibal. 16 Political, charitable, insurance, and manufacturing corporations were chartered as a matter of state policy to facilitate the growth, prosperity, and welfare of the community. The preponderance of political and educational charters granted and the apparently innocuous nature of the others served to minimize opposition to the charter policy of the legislature. As no interest considered itself injured by existing corporations, little or no evidence of public dissatisfaction appeared in the press. There was, of course, a very considerable body of antibank sentiment which occasionally found expression in attacks on corporations generally, but this feeling did not take the form of opposition to prevailing legislative practice. In the legislature, charter applications were usually handled quickly and with a minimum of opposition. Acts of incorporation, except for certain political charters, were passed as a matter of routine. Though the ayes and nays were often recorded on

36

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

matters such as legislative divorce grants, the journals of the General Assembly reveal no evidence of roll-call votes on corporation charters prior to 1836. It is probable that if important opposition had developed to manufacturing, insurance, and transportation charters, the journals would show some indication ef the struggle. 17 The modest pace at which the process of incorporation had been proceeding was accelerated considerably when the ninth General Assembly met in 1836. Governor Lilburn W. Boggs, in his message to the legislators, expressed the general sentiment that was to dominate the session. After noting with pride the state's rapid increase in population, rising property values, and great agricultural and mineral resources, he expressed the ardent hope that "judicious legislation" might cooperate in "extending and rendering beneficial the gifts of a bounteous Providence." 18 That the legislators agreed with the governor was soon made evident by their enthusiastic exercise of the chartering power. Despite the long debates on the type of state bank to be adopted, the General Assembly found time to grant eighty-nine charters of incorporation, more than the combined efforts of its six immediate predecessors had produced. 19 Political units played an unaccustomed minor role, accounting for only sixteen of the charters, with twenty-nine going to railways and turnpikes, fourteen to insurance companies, and six to manufacturing and mining companies. 20 Announced objectives of the state were essentially unchanged by the increased activity of the legislature. The St. Louis Gas Light Company was created for the purpose of lighting the city and furnishing the inhabitants thereof with gas and coal for fuel. This, the legislators believed, would be beneficial to the city of St. Louis " . . . and generally conducive to the public good." Liberal concessions in the charter included a monopoly of the vending of gas lights and gas fittings in St. Louis and suburbs, and exemption from all city, county and state taxes for ten years. 21 These privileges were important, but the ultimate beneficiary was to be the community, as the company was forbidden to charge more than one cent a cubic foot for gas and was required

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

37

to sell its entire holdings to the city at the expiration of twenty years, if the city chose to buy. Selling price was to be the current value of the business plus 7 per cent, the valuation to be determined by neutral arbitrators. In the event that the city did not exercise its option, it was to have another chance to purchase the business after five additional years, at the arbitrator's valuation plus 5 per cent. Nonpurchase at the end of the second period was then to have the effect of extending the act in full force for twenty-five more years.22 Eventual public ownership was also envisioned by the legislature when it chartered the Hannibal, Paris, and Grand River Railroad Company. This act gave the state the privilege of purchasing the entire stock of the company after forty years, at its current valuation. During the period of private ownership all books and records of the company were to be open to inspection by agents of the state. 23 Similar provisions for ultimate ownership by the state were included in the charters of the Louisiana and Columbia Railroad Company, 24 the Mine a la Motte and Mississippi Railroad Company, 25 the Monticello and La Grange Railroad Company,2® the Rocheport Railroad Company, 27 the St. Charles Railroad Company, 28 the St. Louis and Bellevue Mineral Railroad Company, 29 and the Southern Railroad Company. 30 The same general principle obtained in the charter of the Marion City and Missouri Railroad Company, and the terms were even more favorable to the state, which was given the right to purchase the road after forty years at original cost plus 25 per cent. If the road was not in good repair at the time of transfer, necessary repair costs were to be subtracted from the purchase price. 31 A roll-call vote taken in the House of Representatives on the passage of this act revealed only scattered opposition to the charter. Fifty-nine legislators favored the bill and twelve were opposed. An analysis of the vote shows only that most of the opposition was from thinly populated rural counties, generally a considerable distance from the proposed route of the railroad. While most of the dissenters were rural Democrats, the margin of

38

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

approval in a legislature composed largely of such men makes it obvious that a strong anticharter sentiment had not developed anywhere in Missouri.32 Turnpikes were also considered to be proper subjects for eventual state ownership. The Hannibal and New London Turnpike Company was required to relinquish its stock at the end of twenty years if the state so desired, at original cost plus 15 per cent. 33 In other turnpike charters, the terms of sale and the time guaranteed to private ownership varied in an inverse relationship. It was considered that longer enjoyment of corporate privileges by private stockholders should be balanced by a smaller payment by the state at the time of transfer. For example, the St. Louis and St. Charles Turnpike Company was granted forty years of grace before its stock could be purchased by the state, at a selling price of original cost plus 8 per cent, in contrast to the twenty years of private ownership and cost plus 15 per cent provisions of the Hannibal and New London Company. 34 The expanded charter policy which began with the ninth General Assembly called forth considerable editorial and general comment, though discussion of corporations still tended to center around the subject of banking rather than other types of incorporation. In his comments on the activities of the legislature at the close of the session in 1837, the editor of the St. Charles Clarion praised its liberality in granting corporate charters. He noted that in past years there had existed in the community "a kind of vague indefinite horror of corporations of all kinds," and a disposition to view them as dangerous institutions without regard to their objects, powers, or the nature of their charters. Demagogues had denounced corporations indiscriminately as monopolies with exclusive privileges, as "monsters without souls,"and as antirepublican institutions. The practice of frightening the ignorant and credulous by picturing chartered companies as "raw-head and bloody-bones" had been much dissipated by the past session of the General Assembly.35 According to this enthusiastic champion of the legislative policy, corporations for useful services, without exclusive privi-

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

39

leges or unnecessary powers and containing proper restrictions in their charters were as innocent as partnerships, and highly useful to the country. He conceded that evils had arisen from corporations in Europe, but there they had received their charters from kings who had given them improper powers. The danger lay in lack of restrictions, not in the principle of continual succession. All the necessary safeguards and inhibitions had been included in the charters granted during the past session, so there was nothing to fear and there were great things to hope for.38 The St. Charles editor was especially pleased that numerous insurance companies had been chartered over the state. Insurance on property had been extremely high and difficult to obtain in Missouri, and enterprising men had lost valuable mills and other property for want of it. Most costly of all had been insurance on boats and merchandise in transit, which had been handled by foreign agencies, resulting in a vast drain of money into distant states. The state's new insurance companies could combine with the railroads and turnpikes to increase the flow of trade and assure a healthy, growing, economy.37 Much of the insurance legislation of the ninth General Assembly had been introduced by James B. Bowlin, leader of the fight for the state bank charter. Bowlin informed the public through the Missouri Argus that he considered the insurance companies to be an essential part of the state's expanded economic program and that he rejoiced to see the liberal disposition manifested by the legislature toward their formation. Foreign agencies would now be forced to depart and the drain of currency to eastern states would be reduced.38 Expressions of opposition to the general charter policy of the legislature were quite rare during and for a few years after the prolific session of 1836-37. Anticorporation sentiments were in evidence, but for the most part, though expressed in general terms, they were attacks on national Whig policy rather than the state's charter program. "Nea-Ta-Wa," in a letter to the Jefferson Inquirer, attacked incorporated power as "dangerous monopoly," calculated to "destroy individual enterprise, enfeeble the exertions of the community, and place a dangerous engine in the hands of

40

MISSOURI,

1820-1860

the aristocratical few." The principles of Democracy were opposed to such institutions because they were dangerous to the liberties of the people, particularly to the honest farmer, the "bone and sinew of the land." After thus condemning all corporations to perdition, the writer revealed that his real target was the Whigs who were sniping at the Independent Treasury on behalf of the Bank of the United States. So far as Missouri was concerned, the future was all with her. Much legislation was required in a young state, and it was to be hoped that the next legislature would adopt a liberal and practical view toward propositions for internal improvement and related subjects.39 The Democratic members of the General Assembly, meeting with "numerous citizens of surrounding counties" in the Senate chamber at Jefferson City in February, 1839, set forth the party creed as follows: The Democratic party believes that the people are the true source of all power, and are its safest depository, and therefore, as much should at all times be retained to them as is consistent with the operations of government — that all their grants of power should be strictly construed — the maintainance of equal rights to all men — no exclusive privileges — no monopolies. Freedom of the press — freedom of thought and opinion — freedom and frequency of elections. . . It is against all wild and speculative constructions of the Constitution of the United States. It is therefore opposed to a National Bank — to protective tariffs — to constructive Internal Improvements, upon the principle that the people can better appropriate their own means then have it dragged from them by taxation, and then appropriated by Congress contrary to the spirit and letter of the constitution. . . It is against every tendency to consolidation of the States — it is in favor of the States being maintained in all their legitimate rights. 40

This declaration of party principles might be construed as a statement of laissez-faire philosophy, but it was primarily an attack on possible usurpations by the general government. The state government, safely in the hands of the people of Missouri, was not under fire when monopolies and "exclusive privileges" were denounced. When a Missouri Democrat at this period professed a horror of corporate charters, he was often thinking of the charter of the Bank of the United States. With his party well

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

41

entrenched at Jefferson City, the state government could be trusted to act in the interests of the people when it granted corporate powers to an organization. Thus the Democratic Missouri Argus, which had supported the extensive chartering activity of the ninth and tenth General Assemblies, launched a tirade against Whig legislators Henry S. Geyer and Wilson Primm for opposing the incorporation of a charitable organization which was to aid impecunious Irish immigrants. These "fine specimens of Federal representation" had always favored corporations " . . . susceptible of being made swindling establishments," but could not tolerate a charitable institution under the management of Democrats. 41 A series of events in 1839 involving the Bank of the State of Missouri and certain insurance companies brought legislative charter policy into sharper focus. The tenth General Assembly, almost as generous as its predecessor, had incorporated twentynine insurance, manufacturing, and transportation companies.42 A few months after the close of the session, several of these companies became embroiled in a banking controversy, with the result that some Missourians began to have misgivings about even the native variety of corporation. The Bank of the State of Missouri, by nature conservative and beginning its career at the start of a nation-wide financial crisis, had consistently refused to expand its circulation or take any unusual risks. As a result, most of the currency used for the transaction of business in St. Louis consisted of notes of the banks of Illinois and other neighboring states. As the financial situation grew more critical, the board of directors of the state bank lost faith in these notes, the greater part of which were not then redeemable in specie. Accordingly they announced on November 12, 1839, that no further notes of non-specie-paying banks would be received on deposit. 43 Indignation ran high among the merchants of St. Louis, who regarded the bank's action as a treacherous betrayal of the business community. The state bank would neither furnish the necessary circulating medium nor support the existing currency. In retaliation, many of the merchants withdrew their funds from

42

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

the bank, and deposited them with private bankers and with the St. Louis Gas Light Company, the Perpetual Insurance Company, and the Mutual Insurance Company. 44 These firms, by receiving the notes of suspended banks on deposit, and by borrowing, lending, and otherwise circulating them, were assuming the functions of banks. These activities were not exactly what outsiders thought their charters intended, though apparently at least one of the firms, the Mutual Insurance Company, had been organized by the St. Louis business men expressly for the purpose of dealing in money 45 The heated discussion that was precipitated by the entry of these companies into banking included many attacks upon the erring corporations, but the state as their creator was not blamed for corporate misdemeanors. Often the reverse occurred, as in the case of the published resolutions of the Young Men's Democratic State Convention of 1840, which took a broad view of the state's powers as the defender of the people against the reprehensible activities of certain companies. The young Democrats believed that corporations as well as individuals should be subject to the law of the land, and that "all charters obtained for an ostensible object and actually applied to a different object, [were] frauds upon the legislative authority, and [were] proper subjects for the exercise of the repealing power." 46 Since banking operations by corporations other than the state bank were in obvious violation of the constitution, these fraudulent companies must be suppressed. 47 This statement of the Democratic attitude toward corporations rather faithfully reflected the views of Senator Thomas H. Benton, who had addressed the convention at length on the subjects of currency and corporations. According to Benton, the government of Missouri should regulate her own currency, within the limits of the constitution. The people were fortunate that the state constitution had been so written as to protect them from the evils of excessive banking. Under it, the state bank had been created, and two branches had been added to it. Thus far, all was well. But was banking in Missouri confined to the constitutional bank and its branches? Far from it! Corporations created for other

STATE AND C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 7

43

purposes were exercising every banking privilege except the only one they did not want, that of manufacturing their own paper. They were inundating the state with the depreciated paper of foreign banks, so that while the state bank paid specie for its own notes, Missouri was becoming "the slave and victim of foreign suspended banks." The notes of the constitutional bank could not circulate. They were all hunted down and presented for specie, which was then shipped out of the state, so that nothing remained but the imported rag currency. It was the "sacred duty" of the coming legislature to "reduce all corporations to submission to the laws, to expel all base paper, and all small paper." 48 William Gilpin, secretary of the aforementioned Democratic convention, had become editor of the influential Missouri Argus at the beginning of the banking controversy in 1839. In this position, his views were of more than ordinary importance. Gilpin's philosophy, as expressed in his inaugural editorial and later, was a curious mixture of positive and negative attitudes toward the role of government in the economy, but was consistently equalitarian. The "true Aristocracy," according to the young editor, was to be found in the ranks of industry, among the productive classes. The object of his editorial labors was simply to obtain for them the control of the government. They asked " . . . no privileges not common to all, but only protection in their lawful pursuits and property — in a word, 'to be let alone!'" He would endeavor to sustain those men who were laboring to crush those schemes and systems which were making the people tributary to individuals by " . . . stealing power from the many for the few." 49 Despite this statement of principles, with its overtones of hostility to positive government, the Argus continued its firm support of the state bank and various specific proposals for the promotion of prosperity by state action. In April, 1840, an editorial denounced "corporations, banks, insurance companies and monopolies of every kind and quality" because they contained ". . . the embryo of the reduction of the government into the hands of a few." On the other hand, democracy contemplated a system of laws which would prevent legislation from being made the

44

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

instrument of those desiring to monopolize the general wealth. It established universal suffrage and raised the mass of the people to a share in government. With equal political rights, government would produce equality of social condition, and equality of wealth, comfort, and happiness. 50 When the eleventh General Assembly met in November, 1840, public attention was directed toward the possibility of the enactment of restrictive and penal legislation against institutions engaged in unauthorized banking. "A Citizen of St. Louis," in an open letter to the Legislature, averred that the people were happily convinced that their representatives were about to exercise their authority over the currency and corporations of the state. It was a matter for rejoicing that the Assembly was going to recover the power currently being exercised by the Insurance and Gas Light directors. These corporations had decreed that gold and silver should be replaced by "broken bank notes and shinplasters" as the currency of the state. Not only had they so ordained, they had forced everyone to obey. Worse, the corporations denied the right of the legislature to interfere in their private preserve. Thus the issue now resolved itself into "a trial of strength between the Constitutional legislative body elected by the people . . . and the corporation legislature elected by themselves."51 As this citizen saw it, the struggle between the Gas Light Company and the legislature aligned the town of St. Louis against the rest of the state, and "wealth and respectability" against the people. Failure to pass regulatory and penal legislation would thus be a defeat for democratic principles. The writer wanted it understood, however, that he was attacking only the three corporations "which stand pre-eminent for the abuse of their charters and their contempt of all legislative authority." Other corporations should be regulated, but the Gas Light, the Mutual, and the Perpetual charters should be repealed. 62 At the opening of the legislative session on November 18, 1840, Governor Thomas Reynolds called attention to the necessity for action on the currency and corporation questions. He was alarmed by the "dangerous tendency of that partial and unequal

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

45

legislation unhappily too prevalent of late, which by grants . . . of privileges and immunities of an exclusive nature, with the ostensible design of aiding and stimulating industry" had brought into being a great combination of associated wealth. This combination, by means of exclusive privileges, vast resources, and "sordid appeals to the most selfish passions" had acquired such political influence that it was a threat to republican institutions.53 Reynolds though it paradoxical that Missourians proudly proclaimed their government to be one of equal rights and equal laws, and acknowledged the supremacy of those laws, while in their midst a "privileged order" openly defied the "very laws to which they owed their being." Wealth in the hands of those subject to the laws of the land was a potent instrument for either good or evil, but in the hands of those not subject to statutory authority, it was usually the instrument of evil. The governor wanted it understood that he had no settled hostility to all moneyed corporations. He favored legislative restrictions and limitations to make them serve the interests of the community, rather than revocation of their charters. If the legislature agreed that the "correcting hand" of the state was needed, it could expect zealous cooperation from the executive.54 If Governor Reynolds was not opposed to all corporations, at least one legislator was. When a bill for the incorporation of the "St. Louis Association for the Relief of Orphan Children" was introduced on the floor of the House, Representative Hans Smith of Lincoln County opposed it on general grounds. Though he approved of worthy charities, he was opposed to incorporating them, as the principle upon which corporations were founded was radically wrong.55 Throughout the legislative session of 1840-41, William Gilpin of the Argus took an extreme anticharter position, which he supported by alternately praising and attacking state authority, as the situation required. He noted on one occasion it had become fashionable in modern times to apply "freedom, not fetters, to trade." Individuals could do anything that would not injure their fellows, unless prohibited by the constitution. It was not desirable, however, to grant the same freedom to "things." A

46

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

corporation could do only what strictly construed law permitted it to do. Corporations were "but apes of men," and should not be allowed to dictate to their keepers. 56 Gilpin closed his editorial with an exposition of antistate doctrine, remarking that the world was governed too much, that men were being crushed " . . . by legislatures and by corporations. The latter are created by scores — they come forth like the locusts of Egypt, and their powers are as unlimited and undefined as the ideas of the men who voted for them." It was time to realize that men could "think, talk, act, buy, sell, marry, and 'laugh and grow fat,' without the interference of legislation or corporations." Gilpin thought that the maxim caveat emptor was a very safe one; when it became otherwise, guardians should be appointed to care for the bulk of mankind. 57 The Missouri Republican felt differently about the charter policy of the legislature. According to this Whig newspaper, the state was being ruined by inaction resulting from the "faithless conduct and preposterous principles of Van Buren legislators." The legislature had done much to drive capital from the state, cripple commerce, and prevent all kinds of enterprise from prospering. Not only had it refused to furnish aid to public enterprise, it had denied proper facilities and corporate powers to groups who were anxious to invest private funds in works of public usefulness. For example, the eleventh General Assembly had refused a charter to the Mine La Motte Mining and Smelting Company, which as a corporation "would have enhanced the wealth and prosperity of several counties in this State to an incalculable extent."58 Despite the governor's recommendations and the considerable sentiment existing for the passage of restrictive legislation, a currency bill embodying the basic recommendations of Senator Benton and the Democratic state committee met defeat in the legislature in 1841. Introduced by Representative Joshua W. Redman of Howard County, it provided that any person who passed paper currency of a denomination smaller than twenty dollars (the notes of the state bank excepted) should be liable for the amount of the notes passed. Incorporated companies which

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

47

violated the law were to forfeit their charters. This bill passed the lower house but was defeated in the Senate by one vote.59 The defeat of the Redman Bill was only a temporary setback for the cause of currency restriction. Two bills drawn up by Claiborne F. Jackson of Howard County, and known to the Whig and "Soft" Democratic press as "bills of pains and penalties," 60 were enacted into law by the twelfth General Assembly. The first of these repealed all acts granting charters to companies guilty of having misused their powers, and authorized the attorney general to institute proceedings against the Gas Light, the Mutual, and the Perpetual companies.®1 The second bill provided that no corporation, money broker, or exchange dealer should pass or receive any bank note or other paper currency of a denomination less than ten dollars after January 1, 1844. In the future, no corporation other than the Bank of the State of Missouri and its branches was to exercise any banking privilege, either by issuing notes or any species of paper currency, by receiving money on deposit, by discounting notes, bills, and bonds, or by lending paper money. All clauses to the contrary in any corporate charter were declared null and void. In the event of violation of this act, all officers and members of the offending corporation were subject to a fine of five hundred dollars, and the charter was to be forfeited. 62 The passage of the "bills of pains and penalties" was a victory for the principle of legislative control over corporations. Banking excesses by certain companies had placed the previous chartering policy of the legislature in an unfavorable light, and the resulting conflict contributed to a general slackening of legislative activity in creating corporations other than counties, towns, and schools. The combined efforts of the three legislative sessions from 1840 to 1845 produced only twenty-four insurance and transportation charters, a number which barely equalled the results of the 183839 session, and fell far short of the forty-four such charters granted by the ninth General Assembly in 1836-37.63 Contributing to the decline, of course, was a reduced number of charter applications probably resulting from the general business recession.

48

MISSOURI,

1820-1860

Anticorporation sentiment was much in evidence among the delegates at Missouri's constitutional convention of 1845. The convention had been called for a number of reasons, most important of which was probably the demand for a more equitable system of representation in the lower house. 64 That a desire to place constitutional limitations on the chartering power of the legislature was another important motive is evident from the remarks of Claiborne F. Jackson, chairman of the committee on banks and corporations, in his report to the convention. Jackson expressed it as the opinion of the committee that a change in regard to the creation and further continuance of banks and corporations in the state was demanded by a majority of its citizens.65 The article on banks and corporations, as adopted by the convention, provided that no bank should thereafter be created, renewed, or extended by the state, and that the legislature should dispose of the stock owned by the state in the Bank of the State of Missouri as soon as possible. Further, no charter could be granted in the future, except for political, charitable, educational, or municipal purposes, without a provision that it might be repealed by a majority of both houses of the General Assembly. Stockholders in such corporations were to be responsible in their individual and private capacities for all debts incurred by the corporation. Finally, no charter was to be granted for longer than twenty years, and the state was forbidden to enter into mixed enterprise. 66 In delivering the report of the banking and corporation committee, Chairman Jackson announced that he would omit detailed reasons for the severity of the committee's conclusions because the wrongs and injuries which had been inflicted upon the mass of the people by the "pernicious system" of banking were well comprehended by everyone. The committee had placed restrictions upon future corporation legislation to protect the people from the "frauds and peculations" so long practiced upon them. There were no hardships imposed upon honest corporations; the committee had merely removed unfair distinctions. Why should privileges be granted to one group of men and withheld from another, in a government of equal rights? So far as the state bank

STATE AND C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 7

49

was concerned, it had paid dividends averaging less than 3 per cent a year, and thus the stock owned by the state constituted a burden on the people. 67 After the close of the convention, its president, Robert W. Wells, elaborated considerably upon the arguments presented by the Jackson committee in a review of the proposed constitution written for his constituents of Cole, Miller, and Morgan Counties in central Missouri. He urged the adoption of the new constitution because, among other things, it made impossible the "Legislative hocus-pocus" by which groups of men had been absolved from all personal liability for debts incurred in their business. This evil practice had been a violation of the principle of political and legal equality which lay at the foundation of all republican government. It was important to note, Wells pointed out, that the new constitution did no harm to solvent corporations.68 The convention's president was not impressed by the lamentations of the friends of the insurance companies, with their tales about serving the public interest. These organizations were "the identical contrivances by which the whole state was flooded with the paper of rotten banks." They were banks in disguise, having borrowed great quantities of paper from the worst banks in the West for the purpose of lending it at their counters. Friends of irresponsible corporations were behind the whole course of violent opposition to the new constitution, according to Wells, though all sorts of other arguments were usually given to conceal the real issue.69 There is little doubt that a large sector of public opinion favored the principle of individual liability and the other restrictions proposed to be placed on corporations. Governor John C. Edwards had pointed out in his inaugural message in 1844 that limited liability and other exclusive privileges granted to incorporated companies tended to increase the inequalities among men. While it would be bad to legislate an equal distribution of property between the idle and wasteful on the one hand and the industrious and frugal on the other, it was even worse to create inequality by extracting means from the hands of the many for the benefit of the few. To refuse, however, to pass any act of in-

50

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

corporation would be going too far. When it could be shown that the people in general would be benefited, properly guarded charters should be granted. 70 In May, 1845, the Democrats of Polk County, meeting at Bolivar, had passed a resolution urging the constitutional convention to . . secure the rights and liberties of the people against the unrighteous immunities of irresponsible corporations." 71 Such meetings and resolutions were not uncommon in the newer sections of the state. 72 An adverse reaction to the convention's anticharter bias was expressed editorially by the Missouri Reporter, Democratic successor to the Argus, in St. Louis. The Reporter was afraid that the individual liability and repeal provisions of the article on corporations would curtail private investment in railroads, turnpikes, and insurance companies, and that all public improvement would be stopped. 73 More vehement in his opposition was "Junius, Junior," Jefferson City correspondent of the Missouri Statesman. He was alarmed because the "bank-hating Democrats" of the convention had adopted the individual liability principle, which would ". . . destroy all associated enterprise — all insurance officers — and would effectually prevent any internal improvement by individual effort." No man would ever take stock in a company if he knew his entire estate would be in jeopardy. 74 The new constitution was submitted to the people for their decision in August, 1846. Despite the wide newspaper and popular support for its various provisions, it was rejected by a majority of 8640 out of a total vote of 58,890. Its defeat has been ascribed to the unpopularity of the banking and corporation provisions in St. Louis and the older sections of the state, combined with rural antipathy toward the new system of legislative apportionment which reduced the advantage of the less populous frontier counties.75 The failure of the Constitution of 1845 to win the approval of the people was not exactly a mandate for a more liberal charter policy, but the fourteenth General Assembly gave evidence of a revival of sentiment for increased activity in that direction.

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

51

Thirty-two charters were granted to insurance, manufacturing, and transportation companies at the session of 1846-47, making it the most prolific in that respect since 1837.76 That the general climate of opinion had changed considerably was demonstrated when the lower house considered a bill to charter the St. Louis Coal Company. Representative W. W. Reynolds of Osage County offered an amendment to the charter providing that stockholders should be individually liable, which was beaten by a vote of fifty-five to thirty-eight. This vote was the first ever taken in the Missouri legislature on the principle of individual liability alone, according to Boone County Representative William F. Switzler.77 Of the thirty-eight legislators who supported the amendment only Speaker Claiborne F. Jackson of Howard represented the older, more heavily settled counties. Most of the support for individual liability came from the newer counties in the northwestern and southwestern sections of the state. 78 At the same session the legislature gave positive emphasis to the promotional role of the state in a charter granted to the Upper Mississippi Pilot's Association. Since a number of steamboat pilots had formed an association . . for the laudable purpose of increasing the skill and information, improving the habits, and elevating the character" of their profession, the General Assembly thought that "suitable legislative encouragement" was required to assist the group in its efforts to lessen the dangers of transportation upon the navigable waters of the state.79 A similar attitude toward another type of enterprise was evinced when the Merrimack Copper Company was chartered "for the purpose of developing the mineral resources of the country, and encouraging the mining and smelting of copper and other ores." To insure that the course of this company was never to conflict with state policy, it was provided that the General Assembly could amend, modify, or repeal the charter at any time. 80 Examination of the charter policy of the Missouri legislature from statehood to the beginning of the great promotional period of the late 1840's reveals a continuing awareness of the responsibility of the state for the general welfare. Though expressions of

52

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

antistate sentiment were not uncommon after the banking and currency controversy had demonstrated the doubtful utility of certain types of corporations, they were usually delivered by persons who blamed the legislature for permitting corporate interference with the currency. No evidence has been found to show that manufacturing corporations, for instance, were regarded with hostility, except in a general way as a reflection'of the animosity aroused by the Gas Light and insurance companies. The course of corporation legislation, which went slowly until 1836, proceeded with very little opposition in the General Assembly or in the press until the three St. Louis companies demonstrated that, as creatures of the state, they could defy the established policy of the state bank and the majority of the people. Even during the currency controversy, the most extreme opponents of corporations placed their principal reliance upon the state, as they were among the most avid protagonists of increased legislative supervision and control of incorporated companies. After the passage of the "bills of pains and penalties," and the gradual economic recovery, the number of charters granted began to rise. Thus it appears that a majority of Missourians who concerned themselves with the question were willing to sanction state activity as a promoter of enterprise through the charter function, as long as proper steps were taken to prevent manipulation of the currency. In the more remote parts of the state, where there was little likelihood that aggregations of private capital would be attracted to form corporations "in the interests of the community," the demands for strong restrictions and state supervision of corporate activity were greatest. Conversely, the older areas were less inclined to favor the "restraining hand of the state." Thus, in miniature, was the attitude of Missourians toward eastern financial power repeated within the state.

IV STATE AND CORPORATION, 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0 HE increased chartering activity of the fourteenth General Assembly in 1847 reflected a desire to meet the needs of an expanding economy. Missouri's population had grown from 140,455 in 1830 1 to 508,372 in 1844.2 The state, apparently ready to enter upon an era of promotion in the fields of transportation and manufacture by 1837, had run afoul of the crisis of 1837 and the associated banking and currency difficulties of the subsequent depression era. By the late 1840's, however, Missouri was well on the road to recovery, according to Governor John C. Edwards. In his second biennial address, delivered at the opening of the legislative session in 1848, the outgoing chief executive noted that conditions in the state had changed greatly for the better during his four-year term. Through industry and frugality the people had recovered from the effects of depression and misfortune.3 The governor hoped, however, that the improvement of conditions had not deceived anyone. If permanent prosperity were to be attained in Missouri, it was necessary that the state go forward with a positive program that would obtain for her a greater degree of economic independence. This object could be achieved only by a proper division of pursuits that would create a permanent demand and enhanced prices for the produce of Missouri farmers. Preoccupation with agriculture was proving to be a great disadvantage to the people. The high cost of transporting the agricultural surplus to eastern markets and the corresponding expense involved in obtaining eastern manufactured goods were evils that should be remedied. A bushel of wheat that would buy twenty-five yards of plain shirtings in Boston, was

T

54

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

worth only five in St. Louis. A comprehensive system of home manufactures was the obvious solution for Missouri, said Edwards, since the state was blessed with plenty of fuel and water power, as well as an abundance of real estate and foodstuffs. Cotton could be readily and cheaply obtained from neighboring states to the south in exchange for hemp, tobacco, horses and mules.4 The governor felt that with these prospects for a bright future, the only remaining problem was the determination of the best method of lending legislative encouragement to manufactures. He knew that one political party had consistently advocated high tariffs as the proper way to foster home industry, but tariff arguments were of no consequence to an inland people whose remote situation was a most effective barrier to foreign competition. The most feasible plan was to combine the resources of the people by chartering corporations, though he realized that there had been wide disagreement on the proper features to be included in the charters. Most of the major difficulties that had arisen in the past could be resolved by constructing a general law for the organization and government of chartered manufacturing companies.5 In his lengthy statement of the case for a general corporation law, Governor Edwards was impelled by the necessity of reconciling his democratic philosophy with the encouragement of combinations of capital. As he saw it, there was no contradiction involved. He assumed that everyone would agree that more manufacturing was necessary to the general welfare. A general law would expedite the creation of manufacturing corporations. If correct principles were written into the law, the interests of democracy would be served. All persons would be placed upon an equal footing, with "the same privileges to all — the same restrictions upon all." Democracy and industry would be mutually advanced, if the state was careful to guard the interests of the people. 6 Perhaps not the least of the advantages of a general law was its timesaving aspects. It would reduce "that eternal and everincreasing legislation upon applications for charters," and com-

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

55

panies would be enabled to organize and go into operation without waiting one or two years for a special act to be passed. 7 Newly-elected Governor Austin King, in his inaugural address delivered on the day following Edwards' valedictory, touched rather lightly upon the subject of a state economic policy, perhaps in deference to the exhaustive remarks of his predecessor. King endorsed strict construction of the federal and state constitutions, rigid economy, and a system of general, rather than special laws. Mining companies especially, he thought, should be chartered liberally, with due regard for the interests of investors and the just rights of the people. 8 The General Assembly wasted no time in getting to work on the subjects of manufactures and corporations. A committee was chosen in the Senate to consider Missouri's economic weaknesses and report upon the proper means of dealing with them. Democrat Jewett Norris was named chairman, to work with William Priest, Democrat, Edwin White, Democrat, and James S. Rollins, Whig. Rollins had been Governor King's unsuccessful opponent in the recent campaign. 9 The report of the committee for the improvement of the economy was an enthusiastic endorsement of ex-Governor Edwards' address. It agreed that a great portion of the surplus production of the state was consumed by the cost of transportation to market and the extra charges that accumulated upon manufactured goods before they were consumed by Missourians. This unnecessary drain was causing Missouri to fall behind her sister states in population and general prosperity, despite her great natural advantages. The state was badly overbalanced; there was too much agriculture and not enough manufacturing. 10 The committee expressed the opinion that cotton fabrics, woollens, iron and steel farming tools and cutlery could be produced in Missouri "with great profit to the capitalist and immense advantage to the State at large." It was estimated that $3,533,826 a year was paid to easterners and Europeans for these articles by Missouri citizens. It was probable also that china, glass, and "common Liverpool ware" could be profitably manufactured in the state. 11

56

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

In addition to saving large amounts formerly lost in transportation charges, the establishment of manufactures would encourage the profitable employment of a large labor force within the state, which the committee felt had been "the foundation of the wealth and prosperity of our eastern neighbors." The absence of such a working force had placed under "a constant and heavy contribution" all those states which had neglected to profit by the example of the older states.12 After thus stating the immediate advantages of a system of manufactures, the committee took the high ground of prophecy and an enlarged view of the obligations of the fifteenth General Assembly to succeeding generations. They regarded the existing population of the great valley of the Mississippi as "but the germ of a great empire," which would be peopled by more than "one hundred million of living souls" within seventy-five years. It was incumbent upon the inhabitants of the present day, to give direction to the morals and policy of a people who may, in the natural course of events, within the next century exceed the whole of modern Europe in population, wealth and power . . . a judicious policy now commenced will not only add to the prosperity and happiness of the present generation, but will sow the seed of improvement and moral culture now, of which our children and our children's children shall hereafter reap the harvest for generations to come. . . This policy, it is believed, requires the encouragement of all the manufacturing and mechanic trades to which our State is naturally adapted.13 The next question in the minds of the committee members was the proper form of legislative encouragement. With Governor Edwards, they were aware of the great diversity of opinion respecting the extent of power and privilege to be granted to corporations, "consistent with the safety and welfare of the community at large." They concluded that a general manufacturing law could be framed, with careful safeguards, that would "encourage to some extent the formation of such companies, and would render it convenient for such organization with little time or expense during the recess of the Legislature." Such a law would prevent the necessity of special legislation upon the sub-

STATE A N D C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0

57

ject, thereby saving much time and expense to the General Assembly. 14 In accordance with the committee's recommendations, an act to authorize the formation of corporations for manufacturing, mining, mechanical, and chemical purposes was introduced in the Senate, where it was passed without a roll-call vote. 15 A similar desire to expedite the bill was exhibited by the lower house, which suspended its rules, allowing the bill to be read the necessary three times and passed, all in one afternoon session. 16 The act, as signed by Governor King on March 12, 1849, included the following important provisions: 1. At any time hereafter, any three or more persons who may desire to form a company, for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical business, may make, sign, and acknowledge before some official competent to take the acknowledgement of deeds, and file in the office of circuit clerk of the county in which the business of the company shall be carried on, and a duplicate thereof in the office of the Secretary of State, a certificate in writing in which shall be stated the corporate name of said company, and the object for which the company shall be formed; the amount of the capital stock of said company, which shall not be more than $500,000, nor less than $5,000; the term of its existence, not to exceed fifty years; the number of shares of which the said stock shall consist, the number of directors, and their names. . . 2. When the certificate shall have been filed as aforesaid, then the aforesaid clerk shall issue a license to the persons who shall have signed and acknowledged the same, on the reception of which, they and their successors shall be a body politic and corporate, in fact and in name. . . 10. All the stockholders of every company incorporated under this act, shall be severally individually liable to the creditors of the company in which they are stockholders, to an amount equal to the amount held by them respectively. . . 18. The stockholders of any company organized under the provisions of this act, shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all the debts that may be due and owing by the company, to the amount of profits which have accrued, or dividends which have been declared and paid upon their stock respectively and no further. 23. If the indebtedness of any such company shall at any time exceed the amount of its capital stock, the directors of such company

58

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

assenting thereto, shall be personally and individually liable for such excess, to the creditors of such company.17 Thus was incorporation by procedure established by the Missouri legislature. The passage of the general manufacturing law has been characterized as a defeat for old-fashioned BentonianJacksonian democracy, and as having broken down "the last important barrier obstructing the road toward a modern type of industrial society." 18 In the opinion of this writer these conclusions are in error. If democracy died when the general law was born, it expired without a shriek or even a murmur. The memorable address of a Bentonian governor, John C. Edwards, had suggested a general law in democratic language. An overwhelmingly Democratic legislature had passed the bill with enthusiasm, and it had been signed by another Democratic governor, Austin A. King. Perhaps even more significant, the press remained silent upon the subject. Editors may have thought the law was a routine or even an unimportant matter, but if it had been regarded as a triumph for Whig principles, it seems probable that some vigorous dissenting opinions would have been expressed by Democratic newspapers. There is little doubt that most Missourians could view the general incorporation law with equanimity, whatever their political affiliations. The desire to promote manufacturing was generally accepted. If such a law would accomplish that purpose, well and good. The limited liability provision protected the property of investors, but creditors had a claim upon accumulated profits or upon dividends which had been paid to stockholders. The latter were liable for dividends paid to them, without time limitations. Reckless directors who involved their companies heavily in debt were also personally liable if the debt exceeded the total amount of capital stock. Thus from the standpoint of those who favored restrictions and responsibility for corporations, the general law was practically foolproof. As there was nothing in the act which made incorporation by procedure mandatory, those who regarded its provisions as too strict could still rely upon special legislative acts to obtain more liberal charters. As will be shown, incorporation by special act

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

59

continued to be the standard practice in Missouri during the decade of the fifties. Experience with general manufacturing laws in other states rather closely paralleled that of Missouri. An important recent study of the corporation in New Jersey reveals that the movement for the enactment of general incorporation laws in that state found its principal support in the Democratic party, on the grounds that such laws would reduce inequality. 19 The New Jersey general manufacturing laws of 1846 and 1849 contained provisions to make reasonably certain that adequate protection was given to creditors. As a result the legislature continued to receive numerous applications for special charters, which were usually acted upon favorably. By 1857 the general law movement in New Jersey had not made appreciable inroads upon the special charter system and was considered a failure. 20 In Pennsylvania general manufacturing laws were enacted in 1849 and 1853 but, in the opinion of Professor Louis Hartz, they did not reflect a more liberal charter policy than did contemporary special act legislation. Industrial capitalists preferred the latter type of charter because of the stringent restrictions in the general laws. Enthusiastic predictions by proponents of general laws were not borne out, as capitalists and promoters continued to ask for more lenient provisions under special charters. 21 A series of acts passed by the Massachusetts General Court in the early 1850's permitted any group of individuals to organize as banking, manufacturing, or gaslight corporations by procedure. These laws were generally justified on the grounds of democratic equality and economy. As in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the grant of charters by special act persisted through the rest of the decade, though it appears that the general laws may have been somewhat more widely used in Massachusetts.22 Despite the rather grandiloquent predictions of Governor Edwards and the Senate committee, the impact of the Act of 1849 upon the economy of Missouri was apparently negligible. Owing to the absence of editorial and news comment upon the subject in the 1850's, and a fire in 1911 which destroyed the archives of the secretary of state, it is not possible to determine

60

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

the number of corporations chartered under the general law during the 1850's. It is probable that few, if any, manufacturing, mining, mechanical, or chemical corporations were chartered by procedure under the 1849 law. It is certain, however, that legislative chartering was greatly expanded during the decade before the Civil War, and remained the principal reliance of business groups desiring to incorporate. The legislative session that produced Missouri's general manufacturing law was also . . prodigal in the passage of charters incorporating everything under the sun." 23 The one hundred forty-two charters granted in 1848-49 included ten manufacturing and mining corporations.24 Other conspicuous beneficiaries of legislative sanction included sixteen educational organizations, ten insurance companies, and thirty transportation enterprises such as railroads, turnpikes, toll bridges, river improvement companies, and plank roads.25 Succeeding sessions of the legislature adhered to a similar liberal pattern. The sixteenth General Assembly in 1850-51 incorporated six manufacturing, mining, and mechanical firms or associations, six insurance companies, and twenty-nine transportation and communication organizations. Fully fifteen of the last were chartered for the purpose of constructing plank roads.26 At the same session, the general law principle was extended to provide for the incorporation of benevolent associations, which upon filing copies of their constitutions, bylaws, and articles of association with the clerk of the county court of the county in which they proposed to operate, were to be granted charters.27 The passage of this act apparently did not inhibit the legislators' freedom of action upon the subject, as thirteen special charters were granted to benevolent organizations before the close of the session in March, 1851.28 Similarly, a general law was passed authorizing plank road associations to incorporate by registering with their county courts. If the debts of any of these companies were permitted to exceed fifty per cent of the capital paid in at any time, the stockholders of the firm concerned were to be individually liable without limit for the excess.29 According to the Jefferson City correspondent of

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

61

the Missouri Statesman, this bill passed the Senate without a single dissenting vote.30 It seems probable that the provisions for incorporation of plank road companies by procedure was a measure of relief for the legislature as well as evidence of promotional zeal. The fever for this type of improvement was so great as to make it seem likely that every deer trail in the state would be covered with planks. 31 The policy of legislative encouragement to business enterprise was continued at the session of 1852-53, during which twelve insurance, seven railroad, five plank road, three manufacturing and mining, and two telegraph companies were chartered. 32 In an apparent effort to bring the general manufacturing law into greater use, the act of 1849 was amended by striking out section eighteen, which had provided that stockholders were liable for debts of their corporation not only for the amount of stock owned but for dividends that they had received. This amendment left stockholders in corporations chartered under the general law liable only to the amount of shares held in the company. The provision for director liability remained in force, however, 33 which helps to explain why the demand for special charters continued after 1853. Charters granted by the legislature usually did not include the director liability feature, as shown by acts incorporating the St. Louis Rolling Mill Company, the Berlin Rope and Bagging Manufacturing Company, and the St. Louis and Perry County Iron Mining Company at the session of 1854r-55.34 During the latter session, the legislature was even more prolific than formerly in the production of special charters for business corporations. Despite the recent removal of restrictions in the general law, eleven manufacturing and mining firms were incorporated. These, with the addition of new insurance, transportation, hotel, and other associations, brought the total number of business incorporations at the 1854—55 session to seventy-one, largest in the state's history up to that time. 35 Heavy chartering activity continued in Missouri through the latter half of the decade. From 1856 to 1860 more than seventy banks and insurance companies were created by the legislature,

62

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

as well as some eighty transportation and thirty manufacturing and mining firms.36 This constantly expanding charter policy reflected a wide acceptance in a rapidly growing state of the principles laid down by the senate committee on banks and corporations in 1849. It seems reasonable to assume that the influx of population accelerated the demand for corporate charters. The population of Missouri reached 682,044 in 1850,37 and further increased to 1,182,012 in I860. 38 Even more striking, and perhaps more significant to state corporation policy, was the expansion of the state's marketing and industrial center, St. Louis, which grew from a modest city of 16,469 in 1840 3 9 to a metropolis of 159,231 inhabitants by I860. 40 Though acceptance of the role of the state as a promoter of community interests through its powers of incorporation was general, as evidenced by the absence of opposition to most charter applications, occasional protests against proposed charters were voiced during the twelve years preceding the Civil War. In the debate in the Senate on a bill to incorporate the White River Navigation Company in 1849, E. L. Edwards of Cole County opposed granting the charter because he was afraid the proposed corporation might engage in banking activity. He was also outraged because the company would have power to take the land of any individual for its use, with the person thus deprived of his land to be liable for the expenses connected with the assessment of damages. Such a charter would never get his vote. Edwards was opposed also to granting a charter which could not be repealed by the legislature at its pleasure.41 Senator Charles Jones of Newton County was surprised to hear such talk from Mr. Edwards. Though he too was opposed to special privileges, he felt that it was time to abandon the practice of burdening the charters of river improvement companies with the incubus of repeal and narrow limitations of their powers. The White River was in his own district, to be sure, but all of the people of the state would benefit from the successful operation of the proposed company. Why raise the cry "raw-head and bloody-bones" when no banking privileges were attached to the

STATE AND C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0

63

charter? The firm wanted only to be of service to the people of southwest Missouri, the "garden spot" of the state. Jones felt that any system that would benefit the public deserved legislative encouragement. As for the clause that granted the right of way, it injured no one. Any landowner who was . . stubborn, and unwilling to subserve his own private interest for the public good" would be forced to submit, but not at any pecuniary sacrifice. If some such provision were not included in charters, no railroad or other improvement could ever be made. 42 In support of Edwards' opposition to the bill, Senator William Priest of the committee that had recommended the general manufacturing law remarked that he favored the principle of public improvement, but was opposed to granting unlimited privileges to corporations. Priest was answered by S. J. Lowe, who regarded as groundless all assertions that the bill was not sufficiently guarded. The public could lose nothing, for if the company operated at a loss, only its stockholders would suffer; if, on the contrary, it was very profitable, there was a provision that the state could purchase the entire stock.43 The debate concluded with Lowe's remarks, and the bill passed without amendment by a vote of twenty-one to seven.44 Free enterprise and noninterference arguments were brought forward to support the position of certain hide and leather dealers of St. Louis who opposed the incorporation of the St. Louis Tannery Company in 1859. In a remonstrance to the General Assembly, this group of twenty-eight businessmen maintained that the granting of a charter to the firm in question would "prejudice the interest of private enterprise" which should be at all times "left entirely free and untrammeled by legislative enactments." Further, the passage of the act would encourage applications for "innumerable acts of incorporation, all tending to the concentration of capital, and the establishment of huge and oppressive monopolies." Such combinations were at variance with republican institutions, and the best interests of society.45 In a later message to the legislature, the same individuals expressed their antipathy for corporations operating in areas within the reach of ordinary private means, declaring them to be ". . . un-

64

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

just and oppressive, and directly in conflict with the spirit of our democratic institutions." Passage of the act would work a hardship on most hide and leather dealers, and result in a heavy tax upon producers and consumers in the state. The legislature would be better advised to concern itself with the maintenance of free trade and equal rights. 46 A larger group of St. Louis leather dealers felt differently about the duties of the legislature and the interests of society. A remonstrance signed by fifty-nine individuals professing to be in that business attacked opponents of the tannery bill as men "actuated by motives of self-interest, in opposition to the general welfare and prosperity of a large majority of the leather dealers and consumers in our city and state." The establishment of a manufactory would reduce the cost of all kinds of leather to dealers and consumers, and eliminate profits formerly drained out of the state by foreign manufacturers. In addition, it would reduce the fluctuation in the price of hides, bring capital to Missouri for investment, give employment, and "draw to the city many valuable citizens." 47 The latter point of view was successful in the Senate, where the bill was passed without serious opposition,48 but suffered a setback in the House of Representatives where it was indefinitely postponed by a vote of ninety-five to fourteen. 49 One of the most important developments in the Missouri economy during the decade preceding the Civil War was the gradual shift in opinion on the subject of banking, which culminated in the general banking law of 1857 and the end of the monopoly held by the Bank of the State of Missouri. Opposition to the state bank in the early years of its existence had come from two widely disparate groups. One faction, composed largely of so-called "Hard" Democrats, had supported the principle of state control of the directory and the many limiting safeguards of the state bank charter at the time of its creation. These individuals naturally favored an extremely conservative course for the bank and supported it only when such a course was being followed. The inclusion of the antistate bank provisions in the unsuccessful constitution of 1845 was largely the work of this group, led by

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

65

Claiborne F. Jackson of Howard County. As Jackson and other "Hards" stated the proposition, the state banking monopoly was preferable to unlimited banking, but no chartered banks at all would have been even better. 50 The other major source of opposition to the state bank originally came from Whig friends of the United States Bank. Whigs who had supported the bank charter in 1837 had done so reluctantly and with a great distaste for its restrictive features. As time passed and the state bank became less capable of meeting the needs of the commercial community, this group steadily gained supporters. Generally, those who adhered to this latter position favored the expansion of banking facilities through the chartering of private corporations. They were not necessarily opposed to the continuation of the state bank, but rather to its extreme conservatism. 51 The eventual downfall of banking monopoly in Missouri in 1857 was primarily a recognition of the need for expanded banking facilities in a growing state, and thus was in a sense a victory for what had been called "Whiggery" in the 1840's. Other factors played their part in the crumbling away of opposition to free banking. The great schism that divided the Democratic party in Missouri in 1849 and several subsequent years brought about a political realignment that affected related questions of state economic policy. A struggle for power within the party between Senator Thomas Hart Benton and a heterogeneous opposing coalition resulted in the division of the party into Benton and anti-Benton wings. The "high wall and deep ditch" 52 that separated these factions was brought about primarily by disagreement over various ramifications of the slavery question, but the break had collateral results important to the present study. Among the anti-Benton leaders were Claiborne F. Jackson and other "Hards" from the central and other parts of the state. As Benton had derived much of his former support from this group, the struggle had the effect of breaking up the solidarity of the opposition to a more liberal system of banking and currency in Missouri. In their anxiety to defeat Benton in his attempt to retain his Senate seat in 1850, the

66

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

"Antis" threw their support to the successful Whig candidate Henry S. Geyer. In return they demanded and received Whig support for their candidates for offices in the state bank and its branches.53 The election of Democrats was regarded sourly by one Whig editor, who thought it strange that the people had so long retained "these bank-hating Locofocos in power, when their professions are so radically inconsistent with their practice." The Democratic party had been "railing out" against all kinds of banks, state and national, for fifteen years, while during the whole time, their legislatures had invariably elected Democratic presidents, cashiers, clerks, directors, and attorneys.54 Democratic state bank officials were nothing new in Missouri, nor did the anti-Benton bargain with the Whigs necessarily indicate an abandonment of banking principles, but the enlistment of the power of the state bank and its branches in the battle against Benton presaged a time when consistency on the currency question would be abandoned in the quest for power by both segments of the party. The former "three-tailed bashaw" of the Democrats, Colonel Benton, was naturally bitter about the use of the state bank's influence against him. In a speech at Jackson in 1852 he damned the "nullifiers" who had bribed or intimidated the press, the Bank of Missouri, the State University, and all the appointive state officers into joining the anti-Benton crusade. He felt that the upshot would be the destruction of all measures for the preservation of the gold currency, and that the state bank would be exempted from examination by elected officials. "Swindling shops" which issued notes at one place, payable at another, would be favored, and "charter monopolies" would reign triumphant.55 Apparently in retaliation for the bargain of 1850, Benton forces in the General Assembly supported Whig candidates for bank offices in 1853. As a result, the Whigs obtained the presidencies and a substantial majority of the directors of the mother bank in St. Louis and all of the five branches.56 The pro-Benton Jefferson Inquirer justified this action by declaring that Benton

STATE A N D CORPORATION, 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0

67

men wished to have a full, fair, and thorough examination of the affairs of the bank as a preliminary to opposing its recharter. It was only just that the Whig party, generally friendly to banks and banking, should preside over the bank's affairs at such a time. In addition, true Democrats did not desire to leave the banks in the hands of men who made "political machines out of them with which to make war against a faithful and long tried public servant." 57 At this time, with the opposition seemingly hopelessly divided, the friends of an expanded banking system began agitating the question of free banking. Whig Senator Wayman Crow of St. Louis informed his colleagues that he believed it was time for the legislature to supply to the state a safe and ample circulating medium. The existing bank had signally failed to provide such a currency, and there was little reason to believe that it would ever be in a condition to meet the increasing wants of the community. It was time Missouri awakened to her true interests: every consideration of duty and "wise State policy" admonished her to use the credit of her own citizens instead of continuing to pay tribute to other states. The state was just embarking upon a "liberal and wise system of railroads," the building of which would require all the capital and all the credit that could be obtained at home and abroad. As the current policy tended to draw capital from the state, instead of attracting it, Senator Crow favored a system of "properly restricted" free banking which would protect the public and the note holder, and keep capital at home. 58 That some kind of action needed to be taken with regard to banking and currency was recognized by Governor Sterling Price in an address delivered to the General Assembly in 1854. Price had been elected in 1852 as a Benton Democrat, though it was often rumored that he was anti-Benton. He was probably personally loyal to Benton, though he was inclined to be sympathetic to the principles of the opposition.59 In his remarks to the legislators, the governor reminded them of their duty to take action "to secure stability in the value of property, facilitate the operations of commerce, and shield the State from . . . depreciated or worthless Bank issues from . . .

68

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

sister States." If the charter of the existing bank were allowed to expire without further legislation on February 2, 1857, the consequences would be disastrous. The value of property would be depreciated, there would be a series of price fluctuations and fraudulent speculations, the property of debtors would be ruthlessly sacrificed, and "whole families suddenly exposed to poverty and want." 60 There were two courses of action open to the legislature, as Governor Price saw it. A system of free banking could be adopted, or the charter of the Bank of the State of Missouri could be extended with certain modifications. Of the two solutions, he preferred the latter. Free banking would require an amendment to the Constitution, which would probably take so much time that the aforementioned "difficulties and calamities" would overtake the state. Thus he respectfully recommended that the charter of the state bank be extended, and that its capital stock be increased to the constitutional limitation of five million dollars.61 The legislature began consideration of the governor's proposals early in the session, but the senatorial contest and the election of bank directors consumed so much time that action on the extension of the charter of the state bank was postponed until the next session.62 Time was found, however, to take the initial step toward a general banking law that would increase the state's banking facilities. As the state constitution permitted only one chartered bank with the privilege of note issue, it was necessary to begin the rather cumbersome amendment process.63 The proposed amendment provided that the General Assembly should have power to establish such banks as might be "deemed necessary for the interest of the state." The number so created was not to exceed ten, with an aggregate capital of not more than twenty million dollars, and they were to be speciepaying banks without exception.64 This proposal met only moderate opposition in the Senate, where it carried by a vote of twenty-two to eight. Seven of the dissenting senators were from rural districts south of the Missouri River, with all of the St. Louis delegation of six members supporting the measure. 65 In the House of Representatives the

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

69

amendment was approved seventy-three to twenty-seven, with the opposition scattered geographically. 66 Forty-four Whigs, twenty-five anti-Benton Democrats, and four Benton Democrats supported the bill, with nineteen Benton Democrats and eight Antis in opposition.07 The pattern of voting in the House indicates that the declining Benton faction of the Democratic party was the only remaining stronghold of the old hard money sentiment. Even Colonel Benton himself was wavering by late 1854, it appears. In November of that year, Whig leader James S. Rollins, who was in close touch with Benton, reported to his friend Abiel Leonard that Benton was ready to support the Whig economic program: "You know the bargain has been for the anties to give us banks, repeal the usury laws — satisfy St. Louis in short — and the Whigs to give them Atchison for Senator. But it seems Bullion will do as much and ask no quid pro quo."68 When the nineteenth General Assembly convened in 1856, Governor Trusten Polk advised the legislators that he considered public sentiment in the state to be overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed banking amendment. With this general opinion he agreed. While the original constitutional provision may have been ample for Missouri in her infancy, a state that was growing to maturity required "wider limits and freer scope for the development of her expanding faculties and energies." 69 The legislators needed no urging. They set to work at once on the problems of the state bank and the broader questions of banking and currency expansion. In the first instance a recharter bill was passed which provided that the present stockholders of the state bank might reincorporate and increase its capital to $3,500,000. The state was to continue to own stock, but the private stockholders were given the option of accepting or rejecting the new charter. If the charter were rejected the bank must be liquidated in 1861; if it were accepted it was to continue in force for thirty years. Its notes were to be receivable for all debts due to the state, as long as specie redemption was maintained. Public funds were to be deposited in the bank, and it was to act as public fiscal agent, but state deposits were subject to

70

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

removal by the governor at any time he considered the bank unsafe. 70 To effectuate the second and major part of the banking program, a joint committee of both houses was chosen to work out the details of a plan for currency expansion. The committee's recommendations were embodied in a general banking bill which passed both houses with little more than nominal opposition. 71 Though the act of 1857 was called a general banking law, it did not provide for incorporation by procedure. The legislature retained the charter granting responsibility, though all banks chartered were to be governed by the provisions of the general law. Neither did the law provide for completely free banking, because of the new constitutional limit of ten chartered banks. The action of the legislature in ending the period of banking monopoly in Missouri did not mean that the state had abandoned its positive economic policy. The legislation of 1857 was an attempt to improve the economic condition of the people of the state through expansion of the currency, as the legislation of 1837 had been. Despite major differences in the methods adopted to attain this goal, many of the principles that had seemed important in 1837 were retained. The state continued to own stock in the Bank of the State of Missouri, and retained the right to invest in any further banks to be chartered. The long-standing ambition of Whigs and some Democrats for privately owned and controlled banks was now partly realized, though the state and the people generally were declared to be the principal beneficiaries. To protect the public interest, the office of bank commissioner was created, with broad authority over banking activities.72 The commissioner was to examine each bank before it opened, and every six months thereafter. Quarterly reports were to be made to him by the banks. Within one year of its opening, ten per cent of a bank's paid-in capital was required to be invested in state or railroad bonds, which were not to be sold below par without the consent of the commissioner. Two per cent of the net annual earnings were to be invested in state bonds, which could be sold at or above par with the consent of the commissioner, provided that an equal

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1848-1860

71

amount of similar bonds were then purchased. In consideration of the privileges granted by the legislature, each banking company was required to pay to the state one per cent annually on the amount of capital paid in.73 In accordance with the constitution, all banks were to be specie-paying, and, as an added Bentonian feature, notes of denominations less than five dollars were prohibited. 74 To insure maximum distribution of the benefits of the reformed currency, each bank was to have at least two branches. By carefully locating the ten parent banks and the thirty branches provided for in 1857,75 the legislature made certain that the banking system was accessible to people of all parts of the state, thus minimizing potential sectional dissatisfaction. This painstakingly planned new system was part of an economic policy that comprehended not only banking but an elaborate network of state-sponsored internal improvements. The legislation of 1857 did not take the state out of banking. By retaining partnership in the largest of the ten banks and reserving the privilege of buying stock in others, the state held to the mixed enterprise principle which had prevailed in 1837. It is significant, too, that the broad authority of the office of bank commissioner was entrusted to an old-fashioned Hard Democrat, the ubiquitous Claiborne F. Jackson.76 The growing population and expanding economy of the state in the late 1840's and through the 1850's brought about considerable readjustment of Missouri's policy toward banking and corporations. Determined to maintain and improve the state's economic position and to provide maximum opportunity for growth in trade, manufacturing, and mining, as well as in agriculture, the state's executives and lawmakers changed the outward manifestations of state policy without altering the basic concept of governmental responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. With the passage of the general manufacturing law, the state hoped to promote her economic objectives by adopting a device common in older, more advanced industrial states. The various restrictive features of this law, intended to prevent abuses, kept it from being used widely, and the legislature continued to meet a heavy

72

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

demand for special charters. As an essential feature of an economic program that included better transportation, more efficient agriculture, and increased manufacturing, the banking system was reorganized and expanded so that Missouri might become the envy of her neighbors, paying tribute to no state or group of states. Accompanying and abetting the economic changes of this period was a desperate struggle for power in the Democratic party, in the course of which conservative ideas about economic expansion were often sacrificed in the interests of political expediency.

ν

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 6

Internal improvement shall forever be encouraged by the government of this state; and it shall be the duty of the general assembly, as soon as may be, to make provision by law for ascertaining the most proper objects of improvement in relation both to roads and navigable waters; and it shall also be their duty to provide by law for a systematick and economical application of the funds appropriated to these objects.1

I

N this succinct manner the men who drafted Missouri's first constitution expressed their belief that the state should assume responsibility for the improvement of transportation facilities. Few Missourians disagreed with this positive concept of state action in 1820, or in the four succeeding decades. Internal improvements were to be much agitated and argued about, at times in relation to the expediency of specific projects or the nature and amount of state assistance to be rendered, and often upon the question of federal activity. Seldom, however, was the state government's primary responsibility for the promotion of better transportation called into question. In Missouri in 1820, as in the West generally, transportation was an outstanding economic problem. Though the rivers of the state provided means of egress to those who lived near them, they were not satisfactory as highways to the interior of the state in the days before steamboat travel. 2 The inadequacy of water transportation was not mitigated appreciably by other facilities. Roads were few, and in poor condition. The Missouri Intelligencer, which served the state's most populous center outside of St. Louis, complained early in 1820

74

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

that instead of being conveniences, roads had become nuisances. Travelers were likely to become lost every few miles, owing to the absence of signboards at the junctures of the main road with neighborhood tracks. Wagons could not reach markets with their loads of pork or corn without having to unload in getting up or down the banks of some little creek.3 Thus there was ample opportunity in Missouri at the beginning of statehood for the application of funds to objects of internal improvement as promised by the constitution. The principal source of revenue for these objects was the 3 per cent fund, 4 so called because it represented 3 per cent of the proceeds from the sale of public lands within the state. It was to be applied to internal improvements in the state, under the direction of the legislature. This concession had been granted to Missouri, as to other new states, at the time of her admission to the Union. An additional 2 per cent had been reserved to Missouri for the purpose of defraying, under the direction of Congress, the expenses attendant upon the building of a "road or roads, canal or canals" leading to the state. 5 Though improvement of transportation by the state continued to be a recognized principle during the early years of statehood, the government was unable to give much financial assistance. Governor Alexander McNair told the legislators in 1822 that internal improvements were "properly within the sphere of legislative duties," and he hoped that their attention would be directed to the establishment of state roads and the safe navigation of the Missouri and other rivers.6 During the second session of the first General Assembly the House of Representatives recognized the importance of the question by appointing a standing committee on internal improvements, to consist of three members. 7 This committee became a fixture at succeeding sessions of the legislature. It was the standard practice to refer questions dealing with proposed improvements for study and a report before action was taken by the House.8 Succeeding legislatures, in accordance with these committee reports, enacted a considerable number of laws creating state roads, but in no case did the state appropriate money for their

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

75

construction before 1833.9 Governor John Miller remarked in 1826 that the accumulated funds at the disposal of the state for internal improvements amounted to a mere twenty thousand dollars, which would "scarcely be seen or felt" if applied to the construction or improvement of roads generally.10 During this early period, which has been termed "a time of comparative inactivity," 11 the making of roads and the bridging of streams were left to the efforts of the counties.12 The principal functions of the state were the authorization of surveys, the designation of certain roads as state roads, 13 and the setting forth of minimum standards. 14 Under this system the condition of transportation in Missouri continued to be less than adequate. As late as 1832, the Missouri Intelligencer was still displeased with the roads in the central part of the state: "[The roads] were never in such a condition as at present. Traveling is almost at an end. Wagoners absolutely refuse to attempt hauling. It would fatigue six horses to pull an empty wagon through the mud and up the hills." 15 As bad as the situation was, there seems to have been little effective demand for a more positive program by the state prior to 1833. Discussion of internal improvements tended to center around the authority of the federal government to engage in the building of roads and canals. In opposing the "American System," Missouri's Jacksonians usually asserted the primacy of the state in the field of internal improvement. At a "Jackson" Fourth of July celebration held near Columbia in 1831, W. K. Van Arsdall offered a popular toast to internal improvements by the state, which was, in his opinion, the only legitimate authority for such activities within its borders. 16 This hostility to federal action was less in evidence, however, in areas where Missouri interests were directly involved. The legislature memorialized Congress in 1829, urging that a specific appropriation be made from the national treasury to effect the construction of the Cumberland Road into Missouri. The legislators contended that completion of the road would be beneficial to the citizens of Missouri, and would also augment the national income and the national wealth. 17 Another memorial urged

76

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

federal expenditures for the improvement of the navigation of the Mississippi River to the lead mines of southeast Missouri.18 The succeeding General Assembly was similarly interested in these projects of national importance. Congress was asked to expedite the extension and completion of the national highway, which was intimately connected, according to the memorialists, with the general welfare and the permanent interests of the entire nation. Missourians expected "great and increasing advantages" to arise from improved communication with "their brethren of the interior, with those of the Atlantic Coast, and [with] the seat of government of the whole union, the common property of all." 19 In the opinion of one advocate of the American System, this latter memorial directly affirmed the power and duty of the federal government to construct works of internal improvement, "in the most extended sense in which those terms are now used by politicians." Significantly this affirmation had been approved without opposition by a legislature in which the majority were Jacksonians.20 This judgment may have been colored to some extent by the sentiments of the writer, but it does seem that Jackson's supporters in Missouri were more loyal to the man than to his measures. Jackson meetings might applaud general statements of hostility to the American System, but when Missouri interests were involved, Jacksonians could make exceptions.21 Whatever the sentiment of Missourians with regard to the powers and duties of the national government, there was not yet much agitation for the state to exercise its unquestioned authority to spend money for internal improvements in the early 1830's. Though newspapers continued to bemoan the condition of the roads, they did not suggest an increased state debt or higher taxes as a means of bettering the situation.22 In recognition of the fact that local authorities were primarily concerned with road building and repair, the legislature in 1833 passed an act providing for the distribution of the 3 per cent fund among the counties for purposes of internal improvement. The fund was divided into as many shares as there were members

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

77

of the House of Representatives, and each county was authorized to draw on the state treasurer for as many shares as it had representatives. 23 This act constituted a temporary abandonment of the policy of reserving the 3 per cent fund for a possible major project, though there was no implication that the state had retired from responsibility for the accomplishment of such objects.24 By 1835 there was evidence of increasing interest in the question of internal improvements by the state. The Salt River Journal noted editorially that several of the western states were beginning to appropriate money for the improvement of "natural canals." Such a policy would be of great benefit to farmers, merchants, and every individual in those fortunate states. The editor regretted that Missouri had no established system of internal improvement in progress, for there were many small streams that needed "the fostering care of [the] legislature." Missouri had also been delinquent in furnishing financial aid for the building of roads. 25 Widespread discussion of a state program of internal improvements began in 1836, with emphasis on railroad building. As a result of the growth of Chicago as a commercial center, 28 and the realization in the state that the national road would probably never enter Missouri,27 the people of St. Louis and other parts of the state began to express their desire for improved land transportation by demanding the construction of railroads. Abel R. Corbin, editor of the Democratic Missouri Argus at St. Louis, was a leader in the campaign. He was convinced that St. Louis had a great future as the trade center of the Mississippi valley, provided that a system of railroads was encouraged by the state. Readers of the Argus were informed in February, 1836, that a railroad from St. Louis to St. Charles, Fulton, Columbia, and Fayette would be started as soon as the next General Assembly met. There was no doubt of it; a determination to see the project through existed among the merchants, the ordinary citizens, and the "wealthy men" of St. Louis. The Argus therefore recommended that county meetings be held immediately for the purpose of considering the subject, so that the legislators would have ample time to learn the wishes of their constituents. 28

78

MISSOURI, 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 6 0

Two weeks after this initial broadside, the Argus reported that the proposed railroad was a general topic of conversation, and that the enemies of the national and state administrations appeared for once willing to " . . . forget their bitterness, and allow the improvement to be made undisturbed by their jeremiads." It was the hope of the editor that counties along the line of the road would subscribe liberally to the stock, as he knew the legislature and the city of St. Louis would.29 The Jeffersonian Republican was favorably inclined toward the project, and trusted that the proposed railroad would prove profitable to those who bought stock in it. Its promoters would deserve the best wishes of everyone, "unless they [came] to the legislature for something more than a mere corporate name." Subscription by the state to the stock of such companies was undesirable, as was any attempt to connect banks with railroad charters, according to this editor.30 In response to the general interest in the railroad proposal, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen called a local convention to consider the question. This group, which met at the courthouse on March 3, 1836, issued a call for a state internal improvement convention, selected a delegation to represent St. Louis at the proposed convention, and selected a committee which was to draw up and publish a report expressing the sense of the meeting upon the subject of railroads.31 The editor of the Argus was pleased that the local convention had met, and was enthusiastic about a future state meeting, but was aware also of a few disquieting factors. For one thing, a majority of the delegation appointed to represent St. Louis was composed of Whigs, a fact which might alarm citizens of other counties who were anxious to keep the railroad and banking questions separated.32 A second possible source of danger was the presence on the delegation of a number of steamboat owners and agents, who were interested in discouraging railroads, not in promoting them.33 Editor Corbin mentioned these things because he wanted the people to realize the difficulties that lay ahead. To insure success, it was going to be necessary to act "with moderation and dis-

INTERNAL I M P R O V E M E N T S , 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 6

79

cretion" in dealing with the "delicate interests" involved. Already there was evidence that people south of the Missouri River were certain that St. Louis was partial to Howard and other northern counties. The only way to satisfy the people of the state at large, and remove suspicion, was to make certain that the proposed convention represented every county in Missouri. Any action taken by the convention must be "as broad as the wants of the common wealth." The state was ready for, and must now adopt, "a regular system of internal improvement by the State, based upon the real not the imaginary wants of commerce, manufacturers, and agriculture." 3 4 A vigorous report setting forth Missouri's dire need for a comprehensive system of internal improvements was released on March 11 by the committee designated at the local St. Louis convention. It began by noting that the people of nearly every state in the Union were actively engaged in "facilitating the commercial and social intercourse between the distant parts of their respective states" by building railroads and canals, while in Missouri nothing was being done. The state was "behind the spirit of the age." Her neighbor Illinois was promoting the interests of her people by intersecting the state with channels of communication. Let Missouri also "commence action, upon the same policy, for the benefit of every part of the state." 3 5 Fortunately, however, asserted the committee, the people of St. Louis and the state were awakening to their true interests. Representatives of the city were looking forward to meeting with their brethren from every part of Missouri. The committee wished to reassure the people of other counties that they disclaimed "any near-sighted view of State policy, which would assume that one section of the State could be benefited without benefitting the whole State, or that one section could be injured, without injury to the whole." In prosecuting any great scheme of improvement, there was only one sound principle that should guide all policy, which was "that the good of the greatest number of, and the greatest mass of interest, should be first consulted." 36 A broad state policy carried out on such principles, in the opinion of these enthusiasts, would be wonderful to contemplate:

80

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

with all its beneficial consequences in a social, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial point of view; a project which will approximate the east, west and middle country, which will break down sectional animosities, having their origin and nurture in mutual ignorance of each other, which will increase the value of agricultural products, encourage manufactures, extend commerce, and aid in the development of unexplored resources.37 In carrying out the program, the committee expected that the counties would give some aid, and thought that "the State itself, in providing for the general welfare [could] reasonably be expected to put its shoulder to the wheel." Even the federal government would undoubtedly assist in a work which would so greatly enhance the value of the public lands and facilitate the defense of the frontier. 38 This optimistic report was undoubtedly representative of the sentiments of a large body of opinion in St. Louis, regardless of party. 39 The Democratic organ in the city made no objection to the report, confining its opposition to the personnel of the delegation appointed to represent St. Louis at the state convention. These objections brought forth counterobjections from the "neutral" Bulletin and the Whig Republican, and an intermittent warfare was carried on among the three newspapers during the weeks preceding the state convention. The Bulletin regretted that the Argus had attempted to make a party matter of so important a project, and the Republican charged that the Argus was lacking in patriotism. In answer, the latter pointed out that its editorial comments were not written for the edification of speculators in railroad or canal stock, but for the farmers and other "substantial interests." Jackson supporters were interested in railroads, but they were also interested in discovering whether there was to be any "shuffling" in connection with them. Democrats had long since learned that when the opposition favored the selection of delegates "without reference to party," they really meant "take men opposed to Andrew Jackson, and friendly to the U. S. Bank." 40 The "Convention of Delegates for the Promotion of Internal Improvements within the State of Missouri" began its delibera-

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

81

tions in St. Louis on April 20, 1836, and remained in session for four days. Sixty-four delegates from eleven counties were in attendance. 41 After considerable logrolling,42 the convention recommended that the state railroad system be started by constructing two roads, one from St. Louis to Fayette, and a second from St. Louis to the mineral regions.43 It was suggested that in order to insure the construction of these railroads, the state should subscribe to one half of the stock. The delegates hoped that this expense to the state could be met by borrowing, and by obtaining from Congress a grant of 500,000 acres of land. 44 Interest in internal improvements continued at a high pitch after the state convention. As 1836 was an election year, officeholders and aspirants to office were required to state their opinions on the subject. Franklin Cannon, candidate for lieutenant governor, endorsed Martin Van Buren, Lewis F. Linn, and Thomas Hart Benton, and was in favor of a state bank, a system of internal improvements by the state, and the continuation of the Cumberland Road. 45 Cannon's opponent, James Jones of Pike County, favored "liberal" internal improvements and a specie-paying state bank with a preponderance in the directory to private stockholders. 48 Lilburn W. Boggs, Democratic candidate for governor, was a strong advocate of state-promoted internal improvements. He felt that the volume of business carried on in Missouri had increased to such magnitude that the state was required to lend encouragement on a more liberal scale than she had in the past. The great interests of the state demanded "an extensive systematic and economical system of Internal Improvements . . . to enhance the wealth, and add to the happiness of the people." With her great extent of territory, fertile soil, "exhaustless mines," and healthful climate, Missouri needed only "an enlarged system of state policy" to raise the state to an equal footing with the most advanced and prosperous in the Union. 47 A correspondent of the Argus, signing himself "Mechanic," had a sure-fire scheme of state promotion. He suggested that the state borrow money to build a railroad from St. Louis to the western boundary of the state, through the Iron Mountains and

82

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Jefferson City; another from St. Louis to Fayette, and a third from Hannibal south to intersect the two. He would then cut a canal to connect the Merrimac River with St. Louis. It was certain that the rise of property values in the state would "more than doubly pay the expense" of the entire scheme.48 Most Whig and Democratic newspapers vied with one another in expressing their enthusiasm for internal improvements in 1836, but one hard-money organ, the Jeffersonian Republican, remained somewhat dubious about the proposals. It had warned against state subscription to railroad stock in February, and reiterated its stand later in the year, when the editor served notice that even if "Whigs and trimmers" obtained a majority in the next legislature, his paper would resist "any project to commit the state, for two or three generations to come, whether it be for a railroad or a bank." He saw no objection to chartering a group of individuals who were willing to undertake the construction of a railroad "upon their own resources," as long as no exclusive privileges were asked for.49 It is significant that even the Jeffersonian based its opposition to state financial support for railroads on the grounds of expediency, rather than upon philosophical or constitutional considerations. Even this qualified opposition was more than the editor of the Argus could tolerate. According to Corbin, the Jeffersonian was the only Democratic newspaper in the state that was opposed to a state bank, and it was also unsound on the railroad question. The people should neither forget nor ignore the fact that those states which had the best banks and the wisest systems of internal improvements were the most prosperous. No person who had ever visited Pennsylvania, New York, New England, Ohio, or Maryland in recent years, and who had witnessed what those states had done to enhance the value of land and products, and to raise the living standards of their citizens, would admit that a man was "of the present age, if he opposes what is so obviously required by the dictates of enlightened policy." 50 Perhaps the most influential voice raised in behalf of statesponsored internal improvements in 1836 was that of ex-Governor John Miller of Howard County, Democratic candidate for

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

83

Congress. As an "original" Jacksonian with the prestige of longstanding state and party leadership, he both reflected and influenced the thinking of a large segment of the public. 51 In his campaign circular, Miller dealt at length with the subject of internal improvements, both state and federal. He doubted the constitutional authority of the general government to construct works of a local character in the several states. Such wise and patriotic statesmen as Jefferson, Madison, and Andrew Jackson had expressed the opinion that the Constitution conferred no such power. It was not proper, therefore, for Congress to engage in such a program without the sanction of a constitutional amendment. 52 Congress could, of course, within its implied powers, initiate projects of an obviously national character, such as the improvement of harbors and large rivers. Miller felt also that the Cumberland Road should be completed, since its construction had been inaugurated under a compact between the federal government and the new Western states, with 2 per cent of the net proceeds from the sale of public lands set apart for its extension.53 After these preliminary remarks, the ex-Governor got to the heart of the matter, his interest in a positive state policy. He knew that no person could be "more deeply solicitous" than he to see works of internal improvement fostered by state governments. Rapid strides already made in that direction by a number of her sister states made it imperative that Missouri take immediate action if she were not to fall behind in the race for wealth and population. It was to the legislatures of the states, as well as to individual enterprise, that citizens must look for the promotion of internal improvement. The authority of the states upon the subject was unquestioned, their resources or the resources of private associations sponsored by them were ample, and "the watchful eye of self-interest" assured "speedy and economical execution" of anything undertaken by them. While the federal government had taken nearly thirty years to construct the Cumberland road for a distance of two hundred miles at great expense, New York had within a few years brought several hundred miles of canal into successful operation, as well as numerous railroads

84

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

and macadamized turnpikes. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana had also embarked upon extensive systems of improvement. It was said that the profits of these enterprises in New York would before long exempt her citizens almost entirely from taxation.84 Missouri could no longer afford to remain passive in the face of advances made by her sister states, asserted Miller. Without asking for special consideration from the federal government, she should "bring into action her inexhaustible resources." Simple justice required, however, that a grant of about 500,000 acres be made by the general government, as had been done for Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and other states. Such a grant would enable Missouri to begin "a judicious system" of internal improvements. Even if the grant were not forthcoming, the state should lend its aid to individual enterprise wherever possible. Miller rejoiced to see that "this spirit [was] already manifesting itself and that . . . citizens [had] entered with much zeal on the project of railways from our commercial metropolis . . . to the interior of the state." 55 Candidate Miller adopted a position common to many "states' rights" adherents in Missouri: he was opposed to federal activity in the economy, especially where no direct or immediate benefit could be discerned for his state. Federal largess, however, was another matter. If the state could obtain a large land grant, an extensive internal improvements program could be initiated with little expense to taxpayers. Without such assistance, the program would necessarily be curtailed, though not abandoned. 56 When the ninth General Assembly convened, in November, 1836, Governor Boggs urged that a state bank be chartered and a system of internal improvements be adopted. He felt that "the policy and utility of internal improvements by the States, remain [ed] no longer a matter of speculation." The experiment had been tested in other states with favorable results,57 and it behooved Missouri to act with vigor if she would "apply the incentive to industry . . . give life and vigor to agriculture and commerce . . . cheapen transportation [and] facilitate intercourse." The time for action was the present, and the best type of

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

85

improvement was the construction of railways. The governor suggested three principal routes which, when completed, would form "a complete chain of communication to almost every portion of the state." 58 The sanguine expectations of internal improvement enthusiasts were only partially realized during the legislative session of 1836-37. Though the legislators responded with alacrity to requests for railroad charters, no provisions were made for direct financial assistance by the state.59 A principal deterrent to such aid was Missouri's inadequate financial resources. Her tremendous fund of good intentions could not disguise the fact that the state had neither the capital to engage in railroad construction nor any way of obtaining it. The state's total revenues, derived principally from a property tax assessed at sixteen and two-thirds cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation,60 amounted to slightly less than two hundred thousand dollars for the biennium ending September 30, 1836. Even a large increase in the tax rate would not have enabled the state to make a substantial investment in railroad construction, and any such proposal would have endangered the entire program, as the warnings of the Jeffersonian Republican had made clear. Missourians were not more friendly to tax increases than were the people of Massachusetts, whose zeal for public improvement in the period before 1820 was often tempered by their unwillingness to increase expenses.61 Despite the failure to provide for state financial assistance, the legislature exhibited an optimistic view of the future by chartering eighteen railroads with an aggregate capital stock of $7,875,000. In most of the charters, provisions for subscription to stock by interested counties and towns were included.62 It is evident that the legislators regarded the railroad system as a part of a larger plan to connect Missouri with the rest of the nation, as each of the roads chartered had at least one of its terminals on either the Mississippi or the Missouri Rivers.63 Conceived as it was at the beginning of a great financial crisis and depression, and far too ambitious for the limited amount of capital available, Missouri's great railroad scheme was doomed to exist on paper only. The impossibility of getting into immediate

86

MISSOURI, 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 6 0

operation did not mean, however, that enthusiasm for the program was to disappear completely. Three additional railroads were chartered by the General Assembly in 1839, based upon nothing more than paper and expectations.64 At this same legislative session, a general law was passed authorizing county courts to grant charters to individuals, "for the purpose of bridging streams, and to encourage the improvement of roads." The act provided that in all cases the county courts were to have power to purchase "for the use of the public" any road or bridge built under their authorization. It was hoped that this simplified procedure would facilitate transportation within the state.65 In a further attempt to encourage road building and internal improvements generally, a state board of internal improvements was created in February, 1839. It was to consist of five members to be appointed by the governor, and was to exercise general supervision and control over all state roads, railroads, and waterways improvements authorized by the state. The board was to have charge of all state funds allocated to internal improvements, with the exception of the 3 per cent fund, which was still at the disposal of the counties.66 The act also provided for a state engineer, to be appointed by the governor, who was to be subject to the authority of the board of internal improvements. The engineer was to superintend all surveys made by the state, provide maps, plans, and drawings for the deliberations of the board, and make reports and recommendations to that body. All other engineers, surveyors, and draftsmen employed by the board were to be under his supervision.67 The legislation of 1839 was an effort to implement and systematize state policy in relation to internal improvements, but it was robbed of much of its significance as the national depression and accompanying failures of public improvement programs in other states brought about a reaction against state-sponsored improvements in Missouri. That former champion of "an enlightened state policy," the Missouri Argus, became quite conservative as the economic situation deteriorated. Economy replaced

INTERNAL I M P R O V E M E N T S , 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 6

87

improvement as the watchword. The St. Louis Democratic organ now boasted proudly that as yet Missouri had not "constructed a railroad, nor dug a canal, nor yet even cleaned out a river." Editors of Illinois newspapers had mistakenly contended for the honor of having given to that state its " . . . so wise, so beneficial and so glorious" system of increasing its channels of communication. At the same time Missouri had been denounced as a state "but one remove from the barbarians of unenlightened Asia" for not imitating her neighbor.68 Now was the time to compare the two policies, thought the editor of the Argus. Illinois had created a debt of over thirteen million dollars with nothing to show for it but a statehouse, a partly-dug canal, several unfinished railroads, and one completed railroad twenty-four miles long. The interest on the Illinois debt was about $790,000 a year, which was more than the entire state debt of Missouri. Thus it was obvious that Missouri's policy did not suffer by comparison. She had attempted but little "in her infancy whilst her population [was] small and scattered" but she had the satisfaction of being relatively free of debt. Illinois, on the other hand, by adopting a policy fitted only to densely settled industrial states had placed herself in the position of having to tax her people heavily to pay for something she did not have.69 For the people of Missouri, the lesson was plain. A new state should not imitate old and wealthy states. The Argus still favored internal improvements, however. If there were logs in the river they should be cut out, and if there were bars in the channel they should be removed. These and many other valuable improvements could be made at very little expense, if only the state were careful. By keeping out of debt, levying light taxes, . . . expelling base coin and depreciated notes, . . . by steadily improving navigable rivers, and increasing the number and amending the condition of her common roads, Missouri will be made the happiest, least embarrassed, and most desirable of States. . . Let us make such [improvements] as we need, and pay as we go. . . The pay-as-we-go system is the mortal enemy of the log-rolling system . . . it is the sworn friend of tax-payers. . . 70

88

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

The cautious policy advocated by the Argus seems to have become characteristic of much Democratic thinking in Missouri after the initial fever for railroads had been dissipated.71 Johnson H. Alford, candidate for the Senate from Crawford, Franklin, and Jefferson Counties in 1838, announced to the voters that he favored internal improvements, though not according to the system that had been adopted by Illinois. He was opposed to the accumulation of a huge debt for any purpose. Only as the state became "older and more wealthy, when the best natural points are indicated," should it construct "extensive railroads or long canals, on the faith of the State." As a child must learn to crawl before it could walk, a man should have money before he spent it. The same applied as well to a community or state as to an individual.72 Alford, it should be noted, did not specify how much "older and more wealthy" the state was required to become before it started spending money on public improvements. Specific projects, even for the improvement of river navigation, were likely to fare badly at the hands of such men. One of the most persistent sources of pressure for state aid to river improvement around 1840 was the Osage River area. Steamboat traffic had begun on the Osage in 1837, and merchants and other residents of counties through which it flowed were anxious to obtain funds from the state for the clearing away of shoals, overhanging trees, and sunken logs. Their demands for such improvement were expressed in conventions, in the newspapers, and by petitions to the legislature.73 Upon at least one occasion, orthodoxy on the Osage question was made a prerequisite to nomination for political office. At a Democratic meeting held in Benton County, it was resolved by the assemblage that Thomas H. Harvey was the Democratic choice for state senator, "provided he is in favor of an appropriation being made by the State for the improvement of the Osage River." Candidate Harvey replied that he favored a "liberal appropriation" for the great purpose in question, though he did not want to be understood to be one who favored "wild speculative improvements by this State; such, for instance, as has been improvidently, and I fear

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

89

unfortunately, entered into by some of our sister states." He was duly nominated.74 Democratic Senators who were a little further removed from the Osage constituency were less favorably inclined toward appropriations for Osage improvement than was Harvey. No state funds were granted for that purpose until 1855.75 The leading St. Louis Whig newspaper was quite caustic about the failure of the eleventh General Assembly to make "a trivial expenditure of money" to make the Osage permanently navigable and useful. In its existing condition, it was "of little more utility to the region of country immediately interested, than if it was a perfectly dry channel." If the people were really interested in this or any other useful improvement in the state, they would have to change their politics, according to the Republican. Nothing should be expected from the "mindless, dependent, pliant tools of the great Humbugger [Benton]." 76 The Osage Banner, like the Republican, was critical of legislative inaction. After describing the difficulties encountered and damage sustained by the steamer Leander in ascending the Osage to Osceola in St. Clair County, the Banner stated that: if the narrow-mindedness of some of our Solons of the Legislature could be removed with equal facility that the very few obstructions to constant navigation might be removed from the channel of our river, the richest region of country in the world would not long languish . . . nor the true interest of the State calculated by dollars and cents.77 Whig newspapers over the state maintained a steady attack against the conservative state policy of the early 1840's. The Columbia Patriot asserted in 1842 that under the "blighting milldew" of Democratic legislation, the "true and substantial interests of Missouri [were] doomed to decay and disregard," because an enlightened view of the duties of government would constitute recognition of the superior qualities of Whig doctrine.78 An act of Congress in 1841 had finally given to Missouri her long-coveted 500,000 acres of land to be used for the purposes of internal improvement.79 Various interests over the state were anxious to obtain a share of the proceeds for their favorite projects,

90

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

but, after some discussion,80 the thirteenth General Assembly provided in 1845 that money obtained from the sale of the federal grant should be divided equally among the counties. 81 Thus the legislature had again avoided the responsibility of instituting a planned program of internal improvements by the state. By 1845, however, public interest in internal improvements was beginning to revive in Missouri and other western states. The blighting effect of the depression was wearing off,82 and newspapers of all parties began to publicize railroad conventions and the need for improved transportation. The Whig Missouri Statesman reported in October, 1845, that a great western convention was meeting in Memphis, Tennessee, in November to discuss internal improvements. It had not been mentioned in the Statesman earlier because of the "profound apathy, on the part of the great body of the people" concerning western improvements. However, parts of Missouri were stirring, Howard and other counties having selected delegates to the convention, and perhaps Boone would do as well.83 A week later, the Statesman noted that the Palmyra Courier, "a Loco-Foco paper of the darkest hue," was beginning to concede that legislative aid was necessary to give "vitality and progress" to the trade and commerce of the state. Editor William F. Switzler of the Statesman regarded the Courier article as an object lesson, and took the occasion to express his opinion of the proper role of government in the economy. It was "the great, legitimate end of all wise government" to regulate the trade, currency, and all interests of the civil state in such a way as to produce "the greatest good to the greatest number." What was the civil government worth "if thro' its agency, the mass of the people [were] not made happier, wiser, better?" Not every member of a civil state could be legislated rich, but the mass could and should be elevated morally and intellectually; . . . made rich and prosperous, in the political sense of the terms. . . . Governments were instituted among men in order to [assure] their prosperity and peace — not to prostrate the energies, despoil the interests, or debase the morals of the masses.84 That Missouri had not attained her high destiny, that she was

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

91

behind her sisters in variety and value of products, that she was without "one single public improvement to facilitate her trade, develop her resources, or minister to the convenience and comfort of her people" was ascribable, thought Switzler, to the "wild and improvident, selfish and profligate, fanatical and ruinous measures of her very scourge and demi-god — that hydra-headed and cloven-footed monster, LOCOFOCOISM." 85 It appears that Switzler regarded himself and his party as the sole custodians of the general welfare, but it is probable that few Democrats would have quarreled with his general concept of the state's duty to the people. Democratic arguments during the years of depression had been based on expediency and economy, not upon a denial of the power of the state to engage upon works of internal improvement. The agricultural interest, comprising an overwhelming majority of the state's population, 88 consistently pressed for tax reduction. 87 Not until this group could be convinced that expenditures of tax money would result in financial advantage to the state and to themselves was there any possibility that appropriations would be made or a debt be created for investment in public improvements. Proposals for state expenditures, as well as corporate charters, received increasing opposition as the depression deepened in Missouri, and the general topic of internal improvements almost disappeared from public discussion. After the mid-forties, however, the improving financial situation was accompanied by a swing away from conservatism among Missourians that was to culminate in an extensive statesponsored improvement program.

VI I N T E R N A L IMPROVEMENTS, 1 8 4 7 - 1 8 6 0 AUTIOUSLY at first, but with gradually increasing enthusiasm, Missouri Democrats resumed their former advocacy of an extended policy of internal improvements by the state. In recognition of improving economic conditions and perhaps partially as a result of the constant hammering of the Whig press, state officials and legislators began to speak in language reminiscent of 1836. Governor John C. Edwards, in a message delivered at the opening of the fourteenth General Assembly in November, 1846, urged that the legislature facilitate the construction of public works such as "McAdamized roads, rail-roads, and canals, if the rail-road has not superseded the canal." 1 The legislature of 1846-47 was responsive to the demand for expanded state action, though it rejected Governor Edwards' plea for repeal of the law distributing the internal improvements fund equally among the counties.2 William F. Switzler, Boone County Whig editor, introduced a bill for repeal in the House, where it was defeated by the small counties, which were naturally the chief beneficiaries of the equal distribution law. Switzler argued that the existing policy defeated the principle of "the greatest good to the greatest number." Legislation for the whole would no longer be possible if local and sectional interests were allowed to prevail. Furthermore, distribution was perversion of the purpose of the Congressional grant, and no improvement made by individual counties would be permanent. As a representative of a populous county, Switzler was of course charged with having a local bias of his own.3

C

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

93

In the field of transportation improvement, the most conspicuous and important aspect of the resurgence of the promotional spirit was the chartering of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, 4 in behalf of which the legislature memorialized Congress, asking for a land grant for the purpose of financing its construction. According to the memorialists, the people of Missouri were awakening to the necessity of beginning a general system of public works. They wished to create a market for their surplus products, and to aid in the development of the "inexhaustible" mines of iron, coal, lead, copper, and other minerals to be found in the state. 5 The proposed road was to connect Hannibal in Marion County on the Mississippi River and St. Joseph in Buchanan County on the Missouri River. In the opinion of the petitioners, it would pass through a land "equal to any upland in the West, capable of the greatest amount of production of almost every species of agricultural staples." Completion of a railway through this rich country would greatly promote the interests of the state and federal governments. All that was required of the latter was the donation of alternate sections of the public and unappropriated lands along the line of the road. This aid, added to the amounts which the state of Missouri would appropriate and which interested individuals would invest would insure completion of the project within a few years. Once completed and in operation, the road would give an excellent outlet to Missouri's "rich and valuable trade with Santa Fe and other Mexican towns," and would facilitate the journeys of emigrants to Oregon and other Pacific provinces.6 Though the Hannibal and St. Joseph enterprise was destined to languish for four years before Congress decided to answer Missouri's appeal for aid, the spirit that had motivated the memorial exhibited itself with growing frequency. The Whig party kept the issue before the public with a barrage of editorials and resolutions.7 In February, 1847, its state central committee published four resolutions setting forth the party's internal improvement doctrine. The first of these vigorously endorsed federal action, including river improvement, the continuation of the

94

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Cumberland Road to Missouri, the reclamation of inundated lands in the southeast corner of the state, and aid for the development of natural and mineral resources.8 A second resolution proclaimed that the best interests of the state required the adoption of "a liberal and prudent system of Intertal [sic] Improvements, by the State government, for the purpose of improving our navigable waters, and making roads from the interior counties to convenient points for steam boat navigation on our rivers." Especially important were roads from the upper Missouri to the Mississippi and from the mineral regions to both great rivers. It was urged also that it was the true policy of the state to grant liberal charters to road construction and mining companies. This would create an extensive home market for surplus products, and add to the "wealth, strength, prosperity and happiness" of the people. That these objectives had not been accomplished before was charged to the derelictions of the "Locofoco party," which had conducted the affairs of the state for twenty-two years without appropriating a single dollar from state revenues for education or internal improvements. Funds donated for those purposes by the general government had been "mismanaged and squandered." If Missouri were to prosper, a "change of rulers . . . and policy" was necessary. In short, voters who had the best interests of the state at heart should support the Whig party.9 One of the more effective indictments of the "do-nothing" policy of the Democrats appeared in the Missouri Whig in late 1847. The editor of that paper regarded it as "one of the wonders of the world" that the internal improvement policy of Missouri remained quiescent after twenty-seven years of statehood. He thought that perhaps an examination of policy as carried out by the predecessors of the Americans would afford a rewarding comparison. At the time of Father Marquette's visit in 1673, the Sac and Fox Indians had been in possession of the country known as Missouri. Though very little had been recorded by early explorers about the politics of the "red statesmen," enough was known to justify the conclusion that they were "Locofocos of the do-nothing school." Neither Marquette nor Father Hennepin, who

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

95

had subsequently visited the country, had ever mentioned any improvements made by them. No roads, no bridges, no canals, no public works of any character manifested the public spirit of either Sac or Fox. . . As the country was left by the "iron policy" of the [primitive] "Black Hawks" and the "Keokucks" so it is now. Their "honored successors" in power. . . The living Locofoco has seized the mantle of the dead savage, and folding it about him in gloomy grandeur, struts forth in all the solemn majesty of unimprovable barbarity. . . In what, then, differeth the policy of the "Edwards" and the "Reynolds," from the policy of the "Black Hawks" and the "Keokucks?" . . . If to promote new facilities for the promotion of intercourse, or to improve those which already exist — if to draw out and develop the resources of the State, agricultural, mechanical, mineral, and commercial, be not a part of the duties of a State, pray tell us in what does civilization consist? — or wherein differeth a "State" from a "tribe!" Who shall put down the bow and arrow? Who assert the supremacy of the plough? 10 The gubernatorial campaign of 1848 reflected the importance of internal improvements as a political issue. Whig candidate James S. Rollins concentrated his attack on Democratic shortcomings on the question and advocated "bringing State credit in aid of private enterprise, in the construction of such works as it is ascertained will pay interest on the investment." 11 His opponent, Austin King, denied that the Democratic party in Missouri was opposed to carrying on projects of improvement through state action. His party merely opposed the creation of a large debt. 12 While the Whigs were more conspicuous and vocal than the Democrats in their advocacy of improvements by the state, their charges that their opponents favored a "do-nothing" policy were disproved by events after the election. King obtained nearly 60 per cent of the total vote cast for governor in 1848, with a majority of 14,953.13 If the Democratic candidates had actually been opposed to a state public improvements policy, and had so represented themselves to the electorate, their decisive victory would have been interpreted as a mandate to refrain from such action. Instead of doing so, they maintained a cautious evolution

96

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

toward a concrete program. Retiring Governor John C. Edwards struck the keynote when he announced that the state had begun to pay her debts, and might soon discharge them all. In the meantime, he believed that the "increasing wealth, population, agricultural products, and manufactures" of Missouri justified preparation for the prosecution of a system of internal improvements.14 Before any works were begun, thought Governor Edwards, the state should collect plans and prepare estimates for an organized system of "plain roads, plank roads, macadamized roads, railroads, canals, locks, and dams." These plans and estimates should be based upon the experience of other states, rather than upon the ideas of "men seeking employment" since the estimates of contractors were likely to be too low, and might involve and deeply injure the state. 15 Specific works that needed attention as soon as possible, in the opinion of the governor, were the drainage of swamps in southeast Missouri, and the improvement of the St. Francis, Black, Current, North Grand, Osage, Missouri, and White Rivers. Though the state could accomplish much river improvement unaided, he thought it wise to ask the support of Congress for the swamp drainage project. That body "could not discharge its duty faithfully and refuse to provide means to improve the southern swamps." 1 6 These remarks on the subject of internal improvements were endorsed by Edwards' successor, Austin King, in his inaugural address. The new governor assumed that a program of state works would be begun, though he hoped that the "sad experience of many sister States" would enable Missouri to escape "the evils into which they fell." 1 7 Legislation enacted by the fifteenth General Assembly reflected the growing enthusiasm for public improvements. The city of St. Louis was authorized to invest not more than five hundred dollars in the stock of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, which had been incorporated in Indiana for the purpose of connecting the two rivers from Cincinnati to St. Louis. 18 Acts were passed providing for state contributions for the im-

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

97

provement of the North Grand 19 and Des Moines Rivers, 20 and five thousand dollars was appropriated for the survey and marking out of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad. 21 More important was the incorporation of the Pacific Railroad Company with a capital stock of ten million dollars. This company was to construct a road from St. Louis to Jefferson City and thence to a point on the western boundary of the state in Van Buren County. 22 County courts in counties through which the road was to pass were authorized to purchase stock in the company. As was not uncommon in Missouri railroad charters, the state was given the option of purchasing the stock at the expiration of fifty years. 23 Federal aid was still considered to be necessary for the consummation of Missouri's improvement projects. Memorials were addressed to Congress urging grants of land for the construction of the Hannibal and St. Joseph 2 4 and the Pacific Railroads, 25 for a geological survey of the state, 26 and for the improvement of the Current, 27 the Osage, 28 and the White Rivers. 29 In asking for the geological survey grant, the legislature emphasized the great store of mineral wealth in Missouri which had remained in an undeveloped condition, owing to its inaccessibility. Unfortunately the state had never possessed the means to establish an adequate system of transportation to its great ore deposits. For the same reason, she had never executed a thorough geological survey. If Congress would grant to the state a township in each United States land district in Missouri, the legislature would make the necessary appropriation to complete the work. 30 The advantages that the survey would render to both nation and state were manifold, the memorialists believed. It would benefit Missouri and would enhance the value of the remaining public lands within the state. Congress had long since recognized the correctness of the principle by spending large sums for surveys in Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In addition, the federal government had examined the rivers and harbors of the Pacific Coast and had financed the exploration of the route across the Rocky Mountains. These surveys and explorations had been

98

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

of great advantage to the agricultural, commercial, and industrial interests of other states. Missouri, too, wanted some of this fostering care.31 During this period of activity by an overwhelmingly Democratic General Assembly,32 the St. Louis Daily Union noted that the Missouri Republican was still repeating the "old hashed up charges" that the Democratic party in Missouri was opposed to internal improvements within the state. These charges had been so often refuted that the Unions editor professed to be "somewhat surprised at their resuscitation." 33 It appears that some Whigs were rather disgruntled with the Democrats for being active in an area regarded as Whig territory. The editor of the Missouri Whig remembered "a time when the name of Locofoco was another name for all manner of hostility to every species of improvement." Democrats formerly had denied the constitutional power of the general government over internal improvements, and had "barely admitted that the State Government possessed the power; yet if any one attempted to set on foot a work of minor importance, the cry of bankruptcy and ruin was rung in his ears. . ." But recently the situation had changed, noted this Whig partisan. The same individuals who had formerly "done the drudgery of public meetings to promulgate such disgusting and miserable sentiments" were now working on the other side of the great question, "each vieing with the other who shall do most to impress upon the beholder's mind the disgracefulness of their former conduct." 34 Unfortunately this great revolution did not mean that the Democrats were now governed by principle. The "slime" was still sticking to them, according to the Palmyra editor. As they had ceased to belong to Benton, it was necessary that they find another reason for existence.35 Since internal improvements were popular, they had become advocates of internal improvements. Though the interests of Missouri had long suffered from Democratic neglect, popular demand for public works had brought about a revolution "in the rotten sewers of Locofocodom." Now the Democrats were determined that the state should build a railroad from Hannibal to St. Joseph, another from Independence to

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

99

White River, and should lock and dam the Osage and North Grand Rivers. All this is well enough — good — glorious, if it can be done. We say amen: do it to-morrow. — But what is all this, ye hypocrites, but good, old, long-tried, much abused, but solid and sterling Whig doctrine? What is it, ye miserable drivellers, but the principles you have fought against and kept down by base-born and low-flung calumniations of the best men in the State for twenty-five years? What has become of the idea that Congress has no power to make internal improvements? Is not all Missouri Locofocodom on the tiptoe of anxiety to show how devout they are in spirit to make a road a mile wide and 2,500 miles in length, at the cost of probably 200 millions of dollars? And is not every foot of that road to be made by Congress? . . . 3e Missouri Locofocos have become the advocates of internal improvement, in the state: the advocates of such improvement by Congress; the asserters of the Constitutional power in Congress; 37 the advocates of the most stupendous work of the kind ever known! What is it a Locofoco cannot do? What is it he will not say or unsay, to keep on the strong side? Nothing! 38 Despite the bias of this embittered Whig, his remarks reveal that the dominant party in Missouri was moving, with popular support, in a direction that threatened to deprive the Whigs of a cherished political issue. As has been pointed out, Missouri Democrats had never denied the power of the state to embark upon a system of internal improvements. They had been more conservative than their opponents in supporting specific projects on the grounds that the state government's resources were inadequate, or later, that proposals were inexpedient or speculative. As previously indicated, there had been in progress since 1845 a gradual expansion of the state's promotional activity. From 1845 to 1850 this tendency was given impetus by the successful promotion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, the Michigan Central Railroad, the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad, and other developments in neighboring states. Moreover, St. Louisans were becoming increasingly aware of the danger that Chicago would monopolize the growing trade with the far West. 39 These factors became more significant as the transcontinental railroad movement gained headway. National internal improvement conventions, held at Memphis in 1845, at Chicago in 1847,

100

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

and at St. Louis in 1849, helped to accelerate the demand for railroads in Missouri.40 Though the delegates to the St. Louis convention failed to achieve their principal objective, the immediate construction of a transcontinental railroad by the national government, the convention was of immense benefit to the Pacific Railroad project of Missouri. The backers of the Pacific were enabled to represent their road as the eventual eastern section of the great national railroad. Thus the line profited from local sentiment for a transcontinental railroad, as well as from the enthusiasm for local internal improvements. 41 That many of the citizens of Missouri were determined to use all available means for the promotion of railroads became evident during the summer of 1850, when the first of a series of county internal improvement conventions was held. On July 11 some residents of Henry County met at Clinton to voice their approval of the proposed Pacific Railroad. They adopted a resolution requesting the county court to order an election on the question of a subscription by Henry County to the stock of the road. They also asked "all candidates for the General Assembly to debate the subject in all their public speeches [before] the election." 42 At similar meetings, citizens of Johnson,43 Bates,44 and Benton Counties 45 offered their support for the construction of the Pacific enterprise. The Benton Countians resolved that they would subscribe to the stock "as liberally as any county in the state in proportion to . . . [their] means," but only if the "ridge route" were selected.46 Railroad conventions continued to be held in interested counties after the beginning of the legislative session of 1850-51. At a meeting at Linn, in Osage County, on December 27, 1850, the county court was urged to "take the sense of the people, as to the propriety of subscribing to the capital" of the Pacific Railroad. It was also resolved by this assemblage that the state should lend its credit to the enterprise to the extent necessary to effect its completion.47 Another group of railroad partisans in Morgan County requested the county court to subscribe fifty thousand dollars to the stock of the Pacific, and also recommended that the state subscribe to one fourth of the issue of Pacific shares.48

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

101

It appears that these conventions and the general agitation for railroads had not escaped the notice of Governor King. In his message to the legislature, delivered on December 30, 1850, the governor took an advanced view of the responsibility of the state for internal improvements. He was certain that the legislature would give more than ordinary attention to the subject, since the representatives of the people were aware as he was that Missouri was "susceptible of being made one of the most desirable States in the Union." In order to enable the state to attain its proper place, the chief executive thought that: . . . the legislature should, by acts of munificent, but judicious legislation, give aid and assistance to the enterprise now struggling into existence among the people, which aims at a development of the resources of the State — to bring into the channels of trade those countless millions of mineral wealth — open up to the farmer and mechanic new sources of wealth and industry — to point out to the capitalist a sure means of profitable investment, and to secure to industry, in all its branches, its surest and most ample rewards.49 In the opinion of Governor King, the great error in Missouri's previous efforts to make improvements had been the failure to concentrate on the completion of one or two great objectives at one time. Suggestions for useful improvement had been hindered by other propositions of seemingly equal merit, making it impossible to accomplish anything. Further delay was inconceivable, however, for the eyes of the nation were upon Missouri. Railroads from "Boston round to Mobile" were pointing to the state, looking to Missouri for an extension of the lines to the western frontier, "from whence, by common consent, the energies of the nation will be concentrated in continuing the road across the plains, and to the Pacific." If Missouri did nothing, and the transcontinental roads passed her by, countless millions of wealth from the East would be turned into other channels. In addition, the state would be deprived of being "the receptacle of that golden stream of commerce which is, at no very distant day, to flow in upon us from the west." The trade and commerce of India, China, and the islands of the Pacific were at stake. It was clear that the action of

102

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

the sixteenth General Assembly would determine the destiny of Missouri.50 The governor thought that the state should give its principal attention to the Pacific and the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroads, the first of which was to pass through, for more than half its length, "a wealthy, populous, and fertile region," and the second of which was to traverse a country "unsurpassed in its whole distance, in the productiveness of its soil, and its adaptation to the means of wealth and affluence." The prompt organization of the two companies, and the "energy and determination of the people interested in the respective routes," made it certain that only state aid was needed to insure their success.51 There was little chance of financial loss to the state, averred Governor King, because every mile of road constructed would pay for itself. As the roads penetrated areas formerly closed to commerce, new sources of wealth would spring up and new life would be infused into the country, so that by the time they were completed, the "most sanguine" would be astounded at the progress of the state. Private enterprise alone would be unable to accomplish these great objectives, but with state aid the work could be done without oppressing the citizens. Without this aid the work would fail. 52 Since other states had successfully followed the practice of lending their credit to railroads, the governor felt that Missouri should adopt the same plan to promote her two most important enterprises. For every fifty thousand dollars collected and expended on construction by a company, the state should lend its bonds to the company in an amount sufficient to carry on the work of construction. If this system were adopted, the two railroads would be completed, and would constitute main trunks, to which could be appended a great system of railroads and plank roads, "branching into every quarter of the state." 53 Governor King's recommendations set the general pattern for the action of the sixteenth General Assembly. The Senate committee on internal improvements concurred in the opinion that the two railroads should be aided, and that they should be presented and considered separately from other schemes of improvement. 54

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

103

In accordance with these views, the legislature framed and passed "an Act to expedite the Construction of the Pacific Railroad, and of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad," which the governor signed on February 22, 1851.55 Opposition to the measure was light in both houses, the Senate passing it by a vote of twenty-seven to five,56 and the lower house by eighty-eight to thirty. 57 Despite the onesided nature of this vote, an analysis of the sectional and political affiliations of those in opposition is revealing. The thirty representatives who objected to the measure were Democrats, and were largely from counties a considerable distance removed from either of the proposed lines. None were from counties through which the roads were to pass, though eight were from adjacent counties.58 Twenty-one nays were voiced by representatives from the southeast and southwest corners of the state, who expected their constituencies to derive little benefit from even the Pacific Railroad, which, though it was to be south of the Missouri River, was routed through the geographical center of the state.59 In addition, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the plan to aid the two roads to the exclusion of all others. 60 In the upper house, the sectional pattern was repeated, the five opposing votes being cast by senators from the southern third of the state. 61 Though the opponents of the bill in the House were all Democrats, political affiliation seems to have been a secondary consideration in determining the alignment on the issue. Thirty-seven Democrats, at the behest of a Democratic governor, joined fiftyone Whigs in the House of Representatives to support the principle of state financial aid to railways. The factional struggle in the Democratic party seems to have had no connection with the question of internal improvement by the state at this time. Both the Benton and the anti-Benton groups gave majorities to the measure, the former by a vote of twenty-two to fifteen, and the latter by a margin of fifteen to thirteen. 62 In the Senate, the vote was even less indicative of party, as the bill was supported by eleven Whigs, nine Benton Democrats, and seven anti-Benton Democrats, with three Benton Democrats, one anti-Benton, and one Whig in opposition. 63

104

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Thus Missouri made a significant departure from previous practice with the blessing of the three principal political groups in the state. Such opposition as did develop to the lending of the state credit for the promotion of railroads reflected the disappointment of a section rather than the uncompromising ideological hostility of an organized political group. 64 Since the principal features of the act to aid the Pacific and the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroads served as an outline for a state policy that was to continue through the greater part of the 1850's, they seem worthy of examination. One million five hundred thousand dollars in "Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad state bonds" was to be granted to that company by the state, subject to certain provisions. Similarly, $2,000,000 in state bonds was loaned to the Pacific Railroad. The companies were required to obtain bona fide subscriptions to their capital stock of $1,500,000 each before any bonds would be granted, and were to show proof to the governor that $50,000 had been expended in actual construction, before the first $50,000 in bonds could be turned over to them. When the proceeds of the first state issue was spent, another $50,000 of the company's capital had to be expended before a similar sum in state bonds would be forthcoming. This pattern was to be followed until the entire grant was consumed. As security, the state was to have a first lien on the property of the railroads, and no state bonds were to be issued until the companies gave "full and satisfactory evidence" to the governor that no prior hen existed.65 The bonds were redeemable at the pleasure of the legislature after twenty years from their respective dates of issue. The companies were privileged to sell them at not less than par, and were responsible for the payment of interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. In the event that a company defaulted on the payment of interest or principal, the governor was to sell its property to the highest bidder, after giving notice of the impending sale by advertising in one Jefferson City and two St. Louis newspapers. 66 Having begun the policy of lending her credit to railroads, Missouri pursued it with a vengeance. 67 As the expense of con-

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

105

struction invariably exceeded original estimates,68 the state was required to augment its original grants to each of the seven companies that were eventually aided. By 1860, Missouri had pledged her credit in aid of these roads to the extent of $23,101,000.69 This amount was approximately twenty-five times as large as the state's average annual income for the ten-year period ending September 30, 1860! 70 As a student of American state debts has shown, Missouri, ranking eighth among the states in population in 1860, had accumulated the fourth largest debt. She was second only to Virginia in borrowing during the period 1845-1860.71 In addition to the aid rendered to internal improvements by the state during the 1850's, national, county, and municipal governments made important contributions. In June, 1852, Congress granted to the state of Missouri "every alternate section of land designated by even numbers for six sections in width on each side of the road" to be used in aiding the construction of the Hannibal and St. Joseph and Pacific Railroads. If, after locating the route of a road, it was found that any of those sections had been sold previously by the government or preempted by settlers, then the company would be allowed to replace them by selecting other sections outside of the six-mile zone but within fifteen miles of the road. Recognizing that the intermediate sections remaining in its possession would probably increase in value as construction proceeded, the government stipulated that the railroad lands could not be sold for less than double the minimum public land price of $1.25 an acre. If construction was not completed within ten years, the companies were to make no further sales, and the remaining lands would revert to the United States. In consideration of public generosity, it was provided that these land grant railroads should "be and remain public highways for the use of the government of the United States, free from toll or other charges upon transportation of any property or troops of the United States," and that the United States mail should "at all times be transferred over [these] railroads, under the direction of the Post Office Department, at such rates as Congress might by law direct." 72

106

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

Similarly, federal land grants were made to the Cairo and Fulton Railroad, and to the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad.73 Of all the land-grant railroads in Missouri, only the Hannibal and St. Joseph derived any considerable benefit from the sale of lands, owing to the absence of a market for the relatively poor land in the southern half of the state.74 By 1860, the Pacific had disposed of 78,000 acres and the Southwest Branch had sold only 7,000 acres at an average price of about $2.50 an acre. The Hannibal and St. Joseph, however, realized over $350,000 from the sale of 33,177 acres during the same period.75 Missourians did not confine their zeal for public aid to internal improvements to the national and state governments. The major portion of the stock issued by Missouri's state aid railroads in the 1850's was sold to counties and municipalities.76 The responsibility of government at all levels for the promotion of railroads, plank roads, and similar projects was generally recognized. The people were continually reminded of their corporate duty by the newspapers, by their public officials, and by the pronouncements of their political conventions. As a result of the federal land grant to Missouri in 1852, Governor King called a special session of the legislature to provide for the proper disposal of the grant. In his address to the special session, he noted that public sentiment was requiring "prompt and decisive action on the part of their representatives, in order to secure a proper devlopment of our resources and hidden wealth."77 The readers of the Fulton Telegraph were exhorted upon this occasion to "use every effort to secure as early as possible, the means and aid requisite" to the building of the North Missouri Railroad. The special legislative session was urged to consider not only the roads for which public lands had been donated, but the general subject of a system of internal improvements for the state. Now was the time for "State and counties, corporations and individuals to come forward and do their duty." 78 At a meeting of Boone County citizens in November, 1852, it was resolved that the manifestations of public concern upon the subjects of communication and commercial transportation was

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

107

"the harbinger of better and more prosperous times." It was clearly the duty of the federal and state governments to foster and encourage this spirit by lending their aid to a prudent system of internal improvements. 79 As the state's railroad program developed, there were occasional signs of bitterness and dissatisfaction with its workings. A common type of complaint was that voiced by the editor of the Bloomington Republican. Bloomington was a town in Macon County which was near, but not near enough, to the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad. The indignant editor reported that there was a manifest intention to locate and construct the road so as to ruinously depreciate one million of dollars worth of property belonging to individuals and to counties, and all this merely to subserve the imaginary ends of the cormorants, vultures, jobbers, speculators, Shylocks of Hannibal and St. Joseph; the one famous for swindling the immigrants, the other for docking the farmer in his pork, beef, hemp, and tobacco, and paying for them in rags.80 Though interested counties usually subscribed to the stock of railroads or plank roads in the fifties, the subscription, principle did not always meet with the approval of all citizens. A proposition for a subscription of $100,000 to the stock of the North Missouri Railroad by Boone County was the occasion of a considerable controversy during the weeks preceding the county referendum to be held on June 13, 1853. The leader of the opposition was Austin Bradford, a gentleman of wealth and influence from the southern part of the county. In a letter directed to William F. Switzler, editor of the Statesman, Bradford attacked the proposed subscription as an "invasion of the rights of free men, [an] unjust tax on the people living near the Missouri River," 81 and asserted that a railroad tax would make citizens hate one another. In addition, the county already owned stock in the Providence plank road, had an empty treasury, and only a small number of taxpayers. Bradford thought that if it were true, as some persons maintained, that the stock would be immensely profitable, then friends of the road should subscribe the entire

108

MISSOURI, 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 6 0

$100,000, and "reap all the profit, suffer all the loss, have all the honor, all the glory of the whole transaction." 82 Attacks on the proposed county subscription were printed in the Statesman, but were greatly outnumbered by letters and editorials favoring the investment. Switzler replied to Bradford's intimations that the county might lose money by taking a broad view of the question, saying: Railroads, like many other great public improvements, pay in multiplied other forms beside the mere per cent in money on their prime cost. As an advocate of the system of public works in Missouri, we are bold to say that this constitutes their chief good. Show that the Railroad will payl Do not the opening of common roads and the building of bridges pay? Do not the erection of churches and school houses in a neighborhood pay? Not, truly in per cents, directly paid into the pockets of those who subscribe, but indirectly in the enhancement of the value of property, the increase of facilities, religious, educational, and commercial.83 As to Bradford's suggestion that individuals should subscribe to all of the railroad stock, Switzler wondered if he meant that "every road and bridge, and telegraph line and school house, designed for the use and benefit of the people, ought not to be owned by the people, . . . but alone by the hoarders of gold . . . in New York and other eastern cities?" 84 Among the procounty subscription letters to the Statesman, "Self against the World" ridiculed the opposition by proclaiming that he was opposed to the railroad tax because new capital would come into the county if the railroad were built and cause interest rates to fall, thus damaging his position as a money-lender. He favored "Low wages, low lands, low mule colts," as the best condition "for him who has lots of money." 85 In another such letter, "Monopoly" thought it best to stick to the old mode of traveling. He was no farmer, and was not concerned with getting any nearer to market. He bought what farmers produced, and as a railroad would make it possible for them to take their wheat, corn, oats, rye, hogs, and cattle to St. Louis "and then get better prices than I can give, [they] will go there, and not any longer sell to me." "Monopoly" hoped that the editor would not charge

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

109

him with being opposed to internal improvements. He was not, but he preferred those that did not enter the county, or those that ran for a short distance into the county, ending at his mill. As a manufacturer, he hoped to continue "to buy low and sell high." 86 One of Bradford's supporters, distiller James McConathy, was accused by editor Switzler of opposing the railroad subscription so that he might "continue to drench us, with (not old Bourbon) but the very meanest article of mean whiskey, and at the very highest price, we say let him pass. The b'hoys understand him!" 87 The railroad subscription was approved by Boone Countians by a vote of 1056 to 816. As might have been expected, the northern part of the county, through which the North Missouri was to run, favored the proposition by a margin of over five hundred votes, the southern section opposed it, and Columbia, in the center, gave it a small majority. 88 Upon occasion, the proponents of railroads were charged with being interested primarily in promoting the welfare of their own purses, rather than the public welfare. Such a charge was made in 1854 against James S. Rollins, long a leading advocate of internal improvements, because of his ownership of land in northern Boone County, in the vicinity of the proposed line of the North Missouri Railroad. Switzler, a close friend and business associate of Rollins, entered an indignant denial in his behalf, stating that the latter was uninterested in personal profit.89 Though it is probable that most of the prominent supporters of internal improvements sincerely believed that they were working in the general interest, it is clear despite their protestations that they were not averse to acquiring "unearned increment" in the process. In this connection, the correspondence of Abiel Leonard, a very influential Whig leader from Fayette, is revealing. In 1851, Rollins had urged Leonard to join him in buying land in western Missouri, near the supposed route of the Pacific Railroad. Apparently Leonard had not been responsive, for in May, 1852, Rollins complained: "Last fall we lost a fortune by your neglect. . . Say in July could we not kill two birds with one stone;

110

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

go out on a political mission, and at the same time locate a few land warrants, on the railroad! W h a t think you of the enterprise now?" 9 0 In a similar vein, Whig Congressman John G. Miller informed Leonard during the political campaign of 1852 that he "had suggested to Switzler that he and Rollins might do good service by making internal improvement speeches and particularly railroad speeches" in the counties of Shelby, Macon, and Knox in the north, and in Cole, Moniteau, Morgan, and Miller in the south. Congressman Miller thought that the "railroad counties" were most important, as they were all Democratic and investments there (political or otherwise) might be advantageous. 91 Early in 1854, Thomas Brown of the firm of Page and Bacon at St. Louis wrote to Leonard: I am glad to hear that you are still in the market for Corn Land, would yet suggest to you the propriety of Selecting it as near to Railroads as possible — as you appear to dislike the name of Railroad lands, we will call it Corn land near a Railroad. . . Would it not be well for you to make your final Selections on the line of the North Missouri RR, as this land will when this Road is finally located be eagerly sought after for Agricultural purposes. . . 92 Whatever the motives of the leading advocates of internal improvements, the established policy of state aid continued to be defended and extolled in terms of the general welfare throughout the decade before the Civil War. As the expenses of construction mounted, and the demand for additional state loans continued, Missouri's Democratic governors found it necessary to speak in exalted terms of the "glorious future" awaiting their constituents if only the state credit were stretched a bit further. Governor Trusten Polk, in his inaugural message of January 5, 1857, announced that he intended to do everything possible "to foster our great agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial interests," and to aid in directing the energies and enterprise of citizens who were developing the mineral and agricultural resources of the state. When the farmer had gathered his crops, when the miner had "disemboweled the ores of our mines" and

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

111

the manufacturer had converted the raw materials into finished products, a market was needed. The governor would be pleased to furnish facilities "to render this desideratum attainable." 93 Polk's successor, Governor Robert M. Stewart, who had been among the promoters of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, surpassed most of his predecessors in his enthusiasm for state expenditures for internal improvements. In his message to the adjourned session of the legislature in November, 1859, he regretted that "the foolish cry of oppressive taxation" was being raised in some quarters. As a majority of the people knew, the completion of the trunk roads would make Missouri "the Central Empire State of the Union." After this had been accomplished the trunk lines would be supplemented by a number of branches to serve as feeders to the system to which the state had "so largely contributed . . . , and without which the car of progress would yet have been almost or wholly a stranger in Missouri." 94 Those who were worried about taxes should do some additional thinking on the subject, said the governor. Currently, only an additional four million dollars was required of the state by the railroads. This sum amounted to only about twenty dollars for each family in the state. If the aid were granted, the completion of those roads already begun would insure that individual taxpayers would be free of taxation upon a debt of thirty million dollars. Refusal to make the loan would mean failure for the enterprises and shift a crushing debt to the taxpayers. Could the state, "on the score of political economy, perpetrate a greater folly?" The completed railroads would be taxable property, and would stimulate other enterprises which would also be taxable. New York and Massachusetts had derived great advantage from their systems of public improvement, and Missouri should do likewise.93 As Stewart saw it, there was no validity in the argument that the state had no right to burden posterity with a public debt. Any public improvement of permanence would benefit future generations as much as the present one, and it was simple justice to impose upon them a proportional share of the burden. Other states were "holding out inducements for immigration;" should

112

MISSOURI,

1820-1860

Missouri then, with her "superior advantages" and a chance to enhance her prosperity, remain listless, and let the active, eager millions of human beings who are thronging the thoroughfares of the country in pursuit of subsistence and a home, pass us by upon the right and the left, and thus allow our millions of acres of virgin soil, and our inexhaustible mines of coal, and deposits of iron, lead, copper, and other minerals, to remain a useless expenditure of the munificence of Heaven? Do we not enhance the value of the heritage of our successors, and contribute to the general good, by works of permanent utility, that will bring these vast resources into use? 9 6

As the remarks of Governors Polk and Stewart show, the course of the state's program of internal improvements did not proceed without interruption and opposition during the 1850's. The mounting cost of the construction program, and a sharp break in the price of the state's bonds on the New York market during the financial crisis of 1857 brought about legislative reexamination of the state's credit situation. Missouri bonds having fallen from 89M to 60M from December, 1856, to October, 1857,97 further issues were forbidden until March 1, 1859, excepting $2,776,000 for the completion of certain railroads. The governor was empowered to authorize a further issue of not more than $500,000 for the completion of the Southwest Branch of the Pacific in the event that the state's bonds rose to 90 during the moratorium period. It was also provided that members of the board of public works should attend meetings of the directors of state-aid railroads.98 As a further demonstration of their misgivings about the program, the legislators ratified a constitutional amendment in 1858, providing that the state debt should never exceed $30,000,000, whether acquired for "the prosecution of internal improvements, or for any other purpose" except to repel invasion or suppress insurrection.99 Missouri's large internal improvements debt was not acquired because her citizens preferred state action to private enterprise, nor, on the other hand, was her policy hindered by a philosophy of hostility to state interference. The state's credit was loaned to private railroad companies because the latter could not command

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

113

the necessary capital and because it was believed that the debt thus incurred would be less burdensome upon taxpayers than would direct public ownership and operation of the railroads. 100 It should be noted, however, that the state-aid charters as well as many other Missouri railroad charters contained provisions for possible eventual public ownership. If private enterprise failed to live up to expectations, the state could take over. Expediency was a primary consideration for most Missourians. With the returning prosperity of the late 1840's and the apparently limitless possibilities offered by American acquisition of California and other areas of the far West, there came to a majority of citizens the conviction that railroads were essential to the public welfare and to their own advantage. Therefore railroads must be built. As private enterprise alone could not accomplish the task, let the state perform her historic mission by lending her credit. The details of ownership and control were secondary, however, to the principal objective, the establishment of a comprehensive system of public improvement in the interests of the general welfare. When the proposed routes of the first aided roads became known, there was considerable objection to the loans in those areas of the state where no direct advantage could be discerned. Though the legislation was at times considered to be unfair and partial in its benefits, there seems to have been no articulate philosophical opposition to state action. Wherever opposition existed, it was likely to reflect personal, local, and sectional ambitions or jealousies.

VII AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY I Missouri was primarily an agricultural community in the ante-bellum period,1 most legislative intervention was intended to further the agricultural interest either directly or indirectly. The more conspicuous aspects of the state's economic program were in every instance considered to be of some benefit to the farmer. The relief legislation of 1821, the creation of the state bank, the legislative charter policy, and the program of internal improvements by the state were all justified by their proponents as instruments for the promotion of agricultural prosperity. The state's activities in behalf of agriculture were not confined to these major examples, however. Governors and legislatures were concerned with various aspects of the promotion of agricultural well-being in the passage of a series of relatively minor measures at almost every session of the General Assembly. One method used to accomplish this end was the discriminatory use of the taxing power. In 1847, the legislature authorized farmers to retail certain items of merchandise at their places of residence free of taxation or license fees, provided that these items had been obtained in exchange for produce of their farms.2 In the same year "an Act to Sustain the Credit of the State," required lawyers, doctors, and peddlers of pills and patent medicines to pay license fees, graduated according to the volume of business transacted. It also levied an income tax of 1 per cent upon the salaries of all persons, whether public officials or private citizens, excepting only those persons employed in nonsupervisory capacities on farms.3

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

115

Another common form of legislative encouragement was the chartering of agricultural associations. These bodies were usually general agricultural societies, though upon occasion they were dedicated to the promotion of a particular crop. An example of the latter type was the "Gasconade Grape Growing Society," created in 1849 "to promote the Growing of Wine in Gasconade County." The board of managers of this corporation was authorized to determine the best methods of cultivating "the wine" and to do all that was necessary to encourage others to use these methods. Further, the board could confer premiums, appoint inspectors, and fix times and places for exhibiting the wine raised in Gasconade County. Once each year a report was to be issued by the board which was to set forth the number of members in the society, its income and expenditures for the year, the improvement made in the technique of wine raising, the quantity, quality, and probable value of the wine produced by members, and such other information as might prove of value to the public. 4 There were forty-nine general agricultural societies chartered by Missouri legislatures from 1841 to 1861.5 The earliest of these charters, that of the Jackson County Agricultural Society, was the pattern for later incorporations. It was formed for the purposes of improving livestock, encouraging agriculture, and promoting domestic manufactures. 6 In 1853, the state policy of encouraging agriculture was expanded by the incorporation of the Missouri State Agricultural Society. This organization was granted an annual appropriation of one thousand dollars for the purpose of purchasing premiums to be awarded at an annual state fair to be held under its auspices. Important among the functions of the state society was its practice of sending agents to the various counties of the state to encourage farmers to improve their agricultural techniques. 7 Shortly after the establishment of the state society, its officers, led by former Governor Meredith M. Marmaduke and James S. Rollins, began a campaign to obtain an additional one thousand dollars a year from the legislature. A bill for that purpose was rejected by the House of Representatives in 1855 by a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-eight. As was so often the case in Missouri when

116

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

financial assistance was asked of the legislature, opposition to the measure was largely of a sectional nature. Since the annual state fair was held at Boonville, it was argued that an increased appropriation would promote that city and its immediate area at the expense of the rest of the state. 8 The problem of satisfying sectional interests was ironed out at a special session of the legislature in 1855. It was decided at that time to replace the single state agricultural society with a system of five state societies so dispersed as to be satisfactory to all.9 Each society was to hold an annual fair and was to receive one thousand dollars from the state for its first year and five hundred dollars annually for four years thereafter. 10 In addition to the direct financial aid rendered by the legislature to the state organizations, county agricultural societies were given assistance. An act of 1855 provided that when any county association should raise three hundred dollars by its own efforts, the state would donate one hundred dollars to that association. Not more than one hundred dollars would be paid by the state to a society in one year, and the maximum drawn by one association could not exceed three hundred dollars.11 Tobacco and hemp, two of Missouri's leading cash crops for most of the period before the Civil War, 12 received the special attention of the legislature. Governor Alexander McNair devoted a portion of his first annual message in 1821 to the importance of tobacco culture for Missouri. He considered the production of a surplus of that crop for sale in New Orleans to be the best means of reducing the drain of specie from the state. In order to increase the production and improve the quality of Missouri tobacco, the governor recommended the erection of public warehouses and the establishment of inspection stations at convenient points around the state. 13 In accordance with McNair's recommendations, the first General Assembly passed an act establishing and regulating inspection of tobacco. This law provided that no tobacco should be exported from Missouri without first being received and inspected at a public warehouse and then packed in hogsheads or casks under the supervision of the state inspector. The various county

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

117

courts of the state were authorized to provide for the erection of these warehouses, which were to be built by private individuals according to strict specifications as to size, durability, and integrity. Inspectors, who were to be appointed by the county courts of the counties in which they were stationed, were each required to post bonds of one thousand dollars, having first sworn that they would not pass any tobacco that was not sound, wellconditioned, merchantable, and free from trash.14 Severe penalties were assessed for violations of the tobacco law. Any person who sold refused tobacco without an inspector's manifest certifying it as such was to be fined fifty dollars, the money to be divided evenly between the buyer and the county court of the county in which the transaction took place. If uninspected tobacco was shipped to any place outside the state, the exporter was required to pay six and one-fourth cents to his county court for each pound so shipped. For altering the contents of a hogshead of tobacco after it had been inspected, a violator was to be fined one hundred dollars.15 These stringent provisions against the export of uninspected tobacco were apparently unpopular with some growers, as the law was modified at the next session of the General Assembly to permit individuals to ship their crops without inspection.16 The modification of the tobacco law was regarded with dismay by a correspondent of the Missouri Intelligencer, who felt that the state's former bright prospects were dimmed by the failure of the legislature to continue the proper encouragement of tobacco cultivation. Legislative imprudence now made it probable that most of Missouri's tobacco would be shipped without inspection, as no planter would spend money to have his tobacco inspected when he knew that others were not doing so. The result would be a lowering of the character of Missouri tobacco in foreign markets. The writer had heard it said that individuals had an undoubted right to do as they wished with their property, but he regarded as fallacious any doctrine that permitted one member of a community to dispose of his crop in such a manner as to injure the reputation of the whole. If the legislature did not have the power to enact laws for the general good, why were people

118

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

taxed for the support of government? The most surprising feature of the legislature's mistaken policy was that it was adopted in the face of evidence that should have dictated a contrary course. The strict inspection laws of Virginia and Maryland were responsible for the high prices paid for their tobacco, while the absence of such laws in Kentucky explained the poor reputation of its product. 17 Though the improvement of Missouri tobacco continued to be an absorbing topic among the farmers of the state, there was no significant change in state policy toward tobacco marketing until 1843.18 As the market for tobacco had been seriously affected by the crisis of 1837 and the subsequent depression, planters over the state began demanding that the legislature take action to establish a market. The cost of shipping to New Orleans had become prohibitive in relation to the selling price of tobacco.19 Characteristically, the legislature in 1841 attempted to solve the problem by memorializing Congress. The petitioners maintained that as a local interest alone, the tobacco industry had an excellent claim to legislative protection. As a valuable source of national wealth, it "imperiously demanded the fostering care" of the national government. Since it was essential that a foreign market be obtained for American tobacco, Congress should arrange a system of reciprocal treaties with foreign governments. 20 Early in 1843 the legislature took action for the encouragement of a home market for tobacco. A new tobacco law was passed which had as its principal feature the appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars for the establishment of a stateowned and -operated tobacco warehouse in St. Louis.21 The state warehouse played an important role in creating an extensive tobacco market for Missouri growers, and it appears that after it was established little tobacco was exported without inspection.22 Though the public warehouse was not a profitable investment for the state, 23 it continued to operate in competition with private establishments as late as 1852. The editor of the Missouri Republican thought that the state warehouse should be maintained even at an annual loss to the state, because it served to

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

119

regulate the charges connected with the handling of tobacco for inspection and shipment. 24 The legislature in 1849, apparently because of rumored corruption in the administration of the warehouse, authorized the governor to dispose of the property at his discretion.25 Governor Austin King announced in 1852 that he had not considered it wise to sell the tobacco warehouse because he had not received bids commensurate with the rapidly increasing value of the property. There was no hurry, as he saw it, because the state's investment was now in the hands of a faithful and efficient administrator. 26 It appears that King did not question the propriety of state competition with private enterprise in this field, as long as the business was honestly managed and returned a profit to the state. Legislative interposition in behalf of hemp growers was not as extensive as in the case of tobacco, confined as it was to regulating the selling weight of hemp, 27 the chartering of hemp improvement and manufacturing companies,28 and petitioning Congress for federal aid to the industry. 29 Though there was some demand for hemp inspection laws, it appears that a majority of producers and manufacturers were satisfied with marketing conditions.30 Unlike hemp growers, Missouri's producers of pork and beef were apparently not satisfied with the standing of their products in out-of-state markets, for an inspection law was passed by the legislature in 1841, providing for an inspector general of Missouri beef and pork, to be appointed by the governor. The inspector general was to appoint two or more deputies in each county in the state, who were to inspect and classify beef and pork brought to them. The law provided that there should be five grades of merchantable pork and beef, and described in detail the standards required for each grade. Meat presented for inspection was required to be "in a dripping condition" and must be packed in barrels. It was to be well salted with at least two pecks of coarse salt, in addition to being immersed in a pickle consisting of fresh water, salt, and saltpeter. As in the tobacco inspection law, it was also provided that persons who tampered with the inspected product before export or sale were subject to fines.31

120

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

It appears that in the passage of inspection laws before the Civil War, Missouri legislators were concerned primarily with the establishment of a good character for the state's produce in out-of-state markets, rather than with the protection of consumers. Their motives were thus in the tradition established in Massachusetts, New York, and most of the American colonies in the period before the Revolution.32 Careful students of the subject in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have pointed out that these practices and motivations persisted in those states well into the nineteenth century.33 Missouri, as a comparative newcomer among the states whose lawmakers were impressed by the necessity of redressing the "unfavorable balance of trade," retained and strengthened her inspection laws at a time when such laws were being abandoned or altered in emphasis by some of her eastern neighbors.34 The protecting hand of the state was extended to livestock raisers in 1837, when the legislature enacted a law providing that one dollar would be paid out of the state treasury for each wolf killed in Missouri. Any person claiming the state bounty was required to produce a wolf's scalp with the ears intact, and swear before a justice of the peace that the animal had been killed within the state.35 The "wolf-scalp law" was the object of considerable humorous comment by St. Louis legislators, but the bounties paid were not insignificant, amounting to $7,629 in the period 1840-1842 alone.36 Owing to their relatively small numbers, nonagricultural laborers were not a potent state-wide political force in Missouri prior to the Civil War. Nevertheless, legislative intervention was exercised for the benefit of mechanics and workingmen upon several occasions. The first General Assembly enacted laws affecting the status of labor at both its first and second sessions. A "bankrupt law" was passed in 1820, which provided that a debtor might offer to deliver to his creditors all of his real and personal property with the exception of necessary clothing for himself and family, thereby obtaining immunity from imprisonment for debt.37 During the short special session of the legislature in 1821, at which the loan office act was passed, imprisonment for debt

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

121

was abolished in cases where the debt was founded upon a contract.38 In 1825, the legislature extended protection to boatmen employed on Missouri rivers. It was enacted that no commander of a boat or vessel should sell or barter any "flour, biscuit, or other provisions," to a boatman during a voyage made while the latter was employed by the commander. The commander could sell whiskey to his employees only if his prices were reasonable. The total charge for liquor on any single voyage was not to exceed one tenth of the boatman's wages for the same period.39 Labor in Missouri made its greatest political effort and obtained its most conspicuous results of the pre-Civil War period in the early 1840's.40 At a meeting of the Democratic Association in 1840, a mechanic introduced a series of resolutions purporting to set forth the ideas of St. Louis laboring men. He believed that the protection of labor was the first duty of all free governments, since such protection fostered and promoted domestic industry in all its branches. As mechanics and workingmen had always contributed to the existing democratic society, they claimed a right to participate in its processes by instituting legislation favorable to their objectives. Among these objectives were a ten-hour working day and a stronger mechanic's lien law.41 Mechanics and other workingmen met at St. Louis on July 2, 1840, for the purpose of bringing organized pressure on candidates for state office in behalf of labor objectives.42 The group disclaimed all allegiance to or connection with any political party, and resolved to support candidates favorably inclined toward labor's demands, regardless of party.43 The case for favorable labor legislation was presented in St. Louis by the Democratic Missouri Argus and the Daily Pennant. The editor of the latter newspaper, G. G. Foster, believed that mechanics and laboring men should "sway the world" because they were the most numerous class. In a nation governed by majorities, only apathy could prevent them from controlling legislation in their own interest. They had but to exercise their rights at the ballot box to achieve their aspirations.44 Editor A. B. Chambers of the Missouri Republican deplored

122

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

such statements. In his opinion, labor was trying to array class against class. It was regrettable that speakers at mechanics' meetings made sweeping denunciations of professional men, merchants, and rich men generally. Such sentiments were actually degrading to mechanics and laboring men. 45 As a Whig, Chambers was inclined to the opinion that laboring men should regard their interests as identical with those of their employers. In accordance with the procedure announced at the labor meeting of July 2, 1840, a committee of mechanics petitioned the legislature for an improved lien law and the establishment of the ten-hour system in Missouri. The select committee of the House to which the lien law petition was referred submitted an adverse report. William A. Lynch, as spokesman for the House committee, regarded as sufficient the existing law which gave contractors a lien on buildings constructed under their direction. Proposals to extend the principle to subcontractors and laborers were unjust to employers, who might conceivably have to pay several times for the same labor. In addition, litigation would be multiplied, and worse, such a law would interfere with contracts. The Constitution and the spirit of American laws regarded contracts as sacred and not to be tampered with under any circumstances.46 Despite the select committee's recommendation, a law was passed extending to subcontractors a lien for materials furnished, and for work and labor done upon "houses and other edifices." 47 As the ordinary worker was not protected by this act, labor was dissatisfied, and continued to press for more inclusive legislation. Finally, in 1843, workingmen attained their objective with the passage of an act which provided that "every mechanic, artisan, workman, or other person or persons performing work on buildings shall have a lien upon the same, to secure payment for such work done or materials furnished." 48 Missouri workers were less successful in their efforts to obtain legislative endorsement of the ten-hour system. A bill for that purpose, introduced in the House of Representatives in 1841, was rejected by a vote of sixty-three to thirteen. Despite the meager support for the bill generally, the roll call revealed the strong position of labor in St. Louis, as six of the seven members of the

AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

123

solidly Whig delegation from that county supported the radical ten-hour principle. 49 Support for the movement for the abolition of imprisonment for debt, while not restricted to the urban worker in Missouri, was a prominent objective of labor in the United States,50 and was often discussed by Missouri legislators in conjunction with more obviously labor measures such as the mechanics' lien law. Considered from the standpoint of the philosophy of state action, the movement is somewhat difficult to classify. Its abolition could be considered a "restoration" of the natural order. It is well to remember, however, that it was essentially a part of a large movement that in most respects demanded positive state action. Imprisonment for debt was finally and completely abolished in Missouri by the twelfth General Assembly in 1843, acting upon a strong recommendation by Jacksonian Governor Thomas Reynolds.51 The law provided that no person should be arrested, held to bail, or imprisoned "on any means process or execution founded upon any contract or debt whatsoever." 52 After its flurry in the early 1840's, labor gradually dropped political activities in Missouri. Improving business conditions brought full employment at good wages to the working men of the state, and there seemed to be no further necessity for petitions to the legislature and concerted action at the polls.53

VIII CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION IN MISSOURI N Missouri, as in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, the state took an active, positive role in the economic affairs of its citizens during the period before the Civil War, and was not hampered appreciably in this course by laissez-faire or nonintervention theories. Insofar as negative ideas found expression, they tended to be directed at federal, rather than state economic activity. Even then, professed opponents of federal participation in the economy were often pleaders for some special type of intervention.1 In this major area as in others, developments in Missouri were strikingly similar to those in eastern states. It is necessary to note, however, that the development of state policy in Missouri often diverged in concept and in detail from the experience of eastern states. It seems clear that many of these differences can be ascribed to Missouri's relative youth as a state, her remoteness from eastern centers of population and wealth, her smaller financial resources, and the comparatively wide dispersion of her population. For instance, while the promotional role of the state was accepted in Missouri as elsewhere, specific programs were considerably later in developing than in most states, not because the desire for such programs was lacking, but because circumstances prevented their fruition. During the transportation boom of the 'thirties, while Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were accumulating debts rang-

I

CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION

125

ing from $4,290,000 to $24,140,000 for the construction of canals, railways, and turnpikes, Missouri borrowed not one cent for these purposes.2 This despite the fact that enthusiasm for railroads reached a fever pitch in the state in 1836, resulting in the granting of eighteen railroad charters by the ninth General Assembly.3 As has been pointed out earlier, Missouri's resources were far too small to attempt a program of financial aid for the construction of railroads to every corner of the state. Nor was it possible for the state to aid one or two major projects only. The spirit of particularism was too well developed to permit such a course. Legislators demanded quid pro quo for their constituencies whenever suggestions for state expenditures were made, and no section of the state was strong enough to dominate the course of legislation. Though students of state policy have called attention to the pervasiveness of localism as a deterrent to promotional activity in other states during the 1820's and 1830's, it should be noted that despite this type of opposition, state financial aid to transportation enterprises was eventually granted in those states during the 'thirties.4 Localism, if not less pronounced, appears to have been less damaging to improvement programs in the comparatively concentrated population centers of the East than in Missouri with its scattered population. Illinois, of course, in a situation comparable to Missouri's, solved the problem of sectional disaffection by passing an internal improvements act in 1837, providing for the expenditure of over ten million dollars by the state to finance fifteen separate projects calculated to satisfy all sections.5 The crisis and depression of 1837-1843 effectively checked large-scale promotional activity in Missouri until the late 1840's, when changing circumstances and attitudes resulted eventually in the state becoming involved financially in an extensive improvement program. Contributing to this result were the territorial acquisitions after the War with Mexico, the desire of Missourians to share in the expected profits to be obtained from a railroad connection with the Far West, the state's rapidly increasing population and prosperity, and the internal conflict within the dominant Democratic party over the question of the extension of

126

MISSOURI, 1820-1860

slavery and related issues. The attitude of the Bentonian-Jacksonian group toward government had been of fundamental importance in determining the course of state action in Missouri. Small farmers over the state generally, and especially in the newer, frontier sections of the state had rallied around Benton and Jackson as symbols of their distrust of eastern or the home-grown variety of financial and political manipulation. 6 Though these men had not denied the responsibility of the state for promotional activity, they were more cautious than Whigs in advocating specific projects, especially where it appeared that state funds might be used for the benefit of private investors or speculators. This conservative attitude toward promotion did not indicate a hostility toward government. If anything, Missouri's Democratic, "hard-money" farmers were more inclined to favor a strong state government than were their opponents. They desired that the government not be used for the private advantage of individual or corporate wealth, but rather for the protection of "the people" (themselves). Thus, they were inclined to rely more heavily upon the state in its regulatory capacity than in its promotional capacity, as evidenced in their attitudes during the banking and currency struggles of the 1830's and early 1840's. However, when proposed projects promised direct and immediate benefits to agriculture generally, and to their sections or groups particularly — as in the numerous legislative acts for the benefit of farmers throughout the period before 1860 — rural and frontier elements usually gave their support. Conversely, persons of more property, especially in the older areas of the state, tended to favor the promotional, rather than the regulatory, aspects of state policy. Always in the minority in the earlier period, this group controlled many of the more articulate organs of the press, and maintained a drumfire of demand for state financial support of internal improvements. At the same time, they generally opposed the rigorous restrictions upon corporate enterprise that were insisted upon by the majority. With the division of the Democratic party into Benton and anti-Benton factions, the former conservatism toward expenditures of state funds for improvement, already weakening under

CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION

127

the impact of economic pressures, declined at an accelerated rate. Leaders of both groups, in an effort to adopt popular positions on collateral issues, bargained with their Whig adversaries and made public pronouncements favoring expanded promotional activity by the state. Most proposals of this type, however, were accompanied by continued advocacy of strict state regulation and supervision, as shown in the general manufacturing law of 1849, the state-aid and other railroad charters of the 'fifties, and the "free" banking law of 1857. As the policy of extending the state's credit to railroads developed in the 1850's, sectional claims to a share of the bounty were acknowledged by the granting of aid to seven companies whose proposed routes left no important area dissatisfied. The southwest and southeast corners of the state, for instance, whose representatives had shown their displeasure by opposing the state loans to the Hannibal and St. Joseph and the Pacific, were appeased by grants of state funds to the Southwest Branch and the Iron Mountain Branch of the Pacific Railroad. 7 In considering the major implications of this study: that in practice the state assumed a positive role in the economy and was regarded generally as the friend and patron of the people, one should not fall into the error of assuming that the economic activities of the state were the products of a theory of state action. Missourians, perhaps typically among westerners and frontiersmen, if not all Americans, were essentially pragmatic. The measure of a proposed plan of action was its potential utility to the general welfare and to the individual's own section or interest group. When a majority of citizens became convinced in 1836 that a state bank was necessary to their well-being, a bank controlled by the state was created, supported on the one hand by men who opposed state control but felt that they must have a bank, and on the other by men who distrusted all banks, but who hoped to mitigate the apparently necessary evil by supporting state ownership and control. Only a minority center group strongly favored banks generally and the principle of state control. In this manner much of Missouri's economic program was fashioned.

NOTES

C H A P T E R i : LEGISLATIVE B E L I E F I N T H E E C O N O M I C E M E R G E N C Y

OF THE 1820's 1. Floyd C. Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood (Jefferson City: The Hugh Stephens Printing Company, 1916), pp. 166, 254. 2. Constitution of the State of Missouri, 1820 (St. Louis: Isaac N. Henry, 1820), Art. Ill, Sect. 26; Art. VIII; and Art. XIII, 9-10, 22, 25-33. See also F. W. Lehmann, "The Constitution of 1820," Missouri Historical Review, XVI (October 1921), 239-246. 3. Constitution of Missouri, 1820, Art. Ill, Sect. 31; Art. XIII, Sect. 5, 11-12, 25-26. 4. William J. Hamilton, "The Relief Movement in Missouri, 18201822" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1925), pp. 29-30. 5. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, August 14, 1821. 6. Ibid., July 16, 1821. The committee's report was released to this newspaper by Duff Green, Representative from Howard County and a prominent land speculator. 7. John Ray Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri (Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, CII, New York: Columbia University Press, 1923), p. 72. 8. St. Louis, Missouri Gazette, April 18, 1821. 9. Dorothy B. Dorsey, "The Panic of 1819 in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XXIX (January 1935), 86. 10. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, July 9, 1821. 11. A valuation law would have placed a floor under land prices, based upon a "fair and just" valuation of land under execution. Duff Green to the editor, Missouri Intelligencer, July 9, 1821. 12. A similar diagnosis of Missouri's difficulties appeared in the report of the legislative committee which investigated the affairs of the Bank of Missouri. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, July 16, 1821. 13. Ibid., June 4, 1821. Burckhartt's misgivings were typical of the views of many state officeholders, who feared that they would be forced to accept cheap money for their services. 14. Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 46-48.

130

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

15. Buel Leopard and Floyd C. Shoemaker, The Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of the State of Missouri (Columbia: The State Historical Society of Missouri, 1922), I, 65. 16. Ibid., 17-19. Hamilton considers that the relief program was the principal reason for the calling of the special session. Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 49-50. 17. St. Charles Missourian, April 25, 1821. 18. Missouri Laws, Special Session, 1821, p. 11. 19. Ibid., pp. 11-19. See also A. J. McCulloch, "The Loan Office Experiment in Missouri, 1821-36," The University of Missouri Bulletin, XV, no. 24 (Columbia: The University of Missouri, 1914). This account is somewhat colored by the writer's dislike of "paternalism." 20. Missouri Laws, Special Session, 1821, p. 32. 21. St. Louis, Missouri Gazette, July 18, 1821. 22. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, July 9, 1821. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., July 16, 1821. 25. Ibid. The personnel of this gathering was quite heterogeneous if later political alignments are considered. Popular toasts were offered by Hampton L. Boon and John J. Lowry, both hard money Jacksonians at a later day, and by Hamilton R. Gamble, later a prominent Whig lawyer and politician in St. Louis. Robert S. Barr, Sr., who hoped for a long life for Colonel Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, offered the same toast at a prorelief dinner a few days later, and received a rousing response on both occasions. 26. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, July 9, 1821. 27. Ibid., July 31, 1821. 28. Ibid., September 4, 1821. One cannot be certain, of course, that these letter-writers were always what they professed to be. Certainly Duff Green was responsible, directly or indirectly, for many of the prorelief letters. 29. Ibid., September 25, 1821. 30. Ibid. 31. One of the causes of the failure of the Bank of Missouri had been excessive borrowing by its directors. Thomas Hart Benton appears to have taken advantage of his directorial office to borrow $13,000 which was never repaid. See Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, pp. 72-74. 32. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, October 9, 1821. A speciepaying bank had been suggested by conservative bank men at the special session in June. See Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 63-66, and the Missouri House Journal, Special Session, 1821, p. 77. 33. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, September 4, 1821.

L E G I S L A T I V E R E L I E F IN T H E 1 8 2 0 ' S

131

34. Ibid. 35. Ibid., October 2, 1821. 36. Ibid., October 16, 1821. 37. Ibid., October 23, 1821. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., communication signed "Brutus." 40. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, October 23, 1821. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., November 13, 1821. The election to fill the vacancy from Howard County actually was held in four counties: Boone, Chariton, and Ray had been created out of Howard at the first session of the General Assembly in November, 1820. Missouri Laws, 1820-1821, pp. 21-26. 43. Governor Alexander McNair's first annual message, November 6, 1821, in Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 20-22. 44. Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 92-93. 45. Missouri Laws, 1821-1822, p. 58. Auditor's Warrants were receipts for services rendered to the state. 46. Missouri Laws, 1821-1822, pp. 52-56. 47. Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 101-102. 48. Missouri Laws, 1821-1822, pp. 46-52. 49. St. Louis, Missouri Gazette, May 23, 30, 1821. Land would not bring one twentieth of its value at sheriff's sales, according to the Gazette. 50. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, March 19, 1822. 51. Hamilton, "Relief Movement in Missouri," pp. 164-165. 52. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, March 26, 1822. Communication signed "Jacobus." 53. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, March 26, 1822. 54. St. Louis, Missouri Gazette, March 6, 1822. 55. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 2829. 56. Missouri Laws, 1822-1823, pp. 8-9. The loan to Neziah Bliss for his iron works was also rescinded. Ibid., p. 9. 57. 1 Missouri State Reports 452 (1824). 58. 1 Missouri State Reports 458 (1824). 59. 1 Missouri State Reports 633, 635 (1826). In January, 1830, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Craig v. Missouri, ruled that the loan office law was unconstitutional, and that notes given by borrowers of the certificates were not subject to collection by the state. 4 Peters 410 (1830). This decision was bitterly resented by many Missourians, including Governor John Miller, who remarked that the state had sustained a great financial loss by a four to three decision

132

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

of the federal court. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 145. 60. George JR. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 18151860 (vol. IV of The Economic History of the United States, New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951), p. 337. 61. Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), pp. 204-205. Missouri's ties with Kentucky were very close. Most of the immigration to Missouri during the latter years of the territorial period was from Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee. Rare indeed were settlers in Missouri River Counties with no relatives in Kentucky. See William O. Lynch, "The Influence of Population Movements on Missouri before 1861," Missouri Historical Review, XVI (July 1922), 506-516, or Hattie M. Anderson, "Missouri, 18041828: Peopling a Frontier State," Missouri Historical Review, XXXI (January 1937), 150-180. 62. William Francis English, The Pioneer Lawyer and Jurist in Missouri (University of Missouri Studies, XXI, Columbia: The University of Missouri, 1947), p. 87. 63. In September, 1842, ex-Governor Lilbum W. Boggs, a Jackson Democrat of western Missouri, published a plan "for the relief of hard times," which was almost an exact copy of the old loan office scheme. Columbia Patriot, November 4, 1842. 64. The loan office was modeled upon the loan banks so prevalent in the colonial period, such as those adopted in South Carolina in 1714, Rhode Island in 1715, and Georgia in 1755. See Chester W. Wright, Economic History of the United States (New York: McGrawHill Company, 1941), p. 171.

C H A P T E R I I : T H E BANK O F T H E STATE O F MISSOURI

1. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 103. 2. Constitution of Missouri, 1820, Art. VIII, 22. 3. Davis R. Dewey, State Banking before the Civil War, National Monetary Commission, IV, no. 2, Senate Document no. 581, 61 Cong., 2 Sess., 35. 4. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 106. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., pp. 106-107. 7. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 166167, 181-183. 8. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, November 9, 1833. Jackson newspapers were all "collar presses," according to this editor. 9. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, June 28, 1834.

BANK O F T H E S T A T E O F M I S S O U R I

133

10. Ibid., February 7, 1835. 11. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 242244. 12. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, January 14, 1834. Article copied from the Jeffersonian Republican of Jefferson City. 13. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, December 10, 1833. Senator Benton's hard money views were certainly well known to Missourians at this time, but he made no attempt to play an active role in the state bank struggle. He was engaged in a fight to the death against the Bank of the United States, and agreed with President Jackson that the state banks would have to wait their turn. Also, the Missouri constitution was insurance against indiscriminate state banking. See Clarence H. McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Renton (George Peabody College for Teachers Contributions to Education, no. 37, Nashville: George Peabody College, 1927), pp. 12-13. 14. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, November 4, 1834. 15. Cable, The Rank of the State of Missouri, pp. 118-119. 16. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, February 21, 1835. The bill had passed the Senate by a vote of ten to nine, and was rejected by the House, thirty-seven to twenty-three. 17. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, February 14, 1835. 18. Ibid., February 21, 1835. 19. Ibid. 20. Roonville Herald, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, May 9, 1835. In agreeing with the sentiments expressed by the Boonvifle paper, the editor of the Intelligencer commented that he could not collect money owed for subscriptions and could not much longer "abide such a state of things." 21. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, August 26, 1836. 22. Ibid. 23. Jackson, Southern Advocate, quoted in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, May 13, 1836. 24. "Message to the Voters," St. Louis, Missouri Argus, May 20, 1836. 25. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 313-316. 26. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, December 30, 1836. This analysis of the contending interests is somewhat arbitrary, and is based on the views of Representative James B. Bowlin of St. Louis, a Democratic state bank advocate. The three groups were loose-knit coalitions, at best. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., December 23, 1836. 29. Ibid., December 30, 1836.

134

N O T E S TO CHAPTER II

30. Ibid., December 23, 1836. 31. Ibid. 32. Louisiana, Salt River Journal, quoted in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, January 13, 1837. 33. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 11-24. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 140. 40. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, December 23, 1836. 41. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 11-24. 42. Ibid. The charter of the Bank of the State of Missouri was much more conservative than most contemporary state bank charters. Missouri's early and unfortunate banking experience combined with observation of results in other states, helped to bring this about. Stateowned and -operated banks in Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, and Mississippi were notably inefficient and reckless. See Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, pp. 145-160, and Leonard C. Helderman, National and State Banks (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1931), pp. 84-87. 43. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, February 17, 1837. 44. Ibid., July 11, 1837. See also McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton, pp. 13-14. 45. In his many speeches on banking and financial matters, Benton often expressed his dislike for small banknotes. Usually he set the lower limit at twenty dollars, though he averred at times that he preferred a minimum denomination of one hundred dollars. For example, see his letter to the citizens of Franklin County, Ohio, which appeared in the Cincinnati Republican of January 3, 1835; quoted in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, February 12, 1836. See also McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton, p. 13. 46. Some Democrats consistently professed to be against all banks, even completely state-owned banks, but they conceded that state ownership and control reduced the evil. See communication signed "Ninety-Eight," in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, January 20, 1837. 47. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, January 2, 1837. Missourians had become well acquainted with "shaving" by merchants during the loan office days, and had continued the experience with the depreciated paper of adjoining states in subsequent years. See Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 109. 48. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, January 2, 1837. 49. Ibid.

S T A T E AND C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 7

135

50. Ibid., January 3, 1837. 51. Ibid., January 6, 1837. 52. Ibid., January 12, 1837. It is interesting to note that the hardmoney leader, Thomas Hart Benton, repudiated Adam Smith during a Senate debate on January 27, 1837. Register of Debates, TwentyFourth Congress, Second Session, pp. 589-590. 53. Representative Thomas cited Biddle in support of his position in favor of real estate loans. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, January 2, 1837. 54. Indiana, Iowa, and South Carolina, as well as Missouri, operated sound and successful state banks. See Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 317-318. 55. A branch office of the Commercial Bank of Cincinnati, established at St. Louis in 1835 to succeed the Branch Bank of the United States, incurred the hostility of Missourians by transferring specie to Cincinnati. Shoemaker, Missouri and Missourians, pp. 500-501. 56. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, p. 317. Massachusetts abandoned mixed-enterprise banking in 1820, and Pennsylvania disposed of the greater part of her stock in banks and other corporations in 1843. See Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, Commonwealth, A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774r-1861 (New York: New York University Press, 1947), pp. 98-99, and Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 40-41.

CHAPTER I I I : STATE POLICY TOWARD CORPORATIONS,

1820-1847

1. Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), I, 8-9. An exception to the general rule was New Jersey, where the first governor disputed the doctrine that the legislature had the exclusive privilege of granting charters. After a brief skirmish, the gubernatorial pretensions were annihilated. See John W. Cadman, Jr., The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-1875 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 3-5. 2. For the most complete discussion of the Missouri Constitution of 1820, see Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood, pp. 212253. 3. Constitution of Missouri, 1820, 22. This clause constituted implicit recognition of the legislative authority to grant corporate charters. This authority had been exercised by the territorial legislature. 4. Halvor G. Melom, "The Economic Development of St. Louis,

136

CHAPTER III

1803-1846" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri, 1947), pp. 186-198. 5. See Dwight H. Brown, editor, Corporations Chartered or Organized under the Territorial Laws and by Act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, 1803-1865 (Jefferson City: Midland Printing Company, 1934). This information has been organized chronologically by Simon F. Kropp in "The Struggle for Limited Liability and General Incorporation Laws in Missouri to 1849" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1939), Chart I, p. 9. 6. Brown, Corporations Chartered in Missouri, 1803-1865. 7. The corporate mechanism was recognized as an instrument of public policy in Massachusetts at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1780, and even earlier. It was commonly assumed in that state that the general purpose of all corporations was to benefit society. See Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, pp. 98-99. 8. Missouri Laws, 1831, pp. 44-48. Louis C. Hunter has called attention to the efforts of the federal, state, and local governments to provide medical care for sick and disabled seamen on western rivers, beginning in 1802. He concludes that despite many difficulties and failures, the program helped the seamen considerably. Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 461-464. 9. Missouri Laws, 1831, pp. 44-48. 10. Ibid., 1826-1827, pp. 8-12. 11. Ibid., 1832-1833, p. 22. 12. Ibid., p. 32. 13. Ibid., 1831, pp. 60-64. 14. Private and Local Acts of Missouri, 1834-1835, pp. 57-60. 15. Ibid., pp. 88-90. 16. Ibid., pp. 61-64. 17. For example, see Missouri House Journal, 1826-1827, p. 112, or Missouri Senate Journal, 1832-1833, pp. 140, 158. 18. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 307308. 19. Brown, Corporations Chartered in Missouri, 1803-1865. 20. Ibid. 21. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 173-179. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., pp. 238-244. 24. Ibid., pp. 247-253. 25. Ibid., pp. 260-263. 26. Ibid., p. 263. 27. Ibid., pp. 265-271.

STATE AND CORPORATION, 1820-1847

137

28. Ibid., pp. 277-280. 29. Ibid., pp. 271-276. 30. Ibid., pp. 282-288. 31. Ibid., pp. 253-260. 32. Missouri House Journal, 1836-1837, p. 260. Other charters received even less opposition. The St. Louis and Fayette Railroad Act was passed by a vote of fifty-six to six. Ibid., p. 261. 33. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 293-294. 34. Ibid., pp. 301-303. 35. Editorial on "Incorporations," in the St. Charles Clarion, reprinted in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, March 3, 1837. The phrase, originally connoting nursery bug bears, was commonly used in early Missouri writing and speaking by those who wished to accuse opponents of demagoguery. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, February 3, 1837. 39. Jefferson City, Jefferson Inquirer, reprinted in the St. Louis Missouri Argus, March 22, 1839. 40. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, February 22, 1839. 41. Ibid., January 31, 1839. 42. Brown, Corporations Chartered in Missouri, 1803-1865. 43. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 179. 44. Melom, "The Economic Development of St. Louis, 18031846," p. 261. 45. Ibid., pp. 261-262. 46. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, October 16, 1840. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., October 20, 1840. 49. Ibid., November 22, 1839. 50. Ibid., April 21, 1840. 51. Ibid., December 5, 1840. 52. Ibid. 53. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 454. 54. Ibid., 454-456. 55. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, December 5, 1840. 56. Ibid., December 29, 1840. 57. Ibid. 58. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, April 12, 1841. A study of the vote on the Mine La Motte charter gives no evidence of a city against country battle. The bill was defeated by a vote of fifty-six to thirty-one, with the St. Louis delegation registering five nays to one aye, with one absent. Democrat Joshua Redman of Howard County, a bitter enemy of the insurance companies, favored the Mine La Motte charter. Four

138

CHAPTER III

representatives from the Whig county of Boone voted aye. Most of the members from the thinly-populated newer counties joined with St. Louis in opposition to the bill. It appears that neither ideological, sectional, nor party considerations were decisive. Missouri House Journal, 1840-1841, p. 381. 59. McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Benton, p. 19. 60. See the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, January 20, 1843, the Boonville Missouri Register, October 3, 1843, or the St. Louis Missouri Reporter, September 15, 1843. The term "Softs," as used by Missourians in the 1840's, does not admit of exact definition. Presumably it referred to those in opposition to the extreme hard money philosophy, but it was often applied indiscriminately to any Democrat who ventured to vote with St. Louis business interests occasionally. Softs were supposed to be in sympathy with the banking activities of the St. Louis corporations. 61. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, p. 25. 62. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 63. Brown, Corporations Chartered in Missouri, 1803-1865. 64. See Priscilla Bradford, "The Missouri Constitutional Controversy of 1845" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1936), p. 36. A condensed version of Miss Bradford's thesis appeared in the Missouri Historical Review, XXXII (October 1937), 35-55. 65. Journal of the Convention of the State of Missouri, 1845 (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845), appendix, p. 8. 66. Constitution of the State of Missouri, 1845 (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845), pp. 17-18. 67. Journal of the Convention of Missouri, 1845, appendix, pp. 8 10. 68. Robert W. Wells, A Review of the New Constitution of the State of Missouri (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845), p. 8. Some of the early charters had contained provisions for unlimited individual liability of stockholders. See the charter of the Cape Girardeau Mill Company, Missouri Laws, 1826-1827, p. 9. By 1836, the common practice was to omit mention of liability in charters. Though there appear to have been no court decisions in Missouri on the question, it was generally assumed that failure to include an individual liability provision was equivalent to a provision for limited liability. For example, see the charters of the Perpetual Insurance Company, the Farmers' and Mechanics' Insurance Company, and the Hannibal, Paris, and Grand River Railroad Company. Missouri Laws, 18361837, pp. 189-192, 215-216, and 238-244. In Massachusetts, it was generally understood by the 1820's that individuals were not responsible for corporate debts unless the corporate charter expressly pro-

STATE A N D C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0

139

vided for such liability. See Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, p.158. 69. Wells, Review of the New Missouri Constitution, p. 8. 70. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 48-49. 71. Springfield Advertiser, May 31, 1845. 72. See Bradford, "The Missouri Constitutional Controversy of 1845," pp. 50-53. 73. St. Louis, Missouri Reporter, January 5, 1846. 74. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, January 9, 1846. 75. See Bradford, "The Missouri Constitutional Controversy of 1845," pp. 156-163. 76. Kropp, "Limited Liability and General Incorporation Laws in Missouri to 1849," p. 9. 77. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, December 15, 1846. 78. Missouri House Journal, 1846-1847, pp. 142-143. 79. Missouri Laws, 1846-1847, pp. 188-189. 80. Ibid., pp. 168-170.

CHAPTER IV: STATE A N D CORPORATION,

1848-1860

1. Fifth Census of the United States, 1830, pp. 162-163. 2. Missouri census figures for 1844 are included in the Missouri Senate Journal, 1844-1845, pp. 275-276. Missouri's population was probably not underestimated by the state census-takers, though the total seems reasonable when compared with the official Federal enumeration of 383,702 in 1840. Sixth Census of the United States, 1840, p. 418. 3. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 8081.

4. Ibid., pp. 103-106. 5. Ibid., p. 108. 6. Ibid., pp. 108-111. Edwards' arguments support the thesis that Democrats favored general incorporation laws as instruments for the destruction of monopoly and the establishment of equality. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), p. 337. 7. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 111. 8. Ibid., pp. 244-247. 9. This committee, which was so concerned with the increase of manufacturing in the state, was composed of three farmers and a lawyer, none of whom were from St. Louis. Chairman Norris, however, had been in business in Boston and New York before becoming a

140

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R IV

Missouri farmer. In 1855 he established a mercantile business in Trenton, and became known eventually as the "Carnegie of Grundy County." See James E. Ford, A History of Grundy County (Trenton, Missouri: News Publishing Company, 1908), pp. 202-203. 10. Missouri Senate Journal, 1848-1849, appendix, p. 188. 11. Ibid., pp. 193-194. 12. Ibid., p. 194. 13. Ibid., pp. 194-195. 14. Ibid., p. 195. While there is no direct evidence that the members of the Senate committee or Governor Edwards had studied the general incorporation laws of other states, it seems likely that they had some knowledge of corporation legislation as it had developed in the East. General corporation laws had been adopted in New Jersey as follows: religious societies (1786), societies for the promotion of learning (1794), manufacturing companies (1816), benevolent and charitable associations (1844), manufacturing companies again in 1846, and mutual savings companies (1847). See Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey, p. 445. Connecticut adopted a general law permitting incorporation "for any lawful business" in 1837. The general incorporation principle was then successively adopted by Maryland in 1838, New Jersey in 1846, Pennsylvania in 1849, and Indiana and Massachusetts in 1851. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 136. Berle and Means do not consider the New Jersey law of 1816 to be a "modern" type of general law. 15. Missouri Senate Journal, 1848-1849, p. 478. 16. Missouri House Journal, 1848-1849, p. 546. 17. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 18-24. 18. See Kropp, "Limited Liability and General Incorporation Laws in Missouri to 1849," pp. 105-106. 19. Cadman, The Corporation in New Jersey, p. 126. 20. Ibid., pp. 128-151. 21. Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860, pp. 40-41. 22. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth-.Massachusetts, pp. 234235. Special chartering also continued in Connecticut after a general incorporation law had been passed in 1837. William C. Kessler, "Incorporation in New England: A Statistical Study, 1800-1875," Journal of Economic History, VIII (May 1948), 43-14, 46. 23. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, March 19, 1849. 24. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 134-384. The pages cited include nothing but charters of incorporation. 25. Ibid. 26. Missouri Laws, 1850-1851, pp. 66-182, 285-293, 310-488.

STATE AND C O R P O R A T I O N , 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 0

141

Only corporation charters included on these pages. 27. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 28. Ibid., pp. 66-182, 310-488. 29. Ibid., pp. 259-261. 30. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, February 28, 1851. 31. Ibid., February 14, 1851. 32. Missouri Laws, 1852-1853, pp. 16-72,185-375. 33. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 34. Missouri Laws, 1854-1855, pp. 260-263, 265-266, 410-411. 35. Ibid., pp. 28-132, 196-440. 36. Brown, Corporations Chartered in Missouri, 1803-1865. 37. Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, p. 655. 38. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, p. 287. 39. Sixth Census of the United States, 1840, p. 90. 40. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, p. 297. 41. Jefferson Inquirer, February 3, 1849. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Missouri Senate Journal, 1848-1849, p. 258. 45. Missouri Senate Journal, 1858-1859, appendix, pp. 434-435. 46. Ibid., pp. 432-433. 47. Ibid., pp. 433-434. 48. Missouri Senate Journal, 1858-1859, p. 98. 49. Missouri House Journal, 1858-1859, p. 287. The journals of the succeeding legislative session give no evidence of further consideration of this bill, nor does the charter appear in Missouri Laws to 1865. 50. Wells, Review of the New Missouri Constitution, p. 2. 51. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, pp. 241-246. 52. This term was used by Senator Benton to illustrate the impossibility of compromise with the "plotters" and "agents of Calhoun" who were bent on destroying him and the Union itself. See Benton's famous speech, the "Appeal to the People of Missouri," delivered at Jefferson City, May 26, 1849, in the Jefferson Inquirer, June 2, 1849. 53. Letter from A. S. Mitchell to Abiel Leonard at Fayette, Missouri, dated September 3, 1852 (Leonard Manuscripts, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri). Mitchell had attended a caucus at which Whig leader James O. Broadhead had explained the details of the 1850 bargain. 54. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, February 28, 1851. 55. Ibid., May 28, 1852. 56. J. Claude Jones, "The Status of the Whig Party in Missouri from 1848-1854" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1930), pp. 157-158.

142

N O T E S T O C H A P T E R IV

57. Jefferson Inquirer, February 2, 1853. 58. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, January 21, 1853. 59. McClure, Opposition in Missouri to Benton, p. 204. 60. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 413-414. 61. Ibid., 415-416. 62. Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, pp. 249-250. 63. The Missouri Constitution of 1820 provided that any amendment proposed by both houses of the General Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of each house, having been published in all the newspapers of the state three times within twelve months of the next general election, might be voted on at the next session of the legislature after the election, and ratified and adopted by a two-thirds vote of each house. Constitution of Missouri, 1820, 24-25. 64. Missouri Laws, 1854-1855, pp. 4-5. 65. Missouri Senate Journal, 1854-1855, p. 265. 66. Missouri House Journal, 1854-1855, p. 459. 67. Ibid. Political affiliations of House members were obtained from the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, October 13, 1854. 68. Letter from James S. Rollins to Abiel Leonard at Fayette, Missouri, dated November 27, 1854 (Abiel Leonard Manuscripts, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri). 69. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, III, 14. 70. Missouri Laws, 1856-1857, p. 14. 71. Ninety-seven to twenty-five in the House; Twenty-four to six in the Senate. Missouri House Journal, 1856-1857, p. 110; Missouri Senate Journal, 1856-1857, pp. 80-81. 72. Missouri Laws, 1856-1857, pp. 26-30. 73. Ibid., pp. 14-23. 74. Ibid., p. 15. 75. See Cable, The Bank of the State of Missouri, p. 251. 76. Ibid., p. 258. CHAPTER V: INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,

1820-1846

1. Constitution of Missouri, 1820, Article VII, 21-22. 2. Jonas Viles, "Missouri in 1820," Missouri Historical Review, XV (October 1920), 42. 3. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, January 7, 1820. The "main road" referred to was the Boon's Lick Trail from St. Charles to Franklin. See Howard L. Conard, editor, Encyclopedia of the History of Missouri, a Compendium of History and Biography for Ready Reference (6 vols. New York: Southern History Company, 1901), V, 367. 4. Often called the road and canal fund.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

143

5. Laws of the United States Relating to Public Lands, p. 567. John Scott, Missouri's Territorial Delegate to Congress, and later her first Representative in Congress, published an address in 1820, explaining the importance of his contribution toward "obtaining liberal grants and concessions to the state," for the purpose of internal improvement. 6. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 34. The principal deterrent to state improvement in the 1820's was emphasized by the St. Louis Enquirer, which commented on January 13, 1824, that " . . . the Missouri River is our great road, it has been made some six thousand years, and now wants twenty or thirty thousand dollars to repair it. Let it not be said that this should be done by the state. That our treasury is empty, is a fact which we could not disguise if we would, and if it were full, we could, with as much propriety require of Virginia, Pennsylvania, New-York and New England, to build the ships and erect the forts which protect their trade and defend their cities, as they can refuse an appropriation for the purpose under consideration." 7. Missouri House Journal, 1821-1822, p. 11. 8. Edward C. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri, 18201850" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1932), p. 87. 9. Ibid., p. 90. 10. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 135. 11. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," p. 92. 12. Ibid., p. 90. 13. The appellation "state road" was of some value in itself. As Dr. William Jewell, a legislator from Boone County, put it, "a state road in any county was always a road of character. The name conferred presupposes and implies something of preference — a greater expenditure, at least, of money and labor on the same, to make it better than ordinary; whether such be the case or not." Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, June 24, 1834. 14. A law of 1822 provided that "no [road] shall be laid out of a greater width than fifty feet, nor less than twenty-five feet, and . . . all roads shall be cleared of trees one foot through, and of brush and limbs of trees which may incommode horsemen or carriages, and that no stump shall exceed one foot in height, and that all wet ground or small water courses shall be causewayed or bridged . . . ," Missouri Laws, 1822-1823, pp. 23-25. 15. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer March 10, 1832. 16. Opposition in Missouri to the American System was rather inconsistent. A number of professed Jacksonians were among its staunchest advocates. For example, Colonel William H. Ashley, candi-

144

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R V

date for Congress in 1831, favored Andrew Jackson, recharter of the United States Bank, internal improvements by the general government in the construction of public highways, and the protection of home industry by tariffs. Ashley's principal opponent, Robert W. Wells, was also for Jackson, against rechartering the United States Bank, against any tariff "beyond such a one as shall secure to the nation revenue for the support of government, and the production of articles essential to the national defence," and opposed to internal improvements "which shall increase the taxation, directly or indirectly, which the General Government has the right to impose; except such improvements as may be carried on to the completion of the national road already begun." Wells also favored federal improvement of important rivers and harbors. Though Wells was the official candidate of the district Jackson convention held at Columbia, Ashley was elected. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, October 1 and 8, 1831, and the Jeffersonian Republican, November 26, 1831. Ashley's advocacy of Jackson may have been merely expediency, but even Wells appears to have been no bitter opponent of tariffs and internal improvements. The pattern was repeated in 1833 when Dr. John Bull of Howard County was elected as a friend of Jackson, though he favored recharter of the United States Bank, federal internal improvements, and a protective tariff. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, July 19 and August 13,1833. 17. Missouri Laws, 1828-1829, pp. 72-74. 18. Ibid., p. 74. 19. Missouri Laws, 1830-1831, pp. 120-121. 20. Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, March 5, 1831. 21. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has expressed the opinion that Jackson's opposition to internal improvements was basically unpopular throughout the West. The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), pp. 58, 206. In 1834, Governor Daniel Dunklin, an extreme Jacksonian, expressed his disapproval of the government's dilatory policy in connection with the national road as follows: "Because it is the fortune of this state to be situated at one of the extremities of the Union, shall she therefore be treated as a stranger in the Federal family, and be doomed to the mortification of seeing herself neglected by those from whom she expected demonstrations of paternal care?" Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 256. 22. See the Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, November 8, 1834. 23. Missouri Laws, 1832-1833, pp. 71-74. 24. See Governor John Miller's Third Biennial Address of November 20, 1832. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 168. 25. Louisiana, Missouri, Salt River Journal, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Intelligencer, February 21, 1835.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

145

26. Edward J. White, "A Century of Transportation in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XV (October 1920), 143. 27. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, February 12, 1836. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., February 26,1836. 30. Jefferson City, Jeffersonian Republican, February 27, 1836. 31. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," p. 128. 32. The Argus favored a state bank, but feared that St. Louis Whigs might try to capitalize upon the popularity of internal improvements to fasten "the wrong kind of a bank," that is, an irresponsible privately owned and controlled bank, upon the people. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, March 11, 1836. 33. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, March 11, 1836. 34. Corbin proposed five railroads, all leading to St. Louis from various parts of the state. One was to originate from some cheap source of wood and coal, a second from the iron, lead, zinc, copper, and marble deposits south and west of the city, a third from Fayette in central Missouri, a fourth from Greene County in the southwest, and a fifth from Independence through Franklin County. These were the most important, but other roads would naturally follow. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, March 11, 1836. 35. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, March 11, 1836. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. The chairman of the convention of March 3, 1836, was Dr. Samuel Merry, a Democrat, and the committee which drew up the report was headed by Whig Mayor John F. Darby. See John F. Darby, Personal Recollections (St. Louis: G. I. Jones and Company, 1880), pp. 201-205. 40. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, March 18, 1836. 41. Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates for the Promotion of Internal Improvements within the State of Missouri (St. Louis: Charles Keemle, 1836), pp. 1-2. 42. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, April 22, 1836. 43. Proceedings of a Convention for Internal Improvements, pp. 17-18. 44. Ibid. A committee headed by James S. Rollins of Boone County drafted a memorial to Congress requesting the land grant. It emphasized the potential value of Missouri iron deposits to the United States. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," p. 133; White, "A Century of Transportation in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XV, 143. This request for a land grant to Missouri was nothing new; Senator Benton, on December 23, 1835, had introduced a bill providing

146

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

for a 500,000-acre grant to the state. Over Benton's protests, opponents in the Senate succeeded in combining his bill with Henry Clay's distribution bill. The combined bills were postponed indefinitely upon motion of Clay himself. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," pp. 63-65. 45. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, June 10, 1836. Dr. Cannon was supported by the Argus. 46. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, June 24, 1836. Though Jones was a Whig, he did not commit himself to a choice for President. 47. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, May 20, 1836. Boggs' opponent, Congressman William H. Ashley, was an advocate of internal improvements by both the federal and state governments. 48. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, June 10, 1836. 49. Jefferson City, Jeffersonian Republican, March 26, 1836. 50. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, August 26, 1836. 51. John Miller was elected governor in 1825 to complete the unexpired term of Frederick Bates, who had died in office. His administration was so popular that he was reelected without opposition in 1828 for a full term of four years. See Perry S. Rader's article, "John Miller," in Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 103-110. 52. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, June 3, 1836. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. According to the Argus, everyone favored internal improvements by the state. Interference by the general government in local improvement was not wanted by most Missourians, though they favored the making of clearly national improvements. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, July 8, 1836. 57. The most conspicuous success was the Erie Canal, built by the state of New York at a total expenditure of about $10,000,000. Begun in 1817, it was open for navigation from the Hudson River to Lake Erie by 1825. Tolls amounted to $1,500,000 in its better years, enabling the state to recover $1,000,000 a year for interest and retirement of the canal debt. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and other states also had extensive canal systems. Over $100,000,000 was spent by state governments on canals before 1850. Kent T. Healy, "American Transportation before the War between the States," in Harold F. Williamson, editor, The Growth of the American Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1944), pp. 176-178. 58. The suggested routes were: First, "a route commencing at, or near, the western boundary line, on the south side of the Missouri River, passing through the intermediated counties to Boonville, and to the city of Jefferson, thence through the mineral region, to terminate

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1820-1846

147

at some point on the Mississippi River, below where that stream is usually blocked with ice; and in the direction of the most direct practicable route to the contemplated railroad from Charleston, South Carolina, to Cincinnati, Ohio." Second, "a route commencing at, or near our western boundary, on the north side of the Missouri River, passing through the several counties bordering on or adjacent to the same, to Fayette, from thence to St. Charles, and the city of St. Louis to Potosi, intersecting the first mentioned route at the latter place." Third, "a route from some prominent point in the northern part of our state, passing through the rich country of Salt River, crossing the route which runs parallel with the Missouri River on the north side and intersecting that on the south, at the City of Jefferson." Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamatkms, I, 317-319. 59. Missouri Senate Journal, 1836-1837, p. 70. Paul W. Gates has noted that Missouri's intentions were greater than her capacity, in "The Railroads of Missouri, 1850-1870," Missouri Historical Review, XXVI (January 1932), 128. See also Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," p. 138. 60. Frederick N. Judson, A Treatise upon the Law and Practice of Taxation in Missouri (Columbia: E. W. Stephens, 1900), p. 38. 61. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, pp. 6 5 66. 62. Counties were permitted by law to levy taxes on property at a rate of eight and one-third cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation prior to 1837. At the session of 1836-1837, the rate was increased to twelve and one-half cents. Judson, Taxation in Missouri, p. 38. 63. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 234-288. The major roads chartered were the Hannibal, Paris, and Grand River, from the Mississippi River to the Missouri River, with a capital stock of $1,000,000; the Louisiana and Columbia, from the Mississippi to Boone County, capital, $1,000,000; the Mineral Railroad, from St. Louis through Potosi to Caledonia in Washington County, capital, $2,000,000; and the Southern, from the iron mines in Washington County to the Mississippi at Cape Girardeau, capital, $1,500,000. The other roads were short line affairs, with capital stock authorized from $25,000 to $600,000. 64. Lucinda de L. Templin, "The Development of Railroads in Missouri to 1860" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1915), p. 9. 65. Missouri Laws, 1838-1839, pp. 15-17. 66. Ibid., pp. 67-75. 67. Ibid. 68. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, November 27, 1840. 69. Ibid.

148

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

70. Ibid. 71. The position of the Argus in 1840 approximated that of the Jejfersonian Republican in 1836. It seems probable that an important segment of the party had felt as the Jeffersonian did, even at the height of the railroad agitation. 72. St. Louis, Missouri Argus, July 12, 1838. 73. Gerard Schultz, "Steamboat Navigation on the Osage River before the Civil War," Missouri Historical Review, XXIX (April 1935), 176-181. 74. Springfield, Ozark Standard, quoted in the St. Louis, Missouri Argus, October 2, 1840. 75. Schultz, "Steamboat Navigation on the Osage," p. 184. 76. St. Louis, Missouri RepuMican, May 21, 1841. 77. Warsaw, Osage Banner, May 13,1841, quoted in the St. Louis, Missouri Republican, May 21, 1841. 78. Columbia Patriot, January 15, 1842. 79. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," p. 105. The grant was accepted by the Missouri legislature in February, 1843. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, p. 400. 80. Lowrey, "Public Improvements in Missouri," pp. 106-108. See also the Columbia, Missouri Statesman of February 7, 1845, for a report of the legislative debates concerning the disposal of the internal improvement fund. 81. Missouri Revised Statutes, 1845, p. 356. A triumph for the over-represented newer counties. 82. See Gates, "The Railroads of Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XXVI, 128-129, and Dorothy B. Dorsey, "The Panic and Depression of 1837-1843 in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XXX (October 1935), 157-161. Miss Dorsey comments that the economic revival had made Missouri once again a "poor man's heaven." 83. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, October 17,1845. The Howard County delegation included a prominent Whig, Abiel Leonard; a leading Hard Democrat, Dr. John J. Lowry; and a political maverick, Weston F. Birch. 84. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, October 24, 1845. 85. Ibid. Whigs were bitter about Missouri's state debt, which reached over $2,000,000 in January, 1846, with nothing to show for it except "an aristocratic state house" and a hard money bank. As one editor put it: "Ye have heard it said in modern times that the Whigs are for a public debt, and democracy hates it; 'tell it not in Gath, proclaim it not in the streets of Ascalon,' that Democratic Missouri, giving 10,000 majority for the hero of the young democracy [James K. Polk] against her old friend Henry Clay of old bank-loving, debtloving Kentucky, owes a debt of two million and upwards." Bowling

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

149

Green, Missouri Journal, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, January 16, 1846. The Statesman of May 23, 1845, carried an article from the Missouri Republican, attacking the "Locofoco" debt in similar terms. 86. Of the total of 110,165 persons listed as employed in Missouri in the 1840 census, 83.9 per cent were engaged in agriculture. Comparative figures for other states show Massachusetts with 41.3 per cent, New Jersey with 62.5 per cent, and Pennsylvania with 60 per cent employed in agriculture. Computed from the Sixth Census of the United States, pp. 50,136,185,418. 87. The rate of taxation on property was reduced from sixteen and two-thirds cents to twelve and one-half cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation at the "railroad session" of 1836-1837. Judson, Taxation in Missouri, p. 38.

CHAPTER

vi:

INTERNAL· IMPROVEMENTS,

1847-1860

1. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 75. Edwards believed that encouragement of common schools would facilitate the development of internal improvements. If the people were educated, they would understand the necessity for better transportation. "Send the school-master into every village and hamlet in the land," said the governor. 2. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 63. 3. House debate reported in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, December 11, 1846. 4. Missouri Laws, 1846-1847, pp. 156-157. 5. Ibid., p. 353. Robert M. Stewart, a leading anti-Benton Democrat of northwest Missouri, led the successful effort to obtain the charter for the Hannibal and St. Joseph, and was no doubt prominent in drawing up the memorial to Congress. In his opinion, his efforts were chiefly responsible for the inauguration of Missouri's "liberal system of internal improvements." See Governor Stewart's message to the Senate of March 9,1859, in Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, III, 194. 6. Missouri Laws, 1846-1847, pp. 353-355. 7. The St. Louis New Era doubted that Congress would ever support the construction of any railroad through Missouri, because of the state's political complexion. How was it possible to improve a state whose leaders denounced improvements by the general government as "utterly unconstitutional and improper," condemned any plan which involved the state in debt, and permitted no corporation to exist "without being first disabled and rendered inoperative by absurd restric-

150

N O T E S T O C H A P T E R VI

tions"? Quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, January 8, 1847. 8. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, February 19, 1847, and the BoonvUle Observer, September 2, 1847. 9. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, February 19, 1847. The central Whig organization furnished ammunition for sympathetic editors throughout 1847 and 1848. In May of the latter year a long statement reciting the progress of public works in other states was released. It appeared that nearly every state in the Union excelled Missouri. Massachusetts had aided railroads, New York had an extensive system of canals, Ohio had both railroads and canals, and Kentucky had eight hundred miles of turnpike and four hundred miles of slack-water navigation. Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia were also "animated by the same enlightened policy." Columbia, Missouri Statesman, May 12, 1848. 10. Palmyra, Missouri Whig, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, September 3, 1847. 11. Rollins' speeches at Richmond, May 13; Gallatin, May 16; Chillicothe, May 18; Linneus, May 20; Bloomington, May 22; and Huntsville, May 27, 1848. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, May 26, June 2, and June 9, 1848. The Statesman reported that one Democrat at Chillicothe had asked: "Is it not the duty of the State to legislate for us farmers?" 12. Jefferson City, Jefferson Inquirer, May 13, 1848. 13. Jones, "The Whig Party in Missouri, 1848-1854," p. 41. 14. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 97. 15. Ibid., pp. 97-98. 16. Ibid., pp. 98-101. Edwards believed that Congress should be asked for alternate sections of the swamp land to defray the expense of reclaiming it. 17. Ibid., pp. 276-279. King was referring to the necessity of avoiding a heavy debt, as he had in his campaign speeches. 18. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 159-161. 19. Ibid., pp. 177-184. 20. Ibid., pp. 119-120. 21. Ibid., p. 192. By the terms of this act, the state was to receive stock in the company in return for the money expended on the survey. Somewhat surprisingly, the Hannibal and St. Joseph never applied for nor received the five thousand dollars. See Dorothy E. Powell, "History of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, 1847-1883." 22. Now Cass County. 23. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 219-222. 24. Ibid.,, pp. 650-651. Similar to the memorial of 1847. 25. Ibid., pp. 645-648. 26. Ibid., pp. 648-650.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

151

27. Ibid., pp. 654-655. 28. Ibid., pp. 655-657. 29. Ibid., pp. 657-658. 30. Ibid., pp. 648-649. 31. Ibid., pp. 649-650. 32. As a measure of the relative strength of the parties, Democrat David R. Atchison was elected United States Senator over the Whig candidate, James S. Rollins, by a vote of one hundred two to twentyone by the legislature in joint session, on January 1, 1849. Missouri House Journal, 1848-1849, p. 63. 33. St. Louis, Daily Union, January 15, 1849. 34. Palmyra, Missouri Whig, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, November 16, 1849. 35. This refers to the split in the Democratic party occasioned by the struggle over the right of Congress to exclude slavery from the territories. It should not be concluded from this that the internal improvements question was a basic issue between Benton and antiBenton Democrats. 36. In a memorial to Congress on March 12, 1849, the Missouri legislature had urged the construction of a "central Pacific" railroad from St. Louis to the Pacific. They had argued that "this great enterprise should not be entrusted to private individuals, nor to associations of men, how large soever might be their capital. Its objects are national, and its execution should be exclusively national, and we do not hesitate to recommend and urge upon your honorable body such legislation, by appropriations of land and money, as may be necessary to carry it into operation." Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, p. 646. 37. Thomas Hart Benton had introduced a Senate bill providing for a transcontinental railroad from St. Louis to San Francisco Bay on February 7, 1849. Missouri's legislative memorial was intended to support this bill. See Ethel Osborne, "Missouri's Interest in the Transcontinental Railroad Movement, 1849-1855" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1928), pp. 6-23, for a detailed treatment of this bill and the reasons for Benton's advocacy of such a measure. 38. Palmyra, Missouri Whig, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, November 16, 1849. 39. Gates, "The Railroads of Missouri, 1850-1870," Missouri Historical Review, XXVI, 128-129. 40. Robert E. Riegel, "The Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879," Missouri Historical Review, XVIII (October 1923), 4-5. The St. Louis convention was the scene of a struggle between Chicago and St. Louis interests. Stephen A. Douglas, speaking for the Chicago group, urged the convention to support a railroad from Council Bluffs, Iowa, through South Pass to the Pacific. From Council Bluffs, branch lines would

152

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R VI

extend to Chicago, St. Louis, and Memphis. Senator Benton and a majority of the Missouri delegation favored a route recommended by John C. Fremont, which was to connect St. Louis to San Francisco by way of the Kansas River, the upper Arkansas, the valley of the Rio Grande del Norte, and one of the central passes through the Rockies. See Osborne, "Missouri's Interest in the Trans-Continental Railroad Movement," pp. 32-36. 41. Riegel, "The Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879," Missouri Historical Review, XVIII, 5. 42. Jefferson City, Metropolitan, July 30, 1850. 43. Jefferson City, Jefferson Inquirer, October 20, 1850. 44. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, November 29, 1850. 45. Ibid., November 8, 1850. 46. Ibid. The "ridge route" was along the divide between the watersheds of the Missouri and Osage Rivers. Since the divide lay just north of Benton County, it is not surprising that it was preferred to the "river route," along the Missouri River, a considerable distance to the north. 47. Jefferson City, Jefferson Inquirer, January 11, 1851. 48. Ibid., January 18, 1851. There seems to have been only one county convention held in behalf of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad during 1850, at Hannibal in October. See Templin, "The Development of Railroads in Missouri to 1860," p. 25. 49. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 305. No trace of Sac or Fox here! 50. Ibid., pp. 305-306. 51. Ibid., pp. 306-307. 52. Ibid., p. 307. 53. Ibid., pp. 307-308. 54. Missouri Senate Journal, 1850-1851, appendix, p. 246. 55. Missouri Laws, 1850-1851, pp. 265-268. 56. Missouri Senate Journal, 1850-1851, p. 250. 57. Missouri House Journal, 1850-1851, pp. 372-373. 58. Local jealousies may have influenced these negative votes. 59. Missouri House Journal, 1850-1851, pp. 372-373. Representatives voting nay were from the following counties and sections: Barry, Cedar, Dade, Dallas, Greene, Jasper, Lawrence, Newton, Ozark, Polk, Taney, and Wright in the southwest; Dunklin, Madison, Oregon, Perry, Reynolds, Ripley, St. Francois, Shannon, and Wayne in the southeast; Benton (south central); St. Charles, 2 nays (east); Howard (north central); Randolph, 2 nays (north central); Chariton (north central); Lewis (northeast), and Scotland (northeast). 60. The report of the Senate committee on internal improvements

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 1847-1860

153

mentioned that "subjects of a kindred nature" had been considered and rejected. Missouri Senate Journal, 1850-1851, appendix, p. 246. 61. Missouri Senate Journal, 1850-1851, p. 250. 62. Missouri House Journal, 1850-1851, pp. 88, 112, 147, 372373. The political affiliations of the legislators were determined by examining their votes for United States Senator at the same session of the General Assembly. In this contest, Henry S. Geyer, a Whig, was elected. This result was brought about by the defection of a group of anti-Benton Democrats, who deserted their candidate, B. F. Stringfellow, on the fortieth ballot, to vote for Geyer, who took the extreme southern view on the question of slavery extension. Forty-two representatives supported Benton on the fortieth ballot, as they had on the first. 63. Missouri Senate Journal, 1850-1851, pp. 75-76, 250. 64. There seems to be something of a legend in Missouri historical writing that economic questions were tests of Benton or anti-Benton orthodoxy during the great intraparty struggles in 1849 and 1850. For example, F. A. Culmer remarks that Governor King defied the Benton group by his advocacy of lending the state's credit to railroads. A New History of Missouri (Mexico: Mclntyre Publishing Company, 1938), p. 284. 65. Missouri Laws, 1850-1851, pp. 265-268. 66. Ibid., pp. 267-268. 67. One historian remarks, "Missouri undertook the greatest projects, for in the fifties the zeal for railroads put her in a ferment." Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American Economic Life (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1932), p. 387. Similarly, see Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, p. 94. 68. John W. Million, State Aid to Railways in Missouri (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1896), p. 91. 69. Aid was granted as follows: the Pacific Railroad received $7,000,000, the Hannibal and St. Joseph $3,000,000, the North Missouri $4,350,000, the St. Louis and Iron Mountain $3,501,000, the Cairo and Fulton $650,000, the Platte County Railroad $700,000, and the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad $3,900,000. See Governor Robert M. Stewart's second biennial message in Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, III, 154-156. 70. Average annual revenue computed from data in Missouri House and Senate Journals, 1852-1861. 71. Benjamin U. Ratchford, American State Debts (Durham: Duke University Press, 1941), pp. 124-127. 72. Statutes at Large and Treaties of the United States, X, 8-10. 73. Million, State Aid to Railways in Missouri, pp. 74, 118. 74. Ibid., p. 118.

154

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

75. Ibid., pp. 118-119. By 1872, the Hannibal and St. Joseph had sold 487,046 acres of its 600,000 acres grant. The land in north Missouri was very fertile, with an abundance of good timber. The company adopted a generous credit policy and skillful advertising to attract buyers. The rolling land was portrayed as more healthful than the level landscape of northern Illinois, and as St. Louis was superior to Chicago as a market for agricultural products, the company had a competitive advantage over rivals in Illinois and Iowa during the 1850's. See Powell, "History of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad," pp. 42-45. 76. Though it is difficult to determine the figures accurately, it appears that the total amount of stock subscribed to in Missouri's seven state aid railways was over $12,000,000 by 1860. Of that sum, about 54 per cent was taken by counties, 12 per cent by municipalities, and 34 per cent by individuals. About 80 per cent of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad stock, however, was sold to individuals, principally in Boston and New York. It was regarded as a safe investment because of the high value of its land grant. See Million, State Aid to Railways in Missouri, pp. 232-243. 77. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 323. 78. Fulton Telegraph, quoted in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, September 10, 1852. 79. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, November 5, 1852. 80. Quoted in ibid., March 25, 1853. 81. It was known that the North Missouri Railroad would traverse only twelve or fifteen miles of the northern part of Boone County at best. See article entitled "Weston and St. Louis Railroad" in the Columbia, Missouri Statesman, May 5, 1854. 82. Columbia, Missouri Statesman, May 27, 1853. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid. 85. Ibid., May 18, 1853. 86. Ibid., May 27, 1853. 87. Ibid., June 10, 1853. 88. Ibid., June 24, 1853. 89. Ibid., July 21, 1854. 90. Rollins to Leonard, May 30, 1852 (Leonard Manuscripts, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri). 91. John G. Miller to Leonard, July 2, 1852 (Leonard Manuscripts). 92. Thomas Brown to Leonard, February 17, 1854 (Leonard Manuscripts). 93. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, III, 13. Governor Polk was elected to the United States Senate in February, 1857. Hancock Jackson, the lieutenant governor, was acting governor

A G R I C U L T U R A L AND L A B O R P O L I C Y

155

until September, 1857, when he was succeeded by Robert M. Stewart, who had won a special election over James S. Rollins by a narrow margin. Ibid., pp. 7, 55. 94. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, III, 111-112. 95. Ibid., pp. 115, 120. 96. Ibid., pp. 125-126. 97. Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 133. 98. Missouri Laws, Adjourned Session, 1857, pp. 69-71. 99. Missouri Laws, 1858-1859, p. 3. 100. See Governor King's messages of December 30, 1850, and December 28, 1852. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 306-307, 350-351. CHAPTER V I I : AGRICULTURAL AND LABOR POLICY

1. In 1840, of 110, 165 Missourians engaged in gainful pursuits, 92,408, or approximately 84%, were farmers. Sixth Census of the United States, p. 418. 2. Missouri Laws, 1846-1847, 96. Iron, salt, sugar, coffee, tea, spun cotton, nails or leather could be sold. Ordinary merchants, of course, were taxed through license charges, or later, through ad valorem taxes on goods. See Judson, Taxation in Missouri, p. 26. 3. Missouri Laws, 1846-1847, 123. This act was repealed in 1851. Ibid., 1850-1851, p. 251. 4. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 241-242. 5. George F. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri: 1830 to the Civil War" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1941), p. 92. 6. Missouri Laws, 1840-1841, pp. 164-165. 7. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri," p. 89. 8. Boonville Observer, March 10, 1855. 9. The five agricultural districts and their headquarters were as follows: Central (Boonville), Southeast (Cape Girardeau), Southwest, (Springfield), Northwest (St. Joseph), Northeast (Paris). Columbia, Missouri Statesman, September 5, 1856. 10. Missouri Laws, Adjourned Session, 1855-1856, p. 8. One student of the subject believes that this type of state encouragement had a remarkable influence in improving the quality of Missouri agriculture. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri," p. 144. 11. Missouri Laws, 1854-1855, p. 3. 12. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri," p. 11. 13. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 2425.

156

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R V I I

14. Missouri Laws, 1821-1822, pp. 36-45. The private owners of the public warehouses were to receive compensation at the rate of seventy-five cents for each hogshead of tobacco received, to be paid by the owner of the tobacco. 15. Missouri Laws, 1821-1822, pp. 36-45. The text of the tobacco law was also published in the Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, March 12 and 19, 1822. 16. Missouri Laws, 1822-1823, p. 21. 17. Franklin, Missouri Intelligencer, February 11, 1823, communication signed "A Missourian." 18. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri," pp. 12-16. 19. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 20. Missouri Laws, 1840-1841, pp. 329-330. 21. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, pp. 142-147. Some of the features of the law of 1821 were retained, but the former system of classifying inspected tobacco as firsts, seconds, thirds, and crossed, was replaced by a provision that it should be classed simply as passed or refused. Passed tobacco was "such as shall be found in hogsheads measuring 54 inches to the stave and 40 inches in diameter, containing 800 pounds nett tobacco, and on opening contains tobacco assorted, free from bugs or ground leaves, and in such order as will stand a sea voyage without decomposition." 22. Lemmer, "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri," pp. 16-17. William F. Switzler of the Statesman was pleased that the state was engaged in an earnest effort to promote a market for tobacco. He had "watched with solicitude the Legislative action in the premises." Columbia, Missouri Statesman, June 2, 1843. 23. See Governor Meredith M. Marmaduke's first biennial message, in Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 2122. 24. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, December 30, 1844. 25. Missouri Laws, 1848-1849, pp. 125-126. 26. Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, II, 338. 27. Missouri Laws, 1840-1841, p. 86. 28. Local Laws and Private Acts of Missouri, Adjourned Session, 1855-1856, p. 204, and Missouri Laws,. 1856-1857, p. 293. 29. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, p. 391. 30. Miles W. Eaton, "A History of the Hemp Industry in Missouri" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1938), pp. 60-61. 31. Missouri Laws, 1840-1841, pp. 92-95. 32. See Wright, Economic History of the United States, p. 140. 33. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, pp. 6872, and Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860, pp. 204-206.

A G R I C U L T U R A L AND LABOR P O L I C Y

157

34. Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, p. 221. 35. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, p. 143. 36. "Missouriana," Missouri Historical Review, XXXVII (April 1943), 326. 37. Missouri Laws, 1820-1821, pp. 106-112. The writer does not intend to imply that this law was intended for the particular benefit of workingmen, but it was a forerunner of the type of legislation later demanded by labor. 38. Missouri Laws, Special Session, 1821, pp. 29-31. 39. Missouri Revised Statutes, 1825,1, 188. 40. Russell M. Nolen, "The Labor Movement in St. Louis Prior to the Civil War," Missouri Historical Review, XXXIV (October 1939), 23-24. The same period was a time of expanded labor activity in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and other states. See Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860, pp. 189, 193, and Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, pp. 263-264. 41. Nolen, "Labor Movement in St. Louis" Missouri Historical Review, XXXIV, 24-26. 42. The following occupations were represented: Bookbinders, bricklayers, blacksmiths, boatmen, carpenters, carters, coach-makers, cabinet makers, draymen, hatters, laborers, limeburners, mechanists, painters, plasterers, saddlers, shoemakers, stonemasons, silversmiths, ship carpenters, tailors, turners, tobacco workers, and sheet iron workers. Note the predominance of the skilled trades. "Laborers" apparently means unskilled workers. Nolen, "Labor Movement in St. Louis," Missouri Historical Review, XXXIV, 24-26. 43. Ibid., 25-26. 44. St. Louis, Daily Pennant, August 26, 1840. 45. St. Louis, Missouri Republican, October 27, 1842. 46. Missouri House Journal, 1840-1841, pp. 523-524. 47. Missouri Laws, 1840-1841, pp. 105-106. This law passed the lower house by a vote of 43 to 25. There was no discernible sectional or partisan pattern in the voting, except that four of St. Louis County's seven representatives avoided the issue by being absent from the roll call. The other three supported the measure. Missouri House Journal, 1840-1841, p. 435. 48. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, 83-84. In contrast to their predecessors, the House select committee in 1843 was favorably inclined to the workers' position, reporting that those "who would be particularly benefitted by the bill, are that most meritorious class of our fellow citizens, the mechanics and working men." 49. Missouri House Journal, 1840-1841, pp. 351-352. Most outstate Democrats and Whigs alike were strongly opposed to the ten-hour system.

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R V I I

158 50. 136. 51. 52. 53. Review,

See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson, pp. 134Leopard and Shoemaker, Messages and Proclamations, I, 489. Missouri Laws, 1842-1843, p. 71. Nolen, "Labor Movement in St. Louis," Missouri Historical XXXIV, 27-28.

CHAPTER VIII: CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE ACTION I N MISSOURI

1. See Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth: Massachusetts, p. 261, and Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860, pp. 289-293. 2. Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 88. 3. Missouri Laws, 1836-1837, pp. 234-288. 4. See Edward C. Kirkland, Men, Cities, and Transportation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), I, 106-111; Paul W. Gates, The Illinois Central, Railroad and its Colonization Work (vol. XLII of Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 21-23; Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860, pp. 10-14. 5. Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad, pp. 22-23. 6. Of forty-six counties for which returns are available for the presidential election of 1836, thirty-five were carried by the Democratic party. Of the eleven Whig counties, ten were adjacent to the Missouri or Mississippi Rivers. Seventeen of eighteen inland counties supported Van Buren (election returns from the St. Louis, Missouri Republican, December 2, 1836). Editor Calvin Gunn of the Jeffersonian Republican pointed out that citizens of the thinly settled parts of Missouri were "much more opposed to aristocratic measures and customs," (monopolies and monopolistic legislation) than were those who lived in the more densely populated counties. Jefferson City, Jeffersonian Republican, April 30, 1836. 7. The Iron Mountain Branch of the Pacific was chartered originally as the St. Louis and Iron Mountain. See Million, State Aid to Railways in Missouri, pp. 80-81.

BIBLIOGRAPHY The most satisfactory sources for this study have been legislative records and newspapers. The papers of lawyers such as Abiel Leonard of Fayette were of some value, as were the printed judicial decisions. Mercantile records examined, such as the Lisbon Applegate Manuscript Collection at the State Historical Society of Missouri, and the D. M. and J. H. Tucker Papers in the Western Historical Manuscripts Collection at the University of Missouri, though voluminous, contained little of relevance to the subject of state policy. Abiel Leonard Manuscript Collection, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia. Anderson, Hattie M., "Missouri, 1804-1828: Peopling a Frontier State," Missouri Historical Review, XXXI (January 1937). Atherton, Lewis E., The Pioneer Merchant in Mid-America (vol. XIV, University of Missouri Studies, Columbia: University of Missouri, 1939). Berle, Adolf, Α., Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933). Boonville Observer, September 2, 1847; March, 1855. Bradford, Priscilla, "The Missouri Constitutional Controversy of 1845" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1936). Broadhead, Garland C., "Early Railroads in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, VII (April 1913). Brown, Dwight H., editor, Corporations Chartered or Organized under the Territorial Laws and by Act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, 1803-1865 (Jefferson City: Midland Printing Company, 1934). Cable, John Ray, The Bank of the State of Missouri (vol. CII of Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, New York: Columbia University Press, 1923). Cadman, John W., Jr., The Corporation in New Jersey: Business and Politics, 1791-1875 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949). Callender, Guy S., "The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations." Quarterly Journal of Economics, XVII (November 1902).

160

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clark, Thomas D., A History of Kentucky (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937). Cochran, Thomas C., and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942). Cole, Redmond S., "Early History of Money and Banking in Missouri" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1906). Columbia Patriot, March 13, 1841-December 16, 1842. Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and Statistics of the United States: 1840 (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841). Conard, Howard L., editor, Encyclopedia of the History of Missouri, A Compendium of History and Biography for Ready Reference (6 vols., New York, Louisville: Southern History Company, 1901). Constitution of the State of Missouri, 1820 (St. Louis: Isaac N. Henry, 1820). Constitution of the State of Missouri, 1845 (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845). Cotterill, Robert S., "The National Railroad Convention in St. Louis, 1849," Missouri Historical Review, XII (July 1918). Culmer, Frederic Α., A New History of Missouri (Mexico: Mclntyre Publishing Company, 1938). Daily Pennant, St. Louis, April-September, 1840. Daily Union, St. Louis, January-April, 1849. Darby, John F., Personal Recollections (St. Louis: G. I. Jones and Company, 1880). Davis, Joseph S., Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917). Dewey, Davis, R., State Banking Before the Civil War, National Monetary Commission, Senate Document no. 581, 61 Cong., 2 Sess., IV., no. 2. Dorsey, Dorothy B., "The Panic of 1819 in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XXIX (January 1935). Dorsey, Dorothy B., "The Panic and Depression of 1837-1843 in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XXX (October 1935). Eaton, Miles W., "A History of the Hemp Industry" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1938). Eighth Census of the United States: 1860 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864). English, William Francis, The Pioneer Lawyer and Jurist in Missouri (vol. XXI, University of Missouri Studies, Columbia: The University of Missouri, 1947). Fifth Census; or, Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States: 1830 (Washington: Duff Green, 1832). Ford, James E., A History of Grundy County (Trenton, Missouri:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

161

News Publishing Company, 1908). Gates, Paul W., The Illinois Central Railroad and its Colonization Work (vol. XLII of Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934). Gates, Paul W., "The Railroads of Missouri, 1850-1870," Missouri Historical Review, XXVI (January 1932). Gouge, William M., A Short History of Paper-Money and Banking in the United States (New York: B. and S. Collins, 1835). Green, Duff, Facts and Suggestions, Biographical, Historical, Financial, and Political, Addressed to the People of the United States (New York: Richardson and Company, 1866). Hamilton, William J., "The Relief Movement in Missouri, 1820-1822" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1925). Hammond, Bray, "Banking in the Early West: Monopoly, Prohibition, and Laissez Faire," The Journal of Economic History, VIII (May 1938). Handlin, Oscar, and Mary F. Handlin, Commonwealth, A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 (New York: New York University Press, 1947). Handlin, Oscar, and Mary F. Handlin, "Origins of the American Business Corporation," The Journal of Economic History, V (May 1945). Handlin, Oscar, "Laissez-Faire Thought in Massachusetts, 1790-1880," The Tasks of Economic History (supplemental issue of The Journal of Economic History), III (December 1943). Hartz, Louis, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). Hartz, Louis, "Laissez-Faire Thought in Pennsylvania, 1776-1860," The Tasks of Economic History (supplemental issue of The Journal of Economic History), III (December 1843). Healy, Kent T., "American Transportation before the War between the States," in Harold F. Williamson, editor, The Growth of the American Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1944). Heath, Milton S., "Laissez Faire in Georgia, 1732-1860," The Tasks of Economic History (supplemental issue of The Journal of Economic History), III (December 1943). Helderman, Leonard C., National and State Banks (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931). Hensley, Orlana, "The Thomas Hart Benton Faction in Missouri Politics, 1850-1860" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1931). Hines, A. Clarence, "The Beginnings of the Democratic Party in Missouri, 1824-1836" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1930).

162

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hunter, Louis C., Steamboats on the Western Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949). Jeffersonian Republican,. Jefferson City, 1831-1836. Jefferson Inquirer, Jefferson City, 1848-1853. Jones, Breckenridge, "One Hundred Years of Banking in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XV (January 1921). Jones, J. Claude, "The Status of the Whig Party in Missouri from 18481854" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1930). Journal of the Convention of the State of Missouri, 1845 (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845). Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Missouri, First to the Twenty-First General Assembly, 1820-1861. Journal of the Senate of the State of Missouri, First to the Twenty-First General Assembly, 1820-1861. Judson, Frederick N., A Treatise upon the Law and Practice of Taxation in Missouri (Columbia: E. W. Stephens, 1900). Kessler, William C., "Incorporation in New England: A Statistical Study, 1800-1875," Journal of Economic History, VIII (May 1948). Kirkland, Edward C., A History of American Economic Life (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1932). Kirkland, Edward C., Men, Cities, and Transportation (2 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). Kropp, Simon F., "The Struggle for Limited Liability and General Incorporation Laws in Missouri to 1849" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1939). Laws of the State of Missouri, First to the Twenty-First General Assembly, 1820-1861. Laws of the United States Relating to Public Lands (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1828). Lehmann, F. W., "The Constitution of 1820," Missouri Historical Review, XVI (October 1921). Lemmer, George F., "Agricultural Improvement in Missouri to the Civil War" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1941). Leonard Family Papers, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, Library, University of Missouri, Columbia. Leopard, Buel, and Floyd C. Shoemaker, The Messages and Proclamations of the Governors of the State of Missouri (vols, I, II, III, Columbia: The State Historical Society of Missouri, 1922). Lowrey, Edward C., "Public Improvements in Missouri, 1820-1850" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1932). Lynch, William O., "The Influence of Population Movements on Missouri before 1861," Missouri Historical Review, XVI (July 1922).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

163

McClure, Clarence H., Opposition in Missouri to Thomas Hart Benton (George Peabody College for Teachers Contributions to Education, no. 37, Nashville: George Peabody College, 1927). McCulloch, Albert J., The Loan Office Experiment in Missouri (vol. XV, no. 24, The University of Missouri Bulletin, Columbia: The University of Missouri, 1914). Meigs, William M., The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1924). Melom, Halvor G., "The Economic Development of St. Louis, 18031846" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri, 1947). Million, John W., State Aid to Railways in Missouri (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1896). "Missouriana," Missouri Historical Review, XXXVII (April 1943). Missouri Argus, St. Louis, May 22, 1835-December 29, 1840. Missouri Gazette and Public Advertiser, St. Louis, 1821-1822. Missouri Intelligencer, Franklin, January 7, 1820-June 16, 1826; Fayette, June 29, 1826-April 9, 1830; Columbia, May 4, 1830-December 5, 1835. Missouri Register, Boonville, October 3, 1843. Missouri Reporter, St. Louis, September 15, 1843, January 5, 1846. Missouri Republican, St. Louis, 1833-1837; March-December, 1841; October 27, 1842; December 30, 1844; 1849. Missouri Statesman, Columbia, 1843-1860. Nolen, Russell M., "The Labor Movement in St. Louis Prior to the Civil War," Missouri Historical Review, XXXIV (October 1939). Osborne, Ethel, "Missouri's Interest in the Transcontinental Railroad Movement, 1849-1855" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1928). Powell, Dorothy E., "History of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, 1847-1883" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1942). Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates for the Promotion of Internal Improvements within the State of Missouri (St. Louis: Charles Keemle, 1836). Ratchford, Benjamin U., American State Debts (Durham: Duke University Press, 1941). Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri 1821-1828 (vol. 1, St. Louis: Chambers and Knapp, 1843). Riegel, Robert Ε., "The Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879," Missouri Historical Review, XVIII (October 1923). St. Charles Missourian, April 25, 1821. St. Louis Enquirer, January 13, 1824.

164

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Schlesinger, Arthur Μ., Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945). Schultz, Gerard, "Steamboat Navigation on the Osage River before the Civil War," Missouri Historical Review, XXIX (April 1935). Seventh Census of the United States, 1850 (Washington: Robert Armstrong, 1853). Shoemaker, Floyd C., Missouri and Missourians (5 vols. Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1943). Shoemaker, Floyd C., Missouri's Struggle for Statehood (Jefferson City: The Hugh Stephens Printing Company, 1916). Smith, William B., James Sidney Rollins (New York: The De Vinne Press, 1891). Springfield Advertiser, May 31, 1845. Taylor, George R., The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (vol. IV of The Economic History of the United States, New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951). Templin, Lucinda de Leftwich, "The Development of Railroads in Missouri to 1860" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1915). The Metropolitan, Jefferson City, July 30, 1850. Viles, Jonas, "Missouri in 1820," Missouri Historical Review, XV (October 1920). Violette, Eugene M., A History of Missouri (New York: D. C. Heath and Company, 1918). Wells, Robert W., A Review of the New Constitution of the State of Missouri (Jefferson City: James Lusk, 1845). West, Alma, "The Earlier Political Career of Claiborne Fox Jackson" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1941). White, Edward J., "A Century of Transportation in Missouri," Missouri Historical Review, XV (October 1920). Wright, Chester W., Economic History of the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1941).

INDEX

INDEX Agricultural societies, 115, 116 Agriculture, aid to, 2, 3, 5, 6, 16, 79, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 126, 155 Alabama, 134 Alford, Johnson H., 88 American system, 75, 76, 143 Anti-Benton party, 66, 67, 69, 103, 126, 149, 151, 153 Antibank sentiment, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 35, 64, 66 Anticharter sentiment, 38, 39, 41, 45, 47, 48, 50, 62 Antirelief party, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 129, 130 "Appeal to the People of Missouri," 141 Arkansas, 8 Arkansas River, 152 Ashley, William H., 143, 144, 146 Atchison, David R., 69, 151 Auditor's warrants, 12, 131 Banking, 1, 3, 7, 9, 16, 17, 18-31, 32, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 78, 81, 82, 114, 126, 133, 134, 135, 138, 145, 148 Bank notes, 20, 21, 26, 41, 43, 46, 47, 87, 134 Bank of Missouri, 2, 4, 18, 32, 129, 130 Bank of St. Louis, 2, 18, 32 Bank of South Carolina, 29 Bank of Tennessee, 29 Bank of the Commonwealth (Kentucky), 16 Bank of the State of Missouri, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 39, 41, 43, 47, 48, 52, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 114, 127, 134

Bank of the United States, 4, 9, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 40, 65, 80, 133, 144 Bankrupt law, 120 Barr, Robert S., 6, 130 Barry County, 152 Bates County, 100 Bates, Frederick, 146 Beef, 107, 119 Benton County, 88, 100, 152 Benton, Thomas Hart, 28, 42, 46, 58, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 81, 89, 98, 103, 126, 130, 133, 134, 135, 141, 145, 146, 151, 153 Berle, Adolf Α., Jr., 140 Berlin Rope and Bagging Manufacturing Company, 61 Biddle, Nicholas, 30 Bills of credit, 13-14, 15, 20 "Bills of Pains and Penalties," 47, 52 Birch, James H., 21 Birch, Weston F., 147 Black River, 96 Bliss, Neziah, 13, 131 Bloomington, 107, 150 Board of Public Works, 112 Boggs, Lilburn W., 23, 26, 27, 36, 81, 84, 132, 146 Bolivar, 50 Boon, Hampton L., 130 Boone County, 19, 51, 90, 92, 106, 107, 109, 131, 138, 143, 145, 147, 154 Boon's Lick Trail, 142 Boonville, 5, 116, 133, 146, 155 Boston, 53, 101, 139, 154 Bowlin, James B., 24, 25, 26, 28, 39, 133 Bradford, Austin, 107, 108 Broadhead, James O., 141

168

INDEX

Brown, Thomas, 110 Buchanan County, 93 Bull, Dr. John, 144 Burckhartt, Nicholas, 4, 129 Burr, Aaron, 14 Cairo and Fulton Railroad Companies, 106, 153 Caledonia, 35, 147 Calhoun, John C., 141 California, 113 Callaway County, 25 Campbell, Colonel, 10, 11, 12 Canals, 79, 80, 83, 87, 88, 92, 95, 125, 146, 150 Cannon, Franklin, 81, 146 Cape Girardeau, 34, 147, 155 Cape Girardeau County, 5 Cape Girardeau Mill Company, 34, 138 Cedar County, 152 Chambers, Adam B., 29, 121, 122 Chariton, 5, 12 Chariton County, 3, 5, 131, 152 Charleston, S. C., 147 Charters, see Corporations Chicago, 77, 99, 151, 152, 154 Chillicothe, 150 China, 101 Cincinnati, 96, 135, 147 Clarksville Steam Mill Company, 34 Clay, Henry, 146, 148 Clinton, 100 Cole County, 24, 49, 62, 110 Columbia, 75, 77, 109 Commercial Bank of Cincinnati, 135 Congress, 5, 19, 29, 40, 74, 75, 76, 81, 83, 89, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 105, 118, 119, 135, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154 Connecticut, 140 Constitution of 1820, 1, 18, 32, 33, 42, 55, 69, 73, 74, 133, 135, 142 Constitution of 1845, 48, 49, 50 Constitutional Convention of 1820, 1, 18, 32 Constitutional Convention of 1845, 48, 49, 50 Contracts, sanctity of, 8, 9, 122

Conway, Thomas, 4 Cooper County, 5, 22 Corbin, Abel R., 25, 28, 77, 78, 82, 145 Corn, 74, 108 Corporations and charter policy, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 82, 83, 91, 93, 113, 114, 115, 125, 126, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 149, 151 Cotton, 54 Council Bluffs, 151 County and municipal ownership, 80, 81, 86, 100, 106, 107, 108, 109, 154 Craig v. Missouri, 131 Crawford County, 88 Creditors, 3, 13, 17, 34, 58, 59 Crow, Wayman, 67 Culmer, F. Α., 153 Cumberland Road, 75, 81, 83, 94, 144 Currency: drain to eastern states, 39, 55; expansion and inflation of, 5, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, 28, 29, 41, 43, 67, 69; paper, 20, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 52, 134; shortage of, 2, 4, 5, 7, 16, 22, 41, 42 Current River, 96, 97 Dade County, 152 Dallas County, 152 Darby, John F., 145 Debtors, 1, 2, 3, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17 Democracy, 16, 43, 44, 54, 58, 59, 64, 121 Democratic party, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 55, 58, 59, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 77, 80, 81, 82, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 103, 110, 121, 125, 126, 132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 148, 149, 151, 153, 157, 158 Depressions, 1, 12, 17, 19, 41, 47,

INDEX 53, 85, 86, 90, 91, 118, 132, 133, 148 Des Moines River, 97 Doctors, 114 Douglas, Stephen Α., 151 Dunklin County, 152 Dunklin, Daniel, 20, 21, 144 Edwards, E. L., 62 Edwards, John C., 24, 49, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 92, 95, 96, 139, 140, 149, 150 England, 10 Erie Canal, 146 Europe, 39, 56 Farmers and farming, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 30, 31, 40, 53, 55, 80, 91, 101, 107, 110, 114, 115, 118, 126, 139, 140, 149, 150, 154, 155 Fanners' and Mechanics' Insurance Company, 138 Father Hennepin, 94 Father Marquette, 94 Fayette, 77, 81, 82, 109, 145, 147 Federal Constitution, 14, 40, 55, 83, 122 Flouring Mill Company of Hannibal, 35 Foster, G. G., 121 Franklin, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 142 Franklin County, 88, 145 Franklin County, Ohio, 134 Free banking, 67, 68, 70, 127 Free medical care, 33, 136 Fremont, John C., 152 Fulkerson v. Devore, 14 Fulton, 77 Galena and Chicago Union Railroad, 99 Gallatin, 150 Gallatin, Albert, 29 Gamble, Hamilton R., 6, 130 Gasconade County, 115 Gasconade Grape Growing Society, 115

169

Gaw, John, 6 General Assembly, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 129, 131, 133, 140, 141, 142, 148, 151, 153, 156, 157 General welfare, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 25, 35, 51, 54, 64, 71, 76, 79, 80, 90, 91, 92, 109, 110, 113, 117, 127 General corporation laws, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 71, 127, 139, 140 Geological survey, 97 Georgia, 132, 150 Geyer, Henry S., 41, 66, 153 Gilpin, William, 43, 45, 46 Gouge, William, 29, 30 Green, Duff, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 129, 130 Greene County, 145, 152 Grundy County, 140 Gunn, Calvin, 158 Hamilton, Alexander, 14, 29, 30 Hannibal, 82, 93, 98, 107, 152 Hannibal and New London Turnpike Company, 38 Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, 93, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111, 127, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154 Hannibal, Paris, and Grand River Railroad Company, 37, 138 "Hards" and hard money, 20, 28, 29, 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 82, 126, 130, 133, 138, 148 Hartz, Louis, 59 Harvey, Thomas H., 88, 89 Hemp, 54, 116, 119 Henry County, 100

170

INDEX

Home market, 94, 118 Hood, Robert, 6 House of Representatives, see General Assembly Howard County, 3, 4, 10, 21, 46, 47, 51, 65, 79, 82, 90, 129, 131, 137, 144, 148, 152 Hudson River, 146 Hunter, Louis C., 136 Huntsville, 150 Illinois, 8, 41, 79, 84, 87, 88, 97, 124, 125, 134, 146, 154 Illinois and Michigan Canal, 99 Immigration, 1, 2, 5, 41, 111, 132 Imprisonment for debt, 120, 123 Independence, 98, 145 Independent treasury, 40 India, 101 Indiana, 8, 84, 96, 124, 135, 140 Individual liability, 48, 49, 50, 51, 60, 138 Insurance companies, 33, 34, 36, 39, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 137 Interest rates, 27 Internal improvements, 19, 23, 40, 50, 62, 63, 71, 73-113, 114, 125, 126, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152 Internal improvement conventions, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 90, 99, 100, 101, 151, 152 Iowa, 97, 135, 151, 154 Irish immigrants, 41 Iron Mountain Branch of the Pacific Railroad, 127, 153, 158 Iron works, 13, 131 Jackson, 5, 66 Jackson, Andrew, 19, 20, 80, 83, 126, 133, 144 Jackson, Claiborne F., 47, 48, 51, 65 Jackson County Agricultural Society, 115 Jackson group, 17, 75, 76, 80, 123, 126, 130, 132, 143, 144 Jackson, Hancock, 154

Jacksonian Democracy, 16, 58 Jameson, John, 25, 26, 29 Jasper County, 152 Jefferson City, 25, 40, 41, 50, 60, 82, 97, 104, 141, 146, 147 Jefferson County, 88 Jefferson, Thomas, 83 Jewell, William, 19, 143 Johnson County, 100 Johnson, Richard M., 130 Jones, Charles, 62, 63 Jones, James, 81, 146 Judiciary, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 Kansas River, 152 Kentucky, 3, 8, 9, 16, 118, 130, 132, 134, 148, 150 Kerr, Augustus, 6 King, Austin, 29, 55, 57, 58, 95, 101, 102, 103, 106, 119, 150, 153, 155 Knox County, 110 Kropp, Simon F., 136 Labor, 120, 121, 122, 123, 157 Laissez faire, 30, 40, 43, 46, 63, 124 Lake Erie, 146 Lamme, William, 6 Land reclamation, 94, 95, 150 Land speculation, 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 16, 109, 110, 129 Lane, William Carr, 13 Lawrence County, 152 Lawyers, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 114, 139 Leander, 89 Leonard, Abiel, 69, 109, 110, 142, 148 Lewis County, 152 Limited liability, 49, 57, 58, 138 Lincoln County, 45 Linn, 100 Linn, Lewis F., 81 Linneus, 150 Loan office, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 120, 131, 132, 134

INDEX Locofocos, 66, 90, 91, 94, 95, 98, 99, 149 Loper v. the State, 16 Louisiana and Columbia Railroad Company, 37, 147 Lowe, S. J., 63 Lowry, John J., 130, 148 Lynch, William Α., 122 Macon County, 107, 110 Madison County, 152 Madison, James, 83 Majority rule, 3, 7, 13, 14, 121 Mansker, Graves, and Simpkins v. the State, 15 Manufacturing and manufacturing companies, 13, 33, 34, 36, 41, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 79, 80, 109, 110, 119, 140 Marion City and Missouri Railroad Company, 37 Marion County, 30, 93 Marion Steam Mill Company, 34 Marine Insurance Company, 34, 35 Markets, lack of, 4, 93, 111, 117, 119, 156 Marmaduke, Meredith M., 115, 156 Maryland, 82, 118, 124, 140 Massachusetts, 59, 85, 111, 120, 124, 135, 136, 138, 140, 149, 150 Massachusetts General Court, 59 McConathy, James, 109 McGirk, Matthias, 15, 16 McNair, Alexander, 4, 12, 15, 74, 116, 131 Means, Gardiner C., 140 Meat inspection, 119 Mechanics, 8, 23, 101, 121, 122, 157 Mechanics' hen law, 121, 122, 123, 157 Memphis, 90, 99, 152 Mercantilism, 15 Merchants, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 41, 88, 122, 134, 155 Merrimack Copper Company, 51

171

Merrimac River (Maramec, Meramec, Merrimack), 82 Merry, Samuel, 145 Michigan, 97 Michigan Central Railroad, 99 Miller County, 49, 110 Miller, John, 19, 75, 82, 83, 84, 131, 146 Miller, John G., 110 Mine a la Motte and Mississippi Railroad Company, 37 Mine La Motte Mining and Smelting Company, 46, 137 Mining and Mining Companies, 46, 51, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 71, 76, 81, 93, 94, 97, 110, 112, 145, 147 Mineral Railroad, 147 Mississippi, 8, 134 Mississippi River, 8, 34, 35, 56, 76, 77, 85, 93, 94, 96, 147, 158 Missouri's admission to the Union, 5, 74 Missouri Insurance Company, 34 Missouri River, 68, 74, 79, 85, 93, 94, 96, 103, 132, 143, 146, 152, 158 Missouri State Agricultural Society, 115, 116 Missouri v. William Carr Lane, 13 Mitchell, A. S., 141 Mobile, 101 Money, see Currency Moniteau County, 110 Monopoly, monopolies, 23, 28, 33, 36, 40, 43, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 139 Monroe, William, 24, 25 Monticello and LaGrange Railroad Company, 37 Morgan County, 24, 49, 100, 110 Mules, 54 Mullanphy, John, 33 Mutual Insurance Company, 42, 44, 47 New England, 82, 143 New Jersey, 59, 124, 135, 140, 149 New Orleans, 8, 116, 118 Newton County, 62, 152

172

INDEX

New York, 82, 83, 84, 111, 112, 120, 124, 139, 143, 146, 150, 154 Norris, Jewett, 55, 139 North Grand River, 96, 97, 99 North Missouri Railroad, 106, 107, 109, 153, 154 Ohio, 8, 9, 82, 84, 134, 146, 147, 150 Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, 96 Ohio River, 96 Oregon, 93 Oregon County, 152 Osage County, 51, 100 Osage River, 88, 89, 96, 97, 99, 152 Ozark County, 152 Pacific Coast, 97, 151 Pacific islands, 101 Pacific Railroad Company, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 127, 153 Page and Bacon, 110 Palmyra, 90, 98 Panic of 1819, 1 Paris, 155 Patten, Nathaniel, 22 Pettibone, Rufus, 14 Pennsylvania, 8, 59, 82, 84, 120, 124, 135, 143, 146, 149, 157 Perpetual Insurance Company, 42, 44, 47, 138 Perry County, 152 Pike County, 81 Plank roads, 60, 61, 102, 106, 107 Platte County Railroad Company, 153 Polk County, 50, 152 Polk, James K., 148 Polk, Trusten, 69, 110, 111, 112, 154 Pork, 8, 74, 107, 108, 119 Potosi, 147 Price, Sterling, 67, 68 Priest, William, 55, 63 Primm, Wilson, 41 Private banking agencies, 2

Protective tariff, 19, 40, 54, 144 Providence plank road, 107 Public lands, 4, 80, 105 Railroads, 36, 37, 39, 50, 60, 61, 63, 67, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 125, 127, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 Randolph County, 152 Ray County, 131 Redmen, Joshua W., 46, 47, 137 Relief measures, 1-17, 20, 130 Relief party, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 Replevin law, 4 Reynolds County, 152 Reynolds, Thomas, 44, 45, 95, 123 Reynolds, W. W., 51 Rhode Island, 132, 157 Rio Grande del Norte, 152 Ripley County, 152 River commerce, 33, 39, 51, 73, 121, 136 River improvement, 77, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 143, 144, 150 Roads and highways, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 108, 142, 143, 144 Rocheport Railroad Company, 37 Rocky Mountains, 97, 152 Rollins, James S., 55, 69, 95, 109, 110, 115, 142, 145, 150, 151, 155 Roman law, 3 Rye, 108 Sac and Fox Indians, 94, 95, 152 St. Charles, 4, 39, 77, 142, 147 St. Charles County, 14, 152 St. Charles Railroad Company, 37 St. Francis River, 96 St. Francois County, 152 St. Joseph, 93, 98, 107, 155 St. Louis, 5, 9, 13, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33, 36, 41, 44, 50, 52,

INDEX 54, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 89, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 108, 110, 118, 120, 121, 122, 130, 133, 137, 138, 145, 147, 151, 152, 154 St. Louis and Bellevue Mineral Railroad Company, 37 St. Louis and Fayette Railroad Company, 137 St. Louis and Perry County Iron Mining Company, 61 St. Louis and St. Charles Turnpike Company, 38 St. Louis Association for the Relief of Orphan Children, 45 St. Louis Coal Company, 51 St. Louis County, 3, 157 St. Louis Gas Light Company, 36, 42, 44, 47, 52 St. Louis Insurance Company, 35 St. Louis Public Hospital, 33 St. Louis Rolling Mill Company, 61 St. Louis Tannery Company, 63, 64 Saline fund, 26 Salt River, 147 Salt springs, 5 San Francisco, 151, 152 Santa Fe trade, 93 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 144 Scotland County, 152 Scott, John, 143 Seminary fund, 26 Senate, see General Assembly Shannon County, 152 "Shaving," 29, 134 Shelby County, 110 Slavery, 126, 151, 153 Smith, Adam, 30, 135 Smith, Hans, 45 "Softs," 47, 138 South Carolina, 132, 135, 147, 150 South Pass, 151 Southern Railroad Company, 37, 147 Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad, 106, 112, 127, 153 Specie: drain from Missouri, 4, 7,

173

43, 44, 116, 135; payments suspended, 4, 28, 41 Springfield, 155 State action, expediency of, 2, 7, 16, 28, 43, 52, 73, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106, 113, 125, 127, 150, 151 State board of internal improvements, 86 State debt, 26, 70, 87, 88, 100, 102, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154 State engineer, 86 State fair, 116 State ownership, 21, 30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 49, 63, 71, 78, 81, 82, 97, 100, 113, 119, 127, 134, 135, 156 States' rights, 40, 84 Stay law, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15 Steamboats, 78, 88, 89, 94 Stewart, Robert M., I l l , 112, 149, 153, 155 Stop law, see Stay law Stringfellow, B. F., 153 Swamp drainage, see Land reclamation Switzler, William F., 51, 90, 91, 92, 107, 108, 109, 110, 156 Taney County, 152 Taxes and taxation: and profits, 27; collection of, 5, 8; exemption from, 34, 36, 114; for internal improvements, 76, 85, 107, 108, 111; inability to pay, 4, 85; on property, 85; on income, 114; powers of the legislature, 1, 118; rate of, 147, 149; reduction of, 31, 91 Ten-hour day, 121, 122, 123 Tennessee, 8, 9, 90, 132, 150 Thomas, Martin, 29, 135 Three per cent fund, 26, 74, 76, 77, 86 Tobacco, 8, 22, 54, 107, 116, 118, 119, 156

174

INDEX

Tobacco inspection, 116, 117, 118, 119, 156 Tobacco warehouses, 116, 117, 118, 119, 156 Tompkins, George, 10, 11, 12, 16 Trammell, Philip, 10, 11, 12 Transcontinental railroad, 100, 101, 151, 152 Trenton, 140 Tucker, Nathaniel Beverley, 13, 14 Turnpikes, 35, 36, 38, 39, 50, 60, 84, 125 Unfavorable balance of trade, 4, 13, 120 Universal suffrage, 44 University of Missouri, 66 Upper Mississippi Pilots' Association, 51 United States Supreme Court, 131 Valuation law, 3, 6, 12, 13, 129 Van Arsdall, W. K., 75 Van Buren (Cass) County, 97, 150 Van Buren, Martin, 46, 81, 158 Virginia, 8, 105, 118, 124, 132, 143, 150

Washington County, 35, 147 Washington County Turnpike Company, 35 Wayne County, 152 Wealth of Nations, The, 30 Wells, Robert W., 49, 144 Weston and St. Louis Railroad Company, 154 Whig party, 22, 24, 25, 29, 39, 40, 41, 46, 55, 58, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 78, 80, 82, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99, 103, 109, 110, 122, 123, 126, 127, 130, 138, 141, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 158 Whiskey, 109, 121 White, Edwin, 55 White River, 62, 96, 97, 99 White River Navigation Company, 62 Willis, Thomas, 7 Wine, 115 Wisconsin, 97 Wolf-scalp law, 120 Wright County, 152 Wright, Uriel, 30