East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Contexts 9783737004084, 9783847104087, 9789863500735, 9783847004080

Citation preview

Global East Asia

Volume 1

Edited by Chun-chieh Huang

Advisory Board: Roger Ames (Hawaii), Don Baker (Columbia), Carl Becker (Kyoto), Michael Friedrich (Hamburg), David Jones (Kennesaw), Bent Nielsen (Copenhagen), Jörn Rüsen (Essen), Kirill O. Thompson (Taipei), John Tucker (Carolina), Ann Waltner (Minnesota)

Chun-chieh Huang

East Asian Confucianisms Texts in Contexts

V&R unipress National Taiwan University Press

This book series is subsidized in part by, and published in cooperation with, the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, National Taiwan University.

®

MIX Papier aus verantwortungsvollen Quellen

www.fsc.org

FSC® C083411

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-8471-0408-7 [Print, without Asia Pacific] ISBN 978-986-350-073-5 [Print, Asia Pacific only] ISBN 978-3-8470-0408-0 [e-book] Printed with support of the National Taiwan University. © Copyright 2015 by V&R unipress GmbH, 37079 Goettingen, Germany © Copyright 2015 by National Taiwan University Press, Taipei, Taiwan All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilm and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover image: Calligraphy by Wang Yangming Printed on aging-resistant paper.

Contents

Preface Prologue

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Part I New Perspectives on East Asian Confucianisms Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Chapter One: On the Relationship between Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia: An Inquiry into the Analects and Mencius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Chapter Two: On the “Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics: Types and Problems . . . . . . .

41

Chapter Three: East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

57

Chapter Four: The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms: A Twenty-First-Century Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

Part II Confucian Texts in East Asian Contexts Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Chapter Five: Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics: A Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

Chapter Six: The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity in Tokugawa Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

6

Contents

Chapter Seven: The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia: A Comparative Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Chapter Eight: Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Chapter Nine: Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Chapter Ten: What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

187

Chapter Eleven: Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi: A Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Chapter Twelve: The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation in the Contexts of Early Modern Japan and Contemporary Taiwan . . . . . . . . 215 Epilogue

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Appendix: Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions in East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

Indexes Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Index of Names

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Index of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Endorsement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Preface

Over the long span of history, Confucian texts travelled across every country and region in East Asia. The vitality and openness of Confucian texts inspired the curiosity of readers in each country and invited those readers to engage in creative dialogue with the texts. Through the continuing intellectual and spiritual conversation among Confucian scholars, a Confucian community was created. This volume tells the story of the importance of the Confucian traditions and why and how Confucian texts were reinterpreted within the different ambiances and contexts of East Asia. Therefore, we will discover that “East Asian Confucianisms” is an intellectual community that is transnational and multi-lingual. It evolved in interaction between Confucian “universal values” and the local conditions present in each East Asian country. Some chapters in this volume are completely revised versions of articles that had been published elsewhere in simplified or altered forms. Therefore I would like to express my thanks to the respective publishers for making those texts available for the present publication. Chapter 1 was published as “Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia,” The Medieval History Journal 11/1 (June 2008): pp. 101 – 21. Chapter 2 was published as “On the ‘Contextual Turn’ in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics: Types and Problems,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9/2 (June 2010): pp. 211 – 23. Chapter 3 was published as “East Asian Confucian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms,” in Kam-Por Yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 2011), pp. 73 – 98. Chapter 4 was published as “The Role of Tasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 9/2 (December 2012): pp. 153 – 68. Chapter 7 was published as “The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia: A Comparative Perspective,” in East Asian Confucianisms: Interactions and Innovations. Proceedings of the Conference of May 1 – 2, 2009 (New Jersey: Confucius Institute at Rutgers University, 2010), pp. 1 – 25. Chapter 8 was published as “Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects,” The Journal of

8

Preface

Kanbun Studies in Japan 1 (2006), pp. 371 – 410. Chapter 10 was published as “What’s Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12/1 (March 2013): pp. 1 – 10. Chapter 11 was published as “Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi,” in APF Series 2: Life, Existence and Ethics. The Philosophical Moment in East Asian Discourse (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2014), pp. 13 – 35. Chapter 12 was published as “The Idea of ‘Zhongguo’ and Its Transformation in the Context of Early Modern Japan and Contemporary Taiwan,” The Journal of Kanbun Studies in Japan 2 (2007): pp. 408 – 398 [sic]. The appendix was published as “Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions in East Asia,” Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia 1 (2010): pp. 11 – 36. In preparing this volume, I wish to express my gratitude for the financial support received from the National Science Council, ROC (Project no: NSC 1012410-H-002-044-MY2) and the National Taiwan University. I am also deeply grateful to my colleague Professor Kirill Thompson for reading the manuscript and offering invaluable comments and finally to Professor Stephen Lakkis for his revisions as well as detailed and professional copy editing.

Prologue

The purpose of this book is not to repeat the cliché that Confucianism is the sine qua non of East Asian civilization, but rather to suggest that the paradigm of “East Asian Confucianisms” can open up a brand new vista for the study of Confucian traditions in East Asia. In this prologue, I will argue that we must finally leave the ghetto of “national learning,” with its practice of holding statecentrism as the basis of Confucianism. Instead, we must reconsider the development of Confucianism in a broader East Asian perspective. By contextualizing Confucianism in East Asian cultures and societies we find ourselves in a better position to appreciate the diversity and variety of East Asian Confucian traditions. In this prologue I will discuss the legitimacy of studying “East Asian Confucianisms,” and the promise that this new field of study holds. I will engage with the twentieth-century Japanese scholar Tsuda So¯kichi (津田左右吉, 1873 – 1961), particularly his doubts on the validity of the concept of “East Asian Civilization.” I shall also confirm “East Asian Confucianisms” as a valid new field of study with a rich and distinct “unity in diversity.” Moreover, I shall suggest that seeing Confucianism in the wide, East Asian perspective opens up a novel vista for future investigations and leads us to new and as yet undiscovered questions.

1

The possibility

If we are to discuss the legitimacy of “East Asian Confucianisms” as a field of study, then we must begin with Tsuda So¯kichi’s objection to the idea of “East Asian civilization.” A guiding thread in Tsuda’s enormous scholarship is the idea of the absolute difference between Japanese and Chinese culture. If this were true, the concepts of “East Asian Civilization” and “East Asian Spirit” would exist only within our cultural imagination. Tsuda insisted that the Japanese lifestyle differs completely from that of the Chinese, especially in clan and social organization, political style and customs.

10

Prologue

He saw nothing in common between Japan and China, claiming that the two differ in ethnicity, language, and even species. Differences in regional conditions, and in geographic, climatic, and other causes also led to differences between the clothing, food, shelter and social psychology of these two peoples. Quoting Sakuma Sho¯zan (佐久間象山, 1811 – 1864), a nineteenth-century Japanese thinker and a scholar of military learning, he argues that the expression “East Asia” only gained general cultural currency during the nineteenth century. In fact, there was nothing substantial to the concept of “East Asia.”1 Were we to survey all these points, we would find that certain features of Tsuda’s intellectual background inclined him to deny the idea of an encompassing East Asian Civilization. He was a strong supporter of the Meiji regime’s new culture, and openly disdained Chinese culture. His writings clearly conveyed this stance and repeatedly stressed the gap between these two cultures. However, as his contemporary Sinologist Masubuchi Tatsuo (增淵龍夫, 1916 – 1983) has pointed out, Tsuda’s critique of Chinese culture reflected an outsider’s perspective, without any sympathetic understanding of China.2 Tsuda lived in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, a period when Japan was undergoing radical modernization and a progression toward militarism. It is hardly surprising that Tsuda was deeply influenced by the views of his time. The renowned Sinologist Naito¯ Konan (内藤湖南, 1866 – 1934) affirmed that East Asian history had been formed and conditioned by Chinese culture. Yet he stressed only what he thought to be the advanced features of that culture.3 When he traveled to China, he often felt uncomfortable with its people and customs, even distressed by their apparent barbarism.4 Having embraced this sense of Japanese superiority, he felt very out of place when visiting the new Japanese colony of Taiwan and argued that the Taiwanese did not deserve equal rights under the Japanese Empire.5 Slightly earlier, Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉, 1834 – 1901), a pivotal architect of modern Japan, stated in one of his influential works that the Western powers represented the epitome of progress. He believed the European powers and America were the most civilized, followed by the half-developed Asian Turkey, 1 Tsuda So¯kichi 津田左右吉, Tsuda So¯kichi zenshu¯ 津田左右吉全集 [Complete Works of Tsuda So¯kichi] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1965), vol. 20, p. 195, pp. 302 – 3. 2 Masubuchi Tatsuo 增淵龍夫, “Nihon no kindai shigakushi niokeru Chu¯goku to Nihon: Tsuda So¯kichi no ba’ai 日本の近代史学史における中国と日本：津田左右吉の場合 [China and Japan in the History of Historiography of Modern Japan],” in his Rekishika no Do¯jidaishi teki Ko¯satsu ni tsuite 歴史家の同時代史的考察について [A Historian’s Observation of Contemporary History] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1983), pp. 3 – 48. 3 Naito¯ Konan 内藤湖南, Naito¯ Konan zenshu¯ 內藤湖南全集 [Complete Works of Naito¯ Konan] (Tokyo: Chikuma shoten, 1944), vol. 1, p. 9. 4 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 75. 5 Ibid., pp. 394 – 6.

The rationale

11

China, and Japan, with the barbaric African and Australian nations last. In addition to this classification, he thought that China had regressed in the evolutionary stages of civilization.6 This predilection for worshiping the West and looking down on Asian cultures (especially Chinese) was characteristic of thought in a Japan that had just completed the Meiji modernization. By drawing a firm line between Japan and China, Tsuda not only exposed his scorn for China, but also reflected the zeitgeist of his age. Nevertheless, Tsuda’s critique of the concept of East Asian Civilization offers some methodological suggestions for the possibility of “East Asian Confucianisms” and hints at a kind of methodological individualism. For Tsuda, general “East Asian Confucianisms” do not exist. What does exist are particular entities with unique features, such as Chinese Confucianism, Japanese Confucianism, and Korean Confucianism. Thus, comprehensive “East Asian Confucianisms” exist only when we can see and examine Confucianism in each of these cultures.

2

The rationale

2.1

East Asian Confucianisms as a reality of history

The rationale for proposing East Asian Confucianisms as a field of study is twofold. On the one hand, “East Asian Confucianisms” embraces the Confucian traditions of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. On the other hand, the varied Confucian traditions in these cultures did not form a mechanical assemblage, but rather a comprehensive, developing, and systematic whole. “East Asian Confucianisms” displays a genetic developmental interconnectedness. It is well known that Confucianism originated in Shandong, China, two thousand years ago. By the sixteenth century it had spread to Japan across the vital bridge of Korea and taken up a major place in Japan’s philosophical mainstream. During the Tokugawa period, the Japanese Zhu Xi (朱熹, Huian, 晦庵, 1130 – 1200) school of Confucianism began to take shape. This was largely due to the great influence of Zhu Xi studies in Joseon (1391 – 1910) Korea, especially in the writings of the Korean scholar Yi Toegye (李退溪, 1501 – 1570), most of whose works were also published in Japan. Later, a Ming (1368 – 1644) scholar Luo Qinshun (羅欽順, 1466 – 1547) revised Zhu Xi’s philosophy in his Kunzhiji (困知 記, Knowledge Acquired through Adversity). This book had a profound impact on

6 Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku 文明論の概略 [Introduction to the Theory of Civilizations] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), pp. 25 – 55.

12

Prologue

the Tokugawa world of thought. Luo’s book was printed in Japan on the basis of the Korean version.7 Apart from journeying across the Korean peninsula, Chinese Confucian classics also reached Japan directly by sea. Chinese classics began to appear in Japan from the ninth century, and by the nineteenth century seventy to eighty percent of the Chinese classics could be found there. In addition to the classics, Japanese thought and culture were also greatly influenced by other Chinese publications such as histories and biographies, local gazettes and law books.8 In the historical development of East Asian Confucianisms, many classics and the ideas therein were transmitted from China to Korea and then Japan, like expanding ripples on a pond, creating developmental inter-connectedness. By the same token, Confucianism throughout East Asia exhibits a similar structural pattern. Despite the fact that Confucianism in China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan displays regional features, Confucians in these different places read the same Confucian classics, such as the Analects, the Mencius, the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean. They all came to ponder the core ideas of the Confucian tradition, reflecting on what Confucius meant when he said “A single thread connects my Way” (Analects 4.15, 15.3) or “At fifty, I comprehended the mandate of Heaven” (Analects 2.4) etc. Yet Confucian scholars of different regions promoted their own site-specific interpretations of the Confucian traditions. All such problems constitute a series of questions commonly shared by East Asian Confucians. Consequently, a Confucian system of thought with East Asian characteristics came to emerge and exhibit a set of “family resemblances,” which can aptly be termed “East Asian Confucianisms.” Such a Confucian family of ideas and problems conveys the sense that East Asian Confucianisms form a system of thought.

7 Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄, Nihon Shushigaku to Cho¯sen 日本朱子学と朝鮮 [Japanese Zhu Xi School of Neo-Confucianism and Korea] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1965, 1975), p. 19. 8 Yian Shaodang 嚴紹璗, ed., Riben cang Songren wenji shanben gouchen 日本藏宋人文集善本 鉤沉 [Selections of the Rare Editions of the Literary Works of Song Literati Preserved in Japan] ¯ ba O ¯ samu 大庭脩, Qi Yinping 戚印 (Hangzhou: Hangzhou University Press, 1996), pp. 1 – 2; O 平, trans., Jianghu shidai Zhongguo dianji liubo Riben zhi yanjiu 江戶時代中國典籍流播日 本之研究 [A Study of the Dissemination of Chinese Texts in Tokugawa Japan] (Hangzhou: Hangzhou University Press, 1998).

The rationale

2.2

13

East Asian Confucianisms as the method of the humanities

To characterize the genetic progression of East Asian Confucianisms as the outward spread of ripples which led to a simultaneous developmental and systematic comprehensiveness would leave us under the impression that Chinese Confucianism is the core or center, and Confucian ideas in other places merely peripheral. Koyasu Nobukuni (子安宣邦, 1933 – ) recently called into question this impression. He noted that such a view would propagate a political center–periphery dichotomy and cultural origin–reception tension. Such a view would amount to an intellectual version of pre-modern Chinese imperialism.9 The ripple effect is one that sends forth Chinese cultural chauvinism. And indeed Koyasu’s doubts are absolutely correct. The monistic approach which would take China’s Confucian tradition as the central culture would mean adopting as the basis of our developmental explanation the civilized–barbaric distinction embraced by the Chinese hegemony. It is little wonder that Tsuda despised China with his Japancentrism and Japanese chauvinism in return. China’s cultural egocentrism has been deep-rooted. Its imperial rulers thought they were the center of the world and they looked down on the peoples of the surrounding “barbarian” lands. According to Wang Ermin (王爾敏, 1927 –), the term Zhongguo (中國, central state or middle kingdom) was used in several senses in the pre-Qin classics, usually involving a center–border outlook, thus suggesting that the Chinese monistic cultural outlook was formed very early indeed.10 However, as I shall argue in chapter 10, some Japanese intellectuals of the seventeenth century took Zhongguo to refer to their own homeland, Japan, since they felt Japan had been imbued with the Way of Confucius and the authentic spirit of the Spring and Autumn Annals more adequately than had China. Moreover, the concept of Zhongguo in the contemporary Taiwanese worldview can be divided into a cultural China and political China. While these two elements are not completely cut off from one another, there is a degree of tension and struggle between them.

9 Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, Ajia wa do¯ katararete kita ka – Kindai Nihon no orientarizumu 「アジア」ほどう語られてきたか – 近代日本のオリエンタリズム [How can Asia be discussed? Orientalism in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 2003), pp. 171 – 98. 10 Wang Ermin 王爾敏, “‘Zhongguo’ mingcheng suoyuan jiqi jindai quanshi 「中國」名稱溯 源及其近代詮釋 [The Origin of ‘China’ and its Interpretation in Modern Times],” in Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun 中國近代思想史論 [Essays on Modern Chinese Intellectual History] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1977), pp. 441 – 80. Cf. Michael Loewe, “The Heritage Left to the Empires,” in Michael Loewe, Edward I. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 992 – 5.

14

Prologue

This monistic, Sino-centric, political-cultural solipsism11 should have collapsed together with the downfall of the Qing Empire (1644 – 1911). After all, the new cultural-political orders of the twenty-first century were formed with the strong affirmation of cultural pluralism, on which “East Asian Confucianisms” is espoused in Taiwan today. Acknowledging the varied Confucian traditions in East Asia – as manifested in China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan – we see that Confucianism in each place expresses its own particular strengths, weaknesses, and its rich multi-faceted contents. Nevertheless, while each regional version of Confucianism responds to the specific features and requirements of that locale, there is a clear commonality within their visible diversities. That is, Confucians of different places still pay the same respect to Confucius (551 – 479 bce) and Mencius (371 – 289 bce) as did their spiritual forebears. Their specific needs and requirements respond to the classics, thereby opening up a new vista of Confucian interpretation, constructing localized Confucianism reflective of their region’s specific ethos. In short, the significant commonality of East Asian Confucianisms is this “plurality.” Thus the common framework of the Confucian traditions need not foster cultural monism but can provide a prism that highlights the rich diversity of East Asian cultures. Viewing “East Asian Confucianisms” in this way makes the study of this field an example of the “method”12 used in studying the humanities. When studying “East Asian Confucianisms” as a historical reality, we must avoid the trap of taking China to be the center. Rather we should see the concept of “East Asian Confucianisms” as a “method” that illuminates concrete processes whereby the so-called peripheries form their own respective versions of Confucianism. Interpreted in this sense, Confucianism becomes a parameter for the formation of the subjectivities of each and every East Asian region. What is important to observe here is the process by which such specific subjectivity is constructed, be it in Japan or Korea, not the “authenticity” or “orthodoxy” of a specific regional Confucianism. “East Asian Confucianisms” are not something ready-cast, nor a frame of thought that exists above the concrete process of the development of Confucianisms in Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Rather it exists only in the interactive formations among East Asian regions, including China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

11 John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1; Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, p. 20. 12 For reflections on Asia as “method,” see Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹內好, “Ho¯ho¯ toshite no Ajia 方 法としてのアジア [Asia as Method],” in Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu¯ 竹內好全集 [Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshimi] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo¯, 1981), vol. 5, esp. 114 – 15.

The aspects and configurations of the problem

3

15

The aspects and configurations of the problem

The view that East Asian Confucianisms reflect the diversity of regional characteristics, and that its comprehensive integrity is not a mechanical assemblage of regional Confucian traditions but rather some overall family resemblances in thinking, leads us to face certain challenges. Let us look here at the legitimized field of “East Asian Confucianisms,” and the new inquiries and points of significance that it raises. One repercussion of the novel view mentioned above regards Chinese Confucianism itself. If we were to consider the study of Confucianism only in the context of Chinese history (even going to the effort of detailing all the changes and differences among the various dynasties and movements, such as Han Confucianism, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, Qing Confucianism, etc.), then our view would still be filtered through the official system of examination and its related educational channels. “Chinese Confucianism” would have remained closely tied to the Chinese imperial order, which functioned as the principal platform for its dissemination. Under Chinese imperial order, such Confucian values could not have produced any tensions between political and cultural identity. And in fact traditionally China strongly promulgated sociopolitical monism, to the extent that the orientations of that value themselves exhibited a high degree of uniformity.13 The influence of an overall imperial monism ensured that political and cultural identity remained tightly fused across two thousand years of Chinese imperial dynasties. Even exiled Chinese Confucians have displayed such a unity of political and cultural identity. Zhu Shunshui (朱舜水, 1600 – 1682), an exiled Confucian of the late-Ming and early-Qing, is a prime example. In 1659, just after the fall of the Ming (1368 – 1644) and rise of the Qing (1644 – 1912) empires, Zhu left for Japan, where he sought military support to restore the Ming dynasty. Recognizing the Ming reign as the political identity, Zhu supposed that political authority was rooted in culture. He wrote to a Japanese friend, lamenting that “recently the Chinese empire fell because it had abandoned the teachings of the sages and rushed to open the competitive road of profit.”14 Staying in Japan for twenty-two 13 Cf. Donald W. Treagold, The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), vol. 1, xxii. 14 Zhu Shunshui 朱舜水, Zhu Shunshui ji 朱舜水集 [Collected Essays of Zhu Shunshui] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), vol. 7, p. 182. Cf. my “Lun dongya yimin ruzhe de liangge liangnanshi 論東亞遺民儒者的兩個兩難式 [On the Two Predicaments in Confucianism as Formulated by the Leftover Subjects in East Asia],” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 3/1 (June, 2006): pp. 61 – 80, and my Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010), pp. 62 – 3.

16

Prologue

years, his political and cultural identities remained fused as one, and he often lamented that “the only place for Confucius and Yan Hui was China: Yao and Shun were not born in remote lands”15 ; “China was the cultural center and Japan a border region; and, the Japanese have never seen a Yao or Shun because they did not cultivate the Way.”16 In this, Zhu was not an exception but an example of a common Chinese attitude displayed throughout Chinese history. However, once we expand our vision to the whole of East Asia beyond China proper, our studies of Confucianism will be liberated from Chinese regionalism, and infused with the new vitality that comes with greater breadth and diversity. Set in the larger context of East Asia, the study of Confucianism gives rise to many new topics. It is up to us to explore the terrain and choose the most promising ones, and to find new wine for the renovated bottles of time-honored Confucianism. Among all the new themes, two merit our study the most.

3.1

Tensions and fusions between Chinese Confucian values and the specific characteristics of other regions in East Asia

Appearing in the Shandong peninsula of China over two millennia ago, Confucianism was originally merely a local wisdom. Yet as it developed over the centuries, Confucianism molded a value system which was eventually accepted all over East Asia. In the eyes of East Asian Confucians outside China, “China” was a great and inevitable “Other.” When examining the overall historical rise and development of Confucianism, we come across many Confucian notions – such as the distinction between the Chinese and barbarians (huayi zhibian 華夷 之辨), zhong (忠, loyalty, doing one’s best), and xiao (孝, filial piety) – that all strongly reflect specific features of Chinese culture and are deeply rooted and colored by that culture’s agrarian economy, clan society, and authoritarian order. It is not surprising then that as these ideas spread outside China to Korea and Japan, tensions appeared due to the differences in regional conditions. For example, Confucianism had to be adjusted to fit into Japan’s imperial feudal conditions; this assimilation of Confucianism aimed to localize Confucianism in Japanese soil.17 Such tensions caused a transformation in Confucian ideas, changing them into diverse versions of East Asian Confucianisms. We see this diversity particularly clearly in two examples. 15 Zhu Shunshui, Zhu Shunshui ji, p. 170. 16 Ibid. 17 Kate Wildman Nakai, “The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The Problem of Sino-Centrism,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40/1 (June 1980): pp. 157 – 99.

The aspects and configurations of the problem

17

First, as Confucianism spread to Japan, changes were made to suit the local context, and some passages in the Analects were given new interpretations. In the Analects (9.14), Confucius considered settling among the “Nine Barbaric Tribes (Jiuyi 九夷) of the east”; Hayashi Razan (林羅山, 1583 – 1657), a Zhu Xi scholar of early Tokugawa Japan, thought Jiuyi referred even to Japan as Japan was the country of gentlemen.18 But Ito¯ Jinsai (伊藤仁齋, 1627 – 1705) drew on the general meaning of the “Sage mind” and broke down the barrier erected by Confucius’ Chinese–barbarian distinction, broadening the meaning of this passage.19 In China, Confucius and Mencius were given equal prominence from the Song dynasty (960 – 1279). Mencius’ tablet was placed in the Confucius Temple as the “Second Sage.” But because Mencius’ revolutionary political thought clashed with Tokugawa feudalism, many Japanese Confucians attacked Mencius. As early as the seventeenth century, Ogyu¯ Sorai (荻生徂徠, 1666 – 1728) proposed removing Mencius’ tablet.20 Sorai’s follower Dazai Shundai (太宰春台, 1680 – 1747) wrote two tracts criticizing Mencius. The Sorai school’s excessive critique of Mencius compelled scholars of Ito¯ Jinsai’s school to launch a counter-critique on such attacks against Mencius. The debate between the two schools continued into the nineteenth century.21 This debate illustrates the underlying tension between Mencius’ political thought and the sociopolitical circumstances in Tokugawa Japan. Second, some ideas in Chinese Confucianism were newly interpreted when they reached Japan and Korea. The meaning of such core concepts as gong (公, public, fair), si (私, personal, private), and xin (心, mind-heart) went through radical changes in Japan. In Japan, xin came to mean “spontaneous,” “natural,” “unified,” and a “receptive medium,” while in China it had a “cosmic character,” an “empty,” “lively” entity full of ontological significance.22 This “cosmic character” itself refers to the heart-mind’s creative activity in and of the world, 18 Hayashi Razan 林羅山, Hayashi Razan bunshu¯ 林羅山文集 [Literary Corpus of Hayashi Razan] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1979), vol. 36, pp. 408 – 9. 19 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, Rongo kogi 論語古義 [Classical Meanings of the Analects], in Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎, ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書 ¯ tori [Complete Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: O Shuppan, 1973), vol. 3, p. 32. 20 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Kenen ippitsu 蘐園一筆 [First Corpus of Kenen], Nihon jurin so¯sho 日 ¯ tori shuppan, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 1 – 3. 本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Confucianism] (Tokyo: O 21 Cf. Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將, Riben Dechuan shidai guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhi lun: yi Yiteng Renzhai, Disheng Culai wei zhongxin 日本德川時代古學派之王道政治論：以伊藤 仁齋、荻生徂徠為中心 [The Discourses of Kingly Governance of the Classical School in Tokugawa Japan: An Inquiry Focusing upon Ito¯ Jinsai and Ogyu¯ Sorai] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), ch. 5. 22 Mizoguchi Yu¯zo¯ 溝口雄三, Chu¯goku no ko¯ to si 中国の公と私 [The “Public” and the “Private” in China] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1995).

18

Prologue

producing and living together, feeling and responding to one another, and the interactive relations that give rise to natural law. Zhong and xiao, two other basic concepts in Confucianism, also attracted entirely different interpretations in Japan. Zhang Kunjiang (張崑將, 1967–) recently researched the meaning given to xiao in the Wang Yangming (王陽明, ¯ shio He¯1472 – 1528) school, from Nakae To¯ju (中江藤樹, 1608 – 1648) to O hachiro¯ (大塩平八郎, 1793 – 1837), and the connotations of zhong for the military school, from Yamaga Soko¯ (山鹿素行, 1622 – 1685) to Yoshida Sho¯in (吉田 松陰, 1830 – 1859). Zhang argued that in Japan, zhong and xiao were both influenced by local Shintoism, the Japanese indigenous thought.23 These examples serve to illustrate the diversity of the Confucianisms present in East Asia. Far from a uniform broadcast of Chinese Confucianism, East Asian Confucianisms exhibits a rich diversity rooted in the various local milieux and specific ethnic cultures of those regions.

3.2

East Asian Confucianisms exhibit a duality of cultural and political identity among non-Chinese Confucians

In China, all Confucians share the same values, and the Han people established an orthodox rule aimed at fusing political and cultural identities into one. Yet in the cases of other East Asian countries, Confucians admired Confucius and Mencius, absorbed Confucian values, adopted Confucianism into their cultural identity, and yet were subject to other political identities. For instance, in the sixteenth century, Zhu Xi’s follower Hayashi Razan argued that “Japan’s flourishing culture can rival that of China.”24 Yamaga Soko¯, the early Tokugawa Confucian and scholar of military philosophy, compared Japan with China and asserted that the former was better.25 Japanese Confucians considered Chinese rules foreign and never fused their Chinese cultural identity with Japanese political identity. In sum, these two new areas in the study of East Asian Confucianisms show how the studies of East Asian Confucianisms can introduce new questions to illuminate traditional Chinese Confucianism, bring up new issues for inves23 Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將, Dechuan Riben “Zhong” “Xiao” gainian de xingcheng yu fazhan 德 川日本「忠」「孝」概念的形成與發展 [The Formation and Development of the Notions of “Loyalty” and “Filial Piety” in Tokugawa Japan] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005). 24 Hayashi Razan, Hayashi Razan bunshu¯, vol. 48, p. 560. 25 Yamaga Soko¯ 山鹿素行, Chu¯cho¯ jijitsu 中朝事実 [Facts of Japan], in Hirose Yutaka 広瀬豊, ed., Yamaga Soko¯ zenshu¯ 山鹿素行全集 [Complete Works of Yamaga Soko¯] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), vol. 13, p. 369.

Conclusion

19

tigation, and thereby pour new wine into old, renovated bottles, and generate new methods.

4

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have argued that studies of East Asian Confucianisms are a new field in the twenty-first century’s new age of globalization. The purpose is not to find in Asia a “Reflexive Orientalism” to counteract Western studies, much less a self-absorbed and self-assertive so-called “national learning” or guoxue (國學). Instead, “East Asian Confucianisms” is a unique and self-formed systematic study. It is not just a mechanical piecemeal assemblage of regional versions of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Confucianisms. Rather, as Confucians in each of these places recite and are immersed in the same classics, they aspire to become the sages in Confucian core values, transcending regional limitations. This common core of Confucianism forms a system of thought without the stigmas of center–border or means–end discriminations. “East Asian Confucianisms” is a field of study that rids us of the vestiges of boundaries and limitations that still remain in the present time and take in East Asia as a whole. In our present era of globalization, we find that in the various traditions of East Asian Confucianisms there exist important spiritual resources that could facilitate dialogues among world civilizations.

Part I New Perspectives on East Asian Confucianisms

Introduction

The vitality of East Asian Confucianisms stems from the desire of Confucian thinkers to interpret the core values of the Confucian classics in line with changes in their own times and location. Although all the interpretations that were advanced in China, Korea and Japan were specific to their own era and country, they do still share some themes in common. The most outstanding of these phenomena is the intimate interaction we witness between interpretations of the Confucian classics and political power in East Asia. The East Asian Confucians aimed at statecraft through careers in scholarship and education. They strived not only to interpret the world but also to change it. Therefore, we readily observe the inseparability of power and Confucianisms in East Asia, as well as the tension between them. Moreover, in order to make Chinese-rooted Confucian values more congenial to the sociopolitical and cultural soil of Korea and Japan, the Korean and Japanese Confucians practiced a form of “contextual turn” in their reinterpretations of Chinese Confucianism. In Chapters 1 and 2, I will examine this “praxis hermeneutics” and “contextual turn” in the history of East Asian Confucianisms. This focus by East Asian Confucians on statecraft showed the extent to which Confucianism transcended the simple sphere of personal or private life. The power of Confucian ideals may have shaped the course of one’s individual life and the private relationships of filiality. But these ideals also extended beyond the private into the shared and very public social world of the political sphere. Yet is there a conflict between these ideals in each sphere, a tension between the demands of private relationships and filiality, and the public demands of loyalty to the state? Chapter 3 analyzes the way in which Confucians in each of the East Asian contexts wrestled with this question in their own particular ways. The ancient, eastward arc of development in East Asian Confucianisms carries us from China toward Japan. Yet in this development Korea played an essential role, acting as a bridge for the movement of Chinese Confucian thought into Japan. Yet that bridge was far from just a neutral or passive link. Chapter 4 argues that Confucianism on the Korean Peninsula grew within its own particular cul-

24

Introduction

tural and political environment, and adopted its own characteristics, shaping the form of Confucianism that would later develop in Japan. Yet its insights and influence would extend far beyond the ancient world. In Korean Confucianism we also glimpse the guiding principles that will direct the continuing transformation of Confucianism and East Asian societies into the twenty-first century. Overall, Part I of this volume offers an arc from the pre-modern period into the struggles of the modern era and beyond, beginning with the hermeneutical challenges of pre-modern East Asian Confucians, and ending with an examination of the sociopolitical uncertainties facing the progression of Confucianism and its contexts in the twenty-first century.

Chapter One: On the Relationship between Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia: An Inquiry into the Analects and Mencius

1

Introduction

The most important feature of the hermeneutic tradition of Confucian classics in East Asia lies in the intimate interaction between the interpretations of those classics and political power. The interpreters themselves wished to give new meanings to the classics in order to tame royal power, and thus benefit the people, bring order to the state, and protection to the world. For this reason, the interpreters entered the intellectual world of the classics from a political standpoint. Moreover, we find that differences among various interpreters typically sprang from debates in the political sphere. However, when we look at the interactive structure linking interpretations of the classics and political power, we find that the latter tended to dominate – texts were given different interpretations in different political contexts, and readers perceived different significances at different times.1 Under adverse political conditions, the ruling class, particularly in imperial China, forced interpreters to impose distorted readings on the classical texts. In dialogue with interpreters of various ages, the classics invite interpreters, through their own “existential structure,”2 to provide new meanings for the classical texts. In this sense, we can say that the classics indeed have an “existential” character. The main reason for the subtle and complex relation between interpretations of the Confucian classics and political power in East Asia was that the scholars who commented on the classics in East Asia not only interpreted the classics but also aimed at managing the world around them. East Asian scholars in particular regarded the task of ordering the state in accordance with the classics as their 1 Eric Donald Hirsch, Jr. distinguishes between “meaning” and “significance.” The former refers to a text’s apparent basic meaning while the latter indicates the different “significances” a text produces in the minds of the readers in different times and places. See his Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 8. 2 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Colin Smith trans., Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), xix, pp. 87 f., 158, 172, 448 f.

26

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

guiding responsibility.3 Hence, interpreters of the Confucian classics developed intimate, often unbalanced, interactive relations with political power. Focusing on examples of East Asia Confucianisms, this chapter will discuss the complex relations between interpretations of the classics and political power. We will begin by analyzing how power led to political domination over the interpretation of the classics. We will then examine portraits of different interpreters in their respective political context and their attempts to use the classics to advise the ruling class, or at least to interpret the classics in the light of political reality.

2

Interpretations of Confucian classics and the domination of political power in East Asia

In the history of East Asian Confucian learning, the domination of political power over the interpretations of the classics was manifested in two ways.

2.1

Through political pressure, new meanings are imposed upon key terms in the classics

The Analects of Confucius is one of the classics of Confucianism. It discusses ways to cultivate the self and to govern the state – a means of ordering “all under Heaven” and of saving the people. Analects 6.1 reads: “The Master said, ‘Yong could be given the seat facing south.’” The term nanmian (南面, “facing south”) is a symbolic expression from ancient China referring to the fact that whenever a leader of any rank received his subjects, he was seated facing south to receive them. Consequently, ancient architecture was arranged to have the leader’s seat placed on the north side facing south – thus whenever any leader or ranking official received visitors, the leader would be seated “facing south.” Accordingly, the expression “facing south” used in the Analects could refer to the king, but also to the feudal lords, vassals4, and even administrators of local prefectures5. For 3 For example, Lu Xiangshan (陸象山, Jiuyuan 九淵, 1139 – 1193) wrote, “Although Confucian scholars aspire to the soundless, the odorless, the formless, and the immaterial, they all place emphasis on ordering the state.” See Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, “Yu Wang Shunbo 與王順伯 [Letter to Wang Shunbo],” in Lu Jiuyuan ji 陸九淵集 [Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan] (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1981), juan 2, p. 17. 4 Wang Yinzhi (王引之, 1766 – 1834) noted that “The expression ‘facing south’ [in general …] was sometimes spoken in reference to the emperor, to the feudal lords, […] and sometimes in reference to the feudal vassals.” But Wang Yinzhi criticized Bao Xian’s (包咸, 6 bce–65 ce) and Huang Kan’s (皇侃, 488 – 545 ce) explanation of “facing south” in Analects 6.1 as referring to feudal lords, as well as other people’s explanations of it as referring to the emperor. He believed

Interpretations of Confucian classics and the domination of political power

27

that reason, the manner in which Confucian scholars interpreted “facing south” in the Analects reflected the extent of political domination they were under at that time.6 Toward the end of the Western Han, the bibliographer Liu Xiang (劉向, 77 – 6 bce) wrote, “In Confucius’ time, there was no enlightened king above. Therefore, he said, ‘Yong could be given the seat facing south.’ The one who ‘faces south’ was the Son of Heaven.”7 His use of “king” to interpret Confucius’ term “facing south” was a little closer to the linguistic context of Confucius and his disciples during the pre-Qin period. A concern with the emperor can be seen in all Confucius’ major undertakings: his teaching of students of all classes, his school’s fourfold curriculum with its major focus on administration, his encouragement of students to take up official positions, and his editing of the Spring and Autumn Annals to instill fear in ministers and generals who rebelled or collaborated with enemy states. In fact, prior to the Qin (221 – 206 bce) unification of China in 221 bce, the expression “facing south” appeared frequently in the early classics, mostly signifying the emperor rather than lower ranking rulers or officials. Thus, the Shuogua (說卦, Explanation of the Trigrams) section of the Book of Changes reads, “The sage [king] facing south listens to the empire and discerns the brightness there in ruling.”8 And the Zhile (至樂, Perfect Happiness) chapter of Zhuangzi (莊子) reads, “A king facing south on his throne could have no more happiness than this!”9 Both these quotations from pre-Qin texts use the expression “facing south” to refer to the emperor or the king. Liu Xiang, who lived during the late Western Han dynasty (206 bce–8 ce) when imperial authority was declining, used the term “Son of Heaven” to explain “facing south,” thus also reflecting the intellectual milieu of his age. During the Eastern Han (25 – 220 ce),

5 6

7 8 9

that, “If I were just a commoner, how could I presume to assume the ruler’s position?” Wang said this perhaps because he lived during a period of unified rule when imperial power was at its zenith, thus this reality was imposed back onto his reading of this pre-Qin classic. Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, Rongo no shinkenkyu¯ 論語の新研究 [New Studies of the Analects] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1975), p. 214. Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1903 – 1982) was the first to notice this problem, but he did not examine it in depth. See his essay, “Guoshi zhong renjun zunyan wenti de tantao 國史中人君尊嚴問題的 探討 [Discussion of the Ruler’s Dignity in Chinese History],” in Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan 儒家政治思想與民主自由人權 [Confucian Political Thoughts and Democracy, Liberty, Human Rights] (Taipei: Bashi niandai chubanshe, 1979), p. 162. Liu Xiang 劉向, Shuo Yuan 說苑 [Collection of Discourses] (Sibu Congkan chubian suoben edition 四部叢刊初編縮本), sec. 19, p. 92. Wang Bi 王弼, Zhouyi zhushu 周易注疏 [Commentaries on the Book of Change] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Jiangxi Nanchang Fu Academy wood-block edition, 1955), vol. 9, p. 5 A. Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋 [Collected Commentaries on Zhuangzi] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), vol. 3, ch. 18, p. 619.

28

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

Bao Xian defined “facing south” by saying “One who can assume the position ‘facing south’ is one who can serve as a feudal lord and govern state administration.”10 Zheng Xuan (鄭玄, 127 – 200) also stated that “‘Facing south’ means to rule as a feudal lord.”11 He Yan (何晏, 190 – 249) of the Wei kingdom (220 – 265)12 and Xing Bing (邢昺, Shuming 叔明, 932 – 1010) of the Song dynasty (960 – 1279)13 both mentioned zhuhou (諸侯, feudal lords) when defining “facing south.” Qing (1644 – 1911) Confucian scholar Ling Tingkan (淩廷堪, d. 1809) wrote, “The expression ‘facing south’ pertained to the ruler, but it was also used in reference to feudal vassals; it did not refer to the Spring and Autumn period (722 – 481 bce) feudal lords or the emperors of later periods.”14 In the history of interpretations of the Analects, definitions of “facing south” shifted from emperors and feudal lords down to district and district-city leaders. This tendency corresponded with the changing influence that imperial power had over interpreters of the classics, and displays the subtle psychological pressure that was placed upon them. Twentieth-century scholar Cheng Shude (程樹德, Yuting 郁 庭, 1877 – 1944) wrote: Master Confucius’ discussion of the rites, weighing of the texts, and editing of the Spring and Autumn Annals – all were imperial matters. … It could be said that the learning of the sages and worthies certainly extended to the ordering of the state and the bringing of peace to the empire. … He approved of Zhonggong’s 仲弓 [cultivation] very much and said he could be given the seat “facing south” (Lunyu 6.1). His expression was subtle, but his intended meaning was clear. Although Bao’s and Zheng’s explanations [in their comments on “facing south”] of “feudal lord” differed from Liu Xiang’s reference to “emperor” (tianzi, 天子), what they meant was about the same. The recent scholars’ reference to ministers [in their comments] without including feudal lord and emperor, based on broad evidence, cannot avoid misinterpreting the Sage’s words.15

Among arguments that Confucius’ expression “facing south” should ultimately be taken to refer to the “emperor,” Cheng Shude’s explanation remains the most penetrating. In sum, the different treatments received by the term “facing south” are noteworthy because the interpreter’s explanation of it revealed extent to which he felt the psychological pressure of imperial power. This was due primarily to the 10 Cheng Shude 程樹德, Lunyu jishi 論語集釋 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), vol. 2, p. 362. 11 Ibid. 12 He Yan 何晏, Lunyu jijie 論語集解 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 3, ch. 6.1, p. 21B. 13 Xing Bing 邢昺, Lunyu zhushu 論語注疏 [Commentaries on the Analects] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1955), p. 51 A. 14 Ling Tingkan 淩廷堪, Lijing shili 禮經釋例 [Explicated Categories of the Book of Rites] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Chinese Lit. & Phil. Inst., 2002), p. 430. 15 Cheng Shude, Lunyu jishi, vol. 2, p. 362.

Interpretations of Confucian classics and the domination of political power

29

ruptures of history that occurred between Confucius and later interpreters in imperial China. In Confucius’ day, China was not unified. Yet with the Han Dynasty there was only one “Son of Heaven” and he became the center of political monism.

2.2

Political power exerted a filtering effect on the classical texts

Another example of political domination over the scholarly reading of the classics can be seen in sixteenth-century Japan, in the avoidance behavior adopted by the court lecturer while teaching the Mencius. The Kyoto University library has annotated texts used by the Japanese imperial Confucian lecturer Kiyohara Nobukata (清原宣賢, 1475 – 1550) to teach the Mencius to the emperor (in classes held from October 17, 1516, to October 21, 1517). Notably, whenever he reached sentences where Mencius criticized imperial power, the Confucian lecturer wrote at the top of the page “forbidden to be read to the emperor.”16 The first forbidden passage appeared in Mencius 2B7; it reads, “In high antiquity, there were no regulations governing the inner and outer coffins. In middle antiquity, it was prescribed that the inner coffin be seven inches thick with the outer coffin to match. This applied to all conditions of men, from emperor to commoner. This was not simply for show. It is only in this way that one can express fully one’s filial love.” The teacher drew a red mark along the words “from emperor,” and wrote “exclude these words from reading to the emperor.” Zhao Qi (趙岐, ca. 108 – 210) also added a comment on this passage, writing: “This applies to all conditions of men, from emperor to commoner. Still, there were differences in the number of layers and in the elegance of the decorations.”17 Here too the Confucian lecturer drew a red line along the left, and wrote “do not read this.”18 The second forbidden passage was from Mencius 3 A2: “I have heard something about the funeral rites. Three years as the mourning period, mourning dress made of rough hemp, the eating of nothing but rice gruel – these were observed in the Three Dynasties by men of all conditions alike, from emperor to commoner.” Again, at the top of the very page, the teacher wrote that the words 16 Eisho¯ sho¯hon Nobukata jihitsu Mo¯shi 永正鈔本宣賢自筆孟子 [Eisho¯ Transcribed Edition of Kiyohara’s Comments on the Mencius], accessed at . Cf. Inoue Masamichi 井上順理, Honpo¯ chu¯sei made ni okeru Mo¯shi juyo¯shi no kenkyu¯ 本邦中世までにおける孟子受容史の研究 [A Study of the History of Acceptance of the Book of Mencius in Japan up to the Medieval Period] (Tokyo: Kazama shobo¯, 1972), p. 512 – 17. 17 Eisho¯ Sho¯hon Nobukata jihitsu Mo¯shi, ken 4, p. 12. 18 Ibid.

30

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

“from emperor” should not be read.19 The third passage appeared in Mencius 5 A6: “In antiquity, Shun [舜] recommended Yu [禹] to Heaven, and died seventeen years later. When the mourning period was over, Yu withdrew to Yangcheng [陽城], leaving Shun’s son in possession of the field, yet the people of the Empire followed him just as, after Yao’s [堯] death, the people followed Shun instead of Yao’s son.” Regarding the sentence, “Shun recommended Yu to Heaven, and died seventeen years later,” the teacher notes not to read the word “die” to the emperor.20 The fourth forbidden passage was from Mencius 5 A6: “Tang [湯] came to rule the Empire through the assistance of Yi Yin [伊尹]. When Tang died, Tai Ding [太丁] did not succeed to the throne.” Here too, the Confucian lecturer indicated that the word “die” should be omitted when reading to the emperor.21 These four examples illustrate how the imperial teacher in sixteenth-century Japan carefully scrutinized the texts of Mencius and Zhao Qi’s commentary to detect any passages that might harm the emperor’s power (or vanity), and marked clearly the passages that should be skipped. Under the invisible pressure of imperial power, the lecturer was forced to omit some texts so as to avoid offending royal ears. Specifically, we can divide the filtering effect of political power on the classics into two types: soft and hard. 2.2.1 Soft Filtering “Soft filtering” refers to cases in which the holder of imperial power influences the selection of topics to be tested in the official state examinations. This case is exclusive to imperial China. Under such conditions, when examinees concentrated on selected topics of the classics, they naturally avoided the unselected ones. This soft filtering effect was most evident at the height of imperial power during the Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644), especially in their selection of questions on the Mencius for the state examinations. At the National Central Library of Taiwan, one can find sixty-six categories of collected questions given at the different levels of the Ming dynasty civil-service examinations.22 This data reveals that during the Ming reign, forty-six questions came from the Mencius. Among them, three were on Book 1, four on Book 2, seven on Book 3, six on Book 4, ten on Book 5, seven on Book 6, and nine on Book 7. Examining these forty-six questions in detail, over half of them deal with issues pertaining to personal moral cultivation. For example, the examination held in 19 20 21 22

Ibid., ken 5, p. 3. Ibid., ken 9, p. 15. Ibid., ken 9, p. 16. Qu Wanli 屈萬里, ed., Mingdai dengkelu huibian 明代登科錄彙編 [Collected Rosters of the Qualified Civil-Service Examinees of the Ming Dynasty] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1969).

Interpretations of Confucian classics and the domination of political power

31

1400 included a question on the passage from Mencius 5B1: “Confucius was the one who gathered together all that was good. To do this is to open with bells and rally with jade tubes.”23 The 1489 examination included a question on the passage from Mencius 3 A4: “We have heard that you, my lord, practice the government of the sages. In that case, you yourself must be a sage.”24 The 1502 examination had a question on passage 3 A3: “A jing [井] is a piece of land measuring one li [里] square, and each jing consists of 900 mu [畝]. Of these, the central plot of 100 mu belongs to the state, while the other eight plots of 100 mu each are held by eight families who share the duty of caring for the plot owned by the state. Only when they have done this duty do they dare turn to their own affairs. This is what sets the common people apart.”25 Other questions tended to surround issues such as self-cultivation and the task of becoming sages or worthies. Yet passages expressing Mencius’ firmly-held “people-centered” political proposals were completely neglected in the Ming dynasty examination questions. This conscious approach to selecting questions, though quite apparent, exerted a “soft filtering” effect on how intellectuals read the Mencius. 2.2.2 Hard Filtering The most representative example of political power exercising hard filtering over the classics happened in 1394 during the reign of the Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanchang (朱元璋, 1368 – 1398). The academic Liu Sanwu (劉三吾, 1312 – 1399) was ordered to censor chapters of Mencius that were deemed slanderous and defamatory of the imperial rule, and to produce a new edition, entitled Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius (孟子節文, Mengzi jiewen). This command meant the original, unexpurgated Mencius was now inappropriate material for educating and examining scholar-candidates.26 Liu Sanwu was ordered to check eighty-five passages in total. The contents of the eighty-five censored chapters fell into eleven categories, as follows: (1) those claiming the common people have their own dignity and rights; (2) claiming the people should take revenge against despotic rulers and corrupt ministers; (3) claiming the people have the right to resist and rebel against despotic rulers; (4) claiming the people have the right to live; (5) claiming the people have the right to criticize their rulers; (6) opposing military conscription and requisitioning goods at the same time; (7) opposing tax surcharges; (8) opposing civil conflict; (9) opposing bureaucratic intrigue; (10) demanding the ruler exercise benevolent rule to assist the common people; and (11) demanding the ruler be responsible for the good 23 24 25 26

Ibid., juan 1, p. 121. Ibid., juan 3, p. 1361. Ibid., juan 5, p. 2229. Quan Zuwang 全祖望, Jieqiting ji 鮚崎亭集 [Literary Corpus of Jieqi Pavilion] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben, 1975), juan 35, p. 371 A.

32

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

and bad customs in society.27 Mencius had written that the people were the root of society, but in the Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius Liu Sanwu stressed that while such an idea may have been “acceptable in that period of principalities and feudal lords,” now that the empire was united, especially at its apex during the Ming dynasty, this theory was unacceptable: If there is but one lord under Heaven and one state within the Four Seas, the people all alike honor their lord and are close to the ruler’s intention. If a scholar is unable to support the original intention of the teaching and would speak and act inappropriately, then his learning and practice would definitely be wronged.28

Indeed, as Liu Sanwu maintained, under the power structure of “one lord under Heaven, one state within the Four Seas,” the Mencius – this subversive classic which advocated opposition to despotic rule – certainly would suffer censorship under the cruel hand of autocratic power. Another example appeared in 1488 when the Ming Emperor Xiaozong (孝宗, r. 1488 – 1505) attended Liu Ji’s (劉機) lectures on the Mencius. Liu came to 4 A1 which ends with the words “To take one’s prince to task is respect; to discourse [陳, chen] on the good and keep out heresies in reverence; to say ‘My prince cannot do it’ is to turn him into a bandit.”29 The emperor and Liu first discussed how the word “chen” should be interpreted, and both decided on “to elaborate (敷陳, fu chen) on the Way of rulership.” When the emperor then asked why Liu did not explain the last statement; Liu answered, “I would not dare, my lord.”30 Here we see the profound contradiction of “dual subjectivity”31 in imperial China. In political reality, it was the emperor alone who was the center of political subjectivity. However, in Mencius’ world of political thought, the people were the center of the populist government of familial empathy.32 Huang Zongxi’s (黃宗

27 Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖, “Ming Taizu de Mengzi jiewen 明太祖的孟子節文 [Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius by Zhu Yuanzhang],” in Dushu yu Chuban 讀書與出版 [Reading and Publishing] 2/4 (1947): pp. 16 – 21. 28 Liu Sanwu 劉三吾, “Mengzi jiewen tici 孟子節文題辭 [Foreword to Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius],” included in Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, ed., Mengxue sixiangshi lun 孟學 思想史論 [Treatise on the History of Thoughts on the Mencius] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Chinese Lit. & Phil. Inst., 1997), vol. 2, p. 538. 29 4 A1, following the D. C. Lau translation with a modified final phrase. 30 Sun Chengze 孫承澤, Chunming mengyu lu 春明夢餘錄 [Record of Dreams of the Capital] (Siku quanshu zhenben, 6th series), juan 9, p. 5a–b. Such stories demonstrating the tension between imperial rule and Mencius’ political ideals can also be found in Tokugawa Japan. Cf. Inoue Masamichi, Honpo¯ chu¯sei made ni okeru Mo¯shi juyo¯shi no kenkyu¯ (Tokyo: Kazama shobo¯, 1972), pp. 512 – 17, et passim. 31 This expression comes from Xu Fuguan. See note 6 above. 32 See Chun-chieh Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics: A History of Interpretations in China (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), ch. 4.

Political interpretation of the Confucian classics in East Asia

33

羲, 1610 – 1695) political ideals were those of Mencius; Huang was thoroughly immersed in the spirit of Mencius.33 In sum, the Mencian ideal government consisted of a humane sovereign (王, wang) implementing empathic policies of familial populism (民本, minben); such views made the censorship of the Mencius inevitable in imperial China.

3

Political interpretation of the Confucian classics in East Asia

Let us now consider another aspect of the relationship between East Asian interpretations of the Confucian classics and political power, namely the way in which interpreters attempted to use the contents of the classics to direct current political power. This kind of interactive relationship was a common occurrence in the history of East Asian interpretations of the classics. There are two forms of this tendency that we can identify here.

3.1

Interpreter-officials using the classics to advocate certain political views

In the histories of various East Asian countries, the Confucian classics were not lofty texts for ivory tower inquiry. Rather they were practical texts devoted to just rule, intimately related not only to the life of the common people but also to political life in particular. The contents of the Confucian classics always displayed a close interaction between the politics of pre-modern East Asia and the cultural ideals that existed in classical antiquity.34 Therefore, East Asian Confucians always used the Confucian classics to guide the direction of political power in their particular contexts. Let us consider some examples of this. Zhang Yu (張禹, d. 5 bce) of the Western Han was a master scholar of the Book of Changes and the Analects. During the reign of Emperor Cheng (成帝, r. 33 – 8 bce), Zhang Yu served as Prime Minister for six years. Even after his retirement, whenever a major political incident occurred, he was still tasked with addressing it. The frequent earthquakes and eclipses of the sun that occurred from 16 – 9 bce drove both officials and the common people to write petitions against Wang Mang (王莽, 45 bce–23 ce, r. 8 – 23), blaming these natural disasters on his usurpation of imperial power. The emperor questioned the reason 33 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待訪錄 [Notes Gathered while Waiting for the Dawn], in Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Collected Works of Huang Zongxi] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji chubanshe, 1985), vol. 1, p. 3. For a full translation, see W. Theodore de Bary, Waiting the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 34 Cf. Frederich P. Brandauer and Chun-chieh Huang, eds., Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).

34

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

for these astronomical anomalies and the people’s criticism of Wang Mang. Zhang Yu was already advanced in age, but since his descendants were young and powerless, and he feared the wrath of Wang Mang, he replied to the emperor: During the 242 years of the Spring and Autumn period, there were over thirty solar eclipses and five earthquakes, some represented feudal lords fighting, and some barbarian tribes encroaching on the central kingdom. The singularity of such disasters and extraordinary phenomena is too deep to discern. That was why the Sage Confucius seldom spoke about destiny, and did not talk about strange ghosts and spirits. Human nature and the Way of heaven, if they are what Zigan [子贛] hardly heard Confucius speak of, how can the shallow scholars of today comment on them at will? What is most appropriate for Your Majesty is to respond to the disasters with corrected politics, and share the blessings with the people below. This is the true significance of the Confucian classics.35

In this highly politicized dialogue, Zhang Yu cited three passages from Confucius’ Analects (9.1, 7.12, 5.13) in order to protect Wang Mang, gain favor from the Wang family, and avoid the destruction of his own clan. Thus Zhang Yu cited the Analects to express his views on the current political debate. Pei Xu (裴諝, dates unknown) of the Tang dynasty (618 – 907) was broad and liberal-minded. When Shi Siming (史思明, d. 761) launched a rebellion and attempted to assassinate the royal family, Pei Xu smoothed things over. Once the situation had calmed down, Pei Xu became an important figure in the eyes of the emperor. During the reign of Emperor Daizong (代宗, 762 – 779), he was appointed to serve as commissioner in charge of salt and iron in the Hedong (河東) area. Once, during a drought in the area of the imperial capital, Pei Xu was summoned by the emperor to ask him about the tax revenue for that year. Pei quoted Mencius 1 A1, “Why, king, must you speak of profit? What is important is benevolence and righteousness.” Accordingly, he declined to answer the emperor’s question about the amount of tax revenue and suggested the emperor show more concern for the suffering of his subjects. Upon reflection, the emperor came to recognize that Pei was right and promoted him to a higher position.36 In the dialogues between emperor and minister during the Han and Tang dynasties, the practice of citing the Confucian classics to support or oppose a certain political proposal was a common phenomenon. The classics were never short of examples and could be interpreted according to the political situation of the day.

35 Ban Gu 班固 (Mengjian 孟堅), Hanshu 漢書 [History of the Former Han] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), juan 81, p. 3351. 36 Liu Xu 劉煦, Jiu Tangshu 舊唐書 [Old History of the Tang] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), juan 12, p. 3567.

Political interpretation of the Confucian classics in East Asia

3.2

35

Interpreting the classics according to the political viewpoints of the day

Scholars also read contemporary political viewpoints into the classics, thereby creating new interpretations. This practice of East Asian Confucians to interpret the classics according to the contemporary political milieu had in fact a long and venerable history. Mencius himself had mastered the Five Classics and was especially well-versed in the Book of Odes and Book of Documents. Whenever he cited those classics, the Book of Odes in particular, he did not constrain himself to the original meaning of the text. Rather he delved into the ancient classics, making them work in his own time. He skillfully spliced the classical citations smoothly with his own train of thought, fitting them into the logic of his own construction, without being bound to the original meaning of the classic.37 Zhao Qi of the Eastern Han read the political views of the Han dynasty into the Mencius. For example, regarding Mencius’ saying that the great man is he who does not lose his child’s heart (4B12), Zhao Qi commented: “The expression ‘great man’ refers to the ruler. The ruler looks at the people as children, and thus the sentence means he does not lose the people’s heart.”38 Zhao Qi elaborated: “Among the things people love, nothing surpasses small children. Look at the people in this light, and they will take it to heart. The practice of the great man is nothing more than just this.”39 Zhao Qi’s interpretation of Mencius’ “great man” as ruler certainly could not avoid discrepancies with Mencius’ other saying that, “A great man need not keep his word nor does he necessarily see his action through to the end. He aims at only what is righteous” (4B1). Considering that Mencius’ notion of the “great man” pertains to the ideal personality, Zhao Qi’s interpretation of it as “ruler” certainly was overly political. The most representative example of this approach can be found in the manner in which Song dynasty intellectuals debated Mencius’ political thought. In the eleventh century, the Northern Song reformer Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021 – 1086; in office 1069 – 1086) venerated the Mencius. This stirred up the opponents of his new policy, such as Sima Guang (司馬光, 1019 – 86) and Li Gou (李覯, 1009 – 1059), driving them to criticize the Mencius. As I have argued elsewhere, their critiques in turn stirred the Southern Song scholars of later generations, such as Yu Yunwen (余允文, fl. 1163), Zhang Shi (張栻, 1133 – 1180) and Zhu Xi, to argue on Mencius’s behalf.40 The debates of the Northern and Southern Song intellectuals over Mencius’ political thought were in fact conditioned by the political background and the contemporary context. 37 Chun-chieh Huang, “Mencius’ Hermeneutics of Classics,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1/1 (2001): pp. 15 – 29. 38 Mencius (Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 8, p. 65 A. 39 Ibid. 40 Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics, ch. 7, pp. 155 – 67.

36

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

Giving the classics new meanings from the perspective of the contemporary political stances was a constant feature in the approach taken by East Asian scholars to the classics. A good example from intellectual history would be the eighteenth-century Japanese Confucian, Ogyu¯ Sorai. He reinterpreted the Analects, criticizing Ito¯ Jinsai’s classicist interpretation, and deconstructing Zhu Xi’s philosophy of li (理, pattern, principle). In Sorai’s study of the Analects, Confucius’ “Way” was precisely the “Way of the Former Kings,” which was established by the seven model political leaders and cultural heroes – Kings Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen (文) and Wu (武), and the Duke of Zhou (周公). The “sages” admired by Confucius throughout his entire life were the “Former Kings” who “modeled Heaven” (法天, fatian) in their endeavors. These “sages” had successfully created a virtuous social order among the people through a framework of upright rule in terms of rites, righteousness, administration and punishment, based on their cosmological notions of the Way of Heaven. This “Way of the Sages,” i. e., Way of the Former Kings, was recorded principally in the Six Classics. The Six Classics were exactly the classical texts that Confucius had studied. Their position was thus higher than that of his Analects.41 Ogyu¯ Sorai was deeply dissatisfied with Mencius’ theory that “benevolent rule” was established solely on the “benevolent heart.” He criticized Mencius saying, “He [Mencius] only considered winning the people’s hearts but provided no details about the regulation of society.”42 When interpreting Confucius’ statement, “subduing oneself and returning to the rites,” he placed emphasis upon “using the rites to regulate the mind,”43 and even spoke of “accommodating one’s body in the rites.”44 Sorai’s interpretation of the Analects was certainly imbued with anti-Zhu and anti-Jinsai elements, but more importantly he interpreted the classics in accordance with the political reality of eighteenth-century Japan. Thus in 1696 Ogyu¯ Sorai won the appreciation of Tokugawa Tsunayoshi’s (德川綱吉, 1680 – 1709) favorite official Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (柳澤吉保, 1658 – 1714), and was promoted to a high-ranking position. Around 1727, he compiled a book entitled Discourse on Governance (政談, Se¯dan) which summed up the key political questions in eighteenth-century Japan, including the two main issues: the entire society’s Ryoshuku no Kyo¯gu¯ (旅宿境遇, traveling situation) and the lack of 41 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Rongo Cho¯ 論語徵 [Comments on the Analects], in Seki Giichiro¯ ed., ¯ tori shuppan, 1973), vol. 7. Cf. Huang ChunNihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho (Tokyo: O chieh, Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun 德川日本《論語》詮釋史論 [A History of Interpretations of the Analects in Tokugawa Japan] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2006), pp. 145 – 78. 42 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Mo¯shi Siki 孟子識 [Comments on the Book of Mencius], in Kan’utei So¯sho 甘雨亭叢書 [Series of the Kan’utei], vol. 4, p. 11. 43 Ibid., p. 304. 44 Ibid., p. 236.

Political interpretation of the Confucian classics in East Asia

37

regulations for many matters.45 In the political context of eighteenth century Japan, Ogyu¯ Sorai devoted his life to interpreting the Confucian classics, emphasizing the necessity of an organized system based on “rites” and laws, and refused to follow anything like the Song Confucian stress on a personal ethic constructed on metaphysics. In short, Sorai read the Confucian classics in light of the political milieu of his own time. Yet why did the East Asian Confucian scholars tend to interpret the classics from the perspective of the “political self” rather than the “social self” or “ethical self”? This question can be explored from the two perspectives: of the East Asian political tradition and the contents of the Confucian classics. First, the East Asian political tradition was based on the sovereignty of the imperial ruler. The monistic political system had been promoted ever since the Qin unification of China in 221 bce became the political reality for China, Japan and Korea. Moreover, East Asian Confucian scholars were mostly officials. In studying the classics, they always bore in mind the grand project to bring peace to the empire. Second, while the Confucian classics certainly stressed cultivating and practicing the character of a sage in one’s personal life, they never cast off the project of working toward benevolent nature in society. Confucius himself regarded the virtue of “fraternity among brothers” as one starting point of “serving the government.” Thus not surprisingly, East Asian Confucian scholars were always politically oriented, and it was on this basis that they reconstructed the intellectual world of the classics. Viewed from this standpoint, we can understand why so many Confucian intellectuals (who grew up under the conditions of autocracy) felt distressed and disoriented when they encountered the Mencius. When the Northern Song Confucian scholar Zhang Jiucheng (張九成, 1092 – 1159) encountered the passage in 1B8 (“I have heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Zhou [紂],’”), he was amazed and shocked. When I read this chapter and recited Mencius’ answer, my hair stood up on end; how could his comment have been so forceful and sharp? This reminded me of Zigong’s word that “Zhou’s badness was actually not that bold, therefore one should step away from morally low status lest all the badness be imputed to oneself.” Why was Zigong’s comment so full of sympathy? While the disciples of Confucius were so forgiving toward Zhou, Mencius directly called him a despot and paid no heed to the lord–subject relationship. It is unusual.46

45 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Gong Ying 龔穎 trans., Zheng tan 政談 [Discourse on Governance] (Beijing: Zhongyang bainyi chubanshe, 2004), p. 229. 46 Zhang Jiucheng 張九成, Mengzi zhuan 孟子傳 [Commentaries on the Book of Mencius] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Wenyuan ge Edition of the Complete Works of the Four Repositories, 1983), juan 4, p. 271.

38

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

Zhang Jiucheng did not hesitate to doubt whether the Mencius should be ranked among the “books of the sages and worthies.” When I read the books of the sages and worthies, I feel they correspond with my intuitions completely. But this passage alone frightens me, and seems to me that it is not right. Humble as I am, how could I hope to grasp even a minute portion of the Way of King Wu, the Duke of Zhou, Confucius and the Doctrine of the Mean? But why Mencius’ words alone make me feel in such a frightened way? While we have Zigong’s saying as support, neither did Confucius say anything about “killing the despot Zhou.” For this reason, I do not dare to judge the right or wrong of the case. I can only leave this doubt to later enlightened gentlemen for a solution.47

The doubts expressed by Zhang Jiucheng were precisely the perplexities felt by countless Confucians who grew up under autocracy in Japan, Korea, and China. For example, when the Korean Confucian Shin Gyo-seon (申教善, 1786 – 1858) read the same chapter of the Mencius, he also raised the same questions. Question: When King Xuan of Qi looked upon Tang’s banishment of Jie and King Wu’s march against Zhou as cases of “regicide,” was he incorrect? When Mencius considered that Zhou was punished as a despot, was he not going too far? Even though Zhou was a “mutilator” [of benevolence] and a crippler [of rightness], he was still the ruler of the state of ten-thousand chariots, so was it not rash to call him a “despot” and then to “punish” him?48

All these questions resulted from a rupture of history between the realities of the age in which Shin Gyo-seon and Zhang Jiucheng lived and the world of the classical text of the Mencius. These interpreters of the classics grew up in an age of monistic autocracy and were unable to understand the political discourse of one like Mencius who lived in an age of political pluralism. Those who venerated Mencius might not have taken this issue into consideration. In 1061, the Northern Song Emperor Renzong (仁宗, r. 1023 – 1063) erected a stone tablet49 carved with the Mencius together with eight other standard classics. Emperor Shenzong (神宗, r. 1067 – 1085) venerated Mencius in the Confucian temple in 1084.50 And the Mongol-Yuan Emperor Renzong (仁宗, r. 1311 – 1320) adopted Zhu Xi’s Sishu zhangju jizhu (四書章句集注, Four Books in Chapter and Verse 47 Ibid., p. 272. 48 Shin Gyo-seon 신교선, Dokmaeng jeonghun 독맹정훈 讀孟庭訓 [Familial Instructions on Reading the Book of Mencius], in Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipsheong 한국경학자료집성 韓 國經學資料集成 [Complete Collection of Korean Study of Confucian Classics] (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988), Bk. 45, Mencius 11, pp. 62 – 3. 49 Wang Yinglin 王應麟, Yuhai 玉海 [Ocean of Jade], vol. 2, juan 43, Yiwen 藝文 [Art and Literature], “Songchao shijing 宋朝石經 [Stone Inscription of Classics of Song Dynasty]” (Jiangsu: Guji chubanshe, 1991), pp. 811b–812a. 50 Tuotuo 脫脫 et al., Song Shi 宋史 [History of the Song Dynasty] (Sibu beiyao edition), juan 16, Benji 本紀 16, Shengzong 3, p. 208a.

Conclusion

39

with Collected Commentaries) as a standard work from which questions were drawn for the civil-service examinations.51 For this reason, interpreters of later times were compelled to draw new meanings from the classics and attempted to bridge the gap between themselves and the classics. A good example can be seen in the new interpretation given to Mencius’ expression “Way of Heaven” by the Korean Confucian Shin Gyo-seon: I say that the Kingly Way is just the Way that was transmitted by Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, Confucius and Mencius. From the Duke of Zhou back, they were all rulers. From Confucius and after, they were all ministers. Certainly all of them [whether being rulers or ministers] were capable of reaching and practicing [the Kingly Way]. Tang and Wu were born respectively in the time of Jie and Zhou and, unfortunately, their punishment would not be avoidable. If they had lived during the time of Yao and Shun, would they stubbornly refuse to submit? Certainly they would align themselves with other ministers of the sage kings, and the atmosphere would be peaceful. Then there would not be any inappropriateness for everybody being Tang and Wu. This saying is so profound that one could appreciate it time and again, and the former blockage of thought is suddenly opened.52

Here we see how Shin Gyo-seon sought to substitute a universal “Way” for that “Way” which is monopolized by the ruler, thus reducing the distance between the Mencius and the political contexts of his own time.

4

Conclusion

Based on concrete examples from the history of interpretation of Confucian classics in East Asia, we have analyzed the complex relations between classical interpretations and political power. We have seen, first, that the Confucian classics all aim at a proper ordering the world. Second, most of the East Asian Confucians carried a dual identity: that of Confucian scholar and government official. They lived within the power networks of their respective countries, which explained their particular political identity. Yet in their career of interpreting the classics, they could not help but be drawn into political disputes. In the relationship between the interpretation of the classics and political power we can identify three levels. First, since a political concern is shared by both the contents of the classics and the interpreters, the interpretation of those classics is inseparable from political power. Second, we have witnessed intense conflicts between the interpretations of the classics and political power. Confucian interpreters in East Asian countries often cited the classics to express their 51 Song Lian 宋濂, Yuan Shi 元史 [History of the Yuan Dynasty] (SBBY ed.), juan 81, p. 3a. 52 See n. 48 above.

40

Interpretations of the Confucian Classics and Political Power in East Asia

intentions, even to the extent of using their commentaries on the classics to guide the direction of contemporary politics. However, perhaps more often was the case of Confucian interpreters being dominated by political power. Regarding certain key expressions in the classics, such as “facing south” or the political ideal of “popular sovereignty,” the interpreters were forced to adopt new interpretations that were suited to the reality of autocracy. Such political domination over the interpretation of the classics persisted in East Asia largely because the Confucian classics contained a viable set of values imbued with ideals and farsightedness, while the political powers were relatively realistic and short-sighted. Although the latter could control the ideals of the former in the short term, those pragmatist interpretations could not finally drown out the values of the classics. Thus the late Ming Confucian Wang Fuzhi (王夫之, Chuanshan 船山, 1619 – 1692) clearly distinguished between the “Confucian order” and the “Imperial order” – and it was the “Confucian order” which abided by “eternal heaven and long-lasting earth and did not vanish.”53 In the long run of history, this “Confucian order” summoned the interpreters to commune with the classics, and to extract new meanings from the old volumes. Thus as a result, the final part of the relationship between the interpretation of the classics and political power consisted of the interpreters’ own efforts to maintain a balance between classical texts and political reality, in order to reduce the conflicts between them as well as to preserve their ideals.

53 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論 [Remarks Gathered from the Reading of Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government] (Taipei: Heluo tushu gongsi, 1976), juan 15, p. 497.

Chapter Two: On the “Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics: Types and Problems

1

Introduction

When we examine the history of East Asia’s cultural exchanges, most attention tends to be given to the renowned Silk Road that carried camel caravans from China, through Central Asia to Europe. Yet there was also the “Book Road.”1 Unlike the Silk Road to the West, the Book Road stretched East from China to Japan. And whereas the former was used for exchanging material goods, the latter was mainly used for the exchange of texts. Along this East Asian Book Road, the Chinese classics were carried overland to the Korean Peninsula or shipped by sea traders from China to Japan. When Korean and Japanese intellectuals read and interpreted the various Chinese classics on their home soil, the texts always underwent what might be called a “contextual turn.” Whereas the contextuality of Confucian classics in China was latent, tacit and almost imperceptible, we have already seen in the previous chapter the way that that contextuality became salient and explicit once texts were transplanted into foreign lands. Tokugawa Japan (1600 – 1868) and Joseon Korea (1392 – 1910) offer us two examples of such a contextual turn. Many Japanese or Korean Confucians took ideas and values expressed in the Chinese classics and transplanted them into the context of Japanese or Korean politics and thought. As we saw in the previous chapter, the political context in each land and era also worked back upon the interpretation of the texts themselves. Japanese and Korean scholars did not simply adopt Chinese understandings of the classics but rather developed new interpretations of these texts. In this sense, we can therefore speak of this interpretive phenomenon as a contextual turn. The contextual turn involves two steps. The first is decontextualization, taking the classics out of that Chinese context which had been tacit among the Chinese Confucians. Second, this decontextualization was then followed by a process of 1 See Wang Yong 王勇, Zhong-Ri “shuji zhi lu” yanjiu 中日「書籍之路」研究 [The “Book Road” between China and Japan] (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2003).

42

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

re-contextualization, embedding these classics within the Japanese or Korean context. This kind of transcultural contextual turn occurred in two different areas: in the political order (e. g., the Chinese world order), and in political thought (i. e., ruler–minister relationships). As we have seen, this process of reinterpreting the classics stirred up many transcultural problems. Here we will continue the analysis begun in the previous chapter, and explore some of the problems associated with the cultural turn in the transcultural endeavor of interpreting the Confucian classics. First, we will examine how scholars in Tokugawa Japan were engaged in both types of contextual turn, and their significance in the history of cultural exchanges in East Asia. Second, we will then discuss methodological questions that emerged in the reinterpretation of the classics through such a contextual turn.

2

Two types of contextual turn in the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges

2.1

The cultural “homeland” and the political “other country”

In this period of history, key terms and concepts in the Chinese classics, such as Zhongguo, were disseminated and transmitted into neighboring regions, carried by the expanding ripples of Chinese culture. As this expansion occurred, these key terms and concepts stirred up many complex problems in the sphere of transcultural, intellectual transmission. Thus, on the one hand, when Confucians living in countries that bordered the Chinese empire read the Confucian classics, they admired Confucius and Mencius. This admiration was so deep that they adopted that world of thought as their cultural “homeland.” Yet on the other hand, they still dwelt in the political spheres of their own home countries – in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. Thus politically, China still existed to them as an “other.” For this reason, transcultural readings of the Chinese Confucian classics produced in readers a tension with regard to the “self.” More precisely, the “political self” and the “cultural self” of Confucians in neighboring regions of East Asia were powerfully ground down under the heavy impact of these Chinese classics. When Japanese Confucians read the Chinese classics, they identified with many of the ideas in them, seeing them as universal values. The world in the Confucian classics began to form the framework of the Japanese Confucians’ own sense of “cultural self.” However, these Japanese Confucians were also citizens of Japan and their homeland always formed the foundation for their sense of “political identity.” Consequently, the Chinese Confucian classics and their

Two types of contextual turn in the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges

43

values became a source of tension between the reader’s political self and cultural self. In Japanese scholars this tension produced a type of spiritual turmoil and drove them to search out ways to combine these two dimensions of the self and thus relieve the tension. After the Chinese Confucian classics were carried to neighboring regions in East Asia, this tension between the political and cultural self of Confucians in these regions became a powder keg. While there were several reasons for this intensification, the most important was the political context of the interpreters: in each East Asian country, many groups of interpreters were already caught up in political bickering and debates. On the surface they seemed to be interpreting the classics, but at a deeper level they were pursuing their own underlying political motives. More often than not, polemics regarding the Confucian classics were imbued with political considerations. As seen in the Veritable Records of the emperors in Joseon Korea, almost all the debates over the Analects and the Mencius among ministers were related to contemporary power struggles. And in Tokugawa Japan, the Confucian master Ogyu¯ Sorai’s refutation of Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of the Analects was very much related to Sorai’s affiliation with the power structures of the state. Moreover, shifts in political authority became historical turning points, with interpreters appearing on horseback, fully armed, and joining in the shouts of war. During the periods of rapid historical change in each East Asian country (such as during China’s Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the late-Qin/early-Han, late-Ming/early-Qing, late-Qing/ early-Republic, etc.; Japan’s early-Tokugawa, late-Tokugawa/early-Meiji; and Korea’s late-Joseon era), interpretations of the classics were intimately and intricately interwoven with shifts in political authority and the changes in the political order. And yet the Chinese Confucian classics have always been politically interpreted and debated. This fact reflects the basic nature of the Confucian classics themselves. One of the main differences between the Chinese Confucian classics and the classics of Western civilization (such as the Bible) was that in the Chinese classics, the “Other” with whom “Man” engaged in dialogue was also “Man” (“Sage”), and not “God.” The political nature of the classics can also be seen in the desire of their authors not only to interpret the world but to change it. As Lu Jiuyuan (陸九淵, Xiangsan 象山, 1139 – 1193) noted, Confucians regarded “justice” and “duty” as the root, and “statecraft” (經世, jingshi) as their chief concern.2 The authors of the Confucian classics were deeply concerned about statecraft, about improving society and the world. Therefore, the Chinese Confucian classics could transcend the limitations of space and time and stir a strong sense of “calling” in readers of different times and places. Indeed, they created an 2 Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵, Lu Jiuyuan ji (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1981), “Yu Wang Shunbo,” juan 2, p. 17.

44

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

“eternal nostalgia” in the minds of readers in East Asia. Inspired by the lofty ideals the text contained, many readers rose up to actualize these Confucian values in their own worlds. For this reason, the East Asian interpreters of the classics regarded “intellectual activities” as the means and “practical activities” as the ends. Intellectual activities were just the outer form of East Asian interpretations of the classics, whereas practical activities were their concrete essence. Within the East Asian interpretive tradition, cognitive activities and moral cultivation were indivisible, solidly integrated into one. When Japanese Confucians strove to realize these values in their own world, they felt this rupture between their cultural identity and their political identity. When Japanese Confucians read the Mencius, the impact of this tension was both strong and evident. During the peak of the Warring States period, Mencius held up the banner of the “(Noble) Kingly Way” largely to oppose the opportunism of many of the kings of his day. Mencius honored the “true king” and was dismissive of the rampant evil rulers. The king that Mencius honored was not the fast-fading Zhou emperor, but an anticipated future king, one who would implement “humane rule.” Thus Mencius constantly traveled to various states, persistently encouraging the ambitious kings of the Warring States to implement “humane rule” and carry out a new era of unification, thus rescuing the people from their extreme misery. Mencius’ theory of the noble Kingly Way was a creative adaptation of the ancient idea of valuing the people, and expressed in his advocacy of the people as the subjects rather than objects of political rule. Such a political theory, based on the ideal that “people are fundamental,” stands in stark opposition to the contrasting political reality that has dominated China ever since the Qin and Han dynasties, namely that the “sovereigns are fundamental.” Consequently, Mencius’ political theory became the only instrument available to later Confucian officials who sought to tame imperial authority. Indeed, at times it did become a sharp instrument for opposing such imperial authority. Mencius held up the ideal of the Sage Kings of the “Three Dynasties” in contrast to the concrete political reality of his day. Mencius’ political idealism was a great advance over Confucius’ focus on the cultivation of virtue in order to be chosen for office. The Mencius, a text imbued with moral and political idealism, was carried to Japan in the ninth century. By 852, we find passages from the Mencius appearing in the Keikokushu 經國集 (Collection of Books on Ordering the State). By 890, the Mencius had been included in the Nihonkoku Genzaisho Mokuroku 日本國見在 書目錄 (Catalogue of Books Currently in Japan). Later, during the Kamakura (1192 – 1333), North-South (1336 – 1392), and Muromachi (1338 – 1573) periods, the Mencius was widely circulated in Japan, where it was studied both by local

Two types of contextual turn in the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges

45

scholars and even among the advanced scholars of the royal court.3 Though the Mencius was circulated widely during the Tokugawa period, and while Japanese Confucians were well versed in its contents, it still caused deep misgivings among them. In the previous chapter, we encountered the story of the imperial tutor Kiyohara Nobukata who was tasked with teaching the Mencius to the emperor. In this task, Kiyohara felt a deep tension between his political identity and his cultural identity. For example, Mencius 2B7 reads: “In high antiquity, there were no regulations governing the inner and outer coffins. In middle antiquity, it was prescribed that the inner coffin was to be seven inches thick with the outer coffin to match. This applied to all conditions of men, from emperor to commoner. This is not simply for show. It is only in this way that one can express fully one’s filial love.”4 Kiyohara noted in his text that when discussing this passage he should exclude the three words: “from emperor to.”5 In Kiyohara’s eyes, Mencius’ words “from emperor to commoner” implicitly equated the emperor with the common people and ran counter to one’s presumed loyalty to the emperor. Thus, he noted that these words should not be read by the Tokugawa shogun. This kind of note to “exclude from the imperial reading” (御讀禁忌 gotoku kinki) signals to us that there was a perpetual tension between the Confucian classics (the Mencius in particular) and East Asian autocratic rule. Therefore, when Confucians in China’s neighboring lands read these Chinese classics, though they identified with Confucianism as their “cultural homeland,” they were bound to perform a contextual turn between the different cultural and political circumstances. In this way the Chinese Confucian classics could be made more congenial to their home countries and their own worlds of thought.

2.2

The contextual turn in the East Asian world order

This kind of contextual turn can be divided into two types: (1) a turn executed to suit the East Asian world order (Realpolitik), and (2) fresh interpretations executed in order to suit the East Asian intellectual context. The most commonly seen example of the former type is in “new” Japanese interpretations of the term Zhongguo. The latter type is best exemplified in the account of the noble “Kingly Way” (王道, wangdao) presented in the Mencius. The term Zhongguo appears frequently in the Chinese classics. In very early classics, like the Shijing (Book of Odes), the term mostly carries a political or 3 See Inoue Masamichi, Honpo¯ chu¯sei made ni okeru Mo¯shi juyo¯shi no kenkyu¯ (Tokyo: Kazama shobo¯, 1972), p. 214. 4 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 1979, 1984), vol. 1, p. 81. 5 .

46

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

geographical meaning. However, with the composition of the three commentaries on Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn Annals) – i. e., Zuozhuan (左傳), Gongyang (公羊), and Guliang (穀梁) – the term also takes on a rich cultural connotation. Zhongguo always appears in the cultural context of the differentiation between Han and “barbarian,” with Zhongguo denoting the region with the highest cultural standards. Before the formation of the modern East Asian political order, Zhongguo always referred at once to the Chinese Imperial Court and to the Chinese cultural homeland. When Tokugawa Japanese Confucians read the Chinese classics, they faced this idea of Zhongguo with a type of cultural solipsism. Given the hypothesis in the classics about the distinction between Han and barbarian based on the East Asian political order and its intellectual content, the Japanese were naturally bound to propose a new interpretation, one that would heal the fracture between their cultural and political self. They adjusted the Chinese classics to suit Japan’s overall cultural ambiance. In executing a transcultural contextual turn of the term Zhongguo, Japanese Confucians adopted at least the two methods. To begin, when considering the cultural meaning attached to the expression Zhongguo in light of the term zhongdao (中道, middle way) or the text of the Chunqiu, we should first analyze the transcultural reading of Zhongguo offered by Yamaga Soko¯. Yamaga Soko¯ was a celebrated Japanese Confucian born in “Zhonghua [meaning “Japan’s”] cultural land,” though he “only relished foreign [i. e., “Chinese”] classics.”6 He also extended the meaning of the term Zhongguo: If the rotation of heaven and earth and the cycle of four seasons obtained the Mean, the occasions of wind, rain, cold and hot would not be askew; therefore, the water and earth would be fertile and the men and materials would be refined. This could be called “Zhongguo.” Among the multitudes of tribes, only our court has attained the Mean […]. Thus, that our court should be called “Zhongguo” reflects the spontaneous propensity of heaven and earth.7

In these passages by Yamaga Soko¯, we see him executing a bold contextual turn in his denotation and connotation of the term Zhongguo in the Chinese classics, performed from the perspective of his “other” culture. He understood Zhongguo as referring to Japan, because “the moist earth of Zhongguo [here meaning Japan] is superior to that of the myriad other tribes, and her officials are more refined and elegant than the other men of rank.” Officials of that “foreign court” (geographical China) could not compare with those in Japan. Japan possessed geographical and cultural excellence and could thus now take over the title Zhongguo.8 6 Yamaga Soko¯, Chu¯cho¯ Jijitsu, vol. 1, ch.13, p. 226. 7 Ibid., p. 234. 8 Ibid.

Two types of contextual turn in the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges

47

Yet in his usage Zhongguo also carried the cultural connotation of “obtaining its Mean.” This has nothing to do with the political meaning of Imperial China. By saying that Japan had “obtained the Mean,” it signified that it was politically stable and its three cardinal rules (the duties of a prince, father, and husband) were unchanging, whereas the Chinese Empire was beset with ceaseless political instability and dynastic change, and would be hard pressed to match the Japanese standard.9 By offering this new interpretation, Yamaga Soko¯ deconstructed the use of Zhongguo in the Chinese classics to refer to Imperial China as both the political and cultural center of the region. In his eyes, since Japan had now “obtained its Mean” both politically and culturally, it was far more worthy and qualified than geographic Imperial China to be called Zhongguo. Just as Yamaga Soko¯ performed a transcultural contextual turn on the term Zhongguo, Sakuma Taika (佐久間太華, d. 1783) also argued that Japan deserved to be called Zhongguo, though this time on the political basis of the uninterrupted rule of Japan’s imperial line and its domestic stability.10 He argued that the key distinction between Japan and China lay not in geography but in the ability of a culture to “obtain the Mean” as well as political stability. There were a number of Japanese scholars who performed this contextual turn to redefine Zhongguo from a cultural standpoint: in addition to Yamaga Soko¯, included Asami Ke¯isai (淺見絅齋, 1652 – 1711)11 and the Ansai school’s Ko¯zuki Sen’an (上月專庵, 1704 – 1752).12 Asami Ke¯isai used Japan’s “knowing the Way of Chunqiu” as the grounds to “prove” that Japan was not barbaric. Yamaga Soko¯ pointed to Japan’s having “obtained the Mean” as a reason why it should be called Zhongguo. Ko¯zuki Sen’an advocated that every country including Japan “obtained its own Mean and civilization” and Japan was eligible to be called Zhongguo. These three scholars’ respective reasons and conclusions were largely consistent with each other. The second approach employed by the Japanese Confucians was to draw upon the general concept of tian (天, heaven, sky) to dissolve the specific definite reference of Zhongguo. To subvert the Han–barbarian distinction at the heart of the political order of the East Asian world, Asami Ke¯isai used the idea that heaven and earth embraced everywhere and stored up everything: “My country [Japan] definitely was produced by heaven and earth,” “each country possesses a portion 9 Ibid., p. 250. 10 Sakuma Taika 佐久間太華, Wakan Me¯ben 和漢明辨 [Distinguishing Japan and China], in ¯ tori Shuppan, Nihon jurin so¯sho 日本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Confucianism] (Tokyo: O 1978), vol. 4, “Disputations,” preface, p. 1. 11 Asami Ke¯isai 淺見絅齋, Chu¯goku Ben 中国辨 [On ‘Zhongguo’], in Yamazaki Ansai Gakuha 山崎闇齋学派 [The School of Yamazaki Ansai] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982), p. 418. 12 Ko¯zuki Sen’an 上月專庵, So¯rai gakusoku Ben 徂徠学則辨 [Debates on the Learning of Sorai], in Nihon jurin so¯sho, vol. 4, p. 14.

48

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

of the world, and there is no inherent difference of eminent and base or rich and poor between them.”13 Having performed the above transcultural contextual turn, Yamaga Soko¯ and other Tokugawa Japanese Confucians thoroughly subverted the distinction between Han and barbarian in the East Asian world. Indeed, they reconstructed the meaning of the term Zhongguo as it appears in the Chinese Confucian classics so that those texts could be accepted by Confucians born into the Japanese cultural context.14

2.3

The “contextual turn” in the East Asian world of thought

The second type of contextual turn performed on the Chinese classics in East Asia was carried out for ideological reasons, especially by Japanese thinkers who were forced to make the Chinese classics more congenial to their own intellectual milieu. Mencius’ lofty political ideal of the “Kingly Way” was based on and aimed at “humane rule” (Mencius 3B5). This “Kingly Way” referred to “the Way of the Former kings,” that is, to the concrete practice of the Sage Kings of the Three Dynasties (三代, sandai), Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, etc. (Mencius 4 A1). However, in Mencius’ thought, the politics of the “Kingly Way” leads to a serious question: If the “King” and the “Way” are not united (if the “King” had deviated and betrayed the “Way”), then what should the people do? Mencius’ reply was clear: the people should take up arms, depose the tyrant, and install a new king. Yet in the eyes of 13 Asami Ke¯isai, Chu¯goku Ben, p. 416. 14 The Japanese Confucians were not the only ones to perform this contextual turn when interpreting the Chinese classics. The Korean Confucians also did much the same when discussing the contemporary relevance of the classics. From the fourteenth through to the nineteenth centuries, when the Korean rulers and ministers discussed Confucius’ Analects they also discussed the applicability of the Analects to the political problems of their time. When Korean rulers and ministers discussed the Analects, besides discussing the meaning within the text (which is comparable to what John R. Searle calls the “locutionary intention”), they would devote themselves to developing meanings outside or after the texts (what we could call the text’s “illocutionary intention” and “perlocutionary intention”). While elucidating a classical text’s “locutionary intention” and “perlocutionary intention,” they always also “decontextualized” Confucius’ dialogues and applied the Analects in order to comprehend their own age. In their political setting, they tried to grasp the contemporary significance of Confucius’ dialogues. Their interpretation of the Analects was a political action: they read the classics in light of their political aims, producing, in effect, a political interpretation. This sort of interpretation of the classics was developed on the basis of a contextual turn of the classics. Cf. John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); and John R. Searle, “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,” in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1975), pp. 344 – 69.

Two types of contextual turn in the history of Sino-Japanese cultural exchanges

49

autocratic rulers and some Confucian officials, Mencius’ position on this question now transformed his conception of the noble “Kingly Way” into a ticking time bomb in desperate need of defusing. Mencius’ political ideal was a deep risk for autocracy. Thus Tokugawa Japanese Confucian interpretations of the Mencius adopted one of two main positions: that “the Way had priority over the King” or that “the King had priority over the Way.” One Tokugawa Confucian who held Mencius in high esteem was Ito¯ Jinsai. He proposed an account of the “Kingly Way” that subordinated the king to the Way. In contrast, Ogyu¯ Sorai opposed Mencius’ view and promoted instead the view that the king had priority over the Way. Thus we could say that Ito¯ Jinsai (who honored the Analects and the Mencius) proposed understanding the “Kingly Way” as a general term, while Ogyu¯ Sorai believed that the “Kingly Way” referred only to the Way practiced by the former kings as presented in the Six Classics.15 By stressing that the king had priority over the Way, Ogyu¯ Sorai tried to disarm the potential risk that Mencius’ political ideals posed to the Japanese imperial authority, thus making it more suited to Japan’s Tokugawa feudal order. From a political perspective, Ogyu¯ Sorai also offered a new interpretation of Confucius’ term dao (道, Way): It could be said that Confucius’ “Way” was just the “Way of the Former Kings.” The Former Kings established the Way to make the people secure.16

Ogyu¯ Sorai understood Confucius’ saying that there was “one single thread binding my Way together” (Analects 4.15) to represent the way of the “Former Kings.”17 His new interpretation of the Way of Confucius and Mencius offers us an example of the way a contextual turn was performed in a different setting in the world of East Asian political thought. In the Analects and the Mencius, the “Way is prior to power” and so Confucius and Mencius are both sages who are loftier than the sovereign ruler, scholars who implement the “Way” in order to save the world.18 Confucius and Mencius held up Yao and Shun as exemplars, idealizing the history of the “Three Dynasties” in order to critique their present realities. Confucius and Mencius set up the idealized Three Dynasties as a critical tool in the counterfactual mode of thinking. By contrasting this counterfactual

15 Zhang Kunjiang, Riben Dechuan shidai guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhilun. 16 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, vol. 7, p. 82. 17 He explained this thesis further in his book: Ogyu¯ Sorai, “Bendo¯ 辨道 [Distinguishing the Way],” in Ogyu¯ Sorai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), upper vol., 200 ff. 18 Regarding pre-Qin Confucian arguments that the Way should be placed before Power, see Yu Yingshi 余英時, Zhongguo zhishijiecengshi lun (Gudai pian) 中國知識階層史論 (古代篇) [A History of the Chinese Intellectual Class (The Ancient Period)] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980, 1997), pp. 38 – 56.

50

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

ideal against the present reality, they could vividly expose the absurdity of the present.19 However, Ogyu¯ Sorai viewed the Way of Confucius and Mencius from a context where “politics had priority.”20 Thus in Ogyu¯ Sorai’s context, “the Way of the Former Kings was established by them in order to make the people secure.”21 This contrasts with the Way discussed by Confucius and Mencius themselves, which was the ideal eternal Way established by the Sages as a tool for criticizing real politics. Having gone through this kind of contextual turn, Ogyu¯ Sorai aimed to drop the parts of Confucius’ and especially Mencius’ political thought that were critical of contemporary autocratic rulers. Thus he sought to make his interpretation of the political thought of Confucius and Mencius more consistent with the practical orientation of the Six Classics, rather than making it critical of contemporary politics. In addition to Ogyu¯ Sorai’s adoption of the principle that the “ruler is prior to the Way,” we also find Japanese Confucians who drew upon their native Shinto thought to Shinto-ize the Chinese concept of the “Kingly Way.” Based on a synthesis of Confucianism and Shintoism, the sixteenth-century Zhu Xi scholar Hayashi Razan assimilated the Chinese idea of the “Kingly Way” into Japanese Shintoism. Hayashi Razan described three kinds of Shinto implements, namely the Mirror, Jade and Sword which were received from the Amaterasu o¯mikami (天照大神) and presented as treasures to the Jinmu (神武) Emperor. The three virtues that they represented were Wisdom, Humaneness and Courage, and are exactly the intellectual contents of the “Kingly Rule.” If the king indeed possessed this kind of Kingly mind-heart, and used this mind-heart to rule the country well, then the “Kingly Way” was precisely the Shinto.22 Thus, in effect, Hayashi Razan transformed the Chinese “Kingly Way” into the Japanese Shinto¯. Hayashi Razan revived ancient Shinto by using Zhu Xi’s concept of Li (理, principle, pattern) to subsume both Shinto¯ and the “Kingly Way,” thereby creating a Shinto-Confucian intellectual synthesis. He regarded the King as the leader of the people, but above the King he added a Master. This Master was the Japanese Shinto¯ Amaterasu o¯mikami. Thus he brought Shinto¯ and the “Kingly 19 Chun-chieh Huang, “Historical Thinking in Classical Confucianism: Historical Argumentation from the Three Dynasties,” in Chun-chieh Huang and Erik Zürcher, eds., Time and Space in Chinese Culture (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 72 – 88. 20 Maruyama Masao 丸山真男 (1914 – 1996) pointed out that Ogyu¯ Sorai represented a turn away from a view (in Ito¯ Jinsai) of the centrality of the Analects and Mencius to one which saw instead the Six Classics as central. At the same time, Sorai prioritized politics over morality. See Maruyama Masao, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974). 21 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, p. 82. 22 Hayashi Razan, “Shinto¯ denju 神道傳授 [The Transmission of Shinto],” in Kinse¯ Shinto¯ron. Zenki Kokugaku 近世神道論．前期国学 [Shintoism and National Learning in Early Modern Times] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982), pp. 12 – 13.

Methodological problems facing the contextual turn

51

Way” into an intimate relationship,23 subsuming the “Kingly Way” within the political notion of Shinto¯. While this differed from Ogyu¯ Sorai’s approach, it played a similar role. In summary, the two types of contextual turn mentioned above both take decontextualization as a prior work. First, certain ideas from the Confucian classics – such as Zhongguo, the “Way,” and the “Kingly Way” – were drawn out from their original context in ancient Chinese politics or from their context in Confucius’ and Mencius’ thought and transplanted into the context of the Tokugawa feudal order and its politics, where they were endowed with completely new interpretations and meanings. While this kind of “decontextualization” and recontextualization yielded completely new views and interpretations, we must say that judged from the perspective of the original linguistic meaning and context of the Chinese classics, these interpretations were a great falling off from the original ideas.

3

Methodological problems facing the contextual turn

In transcultural readings of the classics, we commonly see interpretations which reflect the cultural turn. Decontextualization is a core, foundational effort. And yet this sort of decontextualization leads to two methodological problems.

3.1

The methodological problems of decontextualization

First, in the course of transcultural intellectual exchanges, foreign thought (e. g., Chinese Confucianism) will certainly be adjusted for the local context. For example, as we saw in the instances above of Japanese Confucians decontextualizing key terms (such as Zhongguo) in the Chinese classics. In Korea, Confucians did much the same after receiving the Chinese classics. As the sixteenth-century Korean Yi Hwang 李滉 (Toegye 退溪, 1502 – 1571) noted, they always added an “amendment”24 as a necessary choice. Only by this process of decontextualization were the Japanese and Koreans able to adapt the Chinese classics to fit the situation in their home countries, and thus completely absorb these foreign “loan concepts.”25 In the eyes of these foreign interpreters, 23 Ibid., p. 21. 24 Yi Hwang 이황, Jujaseo jeol-yo seo 주자서절요서 朱子書節要序 [Preface to Select Writings of Zhu Xi], Dosan jeonseo 도산전서 陶山全書 [Complete Works of Dosan] 3, vol. 59, p. 259. 25 A deepening of the notion of foreign “loan words.” Miyagawa To¯ru 宮川透, Kindai Nihon shiso¯ no ko¯zo¯ 近代日本思想の構造 [The Structure of Modern Japanese Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988), p. 5.

52

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

this decontextualization of key ideas in the classics was natural, legitimate, and necessary. However, in the eyes of the authors of the classics who wrote in their own original contexts, this sort of decontextualization would have been highly questionable. Although the key ideas in the Chinese Confucian classics (such as the Mandate of Heaven, Li, Mind, Nature, etc.) all maintained their general meaning, when these concepts were formed at the time the Chinese classics were written, each term had its own concrete context and content. In other words, the contents of the Chinese Confucian classics were by no means some type of “conceptual game.” Rather, they were the heartfelt testimony and record of their authors’ spiritual pilgrimage. Zhu Xi pointed out that reading the classics is not a question of reading word for word. Rather, “one has to draw upon one’s concrete practice and experience in order to infer the meanings.”26 Wang Yangming said that it was only “by dying a hundred deaths and enduring a thousand hardships”27 that he came to understand Mencius’ concept of liangzhi (the innate knowledge of goodness): “The discourses of the ancients expressed the travails of their personal experiences. That is why they expressed themselves so succinctly. When received by later generations, they were congenial to human feelings. If one has not undergone those same travails, how could one grasp [the sages’] mind-heart?”28 What we moderns call concepts from the Confucian classics are in fact incredibly rich testimonies to the life, travails, and practical experiences of the original authors. They are concrete and efficacious. And thus the so-called “abstract universals” found in the classics can in fact be better described as “concrete universals.” From this perspective, when Confucians in the neighboring regions of East Asia decontextualized the concepts from the Chinese Confucian classics, it was in order to transplant them into their home country’s cultural context. While this sort of effort was necessary, it also led to doubts concerning the interpreters’ understanding of the original authors’ meaning. Had these outlying interpreters lost the true essence of the original texts? It was precisely this fear regarding the process of decontextualization that drove many scholars to stress that when interpreting the classics, one must return to the context of the age of the original authors. The Qing scholar Hang Shijun (杭 世駿, Dazong 大宗, 1696 – 1773) stressed that when interpreting the classics and

26 Zhu Xi, Huian Xiansheng Zhuwengong ji 晦庵先生朱文公集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi], “Da Cheng Yunfu 答程允夫 [Reply to Cheng Yunfu],” (SPTK chubiansuoben, 1975), juan 41, p. 701. 27 Chan Wing-tsit 陳榮捷 ed., Wang Yangming Chuanxilu xiangzhu jiping 王陽明傳習錄詳註 集評 [Detailed Annotations and Collected Comments on the Instructions for Practical Living] (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1983), p. 396. 28 Ibid., sec. 296, p. 345.

Methodological problems facing the contextual turn

53

striving to understand the “words,” one “must trace to the origin.”29 The suggestion here was that interpreting the concepts or terms of the classics required that one return to the ancient source and context. Cheng Shude argued that when interpreting the classics, one “cannot have preconceptions”; instead “one must grasp how the ancients themselves established the terms.”30 His stress on returning to the context of the age of the classics when interpreting them meant that one should not decontextualize the classics. The eighteenth-century Tokugawa Confucian Nakai Riken (中井履軒, 1732 – 1817) held that “one’s self-intended words cannot be used to interpret the classics,”31 and declared that the one should not read one’s latter-day viewpoints or biases into the classics. However, the problem remains that, since the interpreters lived in distant and different times and places, how could latter day readers possibly recover the original context of the classics? In fact, there are many approaches that interpreters can employ to grasp that original context. Ito¯ Jinsai, the seventeenth-century Tokugawa Confucian classicist, provided one such possible method. He aimed at solving problems of interpretation by redefining the classical meaning of key terms. His method involved recovering the original context of the dialogues between Confucius and his students. While clarifying the classical meaning (古義, kogi) of the Analects, Ito¯ criticized the Song Confucians (especially Zhu Xi) for deviating from the ancient context of Confucian learning. He pointed out that Zhu had often misconstrued the speech contexts in his interpretations. Thus when he himself sought to clarify the ancient meanings of key terms in the Analects, such as dao and ren (仁, benevolence, humanness, humanity), he aimed to recover those original speech contexts. He reintegrated the Analects with the other classics and constructed his own “classicist” school of interpretation. Smoothly and adeptly, Ito¯ interpreted the term guan (貫, thread, connect) in Confucius’ statement, “There is one single thread binding my Way together.” While Zhu had interpreted it as tong (統, connect, get through), Ito¯ returned to the way uniting zhong and shu (恕, reciprocity) and the virtuous activities in the ethical relationships of people’s lives. This method of interpretation takes the classics back to their original concrete speech contexts.

29 Hang Shihjun 杭世駿, “Li Yishan shi zhu xu 李義山詩注序 [Preface to Li Yishan’s Poetry],” in his Daogutang ji 道古堂集 [Literary Corpus of Daogutang] (1792, wood-block edition), vol. 8, p. 83. 30 Cheng Shude 程樹德, Lunyu jishi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), vol. 2, p. 819. 31 Nakai Riken 中井履軒, Mo¯shi ho¯gen 孟子逢原 [Original Meanings of the Mencius], in Seki ¯ tori Shuppen, 1973), vol. 10, Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho (Tokyo: O Mo¯shi bu 孟子部 [Section of the Mencius] 2, p. 11.

54 3.2

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

The turn of contextuality and the rise of meaning

The second problem concerns whether the contextuality of the classics can be transformed into the context of the interpreter and his or her age. In my view, the contextuality of the classics can be successfully decontextualized and recontextualized in the interpreter’s own contextuality. There are some workable methods for achieving this kind of turn. Indeed, the Confucian tradition itself bears many methodological resources. Let us consider the following two methods. 1. “To know the man by studying the age.” The first method involves the interpreter entering deeply into the authors’ context so as to reach a sort of spiritual communication with the author’s mind. This method of “knowing the man by studying the age” is seen in the Zuozhuan’s approach of “explaining the classic in light of the events,” a method developed by Mencius to include historicity and contextuality.32 Lu Jiuyuan said, “understand those ancients with empathy” and Zhang Zai 張載 (Hengqu 橫渠, 1020 – 1077) advocated the intuitive method of “mental comprehension”33 for interpreting the classics. These approaches were methodologically similar. 2. “To meet the intention [of the writer] with sympathetic understanding.”34 The interpreter meets the author’s intention according to his own “sympathetic understanding,” thus making possible the shift from the author’s to the interpreter’s context. This method was introduced by Mencius and refined by Zhu Xi35, and assumes that the author’s mind is discernible. Although the interpreter lives in a different place and age from that of the original author, the interpreter can still become such a soul mate. Yet the interpreter should, as Zhu Xi stressed, “First comprehend the words in order to grasp the intentions of the Sage’s mind,”36 and thus transcend time and space to understand the author’s voice as it arises from another age. This method could persuasively turn a classic’s context. However, people in other intellectual contexts can 32 Chun-chieh Huang, “Mencius’ Hermeneutics of Classics,” Tao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 1/1 (2001): pp. 15 – 30. 33 Zhang Zai 張載, “Jingxue liku 經學理窟 [Explanations of the Learning of Classics],” in Zhang Zai ji 張載集 [Collected Essays of Zhang Zai] (Beijing: Zhonghua shju, 1987), p. 276. 34 Mencius said, “Hence, in explaining an ode, one should not allow the words to obscure the sentence, nor the sentence to obscure the intended meaning. The right way is to meet the intention of the poet with sympathetic understanding.” D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius, vol. 2 (Hong Kong: HKUP, 1979, 1980), Bk IV, part A, par. 4, p. 187. 35 See Zhou Guangqing 周光慶, Zhongguo gudai jieshixue daolun 中國古典解釋學導論 [Introduction to the Hermeneutics of Chinese Classics] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), pp. 46 – 66. 36 Zhu Xi, “Da Shi Zichong, yi 答石子重一 [First Reply to Shi Zichong],” in Zhuzi wenji 朱子文 集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi] (Taipei: Defu wenjiao jijinhui, 2000), juan 42, p. 1832.

Conclusion

55

always create new meanings, open up new perspectives and create syntheses from new outlooks. Besides these two methods, there are many other possible paths that await further inquiry.

4

Conclusion

In this chapter we looked at the example of how the Japanese Confucians changed the contents of the Chinese Confucian classics after they arrived in Japan. We also analyzed problems related to decontextualization in the transcultural and translinguistic interpretations of the classics. When studying foreign classics, interpreters in Japan took many of the ideas in the classics and extracted them from their original contexts since these were not sensible to the authors. This process of extraction was then followed by a contextual turn aimed at making the content of the classics more congenial to their own country’s cultural milieu. This was commonly seen in the history of cultural exchanges in East Asia. To the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians, Chinese culture was an enormous “other.” While the Chinese Confucian classics were their spiritual home, the Chinese Empire was a political “foreign country.” This was especially so when that cultural homeland and political other (the Ming Empire) fell in 1644. It was a great shock to Japanese and Korean Confucians when the non-Han Manchus overthrew the Ming and established the Qing Empire. Of course, to Chinese Confucians such as Gu Yanwu (顧炎武, Tinglin 亭林, 1613 – 1682), Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi and others, the shock was even greater: they suddenly “lost All Under Heaven,”37 “the sky tumbled and the earth shattered.”38 At this historical juncture, the seventeenth-century Japanese scholar Yamazaki Ansai posed the following hypothetical question to his students: “If now ‘that country’ had Confucius as its commander-in-chief and Mencius as his second-in-command and assembled several tens of thousands of mounted troops to attack us, what could we who have studied the Way of Confucius and Mencius do?”39 Carrying within them this division between the cultural and political self, when Japanese Confucians encountered the term Zhongguo in the Chinese Confucian classics, they performed a decontextualization and recontextualization by divesting the 37 Gu Yanwu, Rizhi lu 日知錄 [Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day] (Taipei: Minglun chubanshe, 1970), ch. 17, section “Zheng-shi 正始,” p. 379. 38 Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲, Nanlei wenji 南雷文集 [Literary Corpus of Huang Zongxi] (SPPY chubiansuoben), ch. 2, “liu bie haichang tongxue xu,” p. 16b. 39 Hara Nensai 原念齋, Sentetsu so¯dan 先哲叢談 [Collected Stories of Former Philosophers] (Eto: Keigendo, 1816 wood-block edition), vol. 3, pp. 4b–5a.

56

“Contextual Turn” in the Tokugawa Japanese Interpretation of the Confucian Classics

term of its geographic and political content. In their comments they gave it a cultural content, such as “obtaining its Mean,” and decided that the term Zhongguo referred to their own home country, Japan. This truly was a case of pouring new wine into old wineskins; it was a creative move, but one that resolved the tension of their dual identity. Although the authors of the classics would view this, at best, as a creative misreading, it was still an effective policy for localizing foreign thought in the formation of Japanese Confucian subjectivity. Before such a contextual turn can take place, there must always be a decontextualization of key ideas or concepts. In my view, this decontextualization is necessary for creating new meanings, even though the new meanings will be inconsistent with the original context and meaning of the Chinese Confucian classics. With regard to this problem, the ancient Confucian intellectual tradition itself provides some methodological resources for contextual turns when reading the classics, notably Mencius’ suggestions to “know the man by discussing the age” and “meeting the author’s intention with one’s sympathetic understanding.” These suggestions legitimize the contextual turn as a possible path of undertaking. In summary, when viewed from the perspective of East Asian intellectual history, the contextual turn in transcultural interpretations of the classics exhibits not only a tension between the universal values in the classics and the special features of regional cultures. It also exhibits a tension between the abstract work of conceptualization and temporal-spatially-determined contextualization. These issues warrant further study.

Chapter Three: East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

1

Introduction

Mencius 7 A35 records the following dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying (桃 應): Tao Ying asked, “When Shun was Son of Heaven, and Gao Yao was his Minister of Crime, if ‘the Blind Man’ [i. e. Shun’s father] had murdered someone, what would they have done?” Mengzi said, “Gao Yao would simply have arrested him!” Tao Ying asked, “So Shun would not have forbidden it?” Mengzi said, “How could Shun have forbidden it? Gao Yao had a sanction for his actions.” Tao Ying asked, “So what would Shun have done?” Mengzi said, “Shun looked at casting aside the whole world like casting aside a worn sandal. He would have secretly carried his father on his back and fled, to live in the coastland, happy to the end of his days, joyfully forgetting the world.1

In the above dialogue, Tao Ying asks Mencius a hypothetical question. The core sense of his question is what Shun should do when his “private” (si) sphere conflicts with his “public” (gong) sphere as Son of Heaven. Should he ignore the law and protect his father or should he obey the law of the land and forsake familial affection in order to preserve righteousness? Which has the higher priority: being filial to his father or being loyal to his state? The key to this question lies in distinguishing and sorting out the differences between the public and private realms. During the late Warring States period (403 – 222 bce), before this discussion between Mencius and Tao Ying had ever taken place, the discourse about the concepts of gong and si already had a developed history in ancient China. Subsequent to this dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying, Chinese, Japanese, and 1 Translation by Bryan W. Van Norden in Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (2nd ed. Indianapolis, IL: Hackett, 2005), pp. 153 – 4.

58

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

Korean Confucians suggested different explanations regarding the implications raised by the question, and these can be taken as reflections of the intricate transformation of the concepts of “public” and “private” in the history of East Asian thought. In this chapter we will begin by examining changes in the concepts of “public” and “private” that occurred during the Western Zhou period (1045?– 771 bce) down to the Warring States period, and how these were manifested in concrete life situations. We will then analyze different East Asian Confucian interpretations of Mencius 7 A35. This will allow us to observe the transformation of the concepts of “public” and “private” within modern East Asian thought.

2

The development of the concepts Gong and Si in ancient Chinese thought

Between the Western Zhou and the late Warring States period, the meanings of the words gong and si evolved from referring to concrete human beings or things into abstract standards for value judgments. Moreover, they came to have a strong connotation for moral judgments. In his early dictionary, the Shuowen jiezi (說文解字), Xu Shen (許慎, 30 – 134) explains the meanings of the words gong and si in the following way: Gong is to distribute evenly. [The character gong 公 (public) is formed] by combining the elements ba 八 (opposed to) and si 厶 (private). The meaning of ba is equivalent to bei 背 (to oppose). Han Feizi said, “What opposes the private is public.” Si (private) is wicked and deviant. Han Feizi said, “When Cang Jie composed characters, he took si 厶 (private) to mean centering on oneself.”2

However, others argue that the origins of the two words gong and si are more likely related to ancient Chinese agricultural life. Xu Zhongshu (徐中舒) once said, “Si 私 (in its original form: 厶) depicts the shape of a plough used in farming.” He continued: “A plough is a farm tool, which is an item a person uses in daily life. So it has to be claimed as something one owns. Thus, a plough is a possession and came to be glossed as “mine.” Si 厶 and si 私 should be understood as extensions of and derivatives of the word ‘plough.’”3 Kato¯ Jo¯ken (加藤常 賢) believed that the word gong originated from gong gong (公宮, patriarch’s

2 Xu Shen 許慎, Shuowen jiezi xizhuan tongshi 說文解字繫傳通釋 [Comprehensive Annotations of Shuowen jiezi] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 70), juan 3, p. 24 (lower part). 3 Xu Zhongshu 徐中舒, “Leisi kao 耒耜考 [A Study of Plow],” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊 2 (1930): p. 1.

The development of the concepts Gong and Si in ancient Chinese thought

59

residence), the place where, in antiquity, the clan leader lived. Over time, the clan leader came to be called gong.4 In ancient texts and records, these two words gong and si both indicate concrete persons or things. The “Punishments of Lu” chapter of the Shangshu (尚書, Book of Documents) contains the sentence “Do not seek private advantage for yourselves by pleading both sides.”5 The word jia used here in the term sijia (私 家) is likely an error, a miswriting of the similarly shaped word hun (圂).6 Nevertheless, what is certain is that the word si refers to those people who hear a lawsuit. Examples of gong and si being used to refer to concrete persons or things are often seen in the Shijing (詩經, Book of Odes). For example, si appears in the ode Getan (葛覃) of the Zhounan (周南) section, “I will wash my private clothes clean; And I will rinse my robes.”7 Here, si stands for yanfu (燕服, the everyday clothes one wears at home). The ode Shiren (碩人) of the Weifeng (衛風) section contains the following lines: “The daughter of the marquis of Qi; the wife of the marquis of Wei; the sister of the heir-son of Qi; the sister-in-law of the marquis of Xing; the viscount of Tan also her brother-in-law [si, 私].” The commentary says, “The husband of one’s younger sister is called si [私].”8 In the ode Qiyue (七月) of the Binfeng (豳風) section we read: “The boars of one year are for themselves; those of three years are for our prince.”9 Here, si and gong are used respectively to mean “one’s own family” (i. e. “themselves”) and “the prince’s family” (i. e. “our prince”). In a line from the ode Dadong (大東) from the Xiaoya (小雅) we read: “The sons of the poorest families; Form the officers in public employment.”10 Here the word si refers to “people from lower-class (si) families.” The gong and si that appear in the following lines from the ode Datian (大田) in the Xiaoya, “May it rain first on our public fields; And then come to our private [fields]!”11 mean 4 Kato¯ Jo¯ken 加藤常賢, “Gongsi kao 公私考 [A Study of the Public and the Private],” Lishixue yanjiu 歷史學研究 96 (February 1942): pp. 1 – 13. 5 “Lu-xing 呂刑,” Shangshu 尚書 [Book of Documents] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan yingyin shisanjing zhushu 影印十三經注疏, 1993), juan 19.29, p. 33 (upper part). 6 Qu Wanli 屈萬里, Shangshu jinzhu jinyi 尚書今註今譯 [New Annotation and Translation of the Book of Documents] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1969), p. 184. 7 “Getan,” “Zhounan,” juan 1.2 of Maoshi zhushu 毛詩注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries on Mao’s Annotation of the Book of Odes], p. 2 (upper part). Translation by James Legge, The She King, vol. 4 of The Chinese Classics (reprint, Taipei: Southern Materials Resource Center, 1983), p. 7. 8 “Shiren,” “Weifeng,” juan 3.2 of Maoshi zhushu, p. 15 (lower part). Translation by Legge, The She King, pp. 94 – 5 (with minor modification). 9 “Qiyue,” “Binfeng,” juan 8.1 of Maoshi zhushu, p. 16 (lower part). Translation by Legge, The She King, p. 230. 10 “Dadong,” “Xiaomin zhi shi 谷風之什,” juan 13.1 of Maoshi zhushu, p. 10 (lower part). Translation by Legge, The She King, p. 355. 11 “Datian,” “Beishan zhishi 北山之什,” juan 14.1 of Maoshi zhushu, p. 16 (lower part). Translation adapted from Legge, The She King, p. 381.

60

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

“public farmland” and “private farmland” respectively. There are many similar examples – more than we can examine here. Nevertheless, all of the examples of gong and si that appear in the Shijing and Shangshu refer to concrete persons, affairs, or things, and especially emphasize their social and political significance. Nishida Taichiro¯ (西田太一郎) has said that prevalent use of the word si began in the late Western Zhou period and usually indicated the personal affairs, things, or behavior of a minister, officer, or scholar-officer. Thus si contrasts with gong, which specifically refers to a ruler’s personal affairs, things, or behavior.12 In the Spring and Autumn period (722 – 404 bce), the two words gong and si still often referred to concrete humans, affairs, or things. In the Zuozhuan (Zuo’s Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals), when gong and si appear in the realm of politics, they often refer to the “house of the lord” and “personal clans” respectively; both have a concrete reference. The entry for the Ninth Year of Duke Xi of Lu (650 bce) mentions “Doing to the extent of my knowledge whatever will be advantageous to your House [公家, gongjia] is loyalty.”13 Here, gong refers to the ruler of Lu. In the Sixth Year of Duke Wen of Lu (621 bce), Yu Pian (庾駢) says, “To injure the public service for my private ends would not show loyalty.”14 In these lines, “private” refers to personal resentment and “public” refers to the killing of Jia (賈) in order to take precautions against Zhao Dun (趙盾). In the Twenty-fifth Year of Duke Xiang of Lu (547 bce), Yanzi (晏子) says, “who excepting his private associates [私暱, sini], would presume to bear the consequences with him?”15 Here, sini refers to a person held dear. Since in the Spring and Autumn period gong and si often refer to concrete objects, they often appear as part of a compound reference term paired with concrete things or affairs. For example, in the Zuozhuan for the Third Year of Duke Zhao of Lu (539 bce), Shu Xiang discusses the disarmament of the ruling house of Jin (晉) in terms of the “ducal house” (公室, gongshi), the “duke’s commands” (公命, gongming), and

12 See Nishida Taichiro¯ 西田太一郎, “Ko¯shi kan’nen no tenkai to shijin no igi 公私観念の展開 と私人の意義 [The Development of the Concepts of Public and Private and the Meaning of the Private],” Shinagaku 9/1 支那学 (July 1937): pp. 87 – 106, esp. 94 – 5. Also see Liu Ji-yao 劉 紀曜, “Gong yu si – zhong de lunli neihan 公與私─忠的倫理內涵 [The Public and Private – The Ethics of Loyalty],” in Tiandao yu rendao 天道與人道 [The Way of Heaven and the Way of Man], edited by Chun-chieh Huang (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1982), p. 179. 13 Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu 春秋左傳注 [Commentaries on the Zuo Commentaries of the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 1982), juan 1, p. 328. Translation by James Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, vol. 5 of The Chinese Classics (Taipei: Southern Materials Research Center, 1983), p. 154. 14 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 553. Translation by Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 245. 15 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 1098. Translation by Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 514.

The development of the concepts Gong and Si in ancient Chinese thought

61

the “ducal clans” (公族, gongzu).16 When Nu Shuqi (女叔齊) discusses the political situation with the marquis of Jin in the Fifth Year of Duke Zhao of Lu (537 bce), he says, “The duke’s house is divided into four parts, and [like one of] the people he gets his food from others. No one thinks kindly of him.”17 The sense is that the people no longer favor Lu Gong. In the Twentieth Year of Duke Zhao of Lu (522 bce), the Zuozhuan says, “Oppressive duties are levied on the private [baggage of travelers].”18 Here, si refers to personal possessions. In the Fifth Year of Duke Ai of Lu (490 bce), it says, “Private enmities should not interfere with public [duty].”19 Du Yu (杜預, 222 – 284) adds the following commentary: “It is a public affair.”20 Each of these examples uses gong and si to indicate some concrete affair. In various texts of the Warring States period, the sense of the two words gong and si gradually developed from having concrete references to involving abstract concepts. They often referred to virtuous character in the abstract, and the gong came to be advocated over the si. This trend of thought reached full maturity in the Guigong (貴公, In praise of the public) and Qusi (去私, Eliminating the private) chapters of the Lüshi chunqiu (呂氏春秋, Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals).21 In the course of this transformation process from concrete references to abstract meanings, Xunzi (荀子, ca. 298 – 238 bce) was one of the first to clearly advocate gong’s priority over si.22 Han Feizi (韓非子, 280 – 233 bce) carried forth what Xunzi had begun and brought the conceptual world into the concrete political world, promoting the absolute priority of gong in the realm of politics. A comprehensive examination of texts from the Warring States period reveals that gong and si are often used in ways that are related to some abstract moral idea. For example, in the Mozi (墨子) the senses of gong and si never stray from the central theme of “impartial caring.” Indeed, the chapter “Impartial Caring” says: “This describes the extensiveness of King Wen’s impartial care for 16 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, pp. 1266 – 337. Translation adapted from Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 589. 17 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 1266. Translation adapted from Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 604. 18 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 1417. Translation by Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 683. 19 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 1630. Translation by Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 806. 20 Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 2, p. 1630. 21 Nishikawa Yasuji 西川靖二, “Ko¯ no shiso¯ : Ryoshi shunju¯ ni okeru to¯itsu genri ni tsuite 「公」の思想 ─《呂氏春秋》における統一原理について [The Thoughts of the Public – A Study Focusing Upon the Principle of Unification in Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals],” Chu¯goku gakushi 中国学志 (1988): pp. 1 – 14. 22 See Sawada Takio 澤田多喜男, “Senshin ni okeru ko¯shi no kan’nen 先秦における公私の観 念 [The Concepts of Public and Private in the Pre-Qin Period],” To¯kai daigaku kiyo¯ bungakubu 東海大学紀要（文学部）25 (1976): pp. 1 – 8, esp. 5.

62

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

the world. It compares his impartiality to the way the sun and the moon impartially illuminate the entire world without showing any favoritism. This was King Wen’s impartial care.”23 In the chapter “The Proper Model,” we read: “What then is the proper model for managing the government?” “For the reasons [given above],” I [Mozi] say, “nothing is better than modeling oneself on Heaven. The actions of Heaven are broad and impartial; it bestows abundance but without thought of return; its illumination endures without fading.”24

In none of these examples is the word si used to refer to particular concrete affairs or things, rather they indicate a personal preference for ethical conduct. The “Five Vermins” chapter of the Hanfeizi says, “Whatever was opposed to the private was public.”25 Daoist texts such as the Laozi (老子) and the Zhuangzi even use the principle of the transformations of the natural world to stress the superiority of gong as a moral standard over si. For instance, the Zeyang (則陽) chapter of the Zhuangzi says: The four seasons have different characteristics; Heaven shows no preference among them, and so the year comes to completion. The five bureaus have different duties; the ruler shows no preference among them, and so the state is well ordered. The great man shows no preference for civil or military affairs, and so their different excellences are perfected. The myriad things have different principles; the Dao shows no personal favorites (不私, busi), and so they remain nameless.26

And thus we see the emphasis in this passage on the moral goodness of having no “personal favorites.” In the late Warring States period, the great Confucian Xunzi had an especially significant role in the developmental history of the concepts gong and si. In the Xunzi, the words gong and si often have abstract meanings; they are placed in opposing positions within the guiding themes of Xunzi’s moral theory, with gong being superior to si. In this way, the two words gong and si often become combined with concepts that have universal moral implications, such as “the Way,” “fairness,” “righteousness,” “desire,” or “injustice.”27 For instance, Xunzi be23 “Jian’ai 兼愛,” Mozi (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 4, ch. 16, p. 36 (lower part). Translation by Philip J. Ivanhoe; see Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, p. 72. 24 “Fayi 法儀,” Mozi (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 1, ch. 4, p. 5. 25 “Wudu 五蠹,” Hanfeizi (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), jaun 19, ch. 49, p. 97. 26 Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi jishi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), juan 8 (lower part), Zeyang 則 陽 25, p. 909. 27 Kurita Naomi 栗田直躬, “Ko¯ to shi 「公」と「私」[The Public and the Private],” in Chu¯goku shiso¯ ni okeru shizen to ningen 中国思想における自然と人間 [Nature and the Human in Chinese Thought], by Kurita Naomi (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996), pp. 188 – 206.

The development of the concepts Gong and Si in ancient Chinese thought

63

lieved that only “after one can train one’s intentions to overcome the concern for personal interest can one be righteous,”28 and only then can one become a great Confucian. Moreover, Xunzi emphasizes the thought that only a “gentleman” is able “to use a sense of the public and righteousness to overcome private desires.”29 The ideal ruler must “clearly define duties, order all affairs and enterprises, determine the ability of officials, and assign positions according to each person’s ability. When everything is properly ordered, the public path prevails and private access is blocked off. Then, public righteousness flourishes and private affairs are terminated.”30 So-called cuanchen (篡臣, usurping ministers) are those “who have no concern for public affairs or universal righteousness, who collude with others and form cliques in order to surround the ruler, with the aim of promoting their personal interests.”31 The ideal scholarly official should be “enlightened, universally minded, and public spirited.”32 Xunzi drew out the abstract implications of gong and combined gong with yi (義, righteousness). He emphasized using “a sense of the public and righteousness to overcome private desires.”33 This reflected a new trend of thought that developed during the late Warring States period. For example, Mozi raised “public righteousness” over and in opposition to “personal resentment,” saying, “promote public righteousness and prevent private resentment.”34 Han Feizi also frequently championed “public righteousness.”35 The “Collection of Illustrations: Outer Group” chapter of the Hanfeizi says, “No private feud should be brought into public office.”36 These examples reveal a consensus that can be found among many thinkers of the Warring States period: in the realm of value, gong has priority over si, and si should not be allowed to harm gong. 28 Wang Xianqian 王先謙, Xunzi jijie 荀子集解 [Collected Commentaries on Xunzi] (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1969), “Ruxiao 儒效篇,” ch. 8, p. 92. 29 Xunzi says, “He does not take too much when angry nor give away too much when happy. This is because the proper model takes precedence over personal feelings. The Book of Documents says, ‘Do not innovate for the sake of personal preferences; follow the way of the kings. Do not innovate for the sake of personal aversions; follow the way of the kings.’ This describes how the gentleman is able to use a sense of the public and righteousness to overcome private desires.” See Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, vol. 2 (upper part) of Shisanjing zhushu, “Xiushen 修身篇,” ch. 2, p. 22. Yang Liang 楊倞 adds the following comments, “Law overrides the private,” and “the public is used to extinguish the private so that rewards and punishments can be upheld.” The mutual interconnection between the “public” and the “law” reveals the special spirit of Xunzi’s school of thought. 30 Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, “Jundao 君道篇,” ch. 12, p. 157. 31 Ibid., “Chendao 臣道篇,” ch. 13, p. 164. 32 Ibid., “Qiangguo 強國篇,” ch. 16, p. 202. 33 Ibid., 23. 34 Mozi, “Shangxian shang 尚賢上,” (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan Photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1968 – 70), juan 2, ch. 8, p. 12. 35 “Shixie 飾邪,” Hanfeizi, juan 5, ch. 19, p. 9. 36 “Waichushuo zuoxia 外儲說左下,” Hanfeizi, juan 12, ch. 23, p. 64.

64

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

Now, let us look at how conceptions of gong and si from the world of thought were manifested in the concrete world. What we see in the historical sources of ancient China is that the ancient Chinese regularly used suicide as a way to escape from situations in which there was an irresolvable conflict between gong and si. In the Spring and Autumn period, during the Fourth Year of Duke Xi of Lu (656 bce), Duke Xian of Jin took Li Ji (驪姬) as his wife and wished to establish her son as the crown prince. This generated a conflict at the royal court, and Duke Xian’s elder son found himself in a deep dilemma – he was unable to fulfill both the demands of “loyalty” (as a subject) and “filial piety” (as a son). And so, he committed suicide in order to resolve this dilemma.37 In the Ninth Year of Duke Xi of Lu (651 bce), Li Ke (里克) of Jin killed Xi Qi (奚齊) and Gongzi Zhuo (公子 卓). Xi Qi’s teacher Xun Xi (荀息) killed himself in order to make clear his view of these events.38 In the Second Year of Duke Xuan of Lu (607 bce), Duke Ling of Jin commanded Chu Ni (鉏麑) to kill Zhao Xuanzi (趙宣子). Chu Ni was placed in a moral dilemma: “‘to murder the people’s lord would be disloyalty, and to cast away from me the marquis’s command would be unfaithfulness. Either alternative is worse than death.’ With these words, he dashed his head against a cassia tree and died.”39 During the Spring and Autumn period, Bu She (不奢), the minister of justice assigned by King Zhao of Chu, chased after a murderer. When he caught up with him, Bu She discovered that the culprit was his own father. So he returned to the palace and spoke to the king: The murderer is my father. To serve a political end by using my father would not be filial, but to fail to obey my lord’s law would not be loyal. To be lenient toward this crime and abandon the law, showing favor to enhance my father’s well-being, this is what I, as a minister, must guard against.

Then, he bent over the chopping block and asked King Zhao to have him executed. The king decided to release him, but Bu She responded: This cannot be. Not favoring my father is to be unfilial. Not obeying my lord’s law is to be disloyal. Remaining alive while condemned for a capital offense is to be dishonest. Your majesty’s wish to pardon me is the kindness of a superior. My inability to forego punishment is the righteousness of a subordinate.

He then cut his own throat and died in the palace hall.40 In the Spring and Autumn period, when Tian Chang (田常) confronted a moral dilemma in which he had to either “abandon my ruler in order to be filial 37 38 39 40

Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu, juan 1, pp. 295 – 9. Ibid., juan 1, pp. 328 – 30. Ibid., juan 1, p. 658. Translation by Legge, The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, p. 290. Hanshi waizhuan 韓詩外傳 [The Outer Commentary to the Book of Odes by Master Han], (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan Photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 2, p. 14.

The development of the concepts Gong and Si in ancient Chinese thought

65

but disloyal or discard my parents in order to complete my lord’s business but be unfilial,”41 he committed suicide in order to resolve his dilemma. In the Spring and Autumn period, during the rebellion of Duke Bai of Chu, there was a minister who sacrificed his life for his ruler who said, “Fearing for my life is a personal good; dying for my lord is a public good. I have heard that a gentleman will not allow personal good to harm public good.”42 Suicide is the way that many ancient Chinese sought to free themselves from irresolvable conflicts between the realms of the public and private. This ancient Chinese practice of suicide suggests the following three implications. First, within the ancient Chinese world of thought, one’s death was regarded as an integral part of one’s life. The primary reason the ancients chose suicide as a way to escape from irresolvable conflicts between their obligations to the public and private realms is that they believed the moment when a person’s biological life ends is also the day their cultural life is made manifest. By choosing to end their biological lives they could concretely embody the cultural values to which they were committed. Second, the above cases of suicide show that the choices that ancient Chinese people made in an effort to fulfill public or private duties were deeply intertwined in a complex network of social and political relationships. In other words, the ancient Chinese did not deliberate about “public” and “private” as abstract categories or universal concepts. On the contrary, their reflections on the division between public and private and the ethical distinctions between them have a strong sense of situatedness. They were like spiders suspended from a dense network of social and political relationships, arduously struggling to fulfill their most cherished values. Third, the many cases in which ancient Chinese people used suicide to resolve the conflict between public and private show that in their scheme of values deontological ethics had priority over utilitarian ethics. Moreover, the former often appears as a consideration within the latter’s primary mode of reasoning. So-called deontological ethics presents a kind of absolute value that remains unchanged despite the agent’s external conditions, such as his or her identity, position, or vocation. Deontological ethics does not appeal to any end other than an absolute value. In contrast, utilitarian ethics stresses consequences; its aim is to achieve various utilitarian goals. Deontological ethics makes judgments according to the essential nature of the matter at hand, while utilitarian ethics measures the value or expected benefits or utility of the matter at hand. On the ancient Chinese view of utilitarian ethics, the most important issues to be considered when making judgments of value were the agent’s role and position 41 Ibid., juan 6, p. 62. 42 Ibid., juan 1, p. 7.

66

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

within the network of social and political relationships. Among the various relationships in ancient Chinese society, the relationship between father and son was regarded as primary, most natural, and most important. All other social relationships were developed on the model of this relationship between father and son. This is why the ancient Chinese often drew an analogy between fathers and rulers, teachers, elder brothers, and husbands. The ancient Chinese ethic of rulers and ministers required rulers to treat their people as their children. This perfectly reflects the idea that the relationship between rulers and ministers was an extension of the relationship between fathers and sons. In those cases discussed above in which there was an irresolvable conflict between fulfilling obligations of filial piety and loyalty, filial piety almost always had priority over loyalty. And so, in ancient Chinese texts when we see historical cases of children murdering their fathers, these always receive extremely harsh condemnation. To sum up the above discussion, we have seen that in the world of ancient Chinese thought, the meanings of the concepts gong and si developed from the Western Zhou period, when they referred to concrete people or things, to the Warring States period, when they indicated abstract moral values, and when the value of the realm of gong had higher priority over the realm of si. Nonetheless, in actual practice, if there was an irresolvable conflict between the realms of the public and the private, then the ancient Chinese might chose to commit suicide as a way to escape from the dilemma. It is precisely because of the irreconcilable conflicts that sometimes occur between one’s obligations in the public and private realms that the legal practices of modern societies (such as the United States) employ the principle of a “conflict of interests.” This allows one to refuse to serve as a witness to the purported crimes of one’s family members (such as husbands and wives or fathers and sons testifying against one another) and avoids the conflict between the public and private realms.

3

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the relationship between the public and private realms based upon interpretations of Mencius 7 A35

Now that we have reviewed the development of the conceptions of public and private from the Western Zhou to the late Warring States periods, let us return to examine the implications of the dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying and the opinions of later Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Confucians. Such an examination will clarify the ways in which modern East Asian Confucians handle the relation between the realms of the public and the private.

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

67

Premodern East Asian Confucian perspectives on the relation between the realms of the public and private can be characterized in terms of the following two major lines of thought. First, during the pre-Qin period (prior to 221 bce), although Confucius and Mencius emphasized the boundaries between the public and private, they never separated them into two distinct poles. Moreover, they regarded the realm of the public as an expansion and extension of the private realm and its fulfillment or completion. In the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius responded to She Gong’s (葉公) question about the stealing of a sheep (Analects 13.18) by saying that it is not considered “upright” for a son to testify against his father. This implies that the “uprightness” practiced in the public realm actually does not conflict with the affection one has in the private realm.43 Mencius stressed that “the foundation of the world is the state; the foundation of the state is the family; the foundation of the family is the person” (Mencius 4 A5). He believed that the realm of the private was an equally valuable part of a process of development that led to the realm of the public – seeing this process as an expanding series of concentric circles – and that there was no conflict between the public and private realms. Confucius and Mencius regarded the public and private realms as unified and continuous. Therefore, they considered an obligation to obey the law or carry out political affairs to be an extension of one’s ethical affairs. Within this unified and continuous public and private realm, Confucius and Mencius always used parental kindness to accommodate and nurture the rigid political and legal order, in order to transform them into lively living beings. Therefore, in answering Tao Ying’s question, Mencius pointed out that if Emperor Shun confronted the dilemma of having to watch his father go to prison for killing someone, he would give up the world (i. e. renounce his throne). The solution Mencius proposed implies that the “principle of kinship” is the basis for resolving difficulties involving “mutually irreconcilable obligations” between the public and private realms.44 In Mencius’ philosophy, humans are integrated beings. Whether as ethical agents or law-abiding agents, human beings are unified wholes, and the person as a law-abiding agent is deeply informed by the person as an ethical agent. 43 Since the May Fourth Movement, some Chinese and foreign scholars have often used Confucius as an example of one who lacks respect for the law and denies people their independent wills; cf. e. g. Shizukuishi Ko¯kichi 雫石礦吉, “Chichi wa ko no tame ni kakushi, ko wa chichi no tame ni kakusu 父は子の為に隱し子は父の為に隱す [Fathers harbored sons, and sons harbored fathers],” in Uno Tetsuto sensei hakuju shukuga kinen To¯yo¯gaku ronso¯ 宇野哲人先 生白壽祝賀紀念東洋学論叢 [Essays on Chinese Studies in Honor of Mr. Uno Tetsuto on the Occasion of His 88th Birthday] (Tokyo: Uno Tetsuto sensei hakuju shukuga kinenkai, 1975), pp. 511 – 27. However, further discussion of this issue is needed. 44 See Huang Chun-chieh, Mengxue sixiangshi lun (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 106 – 7.

68

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

Confucius’ and Mencius’ suggestion that the public realm is an expansion and extension of the private realm was challenged by Xunzi during the late Warring States period. When Xunzi discussed the ways of the minister, he warned rulers to take precautions against those “who have no concern for public affairs or universal righteousness, who collude with others and form cliques in order to surround the ruler, with the aim of promoting their personal interests” – the cuanchen – and their attempts to seize power.45 Xunzi emphasized that the ruler who has perfect moral integrity will necessarily “use a sense of the public and righteousness to overcome private desires.”46 He clearly differentiates between the realms of “public” and “private” and insists that rulers must “work for the public” rather than be “corrupted by private interests.”47 When Xunzi discusses the principle of filial piety, he suggests that to be “filial when at home and respectful to one’s elder brother outside the home are minor forms of behavior […]. To follow the Dao rather than one’s ruler and follow righteousness rather than one’s father are great forms of behavior.”48 In the “Way of the Son” chapter, he makes clear that the distinction between “great filial piety” and “petty filial piety” is precisely the same as the difference between public and private. This shows that by the late Warring States period, Xunzi was already questioning Mencius’ approach to the issue of public and private. By the eleventh century and thereafter, Northern Song Confucians began to differentiate the realms of public and private even more rigorously. Cheng Yi (程 頤, Yichuan 伊川, 1033 – 1107) argued, “Righteousness and [personal] profit are 45 Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, “Chendao” ch. 13, p. 164. 46 Ibid., “Xiushen” ch. 2, p. 22. 47 Xunzi says, “Testing tallies and casting lots is the way to ensure that public interest is preserved. If those above are fond of deviousness and pursue private interests, then the ministers, down to the most minor officials, will follow along and show prejudice” (Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, “Jundao” ch. 12, p. 51). In this chapter, in order to promote the idea that the ruler is the root of order in the state, Xunzi says: “There are rulers [who produce] chaos; there are no [inherently] chaotic states. There are people who can produce order; there is no model that [alone] will produce order […]. The model is the first blossom of order; the ruler is the source of the model” (151). “The ruler is the source of order […]. The ruler nurtures the source. If the source is pure, the stream will be pure; if the source is muddy, the stream will be muddy” (152). Xunzi wanted the ruler to maintain public standards and shun private interest. Then, the ministers, down to the most minor officials “will maintain the public good without the need to test tallies or cast lots” (152). At the same time, “The enlightened ruler provides his personal favorites with gold, gems, pearls, and jade but never by appointing them to office or granting them official duties. Why is this? I say, because personal favor should never be the source of such benefits” (160). Here too, Xunzi is clearly distinguishing the public and private realms; this advice is of greatest benefit to states and rulers. 48 Ibid., “Zidao 子道篇,” ch. 29, p. 347. The entire text reads: “Filial when at home and respectful to one’s elder brother outside the home are minor forms of behavior. To be compliant to one’s superiors and devoted to one’s subordinates are mid-level forms of behavior. To follow the Dao rather than one’s ruler and follow righteousness rather than one’s father are great forms of behavior.”

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

69

just the [issues] of public and private”49 and “The Duke of Zhou was extremely concerned with public rather than private [good]. He performed or abstained from acting in accordance with the Dao and without being in any way obscured by the desire for [personal] profit.”50 After the Cheng brothers, many Northern Song Confucians clearly differentiated the public and private realms. They emphasized the priority of the public over the private and the idea that the public is more important than the private. As a result, they began to express profound reservations and doubts about Mencius’ response to Tao Ying. The most remarkable example of this tendency can be found in the thought of Sima Guang. Sima Guang’s criticisms of Mencius in his essay “Doubts about Mencius” in fact are directed against and evoked by Wang Anshi, who highly recommended Mencius’ views. “Doubts about Mencius” was written between 1082 and 1085.51 At that time, even though Wang Anshi was no longer active on the political stage, he still was using his influence to promote Mencius as worthy of being worshipped in the Confucian temple. Sima Guang’s “Doubts about Mencius” is obviously directed against Wang Anshi and was prompted by his new policies.52 Sima Guang criticizes Mencius’ response to Tao Ying by saying: The Blind Man already had been arrested by Gao Yao. How could Shun rescue and hide him with the intention of carrying him on his back and fleeing to the coast! Although Gao Yao arrested him in accordance with the law, secretly he harbored the intention of releasing him to Shun. This is nothing but a case in which ruler and minister conspire together to deceive the world.53

49 Er Cheng ji 二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), juan 17, p. 176. 50 Wing-tsit Chan, Jinsilu xiangzhu jiping 近思錄詳注集評 [Detailed Annotations and Collected Commentaries on Reflections on Things at Hand] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1998), juan 10, p. 456. ¯ Anseki ni okeru Mo¯shi sonsu¯ no tokushoku Genpo¯ no Mo¯shi 51 Kondo¯ Masanori 近藤正則, “O haikyo¯ to Mo¯shi Se¯jinron o chu¯shin to shite 王安石における孟子尊崇の特色──元豊の孟 子配享と孟子聖人論を中心として [The Characteristics of Wang Anshi’s Exaltation of Mencius: An Inquiry Focusing Upon Putting Mencius in Confucius’ Temple and Mencius Theory of Sage],” Nihon Chu¯goku gakkaiho¯ 日本中国学会報 [Bulletin of Japanese Society for Chinese Studies], 36 (1984): pp. 34 – 147. 52 Bai Ting 白珽 of the Yuan dynasty notes that people of that time recognized that Sima Guang wrote the Yi Meng 疑孟 [Casting Doubts on Mencius] “for a particular reason. At that time, Wang Anshi was using Mencius’ discourse in order to gain respect for himself. [Sima Guang] believed that Anshi’s claims should not be fully trusted,” (Zhanyuan jinyu 湛淵靜語 [Random Notes of Zhanyuan], Zhibuzuzhai congshu ben 知不足齋叢書本 [Series of Zhibuzhu Zhai], juan 2, p. 14). 53 Sima Guang 司馬光, Wenguo wenzheng Sima Gong wenji 溫國文正司馬公文集 [Literary Corpus of Sima Guang], juan 73, pp. 532 – 3, in Zunmengbian 尊孟辨 [On Exaltation of Mencius], by Yu Yunwen 余允文 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan printed shoushange congshuben edition, 1937), juan 1, p. 10.

70

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

Sima Guang’s criticism of Mencius emphasizes the importance of the public over the private in order to criticize Mencius’ discourse. Slightly later than Sima Guang, Su Che (蘇轍, Ziyu 子由, 1039 – 1112) also criticized Mencius’ response to Tao Ying’s question. Su Che wrote “Explaining the Mencius” in order to express his doubts about Mencius’ response that Shun would rescue his father and flee to the coast, saying that such a view is worthy of a barbarian rather than a gentleman. He said, “If the parents of the ruler commit a crime, one should launch criticism against it. Who can say that if the ruler’s father murders someone, he won’t be exempt from execution?”54 Su Che’s opinion agrees completely with Sima Guang’s. They both use the same principles – that the private should not harm the public, and that personal favor should not be allowed to abolish state law – in order to criticize Mencius. During the Southern Song dynasty (1127 – 1279), Yu Yunwen rose up and refuted Sima Guang’s criticism of Mencius. He argued that: Mencius’s point is that even all the wealth in the world and the honored position of the ruler cannot change one’s filial obligation to serve one’s father. And so, he replied that the world can be forgotten but fathers cannot be forsaken even for a moment, in order to illuminate the way of father and son. How can one say that this is but a minor contribution to Confucian teachings!55

Yu Yunwen restated Mencius’ original point of view. Although he cannot eliminate Sima Guang’s doubt, Yu Yunwen’s opinions on the issue of public and private are of particular historical significance. Yu Yunwen says: Tao Ying’s view is that the law is the greatest expression of public good in the world. Shun is one who makes the law. Gao Yao is one who guards the law […]. Shun does not dare to prevent Gao Yao from carrying out his duties, because he will not allow personal favor to abolish the public law of the world […]. Now the laws were established by the former kings and publicly shared throughout the world. Scholar-officials who received the laws from the former kings cannot, on someone else’s behalf, use them to pursue private [interests].56

Yu Yunwen’s main point may appear to differ from Sima Guang’s, but in fact their views are the same. They both advocate the principle of not allowing the private to abolish the public. By the time of the Southern Song dynasty, Zhu Xi had integrated concepts such as “Heavenly principle” and “human desire” into the discourse about public and private. In his commentary on Mencius 1 A1, he says:

54 Su Che, Mengzijie 孟子解 [Explantation of Mencius], in Shoushan’ge congshuben 守山閣叢 書本 [Series of Shoushange], vol. 1 of Zhihai 指海 [A Sea of Hints], p. 13. 55 Yu Yunwen, Zunmengbian, juan 1, p. 11. 56 Ibid.

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

71

Benevolence and righteousness are rooted in the innate human heart-mind, which is publicly shared, Heavenly principle. The inclination to pursue [personal] benefit arose with the emergence of physical objects and the self; these are selfish desires. If one follows Heavenly principle, one will not seek [personal] benefit; as a result, everything proves to be beneficial. If one follows human desires, then even before one begins to seek benefit, one already has suffered harm.57

Zhang Shi in his “Explaining the Mencius,” adopted Zhu Xi’s method of connecting the concepts of “Heavenly principle” and “human desires,” and the concepts of “public” and “private,” and he upheld “the public nature of principle” in contrast to “the private nature of human desires.”58 He said: “The senses of propriety and righteousness originate from Heaven and are manifested in the human heart-mind. Each has its principle, which cannot be broken. They are shared publicly by the world rather than privately owned by me.”59 When Zhang Shi discussed Mencius’ teachings about how official positions should be assigned on the basis of virtue, his suggestion was that official positions and salaries are all paths that are open to the public, rather than the private possessions of a ruler.60 When discussing Gaozi’s (告子, 420 – 350 bce) theory that righteousness is external, he pointed out that Gaozi argued for the externality of righteousness because he mistook the universal principles of the world to be personal viewpoints.61 Both Zhu Xi’s and Zhang Shi’s opinions stress the priority of the public over the private. From the pre-Qin thought of Confucius and Mencius, in which public and private are understood as interpenetrating and interrelated, through Xunzi’s challenge, raised in the late Warring States period, and down to Song dynasty Confucians, who advocated the priority of the public over the private, we can see the underlying tension between the public and private realms. In the eleventh century, this issue started to receive more and more attention in the Chinese intellectual world. In the seventeenth century, Ogyu¯ Sorai, a Japanese master of the Ancient Learning School, clearly differentiated between gong and si. In “Distinguishing Terms,” he says, “Public is the opposite of private. What everyone shares in common is called public. What one controls individually is called private. The path of a gentleman involves both what is shared in common

57 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注 [Collected Commentaries on the Book of Mencius], in Sishu zhangju jizhu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), juan 1, p. 202. 58 Zhang Shi 張栻, Nanxuan xiansheng mengzi shuo 南軒先生孟子說 [Mr. Zhang Shi’s Discourses on Mencius], juan 1, p. 2 (lower part), juan 1, p. 10 (upper part). 59 Ibid., juan 4, p. 33 (upper part). 60 Ibid., juan 5, p. 27 (upper part). 61 Ibid., juan 6, p. 6 (lower part).

72

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

and what is controlled individually.”62 This view had a profound and enduring influence in the history of Tokugawa thought.63 The second line of thought that East Asian Confucians advocated with regard to the relationship between public and private was the idea that if a conflict exists between the public and private realms, then the ideal is to find a compromise that preserves both. If this cannot be attained, then “principle,” “Heavenly principle,” or “the heart-mind [shared by all] the world” is used as the standard for deciding. In the Southern Song dynasty, when Yang Shi (楊時, 1053 – 1135) commented on the dialogue between Tao Ying and Mencius, he noted: [The relationship between] a father and son concerns the exercise of private favor. The law concerns the world’s publicly shared righteousness. Both of these are important, and neither can be upheld in a partial manner. And so, if [private] favor is given higher priority over righteousness, then the law has to be bent in order to fulfill such favor. If righteousness is given higher priority over private favor, then such favor has to be obscured in order to obey the law. When the importance of favor and righteousness do not triumph over each other, then both are fulfilled to the utmost. When Shun was the ruler of the world, the Blind Man killed someone, and Gao Yao arrested him instead of setting him free. As for Shun, how could he not forgive his father? Now, releasing the murderer is to abandon the law, while executing his father is to harm private favor. The implication is that the world cannot be without the law even for a day; nor can a son be without his father even for a day. The people do not worry about having no ruler. So [Shun] preferred to abandon his throne in order to uphold the public righteousness of the world. Rescuing his father and fleeing with him on his back, Shun was able to fulfill his private favor. This was how Shun was able to preserve both principles.64

Yet in real life the goal of “being able to preserve both principles” is often difficult to achieve. In such cases, how are we to settle conflicts that arise between our obligations in the public and private realms? Zhu Xi argued, “Gao Yao acknowledges the law but not the ruler’s father. Shun acknowledges his father but not the world. Each of them exhausts the obligation of their respective ways without opposing one another.”65 Thus when these more recent East Asian Confucians were faced with conflicts between the public and private realms and were not able to reach the ideal described by Zhu Xi, they often 62 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Benmei 辨名 [Distinguishing the Names], in Nihon shiso¯ taikei 日本思 想大系 [Great Books of Japanese Thought] 36 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), p. 230. 63 See Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, Nihon se¯ji shiso¯shi 日本政治思史[A History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1952), p. 80. 64 Yang Shi 楊時, “Zhou Shizong jiaren zhuan 周世宗家人傳 [Biographies of Family Members of Emperor Shi-zong],” in Guishan ji 龜山集 [Literary Corpus of Yang Shi] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1973), juan 9, pp. 23 – 4. 65 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Mengzi huo wen 孟子或問 [Queries on the Book of Mencius], in Sishu huowen 四書或問 [Queries on the Four Books] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), juan 13, p. 500.

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

73

relied upon universal concepts such as “Heaven” or “Heavenly principles” to resolve the tension between the realms of the public and the private. In the Zhuzi yulei (朱子語類, Classified Conversations of Master Zhu), we find the following dialogue: Question: “When the Blind Man killed someone, Gao Yao only acknowledged the law but not the ruler’s father. Shun only acknowledged his father but not the world. This shows that the heart-minds of sages or worthies are calm and direct. Is it that when confronted with some affair their attention is focused and there is no need to consider side issues?” Answer: “Mencius is just describing the heart-mind of a sage or worthy. The heartminds of sages or worthies respond immediately like this. There is no need for them to engage in evaluation. However, in extreme circumstances where one cannot but act, one must be flexible in order to work things out. Now, the law is the shared public possession of the world; there is nothing for Gao Yao to do but arrest him [i. e. the Blind Man]. If the heart-minds of the people do not allow Shun to abandon the world and leave, then this is Heaven’s [will]. How could even Gao Yao disobey Heaven! Law and principle are embedded in the core of every person’s heart-mind. But the heart-mind has to respond immediately in this way, in order to make the proper evaluation. People today respond immediately to affairs without this core heart-mind; from the very beginning, they engage in evaluation. This is not proper.66

Zhu Xi recognizes that the law is “the shared public possession of the world.” When the father of the ruler kills someone, according to the law, he should be arrested and sent to prison. Nevertheless, if one is able to preserve one’s heartmind with “Heavenly principle,” then one will be able to make the right decision. Zhu Xi, in his “Combined Commentaries on the Mencius,” says: This chapter discusses how if one is a scholar-official, one will only acknowledge the law and not the honor due to the ruler’s father. If one is a son, he will only acknowledge his father and not the importance of the world. Now the heart-mind is nothing other than the pinnacle of Heavenly principle, the highest good regarding human relations. Those who consult it will attain understanding; there will be no need to wait for calculation or evaluation, and yet no situation will prove difficult [to resolve].67

Zhu Xi believes that if one can attain an understanding of “the pinnacle of Heavenly principle,” one will be able to put into proper order “the highest good 66 Li Jingde 黎靖德, ed., Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 [Classified Conversations of Master Zhu] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), juan 60, p. 1450. The Zhuzi dayu (朱子答語) contains the following sentence: “The law is the shared public possession of the world.” The earliest occurrence of this expression is found in the Western Han, when Zhang Shizhi (張釋之) said to King Wen of Han, “The law is the shared public possession of both the king and the world.” See Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shiji 史記 [Historian’s Record], Zhang Shizhi Feng Tang liezhuan 42 張釋之馮唐列傳第四十二 [Biographies of Zhang Shizhi and Feng Tang] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1997), juan 102, p. 2754. 67 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Mengzi jizhu, in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 13, p. 360.

74

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

regarding human relations.” Because “Heavenly principle” is a universal and transcendent principle, it is not in the least constrained by thoughts of private interest or even the state’s interests. This is precisely the point made by Wang Fuzhi: “If one only talks about the great fault of familial relationship from the perspective of overturning ancestral and social norms, then in evaluating greater and smaller gains and losses, one will distort the natural rules of Heavenly principle.”68 Zhu Xi’s use of the concept of “Heavenly principle” to ease the tension between conflicting obligations in the public and private realms made a deep impression on Korean Confucians of the Joseon dynasty (1392 – 1910), and they adopted and elaborated on this idea. In the sixteenth century, Jo Ik (趙翼, 1579 – 1655) further developed Zhu Xi’s views, noting: Law holds sway throughout the world; it cannot be suppressed. If it is suppressed, it cannot perform [its function] as law. So, the only thing for Gao Yao to do is to arrest him [i. e. the Blind Man]; there is no other way for him to proceed. Nothing is more pressing than for a son to save his father from misery. How can the world decide the importance of this? So, the only thing for Shun to do is to flee; there is no other way for him to proceed. Tao Ying’s question is asked from the perspective of everyday human feelings, and so there seems to be a difficulty. This is why he has doubts and needs to ask this question. However, the appropriateness of principle is just like this. It is only when humans are in the grip of selfish thoughts that they find this a difficult situation. The sage sees things from the perspective of Heavenly principle, which is perfectly correct, and so he knows that things must be like this. Moreover, his words are clear, resolute, and in general not problematic. How could anyone who lacks a deep understanding of the perfect correctness of righteousness and good order, in the way that the heart-mind of the sage understands, ever be like this?69

While the explanation given by Jo Ik may be convincing, there still remains the question of how one is to decide what constitutes the “perfect correctness of Heavenly principle.” Who determines it? If a number of different “Heavenly principles” conflict, how does one decide which kind of “Heavenly principle” determines what is correct? These questions are appropriately directed against any proposal that uses the concept of tianxia (天下, all under Heaven) in order to resolve the conflict between the public and the private. The Korean Confucian Yi Ik (李瀷, 1681 – 1763) responded:

68 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Du sishu daquan shuo 讀四書大全說 [Discourse on Reading the Four Books] (Taipei: Heluo tushu chubanshe photo-reproduction of the 1875 wood-block edition), juan 10 (upper part), p. 49. 69 Jo Ik 조익, Maengja cheonseol 孟子淺說 [Preliminary Comments on the Book of Mencius], in Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipseong 韓國經學資料集成 [Complete Works of Sources of Korean Classics] (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988), vol. 35, Maengja 1, pp. 602 – 3.

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

75

The dialogue in this chapter has not been followed through to its conclusion. Let us follow the implications of Mencius’s ideas and elaborate their hidden meanings. If Tao Ying had asked, “In that case what should Gao Yao do?” Mencius definitely would have replied, “Murder is a crime in the world; the law is the law in the world. Using the law in the world to punish a crime in the world, this is the duty of a scholar-official. Nonetheless, the ruler is both mother and father of the world. If the mother and father of the world were to carry his father on his back and flee, then the world would lose its parents. The world then would cry like a baby and search for where its parents had gone. Where would it have the leisure to think about the crime of murder? Gao Yao only is led by and follows the heart-mind of the world.” If [Tao Ying] had asked, “In that case what should Shun do?” [Mencius] definitely would have replied, “Shun ruled the world but would rather not have participated in it. He did not originally think [of ruling the world]. He abandoned the world happily but with concern. [Later,] when the world would turn to him [again], it would be as if he had served as ruler all along.” If [Tao Ying] had asked, “If [the crime is committed] by his father, he can be pardoned; if [the crime is committed] by the people, they must be punished. If this is how it works, is there still the law?” [Mencius] definitely would have replied, “The pardon is a pardon given by the world; the punishment is a punishment given by the world. Shun would not be involved in either. The sage is sincere and reverent, and thereby the world is pacified. There has never been a case of following the heart-mind of the world that led to the law failing to reach completion.”70

Yi Ik advocates allowing “the world” to resolve the conflict Shun faced between his obligations to the public and private realms. Although this seems to be a feasible proposal, one wonders how the public opinion of “the world” could be expressed under the autocratic political systems of East Asian countries in premodern times? Who represented the public opinion of “the world?” When we consider these questions within the context of the autocratic political systems of East Asian countries in premodern times, it is clear that neither transcendental “Heavenly principle” nor the universal concept of “the world” could overcome the conflicts that arose between the public and the private. In premodern East Asian societies, the authority to interpret concepts such as “principle” or “Heavenly principle” was in the hands of those who controlled political power. This is why many conflicts regarding different interpretations of “principle” were reduced to conflicts of political power. For this reason, conflicts over various interpretations of “principle” could only be resolved in the arena of political power, according to who had more or less power. In the eighteenth century, Dai Zhen (戴震, Tongyuan 東原, 1723 – 1777), responding to this kind of unprincipled understanding of principle, raised trenchant objections. 70 Yi Ik 이익, Maengja jilseo 孟子疾書 [Preliminary Writings on the Book of Mencius], in Seongho jilseo 星湖疾書 [Preliminary Writing of Songho], in Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipseong (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988), vol. 39, Maengja 5 孟子五 [Mencius 5], pp. 433 – 4.

76

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

The honored reprove the lowly on the basis of “principle.” Elders reprove juniors on the basis of “principle.” The noble reprove the humble on the basis of “principle.” Even when they are wrong, they claim that they simply are following principle. The lowly, juniors, and humble challenge such treatment by appealing to principle, but even when they are right, they are said to be acting against principle. This is why those in inferior positions are unable to use the feelings that all share and the desires that all have in common to reach those in superior positions. When those in superior positions use “principle” to reprove those in inferior positions, [we find that] there are countless “crimes” being committed down below.71

Dai Zhen clearly points out that “principle” cannot transcend the problem of stronger people oppressing and controlling the weak, which is a product of the power structure. We can further reflect upon this question by placing it within the history of the Chinese legal system. In a Han dynasty (206 bce–221 ce) legal work, we find a so-called inappropriate acts clause. The Tang dynasty (618 – 906) Tanglu (唐律, Laws of the Tang) has an “acts that are crimes simply because they should not be done” clause, which refers to criminal actions that are not explicitly stipulated in the written legal code but which should not be done based simply on normal feelings and common sense. The judge is to rely on his sense of “principle” in order to arrive at a verdict on such matters. Following the Tang dynasty, the “inappropriate acts” clause remained a feature of Chinese legal codes, appearing in the Song xing tong (宋刑統, The compendium of Song punishments), Ming lu (明律, Laws of the Ming), and Daiqing luli (大清律例, Collection of the laws of the Great Qing). This clause was only abolished in 1910. The extensive influence of this code even reached Japan, where it was not abolished until the fifteenth year of the Meiji period (1882).72 Ideally, this “inappropriate acts” clause would offer considerable latitude in legal practice, the goal of which is to preserve the ideal of substantial justice. However, in the course of actual practice, a judge who can appeal to “principle” in order to decide what is an “appropriate” or “inappropriate” action often relies upon “free intuitive testimony” and drifts into the misuse of power. The actual experience of Chinese legal history tells us that using “principles” or “normal feelings and common sense” offers a highly ineffective foundation for judging 71 Dai Zhen 戴震, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 [An Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in the Book of Mencius], in Daizhen quanshu 戴震全書 [Complete works on Daizhen] (Beijing: Qinghua University Press, 1991), vol. 1, part 1, li, p. 161. 72 See Huang Yuancheng 黃源盛, “Tanglu buyingdezui de dangdai sikao 唐律不應得罪的當代 思考[Contemporary Reflections on Crimes that Should not be Committed in the Tang Legal Codes],” in Gao Mingshi 高明士, ed., Dongya chuantong jiaoyu yu fazhi yanjiu (II) – Tanglu zhuwenti 東亞傳統教育與法制研究（二）──唐律諸問題 [Studies of Education and Legal System in Traditional East Asia (2): Aspects of Tang Legal Codes] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005), pp. 3 – 66.

East Asian Confucian perspectives on the public and private realms

77

whether a crime has or has not been committed. Zhu Xi suggested using “Heavenly principle” to overcome the conflict between public and private. Yet the difficulties encountered by his view are similar in nature to those faced by this traditional Chinese idea of “acts that are crimes simply because they should not be done.” Because Zhu Xi’s conception of “Heavenly principle” could not overcome the conflict between public and private, modern Confucians who came after Zhu Xi often criticized Zhu Xi’s Li xue (理學, Learning of Principle). In the seventeenth century, Ito¯ Jinsai said, “It is not the case that principle existed first and later gave rise to this qi [氣, vital force]. On the contrary, so-called principle is just the orderly pattern of the vital force.”73 Ito¯ Jinsai criticized the notion of “principles that are without sound or odor,” a view advocated by Zhu Xi and Song Confucians. Instead, he insisted that “principles” appear in the daily life of human relations. He stressed the spatial and temporal qualities of “principle” and opposed the transcendent principles established by Song Confucians. His position agrees completely with that held by Dai Zhen,74 which itself largely embodies the general trend of thought among modern East Asian Confucians.75 From the seventeenth century, intellectuals such as Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, and others advocated the idea of bringing together all the world’s “private” aspects in order to form a single “public” world. With this suggestion, the understanding of the relationship between public and private entered a new phase.76 Nevertheless, before this concept of a worldwide covenant could fully spread in premodern Chinese society and penetrated into peoples’ way of thinking, this innovative suggestion made by Huang Zongxi and others – of bringing together all of the world’s “private” aspects in order to form a single “public” world – would still need to face a number of challenges that proved hard to resolve. To conclude this discussion, we can say that modern East Asian Confucian reflections on the dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying, and upon the en73 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, Gomo¯ jigi 語孟字義 [Meanings of Words in the Analects and Mencius], in Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 [Collected Books on Japanese Ethics], edited by Inoue Tetsujiro¯ 井上哲次郎 and Kanie Yoshimaru 蟹江義丸 (Tokyo: Ikuse¯kai育成会, 1901), vol. 5, Kogakuha no bu (middle), p. 12. 74 See above for Dai Zhen’s criticism of Song conceptions of principle as a standard for moral criticism. 75 Huang Chun-chieh, “Dongya jinshi ruxue sichao de xindongxiang – Dai Dongyuan, Ito¯ Jinsai, yu Ding Chashan dui Mengxue de jieshi 東亞近世儒學思潮的新動向──戴東原、伊藤仁齋 與丁茶山對孟學的解釋 [Re-orientation of Confucian Thoughts in Early Modern East Asia: Dai Zhen, Ito¯ Jinsai and Jeong Dasan on Mencius],” in his Ruxue chuantong yu wenhua chuangxin 儒學傳統與文化創新 [Confucian Tradition and Cultural Innovation] (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1986), pp. 77 – 108. 76 See Mizoguchi Yu¯zo¯, “Chu¯goku no ko¯ to shi 中国の公と私 [The Public and the Private in China],” in Mizoguchi Yu¯zo¯, Chu¯goku no ko¯ to shi 中国の公と私 [The Public and the Private in China] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1995), pp. 42 – 90.

78

East Asian Conceptions of the Public and Private Realms

during indivisible character of and mutual tension between the public and private realms, displayed a profound depth of understanding. In an effort to ease the conflict between human beings as ethical agents and human beings as political agents, modern East Asian Confucians proposed using conceptual tools with universal qualities such as “Heavenly principle” or “the world,” to resolve the problem. However, such conceptual tools were often monopolized by the powerful, and so the issue of the conflict between the public and private realms has yet to be settled or resolved.

4

Conclusion

The realms of the public and the private are highly relative and continuously generate multiple levels of meaning that form concentric circles. Relative to a family, an individual is considered as the “private” and the family as “public.” Relative to a particular “private” family, society or the state is considered “public.” Relative to a specific “private” state, the international community is the “public.” Located within this developing process of multiple levels of concentric circles of meaning, an individual often faces conflicts among multiple identities and responsibilities. The dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying recorded in Mencius 7 A35 is an extremely lucid way to set out the problem of Shun’s incompatible roles in, and responsibilities for, the realms of the public and private, and so it has elicited much comment and discussion by East Asian Confucians and constituted an important problem in the history of East Asian thought. By tracing the origins of the concepts of gong and si, we discovered that in the transition from the Western Zhou to the Warring States period the meaning of the two words changed. Instead of referring to something concrete, they both came to imply something abstract. Moreover, in the course of this process of abstraction, both concepts came to imply a value judgment. Among thinkers in the late Warring States period, it was widely recognized that the “public” had priority over the “private.” However, in reality the “public” and “private” had always been incompatible. A large volume of historical material from the Spring and Autumn period onward showed that at times the ancients preferred to end their own lives rather than continue to live in a situation where the “public” and “private” were in irreconcilable conflict. Since the tenth century ce, East Asian Confucians have offered innumerable theories concerning the dialogue between Mencius and Tao Ying. Their explanations are simply too numerous to count. We gained a sense of this breadth by sampling some of these discussions, and found that East Asian Confucians were deeply impressed with the recognition that virtuous activity in either the public or the private realm can only be fully manifested in the public realm. Yet

Conclusion

79

they also recognized the constant, irresolvable tension that existed between the public and private realms. In an attempt to reconcile this conflict between public and private, they tried using the concepts of transcendental tianli (天理, Heavenly principle) or universal tianxia as conceptual tools. Yet under the autocratic social conditions that existed prior to the modern age, the authority to determine the meaning of either tianli or tianxia was monopolized by those who held power. They usurped the transcendental or universal characteristics of these two concepts and transformed them into tools to oppress the people. This was one reason why, beginning in the seventeenth century, thinkers from the Ancient Learning School across East Asia – such as Ito¯ Jinsai and Dai Zhen – heavily criticized the Cheng-Zhu School for constructing their core philosophical system upon “principle.”

Chapter Four: The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms: A Twenty-First-Century Perspective

1

Introduction

The great eighteenth-century Korean Confucian scholar, Jeong Yak-yong (丁若 鏞, Dasan 茶山, 1762 – 1836) is a pivotal thinker in the history of East Asian Confucianisms. While inheriting Zhu Xi’s philosophical legacy, Jeong Yak-yong thought innovatively about many core ideas in Zhu Xi’s thought, particularly his philosophy of humaneness. In Chapter 2 we examined the processes of the localized reinterpretation of Confucian concepts (what we termed the “contextual turn”). And in the previous chapter we focused on an in-depth investigation of one particular instance of such reinterpretation, namely the concept of “public” and “private” in East Asian Confucianisms. We will now shift our focus to the Korean Peninsula and examine Dasan’s influence on the development of East Asian Confucianism. We will begin by considering the special features of Korean Confucianism, before moving on to discuss how Dasan creatively remolded the old ways and shaped the new. In this way, we will be able to recognize Dasan’s continuing important message for us today in this globalized age of the twenty-first century.

2

Special features of Korean Confucianism

Confucianism first arose about 2,500 years ago on the Shandong Peninsula, and was based on the teachings of both Confucius and Mencius. Over the following centuries, Korean Confucianism took its place within the broadening community of East Asian Confucianisms.1 1 Cf. Huang Chun-chieh, Dong ya ru xue: jing dian yu quan shi de bian zheng 東亞儒學：經典 與詮釋的辯證 [East Asian Confucianisms: Dialectics between Classics and Interpretations] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2007); Japanese translation: Higashi ajia no jugaku: kyo¯ten to sono kaishaku 東アジアの儒学: 経典とその解釈 (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 2010); Korean

82

The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms

As we have seen, while each particular strain of East Asian Confucianism may share common resources, this has not prevented each strain from expressing its own particular characteristics. For example, the Confucian traditions of China, Korea, and Japan were each based on Confucius’ core values of “humaneness,” “appropriateness,” “ritual propriety,” and “wisdom.” But in each land these core values were adapted and developed in response to different social, political and economic circumstances and needs. Moreover, as we have already come to see, when Confucian values were expressed and used in China, Korea, and Japan, they adopted different roles in each land. For example, the Shidaifu (士大夫) of tenthcentury China and the Yangban (兩班) of fourteenth-century Korea both began to seize political power and privilege. Yet Japanese Confucians of the Tokugawa era simply functioned as public intellectuals, without possessing any political overtones or power.2 Thus while Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Confucians all shared core universal Confucian values, they expressed them differently in each place. In the making of East Asian Confucianisms, Korean Confucianism manifested the following two special characteristics. First, Confucianism became highly influential in Joseon Korea, rising practically to the position of an established state religion.3 Korean Confucianism became deeply steeped in Zhu Xi’s philosophical tradition. From the sixteenth century, a series of great masters in Zhu Xi learning arose: Yi Hwang and Yi I (李 珥, Yulgok 栗谷, 1536 – 1584), followed by Song Si-yeol (宋時烈, Uam 尤菴, 1607 – 1689), Han Wonjin (韓元震, Namdang 南塘, 1682 – 1751), etc. They focused their attention – and disputes – on concepts such as Li (理, pattern, principle), Qi (氣, cosmic vapor), benran zhi xing (本然之性, original nature), qizhi zhi xing (氣質之質, embodied nature), the siduan (四端, the Four Beginnings), qiqing (七情, the Seven Emotions), yifa (已發, aroused emotions), weifa (未發, pre-aroused emotions), renxin (人心, the human mind-heart), and daoxin (道心, the Way’s heart-mind), all of which were important concepts in Zhu Xi’s learning.4 However, while continuing to build on the philosophical foundations laid by Zhu Xi’s learning, these Korean masters were also highly creative and innovative. In the fourteenth-century, the Joseon Confucian Gwon Bo (權溥, 1262 – 1346) edited and reprinted Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu (四書集註, Four Books translation: Dong-asia yugyo gyeongjeon haeseokhak 동아시아 유교경전 해석학 (Seoul: Munsacheol, 2009). 2 Cf. Hiroshi Watanabe, “Jusha, Literati and Yangban: Confucianists in Japan, China and Korea,” in Tadao Umesao, Catherine C. Lewis and Yasuyuki Kurita, eds., Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness, Senri Ethnological Studies, 28 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990), pp. 13 – 30. 3 Cf. Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA/London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992), pp. 3 – 27. 4 Cf. Sasoon Yun 윤사순 尹絲淳, Critical Issues in Neo-Confucian Thought: The Philosophy of Yi T’oegye (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1990).

Special features of Korean Confucianism

83

with collected commentaries), resulting in Zhu Xi’s learning becoming widespread throughout Joseon Korea. Thus in their interpretations of Confucius’ Analects, most of the Joseon Confucians followed Zhu Xi’s position, which argued that “human nature is a matter of principle” (性即理, xing ji li). When in Confucius’ work they encountered the word “learn” or “learning” (學, xue), they interpreted it in terms of the expression “learning of the great man” (大人之學, darenzhixue) from the Daxue (大學, Great Learning), that is, as a sort of “learning of moral conduct” (德行之學, dexingzhixue). When interpreting Confucius’ saying that “My Dao with One threading it” (吾道一以貫之, wu dao yi yi guan zhi; Analects 4.15), the Korean Confucians generally continued to follow Zhu Xi’s view that it is the mind-heart (xin) that brings pattern or principle (li) into play. Yet they did also innovate and depart from Zhu Xi, such as when they interpreted Confucius’s “single thread” in terms of the virtue of sincerity or authenticity (誠, cheng).5 Consequently, we could say that the making of Korean Confucianism was a process of interaction and negotiation with the subjectivity of native Korean culture and thought. It was not just a subplot in the development of a Chinese Confucianism in Korea. When we understand Korean Confucianism to be the Korean edition of Confucianism among the broad multiplicity of various other editions of East Asian Confucianisms, then we can see the making of Korean Confucianism as a process of adaptation to Korean subjectivity. This adaptation took place through processes of interaction between the special characteristics of Korean culture, society, politics and economy with features of incoming Chinese Confucianism. Thus it certainly extended beyond any simple transplantation of Chinese Confucianism and its growth in Korea. The result of this change of perspective is that we can then avoid the antagonistic dichotomies of “orthodoxy vs. heterodoxy,” “center vs. periphery,” etc. We should not present Confucianism as a single paradigm and assess whether Korean Confucianism is “orthodox” by the standard of Chinese Confucianism. Second, we can describe Korean Confucianism as a central bridge that connects Chinese Confucianism to the East and Japanese Confucianism to the West, spanning their respective values, thinking, and practice. According to Abe Yoshio’s (阿部吉雄, 1905 – 1978) analysis, the seventeenth-century Japanese Confucian scholar Fujuwara Seika (藤原惺窩, 1561 – 1619) thoroughly accepted the insights and teachings of the Korean Confucian Gang Hang (姜沆, 1567 – 1618). And Hayashi Razan even embarked on his study of Zhu Xi’s learning through the Korean edition of Master Li Tong’s Replies to Questions (延平答問, Yanping dawen), which was Zhu Xi’s record of the discourses of his teacher Li 5 Huang Chun-chieh, Dongya ruxueshi de xinshiye 東亞儒學史的新視野 [New Perspectives on East Asian Confucianisms] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2004), pp. 245, 274.

84

The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms

Tong (李侗, Yanping 延平, 1088 – 1163). Yamazaki Ansai’s (山崎闇齋, 1618 – 1682) study of Zhu Xi’s learning was intimately related to the writings of the Korean master Yi Toegye.6 Korea had a large impact on the formation of Japanese culture and thought, and acted as a cultural bridge between China and Japan. We see an example of this in the fierce debate that arose between the eighteenth-century Japanese scholar To¯ Te¯kan (藤貞幹, 1732 – 1797) and the nationalist thinker Moto’ori Norinaga (本居宣長, 1730 – 1801) regarding the origin of Japanese culture. To¯ Te¯kan insisted that Japan’s imperial lineage, language, surnames, etc., had all been transmitted from Korea. But this thesis stirred up harsh criticism by Moto’ori Norinaga, who went so far as to doubt To¯ Te¯kan’s sanity!7 This episode in Japanese intellectual history – often referred to as the “Korean question” – has at its heart the question of the extent of Korea’s role as a cultural bridge in China’s cultural influence on Japan. In conclusion, we can see that in the process of the formation and development of East Asian Confucianisms, Korean Confucianism was deeply steeped in the intellectual heritage of Chinese Confucianism (especially the work of Zhu Xi). Yet at the same time, a creative transformation took place in Korea, as elements of incoming Confucianism interacted with the spatial and temporal elements of life on the Korean Peninsula. As master Yi Toegye wrote in the preface to his Essentials of Zhu Xi’s Writings (朱子書節要), “How could it be that here, east of the sea, after several centuries, that when I study [Zhu Xi’s] writings I do not subtract from or add to his testament for [our] study?”8 When the Korean Confucians absorbed Chinese Confucianism, they strove to construct their own Korean subjectivity, and in playing the role of a cultural bridge between Chinese and Japanese Confucianisms, the influence they exerted on the development of Japanese Confucianism was truly remarkable.

6 Abe Yoshio, Nihon Shushigaku to Cho¯sen 日本朱子学と朝鮮 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965, 1975). 7 To¯ Te¯kan 藤貞幹, Sho¯ko¯hatsu 衝口発 [Spontaneous Thoughts], and Moto’ori Norinaga 本居 宣長, Kenkyo¯jin 鉗狂人 [Madman], in Washio Junkyo¯鷲尾順敬, ed., Nihon shiso¯ to¯so¯ shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan] (Tokyo: Me¯cho Kanko¯kai 名著 刊行会, 1964 – 1970), vol. 4, pp. 227 – 312. Cf. Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, Ho¯ho¯ to shite no Edo: Nihon shiso¯shi to hihanteki shiza 方法としての江戶：日本思想史と批判的視座 [Edo as Method: Japanese Intellectual History and Critical Perspective] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 2000), pp. 16 – 26. 8 Yi Hwang 이황, Jujaseo jeol-yo seo 주자서절요서 朱子書節要序 [Preface to Select Writings of Zhu Xi], Dosan jeonseo 도산전서 陶山全書 [Complete Works of Dosan] (Seoul: Toegyehak yeon-guwon 退溪學研究院, 1988, Toegyehak chongseo 退溪學叢書 [Series of Toegye Learning]), Bk. 3, vol. 59, p. 259.

The position of Dasan’s learning in the making of East Asian Confucianisms

3

85

The position of Dasan’s learning in the making of East Asian Confucianisms

We can view the position of Dasan’s learning in the making of East Asian Confucianisms from many different perspectives. Yet most importantly, Dasan created a brand new trend in Confucian thought. He did this by synthesizing the learning of his East Asian Confucian heritage (especially the works of Zhu Xi) with the Catholicism that he encountered.9 In the making of East Asian Confucianisms, Dasan poured new wine into old wineskins, paving a new way toward future development. Dasan was a man of erudition. Like Zhu Xi and other East Asian Confucian philosophers, he wrote new commentaries on the Confucian classics and established his own system of thought.10 In his commentaries on the Book of Changes (易經, Yijing), the Analects, the Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning (大學, Daxue), etc., Dasan followed the important contributions made by Zhu Xi. Yet he also absorbed the thinking of the Japanese Classicists. Dasan accepted Zhu Xi’s dichotomy of “human mind-heart/Way mind-heart” and acknowledged the central position of the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean. As Tsai Zhen-feng (蔡振豐) has noted, Dasan added new phenomena to Zhu Xi’s learning, adding new water from a fresh stream. Thus we should regard Dasan’s thought as a form of “post-Zhuxi-ism” (後朱子學) rather than an “anti-Zhuxi-ism” (反朱子學).11 Dasan continued Zhu Xi’s learning, but he also innovated. Most specifically, he offered a new interpretation of Humanity. Humanity is the most important of the core values of East Asian Confucianisms. The term Ren appears 105 times in 58 chapters of Confucius’ Analects. Zhu Xi composed a “Treatise on Humanity” in which he used his ontological framework of Li and Qi (氣, cosmic vapor) to highlight the ontological, existential, ethical and psychological dimensions of Humanity. Through this profound essay, Zhu Xi greatly enhanced the breadth and depth of human life. In his Collected Commentaries of the Four Books, Zhu Xi 9 Don Baker, “Tasan Between Catholicism and Confucianism: A Decade Under Suspicion, 1797 – 1801,” Journal of Tasan Studies 5 (2004): pp. 55 – 86. It has been argued that the concepts of Heaven, Nature and the Human Being in Dasan’s work exhibit the influence of Christianity. See Seoung Nah, “Tasan and Christianity: In Search of a New Order,” The Review of Korean Studies 4 (2000): pp. 35 – 51. 10 Chun-chieh Huang, “The Philosophical Argumentation by Historical Narration in Sung China: The Case of Chu Hsi,” in Thomas H. C. Lee, ed., The New and the Multiple: Sung Senses of the Past (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2004), pp. 107 – 20. 11 Tsai Zhen-feng 蔡振豐, Chaoxian ru zhe Ding Ruoyong de Si shu xue: yi Dong Ya wei shi ye de tao lun 朝鮮儒者丁若鏞的四書學：以東亞為視野的討論 [Korean Confucian Jeong Yakyong’s Learning of the Four Books: An East Asian Perspective] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2011), 312.

86

The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms

presented his new definition of humanity as “the virtue of the mind-heart and the principle of love,” thus laying the metaphysical foundation for ethics. However, Zhu Xi’s account of humanity encountered severe criticism by eighteenth-century Japanese and Korean Confucians. The Tokugawa Japanese Confucians sharply criticized his metaphysical foundations and stressed the need to consider concrete social, political and daily-life contexts when interpreting the meaning of Humanity.12 Yet Dasan’s discussion on Humanity is quite in keeping with the views of those eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians. He could not agree with Zhu Xi’s claim that human nature is just a matter of principle. He also opposed Zhu Xi’s dichotomy of “embodied human nature” and “original human nature,” advocating instead that human nature is a matter of appetites and tastes.13 Dasan discussed the meaning of Humanity in the concrete existential contexts of human life, noting: [Zhu Xi’s Four Books with] Collected Commentaries reads: Humanity is the totality of virtues of the original mind-heart. I [Dasan] consider that Humanity is a property of human beings. Humanity consists in the appropriate intercourse between two people. For example, when father and son fulfill their mutual relations, Humanity lies therein. When the ruler and minister fulfill their mutual relations, Humanity lies therein. When husband and wife fulfill their mutual relations, Humanity lies therein. The significance of the term Humanity emerges in the appropriate intercourse between two people. Close at hand among the five basic human relationships, at a distance among the myriad clans under Heaven, whenever any two people appropriately fulfill their mutual relations, therein lies what is called Humanity. It was for this reason that the Master Yu said, “As to filial piety and fraternal affection, they are the root of Humane practice.” Any interpretation of the term Humanity should follow along these lines.14

In the preceding statement, Dasan argued that, “The significance of the term Humanity emerges in the appropriate intercourse between two people. […] whenever any two people appropriately fulfill their mutual relations, therein lies what is called Humanity.” In effect, he was overturning Zhu Xi’s definition of Humanity as “the virtue of mind-heart and the principle of love,” [心之德, 愛之 理] by replacing Zhu Xi’s metaphysical grounding of Humanity with an understanding that was ethical and relational. In his thinking, Dasan especially stresses that the core of Humanity lies in the appropriate interpersonal intercourse between two or more people. Indeed, as Tsai Zhen-feng points out, in Dasan’s discourses Humanity serves as both a type of “practical subjectivity” in a person’s 12 See Chapter 6 of this book. 13 Jeong Yak-yong 丁若鏞 정약용, Yeoyudang jeonseo 與猶堂全書 [Complete works of the Yeoyudang] (Seoul: Minjokmunhwa mun-go 民族文化文庫, 2001), Bk. 4, vol. 5, p. 435. 14 Ibid., Bk. 5, vol. 12, pp. 453 – 4. Cf. Tsai Zhen-feng, Chaoxian ru zhe Ding Ruoyong de Si shu xue, p. 319.

The impact of Dasan’s new insights and teachings for the twenty-first century

87

moral consciousness as well as a type of “interactive subjectivity” in one’s moral practice.15 In comparison with Zhu Xi’s ethical theory, Dasan’s ethical theory is relatively plain, down-to-earth, practical, and far less speculative.16 Inter-subjectivity forms the core of Dasan’s new discourse on Humanity. It is certainly deeper and more innovative than the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ discussion on Humanity. While the seventeenth-century Japanese scholar Hayashi Razan followed Zhu Xi’s substance/function paradigm in discussing Humanity, he still stressed the “function” of the practicality of Humanity in concrete ethical conduct.17 Miyake Sho¯sai (三宅尚齋, 1662 – 1741) stressed Humanity as the “principle of love” in the experiential context of concrete daily life.18 Ito¯ Jinsai criticized the Song Neo-Confucian accounts which regarded Humanity as human nature. In contrast, he argued that the practical significance of Humanity is concrete and lies in its “function,” rather than in an abstract “substance.”19 Although Ito¯ Jinsai20 and Toshima Ho¯shu¯ (豊島豊洲, 1737 – 1814) both wrote a “Treatise on Humanity” (仁說), they did not realize that the substance of Humanity lies in interactive subjectivity in the appropriate intercourse between two people. Consequently, Dasan’s discourses on Humanity hold a very special place in the making of East Asian Confucianisms.

4

The impact of Dasan’s new insights and teachings for the twenty-first century

As the twenty-first century unfolds, we find that the spiritual legacy of Dasan’s learning bears profound insights and teachings for our modern age. Let me offer two examples. First, Dasan’s world of thought was animated by the spirit of practical learning; and it is brimming with important new insights for our time. Like the eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians, Dasan opposed Zhu Xi’s fundamental Li–Qi dualism and its related ethical duality. Many eighteenth-century Japanese 15 Tsai Zhen-feng, Chaoxian ru zhe Ding Ruoyong de Si shu xue, p. 122. 16 Seungkoo Jang 장승구 張勝求, “Dasan’s Pragmatic View of Ethics,” The Review of Korean Studies 4 (2000): pp. 19 – 33. 17 Kyoto Materials Association, ed., Hayashi Razan bunshu¯ (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1979), vol. 67, p. 832. 18 Miyake Sho¯sai 三宅尚齋, “Mokushikiroku 默識錄 [Records of Silent Kowning],” in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ and Kanie Yoshimaru, eds., Nihon rinri ihen (Tokyo: Ikuse¯kai, 1901), vol. 1, p. 482. 19 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, “Gomo¯ Jigi,” in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ and Kanie Yoshimaru, eds., Nihon rinri ihen, upper volume, p. 290. For an English translation of this book, see John Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi and Philosophical Definition of Early Modern Japan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998). 20 Toshima Ho¯shu¯ 豊島豊洲, “Jinsetsu 仁說,” in Nihon Jurin So¯sho, vol. 6, p. 5.

88

The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms

Confucians did not accept any Li of metaphysical principle or ethical norm. Most argued that the ethical ground of Heavenly Principle could be discerned directly in the expression of Human Desire. The Chinese Confucian scholar Dai Zhen launched a vehement attack against Zhu Xi’s ethical dualism. However, in Dasan’s practical learning he stressed that it was only after one had concretely and specifically carried out some ethical conduct that one could then understand abstract and general values. The terms Humanity, Appropriateness, Ritual Propriety and Wisdom are realized completely only after one has carried out such affairs. Therefore, only after one first loves others can one be described as being of Humanity. Before one has loved others, the term Humanity has not been established with respect to that person. Before one has conducted oneself uprightly and fittingly, the term Appropriateness has not been established with respect to that person. Only after guest and host have interacted with utmost Appropriateness has the term Ritual Propriety been established. Only after affairs and phenomena have been distinguished and discerned clearly has the term Wisdom been established.21

Here Dasan’s argument that “the terms Humanity, Appropriateness, Ritual Propriety and Wisdom are realized completely only after one has carried out such affairs,” expresses the philosophical thesis that “affairs are prior to principle” – a practical insight for the twenty-first century. The major, leading trend in the twenty-first century has been globalization. Under this trend the interactions between countries are becoming ever more ¯ mae (大前研一, 1943–) suggests that today’s closely interconnected.22 Kenichi O earth could be called a “borderless world,”23 and that we may even see now a foreshadowing of “the end of the nation state.”24 Yet under the trend of globalization, the stronger countries at the center of the globalization process use their political, economic and military advantage to control and exploit the weaker countries and peoples on the periphery. Noted linguist and public intellectual, Noam Chomsky (1928–), characterized these strong countries as “rogue states.”25 The main factor driving this unequal process of globalization is an abstraction of the concrete context of interactions between nation and nation, people and people, allowing it thus to become a kind of de-contextualized, abstract principle that can then be seized and utilized by powerful countries for their own ends. 21 Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, Bk. 4, juan 5, p. 413. 22 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 4 – 5. ¯ mae, The Borderless World (New York: McKinsey & Company, 1990). 23 Kenichi O ¯ mae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: 24 Kenichi O McKinsey & Company, 1995). 25 Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

The impact of Dasan’s new insights and teachings for the twenty-first century

89

Dasan’s practical, empirical thought reminds us that “existence precedes essence.”26 It is only after affairs have been carried out and understood in their concrete particularity that we can establish abstract and general values. Otherwise, decontextualized abstract principles can easily fall under the control of the few in powerful countries who then use such principles as a tool to pressure and control their weaker neighbors. Thus Dasan’s thesis that “affairs precede principle” has great relevance when we want to understand and critique the rising trend of globalization in twenty-first-century international relations. Second, Dasan saw the incredible importance of the notion of “cultural identity.” During the formation of the new international order of the twenty-first century, this serves as a fresh insight and inspiration. In a recent book examining East Asian Confucianisms, I have argued that among the four factors of “self,” “other,” “cultural identity,” and “political identity,” it is “culture identity” that is most important. To East Asian Confucians, we feel that since each of the three main East Asian countries (China, Korea, and Japan) all share the same core values (Humanity, Appropriateness, Ritual Propriety, and Wisdom), the tension between the “self” and the “other” can be dissolved. Thus Dasan, after reading Japanese Confucian masters such as Ogyu¯ Sorai, asserted that Japan would not invade Korea.27 In return, the seventeenth-century son of Ito¯ Jinsai, Ito¯ To¯gai (伊 藤東涯, 1670 – 1736) also believed there was absolutely no possibility that Confucius and Mencius would have led an invasion of Japan.28 Dasan also strongly criticized the geographic explanation of Zhongguo as the “Middle Kingdom.” He argued that the geography of the Earth was not divided into cardinal directions of north, south, east and west, and thus every country could be regarded as Zhongguo when seen from its own perspective. If we were to grasp the center as the space between north, south, east and west, then no matter where one goes, it is “Zhongguo.” By what absurdity [is Korea] called the “East Country”? As to the land called “Zhongguo,” what is the rational basis for that specific name? There was the “Zhongguo” that was ruled by Yao, Shun, Yu and Tang. There was the “Zhongguo” that had the learning and cultivation of Confucius, Yan Hui, Zisi and Mencius. So then, what is the rational condition for the existence of “Zhongguo”? If the 26 This proposition comes from Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1905 – 1980) famous 1946 lecture entitled “Existentialism is a Humanism.” 27 Jeong Yak-yong 丁若鏞, “Ilbonron 日本論 [On Japan],” Yeoyudang jeonseo, Bk. 2, juan 12, pp. 282 – 3. 28 Huang Chun-chieh, Dong Ya wen hua jiao liu zhong de ru jia jing dian yu li nian: hu dong, zhuan hua yu rong he 東亞文化交流中的儒家經典與理念：互動、轉化與融合 [Confucian Classics and Their Ideas in the Cultural Interaction in East Asia: Interaction, Transformation and Fusion] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2010), pp. 39 – 60. Korean edition: Dong-asia-hak yeon-gu bangbeopron – dong-asia-eseo munhwa-gyoryu-wa yuga-gyeongjeon-ui i-nyeom 동아시아학 연구방법론—동아시아에서 문화교류와 유가경전의 이념 (Seoul: Simsan, 2012).

90

The Role of Dasan Learning in the Making of East Asian Confucianisms

condition is that it has the rule of the sages and the learning and cultivation of the sages, then the name of “Zhongguo” should pass to the “East Country” [Korea], which deserves it. Why should the ideal of “Zhongguo” be sought in a faraway place?29

Dasan thus followed the high standard developed by the Japanese for using the name Zhongguo, and thought that Japan “certainly has people who honor Ritual Propriety and Appropriateness and yet are far-reaching in their reflections; thus, it is said that Japan today is without worries.”30 Dasan argued that cultural values transform and transcend the limitations of national politics and the impact of military affairs. This recommendation should be regarded as a very positive insight for remaking our new world order in the twenty-first century!

5

Conclusion

In the history of the making of East Asian Confucianisms, there were resonances between the eighteenth-century Korean Dasan, the seventeenth-century Japanese Ito¯ Jinsai and the eighteenth-century Chinese Dai Zhen. They all exhibited new intellectual trends that helped East Asian Confucians critique and think beyond the scope of Zhu Xi’s learning.31 As for Zhu Xi, in some respects we can say that Dasan followed in his footsteps, though in other respects he certainly diverged from Zhu Xi’s path and developed something innovative and new. Dasan was also well versed in the Confucian thought of the Japanese Classical school, which he also criticized.32 In this age of rising globalization in the twenty-first century, the treasure of Dasan’s learning, his philosophical legacy and spiritual resources, especially his practical thesis that “affairs precede principles” and his push to use cultural values to transform and transcend the impacts of national, political, and military affairs can all play a vital role in the building of a more just world order for the twenty-first century and beyond.

29 Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, Bk. 2, juan 13, pp. 393 – 4. 30 Jeong Yak-yong, “Ilbonron,” Yeoyudang jeonseo, Bk. 2, juan 12, pp. 282 – 3. 31 Huang Chun-chieh, “Dongya jinshi ruxue sichao de xindongxiang – Dai Dongyuan, Ito¯ Jinsai, yu Ding Chashan dui Mengxue de jieshi,” in Huang Chun-chieh, Ruxue chuantong yu wenhua chuangxin (Taipei: Dong da tu shu gong si, 1983), pp. 77 – 108. Korean translation of this article appears in Tasan Hakpo 6 (1984), pp. 151 – 81. Don Baker characterizes Dasan as a “rebel” in the Confucian tradition; see Don Baker, “Thomas Aquinas and Choˇng Yagyong: Rebels Within Tradition,” Journal of Tasan Studies, vol. 3 (June, 2002): pp. 32 – 69. 32 Mark Setton, “A Comparative Study of Choˇng Yagyong’s Classical Learning (Susahak) and Japanese Ancient Learning (Kogaku),” Journal of Tasan Studies 3 (June, 2002): pp. 230 – 45.

Part II Confucian Texts in East Asian Contexts

Introduction

In the long history of East Asian Confucianisms, the Analects of Confucius stands as the predominant and most central point of focus for all Confucian thinkers. The seventeenth-century Tokugawa Confucian Ito¯ Jinsai (1672 – 1705) praised the Analects as “the loftiest, greatest book in the entire universe.” It is not an exaggeration to say that all Confucians in East Asia have been filled with nostalgia for the spiritual home seen in the Analects. Among the many interpreters of the Analects, Zhu Xi (1130 – 1200) represents the watershed of the history of Analects interpretation in East Asia. Zhu Xi created a grand synthesis of all that had been said about the Analects by those who came before him, and established a new paradigm for the hermeneutics of the Analects for all who came after. In Chapter 5, we will look at Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Analects by focusing on his commentary to Analects 4.15 and 15.3. We will also discover why Zhu Xi’s interpretations have attracted such vehement attacks from Confucian thinkers since the sixteenth century. We will then extend that discussion of Zhu Xi’s interpretation and its critics in Chapter 6, where we will examine the core concepts in Zhu Xi’s important Treatise on Humanity, and the important critique and reinterpretation that it received in Tokugawa Japan. The Tokugawa Confucian scholars directly attacked the metaphysical assumptions that underlay Zhu Xi’s work, and insisted instead on pursuing a method of “practical learning” embedded in the ordinary sociopolitical life of the people. In Chapter 7 we will find that as the national identities of Japan and Korea flourished and grew, so did the energy behind their resistance to the old metaphysical reinterpretations offered by Zhu Xi. “Concrete existence” became the key point of focus, rather than Zhu Xi’s abstract transcendence. By pushing away from the abstract, not only did these new scholars feel that their interpretations were more true to the Confucian classics, they also found a way of valuing their own subjectivities and national experiences, and incorporating them into the Confucian framework. In this way they reinterpreted and expanded the borders of the Confucian world.

94

Introduction

Chapter 8 continues this examination and evaluation of Confucian scholarship beyond the borders of China by looking in depth at the work of the seminal seventeenth-century Japanese scholar Ito¯ Jinsai. Ito¯ was an important systematizer who sought to unify the Confucian classics and present a new interpretation by engaging in detailed textual analyses. He championed an understanding of the Dao that is close at hand, incredibly practical, and existing in the secular life of the people rather than a vague, abstract, and mysteriously transcendent principle. This line was extended, as we shall see in Chapter 9, by the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese entrepreneur Shibusawa E¯ichi. For Shibusawa, if the Dao is essentially practical and secular, then it must also encompass the business world; its guidance is relevant not only to philosophers but also to all entrepreneurs. Several centuries of Confucian scholarship across the East Asian region have displayed a vigorous engagement and series of debates that have interpreted and re-interpreted Confucianism in various epochs and contexts. As with all debates and developments, new insights are won – but some aspects are also lost along the way. In Chapter 10 we will return to Ito¯ Jinsai’s impressive work to identify places where core understandings of the Confucian classics, in particular in the Mencius, were lost. The Japanese focus on concrete existence and practical learning was an important corrective, yet does this mean there was no aspect of transcendence at all to be preserved from the classics? Did Ito¯ sacrifice the depth and richness of life by focusing too narrowly on a single dimension? These questions lead us directly into the example of another Japanese Confucian scholar, Yamada Ho¯koku (Chapter 11). Yamada’s innovative contribution came in his reinterpretation of Mencius’ teaching on nurturing qi – an approach which critiqued Zhu Xi’s dualist approach and replaced it with a form of qi-monism. In some respects Yamada’s critique of Zhu Xi pushed even further than Ito¯ Jinsai’s, yet (as we will see) it remains questionable whether the critique was finally adequate. Over the long and many centuries of Confucian scholarship, we have seen the discourse spread from its roots in the Chinese mainland out into the broader regions of East Asia, particularly into the Korean peninsula, into Japan, and Taiwan. As the roots of Confucianism were so closely linked with the history and culture of those kingdoms in the Chinese mainland, it is not surprising that the spread of Confucian scholarship into other national, cultural and political contexts represented a significant interpretive hurdle. In Chapter 12 we will see how, in a fascinating way, this dilemma prompted scholars (particularly in Japan and Taiwan) to perceptively distinguish between China as a geographic region, cultural entity, and political entity. While there may be differences in geography, what was there to stop Japanese scholars, for example, claiming Japan as the true and legitimate bearer of the title Zhongguo?

Introduction

95

The living traditions and discourses that have shaped Confucian scholarship over so many centuries have seen it spread from Chinese antiquity out into the East Asian region and beyond. And the heritage of these East Asian Confucianisms is rich and diverse enough to propel it, in all its regional forms, into all the new contexts and circumstances that await it in the twentieth-first century.

Chapter Five: Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics: A Historical Perspective

1

Introduction

The Analects twice records Confucius’ description of the Dao (4.15, 15.3). This description is simple and straightforward, yet pregnant with inexhaustible implications, a richness which provoked later scholars and philosophers to offer countless interpretations. In the twelfth century, Zhu Xi recognized it as “the First and Primary Chapter of the Analects”1; yet Liu Baonan (劉寶楠, 1791 – 1855), a Confucian scholar in the Qing period, already lamented that “none have captured its meaning since Han times.”2 In this chapter I will examine Confucius’ profoundly enigmatic saying: “My Dao with One threading it”.3 I will probe the basis of the saying, and discuss the themes that various schools in China touched upon as they attempted to interpret this passage. In doing so, I will give special attention to Zhu Xi and his critics. Zhu Xi was a great Confucian scholar generally recognized as second only to Confucius himself. As Qian Mu (錢穆, Binsi 賓四, 1895 – 1990) noted, “Thanks to Master Zhu, Confucianism shines forth daily in all its glories; thanks to Master Zhu, Confucianism attained an almost sole honor and height.”4 Zhu Xi unified the Analects, Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean and devoted his whole life to writing his Collected Commentaries of the Four Books, thereby launching the school of Neo-Confucianism.5

1 Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi Yulei, juan 27, p. 669. Hereafter: Yulei. 2 Liu Baonan 劉寶楠, Lunyu zhengyi 論語正義 [Corrected Meanings of the Analects] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), I, p. 152. 3 Which has been variously translated as, “All that I teach can be strung together on a single thread”; “my Way has one theme running throughout”; “my doctrine is that of an all-pervading unity” (Legge) among countless other variations. 4 Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi xin xuean 朱子新學案 [New Records of Master Zhu], vol. 1 in Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集 [Complete Work of Mr. Qian Mu] (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998), vol. 11, p. 3. 5 Cf. Wing-tsit Chan,“Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” in Études Song in Memo-

98

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

Just as with the other chapters and verses of the Four Books, Zhu Xi’s interpretations of Confucius’ saying “My Dao with One threading it” are full of nuanced viewpoints, which spurred on the creation of his own school. His interpretations not only opened up new horizons unseen in previous scholars, but also profoundly influenced later scholarship on Confucius, as well as becoming an object of constant critique for the next 700 years. In the interpretive history of the Analects, Zhu Xi’s hermeneutics occupies a profound position. In this chapter I will analyze Zhu Xi’s interpretation of Confucius’ enigmatic saying and the various critiques of that interpretation that were provoked among later generations. I will begin by explaining how Zhu Xi unifies old ideas with the new to create his unique world of thought, and how he distinguishes his structural basis as the “principle-matter adherence” (理氣相即), that is, an ontological correlationism. I will then go on to discuss two major critiques of Zhu Xi’s interpretation: the existential critique raised by Wang Yangming, and the pragmatic critique raised by the Qing scholars. Finally, the chapter closes by showing how the very tensions among these positions testify to the dynamics behind the development of Confucian thought and history.

2

Zhu Xi’s exegesis: Its correlative framework and its paradigmatic position in Chinese intellectual history

This section explains Zhu Xi’s interpretation and its framework in three subsections: (1) Zhu Xi’s exegesis, (2) the structural framework of Zhu Xi’s exegesis, and (3) its paradigmatic position in Chinese intellectual history.

2.1

Zhu Xi’s exegesis

In his Collected Commentaries on the Analects, Zhu Xi proposed the following interpretation of Confucius’ celebrated saying, “My Dao with One threading it.” Taking Confucius’ “my Dao” to mean the cosmic principle as Confucius saw it, Zhu Xi typically interpreted “with One threading it” (a) to conform to his favorite doctrine, “the Principle is one while its manifestations are many” (理一分殊), and thus (b) to “reach the knowledge [of One Principle] by investigating various things” (格物致知). (a) On the first point, Zhu Xi argued: riam Étienne Balazs, Editèes par Françoise Aubin Serie Ⅱ, #Ⅰ (Paris: Mouton & Co., and École Practique de Haute Études, 1973), pp. 60 – 90.

Zhu Xi’s exegesis

99

To “thread” is to “pass through without obstruction.” [Zengzi’s 曾子 answering] “Yes” is a quick response without hesitation. The sage’s mind-heart is One Principle throughout, but used differently to respond to various things. Zengzi was already detailperceptive and stoutly practical, but did not yet know there is only One Principle in essence. Confucius knew his long efforts and was about to have gains, so he called and told him so. Zengzi was really capable of tacitly tallying with [Master’s] intention, and responded without hesitation. To utterly exert oneself is called devotion; to extend oneself [to others] is called considerateness; “nothing more” is signifying all that without residue. Master’s One Principle throughout but used differently can be compared to how utterly sincere without ceasing heaven and earth are, and each of myriad things has its place in between […] Zengzi saw that it is beyond words, thus explicated it in terms of “to exert oneself” and “to extend oneself [to others],” helping others to understand it. Being utterly sincere without ceasing is the body of the Dao, what manifests myriad things in one root. Each of the myriad things having its place is the function of the Dao, what manifests one root are myriad things. Taken thus, we can see the reality of “with One to thread [everything].”6

Such comparison reveals that the “thread,” as One Principle, can string many “copper coins,” that is, myriad things. However, Zhu Xi stressed the need for the many things existing and known to be threaded: We must have collected many loose coins before we can understand [why we have] this twine. If many coins are not collected, we have twine in vain; what is there to thread with it? We learners must go about collecting coins. If all scholars of Jiangxi [江西] had not a single coin, only twine, we do not know what they have to thread with it?7

Thus according to this view, Confucius’ saying “my Dao with One threading it” expresses what Zhu Xi had been promulgating, that: “principle is one while its manifestations are many.” (b) Given the above view of “my Dao with One threading it” as One Principle going through many diverse things, we can naturally comprehend the One Principle by “investigating things” that are variously threaded into the One. The One Principle can thus be perceived only by meticulously looking into many concrete things, one by one, each enshrining the Principle in a specific manner. Zhu Xi stressed that only through many things in the world can we understand the One Principle, the Ultimate Pole (太極) especially through things such as the Two Polarities (兩儀), Four Phenomena (四象), and Eight Diagrams (八卦).8

6 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Lunyu jizhu 論語集註 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects], in his Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 2, p. 72. 7 Yulei, juan 27, p. 684. 8 Yulei, juan 27, p. 671.

100 2.2

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

The correlative framework of Zhu Xi’s exegesis

Zhu Xi’s eyes are focused on the keyword, thread (貫), that connects the one (一) and it (之), which can be taken as the myriad manifestations of things. This principle’s various differentiations result in the myriad things of the cosmos. It is thus that we have seen that Zhu Xi’s exegesis of Confucius’ “My Dao with One threading it” is structured by Zhu Xi’s doctrines that “principle is one, manifestations are many” and the need to “investigate things” that are many varied. Therefore, Zhu Xi’s system represents an ontological, dualistic correlationism: One Principle related to the differentiation in myriad things. For Zhu Xi, this complex internal correlation describes Confucius’ “my Dao.” Such a dualistic correlation between “one” and “it,” Principle and things, has three implications. (a) Since the One Principle variously differentiates to become myriad things, we must go through an investigation into things to obtain this One Principle. (b) The investigation into things does not mean we must literally go through myriad investigations in order to obtain the Principle. (c) The reason why we are able to obtain the Principle by investigating things is because our mind-heart has the principle that illuminates the myriad things and matter. Let us look at how these three themes structure Zhu Xi’s exegesis. (a) Since the One Principle variously differentiates to become myriad things, we must go through an investigation into things to obtain this One Principle. Zhu Xi thus states clearly: People do not understand the principle of what Confucius meant by “with One threading it.” People thought that he simply could “thread it with One” and needed no abundance of learning. Now what could he thread if he had no abundance of learning? This is like what we call a “string of coins”: a “string” which needs many coins to thread; without coins what is there to thread through? Confucius was actually a man of abundant learning; he had nothing he did not understand […] What he did to the vast learning was “with One threading it.” Sages are not without much learning about many things and matters. What makes sages sagely is not in their vast learning but in “threading it with One.” What prevents men today who are broad in learning from being sagely lies in their not being able to “thread them with One.” However, only stressing “threading it with One” without vast, broad learning would leave nothing to thread with. “Threading it with One” undoubtedly means our mind-heart illuminating myriad things without residue. However, this is possible only after learning and knowing much. There cannot be threading with One without learning.9

9 Yulei, juan 45, pp. 1148 – 9.

Zhu Xi’s exegesis

101

(b) However, the investigation into things does not mean that we must go through exhaustive investigations of all myriad things before we can obtain the Principle. Zhu Xi carefully cautioned: To thoroughly investigate the Principle means neither to exhaustively investigate all principles under heaven nor to investigate only One Principle. Rather, we should investigate some principles, accumulating enough in number for us naturally to come to discern what the Principle is all about […] To investigate things is not to exhaustively do so on all myriad things, but to thoroughly investigate one thing, then infer others by analogy […] For each of the myriad things is equipped with One Principle and all myriad things came of One Origin, and so we can analogize throughout them all.10

Three prudent and reasonable points are evident here. First, everything has One Principle while all came of One Origin, One Principle. Therefore, secondly, we need not exhaustively investigate all myriad things, but only investigate enough for us to have a general idea of the Principle. Thirdly, we can then investigate one single thing from the ground up for its Principle and infer others by analogy. All these are extremely close to Plato’s concept of ideals that make matter into things, except that Zhu Xi has things equipped with the Principle within each that originates in It.11 Thus Zhu Xi remains concrete. (c) In the final analysis, the reason why we are able to obtain the Principle by investigating things is because our mind-heart has the Principle that illuminates the myriad things and matter. It remains a mystery whether our heart-principle is the Principle of the cosmos. If it is, the Principle already within us renders our investigation of things superfluous; but if our heart-principle is not the Principle, we would be unable to obtain the Principle by investigation. Zhu Xi seems to escape this dilemma by claiming that the li (Principle) and qi (material force) are correlative, mutually adhering, neither identical nor separate. It remains now for Zhu Xi to explain what One Principle variously branching out into myriad things means, yet Zhu Xi believes this One successfully explains what Confucius means by “with One threading.” It completes Zhu Xi’s overall interpretive framework, his doctrine that “The Principle is one while its manifestations are many” into myriad things.

10 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Daxue Huowen 大學或問 [Queries on the Great Learning] (Kyoto: Zhongwen chubanshe, photo-reproduction of Kinsei Kanseki Sokan edition, 1998), p. 18a. 11 Yulei, juan 94, p. 2372.

102 2.3

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

The paradigmatic position of Zhu Xi’s exegesis in Chinese intellectual history

Zhu Xi’s exegesis became paradigmatic for later interpretations. He developed upon what had been proposed before and thus criticized those who differed from his interpretation. Yet in turn, his exegesis attracted both positive and negative attention from later scholars. Rather than being radically new, Zhu Xi’s exegesis developed upon what had previously been suggested. Three examples will suffice for illustration. Several centuries before Zhu, Xing Bing of the Northern Song suggested that “Confucius told Zengzi that the Dao I [Confucius] practice is to govern principles of myriad things under Heaven with One Principle.”12 Similarly, Su Che of the Northern Song also interpreted the “One” of “with One threading it” by saying, “What is the One here? It is to know the Principle of myriad things under Heaven, and to be in charge of what they appropriately position [themselves].”13 Finally, in a detailed analysis Hu Yin (胡寅, Mingzhong 明仲, 1098 – 1156) noted: To thread with One is the ultimate of knowledge. Nowhere does not exist is the Principle; nothing does not possess is the mind-heart. Attaining discernment of everything to reflect back to the self, and the mind-heart and the Principle will not be obscured. Therefore, to know how to follow the Principle is the scholar. To have everything ready [to the self], to be self-reflective and sincere, then the mind-heart would not differ from the Principle, thereby come to enjoy following the Principle, this is the princely person. Heavenly Principle harmonizes in virtues, four seasons harmonize in order, then the mind-heart and the Principle will be one, no need to deliberately follow. Thus to thread with One, this is the sage […] Four buddings of nature are inherently endowed rather than shaped by the outside; Five rules are prescribed by the Heaven and cannot be disobeyed. All this in human being is one mind-heart, in thing is One Principle. Fulfilling the Four buddings, and innate nature will be complete; following Five rules and human relations are accomplished; fulfilling nature and accomplishing human relations are thus identical.14

All the above examples show how the Principle explains “with One threading it.” Zhu clearly followed in this time-honored tradition. Inheriting the tradition of identifying Confucius’ One with the cosmic Principle, Zhu Xi then criticized those who disagreed with this view.

12 He Yan 何晏, Lunyu zhushu 論語注疏 [Explication on Commentaries of the Analects] (Taipei: Taiwan guji chubanshe, 2001), juan 4, p. 56. 13 Su Che, Luancheng ji 欒城集 [Luancheng Collection of Essays] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 1970), juan 6, p. 31. 14 Hu Yin, Feiran ji 斐然集 [Feiran Collection of Essays] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of Siku quanshu zhenben edition, 1969 – 1970), juan 25, pp. 68 – 9.

Zhu Xi’s exegesis

103

I saw recently one or two Yongjia acquaintances who concentrated only on investigating rules and regulations but understood nothing about the fundamentals. Once faced with critical issues, none of the matters they concentrated on would be useful or relevant. Lu Bogong [呂伯恭] also used to instruct people, saying, “What the Analects contains are all empty words; we would rather discuss real matters,’ desiring then to go on to investigate history. Then someone like Lu Xiangshan just talked about empty quietude, saying, “None of many matters is there.” Yanzi [顏子] could not learn: “Choosing the Mean; gaining this one good and keeping faithfully to it.” The Good is but One; what use is there for choosing more? “Zilu [子路] has heard [something] and is yet to practice it, he fears to hear [more].” Hearing One, what else do we need to hear?15

Here Zhu Xi criticized on the one hand his Yongjia acquaintances who concentrated only on investigating rules and regulations without the bases of heart, mind, and the Principle; on the other hand, he also criticized Lu Jiuyuan who neglected the Principle’s various manifestations in things. What Zhu Xi emphasized is both the Principle captured by the mind-heart and things variously existing in the world. For scattered coins remain scattered without the thread to string them together, while one string alone without coins remains just an empty, useless string.16 Zhu Xi’s exegesis thus came to serve as the paradigm for later exegeses. In following the tradition of interpreting Confucius’ One with the notion of Principle, Zhu Xi set the paradigm for later exegeses, both for those who supported him and those who argued against him. Before looking at the two methods by which later scholars revolted against Zhu Xi – namely, the existential-monistic critique, and the socio-ethical-pragmatic critique – we must first look at how Zhu Xi’s work came to be this new paradigm. Simply put, later interpreters followed Zhu Xi and took for granted his interpretation equating “threading with One” with the “Principle as One” penetrating the myriad things. This allowed Zhen Dexiu (真德秀, Jingyuan 景元, 1178 – 1235) of the Southern Song, for instance, to simply state that “To thread with One means myriad matters are of One Principle.”17 Xue Xuan (薛瑄, Dewen 德溫, 1389 – 1464) of the Ming Dynasty said, “Each of the myriad things is equipped with One Principle, and myriad principles all arose from one origin, thus with One they are threaded. […] One can thread with One because the Principle is identical. […] Heaven gives birth to things of one origin, so they can be threaded with One. […] The sages’ hearts and minds with principles of myriad

15 Yulei, juan 45, p. 1149. 16 Yulei, juan 27, p. 684. 17 Zhen Dexiu 真德秀, Lunyu jibian 論語集編 [Collected Volume of the Analects] (Siku quanshu edition, 四庫全書本), juan 2, p. 20.

104

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

things have not the slightest separation, so with One they are threaded.”18 The similarity between these sayings and Zhu Xi’s suggests the possibility that Zhu Xi set the interpretive paradigm for them.

3

Wang Yangming’s existential-monisitc critique

Zhu Xi’s hermeneutics are a paradigm for later interpretations not only in a positive sense (having been followed), but also in a negative sense, attracting critique. A prime example is Wang Yangming’s argument against Zhu Xi. If Zhu Xi saw a balanced correlation between Principle-Qi (things) as the key to understanding Confucius’ statement “my Dao with One threading it,” Wang was especially focused on the term “my”: “my Dao” that penetrates the “One.” As far as Wang was concerned, Zhu Xi was too objective to do justice to the existential thrust that pervades Confucius’ teaching, and simply engaged in his own ontological speculation disconnected from Confucius. According to Wang, this speculation was impartial, disinterested, and finally humanly impossible. Wang Yangming stressed how humanly impracticable Zhu Xi’s project of investigating myriad things is, since Zhu Xi has no systematic “taxonomy.” Zhu Xi had no feasible “scientific methodology” of exploration for so many things in such a vast territory as “everywhere in the world.” Wang Yangming asked, “The Former Scholar understood ge wu [格物] as investigating things under heaven. How can we investigate them ‘under heaven’? He then said, ‘One [blade of] grass, one tree, they all have Principle.’ Now how do we go investigating them? Even if we manage to investigate grass and trees, how could we get what we intend?” Zhu Xi’s ontological correlation is empty, an inedible pie in the sky, a futile castle in midair. Thus Wang Yangming reinterpreted ge to mean “to rectify,” and “wu” as the mind-heart inside us reflecting outside matters and practical affairs. To explain all this, Wang Yangming took Mencius’ “fully realizing our mind-heart” (7Al) to be “fully realizing our nature” which is “the substance of our mind-heart; there is no principle without mind-heart, no things without mind-heart,” and we have to agree that from the human perspective, Wang Yangming is correct. [Human] nature is the body of the mind-heart, heaven is the origin of nature, so, to fully realize the mind-heart is to fully realize nature […] The self ’s lord is the mind-heart, what it issues is the intention, whose body is knowledge, and where the intention resides is a wu (thing). Intending to serve parents, then serving parent is a thing; intending to serve the ruler, then serving the ruler is a thing; intending to love people and things, 18 Xue Xuan 薛瑄, Dushu lu 讀書錄 [Notes on Reading Books] (Siku quanshu edition), juan 6, p. 11.

Wang Yangming’s existential-monisitc critique

105

then loving them is a thing; intending on seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then they are a thing. Therefore I say there is no principle outside the mind-heart, no things outside the mind-heart. The Doctrine of the Mean says, “No sincerity, no thing”; what The Great Learning says to “illuminate illustrious virtue” means nothing but sincerity. To achieve sincerity is to ge wu [investigate things].19

In the end, somewhat existentially, Wang Yangming insisted, “The mind-heart is none other than the principle.” He said: When knowledge is honest, in earnest, it issues in action; when action is clearly perceptive, it is knowledge. Knowing and acting are in essence inseparable. Later learners divide them into two efforts and come to lose their original union, it is my idea to unify them and push them in parallel. True knowledge is the so-called “action”; without action there is no “knowledge”. This point can be seen in Buddhist writings that say that to know eating is to eat […] Merely to seek the original mind-heart so as to lose the principles of things is to lose one’s original mind-heart. [On the one hand] the principles of things reside nowhere other than my own mind-heart; seeking the principles of things outside the mind-heart, there would be no principles of things. [On the other hand] leaving the principles of things to seek only my mind-heart, what thing would it be? The body of mind-heart is [human] nature, which is the principle. Therefore, when we have the mind-heart of loving parents, we have the principle of filial love. When we have the mind-heart of being loyal to the ruler, we have the principle of loyalty to the ruler; without such mind-heart, we have no such principle. Where else is the principle than in my mind-heart? Huian [Zhu Xi] said, “What people study for are merely mindheart and Principle. The mind-heart is mainly [about] oneself, yet really governs principles under heaven. The Principle is scattered among myriad affairs, yet it is really no other than one person’s mind-heart.” This amounts to going between unifying and separating, and is already heading to the mistake of taking as “two” the mind-heart [on the one hand] and the principle [on the other], which leads to the mistake of people seeking only their own hearts and minds and abandoning things, principles. This is precisely because they do not know the mind-heart is [none other than] the principle [itself] […] Mencius said Gaozi did not know righteousness, because the mind-heart is one only. It is “benevolence” as our totality moving, “righteousness” as being appropriate, and “principle” as being orderly. If we cannot seek benevolence or righteousness outside the mind-heart, can we seek principle outside the mind-heart? To seek Principle outside the mind-heart is the reason why knowledge and action become “two”; to seek Principle in my mind-heart is the teaching of holy scholarship on the oneness of knowledge and action.20

Wang Yangming elaborated on his insistent position against Zhu Xi’s understanding of ge wu zhi zhi (格物致知) as “investigating things to attain knowledge”: 19 Chan Wing-tsit, ed., Wang Yangming Chuanxilu xiangzhu jiping (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1983), no. 317, p. 368. Hereafter: Chuanxi lu. 20 Chuanxi lu, no. 133, pp. 166 – 7.

106

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

What Zhu Xi meant by ge wu zhi zhi is “to follow things to exhaustibly [understand] their principle,” that is, to follow things and affairs in order to seek their definitive principles. This is to use my mind-heart to seek principles among affairs and things, thus to cleave mind-heart and principles into two. What I mean by ge wu zhi zhi is to extend my innate knowledge [良知, that is, mind-heart] to affairs and things. My innate knowledge is the so-called Heavenly Principle. To extend the Heavenly Principle of my innate knowledge to affairs and things, they will obtain their principles. To extend my innate knowledge is to zhi zhi; for affairs and things to obtain their principles is to ge wu. Thus it is to unify mind-heart and principle into one, and we can thereby understand without explanation what was said tediously before and those words of later Zhu.21

Having attained such breathtaking heights in the poetically intense oneness of mind-heart with principle, and the original innate or intuitive knowledge with investigating things, Wang Yangming naturally came to interpret Confucius’ “with One threading it” as “attainment [extension] of the original innate knowledge.” He explains it this way: Confucius said, “Do you take me as someone who learns much and memorize them?” […] The Yi Jing says: “The princely person learns much […] to accumulate his virtue.” Does it not mean that learning much […] is accumulating virtue? This is precisely the achievement of the unity of “knowledge and action.” The so-called “loving the ancients to assiduously seek” is just to love the ancients’ learning and to assiduously seek the principle of this mind-heart. The mind-heart is the Principle; to learn is to learn this mind-heart; to seek is to seek this mind-heart.22

Now that the “unity of mind-heart and action” directly results from “mind-heart is Principle,” “threading with One” must mean “threading inside and outside, root and branches, with One.”23 Therefore Wang Yangming argued, against Zhu Xi’s claims: “One” is like the tree’s root; “thread” is like [going through] the tree’s branches and leaves. Not yet planting the root, how could branches and leaves be obtained? Both substance and function have one origin; not yet establishing the substance, whence comes the function? [Zhu Xi] said, “Zengzi has already minutely perceived matters and thoroughly practiced accordingly, but does not yet know their oneness in substance.” I am afraid this statement is not quite fully valid.24

Let us put this all into modern language. Wang Yangming’s existentialist hermeneutics was made possible by realizing that to exist is to be perceived; the sound of a falling tree in a lonely forest makes no sound without an ear to hear it. This fact means that things and objects come into being, and affairs happen, 21 22 23 24

Chuanxi lu, no. 135, pp. 171 – 2. Chuanxi lu, no. 140, p. 187. Chuanxi lu, no. 132, p. 165. Chuanxi lu, no. 112, p. 134; Huang Zongxi, Mingru xuean 明儒學案 [Records of the Ming Confucianists] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), I, juan 24, p. 561.

The Qing scholars’ socio-ethical-pragmatic critiques

107

thanks to our participatory cognition or activities. In other words, the world comes to be by our perception and action, and the purer and more original our existence, the clearer the world of Principle reveals itself. It is in this manner that the “correlation” of principle with things was transformed in Wang Yangming’s thought away from Zhu Xi’s objective ontological correspondence into its initiation, maintenance, and completion at our existential level, a grand unity of subject and object, where our subjectivity is indeed the objective universal truth. It is “at home” that we must begin shaping ourselves, and our own innate knowledge then reverberates to rectify things and affairs around us, both morally and cognitively. Expanding Wang’s “scientific” existential rectification to socio-ethical and socio-cultural pragmatism was the hermeneutical task that fell to scholars in the days of the Qing Dynasty. Let us look at how they approached this task.

4

The Qing scholars’ socio-ethical-pragmatic critiques

Scholars in the Qing period were intensely occupied with Zhu Xi’s work. They performed exegeses of the works predating Zhu Xi, even applying textual criticism on the Classics, and concluded – against Zhu Xi – that Confucius was intensely socio-ethical. Thus they criticized Zhu Xi for engaging in his own peculiar ontological speculation. For an impression of their work, we can look here at three typical examples from the period: Gu Yanwu, Ruan Yuan (阮元, Buoyuan 伯元, 1764 – 1849), and Jiao Xun (焦循, Litang 理堂, 1763 – 1820). To explain the implications of Confucius’ “with One threading it,” Gu Yanwu used his own argumentation: “the Principle of all things under heaven differs in roads and returns to the same [home]; the great learning cites the roots to cover the branches.”25 Thus he criticized “Those scholars [who study] chapters and verses [yet] are not perceptive enough to see through what they are all about, while those wise and brilliant ‘superior men’ often talk about virtue and human nature and neglect studies. They all lose [sight of] the sages’ [essential] intention.”26 Gu Yanwu proposed instead the twin pragmatic virtues of being selfdevoted and like-minded, as the base of Confucius’ “thread with One.” Gu Yanwu argued: The Way of the Master is not far from daily practices. Viewed in terms of completing oneself, this is called devotion [忠]; viewed in terms of reaching things, this is called considerateness [恕]. These are none other than the totality of the Great Dao, which threads through all myriad changes of incidental affairs into precisely One. Zengzi 25 Gu Yanwu, Rizhi lu (Taipei: Minglun chubanshe, 1970), juan 9, p. 202. 26 Ibid.

108

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

answered disciples’ questions just to incite their mind-heart; how could there be “two” [points] at all? […] Totally to complete oneself is called self-devotion, pushing oneself to reach people is called considerateness. Once both virtues are fulfilled, selfishness is overcome, where there resides the Principle that threads through all. Thus self-devotion and considerateness are what manage to thread through with One.27

Thus for Gu Yanwu, Confucius’ “with One threading it” is no distant, abstruse statement at all. Rather it is a concrete proposal to practice self-devotion and considerateness, to conquer selfish desires, and thereby to allow the Principle to thread through all into One. One hundred and fifty years after Gu Yanwu, Ruan Yuan applied textualcritical analysis to understand the word “thread” to mean concrete action in socio-ethical praxis: The word thread [貫] appears in the Analects three times: Zengzi used it, Zigong [子貢] had it, and Minzi’s [閔子] words contained it. These three appearances of thread should all have the same meaning. [I] comment: thread means to perform an affair, and all three appearances of thread should mean performing affairs. Confucius called Zengzi and told him, “My Dao with One threading it.” This says that Confucius’ Dao appears in the performance of affairs, not merely teaching in words and [their] learning. One [一] is the same as [concentrated, total] one [壹], and so “My Dao with One threading it” means his Dao is all taught with the performance of affairs. His disciples did not know what the Dao is that they perform, so Zengzi said, “Master’s Dao is just devotion and considerateness” [… that are] daily virtues, daily wordings, the Dao of words mutually involved with action.28

Ruan Yuan’s new interpretation criticized Song scholars who were “ever seeking truth in the learning of the mind-heart, and not verifying it in the performance of affairs.”29 He then reinterpreted ge wu zhi zhi in the Great Learning as follows: Wu is affair, ge is to reach. By affair we mean affairs of family, state, and all under heaven; [we must perform them until we] reach the ultimate good of Five Relationships [before we] stop. Ge has the meaning of reaching, thus it has the meaning of stopping. To tread on till reaching and stopping at that realm, this is the Dao of actual praxis of the sages […] Ge wu means to reach and finally stop at things. Nothing of family, state, and under heaven should we not personally reach its situation and perform rightly according to the Five Relationships until stopping at the ultimate good. Ge wu, zhi zhi shan [stopping at the ultimate good], zhi zhi, zhi yu ren, jing and the like all share one meaning; they have no two [different] meanings. If we must change the phrase, we must have ge embrace reaching zhi [至] and stop [zhi, 止], and have wu embrace various

27 Ibid., juan 9, p. 193. 28 Ruan Yuan 阮元, Yanjingshi ji 揅經室集 [Collection of the Classics-Studying Studio] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 1970), juan 2, p. 316. 29 Ibid., juan 2, p. 32a.

The Qing scholars’ socio-ethical-pragmatic critiques

109

affairs. The Dao of the sages are none other than praxis. Confucius said, “My Dao with One thread,” where thread is to perform affairs, thus identical with ge wu.30

Here Ruan Yuan is arguing simply that the enigmatic saying “Dao with One threading it” can be felt and understood only in the practical performances of devotion and considerateness. Abstract-sounding thinking resides in socioethical praxis. Ruan Yuan’s contemporary, Jiao Xun, adopted a similar interpretation: Confucius said, “My Dao with One threading it”; Zengzi said, “It is merely devotion and considerateness.” Thus “threading with One” is “devotion and considerateness.” What are they? They are to accomplish oneself to reach things […] Mencius said, “The great Shun was even greater. He was ever ready to fall into line with others, giving up his own ways for theirs, and glad to take from others that by which he could do good.”31 Shun followed whatever is “good” under heaven; this is truly “with One threading it,” with one mind-heart to accommodate the myriad of good, and this is what made him “great”. Confucius [12.1] told Yan Yuan to “overcome the self to return to propriety to become humane.” Only by self-conquest can the self be selfless […] The sage fulfills his nature to fulfill natures of people and things, and people under heaven come to be contained within its transforming nurture […] Thus self-conquest leads to selflessness, and then comes to accommodate [all] under heaven […] To thread is to communicate, to, as was said, communicate with virtues of illustrious divinities, to be in line with situations of myriad things. If we desire to have affairs issued from ourselves, we will breed jealousy, which leads us to differ from people persistently, not being in line with them. This is to cling [obstinately] to one [side], not to thread with One. Obstinately clinging to one [side] limits one’s ways; threading it [all] with One communicates with [everyone’s] mind under heaven. Confucius [15.3] again asked Zigong, saying, “Do you regard me as someone who learns much and commits it all to memory?” [He] said, “Yes. Are you not?” “No. I use one string to thread it all together.”32 [In] much learning […] the “much” still belongs to the self, not communicated with people, and un-communicated knowledge is not great knowledge. It must be knowledge that selflessly follows people, as Shun can it be called great. To be selfless, to follow people, to collect myriad people’s knowledge, to accomplish knowledge of my own, this is why “with One threading it” is more important than “learning much and memorizing it.” To “learn much and memorize it” is to accomplish oneself; to “thread it with One” is to accomplish oneself to reach things, and this is devotion and considerateness.33

30 Ibid., juan 2, p. 32a–b. 31 Translation taken from D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984), 2 A8. 32 This is Chichung Huang’s translation in The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 152. 33 Jiao Xun 焦循, Diaogu ji 雕菰集 [Anthology of the Studio of Carving Wild Rice] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, photo-reproduction of Congshu jicheng cubian edition, 1985), juan 9, pp. 132 – 4.

110

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

Jiao Xun understands “my Dao with One threading it” in terms of “devotion and considerateness.” He speaks of the virtues of conquering oneself to become selfless; in this way one can tear down the walls among people and attain the heights of “with One threading it all.” To learn a great deal is only to belong to the self, at most accomplishing oneself, but this is not as good as “with One threading it all” that accomplishes both the self and the things that comprise both private and public realms. Thus we can infer that much learning cannot attain the heights of “with One threading it,” for it can only be attained by way of pragmatic performances of the virtues of devotion and considerateness. These three examples of scholars in the Qing period clearly show how much they valued returning to the original meanings of the texts, taking “thread” to mean “practicing affairs” by practicing devotion and considerateness. In short, for them truth resides in praxis.

5

Conclusion

So far we have reviewed how Confucius’ brief saying on the simplest of numbers – “one” – generated an unexpected burgeoning of thought in the centuries that followed. We surveyed such an incredible blossoming in three typical categories: correlative (Zhu Xi), existential (Wang Yangming), and pragmatic (Qing scholars). In a distanced way, Zhu Xi perceived li and qi as being together, that is, principle-matter adherence (理氣相即), their principle-things correlation existing throughout the universe. Wang Yangming lived through life to experience the unity of subject-object, human-cosmos. As for the Qing scholars, they sought to fulfill moral and social obligations in devotion and considerateness within which they could attain and realize cosmic unity (理在氣中). Thus we can say that Zhu Xi’s philosophy was an objective survey to see how truth, inclusive of individuals, is cosmos-structured. Wang Yangming’s was existential, focusing on life-experience and total human-cosmic involvement. The Qing scholars took a socio-ethical line in the practicalities of daily praxis. Zhu Xi tended to ontological idea-matter dialectics, yet he wrapped it with the human mind-heart and the human investigation of things. Wang Yangming was inclined to the dictum, “Subjectivity is Truth,” although Wang opened himself to human affairs and the knowing of things in the world. The Qing scholars expressed a belief similar to American pragmatists: “What works is truth.” Yet they also wanted us to work rightly and ethically within interpersonal and sociopolitical contexts. Those three parties in the history of Chinese hermeneutics are all deeply embedded and grounded in the concrete life-world. It is in this worldly mundane manner that Confucius’ “My Dao with One threading it” opens out in three typical Chinese directions in intellectual history.

Conclusion

111

Immediately upon finishing our survey of such a bewildering panorama of interpretive history, we are surprised to find ourselves hanging treacherously in midair. Here lies our strange dilemma. On the one hand, we are impressed with Confucius’ wisdom in claiming that he in all his vast and various learning on the cosmic Dao is he who threads it all with One (15.3) and urges his disciple Zengzi to do the same (4.15). Confucius is the one striving after One simple pivotal thread of the cosmic Dao, for without such a pivot of the One, we would soon be lost in bafflingly detailed and scattered pieces of unending scholarship. Yet on the other hand, in the hermeneutical history of Asia, we see precisely such an unending proliferation of interpretations over this simple injunction of Confucius, and of these interpretations we surveyed merely three types. Why and how could such a simple injunction to attend to the simple “One” have turned into three or more understandings of it? What, moreover, does such a development mean? To begin with, why and how did Confucius’ “One thread” later turn into three or more thoughts? We are impressed with how pivotal his short saying is: without “my Dao,” no learning makes sense; without the “One” to “thread” our various learning, nothing makes sense. At the same time, however, Confucius left unsaid what it actually means. The generations of scholarship following Confucius are fascinating. We saw how Confucius’ “my Dao” was interpreted as his “Dao as I see it,” coming to be enfleshed in each later thinkers’ “Dao as I see it.” Similarly, Confucius’ bare simple “one” also spread out, “threading” an impressive and instructive tapestry of the history of Chinese thoughts on “my Dao.” Of course this is not to imply that those thinkers in Chinese history were so naïve as to read their own thinking into Confucius’ words. Quite to the contrary, they all genuinely researched Confucius’ texts in his situational context, and sincerely probed into what Confucius must have meant. Confucius’ “my Dao” was for them strictly Confucius’ “my doctrine” (as Legge translates 吾道) on the vast cosmic Dao, not theirs; they did not succumb to eisegesis, to reading into the text. Nonetheless, these exegeses remain theirs. As Zhu Xi insisted, “What my heart-mind captured must check with the sages’ writings,”34 yet also conversely, “In reading the Six Classics we must seek Dao solely in ourselves, and their principles will be easily understood.”35 Here the researchers’ “objective” studies must be checked against, and demonstrated by, the researchers’ own life-experience, and it was thus that their life-hermeneutics came to reflect their own 34 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Huian xiansheng Zhu Wengong Wenji 晦庵先生朱文公文集 [Collected Writings of Mr. Huian] (Taipei: Guang wen shuju, 1972), juan 42, p. 2836. 35 Yulei, juan 1, 188.

112

Zhu Xi’s Comments on Analects 4.15 and 15.3, and His Critics

views, thoughts, and perspectives of the Dao of the cosmos, though their texthermeneutics had ostensibly been that of an assiduous probing of Confucius’ “my Dao,” not theirs. But what does such a prolific shift of Confucius’ original “One” into the latter many of the hermeneutical history mean? How significant is it? Since Confucius’ saying was so laconic and lacking in concrete content, the proliferation of interpretations may well have been exactly what Confucius had in mind, in line with his intended goals of education, that is, a diversified growth in perceptive learning: “[I] lift one corner for [you to] return [to me] with three [舉 一隅以三隅反]” (7.8). Such reflections contribute to our initial observation, that Confucius’ simple “one” spreads out, perhaps inevitably, “threading” an impressive and instructive tapestry in the history of Chinese thought on “my Dao.” To put it in Zhu Xi’s words, our comprehensive thoughts on Chinese intellectual history can be portrayed this way: “Asking whence comes the stream so clear, it is that the source brings forth the living water”36, delightfully leading to a blossoming of thoughts. In the final analysis, hermeneutics is an exegesis, interpretation, and understanding of life itself in all its historical depths – ontological (Zhu Xi), existential (Wang Yangming), and socio-cultural (Qing scholars). China presented such a life-hermeneutical performance in the exegeses of the Confucian text that provoked it, blossoming into a magnificent “fusion of horizons” without confusion, which is the Chinese history of hermeneutics. Here is indeed a veritable lifehermeneutics. Zhu Xi’s “the principle is one while its manifestations are many” does, after all, paradigmatically describe the Dao’s incredible “biodiversity” in vigorous Chinese life-thinking. In sum, such life-thinking in China has indeed been proliferating from one to the many, displaying its unstoppable and vibrant dynamism in all its luxuriant vitality. Here we have witnessed a Confucian “hermeneutical turn” from one to three, exemplifying and indicating what it means to engage in a Chinese intellectual history that is life-concrete, genuinely enfleshed, and in constant profusion.

36 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Guan shu you gan 觀書有感 [Thoughts from Reading],” in Zhuzi wenji (Taipei: Defu wenjiao jijinhui, 2000), juan 2, p. 73.

Chapter Six: The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity in Tokugawa Japan

1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw the important influence that Zhu Xi’s work had on later Confucian scholarship, particularly with regard to understandings of Confucius’ enigmatic saying: “My Dao with One threading it”. In this chapter we will continue examining Zhu Xi’s influence, particularly with respect to understandings of ren among Confucian scholars in Tokugawa Japan. Ren is the most important core value of Confucianism.1 In 1173 Zhu Xi, the great Southern Song Neo-Confucian philosopher, wrote a short masterpiece entitled Treatise on Humanity (Renshuo, 仁說).2 In that text, Zhu Xi adopted and 1 In texts pre-dating Confucius – such as the Yin-Shang oracle bones, Western Zhou bronzes, and the Western Zhou texts (Book of Documents, Book of Odes, Book of Change, etc.) – the character for humaneness (ren 仁) does not appear. In the Spring and Autumn Period texts Guoyu and Zuozhuan the character does appear, but its meaning is narrower: “kindness.” In Confucius’ innovative usage, ren became the highest standard for being a person. Confucius did not easily praise a person as expressing ren. He reserved his highest praise for his student Yan Hui: “For three months, his mind did not stray far from being of ren.” Ren appears 105 times in 58 chapters of Confucius’ Analects; cf. Ruan Yuan, Yanjingshi ji (Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition), juan 8, 1 A. Later, people in the late Warring States period were deeply impressed that “Confucius honored humanity” (Lushi ChunQiu 呂氏春秋. “Bu er” 不 二). Regarding the meaning and transformation of the character ren in ancient Confucian Classics, see Qu Wanli 屈萬里, “Ren zi hanyi zhi shi de kaocha 仁字涵義之史的觀察 [A Historical Study of the Meanings of Humanity],” in his Shuyong lunxue ji 書傭論學集 [Essays of A Book Servant], in Qu Wanli quanji 屈萬里全集 [Complete Works of Qu Wanli] 14 (Taipei: Lianjing, 1984), pp. 254 – 66. 2 According to Wing-tsit Chan, Zhu Xi compiled the Treatise on Humanity in 1171; see Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi’s ‘Jen-shuo’ (Treatise on Humanity),” in his Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 155 – 7. However, Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 and Shu Jingnan 束景南 date the text to 1173; see Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, Zhu Xi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 [The Development and Completion of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought], (Taipei: Student Book Company, 1982), 139 – 46; Shu Jing-nan 束景南, Zhu Xi nianpu changpien 朱熹年譜長編 [Preliminary Draft of Zhu Xi’s Chronology] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue, 2001), vol. 1, p. 506. Li Ming-hui contends that 1173 is more likely than 1171; Li Ming-hui 李明輝, Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao

114

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

worked with two core ideas that were raised by Cheng Yi and his brother Cheng Hao (程顥, Mingdao 明道, 1032 – 1085). Cheng Hao had argued that, “The humane person forms one body with all things without any differentiation” (仁者渾 然與物同體)3 ; Cheng Yi suggested that, “The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things” (天地以生物為心)4 thus differing from Zhang Shi’s account of “humaneness.”5 Zhu Xi’s Treatise would have a powerful impact on the Confucian thinkers of Joseon Korea (1392 – 1911) as well as Tokugawa Japan (1603 – 1868). Its reception and reinterpretation in Japan and Korea deal with a fundamental theme in East Asian intellectual history that is well worth further study. In this chapter we will examine the Tokugawa Confucian reception and reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s account of ren. Among the contemplations and writings upon this idea of humaneness, two intellectual tracks emerged. The first deconstructed the metaphysical foundation of Zhu Xi’s account of humaneness, while the second interpreted humaneness in light of the socio-political context. These intellectual tracks both reflected the Tokugawa Confucian predilection for “concrete learning,” and thus revealed the extent of their differences and difficulties with what they understood to be “Song learning.” This chapter identifies and examines the principal strengths and weaknesses in the Tokugawa Confucian discussions on Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity.

2

Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity and its relation to the thought of the Cheng Brothers

Before considering the criticisms raised by Tokugawa Confucians with regard to Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity, we must first examine the text’s philosophical structure, and its roots in the thought of the Cheng brothers. The Treatise on Humanity has three main sections. For our purposes, the most important parts are the first two short sections:

zhexue tantao 四端與七情──關於道德情感的比較哲學探討 [Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings: A Comparative Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Feelings] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005), 80. I too find 1173 to be the more plausible date. 3 Cheng Hao 程顥, “Shiren, 識仁,” in Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 [Surviving Works of the Henan Chengs], juan 2, collected in Er Cheng ji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), juan 1, pp. 16 – 17. 4 Cheng Yi 程頤, Henan Chengshi cuiyan 河南程氏粹言 [Pure Words of the Henan Chengs], in Er Cheng ji, juan 2, ch. 1, p. 1179. 5 Li Ming-hui, “Zhu Xi de ‘Renshuo’ jiqi yu Xianghu xuepai de bianlun 朱子的〈仁說〉及其與 湘湖學派的辯論 [Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity and His Debates with Huxiang School],” in his Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao, pp. 79 – 122.

Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

115

“The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things.” In the production of man and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind. Therefore, with reference to the character of the mind, although it embraces and penetrates all and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless, one word will cover all of it, namely, ren [仁, humanity]. Let me try to explain this fully. The moral qualities of the mind of Heaven and Earth are four: origination, flourish, advantage, and firmness. And, the principle of origination unites and controls them all. In their operation, they constitute the course of the four seasons, and the vital force of spring permeates them all. Therefore, in the mind of man there are also four mortal qualities – namely, humanity, appropriateness, propriety, and wisdom – and humanity embraces them all. In their emanation and function, they constitute the emotions of love, respect, aptness, and discrimination between right and wrong – and the emotion of commiseration pervades them all. Therefore, in discussing the mind of Heaven and Earth, it is said, “Great is ch’ien [Heaven], the originator!” and “Great is k’un [Earth], the originator.” Both substance and function of the four moral qualities are thus fully implied without enumerating them. In discussing the excellence of man’s mind, it is said, “Humanity is man’s mind.” Both substance and function of the four moral qualities are thus fully presented without mentioning them; for humanity as constituting the Way [Dao] consists of the fact that the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things is present in everything. Before the emotions are aroused, this substance is already existent in its completeness. After the emotions are aroused, its function is infinite. If we can truly practice love and preserve it, then we have within it the spring of all virtues and the root of all good deeds. This is why the teachings of the Confucian school always urge the student to exert anxious and unceasing effort in the pursuit of humanity.6

After quoting the proposition, “The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things,” Zhu Xi notes that, “In the production of man and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind.” He then explains the content of humanity in terms of four different orders of qualities. As Li Ming-hui has pointed out, “Zhu Xi held up four different kinds of orders of qualities: the ontological order (origination, flourish, advantage, and firmness), the cosmological order (spring, summer, autumn, winter), the onto-ethical order (humanity, appropriateness, propriety, wisdom), and the ethico-psychological order (love, respect, aptness, and discrimination between right and wrong).”7 Although these four orders can be distinguished, Zhu Xi viewed them as existing together organically on the basis of his theory of li (principle, pattern) and qi (élan, cosmic vapor). In his Treatise on Humanity, Zhu Xi proclaims that humanity refers to “the principle of love.”8 Furthermore, several times in his Four Books in Chapter 6 Chen Junmin 陳俊民, comp., Zhuzi wenji (Taipei: Defu wenjiao jijinhui, 2000), vol. 7, juan 67, p. 3390. For English translation, see Wing-tsit Chan, Sources of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 593 – 4. 7 Li Ming-hui, “Zhu Xi de ‘Renshuo’ jiqi yu Xianghu xuepai de bianlun,” p. 88. 8 Zhu Xi, “Treatise on Humanity 仁說,” in Chen Junmin, comp., Zhuzi wenji, p. 3390.

116

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

and Verse with Collected Commentaries (Sishu zhangju jizhu) he also suggests that humanity is “the virtue of mind and the principle of love.”9 In explaining humanity as the principle of love, Zhu Xi uses his theory of li and qi as a cosmological and ontological basis. Throughout his life, Zhu Xi would repeatedly bring this fundamental idea from his Treatise into play. For example, in his commentary on Mencius 2 A6 – that “All people have the heart that cannot bear [certain things]” – Zhu Xi writes, “‘The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things.’ And, at birth every creature obtains this mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things as its own mind. Therefore, all people have this heart that cannot bear [certain things].”10 In 1172, at the age of 43, Zhu Xi wrote his Kezhaiji (Record of Hall of Self-Mastery), devoting it to his friend Shi Zichong (石子重). While discussing humanity in the Record, Zhu Xi points out that, “humanity, appropriateness, propriety, and wisdom” all belong to what is “before the emotions are aroused,” while the emotions of “commiseration, shame and aversion, deference, and right and wrong” belong to what is after “the emotions are aroused.” These positions were both grounded in a cosmological thesis that, “The mind of heaven and earth is to produce things.”11 Zhu Xi’s greatest contribution in these discussions on humanity came from the way in which he enhanced the depth of our understanding of human life, infusing the Song Confucian “quest for affirmation of the great self”12 (to borrow a phrase from the great, twentieth-century scholar Qian Mu) with a cosmological and ontological significance, steeping human life in transcendental spirit. The pre-Qin Confucians also discussed humanity in terms of embodied conduct. For example, Confucius said that a young man “should love the multitude at large and practice humanity with his intimates” (Analects 2.6). And in response to Fan Chi’s (樊遲) question about humanity, Confucius said that it means to “love others” (Analects 12.22). Mencius also suggested that a person expressing such humanity “loves others” (Mencius 7.46). Moreover, based on newly excavated pre-Qin texts, Liao Ming-chun (廖名春) has argued that the character for humanity derived from the characters for heart and man, thus originally signifying: “loving others.”13 Han Yu 韓愈 (Tuizhi 退之, 768 – 824) wrote that, “Loving broadly is called humanity,”14 and based this on a time-honored interpretation. 9 E.g., Mengzi jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 1, 1 A1, comment, p. 201. 10 Mengzi jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 3, 2 A6, p. 237. 11 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Ke Zhai ji 克齋記 [A Note on the Study of Subduing Oneself],” in Zhuzi wenji, juan 77, pp. 3861 – 9. This essay was written in 1172, one year before the Treatise on Humanity. 12 Qian Mu 錢穆, Guoxue Gailun 國學概論 [An Introduction to National Learning], in Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998), vol. 1, p. 278. 13 Liao Ming-chun 廖名春, “‘Ren’ zi tanyuan「仁」字探源 [An Inquiry into the Origin of ‘Ren’],” Zhongguo xueshu 中國學術 [Chinese Scholarship] 8 (April 2001): pp. 123 – 39. 14 Han Yu 韓愈, “Yuan Dao 原道 [An Inquiry on the Way],” in Zhu Wengong bian Changli

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (1)

117

However, in contrast, Zhu Xi interpreted humanity as the principle of love. Yet this served to remove humanity from its original social context as an ethical value related to interactions between the self and the other, and made it instead the interface between the self and the transcendental principle of cosmic ontology. Still, from the perspective of the intellectual content of Zhu Xi’s Treatise, we see that Zhu Xi adopted two vital theses from the Cheng brothers. First, Zhu Xi’s interpretation of humanity as “the principle of love” was inspired by Cheng Yi’s assertion that, “Humanity is of the nature; love is of the emotions.”15 Second, Zhu Xi’s Treatise affirms the thesis that “in the production of people and things, each one obtains the heart of Heaven and Earth as its own,” which corresponds to the thought of Cheng Hao who argued that, “The person of humanity confusedly forms one body with others, by practicing appropriateness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity.”16 Thus we can see the way that the Cheng brothers’ views formed the foundation for Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity. Yet of the two brothers, Cheng Yi had the greater impact on Zhu Xi, as we can see in the greater number of citations he takes from Cheng Yi, not only in the Treatise but also in Zhu’s Reflections on Things at Hand as well as his Collected Commentaries on Mencius.17

3

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (1): Deconstructing Zhu Xi’s metaphysics

3.1

Rejecting Zhu Xi’s ethical duality

As mentioned above, the Tokugawa Confucians took two tracks when responding to Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity. The first was to deconstruct the idea of li (principle, pattern) which was the metaphysical ground of Zhu’s account of humanity. This approach tended to reject Zhu Xi’s interpretation of humanity as xiansheng ji 朱文公編昌黎先生集 [Works of Han Yu edited by Zhu Xi] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben), juan 11, p. 95. 15 Cheng Yi 程頤, Yichuan xiansheng yusi 伊川先生語四 [Conversation of Cheng Yi, no. 4], in Henan Chengshi yishu, juan 18, in Er Cheng ji, upper volume, p. 182. Li Ming-hui has discussed this in detail, so I will not go further into this here. Cf. Li Ming-hui, “Zhu Xi de ‘renshuo’ jiqi yu xianghu xuepai de pianlun,” p. 97. 16 Cheng Hao 程顥, “Shiren ,” juan 2, in Er Cheng ji, vol. 1, p. 16 – 17. 17 Wing-tsit Chan calculated that in Reflections on Things at Hand, Cheng Yi was quoted 338 times, Cheng Hao 162 times, Zhang Zai 110 times and Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (Maoshu 茂叔, 1017 – 1073) 12 times. See Wing-tsit Chan, “On the Chin-ssu Lu and its Commentaries,” in Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Reflections on Things at Hand (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 331. Zhu Xi quoted Cheng Yi 48 times in Mengzi jizhu, the largest number among Northern Song predecessors. See Chun-chieh Huang, “The Synthesis of Old Pursuits and New Knowledge: Chu Hsi’s Interpretation of Mencian Morality,” New Asia Academic Bulletin (Hong Kong) 3 (1982): p. 216, Table 2.

118

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

“the virtue of mind and the principle of love” because scholars were opposed to the attempt to establish ethics upon a metaphysical foundation. They could not accept that an abstract, general “principle” could serve such a supreme role, governing the embodied, daily, ethical life of the people. They argued instead that humanity ought to be grasped and realized solely in the context of embodied and diverse ethical conduct. Thus many Tokugawa Confucians converted the Song Confucian idea that “principle is above affairs” into “principle within affairs”. This intellectual trend began in the sixteenth century among Zhu Xi’s Tokugawa followers. The Zhu Xi scholar Fujiwara Seika accepted Zhu Xi’s substance/function distinction, and yet emphasized function, interpreting it as “embodied ethical conduct.” Consequently, Fujiwara’s own student Hayashi Razan (1583 – 1657) argued that, “It could be said that the virtue of the original mind is the substance while filial piety and fraternity are the function. Being of ren is the substance of filial piety and fraternity while treating the people with ren and others with love is the function.”18 In Razan’s thought, the concrete substance of humanity is filial piety and fraternity while its function lies in the manifest behavior of loving others and treating the people with humanity. For him, the substance and function of humanity both ultimately refer just to the ethical conduct of daily life. The early Tokugawa scholars of Zhu Xi’s work did not explicitly criticize Zhu Xi, and yet even when they thought they were following Zhu Xi in their interpretations of humanity they did so by discussing it in the context of embodied ethical conduct. For example, Kaibara Ekken (貝原益軒, 1630 – 1714) suggested that, “The way of ren lies in generosity in ethical human relationships.”19 Humanity was discussed in the context of human relationships, and these scholars did not attempt to adopt Zhu Xi’s account of humanity as a principle of love. The Japanese Zhu Xi scholars mostly regarded li (principle, pattern) as an icy cold, emotionless thing in itself. They could only conceive of the principle of love in the context of concrete human life. For instance, Miyake Sho¯sai advocated using humanity to confirm experientially the “principle of love,” thus regarding it as a “living thing.”20 He prioritized concrete human life in order to deconstruct the metaphysical basis of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity. In rejecting Zhu Xi’s metaphysical approach, Tokugawa Confucians deconstructed and dismissed the supposition of ethical duality implicit in the Treatise. 18 Kyoto Materials Association, ed., Hayashi Razan bunshu¯ (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1979), vol. 67, p. 832. 19 Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒, Shinshiroku 慎思錄 [Records of Deliberate Thinking], vol. 1, in Ekken zenshu¯ 益軒全集 [Complete Works of Kaibara Ekken] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko¯kai, 1973), vol. 2, p. 4. 20 Miyake Sho¯sai, Mokushikiroku 默識錄 [Records of Silent Kowning], vol. 1, in Nihon rinri ihen, p. 482.

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (1)

119

As I suggested above, in interpreting humanity as “the virtue of mind and the principle of love,” Zhu Xi was appealing to principle and qi as a metaphysical basis. We can see this in his interpretation of Confucius’ statement, “Master the self and practice propriety to be of humanity” (Analects 12.1). Zhu responds that, “‘Master the self, etc.’ means that if one can get rid of [one’s excessive] selfish desires and restore natural principle, the substance of this mind would be open on all sides and its function would be comprehensive.”21 His comment is based on an ethical duality between “the fairness of natural principle” and “the selfishness of [excessive] human desires.” Again, this becomes apparent in Zhu’s comment on Analects 12.1: Humanity is the comprehensive substance of the original mind. Mastering means overcoming. Self refers to one’s [excessive] selfish desires […] Consequently, one who intends to be of humanity must overcome one’s [excessive] selfish desires and practice ritual propriety. Such endeavors would all be in accord with natural principle, hence the virtue of the original mind would again be complete in oneself.22

In discussions with his students, Zhu Xi also noted that, “mastering the self is getting rid of [excessive] selfishness and thus restoring Heavenly principle. This is humanity.”23 This ethical duality in Zhu Xi’s account of humanity became the focus of criticism for the Tokugawa Confucians. In the minds of the Japanese Confucians, “Heavenly principle” is to be found amid “human desires.”24 In his eighteenthcentury version of the Treatise on Humanity, Toshima Ho¯shu¯ argued that while human desires are given by nature/heaven,25 whether people do good or bad depends entirely on their own mind (volition). He also maintained that humanity is presented in embodied conduct. Thus we can see that Toshima Ho¯shu¯ did not adopt Zhu Xi’s ethical duality, and doubted that humanity could be exhibited or human desires controlled through the careful and disciplined use of Heavenly principle. Instead, he argued, humanity is exhibited directly in embodied conduct. Toshima’s account of humanity reflected the common understanding of eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians. For example, Bito¯ Nishu¯ (尾藤二洲, 1747 – 1813) stressed that, “By observing the li [principles, pattern] of Heaven and Earth, one can obtain and understand their Way; by observing the li of

21 22 23 24

Zhu Xi, “Ren shuo,” p. 3390. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, collected in Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 6, p. 131. Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi Yulei (3), in Zhuzi quanshu, juan 15, ch. 41, p. 1458. The Tokugawa Confucians did not notice that Zhu Xi used siyu (私欲) to refer to excessive selfish desires, understanding it instead to mean ordinary desires, which Zhu Xi had taken to be a natural expression of the emotions. 25 Toshima Ho¯shu¯, “Jinsetsu 仁說 [Treatise on Humanity],” in Nihon jurin so¯sho, vol. 6, p. 5.

120

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

oneself, one can obtain and understand one’s humanity.”26 The Meiji Sinologist and former diplomat Takezoe Ko¯ko¯ (竹添光鴻, 1841 – 1917) suggested that it is only in the context of the five cardinal ethical relationships that one can grasp and manifest humanity: Humanity is about people, it is the upright way of dealing with others. The way of the sage is nothing other than [upright] dealings with others. It lies in the affection between father and son, the differentiation between husband and wife, the order of elder and youth, and fidelity between friends. All of these virtues are produced in [upright] mutual dealings [in these relationships]. The way of the one hundred [various human relations in society] is nothing other than [upright] dealings with others; if there were no mutual affection in people’s dealings with others, the five cardinal ethical relationships would collapse and the upright way of people would be extinguished. Therefore, regard humanity directly as love [affection for others].27

Thus because the Japanese Confucians rejected the ethical duality implicit in Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity, they tended to move instead toward an interpretation of humanity as “love” (affection for others).

3.2

Ito¯ Jinsai’s evolving account of humanity

Ito¯ Jinsai stands as probably the most representative example of the Tokugawa critics of Zhu Xi’s metaphysical approach to humanity. Let us take a closer look at his position. Interestingly, in his early period Ito¯ Jinsai completely adopted and followed Zhu Xi’s understanding (even though by the age of 36, his views would begin to change: Zhu Xi’s li would no longer stand at the center of Jinsai’s world of thought, being replaced instead by qi [élan, cosmic vapor]). At 32, when Ito¯ Jinsai compiled his essay Treatise on Humanity, he followed Zhu Xi’s line of thinking from the Treatise. Ito¯ Jinsai defined humanity as: the beautiful virtue of [human] nature and emotions, and the original mind of people [… because] the great virtue of Heaven and Earth is to produce things, the great virtue of people is humanity, and so-called humanity is obtained through Heaven and Earth’s virtue of production and reproduction, and embodied in the mind.28

26 Bito¯ Nishu¯ 尾藤二洲, Sosanroku 素餐錄 [Idle Records], in Nihon jurin so¯sho, vol. 6, p. 5. 27 Takezoe Ko¯ko¯ 竹添光鴻, Rongo Kaisen 論語會箋 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Taipei: Guangwenshuju, n.d.), p. 5. 28 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, “Jinsetsu 仁說,” in Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯ 古学先生詩文集 [Collection of Poems and Essays from Masters of the Ancient School], in Sagara To¯ru 相良亨 et al., eds., Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei 近世儒家文集集成 [Complete Works of the Literary Corpus of Early Modern Confucians] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1985), vol. 1, Bk. 1, p. 60.

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (1)

121

This account was in line with Zhu Xi’s statement in his Treatise that, “In the production of people and creatures, each one obtains the mind of Heaven and Earth as its own mind.”29 Zhu’s and Jinsai’s accounts were both infused with cosmological and ethical significance. The former provided the foundation for the latter account, and we can trace Zhu’s influence in Jinsai’s texts through his use of key terms such as substance and function, (human) nature and emotions, etc. – terms that appeared prominently in Zhu’s Treatise. Zhu’s views continued to influence Jinsai in his later years, where we find Jinsai still regarding humanity as the interface between the “is” of the cosmos and the “ought” of ethics, thus endowing human life with an impressive cosmological and metaphysical depth. In 1683, at age 56, Jinsai compiled and wrote Gomo¯ Jigi (語孟字義), followed then in 1692 (at age 65) with his Do¯jimon (童子問). In these works, his shift away from Zhu is complete. He clearly casts aside the theory of li which had grounded Zhu’s Treatise. Instead, Jinsai began to claim that li referred to the grains in stone, and thus might be used to describe the ordering of things and affairs, but could not be used to describe the miracle of Heaven and Earth’s production, reproduction, change, and transformation30 : Song Neo-Confucians (Sôju 宋儒) equated humaneness (jin 仁) and human nature (sei 性). Such remarks do much harm to the Confucian way (michi ni gai ari 害于道). The Neo-Confucians further defined human nature as “what has not yet emerged” (mihatsu 未發) while characterizing human feelings as “what has already emerged” (ihatsu 已 發). Yet this implies that humaneness, like subterranean water, remains beyond our reach. Just as underground water cannot be clarified, so would humaneness remain untapped. Neo-Confucian thinking about self-cultivation allows that humaneness surfaces at the practical level, where things “have already emerged.” But of what use is its original substance (hontai 本體), submerged and hidden away? The Neo-Confucians formulated theories of “preserving seriousness” (shukei 守敬) and “abiding in tranquility” (shusei 主靜) to resolve this problem. They suggested that by following these methods we “will not be far from humaneness” (jin ni tagawazu 不違於 仁), and rightness will naturally be within us (gi onozukara sono naka ni ari 義自在其 中). Still, Neo-Confucian techniques seem extremely lax (hanahada orosoka 甚疎) because basic virtues – humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom – appear, by their accounts, to become empty possessions (kyoki 虛器). Yet if that were truly so, no one would bother exerting themselves in order to realize humaneness! Moreover NeoConfucian accounts imply that Confucius and Mencius simply discussed practicing humaneness without broaching its substance (tai 體). But this further implies that the teachings of Confucius and Mencius were partial (ippen 一偏), and their principles incomplete (ri sonawarazaru 理不備)! Is that consistent, however, with the sagely

29 See note 6. 30 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, “Gomo¯ Jigi,” in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ et al., eds., Nihon rinri ihen, upper volume, p. 22.

122

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

Confucian way of teaching (Kômon no kyôhô 孔門之教法)? Students must “quietly seek to resolve this matter” for themselves.31

In this passage, Jinsai stresses that one should grasp the content of humanity from its function rather than substance, thus reflecting the intellectual preference of the Tokugawa Japanese for practical learning. In this vein, Jinsai also noted: “In the books of our sages and worthies, they used practical language to illuminate practical principles. Therefore, when they spoke of filial piety, fraternity, propriety and appropriateness, their Way was naturally illuminated.”32 He called his students to “cast off the footnotes of the Song Confucians and pay special attention to the original texts of Confucius and Mencius, and to study and savor them for two or three years. In this way, they might have some self-attainment.”33 The Song Confucian Cheng Yi had said that, “The person of humanity confusedly forms a single body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” While Jinsai did not explicitly oppose Cheng’s statement, he considered such a thesis difficult to apply34 and sought instead to use the sharp sword of practical learning (Jitsugaku 實學) to sever the link between “Heaven (nature)” and “people (man)” – a link that had been advocated in Song Confucian thought. He boldly proclaimed, “Apart from people there is no Way; apart from the Way there are no people […] If one intended to realize the Way apart from human ethical relationships, it would be like casting nets in the wind to snare shadows – an impossible task.”35 Here then we find confirmed the claim made by Maruyama Masao (丸山真男, 1914 – 1996) that the development of Tokugawa intellectual history can be regarded as the process of dis-integrating Zhu Xi’s thinking on natural law.36 And yet despite this development, we find that the sharp sword of Ito¯ Jinsai’s practical learning ultimately could not sever the cosmological (or metaphysical) and ethical links that were assumed in Zhu Xi’s Treatise. Although Jinsai proclaimed that the great virtue of humanity could be explained in a single word, love37, he also stressed that: The way of people consists of humanity and appropriateness; since the Way of Heaven has yin and yang. How could there be the Way apart from humanity and appropri-

31 English translation from Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, pp. 123 – 4. 32 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, “Do¯shikai hikki 同志會筆記 [Notes of the Companion Society],” in Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯, vol. 5, p. 110. 33 Ibid., p. 290. 34 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Do¯jimon 童子問 [Inquiry of A Child],” in in Ienaga Saburo¯ 家永三郎 et al., eds., Kinse¯ shiso¯ka bunshu¯ 近世思想家文集 [Literary Corpus of Modern Thinkers] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966, 1981), middle volume, p. 239. 35 Ibid., p. 205. 36 Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, Nihon se¯ji shiso¯shi 日本政治思想史 [A History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1952). 37 Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, p. 215.

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (2)

123

ateness? Well, humanity embraces appropriateness just as yang governs yin. Therefore Confucius’ school took humanity as fundamental and appropriateness as supplemental.38

The so-called Way of Heaven is still paired structurally with Ito¯ Jinsai’s “way of the people.” Jinsai’s later discussion of humanity (as with his earlier work) included vigorous criticisms of Zhu Xi’s use of principle. Yet the criticisms proved to be far from lethal. In the end, this leaves Jinsai’s revolt as a markedly “unfinished revolution.”

4

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (2): Reconstruction in light of socio-political context

4.1

The challenge of Ito¯ To¯gai

The second intellectual track that Tokugawa Confucians followed in discussing Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity involved reconstructing the meaning of humanity in the light of the socio-political context. If we say that the Japanese Confucian deconstruction of Zhu’s ethical duality was based on their critique of the way Zhu promoted li as a necessary condition, then we can see how their redefinition of humanity in light of the socio-political context becomes the replacement for Zhu’s metaphysical grounding in li. From the seventeenth century on, the two intellectual tracks developed together as essential characteristics of Japanese “practical learning.” When discussing this redefinition of humanity in light of the socio-political context, we can draw upon the doubts expressed by the elder son of Ito¯ Jinsai, Ito¯ To¯gai, specifically regarding Zhu Xi’s proposition that, “The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things.” Ito¯ To¯gai doubted that Zhu Xi’s account in the Treatise on Humanity could explain the unavoidable tragedies of life, such as “Predatory birds harming creatures, vicious beasts preying on human beings,”39 and that the perpetuation of one’s own life is always made possible on the basis of the replacement value of the sacrifice of the lives of others. To¯gai thought that the theory of qi (élan, cosmic vapor) provided a more adequate foundation to explain such phenomena. He argued that Heaven and Earth use yin and yang, the two qi, to conceive and produce the myriad things; however, the quality of the qi received by each life form, and their difference in strength and weakness, depends on Heaven (nature). That the strong eat the weak conforms to natural law. 38 Ibid., p. 220. 39 Ito¯ To¯gai 伊藤東涯, Kankyo Hitsuroku 閒居筆錄 [Reflection on Life in Leisure], vol. 1. Seki ¯ tori Shuppan, 1971), vol. 7, p. 59. Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho (Tokyo: O

124

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

Although tigers and panthers are able to harm people, people are able to kill tigers and panthers; hence, they balance each other out. But this is not to deny that the mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things. Whether or not To¯gai’s new theory was capable of solving the problem he had identified in Zhu Xi’s Treatise, his reply was established on the concrete foundation of his theory of qi. Here we have an excellent example of the way in which Japanese Confucians, beginning in the seventeenth century, tended to critique Zhu Xi’s Treatise through appeals to the theory of qi. The Japanese Confucians could not accept the proposition offered by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi that there existed above embodied ethical daily life a transcendental li that served as a guiding abstract principle. They argued that humanity could not be explained on the basis of Zhu’s notion of a “principle of love,” and insisted instead that it must be explained on the basis of a person’s concrete, loving conduct. Thus in effect, they re-imagined Zhu’s li above embodied phenomena as the li (patterning) exhibited within li phenomena. In this light, they could use “embodied love” to explain humanity.

4.2

Ito¯ Jinsai and To¯jo¯ Ichido¯’s new interpretation of humanity in light of socio-political context

Ito¯ Jinsai offered us the most representative example of the Tokugawa Confucian tendency to interpret humanity in terms of love. He argued: The notion “humaneness” (jin 仁) refers to the virtue of compassion and love (jiai no toku 慈愛之德). It fills everything and penetrates everywhere, near and far, inside and out, pervading all existence. “Rightness” (gi 義) refers to doing what should be done (masa ni subeki tokoro o shite 為其所當為) and not doing what should not (masa ni subekarazaru tokoro o sezu 不為其所當不為). “Propriety” (rei 禮) involves being respectful (son 尊) towards superiors (jo¯ 上), and superior (bi 卑) toward inferiors (ge 下). In behaving this way, one must not overstep “the various rules of conduct integral to those distinctions” (tôi bunmei 等威分明). “Wisdom” (chi 智) means clearly discerning the principles of the world (tenka no ri gyo¯zen do¯tetsu 天下之理曉然洞徹), without any doubts or misgivings (giwaku suru tokoro naki 無所疑惑). The world includes a multitude of moral goodnesses (zen 善) and manifold rational principles (ri 理). By making humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom one’s standards of conduct [ko¯ryo¯ 綱領], those myriad goodnesses will naturally become replete within oneself. The sage Confucius thus emphasized these four as the fundamental substance of the way and its virtues (do¯toku no hontai 道德之本體], and always taught his students to practice and cultivate them.40 […] Confucians see humaneness as their essence [so¯shi 宗旨], treating it as their daily sustenance (kajo¯sahan 家常茶飯). Whether coming or going, standing or sitting, 40 Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 115.

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (2)

125

Confucians are humane in all they do. Why, then, did Confucius often address the moral significance of humaneness, but not its relationship to love (ai 愛)? Love is the substance (tai 體) of a humane person’s mind. Such a mind is tolerant (kan 寬), impartial (hen narazu 不偏), joyous (tanoshinde 樂), and without anxieties (ure’ezu 不憂). Myriad virtues are naturally replete in it! Considered in those terms, Confucius (Fushi 夫子) addressed the humane mind in replying to his disciples’ questions about humaneness. Thus he stated, “A humane person is reticent” (gen ya katashi 言也訒); “A humane person does not worry” (ure’ezu 不憂); “A humane person first takes on difficult tasks, then reaps the benefits” (kataki o saki ni shite, uru o ato ni suru 先難而後 獲); and “A humane person is like an archer” (iru ga gotoshi 如射)”. These replies suggest that it is from the oneness of love (hitotsu no ai 一愛), which is the substance of a humane person’s mind, that all else flows, including the natural realization of myriad virtues. Students must therefore strive to fathom the deep meanings (o¯shi 奧旨) of Confucius and Mencius. However, we cannot discover those deep meanings with only a superficial study of the meanings of words (jigi o motte kore o motomubekarazaru nari 不可以字義求之也).41

In the above passage, Ito¯ Jinsai used the virtue of compassion and love to interpret humanity, and advocated that the mind of the humane person takes love as its substance. He continued: After Confucius and Mencius, those who understood humaneness were rare. But that was not due to lack of intelligence or insight: they never recognized humaneness as a virtue. While their discourses were shallow, Han 漢 and Tang 唐 Confucians had not completely lost touch with the ancient meanings (koi 古意) of the Confucian teachings. Their understanding of humaneness was not so distant from Confucius’ because they refrained from basing their claims on matters of opinion (iken o mochiizaru 不用意見)! Song 宋 Neo-Confucians asserted that humaneness was principle (jin o motte ri to su 以 仁為理). Their views were further removed from Confucius’ understanding of humaneness as a virtue than ever before. Going to extremes, Neo-Confucians equated the substance of humaneness (jin no tai 仁之體) with having no desires (muyoku 無欲) and defined the foundation of humaneness (jin no moto 仁之本) as emptiness and tranquility (kyosei 虛靜). Not only did they fail to realize that humaneness was a virtue, they truly distorted the ideas of Confucius and Mencius.42

In criticizing Zhu Xi’s use of li to explain humanity, Jinsai believed that Zhu had abandoned the original pre-Qin accounts of humanity found in the work of Confucius and Mencius. For Jinsai, humanity could only be produced in the interpersonal interactions that compose our social dealings. Born 151 years after Ito¯ Jinsai, To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ (東條一堂, 1778 – 1857) also criticized Zhu Xi’s use of “the virtue of mind and the principle of love” to interpret humanity. He repeated this critique several times in his compilation, Rongo Chigen 論語知言. To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ claimed that Zhu’s account of humanity 41 Ibid., pp. 122 – 3. 42 Ibid., pp. 127 – 8.

126

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

was completely based on Daoist and Buddhist thought43, and stressed that one “cannot interpret [Confucius’ Analects] on the basis of the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi.”44 He also claimed that Confucius’ concept of “mind” was always illustrated in the context of human affairs. Every person has “mind”, and for this reason everyone also has (the impulse of) humanity.45 To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ opposed the idea of placing an abstract concept of li over and above one’s concrete, ethical daily conduct, in a position where it could govern humanity. Instead, he argued that humanity should be discussed in relation to the human mind. Furthermore, he rejected Zhu’s attempts to explain humanity using li, pointing out that while the expression “the exhaustive exploration of principle” appears in the explanations of the hexagrams in the Book of Changes, it does not appear in the Odes or History, in Confucius’ Analects or in Mencius. Thus he argued that Zhu Xi’s term li was derived from the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and referred to a Heavenly/natural principle. For To¯jo¯ Ichido¯, such empty words could not have any concrete application. According to Mencius, the term li meant to “put into order,” and had little to do with any intangible, empty usage as a heavenly/ natural principle. As to the Ten Wings commentary on the Book of Change, the idea of li had been influenced by the sayings of Laozi and Zhuangzi, but Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi had taken this idea as one transmitted from Confucius’ own school.46 For this reason, To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ asserted that, “That which is of humanity is a person. That which makes a person a person is none other than this. Being loving is the main point. The way of people s based precisely on this.”47 Thus, in his own work he would interpret humanity in terms of love. In To¯jo¯ Ichido¯’s account of humanity, he clearly distinguished between the Way of Heaven and the way of people; he emphasized that these two ways were mutually exclusive, a move that allowed him to concentrate solely on the way of people.

4.3

Ogyu¯ Sorai’s reading of humanity in light of the political context

Ito¯ Jinsai and To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ had deconstructed the idea that humanity had a metaphysical basis in li. In so doing, they infused the concept of humanity with new meaning in the light of social context. In a similar fashion, the seventeenthcentury thinker Ogyu¯ Sorai reflected on humanity in the light of the political context. In his book Distinguishing the Names (Benmei, 辨名), Ogyu¯ Sorai 43 To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ 東條一堂, Rongo Chigen [Knowing Words of the Analects], in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., ¯ tori Shuppan, 1971), vol. 8 , pp. 35 – 6. Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho (Tokyo: O 44 To¯jo¯ Ichido¯, Rongo Chigen, vol. 3, p. 128. 45 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 36. 46 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 127. 47 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 93.

Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretation of the Treatise on Humanity (2)

127

sharply criticized Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity. He criticized Zhu’s erroneous interpretation of humanity as “the virtue of mind and the principle of love,” arguing that Zhu had been influenced by Buddhism and Daoism, thus leading him to prioritize an empty li and to “regard humanity as human nature.” Instead Sorai interpreted humanity as love, and explained the expression “love others” as meaning “govern people as their fathers and mothers.” In this way, he invested humanity with new meaning. He argued: Of the Confucian teachings, humaneness is the greatest. Why? [This is so because] humaneness well upholds the early kings’ way and gives it substance. The way of the early kings is the way that brings peace to the realm below heaven. Although there are many aspects to this way, essentially they all return to [the project of] bringing peace to the realm below heaven through [humaneness]. The foundation of the way resides in revering the decree of heaven. Heaven decrees that [in some cases] we be the son of heaven, a various lord, or a grandee. Accordingly, there are ministers and common people among us. As [heaven decrees that we] be scholarknights, there are also families, wives, and children among us. All of these [positions] depend upon us so that thereafter there will be peace. Moreover, all scholar-knights and grandees, along with their rulers, have heaven [-decreed] occupations. Therefore, the way of the prince (junzi/kinshi) deems humaneness alone as the greatest [virtue] of all. Moreover, the human nature of humanity naturally tends toward mutual kinship, mutual love, mutual livelihood, mutual completion, mutual assistance, mutual nourishment, mutual protection, and mutual help. Therefore, Mencius said, “In acting humanely (ren/jin), we are [fully] human (ren/jin).” When we combine all of these [attributes of humaneness], we refer to them as the way. Xunzi said, “The ruler (jun) is one who brings people together (jun).” Accordingly, the way of humanity should not be discussed in terms of one person [alone], but instead must be discussed in terms of trillions of people unified together.48

Sorai used the expression, “one who can uphold and practice the late sage-kings’ way” to define a person of humanity, also noting that, “The Way is precisely the way of the late sage-kings.”49 He followed the intellectual track, redefining the major Confucian concepts in light of the political context, thus integrating his interpretation. He stated: Humaneness refers to the virtue that provides for the prosperity of everyone and the peace and stability of the people. It is the great virtue of the sages. The great virtue of heaven and earth is creative production. The sages modeled themselves on this virtue. For this reason, humaneness is also known as “the virtue that favors creative production.” The sages were rulers of all under heaven in antiquity. Thus, of the virtues of a

48 John Tucker, Ogyu¯ Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks: The Bendo¯ and Benmei (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and Association for Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 145 – 6. 49 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, vol. 7, p. 324.

128

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

ruler, none is more revered than humaneness. Accordingly, a commentary [the Great Learning] observes, “To be a ruler, one must abide in humaneness.”50

In Sorai’s new interpretation, humanity became the political ability to revere others and bring peace to the people. It was no longer tied to Zhu Xi’s abstract account as “the virtue of the mind and the principle of mind.” Not only did he reject the metaphysical ground presented in Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity, he also excessively politicized his reading and made humanity into a relatively narrow, limited, parochial, and changeable political ability. Sorai’s political reading of humanity definitely brought humanity into his own intellectual context and into line with Japan’s predilection for practical learning. But, because of its narrowness and instability later Japanese scholars criticized and reevaluated it. But it eventually came to be regarded as an important “event” in Japanese intellectual history.51 For example, in the eighteenth century, in Toshima Ho¯shu¯’s compilation Treatise on Humanity, he criticized Ogyu¯ Sorai’s interpretation of humanity for being based solely on the definition from the Great Learning (“Being the sovereign for the people consists in humanity”), for only discussing humanity in the context of sovereignty, and for completely ignoring Mencius’ own authoritative definition (“As to humanity, it consists in being fully human”).52 Toshima Ho¯shu¯ argued that humanity is a virtue that is commonly shared among the people, and thus inferred that the concrete significance of Ogyu¯ Sorai’s proposition about “revering others and bringing peace to the people” lay in setting one’s mind firmly on loving broadly.53 Toshima Ho¯shu¯’s Treatise on Humanity was aimed at breaking through Ogyu¯ Sorai’s reading of humanity in a political context and instead return to a method of understanding humanity in a broader social context. In summary, having observed these Japanese Confucian criticisms of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity, we see that they rejected his li-based method and developed instead another approach centered on qi. The Japanese Confucians criticized Zhu Xi’s use of “the principle of love” to discuss humanity, and adopted instead an approach that used love to discuss humanity in the light of the social and/or political context.

50 Tucker, Ogyu¯ Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks, p. 186. 51 Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, Jiken to shite no Soraigaku 事件としての徂徠学 [The Learning of Sorai as an Event] (Tokyo: Seudosha, 1990). 52 Toshima Ho¯shu¯, “Jinsetsu,” pp. 5 – 6. 53 Ibid., p. 70.

Conclusion

5

129

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined the Japanese Tokugawa Confucian responses to Zhu Xi’s account of humanity both in his Treatise on Humanity and other writings. We can certainly say that Zhu Xi’s works formed a watershed in the history of East Asian Confucian thought; subsequent thinkers, no matter whether they supported or opposed Zhu Xi, necessarily followed the pattern of reflection initiated by him, making his paradigm the center of their own discussions and disputations. We can say that the Tokugawa Confucians, at least before their middle age, mostly steeped themselves in Zhu Xi’s learning. Having fully accepted Zhu’s positions in his Treatise on Humanity, they hardly offered any strident criticism. However, things began to change with the early Tokugawa Confucian Yamaga Soko¯ who first argued that “the root of humanity” lay in “the way of daily ethical relationships.”54 Further criticisms of Zhu’s Treatise on Humanity then began to develop. Ito¯ Jinsai and To¯jo¯ Itsudo¯ discussed humanity in the context of social, ethical relationships, and Ogyu¯ Sorai insisted on reading humanity in light of the political context. They all strove to dissolve Zhu’s li-based metaphysical foundation, reject the ethical duality involved in his distinction between “Heavenly/ natural principle” and “[excessive] human desire,” replace his prioritization of li above affairs by regarding li as existing inside affairs, and pursue instead the intellectual track of qi monism. In this way, they adapted the core ethical concept of Chinese Confucianism to suit their own native Japanese intellectual preferences. As I have argued elsewhere, the Japanese Tokugawa Confucians concentrated on embodied phenomena and avoided empty abstractions. They honored measurable facts and did not value abstract contemplation. They sought to grasp the transcendental content of “Heaven’s Mandate” solely in the context of daily affairs and to comprehend “the single thread” that connects Confucius’ “Way” in the context of daily life and its ethical relationships.55 The Japanese Confucian criticisms and reinterpretations of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity all reflected the intellectual milieu and ambiance of Japanese practical learning. From the seventeenth century, Japanese Confucians began to reject the metaphysical grounding of Zhu Xi’s account of humanity and to attack “the Way of Heaven” as the foundation of “the way of people” in Zhu’s thought. Yet they still found it difficult to completely purge themselves of Zhu’s metaphysical and cosmological views. As we saw above, in the seventeenth century Ito¯ Jinsai still regarded “the 54 Yamaga Soko¯ 山鹿素行, “Seigaku 5, Jin,” in Yamaga Soko¯ zenshu¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1941) vol. 9, Bk. 37, p. 457. 55 Huang Chun-chieh, Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun, p. 3.

130

The Reception and Reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity

way of Heaven” as a measure for grasping “the way of people.” And Ito¯ To¯gai interpreted the unavoidable tragedies of life via a two qi (yin-yang) interpretation of humanity. Then in the eighteenth century, Toshima Ho¯shu¯ argued that “human desires” were “bestowed by Heaven/nature.” Overall, we can say that the Tokugawa Japanese Confucian opposition to Zhu’s Treatise on Humanity represented a kind of unfinished intellectual revolution. Furthermore, the “qi monism” adopted by the Japanese Confucians in order to construct a new account of humanity could not avoid finally reducing people to one dimension, having sacrificed all of the depth that Zhu Xi had infused into human life. Although the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians strived to reject and destroy the notion of a “principle of love” at the center of Zhu Xi’s account of humanity, they ended by establishing a new faith in a qi-centered “practical learning” within the context of the ethical relationships of daily life. In this way, these seventeenthcentury Japanese Confucians were very much like their eighteenth-century European counterparts: philosophers who “scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers.”56

56 Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932, 2003), pp. 30 – 1.

Chapter Seven: The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia: A Comparative Perspective

1

Introduction

Having traced over the last chapters the central role played by Zhu Xi’s work in the later history of Confucianism, now as we arrive at the eighteenth century we discover a significant change in Zhu Xi scholarship. In the various contexts of East Asia, growing national subjectivity now begins to shape local interpretations of Confucianism and, with it, give rise to new avenues of critique on Zhu Xi’s work and its socio-political implications. The history of different strands of Confucianism in eighteenth-century China, Japan and Korea highlights a period when Confucian learning underwent radical changes all across East Asia. During the eighteenth century, there was a growth in trilateral cultural exchanges between China, Japan and Korea. Zhu Xi’s thought, which originally occupied a commanding position of “orthodoxy”, suddenly attracted spirited criticism from scholars on every side. These developments laid the foundation for the transition from the early modern to the modern period in each country’s Confucian traditions, and paved the way for the stormy intellectual crises that would confront nineteenth-century Confucianism. The diverse developments of these traditions in China, Japan and Korea prompts us to speak more accurately of various “Confucianisms.” Nevertheless, in the eighteenth-century these various Confucianisms featured two major trends in common: opposition to Zhu Xi’s thought and his metaphysical approach, and a desire to seek “reality” or “substance” in actual “existence.” However, when we come to consider the development of subjectivity in Chinese, Japanese and Korean Confucians, we find that they each displayed their own distinctive national tendencies. In this chapter, we will examine the salient similarities and differences between eighteenth-century Confucians in China, Japan and Korea. These will guide us toward a better comparative understanding of the phenomenon of East Asian Confucianisms.

132

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

2

Common trends (1): Opposition to Zhu Xi’s thought and abstract metaphysics

2.1

Restructuring the intellectual world of the Four Books and the critique of Zhu Xi

Confucian scholars in China, Japan and Korea had very different social backgrounds and political contexts. In 587, Emperor Wendi (文帝, r. 581 – 587) of the Sui (581 – 618) established the Gongju (貢舉) civil-service examination system in China.1 In the same year, he abolished the “nine-ranking system” regulations and instituted an examination system for choosing scholar-officials. After 1313, during the reign of emperor Renzong (仁宗, r. 1311 – 1320) of the Yuan-Mongol dynasty, Zhu Xi’s edition of the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu) was chosen to be the standard text for the civil-service examination. Through mastery of this text scholars sought to climb to fame and power. Consequently, all the ranking scholar-officials in Chinese society from the fourteenth century on immersed themselves in Zhu Xi’s thought. In contrast, Tokugawa Japan (1600 – 1868) did not have a civil-service examination system, thus the Tokugawa Confucians who studied the Four Books were not doing so in order to be admitted into the state power structure.2 Instead, the Tokugawa authority made flexible use of the various systems of thought, and the ideology of the Tokugawa regime was based on Buddhism rather than Confucianism.3 Whereas Zhu Xi’s learning commanded the position of orthodoxy in Chinese imperial rule from the early fourteenth century right up to 1908, in Tokugawa Japan it was, in the words of Koyasu Nobukuni, merely a form of “common knowledge.”4 Zhu Xi’s thought was a general bank of common knowledge that scholars in Tokugawa society could accept or reject as they wished.

1 See Gao Mingshi 高明士, Sui-Tang gongju zhidu 隋唐貢舉制度 [The Civil-service Examination System in Sui-Tang China] (Taipei: Wenjing chubanshe, 1999), pp. 7 – 80. 2 See Watanabe Hiroshi 渡辺浩, “Jusha, Literati and Yangban: Confucians in Japan, China and Korea,” in Umesawa Tadao, Catherine C. Lewis and Yasuyuki Kurita, eds., Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness, Senri Ethnological Studies 28 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990), pp. 13 – 30. 3 See Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570 – 1680 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 4 Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, “Zhu zi xue yu jindai riben de xingcheng” 朱子學與近代日本的 形成 [Zhu Xi Learning and Formation of Modern Japan], in Huang Chun-chieh and Weijie Lin 林維杰, eds., Dongya Zhuzi xue de tongdiao yu yique 東亞朱子學的同調與異趣 [The Similarity and Dissimilarity of Zhu Xi Learning in East Asia] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2006), pp. 155 – 68.

Common trends (1)

133

In Korea the situation differed again. The most distinctive feature of premodern Korea was its stress on clan lineage. This phenomenon displayed evolving relations with politics and economic profit. In Korean society, only the descendants of important families were able to approach the axes of power; at the same time, since they enjoyed superior educational opportunities, they monopolized the lists of those who passed the state examinations. This form of hierarchical society inclined high-level Korean scholar-officials to advocate an authoritarian top-down form of Confucian thought while at the same time firmly maintaining their own elite position.5 In Korea, Confucianism occupied the position of a religion; during regime changes, the intelligentsia always sought to rid society of the corruption from its gentry and monks, and replace them with Confucian ethics and politics. Over several centuries, the Cheng-Zhu school of Neo-Confucianism took root in Korea; but while adapting to Korea’s unique intellectual and political environment, it developed in a manner unlike its counterparts in China and Japan.6 Despite this major difference in the position of Zhu Xi’s thought in China, Japan and Korea, from the seventeenth-century on, and especially in the late eighteenth-century, a virulent, tumultuous intellectual tide critical of Zhu Xi’s thought arose and percolated in China and Japan. Although Zhu Xi continued to be upheld as a great master in Korea, critical discussions of his thought also began to appear there. This intellectual tide in opposition to Zhu Xi’s thought appears to have arisen with the new interpretive approaches to the Confucian classics, the Four Books in particular, which completely criticized, transcended, and discarded Zhu Xi’s interpretive tradition. The endeavors of eighteenth-century Chinese, Korean and Japanese Confucians to oppose Zhu Xi’s thought necessarily included a systematic reinterpretation of the Four Books. This was necessary because Zhu Xi himself had reinterpreted Confucius’ Analects, Mencius, Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean on the basis of li (pattern, 理).7 In Zhu Xi’s world of thought, many ideas took the form of “two aspects of one thing,” which “integrate two as one.” Zhu Xi devoted much thought to the relationship of basic concept-pairs, such as substance and function, li and qi (primal vapor, 氣), heavenly-li (天理) and human 5 See Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA/London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992), pp. 3 – 27, 89 – 128. 6 See Edward Y. J. Chung, The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok: A Reappraisal of the “Four-Seven Thesis” and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultivation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 1 – 36. 7 Regarding Zhu Xi’s fusion of four texts into the Four Books, see Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” in Études Song in Memoriam Étienne Balazs, Editées par Françoise Aubin, Série II, #I (Paris: Mouton & Co. and École Practique de Haute Études, 1973), pp. 60 – 90.

134

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

desire (人欲), which formed unities or wholes. At the same time, he stressed that the relations between substance and function, li and qi, heavenly-li and human desire respectively, were “inseparable, yet distinguishable.” We get a sense of this for example in his comment on Analects 1.12: “Of the functions of the rites, harmony is the most precious.” Zhu Xi also utilized his pair-concepts of substance, function, li, qi, heavenly-li and human desire in his commentary on the Four Books. Nonetheless, when he interpreted “rites” both as the “appearance and regulation of heavenly-li” and as the “form and law of human affairs,” he suggested the “inseparability” between li and shi (事, human affairs, events) (the term qi [氣] can also be used in this connection). Generally speaking, when interpreting the Four Books Zhu Xi maintained that these basic concept-pairs are “inseparable, yet distinguishable.” However, since his interpretation was based on his philosophical system, there was a great difference between the original contents of the Four Books and many of Zhu Xi’s comments on them. This created tensions between his accounts and the original utterances, as well as between his philosophy and the system of thought implicit in those early texts.8 After the seventeenth-century, the Manchu regime adopted Zhu Xi’s thought as its official ideology; this stirred up a new tide of opposition to Zhu Xi’s thought in China and Japan that commenced in the mid-to-late seventeenth century and reached its height in the eighteenth century. East Asia’s intellectual tide opposing Zhu Xi swelled against his interpretation of the Four Books. A pioneer in this effort was Ito¯ Jinsai. In reinterpreting the Analects, Mencius, and other classics9, he invested the major terms – such as dao, ren, etc. – with new meanings. Ogyu¯ Sorai, the master of the classical philology school, went so far as to reinterpret the classics, including the Analects, in order to mount an even stronger critique of Zhu Xi’s system.10 Meanwhile in eighteenth-century China, Dai Zhen also took the route of reinterpreting the Mencius in order to critique Zhu Xi’s thought, which was at that time the ideological foundation of imperial Manchu despotism.11 The Korean Confucian scholar 8 Huang Chun-chieh, “Lun jingdian quanshi yu zhexue jiengou zhi guanxi: yi Zhuzi dui ‘Sishu’ dejieshi wei zhongxin 論經典詮釋與哲學建構之關係：以朱子對《四書》的解釋為中心 [On the Relationship between Interpretation of Classics and philosophical Argumentation: An Inquiry of Zhu Xi’s Interpretation of the Four Books],” in Huang Chun-chieh, Dong ya ru xue, pp. 1 – 28. 9 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, Rongo Kogi, in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho, vol. 3; Gomo¯ Jigi, in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ et al., eds., Nihon rinri ihen, upper volume; Mo¯shi Kogi 孟 子古義, in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho, vol. 9; Do¯jimon 童子問, in Ienaga Saburo¯ et al., eds., Kinse¯ shiso¯ka bunshu¯, vol. 1. 10 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, vol. 7. 11 Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, vol. 1. For English translation, see Ann-ping Chin and Mansfield Freeman, trans., Tai Chen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and Meaning. A New Translation of Meng Tzu tzu-I shu-cheng (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990).

Common trends (1)

135

Jeong Yak-yong also launched a critique of Zhu Xi’s thought based on his interpretation of the Four Books. For example, Jeong Dasan opposed Zhu Xi’s bifurcation of human nature into “embodied nature” and “original nature,” arguing that, “Those who talk about ‘human nature’ certainly are stressing ‘human likes’ (dispositions), thus its meaning is produced.”12 This proposition amounted to an attack on Zhu Xi’s assertion that, “human nature is li (pattern).”

2.2

From “prior to” to “within”: Development of anti-metaphysical discourse

In the eighteenth-century Chinese, Japanese and Korean Confucian expressions of opposition to Zhu Xi’s learning, their most fundamental target was the metaphysics on which Zhu Xi’s ethical theory was rooted. They opposed Zhu Xi for his supposition that prior to the concrete, diverse “myriad things and affairs,” there was a general and necessary li (pattern) that grounded the cosmos and moral values. To grasp this argument, let us consider Zhu Xi’s organic proposition that “li (principle) is one, manifestations are many” (理一分殊). Zhu Xi considered that, “In the world, although affairs have ‘thousands of branches, tens of thousands of leaves,’ in fact there is just one daoli [道理, guiding pattern]. This is expressed in the saying that, ‘Li is one while its manifestations are many.’”13 Zhu Xi further elaborated on the notion that “li is one” (理一), noting: Each of the myriad things has this li; each of their li derives from the same source. As they occupy different positions they express their li in different ways. For example, the sovereign must be humane; the minister must be respectful; the son must be filial; the father must be caring. Things all bear this li but they each differ in their expression of li. Nevertheless, none of them fails to be the expression of the self-same li.14

In Zhu’s thought, li is, in one respect, monistic. (“The myriad things each bear this li; their li originate from the same source.”); it is the common productive force of the myriad things and affairs. “None of them fails to be the expression of the self-same li.” Even though Zhu Xi himself clearly stated, “As for ‘li is one,’ it is connected in the myriad differentiations and they never begin to be separated,”15 once the idea that “li is one” has been extrapolated from the myriad manifestations, it becomes the “one” that is “prior to” the “many,” never under the sway 12 Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 2, vol. 5, Maengja Yo-ui 맹자요의, “Deungmungong” 등문공, Bk. 4, p. 435. 13 Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi Yulei (3), in Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 18, ch. 132, p. 4222. 14 Ibid., vol. 18, Zhuzi Yulei (1), ch. 14, p. 606. 15 Zhu Xi, Huian xiansheng Zhu Wengong wenji, collected in Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 21, ch. 37, “Yu Guo Zhonghui 與郭仲晦 [Letter to Guo Zhonghui],” p. 1639.

136

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

of the many but ruling over them. When this idea is translated into political power, it can be used to justify the power monopoly of the minority group that holds the reins of political power. In this way, li could be said to have become a lethal instrument for suppressing the Other. The eighteenth-century Chinese, Japanese and Korean critique of Zhu Xi was concentrated on his notion that li existed “prior to” “things and affairs.” The East Asian scholars altered this relationship, insisting that li existed “within” things and affairs, thus deconstructing the metaphysical foundation of Zhu’s theory of ethics. Once li was dethroned from its privileged status “prior to” “things and affairs” and positioned squarely “within” them, it could no longer serve as a fundamental justification in the political realm (for authoritarian political leadership, in particular) and human affairs. With this transition in the conception of li, the universal necessity attributed to li could only be discovered and identified by observing the behavior and characteristics of the myriad things and affairs. Consequently, the general necessity of li would be rooted in the specific features of the concrete things and affairs and could not be specified a priori. Therefore, in the world of thought of eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms, concrete particulars were liberated and brought into view in their own right. By the same token, respect for the individual in society and politics received at least theoretical approval. The eighteenth-century East Asian Confucian thinkers were concerned to restore the spirit and moral significance of interpersonal ethical relationships in daily life. Thus, they concentrated on the efforts people make in their concrete daily life, and had no interest in understanding abstract moral principles. In the seventeenth century, Ito¯ Jinsai expressed propositions such as: “Dao [道, the way] is the road that people should walk in their daily interpersonal ethical relationships”16 ; “Apart from people, there is no dao; apart from dao, there are no people”17; “As for the term dao, it refers to the way that people make themselves human.”18 These propositions indicated a shift in the temper of the times and foreshadowed the wholesale assault that was approaching the citadel of Zhu Xi’s thought. By the time we reach the eighteenth century, we find Ogyu¯ Sorai explaining that dao is simply “the way practiced by the former kings.” He wrote: “The term dao is a general term. It refers broadly to the upright practices established by the former kings in upholding rites, music and conducting strict rule. Apart from rites, music and strict rule, there is no proper application for the term dao.”19 16 Ito¯ Jinsai, Gomo¯ Jigi, upper volume, p. 19. For English translation, see John Allen Tucker, Ito Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi and the Philosophical Definition of Modern Japan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998). 17 Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, in Ienaga Saburo¯ et al., eds., Kinsei shiso¯ka bunshu¯, vol. 1. 18 Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo Kogi, p. 50. 19 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Benmei, in Ogyu¯ Sorai, upper volume, art. 3, 201a.

Common trends (1)

137

Ogyu¯ Sorai’s emphasis that dao was fashioned by the former kings contained the implication that people themselves had artificially created the dao – a theoretical risk I will not pursue further here.20 However, Ogyu¯ Sorai did stress that, “The dao of the former kings was the way to make the empire secure.”21 In eighteenth-century China, the Confucian scholar Dai Zhen criticized the political situation of his age, asserting that in the hands of an oppressive government Zhu Xi’s notions of li (as well as dao) had become lethal instruments. He wrote: “Whenever the exalted use li to blame the base, the elders use li to blame the young, and the well-to-do use li to blame the poor, although they deviate, they are called ‘in accord.’ Whenever the base, the young, and the poor use li to contest them, although they are in the right, they are called ‘against the stream.’”22 This was the most bitter attack on Zhu Xi’s thought in its manifestation as an official ideology. Analects 4.8 reads: “The Master [Confucius] said, “Having heard the dao in the morning, one can die at ease in the evening.” Zhu Xi noted that in this passage, “dao is the upright principle of things and affairs.”23 By interpreting Confucius’ dao in this way, Zhu transformed it into a metaphysical principle and an abstract ethical norm. In criticizing Zhu Xi’s thought, the eighteenth-century East Asian Confucians strictly distinguished between tiandao (天道, the natural way) and rendao (仁道, the human way), bifurcating is from ought, and thereby setting up the basis for the autonomy of the political realm. This was an obvious common tendency in all of eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms. This method of opposing Zhu Xi – by stressing that li only exists in shi (事, concrete affairs) – was also discernible in the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth century Korean world of thought. Jeong Dasan insisted that only in the context of concrete xingshi (行事, conduct of affairs) can there be abstract value: The terms ‘humaneness,’ ‘appropriateness,’ ‘ritual propriety,’ and ‘wisdom’ are grasped only after one has conducted affairs. Therefore, ‘humaneness’ can be attained after loving others. Before one has loved others, the term ‘humaneness’ is not yet established. The term ‘appropriateness’ is established only when I have conducted myself well. Before I have acted well, the term ‘appropriateness’ has not been established. Only after the actual conduct of polite intercourse between host and guest is the term ‘ritual

20 As to the idea that dao was fashioned artificially by human beings, this manner of expression is risky on two counts: first, people would no longer practice the proper way of mourning, of beseeching, of comportment, of verifying, because those “ways” were simply practices of their creator (and not relevant to others); second, the explanation of the dao could easily fall into the hands of the ruling authority, allowing them to make it a tool to suppress and control the people. 21 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Benmei, in Ogyu¯ Sorai, upper volume, art. 3, 202a. 22 Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shucheng, in Dai Zhen quan shu, pt. 1, Li, p. 161. 23 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, collected in Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 2, p. 71.

138

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

propriety’ established. Only after one has discerned things and affairs clearly is the term ‘wisdom’ established.24

Jeong Dasan stressed that the abstract Song Neo-Confucian concept of li can be observed only in the concrete conduct of affairs. Jeong’s words implicitly echoed the trend of the Chinese and Japanese intellectual worlds of the time. This was the first common intellectual tendency in eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms.

3

Common trends (2): Seek “substance” in “concrete existence”

The second common tendency in eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms was their stress that even if one wanted to seek the abstract essence of things, one would have to seek it amid concrete existence. This common development was rooted in a “practical spirit.” It was, in the words of Ito¯ Jinsai, “the spirit of using practical speech to understand practical principles.”25 They all criticized Zhu Xi for placing li at the center of his world of thought. The best way to grasp the sense and method of this practical learning, which sought abstract substance in concrete existence, is by observing their differing explanations of Confucius’ enigmatic saying in Analects 4.15: “My Dao with One threading it.”26 Zhu Xi drew upon his central concept of li in explaining the meaning of Confucius’ proposition: “‘Threading’ means to penetrate or get through. […] The Master drew upon integrated li in making appropriate responses. Liken this to the ceaseless utmost sincerity of heaven and earth through which each of the myriad things obtains its suitable niche.”27 Zhu Xi understood Confucius to mean that the integrated li in the mind of the sage could connect and penetrate the myriad things and affairs. But the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Chinese Confucian Ruan Yuan wrote about Confucius’ proposition arguing, “This says that Confucius’ way is completely manifested in the conduct of affairs. Do not pursue book learning as instruction. Yi 一 means one. Be one in order to connect them. He 24 Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 2, vol. 5, Maengja Yo-ui 맹자요의 [Essential Meanings of the Book of Mencius], “Gongsonchu” 공손추, Bk. 4, p. 413. 25 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Do¯shikai hikki,” in his Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯, vol. 1, p. 107. 26 See the extended discussion in chapter 5 of this volume. 27 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 2, p. 72. Zhu Xi used tong (penetrate, communicate, get through) to interpret guan (to connect, thread), differing from He Yan (190 – 249) and Huang Kan (488 – 545) who used tong (unite, command) to interpret guan. See Bao Tingbo 鮑廷博, comp., Lunyu jijie yishu 論語集解義疏 [Collected Commentaries and Annotations of the Analects] (Taipei: Yiwen Yinsukuan, 1966), juan 8, p. 3.

Common trends (2)

139

says one particularly to stress that the conduct of affairs is the instruction.”28 Ruan Yuan used “conduct of affairs” to explain Confucius’ expression yi guan (一貫) and to overthrow Zhu Xi’s explanation that to “be integrated to connect them” means to “use an integrated mind in responding to the myriad affairs.”29 Jiao Xun used zhong-shu to explain Confucius’ way of “being one to connect them,” considering the concrete practice of the virtues of zhong-shu as that which makes people “master the self in order to be free of (ego)self” and thereby destroy interpersonal barriers and reach the level of “being one in order to connect them.”30 Yuan and Jiao both advocated that guan should be read as tong (統, to get through, be communicative). The eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians took the same path as did their Chinese Confucian contemporaries. From Ito¯ Jinsai on, they also used tong to interpret guan.31 Japanese Confucians also believed that the meaning of yi (一, one) alluded to ren, since zhong-shu were basic elements in the quest to be humane. The eclectic eighteenth-century scholar Katayama Kenzan (片山兼山, 1729 – 1782) used ren to interpret yi.32 Ogyu¯ Sorai explained the expression yiguan as: “The Way the former kings united society to bring security to the people, therefore they were called ren. The great virtue of the former kings was based on ren. Thus, the way of the former kings could connect them.”33 The foregoing statements all reflect the practical spirit of the eighteenth-century Japanese Confucian scholars in their interpretations of the classics. They all drew upon the notion that ren consisted in concrete practices in interpreting Confucius’ dao, seeking the abstract substance in concrete existence and thus thoroughly criticizing and discarding Zhu Xi’s intellectual project.34 Eighteenth-century Korean Confucians also stressed that the substance of things and affairs must be sought in concrete existence. Jeong Dasan’s interpretation of Confucius’ remark that, “conquering the self and returning ritual propriety constitutes being humane,” reflected this line of intellectual opposition 28 Ruan Yuan, Yanjingshi ji, (Sibu congkan chubian suoben), vol. 1, ch. 2, “Lunyu yiguan shuo 論語一貫說, ” esp. 31 ff. 29 Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi yulei (2), in Zhuzi quanshu, vol. 15, ch. 27, p. 966. 30 Jiao Xun, Diaogu ji, juan 9, “yi yi guan zhi jie 一以貫之解,” pp. 132 – 4. See Huang Chunchieh, “Kongzi xinxue zhong shenzang de wenti jiqi quanshi zhi fazhan: yi Zhuzi dui ‘wu dao yi yi guanzhi’ de quanshi wei zhongxin 孔子心學中潛藏的問題及其詮釋之發展：以朱子 對「吾道一以貫之」的詮釋為中心 [The Problems in the Learning of mind-heart of Confucius and the Development of Their Interpretations: An Inquiry Focusing Upon Zhu Xi’s Interpretation of Confucius’ Doctrine of ‘My Dao with One Threading It.’],” in Huang ChunChieh, Dong ya ru xue, pp. 251 – 76. 31 Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo Kogi, pp. 53 – 4. 32 Katayama Kenzan 片山兼山, Rongo Ikkan 論語一貫 [The One Running through the Analects] (Rare-book in the collection of the Kyoto University Library), p. 24. 33 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, p. 84. 34 See Huang Chun-chieh, Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun, pp. 227 – 60.

140

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

to Zhu Xi. Zhu had interpreted humaneness as, “the (utmost) virtue of mind, the (utmost) li of love,” thus investing humaneness with an abstract metaphysical meaning. In his commentary, Jeong Dasan expressed his critique of Zhu Xi’s interpretation: [Doubts]: [Zhu Xi’s] Four Books with Collected Commentaries reads: “Complete virtue of the original mind.” I contend that, “Humaneness is being fully human; the upright intercourse between two people constitutes humaneness. When father and son both fulfill their relative roles completely, that is being humane. When lord and minister fulfill their relative roles completely, that is being humane. When husband and wife fulfill their relative roles completely, that is being humane. The term “humaneness” arises from the upright intercourse between two people. This principle applies at hand in the five basic human relationships and extends afar to the ten thousand clans of the empire. Generally, when person to person relations are fulfilled exhaustively, that is called humaneness. Therefore, the Yuzi said, “Being filial and fraternal is the root of being humane.” The accurate explanation of humaneness should be along these lines.35

Jeong Dasan argued that the substance of humaneness is manifested only in “the upright intercourse between two people,” that is, in this sort of concrete “existential” context and environment. Thus, Jeong Dasan’s interpretation of humaneness is consistent with the interpretations of the eighteenth-century Chinese and Japanese Confucian scholars – displaying the second commonality among eighteenth-century East Asian Confucians.

4

A divergence among eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms: A comparison of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean subjectivities

Apart from the above-mentioned, commonly shared intellectual trends, eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms exhibited one major difference: a sharp difference in their respective subjectivities. The subjectivity of the eighteenthcentury Chinese Confucians was concentrated inward; they considered themselves and their realm as the center and did not concern themselves with foreign affairs. In contrast, the subjectivity of the Japanese Confucians had already matured by the eighteenth century, their world view was more open and they took China to be the imperial system most worth observing. But since China (the Middle Kingdom) itself was a foreign country, these scholars argued that Japan itself should be seen as the proper bearer of the title “Middle Kingdom.” As for

35 Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 2, vol. 12, Non-eo gogeumju 논어고금주, “An-yeon” 안연, 12, vol. 5, pp. 453 – 4.

A divergence among eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms

141

the Korean Confucians, while they continued to esteem “China,” they too were becoming aware of their own subjectivity.

4.1

Characteristics of Chinese subjectivity

Eighteenth-century Chinese Confucians, like Chinese Confucians throughout history, embraced a Sino-centric worldview that was deeply rooted in the timehonored imperial order. While decoding the term China (lit. “Middle Kingdom”) in the ancient classics, I recently pointed out that the term “Middle Kingdom” was developed and formed in the historical context in which East Asia took China as the hegemonic power of their political world. This sort of specific historical background gave rise of what contemporary scholars have called “political solipsism,”36 “Sinocentrism,”37 or the “Sinocentric World Order”38 in Chinese culture. Among the authors and commentators of the Chinese classics, “Middle Kingdom” was understood as representing a concrete and specific concept within Chinese culture, which also carried certain characteristic Chinese cultural values.39 The terms “Middle Kingdom” and “All Under Heaven” appeared early in the Western Zhou; what arose in the subsequent Warring States period (403 – 222 bce) was a complex orthodox concept, but the demarcation between Han and “barbarian” was not yet fixed. After the Zhou established the cultural imperial outlook, two dominant ideas tended to appear, namely, “The empire is one family” (天下一家), and “Distinction between Chinese and barbarian”. When the Chinese empire flourished, the idea that “the empire is one family” also flourished. But, when China was divided or ruled by a barbarian regime, the idea of “Distinction between Han and barbarian” prevailed.40 In paintings like the Portraits of Periodical Offering (Zhi gong tu, 職貢圖), foreigners were mostly depicted in grotesque, exaggerated, or twisted forms,41 reflecting the biases 36 Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權, Zhongguo Zhengzhi sixiang shi 中國政治思想史 [A History of Chinese Political Thought] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 10 – 16. 37 John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 1. 38 Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical notes on the Chinese World Order,” in Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, pp. 20 – 33, esp. 20. 39 See ch. 12 of this volume: “The Idea of ‘Zhongguo’ and Its Transformation in Early Modern Japan and Contemporary Taiwan.” 40 Hsing Yi-tien 邢義田, “Tianxia yijia – chuantong Zhongguo tianxiaguan de xingcheng 天下 一家─傳統中國天下觀的形成 [All-Under-Heaven is One Family: The Formation of the AllUnder-Heaven Concept in Traditional China],” in Qin-Han shi lunkao 秦漢史論稿 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1987), pp. 3 – 41, esp. 39. 41 Ke Caoguang 葛兆光, “Sixiangshi yanjiu shiye zhongde tuxiang 思想史研究視野中的圖像

142

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

against foreigners in the imperial Chinese worldview. For the Chinese Confucian scholars, the two aspects of “cultural China” and “political China” were intimately united. “China” was not only a political center but also a region of peak human civilization. The eighteenth-century Chinese were not interested in information about foreign countries. Even in the heyday of evidential studies, Chinese scholars confined their studies of philosophy and geography to China proper.42 The highly representative eighteenth-century Confucian scholar Dai Zhen was also deeply interested in geography, re-editing the Shuijingzhu (水經 注) and Shuidiji (水地記), editing the Zhili hequshu (直隸河渠書), reviewing and verifying geographic evolution, and examining the Fenzhoufu zhi (汾州府 志) and Fenyangxian zhi (汾陽縣志). But his purview never extended beyond China. In Dai Zhen’s world, outlying regions such as Korea and Japan, their customs, national character and culture were never taken into consideration.

4.2

The idea of “China” for Japanese subjectivity

In contrast to Chinese Confucians, Japanese Confucians became conscious of their Japanese subjectivity in the seventeenth century, and this subjectivity matured in the eighteenth century. The seventeenth-century Confucian Yamaga So¯ko, considered the term Zhongguo (“Middle Kingdom”, “China”) as best referring to Japan: “Our imperial court [Japan] is the referent of ‘Middle Kingdom.’”43 Yamaga So¯ko also believed that Japan had “attained its equilibrium (zhong),”44 and thus was far more qualified than imperial China to be called the Middle Kingdom. The eighteenth-century scholars Sakuma Taika45 and Asami Ke¯isai46 both understood “Middle Kingdom” as referring properly to Japan. The Yo¯meigaku scholar Sato¯ Issai (佐藤一齋, 1772 – 1859) also argued that the expression “Middle Kingdom” did not refer exclusively to the geographic region of “China.”47 These more refined expressions reflected the maturation of Japanese subjectivity, and with this maturation eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians were from then on always able to distinguish clearly between “cultural identity”

42 43 44 45 46 47

[Images in the Perspective of Intellectual History],” in Zhongguo shehuikexue 中國社會科學 4 (2002): pp. 74 – 83. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1990), p. 119. Yamaga So¯ko, Chu¯cho¯ Jijitsu, ch.13, vol. 1, p. 234. Ibid. Sakuma Taika, Wakan Me¯ben, in Nihon jurin so¯sho, vol. 4, “Disputations,” 1. Asami Ke¯isai, Chu¯goku Ben in Yamazaki Ansai Gakuha, p. 418. ¯ shio Sato¯ Issai 佐藤一齋, “Genshiroku 言志錄 [Notes on Words and Will],” in Sato¯ Issai: O Chu¯sai 佐藤一齋．大塩中齋 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), p. 227.

A divergence among eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms

143

and “political identity.” In the late eighteenth century, Bito¯ Nishu¯ served as instructor at the Sho¯heiko 昌平黌. His views were very representative. The Han kingdom has vast lands and a huge population. As to its cultural artifacts and classical texts, none of the other countries in the world can compare. To call it “Hua,” to call it “Xia” are both quite natural appellations. It is not that the people selfishly described it extravagantly. As to my kingdom [Japan], its land is not nearly as vast and its cultural artifacts are not nearly as abundant as the Han’s. Still, my kingdom occupies a unique position in the vast sea and has never been conquered by others. The people are prosperous and have everything they need.48

Bito¯ Nishu¯ clearly distinguished between China and Japan as having different “political identities.” He also expressed a warning for Japanese Confucians: “If you Confucians admire antiquity in studying the Way, certainly that is fitting. But, if admiring antiquity means admiring Han customs, such that you want to conduct all of your affairs in that fashion, then you are deviating from the fundamentals. You must pay attention to this and take it as a self-warning.”49 Bito¯ Nishu¯’s discourses concretely testify to the maturation of Japanese subjectivity in the eighteenth century. In the world view of Japanese Confucians of this era, geographic imperial China – with its vast lands, huge population, and long history – was the enormous other, it was also the most significant reference system when the Japanese considered their own domestic problems. In the mind of Tokugawa scholars, China was an idealized land of sages and worthies. Japanese literary writings always displayed images from Chinese pastoral scenes, and eighteenth-century ornamental Han poetry inscriptions had become quite fashionable. The poems became descriptive expressions; they were exchanged socially and even became tools of political satire. For this reason, when Japanese subjectivity led to a simultaneous rise in Japanese ethnocentrism, those scholars who felt affection for China suddenly became targets of attacks. Gradually, Zhongguo was transformed into a metaphorical expression for the Japanese. It no longer referred to that geographic region called “China” with its definite cultural content, but became an other, one morally and politically constructed, a relatively primitive, homegrown, intuitive other. There was a mythologized “Middle Kingdom” and a defamed “China.” These two reckonings sprang from the same psychological root.50 In the eighteenth century, the position China occupied in the Japanese mind gradually diminished. In the modern Japanese worldview, China changed 48 Bito¯ Nishu¯ 尾藤二洲, Se¯ki Yohitsu 靜寄餘筆 [Remaining Notes in Serenity], vol. 1, in Seki ¯ tori shuppan, 1978), vol. 2, p. 10. Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho (Tokyo: O 49 Ibid. 50 Marius B. Janson, China in the Tokugawa World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 76 – 88.

144

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

from being tian-xia (all under Heaven, the Empire, the world) to being just one of many “other” lands. This diminishment occurred in step with the development of Japanese subjectivity, and it was spurred on by the growing strength of Japanese “collective identity.”51 Among the eighteenth-century Japanese Confucians, Ogyu¯ Sorai enjoyed a very close relationship with the Tokugawa Shogunate. On the first day of April (lunar calendar), 1728, Ogyu¯ Sorai had an audience with Tokugawa Yoshimune (德川吉宗, 1684 – 1751). Ogyu¯ Sorai composed a book, Discourse on Governance, in which he deduced the key problems of Tokugawa society as the entire society’s wandering lifestyle and its lack of a system of rules for governing human affairs. As a result, Ogyu¯ Sorai recommended establishing a household registration system and allowing all people to have a clear dwelling place. He also recommended focusing on townsmen, peasants, and samurai in order to establish an unequal social order, which would lead to clear social distinctions. Moreover, he suggested establishing a system for the gentry class and prohibiting the Shogunate from purchasing goods.52 This ambitious proposal for administering Japan was recommended to the Shogun, and was intertwined with references and examples drawn from Chinese history. However, every time China was mentioned in his Seidan, he called it the “foreign country.”53 For instance, Ogyu¯ Sorai held up an example from Chinese history to advocate a certain administrative policy; he referred to the Qin-Han empire’s experience of implementing a household registration system for the people, and suggested that Tokogawa Yoshimune also establish a household registration and travel documentation system to strengthen control over the people’s homes and movements. Throughout his Seidan, whenever he presented policy suggestions he always secretly drew on the policy experiences of the authoritarian rule of the Qin-Han empire. Yet at the same time, he always referred to China as just a “foreign country.” Here we see a concrete example of his Japanese subjectivity. If we turn now to the subjectivity of eighteenth-century Korean Confucians, we find for example the Korean Yangming scholar, Jeong Je-du (鄭齊斗, 1649 – 1736) mentioning in his writings that the numerous rules of ancient China were like the numerous well-field systems, “that which China did not transmit, that which the late Confucians did not see, only my Korea had the foundation.”54

51 Peter Nosco, “The Place of China in the Construction of Japan’s Modern World View,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 4/1 (June 2007): pp. 27 – 48. 52 Cong Ying, trans., Ogyu¯ Sorai, Zheng tan, ch. 4, p. 229. 53 Ibid., 57, p. 227. 54 Jeong Je-du 정제두, Hagokjip 霞谷集 하곡집 [Collection of Essays by Hagok], in Han-guk munjip chonggan 韓國文集叢刊 한국문집총간 [Series of Literary Corpus of Korea] (Seoul:

A divergence among eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms

145

Jeong’s argument was that Korea had a better sense of antiquity than did China. Nevertheless he admitted that, “We in the east [Korea] do not have the original line of sage-to-sage transmission,”55 recognizing the excellence of Chinese culture. However, by the late eighteenth century Korean subjectivity was already clearly and distinctly expressed in the writings of Jeong Dasan. Jeong Dasan wrote that, although Korea “boasted texts and cultural objects, they were modeled after China’s. But, as for the writings in books and records, we must make our country clear.”56 For Jeong Dasan, it was clear that Korea and China were equal competitors. He also referred to Confucius’ wish to dwell with the nine barbarian tribes, thus disputing Confucius’ other assertion that two barbarian tribes with rulers could not be as good as the Xia people without a ruler.57 Jeong Dasan declared: The country located south of the great wall and north of the five peaks is called “the Middle Kingdom” while the country located east of the Liao River [遼河] is called “the East Kingdom.” As to those from the East Kingdom who venture to swim across the river, people all admire them and sigh. In my point of view, as for the so-called Middle Kingdom, I do not know in what sense it is “middle,” and as for the so-called East Kingdom, I do not know in what sense it is “east.” If we regard the sun at the apex as noon, then time marches in step with the increasing distance between the sun and the apex, and we can know the center established between east and west. The North Pole rises as the highest point on earth while the South Pole sinks as the lowest point on earth. Only by establishing the arc between them can we establish the midpoint between north and south. Having obtained the middle between east, west, north and south, it turns out that no matter where we go, it is the Middle Kingdom. Who is to say what is “East Kingdom”? If wherever we go is the Middle Kingdom, who is to say what is “Middle Kingdom”? How, indeed, was the expression “Middle Kingdom” ever established? There was the Middle Kingdom of the upright rule of Yao, Shun, Yu and Tang. There was the Middle Kingdom of the learning of Confucius, Yan Hui, Zisi and Mencius. How could such a “Middle Kingdom” exist today? If the criteria were sagely upright rule and sagely learning, then the designation should be transferred to the East Kingdom [Korea]. Why must we insist to seek it in a faraway distant place?58

What is most noteworthy about this passage is that Jeong Dasan draws upon cultural transmission rather than geographic space in defining the “Middle

55 56 57 58

Gyeong-in munhwasa, 1995), series 160, vol. 3, Yeominpanseoseo 여민판서서 [Letter to Minpanseo], p. 73a. Jeong Je-du, Hagokjip 하곡집, vol. 9, Jon-eon 存言下 [Remaining Words, II] 존언, 264a. Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 1, Simunjip 시문집 [Collection of Poems and Essays], vol. 8, Daechaek 대책, “Jirichaek” 지리책, vol. 1, p. 604. Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 2, Gyeongjip 경집, vol. 7, Non-eo jogeumju 논어고금주, vol. 1, “Pal-il” 팔일, Bk. 5, pp. 89 – 91. Jeong Yak-yong, Yeoyudang jeonseo, collection 1, Simunjip 시문집, vol. 13, Munjip 문집, “Song han-gyori sayeon seo 송한교리사연서,” Bk. 2, pp. 393 – 4.

146

The Confucian World of Thought in Eighteenth-Century East Asia

Kingdom.” He considered that the learning of Confucius and Mencius and the wise rule of the sages no longer existed in eighteenth-century China, but had instead been transmitted to Korea. Thus Jeong Dasan’s account of the “Middle Kingdom” fully manifested a vital expression of Korean subjectivity in late eighteen-century Confucian worldview. In summary, from our examination of several representative figures from eighteenth-century East Asian Confucianisms, we have seen that the Chinese subjectivity of the eighteenth-century Chinese Confucians was limited to Chinese territory and soil alone. As to the world outside of China, the East Asian border regions in particular, they were not included in the limited purview of Chinese Confucians such as Dai Zhen. However, when reflecting on political problems, Japanese Confucians like Ogyu¯ Sorai, while referring to Chinese imperial history still did not deviate from their solid sense of Japanese subjectivity. Even among Korean Confucians, such as Jeong Dasan, Korean subjectivity was well rooted and beginning to sprout.

5

Conclusion

In the eighteenth century, the Western powers were strong and vital but still had not invaded East Asia. This meant that the East Asian countries enjoyed a calm and peaceful century before the storms and turmoil that was to follow. During the years of the eighteenth century, East Asian Confucians transitioned from early modern to modern thought and disposition. They were deeply dissatisfied with the thought of Zhu Xi which had been the official ideology since the fourteenth century. The majority of eighteenth-century East Asian Confucians criticized Zhu Xi’s thought and sought to deconstruct the metaphysical foundation that he had erected. Instead, they tended to emphasize the importance of the concrete daily life of the people, reflecting their heartfelt concern for the common people. The eighteenth-century East Asian Confucians could not accept that the “human way” (rendao) was determined in advance by a supposed metaphysical realm, the “heavenly way” (tiandao), and claimed that pattern (li) and the Way (dao) could only exist in the context of actual ethical intercourse within the ordinary daily lives of the people. Thus that principle and the Way changed with the times, their content became ever richer over time. Indeed, this new claim that “the Way exists in the secular world” inclined the eighteenth-century Confucians to seek the substance or essence of the Way and principle in concrete existence. Nevertheless, the differing subjectivities among the eighteenth-century Confucians also revealed some major contrasts among them. The Chinese Confucians took China to be the center of the world so that, even though they made efforts in the study of geography, their purview did not extend to the outside

Conclusion

147

world. In contrast, the Japanese and Korean Confucians, on the one hand admired China as the enormous and unavoidable other while, on the other hand, nurturing a high degree of Japanese and Korean subjectivity. Hence, the Japanese Confucian Ogyu¯ Sorai could not only call China the “foreign country,” he could also argue that only Japan was qualified to bear the name Middle Kingdom. As for the Korean Confucians, while they still admired China, they also bore a clear and evident Korean subjectivity. In this chapter we have seen that the study of “East Asian Confucianisms” should not be undertaken with a dubious Sinocentric assumption of the dichotomy between “center” and “periphery.” When we study East Asian Confucianisms we participate in a new research field of comparative intellectual history, and we should therefore adopt a flexible, dynamic standpoint, examining the developmental processes that have occurred in the Confucian traditions of China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. We should focus on the attitudes and discourses of the Confucian scholars in constructing and expressing their own respective national subjectivities. Indeed, only with this highly diversified outlook can studies in East Asian Confucianisms begin to open the door to a new scope and range of scholarship, and make rich contributions to the continuing dialogue among civilizations in the twenty-first century.

Chapter Eight: Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

1

Introduction

Without doubt, Confucius occupies an incomparable position in East Asia. In the traditional cultures of China, Japan, and Korea, he is revered as the One with sagely personality, exquisite literary sensibilities, robust sense of praxis, and humane political principles. Venerated as the Sage par excellence, Confucius has exerted far-reaching influence throughout all East Asia. Commentaries on the Analects, the received compilation of his didactic dialogues, are almost countless, having proliferated from ancient times down to the present. Over the last chapters we have examined how Zhu Xi’s scholarship has grown in impact and influence in the history of Confucian thought, and the ways in which different East Asian Confucian traditions in the early modern period have engaged with the so-called orthodoxy of Zhu Xi’s work. In the present chapter, we will turn now to look at Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretations of the Analects. Ito¯ is particularly important since he stands as Japan’s foremost seventeenth-century thinker, particularly as a scholar of Classical Confucianism. He held the Analects in high esteem, regarding it as “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe” (最上至極宇宙第一書).1 He wrote two commentaries, the Gomo¯ Jigi and Rongo Kogi (論語古義), devoting much of his life to the latter work. His eldest son reported that, “He began writing this commentary when his teeth were still growing […] and continued revising and adding to it for about fifty years, rewriting the manuscript five times.”2 It is obvious that Jinsai himself felt confident about the Rongo Kogi and further claimed that it “elucidates what has lain hidden for ages in the Analects and the Mencius. I venture to publicize my personal opinions in this commentary on what has not been explicitly said before.”3 Indeed, it was to become Ito¯’s most representative work. 1 Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo Kogi, vol. 3, p. 4; hereafter: Rongo Kogi. Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, vol. 1, p. 204. 2 Rongo Kogi, p. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 4.

150

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

The book also stands as a testament to a type of Confucian hermeneutics that developed in East Asia, a forceful apologia for Confucius against the “heresies” of Daoism, Buddhism, and Song Neo-Confucianism. Jinsai re-interprets Confucius by offering meticulous textual exegesis, fresh intratextual annotations of the Analects, and faithful definitions of key concepts such as Dao and Jen as Confucius himself meant them. He also offered intertextual collations of the Analects with other classical writings in order to show their mutual coherence.

2

The Analects and Ito¯’s hermeneutical methodology

Ito¯ Jinsai sought a fresh understanding of Confucius by commenting on the Analects via two routes: (2.1) re-reading the Analects with new textual and philological annotations, thus replacing the Song Neo-Confucian hermeneutics; and (2.2) meticulously comparing the Analects with other Chinese classics in order to discern their overall mutual coherence. His fresh grasp of Confucius opened the way to a new Confucian hermeneutics.

2.1

Intratextual annotations on the Analects

Ito¯’s commentaries proceed in three steps. First, he glossed word meanings after every single sentence in the Analects; second, he expressed his impressions of every chapter; finally he summed up his opinions with a statement beginning, “I judge, saying…” (論曰). Let us look at two examples of this method. In Analects 1.12, Youzi says, “Of the things brought about [用] by the rites, harmony is the most valuable. Of the ways of the Former Kings, this is the most beautiful, and is followed alike in matters great and small.”4 Over generations, the character yong (用) had attracted various interpretations. Zhu Xi, for example, interpreted it according to the Song Neo-Confucian theory of “substance” (ti, 體) and “function” (yong, 用). “Since decorum (li, 禮), though solemn in substance, also originates with Harmony in the Principles of Nature, so both their functions must value unhurried calm.”5 Based on an alleged distinction between substance and function in rites, this interpretation better reflects Zhu Xi’s own system of thought rather than serving as an explanation of either the word or the rites. Ito¯ adopted a special method to reject Zhu Xi’s normative interpretation, he examined the meanings of the words as Confucius himself had used them in the Analects. He wrote, “yong (用) is ‘as/with’ (以), as the Book of Rites 禮記 said, ‘li 4 D. C. Lau, trans., The Analects, 1.12; hereafter: Analects. 5 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, juan 1, p. 51.

The Analects and Ito¯’s hermeneutical methodology

151

takes harmony as valuable’ (禮之以和為貴). Harmony means no affront, for since excessive li (禮) separates people, in performing li one takes harmony as valuable.”6 Ito¯ Jinsai’s belief was that we should understand the Analects by recovering each word’s meaning in its original context, and should avoid imposing meanings or contexts from outside the Analects, as Zhu Xi had done. Thus Ito¯ criticized and rejected Zhu Xi by arguing: An old commentator [i. e. Zhu Xi] said, “Li [禮, decorum], though solemn in substance [體], must be unhurried and calm in function [yong, 用].” Now the Song Confucian scholars originated the theory of substance versus function, but the studies conducted by the sagely ancients had no such distinction. What were they [like]? The way among the sages just shuttled among ethics and its principles; they kept striving to practice their concrete details, never reflecting back to the calm recesses of the mind-heart in practice, seeking where it is yet to issue in action. Thus, as to what is called Benevolence, Righteousness, Decorum, and Wisdom, the sages practiced at the level of their having already been issued in action, without minding their substance. But, Buddha stayed out of ethics and its principles to concentrate on our single mind-heart, and yet could not stop the worldly give and take among men. In talking about true versus false doctrines, he could not help but adopt the theory of substance versus function, as a Tang monk said in the Commentaries on the Huayan Sutra [華嚴經疏], “Substance and function are the single origin that thoroughly manifest the minutest details [of things].” Sayings like this became so prevalent among Song Confucian scholars that they began to formulate a theory of Principle, Matter-energy [qi, 氣], Substance and Function. Benevolence, Righteousness, Decorum and Wisdom have their respective substances and functions. “Before manifesting” [未發] is substance; “already manifesting” [已發] is function. The sages’ great instructions thus were torn to pieces and turned into words of function without substance. As long as we hold to the framework of substance-function, we will make light of function in favor of substance and people cannot but pursue substance by discarding function. The result has been to promote the doctrine of desireless quiet emptiness at the expense of Filiality, Brotherliness, Loyalty and Fidelity.7

Ito¯’s claim here is that the distinctions the Neo-Confucians had drawn between inner and outer, substance and function had originated in a Buddhist-like desire for orthodoxy, and that the propagation of such dichotomies inclined people to pursue the will-o’-the-wisp of “inner substance,” such that they tore to pieces Confucius’ robust praxis of principled ethics. Both of these extraordinary claims await historical confirmation, to be sure, but they show how Ito¯ Jinsai engaged in this project, “returning to Confucius” in order to defend Confucius against later heresies.

6 Rongo Kogi, p. 10. 7 Ibid., p. 11.

152

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

As a second example, we can look at the phrase “with One threading it” (yi yi guan zhi, 一以貫之) which appears twice in Confucius’ Analects.8 In Analects 4.15, Confucius talks to his disciple Zengzi about the single thread binding his Dao, Zengzi then tells others that this means doing one’s best (zhong) and using oneself as a measure to gauge the likes and dislikes of others (shu). On another occasion, recorded in Analects 15.3, Confucius denies that he is a man of broad learning, and claims instead to “have a single thread binding it all together.” Liu Baonan lamented that, “No one knew what this meant since the times of Han.”9 Zhu Xi had interpreted the phrase in terms of his own philosophical concept, saying: Principle runs throughout, responding everywhere appropriately at every twist and turn, thus 貫 means to “penetrate all” (tong, 通) […] The sage’s heart-mind is One turn, to function differently on each occasion […] It is analogous to “the Heaven and Earth stay sincere to the utmost without ceasing, and all myriad things respectively obtain their proper places.” […] “Sincere to the utmost without ceasing” is Dao’s substance [ti, 體], the One Origin [Yiben, 一本] of myriad things. “All myriad things respectively obtaining their proper places” shows Dao’s function [用], the One Origin diversifying in myriad ways.10

Clearly, Zhu Xi understood Confucius’ “with One threading it” in light of his own conception that, “principle is one, its manifestations are many.” However, in contrast, Ito¯ Jinsai argued: Guan [貫] means to unite [統]. It means that Dao in its extreme vastness is unity without mixture and is self-attained for good among all under heaven, uniting everything everywhere; it is impossible for us to obtain by means of much learning […] Dao is merely a single unity. Although the Five Constancies go in hundreds of ways, and are extremely various; in their diverse ways, through hundreds of deliberations, they all return to this One, this Ultimate One of all under heaven that can unite myriads of “good” under heaven. Thus, the Master mentions no mind-heart [xin, 心], no principle [li, 理], but mentions only “a single thread binding it all together.”11

Unlike Zhu Xi’s abstract tong (通) that penetrates whatever is, Ito¯ Jinsai takes guan as a concrete unity (tong) of all. Koyasu Nobukuni recently described Ito¯ Jinsai’s hermeneutic method as understanding the words by concretely deciphering their meanings as they appear in each textual instance, as opposed to interpreting the words via abstract Neo-Confucian theories.12 In Koyasu’s words, Ito¯ adopted the “concrete incidence approach.” 8 See the extended discussion of this phrase and its interpretive history in chapter 5 of this volume. 9 These are the words of the Qing scholar Liu Baonan in Lunyu zhengyi, vol. 1, p. 152. 10 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, juan 8, p. 161. 11 Rongo Kogi, pp. 53 – 4. 12 Based on a recent study of Ito¯’s Gomo¯ Jigi, Koyasu Nobukuni said that this volume seeks the

The Analects and Ito¯’s hermeneutical methodology

153

Ito¯ Jinsai further elucidates such concrete hermeneutics in taking loyalty (zhong) and reciprocity (shu) as the praxis of Dao, not as scholastic glosses on Dao. He says: I judge, saying: The Sages’ Dao merely resides in the midst of the human ethical constants, the greatest of which is to save people. Thus, by loyalty and reciprocity, Zengzi developed the one penetrating the Master’s Dao. This was indeed how the Sages’ Dao was transmitted to later students so clearly and completely. The Master thus answers Fan Chi’s [樊遲] query on Ren by saying, “Be loyal to people.” Zigong [子貢] asked, “What would be one word to practice through life?” The Master said merely, “Probably reciprocity.” Mencius also said, “Try to reciprocate with others; for seeking Ren, nothing is closer than this.” So, we can see that loyalty and reciprocity are the ultimate essentials of Ren that form the start and the finish of the sagely studies. Loyalty and reciprocity do not refer to “the one that penetrates”; they are themselves that Dao by which to penetrate things into one. Former Confucians [i. e. Zhu Xi] thought the Master’s heart-mind was totally one Principle, flexibly responding to all. Only Zengzi had grasped Confucius’ real meaning, and it was something that not all students can understand. So, he used loyalty and reciprocity to instruct us about the meaning of the one that penetrates. How could all this be the case?13

When Ito¯ Jinsai said14 that the Dao that “penetrates all into one” resides only amid loyalty and reciprocity, in concrete moral behavior, he was directly targeting Zhu Xi’s view that the Dao is above loyalty and reciprocity, at one with the metaphysical Principle (li) that gives birth to qi and the myriad things.15 In a similar vein, Ito¯ Jinsai commented on Confucius’ saying in 15.2: I judge, saying: The ancients considered practicing virtues to be doing scholarship. Outside virtue-practice there was no so-called “scholarship.” Thus, once scholarship was accomplished, virtues were established of themselves. In deepening self-cultivation to manage families and all under heaven, there was nothing difficult. Later, people took meanings of the words by looking into concrete usage of these terms by Confucius and Mencius. This is diametrically opposed to the theoretical approach used by Zhu Xi’s school of Neo-Confucianism, which sought to ascertain the definite meanings of terms (as in Xingli ziyi 性理字義). The “incident approach” examines the meaning of a word in the concrete context of its usage. See Koyasu Nobukuni, “Ito¯ Jinsai yu ren di shidai ti Lunyu jie: zhi Tianming shuo 伊藤仁齋與「人的時代」的《論語》解—知天命說 [Ito¯ Jinsai and Interpretation of the Analects in the ‘Era of Man’: An Interpretation of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’],” in Koyasu Nobukuni, Donya Zuxue: Pipan yu fangfa 東亞儒學：批判與方法 [East Asian Confucianisms: Critique and Method], trans. Chen Weifen 陳瑋芬 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 37 – 53. 13 Rongo Kogi, pp. 230 – 1. 14 We might call this Ito¯’s “locutionary intention,” as defined by John R. Searle in his Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), and “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,” in K. Gunderson, ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 334 – 69. 15 Cheng Shude said, “This chapter has only two possible meanings, the one that penetrates all resides either outside or inside loyalty and reciprocity.” See his Lunyu jishi, vol. 1, p. 267.

154

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

practicing virtues as virtue-practice and doing scholarship as scholarship, not realizing that we must take virtue-practice as scholarship itself. Thus, if one decides to practice self-cultivation, one will use strength to grasp and hold on, if one wants to manage the world, one will maintain it with legal regulations, and those with little knowledge will try hard to borrow and pretend. Virtues now lie barren.16

Whatever is regarded as abstract in scholarship can actually be found only in concrete practice. This thesis derives from Ito¯’s distinctive interpretation of the Dao in Confucius.

2.2

Intertextual coherence with other classics

Ito¯’s second interpretive method was to collate other classical writings with Confucius’ Analects in order to identify and display their mutual affinities. Ito¯ Jinsai expressed this general approach in his annotation to Analects 2.2 (which reads, “The Master said, ‘The Odes are three hundred in number. They can be summed up in one phrase: Swerve not from the right path.”17). Ito¯ Jinsai commented: I judge, saying: Benevolence, Righteousness, Principle, and Wisdom are called virtues, they are the root of the human Way. Loyalty, Fidelity, Reverence, and Reciprocity are called behavior-cultivation. Thus, talk about virtues must be the center, while discourses on cultivation of behavior must be what is essential, which is also what our Teacher [Confucius] meant when he said “swerve not from the right path” to cover “the Odes are three hundred in number.” Some former scholars [i. e. Zhu Xi] regarded benevolence as the essence of the Analects, innate good as the essence of the Mencius, holding to the Middle, of the Book of Documents, and timeliness, of the Book of Change, thus assigning each Classic one essence, without seeing an overall unity. These scholars were unaware of various classics as various roads converging to one, the one going back to hundreds of thoughts, many words pierced into one. Thus, “swerve not from the right path” is really what begins and completes sagely scholarship.18

Ito¯ believed that there was a unity of meaning in the various sagely words of the Classics. Thus, he interpreted the Analects by also appealing to the content of the other classics. He took the Mencius to be at one with the Analects, as its derivative19, and so the words in the former can lead back to a correct understanding of the latter. For example: 16 17 18 19

Rongo Kogi, vol. 8, p. 230. Analects, p. 11. Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, vol. 9, p. 1. Rongo Kogi, p. 31.

The Analects and Ito¯’s hermeneutical methodology

155

The Seven Sections comment on the Analects, we understand by grasping the Mencius. By not starting at the Mencius but seeking what Confucius meant by merely looking at words in the Analects, we could become arbitrary and make mistakes, as with Song scholars saying “benevolence means the orthodox principle of all under heaven.” Learners should not be unaware of this danger.20

Thus, Ito¯ Jinsai always cited the Mencius when commenting on the Analects. For example, Ito¯ cited Mencius’ statement that, “The organ of the heart can think. But, it will find the answer only if it does think” (Mencius 6 A15), in interpreting Analects 5.20: “think three times before taking action.”21 He also cited Mencius’ arguments based on the “unbearable mind” and “unbearable governments” to interpret some of Confucius’ comments on benevolence.22 On human nature, however, the views of Confucius and Mencius differ somewhat, yet after some effort Ito¯ Jinsai believed he could harmonize them: Confucius said, “Nature [among humans] is mutually close.” Mencius specifically said, “[Human] nature is good,” so their words seem to differ. Why? Being a student of Confucius, how could Mencius have meant something different? His “Human nature is good” was to elucidate the meaning of “Human nature is mutually close.” Sages Yao and Shun differ so much from people on the street, yet they are said to be close, for however different people are in their personalities, strong or soft, dark or brilliant, they do not differ in the Four Buds inside. Water may differ in being sweet or bitter, clear or turbid, yet it always flows downward. Likewise, what our Teacher took to “be close” Mencius said to “be innately good.” Thus, what Confucius said to be close, Mencius specifically said to be as innately good, as water flows downward, and thus as far as our true-nature [情] goes, it is capable of becoming good, in short, “good.” All these words are said in terms of innate quality, not in terms of reasoning. In regard to reasoning, we cannot even talk about ourselves as being far or close.23

Here Ito¯ Jinsai emphasized the basic unity of what Confucius and Mencius were discussing. Again, this was to target the Song Neo-Confucians, especially Zhu Xi and his so-called “solid scholarship.” Besides being at one with the Mencius, Ito¯ Jinsai also took Confucius to be at one with the Spring and Autumn Annals. He said: The people, events, and political ebb and flow of those days that our Teacher [Confucius] spoke about do not seem very relevant to students of “today.” Why then did Confucian students avidly receive those volumes? Our Teacher had said, “Rather put down clearly matters relevant to specific times than wield empty words.” Since scholarship aims at effective action, it is best to tackle concrete events and things to observe their rights and wrong, gains and losses, rather than discourse about general principles. 20 21 22 23

Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., pp. 70 – 1. Ibid., p. 70. Ibid., pp. 256 – 7.

156

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

These chapters and the Spring and Autumn Annals then mutually form “inside and outside.” This is why these students held them dear.24

Ito¯’s view can be contrasted with the approaches taken by two other scholars. Pi Xirui (皮錫瑞, Lumeng 鹿門, 1850 – 1908) and Takeuchi Yoshio (武內義雄, 1886 – 1966). Pi Xirui aptly noted that, “The Annals’ claim that overthrowing rebels is Great Justice tacitly suggests Mencius’ words on change and establishment of government; Gongyang and Zhu Xi’s comments lead us to grasp Mencius’ intentions.”25 In this way the Annals and Mencius together form “the inside and the outside” of a whole. Takeuchi Yoshio, a contemporary Japanese sinologist, also adopted a similar view.26 They both understood the Annals in terms of the Mencius. Ito¯ took the Annals and the Analects to form the inside and outside of a whole, since both books argue from concrete matters without wielding empty generalizations. Likewise, Ito¯ Jinsai saw how the Books of Odes and Documents agreed with the Analects in that they all discuss principles without neglecting the actual circumstances; they view abstract matters in concrete terms. He commented on Analects 7.18 saying, “Where the Master used the correct pronunciations was the Odes, the Book of Documents, and the performance of rites. In all these cases, he used the correct pronunciation.”27 He then added, “The Book of Odes explains feelings and sentiments, the Book of Documents explains matters of politics. Both Classics realistically elucidate interpersonal ethics in terms of daily life.”28 Ito¯ could then develop this viewpoint further: I judge, saying: Seeking the Way in the high, seeking matters in the far, this is a general fault of scholars. In contrast, Books of Odes and Documents teach with matters close to human situations relevant for daily use, making matters not far from us humans into the Way, with words not far from the human world. And so, as we can persist in adhering to Decency [禮], we become paragons of human demeanor to keep up the worldly ways. This is why our Teacher constantly discusses these three Classics. As for Buddhism and Daoism, they leave the world and break off with secularity to engage only with the high and far without regard to this world. They therefore do not really attain the principles (理) of the Books of Odes and Documents. Besides, although later Confucians recite the Book of Odes and read the Book of Documents, they seek understanding in too deep, too difficult areas without knowing that they should seek it in easy ordinary situations close by. As a result, their words and deeds are often manifestly encumbered

24 Ibid., p. 29. 25 Pi Xirui 皮錫瑞, Jingxue Tonglun 經學通論 [An Introduction to the Study of Classics] (Taipei: Holo tushu chubanshe, 1973), vol. 4, pp. 1 – 2. 26 Takeuchi Yoshio 武內義雄, “Mo¯shi to Shunju¯,” in Takeuchi Yoshio Zenshu¯ 武內義雄全集 [Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshio] (Tokyo: Kadogawa Shoten, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 473 – 85. 27 Analects, p. 61. 28 Rongo Kogi, p. 103.

The Analects and Ito¯’s hermeneutical methodology

157

with twists and difficulties, lacking in vast, right, and unhurried composure. Isn’t it true that the reputed difficulty of reading is not in reading but in reading well and right?29

Ito¯ Jinsai stressed that the Analects, the Books of Odes and of Documents all derive from daily human and ethical activity, and so they are able to cast light on one another. He hesitated, however, inhis attempts to interweave the Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of Changes due to the “extremely high and profound” contents of the latter two. On Analects 5.16 (“The Master said of Zichan that he possessed the way of the gentleman on four counts”30), he noted: I judge, saying: Claiming the gentlemanly way differs considerably from claiming the sagely way. The sagely way is concerned about the extremity, the gentlemanly way is concerned with the ordinary, right and common rules that apply throughout myriads of generations, such as what various chapters in the Doctrine of the Mean discuss. Sadly, the commentator [i. e. Zhu Xi31] understood the Biyin [費隱] Chapter according to high abstruse principles, thereby losing much of the original intent.32

What is difficult about the Mean does not lie in its mysterious technicalities. As Ito¯ said, “The Mean is the most difficult thing to practice in the world, not in undertaking the difficult actions of the world, but in keeping up our easy daily routines without change from start to finish. This is why they say the Mean is impossible.”33 It is in this sense that he believed that the Mean and the Analects could mutually interpret one another. Ito¯ Jinsai thus unified various Classics with the Analects under the view that they all discuss the ways of our daily ethics. Yet this hermeneutical method ran into difficulties when it came to the Book of Changes. When discussing Analects 7.17 (“Grant me a few more years so that I may continue to study the Changes at the age of fifty and I shall, perhaps, be free from major errors”), Ito¯ noted: I judge, saying: In the ancient days of his sagely rule, Bao Xi [包羲] looked up and down, far and near, and created eight trigrams that were modeled after powers of divinities and the vicissitudes of yin-yang [陰陽], the principles of myriad things giving birth and

29 Ibid., p. 104. 30 Analects, p. 41. 31 Zhu Xi commented on a statement in the Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 12 (“The way which the gentleman pursues, reaches wide and far, and yet is secret”) – which he had personally compiled – saying, “The gentleman’s Dao is inexhaustible, uncontainable, from as close as in the nuptial room to the realm of the sages. Its exterior has no outside, its interior has no inside; it can be called bi [費]. Yet the principle [理] that makes it what it is lies hidden and invisible. What we can know and are capable of is one within Dao, and its outer reaches no sages know or are capable of knowing.” See Zhongyong Zhangju 中庸章句 [Chapters and Verses of the Doctrine of the Mean], in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, p. 22. 32 Rongo Kogi, p. 68. 33 Ibid., p. 69.

158

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

resting. After the last days of the Yin [殷] Dynasty, the Zhou [周] Dynasty arose to compile appended remarks so as to tell fortunes, and called the book the I – Ching [周易, Zhouyi, Book of Changes]. When our Teacher came he only spoke on the way of former rulers and virtues of ren [仁, benevolence] and yi [義, righteousness]. His talks with disciples were simple and refined. He instructed them untiringly with nothing other than discussions on such virtues in the Book of Odes and Documents, while we are left with only this saying on the Book of Changes, which previously had been a book of divination, so our Teacher went against the custom of concentrating on the principles of change. Mencius also often quoted from Book of Odes and Documents and argued about the Spring and Autumn Annals, but of the Book of Changes he left not a single saying with us, for his studies were concerned with the adoration of benevolence and righteousness, and attending to filiality and brotherliness. He taught us to cultivate our nature, while the Book of Changes talks about nothing but profit. However, since the book also meticulously details methods of life-management and exhorts people to greatly benefit others, our Teacher also adopted it. Those desiring to learn from Confucius and Mencius also do well to adore the Book of Odes and Documents and Annals, and approach the Book of Changes in the perspective of our Teacher’s saying, “may have no major mistakes,” never using it as a book of divination.34

Ito¯ Jinsai regarded Confucius as the first person in history to understand the Book of Changes, not as a book of divination but as a book of meanings. In that light he could harmonize it with the Analects and use each to elucidate the other. In sum, Ito¯ Jinsai initiated a new phase of Analects scholarship. He not only traced back to the original meanings of Confucius’ sayings in the Analects, but also understood all the Classics to form together a unity, “inside and outside,” each elucidating the great principles of daily life. Ito¯ pursued both these routes in order to refute Zhu Xi.

3

Ito¯ Jinsai’s perspective on his Analects-scholarship and its reconstruction

Now that we have a sense of Ito¯’s hermeneutical methods, we can examine just why he considered the Analects to be “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe.” In the following sections, we will see (3.1) that Ito¯ Jinsai understood the world of the Analects as providing the context of the “Dao in the secular,” and (3.2) offered new interpretations of Dao and ren in that light.

34 Ibid., p. 103; Analects, p. 61.

Ito¯ Jinsai’s perspective on his Analects-scholarship and its reconstruction

3.1

159

The context of “Dao in the secular”

Ito¯ Jinsai considered the world of the Analects as providing the context of “Dao in the secular,” a statement which means that the common and inevitable moral principles are to be found only in daily life. The Dao exists only in the interpersonal deeds and words that occur in daily life. As the Mean shows, the metaphysical world only appears in the common ordinary world, and both worlds together form a unity in their shared constitution. It was for this reason that Ito¯ objected to the Song Neo-Confucians who had, he believed, constructed well above this actual life-world another separate metaphysical world of li (principle) that supposedly gave birth to and governed the myriad things of the universe. Ito¯ denied the existence of such a transcendent world “above and beyond,” and instead sought human nature only through concrete daily life.35 Ito¯ admired Confucius’ saying in Analects 6.29: “Supreme indeed is the Mean as a moral virtue. It has long been rare among the common people.”36 Ito¯ discussed this at length: I judge, saying: The virtue of the Mean is the most difficult virtue under heaven. People discuss the Dao. They want to reach the highest and most difficult Ultimate in order to get to the Dao. We rely on thrust to reach the highest and on striving to do the difficult. But, the virtue of the Mean is common, easy, and unhurried; it is unreachable by thrust or striving. This is why people are incapable of the Mean. During the Three glorious Generations of Tang and Yü, people were simple, common, pure, without twisty artificiality, and none were not naturally in harmony with the Dao. Fathers were fathers, sons were sons, brothers were brothers, and spouses were spouses, naturally without contrivance or strange manipulation, and dealt with one another according as what they saw and heard. This is what is called the virtue of the Mean. In contrast, later people seek the Dao in the far and seek matters in the difficult. The more they try the farther away they get. Trying to repair the situation, they tear things apart even further. Therefore it is said, “It has long been rare among the common people.” This is why our Teacher specifically established the Dao of the Mean as people’s ultimate horizon, and this is why the Analects is “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe.”37

For Ito¯, the Analects was “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe” precisely because what it conveys are the principles of ordinary daily 35 See Huang Chun-Chieh, Dongya ruxueshi de xinshiye, pp. 125 – 70. Contemporary Japanese scholars unanimously agree on Ito¯’s anti-metaphysical character. E.g., Ishida Ichiro¯ 石田一 良 said, “Jinsai-scholarship is an ‘absolute humanity-scholarship’ against Heaven-centered Song scholarship, insisting on understanding humanity in terms of humanity”; see Ishida Ichiro¯, Ito¯ Jinsai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1960, 1973), p.140. Koyasu Nobukuni, Ito¯ Jinsai: Jinrinteki sekai no shiso¯, esp. 27 – 60, convincingly argued that Ito¯ Jinsai’s world of thought is the ethical interpersonal world. 36 Analects, p. 53. 37 Rongo Kogi, p. 91.

160

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

life. Such a Dao bears its inevitable universality and universal effectiveness. As Yang Rur-bin (楊儒賓) recently noted, “Ito¯ Jinsai regarded the content of the Analects to be none too mysterious or profound, but just the universal, common, and practicable matters to be learned. This was the so-called ‘No Dao outside people, no people outside Dao.’ The precise definition of Dao is ‘people’s Dao.”38 Ito¯ thus understood the Dao to lie in the common and the human; the Analects discusses such a Dao, and therefore it is “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe.”

3.2

Ito¯’s new interpretations of Confucius

3.2.1 Understanding Dao by its Classical Meaning Ito¯ Jinsai conducted such mundane hermeneutics of the Analects by tracing the key notions back to their classical archaic meanings – in contrast to Zhu Xi’s metaphysical approach to the Classics. One typical example is his interpretation of Dao and nature, for example in Analects 5.12 (“Zigong said, ‘One can hear about the Master’s achievements, but one cannot hear his views on human nature and the Way of Heaven’”39). Here Ito¯ commented: I judge, saying: Sages teach diversely according to the diversity of people. What are mentioned here of [human] nature and Heavenly principle is what people say of them, without anything abstruse or mysterious beyond understanding. What did Zigong mean by “one cannot hear”? People only know human diversity in strengths and intelligence without knowing their common love of original virtue and adherence to a common potential for advancing in goodness, yet because their liking is not strong enough to reach goodness, our good-potential is often doubted. Now Zigong’s virtue was not yet sagely, he also took the Teacher’s word to mean “one cannot hear” [不可得 而聞], without depending on sages there is goodness already; anyone whose heartmind is concentrated on goodness will see it covering the entire heaven and earth. Thus, we know that everyone can advance to goodness. Besides, heaven inevitably helps good people. This is how our Teacher became a sage. Sadly, in latter days people studied the high, far, and mysterious, and said such is the way to seek heavenly principles, which are unintelligible except to the enlightened. Zigong had studied quite minutely yet still said something like this. How could it be? What the sage mentioned as [human] and

38 Yang Rur-bin 楊儒賓, “Renlun yu tianli: Ito¯ Jinsai yu Zhuzi de qiudao licheng 人倫與天理— 伊藤仁齋與朱子的求道歷程 [Human Interpersonal Ethics and the Heavenly Principle: Ito¯ Jinsai’s and Zhu Xi’s pilgrimages for the way],” in Huang Chun-chieh, ed., Rujia Sixiang zai xiandai Dongya: Riben pian 儒家思想在現代東亞：日本篇 [Confucianism in Modern East Asia: Japan] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999), pp. 87 – 134, esp. 123. 39 Analects, p. 41.

Ito¯ Jinsai’s perspective on his Analects-scholarship and its reconstruction

161

Heavenly principle are just what later generations call qi [氣], not li [理, principle] and should not be taken as the road to follow in seeking the truth.40

What Ito¯ Jinsai understood as Dao in the Analects was anthropo-genetic, constructed by the common people to be moral regulations for the people to follow. We can see the difference between Ito¯’s mundane approach and Zhu Xi’s metaphysical one in their interpretations of the Dao in Analects 4.8 (“He has not lived in vain who dies in the evening, having been told about the Way in the morning”41): Master Zhu Xi said, “Dao is the prescriptive principle of things to be as they are. Once we could hear about it, we would be living smoothly, dying contentedly, with no trace of regret. Thus, he stressed the nearness of the time.”42 Ito¯ Jinsai said, “Dao is that by which people become human. Being human without hearing about it is to live emptily, if not being with chickens and dogs then rotting with grass and trees. Isn’t it sad? If once we heard about it, we would have that by which we are human and complete our life, and so a gentleman’s death is called “Completion” [終], meaning that he would not perish.43

For Zhu Xi, the Dao is the prescriptive principle of things to be as they are, and constitute both the metaphysical principle and the ethical norm. In contrast, so far as Ito¯ was concerned, the Dao is that by which people become human, without the metaphysics. Similarly, regarding Confucius’ saying in 9.31, Ito¯ asserted that, “Dao is that in which all under heaven are identical.”44 He made this point in order to refute the Han Confucian theory that “Going against normality and conforming with Dao is called expedience.” Instead Ito¯ argued: The Teacher once said, “Is ren far? I desire ren, and ren arrives here.” And, he also said, “If a person claims to practice Dao yet is far away from people, he does not practice Dao.” Both indicate that Dao is very close by. For outside Dao there is no person, outside person there is no Dao. The sage diversely teaches according to their diversity, and does not set up a set teaching and drive people into it. Here there is nothing far from people, either. Those Dao-ignoramuses think the high is admirable, as if going up to heaven, they see Dao as so far away and make it hard for people to attain Dao. What a pity!45

In a similar vein, Ito¯ also commented on Analects 1.4 (“Every day I examine myself on three counts”46) saying that, “the Dao of heaven and earth exists in 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Rongo Kogi, pp. 66 – 7. Analects, p. 31. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, juan 2, p. 71. Rongo Kogi, pp. 50 – 1. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 145. Analects, p. 3.

162

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

humans. Human Dao is nothing else than filiality, fraternity, loyalty, and fidelity, so such human virtues suffice to fulfill human Dao.”47 Such common human practices of common human virtues are the Dao. Ito¯ Jinsai further pointed out that this human Dao exists precisely in mundane secular life. On Analects 9.3 (“I follow the majority”) he commented: Former Confucians said, “On things that do not harm righteousness, we can follow secular convention.” They are mistaken, for if things would never harm righteousness, the secular is the Dao, and outside the secular there is no Dao. Thus, it is said, “The gentlemanly Dao begins at the spousal relation.” Likewise, Yao and Shun both ceding crowns, and kings Tang [湯] and Wu [武] expelling and attacking followed the people’s hearts. Where people’s hearts tend, there the secular accomplishes. Thus, it is enough to see if what you do conforms to righteousness or not, why do we have to put aside the secular to pursue Dao? This sort of practice is really the likes of heresy, not sagely Dao.48

This form of Dao within the secular must be common, easy, and close to the people.49 The virtues themselves (such as: “in word you are conscientious and trustworthy and in deed single-minded and reverent”) are the Dao, not transcendent principles (li, 理) in extreme heights and depths.50 Ito¯’s common secular Dao bears no distinctions between ancient or present, and remains unchanging through time and place.51 To Ito¯, this was Confucius’ Dao: “the constant Warp [常經] of heaven and earth, the common justice [誼] through the old and the new; anyone with intelligence can know it and practice it, however uncouth, as common spouses they can all know it and know how to practice it. Such is the so-called sagely Dao.”52

47 Rongo Kogi, p. 5. 48 Ibid., p. 130. 49 Ibid., p. 135: “Those who are clever and intelligent would soar up high and far to strive after difficulties, not knowing that Dao originally stays amid daily common activities, ordinary and close by us.” 50 Ibid., p. 232: “Loyalty and fidelity [忠信] are the root of our studies, whose ground is seriousness [篤敬], and all this completes the whole matter. Later Confucians thought these to be daily constant duties, not theories of the highest and the farthest ultimate, and so established separate doctrines. They did not realize that Dao is the real Principle and studies are the real duties. How could there be anything high and far outside of loyalty, fidelity and seriousness? So the words of those who know Dao are solid and close to life, and the more they are adhered to and practiced, the more they appear to be inexhaustible. Those who talk of Dao without loyalty, fidelity and seriousness do not know what Dao is.” 51 Ibid., p. 238: “As in Dao, so among people, nowhere among them is there any distinction of ancient from present. Today’s people are just the ancient people of the legendary Three Dynasties. As long as people practice straightly according to Dao, their nature has no difference to begin with. Those ignorant of this have to regard today’s people as not good, so in managing the world they have to entirely transform people of today into the people of Three Dynasties. This is entirely out of line with truth.” 52 Ibid., p. 288.

Ito¯ Jinsai’s perspective on his Analects-scholarship and its reconstruction

163

In summary, Ito¯ Jinsai interpreted Confucius’ Dao in terms of the secularity of the Dao, thereby unifying all the Classics, including the Analects, the Mencius53 and the Doctrine of the Mean.54 Such was Ito¯’s novel and unique hermeneutical system. 3.2.2 Understanding Ren by its classical meanings Another key notion Ito¯ used when offering his epoch-making interpretation was ren. This term appears in the Analects 105 times in 58 chapters, each occurrence bearing a specific linguistic context between Confucius and his disciples. On the whole, the concept of ren as it appears in the Analects includes all admirable human virtues55, especially those referring to moral behavior. Ito¯’s interpretations of Ren are based on pure Kogaku (classical learning, 古學) that was aimed at uncovering the ancient meanings; this contrasted with Zhu Xi’s more intellectual interpretative approach. Consider the following cases: Analects 1.2 reads, “The gentleman devotes his efforts to the root, for once the root is established, the Way will sprout from there. Being good as a son and obedient as a young man is, perhaps, the root of a man’s character.”56 On this passage, Zhu Xi commented: “Ren is the principle of love and the character of heart-mind.”57 Influenced by Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi’s interpretation contains many inconsistencies. The modern scholar Qian Mu noted: [Zhu Xi] quoted from Cheng Yi’s saying, “Virtue has its root, which, when established, fills and enlarges its Dao, from filiality and fraternity practiced at home extended to love things.” This quotation purposely omits a word “birth” [生], replacing it with “fills and enlarges” [充大] from Mencius, for if ren is substance [性體], it could not have begun to exist by being given birth by practicing filiality and fraternity. […] Zhu Xi said, “Ren is the principle of love,” yet neither could “principle” have begun to exist by being given birth by practicing filiality and fraternity. In addition, Dao differs in connotation from 53 Ito¯ Jinsai commented on Mencius’ remark on “assassinating the tyrant Chou [紂]” by saying that King Wu’s acts of expulsion and assassination did not count as regicide since “the entire world expelled and assassinated him.” Ito¯ Jinsai commented: “Dao is what all people under heaven share; where all hearts agree, there is Dao.” See Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, vol. 1, pp. 35 – 6. 54 In his interpretation of the Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 1, Ito¯ Jinsai wrote: “Dao, flowing everywhere under heaven, is where all people commonly originate. Thus, what conforms to human nature is Dao; whatever is otherwise does not. Dao exists within daily human activities and reaches all under heaven throughout myriad generations, and should not be left for a single moment.” See Ito¯ Jinsai, Chu¯ Yo¯ Hakki 中庸發揮 [Interpretation of the Doctrine of ¯ tori Shuppan, Mean], in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho (Tokyo: O 1973), pp. 9, 11. 55 Cf. Qu Wanli 屈萬里, “Ren zhi guyi de lishi kaocha 仁之古義的歷史考察 [A Historical Survey of the Classic Meanings of Humanity],” in his Shuyong lunxue ji 書傭論學集 [Essays of A Book Servant] (Taipei: Kaiming shuju, 1969), pp. 254 – 66. 56 Analects, p. 3. 57 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, p. 48.

164

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

“principle.” We can say, “The Dao of Ren is born from this” but not “The Principle of Ren is born from this.” Both Confucius and Mencius often used Dao but seldom “principle.” Both Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi began using “principle” to explain Confucius and had to try hard to patch up the irreparable seam. We can see Zhu Xi’s effort at sewing up the distance between Confucius and Mencius, on the one hand, and the two Cheng brothers, on the other.58

Qian’s view is valid and convincing. Confucius and Mencius both advocated ren in terms of concrete behavior, and never took it to be a substance of nature. Zhu Xi’s intention of explaining everything according to his theory of li as the principle shared by everything is quite explicit in his explanation of Confucius’ ren. Zhu Xi says nothing about ren as a principle of concrete behavior. In contrast, Ito¯ Jinsai’s explanation of Analects 1.2 clearly demonstrates his devotion to classicism: I judge, saying: Ren is the thoroughfare of all things under heaven, what people cannot but follow in order to behave. Its root consists of the innate goodness of human nature with these Four Buds; if we know how to expand them, we will reach ren. Therefore, Mencius said, “People all have what they cannot bear, with such unbearable heart to reach what they can bear, that is ren.” Again he said, “The heart of compassion is the bud of ren”; “Intimate concerns for the intimate parents are ren. There is nothing else, expand it throughout under heaven.” Such sayings fit Youzi’s [有子] sentiment of taking filiality and fraternity as the root of ren. Mencius was merely conveying the ancients’ views. The former scholar [i. e. Zhu Xi] said, “Ren [benevolence] and yi [righteousness] are principles in human nature. Our nature only has ren, yi, li [decency], and zhi [intelligence], these four. Whence then did filiality and fraternity come from?” If so, ren as substance is the root, filiality and fraternity as the function are the branches, this would contradict Youzi’s [有子] saying, “filiality and fraternity are Ren’s root.” So, he [i. e. Zhu Xi] had to say, “Practicing ren is the root of filiality and fraternity, discussing nature takes ren as the root of filiality and farternity.” But, then, this saying turns Youzi’s original contention upside down, namely, “其為人也孝悌” [a man whose character is such that he is good as a son and obedient as a young man] and “本立而道 生” [for once the roots are established, the Way grows therefrom], in short, filiality and fraternity are the root of ren. But then, why did Mencius take ren and yi as our innate possession? It was because human nature is good that he took ren and yi as our nature. This is to identify human nature in terms of ren and yi, not to take ren and yi directly as human nature. Mencius did not directly describe ren and yi as human nature. One slight deviation here could lead to a thousand miles of error. We must stay clear-sighted.59

Ito¯’s contention that “Ren is the thoroughfare of all things under heaven, what people cannot but follow in order to behave,” fits well with Confucius’ original

58 Qian Mu 錢穆, Kongzi yu Lunyu 孔子與論語 [Confucius and the Analects], in Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998), vol. 4, esp. p. 272. 59 Rongo Kogi, p. 3.

Ito¯ Jinsai’s perspective on his Analects-scholarship and its reconstruction

165

intention of indicating ren through concrete moral behaviors. Thus Ito¯ Jinsai used classical philology to target Zhu Xi’s interpretation. Analects 7.30 (“Is benevolence really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here”60) provides another case in point. Zhu Xi’s comment here was: “Ren is the virtue of the heart, not something outside.”61 But Ito¯ heatedly criticizes this comment: I judge, saying: Ren is the great virtue of the world, yet ren’s affairs are so very close by, practicing it resides in myself. Hence: “is benevolence really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here.” But, the former scholar [i. e. Zhu Xi] took ren to be a principle within nature, and understood the work of ren to be eliminating desire in order to return to the beginning. If this is the care, everyone has ren as my body has four limbs and a hundred bones, and there cannot be anyone who is not-ren or has the necessity of “reaching” ren. For example, take many heart-minds as wood and ren as fire. The use of the wood lies in making fire, and the virtue of the heart lies in ren, if the wood is accumulated yet not burned, the use of the wood would not be manifested. If one lets go of it and does not seek it, then the virtue of the heart is not manifested. Thus, the sages always said “desire benevolence” [欲仁], “seek benevolence” [求仁], but not “the work of ren is eliminating desire in order to return to the beginning.” Cheng Yi had the theory of inside-outside and guest-lord that naturally fits our Teacher’s meaning of “reach” [至], and which differs greatly from taking ren as nature or principle. Students would do well to take note of all this.62

Ito¯ interprets Confucius’ statement “is benevolence really far away” to mean “Its matters are extremely close by; practicing it resides in myself.” What he stressed was that it is “I myself” who is conducting concrete acts. Thus, Zhu Xi’s deviation was to make it internal, that “ren is the virtue of the heart.” In summary, Ito¯ Jinsai started from a perspective of practical scholarship (實 學), and proposed a new classicist interpretation of “meaning” [意味].63 In Ito¯’s new Confucius-scholarship, Confucius’ Dao became the Dao of daily interpersonal life; ren was then understood as being fulfilled in the practical acts of filiality, fraternity, loyalty, fidelity, and the like. 60 61 62 63

Analects, p. 65. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, p. 100. Rongo Kogi, pp. 109 – 10. This is Ito¯ Jinsai’s technical term. He said, “I divide our learning into two: to learn the blood vein [血脈, Ketsumiaku], and to learn the meaning [意味, Imi]. ‘Blood vein’ is the gist of sagely tradition, such as the theory of ren and yi in Mencius; ‘meaning’ is the meaning behind it. Meaning derives from the vein, which we must first learn. Without the vein we are ships without rudders, nights without candles, ignorant of where to stop. The vein is prior in learning, but yet meaning is harder to grasp. Why? A vein is a road; once we are on it, we will arrive, however far, but without insight we are at a loss as to where to find the meaning in the vast terrain. I once said that reading the Analects differs from reading the Mencius. We first read Mencius’ vein, and we can naturally find his meaning. We first grasp the meaning in the Analects, and only then find its vein.” Ito¯ Jinsai, Gomo¯ Jigi, vol. 5: B, 50.

166

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

The purpose of Ito¯’s Analects scholarship

4

To adopt Searle’s terminology, what is the purpose and perlocutionary “intention” behind Ito¯’s reconstruction of Confucius and the Analects? Simply put, it was apologetic and argumentative. He had two targets: (4.1) the Buddhism and Daoism that discard and abandon the mundane interpersonal world; and (4.2) Song Neo-Confucianism with its philosophy of a cosmic Principle (理) transcending this mundane world.

4.1

Critique of Buddhism and Daoism

At many points in his volume Rongo Kogi, Ito¯ criticized Daoism and in particular Buddhism. We need only look at one representative example here. Confucius’ Analects 18.6 related the following narrative: Chang Ju [長沮] and Jie Ni [桀溺] were ploughing together yoked as a team. Confucius went past them and sent Zilu to ask them where the ford was. Chang Ju said, “Who is that taking charge of the carriage?” Zilu said, “It is Kong Qiu of Lu.” “Then, he must be the Kong Qiu of Lu.” “He is.” “Then, he doesn’t have to ask where the ford is.” Zilu asked Jie Ni. Jie Ni said, “Who are you?” “I am Zhongyou.” “Then, you must be the disciple of Kong Qiu of Lu?” Zilu answered, “I am.” “Throughout the Empire men are all the same. Who is there for you to change places with? Moreover, for your own sake, would it not be better if, instead of following a Gentleman who keeps running away from men, you followed one who runs away from the world altogether?” All the while he carried on harrowing without interruption. Zilu went and reported what was said to Confucius. The Master was lost in thought for a while and said, “One cannot associate with birds and beasts. Am I not a member of this human race? Who, then, is there for me to associate with? While the Way is to be found in the Empire, I will not change places with him.”64

This narrative contrasts the worldliness of Confucianism with the otherworldly reclusive Daoists of the Spring and Autumn period (722 – 464 bce). Ito¯ commented at length specifically on this passage: 64 Analects, p. 185.

The purpose of Ito¯’s Analects scholarship

167

I judge, saying: Jie Ni wanted to change the world; sages do not. The former forced the world with their ways. The latter govern the world with the world. The world is made of people, without whom it cannot exist. Thus, sages enjoy the world, worry about it, but never avoid it to cleanse themselves apart from it, like those, such as Chang Ju and Jie Ni. Their ways were not the universal historical ways of the world. Buddha taught quiet selfdemise, Laozi took the way of empty nothingness, thereby they thought to change the world. After two thousand odd years, however, Buddha is still incapable of effecting the demise of ruler-subject, father-son, and spousal relations of the world. Nor could Laozi revive ancient non-action. This fact shows us that our Teacher’s instruction is great, decent, correct, and persists through the ages and cannot be further added to. He also said, “These people are those who enabled the legendary Three Generations to go on.” He said again, “Govern people with people, they improve and stop.” Sages thus refuse, like this, to cut themselves off from things or to fume at the world. Perhaps this is what he meant when Wei Zheng [魏徵] of the Tang dynasty said, “Sagely Five Emperors and Three Rulers changed no people but they transformed themselves.”65

Ito¯ had based this powerful argument on his interpretation of Confucius, teaching that “No Dao outside people, no people outside Dao.”66 Dao exists amid the daily activities of the people; as Ito¯ said, “Why seek Dao outside the secular?”67 In Ito¯’s world of thought there exists not a single divine recluse able to fly high up above this world. He sought to blow away the Buddhist-Daoist fog and lead people back to the original Dao of Confucius. He applied Confucian orthodoxy as an apologia against teachings he regarded as heterodox.

4.2

Critique of Song scholars

The main target of Ito¯’s critique was Song Neo-Confucianism. He especially attached Zhu Xi’s principle- or li-based metaphysics. Zhu Xi was certainly a great Confucian scholar who wrote detailed commentaries on most of the Classics. His thinking greatly influenced the world of thought in Asia, especially from the fourteenth century on. He initiated Asia’s Neo-Confucian movement that gave the Four Books priority over the Five Classics.68 His Collected Commentaries on the Four Books, not only anthologized 65 66 67 68

Rongo Kogi, p. 271. See note 44. See note 47. Uno Se¯ichi 宇野精一 said that the Five Classics were products of the medieval society. Because of the succinct brevity of the Four Books that appealed to the contemporaries, the latter easily replaced the former. See his “Gokyo¯ kara Shisho e – Kyo¯gakushi Oboegaki 五経か ら四書ヘ – 経学史覚書[From Five Classics to Four Books: Reflections on the History of Learning of Classics],” in To¯yo¯ no Bunka to Shakai 東洋の文化と社会 [Culture and Society in the East] 1 (1952): pp. 1 – 14. Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Four Books rose in popularity similarly in close relation with external social, economic, and political factors. Cf.

168

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

all the commentaries from the Han, Tang, and Northern Song periods, unifying the entire Four Books, but also cast aside some of them and created a unique metaphysical system centered on principle [理].69 Among the Four Books, he particularly stressed the importance of the Great Learning, saying, “Learning must begin at the Great Learning, followed by the Analects, the Mencius, then the Doctrine of the Mean.”70 “I want people to read first the Great Learning to define the framework, then read the Analects to establish the basic root. After this, people should read the Mencius to observe its development, then read the Doctrine of the Mean to seek the subtleties of the ancients.”71 Again, “The Analects, Mencius, and Doctrine of the Mean all depend on the Great Learning for their grand harmony.”72 He had specifically written the “Appended Remark’s on the Investigation of Things” in order to argue for the capabilities of the heart-mind to discern principle and stressed the importance of exhaustively seeking principle by following things and investigating things to attain knowledge.73 Zhu Xi placed

69

70 71 72 73

James T. C. Liu, “How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?” Philosophy East and West, 23/4 (October 1973): pp. 483 – 505, esp. 501 – 4. On how creative and yet how traditional Zhu Xi was in his Collected Commentaries on the ¯ tsuki Nobuyoshi 大槻信良, “Shisho shu¯chu¯ sho¯gu¯ ni arawaretaru Shushi no Four Books, see O taido 四書集註章句現朱子態度 [Zhu Xi’s Attitudes toward the Collected Commentaries on the Chapters and Verses of the Four Books],” Nihon Chu¯goku gakkaiho¯ 日本中国学会報 5 (1953): pp. 80 – 94. On how Zhu Xi unified the Four Books into one, see Wing-tsit Chan, “Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” in Études Song in Memoriam Étienne Balazs, Editées par Françoise Aubin, Série II, #1 (Paris: Mouton & Co. and École Practique de Haute Edudes, 1973), pp. 60 – 90. Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi yulei, 1, p. 249. Ibid. Ibid., p. 256. Yang Rur-bin makes the novel claim that Zhu Xi’s idea of the “investigation of things” was not just a cognitive activity but also involved the concentration of the mind-heart. This specific concentration and other separated concentrations are parts of the task of striving for seriousness, called a seriousness-penetrating activity and quietude, where seriousness evokes a sudden comprehensive realization. Zhu’s experience of principle warrants the unification of transcendence and experience. What the scholars experience as principle penetrating things without obstruction is not only an ontological affirmation of significance and realms, but also facilitates one’s free responses and management of concrete affairs. Yang says that Zhu’s sudden realization refers to a re-grasping of our primal self, where the mind-heart is a bright, empty quietude in which all principles reside and one’s nature is clear and unified. The scholar, the universe, and the Great Ultimate advance together to the realm of Truth. In this world, all things that are usually incomplete, partial, potential, existing in process, are respectively completed. See Yang Rur-bin, “Gewu yu huoran guantong: Zhuzi ‘gewu bujuan’ de quanshi wenti 格物與豁然貫通：朱子“格物補傳”的詮釋問題 [Investigation of Things and Comprehensive Realization: Problems of Interpretation of Zhu Xi’s ‘Appended Remarks on the Investigation of Things’],” in Zhong Caijun 鍾彩鈞, ed., Zhujixue de Kaizan: Xueshe pien 朱子學的開展──學術篇 (Taipei: Center for Chinese Studies, 2002). I think dualism describes the process of the mind-heart trying to discern the Principle, while Yang’s view describes the realm of sudden realization after discernment. Both views are perhaps mutually complementary.

The purpose of Ito¯’s Analects scholarship

169

particular stress on the creativity of ren, interpreting ren as “the character of heart-mind and the principle of love.” In this way he stressed that this principle is the heart-mind of the universe, the principle that gives birth to all things. Zhu thus put aside Cheng Yi’s account of ren as productive, producing on the basis of principle, and claimed that love is born only out of principle, the heart-mind of the universe gives birth to the universe. It was in this way that Zhu conferred a metaphysical basis to Confucian ethics.74 In contrast, as we have seen, Ito¯ Jinsai claimed that the Dao is just the Dao of daily human intercourse, violently disagreeing with Zhu Xi’s understanding of Confucius’ Dao as a “Normative Principle of things and events,”75 an “ultimate Dao [that] is difficult to hear about.”76 In opposition, Ito¯ argued: The Song Confucians always undertook to discover what the former sages had not sought, not realizing that the sages’ words pervade up and down, and are all embracing, all sufficient, leaving no undiscovered matters whatever. Why do they have to wait for later people to discover anything new for them? Mencius’ theories of “goodness of nature” and “cultivation of qi” based on ren and yi were just to explain our Teacher’s words. The former Confucian [i. e. Zhu Xi] thought them to be discoveries of what former sages did not seek, and so he also wanted to append his own theories, following Mencius, […] all of which are remnants of Buddha and Laozi, not to be found in our Confucius or Mencius. Can he be said to “transmit and not create,” to be “faithful to and fond of the ancients”? Clearly we need no further explanation about who is right and who has gone wrong.77

Ito¯ Jinsai accused Zhu Xi of being completely out of touch with Confucius and Mencius, as well as being unduly influenced by Buddhism and the doctrines of Laozi. Consequently, Ito¯ further accused Zhu Xi of straying into mysterious depths and preaching a Dao out of touch with daily life. I judge, saying: Seeking the Way in the heights, seeking matters in the far, this is a general fault of scholars. In contrast, the Book of Odes and Documents teach with things close to human situations relevant for daily use, making matters not far from us humans into the Way with words not far from the human world. And so, as we persist in adhering to Decency [禮], we become paragons of human demeanor to keep up the worldly ways. This is why our Teacher constantly speaks on these three Classics. As for Buddhism and Daoism, they leave the world and break off with the secular world to engage in only the high and far. They, therefore, do not really attain the principles [理] of the Book of Odes and Documents. Moreover, although later Confucians recited the Book of Odes and read the Book of Documents, they sought understanding in too deep, 74 See Chan Wing-tsit, “Lun Zhuzi zhi Renshuo 論朱子之仁説 [On Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity],” in Zhu xue lunji 朱學論集 [Essays on Zhu Xi’s Learning] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1982), pp. 37 – 68, and his “Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” pp. 73 – 80. 75 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, p. 71, commentary on 4.8. 76 Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, commentary on 5.27. 77 Rongo Kogi, p. 94.

170

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

too difficult areas without knowing that they should seek it in easy ordinary situations close by. As a result, their words and deeds are often manifestly encumbered with twists and difficulties, lacking in vast, right, and unhurried composure. Is it not true that the reputed difficulty of reading is not in reading but in reading well and right?78

Ito¯ claimed the Dao was “close to human situations relevant for daily use” because “the secular is Dao, outside the secular there is no so-called Dao.”79 Ito¯ also targeted Zhu Xi in his comments on Analects 13.18 (“The Governor of She said to Confucius, ‘In our village we have one “straight bow.” When his father stole a sheep, his son gave evidence against him’”80). Here Zhu Xi commented, “That father and son conceal for each other is the ultimate of heavenly principle and human sentiment.”81 Yet Ito¯ countered: I judge, saying: An old commentary on this passage says, “Father and son conceal for each other is the ultimate of heavenly principle and human sentiments.” This is wrong, for it splits the human and the principle in two. What human sentiments share in common everywhere throughout history is that which originates all Five Constants and Hundred Processes [五常百行] of things, how could there be any heavenly Principle outside human sentiments? Let human sentiments go against one another; then, even if one could have pulled off the world’s most difficult tasks, it is really done with animal heart, whose bane reaches the level of a thief ’s Dao. Why? When things are done with discrimination of yes as yes, no as no without distinguishing close relations from distant, the noble from the lowly, such management is called a “public/official/fair” [公] act. Now, if a father conceals for a son, or a son for a father, if it is not called “straight,” it should not be called “public/official/fair.” Still our Teacher accepted such father-son concealing for each other because this is the ultimate human sentiment, where decency exists and where righteousness resides. So, the sages talk about principle [理] without saying it, talk about righteousness [義] and not public/official/fair. To leave human sentiments and warmth aside in seeking Dao is heresy, not the universal Dao of the world.82

For Ito¯ Jinsai, to split human nature from heavenly principle, for the latter to govern the former, and to leave the secular to seek the Dao (as the Song Confucians did), was to leave Confucius’ original meaning of Dao behind. Ito¯ Jinsai also criticized Zhu Xi regarding his understanding of ren. According to Wing-tsit Chan, Zhu Xi reflected deeply upon this concept for around ten years, from about 36 or 37 years of age. He completed his Treatise on Humanity [Ren] at about the age of 42 (1171), and it became a basis for the discussions in his

78 79 80 81 82

Ibid., p. 104. Ibid., p. 130. Analects, p. 127. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, p. 146. Rongo Kogi, p. 197.

The purpose of Ito¯’s Analects scholarship

171

later works: the Collected Commentaries on the Four Books (1177, published 1190) and the Jade Mountain Lecture (1194).83 The vital key to Zhu Xi’s philosophy of ren is his saying, “Ren is the character of mind-heart and the principle of love” – a statement that appeared more than ten times in his commentaries on the Analects and Mencius. It stands as one of Zhu Xi’s most important creative ideas.84 Ito¯ ruthlessly criticized this interpretation of ren. He thought that Zhu had inappropriately extracted ren from concrete human activities, and sublimated it into an abstract principle: The former scholar [i. e. Zhu Xi] said, “Ren [benevolence] and yi [righteousness] are principles in human nature. Our nature only has ren, yi, li [decency], and zhi [intelligence], these four. Whence then did filiality and fraternity come from?” If so, ren as substance is the root, filiality and fraternity as the function are the branches, this would contradict Youzi’s [有子] saying, “filiality and fraternity are Ren’s root.” So, he [i. e. Zhu Xi] had to say, “Practicing ren is the root of filiality and fraternity, discussing nature takes ren as the root of filiality and farternity.” […] But then, why did Mencius take ren and yi as our innate possession? It was because human nature is good that he took ren and yi as our nature. This is to identify human nature in terms of ren and yi, not to take ren and yi directly as human nature.85

Ito¯ pointed out how Zhu Xi had strayed away from the dialogic situation in the Analects (and thus “contradicted Youzi”) and quoted Mencius to indicate Zhu Xi’s mistakes. This reflects Ito¯’s strategy of attack. Ito¯ then claimed that Zhu Xi’s mistakes and irrelevancies stemmed from the influence of Zen Buddhism: After Mencius died, his Dao became obscure in the world, and later Confucians merely wandered in the realm of annotating words. When the Song clan arose, many great Confucian scholars appeared to promote orthodoxy and reject heresies, to wash away the disgraceful scholarship of the Han and Tang dynasties. Despite such great occurrences, there flourished also the philosophy of Zen and not a few scholars interpreted the sages’ saying with Zen ideas. The situation indeed was not auspicious. People came to treasure oneness of mind, to regard clear mirror and quiet waters as the ultimate task of self-cultivation.86

83 Wing-tsit Chan, Zhu xue lunji, pp. 41 – 2. 84 Yamazaki Yoshishige (山崎美成, 1796 – 1856) said of ren in the Long An shoujian 龍龕手鑑 [Mirrors of Long An]: “People’s voices, the heart’s virtue, love’s principle. A Buddhist monk Zhiguang [智光] wrote the volume in 997. Zhu Xi completed the Lun Meng jizhu in 1177, and adopted this Buddhist phrase.” However, Chan Wing-tsit’s textual criticism has revealed that people only later added the phrase to the Long An shoujian, showing that Zhu Xi had not adopted it (see note 83 above). Chan’s assertion is plausible. 85 Rongo Kogi, p. 3. 86 Ibid., p. 17.

172

Ito¯ Jinsai on the Analects

Even though Ito¯ respected the efforts of the Song Confucians, he differed greatly from them for “seeking Dao too highly.”87 Ito¯ saw they had polluted valuable Confucian notions, such as ren, with Buddhism and Daoism; thus, the sages needed Ito¯ to dispel the dark clouds so that the sun could re-appear and reestablish the classical meanings of Confucianism. In conclusion, Ito¯’s hermeneutics of the Analects was not just a theory but also a practice, aiming to protect and promote original classical Confucianism by attacking the wayward interpretations of Zhu Xi, who had been misled by Buddhism and Daoism.

5

Conclusion

In this chapter we have investigated one major East Asian approach to the hermeneutics of the Classics and Analects: hermeneutics as apologetics. Such a hermeneutics uses annotation or commentary on the Classics (going back to their original, classical meanings) as a means to clear up polluted understandings of Confucianism. Going back to the original meanings of the original texts resolves many mistakes and problems that were incurred by Song Neo-Confucian interpretations. Ito¯ Jinsai pointed out how far Zhu Xi and his colleagues had departed from the original dialogical world and context of Confucius and his disciples. Ito¯ Jinsai used an annotative scalpel that cut back to the original meanings of the Classics, and revealed the insights of mutual harmonies among the Classics, in order to surgically remove later accretions of foreign meaning that had built up around key notions such as dao and ren. This linguistic and contextual correction of Zhu Xi’s interpretive system enabled Ito¯ Jinsai to restore Confucius’ “one” that threads and penetrates [貫] all, recovering it from Zhu Xi’s mistaken notion of “comprehension” [通]. He did so by returning to the original dao of “loyalty and reciprocity,” that which governs all daily virtuous activities in the Five Constants and Hundred Processes. By examining the muddled controversies of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Qing Confucians on that simple declaration of Confucius’, “a single thread binding all,”88 we are all the more impressed with 87 Ibid., p. 79. 88 Ruan Yuan said: “Confucius’ Way appears in all his daily activities, not just in the learning of his teaching and sayings. Thus, when he told Zengzi to penetrate his Way [道, Dao] into one, ‘penetrate’ [貫] means actions and events […] So, if we take ‘penetrate’ [貫] as ‘practice of things,’ then the sage’s Way reduces to Confucianism; if we take it as ‘penetrate through’ [通 貫], then it is close to Chan Buddhism. We ask what sort of Way it is, then we get what the Doctrine of the Mean calls loyalty and reciprocity, virtues of the ordinary, words of the ordinary, the Way mutually involving words and acts.” However, Fang Dongshu (方東樹,

Conclusion

173

Ito’s insightful interpretation of how the “one” that “penetrates all” successfully dissected and overthrew Zhu Xi’s interpretive approach to the Analects. In this way, Ito¯ Jinsai completed the revival of Confucius’ original Dao. Ito¯ Jinsai’s hermeneutical apologetics can be compared instructively to that of the Qing Confucian Dai Zhen, who attacked Zhu Xi using a classicist, annotative hermeneutics of the Mencius in a monograph titled Textual Critical Commentary on the Mencius. Unfortunately, Dai Zhen was less effective than Ito¯ Jinsai. He was unable to deliver a fatal blow to Zhu Xi, because he never really entered into Zhu’s “circle of hermeneutics.” Dai Zhen’s methodological limitation rendered him less than successful in his apologetic attack on Zhu Xi.89 Ito¯ Jinsai would have met with problems such as Dai Zhen’s on the Mencius, for they both applied the tools of textual hermeneutics (which were more suitable for word studies than for understanding the theoretical metaphysical side, that was more prominent in Mencius than in Confucius). Be that as it may, the debates between Ito¯ Jinsai and Zhu Xi, against the background of the tacit “enemy” of Buddhism and Daoism, add depth to our understanding of Confucianism, including Confucius, Mencius, Zhu Xi, and Ito¯ Jinsai himself.

1772 – 1851) disagreed, saying, “The phrase ‘penetrating into one’ combines knowing and acting, and cannot be tilted to either one […] Loyalty and reciprocity is the salt to salt ‘penetrating into one’, the salt penetrates and then we know it. Only upon finishing the salting can we understand its meaning, unreachable by shallow scholars. Jiao Xun understood it to be ‘My Way pervades all through among people.’ He just stuck himself to loyalty and reciprocity, trailing these words to miss the real meaning.” Both statements appear in Fang Dongshu 方東 樹, Hanxue shangdui 漢學商兌 [An Assessment of Han Learning], in Xu Hongxing 徐洪興, ed., Hanxue shichengji 漢學師承記 [Succession of the School of Han Learning] (Beijing: Sanlian shuju, 1988), pp. 299, 301. 89 See my Mencian Hermeneutics, pp. 211 – 32.

Chapter Nine: Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

1

Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we looked at Ito¯ Jinsai’s praise of the Analects as “the loftiest, the greatest Primal Book in the whole universe.”1 Japanese intellectuals of all schools have given this text an exalted position. No matter how bitterly the Tokugawa Confucian scholars quarreled among themselves, they all regarded the Analects with the utmost respect. They produced countless commentaries, interpretations, and related books. And when we read Hayashi Taisuke’s (林泰輔, 1854 – 1922) Analects Chronicle – published in 1916 in celebration of the seventyseventh birthday of Shibusawa E¯ichi (澁澤榮一, 1840 – 1931) – we can clearly see the exalted position that the Analects holds in Japan.2 In the early twentieth century new books on the Analects were still being published, despite Japan’s movement through the heights of the Meiji period with its irresistible move toward Westernization and its desire to “shed Asia in order to enter Europe.” Among all the books on the Analects published in Japan during the twentieth century, Shibusawa E¯ichi’s 1928 The Analects and the Abacus3 occupies a very special position. Shibusawa was an important figure in twentiethcentury Japan. Indeed, he has been called “the guide of Japanese capitalism.”4 Over the course of his entire life he promoted the Analects, and argued that the Analects should serve as a golden guidebook for enterprise managers. In this context, The Analects and the Abacus represented a major study, bringing into play Shibusawa’s advocacy of the Analects for the modern age – and its impact on Japanese society was tremendous. 1 Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo Kogi, vol. 3, p. 4. Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, vol. 1, p. 204. 2 Hayashi Taisuke 林泰輔, Rongo Nenpu 論語年譜 [Chronology of the Analects] (Tokyo: Ryu¯mon-sha, 1916). 3 Shibusawa E¯ichi 澁澤榮一, Rongo to soroban 論語と算盤 [The Analects and the Abacus] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko¯kai, 2001). 4 Tsuteya Takao 土屋喬雄, Nihon shihonshugishi jo¯ no shido¯shatachi 日本資本主義史上の指 導者たち [Directors in the History of Japanese Capitalism] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1939).

176

Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

This chapter focuses on two of Shibusawa E¯ichi’s most noteworthy claims about Confucius’ thought. We begin by discussing Shibusawa’s special formulations concerning the Analects, in connection with his thesis that the Analects expresses the concrete world of “practical learning.” We then go on to analyze Shibusawa’s new account of Confucius’ perspective on yi and li (利, benefit, profit), and examine his claim that Confucius’ thought was animated by the spirit of “the unity between yi and li.” Finally, we will place Shibusawa’s thought into the historical context of Japanese interpretations of the Analects.

2

Cultivation is not Theory: The Analects for Practical Learning

The Analects is the record of spiritual dialogues between Confucius and his disciples 2,500 years ago. They include the daily concerns and expressions of the people, but also give insights into the deeper, transcendental aspects of life, and thus give later generations of scholars a vast space for interpretation. Consequently, Confucian scholars from all over East Asia have written interpretations and commentaries on the Analects, all of which reflect the writer’s respective intellectual inclination or the spirit of the age. For example, the differences in interpretations of the Analects from Zheng Xuan and He Yan to Wang Bi (王弼, 226 – 49) were based on their differing interpretations of the way of heaven (nature) (tiandao). Thus, when discussing the framework that unites human beings with heaven (nature), the cosmological mindset of these three interpreters led them into metaphysical speculation. In Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Analects (Lunyu jizhu) we find the maturation of Song dynasty Neo-Confucianism; whereas in Liu Baonan’s Corrected Meanings of the Analects (Lunyu zhengyi, 論語正義), we see the development of Qing dynasty evidence-based learning.5 As we have seen, in the history of studies of the Analects in East Asia, Zhu Xi stands as a watershed (and controversial) figure. His Collected Commentaries on the Analects offered a reworking of all interpretations before the thirteenth century. For the East Asian Confucians who followed Zhu Xi, this text became an authoritative model of interpretation, with its own circle of supportive and critical discourse that developed around it. As for Shibusawa E¯ichi, throughout his life he was devoted to promoting the practical learning that was to be gained from the Analects. For example, he wrote: 5 Cf. Matsukawa Kenji 松川建二, ed., Rongo no shiso¯shi 論語の思想史 [Intellectual History of the Analects] (Tokyo: Kyu¯ko Shoin, 1994); Matsukawa Kenji 松川建二, So¯-Min no Rongo 宋明 の論語 [The Analects in the Song-Ming Period] (Tokyo: Kyu¯ko Shoin, 2000). Cf. John Makeham, Transmitters and Creator: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003).

Cultivation is not Theory: The Analects for Practical Learning

177

Ever since the sixth year of the Meiji period, when I resigned from government office, I entered into the practical world of business enterprise, something that I had always been looking forward to, and I formed an inseparable unity with the Analects of Confucius. At first, when I became a merchant, I thought that from now on I have to calculate all of the issues of minor profit in order to carry on through daily life. I considered what sort of aspiration I should embrace. I pondered this question. At that moment, I thought back on what I had read in the Analects. This is a book filled with lessons on daily life, selfcultivation and service to others. The lessons in the Analects seemed to me to be the least flawed of any philosophy; so, can’t we apply these lessons to managing an enterprise? My answer was in the affirmative. If a merchant applies the lessons of the Analects in managing his enterprise, his major plans will certainly have great potential for development.6

Shibusawa E¯ichi argued that the Analects was a classic text that every person could use with and for profit. He took on the “crab-holism philosophy of life,” and embraced Confucius’ lessons for daily life as recorded in the Analects.7 What Shibusawa emphasized in particular was his belief that the Analects expressed a form of practical learning that had little to do with abstract rational learning: Recently, I especially put a lot of effort into the study of the Analects, and suddenly understood many points that previously I had not quite grasped. Consequently, I dared to determine that the Analects does not present a sort of esoteric learning; it was written for the common people. Its lessons are quite obvious and easy to understand. The problem is that the later generations of scholars concocted mysterious, vacuous explanations, and interpreted it in esoteric terms, thereby, on the contrary, turning it into a difficult text. This resulted in people in the farm, labor, and the merchant classes all thinking that the Analects has nothing to do with them, so in the end they respected this text but kept their distance. This constituted a major error [in understanding the text]. These later scholars were very much like unreasonable, stubborn gatekeepers who obstructed Confucius’ teachings. Getting past these stubborn gatekeepers to see the real Confucius is nearly an impossible feat! Confucius certainly was not an extremist far removed from the common people, and who didn’t understand the ways of the world. He was a very plain prophet who was close to the people. People from all walks of life, merchants, farmers, laborers, all can benefit from his lessons. Confucius’ teachings are of great practical benefit to us all.8

It was by returning to the original text of the Analects that Shibusawa sensed the focus that its discussions had on daily life. The text was in no way mysterious or arcane, as the later Confucian scholars had contended. Therefore, Shibusawa E¯ichi was emphatic that “cultivation is not theory” but must rather consist in one’s own personal efforts focused on the practical con-

6 Shibusawa E¯ichi, Rongo to soroban, pp. 10 – 11. 7 Ibid., p. 24. 8 Ibid., p. 13.

178

Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

duct of life. In stressing the Analects focus on practical learning, Shibusawa criticized Zhu Xi’s li as being of no benefit in the practical world: The Confucian doctrines of Confucius and Mencius are the most honored and venerated in China; later, it was considered “learning of classics” or “practical learning.” But the Confucian teaching became distorted by other Chinese poets and men of letters whose rococo compositions differed greatly. Classicism was most vigorous and reached its fullest development by the late Song master Zhu Xi, who was broadly learned and devoted himself to promoting this learning. However, the China of Zhu’s day was politically decayed, militarily weak and the power and influence of the country was at its nadir. They could not bring the practical effect of that classicism into play; thus, even though classicism was so well-developed, the national administration was oddly disarrayed; the principal reason for this was that the principles studied were completely separate from the actual affairs of life. Although Zhu Xi had brought classicism to full flower in the Song, unfortunately the Imperial court was unable to adopt it. In fact, there was no way to put it into practice. All this learning of li was of no benefit to practical affairs.9

Shibusawa also pointed out that, although the Tokugawa court had adopted Zhu Xi’s learning, they still “employed men like, Fujiwara Seika, Hayashi Razan, etc. Those are scholars who positively applied Confucian learning to practical affairs and were willing to compromise to bring theory and practice closer together.”10 He also believed that, by the end of Tokugawa rule the practical spirit of Confucianism was no longer evident. To him, this was the reason behind the weakening power and influence of the Tokugawa court.11 In Shibusawa E¯ichi’s special emphasis on the practicality of the Analects, and in his rejection of Zhu Xi’s metaphysical approach, we can discern a continuation of the Japanese Tokugawa tradition in the study of the Analects. From Ito¯ Jinsai in the seventeenth century down to the renowned twentieth-century literary scholar Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ (吉川幸次郎, 1904 – 1980), Japanese intellectuals tended to highlight the practicality and everyday character of the Analects. As we saw in the previous chapter, Ito¯ Jinsai strongly advocated a method of interpretation for the Analects that returned to the original linguistic contexts of the dialogues between Confucius and his disciples. He sought thereby to clarify the classical meanings of the words and expressions used in the Analects, as well as to criticize the Song Confucian interpretations (especially by Zhu Xi) for stripping away the original contexts of classical Confucianism. Ito¯ returned to the original linguistic contexts of the classics in order to clarify the meaning of key terms in the Analects, such as Dao and ren. Taking the Analects together with other early classical texts, Ito¯ criticized Zhu Xi’s interpretive system. He even set up a classicist interpretive 9 Ibid., p. 152. 10 Ibid., p. 153. 11 Ibid., pp. 153 – 4.

Cultivation is not Theory: The Analects for Practical Learning

179

model specifically for reading the classics. Following a highly detailed and intensive analysis of the term guan (貫, connect, unite) in Confucius’ saying “My Dao with one threading it,” Ito¯ Jinsai disconnected this term from Zhu Xi’s reading of guan as tong (通, to penetrate) and reinstated it in line with the early transmission of the way as zhong-shu (忠恕, doing one’s best, and thinking in the position of the other), that is, as the core of daily interpersonal ethical practice based on the “five virtuous practices and the hundred constant standards.”12 On the surface, the history of Tokugawa Confucian interpretations of the Analects displays instances which not only critique and reject Zhu’s interpretive model, but also surpass it. Yet at a deeper level, they departed from Zhu’s intellectual attitude which identified nature with culture, and moved instead toward their separation, bifurcating the Dao from nature. In the Tokugawa Confucian reinterpretations of the Analects, they reconstructed Confucius’ world of thought in a way that severed the interface between tian and humanity. They saw no resonance between heaven’s mandate and the human mind; heaven no longer represented a transcendent truth that people could sense and know. Ito¯ Jinsai held that “The way maintained by all of the sages was always mentioned with reference to the purely human way […] The way is the path of upright conduct taken by people in their daily intercourse.”13 He also said, “Apart from people, there is no way; apart from the way, there are no people […] The way lies in common social customs.”14 Ogyu¯ Sorai went one step further by declaring that Confucius’ way was precisely the way of the late sage kings.15 He added that “Generally, the way of the late sage kings lay without. It consisted in the li [rites, rituals] and yi [sense of appropriateness] to be forced on the people from without.”16 What connected these three hundred years of Tokugawa interpretations was the intellectual trend of practical learning. In Ito¯ Jinsai’s words, “practical learning just consists in using practical language to understand practical truth.”17 This approach by the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians to understand the Analects from the perspective of practical learning was strengthened by Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯. While the young Yoshikawa was still studying at Kyoto University, he encountered Aoki Masaru’s (青木正兒, 1887 – 1964) criticism of Confucius. 12 See the previous chapter of this book for Ito¯ Jinsai’s views, as well as chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of Confucius’ saying. 13 Ito¯ Jinsai, Gomo¯ Jigi, vol. 5, p. 19. 14 Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, p. 205. 15 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, vol. 7, Bk. 2, p. 62. 16 Ogyu¯ Sorai, “Bendo¯ 辨道,” in Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸次郎 et. al. eds., Nihon shiso¯ taikei 日 本思想大系 [Series on Japanese Thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), vol. 36, #6, p. 228. Cf. Tucker, ed./trans., Ogyu¯ Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks, pp. 233 – 9. 17 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Do¯shikai hikki,” vol. 5, p. 11.

180

Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

This aroused Yoshikawa’s curiosity, and prompted him to launch a careful rereading of the Analects.18 He tells how he “impatiently drove [him]self to read it through. Especially, the fact that Shibusawa was everywhere holding up this text tended to throw cold water on [his] interest.”19 Nonetheless, this direct encounter with the Analects aroused his deep interest in the text. In light of the context of Japanese intellectual history, we see that Shibusawa ¯Eichi’s emphasis of the Analects’ core focus on practical, daily-life was in fact part of the heritage of the Tokugawa tradition of practical learning. In an obscure way, it also continued the critical attitude of several Tokugawa Confucian masters toward the metaphysical world that Zhu Xi constructed on the basis of the concept of li.

3

“The Unity of Ethics, Fact, and Benefit”20 : A New Interpretation of the Relationship Between Yi (appropriateness) and Li (benefit, profit)

Shibusawa E¯ichi’s second break from earlier interpretations of the Analects lay in his advocacy of the “unity of yi and li.” In his book The Analects and the Abacus, he outlined the object of this inquiry: The abacus, if based on the Analects, can be operated more precisely. And, the Analects, if based on the abacus, can see its scope of applicability expanded to wealth. For this reason, I consider that the relationship between the Analects and the abacus is at once distant and near. I consider that if one wishes to establish human life in the world soundly, one surely must have the samurai spirit. Yet if one only appreciates the samurai spirit but lacks business acumen, one will easily bring about one’s own destruction in doing business. Hence, besides having a noble spirit, one must also have business acumen. To cultivate a noble spirit, although one may venture to consult many texts, it is still the Analects to which one must return in order to nurture one’s samurai roots. What about one’s business acumen? One can fill out one’s business acumen also by studying the Analects of Confucius. While on the surface it is purely an ethics text, which should have nothing to do with business acumen, as a matter of fact business acumen has ethics as its root. Those who deviate from ethics in their conduct of business, such as swindlers, the vain, and the frivolous, who conduct themselves as mean fellows, absolutely fail to have proper business acumen. Consequently, business acumen and ethics are inseparable. Naturally, business acumen can be nurtured by 18 Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸次郎, Yu¯ka kiroku 遊華記錄 [Travelogue in China] (Tokyo: Tsukuba shobo¯, 1979), pp. 32 – 5. 19 Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸次郎, Zhongguo Zi Zhihui: Kongzi xueshu sixiang 中國之智慧：孔 子學術思想 [The Wisdom of China: The Thought of Confucius], trans. Cai Jintang 蔡錦堂 (Taipei: Xiezhi gongye congshu chuban, 1965), p. 20. 20 Shibusawa E¯ichi, Rongo to soroban, p. 2.

“The Unity of Ethics, Fact, and Benefit”

181

studying the ethics of the Analects. This is beyond doubt, but the way of human life and dealing with the world is extremely difficult to follow; not only must you study the Analects and think about the Analects, you must be able to sense the unexpected benefits you hadn’t consciously thought of before. Because of this, in my ordinary daily life, I hold up Confucius’ guidance and at the same time take the Analects as giving the Golden Rule for dealing with the world – from which I will not depart for even an instant.21

Shibusawa E¯ichi promoted the vital role of the Analects in the cultivation of a noble merchant ideal for a new age of management enterprise. The most common theme we encounter in The Analects and the Abacus is that, “Benevolence, Appropriateness and the Upright Way” and “Holding Goods for Wealth and Value” are mutually consistent and not necessarily conflicting conceptions.22 Shibusawa advocated the unity of yi and li, and argued that the views of many scholars who saw yi and li in opposition were not only misguided but brought about serious consequences. The result of wrongly transmitting Confucius and Mencius’ basic principle of yi was that the original enterprise spirit, of devoting one’s life to improving people’s lives, almost completely devolved into self-centered egoism. Lacking any concept of ren-yi [benevolence and appropriateness] or any embrace of ethics, the merchants reached a point where they just thought of ways to benefit themselves, ways to grasp loopholes by any means in order to expand their income. This effect became widespread. Today’s enterprises are mostly concerned solely with making money; but, as to how other people are doing, or the state of the world, their attitude is that none of the suffering of others has anything to do with them. They don’t realize that if there were no society or rule of law, they would sink into a dog-eat-dog quagmire and be forced to fight tooth and nail. If this were to go on in society for any length of time, the disparity between rich and poor would grow and the situation of people’s depraved desires for personal benefit would not be hard to imagine. This would be the net result of using the wrong transmissions of Confucius and Mencius’ teachings by interpreters of several hundred years, working at cross-purposes and producing an abiding poison in society.23

Shibusawa E¯ichi took this “unity of yi and li” viewpoint and appealed to society: When choosing between ways and trials to gain wealth, you should give priority to the public interest. Don’t do things that abuse people, cause them loss or harm, deceive them or cheat them. In this way, everyone can reach his or her station in life and fulfill him or herself. When increasing your wealth, do not go against ethical principle; when developing yourself, do not encroach upon others.24

21 22 23 24

Ibid., pp. 1, 3 – 4. Ibid., pp. 85 – 111. Ibid., pp. 104 – 5. Ibid., p. 138.

182

Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

He stressed that, “This is my concept of enterprise management: To share and let another person benefit is not as good as to let many people receive benefit. To achieve this goal, I should expend every effort to make my enterprises secure: to expand our endeavors and have robust business.”25 He criticized Hayashi Razan and his followers, saying that a strict division had been developed between those who talk ethics and those who practice ethics, creating a situation where “a patriotic outlook that stresses ethics is now completely lacking in society.”26 Thus, “merchants are called just merchants and looked down upon as such, unequal to scholars. Merchants are classified among the mean and cowardly. Finally, we have the egoistic generation that schemes only for self-profit.”27 He argued that the best way to improve this situation would be to establish belief in the unity of yi and li.28 For Shibusawa, this belief was Confucius’ own view on “Holding goods for wealth and value.”29 At this point, it will be helpful to examine Shibusawa’s view on this “unity of yi and li” within the context of Sino-Japanese comparative intellectual history. The distinction between yi and li is an important topic in Chinese intellectual history. In a previous study, I have argued that during the pre-Qin period Confucius initially treated yi and li as a part of the problem of self-cultivation.30 Mencius faced the intellectual competition of the Warring States period, “when the teachings of Yang Zhu and Mo Di filled the Empire,” and was thus moved to strictly distinguish between yi and li, and delve into their conceptual content. In Xunzi’s hands, the concept of yi turned from the yi as one’s inner sense of appropriateness, as it had been in Confucius and Mencius’ thought, to an externally forced instrument of society. Thus the distinction between yi and li in Xunzi’s thought was thoroughly different from that proposed by Confucius and Mencius. In Confucius’ thought, yi had two levels. On the first level, yi can be explained as appropriate, suitable or right, and refers to the most appropriate condition for things or phenomena. It is a creative, active principle of conduct, not an ossified moral dogma. This first level follows the old meaning of yi from the Western Zhou period. The second level of yi in Confucius’ thought refers to the self in relation to others. Confucius understood yi as forming the ethical guideline of an ideal self. Although Confucius never used the term gongli (公利, public benefit), in his thought li (利, benefit, profit) referred to the benefit of goods held by a private person. What Confucius opposed was any plotting for purely selfish gain at the expense of others. As for gongli, not only was he not 25 26 27 28 29 30

Ibid., p. 186. Ibid., p. 208. Ibid., p. 127. Ibid., pp. 102 – 5. Ibid., p. 91. Chun-chieh Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics, pp. 53 – 79.

“The Unity of Ethics, Fact, and Benefit”

183

opposed to it, he positively approved of it, seeing gongli as a genuine expression of yi. In saying that the “government should not contend with people for benefit,” Western Han intellectuals brought this meaning into play. In the discourses of the eminent ministers of the two Hans, we can witness this point being made quite frequently. As for Zhu Xi, we find that he pairs yi and li with tianli and renyu (人慾, human desire). Commenting on Mencius 1.1, Zhu wrote: “Ren and yi are rooted in what the human heart definitely possesses, the gong [fairness] of tianli. Profitmindedness arises from my visible frame, the selfishness of human desires.”31 Zhu’s friend Zhang Shi and his successors greatly narrowed the relationship between yi and li. The principle target of Shibusawa’s criticisms was precisely this Song intellectual tradition which sought to bifurcate yi and li. In the same way, we can also see a Japanese Confucian interpretation of Analects 4.16, where “The Master said, ‘The gentleman is conversant with yi [appropriateness], the mean fellow is conversant with li [profit].” On this point, the eighteenth-century classical philologist Ogyu¯ Sorai wrote: Generally, the term yi, although not spoken in opposition to li, still must go back to “the benevolence of making the people secure,” for this reason. Therefore, to be a man of yi is that to which the gentleman aspires, while to be a man of li is what the mean fellow desires. Hence, being conversant of the ways of man, to the gentleman it is yi and to the mean fellow it is li. Nonetheless, even though he is a gentleman, won’t he wish for profit [benefit]? Even though he is a mean fellow, won’t he take delight in appropriateness? The difference just lies in how they devote themselves.32

Ogyu¯ Sorai criticized Song learning “for valuing the discipline of mind, actively seeking it in oneself, for making a fine and formal distinction between yi and li, and for exploring the subtleties of the discipline of mind. Exploring the beginning is no more effective than only discussing the results.”33 Still, it is clear that he established an intellectual position regarding the distinction between yi and li for the ruler and the ruled. This was precisely the object of Shibusawa’s critique. In the eighteenth century, Osaka’s economy expanded and the Kaitokudo¯ (懷 德堂, 1724 – 1869) flourished. In the beginning, the Kaitokudo¯ was merely a private school in Osaka. Yet later, five prominent merchants provided the capital to transform it into a public academy.34 The theme of the Kaitokudo¯ scholars in their interpretation of the Analects was that yi and li were united as one. They equated the profit of the merchant with the appropriateness of the gentleman. 31 32 33 34

Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, juan 1, p. 202. Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, vol. 7, p. 86. Ibid. Tetsuo Najita, Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudo¯ Merchant Academy of Osaka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 8.

Shibusawa E¯ichi on the Analects

184

This belief was tightly linked to Osaka’s position as an important commercial city. Viewed in the context of this intellectual history, Shibusawa’s view of the unity of yi and li sits very well with the Kaitokudo¯ intellectual tradition. But Shibusawa added a new concept that transformed the Analects into a new classic of ethics for twentieth-century Japanese capitalism.

4

Conclusion

Shibusawa E¯ichi published The Analects and the Abacus in 1928, during the transition from the Taisho¯ (大正, 1912 – 1926) to the Sho¯wa period (1926 – 1989), and after the successes of the Meiji Restoration (which began in 1868). This was a period when the Japanese looked askance at Asia and took pride in their own prowess. It was a time when the Japanese looked down upon China, and a time of tense relations between the two nations. Against this historical backdrop, Shibusawa E¯ichi strongly promoted the Analects. He held the Analects in high regard, and his vision of its value was acute. Like other Japanese sinologists, Shibusawa recognized the incredible difference between the intellectual world of cultural China and the real world of socio-political China. He noted, “I read the histories, and the China I respect is mainly that of the late Shang and early Zhou, the halcyon days of emperors Yao and Shun. That was the time when Chinese culture had reached its zenith, its glory days.”35 But when he went to China, “From the moment I first personally set foot on Chinese soil and concretely observed the life and customs there, I discovered that the reality is not at all like that.”36 He felt pained that the “Chinese people’s pride of individualism and seeking personal gain were highly developed. The entire population lacks the concept of country. These two points can be said to convey China’s two main faults.”37 However, these troubling insights did not extinguish his veneration for Confucius and the Analects. Indeed, as we have seen, his praises for the Analects reached such a crescendo that they disturbed the young Kyoto University student Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯. In the end, Shibusawa spent his entire life gathering texts on and about the Analects in every language. We have see that in the early twentieth century, Shibusawa offered a great service by popularizing the Analects in Japan. His interpretation of Confucius’ thought followed the spirit of practical learning observed in the Tokugawa Confucians. The Analects and the Abacus can be seen as a twentieth-century 35 Shibusawa E¯ichi, Rongo to soroban, p. 195. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 196.

Conclusion

185

embodiment of Ito¯ Jinsai’s pronouncement that the way lies in common social customs. Shibusawa’s book achieved this in two ways. First, in his interpretation of Confucius’ thought, Shibusawa always stressed that ethics is not established on the basis of metaphysics, but rather through the course of concrete practice. Everything that he saw presented in the Analects was linked to the world of practice and practical learning. Second, Shibusawa contended that in Confucius’ world of thought yi (appropriateness) and li (benefit, profit) were not antagonistic opposites. Rather, he argued that ethics, facts, and benefit form a unity. Thus, he encouraged others to see that the principles contained in the Analects for self-conduct and for managing the world could be brought into modern enterprise management. In summary, ever since the nineteenth century the Analects has been widely read throughout Japanese society. Shibusawa and his The Analects and the Abacus played a major role in the popularization process, showing that the principles in the Analects can guide people’s daily interpersonal relationships, even in modern society, and even in the new age of twentieth-century capitalism, by establishing a new model of the gentleman merchant.

Chapter Ten: What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

1

Introduction

In Chapter 8, we examined Ito¯ Jinsai’s impressive reinterpretation of the texts of the Confucian traditions. His work focused in particular on reversing what he saw as the harmful interpretive approach taken by Zhu Xi, with its stress on the abstract and transcendent over the practical and everyday. For Ito¯, steering Confucian scholarship back to the practical meaning of the texts helped scholars escape centuries of the fog of Zhu Xi’s interpretation and rediscover the clarity of the texts’ original meanings. Yet despite Ito¯’s valuable and impressive work, we cannot say that he himself wholly grasped the entirety of Confucian understanding. Ito¯’s work also reflected his particular context in the East Asian arena, and his tight focus on “practical learning” (jitsugaku, 實學) allowed other aspects of the traditions to slip from view. Since the seventeenth century, Japanese intellectual history has been characterized by this development toward “practical learning,” which included both empiricist and rationalist elements, and which focused on the concrete knowledge useful for daily life.1 From the seventeenth century, “practical learning” grew to become Japan’s intellectual mainstream. Ito¯ Jinsai’s admonition to “use concrete language to explain concrete principle”2 captured the creed and spirit of this Japanese “practical learning.” In this chapter, we will explore the following questions: When Ito¯ Jinsai engaged in his reinterpretations in the context of his own inclination toward “practical learning,” which elements – particularly of Mencius’ thought – did he stress? Conversely, which aspects did he gloss over and which did he exclude altogether? In Ito¯’s reinterpretation, what was gained and lost from Mencius’

1 Minamoto Ryo¯en 源了圓, Kinse¯ shoki jitsugaku shiso¯ no kenkyu¯ 近世初期実学思想の研究 [A Study of Practical Learning in Early Modern Japan] (Tokyo: So¯bunsha, 1980, 1986, 1991). 2 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Do¯shikai hikki,” vol. 5, p. 11.

188

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

original teachings? And what is the historical significance of Ito¯’s reinterpretation of Mencius? This chapter examines Ito¯’s tendency to grasp the secular at the expense of the transcendental when reinterpreting Mencius’ thought. Section two begins by highlighting Ito¯’s argument that Mencius’ political theory of the “Kingly Way” was the centerpiece of his thought. Section three analyzes Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ discussion on human nature solely in terms of “physical nature.” We will see that Ito¯ ignored, to a large extent, the transcendental aspect of Mencius’ discourses on the human mind and nature. Finally, section four will show that Ito¯’s interpretation lost sight of the transcendental dimension in Mencius’ system of thought.

2

Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius’ political thought

Ito¯ Jinsai (1) saw the political ideal of the “Kingly Way” as the core idea of Mencius’ thought, and then (2) interpreted the political theory of the “Kingly Way” in concrete practical terms, thus exhibiting the spirit of “practical learning” in the Tokugawa (1603 – 1868) school of classical learning. (3) In his interpretation of Mencius’ “Kingly Way,” Ito¯ emphasized Mencius’ affirmation that the true King regarded the people as being of supreme importance. He approved of Mencius’ accounts of King Tang’s (湯) and Wu’s (武) punitive attacks on the Shang (商), since he saw them as reflecting the core of Mencius’ political thought. Let us examine these three points. (1) Ito¯ Jinsai believed that ren and yi formed the foundation of Mencius’ thought. In Ito¯’s representation of Mencius, “the true king governs people as if he were nourishing his own children.”3 Moreover, “True kings make virtue [德, toku] the foundation of their rule, but have never dispensed with laws and the institutions of government. Yet true kings only use laws and institutions to supplement their virtue.”4 Hence, the “Kingly Way” for Ito¯ meant acting from humaneness and righteousness.5 Ito¯ stressed that the “Kingly Way” was Mencius’ central concern and formed the centerpiece of his learning.6 In Ito¯’s view, Mencius’ distinctive doctrine was the “Kingly Way,” not his teaching of “the goodness of human nature.” In his commentary on Mencius 4 A1, Ito¯ stressed that the “Kingly Way” was more important than the “goodness of human nature,” and that it formed the core value of Mencius’ system of thought.7 For him, 3 4 5 6 7

Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 200. Ibid., p. 201. Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, p. 3. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid.

Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius’ political thought

189

“humaneness” formed the foundation of Mencius’ political theory. Indeed, by taking the king’s “humane” mind as the foundation8, he held that only rulers who had cultivated their “humane” heartedness could be said to possess the “King’s mind.”9 Since Ito¯ regarded “the mind of the King” as the foundation of Mencius’ political theory of the “Kingly Way,” he took a different approach to explaining Mencius’ lack of respect for the Zhou king. In 1692 when Ito¯ was 65 years old, he composed the article, “On Mencius’ Exhorting the Feudal Lords to Practice the Kingly Way.” In this text, he gave his account of the historical context of “Mencius’ not respecting the Zhou king.”10 Ito¯ argued that because the term tianming (天命, Heaven’s Mandate) had been altered by later scholars, it appeared that the feudal lords could “not respect” the Zhou king. This change had been made by the Northern Song Neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi. Cheng Yi held that Mencius’ disrespect for the Zhou king depended on whether the Mandate of Heaven had been changed.11 Ito¯ Jinsai criticized this account, arguing that there was no loftier and more general “Mandate of Heaven” above the Zhou king that could determine whether or not the Zhou king was worthy of respect. Ito¯ stressed that whether the king deserved our utmost respect depended on whether he has maintained his “humane” mind.12 In other words, Ito¯ laid particular emphasis on the king’s moral practice and was not concerned about a general “Mandate of Heaven” or “Principle of Heaven.” Because Ito¯ regarded the “Kingly Way,” and not “the goodness of human nature,” as the core of Mencius’ thinking, when he came to the Mencius he regarded the first three books – “Liang Hui Wang” (1 A&B), “Gongsun Chou” (2 A&B), and “Tengwen Gong” (3 A&B) – as the “Prior Mencius” and the following four books as the “Posterior Mencius” which were grounded in the previous three. Among the books of the “Prior Mencius,” Ito¯ regarded 1 A&B as forming the core of Mencius’ learning.13 Consequently, in Book 1 A&B, whenever Mencius discussed the concrete procedures of nurturing the people, Ito¯ would add praises, inferences, elaborations, etc. In his Ancient Meaning of Mencius, Ito¯ provided more explanations for parts 1 A and 1B than for any of the other Books, thus concretely exhibiting the spirit of “practical leaning” in the Tokugawa school of classical studies. 8 Ibid., p. 171. Ito¯ Jinsai’s “humaneness” (ren, 仁) referred especially to the concrete behavior of loving others. See Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, pp. 216 – 17. 9 Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, p. 324. 10 Ito¯ Jinsai, Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯, vol. 1, pp. 26a–29a. 11 Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, Er Cheng ji 二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), p. 145. 12 Ito¯ Jinsai, Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯, vol. 1, p. 29a. 13 Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, p. 1.

190

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

(2) When explaining Mencius’ political discussions on the “Kingly Way,” Ito¯ stressed that the criterion for assessing a person’s status as “King” was that of virtuous practice, and not simply whether the person occupied the throne. Indeed, he used this practical criterion to criticize the Song Confucians. Ito¯ stressed that Mencius had proposed the term “King” to encourage the feudal lords to realize virtue by practicing humane rule, and not simply as a term to designate the one who chanced to occupy the throne. Thus he argued that the Song Confucians were mistaken in their view that Mencius had encouraged feudal lords to struggle to take the throne as king.14 This leaves us with an interesting question: If “the heart of the King” deviates from the people’s welfare, how should the people deal with this situation? Ito¯ Jinsai’s attitude to this question was absolutely clear: he positively approved of Mencius’ doctrine of the people’s right to revolt. Ito¯ stressed the importance of the wishes of the people in the world, and affirmed that the ruling authorities should make adjustments according to the wishes of the people. He said, “As for the Way, it is common in the world, in the commonality of human mind; the Way exists in the common ground and the propensity of the popular minds.”15 Ito¯ Jinsai defined the “Way” very clearly: it is the path that people should follow in daily ethical conduct (jinrin nichiyo¯ masa ni yukubeki no michi, 人倫日 用當行之路).16 It does not exist simply because it was taught. Nor does it exist simply because it corrects human tendencies. Rather it exists naturally (mina shizen ni shite shikari, 皆自然而然). Throughout the four directions and eight corners of the world everyone understands the moral relationships that exist naturally between rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, husbands and wives, elder and younger brothers, and friends. Everyone also understands the ways of parental love, duty, distinctions, order, and fidelity. For countless generations this has been true and it will remain true. Therefore these are called the Way. The remark in the Doctrine of the Mean, that “People cannot depart from the Way for an instant,” refers to the very universality of the Way. Ito¯ Jinsai’s re-definition of Mencius’ concept of the “Way” is clearly at odds with the Song Confucian emphasis on the Way’s transcendental meaning and metaphysical content. In contrast, Ito¯ maintained that the Way had to be grasped in the context of the people’s concrete life (daily interpersonal activity). He underscored that, “the commonality of the world is what is called the Way.” Ito¯ also maintained that “the Way exists amid the secular.”17 Asking “why search for the Way outside of the world of the secular,” Ito¯ stressed that “the Way exists 14 15 16 17

Ibid., pp. 7 – 8. Ibid., pp. 35 – 6. Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 95. Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, p.130.

Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature

191

amid the secular world,” and thus destroyed the Song Confucian notion of a “transcendent Way.”18 Here we see an excellent example of how the Tokugawa school of classical learning treated the idea of the “Way” in terms of interpersonal daily activity. (3) That Ito¯ would understand the “Mandate of Heaven” as the basis for Mencius’ doctrine of the right to revolt was conditioned by his historical context. The Tokugawa feudal authority feared that feudal lords from every corner of Japan may raise the false banner of the “Mandate of Heaven,” usurping power and thereby leading the people into a violent maelstrom. However, without doubt, Ito¯ affirmed that the people were the weighted center of politics. He powerfully stated: “The All Under Heaven is the heaven of common folks.”19 Here we have an excellent expression of Mencius’ spirit. Ito¯ himself was born into the townsman class and never engaged in politics. Believing in popular education, he organized the Do¯shikai (同志會, Comrade Society) as a way to instill popular wisdom and to reform society. Ito¯ made efforts to provide social education and supported the view that one must protect the people in order to be the King. Advocating the idea that “the Way lay in common practices,” he then concluded that the “Kingly Way” consists in “the Way of bringing peace to the people.” This type of advocacy was potentially intimidating to the Tokugawa feudal authorities. Consequently, as Watanabe Hiroshi noted, Ito¯ Jinsai was the first among Japanese Confucians to include punitive attacks on tyrants as a manifestation of “the Way.”20 In this regard, Ito¯’s political thought was similar to Mencius’ in spirit.

3

Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature

Another salient aspect in Ito¯’s reading of Mencius was his interpretation of Mencius’ theory of the goodness of human nature. Ito¯’s commentaries on Mencius’ theory of human nature appear in his texts Mo¯shi Kogi, Gomo¯ Jigi and Do¯jimon. Three points are noteworthy here. First, on the basis of these sources, we see that Ito¯ articulated Mencius’ theory of human nature solely in the terms of 18 However, we should note that in his early years Ito¯ studied Zhu Xi’s philosophy. But once in his mid-thirties, he launched an attack on the Zhu Xi school of Song Neo-Confucianism. Cf. Samuel Hideo Yamashita, “The Early Life and Thought of Ito¯ Jinsai,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 43/2 (1983): pp. 453 – 80. ¯ sa no sai 論諸葛孔明非王佐之才 [On Zhuge Liang’s 19 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Ron Shokatsu Ko¯mei hi O Talent Is Not Comparable to Wangzuo’s],” in Kogaku sense¯shu 古学先生集 [Literary Corpus of Master of Classical Learning], in Sagara To¯ru et al., eds., Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1985), p. 52. 20 Watanabe Hiroshi, Kinse¯ Nihon shakai to so¯gaku 近世日本社会と宋学 [Early Modern Japanese Society and Song Learning] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1985), p. 239.

192

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

a physical disposition.21 Ito¯ believed that Mencius’ theory of human nature was given in the concrete, existential context of action and not in the context of any general, transcendent cosmic order. Second, seen from the perspective of intellectual history, Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature bears a remote affinity with Gaozi22 and the Han Confucian tradition of defining “human nature” (性, xing) in terms of “physical nature” (生, sheng). The eighteenthcentury Chinese Confucian scholar, Dai Zhen, interpreted Mencius’ theory in similar terms. Nonetheless, third, Ito¯’s “physicalist” account of Mencius’ theory of human nature departed from Mencius’ own stated theory of human nature. Let us have a closer look at each of these three points. (1) Ito¯’s comments on Mencius’ theory of human nature share a common thread: when discussing the theory that human nature was good, he always did so in “physicalist” terms. Ito¯ argues: Mencius once asked, “Is a dog’s nature (inu no sei 犬之性) identical with that of an ox (gyû no sei 牛之性), or is an ox’s nature the same as human nature?” He also asked, “If palates differ from one person to the next, according with their individual human nature, just as hounds’ and horses’ tastes differ from mine, how do we explain the fact that people defer to the great connoisseur Yi Ya [易牙] in culinary matters?” Mencius’ questions – about the physical characteristics of different animals as well as human beings – reveal that his remark about human nature’s goodness referred most primarily to the physical disposition.23

Ito¯ asserts that Mencius’ “humane nature” refers to one’s “physical disposition.” In order to correctly understand the meaning of Ito¯’s account, we need to discuss the meaning of the Chinese term qizhi (氣質), which can be translated as “embodied” or “physical.” As Zhu Xi observed, the theory of “physical disposition” (qizhi, 氣質) originated with Zhang Zai and was developed by Cheng Yi .24 Zhu elaborated on Zhang’s theory: With the existence of physical form, there exists physical nature. If one skillfully returns to the original nature endowed by Heaven and Earth, then it will be preserved. Therefore in physical nature there is that which the superior man denies to be his original nature.25

As Lao Siguang (勞思光) points out, the term “physical nature” in this proposition implies that as a person takes shape in physical existence, there are the 21 In his Gomo¯ Jigi, Ito¯ Jinsai asserts: “Mencius’s account of human nature pertained to the physical disposition. He never spoke of human nature apart from it”; Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, 137. 22 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 222 – 9. 23 Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 136. 24 Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi yulei, vol. 4, p. 70. 25 Wing-tsit Chan, trans./ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 511.

Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature

193

conditions of physical disposition. These conditions are called “physical”; “physical disposition” itself has a kind of “nature” called the “physical nature” which just indicates the characteristics associated with the manifest physical existence and not the commonality of “heaven” (天, tian).26 In the language of the Cheng-Zhu school of Song Neo-Confucianism, “physical nature” was contrasted with “original nature.” “Physical nature” refers to the conditions or situation of human existence in space and time; it does not refer to “principle” or “Heaven,” i. e., an abstract, general ontological sense of human nature. Ito¯ Jinsai indicated that Mencius “discussed the goodness of human nature in the context of physical disposition,” that is to say, he considered human nature in the context of common, daily life or “everyday interpersonal relations” rather than human nature at the level of transcendental “principle.” Fundamentally, Ito¯ Jinsai saw “man’s good nature” manifested only in concrete daily life, and he rejected the possibility of a transcendental metaphysical world beyond the physical world.27 Ito¯’s fundamental position regarding the question of human nature closely paralleled his interpretation of the “Way” in terms of everyday interpersonal ethical relations. Unfortunately, in this regard, Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature has departed from the transcendental dimension of Mencius’ own thought. For example, Mencius 7 A1 contains Mencius’ most characteristic and valuable teaching.28 Mencius’ teachings on “mind,” “nature,” and “heaven” were all intertwined, and together they indicated the “immanent and transcendental” dimensions of human life. Put simply, this chapter represents one of the most important contributions in the history of ancient Chinese thought. Mencius offers an intellectual sequence where “fully realize the mind” (jinxin, 盡心) leads to “understanding the nature” (zhixing, 知性) which in turn leads to “knowing Heaven” (zhitian, 知天). This sequence formed the “chain of being” in his thought, which was based on the notion of “expanding” or “developing.” In Mencius’ thought, the mind had unlimited capacity. For him, the capacities of value judgment – namely, compassion (ceyin, 惻隱), shame (xiue, 羞惡), courtesy and modesty (gongjing, 恭敬), as well as right and wrong (shifei, 是非) — were all rooted in the mind. But by developing this mind and fulfilling it, not only 26 Lao Siguan 勞思光, Xinbian Zhongguo zhexuesi 新編中國哲學史 [New Edition of History of Chinese Philosophy] (Taipei: San Min Book Company, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 181 – 2. 27 Ishida Ichiro¯ 石田一良, Ito¯ Jinsai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1960), p. 140; Sagara To¯ru, “Jinrin nichiyo¯ ni okeru cho¯etsu – Ito¯ Jinsai no ba’ai 人倫日用における超越 ─ 伊藤仁齋の 場合 [Transcendence in Interpersonal Daily Business – The Case of Ito¯ Jinsai],” in Sagara To¯ru chosakushu¯ 相良亨著作集 [Complete Works of Sagara To¯ru] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1996), pp. 220 – 300; Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦, Ito¯ Jinsai: Jinrin teki sekai no shiso¯ 伊藤仁 齋：人倫的世界の思想 [Ito¯ Jinsai: The Thought of the Interpersonal World] (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯ Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), pp. 27 – 60. 28 D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1979), vol. 2, p. 265.

194

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

could one eliminate the barriers between the self and other, one could also protect everything within the Four Seas, to the extent of dissolving the boundary between heaven and humanity and attaining a sphere of resonance with the ultimate reality of the cosmos. Ito¯ Jinsai forcefully critiqued Zhu Xi’s teaching that “human nature was principle.”29 He rejected the claim that there was another transcendental, general world beyond the concrete specificity of “daily interpersonal ethical relations.” Ito¯ also opposed Zhuxi’s interpretation of Mencius’ concept of “beginning” or “sprout” (duan, 端) as “clue” or “intention” (xu, 緒) and instead offered his own interpretation as “root” or “trunk” (ben, 本)30, on the basis that the four beginnings of mind were the roots of humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. Ito¯’s account came close to that of the Han commentary of Zhao Qi, that: “The beginnings are the heads. People all have the heads of humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety and wisdom, and can exercise them.”31 However, neither of these interpretations grasped the fundamental insight of Mencius’ idea of the mind with its transcendental dimension, and was akin to what the Song Confucians called “principle.” Among the received interpretations of Mencius, that of Lu Jiuyuan came the closest to capturing Mencius’ spirit. In Mencius’ thought the term “mind” had three essential points of significance: (i) mind had priority over the five senses, (ii) the value consciousness of the mind had universality, and (iii) mind and principle had common attributes.32 Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of the mind’s four beginnings stripped Mencius’ philosophy of mind of its broad, deep and lofty transcendental dimensions, inevitably flattening Mencius’ thought and leaving it much shallower. Indeed, as Li Minghui has indicated, the thinkers of the Lu-Wang school regarded the four beginnings as indications of the “original mind.” The original mind included the principles of humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. This “inclusion” did not mean “inclusion” in a cognitive sense, but rather referred to their dynamic role in moral self-legislation. The mind’s four beginnings were the expressions of this original mind. Mind and principle thus formed a unity.33 Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius’ philosophy of mind thus deviated from Mencius’ original intended meaning. 29 Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, vol. 7, p. 283. 30 Ibid. 31 Jiao Xun 焦循, Mengzi zhengyi 孟子正義 [The Correct Meanings of Mencius] (rev. ed.; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), vol. 1, p. 234. 32 Huang Chun-chieh, Mengxue sixiangshi lun, vol.2, pp. 536 – 8. 33 Li Ming-hui, “Mengzi de siduanzhixin yu kangde de daodeqinggan 孟子的四端之心與康德 的道德情感 [Mencius’ Four Beginnings of Mind and Kant’s Moral Feelings],” in Li Ming-hui, Rujia yu Kangde 儒家與康德 [Confucianism and Kant] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 143 – 4.

Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature

195

From the vantage point of East Asian Confucianisms, Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of the goodness of human nature essentially continued in the tradition of Han Confucian interpretations of “human nature.” In effect, Ito¯ discussed human nature in terms of concrete human existence. Ito¯’s manner of speaking followed that intellectual stream represented by Gaozi and the tradition of the Han Confucians, a stream which discussed “human nature” in terms of “life.” Indeed, from the time of Gaozi on, every generation saw the arrival of a scholar who sought to speak of human nature in terms of physical life. Xunzi said, “As to the natural ingredient of physical life, call it the nature.”34 Similarly, the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒, ca. 179 – 104 bce) also said, “As to the natural materials of life, call them nature.”35 And starting with Wang Chong (王 充, b. 27 bce) – who cited Liuxiang’s saying, that “man’s nature is inborn”36 – the Han Confucians all tended to take the position that, “what is so by birth is called the nature.” For his part, Ito¯ Jinsai said, “Human nature is the root of life, that which sustains us; the emotions are the intentions of life, spoken in terms of likes and aversions. As to capacities, they enable us to act. These three are identified in terms of physical embodiment.”37 (2) From the perspective of the comparative context of East Asian Confucianisms, Ito¯ Jinsai’s advocacy for nature in the terms of physical life is full of historical significance. In the century following Ito¯, the eighteenth-century Chinese Confucian Dai Zhen, offered an interpretation of Mencius that came quite close to Ito¯’s. In general, we find several similarities between the two thinkers. Ito¯ and Dai Zhen shared a common tendency toward revivalism and fundamentalism in Neo-Confucianisms, a tendency seen in China and Japan since the seventeenth-century.38 From a historical perspective, they both represent a development of Confucian thought that moved from “honoring moral nature” to “following the path of inquiry and study.”39 And they also both reject the “ethical duality” implicit in Zhuxi’s cosmology of li and qi. The theoretical foundation of Dai Zhen’s interpretation of Mencius was “ontological monism,” which placed “naturalness” and “necessity” in a cyclical relationship. From his 34 Wang Xianqian, Xunzi jijie, p. 412. 35 Su Yu 蘇輿, Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 春秋繁露義證 [Commentaries on the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), p. 291. 36 Huang Hui 黃暉, Lunheng xiaoshi 論衡校釋 [Commentaries on the Balanced Inquiries] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), p. 140. 37 Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, vol. 6, p. 242. 38 William Theodore De Bary, “Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism,” in David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, eds., Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 25 – 49, 31. 39 Yu Ying-shih 余英時, “Dai Zhen yu Ito¯ Jinsai 戴震與伊藤仁齋,” in his Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng 論戴震與章學誠 [On Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng] (Hong Kong: Lung Meng Shuju, 1976), pp. 291 – 4.

196

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

monist perspective, Dai Zhen understood human nature as a person’s instinct of biological survival, and thus he broke up the intimate relationship between the cosmic order and the human order. He went on to reject the transcendental dimension of Mencius’ thought. In Dai Zhen’s reading, Mencius’ theory of human nature also lost its broad, deep and lofty transcendental anchorage; in effect, Dai flattened out Mencius’ theory to such an extent that the human being, in his view, could not avoid but be “one-dimensional.” By removing Mencius’ thought from the Song Confucian intellectual context, Dai Zhen failed to grasp the intellectual content of Mencius’ thought. Furthermore, his spirited critique of Song Neo-Confucianism also failed to hit its target, since he himself had failed to enter into the “hermeneutical circle” of Song Neo-Confucian philosophy. From this perspective, we could say that while Dai Zhen had intended to use his interpretation of Mencius as a weapon to criticize Song Neo-Confucians, his methodological limitations prevented him from entering into and striking against either their intellectual system or indeed Mencius’ philosophy. Consequently, his study of Mencius’ philosophy was reduced to unsuccessful apologetics.40 Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius’ philosophy, whether on substantive issues (such as interpreting “human nature” in terms of “physical nature”) or methodology, followed a track quite similar to that taken by Dai Zhen. It is truly noteworthy that this fact reflected a common trend in Sino-Japanese Confucianism from the seventeenth century on. Yet why did Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of human nature so readily discard the important context of Mencius’ philosophy? Here we could say that the most basic reason was that Ito¯ simply ignored the transcendental impulse in Mencius’ idea of the mind. In Ito¯’s interpretation of Mencius’ concept, two points are incredibly important. The first is that “mind” is what brings “intellectual applications” of the cognitive mind into play, as we see in his saying that, “The mind (kokoro, 心) is the faculty with which people think and plan (shiryo¯, 思慮). Originally it was neither esteemed nor despised. After all, every sentient being (jo¯ aru no rui 有情之類) has a mind.”41 Second, “mind” and “human nature” are two things, as in his saying that, “Mind is mind, nature is nature; their references are differentiated.”42 He made many arguments of this kind, which deviated significantly from Mencius’ views on the “mind.” (3) Ito¯ interpreted Mencius’ “human nature” as “the root of life, as that which sustains us,” and Mencius’ “mind” as “that by which man applies thought; at root, it is neither precious nor cheap.” Ito¯ completely cut off the transcendental 40 Huang Chun-chieh, Mengxue sixiangshi lun, vol. 2, pp. 327 – 68. 41 Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 129. 42 Ibid.

Conclusion

197

root of Mencius’ world of thought and deviated far from the general necessity and transcendence of the “mind” in Mencius, as well as from Mencius’ “great chain of being” (“mind–nature–Heaven”). And yet we should note that there is still a sense of transcendence in Ito¯’s philosophy. He argued: “The Dao is not dependent upon whether there are human beings or not. It is self-so naturally. It fills in the Heaven and Earth and is imbued within human beings in any time and any place.”43 Thus according to Ito¯, the Dao can exist independently of and before humans. However, Ito¯ insists that this transcendent Dao can be found in and distilled from human nature. He holds that the Dao is not far from interpersonal ethical relationships.44 We may infer that it is this philosophical inclination that led Ito¯ to interpret Mencius theory of human nature in terms of “physical nature” at the expense of “original nature.”

4

Conclusion

Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius has an inner side and an outer side. He took the political theory of the “Kingly Way” as the centerpiece of Mencius’ thought, and here we must say that taking “the king’s benevolent mind-heart” as the foundation of Mencius’ political theory was an astute move. In his approval of Mencius’ discussion on banishing tyrants, Ito¯ appeared to grasp the essence of Mencius’ political thought. And yet in his interpretation of Mencius’ thought on the goodness of human nature, Ito¯ deviated too far from Mencius’ main point, namely discussing the goodness of human nature in terms of the goodness of the human mind. In effect, Ito¯ confined himself to “physicality” or “embodied qi” in discussing the goodness of human nature, laying particular stress upon the concrete and specific context of a person’s “daily interpersonal ethical relations.” Regrettably, he cast off those generally necessary and transcendent commonalities of the “mind,” and connections in the “great chain of being” so intrinsic to Mencius’ theory of human nature. In these examples we see the limitations inherent in the readings of Mencius provided by the Tokugawa Japanese, especially the school of classical learning. In interpreting the Mencius, Ito¯ referred broadly to the Han commentaries in order to reconstruct the so-called “ancient meanings” of Confucius and Mencius. However, Ito¯ had no way of immersing himself in Mencius’ own world of thought, nor could he enter into the philosophical world of the Song Neo-Confucians. Consequently, his commentary was less an exposition of Mencius’ spirit and more an expression of Han Confucian perspectives. Furthermore, although 43 Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, vol. 5, p. 83. 44 Ibid., pp. 82 – 3.

198

What is Ignored in Ito¯ Jinsai’s Interpretation of Mencius?

Ito¯’s criticisms of Song Neo-Confucianism were spirited, they failed to truly meet their mark. From the vantage point of the history of early modern East Asian Confucianisms, Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Mencius is deeply significant. About one hundred years before the eighteenth-century Chinese Confucian Dai Zhen, Ito¯’s clarion call for the movement to return to the original teachings of Confucius and Mencius indeed managed to rally modern East Asian Confucians to return to the original Confucian classics.45 At the same time, this new movement produced spirited critiques of Song Neo-Confucian philosophy, notably of their idea of absolute “principle” and their strong claims that “heavenly principle” can be observed only in the context of human affairs. The spawning and stirring of these new movements stand as testimony to Ito¯ Jinsai’s commanding position in the history of East Asian Confucianisms.

45 Huang Chun-chieh, “Dongya jinshi ruxue sichao de xindongxiang – Dai Dongyuan, Ito¯ Jinsai, yu Ding Chashan dui Mengxue de jieshì,” pp. 77 – 107.

Chapter Eleven: Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi: A Historical Perspective

1

Introduction

Mencius famously stressed the need to “Know words and nurture qi.” This saying attracted the interest of many traditional East Asian Confucians. As we have seen, Zhu Xi’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of qi particularly provoked much discussion and debate among Chinese, Japanese and Korean Confucians. This was hardly surprising, since these East Asian Confucians studied Mencius’ thought using Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries of the Four Books.1 In previous chapters we have already seen aspects of the debate regarding Zhu Xi’s interpretations, looking in particular at the early-eighteenth century Tokugawa scholar Ito¯ Jinsai. In this chapter we will jump forward a hundred years to analyze the work of the nineteenth-century Japanese Yo¯meigaku (Yangming Learning, 陽明學) Confucian, Yamada Ho¯koku (山田方谷, 1805 – 1877), particularly his interpretation of Mencius’ conceptualization of qi (section 2). We will then supplement Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation by examining his work in the context of the history of the hermeneutics of Mencius in general (section 3) and the history of Japanese Confucianism in particular (section 4).

2

Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation of Mencius’ Qi

Yamada Ho¯koku was a Yo¯meigaku philosopher who was deeply involved in the political reforms of the late Tokugawa period.2 Yamada and Kasuga Sen’an (春日 潜庵, 1811 – 1878) claimed to be the two pivotal Yo¯meigaku scholars of nine1 See Huang Chun-chieh, Mengxue sixiangshi lun, vol. 2, ch. 5, pp. 191 – 252; Chun-chieh Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics, pp. 172 – 184. 2 For a recent biography of Yamada Ho¯koku, see Yabuki Kunihiko 矢吹邦彥, Hono¯ no Yo¯meigaku: Yamada Ho¯koku den 炎の陽明学：山田方谷傳 [Yangming Learning in Zeal: A Biography of Yamada Ho¯koku] (Tokyo: Me¯toku Shuppansha, 1996). For a convenient handbook on Yamada Ho¯koku, see Yamada Ho¯koku Ni Manabu Kai 山田方谷に学ぶ会 [Asso-

200

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

teenth-century Japan. In a letter to a friend written in 1832 when he was 28 years old, Yamada speaks of having studied Song Neo-Confucianism since his childhood. Being dissatisfied with the Han (206 bce–220 ce) and Tang (618 – 907 ce) approaches, Yamada turned to Zhu Xi’s school of Neo-Confucianism. Yet, neither did he find himself fully convinced by Zhu Xi.3 In the following year (1833), Yamada read Wang Yangming’s Chuanxi Lu and found Wang’s thought intriguing and attractive. He described the resonance between Wang and himself “as the reflection of bright moon upon clear water.”4 Yamada’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of qi is based on his philosophy with a strong qi-monism (2.1). In Yamada’s view, qi at once possesses cosmological and ethical features (2.2). In the early history of Chinese thought, we already find qi discussed along these lines, not only in Confucius’ Analects, but also in the Book of Changes and The Doctrine of the Mean, before culminating in the Mencius. Thus the concept of qi is deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition (2.3). Nonetheless, Yamada is unique in his qi-monism, and used this approach as the basis for his creative interpretation of the Mencius (2.4).

2.1

The idea of qi-monism as basis for interpreting the Mencius

In the winter of 1873 when he was 65 years old, Yamada Ho¯koku lectured to his students on Mencius 2 A2. In his own publication – Mo¯shi Yo¯kisho¯ Wakumon Zukai 孟子養氣章或問圖解 (Diagrams with Explanation on Questions Concerning the Chapter on “Nurturing qi” in the Mencius), which included fourteen diagrams with explanations and seven questions with discussions concerning Mencius 2 A25 – Yamada followed Wang Yangming’s approach and criticized Zhu Xi’s interpretation. ciation for the Study of Yamade Ho¯koku], Nyu¯mon Yamada Ho¯koku: shisei no hito 入門山田 方谷：至誠の人 [A Primer for the Study of Yamade Ho¯koku: A Man of Supreme Sincerity] (Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppansha, 2007). For a general account of Yamada’s thinking, see Hayashida Akio 林田明大, Yamada Ho¯koku no shiso¯ o megutte: Yo¯meigaku saha nyu¯mon 山 田方谷の思想を巡って：陽明学左派入門 [An Overview of the Thought of Yamada Ho¯koku: A Primer on the Left Wing of the Yangming School] (Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppansha, 2010). 3 Yamada Ho¯koku, edited by Yamada Jun 山田準, Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全集 [Complete works of Yamada Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷 全集刊行会, 1951), vol. 1, p. 145. 4 Yamada Ho¯koku, Yamada Ho¯koku Zenshu¯, vol. 1, p. 178. Cf. Kaname Asamori 朝森要, “Yo¯meigakusha Yamada Ho¯koku o megutte 陽明学者山田方谷をめぐって [A Review of the Yangming Scholar Yamada Ho¯koku],” Nihon Rekishi 日本歴史 359 (Sep. 1977): pp. 87 – 90. 5 Yamada Ho¯koku, Mo¯shi yo¯kisho¯ wakumon zukai 孟子養氣章或問圖解 [Diagrams with Explanation on Questions Concerning the Chapter on “Nurturing qi” in the Mencius] (Osaka: Imeido¯ wood-block edition of Ko¯do¯ shoin, 1902); hereafter as Zukai. Yamada’s student Okamoto Takashi (岡本巍, 1850 – 1920) reported how Yamada insisted that Wang Yangming’s

Ho¯koku’s interpretation of Mencius’ Qi

201

Yamada’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of nurturing qi is based on his qimonism. From his point of view, qi is the most fundamental and important element in the universe; it is essential to all living things. If there were a world, there would have to be a “way of nurturing qi.” Mencius’ contribution was merely to give a name to this tacit way of nurturing qi. As Yamada said: The Great qi pervades the world and the myriad things. And, that which is imbued with qi is a living creature. All creatures have mind and are percipient. Having mind, they can move. Their percipience and movement are ceaseless; this is to nurture this qi.6

The proposition that “The Great Qi pervades the world and the myriad things” is Yamada’s basic tenet. In his conversation with his students, Yamada perceptively announced: “It is qi which generates li, but not the qi that blurs li. If there is qi, then there is li. It is appropriate to say that li exists amid the qi. Li changes in accordance with [changes of] qi.”7 Yamada was obviously thinking in line with Wang Yangming who had argued that the li was merely the order of qi: The word ching ([精] refinement) in the phrase “refinement and singleness” refers to the principle of man and thing, while the word ching (精) in the phrase ching-shen (mental energy) refers to qi. Principle is the order according to which qi operates, whereas qi is the functioning of principle. Without order it cannot function, and without functioning there will be nothing to reveal what is called order.8

Wang Yangming further insisted: When Mencius talks about a man’s nature being good, he spoke from the point of view of the original nature. However, the beginning of goodness of human nature can be seen only in qi. Without qi the goodness of human nature cannot be revealed. The feelings of commiseration, of shame and dislike, of deference and compliance, and of right and wrong are all qi.9

6 7

8 9

thought, although being enlightened through “innate knowledge,” actually stemmed from Mencius. See Zukai, 3. For Okamoto Takashi, see Yoshida Ko¯hei 吉田公平, “Okamoto Takashi no jijyonenpu ni tuite” 岡本巍の『自敘年譜』にっぃて [Concerning Okamoto Takashi’s “Autobiography”], To¯yo¯ daigaku Chu¯goku tetsugaku bungakuka kiyo¯ 東洋大学中国哲学文 学科紀要, 15 (2007): pp. 1 – 25. Zukai, p. 6, lower half. Okamoto Takashi 岡本巍, ed., Shimon monbenroku 師門問弁錄 [Inquiries and Answers under the Mentor], in Yamada Ho¯koku, Yamada Ho¯koku Zenshu¯, vol. 2, p. 833. For a discussion of Yamada Ho¯koku’s theory that “qi generates li,” see Yoshida Kohei 吉田公平, “Yamada Ho¯koku no ‘ki wa li o sho¯zuru’ no setsu ni tsuite 山田方谷の「気は理を生ずる」 の說について [Concerning Yamada Ho¯koku’s Theory that ‘Qi generates Li’],” Shu¯kan To¯yo¯gaku 集刊東洋学 100 (2008): pp. 289 – 305. Wang Yangming, Instructions for Practical Living, and Other Neo-Confucian Writings, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University, 1963), #153, p. 132. In this passage, Chan translates qi as “material force”; I have left it untranslated. Ibid., p. 131. Again, I have replaced Chan’s translation of qi as “physical nature,” leaving the term untranslated.

202

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

It is not farfetched to say that Yamada Ho¯koku’s theory of “li generates qi” was primarily influenced and inspired by Wang Yangming. In his interpretation of the method of “Nurturing the flood-like qi,” Mencius explained that one should “nourish it, with integrity and place no obstacle in its path.” To Yamada Ho¯koku, Mencius’ method was the fundamental “way of nurturing qi.” Consequently, Yamada claimed: Although in the production of the myriad creatures they all have the same qi, still in the formation of people they have different characteristics, and so there are differences in their percipience and movement. Consequently, they naturally have distinctive patterns of organization. By following their nature and not harming their pattern of organization, they can be united with the Great Qi. This is what is called “nourishing it, with integrity.” But, not following their nature and running counter to their pattern of organization is called “without integrity.”10

It was in the twilight of his life that Yamada Ho¯koku interpreted Mencius’ statement “there would be no harm if one were to nourish, with integrity” in terms of “following it naturally without harming their pattern of organization.” Yamada regarded human mind (will) and the qi as the two sides of the same coin of human existence.11 He explained that “nourish it, with integrity” came “from the spontaneity of the integrated qi” (從一氣自然) and did not read this sentence as “by integrity, nourish it without harming it.” Rather, he stressed that the way of nurturing qi must be “entirely by naturalness.”12 However, this idea in fact was not implied in Mencius’ discussion on the discipline of nurturing qi. We will examine this problem in depth after we have discussed the contents and development of Yamada’s standpoint of qi-monism.

2.2

Dual nature of qi

In Yamada’s thought, qi is the most fundamental and sole element in the universe which has both cosmological and ethical characteristics. In Yamada’s opinion, Mencius’ Way of Nurturing Qi is precisely the ancient Way of Serving the Spi10 Zukai, p. 7, upper half. 11 Cf. Matsukawa Kenji 松川健二, Yamada Ho¯koku kara Mishima Chu¯shu¯ e 山田方谷から三 島中洲へ [From Yamada Ho¯koku to Mishima Chu¯shu¯] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2008), pp. 76 – 84. 12 Zukai, p. 7, lower half. Yamada even characterized Wang Yangming’s philosophy as “the learning of nurturing qi.” See Kurata Washio 倉田和四生, Yamada Ho¯koku no Yo¯meigaku to kyo¯iku kannen no tenkai 山田方谷の陽明学と教育観念の展開 [The Yangming Learning of Yamada Ho¯koku and the Unfolding of His Educational Philosophy] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2009), p. 142.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation of Mencius’ Qi

203

rits.13 Inferring from Yamada’s idea, “qi” is ultimately the qi of creation, and it is God in human form; it is the origin of creation in a cosmological sense, and it is also a way to cultivate oneself ethically. In other words, Yamada’s idea of qi is, on the one hand, the spontaneity of natural principle and, on the other, the norm of the human world; it is the is of the universe and also the ought of human affairs; it supports both judgments of fact and judgments of value, through which both are ultimately merged.

2.3

The origin of qi and its universality

As Yamada stated, this way of nurturing qi had appeared in pre-Qin Confucianism.14 It was not limited to Confucius’ school. Its dual cosmological and ethical nature can also be seen in the Book of Changes15 and The Doctrine of the Mean, before being taken up by the Mencius where it really began to flourish.16 In Yamada’s view, this way of nurturing qi originated in ancient China, but has spread around the world: In the vastness of the universe, the Great Qi pervades without gap. Hence, as to the Way of Serving the Spirits and Nurturing Qi, what country does not have it? What age does not have it? We in Japan have practiced the “Way of Serving the Spirits” from antiquity. That [Japan] surpassed the myriad countries need not be discussed. Later, this way was honored in order to teach the subjects and to make the origin upright. Hence, this way is not transmitted from Chinese soil and concurrent with [that of China] naturally. In the Western Continents […] one can also see the unity of qi in the human person and the Creator God.17

For Yamada, this way of nurturing qi is exactly the “Way of Serving the Spirits” because they both transcend space and time and are eternally existing human practices.

2.4

Yamada’s creative interpretation of Mencius

But Yamada’s interpretation did not exactly conform to Mencius’ theory of nurturing qi. He did not realize that Mencius’ idea of the “flood-like qi” emphasized the process of “humanizing the natural.” Mencius has asserted that “it is 13 14 15 16 17

Zukai, p. 7, upper half – 8, lower half. Zukai, p. 8, lower half. Zukai, p. 9, upper half. Zukai, p. 9, lower half. Zukai, p. 7, upper half.

204

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

qi that unites rightness and the way,” “it is born of accumulated rightness.” Clearly, Mencius held to a different way of nurturing qi; this also casts light on the differences between Gaozi and Mencius. In sum, when Yamada explained nurturing qi as coming “from the spontaneity of integrated qi,”18 he missed the “humanizing” element in Mencius. Before Mencius, there were some theories about qi, such as theories of the resonance of yin and yang, watching qi, eating qi, and also theories of promoting, sharpening, prolonging qi, all four of which stressed the “naturalness” of qi. But, Mencius was the first to propose the idea of a “flood-like qi,” and discuss the way qi unites with “righteousness” and “the way” such that after one had accumulated “righteousness” one’s qi would be sublimated to the highest degree, becoming vast and unyielding qi – in this way he elicited the moral and ethical value and potential of qi.19 However, this humanized, ethical potential of qi in Mencius was ignored in Yamada’s interpretation. Let us examine this problem in detail.

3

Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation in light of the history of discourses on the Mencius

A good way to examine Yamada’s interpretation of Mencius’ theory of nurturing qi is to contextualize it in the history of interpretation of the Mencius. Yamada’s idea of qi-monism may have been defective, it was however innovative (3.1). His idea of “li amid qi” was a potent criticism of Zhu Xi’s declaration of “li above qi” and his overall philosophical position (3.2). However, Yamada’s new interpretation merits methodological reflection (3.3).

3.1

Yamada’s idea of qi-monism is innovative in the history of interpretation of the Mencius

Yamada Ho¯koku’s new concept was innovative, and not only because it was unprecedented in interpreting Mencius’ theory with qi-monism; his approach also leapt over the limitations of Zhu Xi’s approach. Yamada’s interpretation focused on two main ideas:

18 Zukai, p. 2, upper half. 19 Huang Chung-chieh, Mengxue sixiangshi lun, vol. 1, pp. 41 – 6.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation in light of the history of discourses on the Mencius

205

3.1.1 Explanation of “righteousness” and the “way” As Mencius said, the significance of “flood-like qi” is that “it is such qi that matches righteousness and the way. Deprived of these, it atrophies.” This explanation of righteousness and way had long been a puzzle to Mencius interpreters. Yamada defended the idea from the standpoint of qi-monism, proceeding “from the spontaneity of integrated qi.” He wrote: The so-called “righteousness” and the “way” are precisely examples of the li that are produced directly in it (i. e., in qi). As to “matches,” it refers to spontaneously uniting righteousness and the way, they merge naturally; it is not the case that qi is controlled by the so-called righteousness and the way.20

Because Yamada interpreted Mencius’ righteousness and the way as the “li is produced directly in it (qi),”21 he had to interpret the term “matches” as “merge naturally.” This interpretation by Yamada was unprecedented in the history of Mencius interpretation. Zhu Xi had explained that, “Matches [配] means joining and aiding it; Righteousness [義] means self-control of the human heart; Way [道] means spontaneity of natural principle; atrophying [餒] means fading qi.”22 As Zhu Xi clarified, in Mencius’ view, if a person could nurture this qi completely, and merge the way and righteousness, he would act bravely and resolutely, without hesitation; if one’s qi were not completely at this level, it would be because one’s cultivation was not complete, so one could not avoid hesitating and not be ready to carry it out fully. Zhu Xi clearly regarded this as talking about one’s qi.23 Zhu Xi’s own interpretation raised many questions. His rival, Lu Ziyue (呂子 約, d. 1200 ce), was doubtful.24 He thought that in Mencius’ statement, “qi which matches righteousness and the way; deprived of these, it will atrophy,” “it” refers to both the way and righteousness. If one were without righteousness and the way, one’s qi would atrophy.25 Zhu Xi did not agree; for him, “The so-called ‘It’ definitely refers to qi. If one were lacking qi, one’s body would not be filled out and one would atrophy.”26 Zhu Xi’s position remained consistent with what he had advocated in his Collected Commentaries on the Mencius.27 20 Zukai, pp. 10, lower half – 11, upper half. 21 In Ho¯koku’s thought, li refers to the ordered patterns (tiaoli, 條理) which take shape within qi. See also note 7 above. 22 Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, in his Sishu zhangju jizhu, juan 3, p. 231. 23 For Zhu Xi’s further discussion of this topic, cf. Li Jingde, ed., Zhuzi yulei, 103 f. 24 For Lu Ziyue’s biography, see Chan Wing-tsit, Zhuzi menren 朱子門人 [Disciples of Zhu Xi] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1982), 103 f. 25 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Zhu Wengong wenji 朱文公文集 [Literary Works of Zhu Xi], juan 48, “Da Lu Ziyue shu” 答呂子約書 [Letter to Lu Ziyue], p. 835, lower half. 26 Ibid. 27 Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, juan 3, p. 232.

206

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

Zhu Xi’s explanation of it as qi also differed from Zhao Qi’s Han dynasty account. Zhao had said, “It means, if one could Nurture this Way-Qi and practice Righteous Principle, one’s viscera would always be filled out; otherwise, one’s organs would atrophy and become hollow.”28 In the Qing dynasty, Jiao Xun accepted Mao Qiling’s (毛奇齡, 1623 – 1716) and Quan Zuwang’s (全祖望, 1705 – 1755) explanation that it refers to the way and righteousness.29 This idea was acceptable because it was consistent with Mencius’ meaning. By explaining it as qi, Zhu Xi was committed to interpret Mencius’ “One who lacks it will atrophy” as: qi is the power that fills and strengthens the life force. However, this idea does not match Mencius’ conception of “Knowing Words and Nurturing Qi,” which stressed rationalizing one’s original life impulses. Further, regarding Mencius’ term “the way,” Zhu Xi explained the way as the naturalness of heavenly principle, and righteousness as self-restriction of mind. From Zhu’s point of view, the way has generality30, whereas righteousness has specificity. Viewed in the context of the history of Mencius interpretation, Yamada’s choice to interpret righteousness and the way as “naturally produced li (from within qi) “and his taking “matches” to be “united with nature” were well grounded in his standpoint of qi-monism. Nonetheless, he showed no sign of recognizing Mencius’ sense of value judgments and had no way of comprehending Mencius’ full message. 3.1.2 “Nourish directly, with integrity” According to Yamada’s interpretation, Mencius’ expression of “nourish it directly, with integrity” means that “when one follows one’s naturalness, without harming the orderly patterns, then one is united with the great qi; this is called nourishing directly, with integrity.”31 However, there was a large gap between this interpretation and the earlier Confucians’ interpretations of the Mencius. From Zhao Qi in the Eastern Han (25 – 220 ce) to Zhu Xi in the Southern Song (1127 – 1279 ce), to Jiao Xun in the Qing (1644 – 1912), they all read zi (直, directness, forthrightness) as “righteousness”; they took it as a moral judgment with value, instead of Yamada’s interpretation of zi 直 (integrity) as “from its naturalness.” For example, Zhao Qi wrote, “it describes the greatest, firmest, most upright qi. It penetrates into one’s sinews and organism to order one’s spiritual illumination. Therefore, it is difficult to describe. One cultivates it by 28 Zhao Qi 趙岐, Mengzi 孟子 (Sibu congkan chu bian suo ben edition), ch. 3, p. 24, lower half. 29 Jiao Xun, Mengzi zhengyi 孟子正義 (Sibu bei yao edition), vol. 1, ch. 6, p. 16, lower half. 30 Zhu Xi said, “This sort of qi matches with Way and Righteousness. Without it, the qi is fading.” Match here means to merge; righteousness means the application of the mind’s selfrestrictions; the Way signifies those principles that determine how one should behave in human affairs. See Zhuzi yulei, ch. 52, p. 1257. 31 Zukai, p. 7, upper half.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation in light of the history of discourses on the Mencius

207

being righteous and not by wicked means to harm it; then it will fill the universe. By spreading this virtuous instruction, its effect will be boundless.”32 In the Southern Song, Zhu Xi wrote, “It is utmost boundless, utmost firmness without any retreat. It could be said to be the upright qi, and people partake of it from birth. Their bodies bring it forth. If one finds oneself in the right, it is cultivated. If one does nothing to harm it, their root substance bears it completely without any lack.”33 In the Qing, Jiao Xun said, “It is called the utmost great and firm upright qi. Only because it is upright and direct is it called firm and great. It is also said that ‘nourishing it by righteousness’ means ‘directly nurturing it with uprightness.’ Hence, directness implies righteousness. Because one cultivates it directly with uprightness, therefore it becomes the upright, forthright qi. Therefore, it can be of the utmost greatness and firmness.”34 From Zhao Qi to Zhu Xi to Jiao Xun, they all interpreted Mencius’ term “direct, forthright” as righteous, thus imbuing it with value and moral judgment. Compared to the Chinese Confucians, Yamada’s interpretation of Mencius’ “nurturing qi” as “follow one’s naturalness” was obviously lacking with respect to value judgments. Despite its inconsistency and limitations, this new interpretation was innovative. Regarding Mencius’ expression, “cultivate it directly with integrity,” the Qing Confucian Li Fu (李紱, Mutang 穆堂, 1675 – 1750) stressed that the reason why people “know in their hearts right and wrong but do not dare to judge it so,”35 is because “their qi is not enough to match righteousness.”36 His interpretation was exactly on the mark. Given the common understanding of these scholars, Yamada’s interpretation of the Mencius is clearly not in line with his Chinese Confucian predecessors. Even though it departs from Mencius’ meaning and the traditional line of interpretation, viewed from the perspective of the history of Mencius interpretation we have to say that it breaks through the limits of Zhu Xi’s paradigm and in some respects is highly innovative. As we have seen in the previous chapters, from the fourteenth century on, Zhu Xi’s explanation of classical Confucianism in the Four Books became the dominant orthodox position.37 Whenever East Asian Confucians discussed or criti-

32 33 34 35

Zhao Qi, Mengzi, ch. 3, p. 24. Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, juan3, p. 231. Jiao Xun, Mengzi zhengyi 孟子正義 (rev. ed.; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), ch. 6, p. 200. Li Fu 李紱, Mutang chugao 穆堂初稿 [Preliminary Draft of Li Fu] (1740), cited in Jiao Xun Mengzi zhengyi, ch. 6, 201 f. For a discussion on Li Fu’s place in the intellectual history of Qing China, see Chin-shing Huang, Philosophy, Philology, and Politics in Eighteenth-Century China: Li Fu and the Lu-Wang School Under the Ch’ing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 36 Ibid. 37 For a perceptive discussion of Zhu Xi’s assemblage of the Four Books, see Wing-tsit Chan,

208

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

cized Zhu Xi’s philosophy, they were forced to begin from his approach to the Four Books, and critically review the questions and problems he raised. Zhu Xi reputedly based his explanation of the Mencius on the Great Learning38, and stressed the importance of the quest for rational understanding through investigating things. Zhu Xi read many new ideas into the Mencius. Two critical questions in particular arise from his explanation: (a) is knowing words (jiyen, 知 言) prior or subsequent to nurturing qi?; and (b) how does mind (xin, 心) know one’s words (yen, 言)? According to Zhu Xi, knowing words is prior to nurturing qi, because we cannot cultivate qi without knowing words.39 He also stressed that our mind is able to justify external matters (including language). Hence, Zhu Xi thought that knowing words involves the intellectual activity of “investigating things to extend principle.”40 Zhu Xi thus transformed matters of moral practice in the Mencius to matters of the intellect, and thus set up a new interpretive paradigm. This was why Zhu Xi’s pattern of explanation was so persuasive and dominant. The use of his work as the basis of the civil service examination system only extended and solidified the influence of Zhu Xi’s interpretation. Accordingly, we could venture to say that Yamada Ho¯koku interpreted Mencius’ theory of Knowing Words and Nurturing Qi in light of his “qi-monism” and thereby overcame Zhu Xi’s philosophical limitations, avoiding the restrictive epistemological theory that Zhu Xi had introduced. Thus Yamada’s approach provided an innovative counterpoint to Zhu Xi. The standpoint of “qi-monism” presumed the idea of “li amid qi,” so Yamada stressed that the abstract li is in fact formed as orderly patterns through qi41; concrete qi is certainly not a derivative of li. As Yamada said, “qi is a living thing.”42

38

39 40 41 42

“Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism,” in Études Song in Memoriam Étienne Balazs, pp. 60 – 90. In interpreting the Mencius, Zhu Xi holds to his philosophical position of “investigating things to extend principle” from his study of the Great Learning. Cf. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xinti yu hsingti 心體與性體 [The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Nature] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1969, 1971), vol. 3, pp. 439 – 47; Daniel K. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Tahsüeh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986). Zhu Xi, “Yu Guo Zhonghui 與郭沖晦 [Letter to Guo Zhonghui],” in Zhu Wengong wenji (Sibu congkan chu bian suo ben edition), ch. 37, p. 601 f. Zhu Xi said, “Understanding words is understanding principle”; see Zhuzi yulei, vol. 4, ch. 52, p. 1241. Zukai, p. 11, upper half. Zukai, p. 6, lower half.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation in light of the history of discourses on the Mencius

3.2

209

Yamada Ho¯koku’s critique of Zhu Xi

Yamada thus criticized Zhu Xi’s explanation of Mencius on the basis of his own philosophical tenet of “li amid qi.” For him, li signifies the “naturally orderly patterns” which exude through qi. It is a different conception than the li structured through thinking that dominates qi, as described by Zhu Xi.43 Yamada was critical of Zhu Xi for the mistakes he had made in his explanation of Mencius, because he had interpreted the Mencius in light of the Great Learning44 and had thus divided body from mind, percipience from movement, etc. Yamada argued: In Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Great Learning, he understood “extend knowledge by investigating things” as “exhausting li.” Because he placed this effort prior to “Making the will sincere,” did he not divide mind and body into two things? It was because he treated percipience and movement as two separate items of cultivation. This lack of connection was true not only for his interpretation of the Great Learning; he ran also contrary to Mencius’ discussion on “nurturing the qi.” This was the starting point of Wang Yangming’s “unity of knowledge and action.”45

Thus Yamada’s critique of Zhu Xi centered on Zhu’s dualism, thus reflected Yamada’s on viewpoint on qi-monism. In section 4 below, we will look at Yamada’s critique of Zhu Xi’s learning from the context of Japanese Confucianism. But before beginning that examination, we must look at some methodological issues in Yamada’s work.

3.3

Methodological problems in Yamada’s interpretation

In the context of the history of Mencius interpretation, the qi-monism in Yamada’s reading of the Mencius reflected his creativity in opening new vistas; he now stressed that human relations were a sort of practice without pretense, a kind of “natural philosophy of the Way of human relations.”46 However, his interpretation encountered methodological problems. For Yamada, qi was an embodied concrete thing (to the extent that, in his words, “qi is a living thing”), which possessed both cosmological and ethical characteristics, and yet he also stressed that “qi arises from pure naturalness.” This proposition provokes two 43 44 45 46

Zukai, pp. 10, lower half – 11, upper half. Zukai, pp. 11, lower half – 12, upper half. Zukai, p. 12, lower half. Miyagi Kimiko 宮城公子, Yamada Ho¯koku no Sekai 山田方谷の世界 [The World of Yamada Ho¯koku], in Kishi Toshio kyo¯ju taikan kinenkai 岸俊男教授退官記念会, ed., Nihon se¯ji shaikaishi kenkyu¯ 日本政治社会史研究 [A Study of Japanese Politico-Social History] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo¯, 1985), vol. 3, pp. 474 – 94.

210

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

questions, namely (a) how to derive abstract li from concrete qi, and (b) whether there is any spirit of humanism in qi-monism? Regarding the first question, Yamada did not provide an answer. According to his students, Yamada taught that, “qi pervades in the universe. Only with this very qi, could this very li be generated. Thus, li is derived from qi; it is not that li controls qi.”47 In his interpretation of the Mencius, Yamada fiercely opposed Zhu Xi’s idea that li controls qi, but he did not go on to explain the possibility of “qi generating li.” Hence, there is a breach in Yamada’s interpretation of Mencius which leaves Yamada’s critique of Zhu Xi an unfinished revolution. As for the second question, here too Yamada did not give a specific solution. In his interpretation of the Mencius he asserted that “qi from the naturalness” could master the “naturally ordered patterns,” but this interpretation cannot fully explain Mencius’s theory of nurturing qi. In Mencius’ thought, nurturing qi involves human effort; it does not rely completely upon a priori human nature but requires a posteriori human craft. Mencius asserted that, “Where the will arrives, there the qi follows.” Yamada skipped these issues, but they require further clarification.

4

Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation in the context of Japanese Confucianism

In this section, we will look at Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation of the Mencius in the history of Japanese Confucianism. In the nineteenth century, Japanese Yo¯mei scholars explained Wang Yangming’s idea of innate knowledge of the good on the basis of qi-monism (4.1). We will also find that at that time there was another aspect in Japanese thought which drove it to focus on “nature” rather than “culture” (4.2).

4.1

Yamada was a representative thinker of the nineteenth-century Japanese Yomei school

Yamada’s influence extended to Nakae Cho¯min (中江兆民, 1847 – 1901). Nakae’s definition of qi as “free of beginning and end, and boundless and infinite” reflected his philosophy of qi as based on the gathering and dispersal of yin and yang qi, which also caused the creation and destruction of the world. The fluid stage of qi is taixu (太虛, utmost emptiness). Nakae was the earliest Japanese 47 Zukai, pp. 2, lower half – 3, upper half.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation in the context of Japanese Confucianism

211

thinker to have been greatly influenced by European thought. Yet, Nakae affirmed the difference between East Asian traditions and the Christian worldview, and made efforts to create a unique philosophy for East Asian society. Nakae stressed the democratic theory of freedom of mind. His view was similar to that of Yamada Ho¯koku’s explanation of “natural sincerity” as “the flood-like qi.” When we compare Yamada’s and Nakae’s thought, we can see that the views of the latter were based on those of the former.48 As a Yomei scholar, Yamada Ho¯koku explained “innate knowledge of the good” as the subtle percipience of qi: The learning of Wang Yangming was enlightened by the “innate knowledge of the good.” Therefore, he lectured on two things. First, innate knowledge [of the good]. Second, innate ability to act [on that knowledge]. […] the innate knowledge of the good is the subtle percipience of qi. Qi is direct and forthright; it is entirely innate knowledge [of the good]. Therefore, if one directly were to nourish the qi without obstruction, one would be in accord with one’s mind. Thus, Mencius could speak of innate knowledge in order to show that the spontaneous percipience of human mind is humane and righteous.49

This passage certainly supports the commitment to the innateness of humaneness and righteousness in Mencius’ and Wang’s learning. However, Yamada’s qimonism has cosmological and ethical dimensions; his interpretation of innate knowledge as the subtle percipience of qi is not quite appropriate. While Yamada was the first to interpret this passage in the Mencius through his qi-monism, that stance was not Yamada’s original philosophical creation. From the seventeenth century, many Japanese Confucians had discussed qimonism. For example, Ito¯ Jinsai had affirmed in his Gomo¯ jigi that, “In the universe, there is just the one qi.”50 He wrote, “this generative force exists within heaven and earth. It should be very clear that principle (ri 理) did not exist first, and then generative force. Instead principle is simply the rationale existing within generative force.”51 Ito¯ further claimed that his qi-monism was in line with Confucius’ teaching: A unitary generative force (ichigenki 一元氣) pervades all heaven and earth. Sometimes it exists as yin, sometimes as yang. These two aspects of the generative force fill things and empty them, promoting both growth and decay. They actively come and go, and respond ceaselessly to everything. As the whole substance of heaven’s way (tendo¯ no zentai 天道之全體) and the activating force of nature (shizen no kiki 自然之氣機), yin and yang produce myriad transformations and manifold beings. When the sage (seijin 48 Miyagi Kimiko, “Bakumatsu jugakushi no shiten 幕末儒学史の視点 [Perspective of Confucianism in Late Tokugawa Period],” Nihonshi Kenkyu¯ 日本史研究 232 (Dec. 1981): pp. 1 – 29. 49 Zukai, p. 11, lower half. 50 Ito¯ Jinsai, Gomo¯ Jigi, vol. 5, p. 11. English translation from Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 74. 51 Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 12.

212

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

聖人) Confucius discussed heaven, his discourse climaxed with his description of the way of heaven as “yin alternating with yang.” Apart from this remark from the Book of Changes, Confucius offered no higher teaching defining the way of heaven!52

Ito¯ had rejected the Song Confucian dualism of rational principal (li) and qi. Typically, he agued that: “The claims of the Song Neo-Confucians, such as ‘principle exists and then generative force (qi) exists’ and ‘prior to the existence of heaven and earth, there was principle,’ are nothing more than subjective opinions (okutaku 臆度).”53 Ito¯ Jinsai preceded Yamada Ho¯koku by two hundreds years, and his standpoint on qi-monism was a commonly held view during the Tokugawa period.54 Yamada Ho¯koku’s interpretation of qi resembles Zhuangzi’s position that “one qi runs through all under Heaven.”55 Zhuangzi had analyzed the process of life and death on the basis of qi transformation.56 Wang Chong, on the other hand, had explained life and death as being based on the respective presence and absence of jingqi (精氣, essential qi; life force).57 These theories of qi were similar to Yamada’s view in spirit, and consistent with his interpretation of human nature in terms of natural instinct. The idea of human nature as natural instinct had been fermenting since the classical period of Chinese thought. For example, during the Warring States period, Mencius’ contemporary Gaozi claimed that, “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’” (Mencius 6 A3). At the end of the Warring States period, Xunzi proposed a similar definition in his essay on the rectification of names (“Zhengming,” 正名). Later, in the Qing dynasty, Dai Zhen repeatedly discussed this term. He wrote: “nature is proportioned as yin, yang and the Five Phases to compose blood-qi.”58 Dai regarded the “spontaneous transformation of qi” as the endowment of human life principle. As to the basic substance of human nature, he wrote, “blood-qi and mind percipience are nature’s substantial body.”59 In Yamada’s interpretation of the Mencius, by stressing that it came “from the naturalness of the integrated qi,” he could not 52 Ibid., pp. 71 – 2. 53 Ibid., pp. 74 – 5. 54 Since the seventeenth century, the views on qi-monism offered a counter-argument against the mainstream li discourses in East Asian Confucianisms. For a current account of this development, see Yang Rur-bin, Yiyi de Yiyi: Jinshi Dongya de fan-lixue sichao 異議的意 義：近世東亞的反理學思潮 [The Significance of Dissent: Intellectual Trends Against NeoConfucianism in Modern East Asia] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2012). 55 Guo Qingfan, Zhuangzi jishi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), vol. 2, ch. 7B, “Zhi bei yu” 知北 遊, p. 733. 56 Ibid., vol. 2, ch. 6B, ch. 18, “Zhile 至樂,” pp. 614 f. 57 Wang Chong 王充, Lunheng 論衡 [The Balanced Inquiries] (Sibu congkan chu bian suo ben edition), ch. 20, “Lun si pian” 論死篇, p. 199. 58 Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, in Daizhen quanshu, vol. 1, sec. 2, “Xing,” p. 176. For an English translation of this volume, see Chin and Freeman, trans., Tai Chen on Mencius. 59 Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, “Tiandao,” p. 172.

Ho¯koku’s interpretation in the context of Japanese Confucianism

213

avoid confusing Mencius’ theory of human nature with Gaozi’s, and in so doing obscuring the moral stance of Mencius’ theory of nurturing the qi. Yamada Ho¯koku interpreted Mencius’ innate knowledge as subtle qi percipience, and held that Wang Yangming was enlightened by the innate knowledge that originated in Mencius’ notion of nurturing qi.60 Yamada’s view also resembled that of the late Ming scholar Huang Zongxi. Although on the surface Huang Zongxi’s words “What knows is the luminosity of qi”61 resemble Yamada Ho¯koku’s view, there was a major difference between them. Huang stressed the subjective position and operation of the “mind,” and believed that one’s own mind “reflects and confirms (照證, jaozeng)”62 the myriad things. He thus grasped Mencius’ core idea of the mind. In contrast, Yamada exaggeratedly stressed “by nature” or “spontaneity,” thus misconstruing Mencius’ philosophy of the mind.

4.2

Yamada Ho¯koku’s place in Japanese intellectual history

According to Maruyama Masao, the development of modern Japanese intellectual history moved across the spectrum from “nature” to “culture.” As he pointed out, Zhu Xi’s concept of li (principle) or tianli (heavenly principle) signified the order of “nature.” The deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s system of thought marked the beginning of the trend toward modernity.63 Maruyama Masao’s explanation of modern Japanese thought was deeply influenced by his inclination toward German idealism and the theory of modernization. Yet in studying Yamada Ho¯koku’s strong emphasis on the standpoint of “the naturalness of integrated qi,” we see that the development of modern Japanese thought become more complicated than simply the sequence from “nature” to “culture.” At the age of 63, Yamada Ho¯koku was appointed as an advisor to the Shogunate, but due to illness he was forced to resign after only twenty days. Afterwards, the political situation worsened, and it became even more difficult for Yamada to help the Shogunate. Indeed, the toils and hardship he experienced in 60 Zukai, p. 3, lower half. 61 Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲, Mengzi shishuo 孟子師說 [Interpretation of Mencius], in Huang Zongxi Quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Complete Works of Huang Zongxi] (Kangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1985), vol. 1, sec. 2, p. 64. 62 Ibid. 63 Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, Nihon se¯ji shiso¯shi no kenkyu¯ 日本政治思想史の研究 [A Study of History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Press, 1976), ch. 1. Maruyama revised his earlier schematic view of Tokugawa intellectual history in his introduction to the English translation, see Masao Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974).

214

Yamada Ho¯koku on Mencius’ Theory of Nurturing Qi

the latter part of his life changed his views on life.64 As Yamada came face to face with chaotic politics and human viciousness, he believed that Zhu Xi’s philosophical anthropogenetic thought may have been responsible for these phenomena. This drove Yamada to postulate an ideal and beneficial “original mind,” pointing out the idea of “natural sincerity”; in doing so he intended to go beyond Yo¯mei learning.65 Thus from the example of Yamada Ho¯koku, we can see the complexity of nineteenth-century Japanese thinking as it twirled around “nature” and “culture.”

5

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined the “qi-monism” employed by the nineteenthcentury Japanese Yo¯mei scholar Yamada Ho¯koku when interpreting Mencius’s theory of “nurturing the qi.” Viewed in the context of the history of Mencius interpretation, Yamada’s work was undeniably innovative. He suggested that since the “integrated qi pervades heaven, earth and the myriad things,” this kind of qi links the ancient past with the present, connects object and self, and is the common substance of the world. Yamada’s qi-monism enabled him to answer many questions that Zhu Xi’s interpretation had created concerning Mencius’ theories such as whether knowing words is prior to or subsequent to nurturing qi. Moreover, his new interpretation provided a solid stance for vigorously criticizing Zhu Xi’s “dualist” theory. However, Yamada’s interpretation stressed the spontaneity of qi at the expense of the ethical impulse of Mencius’ views regarding the effort of “nurturing qi.” In this way and to that extent, he seriously departed from Mencius. In the history of Japanese Confucianism, Yamada Ho¯koku replaced old scholarship on Mencius with fresh new insights and launched attacks against the old orthodoxy of Zhu Xi. Although his critique of Zhu Xi surpassed that of Ito¯ Jinsai and other seventeenth-century Tokugawa Confucians, Yamada finally never proposed an explanation of how abstraction formed out of concreteness. Consequently, Yamada’s advocacy of “li amid qi” was clearly inadequate and his critique of Zhu Xi may be regarded as an unfinished project.

64 For a recent treatment of Yamada’s thought and the reform of Tokugawa politics, see Higuchi Ko¯kei 樋口公啟, Yamada Ho¯koku no shiso¯ to hansei kaikaku 山田方谷の思想と藩政改革 [Yamada Ho¯koku’s Thought and the Reform of the Shogunate] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2011). 65 Miyagi Kimiko, Yamada Ho¯koku no Sekai, pp. 471 – 94.

Chapter Twelve: The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation in the Contexts of Early Modern Japan and Contemporary Taiwan

1

Introduction

In the second part of this volume, we have traced developments in Confucian scholarship from the twelfth-century Chinese region and have seen how that scholarship has developed and changed over the following centuries as it spread into the Korean peninsula, across to Tokugawa and modern Japan, and beyond. Yet these were not merely one-way developments, with other East Asian regions simply adopting wholesale the contents of former Confucian scholarship. Instead, each region and period actively reinterpreted the Confucian heritage for their own context and age. One of the most interesting examples of this reinterpretation involved the word Zhongguo. In East Asian Confucian texts, the term and concept Zhongguo was defined and shaped in ancient China. However, it underwent significant twists and changes in the contexts of early modern Japan and contemporary Taiwan scholarship and culture. While today Zhongguo stands as the name for China, in Tokugawa Japan, the term came to signify Japan, a development that was in sync with and was supported by the development of Japanese national subjectivity. In contemporary Taiwan, the idea of Zhongguo is even more complex as it points to the two elements of “cultural China” and “political China” and their dialectical relationship. In this chapter, we will examine the salient features of the concept of Zhongguo as it evolved in ancient Chinese Confucian texts. We will analyze the way that Tokugawa Confucian intellectuals sparked a change in the referential meaning of this term. We will then discuss the further changes that the concept of Zhongguo has undergone in contemporary Taiwan.

216

2

The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation

Zhongguo in the historical process of the formation of China’s self-consciousness: An assumed cultural and political unity

The term Zhongguo arose during the proto-historic Yin-Shang period (殷商, 14th c.–1045 bce), appearing initially in oracle bone inscriptions.1 These inscriptions included the expression wufang (五方, five quarters) and zhongshang (中商, central Shang), which likely became the direct source of the expression Zhongguo. Wang Ermin carefully examined 53 pre-Qin texts, and found 28 occurrences of the expression Zhongguo. In those 28 occurrences, he noted five different meanings. If we look at the most significant proportions, we find (1) the most common (83 percent) referred to the Xia (夏) people and their domain; (2) 10 percent referred to the boundary of the state as its scope; and (3) 5 percent referred to the imperial capital (jingshi, 京師) as its scope. From this we see that the meaning of Zhongguo was determined well before the unification of Qin (秦, 221 – 206 bce) and Han (漢, 202 bce–220 ce). It referred primarily to the territory controlled by the Xia people and allied states, while sometimes also referring to the regions in which Xia forces were active. The key significance and promise of the term Zhongguo lay in providing a systematic ethnic cultural concept.2 In the pre-Qin texts, including the Confucian classics, Zhongguo as a term evolved against the powerful political and cultural backdrop of imperial China. Out of this special historical context, the typically Chinese political solipsism3, Sinocentrism4, and Sinocentric world order5 took shape. The concept of Zhongguo itself evolved in this special political and cultural context. In the preQin texts Zhongguo was not an abstract or general concept, but was subject to the specific explanations or accounts given by the authors and editors of the Chinese classics. Indeed, for these authors and editors the term was imbued with specific 1 Houxuan Hu 胡厚宣, “Lun wufang guannian yu zhongguo chengwei zhi qiyuan 論五方觀念 與中國稱謂之起源 [On the Concepts of Five Directions and the Origin of the Term ‘Zhongguo’],” in Jiaguxue shangshi luncong 甲骨學商史論叢 [Essays on Shang History, Based on Oracle-bone Inscriptions], vol. 2 (Chengdu: Qilu daxue guoxue yanjiusuo, 1944). 2 Wang Ermin, “‘Zhongguo’ mingcheng suoyuan jiqi jindai quanshi,” pp. 441 – 80, statistics 442 f. For a discussion of the idea of Zhongguo in ancient China, see Michael Loewe, “The Heritage Left to the Empires,” in Michael Loewe, Edward I. Shaughnessy, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China, From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 967 – 1032, 992 – 5. 3 Gongquan Xian 蕭公權, Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi 中國政治思想史 [A History of Chinese Political Thought] (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban siye gongsi 聯經出版事業公司, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 10, 16, n. 54. 4 J. K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 1. 5 Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in Fairbank., The Chinese World Order, pp. 20 – 33, 20.

Zhongguo in the historical process of the formation of China’s self-consciousness

217

content and cultural significance, which reflected and connoted definite Chinese cultural values. Broadly speaking, in the traditional Chinese classics Zhongguo manifested three principal meanings: geographic China, political China, and cultural China. According to the Sinocentric worldview, geographically China lay at the center of the world. Places to the north, south, east and west were regarded as merely peripheral frontier regions.6 Politically, China was the area under immediate imperial jurisdiction. As recorded in the Yao Dian (Canon of Yao, 堯典) of the Shangshu, the four quarters of China extended to those borders under imperial patrol. Regions beyond imperial jurisdiction were thought to be inhabited by stubborn troublemakers. Hence, the Shun Dian speaks of the sage-king Shun expelling four types of troublemakers beyond the four quarters.7 The Shijing sings, “I would expel them into the north, beyond the border.” And the Daxue (Great Learning, 大學) reads, “Only the benevolent person [renren, 仁人] can banish such a man and send him into exile, driving him to live amongst the four barbarian tribes, not together with [civilized people] in the central state [China].”8 As to its cultural meaning, Zhongguo referred to the “civilized” world; outlying frontier regions were regarded as uncivilized places, and were called by derogatory expressions such as guifang (鬼方, ghost regions); the people were called man (蠻, southern barbarians), yi (夷, eastern barbarians), rong (戎, western barbarians), and di (狄, northern barbarians). The word Zhongguo appeared frequently in the Chinese classics. In the Book of Odes it usually bore political or geographic significance. For example, the ode “Min Lao” (民勞), in “Da Ya” (大雅) reads, “Let us cherish this central kingdom, in order to secure the repose of the four quarters (of the realm).”9 “Sang Rou” (桑 柔), also in “Da Ya” (大雅) reads, “Lament those of the central kingdom, who met their end in the brambles.”10 But, when we reach the three commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals – the Zuochuan, Gongyang, and Guliang – the expression Zhongguo takes on a richer, more cultural meaning. For example, a passage in the Guliang about the eleventh year (580 bce) of Duke Ceng (成公) reads, “In the state of Ju [莒], even though it is a yi [夷] or di [狄] barbarian area, it is just like the central kingdom.”11 A passage in the Gongyang about the fif6 Cf. Paul Wheatley, The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins and Character of the Ancient City (Chicago: Aldine, 1971). 7 J. Legge, trans., The Shoo King (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 39 – 40. 8 J. Legge, trans., The Great Learning (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 378. 9 J. Legge, trans., The She King (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 495. 10 Ibid., p. 523. 11 Ruan Yuan 阮元, Shisanjing zhushu 十三經注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries of the Thirteen Classics] (Taipei: Yiwen Yinsuguan, 1960), Guliangchuan 穀梁傳, juan 14, p. 137b.

218

The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation

teenth year (594 bce) of Duke Xuan (宣公) reads, “Departing from even [the way of] the yi [夷] and di [狄] [barbarians], one cannot comply with [the way of] the central kingdom.”12 And in the records of the thirty-first year (662 bce) of Duke Zhuang (莊公) in the Zuozhuan it reads, “Without the central kingdom, the feudal lords will not release each other’s prisoners of war.”13 These passages all display rich cultural connotations. Confucius (551 – 479 bce) and Mencius (371 – 289? bce) both pressed the cultural significance of Zhongguo in their thought to the extent that, to them, it signified the highest standard of culture. In the premodern East Asian political order, Zhongguo carried the political significance of the Chinese imperial court, as well as the cultural significance of the Chinese cultural homeland. Many of the ancient Chinese classics presented Zhongguo as the highest state of culture, as the homeland of cultured, ethical people. Examples of this sort can be found in the “Chiu Guan Si Kou” (秋官司寇) in the Zhouli (周禮, Rites of Zhou).14 Another representative expression appears in Zhanguoce (戰國策, Stratagems of the Warring States), “Zhaoce” (趙策, “Stratagems of the State of Zhao”): China [central kingdom] is the place where discerning, wise people dwell, where the myriad creatures and useful implements are found, where the sages and worthies instruct, where benevolence and appropriateness are expressed, where the classics of Odes, Documents, Rites and Music are followed, where different ideas and techniques are tried, where distant people are sent to observe, where even the man [蠻] and yi [夷] [barbarians] exhibit appropriate conduct.15

This passage vividly expresses the degree of Chinese self-consciousness borne by the term Zhongguo, even before the Qin-Han unification. This sort of self-consciousness was maintained down through history into the nineteenth century. The Qing (1644 – 1911) diplomat to Japan, Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 (1848 – 1905) wrote in the “Lin jiao zhi” (鄰交志) chapter of his Annals of Japanese History: “Among the myriad nations of the world, as to the fragrance of fine culture, none is prior to China.”16

12 Ibid., Gongyangchuan 公羊傳, juan 16, p. 207a. 13 J. Legge, trans., The Ch’un Ts’ew with The Tso Chuen (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 118 – 19. 14 Ruan Yuan, Shisanjing zhushu, Shisanjing zhushu, Zhou Li 周禮, juan 34, p. 510a. 15 J. I. Crump, Jr., trans., Chan-Kuo Ts’e (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 298. 16 Huang Zunxian, Riben guozhi 日本國志 [Notes on Japan] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin, 2005), upper volume, p. 94.

Reconstruction of the idea of Zhongguo in the modern Japanese worldview

3

219

Reconstruction of the idea of Zhongguo in the modern Japanese worldview

The ancient Chinese classics assumed the identity of cultural China and political China in one unified entity. Yet when the term was transmitted to Japan, it was altered, changed and adapted to the new ethnic and linguistic environment. When Tokugawa Japanese Confucians recited the classics, they encountered this normative idea of Zhongguo and the related Han-barbarian distinction as the core of the East Asian political order and its ideology. This experience moved them to offer new interpretations in order to ameliorate the resulting split between their own cultural self and political self, and to make the Chinese classics more congenial to the Japanese local culture. They applied two methods in reconstructing the meaning of the term Zhongguo. First, some scholars sought to explain the cultural significance of the word in terms of zhongdao and its meaning in the Spring and Autumn Annals. Yamaga Soko¯ worked out a cross-cultural analysis and reading of the idea of Zhongguo, and offers a good example of this method.17 He praised the beauty of Japan and the riches of Japanese culture. Everything existed in Japan. In his reflections, Yamaga boldly announced that Japan held the principle of centrality and changed both the reference and connotation of the expression Zhongguo in the Chinese classics, taking it to refer, ultimately, to Japan.18 After all, Japan’s water and soil truly were beyond compare with that “external court” (gaicho¯, 外 朝, i. e., China). Analyzing Yamaga’s method of transforming the meaning of the idea of Zhongguo, we discover that the cultural meaning of Zhongguo signified, for him, that country which hit the mean (obtained centrality) and thus had nothing to do with political China. Yamaga said, “Heaven and earth interact, the four seasons rotate, and strike their balance, hence the wind, rain, cold and hot here are not out of balance. Therefore, the water and soil are moist (and fertile), and the people are exquisite. This place is worthy of the name Zhongguo.”19 For Yamaga, Japan had struck its balance, thus its politics were stable, human relationships were in good order, and it had not suffered imperial coups.20 In all this, political China could not compare with Japan, the true ‘China.’ Working out this new interpretation, Yamaga took issue with the old readings of the Chinese classics that had combined the political and cultural aspects of imperial China, arguing effectively that Japan, due to its success in striking a balance in culture and 17 18 19 20

Yamaga Soko¯, Chu¯cho¯ jijitsu, vol. 13, Bk. 1, p. 226. Ibid., p. 234. Ibid. Ibid., p. 250.

220

The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation

politics, was superior to the geographic Chinese empire and was thus much more qualified to be called Zhongguo (the central kingdom). Sakuma Taika offered a similar approach to the meaning of Zhongguo. Sakuma contended that Japan’s extended period of continuous political rule and secure domestic life provided more than enough reason to call Japan Zhongguo.21 His main argument was that the key difference between Japan and China in this regard was not geographic, but in having (or not having) found its balance and its political stability. Similarly, Asami Ke¯isai also revised the cultural meaning of Zhongguo to refer to Japan rather than China. Asami argued that since Japan understood the Way in the Spring and Autumn Annals, it was not possible for Japan to be considered a barbarian country and be classified as either yi [夷] or di [狄].22 Like Yamaga, Asami held that since Japan had struck its balance, Japan was qualified to be called Zhongguo. Their patterns of explanation were quite compatible. Second, some Japanese Confucian thinkers combined the general meaning of Heaven (tian) with Zhongguo to create a special reference for the expression. In “On ‘Zhongguo’”, Asami Ke¯isai drew upon the principle that, “heaven and earth embrace and contain all things [without discrimination],” in order to overturn the age-old distinction in the classics between Han and barbarian, which had always defined the East Asian political order. He argued that Japan had been produced together with heaven and earth, of which each shares a portion of the empire, with no distinction of social class or wealth observed.23 Sato¯ Issai also used the general meaning of “heaven” (tian) to explain the significance of the expression Zhongguo. He wrote: In this vast world, this Way just consists in the single connecting thread. When people observe it, they distinguish between China and yi [夷] and di [狄] [barbarians]. When heaven observes it, there is no China nor any yi [夷] or di [狄].24

Sato¯ believed that the notion of heaven in the classics provided a way to see through the so-called Han-barbarian distinction. We can say that, besides his inborn wisdom, Sato¯ had his creative uniqueness. Surveying the cross-cultural changes in the expression Zhongguo, we note that Tokugawa Confucian scholars such Yamaga Soko¯ and others were able to see through and overturn the established East Asian political order. They forcefully reconstructed the meaning of the expression Zhongguo as they had encountered it in the Chinese Confucian classics, making it more congenial to Confucians in the Japanese cultural context. 21 22 23 24

Sakuma Taika, Wakan Me¯ben, vol. 4, “Disputations,” “Preface,” p. 1. Asami Ke¯isai, Chu¯goku Ben, p. 418. Ibid., p. 416. Sato¯ Issai, “Genshiroku 言志錄 [Notes on Words and Will],” p. 227.

Zhongguo in the contemporary Taiwanese worldview

4

221

Zhongguo in the contemporary Taiwanese worldview: Unity and separation of political identity and cultural identity

After Japan defeated Qing China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Since that time, the meaning of Zhongguo also began to alter for the people on Taiwan. Throughout the twentieth century, the concept of Zhongguo for Taiwanese intellectuals had the following two characteristics. First, the idea of Zhongguo in contemporary Taiwan included “cultural identity” and “political identity.” Cultural identity is relatively abstract, ideal and longterm, whereas political identity, in contrast, is relatively concrete and short-term. Cultural identity is more lasting than political identity; in this sense, the rulers of imperial China were all travelers in the endless stream of Chinese culture, be they as long as several centuries or as short as a decade. While political authorities may influence culture, they were absolutely unable to significantly alter the content of the culture. As an example, after Taiwand was ceded to Japan by Qing China in 1895, a wealthy Taiwanese businessman Li Chunsheng (李春生, 1813 – 1924) visited Japan at the invitation of the Japanese colonial authority. Writing about his journey upon his return to Taiwan, he reflected that, “although the new grace is compelling, the old legacy is hard to forget.” Li characterized himself as one of the “people in the lost land” who will not work for the new order.25 Indeed, “people in the lost land” was a full-bodied assessment of the author’s own situation.26 Lian Heng (連橫, 1878 – 1936), who wrote and compiled the Comprehensive History of Taiwan (Taiwan tongshi, 台灣通史), also used “people in the lost land” as a selfdescription.27 Li Chunsheng and Lian Heng’s self-descriptions as people who would not work for the new order was based upon their Chinese cultural identification, one which was simultaneously far removed from any sort of political identification with the ruling authorities in China. This sentiment was shared by the renowned intellectual Zhang Binglin (章炳麟, 1869 – 1936), who wrote: “Taiwan, that is my country.”28

25 Li Chunsheng 李春生, Dongyou liushisiji suibi 東遊六十四日隨筆 [Random Notes of a Sixtyfour-day Journey East] (Fuzhou: Meihua shuchu, 1896), p. 51. 26 Ibid., pp. 9, 51, 82. 27 Lian Heng 連橫, “Yu Lin Zizhao xiansheng shu 與林子超先生書 [Letter to Mr. Lin Zichao],” in Yatang wenji 雅堂文集 [Literary Corpus of Lian Yatang] (Taiwan Document Collection), p. 127. 28 Zhang Binglin 章炳麟, Taiwan tongshi xu 臺灣通史序 [Preface to General History of Taiwan] (1927), in Zhangshi congshu sanbian – Taiyan wenlu xubian 章氏叢書三編太炎文錄續編 [Books of Zhang Binglin, 3 vols.: Essays of Zhang Binglin, 2nd vol.] (Suzhou: Zhangshi guoxue jiangxihui, 1938), vol. 2, lower.

222

The Idea of Zhongguo and Its Transformation

During the Japanese occupation (1895 – 1945), Taiwanese intellectuals held a romantic image of cultural China. For example, the Taichung-area cultural figure Ye Rongzhong (葉榮鐘, 1900 – 1956), writer Wu Zhuliu (吳濁流, 1900 – 1976), doctor and writer Wu Xinrong (吳新榮, 1906 – 1967) and Taiwanese merchant in China Wu Sanlian (吳三連, 1899 – 1988) all viewed China as their own cultural homeland.29 Writer Zhang Shenqie’s (張深切, 1904 – 1965) recollection of being forced to have his queue cut off during the Japanese occupation expressed the Taiwanese sense of Chinese cultural identification at that time. He wrote: When we were about to have our queues cut off, our whole family cried. Kneeling before our ancestors’ tablets, hot tears flowed down our faces as we repented and promised our descendants would not do the same and live up to the standard. Today we had our queues cut, so we can receive Japanese education and be authorized to be Japanese citizens. But, we wish to expel these Japanese devils and grow back our hair in order to pay our respects to our ancestors. After kowtowing, we knelt down to have our hair cut. Mother just couldn’t do it. Dad is braver; he steeled himself, gritted his teeth, grabbed my queue and lopped it off with one stroke. My skull suddenly felt lighter and I knew my hair was gone. I let out a loud cry, as if I was in mourning.30

Zhang’s cry expressed his lament at being split off from his Chinese cultural identity in this dramatic way. Second, in contemporary Taiwan, both the cultural and political components of the concept of Zhongguo have become abstract ideals; in the give and take of daily life, this can unite or drive to conflict. During the Japanese occupation, Taiwanese nostalgia for traditional Chinese culture could not be suppressed by the oppressive powers of Japanese colonial rule. Nevertheless, because the views of Taiwanese intellectuals were overly sentimental and romanticized, they were unable to grasp the longterm historical conflict that existed between the cultural ideal and political authority in Chinese history. When thinking of China, they did not recognize the underlying contradiction between cultural identity and political identity. For the Taiwanese who visited China during the Japanese occupation, this failure in perception led to a sense of “broken dreams” with regard to the ancestral homeland; it also exacerbated Taiwanese feelings of hopelessness in the face of incoming Kuomintang (KMT) control after the retrocession of Taiwan in 1945. This separation and struggle between cultural China and political China latent in the Taiwanese worldview persists to this very day. During the past three

29 Chun-chieh Huang, Taiwan in Transformation: 1895 – 2005, rev./enlarged ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2014), ch. 1. 30 Chen Fang-Ming 陳芳明 et al., eds., Zhang Shenqie quanji 張深切全集 [Complete Works of Zhang Shenqie] (Taipei: Wenjingshe 文經社, 1998), vol. 1, p. 84.

Conclusion

223

decades of democratization in Taiwan, this tension and struggle have become ever more pronounced and evident.

5

Conclusion

In the course of this discussion on the formation of the idea of Zhongguo with its twists and transformations in Chinese antiquity, in Japan, and in modern Taiwan, we found that Zhongguo is not a simple notion, but rather expresses a complex of ideas. At the very least, the idea of Zhongguo contains the elements of “cultural China,” “geographic China,” and “political China,” with “cultural China” occupying the most important position. From the perspective of the East Asian border regions, the idea of Zhongguo also included the ideas of “China as spiritual diaspora” and “China as imagined community.” No matter whether past or present, the idea of “Chineseness” cannot be contained by geographic parameters. On the contrary, China and Chineseness is a geographically fluid concept. In this chapter, we have described how Japanese intellectuals from the seventeenth century took Zhongguo to mean their own homeland, feeling that Japan had done far better than China at adopting Confucius’ Way and the authentic spirit of the Spring and Autumn Annals. We have also explored the idea of Zhongguo in the contemporary Taiwanese worldview, which can be divided into cultural and political components. These two elements are not completely separate; there is a degree of tension and struggle between them. Given the longterm cross-strait separation between Taiwan and Mainland China and the rapid democratization process in Taiwan, the tension and struggle between them will inevitably grow deeper and more intense.

Epilogue

1

Introduction

The leitmotif running through every chapter of the present volume has been the concept of contextual turn. Chapter 2 explained how this contextual turn incorporates two aspects: decontextualization and re-contextualization. The former term refers to the process whereby a thought or a concept is divested of its original context and linguistic environment while the latter term signifies the process whereby such a decontextualized thought or concept is transplanted into a receiving place’s cultural and linguistic context, and is thus endowed with new meaning.1 While decontextualization and re-contextualization can be clearly demarcated and distinguished in theory, in the actual exchange of ideas among the countries and regions of East Asia, these two phenomena frequently arose simultaneously and advanced and unfolded in a continuous process. In this Epilogue, I will examine two questions that arise in the study of the phenomena of contextual turn in the history of East Asian intellectual exchanges: (1) What is the impetus that drive the process of contextual turn? (2) After a classical text has undergone decontextualization and re-contextualization, what are the respective advantages and disadvantages to the classical text and its interpreter?

2

Impetus toward the contextual turn in East Asian intellectual exchanges

We may consider the first question from two angles: that of the classical text and that of the textual interpreter. As the Confucian classics (which were somewhat open-textured2) were being transmitted through the countries and regions of East Asia, they called to readers 1 See Chapter 2 of this volume. 2 When Paul Ricoeur (1913 – 2005) uses the expressions decontextualization and re-contex-

226

Epilogue

in each region, drew them in, stirring the spirit of some and pressing them to engage in dialogue with the authors of the classics. This resulted in multiple new readings of those ancient texts. Here in this process we find the original impetus for the contextual turn. The “call” of a classical text to a reader refers specifically to the values, concepts and thoughts of the text, which interpreters of various later times and places found enticing and seductive. Stirred by the siren call of the original authors, interpreters responded concretely by offering new interpretations and transforming their ethical ideals. In chapter eleven, we discussed the case of the nineteenth-century Japanese Yo¯meigaku scholar Yamada Ho¯koku, an example which exemplified the enticing siren call of the classical texts to the sincere reader. In 1839, when Yamada was twenty-five, he set off to study in Kyoto. He commenced his studied with Song Neo-Confucianism but soon immersed himself in Han-Tang Confucianism and the early classics of the Three Dynasties. Subsequently, he felt dissatisfied with the Han-Tang approach, and returned to the study of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian system of thought. Eventually, he found that he could not accept Zhu Xi’s approach either3, and in 1833, at the age of thirtynine, he began to read Wang Yangming’s Instructions for Practical Living. He responded strongly to Wang’s siren call as it emanated through his text. Describing his trembling excitement at the strong sense of identification with the mind of Wang Yangming, Yamada wrote: “Between the bright moon and its reflection in still water there is no gap.”4 Having experienced this unexpected spiritual siren call, Yamada confirmed that, “As to the ancient worthies, only after they had solid attainment within did they set forth their teachings as masters.”5 As his student Mishima Chu¯shu¯ (三島中洲, Tsuyoshi 毅，1830 – 1919) affirmed, Master Yamada emphasized that, “Empty discourses do not measure up to solid attainment”6 ; in regard to the personal understanding of Yamada’s master, Yamada added that, “In Yomei’s learning, sincerity of the will was fundamental, and the extension of the innate knowledge of the good was a

3 4 5 6

tualization, he stresses the text’s own subjectivity and openness. See Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Science, ed./trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 139. Yamada Ho¯koku, “Yo Hoashi Ho¯keisyo 與帆足鵬卿書 [Letter to Hoashi Ho¯kei],” in Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯, vol. 1, pp. 145 – 6, esp. 145. Yamada Ho¯koku, “Denshu¯roku bassuijo 傳習錄拔萃序 [Preface to the Essentials of Instructions for Practical Living],” in Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯, pp. 178 – 9, esp. 178. Yamada Ho¯koku, “To¯ yu¯jin bo¯ sho 答友人某書 [Letter to a Friend],” in Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯, esp. 184. Mishima Chu¯shu¯, as quoted in Yamada Ho¯koku, “To¯ yu¯jin bo¯ sho,” in Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯, p. 184.

Two types of turn, and their respective advantages and disadvantages

227

matter of the sincere will.”7 Wang Yangming had declared that the core value in his thought was “the extension of innate knowledge of the good.”8 Yet Yamada disagreed. For him, “sincerity of the will” was truly Wang’s core value. Here we see an excellent example of a contextual turn occuring with respect to Wang Yangming’s thought in Japan. From this vivid example of Yamada’s eager response to the spiritual siren call of Wang Yangming’s Instructions for Practical Living, we observe that in the intellectual exchanges in East Asia it was the values embodied in the classical texts that provided the primary impetus for the contextual turn. Yet in this process, there was something even more important than the seductive classical texts themselves, namely, the classical interpreters, the seekers. The Platform Scripture reads: “All scriptures and writings, both Mahayana and Hinayana, and the twelve sections of the scriptures, are provided for [human beings].”9 The classical texts were preserved, awarded the status and respect as classics, and were vastly influential only because readers and interpreters of various times and places found treasures within them that were worth mining, examining, and interpreting; and this was done on their own terms. From this perspective, the readers and interpreters of the classical texts provided an even greater impetus for the contextual turn than did the classical texts. In short, the contextual turn arose out of the need of interpreters not just to understand the texts, but to master and appropriate their meaning and values to suit their own lives and times, their own context.

3

Two types of turn, and their respective advantages and disadvantages

Let us now consider the two following questions: What are the sorts of context in which contextual turns occur? What are the respective advantages and disadvantages of each type of context? Generally speaking, in the transmission of texts in the history of intellectual exchanges in East Asia, the transformation and production of textual meaning tended to occur in two sorts of context: (1) the personal, intellectual context of the interpreter (lowercase context), and (2) the temporal and spatial Context of 7 Yamada Ho¯koku, “Fuku Kasuga Sen’an sho 復春日潜庵書 [Letter to Kasuga Sen’an],” in Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯, p. 185. 8 Wang Yangming said that his doctrine of the “extension of innate knowledge” was gained through a “hundred deaths and thousand difficulties”; see Chan Wing-tsit, Wang Yangming Chuanxilu xiangzhu jiping (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1983), ch. 10, passage 396. 9 Wing-tsit Chan, ed./trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, 1973), pp. 438 – 9.

228

Epilogue

the interpreter (uppercase Context). Since the interpreter lives within the background of his or her spatial-temporal setting, these two contexts complement one another. Nonetheless, the personal context and the spatial-temporal Context each has distinctive features and impact, and we can appeal to this distinction for the purpose of discussion. Let us begin by discussing the first type of “contextual turn.” A commonly noted phenomenon in the exchange of Confucian thought in East Asia is that while textual interpreters consciously submitted themselves to the text and did not intend to forge novel interpretations, nonetheless once the intellectual views and values of the text had been extracted from their original context and placed in the new context of the interpreter’s time and place, they naturally adopted new meanings. Viewed in the perspective of the exchange of thought in East Asian Confucianism, this type of contextual turn carries its own distinctive imperative and necessity. After foreign ideas are given new meaning in the context of an interpreter’s own intellectual context, the main advantage is that those foreign ideas can now be integrated into the interpreter’s own system of thought. Furthermore, because the interpreter is part of his or her society and intellectual community, at the same time those foreign ideas are tamed and domesticated, thus made congenial and easy to digest by the new host society. Just as importantly, the text receives new life through this re-contextualization. Since this type of contextual turn occurs via the sincere subjectivity of the interpreter, the resulting interpretation that he or she offers brings new value that more than compensates for some loss of the text’s original meaning. To take another example, in Chapter 11 above, we examined Yamada Ho¯koku’s reinterpretation of Mencius’ idea of nurturing vital qi; for his interpretation Yamada uses his theory that “qi generates li.”10 Yamada had studied under Sato¯ Issai, Japan’s preeminent nineteenth-century Yo¯mei scholar, who in turn had based his theory of qi-monism on the work of the seventeenth-century scholar Ito¯ Jinsai. Yamada’s theory of qi was also somewhat consistent with that of the eighteenth-century Chinese scholar Dai Zhen. These accounts of qi thus formed what Taiwanese scholar Yang Rur-bin has called the “modern East Asian tide against Neo-Confucianism.”11 The tide in nineteenth-century Japan was especially strong. Notably, in interpreting Mencius’ account of “flood-like qi” Yamada extracted this expression from the context of Mencius’ thought and interpreted it in the context of his own qi–monism. In so doing, he not only reinterpreted Mencius’ learning, he strongly criticized the dualism and ethical 10 See Chapter 10 of this volume. 11 Yang Rur-bin, Yiyi de yiyi: jinshi Dongya de fan lixue sichao [The Significance of Dissent: Intellectual Trends Against Neo-Confucianism in Modern East Asia].

Two types of turn, and their respective advantages and disadvantages

229

duality of Zhu Xi’s thought. However, this also led him to lose the ethical significance of Mencius’ account of “flood-like qi.” He also missed an especially important feature of Mencius’ learning: the integration of factual judgment and value judgment. Yamada completely missed these facets of Mencius’ thought and thus traded a major loss for a minor gain.12 Yamada’s contextual turn in interpreting the Mencius took the form of a reader-centered “intrusive reading.” Contextual turns associated with intrusive readings of this sort are typified by a severe reductionism, to the extent of twisting the original outlook and meaning of the text. The most illustrative example of this phenomenon would be the Japanese Tokugawa Confucian interpretations of Confucius’ Dao. During the Spring and Autumn period (722 – 481 bce), the Confucian school created a simultaneously immanent and yet transcendent intellectual world in which Confucius embodied the immeasurable spiritualization of the daily conduct of human ethical relationships. Confucius himself said that at fifty he understood his mandate of Heaven. Hence, Confucius’ way comprehends both the everyday and the transcendent. As we saw in Chapter 8, Ito¯ Jinsai came to those texts and said: “As to the way, it is the path taken in the ethical conduct of daily affairs,”13 and “Apart from humanity there is no way, apart from the way there is no humanity.”14 Ogyu¯ Sorai proclaimed: “The way of Confucius is simply the way of the late sage kings,”15 and “Generally speaking, the way of the late sage kings is external: their ritual propriety and sense of appropriateness were entirely expressed in their treatment of others.”16 In making these claims, they were taking the lofty comprehension and practice of utmost propriety as it appeared in Confucius’ world of thought and narrowed and squeezed it down into existing social, ethical relationships (Jinsai) or anthropogenetic political ethics (Sorai). Here we see how this sort of contextual turn based on an intrusive reader-centered reading often tends to come at the cost of the text’s richness. The second type of contextual turn occurs when a text from one place is transplanted across a vast spatial expanse or into a specific temporal context where it is reinterpreted resulting in a new time-specific and space-specific understanding. This sort of decontextualization always includes a de-politicization of the text.

12 See Chapter 10 of this volume. 13 Ito¯ Jinsai, Mo¯shi Kogi, in Inoue Tetsujiro¯ and Kanie Yoshimaru, eds., Nihon rinri ihen (Tokyo: Ikuse¯kai, 1901), ch. 1, “Dao,” pp. 18 – 19. 14 Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, p. 205. 15 Ogyu¯ Sorai, Rongo Cho¯, ch. 7, p. 62. 16 Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Benmei 辨名 [Distinguishing the Names], in Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸 次郎 et al., eds., Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠, Nihon shiso¯ taikei 日本思想大系 [Great Books of Japanese Thought] 36 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), p. 228.

230

Epilogue

The Sinological studies of Tokugawa Japan provide an example. As Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ noted: “The Sinological research conducted during the Edo [Tokugawa] period involved applying Japanese style interpretations to Chinese texts. The negative reason for this was that Japanese scholars could not do otherwise. The positive reason was that Edo period Sinology was a sort of ethnic artifact.”17 In the perspective of broad intellectual trends, after Confucian learning was transmitted from China to Japan, it was interpreted in the overall context of practical learning characteristic of Japanese society and thought. In modern Japan, the expression “practical learning” refers to an empirical and rational academic approach to concrete life affairs. For example, Minamoto Ryo¯en writes that, “People inquired to seek truth, they inquired to practice ethics, they inquired to conduct politics, and they inquired to grasp how to manage the realm and benefit the people.”18 Ito¯ Jinsai’s saying that, “I study the books of the sages and worthies in order to concretely expound concrete principles,”19 provides insight into what was meant by practical learning in traditional Japan. Steeped in the general context of Tokugawa Japanese practical learning, the Confucian learning from China was thus adapted and Japanized. As Shimada Kenji (島田虔次, 1917 – 2000) has pointed out, Japanese Zhu Xi learning entirely lacked the spirit of the grand scope of Song learning. Zhang Zai expressed this eloquently: “Establish one’s [upright] heart-mind for Heaven and Earth; carry out one’s [ethical] mission for the people; continue [and revive] the lost learning of the ancient sages in order to commence an age of grand peace for ten thousand generations.”20 To take two further examples, the most commonly used “keyword” in the commentaries on Confucius’ Analects during the Tokugawa period was the expression “daily conduct of human ethical relations,” which reflected a disregard for the transcendent concern of Chinese Confucianism.21 Ito¯ Jinsai redefined the Confucian Dao, saying: “the way is the path that people should follow in daily ethical conduct.”22 Again, in the Chinese classics, we often encounter the term Zhongguo (middle kingdom, central state) as both a political and cultural identifier. In modern Japan, this term lost its original political meaning (denotation) and retained solely its cultural meaning (connotation). When Yamaga 17 Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯, Yu¯ka kiroku, p. 9. 18 See Minamoto Ryo¯yen, Kinse¯ shoki jitsugaku shiso¯ no kenkyu¯, ch. 1, pp. 55 – 138, esp. 58. 19 Ito¯ Jinsai, “Do¯shikai hikki,” in Kogaku sense¯ shibunshu¯, ch. 5, in Sagara To¯ru et al., eds., Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1989), ch. 1, p. 107. 20 Cf. Zhang Zai 張載, “Zhangzi yulu 張子語錄語錄中 [Conversation of Zhang Zai, Middle Volume],” in Zhang Zai ji 張載集 [Complete Works of Zhang Zai] (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1981), p. 320. 21 See Chapters 7 and 8 of this volume. 22 Tucker, Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi, p. 95.

Two types of turn, and their respective advantages and disadvantages

231

Soko¯ proclaimed, “this court [Japan] is what is called Zhongguo,”23 he was pointing out that “the richness of [Japan’s] lands and rivers and the spirit of [her] people had rendered her qualified to be called Zhongguo.”24 Japanese Confucians thought that Japan had now received the spirit of Confucius’ Way; for this reason they were justified in calling Japan Zhongguo.25 If we described the first type of contextual turn as a sort of intrusive reading, then we may describe the second type of contextual turn as a sort of selective reading. From the seventeenth century, Japanese Confucians viewed Zhongguo in the Chinese classics as “cultural China” and cast aside any sense of “political China,” dismissing the political implications of Zhongguo while integrating the notion of “cultural China” into the modern Japanese worldview. In this way they completed the implicit mission of “Japanese style” interpretations of the Chinese classics. In the early twentieth century, Shibusawa E¯ichi spoke of uniting “the scholar’s integrity and the merchant’s talent.” “In regard to the abacus, if the user bases himself on the Analects, he will be more accurate. The Analects too can increase the user’s output on the abacus, leading to increased wealth.”26 In making this assertion, Shibusawa had selected the idea of the unity of appropriateness (righteousness) and benefit (profit) in Confucius’ thought. In so doing, he created a new understanding of Confucius’ thought to suit the rising capitalist economy and society of early twentieth-century Japan. In Chapter 6, we discussed how the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians have interpreted Zhu Xi’s world-class masterpiece, A Treatise on Humanity. The Japanese scholars undertook “Japanese style” interpretations of what was originally a Southern Song text and perspective, forcefully deconstructing and eschewing Zhu Xi’s metaphysical theory and imbuing the idea of humaneness (ren) with new meaning for practical social and political life. These twin moves of eschewing the old foundation and instilling new meaning illustrate the characteristic approach taken by Japanese Confucians to the Chinese classics. In the second type of contextual turn, decontextualization is always de-politicization, because before the twentieth century the Chinese empire was the dominant political power in East Asia and the center of East Asian civilization. Moreover, the Chinese Confucian classics were imbued with the mission of managing the world. In the context of the history of imperial China, the interpreters of the Confucian classics were faithful believers in Confucian values and many of them were imperial political power holders. Hence terms that the Chinese Confucians had taken as general values for managing the world/empire 23 24 25 26

Yamaga Soko¯, Chu¯cho¯ jijitsu, ch. 13, p. 234. Ibid. See Chapter 11 of this volume. See Chapter 9 of this volume.

232

Epilogue

(such as the concept of Zhongguo) were seen by many Japanese and Korean Confucians as part of the hegemonic discourse. Consequently, the stage of depoliticalization in the contextual turn carried out by Japanese and Korean Confucians was in fact a “de-Sinification.” Against the background of a certain time and place, de-politicization is always carried out in step with re-politicization. An illustrative example is how 1930s Japan became enthralled with what Maruyama Masao has critiqued as Japan’s frenzied ultra-nationalism before the end of World War II.27 At that time, the notion of “Japanese Soul” appeared in a re-politicized reading of Book I of Confucius’ Analects28 – a book which advocated that the Oriental spirit could save and redeem the Euro-American spirit, and moreover that the Japanese spirit could lead the Oriental spirit.29 In this book, under a heading that read “The Great Geist Supporting the Imperial Destiny” (皇運扶翼大精神),30 the first book of the Analects was interpreted as a footnote to imperial education.31 The author of that book advocated that while the virtue of filial piety was prior to loyalty in the Oriental spirit, the virtue of filial piety had to be based on loyalty in the Japanese spirit.32 In many new Japanese interpretations of the Analects published during the 1930s, the aim was to utilize that “Chinese” book in the service of the Japanese empire, and thus to re-politicalize the Analects in the context of Japanese imperialism. This was a clear example of putting antiquity to contemporary use. This example of contextual turn not only threw the baby out with the bathwater, it achieved a serious abuse of Confucius and his high ideals. Thus the second type of ’ “contextual turn” encounters a serious question: In East Asian intellectual exchanges, can state power be transcended? When we view the actual experience of cultural and intellectual intercourse in East Asia, we find that even though it crossed borders, was multi-vocal, richly diverse, and involved in negotiation and appropriation, the people engaged in these exchanges found it difficult to get beyond their state’s framework of intellectual and cultural restriction. Let us look at one example. Confucius’ Analects exerted a deep and far-reaching influence on Japanese society and culture. In the seventeenth century, the classicist Ito¯ Jinsai lauded the Analects as “the utmost book in the universe.”33 In interpreting the passage that 27 Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, Gendai se¯ji no shiso¯ to ko¯do 現代政治の思想と行動 [Thoughts and Action of Modern Politics] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970), pp. 11 – 28. 28 Ito¯ Taro¯ 伊藤太郎, Yamatodamashı¯ ni yoru rongo kaishaku: gakuji (no. 1) 日本魂による論 語解釋學而第一 [The Analects 1.1 Viewed from the Japanese Soul] (Tsushi: Rongo Kenkyu¯kai, 1935). 29 Ibid., p. 1. 30 Ibid., p. 25. 31 Ibid., chart attached between pp. 34 and 35. 32 Ibid., p. 119. 33 Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo kogi, vol. 3, p. 5. See also Ito¯ Jinsai, Do¯jimon, vol. 1, p. 204.

Two types of turn, and their respective advantages and disadvantages

233

read, “The Master [Confucius] wanted to dwell among the Nine Tribes,” Jinsai understood this to mean that Confucius had intended to live in Japan – thus expressing the stance of the Japanese “state” in his interpretation of Confucius’ purpose.34 The “Japanese style” interpretation of the Analects undertaken by Tokugawa Confucians35 shows that in the East Asian intellectual exchanges of the seventeenth century, the national subjectivity of each East Asian country grew increasingly self-conscious and the intellectuals found it increasingly difficult to completely avoid state frameworks and restrictions. Consequently, Yamazaki Ansai could ask his students the following hypothetical question: if Confucius and Mencius were to lead an army in an attack on Japan, which side should the Japanese Confucians support?36 But further examples abound. The eighteenthcentury Japanese Confucian, Bito¯ Nishu¯ said that even though Japan’s territory was not as large as China’s, her population “is plentiful and prosperous, her commodities sufficient, and she never needs to beseech assistance from other lands,”37 therefore Japan was qualified to bear the title Zhongguo. The nineteenth-century scholar Fujisawa To¯gai (藤澤東畡, 1793 – 1864) – when interpreting the passage in the Analects where Confucius’ disciple Zizhang (子張, b. 503 bce) asks about the term “Ten Generations” – responded by praising Japan’s political tradition of “ten thousand generations of single royal lineage.”38 Another nineteenth-century scholar, Yoshida Sho¯in, who was imprisoned from June 13, 1855 to June 4, 1856, discussed the thought of Mencius with several fellow prisoners. Yet because he was reading the Mencius in the political context of the modern Japanese royal political tradition,39 he consistently and strongly criticized Mencius’ discussions on the relationship between the ruler and his ministers.40 And on August 10, 1906, during a tour of China, Sinologist Uno Tetsuto’s (宇野哲人, 1875 – 1974) visited Badaling along the Great Wall where he drank whisky and sang Japan’s national anthem.41 These concrete examples illustrate 34 See Chapter 8 in this volume. 35 Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定 (1901 – 1995) maintained that Ito¯ Jinsai’s interpretation of Confucius’ Analects exhibited Japanese characteristics; cf. Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, Rongo no shinkenkyu¯ 論語の新研究 [A New Study of the Analects] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), p. 57. 36 Hara Nensai, Sentetsu so¯dan, vol. 3, pp. 4b–5a. 37 Bito¯ Nishu¯, Seiki yohitsu, vol. 1, in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho, ch. 2, p. 10. 38 Fujisawa To¯gai 藤澤東畡, Genseishi 原聖志 [On the Will of Sages], in Seki Giichiro¯, ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho, vol. 4, appended after Shimonroku 思問錄 [Records of Reflections and Queries], p. 2. 39 See Zhang Kunjiang, Riben Dechuan shidai guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhi lun, pp. 278 – 9. 40 Yoshida Sho¯in 吉田松陰, Ko¯mo¯ yowa 講孟餘話 [Lectures on the Book of Mencius], in Matsumoto Sannosuke 松本三之介, ed., Yoshida Sho¯in 吉田松陰 (Tokyo : Chou¯ko¯ronsha, 1995), p. 51. 41 Uno Tetsuto 宇野哲人, Shina bunmeiki 支那文明記 [Notes on Chinese Civilization] (Tokyo:

234

Epilogue

the degree to which “state” was the object of these intellectuals’ “political identity.” In the modern East Asian cultural and intellectual intercourse, this came to pose an insurmountably restrictive framework. Even today in a twenty-first century of rising globalization, the nation state remains the major driving force of global economic activity, with each country’s central bank manipulating monetary policy to bring various major financial operations into play.42

4

Conclusion

In the history of intellectual interaction in East Asia, all sorts of classical texts, such as the Analects and Mencius, were transmitted through various countries. When scholars in each region encountered such texts, they read them apart from their temporal and spatial contexts and created new interpretations. Unsurprisingly, after these texts underwent such a contextual turn, we were left with a rich diversity of interpretations. In this contextual turn, the meaning of a text is interpreted, developed, and embodied in a new context. The term context itself includes a minor context of the interpreter’s system of thought, and the major Context of the interpreter’s temporal-spatial position. The turn, and the production and creation of new meaning in a transmitted text are all carried out in the minor and/or major contexts. However, if a text had not gone through the process of striking, impacting upon, or offending the new context (major or minor), the function or operation of the contextual turn would not have been so evident. For this reason, those researching East Asian intellectual interactions must seek to strike a dynamic balance between textualism and contextualism in their work. This has become a major issue in the study of intellectual exchanges in East Asia. The impetus of the contextual turn in intellectual interactions was two-sided. First, it came from the charisma and siren call of the thoughts expressed in the text, views which stirred the reader’s interest and will to understand it. But secondly, it came from the reader, who was willing to engage with the text. This second impetus is more important than the first because without a reader there would be no one to create new meaning from the text and in this way extend its life. As Zhu Xi noted so poetically, the reader is the artesian well of new meaning Daido¯kan, 1912), in Kojima Shinji 小島晋治, ed., Bakumatsu Meiji Chu¯goku kenbunroku shu¯sei 幕末明治中国見聞録集成 [Collections of Travelogues in China in Late Tokugawa and Meiji Periods] (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo¯, 1997). For an account of Uno’s travels in China, see Joshua A. Fogel, The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862 – 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 107 – 19. 42 See Peter F. Drucker, “The Global Economy and the Nation State,” Foreign Affairs 76/5 (Sep./ Oct., 1997): pp. 159 – 71.

Conclusion

235

in the text.43 However, this is certainly not to say – following Roland Barthes (1915 – 1980) – that in the “contextual turn” in East Asian intellectual exchanges “The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”44 In my view, a sincere interpretive reader engages in an interactive dialogue with the author of the text. As Zhu Xi once said, studying the classics “is like conversing face-to-face with the ancients, each side responds to the other.”45 The thoughts and values of the text infuse and transform the life of the sincere interpreter. However, the interpreter also bestows new meaning into the text. The two sides rotate in an eternally interpretive circularity. Finally, at the same time the interpretive circularity between text and interpreter manifested cycles of inter-subjectivity. However, as expressed in the chapter titles of this book, many overly subjective textual interpreters imposed forced readings or selective readings onto the texts. For this reason, a great challenge to our understanding of the making of East Asian Confucianisms is how to strike a dynamic equilibrium between these two kinds of subjectivity: that reflected in the text and that in the interpreter. The twentieth-century Chinese Neo-Confucian scholar Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1904 – 1982) wrote, “As to the thought of the ancients, we can only base our interpretations on the text, we cannot base them on our own philosophy.”46 Xu Fuguan made this assertion in regard to the study of Chinese intellectual history. Yet viewed in reference to the history of East Asian Confucianism, interpreters from each country needed to base their interpretations on respect for the texts so that their subjectivity could receive its fullest unfolding and development. Like basketball players on court, they must play by the rules if they hope to develop their talents and skills.

43 Zhu Xi, “Guan shu you gan,” in Zhuzi wenji, juan 2, p. 73. 44 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in his Image – Music – Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Noonday Press, 1988), pp. 142 – 8, esp. 148. 45 Zhu Xi, “Da Zhang Yuande (6) 答張元德六 [Letter to Zhang Yuande (6)],” in Zhuzi wenji, juan 62, p. 3065. 46 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, “Wo de ruogan duan xiang 我的若干斷想 [Some of My Random Reflections],” in his Zhongguo sixiangshi lunji 中國思想史論集 [Essays on Chinese Intellectual History] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1974), p. 1.

Appendix: Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions in East Asia

1

Introduction

As historians engage in the craft of historical inquiry, that is, in the process of investigating historical documents and then writing histories, one of the questions that commonly occurs to them is: Should the scope and purview of historical inquiry most ideally be focused at the national, regional or global level? Since the French Revolution of 1789, studies in “national history” have represented mainstream historical practice. During the nineteenth century and especially the first half of the twentieth century, historians tended to take the “nation state” (usually their own) as the basic unit of historical inquiry. As a result, studies of “national history” inevitably became the leading trend in the twentieth century, and historians wrote their historical discourses on the basis of political or cultural nationalism.1 Qian Mu’s (錢穆, 1895 – 1990) classic 1939 work Guoshi dagang (國史大綱, Outline of National History) provided a good representative example of historical studies in twentieth-century China.2 However as Geoffrey Barraclough (1908 – 1984) pointed out in 1979, since the end of the World War II ethnocentric national histories that were once in vogue prewar had now become distasteful; many European intellectuals even came to believe that the studies of ethnocentric national histories were to be placed among the intellectual origins of World War II.3 Under such an intellectual atmosphere, the 1 See Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, eds., Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 2 Huang Chun-chieh, “Qian Binsi shixue zhong de guoshi guan: neihan, fangfa yu yiyi 錢賓四史 學中的「國史」觀：內涵、方法與意義 [The ‘National History’ in Qian Mu’s Historical Thinking: Contents, Methods and Meanings],” Bulletin of the Department of History of National Taiwan University 26 (December, 2002): pp. 1 – 37; Chun-chieh Huang, Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010), ch. 5, pp. 81 – 96. 3 Geoffrey Barraclough, Main Trends in History (New York/London: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 149. For the study of history in the twentieth century, see Georg G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge with a New Epilogue (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2005).

238

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

rationale for national history has been weakened and national history itself has come to be seen as a dubious activity. During the past century, nearly every country in Asia has experienced the traumas of invasion and colonization, and yet ironically national history remains the major approach of historical research undertaken by Asian historians.4 In the Japanese context, historians in postwar Japan have even sought to stir up nationalistic fervor as a matter for reflection. Yet in general we can say that the focus of national historical inquiry as practiced in postwar Japan has shifted from state-centric to people-centered studies.5 While studies of national history dominated historical inquiries during the twentieth century, the study of “global history” has started to catch the attention of historians in the twenty-first century. Recently, Georg G. Iggers (1926–) and Q. Edward Wang (王晴佳, 1957–) reviewed post-1990 trends in historical research, and pointed out five new directions shown in recent historical inquiry6 : (1) the notion of “culture” has become closely associated with “language,” and the two are being reformulated together into “new-cultural history;” (2) there has been a rise in women’s history and feminist history; (3) confronting a strong postmodern critique, historical inquiry and the social sciences are beginning to merge; (4) the postmodernist critique has gone hand in hand with a strong postcolonial critique of national history; (5) the rise of world history, global history, and history of globalization. Among these upward trends in historical studies since 1990, the rapid rise of studies in “global history” is particularly noteworthy. Reflecting on this spike in global history, Hayden White (1928–) recently pointed out that in the purview of global history, the very notion of a “global event” has been transformed into something completely new, viewed in the perspective of the entire world. This new notion of a global event may serve to deconstruct the abstract concepts of time, space, and causality that were taken as assumed when historical studies were conducted as a modern, Western, scientific discipline.7 Taking a cosmopolitan point of view, Frank Ankersmit (1945–) is dubious about modernist “world histories.” Not only do they tend to exaggerate the impact of 4 For a review on the sorts of historical studies conducted in Asia, see Masayuki Sato, “East Asian Historiography and Historical Thought,” in the International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 2002), p. 6776 – 82. 5 See To¯yama Shigeki 遠山茂樹, Sengo no Rekishigaku to Rekishiishiki 戦後の歴史学と歴史意 識 [Historical Studies and Historical Consciousness in Postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). 6 Georg G. Iggers and Q. Edward Wang, “The Globalization of History and Historiography: Characteristics and Challenges, from the 1990s to the Present,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. 7 Hayden White, “Topics for Discussion on Global History,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007.

Introduction

239

non-human factors, such as plagues and famines, on the course of human history, but they can also lead to paradoxical sorts of “dehumanized history.”8 Edoardo Tortarolo (1956–) examines the concepts of past, present and future, pointing out that the writing of world history faces challenges regarding the author’s ideology as well as the legitimacy of his or her research.9 Be that as it may, as global history becomes a major research trend in the near future, its purview must still confront the “master narrative” which was assumed in historical studies in the past. Between the national histories which flourished in the twentieth century, and the newly rising studies in global history, there also exist studies of “regional history” focused on areas such as East Asia, Western Europe, North America, Latin America, etc. (there has also been an increase in interdisciplinary “area studies” focused on selected “regions”). Regional history in this sense is a new field of history that warrants serious thought and reflection. In this chapter I will first analyze the methodological basis of the practice of regional history, taking as my example the history of cultural exchanges in East Asia. Second, I will point out issues facing the historical study of cultural exchanges within East Asia, before finally suggesting new, related research topics. As a field of historical inquiry, regional history can be divided into two principal types, with one lying somewhere on the spectrum between national history and local history, and the other between national history and global history.10 The first examines the history of different regions within a country (such as the history of southern Taiwan), while the second emphasizes the history of various transnational regions (the histories of East Asia and Eastern Europe, for instance). In this chapter, I will focus on the second, transnational form of regional history.

8 Frank Ankersmit, “What is Wrong with World History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View?” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. 9 Edoardo Tortarolo, “Universal/World History: Its Past, Present and Future,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Directions in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. 10 On these two kinds of regional history, see Allan Megill, “Regional History and the Future of Historical Writing,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Directions in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007.

240

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

2

Reflections on methodology

2.1

East Asia as a “contact zone”

Before discussing the methodological problems in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, we must first look into some overall characteristics of this geographic region. Geographically, the region comprises mainland China, the Korean peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, and the Indochina peninsula. It has its own distinctive climate and temperature ranges. The twentiethcentury Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro¯ (和辻哲郎, 1889 – 1960), identified three geographic, regional categories in the world – monsoon, desert, and grazing land – and linked each geographic area to a particular character of its native peoples. He described people who live in monsoon regions (which covers East Asia) as delicate and rich in emotional life. They are willing to face disgrace and humiliation in order to fulfill a task and have a strong sense of history.11 While we could argue that Watsuji’s theory exhibits a dubious form of geographic determinism, the East Asian geographic region certainly is distinguished by its distinctive climates, environments, and cultures. East Asia is the “contact zone”12 of its constituent countries, peoples and cultures. For two thousand years, under unequal relationships of domination and subjugation, all kinds of exchange activities have been undertaken here. Prior to the twentieth century, the Chinese empire was the dominating power in East Asia. During the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese empire then rose to power, invading other countries in the region and spreading the various sufferings of Japanese colonization. Then in the postwar period, with the United States leading a new hegemony, East Asia was reestablished in accordance with the new Cold War order. The turn of the twenty-first century witnessed the rapid rise of mainland China, which is fast pushing a realignment and rearrangement of the political and economic order in East Asia. In this East Asian contact zone, the Chinese empire was vast and populous and enjoyed a long, continuous history. It not only exerted a powerful influence on the politics, economics and culture of East Asian countries, including of Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and their neighbors, but also played a role as the “center” of this “region.” From the standpoint of countries on the periphery, China was the common source of elements in East Asian culture: Chinese characters and their 11 Watsuji Tetsuro¯ 和辻哲郎, Fu¯do: Ningengakuteki ko¯satsu 風土—人間学的考察 [Local Cultures and Customs: Anthropological Observations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1935, 1960, 1979). 12 “Contact zone” indicates social spaces where people of different cultures interact with and impact upon one another. Cf. Mary L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992, 2000), p. 6.

Reflections on methodology

241

related culture, Confucian learning, Chinese medicine, etc. China stood before them as a gargantuan “Unavoidable Other.”13 Because China played such a crucial role in forming the distinctive character of the East Asian region, the study of the history of cultural exchanges in this region is all the more complex and challenging. In the history of East Asia, China could be described (in terms of the history of modern nation-states) as a “transnational” power in politics, economics, society, and culture. For this reason, in the study of cultural exchanges within East Asia, to speak of exchange activities between China and Korea or Japan, or to speak of Sino-Korean or SinoJapanese exchanges, would not be as precise as to speak of exchanges between the Zhejiang region and Japan or between the Shandong peninsula and Korea, a far more historically concrete approach.

2.2

The new view of regional history studies: The turn from results to processes

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we may proceed to look into some methodological problems in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia. The first noteworthy challenge is to shift the focus of study from the results of regional cultural exchange to its processes – in effect, carrying out a paradigm shift in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia. To clarify this methodological reflection, we can turn to the influential 1970 compilation of writings by leading Japanese historians, Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi (岩波講座世界歴史, Iwanami Series of World History).14 This massive work in 31 volumes was far-reaching and broad-spirited. In its preface, the editors begin by criticizing the tendency of Japanese historians during the Meiji period (明治, 1868 – 1912) for treating the term “world history” as synonymous with “western history.”15 The editors then go on to remark that due to the in13 Koyasu Nobakuni 子安宣邦, Kanjiron: Fukahi no tasha 漢字論：不可避の他者 [On Chinese Characters: The Unavoidable Other] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003). 14 Historians in postwar Japan have been enamored with “world history.” During the quarter century from the end of World War II until 1970, Japanese historians published 14 series titled World History. See Gao Mingshi 高明士, Zhanhou Riben de Zhongguoshi yanjiu 戰後日本的 中國史研究 [Postwar Japanese Studies in Chinese History] (Taipei: Mingwen Book Company, 1996), p. 48, n. 1. The largest and most representative work is the Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi 岩波講座世界歴史 [Iwanami Series of World History] in 31 volumes. The first printing was in 1970 – 71, and the second in 1974 – 75. 15 The preliminary stage of Western historical studies conducted in Japan is now complete; it covered the period from the early Meiji period until the beginning of the Taisho¯ era (大正, 1911 – 1926). At the end of the nineteenth century, the History Department at Tokyo Imperial University was gradually laying its foundation and attracting and cultivating eminent faculty.

242

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

fluence of Marxism during the later Sho¯wa period (昭和, 1926 – 1989), Japanese historians underwent a major change in historical consciousness, one which saw the birth of a new theoretical approach to world history. By then, Japanese historians had begun to criticize the Western Eurocentric historical perceptions of previous generations. But the wartime outlook that the Pacific War was to be Japan’s “historical destiny” vanished together with Japan’s crushing defeat in the war. Following the war, the study of world history in Japan developed in new directions both in research and education, leading the editors of the Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi to criticize and assimilate these various forms of world history. In light of the reoriented historical consciousness of the Japanese people, the editors sought to compile the latest Japanese research results in world history. They divided world history into eight “worlds,” ranging from antiquity to the present: (1) The World of the Ancient Near-East, (2) The Mediterranean World, (3) The World of East Asian History, (4) The East Asian World, (5) The World of Inner-Asia, (6) The World of Western Asia, (7) The World of Medieval Europe, and (8) The World of Modern History.16 Although this compilation nominally claimed to cover world history, the chapters of each volume were written from the perspective of a national history. For an example, volume 4 – “Antiquity 4,” in Formation of the East Asian World 1 – contains the following twelve chapters: 1. Establishment of the Yellow River Civilization 2. Creation of the Yin-Zhou (殷周) State 3. Formation of the Ancient Classics 4. Society and State during the Warring States Period 5. On the Various Philosophers and Hundred Schools of Thought 6. Establishment of Imperial Domination 7. The Authoritarian System of the Han Empire

In 1877, the great German historian, Ludwig Riess (1861 – 1928), came to lecture at Tokyo University, and was greatly influential. The Japanese historian Tsuboi Kumezo¯ (坪井九馬三, 1858 – 1936) then returned to Tokyo University from studying in Europe in 1891 to lecture on history. From 1897, Tokyo University had many specialists in European history, such as Murakawa Kengo (村川堅固, 1875 – 1946), Uchida Ginzo (內田銀藏, 1872 – 1919), etc. Kyoto University established its College of Liberal Arts in 1906, and in 1907 its distinctive division of Western history. On November 1, 1889, Riess’s students established the History Association Journal (later renamed the History Journal). The direction and focus of the early issues of this journal had been set by Riess. In 1908, Sakaguchi Takashi (坂口昻, 1872 – 1928) initiated the “Historical Studies Association.” In 1916, he established the History Grove journal to encourage students to study Chinese and Western history in the context of world history. Cf. Sakai Saburo¯ 酒井三郎, Nihon Seiyo¯ Shigaku Hattatsushi 日本西洋史学発達史 [History of the Development of the Study of Western History in Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa ko¯bunkan, 1969). 16 Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970), Antiquity 1, preface, pp. 1 – 9.

Reflections on methodology

243

8.

The Establishment of Government Trading Bureau of “Equalization and Standardization” (平準), and the Salt Monopoly 9. Establishment of Confucianism 10. Rise of Wang Mang’s (王莽) Political Authority 11. Later Han Empire and Big Families 12. The Han Empire and Frontier Peoples Each of these chapters on historical events, personages and thought was written in complete accordance with the standards and aims of a Chinese national history. As a result, instead of Formation of the East Asian World, the volume would have been better titled Formation of the Chinese World. The contents of this compilation suffer from at least two other major problems. First and foremost, each volume breaks down into a mosaic of chapters and lacks an overall structure. Since each of the volumes is presented in the context of a national history without any context of world history, it cannot avoid a phenomenon that Jack H. Hexter (1910 – 1996) has called “the tunnel effect” in the study of history.17 For example, with regard to the theme of the first volume of the Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi, the context of Chinese history is relevant and important, and yet the scope and perspective of a world history would have provided a broader vantage point for considering and weighing the importance and meaning of this theme. Second, because of the “decontextualization” that occurs when world history is practiced in this way, each chapter focuses more on the results than the processes in describing the development of cultures. As one example, each chapter in the Formation of the East Asian World volume discusses the completed formation of political institutions and economic measures – as in “Creation of the Yin-Zhou (殷周) State” and “The Authoritarian System of the Han Empire.” Only Chapter 6, “Establishment of Imperial Domination” by Nishijima Sadao (西 嶋定生, 1919 – 1998), touched upon the relationship between Chinese Imperial Rule and the formation of the wider East Asian World. In the historical studies of cultural exchanges within East Asia, a transition from results to processes would stimulate the following three new directions: 2.2.1 Turn of perspective: From “structural” to “developmental” Studies of cultural history that focus results over processes are most likely to be static researches that concentrate mainly on the analysis of selected common essential factors in culture. For example, Nishijima Sadao’s “General In17 See Jack H. Hexter, Reappraisals in History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), pp. 194 f. See also David H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), pp. 142 ff.

244

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

troduction” to Formation of the East Asian World (volume 4 of Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi) pointed out four main characteristics of the history of the civilization of the East Asian world, including the culture of Chinese characters, Confucianism, the System of Imperial Laws and Orders, and Buddhism.18 These four characteristics reflect the static and “structural” perspective Nishijima took in viewing the common features of the historical world of East Asia. However, by focusing on the dynamic process of the history of East Asian culture, we would see these four cultural characteristics in the context of developments in each country – China, Japan, Korea – and the different concrete contents associated with their “contextualization” or “localization.”

2.2.2 Transition from “center” to “periphery” The turn from “structure” to “process” inclines the historian’s eye to turn from the “center” to the “periphery”. When taking a results-oriented perspective on cultural developments in East Asia, as Nishijima did, we would still identify static features like his four main characteristics above. This is because they were important phenomena in the mature manifestations of East Asian culture. Following this thread of thinking, indeed Nishijima wrote that in the perspective of world history, the East Asian world was one of many pre-modern historical worlds that existed independently, as “a self-contained, complete historical world.”19 Yet as recent studies have proven, since late antiquity every known ethnic group has been engaged in cultural exchanges. From 2000 – 1000 bce, the western and eastern sides of the old world had already conducted various exchanges, an excellent example of which was advances in metallurgy that occurred via the Silk Road.20 Thus East Asia was certainly not a self-contained, complete historical world. Nishijima’s methodology was based on the supposition that in the specific exchange relations among East Asian countries, there was something like an abstract, common “center” with essential characteristics that then “unfolded” as it was adopted by peripheral cultures. This view of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia unconsciously implied a cultural and political monism and assumed that in the formation and development of cultures, the peripheral regions moved toward or away from the developmental path of the “center.” It also emphasized that between center and periphery there was at work a kind of 18 Nishijima Sadao, “General Introduction,” Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi, vol. Antiquity 4, p. 5. Regarding Nishijima’s historical approach, see Gao Mingshi, Zhanhou Riben de Zhongguoshi yanjiu, pp. 44, 70 ff. 19 Nishijima Sadao, “General Introduction,” p. 7. 20 Victor H. Mair, Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

Reflections on methodology

245

“principle of subordination,” yet without any corresponding “principle of coordination.”21 However, once we view the history of East Asian culture from the perspective of processes rather than results, the focus shifts naturally from “center” to “periphery.”22 This enables us to see the processes of cultural exchange activities between countries in this region, and to witness the interactions, conflicts, transformations, and syntheses between the “self” of one people and the “other” (other selves) of other people(s). Consequently, the common destiny and values of East Asian culture ceased to emerge from a discrete center over and above each country, a unique set of core authoritarian values. On the contrary, the common core values of East Asian culture were formed in the process of each country’s interaction with others. Hence, the history of cultural interaction in East Asia is best viewed as a formation process of the cultural subjectivities of each and every country. As Chen Hui-hung (陳慧宏, 1968–) has recently argued, “in the ‘processes’ of interaction and communication, the interlocking or multiplicity of diverse viewpoints is the visual angle that researchers should adopt.”23 In the wake of this change of focus from results to processes and the consequent movement from center to periphery, we can see more clearly the plurality of East Asian cultures. Each region has its own common characteristics, as Nishijima pointed out, unique and distinguishing features that set each region apart. 2.2.3 From text to atmosphere Once we have shifted our focus from results to processes, the object of our research also shifts from text per se to the atmosphere or environment. In the following analysis, we will look into the interactive relations between classical interpretation and political power as a case in point. Before the twentieth century, when intellectuals studied the history of East Asian countries they tended to pore over the Confucian classics. This was because throughout East Asian history, in the setting of the imperial high tide, the practices of interpreting and citing the Confucian classics stood in a complex relationship with the political power structures. I have recently combed through materials concerning East Asian Confucian interpretations of the Analects, 21 The terms, “principle of subordination” and “principle of coordination,” come from Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909 – 1995). See his Zhongguo wenhua de xingcha 中國文化的省察 [Reflection upon the Chinese Culture] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Company, 1983), p. 68. 22 Naturally, this is not to say that China at “the center” is not historically important. In fact, China functioned as the “Unavoidable Other,” and continues to exert a major impact on other countries in East Asia. 23 Chen Hui-hung 陳慧宏, “Wenhua xiangyu de fangfalun – pingxi Zhong-Ou wenhua jiaoliu yanjiu de xin shiye 文化相遇的方法論──評析中歐文化交流研究的新視野 [Methodology of Cultural Interactions: New Perspective of Sino-European Cultural Interaction],” Historical Inquiry 40 (Dec. 2007): pp. 239 – 78, 253.

246

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

Mencius, and other significant classics. As shown in the interpretations, in relation to questions on the civil service examinations during the Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644), proscribed passages in the Mencius were excluded by the imperial tutors in Tokugawa Japan (1600 – 1868), as well as from the citations of Confucian classics in dialogues between rulers and ministers during the Han (206 – 220 bce) and Tang (618 – 907) dynasties. In exploring these questions, I realized that East Asian interpreters of the Confucian classics tended to merge dual identities (that of Confucian and government official) into one. This further confirmed the intimate relationship between their work as classical commentators and political power. There are three implications of this dual nature relationship: (1) to a large extent, classical interpretation and political power were inseparable; (2) there was a degree of competition between these two sides; and (3) classical interpreters tended to strive to keep these two sides in balance.24 If we adopted the traditional standpoint of the study of the history of East Asian culture, our research themes would inevitably focus on the classics themselves and the analysis of how the gifted intellectuals of each country interpreted those classics. However, if we adopt the new standpoint, aside from a focus on the classics we would also pay attention to the way in which the contemporary environment, atmosphere, and the political situation influenced the interpreter’s approach to the classics. Furthermore, we would also keep an eye on the question of how the classics in turn might have influenced or changed the atmosphere or environment of the interpreter’s time and country.

3

The relationship between global, regional, and national history

The second methodological problem involved in bringing a “regional history” approach to the study of cultural exchanges in East Asia is the relationship between “global history,” “regional history” and “national history.” Taking the regional history approach in studying the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia does not involve provoking an abstract conceptual framework that prevails perpetually and ubiquitously. On the contrary, it involves a field of interlocking interactions within concrete settings of specific times and places. This field of history of cultural exchanges definitely registers the blood, sweat and tears of every people concerned, such as the tortures and suffering undergone by Confucian intellectuals in their respective political environments. We can picture each country’s exchange of envoy missions on horseback, merchants traveling across borders to exchange merchandise, intellectuals from different countries offering all kinds of new interpretations of the 24 See chapter 1.

The problem of a “contextual turn” in the study of regional history

247

classics in light of their own cultural context. Consequently, the concept of regional history gradually comes to life in the interactive relationships between the national histories of each East Asian country. This is certainly not an abstract sphere over and above each country’s national history. In fact, global history and regional history are two mutually dependent research fields. Recently, scholars have been speaking more of global history, regarding it as a sphere of research that includes the entire globe as a research standpoint. Yet the so-called world history that came into vogue after World War II was in essence no different in conception from global history. In 1953, during the early postwar period, the Journal of World History was established; in 1963 the journal Human History also commenced publication.25 Authors of world histories in the postwar period tended to stress that historical studies ought to focus on specific historical events in historically significant regions of the world.26 The historical personages and events of every country and region were to be weighed and assessed against the background or context of global history. According to such a de facto standard, regional history constituted only a marginal sector of regional experience within an overarching global history. But if the unique, concrete experience of the peoples in different regions is put aside, then global history ends up with an empty abstract concept, devoid of content. Only when it is fully recognized that regional history forms the fundamental content for a meaningful global history, can we go on and say that the notion of global history is understood more adequately as a “trans-regional history.”

4

The problem of “contextual turn” in the study of regional history

The third methodological issue in the study of regional history is the problem of “contextual turn.” The gist of this methodological issue is that in the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, all “cultural products”27 (including the classics and their values) were produced in concrete, specific cultural contexts. Each of them came from a specific time and place. Therefore, it is comprehensible that in the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, the transmission of any 25 International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). 26 See, for example, L. S. Stavrianos, The World to 1500: A Global History (Englewoon Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975), pp. 4 f. 27 The expression, “cultural product”, was coined by Roger Chartier. See Roger Chartier, On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

248

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

cultural product (especially classical texts) to a peripheral area had to involve the process of “cultural turn,” a process of assimilation to each respective area. Yi Toegye (李退溪, 1502 – 1571), the sixteenth-century Korean master of Zhu Xi’s (朱熹, 1130 – 1200) philosophy, spent half his lifetime editing Zhuzi shu jieyao (朱子書節要, completed in 1556). In that work he emphasized that given the differences in time and place between Zhu’s China and Yi’s Korea, he had no choice but to “cut out the dross [損約]” in order to make Zhu Xi’s words palatable to Korean Confucian readers.28 Although Yi’s expression, “cut out the dross,” originally referred to his process of bowdlerizing the text, he was in effect running Zhu’s writings through a new cultural filter, driving this “contextual turn.” The interpretations of Confucius’ Analects that appeared in Tokugawa Japan (1600 – 1868) are a good case in point. This “contextual turn” signifies the transplantation into the Japanese cultural or intellectual context various classics which were originally deeply rooted in the Chinese cultural context. This process predictably led to the production of entirely new interpretations. Such a transcultural turn worked well in at least two contexts in East Asia: the sociopolitical context (especially with regard to the so-called Han-Barbarian distinction) and the context of political thought (especially in the ruler-minster relationship). Yet it also gave rise to other trans-cultural problems in the interpretation of the classics.29 Among the cultural products involved in the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, the Confucian classics in particular underwent contextual turns at the hands of Confucian scholars and Confucian officials in Japanese and Korean society and courts, places where these scholars and officials had various functions and roles. From the Song dynasty, Chinese Confucians played crucial roles both in society and the political arena. After passing the civil service examination, they would be promoted to the level of high officials; then upon retiring from office, they would become country gentry. During the Joseon Era (1392 – 1910), Korean Confucians of different ranks could eventually rise to Yangban (兩班) aristocracy. As for the Confucians of Tokugawa Japan, they played the role of intellectuals in society, and were not separated from the political power structure.30 28 Yi Hwang 李滉 이황, Jujaseo jeol-yo seo 朱子書節要序 주자서절요서 [Preface to Selections of the Works of Zhu Xi], in Dosan jeonseo 陶山全書 도산전서 [Complete Works of Yi Hwang], 3 (Seoul: Toegyehak yeon-guwon, 1988, Toegyehak chongseo), vol. 59, p. 259. 29 Huang Chun-chieh, Huang Chun-chieh, Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun, p. 43. (Japanese translation published by Perikan-sha Press, Tokyo, 2008). 30 Cf. Watanabe Hiroshi, “Jusha, Literati and Yangban: Confucianists in Japan, China and Korea,” in Tadao Umesao, Catherine C. Lewis and Yasuyuki Kurita, eds., Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness, Senri Ethnological Studies 28 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990), pp. 13 – 30.

The problem of a “contextual turn” in the study of regional history

249

The most representative example of contextual turn can be found in the term China (中國, Zhongguo, lit. “Middle Kingdom”), which appears frequently in the early classics. In the context of Chinese culture and history, Zhongguo refers at once to both cultural and political identities which, in the Chinese context, are fused into one. However, when Japanese Confucians of the Tokugawa period read the expression Zhongguo in the Chinese classics, they immediately sensed a dramatic gap between “political identity” and “cultural identity” because, as far as they were concerned, this term denoted the homeland of their spirit and culture, despite the fact that the term originally meant another historical and political land. They were convinced that instead of China, the term Zhongguo referred to Japan, their own country, for they believed that since Japan had truly obtained the Way of Confucius, Japan was more suitable to be called Zhongguo than the geographically central China. Quite a few similar examples of contextual turn vividly show that this was a common phenomenon encountered in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia. In contemporary Taiwan as well, the expression Zhongguo has a dual reference to “cultural China” and “political China.”31 Thus the contextual turn is an important phenomenon to note in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, and it will give rise to many research topics that await fresh scrutiny. Once we begin to view the history of cultural exchange within East Asia in light of the contextual turn, we are better prepared to register that this history also illustrates what Clifford Geertz (1926 – 2006) called “thick description.”32 Although historians began to pay attention to the problem of cultural history in the 1980s,33 I would still like to emphasize that cultural history in the sense of “the object of the study of cultural exchanges” should not stop at examining and confirming the peoples, events, places and things exchanged, but should also at the same time closely examine them and seek the specific meaning of these transactions. As Clifford Geertz wrote: “[Believing that] man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be that whole web, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”34 If our study of the history of cultural exchanges enters into these webs of significance, we may be in a better position to appreciate the meaning of the exchange activities between each country in the history of East Asia.

31 For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 12. 32 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 5. 33 Georg G. Iggers, New Directions in European Historiography (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), p. 200. 34 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, p. 5.

250

5

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

Challenges

Now that we are prepared to discuss regional history in connection with the challenges in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, I propose the two following issues for further study in this context.

5.1

The interaction between “self” and “other”

In Section II, it was pointed out that the focus of the study of the history of cultural interactions in East Asia should be shifted from the results to the processes of exchange activities. Adopting this shift of attention leaves us better prepared to register the complex problems involved in the interactions, conflicts, and symbioses of each country’s “self” with its surrounding “others.” Many academic studies on the challenges of the “self” and “other” have been published in recent years. In 2006, Richard Sorabji (1934–), a renowned expert on ancient Greek philosophy, argued that though “self” is difficult to investigate, everyone still exhibits a “self” in responding to the world. The conceptual meaning of “self” is not very clear or determinate, but as for the reference of “self,” we can venture to say that generally it refers to a facet of our interactive activity. Because of this, Sorabji advocates that the “self” is a sort of embodiment, made possible in a person’s manifold interactive relationship with the world.35 In western tradition, the concept of self is also typically associated with those of “autonomy” and “rights.” Consequently, comparative ethicists tend to emphasize that the concept of “self” in Confucian philosophy is incompatible with the more individualized and abstract Western notions of “self.” Recently however, Kwong-loi Shun 信廣來 has inquired into the practical domain of a broader “concept of man” in Chinese and western thought. In particular, he analyzed Confucian concepts such as xin (心, mind, heart-mind), zhi (志, will, ambition, purpose), and qi (氣, vitality, spirit), stressing that the Western concepts of “autonomy” and “rights” are not necessarily incompatible with Confucian thought, just that in the Chinese concept of person, what is being stressed is the social dimensions of the person.36 Viewed from the context of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, in these concrete historical experiences the concepts of “self” and “other” will incorporate every kind or level of “self” and “other,” including gender, political, social, and cultural aspects, and so on. As I 35 Richard Sorabji, “The Self: Is There Such a Thing?” in his Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life and Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 17 – 31. 36 Kwong-loi Shun, “Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought,” in Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong, eds., Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 183 – 99.

Challenges

251

have illustrated elsewhere,37 in the spectrum between “cultural identity” and “political identity,” one’s cultural self is more fundamental and inalienable. Concrete interactions between “self” and “other” often bring about challenges and problems. In the study of the history of cultural interactions within East Asia, we can tightly link cultural and political identity (which are associated with “self” and “other”) against the social and cultural background and the linguistic environment, thus tracing the gradual processes of attunement and assimilation, and confirming the significance of the theory. In the history of cultural interactions within East Asia, the perception and construction of the self tends to be completed amid interactions with the other. During the Eastern Chin (東晉, 317 – 420), Guo Pu (郭璞, 276 – 324) wrote in his preface to Shanhaijing (山海經, Classic of Mountains and Seas) that: “(Other) things do not regard themselves as ‘other.’ They wait for ‘me’ and then become my ‘other.’ ‘Otherness’ consequently comes from ‘me’; things are not inherently ‘other.’”38 Huang Zongxi (黃宗羲, 1610 – 1695) said: “Filling the midst of heaven and earth, there are no so-called ‘ten thousand things.’ The expression ‘ten thousand things’ was entirely given by me [humanity], just as what I call ‘father’ is just my father.”39 Both these passages maintain that “self” is constituted before the “other” is recognized, and that matches the experiences recorded in cultural exchanges between China and Korea during the Joseon period. The critique of Chinese culture and thought by Korean visitors to China reflected their observations of “self” and “other” in the concrete cultural exchanges between China and Korea. Such criticism also revealed that the Korean visitors’ perception of “self” had preceded their perception of the Chinese “others.” In many situations, the encounters and intercourse with the “other” aroused important factors of the self. Therefore, early in the twentieth century when Japanese sinologists, such as Naito¯ Konan (內藤湖南, 1866 – 1934), Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ (吉川幸次郎, 1904 – 1980), Aoki Masaru (青木正兒, 1887 – 1964), and Uno Tetsuto (宇野哲人, 1875 – 1974), toured China, they all started out with their firm Japanese sense of “political self” and “cultural self.” In the setting of Chinese politics and culture, they always underwent a realization process – from sub37 Huang Chun-chieh, “Zhongri wenhuajiaoliushi zhong ‘ziwo’ yu ‘tazhe’ de hudong: leixing yu hanyi 中日文化交流史中「自我」與「他者」的互動：類型與涵義 [The Interaction between the ‘Self ’ and ‘Others’ in the Sino-Japanese Context between the 17th and 20th Centuries: Tensions and Implications],” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, 4/2 (8th issue; Dec. 2007): pp. 85 – 105. 38 Guo Pu 郭璞, Shanhai jing 山海經 [Classic of Mountains and Seas] (Siku congkan chubian suoben edition), p. 1a. 39 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Complete Works of Huang Zongxi] (Hanzhou: Zhejiang guji Press, 1985), vol. 1, Mengzi shi shuo 孟子師說 [Comments on the Mencius], sec. 7, “Wanwu jiebei zhang 萬物皆備章 [Chapter on Myriad Things Are in Myself],” p. 149.

252

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

conscious to conscious.40 The experience of Uno Tetsuto, the Tokyo University professor of Chinese philosophy, provides an excellent example. He felt deep reverence for Confucius, yet while traveling along the Great Wall at Badaling (八 達嶺) in 1906, he climbed atop the Great Wall to sing the Japanese national anthem.41 The interactions between “self” and “other” produced images of the “other,” especially in the self ’s “representations” of the “other” – to the extent of sketching “imaginative geographies” of the “other.”42 These images are particularly evident in the travel journals, written accounts and local gazettes of East Asian travelers in neighboring countries. For example, after China’s ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895, several Chinese intellectuals and officials toured Taiwan and left firsthand accounts expressed from their Chinese perspective. These works include Chi Zhicheng’s (池志徵, 1853 – 1937) Quan Tai Youji (全台遊記, Travels in All Taiwan, from 1891 to 1894); Shi Jingchen’s (施景琛, 1973 – 1955) Kunying riji (鯤瀛日記, Kunying Diary, from his travels in Taiwan from March to April, 1919); and Zhang Zunxu 張遵旭’s compilation, Taiwan youji (台灣遊記, Travels in Taiwan, covering his experiences in Taiwan from April 4 – 20, 1916).43 Sometimes, the “self ’s” observations or descriptions of the “other” came from the reports of official delegates’ interactions, such as the Japanese accounts of medieval China by the envoys dispatched to Tang China, and those written by Korean envoys to Ming China. Occasionally people drifted to other countries due to sudden changes in weather or even by accident. In 1826, after a Japanese ship drifted to Shanghai, the Chinese composed poems dedicated to these Japanese refugees. Japanese also drifted to Guangdong (廣東) and wrote descriptions of

40 Huang Chun-chieh, “Ershi shiji chuqi riben hanxuejia yanzhong de wenhua zhong’guo yu xianshi zhong’guo 二十世紀初期日本漢學家眼中的文化中國與現實中國 [Cultural China and Realistic China in the Eyes of Japanese Sinologists in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century],” in Dongya Ruxueshi de xinshiye 東亞儒學史的新視野 [New Perspectives in the History of East Confucianism] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004), pp. 265 – 312. 41 Uno Tetsuto 宇野哲人, Shina bunmeiki 支那文明記 [Account of Chinese Civilization] (Tokyo: Taitokan, 1912), collected in Kojima Shinji 小島晋治 ed., Bakumatsu Meiji Chu¯goku Kenbunroku Shu¯sei 幕末明治中国見聞録集成 [Collection of Travelogues of China at the End of the Tokugawa Period and the Beginning of the Meiji Era] (Tokyo: Yumane Shobo¯, 1997), Chinese translation given in Zhang Xuefeng 張學鋒, Zhong’guo wenming ji 中國文明記 (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Press, 1999). For an account of Uno Tetsuto singing Japan’s national anthem atop the Great Wall, see p. 60 of the Chinese translation. For an account of Uno Tetsuto’s travels in China, see Joshua A. Fogel, “Confucian Pilgrimage: Uno Tetsuto’s Travels in China, 1906,” in The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 95 – 117. 42 D. Clayton, “Critical Imperial and Colonial Geographies,” in K. Anderson et al., eds., Handbook of Cultural Geography (London: Sage Publications, 2003), pp. 354 – 68. 43 These three books are collected in Taiwan Youji 台灣遊記 [Travels in Taiwan], Taiwan Literature Series 89 (Taipei: Economic Research Office of Bank of Taiwan, 1960).

Challenges

253

Guangzhou Harbor.44 In 1835, during the Qing dynasty, Cai Tinglan (蔡廷蘭, 1801 – 1859), a “presented scholar” from Penghu (澎湖), was caught in a storm while sailing to Taiwan and drifted off to Vietnam. The following year, after traveling overland back to Fujian (福建), he compiled his observations in Hainan Zazhu (海南雜著, Miscellany of the South Seas).45 All of the aforementioned historical records provide important documentary materials concerning the self ’s “representations” of others for our study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia.

5.2

Interactions between cultural exchange and power structure in East Asia

The second aspect of the challenges in the study of the history of cultural interactions in East Asia lies in the cultural exchange activities among East Asian countries. What forms of political power came into play? This issue inevitably leads us to reflect on imperial China’s role as “Unavoidable Other” to the other East Asian countries. In Chinese history, China’s vast imperial scale started with the Qin dynasty (221 – 206 bce) and grew ever stronger and mature. Once the Chinese imperial order was established as the central political order, it produced a comprehensive system for cultural transmission and intellectual infrastructure. Kan Huai-chen (甘懷真, 1963–) has summed up the complex relationships among the Confucian school, the Confucian state, and the imperial order, and provided issues for further discussion.46 He has argued that the Chinese political order unfolded as a special East Asian worldview,47 which influenced the theory

44 See Matsuura Akira 松浦章, Edo jidai To¯sen nu yoru Nit-Chu¯ bunka ko¯ryu¯ 江戶時代唐船に よる日中文化交流 [Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Ships during The Edo Period], pp. 310 – 44. 45 Cai Tinglan 蔡廷蘭, Hainan Zazhu 海南雜著 [Miscellany of the South Seas] (Taipei: Economic Research Institute, Bank of Taiwan, 1960); For Cai’s biography, see Penghu tingzhi, sec. 14, Yiwen b. For a recent study of Cai Tinglan, see Chen I-yuan 陳益源, Tsai Ting-lan jiqi Hainan Zachu 蔡廷蘭及其海南雜著 [Cai Tinglan and His Miscellany of the South Seas] (Taipei: Li-ren Press, 2006). 46 Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真, Huangquan, Liyi yu jingdian quanshi: zhongguo gudai zhengzhi shi yanjiu 皇權、禮儀與經典詮釋：中國古代政治史研究 [Imperial Power, Rituals and Interpretations of Classics: A Study on Ancient Chinese Political History] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004). 47 Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真, “Chongxin sikao dongya wangquan yu shijieguan – yi ‘tianxia’ yu ‘zhongguo’ wei guanjian ci 重新思考東亞王權與世界觀──以「天下」與「中國」為關鍵 詞 [Rethinking East Asian Imperial Power and Worldview],” in Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真, ed., Dongya lishi shang de tianxia yu zhongguo gainian 東亞歷史上的天下與中國概念 [The Concepts of “All under Heaven” and “China” in East Asian History] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007).

254

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

of royal power held throughout the entire region.48 The history of cultural interactions within East Asia really unfolded in the interlocking network of imperial power structures. There are two related issues that can be dealt with. First, after the fall of a center of political power in East Asia (e. g. the 1644 fall of the Ming), what changes start to appear in cultural exchange activities? What impact is felt in other East Asian countries, such as Korea, especially on their domestic policies, thought and culture?49 Second, in the history of interactions between China and Japan, to what extent and depth do we see cultural exchanges being influenced by the two countries’ power structures?

6

Possible research topics

Finally, on the basis of the above discussions, I would like to suggest the following three topics for further study of cultural interactions within East Asia.

6.1

Exchange of people: “Professional intermediary agents” and their observations of “others”

In the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia, people from every country traveled along each others’ roads, and paid secret visits. Japanese envoys to China can be traced back to the medieval period, as can Korean ministers and intellectuals who were dispatched to China, and the exchange of envoys between Japan and Korea, etc. All of them left quantities of historical material well worth further examination. As for those who actually conducted the cultural exchanges in East Asia, most of them were what Yang Lian-sheng (楊聯陞, 1914 – 1990) described as “professional intermediary agents” (媒介人物). These included merchants, entrepreneurs, purchasing agents, compradors, labor hiring agents, matchmakers (who worked to unite families), gatekeepers (who served as messenger servants),

48 Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真, Tianxia guojia: dongya wangquanlun 天下國家：東亞王權論 [On East Asian Imperial Power] (Taipei: San Min Book Co., 2008). 49 For studies of Korean reverence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the Zhou dynasty and for China, and their reflections on intellectual currents in the Ming dynasty, see Sun Weiguo 孫衛國, Da Ming qihao yu xiaozhonghua yishi – chaoxian wangchao zun zhou siming wenti yanjiu 大明旗號與小中華意識──朝鮮王朝尊周思明問題研究, 1637 – 1800 [Flag and Title of the Ming Dynasty and “Small China” Consciousness, 1637 – 1800] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2007).

Possible research topics

255

various sorts of envoys, missionaries, pastors, high priests, wizards, teachers, translators, simultaneous interpreters, etc.50 “Private intermediary agents” are invaluable objects of study in the history of cultural exchange in East Asia, because these agents were not only prime movers in the political and economic activities of each country, but were also important carriers of each country’s social and cultural values. The first manifestation of cultural exchange in East Asia was in the exchange of its peoples.

6.2

Exchange of material goods (especially texts)

A second research topic would be the exchange of material goods. In particular, the exchange of books and texts was a special phenomenon of cultural exchange in this region. The export of Chinese literary texts to Japan in the ninth century was estimated at about 1568 titles. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, about seventy to eighty percent of the books Japan imported were written in Chinese.51 Among these books, important classics, such as Confucius’ Analects and the Mencius, made a tremendous impact on Japanese thinkers. Their influence was deep and far-reaching.52 Moreover, the Japanese had successfully preserved some Chinese classics, and in turn exported them back into China after these classics had been lost there. Looking back again at the facts of cultural exchange between Japan and Korea, from 1395 to 1443 Japan sent envoys to Korea every year in search of important Buddhist classics, including Da zang jing 大藏經, Da Bore jing 大般若經, and Fahua jing 法華經.53 These cases all reflect the intimate cultural relationships between China, Japan and Korea. Consequently, Wang Yong (王勇, 1956–) recommended that, besides the Silk Road,

50 Yang Lian-sheng 楊聯陞, “Zhongguo wenhua de meijie renwu 中國文化的媒介人物 [Professional Intermediary Agents of Chinese Culture],” in Dalu zazhi shixue congshu 大陸雜誌 史學叢書 [Mainland Magazine Series of Historical Studies], first series, vol. 1, Shixue tonglun 史學通論 [General Account of Historical Studies] (Taipei: Dalu zazhi, n.d.), pp. 243 – 50, esp. 244. 51 Yian Shaodang 嚴紹璗, Riben cang Songren wenji shanben gouchen 日本藏宋人文集善本鉤 沉 [Selections of the Rare Editions of the Literary Works of Song Literati Preserved in Japan] (Hangzhou: Hangzhou University Press, 1996), pp. 1 f. 52 See Huang Chun-chieh, Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun; and Zhang Kunjiang, Riben dechuan shidai guxuepai de wangdao zhengzhilun. 53 See Kang Chu Chin 姜周鎮 강주진, “Haehaengchongjae: Haeje 海行摠載：解題 해행총재：해제 [Collections of Travelogues: Introduction],” in Haehaengchongjae 海行摠 載 해행총재 [Collections of Travelogues] (Seoul: Minjokmunhua Chujinhoe, 1974), 《Gojeon Guk-yeok Chongseo 古典國譯叢書 고전국역총서》78, vol. 1, pp. 1 – 28.

256

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

East Asia had another “Book Road” network as an alternative pathway for cultural exchanges.54

6.3

The exchange of thoughts and ideas

The above discussions on the exchange of people and material goods, especially texts, have significant implications for the exchange of thoughts and ideas. This is the third theme in the study of the history of cultural exchanges within East Asia. Under this theme, we find numerous research problems regarding the abovementioned texts. Moreover, since China was perceived as the “Unavoidable Other,” the two following issues are worth exploring. 6.3.1 The impact of Chinese thought on Japan and Korea There always existed a huge gap between Chinese thought and the local conditions of the peripheral countries of East Asia. The acceptance of Mencius in Japan is a good example. In Tokugawa Japan, the political system had clearly rejected Mencius’ political thought, so that as soon as the Mencius was imported to Japan, it immediately drew attacks from the Sorai school (徂徠學派) and prompted debates between the Classical Meaning school and the Zhu Xi school.55 After the Mencius was exported to Japan and Korea, elements of thought which were deemed inconsistent with special features of the Japanese and Korean political system and intellectual style stirred up intellectual waves that are certainly worth further investigation. 6.3.2 The problem of “self identity” arises in the cultural exchange within East Asia In the intimate cultural relations between each country in East Asia, China (the huge “Unavoidable Other”) always stirred up the problem of self-identity in the peripheral regions. In eighteenth-century Japan, a prime example can be seen in the debates over the provenance and nature of Japanese culture between To¯ Te¯kan (藤貞幹, 1732 – 1797) and the National Learning School scholar Moto’ori Norinaga (本居宣長, 1730 – 1801). To¯ Te¯kan believed that Japanese cultural factors such as the imperial system, language, names, etc., had originated in Korea, and that Zhen-Han (辰韓) was descended from remnants of the vanquished Qin (秦). To¯ Te¯kan’s theory that Japan’s culture was largely borrowed 54 See Wang Yong 王勇, Zhong-Ri “shuji zhi lu” yanjiu 中日「書籍之路」研究 [The “Book Road” between China and Japan] (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2003). 55 See Zhang Kunjiang, Riben dechuan shidai guxuepai de wangdao zhengzhilun, ch. 5, pp. 219 – 86.

Conclusion

257

from overseas aroused forceful critique from Moto’ori Norinaga, who dismissed To¯ Te¯kan as a madman.56 In Japanese thought this has come to be known as the “Korea problem.” Throughout this debate one can easily sense the projection and presence of enormous China in the background. This is an important phenomenon in the study of cultural exchanges within East Asia. Naturally, in the approximately 1500-year period of cultural exchanges within East Asia, the range of possible research themes is not limited to the abovementioned exchanges of people, material goods (especially texts), thoughts and ideas. Aside from these, there were also exchanges of political systems (such as the impact of the Chinese imperial system on the peripheral countries), and of religious faith (such as the transmission eastward of faith in Guanyin [觀音]), etc. Any of these would make a good topic worthy of further research.

7

Conclusion

As globalization in the twenty-first century accelerates and unfolds, it is creating on the one hand a process of “de-nationalization” and “de-regionalization.”57 On the other hand, it is leading to “interconnectedness” among regions of the globe.58 These new developments have had a major impact on “nation states,” an idea that prevailed in the twentieth century.59 Yet it remains the case that in economic activities in the age of globalization, each person remains first and foremost a citizen of a nation; only in a derivative sense can he or she be reckoned a citizen of the global village. While recommending a regional approach in the study of the history of cultural interactions within East Asia, I still insist on sorts of “national history”60 so that the purview of legitimate historical research is properly expanded and that, in future, the purview of “global history” will be sufficiently concrete and well-grounded. 56 See To¯ Te¯kan 藤貞幹, Sho¯ko¯hatsu 衝口発 [Spontaneous Thoughts], Moto’ori Norinaga 本居 宣長, Kenkyo¯jin 鉗狂人 [Madman], in Washio Junkyo¯ 鷲尾順敬, ed., Nihon Shiso¯ To¯so¯ Shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan] (Tokyo, Me¯cho Kanko¯kai, 1970), pp. 227 – 312. See also Koyasu Nobukuni, Ho¯ho¯ to shite no Edo, pp. 16 – 26. 57 Ulrich Beck, Quanchiuhua weiji 全球化危機 [The Crisis of Globalization], trans. Sun Chi-pen 孫治本 (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1999), p. 90 f. 58 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Rights: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 4 f. 59 Peter F. Drucker, “The Global Economy and the Nation State,” Foreign Affairs 76/5 (1997): pp. 159 – 71. 60 “National history” is still being discussed in recent publications. See e. g. Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore eds., Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1989); Stefan Berger, ed., Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

258

Some Observations on the Study of the History of Cultural Interactions

In the second section of this chapter, I recommended adopting a “regional history” approach to the study of the history of cultural interactions within East Asia. Methodologically, this would imply a shift of focus from the results of such cultural exchanges to their processes. This adoption of a more dynamic viewpoint in conducting the study of cultural exchanges within East Asia would push the focus of the study from the center outward to the periphery, from the original text to the atmosphere or the environment in which that text was reinterpreted. In section three, I also recommend that two challenging aspects be taken up as starting points for future research on the history of cultural exchanges in East Asia. The first was the interaction and stress between “self” and “other.” The second was the relationship between activities of cultural exchange and the power structure of every East Asian country. Once these two aspects were outlined, section four then proposed that, among the possible research themes that could be pursued in this field, it would be fruitful to focus on the exchange of people (especially “professional intermediary agents”), of material goods (especially texts), and of thoughts and ideas. Following the twenty-first century rise of Asia – and East Asia in particular – and the expanding processes of globalization, state-centric studies in the humanities and social sciences in East Asia have gradually given way to examinations of “East Asia” as a whole. For example, Tokyo University once had a chair in “Chinese Philosophy,” which is now being re-conceived as a chair in “East Asian Thought and Cultural Studies.” And since 2008, the Institute for Cultural Interaction Studies at Kansai University has started publishing the Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies. Recently, Yu Ying-shih (余英時, 1930–) looked back at the Chinese intellectualist obsession with Western analytical models of pragmatism and Marxism during most of the twentieth century, and pointed out that in the past twenty years a new turn in the study of cultural history has taken place in the international historical community. He hoped that Chinese historians would truly immerse themselves in traditional Asian culture, and devise new problem fields, new concepts and new methods for tracing the Chinese historical experience. Preferably, they would no longer employ questions, models and methods from the outside, such as theories and practices adopted from the Western world. Yu suggested that the reason why a society and its people merit studying is not just because they are a part of the larger world but, more importantly, because they bear some intrinsic value in their own right.61 Taking a “regional history” approach to the study of the history of cultural interaction within East Asia represents a way of implementing the idea of 61 Ying-shih Yu, “Clio’s New Turn and the Rediscovery of Tradition in Asia,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6/1 (March 2007): pp. 39 – 51.

Conclusion

259

returning to and immersing ourselves in the East Asian cultural traditions, to appreciate and understand their diversity and richness.

Indexes

Bibliography

I.

Primary Sources

Asami Ke¯isai 淺見炯齋. Chu¯goku Ben 中國辨 [On ‘Zhongguo’]. In Yamazaki Ansai Gakuha 山崎闇齋學派 [The School of Yamazaki Ansai] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982). Bai Ting 白珽. Zhanyuan jinyu 湛淵靜語 [Random Notes of Zhanyuan]. In Zhibuzuzhai congshu ben 知不足齋叢書本 [Series of Zhibuzhu Zhai]. Ban Gu 班固. Hanshu 漢書 [History of the Former Han] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002). Bao Tingbo 鮑廷博 comp. Lunyu jijie yishu 論語集解義疏 [Collected Commentaries and Annotations of the Analects] (Taipei: Yiwen Yinsukuan, 1966). Bito¯ Nishu¯ 尾藤二洲. Se¯ki Yohitsu 靜寄餘筆 [Remaining Notes in Serenity], vol. 1. In Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎, ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho日本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Con¯ tori shuppan, 1978), vol. 2. fucianism] (Tokyo: O Bito¯ Nishu¯ 尾藤二洲. Sosanroku 素餐錄 [Idle Records]. In Nihon jurin so¯sho日本儒林叢 ¯ tori shuppan, 1978), vol. 6. 書 [Series on Japanese Confucianism] (Tokyo: O Cheng Hao程顥. “Shiren, 識仁.” In Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 [Surviving Works of Henan Chengs], collected in Er Cheng ji二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004). Cheng Yi程頤. Yichuan xiansheng yusi 伊川先生語四 [Conversation of Cheng Yi, no. 4]. In Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 [Surviving Works of Henan Chengs], collected in Er Cheng ji二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981). Cheng Yi程頤. Henan Chengshi cuiyan 河南程氏粹言 [Pure Words of Henan Chengs]. In Er Cheng ji二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981). Cheng Hao程顥and Cheng Yi程頤. Er Cheng ji二程集 [Complete Works of the Two Chengs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981). Cheng Shude程樹德. Lunyu jishi 論語集釋 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990). Dai Zhen戴震. Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 [An Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in the Book of Mencius]. In Daizhen quanshu 戴震全書 [Complete works on Daizhen] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 1991).

264

Bibliography

Eisho¯ sho¯hon Nobukata jihitsu Mo¯shi 永正鈔本宣賢自筆孟子 [Eisho¯ Transcribed Edition of Kiyohara’s Comments on the Mencius], accessed at . Fang Dongshu方東樹. Hanxüe shandui 漢學商兌 [An Assessment of Han Learning]. In Xu Hongxing 徐洪興ed. Hanxue shichengji 漢學師承記 [Succession of the School of Han Learning] (Beijing: Sanlian shuju, 1988). Fujisawa To¯gai 藤澤東畡. “Genseishi 原聖志 [On the Will of Sages].” In Nihon jurin so¯sho ¯ tori shuppan, 1971). 日本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Confucianism] (Tokyo: O Gu Yanwu 顧炎武. Rizhi lu 日知錄 [Record of Knowledge Gained Day by Day] (Taipei: Minglun chubanshe, 1970). Guo Pu 郭璞. Shanhai jing 山海經 [Classic of Mountains and Seas] (Siku congkan chubian suoben edition). Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩. Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋 [Collected Commentaries on Zhuangzi] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982). Hanfeizi 韓非子 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben 四部叢刊初編縮本edition). Hang Shihjun杭世駿. “Li Yishan shi zhu xu 李義山詩注序 [Preface to Li Yishan’s Poetry].” In Daogutang ji 道古堂集 [Literary Corpus of Daogutang] (1792, wood-block edition). Han Ying 韓嬰. Hanshi waizhuan 韓詩外傳 [The Outer Commentary to the Book of Odes by Master Han] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan Photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben 四部叢刊初編縮本edition). Han Yu韓愈. “Yuan Dao 原道 [An Inquiry on the Way].” In Zhu Wengong bian Changli xiansheng ji 朱文公編昌黎先生集 [Works of Han Yu edited by Zhu Xi] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben). Hara Nensai 原念齋. Sentetsu so¯dan 先哲叢談 [Collected Stories of Former Philosophers] (Eto: Keigendo, 1816 wood-block edition). Hayashi Razan 林羅山. “Shinto¯ Tenshu 神道傳授 [The Transmission of Shinto].” In Kinse¯ Shinto¯ron. Zenki Kokugaku 近世神道論．前期国學 [Shintoism and National Learning in Early Modern Times] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982). Hayashi Razan林羅山. Hayashi Razan bunshu¯ 林羅山文集 [Literary Corpus of Hayashi Razan] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1979). He Yan 何晏. Lunyu zhushu 論語注疏 [Explication on Commentaries of the Analects] (Taipei: Taiwan guji chubanshe, 2001). He Yan何晏. Lunyu jijie 論語集解 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition). Hu Yin胡寅. Feiran ji 斐然集 [Feiran Collection of Essays] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of Siku quanshu zhenben edition, 1969 – 70). Huang Hui 黃暉. Lunheng xiaoshi 論衡校釋 [Commentaries on the Balanced Inquiries] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009). Huang Zongxi黃宗羲. Mingyi daifang lu 明夷待訪錄 [Notes Gathered when Waiting for the Dawn]. In Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Collected Works of Huang Zongxi] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji chubanshe, 1985). Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲. Nanlei wenji 南雷文集 [Literary Corpus of Huang Zongxi] (SPPY chubiansuoben).

Primary Sources

265

Huang Zongxi黃宗羲. Mingru xuean 明儒學案 [Records of the Ming Confucianists] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985). Huang Zongxi黃宗羲. Mengzi shishuo 孟子師說 [Interpretation of Mencius]. In Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Complete Works of Huang Zongxi] (Kangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1985). ¯ sho shi sai 論諸葛孔明非王佐之才 [On Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. “Ron Shikaku Ko¯mei hi O Zhuge Liang’s Talent Is Not Comparable to Wangzuo’s].” In Kogaku senseishu 古學先 生集 [Literary Corpus of Master of Classical Learning]. In Sagara To¯ru 相良亨 et al. eds. Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei 近世儒家文集集成 [Complete Works of Literary Corpus of Early Modern Confucians] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1985). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. Chu¯ Yo¯ Hakki 中庸發揮 [Interpretation of the Doctrine of Mean]. In Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎 ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全 書 [Complete Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: ¯ tori Shuppan, 1973). O Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. “Jinsetsu 仁說.” In Kogaku sensei shibunshu¯ 古學先生詩文集 [Collection of Poems and Essays of Masters of Anciant School]. In Sagara To¯ru 相良亨 et al. eds. Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei 近世儒家文集集成 [Complete Works of Literary Corpus of Early Modern Confucians] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1985). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. “Do¯shikai hikki 同志會筆記 [Notes of the Companion Society].” In Sagara To¯ru相良亨 et al. eds. Kinse¯ juka bunshu¯ shu¯sei 近世儒家文集集成 [Complete Works of Literary Corpus of Early Modern Confucians] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1985). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. “Do¯jimon 童子問 [Inquiry of A Child].” In Ienaga Saburo¯ 家永三郎 et al., eds. Kinse¯ shiso¯ka bunshu¯ 近世思想家文集 [Literary Corpus of Modern Thinkers] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1966, 1981). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. Gomo¯ jigi語孟字義 [Meanings of Words in the Analects and Mencius]. In Inoue Tetsujiro¯ 井上哲次郎and Kanie Yosimaru 蟹江義丸eds. Nihon rinri ihen日本 倫理彙編 [Collected Books on Japanese Ethics] (Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1901). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. Rongo Kogi 論語古義 [Classical Meanings of the Analects]. In Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎 ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書 ¯ tori [Complete Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: O Shuppan, 1973). Ito¯ Jinsai伊藤仁齋. Mo¯shi Kogi孟子古義 [Classical Meanings of the Menciaus]. In Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎 ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書 ¯ tori [Complete Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: O Shuppan, 1973). Ito¯ To¯gai伊藤東涯. Kankyo Hitsuroku 閒居筆錄 [Reflection on Life in Leisure]. In Seki Giichiro 関儀一郎 ed. Nihon jurin so¯sho 日本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Con¯ tori shuppan, 1971). fucianism] (Tokyo: O Jeong Yak-yong丁若鏞 (정약용). Yeoyudang jeonseo 與猶堂全書 여유당전서 [Complete works of the Yeoyudang] (Seoul: Minjokmunhwa mun-go 民族文化文庫, 2001). Jeong Yak-yong丁若鏞 (정약용). “Ilbonron 日本論 일본론 [On Japan].” In Yeoyudang jeonseo 與猶堂全書 여유당전서 [Complete works of the Yeoyudang] (Seoul: Minjokmunhwa mun-go 民族文化文庫, 2001). Jeong Je-du 鄭齊斗 (정제두). Hagokjip 霞谷集 하곡집 [Collection of Essays by Hagok]. In Han-guk munjip chonggan 韓國文集叢刊 한국문집총간 [Series of Literary Corpus of Korea] (Seoul: Gyeong-in munhwasa, 1995).

266

Bibliography

Jiao Xun 焦循. Diaogu ji 雕菰集 [Anthology of the Studio of Carving Wild Rice] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, photo-reproduction of Congshu jicheng cubian edition, 1985). Jiao Xun焦循. Mengzi zhengyi孟子正義 [The Correct Meanings of Mencius] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987). Jo Ik 趙翼 (조익). Maengja cheonseol孟子淺說 맹자천설 [Preliminary comments on the Book of Mencius]. In Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipseong韓國經學資料集成 한국경학자료집성 [Complete Works of Sources of Korean Classics] (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988). Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒. Shinshiroku 慎思錄 [Records of Deliberate Thinking]. In Ekken zenshu¯ 益軒全集 [Complete Works of Kaibara Ekken] (Tokyo: Kokisho Kanko¯kai, 1973). Katayama Kenzan 片山兼山. Rongo Ikkan 論語一貫 [The One Running through the Analects] (Rare-book in the collection of the Kyoto University Library). Ko¯zuki Sen’an 上月專庵. So¯rai gakusoku Ben 徂徠学則辨 [Debates on the Learning of Sorai]. In Seki Giichiro 関儀一郎 ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho日本儒林叢書 [Series on ¯ tori shuppan, 1971). Japanese Confucianism] (Tokyo: O Li Jingde 黎靖德 ed. Zhuzi yulei朱子語類 [Classified Conversations of Master Zhu] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986). Lian Heng連橫. “Yu Lin Zizhao xiansheng shu 與林子超先生書 [Letter to Mr. Lin Zichao].” In Yatang wenji 雅堂文集 [Literary Corpus of Lian Yatang] (Taiwan Document Collection). Ling Tingkan凌廷堪. Lijing shili 禮經釋例 [Explicated Categories of the Book of Rites] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Chinese Lit. & Phil. Inst., 2002). Liu Baonan劉寶楠. Lunyu zhengyi 論語正義 [Corrected Meanings of the Analects] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990). Liu Xiang劉向. Shuo Yuan 說苑 [Collection of Discourses] (Sibu Congkan chubian suoben edition 四部叢刊初編縮本). Liu Xu 劉煦. Jiu Tangshu 舊唐書 [Old History of the Tang] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002). Lu Xiangshan 陸象山. “Yu Wang Shunbo 與王順伯 [Letter to Wang Shunbo].” In Lu Jiuyuan ji 陸九淵集 [Collected Works of Lu Jiuyuan] (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1981). Maoshi zhushu毛詩注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries on Mao’s Annotation of the Book of Odes] (Reprint, Taipei: Southern Materials Resource Center, 1983). Mencius (Sibu congkan chubian suoben 四部叢刊初編縮本edition) Miyake Sho¯sai三宅尚齋. Mokushikiroku 默識錄 [Records of Silent Kowning]. In Inoue Tetsujiro¯ 井上哲次郎and Kanie Yoshimaru 蟹江義丸eds. Nihon rinri ihen日本倫理彙 編 [Collected Books on Japanese Ethics] (Tokyo: Ikuse¯kai, 1901). Moto’ori Norinaga 本居宣長. Kenkyo¯jin 鉗狂人 [Madman]. In Washio Junkyo¯鷲尾順敬 ed. Nihon shiso¯ to¯so¯ shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan] (Tokyo: Me¯cho Kanko¯kai 名著刊行会, 1964 – 1970), vol. 4. Mozi 墨子 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Sibu congkan chubian suoben 四部叢刊初編縮本edition). Naito¯ Konan內藤湖南. Naito¯ Konan zenshu¯ 內藤湖南全集 [Complete Works of Naito¯ Konan] (Tokyo: Chikuma shoden, 1944). Nakai Riken中井履軒. Mo¯shi ho¯gen 孟子逢原 [Original Meanings of the Mencius]. In Seki Giichiro¯ 関儀一郎 ed. Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書

Primary Sources

267

¯ tori [Complete Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: O Shuppan, 1973). Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠. Kenen ippitsu 蘐園一筆 [First Corpus of Kenyen]. In Seki Giichiro 関儀一郎 ed., Nihon jurin so¯sho日本儒林叢書 [Series on Japanese Confucianism] ¯ tori shuppan, 1971). (Tokyo: O Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠. Rongo Cho¯ 論語徵 [Comments on the Analects]. In Seiki Giichiro¯ 関 儀一郎 ed., Nihon meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書 [Complete ¯ tori Shuppan, Works of the Annotations of the Renowned Japanese Scholars] (Tokyo: O 1973). Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠. Mo¯shi Siki 孟子識 [Comments on the Book of Mencius]. In Kan’utei So¯sho 甘雨亭叢書 [Series of the Kanutei], vol. 4. Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠. Gong Ying 龔穎 trans., Zheng tan 政談 [Discourse on Governance] (Beijing: Zhongyang bainyi chubanshe, 2004). Ogyu¯ Sorai荻生徂徠. Benmei 辨名 [Distinguishing the Names]. In Nihon shiso¯ taikei 日本 思想大系 [Great Books of Japanese Thought] 36 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978). Ogyu¯ Sorai荻生徂徠. Bendo¯ 辨道 [Distinguishing the Way]. In Nihon Shiso¯ Taikei 日本思 想大系 [Series on Japanese Thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978). Pi Xirui皮錫瑞. Jingxue Tonglun 經學通論 [An Introduction to the Study of Classics] (Taipei: Holo tushu chubanshe, 1973). Quan Zuwang 全祖望. Jieqiting ji 鮚崎亭集 [Literary Corpus of Jieqi Pavilion] (Sibu congkan chubian suoben四部叢刊初編縮本, 1975). Ruan Yuan阮元. Yanjingshi ji 揅經室集 [Collection of the Classics-Studying Studio] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduction Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 70). Ruan Yuan 阮元. Shisanjing zhushu 十三經注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries of the Thirteen Classics] (Taipei: Yiwen Yinsuguan, 1960). Sakuma Taika 佐久間太華. Wakan Me¯ben 和漢明辨 [Distinguishing Japan and China]. In ¯ tori Shuppan, 1978). Nihon jurin so¯sho (Tokyo: O ¯ shio Sato¯ Issai佐藤一齋. “Genshiroku 言志錄 [Records of Words and Will].” In Sato¯ IssaiO Chu¯sai 佐藤一齋大塩中齋 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990). Shangshu 尚書 [Book of Documents] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan yingyin shisanjing zhushu 影印十三經注疏, 1993). Shin Gyo-seon 申教善 (신교선). Dokmaeng jeonghun 讀孟庭訓 독맹정훈 [Familial Instructions on Reading the Book of Mencius]. In Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipsheong 韓 國經學資料集成 한국경학자료집성 [Complete Collection of Korean Study of Confucian Classics] (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988). Sima Guang 司馬光. Wenguo wenzheng Sima Gong wenji 溫國文正司馬公文集 [Literary Corpus of Sima Guang] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan printed shoushange congshuben edition, 1937). Sima Qian 司馬遷. Shiji史記 [Historian’s Record] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1997). Song Lian 宋濂, Yuan Shi 元史 [History of the Yuan Dynasty] (SBBY ed.). Su Che蘇轍. Luancheng ji 欒城集 [Luancheng Collection of Essays] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 70). Su Che 蘇轍. Mengzijie 孟子解 [Explentation of Mencius]. In Shoushan’ge congshuben 守 山閣叢書本 [Series of Shoushange].

268

Bibliography

Sun Chengze 孫承澤. Chunming mengyu lu 春明夢餘錄 [Record of Dreams of the Capital] (Siku quanshu zhenben, 6th Series). Su Yu 蘇輿. Chunqiu fanlu yizheng 春秋繁露義證 [Commentaries on the Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010). Takezoe Ko¯ko¯竹添光鴻. Rongo Kaisen 論語會箋 [Collected Commentaries on the Analects] (Taipei: Guangwenshuju, n.d.). To¯jo¯ Ichido¯東條一堂. Rongo Chigen 論語知言 [Knowing Words of the Analects]. In Nihon ¯ tori Shuppan, 1971). meika shisho chu¯shaku zensho (Tokyo: O Toshima Ho¯shu¯豊島豊洲. “Jinsetsu 仁說 [Treatise on Humanity].” In Nihon jurin so¯sho ¯ tori shuppan, 1978). (Tokyo: O Tuotuo 脫脫 et al. Song Shi 宋史 [History of the Song Dynasty] (Sibu beiyao edition). Wang Bi 王弼. Zhouyi zhushu 周易注疏 [Commentaries on the Book of Change] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Jiangxi Nanchang Fu Academy woodblock edition, 1955). Wang Chong 王充. Lunheng 論衡 [The Balanced Inquiries] (Sibu congkan chubian suo ben edition). Wang Fuzhi王夫之. Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論 [Remarks Gathered from the Reading of Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government] (Taipei: Heluo tushu gongsi, 1976). Wang Fuzhi王夫之. Dusishu daquan shuo讀四書大全說 [Discourse on Reading the Four Books] (Taipei: Heluo tushu chubanshe photo-reproduction of the 1875 wood-block edition). Wang Xianqian 王先謙. Xunzi jijie荀子集解 [Collected Commentaries on Xunzi] (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1969). Wang Yinglin 王應麟. Yuhai 玉海 [Ocean of Jade] (Jiangsu: Guji chubanshe, 1991). Washio Junkyo¯鷲尾順敬ed. Nihon shiso¯ to¯so¯ shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan] (Tokyo: Me¯cho Kanko¯kai 名著刊行会, 1964 – 1970). Xue Xuan 薛瑄. Dushu lu 讀書錄 [Notes on Reading Books] (SKCS edition). Xing Bing邢昺. Lunyu zhushu 論語注疏 [Commentaries on the Analects] (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1955). Xu Shen許慎. Shuowen jiezi xizhuan tongshi 說文解字繫傳通釋 [Comprehensive Annotations of Shuowen jiezi] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan photo-reproduct of Sibu congkan chubian suoben edition, 1969 – 70). Yang Shi 楊時. “Zhoushizong jiarenzhuan周世宗家人傳 [Biographies of Family Menbers of Enperor Shi-zong].” In Guishan ji龜山集 [Literary Corpus of Yang Shi] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1973). Yamada Ho¯koku 山田方谷. Okamoto Takashi 岡本巍ed. Shimon monbenroku 師門問弁 錄 [Inquiries and Answers under the Mentor]. In Yamada Ho¯koku Zenshu山田方谷全 集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全集刊行會, 1951). Yamada Ho¯koku山田方谷. Yamada Jun 山田準 ed., Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全 集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全集刊行會, 1951). Yamada Ho¯koku. “Yo Hoashi Ho¯keisyo 與帆足鵬卿書 [Letter to Hoashi Ho¯kei].” In Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全集刊行會, 1951).

Primary Sources

269

Yamada Ho¯koku. “Denshu¯roku bassuijo 傳習錄拔萃序 [Preface to the Essentials of Instructions for Practical Living].” In Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全 集刊行會, 1951). Yamada Ho¯koku. “To¯ yu¯jin bo¯ sho 答友人某書 [Letter to a Friend].” In Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全集刊行會, 1951). Yamada Ho¯koku. “Fuku Kasuga Sen’an sho 復春日潜庵書 [Letter to Kasuga Sen’an].” In Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ 山田方谷全集 [Complete works of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Okayama: Yamada Ho¯koku zenshu¯ kanko¯kai 山田方谷全集刊行會, 1951). Yamada Ho¯koku山田方谷. Mo¯shi yo¯kisho¯ wakumon zukai 孟子養氣章或問圖解 [Diagrams with Explanation on Questions Concerning the Chapter on “Nurturing qi” in the Mencius] (Osaka: Imeido¯ wood-block editon of Tokyo¯ Ko¯do¯ shoin, 1902) Yamaga Soko¯山鹿素行. Chu¯cho¯ jijitsu中朝事実 [Facts of Japan]. In Hirose Yutaka 広瀬豊 ed., Yamaga Soko¯ zenshu¯ 山鹿素行全集 [Complete Works of Yamga So¯ko] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942). Yi Hwang李滉 (이황). Jujaseo jeol-yo seo 朱子書節要序 주자서절요서 [Preface of the Abridged volumes of Zhu Xi]. In Dosan jeonseo 陶山全書 도산전서 [Complete Works of Yi Hwang] (Seoul: Toegyehak Yeon-guwon 退溪學研究院, 1988, Toegyehak chongseo 退溪學叢書 퇴계학총서 [Series of Toegye Learning] ). Yi Ik 李瀷 (이익). Maengja jilseo孟子疾書 맹자질서 [Preliminary Writings on the Book of Mencius]. In Seongho jilseo星湖疾書 성호질서 [Preliminary Writing of Songho]. In Han-guk gyeonghak jaryo jipseong韓國經學資料集成 한국경학자료집성 (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan Daehak Daedongmunhwa yeon-guwon, 1988). Yu Yunwen 余允文. Zunmengbian 尊孟辨 [On Exaltation of Mencius] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan printed shoushange congshuben edition, 1937). Yoshida Sho¯in 吉田松陰. Ko¯mo¯ yowa 講孟餘話 [Lectures on the Book of Mencius]. In Matsumoto Sannosuke 松本三之介 ed., Yoshida Sho¯in 吉田松陰 (Tokyo : Chou¯ko¯ronsha, 1995). Zhang Jiucheng張九成. Mengzi zhuan 孟子傳 [Commentaries on the Book of Mencius] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan photo-reproduction of the Wenyuan ge Edition of the Complete Works of the Four Repositories, 1983). Zhang Shi張栻. Nanxuan xiansheng mengzi shuo南軒先生孟子說 [Mr. Zhang Shi’s Discourses on Mencius]. Zhang Zai張載. “Jingxue liku 經學理窟 [Explanations of the Learning of Classics].” In Zhang Zai ji 張載集 [Collected Essays of Zhang Zai] (Beijing: Zhonghua shju, 1987). Zhang Zai張載. “Zhangzi yulu 張子語錄語錄中 [Conversation of Zhang Zai Middle Volume]. ” In Zhang Zai ji 張載集 [Complete Works of Zhang Zai] (Taipei: Liren shuju, 1981). Zhao Qi 趙岐. Mengzi 孟子 (Sibu congkan chu bian suo ben edition) Zhen Dexiu真德秀. Lunyu jibian 論語集編 [Collected Volume of the Analects] (Siku quanshu edition, 四庫全書本). Zhu Shunshui朱舜水. Zhu Shunshui ji 朱舜水集 [Collected Essays of Zhu Shunshui] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990). Zhu Xi朱熹. Huian xiansheng Zhu Wengong Wenji 晦庵先生朱文公文集 [Collected Writings of Mr. Huian] (Taipei: Guang wen shuju, 1972).

270

Bibliography

Zhu Xi朱熹. Huian Xiansheng Zhuwengong ji 晦庵先生朱文公集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi] (SPTK chubiansuoben, 1975). Zhu Xi朱熹. Chen Junmin陳俊民 comp. Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 [Literary Corpus of Master Zhu Xi] (Taipei: Defu wenjiao jijinhui, 2000). Zhu Xi朱熹. Sishu zhangju jizhu四書章句集注 [Four Books in Chapter and Verse with Collected Commentaries] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983). Zhu Xi朱熹. Mengzi huo wen孟子或問 [Querries on the Book of Mencius]. In Sishu huo wen四書或問 [Querries on the Four Books] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001). Zhu Xi朱熹. Daxue Huowen 大學或問 [Querries on the Great Learning] (Kyoto: Zhongwen chubanshe, photo-reproduction of Kinse¯ Kanseki Sokan edition, 1998).

II.

Secondary Sources

Works in English Ankersmit, Frank. “What is Wrong with World History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View?” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. Baker, Don. “Tasan Between Catholicism and Confucianism: A Decade Under Suspicion, 1797 – 1801,” Journal of Tasan Studies 5 (2004): 55 – 86. Baker, Don. “Thomas Aquinas and Choˇng Yagyong: Rebels Within Tradition,” Journal of Tasan Studies, vol. 3 (June, 2002): 32 – 69. Barraclough, Geoffrey. Main Trends in History (New York/London: Holmes & Meier, 1979) Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” In Stephen Heath trans. Image – Music – Text (New York: Noonday Press, 1988). Becker, Carl L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932, 2003). Berger, Stefan and Lorenz, Chris eds. Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Berger, Stefan, Donovan, Mark and Passmore, Kevin. eds. Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 (London: Routledge, 1989). Berger, Stefan ed. Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Brandauer, Frederich P. and Huang, Chun-chieh eds. Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994). Chan, Wing-tsit trans. and ed. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Chan, Wing-tsit trans. Instructions for Practical Living, and Other Neo-Confucian Writings (New York: Columbia University, 1963). Chan, Wing-tsit trans. Reflections on Things at Hand (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) Chan, Wing-tsit. Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989).

Secondary Sources

271

Chan, Wing-tsit. “Chu Hsi’s Completion of Neo-Confucianism.” In Études Song in Memoriam Étienne Balazs. Éditées par Francoise Aubin, Serie II, #I (Paris: Mouton & Co., and École Practique de Haute Études, 1973), pp. 60 – 90. Chan, Wing-tsit. Sources of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Chartier, Roger. On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Chin, Ann-ping and Freeman, Mansfield trans. Tai Chen on Mencius: Explorations in Words and Meanings. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990). Chomsky, Noam. Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (London: Pluto Press, 2000). Chung, Edward Y. J. The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok: A Reappraisal of the “Four-Seven Thesis” and Its Practical Implications for Self-Cultivation (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1995). Clayton, D. “Critical Imperial and Colonial Geographies.” In Anderson, K. et al. eds. Handbook of Cultural Geography (London: Sage Publications, 2003). Crump Jr., J. I. trans. Chan-Kuo Ts’e (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). de Bary, William Theodore. “Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism.” In David Nivison, S. and Wright, Arthur F. eds. Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 25 – 49. de Bary, W. Theodore. Waiting the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Deuchler, Martina. The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992). Drucker, Peter F. “The Global Economy and the Nation State.” In Foreign Affairs 76/5 (Sep./ Oct., 1997): 159 – 71. Fairbank, John K. ed. The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). Fischer, David H. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970) Fogel, Joshua A. The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862 – 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). Fogel, Joshua A. “Confucian Pilgrimage: Uno Tetsuto’s Travels in China, 1906.” In The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995) Gardner, Danial K. Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsüeh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986). Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973) Giddens, Anthony. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). Gunderson, K. ed. Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975). Hexter, Jack H. Reappraisals in History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961) Hirsch Jr., Eric Donald. Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

272

Bibliography

Huang, Chichung trans. The Analects of Confucius: A Literal Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Huang, Chin-shing. Philosophy, Philology, and Politics in Eighteenth-Century China: Li Fu and the Lu-Wang School Under the Ch’ing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Huang, Chun-chieh. Taiwan in Transformation: Retrospect and Prospect (New Brunswicki: Transaction Publishers, Revised and Enlarged edition, 2014). Huang, Chun-chieh. Mencian Hermeneutics: A History of Interpretations in China (New Brunwick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001). Huang, Chun-chieh. Humanism in East Asian Confucian Contexts (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010). Huang, Chun-chieh. “Mencius’ Hermeneutics of Classics.” In Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 1/1 (2001): 15 – 29. Huang, Chun-chieh. “The Synthesis of Old Pursuits and New Knowledge: Chu Hsi’s Interpretation of Mencian Morality,” New Asia Academic Bulletin (Hong Kong) 3 (1982): 216. Huang, Chun-chieh. “Historical Thinking in Classical Confucianism: Historical Argumentation from the Three Dynasties.” In Huang, Chun-chieh and Zürcher, Erik eds. Time and Space in Chinese Culture (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995). Huang, Chun-chieh. “The Philosophical Argumentation by Historical Narration in Sung China: The Case of Chu Hsi.” In Lee, Thomas H. C. ed. The New and the Multiple: Sung Senses of the Past (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2004). Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. eds. Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Indianapolis, IL: Hackett, 2005, 2nd ed.). Iggers, Georg G. Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge with a New Epilogue (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2005). Iggers, Georg G. New Directions in European Historiography (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984) International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Iggers, Georg G. and Wang, Q. Edward. “The Globalization of History and Historiography: Characteristics and Challenges, from the 1990s to the Present,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. Jang, Seungkoo 張勝求 (장승구). “Dasan’s Pragmatic View of Ethics.” In The Review of Korean Studies 4 (2000): 19 – 33. Janson, Marius B. China in the Tokugawa World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Lau, D. C. trans. Mencius (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984). Legge, J. trans. The Shoo King (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960). Legge, J. trans. The Great Learning (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960). Legge, J. trans. The She King (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960).

Secondary Sources

273

Legge, J. trans. The Ch’un Ts’ew with the Tso Chuen, vol. 5 of The Chinese Classics (Taipei: Southern Materials Research Center, 1983). Liu, James T. C. “How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?” Philosophy East and West, 23/4 (October 1973): 483 – 505. Loewe, Michael. “The Heritage Left to the Empires.” In Michael Loewe, Edward I. Shaughnessy eds. The Cambridge History of Ancient China, From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Makeham, John. Transmitters and Creator: Chinese Commentators and Commentaries on the Analects (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003). Mair, Victor H. Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006). Maruyama Masao. Mikiso Hane trans., Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Smith, Colin trans. Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). Megill, Allan. “Regional History and the Future of Historical Writing,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Directions in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. Nah, Seoung. “Tasan and Christianity: In Search of a New Order,” The Review of Korean Studies 4 (2000): 35 – 51. Nakai, Kate Wildman. “The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The Problem of sino-centrism.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40/1 (June 1980): 157 – 99. Nosco, Peter. “The Place of China in the Construction of Japan’s Modern World View,” Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 4/1 (June 2007): 27 – 48. ¯ mae Kenichi. The Borderless World (New York: Mckinsey & Company, Inc., 1990). O ¯ mae Kenichi. The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: O Mckinsey & Company, 1995). Ooms, Herman. Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570 – 1680 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Pratt, Mary L. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992, 2000) Ricoeur, Paul. Thompson, John B. ed., Hermeneutics and the Human Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Yamashita, Samuel Hideo. “The Early Life and Thought of Ito¯ Jinsai.” In Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 43/2 (1983): 453 – 80. Sato Masayuki. “East Asian Historiography and Historical Thought.” In the International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 2002). Searle, John R. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). Searle, John R. “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.” In Gunderson, K. ed., Language, Mind, and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1975). Setton, Mark. “A Comparative Study of Choˇng Yagyong’s Classical Learning (Susahak) and Japanese Ancient Learning (Kogaku),” Journal of Tasan Studies 3 (June, 2002): 230 – 45.

274

Bibliography

Shun, Kwong-loi 信廣來. “Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought.” In Shun, Kwong-loi and Wong, David B. eds. Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Sorabji, Richard. “The Self: Is There Such a Thing?” In Sorabji, Richard. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life and Death (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1990). Stavrianos, L. S. The World to 1500: A Global History (Englewoon Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975). Tadao Umesao. Lewis, Catherine C. and Yasuyuki Kurita eds. Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness Senri Ethnological Studies 28. (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990). Tetsuo Najita. Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudo¯ Merchant Academy of Osaka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Tortarolo, Edoardo. “Universal/World History: Its Past, Present and Future,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Directions in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. Treagold, Donald W. The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Tucker, John A. ed. and trans. Ogyu¯ Sorai’s philosophical Masterworks: The Bendo¯ and Benmei (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawaii Press, 2006). Tucker, John A. Ito¯ Jinsai’s Gomo¯ Jigi and Philosophical Definition of Early Modern Japan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998). Watanabe Hiroshi. “Jusha, Literati and Yangban: Confucians in Japan, China and Korea.” In Tadao Umesao, Catherine C. Lewis and Yasuyuki Kurita eds. Japanese Civilization in the Modern World V: Culturedness, Senri Ethnological Studies 28 (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1990). Wheatley, Paul. The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins and Character of the Ancient City (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1971). White, Hayden. “Topics for Discussion on Global History,” paper presented at the International Conference on “New Orientations in Historiography: Regional History and Global History,” held at East China Normal University, Shanghai, November 3 – 5, 2007. Yang, Lien-sheng. “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order.” In: Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968) Yu, Ying-shih. “Clio’s New Turn and the Rediscovery of Tradition in Asia.” In Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6/1 (March 2007): 39 – 51. Yun Sasoon 尹絲淳 (윤사순). Critical Issues in Neo-Confucian Thought: The Philosophy of Yi T’oegye (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1990).

Secondary Sources

275

Works in Chinese, Japanese or Korean Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄. Nihon Shushigaku to Cho¯sen 日本朱子学と朝鮮 [Japanese Zhu Xi School of Neo-Confucianism and Korea] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1965, 1975). Beck, Ulrich. Sun Chi-pen 孫治本trans. Quanchiuhua weiji 全球化危機 [The Crisis of Globalization] (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1999). Cai Tinglan 蔡廷蘭. Hainan Zazhu 海南雜著 [Miscellany of the South Seas] (Taipei: Economic Research Institute, Bank of Taiwan, 1960). Chan, Wing-tsit 陳榮捷 ed. Jinsilu xiangzhu jiping 近思錄詳注集評 [Detailed Annotations and Collected Commentaries on Reflections on Things at Hand] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1998). Chan, Wing-tsit 陳榮捷ed. Wang Yangming Chuanxilu xiangzhu jiping 王陽明傳習錄詳 註集評 [Detailed Annotations and Collected Comments on the Instructions for Practical Living] (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng shuju, 1983). Chan, Wing-tsit陳榮捷. “Lun Zhuzi zhi Renshuo 論朱子之仁説 [On Zhu Xi’s Treatise on Humanity]. ” In Zhu xue lunji 朱學論集 [Essays on Zhu Xi’s Learning] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1982). Chan, Wing-tsit 陳榮捷. Zhuzi menren 朱子門人 [Disciples of Zhu Xi] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1982). Chen Fang-Ming 陳芳明 et al. eds. Zhang Shenqie quanji 張深切全集 [Complete Works of Zhang Shenqie] (Taipei: Wenjingshe 文經社, 1998). Chen Hui-hung 陳慧宏. “Wenhua xiangyu de fangfalun – pingxi Zhong-Ou wenhua jiaoliu yanjiu de xin shiye 文化相遇的方法論──評析中歐文化交流研究的新視野 [Methodology of Cultural Interactions: New Perspective of Sino-European Cultural Interaction].” In Historical Inquiry 40 (Dec. 2007): 239 – 78. Chen I-yuan 陳益源. Tsai Ting-lan jiqi Hainan Zachu 蔡廷蘭及其海南雜著 [Cai Tinglan and His Miscellany of the South Seas] (Taipei: Li-ren Press, 2006). Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉. Bunmeiron no Gairiaku 文明論の概略 [Introduction to the Theory of Civilizations] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997). Gao Mingshi高明士. Sui-Tang gongju zhidu 隋唐貢舉制度 [The Civil-service Examination System in Sui-Tang China] (Taipei: Wenjing chubanshe, 1999). Gao Mingshi 高明士. Zhanhou Riben de Zhongguoshi yanjiu 戰後日本的中國史研究 [Postwar Japanese Studies in Chinese History] (Taipei: Mingwen Book Company, 1996). Hayashi Taisuke林泰輔. Rongo Nenpu 論語年譜 [Chronology of the Analects] (Tokyo: Ryu¯mon-sha, 1916). Higuchi Ko¯kei 樋口公啟. Yamada Ho¯koku no shiso¯ to hansei kaikaku 山田方谷の思想と 藩政改革 [Yamada Ho¯koku’s Thoght and the Reform of Shogunate] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2011). Hsing Yi-tien 邢義田. “Tianxia yijia – chuantong Zhongguo tianxiaguan de xingcheng天下 一家─傳統中國天下觀的形成 [One Family in All-Under-Heaven: the Formation of world view in traditional China].” In Qin-Han shi lunkao 秦漢史論稿 (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1987). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. Ruxue chuantong yu wenhua chuangxin 儒學傳統與文化創 新 [Confucian Tradition and Cultural Innovation] (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1986).

276

Bibliography

Huang, Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. Dong Ya wen hua jiao liu zhong de ru jia jing dian yu li nian: hu dong, zhuan hua yu rong he 東亞文化交流中的儒家經典與理念：互動、轉化與 融合 [Confucian Classics and Their Ideas in the Cultural Interaction in East Asia: Interaction, Transformation and Fusion] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2010). Korean edition: Dong-asia-hak yeon-gu bangbeopron – dong-asia-eseo munhwagyoryu-wa yuga-gyeongjeon-ui i-nyeom 동아시아학 연구방법론—동아시아에서 문화교류와 유가경전의 이념 (Seoul: Simsan, 2012). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. Dong ya ru xue: jing dian yu quan shi de bian zheng 東亞儒 學：經典與詮釋的辯證 [East Asian Confucianisms: Dialectics between Classics and Interpretations] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2007). Japanese edition: Higashi ajia no jugaku: kyo¯ten to sono kaishaku 東アジアの儒学: 経 典とその解釈 (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 2010). Korean edition: Dong-asia yugyo gyeongjeon haeseokhak 동아시아 유교경전 해석학 (Seoul: Munsacheol, 2009). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. Dongya ruxueshi de xinshiye 東亞儒學史的新視野 [New Perspectives on East Asian Confucianisms] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2004). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. Dechuan riben “Lunyu” quanshishi lun 德川日本《論語》詮 釋史論 [A History of Interpretations of the Analects in Tokugawa Japan] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2006). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. “Lun dongya yimin ruzhe de liangge liangnanshi 論東亞遺民 儒者的兩個兩難式 [On the Two Predicaments in Confucianism as Formulated by the Leftover Subjects in East Asia].” In Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 3/1 (June, 2006): 61 – 80. Huang Chun-chieh黃俊傑 and Lin Weijie 林維杰 eds. Dongya Zhuzi xue de tongdiao yu yique 東亞朱子學的同調與異趣 [The Similarity and Dissimilarity of Zhu Xi Learning in Last Asia] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2006). Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. “Qian Binsi shixue zhong de guoshi guan: neihan, fangfa yu yiyi 錢賓四史學中的「國史」觀：內涵、方法與意義 [The ‘National History’ in Qian Mu’s Historical Thinking: Contents, Methods and Meanings].” In Bulletin of the Department of History of National Taiwan University 26 (December, 2002): 1 – 37. Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑. “Zhongri wenhuajiaoliushi zhong ‘ziwo’ yu ‘tazhe’ de hudong: leixing yu hanyi 中日文化交流史中「自我」與「他者」的互動：類型與涵義 [The Interaction between the ‘Self ’ and ‘Others’ in the Sino-Japanese Context between the 17th and 20th Centuries: Tensions and Implications].” In Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, 4/2 (8th issue; Dec. 2007): 85 – 105. Huang Yuancheng 黃源盛. “Tanglu buyingdezui de dangdai sikao 唐律不應得罪的當代 思考 [Contemporary Reflections on the Not-should-do Crime in the Tang Legal Codes].” In Gao Mingshi 高明士 ed., Dongya chuantong jiaoyu yu fazhi yanjiu (II) – Tanglu zhuwenti 東亞傳統教育與法制研究（二）──唐律諸問題 [Studies of Education and Legal System in Traditional East Asia (2): Aspects of Tang Legal Codes] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005). Huang Zunxian黃遵憲. Riben guozhi 日本國志 [Notes on Japan] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin, 2005). Houxuan Hu 胡厚宣. “Lun wufang guannian yu zhongguo chengwei zhi qiyuan” 論五方觀 念與中國稱謂之起源 [On the Concepts of Five Directions and the Origin of the Term “Zhongguo”]. In Jiaguxue shangshi luncong 甲骨學商史論叢 [Essays on the History of

Secondary Sources

277

Shang Based on Oracle-bone Inscriptions], vol. 2 (Chengdu: Qilu daxue guoxue yanjiusuo, 1944). Inoue Masamichi 井上順理. Honpo¯ chu¯sei made ni okeru Mo¯shi juyo¯shi no kenkyu¯本邦中 世までにおける孟子受容史の研究 [A Study of the History of Acceptance of the Book of Mencius in Japan up to the Medieval Period] (Tokyo: Kazama shobo¯, 1972). Ishida Ichiro¯ 石田一良. Ito¯ Jinsai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Ko¯bunkan, 1960, 1973). Ito¯ Taro¯ 伊藤太郎. Yamatodamashı¯ ni yoru rongo kaishaku: gakuji (no. 1) 日本魂による 論語解釋學而第一 [The Analects 1:1 Viewed from the Japanese Soul] (Tsushi: Rongo Kenkyu¯kai, 1935). Iwanami Ko¯za Sekai Rekishi岩波講座世界歴史 [Iwanami Series of World History] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970), Antiquity 1. Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真. Huangquan, Liyi yu jingdian quanshi: zhongguo gudai zhengzhi shi yanjiu 皇權、禮儀與經典詮釋：中國古代政治史研究 [Imperial Power, Rituals and Interpretations of Classics: A Study on Ancient Chinese Political History] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004). Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真. “Chongxin sikao dongya wangquan yu shijieguan – yi ‘tianxia’ yu ‘zhongguo’ wei guanjian ci 重新思考東亞王權與世界觀──以「天下」與「中國」 為關鍵詞 [Rethinking East Asian Imperial Power and Worldview].” In Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真. ed., Dongya lishi shang de tianxia yu zhongguo gainian 東亞歷史上的天下與 中國概念 [The Concepts of “All under Heaven” and “China” in East Asian History] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007). Kan Huai-chen 甘懷真. Tianxia guojia: dongya wangquanlun 天下國家：東亞王權論 [On East Asian Imperial Power] (Taipei: San Min Book Co., 2008). Kaname Asamori 朝森要. “ Yo¯meigakusha Yamada Ho¯koku o megutte 陽明学者山田方 谷をめぐって [A Review of the Yangming Scholar Yamade Ho¯koku]. ” In Nihon Rekishi 日本歷史 359 (Sep. 1977): 87 – 90. Kang Chu Chin 姜周鎮 (강주진). “Haehaengchongjae: Haeje 海行摠載：解題 해행총재：해제 [Collections of Travelogues: Introduction].” In Haehaengchongjae 海 行摠載 해행총재 [Collections of Travelogues] (Seoul: Minjokmunhua Chujinhoe, 1974), 《Gojeon Guk-yeok Chongseo 古典國譯叢書 고전국역총서》78, vol. 1. Kato¯ Jo¯ken加藤常賢. “Gongsi kao 公私考 [A Study of the Public and the Private].” In Lishixue yanjiu 歷史學研究96 (February 1942): 1 – 13. Ke Caoguang 葛兆光. “Sixiangshi yanjiu shiye zhongde tuxiang 思想史研究視野中的圖 像 [Images in the Perspective of Intellectual History].” In Zhongguo shehuikexue 中國 社會科學 4 (2002): 74 – 83. ¯ Anseki ni okeru Mo¯shi sonsu¯ no tokushoku Genpo¯ no Kondo¯ Masanori 近藤正則. “ O Mo¯shi haikyo¯ to Mo¯shi Se¯jinron o chu¯shin to shite 王安石における孟子尊崇の特 色──元豊の孟子配享と孟子聖人論を中心として [The Characteristics of Wang Anshi’s Exaltation of Mencius: An Inquiry Focusing Upon Putting Mencius in Confucius Temple and Mencius Theory of Sage].” In Nihon Chu¯goku gakkaiho¯日本中国学 会報 [Bulletin of Japanese Society for Chinese Studies], 36 (1984): 34 – 147. Koyasa Nobukuni子安宣邦. Ho¯ho¯ to shite no Edo: Nihon shiso¯shi to hihanteki shiza 方法 としての江戶：日本思想史と批判的視座 [Edo as Method: Japanese Intellectual History and Critical Perspective] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 2000). Koyasu Nobukini子安宣邦. Jiken to shite no Soraigaku 事件としての徂徠学 [The Learning of Sorai as an Event] (Tokyo: Seudosha, 1990).

278

Bibliography

Koyasu Nobukini子安宣邦. Ito¯ Jinsai: Jinrin teki sekai no shiso¯ 伊藤仁齋：人倫的世界の 思想 [Ito¯ Jinsai: The Thought of the Interpersonal World] (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯ Daigaku Shuppankei, 1982). Koyasu Nobukini子安宣邦. translated by Chen Weifen陳瑋芬. Donya Zuxue: Pipan yu fangfa 東亞儒學：批判與方法 [East Asian Confucianisms: Critique and Method] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004). Koyasu Nobukuni子安宣邦. Ajia wa do¯ katararete kita ka – Kindai Nihon no orientarizumu 「アジア」ほどう語られてきたか – 近代日本のオリエンタリズム [How can Asia be Spoken: Orientalism in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 2003). Koyasu Nobakuni 子安宣邦. Kanjiron: Fukahi no tasha 漢字論：不可避の他者 [On Chinese Characters: The Unavoidable Other] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003). Kurita Naomi栗田直躬. “Ko¯ to shi 「公」と「私」[The Public and the Private].” In Chu¯goku shiso¯ ni okeru shizen to ningen中国思想における自然と人間 [The Nature and Human in Chinese Thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996). Kurada Washio 倉田和四生. Yamada Ho¯koku no Yo¯meigaku to kyo¯iku kannen no tenkai 山田方谷の陽明学と教育観念の展開 [The Yangming Learning of Yamada Ho¯koku and the Enfolding of His Educational Philosophy] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2009). Lao Siguan勞思光. Xinbian Zhongguo zhexuesi 新編中國哲學史 [New Edition of History of Chinese Philosophy] (Taipei: San Min Book Company, 1983). Liao Ming-chun廖名春. “‘Ren’ zi tanyuan「仁」字探源 [An Inquiry into the Origin of ‘Ren’].” In Zhongguo xueshu 中國學術 [Chinese Scholarship] 8 (April 2001): 123 – 39. Li Chunsheng李春生. Dongyou liushisiji suibi 東遊六十四日隨筆 [Random Notes of a Sixty-four-day Journey East] (Fuzhou: Meihua shuchu, 1896). Li Ming-hui 李明輝. Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao 四 端與七情──關於道德情感的比較哲學探討 [Four Beginnings and Seven Feelings: A Comparative Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Feelings] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005). Li Ming-hui李明輝. Rujia yu Kangde 儒家與康德 [Confucianism and Kant] (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, 1990). Liu Ji-yao 劉紀曜. “Gong yu si – zhong de lunli neihan 公與私─忠的倫理內涵 [The Public and Private—the Ethics of Loyalty].” In Huang Chun-chieh ed. Tiandao yu rendao 天道 與人道 [The Way of Heaven and the Way of Man] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1982). Liu Sanwu 劉三吾. “Mengzi jiewen tici 孟子節文題辭 [Foreword to Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius].” In Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑, ed., Mengxue sixiangshi lun 孟學思 想史論 [Treatise on the History of Thoughts on the Mencius] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Chinese Lit. & Phil. Inst., 1997). Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先. Zhu Xi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發 展與完成 [The Development and Completion of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought], (Taipei: Student Book Company, 1982). Maruyama Masao丸山真男. Nihon se¯ji shiso¯shi日本政治思史 [A History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1952). Maruyama Masao丸山真男. Nihon se¯ji shiso¯shi no kenkyu¯ 日本政治思想史の研究 [A Study of History of Japanese Political Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Press, 1976). Maruyama Masao丸山真男. Gendai seiji no shiso¯ to ko¯do 現代政治の思想と行動 [Thoughts and Action of Modern Politics] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970).

Secondary Sources

279

Matsukawa Kenji 松川建二. So¯-Min no Rongo 宋明の論語 [The Analects in the Song-ming Period] (Tokyo: Kyu¯ko Shoin, 2000). Matsukawa Kenji 松川建二 ed. Rongo no shiso¯shi 論語の思想史 [Intellectual History of the Analects] (Tokyo: Kyu¯ko Shoin, 1994). Matsukawa Kenji 松川健二. Yamada Ho¯koku kara Mishima Chu¯shu¯ e 山田方谷から三島 中洲へ [From Yamada Ho¯koku to Mishima Chu¯shu¯] (Tokyo: Me¯toku shuppansha, 2008). Matsuura Akira 松浦章. Edo jidai To¯sen nu yoru Nit-Chu¯ bunka ko¯ryu¯ 江戶時代唐船によ る日中文化交流 [Sino-Japanese Cultural Interaction via Chinese Ships during The Edo Period]. Masubuchi Tatsuo 增淵龍夫. Rekishika no Do¯jidaishi teki Ko¯satsu ni tsuite 歷史家の同時 代史的考察について [A Historian’s Observation of Contemporary History] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1983). Minamoto Ryo¯en 源了圓. Kinse¯ shoki jitsugaku shiso¯ no kenkyu¯ 近世初期実学思想の研 究 [A Study of Practical Learning in Early Modern Japan] (Tokyo: So¯bunsha, 1980; 1986; 1991). Miyagawa To¯ru 宮川透. Kindai Nihon shiso¯ no ko¯zo¯ 近代日本思想の構造 [The Structure of Modern Japanese Thought] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988). Miyagi Kimiko 宮城公子. Yamada Ho¯koku no Sekai 山田方谷の世界 [The World of Yamada Ho¯koku]. In Kishi Toshio kyo¯ju taikan kinenkai 岸俊男教授退官記念会Nihon se¯ji shaikaishi kenkyu¯日本政治社会史研究[A Study of Japanese Politico-social History] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo¯, 1985). Miyagi Kimiko 宮城公子. “Bakumatsu jugakushi no shiten幕末儒学史の視点[Perspective of Confucianism in Late Tokugawa Period].” In Nihonshi Kenkyu¯日本史研究 232 (Dec. 1981): 1 – 29. Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定. Rongo no shinkenkyu¯ 論語の新研究 [New Study on the Analects] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1975). Mizoguchi Yu¯zo¯ 溝口雄三. Chu¯goku no ko¯ to shi 中国の公と私 [The “Public” and the “Private” in China] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1995). Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Xinti yu hsingti 心體與性體 [The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Nature] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1969, 1971). Mou Zongsan牟宗三. Zhongguo wenhua de xingcha 中國文化的省察 [Reflection upon the Chinese Culture] (Taipei: Lien-ching Publishing Company, 1983). Nayashida Akio 林田明大. Yamada Ho¯koku no shiso¯ o megutte: Yo¯meigaku saha nyu¯mon 山田方谷の思想を巡って：陽明学左派入門 [An Overview of the Thought of Yamade Ho¯koku: A Premiere of the Left Wing of Yangming School] (Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppansha, 2010). Nishida Taichiro¯ 西田太一郎. “Ko¯shi kan’nen no tenkai to shijin no igi 公私観念の展開 と私人の意義 [The Development of the Concepts of Public and Private and the Meaning of the Private].” In Shinagaku 9/1 支那學 (July 1937): 87 – 106. Nishikawa Yasuji 西川靖二. “Ko¯ no shiso¯ : Ryoshi shunju¯ ni okeru to¯itsu genri ni tsuite 「公」の思想──《呂氏春秋》における統一原理について [The Thoughts of the Public—A Study Focusing Upon the Principle of Unification in the Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals].” In Chu¯goku gakushi中國學志 (1988): 1 – 14.

280

Bibliography

¯ ba O ¯ samu 大庭脩. Qi Yinping 戚印平 trans. Jianghu shidai Zhongguo dianji liubo Riben O zhi yanjiu 江戶時代中國典籍流播日本之研究 [A Study of the Dissemination of Chinese Texts in Tokugawa Japan] (Hangzhou: Hangzhou University Press,1998). ¯ tsuki Nobuyoshi 大槻信良. “Shisho shu¯chu¯ sho¯gu¯ ni arawaretaru Shushi no taido 四書集 O 註章句現朱子態度 [Zhu Xi’s Attitudes toward the Collected Commentaries on the Chapters and Verses of the Four Books]. ” In Nihon Chu¯goku gakkaiho¯日本中国学会報 5 (1953): 80 – 94. Qian Mu錢穆. Zhuzi xin xuean 朱子新學案 [New Records of Master Zhu]. In Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集[Complete Work of Mr. Qian Mu] (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998). Qian Mu錢穆. Kongzi yu Lunyu 孔子與論語 [Confucius and the Analects]. In Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集 [Complete Work of Mr. Qian Mu] (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998). Qian Mu錢穆. Guoxue Gailun 國學概論 [An Introduction of National Learning]. In Qian Binsi Xiangsheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集[Complete Work of Mr. Qian Mu] (Taipei: Lianqing chuban gongsi, 1998). Qu Wanli屈萬里. Shangshu jinzhu jinyi 尚書今註今譯 [New Annotation and Translation of the Book of Documents] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1969). Qu Wanli屈萬里. Shuyong lunxue ji 書傭論學集 [Essays of A Book Servant]. In Qu Wanli quanji 屈萬里全集 [Complete Works of Qu Wanli] 14 (Taipei: Lianjing, 1984). Qu Wanli 屈萬里 ed. Mingdai dengkelu huibian 明代登科錄彙編 [Collected Rosters of the Qualified Civil-Service Examinees of the Ming Dynasty] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1969). Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖. “Ming Taizu de Mengzi jiewen 明太祖的孟子節文 [Abridged Texts of the Book of Mencius by Zhu Yuanzhang].” In Dushu yu Chuban 讀書與出版 [Reading and Publishing] 2/4 (1947): 16 – 21. Sagara To¯ru相良亨. “Jinrin nichiyo¯ ni okeru cho¯etsu – Ito¯ Jinsai no ba’ai 人倫日用におけ る超越 ─ 伊藤仁齋の場合 [Transcendence in Interpersonal Daily Business – The Case of Ito¯ Jinsai].” In Sagara To¯ru chosakushu¯ 相良亨著作集 [Complete Works of Sagara To¯ru] (Tokyo: Perikan-sha, 1996). Sakai Saburo¯ 酒井三郎. Nihon Seiyo¯ Shigaku Hattatsushi 日本西洋史学発達史 [History of the Development of the Study of Western History in Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa ko¯bunkan, 1969). Sawada Takio 澤田多喜男. “Senshin ni okeru ko¯shi no kan’nen 先秦における公私の観 念 [The Concepts of the Public and thr Private in Pre-Qin Period].” To¯kai daigaku kiyo¯ bungakubu 東海大學紀要（文學部） 25 (1976): 1 – 8. Shibusawa E¯ichi澁澤榮一. Rongo to soroban 論語と算盤 [The Analects and Abacus] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko¯kai, 2001). Shu Jing-nan束景南. Zhu Xi nianpu changpien 朱熹年譜長編 [Preliminary Draft of Zhu Xi’s Chronology] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue, 2001). Shizukuishi Ko¯kichi 雫石礦吉. “Chichi wa ko no tame ni kakushi, ko wa chichi no tame ni kakusu 父は子の為に隱し子は父の為に隱す [Fathers harbored sons, and sons harbored fathers].” In Uno Tetsuto sensei hakuju shukuga kinen To¯yo¯gaku ronso¯ 宇野哲人 先生白壽祝賀紀念東洋學論叢 [Essays on Chinese Studies in Honor of Mr. Uno Tetsudo on the Occasion of His 88th Birthday] (Tokyo: Uno Tetsuto sensei hakuju chukuga kinenkai, 1975), pp. 511 – 27.

Secondary Sources

281

Sun Weiguo 孫衛國. Da Ming qihao yu xiaozhonghua yishi – chaoxian wangchao zun zhou siming wenti yanjiu 大明旗號與小中華意識──朝鮮王朝尊周思明問題研究, 1637 – 1800 [Flag and Title of the Ming Dynasty and “Small China” Consciousness, 1637 – 1800] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2007). Taiwan Youji 台灣遊記 [Travels in Taiwan]. Taiwan Literature Series 89 (Taipei: Economic Research Office of Bank of Taiwan, 1960). Takeuchi Yoshio武內義雄. Takeuchi Yoshio Zenshu 武內義雄全集 [Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshio] (Tokyo: Kadogawa Shoten, 1978). To¯yama Shigeki 遠山茂樹. Sengo no Rekishigaku to Rekishiishiki 戦後の歴史学と歴史意 識 [Historical Studies and Historical Consciousness in Postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). Tsai Zhen-feng蔡振豐. Chaoxian ru zhe Ding Ruoyong de Si shu xue: yi Dong Ya wei shi ye de tao lun 朝鮮儒者丁若鏞的四書學：以東亞為視野的討論 [Korean Confucian Jeong Yak-yong’s Learning of the Four Books: An East Asian Perspective] (Taipei: Taiwan University Press, 2011). Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹內好. “Ho¯ho¯ toshite no Ajia 方法としてのアジア [Asia as Method].” In Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu¯ 竹內好全集 [Complete Works of Takeuchi Yoshimi] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo¯, 1981). Tsuteya Takao 土屋喬雄. Nihon shihonshugishi jo¯ no shido¯shatachi 日本資本主義史上の 指導者たち [Directors in the History of Japanese Capitalism] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1939). Tsuda So¯kichi 津田左右吉. Tsuda So¯kichi zenshu¯ 津田左右吉全集 [Complete Works of Tsuda So¯kichi] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1965). To¯ Te¯kan 藤貞幹. Sho¯ko¯hatsu 衝口發 [Spontaneous Thoughts]. In Washio Junkyo¯鷲尾順 敬 ed. Nihon shiso¯ to¯so¯ shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan] (Tokyo: Me¯cho Kanko¯kai 名著刊行会, 1964 – 1970), vol. 4. Uno Se¯ichi 宇野精一. “Gokyo¯ kara Shisho e – Kyo¯gakushi Oboegaki 五経から四書ヘ – 経 学史覚書 [From Five Classics to Four Books: Reflections on the History of Learning of Classics].” In To¯yo¯ no Bunka to Shakai 東洋の文化と社会 [Culture and Society in the East] 1 (1952): pp. 1 – 14. Uno Tetsuto 宇野哲人. Shina bunmeiki 支那文明記 [Notes on Chinese Civilization] (Tokyo: Taitokan, 1912). In Kojima Shinji 小島晋治ed. Bakumatsu Meiji Chu¯goku Kenbunroku Shu¯sei 幕末明治中國見聞錄集成 [Collections of Travelogues in China in Late Tokugawa and Meigi Periods] (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo¯, 1997). Wang Ermin 王爾敏. “‘Zhongguo’ mingcheng suoyuan jiqi jindai quanshi 「中國」名稱 溯源及其近代詮釋 [The Origin of ‘China’ and its Interpretation in Modern Times].” In Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun 中國近代思想史論 [Essays on Modern Chinese Intellectual History] (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1977). Wang Yong 王勇. Zhong-Ri “shuji zhi lu” yanjiu 中日「書籍之路」研究 [The “Book Road” between China and Japan] (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2003). Watanabe Hiroshi渡辺浩. Kinse¯ Nihon shakai to so¯gaku 近世日本社会と宋学 [Early Modern Japanese Society and Song Learning] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1985). Watsuji Tetsuro¯ 和辻哲郎. Fu¯do: Ningengakuteki ko¯satsu 風土—人間学的考察 [Local Cultures and Customs: Anthropological Observations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1935, 1960, 1979).

282

Bibliography

Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權. Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi 中國政治思想史 [A History of Chinese Political Thought] (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban siye gongsi 聯經出版事業公司, 1982). Xu Fuguan 徐復觀. Zhongguo sixiangshi lunji 中國思想史論集 [Essays on Chinese Intellectual History] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1974). Xu Fuguan 徐復觀. Rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu minzhu ziyou renquan 儒家政治思想與民 主自由人權 [Confucian Political Thoughts and Democracy, Liberty, Human Right] (Taipei: Bashi niandai chubanshe, 1979). Xu Zhongshu徐中舒. “Leisi kao耒耜考 [A Study of Plow].” In Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊2 (1930): 1. Yabuki Kunihiko矢吹邦彥. Hono¯ no Yo¯meigaku: Yamada Ho¯koku den 炎の陽明学：山 田方谷傳 [Yangming Learning in Zeal: A Biography of Yamade Ho¯koku] (Tokyo: Me¯toku Shuppansha, 1996). Yamada Ho¯koku Ni Manabu Kai 山田方谷に学ぶ会 [Association for the Study of Yamade Ho¯koku]. Nyu¯mon Yamada Ho¯koku: shisei no hito 入門山田方谷：至誠の人 [A Premier for the Study of Yamade Ho¯koku: A Man of Supreme Sincerity] (Tokyo: Meitoku Shuppansha, 2007). Yang Bojun 楊伯峻. Chunqiu Zuozhuan Zhu春秋左傳注 [Commentaries on the Zuo Commentaries of the Spring and Autumn Annals] (Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 1982). Yang Lian-sheng 楊聯陞. “Zhongguo wenhua de meijie renwu 中國文化的媒介人物 [Professional Intermediary Agents of Chinese Culture].” In Dalu zazhi shixue congshu 大陸雜誌史學叢書 [Mainland Magazine Series of Historical Studies], first series, vol. 1, Shixue tonglun 史學通論 [General Account of Historical Studies] (Taipei: Dalu zazhi, n. d.). Yang Rur-bin 楊儒賓. “Renlun yu tianli: Ito¯ Jinsai yu Zhuzi de qiudao licheng 人倫與天理 —伊藤仁齋與朱子的求道歷程 [Human Interpersonal Ethics and the Heavenly Principle: Ito¯ Jinsai’s and Zhu Xi’s pilgrimages for the way].” In Huang Chun-chieh ed., Rujia Sixiang zai xiandai Dongya: Riben pian 儒家思想在現代東亞：日本篇 [Confucianism in Modern East Asia: Japan] (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1999). Yang Rur-bin 楊儒賓. Yiyi de Yiyi: Jinshi Dongya de fan-lixue sichao 異議的意義：近世 東亞的反理學思潮 [The Significance of Dissent: Intellectual Trends Against NeoConfucianism in Modern East Asia] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2012). Yang Rur-bin 楊儒賓. “Gewu yu huoran guantong: Zhuzi ‘gewu bujuan’ de quanshi wenti 格物與豁然貫通：朱子“格物補傳”的詮釋問題 [Investigation of Things and Comprehensive Realization: Problems of Interpretation of Zhu Xi’s “Appended Remarks on Investigation of Things”] .” In Zhong Caijun 鍾彩鈞 ed., Zhujixue de Kaizan: Xueshe pien 朱子學的開展──學術篇 (Taipei: Center for Chinese Studies, 2002). Yian Shaodang 嚴紹璗 ed. Riben cang Songren wenji shanben gouchen 日本藏宋人文集善 本鉤沉 [Selections of the Rare Editions of the Literary Works of Song Literati Preserved in Japan] (Hangzhou: Hangzhou University Press, 1996). Yoshida Ko¯hei 吉田公平. “Okamoto Takashi no jijyonenpu ni tuite 岡本巍の『自敘年 譜』にっぃて [Concerning Okamoto Kai’s “Autobiography”].” In To¯yo¯ daigaku Chu¯goku tetsugaku bungakuka kiyo¯ 東洋大学中国哲学文学科紀要, 15 (2007): 1 – 25. Yoshida Ko¯hei 吉田公平. “ Yamada Ho¯koku no ‘ki wa li o sho¯zuru’ no setsu ni tsuite 山田 方谷の「気は理を生ずる」の說について [Concerning Yamada Ho¯koku’s Theory of ‘Qi generates Li’].” Shu¯kan To¯yo¯gaku 集刊東洋學 100 (2008): 289 – 305.

Secondary Sources

283

Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸次郎, Yu¯ka kiroku 遊華記錄 [Travelogue in China] (Tokyo: Chikuba shobo¯, 1979). Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯吉川幸次郎. Cai Jintang, 蔡錦堂trans. Zhongguo Zi Zhihui: Kongzi xueshu sixiang 中國之智慧：孔子學術思想 [The Wisdom of China: The Thought of Confucius] (Taipei: Xiezhi gongye congshu chuban, 1965). Yu Ying-shi 余英時. Zhongguo zhishijiecengshi lun (Gudai pian) 中國知識階層史論 (古 代篇) [A History of the Chinese Intellectual Class (The Ancient Period)] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980, 1997). Yu Ying-shih余英時. Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng 論戴震與章學誠 [On Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng] (Hong Kong: Lung Meng Shuju, 1976). Zhang Binglin 章炳麟. Taiwan tongshi xu 臺灣通史序 [Preface to General History of Taiwan] (1927). In Zhangshi congshu sanbian – Taiyan wenlu xubian 章氏叢書三編太 炎文錄續編 [Books of Zhang Binglin, 3 vol: Essays of Zhang Binglin, 2nd vol.] (Suzhou: Zhangshi guoxue jiangxihui, 1938). Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將. Riben Dechuan shidai guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhi lun: yi Yiteng Renzhai, Disheng Culai wei zhongxin 日本德川時代古學派之王道政治論：以 伊藤仁齋、荻生徂徠為中心 [The Discourses of Kingly Government of Classical School in Tokugawa Japan: An Inquiry Focusing upon Ito¯ Jinsai and Ogyu¯ Sorai] (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2004). Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將. Dechuan Riben “Zhong” “Xiao” gainian de xingcheng yu fazhan 德川日本「忠」「孝」概念的形成與發展 [The Formation and Development of the Notions of “Loyalty” and “Filial Piety” in Tokugawa Japan] (Taipei: Taida chuban zhongxin, 2005). Zhang Xuefeng 張學鋒. Zhong’guo wenming ji 中國文明記 (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Press, 1999). Zhou Guangqing 周光慶. Zhongguo gudai jieshixue daolun 中國古典解釋學導論 [Introduction to the Hermeneutics of Chinese Classics] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002).

Index of Names

Abe Yoshio 阿部吉雄 12, 83 seq. Amaterasu o¯mikami 天照大神 50 Anderson, K. 252 Ankersmit, Frank 238 seq. Aoki Masaru 青木正兒 179, 251 Asami Ke¯isai 淺見炯齋 47 seq., 142, 220 Bai Ting 白珽 69 Baker, Don 85, 90 Ban Gu 班固 (Mengjian 孟堅) 34 Bao Tingbo 鮑廷博 138 Bao Xi 包羲 157 Bao Xian 包咸 26, 28 Barraclough, Geoffrey 237 Barthes, Roland 235 Beck, Ulrich 257 Becker, Carl L. 130 Berger, Stefan 237, 257 Bito¯ Nishu¯ 尾藤二洲 119 seq., 143, 233 Brandauer, Frederich P. 33 Bu She 不奢 64 Cai Tinglan 蔡廷蘭 253 Cang Jie 倉頡 58 Chan, Wing-tsit 陳榮捷 52, 69, 97, 105, 113, 115, 117, 133, 168 – 172, 192, 201, 205, 207, 218, 227 Chang Ju 長沮 166 seq. Chartier, Roger 247 Chen, Fang-Ming 陳芳明 222 Chen, Hui-hong 陳慧宏 245 Chen, I-yuan 陳益源 253 Chen, Junmin 陳俊民 115 Chen, Weifen 陳瑋芬 153

Cheng Hao 程顥（Mingdao 明道） 114, 117, 189 Cheng Shude 程樹德（Yuting 郁庭） 28, 53, 153 Cheng Yi 程頤（Yichuan 伊川） 68, 114, 117, 122, 124, 126, 163 – 165, 169, 189, 192 Chi Zhicheng 池志徵 252 Chin, Ann-ping 134 Chomsky, Noam 88 Chu Ni 鉏麑 64 Chung, Edward Y. J. 133, 204 Clayton, D. 252 Cochrane, Lydia G. 247 Confucius 孔子 7, 12 – 14, 16 – 18, 26 – 29, 31, 34, 36 – 39, 42, 44, 48 – 51, 53, 55, 67 – 69, 71, 81 – 83, 85, 89, 93, 97 – 104, 106 – 113, 116, 119, 121 – 126, 129, 133, 137 – 139, 145 seq., 149 – 155, 158 – 167, 169 seq., 172 seq., 176 – 182, 184 seq., 197 seq., 200, 203, 211 seq., 218, 223, 229 – 233, 248 seq., 252, 255 Crump, Jr., J. I. 218 Dai Zhen 戴震（Tongyuan 東原） 75 – 77, 79, 88, 90, 134, 137, 142, 146, 173, 192, 195 seq., 198, 212, 228 Dazai Shundai 太宰春台 17 De Bary, William Theodore 195 Deuchler, Martina 82, 133 Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 195 Donovan, Mark 257 Drucker, Peter F. 234, 257 Du Yu 杜預 61

286 Duke Ai of Lu 魯哀公 61 Duke Bai of Chu 楚白公 65 Duke Ceng 成公 217 Duke Ling of Jin 晉靈公 64 Duke of Zhou 周公 38 seq., 69 Duke Wen of Lu 魯文公 60 Duke Xi of Lu 魯僖公 60, 64 Duke Xian of Jin 晉獻公 64 Duke Xiang of Lu 魯襄公 60 Duke Xuan of Lu 魯宣公 64 Duke Zhao of Lu 魯昭公 60 seq. Duke Zhuang 莊公 218 Emperor Cheng [of Han] 漢成帝 33 Emperor Daizong [of Tang] 唐代宗 34 Emperor Renzong [of Mongol-Yuan] 元仁 宗 38, 132 Emperor Renzong [of Song] 宋仁宗 38 Emperor Shenzong [of Song] 宋神宗 38 Emperor Wendi [of Sui] 隋文帝 132 Fairbank, John K. 14, 141, 216 Fan Chi 樊遲 116, 153 Fang Dongshu 方東樹 172 seq. Fischer, David H. 243 Fogel, Joshua A. 234, 252 Freeman, Mansfield 134, 212 Fujisawa To¯gai 藤澤東畡 233 Fujuwara Seika 藤原惺窩 83 Fukuzawa Yukichi 福澤諭吉 10 seq. Gang Hang 姜沆 83 Gao Mingshi 高明士 76, 132, 241, 244 Gao Yao 皋陶 57, 69 seq., 72 – 75 Gaozi 告子 71, 105, 192, 195, 204, 212 seq. Gardner, Daniel K. 208 Geertz, Clifford 249 Giddens, Anthony 88, 257 Gong Ying 龔穎 37 Gongsun Chou 公孫丑 189 Gongzi Zhuo 公子卓 64 Gu Yanwu 顧炎武（Tinglin 亭林） 55, 77, 107 seq. Guanyin 觀音 257 Gunderson, K. 48, 153

Index of Names

Guo Pu 郭璞 251 Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 Gwon Bo 權溥 82

27, 62, 212

Han Feizi 韓非子 58, 61, 63 Han Wonjin 韓元震（Namdang 南塘） 82 Han Yu 韓愈（Tuizhi 退之） 116 seq. Hane, Mikiso 50, 213 Hang Shijun 杭世駿（Dazong 大宗） 52 Hara Nensai 原念齋 55, 233 Hayashi Razan 林羅山 17 seq., 50, 83, 87, 118, 178, 182 Hayashi Taisuke 林泰輔 175 Hayashida Akio 林田明大 200 He Yan 何晏 28, 102, 138, 176 Hexter, Jack H. 243 Higuchi Ko¯kei 樋口公啟 214 Hirose Yutaka 広瀬豊 18 Hirsch, Jr., Eric Donald 25 Hsing Yi-tien 邢義田 141 Hu, Houxuan 胡厚宣 216 Hu Yin 胡寅（Mingzhong 明仲) 102 Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 32, 36, 67, 77, 81, 83, 89 seq., 129, 132, 134, 139, 160, 194, 196, 198 seq., 237, 248, 251 seq., 255 Huang Hui 黃暉 195 Huang Kan 皇侃 26, 138 Huang Yuancheng 黃源盛 76 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 32 seq., 55, 77, 106, 213, 251 Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 218 Ienaga Saburo¯ 家永三郎 122, 134, 136 Iggers, Georg G. 237 seq., 249 Inoue Tetsujiro¯ 井上哲次郎 77, 87, 121, 134, 229 Ishida Ichiro¯ 石田一良 159, 193 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 7 seq., 17, 36, 43, 49 seq., 53, 77, 79, 87, 89 seq., 93 seq., 120 – 126, 129, 134, 136, 138 seq., 149 – 165, 169 seq., 172 seq., 175, 178 seq., 185, 187 – 199, 211 seq., 214, 228 – 230, 232 seq. Ito¯ Taro¯ 伊藤太郎 232

Index of Names

Ito¯ To¯gai 伊藤東涯 89, 123, 130 Ivanhoe, Philip J. 7, 57, 62 Jang, Seungkoo 張勝求 장승구 87 Janson, Marius B. 143 Jeong Je-du 鄭齊斗 정제두 144 seq. Jeong Yak-yong 丁若鏞 (Dasan 茶山) 정약용 77, 81, 85 – 90, 135, 137 – 140, 145 seq. Jiao Xun 焦循（Litang 理堂） 107, 109 seq., 139, 173, 194, 206 seq. Jie 桀 38 seq. Jie Ni 桀溺 166 seq. Jinmu Emperor 神武天皇 50 Jo Ik 趙翼 조익 74 Kaibara Ekken 貝原益軒 118 Kan, Huai-chen 甘懷真 36, 253 seq. Kaname Asamori 朝森要 200 Kang Chu Chin 姜周鎮 강주진 255 Kanie Yoshimaru 蟹江義丸 77 Kasuga Senan 春日潜庵 199, 227 Katayama Kenzan 片山兼山 139 Kato¯ Jo¯ken 加藤常賢 58 seq. Ke Caoguang 葛兆光 141 King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 38 King Zhao of Chu 楚昭王 64 Kiyohara Nobukata 清原宣賢 29, 45 Kojima Shinji 小島晋治 234, 252 Kondo¯ Masanori 近藤正則 69 Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦 13, 84, 128, 132, 152 seq., 159, 193, 257 Ko¯zuki Sen’an 上月專庵 47 Kurata Washio 倉田和四生 202 Kurita Naomi 栗田直躬 62 Lao Siguang 勞思光 192 Laozi 老子 62, 126, 167, 169 Lau, D. C. 32, 45, 54, 109, 150, 192 seq. Legge, James 59 – 61, 64, 97, 111, 217 seq. Lewis, Catherine C. 82, 132, 248 Li Chunsheng 李春生 221 Li Fu 李紱（Mutang 穆堂） 207 Li Gou 李覯 35 Li Ji 驪姬 64

287 Li Jingde 黎靖德 73, 97, 119, 135, 139, 168, 192, 205 Li Ke 里克 64 Li Minghui 李明輝 194 Li Tong 李侗（Yanping 延平） 83 seq. Lian Heng 連橫 221 Liang Hui Wang 梁惠王 189 Liao Ming-chun 廖名春 116 Lin, Weijie 林維杰 132 Ling Tingkan 淩廷堪 28 Liu, James T. C. 32, 168 Liu Baonan 劉寶楠 97, 152, 176 Liu Ji 劉機 32 Liu Ji-yao 劉紀曜 60 Liu Sanwu 劉三吾 31 seq. Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先 113 Liu Xiang 劉向 27 seq. Liu Xu 劉煦 34 Luo Qinshun 羅欽順 11 Loewe, Michael 13, 216 Lorenz, Chris 237 Lu Bogong 呂伯恭 103 Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (Xiangsan 象山) 26, 43, 54, 103, 194 Lu Ziyue 呂子約 205 Mair, Victor H. 244 Makeham, John 176 Mao Qiling 毛奇齡 206 Maruyama Masao 丸山真男 50, 72, 122, 213, 232 Masubuchi Tatsuo 增淵龍夫 10 Matsukawa Kenji 松川建二 176, 202 Matsumoto Sannosuke 松本三之介 233 Matsuura Akira 松浦章 253 Megill, Allan 239 Mencius 孟子 12, 14, 17, 18, 25 – 40, 44 – 56, 67 – 79, 89, 94, 97, 104 seq., 109, 116 seq., 121 seq., 125 – 127, 133 seq., 138, 145, 149, 153 – 156, 178, 181 – 183, 187 seq., 199 – 214, 228 seq., 255 seq. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 25 Minamoto Ryo¯en 源了圓 187, 230 Ming Emperor Xiaozong 明孝宗 32 Minzi 閔子 108

288

Index of Names

Mishima Chu¯shu¯ 三島中洲（Tsuyoshi 毅） 202, 226 Miyagawa To¯ru 宮川透 51 Miyagi Kimiko 宮城公子 209, 211, 214 Miyake Sho¯sai 三宅尚齋 87, 118 Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定 27, 233 Mizoguchi Yu¯zo¯ 溝口雄三 17, 77 Mo Di 墨翟 182 Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 84, 256, 257 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 208, 245 Murakawa Kengo 村川堅固 242 Naito¯ Konan 內藤湖南 10, 251 Nakae Cho¯min 中江兆民 210 Nakae To¯ju 中江藤樹 18 Nakai, Kate Wildman 16 Nakai Riken 中井履軒 53 Nishida Taichiro¯ 西田太一郎 60 Nishijima Sadao 西嶋定生 243 seq. Nishikawa Yasuji 西川靖二 61 Nosco, Peter 144 Nu Shuqi 女叔齊 61 ¯ ba O ¯ samu大庭脩 12 O Ogyu¯ Sorai 荻生徂徠 17, 36 seq., 43, 49 – 51, 71 seq., 89, 126 – 129, 134, 136 seq., 139, 144, 146 seq., 179, 183, 229 ¯ hmae, Kenichi 大前研一 88 O Okamoto Takashi 岡本巍 200 seq. Ooms, Herman 132 ¯ shio He¯hachiro¯ 大塩平八郎 18 O ¯ tsuki Nobuyoshi 大槻信良 168 O Passmore, Kevin 257 Pei Xu 裴諝 34 Pi Xirui 皮錫瑞 (Lumeng 鹿門) Pratt, Mary L. 240

156

Qi Yinping 戚印平 12 Qian Mu 錢穆 （Binsi 賓四） 97, 116, 163 seq., 237 Qu Wanli 屈萬里 30, 59, 113, 163 Quan Zuwang 全祖望 31, 206

Ricoeur, Paul 225 seq. Riess, Ludwig 242 Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖 32 Ruan Yuan 阮元（Buoyuan 柏元） 107 – 109, 113, 138 seq., 172, 217 seq. Sagara To¯ru 相良亨 120, 191, 193, 230 Sakaguchi Takashi 坂口昻 242 Sakai Saburo¯ 酒井三郎 242 Sakuma Sho¯zan 佐久間象山 10 Sakuma Taika 佐久間太華 47, 142, 220 Sato¯ Issai 佐藤一齋 142, 220, 228 Sato Masayuki 佐藤正幸 238 Sawada Takio 澤田多喜男 61 Searle, John R. 48, 153, 166 Seki Giichiro¯ 關儀一郎 17, 36, 53, 123, 126, 134, 143, 163, 233 Setton, Mark 90 Shaughnessy, Edward I. 13, 216 She Gong 葉公 67 Shi Jingchen 施景琛 252 Shi Siming 史思明 34 Shi Zichong 石子重 54, 116 Shibusawa E¯ichi 澁澤榮一 94, 175 – 178, 180 seq., 184, 231 Shimada Kenji 島田虔次 230 Shin Gyo-seon 申教善 38 seq. Shizukuishi Ko¯kichi 雫石礦吉 67 Shu Jing-nan 束景南 113 Shun 舜 67, 69, 70, 72 – 75, 78, 89, 109, 145, 155, 162, 184, 217 Shun, Kwong-loi 信廣來 250 Sima Guang 司馬光 35, 69 seq. Sima Qian 司馬遷 73 Song Lian 宋濂 39 Song Si-yeol 宋時烈（Uam 尤菴） 82 Sorabji, Richard 250 Spence, Jonathan D. 142 Stavrianos, L. S. 247 Su Che 蘇轍（Ziyu 子由） 70, 102 Su Yu 蘇輿 195 Sun Chengze 孫承澤 32 Sun Chi-pen 孫治本 257 Sun Weiguo 孫衛國 254

289

Index of Names

Tai Ding 太丁 30 Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹內好 14 Takeuchi Yoshio 武內義雄 156 Takezoe Ko¯ko¯ 竹添光鴻 120 Tang 湯 30, 36, 38 seq., 48, 145, 159, 162, 188, 200 Tao Ying 桃應 57, 66 seq., 69 seq., 72, 74 seq., 77 seq. Tengwen Gong 田文公 189 Tetsuo Najita 183 Thompson, John B. 8, 226 Tian Chang 田常 64 To¯ Te¯kan 藤貞幹 84, 256 seq. To¯jo¯ Ichido¯ 東條一堂 124 – 126 Tokugawa Shogunate 144 Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 德川綱吉 36 Tokugawa Yoshimune 德川吉宗 144 Tortarolo, Edoardo 239 Toshima Ho¯shu¯ 豊島豊洲 87, 119, 128, 130 To¯yama Shigeki 遠山茂樹 238 Treagold, Donald W. 15 Tsai Zhen-feng 蔡振豐 85 – 87 Tsuboi Kumezo¯ 坪井九馬三 242 Tsuda So¯kichi 津田左右吉 9 seq. Tsuteya Takao 土屋喬雄 175 Tucker, John 87, 122, 124, 127 seq., 136, 179, 188, 190, 192, 196, 211, 230 Tuotuo 脫脫 38 Uchida Ginzo 內田銀藏 242 Umesao, Tadao 82, 248 Uno Se¯ichi 宇野精一 167 Uno Tetsuto 宇野哲人 67, 233, 251 seq. Van Norden, Bryan W.

57, 62

Wang, Q. Edward 王晴佳 238 Wang Anshi 王安石 35, 69 Wang Bi 王弼 27, 176 Wang Chong 王充 195, 212 Wang Ermin 王爾敏 13, 216 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之（Chuanshan 船山） 40, 55, 74 Wang Mang 王莽 33 seq., 243

Wang Xianqian 王先謙 63, 68, 195 Wang Yangming 王陽明 18, 52, 98, 104 – 107, 110, 112, 200 – 202, 209 – 211, 213, 226 seq. Wang Yinglin 王應麟 38 Wang Yinzhi 王引之 26 Wang Yong 王勇 41, 255 seq. Washio Junkyo¯ 鷲尾順敬 84, 257 Watanabe Hiroshi 渡辺浩 132, 191, 248 Watsuji Tetsuro¯ 和辻哲郎 240 Wei Zheng 魏徵 167 Wen 文王 36, 39, 61 seq., 73 Wheatley, Paul 217 White, Hayden 238 Wong, David B. 250 Wu 武王 36, 38 seq., 108, 162 seq., 188 Wu Sanlian 吳三連 222 Wu Xinrong 吳新榮 222 Wu Zhuliu 吳濁流 222 Xi Qi 奚齊 64 Xiao Gongquan 蕭公權 141 Xing Bing 邢昺 （Shuming 叔明） 28, 102 Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 27, 32, 235 Xu Hongxing 徐洪興 173 Xu Shen 許慎 58 Xu Zhongshu 徐中舒 58 Xue Xuan 薛瑄（Dewen 德溫） 103 seq. Xun Xi 荀息 64 Xunzi 荀子 61 – 63, 68, 71, 127, 182, 195, 212 Yabuki Kunihiko 矢吹邦彥 199 Yamada Ho¯koku 山田方谷 8, 94, 199 – 202, 204, 208 – 214, 226 – 228 Yamada Jun 山田準 200 Yamaga Soko¯ 山鹿素行 18, 46 – 48, 129, 219 seq., 231 Yamashita, Samuel Hideo 191 Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇齋 47, 55, 84, 142, 233 Yamazaki Yoshishige 山崎美成 171 Yan Hui 顏回 16, 89, 113, 145 Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 柳澤吉保 36

290 Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 60 seq., 64 Yang Lian-sheng 楊聯陞 254 seq. Yang Liang 楊倞 63 Yang Rur-bin 楊儒賓 160, 168, 212, 228 Yang Shi 楊時 72 Yang Zhu 楊朱 182 Yanzi 晏子 60, 103 Yao 堯 16, 30, 36, 39, 48 seq., 89, 145, 155, 162, 184 Yasuyuki Kurita 82, 132, 248 Ye Rongzhong 葉榮鐘 222 Yi Hwang 李滉 이황 (Toegye 退溪) 11, 51, 82, 84, 248 Yi I 李珥（Yulgok 栗谷） 82, 133 Yi Ik 李瀷 이익 74 seq. Yi Ya 易牙 192 Yi Yin 伊尹 30 Yian Shaodang 嚴紹璗 12, 255 Yoshida Ko¯hei 吉田公平 201 Yoshida Sho¯in 吉田松陰 18, 233 Yoshikawa Ko¯jiro¯ 吉川幸次郎 178 – 180, 184, 229 seq., 251 Youzi 有子 150, 164, 171 Yu 禹 7, 26, 30, 36, 39, 43, 48 seq., 86, 89, 135, 145, 208, 221, 258 Yu Pian 庾駢 60 Yu Ying-shih 余英時 195, 258 Yu Yunwen 余允文 35, 69 seq. Yun, Sasoon 尹絲淳 윤사순 82 Zengzi 曾子 99, 102, 106 – 109, 111, 152 seq., 172 Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 221 Zhang Jiucheng 張九成 37 seq. Zhang Kun-jiang 張崑將 17 seq., 49, 233, 255 seq.

Index of Names

Zhang Shenqie 張深切 222 Zhang Shi 張栻 35, 71, 114, 183 Zhang Shizhi 張釋之 73 Zhang Xuefeng 張學鋒 252 Zhang Yu 張禹 33 seq. Zhang Zai 張載（Hungqu 橫渠） 54, 117, 192, 230 Zhang Zunxu 張遵旭 252 Zhao Dun 趙盾（Zhao Xuanzi 趙宣子） 60, 64 Zhao Qi 趙岐 29 seq., 35, 194, 206 seq. Zhen Dexiu 真德秀（Jingyuan 景元） 103 Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 28, 176 Zhong Caijun 鍾彩鈞 168 Zhonggong 仲弓 28 Zhou 紂 37 – 39 Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 （Maoshu 茂叔) 117 Zhou Guangqing 周光慶 54 Zhu Shunshui 朱舜水 15 seq. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (Huian 晦庵) 11 seq., 17 seq., 35 seq., 38, 50 – 54, 70 – 74, 77, 81 – 88, 90, 93 seq., 97 – 107, 110 – 140, 146, 149 – 158, 160 seq., 163 – 165, 167 – 173, 176, 178 – 180, 183, 187, 191 seq., 194, 199 seq., 204 – 210, 213 seq., 226, 229 – 231, 234 seq., 248, 256 Zhu Yuanchang 朱元璋 31 Zhuangzi 莊子 27, 62, 126, 212 Zichan 子產 157 Zigan 子贛 34 Zigong 子貢 37 seq., 108 seq., 153, 160 Zilu 子路 103, 166 Zisi 子思 89, 145 Zizhang 子張 233 Zürcher, Erik 50

Index of Terms

abiding in tranquility (shusei 主靜) 121 Analects 7, 12, 17, 25 – 28, 33 seq., 36, 43, 48 – 50, 53, 67, 77, 83, 85, 93, 97 – 99, 102 seq., 108 seq., 113, 116, 119 seq., 126, 133 seq., 137 – 139, 149 – 166, 168, 170 – 173, 175 – 181, 183 – 185, 200, 230 – 234, 245, 248, 255 anti-Zhuxi-ism 反朱子學 85 appropriateness 74, 82, 88 – 90, 115 – 117, 122 seq., 137, 179 – 183, 185, 194, 218, 229, 231 A unitary generative force (ichigenki 一元 氣) 211 beginning (duan, 端) 24, 73, 79, 124, 146, 150, 165, 183, 194, 201, 209 seq., 213, 235, 238, 241, 252, 255 benevolent person (renren, 仁人) 217 benran zhi xing (本然之性, original nature) 82, 135, 192 seq., 197, 201 birth (sheng, 生) 103, 116, 153, 157, 159, 163, 169, 195, 207 ching (精, refinement) 158, 201, 245 Chunqiu 46 seq., 60 seq., 64, 195 classical meaning (古義, kogi) 17, 53, 134, 136, 139, 149, 151 – 154, 156 seq., 159 – 167, 169 – 172, 175, 178, 188 – 191, 194 seq., 229, 232, 256 compassion (ceyin, 惻隱) 124 seq., 164, 193 courtesy and modesty (gongjing, 恭敬) 193

cuanchen (篡臣, usurping ministers) 63, 68 cultural chauvinism 13 cultural egocentrism 13 Da Bore jing 大般若經 255 Daiqing luli (大清律例, Collection of the laws of the Great Qing) 76 daoli (道理, guiding pattern) 135 dao (道, Way) 7 seq., 12 – 14, 16, 23, 26, 29, 32 seq., 35 seq., 38 seq., 41, 43 – 45, 47 – 51, 53 – 55, 58, 60 – 66, 68 – 70, 72 – 74, 77 seq., 81, 83, 85, 93 seq., 97 – 100, 102, 104, 106 – 113, 115 – 124, 126 seq., 129 – 131, 134 – 139, 143, 146, 149 – 154, 156 – 167, 169 – 173, 177 – 183, 185, 188 – 191, 193, 197, 201 – 206, 209, 211, 214 seq., 218, 220, 222 seq., 229 – 231, 234, 243, 246, 249, 258 daoxin (道心, the Way’s heart-mind) 82 Daxue (大學, the Great Learning) 12, 83, 85, 97, 101, 105, 107 seq., 113, 128, 168, 208 seq., 216 seq. Da Ya 大雅 217 Da zang jing 大藏經 255 Decency 禮 156, 164, 169 – 171 di (狄, northern barbarians) 30, 122, 137, 153, 161, 217 seq., 220 Do¯shikai (同志會, Comrade Society) 122, 138, 179, 187, 191, 230 duke’s commands (公命, gongming) 60 Edo [Tokugawa] period 11, 45, 199, 211 seq., 230, 249, 252 seq.

292 Eight Diagrams 八卦 99 emperor (tianzi, 天子) 26 – 34, 38, 43 – 45, 50, 67, 72, 132, 167, 184 exclude from the imperial reading (御讀禁忌 gotoku kinki) 45 external court (gaicho¯, 外朝) 219 Fahua jing 法華經 255 familial populism (民本, minben) 33 fills and enlarges 充大 163 Five Constants and Hundred Processes 五常百行 170, 172 Former Kings 36, 48 – 50, 70, 136 seq., 139, 150 four beginnings 114, 194 Four Phenomena 四象 99 Fujian 福建 253 fully realize the mind (jinxin, 盡心) 104, 193 function (yong, 用) 26 seq., 74, 87, 99, 106, 115, 118 seq., 121 seq., 133 seq., 150 – 152, 164, 171, 201, 234, 248 ge wu (格物, investigate things) 100 seq., 104 – 106, 108 seq. ge wu zhi zhi (格物致知, investigating things to attain knowledge) 105 seq., 108, 168 gongli (公利, public benefit) 182 seq. gong (公, public, fair) 7, 17, 23, 57 – 75, 77 – 79, 81 seq., 88, 90, 110, 141, 170, 181, 183 guan (貫, thread, connect) 9, 12, 49, 53, 83, 97, 99 seq., 102 seq., 106 – 112, 129, 138 seq., 152, 172, 179, 192, 214, 218, 220, 235, 237, 244 Guanyin 觀音 257 guifang (鬼方, ghost regions) 217 Guigong (貴公, In praise of the public) 61 guoxue (國學, national learning) 9, 19, 50, 116, 216, 221, 256 Han 漢 15, 18, 27, 29, 33 – 35, 38, 43 seq., 46 – 48, 55, 64, 73 – 76, 97, 125, 141, 143 – 145, 152, 161, 168, 171, 173, 183,

Index of Terms

192, 194 seq., 197, 200, 206, 216, 218 – 220, 226, 242 seq., 246, 248, 256 huayi zhibian 華夷之辨 16 human nature is a matter of principle (性即 理, xing ji li) 83 human nature (性, xing) 34, 59, 86 seq., 107, 121, 127, 135, 155, 159 seq., 163 seq., 170 seq., 188 seq., 191 – 197, 201, 210, 212 seq. innate knowledge (良知, that is, mindheart) 7, 14, 48, 52, 83, 89, 94, 98 seq., 106 seq., 110, 112, 114, 128, 135, 140, 143, 164, 179, 193, 201, 210 seq., 213, 221, 226 – 228, 237 Inter-subjectivity 87, 235 jingqi (精氣, essential qi; life force) 206, 212 Joseon Korea (1391 – 1910) 41, 43, 82 seq., 114 Kaitokudo¯ 懷德堂 183 seq. knowing Heaven (zhitian, 知天) 193 Kogaku (classical learning, 古學) 90, 120, 122, 138, 163, 188 seq., 191, 197, 230 learning of moral conduct (德行之學, dexingzhixue) 83 learning of the great man (大人之學, darenzhixue) 83 learn ; learning (學, xue) 7, 10, 26, 28, 32, 47, 53 seq., 71, 79, 81 – 87, 89 seq., 100, 103, 106, 108 – 112, 114, 128 seq., 131 – 135, 138 seq., 145 seq., 152, 158, 165, 167 – 169, 171 – 173, 176 – 178, 183, 188 seq., 191, 199, 202, 209, 211, 214, 217, 226, 228 – 230, 241 li (里, chinese mile) 31 li (利, benefit, profit) 138, 176, 178 – 185 Li (理, principle, pattern) 36, 50, 52 seq., 76, 82 seq., 85 – 89, 100 seq., 113 – 121, 123 – 129, 133 – 138, 140 seq., 150 seq., 159 – 162, 164 seq., 167, 171, 178 – 185,

Index of Terms

194 seq., 201 seq., 204 – 206, 208 – 210, 212 – 214, 228 Li (禮 propriety, ritual) 71, 82, 88, 89, 90, 109, 115 – 117, 119, 121 seq., 124, 137 – 139, 194, 229 Li xue (理學, Learning of Principle) 77 liangzhi (the innate knowledge of goodness) 52 Lu-Wang school 194, 207 Meiji period (明治, 1868 – 1912) 76, 175, 177, 234, 241 Mencius 8, 12, 14, 17 seq., 25, 29 – 39, 42 – 45, 48 – 58, 66 – 78, 81, 85, 89, 94, 97, 104 seq., 109, 116 seq., 121 seq., 125 – 128, 133 seq., 138, 145 seq., 149, 153 – 156, 158, 163 – 165, 168 seq., 171, 173, 178, 181 – 183, 187 – 214, 218, 228 seq., 233 seq., 246, 251, 255 seq. Ming dynasty (明, 1368 – 1644) 15, 30 – 32, 103, 246, 254 Muromachi periods (1338 – 1573) 44 Nine Barbaric Tribes (Jiuyi 九夷) 17 North-South (北宋, 1336 – 1392) 44 physical nature (生, sheng) 192 seq., 196 seq., 201 post-Zhuxi-ism (後朱子學) 85 practical learning (Jitsugaku 實學) 87 seq., 93, 122 seq., 130, 176 – 180, 187 seq., 230 practical scholarship 實學 165 preserving seriousness (shukei 守敬) 121 principle 36, 50, 70 – 79, 82 seq., 86 – 90, 94, 98 – 108, 110 – 112, 115 – 119, 121 – 130, 135 – 138, 140, 149 – 159, 160, 161 – 171, 178, 189, 193 seq., 198, 201, 203, 205 seq., 208, 211 – 213, 220 Qi (氣, cosmic vapor) 8, 59, 77, 82, 85, 87, 94, 101, 104, 110, 115 seq., 119 seq., 123 seq., 128 – 130, 133 seq., 151, 153, 161, 169, 195, 197, 199 – 214, 228 seq., 250

293 Qin 秦 13, 27, 37, 43 seq., 49, 61, 67, 71, 116, 125, 141, 144, 182, 203, 216, 218, 253, 256 Qing Confucianism 15 Qing Empire (清, 1644 – 1911) 14, 55 qiqing (七情, the Seven Emotions) 82, 113 seq. qizhi (氣質, physical disposition) 192 seq. qizhi zhi xing (氣質之質, embodied nature) 82, 135 Qusi (去私, Eliminating the private) 61 ren (仁, benevolence, humanness, humanity) 34, 38, 53, 71, 85 – 89, 105, 108, 113 – 130, 134, 139, 151, 153 – 155, 158 seq., 161, 163 – 165, 169 – 172, 178 seq., 181, 183, 188 seq., 194, 218, 229, 231, 251, 253 rendao (仁道, the human way) 60, 137, 146, 154 renxin (人心, the human mind-heart) 82, 110 renyu (人慾, human desire) 70 seq., 88, 119, 129 seq., 134, 183 right and wrong (shifei, 是非) 115 seq., 155, 193, 201, 207 Rites 28 seq., 36 seq., 134, 136, 150, 156, 179, 218 rong (戎, western barbarians) 89, 217 root (ben, 本) 32, 43, 47 seq., 68 seq., 86, 94, 99, 106 seq., 114 seq., 129, 133, 140, 142 seq., 154, 162 – 164, 168, 171, 180, 194 – 197, 206 – 208, 212, 220 Ryoshuku no Kyo¯gu¯ (旅宿境遇, traveling situation) 36 Sage Kings 39, 44, 48, 179, 229 Second Sage 17 shame (xiue, 羞惡) 116, 193, 201 Shanhaijing (山海經, Classic of Mountains and Seas) 251 shi (事, human affairs, events) 29, 32, 36, 38 seq., 45, 51, 53 – 55, 59 – 62, 64, 69, 72, 77, 81, 84 seq., 110, 113, 122, 124 – 126, 134, 136 seq., 141, 144, 154 – 156, 159, 163, 169, 172, 176, 179, 187 – 191,

294

Index of Terms

193 – 195, 198, 200, 203, 206, 213 seq., 216, 229 seq., 232, 243, 247, 249, 251, 253, 257 Shintoism 18, 50 Sho¯heiko 昌平黌 143 Sho¯wa period (昭和, 1926 – 1989) 184, 242 Shuidiji 水地記 142 Shuijingzhu 水經注 142 Shuogua (說卦, Explanation of the Trigrams) 27 Shuowen jiezi 說文解字 58 shu (恕, reciprocity) 16, 30, 36, 39, 48 seq., 53, 57, 60, 67 – 70, 72 – 75, 78, 85 – 87, 89 seq., 109, 112, 134, 137, 139, 145, 152 – 155, 162, 172 seq., 179, 184, 191, 205, 217, 221, 235, 248 sijia 私家 59 Silk Road 41, 244, 255 sincerity or authenticity (誠, cheng) 14, 33, 52, 69, 79, 83, 105, 114, 117, 122, 133 seq., 138, 164, 189, 193, 200, 211, 214, 226 seq. sini 私暱 60 si (私, personal, private) 7, 17, 23, 30, 37, 52, 57 – 75, 77 – 79, 81, 85 – 87, 90, 110, 149, 177, 181 – 184, 212, 218, 226 – 228, 255 Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism 15 Song xing tong (宋刑統, The compendium of Song punishments) 76 Sorai school 徂徠學派 17, 256 sovereign (王, wang) 26 seq., 33 seq., 43 seq., 49, 104, 107, 110, 128, 135, 200, 211, 226 seq. Spring and Autumn Annals 13, 27 seq., 46, 60 seq., 155 seq., 158, 195, 217, 219 seq., 223 substance (ti, 體) 87, 104, 106, 115, 118 seq., 121 seq., 124 seq., 127, 131, 133 seq., 138 – 140, 146, 150 – 153, 163 seq., 171, 207 seq., 211 seq., 214 Taisho¯ 大正 184, 241 taixu (太虛, utmost emptiness)

210

Tang 唐= 30, 34, 36, 38 seq., 48, 73, 76, 89, 125, 132, 145, 151, 159, 162, 167 seq., 171, 188, 200, 226, 246, 252 Tanglu (唐律, Laws of the Tang) 76 the Doctrine of the Mean 《中庸》 12, 38, 85, 97, 105, 157, 163, 168, 172, 190, 200, 203 The Great Geist Supporting the Imperial Destiny 皇運扶翼大精神 232 the Kingly Way 39, 189 the siduan (四端, the Four Beginnings) 82, 194 the Two Polarities 兩儀 99 the Ultimate Pole 太極 99 Three Dynasties 29, 44, 48 – 50, 162, 226 tiandao (天道, the natural way) 60, 137, 146, 176, 212 tian (天, heaven, sky) 12, 27, 29 seq., 32, 36, 40, 46 seq., 52, 55, 57, 62, 71, 73, 85 seq., 99, 101 – 105, 107 – 109, 114 – 117, 119 – 124, 127, 129 seq., 138, 141, 144, 152 seq., 159 – 164, 176, 179, 189, 191 – 194, 197, 211 seq., 214, 219 seq., 229 seq., 251 tianli (天理, Heavenly principle) 70 – 75, 77 – 79, 88, 102, 106, 119, 160 seq., 170, 183, 198, 206, 213 tianxia (天下, all under Heaven) 26, 55, 74, 79, 108, 127, 141, 144, 152 seq., 155, 161, 163, 191, 212, 253 seq. Tokugawa 7, 12, 16 – 18, 32, 36, 41 – 43, 45 seq., 48 – 51, 53, 55, 72, 82, 86 seq., 93, 113 seq., 117 – 120, 122 – 124, 129 seq., 132, 143 seq., 175, 178 – 180, 183 seq., 188 seq., 191, 197, 199, 213 – 215, 219 seq., 229 – 231, 233 seq., 246, 248, 256 Treatise on Humanity 仁說 85, 87, 93, 113 – 120, 123, 127 – 130, 169 seq., 231 understanding the nature (zhixing, 知性) 193 virtue 德 37, 44, 50, 71, 83, 86, 102, 105 – 110, 115 seq., 118 – 122, 124 seq.,

Index of Terms

127 seq., 139 seq., 153 seq., 158 – 160, 162 seq., 165, 171 seq., 183, 188, 190, 232 Warring States period (403 – 222 bce) 43 seq., 57 seq., 61 – 63, 66, 68, 71, 78, 113, 141, 182, 212, 242 Way of Heaven 34, 36, 39, 60, 122 seq., 126, 129 seq., 160, 176, 212 weifa (未發, pre-aroused emotions) 82 Wisdom (智, chi) 16, 50, 82, 88 seq., 111, 115 – 117, 121, 124, 137 seq., 151, 154, 180, 191, 194, 207, 212, 220, 251 wufang (五方, five quarters) 216 Xia 夏 64, 143 – 145, 216 xiao (孝, filial piety) 16, 18, 64, 66, 68, 86, 118, 122, 232 xin (心, mind-heart) 17, 50, 52, 83, 85 seq., 97, 99 – 106, 108 – 110, 139, 151 seq., 168, 171, 197, 250 Yangban 兩班 82, 132, 248 Yao Dian (Canon of Yao, 堯典) 217 yi (夷, eastern barbarians) 217 seq. yifa (已發, aroused emotions) 82 yin-yang 陰陽 130, 157 yi (義, righteousness) 18, 164 seq., 169, 171, 176, 179 – 185, 188, 204, 220, 242 seq. Yo¯meigaku (Wang Yangming, 陽明學) 18, 52, 98, 104 – 107, 110, 112, 142, 199 – 202, 209 – 211, 213, 226 seq.

295 Zhengming正名 212 Zhile (至樂, Perfect Happiness) 27, 212 zhi (志, will, ambition, purpose) 7, 9, 12, 16 seq., 19, 23 seq., 26, 34 seq., 41 seq., 49, 51, 56, 58 – 60, 65 – 68, 70 seq., 73 seq., 81, 83, 93 seq., 97 seq., 102, 106, 108 seq., 111, 113 – 115, 117, 121, 124, 127, 131, 134, 137, 139, 141 seq., 149, 151 – 155, 158, 160, 163 – 166, 169, 171, 176 seq., 180 – 182, 187 seq., 190, 192, 199, 201 seq., 205 – 207, 209 seq., 212, 215 seq., 218, 220 seq., 223, 225 – 228, 231, 233 seq., 239, 245, 249 seq., 256 seq. zhongdao (中道, middle way) 46, 219 zhongguo (中國, central state or middle kingdom) 8, 12 seq., 42, 45 – 49, 51, 54 – 56, 89 seq., 94, 116, 141 – 143, 180, 193, 215 – 223, 230 – 233, 235, 245, 249, 253, 255 Zhonghua (中華) 15, 27 seq., 34, 46, 53 seq., 62, 69, 71, 73, 97, 106, 109, 114, 189, 194 seq., 207, 212 zhong (忠, loyalty, doing one’s best) 16, 18, 23, 27, 41, 45, 53, 60, 64, 66, 89, 105, 139, 142, 151 – 154, 162, 165, 172 seq., 179, 232, 237, 245, 251 seq., 256 zhongshang (中商, central Shang) 216 zi (直, directness, forthrightness) 113, 116, 132, 180, 206 seq.

Endorsement

Chun-chieh Huang offers a new approach to exploring the history of Confucian thought. Breaking with the nation-centered approaches of previous scholarship, Huang decenters China, allowing him treat various approaches to interpretations of the Confucian Classics, whether Chinese, Japanese, or Korean, as equally interesting and worth examining. Though scholars of Confucianism all recognize that it was a pan-national philosophy that spread throughout East Asia, Huang is the first to take that transnational nature of Confucianism seriously by examining the various socio-political contexts of the states and societies of China, Japan, and Korea and relating those environments to the differences in the way the peoples in those countries read the same Classics, particularly the Analects and the Mencius. –Donald Baker, Professor of Asian Studies, The University of British Columbia Chun-chieh Huang argues that the continual “decontextualization” and “recontextualization” of Confucian thought in later Chinese dynasties, Korea, and especially Tokugawa Japan has produced a variety of “Confucianisms” rather than the “unfolding” of a unitary tradition. With impressive depth and breadth he shows how each culture has injected its own subjectivity and national experience into the Confucian framework. The core of the book is a series of chapters using Zhu Xi (1130–1200) as “one thread” demonstrating simultaneously the continuity and the variety of East Asian Confucianisms, by showing how Zhu Xi’s “watershed” synthesis was contextualized differently and taken to new levels in the various later socio-political circumstances. This is a richly rewarding book. –Joseph Adler, Professor Emeritus of Asian Studies and Religious Studies, Kenyon College

298

Endorsement

Chun-chieh Huang in this newly published volume, East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Contexts, makes a compelling and visionary cultural argument. He challenges scholars to rise above statist, linguistic, and ethnic differences to acknowledge a shared yet productively disparate East Asian narrative in which differences have been resourced to produce the thick cultural diversity of the region. It is only by embracing the concept of a persisting yet always changing legacy grounded in the texts and commentaries of this living cultural tradition – its continuities and multiplicities across time – that we can register the thick hybridity and multichromatic richness of what is rapidly emerging as a world resource for cultural change. –Roger Ames, Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii Professor Huang’s most recent book shows, with excellent examples and tight, cogent reasoning, how the innovative paradigm of East Asian Confucianisms, emphasizing plurality rather than monistic orthodoxy, highlights the multidimensionality of Confucian traditions in East Asia. Huang argues convincingly that Confucian studies should quit “the ghetto of ‘national learning,’ with its relatively closed and isolationist state-centered approach. Instead solid scholarship must examine the development of various expressions of Confucianism, both theoretical and practical, as they unfolded historically in a broader, regionally based East Asian context. By recognizing that received expressions of Confucianism must be decontextualized and recontextualized vis-à-vis subjectivities of particular regional cultures, East Asian Confucianisms: Texts and Contexts aptly magnifies for skeptics the real diversity and variety of East Asian Confucian traditions. –John Tucker, Professor of History, East Carolina University