Early Modern German Philosophy (1690-1750) 0198803303, 9780198803300

Table of contents :
Dedication
Epigraph
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Timeline of Important Events in Germany, ca. 1690–1750
Introduction: Early Modern Philosophy in Germany
Part I. Truth and Prejudice
1. Christian Thomasius: Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason (1691)
2. Dorothea Christiane Erxleben: Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study (1742)
Part II. Radical Philosophy
3. Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch: The Concord of Reason and Faith (1692)
4. Theodor Ludwig Lau: Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being (1717)
Part III. The Controversy between Wolff and the Pietists
5. Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also All Things in General (1720)
6. Joachim Lange: A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System (1724)
7. Christian Wolff: The Refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics (1737)
Part IV. The Limits of Reason
8. Christian August Crusius: Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1743)
9. Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death (1746)
Index

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Early Modern German Philosophy (1690–1750)

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Early Modern German Philosophy (1690–1750)  ,    

Corey W. Dyck

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Corey W. Dyck 2019 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2019 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2019952631 ISBN 978–0–19–880330–0 (hbk.) ISBN 978–0–19–880331–7 (pbk.) Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

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Meiner Mutter gewidmet

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Learnedness is propagated, imperceptibly but with great advantage, when someone can read all that is required to furnish a prudent intelligence in the language of his own country and does not first have to become frustrated through learning foreign tongues. —Christian Thomasius, Discours, Welcher Gestalt man denen Frantzosen in gemeinen Leben und Wandel nachahmen solle? [Discourse, in what way should one imitate the French in ordinary life and affairs?]

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Table of Contents Acknowledgments Timeline of Important Events in Germany, ca. 1690–1750 Introduction: Early Modern Philosophy in Germany

xi xiii 1

Part I. Truth and Prejudice 1. Christian Thomasius: Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason (1691)

15

2. Dorothea Christiane Erxleben: Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study (1742)

41

Part II. Radical Philosophy 3. Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch: The Concord of Reason and Faith (1692)

57

4. Theodor Ludwig Lau: Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being (1717)

74

Part III. The Controversy between Wolff and the Pietists 5. Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also All Things in General (1720)

95

6. Joachim Lange: A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System (1724)

135

7. Christian Wolff: The Refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics (1737)

156

Part IV. The Limits of Reason 8. Christian August Crusius: Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1743)

197

9. Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death (1746)

226

Index

259

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Acknowledgments I gratefully acknowledge the many debts I acquired to the excellent graduate students at Western University who lent their manifold expertise to this project. First and foremost, I offer my sincere thanks to Alexandra Dawson in the department of Classical Studies for her diligence and patience in proofreading my translations from Latin. I am also grateful to the various graduate student participants in the German Research Language Seminar I have been running over the past decade, in which this volume had its modest start, and to those who attended my graduate seminar on this volume’s topic for their helpful feedback, with particular thanks due to Richard Creek, Michael Walschots, James Belford, Dwight Lewis, and Fabio Malfara. My thanks to Nick Nash as well for his helpful comments on drafts of many individual chapters, and to Ignacio Moya for proofreading the final draft and compiling the index. Unsurprisingly, thanks are also owed to a number of my colleagues, including Lorne Falkenstein, Ben Hill, and Michael Milde at Western, as well as to Ursula Goldenbaum, Michael Hickson, Pauline Kleingeld, Christian Leduc, J. Colin McQuillan, Paola Rumore, Udo Thiel, Falk Wunderlich, and an anonymous reviewer for their various contributions to improving this volume. My thanks too to Peter Momtchiloff for his enthusiasm for this project from start to finish. During my work on this project, I was supported by a SSHRC Insight Grant, which I gratefully acknowledge. In addition, most of this volume came together during my year as an Alexander von Humboldt research fellow at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. I could not imagine a more fitting and pleasant setting for this work, and I will take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the university, the IZEA, Petra Lohse and the staff at the Georg-Forster-Haus, and to Heiner Klemme, for their continued hospitality, and to the Humboldt-Stiftung for its generous support.

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Timeline of Important Events in Germany, ca. 1690–1750 1688 April 29

Beginning of the reign of Friedrich III, Elector of Brandenburg

1691

Christian Thomasius publishes Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason, the first university textbook written in German

1694 May 14

Inauguration of the university (Friedrichs-Universität) in Halle, with Thomasius among the founding faculty

1695 Spring

Foundation of the orphanage in Halle by August Hermann Francke

1700 July 11

Establishment of the Kurfürstlich-Brandenburgische Sozietät der Wissenschaften by Elector Friedrich III, with Leibniz named as president Friedrich III, Elector of Brandenburg crowned Friedrich I, King in Prussia

1701 January 18 1706 September 1707 January

Swedish forces under Charles XII invade Saxony and occupy Leipzig Christian Wolff begins lecturing in Halle

1713 February 25 1716 November 14

Friedrich I dies, is succeeded by his son Friedrich Wilhelm I Death of Leibniz

1721 July 12

Wolff delivers his rectoral address “On the practical philosophy of the Chinese”

1723 November 8

Friedrich Wilhelm I orders Wolff ’s exile from Prussia; the order is received in Halle on November 12 and Wolff is given forty-eight hours to depart, ultimately taking up a position at the university (Philipps-Universität) in Marburg

1724 April 22 1728 September 23

Birth of Immanuel Kant Death of Thomasius

1734 October 14

Lectures begin at the new Georg-August-Universität Göttingen (which is formally inaugurated in 1737) Friedrich Wilhelm I dies, is succeeded by his son Friedrich II (“the Great”) Friedrich II travels through Quedlinburg during his inaugural tour; Dorothea Christiane Leporin (Erxleben) is granted an audience with him

1740 May 31 November 24

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xiv

     , . – December 6 December 16

1742 June 11 1754 April 9 May 6 June 16–17

Wolff returns to a position in Halle, on the invitation of Friedrich II Friedrich II invades Silesia (in present-day Poland), marking the beginning of the first Silesian war with Austria Treaty of Berlin signed; end of first Silesian war Death of Wolff Erxleben is examined for her medical doctorate, which is subsequently awarded to her Friedrich II visits Halle and meets with professors from the university (including G. F. Meier)

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Introduction: Early Modern Philosophy in Germany In many ways, the German-speaking lands of Europe, grouped together within the loose federation of states, cities, and still smaller entities known collectively as the Holy Roman Empire,¹ stand apart from their British and European counterparts at the outset of the early Modern period. The devastating Thirty Years War (1618–48), a pan-European conflict that took place largely on German soil, imposed lasting and disproportionate costs on its population and economy. Indeed, in contrast with, for instance, Anglican England and Catholic France, the religious schism between Catholics and Protestants that had provided the original pretext for the war continued to divide the German lands into Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist states. This had the effect of fragmenting the intellectual climate, as the agenda for academic inquiry was set by the confession of the regional potentate and enforced by state censors. Outside of the universities, there was little in the way of the independent institutions—the learned societies and journals—that contributed so much to setting and driving the intellectual debate elsewhere, while most German universities themselves, including a clutch of respected Medieval universities, bent their resources to churning out scholastic textbooks and advancing their own spiritual cause. And where the rest of Britain and Europe had completed their turn to the vernacular as the preferred mode of learned expression, German remained unestablished as a literary language, and even into the 1680s professors had yet to lecture, much less publish, in their mother-tongue as Latin remained the language of scholarly discourse. Yet, this would all change beginning around 1690 as a result of a number of intellectual developments that contributed to the establishment of a distinctively modern, German philosophical scene. Of course, the singular Leibniz, without question the foremost German philosopher of the early Modern period, had contributed enormously to this through his (relatively few) publications on philosophy and mathematics, but also through his successful advocacy for a German academy to rival the famous Académie française and Royal Society, and his staunch support of forward-thinking countrymen for university positions. Germany likewise saw the founding of learned journals, including the Acta eruditorum in 1682 and the first, if short-lived, German-language periodical published beginning in 1688 by Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who would also become the first professor to lecture and ¹ For ease of reference, I will refer to these lands simply as “Germany” in what follows.

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publish in German. These developments were followed by the founding of the first modern university, the Friedrichs-Universität in Halle in 1694, which situated itself at the cutting edge with its recruitment of Thomasius and, later, Christian Wolff (1679–1754), among other innovators, to faculty positions. The university in Halle would also prove the site of Germany’s first major intellectual controversy, namely, the dispute between Wolff and his Pietist colleagues in the theology faculty, a debate that had the effect of setting before the German literate public the full menu of the most contentious modern debates, including the conflict of faith and reason, the challenge of Spinozism, the antinomy between freedom and necessity, as well as the libertas philosophandi. The outcome of the controversy did not initially bode well for modern Germany’s nascent intellectual scene, as Wolff was removed from his position and hastily exiled from Prussia, yet these acts had the unintended effect of advertising his cause and turning him into an international celebrity. The subsequent ascent of the Wolffian philosophy and its successful propagation through German universities led to a significant realignment within the German academy, with traditionalists now opposed to the modern (Wolffian) philosophy. In addition, and beyond the universities in the more tolerant urban centres such as Berlin and Hamburg, clandestine philosophical texts were authored and transmitted, further linking learned Germans to the current of radical ideas flowing throughout Britain and Europe. Given this, it will not come as a surprise that German philosophers during this time directly engaged with many of the most important issues that occupied their counterparts in, for instance, England, France, and Holland. While it cannot be denied that some opted to devote their efforts to exploring the minutiae of the socalled “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophy, others focused their efforts on contributing to issues of broader significance for the early Modern period, and it is by way of showcasing these that the following texts have been selected. For the purposes of introducing these texts and underlining their relevance for our understanding of the history of Modern philosophy, I will consider four broader issues of acknowledged importance in this period and briefly outline the ways in which philosophers such as Thomasius and Wolff, and a number of others besides, not only engage with them but also advance their discussion in philosophically interesting and innovative ways.

Truth and Prejudice A number of German thinkers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century produced logic texts that were thoroughly modern in their rejection of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. This included works within the broadly Cartesian tradition, which continued to be influential in the philosophical and medical faculties in German universities. Most notable among these are texts by Johannes Clauberg (1622–65) and Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708). Like their contemporaries outside of Germany, including Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Nicolas Malebranche, and John Locke, these theorists tended to view logic as an organon for the sciences (whether metaphysical or natural) and, given its unsuitability for the purpose, rejected the syllogism as an ineffective tool for scientific discovery

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in favour of new methods. Additionally, inasmuch as the task of logic was not merely the ordering and justification of truths but the generation and preservation of certainty or conviction, significant attention was paid to the psychological activities and faculties on the part of the subject. These same features can be found in Christian Thomasius’ logic, as put forward in his Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason of 1691. However, Thomasius’ logic is particularly notable for its departures from and criticisms of the Cartesian tradition, in spite of his numerous (and unacknowledged) borrowings from it. So, in contrast to the scientific orientation of many Cartesian logics, Thomasius contends that the aim of logic is to train the natural light of the mind for the attainment of learnedness, which is also understood in practical terms, namely, as the improvement of the understanding and the will. Moreover, Thomasius is clear in distinguishing the natural light from the supernatural light, thereby emphasizing logic’s concern with this-worldly affairs, in contrast with theology’s authority in supernatural matters. This latter is consistent with Thomasius’ ambition, reflected in the fact that he published the work in German, to make the sort of training effected in logic more widely available outside of the schools. Thomasius’ departure from the Cartesian tradition is also clearly evident in the theory of the mind, the doctrine of truth, and the account of prejudice he outlines in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason. So, he provides a capsule account of the faculties of the mind, distinguishing thought, on the one hand, from external sensation as an internal discourse which yields the images that constitute the object of thoughts and, on the other hand, from internal sensation which amounts to our apprehension of our thinking and which Thomasius contends is or results in consciousness. Significantly, Thomasius objects to Descartes’ conception of the intellect as purely passive in contrast with the active will, claiming that both the faculty of thought, or the understanding, and the will can be active as well as passive. This activity on the part of the understanding informs Thomasius’ account of truth, which he takes to consist in the agreement of thoughts with things outside of our thoughts. While this initially seems to be little more than the familiar account of truth in terms of correspondence, Thomasius proceeds to contend that truth can consist not only in the agreement of our thoughts with things but also of our things with thoughts. This introduces a conception of truth as resulting from the mind’s imposition of an order on things through activities and principles native to it, rather than as simply consisting in the passive reception of information from without. This conception of truth founded in the activity of the understanding is taken up by later thinkers in the Thomasian tradition, and most notably by Christian August Crusius in his account of the essence or nature of the understanding. A final innovative feature of Thomasius’ logic is his account of prejudice presented in the final chapter. Thomasius’ empiricism leads him away from the Cartesian account of prejudice as consisting in an over-reliance upon the senses, but his ultimate identification of precipitancy and reliance on authority as two principle prejudices bears a direct comparison to Bacon’s discussion of the four idols in the New Organon. In addition to its importance for (what would come to be called) the ThomasianPietist tradition, Thomasius’ logic notably provided a crucial point of departure for Dorothea Christiane Erxleben (1715–62) in her later exposure of and attack on the

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prejudices obstructing women’s access to education. In her Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study of 1742, Erxleben adopts Thomasius’ conception of learnedness as the aim of study, contending quite consistently with Thomasius’ intentions that this is a form of wisdom attainable by all regardless of gender. Moreover, Erxleben quite explicitly draws on Thomasius’ account of prejudice in her thorough criticism of the prejudice that women are unsuited to education. However, in contrast to Thomasius, who emphasized the removal of prejudice and purification of the understanding as a key result of study, Erxleben identifies the claim that women are unsuited for learning as a prejudice that is in a number of respects only reinforced by study (as evident through the many learned men who have maintained the contrary); moreover, whereas Thomasius’ emphasis is on the harm caused by prejudice to one’s own understanding and will, Erxleben emphasizes the noxious effects on others, particularly women, that can result. Significantly, Erxleben’s criticism of the arguments offered in support of this prejudice draws on, and bears comparison to, other arguments and texts in the history of feminism, including those by Christine de Pizan (1364–1430), Marie de Gournay (1565–1645), and Anna Maria von Schurman (1607–78); yet, that she should identify these arguments as the products of an underlying prejudice constitutes her original and influential contribution to the ongoing querelle des femmes.

Radical Philosophy Throughout the early Modern period, and continuing through to Kant, German philosophy was very much an academic affair. In spite of the proliferation of periodicals intended for a broader literate audience and the advent of learned societies and other institutions, philosophical debate and discussion tended to be engaged by professors with textbooks intended for use in classrooms (as was widely required) being among the most influential publications. The university, with its ties to a regional patron and frequently a broader religious agenda, had a moderating effect on the thought that emerged from it. Even so, outside of the university a tradition of radical philosophical thinking flourished in Germany between 1680 and 1750, which tradition drew variously on Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, and others in, for instance, advancing mortalist views of the soul, rejecting the divine origin of Scripture, and challenging the institutions of contemporary political and clerical authority. While radical philosophical networks spanned Europe, BrandenburgPrussia was a particularly active scene for the circulation of clandestine literature. This fact is accounted for, at least in part, by the comparatively tolerant attitude of the ruling (Calvinist) Hohenzollerns who welcomed groups from other nations who had been persecuted for their non-conformist ideas, most famously inviting the Huguenots who fled France in 1685 in the wake of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to take up residence in their lands. Berlin in particular, as the home to a number of well-connected nobles and with its frequent diplomatic traffic, became an important center for the exchange of radical ideas. The Socinian underground in Berlin provided the milieu for Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch (1648–1704), whose Concord of Reason and Faith of 1692 was the first significant clandestine work produced by a German author. Stosch’s Concord bears

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the classic hallmarks of a Socinian treatise in subjecting all claims of faith to the standard of reason, and its rejection of the natural immortality of the soul and the doctrine of eternal punishment. Moreover, in making this case, Stosch draws on the works of Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736), a theologian suspected of Socinianism who was a friend of Locke’s and who published the first French summary of the Essay concerning Human Understanding. While Stosch also makes a number of waves in Spinoza’s direction, affirming that God for instance is the sole and unique substance, these ultimately amount to flourishes and betray little by way of any deeper commitment to Spinozistic thought. Instead, Stosch draws more deeply from Gassendi in framing his materialist account of the soul and even from Malebranche in rejecting any but an obscure grasp of thought and consciousness. Significantly, while Stosch’s initial account of thought seems to be crudely materialistic, he ultimately elaborates what amounts to an Aristotelian conception of the soul, in accordance with which it is identified with a principle of organization of the body. This culminates in Stosch’s comparison of the soul with a mill, identifying thought as one of its various effects, a comparison that was later targeted by Leibniz in the “Monadology” (who was familiar with Stosch through the Berlin court). Brandenburg-Prussia’s reputation for toleration would be sorely tested by Theodor Ludwig Lau (1670–1740), a native of Königsberg educated in Halle. Like Stosch’s Concord, Lau’s Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being of 1717 was a widely circulated piece of clandestine literature in spite of a limited printing (and subsequent destruction of many of those copies), and Lau similarly defends a materialist conception of the soul, distinguishing between active and passive matter, with the former producing thought. However, in contrast with Stosch, Lau is working within a broadly pantheistic tradition, one in which the influence of Spinoza can be distinctly recognized but also, and perhaps more significantly, that of the Irish freethinker John Toland (1670–1722). Consistent with the latter, Lau frames his Meditations as a presentation of a universal religion, one for which the manifest character of God’s existence and providence, and an emphasis on internal sincerity, makes the recourse to theologians and the mediation of the Church utterly unnecessary for and even harmful to true piety. In addition to rejecting clerical authority Lau offers a genealogical critique of the authority of the state, drawing upon the Hobbesian conception of a state of nature, which Lau conceives of as a condition of unfettered freedom and one which, in spite of its amorality, is offered as an instructive contrast to the condition of slavery that is reinforced by contemporary political, social, and religious institutions. In these distinctive ways, then, both Stosch and Lau make important and original contributions to radical thinking in the early eighteenth century.

The Controversy between Wolff and the Pietists No history of German philosophy in the early Modern period can overlook the importance of Leibniz, not only for supplying the elements for the most influential philosophical system in Germany before Kant’s but also for his tireless efforts on behalf of modernizing German academic and intellectual institutions. Leibniz’s reputation had been harmed by the bitter priority dispute with Newton over the

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invention of the calculus, yet he continued to find a largely sympathetic audience within Germany, where his decisive influence on the broader philosophical agenda was out of all proportion with the few philosophical works he had published or which were otherwise available in the early 1700s. That this was so is to no small extent due to Christian Wolff, who came to Leibniz’s attention as a talented young mathematician and with whom Leibniz corresponded for the last decade or so of his life. Wolff would later appropriate key planks of Leibniz’s metaphysics and epistemology, from sources including the exchange with Bayle concerning the pre-established harmony, the essays on substance and power published in the Acta eruditorum, as well as the correspondence with Clarke, to serve as the core of what would come to be called (in spite of Wolff ’s protests) the “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophy. This system was first elaborated in Wolff ’s Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also all Things in General (or the German Metaphysics) published in December 1719 (but printed with a publication year of 1720). The Leibnizian-Wolffian system included a number of doctrines that spurred German philosophical debate in the early Modern period. Perhaps the best known is the debate concerning the pre-established harmony, according to which the observed agreement of states between the soul and the body is explained through two independent orders of states grounded within each substance, the correspondence between which God ensures in advance of His act of making this world actual. Wolff himself qualified his commitment to Leibniz’s harmony, both taken as a hypothesis in cosmology (as a theory about the ground for the agreement between all substances in the world) and as a theory in psychology (concerning the agreement between the soul and body specifically), though he did view it as preferable to the influxionist and occasionalist alternatives. In addition, and significantly, Leibniz’s theory of freedom elaborated in the Theodicy was also the focus of heated discussion. Leibniz considers freedom to involve contingency (insofar as an act is not metaphysically necessary but possible in other worlds), intelligence (or a capacity to act according to a clear or distinct cognition of what is good), and spontaneity (or the fact that an action proceeds from causes internal to the agent rather than external). Wolff, in his own treatment of freedom late in the empirical psychology of the German Metaphysics, sets out from Leibniz’s discussion, though (consistent with this empirical context) he frames his account in straightforwardly psychological terms without invoking the contentious metaphysics behind Leibniz’s view. In any case, spontaneity constitutes the core of freedom for Wolff, and he accounts for it in typical compatibilist terms as amounting to the soul’s capacity to choose, among a set of alternatives, whatever pleases it most in accordance with its own internal motives. Even in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition itself there were a variety of positions canvassed on these, and other, topics, with some defending a natural influence, or genuine causal interaction between substances, and others seeking to distinguish between the soul’s spontaneity and its power of choice, properly understood. Yet, the most vehement and strategically effective opposition to Wolff came from his Pietist colleagues in Halle. This influential theological movement within the Lutheran tradition, which counts Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705) and August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) among its founding figures, and which established a firm institutional foothold in the theology faculty at Halle, emphasized the cultivation of

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strict intellectual and moral discipline in order to make oneself ready for a spiritual rebirth and personal transformation through an act of divine grace. This naturally brought them into conflict with their high-profile colleague in the philosophy faculty, whose (qualified) endorsement of a pre-established order of states of the soul and consequent reduction of freedom to a mere spontaneity flew in the face of the Pietist emphasis on the efficacy of the human will and the urgency of our vocation to moral and spiritual improvement. This was not lost on Joachim Lange (1670–1744), Wolff ’s most dogged Pietist opponent. He outlines a starkly contrasting philosophical perspective to Wolffian metaphysics in his A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System (1724), where he contends that Wolff denies the efficacy of the will in human action, argues that morality and religion require a capacity for genuinely free rather than merely spontaneous action, and cites the human conscience, among other things, as evidence of the reality of freedom, even if the use of that freedom is restrained by the fallen corruption of our intellect and will. The immediate result of this controversy was Wolff ’s removal from his university position and expulsion from Prussia by Friedrich Wilhelm I, who had personal connections with Francke and political interests in promoting Pietism. Yet, Wolff thrived with his new status as a martyr for the Enlightenment, taking up a position in Marburg, penning a Latin series of textbooks that gained him much wider Continental exposure, and collecting memberships in national learned societies among other honours. However, Wolff ’s popularity and increasing influence on the German academic and intellectual scene, as well as the fact that the king would later think better of his precipitous verdict, galled his otherwise victorious Pietist detractors who continued their campaign against Wolff through the 1730s (with Wolff replying in kind to each new broadside). Among Lange’s most persistent charges was that Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, with its reliance on the principle of sufficient reason, its embrace of a thoroughgoing causal determinism, and consequent reduction of the human being to a sort of automaton, amounts to a partial but nonetheless pernicious form of Spinozism. It was against the background of the controversy with the Pietists, and his interest in addressing the charge of Spinozism directly, that Wolff ultimately penned a fulldress refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics as part of his Natural Theology published in 1737. While in early eighteenth-century Germany, as was the case throughout the rest of Western Europe, Spinoza’s name was synonymous with atheism, materialism, fatalism, and immorality, Spinoza’s thought itself, particularly as expressed in the Ethics, was not often directly engaged with by philosophers (one notable exception being in histories of atheism or heterodox thought). Indeed, Wolff ’s critical treatment of Spinoza represents the first (published) discussion of Spinoza by a major philosopher since Pierre Bayle’s (notorious) entry on the topic in the Historical and Critical Dictionary of 1697. In his own discussion, Wolff attempts to reply to Lange’s charge by illustrating that the foundational errors of Spinozism can only be remedied with the sort of rigorous ontology outlined in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. Yet, Wolff ’s persistent refusal to criticize Spinoza for the alleged pernicious consequences of his views, or his immoral motives in propounding them, represents a charitable hermeneutics, nearly unprecedented in its application to Spinoza’s Ethics, that can be

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traced directly back to Wolff ’s own treatment at the hands of Lange, who had made frequent use of this method in his attacks (as evidenced in A Modest and Detailed Disclosure). In addition to constituting Wolff ’s final major salvo in the dispute with Pietists, his refutation of Spinoza is also significant in providing the last detailed presentation of the core of the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, as Wolff would devote his remaining intellectual efforts, after returning to Halle in 1740 at the invitation of the newly ascended Friedrich II, to practical philosophy.

The Limits of Reason The ascendancy of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy in the 1730s and 1740s would provoke further, and more sophisticated challenges to its distinctive brand of philosophical rationalism. Wolff ’s apparent reduction of freedom to a kind of spontaneity remained controversial, and it soon became clear to Wolff ’s opponents that this conception of freedom in terms of a choice determined by internal motives was a direct outgrowth of the Leibnizian understanding of the meaning and scope of the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz, like Spinoza, made liberal use of the principle in his metaphysics, including the Theodicy but particularly in the correspondence with Clarke, where he included God’s free choice to make this world actual within its scope and sought to vindicate the principle by showing that it had long been assumed by philosophers even if it had not been explicitly formulated. Wolff, whose metaphysics was deeply influenced by this correspondence (and who penned the preface to the German edition of 1717), likewise extended the scope of the principle to the free actions of the human will, and even supplemented a perceived deficiency in Leibniz’s discussion by offering a demonstration of the principle itself. Lange, of course, had taken issue with the application of the principle of sufficient reason to human actions, contending that it renders them necessary in a manner inconsistent with morality (but consistent with Stoicism and Spinozism). Yet, it was Christian August Crusius (1715–75), a philosopher and theologian also situated within the Thomasian-Pietist tradition, who mounted the most sophisticated and comprehensive assault against the Leibnizian understanding and use of this principle in his Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason of 1743. Like Lange, Crusius takes the Leibnizian usage of the principle to be destructive of morality, though Crusius goes further in exposing the ambiguities within the principle itself which help account for much of the disagreement between Leibniz and Clarke (despite the fact that both purport to accept it), as well as to expose the fallacies in Wolff ’s alleged proofs. Rather than rejecting the principle altogether, however, Crusius defends a nuanced position, accepting the applicability of a related principle, which he calls the principle of sufficient cause, to all actions and events, while denying that the strongest version of the principle, which he dubs the principle of determining reason, also applies to the first actions of the human (or indeed the divine) will. Crusius’ dissertation thus represents a decisive intervention in the active and ongoing debate concerning the principle of sufficient reason, and certainly raises a considerable, if frequently overlooked, challenge to the most ambitious formulations of philosophical rationalism.

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Another wider ranging, but complementary, challenge took up rationalist attempts to supply demonstrations for truths of faith. Wolff ’s own efforts in this regard representation a continuation of a rationalist project stemming back to Descartes’s Meditations—in the letter to the theological faculty at the Sorbonne that prefaces that work, Descartes emphasizes the continuity of his project with the injunction of the Lateran council under Pope Leo X in 1513 to demonstrate the existence of God and the recently declared dogma of the soul’s immortality. Whether Descartes succeeds in either of these, of course, is doubtful, but his thought nonetheless laid the foundations for later Cartesians, such as Pierre Poiret (1646–1719), to tackle other issues, including the problem of theodicy. The Socinians were likewise at the forefront of this debate, as were Le Clerc and Locke, with the last insisting that religious belief must remain subject to the canons of probable knowledge lest it devolve into mere enthusiasm. As might be expected, a more radical challenge was posed by Hobbes and, most notoriously, by Spinoza, who in his Theological-Political Treatise of 1670 raised detailed objections to the authenticity of Scripture, on which the transmission of revelation relies. The non-rationalist camp by contrast, did not count a major philosopher among its ranks, with one exception being the lapsed Cartesian Pierre Daniel Huet (1630–1721), that is, not until Bayle, whose famed Dictionary and other works presented a comprehensive criticism of rational attempts to resolve the problem of evil, apparently leaving only recourse to faith for this and other Christian mysteries. It was, in fact, Bayle’s attack that prompted Leibniz to take up the cause of reason in his Theodicy, and to contend that there are truths that are no doubt above reason but, and against Bayle, that these are not and cannot be contrary to reason. As might already be clear, the conflict between faith and reason was likewise a crucial debate within the early Modern German context. Stosch’s Concord, while billed as an attempt to broker a reconciliation between the two, in actuality mounts a formidable challenge to the independence of belief from the canons of reason, to the basis in Scripture and reason for the belief in the soul’s immortality, and to any possible vindication, rational or otherwise, for eternal punishment. Similarly, the conflicting claims of reason and faith lie at the root of the controversy between Wolff and his Pietist opponents, as Lange and others came to suspect that Wolff ’s project was a mask for his deeper hostility towards the importance of revealed truth, signalled for instance in his intellectualist definition of God and idiosyncratic proof of God’s existence, his denial of a central role of grace in moral improvement, and his exclusion of any room for miracles in his fatalistic account of the connection of events. Crusius, naturally, takes up the cause for the Pietists, making room in his account of the understanding for genuine mysteries of reason and outlining his own view of how human freedom can be made consistent with divine foreknowledge. But, perhaps the most intriguing contribution to the German discussion on this topic is on the part of a sympathetic colleague of Wolff ’s, namely, Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–77). In his Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death of 1746, Meier offers a critical examination of the rationalist project of demonstrating the soul’s immortality, though in emphasizing the need to prove the continued existence of the substance and personhood of the soul, Meier evidently has a richer conception of what immortality involves than, for instance, Descartes. However, in contrast to Descartes, Meier is sceptical about any rational basis for certainty that the soul will

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      survive the body’s death, and he provides a comprehensive rebuttal of the purported demonstrations of this claim. Even so, Meier’s position is nuanced in that, while he denies any demonstrative certainty of immortality, he contends that we are nonetheless justified in believing that the soul will survive after the death of the body, primarily due to the important role this assumption plays as a support for morality and religion. Despite his Wolffian leanings, then, Meier’s considered position on immortality, and his concession that even those who deny it can still attain virtue, bears more than a passing resemblance to Bayle’s views, even if Meier is careful to distinguish himself from (what he regarded as) the latter’s scepticism. That said, Meier’s denial of our rational certainty of immortality, along with his rejection of any demonstration of the eternality of punishment and his affirmation of the sufficiency of natural rewards and punishments for our actions, cannot help but put one in mind of Stosch’s controversial views, and the fact that Meier was never required to answer formally for these assertions points unmistakably to the new toleration of radical thinking, and the beginning of a new philosophical epoch, under Frederick the Great.

Selection and Presentation of the Texts Concerning these topics, then, we can see that German thinkers active in the period between 1690 and 1750 make original and significant contributions to familiar discussions and debates within the broader early Modern context. Indeed, though I have not touched on them here, there are a number of other topics besides, such as the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness, the thinking matter debate, questions concerning the relation between the soul and body, the metaphysics of causality and the ground of the laws of nature, the challenge of idealism and the proper form of its refutation, not to mention issues relating to natural law, moral psychology and the legitimation of political authority, as well as other figures, including Malebranche and Isaac Newton among others, that are also productively discussed. With respect to the texts selected for this volume, I have provided those which speak most originally and influentially to the four themes presented above which, I take it, amounts to a fairly broad sampling of some of the major issues in theoretical philosophy in the early Modern period. Recognizing the distinctive slant of most taught introductions to early Modern philosophy towards issues in metaphysics and epistemology, I have not devoted much attention to treatments of ethics or political philosophy, despite the numerous important contributions to these topics in the period (and as it happens a number of translations of key texts on these issues by thinkers in this period are already available which will be noted in due course). Moreover, I have devoted, as is only appropriate, the most space to the major figures of the period (Thomasius, Wolff, Crusius, and Meier), but have sought to balance this with a generous selection of some of the less well-known thinkers. The selection from Erxleben is the lone (and a very worthy) text by a marginalized figure to appear in this volume, though the recent surge of interest on the part of scholars in women and racialized thinkers in the early Modern period will soon see additional resources made available, including a forthcoming collection of essays relating to the contributions of women, entitled Women and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Germany

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(edited by Corey W. Dyck) and a translation (by Stephen Menn and Justin E. H. Smith) of the works of Anton Wilhelm Amo (ca. 1700–ca. 1759), the first African-born professor of philosophy in Germany. Beyond that, specialists might accuse me of a certain Brandenburg-Prussian bias in my selection, particularly evidenced by the many connections of the figures here represented to the university in Halle. While this cannot be denied, it is to be expected to some extent, given the university’s distinctly and, for a time, uniquely modern mandate, and it is in any case a natural reflection of the unusually high concentration of innovating faculty there as well as its unsurpassed influence on German thought in the early and mid-eighteenth century. In the end, my highest priority was to select those figures and texts I thought would best showcase German philosophy in the early Modern period as a far richer tradition than it is typically given credit for, and indeed as much more than either a mere footnote to Leibniz or but a step on the way to Kant.

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PART I

Truth and Prejudice

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1 Christian Thomasius: Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason (1691) Christian Thomasius was born on January 1, 1655 in Leipzig. His father, Jakob Thomasius, was a professor of rhetoric and moral philosophy at the university there and counted Leibniz among his students. As the son of a professor, Christian Thomasius was admitted as a student in 1669 (at the age of fourteen), receiving a Magister artium in 1672. In this same year, Thomasius was introduced to modern theories of natural law through the writings of Hugo Grotius and, especially, Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), leading him to pursue a doctorate in jurisprudence at Frankfurt an der Oder, which he received in 1679. Thomasius soon returned to Leipzig where he worked as a private lawyer but also offered private lectures at the university in hopes of obtaining a position. However, Thomasius’ outspokenness and his heterodox intellectual commitments soon brought him into conflict with the local theologians who endorsed an inflexible orthodox Lutheranism. So, a dissertation of 1685, in which Thomasius contends that bigamy is not inconsistent with the natural law, provoked controversy as did his announcement in 1687 that he would hold a course of lectures in German (when the practice until then had been to lecture in Latin). In 1688, Thomasius started the journal Monats-Gespräche (Monthly Conversations), the first academic periodical published in German, in which he (as the sole author) discussed recent publications in philosophy, theology, and politics, but also frequently took the opportunity to denounce what he regarded as pedantry and unjustified deference to authority in contemporary scholarship. This, as well as a couple of books—one on natural law theory and the other attacking what he regarded as Aristotelian and Cartesian philosophical dogmas—earned Thomasius a number of enemies at the university, but he initially managed to avoid any serious political or personal consequences from these (and other) conflicts on the basis of his family’s connections to the Saxon court. This would change, however, in 1690 when Thomasius penned a tract defending the marriage of a Lutheran duke and the Reformed sister of the Elector of neighboring Brandenburg, a rival to Saxony. Having lost the support of the court in Dresden, Thomasius was banned on March 10, 1690 from writing and lecturing. Thomasius was not short of options, however. Partly through the mediation of Pufendorf himself at the court of the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick III (later Frederick I of Prussia), he was invited to Halle where he would be among the founding faculty of the new university which was officially opened in 1694. He was joined there by August Hermann Francke (1663–1727), a leading Pietist theologian

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    who had previously lived in Leipzig and whom Thomasius had also defended in 1689 against the voices of Lutheran orthodoxy. In 1691, Thomasius published the Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason, his first book published in Halle though all but the last chapter were written in Leipzig, and this was followed by a series of texts on logic, ethics, and psychology, all in German and in a style that made his ideas accessible to the widest possible audience. He could not avoid controversy for long, however, as a criticism of Francke’s educational program published in 1699 led to a break with him (repaired only in 1714), and Thomasius’ use of his lectures to extend his attack on his colleagues led to a royal rescript forbidding him from lecturing on theological topics. Thomasius continued to publish, with a dissertation on concubines in 1713 that once again proved controversial, though he adopted a lower profile after 1720, and did not play a significant role in the events leading to Christian Wolff ’s expulsion from Halle in 1723. He died in Halle on September 23, 1728. The Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason (subtitle: in which the way is shown in an intelligible manner to distinguish the true, probable, and false from one another and to discover new truths, all without syllogistics, for all reasonable people of whatever estate or gender they might be) was based on Thomasius’ lectures on logic in Leipzig and was successful enough to be published in five editions before 1720. In it, Thomasius attempts in various respects to carve a middle way between Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Protestant school logics by providing an accessible account of judgment, reasoning, and discovery that avoids needless intricacies or detours into metaphysics or theology but which conforms to common sense and consistently places epistemic priority upon the senses. In this, Thomasius’s Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason variously bears comparison to the work of E. W. von Tschirnhaus (even though his Medicina mentis was one of the targets of Thomasius’ earlier criticism) and Locke (with whose Essay Thomasius did not seem to have any direct acquaintance). The following translation of Thomasius’ Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason (the edition of 1691) includes selections from Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5–7, and 13. In the first chapter, Thomasius introduces his novel conception of learnedness which is distinguished from scholastic erudition through its practical orientation and its accessibility through the (suitably cultivated) natural light of reason. The second chapter argues for a role for logic in promoting this learnedness. In the third chapter, Thomasius lays out his theory of reason as well as his general (sensualist) theory of cognition. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, Thomasius turns to the doctrine of truth, offering a division among the types of truth and falsehood, as well as an account of what he takes to be the first principle of truth and a common-sensical theory of demonstration grounded upon it. The thirteenth chapter turns to an analysis of the principal prejudices that are the sources of error. Regarding the translation itself, I have opted to render “Vernunftlehre” as “the doctrine of reason” rather than as “logic” throughout: while these amount to equivalent expressions for Thomasius (and others in the period), the fact that a number of his points draw on the component of reason (Vernunft) makes the former preferable despite its awkwardness. Also, reflecting the comparatively immature state of academic German in his day, Thomasius’ choice of terms is idiosyncratic and frequently inconsistent. When necessary I have consulted his earlier treatment in

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the Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam (Leipzig, 1688) for guidance on functionally equivalent Latinate terms. Similarly, I have not indulged Thomasius’ habit of overusing italicization (Fettdruck). All notes in the translation are my own.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Ahnert, Thomas, “Enthusiasm and Enlightenment. Faith and Philosophy in the Thought of Christian Thomasius,” in Modern Intellectual History, II (2005), pp. 153–77. Barnard, F. M., “The ‘Practical Philosophy’ of Christian Thomasius,” in Journal of the History of Ideas, 32.2 (1971), pp. 221–46. Beck, Lewis White, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1969) [pp. 247–57]. Bottin, Francesco and Longo, Mario, “Christian Thomasius,” in G. Piaia and G. Santinello, eds., Models of the History of Philosophy. Volume II, From the Cartesian Age to Brucker (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), pp. 315–23 [cf. also the “Introduction,” pp. 301–15, which considers Thomasius’ contributions to the spread of eclecticism]. Hunter, Ian, “Christian Thomasius and the Desacralization of Philosophy,” in Journal of the History of Ideas, 61.4 (2000), pp. 595–616. Kuehn, Manfred, Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1987) [pp. 257–63]. Schröder, Peter, Christian Thomasius zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 1999) [especially pp. 11–35]. Schneewind, J. B., The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) [pp. 141–66]. Thomasius, Christian, Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre, edited with a preface by W. Schneiders in W. Schneiders, ed., Christian Thomasius: Ausgewählte Werke, Bd. VIII (Hildesheim: Olms, 1998). Thomasius, Christian, Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence. With Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations, edited and translated by T. Ahnert (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2011) [in addition to Ahnert’s introduction, pp. 1–26 contain Thomasius’ reflections on his educational path thus far].

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   

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason First Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On Learnedness in General 1. Le arnedness¹ is knowledge through which the human being is made capable of properly distinguishing the true from the false and the good from the bad, and of providing the true (or as the occasion demands, the probable) causes that ground it in order that he might promote his own temporal and lasting welfare, and that of others, in ordinary life and affairs. 2. Learnedness has its seat in the human understanding, and because this is common to all, so all are capable of attaining it even though the smallest minority among us are entirely bereft of it for a variety of reasons. 3. Even in the state of innocence, where the human being lacked any imperfection, everyone would have been learned [in this sense], and indeed in that state they would probably not have even required any instruction from anyone else. 4. Yet it was after the fall, when the human understanding was cast into darkness and man accordingly had to have recourse to various laborious means in order to illuminate it, that the distinction between the learned and unlearned came about. 5. After birth, the child of whatever estate he might be is completely unknowing, and indeed to such an extent that were we to suppose that he was raised from this state in separation from other people, he would evince as little, or perhaps even less, of a trace of reason as some beasts. 6. When, however, the child dispels the clouds of unknowing, with God’s grace, through a good education, conversation with others, the reading of good books, and above all mature reflection, then he can finally attain to the highest degree of wisdom that can be achieved in this life, to be compared with Socrates, Plato, and others among the heathens, and with Joseph, Salomon, etc., among the pious. 7. Between this highest degree of human wisdom and the lowest degree of utter unknowing there are innumerably many intermediate steps which might be classified, as the case may be, either as learnedness or as the lack thereof. 8. As difficult as it is to say how many seeds out of a handful might constitute a heap, it is just as difficult to determine at what precise degree of knowledge a human being emerges from being un-learned to become properly learned. 9. On account of this one need not wonder that it is often the case that the names of the learned are misused by those who are anything but, or that one dismisses learnedness in favor of titles and honorary offices. 10. I hold him to be a learned individual who knows a few truths with certainty which he can apply to common use and from which he can further derive other truths in a variety of areas of knowing; for the rest, he rightly understands the common saying that the world is full of empty delusions. Thus, he can discern as easily and clearly the truths he himself possesses as he can the delusions of others. 11. Nonetheless, even such an individual must continue to strive daily to improve his understanding because he will continually have the opportunity to discover new

¹ Thomasius here uses the archaic “Gelahrheit” rather than “Gelehrsamkeit.” While I have opted to render it as “learnedness,” which is its most natural translation, as will become clear Thomasius does not consider Gelahrheit to be only (or always) the result of academic education.

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truths and to uncover new prejudices, partly in himself and partly in others, that hinder the search after truth. 12. Now although learnedness tears one from the clutches of imperfection, and therefore it is reasonable that all should endeavor to become learned, so the state of human society after the fall does not permit this as the difference in estates gives many people so much to do that the time that is required for the attainment of learnedness for the sake of the common good must be consumed by affairs. 13. However, everyone should also endeavor that their lack of learnedness cannot be taken for a crude ignorance, and to this end should learn as much as their position in their estate permits, through daily experience and requests for counsel from the learned, so that they can promote the happiness of others and their own, even if they have no comprehension of other estates or cannot even give an accurate account of their own. 14. For the rest, however, who have the leisure and opportunity to tend to the more exact correction of their understanding, even if they do not intend to make a profession of their learnedness, they should nonetheless endeavor as far as possible to raise themselves above the state of the first group so that they cannot be called unlearned though they might not be able to pass as learned. 15. For those who would make a profession of their learnedness, however, they must first and foremost take into consideration that God has made provision for two special sorts of light in this life by means of which the darkened understanding might be illuminated and which such individuals know well to distinguish. 16. The first is the natural light or the understanding itself, through which the human being is made capable of framing true and distinct concepts of sensible and earthly things from its own natural powers for use in this temporal life. 17. The second is the supernatural light that originates in divine revelation, through which the human being is given to know, as far as his present imperfection permits, the divine mysteries that will lead him to a future life. 18. As this divine revelation is contained in the Holy Scripture, so the individual who would be properly learned in this respect must undertake to master the languages of the Old as well as the New Testaments. 19. For the use of the natural light, by contrast, no foreign languages are necessary but rather one can readily avail oneself of it without these, irrespective of whether one is a man or woman, young or old, poor or rich. 20. It is, however, better to have foreign languages at one’s command insofar as through reading the work of other learned people who write in another language one gains the opportunity to attain knowledge of things that are not regularly available to one’s senses or is led to reflect further on one’s own knowledge of things through another’s remarks which might not have otherwise occurred to us since many eyes are better than two. 21. The knowledge that originates from Holy Scripture is called theology, that however which relies upon human reason is called philosophy.² And when someone

² Thomasius here uses the term “Welt-Weisheit” which might literally be translated as “worldly wisdom” (and thus the contrast with theology or “Gottes-Gelahrheit”) though it was a common way of referring to philosophy.

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    devotes his life to pursuing these, his is called a God-fearing or a virtuous life, respectively. 22. Theology is not my subject in this treatise as I judge myself to still be a student in this sort of learning; rather, my aim is to elaborate on that philosophy which leads to a virtuous and happy life in this world. 23. Although theology rests on revelation and philosophy is, by contrast, derived from the inner power of reason, nonetheless the former is not entirely independent of human reason, and the latter presupposes a human sort of revelation, if not a divine one. 24. This is because divine secrets no doubt exceed human understanding and yet they are not contrary to it; instead, God has accommodated Himself to us humans as far as possible in his Holy Scripture and speaks to us as a man who is at the same time the Lord God. 25. Further, as concerns philosophy, which reasons about creatures, it is not in dispute that this extends beyond merely present things to consider things that are far removed or in the past, about which the philosopher cannot infer anything reasonable if he does not presuppose at the very least the truth of some historical account. 26. Accordingly, the doctrine of reason and history are two instruments that theology and philosophy have in common, though with the following notable difference. 27. Philosophy requires the doctrine of reason as the ground of its entire science and presupposes only those historical accounts that rest on revelation as postulates and hypotheses upon which it will exercise its method, and does not concern itself primarily with whether these historical claims stem from divine or human revelation. 28. With theology, however, divine revelation is the constant basis in accordance with which it not only judges those historical claims derived from human beings but also it is chiefly that by which it trains reason not to venture to measure divine mysteries according to the standard of its syllogisms but instead to subject the understanding to the control of belief when it comes to supernatural things. 29. As such, one does not make use of the doctrine of reason in theology as a means for grasping divinely revealed truths, since for this a divine illumination would be required, albeit one that, as is declared by our Church, does not provoke fanaticism. 30. Rather, one needs the doctrine of reason in theology only insofar as one thereby purifies the understanding of all prejudices, reveals erroneous syllogisms and inferences, and also promotes the avoidance of sophistical and quibbling interpretations. 31. For when God speaks to us through the Scripture he does not accommodate Himself to such people who have left their reason in a state of confusion, and who are given to all sorts of prejudices that hinder them from grasping divine mysteries, but instead He accommodates Himself to such as have sufficiently purified their understanding in these respects. This is because the Holy Scripture is already difficult to understand and would only be further misunderstood otherwise; yet, for those frivolous or sophistical individuals who are unwilling to be taught, this misunderstanding takes place as a result of their own inaction and so they only succeed in securing their own damnation.

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32. The Holy Spirit has no doubt often availed itself of such people who were not tutored in human wisdom, as a result of which the style of writing in the Holy Scripture is different; however, these are nonetheless all individuals who did not misuse their natural understanding. 33. In this way, one need not be perplexed when one sees that a theologian writes on topics primarily belonging to the doctrine of reason, concerning interpretation in general, etc., since this is for no other end than to warn the orthodox believer that erring sophistry is best avoided in this way, and to instruct the heterodox believer of his misuse of reason in this instance. 38.³ Hopefully the following short remarks will clarify what we have said thus far and render any further proofs unnecessary: i. That does not count as learning which neither yields nothing of use in ordinary human life nor contributes to our blessedness. ii. Having many languages at one’s command is but the smallest part of learnedness. iii. One needs no particular calling to be learned. iv. Women are as capable of learnedness as men. v. Knowing much does not of itself make for a learned man. vi. He is not learned who cannot prove it in deed. vii. He is not learned who confuses the natural and the supernatural light.

Second Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On the Doctrine of Reason in Particular 1. The doctrine of reason is the doctrine that teaches the human being how to properly make use of his reason, that is, those thoughts in general that are involved in the cognition of truth, in whatever area of learnedness it might be, and that teaches how he should be of service to other human beings through the use of it. 2. The doctrine of reason concerns human beings specifically and no other creatures because no other creatures possess reason. Reason is thus nothing else than a faculty of the human soul. 3. This doctrine is grounded in the faculty of reason of the human being himself, and therefore it is given naturally by God to the human race itself. Commensurate with this circumstance, we would not stand in need of any abstract doctrine of the doctrine of reason whatsoever were it not the case that the human condition in this life is so constituted that from childhood onwards the natural light of our reason is obscured by manifold causes. 4. For from youth onwards, many false imaginings are impressed as true ones upon young children, whose understanding is not yet empowered to judge which are true and which false; it is not until the age of adulthood that they become capable of recognizing the errors that have been committed and are able to correct them.

³ This section is incorrectly numbered “30” in the original, and I have omitted the successive section numbers in the list of points that follows.

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    5. On account of this, the doctrine of reason also offers no instruction concerning supernatural things, but rather only teaches how to employ reason correctly according to its natural use, or better, how we might drive out this obfuscation of the natural light. 6. Accordingly it is not a cause for perplexity that among some human beings the natural light is so strong that they are able to dispel the dark clouds of error independent of any instruction. 7. However, all such instruction is not on that account to be dismissed inasmuch as examples of such individuals are rare and, through the appropriate instruction, freeing oneself of error is once again made easier for others. 8. Yet, this doctrine only teaches how reason should be employed in general, irrespective of which area of learnedness is at issue, since we have already made clear that the doctrine of reason is an instrument common to all of learnedness as such. 9. And thus the doctrine of reason would not at all be deserving of this title if it could not be employed in all parts of learnedness, since that is a poor instrument which I cannot apply to more than one task. 10. Therefore, the doctrine of reason should present the principal rules that can be used for the cognition of truth in whatever area of learnedness. However, concerning the application of these rules to a specific area, the doctrine of reason leaves this to other disciplines. 11. The end of the doctrine of reason is truth, and accordingly it is to be distinguished from grammar and rhetoric since the former only instructs us concerning how we should formulate our thoughts in discourse without regard for their truth, whereas the latter teaches how we should go about convincing others of something, true or otherwise, by means of a well-turned speech. 12. The doctrine of reason has as its chief aim the cognition of truth as every part of the doctrine of reason aims at this, albeit in different ways. 13. However, the doctrine of reason would not at all merit the title if it only taught human beings how they should express truths that are already known, or how to present them to others, or how to discourse in a convincing fashion on a topic about which one knows nothing. 14. Furthermore, the search after truth must not be confused with the acquisition or actual cognition of truth,⁴ since it is not sufficient for the doctrine of reason to instruct us on how we should hunt for the truth, but it must also disclose the means by which we can capture and retain it. 15. Yet, because the weakness of the human understanding is such that it makes it impossible for us to cognize all truths precisely and distinctly, or even to be assured of the certainty of the truths that one already knows, it suffices if the doctrine of reason only shows how to distinguish the incontrovertibly true from the incontrovertibly false, and for the rest if it shows us how we might recognize in other matters whether there is some probability to be encountered in it, and the degree and extent to which the human understanding can advance its science regarding it.

⁴ Here Thomasius draws a subtle distinction between Nachforschung (i.e., the search or inquiry after truth) and Erforschung (the research or successful attainment of truth).

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16. In addition, the doctrine of reason must not instruct a human being on how he can attain truth solely for his own benefit, but it must also show how he can thereby be of service to the human race. The doctrine of reason is thus not only an instrument for attaining learnedness but also the first and most necessary part of it. 17. Accordingly the doctrine of reason might appropriately be divided into two parts, where the first part treats reason in general and truth; the first characteristic features of and basic rules concerning truth; the various things concerning which reason might investigate their truth; the means of attaining to the acquisition of unknown truths; the method and the order that we can make use of in this, etc. 18. The second part considers in particular how one should proceed when one is (i) investigating truth in its own right, (ii) teaching others known truths, (iii) trying to understand the opinions of others, (iv) judging regarding these opinions, and (v) seeking to refute these.

Third Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On Human Reason and its Various Activities 20.⁵ [Let us consider a bit more carefully what thoughts are on the part of the human being.] If thoughts were things outside of us then we would not trouble ourselves with their description; rather, I would only point them out to you as I would a lion, triangle, or motion. But thoughts are in us to such an extent that we could not even get at them by means of anatomy. It is, therefore, necessary for us to give one another a clear description of our thoughts so that we do not simply tap around blindly. 21. Yet I am best placed to know my thoughts and you yours; whence I can describe to you how I think better than how you think and you, by contrast, can give the best account of your thoughts to me. If we compare these various accounts, and confer with others regarding their thoughts, then without fail we will either obtain from this a correct description of thoughts, or discover that one person thinks differently than another. Now then, I plan to make a start of this here. 22. When I think, I always engage in an internal discourse with myself concerning the images that are impressed upon the brain by the movements of external bodies through the senses, and if I should be made to swear on it then I would say that I have an inner sentiment that this inner discourse takes place nowhere else than in my own brain. 23. If you hold that your thinking proceeds differently, then I would be obliged if you would tell me as much or provide a single example of a thought that does not transpire in this way. Where such is not forthcoming, then let us consider the words of my definition more carefully. 24. I referred to an internal discourse, and I have as yet not met anyone who did not also have a sentiment concerning his own thoughts of the sort that one has when another speaks to him. It is true that children and people who are deaf by nature cannot thus speak with themselves; yet, ask a child or someone who is deaf what he ⁵ The initial sections of this part consider the differences (including physiological) between humans and animals by way of showing that reason is a uniquely human faculty and logic its discipline.

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    has just thought or what they are thinking now, and you will find that there are no sound reasons on the basis of which you could convince someone else that these individuals do not think. They are no doubt human beings, but you have not yet proven that human beings must think at all times. 25. I engage in this internal discourse with myself, I who stand before you with skin and hair, flesh and bone, and with everything that is within and about me. 26. I discourse with myself concerning images. By these, I understand all the impressions of external bodies or of their properties and movements upon our brain; these might be impressed upon it by means of the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, or by means of any other organ and its nerves which all come together in the brain. And thus, I understand the images of sound, or smell, etc., in addition to the images of external things. 27. As concerns feeling, I do not deny that it is distributed through all of the members of the human body, and even that the brain is moved through the physical movement of the body’s internal organs. Accordingly, when in the foregoing section I thought of external bodies, I understand by these not those that are external to the whole human being but rather those that are external to the human brain. 28. And therefore I also comprehend under feeling any unusual sorts of sentiments that that others have considered under an isolated sense, such as hunger, thirst, the “touch of Venus,” and similar things. 29. This internal discourse however, which takes place within my brain, is not sensed in my heart nor in any other part of the human body, as I feel quite particularly that I think in the upper part of my head, where the brain rests, even though this sentiment is much subtler than others which stir immediately upon the movement of external bodies, and this sentiment consists in nothing else than that I think that I think or, in the style of the Cartesians, in consciousness. 30. Consequently, within human sensibility there are external and internal sensations (senses). 31. External sensations are those that take place when the human brain is immediately stimulated by external bodies, so when it sees, hears, smells, tastes, feels, or when it senses hunger, thirst, romantic feelings, pains, or any other stirrings of the mind. 32. Internal sensations are when the impressed images recur, and when along with this one knows what one is thinking. 33. Yet you must beware of conflating this division of the senses with the common signification of the terms. Since what one generally refers to as the external senses are nothing other than the external members of the human body, of the same sort as those that are found in beasts. Beasts, however, do not possesses an actual sensibility, as this can never obtain without cognition and consequently without thoughts. 34. As concerns common internal senses, of which the first, namely, the common sense (sensus communis), is nothing other than my external sense, phantasy, and memory, these belong partially to the internal senses and partially to our active thoughts. 35. [These partially belong to active thoughts] since the thoughts on the part of the human being are either passive or active (passions or actions).

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36. Passions are nothing else than the sensations we have previously explained. 37. Actions occur when the human being considers what he has seen, heard, etc. with his will, that is, when he reckons, estimates, combines or separates thoughts, poetically invents, or when he resolves to do something. 38. The brain is, however, large, and is typically divided into the cerebrum and the cerebellum. Now I cannot tell you with any certainty in which part of the brain the human being thinks; yet, all appearances suggest it to be impossible that the human being would execute all of its thinking from the pineal gland. 42. Now that we have considered the thoughts on the part of the human being more carefully, you will see that animals, because they cannot think, comprehend no internal discourse nor do they discourse with themselves internally, and that they have no knowledge of anything, do not reflect, poetize, reckon, estimate, combine or separate thoughts from one another, or even will. 57. However, it is also not likely that the movements of animals are merely the result of the motions of external bodies and that they have no internal cause at all, as there are too many behaviors on the part of beasts that indicate some internal direction. 60. Now we are in a position to offer a description of the human being. The human being is a corporeal being that can move itself and think. 61. The human being consists of two principal parts, the first of which he has in common with animals, and the second of which distinguishes him from animals, namely, body and soul, respectively. 62. The body is the part that moves itself and the soul is the part that can think. 63. I cannot say anything further regarding the human soul, as will be made clear in many instances below. 64. As far as the thoughts of the human being are concerned, however, these consist in two different types, namely, in the understanding and the will. 65. The understanding is also called reason, as we use it here, since sometimes under “reason” are comprehended both the understanding and the will and thereby all of the thoughts of which human beings are capable. 66. The understanding and the will are frequently associated with one another, and therefore I need to carefully distinguish them from one another. 67. In general, one says that the passive thoughts on the part of the human soul comprise the understanding, and that action comprises the will, and in this way we could claim with utmost distinctness that the understanding consists merely in our sensations or sentiments as we have defined them above, and that the rest of our thoughts belong to the will. And in this way, when I meditate concerning something it would also be something proper to the will. 68. Yet this opinion is not correct because human reason also often acts in its own right, and conversely the human will is often passive. Therefore, I prefer a different distinction: the human understanding is the activity or passivity of the soul insofar as it considers and cognizes the essence or constitution of things. The will, however, is the activity or passivity of the soul insofar as it is led to think something on the basis of the movement of the external sensory members. In this way, the resolution on the part of the human being to consider something regarding past or absent things belongs to the understanding.

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    69. Concerning the human will, I will have more to say on this in another place. As concerns the understanding, however, it is necessary first to say something regarding its activities or operations. 70. Moreover, we will not make any effort to inquire into whether there are two, three, or four operations of the mind and what these consist in. Every opinion relating to this question (even that which we ourselves have previously defended⁶) is lacking in clarity, subject to a number of doubts, and have no other use than to justify the general method of the doctrine of reason. But because we are not concerned with this, we can avoid discussing them altogether. 71. The activities of the human understanding with respect to external things are either doubtful or without doubt. With the activities involving doubt, the human being is always asking after something. 72. Concerning those activities which involve no doubt, these consist either in affirming something about some matter or denying it. 73. Activities involving doubt presuppose some imperfection in the human being in his present state; but they are notwithstanding a necessary evil because without them one could not easily attain to a certain cognition of the truth. 74. Those activities that are without doubt, however, are in some cases signs of some perfection in our present life but, in others, signs of a great imperfection. 75. Furthermore, the activities of human reason either concern an external thing in and for itself alone, or in consideration of and comparison with other things. 76. Considered in and for itself, one considers an external thing either according to its being or existence, or according to its essence or constitution. 77. In either case, one either considers the entire thing in general or specifically according to its parts. 78. Questions regarding the whether? when? and where? of an external thing concerns its existence, whereas those regarding of what form? and in what measure? concern its essence. 79. When the understanding compares one external thing with others and considers both as present, then it either counts these, or it engages in estimation with respect to them where it seeks either for some uniformity or some difference between them. 80. Here, questions such as how many? how large? and in what respect are these the same? are appropriate. 81. However, when the understanding considers one thing as present and another as past or in the future, it engages in considering either the thing’s motion, duration, origin, or action. 82. Here, questions such as from where? whence? out of what? and to what end? are appropriate. 83. In all of these cognitions, the human brain is, as contended above, impressed with images which, insofar as the human understanding operates internally with these, are called abstractions. ⁶ Thomasius might be referring here to his previous contention in his Monats-Gespräche that “the human being has two faculties of cognition, the understanding (intellectum) and imagination (imaginationem)”; see Lustiger und Ernsthaffter Monats-Gespräche I (1688), pp. 400ff.

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84. Indeed, it considers these abstractions in two ways: either in and for themselves, as they have been impressed upon it by the presence of external things. This internal activity is usually called memory. 85. Or, it combines them as it pleases, or separates them from one another, and makes as it were new abstractions from them. This activity is called phantasy or imagination. 86. When, however, the understanding seeks previously unknown things on the basis of these known abstractions, then this action is called reckoning, inferring, calculating: reasoning. 87. This inference is either for the sake of investigating a past origin and cause of a thing, or it is for reckoning the future activities and consequences that will emerge from it. 88. As these activities on the part of the understanding, and the cognitions proper to them, are distinguished, so they have received different names. These cognitions are alternatively called clear or obscure, manifest or subtle, confused or distinct. 89. A clear cognition is one in which the understanding is brought to its cognition of something through the external senses by means of a strong motion, that is, when the object is close to the senses. 90. An obscure cognition is that where the object is either completely removed from the senses, or only weakly stimulates the senses. 91. One’s cognition is manifest when one can instruct another of what one cognizes in such a distinct way that it is as if it lies before his eyes, or in such a way that when the corresponding object is actually presented to his senses he is able to grasp it. 92. One’s cognition is subtle when one cannot so instruct another in such a distinct way. 93. Therefore, the greatest difference between clear and manifest cognitions, and likewise between obscure and subtle cognitions, is that our conceptions of things are called clear or obscure with respect to ourselves, whereas they are called manifest or subtle with respect to others, even though in common parlance these names are not carefully distinguished. 94. We speak, however, of confused or distinct cognition either with respect to a single thing or many things. 95. With respect to a single thing, that cognition is confused where I only grasp the whole in general, and another is distinct where I consider the parts of the whole as well. The more parts of a thing that I distinguish, the more distinct is my cognition. 96. When however I mix up different things, then this yields a confused concept. Yet, the more precisely that I know how to distinguish these things from one another, the more distinct is my concept. 97. Beware of confusing this last designation with the first, since such a confusion can give rise to a significant hindrance in the investigation of the truth. 98. But also beware, for the sake of this same investigation, that you do not conflate the truth or falsehood of a cognition, or its certainty or uncertainty, with these above-mentioned designations, since these former designations rest on an entirely different foundation, as will be made clear in the chapter on truth.

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   

Fifth Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: Of Truth and its Various Types 1. By truth is not to be understood mere truthfulness, which belongs to morals, but rather an assent internal to the human being that something which it thinks is in fact the case. 2. Yet this concept of truth remains too wide-ranging, since this internal assent also occurs among those who propound a false opinion or a merely apparent truth. Accordingly, if we consider the principal rules for acquiring truth, then we could better come to know what truth actually is. 3. But perhaps truth is not in the world, and is merely the idle delusion of those who call themselves learned; or maybe it is so hidden from human beings that they could never discover it. Indeed, for how many thousands of years have the learned argued concerning it and yet they still cannot agree on who has found it. 4. The fault however is not on the side of truth, but rather on that of the stubbornness or hastiness on the part of these philosophers. 5. Your own thoughts will convince you when something is true, and were you to deny this then our entire purpose in this discussion is for naught since this proposition that something is true cannot be taken to hold without the general assent of all reasonable people and in the absence of the assurance of each individual in their own case. 6. We will gain a more distinct knowledge of the essence of truth, however, when we begin by comparing a number of examples of incontrovertible truths. For example, such truths as: this tower is square, this stick is straight, you and I are currently awake, we have hands and feet, snow looks white and not black, [etc.]. 8. I will present another sort of example: it is impossible that something is and is not at the same time; 4 plus 3 is 7, the whole is greater than the half, three angles in a triangle equal two right angles [etc.]. 12. [In providing these sets of examples,] I intend for you to select an example from each of both types since were you to reflect on only one of these classes [and frame your conception of truth accordingly] your concept would be more narrowly limited than it should be, as will be made clear in the following chapter. 13. Thus truth is nothing other than an agreement between human thoughts and the constitution of things outside of our thoughts. 14. Here, however, you must not ask whether the understanding must agree with things, or the things with the understanding; rather this harmony is so constituted that neither provides the guiding principle for the other, but this harmony is simultaneously presupposed by both even though external things as it were initiate it. 15. This is because things are so constituted that they can be grasped by the human being, and the understanding is so constituted that it can grasp external things. 16. External things stimulate the sensibility of the human understanding. The understanding, however, considers these stimuli, divides them, combines them, isolates them from one another, and compares them. 17. Falsehood or untruth comes to be, however, when there is no harmony between external things and our thoughts.

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18. When one sincerely passes one’s opinion off as true then this is called an error, though when one lets this take place merely as an activity of one’s understanding then it is called a fiction or poetic invention. 19. In the case of a falsehood, however, whether it is external things that do not agree with our thoughts, or our thoughts that do not agree with external things, the responsibility for error nonetheless lies more on the side of the human understanding than with external things, even though, for instance, it is its removal from external things that often occasions the carelessness of the understanding. 20. What is true is either incontrovertibly true or probable. 21. That is incontrovertibly true which any given adult with whom we have concourse is also internally certain of provided only that we have brought him through the use of distinct words to understand our thoughts. 22. When this internal approval is accompanied with a doubt that the matter could be otherwise then it is probable. 23. These different sorts of truth stem not so much from external things as they do from the altered state of human reason. External things remain at all times the same as far as their essence is concerned; yet the human understanding is incapable of immediately grasping the truth concerning all things, and no doubt the fault belongs to it. 24. And so there are some things that stand in no need of even the slightest proof or that cannot be proved, because there is nothing more truthful to be found, and these truths are instead readily understood by all human beings, provided these retain their innocence, such as that we are awake at this moment, or that 2 times 3 is 6. 25. Some of these truths, however, are such that they can be proven through something clearer, as that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. And if an incontrovertible truth issues thereby, then one calls that proof a demonstration. 26. When, however, it is not clear than an internal assurance can follow from a proof then the result is a mere probability; for instance, that that is true which two witnesses affirm to be the case. 27. From this follows (i) that sometimes probable things can become incontrovertible truths, though not always. 28. It also follows (ii) that something could be incontrovertibly true that is held to be only probable or even false on account of human limitation; for instance, that the earth is round. 29. It also follows (iii) that some false or probable opinions are, on account of this same limitation, held for incontrovertibly true; for instance, that there are no antipodes. 30. It also follows (iv) that many incontrovertible truths are recognized by some people, but by some others they are only taken as probable on account of the uncertainty of the proof; for instance, that the human being is unhappy without the society of other people. 31. As we have just divided up the true, so we can also divide the false into the incontrovertibly so or that which is only accompanied with probability. 32. That is incontrovertibly false with respect to which any person can become assured of its disharmony with things.

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    33. That is probably false when one recognizes in the approval of something that it could also turn out to be true. 34. In the same way, the falsehood of some things is so evident to the human understanding that they require no proof; for instance, that I do not have any hands or feet, or that a triangle is a square. Others can be demonstrated to be false, as that two angles of a triangle equal two right angles, or that animals think, and still others are only probable conjectures, for instance, that the sun revolves around the earth. 38. Similarly, there are things that one passes off as neither true nor false, either because they are of a nature entirely unsuited to the capacity of our understanding so that on account of their exceeding minuteness no sensible impression of them can penetrate, such as with the most minute particles of matter; or it is because of the exceedingly elevated character of those things that they cannot be impressed upon our understanding, as with supernatural, spiritual, or divine things. 39. Or it can also be on account of the absence of those things such that they cannot be compared with the understanding, as again is the case with supernatural things but also with many natural things that remain at all times removed from us. 40. These latter things, insofar as they remain removed from our consideration, are called unfamiliar or unknown things and they are, with respect to our understanding, neither true nor false because some cognition is required for the true as well as for the false. 41. These can of course become true or false under the right circumstances, as when we do become acquainted with them, so when they either cease to be absent or when we learn something of them through revelation, but in these cases they cease to be unknown. 42. From the above follows, (i) that mere words, insofar as they are just considered as words and are not referred to the things that they signify or to other external things, are neither false nor true but are only apt to be one or the other in their application to these things. This is because words hold a signification on account of the will of the human being and not as a result of their own nature. 45. Similarly, it follows from this (ii) that the thoughts on the part of the human being are, in and of themselves, neither true nor false without relation to something else, but are only apt to be one or the other when compared with something. 47. It also follows (iii) that, when I direct my thoughts to a non-being and affirm or deny something of it, instead of being supposed to think something true or false it is rather much more the case that I do not in fact think anything, since a non-being, as we have defined it above,⁷ as in a human being without reason or a cold fire, is neither within our understanding nor external to it but is rather mere words without significance that are not apt for harmony or disharmony and, thus, can be neither true nor false. 48. (iv) That because every instance of harmony is a relation, and this always requires two things, there is properly speaking in the concept of a simple term neither truth nor falsehood but instead a proposition is at least required for these.

⁷ See the Fourth Main Part (“On the Technical Terms Proper to Logic”), propositions 7–9.

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49. (v) That there can be no talk of truth or falsehood concerning thoughts of doubts or questions on the part of the mind, but rather only concerning claims that are held without doubt⁸ that affirm or deny something, since the former have as their object something that is unknown.

Sixth Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On the First, Indemonstrable Truths as well as the First Principles and Criteria of Truth 1. Now the previous chapter has made it clear that there are truths and indeed of different sorts, and that among these are the incontrovertible truths which are reasonably taken to have priority and to belong above all to the doctrine of reason and even to constitute the touchstone for truth in general. We must consider these a bit more closely. 2. It appears that, because some of these incontrovertible truths have no need of proof, whereas some are derived from others, we need not concern ourselves with the former or look upon them as anything deserving of particular attention in our doctrine of reason since no one calls them into doubt. Since, however, we have to seek the ground of provable truths above all, that is, that from which other truths are derived, so it remains necessary to at least investigate whether we cannot somehow obtain the ground for these truths from the indemonstrable ones. 3. A proposition that must be proven from another has to stand in some connection with it, and if that proposition is supposed to be proved from some further one, then the same connection must be presupposed. 4. From this it follows that one truth is connected with others and as long as a given truth is proven through another, then it may not be called a principal ground or source of truth as instead it seems clear that such a foundational truth must be indemonstrable. 5. Such a foundational truth is called a first principle by philosophers and can be defined for now as an indemonstrable truth from which other truths can be derived. Since however there has been serious controversy among philosophers concerning this first principle, we have to proceed all the more carefully in our investigation. 6. In the previous chapter, we have listed many examples of such indemonstrable truths; for instance, that this is a dog, that the tower is square, that 3 times 2 is 6. 7. Yet these cannot be admitted as first principles because they are all individual or particular propositions from which no truth can be derived. 8. Accordingly, it is proper to first principles that they are universal propositions so that further truths can be derived from them. 9. And in this way one can establish a difference between first truths and first principles. All first principles are first truths, but not all first truths are first principles. First truths can also include particular propositions whereas first principles are only universal, although the latter are formed from the former, and the former occur to the human understanding sooner and as it were awaken the latter in it.

⁸ These are not necessarily indubitable claims, but rather claims that we wholly affirm or deny.

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    10. Further: first truths cannot be first principles since the former are innumerable whereas there can only be a single first principle. 11. This is because the human being has but a single understanding, and the understanding does not differ between human beings but rather is of a single essence. 12. Accordingly, it is typically conceded that the word first can be predicated in a certain sense of many things, yet as concerns the first principle of truth it signifies only a single principle. 13. Since if there were in fact two principles, then these would nonetheless have either some connection between them or none. 14. If they were connected with each other by means of a third principle, then that third principle would be the first, and consequently the other two could not be called first principles. 15. If they were not connected with each other, then we would have to infer that the human understanding was not one but rather that two different lights of nature were cast from it, which is absurd. 16. Indeed, it would follow that truth was not truth, because irreconcilable things cannot make up a harmony. 17. What, then might this first proposition be? While the philosophers quarrel about that vigorously among themselves, we can proceed without any hesitation on our part. There cannot fail to be one as the first principle comprehends all truths. 18. The principle must therefore necessarily be derived from the definition of truth, since if this definition did not also comprehend all truths, then it would not be a definition. 19. In mathematics, one also tends to derive all axioms from the definitions of things. 20. In this way, we can see that the first principle must be as follows: That which agrees with human reason is true, and that which is contrary to human reason is false.⁹ 21. Yes, you say, I have long known this to be the case, but what I would really like to know is what this agreement consists in. This first principle remains far too obscure for me as I still do not know whether the true is that which agrees with the senses or that which agrees with the ideas of the understanding. 22. My dear friend, I reply, you are yourself responsible for this obscurity because you oppose the senses and ideas on account of having been seduced by the heathen philosophy; in fact both belong to the human understanding and, therefore, truth must involve agreement with the senses as well as with the ideas of the understanding. 23. The senses yield the passive thoughts of the understanding, whereas ideas are its active thoughts. 24. The former have immediately to do with individuals whereas the latter have to do with universals. 25. The senses are the beginning of all human cognition, and the ideas of the understanding follow upon them. [ . . . ]

⁹ Compare Thomasius’ definition of truth in the Fifth Main Part, proposition 13.

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26. This first principle thus comprehends two propositions within itself, or rather resolves itself into them. The first is: what the human understanding cognizes through the senses is true, and what is contrary to the senses is false. 27. Yet since it often occurs that things are in fact different from what is presented through the senses, as when a straight stick appears bent in water, we must provide a clearer account of this rule, lest we come to think that the senses deceive, or could deceive, the human being. 28. For this reason, we presuppose that the human being who would investigate the truth is sound in body, that is, that the external organs of sense are in that natural condition in which they are found in other human beings. 29. Second, we also presuppose he is of sound understanding and neither raving nor otherwise demented. 30. Third, we presuppose that he is waking and not asleep. 31. These three requirements belong as much to the cognition of that truth acquired through the senses as it does to that truth acquired and exercised through our active thoughts [ . . . ]. 32. Nonetheless there is a notable difference in importance between these three requirements. Sleep naturally hinders me from the cognition of all truths because through it the starting point of cognition, by which I mean sight, hearing, and feeling, is blocked. It might be that this is a dreamless sleep, in which case the human being neither thinks something true nor something false, or that this slumber is accompanied by dreams, in which case his own conscience will inform him upon awakening that his dreams represented things to him that were either entirely false or had falsehoods interspersed throughout. 40. Yes, you say, but who assures me of this truth, namely, that I am of sound understanding and awake? I have often thought while dreaming that I was awake, and I might be so deceiving myself now. 41. Certainly, if you do not want to trust your own senses and your own internal assurance, then I cannot help you, as this presupposition belongs among the indemonstrable truths.¹⁰ 42. What you conclude from your objection, moreover, is rather unreasonable since all that would follow from this is that a dreaming person does not know how to make use of the criterion of truth, and now behold you only strike at yourself with this objection. 44. Now once we have presupposed this, then we know further that inner sense, as defined above, has never deceived us, and cannot even possibly do so.¹¹ 45. As concerns the external senses (as we have defined them), we must first and foremost avoid confusing their images or schemata with the things themselves from which they are formed. 46. Images, that is, the movements or impressions in our brain, never deceive us. Therefore it is, for instance, actually true that something rings in our ears, that a

¹⁰ It seems likely that Thomasius is here referring to the presupposition that such conviction (i.e., supplied by the senses and our own internal assurance) cannot be false. ¹¹ See the Third Main Part, propositions 22 and following.

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    square tower seems round in the distance, that a straight stick appears bent in water, [ . . . ], etc. 47. But, with regard to the things themselves, it sometimes happens that these images do not in actuality relate to them in the way in which we imagine, or they do not stem from the causes that we are convinced they do, which can easily be gleaned from the examples just cited. 48. However, one should not cast blame on the senses as a result; the fault lies rather with the precipitancy of our active thoughts and of judgment. 71. We must now also consider ideas which make up the other half of the understanding and, indeed, constitute its most distinguished part. Nonetheless, there is such a connection obtaining between it and sensibility that nothing rational can be imagined of one of them without the other. 72. The senses present me with mere individuals and there is no doubt that for as many individuals as occur to me, there are as many impressions occurring in my brain, and there are likewise as many reflections on these on the part of the human understanding. 73. Now, however, every human being has the capacity of dividing a given thing into a thousand smaller parts in his thoughts, and of comparing these parts with one another as well as with the parts of a thousand other wholes. 74. This division and composition cannot stem from the senses since these only present individuals to us without any ordering and indeed it presents each as an undivided whole. 75. Accordingly, the division and combination must be a pure act of thought that is not touched by a crude impression, as occurs in passive thoughts, but that rather was in part previously in the cognitive capacity in the human being (which capacity it shares with sensible and passive thoughts) and in part something that comes about after the occurrence of an impression (like reflection), not as it were against one’s will but rather through one’s own power of choice. 76. Since, however, this dividing and holding-together is the completion of the human understanding and will, the human being would not be what he is if he did not possess this capacity but instead had only the power to reflect on the individuals that are present to him; indeed, reflection and apprehension would do him little good if he did not have that capacity. 77. (And so an animal cannot yet be taken for rational even if it reflects on the things impressed on the senses.) 78. Nonetheless, the exercise of active thoughts would not be possible for the understanding if the concepts of individuals acquired through the senses had not been imprinted on it. For, how could it divide a whole into parts if it did not have a whole available to it, and how could it compare one individual with another, or order them with respect to each other, if it did not already have concepts of individuals? 79. Consequently, active thoughts always presuppose passive ones, and it is in this way that the common dictum is to be explained, namely that nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the senses. 80. Everything, then, that is proper to these active thoughts on the part of the understanding can be called ideas or abstractions, or whatever else you like.

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100. Thus, the other main proposition that is contained in the first principle is as follows: that which agrees with the ideas the understanding makes of those things impressed upon the senses is true, and that which is contrary to these is false. 101. No one will deny this proposition if he only considers that ideas, as we have defined them thus far, are and could be nothing else than definitions of things. 102. And if someone did deny this proposition, or demanded its proof, then we would not engage with him because it is just as indemonstrable as the first. 103. The greatest difficulty facing this proposition would appear to be that human beings occasionally, or even often, frame fantastic and false ideas of a thing, and in this way it seems that it is the ideas that deceive us, and as a consequence no first principle of truth can be drawn from them. 104. However, it can readily be replied that it does not tell against our proposition that the ideas and definitions of things that human beings frame are for the most part false, since the fault lies not with the human understanding or the natural light, but instead with the corrupted will, through which the human being obscures his own understanding and stubbornly takes false ideas for the genuine article, and indeed even deliberately heaps these one upon another, and does so from his partiality towards those prejudices formed in his youth which are the source of all error. 110. Finally, having shown that there can only be a single first principle of reasoning, it follows necessarily that we cannot divide it into species. 111. And even though one tends to speak generally about primary first principles and secondary first principles, this is not to be understood as amounting to a real division of principles. 112. For only the primary first principle belongs here, in the doctrine of reason, whereas secondary first principles are nothing other than the most general ideas, beyond which one cannot advance in a given special philosophical discipline, and which must be regarded as inferences from our first principle. 113. Accordingly, there are as many secondary first principles as there are special philosophical disciplines. 114. From which it follows quite obviously that the first practical principle, which practical philosophy has to do with, must be a secondary first principle, and therefore that the primary first principle cannot be divided into a theoretical and a practical principle [ . . . ].

Seventh Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On the other Incontrovertible Truths that are Proven through the First Principle, and Demonstration 1. The first principle which we have considered in the previous chapter, along with both of the propositions into which it was resolved, is simply understood and not proved, since it cannot be proved: intelligitur, non probatur. 2. Now, however, it comprehends all truths under itself, that is, all truths are connected with it. Therefore, there is also no doubt that if I seek to grasp other truths, I must also grasp their connection which they have with the first principle. 3. So, with regard to myself, when I have otherwise purified myself of the chief prejudices and come to hold nothing as true concerning natural things other than what is connected with my senses and ideas, then no proof is required at all of these

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    other truths, but rather they are understood with respect to myself (intelliguntur non probantur) just as well as the first one. 4. For, if I do not grasp the connection, then I should not take the matter at hand for true, but if I do grasp it, then with respect to myself it needs no proof. 5. However, with respect to others for whom this connection is unknown, I can arouse the cognition of this truth in them through certain representations. 6. Since even though another human can cognize everything that the human understanding is capable of cognizing, nonetheless in such a case the other individual does not actually have this cognition right away. 7. Similarly, although one person might in fact cognize more truths actually than another, indeed, even though it might take longer to teach one person unknown truths than it does another, still one should not for that reason think that it is the capacity for understanding that it is at fault; rather, the fault lies with other impediments. 8. Now, if a cognition of a previously unknown truth is aroused in someone else so that he understands it as well as I, then one says that the truth has been proven. 9. You will notice, however, from all this that proof is nothing other than demonstrating how a truth is connected with the first principle. 10. And it is self-evident that for such a demonstration you cannot make use of your authority but instead must move the understanding of another through friendly means so that he makes use of his own capacity and pushes all impediments to the side. 11. Yet, so that we do not already provide an occasion for error at the outset of this description of the connection that is used in the course of a proof, we must set out to understand this word rather more distinctly. 13. One might imagine a chain consisting of many thoughts, where one is always connected with another. 14. However, do not imagine a sort of chain where one link is connected with another, and this further with still another, and so on so that it might be such that the last is in turn connected with the first link as with a necklace, or such that when disconnected it would always form a uniform line, as with a string of pearls. 15. For it appears to be such an image of connection that prompted many ancient philosophers to a variety of errors, particularly those who engaged in overly subtle disquisitions concerning the axiom the essences of things are like numbers.¹² 16. Instead, imagine a chain with one principal link on which all the others hang, and indeed, in such a way that on a single link there is not simply one but variously three, four, etc., but always at least two other links as with a family tree where a single person is the common trunk and we add two, three, or more children to various intermediate people connected to the common trunk. 17. And just as, in the calculation of degrees of kinship I do nothing more than trace the generations through which the various levels of the tree are connected with ¹² The phrase here is “essentiae rerum sunt sicut numeri,” which is frequently ascribed to the Pythagoean or Platonic schools, though is also taken up in the Aristotelian tradition and, later, by Leibniz. Thomasius is here evidently referring to the notion that a continuous series of distinct essences, like numbers, can be produced through the addition or subtraction of some feature.

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one another, and in doing so I must always proceed from a common trunk; so also in the proof of these other truths I need to do nothing else than to show the connection of these with the first principle as the principal link. 18. Surely, it does not require any complicated calculations when there are only two links connected together, as with the calculation of the degree of kinship between father and son, but rather this initial connection is grasped by me as quickly as the connected things themselves. 19. In the same way, no proof is required to demonstrate that included within or immediately bound up with the first principle (A), [which stipulates] the agreement with reason, are two further principles, namely, the agreement with the senses (B) and with ideas (C) [ . . . ]. 20. So, already in the previous chapter we have seen the principal link (A) along with two further links (B) and (C) with which it is connected at the very beginning. 21. What it means to actually prove a proposition, then, is to show that some claim can be further linked to these two links and thereby to the principal link. 22. This proof is, however, twofold, since either another unknown truth is simply shown (ostension) or it is demonstrated (demonstration). 23. Showing something to be the case through ostension is nothing else than a proof that some claim is immediately connected with sensibility or to link (B). 25. Accordingly, even small children are capable of this form of proof (ostension), and so they do not doubt anything that is placed before them through the evidence of the senses and they are also disposed to refute false opinions at once by means of the same evidence. 26. To this sort of proof belong, then, all truths that can be cognized immediately through the senses, and these amount to no more than subsumptions that belong to the principle (B) as to a major proposition. 27. Therefore, there are but few degrees of kinship to be hoped for here since while (B) is joined to (A), the other links, of which there are innumerably many, are altogether directly joined to link (B) and as it were all hang next to one another. 31. Demonstration, however, is a proof that something is connected with ideas or the definitions of things, or to link (C). 32. Demonstration is the apple of discord over which the learned dispute so bitterly, not only with regard to the practice of demonstration but also as to its theory. We will undertake to clarify matters in the following remarks. 33. The reason that the doctrine of demonstration is made so difficult seems to be that in ostension there is only a single link to which all of the appropriate conclusions are applied, but in demonstration there are countless links that are not all directly connected to the link (C), but are only joined by means of two, three, or ten intermediate links. 34. For it is very easy to show someone the conclusion that is directly joined with link (C) which requires as little learning as ostension; yet when it is a matter of ten or twelve links, then showing this connection requires a lengthier account. 35. For instance: a farmer knows when he sees a human being that it is a human being and not a dog, etc. This is because the idea through which one whole substance is compared with or distinguished from another whole substance is immediately joined with link (C): for it is the first and easiest thing for the human being to form

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    an idea of a species or of what is common to a plurality of individuals on the basis of reflection on the individuals given to the senses, which species is in turn applied to all individuals within that species that he has not yet seen and, consequently, all these individuals can be distinguished from individuals of a different species. 37. I have said that for such a demonstration as that just outlined no special learnedness is required as an unlearned person can grasp it as well as one who is thought to be learned; indeed, the former would be able to grasp this demonstration readily with only a small amount of attention and patience. However, because these two requisites are fairly rare, one sometimes needs a brief account as a special technique whereby one can proceed more quickly and, should one fall into error, come back onto the proper path. 42. I mark well your complaint that you are still deficient in your knowledge because you lack a certain, general technique in accordance with which you could evaluate the demonstrations undertaken in the special sciences and, as a result you continue to search for this general technique with much effort and labor. 43. For my part, I am sorry for your miserable situation, which I take to be as pitiable as that of someone who seeks for his horse when he is sitting upon it. You poor soul, who seeks the rules of demonstration in Aristotle, Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, etc., yet as long as you do not seek them within yourself you will never discover them. 45. Now, let all the philosophers pen whatever they want concerning demonstration and make the matter as variegated as they like—listen to me and see whether I can, analogically to the incontrovertible truths of arithmetic, awaken an awareness of the rules of demonstration in you. 46. Do not undertake to demonstrate something before you know what you want to demonstrate, or before you understand it well yourself. [ . . . ] 47. For, you do not understand a matter well yourself when you do not know how it is connected to the first principle using your own reason, even though it can happen by chance that the claim to be demonstrated is true, as when someone says that 3 times 777 is 2331, but knows this only from the testimony of others. 48. You cannot hold a given claim to be connected with the first principle if you are unfamiliar with every link that lies between them and if you do not show how these are joined together. For instance, you do not know that 3 times 777 is 2331 if you do not know that 3 times 700 is 2100, that 3 times 70 is 210, that 3 times 7 is 21 and that all of these claims are connected with one another as certainly as if I were to claim that 2 times 1 is 2 [ . . . ]. 49. Accordingly, because we mentioned above that ideas and definitions are the same, and therefore in every demonstration I must know how a definition is connected with others, so I also have to ensure that I do not take any proposition to be true when I do not know that the subject and the predicate are connected with one another as certainly as 3 times 70 is 210. 50. I cannot know this, however, unless I know how to define the subject and predicate, and I do not in turn know the definitions of these if I do not understand with certainty what idea is indicated by each word that I have used in the definitions of the subject and predicate.

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51. And when I find that these ideas are connected with still others and do not yet link up with (C) in their definition, or that they present an ultimate abstraction to me that I cannot further divide, then I must seek to make this connection by means of new ideas or definitions for as long as it takes for me to attain it. 53. However, while it often happens in the course of this examination that we deceive ourselves, just as a fine accountant might add up a figure incorrectly even though he has checked it two or three times; there is nonetheless no better means for checking the correctness of a demonstration than testing it well. 54. Now, just as arithmetic offers the best test for correctness almost without any possibility for deception when a number of people perform the sums independently and compare their answers, so the most secure test for a demonstration is when one person presents his demonstration to others who have some experience with such exercises who scrutinize it and, if they charge him with some error that he cannot immediately correct, then he begins from the beginning once again until there is a general agreement regarding the correctness of the sum or demonstration. 55. If you have got this far yourself then you have no need for rules for demonstrating these sciences of yours to others, but instead you can simply direct the understanding of another and explain how you find the ideas to be connected. [ . . . ]

Thirteenth Main Part of the Doctrine of Reason: On Errors and their Origin 37. [We can now attempt to discover] the origins and main sources of all errors. These sources are generally called prejudices, partly because they afflict human beings immediately, even before their understanding and judgment have matured sufficiently, and partly because by means of them the human being tends through carelessness to judge a matter before he has adequately examined it. 38. Accordingly, prejudices are nothing other than false opinions that lead us astray from the cognition of truth, which groundlessly persuade the human being of their own truth and which he believes either because he trusts the authority of others out of gullibility or because he convinces himself on the basis of his impatience and consequent hastiness. 40. The principal source of all prejudices lies in the miserable state of the human understanding in youth, and the gullibility that belongs to it, through which one is quickly persuaded or persuades oneself of something false. 41. And because this shallow persuasion stems partly from others outside of the human being, but is also partly hidden within himself, two general, main prejudices thus emerge to which one can ascribe all the errors that are to be found in this world. Of these, we will call the first the prejudice of human authority, and the other the prejudice of precipitancy. 43. The former prejudice, that of authority, stems from an irrational love of others and is bolstered by an impressed fear of something undesirable befalling us. 44. However, the latter prejudice, that of precipitancy, stems from an irrational self-love concerning our own ease, as well as from our carelessness and impatience to flatter and to be conciliatory to others, and it is similarly bolstered by a juvenile sense of shame and laziness. 45. The former is older than the latter and therefore more deeply rooted since we believe other people before we begin to reason for ourselves.

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    46. It follows from this, then, that one is sooner rid of the latter prejudice than the former, though this claim can also be proven from our original distinction between the two. 48. For instance, someone who takes a square tower for round, or a straight line for bent, etc., on the basis of precipitancy easily comes to recognize his error through the evident proof to the contrary; so also when someone makes a fallacious inference out of precipitancy, one can bring him to recognize his hastiness without much effort. 49. Yet, once a false opinion infiltrates the mind on the basis of a foolish love of human authority, then it is so difficult to get rid of it that the cleverest people refuse to acknowledge their error even though they have no reply to its refutation; instead they prefer to convince themselves that it is on account of the deficiency of their own understanding and that those from whom they borrow their opinion would be much more capable of defending it. 50. Indeed, one often hears people make the unreasonable claim that I would rather err along with this esteemed man than affirm the truth with someone else; or I will not permit myself to be persuaded otherwise, though my own eyes assure me it is so. 52. Even though these two main prejudices are distinguished in terms of their essence, they are nonetheless often united with one another in actuality and even offer each other, as it were, a helping hand. The prejudice of authority gains a firmer foothold on us daily through an excessive precipitancy in judging, in part insofar as one regularly finds oneself deceived by the authority of others and yet for expediency’s sake one continues to ground most of the opinions one believes to be true upon it, and partly also because the erroneous opinions that are grounded on human authority tend to continually bring forth new errors through a negligent precipitancy. 53. In turn, the prejudice of authority no less comes to the aid of the prejudice of precipitancy, particularly as a result of the fact that hastiness and the errors that rest upon it are common to many of us and, therefore, it is as though a blind man would show another one the way and yet the one deviates from the path of truth as much as the other and, on account of the fact that they find their opinions defended by others, both persuade themselves that these are grounded in that reason which is common to all. 54. The human being must not only bear the burden of these two main prejudices during his tender youth while his understanding remains immature; rather, and lamentably, these will continue to tyrannize over him for his entire life, even once human reason has attained to maturity, such that each and every one of his errors and all of the evils that arise from them can be ascribed to these two principal sources. 55. The cause, however, that the human being remains for the most part willingly in thrall to these at an age when he could quite easily free himself from this slavery is, again, due partly to negligence and partly to irrational love. 56. He, however, who would tear himself from the grip of these errors must, at least at the outset, reckon with considerable effort and frustration before a salutary attention to the circumstances of his condition can be roused. The long habituation to precipitancy will make such an effort seem to be as impossible as honest work is for the beggar.

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2 Dorothea Christiane Erxleben: Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study (1742) Dorothea Christiane Erxleben, née Leporin, was born on November 13, 1715 in Quedlinburg in the Harz mountains. Her father, Christian Polycarp Leporin, was a medical doctor who took an active interest in her education. From an early age she received instruction in Latin as well as in theology and the natural sciences, and frequently accompanied her father on house-calls. Her aptitude for the theory and practice of medicine engendered an ambition to stand for a degree from the medical faculty at the university in Halle, for which she was given special permission by the recently ascended Frederick II on April 15, 1741. Her matriculation was initially postponed due to a family crisis (involving her younger brother’s apparent desertion from the military while also pursuing medical studies at Halle). However, a further and protracted postponement of more than a decade followed upon the death of her cousin who left behind five children whose care she overtook, and whose widow, Johann Christian Erxleben, a pastor, she married in 1742. In the same year, Leporin (now Erxleben) published her first book, Gründliche Untersuchung der Ursachen, die das weibliche Geschlecht vom Studiren abhalten (Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study), which according to her own report she had written four years previous as a set of notes recording her personal reflections on the topic. Erxleben would eventually fulfil her ambition of obtaining a medical doctorate, albeit not necessarily under the circumstances she imagined. After the death of her father in 1747, she took over his medical practice, and while she was by all accounts an excellent practitioner, on February 5, 1753 a malicious complaint was lodged against her by three doctors in Quedlinburg, baselessly accusing her of quackery and of falsely laying claim to the title of doctor. The complaint issued in a public dispute, which the local magistrate brought to a conclusion by ordering Erxleben to stand for examination at Halle if she wanted to continue practicing medicine. Delayed temporarily by pregnancy and recovery, an application for promotion was finally filed on January 6, 1754, at which point Erxleben also submitted her dissertation, a Latin treatise that advocated against courses of treatment that prioritized a patient’s comfort over desirable outcomes (and which she later published in her own German

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   translation). The dissertation was successfully defended during a two-hour examination (in Latin) on May 6, 1754 and the doctorate subsequently awarded, making Erxleben the first woman to receive a medical doctorate in Germany. Erxleben returned to her practice in Quedlinburg, and little is known of her activities in the time before her death on June 13, 1762. The Rigorous Investigation is a systematic examination, and thorough rebuttal, of the variety of obstacles that have historically limited women’s access to education. The text is divided into two essays, with the first essay focusing on the various prejudices that interfere with this goal and identifying four main prejudices: that women are incapable of learning, that they have no advantage to expect from it, that learnedness is or would be misused by women, and that the only reason a woman would seek out education is to distinguish herself from her peers. The second essay considers further causes for this exclusion, including miserliness and laziness (particularly on the part of male guardians). Many of the arguments that Erxleben deploys throughout her text are not unfamiliar within the history of feminist thought—she was noticeably influenced for instance by the Dissertation on the Aptitude of Girls by Anna Maria von Schurman (1607–78)—nonetheless, Erxleben’s treatment is distinguished by its systematic character, its detail, and by its ingenious and strategic appropriation of contemporary philosophical resources, including the logical theory of Christian Thomasius, as the theoretical framework for her criticism. Erxleben’s treatise enjoyed a positive reception in its own day, even being republished and (positively) reviewed in a pirated edition in her lifetime. Along with much other work by women intellectuals in eighteenth-century Germany, however, it remains largely overlooked by historians of philosophy and even by historians of feminism. The text translated here consists of selections from Erxleben’s discussion of what she identifies as the first prejudice in the first essay of the Rigorous Investigation. All footnotes are my own.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Böhm, Heinz, Dorothea Christiane Erxleben—Ihr Leben und Wirken (Quedlinburg: Städtische Museen, 1985). Clarke, Desmond M., ed. and trans., The Equality of the Sexes: Three Feminist Texts of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013) [contains a translation of Anna Maria von Schurman’s Dissertatio de ingenii muliebris ad doctrinam et meliores litteras aptitudine of 1642]. Dyck, Corey W., “On Prejudice and the Limits of Learnedness: Anna Maria von Schurman and Dorothea Christiane Erxleben,” in Women and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Germany, C. W. Dyck, ed. (forthcoming, Oxford: Oxford UP). Green, Karen, A History of Women’s Political Thought in Europe, 1700–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015) [pp. 110–11]. Erxleben, Dorothea Christiane, Gründliche Untersuchung der Ursachen, die das weibliche Geschlecht vom Studiren abhalten (Berlin, 1742); reprinted with a postscript by G. Rechenberg (Hildesheim: Olms, 1987). Erxleben, Dorothea Christiane, Academische Abhandlung von der gar zu geschwinden und angenehmen aber deswegens öfters unsichern Heilung der Krankheiten (Halle, 1754)

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[Erxleben’s German translation of her dissertation which includes her own “Lebenslauf,” pp. 121–34]. Kleingeld, Pauline, “Erxleben, Dorothea Christiane,” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 190–1. Markau, Kornelia, Dorothea Christiana Erxleben (1715–1762): Die erste promovierte Ärztin Deutschlands. Eine Analyse ihrer lateinischen Promotionsschrift sowie der ersten deutschen Übersetzung ([Diss.] Halle, 2006). O’Neill, Eileen, “Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and their Fate in History,” in J. Kournay, ed., Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), pp. 17–62.

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Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study First Essay, Chapter I Concerning the First Prejudice which Obstructs the Female Sex from Study §18. Prejudices are among the foremost causes that obstruct the female sex from pursuing study, and among these, the first is that learnedness is not appropriate for the female sex because that sex is incapable of any suitable accomplishment in learning. §19. I would not be surprised were it only the case that the male sex was given to making this error, since nothing is more common among them than to have less confidence in others than in themselves. Yet, it is a cause of some astonishment that many among the female sex shy away from learnedness because they suppose themselves to lack the powers requisite for its attainment. §20. As great as the harm that arises when people place too much trust in themselves, so just as much evil is occasioned when one places less trust in someone than one can afford to. Accordingly, the more harmful that this prejudice is, the greater is our responsibility in revealing its baselessness. Yet, before I take up this task, I must first explain what I understand by learnedness. §21. By learnedness I understand a rigorous cognition of such necessary and useful truths whereby the understanding and the will are improved and, consequently, the true happiness of the human being is promoted.¹ §22. It does not suit my purpose to dwell on this description of learnedness for long, and neither would it were I to share a handful of other definitions; yet, one might profitably consult the essay of Thomasius with which he prefaces Poiret’s book Of the Three Types of Erudition, and Prof. Lehmann’s recent book, particularly the initial preparatory chapters.² §23. We have already indicated what we understand by learnedness; now we have to investigate whether the female sex is capable of attaining it or not? §24. When someone is unable to attain something, then that thing must either be impossible as such, that is, impossible for each and every person to attain; or it is the case that those about whom one says they cannot attain a thing must be lacking in some property which is required for attaining it; or, finally, there must be certain external circumstances present which inhibits some person or other from its attainment. §25. Accordingly, when it is claimed that the female sex is not capable of learnedness, then either learnedness must not be attainable in itself and as such, or the female sex must not possess those properties that are required for its attainment, or

¹ Compare Thomasius, Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason, First Main Part, proposition 1 (p. 18 above). ² The references here are to Thomasius’ Dissertatio ad Petri Poiret libros de eruditione solida, superficiaria, et falsa (Frankfurt, 1694), and to Johann Jakob Lehmann (1684–1740), whose Neueste und gründlichste Art, Die Vernunfft-Lehre, folglich die Verbesserung des Verstandes, gründlich zu erlernen und leicht auszuüben was published in Jena in 1723.

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there must be certain external circumstances at hand that obstruct the female sex from study. §26. Yet, no one will be so rash that they would declare the attainment of learnedness to be impossible as such, and so it comes down to these two questions: 1) Whether the female sex also possesses those powers that one cannot do without for the attainment of learnedness? 2) Whether external circumstances are so constituted that they inhibit study? §27. Learnedness generally requires the powers of a rational soul and in particular the understanding, and who would be so unreasonable as to wish to deny this of the female sex? Whoever does not want to maintain that there is a difference in souls with respect to sex, contrary to all of the notions that we can form of the essence of the soul, must also accord to the female sex the very same powers of the soul that are encountered in the male sex. §28. The powers of the human soul are a part of the image of God after which the human being is formed. The female sex is created in accordance with this image as well as the male (cf. §91). Therefore, whoever would deny the powers of the soul of the female sex would also have to hold that this sex is not made according to the likeness of God, or that the female sex forfeited more of its originally received powers through the fall than the male sex and that they no longer stood in as favorable a position as the male sex such that a beginning could be made of restoring in them the lost divine image. In fact, the opposite of these unjust claims are truths that might be accepted as basic without proof, and as everyone will grant them without proof, I will not dwell on them. I will also not get into what I could say regarding the final end of humanity, namely, that as both sexes are created for the same end of blessedness the same powers are needed by them. §29. I deliberately, however, refrain from engaging with those who go so far as not to number the members of the female sex among human beings, since these individuals do not deserve that we should make such an effort for their sake of showing that, through our own use of reason, we are not unworthy of the title of human being. §33. And just as little do I find myself bound to prove that the female sex is actually endowed with reason. To want to claim that someone is a human being but does not possess any power of reason would be an all-too-obvious contradiction, and such a human being as would thus be supposed could not be distinguished from an irrational beast except through its external form. §34. Now even though things stand well for our sex as far as this matter is concerned—that one is seldom encountered who unabashedly employs these initial slanders, even only in jest, from which anyone in all seriousness withholds their assent—there is nonetheless no shortage of those who concede that while the female sex has received understanding, she does not possess it in such a high degree as men, and that it is for just this reason that the female sex is not suited to the attainment of learnedness. [ . . . ] §35. I find it unnecessary to provide a detailed list of those who speak in such belittling terms of the female sex’s understanding, even if they do it in a subtler manner than the others. It is enough for me to say that, just as in the previous cases, these (1) presuppose something for which they still owe us a demonstration which will never prove compelling to us, and (2) infer something from it which in no way follows.

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   §36. It is presupposed by these as an already established truth, no longer subject to doubt, that the female sex has been endowed with lesser powers of understanding than the male sex, and when this is supposed to be proved then the entire business comes down to petitiones principii and other fallacies. In particular, one appeals to the fact that the female sex has not accomplished as much through study as the male sex. Yet, it is a rather perverse inference for one to conclude from the fact that only a few women pursue study that all of those who belong to this sex lack the powers of understanding requisite for this pursuit. §37. It is one thing to have received an understanding, and another to have learned to apply the understanding one has received. It does not follow from the fact that one does not actually apply something, or does not know how to apply it, that one does not have or possess that thing. §38. The example of a miser illustrates the falseness of this inference. He is possessed of many goods, yet he is uneasy because he cannot acquire means sufficient to make himself secure against the loss of his goods; but, if we wanted to judge his behavior in accordance with the foregoing inference, we would have to take him to be very poor because he has not learned how he is supposed to apply his wealth. §39. The matter stands in just the same way as regards the human being’s power of reason. Our supremely wise Creator has imparted to the female sex as much as to the male the ability to cognize the truth and distinguish it from falsehood. The greater part of this splendid faculty has been forfeited through the fall, and what remains is not employed by all in accordance with the end of the Creator. And even though it cannot be denied that many of the male sex are forgetful of their duty as far as the use of reason is concerned, one must nonetheless concede that this offence is far more common among the female sex, and one must concede, out of regard for the many who dutifully pursue the cognition of truth, that it is correct when one claims that the male sex has accomplished more through their studies than the female sex. Yet, their fault lies in a failure to properly apply the understanding they have received, which understanding both sexes are endowed with in the same measure. §40. It might be objected against this that, as the construction of the male body is far more durable and robust than the female body, so the powers of the soul in the former must be correspondingly greater. However, this objection has already been countered in Alberti’s Philosophical Thoughts on the Difference of the Powers of Souls according to the Differences among Human Beings,³ in which he makes sufficiently obvious that the powers of the soul are not to be sought in the construction of the body. As this truly excellent teacher hastens to add, mental powers, inclinations, and effects cannot be produced, brought forth, or made by bodily qualities.⁴ §41. One might misleadingly press this renowned teacher’s own words into service against me when he says that just because souls must be alike in property, activity, faculty, condition, and capacity, it does not follow that they would have to

³ The reference here, and in subsequent sections, is to Michael Alberti’s (1682–1757) Philosophische Gedancken von den Unterschied der Kräfte der Seelen nach den Unterscheid der Menschen (Halle, 1740). ⁴ Alberti, Philosophische Gedancken, p. 7.

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also have the same tendencies, power, and aptitude in the very same degree and measure.⁵ In fact, this most worthy personage is correct, and his statement in no way harms my claim but instead my claim is strengthened by it. §42. For, what is intended here is not that, as far as sex is concerned, the soul does not have the same power and skill or even that they are not possessed of understanding in the same degree and measure; rather, Alberti puts this unequal degree and measure down to the way in which the understanding is used, exercised, and applied or not so applied,⁶ and this is the very thing that I repeat throughout this treatise and it is the reason why I admit that the female sex must fall short of the male sex in understanding when the understanding of the former is not, like that of the latter, used, exercised, and applied. [ . . . ] §43. One also should not object here that Alberti shows that the general power of souls varies between individuals. This statement is also correct, but if our opponent would make use of it, then he would have to show on the basis of irrefutable reasons that the entire female sex is comprised of individuals in whom this power of the soul will never be found in an exceptional degree. At this point, however, the question is not whether one human soul might be endowed with a degree of capability higher than others, which I gladly admit, but rather whether all souls of men are possessed of a higher degree of capability than all of the souls of women, which I steadfastly deny. §45. [ . . . ] [Instead of admitting the fault in their arguments, however, our opponents] object that even if the understanding of the female sex is capable of grasping truths, the same understanding is far more subject to affects, concerning which it is well-known how greatly they inhibit the cognition of truth, than is the male understanding and, consequently, the female sex is not capable of accomplishing as much with respect to learnedness as we might expect of men. §46. But even this objection is of little significance. It is true that the affects obstruct the understanding in the cognition of truth, and thus even those who urge others in most emphatic terms to pursue the truth nonetheless discourage one from doing so when in the throes of affects. Moreover, it is not to be denied that the female sex is more susceptible to these than is good for it; yet, whoever would contend that the male sex, considered in and for itself, is more free from these than the female sex before the influence of the affects is broken by study, would only reveal through such a pretension that he himself remains in thrall to them. §47. When we attend to those who have learned to control their affects, we find that they have attained this happy state through applying themselves to study. By such a state, I do not in any way intend that elevated form of self-denial proffered by reason, since the attainment of that state is the very summit of learnedness; so I cannot agree with Poiret who does not allow any but the enlightened to count as learned, though he must only take the word learnedness in a different sense than the ordinary one. Now, if the female sex might endure the application of the curative means of study against this dangerous affliction, then perhaps before long our Herr Doctors will be spared the effort of treating our sex as a special subject of diseases on

⁵ See Alberti, Philosophische Gedancken, p. 5. ⁶ See, for instance, Alberti, Philosophische Gedancken, pp. 7–8.

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   account of the intensity of the agitations of our mind.⁷ The affects of the female sex are accordingly not to be regarded absolutely as causes which render the understanding useless for the cognition of truth and which cannot be ameliorated, but are rather much more to be regarded as the consequences that arise when the improvement of the understanding and study are neglected. §48. Just as someone who, refusing to take a medicine because, in spite of being threatened by the attending circumstances of a malady, prefers to give himself over to those harms rather than combat them with the appropriate curative means, would only thereby prove themselves to be sick, so one acts in such a way who, on account of various disorders of the mind obstructing the path to the cognition of truth, would entirely succumb to these rather than seek to remedy them through the available curative means. §49. The same sort of error is evinced in the objection that runs together with the previous one, namely, that women cannot accomplish as much through study because the female sex is inconstant by nature and, by contrast, a certain steadfastness is required for study. It is, of course, the case that real steadfastness is required if one is to grasp many truths, but it would be unreasonable to demand steadfastness from someone whose mind has not acquired a temperament such that this quality might take root. §50. The will of the human being can choose nothing other than what is good, or at least what appears to be so; even among the vicious a vice cannot gain a foothold except under the appearance of the good. Now given that the human understanding is not so constituted that the good is recognized with certainty and at all times as good, nor the evil recognized with certainty and at all times as evil, but instead the good is sometimes recognized as such and the evil sometimes mistaken for the good, so the will cannot constantly choose something as good, or shy away from something as evil, because it frequently finds contradiction and never attains to certainty and, consequently, must revise its choice as its understanding sees things differently than it had before. It is this, then, that is the true source of inconstancy. §51. One would therefore lack any cause to reproach the female sex with inconstancy, or to regard it as something that belongs to the essence of our sex, since we find it as much in the male as in the female sex when that constitution of the understanding has not been put into place where it might possess a certain and rigorous cognition of what is good or evil. One also need not worry that inconstancy will inhibit the female sex from study since, as inconstancy is generally removed through study, so it is not to be feared that those who have once discovered the excellence of learnedness will cease seeking it earnestly. What Bernhard aptly expresses in his Curious History of the Learned deserves mention here, namely, that “study is the confection of the learned: he who has first tasted of it cannot easily go without it.”⁸ Indeed, anyone who has savored this dish will not wonder at the fact

⁷ See for instance, Georg Daniel Coschwitz (1679–1729), Organismus et mechanismus in homine vivo obvius, destructus et labefactatus seu hominis vivi consideratio pathologica (Leipzig, 1728), pp. 11–18. ⁸ Johann Adam Bernhard (1688–1771), Kurzgefaßte Curieuse Historie derer Gelehrten (Frankfurt am Main, 1718); the quotation is from p. 61.

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that the blessed Seckendorff⁹ once made known that, were he given the choice between the imperial crown without learning or learning without the imperial crown, he would choose the latter. §91. [We have considered the testimony of some learned men who endorse the female sex’s capacity for learnedness,] yet why should I fill this space with such witnesses, of which there are many who have something to add at some point, when I might simply cite the famous Prof. Heumann who does not hesitate to contend that a woman is also capable of acquiring wisdom, which is to say philosophy, by learning even though he says that philosophy also requires a rare talent to give matters the appropriate turn.¹⁰ As he writes in his own words, “women are rational and tractable animals, just as men are, and are similarly created in the likeness of God, which is to say they are created for wisdom and virtue.” Insofar as this great scholar bases his claim upon the likeness to the divine that our sex also evinces, he draws attention to the same, incontestable ground that is and remains the principal one for our entire discussion (cf. §28). §92. One will object however that this most learned man himself proceeds to note that, as far as philosophical talent is concerned, women must yield pride of place to men. To emphasize this fact one will cite Didymus and Lactantius, who have pointed out that among all learned women there were only a few who dedicated themselves to philosophy.¹¹ In the same way, the famous Cassandra Fedele herself often complained that insufficient talent made the study of philosophy difficult for her.¹² §93. I will treat these objections in reverse order. Cassandra’s complaints are rather to be attributed to her excessive modesty. Anyone familiar with her knows that she was well-versed in philosophy, and one need only consult the Selected Lives which came to light in Breslau in 1711 to banish any doubt about whether she lacked sufficient talent.¹³ §94. It is no prodigious task, for someone acquainted with the history of letters, to refute the allegations of Didymus and Lactantius. Menagius in his History of Women Philosophers alone surveys sixty-five female philosophers, and one might also consult Reimann’s Attempt at an Introduction to the History of Letters, and Esberg’s

⁹ Ludwig Veit von Seckendorff (1626–92), statesman, political theorist, and first chancellor of the university in Halle (although his untimely death ended his brief term). ¹⁰ Christoph August Heumann (1681–1764), professor of theology in Göttingen. Erxleben here refers to two of his works: the Acta Philosophorum (Halle, 1715–27; cf. Zwölftes Stück (1721), n. 1 pp. 826–75 [“Nachricht von der Philosophie des Frauenzimmers”]) and Conspectus reipublicae literariae, sive Via ad historiam literariam (Hanover, 1718); cf. p. 216 on the difficulty of philosophy. The following quote comes from the former text, p. 826. ¹¹ The references are to Didymus (ca. 80–10 BCE), a first-century BCE writer who notes that Theano of Crotona was the first woman to pursue (the Pythagorean) philosophy (cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.16); and to Lactantius, a church father (250–320 CE) who faulted the abstruse character of philosophy in antiquity for the fact that women (and slaves), with the exception of Themiste, failed to pursue it, despite having the requisite talent (cf. Institutiones Divinae, 3.25). ¹² Cassandra Fedele (1465–1558) was an Italian scholar of Latin and Greek, famous for a number of widely publicized orations. For her discussion of difficulties with philosophical study, see Letters and Orations, edited and translated by D. Robin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 145. ¹³ Erxleben is referring to Christian Gryphius’s Vitae selectae qvorvndam ervditissimorvm ac illvstrivm virorvm: ut et Helenae Cornarae et Cassandrae Fidelis (Breslau, 1711); for Fedele’s life, see pp. 705–28.

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   schediasm on philosophizing women will likely also prove useful in this respect.¹⁴ If one wanted to supplement these catalogues with still more entries, it would not be difficult to find many who deserve the same praise imparted to Elena Cornaro of Padua on the occasion of her promotion: “We hereby recognize as Master and Doctor of the liberal arts and of philosophy, in the name of God, this illustrious and indeed most learned lady sitting before the tribunal, Elena Lucrezia Cornaro Piscopa, adorned with all the gifts of nature and of the arts such that nothing could be seen to be wanting in her.”¹⁵ In general, it does not require much effort to bring to light, little by little, the fact that many women who have already distinguished themselves through their studies are also rather accomplished in philosophy. §95. It is time, however, that we return to Heumann’s statement. He does not in any way take issue with the truth of my thesis since for him the female sex, as well as the male, is endowed with a capacity for insight into necessary and useful truths. Such a capacity is not denied to the female sex since this distinguished teacher does not contend that all three of the faculties that make up the understanding are weaker in the female sex, but only that that faculty which we call judgment is somewhat weaker in their case.¹⁶ §96. Although it is granted that, as far as these faculties are concerned, they are shared equally, one usually adds to this that the female sex must give way to the male sex in terms of judgment, which is the noblest power of the understanding, and so it follows that the former will not be as accomplished with respect to learnedness as the latter. Yet this is inferred quite contrary to Heumann’s intention as he claims, rather, (1) that with respect to judgment it is not the case that every man takes pride of place ahead of every woman, and accordingly in claiming that judgment is weaker in the case of women he is only comparing women with those men who have been so fortunate as to receive an exceedingly sharpened judgment, rather than with all men as such; (2) he does not claim that all three faculties of the mind are stronger in the male sex than in the female, but rather only that faculty that we call judgment seems to him to be stronger in some men than in the female sex. §97. It would therefore be unjust to infer from this that the female sex is in general unsuited to accomplish as much with respect to learnedness, and indeed in no part of it whatsoever, as the male sex is thought to be able to accomplish since, (1) not all men have such a mind that judgment constitutes its greatest part, but rather experience shows us that only the fewest among them can boast of being so fortunate; (2) many areas of study are such that intelligence and memory rather than judgment are required; and (3) one cannot entirely deny sharpness of mind of the female sex since experience teaches that many women, when they have not been unfortunate in

¹⁴ The references here are, in order, to Aegidius Menagius (1613–92), Historia mulierum philosopharum (Lyon, 1690); Jacob Friedrich Reimmann (1668–1743), Versuch einer Einleitung in die Historiam Literariam (Halle, 1708–13; cf. volume I, pp. 468–71); and Johan Esberg (1665–1734) and Peter Hedengrahn (1677–1727), Exercitium academicum mulieres philosophantes leviter adumbrans (Uppsala, 1700). ¹⁵ Elena Lucrezia Cornaro Piscopa (1646–84), Italian philosopher and theologian, was the first woman awarded a degree in philosophy (on June 25, 1678) which she received from the University of Padua. This proclamation is given in Heumann, Acta Philosophorum, Zwölftes Stück (1721), n. 1, p. 845. ¹⁶ Heumann, Acta Philosophorum, Zwölftes Stück (1721), n. 1, p. 829.

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their access to study, might compete with many men for pride of place as far as judgment is concerned. §98. It might seem to some as if I did not understand how important judgment is when I assert that many studies do not require the sharpest faculty of judgment as much as intelligence and a strong memory; however, one has no cause to fear any misunderstanding on this score. It is far from my intention to claim that someone will be able to attain much, even in but a single important area of learnedness, who has received only a small share of judgment, as I am aware that even for someone who wants only to pursue the so-called art¹⁷ of memory, judgment must still perform the lion’s share of the task. I also, therefore, agree entirely with those who claim that the learning of a language does not depend merely on memory but also requires judgment, and I am myself of the opinion that, were it not the case that so much in his school depended upon memory, Pythagoras would have requested a more sharpened power of judgment rather than a very powerful memory when, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, Hermes offered him the chance to request what he desired most.¹⁸ Indeed, it cannot be denied that those in whom judgment is lacking, even if they are well-read and have committed much to memory, are nonetheless to be regarded as unfortunate people. §99. Notwithstanding all this, I do not hesitate to assert that someone who has intelligence and a good memory and who is endowed with a passable faculty of judgment even if not the sharpest one, is not in general unsuited for learnedness but is even capable of advancing rather far in it, at least in some specific areas. This is shown by experience, and so Heumann grants to the female sex, that it might accomplish as much within philosophy as the average philosopher.¹⁹ §100. If one thus takes Heumann’s words in the way that they must be taken, then what follows is nothing more than this: the female sex is no doubt capable of accomplishing much with respect to learnedness but the male sex has nonetheless turned out some examples in certain areas of learnedness to whom the female sex must grant pride of place. Moreover, it would go too far if one wanted to infer from this that each and every man surpasses every woman in learnedness and indeed in all parts thereof. §101. Yet, what harm would it cause us if it pleased some to go still further than this? Even if the female sex had to cede their place in learnedness to every man, it would not follow by any means that the female sex was unsuited to study. This is quite contrary to the attention of the polyhistor we have been referring to—were it the case that he held the female sex to be incapable of study, then he would neither have expressed his displeasure at the fact of its neglect, nor would he have devoted so much energy to encouraging its members to study.

¹⁷ Reading “ars” for “res.” ¹⁸ See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, edited and translated by R.D. Hicks (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1972), Book VIII, ch. 1: “Hermes told him he might choose any gift he liked except immortality; so he asked to retain through life and through death a memory of his experiences. Hence in life he could recall everything, and when he died, he still kept the same memories.” ¹⁹ See Acta Philosophorum, Zwölftes Stück (1721), n. 1, p. 829.

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   §102. Accordingly, if one wanted to proceed in the strictest manner possible, then one can infer from this no more than that the female sex could not attain the heights of what the male sex has achieved. It would nonetheless be perverse if someone wanted to say on the basis of this that, because I am not capable of bringing about that same degree of perfection in my own understanding as some others enjoy, because I am not capable of grasping as many truths as another might be capable of grasping, because there are other people who comprehend more than I, I would rather remain mired in ignorance, I would rather fill my understanding with errors and leave the cognition of truth to those that are more capable of accomplishing something with them than I. In just such a manner do those proceed who obstruct the female sex from study solely because they believe that they cannot achieve as much through it as the male sex (cf. §§48, 109). §103. And insofar as one says that the female sex cannot achieve as much in learning as the male sex, one also thereby concedes that the female sex can accomplish something in that regard. Now would it not be better to cleanse the understanding of that sex as far as possible and grant it insight into as many truths as it might possibly grasp, rather than deliberately tarrying in ignorance and willfully seeking nourishment in error instead of in the truths that one is able to comprehend. §104. I do not however want to speak for those who press their own sons to study, in spite of their lacking the powers of mind required for it, so that they might either earn their daily bread thereby or so that they might achieve a higher rank than is available through another profession, or for the sake of any number of other untoward purposes. For there are two types of study: study so that one helps one’s understanding as far as is possible, provisioning it with useful truths that are better and more certain whereby the improvement of the will is also promoted; or study so that one can also serve others through the truths cognized and might support oneself, whether through teaching or in another way. §105. The first sort of study is available to each and every person, even the most simple-minded; indeed, it would be praiseworthy for one to undertake to improve the understanding of such individuals through study, not only because they stand in urgent need of it, but also because some of these are not simple-minded by nature but only on account of lacking instruction in their youth—and even if our good intentions were not realized in a few cases, certainly no harm could come of such efforts. §106. By contrast, no one should be permitted to take up studies of the second sort who has not been found, through an exacting examination, to be particularly wellsuited and to possess an appropriate temperament for it. If this distinction between sorts of study is not observed, therefore, then we will not ameliorate the ignorance of those who have but a weak understanding, since no one will come to their aid, and we will encounter far fewer learned individuals in every estate who accomplish anything more than what their name secures for them. §107. Yet, I must come back to my main objective. The female sex is not to be excluded from study on account of the claim that it must yield pride of place to men as far as learnedness is concerned, or even on account of the contention that it could not attain to the highest levels of learnedness. Were one to proceed with the male sex in the same way, then many of them would likewise have to be turned away from study, even though experience shows that their efforts in this are not without fruit.

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Indeed, were it the case that only those were permitted to study who are not surpassed by any other in learnedness, then at any given time only a single individual would be allowed to do so, and consequently learned people would be rather rare. §108. Moreover, it is well known that there are many geniuses who found themselves in a poor condition at first, though once someone devoted themselves tirelessly to their education they improved to such an extent that they rivalled those who had previously surpassed them, on which topic one might consult Bernhard’s oft-cited book.²⁰ As it happens, the geniuses of the female sex have languished only due to the fact that no one has borne any concern for their improvement. §109. More generally, I would also like to emphasize what a poor excuse it is when one believes that because you have not been given the same share of talents as another, one might just as well bury those talents that you have in fact received.²¹ The Lord, who has invested each with his respective talents, will demand an account for their use from him to whom he has given few just as he will from him to whom he has given many (§102). §110. I hope to have sufficiently rebutted the objections, but before I bring this chapter to a close, I want to submit for the consideration of my opponents the unavoidable consequences that follow when one persists in upholding the refuted prejudice that the female sex is incapable of study. I can say in all correctness, and without engaging in the sort of consequentializing that is rightly decried, that to maintain this prejudice is as much as to say that the female sex is incapable of casting off error, cognizing truth, and improving their will. From this, however, would follow (1) that error and ignorance are not contingent among the female sex (since were one to hold the opposite then one would have to admit that this sex can be freed from error), but rather one would have to regard error as something that cannot be removed from the essence of the female sex, and any number of absurdities might follow from this. (2) It is held that the female sex too stands under the explicit command that they should improve their understanding and their will. Now, if this is absolutely impossible, as it would be if they lacked the requisite capacity for cognizing truth, then this command would be idle. (3) The ignorance of the understanding and the evil character of the will are sources of everything that vies with true virtue; if, however, the female sex were not capable of obstructing these sources, then its members could not be called to account for their actions much less to punishment on account of their supreme viciousness. Thus, we have no need to tarry any longer with the first question posed by this prejudice that the female sex does not possess the powers sufficient for the attainment of learnedness, since it is obvious that it does, and the contrary opinion remains a prejudice.

²⁰ See Bernhard, Kurzgefaßte Curieuse Historie derer Gelehrten, pp. 84–6. ²¹ A reference to the parable of the talents; cf. Matthew 25:14–30, Luke 19:12–27.

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PART II

Radical Philosophy

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3 Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch: The Concord of Reason and Faith (1692) Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch was born in Kleve on December 25, 1648. His father, a Reformed minister, was the senior chaplain in the court of Electoral Brandenburg. Stosch studied philosophy, theology, and medicine at the university in Frankfurt an der Oder, and among his most important professors was Theodorus Craanen (1620–90), a noted Cartesian philosopher who had an appointment in the medical faculty. After university, Stosch embarked on an educational tour of France, Italy, and Holland, though who he met with is not known. When he was thirty years old, Stosch entered into the service of the Electoral court as the privy state secretary but only remained in the position until 1686, withdrawing for health reasons. Stosch devoted the next years to philosophical study and in 1692 his Concordia rationis et fidei (Concord of Reason and Faith), was anonymously published with a falsified place of publication. Stosch, seeking to avoid controversy, only had 100 copies printed which were not intended for public sale; unfortunately, copies were discovered for sale in Frankfurt an der Oder, and as a consequence nearly all of the copies of the book were seized and publicly burned. The controversial book ignited a fevered search for the author by the authorities, and Stosch was ultimately identified as the author late in 1693 or early in 1694. This led to his arrest and to the formation of a committee that included such luminaries as the political and legal philosopher Samuel Pufendorf and Pietist trailblazer Philipp Jakob Spener to preside over the proceedings against Stosch, which concluded with Stosch’s public retraction on March 17, 1694. In contrast with the fates of other outed radical thinkers, such as Theodor Ludwig Lau, Stosch’s reputation and career prospects did not seem to suffer any lasting damage; in fact, he was later appointed to the position of court councillor and even elevated to the nobility in 1701 (regaining a title that his family had once held). Stosch died on August 20, 1704 in Berlin. While the title of Stosch’s text suggests he is aiming for a reconciliation of reason and faith, it soon becomes clear that the intended concord between the two will be achieved through the complete subordination of the latter to the former. Indeed, while on the surface Stosch’s Concord presents a bewildering mix of not obviously consistent doctrines taken from Spinoza, Gassendi, Hobbes, and Jean Le Clerc, what brings these various borrowings together into a coherent whole is Stosch’s own Socinian-inspired intellectual program, one likely first encountered in the radical circles in which his father was involved. This is evident, for instance, in his efforts to deny the rational basis for natural immortality and his rejection of the reasonableness

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      of eternal damnation. As becomes clear, Stosch’s argumentation in the service of this agenda ultimately brings him into conflict with Spinozistic doctrines as well as core Cartesian ones, such as the immateriality of the soul (or even its distinction from body). Despite its peculiarities, and its scarcity, Concord became one of the most important and influential texts of the free-thinking movement in Germany. In the following selection from Stosch’s text, references to Descartes’ Meditations and the appended Objections and Replies are given to the edition of that work in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, edited and translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999). References to Malebranche’s The Search after Truth are given according to the translation of that work by T. Lennon and P. Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). All notes are my own.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Döring, Detlef, “Stosch, Friedrich Wilhelm,” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 757–8. Dyck, Corey W., “Materialism in the Mainstream of Early German Philosophy,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24.5 (2016), pp. 897–916. Mulsow, Martin, “The ‘New Socinians’: Intertextuality and Cultural Exchange in Late Socinianism,” in M. Mulsow and J. Rohls, eds., Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitarians, Calvinists and Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Leiden, Brill: 2005), pp. 49–78. Rumore, Paola, “Mechanism and Materialism in Early Modern German Philosophy,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24.5 (2016), pp. 917–39. Schröder, Winfried, ed., Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch (1648–1704): Concordia rationis et fidei (1692) vol. I.2 in the series Philosophische Clandestina der deutschen Aufklärung (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 1992). Schröder, Winfried, Spinoza in der deutschen Frühaufklärung (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987) [pp. 32–58]. Stiehler, Gottfried, Materialisten der Leibniz-Zeit (Berlin: VEB-Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966). Stosch, Friedrich Wilhelm, Concordia rationis et fidei (Amsterdam [Berlin], 1692). Walther, Manfred, “Suppress or Refute? Reactions to Spinoza in Germany around 1700,” in M. Laerke, ed., The Use of Censorship in the Enlightenment (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 25–41.

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The Concord of Reason and Faith, or The Harmony of Moral Philosophy and the Christian Religion Introduction There are two ways by which it is possible for human beings to attain to knowledge of things: reason and faith. Reason is judgment concerning things which we are aware of by means of the various senses and experience. Faith is judgment concerning things which we comprehend through reliable testimony and the accounts of others. Faith is divided into blind faith and seeing faith, but this is ambiguous. For, since a blind faith does not involve judgment, it cannot be a species of faith but is mere credulity. What seeing faith is is manifest from the definition of faith. Faith is also divided into divine and human. Yet, since we know that God said something or we know some article of faith only through the testimony of human beings, such as Moses, all faith is human, and a judgment is made concerning those on account of whom a matter is to be believed, namely, whether that person is worthy of trust and the matter itself credible. To the question of whether, in the case of contradictions, reason must give way to faith, or faith to reason, I respond that reason is in its nature more excellent and more certain than faith, because reason strictly relies upon experience where faith more frequently relies upon the experience of others which might be deceptive or mistaken. Still, faith remains exceedingly necessary because we are unable to be present everywhere nor are we able to know and experience everything at every time and place. Hence, it is necessary to trust the learned and the honest, which the majority of people in the world are, and those who were not present for some event must put their trust in those who are trustworthy, as it is this upon which all historical knowledge relies. What should be seen, judged and believed is always determined by who we trust; moreover, he who trusts someone easily is easily deceived. Nor should that ever be admitted which involves a contradiction since reason prohibits this and revelation does not demand it of us; as if, for example, someone is supposed to say they were here and somewhere else at the same time and in the same manner, or that four is five. For whatever is proper to faith rests on reason alone, since reason alone teaches us what the meaning is of the revelation that has occurred to others. See the Logic of Le Clerc part II, c.10 on faith.¹ Thus it is evident that that most learned and celebrated Huet, in his recently published book on the Concord of Reason and Faith, is carried away by some other force that is stronger than reasoning, namely by the fear of offending the Roman

¹ Jean Le Clerc (1657–1736), a Swiss theologian, Biblical scholar, and philosopher. His Logica sive ars ratiocinandi was published in 1692 (Amsterdam), and was notable for its incorporation of elements of Locke’s Essay (Le Clerc had met Locke in 1685 in Amsterdam and was similarly suspected of being a Socinian). Employing the divisions of the Port-Royal Logic, part two of Le Clerc’s Logica is devoted to judgment and chapter 10 concerns faith (“De Fide”) where Le Clerc introduces the distinction between seeing and blind, and human and divine faith (Logica II.x.2–3), and also denies that God would reveal something contrary to human reason (II.x.8).

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      church, when he determines that reason is to submit to faith in the case of contradictions.² For how would it otherwise be possible to uphold the doctrine of transubstantiation and other Pontifical dogmas of this sort? [ . . . ] Whatever science and knowledge the human being possesses is gained by reason or by faith, with philosophy encompassing that knowledge had by reason, and with history, religion, and revelation comprehending that had by faith. In order to make the harmony of philosophy, morals, and Christian theology evident, we will examine and exhibit the foundations of both in a few words.³

Chapter I On God, the World, and the Human Being in General §1. The first thing which the human being with a philosophical inclination is able to perceive clearly is: whoever thinks, is; he who is, is not from himself but from and in something else (Acts 17:28), he does not persist through himself but is a part of the universe, an appendage of heaven and earth. He clings to the world, surrounded by the air without which he cannot breathe even for a moment. He is unable to subsist without food, clothing, shelter and various other things required for protection against injuries from the harsh climate, the company of fellows, and much more besides. In a word, he is a finite thinking and extended thing, determined to a specific mode of existing and acting. Nor is it in his power to exist and act earlier, otherwise, or longer than he actually exists and acts since his existence and activity depend on other causes and objects that determine his existence. This can be demonstrated through innumerable arguments and examples. §2. The human being who becomes practiced to some extent in this contemplation of his existence, and sees innumerably many other things similar to and different from him as well as their connection, order, and motion, I say that human being cannot but conclude that there is a complex of infinite other things aside from himself existing not from themselves but reciprocally dependent on others, or a whole containing infinite parts disposed and united in a proper order, which whole is called the world. §3. Upon considering that some parts of the world come to be, some are destroyed, and some succeed upon others, and that those which perdure undergo a change in place and, indeed, in a proper and fixed order, the human being cannot but conclude that there is a first cause of all things, or a creator and architect, mover and ruler, which is God, that is, a most perfect being from which everything is since He himself does not exist unless it is from Himself, the single and sole substance (because ² Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630–1721), a French clergyman and scholar with interests in the sciences, theology, and philosophy. In 1689, Huet published a polemical critique, the Censura philosophiae cartesianae (Paris), of the Cartesian philosophy of which he was once an adherent. Stosch’s reference here is to a subsequent text, the Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei (Caen, 1690) in which Huet attempts to re-establish the priority of theology and faith with respect to philosophy and reason in response to what he perceived as attacks on this priority from Cartesians and Spinoza. ³ Stosch groups the following chapters under the not entirely apposite title: “Introduction to Moral Philosophy.”

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there is no one apart from Him who subsists from and through itself, nor is a substance capable of producing a substance, since a substance that is produced would not be from and through itself, and so would not be a substance). God is infinite, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and contains everything in Himself (Acts 17:28). God is the most blessed, infinite in thought and extension; no real attribute in the nature of things can be thought of which does not permit of being traced back to Him as they all originate in God. God is the highest and infinite being, that is, He is supremely perfect and eternal since there is nothing which determines God to exist or to think; moreover, there is nothing that ought to be admired, venerated, or worshipped more than this supreme and most perfect Being. §4. Since, therefore, everything that the human being is able to contemplate and understand only serves to make clear either God, the world, or parts of the world and their affections, so it is clear that I have covered the entire gamut of human knowledge and science in these chapters.

Chapter II On the Sciences which are Suitable for the Human Being §1. The Natural Theologian is one who contemplates and worships God in accordance with the dictates of our innate light or reason. §2. The Christian Theologian is one who knows God through Holy Scripture and worships Him according to the laws prescribed there. §3. The Astronomer is one who contemplates and observes the motion of the stars and those things which follow from thence; and to the extent that he further formulates conjectures concerning their operations, he is an Astrologer. §4. The Mathematician is one who considers the quantity, extension, dimensions, dispositions, motion, number, proportions, figures, etc. of things. §5. The Natural Scientist is one who knows the nature and cause of things and their properties and qualities. §6. The Physician is one who is knowledgeable of human nature and the medical art. §7. To the extent that someone studies and observes the character, actions, and duties of the human being, he is an Ethicist. §15. Metaphysics is not a particular discipline or a species of science, but lies hidden within all the philosophical disciplines; for each and every science has need of general terms or secondary notions, from which common metaphysics takes its inspiration and which hardly amounts to more than a lexicon of terms and general axioms. §16. Pneumatics is not understood by anyone because no one knows or is able to define what spirit is. For to say that it is an immaterial substance is only to say what it is not; what is more, the human being is unable to affirm or deny through the light of reason that there are angels and demons who are spirits, that is, immaterial things. For even if the human being is able to know God, the first cause, and gain some insight into His existence through reasoning and by means of the small measure of his own intellect, if only for a short period of time, he is nonetheless not able to know

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      all created things in the heavens, sea, and earth. Nor is he acquainted with anything other than what occurs to the senses or what he is able to understand and know by means of reasoning. For God is a being that encompasses the properties of bodies and spirits and perhaps of other things which are concealed from us; see Le Clerc’s Logic, Book I, ch. 8, §5,⁴ and also his Pneumatics.⁵ §17. The accounts offered by some concerning angels and demons, in Holy Scripture as well as in human history, are partly dreams, partly visions or apparitions, partly phantasms, partly distempered delusions, partly figments and illusions. Also and more often ideas of what is good for the human being are taken for angels, and ideas of what is bad for the human are taken for demons, or these ideas are accepted due to false persuasion, superstition and fear, which is where phrases like A good spirit has directed me, or The devil drove me to do it come from. See Hobbes’ Leviathan⁶ and Le Clerc’s Pneumatology.⁷ §18. As an ethical principle, the Devil is nothing other than perseverance in acting contrary to one’s own or another’s benefit in favor of vainglory or the lure of the Flesh, or the world, which are the worst of all human ideas and thoughts. See Geulincx’s Ethics.⁸

Chapter III Concerning the Human Being’s Knowledge of Himself, insofar as he is Body and Soul §1. Among all creatures, the human being knows of none surpassing him; for he is an animal endowed with a refined power of reason and in which the following must be distinctly considered: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Structure of the body Life, or the soul Senses Imagination Memory and reminiscence Intellect, judgment, reasoning Mind and the human power of thinking Will Affects and passions

§2. The human body, generally considered, is a machine consisting in an infinite number of organs and channels, in which the fluids, fermented and agitated, bring ⁴ The previous sentence amounts to a quote from the last sentence in the passage cited in Le Clerc’s Logica. ⁵ The reference here is presumably to Le Clerc’s Pneumatologia (Leipzig, 1690); cf. section III, ch. ii. ⁶ See especially III.34 (“Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and Inspiration in the Books of Holy Scripture”). ⁷ See especially Pneumatologia, section II, ch. iii-v. ⁸ Arnold Geulincx (1624–69) was a Flemish philosopher with Humanist and Cartesian sympathies. The treatise referred to here is the posthumously published Gnōthi seauton sive Ethica (Leiden, 1675), and the reference is to the fourth treatise (“De Passionibus”), see especially §7–8.

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about life and carry out the activities of the human being. See Craanen, On the Human Being, p. 2.⁹ §3. The life or soul of the human being consists in the appropriate fermentation of the blood and flow of the humors through unobstructed canals, which bring forth voluntary as well as involuntary actions. Hence it is likewise easy to grasp from this what health, disease, death, etc., are, namely, the appropriate fermentation, or corrupted fermentation, or the cessation of fermentation, etc.¹⁰ §4. The sense perceptions of the human being are impressed motions from external objects on the fibres of the nerves, which are dispersed from there through the membranes and are then carried to the brain, where they form different perceptions or images in accordance with the variety of organs, objects, and motions. §5. Imagination is either an internal sense having its seat in the brain, taking up the images excited by the senses and representing them to the mind, or it is the perception of external objects. See Le Clerc’s Pneumatics.¹¹ §6. Memory is the continuation, and reminiscence the restoration, of the images transferred from the senses to the imagination, that is, it is the continuation and repetition of the previous motion which had formed the image in the brain, and which comes about by means of the animal spirits in the same way as the first impressed traces came about, thereby preserving or restoring the original image. See Craanen On the Human Being.¹² §7. The mind is the better part of the human being by means of which it thinks, and it consists in the brain and its infinite organs modified in various ways through the flow and circulation of subtle matter which likewise is modified in various ways, both by the organs of the brain and by the influence of ideas, of the senses, of objects, etc. See the Appendix on the Soul, below. Thought is the act or effect of the mind which has been moved to the consideration of ideas or objects. An idea is the immediate object of the mind and thinking, or it can be the preceding image or thought, or the mind’s account or report of objective things. Every idea is adventitious and none is innate, which is proved by the example of one born blind and deaf, and of the human being raised among beasts. See Gassendi’s Doubts and Replies to Descartes.¹³ §8. The simple perception of ideas is intelligence or intellect. §9. The composition and disjoining of ideas is called judgment. §10. The composition or disjoining of a number of propositions is called reasoning.

⁹ Theodorus Craanen, Tractatus physico-medicus de homine: in quo status ejus tam naturalis, quam præternaturalis, quoad theoriam rationalem mechanice demonstratur (Leiden, 1689). ¹⁰ The foregoing definition of life is taken directly from Craanen’s De homine; cf. p. 241. ¹¹ See Pneumatologia, sect. I, c. iv, §§1–7. ¹² See, for instance, De Homine, pp. 575–8. ¹³ Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), a French philosopher in the Epicurean tradition. The work referred to here is Disquisitio metaphysica seu Dubitationes et Instantiae adversus Renatus Cartesii Metaphicam which was published in Amsterdam in 1644 and contains Gassendi’s original replies to Descartes’ Meditations (published by Descartes as the Fifth Set of Objections), along with Descartes’ replies and a further set of responses by Gassendi (the “Instantiae”). For this objection, see Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, p. 197.

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      §11. Willing and not willing are acts of the mind by which the human being is moved to follow the good and to flee from the bad, and likewise moved to consider the more profound or to acquiesce in imperfect cognition. §12. Sense, imagination, memory, intellect and will are not really distinct things but are only distinguished among themselves and from the human mind through abstraction, and as it were considered as different operations of the same mind. See Gassendi, Doubts and Replies.¹⁴ §13. Affects in general are agitations of the soul which overcome the human being’s capacity for thinking and of strengthening or weakening its will, and which arise from the blood and humors that have been fermented to a greater or lesser degree, and from their flow which is either increased or diminished. According to the variety of human temperaments and dispositions, these are quicker and more vehement in one person than in another, and are more indicative of the constitution of the subject than of the object. For example, the same woman affects a spirited man to a greater degree than she does a man more lacking in energy, and the sciences are more delightful to a man possessing reason in abundance than it is to a duller individual. Affects are either affects properly so-called or passions; the former such as anger, come forth from the soul, and the latter are received by the soul, such as fear which is incited by something external. §14. All affects which produce happiness in the human being are naturally good because they enlarge the power of the human mind or spirit; on the contrary, those which are connected with sadness are naturally evil because they detract from its power. §15. All affections are naturally good or bad: they are morally good if it is an upright judgment on the part of the human being that they accompany, and if it is a depraved judgment then they are morally evil. So, a person affected by regret on account of some sin naturally suffers, but morally he is called to a better life; and so as well, the delight of the Catholics on account of the eradication of the Reformed religion in France is naturally a good affect because it reinvigorates them and augments their spirit, but morally it is evil because it is contrary to reason, etc. §51. [ . . . ] The human being does not have absolute power with respect to his affects, least of all concerning their first motions, and those particularly that are excited by perception and which surpass our judgment are not in our power to control. For though you will yourself at some point not to be angry or afraid, you are nevertheless not able to prevent your spirit from being moved by anger or fear, in spite of reason’s intention to resist. The ground for this is that since affects originate from and consist in the increased or diminished fermentation of the blood and, as a consequence, in the faster or slower flow of blood and of the remaining humors, human reason and will are not naturally able to temper or extinguish these natural motions any more than they could a fever. It is however possible to delay our actions, our raging affects notwithstanding, and indeed to protect and fortify ourselves in advance against affects just as we do for a fever.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Disquisitio metaphysica seu Dubitationes et Instantiae, pp. 64–71 (“Dubitatio V” relating to the Second Meditation).

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§52. The following are useful for the preservation of oneself and the moderation of affects: 1. a correct, deliberately formed judgment concerning those things which tend to stimulate our affects the most; 2. resolving to act according to the previously conceived representation of the law when the occasion is offered rather than according to the representation that tends to be excited by the object; 3. frequent practice and habituation; 4. avoidance of those occasions which tend more easily to produce evil affects; 5. diet and medicine, for thus is it possible to temper the desire to copulate by fasting and chilling treatments; 6. through exciting more powerful affects which are contrary to the weaker affects, for instance, the fear of shameful punishment to oppose the fear that inclines one to flee, or the love of God to oppose the love of worldly things, etc.; 7. persuasion, for thus orators produce passions in various ways. See Vossius, Rhetoric.¹⁵ Moulin.¹⁶ Time as well does much to temper the affections. For since they depend on the fermentation of the blood and its increased or decreased circulation, and these are changed with time and reduced to a moderated or natural state, so it also tempers the affect by means of the exhaustion of excessive spirits or the restoration of deficient spirits.

Chapter X Appendix on the Soul The soul of the human being can be taken in two senses: either as life or as the mind. [ . . . ] Insofar as soul signifies the mind specifically, it is given different definitions by different philosophers. Some have defined the soul as a spirit that is determined by the human body, but these individuals have not satisfactorily articulated its essence, for they do not know nor can they express in positive terms what a spirit might be; so they say, it is an immaterial thing, that is, an unintelligible and unknown thing, which would be the same as if I defined the human being as something not made from iron. By contrast, those who have called the soul a faculty for thinking have identified the essence of the mind more correctly and clearly, yet it must further be accounted for what thinking is, and from where and in what way it arises, and many of them hesitate, admitting that they do not know it adequately since they are unable to understand the mind or to imagine it but are acquainted with it only through consciousness, or they are conscious of it through the actions which it effects. See the author of the Search after Truth.¹⁷ It seems to me to be in no way absurd, but rather in agreement with the truth in every respect, to define the mind of the human being as that which is the better part

¹⁵ Gerardus Vossius (1577–1649), a Dutch Humanist and theologian who published a number of texts concerning rhetoric. ¹⁶ Apparently, a reference to Pierre du Molin (1568–1658), a French Protestant, who among many other publications wrote a well-received text in logic, the Elementa logica (Leiden, 1598). ¹⁷ A reference to the principal work of Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), of 1674–5. For this point, see especially The Search after Truth, pp. 198–9.

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      of the human being, by which it thinks and is able to do so, consisting of the brain and its numberless organs, which are modified in various ways, and the flow and circulation of subtle matter which is likewise modified as much through the various and countless organs of the brain as it is through the impulsive force of (1) the impressed images in fantasy, (2) the senses and objects as the proximate causes, (3) the circulation of the blood, (4) respiration, (5) the air, and (6) ultimately God who is the first cause and the mover of secondary causes. For God moves the air, the air brings about respiration, respiration promotes the circulation and flow of blood and of spirits, the spirits flow here and there and, along with objects that impinge upon us, move the senses, the senses imprint images, and from these images arises thought which is nothing else than the act of the mind moved to the consideration of ideas and objects. An idea is nothing other than the immediate object of the mind, whether an image or a thought, recalled by the mind for the sake of contemplating objects. For it is beyond doubt that one thought can become the object of another, and a preceding thought become the object of a subsequent thought. From the previously given definition, one can easily see that the essence of the mind consists in four required components: 1. in a fine and flowing matter, 2. in its appropriate flow and motion, 3. in the sound and suitably disposed organs of the brain, 4. in the manifold determination and modification of the brain and its organs, and of the matter flowing through them. Yet if the mind should be wanting any of these required components, one can easily gather that it will be frail, imperfect, sickly, and its thoughts and ideas imperfect, inadequate, false, etc. The most evident criterion or proof that the definition of the soul or mind that has just been expressed is true is that all phenomena of the soul and its various modifications can be explained from it. For example: (1) To the question, why are the minds of the young and the old less capable than the minds of those who are middle aged? I answer (a) it is because the organs of the young are pliant, too flexible, and delicate, but those of the old are larger, harder, and less flexible: the minds of human beings of middle age are of moderate consistency. (b) The nervous fluids of the young flow copiously, are fine, and are excessively mobile; the fluids of the aged flow more sparingly, and are sluggish, viscous, and harsh; those of human beings of middle age are of a moderate nature. (c) The determination of the flowing matter in the young is easy but not lasting and inconsistent, in the aged it is difficult but unyielding; in humans of middle age it is of moderate difficulty and more constant. To the question (2), why are those who are drunk, before their intoxication has dissipated, completely robbed of their minds? I respond: it is because with the increased circulation of the blood and, consequently, the excessive circulation of all the humors thereby set in motion, the subtle matter rushes with force towards the brain and carries particles of such a sort with it as are heterogeneous and which damage the organs and do not admit of a proper measure. To the question (3), why is disease able to disturb the human mind, indeed even thoroughly debilitate it, as tends to happen occasionally? I answer: this takes place through the corrupted organs or corrupted humors, or both at the same time, or

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through their flow, as in madness and delirium, melancholy (or delirium without fever), mania (or rage), insanity, epilepsy, etc. See the medical writers.¹⁸ To the question (4), why is the mind impotent when the affects are agitated? I answer: because, due to the fermentation and circulation of the blood, which is either increased or diminished excessively, the subtle matter is also altered and is carried to the organs of the brain either with too much force, or too slowly and not in a sufficient amount. To the question (5), why at one time we are readier and more suited to meditate than at another? I respond: it is because at that time the four required components of the mind, either altogether or individually, find themselves in a more suitable state than at another. To the question (6), why in sleeping do we think or dream? I answer: because while we sleep, the flow of the humors and of subtle matter does not wholly cease. To the question (7), why when the circulation of the blood ceases for a time, thoughts should also cease, and, when it is restored, why human beings should resume thinking? I answer: because the flowing of subtle matter pertains to the essence of the mind, the flow of which ceases when the circulation of the blood ceases, and when the flow is restored it also returns. To the question (8), why one person would be more perspicacious, intelligent, and wise than another? I respond: because the previously mentioned four required components of the mind are more prominent in someone on account of a natural talent or cultivation. In a similar way, satisfactory responses can be drawn from the aforementioned definition and provided for the infinite other questions about the soul, regarding which one can see Craanen on human memory, imagination, and the senses,¹⁹ although he departs from me in following Descartes as far as the mind is concerned. * * * From our definition it further becomes clear that the soul, or mind, considered for itself and in accordance with its nature is not immortal, nor can it exist outside of the human body. For once the body has been destroyed, the blood, the remaining humors and fluids, their flow, etc. cease to be as well. Objection: eternal life requires an immortal soul. I answer: by all means, but it only requires one that will be immortal after the resurrection of the whole human being through God’s particular grace, that is, by that same gift of grace through which the body or the whole human being is made faithful and blessed will it also be preserved by God in eternity. On the other hand, those passages in Holy Scripture which treat of the eternal death of the soul and the power and will of God when destroying the souls of reprobates through fire, suffice to show that the soul is not immortal according to its nature but destructible, as is any

¹⁸ Among those writers Stosch is likely referring to are Craanen as well as Cornelius Bontekoe (1640 [or 1647]–85) whose Tractatus ethico-physicus de animi & corporis passionibus, earundemque certissimus remediis (Amsterdam) was only published (posthumously) in 1696 but who was on the medical faculty during Stosch’s time at university. ¹⁹ See above, n.12.

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      creature which God is able to destroy or otherwise determine since this necessarily follows from His omnipotence.²⁰ * * * Further, our definition shows that the soul of the human being differs not in kind but only in degree, doubtless a much higher degree, from the soul of animals, as for instance the soul of the distinguished philosopher and of the rude farmer differ by many degrees from one another. Indeed, the previously mentioned four required components of the mind are found in animals just as they are in human beings: similar fluids, similar flow, similar vessels and organs, similar determinations. And by the reckoning of most, senses, imagination, and memory are attributed to animals. But neither is judgment altogether to be denied them, as is proven by: 1. their desire for beneficial things and aversion and flight from harmful things; for it is the better part of judging to know what is in fact good for one and what bad; 2. the monarchical regime of bees; 3. the democratic regime of ants; 4. the parrot’s imitation of human speech; 5. the communication of skillfully trained horses and dogs with humans through signs, which are as good as speech, particularly for communicating with the deaf and foreigners. And even though the soul of the human being and that of animals might differ by many degrees, yet it is just as incongruous to say that each is of the same essence as it would be to say that a spring-driven turn-spit is just as spontaneous as a wind-mill, seeing as the latter, in milling a variety of grains and wood, surpasses the turn-spit by many degrees on account of its activity and so is spontaneous in a superior way. If the condition or essence of the human being or human soul is to be made somewhat more evident by means of a comparison, there is none more suitable than the wind-mill, for as its proximate extrinsic efficient cause is the air or wind, and God is the first cause who sets the wind and all other secondary causes in motion, so also the air is the proximate extrinsic cause of life and the human soul. For when you remove air, then respiration and the circulation of the blood and of all of the humors, in short, the human being’s life and capacity for thinking, will soon cease. Suppose, further, that a human being enjoys the proper measure of pure air, then he will be very healthy in body and mind. Suppose, to the contrary, that the air he draws in is impure, dense, and not in the correct measure, then soon the circulation of the blood and subtle matter will be worse, and the human will be less healthy in body and mind. Another apt comparison is that which the watermill provides, particularly the sort which produces melodies as are found near Rome. For just as the operation of such a mill or automaton depends to a great extent on the disposition of the wheels and on the characteristics of the water, which depending on whether there are impediments in the water or not, whether it rushes in larger or smaller quantities into the wheel, so too it makes a significant difference whether the human being should undertake to meditate or to think with the humors naturally fermented and duly flowing, or with

²⁰ See Chapter XI, below, p. 72, for specific references.

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humors having been agitated too greatly or too little through affects, wine, excessive movement, or a variety of other occurrences. Objection: the human being can think more things than occur to the senses, for instance: 1. abstract things and 2. God. I respond: (1) the human being would not be able to conceive of abstract things unless it had previously sensed or imagined singular things. For who can understand a genus except by means of cognizing its species, and who can think the species unless various individuals of the same nature, whose agreements and disagreements the mind was able to attend to, had previously been exhibited to the senses? Concerning (2) God himself is known a posteriori from His actions by means of ascending from effects to their first cause, from motions to their first mover, and the more particular things or creatures we know, the more extensively we know God and the union we share with God and Creation. It would not occur to anyone that God is the most perfect being unless he had already considered the world, or had become aware of some part of it through anticipation or contemplation of the nature of things. See Le Clerc’s Pneumatology (sect. I, ch. v, §20) and Gassendi (Animadversions, bk. II, p. 38).²¹ * * * That the definition of the soul provided above is genuine, adequate, and sufficient is proven by, among other things, the definitions or descriptions of God and the human being presented in the first chapter of this little book. For if God is the one and sole substance, as is beyond doubt, then the soul cannot be a substance as people generally suppose. And if the whole human being does not exist except as a part of the universe and as a mode of divine substance, existing from and in God, then the soul too, which is the better part of the human being, cannot be anything other than a mode. Lastly, if every creature is nothing unless it exists from and in God, then the soul of the human being cannot be of a different nature; all of which arguments are supremely evident, since they are taken from the definitions, and they show how nicely our way of thinking about the soul coheres with the nature of God and of other things. Objection: on the ladder of categories, the human being is reckoned among substances. I answer: that is so, and the human, just like other individuals, can be considered as a substance in respect of the modes or predicates which are in it; indeed, a mode is taken for a substance with respect to another mode by which it is in turn modified. For example, clothing is a mode with respect to a human being, but in respect of its golden or silver buttons, or the other decorations which are hung on it, it is a substance. Thus, we say that the human being is dressed, and the clothes are decorated with gold. Yet, since no part can be a true substance that does not subsist for itself but adheres in some whole, and moreover the human being is a part of the universe, subsisting neither from itself nor for itself but existing from and in God, it is ²¹ The latter reference is to Gassendi’s Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii: qui est de vita, moribus, placitisque Epicuri (Lyon, 1649), and specifically to the second volume (but the third book in Gassendi’s own division of topics) Ethicae Epicuri, which opens with a discussion concerning the knowledge of the existence of God.

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      clear that the human being is not a true substance, even if it is rightly regarded as a sort of substance with respect to its modes. A substance in this sense however intends nothing more than some obscure object in which the properties of things which we are acquainted with exist. See Le Clerc, Logic (bk. I, ch. i, §4, and ch. iii, §11). It is absurd and useless to imagine a physical individual to be composed of two substances, namely an immaterial and a corporeal substance, and to make an aggregate being out of the human, a simple as well as single being like any other living creature. For the body is not able to subsist in the absence of the soul, but soon decomposes, and on account of that same connection and the necessity of human nature neither can the soul subsist without the body. For if the human being were an aggregate being, upon its dissolution the soul and the body would have to subsist in themselves and outside of that union, just like the members of some fellowship once it is disbanded, or the parts of an aggregate being after its dissolution, as with a sheep separated from the herd or grains of sand separated from a pile. Since this does not happen but the body is dissolved, this is the clearest sign that it does not exist except as an integral and not a substantial part. Nor is the soul of another nature, for if it is supposed that the soul is a substance then the body would not exist unless it is joined to the soul, or an accident of it, then this would be absurd since the soul is in the body and not vice versa. Also, the bodies of animals would be of a superior nature than that of the human being since it is beyond doubt that the animal is reckoned among substances on the ladder of categories. It is improper to say that the mind thinks, understands, wills, judges, reasons, etc., which locution also gives occasion for the error of treating the mind as though it were a true substance. For it is more appropriately said that the human being thinks, understands, wills, judges, reasons, though obviously it does so by means of the mind. For a similar reason we say that the human being runs, strikes, eats, sings, begets, and not that the foot runs, the arm strikes, the mouth eats, the throat sings, the genitals beget, etc., though we might make substances out of all these parts, in the same way as we do out of the mind, and afterwards one might even investigate from whence they have these properties and ignore the connection which they have with the human body. It is also a clear indication that the soul or the mind of the human being does not exist except as a part of the human being, since it begins and ends, thrives and diminishes at the same time as the body (as with the young and the old), is diseased or healthy, is affected in an agreeable or disagreeable way, is reinvigorated and restored by food and medication just as the body is, and indeed it is so closely united to the body that the mind is altered when the body is altered, and in turn the body is altered when the mind is altered. See Gassendi, Doubts and Replies.²² The reason why so many people seek to prove the natural immortality of the soul with such zeal is that they suppose that eternal life cannot be obtained by human beings unless one’s soul could exist outside of the human body and be immortal for itself. But since that is a scruple of no consequence, and it is manifest from the Holy Scripture that God will revive and preserve in eternity not only the mind but also the body of some

²² See, for example, Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, pp. 187–8.

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men, that is, the whole human being, why then would we willingly blind ourselves concerning such a clear matter?

Chapter XI Appendix on Divine Punishments The reasons why God does not punish the vicious and the sinful with eternal torture are: 1. because this is repugnant to His essence, perfection, wisdom, and power. For since every single creature is a mode of the divine essence, determined by God to a certain way of existing and acting, and since there are none who are not in God as nothing can exist outside of God who is infinite and all-encompassing, so it is clear that God would not do anything that is against Himself or that may be contrary to Him, but rather everything that God does is good. However, God would do something that is not in any way good if it is supposed that He is injured and offended by some among His creatures or works such that he would be moved to eternal anger and vengeance, the cruellest of all. These are human passions and imperfections which do not occur in God, who is the source of everything good and blessed and who is lacking in nothing and cannot be affected by any vexation. See Gassendi, Animadversions. bk. 2, p. 59. 2. It is absurd to think that God, He who can do everything well and indeed who on account of His wisdom cannot but do everything for the best, has so determined the greater part of Himself to stand in opposition to Him and to His power and to be an object of His hatred, anger, and vengeance as, for example, so many hordes of hostile, ungovernable devils, so many human beings sinning against His will, and such a great abyss as Hell which is supposed to contain the greater part of the human race (which has multiplied to such an extent through the centuries that if all of the rejected were resurrected at once, then neither the Earth nor the heavenly sphere could contain them all). And so it is God, in whom exists all that is and outside of whom nothing is, who brings forth more human beings only so that more might sink into a Hell already congested with infinite devils and reprobates hostile to God, who curse him in eternity and upon whom eternal anger and vengeance are exercised. Is it conformable to the perfection, wisdom, and essence of the divine to treat itself so horribly when it is capable of bringing everything about for the best and in such a way as agrees and is conformable with His essence and wisdom or intellect. See the Search after Truth, bk IV, ch. 1, p. 4.²³ 3. The aim of punishment is not retribution, not even among human beings, but rather the improvement of men so that they are liberated from errors and deterred from vicious behavior, or, in the case of incorrigible members of society, are exterminated as wolves. As a result, temporal punishments and death suffice for this, but in no way is there a need for eternal torments as these are evidence of supreme vengeance and cruelty, passions which are entirely foreign to God, the most ²³ See The Search after Truth, p. 266.

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      perfect being. See Strimesius, Praxiology, ch. 1, part 24, where he says that God does not administer punishment as retribution, which smacks of imperfection, but rather to bring the malefactor back to the path of virtue.²⁴ 4. Since the vices and sins of men for the most part already elicit sufficient temporal punishments and troublesome consequences as a result of God’s eternal decree and through the order of nature, so the fear of eternal torments is not needed for directing them. For in the natural state the ignorance of God is attended by superstition, idolatry, and the fear of invisible things; the consequence of intemperance are diseases of the soul and body; and a reciprocal harm and denial of the duties of humanity follows upon the injury of one’s kin. In the civil condition, penal laws, the executioner, gallows, the sword, the wheel, fire, water, fines, and so forth, are added to these and provide more of a deterrent than the fear of Hell, in which most do not believe anyway. 5. The Holy Scripture itself speaks of the destruction of the soul and of a second and eternal death, and for the greatest of sins God threatened Adam with no other punishment than death; on this see Genesis 2:17, 3:19, Isaiah 66:24, Jude 7, II Peter 2:4, Jude 6, Hebrews 10:27, Deuteronomy 4:24–26, II Peter 3:10, Isaiah 34:5–8, Matthew 10:28, Luke 12:4. Objection 1: Some men neither know of nor worship God sufficiently and act against their own proper well-being while harming their fellows—in a word, they sin and are deserving of eternal punishments. I respond: they harm themselves and others and they are rightly restrained and induced towards a better life in accordance with the decree of the supreme governor of all things by human laws and punishments: for the great earthly authorities are God’s own representatives. But God—He who cannot suffer injury—does not take offence at these trespasses and neither does He stand in need of worship by men, nor does He take offence when animals, infants, the mad, and the ignorant do not honor Him, for He did not want to be honored by these for otherwise He would have imparted them with knowledge of Him. Objection 2: It is nevertheless contrary to God’s will that one man should destroy another. I answer: if a killing is malicious then it is a sin against the law of society and merits a penalty of death. Nevertheless, God Himself cannot object to human destruction any more than He can to the general corruption and change of all other things, for nothing is more frequent in the nature of things than that one thing destroys and alters another. So, as large beasts kill smaller ones, and humans kill beasts and butcher them for food, so the enemy is permitted to destroy his enemy. The executioner rightly kills the offender; a friend rightly abandons his friend in a case of extreme necessity where the latter’s death is unavoidable; fire consumes whatever is combustible; water erodes stone; the earth absorbs water; etc. In all these same occurrences, there is nothing contrary to the divine essence, power, or intellect, and neither is anything withdrawn from the universe; rather particular things are only ²⁴ Samuel Strimesius (1648–1730) was a philosopher and theologian at the university at Frankfurt an der Oder. His Praxiologia apodictica, seu Philosophia moralis demonstrativa, Pythanologiae Hobbesianae opposita was published in 1677 (the text referred to is on p. 22).

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modified and otherwise determined in accordance with natural physical laws; for nature does not suffer a vacuum. Lucretius expresses this more elegantly: “Therefore no visible object utterly passes away, since nature makes up again one thing from another, and does not permit anything to be born unless aided by another’s death [ . . . ], for nothing can be created from nothing and, when it is brought forth, cannot be brought back to nothing.”²⁵ For nature only dissolves everything into its constituent bodies and will never annihilate something since all things consist of elements. See Search after Truth, bk. 3, ch. 10.²⁶ Objection 3: It would conflict with God’s justice if he did not inflict unending torments upon transgressors. I respond: The wicked, who act contrary to their own advantage and society, endure various troublesome consequences, reciprocal injuries, and temporal punishments already through the order of nature, and to this extent they do not escape this life with impunity. Moreover, justice, as it is practiced among human beings, which is the constancy of will in granting to each what is his own, is improperly attributed to God and is said of Him only anthropomorphically since God is not bound to or obligated by anyone as a human judge is. His justice, wisdom, and power are not to be measured according to the standard of the human mind. Furthermore, there is no proportion between the vices of finite human beings, which do not affect God at all, and unending torments. Lastly, the only punishments that are apposite to the laws of nature are those which can be anticipated by reasoning and which we incur through vicious action, and which suffice for guiding us and are proportionate to our trespasses. Objection 4: As God confers many benefits upon human beings on account of His goodness, so He is unfairly treated when we become angry with Him and then He rewards sins with punishment. I respond: Good and evil befalls humanity according to the eternal decree of God, by means of which virtues are attended by pleasure and vices pain. This applies to God as well, though in His case, the pleasure or pain is in no way grounded upon passion or some sudden agitation as is observed with humans because God cannot be moved by anyone. However, in accordance with His supreme wisdom, and as it pleased Him to do so, He framed this order of things in such a way that good actions are followed by good consequences, and evil actions by evil consequences. Superstitious men believe that such consequences could not but proceed from an angered God acting in the given circumstances, or that they are inflicted as punishments, as if God ceaselessly sat as it were in tribunal in order to judge and punish the multitudinous sins of countless human beings, or as if evil consequences could not touch humans or other creatures unless from the hands of an affronted and angered God, though these evils befall even the most innocent in the natural order of things.

²⁵ Lucretius, De rerum natura, trans. W. H. D. Rouse and M. F. Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1924); I.262–6. ²⁶ See The Search after Truth, pp. 255–7.

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4 Theodor Ludwig Lau: Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being (1717) Theodor Ludwig Lau was born in Königsberg on July 15, 1670. His father was a professor of law at the Albertus-Universität in Königsberg, which Lau attended from 1685, studying philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence. He moved to the newly founded university in Halle for a further year of study in 1694 where he attended lectures by Christian Thomasius, among others. Beginning in 1695, Lau embarked upon a series of trips to centers of learning in Europe and England (where he met Newton, among others), returning to Germany in 1700 to take a position as a privy counsellor and cabinet director for the young Duke of Courland. The Duke’s early death in 1711 ushered in a long period of unemployment for Lau, though he apparently used this time to read widely, and ultimately published a number of treatises in 1717, including texts on politics and finance, in Frankfurt am Main where he had re-located in search of a new position. It was in this same year that Lau anonymously published his Meditationes philosophicae de Deo, mundo et homine (Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being). It was immediately denounced as atheistic by the local spiritual authorities, with all copies confiscated by the magistrate and subsequently burned. Under pressure from the authorities, Lau’s publisher gave up his name and Lau himself was imprisoned (during which imprisonment he reportedly attempted suicide) and then expelled from Frankfurt. He appealed to the juristic faculty in Halle regarding the appropriateness of his treatment at the hands of the magistrate in Frankfurt, but was rebuffed in a review written by Thomasius himself. Another anonymously published philosophical text, the Meditationes, Theses, Dubia philosophico-theologica (PhilosophicalTheological Meditations, Theses, and Doubts) of 1719 was also badly received. His reputation in tatters, Lau had little chance of landing another position at court, and he supported himself through translation work and composing verses for special occasions. Alongside this, Lau began a doctorate in law at Erfurt which was awarded in 1725. This led to an opportunity in his hometown of Königsberg, where he was offered a chance to join the juristic faculty in a teaching position. However, a thesis he wrote in 1727 to fulfill the requirements of such a position was judged by the committee to contain “paradoxical opinions” and he was forbidden to publicly

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defend it. Lau’s previous authorship of the notorious Philosophical Meditations also soon came to light, and he was forced to issue a formal recantation of his views. Lau soon left Königsberg again, and appeared to have lived an itinerant life until he settled in Hamburg and Altona in 1736. There, he spent the last years of his life in poor mental and physical health, dying in February 1740. In the span of four compact chapters, Philosophical Meditations covers issues ranging from metaphysics, natural theology, cosmology, physics, physiology, empirical psychology, ethics, and politics. The first chapter defends the immediately evident character of God’s existence, such that any formal demonstration is unnecessary, while denying that we can have any distinct ideas regarding the divine nature other than that it is necessarily one. Lau accordingly has recourse to metaphors in accounting for the relation of God to the individual and to the world, and his scepticism regarding our knowledge of God leads him to reject the authority of Scripture in its determination of the divine nature and the prescriptions of religion when it comes to the proper form of worship (though he also endorses the external accommodation of one’s practices to local customs). The second chapter offers a consideration of the world and its physical constituents. There, Lau denies that the world is created ex nihilo and asserts its pre-existence in God, though Lau also contends that the world can be allowed to come to be sensibly and in time while emphasizing the difference between this and the Biblical account of Creation, and he stresses that the sensible world depends upon God’s activity in conserving it and directing the motions within it. The third chapter turns to the human being, offering a broadly materialist account of its physiology, in accordance with which the soul or active principle is identified with blood, and the operation of the human intellect and will are identified with the actions of the blood in various organs of the body, which understanding of life also offers what Lau regards as a consoling perspective on death. The fourth and final chapter presents considerations relating to ethics and politics, offering among other things a defense of the superiority of the state of nature and an account on the basis of the theory of the temperaments of the origin of oppressive religious and political institutions. Lau’s text was previously considered as belonging primarily to the reception of Spinoza in Germany, though recent research has drawn attention to its manifold borrowings not only from Spinoza but also from Hobbes, Locke, John Toland, Plotinus, Giordano Bruno, and various minor figures in the radical philosophical and clandestine tradition. If there is a main influence on Lau’s thought, it would likely be, ironically enough, Christian Thomasius’ philosophical eclecticism which Thomasius championed in opposition to the ossifying authoritarianism of philosophical sects and schools (and which fact likely motivated Lau to appeal to him after his book was condemned). Like Stosch’s Concord, Lau’s Philosophical Meditations found its way into private collections of forbidden literature and was circulated in handwritten copies (due to the destruction of most of the published versions) among clandestine groups of freethinkers. The text continued to attract attention after Lau’s death, and was translated into French (a translation in which Frederick the Great apparently had a hand) and German. The following, complete translation is of the original Latin text of 1717, and all notes are my own.

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Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Donnert, Erich, ed., Theodor Ludwig Lau (1670–1740): Religionsphilosoph und Freidenker der Frühen Neuzeit (Peterlan and Bern: Peter Lang, 2011). Dyck, Corey W., “Materialism in the Mainstream of Early German Philosophy,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24.5 (2016), pp. 897–916. Lau, Theodor Ludwig, Meditationes philosophicae de Deo, mundo et homine (1717); reprint with an introduction by M. Pott (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1992). Mulsow, Martin, Enlightenment Underground: Radical Germany (1680–1720). Trans. H. C. Erik Midelfort (Charlottesville & London: University of Virginia Press, 2015). Mulsow, Martin, “Lau, Theodor Ludwig,” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 460–2. Rumore, Paola, “Mechanism and Materialism in Early Modern German Philosophy,” in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24.5 (2016), pp. 917–39. Schröder, Winfried, Spinoza in der deutschen Frühaufklärung (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 1987). Shelford, April, “Worse than the Three Imposters? Towards an Interpretation of Theodor Ludwig Lau’s Meditationes philosophicae de Deo, mundo, homine,” in S. Berti, F. CharlesDaubert, and R. Popkin, eds., Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free Thought in Early-Eighteenth Century Europe (Boston: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 439–74. Stiehler, Gottfried, Materialisten der Leibniz-Zeit (Berlin: VEB-Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1966).

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Philosophical Meditations concerning God, the World, and the Human Being Preface Gentle reader, accept these philosophical meditations that I now submit to you with a benevolent spirit. They represent the first sketch of a larger work which in time, provided that God grants me life and leisure, I will bring to the light of the public. The theses, which I present to you to be read in the limited space of the present pages, are as it were abbreviated points and middle terms which, as much is contained in them, stand all the more in need of elucidation and demonstration. I will, therefore, eventually supply them with grounds, and elucidate them through evidence and examples. You should know in the meantime, gentle reader, that what you read by me here has been written not as a theologian, nor as a jurist, nor as a physician, but as a philosopher, one not bound to any sect or society, but one who takes divine and human matters, such as God, the world, and the human being, for the object and end of his mediations, and freely philosophizes, discourses, and writes about them. For my part, I foresee that there will not be a few for whom it remains the supreme and sole virtue to bite and tear with mordant tooth at the work of others, particularly at that which departs from the well-trodden path of opinion and prejudice, and these will no doubt sharpen their gladiatorial arrows against me and my philosophical book. Such heroes might be consumed, like Hector, with an avenging wrath for the sake of God; they might damn, burn, confiscate this book, and even include my philosophical thoughts on the catalogue of forbidden books; they might call me a heretic, atheist, Spinozist, or refer to me by still harsher titles and names, yet, no horror or fear will stay my hand. I will welcome the fiery darts of their refutations and the flaming mortars of their objections with a derisive countenance and philosophical equanimity, always remaining master of myself and my passions, and regarding their tyrannical proceedings against these innocent pages and, if they threaten such, against their author, with indifferent eyes. And just as I greet their cries of imminent triumph with haughty silence, so I will meet even the most scurrilous of calumnies with a high-minded contempt since natural and revealed theology advise us, and ethics and politics teach us, not to heed those public and private denunciations (which as the herald of virtue I prefer to sympathy) that stem from a dark-hearted envy. These illustrious, purple-robed men of the republic of letters may overflow with a superabundant awareness of their science and wisdom; they may be bright as the sun, great luminaries, divine messengers enjoying a double measure of the Spirit of God, yet I cherish the most certain hope that, from their singular abundance of grace they would still not begrudge me the enjoyment of the use of my senses and even reason, and the freedom of a philosopher, so that like a star of the smallest magnitude illuminated by a sliver of divine light, I might at least shimmer if not shine. In the meantime, kind reader, I still want to conceal my name from you, but so that you might have some acquaintance with my faith and my life, you may hold on to this living description of both: I honor the universe for I am a universalist and embrace all things. I worship God and honor the vice-gods, I live honestly, I offend no one, and give to each what is theirs. Farewell!

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First Chapter Theological-Physical Meditations I. God is, God exists. II. All the senses and reason teach this to me and to everyone else. Therefore, there is no atheism, no heathen peoples, and no godless men. III. It is not possible to determine properly or demonstratively what God is. What God is God alone knows. In the meantime, the concepts which people and nations have framed of God and his essence, these multifarious representations and images, let them be constituted in whatever way one likes, are not to be derided or subjected to abuse, much less are they to be punished with hatred, exile, fire, or humiliation. These all have as their foundation religion, devotion, and knowledge, and in matters of religion, devotion, and knowledge each is left to himself, neither able nor required to accept a rule or standard from another. IV. For me, God is natura naturans, I am natura naturata; God is ratio ratiocinans, I ratio ratiocinata; He forma formans; I forma formata; He simple matter, I modified matter; He the ocean, I a stream of water, a drop; God fire, I a spark; He the earth, I a lump of soil; God the air, I a gust; He the sun, I a ray; He the body, I a limb; He the mind, I some operation of the mind; God is eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. V. The existence of God stands in no need of proof, as it is obvious to the senses of everyone. The eye sees Him, the ear hears Him, the nose smells Him, the tongue tastes Him, and the hand touches Him. Behold these infallible witnesses, raised above any objection! VI. The existence of God is manifest to me from His wondrous creation, governance and preservation of worlds, of these spheres made from earth, water, and fire, and from the threefold kingdom of animals, vegetables, and minerals, in all of which God manifests and reveals Himself in a palpable and visible way. VII. This revelation of God that is accomplished through and in his works is the most certain, mathematically infallible, and the most distinct and sufficient principle for knowing and gaining conviction of God and the reality of His existence. VIII. The astounding works of this creation, and the meditation upon and investigation of these, are therefore my bible; for me, these are the most faithful prophets, apostles, and priests, and these I read, examine, heed, and follow. IX. There is also, of course, a certain revelation of God from Scripture, which is regarded as holy and as His unmediated word; but this is a historical revelation resting on the accounts of people and subject to many faults. It acquaints us with a particular God, namely the Messiah and Christ, principally affecting the Jews and Christians, and is surely not the complete and universal science concerning the God of all worlds and peoples. No doubt, in the revealed word of Christ are found a few, general pronouncements concerning the universal author of the whole world, but these are merely set out in advance and as it were in place of a preface so that the connection of the parts subsequently related in the same system coheres with a better thread. The revelation of the supreme God through His own works pleases me better than that through the works of others—pleases me better, since the former

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is from the hand of God Himself, truly divine, and certain, the latter is written and promulgated through the hands of man, merely human, and uncertain. There truly is a God. X. There truly is a God: He is first and one; for He would not be God if he was not one. The universe is a circle and God the center; every circle has but one center. God is perfect, and therefore necessarily one since multiplicity detracts from unity and thus from perfection; to multiply God is to destroy divinity. XI. Hence, the polytheism of heathens and of Christians¹ is a needlessly complicated matter, enveloped in many obscurities, doubts, and contradictions. The best science of God is that which is simple, and that science is simple which teaches and acknowledges the one God without positing many gods, along with their divisions, subdivisions, and co-ordinations, a God freed from and purified of all the terms of the Scholastics and the speculations of the theologians and metaphysicians. XII. In the meantime, the multiplication of the deity or of gods should be permitted to stand where they have been introduced and taken up by theologians and politicians for a reason pertaining to the state or realm under the false cover of religion and the regime, and so the heathen may worship many gods, and the Christian their God who is one and three. XIII. I love and honor, according to my religion, the God who for me is one in essence; these few brief words are to be sure the chief parts of religion, and they are that much better, the briefer and fewer they are. XIV. To be sure, I love God purely and simply for the reason that He is God and indeed my own. In this I give no thought to any present or future good, whether of the body or the soul, or of this or another life. Whoever loves God on account of something else, loves himself more than God. Such a love is a love tainted by interest, not a true and sincere love. XV. If I love the one God in this way, I do not fear him; fear involves hate, and love and hate are incompatible. Fear presupposes some act of transgression, and some injury suffered, so that I dread the anger, vengeance, and punishment of another; yet, God cannot be harmed in any way. The finite has no power, no might, and is incapable of action with respect to the infinite. If God is incapable of being harmed, then there are no sins; since what are those but injuries and transgressions? If there are no sins, then neither are there punishments, nor a devil, nor a Hell—when there are no evil actions, then neither should evil passions be invented. If there are no sins nor sinners, then there is no need for a savior, redeemer, or sanctifier. Non-beings have no affections and the conclusion presupposes the premises. Nevertheless, the ideas can be pleasing to each person who wishes or is required to find them pleasing, the ideas which the heathens and Christians of the golden age cherish, defend, teach, and preach, concerning the state of innocence, the subsequent fall of man, the redemption and birth of the redeemer, the passion and resurrection, atonement, the pouring out of the Holy Spirit, and many other things. These are indeed pleasing and harmless, and not to be censured or damned. Meanwhile, he who

¹ Lau is evidently referring here, as in the next proposition, to the Christian belief in the three persons of God.

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   loves God from his whole heart and his entire soul can do without all these notions and dogmas, for they are only the offspring of fear and hatred. XVI. We come from the love of God to the worship of Him. For me, this consists in admiration, the giving of thanks, and obedience. XVII. I worship Him with admiration, since He is the architect and maker of this universe as well as of my corporeal and spiritual substance. XVIII. I give thanks to Him on account of the innumerable kindnesses He has shown me and still shows me daily. He is my preserver who just as He has first given me my nature, so He has also given me my well-being and my conservation which he bestows upon me even now through the generous benediction of His hand. XIX. I honor Him by obedience, since He is my guide and governor, and I resign myself and all that is mine to His divine will. Because of this, I do not often give myself over to prayers, and I do not pray so that I might obtain this or that good from God, nor do I supplicate myself so that He might allow me to enjoy health, good fortune, and a long and eternal life. For, to beg for such things from God is the same as to prescribe laws to God and to wish to be wiser than Him. Yet God Himself knows best what is useful for me and necessary. I always trust in Him and He will continue to benefit me in the future just as He has done in the past. Nevertheless, I do often call upon God, but this is rather from custom and habit than from a determined intention. And so long as I live and call upon God, I immediately add: let your will be done, not mine! Indeed, I ask of you, but pay me heed only according to your pleasure, give me not what I wish but what you have decreed to give. Do to me, my Lord, exactly as will seem appropriate to you for you to do with me. You are my creator, I your creature; You the artificer, I the artifact; You the king, I the subject over which you have the unrestricted right of life and death, salvation and damnation. XX. Truly, this complete awe of God is internal not external, spiritual not material, and it subsists in the intellect and the heart; these, namely, are God’s best and only temples, chapels, and altars. This is a religion of sense not words, of reason not realm,² free not coerced, of will not command, of all humankind not of the prince, acknowledging no other precepts, no other formulas of concord, confessions, symbols, catechisms, articles of faith than that there is one God, my creator, governor, and preserver. XXI. For me, however, there is a political religion and a religion of society in addition to this natural religion. For I am a citizen and a subject, and thus as in the other parts of life, so in extrinsic and transitive acts of faith I am bound to the law of another and not my own. I therefore worship such a God as the prince or republic commands me to worship. If the prince is a Turk, or a Jew, or a Christian, then I will venerate the Koran, the Old Testament, or the New Testament respectively as the law and precept for my religion. If the pope is the commanding authority, then I believe in transubstantiation; if it is Luther, then for me God is invested partially in, with, and ² Here as well as throughout the next proposition, Lau references the phrase “cuius regio, eius religio [whose realm, his religion]” which expresses a principle from the Peace of Augsburg that permitted potentates within the Holy Roman Empire to determine the religion (Protestant or Catholic) of their respective states.

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under the Eucharist; if Calvin, then I take the Eucharist for the symbol of God. In this way, whoever’s realm it is in which I live, it is his religion that governs me, and of whatever sort the theological, political, or national God of that realm might be, I am and must be content with Him. For the religion that has dominion over the body also rules over that consciousness which enters in the senses.

Second Chapter Physical Meditations I. From God, we proceed to the universe that has been created by Him. II. This universe is, for me, the complex or system of all visible and invisible creatures which live, sense, reason, and exist in its orbs of fire, water, earth and air, and beyond in other ways not known to us. To call it by a single name: the world. III. This world is in God, from God, and through God. God is the spider, the world His web. IV. The world is in God: before creation, the world was a fetus in His depths, a seed in His loins, a circle in His center-point. V. The world is from God: the world comes to be through creation, not from nothing, but from the infinite pre- and co-existent Being. God, father; creation, birth; the world, that which has been born. VI. The world is through God: the world exists through its continual conservation by God. God, the wet nurse; the world, the infant suckling at the providential breast. VII. The world has therefore existed eternally. That which is caused exists along with its cause; the building exists with its architect; the fruit with its tree; the ear with its grain. VIII. However, even if the world has existed eternally, it nonetheless comes forth in time. The chains of eternity are ruptured so that the world has a beginning of its origin. The voice of eternal God decrees: Let it be! and this was the act of generation, the birth accomplished in a single moment. Here, there is no distinct temporal interval—God and the action, decree and its execution, the willing and the effect existed at the same time, conjointly in the production and generation of the universe. God was willing to create the world, and by that very act it was created, through His volition alone and in all of its perfection. IX. I do not however impugn those who count a certain number of years from the foundation of the world, although there is no unanimous opinion and concord among all people and historical accounts regarding their precise determination. These same individuals make God into some sort of idle being who, before those years which they prefix to the world’s existence and His revelation, has been hiding as it were in Cimmerian darkness in a state of perpetual inaction, when however God is a being that is always acting, always willing, always creating. X. Nor do I aim to start any quarrel with those who assert that the whole world has been created in the space of six days, since they say it according to the principles of a revelation written by human beings. They likewise speak of the creation of a particular world which has been effected and accomplished by the particular God belonging to certain peoples, namely the Jews and the Christians. For my part,

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   however, I talk of a universal God of the entire universe, in accordance with my own free reason, and of the revelation of this same God, which has been manifested in His works. XI. I marvel at, more than try to investigate, the manner of creation by which this entire universe has been formed. The work is God’s since it transcends the human being’s capacity to comprehend; and indeed, there is no analogy of the finite to the infinite. XII. I am indeed aware of the various and subtle speculations published by the learned and especially by Englishmen concerning the manner in which the world has been created, but I will not weigh these on the scales of truth. As it is for me, so the same freedom is fit for them of making up their own minds however they wish according to their talent and wit. These are concepts, ideas, intellectual operations in the formation of which everyone enjoys a full measure of liberty. Reason does not recognize any authority, any servitude, or any law; reason swears on no one’s word. XIII. Many creations have gradually followed and succeeded upon this first creation, indeed, they will be infinite in number since God is infinite. All of His will is activity, all of His thought is creation. As many worlds and realms as there are, therefore, so are there that many of His volitions and thoughts. We do in fact know the one created world which we perceive by means of our reason and sense. All of the innumerable remaining worlds are concealed from us, and yet they are and really exist, and our ignorance of them does not annul their nature. The inference that, since I do not know of a thing, am ignorant of a thing, therefore that thing is not given, is not, and does not exist, is not valid. XIV. There are those who say that God rested from His labors on the seventh day; from thence comes the Sabbath and the day of the Lord. Nor would this claim displease me since I am no lover of contradiction for contradiction’s sake. I would embrace it for the cause of peace, lest I be called a heretic or still worse things. For me, God is rest itself in the sense that He is subject to no passions at all. For truly, what are passions other than disturbances of rest? Nonetheless, [in the ordinary sense] God does not rest but is perpetually active, always reasoning, always thinking, always willing. He is life, and so is in motion, and action follows from motion, but whoever genuinely acts does not rest. XV. That God, however, does not rest, even if only in regard to this universe of ours of which I am a part (for I abstract from realms unknown to me), but as He has eternally, so He likewise acts now with indefatigable diligence, this His conservation and governance teaches me. Truly, if God were to rest for even a single moment, if He were to cease to conserve what He creates, if He were not to govern what He conserves, this entire structure would fall out of His order and harmony. Yet are conserving and governing not actions? And what sort of actions? The sort that requires perpetual motion, and indeed does perpetual motion not exclude rest? XVI. As God is, thus, always in motion, so through this motion the conservation and governance of the world also comes about. XVII. Indeed, God has imparted this motion to each creature for the sake of the conservation and governance of its being; God Himself however remains the first movement, the Mover and director of this motion. The whole universe is a ship, God

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the navigator; the universe a chariot, God the charioteer; the universe a clock, God the balance wheel; the universe a machine, God the flywheel; the universe an automaton, God the source of its movement. XVIII. This motion is of a double sort: a motion of love and hate, of concord and discord, of sympathy and antipathy, uniting and resisting, attracting and repelling. It is pleasing to God to conserve and rule the world by means of these contrary motions. XIX. God increases and diminishes this motion, He changes and hinders it as it pleases Him, and it is from this that so many of the diverse actions and effects present themselves in the world. XX. Nevertheless, this motion in the world has always been the same, and so it has also been the same world, whose structure, form, and essential connection is the same now as it once was, even though it has continually been altered and changed in its accidents. XXI. There are certain people who assert that the original world was destroyed through a universal flood and that the present world was somehow brought forth by a new act of creation. This is the claim on the part of those who seek the revelation of God and of His works from the sacred book. Such presuppositions, along with many others, are necessary in the highest degree for supplying the supposed and inferred conclusions found in that book with greater probability. The idea of such a universal flood hardly appeals to my reason, but rather if there has ever been an inundation of such a fatal sort, then it has only been partial. Yet, I am not such a troublesome character as to also place my own creed before the opinion accepted by the venerable crowd of theologians, since peace is better than war; and the tranquil are happier than the quarrelsome. XXII. It seems equally incorrect to me to say that the world has aged or has fallen into a worse condition. For it is the same motion, the same mover, the same God; I do not deny that changes and alterations take place, but these involve no deterioration or corruption. It is in any event the organ of motion, and by no means the motion itself, that has been changed because it pleased the mover to do so. However, the world is still that same one that it was at that time and that it has been for an infinite age. The theatre is always the same, notwithstanding that changes and variations of scene have taken place, and continue to take place in it daily in innumerable ways. XXIII. Truly this same motion will endure into eternity, but according to the pleasure of the first mover and exactly as required by the thing itself. The world will not come to ruin, but will be eternal, notwithstanding that it has not eternally existed sensibly but began to be in time. For, destruction is annihilation, annihilation in truth is a being’s return to non-being, from being into nothing, from positive being to a negative being, which is wholly impossible, since then God Himself, from which the world proceeds, is annihilated. God is nonetheless able to change the world and its creatures, if and as He wills, by changing their motion or the instruments of motion, and to such a degree that a mountain might become a valley, a river might become a stone, a star might become a mass of earth, a fish might become a bird, a tree might become gold, a human might become an animal, and vice versa, and so one thing might change, migrate, and transform into another in a sort of perpetually turning

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   circle. God is the craftsman, and because of this He has the capacity with His works to act according to His heart’s desire, since whoever is unlimited is the arbiter and director of His own affairs. XXIV. Those who thus affirm the destruction of this universe argue for it from passages in Holy Scripture, and yet they must necessarily argue thus since otherwise they would scarcely be able to support the opinion they defend. In the meantime, this opinion as well as the rest of their opinions, might be allowed as acceptable. I do not love controversy; it is best to accommodate oneself to every school, and to be a man of all schools and principles. XXV. As the first mover, God will nevertheless be able to bring the motion that He introduces into the world to a halt, if He should will it, and to recall it back to Himself. At that time, the world will cease to be that being which it now is according to its present form; however, it will not perish as far as its substance is concerned, but returns from whence it came. The world will return to God as to its mother, and as it has been born, so the offspring returns to its cradle and the seed to its first origin.

Third Chapter Physical-Medical Meditations I. Now we proceed from God and the world to a part of the world. II. We will consider the superior part of the world, namely, the human being. III. I will consider this human being: (i) theologically, or as religious; (ii) physically, or as a creature; (iii) medically, or as healthy; (iv) ethically, or as virtuous; (v) politically, or as citizen and subject; (vi) juridically, or as lawful. IV. The foregoing has already treated the human being as religious; in the present section I will consider the human being physically and medically. V. For me, the human being considered physically and medically is actually a machine composed of a twofold matter, of which one part is fine and the other is dense. VI. The fine matter is the soul, the dense matter is the body. VII. The body consists of particles of water, air, fire, and earth, and the whole world, of which the human is a part, is also composed of these things; truly, the part follows the nature of the whole. VIII. However, the particles of the human body have been formed from a much better material than the particles from which the bodies of animals and of other creatures known to us have been formed. What’s more, the bodies of human beings differ among themselves with respect to this material. Hence, some are purer, more beautiful, more robust, and healthier than others. IX. Active matter, the soul, acts upon this body, or passive matter. X. This soul is the blood which is composed of and conglobated from air, fire, earth, and water, just like the body it inhabits and its organs. Like the body, it is wholly material, and yet almost like a spirit it is composed of the purest and most refined matter whose being is to act and direct, as the being of the body is to suffer and be directed.

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XI. Yet, notwithstanding that the blood directs the body, that direction is in turn modified by the body and its organs. Neither the soul nor the blood is able to act, operate, and direct other than in that way which the body and its structure want to and can admit. XII. There is one activity of the blood in the head, for instance, in the brain, and another in the breast, for instance, in the heart. XIII. Where the first action takes place, there is reason. XIV. This reason admits of a twofold differentiation, in accordance with the two sorts of things it reflects upon, namely, divine and human. XV. The former sort of reason revolves around God, the latter around the world. The former is one, the latter manifold. From the former comes that other theological reason which is in turn infinite; from the latter comes juridical reason, which is found in equal degree in academic, judicial, and counselling reason; medical reason; philosophical reason (both concerning society and not); political reason and reason concerning the state (i.e., of war, of peace, of rulers and of subjects). XVI. Intellect is a consequence of reason. XVII. Reason is the standard for the intellect. For a human cannot and should not try to know otherwise than precisely as reason dictates to it. XVIII. The effects of the intellect are ratiocinations. XIX. The activity of the blood in the breast and the heart is the will. XX. The will, like reason, is equally divine and human. XXI. The human will is as manifold as the condition and state of the human being. XXII. Desire is a consequence of the will. XXIII. The effect of desire is enjoyment. XXIV. Desire is the desire to have, or not to have, something. XXV. The desire to have something is love, the desire not to have something is hate. The former consists in election, the latter in avoidance. XXVI. Electing desire strives for all that which is pleasing to it in some way. Avoiding desire strives to avoid all that which is displeasing to it for any reason. XXVII. Now that which is pleasing to desire is wholly agreeable, but that which is displeasing is disagreeable. The former is sweet, the latter bitter. The first is pleasure, the latter pain. XXVIII. However, pleasure and pain are of one sort in a human being considered as human being, that is, regarded in terms of the proper proportion of the body and of the blood, and are of another sort in a human being in the qualified sense, that is, regarded in terms of the state and condition in which he lives. Given this, it is not surprising that there exist different human rational powers and intellects, and thus there exist diverse acts of willing and desires, or actions and passions. The choleric person reasons differently than the melancholic, the phlegmatic individual differently than the sanguine. The wishing and desiring, acting and suffering on the part of these individuals are entirely different from one another. In a word, the princes and his subjects, clerics and the laity, theologians and jurists, physicians, philosophers, soldiers, merchants, farmers and craftsmen, the nobility and the commoners, men, women, the young and the old, even entire peoples themselves, as these possess diverse arrangements of their bodies and

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   blood, heads and breast, brains and hearts, so too they have different reasons and wills, intellects and desire, loves and hates. XXIX. Now since, as has been said, the soul or blood is supposed to nourish and govern the body, in order for it to be able to accomplish both of these tasks properly it likewise has its own means of nourishment as well as its own motion. XXX. These means of nourishment are food and drink, from whose diversity in quality and quantity there arises the distinction and variety of the blood. XXXI. The motion of the blood is its circulation. For the blood moves the body, and the circulation moves the blood. XXXII. As the blood’s control over the body is modified by the organs in the body, so too the circulation of the blood is restricted and limited by the same organs to some operations and actions, and not others. XXXIII. Thus the circulation moves the blood differently when it is in the breast, when it passes through the head, and when it makes its way through the organs of sense. The heart thus receives from its structure the law for its operation and action; the heart, therefore, desires, not the brain, and the brain does not perceive but the heart does. Yet, the brain and heart ultimately apprehend and desire that which the senses represent to them, for there are no innate ideas of things, and nothing is in the intellect and will that was not previously in the senses. In the senses themselves, however, the motion of the blood is circumgyrated in accordance with their proper organs. So, the eye sees and not the ear, the ear hears and not the eye, the nose smells and not the hand, and so forth. XXXIV. Our life and the action of the body consists in the motion and circulation of the blood, for to act is to live, but to live is to move and be moved. XXXV. This movement, where it is in the order appropriate for it and in the proper weight and balance, which it receives from food and drink, actions and passions, air, water, earth, and fire, renders a human being healthy in body and lively in blood, strong in reason and will, and master of his senses, so that one who is healthy in mind is healthy in body; he who loves health thus conserves motion. XXXVI. If at any time this same motion is changed or hindered, either by too much or too little food and drink, by an excess or deficiency of action and passion, then the body is made feeble and sick so that neither the hand, nor the eye, nor the ear, nor the head, nor the breast are able to perform its task correctly. Therefore, he who seeks to avoid falling ill will be watchful and take care as much as possible that this motion always occurs in accordance with its laws. XXXVII. If, however, this motion comes to a stand-still, which takes place when either the organs of the body have deteriorated to such an extent that they are not able to receive the appropriate motion, or when the blood is so weakened and drained of its active spirits that it is not possible for it to act or to carry out its motions anymore, then death follows. XXXVIII. Death however is nothing more than an end to the movement in the soul and body, the beginning of which had been life. XXXIX. Even though the body and blood, active and passive matter, the moving and that which is moved might have perished, or (in my terms) that acting and suffering, moving and being moved have come to an end, yet they

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are not destroyed or reduced to nothing. Rather, just as the body is separated from the blood and blood from the body through death, so both the body and blood further dissolve themselves into those particles which they were before their conjunction and combination. And, through a magnetic bond of attraction, those particles are pulled back to their centres, water particles to water, fire particles to fire, etc., to which material spheres they either adhere and connect perpetually though remaining at rest beyond all active and passive motion; or alternatively they are called back and summoned again by the creator and first mover to a new movement and to the composition of a new heaven and earth, which is to say a new body and soul, so that, in a sort of perpetual circle whose centre is God, one body and one soul migrate, wander, are transformed and transfused into another, and vice versa. XL. Therefore, I have no fear of death which for others is the most terrible of all. There is no such thing as destruction nor annihilation. These are mere notions, ideas not beings, dreams, chimeras; the life of all things is eternal. The nature of creatures is immortal; the migration of souls takes place perpetually. The continual metamorphosis of bodies is not a piece of Ovidian fiction but divine, not a fairy tale but real. My death will be a union of the body and soul with God and the world, not a mystical or sacramental union but a natural and physical one. I will never die, but in dying will be born again. My decline will be a new birth. Like the Phoenix from ashes, I will not cease to live, notwithstanding that this life comes to an end; nor does life itself cease but it will be renewed or transformed in God, with God, and through God. Out of my passing, which I seem to undergo in dying, in that moment I shall at once be restored to life as a star, an angel, a demon, a denizen of the sun, the moon, or some other planet, when before I was a man and a citizen of this earth. Thus, I will always be body and soul, active and passive matter, always a living being, always a creature of God. I rejoice in this faith; in this I will live and in this I will die.

Fourth Chapter Ethical-Political-Juridical Meditations I. Now I will treat of the human being as ethical, political, juridical, and still more things. II. The human from the moment he is born acts, for he is alive and life consists in action. III. This action which is weak at first obtains more strength with increasing years. IV. In this first state, which is a true state of innocence, the human being acts freely, that is, according to the dictates of the brain and heart, devoid of authority and law which are non-beings to him, and of whose qualities and obligations he knows nothing. V. The purpose of these actions is something useful, for all useful things are agreeable and the human being desires what is agreeable. VI. This usefulness terminates in the love of oneself, for in fact proper charity begins of itself.

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   VII. This love admits of three degrees: first, the desire to nourish oneself; second the desire to multiply and propagate; and third the desire to defend oneself. VIII. These actions, though they are absolutely necessary for the human being for obtaining his end, nevertheless are and remain morally indifferent to the extent that they are considered in themselves, rather than relatively to the human being. IX. What rules these actions is desire, for he who acts, always acts on account of some desire. X. The laws of these actions are the vigor of the temperaments of the body and blood. XI. As long as the human being nourishes himself, multiplies, and defends himself in a regimented and measured way, he acts usefully, that is, what he does he does properly and well. XII. Hence, such a one abandoned to his desire in a state of liberty, which he has received from birth, knows no proscriptive or prescriptive laws; he knows no difference between licit and illicit foods; he knows not of the bonds of consanguinity and marital union, the resulting lines and ranks and the prohibitions and dispensations relating to these. Debaucheries, adulteries, and other illegitimate modes of intercourse are unknown to him, and he does not know duels, homicides, and injuring another to be crimes; the phrase “moderamen inculpatae tutulae”³ is unknown to this same person. For he eats and drinks freely, he acts upon the incentive to copulate according to his desire. He preserves and defends himself as he wills to do, even when it involves the slaughter of another. XIII. Yet since there were a variety of temperaments and thus different desires and actions, there soon arose quarrels, strife, oppositions, contradictions, resistance, turmoil, slaughter, and war among the first human beings. XIV. The authors of these wars were primarily those dominated by a choleric temperament. XV. Indeed, just as they were the authors of war, just so were they the founders of empires, whose first foundations they established through arms and oppression. For these cholerics, wished in virtue of their nature to rule the other melancholics, or those who seemed most contrary to their ambition, and these having been conquered by means of violence, secrecy, and entreaty, they next subjected the phlegmatics and sanguinary types to their domination with little effort, many of whom surrendered themselves voluntarily, persuaded by fear, and they kissed the chains of their servitude with smiles on their lips. XVI. Monarchies therefore were the first governments of the world, for the cholerics were the first monarchs. As the heavens truly do not suffer two suns, and the nuptial bond does not know of a third party, so the choleric admits no consort or co-ruler in his kingdom or on his throne. XVII. With monarchical rule thus established, and for the sake of its preservation, religion, laws, rewards, and punishments were introduced, those furtive props of ambition and power, all inventions of the cholerics.

³ A provision in classical Roman and canon law permitting measured self-defense.

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XVIII. In order that human beings, having been made slaves out of free men, might be bound more strongly by the chains of religion, new Gods were devised in an uncountable swarm. Institutions were fabricated for communications with them, divine portents, oracles, miracles, mysteries, martyrs, divine law (universal and particular), morals, ceremonies, courts, councils, synods, Decalogues, old and new Testaments, the Mosaic law and the Gospel, sacred Scripture and the Koran, Moses and Christ, Mohammed and Confucius, the pope, Luther, Calvin, the Missal, the Augsburg confession, symbolic books, catechisms; in addition to a great, steadfast army of Prophets, Apostles, disciples, priests and monks. Temples, chapels, sanctuaries, altars, refuges, and sacred groves have been founded; Sabbaths and the Lord’s day, holidays, oaths, theological sins, confessions, absolutions, the power to bind and loose on earth, these and innumerable other pious frauds were all introduced. XIX. Further divisions of these laws than I know of were invented by these same rulers so that the brain and heart, reason and will, intellect and desire, of human beings were given over to them through the laws, and so that these subjects would not even dare to test their new rulers, the usurpers of their original freedom. The law of nature and peoples, prohibitive and permissive, negative and affirmative laws, took their origin from their minds. From there have also sprung the multiple forms of conscience, vices and virtues, good and evil actions and passions alike, honors and disgraces, just and unjust things, reasonable and unreasonable, shame and decorum, equality and justice, and yes even education of subjects by their parents, teachers, professors, and ministers in houses, schools and in gymnasia, academies, churches; the variety of societies, federations of villages, towns, cities, states, fortresses, and castles, legitimate and illegitimate marriages, restrictions of these and dispensations, the rule of the husband, father, and lord over the spouse, the children, and the servants, so many classes of magistrates and judges, innumerable royal titles, endless forms of tributes all tracing the origin of their inviolable majesty immediately from God, crimes of treason and other sorts of transgression, blind and passive obedience, etc. What are these other than the offspring, ideas, notions, of those with a choleric and ambitious temperament (since the first founders of kingdoms were of such a mind and disposition), what else but things conceived, promulgated and introduced by these same individuals for the sake of their interests and the benefit of their regime? XX. To religion and laws were added rewards. The aim: that attracted and inebriated by these, human beings would more easily grow forgetful of their first state, that they would become accustomed to the empires and their rulers, and that the rulers would be in command of their reason without any resistance. Specifically, some rewards are temporal and others spiritual; to the latter pertain the Elysian field of the pagans, the paradise of the Christians, goods of the soul, body, and fortune, resurrection, blessed life, new life, eternal life. To the former pertain dignities, titles, honors, privileges, as well as exemptions, graces, games and spectacles, holidays, signet rings, crowns, columns, obelisks, monuments, etc. XXI. The addition of punishments were the fourth means of stabilizing the empire and keeping the subjects in a state of obedience. These were in part spiritual and in part temporal, and along with the reasoning behind the rewards, both are inspired by

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   the disposition of the cholerics. From there arose the anger of God, famine and pestilence, and all the other terrible evils of suffering. Tortures, torments, prisons, and innumerable other forms of punishment were devised. Hell and Avernus, the Devil and Pluto, Cerberus and Acheron, lictors and executioners, were established as instruments of fear for human beings, executors of punishments, fulcra of tyranny, defenders of the ruler. XXII. Although the monarchy had in fact been originally founded, preserved, and expanded by the cholerics in the way described, yet its form, connection, and good condition did not always remain the same. For no one was more apt for the exercise of authority than the cholerics, that is, those in whom ambition is the dominant passion. When, therefore, pleasure-seekers, the sanguine, or the phlegmatic have held the seat of authority in the empire, and with this temperament of theirs more suited to obedience than to rule, the people subdued and subjected by these same people knew how to seize the advantage and the opportunity when the occasion permitted, and then monarchies have gradually undergone not inconsiderable alterations, and their original form of kingship was completely degraded. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in the past and today, so many rebellions and changes of regime take place and that limited empires and republics that are free, irregular, and even monstrous are invented. XXIII. However, notwithstanding that any empire, of whatever sort of form it still exists under today, is preserved by the rulers by means of religion, laws, rewards, and punishments, yet the rulers themselves exist above religion and laws, above rewards and punishments since these chains are only for the subjects, as shackles of the people and snares for the obedient. Far more majestic is the state of the illustrious rulers; they rule and therefore cannot be ruled. They hold sway over the servants and are themselves masters. They bind others, while they are themselves unbound. They issue commands to their subjects, while no one does the same to them. Otherwise, they would be made into subjects, but to obey others and to rule are incompatible things. XXIV. Nevertheless, desire and advantage hold sway over the rulers, just as subjects follow this twofold guide. Indeed, the princes forbid it of their subjects, but these princes themselves have as their one and only aim in all of their actions satisfying their desires and seeking their own interests and advantage. XXV. But, just as now, after having been made from free creatures into men of the rulers, these subjects, who are obligated to live according to the prescriptions of religion and the laws, did not always heed this twofold norm of living. For certainly in this second state of conditioned life they have not set aside the image of the first state and of pristine liberty, but they retained many remnants of both, notwithstanding that human beings as yet are free potentially and not actually, and indeed before they act but not, or only rarely, afterwards. Whenever, then, they are able, they begin to act freely again, that is, in accordance with the temperaments of the body and blood, of the brain and heart, according to the dictates of reason and the will, of the intellect and desire. And thus there are innumerable actions which are committed daily by citizens and subjects in circumvention of religion and laws for the sake of nutrition, generation, and defense and they are performed without horror, shame, conscience, or wickedness. Indeed, such individuals are not virtuous, not just, not dutiful, except in the appearance, out of a hope for rewards and still more from a fear of

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punishments. These political-philosophical claims could be illustrated by examples and demonstrated to be the case, but such things are insufferable even if they are not rare, for the court, the church, castles, banks, workshops, the fields, the sea, in short, all public and private intercourse abounds with them. XXVI. The condition of the citizens and subjects all over the world is, therefore, harsh; nevertheless, it is one that is necessary especially according to the customs of today. I approve that same state as a citizen and subject myself to it, I for whom only the glory of obedience remains, yet at the same time I deplore it. Indeed, we are brutes, nay, even worse than brutes, servants of kings, the chattel of magistrates, machines without sense, reason, and will; sensing, thinking, and desiring nothing else and in no other way than exactly as our rulers will and command us to. XXVII. A much happier condition, even though it does not exist and is not advantageous to human beings anymore, is that of a mere creature. In that state, one is a sovereign being, acting and thinking freely, without king, law, or flock, one does not hope for rewards, does not fear punishments, is ignorant of vices and knows nothing of sins, having precepts of reason before his eyes in all actions, which light the way before him, and of the will, which guides him as his life’s star. Such a life is blessed, yes even divine; in this way the creature is made similar to God. For God rejoices in the freedom of the intellect and desire. Nothing more.

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PART III

The Controversy between Wolff and the Pietists

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5 Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also All Things in General (1720) Christian Wolff, the most important German philosopher between Leibniz and Kant, was born in Breslau (Wrocław) in Silesia (part of present-day Poland) on January 24, 1679. Wolff ’s philosophical education begins during his time at the MariaMagdalene-Gymansium, located in his hometown: while the rector of the school, Christian Gryphius (son of a famed Silesian poet), was an avowed enemy of philosophy, another teacher, Caspar Neumann (1648–1715) introduced Wolff to the Cartesian philosophy. Wolff departed Breslau in 1699 to take up university studies in mathematics (among other subjects) in Jena, leaving in 1702 to sit the Magisterexamen in Leipzig, where he also wrote his Habilitationsthesis in 1703 on practical philosophy, in which he treated moral philosophy according to the mathematical method. The thesis was examined by Otto Mencke (1644–1707), professor of morals and politics at Leipzig and the founder (in 1682) of the influential Acta eruditorum, the first academic journal in Germany. Wolff became an active contributor to the Acta, and he was charged with reviewing the latest English-language publications on science and philosophy. Mencke also sent Wolff ’s thesis to Leibniz (apparently without Wolff ’s knowledge), which led to a regular correspondence between the two that continued until Leibniz’s death in 1716. The lively intellectual climate in Leipzig evidently appealed to Wolff as he preferred to remain rather than take up offered positions elsewhere; however, in 1706, Saxony was occupied by the forces of the Swedish king Charles XII, prompting the students and professoriate to flee the city, and leading Wolff to accept a call to a position in Giessen. Yet, Wolff never took up this appointment—during a trip home before departing for Giessen, he took a detour through Halle, where he met with the rector of the recently founded university and was quickly recruited to the vacant chair in mathematics, supported by Leibniz’s recommendation. His inaugural lecture was delivered in January of 1707. Like his new colleague Thomasius, Wolff lectured and frequently published in German. As might be expected of a professor of mathematics, Wolff ’s initial major publications during the Halle years included an introductory textbook for the mathematical sciences (in 1710) and an influential mathematical lexicon (in 1716). However, Wolff continued to pursue his interests in philosophy, particularly in

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   psychology, natural theology, and logic, on which topics he also lectured. His famous series of German philosophical textbooks begins with his work on logic, the Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes (Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding, or German Logic), published in 1713, followed by his ground-breaking treatment of metaphysics in the Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also all Things in General) published in 1720. Wolff ’s bold incursions into metaphysics, and particularly theology, not to mention his increasingly well-attended lectures, drew the ire of his Pietist colleagues in the theology faculty, who began a campaign with a series of publications taking aim at Wolff (directly or indirectly) and accusing him of atheism, fatalism, and Spinozism. Wolff responded in kind, but his rectoral address on July 12, 1721, in which he praised Confucian ethics as consistent with morality, galvanized his opponents who directly petitioned the king, Friedrich Wilhelm I, to intervene. The Pietists, merely seeking to restrict Wolff ’s teaching and publishing activities, prevailed on the king with the argument that the pre-established harmony, endorsed by Wolff, entailed that deserting soldiers bore no responsibility for their actions. The militaristic Friedrich Wilhelm I was incensed by this alleged consequence and issued an edict in his own hand on November 8, 1723 stripping Wolff of his professorship and giving him forty-eight hours to leave Prussia on pain of being hanged. Upon receiving the order, Wolff left Prussia by crossing the Saale river into (Saxon) Passendorf, where he paused to refund the fees paid by his students and began the search for a new academic position, ultimately taking up a professorship in Marburg where he was enthusiastically received by students. Now enjoying the status of a martyr for the Enlightenment, Wolff began revisiting many of the themes in his previous German books in a series of Latin texts intended to broadcast his philosophical system to his new, pan-European audience. Friedrich Wilhelm I eventually thought better of his precipitous action against Wolff, as he later attempted to entice him back and lifted a prohibition against the teaching of Wolffian texts. However, Wolff remained in Marburg, collecting tributes and memberships in learned societies, until the ascension of Friedrich Wilhelm I’s son, Friedrich II. Wolff accepted the new king’s invitation of a professorship and vicechancellorship at his previous institution in Halle and returned to the city on December 6, 1740 to take up his new position. Wolff continued to lecture and publish actively, with his later efforts devoted particularly to multi-volume works on the law of peoples, natural law, and ethics. He died in Halle on April 9, 1754. Wolff ’s Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul (commonly called the German Metaphysics) represents the first modern, systematic treatment of metaphysics in German. Wolff ’s innovative spirit is already evident in the division of the topics of metaphysics: after a preliminary, Cartesian-inspired discussion of our certainty of our own existence, Wolff launches into a treatment of ontology (chapter 2), empirical psychology (chapter 3), cosmology (chapter 4), rational psychology (chapter 5), and natural theology (chapter 6), a division of topics that became canonical for later German metaphysical texts, including Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, within each division, Wolff stakes out positions that serve as the objects of extensive discussion in subsequent German thought (and especially

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in the texts included in the present volume). In the context of his ontology, Wolff provides, among other things, a proof of the principle of sufficient reason (§§30–1), an anti-Cartesian account of essence (§§33–8), and a Leibnizian definition of substance in terms of the possession of a power (§§114–16). In his treatment of psychology, Wolff extends the Leibnizian taxonomy of notions or concepts to thoughts (§§198–214), endorses Leibniz’s identification of freedom with spontaneity (§518), which he supplements with an account of the will and motives (cf. §§492–4, 496), and considers the limits of observation as applied to the ground of the agreement between changes in the soul and those in the body (§§527–39); in the rational continuation, Wolff argues that matter cannot think (§§738–41), offers an account of the soul’s essence (§§753–5), speculates concerning the ground of the observed agreement between soul and body (§§760–7), and provides a proof of the soul’s personal immortality (§§921–6). In his cosmology, Wolff considers the essence of the world and concludes that a contingent but nonetheless determined connection of events obtains within it (§§545–79), in addition to defending an agnosticism concerning the representative powers of the elements of nature (§§582–98); and in his natural theology, Wolff provides a definition of God that notably emphasizes His understanding rather than His will (§1069). As is frequently noted, Wolff ’s German Metaphysics was widely influential and saw numerous editions in Wolff ’s own lifetime, but less often noted is the fact that Wolff continuously amended his text in response to recent criticisms or by incorporating the many innovations and contributions of his own students to his system. As an evolving text, it is therefore difficult to identify a canonical edition, but since many of the figures collected in the present volume would have worked from an earlier edition I have preferred here to offer a healthy selection of passages from the first edition (though I have sometimes referred to subsequent editions to clarify ambiguities and identify typographical errors). As with Thomasius, Wolff ’s German presents challenges given that the language was still relatively unestablished academically. Wolff was well-aware of this, of course, and for this reason he supplies an invaluable glossary as the first register of the German Metaphysics in which he provides the Latin originals of many of his German philosophical terms and neologisms. Accordingly, for some German terms (for instance, Eigenschaft, vor sich bestehendes Ding, and perhaps most controversially, Willkühr), I have looked to Wolff ’s suggested Latin equivalents (attributum, substantia, and spontaneitas, respectively) for insight into appropriate English renderings. All references to the Logic are to chapter and section of the second edition of Wolff ’s German Logic (1719) (an early English translation of a later edition of which is listed below), and all notes are my own.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Beck, Lewis White, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1969) [pp. 256–75]. Blackwell, Richard, “The Structure of Wolffian Philosophy,” in Modern Schoolman, 38.3 (1961), pp. 203–18. Corr, Charles, “The Existence of God, Natural Theology and Christian Wolff,” in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4.2 (1973), pp. 105–8.

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   Dunlop, Katherine, “Mathematical Method and Newtonian Science in the Philosophy of Christian Wolff,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 44.3 (2013), pp. 457–69. Dyck, Corey W., Kant and Rational Psychology (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014) [pp. 19–42]. Holloran, John Robert, Professors of Enlightenment at the University of Halle, 1690–1730 (Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2000). Schwaiger, Clemens, “Wolff, Christian (von),” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 863–8. Theis, Robert, and Aichele, Alexander, eds., Handbuch Christian Wolff (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2018) [includes articles on Wolff ’s philosophy in English and German]. Watkins, Eric, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) [pp. 38–50]. Watkins, Eric, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) [pp. 5–53 contain a partial translation of the 11th edition (1751) of the German Metaphysics]. Wolff, Christian, Logic: Or, Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding; with Their Use and Application in the Knowledge and Search of Truth, Translated from the German of Baron Wolfius, To which is prefixed a Life of the Author (London: Hawes, Clarke, and Collins, 1770) [English translation of the 5th edition of Wolff ’s German Logic]. Wolff, Christian, Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General, translated, with notes, by R. Blackwell (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963) [translation of Wolff ’s Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere, the first part of his Latin logic textbook, originally published in 1728]. Wolff, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkäntnis der Wahrheit 2nd ed. (Halle, 1719). Wolff, Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Halle, 1720).

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Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also All Things in General Chapter 1: How we Cognize that we are, and what Use this Cognition has for us §1. (How we cognize that we are.) We are conscious. No one can doubt this who has not been completely robbed of his senses, and anyone who wanted to deny it would feign otherwise than he found to be the case in himself and could readily be convinced that his feigning is absurd. For how would he deny something or cast something into doubt if he were not conscious? Now whoever is conscious, exists. And accordingly, it is clear that we exist. §6. (By what kind of inference this takes place.) If we wanted to cognize distinctly how we are convinced through these reasons that we are, we will find that within these thoughts lies the following inference: Whoever is conscious, exists. We are conscious. Therefore, we exist. §7. (How this inference is constituted.) In this inference, the minor premise is an undoubted experience (Logic ch. 5, §1), but the major belongs among those propositions that one assents to without any proof as soon as one merely understands the words that occur in it, that is, it is a principle (Logic ch. 6, §2). §8. (What sort of certainty a demonstration has.) This same proof is a demonstration (Logic ch. 4, §20) and it accordingly becomes clear that everything that is correctly demonstrated is just as certain as that we exist.

Chapter 2: On the First Principles of our Cognition and All Things in General §10. (The principle of contradiction.) When we know that we are conscious of ourselves and take this as certain, this comes about in fact because it is impossible for us to think that we are conscious of ourselves and not conscious of ourselves at the same time. Similarly, we find in every other case that it is impossible for us to think that something is not while it is. In this way, the following universal proposition is readily granted: something cannot both be and not be at the same time. We call this proposition the principle of contradiction and not only do inferences find the source of their certainty in it (Logic, ch. 4, §5), but also a proposition that we experience is set beyond any doubt, as we have just seen in the case in which we are conscious of ourselves. §11. (What constitutes a contradiction.) For a contradiction it is required that that which is affirmed is also denied at the same time. In this way, it is necessary that the thing of which something is affirmed is not only that same thing of which something is denied but also that this same thing is taken under the very same circumstances and regarded in the very same way. §12. (What is possible and impossible.) Because nothing can be and not be at the same time (§10), one cognizes that something is impossible if it contradicts that

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which we already know exists or can be, or also if, among those features that are said to pertain to it, one contradicts another. Accordingly, that is impossible which contains something contradictory within it such as, for instance, an iron wood. From which one sees further that that is possible which contains nothing contradictory within it, that is, which not only can obtain along with other things which are or can be, but which also contains only that within it which can obtain together such as, for instance, a wooden plate. For to be a plate and to be made of wood do not conflict with each other but rather both can be at once. §13. (That which is possible does not on that account exist.) For something to be it is not enough that it does not contain anything contradictory in it. For, if one permits me to give a rather mundane example for the sake of clarity, it is clear that a square table does not become round on account of the fact that being square and being round do not contradict one another, but both can quite well obtain together insofar as we can conceive that the square table becomes rounded when the corners are worn off. Now, since that which is possible contains nothing contradictory in it (§12), so it is more than clear that something does not yet exist because it is possible, and it is not permitted to infer from possibility alone that something is or will be. §14. (What actuality is.) There must be something more, therefore, in addition to possibility that pertains when something is said to exist, whereby that which is possible attains its fulfillment. This fulfillment, or complement,¹ of the possible is just that which we call actuality. [ . . . ] §15. (What is actual is possible.) Since nothing other than what is possible can become actual (§14), so everything actual is also possible, and one can always infer from actuality to possibility without hesitation. When I see, namely, that something is, I can assume that it can be. §16. (What a thing is.) Everything that is possible, whether it is actual or not, is called a thing. Thus, when we take something impossible to be possible, we likewise call it a thing but out of error because it seems to us to have the appearance of possibility. [ . . . ] §17. (What is identical and what is different.) When I can posit the thing B for the thing A, and everything remains as before, then A and B are identical; if however I posit B for A and everything does not remain as before, then A and B are different or distinct things. §18. (What is similar and dissimilar.) Two things, A and B, are similar to one another when that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate them from one another is the same on both sides; by contrast, A and B are dissimilar things when that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate them from one another is different on both sides. In this way, similarity is an agreement in that on the basis of which one is supposed to cognize and differentiate things from one another. §28. (What nothing is.) That which neither is, nor is possible, is called nothing, and therefore something also cannot come to be from nothing. For then the

¹ In the glossary that constitutes the first register, Wolff indicates that the German “Erfüllung” is his rendering of the Latin “complementum.”

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impossible would have to become possible, which runs contrary to the principle of contradiction. §29. (What a reason is, and what it means to have a reason.) If a thing, A, contains something in it from which one can understand why B is (B might be something in A or outside of it), one calls that which is in A the reason of B; A itself is called the cause and concerning B one says that it finds its reason² in A. I will explicate this by means of an example. If I investigate how it transpires that everything grows quickly in a garden, and find that it is to be attributed to the warmth of the air, then the warmth is the reason of the fast growth, and the air, insofar as it is warm, is the cause; the fast growth, however, finds its reason in the warm air. [ . . . ] §30. (The principle of sufficient reason.) Were it the case that something could be, or take place, in a thing without a reason why it should occur being met with either in that thing itself or something else, then it would come to be from nothing. Since, however, it is impossible that something could come to be from nothing (§28), everything that is must have a sufficient reason why it is. We will call this proposition the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz first proved the importance of this proposition in our times through his excellent probative discussion in his Theodicy as well as in the letters which he exchanged with the Englishman Clarke, though Archimedes had long ago grounded his doctrine of the equilibrium or balanced state of heavy bodies on it.³ Leibniz accepted the principle as a proposition grounded in experience, against which one cannot bring forth any example, and thus he gave no proof even though Clarke demanded one. §31. (Further proof of the same.) The principle is also proved in the following way. Suppose two things, A and B, which are identical. If something can be which does not have a sufficient reason why it is either in the thing or outside of it, then an alteration can occur in A that would not follow in B, were one to put B in the position of A. As a result, B is not the same thing as A (§22). Now since if the principle of sufficient reason is not allowed to hold it follows from the assumption that A is identical with B that A is not identical with B, and it is impossible for something to be and not be at once (§10), so the principle must be accorded incontestable correctness, that is, it is true: everything has its reason why it is. §32. (How that is constituted which pertains to a thing.) If accordingly there is a multiplicity that can be distinguished in a given thing, then there must be one among these which contains the reason why the rest pertains to that thing and, because this cannot in turn find its reason why it pertains to that thing in the others (as can easily be grasped by means of the principle of contradiction—§10), therefore it must pertain to it necessarily. For that which is necessarily so requires no further reason why it is thus. §33. (What essence is.) That is called essence in which the reason is to be found for the rest of what pertains to a given thing. Whoever cognizes the essence of a thing can indicate the reason for everything that pertains to it. ² Throughout I have rendered “Grund” and its cognates as “reason,” though because this does not readily lend itself to a verbal form, I have opted for the locution “finds its reason” to render “gegründet wird.” ³ Archimedes is mentioned in this context by Leibniz; cf. Leibniz’s second letter to Clarke, §1.

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§34. (Essence is primary in a thing.) That which contains the reason for the rest is what first permits of being thought of a thing. That which finds its reason in it cannot be posited beforehand, for one must set out from that from which I can cognize why something else is. Therefore, essence is what first permits of being thought of a thing. §35. (What it consists in.) There is nothing that can be thought of a thing prior to how it is possible, since it is only on account of the fact that it is possible that it is a thing in the first place (§16). Therefore, the essence of a thing is its possibility, and whoever knows the way and manner in which something is possible, understands its essence. §36. (What is necessary.) When that which is opposed to a thing contains something contradictory, then that thing is necessary. Now, since that which contains something contradictory is impossible (§12), that is impossible which is opposed to something necessary, and if that which is opposed to a thing is impossible, then that same thing is necessary. §38. (The essence of a thing is necessary.) That which is possible cannot at the same time be impossible (§10), and if something is possible in some way and manner then it cannot be impossible in the same way or manner at the same time. Now the essence of a thing consists in its being possible in a certain way and manner (§35), and therefore essence is necessary (§36). §39. (That which is necessary is eternal.) That which is necessary is also eternal, that is, it can have neither beginning nor end. For, if something is necessary, then it is impossible for it not to be (§36). If, however, it had a beginning or end then it would be possible for it not to be. §40. (Essence is eternal.) Now, since the essence of things is necessary (§36), so it is also eternal, that is, one cannot posit a time when it began to be possible and when it will cease to be possible. §41. (That which is necessary is also unchangeable.) That which is necessary is in turn unchangeable. For if it could be changed then it could also not be, which conflicts with necessity (§36). §42. (Essence is unchangeable.) On account of the fact that the essence of a thing is necessary (§38), it is also unchangeable. But if I can think a possible change in the essence of a thing, the essence of the thing is not thereby altered but rather through this cognition I have only come to cognize the essence of a different thing. For instance, the essence of a triangle consists in the enclosure of a space within three sides. It is possible that instead of three one can assume four sides and enclose a space thereby; yet, the essence of a triangle is not changed, since when four sides enclose a space one has a square and, therefore, a different thing. §43. (Nothing foreign can be communicated to an essence.) Inasmuch as the essence of a thing is unchangeable and that thing would not remain the same if something in its essence were changed (§42), we can grasp that the essence of one thing cannot be communicated to another, that is, it is not possible that a thing should receive the essence of another thing in addition to its own essence and remain the same thing. This is so because all that pertains to a thing and is different from its essence must have its sufficient reason in its essence (§§32–33), and so nothing can be attributed to a thing that does not find its reason in its own essence but rather the essence of another thing.

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§44. (What an attribute is.) That which wholly and solely finds its reason in the essence of a thing is called an attribute. And therefore attributes cannot be separated from a thing and are just as unchangeable as the essence itself. §45. (What is outside of us and one another.) If we attend to ourselves, we will find that we are conscious of many things as outside of us. However, we posit them outside of us insofar as we cognize that they are differentiated from us; similarly, we posit them outside of one another insofar as we cognize that they are differentiated from one another. §46. (What space is.) Now insofar as many things that exist at the same time, where one is not the other (§17), are represented as outside of one another, a certain order comes to be thereby such that if I take one among them for the first, then another becomes the second, another the third, another the fourth, and so on. And as soon as we represent this order to ourselves, we represent space. Therefore, if we want to regard things no differently than in the way in which we cognize them, then we must take space as the order of those things that exist at the same time. §47. (What place is.) As such, there is for any given thing a certain way in which it exists simultaneously with others, so that none among the remaining things exists simultaneously in precisely this way with the others. And just this is what we tend to call the place of a thing. §51. (What composite things are.) All those things of which we are conscious as outside of us consist of many parts: for we find many parts that we can differentiate from one another in any given whole, and this multitude taken together constitutes but one thing because the parts are connected with one another (§24). We call such a thing that consists of many parts a composite thing. §59. (What the essence of composite things consists in.) A composite thing is possible inasmuch as certain parts can be posited together in a certain way; therefore, its essence consists in the manner of composition (§35) and, accordingly, whoever can represent this manner of composition understands its essence. §64. (Composite things come to be and cease to be.) Composite things can come to be and cease to be. Their essence consists merely in the composition of their parts (§59). Now, however, since parts do not take up their place necessarily (§50), it is possible that some could come together in a manner in which they were not previously arranged, and in this way a composite thing comes to be. Likewise, it is also possible that some parts that are arranged in a certain manner could fall out of this ordering and it is in this way that a composite thing ceases to be. §72. (What sort of changes can occur in a composite thing.) No changes can take place in a composite thing other than in magnitude and figure, in the positioning of its parts, in its internal motion, and in the place occupied by the whole thing. [ . . . ] §73. (Magnitude, figure, filling of space, and internal motion are properties of composite things.) Because magnitude, figure, the filling of space and inner motion pertain to a composite thing on account of the fact that it consists of many parts (§§61, 54, 57), it follows that they find their reason in its essence (§59) and are therefore attributes of composite things. §75. (What is called a simple thing.) Now as one calls that thing composite which has parts, so by contrast one calls that thing which has no parts a simple thing. [ . . . ]

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§76. (That there are simple things.) Where there are composite things there must also be simple things. If there were no simple things at hand, then all parts of a thing, they might be supposed to be as small as you like, indeed even inconceivably small parts, would have to consists of other parts. Then, however, one could provide no more of a reason for where the composite parts ultimately arose from than one could conceive of how a composite number could arise when it did not encompass any units in it. And since nothing can be without a sufficient reason (§30), one must ultimately admit simple things from which composite things arise. §81. (Simple things have no figure, magnitude, internal motion, and also do not fill space.) It has now been established that there must be simple things through whose composition the parts of other things come to be. Now, however, because these simple things have no parts (§75), and therefore are not themselves further composed out of other things (§51), and because magnitude, figure, filling of space and internal motion are attributes of composite things (§73), it follows that simple things have no figure and magnitude, that they cannot fill space, and that no internal motion is to be encountered in them. §94. (What time is.) We attain to a concept of time insofar as we attend to the fact that our thoughts follow one upon the other and thereby cognize that something can come to be gradually. From this it becomes clear that if we are supposed to represent time in no other way than as it is found with us, then it is nothing else than an order of that which follows one upon the other such that if one takes one thing as the first, then another becomes the second, another the third, and so on. §95. (Similarity between time and space.) Accordingly, what space is to those things that are next to each other at the same time, that is what time is to those things that occur one after another or where one follows upon the other (§§46, 49). §99. (What occurs in time.) Everything that takes place gradually occurs in time. For since in such cases there is much that one can differentiate, where something precedes and something else follows (§89), a time has elapsed (§94⁴). §100. (Composite things can come to be over time.) Since composite things can gradually come to be (§91), they also come to be over time, that is, while they come to be or attain to actuality, a time elapses. §101. (Simple things do not.) By contrast, no time can elapse when a simple thing comes to be, if one supposes that it should come to be or attain to actuality because it was previously merely possible. For, if they are supposed to come to be then they have to come to be all at once (§89), but then nothing that follows one upon the other permits of being differentiated here while it comes to be (§90). And therefore, no time has elapsed (§94). And it is thus clear in general that nothing that occurs all at once takes place in time, that is, no time passes while it takes place. §102. (How a simple thing can cease to be.) If a simple thing that exists at some point should cease to be again, then it would have to be brought to nothing. This is because it has no parts (§75), and so its essence cannot consist in composition (§59), and therefore it does not permit of being changed through division or internal displacement; consequently, its actuality cannot cease in the way it does with

⁴ Corrected from “§43.”

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composite things (§64). However, if that which can cease to be neither through division nor internal displacement should cease to be, it must be annihilated. §104. (What an action and a passion is.) If something is changed, then the reason of the change is either to be encountered in it or outside of it. One or the other is necessary (§30). A change, the reason of which is found within the thing that is changed, is called an act or an action: on the contrary, a change the reason of which is found in a thing other than that which is changed is called a passion. §105. (Why a thing can undergo something.) Notwithstanding, however, that those changes that one tends to count as passions have a reason outside of those things in which they take place, a reason must also be found within those things for why they are able to be subject to such changes through the action of another thing. [ . . . ] Namely, since everything has a sufficient reason why it is (§30), a reason must be at hand for why a thing permits of being altered in this manner by another. And in this way it must be suited for a certain change, though what this aptitude consists in has to be established in the particular cases. §106. (Inner constitution of simple things.) There are actually simple things (§76), and they cannot cease to be for themselves (§102). Therefore, something enduring must be encountered in them and this either has limits or not. Since a simple thing is indivisible in itself (§75), it follows that through these limits nothing else but a specific degree can come to be, which degree one represents as if it were composed, as it were, from other lesser degrees as from parts, and accordingly assigns a magnitude to it (§61). [ . . . ] §107. (What all changes are.) All changes that take place in a thing, are alterations of its limits. For nothing more is to be met with in a thing than its essence and the limitations of what it has that is enduring in the essence. Essence is unchangeable in itself (§42), and therefore there is nothing else that can be changed other than the limits of that which is enduring in a thing. Accordingly, nothing else can happen during a change than that that which was limited in a given way only receives different limits. [ . . . ] §108. (What they are in simple things.) In this way, all changes that can take place in a simple thing must be nothing else but an alteration of degree (§106). However, because nothing can occur without a sufficient reason (§30), one alteration must find its reason in the other, namely, the subsequent alteration finds its reason in the foregoing one. §114. (Difference between things that subsist for themselves and those that subsist through others.) It is now possible to grasp the way in which things that subsist for themselves are distinguished from those that only subsist through others. Namely, a thing that subsists for itself ⁵ is that which has the source of its changes in itself; by contrast, a thing that subsists through another⁶ is nothing else but a limitation of the former. §115. (What power is, and in which things it is to be found.) One calls the source of changes a power, and understood as such one finds a power in every thing that

⁵ As Wolff indicates in the first register, this is his rendering of “substantia.” ⁶ Again, Wolff indicates that this is his rendering of “accidens.”

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subsists for itself, and the same is not to be encountered in things that subsist through others. §116. (Things that subsist for themselves can act.) Now since the changes which are to be borne by a thing that subsists for itself find a reason in it by means of this power (§29), so they are acts of the same thing (§104), and in such a way one sees that a thing that subsists for itself is able to act, and one therefore also cognizes that thing from this and also differentiates it from other things; consequently, this constitutes the proper mark of a thing that subsists for itself, as Leibniz⁷ had long held without proof. §117. (How power is distinguished from faculty.) Power, however, must not be confused with a mere faculty, since a faculty is only the possibility of an action and, on the contrary, because power is a source of changes, an effort or striving to do something must be met with in it. §118. (Things that subsist for themselves are striving to act.) On account of the fact that in a thing that subsists for itself a power is to be met with, there must also be a striving to act (§116), that is, a striving to change its limits (§§106–7). §119. (How action is distinguished from striving.) If this striving is advanced continuously, then an action emerges from it. Insofar as there is nothing at hand as to why it should not be advanced, that is, when nothing obstructs it, then it will be advanced (§30), and accordingly action always results when there is no obstacle at hand. §120. (What an effect and an efficient cause⁸ are.) Accordingly, it is through a power that that which was merely possible attains its fulfillment, or complement, that is, the possible is brought to actuality (§14). Now, however, that which attains its actuality by means of action is called the effect. By contrast, that thing which assists in bringing the possible to actuality, that is, which produces something, is called an efficient cause. For example, when the sun melts the wax, this takes place through continued warming. And therefore, the warming on the part of the sun is its action, the melting is the effect, and the sun itself is the efficient cause by which the action is executed. [ . . . ] §121. (State of a thing.) The manner of limitation is that which we call the state of a thing. Now if this limitation occurs in that through which the thing subsists, then it is called the internal state of a thing; if it pertains to that which is external to a thing, that is, to that through which it relates to other things, then it is called the external state of the same. §125. (Simple things have a power.) Simple things cannot be limited in any other way than by degree (§106). That, however, which is indivisible and is limited only by degree is a power: for there is more at one time in an indivisible thing than another, through which the magnitude of the degree is also given. Now, since this multiplicity finds its reason in the simple thing (§32), and indeed, as something changeable (§111), it is not absolutely necessary (§41), so it cannot attain its actuality otherwise ⁷ Wolff provides a citation here referring to the “Acta eruditorum of the year 1695” but this reference is later corrected to “1694” as Wolff is referring to Leibniz’s essay, “De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae” (“On the Emendation of First Philosophy and the Notion of Substance”) published in that year. ⁸ Wolff indicates that “würckende Ursache” is his rendering of “causa efficiens” in the first register.

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than through the action of the simple thing (§116). Action, however, issues from a continually increasing effort or striving (§119), and therefore a simple thing must have a power. §126. (Simple things change their limits.) Because, accordingly, any given simple thing is constantly striving to change its limitations (§119), and consequently is actually changed when nothing resists it (§119), and yet it cannot itself resist such changes insofar as it would have to have a striving to change and not to change its limitations at the same time, which cannot take place in a simple or indivisible (§75) thing (§10); so, therefore, limitations must indeed be constantly altered and in this way its state is constantly changed (§121). §127. (They are things that subsist for themselves.) One accordingly sees that any given simple thing has a source of its changes in itself (§§125–6), and therefore is a thing that subsists for itself (§114). §132. (What order is.) When many are considered together as one and there is something similar to be found in them, an order arises from them, so that order therefore is nothing other than the similarity of the many in one. §134. (How the definition of order applies to space and time.) [ . . . ] [It] may be helpful if I show that an order similar to that described in §132 is to be found in time as well as in space. In space, I encounter manifold things, namely, the different ways in which a given thing may exist simultaneously among many things, which we tend to call places (§47). These ways agree with one another in that a given thing is outside of all of the others and is removed by some particular distance from each. And in these respects, they are similar to one another (§18). Therefore, since one takes all places together as a whole, the order of those things that exist simultaneously consists in the similarity of the manifold. One can show in a similar manner that the same holds of time. §142. (What truth and dream are.) Because everything has its sufficient reason why it is (§30), so there must always be a sufficient reason why the changes in simple things follow one upon another in such a way and not otherwise, why the parts in composite things stand next to one another in such a way and not otherwise, and why their changes follow upon one another in such a way and not otherwise. Accordingly, there is an order here of the same sort as is found in the orderly completion of a proof (§135). Now, since such an order does not obtain in dreams, where through our own experience we find that no reason is to be provided for why things are by one another, and so stand next to each other, and also for why their changes follow one upon the other, so from this one distinctly recognizes that truth is distinguished from dream through order. Accordingly, truth is nothing other than order in the changes of things; by contrast, dream is disorder in the changes of things. §144. (Origin of truth.) Whoever has considered the matter carefully will readily recognize that without the principle of sufficient reason there can be no truth. §145. (When one cognizes truth.) It is further clear that one cognizes truth when one understands the reason why this or that can be, that is, the rules of order that are to be encountered in things and their changes (§§141, 129). §146. (There is truth in all things.) Accordingly, because an order (§132) arises insofar as all things, simple as well as composite, find a reason in one another (§30), so there is truth in them. As a result, there is something true in every thing.

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§152. (What perfection and imperfection are.) The agreement of the manifold constitutes the perfection of things. [ . . . ] Imperfection consists in the fact that the parts of the manifold run counter to one another. §156. (In perfection there is sheer order.) In perfection there is sheer order, for where there is perfection, everything relates to a common reason or ground. And when this obtains, the manifold that is to be met with in one thing is similar (§18). As a result, since order consists in the similarity of the manifold (§152), there is sheer order in perfection. §175. (That there are contingent things and where they come from.) [ . . . ] When something could be otherwise than it is, then what is opposed to it contains nothing contradictory in it (§11), and therefore that thing is not necessary (§36). Now, since one tends to call something that is not necessary contingent, it is clear that that is contingent for which it is also possible for what is opposed to exist, or which is not contradicted by what is opposed. [ . . . ]

Chapter 3: On the Soul in General, namely, what we Perceive of it §191. (Plan.) Here I do not yet want to show what the soul is and how changes take place in it; rather, my present intention is merely to explain what we perceive of the soul by means of everyday experience. I will not introduce anything more here than what anyone can cognize who attends to himself. This will serve as a basis for the derivation of other things that one cannot so easily see. §192. (What is here understood by “soul.”) However, in order that one might know what is to be perceived, it should be noted that by “soul,” I understand that thing which is conscious, and therefore we want to investigate here what we perceive of ourselves insofar as we are conscious. §194. (When we do and do not think.) I have already mentioned above (§45) what the first thing is that we perceive of our soul when we attend to it, namely, that we are conscious of many things as outside us. When this takes place, we say that we think and accordingly call thoughts those changes of the soul of which it is conscious (Logic ch. 1, §2). By contrast, when we are not conscious as, for instance, in sleep or even at times when waking, we tend to say that we are not thinking. §195. (On what basis we cognize thoughts.) Accordingly, we suppose being conscious as a mark on the basis of which we cognize that we think. And thence arises the tendency to say that being conscious cannot be separated from a thought. §196. (Difference among thoughts.) We find however a difference among thoughts when we think of things outside of and in us, namely, we find it to be the very same as I have shown to hold among concepts in the Logic (ch. 1, §9f). Although I could no doubt simply appeal to that discussion, it will nonetheless serve our purposes if I briefly reiterate this difference here. §197. (On what basis we cognize what is in us.) Because, however, I contended that this difference obtains whether we are thinking of things outside or in us, it is necessary that I first explain the basis from which we cognize that something is in us, since it was already shown above (§45) how we gather that something is outside us. Insofar namely as we are conscious of some things, for instance, when we see buildings or people, we cognize by means of the principle of contradiction cited

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above (§10) that I, who am conscious of a thing am not that thing of which I am conscious. Therefore, I cognize it as differentiated from me (§17). Because, however, nothing more is found in myself than consciousness, that is, my thoughts (§194), so I do not assign anything further to me than thinking, and accordingly whatever belongs to this, I regard as in me. In this way, we see something as in us when we find that it is the very thing on the basis of which we cognize ourselves, just as we tend to posit as in a thing that on the basis of which we cognize it; for example, I cognize the sphere on the basis of its figure, but we posit this figure in the sphere. And therefore, when I say that there is something in a thing it should be understood in no other sense than this, namely, that I cognize the thing on this basis and differentiate it from others. §198. (What clear thoughts are.) Some thoughts are constituted in such a way that we know quite well what we think and are able to distinguish them from others. When this is the case, we say that they are clear. For example, I now see buildings, people, and other things. I am quite conscious of what I see and can recognize each given thing and differentiate it from others. On account of this I say that my current thoughts are clear. §199. (What obscure thoughts are.) By contrast, when we do not properly know what we should make of what we think, then our thoughts are obscure. For example, I see from afar something white on the field but do not know what I should make of this insofar as I cannot properly differentiate one part from another; thus, the thought that I have of it is obscure. §201. (Where clarity comes from.) Therefore, clarity arises from noticing the differentiation in the manifold; obscurity however arises from the lack of so noticing. §202. (When something becomes clearer.) We thus find that a thing becomes clearer to us the more that we notice its differentiation from others; by contrast, the less we perceive this the more obscure it becomes. This applies as much in the sciences as it does in ordinary life. §203. (What the light of the soul is.) When our thoughts are clear we say that it is light or bright in our soul. However, just as we otherwise tend to call that light which makes the surrounding bodies visible in the world, such that namely we can see and recognize them through their difference from one another, so we also call that a light in our soul which makes it such that our thoughts are clear and that we can recognize one apart from the other through their difference, that is, it is that which assures us of that difference. It is not yet the time, however, to investigate what it is in which this light consists. §206. (When thoughts are distinct.) It sometimes happens that we determine the difference among that which we think and, thus, are also able to relate it to others when asked. Then, our thoughts are distinct. For example, when I think of a triangle and a square, I can determine the difference between the triangle and the square, and if someone should ask me how I differentiate these figures from one another and both from all other figures, I can also relate the difference. Here, namely, it depends on the number of sides: in the triangle there are three lines, but in the square, there are four that bound it. And in this way, I recognize that the thought of the triangle is different from the thought of the square. With this, however, the thoughts of the triangle and of the square are distinct. [ . . . ]

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§207. (Where distinctness comes from.) It should be noted that our thoughts always contain a multiplicity in them. Now when we think of something, and our thoughts are clear with respect to its parts or with respect to the manifold that is encountered in one of them, then from this clarity distinctness arises. Insofar as we attain clear thoughts of the parts such that we can differentiate them from one another, even if we are not capable of determining the proper difference, then we have a distinct thought of the whole. [ . . . ] §213. (State of obscure thoughts.) By contrast, when there is altogether no clarity concerning those things which we think at once, then we cannot differentiate them from one another at all (§198) and there is neither clarity nor distinctness in the whole thought which encompasses everything we think at once. And then we are in a state of obscure thoughts. §214. (When our thoughts are indistinct.) It often occurs, and mostly among certain people, that they do not determine the difference of that which they think, and therefore cannot relate it to others when asked. When this is the case, our thoughts are indistinct. For example, when I see a red color, I know quite well to differentiate it from green, yellow, and other colors, and accordingly the thought which I have of it is clear. Yet, I cannot determine the difference, and therefore also cannot relate, when one asks me, in what the difference between the red color and the green or another color consists; therefore, my thought of it is indistinct. §217. (What we think of the body.) The things which we represent as outside of us are one and all composite things which we differentiate through magnitude, figure, and color, and whose position with respect to one another and changes in the same, as well as of their parts, through motion are perceived by us. We tend to call these things bodies and below, in the proper place, we will investigate what they actually are. §218. (On what basis we cognize our body.) Among these bodies we take one for our own body because the thoughts of other bodies are directed in accordance with it and it always remains present to us as all the others change. §220. (What sensations, senses, and the organs of sense are.) We tend to call the thoughts which have their reason in the changes in the organs of sense and which are occasioned by corporeal things outside us sensations, and the capacity for sensation the senses; the organs, however, in which these changes occur, are called the organs of the senses. §235. (What imaginings are, and what the imagination is.) One tends to call the representations of such things as are not present imaginings. And the power of the soul to produce such representations is called the imagination. §236. (How imaginings are to be distinguished from sensations.) Since imaginings do not clearly represent everything contained in the original sensations (§231), there is great obscurity in them and in this way they are distinguished from sensations, and indeed we tend to distinguish the former from the latter in just this way. For example, when I imagine a person who I have seen at another time, but also see another person before me, a significant difference between the two becomes evident. For, concerning the former, even though I can quite well represent whatever pertains to figures and magnitudes, as well as to the positions of the parts with respect to one another, nonetheless the colors remain almost entirely absent and everything becomes rather

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dark. By contrast, my sensations represent the colors to me in a lively way; therefore, everything looks obscure with the imagined person, but with the real person everything is bright and clear. §238. (The rule of imaginings.) One finds, however, that imaginings take their origin from sensations and indeed in the following way. When our senses present something to us that has something in common with a sensation which we had at another time, then that same thing occurs to us again. Now if this has, in turn, something in common with a sensation or imagining that we had at some other time, then this likewise occurs to us again. In this way, imaginings continuously vary, one after another. [ . . . ] §239. (How to define dreams.) Now since dreams are nothing but imaginings, from the foregoing we can derive the reason or ground of dreams; namely, these also take their origin from a sensation that does not suffice to wake us and something is thereby reproduced which we have otherwise sensed or imagined which, however, has something in common with the present sensation. After this, it proceeds in the manner just outlined concerning imaginings. §240. (Why there is no order in dreams.) Now because these things which we imagine one after the other do not find their reason in one another, so in dreams nothing finds its reason in one another. [ . . . ] In this way, one can understand why there is no order of the sort that obtains when it comes to truth (§142). §248. (How we recognize that we have had a thought before.) Here the question arises concerning how we know that we have already had a thought before, for instance, that we have already seen a person. Notwithstanding that this seems difficult to answer at first, yet when we attend to it properly the reason for this becomes quite distinct. Namely, it is because the thought is now in a different order than it was before, both with respect to the other things that existed at the same time with it and those that followed on it. So, when I see a person who I have formerly seen again, I see them in another place, or next to other people, than before, or otherwise clothed than previously, and before I might have looked at them differently, or imagined them otherwise than when I saw them the first time. As a result, when we cannot, for example, accurately represent the place where we previously saw a person, but notice something indistinct by which we recognize that we have seen them before, we grow rather doubtful and say that we have seen that person somewhere but cannot remember where. Once it occurs to us, however, or someone tells us, then we become certain from that place that we have already seen this person before. §249. (What memory is.) Now on account of the fact that we can recognize that we have previously already had thoughts which we reproduce anew, we attribute a memory to the soul. Memory, therefore, is nothing other than the capacity to recognize that we have already had thoughts which we had previously, when they occur to us again. §272. (When we reflect⁹ on something.) When we represent something, whether we sense or imagine it, and direct our thoughts to one part after another that

⁹ Wolff indicates that “überdencken” is his rendering of the Latin “reflectere.”

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composes it, or to one item in the manifold that is encountered in it, we reflect on that same thing and through this progressive attention to one part or to one item in the manifold after another, it becomes clear in its parts or in the manifold (§198) and distinct for itself (§206), though it may yet be that we are unable to determine the difference among the parts or the manifold, in which case the thing remains merely clear (§206). §273. (How we attain to concepts.) When we reflect on something and are assured through memory that we have also previously sensed or imagined it (§248), we cognize thereby the similarity and difference of things (§§17, 18). In this way, we attain to the representations of the species and genera of things (§182), which one tends to call concepts and which are the ground of general cognition. §276. (When we understand something. What is understandable.) As soon as we have distinct thoughts or concepts of a thing, then we understand it. That is understandable which we are able to cognize distinctly. §277. (What the understanding is.) The power of distinctly representing the possible is the understanding. And the understanding is distinguished from the senses and the imagination in that, where these latter operate on their own, representations are at most clear but not distinct; by contrast, when the understanding is involved they become distinct. [ . . . ] §278. (When we cognize a thing.) As soon as we are able to represent something, we cognize it. And when concepts are distinct, then our cognition is also distinct: if these are indistinct, however, then our cognition is indistinct. §282. (When the understanding is pure and impure.) Because the distinctness of cognition belongs to the understanding, and indistinctness to the senses and imagination (§277), the understanding is separate from the senses and imagination when we have completely distinct cognition; when, by contrast, there is still indistinctness and obscurity in cognition, it is still united with the senses and imagination. In the former case, the understanding is called pure, and in the latter it is impure. §285. (Our understanding is never pure.) In the meantime, experience shows, and we will discuss this in due course, that our understanding is never entirely pure but rather that even amidst distinctness much indistinctness and obscurity remains. [ . . . ] §286. (The understanding brings us to general cognition.) The understanding shows itself in concepts in that we differentiate what is encountered in a thing that we represent and, inasmuch as we compare it with that which is encountered in other things which differ from it, we determine the difference of things from one another whereby we attain definitions (Logic ch. 1, §36) and cognize the genera and species of things (§182). Therefore, it is from the understanding that we have general concepts (Logic, ch. 1, §23) and general cognition altogether. §287. (When the understanding judges.) As soon as we differentiate the genera and species of things, as well as the attributes and changes, and their relations to one another, we cognize that this or that thing has this or that in itself, or at least could have it, or also that something could proceed from it, that is, that one could find in it the reason or ground of a change in something else; by contrast, we cognize from another thing which does not have this or that in itself, or could not have it, that something could not proceed from it. And we call this accomplishment on the part of the understanding judgment.

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§288. (What judgment involves.) From this we see that it does not suffice for a judgment when one represents a thing with its attribute or change, or even with its effect; rather, in addition to this is required that we differentiate the attribute, change, or effect from the thing and regard them as two different things that exist together at the same time and indeed where the one is connected with the other. In this way, judgment comes to the representation of the connection of two things with one another. And the same applies to the separation of two things. §325. (What experience is. The difference between common experience and experiments.) We tend to call the cognition that we attain when we attend to our sensations and the changes of the soul experience. We call it common experience when sensations are provided of themselves, and experiments, by contrast, when we only attain them through effort. [ . . . ] §326. (What we have to do with experiences.) With experiences, then, we can do nothing more than to take note carefully of everything which permits of differentiation from one another, either in the sensation of that which is outside of us or in the state of our soul, and to call each of these things by their proper name so that we do not mix our imaginings and preconceived opinions with experience and in this way seek to subreptically introduce certain principles of cognition as are not grounded in things. §329. (What kind of cognition one attains through experience.) Through experience we attain partly to concepts and partly to judgments. [ . . . ] §330. (Where the certainty of experience comes from.) [ . . . ] The concepts gained from experience are certain when we cognize their possibility (Logic, ch. 9, §24). Now since experience shows us that those same things exist whose concepts it has afforded us with, we thereby cognize that they are possible (§15). Judgments are certain when that which we attribute to things in the judgments pertains, or can pertain, to them (Logic ch. 9, §6). Now, if we attain a judgment by means of experience, then we have cognized from this that this or that pertains to a thing, and accordingly it is clear in turn that it can pertain to it (§15). However, because in judgments everything is asserted of a thing under specific conditions (Logic ch. 3, §6), it is not certain that something will occur again until these same conditions obtain again, that is, in similar cases (§18). §340. (What inferences are.) When we draw a proposition from two others, we call it inferring, and the manner in which we infer is called an inference. [ . . . ] §341. (Of the particular usefulness of inferences.) [ . . . ] Inferences serve, namely, for grasping how one thought always follows from another in an unswerving series and in such a way that one can indicate the reason, or ground, of all thoughts that arise from another and represent something that is not present to our senses. §347. (What a demonstration is, and what a proof in general is.) One sees from this however what a demonstration actually is, namely, a continual connection of many inferences in which the only premises assumed are those whose correctness we recall having previously cognized. Other proofs are not distinguished from it except in that some premises are assumed, the truth of which we have not yet fully ascertained. What I understand by the connection of inferences can be gleaned from the foregoing. An inference is connected with another insofar as its conclusion is made into a premise of the other inference. One also connects two inferences with a

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third when through the comparison of the formers’ conclusions one derives a third proposition which permits of being used as the premise in a new inference. §361. (What knowledge is and what science is.) We tend to affirm that we know something when it is derived from indubitable principles by means of correct inferences. And one calls the facility in deriving what one maintains from indubitable principles, by means of correct inferences, science. §368. (What reason is.) The art of inferring shows that truths are connected with one another, which should also be proven in its proper place. That insight which we have into the connection of truths is called reason. That this definition of reason is in accordance with ordinary ways of speaking is shown in the Logic (ch. 2, §16). We say, for instance, that Sempronius has set about his business in a reasonable way when he has taken well into consideration all of the harms and benefits that could be brought about from his actions, and as a result has arranged things in such a way that he does not work against himself in his acts and omissions but rather that each supports the other. Now what does that reason consist in which Sempronius evidences here? Certainly, in nothing else than the insight that he has into the connection of things, namely, the insight into the connection of his actions as much as that into their connection with other things. §371. (Experience is opposed to reason.) Now, because one does not have insight into how what is cognized through experience as being the case is connected with other truths (§325), it follows that there is no reason at all in this cognition (§370), and therefore experience is opposed to reason. §372. (Ways of cognizing the truth.) Accordingly, we have two ways in which we can attain to cognition of the truth. The first is grounded in the senses (§§220, 325), the second however in the understanding (§§277, 368). For example, most people cognize that the sun rises in the morning from repeated experience (§338) and they cannot say why it happens; by contrast, an astronomer who has insight into the cause of heavenly motions and into the connection of the earth with the heavens cognizes this through reason and is able to demonstrate that, why, and at what time it must take place. §381. (What kind of cognition comes from reason.) Because reason is an insight into the connection of truth (§368), but truth is cognized when one understands the reason, or ground, why this or that can be (§145), so [the faculty of] reason shows us why this or that can be. [ . . . ] §382. (When reason is pure.) When one has such an insight into the connection of things that one can combine truths with one another without assuming any propositions from experience, then reason is pure; by contrast, when one is assisted by propositions from experience, then reason and experience are mixed together and we do not see the connection of the truth with others completely. For, when we arrive at a proposition taken from experience, we come to a stop and our reason cannot proceed any further. We find sufficient examples in the sciences that our reason is not always pure, particularly in the cognition of nature and of ourselves. In arithmetic and geometry, just as in algebra, we have examples of pure reason, for here all inferences proceed from distinct concepts and various principles which are abstracted from the senses. §383. (Science comes from reason.) Since science is a facility in proving everything that one maintains on the basis of incontrovertible principles, or in a word, a facility

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in demonstration (§§361, 347), but in demonstrating something truths are connected together, it follows that through science one cognizes the connection of truths, and therefore science comes from reason. §404. (What pleasure is.) Inasmuch as we intuit perfection pleasure arises in us, so that pleasure is nothing other than an intuition of perfection. [ . . . ] §417. (What displeasure is, and how it comes to be.) [ . . . ] Displeasure, namely, is nothing else than the intuitive cognition of imperfection, whether it is a true imperfection or only has the appearance of imperfection. [ . . . ] §418. (Displeasure is something actual for itself.) Accordingly, displeasure is not merely the lack of pleasure but rather something actual for itself. This is because, for a mere lack of pleasure it is sufficient that we have no intuitive cognition of a perfection (§404); by contrast, for displeasure, something actual is required, namely, cognizing an imperfection (§417). [ . . . ] §422. (What good is.) Whatever makes us and our condition more perfect is good. For example, the art of discovery makes our understanding more perfect and, therefore, is something good; health makes our body more perfect and, therefore, it is likewise something good. Money makes our external condition more perfect and, therefore, it is also something good. [ . . . ] §423. (The good arouses pleasure, and what it is to be naturally good.) Because the good makes us and our condition more perfect (§422), and the intuition of perfection arouses pleasure (§404), so the intuitive cognition of the good must arouse pleasure. On account of this, we call that which brings forth pleasure naturally good.¹⁰ §424. (Distinction between true and apparent goods.) And through this we can distinguish between true and apparent goods. Namely, a true good is what yields a constant pleasure, or at least never causes displeasure; by contrast, an apparent good only brings about a fragile pleasure which is often converted into a greater displeasure. [ . . . ] §426. (What evil is.) Whatever makes us and our condition more imperfect is evil. For example, uncertainty makes our condition imperfect and, therefore, it is evil. Sickness makes our body imperfect and, therefore, it is likewise evil. Poverty makes our external condition imperfect and therefore it is something evil. §427. (The evil arouses displeasure. What it is to be naturally evil.) Because the evil makes us and our condition more imperfect (§426), and the intuition of imperfection arouses displeasure (§417), so the intuitive cognition of the evil arouses displeasure. On account of this, we call that which brings forth displeasure naturally evil. §434. (How sensory desires come to be.) Sensory desires come to be from the indistinct representation of the good, and accordingly these are nothing but the inclination of the soul towards that which we indistinctly conceive of as good. [ . . . ] §436. (How a sensory aversion comes to be.) The indistinct representation of the evil draws the soul back as it were from that which we conceive of as evil, which one commonly tends to reckon to sensory desire. One could, however, more appropriately call it a sensory aversion. [ . . . ] ¹⁰ The original reads “Deswegen nennen wir natürlich gut, was entweder Lust bringet, oder wenigstens Unlust ist” but the latter clause is clearly problematic and was removed in subsequent editions, so I have omitted it here.

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§439. (What an affect is.) A noticeable degree of sensory desire and of sensory aversion is called an affect. [ . . . ] §492. (What the will is.) Insofar as we represent something as good, our mind is inclined towards it. This inclination on the part of the mind towards a thing for the sake of the good that we suppose ourselves to perceive in it is that which we tend to call the will. For example, someone sees a book lying in a bookstore, leafs through its pages a little, and supposes himself to find things in it that are useful for him to know, that is, he represents the book as good (§422). Insofar as this takes place, he gets a desire to purchase the book. This inclination, which he has towards the book because he takes the book to be good, is called the will. And one says then: he wants, or wills, to purchase the book. §493. (What not willing is.) On the contrary, our mind is withdrawn from something that we represent as evil. This withdrawal of the mind from something for the sake of the evil that we suppose ourselves to perceive in it is that which we tend to call not willing. For example, someone sees a book lying in a bookstore, leafs through its pages a little and suppose himself to find things in it that are in part without meaning and in part absurd, that is, he represents the book as evil (§426). Insofar as this takes place, he desires to have nothing more to do with the book, throws it aside and withdraws his mind from it. The withdrawal of his mind from the book which he takes for bad or evil is called not willing. And one says then: he wants, or wills, not to have the book. §494. (How not willing is distinct from the omission of willing.) From this it becomes clear that not willing is something more than the omission of willing. For one omits to will when one does not discern anything good in a thing, as in the previous example when in leafing through the pages of a book nothing is found which one considers to be useful: by contrast, one wants not to have something when one encounters something evil in it [ . . . ] §496. (What motives are, and that the will cannot be without them.) From the definition of the will we have given it becomes clear that we must always have a reason why we will something, namely, the representation of the good, or alternatively a reason why we do not will something, namely the representation of the evil. And that this is so is made clear enough from the principle of sufficient reason (§30). For if everything must have a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, so there must also be a sufficient reason why we will and do not will. Now we tend to call these reasons of willing and not willing motives. §502. (What is to be numbered among motives.) In addition to this it should be noted that one must not only number distinct representations of the good and evil among motives, but rather also indistinct representations. And accordingly all pleasure and displeasure that a thing now produces, or has previously produced in us, also belongs here (§§423–7), and similarly one must number all affects aroused in us, by which we are presently or have previously been moved by the same thing, among motives. §506. (We only will the good, not the evil.) Meanwhile, what was noted long ago by the ancients remains quite true, namely that we will nothing except what we take to be good, and what we regard as evil is the only thing that we do not will. For motives are either distinct representations of the good and evil (§496), or pleasure,

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displeasure, and affects (§502), that is, indistinct representations of the good and evil (§§404, 417, 441). §508. (With motives of equal weight, one does not come to any resolution.) Since without motives one can neither will nor not will (§496), it is impossible that someone wills something or not when motives of equal weight are present on each side. As a result, as long as one is doubtful about whether the motives on one side outweigh those on the other or not, one does not come to any resolution. As soon, however, as something is found on one side which is not to encountered on the other, and accordingly through which the equilibrium is upset, then the weightier side prevails. [ . . . ] §511. (False concept of freedom.) Accordingly, those err who define freedom in terms of a capacity of choosing one or the other of two contradictory things without a motive being present for why one chooses the one over the other. Their error is clear, namely, by means of what has been comprehensively exposited here, and such a capacity is contrary to reason (§369) as well as to experience (§325). §513. (How to obtain a better concept.) In order that we can now obtain a better and more fruitful concept of the freedom of the will, let us investigate precisely (Logic ch. 2, §16) what the character is of our actions which we call free. §514. (How we understand free actions.) In so doing, we find [1.]¹¹ that what we understand is involved in these actions, or conceive them distinctly (§276). For example, when it is the question of whether I should buy a book or not, I am aware what kind of book it is and what I am supposed to exchange for it. I know whether the same book is serviceable to my own ends or not, and whether I could do without as much money as it costs. §515. (They are not necessary in themselves.) We find, 2., that the actions that we call free are not absolutely necessary inasmuch as that which is opposed to them is possible just as well (§36). For example, in our case of the book it is possible just as well to buy the book as not to buy it. For all the motions of the bodily members that are required to make the purchase are possible in themselves and the required sum of money similarly lies ready. However, it is also possible to omit these motions and undertake others. §516. (Motives also do not make them necessary . . . ) Now even though there are motives present for why an action is preferred, nonetheless they do not on that account render it necessary in itself. For these leave out how the object of the action is constituted and the capacity of executing it at one time or another, and cannot make any difference in these. For example, although I consider the book to be useful to me, and thereby get the desire to buy it, nonetheless nothing is changed either in the book, in the motions of the bodily members required to buy it, or in the other required circumstances as well; rather, everything remains as before, namely, it can happen or not. One is just as possible as the other. §517. ( . . . but rather only produce certainty.) Meanwhile, it of course remains the case that motives are that which makes the possible actual (§14),¹² and insofar as they ¹¹ Wolff offers three such characteristics, the latter two of which he numbers. This is presumably the first. ¹² Here it might be kept in mind that the German word for motive is “Bewegungs-Grund,” which contains the term “Grund” (i.e., reason or ground).

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suffice for this, they yield certainty. For example, when one asks why I am buying the book, since I could have omitted doing so just as well as doing it, I cite as the cause the fact that I regard it as useful to me and that the money I must give for it does not strike me as a hefty sum. And as soon as I frame the resolution for the sake of this motive it becomes certain that I will purchase the book, but not necessary since it remains as possible now as before that I omit to make the purchase (§516). Therefore, it frequently happens in the meantime that the firm resolution is nonetheless changed again (§505), and as a cause one cites the fact that something interfered. If motives had rendered things necessary, then it would not have been possible that something would have been able to interfere (§36). §518. (The reason of free action is in the soul. What is spontaneous.¹³) Finally, we find, 3., that the soul has in itself the reason of its actions that we tend to call free. For the representations that are needed for motives (§496) are in it and come from it, and it is inclined through its own power towards whatever pleases it and withdraws itself from whatever displeases it. And insofar as the soul has the reason of its actions in itself, to that extent one attributes a spontaneity to it, and calls that the reason for which is to be found in the soul spontaneous action and omission. §519. (What freedom is.) When we take all this together, it becomes clear that freedom is nothing other than the power of the soul, through its own spontaneity, for choosing that one among two equally possible things that pleases it most. §520. (On what it is grounded.) Now since the insight into the connection of things shows what is good and evil, better or worse (§§422, 426), it follows that [the faculty of] reason is the ground, or reason, of freedom (§368). §521. (What sort of necessity there is in freedom.) It cannot be denied that it is impossible for someone who cognizes something as better to prefer the worse to it, and in this way it necessarily transpires that he chooses the better. Yet, this necessity is not contrary to freedom: for the individual is not thereby coerced to choose the better because he could also choose the worse were it pleasing to him, insofar as the one as well as the other are possible for and in themselves (§516). As previously mentioned, it only produces a certainty of a sort that otherwise would not be met with in human actions. And should I later turn to an exposition of human actions, it will be shown that without this kind of necessity there would be no hope for any certainty in ethics. §527. (Agreement of the soul with the body, and how to perceive it carefully.) Nothing more remains here than for me to consider what we perceive of the agreement of our thoughts with certain changes in the body and, in turn, what we perceive of the agreement of certain motions in the body with certain thoughts in the soul. Here, however, it is especially necessary that we keep in mind what was recommended above concerning experiences (§326¹⁴), and indeed all the more so because concerning the matter before us many prejudices are commonly and incautiously introduced subreptically, preventing one from cognizing the truth.

¹³ Wolff indicates in the register that “Willkühr” (usually translated into English as “power of choice’ ” is his rendering of the Latin “spontaneitas,” and so I have opted to render it thus here. ¹⁴ Corrected from “§316.”

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§528. (The agreement of the soul with the external senses.) When external things produce a change in our organs of sense, sensations arise simultaneously in our soul, that is, we are immediately conscious of these things. [ . . . ] §529. (That no action of the body on the soul comes to light thereby.) However, one must be wary lest one detrimentally reads more into this experience of the truth than is warranted (§527). We perceive nothing more than that two things exist simultaneously, namely, a change that occurs in the sensory organs and a thought whereby the soul is conscious of the external things which cause the change. In no way, however, do we experience an action¹⁵ of the body upon the soul. For were this to be the case, we would have to have a concept of it, and if not a distinct one then at least a clear concept (§325¹⁶). Whoever attends carefully to themselves, however, will find that he does not have even the least concept of such an action, and accordingly we cannot say that the assertion of an action of the body upon the soul is grounded in experience. He who will speak precisely can ascribe no more to our experience than that two things exist at the same time; however, it can by no means be concluded from this that the one is the cause of the other [ . . . ]. §530. (Needed reminder.) One would do well to note that the activity of the body upon the soul is not rejected on account of this; rather, it is set aside for further investigation. For it would not only be incorrect if we would say: whatever we cannot define, that is, whatever we do not have a distinct concept of, cannot be; in addition, I hold that it is also objectionable for one to say: whatever we do not have any concept of at all, is not. I will demonstrate below that we cannot even say: whatever we are not conscious of in our soul is not to be met with in it. §535. (Agreement of the body with the soul.) We also note, by contrast, that certain motions in the body follow when the soul desires these same motions. For example, I want to reach for something, so I stretch out my arm for it. I want to stand up and walk away, and this also takes place. §536. (That no action of the soul upon the body comes to light from this.) If, here as well, we do not want to advance further than what we experience, then we can say no more than that certain motions of the body occur at that time when we will the same, or when they are omitted, or when they are not willed. Since, however, we again have no concept, not even a clear one, of the action of the soul through which it should bring about motion in the body, so one cannot pass such an activity off as grounded in experience, as is evident from what was already said before (§529). §539. (Union of the soul with the body.) One tends to say, concerning this agreement of the thoughts of the soul with some changes in the body, and of some motions in the body with the will of the soul, that the soul is united with the body. What, however, this union of the soul with the body consists in does not permit of being shown before it is already established how it is possible that the soul agrees with the body in the previously mentioned ways.

¹⁵ In the first register, Wolff indicates that both “effectus” and “actio” are possible Latin equivalents of “Würckung”; in the remainder of the chapter, I have opted to render it consistently as “action” ¹⁶ Corrected from “§352.”

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Chapter 4: On the World §540. (Why the world is treated here.) Before we can understand what the soul actually is and what reason there is for what has been adduced thus far concerning it, we must first come to understand what a world is. For it will be shown in what follows that one can conceive neither the essence of a spirit in general nor of the soul in particular before one understands what a world actually is and what sort of constitution it has. §544. (What a world is.) Now since the actuality of things does not belong with their essence (§35), but real definitions merely exhibit the essence of a thing (Logic ch. 1, §48), so it follows from what we have already noted that the world is a series of changeable things that are next to one another and follow one upon the other but which are altogether connected to one another. §545. (When things are connected to one another.) I say that things are connected to one another when a given one among them contains the reason in itself why another is next to it, exists simultaneously with it, or follows upon it. §546. (When things are connected according to space.) If, among things that are simultaneous, one contains the reason in itself why the other exists simultaneously next to it, then one thing among them has its particular way in which it exists simultaneously with the others. As a result, that thing has its particular place (§47), and therefore they are connected with one another according to space. §547. (When they are connected according to time.) If, among things that follow one upon the other, the preceding thing contains the reason in itself why the other succeeds, and by contrast, the succeeding thing contains the reason why the former precedes, then they follow one upon the other in an order (§§132, 134), and therefore are connected with one another according to time (§94). §548. (In the world, everything is connected according to space and time.) Now, since things in the world are connected with one another, both insofar as they exist simultaneously and insofar as they follow one upon the other (§544), so they are connected with one another as much according to space as according to time (§§546, 547). §549. (The world is something singular.) That which is connected together according to space and time constitutes one thing. For, it is from the connection of what is different according to space and time, that one cognizes that there is but one thing. Now, since everything is connected with one another according to space and time in the world, so the world is to be regarded as one thing. §550. (The world is a whole that consists of parts.) Accordingly, the world is a whole and things which are next to one another, as well as those which follow one upon the other, are its parts (§24). §551. (It is a composite thing.) Whatever consists of parts is a composite thing (§51). Now since a world is a whole that consists of different parts (§550), so a world must be a composite thing. §552. (Essence of the world.) As a result, its essence must consist in the manner of composition (§59), and accordingly one world can be differentiated from another in no other way than in the manner of composition.

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§557. (The world is a machine.) [ . . . ] [T]he world is likewise a machine. The proof of this is not difficult. A machine is a composite artifact, the motions of which find their reason in the manner of composition. The world is also a composite thing, the changes of which find their reason in the manner of composition (§544). And, accordingly, the world is a machine. §558. (There is order and truth in it.) Because everything in the world finds its reason in one another, according to time as well as space (§548), there is order in the world and its changes (§§132, 138), and consequently also truth (§142). §561. (Where events in the world draw their certainty from.) Because the present state of the world finds its reason in its preceding state, and the future state in the present one (§§547, 548), the events in the world thereby obtain their certainty. And inasmuch as the world is a machine (§557), all events that take place in it are thereby rendered certain. §562. (What sort of necessity there is in it.) As events in the world are certain, it is not possible that they should not come to pass. And, in this way, they must come to pass, and consequently to that extent they are necessary (§36). §563. (This is treated further.) I say that events are only necessary to the extent that the preceding one was, and therefore not absolutely. Namely, any given event is necessary insofar as one presupposes a specific connection of things. Now when this connection is not necessary, but can also be otherwise, then events are not necessary in themselves but are rather contingent, as is the connection in which they find their reason (§175). Accordingly, we cannot judge whether the events in the world are absolutely necessary or not before it is established whether the connection in which they find their reason, that is, the world itself (§544), is necessary or not. §565. (How events in the world find their reason in it.) In order to now ascertain whether events in the world are contingent or necessary, let us investigate whether the world itself is necessary or whether it is to be numbered among contingent things. For this, however, it is required that we investigate more precisely how its events find their reason in it. For example, the dawn sky at present is clear and starry. This has its cause: a morning wind blows that is dry and therefore brings pleasant weather with it. The morning wind has, in turn, its cause, although we might not know it, and its cause has its own cause in turn, and so on through all time. Now, however, since everything in the world finds its reason in one another according to space, so the morning wind near us also has its causes in those things that exist next to it simultaneously in the world. And this is partially explained when one shows, in the context of the consideration of physics, how a wind can come to be. And since everything finds its reason in one another, so this connection to the wind must also proceed through all of space. Accordingly, if one were able to have a complete conception of why the sky is presently clear, one would find that everything in the entire world, that has ever existed in it or that still does, contributes something to it. [ . . . ] §567. (That an opposed event belongs in an entirely different world.) Consequently, if the most trivial event in the world is supposed to be other than it is, everything before it in the world would have to have been different, and everything that occurs after would also have to come to pass differently than it will currently.

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And therefore, there would have to be an entirely different world than what presently exists (§17) [ . . . ]. §569. (More than one world is possible.) Given that, from what has been said, it becomes clear that there could be many other connections of things than that which presently obtains (§565ff), and because a series of such things that are connected with one another according to space as well as time constitutes a world (§544), so more than one world is possible, that is, outside of the world to which we belong, or that we sense, there are still others possible that are completely distinguished from one another with respect to their events as they are from our world (§47). [ . . . ] §575. (Distinction of the necessary.) [ . . . ] What is possible in this world must also come to pass, if it has not done so already or does not still exist, and it is impossible for it to be omitted; for otherwise the reason it has in the present connection of things would not be sufficient, which is contrary to what we have accepted (§12), and thus cannot be the case (§10). In this way, it is necessary (§41); namely, it is necessary with respect to the present connection of things, but not absolutely for itself (§36). There is, however, a notable difference between that which is absolutely necessary and that which is only necessary under a certain condition or, as concerns our present topic, with respect to the present connection of things. [ . . . ] Insofar as one tends to call the latter the necessity of nature or natural necessity, so, by contrast, one tends to call the former geometrical necessity as well as metaphysical necessity [ . . . ]. §576. (The world is a contingent thing.) Since the world could have been otherwise than it is (§569), it belongs among contingent things (§175) and is therefore, in respect of its actuality, not necessary (§36). I emphasize that this is with respect to its actuality, for with respect to its essence it is and remains, like all other things, necessary (§38). [ . . . ] §578. (All of its events are contingent.) [ . . . ] It should nonetheless be noted that that which one calls the necessity of nature does not properly deserve the name of necessity inasmuch as the concept of necessity does not pertain to it absolutely (§36), but rather it should actually only be called certainty. [ . . . ] Along with this it should be noted that the necessity of nature only properly extends to the essence of things and not to their actuality, inasmuch as the actuality of the entire world, considered as a thing with all of its parts and the events it comprises, is contingent. What takes place in the world comes to pass necessarily insofar as it belongs to the essence of the world, which is necessary (§576); by contrast, with respect to its actuality, what takes place remains as contingent as the actuality of the world itself (§576). [ . . . ] §579. (Correct understanding of the contingent.) Now we obtain a correct understanding of the contingent in the world. Namely, we recognize that contingent events cannot attain to their actuality otherwise than through a series of innumerable other things, that proceed before them and exist simultaneously next to them, in such a way that should one want to indicate their reason, that reason always has a new reason, without end. By contrast, in that which is necessary, one comes quickly to an end, since one ultimately finds a reason where one can stop. [ . . . ] §582. (What elements are.) Because a world is a composite thing (§551), there must be simple things from which its parts are composed (§76). These simple things are typically called elements.

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§584. (Constitution of the elements.) Since elements are simple things (§579¹⁷), everything holds of them which was elaborated above in detail concerning simple things in general. They have a power (§125), through which they change their inner state incessantly (§§126, 121), and they are something that subsists for itself (§127) and so cannot cease to be otherwise than through annihilation (§102). §593. (Why one given simple thing is now here and not elsewhere.) Because everything must have its reason why it is (§30), so there must also be a reason why a given simple thing is here rather than elsewhere. Now, however, since space and time contain nothing in themselves from which one could understand why this or that simple thing, at this or that time, is here rather than elsewhere—inasmuch as the parts of space as well as of time have nothing in them through which they permit of being differentiated from one another (§§46, 94)—so the sought-for reason cannot be found in them (§29). Accordingly, if it cannot be found outside of simple things, it must be found in them; consequently, we must come across it in the internal state of a given simple thing. §594. (Also why these and not others are next to one another.) Since everything has its sufficient reason why it rather is than not (§30), so there must also be a sufficient reason for why a given thing is encountered next to these things and not next to others. Now, however, because even here as well the reason is not to be sought in space or in time, insofar namely as they are regarded as empty of the things that are found in them (§§46, 94), so it must in turn be found in those things that are next to one another, and therefore in the internal state of simple things (§565). §595. (Origin of perfection in composite things:) Following this, the internal state of a given simple thing directs itself according to the other simple things that are around it (§§593, 582¹⁸). And as a result all of them agree with one another, through which the perfection in the composite is attained (§152) §596. (In the entire world.) Because all composite things are connected with one another in the world (§544), and simple things are connected with the rest of the simple things such that they constitute a composite thing (§595), so the internal state of a given simple thing must also direct itself according to all composite things that are around it, like a center-point, in the world. And in this way each of the simple things accords with the entire world: from which arises the perfection of the world (§152¹⁹). §597. (What simple things effect.) The internal state of a simple thing is nothing else but the manner of limitation of that through which it subsists (§121): the alterations of the limitations are its changes (§107): its changes are nothing other changes of the degree (§106) of its power (§115). Now, since in this way simple things are constantly active (§120), so there must be something produced through their action which relates not only to all other simple things that are surrounding it but also to all composite things in the entire world. §598. (Their activity is set aside for further investigation.) What it actually is that is produced by the action of simple things, is something that we will set aside for further

¹⁷ This is corrected from “§594.” ¹⁹ Corrected from “§597.”

¹⁸ Wolff originally and anomalously refers to “§1.”

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investigation. Leibniz was of the opinion that the entire world is represented in a given simple thing, which provides a comprehensible explanation of how one given simple can be differentiated from others and can relate to the entire world in a particular way, and even how it relates differently to the things that it has around it as well as those that are further away. §599. (Unities of nature.) And from this one understands what Leibniz has in mind with his monads or unities of nature, which he also tends to call the indivisible of nature. Now it should be noted that, according to him, these unities are by no means conscious of all of that which is represented in them. One could accordingly say: one of Leibniz’s unities is a mirror of the entire world which it represents in it according to the point where it is. However, since we previously set aside the investigation (§598), it suffices for us that we have provided a distinct concept of the Leibnizian unities of nature, and have shown at the same time how they are not contrary to what we have proven concerning simple things in the world (§597). §600. (Universal harmony of things.) As I have also distinctly proven in the foregoing that the internal state of a given simple thing relates to everything else that is in the world (§596), and Leibniz accounts for this in that in any given simple thing the entire world is represented according to the point where it is (§599); so now one also understands further how, in his opinion, all things in the world, including even the smallest, can accord with one another, and what he has in mind with his universal harmony of things. However, since we do not yet want to establish what the internal state of simple things actually consists in such that it relates to everything in the world, so we will also set aside for now what it is that the universal harmony consists in, and it is enough for us that we have proven that it does obtain and that Leibniz has explained it in a very intelligible fashion. §602. (How simple things fill space.) Since, again, each simple thing relates in a particular way to the others (§595), it exists simultaneously in a particular way with the others such that none among them can exist in just this way with the others. And, therefore, not only is each outside of the other (§45) but also many together follow upon one another in an order (§§132, 133), and thus they fill space (§46), even though any one among them actually does not fill any space but only has its own specific point in it. §603. (How composite things come from simple things.) It is now time for me to explain how it is possible for composite things, which have parts, to nonetheless come from simple things that have no parts at all that might touch each other. But one who understands the constitution of simple things correctly will not find this difficult to grasp. For, because each of them exists simultaneously with the others in a particular way, such that none of them can exist with the others in the same way (§602), so it is not possible that many could exist simultaneously in the same point but rather each requires its own point. Meanwhile, since each is connected with those that are around it (§545), many simple things together make up a single thing (§549), and the composite thereby acquires an extension in length, breadth, and depth (§53). §606. (Constitution of bodies) Having considered simple things, we must also come to composites. Now, what was proven of them in general above must hold for any composites that are to be met with in any world. We call the composite things that are in our world bodies or also corporeal things and it is accordingly clear that a

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body necessarily fills a space (§52) and is extended in length, breadth, and depth (§53), that it has a figure (§54), permits of being divided (§58) and set into motion (§57), that its essence consists in the manner of composition (§59), that it has a measurable magnitude (§61), that it can come to be anew and cease to be again (§64), that it can undergo changes in magnitude and figure without changing its essence (§§65, 66, 68), and likewise that it has internal motions without impairment of its essence (§71). §607. (What matter is.) [ . . . ] We have seen that a body has an extension and therefore permits of being divided into many parts (§606²⁰), and experience confirms this of bodies in our world. In addition, we find that a body has a power of resisting motion, so that it cannot be set into motion before this resistance is overcome. Now that which is provided with extension along with its power of resistance is called matter. We know from the foregoing, however, that extension along with abiding in one place comes from simple things as the elements of the composite (§§603, 605), and accordingly matter is no disorderly lump, that is, no heap thrown together of similar parts in which nothing but magnitude could be distinguished; rather, everything within it is distinguished from one another in a quite particular way. And the common concept of matter merely stems from the imagination, which represents things indistinctly and therefore overlooks what is in them (§214). §615. (Changes of bodies occur through motion.) Again, no change can take place in bodies, as composite things (§606), other than in magnitude, figure, or place of the parts or also of the whole (§72). Now, since none of these can happen without a change of place (§§65, 68, 47), so all changes occur through motion.

Chapter 5: On the Essence of the Soul and of a Spirit in General §727. (Present intention.) In the third chapter, above, I have in fact already treated the soul in detail, but only insofar as we perceive its effects and are able to attain a distinct concept of it (§191²¹). Now we have to investigate in what the essence of the soul and of a spirit in general consists, and how what we have perceived of it and noted above finds its reason in it. In the course of this, there will be still more and different things that will be treated to which experience does not easily lead us. §728. (Why we take our start from consciousness.) The first thing that we noted concerning ourselves was that we are conscious (§1), that is, that we know we now represent many things as outside of us (§144). For example, I know that I now see the mirror and my form in the mirror. Accordingly, let us now investigate how it transpires that we are conscious of this. §729. (When we are conscious of something.) We find, accordingly, that we are conscious of things at that moment when we differentiate them from one another. As in the first example given, I am conscious that I see the mirror when I not only differentiate the various parts that I perceive in it from one another, but also represent the difference of the mirror itself from other things. When we do not notice the difference among things that are immediately present to us, then we are not conscious of what occurs to our senses. [ . . . ] ²⁰ Originally “§607” but corrected in subsequent editions.

²¹ Corrected from “§91.”

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§730. (When we are conscious of ourselves.) From this it likewise becomes clear when we are conscious of ourselves, namely, when we note the difference of ourselves and of other things of which we are conscious. This difference, however, shows itself as soon as we are conscious of other things. For, if we are supposed to be conscious of that which we cognize through our senses, so we have to note the difference of that which we perceive in it, and indeed we must also at the same time differentiate the thing that we thereby cognize from other things (§729). Yet, the representation of things as well as this differentiation (which appears to be so even more clearly) is an action of the soul, and we accordingly cognize the difference of the soul thereby from the things that it represents. And, as a result, we are also conscious of ourselves (§729). Experience agrees with what I have said. For, when we do not think of the actions of the soul which take place in it, and thereby differentiate ourselves from the things that we think, we are not conscious of ourselves and, if someone should ask us at that moment whether we were conscious of ourselves, we would have to answer him in no other way than by saying that we were not then thinking about ourselves. Now, if one wants to investigate further what was lacking at that moment when we were not thinking of ourselves, and what otherwise transpires when we think of ourselves, then we will find nothing else but that we did not represent the actions of our soul and, thereby, the difference of ourselves from that which we think. §731. (The obscurity of internal sensation negates consciousness.) The obscurity of thoughts arises when we do not note the difference of things (§201). As a result, were no difference at all to be noted in that which we represent at one time, such that we did not differentiate anything in the slightest in the whole representation, then the entirety of our thoughts would be obscure (§201). Then, however, we would not be conscious of anything (§729) and, consequently, would also not be conscious of ourselves (§730). Therefore, complete obscurity negates consciousness. §732. (Consciousness requires clarity and distinctness of thoughts.) By contrast, since clarity arises from noting the difference in the manifold (§201), and distinctness from the clarity of its parts (§207), so we can grasp in just the same way that the clarity and distinctness of thoughts grounds consciousness. §733. (Reflection is required for consciousness.) Whoever differentiates things from one another must hold them against one another. For we differentiate them from one another when we perceive something in the one that we cannot put in the place of that which we find in the other (§17). However, we cannot perceive this except when we hold either the things themselves, or that which differs that is found in them, against one another. When we hold the items of the manifold against, and differentiate them from, one another, we call that reflection. As a result, it is clear that reflection is required for consciousness. If, accordingly, something cannot reflect, then it is not conscious of anything and, consequently, not conscious of itself. §734. (A memory is required for consciousness.) Whoever holds thoughts against one another must not only be able to retain what he thinks but also must know that he has already had the thought previously, and accordingly, must be endowed with a memory (§248). Now since one who is conscious holds thoughts against, and differentiates them from, one another (§733), so he must also have a memory; and in this way a memory is required for consciousness.

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§735. (How it actually transpires that we are conscious.) And now we can grasp how it actually transpires that we are conscious, that is, that we know what we think or why our thoughts bring a consciousness along with them (§144). Namely, when we think something, we retain a thought over a noticeable time and differentiate it, as it were, from itself through the parts of time that we differentiate from each other, even if only indistinctly (§206). We hold it against itself and recognize that it remains the same (§17) and, in this way, we are brought at once to think that we have previously had it. And, thus, memory and reflection bring forth consciousness (§§733, 734). §738. (No body can think.) All changes of a body occur through motion (§615) and have their reason in the magnitude, figure, and position of the parts (§615). As a result, if a body is supposed to think, its thoughts would have to be a change that occurs in the position of some of its parts with a certain magnitude and figure through a determinate motion. Now if a thought is supposed to be retained over a certain time, then either the parts would have to remain in their position, and therefore their motion would be impeded, or other similar parts would have to be brought into their place through a similar motion. Further, supposing the body to be conscious of this change, then the two similar states of the body (§18) would have to be compared with one another and their inherent similarity, but also their difference according to time as well as with respect to the body, would have to be noted. Now, this cannot be brought about through the motion of parts, since these could not represent anything but something composite through their magnitude, figure, and position; and given this, a body cannot be conscious of this change or of the representation that is brought about thereby (§735). Because, therefore, thoughts bring consciousness along with them (§194²²), no body can think. §739. (Even subtle matter cannot think.) I am well aware that those who attribute thoughts to the body imagine that thoughts consisted in the motion of a subtle matter. Yet, since in our proof we did not assume that matter should be dense, the proof holds as fast and immovably as before, however subtle one supposes matter to be. For we still cannot advance any further than that a representation of a composite is attained thereby: the consciousness which is required for thought (§194²³), remains lacking just as before. §741. (A body cannot receive a power to think.) I am well aware that Locke and some along with him are of the opinion that God could impart a power to think to a body, or as they inaptly put it, matter. We have seen (§738) that no thought can come from the essence and the nature of a body and, insofar as they would have it that God should impart this to them, they themselves acknowledge this fact. In such a way, God would have to make something proceed from the essence of a body that cannot thus proceed from it, and accordingly would have to change its essence, or at the same time impart to it the essence of another thing from which thoughts can proceed. Now, however, it is well known that the essence of a thing is unchangeable (§42), as well as that the essence of one thing cannot be communicated to another (§43). And

²² Originally “§144” but corrected in subsequent editions.

²³ Corrected, as in the previous note.

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consequently, when one says that God is supposed to communicate a power of thinking to matter, it is the same as to say that one wants God to make iron at once into gold, such that it would be iron and gold simultaneously. §742. (The soul is a simple thing.) Because a body can neither think according to its essence and nature (§§738, 739) nor can a power to think be communicated to it or to matter (§741), so the soul cannot be anything corporeal and neither can it consist of matter (§192). And since it becomes clear generally from the proofs of the reasons we have cited that thoughts cannot pertain to any composite thing, therefore, the soul must be a simple thing. §743. (It subsists for itself . . . ) Since all simple things subsist for themselves (§127), so the soul as well must be a thing that subsists for itself (§742). §744. (it has a power . . . ) Since, moreover, every thing that subsists for itself has a power, from which its changes flow as from a source (§§114, 115), so the soul must also have such a power from which flow those changes enumerated in the third chapter above, on the basis of our experience. §745. (and indeed, only a single power.) Since, it is, among everything else, a simple thing (§742), but there can be no parts in a simple thing (§75), so a plurality of powers distinct from one another cannot be encountered in the soul inasmuch as each power would require a particular thing that subsists for itself to which it would belong (§127). And therefore, there is only a single power in the soul, from which all of its changes come, even though we tend to designate it with different names on account of the variety of changes. §747. (The one power of the soul produces a diverse effect.) Accordingly, the senses (§220), the imagination (§235), memory (§248), the power of reflection (§272), the understanding (§277), sensible desire (§434), the will (§492), and whatever else one might distinguish through the changes perceived in the soul, are not different powers (§745). As a result, the one power of the soul must now bring forth sensations, at other times imaginings, and at other times distinct concepts, or syllogisms, or desires, or acts of willing and not willing, or still other changes. [ . . . ] §748. (How one comes to cognition of it.) In order to come to a cognition of this power, we must consider the changes that take place in the soul. For, since the power is the source of changes (§115), it provides us with nothing else by which to cognize it than the changes that it brings forth. §749. (What sensations are.) The most ordinary changes that we perceive in the soul are sensations. These represent the bodies to us which stimulate the organs of our senses (§220). Bodies are composite things (§606); accordingly, sensations represent composite things. The soul, in which this representation takes place, is a simple thing (§742). In this way, the composite is represented in a simple. Sensations are, accordingly, representations of the composite in the simple, which occur on the occasion of the changes in the external organs of the senses. §753. (The soul has a power of representing the world.) I have already remarked above that sensations direct themselves according to the changes that take place in the organs of the senses (§219), and represent the bodies in the world which stimulate our senses (§§217, 220). These bodies, however, are a part of the world (§606), and therefore the soul represents a part of the world, or as much of the world as the position of its body in the world permits; consequently, since the effects of the soul

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come from its power (§744), the soul has a power of representing the world according to the position of its body in the world. §754. (Everything in the soul comes from it.) Since the soul has only one single power from which all of its changes come (§745), so everything else changeable that we perceive in it must also come from this power, through which the soul represents the world (§753). §755. (The essence of the soul consists in it.) Because this power is accordingly the reason of all that is changeable that transpires in the soul (§754), so in it consists the essence of the soul (§33), and in this way it is the first thing that permits of being thought of the soul (§34). Indeed, whoever distinctly cognizes it is in the position to supply the reason for everything that pertains to the soul (§33). §760. (Why the thoughts in the soul agree with the body is a difficult question.) We have already explained in detail above (§527ff) the extent to which, according to experience, the thoughts of the soul agree with some changes in our body, and in turn some changes in the body agree with others in the soul. Now, however, since we have proven that the soul has a power of representing that which causes changes in its body, so we now have to investigate how it comes about that the soul and body agree with one another and why at all times a thought is brought forth by the soul that accords with the present state of the body. And this is the difficult knot that has cost philosophers so much trouble, namely: accounting for how it is possible that the soul and body are in community with one another. §761. (Whether the power of the body brings forth thoughts in the soul, and the power of the soul brings forth movements in the body.) It is generally believed that through the power of the body thoughts are produced in the soul and through the power of the soul movements are produced in the body. [ . . . ] And this opinion on the part of the common person was for a long time widely endorsed by philosophers even if few today adhere to it. This activity of the soul upon the body, and of the body upon the soul, is called the natural influence of one thing upon another, and one thereby claims that the community of the body with the soul finds its reason in the natural influence of one upon the other. Yet, that this influence of the soul upon the body and of the body upon the soul can neither be conceived nor explained in an intelligible way will readily admitted; yet, it is supposed that our knowledge of it is nonetheless grounded in experience. But, since I have already demonstrated above (§§529, 534, 536²⁴) that it cannot be shown through experience that the body acts upon the soul or conversely that the soul acts upon the body, so we have no choice but to say that the natural influence of the soul upon the body and of the body upon the soul is accepted without any reason and only on account of laziness. §762. (The activity of the soul and the body upon one another is contrary to nature.) [ . . . ] If the body acted upon the soul and the soul acted upon the body, then the same quantity of motive force cannot be preserved in the world. For, if the soul acted upon the body, then a motion would be produced without a previous one, provided that one supposes that the soul produces a motion in the body merely through its willing. Now since the motion that is produced possesses its own quantity

²⁴ Corrected in later editions from “§586.”

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of force, this introduces new force into the world that was not previously at hand. Therefore, contrary to the law of nature the quantity of force in the world is increased. The same would be the case if the body acts upon the soul, where a motion brings forth a thought. Now, since according to this the motion would cease without a new motion arising in some other part of matter, so some force that was previously in the world ceases. And therefore, contrary to the law of nature, the quantity of force in the world is diminished. [ . . . ] Accordingly, because the action of the body and the soul upon one another is contrary to nature (§11), this more than suffices to reject it. §765. (The pre-established harmony.) Now since the soul has its own power through which it represents the world (§753), and by contrast all the changes of the body find their reason in its essence and nature (§630), so one easily sees that the soul performs what it does for itself and the body likewise has its own changes for itself, without the soul acting on the body or the body on the soul, and without God accomplishing this through His immediate action; the sensations and desires of the soul only agree with the changes and motions of the body. And in this way, we hit upon the explanation of the community of the body with the soul given by Leibniz, called the pre-established harmony. §766. (It is no empty phrase.) Yet the question now is just how is it possible that sensations in the organs of the senses and the motions of the body constantly agree with the will of the soul such that one would not hold the pre-established harmony to be an empty phrase, as some have imagined [ . . . ]. It is true, we perceive nothing further than a mere agreement or harmony through experience (§§527, 532ff). And accordingly, if one wants to show the reason for this, it is not enough for me to say that God has instituted the harmony between the soul and the body, since then like Descartes I must immediately fall back upon the will of God, which we cannot countenance. Rather, it is necessary that I show how this same harmony is possible. §767. (How it is possible.) Accordingly, it is to be noted that the changes in the world succeed one another in a fixed order (§544) and, because in the soul the preceding state must likewise contain the reason of the following one (§§108, 742), so also the sensations in the soul follow one another in a fixed order. Now, since sensations represent the changes in the world (§709), it is necessary that at the beginning they are brought into a harmony with one another, and this same harmony can endure continuously after this,²⁵ as Leibniz himself has already noted. §777. (The soul would see the world outside of it even if there were none there.) On account of the fact that the body does not contribute a thing to the sensations in the soul, all of these would follow in the very same way, even if no world was at hand, something that Descartes also recognized as did, already long before him, the idealists who admitted nothing but souls and minds but ceded no further space to the world than in thoughts. Indeed, from this what was proven above becomes clear, namely, that we would still see, hear, and sense in other ways that which is outside of us even if there were no things outside of us (§765). §783. (The soul is a limited or finite thing.) Because the soul does not continuously have the same thought, as we experience every day, indeed, at every hour and

²⁵ “Nach dieser” corrected in subsequent editions to “nach diesem.”

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moment, and because in a thing nothing but its limits permit of being changed (§107), so the soul is a finite thing and cannot, therefore, be everything that it can be all at once, but instead it must gradually proceed from one state to another (§109). §784. (In what this limitation consists.) We encounter nothing further in the soul than a power of representing the world (§§753, 754), and this is what persists in it and makes it into a being that persists for itself (§743). All changes, accordingly, that one perceives in it are nothing but various limitations of that same power through which it is determined [ . . . ]. The reason of the limitation consists in the position of the body in the world (§753) and, because it is changeable, in all of the body’s changes. §789. (That animals also have souls.) And it is therefore to be believed that animals, which like human beings have organs of sense, also have souls which represent the world according to the changes that occur in their sensory organs. For since we have come to learn of human beings that nature has fitted its soul with a body that is endowed with sense organs, because the body’s soul represents the world according to the position of this body and the changes that take place in its organs; so from this we can cognize the intention which nature has with such bodies. And it is reasonable to appropriate a soul to such a body as a consequence, that is, a simple being that represents the world according to the position of this body in the world and according to the changes that take place in the organs of the senses. §921. (The human soul, and that of animals, is incorruptible.) [ . . . ] We note here only that the souls of cattle as well as the souls of human beings are simple things (§§742, 789) which can neither come to be naturally (§§87, 88) nor pass away (§102). And accordingly, both are incorruptible, since namely corruption is a separation of parts. §922. (It is not destroyed by the decline of the body.) As a result of which, the soul does not cease to be when its body does. For the soul cannot be destroyed inasmuch as the parts of matter, of which the body consists, are dispersed. The soul, rather, as a simple being, cannot cease to be other than through annihilation (§102). §924. (Animals are not persons.) Now, given that one calls a person a thing that is conscious that it is the very same thing which was previously in this or that state, animals are not persons. §925. (Humans are persons.) By contrast, because humans are conscious that they are the very same things which were previously in this or that state, they are persons. §926. (Human souls are immortal, but those of animals are not.) As all the changes of a simple thing find their reason in one another (§128), so too the [soul’s²⁶] state after death must be connected with the state of the soul in life. And, thus, the current state must lead us to recall the previous one in our memory (§§238, 248). Now since the human soul recognizes that it is the very same soul which was previously in this state, and accordingly retains its state of personhood even after the death of the body, so it is immortal. For that which is incorruptible is immortal when it constantly retains the state of personhood. It further becomes clear from this, however, that the souls of animals are not immortal, even if they are incorruptible (§921).

²⁶ Wolff writes “Leibes” but since the body is not a simple thing, he clearly intends the soul here.

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Chapter 6: On God §928. (There is a necessary thing.) We exist (§1). Everything that exists has its sufficient reason why it rather is than not (§30). And, therefore, we as well must have a sufficient reason why we exist. Now, if we have a sufficient reason why we exist, then that reason must be encountered either in us or outside of us. If it is to be found in us, then we are necessary (§32); if, however, it is to be found in some other thing, then it must be that thing that has its reason why it is, and is therefore necessary. And, accordingly, there is a necessary thing. Now, however, so that we might come to know whether we ourselves are that thing, or whether it is something else, we will endeavour to investigate the attributes of that thing, in order to see whether they pertain to our soul or not. §929. (There is an independent thing.) That thing which contains the reason of its own actuality and therefore is such that it is impossible for it not to be, is called an independent being. And accordingly, it is clear that there is an independent being (§928). §930. (This being contains in it the reason why the rest are.) That which is independent has the reason of its own actuality in it (§929). Because of this, that which is not independent, but which rather stems from another being, has the reason of its actuality outside of it, namely, in the independent being. And therefore, the independent being must contain the reason why the other things that are not independent exist. §931. (It is eternal.) That which is necessary can have neither a beginning nor an end, but is instead eternal (§29). As a result, because the independent being is necessary (§929), so it can have neither beginning nor end, but is instead eternal. §934. (It is incorruptible.) That which has no end is incorruptible (§921). Now since the independent being can have no end (§931), it is incorruptible. §935. (It is not corporeal.) Composite things can come to be and cease to exist (§64). The independent being cannot come to be and cease to exist (§931), and accordingly cannot be anything composite, and consequently cannot be a body (§606). §936. (It is a simple thing.) Now, since there can be no other things than simples and composites (§§51, 75), and the independent being cannot be something composite (§935), so it must be a simple thing. §939. (It is not the world.) Now that we have discovered some attributes of the independent being, we can prove that neither the world nor the soul could be an independent being. The world is not necessary (§576), the independent being is necessary (§§928, 929); therefore, the independent being is not the world (§17). Moreover, the world is a composite thing (§551), the independent being is a simple and not a composite thing (§936); as a result, the independent being is not the world (§17). §941. (It is different from our soul.) The representative power, in which consists the essence and nature of the soul (§§754, 755) directs itself according to the position of the body in the world and the changes in the organs of the senses that occur in it (§753), and therefore it has the reason of its representations outside of it, namely, in the world (§786). Accordingly, the soul is dependent on the world (§938). Since,

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however, the independent being is independent of all things (§938), so the soul cannot be an independent being (§17), and in this way the independent being is different from our soul. §945. (What God is.) [ . . . ] God, accordingly, is an independent being in which is to be found the reason for the actuality of the world and of souls. §946. (That there is a God.) Now, because it is certain that there is such an independent being (§945), so there is also a God. §951. (Why one world is preferred to the others.) In God the reason is found why this world attains to actuality rather than the others (§945). Now, since a world is more perfect than others (§712ff), so this reason can consist in nothing else than that its greater perfection moved God to bring it forth instead of the others. §952. (God represents all worlds.) As a result of this, it is necessary that God can distinctly represent all worlds at once, for otherwise it would not be possible for Him to cognize the greater perfection of one. Perfection consists in an agreement among the things that make up the world and what happens to them (§701). Accordingly, whoever wants insight into the perfection of a world must be able to distinctly represent everything that fills space and time in it (§548), down to the minutest detail. However, whoever would judge where the greater perfection lies must hold all worlds, along with every state they can have in succession, against one another and therefore represent everything together distinctly at once. §953. (God knows everything that is possible.) Now since a world is nothing else but a series of changeable things that are next to and follow one upon another, which are nonetheless altogether connected to one another (§544), but anything that is possible is called a thing (§16); so, all worlds comprehend in themselves everything that is possible. As a result, since God can represent all worlds, so He also cognizes everything that is possible. §954. (God has an understanding.) The understanding is the power of distinctly representing the possible (§277). Now since God represents everything that is possible (§953), so He also has an understanding. §955. (What God’s understanding is.) The divine understanding, accordingly, is a distinct representation of all that which is possible, simultaneously or at once (§§952, 953). §973. (Origin of the essence of things.) Because God represents all worlds through His understanding (§952), the divine understanding is the source of the essence of all things. Now since the essence of things consists in their possibility (§35), so it is the divine understanding that makes something possible. Namely, something is possible just because it is represented by the divine understanding. And since we have proven above that the essence of a thing is eternal (§40), so we can now see where the essence of all things has resided for all eternity, namely, in the divine understanding. §980. (God has a free will.) Among the innumerable worlds that are possible, God chose but one and preferred it to the others such that it attained to actuality (§951). Now since no choice can take place without a free will (§519²⁷), so God must also have a free will. ²⁷ Corrected from “§529.”

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§981. (The motive for His will.) Because, however, nothing can happen without a sufficient reason (§30), so there must also be one at hand for why God preferred one world to the others. Now since the various worlds, as things under a single genus, cannot be differentiated other than by their degree of perfection (§172), this reason can only be the greater degree of perfection which God encountered in this world which He preferred to the others. And, accordingly, it is the greatest perfection of the world that is the motive for His will (§496). §988. (Origin of actuality.) Because the perfection of the world moved God to choose one instead of the others (§951), and it was that world which He chose that alone attained to actuality (§949), so the will of God is the source of the actuality of things. §994. (Error concerning arbitrary essence.) Now since the will of God has merely to do with the actuality of things, but has nothing to do with their essence or possibility (§973), so those err who imagine that God has instituted the essence of things according to His own pleasure, or that He could change what He wants within that essence as it pleases Him. §1067. (What the essence of God consists in.) All that we have proven thus far concerning God proceeds from the fact that He can distinctly represent at once everything that is possible. And, accordingly, the essence of God consists in the power of representing distinctly and at once everything that is possible, that is, all worlds (§33). In this, consequently, the divine essence bears some resemblance to the essence of our soul. §1069. (What God is.) And one can accordingly say that God is the being that represents all worlds at once with the greatest distinctness of all. I am well aware that there will be some for whom this seems as if we are not speaking highly enough of God; yet, if they would read the foregoing carefully and were capable of comprehending it, they would realize to their satisfaction that all that which is now extolled of God, and much more perhaps than has ever been the case before, is brought out by this power for representing worlds with the greatest clarity and distinctness. §1072. (God is infinite,) Because God represents all at once everything that is possible, and indeed entirely distinctly (§955), and all that can pertain to Him is contained in this representation (§1067), so God is everything that He can be, all at once, and accordingly without any limitations, or He is infinite (§109). §1073. (unchangeable,) From this, however, it further becomes clear that God is unchangeable. For if something were supposed to change in God, then He would be something that He had not been before, and accordingly He would not be everything at once, which is contrary to what was just proven (§1072). §1074. (and outside of time.) In turn, because God is everything at once, so nothing precedes, and nothing follows after (§1072). As a result of this, since time consists in the order of things that follow one upon the other (§94), God is not in time. With Him, there is no distinction between today and yesterday, yesterday and tomorrow, but rather all is and always remains the same.

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6 Joachim Lange: A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System (1724) Joachim Lange was born on October 26, 1670, in Gardelegen into a large family. When he was 15, the family home burned in a fire, leaving his father, a local councillor, in a dire financial situation which forced Lange into the care of his uncle until the time he left to attend Gymnasium in Quedlinburg. Emulating his beloved brother Nicolaus, Lange sought to become a parson, a desire that brought him in 1689 to the university in Leipzig where he came under the tutelage of the orientalist and Pietist theologian (and later founder of the famous Halle orphanage) August Hermann Francke. Upon Francke’s dismissal from his position in Leipzig, after a conflict with the orthodox Lutheran authorities, Lange followed him to Erfurt and then briefly to Halle, though Lange soon moved to Berlin (in 1693), working first as a tutor and teacher and then as rector of a Gymnasium (after a brief turn as a rector in Cöslin in present-day Poland). In this position, Lange lectured on classical languages (his most popular work, a Latin grammar, saw 26 editions in his lifetime) as well as philosophy, and it was during this second stint in Berlin that Lange wrote his first philosophical treatise, the Medicina mentis (Medicine of the Mind) of 1704. In 1709, Lange was offered, and accepted, an appointment in the theology faculty in Halle (after having refused a similar offer in 1699, due to his contractual obligations). Lange engaged in various theological polemics, but it was his role as the spearhead of the Pietist campaign against Wolff in which he proved most consequential. In the year Lange arrived, Wolff had begun lecturing on philosophical topics, including metaphysics and natural theology, in which lectures Wolff frequently defended positions contrary to the Pietists (and increasingly attracted students from theology). Tensions continued to simmer as Wolff successfully promoted his own disciple for a university position over Lange’s son, the theology faculty’s preferred candidate. Finally, Wolff ’s address in 1721 concluding his rectorship of the university before passing it to Lange prompted outrage on the part of the theology faculty, and led them to scrutinize Wolff ’s philosophical texts (apparently on Christian Thomasius’ advice) for evidence of radical thinking. After penning a set of remarks on behalf of the theological faculty intended for the Berlin court, Lange’s first public salvo was in his Caussa Dei et religionis naturalis

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adversus atheismum (On Behalf of God and Natural Religion against Atheism) in 1723 which attacked Wolff, albeit without naming him, in the guise of refuting Stoic and Spinozistic atheism and fatalism. Wolff complained about his mistreatment to the court while his Pietist opponents in turn appealed to have his right to hold lectures in philosophy revoked; however, it was Lange’s caricature of Wolff ’s defense of the harmony as exculpating soldiers’ acts of desertion as necessitated, and evidently communicated to Friedrich Wilhelm I (the “soldier king”) in a letter from Francke, that turned the king against Wolff, resulting in the loss of his position and immediate exile from Prussia. Yet, this only marked the beginning of the voluminous exchange of texts between Wolff and Lange, and their respective allies, texts that include Lange’s Bescheidene und Ausführliche Entdeckung der falschen und schädlichen Philosophie in dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico (A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System) of 1724. After this early victory, Lange’s personal campaign against Wolff suffered a number of strategic setbacks as Wolffianism soon gained ascendancy in German academia and Wolff became a European cause célèbre, the influence of the Pietists waned in the Berlin court, and a royal commission finally exonerated Wolff in 1736, after which Friedrich Wilhelm I even sought (unsuccessfully) to entice Wolff back to Halle. Lange died in Halle on May 7, 1744. Unsurprisingly, Lange’s philosophical positions are in service of his Pietist theological views. Lange had already, in 1704, developed a pessimistic outlook on the capacity of the human intellect, beset with limitations and a susceptibility to prejudice in its fallen state, to reliably cognize truth through its own powers, and outlined a method for healing the mind that includes cultivating self-awareness through the natural light and supplementing this with divine illumination attained through mental and spiritual discipline. For Lange, then, the Wolffian philosophy, with its intellectual hubris and metaphysical views that appear to undermine the efficacy of the human will and to rob it of any incentive to action, not to mention its deflationary conception of God as a pure intellect, could only have appeared as a systematic outgrowth and symptom of the illness diagnosed in the Medicina mentis. This criticism of Wolff ’s metaphysics, which is consistent among Lange’s voluminous polemics, is enacted particularly succinctly and effectively in the preparatory section of A Modest and Detailed Disclosure. The so-called “Protheory [Protheorie]” consists of a sequence of postulates and theorems that together represent the core of Pietisms’ theoretical philosophical commitments and proceeds to prove or defend these assertions in the face of the contrary Wolffian assertions. The first set of principles (1–7) provide a consideration of spirits, particularly the human being and God, attributing to them both an intellect and will, with the latter characterized by absolute freedom which is further taken to constitute the proper essence of the human soul. Lange also takes the opportunity to make the case that the soul possesses a capacity to move the body, with which it consequently stands in a natural union and so, contrary to the harmonists, naturally and directly influences it. The second set of principles (8–14) explores the consequences of this characterization of spirits for the connection of events in nature, arguing for a contingency of events on the basis of the human soul’s and God’s capacity for absolutely free action. This is contrasted with what Lange takes to be Wolff ’s fatalism, grounded in the mechanical connection among natural events and the pre-ordained order of the soul’s own states.

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The last set of principles (15–24) argues that the consequence, intended or not, of the Wolffian denial of the genuine freedom of spirits and the contingency of nature, is (partial) Spinozism and atheism. Lange’s criticism of Wolff, and his broader intellectual contributions, have not traditionally gained a sympathetic reception among historians of philosophy, a fact partially attributable to the polemical nature of many of his philosophical texts but also to the theological commitments that underlie his attack on Enlightenment thought. However, recent scholars have come to recognize the frequently insightful and trenchant character of many of Lange’s observations and arguments, and that his treatment offers essential context for later debates about, among other things, the antinomy of freedom and natural necessity. Moreover, Lange’s conception of philosophy as an ancilla or handmaiden to theology is hardly exceptional in the history of philosophy, nor can it be denied that Pietistic commitments are interwoven into some of the most important philosophical systems of subsequent eighteenth-century German philosophy, including that of Crusius but also, arguably, Kant’s.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Beutel, Albrecht, “Causa Wolffiana. Die Vertreibung Christian Wolffs aus Preußen 1723 als Kulminationspunkt des theologisch-politischen Konflikts zwischen halleschem Pietismus und Aufklärungsphilosophie,” in Reflektierte Religion: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Protestantismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), pp. 125–69. Bianco, Bruno, “Freiheit gegen Fatalismus. Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff,” in N. Hinske, ed., Zentren der Aufklärung I: Halle, Wolffenbüttler Studien zur Aufklärung 15 (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1989), pp. 111–55. Grote, Simon, The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017) [ch. 2]. Kühnel, Martin, ed., Joachim Lange (1670–1744), der “Hällische Feind” oder: Ein anderes Gesicht der Aufklärung (Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1996). Lange, Joachim, Bescheidene und Ausführliche Entdeckung der falschen und schädlichen Philosophie in dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico von Gott, der Welt, und dem Menschen; und insonderheit von der so genannten harmonia praestabilita des commercii zwischen Seel und Leib [ . . . ] (Halle, 1724). Lange, Joachim, Caussa Dei et religionis naturalis adversus athesimum, et, quae eum gignit, aut promovet, pseudophilosophiam veterum et recentiorum, praesertim stoicam et Spinozianam (Halle, 1723). Lange, Joachim, Joachim Langens [ . . . ] Lebenslauf, zur Erweckung seiner in der Evangelischen Kirche stehenden und ehemal gehabten vielen und werthesten Zuhörer, von ihm selbst verfaßet [ . . . ] (Halle, 1744). Lange, Joachim, Medicina mentis, qua praemissa Historia mentis medica, seu philosophica, detectaque ac rejecta philomoria; genuina philosophandi ac litterarum studia tractandi Methodus [ . . . ] ostenditur (Halle, 1704). Schönfeld, Martin, “Lange, Joachim,” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 456–60. Watkins, Eric, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) [pp. 38–49].

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A Modest and Detailed Disclosure of the False and Harmful Philosophy in the Wolffian Metaphysical System Protheory, or Introduction (            .) First Principle: The soul of the human being is an immortal spirit that subsists for itself. Explanation: This is a foundational truth that is admitted by all true philosophers; I have demonstrated it against those atheists and false philosophers one calls materialists in Caussa Dei, sect. I, pp. 95ff. Second Principle: The spiritual essence of the human soul, considered in itself, consists in an active and free power of the understanding and will which subsists for itself. Explanation: (1) Given the weakness of our concept of it and for lack of a more apt term, the word power best expresses the nature of a spirit. (2) And this power subsists for itself, hypostatically or substantially, and therefore is not a property of another thing but rather its own and is indeed an immortal substance which subsists for itself if not from itself, in accordance with the first principle. (3) And since the essential property of any power, provided one understands this word with the appropriate emphasis, is that it possesses an activity in itself or is effective, so one easily recognizes that a rather special and very eminent activity pertains to a substantial power. (4) The free power, which constitutes the spiritual essence, subsisting for itself, of the soul, consists and expresses itself in two specific principal powers, namely the power of the understanding and the power of free will, which two powers one might otherwise also call two faculties of the soul. (5) However, experience teaches us, and the nature and purpose of the soul requires, that along with the activity of the soul in accordance with the understanding and the will, there is also found a certain passivity, a capacity to receive something, and to have sensation. (6) Freedom, however, is that which distinguishes by a wide measure the active power of the soul from all other powers proper to other living creatures that are at the same time corporeal, as well as from inanimate beings, and which signals its preeminence, as will be shown in more detail in the third and fourth principles. Consequence of the Second Principle: The essence of the soul does not consist in the power of representing the world, or of forming ideas of corporeal things, especially without any assistance from a body. For just as, on the one hand, no such power of forming ideas without any contribution from the body is to be found in the soul at all, as will be shown in the seventh principle, so also the power of representing the world insofar as it is found in the soul is far too humble that the essence of the soul should consist in it and that the soul should be designated by it. We will show in the proper place what this error stems from and what further errors it leads to.

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Third Principle: The freedom of the understanding and will consists and is expressed particularly in the fact that the soul itself is the free cause of its direction, without being hindered by an external necessity or by an inner necessity stemming from its own nature, in choosing this or that, willing or acting thus or otherwise, according to its own free choice, in such a way that that which is actually chosen and which takes place either could not have occurred at all or could have occurred otherwise. Explanation: (1) That the freedom of the soul is of this sort is taught by the very name and nature of freedom; for freedom would not be worthy of its name, which even the fatalists grant to it, and in fact could not even exist, if it were not of this character. (2) And just this is reinforced by the common experience of all human beings, the untutored as well as the learned, and indeed with such unsurpassed evidence that it cannot fail to convince anyone, nor could more be desired. And that such an experience already supplies a sufficient criterion of truth is known by everyone. (3) The human conscience belongs to this experience. For the human being knows from his conscience that he is either mentally at ease, or made uneasy or anxious in the recollection of his past actions, according to which feeling the action is good or bad. Why, however, would this be the case except for the sole reason that he knows or is himself entirely aware that he did this or that action voluntarily, and therefore that he has the evil as well as the good within his free control and thus ascribes it to himself? If he found, by contrast, that his actions did not stem from his free will but rather that what happened could not in any way have been omitted, then the ease or uneasiness of his conscience would not have any ground in human nature and would not be encountered in it. And if this uneasiness were merely imagined, then malicious individuals would not burden themselves or torment themselves with it but would instead immediately dismiss its pangs, and even see to it that these did not well up in them in the first place. And why is it that someone who, in the midst of adversities that he did not cause himself, but rather which befell him contrary to what he deserved, reflects on his circumstances in accordance with right reason can nonetheless resign himself to it and even sooner find himself at peace with it because he knows that he does not bear the blame for these things through the misuse of his free will but rather that others are to blame for them? (4) To this experience belong countless other actions on the part of the human being, natural as well as moral. For everyone knows that it stands within the scope of his free will to walk, stand, sit, lay down, wake up, eat, drink, and even to abstain from food for awhile and to fast, and to behave in other ways as he likes and in accordance with his own free will. And as concerns the properly so-called moral actions, the human being is no less aware that he can pursue a recognized good so long as he but wills it, or that he can even resolutely strive against it willfully and in spite of all exhortations to the contrary and in spite of ideas of what he was convinced was a better course of action, as daily experience teaches us. Even though the represented motives are capable of moving the free will to determine itself in such and such a way, yet they do not coerce it so to act, as anyone can experience for themselves. And what is more certain from experience than that when, in deciding whether to do or to omit something, a person feels an equivalence in his motives and cannot come to a

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decision concerning which side outweighs the other, in the end he can tip the balance with his free will. (5) How unavoidable and necessary the freedom of the will is to human nature is conceded even by those who contest it, so that one can discern clearly enough, and counter to their own intention, that they want to appear as if they did not reject freedom, indeed, as if they were leading others to it, and thus they make occasional use of the term themselves as we will see is the case in the Wolffian system. Just how much we have invested in freedom shall be made particularly clear in the following proposition. (6) What will be maintained concerning freedom in this Protheory and afterwards in the essay itself is opposed to Stoicism, which traces everything that has to do with the human being to a necessary connection of things and which constitutes as it were the center of the Wolffian system. Accordingly, what is said here should be understood within its appropriate limits and must not be misused for the extenuation of human corruption and not in the least for the renunciation of our incapacity concerning spiritual matters. Consequence: The soul is not an automaton, or clockwork, such that in virtue of the soul’s essence its sensations, thoughts, and effects come to be in a necessary and fixed order with one state always following from the other. Yet there is no basis in the sound understanding for comparing the soul with an automaton or clockwork, for the essence of a clock brings with it a necessary series of its motions that proceeds from its structure, and so it evinces no trace of or similarity to true freedom. Fourth Principle: Freedom constitutes what is truly noble concerning the human soul and it is the ground of all morality and religion. Explanation: (1) God is supremely free, the most freely acting being, possessed of the highest, infinite freedom which is as it were the crown of His majesty and glory. Now since the human being bears the likeness of God, more than any other creature, as we know in part from the light of reason but mostly from Holy Scripture, so it cannot but be the case that the human being is endowed with freedom, as the most splendid aspect of the divine likeness, in his very essence, even though as a consequence of the fall he is deprived of the proper use of this divinely given power particularly in spiritual matters. (2) The principal distinction between humans and animals consists as much in the possession of reason as in the freedom of the will, and it is in virtue of these two principal powers of the spirit that we rightly attribute personality to the human soul, in accordance with which it subsists for itself and is immortal. [ . . . ] (4) As concerns morality, for this is required both a law and a free will that has regard for the law. And it is this free will that makes it so that the effects and actions of the soul agree or conflict with the law so that these are not indifferent¹ but rather good or evil morally speaking. Now if the soul were like a clockwork, in which everything occurs in a necessary sequence, then it would have no need for or be capable of any other law other than that of its natural sequence and the necessity of

¹ As would be the case if these actions necessarily proceeded in conformity with the law.

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its driving mechanism. In such a case there could be no promising, no rousing or exhortation to action, no reward or punishment. For why would God promote, praise, and reward the good, and forbid and punish the evil, when none of it stemmed from a free will but instead everything proceeded in a necessary sequence and could not and must not occur otherwise? (5) On the basis of such a necessity there ceases to be any distinction between the good and the evil. For if everything that happens follows necessarily, then this fatal necessity is just the law of nature in accordance with which the soul always acts even when it does evil (speaking in terms of its free nature), and because the soul does everything in conformity with the law of its nature, it cannot be faulted for doing evil. (6) It is for just this reason that those atheists who maintain an absolute fatalism in all things negate the very nature and distinction between virtues and vices, as one sees in the system of Spinoza. [ . . . ] (8) And just as little can religion cohere with absolute necessity since, inasmuch as morality is completely negated by it and morality only acquires its proper form and lustre in religion, so it is easy to imagine that the damage that issues from fatalism as far as religion is concerned, and particularly to that religion revealed by God in the Holy Scripture, is most severe. Fifth Principle: Between the body and the soul, which constitute a person, there is not a metaphysical union but rather a physical one, a natural and real union, and thus arises a natural community of both substances with one part naturally acting upon the other. Explanation: (1) It is impossible for two natural substances that make up a single person to have any but a natural union with one another. Where there is a natural union, a natural community and influence follows. That this inference is correct is recognized even by those who deny natural community and the influence of one part upon another and, so that they might deny this latter in the case of the soul and body with some semblance of truth, they first of all reject the natural union of the soul with the body and set a metaphysical union in its place. (2) However, that there should be a metaphysical union, as a mere abstraction and invention of the mind, between two natural substances as are the soul and the body, is as absurd as if one were to invent a physical union between two metaphysical notions, or between two terms that make up a single distinction, as between the terms formal and material or general and special. (3) That there is a natural union between the soul and body is proven by reason and by experience. Reason along with the senses cognizes on the one hand that the soul and body are two naturally existing substances, and on the other hand that they do not make up two persons but only one and, consequently, that it is necessary for the constitution of a single person that they are really united and indeed in a way that is conformable to their nature. As concerns experience, it is this that forms the basis of reason’s judgment and as such it is as persuasive as it ever can be with regard to any other single thing, indeed all the more so since experience immediately proves that neither the body can separate from the soul before the time of their natural or violent dissolution, nor can the soul separate itself from the body, however much it might desire it, apart from the willful destruction of its bodily residence. Such an

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   

exact and fixed natural bond between body and soul must of course have a natural union at its basis as it is inconceivable without it. (4) Now, when those who deny the natural union and influence between the soul and body, aside from taking the rules of motion from mechanics and baselessly applying them in pneumatics in opposition to the nature of freely acting causes, specifically cite as a reason for their denial that they cannot conceive how a spirit could be physically united with a body and act upon it, they commit a twofold error in their argumentation. First, they commit an error inasmuch as they seek to deny something concerning which one can have adequate certainty by means of experience only because they cannot comprehend how something happens, and thus they argue, contrary to the principles of a sound philosophy, from the ignorance of something to the denial of that thing which is itself confirmed through universal and constant experience. Further, they err in that they light upon a hypothesis which not only conflicts with experience but is also much less comprehensible than the one they reject in defiance of all experience. Of such a sort is the hypothesis which they have invented concerning the metaphysical union of the soul and body, and the associated pre-established harmony between both parts of the human being, as we will come to see in several instances below. Sixth Principle: To the active and free power of the soul, insofar as it is united with the body, belongs the capacity of directing and moving the body, as its mechanical structure permits, and while the manner in which the soul directs the body conforms to this structure, the principle of that direction depends upon the soul. Proof of this Principle: As this proposition is a postulate which no one can have any ground for denying, and thus it was found to be true and continues to be found so on account of constant experience, and indeed was taken as such not only by philosophers up until Descartes but by the entire human race, so it stands in no need of proof; some few philosophers, however, namely Descartes and Leibniz, dissent from this and so I will briefly and quite superfluously adduce the grounds for this proposition, which are: (1) The natural union of the soul and the body, in accordance with the fifth principle. Where there is a natural union, there a natural community must also arise which expresses itself in reciprocal influence, since the union would otherwise be without a reason and would thus be in vain and useless. This is recognized as well by those who oppose this union and thus they hit the very height of absurdity, as was already considered, in denying the natural union of soul and body and setting a merely metaphysical one in its place. (2) The common experience of all human beings, not only of the learned but also of the untutored, and the consensus that thereby emerges among the entire human race, which brooks no comparison with the dissent of a few philosophers with their novel opinions that fly in the face of all reason and experience. (3) The utility, even necessity, of this doctrine for the entire doctrine of moral and civic duties, and in natural and revealed religion. This is because most actions which pertain to human life and civil society, and some of those concerning God pertaining to religion, require the assistance of the body and its members in such a way that without its cooperation these actions could not be carried out by the soul. So also the

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morality of such actions comes to nothing when they do not proceed from the soul and its free will but rather depend merely upon the mechanical structure of the body and the disposition of other surrounding bodies and are supposed to take place only according to mechanical laws. And what remains of any foundation for blame and imputation in such actions as when one insults or even kills one’s neighbor, if the soul has no direction over the body and contributes nothing to its actions? For where there is no law, there is no transgression. Now, since the law is properly only given to the soul, as only it is capable of heeding it, so ex hypothesi the body is incapable of acting contrary to the moral law but rather directs itself according to the mechanical law of nature; thus, it is clear that the authorities, when they enforce a punishment on some poor offender, act contrary to justice and contrary to the mechanical law of nature, though even this is supposed to be pre-established by God. (4) The explicit testimony of Holy Scripture. [ . . . ]² (5) The lack of any trenchant ground of proof that one could put forward against this principle to demonstrate its falsehood, as would of course have to be the case if the contrary proposition were true. For insofar as this opposition brooks expression, they know of nothing else to cite against it but their own ignorance, namely, that they cannot comprehend how a spirit could have some influence upon and in a body. [ . . . ] As concerns the use they make of the mechanical laws of motion, however, as if by means of these the soul’s free sovereignty over the body were undermined, this is something they merely assert rather than prove and in so doing they commit a metabasis eis allo genos³ insofar as they apply that which holds of material and corporeal things standing in a certain order to free spirits or free causes in pneumatics. As a result of this, which is the very proton pseudos, the source of their error and of their whole perverse system, they cannot produce any ground of proof against this principle. (6) The obvious vulnerability and charges of incorrectness one exposes oneself to in defending the contrary proposition; for instance, (a) when in response to the well-grounded testimony of common experience, one charges others with an error of subreption, and in so doing only commits the fallacy of begging the question and of issuing a simple negation masked as an objection, since the denial of the correctness of our experience of the soul’s sovereignty over the body can in no way be proven. (b) when, in order to be able to deny this sovereignty, one is also required to deny the natural union between body and soul contrary to common sense, and to invent a metaphysical union to put in its place. (c) when one rejects the common system principally on the grounds that one does not grasp how a spirit could influence a body and, on the contrary, frames such a system that through it one cannot comprehend at all or ever make comprehensible this sovereignty over the body and as a consequence is required to admit countless, indeed infinite, natural mysteries and miracles [ . . . ].

² In the excised portion, Lange refers to Romans 6:13, 6:19, and 12:1; and I Corinthians 6:15 and 9:27. ³ That is, the mistaken application of a predicate or principle proper to one genus or domain to another.

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   

(d) when one is required either, with Descartes, to ascribe the actions and motions of the body immediately to God or, with Leibniz, to credit God with such an arrangement of the body and the entire world that it makes of the body a mere automaton and clockwork and makes its motions and actions depend upon its own mechanical structure and that of the entire universe. Now even though in both the Cartesian and Leibnizian systems the denial of all human freedom implies that nothing other than sheer miracles can be taken to come forth in nature, as shall be proven with respect to the Leibnizian system hereafter; yet the Cartesian system is also guilty of an obvious contradiction inasmuch as it denies one spirit the power to influence the body but nonetheless grants the denied power to God, Himself a spirit. This is just as if we were to say that God, the creating spirit, while He brought forth the immortal spirit of man in His own image, He could not or did not also endow the human spirit with the capacity of acting upon and directing the body, in analogy with His own power of doing so, a fact all the more strange given that this human spirit is supposed to and indeed does stand in a most precise union with the body as a result of which it constitutes a single person along with it. Moreover, this system leads to atheism, or at least unmistakeably gives occasion to it. For, inasmuch as it ascribes everything to God, it negates the foundation of liberty and imputation of all human actions—the good as well as the bad—along with morality, and makes God into the original creator of everything evil and ultimately provokes such an idea of God that He must be entirely renounced as a result. This renunciation of God, or atheism, is only made easier, the more obvious it becomes that this system confuses God with nature, and all that which belongs to and is done by human nature is called God or attributed to Him; thus, this system lays the ground for a complete Spinozism whereby this universe is identified as a single substance and is not distinguished from God. [ . . . ] Consequences of the Principle: (1) There is no question that the human body has a mechanical structure such that it can be moved and, according to the direction of the soul, can assume various sorts of positions with its limbs; however, it is not for this reason a mere machine or automaton since these movements do not so much proceed from its internal structure, and so occur in an unchanging order, as they depend upon the direction of the soul and thus have their beginning in its preference and permit of being changed. (2) Since the soul moves the body, the system of the so-called materialists, who ascribe everything that transpires within and without the human being to a mere machine, lacks any foundation, and nothing further needs to be said at this point regarding the absurdity of this system. (3) Because the soul moves the body and, through the body, brings about thousands of further actions and motions with respect to other bodies and objects, such a mechanical connection of material things as involves a connection among all things and events so that they are immutably grounded in one another, where one contains the reason for the necessary succession of the other, cannot obtain within the otherwise undeniable subordination of things and causes.

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(4) Because the soul moves the body, voluntary and arbitrary motions and actions are not those which are merely in accord with the will of the soul, but rather those that are effected by the soul in accordance with its free will. Explanation: One does well to distinguish the merely natural motions that pertain to the body’s continued life, such as digestion and nourishment, from arbitrary and voluntary or elective movements and actions, and from those arbitrary movements and actions of the body, the so-called coerced motions, which originate in external force. Seventh Principle: Just as the soul directs and moves the body in virtue of its natural union with it, and therefore also makes use of the body and bodily senses in order to frame its ideas or symbols of corporeal things, so it is also diversely affected according to the constitution of the body and of bodily things and is thereby brought to this or that sensation. Proof of this Principle: No doubt the current proposition is also a postulate, so it stands in no need of proof on account of its self-evidence and is therefore rightly to be reckoned among those givens that everyone admits. However, even though it is superfluous, I will supply the grounds for this principle here because there are some few who dissent from this. These grounds are: (1) The previously proved natural union between the soul and the body, which brings this principle along with it. (2) The previously demonstrated sovereignty of the soul over the body. For, whoever admits that will not deny this proposition [ . . . ]. (3) The common experience of all human beings, as on this point it is as selfevident and convincing as anything can be. To this as well belongs what the medical doctors have observed and proven of the community between the soul and body in so many instances. (4) The pure impossibility that the soul should be able to frame for itself, out of its own essence, all ideas as well as sensations of corporeal things without making use of its bodily senses for their formation. And even if one cannot formulate a distinct concept of how the soul, as a spirit, could be affected through the senses of a corporeal being, nonetheless familiarity with the rest of the arguments suffices, and indeed all the more so since it is much less comprehensible how the soul could frame a representation of the things which impinge upon the soul without any assistance from the senses; and thus the rule, which is correct when appropriately limited, has come about, namely, that nothing is in the intellect that has not previously been in the senses. So one has that much less reason to fault the common system for its deficiency in accounting for the cognition of the way in which the body influences the soul, since the deficiency in the Cartesian and Leibnizian or Wolffian system is all the greater. (5) The irresolvable difficulty, that is to be found in the dissenting Cartesian system, that one immediately appropriates to God what one does not want to ascribe to the body, and hence excites such ideas in God as are highly unbecoming to Him and opens the way to atheism. Indeed, nature is confused with the creator since one ascribes to God what nature itself effects, in accordance with the divinely instituted order, in the commerce between the soul and body, and thereby passes nature off for God and only makes the ground that much more suitable for Spinozism and atheism

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   

to take root. No less impossibility and difficulty is to be found in the Wolffian system of so-called pre-established harmony, as shall be shown in detail below. The sandy and hollow foundation upon which this system builds its case for the contrary proposition, namely that the soul brings forth all of its ideas and sensations of corporeal things, without any assistance from the body and the senses, from its own essence, is precisely the idealistic principle that the essence of the soul actually consists in the power of representing the world as it were without the world, or of framing ideas of corporeal things without corporeal things, which principle has been accepted without any ground and indeed contrary to all reason and which can never be proven. Consequence: Because it is impossible for the soul to frame ideas of corporeal things without the actual existence and assistance of the world and its body, the system of the idealists that is built on the contrary proposition is altogether baseless, to say nothing at the moment of its inherent absurdity. Eighth Principle: Just as the human soul, as a free spirit, can act upon the body and through it upon other bodies and hence can act as it pleases so far as its nature allows and in a way that the mechanical structure of the world with its subordination of material things within the series of secondary causes is not thereby disturbed; so, there is a similar sort of action on the part of God that takes place in the universe, since He does not only have a particular influence on the human soul but also on material things or bodies, as secondary causes, and in accordance with their nature, and this action proceeds in such a way that the structure and order of the universe is not thereby changed or degraded. In addition to this sort of action, God also retains the freedom to employ His power according to His wisdom exceptionally outside of and above nature, which is to say, to perform miracles, without thereby degrading the structure and order of the universe, especially when the miracle is not directed towards those principal bodies that belong to the structure of the universe. Explanation: [ . . . ] (2) As concerns the free providence of God, three things are to be carefully distinguished: (a) The initial arrangement of the universe and of all things in it, after which the secondary causes continue to act, for themselves and each according to its own nature, and maintain their order by means of the sustaining and, so long as it extends, concurring power of God. (b) The special influence of God, which nonetheless is accommodated to the secondary causes, upon the particular direction of things, especially with regard to the human race, partially in order to hinder evil (or in the case that evil is admitted by God’s justice, to limit it) and punish it and, in that way, to direct it to good ends, but partially also in order to support and bless the good. (c) The extraordinary influence and action of God, in accordance with which God departs from the regular order of nature in the production of this or that effect, whereby He eminently demonstrates His sovereignty and the superiority of His free power over all of nature, which is to say, He works a miracle. The first is the ground of the general providence of God. And just as God proves His particular influence in the second, so the third belongs to His extraordinary providence and government which distinguishes itself particularly in being directed towards such objects as belong to the realm of nature but nonetheless usually takes place with a particular eye towards the realm of grace. [ . . . ]

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(6) The principal aspects of divine providence in the realm and order of grace harmonize with the previously noted principal aspects of God’s providence in the realm of nature. For, there is (a) the foundation and instituted order of our salvation; (b) God’s orderly activity and government, which operates on souls through the medium of the divine word and holy sacraments, as it does at the outset for our conversion and after that for constancy in our action and our direction; (c) God’s extraordinary action, for when God converts someone without the ordinary means, as with Saul or Paul, He deems them worthy of a quite particular grace and gift. In the latter instance, such an action on the part of God compares to those miracles which He performs upon corporeal things, or at least has a certain analogy with them [ . . . ]. Consequence of the Eighth Principle: Now since, as has been shown, God as the highest free cause acts in the universe and particularly with respect to the human race, in the realm of nature as well as in the realm of grace, and partly in the form of orderly action and partly in the form of extraordinary action, inasmuch as He brings about countless contingent occurrences but also as He arranges, or allows, good and evil to take place through created spirits and angels; so, it follows incontrovertibly from this that a mechanical connection of material things could not obtain in the universe since that would mean that all occurrences would merely happen according to the necessity of nature and the subsequent occurrence would always necessarily and without exception arise from the preceding and would have to find its reason in it, even though it is not to be denied that some subordination of things and causes obtains. Ninth Principle: The freedom of freely acting causes is the ground of contingency or of contingent things as opposed to necessary things. Explanation: (1) Contingent things are those things which occur in this world, though which, because they involve no contradiction or other impossibility, could have occurred otherwise and could have been constituted differently than how they were actually constituted or than how they actually occurred or could still occur. (2) Now, because the possibility of another occurrence or different constitution presupposes such causes as have it within the scope of their free will to nonetheless act so or otherwise, even when all the conditions sufficient for an action are at hand; so one can easily see that the freedom of freely acting causes is as it were the root and ground of contingency. Tenth Principle: Possible things, with regard to freely acting causes, are not only those things which have actually occurred, are occurring, or will occur in this world, but also those which though they neither have occurred, do occur, nor will occur, nonetheless could have or even to some extent should have done so. Explanation: (1) This proposition is grounded on the nature of freedom as that in accordance with which someone did or omitted something which could have or should have been omitted or done. (2) The correctness of this proposition is particularly evident because otherwise, if there were nothing else possible in the world than what actually happens, then not only freedom but the whole of morality would collapse, and all promises, warnings, exhortations, and commands, as well as threats and punishments, would be in vain.

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   

(3) It remains to note, so that one can better distinguish the tenth proposition from the ninth, that contingent and possible things, while they have much in common with one another, are nonetheless not the same. For all contingent things are also possible, but not all possible things are also contingent, since necessary things also belong to the possible; and likewise concerning the contrary, impossible things are not necessary things (which are opposed to the contingent) but rather, as things which involve a contradiction and therefore can never come to exist, remain non-beings. Eleventh Principle: God’s foreknowledge or foresight, as He sees all possible and contingent things before they occur on account of His omniscience, does not confer any necessity on those events that depend upon a freely acting cause, even though they are certain from the perspective of divine foreknowledge. Explanation: (1) The truth of this proposition is clear from the nature or proper characterization of foreknowledge, which does not mean to make something as it should be and order it in accordance with some special influence, but instead to know something in advance as it is, and therefore to know those things that occur on the basis of free causes as free and contingent, and to know those things as necessary that do not occur through free causes but through beings acting according to natural necessity. In this way, the free, contingent, and the necessary are and remain what they are. (2) And since the foreknowledge of God is constituted in this way, it does not serve as the ground for the existence and constitution of the things and events so foreseen, as if these took place because they were foreseen to do so; the case is rather the reverse as the existence and constitution of things and events serve as the ground for divine foreknowledge such that that which either does not exist or occur at all, or which cannot under any condition be reckoned among possible events, is not and cannot be foreseen by God since it is pure nothingness. (3) When an individual who is endowed with freedom limits himself to the perspective of his own present time and his own experience, he can easily comprehend matters from the past and relating to the present, or make an inference from the present to the past or future. For he knows on the basis of an experience whose certainty exceeds almost all geometrical self-evidence, that it stands within his freedom to do, or omit to do, this or that, to perform an action in this way or that or at some time or another, without finding himself subject to certain and immutable determination. Now what he does in fact do is a contingent action and it remains such even if it might be so that God through His omniscience foresaw the action when it actually happened. or should or could have happened under a given condition. What holds regarding the present holds, as already indicated, regarding the past and the future as well. (4) The same thing might be illustrated quite clearly with respect to what humans know of what others do. For suppose that others act in various ways and indeed such that I hear and see, and therefore know, what they do. Now it is obvious here that my knowledge exercises no influence upon the actions of other people, no more than upon the events that occur on account of the series of merely physical causes, with one subordinated to the other, which is not contingent but necessary and likewise known by me. Now, the better to imagine the foreknowledge of God, suppose that the

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human being could foresee future things as certainly as he knows present ones; in that case his foreknowledge would nevertheless have as little an influence as an effect upon future things as his knowledge does upon present things. [ . . . ] (6) For even though events have their certainty in regard to God’s foreknowledge, they nonetheless do not have any necessity. Even if one ascribes to them a hypothetical necessity, or necessity of consequence, they still retain their contingency if they are contingent in themselves. Since God’s foreknowledge does not wield any influence as its effect but instead the effect comes from the human being as a free cause, so the antecedent, the human being who has effected this or that state of affairs, stands in no necessary connection with another cause; as a result, the consequent is not necessary but only contingent and could not have happened or could have been omitted according to the free will of the antecedent, as a freely acting being. [ . . . ] Twelfth Principle: Just as God’s understanding does not introduce any necessity into human action through His foreknowledge, so just as little does God’s will negate the freedom of human action, and the contingency that thereby comes about, through His providence and the decrees that belong to it. Explanation: [ . . . ] (2) The truth of the above proposition can also be clearly known from the properties of the providence of God, which depends on His wisdom and will. However before I put this forward, I presuppose as an undeniable postulate that since God’s providence has to do with the governance of the entire world, and particularly of the human race, His providence must evidence the same properties in themselves and in their infinite perfection which one finds and praises in a wise, good, and just regent, steward, and father, indeed, those same properties which God Himself demands of such individuals according to the law of nature and His own word. (3) Now, however, as concerns one’s comportment with respect to good and evil, one finds and praises, and also demands, of such individuals the following: that they love the good and promote and reward it through benevolent regulation; and on the contrary that they hold the evil in contempt and forbid it or, when it does not permit of being obstructed, allow it to happen contrary to their good will but, even with such a disfavoring permission, they punish and limit it to the extent that the constitution or rules of their realm and household rightly allows, and in doing so direct it to a good purpose, and in matters relating to the good and evil they proceed with only this end in mind in composing their decrees and prescriptions. (4) These are the properties, set down by God Himself according to the law of nature and Holy Scripture, that a good, wise, and just regent, that is, one pleasing to God, can and must have with respect to the good and the evil. On this basis, it would be impossible for us to conclude otherwise, consonant with sound reason, than that God Himself possesses these well-pleasing characteristics in the most perfect way and that they are evidenced in His governance of the world and of the human race as He directs all of His decrees according to them. Therefore, we are entirely justified in making the following inference concerning the providence of God: Everything good must come originally from God. That good which occurs on account of a free creature is loved, promoted, and blessed by God.

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   

Everything evil among creatures comes solely from the misuse of freedom. The evil which occurs on account of a creature is despised and obstructed by God but, when He permits it, He concurs only with a specific limitation, directs everything to a good end, and punishes that which is to be punished. God’s decrees and actions relating to the human race are ordinarily not absolute but rather ordained in such a way as to accord with the freedom of human nature. Thus, one does well to distinguish the divine will into absolute and ordinate.

(5) This is the idea that we have to frame for ourselves consonant with sound reason of the providence of God in respect of the good and evil. Now, as this idea is correct in itself, and involves no decree contrary to human freedom nor does it contain any root or source from which a decree that is harmful to that freedom could grow, so no less do sound reason along with experience teach us that it is in itself more noble and splendid to rule over and govern a populace that are truly free than to lord over serfs and slaves. Indeed, the less capable we are of framing through our God-given natural light a concept of divine providence where human freedom is harmed through God’s decrees, the more evident it is from our experience that God has in fact bestowed this treasure of freedom upon human nature. [ . . . ] Thirteenth Principle: The necessity that is opposed to that contingency which depends on freely acting causes is not merely to be found in arithmetical, geometrical, and metaphysical truths, such as 2 x 2 = 4, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and that a whole is larger than any one of its parts, among others; rather, it is also found in such events and occurrences which do not stem from free causes but which either proceed from natural or essential properties of a thing, as when fire touches some flammable material and ignites it, or which stand in such a physical and mechanical connection of unfree causes that they are absolutely necessary and, naturally speaking, cannot fail to occur or occur otherwise than as they actually occur, as for instance when a solar or lunar eclipse takes place [ . . . ] or when a clockwork runs in just the way its structure dictates and not otherwise. Explanation: (1) The necessity described in this proposition has different names according to what relation it is considered in; generally, it is called absolute as opposed to hypothetical. (2) There are however two sorts of absolute necessity. The first is absolute in the sense that it cannot be negated or altered even by God Himself inasmuch as the negation or alteration would involve a contradiction. This sort of necessity is called geometrical, arithmetical, as well as metaphysical. [ . . . ] The other sort leaves open the possibility of being altered through God’s supreme power, yet other than admitting this possibility, this necessity is so absolute for itself that the event it pertains to can be inferred from the essence of a given thing, as dictated by its nature and structure, without any freedom being involved, and therefore without any genuine contingency or possibility of alteration. This necessity is called physical and mechanical, examples of which have already been cited in the principle itself. (3) This last sort of absolute necessity is thus called natural necessity, or physical, on account of the things that it concerns, that is, merely physical and material things or causes, and so which possess no principle of freedom for contingency, and thus it is also called natural on account of their nature, as that in accordance with which

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everything that happens proceeds immutably, and without any freedom and free determination, out of the essence of the things themselves. Since one rightly asserts that [ . . . ] such physical causes necessarily act and their effect must necessarily follow when they are found in such circumstances that they can act and an effect must follow, as one observes when fire is brought close enough to straw for it to catch, the straw cannot refrain from doing so and thus its ignition necessarily follows. By contrast, a free cause can determine itself completely freely now and again and can even refrain from acting when the conditions sufficient for the action are in place such that the effect does not follow; or, when it does not refrain from so acting, the effect still is not absolutely necessary but is rather only contingent. And because such natural and unchangeable necessity is found in those things that have a mechanical structure, such as automata and clockworks, so one also tends to call physical necessity mechanical necessity. (4) This absolute physical-mechanical necessity is also called necessity of the consequent [necessitas consequentis], where this indicates that the thing or effect that results from the antecedent is necessary as when it proceeds from a cause that is not free but is merely natural and necessary, or even as a necessary effect insofar as it stands in connection with another necessary cause. (5) This absolute physical-mechanical necessity is also appropriately termed necessity of concatenation as the causes and effects hang together like a chain in a fixed order [ . . . ]. (6) And the same physical and mechanical necessity is otherwise called fatal necessity, or physical-mechanical fate which consists in a necessary series of causes and effects. (7) There is accordingly no contingency but an absolute necessity among machines and automata or among the events that merely stem from physical causes and the necessity of the nature of acting beings, and so which are similar to automata in a certain respect. And even though their constitution is contingent to the extent that it has not always existed but at one point began to be, having been brought to existence by a free cause, so the occurrences that proceed from it are not contingent but, in accordance with the being’s constitution, and in virtue of its unchangeable connection with those occurrences, follow from it with an absolute necessity. Therefore, one cannot infer at all from the contingency of existence and of a being’s constitution to a contingency of the sequence in the same connection such that it would be opposed to a genuine necessity; as a result, this connection is not contingent but rather necessary. (8) It is self-evident, however, that God Himself, as a being from itself, both independent and eternal, is an absolutely necessary being in the most perfect sense of that term, and it is no less obvious that things which are geometrically, arithmetically, metaphysically and even physically and mechanically necessary do not on that account cease to be absolutely necessary since “absolute necessity” can be said to hold of the essence and existence of God Himself in a quite special way. (9) We should distinguish hypothetical necessity from all those sorts of absolute necessity we have described and differentiated thus far. For this necessity is found in such occurrences as presuppose a free cause and a freely acting being and are an effect of these. This necessity is called “hypothetical” on the basis of the hypothesis or

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supposition that the free cause has actually brought something about through its own action and therefore the effect must come to be and is to that extent necessary, though as regards the free cause it retains its contingency because it could have also omitted to perform its action, or could have done so in another way, freely determining itself to do so. This hypothetical necessity is also sometimes called necessity of the consequence [necessitas consequentiae] which must not be confused with the previously mentioned necessity of the consequent [necessitate consequentis] which is absolute. [ . . . ] Fourteenth Principle: The words “free,” “spontaneous,” “freedom,” and “spontaneity”⁴ are in no way synonymous but distinguished in terms of their meaning inasmuch as they refer to contrary things; so, freedom pertains solely to freely acting causes, whereas spontaneity in the proper sense pertains only to animals, merely physical causes, and automata. Explanation: (1) Free, properly speaking, means that something can determine itself from its own power of choice to do a variety of things in a variety of ways, and therefore that it has the principle of its own dominion in itself or in its free will, and is directed by the understanding; freedom, therefore is found chiefly in God Himself but also in some measure in all created and immortal spirits, such as angels and human souls. By contrast, that action is spontaneous which proceeds from what is internal to some thing without rational or free direction, and without any external coercion, merely from the constitution of its nature and structure according to the natural and mechanical laws of motion, and so that action transpires in such and such a way but cannot proceed or transpire otherwise. Therefore, irrational animals no doubt act spontaneously in those actions that they do themselves, but not freely, even though they are not automata. The grass grows after the rain spontaneously but not freely, and the clock works spontaneously but not freely. (2) While it should be noted that the words spontaneous and spontaneously are often taken to mean the same as free and freely, a fact quickly recognized from ordinary speech, such an equivalence cannot be permitted to those who actually deprive the human being of any genuine freedom and regard him as an automaton, in this way only granting him a mere spontaneity in the guise of a proffered freedom. [ . . . ] Consequence from the Foregoing Principle: Whoever takes spontaneity for a genuine liberty, and yet understands by spontaneity nothing other than a necessary drive of nature and a structure that is found among natural causes and automata, that person leads people down the garden path from true liberty to Stoical and absolute fatalism which forms the soul of Spinozism. [ . . . ] Fifteenth Principle: When free causes, such as human beings, are dragged into the natural and mechanical connection of material things, and are thus supposed to do everything in accordance with the necessity of their nature and structure like merely physical causes and automata, then such a connection is not a wise one with regard to the human being that could be consistent with freedom and contingency, but is rather

⁴ Here, and in what follows, Lange employs the Latin “spontaneum” and “spontaneitas.”

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necessary, and as it were brute, and a genuinely fatal necessity. Such a connection constitutes the soul and proper form of Spinozism insofar as it renders everything necessary in the world and among the human race, even if one departs from Spinoza through distinguishing God from the universe or from the world, or even by taking the soul to be a particular substance distinct from the body. Explanation: (1) The chief misuse of mathematics and mechanics is when their laws and experiments are also applied to pneumatics, or to free causes, such as human beings, under the pretext that if one were to grant free causes a particular principle of acting upon material things, then the mechanical connectedness of the universe would be disturbed. This amounts to a misuse, however, since one thereby merely assumes such a connection in which the influence of free causes has no place, which is subsequently cited as a reason for this application, without proving it and in spite of the fact that it cannot be proven. (2) In this way, human beings, who are in fact free causes, are made into mere machines in both soul and body through being robbed of all true freedom, and are subjected to that absolutely fatal necessity of physical-mechanical connection. (3) As concerns Spinozism, one might distinguish total Spinozism from partial Spinozism. Total Spinozism consists in these three principal errors (and from there proceeds to all the remaining ones): (a) That the entire world is but a single substance and indeed of such a form that God Himself, understood as nature, also belongs to it; and therefore that no essential or substantial distinction obtains between the body and soul. (b) That the world is eternal, and therefore there is an infinite regress in the connection of causes and effects. (c) That all things in the world and particularly human affairs which, as belonging to the single world-substance or world-machine are supposed to stand in the same connection of causes and effects, are necessary and occur necessarily. Partial Spinozism consists in the two latter points, and particularly in the third, along with the principles of the Ethics that follow from them. [ . . . ] Sixteenth Principle: That system which brings the universe under a universal and necessary connection is opposed to God’s providence in the realm of nature and of grace, and indeed to such an extent that it negates it completely. Seventeenth Principle: That system which draws everything into a necessary connection of events and a fatal necessity with the cancellation of true freedom, and subjects the human being himself as an automaton to this same connectedness, destroys all morality and religion in its application and thereby leads to atheism. Explanation: (1) That there could be no true morality without freedom is something that I take as given such that it will hardy be called into question by anyone, and even the fatalists want to avoid appearing as if they sought to negate freedom so that they might not be accused of destroying morality. (2) Now provided this is the case, then the consequence is correctly drawn that that system of philosophy which makes the necessary connection of events so universal that it even regards free causes, such as human beings, as automata and subjects them to the same connection, effectively destroys all true freedom and all true morality along with it, and amounts to a partial Spinozism. (3) Yet, where morality falls away there religion must also be cast aside since it is primarily in religion that morality is raised to distinction and exhibited, and religion

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without freedom of the will and morality is an absurdity—a religion of such a sort would by rights also have to be ascribed to brutes and lifeless things. When one further takes into consideration how such a system also dispenses with God’s providence, then it only becomes clearer how little religion could cohere with it. (4) Where, however, religion falls away, atheism gains entry; since the idea of God without religion is nothing but a dream or chimera, it must ultimately transform into a true atheism. Eighteenth Principle: Atheistic thinking is in fact promoted (even if one does not have the intention of doing so) when the hypothesis of the eternality of the world is combined with the hypothesis of the fatal, or natural and mechanical necessity of all things, as one thereby either affirms outright such thinking or does not reject it as absurd and objectionable, and though one makes a show of denying it, it is elsewhere made sufficiently clear through various assertions that it is nonetheless insinuated. Nineteenth Principle: For denying the existence of God it helps considerably, for instance, when one declares the most important arguments for the dogma of God’s existence and providence concerning the human race to be unfit and rejects them, or seeks to weaken them and make them suspect and contemptible under the pretext of some difficulty or other, or of this or that defect—a set of arguments it should be said that has always received and continues to command the most conviction among all intelligent people. This denial is also helped, however, when one advances such an argument as resolves into sheer metaphysical subtleties and is incomprehensible to most, and for those who do comprehend it, it produces either too little conviction or none at all; indeed, in comparison with some other hypotheses in the same system it is revealed to be entirely baseless and without foundation. This is the case even though no evil purpose is intended; rather, even with better intentions such a result comes about through an overweening attachment to and fondness for one’s own erroneous principles that are, accordingly, accepted without sufficient scrutiny. Twentieth Principle: It further greatly encourages the denial of God’s existence but most of all His providence when one frames false or for the most part incorrect, or utterly incomplete and inadequate, definitions of God’s essence, attributes, and works, and yet passes these off as accurate and correct and gives them priority with respect to any other. Twenty-First Principle: It is no little help to atheistic thinking when, through all manner of fictions, one ascribes to God such works as, on the one hand, conflict with the appropriate idea one must reasonably frame of God’s nature and which bring with them many absurdities that have to be regarded as sheer mysteries of nature and miracles, and on the other hand are completely indemonstrable and will forever remain so. Twenty-Second Principle: Whoever says and writes that atheism is not in itself harmful to morality and does not offer an incentive for a life of vice, or that an atheist, as an atheist, is quite clever and intelligent and can live virtuously, and that he only speaks of the misuse of atheism, he, I say, speaks in favor of atheism and defends it. Twenty-Third Principle: Whoever says that atheistic thinking does less damage to human society and to the common good than superstition, offers if not intentionally but in fact no small support for atheism by means of this indemonstrable claim.

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Twenty-Fourth Principle: Conclusions that follow as entirely suitable and evident consequences from premises, understood as principles, reveal the character of the premises or principles, whether those conclusions are true or false, secure or harmful and dangerous, and they do so in such a way that, for any legitimate inference that follows from one’s theorems in an evident manner, a philosopher must either affirm such conclusions or abandon those of his principles and hypotheses from which they result.

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7 Christian Wolff: The Refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics (1737) As was the case throughout Europe, Spinoza’s spectre haunted the intellectual debate in early Modern Germany, with the charge of “Spinozist” serving as a catch-all for thinkers suspected of the least sympathies with materialist, atheistic, or fatalistic views. Indeed, thinkers as otherwise diverse as Lau and Wolff were at some point denounced as Spinozistic on account of the bare compatibility (real or apparent) of their views with those of the Dutch thinker. Despite this, there were few serious attempts on the part of philosophers to engage with Spinoza’s thought, especially with his Ethics which had been generally available since its publication in the Opera posthuma of 1677. Christian Thomasius provided a brief précis of Spinoza’s Opera, including a summary of the Ethics, in his own periodical, the Monats-Gespäche (Monthly Conversations) in 1688, which treatment was provoked by the publication of the Medicina mentis in 1687 by E. W. von Tschirnhaus, a Saxon nobleman and one of Spinoza’s intimates (with whom he shared an early draft of the Ethics and exchanged valuable correspondence on topics relating to it). In terms of critical remarks, however, Thomasius contents himself with the usual denunciations followed by a general endorsement of the refutation by Pierre Poiret (1646–1719) who charged Spinoza with deviating from the ordinary definitions of metaphysical terms. Yet the most detailed, and certainly the most infamous, treatment is found in Pierre Bayle’s entry “Spinoza” in the Dictionary. Although it is the lengthiest entry in the work, Bayle’s discussion of Spinoza remains focused on the initial propositions of Book I of the Ethics, and indeed is largely limited to exploring the paradoxes that he takes to follow from Spinoza’s “abominable hypothesis” of substance monism, with its allegedly disastrous implication that extension is an attribute of God, the sole substance. It is, therefore, a circumstance of some significance that a major philosopher such as Wolff should take up the task of writing a full-dress refutation of Spinoza and accounting of his errors. That Wolff should turn to the topic in the first place is, of course, by way of responding to the accusation of (partial) Spinozism frequently levelled by Lange (in the foregoing text, for instance). Even so, and in spite of Wolff ’s discussion of Spinoza in the context of exposing the errors of paganism, Epicureanism, and Manicheanism, his treatment is distinguished by the thorough familiarity with the Ethics that it evidences, and its consistent focus on Spinoza’s express views and arguments rather than simply trading in speculation about his real motives or the consequences of his views for traditional morality and religion. Spinoza thus

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enjoys a (relatively) charitable treatment at Wolff ’s hands, though this is less surprising considering Lange’s decisively uncharitable treatment of Wolff, but also considering Wolff ’s own express admiration for Tschirnhaus. Early in his own intellectual career, Wolff met Tschirnhaus on at least one occasion, during which they discussed Spinoza’s philosophy and Tschirnhaus reportedly disabused Wolff of a widespread mischaracterization of Spinoza’s metaphysics (which mischaracterization is addressed in the note to the opening section of the Refutation). Wolff ’s Refutation is presented in §§671–716 of the second volume of the Theologia naturalis (Natural Theology) of 1737. In the initial set of sections (§§671–687), Wolff scrutinizes Spinoza’s definitions, particularly of God, substance, attribute, mode, and finite thing. Wolff finds a variety of faults with these definitions, and contrasts them with their proper definitions in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. Wolff traces these errors to Spinoza’s failure to engage in a properly rigorous ontology, an exercise Spinoza evidently thought he could be excused from given his reliance on the Cartesian principle that to grasp a term or concept it suffices simply to have a clear and distinct perception (or conception) of it. Having uncovered the inadequacies of Spinoza’s initial principles, Wolff proceeds to show how these figure into Spinoza’s account of extension (§§688–93), his doctrine of bodies (§§694–6), the claims of the uniqueness and necessary existence of substance (§§697–706), and his faulty account of infinite thought as composed of an infinite number of finite thinking things (§§707–8). Finally, in the last sections (§§709–16), Wolff confirms the fatalistic, irreligious, and atheistic character of Spinozism and shows how these errors could have been avoided had Spinoza sought distinct notions of key ontological concepts. Due to its rigor and sensitivity to Spinoza’s express views, Wolff ’s Refutation enjoyed a largely positive reception and became a key point of reference in subsequent discussions of Spinoza by German thinkers (sympathetic and otherwise). In addition to being published by Wolff as part of the Theologia naturalis, the sections comprising the Refutation were later published separately in a German translation by Johann Lorenz Schmidt (1702–49) in 1744, along with the first German translation of Spinoza’s Ethics. Significantly, it is in this edition that these sections are first designated (by Schmidt) as a self-standing “refutation [Widerlegung].” Wolff was later praised for his treatment of Spinoza by no less than Moses Mendelssohn who in 1755 lauded Wolff for casting Spinozism in its proper light before setting about to refute it. Wolff ’s Refutation also played a role in the famous pantheism controversy later in the eighteenth century, as F. H. Jacobi and G. E. Lessing were apparently in agreement that Wolff had failed to understand, and so to decisively refute, Spinoza, but Mendelssohn continued to defend Wolff ’s criticism in his own refutation of Spinozism in his final philosophical work, Morgenstunden (Morning Hours) of 1785. The following translation is of Wolff ’s original Latin text, and all notes are my own. Translations from Spinoza’s Ethics and other works follow those in The Collected Works of Spinoza, edited and translated by E. Curley, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985 & 2016) and, as is standard scholarly practice, the Ethics is cited according to book (Roman numeral); definition “d,” axiom “ax,” proposition “p,” or appendix “app,” and corresponding number; followed by scholium “s,” or corollary “c,” and number when appropriate. Wolff ’s references to his own texts are to the

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Latin editions of his metaphysical and logical writings, individually listed in the bibliography below, with references to the second part of the Theologia naturalis given simply by section number. Additionally, it should be noted that I have retained a couple of important Latin terms in the translation for which no English rendering was available or preferable: “essentialia” which for Wolff denotes that set of determinations that makes up a being’s essence, and “a-se-ity [aseitas]” (which would literally be rendered “being-from-itself-ness”).

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Bayle, Pierre, “Spinoza,” in Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, edited and translated by Richard Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), pp. 288–338. Bell, David, Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 1984). Boehm, Omri, Kant’s Critique of Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014) [pp. 190–209]. Dyck, Corey W., “The Spinozan-Wolffian Philosophy? Mendelssohn’s Dialogues of 1755,” in Kant-Studien, 109.2 (2018), pp. 1–19. Goldenbaum, Ursula, “Die erste deutsche Übersetzung der Spinozistischen ‘Ethik’,” in H. Delf, J. Schoeps, and M. Walther, eds., Spinoza in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte (Berlin: Hentrich, 1994), pp. 107–25. Israel, Jonathan, Radical Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001) [pp. 544–52, 655–9]. Morrison, James, “Christian Wolff ’s Criticisms of Spinoza,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 31.3 (1993), pp. 405–20. Schmidt, Johann Lorenz, B. v. S. Sittenlehre widerleget von dem berühmten Weltweisen unserer Zeit Herrn Christian Wolff (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1744). Wolff, Christian, Cosmologia generalis, methodo scientifica pertractata (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1731). [cited as “Cosmol.”] Wolff, Christian, Elementa matheseos universae, 2nd edn., 5 vols. (Halle, 1730–41). [the first volume contains the Elementa arithmeticae, cited as “Arithm.” in what follows, and the Elementa geometriae, cited as “Geom.”] Wolff, Christian, Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1736). [cited as “Ont.”] Wolff, Christian, Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, methodo scientifica pertractata (Frankfurt & Leipzig, 1728). [cited as “Log.”] Wolff, Christian, Psychologia empirica, methodo scientifica pertractata (Frankfurt & Leipzig: 1732). [cited as “Emp. Psych.”] Wolff, Christian, Psychologia rationalis, methodo scientifica pertractata (Frankfurt am Main, 1734). [cited as “Rat. Psych.”] Wolff, Christian, Theologia naturalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, 2 vols. (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1736–7). [first volume cited as “Nat. Theol.”]

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The Refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics §671. (What Spinozism is.) Spinozism is a hypothesis which admits nothing other than a single substance endowed with infinite attributes, two of which are infinite thought and extension, and each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence; it is supposed however that finite beings arise from necessary modifications of the attributes of this substance, as, for instance, souls arise from modifications of infinite thought and bodies from modifications of infinite extension. Spinozism takes its name from Benedict de Spinoza, a private citizen in the Netherlands who lived in the previous century. He was born in Amsterdam in 1632 and died in the Hague in 1677, after he had modestly declined a professorship in philosophy in the Heidelberg Academy offered to him in 1673 by the Elector of the Palatinate (see letters 53 and 54¹). Spinozism is commonly said to consist in the confusion of God and nature or, as the Scholastics say, of natura naturans, which is God, and natura naturata, which tends simply to be called nature;² yet, this is imputed to Spinoza only by consequence, since in the scholium of Ip29 of the Ethics, which is the first work in his Opera posthuma,³ he acknowledges that natura naturans must be distinguished from natura naturata, and explains how they should be distinguished according to his hypothesis. To the extent however that our intention is the overthrow of Spinozism, we do not want to infer anything concerning the author’s opinion other than those teachings which are expressly transmitted by the author himself; for their falsehood having been demonstrated, those things which are deduced from them as a consequence scatter into the breeze of their own accord. It is not our way to impute to others that which they expressly reject just so that we might have something we can impugn. Yet that we have defined Spinozism in a way conformable to the mind of the author is easily shown from his Ethics, since Ip14c1 reads “in nature there is only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite,” and in the same proposition Spinoza affirms that “except God, no substance can be or be conceived” and so Spinoza makes this single, absolutely infinite substance into God. Moreover, in Id6, which is the definition of God, “the absolutely infinite being” is understood in terms of “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” He further contends in Ip25c that “particular things are nothing but modes of God’s attributes,”⁴ and it is said that all modes must follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from the necessary modification of some attribute.⁵ Lastly, he asserts in Ip14c2 that “an extended thing and a thinking thing are either attributes of God” (insofar namely as thought and extension are considered as infinite or unlimited), “or affections or modes⁶ of God’s attributes” (insofar as thought and extension are considered as modified), and in IIp1–2 he contends that thought and extension are attributes of God, defining body in IId1

¹ See Correspondence of Spinoza, edited and translated by A. Wolff (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), pp. 265–7. ² This is for instance Bayle’s charge against Spinoza; see remark A in his entry “Spinoza.” ³ The Ethics was first published in the Opera posthuma of 1677. ⁴ Ip25c reads: “Particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain determinate way.” ⁵ See Ip23: “Every mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has necessarily had to follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute, modified by a modification which exists necessarily and is infinite.” ⁶ Wolff here interpolates “or modes [seu modos].”

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in terms of “a mode that expresses God’s essence in a certain and determinate way insofar as He is considered an extended thing,” and he claims in [IIp11c⁷] that “the human intellect is a part of the infinite intellect of God,” of which he gives no particular account inasmuch as he holds “thinking substance and extended substance for one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that.” So he also calls “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode one and the same thing but expressed in two ways” (IIp7s), or “the mind and the body are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension,” and “the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely thought” (IIp21s). It is thus apparent that nothing has been inserted by us into this definition of Spinozism other than what one can read in the Ethics of Spinoza in just as many words. That the terms are taken in the signification according to that which they have in their definitions can be ascertained from what has been said but will also be understood from what follows.

§672. (The definition of God according to Spinoza’s hypothesis.) According to the Spinozistic conception, God is “a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Id6). Spinoza’s definitions must be weighed carefully if you want to uncover the source of those errors which he appeared to demonstrate, at least as far as he and others were concerned. However, these are not perspicuous enough but foster a kind of obscurity which easily casts a cloud over an insufficiently attentive mind. We will consider what he understands by attribute in the next section. Insofar, however, as he says that God consists of an infinity of attributes, and nonetheless lays claim to no more than two of these in the entire course of his treatment, namely extension and thought, and asserts both to be infinite as we have already noted (§671n), it was possible for it to appear dubious whether according to the present definition an infinite number of attributes are to be attributed to God or in fact only two, or whether a finite number of attributes are to be attributed to God after all but of which each is infinite in itself. To be sure, he has distinguished in his account between a being infinite in its own kind and one absolutely infinite, and he affirms that, concerning the former, it is possible that an infinity of attributes be denied but that in the latter case it does not involve any negation,⁸ and on account of this they seem to be understood as infinite in number. This is confirmed more fully in a number of places, for instance, when he writes in IIp3s that “God does infinitely many things in infinitely many ways” (though, according to his opinion, diverse ways of acting flow from the diversity of attributes), and when he asserts in Ip9 that “the more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.” Not a little obscurity, in short, hides in these words, namely that each attribute expresses an eternal and infinite essence. For Spinoza is not able to define what he wishes to be understood by essence, but contents himself with a confused notion; further, it is not sufficiently understood what it is to express an essence, particularly since it is manifest from the work as a whole that individual attributes express one and the same thing in diverse ways such that it is one and the same thing that is expressed through thought and extension, and only the manner of expression is different.

⁷ The text here anomalously refers to “prop.2 part. 2.”

⁸ See the Explanation of Id6.

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§673. (The definition of attribute according to Spinoza’s hypothesis.) By attribute Spinoza understands “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Id4). Here again Spinoza presupposes a signification of the word essence which has not been explicated by him. For, although he explains what essence is and how it is distinguished from the being of an idea and even the being of existence in the “Metaphysical Thoughts” appended to his Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy demonstrated in the geometrical manner,⁹ these concepts are not carried over into the system he puts forth here, because there he philosophizes in Descartes’ mindset and not really in agreement with his own teaching as set forth in the Ethics.

§674. (The definition of substance according to Spinoza’s hypothesis.) By substance Spinoza understands “what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed” (Id3). It is not sufficiently clear what is intended by being in itself and being conceived through itself. Noticing this obscurity himself, Spinoza accordingly attempts to explicate what it was he had in mind through the words that follow: namely that is in itself and is conceived through itself the concept of which does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed. It is evident from the rest of his work that he understands by concept the representation of a thing in the intellect, which we have called a notion (Log. §34). From this it is understood that according to Spinoza that is in itself and is conceived through itself of which we have a notion without presupposing a notion of another thing, or the notion of which is not resolvable into other notions. Thus, according to him and as was also apparent to Descartes, the notion of extension is not resolvable into other notions, and thus the intellect represents through extension something to itself that exists in itself, or a substance, and in this way the Cartesians take extension for a substance. For although Spinoza makes extension into an attribute of God, nonetheless it is clear from Ip10 that any attribute of a single substance must be conceived through itself, and that a substance cannot be conceived otherwise by means of the intellect than through an attribute (§673). An attribute, after his way of thinking, thus supposes nothing in the thing as to why it exists in that same thing, and therefore for him the essence of a substance is represented in the intellect and the object, as it were, which the idea corresponds to is in the substance itself.

§675. (What cause of itself is for Spinoza.) Through cause of itself, which is to say being from itself, Spinoza understands that “whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” (Id1). That Spinoza names that the cause of itself which we call being from itself is clear from the identity of their definitions. For we define being from itself as that which exists through its own

⁹ Spinoza’s book, Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae pars I & II, more geometrico demonstratae, was published in 1663 and was the only book published under his name in his lifetime. The “Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts” is found in The Collected Works of Spinoza vol. I, pp. 299–346, with the chapter Wolff is referring to occurring at pp. 303–5.

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power, or which does not require the power of another being in order to exist (Nat. Theol. I §27), and hence as that which has the reason for its existence in its essence (Nat. Theol. I §31); consequently, when its essence is posited, so is its existence (Ont. §118). Being from itself, therefore, cannot be conceived except as existing and its essence includes existence; consequently, this is the very thing which Spinoza calls cause of itself.

§676. (What a mode is according to Spinoza’s hypothesis.) Through mode Spinoza understands that “which is in another through which it is also conceived” (Id5).¹⁰ Spinoza does not explain what it is to exist in another. Still, since he opposes attribute to mode and maintains that beyond attributes and modes it is not possible that anything be conceived of substance, it is possible to understand from this opposition what it must signify. Indeed, an attribute supposes no other thing through which it is understood why it exists in a being or substance; consequently, no reason can be given as to why it exists in it (Ont. §56), and so one says it exists through itself and is conceived through itself. A mode, therefore, supposes something through which it is understood why it exists in a thing, and so it supposes a reason through which it is known why it exists in that other thing.

§677. (What a finite thing is according to Spinoza’s hypothesis.) Spinoza calls a thing finite in its own kind that which “can be limited by another of its own nature” (Id2). It is readily evident that here a finite thing for Spinoza is the same as a limited thing; consequently, since limits indicate a lack of a reality which is understood to be present in another thing of the same kind, such as the lack of a farther extension in a body, a finite thing would have been more correctly defined in terms of a thing for which a greater can be conceived, as we have with this example and as with others that he supplies. However, his definition is deceptive and fallacious as long as it requires that a finite thing must be able to be limited by another thing of the same kind, a claim which is easily abused. Evidently, it is tacitly presupposed that some reason, or in his manner of speaking, some cause, must be given for any limitation. In general, it is to be noted that Spinoza has constructed his definitions for the sake of his preconceived hypothesis just so that he might be able to demonstrate this same hypothesis from these definitions as if from principles, rather than deriving the definitions from the things themselves and then offering a deduction of the hypothesis, as ought to be done. It is undeniable that he was constantly occupied with the Cartesian philosophy, and that his mind was steeped in its principles. Moreover, it is clear that Descartes traced everything that can be cognized concerning existing things to two notions, namely the notion of extension and that of thought. He determined, however, that for any substance there was some principal property, which constitutes the nature and essence of that thing and to which everything else is referred; namely, he determined that extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance, and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance. Anything else which can be attributed to bodies presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an extended thing, just as all that we discover in the mind are only diverse modes of

¹⁰ Wolff omits the first part of Spinoza’s definition: “By mode I understand the affections of a substance [substantiae affectiones] [ . . . ].”

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thinking (see Principles of Philosophy I.52–4¹¹). In addition, one sees that Descartes claimed that what is true is recognized through clear and distinct perception, affirming that to be true which is clearly and distinctly perceived, and contending that error is avoided insofar as something is not allowed to be true unless it is clearly and distinctly perceived (see Principles I.30). Finally, it is evident that besides the ideas of extension and of thought, Descartes also admits an idea of a supremely perfect being, involving necessary and eternal existence, and this is the idea of God (Principles I.14), from whom he removes anything in which some imperfection or limitation is apprehended (Principles I.23), and whom alone he declares the true cause of everything that is and can possibly be (Principles I.24). He claims this idea of God to be clear and distinct, provided that “we avoid supposing that the idea adequately represents everything which is to be found in God; and we must not invent any additional features, but concentrate only on what is really contained in the idea and on what we clearly perceive to belong to the nature of a supremely perfect being” (Prinicples I.54). By means of these principles, he rejects a motive power implanted in bodies, since we do not at all perceive clearly and distinctly how such a power might follow from extension, and so he referred the motion on which depends “any variation in matter or diversity in its many forms” (Principles II.23) to God as its cause (Principles II.36). He who attends with care to the details in the course of reading the Ethics will understand sufficiently that these notions were fixed in Spinoza’s mind. Now since he considered that, concerning our creation properly so called, which the theologians call a first creation, that is, a bringing forth from nothing (Rat. Psych. §697), we do not have a clear and distinct notion, so he rejected the notion of a creative power as a human fabrication, and maintained that it cannot properly be attributed to God.¹² And since existence is not contained in the notion of extension or in the notion of thought, nor is it admitted to follow from these notions necessarily, such that some portion of extension or a certain thought in a certain determinate mode necessarily exists; as a result Spinoza did not recognize corporeal substance or finite thinking substance as necessary or uncreated beings. Nothing remained, therefore, other than to admit one substance, namely God, to whose essence belongs necessary existence, and in whom infinite extension and thought exist, and moreover that the infinite modifications of both yield particular things, which are called bodies and souls. Now after he had conceived this hypothesis firmly in his mind, he reformulated Descartes’ notion in accordance with what he required, and from thence arose the definitions just set forth which fit the hypothesis, as will be sufficiently obvious to the attentive reader if he wishes to compare these definitions with those just stated. Thus, Spinozism has arisen from the impossibility of creation combined with the principles of the Cartesian philosophy, and through the abuse of the criterion of truth that is established in that philosophy. He who is to overturn Spinozism must either defend the reality of the notion of the creative power, or must show that there is something in the Cartesian principles that deviates from the truth. Insofar as this is corrected by the elimination of that which is erroneous, it follows that creation must be admitted, even if we do not clearly and distinctly perceive it like we do other things of which we are properly conscious.

¹¹ Translations from Descartes’ Principles follow those in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, edited and translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 177–291 (references are to part and section number in the Principles). ¹² See, for instance, Spinoza’s comparison in his Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy of creation ex nihilo to producing a square circle (in Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, p. 249).

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§678. (On who one calls a Spinozist.) He is called a Spinozist who embraces Spinozism as true or who holds Spinoza’s hypothesis to be true. For, just as someone is called a Copernican who defends Copernicus’ hypothesis concerning the Sun’s state of rest and the motion of the Earth, both rotational as well as around the Sun, so too is he rightly called a Spinozist who embraces Spinoza’s hypothesis concerning the origin of all things from God. What Spinozism consists in has already been said above (§671), and from that it is clear what one must uphold in order to merit the name of a Spinozist. Since Spinoza maintained the fatal necessity of all things and thus denied the freedom of the soul, one commonly tends to call him a Spinozist who defends the fatal necessity of all things and who extends this necessity even to human actions. Yet since this error is hardly proper to Spinoza but can be observed in many others who are not of Spinoza’s opinion concerning God and the nature of things, and this same error has been separately identified, above (§528) and by others, by the name of universal fatalism; so, we cannot, nor must we, admit this signification of the term, lest one who acknowledges a universal fatalism be regarded as holding Spinoza’s opinion concerning God and the nature of things. And because Spinoza is charged, as a consequence of his views, with confusing God and nature, one tends to call him a Spinozist who is suspected of confusing God and nature. But those claims that are elicited as a consequence of one’s views must not be confused with that error, which is openly professed and acknowledged, nor are we including this in our signification of the term.

§679. (Spinoza’s error in defining attribute.) Spinoza confuses attribute with essential determination. This is because he defines attribute as “what the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence” (§673). Now, since according to him, substance is conceived through itself (§674), he infers that “each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself” (Ip10). That, however, is conceived through itself the cognition of which does not require the cognition of some other thing, as Spinoza otherwise puts it in Ip8s2, which is to say, in our manner of speaking, it is that for which no reason is given why it exists in the being but rather it is the first thing that is conceived of the being. And yet the first thing that is conceived of a being is its essence (Ont. §144), and as to why the essentialia or the essential determinations which constitute essence (Ont. §143) exist in something, no intrinsic reason is given (Ont. §156). Therefore, Spinoza confuses attributes and essential determinations. No one, I think, will find any perplexity in what we have said, namely, that to be conceived through itself is the same, in our phrasing, as having no intrinsic reason for existing in something. Since, if there is no intrinsic reason why something exists in something else, then one can find nothing in the being through which we can understand why it exists in it (Ont. §56). Therefore, one need not presuppose anything else in a being for it to be cognized that something must exist in that being, and so this can be cognized in the absence of any other presupposed cognition; consequently, its cognition does not in the least require the cognition of another thing. And in fact, according to Spinoza, that is conceived through itself the cognition of which does not require the cognition of another thing (by Ip8s2). In our terms, therefore, that is conceived through itself for which there is no intrinsic reason in the being as to why it exists in it. Thus, no doubt can remain that what Spinoza calls attribute is what we have named the essentialia or essence (Ont. §143), in conformity with the received notion of

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the philosophers, a notion derived from the things themselves but in agreement with reason, as is abundantly clear from our own ontological demonstrations (Ont. §142), and not, as is the case with Spinoza (§677n), arbitrarily fabricated for the sake of his preconceived hypothesis. Indeed, since nominal definitions are arbitrary it appears to come to nothing that what Spinoza calls attribute is commonly termed essence, for those things that are demonstrated concerning essence must pertain to attributes in the sense expressed by Spinoza, and in this way it appears that the very same truth holds even if it is expressed with different words. And no doubt this would have been the case, except that nominal definitions have been abused through error, especially when they are formed out of ambiguous words, of which sort are Spinoza’s definitions, as no one will deny who uses sufficient acuity in examining them. For when it comes to notions and also definitions (Log. §152), their reality must be demonstrated (Log. §717f), before you use these same things in order to derive other things from them, lest through using deceptive notions in the place of true ones you should fall into error (Log. §629), especially since with nominal definitions it is not yet evident that the defined thing is even possible (Log. §191). Yet Descartes, whose principles Spinoza embraces insofar as his hypothesis allows (and otherwise changed in conformity with it) (§677n), takes a notion to be real if he clearly and distinctly perceives it (or as Spinoza prefers to say, conceives) without having sufficiently defined clear and distinct perception. Accordingly, Spinoza made little effort in showing the reality of his definitions, but he uses these principles as if they had already been granted. We are correct in noting, therefore, the confusion, that has been made of the essential and an attribute by the same author, and no Spinozist can deny this confusion of an attribute with an essential determination since Spinoza himself explicitly says that one perceives an attribute as constituting the essence of a substance (§673); and the essentialia, or what amounts to the same thing, the essential determinations (Ont. §222) constitute the essence of a being (Ont. §143).

§680. (The other mistake in this regard.) The notion of substance incorrectly enters into the notion of attribute in Spinoza’s definition. For Spinoza confuses attribute with the essential determinations which constitute the essence of a being (Ont. §143) so that attribute is for him what others call the essence of a being, and so it is the first thing that is grasped concerning a being (Ont. §144). However, those things that pertain to the notion of a being are understood without the notion of substance, as is abundantly clear from the ontological demonstrations that are found together in my Ontology, part I, chapter 3, section 2,¹³ and it is rather the case that the notion of substance insofar as it conforms to its ordinary usage (Ont. §771) presupposes the notion of being (Ont. §768). The notion of substance therefore incorrectly enters into the notion of attribute in Spinoza’s definition. It is not without reason that Spinoza inserts the notion of substance into the notion of attribute. For, since he assumes the reality of his definitions, and does not prove it, on account of the fact that he appears to conceive of what is contained in the definitions and, moreover, he has convinced himself that those things are true which we conceive or have a concept of (or if you prefer to speak with Descartes, which we clearly and distinctly perceive); so, in this way the

¹³ A reference to the section titled “De notione entis [Concerning the notion of being],” in the Ontologia (§§132–78; cf. especially §§134–9).

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definition of attribute serves for demonstrating his hypothesis, a use which it otherwise would not have held. If one is going to expose his erroneous inferences, then one must attend to the present proposition.

§681. (Spinoza’s error concerning the definition of mode.) Spinoza does not distinguish modes from attributes properly so-called. He defines mode as that which is in another thing through which it is also conceived (§676). Since, according to him, “whatever is, is either in itself or in another” (Iax1), to be in itself and to be in another are for him mutually opposed. Since that is said to be in and conceived through itself the cognition of which does not require the cognition of any other thing (Ip8s2), so it follows that one must take that to be and be conceived through another the cognition of which requires the cognition of some other thing, and thus it is understood through another thing in which it is conceived as being; consequently, that which is in a being has its sufficient reason in something else as to why it exists in it, or at least can exist in it. However, that which is in a being outside of what is essential is to be referred either to attributes, properly so-called, or to modes (Ont. §149), and attributes find the sufficient reason for why they exist in something in the essentialia (Ont. §157), and so they are [actually] posited in a being together with the essentialia (Ont. §118); yet, these essentialia only contain the sufficient reason for why the modes possibly exist in something (Ont. §160), and consequently, only the possibility of these modes is posited when the essentialia are posted (Ont. §118). Modes, therefore, differ from attributes insofar as they are distinguished from the essentialia and must accordingly be separated from them. From whence it is clear that Spinoza does not distinguish modes from attributes, properly so-called, as modes are undoubtedly separated from essentialia. We see, therefore, that Spinoza mixes everything up in his notion of being, and deceives the incautious and untutored by means of the obscurity and ambiguity of words. Whoever has correctly understood the ontological notions we have rendered distinct in our ontology will easily avoid falling prey to Spinozism, a doctrine that results from the neglect of first philosophy. From this it is also clear how far Descartes deviated from the truth when he attempted to persuade others that the terms employed in first philosophy did not stand in need of much explication but were well enough understood on their own.

§682. (Another mistake concerning modes.) Spinoza opposes mode to substance and conflates it with being from another. For he defines mode as that which is in another through which it is also conceived (§676); by contrast, substance is defined as that which is in itself and conceived through itself (§674). Now since all things that exist are either in themselves or in another (Iax1), and that which cannot be conceived through another must be conceived through itself (as per Iax2), a mode is not in itself nor is it conceived through itself. Concerning modes, then, Spinoza denies what he affirms of substance (Log. §205). As those propositions are opposed where one denies what is affirmed by the other (Log. §288), it follows that these two propositions “A is in itself and conceived through itself ” and “A is not in itself and not conceived in itself ” are mutually opposed. It is clear, then, that Spinoza opposes modes to substances, which was the first point to be proved.

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To be in another and to be conceived through another, do not have precisely the same significations in relation to the definition of mode as that which is in another through which it is also conceived (§676); for otherwise it would not be possible to assert concerning that which is in another that it is conceived through another (Log. §§198, 225¹⁴). That is conceived through another which does not permit of being cognized except by means of the presupposed cognition of something else (Ip8s2) or, in our terms, which has the reason why it exists in something else, as we have already noted above (§679n). Since, therefore, if the sufficient reason is posited then that is also posited which exists on account of it rather than not (Ont. §118), so when the former is actually posited then the latter must likewise actually be posited; if, however, the former is merely considered as something which could be posited, then the latter can be considered only insofar as it can be posited, consequently, only insofar as its possibility is concerned. When it is said that something is conceived through another, it is understood well enough from this that it is not possible for it to be known except through another whose possibility has already been discerned by us; and so being in another must not express a bare possibility but must express something more; consequently, being in another is immediately related to existence. Hence, being in another means the same as that the sufficient reason for its existence is to be sought in another, and as a result, that which is in another requires the power of that other being in order to exist. However, a being is from another, according to us, which requires the power of another in order to exist (Nat. Theol. I §27); therefore, it is clear that Spinoza conflates mode with what we call being from another. Which was the second point to be proved. The more rigor and acuity that we apply to the examination of Spinoza’s definitions, the more we discern a confusion among notions which should be distinguished from one another. If, however, one should be lacking in both of these qualities, one will easily assent to the inference of those things which cannot be inferred and, consequently, embrace a cloud one takes for Juno. The effort taken, therefore, in the examination of Spinoza’s definitions must not be regarded as wasted. Accident is opposed to substance (Ont. §768), and being from another to being from itself (Nat. Theol. I §27). As long, then, as it has not been demonstrated that all substance is being from itself, such that being from itself and substance could be taken as synonyms (Log. §330), then it is not possible to oppose mode to the same notion, insofar as it is considered only as being from another. And since attributes, as much as modes, are accidents (Ont. §779), and Spinoza mistakenly identifies attributes with what we call essential determinations (§679), which constitute the essence of a thing (Ont. §143), and neither does he distinguish modes from attributes properly so-called (§681), so it is not at all correct to oppose modes alone to substance, as if nothing is conceived by the understanding except that which is either substance or its mode.

§683. (Spinoza’s error concerning the definition of substance.) Spinoza does not take substance in its received signification. For, when taken in its received signification this word denotes a subject of constant and changing intrinsic determinations

¹⁴ This seems to amount to the rather precious point that this could not count as a genuine predication, as the predicate already belongs to the subject in virtue of its definition.

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(Ont. §§769, 771), that is, a subject in which there are some determinations which remain the same, namely the essentialia and attributes, while the rest vary continuously, which are of course modes (Ont. §770). However, for Spinoza substance is that which is in itself and conceived through itself (§674), that is, as he himself explains in Ip8s2, it is that the cognition of which does not require the cognition of any other thing, and which is understood as attaching to the subject, even though nothing is supposed in it through which it is known why it exists in it, just as essentialia, are conceived (Ont. §§156, 56). It is therefore clear that in the notion of substance Spinoza focuses solely on essential determinations, with attributes and modes having received less attention (to which consideration must likewise be given, as has been demonstrated). In this way, it is evident that Spinoza does not take substance in its received signification. It is not, therefore, surprising that those things which he predicates of substance cannot be demonstrated of it in its received signification, such as that it is one in number, and that it necessarily exists, or its non-existence cannot be conceived (Ip5, Ip7). For, from the fact that, in a given being certain determinations remain the same while others are changed continuously, no one would infer that it must necessarily exist, or that its non-existence cannot be conceived and that a being of this sort cannot exist unless it were one in number. Even if one should want to affirm this gratuitously, experience would protest against him.

§684. (Another mistake on Spinoza’s part concerning the definition of substance.) Spinoza conflates substance with being from itself. Spinoza requires two things for something to count as substance, namely, that it is in itself and that it is conceived through itself (§674); consequently, being in itself and being conceived through itself do not signify precisely the same thing, just as was clear from the demonstration of the above proposition (§682), namely that being in another and being conceived through another do not signify precisely the same thing.¹⁵ Accordingly, since being in itself and being in another mutually oppose one another, from Iax1, and since being in another means that something which exists in another stands in need of the power of that other thing in order to exist, as we have shown in the proof of a previous proposition (§681), so being in itself must mean that that which exists in itself does not stand in need of the power of another for its existence, and consequently exists through its own power. Yet, that which exists through its own power is a being from itself (Nat. Theol. I §27). Spinoza, therefore, conflates substance with being from itself. Since Spinoza thus introduces a-se-ity into his definition of substance, albeit by means of ambiguous and less than perspicuous terms, it is hardly surprising that he makes it into a necessarily existing thing, where necessary existence (Nat. Theol. I §32) and existence in virtue of its essence are the prerogatives of being from itself (Nat. Theol. I §31).

§685. (The defective character of Spinoza’s definition of a finite thing.) Spinoza defines a finite or limited thing incorrectly and ambiguously. For he defines a thing finite in its own kind as that which can be limited by another of the same nature ¹⁵ Wolff ’s reference has been corrected here (it was originally to “§681”).

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(§677). However, in mathematics, that is called finite to which limits can be assigned, that is, limits to where it begins and where it ends, or beyond which it can be increased (Ont. §798). The limits of lines are points (Geom. §11), and so if two points can be assigned to a plane where a line begins and where it ends, then that line is called finite or limited. And therefore, some thing is called finite or limited insofar as bounds or limitations are connected with the intrinsic determinations through which it is conceived (Ont. §142) and beyond which their reality does not extend in the slightest (Ont. §468). Therefore, just as the line is not called finite because it can be limited by some other line but because limits are conceived on both ends beyond which it does not extend; so too any given thing cannot be called finite because it is limited by another of the same nature, or is conceived as possibly being so limited, but because these limits are connected with it, beyond which the realities that are understood as being in that thing cannot be increased. Indeed, when it happens that there is no contradiction for some thing that another thing should exist at its boundaries or limits, beyond which its reality does not extend, one does not understand that this has taken place because the second thing exists at the limits of the first, but rather it is clear that the second is able to exist at the limits of the first because the first has limits by means of which the reality of the same is constrained. So, if a straight line on a plane were not limited on either side by two given points, then it would not be possible to draw other straight lines through its limits, that is, through those same points beyond which the length of the finite line does not extend. Thus, Spinoza wrongly defines a thing finite in its own kind as that which can be limited by another thing of the same nature, when he ought rather to have defined it in terms of the limits that are connected with the realities through which it is conceived and beyond which they cannot be increased, that is, in our manner of speaking, in terms of the limits that are connected with the intrinsic determinations that enter into our notion of the thing, which limits are inseparable from the determinations for as long as one wants to represent that thing. This is the first item that was to be demonstrated. The phrase that a thing “is limited by another of the same nature” is not sufficiently perspicuous that it would be adequately clear what it is supposed to signify. For this reason, Spinoza adds (intending to explain this lest these seem like sounds without meaning) that a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. Even if this is true (Ont. §825), it nonetheless does not make the obscure words through which the definition is given better understood, but rather only clouds the definition with more obscurity. For, through the fact that for a given body another greater one is conceivable, we do not grasp why there are such limits to its magnitude, but rather another greater one is conceivable because it [i.e., the first body] has these limits to its magnitude, which are understood to exist in it apart from whether we give a thought to another that is greater. To be limited by another of the same nature, therefore, cannot signify the same as containing the reason in itself for the limits that exist in other beings. Nor is it clear that, through the fact that a greater body is conceived for a given body, that we can thereby grasp that a body can coexist with it which hinders it from being greater or smaller on account of existing at its limits, as these words were bound to have been interpreted according to what has been said in the demonstration of the first point. Since, therefore, words are called

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ambiguous when their signification cannot be determined with certainty, it cannot be denied that Spinoza defines a thing finite in its own kind, or a limited thing, ambiguously. Which was the second point to be proved. This definition is of signal importance for Spinozism: for, seduced by the ambiguity of these words, one readily assents to the infinite and unitary character of substance, and exempts finite things from the number of substances and, consequently, holds these for modifications of the attributes of the single and infinite substance which alone exists and can possibly exist, and thereby joins with Spinozism (§671). I thus want my readers to weigh carefully what we have said, particularly concerning the present definition but also the others, so that we gain an intimate understanding of Spinozism and learn to recognize how far removed it is from the truth.

§686. (Spinoza’s error in defining a finite or limited thing.) Spinoza errs when he assumes that a thing finite in its own kind is always capable of being limited by another of the same nature. For when he intends to explain the definition in which he assumes this, he says that thought is limited by thought but body is not limited by thought nor thought by body. In virtue of their use in the demonstration of Ip8, these ambiguous words (§685) can be understood in no other way than that a finite being can neither be nor be conceived unless another finite thing of the same nature exists and is conceived, and in which that is found by which it is understood why these limits rather than others exist in it, that is, which contains in itself the sufficient reason for the limits of another thing (Ont. §56). Since, therefore, when some finite thing is actually posited, the limits of another thing are simultaneously posited (Ont. §118), limits in fact denote a lack of further reality (Ont. §468), one which prevents a greater reality from being able to exist in another being. According to Spinoza, the soul is a thinking thing, or a thought, and therefore must, as something finite, be limited by another soul, that is, it cannot be nor be conceived without another soul which prevents its limits from extending further; consequently, the sufficient reason for the original limitations, which are connected to its essential determinations, must be in another soul. Yet, the power of the soul, in which consists its essence and nature (Rat. Psych. §§66–7) is materially limited by the position of the organic body in the universe, and indeed in such a way that it could not perceive clearly unless something acted in that body or some change was induced in the organs of sense and so in the formal constitution of the organs of sense, insofar namely as such changes are induced in those organs (Rat. Psych. §63). Yet is there anyone who would say that it is not possible for these limitations to actually be or be conceived in the soul unless another soul actually is or is conceived which prevents our soul from being able to perceive more objects than those which act upon our sensory organs, and from perceiving these more clearly and distinctly than the constitution of our sensory organs permits? Rather, since no reason is required for why essentialia exist in something (Ont. §159), it is understood through these limitations themselves that they are conjoined with the power of the soul. Thus, Spinoza affirms what must be denied (Log. §200), and since one who affirms what is to be denied errs (Log. §624), it follows that Spinoza errs when he assumes in his definition of a thing finite in its own kind, for instance a thought or finite thinking thing, that it must be limited by another of the same nature, such as another thought or another finite thinking thing.

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No doubt the notion of a sufficient reason had occurred to Spinoza, just like it had to Descartes (Ont. §321n), whose principles he was educated in (§667n), and through it he confusedly cognized the principle of sufficient reason as well, but a distinct notion of the same eluded him; from where, having erred in the principle’s application, he sought a sufficient reason for the original limitations which are connected with the essences of finite things. Since no internal reason is given (Ont. §156), he concluded that there must be an external one, which he wrongly confuses with a cause (Ont. §321), as it were, with a source of its determination, which contradicts this principle because it does not permit such a cause (Ont. §883), as is clear enough to those who attend to the original limitations of the soul. For the soul’s perceptions are limited or finite, where these limits indicate a lack of further reality (Ont. §468), insofar as they are confused and obscure and consequently not distinct enough (Emp. Psych. §§32, 39), and so everything in the perceived thing that might be separately enumerated is not represented distinctly (Emp. Psych. §§24, 38 & Rat. Psych. §98). The reason why these are confused and obscure is to be found in the original limitations connected with the soul’s essence (Ont. §144), which limitations we are bound to admit in virtue of the principle of contradiction (Ont. §142), insofar, namely, as it is not contradictory for such limitations to exist in the power of perception as it is experienced in the soul. If Spinoza’s ontological notions had been sufficiently distinct, and he had made fitting use of the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason, as we have done in ontology, he would never have become entangled in the confusions that have been uncovered in his definitions, nor would he have derived his concepts from a hypothesis antecedently framed in his mind, but he would have derived his first notions from the things themselves, notions which he would have himself discovered his hypothesis does not at all agree with.

§687. (The principles of Spinozism.) Spinozism rests upon uncertain, confused, and ambiguous principles. For Spinoza endeavors to demonstrate his hypothesis concerning the single, infinite substance, where everything else proceeds from the necessary modifications of its attributes, which is to say Spinozism (§671), on the basis of his definitions and axioms. Indeed, he relies upon the Cartesian principle that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived (or conceived, in his own terms) is true, and accordingly does not demonstrate that which he assumes in his definitions. Yet principles for a proof, as definitions are (Log. §562), which themselves require proof but are assumed without it, are uncertain (Log. §843). Spinoza therefore uses uncertain principles in demonstrating his hypothesis, and consequently Spinozism rests upon uncertain principles. Which was the first point to be proved. Furthermore, in his definitions he confuses attributes with essential determinations (§679), modes with attributes, properly so called (§681), and with being from another (§682), and lastly substance with being from itself (§684). Since then he takes diverse things to be the same in his definitions, he fails to distinguish sufficiently that which exists in things that can be enumerated individually. Just as that perception is confused when we do not distinguish all that which can be enumerated separately in the clearly perceived thing (Emp. Psych. §39), and a notion is confused if we are not able to distinguish its marks at all (Log. §88), so the notions that correspond to Spinoza’s definitions (Log. §152) are confused. And indeed, it is clear from the demonstration of the previous point that these definitions are the principles upon which Spinozism rests; therefore, Spinozism rests upon confused principles, which was the second point to be proved.

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Lastly, Spinoza not only defines a finite or limited thing ambiguously (§685), the definition of which is of great importance for Spinozism (§685n), but it is also clear from what we have shown and noted concerning the remaining definitions that almost all of his terms are quite ambiguous so that if one attends to them solely, one is scarcely able to come up with a conjecture as to what it should signify. Since it is apparent from that which was demonstrated in the proof of the first point that Spinozism rests on these definitions as on principles, it is therefore entirely clear that Spinozism rests on ambiguous principles. Which was the third point to be demonstrated. We see then how slippery the foundation of the whole of Spinozism is, so that no assent is merited even if one takes nothing else into consideration but Spinoza’s definitions. Yet no one should be surprised that Spinoza could have been able to persuade himself that this foundation was so firm and unshakeable that he could take the system he constructed upon it as demonstrated, and that it could even contend with geometrical truths concerning its evidence. For having embraced as true the Cartesian principle that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived (or, as he preferred to express it, whatever is so conceived) is true, he was hardly concerned with the proof of what was assumed in the definitions. In this way it came about that he built his system upon uncertain principles. Neither he nor Descartes accounted for clear and distinct perception (or conception as he calls it) in such a way as to distinguish the intellect from the senses and the imagination; but both contented themselves with a confused idea, one engendered in the mind by means of a handful of examples. Thus it happened that he seemed to clearly and distinctly perceive (or conceive) that which was in no way grasped with a distinct and determinate notion, and he was sufficiently content with the clarity of obscure and ambiguous terms that were borrowed from an hypothesis already conceived in his mind before he gave a thought to its demonstration. We learn from the example of Spinoza how deceptive the Cartesian criterion of truth is, even if one should explain clear and distinct perception to the fullest extent using concepts and trace it back to an act of the intellect, since in this way we do not keep other deceptive notions at bay but rather admit them all too easily. Thus, just like Tschirnhaus in the Medicina mentis, he spent vain effort in embellishing and commending it to the great extent that he did.¹⁶ That Spinoza has in fact confused everything in his definitions that, as far as possible, should be considered separately from one another is to be attributed to his lack of knowledge of first philosophy. For because of this he fashions such definitions as are required for his preconceived hypothesis, doing so before he considers the principles upon which he would build his system; rather, should one wish to acquire real concepts and to avoid deceptive ones, one would have instead proceeded from the knowledge of the things themselves, from which ontological notions are to be derived through abstraction. We see, therefore, how great a need there is for a properly cultivated first philosophy, that is, one that can be traced back to true notions which are also distinct and determinate, unless one prefers to amble blindly concerning the most difficult things and to fall headlong into all sorts of errors. Indeed,

¹⁶ Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus (1651–1708), an intimate of Spinoza’s and early mentor to Wolff. His Medicina mentis sive tentamen genuinae logicae was originally published in 1687, with a revised text entitled Medicina mentis sive artis inveniendi praecepta generalia following in 1695. Tschirnhaus’ discussion of the Cartesian principle can be found in the preface of the latter edition.

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there is no other reason than this for why we have begun the study of philosophy from first philosophy and shone light through it on the remaining parts of philosophy.

§688. (On what notion Spinoza has of extension.) Spinoza has none other but a confused notion of extension. For concerning the idea of extension, Spinoza like Descartes is content with that notion we have by means of sense perception and does not provide a definition of it—just as we are typically content with the idea of color which we perceive by means of the senses, and neither do we provide any definition of it. However, we do not perceive extension in the body other than confusedly (Cosmol. §224); Spinoza, therefore, has none other than a confused notion of extension. The reason that neither Descartes, nor Spinoza after him, realized this was that the former did not explain by means of a distinct notion what it is to clearly and distinctly perceive (or, according to the latter, to clearly and distinctly conceive). Hence, Descartes took himself to perceive extension clearly and distinctly insofar as he was aware that he perceived it in bodies, and to that extent he judged that it was not the same as thought but was something different from it because thought and extension did not appear to be the same; on account of this as well, Spinoza purported to conceive of extension, agreeing with Descartes concerning the matter itself but only changing the words.

§689. (Spinoza’s error concerning the notion of extension.) Spinoza wrongly takes extension for something real. For Spinoza takes extension to be an attribute of God, through which His infinite and eternal substance is expressed, and so for something real (§671). Now extension is a phenomenon (Cosmol. §225) and not something real (Cosmol. §225n); therefore, Spinoza wrongly takes it for something real. Whoever recognizes that extension is not a real thing existing in some being but that it rather supposes some other real thing whereby, when that thing is confusedly perceived, extension seems to exist in it (just as color is not itself something real existing in body but supposes another real thing in body, through the confused perception of which the idea of color is produced), and whoever has sufficient insight into how the idea of extension arises in the soul (Rat. Psych. §103), I say that person will also recognize this particular absurdity on the part of Spinozism. Spinoza simply assumes with Descartes that extension is something real that expresses the essence of corporeal substance, and does not prove this on account of his complete reliance upon the spurious principle of clear and distinct perception. We have concluded, however, on the basis of true notions that extension is not something real, but a phenomenon sufficiently grounded in real things (Cosmol. §225).¹⁷ But if Descartes and Spinoza had paid the same attention to extension that they applied in examining the idea of color, they would have easily avoided the error noted in this section.

§690. (The resolvability of the notion of extension into other notions). Extension in Spinoza’s sense is not conceived through itself. For extension is the coexistence of a ¹⁷ Here, and in what follows, Wolff is drawing on Leibniz’s idealist account of space, and his resulting contention that spatially extended objects are merely “well-founded phenomena”; on the former, see Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, §47, and on the latter see, for instance, the letter to Des Bosses of May 29, 1716 (both of these texts are translated in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by R. Ariew and D. Garber [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989]; pp. 201–6 and 337–9.)

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number of things existing externally to one another as one thing, and is constituted by the union of a number of things existing externally to one another (Ont. §548), if one takes the notion in its received signification (Ont. §567) and explicates it distinctly in conformity with the common way of speaking (Ont. §569). That is to say that extension is constituted by the extension of bodies, which are aggregates of simple substances (Cosmol. §176), arising from that which is not extended (Cosmol. §223), namely, from the aggregation of the elements itself (Cosmol. §221). We do not perceive extension other than insofar as we represent many things existing externally to one another as one (Ont. §548), which is to say we perceive it (Emp. Psych. §24), namely, by means of the idea of the extension of bodies arising in the soul when it confuses the diverse internal states of the elements into a single one (Rat. Psych. §103). If, therefore, one wanted to distinctly perceive or cognize extension, without which bodies cannot be perceived (or conceived as Spinoza puts it) (Cosmol. §122), it is necessary that one cognizes the elements (the aggregates of which are bodies), their internal states, and how through these many are represented as though they exist in one; or, if one prefers to speak generally, it is necessary that one cognizes what those many things are which exist externally to one another, and how they can coexist as one thing. The cognition of extension thus presupposes the cognition of many things existing externally to one another and of their union, and in particular it presupposes the cognition of the extension of bodies or simple substances and of their internal state and the manner in which they are aggregated such that one comes to be from many. Since, according to Spinoza that is conceived through itself the cognition of which does not suppose the cognition of another thing (Ip8s2), it is evident that extension in Spinoza’s sense is not at all conceived through itself. It is not without reason then that in the demonstration of the present proposition we connect what is claimed in general concerning the notion of extension in first philosophy with that which is demonstrated in particular concerning the extension of bodies in cosmology and concerning the idea of this extension in rational psychology. For through those claims taken from cosmology, it is more clearly evident what those things are whose cognition is presupposed in the distinct cognition of the extension of substance, and through claims seconded from rational psychology, it is more clearly understood how the confused idea of extension, having arisen in the soul from the limitations of the perceptive power, differs from the distinct notion that belongs to the intellect (Emp. Psych. §275). Even if the Spinozist should be unwilling to assent to our cosmological and psychological principles, which would require a detailed presentation to convince him of, nonetheless the ontological principles are sufficient and no one calls these into doubt provided only that they are not entirely lacking in attentiveness or possessed of a hostile mind, unfamiliar with the truth, seeking to doggedly defend their own preconceived hypotheses. If Spinoza had recognized that the extension which we perceive by means of the senses is perceived only confusedly, just as is the case with colors, then he would never have taken this notion for a distinct one, and traced it back to the intellect as opposed to the senses and imagination. He was deceived as long as he convinced himself that nothing could be distinctly explicated concerning which he did not see how it must be explicated; yet his inability to see was due to the neglect of first philosophy. For if he had inquired into the notion of being in general and the notions of composition and the simple in particular, as we have done in our first philosophy, he would not have taken a notion of

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extension which depends on the senses for a distinct one and as irresolvable into other, simpler notions. Indeed, if he had only attended to that which we perceive concerning corporeal substance by means of the senses themselves, and had employed more acumen in separating those things that are different from one another, then he could not have helped but notice that extension presupposes the cognition of a striving and counter-striving substance and thus that it cannot be cognized without that, and so is not conceived through itself.

§691. (Why extension in Spinoza’s sense cannot be an attribute of God.) Extension in Spinoza’s sense cannot be an attribute of God. For extension in Spinoza’s sense is not conceived through itself (§690). Now since according to him any attribute of the single substance must be conceived through itself (Ip10), as he himself infers there from the definitions of substance and attribute (§§673, 674), so extension cannot be an attribute of God, whom Spinoza recognizes as substance (§672). We have indeed already shown that God cannot be extended (Nat. Theol. I, §8 & II, §38); but here, where we are undertaking to overturn Spinozism, we had to demonstrate the same thing from Spinoza’s own principles. As for various others who make extension into an attribute of God and are convinced that God cannot be conceived without extension,¹⁸ they may discern whether they grant more to Spinoza than is suitable and so they may consider carefully whether this error easily degenerates into a crypto-Spinozism, as will be established more clearly in what follows.

§692. (Spinoza’s error in attributing extension to God.) Since one errs who affirms what should be denied (Log. §624), and it must be denied that extension in Spinoza’s sense is an attribute of the divine (§691); it follows that Spinoza errs insofar as he maintains that extension is an attribute of God, or that God is an extended thing (IIp2). It is not necessary for us to overturn the previously given demonstration to which Spinoza refers at this point,¹⁹ for it is grounded on principles which we reject as uncertain, confused, and ambiguous (§687). It more than suffices that we have shown that even in Spinoza’s sense, that is, according to his own definitions, extension cannot be an attribute of God. Nor would it help to respond that our demonstration depends upon our own principles and our notion of extension (Log. §992), on the basis of which, namely, we have concluded that it is not possible for extension to be conceived, in Spinoza’s sense, through itself (§690), and therefore that it is only according to our principles that he is said to have erred. For error cannot be refuted other than on the basis of true principles, that is, other than through directly opposing what lies at the basis of the deviation, since from such faulty principles it is not possible to infer anything according to the form of correct reasoning; otherwise, unless one agreed concerning the truth of the principles, then any attempt at a refutation would only be an ad hominem argument, and neither would it be decided that that which is rejected is false, but only that it cannot agree with correct principles. No one therefore will

¹⁸ For examples, see §694n below. ¹⁹ The demonstration of IIp2 reads: “The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as that of the preceding proposition,” where the previous proposition (IIp1) is: “Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.”

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find fault with the fact that an error is decisively checked by a principle that is assumed as true but not acknowledged as such by the erring party.

§693. (The infinity of extension is not proved by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not proved infinite extension to be possible. For, from the fact that one can arbitrarily remove limits from extension as it is confusedly perceived by the imagination, it does not follow that an extended thing without any limits is possible; rather, the possibility of this notion, which is formed through arbitrary determination, must be proved as such notions are no less capable of being impossible as possible (Log. §720ff): Spinoza never does this however because he relies upon the ambiguous principle that that is true which is clearly and distinctly perceived (or conceived as he says), and accordingly he incorrectly holds extension for something real (§689) and so takes it to be possible without limits; it is assuredly clear, then, that he has not proved infinite extension to be possible. Moreover, even though he makes extension into an attribute of God (§671) and all divine attributes are taken to be infinite (§672), it is not understood from this that there is infinite extension and that it is therefore possible (Ont. §170). For extension in Spinoza’s sense cannot be an attribute of God (§691), and consequently that infinite extension is possible is in no way proven when it is taken to be an attribute of God. Accordingly, nowhere in the principles by means of which Spinoza advanced his hypothesis is to be found that from which it follows that infinite extension is possible. Since then Spinoza himself supplied no proof of infinite extension, and neither is it possible to prove this through his principles (provided one does not want to infer something which does not follow from them at all), it is completely evident that the possibility of infinite extension has in no way been proven by him. The possibility of infinite extension, if it does not otherwise conflict with truth, is not capable of being proven so easily. For, since an extended thing arises from something which is not extended (Cosmol. §223), when namely the elements of material things, or simple substances (Cosmol. §182), are aggregated together (Cosmol. §221); so, if one intends to demonstrate the possibility of infinite or unlimited extension, it must be demonstrated that simple substances are possible, through whose aggregation into phenomena infinite extension arises. Is there anyone, however, other than a complete stranger to the doctrine of elements, who does not see that proving this is something that one should not take on lightly? For it is not easy to undertake to demonstrate whether infinite extension is possible or impossible. Here imaginary things are mistaken for real ones, even if Spinoza professes to be repulsed by the Cartesian terminology of clear and distinct perception so that he substituted conception for it, lest we should confuse that which is imagined with what is understood or comprehended only by the intellect. Spinoza never took up the possibility of infinite extension, but maintained that through it the infinite essence of God is expressed: if only he had not confused the perception which belongs to the imagination with a distinct notion formed by the intellect. Nor is it enough for us to perceive the extension of bodies confusedly by means of the senses and, insofar as we imagine it in abstraction, to sense in ourselves nothing contradictory as we continue to add, or arbitrarily posit, more to the extension no matter how great its magnitude, so that we infer from this that an infinite extension is possible, and that an infinite extended thing is likewise possible. For even were this sort of argument to be permitted, I cannot know

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what cannot be proved. Why could we not prove in a similar way that an infinite color or infinite sweetness is also possible?

§694. (Spinoza’s error concerning the origin of bodies.) Bodies cannot arise through the modification of some attribute of the divine, namely the modification of infinite extension, nor can they be called a mode, in Spinoza’s sense, which expresses the essence of God in a certain and determinate way insofar as He is considered as an extended thing. For extension is not even an attribute of God in Spinoza’s sense (§691). Accordingly, even if bodies arose in the first place from the modification of infinite extension, it would still not be able to be claimed that they arose from the modification of some attribute of the divine. Indeed, extension is nothing but a phenomenon (Cosmol. §226), nor can it be held to be something real (§689), and all bodies arise from something which is not extended (Cosmol. §223). So, even if extension were an attribute of God, as Spinoza has it (IIp2), it still could not be said that bodies arise from the modification of an attribute of God. It is, therefore, clear that bodies in no way arise from the modification of some divine attribute, namely, the modification of infinite extension. Which was the first point to be proved. Since God cannot be extended (Nat. Theol. I, §85; II, §38), nor indeed can extension in Spinoza’s sense be an attribute of God (§691), God also cannot be considered as an extended thing in accordance with Spinoza’s principles, nor does extension express the infinite essence of God. Bodies therefore cannot be called a mode, in Spinoza’s sense, which expresses God’s essence in a certain and determinate way insofar as He is considered as an extended thing, which was the second point to be proved. A uniform extension considered without any limits, that is, without figures (Ont. §621), is an imaginary notion, of the sort that the vulgar attribute to space (the imaginary notion of which they are also content with—Ont. §599), and on account of which Henry More and his follower Joseph Raphson took space to be an attribute of God which expresses His infinite and truly unlimited essence, in conformity with Spinoza’s opinions (Ont. §599n).²⁰ The origin of bodies through the modification of extension must therefore be reckoned among the miscarriages of the imagination insofar namely as, according to this view, the power of God [merely] imposes various limits, or diverse figures, upon a uniform extension. Nor do I see how someone who takes extension for something real can avoid Spinoza’s opinion in the end. For, since everything that is real is possible in the highest degree (§12), such a one will acknowledge that infinite extension is possible. And because all realities are in God, the most perfect being (§14), in the highest degree possible (§15), he will also readily ascribe infinite extension to God as an attribute, in accordance with the true definition of attribute (Ont. §146), inasmuch as supreme perfection is regarded as His essence (Ont. §168). Even if bodies are produced by means of the modification of extension, such a theorist could not see why he must still admit another

²⁰ Henry More (1614–87) was a theologian and philosopher, and one of the Cambridge Platonists. In his A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More (London, 1662) he contends that God, and finite spirits, are extended but indivisible. Joseph Raphson (1648–1715), was a Cambridge mathematician, influenced by More and a close associate of Newton, who attributed space (as distinct from matter) to God in his De spatio reali, seu Ente infinito (London, 1697), which text also introduced the term “pantheism” (in Latin).

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extension beyond that which is in God, one that would be opposed to it, which is just what happens with Spinoza. Therefore, it is hardly difficult for this same individual to agree that bodies arise from some divine attribute, namely, infinite extension, modified through divine power, and in this way, quite in keeping with Spinoza, bodies are nothing other than some mode which expresses God’s essence in a certain and determinate way insofar as He is considered as an extended thing; indeed, as we have just seen with More and Raphson, an attribute, namely infinite extension, expresses God’s infinite and truly unlimited essence in a manner quite in agreement with Spinoza. It is, therefore, clear how necessary it is for the confused notion of extension to be rendered distinct, just as we have done in first philosophy (Ont. §548), and through this to remove the extension of bodies from among the number of real things, as has been done by us (Cosmol. §226) when we uncovered the true source of this notion (Cosmol. §221 & Rat. Psych. §103).

§695. (What sort of power it is that produces bodies, according to Spinoza.) The power of God, through which bodies are produced according to Spinoza, is nothing else but a power to modify. For according to Spinoza, bodies arise through the modification of some divine attribute, namely, infinite extension (§671). Now as the attribute of God is modified through the power of God, insofar namely as limits are introduced by the unlimited, so that that is expressed in a certain and determinate way which is expressed through the attribute as infinite and unlimited (IId1), it follows that the power of God, through which bodies are produced, is nothing else but a power to modify. Spinoza evidently attributes a power to God, as substance, through which everything is and takes place; otherwise, we would have no sufficient reason for that which exists in the world, nor would we be able to understand whence they exist. Since, however, Spinoza rejected the power to create as gratuitously fabricated, nothing remains for God but the power to modify, and this he judged to suffice for the explanation of everything that is and takes place in the material world or corporeal universe. Indeed, for precisely that reason, he made extension an attribute of God, that is, so that the arising of bodies in the absence of a power to create could be explained by modification alone.

§696. (Spinoza’s error concerning nature.) Spinoza makes the power of nature the power of God, and removes all nature properly so-called from the bodies in which the world consists, or he makes nature properly so-called a non-being. For the power of nature is the power to modify (Nat. Theol. I, §853), and Spinoza makes God’s power into nothing else than a power to modify (§695). So, he makes the power of nature into the power of God, which was the first point to be proved. The whole of nature is an aggregate of all of the powers of motion that are in the coexisting bodies in the world taken together (Cosmol. §507), and it contains the reason why these changes, rather than others, take place in the world (Cosmol. §505). For Spinoza recognizes no other power in God than that through which extension, as His attribute, is modified so that bodies and their alterations are produced in the material world (§671), and he makes it the power to modify extension (§695). He therefore removes all nature, properly so-called, from the bodies in which the world consists (Cosmol. §119), and denying that nature properly so-called can exist, he makes it into a non-being. This was the second point to be proved.

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In this matter, Spinoza is preceded by Descartes who, because he took extension to be the essence of body or an attribute, as he puts it, which expresses the same thing, but also noted that from the confused notion that he had of extension it followed that there was no power, such as a source of alterations, implanted in bodies (Cosmol. §136), inasmuch as it would be conceived (Cosmol. §301) as a substance different from matter or from what is extended (Cosmol. §141); so, he removed all active power from bodies and attributed it solely to God. Yet, if bodies are conceived without any activity, then because active power is their nature (Cosmol. §145) one would have to call nature a non-being (Ont. §137). For this reason, Robert Boyle called nature an idol, which cannot be imagined without injury to the supreme Being, and Sturm makes a spectacle of treating this word nature as an empty term.²¹ It is, therefore, clear how necessary an understanding of the theory of elements treated in cosmology is, through which it is established that bodies are no less to be attributed an active power (Cosmol. §180) than they are an extension (Cosmol. §223), and why both should appear as two different substances (Cosmol. §301) since these are nothing more than substantiated phenomena (Cosmol. §300) whose reality is grounded in the elements (Cosmol. §192) and besides this there is nothing substantial given in bodies (Cosmol. §177). Spinoza undoubtedly distinguishes natura naturans from natura naturata in Ethics Ip29s,²² but he along with Descartes takes essence and nature as synonyms, just as one commonly confuses essence with nature, and indeed as all those must so confuse them who do not count nature among beings and declare it an idol and a rival to the supreme Being. For he says that natura naturans is that which is in itself and conceived through itself, or through attributes that express its eternal and infinite essence, that is, it is God insofar as He is considered as a free cause (free, namely, from all external coercion); natura naturata however is that which follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or from one of His attributes, that is, it is all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and which cannot be nor be conceived without God. As Spinoza himself states at IId2, to the essence of a thing belongs that “without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived and vice versa.” Now since he maintains that God is to be conceived through such attributes as express an eternal and infinite essence (§672), but he takes the things, or particulars, that exist in addition to God for nothing more than modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (Ip25c), and so body is defined “as a mode that expresses God’s essence in a certain and determinate way insofar as He is considered as an extended thing” (IId1); is it not then obvious that the entire distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata does not consist in the difference between the active power of particular things and that of God, but in the difference between the essences of particular things and that of God? As for the rest who do not distinguish at all between nature and essence, they must be said to confuse nature with God in the same way as Spinoza, since he also admits the difference between particular things which is derived from essence.²³ Thus it can happen that some explain the actuality of those things that have this essence differently, for ²¹ See Robert Boyle’s A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (1686). Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703) was a natural philosopher in the Cartesian tradition who was influenced by Boyle (in for instance his De naturae agentis idolo of 1692). ²² See §671n, above. ²³ The point here would appear to be that if one does not distinguish nature from essence, or denies that nature designates a distinct power on the part of an individual thing (as with Boyle and Sturm), then one will ultimately identify nature with God, since God contains the essences of all particular things even though particular things remain distinguished through their different individual essences.

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the disagreement between Spinoza and his opponents does not concern the essence of things (on which they agree) but their actuality. Furthermore, we have shown that one and the same power of the soul constitutes its essence and nature (Rat. Psych. §§66, 67). Yet, we have also shown that that this power does not, taken in the same respect, constitute the essence and nature of the soul; rather, it constitutes the soul’s essence insofar as the soul is limited to these and not other representations, which are actualized in this and not some other order; however, it constitutes its nature insofar as these same representations are in fact brought to actuality (Rat. Psych. §68), so that through its nature those representations are brought to actuality which are only understood as possible through its essence. We thus sufficiently distinguish the soul’s essence and its nature from one another, namely in a manner conformable to both notions. However, Spinoza could not admit this difference within the soul, given his attribution of the activity or power by which all that exists is brought to actuality solely to God, and thereby making natura naturans, in contrast to what he calls essence, a non-being.

§697. (The impossibility that two substances of the same nature should exist according to Spinoza.) Spinoza has not proved that “in nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature”²⁴ (Ip5). For the entire strength of the argument, on which the pretended demonstration rests, comes to this that two such substances could not be distinguished from one another, and so would have to be one and the same being.²⁵ Since he confuses attribute and essential determination (§679), this is just as much as to say that it is not possible to distinguish two substances, through their essence, when they have the same essence in common. Indeed, this results from his supposition that an attribute, through which is expressed the essence of substance (according to him) or (put more correctly) of a being (§673), is something unlimited, considered with all original limitations having been set aside, and so as constituting some kind of higher genus, like body in general; consequently it represents a sort of universal being (Ont. §230). Now since universals do not exist (Ont. §235) but there are only singular things that are thoroughgoingly determined (Ont. §§226, 227), and yet original limitations, which belong to essential determinations and are that through which the essences of things are differentiated, are connected with individual things in such a way as to be inseparable from them (Nat. Theol. I, §§894, 895); it is evident to all that Spinoza has hardly demonstrated that two or more substances of the same nature, or that have a common essence, are not possible in nature. Spinoza is not helped by the fact that he does not take substance in the received signification (§683) but confuses it with being from itself (§684), and so it is just the same as if he had said that it is not possible to have two beings from themselves which have the same essence, a claim that would contain nothing estranged from truth. For Spinoza abuses this principle the better to camouflage his hypothesis. It is not fitting for a philosopher to confuse those things in his definitions which should be distinguished just so that he might allow ambiguities to be inferred that could not otherwise be inferred from them in any way. Since Spinoza unquestionably takes extension for an attribute that expresses infinite and eternal substance, it follows in virtue of this proposition that there is no more than one extended substance, that that substance is a

²⁴ In the original, Spinoza adds “sive attributi [or attribute].”

²⁵ See the demonstration of Ip5.

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being from itself, and that bodies are produced by means of continuous modification through the potency or power of that substance. From thence it is further concluded that the world is eternal and a necessary being, and that everything has taken place in it according to a fatal or immutable necessity, and neither is there a place in it for purposes; such inferences are also drawn by Spinoza. But even if Spinoza distinguishes the notion of being from itself and that of substance from one another, as would be proper, and he had demonstrated only the impossibility of more than one being from itself having exactly the same essence, then there would be no error to fear following from the conclusion. For this reason, it is necessary that one does not assume something to be demonstrated which cannot be admitted in the received signification of the terms, and that any ambiguity is removed which might lead us down a false path. The error of Spinoza stems from the fact that he took all limitations for modes and that he did not distinguish between original limitations, which are connected in themselves with essential determinations and permit of being conceived through themselves, which is to say not through the supposition of another thing, and changeable things, which are capable of alteration whereas the former remain the same, but also from the fact that he tacitly supposed that all substance must be infinite, and consequently that the reality through which it is conceived spurns any limits.

§698. (The contrary is proved.) It is not contrary to the notion of substance in its received signification that there are multiple substances of the same kind (genus or species): in fact, this is actually the case. For in its received signification, substance is a subject in which the essentialia and attributes remain the same while its modes are continuously altered (Ont. §770). Kinds retain the same essentialia (Ont. §§233, 234, 247), as well as the same attributes and the same modes that are conditionally asserted of these attributes (whether as proximate or remote possibilities) (Ont. §§268, 269). It is not at all contrary, then, to the notion of substance in the received signification that there are multiple substances of the same kind (genus or species). This was the first point to be proved. A soul of any sort whatsoever is a substance (Rat. Psych. §48), and that it exists no one is able to call into doubt (Emp. Psych. §21). The essence of any soul whatsoever consists in the power of representing the world materially limited by the position of the organic body in the world and formally limited by the constitution of the sensory organs (Rat. Psych. §66). Accordingly, all souls have the same common essence and, since singular things belong to the same kind insofar as they have the same essentialia (Ont. §254), it follows that they all belong to the same kind. Therefore, there are in fact multiple substances of the same genus or species. Similarly, bodies are aggregates of simple substances (Cosmol. §176) which constitute their elements (Cosmol. §182). All elements belong to the same kind, as is clear from the complete doctrine of elements that was presented in our Cosmology. Therefore, there are as many substances of the same genus or species as there are elements of material things. From this it is once again clear that there are in actuality many substances of the same kind (genus or species). This was the second point to be proved. Nor does one exempt themselves from this argument by claiming that the soul and the elements of material things are not substances in Spinoza’s sense. For Spinoza does not take the word substance in the received signification and he tacitly injects a-se-ity into this notion (§684). He should, however, have taken substance in the received signification and then

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demonstrated, if he had been able to, that in that sense every substance would have to be a being from itself: yet he did not prove this nor could he prove it. To impose ambiguous words upon notions which do not belong in them, and not to demonstrate their reality, as Spinoza did, is not only contrary to the rules of proper method, but also a source of errors (Log. §631), for with the demonstrative method which Spinoza wanted to use in the construction of his system many errors follow from a single one (Log. §628). No one, therefore, will justly reprimand us that we take issue with Spinoza on the basis of true principles, and that we oppose what we have disclosed to be the falsity of deceptive notions and the conclusions deduced from them with propositions that have been demonstrated on the basis of true principles, unless they want to reject the best method of refutation (Log. §1036).

§699. (The impossibility of creation has not been demonstrated by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not demonstrated that one substance cannot be produced by another substance, nor indeed that substance absolutely cannot be produced by anything else. For, when he intends to demonstrate in Ip6 that one substance cannot be produced by another substance, and from there to infer in the corollary that a substance cannot be produced from anything else, he presumes as demonstrated that there cannot be two substances of the same attribute, or essence, or genus, or species, in nature. Yet, Spinoza has in no way proven this (§697), and indeed one could rather demonstrate the contrary (§698). Now since that has not yet been demonstrated the proof of which involves undemonstrated propositions, so even less can something be said to have been demonstrated if it involves propositions whose contraries are capable of being demonstrated; thus, it is evident that Spinoza has not demonstrated at all that one substance cannot be produced by another, nor indeed that substance cannot be produced in any way by anything else. Spinoza of course also attempts to show indirectly that it is impossible for one substance to be produced by another,²⁶ yet the indirect demonstration he purports to give is no stronger than the direct one. For he claims that if one substance were produced by another, the cognition of it must depend on the cognition of its cause, and since he assumes in Iax4 that the cognition of the effect depends upon the cognition of the cause, it follows that it would not be a substance according to its definition (§674). However, one must in any case distinguish between the cognition of possibility and cognition of actuality. For, when it is claimed in the definition of substance that it is conceived through itself, where these words are understood to mean that the cognition of that being does not depend upon the cognition of any other being, this cannot mean anything else than that we can have a notion of this being and that we can demonstrate its possibility even when we do not suppose the notion of another being. This is the same as when we have the notion of an equilateral triangle, and we are able to demonstrate its possibility, even though we do not take into account the possibility of another figure such that the triangle is not conceived of as possible unless one also admitted that other figure to be possible and, consequently, that the triangle’s possibility presupposed the possibility of something else. But, that which is caused depends upon its cause as far as its actuality or existence is concerned (Ont. §881), and thus we can understand through that which is contained in the cause why such a being, whose possibility is already otherwise established and would be

²⁶ The indirect proof follows the direct proof in Ip6, after the corollary.

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established even if it could be shown per impossibilie that its cause is not possible, attains to actuality, and consequently the cognition of its actuality or existence presupposes the cognition of the cause. Therefore, even if one admitted that substance is correctly defined in terms of that which is conceived through itself, nonetheless it would not at all follow from the fact that one supposes something to be produced by another thing that it is not capable of being conceived through itself. Although a Spinozist may object that in the definition it is added that substance is that which is in itself, and so the words that follow “and is conceived through itself” must be extended to actuality, it is easy to reply to this.²⁷ Namely, Spinoza would have to prove, concerning something that is understood to be possible without the presupposition of the possibility of another being, that its actuality or existence can be cognized (a priori, that is, through its notion) without having presupposed the existence of another being, something that Spinoza neither proved anywhere nor could he prove at all. However, Spinoza sets himself against the rules of correct logic when he collects terms in his definition where one is determined through the other (Log. §836), and makes use of ambiguous words (Log. §160), and indeed assumed something to be granted that must first be demonstrated before one can grant it. Moreover, while Spinoza takes himself to have demonstrated the impossibility of creation in the proposition in which he disputes the production of one substance from another, it is clear from the present proposition that that impossibility has in no way been proven on that basis, and neither, then, can the power to create which is attributed to God be counted an absurdity.

§700. (The a-se-ity of substance is not demonstrated by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not demonstrated that substance necessarily exists. For, when he intends to demonstrate in Ip7 that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, he assumes that it cannot be produced by another thing. Yet, since he has not demonstrated that substance cannot be produced by another thing (§699), one also cannot say that he has demonstrated that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, or that substance necessarily exists. He errs, therefore, when he confuses substance with being from itself (§684), namely, when ase-ity has been tacitly inserted into the notion of substance. Indeed, if one considers the notion of substance, that namely it is a subject of constant and variable determinations (Ont. §769), of which some are continuously changed while the rest remain the same (Ont. §762), then one will not at all be able to infer from this that substance necessarily exists. And even if you ventured to hold this quite apart from the fact that it does not follow as a consequence, the counter-examples of souls and elements would soon convince you of your error.

²⁷ A gloss of Wolff ’s argument here might be helpful. Wolff has just shown that, if we understand Spinoza’s claim that substance is “conceived through itself” in terms of not presupposing the notion of some other thing in cognizing its possibility, then we must allow that being conceived through itself is not inconsistent with being produced by something else, since as far as its actuality is concerned it still presupposes its cause. Now, Wolff imagines the Spinozist objecting that, given that existence or actuality is mentioned in the first part of the definition (that substance is that which is in itself), the term to which the second part of the definition applies (that it is conceived for itself) must be taken in an extended sense such that it involves the cognition of the possibility and the actuality of some thing, that is, that through cognizing something to be possible without presupposing another being we thereby also cognize its actuality independently of any other being. It is to this latter objection that Wolff now proceeds to respond.

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§701. (The contrary demonstrated.) Not all substance exists necessarily, or the essence of substance in no way involves necessary existence. For the elements of material things and human souls are contingent beings (§331). Now since contingent beings do not have the sufficient reason for their existence in their essence (Ont. §310), to posit the essence of elements and of human souls is not yet to posit their existence (Ont. §118), and so their essence does not involve necessary existence. The elements, however, of material things (Cosmol. §182) and human souls are substances (Rat. Psych. §48). The essence of substance, therefore, does not involve necessary existence at all, and so not all substance exists necessarily. It is also already clear from what we have noted in connection with the preceding proposition that the notion of substance does not involve necessary existence at all. The ambiguity of Spinoza’s terms, namely, being in itself and being in another, not only introduces obscurity but also delivers the mind over to perplexity from which it is unsure how to extricate itself. Yet, nothing stands in the way of discerning the truth for someone who has once provisioned his mind with distinct and determinate ontological notions, the reality of which is manifest in things themselves. For this reason, I have already warned above (§672n) that Spinoza’s definitions are to be examined carefully, especially since in them he assumed that which he does not prove and that which in his estimation stands in no need of proof because he deems it to be conceived of itself and he supposes all that to be true which can be so conceived. On account of this, we have recalled all of Spinoza’s definitions for examination.

§702. (The infinity of all substance is not demonstrated by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not demonstrated that all substance is necessarily infinite. For when he seeks to demonstrate this he supposes that there is no more than one substance of the same attribute or kind, that this necessarily exists, and that if it had been finite, then it would have to be limited by another of the same nature or essence. However, he has not demonstrated that there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature (§697), nor has he proven that all substance exists necessarily (§700), but instead the contrary of both can be proven (§§698, 701). And moreover the terms he uses in his definition of a finite thing—that it is limited by another thing of the same nature or essence, as thinking would be limited by other thinking—are not only ambiguous and unsuited for a definition (§685), but also, even if they should be explicated in a way that makes tolerable sense of them, they do not hold for every kind of being (§686). It is therefore clear, as it was before (§§697, 699), that it has not been demonstrated by Spinoza that all substance is necessarily infinite. It is abundantly clear from this that Spinoza’s error expands continuously, as we should expect it to, given his use of the demonstrative method (Log. §628). For, when the error hiding in his principles and smuggled into his first propositions has been exposed, all that has been further deduced from them collapses of its own accord. Spinoza himself remarked that the infinity of substance in general would not readily be conceded on the basis of his demonstration: thus, he seeks to defend this position in the lengthy [second] scholium, and he charges those who think otherwise with “judg[ing] things confusedly” and not being “accustomed to know things through their first causes” [Ip7s2]. Indeed, we saw above that Spinoza is himself guilty of this failing (§687), namely insofar as he contents himself with confused perceptions, whence it transpires that he has not proven such first causes as really exist, but rather framed them in such a way so as to agree with his hypothesis.

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§703. (The contrary is shown.) Not all substance is necessarily infinite or unlimited. For human souls are substances (Rat. Psych. §48) and at the same time finite (Rat. Psych. §264), insofar as finitude pertains to the essence of the human soul (Rat. Psych. §265). The elements of material things are also simple substances (Cosmol. §182) and at the same time finite (Cosmol. §203). Thus, both souls and the elements of material things are limited substances (Nat. Theol. I, §173). Not all substance, therefore, is necessarily infinite or unlimited. Of course, in Ip8s2 Spinoza declares with great confidence that those who cast the infinity of substance into doubt do not know how things are produced. Yet, quite the opposite is apparent from what has been demonstrated in the first part above concerning the origin of all things from God.²⁸ It is true that if one traces everything back to the first cause then finite beings, the series of which is the world (Cosmol. §55), cannot be conceived without an infinite substance, which is God, and so the cognition of them likewise presupposes the cognition of God. It is clear, however, that it is from the limitation of the realities that are in God that there arise subsequent primitive possibilia (§91), from the combination of which results the essences of limited beings (§94). Yet, in this way limited things are only understood in terms of their possibility (Ont. §153), and it is not yet clear why they exist (Ont. §172). Thus, another principle²⁹ must be admitted, through which their existence or actuality might be explained. I will not press the point now that the infinite realities that are in God are not at all able to be considered as Spinoza considers them, that is, as if they were composed out of all limited realities taken together, as this will be treated in more detail soon.

§704. (The one-ness of substance is not demonstrated by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not demonstrated that, outside of God, there cannot be another substance, nor can one be conceived, or, that there can be no substance unless it is one and infinite. For, when he seeks to demonstrate this, he supposes that there cannot be two substances of the same attribute or essence, and that all substance is infinite and that God consists of infinite attributes. However, Spinoza does not by any means demonstrate that there cannot be two or more substances of the same attribute (§697), or that all substance is infinite (§702); but rather the contrary of each of these can be shown to be the case (§§698, 703). He likewise assumes in his definition that God has infinite attributes, but nowhere does he prove it (§672). It is therefore clear once again, as before, (§§697, 699), that Spinoza has in no way demonstrated that there is not, nor can there be conceived, a substance outside God or that there is no substance unless it is one and infinite. The one-ness of substance is the cornerstone of Spinozism (§671). From this it is apparent how slippery a foundation it relies upon.

§705. (The truth of the contrary is affirmed.) Since we have already shown that it is not contrary to the notion of substance taken in its received signification that there are more than one substance of the same kind or species, indeed, as there are in actuality (§698), and neither is every substance necessarily infinite or unlimited ²⁸ This is likely a reference to chapter 5 of the first volume of Theologia naturalis (“De Creatione et Providentia divina [On Creation and Divine Providence]”). ²⁹ See below §710.

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(§703); so it is altogether false that there is not, nor can there be conceived, a substance outside of God, or that there is no substance unless it is one and infinite (Log. §505). If Spinoza had adequately distinguished being from itself from substance (though that he did not is well known—§684), and if he had not confused modes with being from another (§682) and had separated finitude in a more correct way from infinitude than he in fact did (§§677, 685); then he would not have fallen into the very uncommon error of holding that there is but one substance that is also infinite.

§706. (Rejection of the spurious notion of infinite reality.) All infinite reality, and infinite thinking in particular, is not composed of finite realities which are infinite in number. The human intellect, which no one can doubt is a reality (§5), is limited as far as its manner of representing objects is concerned, namely, not everything that is discernable in the intellect permits of being distinguished by it (Emp. Psych. §279). Thus, that intellect is unlimited which is capable of distinguishing in a given object everything that is discernable within it (Ont. §468). However, one might take as many intellects [of the former sort] as one likes, it will nonetheless never yield an intellect that in fact distinguishes everything discernable in a given object, but only a multitude of intellects, each of which is in no way able to distinguish all that is discernable in an object; consequently, a finite intellect is utterly heterogeneous from an infinite intellect (Arithm. §32). It is, therefore, clear that any infinite reality is not composed out of finite realities that are infinite in number. Since thought is perception accompanied by apperception (Emp. Psych. §26), and perception is an act of the mind by which it represents a given object to itself (Emp. Psych. §24), so concerning thought in particular it is likewise evident that it is not at all composed out of finite realities that are infinite in number. This notion of infinity is only an imaginary one, from which Spinoza did not guard himself, even though he constantly reprimands others who, since they confuse imagination with the intellect, could not distinguish between those things which we imagine and those things that are conceived by us. For of the realities, as I call them, recognized by us, he admits no more than two as foremost, namely, extension and thought. Now since he had none other than a confused idea of extension (§688), which he wrongly takes for a reality (§689), he deemed himself to have an idea of infinite extension because for any given magnitude he could imagine a greater magnitude, and thus it seemed to him that he had produced the idea of infinite extension once a given finite or limited extension was replicated an infinite number of times, which notion of infinite quantity is only an imaginary one as we have previously shown elsewhere (Ont. §804). According to the similarity with infinite extension, he also imagined infinite thought, as if it arises from the continued, infinite addition of finite cognition. From this it occurred to him that infinite extension was composed of extended things infinite in number, and infinite thought composed of thinking things infinite in number, contrary to what we have demonstrated in the present section. Had he considered, however, that a finite thing is conceived through limits that are necessarily connected with it, then he would have noted that the notion of the infinite is produced through the removal of all limits. Now since the figure of an extended thing is its limit (Ont. §621), he should have recognized that we do not have the idea of infinite extension before it has been demonstrated that there can be an extended thing without any limits whatsoever. And because there are limits to thinking, or to the act of

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representing possible things in the mind so that we are conscious of them (Emp. Psych. §23), given that we cannot represent everything distinctly at the same time, so we could not understand the idea of infinite thought before it has been demonstrated that it is possible to represent all possible things distinctly or adequately at the same time, or that there exists a subject to which such a representation pertains. From this, Spinoza would have learned that infinite thought contains all finite or limited thoughts that are conceived as possible only eminently, that is, insofar as it assumes their place (Ont. §845).

§707. (Spinoza’s false notion of thinking things is demolished.) Finite thinking things do not arise through the modification of infinite thought, taken as a divine attribute, nor can they be called modes of a divine attribute, namely of infinite thought. For suppose, if it is possible, that finite or limited thinking things arise through the modification of infinite thought, which is considered as a divine attribute, that is, as something that expresses or constitutes the infinite essence of God (§673). Since a being is said to arise insofar as it begins to exist (Ont. §541), a thinking thing exists insofar as infinite thought is modified, where infinite thought is considered as a divine attribute constituting the essence of God, and infinite thinking things must exist insofar as that attribute is modified in infinite ways. Therefore, an infinite number of thinking things taken at the same time constitute infinite thought, and these make up God’s essence or it is composed from these. But since this is absurd (§706), it is impossible that finite or limited thinking beings arise through the modification of infinite thought considered as a divine attribute. Which was the first claim to be proved. Since, therefore, finite thinking things do not arise through the modification of infinite thought considered as a divine attribute, as has been demonstrated, it is clear of itself that these cannot be called modes of a divine attribute, namely, of infinite thought. Which was the second claim to be proved. If Spinoza had sought distinct notions of limit (without which a sufficiently distinct notion of a limited being cannot be had) and of infinite thought, and had not inferred from an imaginary notion of infinite extension to infinite thought, then, he would scarcely have failed to notice that thinking beings cannot possibly arise from the limitation of infinite thought such that they would actually exist in God as things pertaining to His essence and could not possibly be conceived without Him in any way. Having an idea of the soul is essential to the soul, insofar as it is conscious of itself, and since the soul is limited (Rat. Psych. §63), we have an idea of limited thought, to use Spinoza’s phrase, even when no thought of God occurs to the mind. The idea of infinite thinking, however, arises through the removal of the limitations which are in the former idea (Nat. Theol. I §1095), and the reality of this idea of infinite thinking is demonstrated from the fact that any given reality taken in the absolutely highest degree is possible (§12). Yet, that the existence or actuality of the soul, a finite thinking thing, cannot be conceived without God, that is, that its existence could not be demonstrated a priori, cannot be established until one has proven its contingency (§§331, 335–38). And when one has ultimately traced all things back to their first cause, namely God, only at that point is it possible to understand the dependence of the idea of the soul on God (§97). In this way, however, souls are finite substances without which God can surely exist but which cannot exist without God and, thus, creatures are suitably distinguished from their creator in accordance with the received doctrine, making it unnecessary to deviate from it as Spinoza appeared to.

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From this it is once again clear that, in these exceedingly difficult matters, we can expect illumination from no other quarter than from ontology, and it is no wonder that those who condemn or neglect it, or only treat of it in a superficial manner, should end up tapping around blinded by their own shrewdness.

§708. (Spinoza’s error concerning the notion of bodies and souls.) Bodies and souls are not in God as parts are in a whole, nor can they be said to be particles of God. For let us suppose, if it were possible, that bodies and souls are in God as parts are in a whole. Since the whole is just all parts taken together (Ont. §341), God would be all bodies taken together and all souls taken together, or these would at least be something that necessarily existed in God and without which God could not be or be conceived. God would therefore actually contain all bodies and souls as things pertaining to His essence. Accordingly, we cannot conceive of that which is attributed to God as infinite in any but the following way: all possible modifications are actually contained in Him, where these modifications consist in nothing else than the variation of limits (Ont. §830); consequently, bodies as well as souls arise in God Himself through the modification of a divine attribute. Since, therefore, neither bodies (§694) nor souls arise through the modification of some divine attribute (§707), neither the former nor the latter could be in God as parts are in a whole, which was the first point to be proved. Since bodies and souls are not in God as parts are in a whole, as has been demonstrated, it further follows from this of itself that neither bodies nor souls are particles of God, which was the second point to be proved. There were some among the ancient philosophers who called the soul a particle of the divine mind.³⁰ That, however, these philosophers did not take bodies to be particles of God is evidently the result of their holding the matter that bodies consist of for a being from itself, and so something co-eternal with God. Spinoza explicitly declares the human mind a part of the divine intellect in Ip11c, and in Ip31 and Ip17s he denies that the intellect, whether it be finite or infinite, actually pertains to the nature of God; and he ridicules those who count the intellect and the will among the divine attributes. Whence he further claims in IIp11c that, “when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but [ . . . ] insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind, then we say that the human mind perceives a thing only partially or inadequately.” Since all particular things are nothing if not modes through which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by Ip15c), and extension (in IIp2) no less than thought (IIp1) is called an attribute of God, or God is taken as an extended thing no less than a thinking thing, and bodies are defined (in IId1,³¹ in virtue of Ip25c) as a mode which expresses God’s essence, insofar as it is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way; then according to Spinoza, a given body will have to be a part of

³⁰ Among the adherents of this view are Pythagoras and his disciples, and Seneca; see Aldo Setaioli, “Seneca and the Divine: Stoic Tradition and Personal Developments,” in International Journal of the Classical Tradition, 13.3 (2007), pp. 333–68. ³¹ Wolff erroneously refers to “def. I part. I” here.

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God, just as he makes the soul or human mind into a part of the divine intellect. Nor should one fear that we have misconstrued Spinoza’s opinion here, on account of the fact that substance does not pertain to the essence of the human being (IIp10³²) but rather is constituted by certain modifications of God’s attributes (IIp10c), and so the same thing must be said concerning bodies and thinking things, like the soul, in all such matters. As Spinoza confuses substance with being from itself (§684), and as he removes substantiality from bodies and souls, so he likewise removes a-se-ity from them. Accordingly, if the notion of substance is corrected and made to conform to common usage, then one could say without injury that Spinoza makes bodies and souls into parts of the divine substance, such that nothing substantial is to be encountered in them unless it pertains to the divine substance. But, so that we would not give the Spinozists cause to complain (though they might do so anyway) that we imputed something to them that was utterly foreign to their way of thinking, we have preferred to avoid this terminology, which even they must admit in the received signification.

§709. (Universal fatalism of Spinoza.) Spinoza is a universal fatalist. According to Spinoza, there is nothing contingent in nature, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to a certain mode of existing and acting (Ip29), and whatever follows necessarily from an attribute of God necessarily exists (Ip12). So the will cannot be called a free cause but rather only a necessary one (Ip32), and thus God does not produce an effect through free will (Ip32c1), which is to say that “things could have been produced by God in no other way and in no other order than they have been produced” (Ip33³³). Nor is there any free will in the human mind but it is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another and this in turn by another, and so on without end (IIp48), and human beings only believe themselves to be free insofar as they are conscious of their volitions and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to willing (Iapp). It is evident, therefore, that Spinoza defends the absolute necessity of everything in the world and, having denied the freedom of the human will, that he extends this same necessity to human actions. Accordingly, since one is a universal fatalist who defends the absolute necessity of all things and extends this same necessity to human actions (§528), Spinoza is a fatalist, and indeed of the universal sort. Spinozists do not dispute that they are fatalists, nor do they deny being universal fatalists: for they claim that universal fatalism is something that accords with the truth. For this reason, fatalism, and particularly the universal variety, is often simply misidentified with Spinozism in such a way that one tends to call those Spinozists to whom a fatal necessity might be imputed even only as a consequence of their views. However, although universal fatalism is connected with Spinozism by an indissoluble bond, it is nevertheless not to be identified with it (§§528, 671).

§710. (Universal fatalism is falsely asserted by Spinoza.) Spinoza has not demonstrated the fatal necessity of all things, nor can it be demonstrated. Since when Spinoza seeks to demonstrate this (Ip16), he maintains that everything which can fall under an infinite intellect follows from the necessity of the divine nature, and from this he ³² Wolff erroneously refers to the first book of the Ethics here and in the next reference. ³³ Wolff incorrectly refers to Ip32.

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infers (Ip17) that God acts from the necessity of His nature alone since there is nothing outside Him by which He might be determined to act. However, he proves that all things follow with necessity from the divine nature from the claim that “the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing [ . . . ] that which really does necessarily follow from it, that is, from the very essence of the thing.”³⁴ Yet, what Spinoza infers here does not follow at all. For if he had not accepted imaginary notions of infinite thought (§707) and of extension (§689) as real and had not attributed both to God as attributes that express His infinite essence (§671), then he would never have inferred that all things necessarily follow from thence. But if he had had a distinct conception of the limited realities that are in the soul, and had attributed them to God in the absolutely highest degree (§70), he would have recognized that an infinite intellect pertains to God (§§117, 118) and he would have recognized that only the essences of things, or whatever is possible, necessarily follow from it (§94); he would have also seen that the divine intellect and power are not the sufficient reason for why a given finite being exists (§349), nor therefore are finite things actually posited when the divine intellect and power are posited (Ont. §118), but rather the will of God (§350), which is the freest of all, is also required (§277). It is therefore clear that Spinoza has not demonstrated the absolute necessity of all things. Indeed, God freely created human souls (§338) along with the whole world (§354), free even from any internal coercion (§355) insofar as He choose this world out of the various possible ones, and so every finite being (§330), the soul as well as the world, is a contingent being (§332), and nothing exists unless it does so contingently (§334) and even the order of nature is merely contingent and free from absolute necessity (Cosmol. §561 and note; Nat. Theol. I, §761). Therefore, it is clear of itself, since whatever is demonstrated must be true (Log. §544), that it would not at all be possible for the absolute necessity of things to be demonstrated by Spinoza. Whatever is derived from the notion of free will by means of inferences, follows necessarily from it, since whatever is ascribed to it in this way must agree with the freedom of the will. However, it does not at all follow from it that the will itself is unable to be free, or that no other freedom could agree with it, unless it were a freedom from external coercion, which is the only sort of freedom Spinoza recognizes when he maintains that God alone is a free cause. We see all the more, then, that the fatalism of Spinoza depends upon his definitions which, having been fabricated to suit his hypothesis, suffer from numerous defects as we have noted above.

§711. (The falsity of Spinoza’s hypothesis.) Spinozism is a false hypothesis. For according to Spinoza’s hypothesis, there is nothing other than a single substance, endowed with infinite attributes, of which two are infinite thought and extension and each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence; and finite beings arise from the necessary modification of the attributes of that substance, namely God, as for instance souls arise from the modification of infinite thought and bodies from the modification of infinite extension (§§671, 672). Yet, Spinoza has not demonstrated that, beyond God, there cannot be, nor be conceived, another substance, or that there

³⁴ This is taken from the demonstration of Ip16.

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is no substance other than a single, infinite one (§704), but there are in any case many finite substances when this word is taken in its received signification (§705). Extension in Spinoza’s sense cannot even be an attribute of God (§691), and Spinoza errs when he contends that God is an extended thing (§692), neither can bodies arise through the modification of infinite extension considered as a divine attribute, nor can they be called modes (in Spinoza’s sense) that express God’s essence, considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate way (§694). Similarly, finite thinking things, such as souls, do not arise through the modification of infinite thought considered as a divine attribute, and neither can they be called modes of a divine attribute, namely of infinite thought (§707). In the end, Spinoza has not demonstrated, nor could he demonstrate, the absolute necessity of all things, with all contingency and freedom of the will having been completely removed (§710), and so all things that exist do not follow necessarily from the divine attributes. It is, therefore, clear that Spinozism is a false hypothesis (Log. §505). Spinozism is thus overthrown by our system, insofar as it is diametrically opposed to it, and with the result that it would be impossible for anyone with a mind steeped in our principles to fall into that error. On the contrary, no one will oppose Spinozism more correctly and with more hope of a successful outcome than through using the weaponry supplied by our principles. Now that we have refuted Spinoza’s hypothesis, upon which everything rests that he claims for his own, so all the rest of his errors which follow from it scatter into the breeze of their own accord, such that there is no need for expending further labor in discussing all of them. Nonetheless, it may be appropriate to remark on a few.

§712. (Ends are wrongly banished from the world by Spinoza.) Spinoza errs when he contends that there are no ends in nature or when he declares final causes to be nothing but human inventions (in Iapp). For he infers this from the claim that everything proceeds from a certain eternal necessity of nature, but since he has not demonstrated this, nor is it possible to demonstrate it (§710), then a conclusion which is inferred from a false premise cannot be admitted as true (Log. §407). Indeed, since we have shown the contrary to be the case (Nat. Theol., I §§608, 645, 648ff), Spinoza affirms something which he should have denied (Log. §205). Accordingly, since one errs who affirms what should have been denied (Log. §624), Spinoza errs when he excludes all ends from nature and declares them to be nothing but human inventions. Along with ends, Spinoza negates the wisdom of God (Rat. Psych. §678), which he declares to be nothing and refers to as among human inventions: how harmful to piety this error can be will be amply shown when we turn to the consideration of the duties owed to God.

§713. (The impossibility of miracles is falsely affirmed by Spinoza.) Spinoza errs when he numbers miracles among impossible things. Since Spinoza is a fatalist, and of the universal sort, deducing the fatal necessity of all things from God Himself, with all contingency in things and freedom of action having been removed (§709), nothing could have taken place otherwise than it did. From this (and Ip33) it is maintained that things could not have been produced by God in any other way, or in any other order, than God has produced them in, and in Ip32c[1] he denies that God acts through freedom of the will. It is impossible, then, according to Spinoza, that an effect

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should exist in nature for which there is no natural sufficient cause at all. Accordingly, since a miracle does not take place except when the natural causes are lacking for determining the actuality of that which is possible (Cosmol. §518), so according to Spinoza it is impossible that a miracle should ever occur, and thus he numbers miracles among impossible things. Yet, God can perform a miracle whenever he wants (Nat. Theol. I §363). It is therefore as clear as before (§712) that Spinoza errs when he numbers miracles among impossible things. In the Theological-Political Treatise (ch. 6, 68ff³⁵), Spinoza rejects miracles on the basis of the absolute necessity of the order of nature, the contingency of which and freedom from such necessity I have established elsewhere (Cosmol. §561), and he contends that miracles mean “nothing but a work whose natural cause we cannot explain by the example of another familiar thing, or at least which cannot be so explained by the one who writes or relates the miracle”³⁶ such that a miracle could be defined in a manner conformable to what Spinoza intends as an unfamiliar effect of nature whose cause is unknown to the common person. We are thus not imputing something to Spinoza that he expressly denies only as a consequence of his claims but, rather, what is imputed to him is something he defends as true inasmuch as he is well aware of what follows as a consequence of his hypothesis. From thence he infers, quite in conformity with his hypothesis, that all of the miracles related in Scripture were natural occurrences (p. 76³⁷), and he ventures to show by means of a few examples how they can take place, and he does so with such confidence in his hypothesis that he is not ashamed to conclude on p. 77 that “if anything should be found which can be conclusively demonstrated to be contrary to the laws of nature, or to have been unable to follow from them, we must believe without reservation that it has been added to the Sacred Texts by sacrilegious men.”³⁸ From this it is understood how harmful Spinozism is, and how necessary it was for me to show in the clearest possible terms the slippery foundation on which it rests, something which I trust I have shown in the foregoing. As for the rest of Spinoza’s system, from what has been demonstrated in the previous sections concerning this impious hypothesis it is readily understood that the fundamental errors hiding in Spinozism can scarcely be discerned except by someone who has been inculcated with distinct ontological notions derived from things themselves; and so it assuredly goes without saying how necessary it is that we should invest indefatigable efforts in the study of ontology. For which reason we have previously taken the opportunity to advise, and now seek to impress upon the reader once again (since one cannot do so enough), that the neglect of first philosophy prevented Spinoza from recognizing the fundamental errors from which the rest of his system proceeds, and the very same neglect must prevent others, upon reading Spinoza’s writings, from extricating themselves from the difficulties in which they become entangled thereby, and especially when they were not sufficiently trained in the [mathematical] method.

§714. (The destruction of religion through Spinozism.) Spinozists are irreligious, or religion is nothing to them. For Spinozists are fatalists, and indeed of the universal ³⁵ Wolff ’s reference here is to the original version of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), though in that edition the sixth chapter begins on p. 67. ³⁶ See Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 2, p. 155. ³⁷ See Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 2, pp. 159–61. ³⁸ Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 2, pp. 163–4.

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sort (§709). However, if one is a universal fatalist then one is irreligious (§571); therefore, Spinozists are irreligious. The demonstration by which we showed that religion is destroyed through universal fatalism can readily be applied to Spinozism. According to Spinoza, no freedom of action is left to God, and because no wisdom is granted to Him (§712n), no ends are admitted in nature (§712) nor does the direction of all that which occurs in the world in accordance with certain ends belong to God. Now since divine governance consists in just this direction (Nat. Theol. I, §899), according to Spinoza God does not govern the world in any way, and so Spinoza negates that which is most essential to divine providence (Nat. Theol. I, §922). When one considers this, one will easily see that Spinozism cannot sustain any religion. For although he commends the cognition of God many times at IVp28, there is nonetheless no more in this cognition in terms of genuine reverence than there is in the cognition of nature, something which we diligently pursue only because of the pleasure it brings us. It is well known that Spinoza sought the highest human good in the theoretical cognition of truth,³⁹ and that according to his hypothesis the cognition of God is the same as the cognition of natural things through their causes. From this it is once again apparent how harmful Spinozism is as an enemy of all religion. He who might want to know the mind of Spinoza, and his disposition with respect to religion, should read his Theological-Political Treatise himself as it is not our intention here to paint a vivid portrait of this text.

§715. (Our divine obligation to certain actions is destroyed by Spinozism.) Spinozists negate all divine obligation to committing virtuous actions and omitting vicious ones. For Spinozists are fatalists, and of the universal sort (§709), but if one is a universal fatalist, then one negates divine obligation (§544); therefore, Spinozists negate divine obligation. The Spinozists deny, namely, that the soul’s will is free, and so according to their hypothesis the human being necessarily acts in the way it does and it is determined by natural causes to act thus and not otherwise, and neither is it able to render itself undetermined; indeed, since everything is ultimately determined by God to be thus and not otherwise, and God is not able to determine anything to be otherwise than it is determined to be, so one cannot even imagine a divine obligation according to Spinozism. Nonetheless, this does not prevent Spinoza from granting that it is far better if a human being live according to reason than if they lead a life contrary to it, and this despite his denial that the human being can, through his free will, make his actions conform to his reason. Yet, Spinoza judges the human being who lives according to reason to be more perfect than another who leads his life contrary to it. Indeed, it is certain that Spinoza himself led a very moderate life, that he was inclined to the service of others and far removed from doing any harm to them. As for the rest of the consequences which flow from here that are destructive to the truth and practice of morality, when all divine obligation to commit some actions and omit others should be counted as nothing, and the human being is not left the power to live otherwise than how he in fact lives, it should not be necessary for us to show in the present context that which even the least perspicuous mind might see for itself.

³⁹ See Vp27.

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§716. (Spinozism is compared with atheism.) There is little that distinguishes Spinozism from atheism but it is just as harmful as, and in some respects even more harmful than, atheism. For even if Spinoza admits a God who is the first and unique cause of all things (§672), nevertheless, since he denies that He is wise (§712n) that His actions proceed from a free will (§709n), that He governs this world (§714n), and he claims that bodies, souls, and other thinking things (if there be any) are to be found in Him as parts in a whole (§708n), Spinoza invents a God that is utterly different from the true God, who is endowed with supreme wisdom (Nat. Theol. I, §640) and the greatest freedom of the will (Nat. Theol. I, §431), who governs this universe by His wisdom (Nat. Theol. I, §902), and in whom souls and bodies, and any thinking things that there are in addition to these, do not exist as parts in a whole (§708). It is, therefore, just as if he denied the existence of the true God, and since one is an atheist when he denies that God exists (§411), it is clear that there is little that distinguishes Spinozism from atheism. This was the first thing to be proved. Furthermore, Spinozism is destructive of all religion (§714) and of all divine obligation to commit certain actions but omit others (§715), just like atheism (§§516, 539). Since, therefore, atheism is harmful insofar as through it all religion and divine obligation to commit certain actions but omit others is destroyed, how can one doubt in any way that Spinozism is just as harmful as atheism. This was the second thing to be proved. Now, universal fatalism is connected with Spinozism by an indissoluble bond (§709). Since a fatal necessity is extended to absolutely all human actions through universal fatalism (§528), but universal fatalism is not necessarily connected with atheism (§531), Spinozism proves to be a greater hindrance to morality than atheism considered in itself, which universal fatalism resembles only accidentally. Since, therefore, atheism is harmful insofar as it obstructs moral practice, as we will illustrate with examples at the proper place, it is evident to all that in certain respects Spinozism is more harmful than atheism. This was the third thing to be proved. If one wanted to have a clearer cognition as to how great the difference is between the true God and the one Spinoza invents and adorns with a specious definition (§672), in which a snake lies hidden in the grass, one need only compare that which has been demonstrated concerning the true God both in our system and, specifically, in the first section above, with Spinozism. In this way, that which is contrary to the true God and must be denied of God when one has accepted the true conception of Him will become clear; consequently, it will be evident how few of the doctrines in the system of Spinozism retain their truth. And on account of this it happens that Spinozists are supposed with universal consent to be atheists and Spinozism held to be an impious hypothesis, and that whereas other authors have found some who have defended them from the charge of atheism, yet there has been no one up to this point who has dared to dispel the same charge from Spinoza. Rather, Spinoza’s Ethics is acknowledged as the sole atheistic system which makes itself available to the general public; and thus, we have deemed it our proper business to undermine its foundations.

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PART IV

The Limits of Reason

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8 Christian August Crusius: Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1743) Christian August Crusius was born June 10, 1715 in Leuna, a town just south of Halle, the son of a parson and a parson’s daughter. Crusius attended Gymnasium in nearby Merseberg beginning in 1729, and in 1734 the university in Leipzig. There he studied a number of subjects, but was drawn particularly to theology and, through the lectures of the Thomasian thinker Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann (1707–41), to philosophy. Crusius attained his Magister in philosophy in 1737, habilitated in 1740 with a dissertation on the corruption of the human intellect, and went on to receive a baccalaureate in theology in 1742. Crusius nonetheless sought a position in the philosophy faculty, to qualify for which he defended two dissertations, the second being the Dissertatio philosophica de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis (Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason) which was published in 1743. In 1744, Crusius became extraordinary professor of philosophy at the university in Leipzig. Crusius’ major philosophical works followed in quick succession, with his textbook on ethics (Anweisung vernünftig zu Leben, or Guide to Rational Living) published in 1744; his metaphysics textbook (Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten or Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason) in 1745; and a book on logic (Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverläßigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniß or Path to the Certainty and Reliability of Human Cognition) in 1747. A book on physics followed in 1749, after which Crusius shifted his attention to theology, accepting an ordinary professorship in the faculty in 1750. And while he did not publish any substantial (new) philosophical works for the rest of his career, he did not resign from his previous position and continued to lecture in philosophy. He died October 18, 1775. Crusius is widely, and rightly, regarded as the most sophisticated philosopher within the “Thomasian-Pietistic” tradition. Like the thinkers in this tradition,

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Crusius harbors a pessimism, albeit one not as deep as Thomasius or Lange, concerning the power of the human intellect, particularly in speculative matters. Moreover, Crusius upholds a libertarian conception of the freedom of the human will, according to which freedom is understood to consist in the power to act otherwise or to refuse to act in the same circumstances. In light of these commitments, Crusius constructs a powerful and systematic rebuttal of the Wolffian philosophy, distinguishing between mathematical and philosophical method, rejecting the Wolffian prioritization of (necessary) essence to existence, defending the soul’s natural capacity to move the body (in contrast to the harmonist denial of such influence), designating the will as an equally fundamental power of the mind, and rejecting the Leibnizian identification of freedom with mere spontaneity. In order to preserve what he considers the genuine freedom of the will, Crusius focuses his critical attention in his Dissertation on the rationalist dogma of the principle of sufficient reason. Crusius argues that the principle, as commonly understood, should be limited in the scope of its use precisely so as to exclude its application to the human will. Crusius begins by identifying and resolving ambiguities in the key terms in the principle, including “reason” and “sufficient.” Concerning the former he distinguishes between reasons of cognizing and reasons of being and proceeds to identify various species of these in turn (§§I, XVI, XXXIV–XXXIX), and concerning the latter he distinguishes between a reason that merely suffices for a state of affairs and one that determines that state of affairs as necessary such that it could not have been otherwise (§II). A sufficient reason, then, in its stronger, Leibnizian interpretation is understood as sufficient in this latter sense, which Crusius designates a determining reason. While Crusius accepts that the principle of determining reason applies to most sorts of actions and their effects, he argues that it cannot apply to the actions on the part of the human will which he dubs “free first actions” (§XXV), and he makes his case for this in two steps. First, Crusius offers what he terms an “indirect proof” of this conclusion (cf. §XLI) by arguing (along the lines of Lange) that the principle taken in its unlimited scope entails the absolute necessity of events, a Stoic fatalism, and undermines morality (§§IV–IX); further, Crusius contends that the only reason to think that the principle would apply to the acts of the will is that it is proven through the principle of contradiction which, however, Crusius contends has not been, and cannot be, done (§§X–XV). Crusius then offers his “direct proof” of the possibility of first actions by showing that at least God’s actions would count as such, as would the acts of the intellect (§§XXIII– XXIV), though he suggests that the reality of free first actions specifically can be confirmed directly through inner experience (§IX). This necessitates the limitation of the principle from application to such actions, since as free they cannot be such that the opposite would be impossible (§XXVI). This discussion gives way to a compact presentation of Crusius’ account of truth (§§XXVII–XXIX), which bears comparison to that presented by Thomasius in the Doctrine of Reason, after which Crusius concludes with more general considerations relating to the Leibnizian principle, its limitation and origin, as well as the possibility of human and divine foreknowledge of free actions (§§XL–XLIX). The Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason was published in 1743 in Latin, with a German translation, including

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additional notes and an appendix by the translator (a student of Crusius’), following in 1744. Crusius’ Latin philosophical and theological dissertations were later collected and republished in a single volume in 1750, for which Crusius added a number of responses to objections to the dissertation, in addition to some minor changes in the text itself (and a second edition of the German translation, incorporating Crusius’ new amendments, was published in 1766). This English translation follows the original Latin edition of the dissertation, though I have omitted a number of Crusius’ lengthier notes, and my own supplementary notes (and additions to Crusius’) are enclosed in square brackets. In what follows, I have supplemented Crusius’ references to Leibniz’ works with the relevant page numbers in modern translations into English (provided in square brackets within Crusius’ notes). For the correspondence with Clarke, references are to G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, Correspondence, edited and translated by R. Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000) [cited as ALC.]; for the “Monadology,” references are to G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989) [cited as AG]; and for the Theodicy references are to page numbers in G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, edited by A. Farrer and translated by E. M. Huggard (New Haven: Yale UP, 1952) [cited as H]. Crusius also cites Wolff ’s Ontology [cited as Ont.] (see Chapter 7, above, p. 158), and Wolff ’s Rational Thoughts concerning God, the World, and the Human Soul, and also all Things in General is cited below as the German Metaphysics (and all relevant sections of this text are translated in the foregoing selection).

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Beck, Lewis White, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1969) [pp. 394–402]. Crusius, Christian August, Ausführliche Abhandlung von dem rechten Gebrauch und der Einschränkung des sogenannten Sätzes vom Zureichenden oder besser Determinirenden Grunde. Translated by C. F. Krause (Leipzig, 1744). Crusius, Christian August, Ausführliche Abhandlung von dem rechten Gebrauch und der Einschränkung des sogenannten Sätzes vom Zureichenden oder besser Determinirenden Grunde [ . . . ] mit anderweitigen Anmerkungen des Herrn Verfassers [ . . . ]. Translated by C. F. Krause and C. F. Pezold (Leipzig, 1766). Crusius, Christian August, Dissertatio philosophica de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis (Leipzig, 1743). Crusius, Christian August, Opuscula philosophico-theologica [ . . . ] accedit responsio ad obiectiones quasdam contra Dissertationem de limitibus principii rationis determinantis (Leipzig, 1750). Dyck, Corey W., “Spontaneity before the Critical Turn: Crusius, the Pre-Critical Kant, and Tetens on the Spontaneity of the Mind,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 54.4 (2016), pp. 625–48. Hogan, Desmond, “Crusius, Christian August,” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 149–54. Hogan, Desmond, “Three Kinds of Rationalism and the Non-Spatiality of Things in Themselves,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47.3 (2009), pp. 355–82.

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Schneewind, J. B, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2003) [pp. 568–85 contains a partial translation of Crusius’ Guide]. Tonelli, Giorgio, “Vorwort,” in Christian August Crusius. Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, 4 vols. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1964–87); vol. I, pp. vii–lxv. Watkins, Eric, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) [pp. 81–93]. Watkins, Eric, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) [pp. 132–79 contain a partial translation of the Sketch].

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Philosophical Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, commonly called the Principle of Sufficient Reason §I. (Explanation of the principle of sufficient reason.) The illustrious Leibniz has posited two principles of human cognition, of which the first is called the principle of contradiction and is familiar to everyone, and the other is called the principle of sufficient reason, which he expresses thus: anything that happens or is true has a sufficient reason why that fact or proposition is so and not otherwise.¹ Following the illustrious Wolff, a slightly broader formulation, but one which I believe completely conforms to the opinion of the author of the principle, is often expressed thus²: all that which exists, has a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, and so too why it is thus and not otherwise. A reason, however, might be quite correctly defined, as it has been by the same celebrated Wolff,³ as that from which it is cognized why something is, or more specifically, why something rather is than not and why it is so rather than otherwise. A sufficient reason is one in which nothing is lacking for providing the reason for all the circumstances of a thing. One will occasionally find that the same notion had occurred to Leibniz in various places; on the contrary others, who have deviated from this notion without justification and seem to put forward an entirely new question, understand through reason anything by which a thing can be conceived, from which it would follow that any sort of cognition whatsoever, even if it should proceed from the barest experience a posteriori, would necessarily have to be counted among the reasons of a thing which is completely foreign to our usual manner of speaking. For example, if as I am looking into a mirror, I notice that Titius enters the study behind me, who will say that I thereby cognize a reason for Titius, or even for his presence and arrival? §II. (The principle is not aptly called the principle of “sufficient” reason.) Yet the name of the principle of sufficient reason does not seem to me to be entirely suitable, though it is more than apt to confuse decent minds who easily allow themselves to be misled by the mildness of the word into believing that it would be unreasonable for someone not to grant that there was a sufficient reason for all things, so that nothing could be said to be more sensible than this postulate. For we are already so accustomed to using this term in a way that we also judge that to suffice as a reason for something else which is equally disposed to many other things at the same time, yet understood in this way a sufficient reason has a signification that is entirely contrary to the Leibnizian sense. For it was thus that Samuel Clarke, that most acute philosopher, thought the creation of the world in this or in that part of space and in this or that moment of eternity was not lacking a sufficient reason, one lying namely in the omnipotence and the decree of the divine will, even if the supreme Deity had been able to effect either under the very same circumstances. Obviously he had supposed that merely a true and simple sufficient reason was demanded by Leibniz, because once it is conceded to him, then it can no longer be understood why a reason, A, ¹ [Here Crusius refers to Theodicy Pt. I, §44 (H p. 147) and the “Monadology,” §31 (AG p. 217).] ² Ont. §70. ³ Ont. §56.

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which is now sufficient for an effect, B, could not at the same time and in the very same state be sufficient for effect C or D. How far removed, however, these consequences are from what Leibniz intends is attested by his repeated complaints regarding the misunderstanding of his principle.⁴ §III. (The principle is more suitably called the principle of determining reason.) Clarity will be better served, therefore, if we rather called that principle the principle of determining reason. For to determine means to suppose only one way of existing when it comes to how a thing either is or can be under the posited circumstances. For example, two lines and the angle between them determine the triangle; for, only a single determination of the third line as well as the nearby angles remains which, therefore, upon the assumption of the former, cannot fail to coincide with them. In just this way, any given Leibnizian reason, provided that it be sufficient, determines that thing whose reason it is called in such a way that under these posited circumstances it is able to exist or take place in only this way. So, from that reason it can be understood why something is and why it is thus. Yet, finite beings come to know the certainty of something, whatever it might be, from the falsity of what is opposed to it. Accordingly, from every sufficient reason it is necessary that it be understood why that which is opposed to it does not and cannot exist, as long namely as that reason is posited and the configuration of coexisting things does not change. Therefore, all of those things that are opposed are not even able to take place at that time, but only that is which is understood as having been grounded in this sufficient reason. Anything, then, that is or takes place is completely determined through its sufficient reason, and that very reason is its determining reason. Even though we note that the proponents of the Leibnizian philosophy, in seeking to commend their opinions, tend to make use of the term sufficient reason,⁵ nonetheless they clearly do not shy away from the designation of it as a determining reason but even recognize it as being apt for expressing what they intended. §IV. (This principle cannot be admitted except in a restricted sense.) The principle of determining (or, if you prefer, sufficient) reason has met with such frequent approval, particularly on the part of men illustrious in the praise and reputation of their erudition, so that not only have they erected whole systems on its basis, and exalted its utility to the very skies, but they also behold all those with contempt, even judging them mentally unsound, mad, and spinners of fairy tales, who dare so much as to utter anything against that principle (it seems to me that the first of these can be excused but the latter is plainly shameful).⁶ For my part, I do not think it advisable to

⁴ See the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke, passim; for example, Clarke’s second letter (§1 [ALC p. 11]), Leibniz’s third letter (§2 [ALC p. 14]), Clarke’s third letter (§2 [ALC p. 18]), Leibniz’s fifth letter (§§20, 21, 125, [ALC pp. 39–40, 64–5] etc.). [ . . . ] ⁵ [Here Crusius notes that Leibniz makes use of the phrase “determining reason” in Theodicy Pt. 1, §44 (H p. 147), and remarks that while Wolff rejects this term because it seems to carry a strict necessity with it, this amounts to a merely cosmetic difference as Wolff emphasizes the determining function of a sufficient reason in, for instance Ont. §118.] ⁶ See Wolff ’s Ont. §77, and Johann Gustav Reinbeck (Betrachtungen über die in der Augsburgischen Confession enthaltene und damit verknüpfte Göttliche Wahrheiten, 2 vols. [Berlin and Leipzig, 1733], vol. I, §13; p. 13), where he declares concerning this principle: “whoever would not admit it is not worthy of having another word wasted on him but rather deserves the place of honour in a mental institution.”

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simply deny that principle altogether, even though this could be done in a manner consistent with the truth, yet that principle stands very much in need of limits, which limits I will undertake to set shortly. For it could easily happen that, among those who have the tendency to judge hastily, one would incur suspicion, as if you disputed the wisdom and order of the series of causes and effects, or that you were about to introduce the fortuitous collisions of Epicurus’ atoms or I know not what sort of senseless fantasy world. I will, therefore, exposit my own opinion more moderately; indeed, I only wish this, that this principle should not be admitted without careful restriction. I am going to give the rationale for this judgment in that I will demonstrate first that this principle, when it is not circumscribed by any limits, leads to very problematic conclusions, after which I will make it clear that it has not been demonstrated legitimately by the illustrious Wolff, and then, after having explicated the propositions that are comprehended by that principle, I will carefully fix its proper limits. §V. (For one introduces thereby the absolute necessity of all things.) First, I will show that an unavoidable and absolutely immutable necessity of all things that exist or take place is introduced through this principle. That is necessary, the opposite of which cannot exist or, in the case of that which exists, is such that it cannot fail to exist, or in the case of that which occurs, is such that it cannot fail to take place or to take place in another way. Necessity is either hypothetical, which finds its ground at some point in conditions that are not themselves necessary, or absolute, which is constituted otherwise, and which is thus either always grounded in conditions that are equally necessary, or its opposite is such as cannot even be thought. I now offer the following argument: if anything that happens cannot take place otherwise except on the condition that it has a determining reason, then it follows that that which does not take place also cannot take place, for its determining reason is not at hand, or at the very least it is not at hand now, and so it cannot take place now. Yet, the same also holds for the reason of the reason, for the reason of that reason, for the 600th determining reason of the antecedent reasons, [etc.]. And as far as you might ascend, going as far back as you will, the same thing will hold for any being and state whatsoever; therefore, not only is any thing that presently exists necessary, since its opposite cannot take place, but the entire series of antecedent things is also driven by the same necessity. Accordingly, whatever happens occurs with an ineluctable and utterly absolute necessity. For example, Titius deceives Caius. The deception took place necessarily, for there is a determining reason on the basis of that which preceded and, contrariwise, there was no sufficient reason at hand that might determine Titius to honesty. But perhaps the fault lies in Titius himself, because he did not accustom his mind, at some previous time, to the practice of virtue? I respond: how could one have accustomed oneself to be any other way than one actually is? For, each antecedent state of the mind is likewise produced through a determining reason which has made it so that it is thus and not otherwise. If, therefore, the series of antecedent reasons was supposed to be arranged otherwise

[J. G. Reinbeck (1683–1741), was a theologian and supporter of Wolff, who as part of an investigative commission recommended overturning the ban on teaching Wolff ’s textbooks.]

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at some point, then another world would have had to have been made. But no other world could be made, since God had a determining reason why He made this one and not another; therefore, Titius’ act of deception took place with absolute necessity. §VI. (Elucidation.) I think it is sufficiently evident that what is alleged by others, namely, that absolute necessity is to be conceived such that its opposite implies a contradiction, is without any foundation. For from this one could conclude that the deception in our example is not necessary since nothing contradictory is met with in the notion of a human being who does not deceive another. What difference does it make on this score if the opposite considered separately permits of being thought and yet its possibility or actual existence cannot be thought on account of those circumstances under which it is supposed to exist? Indeed, it is necessary, according to their opinion, that “Titius does not deceive Caius”⁷ contains a contradiction, for Titius’ honesty or omission of any deception would be something that takes place without a sufficient reason, yet do they not boastfully proclaim that it is contradictory for something to take place without a determining reason? One can think of a human being without deception, but one cannot think Titius as such since, when one thinks of Titius, one thinks of such a subject in which deception has a determining reason and honesty does not. I could with equal right assert that an equilateral figure inscribed within a circle can have unequal angles. There is, namely, nothing contradictory in an equilateral figure consisting of unequal angles; nevertheless, a contradiction is implied under the stipulated conditions because it contradicts the other circumstances that are assumed to obtain at the same time, since one supposes the figure to be inscribed in a circle. Now let us apply this case to our previous example. Is it not clear that honesty does not in fact contradict human nature, considered generally, but does oppose Titius’ nature since a determining reason for deception is supposed to be in it and, in addition to this, it is assumed that whatever takes place has a determining reason? Absolute necessity can, in truth, be divided further into immediate and mediate, with the first occurring where the opposed condition, considered on its own, cannot be thought at all, but with the second occurring where the opposed condition cannot be thought in the conjunction of things which are assumed as truly necessary. When, however, the question concerns the general concept, namely the nature of absolute necessity in general, this distinction is not at all relevant, and it does not make any difference when it comes to the conclusions that follow from the nature of the general concept. §VII. (One introduces fate thereby.) When I consider this more carefully, I find that those critics have not argued badly who have objected that, through the principle of determining reason, fate is introduced as it were through the back door. For fate consists in in the immutable implication of all things. But perhaps a distinction would be made between a blind and a seeing fate: that is, a blind fate would be one where that entanglement would not be known by anyone, not even by the divine intellect itself or, if you prefer, one where in the series of connected causes the ⁷ [Oddly, Crusius here provides the sentence “Caius does not deceive Titius,” which changes the deceiver and deceived from the original example in §V. To avoid confusion, however, I have changed it to a negation of the original sentence and have substituted “Titius” for “Caius” throughout the remainder of the section.]

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intellect and a will determined by internal motives would never be encountered at the same time. A seeing fate, then, would be a sort of entanglement between all things that is discerned by God, and where the intellect itself and the will that is determined through it are numbered among the series of interconnected causes. Let it be left to the judgment of the reader whether Leibniz can be absolved of defending this sort of fate, for according to him all things are determined in the world, and it is not through the will of God but through the nature of things themselves. God produced this connection of all things, but He was determined just as well to the production of this world and not another, at this moment and no other, and so on. It will be the wisdom of God therefore to know the necessity to which He and everything else are subject, and His freedom will consist in being determined to obey necessity. In any case, whether a blind or a seeing fate, what is certain is that it will be fate. §VIII. (It is destructive of morality.) Nature instructs us, as a guide, and revealed religion teaches us more fruitfully that there is freedom in the human being, that there is law, fault, imputability, virtues, vices, rewards and punishments, and also that God is truly just and good, makes no one so that they are necessarily wretched, who despises and punishes wickedness, and who punishes no one except on account of the fact that they have brought genuine fault upon themselves. It would be tedious and foreign to my intention to explain everything here in detail. We will at least make an attempt to show what sort of concepts concerning these things issue from the principle of determining reason, and once this is done each might judge for themselves whether they agree with those concepts conscience supplies, with Holy Scripture, and with sound philosophy. Freedom will be that condition of the subject where determining causes are represented simultaneously by the rational intellect. A law will be that rule for explaining the sequence of those determining reasons by which the perfection of a rational substance is brought about. Fault will be the presence of reasons in some subject determining him to evil things. Imputation will be the judgment that this or that takes place or has taken place in a given subject. Virtue will be the determination of the spirit in favor of the means of its perfection. Vice will be the determination of the spirit to something that is contrary to its perfection. Reward and punishment will be the natural and inevitable effects of the determining reasons to perform this or that action, and which are just as necessary and inevitable as the essence of all things themselves. My opponents might judge for themselves whether I have not been completely fair in drawing my conclusions. Perhaps not a few of them cast their lot in with these notions, and by their unspoken approval they provide sufficient acknowledgement that their opinion is exhaustively expressed in them. But now let us proceed with our questions. §IX. (Further explanation.) Does it not follow from this that no sin could be displeasing to God? For can that be displeasing to Him which is inevitable in the things He brings forth and whose very creation He is unable to avoid? Indeed, this would be no less an imperfection than if three sides were displeasing to someone undertaking to draw a triangle. Further, is God able to command the wicked to apply themselves to becoming virtuous and the upright to continue to persist in the footsteps of virtue, or, if the contrary should transpire, how is He able to adjudge that the vicious are to be punished and condemn them not only to natural punishments but also to moral ones? All these things will take place or fail to do so just as

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well even without His command, since the determining reason has already been set in the immutable nature of those things. Is such a command, then, any more rational than if, with a profound and serious countenance, one should command the stone which one throws into the river to seek the bottom, or if, seeing the rain, one should attempt to impress upon the drops the injunction that they better beware that they not move upwards because they are required to fall to the earth? Yet, in this case does not God’s justice blame the innocent? Does God’s justice not then punish people because they have omitted those things the performance of which contradicted the nature of the individual, the nature of the world, or indeed even the nature of God who could not have created this world unless it were the best; conversely, are they to be punished because they perform that action the omission of which opposed the interconnection of all things? Surely, virtue would have to be counted as nothing more than good fortune, and evil as bad. All this is admitted without obscurity by Leibniz,⁸ a most discerning man and one who was thoroughly mindful of his principles, although his followers either are not as forthright in advancing them or, as I prefer to think, they are not profound enough in following the principles of their teacher. Yet what learned person will advance conclusions of this sort, or support them by giving them his approbation? Who will allow their freedom of will to be snatched away by an imaginary principle, when one is aware of this freedom through the testimony of experience, and truly the touchstone of all abstract cognition is agreement with experience. §X. (It is not proven.) In my judgment, it is hardly worth the cost of sacrificing the doctrine of morality, through the proper teaching and application of which human happiness and all of religion are sustained, for the principle of sufficient reason, a recently invented principle and one which has not even been demonstrated. Indeed, that Leibniz did not even venture to demonstrate this principle is abundantly confirmed by his writings.⁹ The famous Wolff, that most successful propagator of the Leibnizian philosophy, has taken up this office. However, whether he has discharged this task successfully is something to examine a little more carefully, with the permission of that illustrious man. For such could not possibly displease one who has so often declared that he has set no other aim for himself than to promote the cognition of truth and the happiness of humankind. §XI. (Wolff ’s first demonstration is refuted.) In fact, we find two proofs of the principle of determining reason furnished by the celebrated Wolff in his German ⁸ [Crusius appends this footnote to the previous sentence, but it is more appropriately placed here.] See Theodicy, Pt. I, §§67–75 [H pp. 159–63] where Leibniz does not deny that punishment is inflicted upon the sinner without guilt, only excusing this by means of using another name, and where he confuses the praise that follows from the imputation of a praiseworthy deed with other forms of praise, and does not admit the former (§75). ⁹ Leibniz either appeals to examples, concerning which see below §XV, or the demonstration is based upon the fact that in general no example of the contrary can be given where the possibility would not remain that one has just not discerned the determining reasons. Yet, this does not amount to a demonstration because this is to infer from what could be the case to what is the case; alternatively, he alleges that it is not possible to uphold the existence of God and His so-called middle knowledge without that principle, although that is both false and, even if one were to concede everything to him, this would still be nothing else than to argue in an ad hominem fashion. One might consult a number of Leibniz’s works, for example Theodicy, Pt. I §44 [H p. 147–8] and the fifth letter to Clarke, §129 [ALC p. 65].

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Metaphysics. The first is in §30, the nub of which you will comprehend conveniently in the following syllogism: Everything that cannot come to be from nothing has a sufficient reason. Yet, whatever is could not come to be from nothing. Therefore, whatever is has a sufficient reason. That this argument is faulty is easily gathered from it, since the proposition that whatever takes place does so from something else is also proved from it, given that nothing comes from nothing; similarly, the proposition that whatever takes place has a determining reason because nothing could be without a determining reason likewise finds a basis in this syllogism. Yet, these propositions differ only in respect of the words used, as the former is affirmative and the latter is only negative in a contingent manner, but both are equivalent to one another such that, consequently, neither can acquire the least certainty as a result of the other.¹⁰ For this would be the same as if I proved that the world is finite on the basis of the claim that it is not infinite, but did not offer any further proof of either proposition. Any given proposition can be proved from the falsity of the strictly opposed proposition, but this falsity must still be proven. Yet, lest I seem unjust towards the inference of the illustrious man, whose merits I esteem as well as one can, I will not decline the opportunity of making a full analysis of it. I say that such an argument always commits a petito principii which lies concealed either in the major or minor proposition depending on how one takes the ambiguous formulation “to come to be from nothing.” For when, for instance, I say “A comes to be from nothing,” my pronouncement is either to be taken in the sense that “A comes to be but there was no cause at hand for why it came to be,” or in the sense that “A comes to be and Nothing is the cause as to why it has come to be.”¹¹ It will easily be discerned that these propositions differ greatly from each other by anyone who has given any thought to whether it would be the same thing to say “Adam did not have a father” and “Nonbeing was the father of Adam”; or “there is no one superior to the King” and “No-one is the superior of the King.” Now, if you retain the former signification throughout, the argument amounts to the following: Whatever cannot come to be except from some other cause, has a sufficient reason. Everything that is cannot come to be except from another cause. Therefore, whatever is has a sufficient reason. I will not here press the point that the major still cannot be admitted in the current formulation, which will become clear below when I explain the distinction between a sufficient cause and a determining reason. I only point out that the minor ¹⁰ [Crusius is referring to a sentence being “incidentally negative [zufälliger Weise verneinend]” which he discusses in his logic (cf. Weg zur Gewißheit, §225), providing the example “The human being is not immortal,” which is equivalent to the affirmative ‘The human being is mortal.” Here, he is evidently claiming that the second, negative proposition in both of the pairs just mentioned is negative only in this sense and so equivalent to the former proposition (rather than, for instance, the basis for its demonstration)]. ¹¹ [Crusius uses “τὸ nihilum [the nothing]” (and sometimes “nonens [non-being]’ ” to refer to the latter sense of “nothing,” which I have rendered through the capitalized form.]

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     

proposition is nothing other than a part of the principle of sufficient reason, and that therefore it is crystal clear that this begs the question. And moreover, that proposition speaks only about those things that come to be, and therefore the conclusion too can only hold concerning things which come to be, which is not to assert that there is a sufficient reason for anything you please. The minor, namely, should be conceived as follows: “For everything that is, if it came to be, then it is not possible for it do so except from another cause.” The conclusion, therefore, will be: “Whatever is, if it comes to be, has a sufficient reason.” Or, if you prefer to assay the second of the two ambiguous significations, this yields the following proof: Whatever thing whose sufficient cause cannot be Nothing, that thing has a determining reason. Yet, whatever is, its sufficient cause cannot be Nothing. Therefore, whatever is has a determining reason. In this way, the minor proposition is indeed immediately evident from the principle of contradiction. But I deny the major. For denying the principle of sufficient reason is not the same as asserting that Nothing is the cause of an existing thing but, rather, that for some existing thing not the least cause was at hand, and I have already pointed out the extent to which these propositions differ from one another. For to deny some proposition is necessarily to grant the strictly opposed proposition, but not, however, to grant a proposition that is merely contrary in some way. Indeed, if one supposes “A has a determining reason,” then the strictly opposed proposition will be “A does not have a determining reason” but not “Nothing is the sufficient cause of A.” Therefore, the proposition that is strictly opposed to the principle of determining reason is not set aside through this argument, and for that reason the principle itself is not yet demonstrated thereby. §XII. (Continuation.) Somewhat differently, but without any change to the nerve of what is concluded, Wolff argues in §70 of the Latin Ontology in roughly this way: Whoever says that something, A, is on account of the fact that nothing is assumed to be, says something absurd. Now, he who says that something, A, is without a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, says that A is on account of the fact that nothing is assumed to be. Therefore, he says something absurd.¹² To the minor proposition, however, I reply that he who denies that A has a sufficient reason does not assert that A is on account of the fact that nothing is assumed to be or,

¹² It is fitting to provide the whole section: Nothing is, he says, without a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, that is, if something is supposed to be, something must also be posited from which it is understood why that same thing rather is than not. For either nothing is without a sufficient reason why it rather is than not, or something can be without a sufficient reason why it rather is than not. Let us suppose that A is without a sufficient reason why it is rather than not. Therefore, nothing must be supposed from which it is understood why A is. One thus admits that A is on account of the fact that nothing is assumed to be, but since this is absurd, nothing is without a sufficient reason, that is, if it is supposed that something is, then one must also admit something from which it can be understood why it is.

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  



what amounts to the same thing, that Nothing is its sufficient reason; but rather denies in general that it is required that A is on account of something else. He wants, then, for it to be proved that when something is supposed to be, it must be supposed to be on account of something else from which it is understood why it is. For one could either simply assume that A exists, or this could be known a posteriori, and so one can suppose its existence without absurdity. And since he does not further suppose that Nothing has brought A about but merely doubts whether in general it was brought forth or had need of being produced from something else, he likewise asserts nothing contradictory here and, consequently, the principle of sufficient reason is not yet proven. For, assume that A is Nothing, B is a being, and C its sufficient reason. The illustrious Wolff says that when B is supposed C is as well because otherwise it would be supposed that C and A are one and the same, which would be absurd. But now the reply to this is that no such claim is made by any opponent, but only that B is supposed and C is not. §XIII. (The other proof is refuted.) The illustrious Wolff ’s other demonstration is in §31 of the German Metaphysics, of which this is the core: Whoever says that something is at once the same and not the same, says something impossible. Yet, he who denies the principle of determining reason says that something is at once the same and not the same. Therefore, he says something impossible, and as a consequence this principle is certain. The minor is proved in the following way: if we suppose A and B are the same and that something can come to be without a sufficient reason, then a change can come to be in A which would not come to be in B were it to be put in its place. Therefore, A and B are at once the same and not the same. Here it is supposed that whoever denies the principle of sufficient reason thereby asserts, of anything and wherever it may be, and thus even concerning those things which are the same, that they could come to be without a determining reason, notwithstanding that he would be able to affirm that it would only be possible for something to come to be without a determining reason in certain substances; thus, again, an inference is made from the negation of a proposition to the supposition of some proposition that is merely contrary rather than one that is strictly opposed to it. But I will grant this point for the sake of the dispute, since the argument does not even proceed correctly from there. For I question whether the illustrious author is speaking of perfect identity, which is the representation of some thing under a two-fold notion, or only of a perfect similarity? In the former case, A and B will be two names or two representations of one thing. Therefore, he who says that a change in one comes to be without a determining reason, will never say that it comes to be in A but does not in B, but rather will assert that it comes to be in that thing and is in it, whether that thing is conceived through the notion A or through B, on account of which this illustrious author does not at all land a blow on his opponents. Conceive of Cicero under two names: call him Marcus and Tully; thus, Marcus and Tully will be the same. Now,

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     

therefore, if you say that something comes to be in Marcus without a determining reason, will you thereby assert that it does not come to be in Tully? Or will Marcus and Tully always remain the same if something were to come to be in him many times over without a sufficient reason? In the latter case, above, it would rather be perfectly similar things that the illustrious Wolff is discussing. So, when he supposes that A and B are perfectly similar things, he either merely assumes that they are perfectly similar things in a given moment, or he considers it necessary that things which are at one point similar always remain similar in the absence of a new reason determining them differently. If one maintained the first, then I do not see what contradiction follows if you said that A and B were similar things in the immediately antecedent moment but that a change appeared without a sufficient reason in one that was not in the other. What then? Do I contradict myself? Not at all, for nothing is proven from this except that now they are no longer perfectly similar things. The second option, however, namely that those things which are at one point similar can never become dissimilar without a sufficient reason, cannot be assumed without an evident petitio principii since the principle of determining reason which is supposed to be proven, is here presupposed and is laid down as the foundation of the argument. §XIV. (It cannot be demonstrated from the principle of contradiction.) We can however go further and show that the principle of determining reason cannot be demonstrated at all from the principle of contradiction. Without doubt, the most acute Leibniz recognized this and for this reason declined to provide a demonstration of it; however, the illustrious Wolff reckoned that he could supply a demonstration with little trouble and in this suffered from an all-too human failing. For, the principle of contradiction is a completely identical proposition, and so for it to be applicable it is necessary that we are speaking about one and the same thing in one and the same respect at one and the same time. For this reason, no question which is posed concerning causes and effects, principles and what follows from them can be decided by means of it, unless some other principle is assumed that is different from and independent of it. Think some thing A and its cause, call it B, and you will see immediately that he who says that A comes to be without any cause no doubt says something absurd and incredible but nothing contradictory, and so he is to be refuted on some other basis, after which the discussion of the proper limitation of the rules concerning the causes and effects of actions must be broached again (and soon will be). For he says that A comes to be and B neither is not nor was not. To come to be is to begin to be, to exist at some moment but not to have existed in the previous moment. Where then is the contradiction? Is it when he says A is at the second moment but was not at the first? Yet no contradiction follows. But B is not? Again, there is no contradiction here. For the rest, I do not suspect anyone will have recourse to the claim that the cause is already involved in the concept of the effect, and vice versa, so that A must be conceived as an effect which presupposes its cause. For here we are not asking about the arrangement of our concepts but about how it stands with things. That is to say, it is not disputed whether an effect would presuppose a cause if it were posited as an effect, which I grant; rather, I want to know whether A is an effect, in the first place, and whence I can know that this is the case.

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§XV. (That it is also not proven through examples.) Much less, however, is it possible to prove the principle of determining reason through examples. For no universal proposition is demonstrated through examples but at most one can contend that it must be postulated on account of the multitude of examples, other things being equal, which is also the path followed by Leibniz. Even if one adduces a reason for human actions, how does one establish that it would have been a determining reason? This cannot be soundly inferred from the fact that the effect follows since in this way one already presupposes the truth of the very principle at issue. On account of this, one must wonder how the illustrious Wolff could have claimed that his principle is already sufficiently demonstrated because the distinction between dream and truth, as well as between the actual world and a fantasy world, can be explained by it.¹³ Now even if the celebrated man had actually shown this, nevertheless the universal truth of his principle would not then have been established. For, it is often accidentally the case that some truth can be explained on the basis of a false proposition. Perhaps some part of this principle only agrees with the truth, and so that having removed all of the superfluities, it alone would suffice to elicit the same, true conclusion. §XVI. (The principle is ambiguous, first, due to the ambiguity of the word “reason.”) I have shown, therefore, that the principle of determining reason, in the form in which it was expressed by Leibniz, cannot be admitted as true, partly because it has not been demonstrated (§§XI–XIII), partly because it cannot be demonstrated (§§XIV–XV), and partly because the highly false consequences which are legitimately derived from it more than suffice to reveal subsequently its deviation from the truth (§§V, VII–IX). Beyond this, however, the principle suffers from a notable ambiguity, as a result of which it is rendered overly pliable and even uncertain in its application. For, first, the word reason is slippery. Since a reason is that from which it is cognized why something is, Leibniz in fact comprehends under it both principles¹⁴ of cognition and of things, that is, principles of cognition a priori, including purely ideal principles, in addition to active causes and the remaining sort of determining principles which determine another thing to be in a certain way merely through their existence and not through some activity; indeed, he even includes ends, laws and rules of prudence among reasons. How so? Moreover, how is it that a reason is sometimes something different from that of which it is called the reason, and other times it is taken to pertain to that same thing, as when that thing is said to have the reason in itself? You tell me that some being A has a sufficient reason. I ask: what sort

¹³ See German Metaphysics, §30. For this reason as well, what he expressly says in Ontology §73 also cannot be sustained: the principle of sufficient reason can be abstracted as universal from examples or singular things. He quotes an example produced from mathematics where it seems the principle of sufficient reason is presupposed by it. But, unless one wants to give license to anyone in concluding from the particular to the universal, then rules must be established to serve as conditions under which a universal proposition can be abstracted from a single example. [ . . . ] However, in demonstrative reasoning, the rule can be none other than that similar adequate causes produce a similar effect. But since this rule acquires its truth from a certain part of the principle of sufficient reason (a part that no doubt accords with the truth), so it cannot be applied to establishing the same principle without circularity. [ . . . ] ¹⁴ [Here, and in a number of instances below, Crusius uses “principium” rather than “ratio”; however, as he makes clear below (cf. §XXXIV), he takes these terms to be synonymous in some cases.]

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     

of sufficient reason? Is it within A or outside of A? An efficient cause or merely ideal principle of cognizing? Is it physical or moral? You cannot leave it wholly up to me to choose among these as I please, as I will illustrate with several examples below (§XL). I do not know, then, which sort of reason you intend. You say that we must investigate and see what sort it is. Correct, but then I will make use of a more specialized principle, yet to be discovered, and not your principle of sufficient reason. §XVII. (The principle is ambiguous, second, due to the ambiguity of the word “sufficient.”) The word sufficient suffers from the same ambiguity which, even though it might be cleverly employed in a way that does not agree with the notion had by most who hear it, as I have shown above (§II), nonetheless if the word is accepted in the most precise sense possible, it can still be understood in terms of either a physically sufficient reason or a morally sufficient reason, which signification you will see indiscriminately extended everywhere. For instance, if you want to confute someone who locates the freedom of the will in a faculty for determining itself to different actions under the same posited circumstances, that is, in a sort of activity which does not stand in need of a physically determining reason in order to issue in a secondary action, you can object that he defends a will that acts without a sufficient reason. Here, many will have a morally sufficient reason in mind, and since the opposite of acting in accordance with such a reason is rashness and foolishness, they will think that you reproach your adversary with a serious charge, though how philosophically sound this may be, those who have some acquaintance with logic may judge. For, someone who defends a will that can act foolishly, affirms nothing that is not confirmed by experience, but to be sure he does not endorse a will for which it is permitted to act foolishly, or which must so act. §XVIII. (Refutation of doubts.) But perhaps someone will conclude that all general concepts can be charged with ambiguity with the same right inasmuch as they comprehend various species under them. Hence, I see that many become thoroughly vexed when one imputes a fallacy of equivocation to the principle of determining reason on account of the various sorts of reasons there are. How is it, then, they might answer, that some take it to be a virtue of this principle that it extends so broadly and that it encompasses various species of reasons? I respond: the ambiguity at issue is an uncertainty in application, whereby it agrees with words in such a way that one cannot understand which meaning is to be attributed to them in a given instance. However, notions are ambiguous when it cannot be understood how they should apply to determinate examples, where a concept should always be serviceable for such determination.¹⁵ Therefore, not all general concepts are ambiguous, nor am I charging the principle of sufficient reason with ambiguity merely because it is general. Those general concepts, however, become ambiguous which do not agree with its species in the same sense and on the same basis. Indeed, concepts of this sort either cannot be applied securely at all, or they are to be divided up and, when they are applied to an example, the appropriate species must be named, for instance, the concept of animal agrees with all of its species in the very same sense and on the very ¹⁵ [See Weg zur Gewißheit, §215 where Crusius recommends, as a test for discovering the ambiguity of a word, that the concrete idea of the word’s signification “is applied to as many examples as possible, in order to see whether they can all be called by a single name for the sake of showing that it is the same concept.”]

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

same basis. Hence, whatever is inferred from the nature of the animal in one example is asserted securely of any species, and when something is predicated of animals in general, it is left to one’s own discretion whether one pronounces the same thing in the same sense and on the same basis of the other examples. But the situation is entirely different if you take reason, for its general concept is: a reason is that from which it is understood why something is. Now take as its species efficient cause and a priori principle of cognition. The general notion agrees with both, but there is a different reason at hand on each side. Namely, from the cause it can be understood why the effect is, since it is produced by it outside of the intellect. But it is from the essence of a thing that we cognize why an attribute pertains to that thing, not because it always follows upon an essence, or that the one produces the other outside our thought, but because the thought of one already includes the supposition of the other. [ . . . ] §XIX. (We have a propensity to assent to it because we desire its truth.) It is true that a particularly important part, indeed the noblest part, of our desire for knowing consists in knowing why something is whose existence we know of a posteriori. We tend to indulge this insatiable appetite most fervently,¹⁶ nor do we acquiesce for the most part until it at least seems to be satisfied. If our prayers are granted, then we are delighted with great pleasure, and instructed by many examples that the determining reason of things is never sought in vain, we are easily led to believe that whatever is has its determining reason and that such a reason is always given even though it is most often not known by the human intellect. Yet it is not for the wise man to believe what he wants to, or to believe something just because he wants to; therefore, another foundation must be sought as to why, and to what extent, there is a reason for all things, which task I will now begin to undertake. §XX. (Proposition I, which is contained in the principle of sufficient reason.) We cannot at all think a being that is but previously was not except on the condition that we grant that another being existed before which had the faculty and activity sufficient to produce that being. From this follows the rule: whatever begins to exist comes to be from another being that had the faculty sufficient for its production and which was set into action and was not impeded. However, we call this being the efficient cause and, when it is set into action and provided that it is sufficient and is not impeded, then the effect is necessarily posited. For when that is posited through which something else rather is than not, then it is necessary that this other thing is also posited. One would not inappropriately name this proposition the principle of sufficient cause. §XXI. (Proposition II and III.) In order better to bring out the character of this proposition, that is, so that it is made more suitable for application to given instances, another proposition must be called in to help; namely, that whenever we think a being whose non-existence, either now or at some previous point in the past, does not contain anything contradictory, the human intellect is so disposed in virtue of its nature that it inquires as to why that thing is and believes that in fact at some point in the past that being did not exist and therefore was brought about. Thus, another

¹⁶ Wolff recognized this; cf. Ont. §§74, 75.

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     

principle springs forth: that whose non-existence can be thought did not exist at some point. Those who are fond of technical terms have my permission to call this the principle of contingency. To this you might easily add a third, namely, the principle of necessity: no being is necessary unless its non-existence cannot be thought. §XXII. (Proposition IV.) If one now posits certain things as existing, then everything that exists at the same time or that comes to be cannot be composed in any other way than the laws of truth allow, namely, that they do not contradict those things now posited as existing. And in this way, even without a faculty of acting but merely through its existence which is now presupposed, an existing thing makes it that some other thing is possible or impossible, or only possible under certain conditions. Such a being which, merely through its existence makes something else possible or impossible, or simply possible in a certain respect I will call an existentially determining principle or reason, regarding which you might consider this rule which is supported by the principle of contradiction: nothing is or can come to be except insofar as it does not contradict those co-existing things which are posited at the same time. For example, the unequal lengths of the sides in the triangle are the cause as to why the angles cannot be equal, and vice versa. §XXIII. (What a faculty is and how many there might be, and what action, effect, and first action is.) An efficient cause, when it produces something, must be equipped with a faculty (§XX). Faculty is the possibility of some thing that is thought, which is connected with another subject. This consists either in the fact that the thing whose truth is posited determines the possibility of other things merely by means of its existence (§XXII). Not knowing what else to call this, I will refer to it as the existential faculty for the time being. Alternatively, it consists in the internal quality of the essence of the thing, in which case it is called the active faculty. An action however is that state of an active faculty in which that takes place which is required for the existence of that thing that is the namesake of the faculty; or where it transfers that which it can transfer to a being that is possible through it. An effect is that which is produced through the action, and is distinct from the subject or from some quality in it. Therefore, there is an action between the effect and the active efficient cause, without which it would be absurd for an effect to come to be. That action situated between the cause and effect is often the effect of some other action, in such a way that in one respect it is an action but, in another respect, the same thing is to be numbered among effects. Since, however, this series cannot progress infinitely, it must at some point come to first actions which are not efficiently produced by any other thing, although they can be bound by their own conditions which are therefore immediately set out by the acting subject and are to be found in it. A first action, therefore, is that which does not have another efficient antecedent cause, and to be numbered among such actions are, for instance, all the actions of God, and the actions of the fundamental faculties in the elements and finite spirits. §XXIV. (First actions either take place perpetually . . . ) If, however, you have occasion to direct your thoughts to the character of first actions a little more carefully, you will discern with little trouble that these are of two sorts. Some, namely, constantly take place, and some do not take place constantly. Those which do constantly take place make up the internal essence of simple substances. Of this sort are, for instance, the actions of the divine intellect and, indeed, all of the

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

immanent actions of the most blessed divinity. To this sort of action, one may also reckon the fundamental faculties of finite simple beings, which are in fact constantly active provided that the required conditions are present, even though these beings must necessarily be sustained by God on account of their finite nature. §XXV. ( . . . or they can be taken up and be left off again.) But there are also other first actions that do not constantly take place, and so which can be undertaken or omitted by the cause, provided that the required conditions are present, and can likewise be directed thus and otherwise as long as it does not involve anything that is contradictory. Such, for instance, was the action in God through which He created the world. For, before He created the world, the world could not have existed, and neither could the world have been in existence eternally because that would obviously be self-contradictory since something would be supposed to be eternal which would nonetheless have been preceded by something, namely a cause by which it is produced. There are also first actions of this sort in finite spirits endowed with reason, and the faculty of such actions constitutes the free will, both in them and in God, as I have demonstrated elsewhere.¹⁷ That these powers cannot exist in other created beings might easily be shown to follow from the wisdom of God, since these powers would not serve any purpose and would be opposed to the order of nature whereas, by contrast, in spirits they actually make moral virtue possible. But I do not take this to be the place to discuss this matter. §XXVI. (Proposition V.) From this, however, I derive another theorem: whatever comes to be that is not a free first action, is produced by an efficient cause such that it could not have arisen otherwise or failed to come to be at all according to the posited circumstances. This proposition could appropriately be called the principle of determining reason, and it is grounded in the principle of sufficient cause (§XX). For if such a thing were able to come about otherwise, it would come about without a sufficient cause which is absurd. But if it were not able to come to be at all, then either the cause would not in fact have been sufficient, either it was not set into action or was impeded, which is what we ordinarily take to be the case or, assuming a truly sufficient cause that has been set into action and is unimpeded, the effect would not also be supposed to follow, which is likewise absurd. The criteria can easily be supplied by which one can recognize whether something is to be set apart from the set of first actions, namely: that action which is produced by a previous adequate change, which admits an external cause, or which could not be omitted is not a free first action. But by what means it is possible to establish which free actions have taken place, concerning these you will need to consult what follows.¹⁸ I am aware in any case that many have convinced themselves that the other sort of first actions, namely free first actions, cannot possibly happen. Yet, can they supply any other reason for this other than Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason which I have thoroughly refuted? Moreover, I have demonstrated not only the possibility but also the actuality and truth of such action from the principle of contradiction, §XXV. ¹⁷ In the Dissertatio de appetitibus insitis voluntatis humanae [Dissertation on the Innate Appetites of the Human Will], §§4–7. ¹⁸ [This is presumably a reference to §XLII, below.]

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     

§XXVII. (The genesis of the cognition of truth from the highest principles of human reason.) Truth is the agreement of thoughts with things.¹⁹ However, no other natural criterion of truth can be established apart from the nature of the intellect itself, or what can be thought, which is not to say that whatever can be thought is true, but rather in this way that whatever cannot be thought is false and, contrariwise, whatever cannot be thought as false is true. And indeed some things cannot be thought since they involve a contradiction, such as that a triangle does not have angles; and in other cases, it is not possible to show that there is a contradiction but it suffices that they cannot be thought and so, unless some further condition is added as will be explained later (§XXVIII), they should be rejected as no less false and absurd, such as that there is a faculty without a subject, or vice versa, or that something comes to be without an efficient cause, or that two pieces of matter penetrate one another at an indivisible point, or that one person can be in Leipzig and Dresden simultaneously. Nevertheless, we must always keep in mind that we are finite, on account of which our efforts in judging what is true are not to be extended beyond the nature of the finite. That judgment where we reject contradicting things as false gives rise to two identical propositions, namely, that whatever is is, and whatever is not is not, which we usually join together into a single proposition: nothing can both be and not be at the same time in the same sense, and we call this the principle of contradiction. But everything else which cannot be thought is equally to be rejected, and is in fact rejected by us as we are compelled to do so. (The highest principles of human reason.) As a result, from the nature of the human intellect, according to which that which is unable to be thought is rejected as false, there flows three general principles for the cognition of truth, of which the first is: nothing can both be and not be at the same time in the same sense, that is, the principle of contradiction. The second is: that which cannot be separated in thought, cannot be separated in fact, even if no contradiction comes about, as long as both are positive, for instance: nothing comes to be without an efficient cause. Provided no fault is found with the term, one might call it the principle of the inseparable. I would like it to be well noted that I have required that both of the propositions that are thought as inseparable are positive, for otherwise we would not be mindful of our finitude by which it happens that whatever we think positively we can conceive in no other way than, and only so long as we think it as, limited; thus, in thinking of the infinite being, we necessarily have to attach something negative to our concept.²⁰ The third principle is: those things which we cannot combine in thought, cannot be combined in fact, even where a contradiction does not arise, which if you want a name you might call the principle of the incombinable. All of the rules of reasoning in logic as well as the truth of axioms and experiences are, or can be, derived from these three principles, and indeed as far as I can see, they are derived by means of the easiest and most natural connection.

¹⁹ [Compare Thomasius, Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason, Fifth Main Part, proposition 13, above.] ²⁰ [Compare Weg zur Gewißheit, §263: “on account of our finitude, we cannot think everything and our intuitive cognition does not stretch very far; therefore we must not assume that we are justified in holding that we might reject everything that is inconceivable to us.”]

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§XXVIII. (Rules for the conflict of the highest principles.) It happens occasionally that something that is correctly derived from the second or third principle opposes that which is elicited from the principle of contradiction, on account of which it is concluded that one or the other of these is contrary to the truth. But this is easily resolved, as one need only have recourse to the general criterion of truth. One must determine, namely, the proposition whose falsity least permits of being thought. Now, however, it is possible to conceive that there is an intellect more perfect than our own, which can combine and separate that whose combination or separation does not lie within our power; yet, it is inconsistent with all thought that there could be an intellect which could think contradictory things as true. It is, therefore, clear that in the case of a conflict, the principle of contradiction is, with the most complete conviction and certainty, to be given priority over the other two principles. However, in other examples where these principles do not conflict, if one wanted to withhold assent to these latter two principles, that would in fact be nothing else but to oppose nature itself and, having abandoned the innate nature of the intellect, to grasp after smoke and shadows. (Mysteries of reason.) Otherwise, one could call those things mysteries of reason that oppose the latter principles but which, on account of a proof taken from the principle of contradiction, indisputably make their own truth clear and, at the same time, affirm the limitation of our intellect. Concerning these things, we know that they are true, but we do not know the manner in which they are established nor the determinate possibility as to how they are capable of being combined and separated. §XXIX. (Proposition VI.) From these considerations, the generation of true cognition, and how it can be distinguished from error, is sufficiently evident. Truth, namely, can admit no other criterion than the agreement with the principles of human reason, and error the disagreement with these principles, unless perhaps you are afraid that God has arranged the nature of our intellect for our perpetual deceit, which however would be foolish and impious. In this way, we have brought forth a new rule: the human intellect judges nothing to be true except on account of the clearly or obscurely perceived connection with these three highest principles (or at least which we imagine to perceive in this way). I suggest that this rule might be called the rule of conviction. [ . . . ] §XXXIV. (Exposition of the types of reasons: of physical and moral existence.) [ . . . ] Let principle and reason be taken as synonyms.²¹ A principle therefore is something that is prior, or that is considered as such, and which contributes something either to the existence or the possibility of some other being which is later or considered as such. [ . . . ] Nonetheless, it must be noted that a principle is either prior temporally or only in regard to the manner of consideration, and also that something is contributed either to the being’s complete existence or to its possibility, and so to a part of its existence. Existence is either physical, when something actually exists, or moral, when something ought to be. Similarly, possibility is also either physical, where some thing that is thought is grounded in some cause, or moral, where some act is

²¹ [Accordingly, and despite the risk of confusion, Crusius uses principium and ratio fairly interchangeably through the next few sections.]

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     

permitted and not prohibited by any law. Wherefore, a principle will be either a principle of physical existence, which makes it that something physically is or can be, as for example the sun is the principle of light, or a principle of moral existence, which makes it that something must come to be or is permitted to do so, as for instance the avoidance of an imminent danger is the reason why one proceeds with caution. §XXXV. (Principle of being and of cognizing.) A reason of physical existence is such either with respect to the thing itself outside of the intellect, and this is called the reason of the thing or the principle of being as, for instance, God is the reason of the world; or with respect to our cognition, insofar namely as it produces the cognition of another thing, as for instance the supreme perfection of God is the reason why He exists eternally and can so exist, and this is called the principle of cognizing. §XXXVI. (Efficient cause and existentially determining principle.) A principle of being either produces its effect by means of an active faculty and its use, in which case it is called an efficient cause and the rules for which one can find at §§XX, XXI, XXVI, as for instance heat is among the causes for the growth of plants; or, it makes something else possible, or impossible or possible in no other way, through nothing more than its mere existence, and this I have called an existentially determining principle, of which sort are all the determining quantities in the whole of mathematics, and the rules for which one can find in §XXII. §XXXVII. (Various principles of cognizing.) A principle of cognizing is either a posteriori or a priori. Yet, a principle that is called a priori can be so merely ideally, as for instance a definition is the principle of [, or the reason of knowing,] the attributes of something; or it can be ideal and real, or a principle of cognizing and of being at once. For, from every principle of being which, and insofar as it, does not act freely, the certainty and state of the effect can be foreseen (§§III, XXVI). Freely acting causes, however, do not serve to that extent as a reason for foreseeing the existence and circumstances of their actions a priori; nevertheless, the possibility of their actions can be known from them. The rules concerning principles of cognizing can be found in §§XXVII–XXXII.²² §XXXIX. (What a reason considered subjectively and objectively is, and what a cause is.) I admit that much still could have been added concerning causes and reasons. However, my intention was to gather from the limitless region of causal abstractions no more than would suffice in order to properly understand and suitably limit the Leibnizian principle of determining reason. Nonetheless, I will provide one more consideration which should not simply be passed over without attention. Some have pointed out that a reason can be considered subjectively or objectively. Namely, a reason considered objectively is that notion from which it can be known why the thing we are inquiring about is; that subject, however, in which the object of that notion is encountered is called the reason subjectively considered. I consent readily to all this, but the matter seems to be attended by a few difficulties. That many call a reason, subjectively considered, a cause is something I could scarcely be in accord with. For although the word cause is employed multifariously in ordinary discourse, ²² [In the next (omitted) section (§XXXVIII), Crusius considers a reason of “moral existence [existentiae moralis],” distinguishing these into reasons of prudence, which are given by the idea of human perfection and the nature of our purpose, and reasons of justice, which stem from a law considered as such.]

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  

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and so the right to determine its signification may not seem to be denied the philosopher, nonetheless, the term seems to be used here far too freely. This is because we never call the principles of cognizing, insofar as they are such, the cause of something even though they are as it were the causes of our cognizing something. [ . . . ] I would think therefore that, even though cause is often taken as a synonym of reason, we would do best to call a cause the being which contains the principle of being of some other thing for which a cause is sought. If, therefore, the cause is a whole being, then it is always a substance; all causes are thus substances, or actions and modifications of substances.²³ §XL. (The ambiguity of the principle of sufficient reason when one does not infer it from the more specific propositions.) Thus far, I have derived nine propositions, each true and of highest importance, which are comprehended under the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason [ . . . ²⁴]. And even if nothing more were contained in the principle than these propositions, and so the principle were to accord exactly with the truth (though it will soon become apparent that things are otherwise), nonetheless, those who commend the principle of sufficient reason to us with so much effort are not to be praised as having conducted the matter well. For one could not understand these specific propositions, whichever one might be called upon here and there in support, from the principle itself. Moreover, even by the admission of its defenders, it is not satisfactory for the principle itself that one is able to cite some species of sufficient reason or another; rather, considerations such as we have entered into here should be adduced and hence we should always reason from those specific

²³ As an aid to memory, take the following tree of divisions presented in tabular form:

either a principle of being either a reason of physical existence, and this is A REASON or PRINCIPLE is

or a reason of moral existence

or a principle of cognizing, and further

either a reason of prudence, and this is

either an efficient cause or an existentially determining principle either a posteriori either merely ideal or a priori and this is

or at the same time a principle of being

either a mere reason of prudence or at the same time a reason of justice

or a reason of justice ²⁴ [The remaining propositions Crusius derives from the principle of sufficient reason in the sections omitted here all relate to morally sufficient reasons. These are: (seventh proposition) the truth ought to be sought, and the obstacles to attaining it must be carefully removed (cf. § XXX); (eighth proposition) one should not act other than in agreement with reason and the law, or prudently and justly (cf. § XXXI); and the ninth proposition is identified as the principle of morally sufficient reason which consists in the general precept “nothing is to be taken for granted or performed without a sufficient reason” (cf. § XXXII).]

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     

propositions that we have explicated. Yet, if one must infer from these, then why, I ask, does one exalt the principle of determining reason with such praise when that principle does not permit of any distinguished use, or only a completely trifling one, in the sciences? So that this might be clearer, I will supply some examples from which it will become apparent how ambiguous and lacking in characteristic features that principle is. Spinoza rejected God, but that the world has a sufficient reason is not gainsaid as its reason lies in itself. Evidently, he understood this to be a merely ideal, a priori principle of cognizing, for he deduced the necessity of the world from the concept of a substance, a deduction with which some who do not teach the method of demonstrating definitions in their logic, or who deny that real conclusions do not follow from possible definitions, would wish to find fault (though I do not see why). Imagine the gods of Epicurus, not of course as creators of the world but as lazy spectators, in the dull intermundial space, of this accidentally aggregated world. Yet because these gods enjoy a superior understanding, and know well enough the accidental declination or swerve of atoms by which our universe was eventually brought forth, do they then not have within them something from which it can be cognized why the world is, and so contain in themselves a sufficient reason for the world? For were it permitted us to examine their intellect, we would be able to understand thereby why the world is, which is to say they contain within themselves the principle of cognizing the world. Likewise, when those who embrace the pre-established harmony claim that the sufficient reason for the changes of the body is no less contained in the soul, and the sufficient reason for the changes of the soul no less in the body; even though neither part acts upon the other yet each at least contains something in it from which it can be cognized why this or that occurs in such a way in the one and not otherwise. By the same token, are not Epicurus’ gods able to have within themselves the sufficient reason of the world since from them it can be understood why the world is? Imagine the world to have existed eternally, and imagine a soul of the world, an informing form, an assisting being, a Stoic, Aristotelian, or Platonic god: in each of these cases it could be said with equal justification that the world has its sufficient reason in god. Is it not clear, therefore, that the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason is of no use in demonstrating the existence of God, properly speaking, on account of that principle’s lack of characteristic features and its extreme pliability, and that recourse must instead be made to the principles I have supplied in §§XX–XXI [ . . . ]. §XLI. (Proposition X from the principle of sufficient reason, which proposition is false.) Yet, besides the nine propositions that have been explicated, another proposition is also comprehended by the principle of sufficient reason which accounts for that part of the principle which is false. This part is clearly incapable of support and it is from it that all of those troublesome conclusions which I have treated in §§V–IX are drawn. According to this proposition, two things are affirmed at once, namely, that every active cause is determined to act, and to act in just such a way and no other, such that the action could not be omitted or directed otherwise under the same circumstances. For, since the sufficient reason is that from which it is understood why something rather is than not, and why it is such and not otherwise, so the same

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will hold for the reason that determines the active cause. Now, however, one cannot gather the truth of anything by means of inference except from demonstrating the impossibility of the strictly opposed proposition. Therefore, when something is at hand from which we can see why this thing is rather than something else, then we also understand why the latter could not come to be. As a result, the active cause is only disposed at that moment to no more than a single determinate action which it can now undertake (§III). Just as we observe in machines that a given machine is disposed to bringing about various effects, but in such a way that each takes place under particular conditions such that, when they are present, that effect cannot be omitted and, when they are absent, it cannot be undertaken; so the reason of every active cause is supposed to be constituted in a similar way. One sees the heavier scalepan descending, which could also have risen but only with the positing of different circumstances; one sees the same sky, though it casts down hail or sprinkles rain. But each one, although possible in itself, does not actually take place without a completely determining reason that at the same time excludes the opposite. In the same way, God and spirits are supposed to be determined to all of their actions, which are yet called free since their determining reasons are distinct notions,²⁵ although they do not differ as far as necessity is concerned. They think up different names for them, but this does not alter anything in the matter itself. For, they believe that bodies are determined by the laws of motion and spirits, by contrast, are determined by ethico-logical laws, but they are nevertheless just as determined. Yet, this opinion is not proved since I have shown that the principle of determining reason has not been demonstrated, §§XI–XIII, and also that it cannot be proven, §§XIV–XV, since on the contrary both the possibility and the truth of such acting causes have been in part directly, §XXV, and indirectly, §§V–IX, demonstrated. The assent, therefore, that tends to be given to this tenth proposition will be derived from the sort of causes which we have supplied in §XIX, and one should keep in mind how inconsequential and far from the truth such causes are. Those actions, therefore, are to be exempted from that complete determination, insofar, namely, as they are free (I want this to be well noted). And since the chief part of philosophy consists in explaining and directing such actions, it is sufficiently clear that no insignificant error lies in the Leibnizian principle of determining reason given that it handles the noblest object of philosophy so badly, but also mistreats religion, which depends on philosophy precisely here. §XLII. (Free actions must be cognized a posteriori, or through an infinite intellect.) Since the Leibnizian principle asserts that an a priori reason can be given for anything, it deviates from the truth in that it also supposes all active causes to be constituted in such a way that it is possible for the effect to be foreseen from them a priori. Yet, I have shown that free actions are to be exempted here. For, even though we might eagerly wish to explain such actions on the basis of a determining reason, §XVIII,²⁶ and so continually strive in vain to find an explanation, yet the nature of the thing itself is not affected and instead only forces us to recognize the limits of our intellect ²⁵ [On this, see Wolff ’s German Metaphysics, §514, and Leibniz’s Theodicy, Pt. III, §§288–9 (H pp. 303–4).] ²⁶ [This is likely a reference to §XIX, not §XVIII.]

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     

and, when it comes to explicating this faculty which constitutes the noblest aspect of our likeness with the infinite supreme being, to be content with a posteriori cognition. For, free actions cannot be foreseen by the finite intellect other than as probable, since they are bereft of determining reasons. When, therefore, such actions take place, they must be known a posteriori since knowing in advance that they will occur requires an infinite intellect, which obviously does not need to make use of inferences but, by means of His nature, always and necessarily and at every moment most perfectly and clearly knows all things that are and that occur, as well as what would have occurred under other conditions. §XLIII. (Divine foreknowledge does not require inferences.) If you were to believe all that concerning the highest Deity which His altogether supreme perfection requires us to believe, then one will form a notion of His foreknowledge that is worthy of so great a God. Nonetheless, Leibniz offered a poor vindication of this divine attribute,²⁷ as he considers God to have foreknowledge of future matters from their determining reasons, and for the rest he baldly confesses that foreknowledge of this kind must be regarded as absurd unless it is not conceived on the basis of his own fabricated system. Yet is this not to yield to the Socinians, and indeed, without any reason? Socinians deny the foreknowledge of free actions, but their opinion concerning freedom is correct; Leibniz would not be a Socinian in this particular matter and so he preferred to adopt an incorrect conception of freedom and thus affirmed the foreknowledge of human actions which are not truly free—is this not, I ask, as much as to reject the very foreknowledge of God into which we were originally inquiring? Moreover, in this way, a subtle anthropomorphism could be introduced which would affix to God those things that are consequences of human finitude. For, the capacity to reason must be removed from the divine intellect no less than the capacity to sense, as both betray a finitude and a merely gradual increase of cognition that are thoroughly unbecoming of infinite majesty. Accordingly, it should not be said that God knows future matters on the basis of their reasons, but rather that He knows future matters and he also knows the reasons by which these are brought about and, insofar as they are connected by these reasons. It does not trouble me if one should object that it is not possible to comprehend God’s foreknowledge in this way; I rather opt for the contrary opinion that the foreknowledge of an infinite being that would not surpass the limits of our intellect is certainly false precisely on account of the fact that it can be comprehended. For, the internal nature of an infinite being cannot be comprehensible to any being outside of an infinite intellect. A mystery of reason is therefore to be acknowledged here, one indisputably sustained by its certainty, even if there is no way in which we might gain distinct cognition of it, the reason for which was given before (cf. §XXVIII). §XLIV. (Limitation of the principle of sufficient reason.) At last, we are now in a position where my opinion concerning the Leibnizian principle of determining reason, and my views concerning its limitation and improvement, can be sufficiently understood. I consider myself correct, namely, in presuming that a principle of such a sort is sought which can prove useful especially in natural theology and in the

²⁷ See Theodicy, Pt. I, §§39–42 [H pp. 144–7], and Leibniz’s fifth letter to Clarke, §5 [ALC p. 36] [ . . . ].

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  



mathematical and physical sciences. [ . . . ] What I have called the principle of sufficient cause (§XX) and of determining reason (§XXVI) can be aptly comprehended within a single rule (though whether this rule would answer to Leibniz’s aim to the extent that it is deserving of our approbation, the readers can judge for themselves). The rule itself will be this: everything the non-existence of which can be conceived comes to be from a sufficient cause and, if it was not a free action, then it came to be from that cause in such a way that it could not fail to come to be or take place otherwise under the posited circumstances. A sufficient cause is one in which there is nothing lacking that is required for the effect. Whether this revision is in other respects pleasing to the reader is not of great concern to me so long as he is in accord with me concerning the explication of the specific propositions contained in the principle of sufficient reason, with which we were so extensively occupied above, since these propositions are the true limits of that principle. For the rest, it must be left wholly to each learned individual to order his thoughts as he pleases and to set the appropriate boundaries for his concepts, provided that no harm to the truth results. §XLV. (Free actions truly have a sufficient reason.) In free actions, therefore, a sufficient reason in the sense that I assign to the word finds a place, namely there is merely a sufficient cause, but not one that beyond this is also determined to only a single way of acting. For a free substance, when it acts freely, is provided with sufficient powers for an action but insofar as it acts freely it is no less provided with powers sufficient to omit that action. That which it undertakes to do does not exceed its powers, and so powers sufficient for it were at hand; however, at the same time there were a number of other actions for the undertaking of which those powers were no less sufficient. I walk, but I can sit; I sit but I can walk. Both are in my power, and I do not stand in need of a new determining reason to do either but rather I determine myself. Certainly, objects I encounter move me but, if I should not wish to act in accordance with them, I resist their impulses as long as this does not exceed my limited powers. Thus, I am not determined. And when I am determined, the cause behind this is that I did not make use of my freedom. If I devote myself to virtue, then I choose what is best. However, since I could still renounce the greater good and choose the lesser, one will still offer me praise if I will have chosen the better. In this way, we easily avoid the aspersions of our opponents when they mock us by saying that the free will, according to our opinion, acts without a sufficient reason, for there is a sufficient reason of physical existence. [ . . . ] §XLVII. (It is not the case that whoever asks after reasons for things presupposes the principle of sufficient reason.) All those judge precipitously who suppose that anyone who speaks of reasons, or who seeks after causes and reasons, makes a tacit inference from, or otherwise presupposes, the Leibnizian principle. For why can they not presuppose another of our rules? Indeed, some have done just this, and because they were convinced that the very same thing which they presupposed was contained in the Leibnizian principle, they have often affirmed this principle though not in the sense Leibniz understands it but in their own. Clarke did not offer any objection against the principle of sufficient reason, but it is clear from his application of it to various examples that he had nothing else in mind than our principle of sufficient cause (§XX), and it is on account of this that Leibniz frequently protested that Clarke had not understood him correctly. Yet the Englishman was only misled by the

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     

ambiguity of the principle and one should not blame him for this, as if he had forgotten his own principles in the course of drawing his inferences. §XLVIII. (The origin of the principle of sufficient reason.) If I might hazard a conjecture concerning the cause by which Leibniz was led to fabricate his principle, I would say that it is to be located in the fact that he did not define an efficient cause in terms of its essence but instead in terms of what amounts to its sign or its mere effect, which it produces in the human mind insofar as it is thought. For, since the efficient cause is that by which something is produced, so Leibniz asserted that it was that from which it is cognized why something is. He thus believed this to be a universal sign of the cause even though it only pertains to determining causes. From this he concluded, further, that no sooner is there a sufficient cause than it can be conceived from it why the thing is and why it exists in this way. For since no one can deny that whatever comes to be has a sufficient cause, he came to be persuaded through a false notion of cause that everything that comes to be is produced by a cause in such a way that it could not be omitted and could not have taken place otherwise under the posited circumstances, or that every sufficient cause is also completely determined to act and indeed to undertake an action in just such a way and no other. He applied this principle to mathematics, in which he was extraordinarily talented, and found it to be true. He determined that one must also explicate the moral sciences on the basis of this principle, and, insofar as these were not consistent with it, they must be transformed. This occasion strikes me as a useful one to prescribe caution to those who are in the habit of almost everywhere constructing their chosen definitions not on the basis of the nature of things but from mere signs. §XLIX (Why my opponents would not easily change their opinion.) Although I have thoroughly refuted and limited this principle, I can nonetheless readily foresee that those who have already been captive to the contrary opinion for some time will not easily abandon it; indeed, I have learned from my own case how difficult this can be. I will therefore subjoin a few of the causes which tend to stand in the way of accepting the better opinion so that the upright among us, when they recognize that it is not arguments but other obstacles that prevent them from lending us their approval, might at that point be more willing to give way when arguments are presented. First, they tend to be displeased by the fact that we would put in the place of the principle of sufficient reason a great variety of other, and for the most part less straightforward propositions. In this way, the ambit of the sciences becomes broader and more troublesome, since otherwise the Leibnizian philosophy commends itself on account of its brevity and simplicity and contents itself with but a single proposition.²⁸ Yet, I urge one to keep in mind that truth and not simplicity should be sought. Moreover, they call to mind innumerable examples in which they have seen that their principle has actually held. I respond, however, that one might also point to innumerable cases where it is manifestly false; consider, namely, free actions, as well as their imputation and their norms. Third, we wish for the truth of the Leibnizian principle, since it seems that through it the manner of connection of

²⁸ Leibniz boasts of this in vain in his Theodicy, Pt. I, § 44 [H p. 148].

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human actions can be more clearly explained, and the clearer a cognition is the greater the pleasure it produces. Yet, it is for the wise not to follow their desire but the truth; where, therefore, there is no clarity to be had other than a fictitious one, one which is not in agreement with the truth but hostile to it, it should not be pretended otherwise. For is not more obscure, but true, cognition to be preferred to imaginary clarity? I do not deny that something is contained in free actions which cannot be comprehended since we cannot clearly conceive of a causal connection except where the effect comes to be from a pre-existing striving with the impediments having been removed. However, it will never be able to be shown that everything is false which cannot be perfectly comprehended by us. Do we not then know the limits in which nature has enclosed us? I have furnished other criteria of truth in abundance, which no one will deny except perhaps on account of arrogance. Whatever is found on that relation to our cognitive capacities to be true, is true, however much it surpasses what we have grown accustomed to and our finitude. [ . . . ]

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9 Georg Friedrich Meier: Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death (1746) Georg Friedrich Meier was born on March 29, 1718 in Ammendorf, a village near Halle an der Saale. On account of his delicate constitution, he was educated at home until 1727 by his mother and father, a pastor. After this, Meier briefly attended the famous Pietist orphanage in Halle, though ill-health interrupted his studies, and from 1729 to 1736 he received instruction in mathematics, Latin, and physics at a school in the house of Christoph Semmler, a polymath and educational innovator. Around the same time, Meier matriculated at the university in Halle, and in 1735 he began attending lectures by, among others, Alexander Gottlieb and Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten, on topics including metaphysics, logic, natural law, and moral philosophy. Meier attained the Magister philosophiae in Easter 1739 and was awarded his habilitation in September of that same year on the basis of a disputation on mathematics. After Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s departure for a position in Frankfurt an der Oder in early 1740 (shortly before Wolff ’s return to Halle), Meier took over his lectures, eventually becoming extraordinary professor of philosophy in 1746 (on Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten’s recommendation), and then ordinary professor in 1748. Meier acquired an excellent reputation through his numerous and varied publications as well as through his lectures which were consistently well-attended, with one notable exception. In 1754, during a royal visit to Halle, Meier was summoned to an audience with Frederick II during which the king personally ordered him to use Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding as a textbook for a collegium. In spite of his doubts about the book’s serviceability for the classroom, Meier complied with the order and thus taught the Essay for the first time in a German university, but only offered the course once on account of low enrollments. Meier was also heavily involved in the university, being elected twice to pro-rector (and in his first term in this office he was taken hostage for three days by occupying Austrian forces during the Seven Years War), and he taught and published actively until illness forced him to retire from lecturing in 1776. He died in Giebichenstein, near Halle, on June 21, 1777. Meier’s philosophical works span a wide range of topics. He published textbooks in logic, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, influential books on hermeneutics, the Christian religion, and natural right, as well as numerous shorter treatises and essays on topics of more popular interest. Meier’s views were influenced by Wolff but also and especially by his teachers and benefactors—the Baumgartens—with a number of

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his texts providing detailed expositions of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s thought in particular. Even as part of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, however, Meier avoids falling into dogmatism and frequently adopts unorthodox positions relative to that school. This tendency is nowhere more evident than in his Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death of 1746. In this text, Meier disputes the validity of any attempted demonstration of the soul’s survival after death and its retention of its higher intellectual powers. Meier takes issue with the distinctively modern assumption that the soul’s immortality follows directly from its simplicity, but also challenges the more sophisticated proofs offered by Wolff and his disciples. While Meier thus denies that mathematical certainty of the soul’s immortality is possible, he nonetheless contends that we can hold this to be true with a high degree of moral certainty, largely on account of its indisputable importance (if not indispensability) for morality and religion. Meier’s position is thus clearly a departure from the orthodoxy of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school, yet that Meier takes this moral certainty to have an ultimately rational basis rather than being grounded wholly in Scripture, for instance, also serves to distinguish him from others, like Bayle, who have issued similar challenges to the power of reason to demonstrate the truths of faith. It will come as no surprise that Meier’s Thoughts was instantly controversial, leading some to suspect that a free-thinking agenda lay behind his rejection of any demonstrative certainty of immortality. His character became the subject of investigation by the Obercuratorium for Prussian universities, and it is likely that Meier would have been subject to censorship, or worse, had it not been for a highly placed friend who intervened with the king on Meier’s behalf. Meier published a further text, the Defense of his Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death (1748) in which he responds directly to a number of his critics, and even formulated a new argument for the soul’s immortality in his Proof that the Human Soul lives Eternally (1751), though even in the opinion of many of his contemporaries Meier’s own later proof was not immune to the sorts of criticisms found in his original Thoughts. The following selections are translated from the second edition of Meier’s Thoughts (of 1749), which edition does not differ materially from the first. In the cases of references to Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (first edition 1697; second edition 1702), I have supplied the corresponding volume and page number in The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle, 5 vols., translated by P. Desmaizeaux (2nd edition, London: Knapton et al., 1734; reprint, New York: Garland, 1984). For Meier’s occasional references to Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (first edition, Halle, 1739), I have supplied the section number of that text, and the reader can consult the recent English translation of that text listed in the bibliography below. All notes are my own.

Biographical Sources, Other Editions, and Selected English-Language Secondary Literature Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials, edited and translated by C. Fugate and J. Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

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Dyck, Corey W., “Introductory Essay,” in C. Dyck, ed., Georg Friedrich Meier, Über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele in Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke, Abt. III, Bd. 155.1 (Hildesheim: Olms, 2018), pp. 5–56. Dyck, Corey W., “Meier and Kant on Belief in the Immortality of the Soul,” in C. Dyck and F. Wunderlich, eds., Kant and his German Contemporaries (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017), pp. 76–93. Lange, Samuel Gotthold, Leben Georg Friedrich Meiers (Halle, 1778). Makkreel, Rudolf A. “The Confluence of Aesthetics and Hermeneutics in Baumgarten, Meier, and Kant,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 54.1 (1996), pp. 65–75. Meier, Georg Friedrich, Beweis daß die menschliche Seele ewig lebt (Halle: Hemmerde, 1751). Meier, Georg Friedrich, Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, translated by A. Bunch (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). Meier, Georg Friedrich, Gedancken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode (Halle, 1746; 2nd ed. 1749). Meier, Georg Friedrich, Vertheidigung seiner Gedancken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode (Halle, 1748). Pozzo, Ricardo, “Meier, Georg Friedrich (1718-1777),” in H. Klemme and M. Kuehn, eds., The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 506–11. Pozzo, Ricardo, “Prejudices and Horizons: G. F. Meier’s Vernunftlehre and its Relation to Kant,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 43.2 (2005), pp. 185–202. Tomasoni, Francesco, “Mendelssohn’s Concept of the Human Soul in Comparison with those of Meier and Kant,” in Reinier Munk, ed., Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), pp. 131–57.

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Thoughts on the State of the Soul after Death First Section: Preliminary Considerations § Anyone fortunate enough to be acquainted with the human being in a more precise way than is typical knows that exceedingly great harm is done in the domain of truth through the strong and imperious influence of the inclinations of the human will upon our pretended convictions. We embrace a claim with our full approval because it is agreeable to us. When our frame of mind, our temperament, our inclinations and passions cast their votes in favour of an opinion, then it has already won the majority, and the understanding is regarded as no more significant than a single person present at a council meeting writing their individual “yes” or “no” on a blank ballot. One believes what one wishes, and proceeds from belief to complete conviction through an unthinking leap. As soon as a claim rouses our power of desire it becomes probable to us, we cease doubting its truth because we are too full of love for ourselves to disturb our enjoyment, and at that moment nothing is lacking for us to take ourselves for utterly convinced of it without further reflection. We are blind enough not to notice the missteps of our understanding, and everyone constructs his own doctrinal edifice which, as is easy to see, he holds for the only true one. Each does as he pleases, at the expense of all the others who contradict him, and does not stray from his own mental preoccupations. In this way, everyone takes themselves to be happy in their own error, and the teachings erected by each are similar to those buildings fabricated by an eccentric mind according to his own fantasy and without a thought being given to its stability and longevity before anything else as should happen in such matters. All that I have said thus far admits of ready application to the opinion of the soul’s immortality and generally concerning the state of the soul after the death of the human being. These topics belong among those matters which reason can say extremely little about, or even nothing at all, with certainty; yet at the same time the vast majority speak as confidently of these things as if they had already been dead once. [ . . . ] § I was brought in particular to the decision to write these pages by the attempts of our contemporary philosophers on this topic. As great an admirer of the most recent philosophy as I might be, just as little do I approve of the lust for demonstration on the part of some of our now-living philosophers. It almost seems to me as if some of them had forgotten the limits of human reason completely. They weave together one proof after another and believe that it is unfitting for a philosopher to admit their ignorance and uncertainty in some instances. They do not consider that, in a hundred thousand cases, it would be much more useful to investigate what we do not know than to bring about numbness and delirium in others through a bombardment of metaphysical principles, as if something had been proven with mathematical certainty when a scarcely measurable degree of probability of the same has been attained. Anyone who is not a complete stranger to the history of now-living philosophers will know that most of these are preoccupied with the thought that

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one could prove the immortality of the soul through reason with complete certainty, and there is an indescribable variety of opinions concocted in our day concerning the state of the soul after death that are regarded by their author as the demonstrated truth. One should almost come to think that these men did not understand what complete conviction requires. Yet, because such a judgment might seem too unkind, I will say only that a little hastiness and inattentiveness is to blame for this mistake. There are certain truths that we take up with our mother’s milk. Our upbringing, our religion, our accepted body of teaching all reinforce these, and the continuous approval bestowed upon these truths through our entire lives becomes habitual for us. Accordingly, the thought of doubting these truths does not occur to us even once. As soon as someone thinks up a proof for them that is only probable in some respects, we do not even expend the effort of examining it because we infer according to the prejudice that an inference with a true conclusion that has never been subject to doubt by us must be valid. Among the countless examples, the infinitely many proofs of God’s existence demonstrate the correctness of this observation of mine. Even the most miserable proofs of this truth are accepted without hesitation because one takes it for a sin to doubt a proof with a conclusion so worthy of veneration. What a contrary way of proceeding! One should evaluate the proof without the conclusion and derive the truth of the latter from the former, yet one does exactly the opposite: one evaluates the proof according to the conclusion and if we should find ourselves convinced of it for other sorts of reasons, then we are so superstitiously and they shame us for doubting their proof. In these pages I will proceed in a completely different manner, and one can consider my project as a critique of the rational proofs of the soul’s immortality and of the various opinions of the state of the soul in and after death. § I do not know whether all of my readers recognize the innocence of my project. Should these pages have that fate, which out of fatherly love I would not wish for them, of falling into the hands of certain theologians who make a virtue of their blind, overblown religious zeal and take any pious thought for rationally grounded, then I have no doubt that they will heave a sigh over me. If I lived in such times as those of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers who honored sound reason, then I would not have to be worried that someone might take any offence from these pages. At that time, one could freely express one’s opinion on the immortality of the soul without suffering persecution because of it. Since then, however, the matter has taken on a completely different appearance. One has tied the truth that the soul is immortal so closely with the Christian religion (a connection which is not blameworthy in itself) that those who claim that nothing certain can be said on the basis of reason concerning the immortality of the soul are taken for free thinkers and mockers of religion. I am so repulsed by such mockery that it would sicken me if I should even fall under the probable suspicion of it and, without being boastful, I believe myself to possess sufficient understanding not to be a free thinker. In this first section, I will entertain only such considerations as will prove serviceable in commending the purity and innocence of my way of proceeding to all reasonable and non-partisan readers. [ . . . ]

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§ Before everything else, I would like to set down my confession of faith concerning the state of the soul after death, and to present in order those claims that are in no way subject to consideration in these pages and against which I will not raise the least doubt. 1) I believe, with the utmost certainty of faith, by means of the infinitely many testimonies of Holy Scripture, which with a humble reverence I regard as the pronouncements of the living God, that the soul is immortal, and that not only a resurrection of the dead is to come but also that the eternal blessedness and damnation of humanity is imminent. Yes, everything in the Holy Scripture regarding the state of the soul in and after death which can be proven with a hermeneutical certainty remains highly valued and I will not dispute it in any respect in this text. I would have to be an enemy to myself in the highest degree to contradict Holy Scripture. I expect the light that will lead me to my supreme happiness to come from no other source than that kindled in us by the word of God, and as a Christian I have never yet had any doubt about the soul’s immortality. I will thus not treat my subject matter as a Christian but rather will consider it in the character of a mere philosopher. [ . . . ] 2) I take it as an established fact that not only can the soul’s immortality only be proven to be very probable, but that it can also be proven with moral certainty by means of reason. I also hold this to be so on the basis of the many passages in Holy Scripture in which the state of the soul in and after death is revealed to us. In this case, reason agrees so precisely with revelation that it supplements these passages with as many and as strong reasons as are necessary to obligate any rational person to accept the immortality of the soul as a truth and to make use of it as a motive for his conduct. I will not therefore dispose entirely of all the proofs I am about to find fault with, as many of them can boast that they elevate their conclusion to the highest degree of probability. 3) I take it to be an indubitable fact that reason does not supply us with a single probable ground for the death of the soul. What’s more, reason cannot come up with a single ground as to why we should take what Scripture reveals to us of the state of the soul after death to be impossible. I hereby challenge all free thinkers and all those who mock religion to use their collected powers to marshal but a single probable ground in favor of the contrary. What else could issue from such pitiable minds but mockeries and frivolous jests, having only the semblance of artful wit to recommend them? [ . . . ] The truth of the soul’s immortality does not contradict reason, and Nicolas Perrot von Ablancourt goes too far when he says that he believes contrary to reason that the soul is immortal.¹ The soul’s immortality is not contrary to reason but rather only its certainty is such that it exceeds reason’s powers. The distinction between things above reason and things contrary to it is so well-grounded and familiar these days that those who dispense with it only betray the dullness of their own understanding in their inability or unwillingness to comprehend it. 4) I esteem highly the efforts of those who strive to prove irrefutably the immortality of the soul. Though they do not achieve their aim, their intention in seeking to prove such a noble, important, and sublime truth is ¹ Nicolas Perrot d’Ablancourt (1606–64), a French man of letters and Catholic convert. For his views on immortality, see note “L” to Bayle’s article “Perrot” (in Dictionary Historical and Critical, vol. 4, pp. 591–2).

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nonetheless praiseworthy. It is always a praiseworthy endeavor when one seeks to support revealed truth by means of reason, and I think the opinion of Pomponazzi, who believed that it was an insult to faith to try and prove the immortality of soul through reason, is absurd.² Having made this declaration, no reasonable reader shall grow indignant if I should present my opinions frankly in the following since they will in no way be contrary to what has been asserted in this paragraph. § Having just set out what in this treatise is in no way subject to consideration, I now want to give some indication of its proper subject matter. I will endeavor to demonstrate three things. The first consists in showing that we humans cannot prove the immortality of the soul with any mathematical certainty on the basis of reason; or, that the same cannot be demonstrated when one takes these terms in their strictest signification. I am not at all contesting immortality itself and its truth, but rather I am only assailing the claim of its certainty through reason. [ . . . ] My opinion on the immortality of the soul is, thus, far removed from that of the eminent Bayle. Bayle belongs among those duplicists³ who believe that reason and Scripture contradict one another, and that one can raise irresolvable doubts by means of reason concerning the soul’s immortality. He knows of no other remedy for this than that one must leave the battlefield in these rational disputes and take shelter under the canons of faith. By contrast, when it comes to the immortality of the soul, I take it that reason and Scripture are never so much as contrary to one another. I claim only that one cannot irrefutably demonstrate the soul’s immortality through reason. Left to its own devices, reason cannot, in my estimation, incite any doubt concerning the immortality of the soul and its truth but can, at least as far as I can see given the current state of my knowledge, very well raise irrefutable doubts regarding the perfect certainty of this truth that is so worthy of being accepted. § Secondly, in this treatise I will endeavor to demonstrate that we do not yet have an irrefutable proof through reason of the soul’s immortality, or that at this point no one has yet demonstrated this truth. To set this claim in the appropriate light, it will be necessary to evaluate the familiar proofs of the immortality of the soul. I will therefore appraise the best proofs of this truth that have been crafted by philosophers and which are widely taken for demonstrations, and show their inadequacy. [ . . . ]

² Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) was an Italian philosopher working within the broadly Aristotelian tradition, though his treatise De immortalitate animae (1516) challenged the claim that Aristotle’s views on the soul were consistent with maintaining its immortality, and concluded that the soul’s immortality is an article of faith and not demonstrable. For a discussion of Pomponazzi’s views on the topic that Meier likely has in mind, see notes “F,” “G,” and “H,” to Bayle’s article “Pomponatius” (in Dictionary Historical and Critical, vol. 4, pp. 717–20). ³ The duplicists were followers of the controversial Lutheran theologian Daniel Hoffmann (1538–1611) who maintained the distinction and even opposition between revealed and rational truths; see Hoffmann’s Pro duplici veritate Lutheri (Magdeburg, 1600) and note “C” to Bayle’s entry “Hoffmann” (in Dictionary Historical and Critical, vol. 3, p. 479).

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§ Third, as concerns the state of the soul in and after death, I will of course contend that one knows nothing of this with complete certainty by means of reason. Since such a state presupposes the immortality of the soul, how would one be able to determine anything about this state with irrefutable certainty when it rests on what seems to me to be such unstable and insecure ground? Yet, under the condition of the presupposition of the soul’s immortality, I will show that some things can be known of the state of the soul in and after death with a complete but merely hypothetical certainty, though a number of other things remain very uncertain. This will occasion a variety of further investigations that, I believe, no one else has previously conducted. [ . . . ] § If I did not have reason to be concerned that this treatise will be taken as dangerous by some, then I would not have need of explaining my intentions in this work in such detail. Since I know, however, that there are many who tend to judge a treatise after an initial glance, I will take pains to make perfectly clear what use I expect of this treatise and on what account I have undertaken to compose it. What I count as its primary use is the determination of the limits of human reason and the elevation of the value of Holy Scripture in the eyes of the non-partisan lover of truth. If we could demonstrate through reason everything contained in the direct revelation of God, then the necessity and value of Scripture would be utterly groundless, or at the very least it would rest on very weak supports. One of the most prominent distinguishing features of this direct revelation is that it reveals such truths to us that we either cannot know at all through reason or can know only uncertainly and deficiently. The immortality of the soul is one of the most important and principal grounds of all virtue and religion. If I now prove that reason only affords us an uncertain and deficient knowledge of this support for the whole of morality, then not only will everyone acknowledge the priority of Scripture to reason but they will also give thanks to God that it so appealed to his love of humanity to inspire us through a direct revelation. No one should mistake my thoughts in this matter for those of the frivolous Bayle, that amiable doubter who roguishly passed off his attacks on Scripture as attempts to elevate it in worth. He incited reason to rebel against revelation and made out as if the value of the latter were elevated when, like an imperious woman seeking to satisfy her own obstinacy, faith commands her maidservant reason to be silent when she raises well-founded objections against her. By contrast I will show that as concerns the immortality of the soul, Scripture supplements the deficiency of reason, advances beyond where reason stops, and provides a needed light for us where reason leaves us in a pernicious darkness. Moreover, reason not only brings much in the way of harm along with it when one pushes it beyond its boundaries but also causes many errors. Reason thereupon involves itself in business foreign to it and sets out on a course that is not suited to its nature and powers. Is it not then inevitable for reason to stumble and fall? The duty of every reasonable philosopher demands that he pushes reason as far as possible but also that he acknowledges its boundaries. The happiness of humanity requires not only the knowledge of the perfections that we possess but also of those we lack. A certain

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humility is thereby cultivated among philosophers and their lust for demonstration is checked, and this is the benefit I hope to attain through this treatise. [ . . . ] § The second use which I hope to fulfill in these pages consists in giving others the occasion to think up more acute proofs of the soul’s immortality than the ones that have thus far appeared in the learned world. Perhaps a keen mind will be fortunate enough to discover a proof against which all these doubts are not able to achieve anything. One says correctly that the realm of truth reaps more benefits when some truths are contested in a modest and reasonable way than when a universal peace reigns among the learned. During times of peace, the mind grows content and careless, and because there is no fear of adversaries one does not give a thought to the fortification of truth. As soon, however, as solid objections are raised, this stirs the attention of many of the learned who strain to their utmost to counter them sufficiently. In this way the weaker sides of the fortification are reinforced, and we make discoveries that otherwise would have remained hidden from our eyes as we consider the ways we might defend ourselves. I am of the opinion that it would be much more beneficial if every reasonable and unassuming friend of virtue were at liberty to engage in rigorous doubt concerning the most important truths. If we had not had a Bayle, then we would also not have had a Leibniz. A single solid objection against a truth is hundreds of times more beneficial than printing its proof in twenty different versions. I hope that my objections against the certainty of the soul’s immortality will be rigorous, weighty, and reasonable, and perhaps I will thereby provide someone with the opportunity of saving this certainty from my doubts, and I should welcome this refutation of my thoughts as I would be eager to see for myself that I could attain complete conviction regarding my future state through reason. § The third thing I expect of this treatise is to render certain important objections on the part of free thinkers and those who mock religion completely unserviceable to their cause. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is one of the most significant supports, if not the only one, of religion and of the entirety of ethics. The enemies of religion consistently launch their first attacks on this front, and in doing so they conduct themselves very cleverly and with considerable foresight as far as their partisans are concerned since here they cannot fail to come up with weighty objections. This is very effective against the defender of religion, an upright individual who is for the most part so honest and trusting of the justness of his cause that he even offers a vigorous defense of the weakest areas. This puts some small triumphs into the hands of the enemy, and because they are not used to engaging in the heart of the battle, they are content with this little victory, and take themselves to have conquered all religion. Yet, the certainty of the soul’s immortality through reason is but a weak and untenable outpost of religion. Sometimes one is better off abandoning something as a strategic capitulation instead of being turned out from it forcefully and bewailing its loss. If one thus surrenders this piece of land to the enemies of religion, then one forces them to come immediately to the main issue, and there one can be certain that if they dare to engage then they will lose the day entirely.

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As I will demonstrate our uncertainty of the immortality of the soul through reason in these pages, those who mock religion will realize not only that they have won nothing at all when they lay siege to it since one can dispute its certainty without belonging to their unholy mob; but in addition, the defender of religion is made wary of taking on the defense of the certainty of the soul’s immortality by means of reason and thereby placing the cause itself in greater danger. For the successful defense of such an important truth, one must grant to the adversaries at the outset everything that does not admit of a decisive vindication. § There are some who are of the unusual opinion that uncovering the weakness of the proof of the immortality of the soul would be dangerous for religion and decent morals. They believe that it would be better for one to leave others to the false opinion that reason could yield complete conviction as one might mislead them through doubts and objections to this truth itself. I cannot say how fantastic this concern seems to me. It would appear that such people have extremely little trust in religion inasmuch as they desire that one should let it rest on such weak supports as the certainty of the soul’s immortality through reason. One would have to have a rather low estimation of religion to believe that it could not stand on its own two feet but must instead seek such supports as could easily be overturned but for the favor and generosity that is shown to it. In fact, religion stands to benefit more than it has cause to fear by the demonstration of the uncertainty of the immortality of the soul (cf. §8 and §10), and this remark prompts me to make some further observations which will make clear that my investigation can in no way be designated as dangerous. § It must of course be admitted that the immortality of the soul contains a noble and important motivation for virtue and religion. Were the soul not immortal we would have fewer and weaker inducements to be pious and virtuous. That this is undeniably so is clear from our experience that the most honest and virtuous people have at all times been among the defenders of this great truth. [ . . . ] If one has the hope of an eternal blessedness and considers that we will approach the supreme being in eternity, albeit without fully reaching Him, then this thought awakens a righteously burning desire to make a beginning of this progress to blessedness already in this life. The fear of eternal wretchedness engenders a complete abhorrence of all sins, however many temporal benefits and delights they might otherwise promise. And the virtuous who set all their hopes on God only in this life are the most miserable of all. Yet, since it is not necessary that our motives be mathematically certain, one can reject our certainty of the immortality of the soul through reason without weakening or dampening the zeal for virtue and piety. For this it suffices that one knows that the soul is immortal with a moral certainty, where this certainty is noticeably strengthened throughout by faith. Even if everyone knew that the immortality of the soul could not be proven with perfect certainty then there is still no cause for concern that there would be fewer virtuous and pious people.

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I would go further and claim that even if the soul were not immortal, or if its immortality were denied, there would still be motives sufficient for virtue and decent morals. These would no doubt be fewer in number, and weaker as concerns their strength, than they are if the immortality of the soul is set alongside them, but they suffice nonetheless. Virtue is something so splendid in itself that one has to love it even if one does not look to its rewards after death. Already in this life, virtue yields such excellent things, and for this it is sufficiently commended as its reward follows immediately on its heels. Vice, by contrast, is in itself something so abhorrent that one would have to despise it even if there was no Hell. Indeed, because punishments are already bound up with the practice of vice in this life, we would still have sufficient motives for despising it even if we were entirely annihilated in death. One might say to this that the recognition of these motives is proper only to those with a philosophical cast of mind, and nature only grants such a mind to a select few. I concede what is here objected, yet I hold to my opinion. It must be borne in mind that I allow that a person who is no philosopher and who denies the immortality of the soul does not have to be as virtuous and morally upright as one who claims the opposite. I only contend that even if everyone were to believe that everything was over with in death, they would nonetheless not altogether be thieves, murderers, adulterers, and swindlers, having lost all sentiment for virtue. There are two grounds for this opinion. First, it is only the fewest among us who live in accordance with their theories. The most frequent motives for our actions are human drives, inclinations, passions, and sentiments, and these are common to everyone, no matter what theory concerning God and the afterlife they might endorse. One finds adulterers, thieves, murderers, and swindlers among both Christians and Mohammedeans. The most zealous of the orthodox engage in fornication and in this are not distinguished from the heretical. [ . . . ] I therefore draw the conclusion that there is no cause to be concerned about a complete deterioration of morals even if everyone were to deny the immortality of the soul—such a theorem would no doubt diminish virtue, but would not destroy it completely. Second, I contend that no vice can be sustained once it has become wholly universal. If everyone engaged in the same sort of vice, they would immediately grow weary of it and give it up. [ . . . ] If, therefore, people believed that they would no longer exist after death, they would nonetheless continue to perform many virtuous acts. Anyone can see that here I am only concerned with external vices, and that I am claiming nothing more than that the opinion that the soul is mortal does not destroy all decent morals, all external acts of honorableness and honesty, and that consequently this error is not as terrible as some defenders of the soul’s immortality imagine it to be. § I will go further still and assert that the opinion of the mortality of the soul does not even lead one to reject religion completely. It must of course be admitted that those who deny the immortality of the soul are for the most part deniers of God and people without religion. Yet, these individuals do not have the proper understanding of their own opinion, and they infer more from it than naturally follows. Anyone familiar

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with metaphysics knows that one can demonstrate the existence of God without taking into consideration the immortality of the soul. As soon as one believes in God one must also admit providence and religion; consequently, we would still be bound to worship God even though our souls were mortal. Just as we have motives sufficient to be good citizens even if we know that death uproots us entirely from civil society, so we would also have sufficient reason to be good citizens in the city of God, even if we were not immortal. It is true that we would lose one great and important motive for the worship of our Creator thereby, but does it follow from this that we would not retain any incentive to fear God? I have now, in my estimation, given sufficient proof that even the denial of the immortality of the soul does not pose the danger that many imagine it to. How blameless, then, must my intentions be as it never once occurs to me to deny the immortality of the soul?

Second Section: On the Concept of the Immortality of the Soul § Many philosophers, and still more theologians, who have attempted to prove the immortality of the soul through reason have, if one should believe them, found it very easy to do. These well-intentioned souls have therefore not been capable of being sufficiently astonished by the blindness and stubborn, malicious intent of those who raise doubts against our rational certainty of this important truth and who find difficulties where, in their own opinion, none at all are to be found. This way of proceeding does not surprise me in the least, because it is so very common. There have always been enough of the learned who take themselves to have found a paved road where others perceive nothing but cliffs and precipices. Such people are already captivated by the most important truths as a result of some prejudice, but either lack the requisite cleverness or do not take sufficient time to scrutinize a theorem in its widest scope. They frame for themselves a concept of the matter that only amounts to a superficial and approximate representation. It is no wonder, then, that in accordance with this concept they purport to demonstrate a truth that other more profound and rigorous minds, who have considered the same matter from the ground up, do not know at all how to prove. Just this has taken place with the immortality of the soul, where only a very few are knowledgeable of the parts of this concept. Most philosophers among the ancients, and perhaps the majority of the erudite today, think of immortality only in terms of the incorruptibility of the soul. Yet, because it is mere child’s play to show that the soul is incorruptible, provided that its simplicity is presupposed, the demonstration of the soul’s immortality is dispensed with in an instant. Descartes put forth just such a proof, inferring that because the soul thinks, it must therefore be simple, and since it cannot perish, it is immortal.⁴ From the following considerations, it will become undeniably clear that this proof proves absolutely nothing, and that someone who has demonstrated the incorruptibility of the soul has proven nothing regarding its immortality. [ . . . ] ⁴ This is evidently a reference to Descartes’ discussion in the “Synopsis” of the Meditations on First Philosophy; cf. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II, edited and translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), pp. 9–10.

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      §

Contemporary philosophers have penetrated more deeply into the concept of the immortality of the soul and, by means of the light they have cast upon it, the efforts of the ancients either to defend it or take issue with it have been rendered fruitless. These philosophers have discovered that while the incorruptibility of the soul is without doubt a preliminary aspect of immortality, or can be regarded as a condition that must be presupposed for it, yet the notion of immortality also consists in completely different parts. One can say that more recent philosophers take immortality in a twofold sense, that is, either with a broader or a narrower scope. The first set such wide boundaries to immortality that it also takes into account those things that can be more appropriately reckoned to the consideration of the state of the soul after death. Among the first within this group to make this claim in his published writings is the late Herr Thümmig who distinguished four components of the notion of the immortality of the soul: its incorruptibility, its eternal duration after the death of the human being, the life of the soul in this state, and the recollection of its previous state.⁵ There is nothing considerable to find fault with in this conception of immortality [ . . . ]. § If the human soul is considered on its own, without regarding it as an inhabitant and governor of the body with which it is united in this life, then one can divide its life into two parts: sensual (or animal) and spiritual life. The soul’s life consists in the continuation of its nature,⁶ and its nature consists in its faculties and powers, and these are either lower or higher; consequently, the sensual life of the soul consists in the continuation of all its sensual powers. The soul lives in the sensual sense as long as even a single, sensible representation, whether obscure or confused, is to be found in it, or as long as it generates even a single sensual appetite or aversion. The continuation of the higher powers of the soul constitutes its spiritual life, and this endures for as long as there is even only a single distinct representation, rational appetite or aversion in the soul. Anyone who is familiar with the nature of the human soul knows that it would be impossible for it to have a spiritual life without a sensual one. By contrast, the latter can take place without the first as already in this life we sometimes find ourselves in a state where the higher powers of the soul are completely inactive, such as in sleep (which I will consider further below). One should here be mindful that I take spiritual life in the philosophical sense without concerning myself with the theological signification of that word. On the other hand, there is clearly also a twofold sense to the death of the human soul: sensual and spiritual. The first robs the soul of all of its lower powers, after which it does not retain even a single sensual representation, appetite or aversion any more. The latter, however, is only the ⁵ This is a reference to Wolff ’s student, Ludwig Philipp Thümmig (1697–1728), who offers an analysis of the notion of immortality in his dissertation Demonstratio immortalitatis animae ex intima eius natura deducta (published in his Meletemata varii et rarioris argumenti [Braunschwig and Leipzig, 1727], pp. 150–82); cf. especially §VI. ⁶ On this, Meier is following Baumgarten; cf. Metaphysica, §780.

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termination of the higher powers of the soul, and is the end of all distinct and rational representations, appetites and aversions. If the soul dies sensually, it also dies spiritually, and as a result everything is at an end for it. Yet, I will prove below that it is possible for the soul to die spiritually while still retaining its sensual life. § I am now in a position to offer a precise articulation of the concept of the immortality of the soul. Just as we call a being mortal if it is possible for it to die, so that being must be called immortal if it is not possible for it to die. Mortality is the possibility of death, immortality its impossibility. Since only impossible things cannot become actual, those who accept the soul’s immortality make a twofold claim: that the soul cannot die, and that it will actually continue to live after the death of the human being. On the other hand, something is not actual just because it is possible, and so someone could affirm the mortality of the soul without it once occurring to him to accept that the soul will actually die at some point. Someone, therefore, who refutes the immortality of the soul does not for that reason prove that it will die, and to accuse him of believing thus is to treat him unjustly. Yet I confess that most of those who deny the soul’s immortality have such an impoverished conception that they affirm the mortality and the death of the soul at the same time. All possibility and impossibility is either absolute or hypothetical; consequently, there are two sorts of mortality as well as of immortality. A being is mortal absolutely or in itself if it is possible for that being, considered in itself, to die; and if it is also possible for that being to die when it is considered in conjunction with other things external to it, then it is hypothetically mortal. The human body is mortal in both respects as there are a thousand fatal combinations of things that might conspire to rob it of life. [ . . . ] It is just the same with immortality. If a thing is supposed to be absolutely immortal, then considered in itself it would have to be contradictory that it should die, and this sort of immortality must be attributed to the supreme being. A being is hypothetically immortal if it is only impossible that it should die considered in a certain connection with other things. That it is impossible that the human body should lose its life as the result of the vigorous onslaught of a gnat or a flea is an example of hypothetical immortality. When we put all of the foregoing together, we can derive the following propositions from it: a thing can be absolutely mortal without being hypothetically mortal in every respect, but not the converse. That which is hypothetically mortal can also die absolutely. That which is absolutely immortal cannot die at all and, consequently, it is hypothetically immortal considered in all respects; yet, a being can be hypothetically immortal without possessing an absolute immortality. I deliberately refrain for the moment from applying these propositions to the soul since this can be done more appropriately in the following. [ . . . ] § Those who advocate and support that great truth of the soul’s immortality must not be satisfied with proving that the soul will continue to live after its departure from the stage of the present time. Rather, they must seek principally to present the nature of this future state in such a way that it can be a powerful motivation for virtue and religion, that it might provide a reason for consolation amidst all of the adversities of

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this restless life, and raise our hopes so high as to open a prospect for us onto the blessed fields of eternity. It would, in truth, hardly be worth the effort if one only wanted quite generally to make the discovery that our souls would still be living creatures after death. Could it not transpire, notwithstanding this dusty truism, that the soul might fall into an eternal sleep or lead a merely animal life after death? What a wretched state would await one in such cases! Those, then, who would demonstrate the truth of the immortality of the soul on the basis of reason such that it is a ground of virtue and religion, have to prove the following claims: 1) that the soul continues after the death of the human being, or that its actuality continues; 2) that it maintains its life in this continuation of its existence. In both of these cases, the sense in which immortality can be ascribed to the soul must be inquired into. These two points make up the narrowest conception of the immortality of the soul, and both could be true even if the soul were supposed to retain none but obscure representations in eternity, or if it were cast into eternal darkness. 3) That the soul will at least intermittently be conscious of itself and other things in its future life. Without this consciousness, the soul would not be susceptible to punishments and rewards since these cease to be such when one undergoes them without being conscious. 4) That the soul will ultimately at least at some point, even if only sporadically, come to make use of its higher powers of understanding and freedom. Without these elements, the soul has nothing to look forward to but an eternal spiritual death, which in fact would render it a mere animal soul. 5) That the soul will also recall in its future life that it is the very same soul that it had been in this life, and that it also recalls what it had done in this life. Modern philosophers call this element the personality of the soul after death,⁷ and if one accepts that the proper rewards and punishments for our present actions are only to be expected after death, then this personality is a necessary element of the state of the soul after death. [ . . . ]

Third Section: On the Life of the Soul after Death § In this main section, I intend to consider in detail the most important content of this treatise. I have resolved to demonstrate that, as far as concerns the immortality of the soul, reason leaves us with complete uncertainty, or if this seems too harsh, that reason does not provide us with complete conviction of the immortality of the soul. Now since everything which one might affirm of the soul’s immortality rests on the claim that the soul continues to live after death, it is incontrovertibly true that we cannot know anything with certainty of the state of the soul by means of reason if this future life of the soul is an uncertain matter, and it is this last point that I will now seek to prove. [ . . . ] § I presume that the soul is a simple, incorporeal being. The proofs for this truth are so convincing and irrefutable that it is only on account of contrarian whims, their own uncertainties, along with the chaos of their confused, crude, and obscure concepts, ⁷ See Wolff ’s German Metaphysics, §926, above, Chapter 5, p. 131.

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that materialists could set themselves in opposition to them. I am well aware that, when the immortality of the soul is to be contested, the simple constitution of the soul is typically the first thing quarreled about. Yet, I will show shortly that answering the question of whether the soul is simple or material could be completely indifferent as far as its consequences for its immortality are concerned. One can be a materialist without casting the soul’s life after death into doubt, indeed, without being necessitated to do so by materialism.⁸ [ . . . ] § Since the proof of the life of the soul after the death of the human being depends solely and wholly upon the demonstration that the soul will not lose its existence when its current dwelling is destroyed, one must investigate how and in what way it could transpire that its existence could be lost. I take it to be an established fact of metaphysics that a simple being can meet its end in no other way than through annihilation. Composite beings can pass away through the separation of their parts from one another. Yet the soul, as a simple being, does not consist of parts that can be separated from one another. If, therefore, it should cease to be completely, it would have to sink back into its original nothingness. It would have to be transformed into a merely possible thing and nothing at all must remain of it after its destruction. Whoever wants to prove through reason that the soul will live on after death must show on the basis of natural truths that the soul will not be annihilated in death. One accordingly sees that those who do not prove anything beyond the incorruptibility of the soul have in fact proven nothing, as one can maintain this incorruptibility of the soul all the while calling its immortality into question if one but allows that it is annihilated in death. § The soul is a contingent, finite thing.⁹ Its existence is accordingly such that it must be placed in the class of changeable things. The opposite of that which is contingent and can be altered is possible in itself. Consequently, the opposite of the existence of the soul is possible in itself, where this encompasses the destruction of the soul. Absolutely considered, then, it is possible that the soul is destroyed in death. The soul cannot perish other than through annihilation (§27). It is, therefore, possible in itself that the soul is annihilated, and if it is annihilated its existence will cease and it will lose its life along with its nature, which considerable loss is the death of the soul. As a result, the death of the soul is possible in itself, and the soul is mortal considered in and for itself. Through the foregoing considerations, we can see that it is therefore a crude and dangerous error to take the soul for something that is absolutely immortal. In that case, the life the soul possesses would have to be such that its contrary would be but a figment of the imagination; consequently, the opposite of its existence would be absolutely impossible and its existence would be necessary in and for itself. Is this not passing the soul off for a necessary and independent being? Would the soul not

⁸ See below, §38.

⁹ See Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §743.

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     

thereby be deified as a matter of fact and truth? One must therefore say, if one wants to remain true to sound metaphysics, that the soul is a mortal creature considered in itself, and one must not allow oneself to be led too far astray on account of a zeal for the good and lay claim to the immortality of the soul in a sense that contradicts sound reason in the highest degree. [ . . . ] § If one wants to decide according to rational principles whether and to what extent the soul is mortal or immortal, or whether it will or will not die, the single thing that must first be determined is what causes can annihilate the soul, and to what extent they can do so (§28). The annihilation of the soul is an alteration that has to be effected by means of a substance’s power; consequently, the soul is either annihilated by its own power, by other finite powers and substances, or by God, the infinite power. [ . . . ] § [It is evident that the soul cannot annihilate itself nor can it be annihilated by other finite powers and substances; accordingly, it only] remains to investigate whether God could annihilate the soul and hence also end its life. That this is to be answered in the affirmative, as it must be, is uncommonly easy to prove. Through His power, which has no limits at all, God can effect anything that is possible in itself. Now, the death of the soul is something that is possible (§28); consequently the soul can die at the hands of God. Since the soul cannot lose its life other than through the complete loss of its actuality, it follows that God can reduce the soul to nothing. Alternatively, one might reason thus: the annihilation of the soul belongs in the class of possible things (§28); for God nothing is impossible; therefore, God can annihilate the soul and thereby extinguish its life. The soul, therefore, is not only a mortal creature, capable of being destroyed, but is also a merely contingent thing in the eyes of God. It must accordingly be claimed that the soul is also hypothetically mortal (§22). It would be too hasty for one to try and infer from this hypothetical mortality to the actual, imminent death of the soul. There are millions of things that are hypothetically possible which do not on that account come to be as a result and there are infinitely many things that God can effect which He has nonetheless determined to remain merely possible eternally. § Taking everything together which has been proven thus far, it is in fact mathematically certain that the soul can die although by no other hand than that of almighty God. And if all of the powers of the world were roused to action against a single soul, they would be far too feeble to rob the soul of its life. Only the supreme being possesses the keys to death as a divine prerogative; God can take and make life. The omnipotence of God is determined by His will and what the latter has decided the former makes actual. If God had decided that the soul should die, then it would certainly do so; if He had decided the opposite however, then the soul could expect, with supreme confidence, an eternal duration and an unceasing life after death. [ . . . ]

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§ I have now articulated everything in such a way that anyone can be made aware of the principal points of the theorem that the soul is immortal. If God has decided that the soul should retain its existence, then it is unfailingly certain that it will remain actual in all eternity and, consequently, it will live eternally. If, however, He has decided to annihilate the soul, then nothing will help and it must die, one can say what one will. Who or what can set themselves against, change, or stay the decree of God? Whoever wants to demonstrate through reason that the soul will not die must demonstrate that God has decided in favor of its eternal and unceasing life, and whoever wants to deny the immortality of the soul has to demonstrate, or at least prove with moral certainty, that God has decided upon the death of the soul. I will show that neither of these can be proven with certainty by means of reason. This is because a divine decree in favor of the eternal life or death of the soul is a decree that concerns some contingent future event, and I will show that reason is never capable of providing us with conviction regarding such decrees in advance of their realization. [ . . . ] § In accordance with the foregoing considerations, we can now see that the question of whether the future life of the soul can be demonstrated by means of reason amounts merely to the question of whether a complete and irrefutable conviction is even attainable with respect to a decree of God concerning a single, future event in this world in advance of its occurrence? To this I answer no, without exception or restriction. There is only a single decree in God, which extends over all parts of the best world, and comprehends no more and no less than all those objects which belong to that world. Whoever wants to demonstrate that God has decided for or against something must demonstrate philosophically that the object of this decree is possible in the best world and belongs to it, or that it is impossible in the best world. If someone wanted, therefore, to demonstrate through reason that we can anticipate the future life of the soul, he would have to demonstrate that the eternal life of the soul belongs to the best world and that its death is impossible in that world; yet this cannot be accomplished. We can select one of only two ways of producing conviction through reason concerning whether something belongs to the best world or not, or what amounts to the same thing, whether something has been decided upon by God or not. 1) The way of experience. Here we can always be infallibly certain that what is actual belongs to the best world and therefore that God has not chosen for it to occur, and that what does not take place is impossible in the best world and God has not chosen for it to occur. Yet, this way can only be selected when we are dealing with past and present things, and accordingly it is unserviceable when it comes to the issue of the soul’s immortality. Once we have died, then of course we can attain a complete conviction through reason of our continued duration and life after the body’s death, but it is whether we can be certain of this beforehand that we are keen to know. Therefore, those who would demonstrate the soul’s immortality through reason must seek to prove 2) a priori that the eternal life of the soul belongs to the best world and that the soul’s death in that world is impossible. Yet, our reason is wholly inadequate for this. Through reason, we cannot obtain complete conviction, with mathematical

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     

certainty, that a single future contingent event does or does not belong to the best world in advance of its occurrence. There are so many rules of perfection in the best world, and so many exceptions to these rules, that the things that appear to us to be the best and most probable nevertheless do not come to be. We would have to be capable of grasping the entire composition of the best world if we wanted to say with certainty that something was possible or impossible in it in advance of its occurrence. Yet do not thousands upon thousands of things take place in the best, that is, the present world which we consider to be exceedingly bad and which would certainly not come to be if the plan for the best world had been arranged in accordance with our own self-regarding preference? Accordingly, in my judgment, it is a futile labor for a philosopher to undertake a demonstration of the immortality of the soul, indeed, I take this to be something that exceeds the limits of human powers. We can prove nothing further a priori than that everything will later be brought to actuality without which this world would not be the best. However, this is only a general proposition. When it comes to the question of whether this or that individual thing, or whether this or that event is included under the subject of this proposition, we can only place a hand over our mouth and patiently await such a time as when we experience that one or the other is the case. [ . . . ] § I have taken the assumption that the soul is a simple thing as the foundation of the entire investigation thus far, and accordingly I have shown that while one cannot demonstrate the soul’s future life one also cannot cite a single probable ground on the basis of which one could suppose that death awaited it. One could, therefore, object that the materialists would likely regard such grounds with suspicion, so that the death of the soul might permit of proof. Even though I am confident that the ultimate aim of this treatise does not require me to examine all of the opinions that are only incidentally connected with the question of the soul’s immortality, I nonetheless take myself to be obligated to show that one can be a materialist without casting aside the immortality of the soul, and that there is, therefore, no need to refute the materialist before one would prove that the soul will not die. No doubt the vast majority believe that this refutation is necessary, yet I do not take the materialist for such a fearsome and dangerous enemy, though many might appear to be so. I will thus have to presume, though it is impossible for this condition to obtain, that thinking matter is possible, since otherwise one could easily retort that a materialist rejects the soul as such, and consequently also its immortality, because he regards it as a chimerical being that we cannot even conceive of at all. But the materialist takes a material soul to be possible and one has to examine him in accordance with his own opinions. He thus takes the soul for a substance that either is or is not distinguished from the human body. In the latter case, he assumes that thoughts are nothing else but movements of the body, for instance, in the brain. Such materialists do not however reject the immortality of the soul just because these movements have to cease as soon as the body dies. If the materialist accepts the first, then he either takes the soul for such a crude form of matter that it is destroyed by the same causes that bring about the decline of the body; or for a material atom, such as Democritus; or for the most rarefied matter that is to be found in the realm of nature. The first overturns the

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immortality of the soul; the second, however, does not since such an atom is indivisible according to the opinion of those who take it for a possible thing. And just as little does the third overthrow the soul’s immortality since no finite power can separate and dissolve such rarefied matter. Both of the latter two could accordingly be just as certain of the immortality of the soul as those who take the soul for a simple being. One might, then, construct the sharpest proof of the soul’s immortality that can be constructed without making express mention in a single premise of the simple nature of the soul. From this investigation I want to draw two conclusions. 1) That it would be far too hasty for a materialist to believe that in order to cast aside the immortality of the soul he need only be a materialist. Not only is the materialist unable to provide a single probable reason why the soul must be taken to be material, but if he also takes the soul for an accident of the body, and for such a crude sort of matter as can be destroyed by natural causes, then he necessarily begs the question with respect to this opinion of his. [ . . . ] 2) That it is not necessary to prove the simple nature of the soul if one wants to demonstrate its immortality. At all times one should prove no more than is possible and one would take on needless labor if one were to construct a detailed proof which can be passed over without detriment to the principal matter at hand.

Fourth Section: On the Physical State of the Soul after Death § Having articulated my thoughts on our certainty of the immortality of the soul through reason in the previous section, I can now begin with the treatment of the state of the soul after death. This state can be considered in a twofold manner: insofar as this state is grounded in a more direct way in the soul’s freedom, and insofar as freedom has no direct influence on the determination of this state. I call the first the moral state of the soul after death, and the latter the physical¹⁰ state, which includes all of the internal contingent qualities and relations of the soul after death which have no basis in freedom but which are brought about in it by means of a natural necessity. This will constitute the content of this section, though at the outset I will endeavor to set the appropriate limits for myself rather than introducing everything that might be contended or conjectured. Since in this treatise I have set for myself the aim of circumscribing the appropriate boundaries for our conjectures regarding the soul’s state after death, it would be irresponsible of me to seek to add my own inventions to the poetic fictions of the philosophers, the collection of which deserves to form part of a philosophical novel. I will, therefore, only take into consideration the most useful and most eminent aspects of the future physical state of the soul, particularly when philosophers are of varying opinions regarding them. However, everything that I will present in this part of my treatise remains uncertain because it presupposes the soul’s eternal duration regarding which reason cannot supply us with conviction. I will, nonetheless, be able to prove some things with certainty, under the condition that the ¹⁰ As Meier makes clear, he intends “physical” rather in the sense of natural (and so as opposed to moral) than as something akin to “corporeal.” This should be borne in mind for subsequent uses of this term through the remainder of the Fourth Section.

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soul is immortal, where some others will only be capable of a degree of probability and still others will remain doubtful. I would ask my reader, therefore, to keep in mind that though it might appear that I am demonstrating something of the physical condition of the soul after death, this is always subject to the uncertain condition that the soul is immortal. [ . . . ] § [ . . . ] Now I come to a consideration with respect to which the doctrine of the immortality of the soul supports virtue and religion. This consideration relates to the questions of whether the soul will lead a spiritual or merely an animal life after death, and whether it will be cast into an eternal sleep or not. Whoever wants to provide a rigorous answer to these questions must investigate before anything else whether or not it is possible for the soul to be deprived of its reason in accordance with its nature? This might be expressed more clearly in another way. Leibniz divides all finite monads into three classes. To the first are numbered the elements of bodies which only represent the world entirely obscurely; to the second are numbered sensible souls which represent the world obscurely and clearly though confusedly; to the third belong finite spirits, and consequently human souls as well, which also represent part of the world distinctly. This accordingly gives rise to the question of whether any transition from one class to another is possible, or whether it could occur that a monad from the first class could make its way into the second class, and even elevate itself to the third? And conversely, whether it could come to pass that a monad should be downgraded and plummet from the third class to the first? For the most part, philosophers tend to answer this with an unqualified no, if they do not otherwise pass it over in complete silence. Yet, I must confess, with your permission, that I am unable to find the reasons for their denial persuasive. One might say that any given monad is limited to its class—without question it can always become more perfect, because in each class there are many levels of perfection—but any departure from the order of things to which it belongs is eternally ruled out. Why? Because a thing cannot renounce the sort of thing it is, and because it is restricted by the essential limitations of its power of representation. The first reason is undeniably false, as it is a daily occurrence that a thing transgresses its boundaries, abandoning its previous type and changing into a new type of thing. An uneducated person becomes learned, and a vicious one virtuous [ . . . ]. If one wanted to say that the essential distinguishing features of some type of thing nonetheless remain unchangeable, then I would not deny this; yet, I have to wonder how a discerning philosopher could appeal to this proposition in order to prove that no monad can be transplanted from one class to another. Since when he says that it belongs to the essential distinguishing features of sensible souls that they have no faculty for distinctly representing the world, then he says nothing more than that distinct representations conflict with their essence, or that it is impossible in itself that it would be capable of receiving distinct representations. What a peculiar sort of proof! What is supposed to be proved is that a merely sensible soul cannot become a spirit, that is, that it cannot receive distinct representations, and one cites as a ground for this that it is impossible that it would be able to receive such representations. Is this not proving a proposition on the basis of that proposition itself, and presupposing what is supposed to be

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proved? The inference is just as wretched when it appeals to the essential limitations of monads, since what manner of speaking is that when one says that a monad of the first or second class cannot become a spirit on account of its essential limitations? These limitations consist in the fact that a being does not possess realities in the highest degree. If, therefore, a representative power is limited in such a way that it cannot bring forth distinct representations, then that is just to say that it is too weak and small of a power to do so. Consequently, what is meant by the manner of speaking referred to is nothing more than that a monad of the first or second classes cannot become a spirit because it cannot. Is this not a petitio principii? I do not deny at all that there are essential and immutable limitations. I am only asserting that in the course of my present investigation one cannot appeal to them but must demonstrate that these obtain on the basis of further grounds which, as far as I know, no one has yet to do. I say, therefore, that no one has yet proven that from an element of bodies it is impossible for a sensible soul to come to be, nor for a spirit to come to be from the latter, and vice versa. § I have come across a consideration through which it can be demonstrated with the highest degree of probability, if not with complete certainty, that any monad among the elements of bodies could raise itself up to such a point that it has clear representations and, ultimately, even become a spirit. I will express my own opinion without passing it off as irrefutable and at any time I would be glad to learn of a better one. Let us suppose a representation A. Its parts or marks shall be called B and C which will be supposed to be sufficient for distinguishing A from all other things, or for representing A clearly. As long as a monad represents A without at the same time representing B and C as united in it, then the representation A is obscure in that monad. The obscurity of a representation thus stems from the fact that the monad is not strong enough to direct its attention towards all the marks of a representations at the same time. As soon, however, as it directs its attention to the degree requisite for representing B and C at the same time as united in it, then at that moment the representation A becomes clear. Consequently, the monad’s faculty of becoming conscious of a representation, even if only confusedly, is nothing other than a composite faculty whose components represent parts of the representation obscurely. If the representation A becomes distinct, then B and C must be clear. Suppose the marks of B to be D and E, and the marks of C to be F and G. A becomes distinct when D and E are represented as united in it, and F and G are represented in the same way, and on top of this B and C are represented at the same time as parts of A. As soon, therefore, as a monad directs its attention in one instant to D E F G, and yet distinguishes B and C from one another, then it represents A distinctly. As a result, the understanding, reason, or the higher power of representation (which terms, for the sake of brevity, I will for now take as synonyms), is a composite faculty whose components represent the parts of the representation partially obscurely and partially confusedly. The understanding, therefore, in a finite monad, is a composite, sensible faculty. Since an entirely pure understanding is beyond the capacity of a finite spirit, all of its distinct concepts are composed from obscure and confused concepts. Accordingly, I maintain that the understanding of a given finite spirit consists in a composite,

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     

sensible faculty of cognizing things. From everything that I have said up to this point, it thus follows that if a power of representation that has only ever effected wholly obscure representations should be permitted to grow slightly then it would receive more parts of the representation and consequently it would bring about clear representations; and if it goes still further in its growth it will become sufficient for distinct representation. We are able to confirm this by means of our own experience. In the womb, and when we are born, we have merely obscure representations, or at least Descartes could not demonstrate that we have already in the womb engaged in all sorts of profound inquiries. Over the years, our power of representation grows and we thereby also attain clear representations, until finally, with the increase in the strength of our power, these same representation become distinct. If, therefore, it is possible in itself for the power of representation of any monad to grow as far as the essential limitations of finitude permit, then a monad can advance from the first to the second class, and ultimately even be elevated into the third. Now I do not see why one would want to cast this possibility into doubt. In the previous paragraphs, the worthlessness of the opposing reasons has been shown, and in the course of this I have demonstrated that the concepts which ground this possibility do not contradict one another. This suffices for the proof of a possibility, and at least in my opinion it is also probable in the highest degree. Even so, just as I have shown that it is possible for a finite power of representation to increase, so also can the possibility of its decrease be demonstrated. The degree that a finite power attains is never absolutely necessary, and as a result it can be lost and the power can become smaller. Consequently, a spirit can become a merely sensible soul, and this can be transformed into a sleeping monad. Experience confirms this possibility. Many of our distinct concepts become obscured on account of forgetfulness, and sometimes we are so sound asleep that we are entirely unconscious. Whatever is possible in itself with respect to a single distinct concept must be capable of holding for all of our distinct concepts. Accordingly, it is possible, considered in itself, for a sleeping monad, or one that has only ever had obscure representations, to awake and become conscious of its representations and even ultimately for it to have entirely distinct and rational representations, and vice versa. Nothing more is needed for this than that its power grows or decreases. § Let us proceed to applying the foregoing to our soul after death. The human soul is a spirit for as long as it is united with the body which we possess in this life. It belongs, accordingly, in the highest class of finite monads. Consequently, it is possible, considered in itself, that after death it loses that understanding in virtue of which it is a spirit. It could transpire that its power of representation is diminished such that it no longer retains any clear representations at all, loses all consciousness, and is buried in an eternal darkness. Yet, there are many philosophers who believe that it is an uncommonly easy thing to be able to prove that the soul necessarily retains its understanding and spirituality after death. [ . . . ] If, therefore, one wants to decide the question once and for all concerning whether the soul will remain a spirit after death, then it will depend upon whether the soul becomes physically more or less perfect after death than it was in this life. If the soul becomes more perfect, then its

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representative power will increase, and since this power has already attained the strength required for distinct representations in this life, in this case the soul will become even more capable of and disposed to such representations after death. If however the soul becomes less perfect, then its power of representation will decrease; and therefore it is possible for it to become so weak that it no longer suffices to represent something clearly. I admit that I do not know of a single probable ground from which it could be inferred that the soul becomes physically less perfect after death than it was in this life. Yet, I am also not aware of a ground from which the opposite could be proved irrefutably. The increase in the physical perfection of the soul after death is a future contingent matter which stems from God’s decree. Now because we cannot attain complete conviction regarding this divine decree through reason in advance, it remains uncertain as far as mere reason is concerned whether we might expect this augmentation of our perfections after death or not. § On the basis of the foregoing, a variety of questions that have engaged a blameless curiosity on the part of philosophers can now be settled. Foremost among these is whether the soul will sink into an eternal sleep after death, or whether there will be an end to its slumber in the next world? If it is the first, then all of its future representations will be obscure, and it will be brought low to the humble level of the sleeping monads. If one presumes the latter, however, then one must maintain that after death the soul will not find itself in an uninterrupted state of obscure representations. Which side is reason moved by? It must in any case be admitted that this eternal sleep of the soul is a notion that contains nothing absurd considered in itself. I have demonstrated this (§57), and moreover one must allow that any light on the part of the soul, or all of the clarity of its representations, is and remains at all times a contingent matter. The opposite of something that is contingent is possible in itself. Consequently, there is nothing contradictory in the presumption that an eternal obscurity and darkness will set upon the entire soul for eternity, nor does it conflict absolutely with the essence of the soul. One might add that this eternal slumber is even hypothetically possible. Since the consciousness of the soul depends on God’s constant co-operation, the soul sinks into an eternal sleep as soon as God ceases to afford this assistance to it. This co-operation on God’s part is not a necessary action and so it is possible for it to cease, thereby bringing about the eternal sleep of the soul. In addition, it is possible that the soul is placed into the same connection, and could even be combined with the very same body, after death as it had before birth. Now since this body was inadequate for clear representations, in this respect the eternal slumber of the soul is also hypothetically possible. Yet, because it is also possible that the soul should become physically more perfect, that God should never withdraw his assistance in respect to clear representations, and that the soul receives a body that makes it much better suited for clear representations than the present one, so the eternal sleep of the soul is hypothetically impossible in light of these grounds. What position, then, should one accept? I do not know myself with certainty. I have no reason to accept the eternal sleep of the soul, and I cannot demonstrate the opposed position. I do not know with certainty whether the soul becomes more perfect or not after death (§57), and yet deciding the matter depends upon this. I cannot

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     

demonstrate in advance that God has decided to give the soul a helping hand and grant it clear representations and a consciousness of itself for all eternity. I also do not know with certainty whether the soul’s body after death will stand in the way of eternal slumber. In short, mere reason cannot offer a complete refutation of the eternal sleep of the soul. [ . . . ] § If one accepts that the soul does not fall into an eternal sleep after death, but rather attains to a degree of clarity in its representations, then it might be wondered whether the soul will also lead a spiritual life after death? Will the soul thus attain to the use of its higher powers, that is, its understanding, reason, and freedom? Or will it always have only confused and sensible representations and in this way find itself in a degraded state of the sort that must be ascribed to the souls of irrational animals. I will decide this question in the same way as that question was decided which was investigated in §60. The use of the understanding and freedom is something contingent in the soul and, therefore, it can be removed from it eternally, a point that is also provable on the basis of §57. The employment of these faculties depends upon the cooperation of God, and since this can stop, it is likewise hypothetically possible that the soul will never attain to their use again after death. Moreover, who knows whether the soul’s future body and the further connection in which it will come to stand, permits this use? If it does, and if God’s co-operation in this use continues, then, the loss of this capacity is hypothetically impossible. Should one therefore presume that this use will actually take place or not? This I do not know with certainty through the light of reason. If the soul becomes physically more perfect after death, which is uncertain (§57), or if the soul remains a spirit, which is also uncertain (§55), then surely it will require its higher powers. The soul has already gathered together a decent stock of distinct perceptions in this life, which will bring forth without exception the sort of consequences in the soul as to make the understanding active after death.¹¹ Yet, that this is so cannot be demonstrated by means of reason. Such an employment of the higher powers is undeniable on the basis of Scripture, and the full concept of the immortality of the soul requires it necessarily. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that reason leaves us in doubt concerning the most important aspects of the soul’s state after death. The psychopannichists¹² thus maintain that the soul loses all use of its higher powers after death, and in this they cannot be refuted through reason in such a way that one thereby removes every possible avenue of escape. § With respect to the physical state of the soul after death, there is still one important question, namely, whether the soul will distinctly recall its previous state after death? Whether, that is, the soul will know that it is the very same person that performed this or that action in this life. Or, whether the soul will come to be so unacquainted ¹¹ On this point, see Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §§517, 782. ¹² That is, those who hold that after the death of the body, the soul is in a state resembling sleep, either eternally or merely temporarily.

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with itself that an eternal forgetfulness is cast over its previous state and all of its actions in this world. A number of heathen philosophers have maintained the latter. They were of the opinion that there was a river of forgetfulness in the next world from which the departed souls would have to drink so that from this draught they might wash away the representations of their previous state entirely. [ . . . ] Now, the ancient defenders of this river of forgetfulness might either have believed, along with Virgil, that some people had to play their role on earth multiple times so that it would thus be necessary that they no longer knew that they had already been here before; or, they might have it in mind that by means of this draught, the soul would have to forget all outstanding evil so that no painful recollection might disturb it in its blessed state; in any case, the question is whether such forgetfulness amounts to a complete and utter contradiction with reason? Since any clear recollection is a contingent alteration of the soul, it is not impossible considered in itself that the soul would wholly forget its previous state after death. Indeed, if the soul should sink into an eternal sleep, or lose for eternity the use of its higher powers, or if God withdrew his co-operation in the recollection of the soul then, because all of these conditions are possible, that the soul should wholly forget everything that has passed before is a fate that can possibly befall the soul. One might add to this that there are examples enough of people coming to have a bad memory, either through disease or through advanced age, so that even the memory of the most erudite person could have all that it has learned expunged from it. Do not such examples teach in an incontrovertible way that a complete forgetfulness of one’s previous state is not contrary to the nature of the soul? If, however, God has decreed that the soul should retain an effective memory for eternity, if the soul becomes physically more perfect after death, and if the soul attains to the use of its higher powers, then it is naturally necessary that it recalls its previous state. This is because, as soon as we receive a representation that is similar to a previous one, then the earlier representation is illuminated by means of the later. Now since there is no denying that it must also be accepted, among the previously cited conditions, that the soul will still receive representations after death that are similar to the present ones, because otherwise there would have to be a gap in the development of its concepts, so accepting this, the soul’s nature would have to be entirely negated, and the law of imagination be revoked by God, were the soul supposed to completely forget itself.¹³ It is, then, at least much more natural that after death the soul would recall its previous life, than that it should be supposed to forget it utterly, and what is natural is at all times more probable than what is not so natural. Yet, the conditions referred to above cannot be demonstrated to hold through reason, and thus it remains uncertain whether the soul will retain its personality after death, that is, whether it will recall distinctly that it is the same being that was aware of itself as this or that person in this world. § When everything that I have treated here is taken together and compared, one becomes aware that all of the most important aspects of the state of the soul after ¹³ This is Thümmig’s argument for the conservation of personality; see Demonstratio, §XXIIX.

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death that one has to assume for the sake of morality and religion rest upon the decree of God. Anyone, therefore, who does not demonstrate through reason that God has decreed that the soul should become physically more perfect after death, that it should be conscious of itself, attain to the use of its higher powers, and recall its previous state, cannot gain any measure of philosophical conviction concerning these matters. Now, however, such a decree on God’s part cannot be proven in advance by means of reason. Accordingly, it is not only a gift of God’s grace if our souls eternally endure, but it is also such a gift if we retain clear and distinct perceptions, even of our previous state.

Fifth Section: On the Moral State of the Soul after Death § [ . . . ] By the “moral” state of the soul, I understand that state which depends in a more proximate way upon its freedom. I class within this state the free actions and habits of the soul, along with all of the proximate consequences that flow from them. All rewards and punishments, along with all perfections and imperfections connected with them, have to be considered as parts of this state. § One can divide all goods and everything evil into two classes. To the first belong all those things which do not depend upon the freedom of the soul in a more proximate way but rather are effected by its nature as physically necessary or, alternatively, by the confluence of those external causes which we typically refer to with the name of fortune. These goods are called physical goods just as bad things of this sort are called physical evils. Good fortune belongs to the former, and misfortune to the latter. That perfection which comes to be from physical goods constitutes the well-being of the soul and of the human being, and that imperfection of which physical evils are the cause can be called misery. The other class comprises the moral goods and evils, which are derived more proximately from the freedom of the soul, and to these one must reckon morally good actions and virtues, as well as sins and vices. The perfection which arises from the former, is blessedness, and the imperfection that is produced by the latter is moral corruption or accursedness. The sum of well-being and blessedness is called happiness, just as wretchedness consists in misery and moral corruption. I do not believe that anyone will find any reason to take issue with these notions. They are grounded on a precise division of good and evil, exhausting the entire scope of the concept under discussion here, and one must always regard this as one of the most important proofs of the truth of definitions. I have taken these concepts, and much in the following pages, from Prof. Baumgarten’s Metaphysics.¹⁴ § As long as a finite substance exists, it retains its power and unceasingly produces effects. Through a given action, an accident is produced in the finite substance by means of which the sum-total of its realities is either increased or diminished. If it is ¹⁴ See in particular Metaphysica, §§787–8.

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the former, then it becomes more perfect; if however the latter takes places then it becomes more imperfect. As long as a finite substance exists in this world it remains within the universal network; consequently, all finite substances unceasingly produce effects in it and thereby increase or diminish its realities, thus making the substance either more or less perfect. In short, as long as a finite substance exists, it either grows in well-being or in misery and, indeed, in such a way that one or the other can be increased at one point and decreased again at another. If, therefore, the soul continues to exist after death, it is necessarily subject to this fate common to all finite substances. Since I have shown in the previous section that each of these cases are uncertain from the perspective of reason, I will not dwell on this further. Anyone can see without a reminder from me that it also remains uncertain as a result of this whether the soul attains happiness or wretchedness after death (§71). It remains, therefore, only to consider the happiness and wretchedness of the soul after death. If the soul is more blessed after death than in this life, then I will say that it is in Heaven; if however it is less blessed, then we will suppose it to be in Hell. As a philosopher, I cannot specify these concepts in any other way because I would not suppose that to be in them which must first be proven, and otherwise I prefer not to consider how these words are understood by theologians. § Wherever blessedness and its contrary are found, wherever a Heaven and a Hell are supposed to exist, there good actions and virtues, sins and vices must also be met with. As a result, these states cannot be attributed to any substance that does not actually perform free actions. If, therefore, the soul is supposed to be damned or blessed after death, it must make use of its freedom after death; consequently, it must attain to the use of its understanding and lead a spiritual life after death. The posit of Heaven and Hell thus presupposes that the soul endures after death, that it does not sleep eternally, and that it does not live in a merely sensible way but instead that it will become conscious of itself, think rationally, and perform free actions. All of this is uncertain on the basis of reason, according to the third and fourth section of this treatise. It follows that, in general, it is uncertain on the basis of reason whether a Heaven or a Hell awaits humanity. Left to itself, reason does not recognize any contradiction in a state of the soul after death in which it is neither blessed nor damned; but neither does reason see any ground that requires it to accept any such middle-state of the soul. Nonetheless, we will make the supposition that there is a Heaven and Hell—what then can reason uncover regarding these two states? This much is irrefutably certain: if the soul attains to the use of its higher powers after death, then it will either be more or less blessed than it was in this world, and subject to this condition, it is consequently necessary that it comes to be in either Heaven or Hell (§72). [ . . . ] § Reason cannot say with certainty whether those souls that are transported after death to the happy expanses of Heaven will remain there eternally. For if the blessed should stay in Heaven eternally, they must remain virtuous eternally and ceaselessly do more good rather than sin. Yet, even if the blessed should be cleansed of all sins and their

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effects immediately after death, it nonetheless remains just as possible for them to begin to sin anew. Consequently, their habit of acting well can gradually be degraded, while the habit of sinning gradually develops until the latter gains the upper hand so that their blessedness is interrupted. Using Scripture, one can show that those who have once entered Heaven are empowered in their goodness through the grace of God in such a way that it is hypothetically impossible that they should start to sin again. Yet, such a confirmation in goodness is a supernatural work of God’s grace that cannot be anticipated by means of reason. § Everything which I have thus far remarked of the soul’s blessedness after death also permits of application, with the appropriate changes, to Hell. Scripture provides us with a terrifying and fearsome concept of this state, one which reason cannot in fact reject as an absurdity, but which reason nonetheless cannot arrive at either when it merely assumes those principles for its proofs that properly belong to it. When one considers the matter merely as a philosopher, one cannot say with certainty whether the damned will still not perform any morally good actions. One can only suppose that those people who were more vicious than virtuous up until the hour of their death, will be impressed with a degree of moral imperfection through the normal course of nature that is greater than the simultaneous degree of perfection. Consequently, immediately after death, they will find themselves in Hell (§72). Yet, since no one in this world is so vicious as to be supposed not to have performed a morally good action, so it is also impossible for reason to conceive how all moral goodness in the soul is supposed to be extirpated through separating the soul from our current body since that same goodness is grounded in the soul’s nature. It is accordingly probable for reason that even the damned in Hell will still perform some morally good actions. Since, however, things that are probable can be false, one cannot rely in the least upon this. Whoever would decide this matter with certainty must investigate whether it can be proved on the basis of Scripture that the damned in Hell can do nothing else but sin and that all of their free actions will be thoroughly sinful. § That Hell is an eternal punishment cannot be demonstrated at all through reason. If there should not be any exit from Hell, then no improvement or conversion could take place in it, and the grace of God would be eternally denied to the damned. Neither of these permits of proof with certainty through reason. A capacity of the soul may be increased to whatever degree one likes, it remains contingent throughout and can always decrease again to the point of vanishing. The damned might, therefore, be as vicious as one likes, nonetheless, their viciousness remains a contingent and changeable capacity which can, accordingly, diminish. As soon as this occurs, the vicious person improves and leaves the state of the damned. If one wanted to say that the damned become hardened, or that all such improvement is hypothetically impossible, or even that all of the means and opportunities for conversion have been eternally taken from them, then this could all be the case but reason has no ground by which it might be supposed to know these truths. It is impossible for us to represent death, with certainty by means of mere reason, as a

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change that incurs an eternal hypothetical impossibility of conversion in the soul. And reason can know just as little that God has restricted his acts of grace merely to this temporal life. Scripture tells us, no doubt, that the merit of Christ is the sole means of protection from Hell, and that those who have not accepted this before death shall go eternally wanting for its fruits. Yet, reason knows nothing of such matters, and redemption from Hell appears possible to it. Accordingly, reason does not recognize the expanse between Heaven and Hell to be so fortified as to close off all passage from one to the other (§77). § Before I conclude this section, the remaining rational proofs for the immortality of the soul that have yet to be mentioned must be evaluated. In §35, I showed that those who want to demonstrate the immortality of the soul must prove a priori that God has decided in favor of the eternal life of the soul, and I have maintained the same thing concerning the most important elements of the soul’s state after death. Notwithstanding whether I have established in general (and if I am not mistaken, with good reason) that there is not a single case in which one can say with certainty and in advance what God has resolved, I will show here in particular that one cannot demonstrate in advance what God has decreed regarding the future life of the soul. Some among the learned believe the opposite and are of the opinion that one can infer the eternal life of the soul with certainty from God’s goodness, wisdom, and justice. In this, they take as their major premise something which I do not at all cast into doubt, namely, that God decides in favor of what agrees with His goodness, wisdom, and justice, and in favor of what is required by these divine attributes, and whatever He resolves upon follows with irresistible certainty. However, the minor premise, that the eternal life of the soul is something demanded by these attributes, is not a claim that can attain to complete certainty. I will endeavor to show that this is the case one attribute at a time. § When one wants to demonstrate that some occurrence in this world accords with the goodness of God, then it is not sufficient for it to be shown that it is somehow good in itself; rather, one has to be able to demonstrate that it belongs to the best world and that without it this world could not be the best. God’s goodness, the most perfect goodness of all, has the whole world, and its perfection considered in its entirety, as its object. A thing might be as good as one likes in itself, indeed, it might bring about as much perfection in the individual parts of the world as one likes, but still it will not accord with divine goodness until it is unavoidably required for the supreme perfection of the world. In retrospect, we human beings always know with certainty that everything that actually happens in the world, even if it is as evil as one wishes, is in accordance with the supreme goodness of God because such goodness often sacrifices the perfection of the part for that of the whole. Yet, no one can know in advance whether some occurrence accords with God’s goodness. Would one not then have to see through to the perfection of the entire world? Would one not need to realize that a certain occurrence fits into the entire network so precisely that not only does it fail to conflict with any single higher rule of perfection but, much more, that it is

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necessarily required by the same? Whoever among us that would boast of such an insight would have to be foolish and bold in the highest degree. I would ask such a one whether, if God would have consulted with him as He set to founding this world, would it in his opinion accord with supreme goodness to permit the fall of the devil and of man, or not? What would he have answered? Of course, he need not answer at all, yet, would he not have spoken up on behalf of the negative side if he were allowed to follow his own notions? Therefore, it is undeniable that an occurrence can be evil in itself and yet not contradict the goodness of God, and another can be very good, but be inconsistent with the principles of divine goodness. One might apply this consideration to the immortality of the soul. It is true that annihilation robs the soul of all of its actual perfections and makes it so imperfect that it cannot become more imperfect. The eternal sleep of the soul, and being robbed eternally of the use of its higher powers, are sources of greater imperfection in the soul. If, by contrast, the soul continues to exist, if it attains to the use of all of its higher powers in the next world, then it thereby becomes more perfect. If the soul were the only being that God had to care for, then I believe that one could infer its eternal life from the goodness of God with complete certainty. However, God has a number of things to care for through His goodness, and the universal sovereign of all things does not play favorites in His realm. Who knows whether the perfection of the whole world demands the soul’s annihilation at the hand of God? Who can demonstrate the opposite in advance through reason? And I maintain the same regarding the other elements of the state of the soul after death. What in addition to this do we want to say of the damned? One might say a thousand times that God imparts a number of perfections to the damned in the course of preserving them, and thus shows Himself good with respect to them, and yet I believe that anyone would rather be annihilated than damned. One would do me an injustice to believe that I had to prove that reason could uncover a ground as to why the human soul has to be annihilated for the sake of God’s goodness. I hold only that one cannot say anything certain in advance through reason concerning whether the annihilation of the soul, or the opposite, accords with God’s goodness. Even though the latter is probable, I cannot assert anything regarding either. Whoever wants to demonstrate something must show the impossibility of the opposite; accordingly, whoever wants to demonstrate the immortality of the soul must show that the annihilation of the soul and its spiritual death contradicts God’s goodness. If one cannot prove this, then the goodness of God does not yield a demonstration of the immortality of the soul. § From the wisdom of God much less can be inferred in advance by means of an irrefutable inference. We know that that which is best accords in every case with the wisdom of God. Yet, what is best? That which is possible and required in the best possible world, that which has obtained a place in the system of divine ends that is incomprehensible to all finite spirits. Who, however, can say in advance whether this or that individual occurrence finds itself written into the plan of this world? Are God’s ways not inscrutable? Do we not always have to wait until the end before we can say that something accords with the wisdom of God? It is impossible for us to be able to say with certainty in advance whether or not the annihilation of the soul

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conforms to God’s wisdom. Someone asserts that yes, it is contrary to His wisdom to first create something and afterwards to reduce it to nothing again. Yet, this is just what I would like to know. Perhaps human souls serve so few and such small purposes in the best world that, were they supposed to endure eternally, they would become superfluous parts of the world, a piece of furniture that no one can use any longer. The entire human race amounts to but a handful of God’s subjects, and who knows whether its complete extermination is not demanded by the highest laws of the city of God? I cannot support this by means of a single ground; yet, it also cannot be completely refuted a priori by reason. If one wants to hold that spirits are the nearest instruments for the glorification of God, that they are the final end of the best world, and that a spirit that lives eternally is a better instrument for God’s honor than a mortal spirit, then I would admit this insofar as one only considers a spirit on its own. However, from the perspective of the wisdom of God, a spirit is considered with respect to the entire city of God, and there in the vast network of God’s ends it could be that it is not better for this or that spirit to live eternally than for it to die once and for all. For is not a spirit without sin a better instrument for the glorification of God than a sinful one? But why then did God permit so many millions of spirits in this world to fall into sin? In a word, it is a piece of boldness on the part of reason to assert decisively that some event or other accords with the wisdom of God, or is contrary to it, before it even actually happens. In every case, we have to remain silent and await the outcome with complete abandonment to the divine will. From God’s wisdom we cannot make any conjecture regarding a single occurrence in this world with complete conviction, unless God Himself reveals His wise decision to us in advance. § Those who maintain that the immortality of the soul is certain on the basis of reason tend for the most part, and with enormous confidence, to appeal to God’s justice. They say that God must reward goodness and punish evil in a proportional way in virtue of the supreme perfection of His justice. Excellent! I am perfectly convinced that this is the case on the basis of the principles of sound philosophy. Yet, if one assumes that, as regards the human soul in this world, this office of divine justice is not completely carried out because the virtuous are unhappy and the vicious happy then I am of another opinion. Since reason can say nothing with certainty of the punishments and rewards that depend on God’s will beyond asserting their possibility, it is merely natural punishments and rewards that have to be considered here. These are natural effects of free actions, and because no effect can be greater or lesser than its whole cause, one must accept not only that any good or evil action immediately issues in natural consequences, but also that these are proportional to the actions themselves. Consequently, any given free action is, as it were, immediately rewarded and punished, and indeed in a manner proportioned to it, even though this does not always occur in a noticeable way. The unhappiness of the virtuous is either a punishment for their sins, or a true reward and merely an apparent evil, just as the happiness of the vicious is either a reward for their good actions or an apparent good but true evil. If, therefore, one merely looks to natural punishments and rewards, as that to which alone reason can direct its attention, then all the good and evil actions

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on the part of humans are already sufficiently rewarded and punished in this world. Can someone thus conjecture, in the hour of his own death, anything with certainty concerning God’s justice? Is he thus able to demonstrate by means of God’s justice that after death he must attain to such a state that God’s justice still needs to be exercised upon him? [ . . . ] If one instead consults the light of revelation on this score, then one must draw a completely different inference, as God has there proclaimed punishments and rewards that depend on His will which, for the sake of the world’s supreme perfection, are not all linked to the free actions of human beings in this life. Consequently, one can prove, from God’s revealed justice, that the soul is immortal, but reason is incapable of this. Accordingly, I have, as far as I am concerned, sufficiently demonstrated that mere reason cannot yield any conviction regarding the soul’s immortality, although it likewise cannot provide us with a single ground from which the probability of the annihilation and death of the soul can be inferred.

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Index action, activity 25, 85–8, 105–7, 123–4, 129–30, 139–40, 146–7, 214–15 free 117–18, 152, 198, 215, 221–3, 252–3 affect 47–8, 62, 64–5, 116 agreement between thoughts and things 28, 216 of soul and body 96–7, 118–19, 129–30 Alberti, Michael 46–7 Amo, Anton Wilhelm 11 animal 25, 30, 68, 70, 72, 131, 140, 152, 212–13, 250 annihilation 72–3, 83–4, 87, 104–5, 123 of the soul 87, 131, 241–2, 255–8 Aristotle 38 atheism 7–8, 78, 136–7, 144–5, 153–4, 194 attribute 103, 154, 159–61, 164–7, 171, 175–7, 185 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb 226–7, 238, 250, 252 Bayle, Pierre 7–10, 156, 227, 232–4 Bernhard, Johann Adam 48–9, 53 blessedness 21, 45, 231–2, 235, 252–4 blood 64–8, 75, 84–8, 90–1 body 110, 124–5, 127–8, 159–60 human 24, 41–2, 62–3, 65, 67, 70–1, 84, 86, 110, 119, 128–9, 131, 144, 239, 244–5 Bontekoe, Cornelius 67 Boyle, Robert 179–80 cause 6, 60, 66, 81, 101, 106, 121, 146–7, 161–2, 182–3, 210, 213–15, 218–20, 223–4 certainty mathematical 227, 229–30, 232, 243–4 moral 227, 231–2, 235, 243 change 103, 105, 125, 209–10 Christianity, Christian religion 60, 226–7, 230–2 Clarke, Samuel 6, 8, 101, 199, 201–2, 223–4 Clauberg, Johannes 2–3 cognition 24, 27, 112–13, 216 composite 103–4, 120, 123–5, 128, 132, 241 concept 108, 112, 161, 210, 212–13, 247–8 conscience 139, 205 consciousness 24, 65, 80–1, 99, 103, 108–9, 125–7, 131, 239–40, 248–50

contingency 108, 121–2, 147–9, 191–2, 213–14, 241–4 Cornaro Piscopa, Elena Lucrezia 49–50 Coschwitz, Georg Daniel 47–8 Craanen, Theodorus 57, 62–3, 67 Crusius, Christian August 3, 8–11, 137 death 9–10, 63, 86–7, 131 of the soul 9–10, 67–8, 72, 238–9 demonstration 29, 37–8, 99, 113–15, 210, 229–30 Descartes, René 3, 8, 38, 58, 63, 67, 130, 142, 161–3, 171, 173, 237 desire 85–8, 115 Didymus 49 dream 67, 107, 111 elements 72–3, 122–3, 173–4, 176–7, 181–2, 214, 239–40, 246–8 error 29, 39, 53, 164, 166–8, 170, 173, 175, 177–8, 184, 188, 217 Erxleben, Dorothea Christiane 3–4, 10 essence 26, 36, 45, 53, 101–3, 120, 127–9, 132–4, 138–40, 159–61, 164–5, 179–80, 212–13 experience 59, 99, 113–14, 125, 139, 205–6, 243–4 extension 124, 162–3, 173–4, 176–7, 179–80 as attribute of God 161, 175–7 faculty 106, 114, 214 faith 9, 59–60, 231–2 human (or belief ) 59 falsehood 27–30, 46 fatalism 164, 189–90, 194 fate 151, 204–5 Fedele, Cassandra 49 Francke, August Hermann 6–7, 15–16, 135–6 freedom 6–7, 117–18, 138–40, 147, 150, 152, 190, 205, 222, 245–6, 252–3 Gassendi, Pierre 4–5, 38, 57–8, 63–4, 69–71 Geulincx, Arnold 62 God definition of 60–1, 79, 133–4, 154, 160 likeness of 45, 49, 140, 144, 221–2 proof of the existence of 78, 132–3, 154 Gryphius, Christian 49, 95

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Halle, university of (Friedrichs-Universität) 1–2, 6–8, 11, 15–16, 41, 74–5, 226 happiness 44, 252; see also blessedness harmony see pre-established harmony Hell 71, 89–90, 252–5; see also punishment, eternal Heumann, Christoph August 49–51 Hobbes, Thomas 4, 9, 57–8, 62, 75 Hoffmann, Adolph Friedrich 197 Hoffmann, Daniel 232 Huet, Pierre Daniel 9, 59–60 idea 32, 34–5, 38, 63, 66, 138, 145, 159–60, 188–9 idealism 130, 146, 173 identity 209–10; see also similarity images 23–4, 26, 33–4, 45, 63, 65–6; see also God, likeness of imagination 27, 63–4, 110, 112, 177–8, 250–1 immortality 9–10, 57–8, 70–1, 131, 227, 237–40 intellect 34, 62–4, 85–6, 145, 174–5, 186, 213–14, 216–17; see also understanding Königsberg, university of (Albertus-Universität) 74–5 Lactantius 49 Lange, Joachim 6–9, 156–7, 197–8 Lau, Theodor Ludwig 5, 57, 156 law (of nature) 79–80, 129–30, 140–3 learnedness 3–4, 16, 18–23, 42, 44–5, 47–8 Le Clerc, Jean 5, 9, 57–9, 61–3, 69–70 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1–2, 4–6, 8–9, 15, 36, 95, 101, 106, 123–4, 130, 142, 144, 173, 201–2, 205–6, 210–12, 222–4, 234, 246–7 life 62–3, 65, 86–7, 145 spiritual 238–9 Locke, John 2–3, 9, 16, 59, 75, 127–8, 226 logic 2–3, 16–17, 216 Lucretius 72–3 Malebranche, Nicolas 2, 5, 38 materialism 7–8, 156, 240–1, 244–5 matter 84, 125, 127 memory 27, 51, 62–4, 111, 126, 250–1 metaphysics 61, 96–7 mind (human) 62–3, 65–7, 70–1, 188–9 miracle 89, 146, 191–2 mode 69–70, 162, 166–7, 177 monad 124, 246–8 More, Henry 177–8 motion 82–4, 86, 103, 124–5, 127, 129–30, 145 motive 116–18, 134, 139–40, 235–6 nature 61, 72–3, 144, 159–60, 178–80 necessity 102, 118, 121–2, 140–1, 149–52, 189, 203–4, 213–14

pantheism 5, 177 perception 63, 186 clear and distinct 27, 109–10, 112, 164–5, 172–3, 247–8 perfection 52, 108, 115, 123, 133, 177–8, 252 Perrot d’Ablancourt, Nicolas 231–2 person, personality 131, 140–2, 239–40, 250–1 philosophy 19–20, 60, 137 as beyond the talents of women 49–51 Pietism 6–8, 15–16, 135–7 pleasure 85, 115 pneumatics 61–2, 142–3, 153 Poiret, Pierre 9, 47–8, 156 Pomponazzi, Pietro 232 possible, possibility 99–100, 102, 147–8, 167, 214, 239 pre-established harmony 124, 130, 142, 220 prejudice 3–4, 20, 39–40, 42, 44, 53 principle of contradiction 99, 171, 201, 210, 216–17 of sufficient reason 8, 101, 107, 171, 201, 219–20, 224 or reason 217–18; see also reason, or ground probable, probability 29 proof 37; see also demonstration providence 146–7, 149–50 Pufendorf, Samuel 15, 57 punishment 71–3, 79–80, 89–90, 236, 239–40 eternal 72, 254–5 Raphson, Joseph 177–8 reason faculty of 16–17, 21, 25, 45–6, 59, 85, 114–15 or ground 101, 201, 211–12, 216, 218–19 reflection 34, 126 Reinbeck, Johann Gustav 202–3 Schmidt, Johann Lorenz 157 Schurman, Anna Maria von 3–4, 42 science 114–15 Scripture 19–20, 61–2, 78–9, 192, 231–4 sensation 3, 24, 110–11, 113, 128, 130, 138 similarity 100, 107, 209–10 simple, simplicity 78, 103–7, 122–4, 132, 173–4 of the soul 128, 131, 240–1, 244–5 Socinianism 4–5, 9, 57–9, 222 soul 63, 65–7, 84, 108, 128–9, 138; see also agreement, of soul and body; immortality; simplicity; union (of soul and body) space 103–4, 107, 120, 177–8 Spinoza, Benedict de 4–5, 7–9, 57–8, 75, 141, 152–3, 220 Spinozism 144, 153, 159–60, 171–3, 189–91, 194 spirit 61–2, 65, 125, 138, 247–9, 256–7 spontaneity 6, 68, 118, 152 Strimesius, Samuel 71–2

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 Sturm, Johann Christoph 179–80 substance 60–1, 69–70, 105–6, 161, 165, 167–8, 181, 183–6 theology 19–20 thing (finite) 100, 130–1, 162–3, 170–1 thinking, thought 23–4, 63, 65–6, 108, 127, 186–8, 216 Thomasius, Christian 1–4, 42, 44, 74–5, 135, 156, 197–8 Thomasius, Jakob 15 Thümmig, Ludwig Philipp 238 time 81, 104, 107, 120 Toland, John 5, 75 truth 3, 28–32, 107, 211, 216

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Tschirnhaus, Ehrenfried Walther von 2–3, 16, 156–7, 172–3 understanding 19, 25–6, 28, 33, 45–7, 112, 133, 138; see also intellect union (of soul and body) 119, 141–4 virtue 205, 235–6 Vossius, Gerardus 65 will 25, 48, 85, 116, 138; see also freedom Wolff, Christian 2, 5–8, 135–6, 201–3, 206–9, 211, 226 world 60, 81, 120–2, 128–9, 132–3, 153, 220